View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

March 10, 1995

Introductory Remarks -- Senate Banking Committee

I am pleased to appear before this Committee today
to discuss the Mexican economic and financial situation
you know, Mr

As

Chairman, I have no prepared statement,

however, I am prepared to make a few introductory remarks
Because of regrettable delays in implementing
effective policies, Mexico's problems have grown larger
since I last appeared before this Committee to discuss
Mexico on January 31

The major implication is that the

necessary policy actions by the Government of Mexico now
also have to be stronger if confidence is to be restored to
the Mexican economy and financial system

However, the

burdens on Mexico will be reduced somewhat if it can borrow
resources provided by the United States, primarily through
the Exchange Stabilization Fund of the U S

Treasury, and by

the international financial community, primarily through the
International Monetary Fund

I have characterized this

approach as the "least worst" of the various alternatives
that currently confront us
Mexico, which had been hobbled for a number of
years following the debt crisis of 1982, has more recently
gone through a major economic metamorphosis toward
significant improvement in its economic and financial
structure

As a consequence, Mexico has been able to

- 2 broaden its participation in the global economic and
financial environment
major strides

Over the past decade Mexico has made

It has shed what was an inflation prone,

highly unstable, economic structure with excessive
government involvement and until recently had taken on many
of the characteristics of a vibrant economy
As part of efforts to accelerate its move toward
status as an industrial country and in a largely successful
endeavor to bring down the rate of inflation, the government
of Mexico adopted a complex, exchange-rate regime through
which the Mexican peso was linked to the U S
moving exchange-rate band

dollar via a

However, the exchange rate

policy adopted by Mexico was risky with little tolerance for
policy error or capacity to absorb shocks
As 1994 progressed, private foreign investment
inflows slowed

Mexican authorities evidently believed, or

fervently hoped, that the reduction in foreign investor
interest was temporary and that after the uncertainty of the
August election was behind them, confidence and private
capital inflows would reemerge
Meanwhile, it became increasingly clear to many
observers during the autumn that the prevailing level of
Mexico's exchange rate could not be sustained short of a
significant further tightening of monetary policy
Mexican authorities apparently were loath to risk recession,
which might have been the consequence of such action,
hoping instead for a spontaneous return of foreign

- 3 confidence and capital

They were tragically mistaken

The

chosen alternative to dramatically tightened monetary
policy, that is borrowing via Tesobonos and drawing on
reserves to intervene in the foreign exchange market, had a
limit

That limit was reached on December 20, and the

defense of the peso came to an abrupt end
To address the potentially contagious situation
that subsequently developed, the President and the
bipartisan leadership of the Congress have decided to assist
Mexico in dealing with its liquidity problems through a
program that would ensure potential access to substantial
amounts of medium-term funds from the Exchange Stabilization
Fund and the International Monetary Fund
The objective of this program is to halt the
erosion in Mexico's financing capabilities before it has
dramatic impacts far beyond those already evident around the
world

To repeat, this program, in my judgment, is the

least worst of the various initiatives which present
themselves as possible solutions to a very unsettling
international financial problem

My concern is not so much

with potential losses to the American taxpayer, which I
believe have been minimized, but with what economists call
moral hazard where the active involvement of an external
guarantor distorts the incentives perceived by investors
Nonetheless, I currently see no viable alternative to the
type of program that is being pursued

- 4 Mexico's economic policies are the key to ensuring
that the funds being provided under this program actually do
help to stabilize the Mexican economic and financial
situation, ultimately only sound policies that are sustained
over time will restore investors' confidence in Mexico
Under this program, Mexico is being provided with

liquidity

so that its government has time to implement fundamental
actions to deal effectively with the implications of the
inflation bubble associated with the peso's depreciation

It

is essential that the bubble be rapidly defused if stability
is to be restored to the Mexican economic and financial
system within a reasonable period of time
Unless Mexico's efforts to restore economic
stability and financial market confidence succeed, years of
economic reforms in Mexico would be threatened by pressures
to reimpose controls in many areas of its economy and to
reestablish governmental interference in what until recently
was Mexico's increasingly vibrant private sector

This

would be a tragic setback not only for Mexico, but for the
United States and the rest of the world as well.