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For release on delivery
10 40 a.m EDT
October 16, 1989

Remarks by

Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
before the
Annual Convention
of the
American Bankers Association
Washington, D

C

October 16, 1989

I am very pleased to be here once again to address
members of the American Bankers Association.

Today, I want to

use the opportunity to discuss an issue that is central to banks
and that consumes considerable discussion at the Federal
Reserve.

The topic is a timeless one because it is so

fundamental—the need for adequate bank capital. I devoted some
attention to risk-based capital during my remarks to your
convention last year in Honolulu.

Today I do not wish to debate the details of which
specific ratios or standards are most appropriate to assess
capital adequacy.

Rather, I want to address the broader policy

issues raised by some institutions that the capital requirements
we have imposed will undermine the ability of U.S. banking
organizations to compete.

I recognize that many institutions

here today have made laudable progress to improve their capital
ratios and that most of the nation's 13,000 commercial banks
already exceed existing minimum capital standards.

However, it

is important to keep in mind that, in both relative and absolute
terms, banking is a highly leveraged industry.

Moreover,

despite the progress many of you have made in recent years to
improve your capital ratios, capital levels for the industry
remain at the low end of their broad historical range.

The question of current capital levels can be
addressed in two ways: first, by reviewing long term historical
trends in capital ratios and other elements of bank activity,
and second, by sharing the results of analyzing more recent data
comparing capital ratios and returns on equity (ROEs).

First,

however, I want to review the principal functions of capital and
stress its importance in maintaining a sound and resilient
banking system.

Role of bank capital
Capital serves, of course, as a cushion for absorbing
losses and protecting deposits and, as recent events have
reminded us, for protecting the deposit insurance fund.

In this

connection, it also helps to maintain confidence—both
domestically and increasingly internationally— in our banking
system.

Moreover, the presence of leverage restraints and the

effect of capital on pricing practices help to prevent excessive
or imprudent growth.

Most importantly, in our system capital

also represents a vested interest by private owners, who have
the incentives to assert control and limit the risk exposure of
their firms.

Our recent experience would seem to underscore that
last point, from the standpoint of public policy, of ensuring
that the owners who will profit from a depository institution's
success have an appropriate amount of their own funds at risk.

Indeed, the existence of private investors with a significant
ownership interest at risk is one critical element that
distinguishes our free market system from governmentally owned
or controlled banking systems.

While we all recognize the importance of capital, we
often disagree about how much capital is necessary to encourage
prudent behavior and to absorb unexpected losses.

Those

differences exist because of the different responsibilities and
perspectives we have.

I am sure we agree that the banking

industry should be both efficient and competitive, and that it
should be able to finance sufficient economic growth and
generally meet the banking needs of the nation.

It should also

operate safely, while taking reasonable risks and providing
adequate returns to investors.

It is with these last issues

that our views may begin to diverge.

Bank owners have

incentives to minimize their capital investments in order to
maximize their returns; supervisors, on the other hand, are
inclined to stress more capital in order to promote the
soundness of the banking system and reduce the risks to the
safety net.

It is often difficult to reconcile these differences.
Growing international competition, for example, has increased
pressures on banks throughout the world to reduce their capital
ratios in order to compete and protect their market shares.
Throughout the 1980s, in particular, different capital standards

abroad fueled this problem and hurt the market share of some
U.S. banks.

In large part, however, those differences in

capital requirements are now being addressed.

The recently

adopted international risk-based capital standard was needed for
two fundamental reasons: (1) to strengthen the soundness and
stability of the international banking system and (2) to
diminish an existing source of competitive inequality among
international banks.

The new standard should help the

international banking community meet those goals.

Historical trends
In order to enhance our understanding of current
capital levels, it is useful to compare them with capital levels
of the past and also to try to gain some ideas about the
corresponding levels of risk banks take.

For that purpose, I

would like first to look back to the mid-nineteenth century and
identify some long-term trends.

Both the banking business and the economic environment
have obviously changed dramatically since that time.

Markets

have become more efficient; communications, information and
technology are vastly improved; the payments system is stronger
and more sophisticated; a framework of prudential supervision
has become well established; and management practices have
changed.

In addition, deposit insurance, unemployment

insurance, and other social programs have tempered the damage
recessions can cause, and our understanding and management of

the economy have also improved.

Nevertheless, such a long-term

approach, I believe, can provide some interesting historical
insights and perspectives.

