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A Quarterly Review
of Business and
Economic Conditions
Vol. 20, No. 2

Oil Prices

Calculating the Role
Played by Speculators

Credit Default Swaps

The ABCs of CDS
and Their Impact in Europe

April 2012

The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Central to America’s Economy®

College Degrees
Why Aren’t More People
Making the Investment?

c o n t e n t s

4

p r e s i d e n t ’ s
A Quarterly Review
of Business and
Economic Conditions

College Degrees

Oil Prices

Calculating the Role
Played by Speculators

Credit Default Swaps

The ABCs of CDS
and Their Impact in Europe

By Maria E. Canon and Charles S. Gascon

James Bullard, President and CEO
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

The benefits of a college diploma are many, including higher
pay, lower unemployment, maybe even better health. Yet
many high school graduates still do not pursue a college
degree. This article examines several key reasons why more
people aren’t making this investment in themselves.

Recent Actions Increase the Fed’s Transparency

Vol. 20, No. 2
April 2012

THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
CENTRAL TO AMERICA’S ECONOMY®

College Degrees
Why Aren’t More People
Making the Investment?

The Regional

3

president’s message

10

Credit Default Swaps
and Their Role in Europe

14

Economist
april 2012

|

VOL. 20, NO. 2

The Regional Economist is published
quarterly by the Research and Public Affairs
departments of the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis. It addresses the national, international and regional economic issues of
the day, particularly as they apply to states
in the Eighth Federal Reserve District. Views
expressed are not necessarily those of the
St. Louis Fed or of the Federal Reserve System.
Director of Research
Christopher J. Waller

Deputy Director of Research
David C. Wheelock

Did you know that buying
a credit default swap can be
like buying insurance on your
neighbor’s car—and then getting
paid when that neighbor has an
accident? Learn the ABCs of
CDS, and find out why they are
so important to any discussion
about the European debt crisis.

Director of Public Affairs
Karen Branding
Editor
Subhayu Bandyopadhyay
Managing Editor
Al Stamborski
Art Director
Joni Williams

New Technology May
Cause Stock Volatility
By Adrian Peralta-Alva

20

Volatility in the stock market is
not confined to the short term.
Pronounced movements can be
long-lived. One reason is that
publicly traded companies use
established technologies, and
once those no longer are the
engines of growth, decades can
pass before the innovators with
new technologies go public.

By Bryan Noeth
and Rajdeep Sengupta

Senior Policy Adviser
Cletus C. Coughlin

16

Credit reallocation (the sum
of credit creation and credit
destruction) has yet to return to
prerecession levels either in the
nation at large or in the Eighth
District of the Federal Reserve
System. This is important
because credit reallocation is a
key indicator of an economy’s
strength.

communit y profile
Carroll County, Tenn.
By Susan C. Thomson
22

You can also write to him at the
address below. Submission of a

12

Although the consensus forecast
is for modest, below-trend
growth, GDP for the year will
likely be stronger than last year’s
growth of 1.6 percent. One
potential risk, though, is rising
energy prices.

When Oil Prices Jump,
Is Speculation To Blame?

letter to the editor gives us the right
to post it to our web site and/or

Like many rural counties, this
area around Huntingdon at one
time had been dependent on
factory jobs. After that work
started to disappear in the
1990s, civic leaders vowed to
diversify. An arts center and a
soon-to-open man-made lake
have Carroll County headed in
that direction.

publish it in The Regional Economist
unless the writer states otherwise.
We reserve the right to edit letters
for clarity and length.
Single-copy subscriptions are free
but available only to those with
U.S. addresses. To subscribe, e-mail
tracie.l.mueller@stls.frb.org or sign up
via www.stlouisfed.org/publications
You can also write to The Regional
Economist, Public Affairs Office,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
Box 442, St. Louis, MO 63166.

The Eighth Federal Reserve District includes

all of Arkansas, eastern Missouri, southern
Illinois and Indiana, western Kentucky and
Tennessee, and northern Mississippi. The
Eighth District offices are in Little Rock,
Louisville, Memphis and St. Louis.

By Brett Fawley, Luciana Juvenal
and Ivan Petrella
Whenever the price at the pump
becomes particularly painful,
people start pointing fingers
at investment banks, hedge
funds and other speculators.
This article quantifies the role
of speculators in rising prices,
along with the role being played
by other key drivers.

19

economy at a glance

23

re ader e xchange

ONLINE EXTRA
Earnings Growth
over a Lifetime:
Not What It Used To Be
By Yu-Chien Kong
and B. Ravikumar
A typical worker’s earnings
grow over his lifetime. The
generation of workers born in
the 1910s experienced more
growth than the generation
born in the 1940s. See www.

cover illustration: © get t y images

2 The Regional Economist | April 2012

n at i o n a l o v e r v i e w
Economy Is Expected
To Build Up Steam
By Kevin L. Kliesen

to Subhayu Bandyopadhyay
subhayu.bandyopadhyay@stls.frb.org.

district overview
Reallocation of Credit
Has Yet To Bounce Back
By Constanza S. Liborio
and Juan M. Sánchez

Please direct your comments
at 314-444-7425 or by e-mail at

m e s s a g e

stlouisfed.org/publications/re

A

t the January 2012 meeting, the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) took
steps to further increase the Fed’s transparency regarding monetary policy decisions
and strategy. For one, the FOMC named an
explicit, numerical inflation target. With this
action, the Fed joined many other central
banks—including the Bank of England, the
European Central Bank and the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand—in adopting an
inflation target. Also in January, the FOMC
released its forecasts of the target federal
funds rate. Several other central banks publish forecasts of their policy rate as well.
The FOMC set an inflation target of 2
percent, as measured by the annual change in
the overall personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. To clarify, this does
not mean inflation must be 2 percent in the
short term; rather, monetary policy should be
set so that inflation moves toward the target
over time and, in the absence of unpredictable changes in either supply or demand,
would reach 2 percent in the medium term.
The FOMC will target the headline inflation rate as opposed to any other measure
(e.g., core inflation, which excludes food and
energy prices) because it makes sense to focus
on the prices that U.S. households actually
have to pay.1 To illustrate, headline PCE
inflation (measured from one year earlier)
has been higher than core PCE inflation for
more than three-fourths of the months since
January 2000. This implies that the changes
in prices excluded from the core measure are
not simply temporary fluctuations, especially
those for energy. Headline inflation is, therefore, the appropriate measure to target.
Inflation targeting emphasizes control over
inflation as the key long-term goal of monetary policy. Although the FOMC did not
set an employment target in addition to the
inflation target, the January decision is still
consistent with the Fed’s dual mandate to
promote maximum sustainable employment
and price stability. Keeping inflation low

and stable helps the market economy allocate
resources optimally, which then leads to the
best possible employment outcomes. This
interpretation of how to pursue the dual
mandate resulted, in part, from lessons of
the 1970s.
During the 1960s, economists thought
there was a permanent trade-off between
unemployment and inflation—that is, lower
unemployment would be accompanied by
higher inflation and vice versa. This belief
was shattered in the 1970s, when the U.S. had
both high inflation and high unemployment.
In addition, the real side of the economy was
very volatile, and the U.S. suffered through
four recessions from 1970 to 1982. From this
experience, the FOMC and other policymakers around the world learned that high
inflation is very damaging and does nothing
to address fundamental macroeconomic
issues. Afterward, the FOMC achieved low
and stable inflation, and the U.S. experienced
a long period of good economic performance
compared with the 1970s.2
Having an inflation target helps to reduce
uncertainty about future inflation rates and,
thus, helps to avoid the 1970s experience.
Even with an inflation target, though, the
FOMC will continue to have differences of
opinion among its members as to how to
respond to current and expected economic
conditions. For instance, a so-called hawk
may place more weight on deviations of
inflation from the target, whereas a so-called
dove may place more weight on unemployment. As a result, their monetary policy
recommendations may be different, despite
both targeting the same inflation rate. One
interpretation is that while the inflation
target provides a nominal anchor for the
economy, policymakers can debate about the
appropriate way to adjust policy to move to
that target.
As for the other step taken in January, the
FOMC released the 17 participants’ forecasts
of when the federal funds rate target would

first move above its current level and of the
appropriate policy rate path. This “first”
increase is noteworthy because the federal
funds rate target has been in the 0-0.25
percent range since December 2008. While
releasing these forecasts was a move toward
more transparency, a better way in my view to
give a basic overview and our perspective on
the key economic issues would be to release
a quarterly report on the economy, similar to
what the Bank of England publishes.
One advantage of having a quarterly
report on the economy is that it provides
policymakers the opportunity to comment
on many different issues and subtleties that
are affecting the economy. For instance, the
report could include a discussion about the
foreign exchange situation, special seasonal
factors, certain market disruptions and any
other relevant topics. Such a report would
also provide a chance for the FOMC to
link its forecasts of gross domestic product
growth, the unemployment rate, PCE inflation, core PCE inflation and the fed funds
rate and, therefore, to tell a coherent narrative. Now, these forecasts are “disconnected”:
We release summaries across FOMC participants for each variable. A quarterly report
would likely provide a valuable public service
in the U.S. and might be something for the
FOMC to strive for as we continue to seek
ways to become more transparent.

endnotes
1

2

For more on headline vs. core inflation, see my speech
on May 18, 2011, “Measuring Inflation: The Core Is
Rotten.” http://research.stlouisfed.org/econ/bullard/
pdf/Measuring_Inflation_May_18_2011_FINAL.pdf
See also my message in the St. Louis Fed’s 2010 annual report, “The Fed’s Dual Mandate: Lessons of
the 1970s.” http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/
ar/2010/pages/ar10_1.cfm

The Regional Economist | www.stlouisfed.org 3

c o n t e n t s

4

p r e s i d e n t ’ s
A Quarterly Review
of Business and
Economic Conditions

College Degrees

Oil Prices

Calculating the Role
Played by Speculators

Credit Default Swaps

The ABCs of CDS
and Their Impact in Europe

By Maria E. Canon and Charles S. Gascon

James Bullard, President and CEO
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

The benefits of a college diploma are many, including higher
pay, lower unemployment, maybe even better health. Yet
many high school graduates still do not pursue a college
degree. This article examines several key reasons why more
people aren’t making this investment in themselves.

