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J& Q



1892 - 1914





R O B E R T L. O W E N





To the Fathers and Mothers and to the youth of
France and of Germany, and of the W orld; to all
lovers of truth and fair play
T h is V o l u m e is D e d ic a t e d

W ith the friendly suggestion that

G l o r io u s L if e i n

P eace


B etter





O F 1892-1914

T h e M o st G ig a n t ic I n t r ig u e o f A l l T im e

The Germans did not will the war. It was forced
on them by the Russian Imperialists— Grand Duke
Nicholas, Isvolski, Sazonoff, Sukhomlinoff, and as­
sociates in control of Russia. The German, Rus­
sian, French, Belgian and allied peoples became
alike the sorrowful victims.
R e c e n t E v id e n c e

of the IN N E R S E C R E T S O F E U R O P E A N D I­
P L O M A C Y proves this.
A n effort so to condense the vital evidence that a
busy man may conveniently read it.
The happiness and future peace of the world re­
quire the reconciliation o f the German and French

In the summer of 1923 in Europe there fell into my hands
at Paris the work of Rene Marchand— Un Livre Noir—
containing the secret dispatches between the Russian Foreign
Office and Isvolski, the Ambassador of Russia at Paris imme­
diately preceding the W orld W ar.
In London I obtained de Sieberts’ publication of the like
secret dispatches between the Russian Foreign Office and
Benckendorf, the Ambassador of Russia at London.
M y interest was thus aroused and every book available
on the subject was studied because it was perceived that the
Allied Propaganda that they had fought unselfishly for demo­
cratic principles and to establish justice and right in inter­
national affairs had greatly deceived the people of the
United States.
It became perfectly obvious that the theory that the Czar
was leading the fight to make the world safe for Democracy
was ludicrous.
These Secret Dispatches showed that the theory that the
war was waged in defense of American ideals was untrue.
They also proved that the theory that the Entente Allies
were fighting a war to defend themselves and the United
States from the criminal design of William II to dominate
the world by military force was false.

Vl ll


It became clear that a few leaders of the Entente Allies
had instigated and launched the war inspired by the mixed
motives of imperialistic ambitions, greed for commercial and
political power, future security, revenge, hate, love of secret
diplomacy and intrigue, believing that the war would be
quickly ended, that the profit would be great and the future
enjoyment of such illicit gains well protected.
When the Records had been studied, the evidence and
my conclusions were presented to the American People in
the United States Senate, December 18, 1923.

M y action

was moved alone by my love for the people of the United
States, feeling that it was my duty as a matter of loyalty, to
disclose to them the truth, even if I seemed quite alone.
N ow that European interests are vigorously declaring by
a second great American Propaganda that it was “ Our War ”
as a basis for cancelling the W ar Debts, it has seemed worth
while to put in a compact form the evidence to show it was
not “ Our W ar,” and to show the Common People of all the
nations that they have been the victims of imperial intrigue
and unwise leadership, and that they should, by democratic
processes, defend themselves in future against the secret di­
plomacy and intrigue of unintelligent officials.— R. L. O.





The P ro b le m ....................................................
The E v i d e n c e ................................................
W hy Is the Truth U n k n o w n ? .........................10

r e -W a r


e n s io n



u r o p e

........................................ 16

I. R u s sia ...................................................................... 16
II. The Balkan S t a t e s ............................................. 18
III. I t a l y ........................................................................ 19
IV . F r a n c e ....................................................................21
V. Great Britain
V I. Germany . .......................................................25
V II. B e lg iu m .................................................................. 29
V III. S w it z e r la n d ......................................................... 31
IX . The High S e a s ..................................................... 31
X . I m p e r ia lis m ......................................................... 31





I n t r o d u c t i o n .........................................................................




lan s





o o ty

............................................ 34

I. How the World W ar W as Engineered b y a
Very Few M e n ...............................................34
II. The Franco-Russian Treaty of 1892-4 . . .
III. The Franco-Russian M ilitary Conferences . 41
IV . Dividing the Booty of W a r .............................. 47
V. The Triple Entente and Its W ar Plans . . 52
V I. M ilitary Arrangements and Mobilizations . 54
V II. Absence of a W ar Program in Germany . . 58



of c o n t e n t s



V III. The Secret Dispatches of the Russian For­
eign O ff ic e ...................................................... 66
IX . The European P re ss .............................................. 75
X . Bribery of the French P r e s s ..............................77
IV. How R u s s i a


F rance F





19 14


The W ill to W a r .................................................. 84
July 24, 1 9 1 4 .......................................................... 87
The Case Against P oincare..................................92
M o b iliz a tio n .......................................................... 94
Russian Telegrams Exculpate Germany . . 102
The Russian G o a l................................................ 119

G e r m a n y , A u s t r ia , B e l g iu m


E ngland


1 9 1 4 .........................................................................................



T he

Some Evidence
B e r l i n ........... 122
Kaiser Wilhelm Did Not Will the W ar . . 132
Some Evidence
B e l g i u m ........... 141
Some Evidence
L o n d o n ...............144
G reat

R e v i s i o n .................................................... 153

I. Disinterested French O p i n i o n .....................153
II. Some Very Late A u th o r itie s ...................... 167
III. Professor Barnes’ Conclusions with Regard
to the Attitude of the French Leaders
in Precipitating the World W ar . . . . 171
IV. Hon. John S. E w art’s V i e w s ......................186
1. W hy France Entered the W ar . . . .
2. Did Germany W ant W a r ? ..................187

3 Why Did the United Kingdom Enter
W a r ? .............................................. 187
V. The Conclusions of Mr. Lowes Dickinson . 188
V I. The Fourteen Pledges and the Treaty of
V e r s a i ll e s ..............................................190
V II. A French Appeal to Conscience................. 194
V III. British Appeal to Conscience.................... 197
IX. The Mania of W a r ................................... 199
X. C onclusion......................................................203
X I. B ib lio g ra p h y ..................................................209




T h e P roblem

The most gigantic conspiracy of all time in its conse­
quences was the intrigue of the Russian Imperialists, who
deliberately and intentionally brought about the World W ar
in 1914.

Isvolski was the evil genius chiefly responsible for

the final explosion.
The object was the control of Constantinople and the
Dardanelles, over-lordship in the Balkans and the seizure
of German and Austrian territory.
The motive was imperial greed for power, political, com­
mercial and financial.
The German territory lay between Russian and French
territory with no adequate natural defensive boundaries.
The German theory was that they must be strong enough
to prevent successful attack by Russia and France.


German leaders prepared against war and greatly feared it.
They knew the terrible odds against them.

They hoped

their preparedness would keep the Russian leaders from

Their hopes proved to be vain.

An intimate study of the causes of the World W ar and its




results shows that the common peoples of Europe did not
will aggressive w a r; that they were patriotic, brave and de­
termined to defend their own homes, but they did not have
the will to invade their neighbors’ territory for profit.


people of the belligerent nations were trained in the art of
war and made to believe it a virtue to cultivate the spirit of
a soldier.

Militarism was common to all.

A ll the people involved were, probably 90 per cent, or
more, innocent of wrong purposes, and they were all, whether
victorious or defeated, the victims of this tragedy.
O ver thirty-seven million people suffered death or muti­
lation, and other unrecorded millions disappeared.

Six mil­

lion died from civil strife and forty million from consequent
epidemics; hundreds of millions suffered indescribable sor­
rows and anxiety.

It was through no conscious fault of their

They merit compassion.

Whenever the people realize the great truth that they were
misled, that they were deceived by propaganda, that they
were all alike victims of the errors of unwise leadership, it
may be possible for them to understand each other and to
feel sympathy rather than hate, and understanding and good
will may be established.
Imperialists profited by international hate and promoted

They taught autocracy was necessary for war defense

and that the safety of the people required intensive military
preparation and centralized power.
The German Kaiser occasionally rattled the sword and
cultivated militarism while declaring himself the guardian



of peace.

The czar built up a huge army.


Austria, Serbia,

France, Italy, developed their arms to the extent of their
taxing power.
The people all went to the battlefields of death with cour­
age and loyalty, praying to God to bless the cause for which
they were making the supreme sacrifice.

The history of

their sufferings is the history of their credulity and patriot­
ism. The spirit of excessive nationalism, militarism and im­
perialism built up through centuries, was the atmosphere
which made this war possible, but the deliberate plans of the
Russian Imperial conspirators, who clearly saw the possi­
bility, made it a certainty.

The Russian Foreign Office

leaders willed and planned the war, and unhappily found in
the ambition of the Serbian leaders and in the fears, hates
and ambitions of a very few French leaders the material
which made the conspiracy brilliantly successful, as an in­
trigue, but a hideous and ghastly tragedy in the final issues.
It is doubtful if one Frenchman in ten thousand had any
knowledge that Poincare was deliberately leading France to

Neither the Russian nor French government really

believed that the German government intended aggressive
war on them but the military preparedness of Germany and
the bombast of some of its chauvinists laid a convenient but
false foundation for the French and British propaganda
that the German leaders had plotted the brutal military con­
quest of the world.
The reconciliation of the French and German people,
their mutual heartfelt moral disarmament is essential to phys-



ical disarmament; their mutual respect and good-will are
vital to their future peace and the future peace of Europe
and the world.
Valliant Coutourier, member of the French House of Dele­
gates, in accusing Raymond Poincare of having been respon­
sible with the Russian leaders for having caused the war, did
so “ on his honor as an old French soldier” ; and so “ on my
honor as a long-time member of the United States Senate,
I record the accusing evidence in this book and my pro­
found conviction that the conclusions are absolutely sound,
assuring those who read these lines that they have been
written as the result of careful study, entirely free from
any conscious prejudice or ill will, even against those be­
lieved directly responsible for unloosing the W orld W ar,
without any desire to stigmatize them, but with the purpose
of making the truth known in order that the people may be
ultimately reconciled to each other when they can better
understand each other.
W ith this book goes a prayer that it may be of some use
in establishing understanding, truth and good will.
R .L.O .
“ To sin by silence when we should protest
Makes cowards out of men.
The few who dare must speak and speak again
T o right the wrongs of men.”
“ There is no competent and informed historian in any country who
has studied the problem of the genesis of the World W ar in a
thorough fashion who does not regard the theory of war guilt held


a m



in Articles 227 and 231 in the Versailles Treaty to be wholly false,
misleading and unjust.” ( “Genesis of the W ar,” H. E. Barnes— 679.)
“ Never before in the whole history of historical writing has there
been so rapid and complete a change in the opinions of historians con­
cerning an event of major importance as has been witnessed in the
revision o f our conceptions concerning the causes of the outbreak of
the W orld W ar in August, 1914.” (ibid. 713 )


T h e E v id e n c e

The American people are the descendants, almost exclu­
sively, of the European people.

Their immediate ancestors

are British, German, Scandinavian, Dutch, Russian, French,
Italian, Greek, Spanish, etc., but the American people, sepa­
rated by three thousand miles of water, have been too busy
with their own affairs to search out the truth with regard
to the origin of the late war.

Indeed, the truth itself was

completely hidden from sight, first because the archives were
profoundly secret, then further obscured by willful false­
hood and by a flood of propaganda against the German
people, as well as against the German Government.


propaganda was useful to the Entente Powers and their

It enabled them to borrow ten billion dollars from

the United States, and finally to receive the military and
naval aid of the United States, and its powerful financial
and commercial support when the German Command con­
ceived it to be necessary as a war measure to submarine
American ships.
Fortunately for the world, the overthrow of the absolute
monarchy of the Czar of Russia put into the hands of the



revolutionary government all of the secret Russian archives
which have now been largely published, and from which the
world has been able at last to ascertain the actual truth as
to the infinitely dangerous intrigues of a few statesmen of
Russia, France, Serbia, Great Britain, etc.
W ith the overthrow of William II the German records
were opened wide by the Socialists, who had expected to
find the leaders of the German Empire under William,
guilty of willing the war.

They found their leaders did

not will the war.
The seizure of the Belgium records disclosed the secret
archives of Belgium.
The overthrow of the monarchy in Austria resulted in a
republican government, which made complete exposure or
publication of the records of Austria.
In Great Britain under their parliamentary system, im­
portant portions of the truth have been made public through
parliamentary inquiries and demands, and their Foreign
Office records will now be opened to public knowledge. The
French records have not been opened, but partly falsified
when published.
A s a consequence of these extremely important disclo­
sures, the refusals to disclose and falsifications, there no
longer remains any reason why the truth should not be

The truth is known to the historians and scholars

of the world.

The most important of these secret records

is first a book containing 858 secret dispatches passing be­
tween the Russian Foreign Office and the Russian Embassy

at London, entitled “ Entente Diplomacy and the W orld,” by
Benno de Siebert (Secretary of the Russian Embassy at
London, England), Knickerbocker Press, New York, and

“ Un Livre Noir” , consisting of two volumes edited by Rene
Marchand, published by the Librairie du Travail, Paris,


France, containing the secret dispatches between the Russian


Foreign Office and Isvolski, Russian Ambassador at Paris.


These two records are sufficient completely to disclose the


truth with regard to the launching of the World W ar, and
the manner in which it was done.


These two books alone

contain about 1,500 secret Russian dispatches.

Very volu­

minous quotations from these dispatches will be found in

the Congressional Record of December 18, 1923 (PP- 355


to 399).

On page 397 (ibid) will be found Exhibit 20, the

literature bearing upon this matter, together with a number


of books by French and other authors, which justify the conelusions which are set forth in this volume. (See Appendix.)
Among very distinguished French scholars who have
pointed out the responsibility of French and Russian leader-


ship for the W orld W ar will be found such men as Alfred
Fabre-Luce (author of La Victoire), who is a scholar of
distinction and a historical author.


Victor Margueritte, a

distinguished French writer, is responsible for obtaining
the first 102 signatures of distinguished French scholars,


generals, authors, men and women of Letters, to an appeal


to the conscience of France, demanding modification of


Article 231, and also the abrogation of Articles 227 to 230
of the Treaty of Versailles (the sanctions), in which the



German leaders were charged with being exclusively re­
sponsible for the W orld W ar.
Among the French authors who believed that the Ger­
man confession of war guilt was wrongfully extorted in
Article 231 or that certain French and Russian leaders
were responsible for launching the war will be found George
DeMartial, Gustave Dupin, G. de Toury, A . Pevet, Emile
Laloy, Rene Marchand, Colonel Converset, Alcide Ebray,
Lazare, Victor Margueritte, Millon, Mathias Morhardt, A.
Fabre-Luce, Ernest Renauld, Ernest Judet, J. Caillaux,
Charles Humbard, et al.

(See Supplement.)

Among the British authors of like opinion appear E. D.
Morel, J. M. Keynes, Francis Neilson, G. P. Gooch, G.
Lowes Dickinson, Raymond Beazley, Edith Durham, Irene
Cooper Willis, et al.
Among the American authors of like opinion are Pro­
fessor Sidney B. Fay, Professor Harry Elmer Barnes, Pro­
fessor Ferdinand Schevill, Charles E. Tansill, historical ex­
pert, Library of Congress, E. F. Henderson, Frederick Bausman, W . L . Langer, James W . Thompson, et al.
The Ex-Premier of Italy, Francisco Nitti, has written
strongly to like effect in a number of volumes. The revision­
ist viewpoint is supported by such Italian scholars as Corrado
Barbagallo, Augusto Torre and Alberto Lombroso.
In Belgium the new views on war guilt are supported by
such scholars as Alcide Ebray and V . de Brabandere; in
Sweden by Dr. A a l; in Denmark by Dr. Karl Larsen- in



Holland by Dr. N. Japiske; and in Hungary by Eugene
Horwath, Guillaume de Huszar and John Lutter.
The overwhelming majority of opinion in Russia is that
the Czar’s Government caused the war, and the succeeding
governments gladly gave full publicity to all the secret Rus­
sian records from which this fact is demonstrated.
From Serbia we have the “ Causes of the World W ar , by
Dr. M. Boghitchevitch, who was the Serbian Minister in
Paris and Berlin before the W ar, and fully confirms the
Russian Conspiracy.
In Canada we have John S. Ewart, K ing’s Counsel, who
wrote “ The Roots and Causes of the Wars 1914-18” , after
five years of intensive study, giving the evidence in great de­
tail and proving Russian and Entente responsibility.
These historians from Allied countries are among the
thousands of intellectuals throughout the world who now
know this history.

It must be remembered that Marchand s

translation of the Black Book “ Un Livre Noir” , has never
been published in English, and was only published in French
in 1923, and yet this volume is the official record of secret
telegrams proving clearly that the Russian leaders deter­
mined on this war, and took the successive persistent steps
during a period of twenty-two years— 1892-1914— to bring
it about.
Under the United States Senate Resolution (1925) to
collate the evidence on the origin of the World W ar, Charles
E. Tansill, expert historian, was assigned the task and is now
convinced of the Russian and French responsibility.




book has not been published as a Government document for
reasons of diplomatic amity.
A list of the more interesting bibliography is attached as
an exhibit to this volume.

A sweeping acknowledgment is

made to these authorities for the evidence in this volume.

W h y th e T ruth


U nknow n.

A natural question arises: “ How is it that a truth of such
gigantic consequence has not been made known to all the
world and freely recognized?”
The answer is simple— These most secret archives were
not published or known until some years after the war, and
when they were disclosed, naturally those who had carried
on the pre-war propaganda, and the war-time propaganda
in which not only the German Government but the German
people were bitterly denounced as the enemies of mankind,
were not disposed to confess that they had been parties to
an unsound propaganda against the German people.


international press, outside of Germany, had denounced the
Germans as guilty of the crime of unloosing the war, and
then charged the German troops with every crime in the
calendar— cutting off the hands of babies, bayoneting women
with child, crucifying soldiers, committing massacres on
noncombatants; boiling their own dead to make glycerine
for explosives, etc., etc., etc.

Every artifice was used to

make all the world hate the German name.
These war-time accusations of wholesale atrocities are no



longer believed by informed people. All armies contain some
individuals who exhibit atrocity during the terrible excite­
ment of war.

The story of cutting off the children s hands

was thoroughly investigated, and found untrue.

The story

of boiling the German dead to get the fat from their bodies
was proved to be the confessed invention of a British offi­

The press of the world, finding it embarrassing to re­

verse the views previously believed in, and by which the
world was misled, seems to prefer the position that the
question of war guilt was settled by the Treaty of V er­
sailles and need not be reopened.

Ih ey, therefore, have

failed as a rule to give publicity to the recently discovered
facts or to take the labor and pains to investigate.


this reason, the people of the world have not had access to
the truth except through books (such as those written by
the authors to whom I have referred), whose circulation is
The American press is a giant and has a giant’s responsi­
bility. Ultimately, when it knows the truth, it will do its full
Another obstacle to the knowledge of the evidence is
Entente official opposition.

The Treaty of Versailles (A r ­

ticle 231) had compelled the German leaders to accept com­
plete responsibility for the war.

It was not a treaty of

agreement. It was a treaty dictated by the victors, and the
conquered Germans (over their vehement protests) were
compelled to sign the confession of guilt under the threat,
after they had disarmed, of being invaded and devastated



by war by the Allied armies.

The German women and chil­

dren were suffering the extremities of death by starvation
under an Allied embargo as a means of coercing German con­
sent to the dictated treaty.

The Germans still strenuously

protest they did not will the war.

The Treaty of Versailles

violated many of the 14 points under which President Woodrow Wilson and the Entente Allies obtained the German con­
sent to the Armistice.

For these reasons, the governmental

powers of Europe, outside of Germany, were unwilling to
have any publicity given to the truth that a few Russian and
French leaders had willed this war and forced it on the
German leaders, on Europe and on the world.


the evidence has been largely suppressed by the leaders of
the Entente nations.
But the truth disclosed by the evidence cannot be kept
permanently concealed, and the scholars of the whole world
are now quite well advised with regard to the evidence.
The facts set forth in this book are based upon the evi­
dence of the official records of the belligerent governments,
and the particular records listed in Exhibit A will be found
to completely justify every important statement made in this
There are those who, accepting the facts of the evidence
disclosed, still attempt to put the responsibility of the world
war upon the German leaders on the theory that the Ger­
man leaders had no legal right to object to Russia’s exercise
of her sovereign powers of mobilizing within her own bor­
ders ; that Russia had a legal right to mobilize within her own



borders and that until she actually invaded Germany the
German leaders had no right to declare “a state of war exist­
ing” . But these apologists are compelled to confess that the
military menace of Russian mobilization under secret con­
tract to attack Germany on an undefended frontier, with no
natural boundaries and no adequate forces, exposed the
German military leaders to absolute destruction, if they had
failed to mobilize against such a military menace and recog­
nize it for what it was— war.
The evidence shows that the general mobilization of Russia
was itself a declaration of war, according to instructions
given and understood by the Russian leaders, and, infinitely
more important, the evidence now obtained discloses that
there W A S a secret contract of 1892 (kept actively alive
by annual secret military conference to 1914) between the
Russian and French leaders simultaneously to attack Ger­
many “at the first indication” of Austrian mobilization.
In 1892 Gen. de Boisdeffre, representing France, said to
the Czar, in construing the Secret Treaty of that date which
pledged Russia and France to attack Germany if one of the
Powers of the Triple Alliance should mobilize:
tion IS war.”

Alexander III replied:

“ Mobiliza­

“ That is as I under­

stand it.”
The evidence shows that the German leaders made a
strenuous effort to prevent the local conflict between Austria
and Servia from leading to a general European war, and that
the German leaders were not supported either in St. Peters­
burg, or Paris in this attempt to prevent a European war,



but were prevented from localizing the war, or adjusting it
by a concert of the powers, by the Russian leaders.


intended a local war and was opposed to a general war.
The war against Serbia into which Austria was deliberately
incited by the ruinous intrigues of Serbia at the instigation
of Russia was a trap into which Austria fell, not knowing
it was fomented by Russia to create the pretext of general
mobilization and war and to make Austria and Germany ap­
pear to the world as the wilful originators of the great
But the Russian Imperialists are convicted by the secret
treaties, military conventions, dispatches, documents and by
the confessions out of their own mouths— for example

( 1914):
Gen. de Boisdeffre— “ Mobilization is W ar.”


III agreed that Mobilization is an act of W ar.
Sazonoff, July 24.— “ This is the European W ar.”
Sukhomlinoff, July 25.— “ This time we shall march.”
Isvolski, August 1.— “ This is my war.”
Grand Duke Nicholas’ wife, Anastasia, quotes code mes­
sage from her father, King of Montenegro (July 22) : “ W e
shall have war before the month is out.
Grand Duke Peter’s wife, Melitza (Anastasia’s sister), to
Paleologue, July 22: “ You will get Alsace Lorraine back—
our armies will meet in Berlin— Germany will be annihilated,”
etc., etc., etc.
General Dobrorolski, declared that the W ar was definitely
determined, on July 25th.

Pashitch, Serbian Premier, stated



July 31st that the Russian peace negotiations were merely to
conceal W ar. The Russian General Palizyn confirms Pashitch
see Supplement, Sec. 25 and 29.
In 1916 SazonofT admitted that the World W ar was
brought on in 1914 by the determination of France and
Russia to humiliate Germany.
Colonel E. M. House wrote to the President of the
United States, from Europe May 29, 1914, (House, II,
248) :
“ Whenever England consents, France and Russia will
close in on Germany and Austria.”

I. R u s s ia

In the attempt to arrive at a just understanding of the
factors making possible the W orld W ar, it is necessary to
consider the psychology of the various then governing leaders
of the nations occupying Europe.
The Russian Government, under the Romanoff family,
had gradually acquired powers of absolute monarchy over
an area equal to about one-sixth of all the land in the world,






people speaking many languages and dialects.

The policy

of the Russian Government was to expand its power and its
territory whenever and wherever possible.
which led to the war with Japan.

It was this policy

It was this policy that

made the Russian Government desire to exercise hegemony
over the Balkans and led to the secret treaties with Serbia,
and Bulgaria, setting up the Czar as an arbiter over Balkan
disputes, having him pose as the protector of all the people of
Slav extraction.

The Russian Government deeply desired

the control of Constantinople and the Dardanelles as an out-


let for the free passage in war of her battleships.


desired not only to exercise hegemony over the Balkans, but
was secretly and intensively behind the Pan-Slav Movement,
which had for its object the disintegration of the AustroHungarian Empire and the seizure ultimately of Austrian
territory. Russia financed the Pan-Slav movement, especially
using Serbia as the instrument, subsidizing the Serbian press
and its officers for that purpose.
The Russian imperialists were jealous of the German Em­
pire and coveted German and Austrian territory and nego­
tiated a secret treaty with the French leaders to take a part
of it. To carry out these objects, Russia built up the greatest
army in Europe, estimated by the Russian press in 1914 as
containing 2,230,000 men ready for quick action, and having
over 14,000,000 men subject to a call to the colors, accord­
ing to Dobrorolski, General in charge of mobilization.
In order to carry out the ambitions of the absolute mon­
archy of Russia, not only were secret agreements made with
Roumania, Bulgaria and Serbia, but, still more important,
a secret agreement was made with the President of France
in 1892, contemplating a simultaneous attack on Germany
by Russia and France.

In order to make this attack suc­

cessful, it was essential not only to build up the military and
naval powers of Russia and France to a maximum, but it
was also necessary to subsidize the Russian and the French
press, and persuade public opinion of the honor, patriotism
and wisdom of the Russian government in its alleged policies,
the real policies never being exposed.



The terrible cruelty and corruption of the Russian military
autocracy had built up in Russia a very widespread, deepset revolutionary spirit, of which the belligerent section ap­
peared through organized nihilism.

It was believed by many

of the governing officers of Russia that a general war
against aliens would excite the patriotism of the Russian
people and consolidate them behind the government.


tually after Russia’s collapse in the World W ar, this revo­
lutionary spirit in Russia proved to be more hostile to the
Romanoff autocracy and supporting intelligencia than it wras
to the alien enemy.

It turned on the imperialists with de­

structive ferocity, tearing down the old standards of govern­
ment and even the State religion.

The Bolshevik regime

with Lenine followed.
In the spring of 1914, Russia through France finally had
arrived at a gentleman’s agreement with the British Gov­
ernment, through Edward Grey.
man’s agreement with Italy.

Russia also had a gentle­

In 1914 Russia’s preparations

for war were adequate for the great adventure.

B alkan

S tates

The Balkan states, Roumania, Bulgaria and Serbia, and
Turkey and Greece, during the several years preceding the
W orld W ar had engaged in three different wars, all of
them inspired by a spirit of militarism and imperialism, seek­
ing to obtain advantages, commercial and political, at the ex­
pense of their neighbors.

They had all developed the spirit



of militarism, and had built up their armies to the extent of
their taxing power.

The Serbian leaders were determined

on the policy of Pan-Slavism and a “ Greater Serbia” at the
expense of Austria.

The Serb press was violent against

A t Russia’s instigation Serbia plotted war against

Austria, for the disintegration of that nation; and some of
its military officers took an active part in planning the assas­
sination of the Austrian Grand Duke.
The Balkan Alliance out of which these wars arose was
constructed under Russia’s auspices.

Ita ly

Italy, whose government had a defensive alliance with
Germany, and Austria, had become ambitious to expand its
powers, and had entered upon a substantial colonization
policy in Northern Africa.

Italy was only bound to support

Austria or Germany in the event of a war of wilfull aggres­
sion against Germany or Austria, and Italy was not bound
if Germany or Austria were held to be the aggressor.


fore the World W ar began, Italy’s African interests and her
desire for future expansion were utilized by France, Great
Britain and Russia to weaken the alliance between Italy,
Germany and Austria, and Italy became a dead weight on
Germany and Austria.
depended on.

Italy’s support could no longer be

A fter the war began, Italy was given certain

other promises by the Entente Allies and fought Austria and


... „

................ ................................... ........ ........


.......— --------—



When the W orld W ar came on, it was an important part
of the strategy of Russia and France to make Germany and
Austria appear as the aggressors, in order that Italy would
have the justification of refusing to co-operate with Germany
and Austria.

This plan worked out successfully through

the Pan-Slav movement, the murder of the Archduke of
Austria and the violent propaganda carried on in Serbia
against Austria.

This political intrigue accomplished its in­

tended purpose and led Austria, through the grief of the
Emperor’s household and the indignation of the Austrian
Court, to the conviction that Austria was justified in the use
of stern measures to secure guarantees against Servia.
Austrian ultimatum and mobilization followed.


The ultimatum given by Austria to Serbia, the instant
military measures of Serbia, Russia, France and Belgium
and the war which was declared to exist by Germany on
August i, 1914, enabled the Italian Government to refrain
from supporting Austria and Germany on the allegation
that Germany and Austria were the aggressors and
aggrieved— that they had first declared war.

not the

A famous Frenchman, Montesquieu, said a great while
ago that:
“ The true author of a war is not he who declares it, but he
who makes it necessary.”

The European diplomats thoroughly well understand this
doctrine, but the mass of mankind did not understand it or
its intimate application when the W orld W ar was made to
come by Russian mobilization and influence.


IV .


F rance

The French people are largely of Latin extraction, inter­
mingled, however, with the blood of the North.

They are

a proud and excitable race, intelligent, artistic, of great
social grace, with a language of the highest degree of mental
refinement. There is no society in the world more charming
than that of the best French circles.

Their architecture,

paintings, literature are models of beauty and the admiration
of the world.

They have had a very warlike history.

seem to rejoice in “ Glory” .


Their leaders seem to favor

militarism, though disclaiming it. When the French Revolu­
tion was followed by Napoleon, Napoleon conquered nearly
all of continental Europe, and was adored by the French, who
still honor his memory as the greatest of all Frenchmen.
His tomb is a Mecca.

In 1870, the French Emperor, Na­

poleon III, declared war against Germany, and in a few
months the Germans dictated a humiliating peace to the
French at Versailles, imposing a tax of a billion dollars on
the French, and taking over the government of Alsace-Lor­
raine, which became a terra irredenta and a poisoned thorn
in the side of sensitive France.

This all gave birth to the

doctrine of “ Revanche” or revenge, which finally bore ter­
rible fruit.
Raymond Poincare was born in Lorraine, and long before
he had the opportunity of power, and came into the presi­
dency of France (19 12 ), he had set his heart on the res­
toration of these provinces.

In an address at the Uni-



versity of Paris, October, 1920, Poincare expressed his
sentiments in these burning w ords: “ I have not been able
to see any other reason for my generation living, except the
hope of recovering our lost provinces.”
It was this spirit which in 1892 enabled the Russian
leaders, in pursuance of their own imperial policies, to make
a treaty secretly with the President of France, by which it
was agreed that Russia and France should attack Germany
simultaneously, in the event of a certain contingency, which
the Russian leaders knew they could create, to-w it: “ the
mobilization” of Austria.

They camouflaged this mobiliza­

tion of Austria under these terms:
“ In case the forces of the Triple Alliance, or of one of the powers
which are a party to it, should be mobilized (e.g. Austria), France and
Russia, a t t h e f ir s t in d ic a t io n of the event, and w it h o u t a fire zn o u s
a g r e e m e n t being necessary, s h a ll m o b ilis e a ll o f t h e ir f o r c e s im m e ­
d ia t e ly a n d s im u lt a n e o u s ly , and shall transport them as near to their
frontiers as possible. * * *
w it h th e g r e a t e s t d is p a t c h ,

T h e s e f o r c e s s h a ll b e g in c o m p le t e a c t io n

so that

G e r m a n y w i l l h a v e to f ig h t a t th e

s a m e tim e in th e E a s t a n d in th e W e s t .”

A fter this treaty was entered into by the French President
with the Russian leaders, the Russian leaders subsequently
borrowed seven billions of dollars from the French people, by
selling Russian bonds to them, and using a portion of the
proceeds of the bonds to subsidize the French Press, so that
it would commend with enthusiasm the value of the invest­
ment in Russian securities, and favor a strong Franco-Russian policy in the Balkans.

The French leaders required,



however, the money to be employed in building up a great
Russian army, in the manufacture of light and heavy artillery,
in building military strategic railroads, leading up to the Ger­
man border, etc., and in preparing for the war contemplated
by this treaty.
The French, during all these years, from 1870, had been
developing great areas in Africa, where they governed be­
tween fifty and sixty million African people, recruiting A fr i­
can troops and training them in modern warfare.

This pro­

vided a means of making available for war a French-con­
trolled population larger than the German population.
The building up of the huge Russian army caused Ger­
many to strengthen its military equipment, and thereupon,
when Poincare became President, the French extended the
time of military service for the young men of France from
two years to three years, thus increasing this force by 50
per cent.

In the meantime, year after year, the French

General Staff held military conventions with the Russian
General Staff, planning the ways and means by which a war
of offense could be made against Germany.
France had an understanding with the Italian leaders
by 1902 and both France and Russia began to compose all
differences with Great Britain in 1904-1907.
France, through its Ambassador at London, negotiated in
1912 a secret agreement with Edward Grey, which pur­
ported not to be an agreement, but merely an exchange of
letters, in which it was recited that in the event an occasion



of war should arise in which the co-operation of the French
and British Government might be deemed desirable, that the
question of common action should be immediately discussed
and if it “ involved action the plans of the general staffs would
at once be taken into consideration and the governments
would then decide what effect should be given to them.”
This hypothetical alliance was gradually strengthened.
Military and naval plans were worked out between the
French and British officers.

It was agreed that France

could withdraw its entire fleet from the W est coast of France
to the Mediterranean, that the British fleet would protect
the French coast, and that Great Britain would put 160,000
men on the left wing of the French army, all of which was
duly carried out when the war took place the first of August,
When Raymond Poincare became President (with treaty­
making powers) he immediately and repeatedly assured the
Russian statesmen that they could rely with confidence upon
the diplomatic support of Russian policy in the Balkans, and
upon the French support in case of a general war flowing

The week before Russian mobilization Poincare

was in St. Petersburg strengthening the Russian will to

(See Paleologue, Ewart, Barnes, Morhardt.)


the general war grew more intensely threatening he refused
to try to exercise any moderating influence with Russia.
alone could have prevented war.
willed war.


He did not because he




G reat B r ita in

The British interest was quite different.

The tremendous

strides made by the Germans in industrial production, ship­
building, and commerce, and finally the ambition of the
Kaiser to build up a big navy disturbed many British

They began to view Germany as a somewhat dan­

gerous rival and looked with increasing hostility upon the
proposed German naval expansion.

The intensive military

training of the German youth, the Prussian military system,
probably the most efficient in the world, and the Hohenzollern monarchy were regarded with aversion and increasing ap­

According to the controlling British view, if the

Prussian military machine should conquer France, it would
dominate Europe and this consideration, with the others
mentioned, probably led Edward Grey to believe the agree­
ment with Cambon justified.
When the Czar mobilized under Poincare’s encourage­
ment and war ensued involving Germany and France, the
British statesmen were moved by what they believed to be
best for the British Government.

The invasion of Belgium

was a pretext and not the cause for the declaration of war
by Great Britain.

The newly published English documents

bear out the above conclusions.
V I.

G ermany

In 1914 Germany had no reason for war, no terra irre­
denta, no revenge and knew that a general European war



might easily destroy its merchant marine, its foreign com­
merce, both of which were rapidly expanding, and cause the
loss of its colonies.
Between 1870 and 1914, under the German Empire, the
productive power of the German people had been tremen­
dously increased by systematic, technical education of the
German youth in all the industries, arts and sciences.


German schools and universities had attained the distinction
o f being the finest in the world.

A t Dusseldorf, the German

Government promoted the establishment of a manufacturing
system where every kind of manufacturing enterprise in
Germany was represented, and the custom was established to
permit students of the higher grades from all parts of Ger­
many to visit Dusseldorf and examine these plants in action,
so that they might select the life-work for which their tastes
inclined them.
Co-operative credit, co-operative buying and selling, muni­
cipal management of public utilities and other democratic
processes were stimulated, but the central power was very
firmly held under the Hohenzollern regime.

The German

people were happy and prosperous and intensely patriotic.
Germany like other nations had its jingoes and super-pa­
triots who rejoiced in war talk, like von Bernhardi.


II posed as a W ar Lord at times and assiduously cultivated
his army and navy in the hope of protecting Germany from
attack by a show of power.
The German Emperor, however, and his advisers during
forty years made no war on others.

