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Division of Research
Work Projects Administration ·
Research Monographs
I. Six Rural Problem Areas, Relief-Resources-Rehabilitation
II.
Ill.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.
XI.
XII.
XIII.
XIV.
XV.
XVI.
XVII.
XVIII.
XIX.
XX.
XXL
XXII.
XXIII.
Comparative Study of Rural Relief and Non-Relief Households
The Transient Unemployed
Urban Workers on Relief
Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation
Chronology of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, May
12, 1933, to December 31, 1935
.
The Migratory-Casual Worker
''
Farmers on Relief and Rehabilitation
Part-Time Farming in the Southeast
Trends in Relief Expenditures, 1910-1935
Rural Youth on Relief
.
.
Intercity Differences in Costs of Living ii, March· 1935, 59 Cities
Effects of the Works Program on Rural Relief
Changing Aspects of Rural Relief
Rural Youth: Their Situation and Prospects
Farming Hazards in the Drought Area
Rural Families on Relief
Migrant Families
,,
Rural Migration in the United Sta.tes
State Public Welfare Legislation
Youth in Agricultural Villages
The Plantation South, 1934-1937
Seven Stranded Coal Towns
.
'}
FRO M
YO~
C. W.
CON GRE SSM A
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
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.,,,.ity .-tdmini8tratirnt ( Hoth .., teiu ) .
"Th ere's nothing h er e but just coal."
A :IIirw r· ,; Back Ya rd in Carrie r :11 ills, JJI.
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UN 1VERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
L -1BANA-CHAMPAIGN
FEDERAL WORKS AGENCY
John M . Carmody, Administrator
WORK PROJECTS ADMINISTRATION
Howard 0. Hunter, Commissioner
Corrington Gill, Assistant Commissioner
DIVISION OF RESEARCH
Howard B. Myers, Director
SEVEN STRANDED
COAL TOWNS
A Study of an American Depressed Area
By
Malcolm Brown
and
John N. Webb
•
RESEARCH MONOGRAPH XXIII
1941
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON ·
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
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Jll
Letter of Transmittal
WOR1' PHOJECTS ADMINIS'J'RA'J'lON,
Washington. D. r'., .Tanvary 9, 1941.
Sm: T he problem of" derelict," economically wrecked areas in the
United States has long been of particular concern to the Work Projects
Administration. More than any other agency of the Government, the
WPA bears responsibility for relieving their extra.ordinary unemployment burdell, and, indeed, for preventing utter collapse in these communities which private industry has abandoned.
This is no light respo11sibility. Before the initiation of the national
defense program, one could identify some fifty-odd separate, chronically depr('ssed arens scattered across tbP countrr. Within them W('l'C
concentrated about one-tenth of the total 1,ited States population,
about one-si,-..::th of all the unemployed, abont one-fifth of all the
r., recipients of public assistance .
Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Cow1ties, 111., a part of the
southern Illinois coal field, constitute 011(' sucli ns('a. These three
comities, and especially seven selected coal to,n1s within the ('OllnLies,
°" 1 arc the subj('ct of the pre e11t, report.
:a
The southern Illinois problem, as the report shows, is threefold. In
Lhe first place, tlll'ee out of every fom jobs which formerly existed in
:Ii Fra.nklin , Saline, and Williamson coal mines- the area's solf' industry- ha.ve today disappeared, swept away by either min(' abandonment or mechanization. Receiit years of Nation-wide recovery have
not l1 alted this trend; at the begin11ing of 1941 the southern Illinois
coal mines employed fewer men than at any time during the preceding
quarter of a centmy.
Secondly, no new industries have appenred to fill this gap in the
area's economy. For two generations coal-town businessmen have
campaigned ardently for "outside industry" to supplant the declining
coal in dustry. By 1941, however, these campn.igns had still to win
their fu-st industry and to create their first lasting job in Franklin,
Saline, and Williamson Counties.
Meanwhile-and this is the third essential of the problem-the
size of the area's population bas suffered only a slight decline over a
period of 20 years.
Thus, intense local unemployment ha!' become almost a normal
r-state of th ings. Thousands of good workers lrnve bad no jobs for
many years. T housands of youth, blocked from entering industry,
have reached their most productive years without ever having held n.
j
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IV • LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
early half the peo ple are dependent on public aid year after
job.
,
year, and intense po,erty is common.
The conditions necessary for the dissolution of the depressed areas
ar c of course implicit in the circumstances of theu: origin. Either the
clecw1ing industry mu L be rejuvenated, or it mu t be supplanted, or
the people must mo,e away- obviously there are no other solutions.
The ational defense program will e,rn tu ally bring temporary
relief of one kind or another to many of the depressed arras. In
outhern lliinoi , for example, the immed iate prosprct is not totally
black, in spite of the continued stagnation of the local coal industry.
ince this report was written, coal-field unemployment has already
been slightly reduced by the emigration of young workers to defense
areas. Two year from now the coal field e:Kpects to have 6,000 new
defen. c jobs of its own at the War Department's proposed ordnance
plant on Crab Orchard Lake near Herrin.
Such developments do not justify a complacent outlook upon tlw
problems of the depressed areas. The decline of deprcssecl-aren
unemployment, waiting as it must upon the solution of N ation-wicle
unemployment, is likely to be much slower than might be hoped for.
And whatever improvement the depressed areas may enjoy will in
most cases disappear with the passing of the national emergency.
Aggravated crisis within the depresseJ areas \\ill be among America's
foremost postdefense problems.
The present study was made m the Division of Reseorch w1der the
direction of Howard B. Myers, Director of the Di.ision. The report
was prepared by Malcolm Brown and John . Webb, of the Social
Research Section. Special acknowledgment is made to M. Starr
Northrop, who snpervised the census of population and lmemployment; to Elizabeth J. Greenwood, who supervised the survey of buying
patterns among the long unemployed; to William G. Nowell and
D. C. Smith, who conducted research into the history and other
pecial aspects of the community; to Rebecca Pfefferman, who
supervised the preparat,ion of tabular and graphic materials and
assisted in the analysis; to Albert Westefcld, who assisted in the
analysis of chapter Vll; to Frances McDonald, who prepared the
manuscript for publication; and to Roy E. Stryker, of the Historical
ection, Division of Information, Farm Security Administration, for
the photographs used. Warm thanks are extended also to the scores
of residents of southern Illinois- particularly to union officials,
working miners, and the unemployed- who patiently assisted the
re earch worker in their inquiries.
Re pec:tfully submitLed.
CORRINGTON GILL,
Assistant Commissioner.
0. H uNTER ,
Commissioner o.f Work Projects.
HoN. HowARD
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Contents
Page
xv
Introduction
Summary
XXIII
1
Chapter I. The origins of a vu lnerable community
The coal boom _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
3
Discovery and consolidation _
Labor _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
3
5
The product of the new field _
Prosp erity _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _
6
7
ThP structure of loca l enterprise
10
R eal estate _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
11
Real-estate speculation
13
Th e building and loan us ociations
Banking ___ _
16
17
The tax structure _
18
The changing tax base _ _
18
The rise of tax income _ _
20
23
Chapter II. A depressed area _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
Unemployment and underemployment _
The labor force _ _
25
_ _ _ _
25
The unemployed
26
Underemployment
28
Disadvantaged workers
29
Employment policy in the mines _ _
29
Unemployment among coal miners
31
Age and unemployment _
33
Youth in the depressed area
34
Family unemployment __ ____ _
34
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Chapter Ill. Long un employment in the depressed a rea _
37
Duration of urwmployme 11L
38
Displaced miners _ _ _
39
The r est of the long un employed
39
Inexpcrienc ed workers _ _
40
Y ouLli _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
41
Th e rest of the inexperi eneecl ___ _ __ _
41
Work-progr am employmen t
____ _
43
_ _ _ _
Long-unem ployed fami lies _ _ _
The living standards of the long unemployed _
Income _ _ _ _ _ _
44
45
45
Expenditun • pattern s
46
Food _ _ _
47
Clothing _
48
Housing _
49
Medical care _
49
Other need s
50
Hnnd-to-rno utl 1 living _
51
Chapter IV. The decline of the southern Ill ino is coal industry _
53
coa l depression _ _ _
53
Over expan sion of mine capncity
Loss of markets _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
53
54
Liquidation of s urplu s capitc ity _
55
Recovery- but the problem s remain
55
Th e po twar position of south1·rn lllinois coal
56
Th e
J ation-wide
Co rnp eti tion
56
57
ThC' redu ced slrnn' of , outh!'rn [llinoi
mark et _ _ _ _ _
m th!' coal
Abandonml 'nt of mirws
58
59
R easons for M>andonme nt
New mines ______ _ _
61
Total effect of mi11<• abn,ndo11mc nt __
62
61
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Page
Mechanization of loading
____ _
64
Machine loading _ _ _ _ _ _ _
65
Total effect of mechanization_
66
A depressed area _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
66
Chapter V . Commun ity bankruptcy
71
___ _
The collapse of the real-estate boom
71
The end of real-estate promotion
72
Real-estate values in the 1920's
74
Building-and-loan activity ____ _
75
The r easons for th e building-and-loan boom
75
The end of the building-and-loan boom
77
House wrecking
79
The bank crash
80
The condition of the banks in the 1920's_
80
The collaps e _ _
82
Postal avings
83
Bankrupt governments
84
Tax income in the earlr 1920'
85
Unpaid taxes.
___ _
85
Chapter YI. Attempts at a so lutio n
89
Attempts to check mine unemployment _
89
Att<'mpts to eliminat!' th e machin es _
90
Attempts to r eopen abandoned mines
91
Sharing th!' work at tht· min!'s
92
Th<' "gopher holes " __ _
93
Attempts to bring in industry
____ _
What the coa,l field had to offer
95
_ _ _ _ _
"Land a factory " __
96
97
"Sink or swim "_ _
100
Back to the farm __
102
Farming in the thre<' counti!'s before 1930 _
103
The d epression _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
1Q4
The possibilitirs for a return to farming
105
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VIII • CONTENTS
P age
107
Chapter VII. Migration
Local forces affecting emigra tion _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _
Occupational exper ience _ _ _
108
108
The people
109
The settlement of tbc coal towns _
Money for moving _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ll0
______ _
ll3
A stranded population
ll2
The record of depress ion mobility __
ll4
Population changes between 1920 and 1930
ll5
Population changes s in ce 1930
ll6
Age differentials in mi gration
ll8
_ _ _ _
ll9
Birth-rate changes
120
Prospects for fu t ure migration
Chapter VIII. Relief _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
123
Traditions in loca l relief _ _ _ _ _
123
P auper-relief sta ndard s
125
Pred epression relief expenditures
126
The dark clays _ _ _ _ _ _ _
128
Public assistan ce after 1933
132
Extent of dependency _
Typ es of dependency
:111d
134
assistanC(' in the coal fi eld _
137
139
Work relief
Chapter IX. Conclusions _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
143
Reccn t public policy
143
American policy
143
Th e work programs _ _
144
British policy
146
Transference _
146
Inducements for investors _
147
_ _ _ _
148
The depressed areas in the nationn I d efense program_ _
149
The two special plans: What th ey involve _ _ _
149
The h eart of th e problem
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Page
Long-time problems _
151
Public assistance _
151
Local improvements.
15]
Regional conservation. and deYelopment _ _
152
Spontaneous migration
152
Appendix A. Tables _ _ _
157
Appendix 8. List of tables _
177
Index _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -
179
ILLUSTRATIONS
Figures
Figure
1. Men employed at shipping coal mines in Franklin., Saline,
and Williamson Counties, 1900- 1921 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
8
2. Capacity and production. of shipping coal mines in Franklin,
Saline, and Williamson Counties, 1900- 1921 _ _ _ _ _
9
3. Indices of local business activity in Franklin, Saline, and
Williamson Counties, 1900- 1921 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
12
4. An appeal to real-estat e speculators from Th e Franklin
County I ndependent, October 1906 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
14
5. Unemploym ent and underemployment in 7 southern
Illinois coal to"'-ns and in Birmingham , cw B edford .
Toledo, and San Francisco _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
27
6. Industry of usual occupation of unemployed workers , by
sex, in 7 southern Illinoi coal towns _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
:32
7. Percent of labor force unemployed in 7 southern Illinois
coal towns and in Birmingham, ew Bedford, Toledo ,
and San Francisco, by age groups _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
33
8. Unemployment among families in 7 southern Illinois coal
towns and in Birmingham, ew B edford, Toledo , and
San Francisco _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
35
9. Average duration of unemployment since last full-time job
of workers in 7 southern Illinois coal towns and in Birmingham, New B edford, Toledo , and San Francisco _ _
38
10. Industry of last full -time job of workers unemployed more
than 1 yea r and more than 3 years in 7 sou them Illinois
coal towns _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
40
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X • CONTENTS
Page
Figure
1 J. \r orkers under 25 years of age who never held a full-time
job 7 southern Illinois coal towns, Birmingham , ew
Bedford, Toledo , and San Francisco _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
42
12. Percent of unemployed workNs on work program u1 7
onthrrn Illinois coal towns and in Birmingham , ew
B edford , Toledo, and San Franci co _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
44
hipping mines operating at the close of 1925 and 1939 in
Franklin. Saline, and Williamson Counties _ _ _ _ _ _
63
14. Nfrn employed a,t shipping coal min es in Franklin, Saline,
and Williamson Counties, 1921- 1940 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
67
13.
15. Capacity t1,nd production of shipping coal mines in Franklin ,
aline, and Williamson Counties, 1921- 1940 _ _ _
16. Indices of local business activity in Franklin, Saline. aIJd
Williamson Counties, 1921- 1938_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
6
73
17. Popula.tion of school age, and men employed at shipping
coal mines in Franklin, Saline, and v\"illiamson Counties,
1918- 1938 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
114
18. Gain or loss in popu lation of 7 southern lllinoi coal towns.
1930- 1939 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
117
19. Gain or lo s in population aUributable to migration , by age
group, 5 outhern Illinois coal towns, 1930- 1939
118
20. Persons d ependent on public assistance• in Franklin, Saline.
and \Yilliamson Counties, April 1933- June 1939_ _ _ _
133
21. Percent of population depend ent on public assista11cp in
Franklin , Saline, and Williamson Counties and in Illiuois,
April 1933- June 1939 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
135
22. Estimatrd annual coal-mrne pay roll and am1ual expenditures for public assistance in Franklin. Saline. and
Williamson Counties, 1925- 1938 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
136
Photographs
A miner's back yard in Carrier Mills, IlL _ _
__ Frontispiece
One of the big Franklin County mines __
_ _ Facing
10
Unemployed southern Illinois miner
A young southern Illinoi worker __ _
__ Facing
30
_ Facing
40
The home of an unemployed miner in Franklin
County, IlL _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Facing
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CONTENTS • XI
Page
Abandoned . . . Bush 1finc. Franklin County , IlL _ Facing
58
Abandoned stores in Zeigler, IlL _
_ Facing
78
A gopher hole near Marion , IlL _
94
Strip mine near Carterville , IIL _
Facing
_ _ Facing
104
Main Street, Cambria, IIL __ _
Facing
138
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Seven Stranded Coal Towns
XIII
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INTRODUCTION
CERTAIN AMERICAN communities have borne far more than
ome were
their share of Wlemployment and relief since 1929.
at the
rates
Wlemployment
middepression
typical
already reporting
crash.
stock-market
the
after
months
6
Census,
1930
time of the
AdministraRelief
Emergency
Federal
the
of
operation
During the
tion (1933-1935) some were accustomed to carrying a much as half
or more of their entire population on the relief roll . The 1936
recovery passed them by. And in the trough of the 1937 recession
they reported 3 time , 10 time , some even 50 time higher W1employment rates than their more fortunate neighbors at the other end
of the scale. These communitie , comparable to the industrially
decadent "black districts" of Great Britain, are America' depressed
areas.
The problem of depre ed area i con iderably more serious than
i generally realized. Late in the decade of the l 930's (before the
national defen e program wa initiated) one could identify some
fifty-odd distinct depressed area in the nited tates. 1 The e areas
contained an aggregate population of 13 million, about one-tenth of
the total population of the United tates. In January 1935 more
1 The use of counties a
the geographical unit for identifying depres ed areas
conditions the results obtained. County data conceal pockets of unemployment
which more detailed data would reveal. :Xew York City, for example, doubtless contains a number of "depressed area ," but they cannot be isolated by the
use of existing data.
The areas were identified on the basis of their relief load in January 1935 and
the percent of gainful workers reporting unemployment in November 1937.
The lower limits of the identifying mea ures were arbitrarily set to include specified areas which had been shown by case studies to be, beyond reasonable doubt,
chronically depressed areas.
Se\·eral well-known "problem areas" were not "depressed areas" according to
the measures used. In particular, the greater part of the Cotton Belt was
excluded, since it reported relatively low relief and unemployment throughout
the 1930's. No attempt was made to include plane of living as a criterion.
These figures will, of course, bear substantial revision when the data on earnings and duration of unemployment in the 1940 Census are available.
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XVI • INTRODUCTION
than 3}f million persons in these areas received general relief, and
they accounted for nearly one-fifth of the total relief population of
the United States. In November 1937 the depressed areas contained
more than l ½ million totally unemployed workers, and their excess
of unemployment over their average share was equal to the total
unemployment of Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, and Cleveland
combined.
THE ORIGIN OF DEPRESSED AREAS
Depressed areas come forcefully to public attention only during a
period of general unemployment. Superficially, they then appear as
merely another manifestation of the depression itself, as the depression's special victims, where unemployment has struck hardest and
persisted most stubbornly. It would be a mistake to suppose that
the distinction between the depressed areas and their neighbors ends
with this observation. Beyond the general problems of the depression, depressed areas are a special problem in themselves.
In one sense a depressed area is nothing new on the American
scene. Essentially it is a modern instance of a community whose
basic function has been rendered unprofitable by noncyclical trends
in the pattern of economic interrelations. During the past 100 years
there have been scores of such communities. In the past, however,
two opposing forces have usually come into play, preventing the full
development of a depressed area.
In the first place, the workers not needed in a given community
might move away and find work elsewhere. Thus, with the depletion
of the western gold fields in the 1880's the population simply decamped,
sometimes to the last man. Even as late as the 1920's half the population of numerous central Georgia counties were still able to pick up
and move out after the boll-weevil invasion. More often, however,
wholesale emigration was unnecessary; ordinarily the community
itself could r ebuild its wrecked economic base by shifting to an expanding industry. New Bedford, for example, shifted from whaling to
textiles; South Bend turned its wagon industry to manufacturing
automobiles; Key West became a shipping center when its cigar
industry collapsed. Baltimore, Louisville, St. Louis, and numerous
other American cities have passed through such metamorphoses
since the Civil War.
After 1929 both of these self-healing remedies failed. The general
disappearance of job opportunities not only checked the exodus of
surplus workers from the declining communities but often turned the
stream backward. As a result, "redundant" workers found themselves for th e first time stranded in large numbers within areas where
opportunity had disappeared. The possibility of developing substitu tr industries to absorb the unemployed locally also vanished;
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INTRODUCTION • XVII
investors who shunned the depressed areas in prosperous times found
even less reason for favoring them afterwards. On top of all, the
general depression intensified the decline within these communities,
and hastened the economic degeneration already latent. Overnight
the long-developing difficulties reached maturity. Unemployed
workers piled up by the thousands, the relief load soared, and poverty
became the lot of a great part of the people. At this point the problems of the depressed areas achieved sudden recognition.
The Vulnerable Communities
Not all areas are equally vulnerable to this type of disintegration;
in the aggregate, depressed areas have their own peculiar characteristics. Although several diversified areas have been identified as
depressed, highly specialized areas-whether engaged in extractive
or manufacturing industries-are predominant. The vulnerability
of such communities is clearly related to the narrowness of their
economic base.2 D epletion, as in the stranded oil fields and lumbering
districts; or the loss of markets, as in depressed cotton-growing areas
and bituminous coal fields; or technological obsolescence, as in several
steel-processing centers; or the emigration of industry, as in stranded
cigar and textile centers- these forces paralyze the sole foundation
of economic life in the specialized communities. Without buffer
industries, whole areas are disrupted.
Isolation of one sort or another is a second characteristic of the depressed areas id entified. Several areas, especially those devoted to
extractive industries, are set off at a great distance from the nearest
labor market, so that the emigration of workers is extremely difficult.
Specialized skills tend to immobiliz stranded workers in some of the
depressed areas, particularly in the coal fields and steel centers where
technological changes hav e played special havoc. In other areas, the
problem is complicated still furth er by ethnic isolation, involving not
only egroes, but also important Spanish-language groups in Florida
and T exas. Finally, such depressed areas as the Appalachian and
Ozark Highlands are isolated by a singular culture pattern. In each
instance, the dispersion of "redundant population," difficult enough
in any case, is made even more difficult.
0
The Effects
Internally, the pathology of a depressed area also follows its own
specia.l logic. The extraordinary impact of unemployment, often
1 It does not follow that all specialized communities are vulnerable; indeed,
quite the contrary is true. Many of the least depressed communities are also
specialized-the Iowa food-industry cities, the Piedmont textile districte, and the
Connecticut metalworks cities, for example.
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XVIII • INTRODUCTION
involving half or more of an entire labor force, leads to qualitative
differences of the utmost gravity. The youth problem, for example,
take on a new aspect, for a large proportion of the younger workers
grow into their most productive years without ever knowing the experience of a job in private industry. The long unemployed-those experienced workers who have not worked in private industry for a year,
2 years, even 5 years-form a substantial part of the entire labor
force, and thousands of workers in middle age give up all hope of ever
working again.
Some of the workers, particularly the youth, leave the community
to seek work elsewhere, and a few get jobs. But the great majority,
pauperized by bank failures, foreclosures , and years of unemployment,
lack the resources as well as the contacts necessary for migration, and
they never get away. Many who leave eventually come home again .
pontaneous migration does not proceed rapidly enough to diminish
appreciably the size of the population. Such migration as does occur
drains away the ablest workers, leaving a people h eavily weighted
with the aged, and laying the basis for even more serious problems in
years to come.
The people of the depressed area are h elpless in the face of the disaster. Enthusiastic campaigns to rebuild the economic base-:-" to
land outside industry"-fritter away without producing substantial
results. Th e attempt to save the tottering industrial structure by a
return to more primitive techniques creates as many problems as it
solves. Subsistence farming for the unemployed finds many willing
recruits, but in practice it has usually been ineffectual. The bankrupt
local governments are powerless to carry on their normal activities,
let alone to give r elief to the unemploy ed. Large-scale grants from
the Federal and State Governments are required to save the community from utter collapse.
THE SOUTHERN ILLINOIS COAL FIELD
Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Counties, in southern I llinois, are
such an area. These three counties have long been of special interest
to the Work Project Administration b ecause they have required, year
after year, WP A employment quotas three or four times greater
than average American communiti es of the same size. In order to
get full information on the characteristics and problems of th.is depressed area-and in turn, to throw light on the problems of depressed
areas generally-the WPA Division of R esearch conducted a detailed
survey of the community in 1939 . The r esults of this survey are
the subject of the present report.
The principal Illinois coal field consists of 13 counties extending
nearly 200 miles southward from the center of the State in the shape
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INTRODUCTION • XIX
of the letter" C." The top of the field is at Springfield, the center at
East St. Louis, the bottom at Harrisburg, Ill. , 50 miles north of Paducah, Ky. In the northern part of this area coal mining is only one of
several diverse activities (except in two specialized coal counties);
and in several counties it holds a distinctly minor position in the total
economy. South of East St. Louis, howe,er, the size and frequency
of the mines encountered gradually increases, while the farms become
poorer and other industries gradually disapp ear. At the very bottom
of the field are Franl<lin Saline, and Williamson Counties, almost entirely dependent upon a group of gigantic coal mines.
Thi? Thrl? I? Countil?S
Of the three counties Franklin is by far the most important coal
producer, mining nearly 9 million tons in 1939. In spite of its reverses
dming recent yeru·s, Franl<lin is still one of the half-dozen leading
coal-mining counties in the nited States and the top producer west
of the Appalachians. Franklin County coal is all "deep-vein," lying
300 to 600 feet below the surface of the prairie. It can thus be recovered only by shaft mining. 3 Ample sources of capital, together
with several peculiar advantages in the seam/ have led to large-scale
operation; one of the Franklin County mines is the largest on eru·th ,
and three others have a daily output of more than 5,000 tons. Franl{lin County operators have also been able to take advantage of most
of Lhc recent revolutionary advance in coal-recovery techniques, so
that in 1941 the Franklin County mines were among the most mbdern
and efficient shaft mines in the United States.
Saline County, with a 1939 outpu t of over 3½ million tons, ranks
fourth among the Illinois coal-producing counties. In the northern
part of the county the coal is recovered by deep-vein shaft mines
similar to those in Franklin County, though somewhat smaller.
Towards the south, however, the seam rises gradually to the surface
of the prairie, so that shaft mining is no longer necessary. Along the
southern edge of the seam a considerable ru·ea of coal lies under an
overburden of only about 100 feet. In this area several highly
efficient slope mines 6 have recently been developed. Further south
3 A shaft mine is one in which loaded pi t cars are hoisted from the underground
workings to the surface by means of a system of tandem elevators, or "cages,"
operating in a vertical shaft.
• The No. 6 seam in Franklin County lies almost level, and is relatively free
from faults. T he underground transportation system can accordingly radiate
great distances off the central shaft without encountering difficulties.
6 In slope mines coal is brought to the surface either by means of an inclined
track on which the pit cars run, or on an inclined belt conveyor. In either case,
the elaborate system of cages and hoists used in shaft mines is eliminated.
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still there is an area with an overburden of 60 feet or less. Here the
coal is recovered by strip m.ining,6 the most efficient of all mining
methods.
Williamson County, once the leading coal county in Illinois, ranked
only eighth in 1939 with an output of 2½ million tons. Like Saline,
Williamson County mines both deep-vein and shallow-vein coal;
hence it uses the thrne recovery techniques-shaft mining, slope
mining, and stripping. In addition, there are in Williamson some
one-hundred-and-fifty-odd small, makeshift workings called "gopher
holes," 7 where farmers and displaced workers from the great mines
near by dig shallow-vein coal for the local trade. These mines, which
work the leavings of the coal lands und er the most primitive technical
conditions, represent a return to handicraft methods of production
under the stress of the depression.
The one other primary industry is agriculture. There are scattered,
small communities of prosperous farmers within the three counties,
particularly in Saline County, which has, indeed, b een partially
stabilized by its farm economy. By and large, however, the land
within the area is poor ; erosion has taken a h eavy toll in some sections; and many of the farms are too small for profitable operation.
For generations farmers throughout "Egypt" 8 have counted themselves lucky when they raised half the corn crop regularly grown on the
richer lands 100 miles to the north. As a m atter of fa.ct, several
of the purely agricultural southern Illinois counties adjoining the
coal field are more depressed than the coal counties themselves.
There are 140,000 people living within the area of the 3 counties,
more than half of them living in some twenty-odd coal towns ranging
in size from 500 to 13,000 population. The majority of these people
are descended from settlers who came into Illinois between 1870
and 1910 from the W est Kentucky hills; thus, in speech and numerous folkways, the area is at bottom culturally homogeneous with
th e western Appalachians and distinctly unlilrn the Illinois Corn
Belt communities. In addition to the Kentuckians, several large
foreign-born groups-principally Italians, Hungarians, Croatians,
and Ukrainians-settled in southern Illinois b etween 1900 and 1920
for work in the mines. Finally, Williamson County contains a
separate egro settlement of about 3,000 persons.
8
In strip mines huge power shovels first remove the overburden from the seam,
then simply load out the coal in the open air.
7 "Gopher holes" are officially known as "local" mines, because they produce
coal for the trucking trade and are distinguished from the "shipping" mines, which
produce for railway shipment. Most of them employ from 5 to 10 workers for a
short season at substandard wages.
8 "Egypt" is the local name for the southernmost one-fourth of Illinois, lyi ng
south of a line drawn between Vincennes, Ind., and St. Louis, Mo. The three
coal counties are in the heart of this district.
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INTRODUCTION • XXI
The Study of the Depressed A rea
The present study is based mainly upon three primary sources
of information. T he first source is a census of unemployment and
population, conducted between December 1938 and March 1939 in
seven coal towns selected to present a fair cross section of the nonagricultw-al population. The towns chosen were:
County and town
Population
(1939)
Franklin County:
West Frankfort ______________________ __ _______ ___ 12, 733
Zeigler_ ______ ______ ______________ ________ __ ____ _ 3, 017
Saline County:
Carri er Mills__ ___ _ __ _ __ _ ____ ___ ___ __ _ _ __ __ __ _ ___ _ 2, 234
Eldorado ____________ ___________ _________________ 4,620
Williamson County:
Bush____________ _______ ___ _________ _____________
Herrin__ _________ ______________ ______ __ _______ _
Johnston City_______ ____ ______ ___________________
643
9,608
5,353
T his list includes the larger towns as well as the small mine villages.
towns where mine mechanization was complete as well as the towns
dependent (at the time) on hand loading, and it include the most
prosperous towns remaining in the area as well as the most utterly
depressed. This survey was supplemented with a detailed study
of the buying patterns of long-unemployed families in fow- of the
seven towns.
The second step in the research was a thorough examination of all
pertinent local records on the development of the community. Special emphasis was given to courthouse record dealing with coal-land
ownership, real-estate transfers, real-estate values, the distribution
of the tax load, and tax delinquency. The minutes kept by the
county commissioners and county supervisors were traced for information on the history of poor relief, and for the record of all county
and township expenditw-es. Local newspaper files covering 40 years
in the life of the coal field were read in detail to reconstruct the
history of th e community.
F inally, field research workers informally discussed the problems
of th e coal field with hundreds of local residents. All sections of the
community were covered in this work, and each of the dozens of
conflicting points of view exl)ressed was carefully considered. Ministers, merchants, editors, coal operators, bankers, public officials,
r elief case workers, and teachers were interviewed, together with
scores of workers of all types-miners at the face, union officials,
shopkeep ers, clerks, farmers, and the unemployed.
The organization of the report may be briefly outlined. Chapter I
traces th e economic history of th e three counties through two decades
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XXII • INTRODUCTION
of the great southern Illinois coal boom. The condition of the coal
field in 1939 is described in chapters II and III, with special reference
to the peculiarities of a depressed labor market. The decline of the
Franklin, Saline, and Williamson coal industry is discussed in chapter
IV, and the parallel collapse of local enterprise is traced in chapter V.
Chapter VI deals with the various local attempts, all more or less futile,
to solve the communities' problems. Chapter VII discusses the
emigration of workers from southern Illinois since the dark days first
set in. The extraordinary record of relief in the three counties is
presented in chapter VIII. Finally, chapter IX discusses the general
problem of depressed areas, with an analysis of the possible solutions
that might be attempted.
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SUMMA RY
FEW COMMUNITIES in America are more specialized than Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Counties, three contiguous counties in the
southern lliinois coal field . Outside of agriculture, which has never
prospered on the relatively sterile lands of southern lliinois, the three
counties have only one industry-coal.
Between 1900 and the middle of the 1920's coal mines served the
community well. For a quarter of a century the southern illinois coal
industry enjoyed a dramatic growth, employing an ever-increasing
number of miners to produce coal for an ever-expanding market.
More than 100 mines hoisted coal each day in the 3 counties. Sesser
had 3 mines, Benton had 4, Johnston City had 8, Pittsburg had 3, and
16 mines operated in and around H errin.
About 15 years ago, however, the southern Illinois field began to
lose markets rapidly to rival coal fields and to competing fuels .
Prosperity suddenly ended. The few mines which survived were
saved only by the continual introduction of new laborsaving techniques, with the result that increased efficiency displaced thousands of
workers. Si.."ty of the hunched mines were abandoned and more
thousands of miners were thrown out of work. At last there were no
mines left in Sesser, in Benton, in Johnston City, in Pittsburg; and of
Herrin's 16 mines, only I-equipped with the most modern and
effi.cien t machinery-remained.
In th e wake of mounting unemployment came great waves of bankruptcies and foreclosures. A total of 34 coal-town banks collapsed
within 2 years, and 7 million dollars in savings were swept away. The
building and loan associations, to whom a large part of the population
was debtor, found themselves unable to collect high interest on
property that had suddenly become almost worthless. There followed
score upon score of repossessions, and huncheds of building-and-loan
houses were razed for secondhand lumber. Little busin essmen by
th e dozens closed th eir doors. The tax structure collapsed.
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XXIV
O
SUMMARY
UNEMPLOYMENT
The disintegration of the local coal industry has left the three
counties economically prostrate. At no time during the past 4 years
has less than one-third of the population been dependent on public
assistance and the proportion rose to half for short periods during
both 1938 and 1939. In the seven towns surveyed, more than twofifths of all available workers were unemployed at the peak of the 1939
mining season; in Johnston City 60 percent were unemployed; in the
little mine village of Bush unemployment claimed four out of every
five workers. The distress of the coal towns had apparently become
still more grave by the early autumn of 1940, when 4 of the larger
mines operating at the time of the 1939 survey had been abandoned
and their 1,200 employees dismissed.
The great majority of the unemployed in the coal towns fall into
two groups. The largest of these consists of the long unemployed.
As the local labor market tightened year after year, there came a time
when a man who lost his job was not likely to find another. His
qualifications, his experience, his union, even his friends, could do him
little service, for job opportunities had all but vanished. Unemployed
workers thus became in the course of time long-unemployed workers.
By 1939 half the coal-town unemployed consisted of experienced
workers who had held no private job for at least 1 year.
Among the long-unemployed workers coal miners are of course
most numerous. The displaced miners, as a group, reported continuous unemployment for an average of more than 5 years at the
time of the study. The group was, moreover, heavily weighted with
older workers whose industrial experience had been confined principally to loading coal by hand, an occupation now largely obsolete in
southern Illinois. The rest of the long unemployed had been discharged from a score of industries devoted either to servicing the community or to servicing the coal industry itself. Since the coal field
contains virtually no manufacturing industries, very few operatives
were included among the unemployed.
The second major unemployed group was composed of youth who
had reached working age and who had found no job after months and
even years in the labor market. By 1939 one unemployed worker in
every three was a new worker who had never h eld a _job in private
industry. Four-fifths of all the unemployed were thus either longunemployed or inexperienced workers.
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SUMMARY • XXV
PROSPECTS FOR NEW EMPLOYMENT
At the Mines
It is obviously impossible to predict the extent of the market for
southern Illinois coal during the next few years. The University of
Illinois is now developing a technique for briquetting southern Illinois
coals and making them smokeless; if perfected, the technique would,
of course, increase the demand for southern Illinois coal. On the
other hand, the field suffers increasing competition from a great oil
and gas pool recently brought into production at Salem and Centralia,
Ill., only 75 miles from Herrin.
The effects of the national defense program on the southern
Illinois coal industry cannot be clearly foreseen. If one supposed
that the community could again market as much coal as it produced
in 1917-a somewhat dubious assumption-the prospects for reem. ployment at the mines would still be extremely meager. The efficiency
of the average southern Illinois miner has exactly doubled since 1917.
The tonnage mined in 1917 required 25,000 miners; the same tonnage
could be mined in 1941 with only 12,500 miners, fewer than were
actually employed at the bottom of the depression in 1933.
New Industries
For 30 years the coal towns have campaigned ardently to secure
new industries to supplant the declining coal industry. They have
offered subsidies to outside manufacturers ; they have donated land
and buildings; they have offered guarantees against unionization;
for many years they have advertised the industrial advantages of the
community. But the few investors who have accepted such offers
have long since failed; and three decades of attempting to broaden
the area's economic base must be accounted an utter failure .
EMIGRATION
There has been a slight population decrease in southern Illinois
since the decline of the coal industry first began. In 1920 the 3
counties contained 157,000 persons; in 1930, population had fallen to
150,000 persons; and by 1940 it had declined to 140,000 p ersons.
Over a period of two decad es, the area thus lost 10 p ercent of its
population. Population decrease, however, has lagged far behind the
decline in economic opportunity. During the period when population
was declining 10 percent, the number of men employed at the coal
mines fell from 29,000 to 10,000, a drop of 66 percent.
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XXVI • SUMMARY
The migrants who have left southern Illinois dming the past decade
have consisted principally of youth of both sexes. In the older age
groups emigration has been insignificant; among the very old, indeed,
there has recently been a net increase from migration. These tendencies have resulted in a rapid "aging" of the general population,
thus storing up more serious problems for the future of the community . Emigration of coal-town youth in response to defense activity will doubtless be accelerated in the immediate future. Among the
older workers, however, emigration will still be hindered by the fact
that years of unemployment and relief have left large sections of the
population without the resources necessary for migration in search
of work.
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Chapter I
THE ORIGINS OF A VULNERABLE COMMUNITY
LESS THAN two decades ago the southern lliinois coal field was
riding the crest of a prolonged and spectacular boom. At that time
the coal industry of Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Counties h ad
behind it a record of more than 20 years of uninterrupted advance,
and it was still expanding. The territory between the towns of West
Frankfort and Benton was being surveyed for the site of the New
Orient, the largest coal mine ever developed. Workers were in demand . Nearly every school boy was going into the mines as soon as
he finished the eighth grade. Herrin residents remember those years
as the time when "you could stand on the roof of the city hall and see
smoke from 16 mines every day ." Coal-town service enterprises-th e
banks, the stores, the real-estate agencies, the building and loan associations- reflected the activity at the mines and fl.omished more
dramatically than the coal industry itself.
The prosperity of the area appeared in those times to be as solid as
one could hope for. The three counties were built on coal, and coal
was basic to the American economy. The southern lliinois coal
reserves , then as now, were never spoken of except in terms of being
"almost inexhaustible." Above all, the great natmal advantages of
the coal field- the level-lying coal deposit, the 8-foot seam in the
No. 6 coal, the high B . t. u. and low sulphm content, the flat top land,
and the short run to Chicago ("largest coal market in the worlJ")seemed to assure the favorable competitive position of southern
Illinois coal for y ears to come. Two decades ago a person would have
supposed that the three counties wer e to have a vastly different
future from the one which actually lay in store.
Today the southern Illinois coal field presents a picture, almost
unrelieved, of utter economic devastation. The years since 1923 have
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een the community lose three out of every four of its mines. They
have seen a half-dozen once lively coal centers gradually sink to ghost
towns. They have seen the building-and-loan bubble burst in every
coal town and every bank throughout the greater part of the coal
field driven into bankruptcy. They have seen employment shrink
until two out of every five workers were "surplus" at the busiest
season of the year, while the public-assistance load climbed until it
included more than half the entire population of the three counties.
They have seen the coal boom subside and give way to hopeless
poverty. 1
How did so radical and unexpected a decline in the fortunes of
Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Counties come about? One may
hear many pat answers to this question. The "Jacksonville Scale,"
which set up a higher wage for Illinois miners than was paid in competing nonunion fields, is usually isolated as the one villain in the
piece. But one may justifiably wonder what connection the Jacksonville Scale, abandoned in 1928, could have had with the failure of
coal-field banks in 1932, with the foreclosure of miners' homes in 1935,
or with tax delinquency in 1940.
Another common explanation is that the miners "couldn't stand
prosperity" when they earned high daily wages during the middle
1920's, 2 that they "squandered their money on silk shirts" and
automobiles, that they failed to save for a less prosperous time, and
that their current plight is somehow a just recompense for earlier
folly. But careful examination shows that the legend of the "silkshirt era," as retold today, is built as much on fancy as on fact. In any
case, the accumulation of savings in banks that were eventually to
crash could hardly have altered the history of the coal field. One
will also be told that the present condition of the three counties was
brought on by loading machines, or by the Herrin riots in 1922, or
by the movement off the farms between 1900 and 1930.
Actually, the story of distress in the southern Illinois cottl field
cannot. be reduced to a simple, single cause. The complex forces at
work upon the fortunes of the three counties can, however, be separated into two main threads. One of these is the coal industry itself,
whose rise and fall of course played a dominant, though not a lone,
role in the history of the coal field. The other thread, less often
1 This was written late in 1939, before the national defense program got under
way. In September 1940 a field research worker revisited the community and
found its condition in no way improved. Three mines which were operating when
this study was conducted had been abandoned by September 1940, displacing
1,250 men.
2 Such, for example, is the judgment of a writer who discussed another declining
American coal field in Harpers Magazine, March 1940, p. 412 (Rice, Millard
Milburn, "Footnote on Arthurdale"). This general attitude is also popular
among coal-town businessmen.
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A VULNERABLE COMMUNITY • 3
recognized, lies in the structure of local finance and enterprise which
was created in response to the activity of the mines, but which often
ran a strange independent course of its own. To understand each of
these threads in the history of the coal field, it will be profitable to
begin with their origins 40 years ago, when southern Illinois first
became one of America's important coal fields .
THE COAL BOOM
Discovery and Consolidation
At the turn of the twentieth century the great coal deposits of
Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Counties were for the most part
still undiscovered. H ere and there a few small mines had started
commercial operation, some as early as the 1880's, but for many
years development proceeded slowly. According to the legend,
prospectors had believed that the district's coal occurred only in
pockets, so that if drillers found coal in one place their discovery
was taken as proof that coal could not be found elsewhere in the
neighborhood. Several decades of hit-and-miss exploration had
turned up only a few isolated "pockets," one at Carterville, one at
Johnston City, and one at Marion-all in Williamson County-and
one at Ledford in Saline County.
Not long before 1900 came the first realization that southern Illinois
might have a coal deposit of Nation-wide importance. A group of
small landowners near the present town ofJierrin had become skeptical of the accepted notions about coal o~rence in southern Illinois
and had started drilling on a plot of poor farmland midway between
the Carterville and Johnston City mines. At 150 feet below the
surface they struck a rich 9-foot seam of high quality coal. Soon
afterward n ew drill holes were put down and coal was found to run
all the way across H errin's Prairie from Carterville to Johnston City.
The new Herrin field, some thirty-odd square miles of coal, was the
small investor's opportunity. Only three large blocks of coal were
consolidated, two of them coming under the control of directors of
the Missouri Pacific Railroad. The rest of the new field was parceled
out to numerous small promoters, each taking up blocks varying from
200 to 1,000 acres. Williamson County coal all lay so close to the
surface that exploitation usually required only a small accumulation
of capital, and the n ew operators set to the work of development
immediately. By 1900 three new mines in western Williamson
County were already hoisting coal, and more than a score of others
were being planned.
There were certain investors who took very careful note of the
Herrin discovery. Among these were the more powerful Chicago
mineowners and retail coaldealers, who observed that the northern
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Illinois fields were rapidly playing out and that a newly discovered
high-grade coal, mined close at hand, might soon command the midwestern fuel market. By 1903 this group was fortified with earnings
made during the Chicago coal famin es (which followed the great
anthracite strikes) and were ready to move on to larger enterprises.
Several wildcat coal promoters, fresh from the job of opening n ew
coal properties at New River, or the Hocking Valley, or Kansas, or
Indiana, were looking for newer fi elds to exploit. Steel manufacturers
were anxious to find a coking coal somewhere near their Chicago
mills. Most interested of all were the railroads, not only because of
their operating n eeds, but also because they were deep in a plan to
organize the soft-coal industry as a subsidiary of the carriers, just as
P ennsylvania anthTacite had al.ready been organized.
The Herrin discovery had brought into question all the old notions
about coal occurrence in southern Illinois and suggested the existence
of large undiscovered deposits. The four group of investors responded quickly to the suggestion. Throughout 1900 drill crews
prospected quietly across eastern Williamson County. Land dealers
followed, buying up the land. Within a short time about 15 sections
of coal land east of Johnston City had been consolidated and purchased
by the Illinois Central, and another block of 4,000 acres was taken
Iorth of Herrin , a wildcatter
up by the Illinois Steel Company.
financed by John W. (Bet-a-million) Gates took title to another large
block of Williamson coal. A leading Chicago coaldealer bought two
operating mines at Marion and drove a railroad from Williamson into
the heart of Saline County, buying up the mineral rights along the way.
The most startling discovery was still to come. About 1900 a
wealthy young Chicago promoter named Joseph Leiter bought out the
patent rights on a special coking process, and started a search for a
coking coal. Eventually he e>.-perimented with Carterville coal and
thought it satisfactory (mistakenly, as it later developed). After an
unsuccessful attempt to buy the Carterville mine, Leiter hired a
geologist to discover whether similar coal might be found near by.
The geologist concluded that the Carterville seam ran northward
into Franklin County; and when test drill holes were sunk, the cores
showed that there existed beneath 400 feet of overburden a new field
more extensive and valuable than any yet discovered in southern
Illinois. In 1903 Leiter bought a solid square block of 7,000 acres,
started sinking a shaft, and built the company town of Zeigler.
By 1904 the findings of Leiter's geologist had brought America's
largest corporations scrambling for land in southern Illinois, and especially in Franklin County. The Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy
Railroad bought some 10,000 acres of coal land at Valier, and started
extension of its tracks to the coal field. The United States Steel
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Corporation took up the greater part of two townships east of Benton.
The Missouri Paci.fie consolidated an extensive block of coal at Bush;
the Illinois Central took over twenty-thousand-odd acres north of
Carterville, together with an operating mine; and the Frisco Lines got
control of a block between Benton and West Frankfort. A wildcatter
and a northern Illinois operator bought a couple of townships of
mineral rights in Franklin and Williamson. In Saline a coal operator
controlled by the New York Central Railroad bought up thousands of
acres from Eldorado to Carrier Mills.
The pattern of coal ownership which has since dominated the
southern Illinois field was firmly established by 1907, when the last
stray mineral rights were brought under control. In the gaps between
the great coal blocks of Franklin and Saline Counties a few small
investors-some local, some absentee- had gained a foothold; and in
western Williamson County, where the boom first started, the small
holders were numerous. But the great majority of the coal had come
into the hands of about a dozen companies, holding from 10 to 50
sections each. Four of these holdings were" captive" to the railroads,
that is, held with a view to supplying the railroads' own coal needs. 3
Two others were captive to steel manufacturers. The other half-dozen
great blocks were held by companies connected more or less directly
with Chicago and St. Louis coaldealers. The fortunes of the southern
Illinois coal field were dependent from the start upon these few absentee operators and their successors, and the decisions of these
Chicago, New York, and Boston investors were in the course of time
to make their share of history in the three counties.
Labor
The Illinois miners' union and the southern Illinois coal field were
born at the same time and grew up together. In 1898, just at the
opening of the first mine on Herrin's Prairie, the United Mine Workers
of America (Illinois District) won their first considerable victory in
the State and successfully negotiated contracts with most of the
Illinois operators. Nearly all of the few small mines that had already
started operation in Williamson and Saline Counties signed contracts
in 1898, and the transition to collective bargaining at each new mine
developed after 1898 came for the most part without great strain or
friction.
There were, however, two significant exceptions, which had a
profound influence on the history of the southern Illinois union. In
1899 a Carterville operator had decided to import Negro miners to
3 The original railroad plan for controlling all the output of the field was wrecked
by the Hepburn Act of 1906, which prevented railroads from engaging in the coal
business except to supply their own operating needs.
J1 ,;
IN ER'-1
.ed by
A,-ICHIVE
Cm
11 =ii
from
UN V:..t{SIT" C IL .INC S AT
URBANA-CHAM~AIGN
6 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TO WNS
break a strike at his tipple. Inevitably, violence followed and
numerous persons were killed. This tactic isolated the operator and
led most of the community to support the strike. The operator was
eventually driven to bankruptcy, and finally, after 7 years of nonunion
operation, he gave way to an operator who immediately signed a
contract with the union. A similar incident occurred in Franklin
County, where another isolated operator tactlessly housed his strikebreakers in a stockade protected with Gatling guns. Again there
was violence, again the community supported the strikers, again the
union won after years of bitterness. In 1910, when this last nonunion
'mine started operating under union contract, collective bargaining
had become a part of the natural order of things in the southern Illinois
coal field.
The Product of th e New Field
Even before the great landholdings were consolidated, the rush to
develop the field had begun. From 1900 through 1904 Williamson
and Saline Counties saw 29 new mines opened and during the next
3 years another 21 mines started hoisting coal. In Franklin County
the Zeigler shaft was rushed to completion and began hoisting late
in 1904. The next year two other Franklin County mines opened,
followed in 1907 by five more (appendix table 1). By 1907
southern Illinois coal had become a competitor to be reckoned with
in every midwestein coal market from Bismarck to Chicago.
The new coal had many substantial advantages. In competition
with the dwindling supply of coal from northern Illinois, southern
Illinois coal had to meet a somewhat higher freight rate, but mining
costs were so favorable that they offset the freight differential. In
competition with Indiana coal, southern Illi110is also had a slight
disadvantage in freight rates to Chicago (though not to St. Louis),
but most Indiana coals were of poorer quality. The chief fuel on
the Chicago market of better quality than southern Illinois coal was
a soft coal from the Hocking Valley of Ohio and Pennsylvania anthracite, both of which had to bear a far higher freight rate than southern
Illinois coal.
The investors who opened the field provided a different kind of
advantage. Joseph Leiter was able to spend a considerable sum of
money advertising Zeigler, and thereby helped to build a reputation
for all the Franklin County coal. The new Williamson mines cashed
in similarly on the advertising of a Carterville operator who had made
"Carterville prepared lump" well known on the Chicago market
before the boom started. Several of the mines had enough capital
to provide washers and other cleaning equipment, a new departure
for the time. The railroad mines were helped along with ready-made
contracts and sometimes special rates, while freight rebates came to
Di91• zt... by
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INTERNET ARCHIVE
JNIVERSITY OF llc!NOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
A VULNERABLE COMMUNITY • 7
the aid of several favored independent operators. Finally, many of
the new mines were closely tied to the larger Chicago coaldealers , who
naturally pushed the sale of coal from thf'ir own tipples. Thus,
throughout the early period the West Virginia and Kentucky coal
jobbers, who were later to affect so decisively the fortunes of southern
Illinois, were still begging orders from office to office in Chicago, and
offering their coal on consignment to overcome the reluctance of
midwestern buyers.
Prosperity
Under all these favorabl e influences, the new field pushed rapidly
into the midwestern coal market. Y ear after year the sale of southern
Illinois coal increased. Coal output and mine capacity expanded
with an amazing regularity. Each year saw more men digging coal
in the thr ee counties than the year before. At times the growth was
rapid, as in the early discovery years and the World War boom. At
other times-in the d epression of 1907 and the prewar slump-the
growth was slower. But every single year for a quarter of a century,
from the discovery of coal on H errin's Prairie in 1896 until the postwar depression in 1921 , there was always some advance and never a
backward step (figs. 1 and 2).
Th e magnitude of growth during the long period of steady advance
was particularly impressive: the average net increase in employment
each year between 1900 and 1923 was 1,400 men. The average growth
of coal output during the same period was 1 million tons, roughly
equal to the total output of the field during the year 1900. From
1900 to 1923 an average of two mines was abandoned per year, but
an average of six new mines started hoisting coal (see appendix table 1).
At the beginning of the coal boom southern Illinois coal supplied
only an insignificant part, of the demand on the Chicago and St. Louis
markets; at the end, the three counties were by far the greatest
coal-producing region west of the Appalachians an<l one of the two
or three leading coal regions in the United States.
Th ere was only one catch to this remarkable record of advance:
the growth of production wa constantly being outrun by t.he growth
of mine capacity. For, while output was advancing at the rate of
a 1-million-ton increase annually, the field's capacity to produce coal
was being increased at the average rate of 2 million tons annually.
Thrnughout the long coal boom, this tendency had caused periodic
difficulties. The field was only a few years old when the cry of
"cutthToat" competition was first heard, and the complaint that
rivals sold their coal "below the cost of production" was reiterated
year after year. As early as 1905 attempts were made to form
combines in southern Illinois which would control supply, and despite
repeated fai lun', the attempts were repeated every few :vears until
as late a 1921:i.
C'1g1t1ze1
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NT ".{NE r ARC
'v-
JP
L NIVfRS,TY OF LLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIC N
8 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
Fig. I - MEN EMPLOYED AT SHIPPING COAL MINES IN FRANKLIN,
SALINE, AND WILLIAMSON COUNTIES, 1900- 1921
Thousand
men
Thousond
men
40
40
/
30
__,/
V
~
20
t0
V
I
/
V
I
30
20
10
~
0
1900
.
---
I
1903
I
1906
1909
1912
I
I
1915
I
1918
0
192 1
,,Source : Append ix table 2.
WPA 363!>
The symptom of overexpanded mine capacity was a tendency for
th e work year to contract as time p assed . In th e discovery period
a work year of 220 days was not uncommon (appendix table 3).
Such a work year indicated a brisk demand for coal. Capital responded readily to th e demand and fl.owed into the field faster than
was needed. Capacity thus increased rapidly and soon far ou tran
production (fig. 2) . By 1911 the work year had fallen to only 165
days. At this point n ew investment slackened, production began to
catch up again with cap acity and t h e work year length ened.
Digitized by
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INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
A VULNERABLE COMMUNITY • 9
Fig.2-CAPACITY AND PRODUCTION OF SHIPPING COAL MINES IN
FRANKLIN, SALINE, AND WILLIAMSON COUNTIES, 1900-1921
Million
tons
Million
tons
50
50
-~
,,,
40
I
40
I
I
,,I
,.
~/
,/
30
"/
30
~
''J~:/ .
20
,,,,"'
/
/
I
,,/
Cction
/
//
10
20
V
/
10
/1/
.. ~
0
~
1900
I
1906
1903
1909
I
1912
_o
I
1915
1918
Source: Appendix table 3.
1921
WPA 3636
The extraordinary wartime demand for coal started a new cycle.
In 1918 production soared, the work year lengthened to 254 days,
capacity in excess of output nearly disappeared. But again, and
on a bigger scale than ever before, capital fl.owed into the field, and
capacity soared again as huge new mm.es, developed to meet the
wartime demand, started hoisting coal. In 1919 peace and the
postwar coal strike halted the expansion of output. By 1920 the
work year had fallen back to 183 days. The time had come for
further growth of the market for southern Illinois coal. Unless
[ i(
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'ffER'IIET ARn vr=
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
LRBANA-CHAMPAIGf\J
10 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
it continued to expand- as it had for a quarter of a century--calamity
was certain.
At the peak of the boom in the early 1920's coal had become not
only th e leading industry in Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Counties
but virtually the only industry. Coal bad made the once poor farming
community rich and prosperous, and had made it an important cog in
American industry. But coal bad also made the thTee counties vulnerable. Then· welfare had come to depend solely upon the great
impersonal coal market and upon the accidents which determined
theiJ- position in competing for the market. An increase in the demand
for steel, a mild winter in the Dakotas, a change in the price of crude
oil, the installation of domestic stokers in Minneapolis, a wage cut in
the Harlan County coal mines, a, new freight rate from West Virginia
to Lake Eri c--all such remote occmrences had come to mean the
difference bcLween prosperity and poverty in southern Illinois.
THE STRUCTURE OF LOCAL ENTERPRISE
Local bankers and businessmen in the southern Illinois coal field
have had very little direct connection with coal mining itself. When
the rapid development of the southern Illinois coal field began in 1900,
the three counties were a poor and isolated farming community.
Local capital, which e)\.isted mainly in the form of poor farm land and
deposits in small rural banks, was altogether inadequate for the opportunity at hand. 4 Only a few local entr epreneurs were able to gather
enough capital for speculating in coal-land options, let alone for
extensiYe development of producing mines. From the first the
absentee im-estors controlled the greater part of the output of the
southern Illinois mines, and not many years passed before they had
almost complete ownership. No combination of local capital was
ever strong enough to gain a lasting or iJnportant foothold in the
mining industry.
The coal operators, on the other hand , were not able to set up any
extensiYe system of company-town paternalism in southern I llinois.
Unlike the mountain districts of West Yirginia and Kentucky , the
Illinois prairies provided the coal companies with no monopoly on
townsites. Moreover, the Illinois miner , many of whom were drawn
from farms and rural villages near the mine tipples, were organized
early enough to prevent the operators from r eq uiring residence on
company property as a condition for a job. While seYera.l company
towns and company stores were built early in the cleYelopment of the
southern IlliJ10is field, they were soon forced to compete with inde• In 1900 bank deposits in the three counties totaled $523,403, carcely enough
t o de velop a single good-sized coal property.
Digitized by
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.
Original from
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
"Orient Numb er On e Blows lVork."
One of the Big F r anklin County l\Iines.
)11:1
INTER',
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UN Vlt{SIT" C IL INC S AT
U:l.BA~A-C HAM?AIGN
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Original from
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
A VULNERABLE COMMUNITY • 11
pendent towns near by. Under such circumstances, company towns
had no particular purpose.• By 1910 the job of housing and servicing
the rapidly growing population of the coal field had passed in large
part to local entrepreneurs in real estate and banking.