Recent Actions Increase the Fed’s Transparency

Vol. 20, No. 2
April 2012

THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
CENTRAL TO AMERICA’S ECONOMY®

College Degrees
Why Aren’t More People
Making the Investment?

The Regional

3

president’s message

10

Credit Default Swaps
and Their Role in Europe

14

Economist
april 2012

|

VOL. 20, NO. 2

The Regional Economist is published
quarterly by the Research and Public Affairs
departments of the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis. It addresses the national, international and regional economic issues of
the day, particularly as they apply to states
in the Eighth Federal Reserve District. Views
expressed are not necessarily those of the
St. Louis Fed or of the Federal Reserve System.
Director of Research
Christopher J. Waller

Deputy Director of Research
David C. Wheelock

Did you know that buying
a credit default swap can be
like buying insurance on your
neighbor’s car—and then getting
paid when that neighbor has an
accident? Learn the ABCs of
CDS, and find out why they are
so important to any discussion
about the European debt crisis.

Director of Public Affairs
Karen Branding
Editor
Subhayu Bandyopadhyay
Managing Editor
Al Stamborski
Art Director
Joni Williams

New Technology May
Cause Stock Volatility
By Adrian Peralta-Alva

20

Volatility in the stock market is
not confined to the short term.
Pronounced movements can be
long-lived. One reason is that
publicly traded companies use
established technologies, and
once those no longer are the
engines of growth, decades can
pass before the innovators with
new technologies go public.

By Bryan Noeth
and Rajdeep Sengupta

Senior Policy Adviser
Cletus C. Coughlin

16

Credit reallocation (the sum
of credit creation and credit
destruction) has yet to return to
prerecession levels either in the
nation at large or in the Eighth
District of the Federal Reserve
System. This is important
because credit reallocation is a
key indicator of an economy’s
strength.

communit y profile
Carroll County, Tenn.
By Susan C. Thomson
22

You can also write to him at the
address below. Submission of a

12

Although the consensus forecast
is for modest, below-trend
growth, GDP for the year will
likely be stronger than last year’s
growth of 1.6 percent. One
potential risk, though, is rising
energy prices.

When Oil Prices Jump,
Is Speculation To Blame?

letter to the editor gives us the right
to post it to our web site and/or

Like many rural counties, this
area around Huntingdon at one
time had been dependent on
factory jobs. After that work
started to disappear in the
1990s, civic leaders vowed to
diversify. An arts center and a
soon-to-open man-made lake
have Carroll County headed in
that direction.

publish it in The Regional Economist
unless the writer states otherwise.
We reserve the right to edit letters
for clarity and length.
Single-copy subscriptions are free
but available only to those with
U.S. addresses. To subscribe, e-mail
tracie.l.mueller@stls.frb.org or sign up
via www.stlouisfed.org/publications
You can also write to The Regional
Economist, Public Affairs Office,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
Box 442, St. Louis, MO 63166.

The Eighth Federal Reserve District includes

all of Arkansas, eastern Missouri, southern
Illinois and Indiana, western Kentucky and
Tennessee, and northern Mississippi. The
Eighth District offices are in Little Rock,
Louisville, Memphis and St. Louis.

By Brett Fawley, Luciana Juvenal
and Ivan Petrella
Whenever the price at the pump
becomes particularly painful,
people start pointing fingers
at investment banks, hedge
funds and other speculators.
This article quantifies the role
of speculators in rising prices,
along with the role being played
by other key drivers.

19

economy at a glance

23

re ader e xchange

ONLINE EXTRA
Earnings Growth
over a Lifetime:
Not What It Used To Be
By Yu-Chien Kong
and B. Ravikumar
A typical worker’s earnings
grow over his lifetime. The
generation of workers born in
the 1910s experienced more
growth than the generation
born in the 1940s. See www.

cover illustration: © get t y images

2 The Regional Economist | April 2012

n at i o n a l o v e r v i e w
Economy Is Expected
To Build Up Steam
By Kevin L. Kliesen

to Subhayu Bandyopadhyay
subhayu.bandyopadhyay@stls.frb.org.

district overview
Reallocation of Credit
Has Yet To Bounce Back
By Constanza S. Liborio
and Juan M. Sánchez

Please direct your comments
at 314-444-7425 or by e-mail at

m e s s a g e

stlouisfed.org/publications/re

A

t the January 2012 meeting, the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) took
steps to further increase the Fed’s transparency regarding monetary policy decisions
and strategy. For one, the FOMC named an
explicit, numerical inflation target. With this
action, the Fed joined many other central
banks—including the Bank of England, the
European Central Bank and the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand—in adopting an
inflation target. Also in January, the FOMC
released its forecasts of the target federal
funds rate. Several other central banks publish forecasts of their policy rate as well.
The FOMC set an inflation target of 2
percent, as measured by the annual change in
the overall personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. To clarify, this does
not mean inflation must be 2 percent in the
short term; rather, monetary policy should be
set so that inflation moves toward the target
over time and, in the absence of unpredictable changes in either supply or demand,
would reach 2 percent in the medium term.
The FOMC will target the headline inflation rate as opposed to any other measure
(e.g., core inflation, which excludes food and
energy prices) because it makes sense to focus
on the prices that U.S. households actually
have to pay.1 To illustrate, headline PCE
inflation (measured from one year earlier)
has been higher than core PCE inflation for
more than three-fourths of the months since
January 2000. This implies that the changes
in prices excluded from the core measure are
not simply temporary fluctuations, especially
those for energy. Headline inflation is, therefore, the appropriate measure to target.
Inflation targeting emphasizes control over
inflation as the key long-term goal of monetary policy. Although the FOMC did not
set an employment target in addition to the
inflation target, the January decision is still
consistent with the Fed’s dual mandate to
promote maximum sustainable employment
and price stability. Keeping inflation low

and stable helps the market economy allocate
resources optimally, which then leads to the
best possible employment outcomes. This
interpretation of how to pursue the dual
mandate resulted, in part, from lessons of
the 1970s.
During the 1960s, economists thought
there was a permanent trade-off between
unemployment and inflation—that is, lower
unemployment would be accompanied by
higher inflation and vice versa. This belief
was shattered in the 1970s, when the U.S. had
both high inflation and high unemployment.
In addition, the real side of the economy was
very volatile, and the U.S. suffered through
four recessions from 1970 to 1982. From this
experience, the FOMC and other policymakers around the world learned that high
inflation is very damaging and does nothing
to address fundamental macroeconomic
issues. Afterward, the FOMC achieved low
and stable inflation, and the U.S. experienced
a long period of good economic performance
compared with the 1970s.2
Having an inflation target helps to reduce
uncertainty about future inflation rates and,
thus, helps to avoid the 1970s experience.
Even with an inflation target, though, the
FOMC will continue to have differences of
opinion among its members as to how to
respond to current and expected economic
conditions. For instance, a so-called hawk
may place more weight on deviations of
inflation from the target, whereas a so-called
dove may place more weight on unemployment. As a result, their monetary policy
recommendations may be different, despite
both targeting the same inflation rate. One
interpretation is that while the inflation
target provides a nominal anchor for the
economy, policymakers can debate about the
appropriate way to adjust policy to move to
that target.
As for the other step taken in January, the
FOMC released the 17 participants’ forecasts
of when the federal funds rate target would

first move above its current level and of the
appropriate policy rate path. This “first”
increase is noteworthy because the federal
funds rate target has been in the 0-0.25
percent range since December 2008. While
releasing these forecasts was a move toward
more transparency, a better way in my view to
give a basic overview and our perspective on
the key economic issues would be to release
a quarterly report on the economy, similar to
what the Bank of England publishes.
One advantage of having a quarterly
report on the economy is that it provides
policymakers the opportunity to comment
on many different issues and subtleties that
are affecting the economy. For instance, the
report could include a discussion about the
foreign exchange situation, special seasonal
factors, certain market disruptions and any
other relevant topics. Such a report would
also provide a chance for the FOMC to
link its forecasts of gross domestic product
growth, the unemployment rate, PCE inflation, core PCE inflation and the fed funds
rate and, therefore, to tell a coherent narrative. Now, these forecasts are “disconnected”:
We release summaries across FOMC participants for each variable. A quarterly report
would likely provide a valuable public service
in the U.S. and might be something for the
FOMC to strive for as we continue to seek
ways to become more transparent.

endnotes
1

2

For more on headline vs. core inflation, see my speech
on May 18, 2011, “Measuring Inflation: The Core Is
Rotten.” http://research.stlouisfed.org/econ/bullard/
pdf/Measuring_Inflation_May_18_2011_FINAL.pdf
See also my message in the St. Louis Fed’s 2010 annual report, “The Fed’s Dual Mandate: Lessons of
the 1970s.” http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/
ar/2010/pages/ar10_1.cfm

The Regional Economist | www.stlouisfed.org 3

e d u c a t i o n

College Degrees
Why Aren’t More People
Making the Investment?
By Maria E. Canon and Charles S. Gascon

O

ver the past 30 years, some of the benefits of furthering
one’s education have become more pronounced, specifically, higher earnings and lower unemployment. Some studies
have even found a positive relationship between higher education and better health.1 Surprisingly, over the same period,
high school dropout rates have declined only modestly, and
close to one-third of all high school graduates still do not enroll
in any form of college. Even though a greater percentage of
high school graduates enter college today than 30 years ago, this
rise has not been met by a proportional increase in completion
rates. In the past few years, college graduation rates actually
have fallen as a consequence of increasing college dropout rates.
This begs the question: If the benefits to education appear to be
so high, why don’t more people seek a college degree?

