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September 1965 FEDERAL RE ANK OF ST. LOUIS # , Page Interest Rates, B udget Policy, and Monetary Policy ......................... 1 Fiscal Policy, Monetary Policy, and Internation al Disequilibrium . . . . 7 Economic Expansion in Central M ississippi Valley C ities .............. 12 Agriculture in the Central Mississippi Valley . . . . 16 Volume 47 • FEDERAL RESERVE B A N K OF ST. LOUIS P.O. Box 442, St. Louis, Mo. 63166 DEVELOPMENTS in recent months have been more stimulative than earlier this year, while monetary actions con tinue to be moderately expansive. The Federal budget position has moved from a modest surplus to a deficit. The stock of money has risen at about the same rate since spring as from November 1964 to April 1965. Longer-term interest rates have tended up ward. F Number 9 , Interest Rates Budget Policy and Monetary Policy CO NTENTS is c a l Movements in the Policy Variables The Money Supply The rate of increase in money gyrated sharply from April to August but av Money Supply eraged 3 per cent per annum. Billions of Dollars Weekly Averages of Dally Figures Billions of Dollars 166 This r at e is 166 Annual rata o chang* four w •ndinp Stptomb•r 1,1965 hJcs about the same fro four W§l s • c g m 0 n ftn 164 0 <7965 * as since Novem 164 Aug. 7,1965 H2.-0% July 1 16 !.8 June 9,1965 ►5.7% ber 1964 but is 162 May 12,1965 M.0% f\/ ' W ' 162 — D c. 2, 1964 +2.9% e somewhat less \ ,, I 160 than the aver 160 Vi \J VV age since Sep 158 tember 1962. A 158 3 per cent rate 156 156 of monetary growth is about J-LLi M M L,1J_L M M L L U M J 1 1111 mi I1 L L -L-U-1 ,1111.LLU. OCT. NOV. DEC. JAN. FEB. MAR. APR. MAY JUNE JULY AUG. SEPT. the same as the 1964 1965 Seasonal adjustment com puted using 1959 through June 1965 data. rate of increase Latest data plotted: Week ending September 1,1965 preliminary since the beginning of the current economic expansion in February 1961 and since May 1960, the last peak in national business activity. It is higher than the average 2 per cent rate of increase since 1951. According to some analysts, variations in the money stock introduce— through a complicated chain of cau sation— variations in total demand for the product of the economy. Bank Credit The earning assets of commercial banks have been increasing somewhat less rapidly in recent months than earlier. During the four months ending with August, bank credit increased at a 7 per cent rate, substantially less than the 12 per cent rate in the pre vious eight months. The decline in the rate of increase of bank credit reflects a slight moderation in the pace of loan expansion and a continued reduction in the banking system’s holdings of U. S. Government debt (Table I). Fluctuations in the rate of increase in total bank credit do not necessarily reflect a shift in the stimulative influence of the commercial banking sys tem on total spending. Instead, they may result from shifts in the volume of flow's of funds through the banking system compared with other avenues. The Fiscal Situation The budget of the Federal Government moved to a more stimulative position in the third quarter. Current estimates indicate that the consolidated cash budget will shift from a $2 billion dollar surplus in the second quarter to a deficit in the third quarter. It is antici pated that the national income accounts budget will also move from surplus to deficit. The full employ ment budget, which indicates how the national inU.S. Governm ent Fiscal Operations Billions of Dollars 20 (+)5urplus; (-)Deficit Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates 20 1 1 F ll E p y e t B d t u mlo mn u ge 15 10 \ 5 \ 0 A J 15 / /-—A +7.3 1 ^ Ntion l Ino n a a c ne A c u ts B d co n ui e ^ 7 j +2.9\ /yL 2 + .o I V , V4 10 5 0 A fiscal surplus or deficit may affect economic activ ity by two inconsistent primary routes. (1) A deficit may indicate that more funds are being placed in the spending stream than are being withdrawn by taxes. Thus a deficit may reflect a situation wherein total demands for the economy’s product are being stimu lated. (2) A deficit or surplus affects the flows in financial markets and, hence, influences interest rates. To the extent that the Treasury runs a deficit and does not draw down its cash balances, it must borrow; this tends to place upward pressure on interest rates, tend ing to inhibit investment and total demand. Running a surplus puts the Treasury in a position to repay debt and thereby place downward pressure on interest rates, with resulting encouragement of investment and final demand. Maturity of the Federal Debt The maturity distribution of the Federal debt has changed little in recent months. What changes have occurred have been in the direction of lengthening the debt. Thus, debt management policy has recently been essentially neutral in its effect on economic activ ity, but with a slight tendency toward restriction. How the maturity composition of the debt may have an influence on total demand for goods and services is not agreed upon by all observers. According to some analysts, an increase in the amount of longer matu rities reduces the “liquidity” of the public, thereby limiting final demand. An alternative view focuses on the relation of the structure of the debt to the struc ture of interest rates. Lengthening the Federal debt may tend to place upward pressure on long-term rates and thereby tend to restrict investment and total eco nomic activity. Interest Rates -15 Most interest rates have risen moderately in recent months. Since late February yields on short-term Gov ernment debt have declined; yields on intermediate and long-term issues have moved up. Latest da a plotted: 2nd Quarti r1965; Las half 1965 estim ated. -20 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 Sources: U.S. Treasury Departm Council of Econom Advisers, Board of Governors ent, ic of the Federal Reserve System and Departm of Com erce , ent m iSee the testimony of Gardner Ackley, Chairman of the Coun cil of Economic Advisers, before the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, July 20, 1965. -5 \\ -10 \ \ / V t\ -15 -20 Billions of Dollars come accounts budget would move in the absence of shifts in economic activity, is expected to change from a $7 billion surplus to a smaller surplus.1 The movement from surplus toward deficit has resulted from increased expenditures (largely associated with expanded Social Security benefits and expanded mil itary buying) and a lessening in the rise of revenues (largely associated with the cut in excise taxes). / -5 -10 C sh B d e a ugt Page 2 TABLE I EARNING ASSETS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS1 TOTAL BANK CREDIT C o m p o u n d e d A n n u a l Ra te s o f C h a n g e In itia l M o n th M illio n s T e rm in al 4 -6 4 M o n th 5 -6 4 5 -6 4 6 -6 4 7 -6 4 8 -6 4 9 -6 4 10 -6 4 11 -64 12 -64 1-65 2 -6 5 3 -6 5 4 -6 5 5 -6 5 6 -6 5 7 -6 5 8 -6 5 11.2 6 .7 6.4 9.2 8.5 8.6 9.5 9.5 9 .7 10.1 10.3 10.1 10.2 9.8 9.4 5.1 8.1 6.2 6.1 8.4 