William II claimed and



believed that he was a powerful force for the preservation
of the peace of Europe.

The people of Germany were great

home-lovers, and had large families. They were social, fond
of music, and developed music unsurpassed in the world.
The capital of Germany, Berlin, in the uniform excellence
of its architecture, of its streets, of its public conveniences
and parks, and the economy of living was unsurpassed.


people were not only industrious, but they were thrifty, and
Germany very rapidly grew in wealth, in commercial and
financial power.

The Germans desired security and peace,

but believing that they were surrounded by dangerous ene­
mies, the spirit of nationalism, of patriotism and military
training was stimulated to the highest degree, and they, like
the other people of Europe, were ready to die for the defense
of their country.
It was entirely against the interests of Germany to engage
in war.

The Germany of Schiller and Goethe, of Wagner

and Beethoven hated war. The German leaders were against
war and feared it.
Just as the enormous military preparations of Russia ex­
cited the fears of the German leaders, so the German prepa­
rations excited the fears and anger of the French leaders
and strengthened those who were plotting for war.
The Prussian military machine, with its general staff, was
probably the most efficient war machine ever constructed.
Its officers lived an intensive, military, self-sacrificing ex­

They were given extraordinary honors by the civil­

ian population on all occasions.

They were the men who



had pledged their lives for the peace and security of the

They held their profession in supreme honor.

The German army was full of inherited tradition.
man valor and efficiency were unsurpassed.


The Germans

knew they were surrounded by enemies, much more numer­
ous than they, and of equal intelligence, and that they could
only make up for their disadvantage by courage, speed and

They had annual maneuvers, the officers were con­

stantly at work studying the art of war, and the scientific
men of Germany were co-operating in metals and in chemi­
cals to make improved engines of war.
The reputation of the Prussian military machine went
abroad, and neighboring nations regarded it with fear.


great efficiency was conceded, so that when the time came for
Russia to begin the attack on Germany, it was of great im­
portance, in the Russian view, that the Russian mobilization
should have the advantage over the German mobilization of
at least a week to ten days.

The military conventions be­

tween the French and Russian Staffs assert that it probably
would be the 15th day before Russian armies could get into
full action, whereas either Germany or France could prob­
ably get into action within a week or ten days.

For this rea­

son, it was absolutely essential, from a Russian military
standpoint, that the Russians should on July 24, 1914, camou­
flage their military measures, and prevent the Germans from
knowing their serious military plans.

The Germans, from

reliable reports, did know what it was; and the German
military attache at St. Petersburg flatly rejected the repre-



sentations of the Russian chief of staff to his face when an
attempt was made to make it appear that there had been no
mobilization whatever.

B elg ium

The lands of Belgium between the German and French
territory are level, with no natural defenses.

They com­

prise a densely settled rich section occupied by industrious,
productive and highly cultivated people closely bound by
many ties to France. The people generally speak French and
use the franc for currency.
Because of its geographical location, this region had been
frequently a battleground in the past.

Belgian leaders had

made every effort to obtain a position of guaranteed neutral­
ity, and an agreement of other nations that this neutrality
should be respected, but the military strategists of Europe
recognizing that “ necessity knows no law” , universally re­
garded it as a certainty that in the event of war between
Germany and France, Belgium would be employed as a
necessary corridor for the entry into France of German
troops, because the French border, otherwise protected by
mountains and hills, had been so thoroughly fortified that a
passway was impossible.

The demonstration of this was

shown at Verdun, where the Germans lost 500,000 men in
an attempt to break through, and never were able to pass.
The interest of the Belgian people required their government



to co-operate with France and Great Britain as against Ger­
many, and there was a gentleman’s agreement as to this co­
operation, although the Belgian authorities greatly desired
to strictly preserve their legal, technical position of defend­
ing their neutrality against any invasion.

The only invasion

which they had occasion to anticipate and the only invasion
against which they prepared was the invasion of German

The European strategists knew that in the event

of a war involving France and Germany the German general
staff would be compelled to attack France through Belgium.
Belgium relied upon French and British support against
Germany, and did not seek or rely upon Germany support
against a French invasion.

A s a matter of military strategy,

the French did not need access to Germany through Belgium.
A t the outbreak of the war Belgian authorities were notified
not to regard French entry on Belgian territory as an offense.
The Duchy of Luxemburg, like Belgium, was necessary
also as a passway to or from France, but unlike Belgium,
Luxemburg had no powers of defense, and could do nothing
more than make a gesture against the passage of alien troops.
Belgium had a strong army.

The forts next to the German

border were well designed, for defense, and were able in
August, 1914, for several weeks to stay the advance of the
German troops.

Belgium with magnificent bravery refused

to allow Germany to violate its neutrality and suffered ter­
ribly in consequence.
the Russian intrigue.

It was a victim of fate as a result of



V III. S witzerland
Switzerland, which is a republic consisting of German,
French and Italian people, speaking all three languages, was
and is a modern republic of highly cultivated, brave people.
Their country was easily defensible because of the gigantic
mountain ranges, thoroughly fortified, and with an efficient
militia of 600,000 men.

None of the belligerents could a f­

ford, as a matter of military strategy, to violate the neutral­
ity of Switzerland, and none of them attempted it.
IX .

T h e H ig h S eas

The enormous war fleet of Great Britain, consisting of
over 400 vessels, absolutely commanded the Atlantic Ocean,
the North Sea and the entrance to the Baltic.

The entire

German merchant marine was paralyzed by the war.


French fleet withdrawn from the Atlantic controlled the
Mediterranean Sea against Germany.
X . I m p e r ia lism

All the nations of Europe had contributed to the building
up of the spirit of militarism, in which they had engendered
fear of each other and mutual animosities, because of threats,
real or implied, in their imperialistic and acquisitive policies,
and all of the great nations, as also the Balkans contributed



in this sense to the spirit of war which made it possible by
intrigue to bring about the catastrophe of 1914.
None of the European belligerent governments can be
entirely absolved from responsibility for creating conditions
which made war possible.
It was the common doctrine of Europe that the only way
to prevent invasion and war on one’s country was to be
thoroughly prepared “ for defense” .

This was the doctrine

of the civilians as well as the military caste, but the military
caste went further and held that the best way in which to
wage defensive war was by waging an offensive war.
military plan was to strike first.


This doctrine is clearly

set up in concrete terms in the minutes of the annual mili­
tary conferences between the Russian and the French Gen­
eral Staffs.
A ll the great nations of Europe had cultivated the policy
of colonial expansion, taking over territory throughout the
world, occupied by weaker and defenseless people, and had
excited rivalries between each other, which in A frica had
brought about serious tension between France and its allies
and Germany.
All these conditions contributed to the success of the in­
trigues which led to the W orld War.

In pursuance of these

policies all the nations of Europe were well armed.


was a rivalry in armament and in preparations for war.


people were led to support these policies by propaganda in
the public press advocating preparedness for defense.
proved to be preparedness for offense.




France, Germany, Austria, Russia and Serbia had their
jingoes, who praised war and stirred up fear and hate, but
the real power was in a few hands and it was the cold­
blooded will to war of Isvolski, Sazonoff, Grand Duke
Nicholas, and others in Russia, and of Poincare, Delcasse,
Viviani, Millerand, et al. in France that launched it.
The German Kaiser was convinced that a war of the En­
tente allies against Germany meant the defeat of Germany
and his own political destruction and on July 30, 1914, made
a written record of this conviction.
prevent it.

He did his utmost to


H ow


W orld W ar

W as

E ngineered



V ery

F ew M en

The evidence of how the W orld W ar took place is now
quite complete.

It was engineered by the Russian officials

in control of Russian foreign affairs, led by Isvolski, former
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire, and in
the years preceding the war Russian Ambassador to Franee.
A microscopic study has been made of Isvolski.


letters and dispatches have been analyzed and indexed and
printed in great detail by Frederich Stieve, Rene Marchand
and others.

His personal relation to the plotting of the war

appears in the book ^'Isvolski and the W orld \\ ar , by Stieve.
In May, 1906, Isvolski was placed at the head of the Foreign
Office of the Russian Empire.

Shortly before this, in March,

1906, he went to Paris, where he met three other Russian
diplomats— Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador to
London; Nelidov, Russian Ambassador to Paris, and Muravieff, Russian Ambassador in Rome.

There was an ex­

change of views between the four men, at which it was agreed
to develop the Triple Entente between Russia, France and



Great Britain.


The new Foreign Minister informed the

Czar of the results when he took over the seals of office.
Isvolski himself describes it as the program—
“O f which the further development led to the system of the
Triple Entente,”

in which it was determined by the four Ambassadors to re­
inforce the alliance of France by agreements with Great
Britain and Japan.
Immediately after he took office, he began to work to­
wards a rapprochement with Great Britain and her ally

On July 30, 1907, a convention was concluded be­

tween Russia and Japan, clearing up all existing differences.
On August 31, 1907, a convention was concluded at St.
Petersburg between Great Britain and Russia, covering all
points at issue between the two powers in regard to Afghan­
istan, Tibet and Persia.
Isvolski’s aims harmonized with the London policies of
King Edward V II of encircling Germany.

The Entente of

Great Britain was cemented by the meeting of the British
King and the Czar, at Reval in June, 1908.
It was in pursuance of this policy of building up the Triple
Entente against the so-called Triple Alliance that the treaty
concluded in 1905 at Bjorkoe between the German Emperor
and Czar Nicholas II, proposing friendly relations between
Germany, Russia and France, was refused ratification.
The adverse influence of the French leaders and of the
Triple Entente prevented various other efforts made by the









Great Britain, with France and with Russia.


The sinister

and dangerous objects which Isvolski and the Russian and
French leaders had in view are completely disclosed by the
dispatches published in “ Entente Diplomacy and the World
W a r” , by de Siebert, in “ Un Livre Noir” , by Rene Marchand, and in the Isvolski Papers, by Frederick Stieve.
The de Siebert publication gives 856 secret dispatches be­
tween the Russian Foreign Office and Benckendorff, the
Russian Ambassador at London.

Un Livre Aoir


about a like number of secret dispatches, passing between
the Russian Foreign Office and the Russian Ambassador,
Isvolski, in Paris.
These dispatches day by day, of the most intimate secret
character, demonstrate clearly and positively the Russian

That policy was that the Russians must have con­

trol of the Dardanelles, as a means of giving free access to
the world markets for Russian products, and second, the
extension of Russian influence in the Balkans and to the
West against Germany and Austria, an object which could
only be attained by a general European war in which Russia,
France, Great Britain, with the Balkan allies, should over­
throw Germany.

The Russian Imperialists had clearly in

view the considerations which would be offered to various
allies in order to induce their co-operation in a general war
against Germany.
First, was the ambition of the few French leaders who
controlled the Foreign Policy of France.

They wished to



obtain the restoration of Alsace and Lorraine, the great iron
mines of Lorraine, the coal properties of the Saar Valley,
revenge on Germany for the indignity and humiliation in­
flicted by the Franco-Prussian W ar of 1871 and to break
down the growing power of Germany. The French Govern­
ment got what it was after, but the expense was larger
than had been anticipated by Poincare.
The co-operation of Serbia was secured by promising and
giving Serbia Russian support in the Pan-Slav movement for
a “ Greater Serbia” , in which it was proposed that the PanSlav population of Austria and adjacent country and the
territory occupied by them should be made a part of “ Greater
Serbia” . The Serbian Government, as Jugo-Slavia, got what
the leaders sought.
Roumania was to be satisfied by obtaining Transylvania,
which she got and now holds.

Bulgaria was to be made a

secret ally by supporting certain of her pretensions.


garia was also committed to Germany and thus got noth­
ing. Great Britain was to be moved to co-operate with
France in the event of a war between France and Germany,
on the ground that Germany had become a rival to be reck­
oned with commercially; that Germany was building up a
navy that threatened British supremacy at sea; that German
military autocracy, if it were allowed to conquer France,
would control Western Europe, and would become a menace
to British interests.
This Russian intrigue was politically possible between
Isvolski and his associates and the French leaders because,


under the Constitution of 1875*

President of France had

the right (and still has the right) to make a secret trea*.\
on his sole authority, binding France without the advice or
consent of the French Senate or the French Parliament.
Joseph Barthelemy, French professor of political science,
in “ Democracy and Foreign Policy,’ I9X makes the fol­
lowing statement of the principles of the French constitution
of 18 75 :1*
“ The constitution of 1875 was the result of a transaction brought
about, among other things, by the force of co-operation between a
m o n a r c h is t m a jo r it y unable to establish a monarchy and a republican
“First, in principle, the President of the Republic alone represents
the nation in foreign affairs; it is to him are accredited the ambassa­
dors of foreign powers j it is in his name in which the ambassadors of
France speak; he conducts the negotiations; it is by his signature that
he binds the country in international treaties of which he is the
juridical author.”
“ The principle expressly set forth by Article 8 of the law of the
16th of July, 1875, is that the President of the Republic negotiates and
ratifies treaties upon his sole authority.
“Almost all of the great international acts which have marked the
turning point of our foreign policies during the half-centurj, almost all
those which have exercised a decisive influence on the destinies of
France, are the work of the Government alone and have been ratified
by the President of the Republic upon his sole authority. It is in
effect that Article 8 of the law of the 16th of July 1875, does not
submit to parliamentary approval the most important perhaps of all
the treaties, the great political treaties and the treaties of alliance.” *

1 Op. cit. p. 102.
3 Op. cit. p. 105.
3Op. cit. p. 109.



It was under this authority that the profoundly secret
treaty between Russia and France of 1892 contemplating
military operations against Germany was executed and with­
held from the knowledge of the French Parliament and from
the French people.

It was under this authority that the

secret treaties of 1916-17 to divide German and Austrian
territory between France and Russia were entered into.
Great Britain’s foreign affairs are directed in like fashion
by the British Foreign Office, No. 10 Downing Street, with­
out necessarily being directed by or even disclosed to the
British Parliament.
Sir Edward Grey, in his agreements with the Governments
of France and Russia, contemplating military and naval co­
operation between Russia, France and Great Britain along
the lines worked out by the military and naval staffs of
the three countries, was able to do so in absolute secrecy.
He did not submit these records to Parliament until after the
war had been entered into by Great Britain.

Six times the

British Parliament was advised that there were no com­
mitments made.1
It is of supreme international importance that the world
should understand the structure of these foreign offices and
what they did in bringing about the World W ar.2
The imperial structure of the French and British govern­
ments still so exist.
1 “ How Diplomats Make W ar” , Neilson; “Entente Diplomacy and
the World” ; “Un Livre Noir”, etc.
3 Congressional Record, 355-356.




he F r an co -R u ssia n

T r e a t y o f 1892-4

It was in pursuance of this French law that the following
secret treaty was entered into in 1892 between the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Russia and the President of the French
Republic and concluded in 1894.
The French issued after the war, when they first disclosed
the terms of this agreement, a special T ellow Book upon this

The essential terms of it can be found in the

pamphlet of March, 1919, No. 136, of the American Asso­
ciation for International Conciliation.

The body of the en­

gagement is as follow s:
“ France and Russia, animated by a common desire to preserve the
peace, and having no other end in mind than to ward off the necessities
of a defensive war, provoked by an attack of the forces of the Triple
Alliance against either of them, have agreed upon the following pro­
vision” : (This self-serving declaration of innocence might be useful

if the secret treaty should be exposed.)


F r a n c e is a tta ck e d

G e r m a n y ,R u s s i a
" 2m i n c a s e

shall e m p lo y

th e f o r c e s



G e r m a n y , o r b y I t a ly , s u p p o r t e d b y

a ll it s a v a ila b le f o r c e s to f ig h t G e r m a n y
th e

p o w e r s w h i c h a r e a p a r ty t o i t ,”

T r i p le

A llia n c e ,

or o f

one o f

th e

(e.g. Austria) “ s h o u ld b e m o b ilis e d ,

F r a n c e a n d R u s s i a , a t th e f ir s t in d ic a tio n o f th e e v e n t, a n d w it h o u t a
p r e v io u s

a g reem en t

b e in g

n e c e s s a r y , s h a ll

m o b ilis e a l l

t h e ir f o r c e s

im m e d ia t e ly a n d s im u lt a n e o u s ly , a n d s h a ll tr a n s p o r t th e m a s n e a r to
t h e ir f r o n t i e r s a s p o s s ib le .”
“ 3 . T h e a v a ila b le f o r c e s w h i c h m u s t b e e m p lo y e d a g a in s t G e r m a n y
s h a ll b e :

F o r F r a n c e , 1,300,000 m e n ;

800,000 m e n .”

f o r R u s s ia , fr o m

p o o ,000 to

(France in 1913 pledged 200,000 more and in 1914

Russia had 2,230,000 men ready.)
" T h e s e f o r c e s s h a ll b e g in c o m p le t e a c t io n w it h th e g r e a t e s t d is p a tc h ,



s o th a t G e r m a n y w i l l h a v e to f ig h t a t th e s a m e tim e in th e e a s t a n d in
t h e w e s t .”
“ 4 . T h e s t a f f s o f t h e a r m ie s o f th e tw o c o u n t r ie s s h a ll c o n s ta n tly
p la n in c o n c e r t in o r d e r to p r e p a r e f o r a n d f a c i li t a t e t h e e x e c u t io n o f
th e m e a s u r e s s e t f o r t h a b o v e .”
“ T h e y s h a ll c o m m u n ic a te to e a c h o th e r , in tim e o f p e a c e , a ll t h e i n ­
f o r m a t io n r e g a r d in g th e a r m ie s o f th e T r i p le A l l i a n c e w h i c h i s in , o r
s h a ll c o m e in to , t h e ir p o s s e s s io n .”
“ T h e w a y s and

m e a n s o f c o r r e s p o n d in g in

t u n e o f w a r s h a ll b e

s t u d ie d a n d a r r a n g e d in a d v a n c e .”
“ 5. F r a n c e a n d R u s s i a s h a ll n o t c o n c l u d e a s e p a r a t e p e a c e .”
“ 6. T h e

presen t

T r i p le A l l i a n c e . ”
“ 7. A ll
s e c r e t .” 1

th e

c o n v e n t io n

s h a ll h a z’e

th e

s a m e d u r a tio n


th e

(Later extended beyond such duration.)

c la u s e s

e n u m e r a te d


s h a ll



a b s o lu t e ly


In defending the instant attack on Germany if Germany or
Austria should mobilize as contemplated by this Secret
Treaty General de Boisdeffre for France said: “ Mobilization
is W ar.” Alexander III replied: “ I so regard it.”

T h e F r a n co -R u ssia n

M ilita r y

C onferences

In pursuance of this treaty, the Russian and French Gen­
eral Staffs had many conferences to determine the plans and
methods for making the assault on Germany.
The minutes of three of these meetings of 1911, 1912 and
1913 were inserted in the Congressional Record of December
18, 1923, on pages 358 to 362, inclusive.
In the preamble to each of these meetings appears the fol­
lowing remarkable declaration of principle:
1 Congressional Record, 357.



« T h e tw o c h i e f s o f s t a f f d e c la r e , b y c o m m o n a c c o r d , th a t t h e iv o r d s
‘ d e f e n s i v e w a r ’ m u s t n o t b e i n t e r p r e t e d in th e s e n s e o f a w a r w h ic h
w o u ld

b e c o n d u c t e d d e f e n s i v e ly .

T hey

a ffir m , o n t h e c o n t r a r y , th e

a b s o lu t e n e c e s s i t y f o r th e R u s s i a n a n d F r e n c h a r m ie s to a d o p t a v i g o r ­
o u s o f fe n s i v e , a n d a s f a r a s p o s s ib le a s im u lt a n e o u s o n e , m c o n f o r m i t y
w ith

th e

t e x t o f A r t i c l e 3 o f t h e c o n v e n t io n , w h o s e

th a t ‘ t h e f o r c e s o f th e

t e r m s p r o v id e

tw o c o n t r a c t in g p o w e r s s h a l l c o m e in t o

fu ll

a c t io n w it h a l l s p e e d .’ ”

The “ defensive” war proposed was strictly for diplomatic
purposes it will be observed.

The French words of this

secret treaty were: “ Les forces des deux puissances contractantes s’engagent a fond et en toute diligence.
Article i declares:
“ T h e tw o c h i e f s o f s t a ff , c o n fir m in g th e v ie w p o in t o f p r e c e d in g c o n ­
f e r e n c e s , a r e e n t ir e ly in a c c o r d

o n th e p o in t th a t th e d e f e a t o f

th e

G e r m a n a r m ie s r e m a in s , w h a t e v e r t h e c ir c u m s t a n c e s m a y b e , th e f ir s t
o b j e c t o f th e a llie d a r m ie s .”


In Article 3 the French Chief of Staff submitted the fol­
lowing consideration:
« F r o m w h a t is k n o w n o f t h e G e r m a n m o b iliz a t io n a n d c o n c e n t r a tio n ,
o n e m a y c o n c lu d e th a t th e f ir s t g r e a t e n c o u n te r s w i l l p r o b a b ly ta k e
p la c e in L o r r a in e , L u x e m b u r g a n d B e lg i u m f r o m

th e f if t e e n t h to th e

(so vanishes the legend of the shocked surprise with
which the allied Governments learned of the German invasion of

e ig h t e e n t h d a y ,”


“ A t that moment the strength of the French Army will be
greater than the 1,300,000 men provided for by Article 3 of
the convention.” 3
1 Congressional Record, 358.
* Congressional Record, 358.
* Congressional Record, 358.



The minutes set forth the following:
“ T h i s o b je c t , w h ic h w a s th e v e r y b a s is o f th e m ilita r y c o n v e n t io n o f
18 9 2 , ca n o n ly be a tta in e d b y th e o ffe n s iv e .
“ T h e e f f e c t o f th is o f fe n s iv e w i ll be m o r e c e r ta in in s o m u c h a s it w i ll
ta k e p la c e s o o n e r , w i l l b e c a r r ie d o u t iv ith g r e a t e r s t r e n g t h , a n d w i ll
t a k e a m o r e d a n g e r o u s d ir e c t io n f o r th e e n e m y .
“ I n th e s e c ir c u m s ta n c e s , a n d it b e in g a d m itte d by c o m m o n a c c o r d b y
t h e c o n f e r r i n g p a r tie s th a t th e G e r m a n s w i ll d ir e c t th e p r in c ip a l m a s s
o f t h e ir f o r c e s a g a in s t F r a n c e

(so this was no surprise),

th e F r e n c h

c h i e f o f s t a f f e x p r e s s e s th e d e s ir e th a t th e d is p o s itio n ( o f th e R u s s ia n
a r m ie s ) s h o u ld , a s f a r a s p o s s ib le , a llo w o f t a k in g t h e o f fe n s iv e w ith
th e f ir s t e c h e lo n

(body of troops)

as fr o m

th e e ig h t e e n t h d a y .


h a p s e v e n th is d e la y m ig h t b e r e d u c e d , th a n k s to th e r e c e n t im p r o v e ­
m e n ts in tr o d u c e d in to th e R u s s ia n m o b iliz a t io n a n d c o n c e n t r a tio n .
“ G e n e r a l D u b a i l c lo s e s h i s e x p o s it io n by r e m a r k in g th a t h e is n o t
u n a w a r e o f th e v a r io u s m o t iv e s iv h ic h h a v e c o m p e lle d R u s s i a to r e v is e
th e d is p o s itio n o f h e r tr o o p s u p o n h e r t e r r ito r y in tim e o f p e a c e .
r e n d e r s a s i t u e r e h o m a g e to

th e e f f o r t s m a d e d u r in g


th e la s t th r e e

y e a r s b y R u s s i a to r e i n f o r c e h e r m ilit a r y p o w e r , a n d h e is h a p p y to
n o t e th e im p r o v e m e n t p r o d u c e d , a s a w h o le , a n d th e f r ie n d ly
a r m y b y t h e la te s t m o d ific a t io n s in tr o d u c e d


a llie d

in to t h e m o b iliz a t io n .” '1

General Gilinsky, on behalf of Russia, declares, among
other things, that Russia is expanding her forces preparatory
to action, and says:
“ I n th e s e c ir c u m s t a n c e s R u s s i a d o e s n o t a p p e a r to b e in a c o n d it io n

(that is to say, not before 1913. By
the spring of 1914, Russia’s military chiefs publicly announced their
readiness through the organ of the Russian war minister), a w a r
to s u s ta in , f o r tzvo y e a r s a t le a s t

a g a in s t G e r m a n y w it h a c e r ta in ty o f s u c c e s s .” 3

It is therefore clearly apparent that the pretense of the
1 Congressional Record, 358.
3Congressional Record, 359.



French and Russian leaders that they were taken by surprise
by Germany is not true; that they well understood that
Germany, in a case of war, would have to come through Bel­
gium and Luxemburg; and the pretense that Russia and
France were not prepared was a falsehood, is shown by the
secret French and Russian records, as set forth in these
The official record evidence of the plan to attack Germany
is Russian and French evidence.
These minutes further declare, Article 4:
“ (3 )

T h e m in u t e s o f th e c o n f e r e n c e s w i l l b e s u b m it t e d to t h e a p ­

p r o v a l o f th e g o v e r n m e n t o f e a c h c o u n tr y , a n d a v i s e o f th e m in is t e r
o f zvar a n d o f t h e p r im e m i n is t e r w i l l b e a t t a c h e d th e r e t o , s o th a t th e
c h i e f s o f s t a f f s o f th e a llie d a r m ie s m a y r e f e r t o t h i s d o c u m e n t in th e
r e a liz a t io n o f d e s ir a b le im p r o v e m e n t s .”

So these warlike plans to attack Germany had the approval
of the Prime Minister of France and of Russia.1
They agreed also not to make peace separately in Article
5, as follows:
" T h e c o n f e r r i n g p a r t ie s a r e a g r e e d th a t A r t i c l e


c o m p e ls t h e c o n ­

tr a c tin g p a r t ie s n o t o n ly n o t to m a k e p e a c e , b u t a ls o n o t to c e a s e o p e r a ­
tio n s in o r d e r t o c o n c lu d e a n a r m is t ic e , i n d iv id u a lly

The military conferences of 1912 and 1913 confirm the
previous understandings, and in the conference of August,
1913, appears the following language:
" G e n e r a l J o f f r e d e c la r e s th a t F r a n c e w i ll e n g a g e o n i t s n o r t h e a s t
f r o n t i e r a lm o s t a l l o f h e r f o r c e s , t h e n u m b e r o f w h ic h w i l l e x c e e d th a t

1 Congressional Record, 359.
3 Congressional Record, 359.



p r o v id e d f o r in t h e t e x t o f th e c o n v e n t io n b y m o r e them 200,000 m e n
( t h a t is e x c e e d in g 1,500,000 m e n ) ; th a t th e c o n c e n t r a tio n o f th e f ig h t ­
in g e le m e n t s o n t h is f r o n t i e r w i ll b e c o m p le te d , f o r th e m o s t p a r t, o n
th e t e n th d a y o f m o b iliz a t io n a n d th a t t h e o f fe n s iv e o p e r a tio n s o f th is

o f fo r c e s w ill co m m e n ce fr o m

th e

m o r n in g


th e e le v e n t h

d a y .” 1

Poincare, President of France, declared to the French
Parliament August 4, 1914, that the French armies were
ready for action.

Mobilization must have started eleven

days before or July 24/*
These military conferences provided for the double track­
ing of the roads leading to the German frontiers as a means
of quickly mobilizing the Russian troops against Germany.
It is clear that General Joffre pledged 1,500,000 men for
quick action and that their mobilization began July 24, for
they were ready August 4.

A large number of these troops

were from the African colonies of France— Moroccans,
Arabs, negroes.

Europeans were killing Europeans with

trained Africans.

A ll the records must be interpreted in the

light of this profoundly secret treaty of the Russian and
French leaders to make offensive war on the German people,
who were kept in ignorance of the conspiracy.

The very

existence of this secret treaty was denied, and Article 7 of
the agreement itself provided:
" A l l th e c la u s e s e n u m e r a te d a b o v e s h a ll b e k e p t a b s o lu t e ly
s e c r e t .”

These military conventions demonstrated certain truths
1 Congressional Record, 361.
4French Yellow Book, 158. Congressional Record, 373.



now of the first consequence.

First, that the pretended un­

preparedness of Russia and of France in July, 1914, was a
colossal willful falseful, intended to deceive the world, sup­
port the theory of the innocence of the guilty Russian and
French leaders, and further the theory of the willful guilt
of the German leaders.
Russia, as these military conventions show, was to have
the required light and heavy artillery ready for war by 1914.
The public press of St. Petersburg announced that the avail­
able Russian forces were ready, and that they had over
2,000,000 men ready for quick action.
The military conventions were not confined to the heads
of the general staffs of Russia and France, but by their
own terms were to be submitted “ to the approval of the gov­
ernment of each country and a vise o f the Minister of War
and o f the Prime Minister will be attached thereto.”
The conventions provided for the most complete inter­
communication by messengers, by cable, by radio.

The un­

derstandings between the Russian and French leaders with
regard to division of German and Austrian territory and
property were not left in doubt, and these agreements will
be found set forth on page 362 of the Congressional Record
o f December 18, 1923.
Above all as “ Mobilization” was declared to be W ar by the
Russian and French leaders who made the secret treaty it
follows as a logical necessity that the mobilization o f Russia
with French approval July 30th, 1914, and the refusal to stop



it was by the Russian and French understanding an act of
war against Germany which began the World W ar.
The Russians and French thus began the W orld W ar.
Germany acknowledged its existence and declared it, 7:10
P.M ., August 1st, 1914, eight days after it began and two
days after it was declared by the decree of Mobilization pub­
lished throughout Russia.
IV .

D iv id in g

T he

B ooty


W ar

Sazonoff on the 24th of February, 1916, wired the Rus­
sian Ambassador at Paris, Isvolski, as follows:
" T h e p o lit ic a l a g r e e m e n ts c o n c lu d e d b e tw e e n t h e A l l i e s d u r in g th e
w a r m u s t r e m a in in ta c t, a n d a r e n o t s u b j e c t to r e v is io n .

T h ey

in ­

c lu d e th e a r g r e e m e n t w it h F r a n c e a n d E n g la n d o n C o n s ta n tin o p le , t h e
S t r a it s , S y r ia a n d A s i a M in o r , a n d a ls o th e L o n d o n tr e a ty w ith I t a ly .
A l l s u g g e s t io n s f o r th e f u t u r e d e lim it a t io n o f c e n tr a l E u r o p e a r e a t
p r e s e n t p r e tn a tu r e , b u t in g e n e r a l o n e m u s t b e a r in m in d th a t w e a re
p r e p a r e d to a llo w F r a n c e a n d E n g la n d c o m p le te f r e e d o m

in d r a w in g

u p th e w e s t e r n f r o n t i e r s o f G e r m a n y , in th e e x p e c t a t io n th a t th e A l l i e s
o n t h e ir p a r t w o u ld a l lo w u s e q u a l f r e e d o m in d r a w in g u p o u r f r o n ­
t ie r s w it h G e r m a n y a n d A u s t r i a .”

This meant the Russian statesmen would control Constan­
tinople and the Straits, and take what they pleased of
eastern Germany and Austria, while France would take
what it pleased of western Germany.
The London treaty with Italy referred to promised Italy
various territories belonging to other governments, but
which the Italian leaders coveted.

This same telegram says:



“ R o u m a n ia


a lr e a d y


o ffe r e d

a ll

th e

p o li t ic a l a d v a n ta g e s

w h i c h c o u ld in d u c e h e r to ta k e u p a r m s , a)id t h e r e f o r e it w o u ld b e
p e r f e c t l y f u t i l e to s e a r c h f o r n e w b a its in t h is r e s p e c t .”

The term “ bait” is more expressive than polite.

It is

not the usual language of diplomacy, but served the purpose
of conveying the idea of how Sazonoff regarded the great
country of Transylvania as “ bait” which he had thrown to
the Roumanian Government, as he might throw the haunch
of a stag to a faithful retainer.

It probably was useful

in assuring the co-operation of some of the Roumanian
leaders, although Roumania had powerful ties of blood with
Russia and with Great Britain, through the able and beauti­
ful Queen of Roumania, daughter of the Duke of Edin­
burgh, who was an influence of great power in the de­
cisions of Roumania.
On February 1, 1917, the Russian Foreign Minister ad­
dressed the following note to the French Ambassador at
“ I n y o u r n o t e o f to d a y ’ s d a te y o u r E x c e l l e n c y u>as g o o d e n o u g h to
in fo r m

t h e I m p e r i a l G o v e r n m e n t t h a t th e G o v e r n m e n t o f th e R e p u b ­

li c w a s c o n t e m p la t in g t h e in c lu s io n in th e t e r m s o f p e a c e to be o f fe r e d

G erm any

th e f o l l o w i n g

d e m a n d s a n d g u a r a n t ie s o f a

te r r it o r ia l

n a tu r e :
“ l . A l s a c e - L o r r a i n e to b e r e s t o r e d to F r a n c e .
“ 2. T h e f r o n t i e r s a r e to be e x t e n d e d a t le a s t u p to th e lim it s o f th e
f o r m e r p r in c ip a lit y o f L o r r a in e a n d a r e to b e d r a w n u p a t th e d i s ­
c r e t io n o f th e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t s o a s to p r o v id e f o r th e s t r a t e g ic
n e e d s a n d f o r t h e i n c lu s io n in F r e n c h te r r it o r y o f t h e e n t i r e ir o n d is ­
t r i c t o f L o r r a in e a n d o f th e e n tir e c o a l d is t r ic t o f th e S a a r V a lle y .


“ 3. T h e r e s t o f

th e

t e r r it o r ie s s it u a t e d


th e

le ft



th e

R h i n e , w h ic h n o w f o r m p a r t o f t h e G e r m a n E m p i r e , a r e to b e e n t ir e ly
sep a ra ted fr o m

G erm a n y and fr e e d fr o m

a l l p o li t ic a l a n d e c o n o m ic

d epen d en ce upon her.
“ 4. T h e

t e r r it o r ie s o f

th e l e f t b a n k o f t h e R h i n e o u ts id e F r e n c h

t e r r it o r y a r e to b e c o n s t it u t e d an a u to n o m o u s a n d n e u t r a l S t a t e , a n d
a r e to b e o c c u p ie d by F r e n c h

t r o o p s u n t il s u c h

tim e a s th e e n e m y

S t a t e s h a v e c o m p le t e ly s a t is fie d a ll t h e c o n d it io n s a n d g u a r a n tie s i n d i ­
c a t e d in th e tr e a ty o f p e a c e .
“ Your

E x c e lle n c y

s ta te d

th a t

th e

G overn m ent


th e

R e p u b l ic

w o u ld b e h a p p y to b e a b le to r e ly u p o n th e s u p p o r t o f t h e I m p e r ia l
G overn m ent
Im p e r ia l

fo r

th e

M a je s ty ,

c a r r y in g


m ost




i t s p la n s .
m a s te r ,


t h e n a m e o f th e R u s s ia n G o v e r n m e n t, to in f o r m


th e


H is

h o n o r , in

y o u r E x c e lle n c y by

t h e p r e s e n t n o t e th a t th e G o v e r n m e n t o f th e R e p u b lic m a y r e ly u p o n
t h e s u p p o r t o f th e I m p e r i a l G o v e r n m e n t f o r th e c a r r y in g o u t o f i t s
p la n s a s s e t o u t a b o v e .”

Thus was recorded the promise to the French leaders of
what they wanted— Alsace-Lorraine, the coal district of the
Saar Valley, the separation of the German country on the
west bank of the Rhine from the German Empire as a neu­
tral state, to be occupied by French troops.
On February 26, 1917, Isvolski, the Russian Ambassador,
sent the following telegram to M. Pekrovsky:
“ S e e m y r e p ly to

te le g r a m

N o . 16 7 , N o . 2.


