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For release on delivery
10:45 A.M. Central Europe Summer Time
(4:45 A.M. E.D.T.)
June 12, 1990

New Challenges for the Global Economy

Remarks by
Alan Greenspan
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
before the
General Assembly of the Federation of German Industries
Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany
June 12, 1990

In assessing current and prospective conditions of
economies, some tend to view the current state of an individual
economy in terms of special factors affecting it in isolation
from more sweeping developments in the global economy.

In the

European context, for example, over the past two decades,
policymakers were preoccupied with such developments as how to
respond to the drastic changes in oil prices in the 1970s, or
how to react to the slowing in economic activity in some West
European countries in the early 1980s (which soon was labelled
"Euro-sclerosis").

Similarly, policymakers are currently

confronted with how to assess the impact on their economies of,
and how to respond to, the dramatic economic and political
changes occurring in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union.

While such events, doubtless, need be incorporated in

official and private decisionmaking, it must be recognized that
such developments are often transitory.

By making such events

the primary focus, policymakers and others may be paying
inadequate attention to, and, therefore, may be insufficiently
prepared to respond to other more fundamental changes in the
structure and operation of the global economy.
Over the past year or so, I have endeavored to
emphasize a little noticed structural change of recent decades
that has had, and is continuing to have, a profound impact on
the world economy, as well as on world politics:

the

"downsizing of economic output".
This is the process that substitutes conceptual
insights for physical volumes in the creation of economic

- 2 value.

A half century ago, for example, our radios were bulky

and activated by large vacuum tubes.

Today, owing to the

insights that developed into modern electronics, the same
function is served by pocket-sized transistor packs.
fiber optics are replacing vast tonnages of copper.

Thin
Advances

in architecture and engineering, and the development and use of
lighter but stronger materials, now give us the same working
space in newer buildings, with

much less concrete, glass, and

steel tonnage than was required in an earlier era.
Even the physical quantity of goods consumed in
creating economic services has been affected by downsizing.
Financial transactions, historically buttressed with reams of
paper, are being progressively reduced to electronic charges,
though the sheer volume of activity has kept paper usage
higher.

The transportation services industry, as a result of

conceptual advances, now moves more goods with greater
convenience, while consuming substantially less fuel per ton.
In addition, passenger miles have expanded greatly relative to
the physical materials required to build large modern jet
aircraft.
As a consequence, the considerable increase in the
economic well-being of most nations in recent decades has come
about with little change in the bulk or weight of the gross
national product.

In fact, if all the weight of materials we

produce—the tons of grain, cotton, ore, coal, steel, cement,
etc.—were summed, their total weight per capita might not be
much greater today than it was, say 50 or 75 years ago.

This

- 3 -

would mean that increases in the conceptual components of GNP-that is, those reflecting advances in knowledge and i d e a s —
would explain by far the major part of the rise in real GNP in
the United States, and presumably the industrial world as a
whole.
Underlying this entire process of downsizing have been
quantum advances in technology, spurred by economic forces.
Although downsizing has been evident, more or less, since the
beginnings of the industrial revolution, the explosive growth
in information gathering and processing techniques in recent
years has greatly extended our analytical capabilities of
substituting ideas for physical volume.

Moreover, since

knowledge is essentially irreversible, these trends almost
surely will continue into the decades ahead.
In a world of downsizing, the purpose of production
and exchange of economic value does not change.
serves human needs and values.

It still

But because the form of output

is becoming increasingly less tangible a somewhat lessened
concern over the depletion of finite natural resources in the
face of growing populations has become warranted.
But of more immediate consequence is the implication
of downsizing on international trade, which is having a
profound effect on the policies of the world's economies.
International trade in construction gravel and fiberglass
insulation, for example, is limited by weight and bulk.

High

value computer products, on the other hand, are major and
increasing factors in world trade.

Obviously, the less the

- 4 -

bulk, and the lower the weight, the easier it is to move goods,
both within national borders and across national boundaries.
It is not surprising, therefore, to find that after
adjusting for changes in export prices, pounds shipped per real
dollar of U.S. exports fell an average of almost 3-1/2 percent
per year since 1970.

Reflecting the downsizing of tradable

goods worldwide, pounds shipped per real dollar of U.S. imports
declined even more, an average of 4-3/4 percent per year.

Not

surprisingly, the share of U.S. foreign trade carried by air
has doubled since 1970.