7.9 8.1 8.9 9.0 9.3 9 .7 9.9 9 .7 9.8 9.5 9.2 6 -6 4 7 -6 4 2.4 4.1 3 -6 4 5.8 11.8 9 .7 9.6 10.6 10.4 8.6 7.9 8.1 9.2 9.3 9.5 10.0 10.2 10.0 10.1 9 .7 9.3 18.2 11.8 10.9 11.8 11.4 11.4 10.6 11.0 11.8 11.8 11.4 11.4 10.8 10.2 11.1 10.8 10.8 10.4 9.9 of 10 -6 4 9 -6 4 5 .7 7.4 9.1 11.9 11.1 11.2 9.8 9.8 10.1 10.7 10.9 10.6 10.6 10.1 9 .5 11.8 11.8 11.3 11.3 10.6 9.9 1 1-64 12 -64 14.8 12.2 12.0 12.5 12.4 11.6 11.6 10.8 10.0 1 -65 9.6 10.6 11.7 11.8 11.0 11.0 10.2 9.4 2 -6 5 11.5 12.7 3 -6 5 13.9 12.9 11.3 11.3 10.0 9 .0 12.5 11.4 11.3 10.3 9 .3 5 -6 5 4 -6 5 12.0 10.1 10.4 8.1 9.6 8.1 7.1 9.1 8.0 11.1 8.1 6 .7 6 -6 5 5.3 4 .6 7 -6 5 3 9 D o lla rs 2 5 2,65 0 25 4,90 0 2 5 5,40 0 25 6,60 0 26 0,20 0 26 1 ,4 0 0 26 3,30 0 26 6,35 0 26 8,40 0 27 0,85 0 27 3,80 0 27 6 ,4 0 0 27 8 ,2 0 0 28 0 ,6 5 0 2 8 1,85 0 2 8 2 ,7 5 0 e EARNING ASSETS OTHER THAN U. S. GOVERNMENT SECURITIES C o m p o u n d e d A n n u a l Ra te s o f C h a n g e In it ia l M o n th M illio n s T e rm in al 4 -6 4 M o n th 5 -6 4 5 -6 4 6 -6 4 7 -6 4 8 -6 4 9 -6 4 10 -6 4 1 1 -6 4 12 -6 4 1-65 2 -6 5 3 -6 5 4 -6 5 5 -6 5 6 -6 5 7 -6 5 8 -6 5 17.9 13.5 11.3 12.0 11.2 11.1 11.7 12.5 13.2 13.8 14.3 14.2 14.6 14.5 14.2 13.0 15.4 13.3 11.7 12.2 11.5 11.4 11.8 12.5 13.2 13.7 14.2 14.1 14.5 14.4 14.1 6 -6 4 7 -6 4 9.3 8.1 10.1 9 .6 9.8 10.6 11.7 12.6 13.3 13.9 13.9 14.3 14.3 14.0 8 -6 4 9 -6 4 10-64 1 2 -6 4 11 -6 4 1 -65 2 -6 5 3 -6 5 4 -6 5 5 -6 5 6-6 5 7 -6 5 of D o lla rs 1 9 2,10 0 1 9 4,75 0 19 6,20 0 19 7,30 0 7.0 10.5 9 .7 10.0 10.9 12.1 13.1 13.8 14.4 14.4 14.2 11.1 11.0 11.9 13.2 14.2 14.9 15.4 15.2 15.6 15.4 14.8 14.7 14.3 15.0 8.1 9.4 11.2 12.9 14.1 15.0 15.6 15.3 15.7 15.5 15.0 10.7 12.7 14.6 15.7 16.4 16.8 16.4 16.7 16.4 15.7 14.9 16.6 17.4 17.9 18.1 17.4 18.4 19.1 19.1 19.2 17.8 18.0 17.3 16.2 18.7 18.9 19.0 17.9 18.1 17.5 16.5 17.6 17.1 16.3 19.2 19.2 17.4 17.8 16.9 15.8 19.2 16.5 17.3 16.4 15.1 13.8 16.4 15.5 14.1 19.0 16.3 14.2 13.7 11.9 10.0 1 9 9,50 0 20 0 ,8 0 0 2 0 2 ,5 0 0 20 4 ,8 5 0 20 7 ,7 5 0 21 0 ,8 0 0 2 1 3 ,9 0 0 21 7 ,0 5 0 2 1 9 ,4 0 0 2 2 2 ,6 0 0 2 2 5 ,0 0 0 2 2 6 ,8 0 0 e U. S. GOVERNMENT SECURITIES C o m p o u n d e d A n n u a l R a te s o f C h a n g e In it ia l M o n th M illio n s T e rm in a l M o n th 4 -6 4 5 -6 4 6 -6 4 7 -6 4 8 -6 4 9 -6 4 10 -6 4 11 -6 4 1 2 -6 4 1 -6 5 2 -6 5 3 -6 5 4 -6 5 5 -6 5 6 -6 5 7 -6 5 8 -6 5 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 16.2 12.0 13.9 10.1 2.9 2.7 1.8 0.1 1.7 2 .7 2.7 3.4 4 .0 4.8 6 .0 — 6.8 5 -6 4 — 7.6 — 12.7 — 8.0 0.8 0.2 0.8 2.7 0.3 — 1.1 — 1.3 — 2.2 — — — — 2.9 3.8 5.3 6.1 6 -6 4 7 -6 4 8 -6 4 9 -6 4 1 0 -6 4 11 -6 4 12 -6 4 1 -65 2 -6 5 3 -6 5 4 -6 5 5 -6 5 6 -6 5 7 -6 5 — 17.4 — 8.2 3 .7 2.3 2.6 4.5 1.4 — — — — 0.3 0 .6 1.6 2.4 — — — 3.5 5.1 6 .0 — — — — 2 .0 16.2 9.8 8.3 9.6 5.0 2.5 1.8 0 .3 0.8 2.1 4 .0 5.1 — — — — 3 2 .3 13.9 10.5 11.6 5.6 2.6 1.7 0.1 1.1 2.5 4 .5 5.6 — 2.0 1.0 5.4 — 0.2 — 2.6 — 2.6 — 3.8 — 4 .7 — 5.8 — 7.6 — 8.5 4 .0 9.3 0.3 — 2.7 — 2.7 _ 4.1 _ — — — — 5.0 6.2 8.2 9.1 14.8 — 1.5 — 4.8 — 4.4 — 5.6 — 6.5 — 7.6 — 9.6 — 10.5 — — — — — — — — 15.4 13.3 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.9 12.6 13.2 — — — — — — — 11.3 7.2 8.3 8.9 10.0 12.1 12.9 — 2.9 — 6.8 — 8.1 — 9.7 — 12.3 — 13.2 — — — — — 10.5 10.5 11.8 14.5 15.1 — 10.6 — 12.4 — 15.8 — 16.2 — 14.3 — 18.3 — 18.0 — 22.2 — 19.8 — 17.4 of D o lla r s 6 0 ,5 5 0 6 0 ,1 5 0 5 9 ,2 0 0 5 9 ,3 0 0 6 0 ,7 0 0 6 0 ,6 0 0 6 0 ,8 0 0 6 1 ,5 0 0 6 0 ,6 5 0 6 0 ,0 5 0 5 9 ,9 0 0 5 9 ,3 5 0 5 8 ,8 0 0 5 8 ,0 5 0 5 6 ,8 5 0 5 5 ,9 5 0 e 1D ollar am ounts are averages of seasonally adjusted data for end of preceding and current m onth. C pounded annual rates of change w com om ere puted from these averages. e-Estimated. Page 3 Yields on U.S. G overnm ent Securities Data are (or weeks ending on Friday. Latest data plotted: Week ending September 3,1965 preliminary Yields on most maturities of private debt have risen moderately in recent months. Medium-grade corpo rate bond yields (Baa) rose from 4.78 per cent in February to 4.88 per cent in early September; yields on highest grade corporate securities rose from 4.41 per cent to 4.49 per cent during the period. Secondary market rates on large-denomination certificates of de posit rose from 4.20 per cent in February to 4.28 per cent in August. Interest rate increases are desirable when they are part of a monetary-fiscal policy mix which promotes optimum total demand and international payments balances. Interest rates may affect final demand, production, employment, and prices through several channels. To the extent that interest rates represent a cost to the borrower, higher rates may inhibit borrowing. Fur thermore, because current interest rates determine the capital value of rights to anticipated future income streams, a rise in interest rates decreases the value of any anticipated future income stream, thereby re ducing wealth. Appropriate interest rates may depend upon the combination (or mix) of policies used to achieve op timum total demand for goods and services. To the extent that there is increased reliance on fiscal policy to expand demand, there is a corresponding rise in the appropriate structure of interest rates. In this sense and context, an interest rate increase does not necessarily indicate that the combined effects of sta bilization policies are restrictive; that is, rising inter est rates in themselves do not necessarily indicate a “tightening” in policy. Impact of the Policy Variables We have indicated above that monetary and fiscal developments have recently been more stimulative. Page 4 But, while this interpretation is indicated by a simple examination of current data, the timing of the effect of such policy measures is not certain. Consider first the stock of money. Movements in the stock of money may affect the economy with a lag— perhaps a variable one. It is not at all clear whether very recent changes in money are most relevant for economic developments of the near future— whether or changes which occurred some time ago are more im portant. Similarly, with respect to the Federal bud get the major impact of Federal spending decisions on the private economy may be when contracts are let, not when payments are made. Private firms make decisions which affect economic activity at the time Government contracts are let. According to this view, the payments simply represent an “unwinding” of commitments. Accordingly, some of the economic ef fects of the current Federal budget position may al ready have occurred. The Policy Setting Monetary and fiscal policies are bearing upon a do mestic economy which is continuing a strong expan sion. Production, employment, spending, and prices have increased rapidly in recent months. The domes tic expansion is occurring within an international environment in which, recently, there has been a sur plus in the U. S. international accounts. Over a long previous period, however, the nation had large chronic payments deficits. Domestic Business Activity Industrial production in July reached 144 per cent