G overn m en t o f

th e F r e n c h R e p u b l ic , a n x io u s to c o n fir m t h e im p o r ta n c e o f th e tr e a t­
ie s c o n c lu d e d w it h t h e R u s s ia n G o v e r n m e n t in I 9 I 5 > f o r th e s e t t le m e n t
o n t h e te r m in a tio n o f th e w a r o f t h e q u e s t io n o f C o n s t a n t in o p le a n d
t h e S t r a i t s in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h R u s s i a ’ s a s p ir a tio n s , a n x io u s , o n th e
o t h e r h a n d , to s e c u r e f o r i t s a lly in m ilita r y a n d in d u s tr ia l r e s p e c t s a ll
th e g u a r a n tie s d e s ir a b le f o r th e s a f e t y a n d t h e e c o n o m ic d e v e lo p m e n t



of the Empire, recognise Russia’s complete liberty in establishing her
western frontiers.”

Here a pledge of the French Government to the Russian
Government is recorded, revealing the promised support to
the Russian aspirations as to Constantinople and the Straits,
an d :
“ recognising Russia’s complete liberty in establishing her
western frontier.”

This term “ liberty in establishing her western frontier”
is a diplomatic way of expressing the idea of taking terri­
tory away from other governments, (Germany and Austria),
by drawing certain lines on the map, and thereafter exercis­
ing military and civil jurisdiction over the people included
within the boundaries thus fixed.

The usual diplomatic term

employed in the time of Frederick the Great was “ Corriger
la figure” , meaning to “ correct the figure” , that is, make the
lines look better on the map.
On February 27, 1917, following the French pledge to

Russia’s complete


in establishing her

western frontier at the expense of Germany and Austria,
the Russian revolution took place, and three days later the
Czar abdicated.

As a consequence, the Imperial Govern­

ment of the Czar never had an opportunity to “ correct the
figure” of Russia on the west, nor to exercise “complete
liberty in establishing her western frontiers,” but, on the
contrary, the people of Poland demanded the right of selfdetermination and an independent government.



The Russian Soviet Government, being regarded as a
menace to the governments of Western Europe, was given
no recognition when the time came for establishing new
frontiers, but a series of republics was established on what
had previously been western Russia in Latvia, Esthonia,
Lithuania, Poland; Northern Silesia was attached to Poland
with Danzig and part of East Prussia; Czecho-Slovakia was
set up, Transylvania was attached to Roumania, and Roumania was expanded on the east by allowing her to take over

Greater Serbia became Jugo-Slavia, at the ex­

pense of Austrian territory.

Austria became a very small

The Entente deprived the Germans of large portions of
their Eastern territory as well as other sections on the West
and South.
Mr. Balfour on December 19, 1917, denied on behalf
of Great Britain any knowledge of the Russian and French
plan to cut off western Germany into a new State on the
west bank of the Rhine, so it seems that the Russian and
French conspirators did not disclose their plan for division
of the loot to their most intimate allies.
In 1905 William II aggressively made the Bjorkoe Treaty
with the weak Nicholas, pledging German and Russian friend­
ship and inviting France to join.

France refused and the

treaty was cancelled through Russian and French influence.
Nicholas II knew of the treaty with France of 1892 when he
signed the Bjorkoe Treaty.



T h e T r iple E n t e n t e a n d Its W ar P l a n s

It was in 1906 that the four Russian Ambassadors got
together in Paris, determined on the plan of promoting the
Triple Entente and that Russia promptly made a settlement of
outstanding differences with Japan and Great Britain, and
France had already composed its differences with the British
Foreign Office.

In 1906 Sir Edward Grey, on behalf of

the British Government, entered into an agreement with
France, which on November 22, 1912, be reduced to writing:
(Letter of Sir Edward Grey to F r e n c h Ambassador Cambon,
November 2 2 , 1 9 1 2 .)
M y D ear A m b a ssa d o r : From time to time in recent years the
French and British military and naval experts have consulted t o
gether It has always been understood that such consultation does not
restrict the freedom of either government to decide at any future time
whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed
that consultation between experts is not and ought not be regarded as
an engagement that commits either government to action in a con­
tingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition,
for instance, of the French and British fleets, respectively, at the pres­
ent moment*is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.
You have, however, pointed out that if either government have grave
reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it might be­
come essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the

armed assistance of the other.
I agree that if either government had grave reason to expect an
unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the
general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether
both governments should act together to prevent aggression and to
preserve peace and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to
take in common.



If these measures involved action, the plans of the general staffs
would at once be taken into consideration, and the governments would
then decide what effect should be given to them.1

The French Ambassador, Cambon, immediately replied
in the following letter:
F rench E m b a ssy ,

London, November 23, 1912.
D ear S ir E dw ard : Y ou remind me in your letter of yesterday,
November 22, that during the last few years the military and naval
authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other

from time to time; that it had always been understood that these con­
sultations should not restrict the liberty of either government to decide
in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their
armed forces; that on either side these consultations between experts
were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our
governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I
had remarked to you that if one or other of the two governments had
grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third
power it would become essential to know whether it could count on
the armed support of the other.
Your letter answers that point; and I am authorized to state that
in the event of one of our two governments having grave reasons to
fear either an attack from a third power or some event threatening
the general peace, that government would immediately examine with
the other the question whether both governments should act together
in order to prevent aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two
governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be
prepared to take in common. If those measures involved action, the
two governments would take into immediate consideration the plans
1 T h e la s t v i t a l p a r a g r a p h w a s n o t r e a d to P a r lia m e n t b y G r e y , al­
though afterwards published in the White Book. (How Diplomats
Make War 303.)



of their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be
given to those plans.
Yours, etc.,
P au l C am bon.

(How Diplomats Make War, 279.)

V I.

M il it a r y

A rrangements


M o b iliza tio n

In 1914 Sir Edward Grey delivered copies of these letters
exchanged between him and the French Ambassador to the
Russian Ambassador as a basis for an entente between Great
Britain and Russia,1 under which a plan of naval co-opera­
tion between Great Britain, Russia and France was worked
W hen the German rulers ordered a German mobilization,
5 P.M ., Saturday afternoon, August I, their action was
followed the next morning, Sunday, August 2, 1914,2 by the
marching of regiments through London equipped for war.
French troops invaded German soil Sunday, August 2,
I 9 I 4-3

On Saturday, the 1st day of August, the German border
was crossed in four places by Russian patrols.4
Germany declared a state of war existing with Russia,
because of Russian acts, on August 1, 1914, 7:10 P .M .;5
with France, August 3, 1914; Belgium, August 4, 19x4.
France declared war against Germany on August 3, 1914;
1 See ch. 12, Entente Diplomacy and the World, p. 709.
“ How Diplomats Make W ar, Neilson, p. 295.
a Reflections on the World War, p. 145.
4 Preparation and Conduct of the World W ar. Von Kuhl, pp. 79-80.
“ Scott, Documents on World War, p. 1377*



Great Britain against Germany, August 4, 1914; Russia
against Germany, August 7> I9I4- The evidence appears to
show that it was the Russian policy to invade Germany with­
out a declaration of war and to make its mobilization 1 com­
plete under the camouflage of peaceful negotiations.
In the Russian Czar’s orders for mobilization, 30th of
September, 1912, Chancellor Von Bethmann-Hollweg quotes
the following language:
“It is the Emperor’s order that the notification of the mobilization
should be equivalent to the notification of a state of war with

In other words, the Russian mobilization order was to
be regarded as a secret declaration of war.
The Russian troops invaded Germany before Russia de­
clared war.

Hollweg further states that the Russian in­

struction for the troops on the German front was:
“As soon as concentration is completed we shall proceed to advance
against the armed forces of Germany with the object of carrying the
war on to their own territory.” *

This was strictly in line with the Franco-Russian Treaty
of 1892 and the military conferences of I9I I > 1912 and I9 I3*
It will be observed that under the Franco-Russian secret
treaty of 1892, Section I, it was provided that in case of
war Russia should employ all its available forces to fight
Germany and that the military and naval staffs, in the mili­
tary conference above quoted, expressly contemplated that
1 Von Kuhl, pp. 70-80.
* Reflections on the World War, p. 132.



the German Arm y would be obliged to attack France through
Belgium, and stipulated:
“ The French Army could concentrate as rapidly as the German
Army, and that as from the twelfth day it is in a position to take the
offensive against Germany with the help of the British Army on its
left flank.”

And thus clearly outlines the co-operation agreed upon
between Russia, France and Great Britain:
“It is essential that Germany shall be attacked at the same time on
the east and on the west.”

But the most important light is thrown upon the matter
by the preamble in the minutes of the meetings of the French
and Russian chiefs of staffs, which is here repeated:
P ream ble

The tzvo chiefs of staff declare, by common accord, that the words
“ defensive war” must not be interpreted in the sense of a war which
would be conducted defensively. They affirm, on the contrary, the
absolute necessity for the Russian and French armies to adopt a
vigorous offensive, and, as far as possible, a simultaneous one, in con­
formity with the text of Article 3 of the convention, whose terms pro­
vide that the forces of the two contracting powers shall come into full
action with all speed.

The Franco-Russian Treaty, of 1892, provided “ In case the
forces of the Triple Alliance or of one of the powers which
are a party to it”

(for example, Austria)

“ should be

mobilized, France and Russia, at the first indication of the
event and without a previous agreement being necessary shall
mobilize all their forces immediately and simultaneously and



shall transport them as near to their frontiers as possible.”
* * * “ These forces shall begin complete action with the
greatest dispatch, so that Germany will have to fight at the
same time in the east and in the west.”
Therefore, when Austria partially mobilized for a local
war against Serbia in ignorance of the terms of this secret
Franco-Russian Treaty of 1892, Russia and France were
under a secret contract to mobilize immediately and attack
Germany with all their forces.

This zvas a secret declara­

tion of war on Germany as of the date of the Austrian
mobilisation, July 28, 1914, under the secret contract between
Russia and France of 1892 as modified finally by Poincare
and Isvolski who had agreed 011 making the Austrian Serbian
•war a basis for the general European war.
The Russian and French mobilizations, which were begun
under the treaty of 1892, must be interpreted in the light
of that treaty and the annual military conferences from 1903
to 1913 of the general staffs of the Russian and French
The fact that Austria’s mobilization was local and partial
and only against Serbia under terrible provocation made no
difference to the Russian and French conspirators.


technical case of casus foederis had arisen and they instantly
took advantage of it.
The mobilization by Russia on July 30, 1914 under the
Franco-Russian contract of 1892 required the immediate in­
vasion of Germany.

The evidence is complete.




A bsence



W ar

P rogram


G ermany

The German leaders have been painted in America and
throughout the world as having brought on the World W ar.
It was said that they had been preparing for this war for
forty years; that they had been drinking to the day when
they would launch it.

Their extraordinary intellectual at­

tainments were well known, their intelligence was conceded
and it is impossible to believe that with no adequate object
and with no treaties with other nations that were of any
great value, they were proposing to fight the whole world.
They were encircled on land and sea, and without raw ma­
terials, with foes outnumbering them overwhelmingly, and
yet not only were they charged with planning the war with
Russia, with France, with Belgium, with Great Britain, with
Servia, Roumania, Japan, but with doing so knowing that
they would not have the support even of Italy, and with A us­
tria, their only reliable ally, seething with the Pan Slav
movement and threatened with internal dissolution.


many had everything to lose and nothing to gain, because it
is inconceivable that the 300,000,000 people in Europe and
the hundreds of millions outside of Europe, controlled by
Great Britain, Russia, France and Japan would permit Ger­
many to dominate Europe or the world.

The theory that

the German leaders willed the war violates every element of
reason and common sense, and would require proof of the
highest character to demonstrate that their leadership was
so foolish as to will this war.



Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador to Berlin in
1914, wrote Nicolson on July 30, 1914, that he was firmly
convinced that the German civil government and industrial
and commercial leaders were strongly against war.
Professor Gooch, a leading English historian, in his
book “ Germany” says:
“No evidence has appeared to indicate that the German Government
or the German people had desired and plotted a world war.”

Honorable John S. Ewart, a leading jurist of Canada, in
his “ Roots and Causes of the W ars” fully confirms Professor
Professor Harry Elmer Barnes in his comprehensive his­
tory, “ The Genesis of the World W ar” , sustains this view
with overwhelming evidence.
A series of prominent French historians agree to the
substantial facts.

Among these are Pierre Renouvin in his

book, “ The Immediate Origin of the W ar” ; M. Mathias
Morhardt, distinguished French publicist, in his books, “ The
Proofs” , “ The Diplomatic Crime” , etc.; and Georges Demartial, who says:
“ We are convinced that we can no more accept the thesis of divided
responsibility than we can accept that of the exclusive responsibility
of Germany.”

Gustave Dupin in his work, “ Lecture on the Responsibility
of the W ar,” arrived at a like conclusion.
Sazonoff, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, who
was the chief conspirator, next to Isvolski, personally re-



sponsible for engineering this war, has confessed the com­
plete authenticity oi the official dispatches published in
Un Livre Noir and by DeSiebert, which prove that a few
Russian, Serbian and French leaders willed this W ar, and
engineered it into action.
Finally, M. Raymond Poincare, who, with Isvolski and
Sazonoff, willed the war and actively incited the Russians to
the general mobilization which began the war, makes the
following confession in his apology printed in “ Foreign
Affairs,” October, 1925:
“ I do not claim that Austria or Germany in this first phase had a
conscious thought-out intention of provoking a general war. No
existing documents give us the right to suppose that at that time they
had planned anything so systematic

But this fatal admission by Poincare is an absolute con­
fession of the utter falsehood of the Entente propaganda
in the United States that Germany had for years planned the
W orld W ar, and brought it on.
The world does not need the admissions of Sazonoff or
the confessions of Raymond Poincare.

The official proof

is overwhelming that the Germans did not will the World
W ar; that the Austrians did not will the World W ar; that
the leaders of Serbia, of Russia and a very, very few
French leaders, controlling nevertheless French Foreign
Affairs, did will the World W ar.

The evidence is com­

plete and is not equivocal.
The absence of official evidence against Germany, the
overwhelming evidence that the German Government tried



to prevent a general war is in accord with the common sense
reason that it was entirely against the German interest.
It is worth while to examine the Entente and Austro-German war preparations.
General Von Moltke, in his summary of 1912, says that
Germany would be obliged, in the event of war, to take the
field against France with an inferiority in infantry (though
still with a slight superiority in artillery), and would further
be attacked in the rear by Russia.
And he says:
“In view of the enormous sums Russia is spending on the reorgan­
ization of her army she will be stronger with every year that passes.
It is just as impossible for Germany to try to compete with Russia as
a land power as it is for her to attempt to catch up with England as
a sea power.”

In Chapter 10 1 Bausman points out the preparedness of
the Entente Allies— Russia, France and England— and that
for 1914 the appropriations of Russia, France and England
for war purposes made a total of $1,337,259,735, while Ger­
many and Austria for 1914 appropriated $420,133,850, so
that the Entente Allies appropriated $917,000,000 more in
1914 than Germany and Austria, and this does not include
Belgium, Italy, Japan or the Balkans.
The number of men available for quick action in Russia
and France alone was over 3,500,000, not counting their

The total for Germany and Austria was 1,176,741.

General Joffre in the Franco-Russian conference of 1913
Let France Explain.



said he would have 200,000 more men than agreed to, that is,
1,500,00 men for immediate action.
O f course, Great Britain, France and Russia controlled the
sea through the giant navy of Great Britain, and therefore
Germany was cut off from supplies throughout the world,
and its merchant marine and world commerce were de­
stroyed at once, while the Entente Allies had the whole world
to draw from.
When the war ended Germany, with approximately 67,000,000 people, was facing nearly the whole world, or over
1,400,000,000 people, allied or associated with the Entente
Chancellor Ilollweg states that:
“ The supposition that Germany let loose war out of mere lust of
world power is so silly that a historian would only take it seriously in
the entire absence of any other explanation at all. * * * Such an
assumption ascribes to us the sort of folly that is only attributed to an
opponent in the heat of political controversy.” 1

He says with moderation and justice:
“ The controversy as to which party gave the first impulse to a pro­
gram of general armament and to a perversion of the policy of
alliances will probably never be fought to a finish. Immeasurable
mutual distrust, imperialistic ideals, and a patriotism restricted to
material national instincts respectively worked each other up without
its ever being possible to say that any particular nation had contributed
most to the general tendency of the world.” 1
1 Hollweg, 163.
* Hollweg, 169.



Hollweg points out that Russia mobilized because it de­
sired war.

It refused to suspend mobilization,

“ In spite of the fact that Vienna was ready to enter into direct con­
versation with Petersburg on the Serbian issue.
“ In spite of the fact that Vienna had accepted the Grey mediation.
“ In spite of the fact that Vienna had given assurances as to the
integrity of Serbia.
“ In spite of the fact that Vienna was prepared not to go beyond such
a temporary occupation of a part of Serbian territory as England itself
had considered acceptable.
“Finally, in spite of the fact that Austria had only mobilised against
Serbia, and that Germany had not yet mobilized at all.’’

Former Chancellor Hollweg then says:
“ Consequently, when the telegraph brought us news of the mobiliza­
tion on the morning of the 31st of July, we could not be other than
convinced that Russia desired war under all conditions."

It appears that neither Germany nor Austria knew the
terms of the treaty of 1892 requiring Russia and France to
attack Germany if Austria mobilized. Indeed the people
of Russia, of France, of Belgium, of Great Britain did not
know of it.
The German leaders thought they had artillery superior to
the French. A s a matter of fact, the heavy artillery of Ger­
many was better, but the French field gun recoiled on an air
cushion, multiplying the speed of the gun without making
it necessary to resight it— a fact of great importance in main­
taining a barrage.

This wonderful gun was greatly superior

to the German guns in speed and accuracy.
The Russian preparations for this war were gigantic and




the manner in which they worked out the detail of military
and railway preparations is set forth by Von Eggeling in
“ The Russian Mobilization and the Outbreak of the W ar” ,
and by General H. von Kuhl,1 showing gross force of 2,292,000 men.2 The peace strength in the summer of 1914 was
1,581,000 officers and men. The war strength was 3,461,750 men.3 The evidence shows that Grand Duke Nicholas
insisted on war in 1912.

Sukhomlinoff, Chief of Staff, op­

posed on the ground that they were not yet ready.4 In the
spring of 1914 the Duma sanctioned increases equal to the
entire peace strength of the Austrian and Hungarian armies.
Continual test mobilizations were made, supplies were im­
ported, coal reserves increased, rolling stock added, grain
export was stopped.

In the autumn of 1913 General Joffre

headed a military mission to St. Petersburg to examine the
Russian military efficiency, and remarked:
“ The Russian army is at this moment the mightiest in the world “

The German General Staff believed that the Russian field
forces of the first line could be ready on the fifth day of
mobilization, and the second line on the eighth day.


German leaders did not dare to wait longer.
General Dobrorolski, in charge of Russian mobilization,
estimated the general mobilization would call to the colors
14,000,000 men.

1S e e

E x h i b i t 10, Congressional Record,
* Von Kuhl, 61.
* Von Kuhl, 104.
* Eggeling, 49-50.

3 91.



It is not surprising that when William II was advised
by the Czar that steps for mobilization had been in progress
five days on July 29th, he demanded a cessation of the
mobilization with the statement that otherwise he would
be compelled to mobilize.

lie begged the Czar to stop it and

warned him if the menace to Germany continued the Czar
would be entirely responsible for the war.

The Czar im­

mediately afterwards reordered general mobilization.
Poincare’s acknowledgment that Germany had made vari­
ous overtures to France to establish a rapprochement with
a view to maintaining European peace, may be taken at its
full value.

The cold-blooded refusal of the French leaders

to permit this friendly rapprochement shows that the leaders
in the Quai d’Orsay had the determined purpose of carry­
ing out the contract of 1892 with Russia, and the military con­
ventions, and had the will to war.
Even Isvolski, in his memoirs, narrates the great personal
efforts of William II, in 1905, to establish permanent peace
between Russia, Germany and France in the so-called treaty
of Bjorkoe, pledging Russia and Germany to a treaty of
mutual defensive security, in which Article 4 provided:
“When this treaty goes into effect, Russia will take the necessary
steps to make its terms known to France, and invite her to subscribe
to it as an ally.”

Not only did the statesmen in charge of the French For­
eign Office refuse to concur, but they demanded the cancel­
lation of this agreement between Russia and Germany,



which, of course, was a contradiction of the agreement be­
tween France and Russia to attack Germany in a certain con­
tingency, which both the French and Russian statesmen knew
could be compelled when they were prepared for the physi­
cal conflict, that is, the “ mobilization” of Austria.

It is un­

necessary to give the details of the various efforts made by
the German Government, because the will to war on the
part of the Russian and French leaders has been fully proven
with all Germany’s evidence entirely omitted.

\\ hat is the

need of German witnesses when overwhelming evidence is
available from the Entente records and witnesses of the
highest order from the nations opposing Germany?


T he

S ecret D isp a tch e s of t h e R u ssia n
F oreign

O ffice

Innumerable secret dispatches passing between the Rus­
sian Foreign Office and the Russian Ambassadors at Paris
and at London, Isvolski and Benckendorff, set forth the
policy of the Russian leaders to bring about a general Euro­
pean war for the purpose of getting control of the Dar­
danelles. These dispatches prove they intrigued to bring the
Weir about and bring Great Britain into it without British
opinion knowing the Russian purpose or the Russian respon­
sibility, but aimed to make the public, both in Great Britain
and in France, as well as in the world at large, believe that the
W orld W ar was due to German aggression.

On January 29,



1913, Isvolski telegraphed the Russian Foreign Office imme­
diately after Poincare’s election as President, as follows: 12
“I have just had a long conversation with Poincare, who has de­
clared to me in his capacity as President of the Republic he will have
abundant possibility of directly influencing the foreign policy of
France. * * * According to him it is of the highest importance for
the French Government to be able in advance to take part in directing
public opinion as to a war which could arise in the matter of the
Balkans.” 1 * * * *

And on January 30, 1913; 3
“ The energy, the decision, and the entire character of M. Poincare
appears to the guaranty of that which in his capacity as President
of the Republic he will not content himself— as, for example, M.
Failieres— with a role purely passive and, if it might be so expressed,
decorative, but that he would influence by every means and at all
times the French policy in the domain of foreign affairs.* * * That
is why during the next seven years we can be completely assured
against the appearance at the head of the French Government and
diplomacy of such persons as Caillaux, Cruppi, Nonis, etc. * * *
M. Poincare continues to come every day to the ministry, and M.
Jonnert (Minister of Foreign Affairs) makes no reply, expresses no
opinion without he has knowledge of it and consents to it. * * * ”
“ The French Government is firmly decided to fulfill toward us its
obligation as an ally, and it admits with full knowledge and with all
the cold blood necessary that the final result of the actual complica­
tions can be for it the necessity of the participation of France in a
general war. The moment when France should draw the sword is
exactly determined by the Franco-Russian military convention and
1 “ Un Livre Noir,” p. 14, etc.
2Congressional Record, 364.
*Un Livre Noir, Vol. II, pages 19-20.



under the understanding the French ministry entertain not the slightest
doubt nor the slightest hesitation. * * *
“Also the French Government does not wish to deprive Russia of
its liberty of action, nor to put in doubt the moral obligations which
rest upon it in that which concerns the Balkan States. Consequently
Russia can count not only on the support in arms of France in the
case foreseen by the Franco-Russian convention but upon the most
energetic and effective diplomatic assistance (of France) in all the
enterprises of the Russian Government in favor of said States (the

This official record convicts the Russian and French

The original contract to attack Germany was being

steadily worked out by the conspirators.
Poincare undertook his own defense by writing a book,
“ Les Origines de la Guerre” in 1921, (in English 1922), an
analysis of which appears in “ Let France Explain” , Chapter
X IV . He wholly omits the Russian mobilization and does
not contradict the Belgian minister s charge against him as
responsible for bringing on the war.

He omits the vital

record of the falsification of the Russian Orange Book
and the French Yellow Book, but admits:
“ (a) That the Kaiser made repeated efforts to come to a good
understanding with France (p. 25).
“ (b) That Delcasse made a revision, which he misquotes, of the
Franco-Russian treaty (p. 56).
“ (c) That France had always in mind the recovery of the lost
Provinces (p. 25).
“ (d) That the Franco-Russian treaty (of 1892) was never disclosed
before the war and that Viviani, with a copy in his pocket, re­
frained from reading it to the Parliament.
“ (e) That the pacific Georges Louis (French Ambassador) was



recalled from St. Petersburg because the Russians wanted a different

sort.” 1
Poincare’s defense will be found in the “ Living- A ge” , Sat­
urday, August 26, 1922, page 503, in which he says that
Sazonoff, who plotted the war, was a “pacifist” .
He was, on the contrary, with Isvolski, a Pan-Slavic and
Greek Orthodox fanatic, and the man who deliberately
planned the European W ar while always artfully trying to
make himself appear blameless.

The war strategy was to

put the moral odium on Germany.
Poincare says: “ The thought of crushing Serbia domi­
nated the whole policy of Austria and Germany,” and he
affected as deep concern about Serbia as did Sazonoff.
It was a pretext for a desired war.

He said that when he

and Viviani (July 29, 1914) “ reached Paris we were re­
ceived by a startled and troubled nation that, far from wish­
ing war, was overwhelmed with solicitude for the safety of
France, although firmly resolved upon any sacrifices to de­
fend the fatherland.”

That is what most of the French

people thought, but Poincare was resolved on a war of ag­
gression, not of defense.
That very night, July 29th, Poincare, Viviani and the
Minister of W ar met and definitely decided on war.


nights later— July 31st— the French Minister of W ar told
the military attache of the Russian Embassy with “ enthusi­
astic sincerity” that “ the French Government is firmly de­
cided upon war” and requested the Russian Embassy to
1 “ Let France Explain,” p. 229.



confirm the hope of the French General Staff that all the
Russian efforts should be directed against Germany.


gram 216.)
Poincare states that with the consent of the ministry he
wrote a letter to K ing George on July 31, 1914, informing
the King that France would do all in her power to maintain

This letter to King George is flatly contradicted by

Telegram 216, is inconsistent with the contract of 1892,
with the secret military agreement to attack Germany, with
the secret conferences of the Russian and French General
Staffs of 1911, of 1912, and of 1913 (approved of Poincare)
to mobilize and attack Germany in the event of an Austrian
mobilization. But Poincare’s hypocritical letter was extremely
serviceable in convincing British public opinion of the peace­
ful attitude of the French Government and of the guilt of
the German Government in willing the war.

His letter to

the king was a “ ruse de guerre” .
Asquith, on Saturday, August 1st, at 2 A.M ., had King
George telegraph to the Czar, making a strong appeal for

(See page 1 N. Y . Times, August 2, 1914.)

A s­

quith and K ing George knew well to whom to appeal.


was to the Czar, the authority responsible for making the
war, and not to the German Kaiser, that King George ap­
This fact has great significance.
King George then wired the Czar in behalf of peace,
after the Russian and French Governments were fully com­
mitted to war, and Great Britain bound to follow.

It was



a graceful and useful gesture and went far to satisfy pub­
lic opinion, that Great Britain did not wish the war and
tried to prevent it.

O f course the war was already launched

and Grey, Poincare and Sazonoff knew it.
Poincare insisted on having Grey announce the Entente,
avowedly as a means of preventing Germany from declar­
ing war.

Grey was unwilling, probably because at that

moment it would have offended British public opinion, which
was not advised of Grey’s secret commitments to France,
much less to Russia. Grey’s commitment to France had been
repeatedly denied by Grey and his representatives.
Grey had no option but to support France in the war
when it came (and however it came) with Germany be­
cause of his commitments, but above all because of his con­
viction of what was to Great Britain’s interest.
On the night of July 29, the British Ambassador at Berlin
wired Sir Edward Grey that the German Chancellor had told
him (the British Ambassador in Berlin) that: “ As far as he
was able to judge the main principle which governed British
policy was that Great Britain would never stand by and allow
France to be crushed in any conflict there might be.” 1
So that it is clear that the German Government expected
Great Britain to support France in the event of war.


fact that the Russians knew Great Britain would support
France fully justified the Russian war party and the French
war party in their determination on war, and justified the
German leaders in doing their utmost to prevent war.
1 “How Diplomats Make War,” 263.



Moreover, Sir Edward Grey told the French Ambassador
at London, Cambon,1 that he meant to tell the German Am ­
bassador that day, Wednesday, July 29, that he must not
be misled from the friendly tone of their conversation that
Britain would stand aside, so that both Germany and France
knew that Britain would not stand aside.

When Germany

fought she knew she had overwhelming odds against her.
On Friday, July 31, the British Ambassador to Berlin, Sir
Edward Goschen, wired Sir Edward Grey that the German
Chancellor said he had done everything possible to attain his
object at Vienna, but he could not leave his country defense­
less " while time was being utilized by other powers; and if,
as he learns is the case, military measures are now being
taken by Russia against Germany also, it will be impossible
for him to remain quiet ” 2
Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to the British Ambassador
at St. Petersburg that he did not see how Russia could be
urged to suspend military preparations unless some limit were
put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Serbia.3
In other words, he did not exercise a moderating influence
on St. Petersburg; he justified their military preparedness,
although he knew Austria was not threatening Russia and
had no intention of taking Serb territory or impairing its
The whole story is set forth quite fully by Neilson, for1 British White Paper, 87.
a Ibid., 281.



merly a member of the British Parliament, in Chapter 12 of
“ How Diplomats Make W ar.”

The chapter is entitled, “A

Game of Chess” .
Colonel E. M. House, in 1913 and 1914, sensing the pos­
sibility of war in Europe, made a resolute effort to bring
about a peaceful understanding between Great Britain,
France and Germany.

He had intimate contact with the

British leaders and the French leaders, as the trusted rep­
resentative of the President of the United States.
He went to London and Paris, urged upon the British
and French leaders an understanding between them and
Germany, and went to Berlin, where his suggestion met with
a friendly reception.

He made no real progress with the

British or French in his efforts to prevent war.
On May 29, 1914, he wrote the President of the United
States the following prophetic words:
“ Whenever England consents, France and Russia unll close in on
Germany and Austria

Within seventy-five days England had openly consented,
had itself declared war on Germany, and Russia and France
had taken the concrete steps to close in on Germany and
Austria as House said they would do.
But instantly Germany, completely blockaded, was strenu­
ously advertised in a world-wide campaign as being ex­
clusively guilty of launching the W ar.

The falsehood was

believed and became the corner-stone of the Versailles



Treaty (Article 231).

The peace of the peoples of Europe

cannot safely rest on this dangerous foundation.
Without doubt patriotism in the form of intense national­
ism moved most of the European leaders, who thought in
terms of military strategy alone.
It is futile to reproach individuals in the foreign offices of
St. Petersburg, of Paris or of London.

These men were

produced by their environment in an atmosphere of secret
diplomacy, believing in the power of might first, last and
all the time, but nevertheless also believing it necessary to
subsidize the press and direct public opinion so as to have
the support as far as possible of their own nationals.
A profound distrust between the leaders of the different
nations was everywhere evident.
These foreign offices were controlled by a consuming de­
sire for further political power over other people and over
other territory.

Their whole diplomacy in foreign rela­

tions largely consisted of trading with each other, giving and
taking “ compensations” . The prime moving force was com­
mercialized imperialism.
One of the most convincing evidences of the conscious war
responsibility of the Russian Foreign Office is the wholesale
falsification of the Russian Orange Book, in which out of
sixty dispatches immediately preceding the war fifty of them
were falsified by striking out items that would demonstrate
that the Russian or French leaders willed the war or that
the Germans or Austrians did not will the war.

The fol-


lowing telegrams show some of these falsifications.



words now appearing in italics were stricken out in the Rus­
sian Orange Book and in some cases other words were in­

(See Chapter IV . Section V .)

These corrected Russian dispatches prove that the Ger­
mans and Austrians did not will the general European war
and that the Russian and French leaders in control did will

IX .

T he

E uropean

P ress

The press of Russia, Germany, France, and Serbia in
1914 was a press largely controlled by subsidies.
The journals were not supported by advertisements as in

They relied upon subsidies from governments,

politicians, and from commercial and financial interests.
Through such agencies the people of Germany, France
and Russia were taught to hate each other. The death of the
crown prince of Austria was attributed by the Government
of Austria to the Serbian press propaganda financed by the
Russian Government through the Russian Minister at Bel­
grade with the connivance of the Serbian Government.


Livre Noir, which discloses the secret archives of the Rus­
sian Foreign Office, are many dispatches showing the manner
in which the Russian Government subsidized and directed
the press.
On page 208, Livre Noir, Vol. II. for example, in tele-




gram 591, December 18, 1913, Isvolski, the Russian Am ­
bassador at Paris, speaking of the Paris press, says:
“ The papers which are devoted to us, as Le Matin, rely on me for
instructions, and if we do not give them directions they might per­
haps engage themselves with a false view.”

On page 213 (ibid.) Isvolski says:
“It is particularly important here, at such a moment, to control the
press. Otherwise it may engage itself with a false view; besides it
is more than sure that it is continually moved by financial circles
who have in view only their own special interests.”

On page 371 of Vol. II. Isvolski writes:
“ Endeavoring to maintain the attitudes which are desirable for
us with the press of the government and political world, I am doing
my utmost at the same time to influence the press. With this in
view, thanks to the measures taken in time, considerable results
have been obtained. As you know, I do not intervene directly in the
distribution of the subsidies, but this distribution in which the French
ministers take part, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister
of Finance, is, it appears, efficacious and obtains its ends. From my
side I exert myself every day to influence personally the most impor­
tant journals of Paris such as Temps, Journal des Debats, L ’Echo de

Hundreds of thousands of francs of Russian money were
paid monthly to the French press by the lieutenants of Poin­
The manner in which the press responded to such stimula­
tion has heretofore been shown in the dispatches quoted,
showing that the newspapers were potent instrumentalities
in moving the French and Russian people to war.



From these disclosures it will appear how extremely
significant to the German rulers was the attitude of the
French press in Paris in July, 1914, when they were de­
nouncing Germany and Austria and demanding the support
of Russia, and it is worthwhile to recall the declaration of
the “ Nouvelle Revue” that France was determined on war,
and of the Petrograd press that Russia was determined on
war, and that France and Russia were prepared.
The attitude of the French war party may be appreciated
from the quotation of Mr. Buxton, in the Foreign Office de­
bate of July, 1912, taken from the “ Nouvelle Revue” , one of
the most prominent of Paris periodicals :x
“We intend to have war. After 40 years of a heavily armed peace
we can at least utter this opinion without the serious readers of a
French revue shaking in their shoes. * * * France is ready to strike,
and to conquer, as she was not ready 40 years ago, and as she will
not be in four or five years to come, owing to the annual divergent
numbers of the birth rate in each country. * * * We, the a t t a c k in g
p a r ty , will have arranged with England that their fleet * * * will
have followed * * * the remains of the whole German Navy into the
German waters.”


B r ib e r y o f t h e F r e n c h P ress

On March 16, 1909, Isvolski, in a long letter to the Rus­
sian Foreign Office, used the following language:
“ T h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t fully realizes the extent of its obligations
into which it entered towards us and i v i l l f u l f i l l it s d u ty at the
moment when the national honor of Russia in Serbia is pledged
against Austria— but how will the French people take it? W ill they

1 How Diplomats Make War, p. 206.



find satisfaction in seeing peace endangered by Serbia and in the pros­
pect of war against Germany?”

In other words the French Foreign Office pledged France
to fight with Russia against Germany when the local war
between Austria and Serbia under the Russian promise of
co-operation to Serbia should begin and furnish the pre­

But the attitude of the French people was a ques­


That question was settled by subsidizing the French

press and making the people or their leaders believe France
had a vital interest in the local Austro-Serb controversy.
And since the socialist and radical press was especially
hostile to any war because of the Balkans, Isvolski took the
steps necessary to influence the French press by the use of
Russian money, which was steadily kept up, as will appear
from the following sample telegrams:
“ Strictly confidential.
July 8-21, 1912.
No. 348.
“ Dear Sergei Dimitrievitch:
“ From this interview I was convinced that M. Poincare is in every
respect in accord with us, considers the moment has finally arrived to
realise the century-old aims of our traditional policy ( the seizure of
the Straits) and therewith restore the E u r o p e a n balance of power by
the return of the stolen provinces of Alsace-Lorraine.
“ Poincare did not conceal the great difficulties which we have to
overcome yet. The principal trouble he expects from the radical
Socialists who are opposed to any war caused by financial or com­
mercial reasons, especially when its origin is in the Balkans. This
party has some highly intelligent men: Caillaux, Herriot, Painleve,
and disposes of a considerable number of deputies and newspapers.