On a global basis, the real value of

trade has grown at a 5 percent annual rate over the last two
decades, significantly outstripping the growth of domestic
demand in the world.

(In tonnage terms, needless to say, the

increase has been far less.)

This, of course, implies that the

ratio of imports to domestic output worldwide, on average, has
been rising and will apparently continue to do so, provided
trade barriers are not erected to thwart the trend.
One fallout from the downsizing of product is the
increased integration of the world's production facilities.
Bottlenecks tend to emerge when domestic productive facilities
are pressed to capacity by burgeoning demand.

But if

additional supplies from other world producers can be made
readily and quickly available, such pressures can be
significantly allayed.

Indeed, as import availability on

average tends to become an increasing source of supply, foreign
producers will increasingly vie with domestic suppliers.

Thus,

as we progress toward further downsizing of economic output,

- 5 worldwide production and inventory control integration becomes
far more feasible, inflationary dislocations less likely, and
we may well experience a dampening of the inventory cycle.

In

fact, such a dampening may well help to explain why the current
U.S. economic expansion, contrary to most American economic
history, has continued for such an extended period.
After a brisk expansion through 1988 and the first
quarter of 1989, the American economy began to behave like a
tire with a slow leak.

The economy's momentum began to fade

and the typical prerecession symptoms became progressively
manifest.
By autumn, increasingly negative signals concerning
the economic outlook began to develop.

The emerging weakness

in manufacturing, especially in the durable goods sector,
seemed to be cumulating and prospectively spreading to the
nonmanufacturing areas of the economy.
In the event, however, the weakness in industrial
activity bottomed around the turn of the year.

And, although

the performance since can scarcely be described as robust, it
nonetheless has markedly assuaged the concerns that
recessionary forces were mounting for the American economy as a
whole.
The obvious question is, what went wrong with the
recession forecasts or, more exactly, what went right with the
economy?

While analysts can never be certain of such things,

there is at least presumptive evidence that a major reason,
perhaps the key reason, is the marked change in inventory

- 6 -

behavior on the part of purchasing managers in manufacturing
and elsewhere in the U.S. economy.
Most, if not all, past American recessions have been
sparked, or at least aggravated, by large inventory swings.
Purchasing managers, seeking to protect their production
schedules, accelerated inventory accuinulation as their
suppliers' delivery lead times stretched out during periods of
diminishing excess capacity.

But the process of heavy buying

put increasing pressure on suppliers' capacity, inducing still
further lead-time extensions, which inevitably required still
further increases in days' supply of inventories of materials
on hand.

This cycle generally led to inventories being built

up at unsustainable rates, or to excessive levels often
accompanied by strained corporate balance sheets.
Purchasing managers would then reduce forward orders
to match, rather than exceed, prospective levels of materials
consumption.

Suppliers were then able to cut back on frenetic

production levels which, in turn, set into motion declines in
lead times promised to prospective customers and allowed those
customers to reduce the days' supply of inventory required to
protect their productions schedules.

That, not surprisingly,

led to a still lesser flow of orders, lower production, and
still shorter lead times.
In short, I am outlining the classic inventory cycle.
That cycle, which has been a key element in American business
history, obviously has not been evident on the industrial scene
in recent years.

The historical sequence apparently has been

- 7 attenuated if not broken, enabling purchasing managers to meet
their production schedules throughout the expansion of the
1980s without the historic runup in lead times, accumulation of
inventory, and its inevitable liquidation.

Several

explanations of the change suggest themselves.
The first, but not necessarily the most important
explanation, has been the dramatic expansion of real-time
inventory monitoring.

The expansion of computer technology and

rapidly decreasing costs of telecommunications has enabled
management to become quickly informed of inventory patterns, by
product and stage of processing, within a corporate complex
and, to an increasing extent, beyond the factory gates to
stocks in the hands of distributors and customers.

This has

fostered a reduction in uncertainty in inventory scheduling,
which historically had probably led business to hold larger
safety stocks than were otherwise required.

Implicit in this

trend has been increasing sophistication in transportation
scheduling of the movement of goods and materials between
plants and between production facilities and customers.
Another factor reducing uncertainties of product
availability has been the broadening tendency of customers to
provide suppliers in recent years with projected requirements
well into the future.

Moreover, sophisticated production

techniques have improved quality reliability so that "just in
time" deliveries are associated with a lower reject rate and,
consequently, a lower required safety buffer than had earlier
been the case.