4 The Regional Economist | April 2012

The Regional Economist | www.stlouisfed.org 5

© GETTY IMAGES

e d u c a t i o n

College Degrees
Why Aren’t More People
Making the Investment?
By Maria E. Canon and Charles S. Gascon

O

ver the past 30 years, some of the benefits of furthering
one’s education have become more pronounced, specifically, higher earnings and lower unemployment. Some studies
have even found a positive relationship between higher education and better health.1 Surprisingly, over the same period,
high school dropout rates have declined only modestly, and
close to one-third of all high school graduates still do not enroll
in any form of college. Even though a greater percentage of
high school graduates enter college today than 30 years ago, this
rise has not been met by a proportional increase in completion
rates. In the past few years, college graduation rates actually
have fallen as a consequence of increasing college dropout rates.
This begs the question: If the benefits to education appear to be
so high, why don’t more people seek a college degree?

4 The Regional Economist | April 2012

The Regional Economist | www.stlouisfed.org 5

© GETTY IMAGES

The skill premium measures the difference in the average earnings of four-year
college graduates and that of nongraduates
figure 1
Real Median Earnings for Men by Education Level
$65,000
$60,000
$55,000
2008 DOLLARS

$50,000
$45,000
$40,000
$35,000

Bachelor’s Degree or Higher

$30,000

Some College

$25,000
$20,000

High School Graduate

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

SOURCES: College Board Advocacy and Policy Center and authors’ calculations.

Some college includes associate degrees. It is common to use male earnings due to female labor force selection
bias and changes in labor force participation. Women with the potential for high earnings tend to enter the labor
force, while women with the potential for low earnings elect to stay home.
figure 2
Unemployment Rate by Education Level, Men and Women
12
Bachelor’s Degree or Higher

10
Some College

PERCENT

8
High School Graduate

6
4

What Drives College Participation Rates?

2
0
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table A-4. Some college includes associate degrees.
6 The Regional Economist | April 2012

2008

2009

2010

2011

A 2010 study by economist Gonzalo
Castex analyzed the changes in the college
continued on Page 8

figure 3
Lifetime Earnings: High School vs. College
$1,600
PRESENT VALUE, THOUSANDS

$1,400
$1,200
$1,000
$800

Lifetime Earnings
and the Return
to College

M

any factors influence

High School Graduate
College Graduate

a high school graduate’s

decision to enter college. One of the

$600

main elements is the college wage

$400

premium, which allows a college

$200

graduate to catch up to a high school

$0
18 22 26 30 34 38 42 46 50 54 58 62
AGE

Lifetime Earnings: High School vs. Dropout
$1,600
$1,400
$1,200
$1,000

graduate upon degree completion. Although circumstances vary,
reasonable estimates indicate that
college graduates funding their entire

figure 4

PRESENT VALUE, THOUSANDS

Measuring the Benefits of College

(i.e., dropouts and those who didn’t enroll).2
Recent estimates suggest the skill premium
is between 65 and 75 percent, but estimates
vary depending on the data source.3 This
skill premium implies that, on average, a
college graduate earns between 65 and 75
percent more than a high school graduate.
The skill premium exists due to differences in the supply and demand for different
types of workers. Over time, the demand for
college graduates (driven by factors such as
better technology) has increased faster than
the supply of graduates; at the same time,
the demand for less-educated workers has
declined. As a result, earnings have diverged:
Figure 1 plots real median annual earnings of
males from 1980 to 2008 by education level.
The difference between each of the lines is a
measurement of the skill premium.
The skill premium between college graduates and the other two groups has continued to increase. This is primarily due to a
decline in real earnings of those without a
college degree. Between 1980 and 2008, the
college wage premium between male college graduates and those with some college
increased by 26 percent. The gap between
college and high school graduates grew even
more: 33 percent.
The impact of further education on
income is even more pronounced when the
skill premium is compounded over time.
Recent college graduates who completely
finance their education with student loans
will “catch up” to the total lifetime earnings
of a high school graduate by their mid-30s.
(See sidebar on facing page.)
In addition to the difference in higher
lifetime earnings, higher education is
accompanied by a significantly lower rate
of unemployment. (See Figure 2.) Between
2000 and 2007, the average unemployment
rate for workers with a high school degree
was 4.6 percent, while the rate for workers
with a college degree was only 2.4 percent.
The gap was especially pronounced during
the recent recession, with a difference of six
percentage points in the unemployment rates
between the two groups.

cost of education with student loans will be
able to surpass the lifetime earnings of a high school
graduate by the time the former are in their mid-30s. Figure 3 is a simple depiction of how

High School Graduate

this will occur. The horizontal axis is the age of the individual, and the vertical axis shows

College Dropout

present value of lifetime earnings (in thousands of dollars). Present values are used to account for the fact that the value of a dollar today is greater than a dollar in the future.

$800

Assuming the average cost of attending college (including room and board) is approxi-

$600

mately $26,500 per year ($16,000 for public and $37,000 for private), students who com-

$400

pletely finance their four years of education with loans will accumulate just over $100,000

$200
$0
18 22 26 30 34 38 42 46 50 54 58 62
AGE

in debt. If we assume such students pay off their debt (and interest) and earn a premium
of 74 percent after graduation, they will surpass the lifetime earnings of the high school
graduate by the time they reach 34 years of age.

figure 5
Earnings Risk: High School vs. College

$1,400
$1,200
$1,000

The Role of Risk
If this income path were guaranteed, every high school student would certainly decide to

$1,600
PRESENT VALUE, THOUSANDS

Economists and policymakers have been
particularly interested in trying to explain
this phenomenon. Some possible factors
that have been considered are: higher tuition
costs, changes in assistance programs, fear
of failure, earnings risk and, more recently,
the recession and financial crisis. This article
will pay special attention to failure and earnings risk, as these forces are particularly useful in understanding why one individual may
choose college but another may not.

High School Graduate
College Graduate

pursue higher education. However, the chance of failure or of graduating and being unable
to find a high-paying job is a real concern for most.
Following the framework laid out above, failure can be easily depicted by assuming the

$800

same student drops out of college after two years (accumulating $50,000 in debt) and

$600

enters the labor force with a much lower skill premium. In this case, the student is saddled

$400

with student loan debt but earns only 15 percent more than a high school graduate. (See

$200

Figure 4.) As a result, lifetime earnings remain below that of the high school graduate until

$0
18 22 26 30 34 38 42 46 50 54 58 62
AGE
The shaded band shows the present value of lifetime

well beyond retirement.
The role of earnings risk is slightly more complicated because many things could happen
after college graduation (e.g., low pay or inability to find a job) that would discourage pos-

earnings of a college graduate earning a wage premium

sible entrants. These factors are no different from those afflicting any entrant into the labor

between 125 percent ($73,125 per year) and 25 percent

force, but carrying $100,000 in student loans could make the situation much less desirable.

($40,625 per year). The former follows the path of the top

A simple graphical portrayal of earnings risk can be accomplished by adjusting the wage

of the band, and the latter follows the path of the bottom
of the band. Earnings data for the calculations are the 2008
observations in Figure 1; the costs of college are from College
Board Advocacy and Policy Center, “Trends in College Pricing”
2010, p. 15. All calculations assume a 5 percent interest rate
on student loan debt and a 3 percent discount rate.

premium. In Figure 5, the shaded band shows the present value of lifetime earnings of a
college graduate earning a wage premium between 125 percent ($73,125 per year) and
25 percent ($40,625). The variation in the time it takes to catch up is significant. In the
optimistic scenario, the college graduate surpasses the lifetime earnings of the high school
counterpart by the age of 27. In the pessimistic scenario, the college graduate will not
catch up unless he or she works well beyond a normal retirement age.
The Regional Economist | www.stlouisfed.org 7

The skill premium measures the difference in the average earnings of four-year
college graduates and that of nongraduates
figure 1
Real Median Earnings for Men by Education Level
$65,000
$60,000
$55,000
2008 DOLLARS

$50,000
$45,000
$40,000
$35,000

Bachelor’s Degree or Higher

$30,000

Some College

$25,000
$20,000

High School Graduate

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

SOURCES: College Board Advocacy and Policy Center and authors’ calculations.

Some college includes associate degrees. It is common to use male earnings due to female labor force selection
bias and changes in labor force participation. Women with the potential for high earnings tend to enter the labor
force, while women with the potential for low earnings elect to stay home.
figure 2
Unemployment Rate by Education Level, Men and Women
12
Bachelor’s Degree or Higher

10
Some College

PERCENT

8
High School Graduate

6
4

What Drives College Participation Rates?