of its 1957-59 average, up sharply from June. Output had risen at about an 8 per cent annual rate since spring, approximately the same rate as from a year earlier. Much of the rise since spring has been in metals industries, where increases have been influ enced by possibilities of a steel work-stoppage. In August automobile assemblies, which were at an annual rate of 9.5 million units from April to July, re mained near this level— having declined seasonally for model changeover. Steel ingot production was cur tailed in August; this adjustment was made in antici pation of reduced production of finished steel in Sep tember. Employment has continued to show strong gains. From last spring to August, total employment rose at about a 3 per cent annual rate. Payroll employment has risen at a 4 per cent rate, with especially strong increases in durable goods manufacturing but also with gains in trade and service industries. Unemploy ment reached 4.5 per cent of the labor force in July and August, continuing the downtrend of the past two years. The unemployment rate for married men aver aged 2.4 per cent in the three months ending with August, compared with 2.5 per cent in the previous three months and 2.7 per cent in the corresponding year-earlier period. ic shifts in supply conditions— have declined since spring. In comparable periods of recent years such prices have moved up or been about unchanged. Final demand is probably being further expanded currently by the stepped-up military effort. However, in order to present a balanced picture, it should be noted that the economy may face substantial adjust ments after the resolution of steel wage negotiations. The dimensions of the adjustments depend upon nu merous factors. There has been the basic question of whether there will be a strike. There is also a question of whether the inventories of steel consumers are sub stantially in excess of current needs. To the extent that steel users have excessive inventories which must be worked down, steel production will be adversely affected. Prices of wholesale industrial commodities have crept upward in recent months, continuing the rise which began in mid-1964. In August these prices reached 102.6 per cent of their 1957-59 average, some what higher than the level attained near the last peak in business activity in early 1960. Consumer prices other than for services— whose short-run movements are heavily influenced by a strong, long-run, upward tendency— and other than for food— whose short-run movements are heavily influenced by seasonal or errat T a b le II WHOLESALE PRICES— INDUSTRIALS1 C o m p o u n d e d A n n u a l R a te s o f C h a n g e In it ia l M o n th T e rm in a l M on th 4 -6 4 5 -6 4 6 -6 4 7 -6 4 8 -6 4 9 -6 4 1 0 -6 4 1 1 -6 4 1 2 -6 4 1 -6 5 2 -6 5 3 -6 5 4 -6 5 5 -6 5 6 -6 5 7 -6 5 3 -6 4 4 -6 4 0 .0 0 .0 ^ —0 . 8 0 .0 0 .0 0.0 0 .7 0 .7 0 .9 1.0 0 .9 0 .9 0 .9 1.0 1.1 1.0 0 .0 — 1.2 0 .0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 5 -6 4 6 -6 4 7 -6 4 9 -6 4 8 -6 4 1 0 -6 4 1 1 -6 4 1 2 -6 4 1 -65 2 -6 5 3 -6 5 4 -6 5 5 -6 5 6 -6 5 1 9 5 7 -1 9 5 9 = 100 101.1 101.1 100.9 — 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.2 2 .4 1.2 0.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.5 101.1 0 .0 0 .0 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.4 0 .0 2.4 2 .0 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.4 4 .9 3 .0 2.8 2.4 1.2 1.8 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.7 2.4 1.8 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.2 0 .6 0.8 0 .9 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.3 0 .0 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.8 1.4 1.2 1.8 2.0 1.5 2.4 2.4 1.6 2.4 1.2 0 .0 101.1 101.1 1 01.5 101.6 101.8 101.9 101.9 102.0 102.1 1 02.3 1 02.5 10 2.5 p 1 N seasonally adjusted. ot p-Prelim inary. Source: U S. D . epartm of Labor. ent T a b le I I I CONSUMER PRICES— COMMODITIES LESS FOOD1 C o m p o u n d e d A n n u a l R a te s o f C h a n g e In it ia l M o n th T e rm in a l M o n th 4 -6 4 5 -6 4 6 -6 4 7 -6 4 8 -6 4 9 -6 4 1 0 -6 4 1 1 -6 4 1 2 -6 4 1 -6 5 2 -6 5 3 -6 5 4 -6 5 5 -6 5 6 -6 5 7 -6 5 1 9 5 7 -5 9 3 -6 4 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 — 0.2 0 .0 0 .5 0 .7 0.8 0 .7 0 .4 0 .5 0 .6 0 .7 0 .6 0.3 4 -6 4 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 — 0 .3 0 .0 0 .6 0 .8 0 .9 0.8 0 .5 0.5 0 .7 0.8 0 .7 0.3 5 -6 4 6 -6 4 7 -6 4 8 -6 4 9 -6 4 1 0 -6 4 1 1 -6 4 1 -6 5 2 -6 5 3 -6 5 4 -6 5 5 -6 5 6 -6 5 = 100 104.3 104.3 0 .0 0 .0 — 0 .4 0 .0 0 .7 1.0 1.0 0.9 0 .5 0.6 0 .7 0.9 0 .7 0.3 0 .0 — 0 .6 0.0 0 .9 1.2 1.2 1.0 0 .6 0 .6 0.8 0 .9 0.8 0 .4 — 1.1 0 .0 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.2 0 .7 0 .7 0 .9 1.0 0.8 0 .4 1.1 2.3 2.3 2.0 1.6 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.0 0 .5 104.3 104.3 104.2 104.3 1 04.6 104.8 104.9 104.9 10 4.7 104.8 1 05.0 105.2 3 .5 2.9 2.3 1.7 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.0 0.5 2.3 1.7 1.2 0.3 0 .5 0.8 1.0 0 .7 0.1 1.2 0 .6 — 0 .4 0 .0 0.5 0.8 0 .5 0 .0 — 1.1 — 0 .4 0.3 0 .7 0 .4 — 0.1 — 0 .3 1 Includes hom purchase costs w w classified under services prior to 1964. e hich ere N seasonally adjusted. ot Source: U. S. Department of Labor. 1 2 -6 4 — 2.3 — 0 .6 0.4 0.9 0 .5 — 0 .4 1.1 1.7 1.9 1.2 0 .0 2.3 2.3 1.2 — 0 .3 2.3 0.6 —1.1 —1.2 —2.8 105.1 —4.5 104.7 In te rn a tio n a l D e v e lo p m e n ts The U. S. balance of payments for the second quar ter showed a surplus, the first since 1957. Net receipts from foreigners were at a $528 million annual rate, compared with a first quarter deficit of $3 billion. Major factors contributing to the second quarter gain were a $1.4 billion improvement on merchandise ac count and a marked reduction in private capital out flows. Bank-reported capital movements resulted in a net inflow of $1.5 billion at an annual rate, in con trast with a first quarter outflow of $1.8 billion. United States Balance of Trade and Net Payments Position terly improvements in the future. The dock strike early in the year tended to exaggerate the improve ment in the trade balance from the first to the second quarter. The trade balance for the first half of 1965 was $2.0 billion less than for the first half of 1964, primarily because of greatly expanded imports. In the present context of world trade, growing at a 6 per cent rate compared with last year’s 12 per cent, the prospects for export growth are less promising. On the other hand, prospects for poor European harvests give rise to the possibility of increased U. S. grain exports. Despite the U. S. net payments surplus, the gold stock declined in the second quarter by nearly $600 million to about $14 billion. Long-term interest rates have been rising in Europe, especially in Germany. The German bank rate was increased from 3.5 to 4.0 per cent on August 13. Such developments intensify the forces attracting capita funds from the United States to Europe and prolonj imbalances in international accounts. Summary LL E x c lu d in g m ilitary tra nsfe rs