- 8 -

Finally, and perhaps most important, the increasing
ability of customers in the United States to draw on foreign
facilities when domestic supplies become tight has kept average
lead times on deliveries from accelerating as excess capacity
began to disappear at domestic plants.
As a consequence, it is not surprising that average
delivery lead times for production materials have remained at
levels that in the past would have been consistent only with
periods of substantial slack in domestic production facilities.
One indication of the success of inventory management
techniques and tighter controls in the United States is that
the proportion of materials and supplies in total manufacturing
inventories has trended down since the late 1970s.

Moreover,

typical nationwide inventory-sales ratios, which we employ to
measure the degree of potential inventory deficiency or excess,
are becoming increasingly skewed by imported goods that find
their way into our inventory system.

For example, we estimate

that the proportion of wholesale and retail trade inventories
(marked down to factory gate values), which are foreign
sourced, has risen from less than 20 percent in the early 1980s
to around 2 5 percent currently.

While heavy buildups of

inventories of imported goods can precipitate cutbacks in
domestic production, it seems likely that a large part of that
adjustment falls on foreign facilities rather than domestic,
although obviously there are a number of products for which
there are multiple supply sources, both domestic and foreign.

- 9 Does all of this suggest that we have beaten the
inventory cycle and, perhaps, the business cycle, as well?
immediate answer is, not likely.

The

Historically, inventory

cycles were precipitated by a perceived shrinking of excess
domestic production capacity or potential commodity price
increases for production and maintenance materials.

It is

perfectly rational for a purchasing manager to attempt to
accumulate inventories, in terms of days' supply, as some
function of the time it takes the manager to obtain additional
materials from his suppliers.

If worldwide stringencies in the

production system were to occur, for example, and lead times,
accordingly, were to stretch out, reasonable inventory
management could still readily imitate the type of inventory
accumulation and liquidation cycles that have plagued us in the
past.
One, of course, would be hard pressed to find such
indications in the current American supply/demand balances of
materials.

Nonetheless, I would not presume that the

extraordinary changes that have occurred in inventory
management in recent years have fundamentally altered inventory
purchasing patterns in a manner that will eliminate,
henceforth, any concerns we may have of inventory excess and
inventory-induced recessions.

Moreover, there are many reasons

for business cycle fluctuations other than inventory movements.
Although materials inventory excesses often trigger production
cutbacks and generally exacerbate cyclical change, they can be
far less important in governing the amplitude and extent of

- 10 business cycles than fluctuations in capital goods markets or
residential construction, for example.
In fact, the broader forces of fluctuations in demand
for products reflect a different type of inventory analysis,
one looking at the ownership of, for example, cars and trucks
on the road, the stock of residential buildings, the stock of
office buildings, or the stock of capital equipment.

In short,

the physical parts of the balance sheet of the American economy
can be viewed as inventories in a certain larger sense.

The

notions of deficiency and excess in such items affect the
demand for goods and services and the levels of economic
activity in ways not all that distinct from conventional
inventories, although, granted, the time cycle is appreciably
longer.
The globalization of international economic
relationships is also affecting international capital
movements.

New technology—especially computer and

telecommunications technology—is boosting gross financial
transactions across national borders at an even faster pace
than the net transactions supporting the increase in trade in
goods and services.

Since the latter will in the decades ahead

presumably grow faster than nominal GNP, the growth in gross
financial transactions in the context of downsizing and
consequent globalization should be truly awesome.
Rapidly expanding data processing capabilities and
virtually instantaneous information transmission are
facilitating the development of a broad spectrum of complex

- 11 financial instruments that can be tailored to the hedging,
funding, and investment needs of a growing array of market
participants.

These types of instruments were simply not

feasible a decade or two ago.
Some of this activity has involved an unbundling of
financial risk to meet the increasingly specialized risk
management requirements of market participants.

Exchange rate

and interest rate swaps, together with financial futures and
options, have become important means by which currency and
interest rate risks are shifted to those more willing to take
them on.

The proliferation of financial instruments, in turn,

implies an increasing number of arbitrage opportunities, which
tend to boost further the volume of gross financial
transactions in relation to output and trade.

Moreover, these

technological advances and innovations have reduced the costs
of managing operations around the globe, and have facilitated
international investment.
Investment considerations also are playing an
important role in the globalization of securities markets.