Real Estate
With local entrepreneurs excluded from direct participation in the
coal industry, real-estate values came to be the foundation of the
financial structure of the coal towns and the basic form of wealth
available to the community itself. The banks, the building and loan
associations, and the local governments themselves were in large part
built upon the security represented in real-estate values. An important key to an understanding of the development of the southern
Illinois coal communities thus lies in the history of its real-estate
activity.
The sudden transformation of Franklin, Saline, and Williamson
Counties from a poor farming area into one of America's leading
coal fields naturally created a boom in town real estate. The sudden influx of new workers soon led to a housing shortage, and new
building became a very real need. Actual need , in turn, soon brought
less tangible factors into play. Undue optimism was inevitable.
An enthusiastic local newspaper computed (somewhat incorrectly)
that southern Illinois coal would not be exhausted until A. D. 927!)_
The flow of capital into the field during the discovery years
appeared to make the outlook still brighter; if th e great financiers
of America "had faith in southern Illinois, " its future was indubitably
assured.
Moreover, the early stages of the real-estate boom brought the rise
of the real-estate promoters, local businessmen who were in most
instances connected with the banks, the building-supply houses, the
larger stores, or the building and loan associations. These entrepreneurs busied themselves with buying up farm land on the periphery
of the growing towns , subdividing it into town lots, and offering it to
the public at the end of an intensive advertising campaign. Making
a frank appeal to speculators and promising that investment in real
estate would "return a handsome profit," the promoters carried on a
thriving business. Their activity is reflected in figure 3-A, which
shows the nwnber of deeds for town lots recorded in the three counties
from 1900 to 1921.
5 The town of Zeigler, for example, continued to be a company town through a
period of nonunion operation at the Zeigler mine from 1904 to 1910. In 1910
the Zeigler mine signed a contract with the miners' union . The lands around
the tipple were then opened up for real-estate promotion.
Di( lliZt
by
NTERNET ARCHIVe
d1 igina1 f1 um
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
1 2 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
Fig. 3 - INDICES OF LOCAL BUSINESS ACTIVITY IN FRANKLIN,
SALINE, AND WILLIAMSON COUNTIES, 1900-1921
B. ASSETS AND NEW LOANS OF BUILDING
AND LOA-N ASSOCIATIONS
A. NUMBER AND AVERAGE VALUE
OF DEEDS FOR TOWN LOTS
Thousand
dollors
Thousand
deeds
--,------.--- ,----- --.-n 1.6
arr---
20
New loons
Million dollars
5
16
4
12
3
Assets
Million dollars
4
.
I
I 2
-r~
8
2-
-
-.,,~+ - - - -...._~- - - + - -- - +-+1 0 .4
I
4
/ ' - Number of deeds recorded
I
I
o~~~~.._.__. ._._~~~~~~~ o
1900
1905
1910
1915
1920
~'
0
1900
1905
! Assets
1910
1915
0
1920
*Williamson County only.
D. TAXES EXTENDED AND COLLECTED
C. BANK DEPOSITS
Million
dollars
Mill ion
Million
dollars
dollars
40~- - - - - - - -~ - - - - . ~ 4 0
dollars
30 H-- --+--- - - + - -- -+-- ---+-H 30
3 1+------+-
Million
20
20
4
4
- - f --
--+----_,_~ 3
2
2
,...
10
10
Bonk deposits-----......_
0
1905
191 0
1915
1920
0
1900
0
1905
1910
1915
1920
WPA 3637
Source : Appendix tables 21, 22, 23,ond 24 .
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UNIVERSl1Y OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
A VULNERABLE COMMUNITY • 1 3
Real-Estate Speculation
Although the development of the southern Illinois coal industry
was constant year after year for two decades, the real-estate boom
did not progress evenly. Periodically the turnover in town lots
showed strong speculative tendencies, and for a short time the activity
of th e real-estate promoters would run far ahead of the activity
justified by the actual condition of the industry. · The periods of
inflation would then pass into periods of relative depression. The
local entrepreneurs, seeing the foundation of their local financial
structure weakened, immediately would become apprehensive and
start to plan ways and means "to halt the decline of property values."
Bu t as long as the coal industry continued to expand, these fears
would oon be allayed. B efore many years had passed, the activity
of the mines would catch up once more; increased real-estate activity
would again increase and another period of land-value inflation would
set in.
The real-estate boom thu ro e in waves of alternating inflation
and depression. The first of the waves began with the di covery of
coal in Franklin County in 1902. Within a short time drilling crews
were set up in all part of the field, and month by month the full
significance of the discoYery became clearer. The most important
deposit of coal we t of the Appalachians had been found, and everyone
though t he h ad a chance to get in on the ground floor in the community,6 if not in the industry. The real -estate promoters went to
work (fig. 4). By 1906 uch typical advertisements as this were
appearing weekly:
Just 18 months ago the first car of coal wa shipped from the _ ___ field,
since which time ____ has doubled her population and is now the home
of 4,000 people . .. the most con ervative predict that \\ithin 3 to 5 years,
_ _ _ will be a city of 15,000 people . . . .
We belie,·e these lots \\ill be worth at least 50 percent more by thi time
next year. As an in ,·c tment, whether for holding or disposing of quickly,
or for improvemen t and occupation . . . an investor cannot lose but on the
contrary is bound to make a handsome profit. . . . An increase in value of
50 percent in a year i quite conscrvath·c.
6 The account of the early acth·ity in the coal fie ld read like descriptions of an
oil boom. In 1904 a coal-fie ld visitor wrote: "We had heard much about the
magic city of - -- -, to which people were flocking from everywhere.... We
found it was one of the busiest and most thriving towns we had e\"er seen . . .. On
almost every t reet new homes were going up. The song of the saw and hammer
wa everywhere in the air. P eople walked fast. They were all busy and they
were happy." Another visitor reported in 1903, "Yillages have sprung up where
but yesterday the land "·as rielding a bounteous "·heat crop. Cities ha,·e greatly
enla rged thei r area and population and the whole section is ali,·e to the pos ibilities
of the future. "
l1q1t12ed by
0n 1rial frorri
INTFRJ\JET ARCHIV~
JNIVERSITY 0• IL INO,S AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
14 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
Fig. 4- AN APPEAL TO REAL-ESTATE SPECULATORS FROM
THE FRANKLIN COUNTY INDEPENDENT
October 1906
This odvert,sement, one of the scores thot
appeared, ran as a half - page spread
· · · · -. .· · -. .· · -. . . .
♦-♦. . . . -
. . . .-
...
. . . ._
Wait! Watch and Be R.eady!
Monday, October 15th, 1906.
The greatest lot sale in the entire history of Franklin County will positively take place
on the above date at the new and
Thriving Town of Sesser
Every Lot in the Original Plat
H .as btcn sold, and every purchase r has ban offcrtd a handsome profit on thdr Ulvcstmcnt, which is a sufficient guu•
.antcc that you w ill makic money on any lots you purchase in this new addition, which lays up to the S01Jthcrn boundry
of, and directly bttwcm the original tow n and the Keller Coal Shaft, which is in the choice st:Ction of the entire coal fidd
of Franklin County. The shah has been completed to the coal, and the work of installinK the machinery will be pushed
to completion. Remember the date ,md be with us. Y ou will makt m oney.
Watch Next Week's Paper for the Full Particulars
- -
_
E. FITZGERRELL, Trustee .
-
.... .... ....- ..... .....--......._....... ..
WPA 3638
After a few years of such hysteria , th e first boom in real estate had
gon e far beyond all r easonabl e bounds. The promised increment of
50 p ercent a year fail ed to materializ e, and sales of r eal estate slacken ed sharply . Soon afterward came the depression of 1907, which
for several years slowed the rate of growth of the local coal industry.
The r ea l-estate business becam e progressively more sluggish , and
proper ty values waver ed. As this slump continued it caused considerable anxiety among local bu sinessmen and r eal-estate dealers,
who wer e fearfu l above all of their wavering property values; this was
the first local intimation of the vu ln erability of the one-industry
community. It led to the first sch em es for bringing in outside
industry, which- significantly- wer e co upled with r eal-e tate promotion drives.7
I
See pp. 97, 98. One of the main arguments advanced to raise local money for
factories in 1912 was t hat new factories "would make a veritable boom in realestate values." One town naively computed t hat for e very 100 ne w factory jobs
created, an increment of $420,000 would be add ed automat ically to the total
value of the town's real estate.
7
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
A VULNERABLE COMMUNITY • 1 5
By 1912 the inflated land prices resulting from the first wave of
speculation had been absorbed in large part by the constant increase
in the number of employees working in the mines. During the same
year the real-estate dealers launched their second sales campaign,
based on the prospect of establishing factories in the coal field. 8 Once
more the invitations to get sudden profits from real-estate speculation
was freely extended:
Lots in the addition, as soon as the stove factory and foundry are built,
should be worth more than is now asked.
Lots in Factory H eights will change hands at an increase in value. The
dust had not settled on the roads before Mr ___ _ _ ,,·as offered an advance
of $25 upon his lot p~rchase. Likewise Mr__ _ __ _
was offered $12.50,
as well as man y others.
Once more the turnover in town lo ts began to climb (fig. 3- A),
and a second r eal-estate boom got und er way. "The past sale of
lots," said one newspaper, "is only the beginning of a greater sale
of lots."
The second real-estate boom lasted 3 years. Those who had invested their money in the various "Factory H eights" additions to
the coal towns in 1913 and 1914 were to be sadly disappointed soon
afterward when the factories that had been promised failed to arrive.
At the same time the rate of growth of employment in southern
Illinois coal mines was again slowed down by the short depression
which accompanied the first years of the World War. As soon as
the factory promotion schemes were clearly discredited in 1914, there
followed a second slump in r eal-estate activity. This slump was
short-lived, however. B efore 2 years had passed , the activity of the
mines had again caught up with r eal-estate expansion and a third
wave of inflation had started .
The World War and the years immediately following brought the
real-estate boom to its final climax. The unprecedented demand for
southern Illinois coal, beginning in 1916, attracted thousands of new
workers to the coal field and created a critical housing shortage.
Dozens of jerry-built "shotgun houses," assembled in 24 hours, were
erected in every town. R ents and r eal-estate valu es soared. As
figure 3-A shows, the activity of the real-estate promoters once more
8 The schemes advanced in 1912- 1915 proposed to raise funds for s ubsidizing
new industries out of t h e profit from the sale of lots near the projected factory
site. See pp. 97- 98.
The economics of these schemes was explained as follows: "The amount necessary to secure [these] factories will be less than $100,000, and if this money be
raised by the sale of lots, the increase in [real-estate] values will make the lots
an exceptional investment, especia lly when we consider the certain [added] population of 5,000 to 6,000 people who will be compelled to use these same lots for
residences."
[ i( 11 Z'
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
16 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
began to increase, reaching a new record in 1917 and continuing to
climb rapidly through the period of the war. 9
The strike of 1919 and the postwar depression failed to deflate the
real-estate boom. The housing shortage persisted, and even the coal
companies which had long since abandoned the company-town
system were forced to build houses in order to hold their workers. The
productive capacity of the field continued to increase as new mines,
started during the war, began actual operation. Th e financiers of
New York, Boston, and Chicago also continued to demonstrate their
optimism about the future of the field by their policy of absorbing
the smaller producers throughout the three counties. In 1920 the
miners started a relatively long period of steady work at wages well
above the wartime scale. With this last period of prosperity, the
wave of real-estate speculation reached its third and final peak, far
above the highest wartime levels.
The Building and Loan Associations
During the period of the development of the southern Illinois coal
field local entrepreneurs had organized-in very leisurely fashion-a
number of mutual building and loan associations in the larger coal
towns. Some of these associations were headed by the buildingsupply dealers, who had discovered that the home-loan system encouraged building and at the same time provided ample returns on
the money invested. Also included among the dirnctors of the associations were most of the real-estate promoters whose activities were
traced in the preceding section, the leading bankers and professional
people, and occasionally one or two of the more important coal-town
merchants.
By 1918 there were 20 such associations operating in the 3 counties.
Their activities, however, bad played no important part as yet in the
life of th e communities. even though the communities were already
nearly full-grown. The total assets of the associations in 1918 were
only about 2% million dollars, and the number of new loans issued
had not yet passed the 1-million-dollar mark (fig. 3- B ). By this
time the towns in the 3 counties had already been built from sleepy
rmal villages containing, all told, less than 15,000 persons at the
turn of the century to active towns with 11, total population of more
than 80,000. The coal towns had grown to maturity quite without
the assistance of building-and-loan financing.
9 The boom was apparently not altogether spontaneous.
Th~ usual fanfare in
connection with the sale of lots in a ne'II· subdivision continued during the war
boom, with free transportation, free picnic lunch, and brass bands provided for
the customers. One promoter gave each purchaser of a lot a chance on a twostory house, which was later deeded to the person holding the lucky number after
the lots were sold.
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
A VULNERABLE COMMUNITY • 1 7
In the midst of the 1920 housing famin e many families who were
1mable to find places to rent were forced to buy lots and build their
own houses. In order to build in the emergency, however, a considerable sum of mon ey was needed quickly; and for the first time in
the history of th e coal field, the miners began to turn to the building
and loan associations for loans. Within the space of 4 years the
amount of new loans issued by the associations quadrupled. By 1921,
when new loans passed the 2½-million-dollar mark for the first time,
the associations were doing 10 times the business they had enjoyed
when the war began. The beginning of intense activity among the
home-loan associations thus coincided with the period in which the
real-estate activity in the coal towns reached the final and r ecord
peak discussed in the preceding section (fig. 3-B).
The sudden spurt in the home-loan business during the housing
boom in 1920 and 1921 had built up a sizable backlog of capital for the
associations. The interest rate was high-interest and "premiums"
netted more than half a million dollars in 1921 on total loans of over
5}~ million dollars- hence, local capital flowed freely into the growing
loan enterprises (appendix table 23 ). Installment payments on
association stock sold in connection with the original loans provided
other capital; by 1921 the associations had accumulated 2½ million
dollars for loans from this omce alone. On this basis the associations
prepared themselves for a long and profitable busin ess.
Banking
Southern Illinois banking has always been the private domain of
local businessmen rn thrr than of absentee coal operators. Th e banks
in the coal field have accordingly not dealt directly in any large degree
with the coal-mining industry, and the job of providing banking facilities and credits to the min es has fallen to Chicago and St. Louis banks.
Local banks have perforce confined their activities to servicing the
miners, farmers, and m erchants within the community-to r eceiving
the savings of the min ers, carrying the deposits of local merchants,
and providing credit for the community itself.
Until the time of the World War these functions did not assume great
importance. Mine wages were not high, and the community's share
from the coal industry went principally into physical expansion of
housing and inventories, rather than into cash smplus. Another difficulty faced by local bankers before the war was that the foreign born,
who comprised a large part of the working population, were traditionally suspicious of "the banking institutions of this country." Instead of depositing their money in the local banks, they preferred to
send it to Europe for deposit in government-controlled savings banks. 10
°
1
For this reason the local businessmen welcomed the Postal Savings System.
Seep. 83.
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
1 8 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
Bank deposits thus accumulated slowly during the period which
aw th e greate t development of the coal fi Id. DLU"ing the first
real-estate boom (1900-1906) they in creased from H million dollars
to nearly 4 million dollars. Som e of this increase, however, was
subsequ ently lost during th e depression of 1907. Th e period of the
econd r eal-estate boom (1911- 1913) brought deposits to more than
7 ·million dollars; but again a recession whi ch accompanied the first
years of the war wip ed out a part of the gains. Not until the beginning
of wartime activity in the coal field did the local banking business
come into its own. (See appen dix ta ble 24.)
The World War imultaneo usly incr eased th e pay roll in the coal
fi eld- through a length ened work year , higher " 'ages, and the creation of thousands of n ew jobs- and cut off the flow of savings to
Europ e. Under these circumstances, bank deposits shot upward at
an amazing rate. Whil e it required 16 year for the three counties
to accumulate their firs t 7 million dollars in bank deposits, the second
7 million dollars was deposited in less than 2 years during 1917 and
1918. After the war a furth er rise in wage and employment continued to increase deposits; from 15}~ million dollars in 1918, deposits
climbed to almost 26 % million dollars in 1921. For each dollar deposited in coal-field banks in 1916 there were nearly $4 on deposit in
1921 (fig. 3- C).
The sudden skyrocketing of bank deposits was interpreted in the
coal fi eld to b e a refl ection not only of the prosperity of th e community- whi ch no one could deny- but of its "soundness" as well. A
local n ew pap er boasted:
All the banks are in a mo t healthy and prosperous condition and re flect
our prosperity in a most emphatic manner. We are e njoy ing the greatest
measure of sound, substantial prosperity and growth in our history.
Even the foreign born cast off their suspicions and began to deposit
their money in the local banks.
THE TAX STRUCTURE
The Changing Tax Base
B efore the rapid developmen t of southern Illinois coal r eserves got
und er way in 1900, th e land , improvem ents, and personalty of farms
r epresented the chief form of wealth in Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Counties; and what little tax income was required to keep up
the limited tasks of local governmen t was paid almost altogeth er by
farmers. As the coal mines wer e develop ed, three other forms of
taxable wealth were cr eated: coal in the ground, assessed sometimes
with top land and ometimes separately as mineral rights; coal-land
improvements in the form of tipple , hoisting, and screening equipm ent, etc. ; and r esidence and business property in the growing coal
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
A VULNERABLE COMMUNITY • 19
towns. The tax base was accordingly shifted from farm property to
the community's new property. The manner of the shift, determined
as it was by the informal and empirical approach of local tax assessors, was to have far-reaching effects upon the later life of the coal
field.
The contribution of farm property to the total assessed valuation
of the three counties continued to be important in spite of th e growth
of the coal industry. The State of Illinois had long follow ed a tradition of "encouraging" the coal industry through favorabl e taxation.
At one time coal mines wer e even declared to be exempt from State
(but not local) levies; and although the courts late~· d ecided otherwise, the forces which made for the original exemption continued to
operate through other channels. Si.nee their earliest contacts with
the great absentee coal operators, local tax assessors in the three
counties appear to have been leni ent in appraising mine property.
And when the assessors did not take this approach the operators'
lawyers were not slow to appear before th e local equalization boards
demanding adjustments.
In any case, it appears that the burden of taxes outside the coal
towns was not shared equitably between farmers and coal operators.
By 1913 the gross value of products from the mining industry was
roughly four times that of products from the farms in the three
counties. 11 Yet the assessed valuation of all real property connected
with the coal industry was only half that of farm property. During
the war period this disproportion was heightened, as wartime prices
for coal pushed the value of mining products up to about eight times
the value of farm products. After the war there was a general adjus tment of rural assessments; but the coal industry, which was still
producing about four times as much gross value as the farms, even
then carried no more assessed valuation than the aggregate farm land
of the community (appendix table 20). The attitude of the local
assessors toward the coal industry may be illustrated by the valuation
of a typical mine property: In 1924 the company's real property was
assessed on the basis of half its full-and-true value at 2 million dollars,
and was accordingly judged to have a full value of 4 million dollars.
11 For value of farm products in the three counties during the p eriod 1910- 1925
see Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the Uni ted States: 1910, Agri culture
Vol. VI, 1913, pp. 442- 445 ; Fourteenth Cenws of the Uni ted States : 1920, Agriculture Vol. VI, Part 1, 1922, pp. 365- 409 ; and United States Cen sus of A griculture: 1925, Part 1, 1927, pp. 520- 547, U. S. D epartment of Commerce, Washington, D. C.
For the value of mine products during the same period see M in eral Res ources
of the United States, issued annually by the U. S. Geological Survey, Washington ,
D . C., for the years 1910 through 1923 and by the Bureau of Mines, U. S. D ep artment of the Interior, Washington, D. C., for th e y ears 1924 ff.
[ u II
Z'
by
'ffER'JET ARl
~
vr=
)11gina1 f1 m
ur--.i v~ -1Sr y OF ILLNOIS A
L -1BANA-G AM 'AIC,';
20 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
During the same year an impartial and reputable mmrng engineer
appraised the value of the same property at 27 million dollars.
While the coal operators tended to benefit at the expense of the
farmers in the apportionment of rural taxes, they also benefited at the
expense of the townspeople in the division of the total tax load of the
three counties. County-wide expenditures-for maintaining the
county offices, county road , poor farms , etc.- were from the start
borne more heavily by town property than by coal property. 12 No
matter how fast coal-property valuations might increase during the
coal boom, they were always accompanied by greater increases in the
valuation of town lots (appendix table 20) .
In terms of actual tax collections, the disproportionate division of
the tax burden between coal towns and coal operators was far greater.
It naturally fell to the towns to maintain their own strictly local
services, such as the police force and the fire department. But the
burden of providing revenues for the schools also fell principally upon
the towns. The mines, located in almost every instance beyond the
city limits of the towns , paid taxes in rural school districts where few
people lived, while thousands of the miners' children went to school
in the towns, where the mine operators contributed nothing. Even
the high schools, whose district boundaries frequently included an
entire township, were often financed largely by the coal towns because
the miners' homes were not located in the same townships as the mines.
The most important source of tax revenue in the three counties thus
came to be coal-town real property. The local governments rested
on the same foundation as the banks and the building and loan
associations.
The Rise of Tax Income
Until the time of the World War taxation in Franklin, Saline, and
Williamson Counties presented no special problems. The services of
the local government were restricted to paying the county judges,
juries, and sheriffs, patching up the road now and then, and maintaining a somewhat primitive school system . The coal industry had
grown up in the midst of a backward agricultural community, and as
far as the function of local government was concerned, the rural shell
was not cracked until the industry reached maturity. Not until the
beginning of wartime activity in the coal industry did the community
undertake to do the work it had long neglected.
One pressing job was to build roads. As late as 1917 a drayman
starting from Herrin in the early morning to deliver a load of
Railroad property valuation also increased progressively, but it played a small
part in the total property valuation, and is therefore not included above. Personal property is also omitted from this discussion because its assessment appears
to have been distributed much like real property.
12
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
A VULNERABLE COMMUNITY • 21
merchandise in Marion, 10 miles away, would not return home until
dark. The scope of the independent towns was particularly restricted
by inadequate roads. Miners depended on railroad transportation to
get to their work in out-of-the-way mines, and where railroad co~nections were poor, the independent towns lost population and trade.
From Benton, for example, it was possible to ride 7 miles by train to
work in the Buckner mine; but there was no transportation to R end
City, which was only 6 miles away. Rend City, accordingly, became a
company town, with consequent inconvenience to the miners and
losses to the businessmen of B enton.
Th e school system was also clearly inadequate for the needs of the
community. In 1912, when the total population of the 3 counties
was about 110,000 persons, the expenditure for public high schools was
only $64,000, scarcely enough to maintain even a semblance of a highschool system. Elementary schools were similarly hampered by an
amazing expenditure per student of $10 per year. 13 Many of the school
buildings were so old a.nd unsanitary that they bad been condemned
wholesale by th e State. For many years the schools had not kept
pace with the growth and added wealth of the comm unity, and one of
the first jobs needed at the time of the World War was to expand and
overhaul the education system.
In 1919 the State of Illinois changed the assessment rate of all
taxable property from one-third to one-half of full-and-tru e value.
The three counties took advantage of the broadened base, a nd not only
readjusted valuations according to the n ew State regulation , but
reconsidered assessments generally and raised them still furth er. In
this way the tax base was increa ed in 1 year from about 22 million
dollars to over 40 million clollars. At the same time the total levy of
tbe three coanties jumped from l}~ million dollars to almost 2¼ million
(fig. 3-D). Th e long-awaited local improvements could get under
way at last.
In the early 1920's the community thus began to a surne some of
the more important responsibiliti es it had neglected. The coal towns
set about to provide themselves with sidewalks, gravel streets, sewage
disposal, and city water. The school system was expanded. The
problem of caring for widows and for the blind began to enterhowever dimly- into the consciousness of the county officials. The
local government officials recognized that increased population had
brought new needs, and they made provision for new expenditures for
policing, fire protection, and all the regular services of the towns and
counties-including the cloud no bigger than a man's hand , pauper
relief.
13 The cost per pupil in schools throughout the country during the same
period
was $36. R eport of the Commissioner of Education for the Year Ended June 30,
1913. Vol. II, U. S. Bureau of Education, Washington, D. C., 1914, p. 34.
l1q t,zed by
Vri 1rial frorr,
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JNIVERSITY 0• IL li'JO•S AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
Chapter II
A DEPRESSED AREA
Joss
IN THE southern Illinois coal industry were still plentiful in
1926. Franklin, Saline, and Williamson coal production for the year
set a new postwar mark and, indeed, almost equaled · the wartime
record itself. Southern Illinois coal went upon the world market for
the first time in 1926, when European buyers onlercd several trainloads of Franklin County coal for export through N cw Orleans. The
world's r ecord for coal tonnage hoisted in an 8-hour shift at a single
mine-h eld for years by one or another southern Illinois operatorwas broken many times during the year as the New Orient in Franklin
County proceeded every month or so to surpass its own previous
record. Th e working miners enjoyed a satisfying degree of economic
independence. If a miner di liked his boss. or if he objected to lax
safety practices, or if h e found hi earnings falling because of poor coal,
h e could always quit his job, knowing that in a week or so he could find
another one. You tlt, too, had an agreeable choice to make in 1926:
They could, if th ey wished, take advantage of the excellent new high
schools recently built throughout the coal field; or they could go to
work at the min es as soon as they were grown. 1
The Franklin , Saline, and Williamson mine pay roll in 1926
amounted to about 40 million dollars, enough to provide a comfortable
livelihood for th e entire working population and enough to initiate a
boom in th e trade and servi ce industries. Miners were averaging between $50 and $60 for each 2-weeks' work in 1926, and sometimes
"a pay" would run as high as $100. The automobile dealers, the
1 "As quickly as boys became of any size, their fathers took them to the mine.
Boys could not sed the necessity fo r going to school when the a lmi ghty dollar
could be earned so easily." Garstcns, Arthur and Whit<', Ina, A Semi-Stranded
Area, unpublished ms., Federal Emergency Relief Administration, Washington,
D. C., 1935, p. 18.
23
)1rn1 Led by
Cm 11-=il from
INTERN T A,< HIVE
UNIVLKSIT" C IL~INO S AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
24 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
grocers, the clothing merchants, the furniture and music stores all
flourished, and the newspapers carried advertisements for grand
pianos, Earl Carroll's Vanities, and men's $10 shoes as well as for
necessities. When someone discovered a destitute family living on a
garbage dump near Sesser, the entire community was shocked . Bank
deposits in the three counties increased 3 million dollars in 1926,
bringing the aggregate to 32 million dollars and breaking still another
prosperity record. "The thing for our people to do," said a local
newspaper that year, "is to settle down to a life of enjoyment and
contentment."
But there was little time left for either enjoyment or contentment,
for the collapse came quickly. Within less than a decade the whole
structure of prosperity lay in utter ruin. Where great noisy tipples
had stood, one found a few years later only weed-covered railroad
sidings, crumbling mine buildings, and scrub oaks growing in the
silent mine yards. Sesser once had three mines and Benton had four;
all were abandoned. Johnston City had eight mines, and they were
all abandoned too. Out of the 16 mines which could once be seen
from the Herrin city hall, 15 were gone forever. Throughout the 3
counties, 109 mines were abandoned from 1923 through 1938, leaving
the countryside dotted with industrial tombstones- burnt-out slack
piles, rotting tipples, here and there a smokestack standing alone in
the middle of a pastme- to mark the- graveyard of almost 20,000
jobs. (See appendix: table ] .)
Of course not all the mines had been abandoned; most of the largest
mines, indeed, were still operating. But they too had undergone
great changes. The old atomistic system of coal recovery, based
upon pairs of independent, versatile hand loaders, had almost disappeared from Franklin, Saline, and "W illiamson Counties. The center
of underground activity was now the great, n ew, automatic coal
loaders, which could put as much coal into pit cars within a minute
as hand loaders could load in an hour. Men were now organized into
gangs; their jobs were simplified and specialized; the tempo of their
work was heightened. At Herrin and Carrier :Mills, operators had
reorganized the haulage system too; the standard system of hoisting
coal in cages rnnning in a vertical shaft was replaced by a simple
endless belt, fed underground by rubber-tired trucks. All in all,
mine efficiency had nearly doubled.
The coal towns had been transformed . Whole crowded sections of
• the larger coal towns had fallen into decay. The paint had wom off
the houses, windows long broken were patched with cardboard and
adhesive tape, foundations had rotted away, leaving the roofs sagging
and the walls askew. Other sections of town, where the miners'
homes had been repossessed and razed for secondhand lumber, had
vanished altogether. Block after block of vacant store space lined
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
A DEPRESSED AREA • 25
the business streets, testifying to the ruin of cores of businessmen.
In some of the towns one found families living in tents, in banties
built on the garbage dumps, in chicken houses. A half dozen once
active mine villages had degenerated into dilapidated, crowded,
poverty-ridden rural slums.
In a few short years the coal towns had seen many strange thing
happen. Out of every four coal diggers who had once worked in the
mines, only one-who counted himself exceedingly lucky-still held
his job; and even so his yearly income had shrunk from $1,350 to $700.
Sometimes singly, sometimes in batches, a total of 34 coal-town banks
had collapsed, and some 7 million dollars in savings had been swept
away. The high schools had suddenly filled to overflowing; but the
teachers went unpaid , and members of the graduating classes regularly
took their places in the ranks of the unemployed. The coal town had
seen families reduced to living on a dole as low as 78 cents a week,
had seen outside charities set up soup kitchens for their undernourished children, and h ad een thousand of their people at hunger's
door.
What had happened? T o begin with, the community had lost half
its coal market, three-fourths of its coal-mine jobs, and four-fifths of its
mine pay rolls , the community's basic income. No new industries
whatever appeared to fill these gaps in the coal towns' economy.
And meanwhile, the size of the population in the three counties
suffered only an insignilicant decline. In brief, the comm.unity no
longer offered support for a large section of its population.
UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT
Just how serious the economic plight of the southern illinois
coal field had become may be judged, first of all, on the basis
of the extent of unemployment among its workers and families.
Statistics on unemployment ar e provided in a special survey of unemployment conducted in seven southern Illinois coal towns between
D ecember 1938 and farch 1939. 2
The Labor Force
At the time of the special census roughly two-fifths of the entire
population of the coal towns were workers: that is, they came within
2 The census determined the employment status of workers as of a "census
week" just prior to en umeration. The census week was changed from town to
town as the enumeration progressed, but was never changed within a town.
Enumeration began in Bush on D ecember 19, 1938, with reference to the census
week December 11-17, 1938. The latest census week used was March 12- 18,
1939, applied in Herrin.
Throughout chapters II and III, all mention of employment, unemployment,
and !Abor-market status refers to the workers' activities during the census week.
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
26 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
one of three categories--employed persons, unemployed persons
actively seeking work, or persons normally employed but temporarily
neither working nor seeking work (appendix table 10). Compared
with the labor force in four American cities, 3 this proportion appears
to have been somewhat small. Among males the difference was not
great, though the seven coal towns did have a smaller proportion of
males in the labor force. The difference was principally the result
of a much smaller proportion of female workers in southern lliinois,
where only 18 percent of all females were workers, as compared with
24 to 36 percent in the four cities . The fact that coal mining offers
no job opportunities for women obviously accounts for this difference.
The important point is that numerous persons who might have sought
work under other circumstances were not seeking work in southern
Illinois. Such persons are not, of course, counted among the community's workers, and hence are likewise excluded in the count of the
unemployed.
The Unemployed
The census of unemployment in the seven coal towns was timed to
coincide with the peak of the year's mining activity, 4 and it accordingly shows employment in the best possible light. Th e census
caught E ldorado, for example, just after one mine had resmned work
after a period of bankruptcy and reorganization, and just before a
second mine shut down for the springtime slmnp. At Herrin the
enumeration found another mine crew briefly enjoying the only
stretch of employment it had had since 1937. Many other workers
reporting private employment during the census period had only
3 The same survey of unemployment was also conducted in Birmingham, Ala.;
New Bedford, Mass.; Toledo, Ohio; and San Franci co, Calif., at about the same
time as the southern Illinois census. In the seven coal towns 41 percent of the
population were workers; in Birmingham, 47 percent; in New Bedford, 51 percent;
in Toledo, 45 percent; in San Francisco, 52 percent. For data on Birmingham,
Toledo, and San Francisco see Webb, John N. and Bevis, Joseph C., Facts About
umber 4, Division of Research,
Unemployment, WP A Social Problem Series
Work Projects Administration, Federal Work Agency, Washington, D. C., 1940.
The data on Ne"· Bedford are derived from The Decline of a Cotton Textile City:
A Study of New B edford, a manuscript in preparation by Seymour L. Wolfbein,
Division of Research, Work P rojects Administration.
4 An index of seasonal variation in coal tonnage in Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Counties for the period 1922- 1937 shows that the peak of activity occu rs
between October and March, and the low point between April and August.
Peak activity is regularly more than double the activ ity at the slack period.
This remarkably wide seasonal fluctuation results in part from the timing of
uniou stoppages, which ordinarily begin on April first of an "agreement year,"
i. e., a year in which a ne"· union contract must be negotiated. But in other
outhern Illinois, unlike the
years, the seasonal fluctuation i still very wide.
Appalachian fields, get little busines from the summertime Great Lakes coal traffic.
DigitlZ"'r' by
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INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
A DEPRESSED AREA • 27
recently resumed work or were soon to be laid off to face months of
summertime unemployment. The mine work week was also longer
than average during the census period, so that underemployment
was at its minimum, too, for the year.
But even under peak-season activity, the community's workers
suffered a staggering loss through unemployment (fig. 5).
Fig 5- UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT IN 7 SOUTHERN
ILLINOIS COAL TOWNS AND IN BIRMINGHAM, NEW
BEDFORD, TOLEDO, AND SAN FRANCISCO
Percent of
lobor force
100
Percent of
lobor force
100
Pe, cen1 ol
80
Percen 1 ol
':!i1H:J:
40
60
20
80
40
:;-
·
20
>
0
7
0
l'!C."1" . l . l
. l
j
.,.~l°",l . . l
0
40
i
,_,o::,
l
<S" .•
60
I
40
/"
"j
~ Employed, but working
_
20
less than 30 hours per week
~ Unemployed
~
§
;;;
~c::-
-§'
,.__.,
_..._-",
$
G
qJ
-~
.::-
;:
·S
t
:t
&
.._o
<!
t.,__'-0
~
. o;
,;;
'Ii
2
o
if
~o
t:,o
0
~
(j
.¼"'
Source , Appendi x table 10.
WPA 3639
A good, simple rule of thumb for evaluating the gravity of unemployment might be about as follows: When 10 percent of a community's labor force is unable to find a job, the community has
begun to suffer appreciably. When unemployment climbs to 20 percent, a depression of serious consequences exists. And when unemployment reaches 30 percent-a figure rarely reached by most
American communities and still more rarely maintained over any
period of time--the community must be judged to be in extremely
desperate circumstances.
According to this scale, the predicament of southern Illinois will be
clear; throughout the seven towns 41 percent of all available workers
had no jobs at the time of the census. In Johnston City, the hardest
)14
ed by
II, TE Rt-.J-T A,, HIVE
Cr II
I 'rem
JN:VE ~c,rrv O IL INO C, AT
URBANA< HAMPAIGN
28 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
hit of the larger coal towns, unemployment had climbed to 60 percent; and in the little mine village of Bush, un employment claimed
four out of every five workers. In Zeigler and West Frankfort, two
of the most active coal towns in Illinois, more than one-third of the
workers were without jobs. Eldorado, which had (at the time) suffered
far less than most of its neighbors from either mine mechanization or
abandonment, was the most favored of the seven towns. Yet even
there, more than one-third of all the available workers were found
to be Lrnemployed. 5 (See appendix table 14.)
Underemployment
Tradition provides that southern Illinois mrnes shall work with
the entire mine crew or else not work at all. If there are orders for coal,
every man works; but if there are none, nobody works. Slack business at the operating min es accordingly means fewer days worked
rather than fewer men working, underemployment rat.lier than unemployment. Dming the past few years 1 or 2 workdays a week have
been the standard summertime schedule in southern Illinois, and
even in the winter most of the mines run only 3 or 4 days unless the
weather is severely cold. A second scheme for spreading work also
reduces the length of the work week. According to agreement between the operators and the union , men displaced by machinery at
a given mine have the right to "divided time" at the remaining jobs,
and the reduced work is rotated so that all the men on divided time
will work less in order that no one may lose his job altogether.
The practice of spreading work in the seven towns has doubtless
help ed to prevent unemployment from b ecoming even greater than
it is. Yet underemployment can b e nearly as disastrous to a worker's
welfare as complete lack of work. A worker who is allowed only 1 or
2 days of employment a week cannot meet his normal living expenses,
and he is sometimes considered ineligible for public assistance 6 as long
as he bolds a job bringing in any income at all. The extent of underemployment is another important index to the plight of the southern
Illinois coal towns (fig. 5).
5 By comparison, the survey of Birmingham showed 26 percent unempioyed;
New Bedford, 30 percent; Toledo, 30 percent; and San Francisco, 20 percent.
The actual difference between sou them Illin ois and the four cities was probably
even greater, for the wintertime s urvey would have found the four cities at their
worst and the coal field at its best.
6 Shortly after the survey was completed, Illinois workers became eligible to
receive compensation for either total or part-time unemployment. Coal miners
are now permitted to draw compensation for underemployment, but only for a
part of each year. Miners underemployed at the peak season would get little
help from the compensation system, since most of their benefits would be used
up in the summertime slump.
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
A DEPRESSED AREA • 29
In Bush and Johnston City, where few were working at all during
the special census, obviously there could be little underemployment
either; and the full effect of division of work is best seen in the more
active towns-Eldorado, West Frankfort, and Zeigler-where underemployment had become little less widespread than unemployment
itself. Throughout the seven towns a shortened work week added
substantially to the general distress of the workers.
ot only were
two available workers out of every five without jobs altogether, but
one out of five wa.s working less than 30 hours per week. 7
DISADVANTAGED WORKERS
The shadow of the general industrial decline in southern Illinois
falls in one way or another upon most of the workers in the coal to,rns.
No age group and no class of worker bas escaped considerable damage
from the disrupted labor market. Some sections of the working population, however, have borne more than the average burden of unemployment, and have been disadvantaged in relation to other sections
of the depressed community.
Throughout American industry young and old workers bear the
heaviest brunt of unemployment, and the same general tendency
governs the depressed labor market in the southern Illinois coal field.
Th e tendency operates, however, with several qualifications and exceptions which grow out of the special rules for employment at the coal
mines. Instead of being left to "natural forces," the labor market
for miners is controlled within limits by the terms of the union contract.
Employment Policy in the Mines
Although the union contract reserves to the coal operator" the right
to hire and fire," the right is substantially abridged in actual practice.
An operator may after due warning discharge a miner for violation of
afety rules, for unwarranted absence from work, for gross inefficiency
and irresponsibility, for "vile and abusive language," or for physical
incapacity to perform bis duties. Short of these reasons, the union
7 In Birmingham 10 percent of the available workers were employed less than
30 hours a week; in New Bedford, 7 percent; in Toledo, 8 percent; and in San
Francisco, 11 percent.
Incidentally, the prevalence of underemployment in southern Illinois does not
mean that excessively long working hours were eliminated. Where trade and
service workers were organized, it is true, the work week tended to be short. But
in the unorganized industries, a 70-hour work week was by no means uncommon.
One family was discovered in which the father, a coal miner, had been working
7 hours a week in the mines, while his son worked 72 hours a week in a gasoline
station.
In the 7 coal towns, 11 percent of all employed workers worked 60 hours or
more, as against 9 percent in I e"· Bedford, 7 percent in San Francisco, 10 percent
in Toledo, and 14 percent in Birmingham.
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30 •
SEV EN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
protects the min er in his job . The practice of replacing older workers
with more active young ters is not permitted, for example. Nor
can the operator indulge in periodic bolt-from-the-blue dismissals" to
keep up morale," nor discharge surplus workers after the installation
of coal-loading machines, nor pare down the min e crew for a p eriod
of slack operation. Th ese restrictions on fu-ing of course restrict
hirin g as well, and virtually eliminate labor tmnover at the operating
mines.
A second important tradition fixes the miners' job rights to a particular shaft, whose fortunes become their own. As long as a shaft
continues to hoist coal, the entire mine crew is reasonably certain of
some kind of a job (though by no means certain of a living wage the
year round , particularly when divided time is widespread). When a
shaft reopens after a period of suspension, all available members of the
original mine crew must be rehired, for suspension does not cancel a
miner's job rights. But if a shaft is abandoned, the job rights of its
entire crew automatically disappear; and its miners are cast adrift to
take their own chances of finding other jobs. The selection of those
who shall be thrown out of work is thus governed more by the fate of
each individual mine than by the characteristics of the miners themselves.8
From time to time a few new jobs for coal miner are created, either
by the opening of new mines or the extension of the underground
workings at operating mines. The operators may fill these jobs with
whomever they please, and as a result hirings- unlike dismissals-are
hi!?;hly selective. 9 Neither older displaced miners nor inexperienced
youth have much chance at the new jobs. Most of them go to a
special group of workers, usually young and active, and usually chosen
from the abandoned mines of the company which is hiring. New jobs
8 There has been one significant departure from this tradition.
In 1932 the
local unions at most of the larger Franklin County mines split. Several thousand
miners withdrew from the Un ited Mine Workers of America, established a new
union, the Progressive Miners of America, and struck again t a new agreement.
The strike f:>iled and the miners lost their jobs. It happened that at the tim e
most of the struck mines were already mechanized, and their crews were heavily
weighted with displaced hand loaders getting on in years and working on divided
time. The dismissal of the strikers enabled the operators both to abolish the
surplus jobs and to remove the older hand loaders from the mine rolls. It also
enabled them to rebuild the mine crews according to such standards as they chose.
The new employees at the struck mines automatically acquired the same job
rights that govern every union mine, and the labor market was frozen again.
9 Job rights are not company-wide.
If an operator abandons one mine and
opens another at the same time, he may choose whom he pleases from the crew at
the abandoned mine, and reject whom he pleases, in building a crew for the new
mine. In this process the older workers are eliminated.
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLl~OIS AT
URBANA-CHAM 'AIGN
"When I think ab out th e futur e 1 get th e blu es so bad I can't sta nd it."
l:n e mployetl Sou th e rn Jlli no is )fine !'.
)I 11
zr u
'-lTER"JET Af-lCHIVE
from
UN VERsrry OF ILL ''IIOIS AT
URBANA-CHAM-AIGN
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UNIVERSl1Y OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
A DEPRESSED AREA • 31
have been so rare in recent years, however, th:1,t even the preferred
workers have benefited from them but little.
All these policies add up essentially to this: Youth coming of working
age are virtually barred from the mines, for all the available jobs are
taken. Able-bodied older workers who have put in a lifetime of
service to the mines are reasonably certain of work unle s their mines
are abandoned; but if they ever do lose their jobs, they stand practically
no chance to work underground again. The middle group of active
experienced miners is likewise protected except against mine abandonment; and when they lose their jobs, they hold the best odds- such as
they are-to return to work if new jobs are created.
Hiring policies in the coal towns' retail and service industries offset
these tendencies in part. A few of the older workers displaced from
the mines have been able to pick up unskilled jobs here and there, and
a few others have opened up little stores, beer parlors, hamburger
stands, and the like in the coal towns. Jobs in the coal-town stores,
garages, filling stations, utilities, and offices are open to anyone who
can qualify for them; youth are not only acceptable but usually
favored as applicants. But the service industries are little less
depressed than the mining industry itself; job tmnover is small, and
few jobs are available. Whatever job opportunities they offer do not
neutralize the hasic employment patterns determined by policy at the
nunes.
Unemployment Among Coal Miners
The shrinkage in the number of coal miners employed in southern
Illinois has been brought about in two different ways. First of all,
there have of course been thousands of dismissals, resulting either
from the abandonment of mines or from the unsuccessful Progressive
Miners of America strike in 1932. But other miners have left the
industry for a variety of reasons not connected with dismissals. Death
and permanent disability resultin g from mine accidents alone retire
about 1 percent of the total mine crew in Franklin, Saline, and
Williamson Counties each year; and the expected mortality from
natural causes runs to another 1 or 2 percent. In the course of a
year a number of additional miners leave the labor market because of
illness, age, and removal to another job or another community.
The sum of all these causes reduced the total labor force at the mines
by perhaps as much as one-fourth between 1929 and the time of the
special survey of the seven towns.
With the normal flow of inexperienced new workers into the coal
industry checked, the loss of workers through death and withdrawal
from the labor market produced a substantial net decrease in the size
l1q1t12ed by
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INTFRNET ARCHIV~
JNIVERSITY 0• IL INO•S AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
32 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
of the labor force attached to coal mining, 10 and further, a decrease in
the inci dence of mrnmployment among miners who continued to be
available for work. In 1939, paradoxically, unemployment among
coal miners- that is, among those who reported coal mining as their
usual occupation- was less severe than among the coal-town working
population as a whole (appendix table 11). Unemployment claimed
every third coal miner, but two-fifths of the transportation workers,
two-fifths of the manufacturing and mechanical workers, and fourfifths of those without a usual occupation. Only the trade and professional workers fared better than the miners.
Outsiders sometimes think of the unemployment problem in the coal
towns as being almost exclusively one involving coal miners. Actually, as figure 6 shows, coal miners constituted only about one-fourth
of the unemployed. Considerably more numerous among the
Fiq 6 - INDUSTRY OF USUAL OCCUPATION OF UNEMPLOYED
WORKERS, BY SEX, 7 SOUTHERN ILLINOIS
COAL TOWNS
Percent
0
10
20
40
30
50
'
Agriculture and
forestry
Public and
professional service
Trade
communication
mm
Domest ic and
personal service
I\:) I
Transportation and
Manufacturing and
mechanical
Mol e
("(5 percent)
Female ( 25 percent )
(Total • 100 percent)
Cool mining
No usual occupation
Source: Appendix table 12.
WPA 3640
10 The decrease in the size of the labor force when neither replacements nor dismissals are made to an y extent is apparent in the process by which divided time
" works itself out" and di sappears over a period of a few :vears . Zeigler mine
No. 2, for example, installed new machines in 1936 a nd cut the number of available
jo bs from 900 to 650. The " surplu s" workers, numbering 250, then bega n to
share work with the "necessary" workers. In 1936 t he surplus shrank t o 200
miners, in 1937 to 100 miners, in 1938 t o 70 min ers, a nd in 1939 the surplust ogether with divided time--disappeared altogether .
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
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A DEPRESSED AREA • 33
unemployed were the workers without a usual occupation, a group
composed mainly of youth who had been blocked from normal entry
into the labor market. 11 Experienced workers from all industries other
than coal miniJ1g also formed a larger proportion of the unemployed
than the displaced coal miners.
Age and Unemployment
Like most American co mmuni ties, the coal towns showed least unemployment in the middle age groups, a higher incidence among the
older workers, and the highest incidence of all among youth (fig. 7). 12
But because of the peculiar labor-market tendencies in southern Illinois, the variation among the three age groups was not exactly what
might be expected in the operation of a more "normal" labor market.
While older workers were disadvantaged by comparison with the
middle group, their r elative disadvantage was not as great as
Fig. 7- PERCENT OF LABOR FORCE UNEMPLOYED IN 7 SOUTHERN
ILLINOIS COAL TOWNS AND IN BIRMINGHAM, NEW BEDFORD,
TOLEDO, AND SAN FRANCISCO, BY AGE GROUP
Percent
Percent
60 ~ - - -- - - -- - - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - -~
~
_ []]Il]
50
60
Under 25 years of age
25 - 54 ye ars of age
- j 50
~ 55 yea rs of age and over
-
40
-
- 1 40
30
30
20
20
10
10
Southern Illinois
Birmingham
New Bedford
Son Francisco
Toledo
WPA 3641
Source : Appendix table 14 .
Seep.41.
The percent of wo rk er unemployed in each age group in four Ameri can cities
at about the time of the outhern Illinois survey were as follows:
11
12
Under
25 ywrs
City
36
Birmingham, Ala ____
- - - - - --- 38
New Bedford, Mas,, _
_
--- --- --25
San Francisco, Calif __ _ _ _ - ___ - - - - - - - - Toledo, Ohio ___ ________ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 41
25- 54
55 years
22
26
18
26
35
years
and over
30
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INTE'RNET ARCHIV~
UNIVERSITY 0• IL IN01S AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
27
35
34 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
commonly prevails. On the other hand , the relative disadvantage of
youth was intensified beyond normal expectation.13
Youth in the Devressed Area
Even beyond the general unemployment problem in southern
Illinois, coal-field youth are a special problem in themselves, a disadvantaged group within a depressed area. Since they have little opportunity to enter the coal mines, they make up an insignificant part of
the mine force. Out of 3,789 coal miners at work in the 7 coal towns,
only 227 were under 25 years of age (appendix table 13) . Cut off in
such fashion from the basic employment of the community, coal-field
youth suffer an exceedingly high proportion of unemployment.
Among all the workers under 25 years of age in the 7 towns, nearly
three-fifths (58 percent) were unemployed at the time of the census
(appendi,~ table 14 and fig. 7). In the most active of the 7 towns,
nearly half the youth were jobless; in the most severely depressed
town the proportion rose to almost 9 out of every 10. In contrast,
the incidence of unemployment among youth in four American cities
ranged from a low of 25 percent in one city to a high of 48 percent
in another. Coal-field youth clearly bear an extra burden of unemployment, both by comparison with the other workers within the
depressed area itself and also by comparison with the youth in other
areas.
FAMILY UNEMPLOYMENT
Unemployment among a community's workers does not tell exactly
the predicament of a community's families. The loss of a job in a
family with more than one worker employed is not quite as serious as
the loss of a job in a family with a single breadwinner. An unemployed worker does not necessarily mean a famil_y out of work. On
the other hand, some families in every community have no workers
13 The varying disadvantage of young and old workers, computed as the ratio of
the percent of unemployment among the young and old workers in each city to
the percent of unemployment among the middle age group in each city, appears
as follows:
Under 25
25-54
55 years
City
years
years
and over
7 southern Illinois coal towns____________ 170
100
126
Birmingham, Ala __ ___ _____ _____________ 164
100
136
New Bedford, Mass____ _________________ 146
100
135
San Francisco, Calif____________________ 139
100
150
Toledo, Ohio___________________________ 158
100
135
The incidence of unemployment among the older coal-field workers was only 26
percent higher than among the middle group, but in four American cities it ran
from 35 percent to as high as 50 percent above the incidence in the middle group.
The incidence of unemployment among coal-field youth was 70 percent above
that of the coal-town middle group; in three American cities, however, the differential against youth was 39 percent to 64 percent.
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
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A DEPRESSED AREA • 35
at all, and would be without means of support even though all the
community's gainful workers were employed.
Th e family is an economic as well as a social unit. Its economic
resources, as far as employment is concerned , depend upon the number
of workers it contains. The more workers a family has, the better its
chances of having at least one member employed. In the seven coal
towns the distribution of families by the number of available workers
per family was not out of the ordinary. About one-tenth of the families had no workers at all, more than two-thirds had only one worker,
and one-fourth had two workers or more; apparently, thesf' proportions
are about what would be expected in most nonagricultural American
communities. 14 With no more than a normal distribution of workers
in coal-town families , the heavy incidence of worker unemployment
naturally took a heavy toll in family unemployment (fig. 8).15
Fig . 8 - UNEMPLOYMENT AMONG FAMILIES IN 7 SOUTHERN ILLINOIS
COAL TOWNS AND IN BIRMINGHAM, NEW BEDFORD,
TOLEDO, AND SAN FRANCISCO
JOO;___ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Percent
Percent
~
100
Perc:e: nl
,oo
Percent
100
80
80
60
60
80
40
60
60
20
o
40
Some workersnone employed
No workers
20
~
§
~
-s:c:
-f
,__.,
(3:::...
Q)~
$
.,:-.t-
c.;cl-
;:,
~c::
,t,
<
,. ~
-?
~
,t-
.o;
<i,
'v
20
~
,?
~
,;;
~.,~
Source: Appendix table 15 .
WPA 3642
" Approximately the same proportions were found in Toledo and San Francisco.
In Birmingham and Ke\\· Bedford, howm·er, the number of families with two
workers or more was considerably higher, because of the employment of females
in the textile and domestic-sen·ice industries.
15
Families in the seven coal towns, like those elsewhere in the country, suffered
less from unemployment when they contained more than one worker. Among
families with one available worker, 40 percent had no employment. But among
families with two available workers or more, 25 percent had no member employed .
[ i< 11 Z
by
'l!TER'\IET ARn vr=
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLNOIS A,
URB.ANA-G AMPAIC N
36 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
Tlll'oughout the scYcn towns twu families out of every five held no
job in pr:iYa.tc industry, either because they contained no worker or
because their worker members were unable to find jobs. Even in the
most active coal towns, every third family still held no job in private
industry. In JohnsLon Cit:, the familie with no member employed
made up nearly two out of enry three families , a.n d in the village of
Bush they made up nearly four out of every fiYe. (See appendix table
15.) In contrast, four American cities reported only about one-fourth
of their families without jobs. 16
Some of these, the families without workers, \\·ere not necessarily
a depression problem, of course. Families in which the bead is a
,rnman with dependent children, or in which tbc head is incapacitated
by injury or disease, or is aged and too feeble to work would presumn bly exist in about the saine proportion i11 good limes as well as bad,
though their problem naturally becomes more acute whrn the depression cuts off whatever support they may have hnd in better times from
relatives. But the great majority of the familiPs without jobs were
not of this type; more than three-fou rth of them c-onlaincd one or
more available workers, none of ,vhom was ab]r, lo find a job. 11oreovcr, the families which did hold priYatc jobs ,,·ere not necessarily as
fortunate as this clas ification implies. , onw of them had earnmgs
so lo,Y that they still required public assi sta nce (appendix table 15).
Others contained jobless workers who doubtless felt the distress of
uncmploymenL no less acutely than if the entire family had been out
of work.
Whether the sta,te of the south ern Illinois Jnbor rnarkc•l is measured
in terms of famiJies or workers, the conc-h1sion i. tlw, ame. Between
one-third and two-thirds of the people- cleJ)('nding on the circumstances of the individual towns- were" surplus" at the busiest season
of 1939; and a considerable part of the remainder " ·pre none too secure,
as the figures on underemployment reYcal. The seven coal town
have undergone a depression so sen.- re that today they take their
place, not, as before, among the most prosperous American commtmities, but among the most prostrate. In the l 920's superlatives were
applicable to the prosperity of the coal field. Today, superlatives arc
again applicable, but they are the old ones reversed.
16
In Birmingham 7 percent of the families had no work ers and an additional
16 percent had worker without job : in Ke\\· Bedford and an Francisco the proportions were, respecti vely, 11 percent and 15 percent: and in Toledo, 9 percent
and 22 percent. Note that the proportion of families without workers in tne four
citie was roughly th e same a in the seven coal town .
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
Chapter Ill
LONG UNEMPLOYME N T I N THE
DEPRESSED AREA
THE WORKERS employecl in most "normal" American industrial
commuuities are consta.ntly shifting and changing. A part of the
labor force will always be losing its jobs; another part will be returning
to work; a third part will be entering industry for the first time. The
constant labor turnover means that at any given time a considerable
part of the unemployed will have been out of work only a short time,
and will have a reasonable chance of shortly returning to work. This
situation reflects itself in a relatively short duration of unemployment
among a cross section of all the jobless workers.
In the southern Illinois coal field there was also once a time when
an w1cmployed worker could find another job without much trouble.
But as more and more mines shut do,vn, as more and more stores,
garages, banks, and other local businesses disappeared, jobs became
increasi ngly difficult to find. Men at work held to their jobs tenaciously; mobility from job to job was stopped; the labor market was
frozen. At last there came a time when a man who had lost his job
was very un likely Lo find another. His qualifications, his experience,
his union, even his friends might do him little service, for job opportunities h ad all but vanished. Such was the prevailing condition of
the coal-town labor market at the time of the special unemployment
survey in 1939.
T he constantly narrowing chance for reemployment in the coal
field reflects itself in the long period of unemployment reported by
the coal-town jobless workers. Long unemployment, in turn, implies
a whole train of consequences for a people who were prosperous only
a short time ago . It means drastically reduced income and dependence upo11 pu blic aid. It means the sacrifice of the normal accumulations against want and old age, and the destruction of former living
standards. It also means immeasurable an..xiety, hopelessness, and
despair.
37
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
38 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT
The average duration of unemploy ment among all the unemploy ed
workers in the seven coal towns is shown in appendix table 16 and
figure 9.
Fig. 9 - AVERAGE* DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT SINCE LAST
FULL-TIME JOB OF WORKERS IN 7 SOUTHERN
ILLINOIS COAL TOWNS AND IN BIRMINGHAM,
NEW BEDFORD, TOLEDO, AND SAN FRANCISCO
Months
36
48
60
72
Bush
Johnston City
Corrier Mills
Herr in
West Fronkforl
Zeigler
Eldorado
*
Median .