u n d e r g ran ts. [2 Deficit m easure d b y nef decline in U.S. m onetary re se rve assets plus net increases in foreign-held liq uid d o lla r assets, adjusted for sp ecial no n -liq u id govern m e nt transactions. Source: U.S. Deportment of Commerce Latest data plotted: 2nd quarter prelim inary The second quarter figures reflected, to a great ex tent, temporary influences. The impact of the Vol untary Credit Program on capital outflows, very large initially, will probably not produce continuing quar To the extent that Government fiscal policies ar< relatively more relaxed, a rise in the structure of inter est rates is consistent with that mix of total Govern ment policy which is appropriate to optimum tota demand. Such a rise in rates cannot meaningfully be interpreted as restrictive. Such a policy mix which relies more heavily on stimulative fiscal actions— and hence, implies higher optimum interest rates— may be more conducive to needed basic adjustment vis-a-vii foreign countries than a mix wherein low interest rates are associated with restrictive fiscal policy. J B t/L X MAILINGS of this bank’s REVIEW for classroom use will be made monthly during the school year to teachers requesting this service. Requests should be directed to: Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, P. O. Box 442, St. Louis, Missouri 63166. Page 6 Fiscal Policy, Monetary Policy, and International Disequilibrium In tr o d u c tio n T h e in t e r n a t io n a l f in a n c ia l s y s t e m has been unable to avoid persistent imbalances of international payments over the past several years. One aspect of this problem has been the “chronic defi cit” in the U. S. balance of payments with its obverse, a “chronic surplus” for certain European countries. During the last two years rising U. S. capital outflows to various developed countries1 have maintained and perhaps increased this international financial disequi librium. The traditional remedy for controlling capital ex ports is to reduce the interest rate differentials which provide the incentive for foreign lending. Monetary policies in either the capital importing or capital ex porting country can be employed to influence interest rate differentials between countries. Such policies may, however, have undesirable domestic consequen ces. The policy problem at hand in such cases is to find means which foster international adjustment with out undue cost in terms of internal goals. This article discusses stabilization policies from two standpoints. First, some of the relationships between national stabilization policies and desired economic goals— both internal and external— are outlined. Sec ond, recent experience in various major countries is examined to determine whether stabilization policies being pursued are most appropriate for the attainment of national objectives and the preservation of interna tional financial equilibrium. S t a b iliz a t io n P o lic ie s — C o n c e p ts a n d M ea su rem en ts Government policies in most industrialized, welldeveloped market economies are directed toward goals of economic growth, full employment, price stability, and appropriate balance in external transactions. It is generally recognized that two main responsibilities of government— regulation of the private financial sys tem and management of the public finances— can exert 1See this R ev iew of M arch 1965 for a discussion of capital ex ports by type and area. a powerful influence on the total demand for goods and services in an economy. Hence, policies regarding monetary and fiscal actions have come to play a major role in the attempts of governments to stabilize their economies and attain national economic goals. Whenever an economy is operating with less than appropriate total demand, either monetary or fiscal actions can be taken to raise the level of total spending and output. An increase in the money supply can be brought about which will tend to lower interest rates and encourage spending; or the government may stimulate total demand by increased spending or by reduced taxes. Monetary and fiscal actions can also be used to restrain total spending whenever it appears that planned expenditures would lead to excessive total demand with unwanted general price increases or an undesirable deficit in the balance of payments. Mon etary expansion can be reduced, contributing to higher interest rates and reduced private spending. Taxes can be increased or government expenditures reduced in order to moderate the level of over-all de mand. There is little unanimity among economic analysts and observers as to the appropriate method of assess ing monetary and fiscal policies. Some, in viewing monetary experience, choose to emphasize changing credit conditions or interest rates as the best measure of monetary actions. Others prefer to examine the liquidity of the banking system for signs of monetary ease or restraint. A third view finds that the close his torical relationship between the money stock and economic activity is significant evidence for judging monetary policy by the behavior of the money supply. Until further advances in economic analysis permit the resolution of these alternative views, it may be useful to weigh and consider each in evaluating mon etary experience. As with monetary policy, there are a variety of ways of measuring changes in fiscal policy. At first glance, the government net budget position (administrative, cash, or national income accounts basis) may seem to be a good measure of the impact of fiscal actions on aggregate spending. Tax receipts reduce private Page 7 purchasing power, and government expenditures raise total spending. Hence, a deficit in the govern ment accounts is a net stimulus, and a surplus is a net restraint on the economy. However, the actual deficit or surplus may not indi cate fiscal stimulus or restraint, respectively. A dimi nution of private expenditure may lower total in comes and hence Federal tax receipts. Similarly, cer tain government expenditures (e.g., unemployment compensation) may increase. The consequent “pas sive” deficit then reflects the effects of reduced private spending on government accounts and is not a good measure of affirmative fiscal policy. To arrive at a better measure of discretionary fiscal actions, the “full employment budget” is used.2 This device estimates what the net budget position might be, given tax and expenditure programs, at a desired or optimal level of business activity. When total spending is insuffi cient to attain this desired level of activity, the full employment budget figure isolates the contribution of Federal fiscal actions to realized aggregate demand and indicates what fiscal actions are appropriate. P o lic y M ix in a n E c o n o m y w i t h L i t t l e F o r e ig n T ra d e In terms of regulating total spending in the econ omy, it might seem to be a matter of indifference whether main emphasis is placed on monetary or fiscal policies. Each policy tool has its merits and draw backs, however, which under