2
0
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table A-4. Some college includes associate degrees.
6 The Regional Economist | April 2012

2008

2009

2010

2011

A 2010 study by economist Gonzalo
Castex analyzed the changes in the college
continued on Page 8

figure 3
Lifetime Earnings: High School vs. College
$1,600
PRESENT VALUE, THOUSANDS

$1,400
$1,200
$1,000
$800

Lifetime Earnings
and the Return
to College

M

any factors influence

High School Graduate
College Graduate

a high school graduate’s

decision to enter college. One of the

$600

main elements is the college wage

$400

premium, which allows a college

$200

graduate to catch up to a high school

$0
18 22 26 30 34 38 42 46 50 54 58 62
AGE

Lifetime Earnings: High School vs. Dropout
$1,600
$1,400
$1,200
$1,000

graduate upon degree completion. Although circumstances vary,
reasonable estimates indicate that
college graduates funding their entire

figure 4

PRESENT VALUE, THOUSANDS

Measuring the Benefits of College

(i.e., dropouts and those who didn’t enroll).2
Recent estimates suggest the skill premium
is between 65 and 75 percent, but estimates
vary depending on the data source.3 This
skill premium implies that, on average, a
college graduate earns between 65 and 75
percent more than a high school graduate.
The skill premium exists due to differences in the supply and demand for different
types of workers. Over time, the demand for
college graduates (driven by factors such as
better technology) has increased faster than
the supply of graduates; at the same time,
the demand for less-educated workers has
declined. As a result, earnings have diverged:
Figure 1 plots real median annual earnings of
males from 1980 to 2008 by education level.
The difference between each of the lines is a
measurement of the skill premium.
The skill premium between college graduates and the other two groups has continued to increase. This is primarily due to a
decline in real earnings of those without a
college degree. Between 1980 and 2008, the
college wage premium between male college graduates and those with some college
increased by 26 percent. The gap between
college and high school graduates grew even
more: 33 percent.
The impact of further education on
income is even more pronounced when the
skill premium is compounded over time.
Recent college graduates who completely
finance their education with student loans
will “catch up” to the total lifetime earnings
of a high school graduate by their mid-30s.
(See sidebar on facing page.)
In addition to the difference in higher
lifetime earnings, higher education is
accompanied by a significantly lower rate
of unemployment. (See Figure 2.) Between
2000 and 2007, the average unemployment
rate for workers with a high school degree
was 4.6 percent, while the rate for workers
with a college degree was only 2.4 percent.
The gap was especially pronounced during
the recent recession, with a difference of six
percentage points in the unemployment rates
between the two groups.

cost of education with student loans will be
able to surpass the lifetime earnings of a high school
graduate by the time the former are in their mid-30s. Figure 3 is a simple depiction of how

High School Graduate

this will occur. The horizontal axis is the age of the individual, and the vertical axis shows

College Dropout

present value of lifetime earnings (in thousands of dollars). Present values are used to account for the fact that the value of a dollar today is greater than a dollar in the future.

$800

Assuming the average cost of attending college (including room and board) is approxi-

$600

mately $26,500 per year ($16,000 for public and $37,000 for private), students who com-

$400

pletely finance their four years of education with loans will accumulate just over $100,000

$200
$0
18 22 26 30 34 38 42 46 50 54 58 62
AGE

in debt. If we assume such students pay off their debt (and interest) and earn a premium
of 74 percent after graduation, they will surpass the lifetime earnings of the high school
graduate by the time they reach 34 years of age.

figure 5
Earnings Risk: High School vs. College

$1,400
$1,200
$1,000

The Role of Risk
If this income path were guaranteed, every high school student would certainly decide to

$1,600
PRESENT VALUE, THOUSANDS

Economists and policymakers have been
particularly interested in trying to explain
this phenomenon. Some possible factors
that have been considered are: higher tuition
costs, changes in assistance programs, fear
of failure, earnings risk and, more recently,
the recession and financial crisis. This article
will pay special attention to failure and earnings risk, as these forces are particularly useful in understanding why one individual may
choose college but another may not.

High School Graduate
College Graduate

pursue higher education. However, the chance of failure or of graduating and being unable
to find a high-paying job is a real concern for most.
Following the framework laid out above, failure can be easily depicted by assuming the

$800

same student drops out of college after two years (accumulating $50,000 in debt) and

$600

enters the labor force with a much lower skill premium. In this case, the student is saddled

$400

with student loan debt but earns only 15 percent more than a high school graduate. (See

$200

Figure 4.) As a result, lifetime earnings remain below that of the high school graduate until

$0
18 22 26 30 34 38 42 46 50 54 58 62
AGE
The shaded band shows the present value of lifetime

well beyond retirement.
The role of earnings risk is slightly more complicated because many things could happen
after college graduation (e.g., low pay or inability to find a job) that would discourage pos-

earnings of a college graduate earning a wage premium

sible entrants. These factors are no different from those afflicting any entrant into the labor

between 125 percent ($73,125 per year) and 25 percent

force, but carrying $100,000 in student loans could make the situation much less desirable.

($40,625 per year). The former follows the path of the top

A simple graphical portrayal of earnings risk can be accomplished by adjusting the wage

of the band, and the latter follows the path of the bottom
of the band. Earnings data for the calculations are the 2008
observations in Figure 1; the costs of college are from College
Board Advocacy and Policy Center, “Trends in College Pricing”
2010, p. 15. All calculations assume a 5 percent interest rate
on student loan debt and a 3 percent discount rate.

premium. In Figure 5, the shaded band shows the present value of lifetime earnings of a
college graduate earning a wage premium between 125 percent ($73,125 per year) and
25 percent ($40,625). The variation in the time it takes to catch up is significant. In the
optimistic scenario, the college graduate surpasses the lifetime earnings of the high school
counterpart by the age of 27. In the pessimistic scenario, the college graduate will not
catch up unless he or she works well beyond a normal retirement age.
The Regional Economist | www.stlouisfed.org 7

continued from Page 6

Higher tuition should make
college less desirable because
it lowers the return on the
investment and because the
high price tag may put college
out of reach for some families.
However, higher tuition costs
can be offset by more borrowing. As a result, the impact of
higher tuition is smaller than
one might expect.

8 The Regional Economist | April 2012

participation rate between 1980 and 2000.
Using data from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY), Castex found that
the college enrollment rate increased from
41 percent in 1980 to 68 percent in 2000.
More important, he found that the increase
in enrollment rates was not the same for
all groups of people. Variation was due to
differences in cognitive ability and financial
status.4 The increase in enrollment was more
pronounced for students of high ability or
from a high-income family. For example,
the gap in college participation rates between
students from the lowest-ability quartile and
the highest-ability quartile was more than
60 percentage points.
Aiming to explain this change in enrollment rates and differences across groups,
Castex used a decision-choice model. This
type of model simplifies real-world decisions
by identifying the important factors influencing a particular decision; the model assumes
individuals make rational choices based on the
information they have. In the model, there are
four driving forces that can explain enrollment rates: increases in college wage premium,
increased availability of merit-based aid for
college, increases in tuition costs, and shifts
in both the distribution of family income and
individual ability.
A higher college wage premium increases
the payoff of completing college and, hence,
should have a positive effect on college
enrollment. The model confirms this
hypothesis: Increases in the college wage
premium are the most influential factor
affecting college participation among the
four driving forces.
The increased availability of merit-based
grants and scholarships reduces the cost of
college education, making college more desirable. According to Castex, the number of
recipients also increased. Between 1980 and
2000, the ratio of grants awarded to highability students (in dollars) to cost of education increased by 70 percent for low-income
students and by 50 percent for high-income
students. This ratio changed little for students
in the low-ability groups. In the model, the
redistribution of college subsidies accounts for
6 percent of the aggregate increase in college
enrollment, and not surprisingly, it has a larger
effect for students of high ability.

Tuition costs are another factor influencing the decision to attend college; this has
been well-documented by economists.5
The average college tuition increased by
about 150 percent between 1980 and 2000:
from $9,000 to $23,000.6 Higher tuition
should make college less desirable because
it lowers the return on the investment and
because the high price tag may put college
out of reach for some families. However,
higher tuition costs can be offset by more
borrowing. As a result, the impact of higher
tuition is smaller than one might expect.
In the model, increases in tuition reduced
the overall college participation rate by
only 3 percent (by 7 percent for low-ability
students).
The interaction between students’ ability
and their family income is also an important determinant of college participation.
Holding ability constant, students in lowand middle-income families have greater
access to need-based grants and scholarships, which reduce the cost of education.
Since 1980, there has been significant
change in the relationship between student
ability and family income. Castex’s findings
suggest that more high-ability students
now belong to middle-income families than
did in 1980. This implies more grants for
middle-income students and, therefore,
an increase in college participation.
Using the same data set as Castex, but a
different skill measure, Joseph Altonji and
co-authors found that the skill premium
provides even less motivation for individuals to acquire additional skills than Castex
found.7 Specifically, only about 1.5 percent
of the increase in skills can be explained
by the higher skill premium (after controlling for factors such as race, gender, family
structure and parental education).
In the past, economists used self-selection
(i.e., college may not be for some people)
to explain the high return of college education but lower participation. However,
college is a risky, irreversible investment,
which makes some students hesitant to
commit. Two recent papers, one by Castex
and another by economists Kartik Athreya
and Janice Eberly, explain this in terms of
failure risk and earnings risk. Failure risk
refers to the possibility that a student will
not complete college. Earnings risk relates
to a college graduate not being guaranteed

anything in terms of future earnings
or employment.
Failure Risk

It is important that one’s ability to earn
a college degree be taken into consideration when deciding about college. A 2009
study by economists John Bound, Michael
Loevenheim and Sarah Turner found college
failure rates close to 50 percent at four-year
public colleges. The authors also found that
increases in the rate of college enrollment
had been accompanied by a decrease in
completion rates. The costs of failure can be
very high because uncertainty over eventual
completion is not quickly resolved; generally,
students who drop out do so after about two
years. Those two years of tuition expenses
and forgone earnings may deliver no return.8
Economists Fabian Lange and Robert Topel
argued that many dropouts failed to earn any
wage premium because most learning takes
place in the later years of college.
In another part of his paper, Castex examined a sample of workers from the 1979
NLSY. He found that students who dropped
out of college at the beginning of the 1980s
owed financial and educational institutions
$9,350 on average; 15 percent of this group
owed more than $24,000. The average
wage when joining the labor force for those
students who dropped out and owed more
than $15,000 was about $28,000, a wage
comparable to that of a high school graduate. Therefore, incorporating the probability
of failure into the decision to attend college
could change an individual’s decision.
Earnings Risk

Even the young adults who earn college
degrees are not given any guarantees. Uncertainty about future employment and earnings
even exists on graduation day. A May 2011
article in The New York Times reported that
in 2009 slightly over half of college graduates
under the age of 25 were working on jobs
that required a college degree. Moreover,
22 percent of this same group was not working at all, and the remaining 22 percent was
underemployed.
Even though part of this underemployment
may be due to the state of the economy, some
graduates are unable to earn the wage premium they had invested in. This can be due to
various factors, such as school performance,

degree choice or quality of life issues. This
implies that it is possible for relatively young
college graduates to immediately earn less
than they expected. These events substantially
lower their present and future stream of earnings and, consequently, the present value of
their remaining lifetime income.