Of the latter, some have only a few readers— Le Radical, La Lanterne,
Le Rappel, L ’Action, L ’Aurore, La Depeche de Toulouse— but they
have much influence. They are the mouthpiece of some prominent
leader and accorded by his partisans unflinching political obedience.
Each of these publishers and leaders is backed by a group of deputies
and senators who want to rise with him and submit themselves with­
out contradiction * * * M . P o i n c a r e s h a r e s m y o p in io n th a t a v e r y
la r g e s a c r if ic e o n o u r p a r t i s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h i s p u r p o s e .
I hardly
dare to mention the amount— th r e e m illio n f r a n c s — of which 250,000
francs alone is for the Radical, the organ of Senator Perchot. If
we consider that th e T u r k i s h G o v e r n m e n t has spent f iv e m illio n s to
in f lu e n c e th e F r e n c h p r e s s and b o u g h t even one of their most promi­
nent authors (Pierre Loti) and if we also contemplate the r e la t iv e
in s ig n ific a n c e of this amount in c o m p a r is o n to th e w o r ld - c h a n g in g
p r o g r a m which we can bring closer to realization therewith, you
may want to undertake to submit this proposition to the cabinet for
their immediate consent.
“I propose that the subsidy be paid in monthly installments a s h e r e ­
t o f o r e in order to be sure every minute o f th e s e a l o f th e n e w s ­
pa p ers.
I consider it advantageous this time not to use Lenoir but
LafTon. Laffon has considerable influence with the Matin, whose
financial director he was, as well as with the great dailies.
I svolski .”

This communication printed in “ Behind the Scenes in
French Journalism” was identified under oath by former
Prime Minister Kokovtzev in the libel suit of the Matin
against Humanite.
To the telegram of July 8-21, Sazonoff replied:
July 13-28, 1912.
“ In consequence of your excellency’s letter of July 8-21 (No. 348)
I have not failed to submit your proposition and the report of your
conversation to the cabinet, p r e s id e d o v e r b y H i s M a j e s t y . It is a
great joy to be able to communicate to you that the request of the



President of the Republic regarding the amounts to be put by us at
the disposition of the press, has, after some natural hesitations
(quelques hesitations bien comprehensibles), been granted by His
Majesty with the condition that, as heretofore, Privy Councillor
Raffalowitch will be entrusted with the financial part of the transac­
tion. The State Counselor Davidoff will start for Paris immediately
with the most far-reaching instructions.”

So the Czar authorized it.
The matter was put in the hands of Raffalowitch, who, on
the 30th of November, 1912, wired for additional finances for
secret distribution in Paris.

A number of such demands

were made.
T o the Russian Foreign Minister was sent the following
“ October 10-23, 1912.
“ Some time ago I wrote to you, as well as to Kokovzeff, about the
absolute necessity of providing further funds for the purpose of in­
fluencing the French press.
“As I personally have very little experience in such matters, I con­
ferred with Privy Councillor Raffalowitch, who is familiar with such
questions and who proposes the following scheme: To immediately
provide for that purpose Frs. 300,000-and to entrust Lenoir with
the distribution as the latter has managed previous distributions. It
is very important not to undertake anything without consulting Poin­
care. French statesmen are practised in such matters and possess
incredible adroitness.

Sazonoff complied October 17th, and authorized Depart­
mental Chief Davidoff to act.
following w ire :

Davidoff sent Sazonoff the



“ October 17-30, 1912.
“ Summary of my conference with Poincare and ambassador. F u r ­
t h e r credit 300,000 for quick p r e s s - in t e r v e n t io n as soon as same
becomes necessary. This is reasonable and I accepted subject to
referring to your Excellency.”

This system was kept up, and on November 7, 1913, (for
one of many examples), Raffalowitch reported to the Rus­
sian Ministry the following disbursements:
La Lanterne........................................ Frs. 42,000 Millerand’spaper
L ’Aurore ............................................... “ 17,000 Clemenceau’s paper
L ’Evenement......................................... “ 11,000
L ’Action ................................................ “ 9,000
La F ra n ce.............................................. “
Le R app el.............................................. “


Le Gil B ia s ............................................ “
Le Journal............................................. “


and on November 19, 1913, he reported the following dis­
bursements :
Le Radical ........................................Frs. 120,000
La Lanterne ....................................... “
35,000 Millerand’spaper
Le F ig a r o ............................................ “ 25,000
Le T em p s............................................. “ 50,000
La Libre P a ro le .................................. “
L’Aurore ........................................... “
45,000 Clemenceau’s paper
Le G aulois........................................... “ 25,000
La Liberte .......................................... “

Raffalowitch made the following communication to Isvolski:



“December n , 1912.
“ I have already informed your Excellency that Lenoir at the insti­
gation of Klotz, who herein is Poincare’s mouthpiece, has pledged
himself firmly towards the journals, ‘L ’Aurore,’ ‘Lanterne,’ ‘Radical/
etc.— as well as to certain directors of journals having but small
editions, but great influence in politics.”

It was under these subsidies of the French press that the
French people were worked up by special writers to believe
that it was the interest of France to support Russia in de­
fending Serbia on the pretense of maintaining “ the balance
of power” in the Balkans, while Russian money in Serbia
had excited the intrigues of Serbia, which led to the assas­
sination of numerous Austrian officials (finally of the Grand
Duke Ferdinand) and compelled Austria to mobilize against
Serbia in self-protection.

This local act of war of Austria

against Serbia was used then as a pretext for Russian gen­
eral mobilization, which really meant a secret declaration
of war by Russia and France against Germany, as shown
by the contract of 1892-4, the military conferences, and the
secret dispatches already published.
The book “ Behind the Scenes of French Journalism” tells
how the press was used by French officials to influence the
whole world by false propaganda, as opinion in Paris, St.
Petersburg and Serbia had been influenced.
Three days before the war broke out. a resolution was
offered and passed the same day, by the French Parliament,
providing 25,000,000 francs for the establishment of the
“ Maison de la Presse” .

The House of the Press was a

building of 200 rooms, No. 3 Rue Francois, five stories



high, where the war news was distributed, propaganda manu­
factured, photographs of well-painted atrocities made to
prove the wickedness of the Germans; the usual war lies

There were 80 employees transmitting to the

Foreign Press, free of charge, and in eighteen civilized lan­
guages, reports of French victories and painted cruelties of
the Huns and Bodies.

Here was distributed the amiable

stories about the Germans cutting off the hands of children,
crucifying prisoners, boiling their own dead for fat, etc.
They lived up to the language of Isvolski, and showed
“ incredible adroitness” .
The British lie factory was not far behind.

Unity of

Chicago of Mar. 7, 1927, quotes Rt. Hon. Arthur Ponsonby
as to how the films were made in England for use in America
to change a pacifist into a militarist.

The story of the Ger­

mans boiling their own dead for fat and glycerine was an
English invention.

The Lusitania medals representing the

Germans celebrating the sinking of the Lusitania were made
in England.

The pictures of cheering Germans about the

Kaiser’s Palace celebrating the sinking of the Lusitania was
an English fake.
Unhappily war lies freely circulated among all of the bel­

There were none who were innocent of these


IN 1914
I . T h e W i l l to W a r

In ascertaining “ the will to war,” it is of the greatest im­
portance to study these dispatches and to consider the true
intent as indicated by their language, the context, the secret
treaties and conferences of the General Staffs of Russia,
France and Great Britain.
It is clear from these dispatches that the Russian Imperial­
ists, in pursuance of the contract they made with the French
President in 1892 to attack Germany, had persistently for
22 years maintained a fixed policy of attacking Germany
when the time arrived at which it could be done with a
certainty of success; that they had borrowed billions of
money from France with which to prepare for the day; that
they had carried on their secret military conferences, and
had the machinery of war completely worked out with the
most modern methods of inter-communication by messenger,
telegraph, telephone and by wireless.

It is perfectly clear that the object of the conspiracy was



the control of the Dardanelles, over-lordship of the Balkans,
the acquisition of Austrian and German territory, and mak­
ing the Romanoff Dynasty the over-lord of Eastern Europe,
and by breaking down the power of Germany and Austria,
giving it a position of greatly increased power in the world.
The manner of accomplishing this conspiracy is equally

It was to be done by a policy of complete encircle­

ment of Germany, by disorganizing Austria with a Pan-Slav
movement, alienating Italy by secret promises, and striking
Germany with a sudden over-powering blow.

Germany was

to be kept entirely in the dark with regard to this con­
Nicholas, in pursuance of this design, invited William II
to act as a mediator between Russia and Austria, thereby to
allay apprehensions that would otherwise be aroused by the
Russian mobilization.

The mobilization was to be rushed,

and the German Emperor kept in ignorance of its significance
until it was too late.
The proposals for adjusting the difficulties between A us­
tria, Serbia and Russia by international conferences, was a
ruse of war intended to keep the German leaders quiet until
a sledge-hammer blow could be suddenly delivered.
Consider, for instance, Telegram 210 of July 30, 1914, in
which Isvolski, the Russian Ambassador at Paris, told
Sazonoff, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the
French W ar Minister had advised the Russian Military A t­
tache that—




c o u ld

d e c la r e

th a t i n

th e

h ig h e r in te r e s ts


p ea ce


a re

r e a d y to d e la y o u r p r e p a r a tio n s f o r m o b iliz a t io n s in c e t h is w o u ld n o t
p reven t u s fro m

c o n t in u in g o u r ftr e p a r a tio n s , a n d in d e e d f r o m in t e n ­

s i f y i n g th e m , b u t w e s h o u ld h a v e to r e f r a i n f r o m

t h e p o s s ib le g r e a te r

m o v e m e n ts o f tro o p s

And on the night of July 31, 1914, Dispatch No. 216
showed a determined purpose to war by the French Govern­
ment, though in the meantime and thereafter, the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of France was assuring the German Am ­
bassador at Paris that they were trying to work out a
friendly adjustment, and on July 31 Sazonoff was sending
out dispatches pretending that he wanted a peaceful adjust­
ment, although fully committed to war.
In the meantime both Paris and London refused to exer­
cise any moderating influence on St. Petersburg.

St. Peters­

burg notified Paris and London that it would not submit
to moderating influences while Berlin was doing its utmost to
exercise a moderating influence in V ienna and succeeded.
The Russian leaders would not have refused to listen unless
they had been already assured that this attitude would be
acceptable to Paris and London.

It was a part of the plot.

August 1, 1914, Telegram No. 233, Poincare told Isvolski
“ d u r in g t h e la s t f e w

d a y s th e A u s tr ia n A m b a s s a d o r h a d e n e r g e ti­

c a lly a s s u r e d h im a n d V i v i o n i th a t A u s t r i a h a d d e c la r e d to R u s s i a


n o t o n ly

to r e s p e c t th e t e r r it o r ia l i n t e g r i t y o f S e r b i a ,


a ls o h e r s o v e r e i g n r i g h t s , b u t th a t R u s s i a h a d in t e n t io n a lly c o n c e a le d
t h e s e a s s u r a n c e s .”



Austria made the same representations to London, but, of
course, they were unavailing because the Imperial Russian
conspirators had no intention whatever of permitting Ger­
many and Austria to escape.

They were determined to have

the war for which they had made such long and careful prep­
arations, and from which they entertained such high hopes
of great glory and power.
II. J u l y 24, 1914
July 24, 1914, presents a complete demonstration that the
Allies anticipated a general European war and were taking
full steps to that end, and that Germany was not anticipating
a European war.
On July 24, 1914, there was no pretense whatever that any
steps looking to war were being taken by the German Gov­
On July 24, 1914, Serbia’s preparation of a reply to A us­
tria’s demand for redress and security was being accom­
panied by plans for an immediate mobilization of all of her
army, under the secret understanding with Russia.
On July 24, 1914, the Russian Crown Council made plans
for mobilization, and Januskewitch, Chief of Staff under
Sukhomlinoff, gave the order to General Dobrorolski, officer
in charge of mobilization, to prepare for the mobilization of
1,100,000 Russian troops.
This was a secret declaration of war against Germany, in
strict pursuance of the secret treaty of 1892.

It involved



ultimately calling to the colors 14,000,000 men (Dobrorolski
on Russian Mobilization).

The official pretense that it was

a partial mobilization was merely a piece of self-serving
official hypocrisy, intended to prevent Germany from know­
ing it until too late to adequately defend.

Sukhomlinoff on

the 25th of July had dinner with Baron Rosen and on the
receipt of a dispatch from Serbia that the Serbs had mo­
bilized, exclaimed: “ This time we shall march.”

He was

Minister of W ar of Russia, and he knew and his testimony
unconsciously given is of the first magnitude.
On July 24th Sazonoff said on receiving news of the A us­
trian ultimatum: “ C ’est la guerre Europeenne — “ this is
the European war.” 1
Sazonoff, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in declaring he
would not permit any moderating influence from the British
or French Government, knew what the policy of Russia was
— that it was for war. His pretense of favoring peace had no
foundation of fact.
Boghitchevitch, who was the Diplomatic Representative
of Serbia, in Paris up to 1907, and then at Berlin up to 1914,
with regard to Sazonoff’s self-serving public expression that
the war had been made too soon in his opinion and at a time
he thought not propitious, says: 2
“The insincerity of the Minister was complete, but his hypocritical
declarations succeeded in making him appear before the European
cabinets as an adversary of Russian Pan-Slavism, of which he was

1 Barnes, p. 200.
a “ Les Causes de la Guerre,” p. 69.


on the contrary— the course of events of the war of 1914 demonstrated
it— the damned soul.”

Boghitchevitch was quite right.

Not only SazonofF re­

fused in advance to consider any moderating influence from
Great Britain or France as to Russia’s artificial, unfounded
controversy with Austria as to Serbia, but Poincare and
Viviani, representing France, refused to try to exercise any
moderating influence on the war policy of SazonofF; and
Edward Grey, representing Great Britain, also refused.
Boghitchevitch testifies strongly in his book (supra) to
“ The W ill to W ar” of Serbia and Russia,1 and says of Ger­
many, that its decisions were inspired by the fixed purpose
“ to maintain peace” .

He says 2 “ To fight Germany was the

one reason which determined France to seek the alliance with
On July 24, 1914, the Belgian Foreign Office sent out a
circular to Belgian officers, that Belgium was completely
mobilized, although the official order of Belgian mobilization
was not published until July 30, 1914.

Again the public was

deceived as to the time of Belgian mobilization.
On July 24, 1914, France ordered its African troops to
On July 24, 1914, France took preliminary steps for mo­
bilizing and was ready for action in eleven days when Poin­
care addressed the French Assembly on August 4, 1914; so
1 Ibid., p. 107.
a Ibid., p. m .



general mobilization must have started about July 24th, not­
withstanding the delay in the publication of the announce­

The French and Russian leaders were intimately co­

On July 24, 1914, France had already withdrawn its navy
from the Atlantic seaboard to the Mediterranean, relying
upon British protection.
On July 24, 1914, Poincare and Viviani were on their
way from St. Petersburg, Russia, where they had been re­
ceived with great pomp and circumstance, and where they
had renewed assurances to the Russian authorities that
France was ready, and would support Russia in making war
on Germany.1

They reached Paris on July 29, and on the

night of July 31st the famous Dispatch 216 from Isvolski to
Sazonoff declared that the French W ar Minister had informed the Russian Military Attache with enthusiastic sin­
cerity that the French Government was firmly decided upon
war, and expressed the hope that all the Russian efforts
would be directed against Germany, and that Austria should
be treated as a negligible quantity.

According to the secret

Franco-Russian conventions “ the aggressor shall be the
power which mobilizes first” (No. 53 )> and ‘ mobilization
is the declaration of w ar” (N o. 71 )*


and Annual

Cnder the Franco-




French and Russian mobilizations were to be followed by
the immediate attack on Germany.
1 See Margueritte, “ Les Criminels.”

I he mobilization orders



of France and Russia under the Treaty were absolutely
equivalent to a secret declaration of war against Germany.
On July 24, 1914, Great Britain had its war fleet mobilized
for war in control of the North Sea, the outlet of the Baltic,
the English Channel and the French coast.

On July 24,

1914, France had its entire war fleet ready for action in the
Mediterranean Sea.
On July 24, 1914, William II, who had been painted by
Allied propaganda as the monster who unchained the dogs
of war, was quietly cruising the northern waters of the
Baltic Sea on his summer vacation, apparently unconscious
that his complete ruin was impending.
Fie came back on Sunday, the 26th of July, and immedi­
ately began his strenuous but useless appeals for European
He had been grossly deceived by Nicholas II, who, with
unbelievable hypocrisy, had asked him to intervene for peace
as a mediator between Austria and Serbia, at the very time
when a general mobilization was going on in Russia, with
the well understood purpose of the Russian leaders imme­
diately to attack Germany under the secret treaty of 1892.
Even Sazonoff has written that the Kaiser begged the Czar
to keep his troops from the border, and that William II was
“ nearly frantic” .
The die was cast. The war was already in progress.


entire Entente mobilization was ready, and under full swing.
The avalanche was grandly moving.

The World W ar had

begun. William II was wasting his breath.





C a s e A g a i n s t P o in c a r e

The secret record shows abundantly, from prominent wit­
nesses in all the Entente countries, that neither the German
nor the Austrian leaders had any purpose to bring on a
European war.

They did not will the war.

The German

leaders did their utmost to prevent it when they saw it threat­

The conspiracy of the Russian and a few French

leaders willed the war, and deliberately brought it on for the
purpose first set forth in the statement of this case.
It should be remembered that in England only Asquith,
Edward Grey and very few others knew about Grey’s secret
commitments; John Burns, Lord Morley and others about
August i, 1914, withdrew from Asquith’s Cabinet when they
discovered the truth.
It should be remembered that the great body of the French
leaders were as ignorant of the secret intrigues of Poincare
as the body of the French and English people were, for the
secret treaty of 1892, to attack Germany was a profound state
But Poincare, Isvolski and Sazonoff thoroughly under­
stood it and each other.
Poincare wrapped himself in the cloak of France, and
loudly proclaimed, “ France does not wish war” , and repeated
and repeated such phrases, but peace-loving France was one
thing, and Poincare was another thing.

Poincare is not

France, and happily France is not Poincare.

The French


people desired peace.


Poincare desired war, and engineered

the French people into a gigantic disaster.

Even the people

of Alsace Lorraine were opposed to w a r; the Diet of AlsaceLorraine had unanimously passed resolutions against war on
May 6, 1913.

Poincare expressed his true sentiments at the

University of Paris, October, 1920, when he said:
“I have not been able to see any other reason for my generation
living, except the hope of recovering our lost provinces.”

Poincare has so far failed to disprove the following serious
disclosures made against him by the evidence:
1. That he refused the German efforts at rapprochement
in 1912 and its offer of self-governing autonomy for AlsaceLorraine.
2. His agreement with Isvolski to support Russia in a war
arising over the Balkans which should bring in Germany.
3. The appointment of Delcasse and Paleologue as Ambas­
sadors to Russia, knowing they favored war.
4. His participation in bribing the French press, with
Russian money to support Russia in the war breeding policy
in the Balkans.
5. The financing of the Russian Arm y and military rail­
roads against Germany.
6. Promoting the Anglo-Russian Naval Convention in
spring of 1914.
7. His stimulation of the Russian W ar Party at St. Peters­
burg in the week preceding the Russian mobilization of July
1914, which launched the war.



8. Throwing his personal influence for war on the night
of July 29, 1914, and allowing his Minister of \\ ar to advise
Russia on the night of July 31, France was determined on
9. Withholding from the French people his commitments
to Russia and deceiving them as to the vital facts, making
them believe Germany was the wilful aggressor and that
France was merely waging a war of self-defense.
10. His deceit in the letter to King George July 31, 1914,
assuring him of his pacific purposes after having caused the
launching of the war by the Russians.
It would be a grave mistake to permit a discussion of this
great question to degenerate into stigmatizing leaders, how­
ever much they erred.

Let us give Poincare credit for be­

lieving that he was another Napoleon, leading France to a
“ glorious victory” , to an era of “ greater splendor” , to the
hegemony of Kurope, and that his motives were inspired by

He played his part.

He failed to realize the

relentless law of gravity, which at last controls all human

It is not yet too late for him and his group to make

some amends by giving their energies to making future peace
secure on a basis of open diplomacy, true democracy, justice
and conciliation, and by ending the old doctrine of intrigue
and violence.
IV . M o b il iz a t io n
General mobilization was precisely equal to a declaration
of war, and was so understood throughout Europe.

It in-



volved in Russia, for example, calling to the colors fourteen
million men, and a vast machinery providing instant daily
supplies of food, clothing, transportation, arms and ammuni­
tion to these millions of combatants.
It meant putting the entire country under military control,
and submerging the civil authorities.
It was the final act after diplomacy had utterly failed,
and when nothing remained except military force.

It was

the roar of the cannon’s mouth instead of the courteous voice
of the diplomat.
General Boisdeffre, when negotiating the Franco-Russian
agreement of 1892, said: “ Mobilization is a declaration of

Mobilization compels one’s neighbor to do the same;

mobilization involves the execution of strategic transport and
of concentration,” to which the Czar of Russia replied: “ It
is thus that I understand it.” 1
Even the strongly pro-French eminent historian, Renouvin,
admits this, and says that Russian mobilization could not but
provoke a reply from Germany, that is, German mobilization
and war.
The eminent French publicist, M. Mathias Morhardt, in
his book “ Les Preuves,” 291, says:
“All the governments of Europe knew that ‘general mobilization
meant war.’ The Russian general mobilization constituted, on the
highest authority, an act of aggression.”
“ We have on this point the cumulative testimony of Czar Alexander
III; of Czar Nicholas II; of King George V ; of William II, and
1 French Yellow Book, No. 71.



M. Raymond Poincare, and we have also the declarations of General
Boisdeffre, General Obrontcheff, of General Dobrorolski, of M.
Maurice Paleologue, of M. Rene Viviani, of Sir Edward Grey, of
Lloyd George, etc., etc.”

M. Morhardt says, in speaking of Germany, that:
“ Threatened in her security and even in her existence by the
Russian general mobilization, Germany first demanded that Russia
suspend her mobilization, as proclaimed by Nicholas II in his declara­
tion, and it was because Russia refused * * * that war became

This verdict is supported by the ablest historians in the
world— among them many distinguished Frenchmen.1
It is perfectly obvious from the records that the conspiracy
of the Russian Imperialists and of Raymond Poincare not
only willed the war, deliberately prepared for it, created the
pretext through Serbia, and falsely put the blame on the
German leaders for willing the war, but then took the ag­
gressive step of the general mobilization of Russia which
began on July 24 with the order given by the ministerial
counsel for mobilization, which the military clique imme­
diately converted into a general mobilization.

The Czar

signed the first formal ukase ordering general mobilization
July 29th, withheld it and reissued it July 30th.
On July 24th, 1914 the French Ambassador to Russia gave
a luncheon attended by the Russian Minister of Foreign

This was immediately following the advice from

Serbia of the Austrian ultimatum.
1 See Supplement.



Immediately following at three o’clock a Ministerial Coun­
cil was held at which the consent of the Czar was requested
to order the mobilization of the Russian armies and the
Russian fleets, to authorize the gathering of war materials, to
authorize the withdrawal of funds from Germany and

These resolutions were confirmed by the Czar July

25th, a crown council endorsed it July 25th, and all necessary
measures preparatory for war were to be taken. The English
Ambassador Buchanan notified his Government that the Rus­
sian Emperor had sanctioned the drafting of the Imperial
Ukase which was to be published when the Minister of
Foreign Affairs considered the moment had come for giving
effect to it, ordering the mobilization of eleven hundred thou­
sand men.

The necessary preliminary preparations for

mobilization would however be begun at once. This was July
Ambassador Buchanan further advised his Government
that Sazonoff was given courage in his aggressive plans by
absolute French assurance of military aid.

That the French

Ambassador had given Sazonoff formal assurance that France
placed herself unreservedly on Russia’s side.

(July 25th.)

So Edward Grey knew these vital facts.
General Dobrorolski, chief of mobilization of the Russian
general staff, states that the Ministerial Council and general
staff meeting on July 25th decided definitely upon war. This
was before the Russians had learned the terms of the Serbian
reply to Austria.
Dobrorolski said:



“ On the evening of July 25th, 1914 a meeting of the com­
mittee of the general staff took place at which it was decided
to declare at once a preparatory mobilization period and fur­
ther to declare a state of war over all fortresses and frontier

W ar was already decided on.

The whole flood of

telegrams between the governments of Russia and Germany
was merely the stage dressing behind which a drama was
He states that on the night of July the 25th a second order
was dispatched:
“ To reckon the 26th of July as the beginning of the period
of war preparations in the whole territory of European
From that time onward the entire Russian army was as a
matter of fact in a state of mobilization although the Lkase
was not yet published.

Dobrorolski sa\s a partial mobiliza­

tion was impossible and that he resisted an\ order s to that
The Peace negotiations by the Russians was solely a ruse
without sincerity and with no true desire for peace.
General Palizyn in the summer of 1915, at that time chief
of the Russian general staff, speaking of Austria, said:
“ But for a long time they did not believe that we would
declare war.
the full

They devoted all their attention to Serbia in

c o n v ic tio n

that we would not stir.

struck them like a thunder bolt.

Our mobilization

It was then too late for

them. They had become involved with Serbia. The Germans
too permitted the first days to elapse without action.




gether we gained twelve days. Our enemies committed a huge
blunder [by regarding Russian diplomacy as sincere] and
conceded to us at the same time an incalculable advantage/'
Premier Pashitch of Serbia wrote his chief of staff July 31,
1914 and said:
“ The report received from our minister in St. Petersburg
states that Russia is now negotiating and is prolonging the
negotiations in order to gain time for the mobilization and
concentration of her army. When her mobilization is finished
she will declare war on Austria.”
On July 28th Palelogue again informed Sazonoff of the
complete willingness of France to fight with Russia.


noff knew from dispatches from London that Germany could
not rely on British neutrality and that the British Govern­
ment was fully committed to France— Russia’s ally— so Sazo­
noff pointed out to the chief of the general staff “the necessity
of no further hesitation with the mobilization of the army”
and on July 28th orders for a complete mobilization were
made ready for the Czar’s signature.

He signed it July 29th

and after the telegram was ready for delivery countermanded
it by telephone, because of the urgent telegram from W il­
helm the Second telling him that if he ordered mobilization
he would be responsible for the war which would follow.
The chief of staff on July 29th telegraphed to Warsaw that
“July 30th would be the first day of mobilization.”
On July 29th at 3 P.M . the Russian chief of general staff
falsely declared to the German military attache at St. Peters­
burg upon his word of honor that up to that hour mobilization




had occurred nowhere and that the Czar wished no mobilization against Germany.

The Czar hail already signed the

On July 28th Sazonoff telegraphed the Russian Ambas­
sador at Berlin that on July 29th the mobilization of four
districts against Austria would be published but no aggres­
sive purposes against Germany were entertained.
an official falsehood.

This was

On July 24th between 11 and 12

o’clock A.M . General Janushkivich, Chief of the general staff
called Dobrorolski, mobilization chief, and asked him “ have
you everything ready for proclaiming the mobilization of the

A n affirmative answrer w’as given and he wT told

to bring the necessary documents within an hour and that
only a partial mobilization would be given out for the reason
that “ in carrying out such a mobilization nothing should give
Germany occasion to see in it anything hostile to herself.
(See Sec. 25 and 29 supplement). The preparations for war
thus begun on the 24th of July and the partial mobilization
so-called were in effect the immediate steps looking to
general mobilization which was determined upon almost
immediately and carried out without having been delayed to
much greater material extent than if the general mobilization
had gone into effect by being posted from the beginning.
These records demonstrate beyond a doubt the warlike inten­
tion of Russia and that the French leaders were equally deter­
mined on war.
Sazonoff reporting on his mission to Paris and London in

1912 said: “ Grey voluntarily confirmed to me what I already



knew from Poincare; the existence of an arrangement be­
tween France and England, by virtue of which, in case of war
with Germany, England has incurred the obligation of lend­
ing to France her assistance, not only on sea, but also on land,
by means of landing troops on the continent.”
See Ewart, p. 531.
France, with England behind her, made the Russians bold
to carry out the Russian Imperial Conspiracy to destroy
Austria and crush Germany.
In a recent Paris publication of 400 pages by sixteen
former leading generals and admirals of Nicholas II. fore­
word by Victor Marqueritte, entitled “ Documents Historiques
des Alliees contra la Russie” the evidence against the French
leaders is set forth from a Russian view-point, but it also
convicts the Czar’s government.

These witnesses contend

that the French leaders intrigued Russia into the W ar.
By four o ’clock of Thursday, the 30th of July, the Czar
had twice ordered general mobilization, which meant war and
nothing else than war against Germany under the predeter­
mined plot of the conspirators, Sazonoff, Isvolski and Poin­

Day by day dispatches were coming from the French

Government that France would stand firmly by Russia, and
on the night of July 31 the famous Dispatch 216 advised
Sazonoff that the French Government was determined on
war, and that the Russians should concentrate their forces
on Germany, treating Austria as a negligible quantity.
Russia took this advice, and threw 800,000 troops into East
Prussia before the Germans could rally to its defense. It was



not until midnight Friday, July 31, that Wilhelm II demanded
the cessation of the Russian mobilization.

W hen this de­

mand was refused, the German Government did not declare
war on Russia, but accepted the challenge of a state of war
against Germany by Russia.
Immediately Germany was charged with having declared
and started the war, and thereby held morally responsible for
everything that followed, by all those who innocently ac­
cepted this artfully contrived fiction.
The moral responsibility was on Sazonoff, Nicholas II,
Grand Duke Nicholas and Raymond Poincare.

Their guilt

is now thoroughly established, and no well informed man has
any right whatever to deny it.

The evidence is complete,

and has been printed by the highest authorities in many lan­

(See Supplement.)


T he

F a t e f u l T e l e g r a m s o f J u l y 1914

Telegram 184,1 the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Sazonoff, on July 24, states:
" Germany ardently desired the localization of the conflict, as the
interference of any other power on the ground of existing treaties
must have incalculable consequences. * * * Ex-Minister Pichon had
an interview with the Austrian Ambassador today, from which he
also gained the impression that Austria-Hungary did not intend her
step to be regarded as an unconditional ultimatum.
1 Falsification of the Russian Orange Book, p. 21.



Telegram 186, from the Russian representative at Paris to
Sazonoff, Petrograd, on July 25, said that the action of the
German Ambassador—
“ Has to some extent reassured the foreign ministry as being an
indication that

G e r m a n y d o e s n o t s e e k f o r w a r in a n y c a s e .” * * *

That the German Ambassador had pointed out—
“ T h a t t h e A u s t r i a n n o te h a s n o t t h e c h a r a c t e r o f a n u lt im a t u m ” ;

* * * “that the

G e r m a n s te p h a d o n ly f o r it s o b j e c t t h e lo c a lis a t io n

* * * that the absence of the Presi­
dent of the Republic and of the Minister President (Viviani) p r e v e n t s
o f t h e A u s t r o - S e r b ia n c o n f li c t ;

th e f o r e i g n o ffic e f o r t h e m o m e n t f r o m e x p r e s s i n g its o p in io n d e fin ite ly
r e g a r d in g p r e s e n t e v e n t s .”

Telegram 187, July 26, from the Russian representa­
tive at Paris to Sazonoff, Petrograd, states that the German
Ambassador had advised the French Minister for Foreign
A ffa irs:
“ A u s t r i a h a s d e c la r e d to R u s s i a th a t s h e s e e k s n o t e r r it o r ia l g a in s
a n d d o e s n o t th r e a te n th e in t e g r it y o f S e r b ia .

H e r s o le o b j e c t is to

s e c u r e h e r o w n p e a c e a n d to m a in ta in o r d e r .”

Telegram 188, July 26, from the Paris Russian representa­
tive to Sazonoff, says that Berthelot, the director of the
political department of France, inclines to the opinion—
" T h a t G e r m a n y a n d A u s t r i a d o n o t d e s ir e w a r in a n y c a s e .”

These Russian telegrams from their highest authorities
are evidence of commanding importance showing the earnest
desire of the Germans and Austrians to localize and adjust



the conflict and to avoid a general European war. The Rus­
sians would not permit it.
Telegram 1521, July 27, Sazonoff, Russian Foreign Minis­
ter, to Isvolski, Russian Ambassador in Paris:

th e r e



q u e s t io n


e x e r c is i n g


m o d e r a t in g

i n f lu e n c e


P e t e r s b u r g , w e r e j e c t it in a d v a n c e , a s w e h a v e a d o p te d a s ta n d p o in t
f r o m t h e o u t s e t w h i c h w e ca n in n o w a y a lt e r .” * * *

The Russian Standpoint is clearly set forth in the Treaty
of 1892-1894; the Franco-Russian military conferences and
the Crown Councils favoring a general war.
Telegram 194, Isvolski wired that Poincare will return to
Paris on Wednesday, July 29 (five days after Belgian mo­
bilization, four days after Russian preparatory mobilization
had begun) and two nights later, July 31, the French Minis­
ter of W ar told the Russian Military Attache the French
Government was determined on war, (telegram 216).
Telegram 195, July 27th, the German Ambassador is
shown urging a new proposal for the intervention of France
and Germany between Russia and Austria, which was not

Isvolski says in this regard:

“ I was surprised at the c o r r e c t understanding of the situation m ani­
fested by the acting minister and His assistant and to see h o w f ir m
a n d t r a n q u il t h e y w e r e in t h e ir d e t e r m in a t io n to e x t e n d

to u s t h e ir

and to avoid the slightest appearance of any lack of
unity between us.”
fu lle s t su p p ort

Telegram 197, July 27, Isvolski to Sazonoff:
“ M. Cambon (French Ambassador in Berlin) telegraphs from
Berlin that in reply to his questions as t o w h a t a t tit u d e G e r m a n y w o u ld



Jagow (German secre­
tary of state for foreign affairs) replied that a m o b ilis a t io n o f th a t
k in d would not result in German mobilization, but th a t i f R u s s ia
a d o p t to w a r d a p a r tia l m o b ilis a t io n by R u s s i a ,

a tta ck e d

A u s tr ia ,

G erm an y

w o u ld

im m e d ia te ly

r e p ly


a t ta c k in g

R u s s ia

Telegram 1539, July 28, Sazonoff to Isvolski:
“In consequence of Austro-Hungary’s declaration of war against
Serbia, we shall announce tomorrow a mobilization of the Odessa,
Kieff, Moscow and Kazan military districts. I n b r in g in g t h is to
t h e n o t ic e o f t h e G e r m a n G o v e r n m e n t r e p e a t th a t R u s s ia h a s n o a g ­
g r e s s i v e in t e n t io n s a g a in s t G e r m a n y .

M e a n w h ile

our Ambassador in

Vienna is not being recalled.”

Sazonoff directed his Ambassador to state a falsehood
to the German Government.

Russia did have aggressive in­

tentions against Germany.

The testimony of Dobrorolski,

Sukhomlinoff, Isvolski, Palinzy, Pashitch, and Sazonoff him­
self prove it.
Sukhomlinoff had already issued a general mobilization
order of the Russian Army.

He “ lied to the Czar” as to its

being a general mobilization,1 said it was partial, and pre­
tended that he had stopped the mobilization, although he did
not do so.

The Czar however, July 30, authorized the gen­

eral mobilization.2
Telegram 198, July 28, Isvolski to Sazonoff:
“ I deem it my duty to make clear that, as results from my con­
versation yesterday at the Quai d’Orsay, the acting F r e n c h M in i s t e r
f o r F o r e ig n A ffa ir s

d id n o t f o r a m o m e n t a d m it t h e p o s s i b ili t y o f

1 “Eggerling.”
’ Let France Explain, p. 201.



e x e r c is i n g a m o d e r a t in g in f lu e n c e in P e t e r s b u r g . * * * As a result of
his conversation with Baron Schon, the Minister declined to accept

the German proposal.”