Source : Append ix table 16 .
WPA 3643
These figures, it must be rem embered, do not indicate th e time lost
through unemploy ment during the past fc\\· years, but only the time
elapsed sin ce the last 2-wceks' job of at least 30 hours' work each week.
·w orkers who had picked up occasional odd jobs would shorten the
average duration anrl put the best face on the matter. E ven so, the
1
.figures are almost incredible. The r ecord of experienc ed and ableyears is an
6
to
2
from
of
bodied workers out of a job for an average
ed in an
unemploy
the
all
extraordin ary showing for a cross section of
of
measure
a
as
means
area. What wrnmploy ment of snch duration
comby
clear
be
will
towns
the general economic collapse of the coal
parison with fou r American cities, where th e average duration of
un employment during the same period was roughly 1 year. Coaltown workers in southern Illinois had not only suffered half again as
much unemploy ment as might have been expected in an "average"
communi ty during 1939, but their unemploy ment h ad lasted three
times as long.
Duration of un employmen t could not, of course, be computed for the num erous
new workers in the seven towns who had never had a full-tim e job in private
industry. This group is discussed later; see pp. 40-43.
1
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
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j
LONG UNEMPLOYMENT • 39
Displaced Miners
Although coal miners enjoy a measme of secmity as long as the
mine employing them continues to work, those who have lost their
jobs face a particularly difficult problem. Once a miner is out of the
mines, his chances of returning are small, especially if h e happ ens to
be an older worker. Unemployed coal miners accordingly reported
the highest average dmation of unemployment of all the major industrial groups within the coal towns. Half of all the unemployed coal
miners had been out of work for 68 months or more-over 5½ years.
(See appendi.,-x table 17.)
Unemployed coal miners' time out of work increased with their
age. Among those over 55 years, for example, the average duration
of unemployment was 6½ years. Unemployed miners under 45 years,
on the other hand, had been out of work about half as long. This
differ ence reflects a somewhat more favorable labor market for the
younger displaced miners. Avenues closed to older displaced miners
are not altogether closed to the younger men. Some of them have
been rehired in other mines, some have moved away, a few-probably
very few-hav e shifted to other industries. In spite of these advantages, however, even the most favored among the unemployed miners
had still been out of work for an average of more than 3}~ years.
The displaced coal miners in southern Illinois are obviously a disadvantaged group of workers. Out of work for more than 5 years
on the average, skilled workers in a declining industry, replaced by
machines, lacking the resomces and the qualifications to seek work
in another labor market, likely in many cases, indeed, to spend the
rest of their days outside of private industry, these workers suffer
long unemployment at its worst.
The Rest of the Long Unemployed
If we arbitrarily set up 1 year of unemployment as a convenient
dividing line between "short-term" and "long-term" unemployment,
,.,,.e may identify that part of the labor force which has suffered most
tlu-ough loss of work. In the 7 coal towns there were 3,117 such
long-unemployed workers (appendL'< table 17). They constituted
nearly one-fourth of all the exp erienced 2 workers in the coal towns
and almost three-fourths of all the experienced unemployed workers.
We may make a further distinction and identify the workers unemployed more than 3 years as the "very long" unemployed. There
were 2,223 such workers in the coal towns. They made up about
one-seventh of all workers and roughly half of all the unemployed.
Who were these workers?
2
The term "experienced" applies to workers who have had a full-time private
job.
)i4 t 1ed by
1r--iTrn~ _TA~, HIVE
Cri 1r I 'rem
JNIVE ~',ITV O IL INO S AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
40 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
Coal miners made up by far the largest single group of these long
and very long unemployed. The remainder were distributed among
scores of other industries, with no significant concentration in any
one industry. When combined, however, these other industries contributed one long-unemployed worker for each one contributed by the
coal mines. The bmdcn of unemployment in a one-industry community falls not alone on workers in the main industry.
Fig. 10- INDUSTRY OF LAST FULL-TIME JOB OF WORKERS
UNEMPLOYED MORE THAN I YEAR AND MORE
THAN 3 YEARS IN 7 SOUTHERN ILLINOIS
COAL TOWNS
Percent
Percent
60
40
20
20
0
0
40
60
Agriculture ond
forestry
Public ond
professional service
.... , . Workers unemployed
j:::;
Tronsportotion ond
communication
j IT~l~I t=h~~cj :e~~~nt)
~
Domestic ond
personal service
Workers unemployed
more thon 3 yeors
(Toto!= 100 percent)
Monufocturing ond
mechonicol
Cool mining
Source: Appendix toble 17.
WPA 3644
Inexperienced Workers
Inexperienced jobless workers- if they eA'ist in unduly large numbers-have the same significance as long-unemployed workers. The
problem of the long unemployed is their difficulty in recovering a
place they once held in industry. The gravity of their problem is
implied in the lapse of time since they last worked. The problem
of the inexperienced workers is their difficulty in finding their first
jobs in industry. Since lapse of time is difficult to measure in this
situation, the unemployment problem among new workers may be
shown in terms of the number of inexperienced workers in the labor·
market.
'
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
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wors e."
"Tim es are sure bad for everyb ody. But th e young ones-t hey got it
A Youn g South e rn I llinois W or ker.
r, g1t1Zed y
INTJ:'\NET ARCHIVf
01 g1na1
Jl'l
uNl%R'i,TY OF LLINOIS AT
UR"lANA-CHAMPA,CN
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UNIVERSl1Y OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
LONG UNEMPLOYMENT • 41
Youth
As we have seen, coal-town youth suffer an extremely high incidence of unemployment; nearly three workers out of every five under
25 years of age were jobless at the time of the special survey. This
figure tells only a part of their predicament. Ordinarily, the economic
problems of youth consist more in the kinds of jobs they get-the
wages they receive, the hours they work, the insecurity of their jobsthan in their failure to get jobs of any sort. A recent study of urban
youth in the labor market has shown that however many problems
young workers faced, most of them have at least held a job at one
time or another. 3 In the southern Illinois coal field , however, quite
another situation prevails. A substantial part of the coal-town youth
are not only unemployed, but have still to find their first job.
Nearly two-fifths of the new generation of workers in the coal towns
have come to their best productive years without ever having held a
full-time job in private industry. In the more severely stricken
towns the proportion rose to half of all young workers; and even in
the most active of the towns surveyed more than one-fourth of the
youth had never been employed. Among all the coal-town youth
who were jobless at the time of the special survey, nearly two-thirds
had never held a full-time job at any time in the past. (See appendi,'{
table 18.)
In most American industrial communities the case for youth-bad
as it is-has one reli eving feature: unemployed youth are at least future
workers. At any given time, it is true, a section of youth are in the
position of awaiting their turn in industry. But in the course of
time most of them will presumably be drawn into private jobs.
Youth generally do not fall into the category of the long unemployed.
In the southern Illinoi coal field, however, even such qualified optimism is not pos ible. Looking at the problem of coal-town youth as
one of waiting for work, one will conclude that for many the wait
must be very long indeed. The general predicament of youth in the
depressed area suggests an analogy with sections of youth in postwar
Engla,nd and Germany, the "lost generation" which has grown to
middle age without every knowing the experience of a private job.
The Rest of the Inexperienced
Although most of the inexperienced coal-town workers were youth,
a few were older workers. Among the workers under 25 years nearly
two-fifths were inexperienced; among the workers over 25 years,
only about 1 in each 20 wa.s in experienced (appendix table 18).
3 Payne, Stanley L., Disadvanta ged Youth on the Labor Market, Series I, No. 25,
Division of Research, Work Projects Administration , Federal Works Agency,
Washington, D. C ., 1940.
)1 4 t
~ed by
INTFR~ :TAR~ HIVE
0n 1riail 'ron,
UNIVERSITY 01' IL INO S AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
42 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
Fig . 11 - WORKERS UNDER 25 YEARS OF AGE WHO NEVER HELD A
FULL-TIME JOB, 7 SOUTHERN ILLINOIS COAL TOWNS,
BIRMINGHAM, NEW BEDFORD, TOLEDO,
AND SAN FRANCISCO
Percent
A. AS A PER CENT OF ALL WORKERS UNDER ~5
Percent
100 , -- - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - -- - - - - - -- - - ---, 100
Percent
PtrCll'II
100 , - - -- -- -
80 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -- -- - -
60 f-- -- - -- - - - -- - - --
-
-
100
-
BO
60 1 - - - - -- --
60
80 1---
- - --
80
-
60
20
0
40
20
0
0
........
;f
<$
.._<S
~
. .}
c-·S
~
.:-
~
-;~
Percent
100
~
<,
~
-?
*
,,_-§
.,.,--
$
(j
-§
.._o
.}
. o;
~
bo
0
.¾
AS A PERCENT OF ALL UNEMPLOYED WORKERS UNDER 25
B.
Percent
100
80
801---
- -- ----1 8 0
60
-
- - - - - < 60
60
40
- - - - - -- - -- - - -~
20
a~
;f
<$
;;
.,f
..,,o
~
~
...
,§
._o;:-
·S
......
~.,
c-·!!'
<.,o
~
,/'
.}
i,;
of
'v
20
-§
.._o
bo
0
.7-~
Source : Appendix table 18.
WPA 3645
Digitized by
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INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
LONG UNEMPLOYMENT • 43
Many of these, naturally enough, were in the age group 25-29 years,
and r epresent persons who have been unsuccessfully seeking work over
a period of some years. Others, of course, represent new entrants to
th e_labor market, and in particular, inexperienced women forced by
circumstances to seek work for the first time at near middle age or
beyond. It may be noted, however, that these older in ;,.-perienced
workers formed a smaller part of the total coal-town labor force than
would be expected in most communities.
Work-Progra m Employment
Obviously, a workingman cannot maintain himself and hi s family
for 1 or 2 years- let alone 5 years- without work. The first shock of
long unemployment may perhaps be taken up by accumulated reserves, by savings accounts, life-insurance policies, and home ownership. In southern Illinois, however, the early years of the depression
wiped out a great part of the community's reserves through bank
failure, lapsed payments, and the collapse of real-estate values.
Once these resources had vanishrd, and once the debts with landlord,
grocer, and butcher had reached the limits allowed, some form of
public assistance became essential.
At the time of the special survey employm ent on the work programs 4 was the principal form of assistance available to the ablebodied unemployed ; and Lhe proportion of the tmcmployed holding
work-program jobs was, again, unusually high (fig. 12).
Ordinarily , the proportion of unemployed workers on the work
programs remains low. For the country as a whole an estimated
20 to 25 percent of the unemployed had work-program jobs at about
the time of the coal-town survey. Depressed areas are an exception
to this general rule. The rate of labor turnover is low, the long
unemployed form an unduly large group of workers, and the normal
activity of seeking a job has little chance of success. In southern
Illinois the work programs have necessarily become indispensable
props to the economic life of the community.
The work programs for youth were of special importance to the
coal towns. Nearly half the unemployed coal-town youth, and well
over one-quarter of all the youth in the labor market, held jobs on
either the NYA, the CCC, or the WPA. In contrast, four American
cities reported an average of about 20 percent of the unemployed
youth, and 7 percent of the youth in the labor market, holding work4 As used here this term includes the Works Progress Administration, the National Youth Administration, the Civilian Conservation Corps, and other emergency work programs of the Federal Government. Of these, the WP A is by far
the largest.
DI( 11 Z
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NTERN~T ARC!-'
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
44 •
SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
program jobs.6 On the basis of a given number of unemployed youth,
the coal towns thus had more than double the work-program employment of a cross section of urban youth. And on the basis of a given
number of youth in the labor market , the extent of work-program
employment in the seven coal towns was four times greater.
Fig. 12 - PERCENT OF UNEMPLOY ED WORKERS ON WORK PROGRAMS«
IN 7 SOUTHER N ILLINOIS COAL TOWNS AND IN BI RMIN GHAM,
NEW BED FORD, TOLEDO, AN D SAN FRANC ISCO
Percent
Percent
- ,oo
100 .:--- - - - - - - - -- - -- - - - -- -- -- Perc e nt
, o o ~ --
80 1--- - - -- - - - - -- - - - - -
Percen t
--
80
>--- - --
60
>---
,oo
-
80
-
80
- - - - 60
• o >-- r,;,, - -- - - < • o
60
20
20
--j 60
0
40
40
20
- -- -- - - - - - - - - - - - , 20
emergency programs .
Source : Appendix table 10.
WP A 36 46
Long-Unemployed Fam ilies
Long unemployment is a family disaster. A substantial number
of coal-town families , it will be recalled, had none of their workers
employed in private industry at the ti.me of the southern Illinois
unemployment survey. 6 These families had frequently been wi thou t
private employment for a period of some years. Long-unemployed
In the seven coal towns, 48 percent of the unemployed youth and 28 percent
of all youthful workers were on the work programs. In Birmingham the proportions were, respectively, 30 percent and 7 percent; in e" · Bedford, 20 percent
and 6 percent; in Toledo, 18 percent and 10 percent ; in San Francisco, 17 per cent
and 5 percent. The ratio of WP A to NYA to CCC among youth var ies considerably . In the seven coal to"·n, it " "a s 2-2-1. In Birmingham the ratio 1Ya8
5- 5-1; in New Bedford, 1- 1- 2; in San Francisco, 1- 3- 1; in Toledo, 5-3- 1.
G Sec pp. 34-36.
5
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
LONG UNEMPLOYMENT • 45
famili es were common not only among the coal-town families with
only a single worker, but among the multiworker families as well.
Among coal-town families whose worker members were unemployed,
one group had had no job in private industry for more than a year at
the time of the survey. Two-thirds of all the unemployed families
fell within this group.7 Another group of families contained only
workers who had never held a full-time job in private industry.
A great many of these families were of course young couples who had
ma1Tied b efore the head could find a job. Others were mature
families in which the breadwinner's responsibility had fallen to a
youth or to an older inexperienced female head. Every ninth unemployed family in the coal towns surveyed was such a family. All
told, Ii.early four-fifths of the unemployed families contained only
inexperienced or long-unemployed workers. (See appendix table 19.)
These are the families who have borne the heaviest burden of the
coal fi eld 's decline. A few years ago they were as necessary in the
community as any other coal-town families; today they are "surplus"
population, and a great gap separates them from the normal economic
life of the coal towns. Their common experience is less income,
greater dep endence on relief, and more of all the stark compulsion of
poverty than prevail among their neighbors in the depressed area.
THE LIVING STANDARDS OF THE LONG UNEMPLOYED
The various indexes of economic disturbance, marshaled in this
and the preceding chapter, show the southern Illinois coal field to
b e a critically depressed community. In human terms, what does
this fact m ean? What does it mean to say, for example, that twofifths of the coal-town labor force is jobless, or that four out of every
five un employed families in the coal towns have had no work for a
year or lon ger? As an approach to these questions, the principal
findings of a special survey of buying patterns among 149 longunemployed coal- town families conducted in the spring and summer
of 1939 are presented. 8
Income
The income of th e long unemployed is derived almost entirely
from various forms of public assistance. WPA employment alone
accounted for 81 percent of all the families' income during an average
month; direct relief, old-age assistance, CCC, and NYA together
provided another 12 percent of all income. The small remainderWe leave out of account here the families which contained no workers at all.
The survey included on ly families which contained one worker or more.
Dependency growing out of the absence of workers in the family unit is not r epresented in the 149 families surveyed.
7
8
Di( 11 Z'
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NTER'lffT ARCHIVE
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
46 • SEVEN STRANDED COA L TOW NS
7 percent of all income-came from earnings on odd jobs picked up here
and there in the coal towns, from gifts, and from th e sale of various
possessions. 9 The average income of the families from all th ese
sources was $39.30 per month-$471.60 per yea r . Th e average size
of family dependent upon this income was 3.5 persons.
Expenditure Patterns
An aYerage monthly income of about $40-plus some supplementation by surplus commodities for large familie - must thus providr all
of a long-uI1employcd family's needs. Th e resulting problem in
household fina.n ce is difficult indeed . Each family must try to stretch
this income to satisfy the butcher, the baker, the grocer, the landlord,
the dry-goods merchant, the moving-picturn manager, the pastor, th e
utility company, and the doctor. When the money does not go
around the alternatives arc clear. The family may possibly run into
debt, although the chances of finding a creditor arc not good. Other,,;rise the family mu t simply do without and not only put up with
discomfort but even get along without necessities.
The resulting predicament of the families is shown in the level of
buying choices they must make. Early in the winter, for example,
one housewife was faced with the mgent need for both a n ew heater
and a .winter coat, but she had money enough for only one. After
long thought she decided that a heater was more needed, and sh e
bought one on the installment plan. Three month s later, however,
she wished she had bought the coat because " it would have cost less
and we wouldn't have to owe for it." In another family an unemployed miner 's wife wa ill , but had no doctor. "We doctor ourselves,"
she sa id; "every time you get the doctor it takes that much off what
you have to eat." Another coupl e bad 30 cents saved to celebrate
their wedding anniversary. The problem then was bow to spend it,
wh eth er to buy a dish or go to the movies. Th ey decided at last to
go to the movies and do without the dish. Another family chose to
ba,e the kitchen stove r epaired in preference to replacing worn-out
shoes, another traded food for pillow slips, and so on.
The sum of all these choices between competirtg needs creates a
pattern imposed by the "must" items in subsistence living Each
family spends its money in its own way, but as the following table
indicates, there is less choice involved than one might thinl-:.
9
Barter is not included as a part of income. Nevertheless, some of the barter
transactions among the long unemployed take on considerable importance, not
to say complexity. One family, for example, set out to buv a house which had
been ruined by the Ohio River floods . This deal, involv i,;g $30, ,ms achieYed
through these steps: (J) trading a hog to pay for part of the hou se, (2) mortgaging
a cow to pay the rest. and (3) selling the cow to pay for new s hingles and the electr ic
light deposit.
Digitized by
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INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
LONG UNEMPLOYMEN T • 4 7
Percent Distribution of Expenditures of Long- Un em ployed Families in 3 Southern Ill inois
Coal Towns
ICarrier Mills
Tots!
Item
TotaL _____ ________________ . ___ ____ _____ __ __ _
100
100
West Fran kfort
Zeigler
100
100
l - - -- r- - - -1 - - - - ~ - - - -
Food . . ________ . __________________ . ________ ___ _____ _
Clothing.·- - --- --------------------------- ----- ---Personal care___ ________________________ _________ ___
Housing ____ ____________ _____ __ ____________ ________
Household operation ____ __ ____________ · - · · -- --·-Furniture, furnishings, and household equ ipment_ _
Medical care . . __ ____ __________ . __ . · · --- --· ·T ransportation __ __ ________ ______ __ ___ . __ ________
Recreation __ ____ __________ ____ ____ __ ____ ___ __ __
All other_________ ______ __ _________ __ ____ _____ __ _ __
51
50
9
7
1
II
5
6
3
1
JI
6
5
3
6
I
7
5
2
JO
49
51
16
I
9
7
8
1
12
6
4
4
5
3
4
8
4
l
6
1
fi'oorl
When incomes fall, the relative importance of food increases, not
only because food is the most urgent of a family's needs, but also
because ha bits of diet are p0werful and tend to be maintained after
other li ving habits have disintegrated. Ordinarily, even in families
li ving on short income, the cost of food occupies no more than onethird of a family 's total budget; a.n d as income increases, the cost of
food falls considerably below a third. Among the long-unemployed
fam ilies in the coal towns , however, food purchases accounted for
exnc tly half of all cash expenditures. Out of the $40 which the
flverage family was a.ble to spend each month, $20 went for food.
In spite of the important position of food expenditmes in the
b11dgets of the coal-tow11 long unemployed , a generally satisfactory
diet was by no means provided. According to the accepted standards
for measurin g adequacy of diets, 10 cents per person is considered to
be the minimum cost per meal in a budget to be used over any long
period of time; and beb1·cen 7 .5 and 8 cents is the absolute bottom for
an "emergency" hudgct designed to tide a family over a short period
of poor luck. But th e nverage sum available to the lon g-unemployed
famili es in southern Illinois was 6.3 cents a meal. Moreover, this
allowance was not a temporary expedient, but had become more or less
permanently established over a period lasting for many families as
·
lon g as 7 or 8 years.
In the process of stretch ing their cost pei· meal further than it
should hnve to go, the families have become accustomed to several
serious deficiencies in their diets. Flour, corn meal, beans, potatoes,
and hacon are necessarily the basic foods consumed. Fresh milk is
almost excluded from the average menu, even when there are small
children in the family , and canned milk is substituted . Oleomargarine
takes the place of butter. Fresh vegetables are likewise absent
through out th e ,1·inter and sprin g, and in the summertime as well
unless a family has a garden of its own. Unsalted meat is usually
) 11 zrd by
'-lTER'-lU AKCHIVE
Ong1 ,al from
UN VERSITV OF lll''-IOIS AT
U'\tlANA-l HAM t\lGN
48 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
foregone except for the biweekly pay-day celebration, the husband'
lunch on WPA workdays, and an occasional upper of hamburger,
wieners, shank bone, or some other cheap meat. Families wanting:
more fresh meat- the central European immigrants in particularmust trim their budget el ewhere to make up the difference.
As the number of mouths Lo be fed increase , the burden of providing
enough food of the right kind naturally become more difficult. In
the very large familie , however, the difficulty is partly relieved by
surplus commodities. "[f it weren't for surplu commodities," said
one housewife, "we couldn't navigate at all."
Many families also rai e a pnrt of their own food. Though by no
means universal, garden , chickens, and even pigs and cows were
common, and they doubtle s helped to improve the quality of many a
long-unemployed family's diet. They did not, however, solve the
families' food problems- as outsiders so often suppose. Nor were
they always a net financial gain; feed for cows and chickens, canning
supplies, seeds, and the like were items of considerable importance in
the family budgets.
Clothing
Very little of the long-unemployed families' income goes for clothing.
Out of the aYernge income of $40 a month, 9 percent, or about $3.60,
was spent on clothes. Over the couTse of a full year, clothes would
cost the average long-unemployed family about $43, which would be
less than one-third the amount provided in synthetic "maintenance"
budgets, and less than half the amount provided in minimum-standard
"emergency" budget .
As the wife of a long-unemployed miner commented, "You can
promise your back, but you can't promise yom tomach." The job
of keeping a family lothed is accomplished through a variety of
ingenious make hift in ordrr that money which would otherwise be
spent on clothing may be diYertcd to apply on more pressing needs.
Flour sacks, sugar ack , and feed acks are made over for a wide
variety of need , ranging from underwear and sheeting to washrags
and curtains. The life of every garment is streLched to the limit;
clothes are always made over, patched, and handed down from person to person until "when they 're finished, they're about gone." For
necessary replacemt'n ts many families depend on econdhand clothing,
or on cas toff clothes donated by more prosperou relatives. Surplus
commodity clothing- much of it made in the WPA sewing roomshelps the larger families. Often replacement is not po iblc from any
source. Some familic had no shoes for winter weather and some had
none at all; some were forced to send their children to school in rotation; on washday it was not unusual for family members to be confined
to the house until their clothes were my.
OigltlZ"'r' by
C.n 111 I frorri
NTERNET ARCH VE
UN VERSITY O~ IL INO 5 AT
UREIANA-CHAM?AIGN
ec111·i,ty A<l1ninistration (Hoth , t ein).
"Ten years ago you wouldn't of /mow ed it was th e same house."
The Home of an Unemployed :\liner in Franklin County, Ill.
)io,t;,ed by
on..,inal frofll
INTERI\JET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
Digitized by
INTERNET ARCHIVE
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
LONG UNEMPLOYMENT •
49
The families' clothes are usually 3 or 4 years old. Few have good
dresses or suits; and a clean housedress or overalls-sarcastically
called "blue serge"-serve for special occasions as well as everyday use.
Inadequate clothing often results in changed social habits. Many
families have not attended church since they wore out their last Sunday clothes, and visiting beyond the neighborhood is similarly handicapped. An unemployed miner complained, "See my pants, a patch
h ere, a patch there, and I have to go to town like this. I have to buy
for the kids first, they go to school. But I have to go among people
too, once in a while."
Housing
Housing, like clothing, was subject to considerable skimping. The
cash cost of housing in the budgets of the coal-town long unemployed
absorbed 11 percent of the total cash outlay, and averaged about $50
per family over the period of a year. About half the families still held
title to their house and paid somewhat less than the average, while
the families who rented paid somewhat more. In both situations,
however, unpaid housing obligations tended to accumulate, either as
d elinquent taxes among owners or as past-due rent among the tenants.
Both owned and rented houses had often passed into the advanced
stages of disrepair. Roofs leaked ("like all outdoors"); windowpanes
were cracked and sometimes mis ing al together; floors sagged and doors
were pulled askew from the rotting of underpinning; the paint on
most of the houses had long since worn away. "But if you'd come to
my hou e 10 years ago," said a miner's wife, "you wouldn't of kn.owed
it was the same house." In spite of all these hardships the houses
were almost invariably kept clean and neat, and decorated with the
b est that had come to hand- with crocheted work, bright lithographed
calendars, and religious mottoes.
City water, and often electricity as well, had been sacrificed. Out
of all the long-unemployed families interviewed, 80 percent had no
running water and 95 percent used outside toilets. Bathtubs had become an equally rare luxury. Every third family had had the electricity twned off and had reverted to kerosene lamps. Gas for
cooking was available to most of the communities, but only 3 percent
of the long-unemployed families could afford to use it. ln spite of the
intense summertime beat in southern Illinois, half the long-unemployed
families used no ice.
Medical Care
Southern Illinois long-unemployed families bear their full share of
illness. D eficient diets extended over any p eriod of time will leave
their mark; and the insecurity and worry of long unemployment can
[ i( 11 Z
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NTERI\JET ARn v~
Original from
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
50 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
ontribute to a variety of di orders. 1loreoYer, when illne s does
come to the familie of long-unemployed workers it is likely not to b e
properly treated. Many of their small disordl'rs gro"· into chronic
undiagno ed ailment sim ply becau e the famili es cannot afford
proper medical care. All these difficulties produced a rather unu ual
rl'corcl of di ability among the long unemplo~, ed in the coal t°'vns.
During th year ending June 30, 1939, the member of the families
intervicwl'd were disabled for an average of 25 clays each. 10
The ca h outlay for medical care absorbed about 5 percent of total
ca h expenditures of the lon g-unemployed families, and in a full year it
co t an average of about $23 per family. This outlay, however, took
care of only a mall part of the total charges made against the families
for medical care. Accumulated debt for past medical care amounted
to an average of ·34 per family at the encl of the period covered .
In mo t cases th e families accepted this debt as a r eal obligation against
their future income.
But there i a limi t to cr edit for even such neces arie as medical
care. Many of the serYi ces that the families needed they did without.
Hospitalization, for example, was quite out of th e que ti.on for longunemployed familic . One unemployed worker "nearly went crazy
with the toothache all summer," but could not afford to get treatment. A schoolboy had to drop out of school for a whole year because
the family could not buy glasses for hin1. In one family a diabetic had
nl'iiher proper diet nor insulin. :.Iany persons bad not been able to
buy fal e teeth after their own werl' ('xtracted. And there were
in tancl's in almost every family of home treatment for illness which
would ordinarily call for medical care.
Other .\'eeds
Several other types of wants baYe a necessary claim on the longunemployed families' income. Trnnsportation, which in most
families involves nothing more than rid es from home to th e WPA
proj ect and back, is a substantial and inescapable item. The co t of
household operation is omewhat reduced by the cheap fu el available
in all the coal towns- where "gopher-hole·, coal sells for as little as
1.50 a ton; but even so, the cost of fud and lights still absorbed 6
percent of the family income. The families had also cut their exp endi10
It hould be borne in mind that th e familie:-: ~tudied wer e not "tm ernployable," but that each contained one available worker or more.
Th e National Health urvey discovered that dmi11g 1935 and 1936 the aYerage
annual di -ability per per on in the population at large was 9.8 days, and that
arnonp; rcli f recipient generall~- the av erage was 16.3 days. See Division of
Public Health Method , Th e National Health Suri•ey : 1985-1936, Preliminary
R eport , Bulletin No. 2, Sickness and Medical Care Series, National Institute
of Health, U.S. Public H ealth Service, Wahingto n, D. C., 1938, p. 4.
Digitized by
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INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
LONG UNEMPLOYMENT • 51
tures for furniture and household eq uipment to the absolute minimum,
but they could not eliminate this cost. Replacement of worn-out
equipment, particularly worn-out stoves, took up 5 percent of all the
expenditures of the long-unemployed families, and the biweekly
installment payment to the furniture store was one of their more
common obligations. All of these supposedly minor and supposedly
nonessential items, together with a meager expenditure for recreation
(1 percent) and for "other" expenses, took one-fourth of all the cash
outlay of the long-unemployed families.
Hand-to-Mouth Living
The long-un employed families do not make allowance for all the
miscellaneous needs that must in the course of time absorb a considerable part of their incomes. Certain needs arc constant-food, for
example, and electric lights, rent, transportation, and recreation.
These items are, in practical terms, the families' necessities, and they
absorb most of every pay check. But there are occasional needs that
can no more be avoided than the grocery bill itself. The doctor's bill
is one of these items, and prescriptions, clothing, replacement of
household equipment, and repairs to roofs, floors, windows, and the
lilrn are others. With most of the monthly income already spoken
for , these unexpected needs will in most cases thrnw the families into
debt. And no sooner is one debt paid than otlwrs must be assumed,
so that the families live perpetually in tlw midst of a struggle to pay
off their small obligations.
There is another difficulty. E:.·(penditures among the long unemployed are naturally gauged to their full monthly income. But
sometimes there are misfortunes. A WP A worker may lose time
through bad weather, or illness, or failme to be transfened to a new
proj ect, or h e may be laid off altogether. From time to time every
long-unemployed family must draw less than the expected full pay.
In this situation, the budget is invariably thrown out of gear. Again
the family must go into debt, a.nd frequently nothing but the comer
grocer's credit will stand between it and hunger.
Any approach to the broader questions of the southern Illinois
depressed area must take into account the current economic predicament of the long unemployed. The families are without reserves of
any sort. N early all are in debt for their cmrent needs, 11 and they live
11 There are two types of debts among the long unemployed.
There are the
"old debts," running to as high as $1,000 in a single family, accumu lated in most
cases during the years when there was no r elief for the unemployed. The extent of
old debts is amazing; a small corner grocer~• in one coal town, for example, had
bad debts amounting to $40,000. There is no chance whatever that the old
debts ca11 be repaid. The other type, the "current debt," which is kept di tinct
from the old debt, is far smaller, and is recognized as a real obligation.
[i""
bo oF
'ffER"JET ARn vr=
tL... LIi:).
011gina1 frl m
UNIVERSITY OF ILLNOIS A,
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
52 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
from day-to-day. Self-initiate d r emedies for the predicamen t of the
long unemployed have thus long since become impossible. The backto-thc-fa1m movement, for example, would require capital which the
families do not have and could not get. Spontaneou s migration of
family units must likewise be ruled out as a possible solution, for
migration also requires reserves which the families simply do not
possess.
Digitized by
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
Chapter IV
THE DECLINE OF THE SOUTHERN
ILLINOIS COAL INDUSTRY
WHEN UNEMPLOYED southern Illinois coal miners explain
the causes of the predicament in which they now find themsel,e ,
they invariably begin with the statement: "There is nothing here but
just coal." The statement is almost literally true. There is, of
course, some agriculture. Farm land in the three counties is generally
poor, however; average farm income is exceedingly low; and a considerable part of the coal field bas nenr been put under cultivation.
Compared with coal, agriculture is a minor contributor to the economic
life of the community. There are also a few primary manufacturing
establishments-a flour mill, a packing house, a brick plant-but
their total pay roll has carcely exceeded 200 workers at any time within
the past 15 years. The rest of the working population is dependent
upon either the mines, the industries which are subsidiary to mining,
or the area's trade and local service industries. The fortunes of the
coal industry and the fortunes of Franklin, Saline, and Williamson
Counties are inseparable. 1
THE NATION-WIDE COAL DEPRESSION
Overexpansion of Mine Capacity
The underlying causes of the long depression in southern Illinois
are the difficulties which beset the bituminous coal industry throughout
1 The recent discovery of oil near Benton, in Franklin County, does not alter
this fact. I ronically enough, the first effects of the discovery were more detrimental than helpful. Few of the local unemployed found work on the drilling
crews which suddenly went to work all over the coal field, for these crews were
manned almost altogether with skilled workers originally brought from Texas and
Oklahoma. The influx of these migrants intensified the already critical shortage
of housing in the coal towns. The community will apparently not even benefit
greatly from royalties, since the great bulk of the mineral rights are of course
owned by the absentee coal operators.
53
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
54 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
the United States. Since the turn of the een tw-y bituminous coal
mining has been "unstabilized." Dw-ing the period of a rapidly
expanding coal market (1900- 1918) the productive capacity of the
coal industry was developed faster than coal consumption. Anticipating futme profits through occasional coal famines and through a
constantly expanding market, optimistic investors not only continued
to pour unneeded capital into the industry but also failed to abandon
inefficient operations. Overexpansion of capacity led in twn to
bitter and prolonged price wars. In order to keep the mines working
and thus protect their investment against heavy shutdo,vn losses,
operators were forced in slack times to dump coal on the market for
whatever it would bring. The many prewar attempts to control
competition among the operators, whet.her by merger or trade agreement, were unsuccessful; and the industry was already in serious
difficulty as it entered the wartime boom.
High coal prices dming the World War intensified the top-heavy
condition of the soft-coal industry. 'When the wartime peak of 579
million tons in production was reached in 1918, America's coa.1-mine
capacity (i. e., the output possible under 280 days operation) had
risen to 650 million tons. After the wr.r was over and output began
to decline, capacity continued to grow. The postwar shift in production from the union fields to the nonunion fields in Kentucky and
West Virginia resulted in the development of hundreds of new mines
not justified by the demand for coal. By 1923 mine capacity had
risen to 885 million tons, while production stood at 565 million tons. 2
Loss of Markets
Just when overexpansion reached its height in the years after the
war, the coal industry suddenly began to lose markets. Petroleum,
natural gas, and hydroelectric power became serious competitors with
coal for both the industrial and the domestic fuel trade. In 1918
these three sources of power had supplied only 18 percent of t h e total
energy consumed in the United States. But by 1922 they supplied
32 percent, and in 1927 their share further increased to 36 percent.
Bituminous coal fought a losing battle; between 1918 and 1927 its
share in the total energy consum ed dropped from 70 percent to 55
percent. 3
Simultaneously, American industry began to make substantial
improvements in fu el-burning efficiency. Railroads, which consume
more bituminous coal than any other industry, bad bw-ned 174
pounds of coal per 1,000 ton-miles in 1920. By 1927 the consumption
2
Bureau of Mines, l'vfinerals Yearbook, U. S. D epartment of the Interior,
Washington, D. C., L936, p. 562.
3 Ibid ., 1937, p. 810.
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
DECLI N E OF TH E COA L INDUSTRY • 55
of coal for the same amount of hauling was only 131 pounds, a decrea e
of one-fourth. Central electric power station , another large consumer of coal, burned 3.04 pounds of coal per kilowatt-hour in 1920,
but burned only 1.84 pounds in 1927, a decrease of 39 percent.
Increased efficiency in fuel burning was also r ecorded for the manufacture of cement and pig iron. 4
liqu idation of Surplus Capacity
In the face of this situation liquidation of surplus coal capacity was
inevitable. The postwar record for coal production in the United
States was set in 1926, when total output reached 573 million tons.
Three years before this record was made, howev-er, the indu try
began a rapid deflation in terms of both mines and men. Between
1923 and 1926, 138 million ton of mine capacity were abandoned,
and 100,000 miI1r·rs were displaced from their job . During the last
3 years of "pro perity" in the 1920's nearly 100,000 more miners
were displaced. Fmther wide pread abandonment of coal mines
brought capacity in 1929 down to a point only 27 percent above actual
output, and for a short time the industry was more nearly stabilized
than at any other time since before the World "TI""ar. 5
The depres ion intensified all the basic difficulties of the bituminous coal industry. B etween 1929 and 1932 a third group of 100,000
miners lo t their job , cutting the total number of miners employ ed
to the lowest point since 1902. Actual tonnage fell to 310 million,
the lowest since 1904 . Total producti,-e capacity , however, declined
only slightly during this period, so that by 1932 capacity wa again
almost double actual output. 6 The result was rampant cutthroat
competition, and in turn a rapid lowering of wages and working
standards.
Recovery-but the Problems Remain
With the adoption of the coal code under the National Industrial
Recov-ery Act, the coal industry began a period of steady r ecovery ,
though at a slower pace than the recovery of industry in general
because of competition with rival fuel . In 1936, when the volume
of all industrial production had recovered to 1927 levels, America's
output of bituminous coal had risen only to the level first reached in
1912. The 7-hour workday established by the Kational R ecover5
'Yaworski, Nichola ; Spencer, Vivian; Saeger, Geoffrey A.; and Kies ling,
0. E., Fuel Efficiency in Cement ,1Ianufacture, 1909-1985, Report ·o. E- 5, Xational Research Project, Work Progres Admini tration, Philadelphia, Pa.,
April 1938, pp . 1-15.
6 Bureau of Mines, op. cit., 1936, pp . 562- 563.
5 I bid., pp. 562- .563 .
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
56 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
Administration coal code raised the total number of workers employed from 406,000 in 1933 to 458,000 a year later. In 1936 total
men employed tood at 477 ,000, and in 1937 at 492,000, an incr ease
of 86,000 over the bottom year of the dcprc ion. 7 But these increa es reabsorbed less than half of the work er displaced between
1926 and 1932.
To tal
The year 1938 wip ed out th e greater part of these gain
. oft-coal output dropped to 349 million tons for the year , th e lenl
of production preYailing in 1908. The number f men employed was
cut from 492,000 to 441,000, and the greater part of the employment
gains made after 1932 was canceled. In 1939 oft-coal output showed
a ubstantial r ecovery, increasing 13 per ent over 1938. Y et preliminary estimate put the total numb er of workers employed at
437,000, or 4,000 Jes than had been employed in 1938. 8
THE POSTWAR POSITION OF SOUTHERN ILLINOIS COAL
The general po twar decline in the American coal industry found
the once favored competitiYe po ition of outhern Illinois coals vastly
changed. Of cour c, the fayorable freight haul to Chicago and St.
Louis r emained. A Lon of mine-run coal from H errin continued to
enter the Chicago market with an initial fn,ighL-rate advantage; in
1939 this differential amounted to 35 cent over we tem Kentucky,
. 1.14 over northern "\Yest Virginia and wesLcm P ennsylvania, and
$1.34 over southern "\Vest Virginia. Indiana and central Illinois
coals, however, were still favored by lower rates than southern
Illinois, which bore 30 cents more than Sullivan, Ind., and 40 cents
more than Taylorville, Ill.
Competition
The quality of southern Illinois coal till compared favorably with
any other coal mined we t of the Appalach ians 9 Hocking Valley
Ohio, coals- originally the chief high-gra ck . oft-coal competitor of
southern Illinoi -had virtually disappl'are<l from th e midwestern
market.
7
Ibid ., 1937, p. 799; 1938, p . 694.
Ibid., 1940, pp. 779, 780.
0
Southern Illinois No. 6 seam coal is superior in B. t. u. to all other midwe tern coal except that mined from o. 6 and No. 11 seam in Hopkins County,
Ky. In a h content it averages better than all leading coals from the midwe tern fields with the exception of those from No. -1 cam Vigo County, Ind.,
and No . 6 seam in Sullh·an County, Ind ., and Hopkins County, Ky. In
,·olatile matter, outhern IUinois coal averages upcrior to all leading mid". tern coals except coal mined in No. 5 _seam Sullivan County, Ind ., and
No. 6 seam of Vermillion County, Ill. In su lphur content its low-sulphur
coal are uperior to leading midwestern coals with the exception of No. 4 seam
coal from Vigo County, Ind.
8
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INTERNET ARCH VE
UNIVERSITY O~ IL INO 5 AT
URBANA-CHAM?AIGN
DECLINE OF THE COAL INDUSTRY • 57
Shortly before the World War, however, a new high-grade Appalachian coal appeared on th e Chicago market, and as time passed its
inroads iuto the southern Illinois trade became iucreasingly severe.
This was Pocahontas (low-volatile) coal, which outranked southern
Illinois in all the standard quality criteria. Pocahontas coal had an
additional advantage in that it burned with less smoke than any other
soft coal. As the agitation for control of the urban smoke nuisance
grew, the competitive position of Pocahontas coal was greatly strengthened . In spite of a high freight rn.te, smokeless coal became increasingly popular in St. Louis and Chicago.
The southern Illinois coal field also lost heavily in competition with
petroleum and natural gas. Midwestern cities, particularly Chicago
and St. Louis, were logical terminals for the pipe lines from the new
southwestern oil fields, so that natural gas and petroleum could be
delivered at particularly low prices throughout the territory covered
by outhern Illinois coals. After the war oil and gas became se ·ious
competitors for the coal industry generally, but especially for Franklin,
Saline, and Williamson Counties.
Woge Scoles
An equally important reason for the decline of the southern Illinois
field lay in the lower wages paid by competing fields. The most intensive period of mine development in southern Illinois occurred immediately after the World War, when total capacity was increased by
one-half within the space of 6 years. This eA--pansion was motivated,
first, by the belief that the general demand for coal would continue to
increase geometrically, just as it had been increasing since the 1870's.
And there was a second fateful assumption that the early postwar
pattern of union wages, and hence mining costs, in the competrug coal
fields would not be disrupted.
Immediately after the war the United Mine Workers of America
began to lose agreements in one Appalachian coal field after another.
At one time or another in the early 1920's, western Kentucky (the
nearest competitor to Illinois), eastern Kentucky, Tennessee, 1tfaryland, and nearly all fields in West Virgi11ia began operating on a
nonunion basis; after 1926 operators in Ohio and Pennsylvania
followed suit . There came a time at last when Illinois was the only
leading coal-producing State with a strong miner's organization left
intact. In 10 years membership in the U.M.W. of A. had dropped
from 386,000 to 80,000, of whom half were in Illinois.
As union influence outside of Illinois waned, the 1919 wage structure
in the industry fell to pieces. By 1924 average hourly earnings for
hand loaders in Illinois had risen 12 percent above 1919 levels, while
wages in West Vfrginia and Kentucky had decreased between 2 percent and 6 percent (appendix table 4). On this new basis, which
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
58 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
remained ub tantially con tant through a period of generally falling
wage until 1929 , \Ye t irgi:nia and Kentucky were able to double
their tonnage output within years. In th depre sion a second gap
appeared. Between 1929 and 1931 the Illinoi wage rate stood practically unchanged, while the West Virginia rate fell by one-fifth and
the K en tucky rate by about one-tenth. Comparable cuts took effect
in Ohio and Penn ylvania. In the next 2 yea1 the Illinoi scale was
cut 30 percent, but in competing field the cut wa even greater.
Before the NRA wa e tablished in 1933 , Kentucky , West Virginia ,
Ohio and Penn ylvania were paying only lightly more than half the
Illinois scale. ( ee appendix table 4. )
These unequal wage rate thoroughly demoralized the coal market.
1926 and 1933 the quoted price of mine-run coal from southet\Yeen
B
never fell below $1.95 a ton. But mine-run coal from
Illinoi
ern
western Kentucky averaged about $1.20 a ton through the whole
period, and in 1933 it old for a little a 70 cents. During the same
period We t Virginia coal dropped to a low of 1.25, and for a short
tinrn smokeless coal wa delivered on the Chicago market at a price
only 65 cent higher than the deli,ered price from outhern Illinoi .
This state of affo.irs was ended in 1934 when the nited :-.line
·\ forkers once more organized all the principal coal fields. On the
ba is of union agreement covering almost the en tire bituminous coal
indu try, wage diffrrential among the competin g fields were again
brought back to approximn.tely the 1919 patLrrn. This new stabilization, which wa generally welcomed by operators and miners alike,
solved one of the mo t grave and persistent problems of the southern
Illinois coal industry. But meanwhile, 10 yc'ars of unstabilizc'd minr
wages left their mark upon Franklin , , alin c, and William on
ountie .
The Reduced Sha re of Southern Illinois in the Coal Market
The outhern Illinoi coal industry lost its tonnage after 1923 even
more rapidly than the coal industry as a whole. Immediately after
th e World War Franklin , Saline, and William on Counties mined
5.6 percent of th e total United States oft-coal output, and a bout
the same share wa maintained through 1926. After the 1927 stril,e
thi Lare beO'all to diminish rapidly. In 1928 the three cow1tie
mined 4.6 percent of the Nation' output; in 1930 they mined 4.2
percent; in 1933 tbrir hnrc had fallen to 3.3 percent. Once lost, the
bare wa not ea ily recowred. In 193 the thT e counties still
min ed only 3.7 percent of the United , tate total. ( ee appendi.x
tables 3 and 5.)
The falling pri e f conl in the 1920's and during the depression required each coal field to nu1kr it own particular aclju tment, depending
D1g1t12Ar' by
NTERNET ARCH
vr=
0r
I frorr,
UN VEA.SITY or= IL lf\JO 5 AT
UREW,A-~ HAM?AfGf\J
nkli n Cou nty, Ill.
A ban clon ed ... Bus h ll!in e, Fra
1 11
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'-lTER'-lU ARCHIVE
Cn 11 I from
UN VERSIT< OF IL~lr-.io,s AT
UREIANA-CHAMPAIGN
Digitized by
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Original from
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
DECLINE OF THE COAL INDUSTRY • 59
upon its position in competition with ri,al fields. The nonunion
fields of Kentucky and West Virginia were able to keep both tonnage
and mine investment intact, but only by cutting wages drastically,
eventually to less than half the 1924 level. In Pennsylvania, which
bore the heaviest brunt of the general decline, deflation meant "idespread abandonment of mines, and, after 1927, the degmdation of
wages and working conditions as well.
In Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Counties two adjustments in
the basic structure of the industry were made: (1) Th e field abandoned
roughly half of its min e capacity, somewhat more than its average
share in the Nation-wide deflation. (2) The sunriving operators cut
their costs by installing coal-loading machinery, which nearly doubled
the efficiency of op erations and eliminated thousands ol workers from
the mines.
ABANDONMENT OF MINES
The first effect of the developing coal depression in southern Illinois
was a rapid liquidation of mine capacity. The collapse began with
the 1922 strike, the longest and most bitterly fought in the history of
the field. The strike had several important results. It led to the
bloody clash between strikers and strikebreakers which has come to
be known as the "Herrin Massacre," and in turn to a boycott against
Williamson County coal in northern Illinois. lt raised mine wages
to a basic scale of $7.50 a day, the rate which became the "Jacksonville Scale" when it was renewed at a Jacksonville, Fla., conference in
1924. Most important of all, the failure of the 1922 strike in west
K entucky and in several Appalachian fields gave one section of the
soft-coal industry an opportunity to cut the miners' wages and to
destroy the 1919 wage structure.
As soon as the strilrn was over and the new agreement was signed ,
mine abandonment started suddenly and in earnest. 10 Thirte en
shipping mines were abandoned in 1923, displacing 2,500 miners.
Next year 17 more mines were abandoned and 3,800 more miners were
displaced. Deflation continued in 1925 with 11 mines closed and
3,000 more miners displaced. (See appendix table 1.)
During these years the growing trend went almost unnoticed. The
miners drew high wages under the new contract, and the "silk-shirt
era" had begun. Jobs were still plentiful, and most of the displaced
10 Williamson County took the first and the heaviest blows of the deflation. Its
position was somewhat injured by the boycott on Williamson coal and by the lurid
publicity given to the so-called "Herrin Massacre." It suffered even more,
however, from the fact that its principal mines were the first so uthern Illinois
mines to be developed. Williamson mines by 1922 tended to be both small and
old, and either had been worked out during the war or had become too inefficient
to survive the new competition . Seep. 3.
Di( 11 Z'
by
'ffERNET ARn vr=
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
60 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
miners were soon rehired. Older coal miner , in particular , wer e
fortunate; for as long as coal was loaded by band, the operators
considered the older workers to be their steadiest and best b ands.
The New Orient mine at West Frankfort, " largest mine in the world"
and the last big mine developed in southern Illinois, was opened in t bi
period and made new jobs for 1,900 coal miners. Among the 9,300
miners who lost their jobs between 1923 and 1925, about 3,000 fo und
their way back into the mines. Most of the rest either went back to
school, moved away, or retirnd to live on their savings or their children's earnings. Only a small number of unemployed bad begun to
pile up in the three counties .
Southern IlJinois miners look back on 1927 as the year that ushered
in the hard times . Before the 1927 strike, a miner could still move
about from mine to mine with little difficulty. After 1927 all such
mobility stopped. Miners were suddenly frozen in whatever jobs they
held, or if their mine had shut clown, they looked forward to an indefinite period of seeking work. The loading mac.hums had already been
installed in several mines, and bad begun to take over the hand
loaders' work. Older miners were no longer preferred, for alert
young workers were wanted to run the new machines. On top of a11,
a second wave of mine abandonment followed the 1927 strike (appendix table 1). In the period 1927- 1929 a total of 29 mines closed permanently in the 3 counties, and 5,000 miners, nearly one-fourth of the
total mine crew, were thrown out of work. By the time of the 1930
Census (only 6 months after the stock-market crash) southern Illin ois
was alrnady deep u1 the trough of the depression; Franldin County
had a higher unemployment rate than any other county in the United
States, and the tl1Tee counties together bad nearly four times the average mcidence for the country as a whole. 11
Dmu1g the first years of the depression mine abandonment contu1ued, though at a slower rnte. In the years 1930- 1932, 10 mums were
n.bandoned and 2,100 more miners joined the unemployed, who now
constituted a sizable part of the entu·e working population. By 193 1
poverty and distress had become commonplace throughout the coal
field, and local pauper funds were no longer adequate to provide even
food for the unemployed. 12 Jobs in mines which had survived became
more and more difficult to find; and although several thousand displaced miners, members of the U.M.W. of A., found jobs in Franklin
County after the strike of the Progressive Miners of America in 1932,
one Progressive miner was dismissed for each unemployed miner
reemployed.
11 Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930, Unemployment, Vol. I, U. S. Department of Commerce, vVashington, D. C., 1931, pp. 317,
318. In Franklin County, 27 percent of a ll gainfu l workers were unemployed,
in the t hree counties, 21 percent.
12 See pp. 128-129.
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
DECLINE OF THE COAL INDUSTRY • 61
With the beginning of o-eneral recovery in 1933, the market for
outhern Illinois coal broadened and the tonnage produced in the field
i11creased rapidly. Wi th the increasing efficiency aL the larger mine ,
however abandonment of muller mine continued a before. From
1933 through 1938, 28 more mine were permanently abandoned and
their combined mine cre,vs, con isting of 3,200 worker were di missed. In 1939 and 1940 the proces continued; <luring the e 2
years five more mines were abandoned and everal hundred more
men were thrown out of work.
Reasons for Abandonment
Wrnle the particu lar rea on for abandonment varied from mine to
mine, the most important caus of the general liquidation wa direct
economic pressure. The Old B en Coal Co ., the Con olidated Coal Co.,
the Sahara Coal Co., the P eabody Coal Co., and the C. W. and F.
Coal o. each closed from two to four good mines because they could
not operate them profitably. Another group of mine wa clo ed
because underground condition would not permit the in tallation of
loading machines or becau e the operator could not a"fford to buy
machine . E conomic pre sure in still another fo1m clo ed mo t of
the captive mine in the three counties. The -United tate
teel
Corporation mine at B enton wa abandoned when chano-ing wage
differentials made a hift in operation to the Appalachian field more
profilable. A number of captive railroad mines were dismantled and
abandoned in order to appea e independent operator who were
unwilling to ship coal over railroads that bought no coal.
I eanwhile, a number of :urine were being clo ed for other rea ons;
in many the coal territorie had been mined out, and in others the
underground workings had been flooded. The coal depres ion, of
cour e, had little to do with the abandonment of the e mine , although
operators might ha,e reopened at lea t one of the flooded mine if the
d emand for coal h ad warranted. The important fact is not o much
that the e min es were abandoned a that they were u ually not replaced . Operators who were being forced to abandon good producing
mines each year were not eager to develop new mines, and any excess
capacity which could be canceled by abandoning worked-out and
flooded mines was imply con idered o much to the goo<l.
New Mines
In pite of the trend toward re tricted operation, a few new mine
were opened after 1923. The new mines, howe,er, were far more
efficient than the old er mines, and they did not provide a great deal
of employment. The general tendency of new inve tment wa away
from shaft mining; only one of the more important new mine opened
since 1923 (the
ew Ori ent) is a shaft mine.
lop e mining ha
Dg tze
NTtl{NE r ARC.H Vt.
ll g n
t,NIVE.R'i1TY OF LINOIS AT
uRtlANA C. AMPA,r "J
62 • SEVEN STRA NDED COAL TOWNS
expanded considerably since 1923, partly because it requires less investment than shaft mining, and hence is a more flexible oper ation ; and
partly because it perm.its the added efficiency of semiau tom atic conveyor haulage, instead of the elabor atesystcm of pit cars, lo como tives,
and cages r equired in shaft mines. B etween 1923 nnd 1938 some 17
lope mines were developed in Williamson and Saline Counties. 13
Four of these still survived in 1940, giving employment to about 400
men. A fifth supermechanized slope was opened early in 1940.
In terms of recent new tonnage, the strip mines have con tribu ted
most to the field . After 1923 a total of 14 strip mines began op er ation
in aline and Williamson Counties. F ive of these mines were still
working in 1940, adding 2 million tons to the total annual capacity of
the two counties. These mines are so extremely efficient, however ,
that their employment has been almost negligible. The maximum
employment of all 5 mines is about 400 men, while an equivalent
output in a shaft mine would require appro:>,.'11llately 3 times th at
number.
Total Effect of Mine Aban donment
Of the two great changes in the southern Illinois coal industry since
the early 1920's, mine abandonment has b een far more disastrous to
employment than m echanization. In 1923 the 3 counties had 103
shipping mines with an aggregate yearly capacity to produce 47 million
tons of coal. Thereafter productive capacity decreased almost
uninterruptedly until 1935. In 1939 there wer e 35 mines left, and
capacity had fallen to 27 million tons, a little more than h alf of th e
p eak . (See appendix tables 1 and 3.)
At th e p eak southern Illinois' 103 shipping mines provided jobs for
36,200 miners. After 1923, 85 of these 1nine fell by the wayside,
and with their di appearance a total of 21,100 job also disappeared .
Meanwhile, mines opened after 1923 (which had survived until 1938)
had added 2,100 new jobs. Liquidation of productive mine capacity
in Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Countic would have eliminated
about 19,000 jobs, n early half of all those existing in 1923. 14
13 Slope mining is not pos ible in Franklin County because of the depth of the
coal below the surface. Slope mines operate in "shallow-vein" coal lying 50 to
150 feet deep.
14 Mine abandonment ha
not been uniform throughout the field. Franklin
County, the lea t seriously affected, lost about one-quarter of its 1923 capacity,
and, as a result, about 9,600 of its peak of 16,200 jobs. Saline County lost
somewhat Jes than one-third of its 1924 capacity, but nearly half of its jobs.
Williamson was by far the worst h it of the three counties. Since 1923 it has lost
78 percent of it capacity, even with the recent cleYclopment of three strip mine:;
and one slope mine. Abanclonm.:mt of Williamson mines displaced abou t 11 ,200
of its 12,900 miner employed in 1923.
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
DECLINE OF THE COAL INDUSTRY • 63
Fig. 13- SHIPPING MINES OPERATING AT THE CLOSE OF 1925 AND
1939 IN FRANKLIN, SALINE, AND WILLIAMSON COUNTIES
oO
Oo 0
0
0
0
oO
oi
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
ANNUAL
CAPACITY
Q
500,000 tons or more
0
100,000 to 500,000 tons
o
Less then 100,000 tons
WPA 3647
li 11 ,zed by
Original from
INTER";ET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAM 'AIGN
64 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
MECH A NIZATION OF LOADI NG
the last r~ ort
The deci ion to abandon an unprofitable mine
Illinoi
southern
in
mine
larger
the
of
Each
of coal operators.
dollars
million
7
to
dollar
million
1
from
of
tment
repre ent an inve
as the
long
As
.
land
coal
and
cost
in equipment, development
coninvestment
original
this
s,
lo
a
at
even
run.
mine continue to
profit.
future
of
ibility
po
the
upon
ed
ba
value
tinue to have some
But if the mine are dismantled. the operator can alvage only a
very small fraction of the capital inve ted. They must write off a
a total lo the co t of inking the haft and driving the haulage
entries. 1Iuch of the equipment, which cannot be used in any other
industry, can at be t be sold for scrap iron at a few cents on the
dollar, or mu t be left to ru t at the mine ite. The value of the
coal property it elf i also frequently lost; the coal tenitories once
opened are u ually not recoverable after abandonment, even though
the coal it elf ha not been worked out.