endnotes
1
2

3

4

Impact of the Recession

Traditionally, economic slowdowns have
not been associated with declining college
enrollment rates. This is because, during bad
economic times, people are less likely to find
a good job and, thus, choose to go to school
instead. However, the experience during the
last recession was different: College enrollment rates declined. The housing crash and
financial crisis may explain the difference.
Declining home prices and stock market
wealth placed some families in a situation
where college may have become unaffordable. In addition, college endowments lost
significant value, which may have resulted
in fewer scholarships. Compounding this
problem, the financial crisis made it more difficult for households to borrow. In fact, part
of the Federal Reserve’s response during the
financial crisis involved creating programs to
improve the student loan market.9
Earnings risk likely has played a role, too.
Since the recession, the unemployment rate
for college graduates has more than doubled,
from under 2 percent in 2007 to a peak of
5 percent at the end of 2010, and roughly
one-quarter of recent graduates were underemployed. Making things even worse, the
economy has experienced a jobless recovery,
and four years after the recession began, the
unemployment rate is still elevated. These
factors have increased the aggregate risk of
pursuing a college degree. In this new environment, even attaining a college degree may
not result in the skill premium desired. Therefore, even though the skill premium may have
gone up during the recession, the increase in
unemployment rates for college graduates can
certainly be an important factor explaining
the slow growth in college enrollment rates
and the elevated college dropout rates.
Maria E. Canon is an economist at the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. See http://research.
stlouisfed.org/econ/canon/ for more of her work.
Charles S. Gascon is a research support coordinator at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

5
6
7

8
9

See Hernández-Murillo and Martinek.
The skill premium will differ based on factors
such as school choice, major, occupational
choice and geographic location, among others.
Sixty-five percent is from Goldin and Katz
and controls for multiple factors. Back-ofthe-envelope calculations using the data in
Figure 1 put the premium over 70 percent.
Castex measures cognitive ability by
standardized test (AFQT) score.
For example, see Garriga and Keightley.
In 2007 dollars, according to the
College Board.
The authors measure skills using a skill
index based on wages and employment
after 10 years of employment.
Hungerford and Solon find that the return
of partial completion of college is low.
Specifically, the Fed created the Term
Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF),
which supported the issuance of asset-backed
securities collateralized by student loans
(as well as auto and credit card loans).

References
Altonji, Joseph G.; Bharadwaj, Prashant; and
Lange, Fabian. “The Anemic Response of
Skill Investment to Skill Premium Growth.”
VOXeu, May 6, 2008. See www.voxeu.org/
index.php?q=node/1110
Athreya, Kartik; and Eberly, Janice. “Risk and
the Response of College Enrollment to Skill
Premia.” January 2012, Northwestern
University, mimeo.
Bound, John; Loevenheim, Michael; Turner,
Sarah. “Why Have College Completion Rates
Declined? An Analysis of Changing Student
Preparation and Collegiate Resources.”
National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper 15566, December 2009.
Castex, Gonzalo. “Essays on Human Capital
Formation.” University of Rochester Ph.D.
dissertation, August 2010.
College Board. See http://trends.collegeboard.
org/downloads/archives/CP_2010.pdf
Garriga, Carlos; Keightley, Mark P. “A General
Equilibrium Theory of College with Education Subsidies, In-School Labor Supply, and
Borrowing Constraints.” Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis Working Paper 2007-049A,
November 2007.
Goldin, Claudia; and Katz, Lawrence F.
“Long-Run Changes in the Wage Structure:
Narrowing, Widening, Polarizing.” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007.
Hernández-Murillo, Rubén; and Martinek,
Christopher. “Which Came First—Better
Education or Better Health?” The Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ The Regional
Economist, April 2011, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 5-6.
Hungerford, Thomas; and Solon, Gary. “Sheepskin Effects in the Returns to Education.”
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 89,
No. 1, February 1987.
Lange, Fabian; and Topel, Robert. “The Social
Value of Education and Human Capital.”
Handbook of Education Economics, Vol 1. Eds.
Eric Hanushek and Finis Welch. 2006.
Rampell, Catherine. “Many with New College
Degree Find the Job Market Humbling.”
The New York Times, May 18, 2011.

The Regional Economist | www.stlouisfed.org 9

continued from Page 6

Higher tuition should make
college less desirable because
it lowers the return on the
investment and because the
high price tag may put college
out of reach for some families.
However, higher tuition costs
can be offset by more borrowing. As a result, the impact of
higher tuition is smaller than
one might expect.

8 The Regional Economist | April 2012

participation rate between 1980 and 2000.
Using data from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY), Castex found that
the college enrollment rate increased from
41 percent in 1980 to 68 percent in 2000.
More important, he found that the increase
in enrollment rates was not the same for
all groups of people. Variation was due to
differences in cognitive ability and financial
status.4 The increase in enrollment was more
pronounced for students of high ability or
from a high-income family. For example,
the gap in college participation rates between
students from the lowest-ability quartile and
the highest-ability quartile was more than
60 percentage points.
Aiming to explain this change in enrollment rates and differences across groups,
Castex used a decision-choice model. This
type of model simplifies real-world decisions
by identifying the important factors influencing a particular decision; the model assumes
individuals make rational choices based on the
information they have. In the model, there are
four driving forces that can explain enrollment rates: increases in college wage premium,
increased availability of merit-based aid for
college, increases in tuition costs, and shifts
in both the distribution of family income and
individual ability.
A higher college wage premium increases
the payoff of completing college and, hence,
should have a positive effect on college
enrollment. The model confirms this
hypothesis: Increases in the college wage
premium are the most influential factor
affecting college participation among the
four driving forces.
The increased availability of merit-based
grants and scholarships reduces the cost of
college education, making college more desirable. According to Castex, the number of
recipients also increased. Between 1980 and
2000, the ratio of grants awarded to highability students (in dollars) to cost of education increased by 70 percent for low-income
students and by 50 percent for high-income
students. This ratio changed little for students
in the low-ability groups. In the model, the
redistribution of college subsidies accounts for
6 percent of the aggregate increase in college
enrollment, and not surprisingly, it has a larger
effect for students of high ability.

Tuition costs are another factor influencing the decision to attend college; this has
been well-documented by economists.5
The average college tuition increased by
about 150 percent between 1980 and 2000:
from $9,000 to $23,000.6 Higher tuition
should make college less desirable because
it lowers the return on the investment and
because the high price tag may put college
out of reach for some families. However,
higher tuition costs can be offset by more
borrowing. As a result, the impact of higher
tuition is smaller than one might expect.
In the model, increases in tuition reduced
the overall college participation rate by
only 3 percent (by 7 percent for low-ability
students).
The interaction between students’ ability
and their family income is also an important determinant of college participation.
Holding ability constant, students in lowand middle-income families have greater
access to need-based grants and scholarships, which reduce the cost of education.
Since 1980, there has been significant
change in the relationship between student
ability and family income. Castex’s findings
suggest that more high-ability students
now belong to middle-income families than
did in 1980. This implies more grants for
middle-income students and, therefore,
an increase in college participation.
Using the same data set as Castex, but a
different skill measure, Joseph Altonji and
co-authors found that the skill premium
provides even less motivation for individuals to acquire additional skills than Castex
found.7 Specifically, only about 1.5 percent
of the increase in skills can be explained
by the higher skill premium (after controlling for factors such as race, gender, family
structure and parental education).
In the past, economists used self-selection
(i.e., college may not be for some people)
to explain the high return of college education but lower participation. However,
college is a risky, irreversible investment,
which makes some students hesitant to
commit. Two recent papers, one by Castex
and another by economists Kartik Athreya
and Janice Eberly, explain this in terms of
failure risk and earnings risk. Failure risk
refers to the possibility that a student will
not complete college. Earnings risk relates
to a college graduate not being guaranteed

anything in terms of future earnings
or employment.
Failure Risk

It is important that one’s ability to earn
a college degree be taken into consideration when deciding about college. A 2009
study by economists John Bound, Michael
Loevenheim and Sarah Turner found college
failure rates close to 50 percent at four-year
public colleges. The authors also found that
increases in the rate of college enrollment
had been accompanied by a decrease in
completion rates. The costs of failure can be
very high because uncertainty over eventual
completion is not quickly resolved; generally,
students who drop out do so after about two
years. Those two years of tuition expenses
and forgone earnings may deliver no return.8
Economists Fabian Lange and Robert Topel
argued that many dropouts failed to earn any
wage premium because most learning takes
place in the later years of college.
In another part of his paper, Castex examined a sample of workers from the 1979
NLSY. He found that students who dropped
out of college at the beginning of the 1980s
owed financial and educational institutions
$9,350 on average; 15 percent of this group
owed more than $24,000. The average
wage when joining the labor force for those
students who dropped out and owed more
than $15,000 was about $28,000, a wage
comparable to that of a high school graduate. Therefore, incorporating the probability
of failure into the decision to attend college
could change an individual’s decision.
Earnings Risk

Even the young adults who earn college
degrees are not given any guarantees. Uncertainty about future employment and earnings
even exists on graduation day. A May 2011
article in The New York Times reported that
in 2009 slightly over half of college graduates
under the age of 25 were working on jobs
that required a college degree. Moreover,
22 percent of this same group was not working at all, and the remaining 22 percent was
underemployed.
Even though part of this underemployment
may be due to the state of the economy, some
graduates are unable to earn the wage premium they had invested in. This can be due to
various factors, such as school performance,

degree choice or quality of life issues. This
implies that it is possible for relatively young
college graduates to immediately earn less
than they expected. These events substantially
lower their present and future stream of earnings and, consequently, the present value of
their remaining lifetime income.