The French Foreign Minister was not willing to work for

One resolute telegram to Russia demanding peace

would have sufficed.
Germany was strenuously exercising a moderating influ­
ence on Vienna in favor of peace.
On July 30 the German Chancellor telegraphed the German
Ambassador at Vienna to notify Austria that Germany “ must
refuse to be drawn into a world conflagration frivolously
and in disregard of our advice.
Telegram 201, July 28, Isvolski to Sazonoff, states that the
German Ambassador had again visited the French Foreign
Minister and told him that:
“ G e r m a n y s o le ly d e s ir e d to w o r k w it h F r a n c e f o r t h e m a in te n a n c e

* * T h a t G erm an y w as rea d y
powers for the maintenance of peace.”

o f p eace. *

to c o - o p e r a t e w i t h t h e


Telegram 1544, Sazonoff to Isvolski, July 29:
“ The German Ambassador informed me on behalf of the Imperial
Chancellor that Germany had not ceased and w i ll n o t c e a s e to e x e r c is e
a m o d e r a tin g in flu e n c e in V ie n n a , a n d w o u ld c o n t in u e to d o s o d e s p ite
t h e d e c la r a t io n o f w a r . Up to this morning no news has been received
of the crossing of Austrian troops on to Serbian territory.’

Telegram 1551, July 29, Sazonoff to Isvolski:
“ The German Ambassador has communicated to me today the
decision of his government to mobilize i f R u s s ia d o e s n o t s t o p h e r
m ilit a r y p r e p a r a tio n . * * * A s we can not accede to Germany’s wish,



nothing remains for us but

to r e c k o n w it h

F ren ch

G overn m ent

to h a s te n

o u r oven w a r lik e p r e p a r a tio n s

th e p r o b a b le in e v it a b ilit y



tim e

th is , a n d a t th e sa m e

w a r.

In fo r m

th e

th a n k it f o r it s

d e c la r a tio n m a d e in it s n a m e by th e F r e n c h A m b a s s a d o r th a t w e ca n

Under present cir­
cumstances this declaration is especially valuable for us. It is v e r y
f u l l y r e ly u p o n th e s u p p o r t o f o u r a lly , F r a n c e .

d e s ir a b le

th a t

E n g la n d

a ls o

w it h o u t

lo s s


tim e

s h o u ld

a s s o c ia t e

h e r s e l f zv ith F r a n c e a n d R u s s i a , as it is o n ly t h u s th a t s h e ca n s u c c e e d
in p r e v e n t in g a d a n g e r o u s a lte r a t io n in th e E u r o p e a n b a la n c e .


telegraphed to in like terms.”

The war contract was in action.

The association of Great

Britain with Russia and France would guarantee the safety
of attack by Russia on Germany.
Telegram 304, July 29, Sazonoff to Isvolski:
“ I u r g e n t ly request you to communicate to the French Foreign
Minister the following telegram from the French Ambassador in
Petersburg: “ T h e G e r m a n A m b a s s a d o r h a s j u s t in f o r m e d S a z o n o f f
th a t i f

R u s s ia

d o e s n o t s to p h e r

m ilita r y p r e p a r a tio n s

th e

G erm an

A r m y w i ll b e o r d e r e d to m o b iliz e .” * * *

Telegram 202, July 29, Isvolski to Sazonoff:
“Bienvenu-Martin, the acting Foreign Minister, told me that this
morning the G e r m a n A m b a s s a d o r m a d e a c o m m u n ic a tio n to him,
employing practically the following expressions: “ G e r m a n y is c o n ­
tin u in g h e r e n d e a v o r s in V ie n n a to c a u s e A u s t r i a to a g r e e to a f r ie n d ly

which should indicate the object and the extent
of the steps undertaken by her and concerning which Germany has
not so far been exactly informed. The declaration of war will not
stand in the way of this exchange of opinions. G e r m a n y h o p e s to
e x c h a n g e o f o p in io n s

r e c e iv e d u r in g

th e

cou rse


th e se

n e g o tia tio n s

e x p la n a t io n s w h i c h

Finally, Baron Schon again protested against
the assertion that Germany was encouraging Austria to be un­
w i ll s a t i s f y

R u s s ia .



Telegram 203, July 29, Isvolski to Sazonoff:
* * *

“ G e r m a n y * * * d e c la r e s th a t a s w e h a v e r e c e iv e d th e a s s u r ­

a n c e th a t A u s t r i a s e e k s n o t e r r it o r ia l g a in s , th e m a in te n a n c e o f p e a c e
e n t ir e ly

d e p e n d s o n R u s s i a because it turns upon the necessity for

localizing the Austro-Serbian a ffa ir; that is, the punishment of Serbia











future.” * * *

He states:
“ T h a t F r a n c e a n d E n g la n d p o s it iv e ly c o u ld n o t e x e r c i s e a n y m o d ­
e r a tin g in flu e n c e in R u s s i a .’ ’ * * *

A single telegram from Poincare to the Czar refusing to
approve a general war would have prevented the World W ar.
A vigorous demand from Edward Grey on Poincare and
Sazonoff might have prevented the W ar.
The W orld W ar was already on under the secret con­
tract, and that very night, July 29, Poincare, Viviani and
the Minister of W ar at a confidential meeting agreed to stand
firmly for war.


On this very day the Czar

ordered a general mobilization— the Russian equivalent of
war— suspended it and reordered it the next day, Thursday,
July 30.

The British fleet was fully mobilized and so were

Serbia and Belgium.
Telegram 204, July 29, Wednesday, Isvolski to Sazonoff:
“ The

fir m

a t tit u d e

ta k e n



th e

F ren ch


c o n t in u e s .


passes severe judgment upon the Austrian attack and u p o n G e r m a n y ’s
m a n ife s t s h a r e o f b la m e f o r i t , a n d u n h e s it a t in g ly d e c la r e s th a t t h is
t o u c h e s u s , and th a t w e c a n n o t r e m a in u n s y m p a t h e t ic .

A s reg ard s

s o lid a r it y w it h u s , this question is not once discussed, but is taken as



a matter of course. E v e r y jo u r n a lis t e x p r e s s e s h i m s e l f in this sense,
including such prominent personages belonging to the most diverse
parties as Pichon, Clemenceau, and even Jaures, and also Herve, the
father of antimilitarism.”

The press reflected the French Government’s wishes.


part had been subsidised with Russian money, a part was
moved by nationalism and the certainty of victory.
Telegram 206, July 29, Isvolski to Sazonoff:
“ When the President returned to Paris, he was received at the rail­
way station and in the streets with sympathetic demonstrations from
the assembled crowd. Margerie (political director in the French
Foreign Office) told me that the President, from his conversations
with prefects and politicians during his journey, had become convinced
of the fir m , e n e r g e t i c , and at the same time c a lm s ta te o f p u b lic
o p in io n , w h i c h p la in ly f o r m e d a c o r r e c t e s t im a t e o f th e tr u e s i g n i f i ­
c a n c e o f e v e n ts .
The same attitude reigned among a large section
of the Radical Socialists. The government attaches no importance to
the antimilitary demonstrations of the revolutionary party, and intends
to take energetic measures against it. O u r m ilita r y a t ta c h e r e p o r t s
in d e t a il r e g a r d in g th e p r e p a r a to r y m ilit a r y m e a s u r e s .
h ig h in m ilita r y c i r c le s a n d in th e c h i e f c o m m a n d .

F e e lin g r u n s

I report regarding

the press in a special telegram.”

Telegram 207, July 29, Isvolski to Sazonoff, shows fur­
ther efforts on the part of Germany to get an adjustment and
“ Finally Baron Schon complained of France’s military preparations,
and said that in this case G e r m a n y w o u l d b e c o m p e lle d to adopt
similar precautions. Viviani, on his part, declared that France
honestly desired peace, but at the same time iv a s
to a c t in f u l l a g r e e m e n t w ith h e r a llie s , and B a r o n

fir m ly d e t e r m in e d
S c h o n c o u ld c o n -



v i n c e h i m s e l f th a t t h i s d e c is io n w a s f in d in g
th e c o u n try .
m e e tin g

th e

li v e li e s t s u p p o r t in

T h i s e v e n in g V iv i a n i h a s f o r b id d e n a p r o j e c t e d a n ti- w a r

of the revolutionary party.”

On the night of July 31st the French Minister of W ar told
the military attache that the French Government was deter­
mined on war.
Telegram 1554, Sazonoff to Isvolski, states that if Austria
would admit that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed
the character of a European question and would declare a
readiness to eliminate from her ultimatum those points which
violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia would under­
take to suspend her military preparations.
These preparations had been going on for at least five
days. The Russian policy was to use diplomatic negotiations
to conceal the war measures, and the Russian policy fixed in
1912 was to cross the German border without a declaration
of war.1
Telegram 1555, July 30, Sazonoff wires Isvolski:
“Until we receive a t h o r o u g h ly satisfactory reply from Austria
through the German Government, w e s h a ll c o n t in u e o u r m ilita r y
p r e p a r a tio n s . This is communicated to you very confidentially.”

The word “ thoroughly” is interesting.

It suggests that

Austria’s reply, whatever it might be, would not be satis­
That very night (July 3 1), at 1 A. M., August 1, Isvolski
telegraphed to Sazonoff, telegram 216:
1 Von Kuhl, p. 79-80.

"F rom

m ilita r y a t ta c h e to

The F ren ch

W a r M in i s t e r , 1 A . M .

W a r M in i s t e r i n f o r m e d

(sincerite enthusiastique)


m e i n e a r n e s t, h e a r ty

to n es

th a t t h e G o v e r n m e n t i s f ir m ly d e c id e d u p o n

w a r , a n d r e q u e s t e d m e to c o n fir m

th e h o p e

o f th e F r e n c h


s t a f f th a t a ll o u r e f f o r t s w i ll b e d ir e c te d a g a in s t G e r m a n y , a n d th a t
A u s t r i a w i l l b e tr e a te d a s a q u a n tite n e g lig ib le .”

This was a secret French and Russian official declaration
of war even if not following the usual forms. The Czar had
already on the 30th of July renewed the order for a general
Russian mobilization, the Russian equivalent of war.
This attitude was strictly in line with the Franco-Russian
secret treaty of 1892 and the military plans worked out by
the French and Russian general staffs in annual conferences
and frequent intercommunications.
So that the French Government gave Austria no time to
make “ a thoroughly satisfactory” reply to Russia or any
other kind of reply, and indicates that Sazonoff wanted none.
On August 1, telegram 1601, Sazonoff wired Isvolski:
“A t midnight the German Ambassador informed me on behalf
of his government th a t i f w it h in tw e lv e h o u r s — that is, before m
day on Saturday— tee d o n o t b e g in to d e m o b iliz e , n o t o n ly a s a g a in s t
G e r m a n y , b u t a ls o a s a g a in s t A u s t r i a , th e G e r m a n G o v e r n m e n t z v ill
b e c o m p e lle d to o r d e r m o b ilis a t io n .

To my query as to w h e t h e r t h is
the Ambassador replied that

zva s e q u iv a le n t to a d e c la r a tio n o f w a r ,
i t w a s n o t,

but added that

w e w e r e v e r y n e a r to w a r .”

On Saturday, August 1, at 5 P. M., Germany issued a
general order of mobilization; at 7.10 P. M. the German A m ­
bassador notified Sazonoff that Germany accepted the war
challenge of Russia.

The negotiation with Austria and Ger­



many for the preservation o f peace appears to have been
used as a camouflage for a predetermined war.
Telegram 208, July 30, from Isvolski to Sazonoff, assured
h im :
" T h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t is r e a d y to f u l f i l l a l l it s o b lig a t io n s a s a n
I t is o f o p in io n , however, that a t th e p r e s e n t m o m e n t , when
negotiations are still in progress between the less interested powers,
it would be to th e p u r p o s e th a t R u s s i a , s o f a r a s th e m e a s u r e s o f a
d e f e n s i v e and p r e c a u tio n a r y n a t u r e which it has deemed necessary to
adopt will permit, s h o u ld n o t ta k e a n y d ir e c t s te p w h ic h w o u ld s e r v e
a lly .

G e r m a n y a s a p r e t e x t f o r o r d e r in g t h e g e n e r a l o r p a r tia l m o b ilis a t io n
o f h e r fo r c e s .”

This dispatch was based on the authority of a decision
made by Poincare, Viviani and Messimy.
Defensive” meant " offensive” by General Staff interpre­
tation and this telegram meant— we are ready; press your
war measures and keep Germany in the dark.
The significance of this suppressed telegram is revealed
in combination with telegram 1551 of July 29 and suppressed
telegrams 209 and 210 and 216 from Paris on July 30.
The French Government having determined on war, did
not wish Germany to mobilize yet, but gradually to discover
a situation so dangerous that she must declare a state of war
existing as a military necessity.

Then the Russian and

French leaders could and did fix the blame on Germany for
breach of the peace.

This was brilliantly done.

Telegram 1551, on July 29, from Sazonoff to Isvolski,




" N o t h in g r e m a in s f o r u s b u t to h a s te n o u r o w n w a r lik e p r e p a r a tio n s

to r e c k o n

F ren ch

w it h

G overn m ent

d e c la r a tio n

* * *

the probable in e v it a b ilit y
o f t h i s and a t th e s a m e

th a t w e


fu lly

r e ly

o f w ar.
tu n e


th e

In fo r m

th a n k

it f o r

su p p ort


th e
it s

a lly , F r a n c e .”

This was two days before the German Government de­
manded that the Russian mobilization should stop under a
penalty of German mobilization and three days before the
German Ambassador at Petersburg accepted a state of war
as forced on the German Government.
declaration of war.

It was not a German

It was a German acceptance of a state

of war organized and made against Germany on a pretext
that was frivolous and false.

Neither Russian, French nor

British interests were menaced by Austria or Germany.
Telegram 209, of July 30, Isvolski to Sazonoff, states that
the French Ambassador in London:
“ W a s i n s t r u c t e d to c o n f e r w it h

G r e y a s to th e f ix in g o f t h e c o m ­

concerning which these two
powers, in c o n s e q u e n c e o f th e g e n e r a l u n d e r s ta n d in g e x i s t i n g b e tw e e n
t h e m , have to d e lib e r a t e whenever a period of political tension arises.”
b in e d

a t t it u d e


F r a n c e a n d E n g la n d

The time “ to deliberate” had nearly arrived.
This proposed conference was based on the notes ex­
changed between Cambon and Grey on the 22nd and 23rd
of November, 1912,1 and the war plans of the military and
naval staffs of Great Britain, France and Russia, already
completely matured.
Telegram 210, of July 30, from Isvolski to Sazonoff, said
1 Exhibits 8 and 9, How Diplomats Make War.



that the French War Minister had said to the Russian
military attache:
* * * " that we could declare that in the higher interests of peace

we are ready temporarily to delay our preparations for mobilisation,
since this would not prevent us from continuing our preparations and
indeed from intensifying them, but we should have to refrain as far
as possible from transporting troops in masses.”

These suppressed telegrams indicate that both in Peters­
burg and in Paris the negotiations for the maintenance of
peace were “a ruse de guerre” and being used as a screen
for a war already fully determined on both in Paris and in
Telegram 216, of July 31, Isvolski to Sazonoff, expressed
a fixed war determination.
On the same day, July 31, telegram from Isvolski to
SazonofiF discloses that Baron Schon asked Viviani what atti­
tude France would adopt in the event of an armed collision
between Russia and Germany.

Viviani declined to an­

Baron Schon requested arrangements for passports.

On August

1 the German Ambassador again visited

Viviani, and the latter expressed his “ astonishment” to
Baron Schon at his action yesterday, “which was not justi­
fied by the relations between France and Germany,” al­
though, as above, the French Government had already de­
cided upon war and advised Russia to attack Germany with
all its forces— and Viviani knew it as premier.
Isvolski to Sazonoff, August 1, telegram 219, states that




the German Ambassador had visited Viviani for the second

That Viviani informed him that the President of the

Republic, Poincare, had signed a decree ordering French

(It may be remembered that the formal pub­

lic order of Belgian mobilization was issued July 31 also,
although the army had been mobilized on and before July

Viviani expressed his astonishment that Germany

should have adopted such a measure as demanding that Rus­
sia demobilize under penalty of a German mobilization—
“when a friendly exchange of views was in progress between
Russia, Austria and the other powers.”

Here is the refinement of high-class diplomacy.


nations have fully prepared themselves for war, are deter­
mined on war against a neighbor, and yet the Premier of
France assures the Ambassador of Germany that a friendly
exchange of views between the powers forbids Germany
to prepare for defense!
And the same day, August 1, Isvolski wires Sazonoff:
“ Poincare declared to me in the most categorical manner that both
he himself and the whole cabinet are firmly determined fully to carry
out the obligations laid upon us by the terms of our alliance.”

That meant that Russia could go to war with confidence,
that France was ready and would carry out the secret con­
tract and attack Germany simultaneously.
The French general mobilization and an immediate offen­

I l6


sive on Germany were required by the secret Russian agree­
ment of 1892.
Isvolski, Russian Ambassador, wired Sazonoff the same
day, August 1, 1914, telegram 223, as follows:
“Poincare told me that during the last few days the Austrian
Ambassador had energetically assured him and Viviani that Austria
had declared to us (Russia) her readiness not only to respect the
territorial integrity of Serbia but also her sovereign rights, but that
we (Russia) had intentionally concealed those assurances. To my
remark that this was a complete lie, Poincare replied that similar
statements had been made in London by Austria, where they might
create a very dangerous impression, and therefore ought to be denied
there as well.”

That Austria did make these representations is shown by
telegram 195; by a verbal declaration of Count Pourtales,
German Ambassador in St. Petersburg; and by Sazonoff’s
answer contained in the first two sentences from St. Peters­
burg of telegram 1554» and by many other records.
The attitude of Italy is shown by telegram 220 of August
1, from Isvolski to Sazonoff, as follows:
“ Margerie told me that according to information from a very secret
source Italy apparently intends, in reliance upon the manner in which
the conflict has arisen, to remain neutral at first, and then to come
to one decision or another in accordance with the course of events.”

The Entente had already weakened Italy’s attachment to
Germany by concessions in A frica and elsewhere.
Von Moltke’s memorandum of 1912 as the chief of the
German general staff, showed that the Germans did not count





upon Italy.1 That Germany could not compete on the ocean
with Britain or on land with Russia; that Germany had but
little hope in a war with Russia and France.
Austria accepted the proposed mediation as between her­
self and Serbia as two sovereign governments,2 but it availed
Petrograd knew of Austria’s acceptance of mediation
which was disclosed to Grey in London on the ist of
Sazonoff, former Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
seven years later, November 15, I 92I>in ^ a Revue de France,
tells that the Czar received a telegram from the Kaiser beg­
ging the Czar, notwithstanding the declaration of war, to
keep the troops from the German frontier, and that the Ger­
man Emperor was nearly frantic.
Baron Rosen in “ Forty Years of Diplomatic L ife” , Satur­
day Evening Post, August 21, I920> Pa&e 85, £Pves if as
his opinion that the Russian mobilization necessarily led to

H e places the guilt upon all three Russian heads,

Sazonoff, Sukhomlinoff, and Jaunuschkevitch.

He states

that at dinner with Sukhomlinoff, then Minister of W ar,
when he received a telegram that Austria-Hungary had
mobilized against Serbia (July 25), he heard the war minis­
ter exclaim—
1 Congressional Record, 392.
2Austrian Red Book III, p- 65.
'B ritish White Book, 133.



“ Cette Fois Nous Marcherons!”
that is, “ This time we shall march.” 1

This meant under

the treaty, 1892, the military and naval conventions with
France that Russia would attack Germany.
France would follow, as by treaty required, and England
would instantly support France as Edward Grey “ volun­
tarily” told Sazonoff when visiting Grey in 1912.
Baron Rosen states that the intelligencia and military party
o f Russia were for war?

They controlled the government.

Baron Rosen further tells that Sazonoff and Jaunuschkevitch stopped the dispatch of the Czar’s aide to Berlin and
secured on Thursday, July 30, a re-order o f the general
It was in this condition of affairs, with Russia having an
army of over 2,000,000 men on the east, who had been
practicing mobilization since spring and actually had been in
process of mobilizing at least since the 25th of July (Czar’s
telegram), that the German Government demanded the mobil­
ization stopped under the alleged necessity of regarding it
as a declaration of war by Russia.
It was well understood by the military strategists of France
and Russia and of Europe that Germany’s only chance in
such a war as this was by lightning speed and efficiency,
striking France through Belgium.

1 Rosen, July 24, 1920, 132.
* Rosen, August 21, 1920.
* Rosen, August 21, 1920.

(See French and Rus­



sian military conferences.)


The dispatches show that Ger­

many tried to secure French neutrality and failed, tried to
obtain British neutrality and failed, tried to induce Belgium
to submit to an unopposed passage and failed.1
V I.

T h e R u ssia n G oal

In Stieve’s book “ Isvolski and the World W ar” , page 187,
will be found an analysis of Sazonoff’s report of December
8, 1913, which shows that the previous attempt of Russia
to control the Dardanelles, through the breaking up of Tur­
key, was impracticable because of the opposition of France,
which had great financial resources invested in Turkey.


this report the following language reveals the policy of
"Moreover, I must repeat that the question of the Straits can
hardly he advanced a step except through European complications.
To judge from present conditions, these complications would find us
in alliance zvith France and possibly, but not quite certainly, with
Great Britain, or at least zvith the latter as a benevolent neutral.
In the event of European complications, we should be able to count
in the Balkans on Serbia and perhaps also on Roumania. This makes
clear the task of our diplomacy, which consists of creating favorable
conditions for as close a rapprochement with Roumania as possible.
This policy must be pursued uninterruptedly, cautiously and openmindcdly.” * * *

This report met the Czar’s approval.
On February 8, 1914, there met, this time with Sazonoff
1 Morel, Truth and the War. H o w Diplomats Make War, Neilson.
Diplomatic Documents, World War, Scott.




himself in the chair, a fresh conference with the heads of
the Russian Arm y and Navy, in which preparations for con­
quest of the Straits were discussed on the basis of the re­
port to the Czar of December 8, 1913.

The minutes con­

tained the following record:
“ Replying to the question whether * * * we could count on sup­
port from Serbia, S. D. Sasonoff said that it could not be assumed
that our operations against the Straits could take place uhthout a
general European war, and that it was assumed that under such cir­
cumstances Serbia would direct all her forces against AustriaHungary.
“ With reference to what the Foreign Minister had said concerning
the general situation in which a decision of the question of the Straits
might be expected, the chief of the general staff expressed his con­
viction that the struggle for Constantinople would hardly be possible
without a general European war/’ 1

A ll the ministers were advised to adopt all measures re­
quired to facilitate the plans of the contemplated war.
So the military leaders supported Sazonoff.
The Czar himself entered on the minutes of the confer­
ence the following:
“ I entirely approve the decisions of the conference.”
This and the fuller record referred to clearly show that the
plan laid in 1892 and in the French and Russian military
conferences was being still carried out, and that its object was
to control the Dardanelles, exercise Balkan hegemony, and
the means was a general European war, with Serbia, Rou-

1 Stieve, p. 230.




mania, France, Great Britain and Japan as allies.

And so it

It was in February, 1914, that the Czar assured the Serbian
minister of his support in the war and in which the Serbian
minister asked for 120,000 rifles and said his country would
supply 500,000 men.

For months before the war Russian

war supplies were pouring into Serbia.
On July 24 the Czar approved a pretended partial mobili­

On July 29 the Czar approved a general mobiliza­

tion order, and reordered on July 30 the general mobilization
of all of Russia’s forces, involving 14,000,000 men.
meant nothing less than war.


G E R M A N Y , A U S T R IA , B E L G IU M A N D
E N G L A N D IN 1914

S o m e E v id en ce F rom B erlin

It was the policy of Germany to support Austria in re­
buking Serbia, as far as could be done through diplomacy,
but even if the diplomatic effort should fail, Germany did
not intend to be drawn into a war.
On Sunday, the 26th of July, the Kaiser returned from
his Scandinavian cruise.

On Monday a rapid fire of tele­

grams took place from Berlin to Vienna, under the instruc­
tions of the Kaiser, demanding a peaceful adjustment,
Berlin assuming that the purpose of the Entente was not
necessarily hostile or determined on war, and that the negotia­

tions for a peaceful settlement were really sincere, put great
pressure on the Austrian Government, as appears, through
the following telegrams:
From the German Chancellor to the German Ambassador, Vienna,
July 27:
“ W e can not reject the role of mediator and must place the Eng­

lish proposal before the Vienna cabinet for consideration.



Count Berchtold’s opinion on the British proposal, as well as on
Sazonoff’s wish to negotiate directly with Vienna.” 1

On July 28 the Chancellor sent this dispatch:
“ The refusal of every exchange of views with Petrograd would
be a serious mistake if it provokes Russia precisely to armed inter­
ference, which Austria is primarily interested in avoiding. We are
ready, to be sure, to fulfill our obligations as an ally, but must refuse
to allow ourselves to be drawn by Vienna into a world conflagration
frivolously and in disregard of our advice. Please say this to Count
Berchtold at once with all emphasis and with great seriousness.” 2

On July 28 Austria declared war against Serbia in order
to escape from the German pressure to avoid even a local
war which Wilhelm II thought no longer necessary.


tria was determined to punish Serbia, but did not want a
general war.
On July 29 the German Chancellor sent this dispatch:
“ I regard the attitude of the Austrian Government and its un­
paralleled procedure toward the various governments with increasing
astonishment. * * * It leaves us wholly in the dark as to its pro­
gram. * * * I must conclude that the Austrian Government is har­
boring plans which it sees fit to conceal from us in order to assure
herself in all events of German support and avoid the refusal which
might result from a frank statement.” J

He sent five warning telegrams on the 29th and 30th to
The Kaiser had informed Foreign Minister Jagow on see1 Die Deutschen Dokuinente, No. 396.
2Ibid., No. 396.
8Die Deutschen Dokumente, No. 396, p. 361.




ing the Serbian reply accepting most of the Austrian con­
ditions and agreeing to mediation that—
“ Now, no cause for war any longer exists.”

On July 30 the German Chancellor sent the following tele­
“If Austria refuses all negotiations, we are face to face with a
conflagration in which England will be against us. Roumania and
Italy, according to all indications, will not be for us, and we shall
stand two against four powers. Through England’s opposition the
main blow will fall on Germany. Austria’s political prestige, the
military honor of her army, as well as her just claims against Serbia,
can be adequately satisfied by her occupation of Belgrade or other
places. Through her humiliation of Serbia she will make her posi­
tion in the Balkans, as well as her relation to Russia, strong again.
Under these circumstances, we must urgently and emphatically
press upon the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet the adoption of
mediation in accordance with the above honorable conditions. The
responsibility for the consequences which would otherwise follow
would be for Austria and for us an uncommonly heavy one.” 1

On July 31st Austria finally made the concessions required
but they were of no consequence as the W orld W ar was al­
ready in full swing, as the conspirators intended.
The Austrian statesmen intended only a local war to obtain
guarantees of peace from Serbia and were willing to mediate,
but the Russian statesmen who had instigated the deeds lead­
ing to the local war used it as a pretext for the W orld W ar,
the French leaders cooperating.

In Oman’s Outbreak of the W ar, pages 61, 68, 69, 77, 79,
German White Book, p. 395.



88 and 89, will be found the exchange of telegrams between
William II and Nicholas, as follow s:
(Tuesday) July 28— 10.45 P- M.
“ I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which
is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Serbia. The
unscrupulous agitation which had been going on for years in Serbia
has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand
has become a victim. The spirit which made the Serbians murder
their own King and his consort still dominates that country. Doubt­
less you will agree with me that both of us, you as well as I, and
all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those
who are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their de­
served punishment.
On the other hand, I by no means overlook the difficulty encountered
by you and your government to stem the tide of public opinion. In
view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long
time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce AustriaHungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with
Russia. I hope confidently that you will support me in my efforts to
overcome all difficulties which may yet arise.
Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin,
W ilhelm.” 1

Peterhof Palace, July 29— 1 P. M.
“ I am glad that you are back in Germany. In this serious moment
I ask you earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been
declared against a weak country, and in Russia the indignation, which
I fully share, is tremendous. I fear that very soon 1 shall be unable to
resist the pressure exercised upon me, and that I shall be forced to
take measures which will lead to war.
T o p r e v e n t s u c h a c a la m it y a s a E u r o p e a n w a r w o u ld b e, I u r g e y o u
1 O m a n ’ s O u t b r e a k o f t h e W a r , p. 6 1 .



in the name of our old friendship to do all in your power to restrain
your ally from going too far.”
N ic h o l a s .1

Russian war preparations had been in progress five days,
and on July 29 and again on the 30th of July, Nicholas or­
dered the general mobilization of all of Russia’s forces—
the Russian equivalent of war.
(Wednesday) July 29— 6.30 P. M.
“I have received your telegram and I share your desire for the
conservation of peace. However, I can not as I told you in my
first telegram— consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an ‘ig­
nominious war.’ Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the
promises of Serbia, as long as they are merely on paper, are entirely
unreliable. According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary
is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the
promises of Serbia are effectively translated into deeds. In this
opinion I am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian Cabinet
that Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of
Serbia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for
Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbian War without
drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe
that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between your
government and Vienna, an understanding which, as I have already
telegraphed you, my government endeavors to aid with all possible
e f f o r t . Naturally, military measures by Russia, which might be con­
strued as a menace by Austria-Hungary, zvould accelerate a calamity
which both of us desire to avoid, and would undermine my position
as mediator, which, upon your appeal to my friendship and aid, I
willingly accepted.” *
W il h e l m .
1 O m a n ’s O u tb r e a k o f th e W a r , p. 61.
* Ibid., p. 68.


I2 7

It was the night of the 29th of July that Poincare, Viviani
and the French Minister of W ar decided on war.
It was two nights later that the French Minister of W ar
said the French Government was determined on W ar (Tele­
gram 216) and Isvolski so advised Sazonoff.
Peterhof Palace, July 29.
“ Thanks for your telegram, which is conciliatory, while the official
message presented by your Ambassador to my Foreign Minister was
conveyed in a very different tone. I beg you to explain the difference.
It would be right to give over the Austro-Serbia problem to The
Hague Conference. I trust in your wisdom and friendship.”
N ic h o la s .1

The alleged difference was a fiction.


Nicholas conceals from Wilhelm that he had signed the
general order for mobilizing 14,000,000 men.
Telegram to Nicholas, the Czar:
July 30— 1 A. M.
“My ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of your
government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobiliza­
tion. I have told you the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary
has mobilized only against Serbia, and only a part of her army. If
Russia, as seems to be the case, according to your advice and that of
your Government, mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, the part of
the mediator, with which you have intrusted me in such friendly
manner and which I have accepted upon your express desire, is
threatened, if not made impossible. The entire weight of decision
noZv rests upon your shoulders; you have to bear the responsibility
of ivar or peace.”
W il h e l m .*
1 O m a n ’ s O u tb r e a k o f th e W a r , p. 69.
* Ib id ., p. 77



This was the day the Czar reordered Russian mobilization
and at a time the French Government was determined on war.
O f all which Wilhelm was kept in the dark.
Peterhof, July 30— 1.20 P. M.
“ I thank you from my heart for your quick reply. I am sending
tonight Tatischeff (Russian honorary aid to the Kaiser) with in­
structions. The military measures now taking form were decided
upon five days ago, and for the reason of defense against the pre­
paredness of Austria. I hope with all my heart that these measures
will not influence in any manner your position as mediator, which
I appraise very highly. W e need your strong pressure upon Austria
so that an understanding can be arrived at with us.”
N ic h o l a s .1

“ The military measures now taking form” was a gen­
eral mobilization.
He tried to send his aide— Tatischeff, but Sazonoff seized
him at the railroad station.

He again ordered the general

Poincare, Viviani and the French Minister of W ar had
in council the night before, July 29, firmly decided on war.
Wireless telegraphy was in existence to assist speedy inter­
T h en N ich o las reordered R u ssian m obilization, in vo lvin g
14,000,000 men, and w ired W ilh elm .

(D o b ro ro lsk i.)

Telegram to Wilhelm II from the Czar:
July 31, 1914.
“ I thank you cordially for your mediation, which permits the hope
that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to

1 German White Book, 1915, 23-A.


I2 9

discontinue our military preparations, which have been made neces­
sary by the Austrian mobilisation. I t is f a r f r o m u s t o w a n t w a r .
A s lo n g a s th e n e g o t ia t io n s b e t w e e n A u s t r i a a n d S e r b ia c o n t in u e , m y
t r o o p s w i l l u n d e r t a k e n o p r o v o c a t iv e a c tio n .
w o rd th ereo n .

I g i v e y o u m y s o le m n

I c o n fid e w it h a l l m y f a i t h in th e g r a c e o f G o d , a n d

I h o p e f o r t h e s u c c e s s o f y o u r m e d ia tio n in V i e n n a f o r t h e w e l f a r e
o f o u r c o u n t r ie s a n d t h e p e a c e o f E u r o p e .”

N ic h o la s .1

Nicholas could have stopped the mobilization. The mobili­
zation was not due to Austria but to the secret contract of
Russia and France to attack Germany.
Under the 1892 treaty a partial Austrian mobilization re­
quired Russia and France to attack Germany. The AustrianSerbian negotiations could end when Nicholas said the word
and Russia was ready to enter Germany.
The negotiations were only a ruse of war.
Telegram of Wilhelm to Nicholas, Friday
July 31— 2 P. M.
“ U p o n y o u r a p p e a l t o m y f r ie n d s h ip a n d y o u r r e q u e s t f o r m y a id ,

I have engaged in mediation between your government and the gov­
ernment of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place
your troops zvere being mobilised a g a in s t m y a lly , A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y ,
w h e r e b y , a s I h a v e a l r e a d y c o m m u n ic a t e d t o y o u , m y m e d ia tio n h a s
b e c o m e a lm o s t illu s o r y .

I n s p ite o f th is

I h a v e c o n tin u e d it, a n d


now receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are going
on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my
country forces me to measures of defense. I have gone to the
extreme limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the
peace of the world. It is not 1 who bear the responsibility for the
misfortune which now threatens the entire civilised world. It rests
in your hand to avert it. No one threatens the honor and peace of
Russia, w h ic h m ig h t w e ll h a v e a w a it e d th e s u c c e s s o f m y m e d ia 1 O m a n ’s O u tb r e a k o f the W a r , p. 88.




tion. The friendship for you and your country, bequeathed to me
by my grandfather on his deathbed, has ahvoys been sacred to me, and
I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction,
especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be
preserved by you if Russia decides to discontinue those military
preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary.”
W il h e l m .1

No reply.

Wilhelm, at midnight Friday, gave notice that

the German Arm y would mobilize if by noon Saturday Rus­
sian mobilization did not stop.

A t 5 P*

August 1, German mobilization was issued.

A t 7.10 P. M.,

the German Ambassador at Petrograd advised the Russian
Government that the Russian challenge and the state of war
forced on Germany were accepted.
It will be observed in this exchange of telegrams that
Nicholas was under a pressure he feared he should be tinable to resist.

On the very day that the Kaiser advised him

that he would have to bear the responsibility of war or
peace if he ordered a general mobilization, he reordered the
mobilisation which had been begun by his own statement on
July 25; and on July 31, having the day before ordered the
general mobilization, he advised the Kaiser that it was im­
possible to discontinue the military preparations, and he gave
his solemn word that the Russian troops would undertake no
provocative action, although in fact they crossed the German
border in four places the next day.2 It is quite clear that the
Czar’s solemn word was not worthy of trust.

1 Oman’s Outbreak of the W ar, p.
s Kuhl, 79-80



I3 I

The German leaders, getting daily reports from Paris,
London, Brussels and Petersburg, accepted what they had
become convinced was now absolutely unavoidable, and on
Saturday, 5 P. M., August 1, ordered a general mobilization,
and two hours later recognized the existence of the war
forced on them.
The men directing the foreign affairs of Russia and France
gave diplomacy no time and no chance to avoid the general
W ar which was fully predetermined by them.
To the Germans surrounding his residence Saturday,
August 1, 1914, Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg said: “ The
whole work of Emperor William has been devoted to the
maintenance of peace.