various circumstances tend to establish a preference between the two. Ad ministratively, monetary policy can be applied rather quickly and flexibly, compared with fiscal policy oper ating under present-day administrative procedures and political restraints. On the other hand, it has often been acclaimed a virtue of fiscal policy that, by direct ly increasing or decreasing total spending, its effects are realized much faster and more reliably than those of monetary actions, which affect spending less direct ly via interest rates and portfolio readjustments. Perhaps a more important consideration regarding the desirable mix of policies is that the composition of total demand is affected by the relative weight given each arm of policy. Total demand, employment, and price goals might be attained by any one of several policy combinations, but economic growth might not be the same, depending on the policy mix. If expan sionary government actions are appropriate and main reliance is placed on monetary policy, lower interest rates would be an inducement for greater private in vestment and contribute to a faster rate of economic 2See this Review of April 1965 for a discussion of the full em ployment budget and recent U. S. fiscal policy. Page 8 growth. If fiscal policy is utilized to provide the mai forces of economic expansion, the government could either reduce taxes or increase expenditures. In either case, increased borrowings resulting from the larger government deficit would tend to put upward pressure on interest rates, which could inhibit private invest ment and retard the pace of capital formation, produc tivity increases, and economic growth. P o l ic y M ix in a n E c o n o m y w it h S ig n if ic a n t F o r e i g n T r a d e When taking into account the maintenance of bal ance in international transactions, further problems arise of choosing a mix of policies appropriate to meet ing all desired policy goals. If the demand for a na tion’s exports is determined by the state of foreign markets and imports are related primarily to its na tional income, a given level of total demand will have the same implications for the balance on goods and service transactions3 regardless of the combination of monetary and fiscal policy. But if capital is free to move internationally and is responsive to interest rates at home and abroad, net capital flows will be affected by policy mix. If, in pursuing a policy stimulative to the domestic economy, monetary ease is effected, do mestic interest rates will be lower than if fiscal policy had been employed. The relative attractiveness of foreign versus domestic investment will encourage outward private capital flows. Conversely, when tak ing actions to restrain total demand, primary reliance on monetary policy will tend to raise interest rates and increase net capital inflows. P o l ic y M ix a n d t h e A d j u s t m e n t o f In te r n a tio n a l I m b a la n c e s It is possible that the economies of nations pursuing similar policy goals will fall short of achieving those goals in differing ways. Total demand may be exces sive or deficient; the balance of payments may be in deficit or surplus; and differing combinations of these problems may exist in the respective national econ omies. In countries facing excessive total demand along with deficit on foreign account, actions of re straint are called for. Deficient total demand accom panied by a foreign surplus calls for policies of ease. In neither of these simple cases is there a conflict of domestic and international goals which suggests a particular mix of monetary and fiscal policies. In other situations requiring domestic and foreign adjustment, the combination of monetary and fiscal policy used to influence total demand may not be a 3Neglecting, in the short run, income on foreign investment. Chart 1 matter of indifference. If a nation Balance of Payments faces excessive total demand and is ex periencing a balance-of-payments sur plus, monetary restraint, while mod erating inflationary developments, by raising interest rates would lead to capital inflows and a yet greater for eign surplus. In the case of a nation with deficient total demand and a balance-of-payments deficit, monetary ease may stimulate the domestic econ omy, but at the cost of promoting greater capital outflows and an in creased foreign deficit. Had fiscal pol icies been used to influence total de mand and monetary policies been directed toward influencing internat ional capital flows, both domestic and foreign policy goals might be attained in each instance. If a policy mix which is inappropriate for foreign goals is 1 9 58 1959 19 60 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 U. Includes remittances and pensions. followed to achieve domestic goals, [2 Includes errors and unrecorded transactions. L2 Before special Government transactions. the international payments situation Latest data plotted: Over-All Balance-2nd quarter 1965 preliminary. Others-lst quarter 1965. may deteriorate further and call for Source: U.S. Department of Commerce reversal of policy actions before de and price increases have remained negligible relative sired domestic results have been achieved. In the end, to past experience or to recent European inflation such vacillating actions may result in failure to attain either domestic or foreign aims. It may then be (Chart 5). deduced incorrectly that the policy goals are insoluble Over the past several years there has been a body by general policy instruments and recourse will be of opinion which has advocated higher U. S. interest had to unconventional measures of economic control. rates in order to reduce capital outflows and thus the over-all payments deficit of the United States. To R e c e n t E x p e r ie n c e iv it h S t a b i l i z a t i o n some extent, policy measures in accord with this view P o l ic ie s have been taken. Maximum rates payable by com mercial banks on time and savings deposits have been The U. S. balance-of-payments deficit averaged $3.4 raised three times— January 1962, July 1963, and in billion from 1958 to 1964, despite a rising net surplus November 1964— and the Federal Reserve discount on goods and services and relatively stable outflows rate was raised on each of the latter two dates. Ear on government account (Chart 1). By contrast, the lier, in 1960 and 1961, short-term interest rates were balance of payments of six selected European coun tries has shown a persistent surplus as a declining balance on goods and serv Chart 2 ices was more than offset by rising Balance of Payments capital inflows (Chart 2). on i r> ii r ,i- „ c B illio n s of D o lla r s Selected European Countries B :illio n s ot D o lla r s r Similarly, experience with the do mestic goals of stabilization policy has differed in Europe and the United States. In Europe total demand for goods and services probably has been excessive in recent years; unemploy ment has remained remarkably low (Table I), and prices have risen. In the United States a larger portion of the labor force has been unemployed, LLE.E.C. and Switzerland. Latest data plotted: Over-All Balance-first half 1965 at annual rate. Others-1964. Page 9 Table I UNEMPLOYMENT Annual averages 1958 Belgium1 ................ France2 ................ Germany1 ............. Italy1 ................... Netherlands1 ......... Switzerland2 .......... United States1 ........ 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 5.2 3.2 3.5 6.6 2.3 0.8 6.8 6.0 7.9 2.4 5.6 1.8 0.5 5.2 5.3 1.2 4.2 1.2 0.2 2.3 1.8 0.8 2.2 5 .6 3.3 1.8 0.7 3.1 0.8 0.1 5.6 2.7 5 .5 4.2 3.0 0.8 3.5 0.9 0.1 6.7 1964 0.7 2.7 2.5 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.1 5.7 5.2 flows averaged $0.2 billion over the next year. Over the six quarters from mid-1963 to the end of 1964, increases in bank credit to foreigners averaged $2.2 billion per annum, compared with an annual rate of $0.6 billion for the preceding two years. As a result, in February 1965 the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program was introduced to provide restraints on all major U. S. lenders to foreigners. In most major European nations, gov ernment policies since 1962 have given consideration to control of excessive de mand and price inflation.5 Monetary growth has been at a somewhat reduced rate in most countries (Table II), and interest rates have risen ( Charts 3 and 4). On the other hand, the effect of government fiscal operations on total demand was generally expansionary in 1962 and 1963 relative to 1961. In April 1964 the European Economic Commu nity Council of Ministers recommended a greater de gree of fiscal restraint as part of a general anti-infla tionary policy for the Community. It also recommend ed that the member countries “maintain or tighten present restrictive credit policies.”6 In the United States during 1962 and 1963 fiscal policy, as measured by the full employment budget surplus,7 was relatively IPer cent of labor force. 2N ber unem um ployed relative to job vacancies. Sources: O rganization for Econom C peration and D ic o-O evelopm U ent; nited N ations. Chart 3 „ „ Per C ent —\ ' \ Government Bond Yields Jtaly v--\ G an l erm y -N \ ^ s ---s / ----- > N S' y V fv fn n S C triOd / ~ iu 7y.B * \ ' elg m y \s I S itzerlan ■ w d "- s Per C e n t In StateS2L ited — r , i ,~ir . . ,~ir__L,i i~ir , i i~ = , , ,~ , , i~ 1= 1960 1961 1962 1963 LLPublic Authorities Bond Yield Latest data plotted: 2nd quarter preliminary, 1964 1965 5See the May 1964 issue of this R ev iew for a discussion of these policies. 6E u ro p ea n C om m u n ity, May 1964, p. 4. Source I.M.F. not permitted to decline to the low levels of previous periods of business recession. The Treasury bill rate, which had fallen below 1 per cent in both the 1954 and the 1958 recessions, stayed above 2.2 per cent during 1960 and 1961 (Chart 4). However, develop ments abroad, primarily in Canadian and British money markets, made foreign short-term investments attractive and led to outflows averaging $1.4 billion for these two years. 7To compare the U. S. full employment budget position with actual European budget figures seems appropriate. It is gen erally believed that the European unemployment rates reflect ed full utilization of economic resources during this period, whereas U. S. rates indicated that total demand was not such as to attain potential levels of output. See above, p. 8. Since mid-1962 capital outflows in the form of U. S. purchases of foreign securities, bank loans to foreign ers, and direct investments have assumed increasing importance. With U. S. long-term rates relatively stable and considerably below most foreign rates (Chart 3), net outflows from foreign security trans actions, which had averaged less than $1 billion per annum from 1959 to mid-1962, rose sharply and had doubled by the first half of 1963. The Administration then proposed an interest equalization tax, and these 4See Samuel I. Katz, “Yield Differentials in Treasury Bills, 1959-64,” Federal Reserve B ulletin, October 1964, for a dis cussion of short-term capital movements. Page 10 1960 1961 1962 19 63 19 64 19 65 [] Yields on three-month Treasury bills for United States, Netherlands, and Belgium; __ day-to-day money rates for France and Germany; and three-month deposit rates for Switzerland. Latest data plotted: 2nd quarter preliminary. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and O.E.C.D. Chart 5 Table II Consumer Price Indexes / Annual Averages of Monthly Data \?6 // 120 " ilv 116 112 J / y / . / y // // £ France i X iwitzerland ^Germany / a .Belgium / y 104 Government Net Budget Position as a Per Cent of GNP* Nelheildnds y J \/^<> / ^ / // 108 19 6 0 —100 / / y y- MONETARY AND FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS UNITED STATES AND SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 1961 Belgium ......... France ............ G e rm a n y......... Italy .............. Netherlands .. . . Switzerland . . . . United States ... — 1.4% — 1.4 0.1 — 0.4 — 0.2 0.8 2.0 1962 — 1.5% — 1.7 — 0.4 — 0.7 — 1.1 — 0.1 1.2 1964 — 1.5% — 0.4 — 0.1 — 1.0 — 1.2 0.7 0.6 / Monetary Growth Annual rates iled States 1958-62 100 19 60 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 Latest data plotted: Italy, France, and Netherlands-1965 is average of first five months data. Switzerland, Germany, Belgium, and United States-1965 is average of first six months data. Source: O.E.C.D. restrictive, and monetary policy was easy compared with previous expansion periods. The money supply expanded at a 4.1 per cent annual rate, compared with the 1951-62 rate of 1.9 per cent. Interest rate differentials between countries, while not providing a full explanation for all international capital movements, are a major determinant of much foreign investment. These differentials result from a number of factors. Gross savings and marginal pro ductivity of capital in each country are perhaps fun damental. Market organization, willingness or ability of lenders to acquire long-term assets, and the degree to which the savings-investment process is subject to government control are also important.8 But beyond these considerations, monetary and credit policies are of major significance in the economic and financial processes by which interest rates are generated. For this reason, the preceding examination of the mix of national stabilization policies may contribute to an understanding of comparative interest rates and inter national capital flows. Conclusion This article has related recent stabilization policies pursued in Europe and this country to policy goals. Domestic objectives seem to have been pursued in 8See U. S., Congress, Joint Econom ic Committee, E c o n o m i c P o l i c i e s a n d P r a c t i c e s ( P a p e r N o . 3 ) : A D e s c r i p t i o n a n d A n a ly s is o f C e r t a i n E u r o p e a n C a p i t a l M a r k e t s , 88th Cong., 2d. Sess., 1964, for an account of the extent to which government con trol of some capital markets may result in higher interest rates in the uncontrolled markets. 