Rather than liquidate their in,e tment on any such basis, or
continue trying to protect the investment with mounting deficits,
operato1 wi11 naturally explore even the most difficult possibilities
of reducing mining cost. In Kentucky, Ohio, P ennsylvania, and
We t Virgini a a partial "solution" to this problem was found in
wa(Te cut . Thi olution, which frequently had to be enforced by
re ort to the yellow-dog contract. espionage, the maintenance of a
private indu trial police ystem, and like tactics, was difficult in any
ca e. In Illinois, ,vherP the influence of the union continued to be
powerful, a parallel reduction of wage co ts wa not pos ible . Southern Illinoi operators turned in tead to laborsaving techniques as a
olution to the problem of cutting the cost of mining coal. 15
This tendency ha involved, first, the increasing empha is on strip
and lope mining. B ecau e of the prevailing depth of the coal earn,
however, both lop e hoisting and tripping are impossible except for
a mall district near the outcrop in Saline and Williamson Counties,
and neither technique can be used in Franklin County. The introduction of stripping and conveyor-h aulage slope mines not only
failed to benefit the majority of the haft-mine operators establi b ed
in the field but actually gave them new competition from within
their own district . The one way to lower cost for haft-mine
operators wa through m echanization of underground loading. 16
,s outhern Illinoi operator al o met this ituation by buying up coal property
in Kentucky and We t Virginia.
IG For an exhaustive account of coal-mine mechanization, see H otchkiss,
"'illard E. and Other , lllechanization, Employment, and Output Per lllan in
Bituminous-Coal Afining, Report Xo. E--9, Kational Re earch Project. Work
Project Administration, in cooperation with the . S. Department of In terior,
Bu reau of Mines, Philadelphia, Pa., August 1939.
Digitized by
Original from
IN_TERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
DECLINE OF THE COAL INDUSTRY • 65
M a chine: Loading
The installation of underground coal-loading machines can be
und ertaken only wher e a peculiar combination of circumstances
exists. Because of poor underground working condition , un teacly
markets, insufficient coal reserves, or lack of capital to purchase
additional expensive equipment, the great majority of the shaft
mines in southern Illin ois ,,ere not able to mechanize. By January
1941 all such mines in Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Countie had
been abandoned, and every single mine which survived the period of
liquidation was mechanized. From the operator's point of view, this
solution has been adequate.
In 1924 the average output of coal per man-clay throughout the
United States was 4.6 tons. Southern Illinois underground mines,
which had not yet begun to install loading machines, were somewhat
more efficient, producing 5.3 tons per man-day during the same year.
Within the next 5 years, a total of 32 southern Illiiiois mines installed
loaders of one kind or another under the pressure of competition from
strip mines and the nonunion coal fields. By 1929 more than onethird of all underground-mine tonnage was loaded mechanically
(appendix table 6) . During these first years of machine loading, the
man-clay output in the tlu·ee counties rose steadily._ By 1929 it had
increased to 6.0 tons per man-day, while the average efficiency
throughout the United State had risen to 4.9 tons (appendix table 8).
The first loadii1g machines installed in southern Illinois were principally pit-car loaders, simple conveyors which hoist coal from the
floor of the miner's room and clump it into a pit car, but which still
require manual workers to shovel coal into. the bottom of the conveyor.
These machines speed up loading somewhat, but do not dispense with
a large number of workers. In 1929 most of the coal loaded mechanically in the three countie was loaded by these machines (appendix
table 6).
The depression forced Illinoi operators to hasten their program of
mechanization. Between 1929 and 1932 the proportion of coal lo aded
mechanically underground nearly doubled. During the same period,
however, only a few pit-car loaders were installed; instead, operators
turned to the more efficient mobile loading machines, which dispense
with all manual loading of coal at the face. Efficiency rose quickly
under these conditions. In 1932 southern Illinois underground mines
were producing 7.3 tons per man-day, as compared with 5.2 tons
throughout the United States.
After 1932 shaft-mine efficiency increased still further. New installations of mobile loaders continued. Many of the mines which
h ad originally installed pit-car loaders eventually replaced them with
mobile loaders. The proportion of total tonnage loaded by hand
l1q1t12ed by
0n 1rial frorr,
INTFRNET ARCHIV~
JNIVERSITY 0• IL INO•S AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
66 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
dropped steadily from 31 percent in 1932 to 5 percent in 1939. At
t.he beginning of 1941, every ton of coal mined in Franklin County
was loaded mechanically, and in Williamson and Saline Counties
shaft mines were nearly 100 percent mechanized. Meanwhile, the
average output per man-day in southern IlliJ.10is underground mines
had increased from 7.3 tons in 1932 to 8.9 tons in 1939. In Franklin
County, where all hand loading has been eliminated, the 1939 man-day
output was 9.4 tons, almost double the output in the county 15 years
earlier.
Total Effect of Mechanization
The effect of mechanization may be traced in the record of the 21
southern Illinois shaft mines which had by 1938 installed machines
for loading all or part of their coal output. All of these mines were
in existence before loading machines were introduced. In 1926, under
maximum employment on a hand-loading basis, the annual capacity
of the 21 mines was 22 million tons . In 1938 capacity on a machineloading basis was practically unchanged. In 1926 the mines employed 15,300 men to maintain that year's capacity. In 1938,
however, they employed only 9,700 men, of whom about 400 were on
divided time and were not necessary for maintaining the capacity
(appendix table 7). Without appreciably changing capacity the
machines have thus eliminated at least 6,000 miners from the industry
in southern Illinois and abolished the jobs of every sixth miner
emplo~Ted in 1926. 17
A DEPRESSED AREA
The significance of the changes undergone by the southern Illinois
coal industry since the early 1920's is shown in figures 14 and 15.
Since the Jeflation of southern Illinois mining first began, n early
three out of every four miners (actually 72 percent) h ave been
squeezed out of the industry. In part, however, employment ho s
declined with tonnage; and it might be supposed- indeed, it is actually
believed in many quarters-that a restoration of former tonnage levels
would increase mine employment and solve the coal field's unemployment problem.
There is grave doubt that tonnage can be appreciably increased.
A great new oil field recently developed only 75 miles from the center
of the coal field has brought petroleun1 competition closer home than
17 Because of division of work, the first direct effect of the machines is to cause
underemployment, rather than to throw men out of work. See p. 28. The
decrease of 6,000 men employed at the 21 mines came about in several ways:
(1 ) dismissal of men on divided time after the Progressive Miners' strike in 1932;
(2) deaths, accidents, etc.; (3) the restriction on new hiring, except at the end of
the 1932 strike.
Digitized by
Original from
INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
DECLINE OF THE COAL INDUSTRY • 67
Fig. 14-MEN EMPLOYED AT SHIPPING COAL MINES IN FRANKLIN,
SALINE, AND WILLIAMSON COUNTIES, 1921-1940
*
Thousand
men
40
30
T housand
men
40
/ \
-
-
30
I
I
20
I\
20
I'----
10
I
I
0
19 24
10
I
I
1927
~
I
I
1921
~
1930
1933
I
I
1936
I
I
0
I
1939
*
1940 figure is preliminar y .
Source , Appendix table 2.
WPA 3648
ever before; an d recently invigorated antismoke campaigns in the
Midwest seem likely to intensify still fmther the competition with
W est Virginia smokeless coals. On the other hand, it is tru e, progress
is repor ted in developing a new technique for briquetting southern
Illinois slack coals and making them smokeless. But all in all, the
outlook is noi promising, even as the national defense program gains
momentum.
W e may estimate wi th somewh at mor e assm ance the amom1t of
tonnage incr ease which would be r eq uired to restore full employment
in the coal community . P arallel with the shrinkage of the southern
Digitiz"d by
Original from
NTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
68 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
Fig. 15- CAPACITY AND PRODUCTION OF SHIPPING COAL MINES IN
FRANKLIN, SALINE, AND WI LLIAMSON COUNTIES,
1921-1940
Million
tons
Million
tons
s o - - - - - - - ~ - - - ~ - -- - - - - -- -..-----~ so
/
/
\\
/
.\
/
I
\
I
/ \ ,..--- Copoc,ty
I
\/ \
I
I
I
4 0 '--1-----.+---
30 - - - -
20
I_
- 40
- - - - - ' - - - - - - - - ' - l 30
--------l
' - - - - - + - - - 4 - - - + -- - - - 'Y 20
10 ' - - - - - - - - - + - - - - - - 1 - - - -
o'---'---~--__j_--_J___[__
1921
1924
1927
1930
- - - - - - --
_ _ j _ _ c __ _ __
1933
--'- 10
--1_.J.__-'---'----'o
1936
1939
WPA 3649
Source . Appendix table 3 .
Illinois coa.l market h as run a highly significant trend in the man-clay
output of coal. The extension of strip mining and the introductio11 of
mobile loaders in underground mines have increased the efficiency of
mining in the three counties by 80 percent since the early 1920's.
As a result, the tonnage output of the fi eld can be increased to the
highest level ever reached with the restoration of only a small proportion of the jobs that h ave been eliminated in the decline. The
postwar record tonnage for the three counties . c t ablished in 1926, was
about 29 million tons of coal. At present efficiency, about 3¼ million
Digitized by
Original from
INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
DECLI N E OF THE COAL IN DUSTRY • 69
man-days of labor would be needed to recover this tonnage, or a
total mine crew of 16,300 men working 200 days a year. Peak
tonnage would thus require the creation of 6,000 more jobs than existed
in 1939. Between 1926 and 1939, however, a total of 20,000 jobs
disappeared, thus a return to 1926 production levels ,rnuld require
14,000 fewer workers than were needed in that year. If one assumed
a work year of 150 days, 18 there would till be 8,000 fewer jobs. (See
appendix tables 2 and 3.)
The predicament of the coal field may be illustrated in another way.
The average southern Illinois miner in 1940 loaded 9.4 tons per day,
or nearly 1,900 tons per year (200 days). In order for 1926 employment levels to be resto red at such efficiency, lhe three counties would
have to market 58 million tons of coal, twice their all-time production
record and more than four times the output marketed in 1939. Or,
if the 1926 crew were working at present efficiency for only 150 days
a year, the output would still be 42 million ton , far more than the
highest tonnage ever reached and three times the 1939 output.
1s The 200-day-work-year estimate is actually more realistic
than the 150-day
e ti.mate, even though the ayerage ti.me worked in the past 15 year has seldom
run over 150 days. When demand increases, the work year tend to increa e
too. Any uch extraordinary demand as is implied in these estimate \\·ould
doubtle increase the work year first and the size of the mine crew later.
Die 11 z u by
Urigina1 from
'.JTER'-JET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAM 'AIGN
Digitized by
INTERNET ARCHIVE
Original from
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
Chapter V
COMMUNITY BANKRUP TC Y
LocAL COAL-TOWN entrepreneurs enjoyed a spectacular prosperity through t he long coal boom in southern Illinois. Cut off, as
we h ave seen, from direct participation in the coal industry, they had
earl y turned all their energies to the job of servicing the growing community . Un der their guidance u eries of reul-e t ate boom developed
in all par ts of the coal field. Building and loan associations sprang up
in every village to "help the miner own their own homes." Faced
with almost no competition from the coal-company stores, local
merchan ts thrived in the retail trade. The local bankers expanded
th eir acti,ities year after year as the coal industry continued on it
long era of expansion.
But the local enterprise , as everyone was later to discover, were
even mor e seriously inflated than the coal industry itself. A the coal
in du try in Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Counties reached its final
peak and turned downward, the structure of local business activity
was gr adually left with le s and less real foundation. For many years
the structure was kept intact underin creasingstrain. Thensuddenly,
and at the worst possible time, th e whole structure crashed , adding
n ew an d unforeseen difficulties to the growing crisis of unemployment
among the coal miners. Overnight the people found their homes being
repossessed, their savings wiped out, their local-government treasuries
emp ty. The communities were suddenly bankrupt .
THE COLLAPSE OF THE REAL-EST A TE BOOM
Real-estate promotion was th e fast of the boom activities to pas
from the scen e. Through th e long period of prosperity in southern
Illinois, coal-town r eal-estate promotion tended to run ah ead of itself.1
There had been a speculati,e real-estate boom in 1905, another followed in 1912, an d the most hectic of all developed in the wartime
1
See pp. 13 ff.
71
DI( 11 Z
by
'ffER'I/E'T ARn vr=
011gina1 frum
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS A,
URBANA-CHAM 'AIGN
72 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
years and immediately aftenrnrd. Inflation in the coal industry had
meant inflation mult,iplied in real estate. Reale tate was not a very
olid basis for the local financial structure of the coal community; yet
the banks, the building and loan associat,ions, and even the local governments them. elves were built upon it. The sudden end of the reale tnte boom was tbus to have considerable significance in the
ommunity.
The End of Real - Estate Promoti on
The )Tear 1921 " Tas the last year of the grnat activity in coal -town
real estate and the culmination of the long-range tendency toward
inflation. (See figs. 3-A, p. 12, and 16-A.) The time had come again,
as in 1907 and 1913, for a readjustment. The condition to be corrected, however, was far more serious this time than ever before . On
top of that, the southern lliinois coal industry had unexpectedly come
to the end of its era of growth, and in 1922, for the first time in nearly
a quarter of a century, the community looked into an uncertain
future. The time had passed when the periodic adjustment in realestate activity could be left to the faithful growth of the coal industry.
The collapse began with the 1922 strike. Even with a very slight
increase in the number of miners employed during 1922, real-estate
activity fell off precipitously. In 1923 mine employment rose rapidly,
and the year established an all-time record for the number of men at
work in the mines in Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Counties. But
the upturn in employment dming the year scarcely slowed the pace
of the downward trend of real-estate activity. When the widespread
abandonment of southern Illinois mines really got under way in the
middle of the 1920's, real-estate business dropped sharply. By 1926,
in spite of the r ecoYery of coal tonnage to wartime levels, real-estate
activity had fallen to the low·est point since the depression of 1907
(fig. 16- A).
Ten years were to pa s before the full effects of this slump were
finally recognized in the community. M eanwhile, there were straws
in the wind, of course. The promotion schemes of the local entrepren eurs, many of whom \\·ere caught unawares "~ith new subdivisions
on their hands when the decline began in 1922,2 were brought to a
close. The first portentous lists of unpaid taxes, appearing in coaltown newspapers in 1923, showed that the chief delinquents were the
2 The end of the boom wa quite unexpected.
Late in 1921 a coal-town newspap r reported : "The great building boom which started here early in the year
continue unabated, and today there are probably more houses in course of
construction in thi city than at any prcviou time in it hi tory . . . there
appears to be no letup in the building activitie . .. the people have faith in
the [town's] future ."
Digitized by
INTERNET ARCHIVE
Ongmal from
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
COMMUNITY BANKRUPTCY • 73
Fig. 16 - INDICES OF LOCAL BUSINESS ACT IVITY IN FRANKLIN,
SALINE, AND WILLIAMSON COUNT IES, 1921-1938
A. NUMBER AND AVERAGE VALU E
OF DEEDS FOR TOWN LOTS
B. ASSETS AND NEW LOANS OF BUILDING
AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
Thousand
dollars
1.6
Thousand
deeds
8
Assets
Million dollars
20
New loon s
Million doll ars
5
_...-Ave rag e value
I of deeds*
4
16
1.2
6
I
\ ....-N umber
, of deeds
\ recorded
\
4
r
12
\
i
\
\
8
'
2
'
,, ' ,__
1'
-' -- _
4
.....
''
1921
1925
1935
1930
-
0
0
0
2
I
'' '
'
3
1921
1925
'
0
1930
1935
* Williamson County only.
C. BANK DEPOSITS AND POSTAL SAVINGS
40
Million
dollars
4
30
3
Million
dollars
Million
dollars
40
30
D. TAXES E X TE NDED AND COLLECTED
Million
dollars
4
'}
Toxes collected !
I
20
20
10
10
Postal savings
.,._,,, - -
-
3
'
'
2
'
' \.-"''
,,
2
_L_--
I
0
0
1921
1925
1930
1935
0
1921
Source : Appendix t ob les 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 .
[ i( lliZt
by
NTERN~T ARCHIVE
0
1925
1930
1955
WPA 3 650
Original from
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
7 4 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
real-estate promoters who had suddenly decided that their outlying
town additions were not worth the taxes levied on them by the county. 3
Entreprenems who had been engaged in real-estate promotion eith er
took th eir talents to other communities or, more frequently, turned
their attention to their other business interests within the coal field.
But the so-call ed "silk-shirt era" was just getting under way when
the era of r eal-estate expansion closed; the miners still look back on
the period b etween 1922 and 1927 as the time of the crest of the great
coal boom. During this period the miners enjoyed the highest daily
wage in the history of the coal field (the $7.50 p er day Jacksonvillr
Scale) . Jobs and money were still plentiful. In spite of the signs of
the gathering storm, the great changes that were taking place in the
financial structure of the coal-mining community went unnoted
except by a few. 4
Real-Estate Values in the 1920's
Real-estate values, for example, did not decline, although realestate transactions fell sharply after 1922. Indeed, real-estate valu es
continued to rise above the wartime peak, d espite the rapid disappearance of their foundation after 1922 (fig. 16- A). During the first
period of mine abandonment, from 1923 to 1926, the market value
of r eal estate reached a n ew record. After 1927, the year in which
the actual condition of the coal field first became generally known to
the community, values rose again. Not until 1929, nearly a decade
after the first clear indication that a deflation was inevitable, did the
p eople of the coal field r ecognize that the values were being sustained
on thin air. With that realization disaster came quickly; during 1929
coal-town r eal-estate values fell to half the level reached in 1928.
In the b elated crash the finan cial structure of the coal field was swept
away and the community was reduced to utter bankruptcy.
3 Between 1922 and 1925 the financial condition of several coal towns was
disrupte d by this unexpected development. In one town , for example, firemen
and policemen went without pay periodically for several years, and failure to
collect special assessments halted a program of municipal improvements.
4 The comm unity was somewhat diverted during this period by the vest-pocket
civil war between the Ku K lux Klan and the "Knights of the Flaming Circle,"
which took a score or more lives all told and brought the National Guard hurrying to the coal field ever y month or so to restore order among the feudists. This
wa a lso the period of the fantastic reign of Charlie Birger, gambler and gangster
ex traordinary, reputed to have committed a dozen-odd homicides in the coal
field between 1924 and 1926.
Although the southern Illinois coal field is perhaps most noted throughout the
Midwest for these in cidents, they appear to have had only an accidental connection with the community itself. They shed no light on the basic development
of the coal towns, exce pt that they perhaps reflect the flamboyant recklessness
of the last years of the boom.
Digitized by
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INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
COMMUNITY BANKRUPTCY • 7 5
BUILDING-AND-LOAN ACTIVITY
In 1922 the business of promoting new subdivisions in the coal
towns was disrupted; whole blocks of newly platted lots were abandoned to the tax collectors; and the housing boom began to subside.
Families were moving out of the coal towns faster than newcomers
could take their places. In towns where it had been impossible to
rent a house, houses were suddenly plentiful. In Herrin, for example,
every fiftieth house was vacant as early as 1923, and with another Herrin mine being abandoned every month or so, vacancies
were increasing rapidly. The physical shortage of housing soon
disappeared.
One might have expected that the building and loan associations,
which had come to the fore during the wartime housing boom, should
at this point have begun to slacken their activity. Instead, the close
of the era of real-estate promotion actually doubled the building and
loan association business. In 1922 new loans issued by the associations climbed to a new record, nearly 1 million dollars above 1921,
and this record was repeated in 1923. In 1924 new loans increased
again by nearly 1 million dollars and the year set a final record4¼ million dollars-for new loans issued in any given year. During
the 3-year period (1922-1924) which marked the beginning of the
decline of the southern Illinois coal industry, the building and loan
associations issued more loans than had been made through two
decades of the development of the field (appendix table 23 ::i.ncl
fig. 16- B).
The Reasons for the Building-and-Loan Boom
The belated flurry in building-and-loan activity appears to haYe
resulted from several special conditions. In the first place, the n ew
"prosperity" had carried forward new residential building, though
not at the frenzied wartime pace; and it had brought hundreds oi
coal-town workers into the market for homes. Their desire for property and security was strong, and their foresight into the future was
not altogether clear. After the Jacksonville Scale was established, a
large number of coal-town families had enough income ($1,000 to
$1,500 a year) to provide a comfortable living, but not enough to
make large cash investments. For such families the associations had
a persuasive argument: "Why pay rent when you can buy or build
a home on easy terms?"
But the increased purchasing power of the coal-town workers does
not provide the full explanation for the activity of the associations.
There is evidence to show that those who chose to rent vacant houses
were not always able to do so. According to the testimony of numerous
C' g1t1ze1
v
NT ~.{NU ARC
•,\t
o, gm...
JP
L NIVfRS,TY OF 1.LINOIS AT
URBANA-Cl-<AMPAIGN
76 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
miners, it was difficult to find a house to rent anywhere in the
coal field during this period, even though many house were vacant.
Instead, purchase through the building and loan associations was
urged upon the coal-town residents whether they wished it or not.
Over the course of th e two decades after 1900 several local entrepreneurs 5 had slowly accumulated a considerable number of coaltown houses. ~eantime, the growth of the coal industry had greatly
increased the original value of the property and built up a large paper
profit. The wisdom of continuing to bold this property became more
and more questionable after 1922. Of course, real-estate values were
still high. But taxes on town property had become a sizable item
after the war; and in addition, the values built up during the war
showed signs of wavering. There were many coal-town property
owners who were in no way reluctant to begin closing out their surplus
holdings.
Moreover. the building-and-loan transaction had become extremely
profitable for persons with real estate for sale. Illinois laws provided
that interest on loans from the associations could not be deemed
usurious. Through a complicated system of interest, " premiums,"
and fines , loans made by the associations yielded at times a fantastic
return , running as high as 15 percent or more per annum. Persons
owning vacant houses were naturally aILxious to reap such lucrative
returns from their property, and they were not inclined to bargain
with prospective renters as long as sales through the building and
loan associations were possible.
In any case, the associations flourished in their brief clay. In
1921 , after 20 years of growth, the coal towns owed the associations
more than 5½ million dollars in loans outstanding (appendix table 23).
In 1924, just 3 years later , outstanding loans had jumped to more than
J3 million dollars. Meanwhile, the community had obligated itself
to pay into the associations a total of nearly 1}6 million dollars annually in interest and premiums. It had also assumed the obligation
to retire through years to come a principal which was inflated far
beyond the r easonable value of the property. Ther e were special
penalties added to the debt of those who could not make their paym ents on time. On top of all, many of the borrowers had agreedwithout realizing it clearly- to assum e the obligations of other borrowers who had bought in the same block of property, in case their
payments stopped.
5
A number of miners had also invested their savings in houses which they
rented to other miners. Although som e eventually accumulated as many as
three or four houses, their investments were usually on a small scale. Late in
the l 920's most of these little investor began to lose first one house and then
another, and during the depression they " ·ere reduced to the common level.
Digitized by
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INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
COMMUNITY BANKRUPTCY • 77
The End of the Building-and-Loan Boom
The flurry of building-and-loan activity ended in 1924, 3 yea1
behind the close of the era of real-estate promotion (fig. 16-B).
In 1925 the new loans issued by the associations dropped off by nearly
one-half. The decline continued through 1926, the last year of the
coal field's fading prosperity; and with the beginning of hard times in
1927, new loans fell below 1 million dollars. As far as new business
was concerned, the associations had returned to the unimportant
position which they had occupied before the war. The community
was no longer in the market for the building-and-loan plan.
Through these same years the great majority of the borrowers
apparently made their payments faithfully, for the associations continued to prosper in spite of the decline of new loans . From 1925
through 1927 the community was able to pay about 4 million dollars
to the associations in interest and premiums and to retire about 7
million dollars in old obligations, reducing the total amount of loans
outstanding to 11¼ million dollars (appendix table 23). For a short
time, it appeared that the home-loan business had been stabilized, and
that eventually the debt would be liquidated, the associations would
disappear, and a community of homeowners would result.
The period of stability, however, was brief. B etween 1925 and
1927 borrowers were finding it increasingly difficult to meet the payments they had contracted for. As the summertime slump at the
mines grew more protracted year by year, the miners began to fall
behind in their payment . Sometimes they required most of the
following winter to pay off their fines and accumulated interest.
Many borrowers, indeed, were unable to catch up during the work
season, and each fall found themselves a little further in debt than they
were the year before.
There came a time when some workers could not meet their payments at all. As early as 192.5 and 1926 mortgage foreclosures on
coal-town real estate became common, and the ominous legal notices,
"Notice of Publication: In Chancery
. " began to appear
throughout the coal field ; common complainants in these notices were
the building and loan associations. The real difficulties, however, did
not start until after 1927, the year when hard times first set in. At
the end of that year borrowers still owed more than 11 million dollars
to the building and loan associations. Apparently, however, a
number of loans were almost r etired, for between 1927 and 1930
borrowers had succeeded in retiring an aggregate debt of nearly 4
million dollars and clearing their title to so much property. After
the retirement of these loans the 1930 debt stood at almost , million
dollars, with an annual interest charge of $785,000. Thi was a
burden which the community could no lon ger bear.
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Wbat happened to the workers who owed for these loans may be
illu trated with a few random cases:
1. When Mr. A. first came to the coal field in 1922, he discovered that there was
little possibility of renting a house, although numerous houses were available for
purchase through the Building and Loan Association. Mr. A. accordingly signed
a contract to purchase one of these houses and agreed to pay $1,700 for house
and lot. When he took over the house, he understood that five other new occupants were to be tied together with him in a block of six; each of the six was to
assist the others in a neighborly way to make payments on their houses. Each
member of the block paid monthly "dues" of $22.50.
From 1922 through 1926 Mr. A. kept up his installments and paid in $1,100 on
his loan. Shortly before the 1927 strike, recalling that his original debt was
$1,700, he took $600 in ca h to the a sociation intending to finish paying off the
debt. He was told, however, that he still had $1, 100 to pay. Undaunted by
this thought, he kept up his monthly payments until 1930.
Some time before 1930, one after another of the other five borrowers in his block
was laid off at the mines and began to mis payments. Finally, three of the
borrowers quit paying altogether. The manager of the association then told
Mr. A. that there was no point in continuing to make his payments. Thus he
lost every cent he had paid on "his" house, and the house as well. The other
five miners in his block suffered the same fate.
2. A certain house in one of the coal towns was valued at $1,500 when it was
built before the war. In 1924 it was sold for $1,500 to Mr. B., who kept up his
payments until he had paid in $1,500, about half of which went for interest. In
1929 Mr. B. lost the house, and the debt was taken over by Mr. C. Mr. C. kept
the house until 1934, when he, in turn, lost the house after paying in $1,000. In
1935 the house was purchased by Mr. D. for $250, to be paid off at 10 per month.
Said Mr. D. in 1938, " row the property is clear except for $900 in back taxes."
3. Mr. E. bought a home titl e clear soon after the war. In 1927 he contracted
a large debt, and in order to pay it off, he obtained a loan of $700 on his home from
the local Building and Loan Association. In return, he agreed to pay $12.50 on
the premium each month, plus interest on the balance due at 2),'z percent monthly.
During the next 2 or 3 years, the mine whe re Mr. E. worked shut down several
times, and during the winter it fr equently hoisted only 2 days a week. Mr. E.
made his first five payments successfully, but defaulted for the next 5 months.
When he resumed his payments, the first six installments went for fines and interest; then for several months he was able to retire the premium at the rate of about
$6 a month . In 1929 he was laid off again, and this process was repeated.
The outcome was that in 1931, after paying in about $700, his debt to the as ociation was still slightly more than $700. "Then I just moved out--didn't even
wait for them to evict me."
4. Mr. F. moved into one of the coal towns in 1925, and took over a $1,500
house previously occupied by another miner wno had moved away. The hou e
had two debts, one to the company which o,Yned the lot, the other to the Building
and Loan A sociation. The previous purchaser had already paid in $ 1,000 on
the first and $480 on the second debt.
Through the checkoff, Mr. F. soon retired the first debt at the rate of $40 a
month. He then concentrated on monthly payments of $13. 75 to the association.
Between 1925 and 1932 he paid in about $1,100 on the house. In 1932 he lost
his job, but continued his payments until his money was exhausted in 1933. Then
he defaulted but "hung on" to the house. His tenacity wa rewarded, for in a
few months, "when everything was going bust," the buileing and loan failed.
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rm Security Ac/ininiotrntion (Rothst ein).
" H' e used to have one of th e lives t lillle Lawns yoLL eve r saw."
Abandoned Store in Zeigler, Ill.
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For 4 years he heard nothing of his obligation. But in 1937 he received a letter
from a "loan agency" stating that it had bought the a sets of the association,
and that a debt of $967.63 on the house "must be terminated very soon." Mr. F.
estimates that the house is now worth about $200.
House Wrecking
It may be gathered from these incidents that the building and loan
associations suddenly found themselves in po ses ion of a large
number of repossessed coal-town houses. For a hort time, they were
able to dispose of these houses to new borrowers. Between 1927 and
1931, however, so many unemployed miners either migrated from the
coal field, or doubled up to save on rent and electric light , that the
real-estate market "'a soon loaded down with hundreds of vacancies.
Houses could be neither rented nor sold outright. Least of all could
they be closed out under the building-and-loan plan; the miner had
become embittered over their losses and were resolved not to enter
such an agreement again.
But while property depreciated, taxes went on as before. The
building and loan associat,ions were faced with the nece sity of selling
the repossessed property before tax collectors had taken what little
,alue remained. Many of the vacant houses were berng damaged by
small boys, or were being taken away board by board to repair the
miners' houses. l\,Ioreover, the existence of so many vacant houses
reduced the value of property that was still occupied, a consideration
to which coal-field entrepreneurs have always been highly sensitive.
About 1930 the associations began selling the repossessed property
for secondhand lumber. Houses akeady vacant were closed out in
short order to out-of-town buyers who wrecked them and carted the
lumber away. When a new vacancy occurred, the ,VTecking-crew was
on hand. Houses in which the dispossessed miner had in,ested
$1,000 to $2,000 were sold for as little as 25 to $50; and town lots
that had cost the miners as much as $400 were forfeited to the State
by the hundreds. In this way, some of the coal towns lo t as much
as one-third of their total number of houses.
Local n ewspapers looked with unconcealed favor on this process.
" The sooner that these vacant houses are taken away," said one,
"the better it will be for the property that is left. Every time one is
pulled down, its value proves to enhance the value of other property."
They pointed to the fact that when the repossessed houses were
unoccupied, they constituted a "fire hazard"; and on the otht>r hand,
when they were occupied by "squatters," they tended to "breed
disease and sickness."
However that might be, the fact was that the number of hou es in
the coal towns diminished more rapidly than the population. If one
of the main purposes of house wrecking was to eliminate the surplus
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80 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
of housing, this end wa achieved. i\ithin a few year , house wreckers
had demolish d not only the urplus of housing, but a substantial
number of the hou es actually needed for the population. Familie
of the unemployed took to crowding together more than ever, to
living in tents, in shantie bwlt on the garbage dump, in chicken
house in vacant store . At the encl of the era of building-and-loan
financing, the problem of in ufficient housing had become one of the
more pressing difficultie of the southern Illinoi coal field. 6
The dispo al of repossessed building-and-loan property to the
hou e wreckPI'S did not save the associations from bankruptcy. As
oon as the flow of money into the associations started to waver, the
stockholders naturally asked to withdraw their investment. The
a sociations were thu forced to meet obligations for which they had
no resources, other than paper profits and depreciated real property.
B eginning in 1931 the associations started to fail throughout the coal
field. Out of the 35 associations which had been operating at the
peak of the home-loan business, only 6 continued in operation in 1936,
and the activity of those was confined almost altogether to cleaning
up the few loans still outstanding.
THE BANK CRASH
The phenomenal rise of funds deposited in the coal-town banks
during and after tb e World War was succeeded by a period of "stabilization." The establishment of the Jacksonville Scale at the mines
dicl not bring any further increase in bank deposits, but it di.d allow
tl,e banks to hold their wartime gains. In 1923 deposits reached
2 million dollars, then leveled off (appendix table 24 and fig. 16-C) .
The Condition of the Banl.s in the 1920's
There is some evidence that many of the coal-field b anks actually
bad more money than they were able to inve t wisely. In any case,
a loan policy of unusual leniency appears to have been widely adopted .
..,ome ections of the community found that unsecured "friendship"
loans were easy to obtain, and a considerable amount of money went
for such purposes.7 A present-day banker in the coal fielrl reports
6
The 1940 Census co unt of vacant housing unit in Franklin, Saline, and
William on Counties (preliminar~· figures) showed that 1.3 percent of the units
were not occupied. In Harri burg (Saline County) unoccupied dwellings were
0.9 percent of the total; in West Frankfort, 0.7 percent. These figures indicate
crowding in the extreme; one mu t search far in the entire country to find evidence
of o extraordinary a housing hortage.
7
An extreme example of thi type of loan came to light in the liquidation proceedinit of a bank in J ohn ton City (Williamson County). The bank had loaned
, 5,000 without ecurity to Charlie Birger, the notorious coal-field gang ter.
Birger's note became worthless when he was hanged for his misdeeds in 1927.
Car tens, Arthur and White, Ina, A Se-mi-Stranded Area, unpublished ms., Federal
Em rgenc~· Relief Ach11i11i.-tratio11, Wa hington, D. C., pp. 42 ff.
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COMMUNITY BANKRUPTCY • 81
that some ba.nkers ·dming- the early 1920's had frequently made loans
on real estate up to 150 percent of the value of the property. Even
where no such fantastic policy was followed, the appraisal of the value
of security offered for loans often tended to be optimistic. For a time
this practice of the less cautious bankers appears to have worked
successfully enough. As long as the miners kept their money on
deposit and the borrowers met their obligations, the interest income of
the banks was incrPased and prosperity r eigned.
The banks tmder more conservative leadership necessarily operated
under similar, if less extreme, circumstances. Within the community
itself the principal loa.ns were secured either by town and farm real
estate or by the notes of loca.l merchants. Although farm mortgage
were reasonably safe, loans on town real estate, even if held to only
50 percent of appraised value, were dangerous risks in view of the
boom values which prevailed during the 1920' . When mine pay
rolls were high, the local merchants enjoyed a sµectacular prosperity
and their credit was safe. But the merchants depended on credit
extended to miners, and cr edit could easily become bad debts. Oth er
funds not loan ed locally were generally diverted to h eavy investments
in" conservative" bonds; these, too, were vulnerable. Even the conservative banks (except those with their funds in farm mortgages) 8
were in no position to m eet a rainy day.
It was not until 1927, however , that the fissur es in the coal-town
banking structure were first observed. An Licipating a major strike
in 1927, the miners had started nearly a year in advance to build up
their savings; and when the strilrn occurred on April 1, 1927, they
began on schedule to withdraw their money. Two coal-town bank
officifl,ls who soon saw that they could not pay the strike withdrawals
legitimately, forged some bogus securities for the emergency. Along
in the summer of 1927 both bankers were caugh t and convicted. The
community was sca11clalized, and took careful note of this incident.
Three other banks closed during the strike year, but all the r est wer e
able to m eet the situation adequately . As soon as the strike was
settled, h eavy withdrawn ls stopped (fig. 16- C).
But as time passed, ug-ly rumors began to circulate. For example,
miners at work underground in a mine at Johnston City beard one day
in the summer of 1928 that a W est Frankfort bank was about to close
its doors. Inunediately all the min ers dropped their tools and rushed
into town to get then· money. The bank pairl off in cash all afternoon.
When the president offered a reward for the arrest of the person who
8 Saline County banks turned out to be the only so und banks in the coal
fi eld;
and while Franklin and Williamson together lost 26 banks, Saline lost only 4.
One main reason for the survival of the Saline banks was that the territory they
served depended as much on farming as on mining, and hence absorbed the hock
of the declining coal industry more easily than Frauklin and Williamso n.
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82 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
started the rumor, the run stopped and the bank was saved for
the time.
A few months later two Franklin County banks decided to try consolidating their position by a merger. Again suspicion was aroused.
Put on the defensive, the new company issued this somewhat incoherent explanation to depositors:
Service is always a paramount goal of every well-balanced financial corporation. There is a definite and pronounced trend toward an era of consolida tions and mergers among financial institutions. Banks, insurance companies,
investment companies, and other organizations dealing in money and credit
are proceeding on the theory of the old adage-"in union there is strength"and the credit fabric of the State and ation is given greater expansive power
and elasticity by means of these combinations. With these facts in mind
. . . the consolidation . . . has today been perfected and ratified.
Four other mergers and reorganizations were hurriedly put through in
th e three counties during 1929.
It was too late for patching up the structure. The pinch had come,
and the miners were withdrawing the savings they had put away for
hard times. To meet these new demands, the banks found their
portfolios filled with all too many defaulted notes, real-estate mortgages that could never be repaid, and depreciated bonds.
The Collapse
The Herrin State Savings Bank, after doing business for more than
a quarter of a century, finished the year 1928 with nearly half a million
dollars on deposit. In 1929 unemployed miners drew h eavily on their
savings and reduced t heir accounts to $380,000. Withdrawals continued through the first months of 1930 until finally deposits stood at
$275,000. One Wednesday morning early in April 1930 residents of
Herrin saw that a typewritten notice had been stuck on the front door,
announcing that the bank was undergoing "examination and readjustment." In Johnston City, 6 miles away, the same notice had been
posted that morning at the larger of the town's two banks.
B efore
the day was over runs had started on every bank in Williamson
County.
Several days later one of the Williamson County newspapers,
speaking for the threatened coal-town entrepreneurs, did its bit to
stop the withdrawals:
Professional and business men point out that where money is taken from
a bank and hidden in the home, there is danger of total loss by fire, burglary,
or robbery, and that at the worst one never suffers total loss if the money is
left safely in the bank. 9
The same issue reported that "confidence in the bank situation was
9 Nearly a year later the newspaper was still pointing up news stories of burglaries with the moral, "Keep your money in the banks."
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being restored," but announced that four other ,Yilliarn on ounty
bank had just closed, bringing the week' total casu11.ltil'S to i..x.
By the end of 1930 the 3 counties had lost 10 more of the 36 banks
which operated at the fit· t of the year. Active deposits fell from about
26 million dollars to 12 million dollars, partly because of thr fund
tied up in the 16 defunct bank and partly because' of the continued
drain on the stronger banks that managed to urvivc the year.
Thrnughout 1931 the liquidation proceeded. Williamson County lost
another bank and half of it total deposits. Franklin County lost
three of its last seven banks, together with almost four-fifth of thl•
deposits with which it started the year. (See appencli..x table' 2-!.)
The last of the largt• banks in Franklin County- the First K ational
Bank of Zeigler-was sand only by the intervention of the' Bell &
Zoller Coal & Mining Company, which bought control and hurried
funds to Zeigler in time to stop a run on the bank.
At the end of 1932 Franklin and Williamson Counties together had
on deposit only 7 cenLs for each dollar held in 1928. All that rPmained
in Franklin County wa the one important bank at Zc•igh'r and three
mall banks outsidP the coal towns. ·Williamson County had two
small banks, neither of which had ufficient re ources to handle more
than a fraction of the county's banking business. Total deposits in
the tlll'ce counties had been reduced from 29 million dollar~ to 6 million
dollars, of which three-fourths was held in the Saline County banks
that had weathered the storm. The bank holiday of March 1933
came as something of an anticlimax in southern Illinois.
By 1933 defunct bank in the three counties h eld 14 million dollars in
frozen deposits.
ot nntil 1934 were any substantial paynwnl made
on the e claims again t the banlrn, and even then the payment were
equal to only about one-fourth of the total amount inYolved. Payments continued, howenr, through 1935 and 1936 until roughly half
of the deposits were repaid. During 1937 most of the receiYerships
were dissolved,1° and a final deficit to depositors amounting to approximately 7 million dollar was written off the books.
Posta l Sa vi ngs
When the United State Po tal Savings System was first established
in coal-town post offices about 1910, local businessmen in the three
counties hoped that as long as the foreign born refu eel to deposit their
avings in local banks anyhow, they would at lea t be willing to trust
their money to "the GoYernment's keeping." "It i expected," they
said," that not nearly so much money will be sent out of the country
hereafter." Actually, however, the Postal Savings System was
10 In the summer of 1940 a defun ct bank in Johnston City, still in the courts, was
about to make its first payment to d epositors since April 8, 1930.
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84 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
not popular with the miners. After 2 years of operation, there were
only 131 postal depo itors in the 3 countie . Even when the World
War upset the flow of savings to Emope, postal savings gained
little; the miners turned to the local banks instead. All during the
1920's the very existence of the postal system remained largely
unrecognized.
It was not until after the bank crash that the miners began to make
use of the Postal Savings System; by that time it was too late to
salvage very much of their money. During the first year of the crash,
bank deposits declined 14 million dollars, but po tal deposits increased
only 1 million dollars. In 1931 deposits in banks dropped another
5 million dollars, while postal savings increased only about l½ million
dollars. Postal savings did not reach their peak (4½ million dollars)
until 1933, a year after the banking structure of Franklin and Williamon Counties had been virtually wiped out. (See appendi.."'{ tables 24
and 25 and fig. 16-C.)
For whatever reason, the community had placed full confidence in
the stewardship of its local entrepreneurs. The one avilable institution which could have h elped to cushion the shock was forgotten , and
it actually helped very little. The chief function of postal savings was
to proYide a place of safekeeping for what little money could be
scraped together from the ruins of the banks.
BANKRUPT GOVERNMENTS
The increase in thr coal-field tax income after 1918 had permitted the
expansion of chools, roads, "charities," local improvemrnts, and all
the services so urgently needed by the newly grown-up community.
These expanded functions required, in turn, still further increases in
tax revenue. A new school building, for example, meant that the
school district must hi.re new and better teachers, as well as pay off
the interest on the school bonds. In order to hold what gains had
been won, the community had obligated it elf for further increases in
its future tax reYenues.
In the early 1920's the job of providing the community with adequate social equipment bad still scarcely bC'gun. One improvement
suggested another. When a new high-school building had been
completed, there was less ju tification for neglecting the city hall, or
the county poor farm, whose condition was a chronic scandal. Road
construction was a job for two decades. In the middle 1920's many
of the coal to,vns still had unpaved streets, no central water supply, no
adequatP sewage system. Counties and town hips were required by
the tate to et up still other function , uch as increased aid to the
blind.
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Tax Income in the Early 1920's
It was altogether natural, then, that the coal-field tax levy should
have risen steadily after thr war. In 1919 the tax income for the thrne
countie passed 2 million dollars for the first time; in 1922 it passed
the 3-million-dollar mark; and in 1925 it reached nearly 4 million
dollars (appendL"s: table 22 and fig. 16-D). But in spite of the increased
tax income, local government official were finding it more and more
difficult to make ends meet. In Franklin County, for example, the
collap e of real-estate promotion schemes in 1922 had di rupted the
finances of several town , leaving firemen, policemen, and street maintenance workrrs unpaid. William on County had similar difficulties.
The extraordinary expenses of the sheriff' and coroner's offices during
the Ku Klux Klan civil war threw the county into considerable debt
and revealed how precarious its fiscal base actually was.
Experts who examined the county records cautioned the officials
as early as 1925 that "strictest economy" would be necessary and
recommended the budgeting of accounts, but the problem was too
large to be solved in this imple way. A short "economy" drive was
launched, how ever, in 1926, and the tax levy was reduced to encourage
thi effort. But ,vhen the time came actually to cut expenses the
local officials could think of no methods more far-reaching than
moving the sheriff's office to the jail to save rent, cutting the "purchase of food supplie for the county farm," and "extreme caution"
in "helping paupers, so-called." After 1 year of such economy
the levy was raised again.
Unpaid Taxes
If local government official could not keep their hou e in order
during the last years of the coal boom, they were to face an utterly
impos ible task when the boom ended. In 1927 all the other di.fficult,ie of the local tax bodies were reduced to insignificance by a new
and unexpected de,elopment: property holders began neglecting to
pay their taxes. Collections lipped a little further behind in 1928,
and warrants drawn on the local tax funds decreased in value. The
need of outside help for the hard-pressed local governments had
r eached the point of "urgency," according tp a private auditor of
the counties' affairs.
T ax forfeitures became far more serious in 1929. Warrants i sued
against the Williamson County general fund were di counted 20
percent. More trouble deYeloped as the unemployed made increasing
demands on the meager pauper-relief funds. The tone of the auditor'
annual report now carried a note of hopeles ness and panic. But
this was only the beginning. The schools were hard hit for the first
time hy the disappointing 1930 school-tax collections, which reduced
their revenue by nearly one-fourth. The closing of the banks in
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Franklin and Williamson Counties during 1930 tied up a large part
of the public money, stopping salaries of teachers and county officials
and payment to paupers. In Saline County, where the banks stayed
open, the extraordinary expenses for relief drained the local treasuries.
Still forfeitures increased. By 1931, even after some of the frozen
bank deposits had been released, Franklin and Williamson Counties
were unable to borrow in advance on anticipated taxes. In the judgm ent of the few local banks that still operated, the credit of the local
tax bodies had become totally worthless.
After 1931 the whole tax system stalled. The coal companies, of
course, continued for the most part to pay their taxes, but they had
won sharp reductions in both assessed valuations and levies and had
thus cut their tax bill by more than one-third. Large numbers of
farmers, particularly those whose land was superior, also kept their
taxes clear. But in the towns, where the majority of the taxes were
levied, and on the poorer farm land, property owners by the thousands
simply stopped paying taxes altogether. Such a large proportion of
the population was involved in tax delinquency that the sheriffs were
not able to take any action to force collection. Although each newly
elected sheriff pledged himself to collect the back taxes of the
"well-to-do" delinquents, the job of separating the well-to-do from
those truly unable to pay turned out to be impossible, and the various
drives for bringing in collections were all dropped after a month or
two of threatening publicity.
The spread of tax delinquency led to a general breakdown of most
of the functions of the local governments. Pauper-relief resources
diminished rapidly, while need increased. The local governments
eventually tlwew up their hands and called on outside help to save the
unemployed from starvation. The schools remained open, but
teachers were dismissed by the score; buildings fell into disrepair, and
the teachers who were retained had to work as long as a full year
witlwut pay. School and county warrants were cashed regularly
for 50 cents on the dollar and frequently for less. The sheriff of
Williamson County refused to serve papgrs unless his fees were paid
in ndvance:
And by fee I don't mean county orders; I mean cash. I have 8 thousand
dollars in county orders now that I can't get money for, and it takes money
for us to buy gasoline to drive a ll over the county serving papers.
The town of Benton turned off the city lights, cut the police force to
1 underpaid employee (for 8,000 people), stopped work on the streets ,
and reduced the fire department to the minimum required by the
insurance companies . Towns throughout the coal field followed suit.
"The town," said a local paper, "has no mone_v with which to pay for
the expensive tastes the people cultivated when <k>llars were literallv
growing on trees."
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The declin e of tax revenues was not simply a temporary phase;
local officials soon recognized that there was no hope, granted the
existing tax base, of collecting revenues adequate for the needs of
the community. A gr eat deal of the property valuation in th 0 towns
had been d estroyed by th e building-and-loan house-wrecking policy,
anJ the depression had brough t a general reduction in val ual ion and
levies on the r em aining properties.
!any of the townspc.·ople who
had forfeited their taxes over a period of years were eventually able to
resume payments on a curren t basis. But by law any tax payments
were credited to back taxe , which in many instances were so great
that they exceeded by far the value of the property itself. Rather
th an attempt to clear their property of all back taxes, property
hold rs who might h ave k ept up current taxes paid nothing at all.
At one time the local governments attempted to h ave all back taxes
written off the books in order that cw-r en t taxes could be collected;
th e Attornry G cn er~11 of th e State, however, ruled that th e procedure
was not legal.
According to the latest figures available, th e tax structure of the coal
field is Lill hopelessly shatt ered. Williamson County Commis ioners
di covered in 1936 that the clerical cost of carrying back taxes on the
records was one-fourth of th e total income from the county lev)'.
Taxes wer e not paid in "\"Yilli amson County in 1936 on 31 percent of
all land , on 49 perce n t of personal property, and on 67 percent of th e
town lots. Coal towns in Franklin and Williamson Com ities showed
tax forfeitur es in 1937 as follows:
Percent of all lots
with taxes unpaid
'l'own
Herrin_ _ _ ___________________ ____- - - - - ___
71
Johnston City ____ _____ __ __ ---------- --- - - ---- 77
West Frankfort _____ __ ________________ ____ __ ______ 71
Zeigler_ ___________ _ ___ _________ - - - _____ _- - - - 70
Even in aliu e County, which remained comparatively solvent through
the d epression , tax delinquency is serious in terms of ordinary standards. Eldorado taxpayers, for C.'xamplc, \,·er e in arrear on 21 percent
of the town lots in 1937, an d in Carrier Mills the rate of forfci ture was
28 percent.
In order for the community to carry on its fun ctions at all, State
and Federal Governments ha Ye been called upon to supply an ever
increasing part of the nece ary money. Local responsibili ty for
unemployment relief broke down b efore the coal depression was well
under way. The three counties were able to contribut e only 10
percent toward their direct relief cost during the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1939. Old-age assistance, which now costs about 1 million
dollars a y ear , is born e prin cipa ll y by reven ues derived outside the
three counties. The Federal Government pays the wage of the
thousands employed on the work programs. In or<ler to maintain
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to provid e
accept able school tandar ds, the State has been forced
, the State
a larger and larger share of the school costs; in 1937, indeed
schools.
the
run
to
d
equire
r
money
the
of
half
paid somewh at over
the welfar e
Long- postpo ned local impro vemen ts, which are vital to
not conof the comm unity but which the comm unity itself co uld
rd witho ut
ceiva bly fina.nce, could not have been carried forwa
the WPA.
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URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
Chapter V I
ATTEMPTS AT A SOLUTION
BETWEEN 1923 and 1933 the southern Illinois coal field evolved
by low stages from an nctin' , booming mining community to one
beset at every turn with dl'cp-seated economic difficulties. Since
the general causes of thi sta Le of affairs involn• the whole bituminous
·oal industry and are Iation-widc in scope, the community itself ha
been h elpless to halt the decli1w. Recognizing that th(• coal depresion was beyond local control, the community was forced to turn in
upon itself to seek a solution for,it growing difficultie . While some
of thesr attempts havr ml't with modest success, they have not contributrd greatly to the olution of the basic economic problems of the
community. 1
ATTEMPTS TO CHECK MINE UNEMPLOYMENT
Unemployment of miners in southern Illinois re ulted l'ither from
the displacement of labor, following the installation of loading mad 1inc•s, or from the abandonment of mine . Coal miners facing w1employm nt accordingly had two distinct problems, depending upon the
pro pccLs of their individual mines. If a mine stood a good chance
to continue working, the miners' problem was to keep out the mach ines. For those mines on the verge of bankruptcy, on the other
hand, the problem was Lo work out arrangements for carrying on
operations.
1 We leave out of account here such activities as bootlegging, which residents
of up-State Illinois erroneou ly belie\'ed to be one of the principal occupations
of unemployed miners. There wa of course some illegal liquor traffic in the coal
field, but it appears to have been a poor business in the dark days of the depression, for-among other reasons- few could afford to buy.
We also omit the various activities based on the principle that the unemployed
might solve their problems by selling magazine subscription , collecting coat
hanger , cleaning tomb tones, making flowerpots out of tin cans, and other
" ingenious" attempts to create sen·ices \\'bich no one wanted.
89
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Attempts to Eliminate the Machines
When southern Illinois coal operators first began to install mechanical loading equipment in 1925 and 1926, no wage scale for the new
occupation of operating the machines had been agreed upon. Th e
miners, sensing from the start that the machines would eventually
"revolutionize" the southern Illinois coal industry and create widespread technological unemployment, first took their stand against the
machines on the question of the wage scale for machine operators.
Miners who lo ad coal by hand work on a tonnage rather than an
hourly basis, and th(' first thought of the miners was that the new
loading machines should also be operated und er a tonnage wage scale.
At the negotiations to fix loading-machine wages in 192!:i, this position
was advanced by the scale committee of the Illin ois union. Although
the union conceded that the machine rate might be somewhat lower
Lhan the prevailing hand-loading scale, the practical effects of its
demands would have been the prevention of mechanization in the
field. As it developed, however, the operators were pressing for a
wage reduction. The eventual outcome was a compromise in which
the miners won a renewal of the prevailing wage and the operators
won an hourly wage scale (considerably higher than average) for the
loading machines. From this time on , the international and the
Illinois union offered no resistance to mechanization as such, but took
the position instead that the benefits of the machines should be passed
on to the miners through a shorter workday.
Th e miners at the face, however, frequently had a different view
of th e matter. Th ey knew from experience that after an operator
installed machines, reduced earnings and increased unemployment
would inevitably follow. It appeared to them that the way to avoid
the effects was to attack what appeared to be the causes. Accordingly, there developed a general antagonism against the machines
themselves, leading on several occasions to unauthorized strikes in
an attempt to prevent their installation.
In October 1928 some 1,800 miners at New Orient went out on strike
to prevent mechanical loading devices from comin g into the mine.
The miners demanded that if the conveyors were set up, "all employees
should be given steady work." The strike, which was not supported
by the subdistrict union , was short-lived; within a few days the miners
• returned to work. A few months later 400 of the 1,800 miners were
displaced.
Two years later the Committee for the Elimination of Mining Machinery was form ed in southern Illinois to urge that all miners "cease
work on loading machines and conveyors. " The committee set a
strike day and sent speakers to every mine local in Franklin and Williamson Counties to build support. But again the subdistrict wuon
did not sanction the action and the strike was a total failure.
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ATTEMPTS AT A SOLUTION • 91
All local action again t the machines eventually failed with one
exception. Following the 1932 strike two of the larger a.line County
operators agreed that no machine would be worke I or installed at
their mines. Later on, however, this agreement was also lo t (though
two of the mines covered in the contract were never mechanized becau e of engineering difficultie ).
ince 1933 the machines have been
accepted a inevitable. Except for poradic "slowdown" strike and
occa ionally a refu al to reopen bankrupt mine on a machine ba i ,
the miners have not ince oppo ed machine loading in southern
Illinois.
Attempts To Reopen Abandoned Mines
Mine abandonment, as we have een, was a far more serious cause
of unemployment than the introduction of machine loading. Usually
mine abandonment was pre ented to the miners as inevitable. Many
of the larger operator decided to close certain of their mines because
of lack of a market, about which the miners themselves could of course
do nothing. At other mine the coal territorie had been either flooded
or completely worked out. There were several small bankrupt mines
in outhern Illinois, however, which the miners did attempt to keep
ope ting.
A mine crew's wage claim play an important part in the reorganization of defunct mine . Wages are paid in Oll them Illinois on the
ba i of 2 weeks' work, but the actual money i not forthcoming until
another 2 weeks have pas ed. When an operator goes into bankruptcy, the miners ordinarily get no notice until "a pay is mi sed,"
that i , until their pay for the period ending 2 week earlier is defaulted .
Meanwhile, the miner have put in :20 ,000 to S60 ,000 worth of work.
After bankruptcy , claim for the amount defaulted are placed against
the receiver, who cannot reopen the mine until he has settled thi
claim to the satisfaction of the men.
In spite of the miners ' wage claims, the receiver ordinarily has the
advantage when negotiating for reopening the mine. The miners
by thi time have usually been unemployed for 6 month to a year and
a half,2 and are an,xious to go back to work. Of course they are also
very much in need of the month's mi sed pay. In this situation, the
miner have often been willing to make large concession to get their
mine operating again.
In reopening bankrupt marginal mines, one of two plans was ordinarily adopted. Sometime the miners would draw their missed pay
in ca h, and then go back to wo;k at what amounted to lower wages.
The other plan was to go back to work without wage conce ions,
z Operators planning to "miss a pay" usually do so in F ebruary or March, at
the beginning of the annual slump. Ordinarily attem pts to reopen a defunct
mi ne begin in the fall at the start of the coal season.
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92 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
either di guised or otherwi e, but to make concessions on the missed
pay, taking partial payment for full settlement, or agreeing that the
debt be paid off a little at a time. In 1.1ach case it was usually agr eed
that the mine crew would put in 1 or 2 months' work without pay.
cleaning up the mine before reopening.
It i obvious that, under each of these plans the miners were really
subsidizing marginal operations. Well aware of this fact, they
assumed that after ,1 time these mines would be able to stand without
help. Actually, hO"wever , such a time never came at most of the
reopen ed banla-upt mine , and the miners were eventually faced with
th e choice of either granting more and more concessions, or of halting
their subsidy and closing the mines.