Although leverage was important in the past, as now,
the amount of leverage historically was much less than we see
today.

During the 1830-184Os, bank capital ratios were around

50 percent (Chart 1 ) . Since then, the ratios declined steadily
for a century and more, with the typical fluctuations during
business cycles.

They generally declined when the economy was

strong and loan demand heavy and improved during economic
slowdowns, when loan demand would subside.

That general pattern

has been clearest during wartimes, including the Civil War, both
World Wars, and even the Spanish-American War.

In each case,

capital ratios declined markedly, as banks were pressed to help
finance the war.

Important events such as the creation of the Federal
Reserve System in 1913 and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation in 1933 had a significant impact on the environment
in which banks operated.

The former led to a more efficient

financial payments system and provided a source of increased
liquidity in the banking system.

The latter gave depositors

greater protection for their funds and relieved pressure on
banks to demonstrate their strength through higher capital
ratios.

Taken together, these developments introduced greater

stability into the financial system and dramatically reduced the

risks the public perceived in placing their funds in depository
institutions.

This increased stability, in turn, created an

environment in which banks could operate with lower capital
positions while maintaining a high level of public confidence.

Clearly, many factors are involved whenever one
assesses changes over such a long period of time.

Nevertheless,

from an historical perspective, the long-term trend in bank
capital ratios is striking.

Current levels are l/6th the levels

of the mid-1800s, and are less than one-half the level some 50
years ago.

None of this is to suggest that any particular period
in the distant past should be viewed as the "good old days" that
we want to repeat—despite the fact that bank capital ratios
were much higher then.

Not only were those higher ratios

probably not all they might appear to have been, but also the
financial world has dramatically changed.

Balance sheets.

Some of those changes are reflected

in other balance sheet trends.

From the time of the Civil War

until the depression of the 1930s, loans usually accounted for
about 55 percent of bank assets, while cash and securities
accounted for 20-3 0 percent of assets.

The depression and the

Second World War and Korean War years virtually reversed those
shares as loan demand dropped and the banks helped finance
government borrowing.

Bank portfolios became loaded with

government securities, while the relative level of loans sharply
declined.

It was not until around 1965 that loans returned to

their "traditional" level of about 55 percent of assets, where
they remained as recently as 1983.

Beginning in 1984, though, this long-established
relationship of loans to assets once again began to change
(Chart 2 ) . This time it increased.

By that year, the loans

reached 60 percent of bank assets and then climbed further to
almost 62 percent at the end of 1988, the highest point since
before the Civil War.

Including standby letters of credit would

raise the 1988 loan figure by another 5.5 percentage points.

Since long-term historical data are not available to
measure asset quality, one cannot conclusively state that asset
quality is either higher or lower today than it has typically
been in the past.

However, the historically large share of

assets represented by loans, combined with the volume of
off-balance sheet exposures we have recently seen, suggests that
the level of risk in the industry today is certainly no lower
than it generally has been in the past and is arguably higher.

In considering these broad historical trends in
capital and asset composition, it is important to keep certain
developments in mind.

I have already referred to the advent of

the federal safety net and the emergence of macroeconomic
techniques for stabilizing the economy.

Other factors that have

8

tended during recent decades to temper the risks associated with
banking include broader financial disclosure, more consistent
accounting practices, increased availability of information,
better analytical techniques, more reliable payments systems,
and improved market efficiencies.

The period from the end of World War II to the early
1970s was one of reasonable economic stability and steady
growth.

This was a climate that accommodated rapid domestic and

overseas expansion by U.S. banks and, especially from the
mid-1960s to the early 1970s, led to declining capital ratios,
particularly for many large banking institutions.

Focussing

specifically on the period from 1947 to the present (Chart 3 ) ,
the industry's average ratio of equity to assets climbed sharply
through the 1950s and early 1960s, but then lost virtually all
of that progress during the next ten years.

The industry's

latest effort to strengthen its capital base has restored only
part of the loss.

At 6.3 percent of industry assets, bank

equity remains slightly below its average for the past 40 years.

By the late 1970s we saw rapidly increasing inflation,
increased economic and financial instability, and soon
thereafter, a severe recession.

Since then, the overall economy

has again experienced steady growth, but the business cycle and
many other risks obviously remain.

Given the continuing

problems in certain regions and sectors of our economy, the
difficulties facing some heavily indebted foreign countries, the

amount of leverage assumed by many of our domestic borrowers,
and the rapid competitive and technological changes affecting
the financial system, I suspect that few of you would argue that
risks in banking have declined within the last decade.