As

the world economies become increasingly intertwined, it is to
be expected that both individual investors and institutions
will raise the share of foreign securities in their investment
portfolios.

Such diversification provides investors a means of

protecting against the prospect of depreciation of the local
currency on foreign exchange markets and against domestic
economic disturbances affecting asset values on local markets.
As international trade continues to expand more rapidly than

- 12 global output, and as domestic economies become even more
closely linked to those abroad, the objective of diversifying
portfolios of international securities will become increasingly
important.
Downsizing and globalization is a process that is
inherent to the development of all of our economies:

the

industrial economies, the developing economies, and even the
economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

In practice,

these different economies have been affected in varying degrees
by the downsizing and globalization process, and this helps to
explain, in part, the noticeable differences in living
standards.
The main parties in the downsizing process and
globalization have, of course,
industrial countries.

been the enterprises in

The evolving newly industrialized

countries of the Far East, capitalizing on their ability to
exploit the downsizing technologies of the 1980s, have also
been active participants in this process, flourishing beyond
expectations.

Enterprises in most other developing countries

as a rule have not been major players in this process, in part
because of the inward-looking nature of their trade regimes.
And the economies of East Europe and the Soviet Union, which
have participated even less in the global economy, have been
even further removed from these dynamic developments.
The downsizing process and the globalization of
capital markets offer economies many benefits in terms of
increased competition, reduced costs of financial

- 13 intermediation benefiting both savers and borrowers, more
efficient allocation of capital, and more rapid spread of
innovations.

Clearly, those economies that are burdened with

dated technology, that protect inefficient firms through
tariffs, quotas, and subsidies, and that discourage savings and
initiative will not derive the gains in living standards that
the downsizing and globalization process is yielding to others.
Recent developments in East European countries and the
Soviet Union reinforce the lessons that centrally directed
economic plans and import-substitution approaches to growth and
development do not yield sustained positive results in terms of
economic welfare of the population.

Over a period of decades,

there has been a very clear test of effectiveness between
economies that selected market-oriented and centrally planned
approaches to growth and development.
unequivocal.

The results are

Wealth is created by the imagination, innovation

and effort of many individuals pursuing their own enlightened
self interest in market economies. Countries whose governments
provide the appropriate environment and incentives that foster
those forces will be the ones that will prosper.
Perhaps the major difference between a centrally
planned economy and a market-oriented one is that, in the
latter, the economic players are forced into competition with
one another by the need for economic success and survival.
Businesses try to fend off competitive pressures, but,
ultimately, in effective market systems, competitive price and
wage pressures prevail.

Centrally planned economies, on the

- 14 other hand, view competition as destructive and hence create
state monopolies to carry out a nation's business.

In a

competitive economy, as the economic value of facilities
deteriorates pressures for replacement emerge.

In contrast, in

planned economies, with no competitive signals on the true
costs of resources, capital is grossly misused, with facilities
generally employed until they can no longer function.

In

planned economies, energy use is inefficient and, surprisingly,
even in one area where non-market forces have prevailed, i.e.,
pollution control, market economies have done far better.
Restructuring of centrally planned economies will be
difficult.

According to no less an authority than Soviet

President Mikhail Gorbachev earlier this month, "... (W)e
found... the old economic system rejected any kind of
progress...

There was no incentive, there was no motivation

for people to work....

We continued to retain the entire old

superstructure of economic management.

...(T)hat system which

evolved over the decades... was really a kind of... clamp on
our entire economy...

(I)t made impossible any initiative, any

decision-making at various levels... .

(W)e have to radicalize

that transition to new forms of economic management."
The increased ease with which economic goods and
services can spill over national borders creates a major
dilemma for the political structure of a country inclined to
inhibit such movement.

The political leadership in order to

keep pace must increasingly accelerate the protectionist

- 15 blocking of goods and services, or open their economy to a more
market-oriented, and less domestically regimented, system.
Advancing technology, which is at the root of recent
globalization, is also creating pressure on autarkic systems in
areas beyond the realm of international trade in economic
values.

The development of satellite technology, for example,

and the ability to transmit television pictures across national
boundaries undercut political censorship of the media.
Governments must then either acquiesce in new political
freedoms or produce increasingly harsh regimes.
Recently, however, the political response to these
technological developments has been liberal.