1963 — 2 .0% — 2.1 — 0.8 — 1.3 — 0.5 0.2 1.8 Be lgiu m ................ F ra n ce ................. G e rm a n y.............. Italy ................... Netherlands . . . . . . . Switzerland ......... United S t a t e s ........ 5 .4 % 18.1 11.4 19.5 7.4 11.9 1.1 19631964 9 .7 % 7 .1 % 14.78.0 7.48.7 13.94.6 9.28.1 7.26.6 4.14.1 *G N P in current prices; cash budget deficit (— ) or surplus for European countries; full employment budget for the United States. Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; International Monetary Fund. both cases by a set of policy “mixes” that might have been inappropriate had the reduction of external im balances been accorded greater consideration in policy formulation. A greater reliance on tight fiscal policy rather than monetary restraint in Europe during re cent years might have moderated the rise in interest rates and at the same time dampened inflationary pressures. Similarly, had stimulative fiscal measures been employed earlier in this country in recent years, it is possible that less expansionary monetary policies would have been in order. Under these circumstances, it seems likely that comparative interest rate develop ments would not have produced so great an incentive for the excessive capital movements which were a ma jor factor in the balance-of-payments disequilibria of the United States and Europe. In the present inter national payments system, the maintenance of given exchange rates, currency convertibility, and freedom of capital movements logically call for a greater degree of international cooperation with regard to national interest rate policies.9 9F o r further discussion of this point, see Bank for International Settlements, T h i r t y - f i f t h A n n u a l R e p o r t , June 1965, pp. 29 and 164-66; Hal B . Lary, statem ent presented at hearings before the Subcommittee on Econom ic Statistics of the Joint Econom ic Committee, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 2, June 8, 1965, p. 161; Harry G. Johnson, “M ajor Issues in Monetary and Fiscal Policies,” Federal Reserve B u lle t in , November 1964, pp. 1403-04. Page 11 S t , L o u is Payroll Em ploym ent 1957-59=100 1957-59=100 Economic Expansion in Central Mississippi Valley Cities Manufacturing Output 1 9 57 -59 =1 00 160 1961 1957-59=100 1957 -59 =1 00 1962 1963 Check Paym ents Business Loans 1957-59=100 160 1964 1965 1957-59=100 1957-59=100 E ICONOMIC ACTIVITY in the Central Mississippi Valley has advanced at about the same rate in 1965 as in the previous four years of the current business expansion. Growth in the four largest metropolitan areas— Louis, Louisville, Memphis, and Little Rock St. — has generally kept pace with the nation since De cember and since early 1961. St, Louis Economic growth in the St. Louis metropolitan area has been more rapid in 1965 than earlier in the cur rent expansion. Payroll employment has increased at a 2.4 per cent annual rate since December 1964, re flecting primarily a large gain early in the year, com pared with a 1.7 per cent average annual rate from the first quarter of 1961 to the fourth quarter of 1964.1 Manufacturing employment has remained near the high December level in the first seven months of 1965. Nonmanufacturing employment has risen moderately since December, reflecting growth in trade and serv ices. Output of manufacturing firms has increased more slowly since December than from early 1961 to late 1964. Manufacturing output has advanced at a 6 per cent annual rate since December, compared with a 9 per cent average rate in the longer run period. 1957 -59 =1 00 Total Deposits 1957 59=100 Spending in St. Louis has followed the national pattern of more rapid growth since December. The volume of spending as measured by check payments has increased at a 15 per cent annual rate in St. Louis *A11 data are seasonally adjusted. Sources of data used in this article are: payroll employment, state employment security offices; manufacturing output, U. S. Departm ent of Com merce, public utility companies, and firms using self-generated power; check payments, samples of commercial banks; busi ness loans and total deposits, weekly reporting commercial banks. T he statistics used in this article appear in “Selected Econom ic Indicators,” a monthly publication of the Research Departm ent, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, P. O. Box 442, St. Louis, Missouri 63166. Page 12 since December, compared with a 12 per cent rate in the earlier period. Nationally, check payments have also risen at a 15 per cent rate in 1965, compared with a 10 per cent rate from 1961 to late 1964. L o u is v ille 1957-59=100 Payroll Employment 1 9 57 -59 =1 00 1957-59=100 M«»«f»Ct»ri»| Output 1957-59=100 1957-59=100 Cl,ecl( Pa*meB,s 1957-59=100 Banking activity has advanced at a brisk pace in 1965. Total loans outstanding at St. Louis banks have increased substantially, and business loans have risen even more sharply since December. In contrast to the national pattern of decline in recent months, invest ments at St. Louis banks have expanded. Total deposits have increased at an 8 per cent an nual rate this year. Demand deposits declined from December to July, while time deposits increased sub stantially. Louisville Economic activity in the Louisville metropolitan area rose markedly early in 1965 and has remained on a high plateau since February. Payroll employment has risen at an average 2.7 per cent annual rate in the last seven months, compared with a 3.7 per cent rate from early 1961 to late 1964. All of the nonmanufac turing categories of employment have shared in the recent growth, but gains have been most significant in government. Manufacturing employment has risen slightly since December. Employment in durable goods industries, particularly transportation equip ment, has increased, while employment in nondurable industries has declined. Production in Louisville, as measured by industrial use of electric power, has risen more slowly in recent months than in the period from 1961 to late 1964. Manufacturing output has risen at a 6 per cent annual rate since December, about half the rate in the earlier period. The pace of spending, on the other hand, has accelerated in 1965. Check payments have risen at a 17 per cent annual rate since December, compared with a 10 per cent rate earlier in the expansion. Banking activity has generally followed the national pattern in recent months. Loans have risen signifi cantly in both the city and the nation, with a rise in business loans accounting for much of the increase. Bank investments in both Louisville and the United States as a whole have declined since December, fol lowing a moderate upward trend earlier in the current expansion. 