endnotes
1
2

3

4

Impact of the Recession

Traditionally, economic slowdowns have
not been associated with declining college
enrollment rates. This is because, during bad
economic times, people are less likely to find
a good job and, thus, choose to go to school
instead. However, the experience during the
last recession was different: College enrollment rates declined. The housing crash and
financial crisis may explain the difference.
Declining home prices and stock market
wealth placed some families in a situation
where college may have become unaffordable. In addition, college endowments lost
significant value, which may have resulted
in fewer scholarships. Compounding this
problem, the financial crisis made it more difficult for households to borrow. In fact, part
of the Federal Reserve’s response during the
financial crisis involved creating programs to
improve the student loan market.9
Earnings risk likely has played a role, too.
Since the recession, the unemployment rate
for college graduates has more than doubled,
from under 2 percent in 2007 to a peak of
5 percent at the end of 2010, and roughly
one-quarter of recent graduates were underemployed. Making things even worse, the
economy has experienced a jobless recovery,
and four years after the recession began, the
unemployment rate is still elevated. These
factors have increased the aggregate risk of
pursuing a college degree. In this new environment, even attaining a college degree may
not result in the skill premium desired. Therefore, even though the skill premium may have
gone up during the recession, the increase in
unemployment rates for college graduates can
certainly be an important factor explaining
the slow growth in college enrollment rates
and the elevated college dropout rates.
Maria E. Canon is an economist at the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. See http://research.
stlouisfed.org/econ/canon/ for more of her work.
Charles S. Gascon is a research support coordinator at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

5
6
7

8
9

See Hernández-Murillo and Martinek.
The skill premium will differ based on factors
such as school choice, major, occupational
choice and geographic location, among others.
Sixty-five percent is from Goldin and Katz
and controls for multiple factors. Back-ofthe-envelope calculations using the data in
Figure 1 put the premium over 70 percent.
Castex measures cognitive ability by
standardized test (AFQT) score.
For example, see Garriga and Keightley.
In 2007 dollars, according to the
College Board.
The authors measure skills using a skill
index based on wages and employment
after 10 years of employment.
Hungerford and Solon find that the return
of partial completion of college is low.
Specifically, the Fed created the Term
Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF),
which supported the issuance of asset-backed
securities collateralized by student loans
(as well as auto and credit card loans).

References
Altonji, Joseph G.; Bharadwaj, Prashant; and
Lange, Fabian. “The Anemic Response of
Skill Investment to Skill Premium Growth.”
VOXeu, May 6, 2008. See www.voxeu.org/
index.php?q=node/1110
Athreya, Kartik; and Eberly, Janice. “Risk and
the Response of College Enrollment to Skill
Premia.” January 2012, Northwestern
University, mimeo.
Bound, John; Loevenheim, Michael; Turner,
Sarah. “Why Have College Completion Rates
Declined? An Analysis of Changing Student
Preparation and Collegiate Resources.”
National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper 15566, December 2009.
Castex, Gonzalo. “Essays on Human Capital
Formation.” University of Rochester Ph.D.
dissertation, August 2010.
College Board. See http://trends.collegeboard.
org/downloads/archives/CP_2010.pdf
Garriga, Carlos; Keightley, Mark P. “A General
Equilibrium Theory of College with Education Subsidies, In-School Labor Supply, and
Borrowing Constraints.” Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis Working Paper 2007-049A,
November 2007.
Goldin, Claudia; and Katz, Lawrence F.
“Long-Run Changes in the Wage Structure:
Narrowing, Widening, Polarizing.” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007.
Hernández-Murillo, Rubén; and Martinek,
Christopher. “Which Came First—Better
Education or Better Health?” The Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ The Regional
Economist, April 2011, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 5-6.
Hungerford, Thomas; and Solon, Gary. “Sheepskin Effects in the Returns to Education.”
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 89,
No. 1, February 1987.
Lange, Fabian; and Topel, Robert. “The Social
Value of Education and Human Capital.”
Handbook of Education Economics, Vol 1. Eds.
Eric Hanushek and Finis Welch. 2006.
Rampell, Catherine. “Many with New College
Degree Find the Job Market Humbling.”
The New York Times, May 18, 2011.

The Regional Economist | www.stlouisfed.org 9

i n t e r n a t i o n a l

A Look at Credit Default Swaps
and Their Impact
on the European Debt Crisis
By Bryan Noeth and Rajdeep Sengupta

The Origins of CDS

CDS were introduced in the mid-1990s as
a means to hedge risk against a credit event.
Initially, commercial banks used CDS to
hedge the credit risk associated with large
corporate loans. The attractiveness of a CDS
contract emerges from the fact that these are
made over the counter and generally adhere
to the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association’s (ISDA) master agreement.1 As
a result, they allow transacting parties to
avoid regulatory requirements imposed by
more-formal insurance arrangements. With
the evolution of this market, CDS contracts
were written on a variety of sovereign,
corporate and municipal bonds, as well as
on more-complex financial instruments,
such as mortgage-backed securities and
10 The Regional Economist | April 2012

collateralized debt obligations. Unlike with
insurance arrangements, sellers of CDS were
not subject to significant regulation and
were not required to hold reserves against
CDS in case of default. It is widely believed
that this exacerbated the recent financial
crisis by allowing financial firms to sell
insurance on various securities backed by
residential mortgages and other assets.
How Do They Work?

Typically, the CDS requires that the purchaser pay a spread (fee) quoted in percentage (basis points) of the amount insured.
For example, the protection buyer of a
CDS contract of an insured amount of
$20 million and a premium of 100 basis
points pays a (quarterly) premium of
$50,000 to the CDS seller.2 The premiums
continue until the contract expires or the
credit event occurs. Higher premiums indicate a greater likelihood of the credit event.
Settlement occurs in one of two ways:
physical or cash. Physical settlement
requires that the buyer of the protection
deliver the insured bond to the seller, who
pays the buyer the face value of the loan.
The occurrence of the credit event would
generally imply that the asset is trading well
below par. Conversely, in a cash settlement
agreement, the seller of the CDS simply pays
the difference between the par value and the
market price of the obligation of the reference entity.3 Suppose that in our example,
the recovery rate on the obligation of the
reference entity is 40 percent on the occurrence of the credit event; then, the protection seller makes a one-time cash payment
of $12 million to the protection buyer as
shown in the diagram at the top of the
next column.

Spread
Protection Buyer

Protection Seller

Protection
(1-Recovery Rate)*Notional Value

Also notable is the fact that spreads on
the nondistressed eurozone and Western
European countries were initially elevated
but then fell, reflecting that these countries
were viewed after the crisis as fiscally sound.
However, in the past few months, the fact that
these spreads have continued to rise does not
bode well for these countries in particular
and the European region as a whole. More
recently, although the spreads have receded
from recent highs, investors’ concerns about
European debt continue to persist.
Rajdeep Sengupta is an economist and Bryan
Noeth is a research associate, both at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. See http://
research.stlouisfed.org/econ/sengupta/
for more on Sengupta’s work.

figure 1

CDS Spreads
and the European Debt Crisis

CDS spreads are an important metric of
default risk—a higher spread on the CDS
implies a greater risk of default by the reference entity. This feature can provide useful
information as to how financial markets
perceive the risk of default on corporate and
sovereign debt. To illustrate this phenomenon, we study changes in the CDS spreads
on the debt of European nations over the
past few years. Figure 1 illustrates spreads
on five-year CDS in Europe since 2005. Each
series is an equally weighted index of country
groupings where data are available—distressed countries in the eurozone (European
Union members that use the euro as their
currency), other countries in the eurozone,
Western European countries that do not use
the euro as currency and Eastern European
countries that do not use the euro as currency.4 Prior to the crisis, CDS spreads were
low for all of the reference countries, showing
that investors placed low probabilities on
these countries defaulting on their debts.
The onset of the financial crisis in 2008
raised the CDS spreads for all of the sampled
groups of countries, especially for those in
Eastern Europe. At the time, it was believed
that Eastern European countries relied
heavily on foreign capital flows to roll over
their debt obligations. The Russian default
in the late 1990s had made investors wary of
the ability of these countries to service their

ENDNOTES
1

2

3
4
5

Reference Entity

Five-Year Spreads on Credit Default Swaps
1600

This is an agreement of the participants in
the market for over-the-counter derivatives.
For more on this agreement, see http://www2.
isda.org/
Suppose the contract is for a notional amount
of $20 million of Greek sovereign debt. Note
that neither the protection buyer nor the seller
of the CDS needs to have any exposure to
Greek bonds in order to engage in this CDS
contract. This is the important difference
between CDS and insurance contracts.
The market price is often determined by an
auction. See Helwege et al. for details.
See Table 1 for a list of the countries included
in each country grouping.
See Oakley.

R EFE R ENCES
Helwege, Jean; Maurer, Samuel; Sarkar, Asani;
and Wang, Yuan. “Credit Default Swap
Auctions.” Federal Reserve Bank of
New York Staff Reports 372, May 2009.
Oakley, David. “CDS Report: European
Credit Default Swaps Hit Record Wides.”
Financial Times Alphaville (blog), Oct. 23,
2008. See http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/
2008/10/23/17371/cds-report-europeancredit-default-swaps-hit-record-wides

1400
1200
Eurozone-Distressed
BASIS POINTS

C

redit default swaps (CDS) are financial
derivative contracts that are conceptually similar to insurance contracts. A CDS
purchaser (the insured) pays fees to the
seller (the insurer) and is compensated on
the occurrence of a specified credit event.
Typically, such a credit event is the default
or bankruptcy of a corporate or sovereign
borrower (also known as the reference
entity). The difference between traditional
insurance and CDS is that CDS purchasers
need not have any financial stake in the reference entity. Therefore, buying a CDS can
be analogous to an individual insuring his
neighbor’s car and getting paid if the neighbor is involved in a car accident. Just like in
an insurance contract, the individual pays a
periodic premium to a CDS seller in return
for compensation should the credit event
(accident) occur. Importantly, the individual
is compensated even though he may have no
financial stake in his neighbor’s car.

debts in the face of a global downturn. In
fact, many of the countries on the list solicited emergency loans from the International
Monetary Fund.5
Since the crisis, it is clear that investors
have become increasingly wary of the
distressed eurozone countries. Their CDS
spreads have continued to rise, reaching
newer highs each quarter. These countries
have relatively elevated debt levels, and
investors have little faith in the countries’
abilities to service their debt obligations.
Although the CDS spread on these countries
as a group was lower than that of their
Eastern European peers initially, subsequent
events have raised the spreads on the distressed countries’ debt well beyond those
for Eastern Europe.

