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For release on delivery
2 3 0 p m EST
April 2,1998

The Ascendance of Market Capitalism
Remarks by
Alan Greenspan
Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
at the
Annual Convention
of the
American Society of Newspaper Editors
Washington, D C
April 2, 1998

The current turmoil in East Asia is easy to categorize as one of many such crises over the
decades Nonetheless, it appears to be an important milestone in what evidently has been a
sigmficant and seemingly inexorable trend toward market capitalism and political systems that
stress the rule of law The shifts have been gradual but persistent
Markets today are responding far more rapidly to subtle changes in consumers' values and
choices than ever before While advancing technology has always been a factor sensitizing
markets to changing consumer tastes, what is so striking in recent years is how pervasive that
force has become Just-in-time inventory systems have enabled production to more rapidly
adjust to changing consumption Satellite coordinated trucking moves goods to destinations of
optimal use Bar coding has facilitated a major revolution in retailing For supermarkets, for
example, checkout scanmng devices have facilitated the creation of a variety of wares reflecting
the most current consumer wants
Those producers who cannot keep up with this technologically driven surge to efficiency
fall by the wayside Those exceptionally skilled in advanced engineering and computer
programming, for example, are rewarded with significantly higher levels of income relative to
the less facile It is difficult to prove, but arguably luck, the great random leveler in the market
place, appears to play an ever smaller role in determining success and failure m today's
just-in-time, high quality, productive systems Those systems appear to be especially rewardmg
to financial skills The advent of computer and telecommunications technology has spawned a
vast proliferation of new financial derivatives products crafted by mathematicians and finance
technicians who had never previously found favor on either Wall or Lombard Streets The

-2above-average earnings they receive reflect the increasing value added created by financial
institutions, which, in turn, results from their enhanced ability to marshal savings to support
investment in the most productive physical capital
Not unexpectedly, as the share of Gross Domestic Product has shifted persistently to
conceptual products and services from those requiring physical brawn to produce, the wage
premium for skills and education has nsen significantly, especially during the past two decades
As one might surmise, the shift arguably has led to the sharply higher college enrollments that
we see here in the United States and elsewhere. But the resulting increased supply of skills has
apparently generally not been sufficient to offset the increasing demand, as net returns to
education, at least until quite recently, have continued to rise
Left to its own devices, this new high-tech competitive system appears to exhibit little
leeway for inefficiency Inefficiencies expose potential unexploited profit opportunities, that in
full, open, and effectively competitive markets induce new resources to be brought to bear to
eliminate bottlenecks and other, less than optimum, uses of capital
Of course, little of this is new Market economies have succeeded over the centuries by
thoroughly weeding out the inefficient and poorly equipped, and by granting rewards to those
who could anticipate consumer demand and meet it with minimum use of labor and capital
resources But the newer technologies are goading this process For good or ill, an unforgiving
capitalist process is driving wealth creation It has become increasingly difficult for
policymakers who wish to practice, as they put it, a more "caring" capitalism to realize the full
potential of their economies Their choices have become limited To the extent they block
themselves or portions of their population from what they perceive as harsh competitive

-3pressures, they must accept a lower average standard of living for their populace As a
consequence, increasingly, nations appear to be opting to open themselves to competition,
however harsh, and become producers that can compete in world markets Not irrelevant to the
choice is that major advances in telecommunications have made it troublesome for politicians
and policymakers to go too far in preempting market forces when the material affluence of
market-based economies has become so evident to ubiquitous television watchers, their
constituents, around the world
It was not always thus In the first decades following World War II, before the advent of
significant advances in computer and telecommunications technologies, market economies
appeared less daunting Adjustments were slower International trade comprised a far smaller
share of domestic economies Tariff walls blocked out competition, and capital controls often
constrained cross-border currency flows In retrospect, the economic environment appeared less
competitive, more tranquil, and certainly less threatening to those with only moderate or lesser
skills Indeed, before computer technology automated many repetitive tasks, the unskilled were
able to contribute significant value added and earn a respectable wage relative to the skilled
In this less demanding world, governments were able to construct social safety nets and
engaged in policies intended to redistribute income Even though such initiatives often were
recognized as adding substantial cost to labor and product markets, and thereby reducing their
flexibility, they were not judged as meaningful impediments to economic growth In economies
not broadly subject to international trade, competition was not as punishing to the less efficient
as it is today To be sure, average standards of living were less than they could have been, and
the composition of output was far less sensitive to changing consumer tastes than is the case in