Should all his efforts prove vain

and should the sword be forced into our hands we will take
the field with a clear conscience in the knowdedge that we did
not seek war. W e shall then wage war for our existence.”
(N . Y . T IM E S .)
The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg on August 1,
at 7.10 P. M., presented the following note:
“ The Imperial German Government has used every effort since
the beginning of the crisis to bring about a peaceful settlement In
compliance with a wish expressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor
of Russia, the German Emperor had undertaken, in concert with
Great Britain, the part of mediator between the cabinets of Vienna
and St. Petersburg; but Russia, without waiting for any result, pro­
ceeded to a general mobilization of her forces both on land and sea.
In consequence of this threatening step, which was not justified by
any military proceedings on the part of Germany, the German Empire
was faced by a grave and imminent danger. If the German Govern-



ment had failed to guard against this peril, they would have com­
promised the safety and the very existence of Germany. The Ger­
man Government was, therefore, obliged to make representations to
the government of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias and
to insist upon a cessation of the aforesaid military acts. Russia having
refused to comply with (not having considered it necessary to answer)
this demand, and having shown by this refusal (this attitude) that
her action was directed against Germany, I have the honor, on the
instructions of my government, to inform Your Excellency as follows:
“His Majesty the Emperor, my august sovereign, in the name of
the German Empire, accepts the challenge and considers himself at
war with Russia.”

The words in parentheses occur in the original.

It must

be supposed that two variations had been prepared in ad­
vance, and that by mistake they were both inserted in the
Deutsche Documente Vol. III. p. 51*
II. K a is e r W i l h e l m

D id N o t W i l l t h e W a r

On July 31 William II appended the following note to the
telegram of Count Pourtales, the German Ambassador at St.
Petersburg, advising of the Russian decision to take the
fatal step of mobilization.

This memorandum by the Kaiser

shows the condition of his mind, and what he thought; shows
that he was strongly opposed to W orld W ar; shows that he
regarded it as absolutely forced upon the German people,
and shows that he intuitively diagnosed the Russian con-


I3 3

spiracy against Germany; he regarded the war as ruinous to
Germany and was almost frantic:
“ If mobilization can no longer be retracted— which is not true—
why, then, did the Czar appeal to my mediation three days afterward
without memtion of the issuance of the mobilization order? That
shows plainly that the mobilization appeared to him to have been
precipitate (the Kaiser was too generous; it was a ruse of war) and
that after it he made this move pro forma in our direction for the
sake of quieting his uneasy conscience, although he knew that it
would no longer be of any use, as he did not feel himself to be
strong enough to stop the mobilization. Frivolity and weakness are
to plunge the world into the most frightful war, which eventually
aims at the destruction of Germany. For I have no doubt left
about i t : England, Russia and France have agreed among themselves
— after laying the foundation of the casus foederis for us through
Austria,— to take the Austro-Serbian conflict for an excuse for waging
a war of extermination against us. Hence Grey’s cynical observation
to Lichnowsky ‘as long as the war is confined to Russia and Austria,
England would sit quiet,’ only when we and France mixed into it
would he be compelled to make an active move against us ( ?) ; i. e.,
either we are shamefully to betray our allies, sacrifice them to Russia
—-thereby breaking up the Triple Alliance, or we are to be attacked
in common by the Triple Entente for our fidelity to our allies and
punished, whereby they will satisfy their jealousy by joining in
totally ruining us. That is the real naked situation in nuce, which
slowly and cleverly set going, certainly by Edward VII, has been
carried on, and systematically built up by the disowned conferences
between England and Paris and St. Petersburg; finally brought to a
conclusion by George V, and set to work. And thereby the stupidity
and ineptitude of our ally is turned into a snare for us. So the
famous ‘circumscription’ of Germany has finally become a complete
fact, despite every effort of our politicians and diplomats to pre­
vent it. The net has been suddenly thrown over our head, and Eng­
land sneeringly reaps the most brilliant success of her persistently
prosecuted purely anti-German world-policy, against which we have



proved ourselves helpless, while she twists the noose of our political
and economic destruction out of our fidelity to Austria, as we squirm
isolated in the net. A great achievement which arouses the admira­
tion even of him who is to be destroyed as its result! Edward V II
is stronger after his death than I am who am still alive 1 And there
have been people who believed that England could be won over or
pacified, by this or that puny measure! Unremittingly, unrelentlessly
she has’ pursued her object, with notes, holiday proposals, scares,
Haldane, etc., until point was reached. And we walked into the net
and even went into the one-ship program in construction with the
ardent hope of thus pacifying England 1 A ll my warnings, all my
pleas were voiced for nothing. Now comes England’s so-called
gratitude for it! From the dilemma raised by our fidelity to the
venerable old Emperor of Austria we are brought into a situation
which offers England the desired pretext for annihilating us under
the hypocritical cloak of justice, namely, of helping France on
account of the reputed ‘balance of power in Europe, i. e., playing
the card of all the European nations in England s favor against u s!
This whole business must now be ruthlessly uncovered and the mask
of Christian peaceableness publicly and brusquely torn from its face
in public, and the pharisaical hypocrisy exposed on the pillory! And
our consuls in Turkey and India, agents, etc., must fire the whole
Mohammedan world to fierce rebellion against this hated, lying, con­
scienceless nation of shop-keepers; for if we are to be bled to death,

England shall at least lose India.”

This hysterical outburst of a man consciously facing de­
struction portrays the anguish of Wilhelm and is evidence
he did not will the war.
William II made the following memorandum on the same
day on an article in the London Morning Post on “ Efforts
Towards Peace” :
“ The only possible way to ensure or enforce peace is that England
must tell Paris and Petersburg— its Allies— to remain quiet (in­


I3 5

formed historians now know this is entirely true), i. e., neutral, to
the Austro-Serbian conflict, then Germany can remain quiet too.
But if England continues to remain silent or to give lukewarm
assurances of neutrality; that would mean encouragement to its Allies
to attack Austro-Germany. Berlin has tried to mediate between
Petersburg and Vienna on the appeal of the Czar. But His Majesty
silently had already mobilized before the appeal; so that the mediator
— Germany— is placed ‘en dcmeure’ and his work become illusory.
Now only England alone can stop the catastrophe by restraining its
Allies, by clearly intimating that— as Sir E. Grey declared— it had
nothing to do with the Austro-Serbian conflict, and that if one of its
Allies took an active part in the strife it could not reckon on the
help of England. That would put a stop to all war. King George
has communicated England’s intention to remain neutral to me by
Prince Henry. On the other hand the Naval Staff have this morning
— July 30— received a telegram from the German military attache
in London, that Sir E. Grey in a private conversation with Prince
Lichnowsky, declared that if Germany made war on France, England
would immediately attack Germany with a fleet! Consequently Sir
E. Grey says the direct contrary to what his Sovereign communicated
to me through my brother” (an astonishing contradiction) “and
places his King in the position of a double-tongued liar vis-a-vis
to me.”
" The whole war is plainly arranged between England, France and
Russia for the annihilation of Germany, lastly through the conversa­
tions with Poincare in Paris and Petersburg, and the Austro-Serbian
strife is only an excuse to fall upon us! God help us in this fight
for our existence, brought about by falseness, lies and poisonous
envy 1”

This is not the language of a man wishing war.

It is

a violent outburst of emotion of a man facing unavoidable
No wonder the Entente leaders did not insist on trying
him under Article 227, Versailles Treaty, for the “ supreme

13 6


offense against international morality and the sanctity of
The terrible offense charged does not describe Wilhelm

It describes the Russian conspirators, and the Treaty of

Versailles, which, with grave international immorality, vio­
lated the solemn pledges made to the Germans as a basis of
their surrender and the abdication of the Hohenzollerns
the fourteen points.

The peace of the world will be best

promoted by the elimination of this destructive international
T h e A t t it u d e of N ic h o l a s

The attitude of Nicholas II must be interpreted in the
light of all the disclosures, and it is demonstrated that Nicho­
las II was not a personality of commanding intelligence,
and it is clear, he was vacillating and weak.


it nowhere appears that he was willing to use his great power
to cancel the secret contract of 1892, committing Russia to
make war on Germany simultaneously with France.


nowhere appears that he hindered or delayed the war
preparations of Russia.

It does clearly appear that the Rus­

sian statesmen in control of the Russian Foreign Office re­
garded it as a wise piece of strategy to avoid giving publicity
to their secret aggressive intentions.

It is now known that

the peaceful suggestions of the Czar in proposing in 1899
and 1907 the Hague Conventions may be properly classed
with the line of strategy to make the world believe the Rus-



sian Empire ardently desired international peace, whereas
they had secret covenants contemplating war.
Even the Bjorkoe Treaty, which William II almost ex­
torted from the Czar in favor of peace between Russia,
France and Germany, was shown to be contrary to the policy
of the Russian Government, because it was abandoned by
It is impossible to believe that Nicholas did not know of
the annual conferences between the Russian General Staff
and the French General Staff, and no interpretation of these
conferences can leave any manner of doubt as to what the
policy was.
It is incredible that the object of the intrigues of Isvolski could have been unknown and not approved by the Czar.
The December, 1913, report of Sazonoff to the Czar
pointed out that it was vital to Russia to control the Darda­
nelles, and that this could be accomplished only by a general
European war.

This met with no rebuke.

The Council of

February, 1914, in which it was determined to acquire the
Dardanelles through a general European war, was approved
by the Czar in writing.
The Current History of July 26, 1926, (page 559) gives
an account of Baron Edmund Heyking (May, 1914) having
told Baron Friedrich Rosen, former Foreign Minister of
Germany, that he had had a letter from special friends in St.
Petersburg about the middle of March, 1914, stating that the
Czar had advised the Minister of the Imperial household,
Baron Frederick, as follows:

I3 8


“ You had better fully prepare your Department for war,
as I shall most certainly go to the front with my army.”
It must be remembered that in February, 1914, the Czar
had talked freely with the Serbian Minister, who advised the
Czar he had 500,000 men available for war, which met the
Czar’s warmest approval.
The negotiations of Russia with Great Britain for an un­
derstanding could not have been unknown to the Czar, as it
was 4 matter of vital importance to know that Great Britain
could be relied on in case of a general European war.
The duplicity of Nicholas is shown by the fact that after
the Russian Crown Council had ordered mobilization on July
24th, he went through the pretense of inviting William II to
act as a mediator with Austria when his own army was in
process of active mobilization, a fact which he concealed
from William II.

Even on July 29, four days after he had

permitted the war to be set in motion, he telegraphed W il­
liam I I :
“ I fear that v e r y s o o n I shall be unable to resist the pressure exer­
cised upon me, and I shall be forced to take measures that will lead
to war.”

He had already taken those measures in pursuance of a
secret contract.
This was a part of the Russian policy to camouflage the
war preparations by peace negotiations.
The telegram of Nicholas of July 29 that William I I ’s
conciliatory telegram had a very different tone from the offi-



cial message of the German Ambassador to Sazonoff was
a fiction. No such differences existed, and after he had been
solemnly warned by William II against mobilization on July
30, the Czar again ordered general mobilization that very day
in a formal manner, and advised William II that—
“the military measures now taking form were decided upon five
days ago, and for the reason of defense against the preparations of

It was a false reason. Austria had only ordered a partial
mobilization against Serbia, contemplating only a local move­
ment, following the Serbian mobilization, and Austria had
not mobilized against Russia, and had no intention of so

Austria was strongly opposed to a European war,

but was not willing to let the assassination of the Austrian
Crown Prince pass without retaliation.
On July 31 Nicholas wired William:
“ I t is t e c h n ic a lly im p o s s ib le t o d is c o n t in u e o u r m i lit a r y p r e p a r a t io n s
w h i c h h a v e b e e n m a d e n e c e s s a r y b y th e A u s t r i a n m o b iliz a t io n . ’

This was camouflage to keep William quiet until the ava­
lanche should crush him.

It was not technically impossible

to stop this general mobilization, and nothing of the sort
had been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization.
The dispatches show that the French and Russians were
pressing their military preparations with the greatest possible

Nicholas was trying to keep William II from mak-



ing counter preparations, and when William II wired Nicho­
las demanding a definite answer with regard to the cessation
of mobilization, he got no reply, which was a further means
of killing time while the Russian mobilization proceeded.
It may be true that Nicholas was unable to control the Gov­
ernment of which he was the head, but whether true or false,
the will to war is demonstrated to have been in the hearts
of the Russian leaders and not in that of the German Kaiser.
It must not be forgotten the wives of Grand Duke Nicho­
las and Grand Duke Peter on July 22, 1914, completely dis­
closed the secret preparations and policy of Russia in their
conversation with Paleologue at the banquet given to Poin­
care at St. Petersburg.

They quoted their father, the King

of Montenegro, as having wired them that the European war
would begin before the end of July. These thoughtless ladies
felt quite safe in talking to Paleologue, and telling him that
nothing would be left of Germany and Austria, that the
war was certain. These ladies knew the secret Russian policy
from their husbands, Grand Duke Nicholas and Grand Duke
Paleologue, the French Ambassador, discloses in his
memoirs, with singular unintelligence, this incriminating
evidence in detail and with apparent delight, not realizing that
it goes strongly to acquit the German leaders and to convict
the Russian and French leaders of the will to war.
Nicholas II greatly erred and greatly suffered.
soul repose in peace.

Let his



S om e E viden ce from

I4 I

B elg ium

In the reports from the Belgian ministers and charges
d’affaires at Berlin, London, and Paris to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs in Brussels, printed by E. S. Mitler & Sons,
Berlin, will be found 200 pages of evidence going to show
the attitude of the Quai d’Orsay of Paris, of the Foreign
Offices of London, and of Berlin to the general effect that
the Berlin Government zvas very desirous of maintaining
peace, that the French Government became increasingly dis­
posed to war as the war powers of Russia and France were
expanded and the Entente zmth Great Britain became de­
For example, the Belgian Minister at Berlin to the Minis­
ter for Foreign Affairs of Belgium says, page 184:
“ Everyone in England and France considers the Entente Cordiale
to be a defensive and offensive alliance against Germany. * * * It is
the Entente Cordiale which has reawakened in France an idea of
revanche, which up to then had slumbered. It is also the Entente
Cordiale which is responsible for the state o f uneasiness and unrest
prevailing in Europe for the last seven years. * * * For the present
it must therefore be considered as approved that the plan of assisting
France in a war against Germany by landing an army of 150,000
English troops was discussed in London. There is nothing in this
calculated to surprise us. It is the continuation of the singular pro­
posals made some years ago by Colonel Barnardiston to General

The Belgian Minister, Guillaume, at Paris to the Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, January 16, 1914, s a y s :1
*Op. cit. p. 169.



“ I already had the honor of informing you that it is M. Poincare,
Delcasse, Millerand, and their friends who have inaugurated and
pursued the nationalistic, militaristic, and Chauvinistic policy, the
renascence of which we witnessed. Such a policy constitutes a danger
for Europe— and also for Belgium. I see in it the greatest peril
threatening today the peace of Europe. * * * The attitude adopted
by Barthou has provoked a recrudescence of militarism in Germany.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin in a long letter on Feb­
ruary 20, 1914, quoted the French Ambassador at Berlin,
as follow s: 1
“ The majority of the Germans and of the French undoubtedly wish
to live in peace. But in both countries there is a powerful minority
dreaming solely of battles, of wars, of conquest, or revanche. Herein
lies the danger; it is like a powder barrel which any rash act may
set on fire.”

On May 8, 1914, the Belgian Minister Guillaume at Paris
quoted to the Belgian Foreign Office an

experienced and

highly placed diplomat’ as stating. 2
“ If a serious incident should arise one of these days between
France and Germany, the statesmen of the two countries will have
to arrive at a peaceful solution of the matter within three days or
else there will be war.
“One of the most dangerous elements of the present situation is
the return of France to the three years’ service; the
inconsiderately imposed by the military party, and
unable to stand it. Before two years have elapsed
placed before the alternative either of abrogating the
or of going to war. * * * The press in both countries

1 Op. cit. p. 173.
1 Op. cit. p. 181.

latter has been
the country is
France will be
three years’ act
is blameworthy.



The campaign pursued in Germany against the Foreign Legion is
exceedingly clumsy, and the tone of the French newspapers is in­
variably acrimonious and aggressive.”

On June 9, 1914, Guillaume wired the Belgian Foreign
Office from Paris as follows: 1
" During the last few days the press campaign in favor of the prin­
ciple of the three years’ service has been extremely violent. All sorts
of means have been adopted with a view to influencing public opinion.
The newspapers have not hesitated to compromise even General
Joffre. We have also seen the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg
take— contrary to all precedents— an initiative which may prove dan­
gerous for the future of France. Is it true that the St. Petersburg
cabinet pledged France to adopt the three years’ service and that the
former is today bringing all its influence to bear in order to prevent
the abrogation of the law in question? * * * We must therefore ask
ourselves if the attitude of the St. Petersburg cabinet is based on
the conviction that events are imminent zvhich will permit of Russia
making use of the instrument placed by her in the hand of her ally.”

The phrase. “ Events are imminent” means “ war is near” .
The Belgian Minister Beyens, at Berlin, June 12, 1914,
in a dispatch to the Belgian Foreign Office, said: 2
“Another criticism which can be leveled against the champions of
the three years’ service in France is that of perpetually dragging Rus­
sia into the discussion— Russia whose political aims remain a mys­
tery, who directs the dual alliance solely for her own benefit and
who, likewise, although she is in noways threatened by Germany, in­
creases her armaments in alarming proportion.”
JOp. cit., p. 182.
1 Op. cit., p. 186.



I V . S o m e E v id e n c e f r o m L o n d o n

In great detail and with innumerable quotations, Francis
Neilson, a member of the English Parliament, in his work,
“ How Diplomats Make W ar,” substantially confirms from
English records what has been disclosed in the telegrams
above quoted; that is, that there was in effect an understand­
ing between Russia, France, and Great Britain with the
military and naval details all worked out by repeated con­
ferences of their general staffs and the understanding that
Great Britain would co-operate with France in the event
of a war with Germany.

For example:

“ In London, on Saturday, August i, Lord Lansdowne, Sir Edv/ard
Carson, and Mr. Bonar Law hastened to the center of the diplomatic
world.1 Germany had issued orders for the general mobilization of
her army and navy; the next day, the Sabbath, to be the first day.
Through the long Sabbath all over the Kingdom thousands of feet
tramped Channelwards, regiment after regiment with full kit wound
through London streets as the bells from tower and steeple called
the folk to prayer. Ministers went to a cabinet meeting there and
yielded up to the French Ambassador some token of British

The German mobilization was ordered 5 P. M. Saturday.
The English regiments were on the march Sunday morn­
ing armed for war.
On August 1 Sir Edward Grey told the German Ambassa1 H o w D ip lo m a ts M a k e W a r , p. 293.



dor that Great Britain would not engage to remain neutral,
“ we must keep our hands free.” 1
The fact was that Grey was not really free but fully com­
mitted, not only by the real intent of the agreement with
France, but far more by the interests of Great Britain, as he
viewed them and Great Britain instantly carried out the
commitment under the agreements with France and with
Telegram 148 from the British Foreign Office, August 2,
“After the cabinet meeting this morning, I gave M. Cambon the
following memorandum:
“ I am authorized to give an assurance that if the German fleet
comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hos­
tile operations against French coast or shipping, the British fleet
will give all the protection in its power.
“This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty’s
government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be
taken as binding His Majesty’s government to take any action until
the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place.”

So that the Entente was in fact effective, after all, on the
certain contingency of action by the German fleet, and Parlia­
ment was committed by its own government s acts.


action was equal to agreeing to attack Germany as an ally of

The interests of Great Britain, however, made it

necessary (in Grey’s opinion) when a war actually came
between France and Germany that Great Britain should fight
1 H o w D ip lo m a ts M a k e W a r ,

p. 290.



the military rulers of Germany who would have been dan­
gerous to British interests if they had conquered France and
dominated western Europe whether they were responsible for
the war or not.
Mr. Neilson points out (p. 265) :
“ News had reached Berlin that Belgium had issued as early as
July 24 a mobilization circular, and an undated instruction to Belgian
Ambassadors w hich contained the information they were to give the
chancellors as to her ‘strengthened peace footing.’ ”

The Belgian circular of July 24 (the day after Austria
made her demand on Serbia) announced that the Belgian
Arm y had already been mobilized and forts near Germany
had been put in order for war.
In the circular of the Belgian Foreign Office to its Ambas­
sadors dated July 24, was the inclosure heretofore referred
to, without date, but necessarily either of that date or of an
earlier date, which states:
“A ll necessary steps to insure respect of Belgian neutrality have
nevertheless been taken by the government. T h e B e lg ia n A r m y h a s
b e e n m o b iliz e d and is t a k in g u p s u c h s t r a t e g ic p o s it io n s as have been
chosen to secure the defense of the country and the respect of its
neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse h a v e b e e n p u t
a state of defense.”


There can be no manner of doubt as to what the GreyCambon letters meant.

The complete plan of na\al and

military strategy had been worked out between the French
and British naval and army officers, and on Sunday morning,
the very next morning, after Germany ordered her mobiliza­



tion of Saturday afternoon, British regiments were marching
through London to the front fully equipped for war.1
A number of members of the British Cabinet, including
Lord Morley, John Burns, etc., resigned when they dis­
covered this secret diplomacy.
The French Government immediately offered Belgium
military support3 and the following dispatch from the
French Ambassador at Brussels to the French Government
explains the relations between France and Belgium:
“The chief of the cabinet of the Belgian Ministry of War has
asked the French military attache to p r e p a r e a t o n c e for the co­
operation and contact of French troops with the Belgian Army pend­
ing the results of the appeal to the guaranteeing powers now being
made. O r d e r s h a v e therefore b e e n g i v e n to B e lg ia n p r o v in c ia l g o v ­
e r n o r s n o t to r e g a r d m o v e m e n ts o f F r e n c h

tr o o p s a s a v io la t io n o f

th e f r o n t i e r .”

The British troops took their place on the left wing of the
French under the plans long before worked out.
The mobilization of the Belgian Army was completed at
least the day before the general mobilisation of the Russian
Army began under Sukhomlinoff’s order, July 25, about
which “ he lied” to the Russian Czar when he represented to
his sovereign that it was a partial mobilisation.

It was re­

ordered as a general mobilization by Nicholas on July 29 and
again on July 30.
In the trial of Sukhomlinoff, Minister of W ar, at St.
Petersburg, by the revolutionary government of Russia,
1 How Diplomats Make War, p. 295.
a Ibid., p. 310.



“ Sukhomlinoff c o n f e s s e d th a t after the Czar had received these
telegrams from the Kaiser the Czar called the Minister of War up
by telephone and t o ld h im to s t o p t h e m o b ilis a t io n . A t th a t tim e
th e C z a r t h o u g h t th e m o b iliz a t io n was only p a r tia l.
I t w a s really
already g e n e r a l , a procedure for which the direct authority of the
Czar was necessary and had not been given. Sukhomlinoff con­
fessed that in m a k in g th e m o b iliz a t io n g e n e r a l h e h a d c o n c e a le d t h is
f r o m t h e C z a r ; nay, more, that h e d id n o t r e v e a l i t to h im in the
conversation by telephone. He next admitted that h e p r o m is e d th e
C z a r to s to p th e f u r t h e r m o b i li z a t io n and n o t to i s s u e a g e n e r a l
m o b ilis a t io n . H e h u n g u p t h e te le p h o n e w i t h a f a l s e p r o m is e to the
Czar, and, he says, w e n t o n w it h th e m o b ilis a t io n . His fellow-rogue,
Januschkevitch, floundering in his testimony and confronted at all
times with contradictions, left the stand in the same disgusting and
humiliating condition.” 1

I f the democracies or peoples of the world continue to per­
mit secret diplomacy with its ambitious intrigue, militarism,
commercial imperialism, this W orld W ar will not be the
The greatest of the English papers, the London Times,
March 15, 1915, correctly states the true position with regard
to this matter of British participation in the Triple Entente,
as follow s: 2
“ There are still some Englishmen and Englishwomen w h o g r e a t ly
as to the reasons that have forced England to draw the sword.
They know that it was Germany’s flagrant violation of Belgian
neutrality which filled the cup of her indignation and made her
people insist on war (sic). They do not reflect that o u r h o n o r a n d
o u r i n t e r e s t m u s t h a v e c o m p e lle d u s to j o i n F r a n c e a n d R u s s i a even
if Germany had scrupulously respected the rights of her small neigh-


1 Bausman, 200; also Oman’s Outbreak of the War, 68.
* How Diplomats Make War, 336.



bors, and had sought to hack her way into France through the
eastern fortresses.”

The word “ honor” frequently means “ interest” in the
diplomatic code.
Great Britain was led into the war on the theory that
British interests required co-operation with France and Rus­
sia, a theory upon which Sir Edward Grey had laid the
ground by years of naval and military conferences in which
every detail of a war on Germany had been carefully out­

This contention is thoroughly borne out by the new

British documents (see Nos. i o i , 369).

It was Sir Eyre

Crowe and Sir Arthur Nicolson who finally forced Grey into
the war.
In Entente Diplomacy and the World, Documents 847 and
850 (Exhibit V I I ) , will be found the British Russian En­
tente plans.

(Congressional Record, December 18, 1923.)

These dispatches demonstrate beyond a possibility of doubt
that there were secret conventions thoroughly worked out
and planned between Russia, France, and Great Britain as
to how war should be made on Germany, involving Great
Britain sending empty ships into the Baltic Sea for Russia’s
use against Germany just before the war of 1914 was de­
clared; (Doc. 850) that England should be prepared to
fetter the German fleet in the North Sea; that arrangements
in the Mediterranean were to be made, and that especial au­
thority to Russian ships to use French and English ports to
establish a complete working plan between the navies and the
armies of the three countries— Great Britain, Russia, and




The limit of space makes it inexpedient to quote

these innumerable documents.

(See De Siebert.)

The Russian Ambassador, London, June 25, 1914, tele­
graphed to Sazonoff: 1
“ Grey told me that he was
which were c i r c u la t i n g i n t h e

g r e a t ly

a la r m e d

by the false rumors

G e r m a n p r e s s c o n c e r n in g

th e c o n t e n ts

o f t h e a lle g e d n a v a l c o n v e n t io n b e tw e e n E n g la n d a n d R u s s ia . * * *
G r e y a s s u r e d th e

G e r m a n A m b a s s a d o r * * * th a t b e tw e e n E n g la n d ,



th e

a llia n c e
assum ed

one hand,


F ran ce


c o n v e n t io n * * *

c h a r a c te r

d ir e c t e d

R u s s ia

th e r e

e x is te d

n e it h e r

that their negotiations had

a g a in s t

G erm any




n ever

th e y

an y

r e f e r e n c e to t h e s o - c a lle d ‘ e n c ir c lin g p o li c y .1 ”

On the face of the Cambon-Grey letters was an express
disclaimer that either Government was bound by them, but
the actual intent and true, common interest against the Ger­
man Imperial Government is quite clear.
The English honor and interest were both involved.


certainly appears that France, Russia and Great Britain did
have secret conventions; the conventions were directed
against Germany, worked out in detail then in process of
execution and they were in pursuance of “ the encircling
policy” ; and were carried out on the battlefields and at sea
within 60 days.
Three days later Russo-Serbian intrigues led to the murder
of Archduke Ferdinand, and the grand drama, with stage
fully set, opened to the astonishment and grief of the poor,
little common people who pay taxes and die.

1 Doc. 855, p. 730, Congressional Record.


I5 1

The secret entente agreements with France and Russia
were repeatedly denied by the representatives of the British
Foreign Office, who asserted in Parliament that there was
no commitment of the British Government to support the
French Government in case of a war with Germany.
On March 10 of 1913, Mr. Asquith, replying to a question
in the Commons from Lord Hugh Cecil, denied that England
was under an—
“obligation arising owing to an assurance given by the ministry in
the course of diplomatic negotiations to send a very large armed
force out of this country to operate in Europe.”

On March 24 he made similar denials in reply to questions
from Sir W . Byles and Mr. King.
On April 14 Mr. Runciman, in a speech at Birkenhead,
denied “in the most categorical way” the existence of a secret
understanding with any foreign power.
On May 3 the Secretary for the Colonies, Mr. Harcourt,
declared that he “ could conceive no circumstances in which
continental operations would not be a crime against the
people of this country.”
On June 28 the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr.
Acland, declared publicly that—
“in no European question were we concerned to interfere with a big

On July 1 Lord Loreburn, Lord Chancellor from 1906 to
1912, said—



‘‘that any British Government would be so guilty toward our country
as to take up arms in a foreign quarrel is more than I can believe.”

On April 28, 1914, and again on June 11, Sir Edward Grey
confirmed in the House of Commons Mr. Asquith’s asser­
tion, made March 11 and 24, 1913, of British freedom from
engagements with continental powers.1
These disclosures of systematic deceit in the highest places
would seem to justify America in receiving the assurances
o f European diplomats with some reserve.
Lloyd George, five months before the war, said: 2
“ The German Army is vital not merely to the existence of the
German Empire, but to the very life and independence of the nation
itself, surrounded as Germany is by other nations, each of w’hich
possesses arms a b o u t a s p o w e r f u l a s h e r o w n .”

On December 23, 1920, Lloyd George said:
“ That no one at the head of affairs quite meant war. It was some­
thing into which they glided or rather staggered and stumbled.”

This is a confession that the Germans did not will the
war, but does not exculpate the statesmen of Russia and
France who engineered it.
1 See Neilson; How Diplomats Make W ar; Morel, Truth and the
War, etc.
“ Daily Chronicle, January 1, 1914.


D isin ter ested F r e n c h

O pin io n

A very large number of intellectual Frenchmen, historians,
scholars, and soldiers have signed “an appeal to conscience
demanding the modification of Article 231 of the Treaty of
Versailles, on the ground that the confession that the German
Government was exclusively responsible for the war was ex­
torted by violence, and has no binding force in morals or

A number of these men have written books demon­

strating the untruth of the charge, to whom a previous refer­
ence has been made.

Some of their works will be found

cited in the Appendix.

These men are typical of the France

Americans have so greatly admired.

Their counsel does

great honor to France.
It may be well to quote a few expressions from the writ­
ings and speeches of some of these men.
Victor Margueritte has recently written a notable book
called “ Les Criminels” in which he traces Poincare’s steps
and shows by the evidence that he willed the war, and took
1 See Appendix.




a strenuous part in bringing it about; that his repeated as­
surances to the Russian authorities of support of the Rus­
sian policy in the Balkans, and in making war on Germany
stimulated the Russian Imperialists to attack Germany in
reliance on French and British co-operation.
On July 5, 1922, page 2337, Journal Official, VaillantCouturier while M. Poincare was presiding over the Cham­
ber of Deputies as its President, declared to his fellow depu­
ties “ upon his conscience as an old soldier” that he was
convinced of the responsibility of Raymond Poincare for
the W orld W ar, and that the records would expose the fact.
He accused him of unwarrantably supporting the Russian
ambitions and policies; declared that Poincare did not do
what he could have done to deter the war, but promoted it,
and built up in France public opinion favorable to Russian
intervention in the Balkans, and he said:
“We accuse him of having been the man about whom was crys­
tallized the desire for revenge on the part of the most turbulent of
French nationalists. We accuse him of having been that which Jaures
hoped he would not be, the president of reaction or of war.
“ We accuse him of having let pass certain omissions of texts in the
publication of the diplomatic archives. * * *
“We accuse him of having thrown France into a war which the
Russian mobilization provoked. * * *
“ For us M. Poincare represents all that nationalism has been able
to produce of a funereal character before, during and after the war.
To-day his policy leads us to isolation, to failure, and to new wars."

Even the former Russian Minister of W ar who co­
operated with Poincare (Sukhomlinoff) is quoted:



“ I dare say that the belief in the sole guilt in Germany is not
possible even to M. Poincare. But if one can conduct a policy of
extortion which is based upon the theory of Germany’s sole guilt,
it is clear that one should grimly stick to this theory, or at least
give oneself the appearance of conviction.”

This advice to be a judicious hypocrite appears to have
been fully appreciated by Poincare.

It must be remembered

that in ascertaining the actual truth, it is necessary to re­
member that the public expressions in favor of peace and
justice and right by men like Poincare and Sazonoff and
SukhomlinofT can only be interpreted in the secret agree­
ments, records, dispatches, etc., which were not made public,
and which flatly contradicted their pacific pretensions.
For example, Poincare published in England on the 31st
of July a letter to the King of England urging him to try
to preserve the peace, and stating that France would do its
utmost to do likewise, after his own Government had caused
a secret telegram to be sent to St. Petersburg saying that
the French Government was firmly determined on war (Tele­
gram 216), and although the secret treaty between Russia
and France had already committed both France and Russia
absolutely and unequivocally to attack Germany immediately
without further notice.

Such official hypocrisy would make

it impossible to know the truth except for the secret records
which have recently been disclosed.
Some of the opinions of distinguished Frenchmen who love
and honor France, who wish France to be honored by other
nations, and who remember that the French Government can



only be honored and loved in such degree as it is honest
and just to other people, are here recorded—
Deschanel, former President of France:
“ Poincare provoked the war because the adherents of the three-year
military service proposition had an interest in anticipating the oppo­
nents of the law in their efforts to abolish it. * * * Poincare knew we
were not prepared, yet he went to Petersburg for the purpose of
driving the Russians into war.” 1


de Toury,

in “ Poincare

a-t-il voulu


Guerre ?” :
“ The Treaty was the work of hatred, of falsehood and of violence.
Our united duty is to combat this hatred, this falsehood, this violence,
in the interest of truth and peace, and relentlessly to put down the
Versailles Treaty and especially Article 231.”

Louis Guetant in “ Rapport sur le Traite de Versailles” :
“ With all our troubles over the present, the responsibility for the
war remains the greatest distress of our soul; it continues to be the
question of questions, for upon the answer depends the whole effect
and legality of the Treaty, and with that our future. We cannot
permit that the Treaty of Versailles should pass as a work founded
upon violence, which will challenge the repugnance of all honest men
and harbors the seeds of future wars. W e can uproot this cursed
seed only by demanding the revision of the treaty. This is a cate­
gorical imperative, the duty of conscience and of self-preservation.”

General Percin, former Inspector General of the French
Artillery, in an Article in the Ere Nouvelle:
1 From Letters to the French Ambassador, George Louis, in St.
Petersburg, February 22, 1915, and June 26, 1915.



“ In order to effect an understanding between the two peoples, the
first duty is to break down the moral barrier which has been erected
against Germany by the Treaty of Versailles and the French post­
war propaganda, the lies about Germany’s guilt during the war as
well as of causing the war.”

A lfred Pevet in “ Les Responsables de la Guerre” *
“ And so seventy million Germans at the end of the war, rendered
impotent for defense by starvation, have signed a treaty, intended to
make them weak and weaponless for centuries and to reduce them
to a refined state of slavery. By means of loaded dice the defenders
of human rights have been able to bring a great nation to the point
of prostrating itself before men and gods by signing this Article

Victor Margueritte in “ Les Criminels” :
“ The real workers for war, the principals responsible for the whole­
sale murder, are Poincare and Viviani, the one as Minister-President,
a helpless shadow, the other as President of the French Republic,
mightier than the Russian Czar, yet a puppet in the hands of Isvolski.
These men, in intimate conjunction with the war party at the Russian
Court, are responsible for the catastrophe. In the interest of justice
as well as of peace the harm caused by Article 231 which was ex­
torted from the vanquished under threats of war and starvation and
as a confession of sole guilt, must be righted. Therefore this
Article 231 must be revised, the sooner the better, if there is to be a
moral disarmament between us and Germany, a real peace and an
enduring European reconciliation. The extorted confession of guilt
is drowned by one demand: the demand for new facts.”

Fabre Luce in “ La Victoire” :
“ In reality Germany and Austria did only what might make war
possible; the Triple Entente did what made war certain. In the



wish to form a Defensive Alliance against Germany, France welded
together an Alliance of Conquerors."

A lfred Ebray, former French Consul General and Min­
ister-Resident, in “ La Paix Malpropre” :
“ The confession of guilt was forced from the vanquished after the
methods employed in medieval juridical proceedings, having no legality
either morally, politically or historically, and therefore valueless in a
careful investigation of the responsibility for the war.”