1000

Eurozone-Other

800

Non-Eurozone Western European

600
Non-Eurozone Eastern European

400
200
0
1/3/2005

1/3/2006

1/3/2007

1/3/2008

1/3/2009

1/3/2010

1/3/2011

1/3/2012

SOURCE: Bloomberg
NOTE: Greece data not available after September 2011, hence the dotted line and drop in spreads.

table 1

Country Listings
EurozoneDistressed

EurozoneOther

Non-Eurozone
Western
European

Non-Eurozone
Eastern
European

Portugal

Austria

UK

Poland

Italy

Belgium

Sweden

Hungary

Ireland

Estonia

Norway

Russia

Greece

Finland

Denmark

Spain

France

Romania

Cyprus

Germany

Czech
Republic

The eurozone is made up of the 17 countries that are both
members of the European Union and that use the euro as
their currency. (The figure and table do not take into account
eurozone member Luxembourg because of its small size.)
Some of the non-eurozone countries in the table do not belong
to the EU. The eurozone-distressed countries are viewed as
having excessive debt burdens.

Latvia

Malta

Croatia

Netherlands

Lithuania

Slovak
Republic

Bulgaria

Ecuador Was the First
Ecuador was the first country to trigger a CDS payment. It happened in November
2008 when Ecuador failed to make an interest payment. This was considered a trigger
event and, in response, an auction was held Jan. 14, 2009. It was decided that the
recovery rate was equal to 31.375 percent. This means that investors were paid
68.625 percent of the gross notional value of the CDS contracts that they had purchased.

Slovenia
The Regional Economist | www.stlouisfed.org 11

i n t e r n a t i o n a l

A Look at Credit Default Swaps
and Their Impact
on the European Debt Crisis
By Bryan Noeth and Rajdeep Sengupta

The Origins of CDS

CDS were introduced in the mid-1990s as
a means to hedge risk against a credit event.
Initially, commercial banks used CDS to
hedge the credit risk associated with large
corporate loans. The attractiveness of a CDS
contract emerges from the fact that these are
made over the counter and generally adhere
to the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association’s (ISDA) master agreement.1 As
a result, they allow transacting parties to
avoid regulatory requirements imposed by
more-formal insurance arrangements. With
the evolution of this market, CDS contracts
were written on a variety of sovereign,
corporate and municipal bonds, as well as
on more-complex financial instruments,
such as mortgage-backed securities and
10 The Regional Economist | April 2012

collateralized debt obligations. Unlike with
insurance arrangements, sellers of CDS were
not subject to significant regulation and
were not required to hold reserves against
CDS in case of default. It is widely believed
that this exacerbated the recent financial
crisis by allowing financial firms to sell
insurance on various securities backed by
residential mortgages and other assets.
How Do They Work?

Typically, the CDS requires that the purchaser pay a spread (fee) quoted in percentage (basis points) of the amount insured.
For example, the protection buyer of a
CDS contract of an insured amount of
$20 million and a premium of 100 basis
points pays a (quarterly) premium of
$50,000 to the CDS seller.2 The premiums
continue until the contract expires or the
credit event occurs. Higher premiums indicate a greater likelihood of the credit event.
Settlement occurs in one of two ways:
physical or cash. Physical settlement
requires that the buyer of the protection
deliver the insured bond to the seller, who
pays the buyer the face value of the loan.
The occurrence of the credit event would
generally imply that the asset is trading well
below par. Conversely, in a cash settlement
agreement, the seller of the CDS simply pays
the difference between the par value and the
market price of the obligation of the reference entity.3 Suppose that in our example,
the recovery rate on the obligation of the
reference entity is 40 percent on the occurrence of the credit event; then, the protection seller makes a one-time cash payment
of $12 million to the protection buyer as
shown in the diagram at the top of the
next column.

Spread
Protection Buyer

Protection Seller

Protection
(1-Recovery Rate)*Notional Value

Also notable is the fact that spreads on
the nondistressed eurozone and Western
European countries were initially elevated
but then fell, reflecting that these countries
were viewed after the crisis as fiscally sound.
However, in the past few months, the fact that
these spreads have continued to rise does not
bode well for these countries in particular
and the European region as a whole. More
recently, although the spreads have receded
from recent highs, investors’ concerns about
European debt continue to persist.
Rajdeep Sengupta is an economist and Bryan
Noeth is a research associate, both at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. See http://
research.stlouisfed.org/econ/sengupta/
for more on Sengupta’s work.

figure 1

CDS Spreads
and the European Debt Crisis

CDS spreads are an important metric of
default risk—a higher spread on the CDS
implies a greater risk of default by the reference entity. This feature can provide useful
information as to how financial markets
perceive the risk of default on corporate and
sovereign debt. To illustrate this phenomenon, we study changes in the CDS spreads
on the debt of European nations over the
past few years. Figure 1 illustrates spreads
on five-year CDS in Europe since 2005. Each
series is an equally weighted index of country
groupings where data are available—distressed countries in the eurozone (European
Union members that use the euro as their
currency), other countries in the eurozone,
Western European countries that do not use
the euro as currency and Eastern European
countries that do not use the euro as currency.4 Prior to the crisis, CDS spreads were
low for all of the reference countries, showing
that investors placed low probabilities on
these countries defaulting on their debts.
The onset of the financial crisis in 2008
raised the CDS spreads for all of the sampled
groups of countries, especially for those in
Eastern Europe. At the time, it was believed
that Eastern European countries relied
heavily on foreign capital flows to roll over
their debt obligations. The Russian default
in the late 1990s had made investors wary of
the ability of these countries to service their

ENDNOTES
1

2

3
4
5

Reference Entity

Five-Year Spreads on Credit Default Swaps
1600

This is an agreement of the participants in
the market for over-the-counter derivatives.
For more on this agreement, see http://www2.
isda.org/
Suppose the contract is for a notional amount
of $20 million of Greek sovereign debt. Note
that neither the protection buyer nor the seller
of the CDS needs to have any exposure to
Greek bonds in order to engage in this CDS
contract. This is the important difference
between CDS and insurance contracts.
The market price is often determined by an
auction. See Helwege et al. for details.
See Table 1 for a list of the countries included
in each country grouping.
See Oakley.

R EFE R ENCES
Helwege, Jean; Maurer, Samuel; Sarkar, Asani;
and Wang, Yuan. “Credit Default Swap
Auctions.” Federal Reserve Bank of
New York Staff Reports 372, May 2009.
Oakley, David. “CDS Report: European
Credit Default Swaps Hit Record Wides.”
Financial Times Alphaville (blog), Oct. 23,
2008. See http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/
2008/10/23/17371/cds-report-europeancredit-default-swaps-hit-record-wides

1400
1200
Eurozone-Distressed
BASIS POINTS

C

redit default swaps (CDS) are financial
derivative contracts that are conceptually similar to insurance contracts. A CDS
purchaser (the insured) pays fees to the
seller (the insurer) and is compensated on
the occurrence of a specified credit event.
Typically, such a credit event is the default
or bankruptcy of a corporate or sovereign
borrower (also known as the reference
entity). The difference between traditional
insurance and CDS is that CDS purchasers
need not have any financial stake in the reference entity. Therefore, buying a CDS can
be analogous to an individual insuring his
neighbor’s car and getting paid if the neighbor is involved in a car accident. Just like in
an insurance contract, the individual pays a
periodic premium to a CDS seller in return
for compensation should the credit event
(accident) occur. Importantly, the individual
is compensated even though he may have no
financial stake in his neighbor’s car.

debts in the face of a global downturn. In
fact, many of the countries on the list solicited emergency loans from the International
Monetary Fund.5
Since the crisis, it is clear that investors
have become increasingly wary of the
distressed eurozone countries. Their CDS
spreads have continued to rise, reaching
newer highs each quarter. These countries
have relatively elevated debt levels, and
investors have little faith in the countries’
abilities to service their debt obligations.
Although the CDS spread on these countries
as a group was lower than that of their
Eastern European peers initially, subsequent
events have raised the spreads on the distressed countries’ debt well beyond those
for Eastern Europe.

1000

Eurozone-Other

800

Non-Eurozone Western European

600
Non-Eurozone Eastern European

400
200
0
1/3/2005

1/3/2006

1/3/2007

1/3/2008

1/3/2009

1/3/2010

1/3/2011

1/3/2012

SOURCE: Bloomberg
NOTE: Greece data not available after September 2011, hence the dotted line and drop in spreads.

table 1

Country Listings
EurozoneDistressed

EurozoneOther

Non-Eurozone
Western
European

Non-Eurozone
Eastern
European

Portugal

Austria

UK

Poland

Italy

Belgium

Sweden

Hungary

Ireland

Estonia

Norway

Russia

Greece

Finland

Denmark

Spain

France

Romania

Cyprus

Germany

Czech
Republic

The eurozone is made up of the 17 countries that are both
members of the European Union and that use the euro as
their currency. (The figure and table do not take into account
eurozone member Luxembourg because of its small size.)
Some of the non-eurozone countries in the table do not belong
to the EU. The eurozone-distressed countries are viewed as
having excessive debt burdens.