-4today's high-tech environment There is clearly a significant segment of society that looks back
at that penod with affectionate nostalgia
But maintaining the kind of safety net that, for example, is prevalent in most continental
European countries where high unemployment appears chronic is proving increasingly
problematic in today's altered environment Governments of all persuasions still may choose to
help people acquire the skills they need to utilize new technologies And they generally
endeavor to support the incomes of those who have been less able to adapt But technology and
competition are extracting a high pnce for the more intrusive forms of intervention that impair
market incentives to work, save, invest, and innovate
International competitive pressures are narrowing the choices for economies with broad
safety nets the choice of accepting shortfalls in standards of living, relative to the less burdened
economies, or loosening the social safety net and acquiescing in the greater concentrations of
income that seem to be associated with our high-tech environment Erecting trade barriers to
shut off cross-border competition leads to the loss of the great advantages of the international
division of labor and cannot be considered a realistic alternative for societies choosing to realize
the full benefits of technological advances Fortunately, for the moment at least, there appears
limited sentiment in Europe or elsewhere to move in that direction
Clearly, the synergies of transistor, laser, and satellite technologies have created a
computer and telecommunications revolution over the last half century that is altenng the way
people interact with each other and with their institutions We are adding to our knowledge of
which economic and political systems contnbute to welfare and wealth and which do not This
process, of course, has been ongoing especially since the advent of the Industrial Revolution

-5when the emergence of significant wealth creation first offered meaningful alternatives But in
the post World War II years most of what had been open to conjecture and debate throughout the
nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth, is gradually being settled by the sharp realities
of recent expenence
I am not alleging that the human race is about to irreversibly accept market capitalism as
the only relevant form of economic and social organization and that this great debate is over
There remains a large segment of the population that still considers capitalism and its emphasis
on materialism, in all its forms, degrading to man's spiritual nature In addition, even some of
those who seek material welfare, view competitive markets as subject to manipulation by mass
promotion and advertising that drives consumers to desire and seek superficial and ephemeral
values Some governments even now attempt to override the evident preferences of their
citizens, by limiting their access to foreign media because they judge such media will undermine
their culture Finally, there remains a latent protectionism, in the United States and elsewhere,
which could emerge as a potent force against globalization should the current high-tech world
economy falter
Moreover, I certainly have no doubt that in the event of problems in today's new, more
Spencerian, form of capitalism, governments would increase their interventions in an endeavor to
alter market results
And, as history amply demonstrates, most recently in East Asia, market--or mostly
market—systems can produce crises that tempt government intervention Such cnses arise on
occasion when confidence unexpectedly fails and is replaced by fear and a loss of trust, inducing
a vicious cycle of retrenchment in economic activity and government endeavors to counter it

-6Nonetheless, in light of the record of failures of intrusive intervention over recent decades, it is
difficult to imagine such activism persisting much beyond any immediate crisis
The history of the twentieth century has been a testing ground for innumerable theories of
social and economic organization that have been tried and found wanting The way people
respond to incentives and rewards persists from generation to generation suggesting a deeply
imbedded set of stabilities in human nature We see this, for example, in remarkable
consistencies in the behavior of markets over time Nonetheless, history is strewn with examples
of economic and social systems that have tried to counter, or alter, human nature and failed
Despite an unrelenting effort over more than seven decades, the system in the Soviet
Union was unable to mold human responses to fit the Soviet view of human destiny and how
society should be organized The post mortem of what went wrong clearly exposed the fatal
flaws as internal to the system, and not the result of external forces, although the arms race may
have hastened the process The lesson that appears to be emerging is that only free market
systems exhibit the flexibility and robustness to accommodate human nature and harness rapidly
advancing technology to consistently advance living standards
To get a better sense of the forces that are driving the world's economies, especially in the
second half of the twentieth century, it is useful to understand why the Soviet experiment in
central planning failed Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to state that from this failure we have
learned as much about why our free capitalist systems work, as about why central planning does
not The Soviet economic failure was so unambiguous that it proffered a new set of standards to
better gauge alternative economic paradigms It, for example, afforded us a far better