Georges Demartial, former Director of the French Colo­
nial Ministry:
“ Our imperative duty today is to go back into the past, since the
future depends upon the past. More than ever, the war guilt question
is the question of all questions. It not only raises the greatest con­
ceivable moral problem, but the world’s destiny depends upon its solu­
tion. Not until Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty has been revised
will justice be done to a lie of the past. The Treaty of Versailles
is a treaty of violence, and nothing else. Its object is to punish Ger­
many for causing the war. It follows that it is valid in the degree
that it is true that Germany’s adversaries were forced to take part in
the war. But if it shall be proved that Germany’s adversaries are
equally guilty or more guilty than Germany, the treaty will fall of
its own weight, since it is founded solely upon their assertion of
complete innocence.”

Professor Renouvin, in “ Les Origines Immediates de la
Guerre” :
“ Article 231 pronounces a judgment: With insufficient evidence the
statesmen have undertaken to lay down an official conviction, to inter­
pret a historical fact which in its very character is lacking in scientific



B y M.

G eorges D e m a r t i a l

Officer of the Legion of Honor, Honorary Minister General
of Colonies has just appeared (Feb. 1927).
The Treaty of Versailles has declared the defeated coun­
tries to be alone responsible for the war.

The truth about

guilt is not sufficiently proved by this declaration.

On the

contrary, very strong reasons for doubting the veracity of
the above charge emerge when one examines the principal
arguments upon which this belief is still based.
It is said that the central empires had alone prepared for
the war.
During the ten years which preceded the war, Russia,
France and England had set aside in their budgets for mili­
tary expenses 46,000,000,000 francs, whereas the central
empires had set aside 26,000,000,000 francs.
It is said that the policies of the governments of the
Entente were pacific.
In 1915 the Germans seized in Brussels and published 119
reports addressed to the Belgian government by its ministers
in London, Paris and Berlin, between the years 1905 and
This is how one publication, otherwise very Francophile.
The Revue de Lausanne, summarized these reports when they

l6 o


“ The Belgian diplomats endeavor to prove that the foreign
policy of France, and especially that of England, is danger­
ous to the peace of Europe.”
In February, 1919, the Soviet government of Russia pub­
lished in the Pravda the correspondence exchanged from
1908 to 1914 between the Russian ambassadors in London
and in Paris, and their governments.

Professor Pokroksky,

people’s commissar, in charge of this publication, says:

A ll

these documents expose in the fullest manner the activities of
the Entente in preparing for the war.”
It is said that Serbia was innocent.
This was not the opinion held by the English at the begin­
ning of the war. Here is what may be read in newspapers of
the most widely different shades of b elief:
“ If one could tow Serbia to the edge of the ocean and
swamp it, the atmosphere of Europe would be cleared.”
{Manchester Guardian, Aug. 3.)
“ Serbia ought to disappear. Let us efface it from the map
of Europe.” (John Bull, Aug. 8.)
The English minister of foreign affairs himself had said
to the ambassador of Austria on July 27:

“ If it is possible

for Austria to make war on Serbia and at the same time to
give satisfaction to Russia, everything would be fine.” (E n g­
lish Diplomatic Documents, V . 1, number 40.)

It is said that the Serbian government could not have ac­
cepted the Austrian note without dishonor to herself.
Nevertheless, the Italian government suggested to the Eng1 Translated by Arthur Julius Nelson.


l6 l

lish government on July 27 to advise Serbia to accept it.
(English Diplomatic Documents, V . 1, number 48.)

On the

next day, the 28th, the Italian government resumed its sug­
gestion in the same manner; the Serbian charge d’affaires
had informed it that his government would be ready to accept
the note in its entirety if some explanations of articles 5 and
6 were furnished him ; the explanation, in this respect, given
by Austria to the powers in her memorandum of July 27,
appeared to him to be precisely of a nature to facilitate
Serbia’s acceptance.

(English Diplomatic Documents, V. 1,

number 64.)
It is to be noted that this memorandum has not been pub­
lished in the diplomatic books of the Entente.
It is said that by refusing arbitration, the Central Powers
Put themselves under the ban of humanity.
W ould a Russian, French, or English government have ac­
cepted it any the more?

W hy should Austria not have

employed force against Serbia in 1914, since Serbia had used
it in 1912 against Turkey, and in 1913 against Bulgaria?
The offer is lost at the end of Serbia’s reply, and is incident­
ally made in a personal telegram from the Czar to the Kaiser,
which the Russian government kept secret for six months.
It was mentioned but once, that is all.
tioned again.

It was never men­

The governments of the Entente never con­

sidered it in the course of negotiations.

W hy did they not

solemnly declare that they were henceforward decided, if
Austria accepted arbitration, not to wage war any more



against any nation, small or large?

That was the time to

preach by example, or never.
It is said that Emperor William, a modern Attila, person­
ally schemed to bring about this war in order to gorge his
people with booty.
On July 28 the emperor received a copy of the Serbian
reply to the Austrian note.

He inserted these words:

“ To

have attained these results in 48 hours is wonderful.

It is

more than was to be expected.
for Vienna.

It is a great moral victory

But now every motive for war disappears, and

the Austrian minister could well have remained in Belgrade.
Under such conditions, I myself should never have ordered
the mobilization against Serbia.”
number 271.)

(Kautsky Documents,

And he wrote immediately to the minister of

foreign affairs and presented him with a suitable plan of
instructions for his ambassador at Vienna.

(Kautsky Docu­

ments, number 293.)
It is said that the German government nez’er desired to give
a counsel of moderation to Austria.
On July 28, while carrying out precisely this wish of the
Kaiser, the German government telegraphed to Vienna:
“ The Serbian reply contains such concessions to the Austrian
demands, that if the Austrian government maintains an un­
compromising attitude, it will have to expect to see the public






(Kautsky Documents, number 323.)



From this moment on­

ward he urged Austria to come to an understanding with
Russian and to accept England’s offer of mediation.




still, in order that his efforts should not be wasted, he had
recourse to an extraordinary proceeding: he published in an
English newspaper, the Westminster Gazette, on Aug. i, the
text of one of his most condemnatory dispatches to Vienna.
It is said that the general mobilization was simply a pre­
cautionary measure, lacking any belligerent motives, and that
in calling upon Russia to suspend it, Germany simply found a
pretext for declaring war on her.
In Number 71 of the Yellow Book on the Franco-Russian
alliance, there is related a conversation of Aug. 18, 1892, be­
tween General de Boisdeffre, the French negotiator, and the
Czar, on the subject of Article 3 of the military treaty, by
which the two powers engaged themselves to mobilize imme­
diately if Germany or Austria mobilized against one of them.
“ I remarked to the emperor that mobilization was a decla­
ration of war,” said the general.
“ That is the sense in which I understand it,” replied the
emperor. W hy should Germany have understood otherwise?
It is said that the general Russian mobilization was a
counter stroke to the general Austrian mobilization.
On Sept. 15, 1917, the Russian government, at that time
represented by Kerensky, made known, in an official com­
munique, that the order for general mobilization was an­
nounced in Russia on the evening of July 30, 1914, and no
one has placed the general mobilization order of Austria befor July 31.

But long before the Kerensky communique,

the truth was known.
It is said that France and England did not want war.




Between the moment when the Russian general mobiliza­
tion order was made public (the night of the 30th and 3 IS0
and the declaration of war by Germany on Russia (Aug. 1,
7 p. m.) sufficient time elapsed for the governments to de­
mand that Russia stop a mobilization which was an act of
It is said that in reality if France entered the war, it was
solely in order to resist Germany’s aggression; without this
aggression, there would not have been any war.
In his great speech on the afternoon of Aug. 3, the Eng­
lish minister of foreign affairs, Sir Edward Grey, proclaimed
in the House of Commons:
“ I may say with the most absolute certainty that the French
are involved in the war on account of an obligation of honor
resulting from a definite alliance with Russia.”
Germany did not declare war on France until the evening
of the day on which these words were uttered.


declaration of war was, therefore, posterior to France’s en­
trance into the w a r; it was the effect, not the cause.
It is said that Germany’s aggression against France was the
greatest crime that a cizrilized country has ever committed
against international law.
In Foignet’s Manual of International Law we read:

“ In

the relations between the ally of one of the belligerents and
the other belligerent, one of two things may occur.


the ally will attack the belligerent in carrying out its treaty of
alliance, or the ally will maintain an indecisive attitude,
awaiting the issue of the first encounters.

In the latter case,



the belligerent if it knows of the existence of the treaty of
alliance, and if it feels strong enough, may attack the ally of
its enemy, after a preliminary declaration of war.”

(P. 490.)

Since manuals are only the resume of what many precedents
teach this theory ought to be applicable. In attacking France,
therefore, Germany committed no crim e; she followed the
rules of the game.
It is said that this attack took France by surprise, that it
was made in a treacherous manner.
This attack was not a surprise to any one.

It was made

known everywhere that in case of a war waged simul­
taneously against France and Russia, it would be a necessity
of life or death for Germany to try to defeat one of her
adversaries as soon as possible so that she could then direct
all her forces against the other, and that the adversary she
would attack first would be France.— The French govern­
ment was so little surprised by Germany’s attack, that it
deliberately exposed itself to it.

On July 29 and 30, nearly

a week before the declaration of war, the French ambassador
reported to the Foreign Office, “ that France was expecting
Germany to demand of her, either to stop her preparations or
to issue a declaration of neutrality, and that, since France
could not accede of these demands, Germany would attack

(English Documents, V . 1, numbers 89 and 105.)

It is said that in holding her troops at a distance of ten kilo­
meters from the front, the French government gave most
decisive proof that it did not want war and made the supreme
sacrifice in the cause of peace.


l6 6


But since the general Russian mobilization was equivalent
to a declaration of war on Germany, and since France was
engaged, as a matter of honor, to aid Russia, this withdrawal
was only a b lu ff; it was not a sacrifice, since on the avowal
of Mr. Viviani himself in his speech of Jan. 31, 1919, the
general staff, on being consulted, had raised no objection.
The withdrawal did not change the course of events at all,
and could not have changed it. It did not prevent Sir Edward
Grey from confessing, on Aug. 3, that France was engaged
in the war by virtue of her alliance with Russia.
It is said that England entered the war only to protect the
neutrality of Belgium.
It is true that in his great speech on Aug. 6, Mr. Asquith,
after asking the question:

W hy is England fighting?

solemnly declared that it was for this reason, and no other;
and he added specifically:

“ W e are not fighting for selfish

But the famous leader in the Times of March

8, following, was devoted wholly to demonstrating that “ Eng­
land would certainly have joined France and Russia even if
Germany had respected the neutrality of Belgium, that she
did not intend to play the part of an international Don
Quixote, and that if she had entered the war, it was because
her interests were involved, interests which called upon her to
fight Germany, as she had fought Philip II, Louis X IV and
Napoleon I.”
Here, apart from reasons based upon conscience and com­
mon sense, is a brief summary, of a documentary nature, of
the reasons why we should refuse to place all responsibility


for the war on Germany.


It seems, now that this corner of

the veil has been raised, that the League of the Rights o f
Man should endeavor to remove it entirely. It was formed a
quarter of a century ago, in order to obtain the revision of
a judgment rendered contrary to the essential rules of justice.
It ought to demand to-day the revision of Article 231 of the
Treaty of Versailles, by which the several enemies of Ger­
many compelled her, without debate, despite her protestations,
and under stress of having hostilities resumed against her in
five days, to assume sole responsibility for the war.


it is on this admission that the whole treaty has been erected,
and especially the chapter on reparations, the question is


V ery

L ate

A u th o r ities

There have just been published in English some new
books by four different authors of great distinction, an
American, an Englishman, a Frenchman, a German, which
confirm the verity of the story disclosed in this volume.
“ International Anarchy” by G. Lowes Dickinson (Century
Company of O xford), a masterpiece of the first order by
an Englishman (500 pages) ; a historical demonstration of
the truth and a philosophical discussion of the best possible
“ The Limitations of Victory” by A lfred Fabre-Luce (A .
A . K nop f).

Fabre-Luce is a Frenchman, a historian who is

judicious, impartial, whose one great motive is the truth.


16 8


He has demolished the defenses and pretenses of Raymond
“ Isvolski and the W orld W ar” by Frederick Stieve (A .
A . K nop f).

Frederick Stieve is a German of vast learning,

whose book on Isvolski must be convincing to any impartial

Stieve has edited all of the dispatches, letters and

documents proceeding from Isvolski, and is the highest
authority on the secret documents o f Russia.
Finally, “ The Genesis of the World W ar” by Harry Elmer
Barnes, Professor of Historical Sociology, Smith College,
etc., a work whose brilliancy and power is not surpassed by
any recent piece of historical writing.

Its scholarship, its

literary excellence, its rhetorical and logical arrangement,
its tremendous accumulation of effective data make this work
a great masterpiece.
Professor Barnes, with additional evidence, draws the
same substantial conclusions as those presented to the United
States Senate on December 18, 1923, by Mr. Owen, Senator
from Oklahoma.
He says:
That previous to the outbreak of the W orld W ar, the
most important point in Russian foreign policy was the
securing of the Straits, and that they could only be ob­
tained by a European war: that Sazonoff was converted
to this view and expressed himself as believing that, with
British help, France and Russia could easily dispose of
Germany and put an end to her existence as a first-class
European power: that a secret Russian Crown Council,

16 9


held on February 8, 1914, decided that Russia must await a
European w ar: that English adherence to the Franco-Rusrsian plans was practically assured by the negotiations con­
cerning an Anglo-Russian naval convention in May, 1914:
That Poincare had assured Isvolski in 1912 that as soon as
Russia was adequately prepared in a military way, and the
bribed French press had reconciled the French people to the
idea of a war over the Balkans, he would join with Russia
in any satisfactory incident in the Balkans which might be
used as the basis for precipitating the war which would re­
store Alsace-Lorraine, as well as capture the Straits.


the Russians had therefore encouraged Serbian plots against
Austria, supplied the Serbians with arms, and promised them
Russian aid against Austria:
That Poincare visited St. Petersburg late in July, 1914,
fired the Russian militarists with new zeal and hope, and
gave the Russian extremists assurance of

full support

against Austria before he knew the terms of the Austrian
ultimatum, and gave them to understand that the prospective
Austro-Serbian crisis would be satisfactory to him as the
“ Incident in the Balkans” over which the Russians might
kindle a European war and count upon finding France a
reliable ally.

Hence, that while Russia brought on the war,

she would never have done so but for prior incitement by
That from the 24th of July, the Russians began steady
and unabated military preparations in anticipation of war,
and carried these to their logical and fatal culmination in




the general mobilization order of July 30.

That the 24th of

July marks the turning point in the history of contemporary
Europe which transformed the European system from one
which invited war into one which was based upon a determi­
nation to precipitate war.

That neither the French nor the

British offered any objections to these Russian military meas­
ures, and the French explicitly advised greater haste, coupled
with more complete secrecy.

That consciously or uncon­

sciously, on July 25, Sir Edward Grey led Sazonoff to under­
stand that Great Britain would countenance Russian mobili­
That personal responsibility for the deadly Russian mili­
tary preparations rests mainly upon the Grand Duke Nicho­
las, Sazonoff and Isvolski, but chiefly on Sazonoff, who led
the militarists on rather than being bulldozed by them.
That in 1916 Sazonoff admitted that the war was brought
on in 1914 through the determination of France and Russia
to humiliate Germany. That his recent attempt to clear him­
self of the charges against him, have consisted solely of the
most obvious and flagrant misstatements of easily verified
and incontestable facts.

That he has not been able to offer

one valid fact in extenuation of his conduct.
That Sazonoff’s suggestions as to a diplomatic settlement
were not made in good faith, but, following the suggestions
of the Protocol of 1912, were designed purely to gain more
time for the execution of the Russian military preparations.
The German and Austrian military action against Russia
came long after the Russian general mobilization, and

neither country had made a move against Russia until after
the Russian general mobilization order had been telegraphed
throughout Russia.

That Germany did not even then move

hastily, but vainly waited twenty-four hours for a reply to a
twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia before ordering mobiliza­

(Genesis of the World W ar, 371.)
P rofessor


B arnes’

C on clu sion s

W it h

R egard


A t t it u d e of t h e R u s s ia n a n d F r e n c h L eaders

P r e c i p i t a t i n g t h e W orld W a r


“ The problem of responsibility for the W orld W ar is not
primarily an abstract matter for scholarly meditation, but is
rather one of the livest and most important practical issues
of the present day.

The whole European situation rests

to a large extent upon unwise and unjust treaties of peace
which grew out of the most complete and uncritical accept­
ance of the grossest forms of wartime illusions created by
the Entente propaganda concerning the responsibility for
the W orld War.

The discovery and dissemination of the

facts concerning the outbreak of the war are not only indis­
pensable to the problem of eliminating the injustices of the
Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain and Trianon, but are
also of vital significance in promoting the cause of world
Peace and firm international organization.
“ For the first time in the history of mankind the generaaThis summary of Professor Barnes’ views was specially revised
for citation in this book.




tion that lived through a great war has been enabled to ob­
tain the information upon which may be based a definite
knowledge of the causes and responsibility for that war.
Hitherto, states have kept secret the documents in the
foreign offices which revealed the facts as to war guilt.
Rarely have such documents been published until from forty
to one hundred years after the event.

For example, in 1914

we possessed no complete documentary knowledge of the
causes of and responsibility for the Franco-Prussian war
of 1870.

The reasons for our peculiar advantages at the

present time are clear.

In Germany, Austria and Russia the

governments in power during the World W ar were over­
thrown and supplanted by new ones.

The latter desired to

make their status and powrer more permanent in every pos­
sible way, and believed that this could be done in part by dis­
crediting the previous regimes.
“ One method of discrediting the earlier governments would
be to show, if possible, that they were responsible for the
tragedies and miseries incident to the World War.

This led

to the opening of the secrets of the foreign offices in Ger­
many, Austria and Russia, and the subsequent publication of
the relevant documents under competent editorship.


German and Austrian documents give us extensive knowl­
edge about the relation of the central powers to the out­
break of the war, and the fact that Russia was closely allied
with France and England not only makes the Russian docu­
ments of significance with respect to Russia herself but also
gives us most of the essential information with respect to



the policies and acts of the French and English governments
in the crisis of July and August, 1914.

The British govern­

ment itself has recently consented to the publication of the
secret documents in its own archives, and we now possess this
information on the crisis of 1914 in carefully edited form.
Serbia, France and Italy must stand self-condemned until
they freely open their archives to scholars.
“ Thus the revolutionary transformation of the attitude of
scholars toward the responsibility for the World W ar has
not in any sense been due to a mere swinging of the psycho­
logical pendulum away from the ardent hatred of Germany
during the W orld War, or to the progress of German propa­
ganda since 1918, but has inevitably grown out of the fact
that today we have real knowledge of the situation, while
from 1914-1918 we were guided solely by the propaganda
of the governments which closely guarded the secrets with
respect to the actual responsibility for the great calamity.
There is nothing mysterious or esoteric about this new in­
formation or its sources.

Practically all of the source mate­

rial has at the present time been published and any in­
dustrious person could easily read it all through and digest
it in a few weeks if adequately oriented in modern diplo­
matic history.

It would certainly be a crime of omission of

the first magnitude if scholars were not to exploit this
unique opportunity to destroy the dangerous and menacing
war psychology of hatred and myth and supplant it by the
solid and substantial body of fact and understanding which is
now at our disposal.




“ The general European system after 1870, based as it was
on nationalism, militarism, secret alliances and imperialistic
aims, naturally inclined Europe toward war.

For the ex­

istence of this situation all the European countries must
share the responsibility.

The European system does not,

however, explain why war came in 1914, as the same general
European situation had been prevailing for many years prior
to that time, though certain problems had become more
acute in the years immediately preceding the World War,
particularly in the Near East and Morocco.
“ The Franco-Russian Alliance concluded by 1894 was trans­
formed into an offensive organization following 1912 through
the co-operation of Isvolski and Poincare.

Both recognized

that the chief objectives of Russian and French foreign
policy, the seizure of the Straits and the return of AlsaceLorraine, could be realized only through a general European

From 1912-14 their joint plans, which were success­

fully executed, involved: (1) a manipulation of the Balkan
situation in such a fashion as to be able to take advantage
of any crisis likely to provoke a European war; (2) an ar­
rangement to get England so involved that she would be
bound to come in on the side of France and Russia; and (3)
a great increase in the military preparations of France and

France loaned Russia large sums of money for

armaments and strategic railroads, while Russian money
was sent in great quantities to Paris to bribe the French
newspapers to support the policies of Isvolski and Poincare.
“ It was decided that Serbia would be the most favorable



area in which to create the desired crisis in the Balkans.
Hence, Serbian nationalism was strongly encouraged and
directed particularly against the position of Austria in the

In February 1914, the Czar received the premier

of Serbia, offered encouragement to the Serbian plans, and
promised arms and ammunition to Serbia for the impending
European war.

In February 1914, the Russians in a secret

crown council, decided upon the steps to be taken as soon as
the European war broke out.

In the early spring of 1914

Dragutin Dimitrievitch, a prominent officer in the Serbian
general staff exploited and brought to fruition a plot for the
assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand.
The Serbian civil government and Royal Family were aware
of the plot for nearly a month before its execution, but made
no adequate effort to stop the plot or to warn Austria.
Prominent Russians were also aware of the plot, but the
degree of the complicity of Russia is as yet uncertain.


least we know that the Russian minister and military attache
in Belgrade both knew of the plot and approved its execu­

The military attache gave 8000 francs (presumably

secured from Russia) to the plotters for the expenses of the
“ When the assassination came, the French and Russians
recognized that the impending clash between Austria and
Serbia would constitute a highly appropriate episode over
which to bring about the desired European conflict.


year 1914 was a particularly desirable year for the Entente
because there was imminent danger that England might de-




velop more happy relations with Germany, and that the
French Radicals might be able to secure the repeal of the
French army law of 1913.

Russia was threatened by an

economic revolution which a war was sure to avert.


ther, France had four classes with the colors in the spring
of 1914.

Poincare went to St. Petersburg late in July,

1914, and, before knowing the terms of the Austrian ultima­
tum, renewed his pledge of November 17, 1912 to support
Russia in a war over the Balkans, and indicated that the
probable Austro-Serbian conflict would meet the conditions
demanded by the French in supporting Russia in interven­
tion in the Balkans.
“ The Franco-Russian procedure in 1914, already outlined
by these powers as early as the fall of 1912, was to advocate
a show of conciliation and concessions on the part of Serbia,
and to indicate apparent Franco-Russian willingness to settle
the dispute through diplomacy while secret Franco-Russian
military preparations were to be carried on which would ulti­
mately make a diplomatic adjustment impossible.


Russia urged Serbia not to declare war on Austria, and, to in­
sure a sufficiently conciliatory Serbian reply to Austria, the
Serbian response to the Austrian ultimatum was drafted in
outline by Philippe Berthelot in the French foreign office.
Russia did not desire to have Serbia precipitate matters pre­
maturely by an early declaration of war on Austria, because
this would have affected European opinion unfavorably, par­
ticularly English opinion and would also have brought about
military activities altogether too rapidly for Russia, whose



mobilization over a vast area would necessarily be slow as
compared with that of Austria and Germany.

The Serbian

reply to Austria was cleverly phrased so as to appear to con­
cede much, while actually conceding nothing of vital impor­

It was skillfully designed to invite further Austrian

aggression against Serbia, but also to discredit such aggres­
sion before European opinion.

Indeed, it was so adroitly

executed that it deceived even the Kaiser, who believed it an
adequate reply to the Austrian demands.
“ On July 24, the moment Russia and France learned of
the terms of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, they began
that dual programme of a diplomatic barrage combined with
secret military preparations which had made a European
war inevitable by the afternoon of July 30.

Baron Schilling

tells us in his authoritative diary that the moment Sazonov
read the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia on July 24 he ex­
claimed: ‘This means the European w ar!’


likewise frankly confesses that the Russian army circles re­
garded the European war as inevitable from the 24th onward,
and worked steadily to prepare for it with the greatest pos­
sible expedition.

Russia sent a diplomatic message to Serbia

on the 24th counselling moderation, but at the same time de­
cided upon the mobilization of the four great military dis­
tricts of central and southern Russia as well as of the two
Russian fleets.

Russian money in Germany and Austria

was also called in.

On the same day Viviam telegraphed to

the French foreign office that the Austro-Serbian situation
was likely to create serious European complications, and




the French troops in Morocco were ordered home.

On the

25th the Russian Crown Council and military authorities de­
cided on war.

Both countries began systematic military

preparations for the war on July 26.
“ By July 28, the time had come when Russian military
preparations had gone far enough to warrant a general
mobilization and the Tsar was persuaded to consent to this
order during July 29.

A telegram from the Kaiser, how­

ever, induced him to revoke the order, but on the 30th Sazonov and the army officials once more extorted from the Tsar
his reluctant consent to the order for general mobilization.
A s soon as Sazonov had overcome the Tsar’s resistance he
ran downstairs, telephoned to Januskhevich, the chief of staff,
told him to hand the mobilization order to Dobrorolski, and
ordered him then to smash his telephone and keep out of
sight for the rest of the day, so that he could not be found
if anything should induce the Tsar to change his mind again
about the mobilization policy.

Baron Schilling tells us that

great enthusiasm prevailed among the Russians over this
fatal decision on general mobilization.
“ The French and the Russians had understood for a gener­
ation that once Russian general mobilization was ordered
there would be no way to prevent a general European war.
General Dobrorolski has told us with great candor that both
the Russian military and civil authorities in 1914 fully real­
ized that a European war was on as soon as the mobilization
order had been sent out of the general telegraph office in St.
Petersburg late in the afternoon of July 30.

To use Do-


brorolski’s own words: ‘This


(the general mobilization

order) once decided there is no way backwards.
settles automatically the beginning of war.

This step

The order was

known in all the larger towns of our huge country.
change was possible.


The prologue of the great historic

drama had begun.’
“ The French authorities had been thoroughly informed as
to the nature and progress of the Russian military prepara­
tions, but they made no effort to restrain them, though the
French knew well that these military activities were bound
to render a European war inevitable.

A fter a secret meet­

ing late on July 29, Poincare and his ministers actually urged
the Russians to speed up their military preparations, but to
be more cautious about them, so as not to alienate England
or to provoke Germany to counter-mobilization.

On the

uight of July 31 the French Government went still further
and openly decided for war, handing this information to
Isvolski with great enthusiasm and high spirits about mid­
night of the 31st.

France was, thus, the first country to de­

clare itself for war in the European crisis of 1914*

'‘The Austrian statesmen in 1914 decided that the time had
come when it was absolutely necessary to curb the Serbian
menace, and they consciously planned an ultimatum to Serbia
of such severity that it would be practically impossible for
Serbia to concede all of the Austrian demands. The plan
then, was to make a show of diplomacy but to move toward
a certain punitive war; This program was much like that of
b ranee and Russia, save for the vital difference that Austria


l8 0


decided to provoke nothing but a local punitive war while
the plans of France and Russia envisaged a general Euro­
pean conflict.

This is the most important point to be borne

in mind when estimating the relative war guilt of Austria
as against that of France and Russia.

Russia had no moral

basis for the assumed role of the protector of the Serbs in

It had been Russia who suggested the annexation of

Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908.

Even more significant,

in the autumn of 1911 Russia proposed to Turkey that she
would protect Turkey against the Slavic peoples of the Bal­
kans if Turkey would open the Straits to Russia.


British Ambassador in Paris in 1914 designated ‘‘as mere
rubbish” the Russian pretensions as protectress of all the
Slavic peoples.
“ The Hungarian premier, Count Tisza, was thoroughly op­
posed to war and did all he could to force the Austrian min­
isters to adopt a policy towards Serbia which would be the
least likely to provoke a general European war.

Tisza was

the most pacific statesman of 1914 in the Austro-HungarianDual-Monarchy.

Hungary cannot be said to have any im­

mediate responsibility for the outbreak of the war in 1914.
“ Germany, formerly friendly to Serbia, was alarmed by the
assassination of the Archduke and the resulting menace to
her chief ally.

Germany therefore at first agreed on July

6th to stand behind Austria in the plan of the latter to exe*
cute her programme of punishing Serbia, and urged Austria
to move rapidly in the situation.

The answer of the Ser­

bians to the Austrian ultimatum, however, impressed the


l8 l

Kaiser as satisfactory, and from that time on he was strongly
opposed to military activity on the part of Austria against

He cancelled his blank check to Austria long before

the Russian mobilization.

In co-operation with Sir Edward

Grey, Germany began on July 27, to urge upon Austria the
opening of direct negotiations with Russia and the mediation
of her dispute with Serbia. Austria at first refused to listen
to this advice and declared war upon Serbia on the 28th.
Germany became still further alarmed at the rumored Rus­
sian military preparations, and vigorously pressed Austria
for a diplomatic settlement of the dispute. Germany rejected
only one of the five diplomatic methods proposed for the
settlement of the crisis of IQM* and f ° r this s^e °ffered as a
substitute a plan which Grey himself admitted was a better
scheme than the one rejected.
“ Austria did not give way and consent to direct negotia­
tions with Russia concerning Serbia until July 31, which was.
too late to avert a general European war, because the Rus­
sian mobilization was then in full swing.

Germany en­

deavored without success to secure the suspension of military
activities by Russia, and then, after unexpected hesitation
and deliberation, declared war upon Russia.
“ The Russian general mobilization, undertaken with the
full connivance of the French, was ordered at a time when
diplomatic negotiations were moving rapidly towards a satis­
factory settlement of the major problems in the crisis, and
when England and Germany were in full agreement as to
the trend of negotiations. Hence the Russian general mobili-


1 82


zation was an unjustifiable act of aggression which not only
initiated military hostilities, but was also the chief reason
for the failure of the diplomatic efforts.

Before the Rus­

sian mobilization was ordered the Austrian ambassador in
St. Petersburg repeatedly assured Sazonov that Austria
would respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Serbia, and Sazonov agreed that he was convinced on this
point, though he concealed these Austrian assurances from
his colleagues. Any diplomatic advantage which Russia
desired to gain from mobilization could have been gained by a
partial mobilization which would not have necessitated Ger­
man military intervention.

Sazonov, however, sharply re­

fused to sanction this plan.
“ England was for peace provided France was not drawn
into the conflict, but Grey was absolutely determined to come
into the war in case France wras involved.

As France de­

cided from the beginning to stand with Russia for war, and
as Grey refused to attempt to restrain either France or Rus­
sia, England was inevitably drawn away from her encourage­
ment of the German efforts towards a diplomatic settlement
of the crisis and into acquiesence in the military agression
of France and Russia.

Grey made his decision to enter the

war before Belgium had been invaded, and after Germany
had proposed to keep out of Belgium and to refrain from at­
tacking France if England would remain neutral. In fact
Lichnowsky even suggested that Germany might guarantee
the integrity of France and the French colonies in the event
of war if England would promise neutrality.

The Belgian



issue in England was, then, a pure subterfuge, exploited by
Grey to inflame British opinion against Germany and to se­
cure British support of his war policy.

Grey was brought to

intervene in part by the pressure of his subordinates Nicholson and Crowe.
“ The United States entered the war in part because the
British blockade of the ports of the Central Powers led us
to have our chief financial and commercial stake in the En­
tente, and partly because of the pro-British sympathies of
Ambassador Page and President Wilson, which made it im­
possible for them to attempt to hold England strictly to in­
ternational law on the seas.

The English violations of inter­

national law in regard to neutral rights provoked the German
submarine warfare in retaliation.

This submarine warfare

furnished the ostensible excuse for the American entry into
the conflict, though Mr. Wilson had secretly conveyed to
England his intention to enter the war on the side of the
Entente nearly a year before the resumption of German sub­
marine warfare if Germany would not agree to terms of
peace which only a conquered state could be expected to ac­

Colonel House was unquestionably a powerful factor

in finally swinging Wilson for war.
“ In estimating the order of guilt of the various countries
we may safely say that the only direct and immediate re­
sponsibility for the World W ar falls upon France, Serbia
and Russia, with the guilt about equally distributed.

Next in

order— far below France and Russia— would come Austria,
for she never desired a general European war in 1914*




Finally, we should place Germany, England and Italy as tied
for last place, all being opposed to war in the 1914 crisis.
Probably the German public was somewhat more favorable
to military activities than the English people, but, as we have
shown, the Kaiser made much more strenuous efforts to pre­
serve the peace of Europe in 1914 than did Sir Edward
“ The really important aspect of the above material is not,
of course, merely the satisfaction of our curiosity as to the
historical facts regarding war origins, but the important
bearing which these facts have on public opinion and inter­
national policy at the present time. As the prevailing Euro­
pean international policy is still based upon the assumption
of the unique German responsibility for the war, it is evi­
dent, that the facts in the situation demand the repudiation
of this programme and the adoption of a fair and construc­
tive policy.

The Dawes plan and the discussion which it

has prompted, in common with most of the analyses of the
reparations problem, rest upon altogether fallacious premises
which invalidate alike the content of the proposal and the
machinery of enforcement.

The whole logical and juristic

foundation of the notion of reparations for Germany and
other defeated powers, in so far as it differs from the age-old
policy of punitive levies on conquered peoples, is the as­
sumption of the complete and unique responsibility of Ger­
many for the origin of the World War and the misery, suffer­
ing and economic losses it entailed.

This assumption is

fully embodied in the Lansing report and in the provisions



of the Treaty of Versailles relating to reparations.


Poincare was once incautious enough to admit that proof of
divided responsibility for the outbreak of the great conflict
carried with it a disappearance of the case for German repa­

The Dawes plan, and any current American and

European agreements as to its enforcement, while immensely
better than the Poincare policy, are comparable to efforts
to reduce the fine of a man, known by all informed persons
to be innocent.
“ What we need to do is to adopt a broad, constructive and
farsighted policy.

The guilt for the World W ar having

been distributed, the expense of indemnifying the sufferers
should not be thrown entirely on the least guilty nations.
The United States might well use its undoubted financial
power to induce France and England (the latter would prob­
ably gladly welcome the proposal) to forego all notion of
any reparations from Germany and to adopt the programme
of a mutual sharing with Germany of the burdens of recon­
struction and rehabilitation.

The United States could with

great propriety indicate its good-will and intentions in the
circumstances by cancelling the debts of the European powers
on the above condition.

Once England and France gave

some such evidence of international honesty and decency, one
of the chief obstacles and objections would be removed to the
United States’s joining the League of Eations.

\\ e may

agree with Fabre-Luce that, though the wartime slogan that
America and the Entente entered the war solely for the pur­

l8 6


pose of ending all war was at the time pure hypocrisy, yet
we shall have lost both the war and the peace if we do not
take steps to make this constructive aspiration an achieved


The beginnings of any such move must be found

in an appreciation of the facts concerning the origins of the
World W ar.”
IV . H o n . J o h n S. E w a r t ’ s V ie w s

Why France Entered the War

In “ The Roots and Causes of the W ars” , 1914-1918, by
Honorable John S. Ewart, K. C., LL.D., etc., the learned
Canadian historian, whose monumental work of 1,200 pages
discloses a microscopic knowledge of the facts, appear a few
very condensed summaries, for example:
“Why did France enter the war?

We may, therefore, say of the

reason which actuated France:
“ 1. It was not because of her interest in Serbia, or because of any
judgment as to the merits of the Serbian quarrel with AustroHungary.
“2. It was not, simply, because of war-treaty with Russia.
“3. France entered the war because of ‘the wound’ ; because th e
h o u r of r e v a n c h e had arrived; because she felt confident of her
military prowess; and because she deemed that her freedom from
future menace could be secured only by the abasement of Germany.
“4. In other words, France entered the war because urged thereto
by her own interests.”
(Ewart 109)

“ i. From the commencement of the diplomatizings prior to the
war, Germany’s chief effort was to localize the war that was, to
confine it to a duel between Austro-Hungary and Serbia. Germany
did not want a wider— a European war.
“2. When Serbia made humble reply to the Austro-Hungarian de­
mands, the Kaiser declared that there was no longer any cause for
war.’ Thenceforward, until the mobilization of Russia against Ger­
many, the German Chancellor did wrhat he could to avoid all war.
“3. It was Germany’s forty-three years of peace which had made
possible her wonderful development.
not have been enhanced by war.