The increasing

international economic pressures of the decades since the end
of World War II have exposed the economic inadequacies of the
centrally directed economies of the East European countries
and, to a somewhat lesser extent, statist economies in the West
as well.
The disillusionment by the population and some of the
leaders of the East European countries and the Soviet Union in
the inefficient and inward-looking economic structures of their
economies has, no doubt, been the principal motivation for
these countries' efforts to transform their economies.

The

road ahead for these countries is going to be difficult and
uphill, in part because their economies will have to catch up
and compete with economies that have been at the forefront of
the downsizing and globalization process while they by-andlarge have been bystanders.

However, it would be most

- 16 -

unfortunate, both politically and economically, if the
transformation effort were not to succeed.
In order for East European countries and the Soviet
Union to participate, contribute, and benefit from the
globalization of production, trade, and finance, it is
essential that they open their economies to a more marketoriented, and less regimented, economic and financial system.
East European countries and the Soviet Union can
benefit from the competition of increased trade with the rest
of the world.

Increased exports help relax the financing

constraints that these countries face, and, with increased
foreign exchange, can accommodate increased imports as well as
meet other financing requirements.
The ability of the world economy to absorb increased
exports from East European countries and the Soviet Union
should not be underestimated.

As noted earlier, world trade is

growing, and will likely continue to grow, at a considerably
faster pace than the growth of world domestic demand, with
world trade in the high-technology goods advancing most
rapidly.

Many Asian economies have succeeded in channelling

their resources and talents into the production and exports of
high-value goods, and have prospered as a result.

Given the

vast resources of some of the East European economies and the
Soviet Union, there is no reason why these countries cannot
similarly substantially expand their exports in the years
ahead.

But the right policy environment obviously must be

established and maintained.

- 17 -

It also must be kept in mind that in order for these
countries to expand their exports, their trading partners must
keep their markets open.

The avoidance of trade protection and

the reduction of existing trade barriers, therefore, should be
high on the international economic policy agenda.
To be sure, sound economic policies and open
international markets are a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for countries' economic development.
financing is equally important.

Adequate

One of the challenges for the

1990s will be to mobilize and attract the capital that is
needed for the growth and development of East European
economies and the Soviet Union.

The private sectors of the

industrial countries, no doubt, will play a key role in this
effort.

This challenge occurs in the context of an

intensifying global competition for savings.

Those nations

that maintain sound policies and that open and restructure
their economies will gain attention and favor.

Those that do

not embrace such policies will have serious problems.
Capital is likely to flow to the former countries
from foreign investors who seek opportunities to invest in
industries in these countries.

However, the climate must be

conducive and hospitable to cross-border investments.
"Climate" here means not only rules governing individual
investments and repatriation of earnings and principal, but
also the macroeconomic and microeconomic environment.

A low

inflation environment, fostered by sound economic policies, is
critical for countries not only to mobilize their domestic

- 18 -

savings, but also to attract foreign capital.

Profit

calibrating commercial interests will determine where foreign
investors will place their investments.
Policy in some industrial countries must also play a
role in facilitating the expansion of savings through lower
budget deficits and in dealing with uncomfortably high rates of
inflation.

One consequence of the squeezing down of inventory

positions noted above in connection with the downsizing and
globalization process is that if demand were to pick up and if
evidence of worldwide tightening in goods markets were to
emerge, including episodes of shortages, then lead times are
likely to begin to stretch out.

This, in turn, is likely to

lead to a classic acceleration of inventory investment
experienced many times in the past.

While such a set of events

is positive as far as the expansion phase of economic activity
is concerned, given capacity constraints in a number of product
lines, it also carries with it unfavorable implications for
inflationary pressures.
High rates of inflation distort resource allocation,
discourage savings and investment, and erode a country's
international competitiveness.

And, as many of you know so

well from your own history, if inflation is allowed to run out
of control, it also unleashes social and political forces that
could be destabilizing and destructive not only for the country
concerned but also for the rest of the world.
The surest way to have an economy move to recession is
to allow inflation to get out of control.

U.S. monetary

- 19 authorities, and those in the principal industrial countries,
are aware of the dangers and risks of inflation and the high
costs of correcting inflationary excesses.

It, therefore, is

essential that the policies that we pursue, not only in the
monetary area, but also in the fiscal and trade spheres, are
directed to prevent these inflationary forces from establishing
themselves.

We have made considerable progress in achieving

this objective, and it is in our power to further consolidate
this progress.