-7understanding of why some of the mercantihstic capitalist economies of East Asia worked for
awhile but then did not
Centrally planned economic systems, such as that which existed in the Soviet Union, had
great difficulty in creating wealth and rising standards of living In theory, and to a large extent
in practice, production and distribution were determined by specific instructions-often in the
form of state orders-coming from the central planning agencies to the various different
producing establishments, indicating from whom, and in what quantities, they should receive
their raw materials and services, and to whom they should distribute their final outputs
Without an effective market clearing mechanism, the consequences of such a paradigm,
as one might readily anticipate, were both huge surpluses of goods that were not wanted by the
populace, and huge shortages of products that consumers desired, but were not produced in
adequate quantities The imbalance of demand over supply of these latter products inevitably
required rationing or its equivalent-standing in queues for limited quantities of goods and
services
One might think that the planning authorities should have been able to adjust to these
distortions They tried But they faced insurmountable handicaps in that they did not have
access to the immediate signals of price changes that so effectively facilitate the clearing of
markets in capitalist economies Movements in prices give incentives to adjust the allocation of
physical resources to accommodate the changing technology of production and the shifting tastes
of consumers
Among the key prices central planning systems lacked were the signals of finance—equity
values and the broad array of interest rates In a centrally planned system, finance plays a

-8decidedly minor role Since the production and distnbution of goods and services are essentially
driven by state orders and rationing, finance amounts to little more than a system for record
keeping While there are pro-forma payment transfers among state-owned enterpnses, few if any
actions are dnven by them Payment arrears, or even defaults, are largely irrelevant in the sense
that they are essentially intra-company transactions among enterpnses owned by the same entity,
that is, the state
Under central planning there are no credit standards, no interest rate nsks, no market
value changes-none of the key financial signals that determine in a market economy who gets
credit and who does not, and hence who produces what and sells to whom In short, none of the
financial infrastructure that converts the changing valuations of consumers and shifting
efficiencies of capital equipment into market signals that direct production for profit is available
But it didn't matter in the Soviet-bloc economies Few decisions in those centrally planned
systems were affected by the lack of a developed financial system
Regrettably, until the Berlin Wall was breached in 1989, and the need to develop market
economies out of the rubble of Eastern Europe's central planning regime became apparent, little
contemporary thought had been given to the institutional infrastructure required of markets In
the West, that infrastructure had developed pragmatically, interacting with, and facilitating the
evolution of, the markets themselves
In the years immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall, many of the states of the
former Soviet bloc did get something akin to a market system in the form of a rapid growth of
black markets that replicated some of what seemingly goes on in a market economy

-9But only in part Black markets, by definition, are not supported by the rule of law
There are no rights to own and dispose of property protected by the enforcement power of the
state There are no laws of contract or bankruptcy, or judicial review and determination again
enforced by the state The essential infrastructure of a market economy is missing
Black markets offer few of the benefits of legally sanctioned trade To know that the
state will protect one's rights to property will encourage the taking of risks that create wealth and
foster growth Few will risk their capital, however, if there is little assurance that the rewards of
risk are secure from the arbitrary actions of government, or street mobs.
Indeed, the presumption of property ownership and the legality of its transfer must be
deeply embedded in the culture of a society for free market economies to function effectively In
capitalist societies, and especially under British common law and its derivatives, the moral
validity of property rights is accepted, or at least acquiesced in, by virtually the whole of the
population Accordingly, a negligible proportion of commercial contracts has to be adjudicated
through the courts If it were otherwise, the system could not function
Most other rights that we Americans and others cherish—protection against extra-legal
violence or intimidation by the state, confiscation of property without due process, as well as
freedom of speech and of the press, and an absence of discrimination—are all essential to a fully
effective, functioning market system
Indeed a list or bill of rights enforced by an impartial judiciary is, and I hesitate to use the
analogy, what substitutes for the central planning function as the guiding mechanism of a free
market economy It is these "rights" that enable the value judgements of millions of consumers
to be converted through a legally protected free market into prices of products and financial

