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A Symposium Sponsored By
The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
OF TRADE
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AND CURRENCY ZONES
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Opening Remarks
Alan Greenspan

It is a pleasure to be here with you once again. As at past meetings
here, the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City has arranged a
particularly challenging and stimulating p r o g r a m — o n e that commands our attention despite the attractions and distractions of this
magnificent setting. Let me take a moment to add a word of special
thanks to Roger G u f f e y for his part in overseeing the whole series
of symposia here at Jackson Hole that many of us have found so
informative and valuable over the years. This will be his last meeting
here as official "host," as his tenure as president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City is coming to an end. W e thank you,
Roger, for this meeting and those of past years and wish you well in
your post-Federal Reserve endeavors.
With m o v e m e n t s toward trade zones proceeding in many parts of
the world—the single market program and economic and monetary
union in the European C o m m u n i t y (EC) and the Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative and the proposed North America free trade area
here in this hemisphere—it is both timely and appropriate that we
consider the economic factors behind these efforts and their implications for global markets and for policy formulation. The outcome of
the Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations unfortunately is still
undetermined. Against this background, we need to learn why the
impetus has shifted to regional agreements; what precisely are the
benefits those agreements offer; and how to ensure that the benefits
of the regional trade agreement do not translate into gjobal losses as
a result of trade diversion and resource misallocation.

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Alan

Greenspan

The dividends offered by free trade zones are primarily
microeconomic in nature—greater e c o n o m i c s of scale in production,
more competitive industrial structures, improved labor and capital
mobility, and more efficient allocation of investment throughout the
region. These gains c o m e about as barriers to the How of goods and
services are lowered and as restrictions such as those on foreign
ownership of domestic firms and on repatriation of earnings are
removed. Inevitably, during the process of adjustment some workers
and owners of capital in place will regard themselves as "losers" in
the m o v e to a free trade area. On balance, we expect the
microeconomic gains to translate into a healthier macroeconomic
p e r f o r m a n c e as well, with an improved outlook for long-term
growth.
How do we estimate ahead of time the net gain in welfare for each
of the members of a proposed free trade area? What policies are
appropriate for ensuring that in response to lower trade barriers
capital and labor successfully move f r o m industries where they are
no longer competitive to those where they can be efficiently and
profitably e m p l o y e d ? At what stage of economic development is a
country ready for participation in a free trade area? Can countries of
different size or at different stages of development all benefit f r o m
forming a free trade area with each other? What should be the policy
of participating countries in their trade with countries not in the free
trade area?
These are all important questions that we might usefully take up
during our two days of discussion. They are questions that the
m e m b e r states of the European C o m m u n i t y have dealt with over the
life of the C o m m o n Market and are grappling with again as the
now-larger EC proceeds to shape the terms of the single market by
the end of 1992. Indeed, they are questions that those responsible
for negotiating the North America Free Trade Agreement will need
to answer in concrete terms for Mexico, Canada, and the United
States.
Our agenda extends beyond free trade areas to a consideration of
currency zones as well. T h e relationship between the two is a topic
that is still much debated. Since the United States is both a free trade