Indeed,

the fact that more than 700 banks have failed in the past five
years, alone, demonstrates that banking is far from risk-free.
The many billions of dollars that this country will ultimately
pay for the thrift industry also helps place in perspective the
costs and market distortions that insufficient capital in
financial institutions can produce.

Relationship of Leverage and Earnings
Considering the high capital ratios of the past, it is
useful to ask how banks were able to compete for investor funds
and bank customers.

The large volume of relatively low cost,

interest free funds and lower levels of competition and overhead
costs were no-doubt important factors decades ago.
times have changed.

Obviously,

Both businesses and consumers have become

more sophisticated and demanding in the services they request;
capital markets have grown; and technology and intensified
competition have changed the face of the financial industry.

It is not essential, however, to have ever-increasing
leverage ratios to compete.

I recognize that leverage ratios

affect your returns on equity and, in turn, the value of your
banks.

We also know, however, that there is a point beyond

10

which further leverage reduces the value of the firm.

We must

be careful not to go beyond that point.

Several factors begin to penalize any institution
whose equity ratios become too thin.
higher funding costs.

The most obvious one is

FDIC coverage may prevent a bank's

insured deposit costs from rising, but eventually the cost of
non-insured funds will increase.

Shareholders, too, will demand

more return for their increased risks and reflect those demands
in stock prices.

In contrast, strong bank capital ratios tend

to imply financial stamina and resilience to withstand both good
times and bad.

Moreover, sound capital positions should help

institutions attract depositors and investors who place a
premium on low-risk and, in general, should help improve the
institutions' competitive strength.

The fact that ever-higher leverage is not essential in
order to have relatively high ROEs is borne out by a recent
review of the performance of U.S. banks.

While, one cannot

necessarily link cause and effect between high capital ratios
and strong earnings, the results demonstrate that the two are at
least not inconsistent.

The review considered the performance of more than
2,300 banks whose assets now exceed $100 million and that
existed throughout the period from 1975 to 1988.

It placed

these institutions into one of four groups based on their

11

average equity to asset ratios during that 14 year period.

The

annual compound return on equity of the banks with the highest
capital ratios was higher than the compound ROE of the least
capitalized banks, and the difference was statistically
significant.

Even among banks of similar size, that pattern

held for 5 of 7 different size groups.

There is, admittedly, some potential circularity to
this analytical approach.

Banks with higher earnings—for

whatever reason—may have higher capital ratios merely because
they had more earnings to retain, while those that experienced
losses necessarily saw their capital reduced.
though, several conclusions seem sound.

In any event,

First, one does not

need exceptionally low capital ratios to produce acceptable
ROEs.

Second, strong capital ratios do not preclude strong

returns.

Third, it is fundamental that, other things equal,

higher capital ratios allow any organization to withstand losses
better than do lower ratios.

No one can know what problems lie

ahead; nonetheless, banks with strong capital positions are more
likely to survive periods of uncertainty than are those with
weak ratios.

12

Conclusion
In closing, it seems fair to say that current capital
requirements are not high by either short- or long-term
historical standards, nor should they make it impossible for you
to compete effectively.

Meanwhile, a review of the composition

of both on- and off-balance sheet exposures, suggests that the
level of risk in banking today may, if anything, be higher than
it has generally been in the recent past.

The number and size

of failures we have seen in both the banking and thrift
industries demonstrate clearly that depository institutions must
maintain sound capital positions and be able to deal with
unexpected events.

Maintaining adequate capital will increase public
confidence in your institutions and will strengthen your case
for the expansion of new powers by ensuring that the public's
interests and resources are protected.

Adequate capital also

provides the necessary incentives for owners to operate in a
prudent and efficient way, while not exposing society to undue
risks.

The willingness of owners to risk their investments is

the foundation of any free-market economy.

It is, in the end,

the key to both a sound and competitive banking system and a
strong and growing economy.

Chart 1

EQUITY AS A PERCENT OF ASSETS, 1840-1988
ALL INSURED COMMERCIAL BANKS

Chart 2

LOANS AS A PERCENT OF ASSETS, 1840-1988
Percent
80

ALL COMMERCIAL BANKS

Charts

EQUITY AS A PERCENT OF ASSETS, 1947-1988
ALL INSURED COMMERCIAL BANKS