-10instruments, and it is, of course, these market prices that substitute for the state orders of the
centrally planned economies
The increasing recognition of a rule of law and its associated rights as being
indispensable to an effective functioning market system, is pressuring political leaders to a
greater acceptance of that framework Economic necessity appears to be functioning, but not in
the way Karl Marx contemplated The broad acceptance of market economics--and the political
rights associated with it-is impressive
Clearly, not all states protect the right of private property with the same fervor Indeed,
they vary widely Nor is it the case that all societies with firmly protected property rights bend
invariably to the majority will of the populace on all public issues But the pressures to meld
democracy and property rights appear persistent
Centrally planned economies tend to be frozen in time They cannot readily accommodate
innovation, new ideas, new products, and altered specifications
In sharp contrast, market economies are driven by what Professor Joseph Schumpeter, a
number of decades ago, called "creative destruction " By this he meant newer ways of doing
things, newer products, and novel engineering and architectural insights that induce the
continuous obsolescence and retirement of factones and equipment and a reshuffling of workers
to new and different activities Market economies in that sense are continuously renewing
themselves Innovation, risk-taking, and competition are the driving forces that propel standards
of living progressively higher
The bold, if unintended, experiment in economic and social systems, which began after
World War II in Europe, did not come to a full resting place with the fall of the Berlin Wall in

-111989 Despite the ebb and flow of governments of differing persuasions, the face of the world
economy continues to edge evermore toward free market-oriented societies It is true in Eastern
Europe, Latin America, and Asia Even many of the socialistic economies of Africa are
embracing free market capitalism.
The current crisis in East Asia is likely to hasten that trend as hard-learned lessons of
economic structure lead to significant reform The economies in crisis did not use central
planning of the pervasive Soviet Union style They relied on markets in most respects, but they
also used elements of central planning in the form of credit allocation, and those elements, in my
view, turned out to be their Achilles heel
The crises have their roots in the endeavor of some East Asian countries to open up their
economies to world competition, while still mandating a significant proportion of their output
through government directives It is, of course, possible for a time to clear a market through
central planning, albeit at a lower standard of living, by restricting alternatives available to a
population as the Soviet system demonstrated It is also possible to clear the market through the
free play of competitive forces with consumers' choices governing what is produced A market
will not readily clear and achieve stability, except by chance, however, if consumers are largely
free to choose, but production is set significantly by government directives
For it is only by chance that governments, meaning planning agencies, can successfully
gauge the rapidly changing tastes of consumers and evolving technologies of production It is
much too difficult a task Only sophisticated market mechanisms can do that Partial planning
of the sort practiced by some East Asian countries can look very successful for a time because
they started from a low technological base and had sufficient flexibility to allow business units to

-12borrow the more advanced technology of the fully market economies But there are limits to this
process as economies mature
Many Asian policymakers are learning that government-directed investments, backed by
government inducements to banks to finance them, can lead to substantial gains in output for a
number of years in economies with low real wages and low productivity (as it did in the Soviet
Union) Eventually and inevitably, however, such a regime leads to establish facilities that
produce goods and services that domestic consumers and export customers apparently no longer
want The consequent losses to companies, and the resultant buildup of nonperforming bank
loans, hobble financial intermediation and the economy
There has been, to be sure, much pain and periodic backtracking among a number of the
nations that discarded the mantle of some forms of central planning or mercantilist capitalism
There will doubtless be more But as a consequence of the experience of the last half century,
market capitalism has clearly become ascendant, at least for now Advancing technologies have
spurred the competitive forces of the market to accelerate the nse in consumer wealth and living
standards So long as material well being holds a high priority in a nation's value system, the
persistence of technological advance should foster this process If we can continue to adapt to
our new frenetic high tech economy, that is not a bad prospect for the next century