Her economic prosperity could

Defeated or victorious, she would

have suffered.

“4. For Germany there was no ‘unredeemed territory’— no French
Alsace-Lorraine; no Italian Trieste or Trentino; no Serbian Bosnia
and Herzegovina; no Bulgarian Macedonia; no Turkish Thrace; no
Roumanian Bessarabia, Transylvania, and Bukovina; no Russian Con­
stantinople. Unlike other continental powers, Germany sought no
territorial expansion in Europe, and the acquisition of territory else­
where was less a desideratum in 1914 than some years previously.
(Ewart 94)

3. “ Why Did the United Kingdom Enter War?”
“ F ro m

w h at has

b e en s a id , th e

f o l l o w i n g c o n c lu s io n s m a y s a f e l y

be deduced:
“ 1. The merits of the quarrel between Austria-Hungary and Serbia
were not a factor in the British determination to enter the war.
“2. There was no treaty obligation to defend Belgian neutrality.
And Belgian neutrality could have been secured by the United
Kingdom remaining neutral.
“3 - An ‘obligation of honor’ to assist France existed.
evaded and, in effect, repudiated.

But it was





“4. Protection of ‘small nationalities’ was not a factor in the deter­
mination to enter the war.
“5. Nor was the hope of territorial aggrandisement.
“6. British self-interest was the reason for the form of the Belgian
treaty in 1839; for Entente relations with France and Russia; for
support of these Powers in various crises; for military and naval
conventions with France; for naval arrangements with Russia; for
Sir Edward Grey’s letters to the French Ambassador of 22 Novem­
ber, 1912, and 2 August, 1914; and for entering upon the war.
“7 Embarrassed by previous denials of arrangements with France
on the one hand, and by the German offer of Belgian neutrality on
the other, Sir Edward Grey, in his speech of 3 August, 1914, asserted
that nothing had been done which circumscribed the perfect liberty
of the Government and the House to do as they pleased; left uncer­
tain what he thought about the Belgian treaty; and omitted refer­
ence to the German offer of Belgian neutrality in consideration of
British neutrality. The only reason for participation in the conflict
which Sir Edward Grey clearly indicated was conservation of British
(John S. Ewart, Roots and Causes of the Wars, page 198-)
V . T h e C onclusions of M r . L ow e s D ic k in s o n

In his excellent work on International Anarchy, 1904-1914,
the eminent English scholar, Mr. Lowes Dickinson, puts him­
self thoroughly on record as a member of the revisionist
group of students of war guilt.
“Little Serbia stood on the verge of satisfying her national am­
bitions at the cost of the peoples and civilizations of three continents.
“ For years the little State of Serbia had been undermining the
Austrian Empire. . . What was the Empire to do in self-defense?
One can conceive a world in which Austria would not have wished
to hold down a nationality against its will. But that would not be



the world of history, past or present. Never has an empire resigned
before the disruptive forces of nationality. Always it has fought.
And I do not believe that there was a State in existence that would
not, under similar circumstances, have determined, as Austria did,
to finish the menace, once for all, by war. . . With every year that
passed the Austrian position would get worse and the Serbian better.
So at least the Austrians thought, and not without reason. They
took their risk according to the usual canons in such matters. They
may be accused of miscalculation, but I do not see that they can be
accused of wrong by any one who accepts now, or who accepted
then, the principles which have always dictated the policy of States.
German diplomacy was cumbersome, stupid, and dishonest. Granted,
it w as! But German policy was such as any State would have
adopted in her position. The Powers of the Entente say that the
offense was Germany’s backing of Austria. Germans say that the
offense was Russia’s backing of Serbia. On that point, really,
the whole controversy turns. T o my mind the German position is
the more reasonable.
"Why was the war not localized, as Austria and Germany in­
tended and desired? There is only one answer to this: because
Russia did not choose to allow it. Why not? . . . The answer is
fhat she wanted Constantinople and the Straits; that she wanted ac­
cess to the Mediterranean; that she wanted extension of territory and
influence; that she had a ‘historic mission’ ; that she must make
herself secure; in short, the whole farrago of superstitions that
dominate all States under the conditions of the armed anarchy. . .
France entered for the sake of the balance of power and to recover
Alsace-Lorraine; and her technical success in waiting till the dec­
laration of war came from Germany does not alter the position. It
had been known for at least two years past, it was reaffirmed more
than once during the crisis that, if Germany came in against Russia,
France would come in against Germany. . . At any rate, since 1912
France would have entered when Russia did. And does any one who
has perused the previous chapters, and who realizes the state of
Europe, believe that Russia would not have started the war a year or




two later? . . . And England? . . . She had military and naval com­
mitments to France which were like a suction-pipe to draw her,
whether she would or no, into the war. And that approximation to
the other two powers of the Entente was made for no other reason
than the maintenance of the balance of power. We had become more
afraid of Germany than of our traditional enemies, France and Rus­
sia. After all of our commitments to France it would have been
base to desert her. Agreed! But what were the objects for which
those commitments were made? Our own power, our own empire,
our own security.”

V I. T h e F ou r te en P ledges

and th e

T r e a t y of

V e r s a il l e s

In the newly discovered light of the disclosures that the
German leaders did not will the World W a r; that they were
opposed to the World W ar; that the World War was de­
sired by the Russian leaders and brought about by them,
it seems worth while to consider the conditions upon which
the German people surrendered and agreed to the Armistice
on November 11, 1918.
The German people surrendered on the promises made to
them through the President of the United States, acting as a
spokesman of the Entente Allies.

These promises were

made in writing, and after nine days’ discussion at the Pal­
ace of the Trianon at Versailles, near Paris, they were ac­
cepted in writing by the representatives of Great Britain,
France, Italy, Belgium, Japan and the United States. These
pledges made to the German people upon which they agreed
to lay down their arms and upon which the Emperor of



Germany resigned and left Germany, are commonly known
as the Fourteen Points. The written agreement stipulates
on behalf of the Entente Allies:
“Their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany
on the terms of peace laid down in the President’s address to Con­
gress in January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in

his subsequent addresses.”
These pledges made to the German people through the
President of the United States, on behalf of the Allies, under
this written agreement promised:
No punitive damages; no annexations, no indemnities;
n° selfish economic combinations; no special or separate in­
terest of any single nation or any group of nations as a
basis of any part of the settlement.
The consent of all nations to be governed in their con­
duct toward each other by the same principles of honor and
° f respect for the common law of civilized society that gov­
erns the individual citizens of all modern states in their
relations with one another.
The destruction of any arbitrary power in rule that can
separately, secretly and of its own single choice disturb the
peace of the world.

The right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety; a
place of equality among the peoples of the earth.
The protection of territorial integrity and political inde­
The impartial adjustment of colonial claims; the elimina­




tion of economic powers; equality of trade.

The end of

secret diplomacy.
The pledges are as binding on the conscience of mankind
today as they were when they were written and signed on
the 4th of November, 1918; as they were on the n th day
of November, 1918, when the Germans surrendered in pur­
suance of these pledges.
The Treaty of Versailles violated these pledges, and put
the United States in the attitude of having betrayed the
German people through the President of the United States.
This miscarriage of justice was due to the violent passions
of war and to a profound misconception of its origin.


was the Russian leaders that willed and caused this war.
The Germans were believed the guilty parties and the treaty
was intended to punish them.
The Versailles Treaty made under such blinding prejudice
and signed by the officials of the German people under vio­
lent protest at the point of the bayonet, has no legal or moral
binding force.

The welfare of the world, the reconciliation

of the peoples of Europe require the elimination of Articles
227 and 231, inclusive, and that this treaty should be so modi­
fied as to make amends to the German people for the wrongs
done them by the Treaty of Versailles.
Article 227 recites:
“The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II,
of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offense
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties,”



and solemnly provides for his trial.

The Allied and A sso­

ciated Powers did not try William II for the excellent reason
that if they had done so, certain former very distinguished
leaders of the Entente Allies would have been shown to be
responsible for the war and thus themselves guilty—
“of a supreme offense against international morality and the sanc­
tity of treaties.”

For the most part the Entente leaders were sincere in the
belief that William II was responsible.

A few of them in

very high places knew that the charge was false.


leaders of the United States had no means of knowing it.
The shallow pretense offered to the world as the reason for
not trying William II was that the good \\ ilhelmina, Queen
of Holland, would not permit them to do so.

This excuse

is ludicrous, and should not deceive a person of any mental­
ity whatever.

The Entente had all the military power in the

world and could have compelled Holland to deliver William

The reason is obvious why it was not done.

The charge of Article 231 that the war was imposed on
the Allies and Associated Governments by the aggression
of Germany and her allies is also entirely untrue, as the
official records now exposed to view overwhelmingly demon­

The historians who have studied this record are in

agreement with regard to the vital facts.
Article 231 should be eliminated.
First— Because it is untrue.
Second— Because the acceptance of this article by Ger-




im p e r ia l c o n s p ir a c y

many was at the point of the bayonet, threatening the Ger­
man people with destruction.

Such a confession is morally

worthless, and without binding force.
Third— Besides being false and worthless, it remains a
subject of profound international irritation, building up
among the German people a dangerous spirit of ultimate
revenge, and making it impossible for them to believe in the
integrity of the Entente leadership.
The establishment of international understanding and in­
ternational good will requires only common honesty and
common sense.
V II. A F r e n c h A p p e a l


C o n s c ie n c e

Under this heading, first signed by one hundred dis­
tinguished French historians, authors, men of letters, in­
cluding five distinguished French Generals who had fought
in the war, and since by increasing numbers, appears the
following intelligent proposal from Paris, France, looking
to the moral disarmament of Europe:
“Only a misunderstanding keeps the world from peace, and per­
petuates between the former belligerents, and particularly between
France and Germany, that spirit of war which is born fatally from
a sense of injustice inseparable from the instinct of revenge.
“German opinion only submits with profound revolt to Articles 227
to 230, and to Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, of which this
is the tenor:
‘“ The Allied and Associated Governments declare and Germany
acknowledges that Germany and its allies are responsible for having



caused them all the loss and damage endured by the Allied and Asso­
ciated Governments and their nationals in consequence of the war
which was imposed on them by the aggression of Germany and of
its allies.’
“It is not against the material facts of reparation that the German
nation raises its protest. It recognizes the necessity of reparation.
It bowed to the rule of international law.
“ That which it does not accept is that there has been snatched
from it by force a confession against which, before as after its
signature, it has not ceased to protest, and where it saw proclaimed
to the world its one-sided culpability as to the origin and therefore
as to the responsibility of the war.
“France on the other side holds to the doctrine that the aggression
materialized by the invasion of Belgium. Such is the situation full
of danger which should at all costs be cleared up. First, the question
at bottom.
“It is impossible to prejudge that question here. That immense
process of judgment in which all humanity is interested can only be
argued, in the complex detail of its causes, when all the archives are
open and before a high supranational court. Let us nevertheless con­
sider a preliminary proposition. It is clear that the official documents
witness that Article 231 was only extorted from Germany by violence
and under the threat of recommencing war to the point of complete
ruin. Could we give the force of right to that proceeding so un­
worthy of civilization, after having declared that we were carrying
on a war of right against might? The day of summary judgments
without appeal is passed. It is as unfair to condemn a people to
dishonor without a hearing as it is an individual to death. W e French­
men, jealous of the honor of our country, and believing also firmly
that every violation of justice brings with it future catastrophe, are
unwilling to face the reproach of a violation of the very principles
which we ourselves have been proclaiming. Even if there cannot be
m the meantime the question of a material change in the Treaty,
which belongs alone to time and the society of nations, and we can
no longer act with regard to the regulation of reparations fixed by
the Convention of London, August, 1924, yet there rests at least


I 96


upon our good will a duty to see that the Treaty shall not impose
greater weight upon the unstable equilibrium in which we are living.
“There is no security in the future if men do not proceed first
toward moral disarmament, without which there never will be material
disarmament possible. Article 231 should be modified in a sense
acceptable to all, as well there should be abrogated Articles 227 to
230 (title: Sanctions), which, encouraging hate with its reprisals, are
not less injurious to the definite re-establishment of peace.
“We are at the cross-roads. It is necessary to choose. On the
one side all the evils of war perpetuated by the spirit of revenge; on
the other, sincere reconciliation and productive labor. We invite all
those who hold in their hearts love of justice and of truth, all those
who ardently desire that their children should have a future free from
war, to join their efforts with ours. The Nationalists of Germany
must not misunderstand us. Here is no proof of weakness only an
evidence of French sense of right; a step toward human solidarity.
The Germany of Goethe will comprehend it.
“ European civilization is risking in these tragic days its entire
future. It is lost if the butchery recommences.”

Victor Margueritte, in his foreword to the Appeal to Con­
science, declares that Germany from the beginning of the
negotiations to 1919 has never admitted the charge of hav­
ing caused the war, as Margueritte calls it “ The Brand
of the Red Hot Iron” . He says:
“The White Book, published by M. Mennevee, bears testimony m
the most impressive fashion. The documents, the proofs are there,
the act of accusation, a tissue of inexactitudes; the solemn protest
of Brockdorff-Rantzau; the sober concluding memoir of Germany
fortified with a mass of proof; the feeble response of the Allies;
♦ * * Finally, the ultimatum of Clemenceau giving five days for
acceptance under penalty of a rupture of the Armistice and recom­
mencement of the war.



“ One cannot read what follows without sadness and without shame,
the vehement supplication of the President of the Ministry of the
Empire; the brutal refusal of delay by Clemenceau; the Allied troops
ready to pass the Rhine, while the assembly of W eimar was de­
liberating; the final demand for delay while in place of the Minister
of Resistance, a Minister of Capitulation succeeded; the incriminating
summary cutting short everything up to the last cry thrown back by
the head of the German delegation. It was a moving scene and
worthy of the cry which burst forth from Haniel as an unheard of
injustice’ in which he submitted himself at the same time that he
flayed the act of violence against the honor of his people.
“ Since that time by the voice of its chancellors, of its parliament,
of its writers, Germany has not ceased to protest. It has seemed to
me, and to a certain number of free spirits who have thought as I
do, that we could no longer admit that France should close its eyes
and its ears. Involuntary ignorance is an excuse, but wilful ignorance
is more than a fault. It is a stupidity and an inexplicable dishonor.

V III. B r i t i s h A



C o n s c ie n c e

In December, 1925, the following petition was signed by
many prominent Englishmen, and presented to the British

Among the signatures were many professors

° f history, etc., such as Professor Raymond Beazley, of
Birmingham University; G. Lowes Dickinson, author of


ternational Anarchy”, Kings College, Cambridge; Professor
J* J. Findley, Manchester University; Professor H. Fleure,
o f University of W ales; Professor A. J. Grant, of Leeds
University; Professor J. H. Muirhead, of Birmingham Uni­
versity; Professor Gilbert Murray, of O xford University;
Professor A . F. Pollard, University of London; Professor

I 98


Percy M. Roxby, of Liverpool University; Professor Fred­
erick Sonny, of the University of O xford ; the Right Rev­
erend the Bishop of Birmingham; the Right Reverend the
Bishop of Manchester; G. Bernard Shaw; H. G. W ells;
Lady Gladstone; the notable historian G. P. Gooch; John
Maynard Keynes; Lascelles Abercrombie; Professor Alex­
ander, of Manchester, and others.
M anifesto

“ Deeply moved by the manifesto signed by over one hundred
French men and women of distinction, and published in L’Ere Nouvelle, on July 9, 1925, we undersigned British citizens declare our­
selves in cordial agreement with its plea that the Treaty of Versailles
should be amended in two points:
“ (1) Article 231 attributes the origin of the war simply to ‘the
aggression of Germany and her Allies.’ Without at this time ex­
pressing any opinion or withdrawing any opinion which we have
previously expressed as to the policies of the late Imperial German
Government, we regard it as an improper and dangerous precedent,
that the victors in a war should thus pronounce judgment on the
vanquished. Such judgment, if it is to have any legal or moral
authority, should be pronounced by an impartial court after careful
study of all the evidence.
“ (2) Articles 227 to 230 dealing with offences against ‘international
morality and the sanctity of treaties’ or ‘violation of the laws and
customs of war,’ provide that any Germans guilty of such crimes
shall be tried and punished by courts set up by their enemies, but
make no provision either for the creation of an impartial court or
for the trial and punishment of criminals who are not German. The
injustice of this cannot be disputed.
“We regard these articles, which were forcibly imposed upon a
defeated nation under the most terrible threats, as having expressed



a state of mind in the Allied and Associated Powers, which has now
largely passed away. W e believe that they are manifestly unjust
and constitute a grave obstacle to international understanding. Con­
sequently we urge the governments concerned either to amend these
Articles with no further delay or, if amendment of the treaty prove
too long and cumbrous a proceeding, to announce severally their
intention to disregard them.”

IX . T


M a n ia of W ar

A t 7 P. M. on Saturday, August i, I9 r4>

German A m ­

bassador, Portales, notified Sazonoff, the Minister of For­
eign A ffairs of Russia, that the Emperor of Germany, after
his strenuous and unavailing efforts for peace, accepted the
challenge of Russia, and considered himself at war with
Russia, because the Russian acts threatened Germany so
dangerously that the safety of Germany no longer permitted
him to disregard these acts, which he regarded as a deter­
mined will to war.
Instantly this communication was telegraphed and tele­
phoned all over Europe as a declaration of war by Ger­

The predetermined war was officially recognized as


The war was officially a fact.

The people, the

men and women and youth of Europe, as well as the officials,
civil, military and naval, became mad with the passion of
The Russian people damned the German people with every
execration for wilfully declaring war on them, and during
August, when hundreds of thousands of men were killed



in battle in East-Prussia and in Belgium and in France,
the people of Belgium and the people of France cursed the
Germans and gave them derisive names as Huns and Boches,
and made the German name increasingly detestable by ter­
rible stories of unspeakable brutality and of hideous atrocity.
The German people, in like manner, cursed from the bottom
of their souls the Russians who struck Eastern Germany
with 800,000 invading troops before the Germans could col­
lect themselves for defense, and the English, whom they
consigned to divine wrath.

This mania of war which justi­

fied mass slaughter broke down the ’moral standards even in
the highest places. Nothing was too bad to say of the enemy.
It became a merit to charge them with every conceivable
crime, and as the homes of France and Germany received the
news of the deaths and terrible wounds of their best beloved
sons, this bitterness and hate increased to the extremest depth
of human passion.
O f course there were barbarities and atrocities. The Ger­
man, Russian, French and other armies all developed sol­
diers who committed atrocities.
War did not respect life nor property nor the pursuit
of happiness, nor the Ten Commandments.

The moral and

ethical standards of men became almost completely obscured.
John Morley has well said: “ That is the worst of w ar; it
ostracises, demoralizes, brutalizes reason.”

The highest

officials employed experts to carry on propaganda to stimu­
late their own people by exciting their animosities against the
enemies. Even in America our people became so infuriated


by this propaganda that in many cases the simplest elements
of common sense vanished.

Many a faithful citizen of Ger­

man origin was ostracised and ill-treated without evidence
against him during the W ar.

His German name sufficed for

proof, although he may have been born in America and had
lived a useful, upright life as a good American citizen and his
loyalty perfect.
The world went mad, and while the Fourteen Points, after
nine days' discussion at Versailles, were solemnly agreed
to and signed by the representatives of Great Britain, France,
Italy, Belgium, Japan, and the United States, on November
4, 1918, the controlling representatives of France, Italy,
Belgium and Great Britain, under the mama of war, framed
the Versailles Treaty in flat violation of many o f these vital
promises, and Article 231 even compelled the German Re­
public to confess complete responsibility for having imposed
the war on the Allies.

The German leaders vehemently,

strenuously, pathetically protested against this Article.


Allies, led by Clemenceau, compelled them to sign the Treaty
at the point of the bayonet when the German people were disarmed.
The mania o f war in June, 19x9, hacl not been a,iate,)'
The fury growing out of the terrific slaughter was domi­

The blood and dust of battle were still in the eyes

of the leaders.

They could not clearly see.

Doubtless the

majority of these leaders, who did not then know, and who
did not then have any opportunity of knowing the truth,



which we now know, sincerely believed the German govern­
ment had been exclusively responsible for the war.
Seven years have passed, and in that time all the Russian
records have been fully exposed to view, and have disclosed
to the world the selfish Imperial Russian conspiracy against
Germany and against Europe.
Isvolski and Sazonoff and Sukhomlinoff thought but little
of the consequences to the common soldiers of Russia, much
less the common soldiers of France and Germany. They had
their eager eyes fixed on the glory of the Imperial Rus­
sian dynasty.

They were going to control Constantinople

and the Dardanelles.

They were going to exercise overlord­

ship of the Balkan Slav States.

They were going to ap­

propriate the eastern portion of Austria and Germany, have
- ice free ports on the Baltic and access to the Adriatic.

Man proposes; God disposes.
This Imperial Conspiracy caused the killing and wounding
of 37,000,000 of men— Russians, French, Germans and
people from the ends of the earth.

It caused other millions

of men to die without record and vanish.

It caused mil­

lions of women and children to die unrecorded.
astated Europe.

It dev­

It broke down the moral standards of

mankind throughout the world.

The war was followed by

waves of epidemic diseases and crime, sweeping the world
from one end to the other.

Boys and girls were corrupted.

The ancient standards of the sacred rights of private prop­
erty vanished from Eastern Europe, and were seriously
weakened throughout all Europe. A ll the Russian Imperial-



ists, almost without exception, met with death, banishment,
poverty or distress.

They paid a terrible penalty for their

The Czar and all of his family were murdered and

with the destruction of the power of the Romanoffs came the
destruction also of the Imperial house of the Ilohenzollerns
and Hapsburgs.

But the people of the world, especially of

France and Germany, should remember that they were all
alike the victims of the ambition, vanity, foil}' of human
leadership, and that if the world had been controlled by edu­
cated Democracies, the opinion of the intelligence of man­
kind based on the moderate judgment of the majorities in
the various nations, would never have led to the slaughter
of the youth of the world.
“A ll of the people know more than some of the people.”
Lincoln wisely prayed that government of the people, by
the people, for the people should not perish from the earth.
The Imperial Russian conspiracy has greatly advanced gov­
ernment by the people, and the greatest need of the world
now is that government by the people should be strenuously
supplemented by education of the people.

The greatest of

all teachers said:
“ Y e shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you
X . C o n c l u s io n
From these records, of which only vital portions have
been presented, it is absolutely clear:




First— That the common people of Russia, France, and
Germany desired peace and did not wish war, but that a very
few men in France and the Imperialists of Russia planned in
1892 to arrange for ultimate war on Germany.
Second— That they prepared for it during twenty years,
during which by subsidizing the French Press with Russian
money, borrowed from the French, and expended under the
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, the French common
people were induced to buy
bonds, which were employed in building up a huge Russian
army, to manufacture supplies of heavy and light artillery
and munitions of war, to double-track their railways to the
German border, for the purpose of carrying out the military
conventions of making offensive war on Germany.
Third— That in order to make a certainty of success in
this gigantic conspiracy, Germany was encircled with a series
of treaties or understandings between Russia and Franee; be­
tween Russia and Roumania; Russia and Bulgaria; Russia
and Serbia, and gentlemen’s agreements between Russia and
Italy; Russia and Great Britain; France and Great Britain;
France and Belgium, so that Germany was completely sur­
rounded on land and sea.
Fourth— That as part of this strategy to throw the moral
influence of the world against Germany, Germany was made
to appear as guilty of having started the war.

This was

done by mobilizing the troops of Russia through a general
mobilization order (the military equivalent of a declaration
of war by Russia, but not so understood by the public),



which called to the Russian colors 14,000,000 men, and con­
centrated such masses of Russian troops against the German
border that the military leaders of Germany as a military
necessity, had no option whatever, except to recognize what
was a fact, “ a state of war existing.”

This was only done

on August 1, 1914, at 7 P- M , after the Russian mohil.zation had been in progress for approximately eight days.
Fifth _That immediately Germany took this official step,
desired by the conspirators, Germany was blockaded by land
and sea, and the most gigantic propaganda the wor d


ever known was begun by the Entente Allies to prove to
the world that the German leaders were solely respons. be or
the w ar; that the German purpose was to conquer Europe
and to become the military dictator of the w orld; that t e
Germans were waging war with fiendish cruelty.
The conspiracy of the Russian and French leaders suc­
ceeded completely.

All the world believed Germany guilty,

and when the Treaty of Versailles was written in June, 1919,
the German Government was compelled by mihtary force
to confess that Germany had imposed the war on the Allies.
Such a confession so extorted has in history no equal in the
magnitude of its injustice.

This confession of should

be removed, and the world brought back to understanding,
truth and good will.

America has keenly felt the terrible war losses which a f­
flicted all our communities through the death and wounding
.ncitil disof our young men, througn ^oci3.l business snd fin3
turbances, and through the taxation of war.



We have sympathized with the French people, whose
country was invaded, who suffered gigantic loss of the
best young men of France, and who suffered ruinous prop­
erty losses because of war and are still feeling its evil con­
sequences. We have forgiven them a large part of the debt
due us.
We have sympathized with the British people who have
suffered in the same way and have been in like manner
generous to them.
America has made large contributions to relieve the a f­
fliction of Belgium, whose people were the innocent victims
o f this terrible struggle.
We have sympathized with the Russian people, who suf­
fered the greatest loss of any of the nations in human life
and in the breaking down of the moral and social standards
o f life.

We sent millions to relieve them of famine.

In view of the recorded proof that the German people
and even the German leaders did not will this war, but were
the victims of a conspiracy of the Russian Imperial power,
is it not reasonable that the Christian world should feel some
sense of sympathy for the women and children and even for
the men of Germany?
Nearly 8,000,000 German soldiers were killed or wounded.
The German people suffered severely from famine, which
destroyed life on a large scale.
complete national bankruptcy.

They had to go through
Not only were they taxed

to the limit of their capacity, but all their savings accounts
measured in marks were reduced to zero. The bank balances



of the middle class vanished for like reason. All the bonds
they held in German companies, or which had been issued
by the States and Municipalities of Germany, or given by
private persons, became completely worthless because of
the destruction of the mark. All of their insurance policies
became valueless. Thousands of middle class Germans com­
mitted suicide in despair.
The German people have been through every suffering
people could endure, and they were innocent of evil intent.
Even today, 1,500,000 of them are unemployed (March,
Does not the world owe them some

sy m p a th y ?

Was ever

a great civilised people more wronged in the esteem and re­
spect o f the world than the GermansT

Is the frightful

tragedy unjustly visited upon them nothing to us?

In America we have 20,000,000 people who are directly
descended from the German stock. These peaceful, industri­
ous, home-loving descendants of German ancestry deserve
well of America.

Their good name and their affections are

involved in the honor of the German name.
America, like the balance of the world, swept away by the
rage of war, largely imagined the Germans to be criminal;
that they had deliberately brought on this war for the pur­
pose of conquering the whole world.

Only the mama of

war could have made such a belief possible, and not until
five years after the war was it discovered through disclosures
of the secret records of Russia that we had been terribly




The establishment of the truth as to the origin of the
World W ar is vital to a reconciliation of the people of Europe,
to their moral disarmament, to their future peace and happi­
ness. It is vital to the future interest of America that Europe
and the world should be at peace and prosperous.
America was nevertheless gravely deceived by European
propaganda as to the origin and the purposes of the World
W ar and is now being subjected to a similar propaganda for
the cancellation of the war debts. Never was it more im­
portant to the people of the United States than to consider
very soberly at this time the advice of George Washington
in his farewell address.
The Father of our country wisely and nobly said:
“ Observe good faith and justice towards all nations; culti­
vate peace and harmony with all.” . . . “ Nothing is more
essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against
particular nations and passionate attachments for others
should be excluded; and that, in place of them, just and
amicable feelings towards all should be cultivated.” . . .
“Antipathy in one nation against another, disposes each
more readily to offer insult and injury, to lay hold of slight
causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable when
accidental or trifling occasions of dispute occur. Hence, fre­
quent collisions, obstinate, envenomed and bloody con­
tests.” . . .
“ So likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation for
another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favor­
ite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common



interest, in cases where no real common interest exists, and
infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the for­
mer into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter,
without adequate inducements or justification.

It leads also

to concession, to the favorite nation, of privilege denied to
others, which- is apt doubly to injure the nation making the
concessions, by unnecessarily parting with what oubht to
have been retained, and by exciting jealousy, ill-will, and a
disposition to retaliate in the parties from whom equal privi
leges are withheld; and it gives to ambitious, corrupted or
deluded citizens who devote themselves to the favorite
nation, facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their
own country, without odium, sometimes even with popu
larity; gilding with the appearances of a virtuous sense o
obligation, a commendable deference for public opinion
a laudable zeal for the public good, the base or foolish com­
pliances of ambition, corruption, or infatuation.

b ib l io g r a p h y

_ .,
, ,.
. .
„ r . c relating to the Russian conspiracy.
Evidence and historical works rela g
1. L





l l ia n c e




( L iv r e

n e


L es A ffa ir e s F ranco -B a l k a n iq u e s 3

3. L ’A





ran co


u sse

5. L

iv r e


le u



iv r e


ran ge



iv r e


l a n c




iv r e


l a n c

A llemand


L es

10 .




n g l a is


S c h u c k in g ,

u sse




Taune 10 2 2 ).
Jau n e, I 9» ; .


(19 14 )(19 14 )(

19 ^9 )

ll e m a n d s

4 v o ls .

ip l o m a t iq u e s

Austro-Hongrois. 3


( L iv r e


(19 14 ) •

llem a n d

o c u m en ts

ie c e s

(L iv r e

F ranco -I talien s


9 •
v o ls .





rassem bles
tr a d u c

■ »rp n n e v £e

K a u tsk v

M o n tg e la s

P fr ^ ' r d a n


S u p p le m e n t e
v o ls .
19 2 2 , tr a d u c tio n




vre R ouge
To r d a n



11. E nten te

D iplom acy


th e

W orld.

Knickerbocker Press, New York.

Benno von Siebert;

T h e S e c r e t D is p a tc h e s o f

th e R u s s ia n L o n d o n E m b a s s y .

U n L ivre N oir (Russian Archives), 2 volumes. Rene Marchand;
Librairie du Travail, Paris. T h e S e c r e t D is p a tc h e s o f th e
R u s s ia n E m b a s s y a t P a r is .

13. T he S ecret T reaties . F. Seymour Cocks.
14. O utbreak of th e W orld W ar. German documents collected by
Karl Kautsky and edited by Max Montgelas and Walther
Shucking. 688 pp. Karl Kautsky. New York, 1924.
15. I ntroduction a u x T ableaux d’H istoire C omparee .

et P. Renouvin.

16. T ableaux

d’H istoire

C omparee et M S moires.

C. Appuhn

Guillaume 11.

17. L es D ocum ents B elges.
18. L es D ocum ents P olitiques , D iplomatiques et F in a n cier s . R.


M obilisation R usse




h e


r ig in s


th e


en 1914.


General Dobrorolsky.
230 pp. Raymond Poincare. London,

21. L es R esponsabilit £s de la G uerre. George Demartial.
22. C onsiderations sur les Responsabilit£s de la Guerre. Gustav

23. PoiNCARfe A-T-IL V oulu la G uerre?

Gouttenoiro de Toury.

24. S ecret D ocuments of the A rchives of th e M inister
eign A ffairs of R ussia. Emile Laloy.
25. L a V ictoire (N ow translated, K nopf). T h e L im ita tio n s

to r y . 428 pp.
L es C riminels .


F or­

o f V ic ­

A . Fabre-Luce. Paris, 1924.
356 pp. Victor Margueritte. Paris, 1925.

27. L es P reuves. L e C r im e d e D r o i t C o m m u n . L e C r im e D i p lo ­
m a tiq u e . 340 pp. Mathias Morhardt. Paris, 1924.




R ussie

T sars P endant


Maurice Paleologue.

29. L es R esponsables

de la


G rande G uerre.

3 vols.

Paris, 1922.

G uerre. 520 pp. Alfred Pevet.



30. A l 'O rigine du M ensonge. Lazare.
31. L es O rigines I mmediate de la G uerre. P. Renouvin.
32. L es O rigines et les R esponsabilit £s de la G rande G uerre. P.
Renouvin et G. Pages.

33. H istoire P opulaire

de la

G uerre







e r it y


Gustav Dupin.



3 vols.




35. L a G uerre I nfernale . Gustav Dupin.
36. C onsiderations sur les R esponsabilites . Gustav Dupin.
37- J uillet 1914, etc. Gustav Dupin.
38. G eorge L ouis . Ernest Judet.
39. C omment on M obiliza les C onsciences . G. Demartial.
40. A gadir. J. Caillaux.
41- Ou va la F ra n ce ? J. Caillaux.
42. Ou va l ’E urope ? J. Caillaux.
43- T rois A ns de D iplomatie S ecrete. Colonel Converset.
44- Chacun son T our. Charles Humbert.
4 S<




a ix

M alpropre.


E bray.

46. D ocuments H istoriques des A llies C ontra L a R ussie — by 14
Russian Generals and Admirals.
47- M emoires. Comte Witte.
48. R ecollections of a F oreign M inister . Isvolski; Doubleday,.
Page & Co., New York.
[See Numbers n and 12 above.]


L es C a u se s de la G uerre.

Dr. M. Boghitchevitch.

50. A R evision

of th e

T reaty .

J. M. Keynes; Harcourt, Brace &

Co., New York.
51. T en Y ears of S ecret D iplomacy . E. D. Morel; National Labor
Press, Manchester.
52. P rewar D iplom acy , 1919. E. D. Morel.
53- D iplomatic G enesis of W ar . E. D. Morel.
54- T ruth and th e W ar . E. D. Morel.
55. T he S ecret H istory of a G reat B etrayal . E. D. Morel.
56. D iplomacy R evealed. E. D. Morel.
57. I nternational A narch y . G. L. Dickinson.
58. T he C auses of I nternational W ar . G. L. Dickinson; Har­
court, Brace & Howe, New York.
59. How D iplomats M a ke W ar . Francis Neilson; B. W . Huebsch,
New York.
60. M y M ission to R u ssia and O ther D iplomatic M emoirs.
2 vols. Sir George Buchanan. London, 1923.
61. A H istory of M odern E urope, 1878-1920. 728 pp. G. P. Gooch.
New York, 1923.




62. T

h e

F alsification

of th e

R u ssian O range




B aron


Romberg; B. W. Huebsch, New York.
63. S ur la Q uestion des R esponsabilites . Count Montgelas.
64. C omment s ’est D eclanchee l a G uerre M ondiale. Karl
65. T he C ase for the C entral P owers. 255 pp. Max Montgelas.
New York, 1925.
66. I svolski and the W orld W ar. Stieve.
67. R eflections of the W orld W ar. Bethmann-Hollweg; Thornton,
Butterworth, London.
68. L et F rance E x pl a in . Bausman; Allen & Unwin, London.
69. L ex T a u o n is . Hills; Fleet, McGinley Co., Baltimore.
70. T he M yth of a G uilty N ation . Nock; B. W. Huebsch, New
71. E conomic I mperialism . Leonard Wolk; Harcourt, Brace &
Howe, New York.
72. N ew L ight

on th e O rigins of th e W orld W ar , in A m e r ic a n
H is t o r ic a l R e v ie w , July, 1920; October, 1920; January, 1921.

Sidney B. Fay.


73. S erbia’ s R esponsibility
T im e s

C urrent

for the W orld W ar, in h e w Y o r k
H i s t o r y M a g a z in e , October, 1925. Sidney B.


74. T he B lack H and P lot T hat L ed

to the W orld W ar , in N e w
Y o r k T im e s C u r r e n t H i s t o r y M a g a z in e , November, 1925. Sid­

ney B. Fay.
75. G enesis of the W orld W ar. Prof. H. E. Barnes; A . A . Knopf,
N. Y.
7 6 . T he V erdict of H istory ; E. F. Henderson.
T he C ase of S ir
E dward G r a y ; Monadnock, N. H., 1924.
77. J ohn S. E wart . T he R oots


C auses

of the

New York, 1925.
78. L ’E urope S a n s P a ix , etc., etc. Francesco Nitti.

W ars . 2 vols.