As a result, most of the attempts to open banla·upt mines failed.
A mine crew at ·w est Frankfort, which tried to keep its mine operating
at all costs, missed a pay each spring for 6 years in succession, then
closed down. l\fost of th e crews at banlu·upt mines, however, refused
to work indefinitely under such conditions. At a marginal mine in
Benton, for example, the miners worked for a full year at wages equal
to 70 percent of the union scale, then demanded the full scale and
closed the mine down rather than continue their subsidy. A ther
mine crew at Johnston City voted to remain unemployed rather than
make an agreement to spend their pay from the reopened mine at the
company store. Another mine canying a debt on two missed pays
was closed because the mine crew was unwilling to make further
co ncessions to the operator until 10-year-old wage claims ,vere paid.
In addition to granting concessions to marginal operators, the miners
on various occasions attempted to take over bankrupt mines and to
operate them cooperatively. Failure greeted each of these ventures.
The equipment available for cooperative mining was usually inadequate; the miner encountered other difficulties when they attempted
to market their output; and at times the plan was disrupted by
quanels among the cooperators. When royalties and jobbers' fees
had been paid, the miners frequently found that they had been
working for less than half of full union wages. After struggling along
for a season or so, the miners let their leases pas to private operators.
Shari ng the Work at the Mines
The miners' attempts either to eliminate coal-loading machinery
or to reopen bankrupt mines failed to check in any real measure the
growth of unemployment in the outhern Illinois coal field. The
local problem wa thu oon reduced to one of ameliorating the hardships of unemployment. Except for some meager unemployment
bendit , the miner ' efforts in this direction consisted mainly of the
u.<loption of the policy of sharing work at the mines when a reduction of
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
ATTEMPTS AT A SOLUTION • 93
crew became neces ary. Displacement of labor by loading machine
has been cushioned at en•ry mechanized mine in outhern Illinois by
the use of" divided time." The policy mi accepted by thP miners to
b e the lesser of two evils, and it ha long been written into the union
contract.
In spite of obvious advantages, the policy did not, increa e actual
employment and h ence dic.l not h elp to solve the general problem of
unemployment in the coal field. Frequently, divided time ha entailed
considerable hardship for the miners. When the mines on divided
time were not working regularly, the policy reduced th(• earnings of
the greater part of the " ·orking crew to a level below ubsistence
standards, and on occa ion it actually increased the total relief load.
Such a situation occurring in thr summer of 1938 helped to rai e the
WP A and relief rolls to a record peak for the three counties. (See
fig. 20 , p. 133.)
Divided time , moreover, took car e of only a very small proportion of
the displaced miners. It did not, for example, help miners laid off
after a mine was abandoned. Although some of the younger workers
from an abandoned mine belonging to a company with other mine
working were sometime rehired, company-wide shar e-the-work plans
werf never an esta blished practice; and workers not actually needed
at other mines were not reemployed.
Divided time is no"· largely a thing of the past. At one time the
mechanized mines in southern Illinois had hundreds of surplus men
dividing time with the rest of the crew. :\!any of them were eliminated after the 1932 strike. Divided time was subsequently extended
as new machine were in tailed, but by 1941 it had almo t "worked
itself out" through death and resignations. In June 1940 the urplus
men dividing time in the 3 counties had been reduced to only 66
workers.3
The "Gopher Holes "
Nearly all of the coal mined in southern Illinois is produced at
shipping mines,4 large-scale operations which load coal for railway
shipment to Chicago , t. Louis, and tlu·oughout the Midwest. Alongside the larger operations there ha alway existed a small makeshift
coal-mining industry catering to the truck and wagon trade of near-by
farmers and townspeople. "11en the larger coal industry began to
fail , one of the paradoxical results was a rapid expansion of the mailer
submarginal industry.
3
See footnote 10, p. 32.
• In 1926 the shipping mines produced 9 percent of the coal output of the three
counties; and in 1938, after the expansion of local mining, the hipping mines still
p roduced 97 percent of the total output.
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94 • SEVEN STRAN DED COAL TOWNS
The gopher holes, which make up this smaller industry, are
extremely poor producers. The coal seam they work consists mainly
of leavings which were too thin and poor to attract the operators who
first started large-scale mining in southern Illinois two generations
ago. The seam averages only 3 to 5 feet in thickness where the
gopher holes operate, so that mining and underground haulage is
difficult. Because of the meager capital of the operators, none can
afford to sink a slope more than 50 or 75 feet deep; hence the mines
are all located in the poor-grade coal near the outcrop. 5 The primitive equipment of the mines usually consists of a couple of discarded
pit cars from a larger mine, a few hundred feet of cable, a salvaged
automobile motor for hoisting the coal , and a tipple made of scrap
lumber. Most of the gopher holes have no undercutting machines,
and practically all loading is done by hand. Many do not even have
storage space at the tipple and cannot load or hoist unless someone
is waiting at the tipple to buy a load of coal.
Before 1929 the function of the gopher holes was merely to fill
small local orders which the shipping mines did not care to handle;
during this period gopher holes employed in their best years only 120
to 180 miners as against a peak of 36,200 in the shipping mines.
After 1928, however, the development of hard roads in southern
Illinois expanded the possible market of the local mines to include a
radius of 100 miles, and they began in a small way to compete with
the shipping mines. 6 Handling a low-grade coal, the small mines
had to deliver coal in their new market at a price far below that of
the larger mines. Although a part of this difference was made up
through cheap trucking costs, coal from the local mines sold for half
the price of deep-vein coal at the tipple, and sometimes less. This
difference had to be absorbed through lower and lower wages at t h e
local mines. The difficulties of the local mines were further increased
by bitter competition among themselves.
In spite of these condition s the number of gopher holes began to
increase after 1929. As unemployment grew more and more critical,
the wages and working conditions in the gopher holes became less
unattractive to the miners. Makeshift tipples began to appear in
every hollow along the outcrop. Unemployed mil1ers and their sons
The entire gopher-hole industry is strung out ea st and west along the southern
fringe of the N o. 5 seam, which outcrops in th e center of Williamson County and
the south of Sa line County. There are no gopher boles in Franklin County,
where the overburde n run s from 300 to 600 feet.
6 The local mines in Williamson and Sa line Counties now sell most of the coal
used in southern Illinois as far a s the Ohio River and in southeastern Missouri
in the vicinity of Cape Girardeau. They seldom truck as far a s St. Louis, however, because they cannot compete with the local mines in St. Clair County, Ill.,
just across the Mississippi from St. Louis.
6
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
"A n old engin e, a. piece of cable, and a slick of wood or two- that's all you n eed."
.\ Goph e r Jl ole .\"ea r :\farion, Ill.
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v~qsrrv OF ILLl'-1015 AT
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URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
ATTEMPTS AT A SOLUTION •
95
would come out from town, lease a few acres of coal, and begin digging
the slope themselves. In a few weeks they would start hoisting 5 or
10 tons of coal a day, which they would sell to the trucks for whatever
it would bring. Sometimes a farmer in need of ready cash would
start digging on his own land, and eventually hire a half dozen neighbors and relatives to help load out the coal. A few local enterprisers
went into busine s on a more elaborate scale with undercutting
machines, Diesel hoists, screening equipment, and a mining crew of
as many as 40 men.
In 1929 there were only 25 local mines, employing 151 men , in
Saline and Williamson Counties. By 1932 the number of mine had
increased to 75, and employment jumped to 444 miners, who loaded
out 154,000 tons of coal for the year. In 1939 there were 106 local
mines in the 2 counties, employing a total of 741 men. Tonnage in
1939 had increased to 547,000 tons, about equal to the output of one
moderate- ized shipping mine in the coal field (appendix table 9).
In a few in tances the rapid increase in the number of local mines
clearly benefited the unemployed miners in southern Illinois. Several
of the larger mines employ 25 to 40 men each, and maintain a ,rnge
scale onsiderably above relief standards, though somewhat below the
union cale a,t the shipping mine . A few farmers have also raised
thefr a,nnual income by inking mall mines on their own land, thus
supplementing summertime work on the farms with wintertime work
in the mines.
By and large, however, the gopher holes have not had any appreciable effect, upon the unemployment problem of the coal field. For
every new job created at the gopher holes, 20 jobs were being eliminated from the hipping mine . Moreover, a large number of gopherhole miner carcely make a living at their new occupation. Because
the mine. sell only to the dome tic trade within a region where winter
weather i mild, the work season includes no more than 5 fall and
winter month each year, and Lhe average time worked a year is about
120 day . D aily wages in some of the more primitive mines run as
low as $1 a day or less, and seldom go higher than $4 a day. Many
of the miners are not self- upporting during the work season, let alone
during the 7 idle months of the year.
ATTEMPTS TO BRING IN INDUSTRY
Residents of the southern Illinois coal field have long been aware of
the precariousness of the area's economic base.
ot very long after
the first mines were sunk, local businessmen came to realize that the
coal industry had its shortcomings. The panic of 1907 fell hard in
southern Illinois, and even in the good years when the industry was
growing steadily long periods of summertime unemployment were
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common. While local newspaper editors were computing in 1910 that
the coal industry in the three counties would last another 7,369 years,
they had already realized that coal alone would never make a stable
community. Typical newspaper comments were:
The min es are not the stable, every-day employers of iabor which a town
must have in orde r to grow.
Diversified industries a re sadly needed as the community at present is very
much in the position of having all its eggs in one basket.
It was agreed that new industries would have to be attracted; if they
would not come of their o-wn accord the community would have to
offer inducements. After some years of fruitless waiting, the second of
the alternatives appeared lo be the only hope.
What the Coal Field Had To Offer
Investors looking for a place to build a factory had no compelling
reason for choos ing t li e so uthern Illinois coal field. True ~nough, the
district did have certain advantages. As one local newspaper put it:
Much has been said relative to [this communi ty's] excellent railroad or
shipping facilities, its geograph ical location, its abundance of suitable factory
land, its wonderful fu<'l advantages, and its water and el<'ctric possibilities.
But these advantages were not unique. Good railroad connections,
for example, could be found almost anyv,,.here east of the Mississippi
and north of the Oh io Rivers, and abundant" factory land" is in itself
hardly an attraction fo r manufactmers . Cheap fuel was obviously a
talking point, but was a real advantage only if everything else were
equal.;
Local publicity also made much of the central geographical location
of the coal field. Actually, however, a glance at the map will show
that its lo cation i not par ticularly favored. Herrin is closer to
Memphis than to Chicago, and close r to Atlanta than to Des Moines.
lt is at the edge and not in th e cen tor of the great mid western market.
A manufacturer looking for central location would h ave no reason to
select south ern Illinois in preference to St. Lo ui s, Indianapolis, or
any one of a dozen other establish ed industrial centers lying north of
the coal field.
As for water "po si bilities," the statement quoted made a virtue
of a handicap. One of the difficulties in attracting industries to the
coal field has been the lack of a dependable water supply. Periodically, severe droughts trike southern Illinois, closing the mines and
even hindering the operation of the railroads. The "possibilities" of
1 Fuel expenditures form a very small part of manufacturing cost, amounting
to on ly "2.8 percent of the gross value of products manufactured." Bureau of
the Census, F~fteenth Censiis of the United Stales, l\lla.nufa.ctures: 1929, Vol. I,
(J. S. D epartment of Commerce, Washington, D. C., 1933, p. 158.
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URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
ATTEMPTS AT A SOLUTION • 97
storing water for the dry eason were present, although it wa not
until 1939 that they were realized. The United tates Department
of Agriculture in cooperation with the WPA has recently completed
the first of a series of storage reservoirs in southern Illinoi which
will now assure an abundan t year-round water supply.
Cheap wages are a familiar claim of areas which advertise to bring
in outside industry. "Docile" and "contented" labor-a th e euphemi m of th e copywriters put i i a substantial attraction for prospective investors, and the regions which lay claim to an open-shop
tradition have not been modest about saying so.
outhem lliinois
promoters could never make such a claim persuasively; they have
always had great difficulty convincing investors that low wages might
be expected anywhere within the coal field.
Even though investors were frequently assured that no attempt
would b e made to organize any new industry, the possibility of future
collective bargaining till e:\.-isted as long as the miner ' union continued to set the examplr. Almost anywhere outside of the closedshop coal field the chances of eventually having to come to terms
with mployees were les . ~ 1o t investors thus preferred to go elsewher . The substantial industries which have been e tabli hed in
outh ern Illinois are all located in such towns as Che ter, Metropolis,
ntralia, and Mount Vernon, at a discreet di tan ·e from the coal
town.
It was believed in the coal field that the advantages and disadvantages could be brought into closer balance if local ubsidies to
new industry were thrown into the scale. Subsidies, however, were
difficult to raise. Early epi odes involving gifts to unreliable manufactw· r had burned many fingers; and few people were atn.::iou to
rep at the experience, particularly when the mines were booming and
pro perity seemed a sured. When the long coal depression had begun,
the idea of ubsidie was re,·ivC'd, but although there was plenty of
desperate enthusia m at that time the scheme never seemed to work.
"Land a Factory"
The campaign to bring new industries to the coal fi eld was crystallized in two extended <lrives, each involving mobilization of public
support to raise money for ubsiclies. The first of the e drive , beginning in 1912 and lasting until the beginning of the wartime coal boom,
wa precipitated by a lull in the local real-estate busines following a
prewar lump in the coal industry .8 The "plan" involved in thi
8 A real- estate•promotion firm with "important offices" in Birmingham, Ala.,
and H untington, W. Va., played an important part in the e prewar cheme-,
conducting sales in Benton, Chri topher, West Frankfort, Harri burg, and El•
dorado. This firm was described in local newspapers as "a large operator in
the location of factories and the sale of real estate in connection therein."
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SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
drive, which wa engineered by local real-estate promoters, aimed to
rai e a subsidy fund painlessly through the sale of lots in new subdivisions.
One town made contacts with a St. Loui stove manufacturer
who wished to move to southern Illinois "on account of the cheap fuel
facilities." In order to provide other inducements, a local real-estate
dealer subdivided 150 lots in a section of town called "Factory
Heights" and advertised that all money from the sale of lots above the
actual cost of the land would be used to build a factory and railroad
switche for the stove works. The purchase of the lots thus became
a civic duty. It wa also made clear that the lots would soon be
worth "more than i now asked ."
At first these venture went off successfully. Within a few days
270 lots were sold at $200 each . The town had raised enough money
for the stove factory and for an automobile factory as well. "There
is scarcely a man or woman," said a local newspaper, "who is not
proud to have these skillful manipulators of mother earth among us to
attract the commercial industries this way." In due time both the
stove and automobile factories were installed and operating with a
crew of about 100 men.
But difficulties began to develop almost immediately. A pump
factory which had signed an agreement to move to the coal town
suddenly refused to carry out its agreement. The stove works ran
for 2 years, then shut down. After changing bands many times the
machinery was removed and the building wa eventually given over
to swallows and bats. The automobile factory closed down after
turning out one automobile, and the factory building was given in
quick succession to a watch factory and a skating rink, and then burnt
down. High hopes turned to disillusionment. When the town was
offered a shoe factory in 1918 for a $100,000 bonus, it declined, saying,
"This town is not handing out any hundred-thou and-dollar packages."
In another town, three real-estate dealers forme l a "development
company" and set out in 1913 to raise $100,000 for bonus money to
bring in a glove, a piano, and a farm implement factory. Through
the sale of city lots a total of $57,000 was pledged in a few months.
R esults were not soon apparent, however, and the drive began to lag.
When the glove factory was eventually landed, the development
company was unable to pay the bonus promised. Local citizens took
over the development company and through straight contributions
they were able to pay off the debt to the glove factory and erect a
building for the piano factory as well. At this point the piano manufacturer reneged, leaving the town with a vacant building on its hands.
Eventually the glove factory closed down also. .After this experience,
the local n ewspaper remarked bitterly:
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ATTEMPTS AT A SOLUTION • 99
The episodes of [a promoter], of factory fame . . . have sen·ed to knock
[this town' l so unding board out of tune. . . . Enthusiasm and the cold
stern reality of raising s~vernl thousand dollars are con idered to be two
entirely different thing;,.
For more than a decade the idea of subsidizing local factories was
dropped. The failure of the prewar drives for new industry had been
discouraging to those who had paid out money for ubsidies without
getting any result. ).Ieanwhile, the wartime coal boom had an-ived
and prosperity based on coal alone eemed assured. Along about
1925, howe.er, the fast effects of the decline of the coal industry
began to be felt, and the coal towns once more realized that n ew
industries would be needed to absorb the workers who were rapidly
being displaced from the mines. It was a sign of the times that
women's literary societies b egan to presen t programs like tms:
Creosoting Plant, by Mrs.- - - -- Brick Plant , by Mrs. _
Ice Cream Plant, by Mrs.
Music
In vain the State Chamber of Commerce ,,·arned that" a concern that
asks a bonus to locate :1 plant iu your city is not worthy of corning."
After 10 yen,r"- of quiet the lo~an, "Land a Factory," was in desperation again rai ed tlu·oughout the coal field.
In 1926 one of the coa l t0'-''11>' began to negotiate for a factory with a
manufactmer of pillowcases and sheets. The company's expansion
plan , which inYolved the sale of $25,000 in stock to local people, was
im-estigated by the town's booster club and pronounced sound. The
company set, up local offices and issued publicity emphasizing the fact
that 30 O'irls would be employed and that money contributed wouJd
"be an im·estment rather than a snbsidy." Trustees to protect the
community's interest were appointed. But the sale of stock turned
out to be difficult, and soon the campaign was forgotten.
A neighboring coal town was more successful. Through the cooperation of all cine organizations, the town was able to erect a $35,000
brick building to house its "new textile industry." Miners and busine s people alike contributed time and money for the building. The
ma.nufactmer who agreed to occupy the building was also given gentlemanly guarantees by local unions that his workers would not be
organized. "We knew that times were hard and if we tried to organize,
he wouldn 't have come at all ." Late in December 1926 the plant
was installed with 56 machines "busily sewmg and cutting various
sizes of underwear."
)./{eanwhile, the towns around the edge of the coal field began to
land factories at an impressive rate. In 1928 an open-shop town just
outside the coal field paid $50,000 for a glove factory. A town to the
north of the coal field had raised $125,000 for a shoe factory; to the
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
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100 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
south it was reported that a rayon factory had been landed. Locitl
newspapers informed the people in the coal towns that 35 factories
had located in southern Illinois between November 1927 and April
1929. Speaking before a coal-town audience, a field representative
of the State Chamber of Commerce predicted that "southern Illinois
would become the center of the manufacturing world within the space
of a few years ." He urged the enthusiastic local Chamber of Commerce to "pull for new industries" on the basis of its "excellent transportation" and its "super power system."
The growiug pressure of unemployment and the success of the
campaigns tor factories in n ear-by towns brought the coal field's
second drive for outside industry to a climax in 1929. " The industrial
fever," said a n ewspaper, a drives were launched throughout the coal
fi eld, "has taken hold of the people in this section of the State." The
record of the campaign waged by one of the towns shows how desperately n ew industry was pursued.
"Sin k o r Swim"
The town began to bargain in February 1929 with an Ohio overall
manufacturer who promised employment for 150 to 200 people, provided the town raised $85,000 for the plant. After a railroad offered
a free site for the factory, a local improvement association set out in
:M arch to raise the money required. The drive started off well enough.
Carpenters offered to donate labor on the building, and other workers
pledged a substantial part of a year's wages. The project was
endorsed by 13 unions, 3 lodges, and 3 banks. The newspaper carried
a full list of contributors, together with frequent warnings and
exhortations:
This overall factory drive is a fight for our Yery existence.
Some years ago the people of [this town] set about to build up a live city
and succeeded as long as the coal mining indu try was thriving. W ork in
the mines is not so good now. What of the future? What of the day when
this country's last mine has hoisted its last ton of coal, far distant as that
day may be?
As the drive progressed, it was rumored that a near-by town had made
the overall manufactlll'er a better offer. The association responded
by urging local citizens to hurry with their pledges.
Shall this be another "Tale of Two Cities," one checked by a disloyal few
and sliding back into obscurity, the other welcoming opportunities and
building to greater heights?
Shall [we] fail?
It's now or never, sink or swim.
All through the summer the drive continued. When the manufacturer telegraphed, "Must have contract completed June 15," the
association redoubled its efforts. There wa s open criticism of a
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"disloyal few, including a few businessmen or concerns" who did not
support the drive wholeheartedly. June 15 passed, and the manufacturer impatiently granted more ti.me. Early in the fall of 1929 it
was announced that money was still coming in. Optimism continued
as architects began to prepare the blueprints for the factory building.
The same type of campaign was pursued throughout the coal field.
Late in 1929 a local newspaper summarized the status of drives going
on simultaneously in five coal towns:
[One town] is making a bid for a factory and held a meeting thi week to
consider a proposition tendered them. . . . The proposition is a pants
factory, which will employ 150 persons.
[Another town] is about to close up their overall factory propo ition. . . .
[A third town] is open-minded and willing to "talk turkey" on most any
sort of an industry the community could handle.
[A fourth town] is dickering with a stove factory [to occupy the vacant
building erected in the 1913 drive].
The citizens of la fifth town] have taken kindly to the overall factory and
the general committee is working hard to sell the required amount of stock
to ecure the factory . . . .
The e industries are a much needed thing in order to take care of the rapid
accumulation of surplu labor.
This ummary appeared on October 23, 1929, the week of the stockmarket crash. It was the last optimistic note; within a few weeks all
hope of bringing factories to the coal towns was gone. The drive in
the one town to raise 5,000 for an overall factory reached the halfway
mark late in 1929. On ovember 15 it was reported that bids for
the factory building would be asked "in a few days." But the bids
were never opened and the campaign quickly died. In the town which
ought to raise 40,000 for another overall manufacturer, the quota
was eventually reported filled. On ovember 20, however, it was
di covered that another $2,000 was needed for moving expenses.
The la t $2,000 could not be raised, and this campaign was also soon
forgotten. The less advanced drives were simply dropped.
As the depression came on, re idents of the coal towns learned that
industrie were as hard to keep as they were to get. The most substantial result of the second campaign for industry was the underwear
factory which opened in the coal field in 1926. This plant continued
to operate until the first years of the depression. Then one morning
in 1931 people passing the factory noticed that the machines were all
gone. The manufacturer, remembering that the residents of the town
had put $35,000 into the factory building, had departed quietly during
the night. Another coal town lost a grocery chain's large central
warehouse, which mo,ed unexpectedly to a town beyond the coal
field in order to take ad,antage of the offer of a free new building and
"escape the influence of the trade unions."
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1 0 2 • SEVEN STRAN DED COAL TOWNS
After t h e fiasco of the 1929 land-a-factory adventures coal-town
people reconsiqered the wisdom of schemes to entice reluctant manufacturers by means of either subsidies or acq uiescence in substandard
wages. 9 For a p eriod of 10 years, they also lost all their enthusiasm
for campaigning; and it wa!s not until late in 1939 that efforts to land
outside industry could be form ally organized again. The n ew organization, called "Southern Illinois, Inc., " approaches the problems of the
community soberly. It offers no subsidies; it seeks to bring only
"sound industries that belong in southern Illinois" ; it cautions the
people to expect no miracles, for "to assume that success is assured is
foolish," and r esults will only come " if Southern I llinois, Inc., is permitted to carry on a p ermanent, dogged , p ersistent, and determined
campaign."
The following list of the industries, aside from coal mining, agriculture, and the services, which existed in the three counties in 1935
illustrates how completely the campaig11s for industry hav e failed .10
Meat packing, wholesale ___ ___ ____ ___ ____ ____ ___ _____ _
Nonalcoholic beverages_____ ______________ ___________ _
Flour a nd grain mill products _________ ____ _____ __ _____
Coke-oven products __ __ _ __ _____________ ___ ___ __ ___ __
Saddlery, harness , and whips __ ___ ___________ _________
Co ncrete products __ ______ _______ ___ ____ ___ __ ________
Clay products ___ _____ ___________ __________ __ ________
Wood preserving _ ___________ ___ ___________ __ ________
Explosives __ ________ ___ ___ __ ______________ __ ____ ___ _
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
plants
plants
plant
p lant
plant
plant
p lant
p lant
plant
The average employment of all these plants, plus a number of bakeries,
printing plants, ice and ice-cream factories, was 396 p er sons. Not one
of the factories once camp aigned for so ardently appears within the
list.
BACK TO THE FARM
11
South ern Illinois is one of the few areas in the United States in
which important coal deposits occur below a prairie-land smface.
g In 1936 a significant d evelopment was reported in a coal town outside th e
three counties which were in cluded in th is s urv ey. This town had landed a garme nt facto ry employing a large number of wom en. But "trouble star ted wh e n
a woman organi zer is said to hav e been led to th e outskirts of the town and t old
not to return ." Whereupon, "unrest at the plant . . . ensued to the point that
manufacturers fi na lly told . . . bus inessmen that the situation would have to
be handled or t he company would establish elsewhere." A near-by Missouri
town promised th e garment manufactu rer a new building if he would move all of
his plants t here.
10 Bureau of the Census , Industrial Market Data Handbook of the United States,
Domestic Comm erce Series No. 107, U.S. D epartment of Commerce, Washington,
D . C ., 1939.
11 Data for this
ection were obtained from the Ce ns us of Agriculture for 1900,
1910, 1920, 1930, and 1935, Bureau of the Cens us, U.S. D epartment of Comm erce,
Washingto n, D. C.
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ATTEMPTS AT A SOLUTION • 103
Unlike the declining coal fields in t,he cramped Appalachian valleys,
southern Illinois thu appeared to offer the possibility of resettling
displaced coal miners on the land. But this "solution" also encountered serious difficulties. Although a return to subsist,ence farming
helped to cushion the shock of wholesale mine unemployment, the land
offered no real solution to the problems of the coal field.
Fa rming in the Th ree Counties Before 1930
In 1900 Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Counties were dependent
almo t solely upon farming.
nder their early agriculturnl economy
the three countie had not prospered. Much of the soil of the southern Illinois prairies wa extremely poor. In 1900 the production of
corn per acre in Franklin , Saline, and Williamson Counties was less
than half that of Com Belt counties 150 miles to the north. Tax
a sessors in the three counties put the average value of farm land plus
improvements at $3 per acre. Coal promoters who began aITiving in
sout,b rn Illinois around 1902 were impressed with the poor quality
of the farm land, and before the existence of coal became generally
known, they were able to buy up top and bottom for as little as$10
an acre. 12
Further, the land had been divided into relatively small plots. Instead of the 160-acre units which prevailed in the rich farm district
to th(' north, the farm in the three counties were principally divided
into plot,s of 80 acres or less. With agriculture in the three counties
ba ed upon such small units of poor soil, the size of the farm population in 1900 was close to the maximum which could be supported on
the land. Before the large-scale development of coal began, the district wa well on it way to becoming what would be called today a
"rw·al problem area."
In 1900 the popul ation of the 3 counties was 69,156 per ons, most
of whom were directly or indirectly dependent upon 9,130 farm enterpri cs. With the udd en increa e of mine employment during the
next decade, population rose rapidly and reached 101 ,245 in 1910.
During this period the mines not only attracted workers from the
di tricts beyond the coal field , but from the unprofitable farms near
by a w II; local farmer welcomed this chance to escape from poor
land. Some of the farm land wa absorbed by the growing coal
towns, and the con olidation of the great blocks of coal land had
further encouraged the movement off the farms. By 1910 the number of farm operated in the 3 counties had decreased by 1,179, the
number of hogs had decrea ed from 95,917 to 52,01 , and 34,529
a n· of farm land bad been taken out of culti,ation.
12 There is a legend that one of the promoters secured title to a block of farm
land-together with the coal- from a widow in exchange for a silk dress.
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104 • SEVEN STRANDED COA L TOW NS
The wartime coal boom beginning in 1915 accelerated these tendencies. By 1920 the population of the 3 counties had risen to
156,738. D espite high wartime food prices and a tremendous increase in the value of farm products in the three counties, the high
mine wages continued to make inroads into farm activity. D uring
the decade ending in 1920 another 873 farms disappeared and
another 37,255 acres of farm land were taken out of cultivation.
The beginning of the coal depression in the 1920's failed to stop
the farm-to-mine trend. Even as employment in the mines began
to fall, the land became no more attractive. By 1930 the number
of farms had decreased to 6,746 and during the decade of the 1920's
a total of 57,333 acres of farm land in the 3 counties were turned
back to scrub-oak forest.
The Depression
After 1930, however, the movement off the land was summarily
halted. For the first time in 30 years the miners of Franklin, Saline,
and Williamson Counties turned back to the land to take their last
stand against privation. The size of farm population increased
rapidly. In 1930 the farm population of the 3 counties had been
31,136; by 1935 it bad increased to 34,949. The 1935 Census of
Agriculture reported, in addition, that 3,834 persons who had not
been on farms in 1930 were living on farms in the 3 counties in 1935.
These newcomers to farms formed 11.0 p ercent of the 1935 population in the three cotmties, as against 6.0 p ercent for Illinois and 6.3
percent for the United States. Said a local n ewspaper in 1932:
Many who were on farm s before the fat years of th;) last decade are
willing to retu rn to a su rer but perhaps not such a fancy living. . . . We
think this is the wise thing to do. Every man and his family, barring
sickness, can get by on the farm.
But common sense was not altogether on the side of the back-tothe-land movem ent. The newspaper which thought that the unemployed would have a "surer living" on the land also made this
discovery:
There are ten pro pective renters to one farm in [this] vicinity . . . and
there are no farms for rent.
Actually, land was by no m eans plentiful Some of the farm land
had be,m ruined by mineral alts in the water pumped from the mines.
Some had been ruin ed by the strip mines, which leave behind a wasteland where not even weeds will grow. The good farm land which
occurs in several parts of the three counties was of course already
occupied. It was not available to the unemployed, who had no
money to buy it ; and it could have absorbed additional workers only
if the existing small farms were further subdivided.
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, Secu rity Aclmi11isl r olio11 \1/oth" l ein).
" Th em sh ovels sure m ess this co untry up."
8trip :\line :'\ear Carter,ille, 111.
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ATTEMPTS AT A SOLUTION • 105
The idle land presented other difficulties. Much of it was obviously
worthless. Many blocks of idle farm land owned by the coal companies were mortgaged to bondholders and could not be sold without
involving legal difficulties more costly than the value of the land itself.
Coal-company land was nearly always available to renters, but it was
peculiarly unadaptable to a tenancy system. Most of the land was
so badly run down that it could not be farmed until soil-building crops
had been plowed in for several years. Renters who had no assurance
that they could hold a plot after it had been improved were naturally
reluctant to go to such trouble and expense. Whenever coal-company
land was rented, it was usually planted to corn year after year, and
the poor land rapidly became more and mare sterile.
Those who were able to secure plots of land after 1930 achieved a
dubious advantage. Between 1930 and 1935 the number of farm
enterprises in the 3 counties increased by 1,518. Of these, 517, or
more than one-third, were farms of only 3 to 9 acres; an additional
351 n ew farms contained 10 to 19 acres; and 430 of them consisted of
20 to 49 acres. Only 220 of the new enterprises contained 50 acres
or more. According to local county agents, a farmer in the three
counties requires at least 80 acres of land before he can become a
self-sufficient producer; less than 80 acres provides only for different
levels of subsistence farming. In terms of this standard, approximately nine-tenths of the new depression farms were enterprises on
which an independent living was not possible. While many of these
subsistence farms raised the living standards of families with income
from other sources, they provided no real substitute for declining
industrial activity.
The Possibilities for a Return to Farming
Many local businessmen in the coal field insist that the salvation
of the community li es in the development of agriculture. In a limited
sense there is some truth in this contention. Working miners ~ho
have not already begun subsistence farming could frequently improve
the family diet and at the same time save on their grocery bills by
raising garden products, pigs, cows, and a few chickens. It is also
true that if the surface land held by the coal companies could be
released, a numb er of self-sufficient farm enterprises could be created,
adding slightly to the productive wealth of the three counties.
But n either of these developments would solve the problems of the
workers now dependent upon public assistance. Unemployed families
without gardens could improve their condition by raising a part of
their own food. But a garden does not provide a living, and the need
for relief would still persist. On the other hand , farming on any more
n.rnbitious sc~le- evcn subsistence farming-requires some capital in
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
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106 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
the form of buildings, equipment, and stock. Judging from the present
hand-to-mouth existen ce of the unemployed famili es, there is li ttle
possibility that they could take advantage of n ew land should it be
made available.
Those local r esidents who continue to hope that farming in itself
will solve all the problems of the coal fi eld have not studied carefully
the predicam ent of their community. In 1930 the average annual
farm income per farm inhabitant in the thrne counties was $192, far
below the average for the United States as a whole, and equal to only
one-fourth of the farm income of the more fertil e counties in the Corn
B elt north of the coal field. Although the productivity of the soil in
th e three counties can and should be incr eased by careful managem ent,13 it do es not appear likely that the land can absorb large numbers of additional workers without furth er impoverishment of the
entire rural population.
13 Southern Illin ois, Inc., advocates the improvem ent of local agriculture a long
these lines:
1. R eduction of waste land.
2. Encouragement of dairy and livestock farming .
3. Revitalization of fr uit farming by better marketing .
4. Encouragement of part-time farming for coal min ers.
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
Chapter VII
MIGRAT ION
ScHEMES FOR turning back the clock of technological change, for
creating new jobs in the crannie of the declining coal industry, or
for bringing in altogether new indu tries, would appear to be a roundabout approach to the unemployment problem in outhern Illinois.
Supposedly, an easier approach- or at least the one that the facts
about the coal fi eld always bring first to mind- might be the migr ation
of unemployed workers away from southern Illinois. Theoretically,
an unsupported population, left behind in a community wher-e the
dominant industry has appreciably declined, should under "normal"
conditions make its own automatic adjustment. What could be more
natural than that workers no longer needed in one place should move
to another place where--tbeoret ically, again-they would be needed?
Unfortunately , so nice an adjustment seldom results from the play
of automatic forces even under the most favorable circumstances, let
alone in the midst of universal unemployment . Shifting industry
orclinarily leaves behind a number of stragglers . Lumbering in the
cu tover district of the lower Michigan peninsula, for example, began
declining as early as 1895. With the automobile industry rising only
200 miles away, with three decades of general prosperity prevailing
outside the cutover district, and with all the displacing effects of the
World War, the district did indeed lose a substantial part of its
population. D espite its losses, however, the district bas to this day
continued to hold more population than it can support. In a drclining community there are those disadvantaged residents who will
choose a lower economic status where they are settled in preference
to th e uncertainties of migration.
In the southern Illinois coal field this disadvantaged and immobile
group included most of the population remaining in the community
in 1939. It must be remembered that the effects of the Illinois coal
depression were first felt in 1923 and have been critical since 1927.
If migration were destined to make an automatic adjustmrnt of the
107
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..,NIVERSllY 01 ILLINQ1< AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
108 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
coal field's unemployed population, it should have shown tangible
results within nearly two decades There bas been, of course, some
population movement from the coal field since the decline first began,
and among certain age groups the movement has been heavy. But
one need only glance at the figures showing present unemployment in
the southern Illinois coal towns to judge how inadequate a solution
migration has actually provided.
LOCAL FORCES AFFECTING EMIGRATION
It is well known that a people's tendency to migrate depends not
only on the pressure of economic adversity, but al o upon its chances
for betterment elsewhere. In the midst of a gmcral depression,
opportunities for finding work outside one' home community are, of
co urse, restricted in the extreme. As general unemployment increases
and as the labor demand grows more and more selective, a family's
chances of successful migration turn more and more directly upon its
characteristics and resources. In Franklin , Saline, and Williamson
Com1ties, the characteristics and circumstances of the people make
migration more than ordinarily difficult.
Occupational Experience
The chief occupational problem connected with migration from
southern Illinois i that of di placed band loader from the mines.
Other problems exist, of course. Coal-field youth, for example, in
seeking to esta~lish themselves where job opportunities arc greater,
have doubtless been handicapped by lack of training for any favored
occupation. In spite of the advantage of their youth, many of their
attempts at emigration have ended in failm-e and have eventually
brought the youth back home again to the depre sod area Toe
disadvantage faced by untrained youth is not peculiar to southern
Illinois, however, and need not concern us at thi point. The problem
of southern Illinois sc.rvice workers-half of the experienced labor
force in the three coun tic - who fail to find work elsewhere is likewise
a general one.
As for the coal miners, their past r ecord of adaptability is often
overlooked. There was a tim e when coal miners were welcome
mough in other industries. Before the World War, indeed, miners
moved so easily into the Gary, Ind. , steel mills that the coal operators had to consider pecial steps to hold their working force in
southern Illinois. Miners point out that the shift from hand loading
to machine loading in southern Illinois mines in the late l 920's
brought such drastic changes in technical operation that they seemed
to have been working in two different industries. Yet, wherever age
and physical strength permitted, hand loaders took up their strange
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MIGRATION • 109
new tasks without great difficulty. It i true that mine1 often find
outdoor work distasteful and even unhealthful, ince work underground at a constant year-round temperature make them highly
sensitive to the extremes of summer and winter temperatures on top;
they accordingly take up farm occupations with some reluctance.
But miners would not, a miners, be at any special disadYantage in
competing for a variety of job for which no long apprenticeship is
required.
At the same time, there is no doubt that old-time hand loaders
di placed from the mine would face difficult odds if they attempted
to find work out ide the coal field. Age and isolation both weigh
heavily again~t them. Th(' pecial skills of hand loader - drilling,
timbering, laying track, the ability to judge a dangerous roof, and
other skills so necessary in mining- are generally usele outside the
mines and offer no advanta<Te in eeking work elsewhere. And when
million of workers ar out of job , failure to offer special qualifications
become a critical factor.
The People
Thr e main population ources upplied practically all the workers
for the growing outb rn Illinois coal industry. First in importance
wer th near-by countryfolk, u ually farmers and their ons who left
ubmarginal f~rms for day wage in the coal mines or job in the
growing al town . Among all the family heads re iding in the coal
town in 1939, 62 percent Wl'rc born within the State of Illinois. 1
The great majority of the native Illinois workers were born either in
Franklin aline, or William on Counties or in the other 20 southern
Illinois countic which ompri (' "Egypt."
Text in importance were
the foreign born- Italian , Pole , Croatian , Ukrainians, Czechs,
Lithuanian , Hungarian , ctc.- who came in great number until the
b giruung of the "World War. Foreign-born workers till comprise
15 percent of the family hrad in the southern Illinois coal town ,
and iu 1930 evrry fifth per on in the three countie was either foreignborn or of foreign-born or mixed parrntage. The third great source
of labor was the hill country lying south of the "little Egypt" area:
T enncs cc, Alabama, and particularly western Krntucky, where the
migrants had frequently worked in coal mines.
atives of this region
made up 13 percent of the family heads living in the coal towns in
1939 (appendix table 26).
1 Thi di tribution is of cour e affected by the age of the family head , ince
the migrant ' children who are family head would in many ca,e have been born
in Illinois. Among the older generation , howeyer, Illinoil' natiYe, still predominated. Of all family heads 40 year of age or o,·er in 1939. lllinois wa the ource
of 50 percent, foreign countries 20 percert, the western Appalachians 20 percent,
and other sources 10 percent.
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LNIVER'i1TY OF LLINOIS AT
JRBANA C. AMPA,C:'11
110 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
The nature of these population sources is significant to the general
problem of mobility in southern Illinois. Two of the principal groups,
·the natives of the area itself and the migrants from Kentucky and the
western Appalachians, are not a cosmopolitan population, in the first
generation at least. In education, dialect, family traits, religion, and
numerous folkways, southern Illinois is a clearly defined r egion, a
region homogeneous with the western Appalachians and altogether
unlike central and northern lliinois. In spite of the broadening influence of large-scale industry, the miners' union, and the recent
popularity of education, the past culture of the region still persists.
As far as social patterns are concerned, Chicago and even St. Louis
(only 100 miles away) are in another world. The native and the
Kentuckian coal miner have social ties in southern Illinois that are
powerful ind eed. The suggestion that job opportunities might be
more plentiful up-State will often bring forth such comments as these:
"Well-this country's always been my home"; or "Why my kinfolks
are all round about here." In short, most of the older native-born
resid ents of the coal field like their own community best. Opportunity elsewhere must be real opportunity to outweigh their natural
desire to stay at home.
The foreign born and their families have no such deep social roots
in the community itself. On the contrary, their integration has been
traditionally hampered by local prejudice, which is only now disappearing thanks to years of common schooling among the second generations. The foreign group tends to be tied to the coal field by other
circumstances, however. Many among the older generation migrated
directly from Europe to southern Illinois, and they are as unfamiliar
with the country beyond the coal field as the natives themselves.
Lacking helpful outside contacts, even with their own nationals in
Chicago, their mobility is made extremely difficult by the universal
provincial prejudice which makes the "alien" unwelcome in every
community where he is not known. Of course these immobilizing
forces fall with considerably less burden on the children of the foreign
born .
The Settlement of the Coal Towns
Although southern Illinois was first settled nearly 100 years ago,
the coal towns themselves are new. Nome and Juneau, Alaska, were
grown-up towns when cows still pastured in what are now the business
districts of the coal towns. Earlier chapters have pointed out that
when the rapid development of Franklin, Saline, and Williamson coal
began in 1902, the three counties were poor and isolated farm communities supporting only a fraction of their present population.
Herrin and Eldorado had about 1,500 residents each in 1900, and
Carrier Mills bad nearly 500. Johnston City was a sleepy villlage of
D1g1tized by
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INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
MIGRATION • 111
about 800. Zeigler and Bush did not exist. West Frankfort, now
the largest coal town in southern Illinois, was only a cro sroads store.
The total population of the 7 selected coal towns was 4,200. After
making allowance for changing city limits and adjusting the census
figures 2 accordingly, the approximate population increase appears
as follows:
1900 __ ___ __________________________ ___ __ _________ __
4, 200
1910 __ -- - - - - - ----- - - ----- _ ---------------------1920 __ ------ - -------- ___ --------------- __ - ·
19,000
41 , 000
The coal boom between 1900 and 1910 thus brought a fourfold increase
in coal-town population, and the World War decade more than doubled
the 1910 population.
Further increases in the coal-town population continued until 1923,
the peak year for employment at the mines. 3 And even after 1923
migrants still moved into the coal towns, though the movement no
longer balanced the losses of the population leaving. A special survey
of out-of-State family heads livi11g in West Frankfort and Herrin in
1939 showed these proportion entering the coal field during the
different periods of its development:
Date of entering Franklin,
Percent of all
Saline, and Williamson
family heads born
Counties
outside Illinois
Before 1904____ _ _ _______________ __ __ ________
12
1904-1913 _____________
-- - ---------- _
1914-1918 _________
-- ------------1919- 1923 ___ --- _ _ _ _ _ _
_ ----------------1924- 1928 _________ --------- _ -------- -----------1929- 1939 ___________ _ _
_ -------·--------- _
29
22
18
8
11
These figures are substantially influenced by mortality among the
groups migrating earliest. If these migrants had moved at about
the ame age and at the same rate during each period, the later groups
would show greater representation than the earlier. Migration was
thus at its peak between 1904 and 1919; and the movement into the
coal field after 1919, while it did exist, dwindled to little significance.
Other things being equal , the population of new communities often
tends to b e highly mobile in response to economic pressure; and as
these figures show, the coal towns are obviously newly settled. One
2 See Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census of the United State~: 1920, Population Vol. I, U. S. D epartment of Commerce, Washington, D. C., 1921. The
censu actually reported population as follows: 4.,218; 17,709; and 37,248. Adjustment must be made for Zeigler, which existed in 1910 but was not incorporated.
In estimating the 1920 figure, John ton City and West Frankfort population must
be increased by about 4,000 persons to allow for persons in outlying sections
which were incorporated into the 2 towns shortly after 1920.
3 See fig. 17, p. 114.
Children of school age in the three counties increased 20
percent hetween 1920 and 1923.
O gn
Dg1tT
NTtl{NE r ARC.
1
VL
.... 'JIVER'i1TY OF LINOIS AT
uRtlANA C. AMPA,c "J
11 2 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
striking feature of timing in the settlement of the coal field should,
however, be noted. The settlers came principally in two waves, the
first wave responding to the original coal boom- 1904 to 1913-and
the second arriving during the World War years. The last wave had
b een settled about 10 years when the n eed for emigration first presented itself in th e late 1920's. Presumably, the later group, more
than the earlier arrivals, would have found emigration a solution to
their problems as the min es closed down, and apparently a considerable number of them did indeed move elsewh er e in the late 1920's
and early 1930's. But a large group of migrants had arrived before
1910, and had b een settled for a full generation when the decline
started. Within that time most of this earliest group would have
grown old and put down social and economic roots making migration
extremely difficult.
Mo ney fo r M ovin g
As time passed , all these forces retarding emigration were overshadowed by another force even more compelling. During the early
stages of the coal depression in th e middle of the 1920's, miners thrown
out of work were usually able to finance a move and to support
themselves in a new communi ty if they found no work immediately.
As the depression gr ew more severe, however, the reserves which
might have been used earlier for migration were slowly exhausted .
At one time an unemployed miner had numerous ways of scraping
together enough money to get out of the coal field: h e could mortgage
his house or sell the equity he had earned, h e could draw his savings
out of the bank, h e could sell his building-and-loan shares. A few
years later most of these nest eggs had vanish ed. His home was repossessed, his savings either spent for groceri es or tied up in defunct
banks, his building-and-loan sh ar es worth only so much secondhand
lumber.
By 1934 a considerable part of the entire coal field population was
no longer able to stay off relief, let alone to travel about the country
in search of noneA...istent job opportunities. Even the Oklahoma
refugee h as his secondhand automobile, som e mon ey for gas, and the
prospect of a job- such as it is-a few hundred miles down the road.
But hundreds of southern Illinois famili es, and the very ones which
would presumably gain most from migration, have for years had literally no reserves left for moving. 4 Residence requirements for relief
h ave r einforced this disadvantage.
This factor, again, immobilized families and older workers more
directly than youth. Even after 1934 underprivileged coal-field
youth without family responsibility could still travel to the North in
search of work. Some of the youth found jobs, particularly in t h e
• See pp . 51 - 52.
Digitized by
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INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
MIGRATION • 11 3
automobil e factories at Flint and D etroit and in the Chicago service
industries. But many others hastily returned home to the coal towns
when th eir jobs ended or their mon ey ran out. Youth's only advantage has been greater freedom to search the distant labor markets
for work. Obviously, when jobs cannot be found, youth are stranded
in the coal towns just as older ~orkers are.
A STRANDED POPULATION
The coal field's unemployed workers have been isolated from more
favored labor markets, have had no special occupational advantages
when they did seek work elsewhere, have had p eculiar social ties to
th eir community, and have long ago exhausted the reserves which
might have financed migration. In the face of such difficulties,
automatic migration could scarcely hav e mad e any great contribution
toward solving the coal fi eld 's unemployment problem. Th e result
of th ese frictions is a stranded people. Their story is briefly told in
figure 17, which relates the yearly trend in population-as reflected
in the Franklin, Saline, and Williamson school census 5- to the trend
in coal-mine employment in the three counties.
B etween 1918 and 1923, years which brought to a close the long
era of expansion in the southern Illinois coal industry, population
change was strikingly r esponsive to economic change.
ew jobs in
the mines were being created each year, and population flowed into the
coal fi eld, k eeping pace with th e growth of employment. But after
1923 the situation changed rapidly (fig. 17). Even during the years
when there was still a chance to find jobs beyond the coal field,
Franklin , Saline, B.nd Williamson Counties were alTeady showing the
chief characteristic of a stranded area: a decline in employment
without a corresponding drop in population.
With the general depression and th e drying up of job opportunities
outside of southern Illinois, the population of the coal fi eld became
increasingly " r edundant" in r elation to available work . In spite of
mass unemploymen t, th e disastrous strike of 1932, and several years
of inadequate relief, no great exodus occurred. B etween 1929 and
1933 min e employment fell 36 percent, but school-age population in
1933 was only 14 percent less than it had been in 1929.
Even with the beginning of ation-wide recovery after 1933 the
maladjustmen t in south ern Illinois was furth er increased, though at
a somewhat slower pace. The numb er of miners employed in the
three counties in 1938 was 18 p ercent below the number employed
in 1933; the school-age population declined only 6 percent during the
5 Although the annual school census (population aged 6 to 21 years) i
not a
perfect measure of total population changes, its 1920-1940 trend for the three
counties did not differ widely from the total population trend shown in the
decennial census itself.
ui< 11 z•,d by
'.JTERNET ARCHIVE
Original from
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
114 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
Fig 17 - POPULATION OF SCHOOL AGE AND MEN EMPLOYED
AT SHIPPING COAL MINES IN FRANKLIN, SALINE,
AND WILLIAMSON COUNTIES , 1918-1938
Thousand
persons
I00
Thousand
persons
100
I
90
I
80
I
60
.,,,,-.-.
50
-
-
~i..--
70
- ---·-
60
i--.
I"'-,.._
~
50
...
--
'i-....
,,,
--- -- ,,..L
90
80
~
School-age
population
I
40
30
T
!
70
I
I
--
~
~
--. '
''
I
-- I',' ,'
40
30
Men employed ' ,
'''
20
-- ' '
20
' ',
,,~--... __
-- -- ...._
10
10
1918
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
Source Appendix !ables 2 and 27.
38
WPA 3851
same period. Thu it was that southern lllinois in 1939, after 16
year of this trend, pre enLed the record of long-time unemployment
and chronic poverLy de cribed earlier in thi report.
The Record of Depression Mobility
The school-age populaLion trend show11 in figure 17 gives only a
general year-by-year picture of population losses in the sou them
Illinois coal field during th e past two decades. Data for a morr
deLailcd analysis of significant population changt'S arc provided in the
d ecennial nitcd tates Crnsus figures for 1920 and 1930, and in the
pecial 1939 Cl'nsu of population conducted in seven southern Illinois
coal towns by the DiYi ion of R esearch, iYPA.
Ther e wer e apprnximately 41 ,000 persons living in the 7 coal town
at, the time of the 1920 Census. This population, which was still
being rapidly increased by migration to th e coal field, showed the
expected trait of a fronti er people. For example, males greatly
outnumbered females; there were 111.4 males for every 100 femal es
Digit1z~r' by
0r 1r,al frorr,
INTERNET ARCH VE
UN VER.SITY 0~ IL 11\JO 5 AT
UREW,A-~ HAM?AIGIIJ
MIGRATION • 11 5
in the 4 towns for which census data on sex are available,6 and in
individual towns the ratio ran as high as 116.9. An equally remarkable characteristic of the population was its youth. In Herrin (the
only town for which age was reported in sufficient detail for computation) the average age of the 1920 population was 22.6 years,
as compared with an average of 27.3 years for the State of Illinois
as a whole.
Populati on Changes Between 1920 and 1930
As was noted in the preceding section, the coal-field population
continued to increase between 1920 and 1923 and thereafter it began
to decline. By 1930, 7 years after the turning point in the fortunes
of the southern Illinois mines and 3 years after the critical period set
in, the population of the 7 coal towns was still 41,000 persons. Under
tho most favorable conditions for emigration, tho size of the population had thus merely returned to approximately the 1920 level. 7
The ebb and flow of migration dming the decade had brought
marked changes in the composition, if not the size, of the population.
The sex ratio fell from 111.4 males per 100 females in 1920 to 105.6 in
l930. In part, of course, this change resulted from the natural tendency for bj.rths to cl.raw the sex ratio toward 100 over a period of time.
But in even greater part, the smaller proportion of males in 1930
appears to have res11lted from the emigration of many unattached
m en, ordinarily the most mobile ~Toup in any community, who
departed for greener fields as the pressme of unemployment grew
more intense. The relative ag •s of the people changed substantially,
too. The average age for Herrin (the one place where comparison is
possible) increased from 22.6 years to 26.5 years dmi.ng the decade.
The sudden slowing dow,i of immigration after 1923 had helped to
raise the average age, since it checked the influx of younger workers
with their children. Moreover, the persons who began to leave the
coal towns subsequently were not a cross section of the entire population, but tended to be concentrated in the younger age groups. 8
The four towns were Eldorado, Herrin, Johnston City, and West Frankfort.
Total emigration during the decade was of course somewhat more than was
required to cancel immigration, since the natural population increase wa likewise canceled. In the 7 towns there were approximately 4,800 births in excess of
deaths during the decade.
8 Migration from Herrin between 1920 and 1930 was greatest for those who
were· 10 to 14 years old in 1920 (20 to 24 in 1930). Altogether, 37 percent of this
group left Herrin during the decade. Migration was least among those 45 years
and over in 1920 (55 and over in 1930); this group lost only 17 percent during the
decade. These figures are based upon a comparison of expected survivors from
the 1920 population with actual residents in 1930.
6
1
liq t zed by
0n 111 t'rorri
1r--iTrnJ1J ,T Ail., HIVt
JNIVERSITY 0• IL INO C, AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
11 6 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TO WNS
Po pu lation Changes Since 1930
The theoretical desirability of migration from the coal towns was
scarcely a debatable quC'stion after 1930, when large sections of the
people came to realize that the community could no longer support its
population. At the same time, the obstacles to migration had become
many times more formidable than ever before. If the miners and
their sons had good reason for hesitating to try tlwi.r fortunes outside
the mine district before 1930, they had much better reason afterward,
even though the local situation had itself become rapidly worse. The
choice of the unemployed between migration and staying put after
1930 was accordingly made under excessive pressure from both directions. Under such circumstances, bow would a population react?
The most striking fact about the behavior of the coal-town population under these conflicting forces was the small size of its population
decrease. The population of the 7 selected coal towns in 1930 had
been 41 ,373 persons. During the next 9 years there were presumably
2,606 births in excess of deaths in the 7 towns. 9 Without any emigration, the expected population of the towns should have been 43,980
persons in J939. Actually, howe,-er, the 1939 population was 38,208
persons. The n et emigration from the coal towns was therefore
5,772 persons. Nine years of depression migration thus removed no
more than one-eighth of the people from the community. Moreover,
because of natural population increase, the actual population loss was
considerably less, amounting to only 3,165 persons, about onethirteenth of th e 1930 population. 10 Spontaneous migration from the
coal towns sincf' 1930 has not run an altogether one-sided race against
natural population increase (fig. 18).
9 This estimate is based on the assumption that the birth and death rates in the
seven towns were the same as in the three counties as a whole. The county data
a re derived from reports of the Illinois Department of Public Health.
10 This Joss (7.6 percent) was unevenly distributed among the seven coal towns.
Zeigler and West Frankfort lost heavi est (20.9 and 13.3 percent, respectively),
doubtless because of the dismissal of members of the Progressive Miners of
America, who were strongest in these two towns, after the 1932 strike. Johnston
City, the hardest hit of the larger towns, lost all of its mines after 1930, but only
10.1 percent of its population. Herrin, kept active by its large retai l trade, lost
1.0 percent. Eldorado, Carrier Mills, and Bush each actually gained population
during the 9 years (3.2, 4.4, and 9.2 percent, respectively). These gains resulted
from natural popula tion increa se and a small influx of near-by farmers and unemployed and in no way indicate the existence of favored havens within the depressed
area . Bush, for example, gained proportionately more population than any other
of the seven towns. Yet 80 percent of Bush's gainful workers were unemployed
in 1939!
Between 1930 and 1940, the three counties lost 6.6 percent of their population;
Franklin County lo, ses were 13.3 percent and Williamson lost 4.2 percent. Saline
County a ctuall y gained 0.9 percent during the decade.
Digitized by
Original from
INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
MIGRATION • 11 7
Fig. 18 - GAIN OR LOSS IN POPULATION OF 7 SOUTHERN ILUNOIS
COAL TOWNS, 1930 -19 39
Percent gorn or lo ss
Percent gain or loss
+10
+10
+5 1 - - - - - - - - - -- 1
- - - - - - - - - - -~+5
-
Effect of no1urol oncreose
-5
- 2 0 1 - - - - - - -- -- -- - - -- - - - - - - -----l-20
WPA 3652
Changes in age composition of the population during the 9-year
period were especially striking. In 1930 persons 45 years of age and
over constituted 20 percent of the total population in the coal towns
studied. In 1939, however, the proportion had risen to 28 percent.
The average age of the population increased similarly, from 26.9 years
in 1930 to 29.2 years in 1939, substantially above the 1930 average
for both Illinois and the United States as a whole. In the space of
less than one full generation, the coal-town population had passed
from a relatively youthful composition to a; relatively aged one.11
So rapid an evolution in age composition between 1930 and 1939
resulted from three forces. One of these was natural aging. In 1920
the coal towns, still newly settled communities, were heavily weighted
with young couples who had recently migrated to the booming coal
field. As the boom subsided, the influx of young people was halted.