1957-59=100 1957-59=100 im w 1957-59=100 ®eP8si*s 19 57-59=100 Bank deposits have fluctuated widely since Decem ber. Demand deposits have risen at a 5 per cent rate, and time deposits at a 20 per cent rate, compared with average rates of 2 per cent and 34 per cent re spectively in the earlier period. Page 13 M e m p h is M e m p h is Payroll Employment 1957-59=100 120 1957-59=100 120 s.jasonally Adjust> d 116 116 112 112 108 108 104 104 100 — "— 1961 1957-59=100 160 1962 1963 1965 MMBfatvriig Output 1 Seasonally A d ju s t* 140 120 100 1964 ________ :— 1961 1962 r - ^ J -— ' 1963 S <otonolly Adjust*d 140 1965 Check Payments 1957-59=100 190 1957-59=100 160 U ^_ 1964 I 100 120 100 1957-59=100 190 170 170 150 150 130 130 110 1961 1957-59=100 1962 1963 Business Loans 1964 1965 110 1957-59=100 Economic expansion in Memphis has been espe cially rapid during 1965. Payroll employment has in creased at a 4.1 per cent annual rate since December, compared with a 2.4 per cent rate from 1961 to late 1964. Employment in service industries and govern ment has risen most rapidly since December, with the anti-poverty program partly responsible for the increase. As in St. Louis and Louisville, employment in manufacturing industries has increased more slow ly than in nonmanufacturing industries in the first seven months of 1965. Total employment in Memphis has advanced at a 4.8 per cent annual rate since December, but the labor force has also risen rapidly. During the seven-month period unemployment has fallen from 3.6 to 3.3 per cent of the labor force. Manufacturing output as measured by the indus trial use of electric power has increased at an 8 per cent annual rate since December, with production of nondurable goods advancing most rapidly. Check pay ments have risen at a 9 per cent rate in' 1965, about the same rate as earlier in the expansion. Trends in banking activity have been mixed. Loans have increased at a 12 per cent rate since December. Business loans, after adjustment for seasonal in fluences, have risen sharply at Memphis banks, as in the other large Central Mississippi Valley cities. Bank investments have declined substantially. Total deposits in Memphis have decreased in recent months. Demand deposits in July remained at about the December level. In contrast to upward trends in the rest of the nation, time deposits have declined at a 13 per cent annual rate since December, after advanc ing at a 33 per cent rate from 1961 to late 1964. The Page 14 probable reason for the recent decline in time deposits is the higher rates paid on such deposits in other areas. A state law limits the rate of interest paid on time deposits in Tennessee to 4 per cent. Little Rock 1 9 5 7 -5 9 = 1 0 0 Payroll Em lo en p ym t 1957-59=100 Little Rock Economic activity in the Little Rock metropolitan area has continued to advance rapidly in 1965. E m ployment growth since December has exceeded the rate for the United States as a whole, although monthto-month fluctuations in Little Rock have been great. Payroll employment has increased at a 6 per cent rate since December, with manufacturing employment ex panding most rapidly. The metals industry has been responsible for much of the manufacturing employ ment growth in Little Rock this year. 1 9 5 7 -5 9 = 1 0 0 Nonmanufacturing employment has risen more rap idly since December than earlier. From M a y to June there was a sharp rise in government employment largely attributable to the Neighborhood Youth Corps and a larger number of students than usual working during the summer. 1 9 5 7 -5 9 = 1 0 0 M anufacturing O tp t uu Check Paym ts en 1 9 5 7 -5 9 = 1 0 0 1 9 5 7 -5 9 = 1 0 0 Manufacturing output in Little Rock has advanced significantly in 1965, more than offsetting declines in the second half of 1964. Check payments have in creased at a much slower rate in recent months than earlier. Loans have dominated the Little Rock banking pic ture recently. In periods of business expansion loans often rise faster than deposits as banks liquidate in vestments. This seems to be the case at Little Rock banks. Loans have risen at a 24 per cent rate since December, while deposits have increased at only an 8 per cent rate. Consequently, bank investments have declined substantially since late 1964. 1 9 5 7 -5 9 = 1 0 0 Business Lons 1 9 5 7 -5 9 = 1 0 0 T D otal eposits 1 9 5 7 -5 9 = 1 0 0 1 9 5 7 -5 9 = 1 0 0 Page 15 Agriculture in the Central Mississippi Valley F a r m IN C O M E P R O S P E C T S in the Central M ississippi Valley area have improved substantially in recent months. Cash receipts from farm marketings have risen significantly since April, compared with levels of a year earlier. Higher prices for livestock products have been a major factor. Crop prospects are favorable. Farm commodity sales in June of this year were 7.8 per cent above the June 1964 level in the five state area. A ll states in the area had sales above year-ear lier levels. Total second quarter sales were up 6.0 per cent, after having trailed 1964 sales by 6.2 per cent in the first quarter ( see Table). Higher prices for live stock products were a major factor in the increases. All major livestock products in the area except eggs were selling above year-earlier prices by mid-year. Hogs, however, were the leading gainer, rising to an average of $23.10 in July, 44 per cent above July 1964 prices. Crop income prospects are excellent for the Central Mississippi Valley. Record yields and production are estimated for most of the major crops in the area. Prices for 1965 crops are not likely to change much from the 1964 average. The level of Government price supports has generally determined the price of most area crops in recent years. Such supports for 1965 were not changed significantly from the 1964 rate. SELECTED CROP PRICES 1964 1964 Support Price H ogs ........................... ... + 4 4 % Steers and h e if e r s ............ + 1 7 All milk, w holesale........ ... + 2 Support Price $1.25 Soybeans ( b u . ) ....... 2.25 2.66 2.25 Rice (cwt.) 4.71 4.92 4.50 ............ $1.16 $1.25 Tobacco (lb.) ......... 0.589 0.602 0.595 Cotton ( lb . ) ............ 0.3350 0.295 0.3335 CASH RECEIPTS FROM FARM MARKETINGS Central M ississippi Valley Per Cent Change _______(1965 compared with 1964)______ June All beef c a t t le ................. + 1 7 by Farmers Corn (bu.) ............ PERCENTAGE C H A N G E IN PRICES OF MAJOR LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS (July 1 9 6 4 -J u ly 1965) 1965 Av, Price Received 2nd Quarter 1st Quarter Central M ississippi Valley States Total Arkansas Illinois ............... 7.8 6.0 — ........................ 5.5 1.8 ........................... 15.8 12.2 .......................... 15.7 8.8 — Indiana 6.2 20.6 3.0 5.1 Chickens, all, live ........ ... + 5 Kentucky ........................ 13.9 7.8 — 38.5 Egg*.......................— 1 M ississipp i ...................... 7.5 5.6 21.0 Missouri .......................... 6.4 7.4 1.6 .................... 10.2 6.5 — 11.5 11.1 9.1 — The lower farm receipts for the area in the first quar ter compared with 1964 resulted from greatly reduced sales of the prior years tobacco crop in Kentucky, Ten nessee and Indiana. Tennessee United S t a t e s ................... 0.5 lF iv e states: Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee.