Full text of The Relocation Program

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The Relocation Program

United States Department of the Interior

J. A.

KRUG,

Secretary

War Relocation Authority
D.

s.

MYER,

Director

FOi' eale by tbe Superintendent of Documenta

U.S. Government Printing Office. Wubington 25. D. C
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EVENTS LEADING TO ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WAR REL~TION AUTHORITY

en

December 7, 1941, approximately 113,000 persons of Japanese
ancestry, two-thirds of them American citizens, were living in freedom
in California, Washington and Oregon. A fn months later their freedaa
was largei,- restricted and within leas than a year all of them were
gone from these States.

'

1his report deals briefly with the movement of the people from
their h011le&) _under conditions ot Government control, to assembly and
relocation centers, and at greater length with their eventual mov-.ent
from these centers back into the normal stream.of American lite.
Immediately' after the attack on Pearl Harbor the Depart.ment
of Justice apprehended and took into custody all persons suspected
of loyalties inimical to the interests of the United States. In this
group there were m.any persons of Japanesel ancestry. Within 2 months
after the outbreak of nr considerable pressure developed to move
the entire Japanese population from the west coast. In February
things began to move rapidly in that direction.

en February 13, 1942, the west coast congressional·delegation
formally recc:mnended to the .i'resident that all persons of Japanese
descent be evacuated from the Pacific Coast States. The next day
the Attorney General designated a strip of the California coast
500 miles in length and fran 30 to 150 miles in width as Restricted
Area No. l with a 9:00 P• m. to 6:00 a. :1i. curfew for all enEllly
nationalities, and restricted all their movements to within 5 miles
or their banes, effective February 24.
Five daya later on February 19, 1942, the President signed
Executive Order No. 9066 empowering the Army to designate areas fr011l
which "An¥ or all persons may be excluded•" en March 2, General
Note:

Thia report Drepared

by

staff members of the Relocation Division

lThe term Japanese ia used in this report to mean all persons ot
Japanese ancestry including the American-born citizens or Nisei and
the foreign-born aliens or Issei.

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l

John L. DeWitt issued Public Proclamation No. l designating Military
Area No. 1 consisting or the westem half or Washington, Oregon.and
Califomia and the southem portion of Arizona. Later, Military Area
No. 2 was established as the remainder or these !our States. The
proclamation stated further, •Any Japaneae, German or Italian alien
or any person of Japanese ancestry now resident in llilitaey Area No. 1
who changes his place of habitual residence is hereby required to
obtain and execute a 'change of residence• notice at any United States
Poat Of'fice. Nothing contained herein, shall be construed to affect
the existing regulations of the United States Attomeya which require
aliens of en~ nationalities to obtain travel pend.ta f'rca the
United States Attomey General and to notify the l'ederal Bureau of
Investigation and the Cmmissioner of Iadgration of any change in
permanent address.•
To the press, General DeWitt said that enemy aliens would be
excluded from Military Area No. 1 in the near future. He also praaised
that American citizens or Japanese ancestry would be excluded and
that Japanese would be the first to go. He advised persona in these
categories to move out their families voluntarily and thua save themselves even greater troubles in the future, aphasizing to th• that
it was their patriotic duty to make this move voluntarily and with
a minimum of inconvenience to the Government. 'nle Westem Defense
C'.oQIDD'land was in effect telling aliens and one certain group of citizens
to take their children and leave the coastal region but was no~
suggesting where they might go or how they might get there. A8 a
result or these pleas, however, a good many thousands of Japanese
started moving from Military Area No. 1. ~·rom all of the neighboring
States began to come violent protests against receiving a population
that California, llashington, Oregon and the Amy had discredited.
Apparently nobody wanted these refugees. '!be Japanese people were
alarmed by rumors of plans to separate husbands and wives in.concentration camps and to separate children from their parents.

In Februaey, Representative John Tolan, chairman of the House
Camnittee on National Defense Migration which was at that time i.nTeatigating evacuation, wired a recommendation to Washington for the
appointment of an Alien Property Custodian for the Pacific coast
region and stressed the -need of making specific arrangements for
giving assistance to the evacuees• Before such arrangements could
be made about 8,000 Japanese had been obliged to leave prohibited
"spot" areas on veey brier notice or had hastily accepted General
DeWitt•s recamnendationa. Many of these people had been victimised
b7 land sharks and racketeering second-hand dealers and had no money
or "place to go. '!be testimony before the Tolan Collln1 ttee on February 23
in San Francisco reveals an utter contusion ot ideas and the lack
or any practical system for handling the problana of the dislocated
people.
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By March 2, when General DeWitt iasued Public Proclamation
No. 1, ·it wa• beccming apparent to the Westem Defense Camnand that
voluntary evacuation would not diapose or tb.e entire west coast
Japanese population in an orderly fashion or within a reasonable
time. Problems of property disposal., finance, employment and public
acceptance in other areas were constituting blocks to this voluntary 3
movement. 'l'he•minor evacuation movements or Japanese aliens in
February from prohibited •spots• designated by the Department of
Justice had resulted in many bewildered and impoverished tailiea
moving in with relatives or friends in already crowded quarters or
camping in their back yards in other sections of the same town or
city. Some had moved as far as the -interior valleys of the West
Coast States to the dismay of eC111e of the citizenry of these regions.
Very few had been able or willing to migrate east of the State lines.
It gradually •became clear that controlled evacuation would have to
~
be arranged for those people who could not plan or finance their
movamenta, and that proviaions would have to be made r or the maintenance of a part of the Japanese population for an indefinite period
until more normal resettlement could be effected.
Up to this time the Army's sole concem in the matter had been
with pbyaical evacuation., with clearing the designated military areas
of Japanese. It was not conaidered feasible or proper that the
Military should assume responsibility for the thouaands of families
involved or that it should administer an extensive resettlement
program. Such a task appeared more proper for a civilian agency.
Discussions were held between representatives of the Depart.ment of
Justice, the War Department and the Bureau ·of the Budget, and a
deoiai011 was made to create a special war agericy to assume responaibili ty for the evacuated population.
- -·
Q-1

March 18, 1942, the War Relocation Authority was officially s

created.
Never before in the history ot the United States had military
decision dictated the exclusion of a largely citizen minority fl-an
a section or the country. No previous Government agency had faced
the same problem.a as now faced the War Relocation Authority and no
prEtcedent or guideposts were available £or devising 1 ta policy and
program. In the past 125 years, this Government had not even in
wartime seriously interfered with the freedom of ·enemy aliens except c.
in so tar as they were individually suspected. l'he fact that in
this instance two-thirds of the people to be evacuated 11'8re American
citizens by 'pirth enormously canplicated the problem. It was agreed
that the Executive order creating this war agency should be broad
and general. There wa,i nt. °'.ther time nor precedent for in1 tial
preparation of a program' in detail. How and where the resettlement
was to take place were questioos that time and experience alone
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could answer. At this stage it was believed that other nationalities
besides the Japanese might be evacuated.2
On March?, 1942, Milton s. Eisenhower, Land Use Coordinator
of the Department of .Agriculture, nnt to San Francisco to look into
the Japanese situation. He retumed on March 15 and 3 days later
the President .signed Executive Order No. 9102 establishing the War
Relocation Authority in the Office for Jhergency Management. •At the
same time Mr. Eisenhower was offieially appointed. by the President
to head the agency.
1

The Director of the War Relocation .Authority was "authorized
directed to formulate and effectuate a program for the removal,
fran the areas designated tran time to time by the Secretary of War
or appropriate ~ilitary Commander under the authority of Executive
Order No. 9066 of February 19, 1942, of all the persons or classes
of persons designated under such Executive order, and for their
relocation, maintenance and supervision."
and

FIRST PLANS CJ! THE V,AR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

The first actions of the Director were to establish a regional
office in San Francisco, to recruit staff', to confer with west coast
representatives of other Federal agencies and to devise a tentative
program. Offices were establ,ished in the Whitcanb Hotel in San
Francisco where the Wartime Civil Control Adminietration was already
located.3
The first plans formulated. by the Director provided that the
War Relocation Authority would have three principal twictions:
2No general evacuation of persona of ancestry other than Japanese was
ordered. Individuals of various nationalities were excluded from particular sections of" the country by individual exclusion orders. The
War Relocation Authority assumed certain responsibilities for resettlement of these individuals but they were so few in number and needed
so little assistance that no further mention or them appears in this
report.
3The Wartime Civil Control Administration had been established on
March 11 by the Western Defense Command as a civilian agency of the
War Department to provide for the evacuation of all persona of
Japanese ancestry from Kilitary Area No. 1 ~ the California
porti'on of Military Area No. 2.

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(1) it would provide financial aid tor Japanese required to.move out
of the military area but unable to do so because of lack of funda;
(2) it would establish a great many small work camps similar to
CiV1lian Conservation Corps camps and scattered through the States
west of the Mississippi River with the employable population living
in camp and working chiefly on farms in the surrounding neighborhood;
(3) it would establish a group of waystationa, possibly aa many as
50 holding fran 1,000 to 1,500 peaple to serve as dispersion points
from which evacuees could relocate to jobs in urban centers or on
fa:rma. The War Relocation Authority began i.mmediately to make a
canvass of existing housing which could be utilized by ~vacueea,
inveatigating particularly the CCC camps many of which had already
bee vacated by the Civilian Conservation Corps.
As soon as the San Francisco office was opened, calla began
to ccae in great numbers from sheriffs and other public officiala ot
inland c0111111Wl1.ties protesting the number ot Japanese passing through
or settling in their jurisdiction. Calls also came from Japaneae
informing the War Relocation Authority that they wre stranded 1n
neighboring States because no one would sell them gasoline or necessaey
services. There were also frequent calls from the press in areas
through which voluntary evacuees were moving. At Klamath Falls,
Oregon, several Japanese were arrested to avoid violence. At
Yarrington, Nevada, eight were met by hostile citizens and had to
retum to C&lifornia. At Swink, Colorado, local residents demamied
the recall of evacuees.
By late March it had become apparent that the resentment of
the interior States toward continued voluntary evacuation was based
upon a ccmplete misunderstanding of the status of the evacuees as
well as upon war bred fears and prejudices. Sherifts from these
States frequently reported that "Califomia Japanese were escaping"
from the military areas. Officials and residents of the interior ,
regions were not aware that the military authorities were urging
the evacuees to leave the West Coast States and establish themselves
in inland areas. There was alao widespread opinion that Call£ornia,
Washington and Oregon were "dumping undesirable■•"

It was obvious that voluntary evacuation could not continue
without widespread disorders and possible risk of physical violence
being directed against the Japanese. The War Relocation Authority's
first general act was to recaumend to General DeWitt that. he prohibit
further uncontrolled evacuation. The result was Public Proclamation
No. 4, issued March Z7, 1942, requiring all Japanese to remain within
Killtary Area No. 1 wi. thout change of residence after midnight of
March 29. In the 2~ay period before the proclamation was issued
and before the "freeze" became effective~ several thousand persona
left Military Area No. 1. Proclamation No. 3, issued March 24 had
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established a curfew affecting all persona of Japanese ancestry 1n
llilitary Area No. l effective between 8:00 P• •• and 6i00 a. m. during
which .hours Japaneee were obliged to be either in their place of
business or in their homes, and could not pass between those place11e
During the day they were not permitted to travel more than 5 miles
from home.
'nle Wartillle Civil Control Adm1n1stration; witli the growing
recognition that a vast majority of the evacuated population could
be relocated only gradually and over a conaiderable period of time,
set about establishing aaa•bl7 centers to receive the evacuees
tam.porarily until more permanent camps could be conatructed and the
population transferred to the Jurisdiction of th• War Relocation
.Authority. Sixteen assembl7 canters, moat of which were set up 1n
former race tracks or fair grounds, ware occupied by the evacuees
under the Wartime Civil Control Administration.

COOFERENCE WITH GOVERNORS AT SALT LAKE CITY
Because of the general misunderstanding of evacuation and the
status of the evacuees in Western States, and in order to explore
more fully the possibilities or a widespread resettlement program,
a meeting was called at Salt Lake City on April ?, 1942, to explain
the situation to the officials of the States in 'Which the Authority
mi8ht be operating. The conference was attended by governors or
their representatives, attorneys general or their representatives,
State extension service directors, State agricultural war board
chairmen, and State Fam Security Administration directors fraa
10 or the Western States.
The meeting was conducted jointly by Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen •
.Assistpnt Chief or Staff in Charge of Civil Affairs, Western Defense
Command and Fourth Army; Tom c. Clark, Chief of the Civilian Starr,
Wartime Civil Control Administration; and M. s. F.1.senhower, Director
of the War Relocation Authority.

~r. Eisenhower described the tentative plane •hich the war
Relocation ~uthority had devised for assisting evscuated persons to
resettle in other parts of the country. He explained in considerable
detail the situation and status of the evacuees and requested l.he
cooperation of the people and officials in facilitating their resumption of normal living, pointing out that one untoward incident
directed toward evacuees would bring reprisals on Americans who had
been interned by the Japanese Government.

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Mr. Eisenhower gave assurance that the War Relocation Authority
would conduct its program in a manner "flhich would not cause long-time
social, econanic and political problems for the communities in which
resettlement might take place.
Most of the govemors and attomeya general, however, 'were
not sympathe:tic to the program as outlined. Some expreseed c0111.plete
and bitter animosities toward settlement or purchase of land by any
Japanese in their States. Some indicated definite suspicion or
conviction that California was using interior States as dumping
grounds for an old problem. Sane refused to recognize that Japanese,
even though United States citizens, had any rights. Some indicated
that the temper of the people in their States could not be controlled
unless Japanese who had already entered the States were brought under
guard. Some opposed Japanese entering private business. Some demanded that the Federal Government guarantee to remove any and all
Japanese remaining at the end of the war. Some indicated that the
States could operate the program if Federal funds were made available
to them. The official conception by State officers of the type of
program best suited to the situation was one of concentration camps
with workers being farmed out to work under armed guards. Some
representatives advocated out and out detention camps for all Japanese.
The govemors and attorneys general utilized most of the
conte:rence time and, unfortunately, did so to a degree 11hich gave
the farm elements present little opportunity to express their need
of workers from the evacuated. population. The elements representing
the farmers at the meeting did indicate that evacuees were needed
tor seasonal and other labor, and stressed the acute labor shortage,
particularly in the beet fields.
Colonel Bendeteen pointed,out the distinction between internment
and evacuation, explaining that under the evacuation program the
military camnander or an area could detennine who would be permitted.
to remain in the area and under what conditions, lrho should be remcved. from the area, or who might enter the area. C:Utside or
designated military areas, citizens of the United States, he explained.,
were free to come and go. The Army's control over such persons
applied only in these designated military areas.
He advised that the guarding by the Army of small C§Ullps, such
as might be provided by former CCC camps, would be impractical from
a military standpoint, and that the Army would not undertake to guard
centers housinB less than 5,000 persons.
The Salt Lake City conference was extremely disappointing to
those ,mo had hoped that favorable reception for the evacuees could
be obtained by informing State officials of tbe exact nature of the

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evacuees' situation. ~r. Eisenhower, in closing the meeting, said
that, in view of the attitudes and conditions specified by the
governors and attorneys general of the States, irmnedbte requests
for evacuee workers would have to be denied.
The Salt Lake City conference was fundamental in setting the
character of relocation centers as they finally evolved.
l,ACTORS CHANGING R.ELOCATICIJ

PLANS

In planning the establishment of relocation centers, every
possible attempt was made to make them approximate the Americaµi small
town. Even in the planning stage, it was realized that this degree
of approximation could not be close, and once the centers came into
being it was obvious that they could never bear more than superficial
resemblance to normal free communities. Perhaps the most noticeable
of the deviations fran no:nnal living was the absence of cooking
facilities in the family unit. Community cooking, canmunity eating,
camnunity bathing and toilet facilities which were camnon to all
relocation centers are not c01m1on to .American living, and they tended
to lessen the effectiveness of family relationships. Equally conspicuous and out of the normal pattern was the barbed wire fence
patrolled by military police llhich surrounded each relocation center.
This not only limited the movement of residents but was also psychologically bad.
)
It was quickly realized thatz (1) loyalty would not nourish
in an atmosphere of restriction and discriminatory segregation;
(2) it was recognized that/uch wide and enforced deviation from
normal cultural patterns o living might have lasting and unfavorable
effects on the individuals exposed to them, particul~rly children
and young people; and, (3) that there was an obligation on the part.
of the War Relocation Authority both to the evacuated people and to
the people of the United States to restore all loyal citizens and
law abiding aliens to normal useful American life with all possible
speed.
SEASONAL LEAVE

The War Relocation Authority had no sooner announced its
decision ~o send all evacuees to large relocation centers following
the Salt Lake City conference than agricultural interests in the
Inter-Mountain States began requesting the release of evacuees
directly to canmunities in these States for work in sugar beet fields
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and other t1P91 ot agriculture. These requests which were advanced
with great force wre in direct conflict with the governor,• and
public o!ficiala' thinking in the1e States as expreased at the
conference. These requests began to be received about mid-April,
and by llay 1 were veey insistent.

,

The Authority recognized that its position would be untenable
Executive
Order No. 9102 had provided for establishing a "work corps.• Thia
work corps plan provided that workers volunteer for the duration ot
the war and would be placed in private or public emplo,ment under
the direct supervision of the War Relocation Authority. It had been
expected that evacuees would greet the work corpa with favor and
that most able-bodied young people would wish to join it. '!he first
official attempt to gain recruits for the work corps was in the
Portland Assanbly Center about mid-May. 'Workers joining there were
to be sent to beet fields in eastern Oregon~ help in meeting a
severe spring labor shortage. Four men were sent fran the San
Francisco regi011al office to the Portland Assanbly Center to start
the enl.iataent. Thej found the evacuees wary of the work corps idea
and full or questions tor which no answers were ready. The enlistment tom impressed the evacuees as bearing too much resemblance
to a blank check presented tor their signature. No workers were
recruited at Portland and upon the recomnendation ot the recruitment
team the work corps plan for recruiting seasonal workers was
abandoned.
with a large reserve of workers idle.in relocation centers.

The demand for seasonal workers in the Inter-Mountain States
continued to graw. '!he veey governors llbo had been opposed to the
presence of any evacuees~ their areas except under armed guard were
now in the position of dananding that the War Depart&ent releeae
evacuee& !ran assembly centers to assist their farmers in the apring
work. Fi.Dally, at the inaistance of aeveral large beet companiee
and tarm organizations, most governors and other public ofticiala
were forced to reverse their stand.
In order to protect the interest of both the evacuee& and the
general public, the Director of the War Relocation Authority and the
head of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, drew up a plan
llbereby evacuees could be released frClll aasembly center~ for seasonal
agricultural work. This agreement provided that the State governors
and the .local law enforcement officials, including the sherif'f,
county judge, county prosecuting attorney and a county camniasioner
would sign a pledge that evacuee labor was needed, and that, ·u
releaded to the cowity and Stote, the above officials would guarantee
the satety of the workers. This agreement also provided that the
employer would provide transportation to and from the assembly center
or relocation center, that they would pay prevailing wages, that
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-"":!"

there would be no displacanent or local labor and finally that the
United States &nplo,ment Senice in the county would guarantee that
adequate housing would be provided, without cost to the evacuee, in
the area of employment.
At this time, the great majority or evacuees were in assembly
centers under the jurisdiction of the Army, and before the Army would
release any evacuee, it was necessary f-<>r the War Relocation Authority
to accept the responsibility for administering the program. It was
alao necessary, before any workers were released, tor the WRA to forward documentary proof to the commanding general of the Western
Defense Camnand that the State and CCIIIDlWlity had met all of the above
conditions. Upon receipt of- this proof, the general issued a public
proclamation permitting certain evacuees to work in a specific county
only. These proclamations · were posted in the count7 in question and
prohibited the evacuees from moving from that county without his
permission. The first county which complied with these regulations
was Malheur County in the State of Oregon. Recruiters fran the
Amalgamated Sugar r.ompany went into the Portland and Puyallup Assembly
Centers with the officials of the United States Employment Service.
They at first bad very little success in recruiting the number of
workers desired. Evacuees were very reluctant to venture into the
outside areas where they were still being criticized by many public
officials ~d by the population as a •hole. 'Ibey were also dubious
about working conditions, and were afraid that they might ~e getting
into something from which they could not withdraw.
However, on or about May 20, a small party of about a dozen
evacuees left the Portland Assembly Center for Nyssa, Oregon. After
a few daya ot exploring the living and working conditions in the
area, they reported back favorably to the Portland Assembl7 Center,
and inlnediately additional workers were recruited. Numerous counties
in Idaho, Utah, and ~ontana then made application for workers. In
most counties and in most States, however, some of the public official&
whose flames were required on the seasonal work agreement objected
to the use of evacuee laborers, or wanted to put special conditions
on their use. A great deal of pressure was applied on the Arrrt7 and
the War Relocation Authority to modify the conditions under which
the workers would be released to these areas. However, the Authority
refused, and eventually most of the Viestern States and a good share
of the oounties'where seasonal labor was needed, signed standard
agreements for the use of evacuee labor. By the end of June,
approximately 1,500 workers had been recruited• Attempts had been
made to recruit many timea this number, and there was a great deal
of criticism against the evacuees and against the War Relocation
Authority because so few evacuees had volunteered for seasonal work.
Farmers and other employers llho were desperately in need of getting
labor could not understand the fears of evacuees; neither could they

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understand that, out of 113,000 people, only a small proportion were
able and qualified to do the work in question~
Many public officials were worried about the treatment evacuees
might receive in inland areas. Elements in some of the camnunities
to which evacuees were going were bitterly opposed to their caning.
Sane threats were made against the evacuees. However, on the whole,
there were fn incidents and none of these were serious. Word "88
gotten around in the communities that these newcomers ~ere Federal
charges and that anyone acting against them would be answerable to
Federal officials. There were instances of fist fights and other
minor difficulties, but the speed with which these incidents were
dealt with and the fact t.bat inquiries were made by Federal officials
discouraged repetition. Qi several occasions, WRA threatened to
withdraw workers from individual cCllllllUJlities and as a result of these
threats, employers saw to it that reception us immediatttly improved.
Public officials who had signed statements offering protection to
the evacuees knew that they were on the spot, and were generally
diligent in quieting opposition. Evacuees won for tbemelves 111&ey
i"riends, which tended to ease tensiona. Most employers were high
in their praise of the evacuees in comparison to other seasonal
laborers. This last fact, coupled with the careful, conscientious
job done by most of the evacuees, raised another proplem, however,
leading to a groat deal of bidding among employers for their services.
The initial employers had gone to unusual expense to recruit evacuees
and pay their transportation. Other employers in the camnunity
would then ·try to lure away these workers by offering better wages
and better housing. '!be public relations program resulting from this
labor pirating made it necessary eventually to work out a specific
contract which bound both the employer and employee as long as contract conditions were met.
After the urgent need for spring labor lessened, there was
in most areas, a slack period and the problem of keeping the evacuees
employed became a major one. 1''requently, evacuees after only a day
or two of unanployment requested ilr.mediate return to the assanbly
center, leading to dissatisfaction on the part of the employer who
had hoped to keep the evacuees in the field during the entire season.
Up to the middle or July there was only one person in the
San Francisco office assigned to the administration of the entire
seasonal leave program. Everyone, including law enforcement officers,
bad come to regard evacuees as oeing quite special cases. The San
Francisco office was fiooded with questions. In sane instances local

laW enforcement officers were reluctant to arrest an evacuee who

broke local laws and ordinances, and called the San Francisco office
for advice on this and other minor problems. In July 1942, one
additional emplo:ne was placed on the -staff and se!lt to the field
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to work on local problems. However, during all of the aummer .montba
these two individuals assigned to the seasonal leave program had
more work to do than they could properly accomplish.
In early September the sugar beet canpanies fran the intermountain country sent representatives to San Francisco to attempt
to work out a-larger seasonal leave program for the fall harvest.
Six or eight large companies were represented, covering States as
far east a& Nebrask'- and North and South Dakota. Most of the evacuees
were still in assembly canters and the Army was represented at the
meeting. 'lbe proceaa or transferring frcm assembly centers to relocation centers, howevc:r, was in full swing and decisions in administrative planning at this meeting rested with the War Relocation Authority.
A general work contract was agreed upon and the ground work was laid
for a large recruitment program in all assembly centers and in the
relocation cmters that were already opened. 'lbe Authority started
recruiting additional personnel to handle the expected large movement
of workers and by the middle of October had established offices in
Boise and Idaho Falls, Idaho; Helena and Havre, Mont.; and in Salt
lake City, Utah. These offices were to be administered by the San
Francisco regional office. F.ach was staffed with one employment
investigator and one secretary. The Denver reiion employed two
relocation officers to work in V/yaning and Colorado •

.

Shortly following the seasonal work conference in San Francisco
which was to coordinate all recruiting activities, the San Francisco
office received applications for tens of thousands of seasonal workers,
In addition to the sugar companies, many individual farmers, agricultural companies and industrial concerns applied for evacuee labor.
Ji"..ach of them eJrpected to get. labor within a few da79 • time and chagrin
was expressed over delays and disappoint.men ts in regard to employers '
requests. By the middle of October, however, approximately 10,000
evacuees were scattered through the Western S"-ates helping in harvest
work. They made a major contribution in saving agricultural crops
in the inter-=iountain area during the fall or 1942•
While the seasonal leave program was getting started during
the spring, thousands of persons in assembly centers or still "frozen"
in their banes, were clamoring to be permitted to leave. Voluntary
evacuation under certain conditions was still permitted by the Army
even after the order of March 29 was issued which forbade free movement of Japanese out of designated military areas. Subsequent to
that date, a relatively few Japanese were pemitted by the Military
to leave on the basis of "rather thorough investigation." Mos~ ~r
these were.the families of persons who had previously found jobs
outside the restricted area. Although more than 10,000 persons
served formal notices of intention to leave Military Area No. 1
during the perind when they might leave on any basis at all, only
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4,889 actually establi■hed themselves 1n free territory during the
entire period. Colorado received 1,963, Utah, 1 1 519, Idaho, .305,
eastem Washington, 208, eastern Oregon, 115, with the remainder
scattered throughout other 3tates.
About 4,000 persona migrated from Mill tary Area No. l to
Military Area No. 2 frClll March 12 to June JO, 1942, when such moves
wer~ recorded. About 90 percent ·of this migration was to Military
Area No. 2 in California which was later evacuated. People who had
moved into eastem California voluntarily, and frequently with con. compliance with the requests ot General DeWitt
'
siderable hardship, in
that they evacuate frClll Military Area No. 1, were most bitter when,
without further warning, they were involuntarily evacuated fran their
new homes. While no commitment had been made by General DeWitt to
the effect that eastern.California might not later be evacuated, it
had generally been assumed by this group that in compt,ing with the
general's request they would avoid the hardships of detention, whereas
in fact, they suffered the inconveniences -and difficulties of voluntary
evacuation plus all or the hardships which would have been their lot
had they 'o riginally remained in their hemes.
In addition to such leaves as the Amy pemitted for the
purposes or seasonal work or for individuals under special circumatances to join relatives ~st of the restricted area, SCllle young
people were pel'llitted to leave the coastal area for the purpo8'8
of continuing ·college and university studies. Almost from the
beginning of evacuation a number or nongover1111ental organizations,
notably the American Friends Service Canmittee, had begun work on
this problem with the formation of the National Student Relocation
Council. In the latter part of May 1942, the efforts ot these
groups were united and brought into sharper focus. '!be council,
established with the express approval of the War Relocation· Authorit7
and the War Department and composed of a number of college presidenta
and other prClllinent educators, rounded o'\lt its final organization
in a meeting held at Chicago on May 29. President John w. Nason
of ·swarthmore College was elected chairman, and national headquarters
were established in Philadelphia. During June the activities of
the council were carried forward by two coordinate groups. The west
coast subcamnittee operated under the leadership of Joseph Conard,
and concentrated its efforts on students interested in tr&nsfer and
on investigation of their academic fitness and financial status.
The eastern group, wit!l President Robbins w. Barstow of Hartford
(Conn.)-Theological Seminary as executive secretary, meanwhile
directed ita efforts toward determining which colleges or -universities
outside the evacuated area would accept evacuee students and how many
evacuees might thus be transferred.· Clearance of colleges with the
War and Navy Lepartmenta was handled by the War Relocation Authority.

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At the same time the Authority was exploring with a number of
coll~ge officials the possibility of extension or correspondence
courses in relocation centers so as to provide for the needs of
students unwilling or unable to transfer to outside institutions.
Looking to the opening of the fall term at colleges and
universities, the War Relocation Authority and tile National Student
Relocation Council intensified their efforts throughout the aWllller
of 1942 to arrange for the attendance of properly qualified evacuee
students at institutions outside the evacuated area. By September 30,
a total of 143 colleges, universities and junior colleges had been
approved for student relocation by both the War and Nav Departments.
In general these Departments excluded, on the basis of military
security, those colleges having ~rmy or Navy contracts. However,
those approved included such liberal arts colleges as Swarthmore,
such State universities as Nebraska and Texas, such women's colleges
as Smith and Radcliff, such Catholic institutions as Gonzaga, such
teachers' colleges as Colorado State College of Education, such
technical institutions as the Milwaukee College of ~gineering, and
such specialized schools as the Northern College of Optometry ·and
the Oberlin Conservatory of Music.
Under a tentative leave policy adopted on July 20, a total

ot 250 students were granted educ3tional leaves from assembly centers
and relocation centers prior to September 30• Sane of these students
left during late July and August to attend summer sessions at various
institutions, but the majority went on leave in September and resumed
their educations with the opening of the fall academic. term.

EARLY RELOCATION POUCIFS
During the first months of l~'RA 's existence, a small staff was
busy meeting the urgent, pressing problems--problems of getting the
first relocation centers into operation; of feeding and housing; and
meeting the other minimum needs of the thousands of people arriving
in the centers; establishing policies for work in the centers and
of assigning evacuees to work; of handling the thousands of requests
from western farmer~ for evacuee labor and of getting the labor out
to the farmers; of handling arran~ements for individual hardship
eases-usually people having families already on the outside-to
leave the centers. At this period there became evident what appears
to be a complete reversal of national policy in regard to the disposition of the evacuated people. Initially the Army, in ordering
the evacuation, had apparently anticipated that the west coast Japanese
would be able, without Government aid, to move to unrestricted areas
of the country and continue normal self-oupport. The adverse
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experiences of voluntary evacuees and the unfavorable community attiitudes shown in JDallY, if not most, sections of the country to which
they had gone, the bewildernment of the ·uprooted people and the
fears which many of them so plainly showed toward resettlement, had
caused most concerned people to be of the opinion that relocation
centers would need to be maintained as havens of refuge for the
duration of the war for the majority of the evacuees. It was not
forgotten, however, -that regulations had to be established under
which those evacuees who wanted to leave the centers for seasonal
work or for other purposes could be permitted to do so. lbe establishment ~f these regulations presented a problem of confiicting needs.
lbe legality and desirability of detaining evacuees, particularly
the American citizens among them, was questionable. However, the
hostility, doubts and fears of the public at large, engendered by
the evacuation towards this group of people, had to be recognized
as did the fears and doubts or the evacuees themselves. Consequ~tly,
WRA decided that it would have to work out a program of controlled
relocation which would permit the relocation or a majority or the
population as fast as the fears of the public could be allayed.

EARLY PROCEDURES
The primary concern of the War Relocation Authority at this
time was the meeting of minimum physical needs of people arriving
in the relocation centers. Little time was available to plan and
work out any kind of relocation program. Ho•ver, because of
extreme pressures, by the early sUJ11D.er of 1942, a general policy
had been established for seasonal agricultural leave. The first
general leave regulations for permanent relocation issued by the
~ar Relocation Authority were contained in a tentative leave policy
dated July 20, 1942• ()l].y American-born·evacuees who had never
lived or studied in Japan were pe:nnitted to apply for leave under
these regulations, and leave was granted only to applicants who
had definite offers of employment outside the area under jurisdiction
of the Western Defense Command. It must be remembered that at this
time the m&jority of evacuees were still under Army jurisdiction in
assembly centers and that many remained under the Army's control
until November 1942• It was consequently necessary to get .Army
permits for these individuals to leave. The Army was generally
extremely reluctant to release individuals. Many permits requested
by ~he War Relocation Authority were turned down by the Army.
Caution 1n planning these first leave regulations was also
inspired by instances of violence and threat~ against the Japanesee
which occurred during the voluntary evacuation period and by statements which were still being received from many parts of the country
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t.bat the .evacuees •re not wanted. Ignorance cl the program and
lack of previous contact with Japanese had led to individual evacuees
being molested, and communities in which they bad arrived, unannounced,
being upset. The first leave regu.lationa were consequently cautious
ones and were aimed to release only individuals who could be expected
to adjust most readily to early resettlement conditiona.

Even as these restricted regulations were being 1nit1a~ed,
more liberal ones were being worked out, and a considerably more
canprehensive set of regulations which would pdnnit leave for broader
sections of the population became effect~ve October 1. By this time
most of the evacuees had been transferred to relocation centers and
were under the sole jurisdiction of the War Relocation Authority.
Also, the outstanding euccess of the seasonal leave program, distinguished by an almost complete lack of major disturbances and the
acceptance of evacuees by residents of CCllllllunities which had been
originally hostile, iDdicatttd that relocation and private employment
in other par ta of the country might be feasible• The Chief ot the
-&nployment Division made several trips through the .IUddle West during
the fall to canvass relocation possibilities in that part of the
country. While there had been some instances of protest from midwestern tWIQIDmi ties, he became convinced that i1' the program were
judiciously handled resettlement of evacuees in this part of the
country 1188 practical.
Under these new regulations, any evacuee, citizens or alien,
could apply for leave to visit or reside in any locality outside the
evacuated area. 'n\ree types of leave from relocation centers were
provided for in the regulationa.
1. Short-term leave was intended for the evacuee who wished
to leave the center for a period of not more than a few weeks in
order to consult a medical specialist, negotiate a property arrangement, or transact other personal business. It 1188 granted by the
project director for a definite period after careful invest~gation
of the applicant. If the project director denied an application
for short,-term leave, appeal could be made to the National Director
whose decision was final.
2. ~ork-group leave (lat~r called seasonal leave) ns designed
for evacuees who wished to leave the center for seasonal agricultural
work. Like short-term leave, it was granted by the project director
for a definite period (which could be extended) and was subject
to investigation at the center. ~herever possible, a record check
was made with FBI and the intelligence services on applicants for
this type of leave. However, the project director had the power
to grant such leave without this check it. he felt that circumstances
warranted.

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3• Indefinite leave was granted to evacuees only by the
National Director and only if four specific requirements were
met: ~a) the applicant for such leave had to have a definite
otter ot a job or some other means of support; (b) there must be
no evidence in the applicant's record either at the relocation
center or with the several Federal intelligence services indicating
that he would endanger the national securityJ (c) there had to be
reasonable evidence that the applicant's presence would not be
unacceptable in the c0111111unit7 in which be planned to live; and
(d) the applicant had to agree to keep WRA informed of any change
1

ot

address.

'lhe first ot the four requirementa for leave

was

to reassure

r-ona,nm1 ties to which evacueee might be going that they would not

beccme public ~ges and had reasonable assurance ot selt-aupport.
'lhe second was to reassure the receiving community or the newCCllrffa I loyalty.
The third requirmumt was mace in order to give
reasonable assurance to the evacuee regarding the reception which
he might expect in the new connunity. It was also intended to give
the WRA time to prepare the cammmity for his reception. The need
for such preparation was clearly evidenced by the unfortunate
experiences or voluntary evacuees going into camnunities which did
not understand their .situation. Olce an unfortunate incident
occurred, it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to get
that community to accept other evacuees. '!be fourth requirement
1n regard to notice of address change was to enable the War Relocation Authority to serw the evacuee.
Within the centers, during the first few months of their
operation, facilities were not well developed for assisting the
evacuee in his plans to relocate. Staff was frequently inadequate
in numbers, and inexperienced in its new Job. The handling ot
leave applications and of advice to evacuees in regard to relocation
plans was originally made a part of the functiona of the employment
division in the center which, at that time, had as its most ianediate
£unction the usignweat of workers to jobs within the project
itael.f and the recruitaent ot workers for essential project jobs.
Coamonly, the same appointed staff member in the center was in
the poeition of having to chooee between advisin6 an evacuee engineer,
tor example, whose services were badly needed on the project, to
take this project job at the same time that openings might exist
tor the same individual in canmunities outside the center. The
employment division staff was also responsible for the assignment
ot housing in the center. During the summer of 1942, this was a
critical assignment, and frequently precluded much time being spent
on relocation.

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\

EARLY RELOCATictJ PROGR™

/

"'

The movement of evacuees out of· the centers and back into '·
life in outside c011111NDities began very slowly. Prior to October 1,
1942, fewer than 273 evacuees (including students) had gone out of
the relo~tion centers on indefinite leave under the policy ot
July 20. By the end of the year, 2,200 applications for advance
clearance had been filed, but only 250 applications for indefinite
leave had been granted and onl7 866 evacuees had actually lett the
centers. It should be pointed out, however, that, in addition to
the 193 persona who left relocation centers on indefinite leave,
approximately 750 persona who left ass•bl.y and relocation centers
on seasonal leave did not return to a center.
'lbe slow progress of the relocation program was due to ID8ll7
!actors. 'lhe procedures governing leave clearance were cumbersana
and time consuming. Applications had to be assembled at the centers
and forwarded to Washington. In Washington they had to be sent
to the intelligence agencies to be checked against their files;
then they had to be reviewed and returned to the centei:s•

In addition to the procedural difficulties, there were
adverse psychological factors. ·Vaey evacuees were reluctant to
leave the sanctuary. of the centers and face a public 'Which might
be hostile. Others were bitter because of evacuation and decided
they would not leave until they could retum to their 01111 haaes
with all of their civil rights restored. An umeasurable but
important factor was the amount of misinformation circulated at
the centers. Sane of these rumors, most of them without any foundation in truth and sane of them calculated to arouse extreme fear,
ware deliberately concocted by trouble-makers. Sane influence
against relocation was also exerted by indivifiuals who had acquired
prestige in the new communities and were anxious to retain not only
their l~adership but the continued presence of the people they were
leading.
Stories were whispered to the effect that relocating people
would be used' as slave laborers, would be underpaid and uncared for.
There were occasional tales of individuals and even groups having
been murdered. Minor incidents and unpleasantnesses experienced by
a few of the early resettlers were exaggerated or misunderstood and
grew into fanciful tales of extreme hardship. In the atmospber~ of
distrust and contusion existing at the centers, each of these rumors
was likely to assume grotesque proportions. In addition, a DWllber of
the Caucasian appointed staff were innocently or otherwise guilty of
opposing pla.na for relocation, and of contributing to the maas of
misinformation. A small percentage of the Caucasian staff manbers were

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was designed to speed the procedures of leave clearance 1 collecting
in one operation personal data on all evacuee residents over 16 years

of age.
The third step waa the adoption in mid~arch of a policy
providin& for limited cash grant.a to needy evacuees going out of
the centers.
'nle fourth step was the decentralization of the leave
clearance machineey ■o that in the majority of cases indefinite
leave could be granted at the relocation centers wit.bout referral
to Washington.

THE OPENING CF FIELD CFFICES
To administer the seasonal work program, seven field offices
While these offices
were established because of the seasonal leave program, as early aa
November 1942 they began to devote a good share of their time to
pramoting permanent relocation among seasonal workers 1 and "1'18re
successful in helping many seasonal workers to remain outside the
centers at the end of their work contract. In December 1 plans were
made to open field offices in the ~iddle West and East to effect
permanent resettlement.
had been opened in the Inter-Mountain States.

Even before relocation offices were fonnally opened 1 resettlement camnittees had been established in many midwestern cities.
Groups of concerned individuals representing many interests in the
camounity 1 particularll' the churches 1 had formed resettlement cOIIIDitteea
in Chicago, Minneapolis, Madison (Wis.) 1 Cleveland and other cities,
as a result of visits by the Chief or tbe Employment Division during
the fall of 1942, and through the efforts of the Federal Council of
Church~s. At first these canmittees had chiefly concerned themselves
with assisting voluntary evacuees who had come into their cities.
later some of the cOIIIDittees began correspondence with center residents
with a view to assisting individuals to relocate.
The first midweatern relocation office was opened in Chicago
on January 4, 1943• In rapid .succession siJrd.lar offices were set
up in Clneland, llinneapolia, Des Moines 1 Milwaukee, New York, and
numerous other key cities throughout the Middle West and East. By
the clc,se of the fiscal year 1943• there were 42 of these offices
scattered from Spokane 1 Wash. 1 to Boston 1 Mass. For the next
2 years, offices showed only a slight increas~ but there was
substantial shifting in the location as the general trend of relocation moved eastward. Thus offices in the inter-mountain region

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dietruattul_or the Japanese population in the centers, regarded them
as •the enemy," and regarded thamaelves as jailers. Thia small group
naturally opposed relocation planning both from a p~licy standpoint
and 1n their contacts with nacuee workers. A second emall group
ot Caucuian employ-eea were overly sympathetic to evacuees and
honestly shared with them their fears or unpleasantnesses to be
faced outside the comparative safety of the centers. Becauae ot
the obvious genuineness or persons in this second group and the
friendships which they were able to build up with evacuees and the
consequent influence they exercised, their effect on relocation
planning was probably the greatest deterrent effected by appointed
staff members. A third and smaller group of Caucasian staff
manbers were chiefiy interested in maintaining their jobs and saw
in relocation planning the eventual loss of employment. In general,
the influence of the first and third groups ceased to be effective
among most evacuees as the basis of their opposition became
apparent. Many manbers of these two groups were weeded out as the
program progressed.
other factors, too, tended to hold back evacuees. Theywere
seriously hampered by remoteness from places where there were jobs.
Unable :to make direct contact with potential employers, sane residents had no effective way of knowing where jobs were, what types
were availb.ble, or how to apply for them. Also, having lived for
a few months in the centerA without earnings, many evacuees lacked
the cash necessary to establish themselves in new camnunities.
With all or the centers operating and the physical needs of
the residents met, a heiehtened awareness developed or the need to
promote relocation actively. The destru.ctive effects of center lite
on the evacueeR' morale was considerabl.7 more obvious after a tn
months of center living. Pressure for manpower throughout the
country also compelled recognition of the large untapped manpower
resources in the centers and or the excellent opportunities available
to evacuees in ~ost communities. The successful use of 10,000
seasonal workers in the fall of 1942 proved that large scale relocation was possible.

In the early months of 1943, the War Helocation Authority
took action in a number of ways to c'.Ccelerate outward moveJQent.
The first step was the establishment of field offices in a number
of key cities throughout the Middle West and :East to facilitate
contact between private anployers and evacuees at the centers and
to develop wideepfead canmunity acceptance for evacuees.
A second step was a large scale registration program carried
out at the centers in February and March of 1943• This registration
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oloaed or were conaolldated ,mile new offices appeared in auch citiu

u Grand Rapida, llicb., and Buttalo, N. I.

Relocation otficu were ot two kinda, ar• otticea and distrin
offices. Bach ot the eight ar• otticee wu h•ded b7 a relocation
aupem.aor and wu pnerally reeponeible tor relocation work ot a
rather broad geographical area. Dietrict otticee, on the other
band, functioned under the general guidance ot the relocation npe~
T.laor and in the i1111aediate vicinity or the cities in llhicb they were
located. Area ofticu were 11&1.ntained in au.cqo, Clneland, DlaYer,
·
Salt Lake City, lansaa City, Little Rock, New York and Boaton..
Both types ot offices nre assigned easentiall,1 t.be • basic tunctiona. 'Ibey serv~ to provide the public in local areas
with infozmation about evacuees and the lar Relocation Authority
program. 'Dley aolicited job offers, analysed them and forwarded
•atiafactoey onaa to the relocation centers. 'Ibey provided the War
Relocation Authority with important information on public attitud•
to1111rd Japanese Americana in cc::nnmo1 ties where relocation wu
CODteplated. 'Ibey f'oatered the eatabliabment of new resettl8118Dt
ccadtteea and collaborated with those al.re~ in aiatence to help
resettling evacuees in a wide variety ot •ya to bec0118 satiafactoril.7
astabllahed.

In the ear}¥ montha of' their exiatence, the relocation otficaa
were priaarily cobcerned with creating favorable CClllllunity acceptance
and with f1nd1og suitable joba tbat evacuees aigbt till• Aa a aeans
of atf'ecting ccaaunity attitudes, relocation officers ga•e talks to
business, professional, social, cine, church and fraternal groups;
Mt with aaployars individually and in groups, enlisted the aid of
uniona when poaaible, and apoke to 911plo19ea in plants where employment of Japanese 1188 contemplated. N8W11papera were provided with
information in regard to the program. This public relationa program
was sufficiently successful so that in moat·comimnitiea opposition
did not cr;ystallze or become an organized movsent. In thoae fn
canamitias in which opposition did ·organize, auff'icient auppon for
t.he program bad been developed that, almoat without exception, relocation continued to be posaible and ••ti.afactory. Aa a result of
these efforts, job offers quickly piled up in relocation otticea
in greater quantities than t.hey could be tilled. As an example,
the Qd.cago office by July l, 1943, had otf'era which would have
required more than 10 1 000 individuals to fill. 'lbese offers represented a 'Wide although not all inclusive range ot occupations. War
plants and emplo19rs seeking dcaestic help nre the most nume:roua
and Uley nre t.he most inaistent upon getting the help which they
·
bad ·requested.

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'!be early exceas ot job offer• aver takers from the centers
led to a rather serious public relationa problem, particularly in
mall c01111lWli.ties and rural sectiorus. llany employers had counted
definitely on securing the help wbich they had requested and sme
of them had gone to conaiderable leagtbs to prepare for the advent
of Jai:snese workers. Failing in moat cues to get the requested
help, employers' attitudes ranged frCIIL simple disappointment to
unreasonable anger and in some casea, particularly in rural sections,
to a condmnation ot the Japaneae group tor it.a failure to leave
what wa• regarded by some as a life of ease in the relocation
centers and to accept wartime •ploJMDt• While bitterness of
this sort was• most common aaong domestic Elllplo,ers, it was more
serious when ccaing from essential war planta and agriculture.
Sending job descriptions to the centers in volume was not
very satisfactory. Evacuees who accepted employment on the basis
of these uaual.ly scanty job descriptions and without a real knowledge ·
of the job or personal contact with •ployers often found themselves
unsatisfactorily placed and there was a tendency to change jobs as
eoon as better opened up. Similarly emplo7ers were scmetimes
~isappointed in the individuals hired by cor·respondence or through
the relocation officer aa intermediary. In many instances employers
had advanced ·funds to eYacuees for their relocation. This made the
problem more serious.
LEAVE CLF.ARANCE REGISTRATIC!l AND @ff RECRUI'IVENT PROGRAM

The War Relocation Authority registration program and the
program of recruiting for military service by the Army were carried
out simltaneously at all relocation centers in February and March
1943• These programs were hastened by Secretary of War Stimson's
announc•ent of January 28., 1943., that the Viar Department would
create an all-Nisei combat team cmposed of volunteers frcm relocation centers in the United States and from Hawaii. llhen the
War Relocation Authority was informed that the Army was planning a
recruitment program in the centers, it was already developing plana
for a mass registration of all adults to speed up the leave clearance
procedures. The Army and the War Relocat.4.cm Authority needed nmch
the same type of background information about the people in the
centttra, and consequently the decision was made to CCIILbine Army
recruitment and leave clearance registration in one large-scale
operation to be carried out jointly by the Army and the War
Relocation Authority.
'
It was believed that residents would welcome news of the
fonnation of a Nisei cca.bat team as an in1Uial step toward the
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restoration ot citizenahip rights. It was conaequenti, expected that
registration would proceed •oothl.J• However, the initial reaction
ot Jl8D1' Nisei 1n every center was one of reemit.aent because the proposed caabat tea was to be a segregated unit. The7 saw in the
A.rm_y'• progra another instance of cliacrimination rather than one
ot r•toration of riJibtll•
In each center the registration progra produced high •otional
tension, and in sau centers a crisis •ituation. It raised iaaue•
ot major importance in the lives of nacuees equalit7 ot citizenahip,
the obligation of military service, and Issei status. In addition
to the objection ot man7 Nisei to the segregated nature ot the
proposed military service, man7 felt that the7 were being forced to
•olunteer tor llilitaey service 11hereaa other .Americana n0l'ID&ll7
were waiting to be dratted. 'nlia belief that the7 were being forced
to Yolunteer tor military. service was at least part1all7 due to a
miaunderatanding of the wording of one of the questions on the
registration form which required male Nisei of military age to state
whether or not they were willing to aene in the amed f orcee. While
it was the intention of thia qaiNtion simpl.J to ask whether or not
the indi~ was willing to sene if required to do so by Selective
Service, it was not so interpreted by moat Nisei. Saae ot the
appointed staff were also not eure of the meaning of this question•
To add to the contusion, it was at the same time that the Arsv's
recruiting ••rgeanta nre bringing pressure to bear on the Nisei
to enlist for the combat teui. 'lhere is no question but what a&n1'
of -the negative anners and qualified anawers to thia question
were the result of failure to urideratand it.. ~ Nisei alao
faced a not \UUl&tural parental resistance to volunteerin& for
service in advance of the normal action of Selective Service.

Prospective •olunteera were concerned about what might happen
to tbeir Iasei parents if they were killed in battle. They knew that
their. parents could not inherit real estate under the law1 ot the
States in the nacuated area. They 110ndered if their en81J1' alien
parents would be eligible for GI allotaenta. They knew that their
elders, eapecially where they were non-English speaking or beccming
infirm because of age, would face more than average d11'ficult7 it
they nre ff8Q1;ually forced out of the centers and into unfailiar
parts of the United States without their grown children to help th••
In addition to the question aa ~o willingneaa of the young men to
serve in the Army, other questions wre also ao phrased aa to make
them ditt'icult to understand and consequently difficult to answer.
Qie question on the registration form llhich Isaei were required to
answer was interpreted as, in effect, cau1ing them to renounce Japan
and ebrace the United States which country's lalfB prohibited them frail
securing citizenship status. Answering this question in the affirmative,
1n their understanding of it, would have laft them men without a country.
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.

The registration and recruitment programs are told in greater
detail in reports of other diviaiona of the agency. As far as
relocation is concemed, it had this positive result. The War Relocation Authority n01r had acCWllUlated an extensive background of
intormataon on virtually nery adult resident in the centers. For
the first time, date required in connection with .leave clearance
was readily available on practically anyone who might apply for
indefinite ldave. The ground work had been laid for faster processing
of leave applications, decentralization of leave procedure, and
segregation of those wnoae loyalities semed to lie with Japan.
While registration clarified leave for most of the evacuees,
it alao compiicated leave for many others. Under circumstances of
confusion, ·misunderatanding, bad advice, and parental pressures, many
answered loyalty questions with qualifications. Others, under duress
and distress, expressed a lack of loyalty to the United States which
they did not really feel. Persons falling into these last two groups,
when time came for them to app~ for leave clearanco, found themaelvea
at least tcporarily and sanetimas indefinitely blocked by elaborate
procedures and repeated hearings with resultant delqs. These people
1n turn tended to delay the relocation of family .mambers and friends.

CHANGES IN LEAVE PROCEDURES
furing the early months of 1943, as the relocation field
offices began functioning and the old indefinite leave program
began gaining tempo and broader scope, it became necessary for the
War Relocation Authority to make a number of changes in its basic
leave regulations. These changes were made primarily to speed up
and simplify leave procedures by transferring to field offices and
relocation centers several functions which had been previously exercised in Washington. Under the basic leave regulations which beC8Jll.8
effective on October 11 1942, two actions wre of central importances
(1) the application for leave clearance, and (2) the application for
an indefinite leave permit. The first of thase applications was
aul:mdtted on a ,form somewhat similar to the questionnaire used
during registration. Its purpose was to provide personal background data that could be used in determining eligibility for
indefinite leave from a standpoint of national security. The
application for an indefinite leave permit was made at the time the
applicant was actually preparing to leave the center. It called
for the specific destination of the individual, a description of
the arrangements which had been made for employment or support
outside the relocation center, and an agreement to keep the War
Relocation Authority notified of changes in address.
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Until March 1943 each of theae applications, whether made
1imultaneoual7 or separatel7, was subnitted to the Washington office
tor final action• In processing applications for clearance, a
careful a,gyp;lnat;ionwaa made of int'ormation collected about the
applicant at the relocation center, and a check waa made against the
files of Federal intelligence agencies. I! there was no evidence
frca either aource that the applicant might endanger the national
security or interfere "'1th the war effort, clearance waa granted.
Processing of applicationa for 1ndefi.nite leave involved ascert.e1oioe
that the applicant bad a detin1te destination and meana of aupport,,
uauall7 a job, 8lld checking aa to whether or not public atti~e•
in the conauo1 t7 to which he was going 119re such as to iDaure bi.a
satet7. Prior to e1tabl1sbment or the field relocation offices,
t.he clieck GIi public attitudeJ waa ueually made b7' writing to kq
officials and leading citizena in the CCfl'l'1nit7 to which the nacuee
was going. Thia check b7 correspondence was a1moa t invariabl)"
unsatisfactor., since, until public relations work was done 1n moet
camnu.nities, reaction of public official.a was cmmonl7 negative.
The first reall7 important Change in these procedures waa
made in tentative form on March 3 and clarified 1n gr<,ater detail
on Karch 20. As finally worked out, the new procedure provided
tor decentralization of the handling ot applications for indefinite
leave. The purel,7 mechao1Ml function of issuing leave permits
1n cues where clearance had been granted was traoaferred to the
relocation centet. The important function of ·checking ~<1DDPJD1 t7
attitudes waa made the re1ponaibil1t7 of the relocation field
offices. The net effect was to accelerate handling of indefinite
leave applications, to give field offices some control over the
t1Jlling of the movanent or resettlers into their districts, and to
give them time to set in motion faYorable public opinion.
The second signliicant change was adopted on March 24, 1943•
It set. up a system of providing financial assistance for evacuffa
leaving the canters on indefinite leave. Such assistance waa
limited to cases of actual need and-was provided onl7 to encuees
who were leaving the centers for the purpose ot taking a job. It.
was not pronded to thoee going out on student leave or those with
independent. means. 'nle scale of grants was established at $50 tor
evacuees leaving the center 1'i thout dependents, '75 for those leaving
with one dependent and a me:dmun of $100 tor those leaving with
two or more dependents. It was neceHar;y to l:1mit the size and
nunber of auch grants quite ·strictly since the Authorit7 bad at
that time no mone7 in its budget allocated specificall)" tor thia
parpclae. Later modifications adopted in April and May- provided
, that grants might be made to the families of men in the armed service
regardless of the purpose tor which the7 were ·leavinl the centers,
and that eYacuees going out to live t-.poraril7 in hostels for the

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purpoee ot seeking •ployment after arrival would also be ellgible.
Later in the year a further change in schedule ot leave assistance
grants was made to etimlate taail7 relocation. The ceiling per
tam:117 unit or 11.00 bad proved an obstacle to the relocation ot
larger families. The Dft ruling reduced the grant tor the individual
going out alone to t2S, but allowed t2S per capita to taily groups
regardless or eise. Coach tare and 13 per di• while en route to
destination were provided 1n addition to the fixed cash grant.
A third major modification ot the leave procedures and regu]a..
tione was made on April 21 1943• cnce registration was completed
and all dockets processed through the intelligence agencies, the
War Relocation Authority was in a position to speed up clearance
ae a separate step in the leave procedures. The amendment of
April 2 authorized project directors to grant indefinite leave
permits without referral to the Washington office and in advance
ot leave clearance, provided certain basic requirements ware mat.
The moat important or these requirements were: (1) the .applicant
mtet have anawered loyalty questions during registration with an
unqualified attirllative, and (2) the project director muat be
satisfied, on the basis ot evidence available at the relocation
center, that the applicant would not endanger national security or
·interfere with the war effort. Issuance ot perm.its in advance ot
leave clearance, however, was specifically prohibited in tb.e case
ot (a) those who had applied for repatriation or expatriation to
Japan, (b) those whose application tor leave clearance bad previously
been denied, (c) Shinto priests, (d) aliens released on parole rraa
interment camps by the Depart.ment ot Justice, and (e) those who
were planning to relocate in one of the eaatern seaboard States.in
the F,utern Detanse ('J)ffffll8J1d.

JAP~E AMERICAN JOINT BQARD

The Japanese .American Joint Board established by War Department
order dated. January 20, 1943, was canposed or one representative each
traa the War Relocation Authority, Office ot Naval Intelligence, Army
Intelligence and the Provoat Marshal General's Oftioe. The board was
created specifically to assist in determining the loyalty of .American
citizens ot Japanese ancestry, and to determine their eligibility
tor war plant emplo1J119nt. Early in 1943 the Joint Board agreed to
consider the caees or all evacuee citizens 17 years or age and over,
and to make rec011111endations to the War Relocation Authority on the
granting ot indefinite leave.
Recommendations or the Joint Board, according to terma ot the
agreement, were not binding on the War Relocation Authority. However,
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the War Relocation .Authority waa guided by these reocaaendations to
the extent of uking further 1nvestipt1ona 1D all the caaea where

tbe Joint Board bad tailed to recCIIDlaod t.he eranting of indefinite
leave. The • r Relocation Authority, at the requeat of t.he Anq,
agreed tor a period not to iaaue indefinite leave for relocation
within the ..■ tern Defense Ccwmend and the coastal areas ot the
Southern Delana~ Ccwnend to arq indiTidual whose case the Joint Board
diaapprOYed• Up to December 14, 1943, the War Relocati~ Authority
kept thia agreement. HaweTer, 1iba l.agt,b ot time C01111U11ed by Joint
Board clearance bad- 1D IIIID1' inatances coat eligible evacuees to loee
deairable job otters in the Eastern States. After the laat aowaent
to Tule i:.Jce ot those evacuees whose loyalty did not seem to lie
wi.th America, the War Relocation Authority withdrew frcm this agreemant.
Early in 1944 the Joint Board diaaolved, returning to the War
Relocation Authority about 1,000 cases upon which it had taken no
action. Frca then 011 clearance for war plant employment wu handled
by the Provost llarsbal General •s Office. The Joint Board had funo-tioned more as a deterrent to relocation than as an aid aa had been
hoped. The following are atatiatica of the board •a operations atter
it bad operated for l year and shortly before it was diasolved:
Total nuaber of caaea referred by the liar Relocation
Authority•••·••••·•••••••·•·•••••••••·•·•••••••••·• 37,'42S
Approved for Eastern Defense r.cnrnand but not invutinted for war plant •ployaent .• • ••••••••••••••••• 21,167
Appr~ved for Eastern Defense Canmand and war plant
emploment ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ••••
491
Approved for Eastern Defense Canmand but referred
to Western Defense Command••···••···••••••••••• •••• 2,48S
Dillapproved •••·•••·••·•••••~•••••••·•••••••·•••••••·• 11,728
No action taken••••·•••••••••••••••••·•·••••••·••••••
489
In the case of those f n persons who were cleared for war plant work,
the long delaya betore clearance !'orced most ot th• into less essential

•plo::,ment. 'lh• actions or the Joint Board, in the minds ot the
nacuees, furnished one more case of diacrimination. The paychologioal
block thus formed proved one of the greatest deterrents to relocation.

LEAVE CLEARANCE INVESTIGATIONS
As a
intormation
returned to
'lb.e purpose

result of Joint Board actions and adverse intelligence
on specific individuals, approximately 12,000 casea were
the canters for further investigation before Juq l, 1944•
of such investigation was to develop by individual bearing
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tactual information C011cerning the evacaee•s attitude and loyal.t71n
order to resolve to a reaeonable degree 8lf1 questionable tactore r►
garding the issuance or denial ot leave clearance. laave clearance
wu never denied except on the basis of individual hearings at the
center, and was denied onl7 by the National Di.rector of the War
Relocation Authorit7. Kost of thoate who were denied leave clearance
were tranaterred to the segreption center at Tule Lake.
In order to establish a procedure which would operate uniformI,,
it was necessary to·prmmlgate an appropriate administrative inatruction to the relocation centers and field offices. The project director
at each center established a bearing board, and in September 1943, the
Director set up a review cCllllllittee in Washington with the Head of the
Leave Section as cbainaaD• The function of this cmmittee was to ·
review objectively the project bearings and to make independent
re~annemationa tor or againat leave clearance to the Director. About
'20 staff members recruited from various divisions ot the Authorit7
served in either full time or part tiae capacit7 on the collllittee.

At the time the Joint Board returned the cases upon which ite
action had been unfavorable, the laave Section prepared transmittal
letters and assembled material essential for project bearings on each
of them. Evacuees whose cases had been unfavorably reported were placed
on a •atop" list and could not be granted leave b7 the project director
11Dtil a hearing was held and leave clearance approved b7 the Director.
In many monthe ot association 111th the evacuee population, the
War Relocation Authority accumulated a large amount ot information about
each evacuee 17 ;years ot age or older. 'nle Leave Section tiles contained information on such topics as the individual's education, emplo1ment record, relatives in Japan, knowledge of the Japanese language,
investments in Japan, organizational and religious affiliations, and
special aptitudes and hobbies. Reference letters were enlightening as
to the evacuee's history and hie social and econanic -environment.
lntelligence reports disclosed contributions inade to prC:,:.Japaneae
organizations, or affiliations with organizations considered inimical
to the· interests of the United States.

After the hearing at the center the case was returned with
a transcript, the project director's reccmmendation and any-additional
relevant intormation. The docket was then prepared tor the review
canmi ttee b7 the Leave Section•
The Leave Section's individual files on evacuees classed as
adults (past 16 years of age) were continuously used for adminia'trative
purposes and were available to authori~ecl representatives ot the
Federal Bureau of Inve~tigation, the Provost Marshal General's Office,
the Cirtl Service Colllniaaion and other Federal agencies.
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PROGRmS OF RBVInt COMMI'rl'D ACTION
On June 30, 1944 after 10 months ot tunctioni..Dg, the project
hearing boards had held hearings on 9, l 77 individual cases and the
renew committee had acted upon them in the followinR wavs: 7,18'7
were approved for the granting of indefinite leave, 1,524 were denied
leave c'learance and the individuals were listed for transfer to Tule
Lake, 50 cases were deterred, and 4~ were returned to the project tor
rehearing a.

As or December :U, 1943, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had
completed and returned a total of 77,037 record checks made since it
began checking records for -th~ War Relocation Authority, leaving 2,101
pending. This balance was cleared up early in 1944.

The extensive and intensive leave clearance programs may in
retrospect seem to have bean excessive in that aliens of' other enemy
nationalities and citizens of' other enamy-nation extraction were not
generally so care:f'u.lly screened. There were, however, many pressures
making thorough check of' this particular group of persons necessary and
desirable. Some of these reasons were entirely aside from any special
suspicion of this group as compared With others which were categorically similar. The Army required the setting up of the Joint Boal'd.
The Civil Service Commission placed in force special discriminatory
regulations limiting the El'Tlploym~t of Nisei by the Government. A
smal.l but violent section of the press had created particular suspicion of this group in the public mind. It we.a therefore necessary for
the War Relocation Authority to "clear" as individuals persons condemned as a group by a portion of the public and by some Government
agencies. Special clearances were also necessary in order to safeguard the relocating evacuees by giVing positive assurance to the general publi"c that each one of them had been individually and thoroughly
checked. 'lhese assurances proved of particular value in effecting war
plant P.lacement. The thoroughness or checking we.a extremely valuable
in creating favorable public relations in communities where resettlement was to take place in that it gave ammunition to answer and effectively block the numerically small but vocally loud voices or rabble
rousers attempting to make capital of the resettlement program.
The stigma placed on these people by evacuation made absolutely
necessary, from the standpoint of present and future public acceptance,
that they be cleared indiVidually and collectively. Not until-relocation had actually been accomplished on a broad scale, and an excellent
record thoro:ighly established by Japanese as good Americans in civilian
as-well as in military life, was it possible to say that the suspicions attached to the group originally were largely erased from the

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publio•s mind. The elaborate and sometimes onerous checking syste
was a neoessary pr.fliminary to the reeducation ot the Amerioan people
in regard to this particular minority.

REEVALUATION OF 'IHE RELOCATION PROGRAM
By early summer 1943 the flow ot evacuees from the centers was
gaining momentum. It was steadily draining the centers ot the young
and unattached but was leaVing almost intact the substantial group ot
older people with family pesponsibilities. It was recognized that
reevaluation and redefinition of the War Relocation Authority•s relocation objectives were in order, and in the first week ot July the key
relocation people from the field and centers filet in the Washington
office to discuss the problems they faced in carrying out the relocation program. The conference clarified and unified thinking on the
entire subject of relocation, and it produced practical definite recoDD!lendations, implementation of vmich had by the end of the year
carried the relocation program to a point where -it was reaching a more
complete cross-section of the population of the centers.

Previously the slow moving machinery for establishing leave
clearance had retarded the advance of relocation but as of July l,
1943, the large majority of~vacuees had been processed and were
eligible for indefinite leave. Allowing for the segregation of those
ineligible for leave clearance and their dependents, it was apparent
that the War Relocation Authority would be left with approxima.tely
85,000 people still in the centers. Thus far the relocation program
had resulted in the resettlement of .fewer than 10,000 people. A great
majority of the relocated personR were in their early 2Qts end were
either single or young oouples without family responsibilities. t'ew
families were actually leaving the centers. It was necessary to deter-mine what was holding families back and then to remove such deterrents
whether the obstructions were actual and material or whether they
eXisted only in the minds of the evacuees. The overcoming ot obstacles
to relocation would require,. it was realized, a reVitalized education
program directed at the ·evacuee in the centers. It was agreed that
greater evacuee participation in relocation planning was essential to
the future success of the program.
During the summer, surveys were rrnde at several centers to find
out what was preventing the families from relocating. 'l'he most coJllplete or these surveys was made at Granada where the questionnaire
submitted produced 2,587 replies. Evacuees were asked when they
wanted to relocate and what their reasons were for hesitancy about
resettlement. Only 5.9 percent were interested in leaving -the centers
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within a few months, 27.1 percent said they were willing to leave only
after the end of the war, 33.2 percent were undecided as to whether or
not they should attempt relocation. The'principal reason for hesitation W&s "uncertainty or public sentiment"; other prevailing reasons
were lack of :funds against an emergency, lack of information about conditions outside the center, fear of being unable to support dependents,
and fear of being unable to find proper living quarters.
One principal deterrent which was difficult to classify was that
inany people had· become institutionalized,. their wants were takail care
of, they knew where the next meal would come from and that they ,vould
be looked after in an emergency. Ml:llly of the older men who had worked
hard all their lives could now sit and play cards all day. The women
whose sociH.l life had been limited by tradition and who had labored
hard most of their lives had found pleasure in the meetings and leisure
to whioh center life had introduced them. Even though living conditions
et the centers were not too satisfactory, they were comfortable and
were better then the majority of evacuees had had before evacuation.
With the termination of the harvest work in 1942, most of the
seasonal workers returned to relocation centers. However, there was a
substantial nwnber who did not wish to return and were permitted to
apply for indefinite leave and stay in the area in which they had been
working. An arrangement was made between one major sugar company and
transcontinental railway in northern Montana for the railroad to take
over as many seasonal employees as would stay for winter employznent.
Several hundred workers accepted this plan. In all areas some farmers
retained evacuees for year round work_. Warehouses employed some of th•
evacuees, who had been working in the fields, tor winter warehouse
work, while other employers invited evacuees to stay on as domestic
workers during the winter months. It is estimated that approximately
500 workers out of the 10,000 remained out on permanent relooation.
These workers were processed under the indefinite leave procedures that
were by then established.
.
The War Relocation Authority had no sooner terminated its 1942
fall seasonal leave program than it started to get inquiries from
agriculturists concerning its 1943 seasonal program. During the 1942
seasoL, a great deal of confusion had existed in many areas because or
overle.pping of the War Relocation Authority seasonal leave program and
the Depart1iient of .Agricul tu.re• s farm labor program. Consequently the
War Relocation Authority suggested to the Department ot Agriculture in
January 1943 that the seasonal leave program tor evacuees be handled by
the Department of .Agriculture. 'l'he Department of Agriculture officials
were sympathetic but their progrmri for 1943 was still in the planning
stage, and they could ofter nothing concrete in the way of a program
for evacuee workers. '.rb.e Authority delayed its seasonal work program
100011 Q---46--8

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as long as possible. However, by~arch 1943 the pressure had become so
great that it was necessary to announce a seasonal leave program separate from the Department of Agriculture's program. Seasonal leave was
handled in 1943 much the same as it had been in 1942. The Authority
had a field organization, however, in 1943 and spent a great deal more
time teying to work out seasonal leave arrangements which might develop
into permanent relocation.
During this season there was increased competition between
communities for evacuee services, and it was necessary to retain the
county travel restrictions siuply to keep peace between comm\lllities
which were trying to steal each others workers. Communities near relocation centers insisted on letting workers live in relocation centers
and commute daily to and from the work fields. In fairness to more
distant communities and in order to run an orderly center, it was necessary to abolish this practice of cotunuting. This caused a t!reat deal ot
resentment on the part of evacuees as well as on the part of nearby
confil1unitiea and the Authority was besieged with protests.
As the 1943 seasonal leave progI'81J'. progressed, it became apparent that while the seasonal leave program was a major factor in promoting relocation, it also had its retarding effect. Utmy able-bodied
evacuees found it very convenient to leave all their dependants in a
relocation center where they would be cared for at Government expense
~ile they were on seasonal leave at high wages. They could then return to relocation centers securing tree maintenance for themselves
during slack seasons of employment. This worked out to the apparent
advantage of the evacuees, and appeared to be a better paying proposition than permanent relocation. In order to meet this situation,·it
became necessary to insist that evacuees going out on seasonal leave
remain for the entire period of their leave rather than commuting back
and forth as many of them had done.
By December ·1943 approximately 3,900 persons hnd relocated in
the Salt Lake area and 3,000 persons in the Denver-area as against
11,000 persons in all of the rest of the country. It we.s tho'lltYlt that
the seasonal leave program plus the proximity of centers were chiefly
responsible for this over E!llllphasis of settlement in the Denver and
Salt Lake districts as compared to other parts or the country which
seemed to offer better prospects for permanent relocation.
1here were other factors contributing to a lag in general
relocation·. One factor suggested by the evacuees was that the
Authority refused to readmit relocated evacuees for permanent residence
in relocation csnters unless it appeared to be to the evacuee•s best
interest. It was necessary for the Authority to place such restric-

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tions because early experience showed that many of the relocatees bec8Jle discouraged or homesick inunediately after arrival, and in many
cases went back to the center before giving relocation a fair trial.
A prime retarding factor and an outgrowth of the segregation
plan was the establishment of the leave clearance "stop" list. The
removal of a name from the "stop" list could be accomplished only on
the basis of painstaking hearings. At the close of 1943, there were
still some hundreds of cases on which a final decision as to eligibility for leave clearance had not been reached. Some of the encuees
affected were not only eager to relocate but also were heads of family
groups, with the· result that upon their own relocation was contingent
the relocation of the entire family. These persons also frequently
encouraged friends and relatives to delay their relocation until they
thanselves were released.
Consistently discouraging throughout the program of relocation
were the hindrances thrown in the way of evacuees by other Government
egencies such as certain divisions of the Army, the Navy and the Civil
Service COI:1J11ission.
There were a number of developments favorable to relocation 1n
the fall of 1943 and early in 1944. By August 1943 public relations
work had been so effective in many communities that it was no longer
necessary to give advance approval to a relocation . plan. Project
directors were told to encourage relocation on the basis of a community
inVitation in these communities. This saved a great deal of time and
gave assurance to the evacuee of conununity welcome. Hostels operated·
by church groups in C'hicago, Cleveland, Cincinnati and Des Moines, at
that tiiae, offered living accommodations to evacuees at a reasonable
price. These hostels, the first of which was established in Chicago
in January 1943, were designed to be we.ystations in which the newcomer
to a community could make prior arrangements for temporary housing and
usually meals during a brief period on arriYal in the new community.
This afforded him initial security and an opportunity for orientation.
Under the community invitation plan,. the hostel provided a base .for
seeking employment as well as housing.
In Novernber 1943 relocation supervisors and officers were advised to reduce the nwnber of job offers being sent to the centers as
the nwnber of these offers had become more beWildering than enlightening. It was recognized that a different kind of information was needed
by center residents, most of whom knew little about any part of the
United States east of the Rocky Mountains.
During the summer of 1943, reports officers were employed in
several of the area offices chiefly to meet this need for information

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existing -among evacuees. Selected on the basis ot newspaper and writing experience, these information specialists were primarily concerned
with providing the canters with factual information in regard to their
areas. Information provided included pamphlets describing the geography and economy ot different States and districts, ~ewsletters,
booklets on taming characteristics of various agricultural sections,
and first hand accounts of what earlier Japanese residents had accomplished. Later, pamphlets dealt with welfare services available to
evacuees, tips on starting a small business, opportunities for Issei,
etc. Reports officers also kept the War Relocation Authority personnel
posted on newspaper story possibilities. 1'hey contacted newspapers and
radio stations to secure the cooperation of these media in promoting
community acceptance. By then, however, reception was generally favorable enough in the Middle West and East so that the chief emphasis was
on convincing the evacuee that it 71RS desirable for hia to relocate.
In Ma~ch 1944, a new leave procedure authorized a trial period
of indefinite leave. A rider on the indefinite leave pemit of the
person ~•s1r1Dg a trial period permitted him to return to the center
at the end of 4 months or at any time between the beginning of the
fifth and end of the sixth month. The evacuee on this type of leave
was to remain in a specific area and was expected to remain with the
employer from whom ha first accepted employment. This restriction was
necessary because of the acute publi~ relations problem which had bean
caused by so many evacuees jumping jobs contra;ry to the existing War
Manpower job freeze regulations. Changes could be approved where the
evacuee was not making a satisfactory adjustment. Any infringement of
the War Manpower Job freeze regulations placed the evacuee on indefinite
leave and in the same status as any other worker. Under t~ial indefinite leave, the evacuee paid his own transportation costs except that,
any time he decided to give up his trial status and accept regular
inuefinite leave, he could be reimbursed for travel and receive an
assistance grant or other privileges usually granted only to persons
originally leaving on regular indefinite leave. Trial leave was introduced bec~use center residents had requested some such arrangement
which would enable th011 to try out relocation before severing all ties
with the center. It we.a not too successful since in practice most of
the center residents who had been unwilling to relocate on indefinite
leave proved also unwilling to make a bon~ fide attempt under the trial
leave program.
Early 1944 also brought che.nges in the seasonal 1 :?ave :rrogram.
In February it wns decided to grant seasonal leave for periods up to 7
months with the privilege of a 2-months• extension, and to prohibit
the seasonal worker's return to the center for the duration of his contract. Only two s.eo.sonal leave periocm yearly were allowed. These provisions ffiade seasonal leave less attractive to the worker as they
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elimi~ated frequent visits to the center. It was hoped that these
changes would encourage some of the seasonal workers to take their families with them on indefinite leave.

In January 1944, the Authority again tried to tie in the seasonal leave program with the Department of Agriculture farm labor progran.
This time the effort was successful and the Office of Labor of the
Department of Agriculture agreed to treat all evacuees as interstate
labor and handle them on standard interstate contracts. The Office of
labor agreed to handle all details in connection with actual employment
while the J1ar Relocation Authority agreed to handle public relation
factors. In February the seasonal leave program was modified to provide for the issuance of seasonal leave only to persons recruited for
agricultural work through the Office of Labor, and employment was authorized only in counties approved by relocation officers.
These new regulations providing better controls over the seasonal leave program removed direct pressure on the Authority from farm
employers, and facilitated the systematic granting of leaves to meet
the more critical manpower shortan;es. It was possible this year as
in previous years to supply only a small fraction of the demand for
seasonal workers.
FEDERAL AGENCY RULINGS LOOTING EMPLOYMENT

Upon the dissolution of the Joint Board, responsibility for war
plant clearance passed on to the Provost .&iars!lal General's Office.
Before discussing the method of PMGO procedure, it may be well to
eumine the attitude of the evacuees toward war work. }i;any thought
such work would prove their loyalty and clear them of the stigma attached to them by evacuation. Other evacuees, hearing of the high wage
rates being paid for war work, were interested because o~ this factor.
Still others used the restrictions limiting employment of Japanese in
war·plants as a reason for not leaving the centers for this or any
other purpose.
The PMGO procedure called for a system of preclearanoe before an
evacuee could start work in a war plant. It also orir:inally called for
the removal from war plants of those who had been hired before it assumed jurisdiction of such hiring. This last requirement led to vigoi-ous protests both from the evacuees working in war plants and from
their employers. Because of these protests, the PMGO removed this
requirement and allowed current employees to remain pending clearance.
Ho118ver, many who had rendered months of faithful service were removed
after the PMGO investigation arxi this was taken by the evacuee group
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as an indication that they did not have a chance for. successful rtrielocation.
prr

ih•

PllGO investigationa took so long to complete that it was n<,g->t

successful in ~nabling a great many evacuees to secure war plant
employment. In August 1944, the Cleveland area office made a tabulation of applicati"ons for war plant clearance then outstanding in the
Detroit district. There were 172. or that number, 146 had been
pending 2 months and some as lone as 9 months.
Not only 11ere evacuees discouraged and disheartened by these
delays, but employers who filed the long and cumbersome forms could
not hold jobs open for as long as was required. The whole procedure
discouraged many if not most employers from even attempting to hire
Japanese Americans.
Another complicated aspect of the PMGO procedure was in the lack
of uniformity in Yihich ciif.f£rent military districts interpreted the
plants which were to be restricted. In one district a food producing
plant would be permitted to hire evacuees in advance of clearance and
in others a similar company would not. The same dis9arities existed
in connection with various war manufacturing or supplying operations;
for example, a railroad in one command would be permitted to hire track
workers without any clearance, but the same railroad in another command would not. The ,,HA protested these inequities frequel)tly but the
problem was never satisfactorily resolved.
Ar.other example of Government interference resulted in the
prejudicial treatment of east coast w.erch2.nt seamen by the Navy and
State Departments. 'I'heY. decided to restrict persons of Japanese ancestry from sailing in the Atlantio without a passport in advance of
saillnr.. All other sea.men could ship out merely by signing a statement
~i~fying an intention to get a passport. This ruling barred the
i::isei sea.c.en from the Atlantic. An ironic situation arose when
Japanese seamen were removed from ships as they returned from 118?' zone~
many of them victims of torpedoin!!. and all of them having risked their
lives to help deliver goods to our allies. After a great deal of negotiation, the restriction was finally modified before the end of the 1'81'
in Europe, and most of the l£isei seamen were permitted to resume their
sailinc.
Still another example of s0vernrnental obstruction came on June
23, 1943, when the Civil Service Commission issued instructions requiring a special investigation by the Cornr.d.ssion priol',' to appointment of
American citizens of Japanese ancestry to positions in Federal agencies.
This was the only r,roup for which such investication was required prior
to hirinP,. ;..any i~isei were rejected for. rederal employr.ient and many

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more were discouraged and did not apply; some were given third degree
investigations and kept in suspense- for months thereafter. Some of
those already on the payroll remained on their jobs pending complet.ion
or an investigation and others were immediately removed.

EVACUEE PARTICIPATION
By the latter ha'l.f of 1943 field offices had established that
satisfactory relocation plans could be made for almost any individual
or family group, regardless of any special problems the individual or
the family might- present. The relocation centers, however, had continued to :work primarily with those individuals obviously best able to
relocate, and even among this group they had worked bhiefl.y with those
strongly desiring to leave the centers. It was necessary, consequently,
to change the emphasis in the centers and to interest families less
sure of themselves or more lacking inknowledge of outside coJilll'Dlnities.

Throughout the las~ half of 1943, increasing emphasis was placed
on evacuee participation in relocation planning. As early as .fuly
several of the centers had relocation committees composed or residents.
The~e were now strengthened, in some caees, by being brought within the
authority of the evacuee conmunity council, or by being given a de.finite relationship to appointed staff cornr.dttees on relocation. By the
end oi the year, 't'fro centers had functioning combined evacuee-staff
relocation committees, while at all 9ther centers the evacuees had
formed their OlVll relocation planiing co~.missions which maintained
relations with responsible members of the appointed staff. Issei were
well represented in these grrups. The committees took their responsibilities seriously, assembling the questions which needed to be
~nsvrered before the ereater relocation moven~nt could get under way,
and formlating recommendations.

GROOP REWCATION
About 43 percent of the evacuated people were farr.iers, and it
was expected that ~hey wo~ld want to continue in a('Ticultural work.
}laving sustained heavy financi:e.l losses in the course of the evacuation,
many families did not have money enou¢1 to start farming in a new
re;p..on. Pooling of resources of several families mi~ht partially over. come this difficulty. However, many who did have sufficient Il}Oney or
who cqu.ld arrange for financing ~ere unwilling to risk their small
capital in new fields. Good land available for lease or sharecropping
was not easy to find, and farm machinery was difficult to secure under

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wartime conditions. A great many people believed twt some of the
difficulties of reestablishing farmers could be overcome by securing
opportunities for r:roups of families to leave the centers and brave
the hazards of unfamiliar soil and climate together. In relation to
group farr.ling ventures, it was considered imperative that responsible
representatives of. the c:,-oup be allolt-ed to go out and investigate the
opportunity before they committed themselves.

In November 1943, the following su~!=restions were sent to all
projects to assist group relocation: stiI1U1lation of credit unions to
?rovide resettlement loans; aid to evacuees in securing loans from
rederal and private financing a~encies; exploration of ~oup relocation
opportu~.ities by relqcation officers, with particular regard to agricultural possibilities; and arranr,ements for evacuees representing
tona fide r,roups to make exploratory visits.
,Like trial indefinite leave, this prop;ram did not result in any
considerable relocation. Only a few scattered families attempted rural
relocation outside the Inter-Mountain States where farming methods were
similar to those on the 1'18St coast. C'cnsiderable rrumbers of the seasonal workers 'Who had gone into the Inter-1iountain States did succeed in
establishing themselves as independent farmers. Seabrook Farms in New
Jersey attracted a large rrumber of evacuees for labor work, and the
Becker Farms in Michigan also:stinn.ilated the relocation of agricultural
workers considerably.
l'i"ELFARE COUNSELING

Surveys made during the summer showed that greater emphasis had
to be placed on individual and family counseling if families were to be
relocated. It was realized that to accomplish the relocation of families who were hesitant about relocating it would be necessary to heip
more of them to plan on an individual basis. It was decided to establish~ separate welfare counseling unit at each center with a view
both to breaking down the rationalizations of reluctant families and
to gathering information which would enable V:RA to plan realistically
its .future program.
SOCIAL SEaJRITY AGREEllENT
An agreement with the Social Security Board by which relocated
evacuees were eliiµble for service and assistance under the prori;ram £or
aliens and other persons affected by r~strictive governmental action
became operative in this period in all States except C'clorado. This
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program gave assurance to evacuees that emergencies would be adequately
met in conununities to which they might be planning to go. Most States
have residence laws relating to welfare assistance, requiring from 1
to 3 years• residence before public welfare assistance can be given, and
assistance given throu:ti the Social Security Board lent assurance that
assistance woul9 be available during the period in which evacuees would
be nonresidents. ~hile the number of evacuee applicants for such service was not lar~, the designated State arencies cooperating with the
Social Security Board did provide assistance in a number of cases of
emergencies, illness, and other contingencies, and assumed responsibility in a smaller number of ~nstances of contirniing need.
NATIONAL HOUSING AGENCY AGREEMENT

Lurine the summer of 1943 an agreement was concluded with the
~Jational HousinG Agency desi(;tled to assist relocation officers in one
of their most critical problems. By the terms of this agreement, the
relocation supervisor of a specific area was to advise the NHA regional
representative of current and anticipated in-migration trends. In
return, the ?-nIA would "assist 1,RA in deterr.d.ning the acceptability of
evacuees for housinp; in the locality, 11 and also "be prepared to suggest
the names of localities where the opportunities for housing evacuees
were most promising. 11 This did not work out very well since, where
housing was easily secured, other relocation factors such as employment
~~re not favorable. The aP,reement was not specific enough in practice
to be of direct value, but did encourage many local units to cooperate.
However, not until 1944 did many war housing projects accept evacuees,
and even then many experienced difficulty in meetin~ war housing requirements 'Which commonly included a rather low income ceiling and the
requirement that the occupants be enga~-ed in war work.
DISSEMINATION OF REWCATION INFCID::ATION

In recognition of the fact that the movements of evacuees out of
.the centers was in a sense dependent upon a steady flow into the centers
of accurate information concerning job opportunities and living conditions on the outside, two techniques for accomplishing that end
were stressed toward the end of 1943. Specific information from the
area offices, including listings of job offers and personalized accounts of actual relocation experiences were sent directly to the
centers. Personal experiences of resettlers were sometimes submitted
in letter form and sometimes in informal reports or in-the publications
issued by area offices for center cistribution. The second plan provided for seneing to the centers individuals or teams of individuals

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thoroughly conversant with conditions in specitic localities in order
to give interested evacuees personal contact with people able to an81'8r
their que,tions. At first these visits were made largely by individual
relocation officers, but in November arrangements were made for an
experimental relocation team, consisting of two relocation supervisors,
a member of the ~ashington relocation staff, and a member of the
Washington Reports Division, to visit Rohwer Relocation Center. Cl:>nsiderable preparation was made by not only the members of this team,
but by the entire relocation field statf to make sure that the team
would be provided with every available informational tool. Relocation
kits were prepared in some comrmmi ties, bringing together every form
of informational printed matter that could be prepared or secured
describing the district or area. Dozens of movies descriptive of
occupations and districts were viewed and some of them selected for
the team's use. District offices prepared for the team full descriptions of their more attractive relocation opportunities. The team
members addressed large general meetings and smaller meetings of
specific project groups, and in addition conducted numerous interviews
with individual evacuees seeking further information. The effect of
this team's visit resulted in plans to continue the practice of sending
relocation officers, especially specialists in.specific fields such as
agriculture. It was also decided to continue to have relocation tea.ma
make a tour of all the centers during the early part of 1944.
In addition to the efforts being made by the War Relocation
Authority itself ·to inform evacuees of resettlement opportunities and
conditions, another group of center visitors at this time was serving
much the same purpose and with even more obvious immediate results.
Employers planning to hire large numbers of evacuees sent recruiters
sometimes to one center and sometimes to all of them. The recruiter,
when he was an able man, frequently achieved excellent results since
he had the advantage over representatives of the Authority of being
able to concentrate on one job and one conununity 'Which .h..e · knew extremely well. By this means the confusion could be avoided 'Which
sometimes developed in the evacuees' minds when presented with not one
but hundreds of colilllllnities and jobs. Recruiters were employed successfully by a wide variety of employers and from many sections of the
country. They ranged from wealthy individuals visi tine a center to
attempt to hire one or several domestic servants to large industrial
employers, such as the International Harvester Chmpany, seeking to
employ hundreds of factory workers. Hotels were among the more
successful and persistent recruiting organizations, the Stevens Hotel.
in Qlicago, for instance, having hired several hundred evacuees by
this process. The largest scale recruitment by a private concern was
done by Seabrook Farms in New Jersey, -which offered not only large
scale group employment:, but also group living 'Which proved particularly
attractive to Issei. Railroads recruited for track laborers, frequently
offering family housing as well as employment. Government agencies
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also participated in the recruiting of 110rkers in the centers. The
Office of Strategic Service, the Army Map Service, and Arm::, and Navy
intelligence schools carried on vigorous recruiting programs in all or.
the relocation centers. They recruited hundreds of :workers. The
Ordnance Department of 'the Army, beginning in the late summer of 1944,
also recruited several hundred evacuees for arsenal work. These
arsenal jobs effected considerable family relocation since they offered
fami~ housing. The Viar Hemp Administration recruited•more than a
hundred men for middle •stern jobs in Government operated plants
processing hemp. lhile the numbers recruited by these Federal agencies
were small in comparison with the total rrumber of people to be relocated these recruitments provided a great impetus to the relocation
program. The utilization of evacuees in essential war employment by
these agencies provided good public relations material to stimulate
the use of evacuees by other essential employers. These recruiting
campaigns 4lso served to reduce the psychological barriers 'Which were
being built up in the minds of many evacuees.
Particular stress was laid in the field at this time on securing
and bringing to the attention of the centers jobs which offered housing
together with employment for one or more families. Large private
estates and public and private institutions proved particularly able
to provide this type of job and hcrusing combination.
PLANNING FOR OOMMUNITY ADJUSTMENT

From the beginning of the relocation program, many chur.ch groups·
and other interested agencies had been active in creating local interest in the VinA program, and in many communities they provided the
relocation officer with local sponsors to whom he could turn for advice
and assistance. As the program broadened and more persons relocated,
it became evident .that a broader cross-section of community cooperation
essential, not only to assist WR.A in matters of employment, housing
and public relations, but also to provide in the community a solid
foundation for the acceptance of evacuees on the same basis as other
residents. There wc:s need to implement locally national agreements
worked out by \·~RA and othe~ public and private agencies, and to coordinate the efforts of other groups so that the resources they possessed
might be available for the use of evacuees. In recognition of this
need for more far-reaching planning in conum.mi ty adjustment, persons
on the staff of the area offices were designated to specialize in the
organization of community resources.

was

There were two main objectives in this painstaking work with
local committees and agencies: (1) to ease the transition of the
evacuee from the isolated and socially artificial centers to life in
a normal cormninity by meeting the resettler with an understandinr, of
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his situation; (2) to encourage relocated evacuees in assisting their
family members and friends to relocate. The youth and inexperience of
these very young people llho had gone ou·t from the· centers, usually
~lone, to adjust to life and work in a completely strange environment,
pointed more and more to the need of having their families join them.
Uiring the fall of 1943, there was evidence that young people in
Olicago, New York, and certain other localities were beginning to bring
their parents out.of the centers. Where this happened, the infusion
of the older generation made for a more stable and better integrated
social situation among the newcomers.
·

AWINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION FOR REU>Q\TION
A significant development during the latter half of 1943 was the
growing conviction that the relocation program was a cooperative one to
which all divisions of the Authority had a contribution to make. Orlginally the handling of the relocation program, both in the national
office and at the centers, was the function.of the Employment Division.
It was not long before the conflict between project employment and
relocation was apparent. As relocation progressed, the dual obligation
of this division to maintain center operations and at the same time to
urge all the efficient workers to leave center employment for relocation kept the division in constant conflict ~~thin itself and with
other center operations. It was understood that ~roject employment
must be subordinated to relocation. The fact remained that the
Employment ni.vision was being called upon to build up a commmity with
one hand and tear it down with the other. Relocation conunittees, consisting of representatives of the employment, reports, and community
management di visions, finally were set up in the ~,ashington office and
at the centers. The work of these committees in some measure relieved
the Employment Division, but there was increasing awareness that relocation interests could best be served by a special division created
to devote all its energies to relocation. On the basis of discussions
held in the V!ashington office and. of suggestions received from the
field, ~~e Relocation Division was organized in November 1943. The new
division was assigned all functions previously performed by the
Employment Division, except that at the project level, project employment and housing was made a function of personnel management, and in
the national office, leave clearance ~-as made the responsibility of the
Ad'llinistrative i.tanagement .l>:i.vision. 'Ihe new division also took over
the functions of the ltelocation Assistance Division except those involving evacuee property, which were assigned to the .hcimin_istrative
:,ianagement Di vision.
\';1th this reorganization, a greatly increased staff in -;,ashingtxx,
the field, am. at the projects was assigned to relocation. By the
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close of.1943, the division of responsibility between the various
divisions of the Authority had been clearly established, and the
Relocation Division was 110rldng toward closer relationships with other
Federal agencies and private organizations at the national level. The
strengthening of the relocation staff at the· centers and expansion of
the field program gave added emphasis to adjustment of evacuees in communities of relocation, and to exploring increased opportunities for
f arnily and /!l"Oup· relocation.
From the Washington office, arrangements were made with the '
Travelers I Aid Society and the Family ~ielfare Association of America
to provide the cooperation of their branch offices and affiliated aeencies in virtually all large communities where relocation activities
were in progress. Other relationships, previously established with
public and private agencies, were reviewed and modified, where necessary; to tie them more closely into the relocation program.
There had been repeated requests by organizations of center
residents and by some individuals for information in regard to the
availability of loans for the establishment of small businesses and
the resumption of far:ning. furing this period the Authority made various attempts to secure agreements with such Federal agencie~ as the
Heconstruction Finance Corporation, the Farm Secitrity Administration,
and the Federal I.and Dank to finance evacuees who wished to reestablish
business pr farminr, operations. Token assurances of cooperation were
forthcoming, but few, if any, loans were ever actually negotiated by
evacuees from these sources. One of the difficulties was that of
rretting an evacuee with reasonable 9rospects for a loan to go through
the process of actually applying for one. Most evacuees were unwillfng
to leave the center and work out a business plan as was required by
loaning agencies unless they could receive definite assurances that
they would get such a loan. In many inetances, it appeared that evacuees were using their demands for easy loans as a rationalization for
not leaving the centers. The lieconstruction Finance Corporation's
regulations were not clear as to aliens• eligibility for loans and no
Issei would apply. It was found that the Farm Security Administration
had more pendine applications than funds avallable for loaning purposes.
Some evacuees were able to establish a basis for securinr loane and did
secure them generally throuvi normal ?rivate bankin:;,- or;ranizations.
There were also a few instances in which loans for the estabiishment of
businesses were made by private welfare or~anizations, and in at least
one instance, through a fund established by a resettlement committee.
At the relocation centers, the program of relocation counselinc,
which was to have been the responsibility of the welfare section, was
revitalized and was divided between that section and the relocation
division. \.elfare counselors were assigned to interview families with

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vJelfare problems already known to that division. The relocation division assumed responsibility for all remaining families. This counseling pror.ram which was completed durine 1944 gave a wealth or information
concerninP, the problems and the thinkinr, or evacuees in regard to
relocation.
The greatest difficulties i.n relocation planning arose with
families which presented dependency problems or serious social maladjustments. In such cases careful planning wit.li outside social a~ncies
was indicated. It was also necessary to make special plans for the
relocation of unattached children as well as to assume the euidance of
youths of 17 and 18 in their new collUIDlnities by church e;roups, social
agencies, or responsible relatives.
For those families and minors definitely planning relocation,
but obviously requiring continuing financial assistance or social
r,:uidance, a plan was worked out under 'Which definite responsibilities
were asswned by local social a~ncies prior to movement of the family
or individual from the center. Detailed family summaries were prepared in the relocation center and submitted to the area office having
jurisdiction over the community in 'Which the individual or family
planned to relocate. The area supervisor or area adjustment officer
then presented these swnmaries to the appropriate local welfare agency,
securing either an acceptance of the case or a refusal of the ~ase,
with reasons for such refusal. This plan not only served to reassure
the persons relocating under it, but also provided the social agency
with a wealth of bac_kground material enabling them to be of greater
- assistance to the resettler.
~bile the need for more effective evacuee participation had
been recognized previously, it had been extremely difficult to ~t
responsible evacuees to take active part as relocation was not too
popular at the centers. By June 1944, however, relocation plannine
commissions, composed of evacuee representatives, had been oreanized
at most of the canters. Thay were calculated to exercise an~mportant
influence not only in the day-to-day planning of relocation activities,
but also in gaining acceptance for the program amon~ the evacuee residents. These evacuee commissions were sometimes helpful in disseminating information about specific relocation opportunities and
interpreting \1,HA policies. At several centers they sponsored the
interviewinc program and recommended several important changes in
policy to stirmilate wider interest in resettlement. At other centers,
the commissions proved ineffective because of differences 9f opinion
between groups and leaders in regard to the desirability of relocation.
To encouraR'.'8 the relocation of families~ several significant
modifications were made in th~ leave assistance pTogram. The limitation was removed on the weight of personal property which relocating
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families could have shipped at Government expense. Shipment, not
previous~ available. at Government expe~e, 11as authorized for the
equipment, tools and fixtures essential to an evacuee's trade, business
or profession (not to exceed 5,000 pounds), when replacing them in the
area of relocation was not feasible because of wartime shortages.
Pullman accommodations were made available for the sick and the infirm
relocating with their families, and coach fares were authorized for
the r~presentati ves of evacuees selected for the purpose of making a
final investigation of relocation oppor'tuni ties, when such trips were
approved by the relocation officers concerned.
In the relocation field offices, as well as in the Washington
office and at the centers, special efforts were made to get more families and older people to relocate. Evacuees already relocated were
encouraged to plan with counselors from social agencies and the ~'RA
field representatives for resettlement of their families and friends.
Dlring the first half of 1944, 10 district offices were closed
and 4 new offices 118re opened. 'Most of the offices closed were in the

Inter-Mountain Area, where the assumption of respor.sibility for seasonal worker• b;y the Department of Agriculture eU:.d.nated th~ need for
these WR.A oltices. Two of the new offices 11P-re established in Savannah
and New

Orleans to pioneer the development of relocation opportunities

in the Sollth.
With the opening of offices in the South, relocation was being
offered in all parts of the country, excepting in the evacuated area.
-~lit.bout bringing undue pressure on individuals as to selection of their
destination, the Authority did encourage as broad a distribution of
Japanese as possible and was proving reasonably successful in securing
their dispersal throughout a great many sections of the country.
The total project population had be~n sufficiently reduced by
relocation that the Director decided to eliminate one of the relocation
centers and to transfer remaining ~esidents to available quart~rs in
other centers. It was realized that some step had to be taken to affect the complacency which was making many individuals and groups in
the centers resistant to relocation. It was hoped that closing one
center and indicating that other centers would gradually be closed
would have this desired effect. Announcement was made on February 22,
1944, that the Jerome Relocation Center, in Drelf and Chicot Cbunties,
Arkansas, would be closed on June 30. Jerome 11as small at the time,
having only 6.600 residents. It was close to Rohwer, making_ transfer
of many of tne residents easier. The center was closed on schedule.
While the center ,~d all field offices made great effort t,o relocate i ta
.residents, the i711I!l8diate effect on relocation. either from Jerome itself
or from the other centers was not as Rreat as had been hoped for.
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The closing of relocation centers on an individual basis was not continued, since before further center closures became practical, it began
to appear that the exclusion order might be lifted in the near future
am that it would lead tQ the general dissolution -of all relocation
centers.

REWCATION PROGRESS
furing the first half of 1944, despite the increased attempts to
stimulate relocation, only about 10,000 people relocated as compared to
approximately 8,000 in the previous 6 months. The surprisingly small
inorease was disappointing since this had been the first period in
which field and center relocation staffs had been adequate to handle a
umch greater number of people. One favorable aspect was that a greater
percentage of the people relocating were Issei.
Up to Dec~ber 1944, relocation progress was continuing in much
the same pattern as-~ had in earlier months, except that during the
last half of 1944 abou~,000 less people relocated than during the
first half. f1eld office had, in general, completed their job of
creating favorable acceptari~ in most communities. Jobs were available
in a tremendous range of occupations, and earnings were high in many
communities. Cities such as Oiicago, kinneapolis, Cleveland and New
York not only had a great surplus of all ordinary types of jobs, but
could give reasonable assurance to an evacuee with even the most outof-the-way skill or profession that employment in his own or a related
field could be obtained. Many commuri\ties in which employment was
readily obtainable could also give assu;-ances that adequate housing
was available.
The job, however, in the relocation centers was becoming more
and r:iore -difficult, since for the most part the adventuresome, unattached young people and the more confident and self-reliant families
were gone. Many with large families were fearful as to their ability
to support their dependents on the outside as well as they were being
supported by the Government in the centers. No amount of successful
relocation by families vdth similar problems seemed to convince them
that they should do likewise. Center livin~ was bein~ accepted as a
normal way of life by many people, and complacency in regard to it was
common. Apathy marked the attitude of an increasing rrumber, and it was
apparent that continued center living was not only demoralizing, but
was tending to disintegrate the fiber of a people who had, previous to
evacu~tion, been unusually self-reliant, sturdy, and independent.

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I

Children wre being e ■pecially &ttected by the ■egregated nature
o~ oamp litea by- laok of oontact with other Amerioana. It wa■ al ■ o
apparent that the •jority- of the people remaining in the oentera could
nei th.er oontinue liTing in them w1 thout great peraona.l and aocial lo ■a
to themaelvea and to the lation., nor could they be induced by voluntary
mathoda to relooate. It waa belieTed that moat ot the people would
leave Toluntarily it they could return to their former weat oout hOIDB ■•
The War Relooation Authority repeatedly brought these facts to the
attention of the ArS¥ and urged the earliest poaaible rescinding of the
general ezcluaion order.
RBSCDIDDJG OF THE GBNBRAL BlCUJSiON <IU>IR
AID THE BFFBCT OI RBLOCATIOI
On Deoamber 17., 1944., the Western Defense Ccmmand revoked the
wat coast general exolµaion order tor per ■ona of Japanese ance■ try
which had been in ettect since March 1942. The lifting ot the order
-.... ettectiTe January- 2., 194:5. It waa the moat ■ igniticant event ainoe
8"9'&ouation., both in the lite of the evacuated people and in the program
of the War Relocatian Authority. To the great •jority of evacuee■., it
meant tull restoration ot freedom o? movementa to the War Relocation
Authority it aigm.tied the beginning of the tina.l phase of ita program.
The relocation program waa tor the tirat time on a oompletely- nationwide buia.

The reopening ot the evacuated area and the broadening ot the
relooation program came at a fortunate time for the eva~ted people.
Job ■ were plentiful and there waa excellent demand tor workers in war
plants., in civilian goods production., in service oooupations., and on
farm■•
Throughout it■ program., the War Relocation Authority had
repeatedly- advi■ ed naoueea to relocate during the period while war
time proaperi ty waa at i ta height. Arter the lifting of the exclusion
order., ~ were able to reeatabliah themaelves before the war'• end.
Those who returned to the e ■t coast . alter August 1946., when war plant■
were beginniDg to close and there was beginning to be aome local unemplOJ1119nt., had a le ■ a wide . choice of job1 than would have been available
had they lett earlier. For thaae people and tor the War Relocation
Authority., the ·tinal relocation job would have been easier had the
exclusion order been 11.tted earlier.
Coincident with the lifting of the exclusion order., 1IRA
it■ own liquidation.
All relocation centers were
to be closed within a period ot 6 J110Dtha to 1 year after the revocation
of the exclusion order. However., no center,.._. to be clo■ ecl without

&DDo\lDCed pl&D8 tor

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3 months• advance notice to the re■identa. other policy
oovere4 in the liquidaticm amiouncement were,

change■

1. Leave pend.ta wre no longer to be required ot evacuee•
leavi~ the center■ tor purpose• ot relooation. Seasonal leave
was abolished since the empha■ is had to be on permanent re ■et­
tlement. llany encueea protested this decision to discontinue
seasonal leave. The Authority also received a great many
protests from agricultural groups. However, the Authority
agreed to encourage all evacuees who wanted to leaTe centers
permanently to go out on so-called seasonal jobs and relocate
from there, but refused to allow persona leaving on ■ea■on&l
jobs to return to the center ■• All departures troa the center•
henceforth were to be terminal departures or short-term lea.Te
for inve ■tigation purpose ■ or emergencies.
2. Reinduotion tor residenoe at centers was no longer permi.tted
tor evacuees who had lett the centers for purposes ot relocation.
3. ApproTal of relocation officers in the field waa required
tor all visit■ to the cetera, and suoh viaita were limited to
tho■ e which would oontribute to the relooation ot family member■
in the centers or to emergenoiea, with excepticma in the cue ot
members ot the armed toroee or the Enlisted Re••"• Corpe.
Center Tisita were initially limited because it wa■ teared that
many or the 35,000 persona already relocated might return to
relocation center ■ with a view to reestablishing themselves a.a
center residents so that they might better, as they thought, be
able to take advantage or such aa11■ tance a.a the Authority ,might
ofter tor reestabli ■hment on the west coast. It was al ■ o feared
tu.t any large influx ot Tisitor ■ at tirat might complicate
center administration and the application or new, stepped-up
relocation procedures. A.a a wartime meaaure, the Authority also
did not feel justified in encouraging exceaaive use or rail
transportation at a time when war needs required that aa few
people use trains as possible. Within a short time, the
Authority was able to get adequate information to reaettlere,
and the need tor visiting limitations ceased to exist. At that
time restriction■ were lifted.
Lee ■ ea1ential ••"ices at the centers were to be sharply
curtailed. Schools were to be continued only through the spring
term.

4.

5. Field office ■ were to be set up in the evacuated area to
facilitate the return or eTacuees, and, simultaneou■ ly, increased
stress was placed on the relooa.tion advantages or other areas of
the country u well.
·

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e. Only those e"f&ouees whose relocation plans were approved by
WRA would be eligible for relocation assi■ tanoe. This was done
solely to enable the Authority to control any stampede which
many people outside the Authority tea.red might develop toward
uy -one coDl'ND1ty or area. In practice, no such mas ■ movement
developed and this regulation did not lim1t individuals from
moving where and when they wished.
7. Evacuee ■ who had already relocated elsewhere, but who had an
approved plan .tor resettling in the evacuated area,were to be
entitled to the relooation·transportation assistance tor themselves and property on the same basia aa those who .•ere leaving
the centers for the tir ■ t time.
The Director announced these reaaona tor adopting the liquidation
policy,
1. Center living was bad tor the evacuees. It did not provide
an atmosphere in which children could develop in the normal
American pattern. It was generally destructive of good work
habits, ot the ■mse or responsibility on the part ot tamily
heads, and did not provide normal family living conditions.
For their own wlfare, the evacuees needed to get back into the
lite ot the usual American nc111muu;I. ty. Thia could be accomplished
only by closing the centers.

2. The country, still at war, needed the skills and the manpower
represented by the center population.
3. The Congreaa would undoubtedly question the necessity or
appropriating tunds to continue centers. (Some Congressmen
later questioned the neceaaity of maintaining centers tor eTen
the period which mu. considered eaaenti&l to orderly liquidation.)
4. A.a long aa this segment or the population re1111W.Ded concentrated in the centers, they were more vulnerable to campaigns
directed against them by their enemies. The very fact that they
were aet apart tended to heighten the impression that their
loyalty was in question.
6. If centers were to be liquidated, it should be done during
the wartime period of high employment -when relocation opportunities were favorable.
Early in the year, WRA endeavored to anticipate the needs or a
at the exclusion order. Since the great majority of evacuees could now go back
Nati.on-wide relocation program made poHible by revocation

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lacae, aachlmr7 wu Mt ap iD tM nacaated arN P1wUar to U.t al.nady
o,eratmc ill other NC'ticma ot tbe COUDtry. 1'JlrM ..... relocaticm
otticN ...,.. Ntabllabeds {l) aoathl,111 Cali.tcr11i& ad .lri&e111&, with
beadqmrtera in Loe .agelee; (2) northern Cali.tornia, located in San
Franciaoo; ad (3) 1luhiJlgt,cm ad Oregon, with lla1D ottiON ill Sea"-le.
blocaticm npenuon wre placed ill charge ot -.ch arN, while 18
dutrict ottiON were eatabllahed at principal localitiea withia N.ah

ot

the.,.....

A6e1nhtraticm ot th1a _ . ...-t eout relocaticm orgamsatica _,
placed UDder tbe uaiataat director in the ....-tena ft.let
ottice. It wu prN: 11 d U.t the Nlocat1cm probl- ot iDdiTicbala
r.tand.Dg to the naom.ted ar• lfOllld be clittermt md WDUlcl reqaire a
ditteraat approach than tha.t uaed in the relocaticm argu.i&&tic:m elaellUre. It wu anticipated t.bat t.bere wight be a wholeaale ruah ot
~ • back to their hcaea 1-diately tollOlring the lit'ting ot thl
exclualcm orct., and the wst cout organi.satic:m wu geared to alas
down this expeotec:l ruah ad to ocmmaot the return in u orderly a
tubion u po••ible. There wu soae apprebea.aion a• to how the re1iiunl1ng pMple would be reoeiTed ad -,at ot the earl7 ettort 011 the Paci.tio
Cout tollonng the 11.tting ot the ex.oluaion order wu dnoted to public
relaticma.

on gi naJ 17

lloalffer, a aurTey ot the aituation ill April 19'15 iDrlioated tbat
still rNiding in tbe omtere .._.e in no bwTy to 'l'etun
to the naouated ar•• !hi• wade neoNeary the applicatic:m ot a
Tigoroua prograa to stiaalate resettl-nt to tbe •••t Cout Stat.a,
•iwilar to that wbiah bad bMD aeoNsary to iDchace relocatic:m eu1:aard.
It bad been learned, alao, that the relooatic:m job looall7 Oil the weat
oout wu eHentiall7 t.be s - u in ct.her part. ot the oountrT--that
it oouieted ot tincUng jobs ad houai.Dg tor rNettlera u W9ll u
eeouri.Dg tnorable ooaami.ty aooeptuaoe.
a>st

9'T&C\I.N8

It wu true that there wu -,re diioriaination ad that -,re
people wre rabidl7 anti-JapanNe within the nacuca"ted ar•, but by
and large it wu the aaae t.o-wa;y selling job that t.be Reloca'tion
DiTiaion bad experienced elanbere--selli.Dg the realdente ot a gi-nm
area on accepting 't'Jie naoueea, and Nlli.Dg the en.cueee on l•Ting tbe
talae 1eouritf whioh the cmtera represented to tbea. C01U1equentl7, tbt
w ■t coast •dw1n1etrative •etup wu reorganized.
The entire relooatioa
prograa wu placed directly under the BelocatiC11 Diviaicm in Wubingtoll
and with the • - workiDg arrangment u had beeu developed in other
relocati011 ottices. Bn.ouee property oontrola at all leTela wre al■ o
placed under the Relocation. D1T1.a1on at Washington. With tl1e weat cout
area reopened, and with plan.a ll&de tor all residents to leave the
cent.re, property watter• had tor the tirst t i • beooae directly
related to relocation.

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ABAIDOIMBIT OF IAVI CI..IAlWl:I

Coinoident with the reop•ninc of the en.ouated area and the
aeaumptttm by the War Departmnt ot responsibility for determining who
among the naouHs ■hould be subject to individual ,xcluaion trcn the
nat oout, or aubject to ot.her oontrol, the 1IRA. abolished the leave
olearanoe (national security) proriaicm• ot it■ leave recuJ.a~iona. It
bad been cont.plated originally tb&t the provisiona ot the leave regulations relating to the i ■ auanc., ot indefinite leave (i.e.,
relating to commmity accep.tance,·meen■ ot aupport outside the center,
eto.) would be retained until January 20, 1946. The immediate elimination ot the indefinite leave requir•ente wu prompted by the aotiOD
of the Supreme Court in the Bndo decieian ot December 18, 1944. The
Court tound that 1IRl bad no authority to detain within a center &JJ1'
concededly loyal citizen pending application tor and issuanoe of leave.
Atter December 20, 1944, WRA. acted cm.ly u agent tor the War Department
and the Department of Justioe in holding in centers individuals plaoed
in re1trictive categories.

tho••

To u1ure that the retw-n. to the west ooaet would be orderly,
WR.A. relooatian u1ietanoe (travel U!penae and turther a■ lia~• where
neoeaeary) n.a provided originally only where the en.ouee had a WR.A.approved relocation plan. Thea• regulation.a were established as a
safeguard against tht poeaibility that too large a number of evacuee■
might return too rapidly to any one ooJIIIIUD.i ty. An agreement betwnn
WR.A. and the Depart...t ot Ju■ tioe n.a efteoted whereby alien■ wo)ll.d not
be allowed travel pend.ti to oo-.m.i ties where, in WU.•• opinion,
returnee■ were arriving at a rate inconsiatent with the public welfare.
It aoon beoaae apparent that the ■• safeguards were unneoeHary, and
they were eliminated.
BVA.OUBI ATTITUDES TOIIARD RILOCATIOJf

At tirat there was a general attitude of disbelief aaon.g oenter
residents regarding the WRA statement that all center ■ would oloae
within a year. A sall element or z-esentment appeared but there waa no
organized reei1tance to the policy. Resistance took the form or a widespread tendency to gra■p every indication which could be taken to mean
that the oentera--one or more ot tbem--might remain open.
In order to emphasize the inevitability ot liquidation and center
closing, the Authority stated ita polic7 a■ ~requently a■ pos ■ible and
under many oiroumatanoe ■• The Jfational Director visited each of the

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tor that ■pecitio purpose, and while Jll&D¥ people •re apurrecl
into action, a con■ iderable DUllber r811&1ned content to let thing■ drU't.
Ruaora gained credence in the oentera 'that the Dep&rtaent ot Ju■ tioe wu
opposing the plan to cloae all center ■, and hopea grew that that Department might be expected to continue two or three cm.tera, at l•st, under
its 01r11 adainis:tratian. limy center reaidenta were hmeatly cmvinoed
that the taak the Allthorltf had aet itaelt to do wu actually impoaaible
ct achieTement. lloat of the appointed start entered wholeheartedly into
the job ot ■ tiJmll.ating relocation and neither voiced nor showed any
reaen-atiom toward the tinal relooaticm and liquidation plana. A
aaller percentage ot the appointed ■ tart, however, continued to oppo■e
relooaticm openly or indirectly becau■ e ot their own aeltiah de ■ irea to
remain in employment or beoauae or exceaai'Ye tear■ tor the ■atety and
·
well-being ot evaoueea.
oenter ■

Relooaticm otticea in the field and at the centers stepped up
their ettorta in suggesting practical solutiona to individual probl....
Intonation regarding specific looalitie■ wa■ tranalated into Japanese
and abundantly distributed. Letters trom auooeastully relocated individuals were reproduced and ciroulated at the centers.
C'!onunm1 ty gOYermnent, which bad attained a varying degree ct
stability, prestige and influence at the centers, taoed in 19"5 the
illlportant problems posed by the liquidation announcement. The community government organizations continued their usually helpful role
in aaai ■ ting with center administration, but the •Jor part ot their
concern waa the tact that total relocation bad 1.4> be attained within
the year.

In February, an all-oenter evacuee conterence was held to di■ oua•
the liquidation pol:icy. Suggestion for the conference came troa Topaz,
when that center•• oommmity council •ent invitatiom to the council ■
ot all the relocation centers to attend a meeting at Salt l.&ke City,
Utah, on February 16, 1946. Thirty representatives from anen center■
(Manzanar and Tule l.&ke did not parti.c ipate) attended a W9ek-long conference in which a ■ earching study was made of the problems racing
center residents.
The period between the revocation amiouncement and the ti.Jae of
the conterence wa■ marked by increased activity or the varioua commmity oounoila. Bxtra se11ion1 were called to diaouaa policies; committees appointed to work out detail ■; survey• conducted in eftorta to
determine the thoughts of the residents; individual block meeting&
contributed their thinking to center-wide opinions. Aa a result ot
this council-sponsored aotivity, most ot the repreaentativea went to
Salt Lake City with the opinion that center residents would require more
uaiatanoe in relooation than 1IRA. 'ft■ making available.
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Conterenoe sentimant tell into three groups. One group sought
to enliat the aupport ot varioua publio and private agencies, arguing
that it they could aeoure a suttioiently wide audience on the outside
they could obtain inoreued Government asaistanoe. Another group
agitated tor a vigorous demand tor tull restituti&i or evacuation
loaae1 before relooation. ~he third group favored resettlement, but
aaw in1urmountable ditfioulties.
The tirat group gained control and were able to exert a constructive intluenoe on the conterenoe. They argued tor increased relocation as1i1tanoe rather than a strongly-worded proteat against center
oloaing. They contended that evacuees who insisted they would not, or
could not, leave the center ware the reaponsibility- or WRA and not ot
the naouee groups.
Ollt ot this meeting oame a •statement ot tacts• as the evaoueea
aaw them, and a liat of 21 reconaendationa. The importance ot thia
sW1111&tion lay i~ the tact that it waa oon1idered by evacuee leader1hip
to be a restrained and genero\18 stat-nt ot the minimum requir•enta
for reaettleDMtnt. It wa1 deaigned tor oonaumption ~ center resident■,
by- tne public, and by ffRt, which to them repre1ented the United State■
Government.
The "atatement ot taot1,• which formed a preamble to the reoom•ndaticma, waa aa tollan a
1. llental •uttering baa been cau1ed by the forced maa1
evacuation.
2. There ha.a been an almost complete destruction of
tinanoial f'oundationa biµlt during over a halt century-.

3. Especially r~ the duration, the war has created
tears of prejudices, persecution, etc., also tears ot
physical violence and tears ot damage to property-.
4.. lfany Iasei (average age i i between 60 and 66) were
depending upon their sons tor a11istance and support,
but these sons are serving in the United States armed
forces. Now these Issei are reluctant to ocmaider
relocation.

5. Resident, feel insecure and apprehensive towards
the~ changes and modifications ot WRA policies.

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6. The resident~ have prepared to re-.in for the
duration beoauae of many statements made by the WRA
that relocation centers will be maintained for the
duration of the war.
7. l4a.ny residents nre forced to dispose or their
personal and real properties, business and agricultural
equipment, etc., at a mere trifle of their cost; also
they drew leases for the "duration," hence have nothing
to return to.

a. Practically every Buddhist priest is now excluded
from the nst ooast. Buddhism has a substantial following, and the members obviously prefer to remain
where the religion centers.
There ia an acute shortage of housing, whioh is
obviously a basic need in resettlement. The residents
fear that adequate housing is not available.
9.

10. Many persona or Japanese ancestry have diffioulty
in obtaining insurance coverage on life, against tire,
on automobiles, on orooerty, eto~

*

*

*

•

•

*

*

The Washington office gave eaob of the 21 recormnendationa ma.de
by the conference careful consideration, checking its liquidation policy
against the suggestions of the conference. The result was a document
entitled ' WRA Comments on Recommendations or· the All Center Conference."
It was adequately distributed in English and later in Japanese at all
centers.

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In general this document stated that solutions to atypical situations and problems would have t~ be-110rked out on an individual basis
and could be met only as examples came to the attention of the Authority. It explained how some of the su~P,estions were not feasible, while
others were already an established part of VIRA policy, sometimes in a
.form more eenerous than that requested. It pointed to plans already
implemented for cooperation with existing Govermnent and civic bodies,
summarizing the definite progress which had been made in reintegrating
evacuees into American conmunities. "This document answers at len,rth
so many of the questions existing at this time in the minds of center
residents that it is given in full below:
Recormnendation No. 1: That special governmental agencies or units be
ea~lished solely for providing assistance to evacuees who
might require funds in reestablishing themselves.
a.
b.

ttesettlement aid (crants).

wans.

Comment: \,e recognize that many of the evacuees now residing in the
centers ~"ill not be able to provide completely for their own
support on the outside and that others will need loans to reestablish themselves in business or farming enterprises. It
should be realized, however, that the practical problem of
securing leeislation and funds for a special agency is a very
real one and, even if desirable, would require much time to
accomplish. It seems highly unlikely that Congressional approval could be secured for.such a proposal, or that a special
aeency is actually needed. As far as grants are concerned, both
public and private welfare acrencies throughout the country now
have the lowest number of clients they have had in years and are
in excellent position to furnish help for relocating evacuees
who need public assistance. i;oreover, the VtR.A has made spec:i.al
arrancernents to transfer funds as needed to the Social Security
Board for the Resettlement Assistance pror,ram which is desir,ned
specifically to meet the needs of people (such as evacuees) who
have been affected by restrictive governmental action. Aid
under this program is available to both citizen and alien evacuees in all parts of the country regardless of previous residence. Y,'RA will:'. make every possible effort, throu~,h its field
offices and in otµer ways, to see that adequate assistance is
promptly provided for handicapped resettlers who need grants or
other special kinds of help. Fuller comment on loans is provided under No. 3 below.
, ~ecommer.dation No. 2: That the present relocation grant be increased.
It should be given to every relocatee. 'l'he penalty clause on
the present form should be deleted.
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We further recommend that federal aid·be granted according to
every individual's particular needs until such time as he is
reestablished.
Cbmment: Relocation grants are now made available on the basis of need
and will continue to be. To provide each resettler with a r;rant
regarpless of his cash resources would be an unwarranted use or
the taxpayers• money. The :,;rants should be reP,Srded not as a
compensation or r81181'd for relocating, but as a form of assistance for those who temporarily lack sufficient cash resources
to reestablish themselves in private life.
The so-called "penalty clause" is included on the form
merely for the information of evacuees and is standard on.all
e;overnment forms of this type. It is intended to warn the applicant against ~ving false information on the application.
The penalties for providing false information will apply whether
the clause is included on the form or not. In view of the reo~IIBllendation of the conferees, however, the WR.A has decided to
delete this clause from all future printings of the form.
In cases where the relocation grant provided by the 1'.'RA
is not sufficient to cover an individual's needs until such time
as he reestablishes himself, supplementary assistance should be
soufjlt under the rlesettlement Assistance Program from the appropriate local welfare ar.ency. In view of the increased tempo or
relocation, <bngress has been asked to increase the amount which
may be transferred to the ~ocial Security Board for the Resettlement Assistance Program between now and June 30, 1945, and is
being asked to appropriate additional funds for this program to
cover the period throue;h June 30, 1946.
Reco1mnendation No. 3: That lone term loans at a low rate of interest
be made available, without security, to aid the residents in
reestablishing themselves as near as possible to their former
status in private enterprises, such as business, agriculture,
fisheries, etc.
Comment: WRA is now exploring every potential source of loans--both
governmental and private-for relocatine evacuees.· Because or
the current inflation of values, we believe that evacuees would
be ill advised to secure long-term loans for land purchase at
this particular time. Comparatively short-term loans for the
restocking of business enterprises, the purchase of acricultural.
equipment and supplies, or other similar PJ:rposes, however, are
definitely needed by many evacuee businessmen and farmers. YiRA
will bend evei=y effort to see that such loans are made availabl.e
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from some aource to those wishing to reestablish themselves in
their, pre-evacuation line of endeavor. Evacuees at the centers
will be advised as further progress ·is made in locating potential credit sources.
Recommendation No. 4: That the WR.A use their good offices so that consideration may be given on priority by OPA. Because or evacuation, residents were forced to dispose of their equipment,
trucks, cars and so forth, many' or which at present require the
approval or an OPA Board. These equipments are essential to
maey residents in order to reestablish themselves in-former
enterprises.
Q:imment: WRl will render every possible assistance through the field
relocation offices to evacuees who need help in obtaining agricultural equipment. Si~ce priori ties are no longer necessary tar
such equipuent (except for crawler-type tractors), the field
offices will be concerned primarily' with locating dealers or
individuals who have equipment and who will sell to evacuee
operators. Evacuees, however, should not expect preferential
treatment or the granting or priorities llhich are not available
to other persons.
Recommenaation No. 5: That the WRA make every effort to obtain a return
or prope.rties tor· evacuees who, due tp evacuation and co'hsequent
inability to maintain installment payments, have lost the same;
further, in order to prevent loss of property, to obtain some
definite arrangement for the grantinl? or govermnental aid, as
may be necessary, to evacuees unable, as a result or evacuation,
to maintain installment payments.
Comment: There are undoubtedly a considerable number or evacuees who
have lost their properties or who are on the verge of losing
them because or inability to main~n installment payments.
Although' WRA is not in position to take any direct action in
such cases, it will assist evacuees, through its field' offices,
in trying to secure necessary refinancing from public or private
lending institutions.
Recommendation No. 6: That the WRA give financial aid to residents
with definite plans, for the purposes or defraying the expense&
ot investigating specific relocation possibilities.
Oonpnent: Assistance of this type is now available to evacuee representatives designated by the Relocation Planning Cbmmission tor·
the exploration of group relocation opportunities anywhere outside the V•est Coast area. This gives evacuees at the centers an
opportunity to acquire first-hand information fran their own

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representatives about sections of the cOW1try with which they- are
not familiar and pt"ovides a tactual basis for evaluating relocation prospects.
On the West Coast, however, there is not the same need
tor exploratory trips of this type that there is in other sections of the comitry. '1'he evacuees, atter all, have a firsthand knowledge of the coastal region-its agriculture, climate,
and economic opportunities. We beliew that any investigatiw
trips center residents may wish to make in that region shou.ld be
at their own expense.

Recoamendation No. 7: That the WRA establish adequately staffed offices
in important areas and employ per&0ns of Japanese ancestry since
they understand Japanese psychology; and also establish 1n these
field offices, legal advisory and employment depart.manta.
Cbanent: Area relocation offices have now been established cowring
the entire United States. In the Pacific Coast section, there

are three area offices-San Francisco, Ios Angeles, Seattle-12 district relocation offices in active operation. other
offices are being established sot.hat 11e shall soon haw a field
office in each section of the West Coast states ~ e there was
an important concentration of Japanese people before evacuation.

and

A mmber of Nisei are already employed at several of the
field offices both on the -;·• est <hast and alsewhere. In view ot
the problem suggested by the conferees, however, ·we are also
planning in the near future to add one Issei to the staff at a
number of the principal field offices. 'l'bese persons will be
chosen because of their knowledge of the Japanese languar,t as
11ell as their general ability as interviewers and negotiators •
.At each of the area relocation offices on the ,:est Q:>astSan Francisco, Ios Angeles, and Seattle-WRA plans to have an
attorney on the staff who will render legal advice and counsel
to the returning evacuees. T.RA is not in position to represent
evacuee clients in -court cases, but will help evacuees to obtain
necessary private counsel through the legal aid program "llhich
is already in operation •
.Assistance in securing employment is available to the
evacuees through the United States Employment Service and the
various private groups which are cooperating in the relocation
program. WR.A field offices are supplementing this service,
wherever necessary, and will contirme.to do so.

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Recommendation No. 8: That the 'hRA continu~ the operation of evacuee
property offices for the duration, to fulfill the needs of
relocatees.
Comment: WRA plans to continue operation of the evacuee property
offices on the \.'est Goast until April 2, 1946-or virtually up
until the time when the agency itself will go out of existence.
All relocating or returning evacuees are given a 60-day period
(after leaving the center) within which to remove their prop.arty
from n1RA warehouses. In emergency cases, application may be
made to the appropriate field office for extension of this time
limit, but in no case beyond April 2, 1946.
Recommendation No. 9: That the WRA. accept for reinduction into centers
those who relocate and who find themselves unable to make satisfactory adjustments.
Comment: The policy governin~ visits to the relocation centers has now
been modified in such a way that all relocate~ evacuees are permitted t110 visits to the centers, totaling a maximum of not more
than 30 days, w1 thout the necessity of securing advance approval.
Vie believe this new policy will largely alleviate the problem
suggested by the conferees. \1e are not prepared, ho-waver, to
reinduct as regular center residents those persons who have left
the centers on indefinite leave or terminal departure. '!be
Resettlement Assistance Program is organized and has funds to
relieve the problems of those who meet adverse circumstances.
Through one means or another, we believe that reasonably satisfactory adjustments can be 1VOrked out in all cases, and that
reinduction to the center would only postpone rather than solve
the adjustment problem which eventually mst be faced.
Recommendation No. 10: That the WR.A arrange for the establishing of
hostels and other facilities in various areas; and furthermore,
build new housing through the FHA, with i'iRA assistance.
Comment,: liRA is encouraging clmrch groups and other private organizations to establish evacuee hostels wherever needed and wherever
appropriate facilities can be located. Hostels are now operating in Cleveland, Detroit, Minneapolis, Brooklyn, Cincinnati,
Des Moines, Philadelphia, "i,ashington, IDs Angeles, Oakland, and
San Jose. Every effort is being made to encourage the establishment of additional hostels in all the major cities of the
West Coast area. As part of this effort, -we have recently completed arrangements under which equipment such as cots, mattresses and kitchen utensils surplus to the needs of relocation
· centers can be made available on a loan basis to approved
hostels in the West Coast states. One loan has already been made.
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In addition, \'r'RA is constantly working on the housing
problem from a munber of other angles.
Recommendation No. 11: That the VJRA provide transportation of evacuee
property door to door.
Comment: Careful consideration has been given to the feasibility of
providing this type of service. However, because of the large
number of deliveries that would be involved and the limited
number of ~RA perso~l available to work on property transportation, it was feared that provision of door-to-door transportation might become a serious bottleneck in the relocation program
and an inconvenience to evacuee resettlers. We believe that the
whole program will move more rapidly and satisfactorily if evacuees make their own arrangements for picking up property at the
nearest railhead and having it delivered to their homes. In
cases where an evacuee needs money to pay for the trucking
service, application should be made to the appropriate welfare
agency for a special grant to cover this item.
Recommendation No. 12: That the 'i,RA negotiate for the establishing of
old people's homes exclusively for persons of Japanese ancestry.
Comment: The WRA is now exploring with a nwnber of ?,tblic and private
agencies the problem of providing adequate care for the older
evacuees who have no means of support •• We believe that it will
be poss;i.ble, through old age assistance and other types of public assistance, to work this problem out without the necessity
for establishing an old peoples• home exclusively for those of
Japanese descent.
Recommendation No. 13: That the h•RA make negotiations to arrange (1) so
that evacuees formerly civil service employees will be reinstated and (2) so that persons of Japanese -ancestry will be able
to secure business licenses as formerly.
0:>?mnent: Evacuees who are seeking reinstatement on former State or
local civil service jobs in the evacuated area and those who
wish to obtain bqsiness licenses should simply apply to the
appropriate State or local agency. If any undue difficulties
are experienced, the case should be reported in detail to the
nearest ,.rnA field office, which will make every effort to work
out a satisfactory solution.
Recommendation No. 14: That short term leave.regulations be changed to
permit an absence of two months with one month extension priviler,es. Also, that the evacuee investigating relocation possibilities be permitted to becone el!lployed, without change of status.
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Cbmment: This, of course, would be tantamount to reinstituting the
seasonal leave program under another. name. Our experiences with
seasonal leave have convinced us that it would not be feasible
at this late stage in the WRA program. Adjustment or evacuees
to private lite will be tar easier if' the wage earners in the
group start turning their thoughts away from the centers and
begin making arrangements as soon as possible to bring their
dependents out to normal communities.
It is our policy to grant an additional 30-day short
term leave in cases 1'here it has been established that more
time is needed. It should also be understood that it an individual on short-term leave wishes to take employment while on shortterm leave, he may do so without losing any of the financial or
other assistance which \~'RA provides for him or his family. It
employt11Snt is taken, the individual would ot course automaticall;y'
enter the status of terminal departure.
Recommendation No. 15: That when an evacuee relocates or returns to his
former busilless or home, WR.A should make every effort to ~elease
frozen assets (blocked accounts), both in cases or individuals
or organizations.
Cbmment: Those evacuees _who· have been cleared by the War Department
for return to their former homes stand an excellent chance or r&gaining their .frozen as~ets or blocked accounts. WnA has already been negotiating with the Treasury Department on this
problem and will soon announce procedures for presenting applications to the proper officials tor consideration. It is suggested that the Comnn.mity Councils inform those whose funds are
frozen or blocked to take their problems to the Proje~t Attorney
and secure his assistance in preparing applications for clearance and his advice on clearance and licensing procedures.
Recommendation No. 16: That the WRA
arrancements whereunder alien
mana~ properties with powers
dren, particularly by sons in

negotiate for the concluqing of
parents may be able to operate or
of attorney issued by their chilthe United States Armed Forces.

Comment: 'Ne are investigating this matter and will provide further
information at a later date.
Recommendation No .. 17: That the \',RA arrange to secure outr_:i.ght releases for parolees who relocate.
Comment: Parolees who have relocated and desire to be released from
parole restrictions should apply to the Enemy Alien 0:>ntrol Unit
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of the Department of Justice. Persons making ~ch application
should submit an,y factual information they may have bearing
upon their loyalty to the United States and their willingness to
cooperate in the war effort. This would include: (a) names and
designations of any sons and daughters who are serving in the
armed forces with theu approval,(b) statements from friends,
acquaintances or colleagues, and (c) a~ additional information
they may.have bearing on the continuation of their parolee
status. WR.A will be glad, upon the request of an individual
parolee., to submit any information it may have regarding his
character and loyalty, to the Department of Justice.
Recommendation No. 18: That the l"'RA obtain the establishment of some
avenue of govermnental indemnities for relocatees who may become victims of anti-Japanese violence in terms of personal
injuries or property damage.
·
<bmnent: The law-enforcement agencies of the iiest Coast States and
the United States Department of Justice have g1 ven e~ry possible assurance that returning evacuees will be protected, and
these agencies have taken positive and rapid action in the
isolated cases that have thus far arisen. It is our considered
opinion that the opposition to the return of evacuees now being
voiced on the vfost Coast by certain small cliques is largely
bluffing. While there have been several cases of attempted
violence, every effort has been made to bring the culprits to
justice., and this procedure will be continued.
If evacuees should suffer any damage or injury, they
have the same rights as any other person to seek compensation
in the courts !'rom the persons causing the loss. If the evac:>uees need additional money protection, there is insurance to
cover almost any kind of risk. \'{~1.A will assist center residents
upon request in obtaining insurance for themselves and for their
property to cover any risks of damage that they think ttl.ght
occur after relocation. We are entirely confident ~hat coverage can be obtained.
Federal legislation would be necessary to provide indemnities of the sort sug~sted by Recommendation No. 18. We know
of no similar Federal legislation that has been passed by
Cbngress. In view of the fact that no similar special consideration has been given to other persons or groups, the presumed
adequacy of local law-enforcement agencies to handle any
problem, and the other averrue~ available to evacuees to seek

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compensation or protect themselves in advance, it seems
extremely doubtful that O::>ngress would give favorable consideration to the proposal.
Reconunendation No. 19: That the WR.A arrange for adequate government
compensation against losses to evacuee property by fire, theft,
etc. while in eovernment or private storage or while in transit.
Connnent: 'iiRA has not been v.ven authority by Con,n-ess to pay claims
of this sort. In one type of case--llhere · property has .been
lost, destroyed, or darnared as a result of the negligence or
government employees-claims can be filed against the government up to ll,000 under the Small Claims Act of 1922. Through
well-established channels ·1;RA may submit such claims to the
Cone;ress for consideration. The evacuee Property Officers and
the Project Attorneys at the relocation centers can give
evacuees complete information with respect to the filing of
claims under this law.
ihere property has been damaged while in transit, claims
can and should be filed in every case against the transportation company. The accountability of railroads and other carriers for property which they transport is very strict am most
claims involving darnae;e to evacuae property while in transit
would likely be paid by the carriers involved.
We realize, of course, that these two remedies cover
only part of the problem. In the case of acts of vandalism
against evacuee property in private storage it has not been
possible in most cases to identify the vandals, despite the
thorough investigation that is required by ~RA procedures. It
:nust be pointed out, however, that all evacuees were given the
option of storing their property with the eovernment free of
charge llhere it would be appropriately guarded. Since the
evacuees had this option 0::>ngresa might well regard any loss
to ·be a risk that the evacuees knowingly assumed. There may
also be other types of cases in which loss has been sustained
throur,h no fault of the evacuee which may not be recoverable
either as a legal or practical matter. 1JRA is now issuing
instructions requiring all field offices to make full investigations and report~ on cases involving damaee. or loss to
evacuee property so· that the facts will be or record in
government files.
700077 0-46-5

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Recommendation No. 20: That the WR.A arrange to provide students of
Japanese ancestry with adequate protection in case of need, and
opportunities equal to those enjoyed by Caucasian students.
Cbmment: Since the school systems at all centers (except Tule Lake)
are fully accredited in the States where the centers are located,
we antici,ate no difficulty concerning credits in connection
with the transfer of evacuee students to the ordinary public
schools outside. the centers. In the ;,est Coast area special
efforts have been made to see that the transition of evacuee
students back to the public schools is a smooth and satisfactory one. The Superintendents of Public Instruction in all
three of the Pacific Coast States have assured us that they
will do everything possible to assist in satisfactory adjust~ent
of the returning evacuee students. Information kits, explaining fully the school program at relocation centers and the
status of returning evacuees, have been placed in the hands of
all local school superintendents in California and will probably
be distributed in the near future to similar officials in
•
\',ashingt,on and Oregon. Should any returnine evacuee students
experience undue difficulties, the \iRA field offices will
render every possible a.s sistance in worki~g out a satisfactory
adjustment.
Recommendation No. 21: That the \',RA make every effort to secure work
opportunities for returnees and relocatees on equal basis with
Caucasian citizens, particularly in reference to admittance into
labor unions.
Comment: V..e have already been "ffOrking on this problem through the
field offices and will intensify our efforts. Of course, the
best argument we have in convincing employers or union officials
that equal treatment should be accorded the evacuees is the
e;eneral attitude and work record of the evacuees themselves.
No preferential treatment should be expected, but equal treatment will be the goal of all our ne~tiations.

*

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PUBLIC ATTITODIS <Jr TBI WIST COAST

larly nat ooaat reaotion to the liquida.tion polioy--more
1peoifioall7 the taot that evaou••• were going to return to their
h011111a--preaented what JaJJ.1 believed to be a more aerioua problem. than
the initial retuaal at the oentera to aocept. at t&M value. the taot
that the oentera were going to be oloaed.
A toretaate ot opposition to the torthooming return ~oourred
dramatloally in Bovember 1944 at Hood RiTer. Oreg •• where the looal
ohapter ot the Amerioan Legion oaused the namea of 16 Nisei to be
eraaed trom the memorial bearing the naaea ot all aenicemen troa the
oommmi ty. Hood River ia the oenter or a proaperoua agri.c ul tural comaunity which had a prewar Japan••• • • ~ t equalling about 12 percent
of ita population. Opposition within the evacuated area ag&inat the
people ot Japan••• deacent had beoo1119 organized and vooal following
the evacuation. But removal ot the nam.ea. although the act aimply
reflected a pbaae ot that aentiment. waa particularly ill-timed tor
the purpo••• or the opposition. It came at a time when there wa• a
growing knowledge in thia country of the fighting record being made by
Nisei troops in Italy. Storie• ot their exploit• had been recorded in
War Department dispatches and publiahed in newspapers everywhere.
Becauae ot the dramatic injustice and flagrantly racial baaia of the
local Legion action. it waa poaaible to atiJllilate the interest ot the
pre•• in general. For 3 montha. columnist•• editorial writer ■• and
radio speakers acro•• the countr., oondemned the Rood RiTer Legion poat.
In the glare ot thia national apotlight. and after considerable puahing
by naticm.a.l Legion headquarters, the Hood River post restored the · naea.
This incident gave nen value ot national importance 'boa situation which threatened to spread up and down the ooa.at. The name• 119re
baok on the memorial, but Hood River remained as determined as ever
that the evacuees would not return. Societies were or~anj.&ed for that
expreH purpose. Full page anti-evacuee advertisements aigned by Hood ·
River citizens were run in local papers. Meetings were oalled where
speaker ■ repeated~ or the old mytha regarding people or Japanese
anoe ■.try.
The economic boycott was in full awing. Bvaouees were
advised to aell their land. They 119re bluntly told that they 119re not
wanted baokJ that they would not be able to operate their orchards
profitably because they would be unable to purchase equipment, auppliea
and the neoeaaitiea or life.
But friends or the Japanese Amerioana alao were active. A handful or Hood River citizen• who believed in fair play and individual
rights. and who dared to express their convictions. began to . be heard.
They formed a Hood River Citizens' League which printed ita own
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advertiaementa, wlling the evaoueea that they oould legally come back
and that they would receive the protection afforded by law. They
actively campaigned tor the support ot the •rchanta or the valley in
counteracting the damage done to the area by race prejudice. Growing
in numbers and in strength, and backed by national preaa interest in
the valley and the tact that people bad begun to talk about a nat1cnal
boyoott against their tamoua Hood River applea, this group started a
move to break the anti-evacuee economic bo7oott which waa beginning to
spread to other cout oitiea.
Thia economic boycott was atrongeat around Portland and Seattle
al though it extended to certain rural areas in California. For example,
one evacuee and hia family returned to their farm near Maryhill, Wash~,
where prior to the war he had operated one or the largest fruit and ·
produce tarma in the mid-Columbia area. According to the Portland
Oregon Journal or March 7s
•Although his truck waa loaded with vegetable• which are
now fairly scarce, R. Tsubota, the first !Jeturne¥ Japanese grower and marketer to take hie produce to the Bast
Side Farmer's wholesale market••• took hie truck home
Monday with between half and two thirds of•the vegetables
still in i t • • • •
"He had 100 cratea of parsnips and took 40 back. From
hi• 30 crate& or turnips he sold seven. He returned
with 20 ot his 80 orates of young onions. All three
vegetable• are hard to find now•••.•
Investigation showed that anti-Japanese groups had brought
preaaure to bear on the buyers, threatening a boycott if they purcha.aed
from Japanese.
Similar treatment was experienced by other evacuees, and WRA
aasigned a marketing specialist to help meet the problem. Throu.gh the
help or the Portland Citizen'• Committee and WRA, private outlets were
secured .tor Japanese-grown produce. By the end or June 1946, marketing
difficulties in Portland were pretty well amoothed out.
Beginning shortly after revooation, a wave of terroristio inoidenta broke out in California. They were concentrated in the agricultural valleya, but extended to coastal 00JD1111Ditiea. About 30 aeriou1
incidents involving ~•on, shooting attempta, and threatenilig viaita bac
occurred by June 30, 1946, with numerous minor demonstrations such aa
rook throwing, threats, or intimidations.
&A. met these incidents aggressively. Each separate oaae wa.a
reported in full not only to the national preaa, but to the office of

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the State attorney general. The theory was that the American public ii
essentially fair-minded and would demand that juatt.ce be done according
to established principles or tair play.
As time passed and the eT&ouees were backed by national public
opinion. and as a .generally more sympathetic attitude developed on the
part ot local law enforcement ott'icia.l•• terroriatio ettorta to atop
the return gradually subsided. Terrori• almost completely disappeared
w1 thin a rew week• after Secretary Iokes iuued a preaa release on
Jlay 14 oonoerning the inoidenta. whioh at that time numbered 16 ahooting attaoka, l dynamiting attempt. S cues or arson and 5 threatening
visits. Commenting in toroetul langtage on the pattern ot terrorism.
the Secretary 1tated1

•The shameful apeotaole of theae inoidents ot terrorism
taking place at the baok door ot the San Francisco Oonterenoe • now in ••••ion to develop means by whioh •n ot
all races oan live together in peace. mat be ended once
and tor all. l beline that an arouaed natie11al opinion.
rooted in the indignation or fair-minded AJDerican.a throughout the country• will be a powerful aid to Weat Ooaat state
and local ott'icia.la charged with bringing the vigilante
oriminals to justice.•
.

WBLFARZ PROBLDS
Early in the relocation program. it had been realized that there
"9re residents at all centers whose reaettlanent would require publio
asaiatance in one form or another, in some instances temporary. in
others oontinuing. Thia problem had been partially met in advanoe by
development ot' a procedure UDder whioh certain tunda were supplied to
the.Social Seourity Board t'or use in providing needy eva.ouees with
assistance which was not available t'rom regular sourcea. This procedure,
known aa the Resettlement Aasiat&noe Program. was utilized very infrequently during 1943 and 1944. primarily because the people who relooated
during that period were. in general. people who did not need that kind
of assistance.
Kost of' the naouees who might be expected to require publio
aaaistanoe were still in the centers at the beginning or 1945. Due to
the immigration pattern. the Japanese segment or the population showed
an unusually heavy concentration in the age groups above 40 and below
:so. with a small representation within the 30- to 40-year bracket.
Prior to revocation. and to a considerable extent cllring the subsequent
S months. it was preponderantly the young. vigorous Nisei who relocated.

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Por them the problem ot public ueiatanoe waa likely to arise only in
case• ot sudden ill.Dees or accident which 0011ld impair their earning
power.
Prior to the evacuation. thia oountry•s Japanese populati011 had
been traditionally selt-aupporting. Pr9W&r reoorda show a negligible
nwaber who had applied for public uaiatanoe. But the evaouati011 and
S years in the centers bad produced a drastic cha.Dge in the economic
picture. Real and personal property, and f'arm and buaineaa equipment
bad otten been sold at a conaiderable loaa. Fire and vandaliam
aooounted tor lo•• ot a great deal ot tangible property which had been
privately •tored. And, in many in■ tanoea. •avinga had been ccnpletely
di•aipated during 3 yeara in a oenter.
Many or the older oenter reaidenta wn baohelor• who had bMn
tenant farmers. share cropper, or migrant worker,. Some ot these men
had eatabl1.ahed a measure ot economic security before the war. but
many would und011btedly have become dependnat on public assiatanoe even
bad the evaouati011 not taken place. Loaa ot employer contacta. depletion ot aavinga, and 3 110re years in age reduced moat or thi• group ot
unattached old men to a point from. which they could not be expected to
reeatabliah themselves. In addition to theae and other aged peraona
and group• without resource,. other types of continuing dependency
were round among the center reaidenta, ju•t as they would be in anyother considerable group or people. The chronically ill,.unattached
children, the physically and mentally handicapped. and persona in
ailllilar oategories wre likely to require continuing aid. The &A
presumed that State and county of legal residence would aaawne responsibility. In general. the public welfare organizations·of California,
Waahington, Oregon, and Arizona did assume these responsibilities
without queation. The fff exceptiona were a small number of inland
oountiea in California, which placed what ditfioultie• they oould in
the way ot returning dependency oases. Even in theae counties• with
the auiatanoe ot the State welfare department, the Authority wa•
aucoeaaf'ul in aeouring adequate looal public aaaistanoe tor returning
residents·.
Beoauae relocation or welfare oasea would require more adminiatrati ve tim.e and effort than would be required for the average evacuee
family, a large part or WRA' • attention throughout the period was given
to aasisting persona in this olaaaifioation. The centers were combed
early in the year in an effort to detennine the exact na.ture and
number of welfare caaes. Then began a continuing process of describing
the neecla of the evacuees to local welfare agencies. and making known
to the evaoueea the Tarioua types or aid that were available. Dependent
persona were ordinarily expeoted to return to their plaoe of legal reei•
denoe. In exceptional instanoe■ where there were aound social or
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tudly reaaona tor reaettleaumt elsewhere, eTery aaaistance poa1ible
and strong etforta were •de to secure aoceptance tor the••
peraou in.the ~one•n1ty ot their oboice, deapite lack ot legal residence tor welfare purpoee1. Re1ett1...nt uaistanoe under the Sooial
Seour1ty Board wu available to Met the weltare needs ot t.heee- inmigrants into ~onnan1 +,i.es in which they would not be eligible tor local
welfare assistance. Kost coJIIIWdties were found willillg to accept a
limited number ot auch oues.

wa• given,

Complete case histories of individual dependent families were
prepared in the centers and sent to the 'IRA. area oftioe in the locality
1D which the family indicated the greatest relocation interest.
One of the chief delays encountered waa in verification of
individual reaidenoe in California, where a 3-year county reaidenoe wu
required before aid oould be given from oounty tunda. Occasionally it
was not po1aible to verify county residenoe for the 3 year• immediately
preceding the war. Many Isaei baohelora, in following their -migratory
work, bad lived in several counties. Many oould reoall living in a
oertain town during a particular period, but oould not recall the enct
street address. The consequent searching tor residence data caused
delay in relooation. Because of the delay■, by September 16 the centers
•ere advised to return evacuees to the conmuni ty from which they were
evacuated in instances where they had been unable to verify county
residence. In such oases, Sooial Security resettlement aasiat&l\oe tunda
could be used while verifying residence.

Shortly after the lifting of the exclusion order, it beoame
apparent that there existed a considerable need for tenporary aid in
procuring essential household goods, in meeting the first month'• rmt,
and for auoh other initial expenaea
transportation of household and
personal effects from railhead to reaidenoe. These expeues oould not
be met from the 126 per person relocation assistance grant, but could
be paid for through the Social Security resettlement assistance program.
Thi• did not work out too nll because of the extrane variation in
standards in the use ot reaettle•nt assistance funds by local welfare
agencies. Because 1IRA had complete reoorda on individuals and oould
establish a uniform standard, the resettlement assistance program was
modified, ettective June 1, 1945. Under this modified plan, WRA began
naldng grants directly, rather than through the Social Security Board
and looal agencies, to relocating families at the centers who needed
temporary aid in reestablishing households during the initial adjustment
period. The Sooial Seourity Board, through the State and local welfare
agencies, continued to provide tor all other types or e•rgenoiea or
continuing ueistanoe that might be needed by reeettlers. AD advantage
of the new syatem •s that families needing taporary assiatanoe during

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the adjustment period could know before leaving the center just how
much they would receive and ma.ke their plane accordingly. It
definitely gave extra aasurance to those tamiliea moat in need of
·
such assistance.

HOUSING
Perhaps the most dittioult aingle .problem posed by the liquidation prooeaa was that of housing tor returnees. Housing was a difficult
problem in aU parts ot the country, but it waa particularly difficult
on the west coast at the time evacuees were returning. Throughout the
war there had been tremendous intlux of new workers into that part ot
the country. In the first half ot 1945 there had occurred a shitting
of war activities to the west coast as the European war neared i~ end,
and war efforts were increasingly directed toward the Pacific. Moat of
the comparatively few center residents who had owned their own homes on
the weat coaat had retained title to them, but quite often it waa difficult to obtain possesaicn. Where these homes were rented, it was necessary to follow OPA eviction proceedings, and some evacuees were hesitant
to evict tor fear auoh evictions might have adveree publio relations
effect. Others found their property had been vandalized, and encountered difficulty and delay in effecting repair ■• The large ma.jority
of returnees simply required some sort of shelter which they could rent.
Slums, which had housed many in "Little Tokyos," were now occupied by
others; flimsy shack•, formerly oooupied by farm worbrs, were beyond
repair or were already in use.
Immediately after the lifting or the exclusion order, extraordinary efforts were put forth by friendly groups in California to
establish hostels to provide temporary houaing tor returnees. The
hostel movement had started early in the relocation program but waa
Relocation Authority
vastly expanded during this period. The
assigned part of its staff to stimulate and assist local clubs, church
groups, and sometimes individual evacuee■ , to operate these refuge ■ ,
which were planned as nonprofit rooming houaes. In order to aen-e the
greatest number, some hostels placed a limit on the length of time
individuals could remain. Increase in rates after a specific p.eriod
was another effective method of controlling this time factor. As
liquidation progressed, the west coast hostel ■ became an integral part
of the program. Many of the moat suooe1 ■ ful operators were returned
ministers of various denominations who secured churches, schools, or
other buildings and established hostels. To further enoourage this
movement, the Authority initiated in·April a policy ot lending neoessarJ
equipment. Loans included suoh needed items as chairs, bed■, mattrea-,
china, and cooking utensils. The Authority stipulated that hostels

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using this equipment should be open to all evacuees. By June 30, some
50 hostels were operating in 25 cities over tlie country, nearly allot
them in the area which had been evacuated. By the end of the year,
there were 110 hostels in operation in California alone. While some
of these hostels could be classed as little more than shelters and
offered only a t•porary solution to the housing or returnees, they
made it po11ible for them to return to their home COJIUIWlities to -seek
employment and permanent housing.
- West coast field offices also concentrated on finding employment
opportunities which would include housing. Perhaps the outstanding
achievement of this type was accomplished in the San Jose district,
where a large influential growers' association purchased considerable
demountable housing which was transported to fal"IIUI ot association
members and set up there to house returning evacuees.
Efforts were also ma.de by church and other friendly groups to
canvass in many localities and neighborhoods for individual families.
While some housing was found in this manner, the result compared with
the effort was disappointing. Individual evacuees were sometimes able
to·find hou1ing for friends and relatives, and there was evidence ot
great responsibility being shown within the group toward mutual aid in
housing. In many instancea returned evacuees took other evacuee
families into their homes. Efforts to secure housing in advance of
the arrival ot the returnee to the conmunity were generally fruitless,
although various attempts were made to accomplish this.
During this period, closer liaison was established with the
National Housing Agency and two of its constituent agencies, the Federal
Public Hou1ing Authority and the Federal Housing Administration, both in
Washington and in their regional and district office,.
Discussions were held with the head of the National Housing
Agency shortly before the lifting of the exclu1ion order, and inquiry
was made as to whether or not it would be possible to set up a special
program for the housing of evacuees returning to the west coast. The
Authority's representatives were advised that the Bational Housing
Agency was having a ditfioult time providing the housing needs for war
workers and the armed forces, and it would be opposed to &J:J¥ type of
special program which called tor the use of special funds to provide
housing for evacuees. As housing was one ot the limiting factor• in
the west coast war effort, the head of the National Housing Agency
stated that he believed that there was absolutely no chance for obtaining the legislation needed for special evacuee housing. The cooperation
ot Federal housing agencies was promiaed, however, within the framework
ot the regular housing pattern existing on the west coast.

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Although the RHA and the P'PHA expreased their willingneaa to
help. they were limited in their ability to be ot·usi1tanoe because ot
provi.aions in the Lanham Act, stating that only war workers were eligible to occupy war housing. Early 1n July, howeTer, the Congress passed
an amendment to the Lanham Act which put families ot ••"icemen and
veterans on a parity with war workers tor eligibility for war housing.
Because of the large number of Niaei soldiers and veteran,, it was
anticipated that this amendment would be of some help in housing
resettlers.
·
V-J Day on August 14 brought immediate cancellation of war
contracts and suspension of war production, and the National Housing_
Agency on August 29 issued new instructions concerning eligibility to
occupy war housing. These provided that ~distressed families without
housing who have been dislocated or displaced aa a result of the war or
its orderly demobilization may also be admitted as an aid to the orderly
demobilization ot the war effort." Evacuees were made eligible by this
order, and the west coast regional housing authorities agreed to do
everything in their power to assist evacuee• to take advantage of these
new regulations. In Washington and Oregon, the National Housing
Administration actually assumed responsibility for housing returnees
and succeeded in providing housing for large nWDDers ot them. Thia
solved the major probleu in these two States.
As early as June it had become apparent that the Authority would
have to take some extraordinary measures to meet the housing crisis in
a few of the California districts. Consequently, the Chief of the
.Relocation Divi.sion went to the west coast the first ot July to explore
all pos1ibilities tor housing. Renewed emphasi1 was -placed on the
acquisition of suitable hostels. A general survey was made of all
Arm:,, Navy, and Coast Guard installations with the hope of obtaining
sufficient temporary barracks to solve the problem in the more crucial
areas. It was found that the Fourth .Air Force was starting to give up
a number of small installations all up and down the west coast.
properties which had been used for the housing or antiaircraft and air
defense squadrons. Surveys were nade of these installations and
requests submitted to the War Department for their acquisition either
on a permit to use or by outright purchase. The Western Defense
Command installations, as well as the Ninth Service Command installations, were also surveyed as possibilities. By late July sufficient
installations had been located in the San Francisco Bay area and in the
Los Angeles area to meet the mo3t ilJll\ediate needs. However, the
Authority experienced considerable diffioulty in negotiatin& the
acquisition of these installations. In some instances, the owners 6f
the property on which the installations •~re located had been tyring
tor months to recover their property and objected strenuously to its
use by another Government.agency, especially one which proposed to
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house returning evacuees. In other instances, co1m11mities in vhich the
installations were located opposed the use or the installations for
housing evacuees. Finally, the "ffestern Defense Comnand turned over to
the War Relocation Authority the first big block of' temporary housing.
This was located at South Fort Funston, a part of the San Francisco
Harbor defense system. Sufficient barracks were turn~d over to the
Authority there to hou1e approximately 600 persona. Shortly thereafter,
the Lomita Air Strip in Loa Angeles County was turned over to the
Authority on a permit to use. Thia installation was capable of' housing
approximately 500 persons. Soon thereafter, five other installations,
located in Loi Angeles County, were purchased from t h e ~ Engineers.
These installations had a total capacity of approximately 700 persons.
The Santa Ana Air Base in 0rJ.Dge County provided, on a permit to ~se,
sufficient barracks to house more than the number of residents returning
to Orange County. The Army Air Transport Command in Sacramento turned
over sufficient barracks at Camp Kohler to house returnees needing
housing in Sacramento.
At the same .t ime these barrack• were being acquired, the
wthority negotiated an agreement with the Federal Public Housing
Authority in San Franciaoo to take 100 veterans or aervice-conneoted
families into public housing in San Franciaco, 100 familie1 in the Loa
Angeles area, and 25 families in the San Diego area. At the same time,
the Federal Public Housing Authority agreed to make available dormitories at Hunter• Point in San Francisco sufficient to liouae 800
persona, and in Marin County, just aorosa the Bay, sui'ficient dormitories to take care of 1,000 persons. The FPHA entered into an agreement to manage, on a reimbursable basis for WRA, all the temporary
housing which it had acquired. Thia agency also agreed to convert the
barraclca into temporary family living quarters at ,mA. expense.
In general these steps went a long way toward solving the
iJ111118diate housing oriaia. Although the situation remained very aoute
in Loa Angeles County, the FPHA finally agreed to loan more than 460
unused trailBra to be used to supplement housing at five of' the existing Army installations. With the acquisition of these trailers,
euf'f icient houaing was in a ight to meet the temporary needs of all
residents returning to the county who did not have other housing
resources.
Planning for the housing needs for the evacuees was complicated
oonsider&bly by the fact that many evaoueea used the housing crisis as
an excuse for not relocating. In a survey made of San Francisco Bay
residents who wished to return, over 2,100 stated that they could not
return unleaa housing was furnished. Consequently, arrangements were
made at Fort Funston, Hunter• Point, and Marin City dormitories to house
approximately 2,100 people. When relooaticm to that area was completed,

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only 800 had moved into the housing provided. In the San Diego area,
out ot 110 families indicating that they needed emergency housing,
only about 15 moved into the housing provided. It was apparent that
many evacuees had housing in sight prior to the survey of housing
requirements, but had hopes of obtaining better or oheaper housing.
When it was found that the Federal housing waa not better or cheaper,
the evacuees turned to their own resources. An attempt wu made to
find A:rrq housing in other oitiea along the coast and in inland oommnitiea. Many installations were located and could have been used,
but were not needed. There W'9re a rn rural area• where no housing
resources could be found, and in these instances many evacuees requested
the loan of tents. The .Allthority borrowed 250 tents from the Antiy and
loaned most of these in rural communities, pending the time the evacueea
could erect or find their 011J1 housing.
By the time the last relocation center was cloaed on November SO,
approxiately 250 veterans or serrice-oonnected families had moved into
public housingJ approximately 100 persons were in Camp Kohler,
A1.cramentc; 100 in Fort Funston, San Francisco; 100 in the Santa Ana
Air Base; 2,000 in the six temporary installations in Los Angeles
County, and in addition to this, approximately 4,000 were in hostels.

TRANSPORTATION
Because or the generally critical transportation situation,
oaretul and detailed plans were fol"lll.llated for transporting the evameee
f'rom the centers to their destinations. In conferences with the Office
ot Defense Transportation and the American Association of Railroads,
plans were made tor the use of special oars along regularly scheduled
runs, as well as special trains to definite points on the west coast.
In mid-July, 417 people left Rohwer on a special train that had been
ohartered by the canter to take evacuees baok to varioua points in
California. Thia was the first special train movement, and the tirat
ma.as movement of returnee• to the evacuated area. It was anxiously
watched by both 1IRA personnel and evacuees, particularly in regard
to its effect on public relations and c01111111Dity sentiment on the west
coaat. Many persona, both within and outside ot the Authotity, bad
advised against such large scale arrivals, fearing that they might
occasion large scale public opposition. The train left Rohwer amid
a great deal of excitement both among the travelers and among those
whom they were le.aving behind. During a stop-over in St. Louis. the
local resettlers comnittee and representative evacuees now .living in
St. Louis ·met the train and provided sightseeing trips and entertainment for the travelers. Reception cOJflm.ittees also welcomed the
evacuees at their des~inations and provided transportation for them to

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ho1tela or to their ho:me1. There was no disturbance pr incident amywhere along the way, and this first special train mowment wa1 adopted
as a pattern for many 11milar maH movelll8nta in the montha to come.
Group movement• wre thereafter encouraged by the Authority, especially
a■ it waa discovered that many evacuees were actually afraid to •ke
the return trip alone,· but lost thia tear when travelling and arriving
a.t their deatinatie11a in·groupa. The chartering of auah special trains
and coaches in addition to making the completion of the relocation
program a physical possibility, gave a tremendous p1yohological impetu•
to relocation. The railroads gave complete cooperation to the All'\hority
by providing the needed equipment tor group movements. With the ahift
ot· the war ettort to the Pacific, the demands on the watern railroadl
had reached unprecedented height,. Only their efficienoy and ooopera.tion enabled the Authority to carey out it• program on sahedule.
PROGRESS OF RBLOCATIOB
Up to June 1945, the relocation mov•ent had continued to be
predominately to the Ba.at and Kiddle Weit, but by the end ot June, the
movement to the west coaat began to equal that toward. the eut. It
soon became evident that large DWDbers, it not the majority or the
people resining in the center,, had definite plans to return to the
west coast, but were heai tant to be among the first to return. At the
same time, there was evidmce trom the evacuated area that many ot the
forme.r employers of the evacuees were .eager to employ th•, but that
they, too, hesitated to be the tir1t to aot. Thia log jam bad to be
broken. WRA could not afford to have eveeyone wait until the lut to
relocate. Transportation facilities would not be adequate for such a
large movement within so short a time, and the 1IRA ,ta.rt would not be
able to handle all the required details if•the movements wre not 1paoed
out.
At the beginning of 1946 when the••• exclusion order was
lifted, there were still 79,770 people living in relocation center,.
It had been expected that the movement out of the center, tor relocation
would be relativuy slaw up to Mq or June because it was believed that
•ny families w1 th children would wish to remain until the end of the
spring school te~n. It wa1 al10 anticipated that after June there would
be large numbers of people relooating steadily throughout the summer.
A part of these expectations were borne out. Following the liquidation
announcement, the number ot people leaving the centers rose steadily
from approximately 200 to about 700 a week. During the second week in
June, this number rose to 1,300 a week, but in the weks following. the
movement dropped back to 800 people a week. In the first 6 months 0 r the
year, 17,485 people had relooated, leaving 62,558 still living in the
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oentera. Ot th!• IIWllber,, about 18,000 nre oonaiderecl '\mrelooatablt"
because ot Departaent ot Juatioe or Aray detention order• atteoting
them or their talli.lies. Thia left OTer 4',,000 to relocate before the
octer• wre to oloae.
Ckle reuc:m tor the reduction in D10Ve1ND.t trm the oen1.ers in
June wu that it bad beocae known aacmg center residmta that certain
indindual• in the Department ot Justice nre advocating continuance of
at leut a tn oentera. Thi• knowledge _of a $litterenoe of opinion
Iii.thin the Government in regard to the Authority'• plans to liquidate
relocation center• led many resident• to dater making plana to leave
ln hope that they would not have to do ao.
SCBIDULllG DBPM'lURIS

It waa ev~dent that moat people still rcaining in the oentera
nre planning to stay until the last poasible moment. It wu alao
reoognized that there were nuoh smaller DWllber• of pers0118 present~
real problema in regard"l;o their ·relooation.

In order to prevent a final residue as wll u to adjust to
tranaportation and housing problaa,, 1IRA initiated a aerie• of ateps
· oaloulated to eft'eot termiDaI departure of all residenta •

.

Announoement was nade on June 22 that Unit• II and III at
Colorado River (Poston) Relooation Center and the Canal Camp at Gila
River nre to be closed in September,, and that the resident• were not
to be moved to another center or to the rmnaining camp• at Poaton and
Gila River,, but Jlll8t relocate.
An interviewing program •s in1 tiated to secure detini te
information on three questians which nre addreaaed to all residents,
Where do you. plan to got When do you plan to got What assistance will
you needt With this information,, administrative plans oould be Dade
both within the oenter11 and at point of relooation.
On July 13,, closing datea tor all relocation oentera were
announoed. Granada Relocation Center was to close on October 15;
14i.nidolca and Central Utah,, November lJ Gila River and Heart Mountain,
November 16; Colorado River and Manzanar, December lJ and Robwr
Relooation Center, Deoember 16.

An additional step emphasizing the tinality of oenter closure
plans was ourtailm.ent of operations and aervic ea. Since oonditions
varied considerably among the eight centers, authority to determine

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whioh ••nice• or operations should be ourtailed or elimimted, and
wh_en, •• largely lett to projeot direotora. Standarda on llhioh
deoi•iona were to be ba•ed nre outlined u tollowea
l. Se"1oe• or operationa that interfere with the relocation ot the resident,, or that po1tpone suoh relooation,
shall be ourtailed or eliminated aa •oon a• poa•ible.
Se"ioea or operation• that a4T&Doe auoh relooation •Y
be continued as lang aa they are neoe•aary.
2. Seni.oea or operation• that ti&ve no appreoiable
etteot on relooation ahall be curtailed or eliminated
as the deolining population ot the oentera no longer
warranta their ocntimaance, makes their adminiatrat-ion
difficult, or inorea•e• administrative ooata.
At the •ame time, the Authority announced the aohedulillg ot
dependenoy oases tor departure tram the center. The objeotive• nre
•et forth as tollowaa
Dependent tudliea who have been aooepted by public
wltare agenoie•, with aa•iatanoe and hou•ing a•aured,
will be required to set date tor departure•• It hou•ing
ia not a1aured the district ottioea will attempt to
seoure it.
Dependent.tamt.liea who retuae to indicate choice of
location, or to diacua1 relooation, will have to make
their relocation plan• by a certain date or plane will
be made tor th•• Ho transportation or other financial
aaaiatanoe shall be provided to dependent person• who
depart tor State• in which they have no legal reaidenoe,
without aaauq,tion ot re•ponaibility tor their •upport
by other meabera ot the tudly aad without approval or
public welfare agenoie1 in the oollllllnity of destination.
Thia waa tollowed by an ~iatrative notioe, dated A~•t 1,
which provided tor scheduling the departure ot all remining center
resident• during the last 6 weeks ot the centers' existence. In
effect, this plan was a practioal devioe tor arranging an even tlow
ot evacuees to tho outside during the cloaing period. It
ad.opted
only attar oaretul oonaideration and weighing ot many taotor1.

wa•

Unquestionably, it would have been desirable it all evacuees
could have lett the centers at their Olm rate ot speed, with WR.A. acting
•rely as adviser and aasistant. )fimy rea•ona iwnented thia, not the
least of 1'hich was that 3 yeara ot life in the centers where food,
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clothing, and other neceasitiea nre provided, had gradually sapped
individual initiative. Many evacuees were willing to let thing• drift
until they were ordered to leave, as they had been ordered to evacuate.
Part• of the scheduling notioe whi.oh explain ita need follons
In order to perform effectively the administrative t&ak
of closing the relocation oentera on the datea established,
it will be necessary- for l.he project direotor of eaoh center
to prescribe, in advance, quotas tor terminal departure■
during the last fn weeks. The importance of giving
iadiviclual attention to the a1sistanoe needed by oenter
resident• in completing their relocation plane, and the
need f\or scheduling the uae of transportation facilities,
nalce it unwise to pendt large groups of evacuees to
postpone their departure until the last few days.
•••Not later than 6 weeks before the date on whioh
the center is to be closed, the project director ahall
adjust the schedule of' terminal departures to the
population still resident in the center and ahall
then assign weekly and daily quot&a tor the departure
ot the remaining reaidente.
• • • I f any resident shall refuse to arrange tor
packing of personal effect,, arrangement, tor the
packing to insure his leaving aocording to schedule
ahall be made for him. It the resident shall have
refused to select a destination for relocation,
transportation shall be arranged to hia plaoe of legal
residenoe which will, in nearly every case, be the
place from which he was evacuated. If such persona
wish to adjust their plans and leave at an earlier
date, they shall be given aasil~ce in completing
arrangeJJ1ents. The attitude of auoh persons shall
not effect their eligibil.i ty tor relocation aaaistanoe grants, temporary assistance, travel grants, and
other assistance provided by WRA.
The National Director wrote to each projeot direotor, explaining
the quot& method~ and offering several suggestion• for ita application,
some of which are as follOWB1
iie should be careful not to schedule people for
departure••• into diatriota where temporary
housing ia not available.

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• • • n should not lose sight ot the reason for
soheduling terminal departures during the last weeks.
Thia is in no sense a punitive measure. It is intended
merely to enable us to do a good administrative job.
We need a relatively even flow during the last tn
weeks so that we •Y oontinue to give individual
assistanoe to oenter residents in oompleting their
relooation plans and ao that w •Y aobedule the use
of transportation facilities in auoh manner aa to
avoid lut minute hardships.
Issuance of these instruotiona dispelled all ideas in the. oenters
that there was a possibility of their not being entirely closed. Practioally all residents now began making definite plans to leave,
including even those who had previously indicated that they would make
no plan,. By September l, the number of person• leaving the centers
rose to an average of 3,000 persona weekly.
At this time, the Western Defense Conmand issued Public
Proclamation No. 24, removing restrictions on the return to the evacuated area for individual exoludee1, and the last barrier to relocation
vanished. During September, moat restrictions by the Government were
removed in regard to the hiring of oiti&ens of Japanese ancestry, both
in war plant, and in Federal service. During this month more than
16,000 people relocated.
Nearly every center closed before the scheduled date. Units II
and III at Poston, each at one time housing more than 4,000 evacuees,
closed on September 28 and 29, a day or two ahead o~ schedule. In
both camps, a few individuals were transferred temporarily to Poston I
because of transportation or unresolved welfare problems. Granada and
Central Utah closed exactly on schedule; Minidoka, 2 days early. Both
Heart Mountain and Gila River, 5 days early; Colorado River, 2 days
early, and Mauanar, 9 days early. Rohwer closed on November 30, 16
da.y1 ahead ot aohedule.
Center closing• wre a Herculean task tor the appointed atatf
and were not effected without oonfuaion and some discomfort on the
part of evacuees. For some ot the aged and for a small percentage ot
weaker individuals, the closing days were periods of real mental diatres1. However, tor the greater ajority of the people, the end dt a
long period of indecision oame as a welcome relief, and most ot those
departing looked forward with interest and aJ.riosity, and in general,
with considerable assurance to· returning home.
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TULi UY.I

Throughout the program, relooation was hampered by the W1certain
statue of persona who were detained beoauae ·some queation bacl been
raised concerning their loyalty. The number of persona aotually
detained delayed the relooation of a far greater number beoauae ot
family ties and friend°ly relationships. At the ti• the WR.A liquidation program was worked out,. negotiations wre held with the Department
of Justice and it was agreed that before the WRA went out of bu•in••••
persona detained in Tule Lake and in other centers would be transferred
to the jurisdiotion of the Juatioe Department.
Throughout the year 1945 there remained in the other relocation
centers a number of persona who were being detained by the Departm•nt
of Juatioe or the War Department. These persona were a aouroe ot
continual difficulty to the relocation program a• they influenced other
persons eligible tor relocation. With the end ot the war, the majority
of these persona were freed from detention orders and were eventually
relocated. Throughout 1945 the ffRA oarried on a relooation program in
Tule Lake for the persona who were not detained. However,. in vin of
the fact that the •jority of the families in Tule Lake had at lea•t
one family member under some type of detention ord•r,. it wa• extremely
difficult to carry out a aatiatactoey relocation plan tor moat families,
From Januaey 1, until December 1, 1946, approximately 6,000 peraona
relocated from Tule Lake. On December 10, 1945, the Department ot
Justice indicated that it was going t~ revin the detention ouu
individually. The Authority then reentoroed its relocation atatf at
Tule Lake and prepared to handle, in the apace of a fn --a• time, u
mey people as the Department of .Justice deoid•d to release. Interviews
were held tor all families and the relocation problaa of each ascertained. However, until the final dq of center oloaure 1IRA never knew
from one day to the next which individuals would be eligible tor r•lccation. and which might be transferred to the Department or Justice.
Neither was it able to tell the evaoueea that nre free to relocate
whether the Department of Juatioe would maintain a ahelter for d•pendent family members or detained head• ot fudli••• Littl• by' little,
hOW8ver, the majority of the person• in Tule Lake were released by the
Department of Justice and were aubsequently relocated. Th• oenter waa
closed on March 20, 1946, when the Department of Justice transferred to
internment camp• the remaining 447 evacuee• who were being detained.
Because of the reputation whioh Tule Lake had acquired in th• publio
mind, many persona wre fearful of the public reaction on the wst coast
in relocating Tuleana as they were released-by the Department of Justice.
Very little dif!'icul ty was evidenced in. this regard. The relocation
from Tule Lake ot o"Yer 8,000 persona from December l until Maroh 20

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ocoupied a great deal ot the field relocation otCicera• time which had
been plamied tor the working out or the final adjuatmant program ot the
entire evacuee population.

COMPLETION OF TBE RELOCATION PROGRAM
~1th the closing of the relocation oentera, the tirat phase ot
the relocation program was completed. There remained the jobs of
assisting the last thousands who had left the centers to aeoure initial
settlement in the CODIIIWlitiea to which they had gone, and ot making
certain that coJDlll.lDitiee wre adequately prepared to give .such·continu1.ng services aa might be needed atter the War Relocation Authority
closed ite otticea.
The Authority continued to give travel usiatance to those
evacuees who had left relocation center• for eastern points prior to
the lifting of the exclusion order and who now wished to return to their
former homes on the west coast. Transportation continued to be a-vailable both for the individuals and tor their household goods, up to
February 28, 1946. Between the closing or the last relocation center
and the last date on which such travel assistance could be given, there
waa a con1iderable increase in the number of persona availing themaelvea
of this service, but the majority or the reaettlers did not do ao,
choosing to remain in the co1111111Ditiea in which they had relocated.

The Director and the Chief ot the Relocation Diviaion spent the
firat 3 week• in December 1945 visiting the larger relocation areas on
the west coa1t to determine what major problems remained. In general
conditions were found to be satisfactory. Comuun1ty acceptance had
improved greatly. The majority of the evaoueea were happy to be back
home and were making a good adjustment. Jzployment was readily available, although within a restricted range of occupationa. Housing
reained the moat difficult problem but was ~vailable tor all returnees
on at least~ temporary baai ■• It wa1 decided to keep most district
office~ on the west ooa1t open until Vay l, and the area offices open
until May 15, 1946. These were the la teat dates that oould be considered since the Authority•• entire program waa to be liquidated by
June 30. District officers were instructed to conduct intensive interviewing programs among the evaoueea to determine their remaining
problems. This interviewing program w.a intended to include every
evacuee insofar a1 poasible and we.a to ascertain housing need, employment problems, medioal and 1ocial problems, and any instances ot racial
discrimination. It was recognized that some hardship caseaweTe not
known to the Authority, and thia interviewing program was intended to
find and assist these families. Area .offices were given authorization
to recommend special grants tor furniture and household equipment aa
needs were found to be genuine and urgent.
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Thia program was carried through with consid~ra.ble auooeBS in
the San Francisco and Seattle area.a. In the San Francisco area alone
families representing approximately 30,000 people were interviewed and
their problems worked out by relocation officer•. In the Los Angeles
area the acute housing problem occupied the full time. or most staff
members and only known hardship oa.ses were interviewed. In the Seattle
area the majority or families were interviewed.
In addition to assisting families to find adequate shelter, the
Authority's housing job included also the disposal bt temporary housing
installations it had obtained in California through joint arrangement
with the War Department and the Federal Public Housing Authority. By
the lat ot December the FPHA was operating temporary housin2 for the
WRA at Camp Kohler, Sacramento; Hunters Point and Camp Funston, San
Francisco; the A.nay Air Base at Santa Ana; and six former Army installations in Los Angeles County. Los Angeles installations included
Winona and Magnolia sites in Burbank, one site in Santa Monica, one in
El Segundo, one in Hawthorne, and one at Lomita. While the Director and
the Chief of the Relocation Division were on the west coast in early
December, a program for the liquidation ot these sites was agreed upon.
WRA personnel in districts where the housing problem was moat acute were
given the specific responsibility of locating housing for specified
families. Relocation officers with agricultural backgrounds were
assigned farm families, and speciarists in urban and domestic employmen~
to take care of the others. In general the plan was to find employment
for the workers in these fami1ies which would provide or include housing
for the family unit. Between December 1945 and 14arch 1, 1946, the staff
worked hard at carrying out this plan, and with considerable success in
some districts. Fort Funston was completely emptied by the first week
in December, and Camp Kohler by March 15. However, at lhmters Point
and other installations in southern California, some difficulties were
encountered. At Hunters Point the housing provided only ccmrrunity
cooking and bathing faoilitiea, but was superior to that occupied by
ID8J11 other evacuees in the San Francisco area. Evacuees living there
11&re naturally reluctant to move. Adequate apartments in the FPHA.
project at Ricnmond were found tor all families living at Hunters
Point, but while these apartments were better, evaoueos were still
reluctant to move, since Richmond was across the bay and was less
convenient to their jobs. At the time the San Francisco office was
closed on May 15, approximately 117 families still remained in these
dormitories. The War Relocation Authority transferred sufficient funds
to the FPHA to convert these dormitories into family units.

In southern California efforts to move families into individual
units met with less success. "mlile a great many job and housing opportunities were found, especially in domestic and agricultural work, a
large percentage of the evacuees preferred to renai.n 1n the housing
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installations despite their inadequacy. Ma~ famiJiea were receiving
full support from the local welfare department and expressed the belief
that they could live better on relief than they could on the wages
offered by domestic and farm jobs which provided housing. Some families
were reluctant to give up the group living to which they had become
accustomed after 4 years of institutional life in relocation center••
Arguments,.advanced by the Authority's staff that it would be to the
advantage. both of the individual families and ot the entire group tor
them to leave these installations, fell on deaf ears. Little success
was had up to March 1 in moving out many of these families. Evacuees
frequently told relocation officers that they would continue in these
installations until the latter were closed at llhich time they would
attempt to find something else.
The Authority waa faced with a difficult situation. It had to
dispose of these installations before going out of existence on June 30.
The families resident in them refu1ed to move. The Authority at this
time asked the War Assets Administration it the barracks it owned could
be turned over to FPHA or ~o the county of Los ADgeles or a private
welfare organization for the continued housing of evacuees. The
Authority was advised that such procedure was impoasible, tl!ld that the
only means of disposing ot these installations was to declare them
surplus to the War Asset■ Administration. The nar Assets Administration
would then have to dispose of them through regular channels and no
assurance could be given that any particular purchaser, no matter how
willing to continue w1 th the evacuees aa tenants, would at,oure them.
The Chief ot the Relocation Division went to the west coast to try to
work out a definite program for providing other h~sing for people
remaining in the installaticma. Negotiations were entered into with
the FPHA and the country of Los Angeles. The county of Los Angeles
finally agreed to take care of 250 persona needing domiciliary or other
institutional care, out of the 2,100 persons then living in the six
teJUJ;_>orary installations. FPHA agreed to house the 367 persona in
veteran or service-connected families by moving them into more permanent public housing projects. The FPHA also agreed that it the liar
Relocation Authority would provide funds for tearing down the barracks
at VUnona site in Burbank, and would aaaanble at the Winona site SOO of
the FPHA trailers then scattered among the aix installations,, the FPHA
would take this trailer project aver and operate it aa a standard FPHA
trailer camp. The Authority was also to provide the funds to the FPHA
to bring these trailers up to standard. FPHA further agreed that it
the Yl'RA would find individual placements for 150 trailers,, FPHA would
rent these trailer■ to- employers or other peraon1 willing to provide
housing tor evacuee families.

Under these arrange•ntl at least 1,000 persona could be housed
at the new trailer camp in Burba:o.lc. These,, plus the 260 the county was
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to a1SWD1 responsibility for, and 367 persona in veteran or serviceconnected families, made a tot.al of 1,617 persona ot the total of
2,100 persons residing in the Authority's installationa in Lo• Angele•
County. The remaining 482 peraons could be accommodated in the 150
trailers to be placed out on rental, or by moving to alternative houaing
which some ot them had.
FPHA, the County of Lo• Angeles, and the Authority were pleased
with thi ■ arrangemen~ and were sure "that it was the beat that could be
done considering the extrema stringency in regard to housing existing
in the locality. Each of the type• ot houling to be furnished would be
tar 1uperior to that existing in the tenporary installations. However,
the program waa no sooner announced than the Authority began to receive
complaints from the evacuees living in the installations and from some
other persona friendly to the n&OUHI, charging that these additional
move, were unnecessary and that the evacuees were being pushed around.
Same ill-advised well-wishers advised the evacuees to sit tight in the
temporary installations and ret"uae to move. It was neceHi.ry to
complete the Winona project with a great deal of speed and move the
serTioe-oomieoted persona and those needing domiciliary care in a very
short time in order to meet the deadline for closing of WRA operations
on the we1t coast. During April and continuing.into May, the Los
Angeles 1IRA. statt devoted allnost full time to the problema involved in
ass1·1 ting the people to move. In spite ot the oppqsi tion and the difticul ties involved, by May 16 all installations except the Lomita Air
Strip had been olo.■ ed. There remained at Lomita approximately 130
persona 11ho were scheduled to move to two private trailer camps. Th~se
camps were habitable but not complete. WRA. suggested that the residents
move 10 that 1'RA could assist before closing its office. However, the
Bureau of Public Aasistance advised the evacuees not to move until all
facilitie ■ at the trailer CBmps were complete.
The WRA, therefore,
closed ita offioea and left the evacuees in Lomita under the sponsorship
or Lo1 Angelea County.
In planning the cloaing or field offices throughout the country,
suftici-ent time was allowed to assist in completing initial readjustment
of the last resettlers to leave the centers and to complete plans tor
continued services to resettlers after these offices were closed. It
was decided that area offices would close on May 16, 1946, with the
exception ot the New Orleans office which waa to cloae on April 1.
District offices were to close on a staggered schedule based on the
number of reaettlera in the district and the time that the office had
had to prepare tor .their continued social adjustment. By April 16, all
district offices outside of the evacuated area were closed. The major
district offices on the west coast remained in operation until May l
with the Los Angeles district office remaining open until J.-:ay 16.

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The t'irat indications earlier in 1946 that the WRA wa.• planning
to -.d it• field aenioea and complete all ita operations by mid-1946
brought protests from 10JD1t 1ouroes that the Japanese population would
require continuing Federal u1iltanoe after that date. The Director
took the poai tion that suoh continuing •enioe• aa might be needed tor
thi• one segment ot the population. 1Mre not a tunotion ot tM Federal
Government and particularly not ot a temporary wartime agenoy. Be
believed that these problema could be handled by established agencie•
and volunteer ind! viduala already familiar with the en.ouee and hia
problema and willing and able to continue to uaiat him.
To asaure such continuing a1sietance in local 00111111Diti••• a
Relocation Division memorandwnwaa issued in September 1946 instructing
relooaticm. otticers to make ~OJ111 1n1-t;y organisations tor continued aid
to evaoueea a major 1\inction ot their liquidation program. Thia memor.andwll auggeated that in each comnmity where a substantial DWlber ot
evacuees had resettled. the district relooation officer should ar~•
tor a meeting of interested coD1111Dity agencies. organizations. andconcerned individuals including repre•entation troa the reaettlers
themael vea. The purpoe e ot these ••tings was to have the co1111111Dity
analyze the immediate and long-term needs ot the reaettlera and to
develop the nachinery nece1sary to meet these needs.
As a result.of finai comnam.i.ty organisation work undertaken by
the Authority•• field start. there was at the closing of the Authority••
program an etieotive local organizaticm. carrying on many ot ita services
to reaettlers ·in almoet every·comnmity having any sizable DWllber or
Japanese living in it. In those tn inatanoea in which communities
did not actually develop an organisation primarily conoerned with the
lo~al Japanese populaticm.. organizations of broader scope agreed to
include the problem• of the Japanese in their long-range programa and
concerned individuals had agreed to continue to assist resettlers in
meeting any difficulties which might arise. In larger cities strong
organizations were 1\motioning with aaai'stance to the evacuees aa their
primary concern. In some localities these organizations were made up
largely ot resettlers. with other local people agreeing to aesist in
their specialized fields. In other cities committees were made up
largely of representatives ot churches, welfare agencies. and professional and busineasmen, with only a small reaettler representation.
It may be presumed that in.. general suoh committees will oontinue
to exist and function as long as there is need for them, but. in many
comnunities by the spring of 1946, such groups were finding almost no
calls being made upon them tor se"ice. and some committe•s believed
that there wouid be no need for their continuing beyond the end of the
year.

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RESUME OF EVACUEE ACCEPTANCE AND ADJUSTMENT OUTSIDE THE EVACUATED AREA
From the start or uie relocation program, the 1IRA raced widely
different oiroums tances in various seotions of the country in regard to
the aooeptance of evaoueea. These sectional Jitferences had a material
effect on the eventual distribution of the evacuee population and on
their adjustment in conmmitiea of resettlement.
The dispersion of the evacuees thrOllghout the country was
accepted as a desirable objective early in the program. The Chier of
the Employment Division r~corded that "by the middle of June fl94'5f it
was pretty clear that WRA could count on a program for seasonal work
outside the camps in western agriculture, but this did not seem to us
to be enough. • • • JJ we saw the problem, a program which would permit
permanent relocation was equally as important aa the maintenance of
oampa. The resettlement of the evacuees throughout the country would
contribute useful manpower to the country. It would aalvage the
Japanese aa Americana and would bolster the morale of the relocation
centers. Beyond these imnediate advantages or relocation it waa hoped
that this a:wa.reneaa of approval might even go a long way toward solving
the problem of the Japanese minority in the United States through an
elimination of tbe pressure that had been generated by excessive
concentration on the west coast."
It was decided to start relocation in the Inter-Mountain States
and in the Middle West, since the early war hysteria particularly in
regard to the possibility of coastal invasions was less strong there
than along the eastern coast. The War Department had asked the
Authority not to issue leave for relocation in the Eastern Defense
CoDIDIUld and Gulf Coast areas without special \Var Department clearance
ot each individual case.
The Chief of the Employment Division made a trip through 14ichigan
and Illino~s to appraise employment possibilities there. This trip
convinced him that a considerable number or evaouees, eapecially the
Nisei, could find new homes in the Middle West.
Time has verified his prediction. By the end or 1945, there were
some 18,000 Japanese resettled in the north central area, which included
the States of Indiana, Illinois, Wiaconain, Minnesota and eastern North
Dakota, Missouri, Kansas, Iowa, the eastern halves or Nebraska and South
Dakota, and the northern peninsula of Michigan. About 12,000 of these
resettlers were in the city of Chicago. For the most part they are not
self-employed but are employed by thouaands or companies and individuals
representing a normal crosa-aeotion of employment. Almost every type or
ocoupation is represented in the group. In comm.mi ties which have
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attracted any number of resettlers, their presence ia no longer a
novelty or occasion for comment. In Chicago, for tnstance, they are
housed in every type or neighborhood and in almost every neighborhood.
The quality of housing ranges from poor to good, with the bulk of it in
fair neighborhoods. In all other cities in the area, housing ranges
from fair to excellent, w1 th the bulk of the Japanese living in good
neighborhoods. Social acceptance is limited chiefly by the hesitancy
or the group to participate fully in the social lite or the 90D1DW1ity
rather than by unwillingness or the conmunity to welcome such participation. It is questionable whether the hesitancy or the group is
greater than is normal for first and second generation resident■ in a
new country.
To a great extent a fair reception was apparently ready and
waiting for Japanese in many 0011lD11nities in the Chicago area. One of
the relocation officers, who had been in placement work in Chicago,
particularly with minority groups for some years before coming to the
WRA, relates that on coming to work in this agency he anticipated the
most difficult placement work he had ever attempted. In his first
day's contacts with Chicago employers he called on two companies, one
a large candy manufacturing concern and the other a small plant doing
essential war work, a manufacturer of marine valves for the Navy. The
candy company saw no basis for concern over the national origin or the
Japanese it was propoaing to hire, and suggested that 15 or 20 might be
tried as a starter although it saw possibilities for the employment or
hundreds of reeettlers. The war plant owner scoffed at the idea that
there would be any objection to the employment of resettlers in his
organization, and offered employment to skilled m.chinista and also
particularly asked for a girl to serve as receptionist for the front
oftice--by all odds the most conspicuous job in the organization. The
girl who was placed in this job in March 1943 was still employed in
the same position when the field office ~loaed.
Commercial amusements and social activities, suoh aa are offered
by theaters, public dancing places, taverns, cocktail bars, bowling
alleys, skating rinks, and reataurants, have been freely patronized by
resettlers. The only known instance of specific discrimination against
resettlers in conmercial places of amusement was in the two largest
public dance halls in Chicago which, after initially welcoming resettlers, for a time did not a.dud. t them. Efforts of the Chicago di strict
office to regain acceptance were not immediately successtul, but both
of these dance halls later changed their policies and again admitted
Japanese.

.

The instances in which public acceptance in the Middle West was
not good were phenomenally few in number, and, where these represented
in arr:, sense an action of the community, they were in rural or small
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town diatriota. Major inoidenta oan almost be· counted on the finger•
or one hand, inoluding three farm ditfioultie• ooouring at Cosad, Neb.,
Bamburg, Iowa, and Marengo; Ill., and some difficulty with the Illinoia
Central Railroad in Chicago. In Nebraska several families left a farm
under preasuJ"e from the oollllUDity, and in Iowa the purchase of a fa.rm
was blocked by comm.mity attitudes. At Marengo, there waa some ama.11
but vocal objection to evacuee tanner• coming into the camiunity, but
thia opposition was overridden, and Marengo ha• proved a satisfactory
resettlement point throughout the program. The Illinois Central
Railroad situation in no amae represented an attitude on the part ot
Chicago, and probably did not represent an attitude on the part ot very
many Chicago railroad workera. The employment of a considerable nwnber
of reaettler railroad workers was blooked by a threat or strike tram
the national office of the track workers union (AFL) located in Detroit.
The probabilities are that the union uaed the employment of these resettlers aa a basis for leverage in a union-management argument over wages
and the employment ot Mexican naticmala.
Publio acceptance for resettlera in the Middle West was
undoubtedly greatly increased by the work of the WRA staff and by the
public relations work done by interested.groups and individuals in the
community, but basically public acceptance was t'und1aentally good to
start with in moat communitiea.
Although large numbers of naoueea resettled in the north central
Outside of northern
Illinois, Misaouri and Nebraska, there are only a ff!ffl evacuee fa.rm
fami.liea in the area. It is eatiJated that only about 2 percent ot th~
reaettlers living in the entire north central area are engaged in farming. Thia tact is not due t o ~ lack of effort on the part of WRA nor
to any lack of opportuni tie• for rural resettlement in this area. An
agricultural specialist was employed on the area start, and he and the
district relocation officers dneloped many attractive farm offer• for
evacuees. There were many reasons for the lack or interest on the part
of evacuees, but the principal one was the disaimilari ty of-midwestern
farming from the type of agrioulture with which the evacuees were
familiar on the west coaat.

area, they located almost entirely in the cities.

Like the north oentral area, the Great Lakes area, including
the States of Michigan (excluding upper peninsula), Ohio, Kentucky, West
Virginia, the western part or Pennsylvania and the weatern part of Bew
York, offered excellent opportunities for resettlement or Japanese
Americana. Employment offers were plentitul and comnunity acceptance
was present from the ~•ginning.
Inatancea of discrimination and prejudice were ff1fl' in number a~
not important, and in no case did they represent the attitude or~
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appreciable segment ot the c,omn,,nity. In one case, in Pittsuburgh in
June 1946, a controversy was touched oft by a preaa announcement that a
vacant orphanage had been donated as temporary quarters for a hostel.
A small group of residents of the neighborhood helQ a protest meeting,
oiroulated a petition, and tried to get an injunction to prevent use or
the orphanage as a hostel. The case was dismiaaed with the ruling that
"common pleas court had no juriadiotion in the matter.• During the
SWIIID9r, llhile court aotion was p,ending, the hostel was used wi tbout
incident. It had alao been learned that only 36 residents of the ward
bad sigued the original petition, although the population of the ward
118.8 24,982.
For almoat a year and a halt, the Western Reserve University .bad
retused to admit Biaei students, and gave as its reason that "Government
agenc1ea with which the university had oontn.ota for carrying on contidential war reaearch indioate that they do notwiah us to enroll students of Japanese oritin for the present." This statement was not true,
sinoe P)l}O clearance had been obtained for this sohool. VJhen the story
appeared in the newspapers, ~e president ot the university reveraed
his ruling and six Niaei were immediately enrolled.
The city or Clweland, Ohio, whioh attraoted some 2,400 reaettlera, was the favorite place for resettlement in the Great Lalcea area.
Aside from the extremely favorable employment situation there, the fact
that the WRA offioe was opened early in the program (January 1943) and
that conmunity interest was already awa.ken•d were important taotors in
the popularity or Cleveland. The groundwork for relocation in Cleveland
was done by a comnittee composed of many influential and highly respected local citizens to pave the way for the resettlement of eva.oueea.
It was organized in November 1942, and remained a positive force in the
program in Cleveland, complementing and supplementing the work ot the
WRA office and exerting a marked degree of leadership in the colllllWlity.
Awareness of the comnittee's activities quickly spread among the
evacuees and had a good effect on their-morale.

The east coast area, comprising the Sta.tea or lfaine, ,New
Hampshire, Vermont, Maasachusetta, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Bew York,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia,
and the District of Columbia, was also a popular region for relocation,
although the full potentialities or this area were not adequately
exploited. Thia was primarily because or earlier limitations on granting leave to the east coast and the resultant relatively late date at
which WRA began to operate field offices in this area. The east coast
area was not able to function on an equal" basis with midwestem areas
UDtil 1945, and by that time many or the families in the centers had
already set their resettlement destinations elsewhere.

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The east coast area presented favorable possibilities tor reset-

tlement. Evacuees were readily introduced into various coJIDILUlitiea,
and public acceptance generally waa good. There 119re a few incidents
o1' prejudice, none of which were especially significant except as they
may have been exaggerated in the relocation centers. In one oaae, known
as the "Great Mead01fl incident," several Isaei farmers were forced to
leave Rehobeth, Del., as the result or protests and threats by neighboring farmers. In New York City, Mayor La Guardia publicly expreSBed
opposition to an influx of Japanese Americans, stating it might complicate the city's already serious racial and minority problems. Later
some property owners protested the establishment of a hostel in
Brooklyn. These protests brought forth the active support ot Jll&ey'
influential individuals and organizations in the city, and in the end
probably helped rather than hindered the relocation program. The
employment of an Issei physicist by Smith College in Northhampton,
l4s.ss.,drew national attention in the newspapers and radio for a time,
but the situation resolved itself when the evacuee was inducted into
the Army. In the spring of 1944 a Nisei was obliged to quit his job
as chemist in East Providence, R. I., because or the objeotions ot
fellow workers. Newspapers in Lowell and Lawrence, Mass., were antagonistic on one occasion. Moat of these incidents, however, were
sporadic short-lived flare-ups or prejudice based on misinformation
or selfish interests, and did not reflect widespread public attitudes.
New York City, which had a prewar Japanese population or about
2,000, attracted about that same Jllllllber .of resettlers. Many new
evaouee-owned businesses were established, and virtually all types
of employment and professional opportunities were open to the resettlers in accordance with their skills.
Seabrook Fe.rms, located near Bridgeton, N. J., was the only
rural place outside or the interm.ountain States and the west coast to
attract any substantial number of evacuees. By December 1945, 1,769
eyacuees had resettled at Seabrook, 1,024 of whom were employed in the
processing plant and on specialized jobs. Seabrook Farms, which is
made up of 16 companies and corporations, operates a huge truck farming
enterprise and freezing plant. In November 1943, when the WRA representative first called upon Seabrook Farms regarding employment possibilities for evacuees, immediate recruitment or 200 people, preferably
in family groups was requested. If these were able to adjust satisfactorily, Seabrook indicated it would wish to employ a substantial number
or additional evaoueea. Recruiters went into the centers to describe
workinc; conditions and to sign workers. At the same time various difficulties arising from requirements of the War Manpower Commission and
the Army's Second Service Command, which required individual investigation of recruits because of the Army's contracts with Seabrook, were"
gradually being overcome by persistent 7iRA and Seabrook effort.
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~ept for Seabrook larms, which·ia a coD1111nit7 1n itaelt, _
acceptance for encuees wu better in urban than 1n rural coDll'llllities
1n the east coast area, and moat ot the reaettlers are in cities.
The southern area. comprising the States of Iouiaiana,
Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Sontb Carolina, Oklahoma,
Arkansas, tennesaee and Texas presented somewhat different relocation
problems. It wu hoped that the South, ¥.1.orida and Texu particularly,
would attract evacuee farmers because of the aimilarit7 of climate and
types of farming to those in California. Actually, however, only
about AOC evacuees resettled in the entire southern area.

The South got off to a late atart-aa did the east coast-partly
because of earlier reluctance of the Anq to permit resettlement along
the eastern seaboard and the gul.f coast. Also the establishment of
two relocation centers ( Jerome and Rohwer) in Arkansas touched off a .
great deal of resentment and prejudice in that state whlch spread into
the surrounding states.
By the fall of 1943 the Authorit7 decided ·that relocation in
the South was possible. The evacuees had proved at. the Jerome and
Rohwer centers that vegetable culture on a large scale was feasible.
The Authority saw the South as offering an opportunity to successfully
relocate a large.number of its farm families. It also thought that
the relocation of a large. number of experienced vegetable growers in
the South 110uld introduce a valuable new industry which would greatly
benefit the area. However, few evacuees accepted the opportunities
offered them. A factor 11hich made the South unpopular among evacuees
was their concern about th, Negro situation there, am their fears
that persons of Japanese ancestry might be.subject. to the same discriud.nation and Jim-Crowism as was practiced against the Negro~ At
Camp Shelby, Mias., where some Nisei soldiers were in training, their
children -were at first required to attend Negro schools because of a
State law requiring segregation of Caucasian children from those of
other racial origins. Except for this instance, there is no pdinted
indication that the South would have placed the Japanese in the same
status as the Negtto. However, this fear was present in the minds of
the evacuees. The tolerance of the South toward Japanese was not
fully tested since evacuees did not resettle in this area in signif-icantly large numbers.

Except for the Camp Shelby situation and in Arkansas, there
were very few instances of overt discrimination against evacnees in
the sou-thern states. 011e incident occurred near New Orleans, when a
group of evacuees from the centers went there to investigate agricultural opportunities. Two parishes (Plaqu8tline and St. Bernard) passed
ordinances to prevent evacuees from settling there.

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Unlike other distriots of the s011thern area, the relocation
program in the Little Rock district met with considerable opposition
in its earliest stages. The Governor of Arkansas was vocal in his
opposition to relocation of evacuees in the State of Arkansas; the
State legislature passed acts directed against persons of Japanese
ancestry; evacuee parents were denied birth certiftcates for. their
children born in the relocation centers in Arkansas. A citizen of
Jerome, Ark., shot at, but missed, a Japanese American soldier on
leave from Camp ftobinson near Little Rock; a farmer returning from a
"squirrel shoot" shot at three evacuees in a woods near McGehee, Ark.,
wou.nding two and missing tbe third. There were in Arkansas a far
greater number of people, hanever, who were just as active in championing the. ri~ts of the evacuees. The Wilson Plantation, located in
northeast Arkansas, offered one of the best resettlement opportunities
for evacuees.. This farm contains 63,000 acres. It was a cotton f'arm,
but planned .· a change to more diversified row-crop production. It
aoudlt a rmmber of evacuees to pioneer in this work. There are 71
different industries built around this giant farm. Schools are .
superior to the average for .the State. School buses serve the entire
plantation. Houses are far above the average tenant houses. Varioua
types of contracts were available to the evacuees-cash rent, share
crop, and wage work. Wilson Plantation offered opportunit1_e s for 1 1 000
evacuee families, but only 17 evacuee families comprising 87 people
chose to resettle there.
While few evacuees settled in the South, those that did are
making an excellent adjustment both socially and economically. .Because
of the financial success of those few farmers that settled there, it is
entirely possible that more Japanese will eventually relocate there.
The intermountain area included eastern Washington, eastern
Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Nevada and ·wyoming. The 01-eat Plains
area,included the states of Colorado, southeastern ~ontana, 11estern
North Dakota, \"iyornins, western Sou;th Dakota, western Nebraska, New
Mexico and southwestern Texas. These t110 areas were mch alike in
regard to acceptance of resettlers and the evacuees• adjustment to
their new communities. Despite the contiruous progress of relocation
in both of these areas, intolerance and prejudice against persons of
Japanese ancestry were generally present in one form or another. The
meeting of the western governors, discussed earlier in this report,
started off the resettlement pror;ram in these areas under a serious
handicap. Only one western governor (Carrot. Colorado) shoed any
graciousness about allowing the ~vacuated people to come to his state.
This antagonistic attitude never entirely disappeared from the
"official" picture, but few officials openly foueht relocation once it
got under ,ray, because of the economic pressures from employers to
bring in more evacuees.

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Adverse feelin~s so~etimes took the form of violence. On one
occasion in 1944. shots were fired throu~h windows of evacuee homes
near :3ri ..,.ham ;ity, l'tah, and on another into the labor camp at Provo.
\.M.le there ·were a number of such •instances, there yzere also many
cases of cor.i.:.~.rnities backinr. an individual Nisei or an evacuee family.
Fc,r example, there was the instance of ci vie leaders of Walla Walla
8idin'7 one evacuee f2mily in findinr a home so that they would have a
r,lace tc w!·,ich their v,our.ded veteran son could return from the Arrny•s
i .c <.av. '3 eneral Eosri tal •
. . tclocation tc the intermomitain and :1reat i~lains areas v1as
l",ainl~, to places which had fairl:,, lar~:e prewar Ja~Janese populations.
~'.xcept for sone concentration in cities such as Denver, Pueblo, Greeley,
Selt .L.ake City, O;'den, Boise and Spokane, the majority of the resettlers ,vorked on farms. Apparently, the presence of prewar Japanese
in these areas and familiarity with the prevaiUnr: type of a~j.culture
were the t,rc ~rincipal attractions of these areas for relocation.
In the cities in this area, resettlers have opened u.p many
s::iall l>uslress ventures, nost of them desi~ed entirely to serve
evacuees and their needs. tnterinf: business ir. these cities, however,
was not wi tho,1t its difficulties. Most businesses were limited in
location b:,~ concentration of the .population which they planned to serve,
but a more serious handicap was the difficulty many of them encountered in obtaininr: business licenses .in some of these cities. In
Denver for example, the city administration was willinp to issue licenses to Japanese, either citizen or alien, for operatinr: businesses
only in the old section of the city. Some did obtain licenses for
other neip;hborhoods, but authcrities used every excuse, valid or otherwise, to avcid issuinz them.
Because such 1a.r"'8 numbers of evacuees were relocating in the
interrnountain and western plains areas, by mid-1043 communities began
to fear the establishment of heavily concentrated areas of Japanese
similar to the "Little Tokyos" that had existed on the west coast
prior to the war. Opponents of the evacuees, who had originally fought
the resettlement of any Japanese in these areas, be~an to make capital
of t,here fears in a revived campaisn ar:ainst the resettlers. 1!orse
still, many of the people who had befriended the Japanese and aided
in their relccation began to express fears sbout these concentrations.
Recocnizing these fears and the more favorable opportunities that
existed for evacuees in other parts of the comitry, ~,RA in 1943,
closed these areas to relocation for a time in the hope of diverting
a greater relocation movement to the East and ?.liddle West. The
"closing" of these areas consisted of not approving leave for persons
planning to relocate there. An exception to this was those persons
who had family members relocated in these areas. In such cases family
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members, especially parents, were urged to corae out and reestablish
the family group, thus stabilizing a bad situation which existed because of the relocation of larr,e rmmbers of irresponsible youth. The
plan was only partially effective, since some evacuees relocated originally to other districts only to enter these areas later. fubsequentlY,
WRA returned to the policy of upholding the right of evacuees to live
where they chose.
THE \.EST CXAST

Hostility toward persons of Japanese ancestry had, historically,
been greatest on the west coast, particularly in Californi~. In other
sections of the country the "incidents" for the most part were .isolated verbal protests, petitions, an occasional refusal to employ
Japanese Americans or to admit them to universities as students, and
similar brief, unspectacular occurrences. On the west coast, however,
shots were fired, economic boycotts organized, homes burned, churches
storing evacuee property vandalized, and in one case a cemetery was
desecrated.
Race prejudice, instigated by greed, emerges from any serious
study of west coast social, economic and pqlitical history as the
dominant factor behind hostile attitudes toward the Jayanese. Antagonism was fostered by certain groups alJllost from the beginning of the
Japanese migration to this ccuntry in the late nineteenth century.
Real estate restrictions in the large west coast cities fcrced the
Japanese into segregated districts. Occupational discrimination kept
many members of the younger generation from finding work in the · professional fields for which they had trained; qualified doctors,
lawyers, clere-,ymen, scientists and teachers were ?,enerally limited
to service within the Little Tokyos-with the alternative of abandoning
their professions. Young Nisei trained in American schools and taught
the theories of democracy, frequently found the ranks of teachers,
scientists and engineers closed to applicants with J~panese names and
faces. The California Alien Lend Law of 1913 prohibited aliens ineli~ble to citizenship from purchasing ar,-icultural land and from
leasing it fore period lonr,er than three years. The revised land
law of 1920 prevented such aliens from leasing agricultural land or
"or king on it except on a wage basis. "(iest coast prejudice was largely
responsible for the ~assage of the "exclusion act of 1924. 11 Prejudice
against µersons cf Japanese ancestry was rmrtured and abettep by
several powerful organizations such as the Native Sons of the Golden
\';est and by newspapers such as those owned by f!earst and LicCla.tchy. ·
Vihen the exclusion orders were finally lifted in December 1944, these
groups; having failed in their effort to force the Government to keep

(94)

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the evacuees from returning., intensified their efforts to intimidate

the evacuees theJDBelves., hoping by so doing to make them afraid to
return.

In the face of discrimination and animosity that existed or was
developed on the west coast., and the incidents of violence that met
some of the first evacuees who returned., it is interesting to note that
50.,140 .or 62 percent of the evacuees. still in the centers in Jarruary
1945., and 5,54lpeople who had already re;ocated elsewhere., returned
to the west coast up to March 30., 1946. ·
There were a variety of individual reasons which led evacuees
to return to the west coast. Some of them owned property., homes and
businesses to ,•,hich they could return. Others., the aged and the sick.,
had to return to their place·of legal residence in order to be eligible
for public assistance. Some ,,ere afraid to go to new and strange
communities. Some had many good friends among the C'A.ucasians., and
the neighborliness and gcod will they had experienced in California
before the war far outweighed th~ instances of discrimination. Others
were just homesick for California.
Added to these reasons., moreover, was awareness of the fact
that something new had been added to the western scene. thereas
before the war only the racist anti-Japanese groups had been well
organized and vocal, now new organizations had grown up which were
dedicated to the ·principles of fair play for mincrity groups. These
groups-such as the Pacific Coas~ Committee on American Principles
and Fair. Play., and the Councils for Civic Unity-were composed of
fair-minded., energetic and influential people., and they demanded
protection snd opportunity for the returning evacuees.
At the time the field offices were closed on :~ay 15 conditions
were found to be . generally satisfactory in V,ashington State. As a
result of the excellent cooperation of the .N.::tional Housing Agency in
the Northwest., hO\lsing had not been the serious problem that it m.s
in california. A substantial number of evacuee businessmen had
successfully reestablished their businesses. In Seattle, a lar'ge
number of hotels and small stores were being operated by evacuees.
Greenhouse operators had successfully reinstated theraselves and
expected no further problems in marketing their goods or in obtaining
supplies. Evacuees were 0ettinc back into many labor unions and were
obtainin~ services even from those who had previously opposed their
return. The principal rer.iaining difficulty was in finding whitecollar clerical positions for Iseei v;ho hed worked in Japane;;e establishments ?rior to evacuation. 'l11e welfare department of the
State of Washington had cooperated wholeheartedly., and it appeared that
all needy families were being adequately cared for.
700077 0-46 -- - -;

(9S)

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In Portland, Ore., the situation was.similar to that in hashington. The only re~l obstacle that had not been overcome was the city
council's refusal to issue liscenses to Issei to operate businesses.
Many influential people in Portland were working on this problem,
however, and it -seemed likely thJt the legality of the city council's
action might soon l;>e challenged in court.

At Hood River, where a great deal of hostility had been exhibited,
all but one of the evacuee growers llbo had returned had been taken back
into the apc1le growers I association, and they were being given excellent
service in the fall harvesting season. In fact, some evacuees had less
trouble gettin t; their crops hervested than the other growerfi, because
many friendly groups turned out to assist them. Some stores in Hood
River, ho~ever, were continuing to refuse to sell to the evacuees.
Because of this boycott, the evacuees were going to The Dalles to do
their shopping, and Hood River merchants ,vere beginning to worry about
all the money leaving their cormnunity. There were indications that
responsible merchants ,10uld soon take steps to stamp out all boycotts
against the evacuees.
In northern California, housin~ contirrued to be the biggest
problem, but t:1is was a general situation affecting others besides
the evacuees. The immediate needs of the evacuees had been met.
A number of evacuee businessmen had returned to their
businesses in San Francisco. They were g:etting alcng .,,-ell. Most
of them v,ere doing as much if not more business than they had done
before evacuation. Some of the larger merchants who had had big
stores in Chinatown had not returned. Many of these had reestablished
themselves in Chicago and New lork. Those who reestablished businesses
in San Francisco . - ·ere, for the most part, serving a mixed clientele
rather than a strictly Japanese one as most of them did before the
war.

~hile job placement had become more difficult in the East Day
area after th.e war, there still seemed to be ample opr,ortuni ties for
evacuees. HoYrever, w~ite-collar Issei again presented a problem in
placement. In the Central Valley and other rural areas in northern
California·, the demand for evacuee agricultural workers far exceeded
the number of evacuees who wished such employment. ~any groups which
resisted the evacuees• return were now clamoring for their services.
labile land was scarce, many of the Nisei Ylere obtaining parcels of
ground and were reestablishin~ themselves as farm operators in this
area. The Issei ,\ere, of ccurse, unable to reestablish themselves
as operators because of the alien land law.
Th6 Southern Pacific Railroad was carrying on an intensive
QIUllpaign to hire railroad workers, and they were offering jobs, plus

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I,

housing acco4modations, for approximately 8 1 000 evacuee families.
Several hundr~ed evacuees were recruited for this work.
All co·tnties in California had accepted respon~i.bility for
evacuee welfa e cases.
In sou hern California, housing too was the most serious
remaining problem but here also the immediate naeds had been met.
Jobs were plentiful, except for white-collar openings. The most
attractive offers were for domestic service. Many wealthy people
were offering_i high wages for evacuee families and ,,ere providing
excellent li,rtng quarters. A number of Hollywood celebrities had
taken evacuee families into their homes and the demand for such
families far ~xceeded the supply.
The "Little Tokyo" section of Los Angeles had largely been
reoccupl;ed by the Japanese but on a much smaller scale.- Many of the
IDs Angeles businessmen who had not relocated elsewhere were again
in business. Greenhouse operators throughout the area were reestablishing themselves successfully. The boycott -whi-ch bad been organized
against the evacuees had apparently broken doffll since the evacuees
were having no special difficulty in obtaining supplies or in marketing
their produce. In San Diego, Santa Barbara and other sections of
southern Galifornia to which evacuees had returned, they were making
a satisfactory adjustment.

REVIEWING THE REU>CATION PROGRAll
At the time the Authority ended its field activities, approximately half of the Japanese relocated in this country had returned
t~ the west coast; the other half were widely distributed throughout
the rest of the country.
~bile the evacuation caused some evacuee9 great financial loss
and meAtal suffering, it was not without compensation for some evacuees.
In the process of resettlement, certain advantages accrued to the group
especially to the Nisei in other sections of the country and even on
the west coast. They found a wider variety of occupations open to
them than had been available prior to evacuation. Most of them escaped
.from segregation in housin~ and were otherwise able to merge into. the
general social life of ne:w communities to a ~eater degree than they
had previously been able to do,. In general the anti-Japanese groups
on the west coast were discredited and had lost the sup;iort of the
public.

(97)

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While half of .the whole group returned to their for
considerably less than half of the Nisei ( a percent) retu
ward; conversely, more than half (65 percent) of the Issei
go back West. Some of the relocated evacuees who returned
co~st are known to have gone back East again after looking
tions in their forme:r homes. Most of those 'Who returned E

er homes,
ned nstchose to
to the ,rest
over condist were Nisei,

In its relocation program the Authority sought and received the
support of a great number of agencies-Federal, State and local, public
and private. ·,.,bile a few such ap;encies opposed the progr through
ignorance or g:igotry, the ovel'llh.elming majority were inte lieently
understanding and heloful. Similarlv. the A.,nerican peopl as a 1Vbole
proved overwhelmingly 'Willing to accept Japanese on a fail basis as
soon as they could be informed re~ardinr. them. The heroi services
of the Japanese American soldiers proved an incontestable nd over. whelming faotor in the education of the public. The good 'citizenship
and courage of the resettlers themselves were major factoril in
securing acceptance for them by the ~neral public. The Authority
acknowledges a debt to the newspapers and radio commentators (only
a few chose not to treat evacuees fairly) and to the natiohal magazines
(many of which carried strong supporting articles and none· of which
opposed resettlers).
lhile most organizations and individuals favorini fair treatment
for the evacuees generally accepted and went alon~ with the Authority's
relocation prop;ram., some well-wishers became emotionally involved in
their concern for the evacuees and strongly advocated changes in the
Authority's program to which the Authority. neither at the time nor in
retrospect could agree. For instance, there wc:s considerable opposition
expressed by friendly ~roups to the Authority's decision to close relo•cation centers. Aside from the practical impossibility of indefinitely
continuing to support large numbers of people et public expense without
Jceljd rea;gn, the Authority was and is convinced that while some hardships were attendant upon center closing, the ill effects of continuing
center life on the residents would have caused much greater hardship
had any number of residents been perr.li.tted to continue· in them. Some
criticism of the Authority's policies and :-irogram were, no doubt,
justified but many of the policies which seemed to delay the free
return of evacuees to other communities were necessitated b:, factors
which v.ere apparent to the Authority but may not have been fully
recognized by its critics. Public attitudes end delaying pressures
f'rom the Army had to be carefully weighed by the Authority before it
could proceed too vigorously. One of the criticisms leveled against
the Authority in its carrying out or center clcsinr, and the consequ~nt
rapid movement of considerable numbers of people to the west ooast was
that the .housing situation there was so stringent as to make relocation there an unreasonable hardship. The Authority did take the
housing situation on the west coast into account in planning oenter
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closure, but it w~s the Authority's opinion based on careful studies
that the housin<:: situation, even ,·, here it ·was most difficult as in
Los AnP,eles, \'fas not impossible. This belief proved to be correct.
The Authority would have liked to ~ee all returnees provided v,;i th
modern housing and fully reestablished economically. However, this
wts no more practical for this group thaQ it w;;s for . millions of
returning veterans. Some impractical well-wishers failed to realize
that while a rnunber of individuals ·here occupyin~ housing less
adequate than that which they had had before the war, great numbers
of persons -who had formerly lived in the slums of Little Tokyos or
in what were ~nerally kno"flTl in Cslifornia as "labor shacks" on
tenant farms were occupying better housing than they had left at the
time of evacuation.
While some of the evacuees will never recover from the bitter
experiences_of ·the evacuation, the Authority is convinced that because
of the industry and integrity of the Japanese Americans, they will
q~ickly build for themselves a better social and economic pattern
than they had before the war.

(99)

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Digitized by

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ne.1

NET INCREASE IN FINAL DEPARTURES
1942-1948

llftlllcaua

17,IOO.------------------------,

11,000

J;..-------------------

U,IOO ,____

_

----1

_ _ __

10,0001-------------------

7,I001-------------------

1,0001-------------------

a,IOO 1 - - - - - -

1946

SOURCE: FROM WRA-176 .
(101)

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