In the course of 20 years these persons have of course grown old,
filling the once thin ranks of the older age groups. The second influence was a drop in the number of births, following from a decrease in
the number of women of childbearing age and from a decrease in the
reproduction rate itself. Finally, depression migration reduced the
number of young, mobile persons faster than the number of older
persons in the population.
11 In H errin , the one town for which 1920 figures are available, the proportion
of persons 45 and over was as follows: 1920, 13 percent; 1930, 21 percent; 1939,
29 percent.
J111zdby
Ong1 ,al from
'-lTER'-lU AKCHIVE
UN VF''\SITY OF ILL '-IOIS AT
Ll'\!:lAIIIA-l HAM AIGN
118 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
Age Differentials in Migration
The influence of these three forces may be partially disentangled
when the effect of migration on the different age groups is isolated ;
that is, after calculating the number of 1930 residents expected to
survive to 1939 and comparing the result with the actual 1939 population. 12 The results of this method, as presented in figure 19, show
a wide variation in mobility according to age.
Fig_. 19- GAIN OR LOSS IN POPULATION ATTRIBUTABLE TO MIGRATION,
BY AGE GROUP, 5*SOUTHERN ILLINOIS COAL TOWNS, 1930-1939
Percent
ga i n or loss
+10
Percent
garn or loss
+10
+5 1------- - - -- - -- - ---,-- - - - - - - -
+S
0
0
-5
- - - - - - - 1 -5
-10
- - - -- - ----j -10
-15
- - -- - - - - - ----! -15
-20
15-24
25-34
- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -~-20
35-44
Age in 1939
45-64
65 and
over
*
1930 data for Bush and Carrier Mills
ore not available .
WPA 3653
12
To ascertain the proportion of the 1930 coal-town population groups which
would survive to the 1939 censu , it is necessary to apply survival rates to the
1930 population. From United States life tables it is possible to obtain the proportion of persons at any one age who are expected to be alive at any specified
later age. Thus, out of 1,000 white males born, 905 are alive at age 10-14, and
885 at age 19-24, according to 1930 mortality experience in the United States.
The ratio of these numbers is .98. This is the "survival ratio" of white males
aged 10- 14 over a period of 9 years. Similar ratios were calculated for the other
age-sex groups.
These ratios then permit an estimate of the number of persons surviving to
1939 from the 1930 population . The estimated survivors, in turn, may be compared with the number of persons enumerated in the WPA survey of the labor
market in four cities (see footnote 2, p. 26) to determine the influence of mobility,
Thus, if 3,000 persons aged 20-24 were expected to urvive, and only 2,400 persons were actually enumerated, the population loss through migration fo r the age
group would be estimated at 20 percent.
Digitized by
INTERNET ARCHIVE
Original from
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
MIGRATION • 119
After 1930 migration clearly offered special possibilities to coalfield youth. On the one hand, their economic status in the coal
field was less favored than that of any other age group of ablebodied workers. Most of the young workers reached maturity
after the expansion of mine employment had stopped, and they had
no prospect of finding jobs in the mines until the great surplus of
experienced jobless miners had been eliminated. 13 At the same time,
they were in a better position to risk the hazards of migration; they
had in many cases no family responsibilities, and they could be more
easily trained to fit the job requirements of distant employers. In
addition, the youth alone had access to the Army, the Navy, and the
CCC, each of which stimulates migration. The older workers, on the
other hand, held whatever mining jobs were available, and hence were
as a group less severely stricken by unemployment. Those older
workers who were unemployed stood little chance of successful migration because of their age and their training in a semiobsolete
occupation.
Accordingly, youth migrated most readily. Every fifth person between the ages of 6 and 25 years in 1930 (15 to 34 in 1939) had left
the coal towns without being replaced by incoming population in the
same age group .14 The persons who were 26 to 35 years old in 1930
migrated somewhat less readily, and iI1 the next older group, migration took 1 ss of a toll still. The number of those who were 56 and
over in 1930 (65 and over in 1939) actually increased as a result of
m igration during the 9-year period (fig. 19).
Birth-Rate Changes
It is impossible to derive migration estimates for children whose
ranks were fil led by births after the 1930 Census. It is known, however, that the absolute number of persons under 15 years of age declined 29 percent during the 9-year period. There is little doubt that
a considerable part of this decrease resu lted from emigration. But
emigration was not the only cause.
T hrough aging and emigration, the number of women of childbearmg age (20 to 44 years) declined somewhat after 1930, 15 reducmg
13 See
pp. 34, 41.
The emigration of the younger persons during the 9-year period was particularly heavy in Johnston City, West Frankfort, and Zeigler. Zeigler lost through
migration 51 percent of its male population aged 20-24 in 1939, and 41 percent of
its females in the same age group. In the group aged 25-29 years in 1939, Johnston City lost 50 percent of its males and 38 percent of its fema les. West Frankfort lost t hrough emigration 32 percent of both males and fema les aged 20- 29 in
1939.
15 There were 7,473 females aged 20-44 in the 5 larger coal town in 1930.
By
1939 the number had declined to 6,766, a drop of 9 percent.
14
D11 11
z u by
'.JTER'JET ARCHIVE
)11gina1 f1 um
Ur-.t v:..~SITY OF ILL '-1015 AT
U:\BANA-CHAl'I. AIGN
120 • SEVEN STRA NDED COA L TOWNS
the number of persons born within the coal toW11s. More important,
the reproduction rate among the women who remained fell off noticeably between 1930 and 1939. In 1930 the ratio of children under 5
years of age to each 1,000 women aged 20- 44 in the 5 larger coal towns
was 443, exactly that required to hold the population size stationary
if local death rates were equal to the average United States rates.
By 1939, however, the reproduction ratio had fallen to 385 children
under 5 years of age per 1,000 women of childbearing age . Sh ould
reproduction persist at the decreased rate, the first full generation
maturing after the decline began would suffer a natural decrease of
13 percent. 16
PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE MIGRATION
The various local frictions which hinder migration from southern
I llinois would ordinarily tend to become stronger, rather than more
relaxed, as time passes. Emigration in the late 1920's was probably
made easier by the fact that one considerable part of the coal-town
population was made up of newcomers who had been settled only a
few years when unemployment first became serious in 1927. By
1939, however, even this last wave of settlers had lived for at least
20 years in the coal field, and the earlier wave had been settled for
upwards of 30 years. Now that the coal towns are no longer new
towns, mobility is not so easy. The aging of the unemployed workers
also decreases the chances of migration; if displaced hand loaders were
occupationally handicapped 10 years ago, their handicap h as been
multiplied now that they are 10 years older. Likewise, year after
year of continued depression would have reduced whatever reserve
resources the unemployed might-by some miracle of good management-have kept intact.
Above all, it is probable that those unemployed wh o had the greatest
likelihood of successful migration would have been the first to leave
the coal field, in a static depressed situation migration would naturally
be expected to decline over a period of time. If relatives in Chicago,
or a friend in Detroit, or a former employer in Moline were interested
in h elping a family leave southern Illinois, they would probably have
done so within the past 12 years, or not at all. Similarly, surplus
workers whose skills would be in demand elsewhere would be expected
to migrate shortly after their predicament became clear, or not at all.
Only two groups would appear to be an exception to this tendency:
those who may in the future be thrown out of work for the first time,
and unemployed youth coming of working age. As fo r the rest of the
distressed population, an unemployed coal miner's comment well
16 See Population Statistics, 1. National Data, National R esou rces Committee,
Washington, D. C., 1937, p. 50, for data on rep roduction ratios calculated to
maintain a stationary population without migration.
Digitized by
On1:,inal from
INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
MIGRATION • 1 21
describes their plight: "Everybody that wa able to get out left a long
time ago."
Putting together two facts-first, that emigration throughout more
than a decade of intense distress has not appreciably reduced the total
population of the coal towns, even though the early year of this period
coincided with the last years of
ation-wide "prosperity"; and
second, that emigration hereafter is likely to be more difficult than in
the past-we may infer that expected migration ,vill hardly solve the
problems of the south ern Illinois coal field, in the near futUl'e at least.
This judgment mu t of course be qualified to allow for a possible employment boom beyond the coal field. A ation-wide labor shortage
would assuredly draw off many of the youth and the surplus middleaged workers, and might indeed end unemployment in southern
Illinois.1' But pending such a development, the coal field's surplus
workers are in large part likely to stay where they are.
Over a long stretch of time, the readjustment of coal-field population
to economic opportunity is somewhat more probable. It is true that
at present births outnumber deaths in Franklin, Saline, and Williamon Counties and this relationship may be expected to continue for
some time to come. Since 1930, however, the birth rate ha fallen
sharply, and in several generations the resulting population decline
will have becom e appreciable. The continued emigration of youth
will make substantial inroads in population size over a period of time,
and will at the same time further reduce the number of births. In the
long run the problem might largely solve itself. But as J. M . Keynes
has said, "In the long run we shall all be dead."
17 Since this was written, there has been an increase in the emigratio n of young
southern Illinois workers to defense center . Meantime, however, the War
D epartment has announced plans to construct a huge ordnance plant near Herrin.
It is said that the plant will employ 6,000 workers by 1943. If the British experience mean anything, the opening of the e jobs will bring a large number of former
residents back to the coal field, where they "ill run con iderable risk of being
stranded again when the emergency has passed.
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URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
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URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
Chapter VI 11
RELIEF
DEPRESSED AREAS represent a tremendous los to the national
economy. I n terms of wasted man power, of clepres ed living standards, of bleak and hopele s liYes, the incalculable costs mount year
after year. There are al o not in ignificant cost in term of public
e:Kpencliture . The depre sion of the southern Illinoi coal field ha
lPd to an extraordinary expenditure for public a. i tance. For the past
4 year an aYerage of well over one-third of the entire population in
Franklin,, aline, and William on Countie ha been on the rolls of the
Yariou public-welfare programs, and twice the proportion rose to
one-half. Between 1933 and the middle of 1939 the cost of relief had
run to a sum equal to more than half the as essed valuation of the property in the coal field- mines. railroads, farms, and toWJ1 real estate
combin ed .
At the beginning of the depre sion the local coal-field communitie
attempted to meet their relief need on a purely local basi . But
before very many months had pa eel, relief cost had exhau ted all
the available re ource , both public and private, within the communitie ; and still the people were hungry. Some time later the tate
of Illinoi took over partial rcspon, ibility for meeting the coal' field'
relief needs; but it too wa prepared to carry no more than a small part
of the full burden, at least not without slighting the needy in other
section s of the State. An adequate recognition of the urgency and
extent of the relief problem in the coal countie came only with the
beginning of Federal aid . Today, with the Federal Government still
furni hing the greater part of the funds for relief in the stranded area,
the problem is of concern not only to the resident of the coal field
it elf, bu t to the country at large.
TRADITIONS IN LOCAL RELIEF
Franklin , Saline, and -William on Counties have been familiar with
both chronic and recurrent poverty from the earliest development of
123
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Llr q
t,'JIVE.R'>1TY OF LINOIS AT
uRtlANA C A"1PA r "J
124 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
the coal mines. In a commtlnity dominated so completely by a single
fluctuating and hazardous industry, the position of the working population was never secure. Strikes and suspensions at the mines have
been recunent, and the shadow of destitution during the long Rlumps
in the coal market·were an inescapable part of every miner's experience.
Mine accidents took a heavy toll in dead and injured each year, leaving widows and crippled workers without means of support. Even in
the best days of the coal boom, the regular quotas of the aged, wido\\" .
and the blind without families to support them wa a continuingproblem.
For nearly 30 year the responsibility for giving h elp to the unfortunate was distributed in the community according to a long-standing
tradition. The local unions, for example, took the m isfortunes of the
working m iners as their particular province. When a miner was
killed, other miners gave money to help his family, lrnowing well that
their own family might be the next to be strick en . Or if a miner was
sick or injmed, the union locals help ed him until he recovered . For
many years the heavy cost of mine accidents fell entirely upon the
locals, and even after the union forced an accident comp ensation law
through the Illinois Legislature, the miners were still called upon from
time to time to help other unfortunate miners. The job cf providing
relief during strikes was largely a responsibility of the locals, sometimes borne in part by contributions from the district and international
union. The locals were al o expected to contribute heavily to the
sentimental charities organized on occasion by the local booster
clubs; and they were the mainstay of the clriYes to raise money for
such special em ergencie as relief of ,·ictims of the tornado which
swept across the coal field in 1925.
The great absentee coal operators na turally took little interest in
these special difficulties of th e coal towns . Their attitude toward tlw
unemployment of miners had been clearly tated in 1914 when an
operator, in answer to a request from the Governor of Illinois that he
do something to "relieve the suffering" of the unemployed, announced :
"We are selling no coal and therefore to opera tc the mines would be a
dead loss. We can do nothing 1mtil . . . people begin to buy coal. "
In later year a few of the lo cal operators made somr effort to help a
dozen or so workers who were out of jobs, and a few would sometin1es
donate coal to the needy. But for all practical purposes, the operators
conLributed nothing excep t theis taxes .
The small businessmen in the community played an important but
freq uently forgotLen role in r elieving the strains of the predepression
era. Connected closely with the miners through family and personal
tirs and at the sam e time dependent upon the min ers' good will for
thc,ir trade, the little merchants were obligated to carry the miners
through recurrent shutdowns and stril~cs. When the mines reopened
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URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
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these debts were repaid-unless the miner in debt lost their job , in
which case the merchants, of course, lost heavily. Other bu inc men
confin ed their charity to passing out Christmas basket to" deserving"
fa milies, to donating coal, and to assisting in other tandard civic-club
activities.
Pauper-Relief Standards
T heor etically, townships and counties carried the responsibility for
the r est of th e community's relief need . The basic temporary relief
throughou t Illinois was township pauper relief, administered by an
elected official in each township. The philosophy behind tow11 hip
relief was that only the "worthy" deserved charity, and that even o,
help should never be given until a family wa utterly de titutc.
As elsewh er e in the United States, the able-bodied unemployed were
considered to be outside its scope. Township relief wa admini tercel
in such a way as to attach the maximum of shame and degradation
to th e recipients,1 so that families hesitated to "go on the town" until
they had sunk below the point of caring about local attitudes.
E xpenditures for town relief thus stayed at. a bare minimum.
The county governments carried on several relief activitie . A
county pauper fund, administered according to th(' same low standard
that governed town hip relief, was used to supplement the funds a...-ailable to the township supervisors. About the time of the World War
the three counties et up what appears to have been, all things conidered, a remarkably advanced system of aid to the blind, providing
$30 a month to recipients. A mothers' "pension" system, introduced
at about the same time, was upposed to take care of widows with
children, but the funds provided were so limited and the standards so
low that the system was not of great benefit. Some idea of how the
system operated may be gathered from the following 1927 report of
the W illiamson probation officer:
There has been a big demand for help from the [Mothers' Pension] Fund.
The larger number of these requestR haYe been from mothers who are
absolutely up against it. . . . During the past quarter there have been 20
appli cants for the pension; of this number it has been necessary to add 6 to
the list. . . . Of the number refused, 5 have been grandmothers . . .
The law states that the pension is for the natural mother. Three haYe been
rC'fused because of their characters. . . . The additional 6 were refused help
a they had ufficient income .
Conditions as a whole show the pen ioners are trying to overcome whateYcr
handicap they have been placed under. While the attitude of a few is not
the best, as a group they are appreciative. The probation officer regrets
that there have been a many addition neces ary as have been made.
In spite of its high-sounding name, the mothers' pension \\·a only
another form of pauper relief.
1 The law required that the nameo of all recipients should be published every
3 months.
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UNIVERSITY OF LLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
126 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
Finally. the rountie were respon ibie for maintaining the poor
farms. These primiti,e inc.titution "-ere designed ma.inly for the
care of the aged and disabled without families although it i5 on
rerord that at one time the aline County poor farm had inmates as
,oung as 14, while in 1Yilliamson Count, all applicant for pauper
~elief "-ere once sent to the poor farm. I\Uether under the care of
contractor.~ or of county employees. poor farm were an admitted
disgrace to the commllliit y-but a disgrace tha no one seemed particularly anx:iou to remo,-e. Indeed. whene,·er county officials
became alarmed o,er increasing deficits their first thought was to
cut down on the food allo"-ed the inmates at the poor farm.
The county upervi ors' records abound with such reports as these:
We ,·i ited aid poor farm July 1 and found the building in very bad
shape, doors broke, pla tering falling off, stair way po t broken out, brick
mi ,-ing in wall . Patients were in Yery good shape except one very old
gentleman . . . whose bed wa not as it should be--he being paralyzed,
the flies tormenting him almo t to death.
In 1 county the supen--isors disco,ered on an annual visit that 13
inmates were leeping in 1 room; whereupon i was recommend ed
that 'inmate that are sick and broken out with sores be removed
o real
and eparated from the other whose condition i better."
supervisors
the
later
Years
e,er.
ho"
impro,emen ts were ma<le
again became alarmed, declaring that" the condition of the buildings
on the County Farm . . . i ~uch that proper care cannot be given
. .. and is a di credit to the ritizens of thi County." B ut as late
as 1930 a State inspector reported finding:
. . . a good jail and a home for the dependent aged that is a disgrace to the
county. There i no plumbing in the building and no bathing facilities.
Heating and water gystem are both inadequate . . . no fire extinguisher
. . . bedding and mattre e- worn out . . . . In mate are given barely
enough food to exist on. In add ition, the food is of poor quality and
poorly prepared . . . . When one of the aged resident die he is buried on
the farm with n o marker for his grave. This might be e:qiected in an institution ~-here so little re pect is shown for the living.
Predepressio n standards of poor relief in the coal field were not
particularly high.
Predepressi on Re li ef Expend itures
It i not pos. ible to di co,er how much money was actually spent
for relief by the local unions in the predepre ion years, al hough it is
clear that the total must ban been con iderable. Dilling the 1927
strike alone the local pent at lea t '50 ,000 for "bean orders," and apparently their regular relief expenclitures over a period of time were
sizable. It i likewise difficult to learn much in detail about the
extent of pri,ate charity. It appear howP,er, to have been insignificant except for the charity represented by bad debts on grocers'
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ledgers. Pauper relief, aid to the blind, and mothe1 -' pen ions in
the town hips and countie , on the other hand. have left ufficient
record to permit rea onably reliable e timate- of their extent and
signifoance in the la t year of the 1920' (appendix tabh• 2 ).
Aid to the blind, which wa_ ad.mini tered according to relatively
high tandards 2 in the coal field makes a u eful ba. i3 tor judging
the full program of public a· i. tance provided by the three counties.
Ordinarily, aid to the blind hould be one of the lea t co·tly part of
a well-rounded program of public a istance, for the imple rea on
that the incidence of blindne- i low compared with the incidence
of economic difficultie . Between 1925 and 1929, h0\1·evcr, aid to
the blind made up an obviou ly di proportionate part of the total
a. si tance expenditure of the outLern Dlinoi town hip and counties; over the entire 5-year period payments to blind pen-ioners
amounted to 36 percent of all public-assistance co t . The blind
receiYed roughly double the relief granted to mother during the
period, and about three-fourth of the total co t of both the poor
farms and utdoor pauper relief.
Of com e the fu t part of thi period o.erlapped the la t years
of the coal boom, when the need for pauper relief wa- not ex raordinary.
But in the la t part of the 5-year period unemployment had become
increasingly severe in the coal field. During the e year the disproportion between aid to the blind and the other form of relief
a tually increased. In 1929, when the great coal depre ion in -outhern
Illinoi had reached an advanced tage, exactly half of the publica i tance expenditure went for aid to the blind, while the other half
was diYided among mother · aid, outdoor pauper relief. ,rn<l the poor
farm . The unemployed, in hort, were not provided for in the
phi.lo ophy that governed pauper relief; and a their number increa ed,
they were e:\--pected to look el where for a i tance.
Actually, the town hip and county official were clearly unable to
proYide unemployment relief, a ide from all con ideration of their
attitude toward as i tance. Even to carry on under the traditional
system became a more and more difficult ta k after 1927. By 1930
the com1tie were petitioning the tate to relieYe them of mothers'
pen ion and aid to the blind; when their reque t wa rejected, they
beO'an to pay recipient on the e program in more or le worthle
county warrant . In the face of the deepening er· i at the coal
mine , the local goYernment were utterly helple . During the
entire 5-year period, 1925-1929, the township and countie had been
hard pre ed to rai e 229.000 for pauper relief. Had they been
required to carry the co t of relief during the depres ion, they would
2 The word "relatively" bear empha i .
The Williamson upervisor in 1929
referred to the payment to blind pen ioner -$1 a day---as a "paltry sum";
and one could scarcely quarrel with this judgment.
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1
l-NIVE.R'i,TY OF LINOIS AT
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128 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
have had to raise more than 100 times this sum for the period
1933- 1937. The total amount spent for pauper aid from 1925 through
1929 would have lasted exactly 8 days at the peak of the relief load
in the coal field during the summer of 1938.
THE DARK DAYS
The history of relief in the coal field after 1929 follows, on an intensified cale, the well-known pattern that prevailed in nearly every
community in the United States, except that every difficulty was
multiplied many fold. For a period of about 4 years at the beginning
of the depression (1929 to 1933) , the unemployed in southern Illinois
had practically no real assistance from any quarter. The townships
and counties were paralyzed financially, and could extend only the
most meager assistance or none at all . In 193 1 the township tax
levies for the poor were either used up immediately (as in most of the
Saline townships where tax anticipation warrants were still salable)
or else yielded no return worth mentioning. The State of Illinois was
not prepared-on the basis of either philosophy or funds-to take upon
itself responsibilities that had been the special province of the smaller
governing units for nearly 100 years. The union locals at the abandoned mines had exhausted their treasuries within a few months after
the layoff, and were unable to give further aid to their members. Still
the p eople were being reduced to dire want, and something had to be
done.
Early in the crisis the coal towns attempted to m eet the needs of
t he unemployed with community chest drives. One town in Saline
County started a drive to r aise $8,000 late in 1930, announcing that
the greater part of the money collected would be used for direct relief
to the "deserving" needy. The money for this purpose was to be
raised by contribution of 1 day's pay from businessmen and the
active mine locals. Another Saline coal town had a more ingenious
plan:
[We] will raise a community fund by donations and by public events,
such as a charity basketball game between high school and alumni players,
and by· finding employment for all that can be placed in various industries.
In another town a community fund was started with money donated
by the union locals. In still another, the drive wa led by the Church
Benevolent Association, which collected money, clothes, and coal for
di tribution and started a woodyard in which relief workers were
o-iven the value of all wood sold. The Associated Charities in another
town opened a commissary in a vacant store for distributing clothes
and groceries to the unemployed.
The c organizations were hopelessly snowed under in a very short
time. The drive to collect 1 day's pay brought in about one-third
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
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of the quota in both 1930 and 1931, netting about $2,500 each year
for the care of 300 to 400 destitute families. The Associated Charities
in a second town had almost no mon ey at all; late in 1930 it had $26
to spread among 42 families, and it was eventually rPduced to paying
20 cents a week to families in extr aordinary need. After the failure
of its 1931 drive another town announced hopelessly:
The funds cannot be stretched to the necessary point. . . . After clo e
calculation the board decided the minimum it would take to provide for
the needy. . . . To date the board has one-fourth that amount . . . .
The board is at a loss to know what to do.
Early in 1931 the State of Illinois stepped into the relief picture
in an unusual way. The Governor of Illinois bad conceived the idea
of collecting unemployment-relief money by soliciting a day's pay
each month from all the employees on the State pay roll. In the
course of a year a total of $183,000 was raised in this manner for
distribution throughout the entire State of Illinois. Out of this sum
Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Counties were allotted $25,000 to
be distributed to the needy th.rough the various community funds in
the coal towns, and through the American L egion , the Knigh ts of
Columbus, the Elks, and other organizations specified by th e State
employees. But these reinforcements from outside the coal fielrl
were scarcely sufficient to allow the community funds to hold their
own; for as the depression deepen ed, contributions from the mine
locals and other groups within the coal towns dwindled rapidly.
The relief given out by the community funds usually stopped at
the city limits of the larger coal towns. In the smaller mine camps
and company towns a periodic dole of R ed Cross flom was practically the only r elief available, and these communitie quickly found
themselves in extremely desperate circumstances. The American
Society of Friends, after making a survey of these districts in 1931,
agreed to set up kitch ens at the semisural schools in order to provide
undernourished miners' children with a least one good meal a day.
Twelve Quaker school kitchens were opened in the outlying mine
towns in Williamson County and in a few months the program was
extended to Franklin and Saline Counties. Theoretically, the rest
of the n eeds in the semirural mining communities was supposed to
be carried by township pauper r elief, although everyone knew that
there was no pauper-r eli ef money.
In the early spring of 1932 relief committees tleseribed their predicament in these terms:
Franklin CountyPractically all local public and pri vate resources are exhausted .. .. The
contributions of State employees are nearly at an end . The inve tigation
indicates that help must be provided from outside the County in order to
provide a minimum of subsistence. . . .
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URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
1 30 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
alinc CountyThere are 13 townships in this County and distress is reported from
each one of them. Local resources in each township are practically exhausted. . . . Local agencies are bankrupt.
Williamson CountyThere is the possibility in three [out of 12] townships of raising a little
further money from township taxes. Voluntary funds in the County are
completely exhausted. . . . The American Friends Service Committee is
very anxious to withdraw . . . . The American Red Cross states that it
cannot continue supplying funds . . . . 3
The Illinois General Assembly eventually recognized that the
$200,000 a year provided by the Governor's semiofficial unemployment
fund was not adequate for the problem at hand. On February 6,
1932, the General Assembly set up the Illinois Emergency Relief
Commission and appropriated 20 million dollars for relief. 4 Of the
10 million dollars made available to the IERC at once, 96 percent was
allocated to Cook County . Six weeks later, after frantic telegrams
from the southern Illinois coal field, the IERC allocated funds for
2 months' needs to Franklin, Saline, and ,villiamson Countiesto the amount of $31,800. With this grant the IERC continued to
insist "strongly" that the counties and township should realize the
"necessity" for using local funds "both public and private" instead
of coming to the State for money. But the time had come when
this advice no longer had much meaning to the coal field. By the end
of 1932 th e townships were able to carry only 10 percent of the reliPf
cost, while private charity paid for 13 percent; the IERC carried the
rest. 5 During the following year the local contribution declined to
almost zero.
3 First
Interim Report, Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, Chicago,
April 15, 1932, pp. 14--15, 29-30, 33.
' See Glick, Frank Z., The Illinois Emergency Relief Con, mission, University of
·
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1940.
Glick gives an excellent account (p. 26) of the stormy sessions of the Assembly
during the weeks when the bill to create the IERC was under debate. At one
point in the House the bill failed to receh·e the two-th irds majorit,y necessary
to make the measure immed iate]~· effecti,·e. Where upon the Speaker of the
House "broke his own policy of not speaking to a measure," and said:
"There is grave danger now. The Federal GoYernment has a lready issued the
orders necessary to curb disorder if it arises. . . . The armories are under
guard now."
Later in the day the two-thirds majority was 11111 tered. Several do\Ynstate
members changed their \'Otes, with such statements as:
"There isn't going to be any blood on my hands tonight. I'm going to vote
for thi bill and sleep with a clear conscience. This i war. This is hell."
"If I am facing political death, let me d ie doing the right thing."
5 First Annual Report, Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, Chicago, 1933,
p. 128. In other downstate counties local contribution carried 61 percent of the
cost of unemployment relief in this period.
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RELIEF • 1 31
Even with State help-and with Federal R econstruction Finance
Corporation help shortly afterward-the local authorities were hardpressed to keep the relief system intact. After the first IERC grant
in April 1932, the Franklin County committees were still able to pay
families only $2 a week (in commodities), and in the town of Benton
relief families got $1.38. Standards in Williamson County were
apparently no better. In Saline, the county committee Kas able to
give the largest families $1.48 a week, and in May 1932 the expenditure was cut to 76 cents. In D ecember 1932 the three counties were
paying families on r elief as follows: Franklin County, $1.57 a week;
Saline County, $1.73 a week; and Williamson County, $1.67 a week. 6
By December 1933 the average weekly relief for families had risen to
only $2.74 . Not until the summer of 1934, with the beginning of the
Emergency Work R elief Program under the FERA, did the weekly
relief income of families rise as high as $5 p er week in the coal field.
How the unemployed sUl'vived the dark clays between the layoff and
the beginning of adequate relief in 1934 is something of a mystery.
The hardships of every American community dlll'ing this period are a
familiar story; in the coal field-where the depression started earlier
and ran a more virulent co urse- th ese hardships were multiplied manyfo ld .7 The Red Cross flour distribution and the Quakers' school-lunch
program, meager as they were, came to have tremendous importance
as a last bulwark against hunger. At a parochial school in 1 town,
undernourishment was so extreme that when a kitchen was opened to
provide 1 solid m eal a day, 150 children gained an average of nearly 2
pounds each within 1 month. The IERC warned in 1933 that the inadequate r elief prevailing throughout most of little Egypt "is bringing
on an increase in respiratory diseases and nervous conditions." The
Commission testified further that the eventual cost of medical care
for the undernolll'ished "will no doubt be many , many times greater
than the cost of sufficient food. " 8 In a survey of relief needs in Saline
County in l 933 it was discovered that at least 50 homeless men had
been sleeping in the open fields for months. In Franklin County
deaths from exposure and starvation were r eported. 9
6 Ibid., p. 55.
This was the period of the famous 1932 coal strike. The
strikers' relief needs placed a particularly heavy strain upon the inadequately
financed relief system in the coal field.
7 Frankl in County rep orted a higher rate of un employment in the 1930 Census
than any other county in the United States. Williamson and Saline Counties
were not far behind.
s First Annual Report, Illinois Emergency Relief Commission. p. 62.
• Walke r, Wilma, "Distress in a Southern Illinoi County," Th e Social Service
R eview, Vol. 5, No. 4, D ecember 1931, pp. 558-581. The author of this article
concluded: "One shudders . . . at the thought of [the coming] winter and no
food in a community where their own resou rces are ab olutely drained." Yet,
2 more years were to pass before adequate outside aid was provided.
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS A
URBANA-CHAMPAIC ';
1 3 2 • SEVEN STRA NDED COAL TOW NS
In the face of this predicament families adopted a variety of desp erate measures either to keep off relief (the stigma attached to "paupers"
wns still strong as late as 1934) or to supplement the relief they receind. The coal-Lown newspapers for the period reveal the community's constant preoccupation with the job of securing food" not delicacies," it was explained, "but hardy food such as flo ur and
beans." Defunct-mine locals busied them elves with setting up
commissaries and soup kitchens. stocked by small contributions from
the actiYe locals or with partly spoiled food collected about town.
Gardening, which had been somewhat neglected during the coal boom,
became one of the most important pursuits in the communities where
idle land wa available; and indeed, home-grown vegetables kept many
a family from going hungry . Several communities, reduced eventually to fornging for food, sent ex:pPditions to the farm districts north
of the coal field to beg something to eat.
These years of inadequate relief resulted not only in immediate
suffering, but also in the destruction of the last reserves of a large part
of the working population. l\finers who still had credit at the neigh borhood stores continued to run up bills as long as possible-with the
result that scores of little businessmen were wrecked by accumulated
bad debts, and credit ceased to exist. Even after the collapse of the
banks and building and loan associations, most of the families h ad a
few possessions which could be sacrificed in the emergency. Some
had houses to sell, money in the postal savings, automobiles, radios, or
a few odd pieces of furniture . Piece by piece this property disappeared. When their possessions were gone, the families started tigh tening their belts and foregoing the things they had always thought
of as necessities. "Doubling up" began, on houses, on parts of
houses, on electric lights, on water. Or the lights were disconnected
and the old kerosene lamps brought out, water wa shut off and leaky
wells put back into service. More often than not this retreat led at
last to the relief rolls, but only after the families had been pauperized.
The communities' relief needs after 1933 accordingly increased ou t
of proportion to the further increases in unemployment. Meanwhile, the coal field gradually settled down to the realization that th e
siege of unemployment would not be lifted for years to come. With
this realization, the old emergency-relief payments, designed to fill a
family's stomachs with beans and bread for a month or so, could no
longer be justified. The time had come for changes which both the
local community and the State itself were helpless to initiate.
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AFTER 1933
The story of relief in Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Counties
after 1933, traced in figmes 20, 21, and 22, is in brief a story of progressively increasing need and increasing case load.
Digitized by
Original from
INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
Fig . 20- PERSONS DEPENDENT ON
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN FRANKLIN, SALINE, AND WILLIAMSON COUNTIES
April 1933 - June 1939
;;:j
;c
Thousand
persons
Thou sa nd
persons
?
Cl
100
100
z.-
,., C
--1'
►t
;c=
(°)<
-i:
( Pe rsons dependent on CCC, rural rehobili-
80 > - - - - toti on, ond FSA grants ore excluded.)
<TI
- - - - + - -- - - - - - l -- - -- - - -+ - -- --- -- -1-- - -- -- -_J80
. Old-oge
1/.assistance
I
60
~
401
/B ffW5%9 '~%0
I 60
4'0
,f$
C:
Duplicot1on,
0'generol relief
lj, and WPA 120
.!'
c<
;cm
co ;c
~~c
20 ~
=r-:!"'
(") 0
0
I-n ~
)>
a·
:,:: .... 1
~~
G) -
..? l/1
'i
0
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
0
;o
ITI
r
i'ii
Chicago;
Source , Monthly Bulletin on Relief Stolistics, Ill inois Emergency Relief Commission,
Moy 1933- June 1939 ; Division of Statistics, I tlinois Work Pro jects Administration, Chicago;
Division,
Filth Illinois District, Notional Youth Administration, Herrin; Old Age Assistance
Illinois Deportment of Publ ic Welfare, Springfield.
"Tl
•
.....
WPA 3654
w
w
1 34 • SEVEN STRANDED COA L TOWNS
Extent of Dependency
The close of the era of the dole late in 1933 found about 25,000
persons dependent upon direct relief in the 3 counties (fig. 20). With
the initiation of the Civil Works Administration late in the year,
d ependent p ersons increased rapidly to 44,000. The CWA absorbed about as many n eedy workers from outside the directr elief rolls as from the rolls themselves; and wh en the CWA was
liquidated, a large numb er of newly assign ed CWA workers applied
for direct and work rclid on the FERA program. With Federal
aid upporting thc coal field 's relief system, the number of needy
persons under care in the 3 cotmties stood at the 40,000 mark in
June 1934, and the distress described in the preceding section was
considerably relieved.
The June 1934 relief loarl included more than onc-fomth of all th e
r esid ents of th e three eounties, 10 indicating a r elief problem of crisis
proportions. As time passed, dependency on relief in the coal field
rose steo,dily above Lhis mark. By Lhc end of 1935 every third
resid ent of the coal field was d ependent on publi as istance ; and late
in 1936 the proportion rose again, to 36 perccll t. In the summer of
1937 , with J ation-widc industrial production at thc high est point
since 1929, relief intensity in the coal field l'O$e to still another record .
A year later (July 1938), when the coal firld ' o sistance load reached
its greotest peak, 54 pc rccnt of the people in thc three counties were
dependent on eith er d ir ect relief, WPA, or old-age assistance for
their living (fig. 21).
Not only the r elief-load peaks, but the wintertime troughs 11 as well,
were rising throughout thi · p eriod. Th e lowest relief intensity in the
winter of 1933-34 was 18 pcrcent of the total population of the three
cou11ties, but the followin g winter the relief load did not fall below
24 percent. During thc next 3 years th e winter load rose steadily, so
that more than 30 percent of the population was still dependent on
public assistance at thc lowest point during the winter of 1937-38.
In the winter of 1938- 39 the proportion of Lhc total population dependent on public assistanc(• did not fall below 44 percent during any
month. Those who st ill requ ired aid at th e year's peak of mine
activity ha<l expanded over a period of 6 years to include a substantial
part of the entire popu lation of the coal fi eld.
The growth of the relief load in the tlu·ee counties after 1933 did not
r eflect immediate change in mine employment (although the number
10 In computing the population base, actual population change between 1930
and 1940 was distributed evenly throughout the decade.
11 The most active em ployment season in Franklin, Saline, and ViT
illiamson
Counties comes between Octo be r and March, when the demand for coal is greatest.
Mids ummer is the d ullest season .
D1g1t12Ar' by
NTERNET ARCH
vr:
0n tl".illfrom
UN'VER.SfTY or: IL INO 5 AT
UREW,A-CHAM?AIGN
E,
ON PUBLIC ASSIS TANCE * IN FRANK LIN, SALIN
Fig . 21 - PERCENT OF POPUL ATION DEPEN DENT
IS
ILLINO
AND WILLIA MSON COUNT IES AND IN
April 193 3 - June 1939
Percent
::..rn
"'
70
Percent
.
70
~I
-l "
►•
:,0 CT
Q'<
<
:
"
so
j'\-
\(' ·l ...,...../.-·--·\ ;l
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_ ___
Wdl1amson
-
-
·-ill
30
~~
20 I
<.~
;,: • m
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01 I
.~ v/
·1.-.·· -.. . \/
\_ .. _ .. _ .. _ .
...........Y
~
I:
40
1- ~
\
- - - - - - - 130
,...
If
I
I
. -.. . _ Frankli n_ .. -._
/'\._ .. _ /
\
,,
I
\
, .. __.,_.. , . _
'/ '°' Seline
-t . - . . . .
..
Stole of 11 lino,s
··, .. _ .. __ ..
··--.. - .. J
Jso
z
·.._."-,r ·-·
3 Counties
/ ..
..
\,
20
'
··-... .. - .. - ··
10
••• •T•
..-...-...-...""'
--
► . ,·
:s:..,_
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-
'-.
.,,,! _ !
'\::·::<~:~~:/
. . . . . . . .~.~_., ,•;;~:;;,/. :•";7:\/·. 1
C
60
.~.
- 1 - - - - - --+- - - - - 1- - - - - - - - t- -- - - -
501--- - - ----+-
~
/.
l I I
I
1 I
1933
I
I
1
1 I
I
I I I I I
1934
I
I It l I
I
I
1935
I
I
I
I
1936
.
* Persons dependent on CCC, rural rehobilitotion, ond FSA grants ore excluded
d.
Note: Population changes 1930-19 40 hove been distribute
Source: See fig . 20 .
1 I I
I
I I
I
I
I
1937
I I I
I
It
I
I
1938
I I I
I
t I I t
I
I
I I I 10
:;,:;,
IT1
C
1939
IT1
'T1
•
WPA 365B
w
V1
1 36 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
of working miners did decrease during this period) so much as the
~umulative effects of the slow exhaustion of the community's last
reserves. Between 1926 and 1932 the annual pay roll of the coal
mines fell 80 percent. Yet it was not until after 1933 that the relief
load began to shown an appreciable increase. Years of trying to live
on insufficient income h ad brought a large part of the population to
the threshold of relief, and th e least economic adversity-or even the
continued delay of "recovery"- brought a new quota of exhausted
and needy families to the relief rolls. Thus it was that 1933 and 1938
were both 8-million-dollar pay-roll years at the coftl mines; yet the
number of persons dependent on relief in 1938 was nearly triple the
number in 1933. The dark days of inadequate relief had sown a
harvest which subsequent assistance programs were to reap in full
measure. (See appendix table 29 and fig. 22.)
Fig. 22-ESTIMATED ANNUAL COAL-MINE PAY ROLL AND ANNUAL
EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN FRANKLIN~
SALINE, AND WILLIAMSON COUNTIES, 1925-1938
MIiiian
Million
dollors
dollars
45
45
40 -
35 -
-
40
D
~ Annual expend ilures for public assistance -
30 -
-
25 -
-
-
10
-
5
-
-
25
20
15
~
~
Sou rce
71
-
~
-
-
-
0
35
30
-
20 15
Estim ated coal-mine pay roll
~
~
~ ~
Appendix lable 2 9
-
10
- 5
0
WPA 3656
The money put into circulation by the public-assistance agencies
came to play an increasingly important role in holding the economic
life of the coal community together. As late as 1933 dwindling mine
pay rolls were still virtually the only primary source of wealth within
the coal field. By 1938, however , the public-assistance programs had
not only taken under care far more workers than were employed at the
mines, but were also paying into the community a sum nearly equal
to the annual mine pay roll itself. During 7 separate months in the
Digitized by
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INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
RELI EF • 1 37
summers of 1937 and 1938, public-assistance payments actuall:,exceeded mine pay rolls. The coal field had indeed become, by 1938,
a community with two industries instead of one; but the second
industry was relief.
Types o f Dependency and Assistance in the Coal Fields
T he relief population in Franklin, Saline, and Williamson CounLies
h as been made up of three principal types of dependents_ To begin
with, there are the so-called "nondepression" relief recipients_ The
growth of the southern Illinois relief rolls after the close of the GWA
led to the discovery of widespread chronic dependency for which no
public assistance had ever before been provided. During the early
months of 1934 Williamson County reported 659 cases (exclusive of
widows and the blind) on relief for reasons not directly related to the
depression-that is, for uch reasons a old age, chronic illness, mental
or physical handicaps. In the 3 counties combined there were 1,471
such cases. 12
Although these nondepression needs, once recognized, were great
enough to have swamped the old pauper-relief s_vstem, 13 they of course
accounted for only a small number of Lhe person receiving relief. In
Franklin County 13 percent of the 1934 relief load (exclusive of widows
and the blind) was dependent for "reasons other than unemployment";
and the Saline and Williamson rolls showed that 10 percent were
n ondepres ion cases. When old-age assistance under the Federal
Social Secur ity Act 14 was initiated in I llinois in 1936, it took under
care the majority of all persons 65 and over-one of the principal
nondepression dependent groups living in the coal field. In terms of
th e total public-assistance program, however, old-age assistance still
occupied a clistinct,ly minor place in Franklin, Saline, and William on
Counties. (See fig. 20, p. 133 .)
T wo different types of jobless relief dependents are indicated in
figure 20. Each summer, when the coal mines ordinarily slow dmvn
op eration for the seasonal slump, the number of persons receiving
12 ·Monthly Bulletin on Relief Statistics, Illinois Emergency Relief Commission,
Chicago, Vol. 1, Nos. 6 and 9, June and September, 1934.
In Williamson County, where the IERC conducted special research on the
relief rolls at this period, only 1 case out of about each 25 opened was "known to a
relie f agency" before 1930. But in two up-State counties "ith the same proportion of "nondepression" cases in the total load, every eleventh case had been
"known to a relief agency" before 1930. These figures are further evidence of
t h e backwardness of public assistance in the coal field before 1930.
1a The pauper funds provided by the townships and counties between 1925 and
1929 could have carried no more than one-sixth of the "nondepression" needy
who turned up after adequate relief became available in the coal field.
H Aid to the blind and aid to dependent children (mothers' pensions) in the
three counties are not administered under the Federal Social Security Act, but a re
still carried by the counties (1939).
C'1g1t1ze1
v
'NTa.{NErARC
•v1
Or Qll"ICU
Jn
UNIVfRS,TY OF ~LINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAll N
1 38 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
public assistance tends to rise sharply until the beginning of winter
activity reduces the rolls once more. In the summer of 1934, for
example, about 7,000 persons were added to the rolls between June
and August but had left the rolls by November. Although partly
obscured by the beginning of new assistance programs, the same tendency was noticeable in 1935 and 1936. It became particularly strilci.ng
in 1937 and 1938, when 11,000 to 14,000 newly dependent persons
remained on the rolls only for the duration of the summer slump.
R ecently the responsibility for meeting these strictly seasonal needs
was shifted in part from the regular direct- and work-relief systems
to th e Illinois unemployment-compensation program. Miners who
put in reasonably full time during the fall, winter, and spring, but who
were unemployed in the summer, became eligible for benefit payments
under this program on July 1, 1939, and were therefore ineligible for
work relief. About 1,500 workers in the 3 counties, practically all of
them miners, were transferred from the WP A rolls to unemployment
compensation during the first month of the n ew program, 15 and the
number of persons dependent on WPA was accordingly reduced by
about 5,000. In future summers unemploym ent compensation will
substantially flatten the seasonal peak in the coal fi eld's r elief load.
But r elief n eeds arising out of seasonal unemploym ent at the mines
were never a very large part of the total welfare problem , as figure 20
shows. In March 1937, the busiest month in the southern Illinois
coal industry for n early a decade, 47 ,000 persons were still dependent
upon public assistance in the 3 counties. The peak of mine activity
during the 1939 season left 66,000 persons dep endent on the welfare
programs. Except for a minority of p ersons in families without an
employable member, this stubbornly persistent r elief load is made up
of the able-bodied long unemployed, from both mine and service industries, and their dependents. The fundamental public-assistance problem in the three counties is thus not so much to provide for emergency,
temporary unemployment nor for the long-time welfare needs of the
helpless, as to create a substitute industry to employ workers cast off
by a rapidly changing industry. The basic and by far the most important type of public assistance in the stranded area is accordingly work
relief.
15 Seasonal unemployment was particularly serious in the summer of 1939.
Out of 9,500 men who had worked in the coal mines during the winter months,
about 9,000 filed claims for unemployment benefits in the first month of the new
program, according to the estimates of local unemployment compensation officials.
During the first benefit-year of Illinois unemployment compensation, workers
registered at the Harrisburg, Herrin, and West Frankfort offices were compensated for 67,705 weeks of un employment, and apparently their payments would
have amounted to between $500,000 and $750,000. See Illinois State Department of Labor, Division of Placement and Unemployment Com]Jensation, Illinois
Employment S ecurity Review, Springfield, Vol. 1, No. 1, Jul y 1940.
Digitized by
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Ong, 1al from
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAM >AIGN
,1 Sec11rity ddmi11ist.ratio11
(l!oth s t ein).
"Just
,vPA going on now."
)Iain Street, Cambria, Ill.
liqil zed by
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l~TfR"JET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHArJ.PAIGN
Digitized by
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UNIVERSl"TY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
RELIEF • 139
Work Relief
The inadequacy of the dole was not a theoretical question in southern Illinois. Three years of grocery-order relief, of 3oup kitchens and
hand-me-down clothing at the beginning of the depression had reduced
a large part of the unemployed to such poverty that active purchasing
power among the relief population had virtually disappeared. As a
result, scores of merchants became superfluous during the era of relief
in kind and were driven to the wall. Extended idleness among active
workers on the dole had taken its toll in demoralization as well as in
poverty. In the meantime, the program of public improvement in
the community had been halted and the existing social equipment had
fallen into disrepair for lack of necessary workers. The only immediate
solution for these critical problems was a broad drive to substitute
public jobs for idleness, a wage income for grocery orders.
The first broad program of work relief 16 came with the initiation of
the Federal-sponsored Civil Works Administration in November 1933.
Within a few weeks the CWA had put more than 6,500 unemployed
persons to work on public projects in the 3 counties, and CWA pay
checks-averaging about $15 a week in the coal field-gave many of
the un employed the first real money they had seen in years. When
the CWA was liquidated in April 1934, the job of providing work relief
was turned back to the State relief commission, operating under the
F ederal Emergency Work Relief Program. By the middle of the
summer of 1934 about one-third of the coal-field relief families with
employable members were assigned to work relief, and by winter the
proportion had risen to two-thirds. Unlike the CWA, the new workr elief program based its monthly wage on a relief budget, with certain
adjustments to allow for the purchase of food on the open market, for
transportation, etc. On this basis, the State program continued to
operate until stabilized work-relief machinery was established by the
WPA in October 1935.
The greater share of the coal field's employable needy were assigned
to the WPA by January 1936, and the program rapidly became one of
the principal sources of income and employment within the stranded
community. During the first 4 years of operation WPA provided jobs
for 7,000 to 15,000 unemployed workers and supported a total population of 23,000 to 55,000 persons. The WPA pay roll has varied from
4 million dollars to 6 million dollars a year. Operating on such a
scale, the program solved-in part at least-the graver relief problems
inherited from the early years of the depression. The poverty and
16 The able-bodied unemployed had long been required to "work out" their
township orders on the public roads but this system could scarcely be called work
relief. "There is the question," said a coal-town newspaper in 1932, "of how
much work a man could be expected to do for 76 cents worth of groceries a week."
Di( lliZt
by
NTERNET ARCHIVE
Original from
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
1_40 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
distress among the relief population was appreciably relieved. With
free buying power restored to the unemployed, local business revived;
and the store space left vacant during the era of the dole gradually
began to fill up. Idleness in good part disappeared. Finally, the
community was enabled to construct and to repair needed public
facilities.
The list of the WP A's physical accomplishments in the three counties is an impressive record in itself. It shows, for example, that
WP A workers had improved 1,311 miles of rural roads and 459 miles
of coal-town streets up to June 1939 (not counting projects begun
but not yet completed). For thousands of rural inhabitants of the
community, the road program meant accessibility to town and school
over all-weather roads for the first time since the countryside was
settled a hundred years ago; for town residents it opened up scores of
miles of needed streets which had never before been usable in winter
weather. In Williamson County WPA workers helped to build three
huge storage dams, enabling the community to develop its first public
recreation site and to make its first real attack upon the perennial
problem of disastrous summertime water shortages. The list of
completed projects includes among other items such work as the construction of 3 playgrounds, a swimming pool, 2 community buildings,
5 parks, 2 athletic fields, and 5 schools ; the improvement of 2 libraries,
2 gymnasiums, 4 pal'ks, and 46 school buildings; the complete
renovation of 2 courthouses; the construction and repair of 112 miles
of ditches for draining malarial marshes, 6 miles of sewers, and 15
miles of water mains. As a first step toward combating the high
incidence of typhoid fever in the coal field, the WP A launch ed an
extensive program of sanitary engineering.
The professional and service activities of the WPA have also been
of great value to the stranded community. The women on the sewing
and canning projects, for example, have produced a large quantity of
clothing and food for distribution to relief families. Th e WPA schoollunch proj ects have more than ordinary importance in helping undei'nourished children, and the existence of the home-nursing program to
aid the sick and disabled has meant the prevention of needless suffering among hundreds of unfortunate families. White-collar WPA
workers have carried through a complete accounting of delinquent
taxes in the three counties and t hus collected the first facts about one
of the coal field's most serious problems. The WP A recreation centers
established in nearly all the coal towns have provided the only available diversion for thousands of persons from both employed and unemployed families.
All these projects, plus those conducted by the National Youth
Administration, have utilized otherwise idle labor to bring solid benefits to the people of the community. Some, like the sewing projects
Digitized by
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INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
RELIEF • 141
and the home-nursing program, have helped to alleviate immediate
distress. Proj ects like Crab Orchard Dam and the JYA student-aid
program have provided a basis for future attempts to eliminate chronic
unemployment in the stranded area. But most of all, the WPA ha
improved the community-through roads, schools, parks, recreation,
drainage systems, sewage systems, water systems-and made the
southern Illinois coal field a more modern, healthful, and pleasant
place to live in.
Digitiz"d by
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INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
Digitized by
INTERNET ARCHIVE
Original from
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
Chapter IX
CONCLUSIONS
FRANKLIN, SALINE, and Williamson Counties are a small part of
the total problem of depressed areas in the United States. The
introduction of the report pointed out that the southern lliinois coal
fi eld is only 1 among a large number of separate depressed areas
existing before the national defense program was initiated; and that
while the 3 southern lliinois counties contain 140,000 people, all the
depressed areas combined have a population of about 13 million.
However important the story of southern Illinois may be, it is less
significant in itself than as an instance of the larger problem.
RECENT PUBLIC POLICY
The experience of the southern lliinois coal field suggests that
attempts to solve the problems of all the depressed areas on a purely
local basis are foredoomed. The interplay of
ation-wide forces
cr eated the depressed areas, and neither subsistence farming, handicraft industry, locally initiated "land-a-factory" drives, nor ingenious
" make-your-own-job" schemes can basically alter their situation.
One can scarcely avoid the conclusion that a national approach offers
the only hop e for a solution. In Great Britain this conclusion is
accepted, but in the United States it is not.
American Policy
T h e United States has never attempted a broad and deliberate
approach to the highly specialized problems of the depres ed areas.
In the distressed agricultural areas, it is true, a great deal of valuable
reconstruction work has been done through the encouragement of
scientific farm practices, through the soil-conservation and ruralelectrification programs; in the T ennessee Valley the e programs
blanket a large and important region. At times an effort has even
been made to r emove farm families from hopelessly poor soil; the
143
liq1t12ed by
IJ\JTFRJIJFT AR,"HIVE
C,ri 111;:i.l
'ron,
JNIVE~SITY 0• IL IJIJ01S AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
144 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
Farm Security Administration, for example, has recently moved
several hundred tranded families from submarginal land in the
Cookson Hills of eastern Oklahoma. These programs are only the
beginnings of an approach to the total problem of distressed farm
communities. As for the nonagricultural depressed areas, their very
eA'istence as a special problem has received very little official recognition. With a few isolated exceptions,1 they have been covered by
tlie same measures-both emergency and long-term-devised to deal
with the altogether different unemployment problems of less disrupted
areas . Officially, no great distinction is made between the unemployed coal miner in Herrin and the unemployed automobile worker
in Detroit.
The Work Programs
In terms of immediate problems, it is true, no distinction is called
for. The work programs, by far the most important of the over-all
relief measures, have properly placed first emphasis upon the relief
of distress and the performance of socially useful work; upon the
prevention of suffering, and at the same time, the preservation of the
morale and skills of the unemployed. This emphasis obviously
applies no less reasonably to depressed areas than to the rest of the
Nation. The first two jobs of the work programs in depressed areas
have necessarily been to feed and cloth e millions of destitute people
and to prevent deterioration of work habits. This fact must always
be kept foremost in mind.
Beyond these two immediate purposes, the work programs have on
record other substantial benefits to the depressed areas. Through
the creation of purchasing power, they have rescued the communities'
trade and service industries. They have made possible long-needed
local improvements which many a bankrupt depressed area would
otherwise never have enjoyed. They have also completed a numb er
of projects designed to aid in rebuilding a community's economic
base. The program to salvage Key West by turning it into a winter
resort is perhaps the most famo us of these, and there have been
scores of projects designed to provide a depressed community with
power, better transportation, and the like, in th e expectation that
new supporting industries would then be attracted. The Crab
1 The principal exception was a small-scale experiment in "government communities" admin istered under the FERA, the Division of Subsistence Homesteads of the Department of the Interior, and the Resettlement Administration.
In 1935 there were about 7,000 persons living in 41 of the communities. Originally the experiment aimed at enticement of factories into nonagricultural derelict
areas, but eventually it narrowed down to a program emphasizing adequate
housing and part-time farming for industrial workers.
Incidentally, it was planned to build one of these communities at West Frankfort. Ill., but the plans never materialized.
Digitized by
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
CONCLUSIONS • 145
Orchard Lake project in the south ern Illinois coal field was planned
with a like purpose.
But with all these accomplishments, there are still serious difficulties
involved in the application of the general administrative rules of the
work programs to th e peculiar problems of the depressed areas. The
work programs operate, for example, within the concept of modified
local responsibility. A community in need of a Federal work project
is presumed to be solvent, at least to the extent of contributing, as
sponsor, a fair share toward the total project cost . In a depressed
community this theory breaks down. By 1940 score upon score of
depressed and bankrupt American communities were finding increasing difficulty in making the required sponsors' contributions for
urgently needed work-program projects.
The pTinciple of "legal residence" grows out of the same concept.
The work programs delegate to each local community the selection
of persons eligible for employment. Almost universally, the local
community r equires a person to prove that he is a "resident" of the
community before h e is cer tified for employment. This procedure
tends to freeze "surplus" workers within the depressed areas. 2 Unemployed workers who might readily b e absorbed into a more active labor
market have no way of r eaching it, since their right to work-program
employment and all other public assistance stops automatically if they
leave home. And those who do take the chance are promptly sent
home again, "where they belong," if their migration is not successful.
The work programs also operate within the limitations of a shorttime, emergency perspective-necessarily so, in view of their shortterm appropriations. 3 This perspective makes it difficult for the
work programs to pursue a broadly planned approach to the problems
of the depressed areas. Careful consideration cannot always be
given to such significant long-time needs as retraining the unemployed from obsolete trades or assisting migration from communities
which can n ever be revived. Projects are confined largely to building
roads, schools, and other social equipment which, though needed,
can never in themselves relieve the basic economic plight of the
distressed communities. Even when there are more basic projects2 It is sometimes said that public assistance itself freezes a "surplus" population.
This is a somewhat loose way of expressing two entirely different ideas : (1) that
legal residence req uirem ents, associated with public as istance but not necessarily
essential to it, tend to prevent mobility; and (2) that if public as istance is stopped,
needy famil ies will often be driven in desperation to set out upon the road in search
of food and shelter.
3 One manifestation of this emergency point of view is the so-called "IS-months
r ule," which requires that WPA workers be terminated (with certain exceptions)
after 18 months of continuous employment on the program. Whatever effects
this ruling may have generally, it obviously works the greatest hardsh ip upon the
unemployed in depressed areas.