Opening

Remarks

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area and a single currency zone, I cannot dismiss the proposition that
a single currency is an important ingredient in a successful free trade
zone. A single currency makes it possible for producers and consumers to eliminate the risk, uncertainty, and expense associated
with transacting in several currencies and with protecting against
potential exchange rate variability. A single currency simplifies
somewhat the problem of planning by enterprises and of making
investment decisions. It reduces even further the significance of
national borders to firms producing within a free trade area and thus
helps to promote the integration of all the regions of the area into a
single, efficient economic system.
At the present time, the m e m b e r countries of the European C o m munity are in the process of negotiating economic and monetary
union. Achievement of a single European internal market and a
single European currency offers the benefits I have just described,
but entails some costs as well. It will require significant institutional
changes and political compromises as well as some loss of economic
flexibility as whatever scope remains for adjustment of m e m b e r
countries' nominal exchange rates is eliminated. The transition f r o m
the present system to full monetary union is likely to be difficult, and
the decision of when to lock in existing exchange rates may be
crucial. Implementation of European economic and monetary union
may add to the complexity of expanding EC membership in the
future.
T h e proposed changes associated with European economic and
monetary union arc far-reaching. While their effects will be felt
primarily within Europe, no doubt there will be impacts on all
exchange rates and international financial markets in general.
Similarly, the achievement of a free trade area in goods and services,
including financial services, within North America can be expected
to have s o m e impact on financial markets elsewhere.
The past decade has witnessed significant changes in global financial markets as deregulation in many countries and technological
advances in information processing and communication have made
it possible for financial markets throughout the world to b e c o m e
more closely integrated. The lowering of barriers to competition

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Alan

Greenspan

within proposed trade and eurreney zones should accelerate that
process for the countries within the zones and may well influence
the course of developments outside these zones. T h e balance of
competition between banks and other financial institutions and
markets, the range of financial services and products available to
consumers, the nature of the risks borne by financial intermediaries,
the pace of innovation, and the efficiency with which financial
intermediation in general is done may all be affected by the increased
competition in financial markets that is expected to result f r o m the
formation of a free trade area.
The emergence of trade and currency zones poses additional
challenges for the ways in which we regulate financial markets.
Small regulatory differences between countries within the zone
might well tip the balance of competition in favor of one c o u n t r y ' s
firms relative to those of the other. Regulatory inconsistencies across
the m e m b e r s of the zone might well be exploited by firms and result
in undesired outcomes in terms of the nature and the distribution of
risk borne by financial institutions. It would appear that the move
toward trade and currency zones needs to be complemented by
efforts to achieve greater coordination of supervision and regulation
of national financial markets.
In what ways do trade and currency zones have an influence on
macroeconomic policies? Their fundamental contribution is to
counter any tendency that might be present for policy c h o i c e s —
whether trade policy, exchange rate policy, or monetary and fiscal
policy—to be made at the expense of o n e ' s neighbor by making
neighboring economies so interdependent that such a policy would
be self-defeating. At the same time, however, the trade and/or
currency zones define a new b o r d e r — a n d thus a new "neighbor."
It is essential that those responsible for policy choices d o not allow
the emergence of trade and currency zones to foster a climate of
policy choices for the benefit of "insiders" at the expense of
"outsiders." •
Trade and currency zones raise issues of policy implementation as
well. Clearly the scope for independent monetary policy is lost, but
to what extent do other macroeconomic policy instruments within

Opening

Remarks

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the region need to be coordinated? Is some degree of tax harmonization needed to assure a "level playing field" for all economic entities
in the zone? Does currency union require limits on national budget
policy choices? Is the effectiveness of fiscal policy on the part of one
government altered by increased "spillovers" to the partner
economies within the zone? Should monetary policy in the low-inflation m e m b e r of the zone function as an anchor for monetary policy
in the other m e m b e r s ? Will changes in the structure of financial
intermediation affect the transmission of monetary policy, and, if so,
h o w ? Our experience with trade and currency zones is still limited.
As a consequence, experience will not be a sufficient guide to answer
these questions unambiguously.
The range of issues before us is quite broad. W e seek answers from
the abstract world of economic models and from the ongoing experience gained in the cases of European economic and monetary union
and the North American free trade area that are already being
planned. W e need to address these questions f r o m the perspective of
industrial countries and f r o m that of countries still in the process of
industrializing. Insights into the economic implications w e can expect
from trade and currency zones should guide us in choosing appropriate m a c r o e c o n o m i c policies now and in the f u t u r e — w h e t h e r we
are "inside" or "outside" a zone. I recognize that we are not likely
to reach complete insight or agreement on these issues in our
discussions during the next two days, but I expect the exchange of
views, both within the formal sessions and outside of them, to be
both stimulating and informative.