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146 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
such as those of the Key West reconstruction program-the approach
is sometimes piecemeal and indirect, leaving the desired r esults to be
hoped for rather than assured.
British Policy
4
More than a decade ago the government of Great Britain first
recognized the special nature of the problem of the depressed areas;
and between 1928 and the beginning of the war in 1939 it administered
special measures for their relief. Although the analogy between
5
British and American depressed areas must not be pressed too far,
the history of the British programs does provide certain experience
applicable to America. Their failures are particularly revealing.
Transference
The British measures have provided for two separate attacks on
unemployment in the depressed areas. 6 In 1928 the government initiated the first of these, called "industrial transference," a program
for encouraging and assisting migration from the depressed areas to
the places where unemployment was less severe. This approach was
based on the belief that concentrated unemployment is a "worse evil"
than the same amount of unemployment distributed evenly through out the country. 7 In addition, it was believed that an "unsatisfied
4 See Dennison, S. R., The Location of Industry and the Depressed Areas, London:
Oxford University Press, 1939; Goodrich, Carter and Others, l'vligration and
Economic Opportunity, Philadelphia, 1936, pp. 565 ff; Greene, Lee S., "State
Policy in the British Depressed Areas," Social Forces, Vol. 18, o. 3, March 1940,
pp. 558-581; annual reports of the Commissioner for the Special Area in England
and Wales, London, 1935-1938; annual reports of the Commissioner for the
Special Areas in Scotland, Edinburgh, 1935-1938; l\Jinutes of Evidence Taken Before
the Royal Commission on the Geographical Distribution of the Industrial Population,
London, 1938, pp. 237 ff.
5 There is no close British analogy for either the extremely isolated American
depressed areas or for our depressed agricultural areas. But the British experience in depressed coal-mining regions, for example, is obviously pertinent.
6 We leave out of account the interesting checkered career of public works in the
British depressed areas. From 1925 to 1928 the British Government made grants
to the stricken communities for the purpose of public works within the areas.
Some question was raised, however, about the propriety of building up the social
amenities of communities whose future was uncertain. In 1929 emphasis was
accordingly shifted to schemes for employing depressed-area workers to build
public works in prosperou areas. In 1931 the public works program was largely
abandoned. With the pa sage of the Special Areas Act in 1934, public works
schemes were again initiated in the depressed areas, with particular s(,ress laid
upon housing and those public works related to sanitation and public health.
See Greene, op. cit., p. 342.
7
Sir William Beveridge expressed this point of view as follows: "From a national
point of view a condition of 40 percent of unemployment in one district and 4
percent in another calls for redress rather than argument." Quoted in Goodrich,
op. cit., p. 590.
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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
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CONCLUSIONS • 1 4 7
demand" for labor actually exi ted in the more active area , and that
adequate labor mobility would not occur automaticallv. 8
Even in relatively good times the transference progra~ encountered
great difficulties. Immobilizing forces were not easy to overcome,
even with pa_yment of moving e::\.l)enses and the offer of job in the new
location. Parents were reluctant to see their children go away.
P er ons with property refu ed to leave it. Homesickne wa a
major ob tacle to succe ful tran ference. As for the job proYided
in the tran ference cheme, one can carcely conclude that thc-r were
o-enerally atisfactory when nearly half the youth, and mor; than
one-third of all the tran ferred workers, eventually came home again
to the depressed areas. After 1931 , as general unemployment pread
through the more prospcrou ections of England, there was a new
problem: the "receiving area " raised such strenuous objection to
tran fercnce that the tempo of the program was lowed down (though
by no means halted ) for several years. 9 But over the cour e of a
ome
decade ome headway was made. B etween 1927 and 193
one hundred thousand worker were permanently tran ferred to
localitie outside the depre eel areas, so that the program did produce
a minor reshuffling of th population.
Inducements for Investors
The sc ond method of attack on depressed-area unemployment was
encouragement of private indu trial e::\.l)ansion within the areas
themselve . In 1934 Parliament approved the Special Arca Denlopment and Improvement Act, empowering two pecial Areas Commi ion er to initiate tep for reviving elected depre eel communitie in
South Wales (coal), the Tyneside (coal), Durham (coal), Cumberland
(coal and hipbuilding), and outhwe t cotland ( hipbuilding and
heavy indu try). 10 Th e Commi ionerswere to publicize the industrial
In 192 thi argument ran as follow : "The existence of local unemployment
doe not make it unnece ary or uneconomic to bring in labour from other areas.
It is quite normal to find imultaneou ly in the same area unemployment and an
unsatisfied demand for labour . . . In districts where the level of unemployment i low, tho e who remain unemployed may be of less than the average employment value . . . " Report, Indu trial Transference Board, 192 , p. 19. Quoted
by D enni on, op. cit., p. 171.
9 "There are cases where the local authorities and everybody else regard it
[transference] as a menace. For example, when Luton had it great infllL".: of
labour it began to put up danger notice and to advertise that it did not want people
coming in at that pace becau e it did not know what was going to happen. There
are prosperou areas, selfi h area , which have set their face against the introduction of labour even though they could very well have upported additional labour.
It is not always an ea y thing to bring them in." Jlinules of Evidence Taken
B efore the Royal Commi·ssion on the Geographi cal Distribution of the Industrial
Population, p. 262.
10 Numerous derelict areas were omitted out of consideration for administrative
difficulties.
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opportunitie of the areas and to interc t prospective investors by
means of "appeal and persuasion." They were to set up "trading
estates," i. e., groups of factory buildings for lease to manufacturers,
and to improve the industrial facilities of the areas by making light,
heat, and power available for industry. In 1936 provision ~as made
for supplying capital loans to investors; and in 1937 the act was
amended to permit the Commissioners to offer also small subsidies in
the form of tax exemptions, rent payments, and the like.
Almost total failure greeted the Commissioners' initial attempts
to caITJ out the purposes of the act through "appeal and persuasion."
Shortly after the 1934 act was approved, one of the Commissioners
circularized 5,829 firms asking whether they were prepared to consider
establishing plants in the special areas. Three-fourths did not
reply; 1,313 gave "an unqualified negative answer," and only 12
stated that they were prepared "to consider" the question. The
Commissioners soon concluded that "there is little prospect of the
special areas being assisted by the spontaneous action of industrialists
now located outside," and they urged the provision of such real inducements as were made available in 1936 and 1937 .11
A new set of problems arose when the Commissioners were finally
empowered to offer concrete inducements to new industry. Not that
inducements failed to bring forth many willing investors; indeed,
"the demand" for them, it was observed, "far exceeds the supply."
One difficulty was that the sum of money ma1e available for inducements was small, 12 and the number of new jobs th us created could not
diminish unemployment appreciably. But small-scale as the program
was, it nevertheless aroused immediate opposition from competing
unsubsidized manufacturers in both the prosperous and the depressed
areas. This opposition forced the Special Areas Commissioners to
restrict the offer of inducements to "noncompeting" industries only,
and in turn prevented the expansion of the program beyond laboratoryexperiment proportions. The Commissioners were struggling with
this dilemma when the war began in September 1939.
TH E HEART OF THE PROBLEM
Whatever small benefits the two British depres ed-area measures
may have achieved, they had hardly scratched the surface of the total
problem by the beginning of the war. Both the transference and
inducement programs, it must be remembered, operated mainly in a
period of general depression. It is easy to imagine that subsidized
Dennison, op. cit., p. 165.
Between 1937 and 1939 total commitments for tax exemptions, rent payments, and the like amounted to about $750,000. Capital Rum. loaned amounted
to 7¾ million dollars in the Government venture, plus 10 million dollars through
the private Nuffield Trust.
11
12
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CONCLUSIONS • 149
new industry could revive the dcpre ed areas, or that their unemployment could be dis olYed by finding job for the tranded workers
in another area. But when industry is contracting everywhere, and
when every community, even the most prosperous, ha a labor surplus,
these schemes are little more than an elaborate sy tern for robbing
Peter to pay Paul. The general problem of the deprc cd areas is
finally insoluble in the midst of a ation-wide depre ion.
In better times the eriou ne s of the depre sed-area problem will,
of coUI e, diminish, but there i little chance that it will automatically
dis olve. Characteristically, the depressed areas were no more able
to attract new industry dw-inO' the years before the depre ion set in
than afterward. A new era of industrial expan ion will likewise pass
many of them by. 13 Spontaneous migration has also tmned out to
be an unreliable solvent for pockets of smplus labor, even in good
times. The southern Illinois coal field was accumulating a "redundant
population" all through the la t half of the 1920's, a period when the
conditions for spontaneous emigration were presumably ideal. In the
futme, stranded workers will probably experience increa ing difficulty
in finding job opportunitie cl ewhcre; for a decade of inten e depression has put new handicap in the way of succe fol emigration from
th e depre ed area .
The Depressed Areas in the National Defense Program
When more active ti.mes arrive, therefore, careful con ideration is
due the special plans devised to aid the depressed area's victims,
eith er through encomagement of industrial expansion in the depre sed
area or by "guided migration" of smplus worker toward the active
area . The conditions nece ary for the operation of both plan will
probably come into existence in the evolution of the national defense
program; and it is to be expected that each plan will then have it
own enthu iastic advocate . It should be recognized, however, that
neither plan can be put into action without involving hidden dangers.
The Two Special Plans: What They Involve
Theoretically, the more desirable plan would be encomagement of
industrial e:\.'J)ansion in ide the depressed area . If the propo ed
industrie were to be permanent, or if they should offer a rea onable
chance of post-emergency conver ion into permanent indu trie on a
sound economic basi , thi ort of program could indeed be recommended without reservation. It i not likely, however, that any great
13 ome of the depressed are
ha,·e traditionally been di advantaged by competition with low-wage, nonunion areas. In any future period of indu trial expansion, thi disadvantage will have been dimini hed by the operation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the National Labor Relations Act.
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part of the new defense industries will be either permanent or convertible. If not, the policy of locating them inside the depressed areas,
despite obvious immediate advantages, would eventually bring new
difficulties. Such a policy would bring "home" again a large number
of workers who had already left the areas. It would also hold within
the areas workers who might otherwise have willingly moved to jobs
elsewhere. The temporary boom would thus end with the problems
of the depressed areas multiplied.
Guided migration, the alternative plan, also appears to offer limited
possibilities for betterment of the depressed areas-or rather, of the
people now living in the depressed areas-particu larly those living in
areas where industrial expansion is clearly out of the question. The
predicament of the southern Illinois labor force suggests that such a
plan would involve a minimum of four steps: a training program for
both inexperienced youth and "obsolete" older workers; a system for
allocating jobs in the prosperous areas to applicants from the depressed areas; provision of travel money to enable entire families to
move to the new jobs; and a waiver of legal-settleme nt r egulations to
prevent the forced return of families to the depressed areas if they
should need relief at their new residence.
There are two main objections to this type of program. One of
them, originating within the depressed areas themselves, stresses the
aftereffects of large-scale migration from a community: the younger
workers are drained away; social patterns are disturbed; established
property values decline; local businessmen lose trade; the taxing power
of the community deteriorates; excess labor supplies, held in reserve
for seasonal work, are lost. It seems obvious, however, that such
objections would be of little weight if set against the successful resettlement of othe1wise surplus workers.
The second and more serious objection is that a guided-migrati on
program endangers labor standards in the receiving areas. It is
pointed out, for example, that the scheme for "guiding" form workers
from the depressed areas of eastern Oklahoma into the Southwest
contributed a substantial part toward the difficulties that developed
among California and Arizona migratory workers in the late 1930's.14
Unless carefully administered, such a scheme could always be abused
by employers who would be tempted to recruit workers indiscriminately as a source of ch eap labor. The only answer to this objection
is that a guided migration must presuppose the existence of actual,
bona fide shortages, and that the plan must be held in abeyance when no
labor shortages exist.
14 See Brown, Malcolm and Cassmore, Orin, Migratory Cotton Pickers in Arizona,
Dh·i ion of Research, Works Progress Administration, Washington, D. C., 1939,
pp. 68- 75.
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CONCLUSIONS • 151
Long-Time Prob lems
Whatever temporary effects the national defense program might
h ave upon the depressed areas-with or without the administration
of the two special plans-defense activity will not likely result in the
permanent solution of the depressed-area problem. Moreover, the
depressed areas will likely b e the last to benefit from defense activity. 16
T hus, questions relating to public assistance, local improvement of
depressed areas, and migration are certain to recur.
Public Assistance
Until the depressed areas are permanently dissolved-that is,
presumably for a long time yet to come-their population will continue
to require extraordinary amounts of public assistance. One may
judge from the predicament of the unemployed in southern Illinois
what consequences would follow if this need were neglected. Since
the problem is basically one of a great and long-accumulating surplus
of highly employable workers, the responsibility for meeting their
need falls principally upon the Work Projects Administration. But
the areas place extra responsibilities upon all the other public-assistance
programs as well.
A double-edged assistance problem is rapidly coming to maturity
in the depressed areas. On the one hand, exceptional need persists,
or is at best only temporarily relieved . But the ability of the
depressed communities to keep up their end of relief costs is progressively weakened. If a general deterioration of depressed-area assistance i to be avoided, those States which have not already done so
should make provision for assuming an increasing share of publicassistance costs which cannot be met by bankrupt local communities.
And where the State itself is unable to assist the people of its depressed
areas, increased Federal respon ibility should be anticipated.
Local Imp rovements
T here is a common feeling that the construction of roads, schools,
recreational and social facilities, and similar local improvements in
the depressed areas is somehow wasteful. "Why build up a doomed
community?" it is asked. "The improvements will be worthless when
15 Among the defense contracts signed by the Government between June 1940
and January 1941 only 1½ percent directly involved the depre ed areas. Their
''average share," in terms of population, would have been seven times greater.
Moreover, the contracts they had received were concentrated in a very fe"·
counties. Three counties held 46 percent of all the depre sed-area defense
contracts; 15 other countie. held an additional 41 percent; and 40 other counties
h eld the rest. About 450 of the dep ressed counties had no primary defense
contracts whatever.
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the people move away." And true enough, there are within the
depressed areas many hopelessly derelict communities where extensive
local improvement would simply be time and money wasted. By and
large, however, this point of view dangerously oversimplifies the
predicament of the depressed areas.
It is quite incorrect to assume that a large emigration from the
depressed areas is necessarily in prospect; slow population losses and
depopulation are two entirely different things. The southern Illinois
coal field and many another American depressed area are going to be
well populated for generations to come. It thus appears to be somewhat unreasonable to expect that the depressed-area population
should forego the use of needed local improvements for an indefinitely
long time.
Regional Conservation and Development
In some American depressed areas economic development has been
held in check by past failure to develop some potential advantages.
In some-notably in the agricultural and lumbering areas-economic
collapse has inevitably followed in the wake of wasteful exploitation
of resources. It goes without saying that where such conditions
exist, public policy should aid in recovering and developing the
missing factors.
The reforestation and soil-conservation programs, the projects for
converting depressed areas into recreation centers, and the great
power developments like the T ennessee Valley Authority have had
such a purpose. Their proved achievement shows the possibilities
of this type of approach to the problems of similar areas. There is
merit, for example, in the suggestion that a "little TVA" be developed
in southern Illinois, based upon low-cost power derived from coal.
Obviously, however , such schemes should not be expected to produce
substantial, permanent results overnight.
Spontaneous lvfigration
"Unguided" migration is continually draining a small part of the
population away from the depressed areas. It is, of course, true, as
this report has pointed out at some length, that during the 1930's
people were not leaving the depressed areas fast enough to keep pace
with local economic disintegration , nor even to cancel the local excess
of births over deaths in most of the areas. But except for a few areas,
people did move cut in sufficient numbers at least to offset the influx
of newcomers. And in Great Britain at the height of the transference
program, spontaneous migration was quietly removing two workers
from the depressed areas for every worker removed by the elaborate
transference machinery.
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Without this small spontaneous movement, the depressed-area
problem in America at the end of the 1930's would have been somewhat more grave than it actually was. In the southern Illinois coal
field, for example, one would have expected to find half the workers
unemployed in 1939, supposing no emigration between 1930 and 1939,
instead of the 41 percent actually reported. There eems to be little
doubt, further, that this spontaneous movement is ucces fully
terminated in the great majority of cases; indeed, spontaneous migration usually will not go forward (except in special situations)
without good chances for succes ful termination-hence it low
pace.
It follows that barriers and friction which unnecessarily retard the
slow, free migration of workers from the depressed areas are likely to
operate against the public interest. Such immobilizing force are
many and diverse, and they range from border blockades and the more
harsh legal-settlement laws to the failure of bankrupt lo cal communities to provide their youth with an average level of training. To
eliminate the existing barriers wherever possible and, more important
still, to prevent the establishment of new ones would appear to be
about as fruitful an attack on the depressed-area problems a the
most alert and complex "guided-migration" scheme.
This does not mean that spontaneous migration from the depre sed
areas is always good in itself. The greatest mischief is done when
people are forced to migrate "spontaneously" without good chances
for successful resettlement, even though their home communities may
be utterly derelict. Migrations growing out of inadequate public
assistance, in·esponsible labor recruiting, and the like are a serious
national problem. The mass hardships of one such recent migration
have already fired the public's indignation. Similar incidents are
always latent in neglected depressed-area situations .
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Appendixes
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Appendix
A
TABLES
Table 1.-Number of Shipping Coal Mine s Opened, Abandon ed , and in Operation in
Fran klin, Sal in e, and Williamson Counties, 1900--1939
Year
Mines
open ed
Mines
abandoned
Mines in
Mines
opened
Year
operation
1900 ..... .... .. .
1901.. ......... .
1902 .......... . .
1903........... .
1904 . .. .. . ..... .
2
5
5
7
10
2
2
1
4
1905 .......... . .
1906.......... . .
1907 ... . .... . . . .
1908...... . ... . .
1909 .. . ....... . .
5
11
12
10
4
2
2
2
2
2
1910 ........ .. .
1911. ........ .. .
1912. .......... .
1913. .......... .
1914 .......... . .
2
5
3
5
3
2
3
4
2
5
66
69
69
70
1915 .......... . .
1916. . ........ . .
1917 ... , .. ... . . .
1918 ····· ···· ··
1919 . .... . .... . .
I
3
6
16
4
2
3
4
3
14
17
Mines
aba nd oned
Mines in
operation
1920..... . ......
1921.. ..... . ....
1922 ............
1923. ...... . ....
1924 ..... . ......
9
IO
5
5
5
4
3
3
13
17
93
99
101
103
95
1925. . . . .. . ... ..
1926. .... . . . . . ..
1927 .. . .........
1928 .. ..... . . . . .
1929 . .. .. . ......
2
2
2
2
1
11
I
14
6
9
80
7J
2
2
1
2
4
2
5
3
5
5
48
71
1930 ····· · · ··• ·
1931.. .. . . ......
1932 ... .. . ......
1933 .... -- ----1934 -- - . - - - - -
67
70
74
87
87
1935.
1936. ... . .......
1937-. . . .. .... . .
1938. .... . ......
1939. . . .. . ......
5
6
5
42
5
5
3
4
43
38
36
35
20
26
32
37
46
5G
64
66
~
3
2
72
60
55
48
44
43
42
Source: Illinois D epartme nt of Mines a nd Minerals, Coal Report of nlinois, a nnu a l, Sp r ingfield , 1900-1939.
Table 2.-Men Employed at Shipping Coal M ines in Frankl in, Saline, and Williamson
Counties, 1900--1940 1
M en employe d
Y ear
Total
1900 ..... ............. .. ..................... .
1901 ...........•...................... ... .....
1002........ . ....... . ... • .........•... ........
1903 ....... . .......................... ....... .
1904. ....... . ...... ... ........ ...... .. ....... .
I, 548
2,206
2,635
3,292
3,789
1905 .. .. .... ·•····· ....•.. · .. . .. · · · .. · · · · · · · ..
1906 . . .............. . .•••....... . ........... ..
1907 ............................ . ............ .
1908 .......... . ...................... ........ .
1009 ..................... . .. . .. . .. . ... ... . . .. .
6,685
8, 968
II, 621
13, 428
5, 119
F rank lin
413
696
I, 342
I, 918
2,732
W illiamson
Saline
182
203
249
424
321
1,366
2,003
2, 386
2,868
3,468
396
984
2,069
3, 427
4,066
4,310
5,005
5,557
6,276
6, 630
See footnote at end of table.
157
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158 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
Table 2.-Men Employed at Shipping Coal Mines in Franklin , Saline, and Williamson
Counties, 1900-1940 -Continued
l\Ien employed
Year
Total
Franklin
aline
W illiamson
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
14,391
16,136
17,592
19,875
20,441
2,630
3,736
4,472
5,314
6, 452
4,081
3,868
4,659
5, 40
4, 832
7,680
,532
, 461
9,153
9,157
1915
1916
1917
1918
19l9
20,470
21,876
24, 497
27,990
28,240
7, 798
8,606
10,511
ll , 618
ll, 855
4,129
4,768
4, 745
6,468
6, 253
8,543
8,502
9,241
9,904
10,132
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
28,878
31, 781
33,126
36, 199
34, 641
12, 261
14,264
14,840
16,231
15,816
5,876
6,049
5,861
7, 114
6,816
10,741
11 ,468
12,425
12,854
12,009
··············•·• ...... .
1925
··········•········
1926 ·················
1927 . ···························· ··········
1928 ····---·····-··----· ······----······-1929 ......................................... .
29,957
29,500
30,178
26,405
22, 724
15,007
14 ,543
15. 234
14,259
12,287
5,373
5,802
6,148
4,869
4,594
9,577
9, 155
8,796
7, 277
5,843
.... ·-- --· · · · ···--·-- .... ··-• ·-·-··-··--······-··-·········-········ -·····•···-·····-·············· ····· . ···-·· . -·
······ ··-·
. ··············· ···•-···
-·-·--·-···- ··- ····-··- ·······--··
19,661
19,044
16,205
14, 459
14, 365
10, 670
10, 064
9, 441
7, 900
8. 407
4,246
4,392
3,947
3, 54
3, 733
4,745
4,588
2,817
2, 705
2,225
13,092
13, 309
12. 465
11,843
11, 057
IO. 200
6,907
7, 697
6,795
6, 611
6. 504
6. 700
3,870
3,915
3,985
3,577
3. 195
2, 450
2,31 5
I, 697
1,685
1,655
1,358
1, 0.S()
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
193
1939
1940 I
1
Figures for 1940 are preliminary .
ource: lllinois Department of Mines and Minerals, Coal Report of Illinois, annual. Springfield, 1900-1939.
Digit1z.-.r1 by
Crn!',1nal from
INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA·CHAMPAIGN
TABLES • 159
Table 3.-Production, Capacity,1 and Average Number of Days Worked at Shipping
Coal Mines in Fran kli n, Saline, and Williamson Count ies, 1900-1940
Production! Capacity
(thousand (thousand
tons)
tons)
Year
Days
worked
Year
I
Production Capacity
(thousand (thousand
tons)
tons)
Days
worked
- ---
1900 ________ __
1901__ ___ _____
1902_____ _____
1903 ___ ___ ____
1904 ___
1,460
2, 166
2,938
3,779
4,213
242
225
211
------
1,262
1, 740
2,219
3,047
3,326
1905 ____ __ ____
1906 _____ ____ _
1907 __ _______ _
1908 ____ __ ____
1909 __ ___ ___ __
4,264
4,886
7, 807
9,459
11 , 110
5,200
7,034
9,557
12,170
15, 404
230
194
229
1910 ___ _____ __
1911__ __ ______
1912 __ ___ __ ___
1913 ____ -----1914 ____ ___ ___
10,985
10,757
15,161
17,4 16
18,126
1915 ______ ___ _
1916 ______ __ __
1917 ____ -- -- -1918 __ __ ______
1919 __________
192Q __ ______ __
18,337
21,428
25,448
29,266
25,930
25,389
192!__ __ --- - -1922 --- -----1923 -- ----1924
1925 _ -------
27, 754
22, 673
27,276
26,093
20,315
40,276
45, 620
47,334
48,981
44,259
193
139
161
153
166
218
202
1926 ________ __
1927 _______ ___
1928 ______ __ __
1929 ________ __
1930 _____ _____
28,625
18,518
22, 859
24,163
19,687
41,560
44,160
38,457
35, 674
32,535
193
ll7
166
190
169
16, 896
18,269
20, 26
22,793
24, 289
182
165
204
214
209
1931__ __ ______
1932 ____ ____ __
1933 __ _____ ___
1934 ___ ______ _
1935 _______ ___
14,579
11,273
IJ,076
ll, 840
13,140
31,726
29, 165
27,348
25, 704
26,219
129
108
113
129
140
27,54 1
28,876
29,842
32,288
34, ll2
38,757
186
208
239
1936 ___ _______
1937 ___ _ -----1938 ___ ____ ___
1939 __ __ -- ---1940 _ _-- -- - -
15, 744
15,951
12,774
14,210
14,833
25,308
25,815
25,829
26,968
(')
174
173
138
226
221
254
213
183
148
(')
1 Capacity is computed as the a,-erage daily output of all mines operating during a given year multiplied
by 280. The hypothetical full worki nl!' year is considered to hP. 280 days.
• Not available.
Source: Illinois Department of Mines and Minerals, Coal Report of lllinois , annual, Springfield, 1900- 1939.
Table 4.-Averag e Hourly Earnings of Hand Loaders in Bituminous Coal Mining in
Principal Producing States, Selected Years, 1919-1933
A vera~e hourly earnings of hand loaders
Year
Illinois
19 19 _________________________ __
1922 ___________________ _______ _
1924 _____ _________ ____________ _
1926 ___ ____ _______ ____________ _
- -------------- - ---_ -- -tg?Q ___
____________ _
_____
___- ___
1931
1933 __ __- ---------- - - --- - ----- -
$0. 889
I. 127
l. 003
. 976
. 791
.800
. 558
Indiana
$0. 875
I. 094
I. 034
1.040
. 865
. 869
.677
Kentucky
$0. 68G
. 704
. 646
. 579
. 547
. 489
. 317
Pennsylvania
Ohio
$0. 7Gl
. 893
. 79 1
. 752
. 545
. 440
. 293
West
Virginia
$0. 753
. 672
. 682
. 651
. 542
. 485
. 296
$0. 77b
. 841
. 764
.710
. 591
. 486
. 326
Source : Bureau of Labor Statistics: Hours and Earnings in Anthracite and Rituminous Coal 1\1ining,
/9.19-19f0, Bulletin No. 279, 1921 ; !Iours and Earnings in Bituminous Coal Mining, 19t f, 19!J, and J9!'J,
Builetin :-.l'o. 454, 1927, H ours and Earnings in Bituminous Coal Mining in 19£9, Bulletin No. 5Jfi, 1930; and
Wages and !Iours of Labor in Bituminous Coallvfininu, Bulletin No. 601. 1934, U . S. Department of Lahor.
Washington, D . C.
J1g1l .ed by
INTERN T AK( HIVE
Crn
UN
11 =ii
v:_"srrv C
from
IL INC c, AT
URBANA< HAM~AIGN
160 • SEVEN STRAN DED COAL TOWNS
Ta ble 5.-Bitum in ous Coa l Production in the United States by Princi pal Producing States,
1910-1939
I
[Amounts in millions of tons]
Bituminous coal production
Year
United
States
Illinois
Indiana
Ohio
Pennsylvania
West
Virginia
Kentucky
All other
States
--417
406
450
478
423
46
54
62
58
18
14
15
17
17
34
31
35
36
19
151
145
162
174
148
62
60
67
71
72
15
14
16
20
20
91
00
443
503
552
579
466
59
66
86
89
61
17
20
27
31
21
22
35
41
46
36
158
170
172
Ii9
151
77
i6
86
90
79
21
25
28
32
30
89
101
112
112
88
1921 -- ------ --- - -- - -------1922
___
___ __---_________
1923 -----1924 __ ________ _______
569
416
422
565
484
89
70
58
79
68
29
20
19
26
21
46
32
27
41
30
171
116
113
172
131
90
73
80
108
102
36
32
42
45
45
108
73
83
94
87
1925 . ----- - ----- --- -1926. ----- - ----- - ---1927 _ - --- ---- - --- - -- ------_. --- -__- -1928
___ _
_____
1929 .______
520
573
518
501
535
67
69
47
56
61
21
23
18
16
18
28
28
16
16
24
137
153
133
131
144
122
144
145
133
139
55
63
69
62
60
90
93
90
87
89
1930 _______ __ ________
1934. _ ------- ----- -- -
468
382
310
334
359
54
44
33
37
41
16
14
13
14
15
23
20
14
20
21
124
98
75
79
90
121
IOI
86
94
98
51
40
35
36
39
79
65
35
54
55
--------_ ------__________
1935 ._______
1936
372 I
439
1937 .. ----- ------ - --1938 .. ------- ---- - --193 9 ' ---- -- -- - ---- - --
349 1
446
393
45
51
52
42
46
16
18
18
15
17
21
24
25
19
20
91
110
Ill
78
92
99
ll8
119
93
108
41
48
47
3~
43
59
70
74
64
67
---_
-- - -- - - ----1910_____
1911_ -__________
-- - ----1912
__ -__- -_____
____- -____
1913 __
1914-- ------ --- -----1915 _____ _____ __ ____ _
1916 ________ _____ __ __
- - -- ---_____
----- ---____
1917
1918 _________
19 19 ________ _____ __ __
1920 ________ ___ ____ __
1931. -- ------ - -- - ----------- ---1932
__ __
___----1933 __________
88
95
98
89
Figures for 1939 are preliminary.
Source: Bureau of Mines, Mineral& Yearbook, annual. U. B. Department of the Interior, Washington,
1
D . C . , 1937-1940.
Digitized by
Original from
INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
TABLES• 161
Table 6.-Production at Shipping Cool Mines by Method of Loading, Franklin , Saline ,
and Williamson Counties, 1927-1939
[Amounts in thousands or ton.s]
Production at shipping coal mines
Underground mines
Year
Strip
mines
Total
Loaded by
hand
1927 ·-------------------------------------_
1m
______________________________________
1929---------------- ---- -----------------1930 _____________________________
_________ _
1931_ _________________________________ ____ _
1932
_--- -------- ------------- ---_________
----------_
1933 -_____________________________
1934- --------------- ------ -------- ------ - - 1935 __ ------ ----------------------------- -1936
__ --- --------- -----------------------1937 ______
_____ _____
_____________________ __
1938 _- ----- ------------------ - ----------- - 1939 __ ----------------------------- ----- - - _
I , 518
22,859
24, 163
19,687
14,579
11,273
11,076
II, 840
13, 140
15,744
15,951
12,774
17,556
19,444
15,058
9,871
5,165
3,455
3,591
4,529
3,903
4,161
2,832
14,210
747
I, 655
Pit-ear
loader
Mobile
loader
117
1,662
6,0 2
6,348
5,779
4,215
2,832
3,458
4,302
4,492
4,224
2,755
365
240
605
652
I, IOI
2,273
3,035
3,417
3,308
4,301
3,466
4,139
6,040
7,614
7,068
11,678
750
433
218
295
352
387
796
1,051
1,281
1,296
1,420
Percent distribution
1927
- ---___
- - --- - - --- _________________
-- -- --- --- - --- - ----- --_
1928 -____
_________
_____
100
100
1929_ - ---------- ------ --------------------1930 __ ----------------------------- -------1931 _____________________________
__ ------------------------------------_
1932
_________
1933 ______________________________________ _
1934 _________________ __ ___________________ _
1935 _____ __ _______________________________ _
1936 ______________________________________ _
100
1937 _ ----------------------------- ---------
1938 __ -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - -
1939 _-------- - - - - - --- - --- -- -- - - -- ---- - - -- --
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
JOO
95
85
63
51
35
31
32
39
30
26
I
18
13
5
1
7
25
32
40
37
26
29
33
29
26
22
3
1
3
5
3
3
9
15
2
2
3
3
23
29
39
29
31
38
48
55
82
3
6
7
8
10
10
Source: Illinois Department of Mines and Minerals, Coal &port of lllinois, annual, Springfield, 1927-1939.
,,
Die
11
z u by
'-JTER'JE"T ARCHIVE
)11gina1 f1 um
ur-.i v~~s1TY OF ILL '-lots AT
U:\BANA-CHAM AIGN
162 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
Ta ble 7.-Men Empl oye d , Capaci ty, Outp ut per Man -Day, and Pe rce nt of Output
Loaded by M achinery a t the 21 M echanize d Sh ipp ing Coal Mines 1 in Fran kli n,
Saline, an d Will ia mso n Cou nties, 19 26-1 938
Percent of total output loaded byYear
Capacity
(thousand
tons)
15,334
15, 799
15,339
13,937
12,744
21 , 610
23,437
22,657
22, 014
21, 522
5. 6
5. 7
5. 7
6.1
6.4
2
10
40
59
5
29
40
12,803
11,860
10,179
9,861
9, 554
21, 146
19,884
18,014
17,050
18, 215
6.3
7. 6
7. 3
7.0
7. 7
75
77
82
70
75
46
40
35
33
36
37
47
37
39
9,905
9,830
9,691
19,403
20, 772
21, 117
7. 9
8. 5
83
88
91
36
32
26
47
56
65
1926 ....... ..... . . ...... .... ...
1927 ---------------- ------ -1928
-· -- ------- ------------
--- -- ------------- ------- ----- -- -------- ---- -- -- ---- ---- ------ ---- ------ -------------- -------·------------------- --- ----- --------- --- ------- ---- -------------------------- -- ----- ----------- ----- ---- --------
192()
1930
1931
1932
1933
1034
1935
1936
1937
1938
Output per
man·day
(tons)
Men em•
ployed
All ma·
chines
8. 5
Pit-car
loaders
Mobile
loaders
2
5
11
19
29
• Less tha n 0.5 percent.
following mines which installed m echa nical loading equipment after 1926 and which o perated during
1938 are included : Franklin County- Bell and Zoller Coal and Mining Co. No. 1; Bell and Zoller Coal and
Mining Co. No. 2; Chicago, Wilmington, and Franklin Coal Co. No. 1; Chicago. Wilmington, and Frank•
lin Coal Co. New Orient; Franklin County Coal Corp. No. 5; Franklin County Coal Corp. No. 7; Old Ben
Coal Cor p. No. 8; Old Ben Coal Corp. No. 11; Old Ben Coal Corp. No. 14; Old Ben Coal Corp. No . 15;
Peabody Coal Co. No . 18; and Valier Coal Co. No. 1; Saline County- Peabody Coal Co. No. 43, Peabody
Coal Co. No . 47, Rex Coal Co. No. 2, Wasson Coal Co. A, and Wasson Coal Co. No. 1; W ill iamson CountyConsolidated Coal Co. New Monarch, F ranco Mining Co., F reemen Coal Mining Co., and Seymour Coal
Mining Co.
Source : Illinois Department of Mines an d Minerals, Coal Report of Illinois, annu al, Springfield, 1926-1938.
1 The
Table 8 .-Bitum ino us Coal Produced per Man-Day in the United States and in Underground and Strip Min es in Franklin , Sal ine, and Williamson Counties, 1900-1 939
[Tons]
Bituminous coal produced per man•day
F ranklin, Saline, and Williamson
Counties
Year
United
States
Underground Str ip m ines
mines
All mines
1900.. . .. . ... ...... . . .. . . . . . . .. . . .. . ...... .... . .
3.0
2.9
3. l
3. 0
3. 2
3. 5
3. 7
4. 3
4. 2
4. 0
:1. 5
3. i
4. 3
4. 2
4. 0
1905 ...... .. ...... . . ... .... ·· ·· ·· ··············
1906. ·· · · ··· · ········· · · ···· · ··· · ····· · · ·• · •· ··
1907 ........ .. . .•... ···· · · · ·· · ·········· · · ··· · · ·
1908 .. .. .. ............... . ... . ............... . . .
1909 ...... ... . ..... . ... . . .. .. . ............. . . . . .
3. 2
3. 4
3.3
3.3
3. 7
3. g
3. 7
3. 9
4. 1
4. 0
4. 2
!901. .. . ......... .. .. . .. . . . . . . . . . ... . . .... ... . . .
1902.. .. .. ············ · ······ ·· ······· · ·· ·· ··· · ·
1903 .. ... . ····· •· . ......• • . • . . .. ··· • · .. ······ .. .
1904_ .. .. ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ......... .
(')
4.1
4. 0
4. 2
4. 4
4. 3
4. 5
4. 3
4. 5
4. 4
1913... · · · ····· · · ··· · · ·· ·· ·· ·· ··· ····· · · • •· • · ·
1914 ....... . . ....... . . . •• •· · ·· ····· · ··· · ···· ···
3. 5
3. 5
3. 7
3. 6
3. 7
1915....... .. . ····· ··· · ••· • · · · · · ··············
3. 9
5. 0
4. 9
.,. 0
4. 9
4. 7
4. 4
4. 5
4. 6
4. 4
4. 5
1910 ... ...... .. • . · ···· · · · ··· ·· ····· ··· · ···· ·· ··
1911. ... . . ...... . .... ... . . . . ... . ...... . .. . ... . . .
1912
• • .• ••• • • ··•··· · • • · •• • •• ••••••••·• • •••· • •
191 6••.••• . . . · ··· ··· ··•· •·•· · ··· · ··· · · ••• • • •··
1917. ·· ···· ····· · · .. . .
191 8. ···· · ··· · ······· ·
1919 ···· ·· ·· · ·· ·· ·· · ·
. ··· ··• · ·· ···· ··· · ·
3. g
3. 8
3. 8
3. 8
4. 3
4. 5
4. 3
4.
5
See footnote at end of table.
DigltlZ"'r' by
Cn1:,1nal from
INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA·CHAMPAIGN
7. 5
10. 5
15. 0
13.5
15. 7
11. 6
TABLES•
163
Table 8.-Bituminous Coal Produced per Man-Day in the United States and in Underground and Strip Mines in Franklin , Saline, and Williamson Counties, 1900-1939-Con.
[Tons]
Bituminous coal produced per man-day
Year
Franklin, Saline, and Williamson
Counties
United
States
All mines
Underground Strip mines
mmes
I
4. 0
4. 2
4.3
4. 5
4. 6
5. 0
4. 7
5. 1
4.9
5. 3
5.0
5. 0
4.9
5. 3
14. 8
4. 9
9. 6
12. 4
4. 7
1925
192fl.
1927._
1928
1929
4. 5
4. 5
4. 6
4. 7
4.9
5. 4
5. 3
5. 5
5. 6
6. 0
5.3
5.3
5. 4
5. 4
5. 9
12. 3
10. 4
19. 2
24. 3
24. 7
1930.
1931.
1932_
1933 _
1034
5. 1
5.3
5. 2
4.8
4. 4
6. 2
6. 2
7. 3
6.9
6. 2
6.1
6. 2
7. 3
6. 8
6.1
27. 9
11. 8
11. 1
14. 6
15.
1935
------------- ---------- -------1936 .
-- ---------------------------- -1937 __ -- --- . -- -------- --------- ------- ----- - --193 .
. -------------------------------------1939
-- -- -- -- ------------------ - ----
4. 5
4. 6
4. 7
4. 9
6.9
7. 8
8. 5
8. 8
9. 4
6.6
7. 5
8.3
8. 2
s, 9
17. l
23. 2
12. 3
23. l
!92(L. . . - ---------------- -----------··· ..
1921. .... _--1922.
1923...
1924
---------------------------···.
• •. ····-···-······-·------------- - -------------------------------------
/1)
4. i
22. i
1 Not available.
Source: Bureau of Mines, J.Iinerals Yearbook, 1936, 1939, and 1940, U. S. Department of the Interior ,
Washington, D . C.; and Dlinois Department of Mines and Minerals, Coal Report of Dlinois, annual, Springfield, 1901-1939.
Table 9.-Production and Men Employed at Local Coal Mines in Saline and Williamson
Counties,1 1900-1939
Product ion
(thousand
t ons)
Year
1000. _.
_-------------1901.
___________
_____ _
1902 __ . -------------1903 ________
__ _ ---- ---------1904
_________ _
1905 __ .. -------------1906 .. ---------------1907 .. ------·---·----1908 __ ---- --- --- - --- -1909 .. -------- --- ----1910 ___ _______ _______ _
114
67
61
70
93
16
30
34
69
33
102
76
139
44
40
46
56
67
50
67
67
87
1917_
--------- _______
- - --- - --_
1918 __________
1919 ___ ______ .. ---- --
Production
(thousand
tons)
Year
19
14
19
19
16
57
1911 .. - ----- --- ----- 1912. _ ------------ ---1913 . -- ---------- ---1914 ----------- -----1915 ___________ ______ _
19)6 ____________ _____ _
Men employed
49
1920 _________________ _
192\.________
. - ---- - ------1922
___ _____--__
1923 . _ -- -------------1924 __ -------- ---- ----
Men employed
81
185
160
139
107
124
71
73
53
75
1925 _ ---------- --- --1926 __
__ _______
---- --------- - -_
1927
________
1928 ________ ________ __
1929 _ ------ ----- - --- -
48
56
57
73
109 · 1930_.
----- -____
- ---1931_ ______
___--___- _115
1932 ____________ ___ __ _
79
1933 ___ _____ _________ _
630
697
785
729
733
741
IOI
63
1!0
1934 __ ----- ------- ----
89
92
154
167
225
151
134
12.5
148
138
1935_ . -- ---- - --------1936 __ - ----- -------- -1937 __ -------- -------1938_ _
---------- -1939 _
269
392
474
412
547
84
109
137
165
177
!51
236
307
444
506
I
• Franklin Coun ty has no local mines.
Source: Illinois Department of Mines and Minerals, Coal &port of ntinois, annual, Springfield, 1900-1939,
)141t
zed by
1r--iTrnN-T A,k HIVt
Cri 1r l'ron,
JN!Vt~SITY O> IL INO C, AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
•
164 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOW NS
Table 10.-Populati on, Labor Force, Employed Workers, Unemployed Workers, and
Worke rs on Work Programs, by Sex, 7 Southern Illinois Coal Towns
Item
Total
Bush
Johnston
City
West
Carrier Herr in FrankZeigler
Mills
fort
Eldarado
------ --- -----------All persons ____________________ 38, 193
643
5. 351
2, 2'31
9,608
Male _____ _- ------ -- ---------- -- -- --- 19,294
Female ----- --------------- ---- ---- - 18,899
325
318
2,743
2,608
1,143
1,088
4, 759
4,849
Labor force'·---- --------- ----· 15, 707
218
2,127
867
4,0
. ________ --- ___________ _______ 12,246
Male
Female,
3,461
1 7
31
1,682
445
675
192
3,133
955
43
41
12, 72/i
3,017
4,618
6,483
6,242
1. 555
1,462
2,286
2,332
.5, 226
1, 22i
1,954
4,095
1, 131
1,004
223
1.470
484
41
42
·--- --- ---
- -- - - - - - - · · - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
Percent of population in labor
force __ . _______ __ - -____ -- -- -- .------Male
___
_____________ --- --- __ --_____ --------------------Female.
Employed worke rs ___ _________
30 hours' work in census
than
Less
. _____________________________
week
30 hours' work or more in census
week ...
Hours not ascertainable _________ . __ .
41
34
40
39
63
18
58
10
17
59
18
20
18
15
21
9,209
44
857
477
2,522
3,257
775
1,277
3,465
21
266
174
1,016
1, 173
366
449
5,700
44
23
578
13
298
1,505
1
2,070
14
408
1
818
- - - - - - - -61- - - - - -66- - -63- - -65- - - 64
--- --- -
-- - - - - - - - - - -
Percent of labor force employed less than 30 hours in
5
-- - --
10
census week __ . _____ _________
22
10
13
20
25
22
30
23
Unemployed workers'--- ---·Male _________ _____________ ____
Female ________ ____________ ___
6,498
174
1,270
390
1,566
1, 969
452
677
4,857
I, 641
148
1,012
258
284
1,140
426
1,506
26
463
330
122
437
240
41
80
60
45
3
38
37
35
10
47
79
R4
60
36
30
45
37
41
33
58
42
55
55
50
3,360
119
850
229
928
661
243
339
2,679
690
109
10
706
144
180
49
711
217
529
132
199
44
245
94
52
68
67
59
59
34
54
liO
42
38
56
46
.51
29
36
39
force unem Percent
_____ ___________
____labor
ployed of
Male . ___________ _________ ________ __
F6male. _________ _________________ ___
workers on work
Unemployed
programs __ __________________
_ . _______ ___ ____ ________ ___ ___
Male
Female
Percent of unemployed workers on work programs'·- ---Male
Female __.
--------------··--------____________
__________
____
------ --- --- --- --- -----106
--- - ---- --- --- --- - -- ---
- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
I
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
56
60
35
62
63
70
74
55
1 Persons employed in private industry, persons on work programs, persons seeking work and persons
only tem()oranly out of the labor market during the "census week," a specified week immediately before
eou.merat10n.
2 Workers
3 Includes
who had no jobs in private industry during the census week.
WP A, NY A, CCC, and other Federal emergency programs.
Dig1t12-=-r' by
Ur ·rial frorr1
NTERNET ARC!-' VE
UN:VER.SITY O~ IL INO 5 AT
UREW,A-.'.'HAM?AIGN
TABLES•
165
Table 11.- Usual Occupation of Employed and Unemployed Workers in 7 Southern
Illinois Coal Towns
Usual occupation
Total ___ - - ----- ---- ----- --- -- ------ ------ -------.
Without usual occupation ___________ ___ __ _________ ____ _
With work experience•- -·· _____ __________________ _
Without work experience• ______ ____ ________ __ ___
With usual occupation _ _____ . _________________ ____ _
Farmers and farm workers. _____________________ __ _
Forestry workers _________________________________ _
Coal mine workers. ____ ·------------------------ -Operators, managers, and officials ___________ ___ _
Foremen and inspectors .. ___________________ __
Surface workers ___ __________________________ __
Face workers --- ---- --------- ---- ------ -------Hand
____ --------------------·_
Other loaders
face workers
______ _______
______ --_____
Hoisting and haulage workers ________________ __
Manufacturing and mechanical workers _________ __
Brickmasons, carpenters, electricians, painters,
and plasterers ______ __ _________________ _
Operatives (except in building trades) ________ _
Other manufacturing and mechanical workers ___
Transportation and communiration workers._. ____ _
Cbaufleurs and truck and tractor dri vers _____ _
Railroad
_______ -------------------- --Road andworkers
street laborers _____________________
_
Other transportation and communication workers_____
----------------------------- ----Tradesworker . _ ------------------------------ -Bankers, brokers, money lenders, and insurance agents ____ . ________________ -------- -- --- Retail dealers .... ___ . _________ ____ ____________ _
aJespersons _____ __ ____ ------- ----- --------- -Other tradesworkers ____ . __________________ ---Public and professional service workers _. ____ ______ _
Domestic and personal ser.,.ice workers _____________ _
Restaurant workers ________ . __________________ _
Servants _.. _ -- - -- --- --- - . -- . ------ -----------Otber domestic and personal service workers ___ _
Clerical workers __________ ------------- __ _
Total labor Employed
workers
force
I
l
Unemployed workers
-umber
I
Percent of
labor force
15, 705
9,209
6,49(1
41
3,401
2,730
671
657
657
2,744
2,073
671
76
100
12,304
175
19
4,920
64
256
473
2,912
1,290
1,622
1,215
I, 716
, 552
51
7
3,228
57
212
398
1,601
451
I, 150
3,752
124
12
1,692
7
44
595
79
3 16
102
621
563
230
176
9
389
215
58
70
89
194
1,763
148
1, 51.5
46
24S
24
14
76
572
792
323
1,027
1,041
72
529
647
267
876
726
185
180
361
547
43
5
8
145
56
151
315
73
169
73
144
18
17
15
30
28
48
17
21
960
1, 039
266
855
952
445
234
258
349
434
691
i5
I. 311
839
472
255
677
279
164
234
4
Excludes 2 workers whose usual occupations were not ascertainable.
• Includes both pri\•ate and emergency-work-program employment.
1
Die 11 z u
by
'JTER'JET ARCHIVE
)11gina1 f1 om
ur-.i v:..~SITY OF ILL '-1015 A~
U:\BANA-CHAl'I. AIGN
81
30
71
63
34
11
17
16
45
65
29
21
39
47
62
27
41
48
25
166 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
Table 12.-lndustry of Usual Occupation of Un employed Workers, by Sex, 7 Southern
Illinois Coal To wns
Unemployed workers
N um ber
Industry of usual occupation
Male
Total
Percent distribution
Total
Female
Male
Female
---------------- - --- -- - - - - - - - -- -- - - ---- - - - TotaL ______ ___ _________ •.•.....•••. ... - _
75
6,486
100
I, 638
25
4,848
----- - - - ----- - -I
Without usual occupation . ... . . . ....... . .. ----•
With work experience'-- -· · ·· ·· ···· · · ··- -··
Without work experience'·-····· ····· · ·····
2,744
2,0i3
671
J, 693
With usual occupation . . _... -.. · · -· · ·· · · · - ···-··
Agriculture and forestry . . . . -··· ·· · · ··· ··
Coal m ining.·-· · ······ -·--·· .... .. . .... .
Manufacturing and mecbanicaL --····- ·· · ·
3,742
162
1, 780
612
356
300
233
299
3,155
160
Transportation and communication
Trade.---- -----·-· · ··· -·-·
Public and professional service ...
Domestic and personal 8Crvicc
1,326
367
1,051
747
304
42
32
JO
26
21
5
16
587
2
1
122
8
82
130
242
58
2
28
10
5
4
4
5
49
2
28
8
5
3
9
I, 779
490
348
218
103
57
11
5
.
2
2
I
• Less than 0.5 percent.
Excludes 12 workers whose industries of usual occupation were not ascertainable.
• Includes both pri,ate and emergency-work-program employment.
1
Table 13.-lndustry of Usual Occupation of Employed and Unemployed Workers, by
Age Group, 7 Southern Illinois Coal Towns
Industry of usual occupation
Total
U ncmploycd workers
Employed worker'-
Labor fore.~
Un- 25-54 y:1rs
Un- 25-54 yt;rs
Un- 25-54 y;;rs
years of age Total t<;;a;t years of age Total t~a;t years of age
of age 01 age and
of age or age and
of age of age and
~';;0 ;t
-
over
over
over
I. 382 6. 483 2. 242 3, 182
I, 059
- ---------1--- - - - - - - - - ----- - -- - - - - - Total_ ____ ___ ___ __ 1 15,682 3, 84
Without usual occupation ------·· · ·- --- -- ·-·
With work experi·
encc 2 ------- - - - - -Without work ex-
perience, ___ _____ _
9,393 2,441 9,199 I, 606 6,211
3, 400 2. 063 I , 097
240
657
393
234
30 2, 743 I, 670
863
210
2, 72() I. 509 I, 004
216
657
393
234
30 2,072 I, 116
770
186
93
24
554
93
24
572 2,319
849
74
33 1, 153
40
592
671
554
With usual occupation __ 12,282 I. 785 R, 296 2,201 8,542 I, 213 5. 977 I, :152 3. 740
Agriculture and for63
58
estry
Ill
56
225
162
18
37
8
Coal mining ______ __ 5, 567
,.5 1 I, 778
227 2, 81 I
260 3, 964 I , 343 3. 789
M anufacturing and
mechanical _____ _
'rransportation and
communication. _
Trade
Public and profes-
sional service __ __
Domestic and per-
sona l srrv icil . __ __
1
743
124
48
I, 355
251
5:14
85
612
127
386
99
895
2,010
612
170
459 1,308
539
113
243 1, 710
392
73
376 1, 11 7
74
217
356
300
97
83
220
191
39
2G
I, 254
316
801
137 1,021
217
682
122
233
99
119
15
976
273
580
123
677
188
404
8.',
176
38
920
184
Excludes 25 workers whoso ages or industries of usual occupation wen• not ascPrt ainable .
'Includes both private and emorgency-work-program employment.
D1g1t1z"'r' by
NTERNET ARCH yr=
Vr I
I frorr,
UN VERSITY or= IL INO 5 AT
UREW,A-.'.'HAM?AIGN
TABLES• 167
Table 14.-Labor Force and Unemployed Workers in 7 Southe rn Ill inoi s Coal Towns,
by Age Group
Age group
Total
Labor force __________________
I
I
Eld~
~
rado
2181~~1
4,0 ~1_5,223
1,226 ,
1,953
3. 57
9,396
2,443
66
130
22
568
1,214
342
245
513
109
966
2,464
655
1,290
3, 128
805
253
783
190
469
1, 164
320
6,494
174
1,267
390
l.!;66
1,968
452 1
6TT
Under 25 years_________________ ___
25-54 years_______________________ _
2,249
3,184
58
97
424
625
13
196
576
785
688
921
133
219
232
341
55 yea;e::n:::~~~~;~~~~-:~~~-1
1,061
19
218
56
205
359
100
104
41
80
60
45
38
38
37
35
58
34
43
88
75
51
64
56
38
51
60
32
31
53
29
45
53
28
53
49
29
:l.1
1
15,696 _
I
I
I
Johns- Carr,·er
West
ton
.
Ilerrin Frank- Zeigler
City
~I,lls
fort
Bush
Under 25 years__________________ __
25-54 years _- - --------------------55 years and over____ ____ ____ ______
Unem ployedworkers________
ployed __ ____ _______________
Under 25 years ____________________
25-54 years________ _______ ___ ______
55 years and over______ ____________
2
!
75
86
Excludes 11 workers whose ages were not ascertainable.
' Excludes 4 unemployed workers whose ages were not ascertainable.
1
Table 15.-Employment Status of Families in 7 Southern Illinois Coal Towns
E mployment status of families
Total
All families ______ ___ ________ ~
,
Bush
Johnston
City
Wet
1.-1Ui;r Herrin Frank- Zeil!ler
fort
181
I, 652
714
3. 231
4,125
982
17
164
14
1,504
93
621
2bl
2,950
357
3, 768
4
934
158
1,434
~1~!;
!
1,592
Without workers___________ ______
Witbworkers _____________________
1, )(;2
11 ,375
7, 373
43
687
384 I I, 983
2,603
640
I. 033
No workers on work programs_ ______________ __ _
6,910
32
607
343
1,862
2,480
616
970
463
11
80
41
121
123
24
63
4,002
121
817
237
967
1,165
294
401
~--~~~em ployment__ _______________
Some workers on work
programs __ ____ __ _____
N o workers with private employment__ _______ __________
No workers on work pro-
grams __________________
Some workers on work programs ____ ___ ________ __ __
1,368
23
157
63
236
657
92
140
2,634
98
660
174
731
508
202
261
100
100
100
90
P ercent d1su1but1on
All fam ilies ___________ __
100
100
100
100
100
Witho ut workers __________________
W ith workers __________ ___ ________
Some workers with private
employment_ ________________
9
91
9
91
9
91
13
87
9
91
91
95
42
54
61
63
65
65
37
48
57
60
63
61
59
No workers on work pro-
grams _______ ________ ____
55
Some workers on work
programs ___ --- -- -- --- --No workers with private employment_ ___________________
No workers on work pro-
grams _______________ ____
Some workers on work pro-
grams __ ------ ----- ------
24
18
- --9 - - -5 - - -10
6
5
6
4
3
2
32
67
49
33
30
28
30
11
13
9
9
7
16
9
9
21
54
40
24
23
12
21
16
Digiliz"d by
Original from
NTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
25
168 •
SEVEN STRAN DED COAL TOWNS
Tab le 16.-Du ration o f Unemployment Since La st Full-Time Job of Workers in 7 Southern
Ill ino is Coal Towns
Workers unemployed
Months since last full-tim ejob
Total
Bush
Johnston
City
West
Carrier Herrin F rank- Zeigler
MiJls
fort
E ldorado
- - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - 'l'otal _________ ______ _------·
12 months or less ____ _____ __------13-24 months ______ ________ _
25-36 months ______ ________ _-------
37-4 months ______ ___ ___ __ _------4\HiO months _______ _______ _-------
61-120 months ___ __________ _------------121 months or over ________ _-------
Total.. ______ _---- ---- ------12 months or less __ ________ _------13-24 months ______ ___ _____ _
~5-36 months ______ ___ _____ _------37-48 months ____ __________ _------49----00 months ______ ________ _------61-120 months _______ ______ _-------
-------
121 months or over ________ _------ -
Average ' months sin ce last
full-time job
----
I
4,386
132
I, 268
605
289
308
198
l, 275
443
21
12
6
9
9
53
22
JOO
29
16
9
14
252
979
1,401
337
466
260
73
45
16
255
163
57
62
51
272
119
426
181
91
88
48
431
rn6
67
30
9
11
9
188
23
166
73
44
23
25
82
IOI
66
86
36
208
62
--
JOO
819
- - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -
20
41
28
.,;a
Percent Distribution
-
-
100
JOO
JOO
100
100
JOO
32
12
8
29
18
6
12
8
16
30
13
7
6
3
31
10
20
9
3
3
3
55
;-
36
16
II
26
17
6
6
5
28
12
31
39
37
74
24
------------------
7
7
4
29
10
7
7
40
17
4
25
8
:l
71
33
4
29
11
9
5
5
18
11
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -- - - -
1 This figure excludes 1,981 unemployed "orkers "ho bad m•,er had a full-time Job , I "hose employ•
ment status was unknown , and 130 whose duration of unemployment was not ascertaina ble .
!
Medino..
Digitized by
Original from
INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
TABLES•
169
Tobie 17.-Duration of Unemployment of Workers in 7 Southern Illinois Coal Towns , by
Industry of Last Full-Time Job
Workers unemployed
Average,
months
since
12
121
last
13--24
25-36
37-48
4!Hl0
IH-120
moronletsshs months months months months months mon!bs fullor ovrr time
job
Industry or last fuU -time
job
Total
- - - - - -- ----1------ - - - ---- - -- - -Tota]. ______ _____ ___
Agriculture ______________ _
Forestry ______ _______ ---Coal mining ___ ___ ____ ___ _
Manufacturing and m echanical ___ ___ ______ ____
Transportation and communication __________ _
Trade _____ .
_ --- _ ---Public ser vice _________ _
Professional service . ____ _
Domestic and personal
service __ _ ____ ____ __
'4,384
I, 26i
605
289
307
198
I, 275
443
38
184
17
1,850
52
2
336
31
6
l53
13
2
112
28
I
140
19
I
79
38
4
818
3
I
212
68
728
25l
l59
49
33
28
147
fjl
21
361
112
55
27
20
84
80
10
35
32
3
8
6
36
28
3
3
21
31
20
14
29
34
27
29
57
76
17
- -- - - -- - ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
479
l85
56
155
27
91
7
59
15
554
243
88
I - - -- - ' - - - - - - -
39
3
-
- -
14
2
II
33
t
- -- --
Pneent distribution
Total.. -----------Agricultu re ___ _________ ___
JOO
100
100
100
100
100
100
4.
4
fi
4
~
10
3
- - - - - -- - - - -- - -- - ----1----1---
100
- - - - --
Forestry _ ________ _____ ___
"
•
Coal mining ______ ___ ___ __
Manufacturing and mechanical. ____
Transportation and communication _
Trade _
__
Public service _
_ _ __
P rofessional service _______
42
26
I
25
39
46
40
64
47
17
20
26
17
II
14
II
14
8
11
l
9
9
9
l3
6
9
3
10
7
I
3
7
6
1
3
o1
14
5
17
29
10
n~iif~!c
a~-~ --~~~~~~!-
4
15
2
5
15
1
3
13
19
15
1
1
4
12
11
10
1
1
•
1
5
P('rrent dist rihut ion
TotaJ. __ ------- - ---Agriculture _________ _____ _
Forestry _____________ ----Coal mining _____________ _
Manufacturing a nd mechanica l. _____
____ _
'l'ransportation and communication . ____ _
Trade ___________ __ ---- ---Public servi ce _________ -- -Professional service . ____ __
Domestic and peraonal
sen- ice __ ______ __ _______ _
100
29
14
------------- ------------21
2
15
10
7
17
28
100
t
t
t
t
t
20
8
8
20
8
5
6
10
7
5
5
23
23
14
6
5
5
10
14
6
8
100
34
22
7
5
l5
l9
13
10
100
44
16
t
12
G
3
4
4
8
31
38
48
38
t
44
18
lOO
100
100
100
t
4
JOO
7
8
5
17
• Less than 0.5 percent.
t Too sma ll for calculation .
• Median.
'This figure excludes l 981 unemployed workers who bad never bad a full-time job, 1 whose employment
status was unknown, 2 for whom the industry of last full-time job was not sprcificd, and 130 whose unemployment duration was not ascertainahlP.
01g1t1ze,1
V
INTERNET ARCHIVE
Or g1na1
Jn
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
170 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
Table 18.-Unemployed Workers Who Had Never H e ld a Full -Time Job , 7 Southern
Illinois Coal Towns, by Age Group
Age group
Unemployed workers who
never bad a ful l-time job ___
Under 25 years ______________ _____
25-54 years __ _____ ________ ___ _____
55 years a nd over _____________ . _
Unemployed workers who
never had a full-time job as
a percent of the labor force 2.
Under 25 years _________ __ ___ __ _____
25-54 years __ _____ _______ ____ ______
55 years and over ____ _________ __ ___
Unemployed workers who
never had a ful l-time job as
a percent of the unemployed'- --------- --- ---Under 25 years ______ ___ ________ ___
25-54 years ___ _________ _________ __
55 years and over_ ___________ __ ____
I
West
John- Carrier
E ldoHerrin Frank- Zeigler
s ton
rado
Mills
fort
City
- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Bush
Total
1,980
42
378
127
578
546
109
200
1,457
438
85
34
8
286
82
82
36
9
409
143
26
434
96
16
82
23
4
130
50
20
14
JO
9
---- --- --- --- --- --- - --
=
13
38
5
3
-
JO
10
19
18
15
52
6
50
7
~
33
7
8
6
4
3
2
32
3
2
24
30
33
37
28
24
30
18
13
63
10
4
11
56
J5
19
- - - - - - - - - -42- - -34- =
-
30
.
- --
28
4
6
- ------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -71
62
65
14
8
59
8
-
59
18
16
67
13
5
4
1 Excludes J unemployed worker whose age \Vas not ascertainable.
• See appendix table 14 for data on labor force a nd number of workers unemployed.
Table 19.-Status of Families Without Private Employment in 7 Southern Illinois Coal
Towns
N u mber
Status or families without private employment
Percent
Total.. __ __ __ _______ ____ _____________ _____ __________ ____________________ ___
5,104
100
Without workers __________ ______________ ______________ __ _____ ____ ___ _. _____ ___ _
- - ----With workers __________ _____ _____ -------- --- - --------- - ----- - ----------- ______
_
Some workers employed within 1 year ___ ____ ___ _____ ____ ___ __________
All workers unemployed 1 year or more ______ ____________ _____ _____ _________ _
- ------ _
All workers inexperienced•- - - -· - -----·- ------ - - -- -- - ------------_________ _ ____________ _
Status of workers not ascertainable ___
I, 102
4, 002
868
2,607
457
70
22
78
17
51
9
1
t
Workers who never held a lul l-time private job.
Digitized by
Original from
INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
TABLES •
171
Table 20.-Assessed Valuat ion of Real Property 1 in Frankl in, Saline, and Williamson
Counties, Se lected Years , 191 3-1932
[Amounts in thousan ds]
Assessed valuation or rea l prop rty
Type of real property
1913
191
1922
1927
1932
----------- ------ - --1-------- ---- ,--- -r---11 real property' ---- --·- -· -·----- -·- ---· --Land and m ineral rigbts _____ __ ·· -·-·--- ···· · -· • •·- ·Coal lands and m ineral rigbts_· · · · · -·····- · ·- --Other lands ___ _--··----·-· ········· ······-··- · -·
Lots . .. - __ --· ····· · · ····· · ···· · ·-····· · · ····· · · · ··- · ·
$14, 114
$15, 694
$31, 520
$55,534
$35, 415
9,799
3, 341
6, 458
4, 315
10, 070
3,302
6, 768
5, 624
19, 628
31,228
16, 49,
14,733
24,306
19, 76
JO, 109
9, 767
15,539
'
20
10,808
11 , 92
Percent dist ribution
All real property ' -···· · · ··-············· · --·· Land a nd m ineral rights ____ · -· ---··· ·· ····•···· ·· -- Coal lands a nd m ineral rights _· ·-·-···- -·-··· ·-Other la nds ·---···--·-·-•··
-------- ····· -Lots · · - _ ··--·- · -·--·-····-•-1
100
100
JOO
100
100
70
24
46
30
64
21
43
36
62
28
34
56
56
30
26
28
28
44
- - - -,- - - -1· - - - - - - - -- - 38
44
Railroad real property is excluded.
Source: Original tax records in the county courthouses at Benton, Harrisburg, and l\farion, Ill.; the
annual reports of the Illinois State Tax Commission, 1920-1934; and the annual reports of t he Illinois State
Board or Equalization, 1900-1918.
NOTE.- Relation of assessed to lu ll value: 1909- 1918, 33¼ percent ; 1919-1926, 50 percent; and 1927 to date,
100 percent .
Table 21.-Number of Deeds for Town Real Property Recorded in Franklin, Sal ine , and
W illi amson Counties and the Average Value of Deeds in Williamson County/
1900-1 938
Average
N um ber or value of
deeds
deeds
recorded (Williamson
Coun ty t)
Year
Average
Number of val ue or
deeds
deeds
recorded (Williamson
County')
Year
409
1920. · · - ·-- ·- ··· -·- ··-· ··1921. .•.• _._. __ . . _• . • _. _• .
1922- · -- ··· -·· --·-·-·-· · -·
1023 - - -····- · · · ·· · ·-··-·-·
1924 • . _··· · · · · -·· ·-·· · · · · ·
5,960
7, 860
5, 235
4,506
3. 603
$1,356
I, 122
I, 203
I, 274
I, 295
53 1
680
660
638
706
1925·- -· · -· ·· - · - -·- · · · · ···
1926 •• • ·-· ·- ··-···-·· · · -·1927._. __·-· - ·- · ·-·-·-· · ··
1928·- · ·· · · -·· ·· ·- · · · ··· · ·
1929 .. .. ·- · -·- · ·· · ···· · · ··
2,720
2, 082
2, 553
1, 685
I, 617
1, 422
1,500
766
2,0 15
1,808
2,255
3, 885
4, 127
750
760
699
789
751
1930- -- - · - -- ·-···-······-·
193L -- ·· · ··· - · ···-·-- ·· · ·
1932 ___ -- ·· · · - · ·· · -· ·- · · · ·
1933. _· - - · · · ··-·--· - · •••••
1934 .•• • ·- - · - · · · · -·- ·· ···
I, 4 17
I, 482
I , 308
3,052
3, 256
4,348
6, 015
6. 099
735
743
832
1935 -·· ·-··· · · ·- - -· · ·· ·--·
1936- · · ·-·-· -· -···-···· -·l937 • • . .. •• _._ ._ • • _. __._ • •
1938. •····--- · · · ··••·· ..
1900 .. ··-·- -··- · - · -· . __\
1901. • • • ·--•-· -··- · · ··-·-'
1902_ · - ·-· ·- - - ·-· -···--1903 . • • - -.- ·· ·-·-·- ·- · · · ·
1904 .. .• ··• · ·· -·-·- · · · ·
261
339
1, 092
I, 815
2, 106
$534
280
314
400
1905 • • • • • . - ·- · --- - ·· ·· ·--·
1906 •• • •• _• • • • - · • · -····- · ·
1907 .••• ·--· ·· ··- · -·-···-·
1908-· - ·· · -···-···-·-··- · l909 . ·-··- ····· · ··· · · ·· · · ·
2,941
2,893
2. 568
2,102
2, 455
1910_· ·· · · ·- ·· · · · · -·-···· ·
1911. · · - · -··· - - · ····-·· ···
1912 .. . •.• • •• ·-······ ·- ·· ·
1913_ ·--···· - ···· · ··-·-· · 1914 •. -· ·- · · - ······· ··· · ··
1915 • •• • •• - ••• • ••• .• ••.• . •
1916 • • •• -·•··· ··· · - ·-·- · -·
1917 • • •• ··· · - ··· · · · ·-··--·
1918 ••• • .• • - ··- · · ·-· -·- ·- ·
1919 .• •. • -· · · · · ·-· · ·-·-·--
968
1, 147
I , 191
I, 456
I, 713
556
I, 774
628
484
387
I, 328
859
580
(' )
t Value of d eeds in Franklin and Sali ne Cou nties is not a vailable.
• Not a rnila ble.
Source: Original de.ed records in t be countv courthouses at Benton. Harrisburl?. a nd Marion, ill
liq1ttzed by
Vri 1rial frorri
1/\JTFR/\JET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY 0• IL 1/\J0tS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
447
447
543
508
172 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
Table 22.-Toxes Collected and Current Taxes Extended in Franklin, Saline,and Williamson
Counties, 1908-1937
[Amounts in thousands]
Taxes collected
Year
Total
F rank- Saline
Jin
Taxes extended
Williamson
- -- - - - - -JOOS _____________________________
$490
585
594
668
744
$79
138
142
169
172
1913 __ ------- -------------I 914 _____ -- -- ----- - - -·- · - -- -1915 __---- - ---- -- -----------1916 ___ -- --- --------------1917 ___ -- ---------- -- ----- .
1, 028
1,029
I, 070
I, 327
I, 393
260
255
269
386
401
1918 __ __ -- ------------------------------ ----1919
____ -_____________
__ -_____
1920 __
1921 ___ ____ __ ___ ______________
1922 ___ ________ ____________
I, 494
2,244
2,450
2, 898
3,242
1923 __ ------ ---------------1924 __ ---- ------------------1925 ___ ---- ---------------1926 _------ ----------------1927- _--- ------------ ---1928 ___
1929 __ -- --- ------ ----- ------ _
- ----------------- ---1930
____________________
1931________
1932
---- -- -------------
1900 ___-- -- - - --- -- _- --- - - -- -- _- -- -------------------________
----- -___
1910
• ______ •• __
l 91L________
1912 __ -------------------
1933
1934 _
1935 _
1936 _
1937 _
------
--- ---------- -------- ---------- ------------ -----------
I
Total
- -- - -- - - - - --
$135
I 156
I 157
182
202
$276
291
295
317
370
$611
654
649
734
868
274
316
332
385
1 391
494
458
469
556
601
I, 123
1, 131
I. 152
I, 384
1, 434
1
I
I
Frank- Saline WilliamJin
son
$183
205
17J
208
277
$281
296
298
321
371
329
433
430
317
369
348
3 6
396
506
463
475
565
608
438
859
939
1,170
I, 144
432
437
545
661
616
638
968
1, 093
I, 252
I, 439
1,322
1, 693
1, 577
I, 570
469
738
22
746
864
I, 379
I, 532
1,523
1, 421
1,3
$147
153
180
205
220
I
I
300
299
I
432
846
926
205
I, 268
I
432
505
569
567
69J
630
893
955
I, 126
I, 283
I, 508
2,202
2,452
2, 924
3, 012
3, 480
3, 632
3,792
3,577
3, 545
I, 379
1,214
1, 455
1,381
I, 311
il8
18
1764
I 768
822
I, 383
1,600
I, 573
I, 428
I, 412
3, 592
4, 038
3, 744
3,822
3, 487
3,145
2,809
2,295
2,041
1,280
I, 164
1,037
58
700
806
794
749
621
564
1,401
I, 187
1, 023
816
777
3,771
3, 00
3,481
3,091
2,720
1, 479
1,522
1,336
1,238
1,001
853
861
03
728
671
1,439
1,417
1,342
I, 125
1,048
I, 759
I, 763
1,856
I, 994
2, 036
704
634
680
705
737
525
573
580
638
672
530
556
596
651
627
2, 352
2,259
2,383
(')
968
889
958
(')
580
568
579
(')
804
802
846
I
I
I
I ],
I
I
3, 2 7
I
(')
I
(2)
(2)
906
(')
(')
Estimated.
' Not available.
Source: Original tax records in the county courth ouses at Benton, Harrisburg, and ~larion, Ill.; and
unpublished data from the Illinois Oo,-ernment Finance Study. WPA Project No . 3121. sponsored by tbe
Illinois Tax Commission.
1
Digitized by
Original from
INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
TABLES • 173
Table 23.-Activity of Building and Loan Associat ions in Franklin , Saline, and Williamson
Counties, 1900-1936
Number of
associations
Year
Assets
New loa n s Inter t, premade dur ing miu.m, and
year
frnes charged
Loans
outstanding
1900 . ··-···························
1901. ••..•• ····•• ••···•··••·•·•••••
1902 ·······•···················· ··
1903. •• •.• • • . .....•..• • . •••...• ••••
1904 .. .. .. . . .. . . .•• .......•..•.•.••
4
4
4
4
5
$169,824
135,164
225,587
258,619
368,527
$123,800
154,500
210,850
243,540
352,000
$58, 700
n.021
100,450
79,450
128,250
$20, 79
25,979
35,112
31,733
1905 •..•.•••. •••·•·•••·····•··· .. ..
1906 ......... ······················
1907. ...................... .. ......
1908. ....................... . ......
1909 .......................... ·····
6
6
7
8
8
468,477
503,745
596,227
663,983
703,832
445,203
470,350
569,000
619,000
656,350
153, 205
127,650
314,450
151,800
139, 750
53,993
51,408
70, 70!\
62,653
66,055
1910 •·••·•·•···•·······••••·······
1911 •• ··················•-·········
1912 •• •-•················· ·········
1913 ··•••···••••·····•• •••· ••••••·
1914 _ ••••·•••. •·······•·•·•·····•
9
13
13
13
13
730,570
819,408
889, 739
991,287
1,286,822
663, 700
741,050
795,200
897,100
1, 187,300
170,400
216,900
211, 750
292,500
480,550
74, 7fi
81,926
90,254
109,013
124,286
1915 •••.••••••.. •·•·•··· ........ .••
1916 ...••...••. ·•··•••··· ........••
1917...............................
1918 ....•••.••.. •·•·•••····•· .•..••
1919 ··•••·•·•••·•·•·••········•·••·
14
15
16
20
21
I, 642,541
I, 954,276
2,276,450
2,741,878
~- 503. 74 1
1,528, 550
1,781,800
2, 113, 100
2,570, 4i0
3. 288. 900
558, 700
486,200
604,873
920,270
1,290,650
137,528
155, 715
197,561
245, 1
32.'i, 623
1920 ••.••.• ···············-· ······
1921. ..••.••. ••···••········•·•····
1922 .•••••.•• ·••••••··•···· ·· ··••··
1923 ••.•••.••.•. •·•••·······•·••· ..
1924 . ··••• ••.•• -• .• •.......... •....
23
28
31
32
35
4, 417,856
5,984.232
8,662,156
11,180, 872
14,079.573
4,100,370
5,643,950
8,174,850
10,216, 190
13,183,600
1,616,850
2, 50 , 103
3,408, 108
3,409.840
4,272, 435
406,406
555, 729
769,503
978,339
I, 323,922
1925 •.• •·•··•····••••••••······•
1926...............................
1927. •• ·••••··••·•••········•···••
1928.. . .•••• ··••·· .. ······--·· · ..•
1929 •• ··•· ··· ·····················
34
34
34
34
34
15,208, 247
15,373,868
14,764, 484
14,296,866
13,514,911
13,620, 130
12, 7.50. 591
11,260, 760
9, 894, 750
2, 34 , 180
I. 624, 750
806,510
584,050
433, 278
I, 386, ObO
1,413, 747
I, 225,212
l , 004, 912
898,074
1930. ········· ·•··················
1931. •..•• •••.• ..... ····-···· ·· ···1932•. --••·· ··· ····················
1933 •••••••• • ••··· .•. ••······••··••
1934 .. ·······-······ ······ ·· ······
35
34
27
26
24
12,546, 294
11,328, 167
7, 759,963
6,777,285
6, 117,357
6,778,973
5,211,562
1935 .•.
1936
14
4,461,672
I. 390,072
7
8,425, 435
(!}
(!)
(!)
(!)
(!}
394,430
110,890
(ll(!
38,899
784,931
553,405
(1)
(! )
(!)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(!
(ll
'ot available.
ource: Illinois Auditor of Public .\ccounts, Annuol Report of .\lutual Building , Loan and Homc,tcad
Atsociat ions, Spr ingfield, 1901- 1937.
1
)
Digitized by
Original ram
INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF LLINOIS AT
URBANA·CHAMPAIGN
174 •
SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
Table 24.-Number of Banks and Amount on Deposit in State and National Banks,
Frankl in, Sa line, and Williamson Counties, 1900-1938
Franklin County
Total
Year
Num•
ber of
banks
Amount
on
deposit
Number of
banks
Saline County
Number of
banks
Amount
on
deposit
784,360
733,064
626,554
553, 617
724, 852
4
8
8
7
7
852,656
1,005,303
797,541
670,239
800, 558
8
9
11
11
11
I, 793, 866
1,983,509
2,055,524
I, 674,5 18
2, 169,460
7
7
9
10
10
I, 005, 420
I, 129,651
1,486, 817
1,690, 776
I. 602,870
7
7
7
7
7
960,374
I, 217,929
1,430, 282
1, 544,364
1,504, 136
12
12
12
12
11
2,433,464
2,845,381
3, 431, 762
3,950,264
3,521,087
6,686, 742
7, 135,992
10,648,946
15,560,408
17, 152, 128
10
10
10
13
17
I, 655, 387
I, 795,738
2,901,236
4,770,378
5,671,076
7
7
7
7
7
1, 364,409
1, 509,140
1,956, 729
3,028,466
3, 180,994
11
II
11
11
12
3,666,946
3, 83 1, 114
5,790,98 1
7, 761,564
8,300.058
45
45
45
45
45
23,49 1, 709
26,433, 193
24,665,624
28,488,893
27,758,907
17
17
17
17
16
7, 511, 887
8,528,422
7,637, 453
9,394,344
9,109,4 11
14
14
13
13
13
5,390,073
5,953,001
5,831, 475
6,756,431
6, 401, 354
14
14
15
15
16
10,589, 749
11 ,951, 770
11 , 196,696
12, 338, 118
12, 248, 142
47
46
41
41
36
29,079, 134
32, 156,935
27,791,280
28,651 ,570
25, 693.027
19
19
17
17
13
10,840,617
12,474,673
9,883,083
10,586,529
8,498,835
14
13
IO
10
10
6, 539,679
6,891,815
6,394, 534
6,451, 247
6,385,516
14
14
14
14
13
11,698,838
12,790,447
11,513,663
11 ,613, 794
10, 808,676
20
16
14
11
11
12, 124, 418
7, 101,226
5,814, 395
5,754,030
6,177,623
7
4
4
3
3
3,373,803
774,4 19
1,011,500
899,098
I, 389,813
9
9
8
6
6
5,252,650
4. 709, 718
4,258,030
4,402,015
4. 140. 871
4
3
2
2
2
3. 497,965
I, 617,089
544,865
452. 917
646,939
11
11
14
13
7,245,231
8,528, 430
10,256,615
10. 027. 902
3
3
4
1, 634,579
2,013,925
2,079.548
2,254.588
6
6
6
5
4. 964. 009
5, 58i . 894
6, 634. 370
5,694 , 257
2
2
4
4
646, 643
926. 611
1,542,697
2,079,057
10
1,720,827
2
$113,432
144,28 1
201, 659
(')
333,697
1905 _--------- -------1906 _____
___ ------ -------_
1907
_____
_______
1908 _________ _________
1909 _________ _________
16
23
26
25
24
3,430,882
3,72 1,876
3, 479, 619
2, 898,374
3, 694, 870
4
6
7
7
6
1910
--- ----------- ____________
1911________
1912 __ --- ------------1913_ ----------- -----1914 __ -------- - --- -- - -
26
26
28
29
28
4, 399, 258
5,192,961
6,348,861
7, 185, 404
6,628,093
1915 __ ---- --- - -------1916 __ -- -------------1917 __ ---- --------- - -1918 ________ _________ _
1919 _____ ____ ___ ______
28
28
28
31
36
1920_
- ---1921_ ----______------___________
1922 __ ________________
1923 ___ ------ ------ --]9?4 _ - ---------------1925_ - ----------- ---- 1926 ____
_---_______
--------- ---1927
________
1928 ______ _______ ___ ___
1929 _ - ----------- - ---1930 ___ ---- ----------1931_ __ -- ---- _- ---- --1932 ______ _------ - ---1933 ______ ___ ____ _____
1934 __ ---- ------ -----1935 _____ ________ ___ ___
1936 ___ ____ -------- --1937 ___ ---------- ----1938 ________ _____ _____
1
Amount
on
deposit
2
$523,403
694,848
1,063,427
/')
Number of
banks
$214,438
289,285
299, 185
(')
328, 729
5
5
7
1900 _______
--------------190L
____
________
1902 __ ---- ---- -------1903 __ ------- ------ - -1904 - --- -------- -----
Amoun t
on
deposit
Williamson County
(!)
1
1
2
(')
4
2
2
2
(')
(!)
2
2
3
$195,533
261, 282
562,583
6
1,058,401
(!)
Not available.
Source: Illinois Auditor of Public Accoun ts, Statemrnt of Condition of 5Yate Banks in Illinois, annual,
Springfield , 1900-1938; and U.S. Comptroller of t he Currency, Indil'idual Statements of Condition of National
Banks at the Close of Business. December SI. 1900[-1988) . supplements to the annual reports of t he Comptroller
of the Currency, Washington, D . C.
Digitized by
Original from
INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
TABLES•
175
Tab le 25. -Number of Depositors and Amount on Deposit in United States Postal
Sa vings Offices in Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Counties, 1914-1938
Total
Franklin County
Saline County
Williamson County
Year
Depositors
Depos.
itors
Amount
1914 ••••• ••••.• • ••. .••• .
1915 ••..•••••• ••.•.• ••• •
1916 ••••.• ••••••. . •••·• ·
1917 • ••.• .•••.• •••..• . •.
1918 ••••·••·• • • • •··· ·• •
rn1
500
738
820
(1)
$4 , 738
1919....• •.•••••.•••••• •
1920.... ...•..•...•.• • .•
1921...•....•••• •.•.••• •
1922. ...•••.. •••..••••• •
1923 .. .•••.•••••.• ..•• ••
844
550
516
38C
309
401 1
335
415
615
754
1924 ••... ..••••••• • ••.. .
1925 .•••. ..•••••••••• •..
1926 .• .••.•••.•••• •• ••. .
1927 . ...• .•..•••••••••. .
1928 . ......•.• •• •••••.. .
Amount
166
273
489
515
(1)
$3 1, 584
58,018
121,423
196, I
(1)
430,962
275,242
293,875
249,553
196,093
554
365
369
251, 510
309,216
336,976
519,491
672. 551
94, 95
169,367
283,047
(1)
Depos• Amount Depos.
itors
itors
Amount
24
52
71
63
$3,451
6,
11, 64
16,636
(1)
IOI
175
178
242
(')
13,703
30,052
36,296
69,530
(1)
217
300,682
197,129
220,529
183,981
147, 60
63
41
30
24
15
30,59
20,357
19,997
II, 091
5, 9i6
227
144
117
97
77
99,682
57, 756
53,349
54, 4 I
42,509
242
294
313
478
573
186, 743
235,659
272,249
422,353
,'32, 283
II
8
9
37
42
5,880
6,410
6,089
23,685
31,255
82
99
93
5 . 7
67. 14,
JOO
139
73, 453
109,013
41
515
141
492
1,580
2,586
2,935
1, 59 . 603
2, 939
3,095
3,283
3,277
3,035
1, 6?5, 571
1,642,306
I , 701, 948
I, 647,955
1, 64~. 606
259
(1)
1929 . .••• .••••• ..•••••• .
1930 .•••• •••••• • • • • •..••
1931 . ..•.• ••••••• • ••••• •
1932 .. .•• ••••• ..•• ••• ••.
1933 .. ....••• •••••••••• •
84
2,028
4,936
7, 150
7,760
793, 3 I
1,771, 566
3,484,198
4,344,848
4,640,474
666
1, 412
2,841
3,682
3, 736
636,943
1,265,425
2,089,292
2,336,541
2,364,638
2
1,089
31,140
92,224
373,316
550, • 3
677,233
1934 •. .• ••••• • •. •• • ·•···
1935 ••••••••• • •••••.••. •
1936 ..••• •• •••••..••• .•.
1937 ••••.••••••••••...••
1938 •. ...• •. ••...••••.••
7,467
7,636
7,947
7,985
7,400
4,392,844
4,274, 727
4,308,850
4, 191,191
4, 116, 216
3,604
3,688
3,881
3,943
3,564
2,168, 762
2,066,670
2, C54, 456
2,022,660
I, 929. 715
924
53
783
765
801
598,511
565, 751
552,446
520,576
542, 95
124
.638
125, 29
413,917
I, 021, -190
1, 45i, i24
1 Not a ,ailable.
ource: Letter From tM P ostmaster General Trammitting the Report of Operations of the Postal Saving,
Svstem, for the Fiscal Y ear Ended Ju11e SO, 1914(-1938], annual report to the Bouse of Representatives, Wash•
ington. D. C.
Table 26.-State o f Birth of Family Heads Residing in Carrier Mills, Johnston City,
Herrin , and Eldorado
1----~---,I
~ ,----311
Family beads
State of birth
- - -- - -- -- - - ·I-N_um
_ __b_e_r
T ot al.. ........ .. . .. ...
Alabama ............... .....
Illinois ............... .. · · · ·· \
Indiana .... . ....... .. ... ......
I
, 951
5,580
173
I
Family beads
State of birth
Percent ·'-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _N_um
__b_er Percent
1
100
Kentucky ....... . ..•. . . . . ....
750
8
62
2
I
; Ie~~~e_-_-_-::::::: : : ::::::::
Otbe_rStates ... _...... .... .. . .
Foreign countnes ........ . . .
231
215
409
1,370
Digitiz"d by
Original from
NTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA·CHAMPAIGN
3
2
5
15
1 76 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
Table 27.-Popu lat ion of School Ag e in Franklin , Saline, and Williamson Counties,
1918-1938
Population
of school age
(6-21 years)
Year
Population
of school age
(6-21 years)
Year
- -- - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - 1-- - - - - - - - - - - - - -1-- - - - 191 ··· ··••···················· ······
1919..•.. ..•••••••••••.•••• •• ••• •••••
1920 ····• ·•••••·····••••••••·•• ••• ••
1921 ··• •··················· ········
1922 ···· •·· ·· ··········· ·· ··········
46,842
47,233
48,314
52, 276
54,404
1929 .. •..••....•.•••.••••• • .••••••••.
1930•.•.•• • .•.••.••••.•••• ••••••• .•••
1931 ... •••. ••.•• •••.•••.•. • • •.• ••.••.
1932. .•. ··• •··•••••••· •·•••••• ••• ••••
1933 .•••••••.•..••••••• ••••• ••• •• ••••
51,168
49,813
45,112
45, 144
43,855
1923. ····· ···· ··•············· ······
1924. · ···· ············ ·············•
1925 .. .••••.•..•.•.••••• •.••••• •••••.
1926 .. •••.•.••.•.••••••.••..•••.••• •.
1927 ....... .••••••••.•••••••••..••••.
·· ··························
1928..
57,959
57,347
55,908
55,666
52,934
53, 184
1934•• • ·•· ······················· .•••
1935... · ··•••·•·•••·•·•••·•••••••••••
1936•••.•• ....•••••••••••• • • • ••.•••••
1937 ..•.•.......•.. •· •••·••••••••·••
1938 . . ..................... ......... .
45,696
42,096
39,632
41, 728
41,098
Source: State of Illinois Su perintendent of Public Instruction, Statistical Report, annue.l, Springfield,
1918-1938.
Table 28.-Expe nditures for Public Assistance by Type of Aid , Franklin, Saline, and
Williamson Counties, 1925-1929
[Amounts in tho usands]
Expenditures for public assistance
Y ear
Aid to the
blind
Total
$27
27
26
39
62
$95
87
87
109
125
·· ·········-··················· ······
1925..
1926 . . ···· ·•···•·•·•••••• •· ••••··•·•·····•·•··
1927 ...• ···••••• .•.••••••• ········•·····•· .•••
1928 .. · ····························· ··········
]929 ...•.• .•.....•.•.•••.•.•...•..•..•.. ...•••••
Mothers'
pension
Pauper relief
$16
15
15
23
23
$52
45
46
47
40
Source: Original pauper records in the country courthouses at Benton, Harrisburg, and Marion, Ill.
1 Annual Coal.Mine Pay Roll and Public.Assistance Expenditures
in Franklin , Saline, and Williamson Count ies, 1925-1938
Table 29.-Estimated
[Amounts in thousands]
Year
1925. • ••••••··• •• •••••••••
1926 . · ······· ········ · ····
1927 • •. ···· ···· ••······ ··
1928 .. ................... .
1929 .• •••••. • •.•.•.•••••••
1930. _·········· ········ ··
1931. .• • •· •• ••• ·•··•••••••
Public•
Estimated 1 assistance
coal-mine
expendi•
pay roll
tures
$36,992
40, 221
25,034
29,433
24,540
19,366
15,367
$95
87
87
109
125
121
9
Estimated 1
coal•mine
pay roll
Year
1932. •..•.•..•• •.•••• •••••
1933 .••••••••• •••••• •••••.
1934 •• ·• • ••••• ••••• ••·•·•·
1935 ••••• • ••• •• • • ••. ••••.•
1936• •• •.••••• •.•• ••••• •. •
1937 ••••.•••.•• • .••.••. •••
1938 •••..•• ·•···•··•·•·••
$8,384
8, 667
9,482
9,871
11 ,020
II , 535
8,692
~~~~~
expendi•
tu rns
$447
1,181
3,509
3,842
5, 184
5,454
8, 174
1 E stimated on the basis of man•days worked each year mu ltiplied by tbe United Mine Workers or
America wage scale each year.
Source: Original pauper record s in tbe county courthouses at Benton, Harrisburg, and Marion, Ill .;
}.fonthlv Bulletin on R elief Statistics, Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, Chicago; Division of Statistics,
Illinois Work Projects Administration, Chicago; Fifth Illinois District, National Youth Administration,
Herrin ; Old Age Assistance Di\"ision . Tllinois Department of Public Welfare. Springfield .
Digitized by
Original from
INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA·CHAMPAIGN
Appendix B
LIST OF TABLES
Table
Page
1.
umber of shipping coal mines opened, abandoned, and in operation
in Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Countie, 1900;-1939 _________
157
2. Men employed at shipping coal mines in Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Counties, 1900-1940_____ ____ ____ __ ________ _ __ ______
157
3. Production, capacity, and average number of days worked at shipping
coal mines in Franklin, Saline, and William on Counties, 1900-1940_
159
4. Average hourly earnings of hand loader in bituminou coal mining in
principal producing States, elected years, 1919-1933 ___ _
159
5. Bituminous coal production in the United States by principal producing States, 1910-1939 ____ _____ ___ ·----- ---- ---------160
6. Production at shipping coal mines by method of loading, Franklin,
Saline, and Williamson Counties, 1927-1939____ __________ __
161
7. Men employed, capacity, output per man-day, and percent of output
loaded by machinery at the 21 mechanized shipping coal mine in
Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Counties, 1926--1938___ _ __ __
162
8. Bituminous coal produced per man-day in the United State and in
underground and strip mines in Franklin, Saline, and "Williamson
Counties, 1900-1939 _______ _________ ________ ·- - - ----------- __
162
9. Production and men employed at local coal mines in Saline and
Williamson Counties, 1900-1939 ____ ___________ ___________ - -163
10. Population, labor force, employed workers, and unemployed worker ,
and workers on work programs, by sex, 7 southern Illinois coal
towns_______ _________________________________ ___ _ __ ______
164
11. Usual occupation of employed and unemployed workers in 7 outhern
Illinois coal towns __________ _________________ ------- - ---- -165
12. Industry of usual occupation of unemployed workers, by sex, 7 outhern Illinois coal towns___ ____________ ____ - ____ - - - __ - - - _ - - 166
13. Industry of usual occupation of employed and unemployed worker ,
by age group, 7 southern Illinois coal towns_ - __ 166
14. L abor force and unemployed workers in 7 outhern Illinoi coal town ,
by age group ___ ___________________ ________ 167
15. Employment status of families in 7 southern lllinoi coal town __ - _
I 67
16. Duration of unemployment since last full-time job of worker in 7
southern Illinois coal towns___ _____
168
17. Duration of unemployment of worker in 7 outhern Illinois coal
towns, by industry of last full-tim e job __________ -- - ---169
177
Die 11 z u
by
'.JTERI\JET ARCHIVE
011gina1 f1 um
UNIV:..~SITY OF ILL 'JOIS A~
U::\BANA-CHAl'I. AIGN
178 • SEVEN STRANDED COAL TOWNS
Page
Table
18. Unemployed workers who had never held a full-time job, 7 southern
170
Illinois coal towns, by age group_ _____________________________ _
19. Status of families without private employment in 7 southern Illinois
170
coal towns_________ _______ ___ _____________________________ __
20. Assessed valuation of r eal property in Franklin, Saline, and William171
son Counties, selected years , 1913-1932______ __ ___ ____ ____ ______
21. Number of deeds for town real property recorded in Franklin, Saline,
and Williamson Counties and the average value of deeds in William171
son County, 1900-1938___________ __________ _________ __ _______
22. Taxes collected and current taxes extended in Franklin, Saline, and
172
Williamson Counties, 1908-1937___ _______ __________ ______ _____
23. Activity of building and loan associations in Franklin, Saline, and
173
Williamson Counties, 1900-1936___ ________________________ ____
24. Number of banks and amount on deposit in State and national banks,
174
Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Counties, 1900-1938_ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ _
25. Number of depositors and amount on deposit in United States Postal
Savings offices in Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Counties, 1914175
1938_____ _ _ __ _ __ __ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ __ __ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ __ _ _ __ _
City,
26. State of birth of family heads residing in Carrier Mills, Johnston
175
Herrin, and Eldorado_ _________ ___ ____ ______________ ___ ___ ____
27. Population of school age in Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Counties,
176
1918- 1938___ _________ __ _________ _____________ ____ ___ __ ____ __
28. Expenditures for public a istance by t ype of aid, Franklin, Saline,
176
and Wi!Jiamson Counties, 1925-1929_ ___ __ _______ ________ ______
29. Estimated annual coal-mine pay roll and public-a sis tance expendi176
tures in Franklin, Saline, and Williamson Countie , 1925- 1938 _ __
DigitlZ"'r' by
Cn~1nal from
INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
Index
179
Diqitized by
Original from
INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
Digitized by
INTERNET ARCHIVE
Original from
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
INDEX
(Excludes appendix tables, which are listed in appendix B .I
Page
Abandoned m ines (see also Mechanization of loading)
24, 59-62
Attempts to reopen:
C ooperatives _ _ _
92
Vi' age concessions _
_ 91-92
Effects of _ _ _ _ _ _
_ 62, 64
Ag ri culture. See Back-to-th e-farm movement; Fam1ing.
Aid to the blind _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _____ _ _ _____ 125, 127, 137n
Aid to dep end ent children . See Moth ers' pensions.
American Legion _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
129
Am erican Society of Friend;,
129
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
Areas su rv eyed (see also Franklin County; aline County ; Southern
Illinois coal field; \\'illiam . on County)
_ _ _ _ _
xxi
Associated Charities_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
128, 129
Back-to-the-farm movement (see al.~o Farming) _ _
101--106
Ban king _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ 11-1 . 0- a
Collap e _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
2- :3
85- (i
Effect on local governm ents
_____ lOn , 12, 18, 2-L 7 , 3:3
Deposits _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Barter _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
46n
83
Bf'll & Zoller Coal & Mining C ompany_
l-!611
Beveridge, Sir \\"illiam __
2611
Bevis, Josep h C ___ _
_ _ 7411 , On
Birger , Charlie ____ _
11 9- 120
Birth rate, 1930-1939 __ _
Bli11d, aid to. See Aid to the blind.
Bootleggin g _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
89n
British d epres ed areas. See Depressed areas.
15011
Brown, Mal colm _ _ _
1 17
Buildin g and loan association s
__ _ 77- 80
D eclin e _ _ _ _ _ _ _
79- 80
And housing shortage _
_ _ 75-76
And vacant houses _ _
12, 73, 75, 76, 77
Volume of b usiness ___ _ __ _
Bureau of Labor Statistics. See 1 . S. Department of Labor.
Bureau of Min es. See U . S. D epartment of the Interior.
61
C. W. and F. Coal Co __ _
Captive min e _ _ _ _ _
Carsten , Arthur __ _
Carterville prepared lum p
Cassmore, Orin _ _ _ _ _
5
_ _ 23n,
6
150n
181
DI II Z
by
TFR'-JET ARCHIVE
On
),1gina1 f1um
ui. v:..~s1· v OF ILL ors AT
U::\BANA CHA~1 AIC,N
182 • INDEX
Pa.ge
_ 19n, 60n, 96n, 102n, 11 ln
Census, Bureau of the _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad __ _
4
- - - - - - - - Chicago, 'Wilmington, and Franklin Coal Co. S ee C. W. and F. Coal Co.
128
_ _ _ _ _ _
Church Benevolent Association _ _ _
133, 134, 137, 139
Civil Works Administration __ _____ _
_ _ 43, 44n, 45, 119
Civilian Conservation Corps _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Clothing. See U nemplo_v cd, living standards.
Coal industry, United State (see also Southern Illinois coal industry):
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
54
Competition from other fuels _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ 53- 54
Overexpan s ion _ _ _ _ _
_ 57-58
Unionization ________ _
136
Coal-mine pay roll, 1925-1938 __ _
146n
Commissioner for the Special Areas in England and Wales _
146n
Commiss ioner for the Special Areas in Scotland _ _ _ _
90
Committee for the Elimination of Mining Machinery _
128
Community Chests _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
10-11
Company town s _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
61
Con olidated Coal Co. (of St. Louis) ______ _
Cooperative mines. See Abandon ed mines, attempts to reopen.
Counties surv eyed. See Areas surveyed.
_ 141, 144
Crab Orchard Lake project _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Dennison, S. R _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 146n, 14 7n, 148n
Depressed areas (see also Back-to-the-farm movement; Indu tri es, attempts
to attract; Migration; Southern IIJinois coal field):
xv- xvii
American _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
143- 145
Approach to problems oL
146-148
British policies _____ _ _
xvi
D efinition _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Diet. See Unemployed, living standards.
45, 133
Direc t relief (see also Relief) _ _ _ _ _ _ _
55
Displaced miners _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ 32n, 92-93
Divided time (see also Underemployment) ____ _
xxn
129
131, 139
"Egypt," location (see also "Little Egypt")_
Elks _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Emergency Work Relief Program_ _ ___ _
Emigration. See Migration.
Employment:
Coal mines _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Other industries __
Policies _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
R elative to population_
Experienced worker, definition
_ _ _ 7, 8, 66, 67
102
_ _ _ _ _
_ 29-31
113- 114
39n
Factory promotion schemes. S ee Industries, attempts to attract.
149n
Fair Labor Standards Act _
Family un employment. S ee Unemployment.
143
Farm Security Administration _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Farming (see also Back-to-the-farm movement; Mine products, value compared with farm products) __________ _____ xx, 103- 104, 105
Digitized by
Original from
INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
INDEX • 183
Page
Federal Emergency Relief Administration _________ xv, 131 , 134, 144n
Franklin County, Ill . (see also Slope mining; Southern Illinois coal field):
Bank failures __________ _________ _ ____ 81n, 83
Coal production _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _
xix
Mine abandonment _
_ _ _ _ _
62n
Population _ _ _ _
xxi
Public assistance _
_ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _
135
Shipping mines, number _
63
Frisco Lines _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
5
Fuel -burning efficiency
_ _ _ _ _ _
54-55
Fuel expenditure, percent of manufacturing cost
_ _ _ _ _
96n
Gates, John W __
Glick, Frank Z _ _
Goodrich, Carter
Gopher holes _
Definition __
Green, Lee S _ _ _
Guided migration. See Depressed areas, British policies; Migration.
Hepburn Act of 1906 _ _ _ _ _
Hocking Valley, Ohio, coal _
Hopkins County, K y., coal
Hotchkiss, Willard E _ _ _ _
Housing. See Building and loan associations; Unemployed, living standards.
4
130n
146n
93- 95
xxn
146n
5n
56
56n
64n
Illinois Auditor of Public Accounts __ _____________ 173n, 174n
Illinois Central Railroad _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
4, 5
Illinois Department of Mines and Minerals ___ _ 157n, 158n, 161n, 162n, 163n
Illinois Department of Public H ealt h _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 116n
Illinois Department of Public Welfare ______________ 133n, 176n
Illinois Emergency R elief Comm ission _______ 130, 131 , 133n, 137n, 176n
Illinois State Board of Education
17 ln
Illinois State Department of Labor _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
138n
Illinois State Tax Commission _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 171n, 172n
Illinois Steel Company _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
4
Illinois Works Progress Administration. S ee Works Progress Administration.
Immigration. See Population, so urces.
Income, miners' annual (see also Coal-mine pay roll, 1925-1938; Unemployed, income; Wages) ____________ _ __ - __ - - 25
Industrial transference. See Depressed areas, Bri tish policies.
Industrial Transference Board ______ _ ___ _ ___ _ - - - - 147n
Industries, attempts to attract ___ _ ____ ___ __ - - _ 15n, 95- 102
Inexperienced workers. See Unemployment, and youth.
2, 59, 74, 75, 80
Jacksonville Scale _
Kiessling, 0. E _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _
55n
Knights of Columbus _ _ _ _ _
- - _ - 129
"Knights of the Flaming Circle"
_ - - _ 74n
Ku Klux Klan _____ ___ _______ - - _ - - _ - - - - - 74n, 5
C'1g1t1ze1
v
'NT ,.{NET ARC •Iv-
Or gm .... 1
Jr
L NIVfRS,TY OF 'L•NOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPA,l '-.J
184 • INDEX
Labor force:
Decrease _
Definition
Proportion of females
_ _ _ _ _
Proportion of population _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Southern Jllinois and selected urban areas compared
Labor organization. See Unionization.
Leiter, Joseph _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
"Little Egypt" _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_
Living standards. See Unemployed.
L ocal government finances (see also Taxes, structu re) ________
Local improvements:
Financing _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Needed in depressed areas __ _ _ ___ _
_
Local mine, definition (see also Gopher holes) _ _
Page
32
_ 25- 26
26
25
26
4,6
109, 13]
_ 10-18
20-21
151- 152
xxn
Machine loading. See M echan ization of loading.
M echanization of loading _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 24, 64-66
Effect on employment _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
66
Compared with mine abandonment
62
Efficiency _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ 65- 66
Opposition to _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ 90- 91
Medical care. See Unemployed, living standards.
Migration (see also Population, trends):
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 115, 118- 119
Distribution by age _ _ _ _ _ _
Factors retarding ______ __ _ _
108-109, llO, 112- 11 3, 120-121
Guided, efficacy of
150
M ethod of estimating _
118n
Mine abandonment. See Abandoned mines.
Mi ne efficiency __________________________ 68-69
Mine pay roll, 1926 ________ _ _ _
23
Mine products, value compared with farm products _
19
Miners, displaced. See Displaced miners.
Miners, income. See Income, miners' annual.
Mining methods. See Shaft mining; Slope mining; Strip mining.
Missouri Pacific Railroad
_____ _
3, 5
Mobile loaders _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
65
Mothers' pensions _ _ _ _
_ _ _ 125, 137n
National defense program _ _ _ _ _
National Industrial R ecovery Act_ _
National Institute of H ealth. See U.
National Labor Relations Act
National Recovery Administration
National Resources Committee __
ational Youth Administration __ _
New Orient mine _____ _
New York Central Railroad
Oil, discover y of
Old-age a. sistance _
Old Ben Coal Co __
_
_ _______ xv, 2n, 143, 149- 151
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
55-56
S. Public Health Service.
1-l9n
_ 55-56
120n
_ _ _ _ _ 43, 44n , 45, 133n, 140-141, 176n
_ _ _ _ _
_ _ 23, 60, 61, 90
---- -
5
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
53n
45, 133, 134, 137
_ _ _ _ _ _
61
Digitized by
Original from
INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
INDEX • 185
Part-time work. See Divided time; Underemployment.
Pauper relief. See Relief, predepression policies.
Payne, Stanley L _ _
Peabody Coal Co_ _ _
Pit-car loaders _ _
Pocahontas coaL __
Poor farm s _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _
Population (see also Birth-rate, 1930- 1939; Migration):
Depressed areas, United States _______ _
Southern Illinois:
Composition _
School age _
Sources
Trends_ ~ _
Postal Savings _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _
Progressive Miners of America
Strike of 1932 __ _ _ _
Property values _
Public assistance. See Relief.
Page
41n
61
65
57
126
xv
xx, 114-115, 117
llln, 113- 114
____ 109- 110
110-112, 114-117
17n, 73, 83- 84
60, 116n
66n
12
Quaker school kitchens (see also American Society of Friends) _ _ ___ 129, 131
Real estate:
Boom _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ 13- 16, 71 - 72
Col lapse _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ 72- 74
Effect on local financial structure _
85
Deeds recorded _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _
73
Values_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ 73, 74
Reconstruction Finance Corporation _
131
Red Cross flour _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ 129, 131
Relief (see also Aid to the blind; American Society of Friends; Associated
Charities; Church Benevolent Association; Civilian Conservation Corps;
Community Chests; Direct relief; Emergency Work Relief Program;
Federal Emergency Relief Administration; Illinois Emergency Relief
Commission; Mothers' pensions ; National Youth Administration; Oldage assistance; Poor farms; Quaker school kitchens; Social Security Act;
Unemployment compensation; Work programs; Work relief; Works
Progress Administration):
l31
Allowances, 1932- 1933 _
124
Coal operators, attitude _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Early depression _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
128- 132
Expenditures _________ __ _
136
136- 137
Effect on local economy _
_ _ _ _ _
_ 134- 137
Load _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - Composition _ _ _ _ _
_ ___ _
137- 138
xv
Depressed areas, United States _
124-125
Local businessmen, contribution of
123- 128
Predepression policies _
- - - - 151
Prospects of future need
_ _ _ 131- 132
Results of inadequacy
129
State aid _ _ _ _ _
I 26, L28, 132
Union participation __
[.,j(
lliZt!d by
'JTERNET ARCHIVE
Original from
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
186 • INDEX
Page
14411
Re ettlement Administration
14411
Resettlement attempts _ _ _
2n
Rice , Millard Milburn __ _
Royal Commission on the Geographical Distribution of the Industrial
Population _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____ _ 146n, 147n
55n
Saeger, Geoffrey A
61
Sahara Coal Co_ _
Saline County, Ill . (see also Southern Illinois coal field ) :
Bank failures __ ___ ________ _ __ ________ 81n, 83
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ xix-xx
Coal production
62n
Mine abandonment _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
xxi
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Population _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
135
Public assistance _
63
_ _ _ _ _
Shipping mines, number _
Schools:
Inadequacy of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
21
State aid to _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
88
Seasonal unemployment. See nemployment compensation.
Seven towns. See Areas surveyed.
Shaft mining _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
61 , 64
xixn
Definition _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Sharing the work. See Divided time.
Shipping mines:
xxn, 93
Definition _ _ _ _ _ _ _
63
_ _ _ _ _ _
umber of _ _
Slope mining _ __ _ _ __ _______________ _ _ _ 61- 62, 64
62n
Impossible in Franklin County _
Definition ________ _
xixn
137
Social Security Act _ _ _ _ _ _
Southern Illinois coal:
__ _ _ _ _ 6, 56-57
Competiton from other coals
56
Freight-rate advantage
10
Importance in American industry
6- 7
Marketing advantages _
Quality _ _ _ _ _ _ _
56n
Southern Illinois coal field (s ee also Franklin; Saline; and Williamson
Co un ties, Ill.):
3- 5
Consolidation of owne rship _
2- 3
Decline, causes _
6
Development _
3-4
Discovery
102
Industries _ _ _
_ _ _ xviii-xix
Location _ _ _
7, 9,68
Mine capacity _ _ _ _ _ _
Product ion _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ 7, 9, 58, 68
66- 69
Prospects
Southern Illinois coal industr y:
57
Competition with oil and gas _ _
19-20
Value of property __
Southern Illinois, Inc _ _ _ ____ _
102, 106n
Digitized by
INTERNET ARCHIVE
vng ,al from
UNIVERSITY OF ILLl'-1015 AT
UKBANA-CHAMPAIGN
INDEX • 187
Page
Special Areas Development and Improvement Act _ _ _ _ _ _ _
146n, 147- 148
Spencer, Vivian _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
55n
Spontaneous migration_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ 152- 153
State of Illinois Superintendent of Public Instruction _____ _
176n
Strike of 1922, effects
59
Strip mining _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
62, 64
Definition _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
xxn
Subsidization of industry. See Industrie , attempts to attract.
Subsistence Homesteads, Division of. See U. S. Department of the
Interior.
Sullivan County, Ind., coal ___ ____ _ ______ __ _
56n
Taxes:
Assessments
Collections _ _
Delinquencies
____ _
Effect on local government functions
Extensions _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Structure __________ _
Towns surveyed. See Areas surveyed .
Transference. See Depre ed areas, British policies.
Transportation, inadequacy of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
18- 21
12, 73
_ _ ___ 85- 88
_ 86-87
12, 73
18-21,85-88
21
Underemployment (see also Divided time) ___ __ _____ 27, 28- 29, 66n
Urban areas compared _____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 27, 29
Unemployed:
_ _ 51- 52
Debts _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ 45- 46
Income ___ _
46-51
Living standards
Unemployment (see also Abandoned mines ; Mechanization of loading ;
Relief) _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 26- 28, 31- 36
And age _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ 33- 34
Depressed areas, United States
xvi
Duration _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _
_ 38-43
Family _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ 34-36, 44-45
Occupations compared
_ _ _ _ _
32- 33, 40
Urban areas compared ________________ 27, 33, 34, 35, 38
And youth _ __ ____ ___ _ • _ ___________ 34,41 , 42
Unemployment compensation ________ - _______ - - _
138
Unemployment relief. See Relief.
/
Unionization (see also Employment policies; Progressive Miner of America;
Strike of 1922, effects; United Mine Workers of America) _ _
5-6, 57- 58
United Mine Workers of America __________ - - - - - 5, 57, 58, 60
U. S. Bureau of Education _ _ _ _ _ _
21n
U.S. Comptroller of the Currency
174n
U. S. Department of Agriculture _
_ - - - 97
U. S. Department of the Interior :
Bureau of Mines _____________ 19n, 54n, 55n , 56n , 16011, 163n
Subsistence Homesteads, Division of ____ - _
144n
. S. Geological Survey _ _ _ _
_ ____ - _ - _ - _
190
U. S. D epartment of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
159n
U.S. Geological Survey. See U.S. Department of the Interior .
•
D ,I:
by
TER''-JFT ARCH VE
,1gina1 f1um
ui. v:..~s1 v oF ILL '1101s AT
U,BANA CHA~1 AIC,N
188 • INDEX
Page
50n
U.S. Public Health Service, National Institute of Health _ _ _ _ _ _ _
United States Steel Corporation ______ _
- - - - _ _ _ 4-5, 61
Urban areas compared with southern Illinois. See l:nderemployment;
Unemployment; Workers per family.
56n
56n
Vermillion County, Ill., coal
Vigo County, Ind., coal __ _
Wages (see also Abandoned mines, attempts to reopen; Coal-mine pay roll,
23, 57- 58, 9.5
1925-1938; Income, mi~ers' annual; J acksonville Scale)
131n
" Talker, Wilma
- _ - - Water supply_
_ ___ __ _
- _ 96--97
26n
Webb, John N
_ _ 23n, 8011
White, Ina _ _ _
Williamson County, Ill. (see also Southern Illinois coal field):
Bank failures _ _ _ _
81n, 83
Coal production, 1939 _
xx
Mine abandonment _
62n
Population _ _ _ _ _
xxi
Public assistance _ _
135
Shipping mines, number _
63
vVolfbein, Seymour L _ _ _ _
26n
Work programs (see also Relief; Unemployed, income; Works Progress
Administration):
_ _ _ _ _ _
144-145
Benefit to depressed areas _ _ _ _ _ _
Definition _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
43n
Employment, urban areas compared _
_ ____ 43-44
·work Projects Administration. See Works Progress Administration.
Work relief (see also Civil Work:;: Administration; Emergency Work Relief
Program; National Yonth Administration; vVork programs; \\' orks
Progress Administration) _
_ _ _ _ _
1:39- 141
Work week_ _ _ _ _
29
vVork year _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _
8, 9, 69n
Workers per family _ _ _ _ _
35
Urban areas compared _
_ __ 35, 36
Works P rogress Admini stration (see also \York program s ; \ York relief)
43,
44n, 45, 88, 93, 97, 133,134, 139- 141, 15 1, 176
_ _ _ _ _
140
Accomplishments __ _
Effect 011 local economy
140
Number employed __
139
Pay roll _ _ _ _ _ _ _
139
World War:
Effect on coal industry _ _
54
Effect on real-estate boom
15
Yaworski, Nicholas __ _____ __ _
Youth. See Unemployment, and youth.
55n
0
Digitized by
Original from
INTERNET ARCHIVE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
Digitized by
INTERNET ARCHIVE
Original from
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
FR OM
YO UR CO NG RE SS
MA N
\V.. . RU NT " BI SH OP
C.
Digitized by
INTERNET ARCHIVE
Original from
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
@FedFRASER