Latvia

Malta

Croatia

Netherlands

Lithuania

Slovak
Republic

Bulgaria

Ecuador Was the First
Ecuador was the first country to trigger a CDS payment. It happened in November
2008 when Ecuador failed to make an interest payment. This was considered a trigger
event and, in response, an auction was held Jan. 14, 2009. It was decided that the
recovery rate was equal to 31.375 percent. This means that investors were paid
68.625 percent of the gross notional value of the CDS contracts that they had purchased.

Slovenia
The Regional Economist | www.stlouisfed.org 11

e n e r g y

By Brett Fawley, Luciana Juvenal and Ivan Petrella

First Contributor: Global Supply

Unanticipated changes in the availability of oil inversely affect the price of oil.
For example, prices increase when the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) unexpectedly decides
to cut oil production.
12 The Regional Economist | April 2012

Second Contributor: Global Demand

A booming world economy demands
more industrial commodities, and at the
top of that list is oil. For example, continuous growth in emerging countries such as
China and India increases the aggregate
world demand for oil and, consequently,
its price.
Third Contributor: Oil Inventory Demand

Expected future shortfalls in oil supply,
relative to demand, motivate the storage of
oil for future use. Either the possibility of a
sudden shortage in production or of a new
source of demand can create an expected
shortfall. For example, uncertainty about
future oil supply may arise from political
instability in key oil-producing countries,
such as Nigeria, Iraq, Venezuela, Libya or
FIGURE 1

110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2000

2002

2004

Iran. Such uncertainty increases demand
for storing oil, driving up the current price.
Fourth Contributor: Speculation

Speculation is the act of purchasing something today with the anticipation of selling
it at a higher price at a later date. Financial
markets allow traders to speculate on oil
prices in the following way: Traders buy a
contract for oil to be delivered at a later date
(a futures contract), sell the contract before
the oil is due for delivery and use the proceeds to purchase another futures contract
for delivery at a more distant date. Expectations that the price of oil will be higher
in the future motivate investment funds
to take positions in these contracts, and as
demand for futures contracts increases, so
does their price, which also moves the current oil price.
Decomposing Oil Prices
in the Past Decade

Real Crude Oil Prices

DOLLARS PER BARREL

H

istorically, the long-run primary
driver of oil prices has been global
demand.1 An expanding global economy
demands more raw inputs, including oil,
and that increased demand pushes up
their price.
However, the past decade (2000-09) saw
a rapid proliferation in the financialization of commodities, i.e., the creation and
trading of financial instruments indexed to
commodity prices. Estimates indicate that
assets allocated to commodity index trading
rose from $13 billion in 2004 to $260 billion
in March 2008. Many people, including
policymakers and economists, have posited
that because this rapid and unprecedented
growth in commodity index trading coincided with a boom in commodity prices,
speculation by financial traders—and not
supply and demand—drove the recent
bubble in commodities.2 (See Figure 1.)
Such charges are perhaps strongest in
oil markets, where large investment banks,
hedge funds and other investment funds
have invested billions of dollars in oil
futures contracts over the past decade. In
our current research, we investigate these
allegations.3 Specifically, we disentangle
the contribution of four factors to oil price
movements. Successfully identifying the
true drivers of oil prices over the past decade
is critical for efficient resource allocation
and policy design.

2006

2008

2010

SOURCE: Energy Information Administration (EIA) and Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS).
NOTES: Prices are deflated using CPI and expressed in year 2000
dollars. The different background colors delineate the periods over
which we compute price changes in Figure 2.

Figure 2 illustrates the degree to which oil
price trends over various parts of 2000-09
are attributed in our model to each of the
four elements discussed above. We identify
periods by the beginning and end of distinctive trends, rather than by evenly spaced time
intervals, in order to best capture the net
contribution each factor made to each trend.
(See shading in Figure 1.) The black line
shows the modeled percent change in real
oil prices during each time period, and the
bars illustrate the percentage point contribution made by each of the four elements.4
For example, factors related to global supply
pushed modeled oil prices about seven percentage points higher between 2000 and 2004
than they would have been otherwise, while
changes in global demand drove modeled oil

green bar exceeds even the blue bar during
the mid-2006 to mid-2008 period.) On the
flip side, however, both oil inventory demand
and global supply fail to explain much if
any of the subsequent decline in oil prices in
the second half of 2008. In total, oil supply
contributed perhaps the least to both the
boom and bust in oil prices, consistent with
previous findings.
On balance, the evidence does not support
the claim that a sudden explosion in commodity trading tectonically shifted historical
precedent: Global demand remained the primary driver of oil prices from 2000 to 2009.
That said, one cannot completely dismiss a
role for speculation in the oil bubble of the
past decade. Speculative demand can and
did exacerbate the boom-bust cycle in commodity prices. Ultimately, however, fundamentals continue to account for the long-run
trend in oil prices.

ENDNOTES
1
2
3
4

5

See Kilian.
See Tang and Xiong.
See Juvenal and Petrella.
While the four components discussed can
account for the large majority of oil price
changes, the model that we estimate does not
require, or assume, that all factors important
to oil prices are included. The allowance for
omitted factors explains why summing the
four individual contributions may not always
equal the total change. Also note that because
we are interested in comparing relative trends
and not levels, we make the normalization of
indexing all factors to the same baseline level
in 2000.
See Tang and Xiong.

R EFE R ENCES
Juvenal, Luciana; and Petrella, Ivan. “Speculation in the Oil Market.” Working Paper
2011-027B, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
January 2012.
Kilian, Lutz. “Not All Oil Price Shocks Are
Alike: Disentangling Demand and Supply
Shocks in the Crude Oil Market.” American
Economic Review, 2009, Vol. 99, No. 3,
pp. 1053-69.
Tang, Ke; and Xiong, Wei. “Index Investment
and Financialization of Commodities.”
Working Paper, Princeton University,
January 2011.

Luciana Juvenal is an economist and Brett
Fawley is a senior research associate, both at
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Ivan
Petrella is an assistant professor in the department of economics at Birkbeck College, University of London. For more on Juvenal’s work, see
http://research.stlouisfed.org/econ/juvenal/

FIGURE 2
Decomposition of Percent Change in Oil Price
60
50
40
30
PERCENT CHANGE

When Oil Prices Jump,
Is Speculation To Blame?

prices about seven percentage points lower
over the same span than they would have
been otherwise.
During the past decade, just as historically, global demand was the primary driver
of oil prices: The blue bars representing the
contribution of global demand are the largest
and show the greatest co-movement with
the total change in oil prices. Moreover, the
decline in the real price of oil in the second
half of 2008 can be traced predominantly to
the sharp reversal in worldwide demand that
resulted from the financial crisis and ensuing
global recession.
Figure 2 also reveals, however, that speculative demand did materially contribute to the
increase in oil prices from 2004 to mid-2008.
In particular, the contribution from speculation to rising oil prices (red bar) exceeded the
combined contribution of global supply and
inventory demand (purple and green bars)
from 2004 to mid-2006. Overall, we estimate
that speculation accounted for about 15 percent of the measured rise in oil prices from
2004 to mid-2008.
It is noteworthy that this trend began in
2004, which is when significant investment
from index funds started to flow into commodities markets. Interestingly, speculation
played a much smaller role during the second
phase of rising prices, from mid-2006 through
mid-2008, underscoring that gains from
speculation decrease as current oil prices
increase. Higher oil prices require that speculators allocate more investment funds upfront
to purchase the same quantity of contracts,
yielding a lower return as a percent of investment for the same dollar increase in oil prices.
But in the second half of 2008, just as in
2004 to mid-2006, speculation was again the
second most-important factor driving oil
prices: Only the blue and red bars can significantly explain the decline in oil prices, or
“popping” of the bubble, during the second
half of 2008. Just as the recession that was
caused by the financial crisis decreased global
demand for oil, the financial crisis also hurt
the risk appetite of financial investors for
risky commodities in their portfolios, consequently pushing prices down.5
Looking to the other factors, oil inventory
demand played only a marginal role in the
oil price buildup from 2004 to mid-2006
but accounted for a large share of the spike
from mid-2006 to mid-2008. (Note that the

20
10
0
–10
–20
–30
–40
–50
–60
–70
–80

2000.1-2003.12
Global Demand

2004.1-2006.6
Inventory Demand

2006.7-2008.6
YEAR/MONTH
Global Supply

2008.7-2008.12

2009.1-2009.12

Speculative Demand

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. See Juvenal and Petrella.
NOTE: Square markers identify the total percent change in oil prices over the period identified on the x axis. Colored bars illustrate the
percentage point contribution made by the four factors of interest. We identify periods by the beginning and end of distinctive trends.
(See shading in Figure 1.)

The Regional Economist | www.stlouisfed.org 13

e n e r g y

By Brett Fawley, Luciana Juvenal and Ivan Petrella

First Contributor: Global Supply

Unanticipated changes in the availability of oil inversely affect the price of oil.
For example, prices increase when the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) unexpectedly decides
to cut oil production.
12 The Regional Economist | April 2012

Second Contributor: Global Demand

A booming world economy demands
more industrial commodities, and at the
top of that list is oil. For example, continuous growth in emerging countries such as
China and India increases the aggregate
world demand for oil and, consequently,
its price.
Third Contributor: Oil Inventory Demand

Expected future shortfalls in oil supply,
relative to demand, motivate the storage of
oil for future use. Either the possibility of a
sudden shortage in production or of a new
source of demand can create an expected
shortfall. For example, uncertainty about
future oil supply may arise from political
instability in key oil-producing countries,
such as Nigeria, Iraq, Venezuela, Libya or
FIGURE 1

110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2000

2002

2004

Iran. Such uncertainty increases demand
for storing oil, driving up the current price.
Fourth Contributor: Speculation

Speculation is the act of purchasing something today with the anticipation of selling
it at a higher price at a later date. Financial
markets allow traders to speculate on oil
prices in the following way: Traders buy a
contract for oil to be delivered at a later date
(a futures contract), sell the contract before
the oil is due for delivery and use the proceeds to purchase another futures contract
for delivery at a more distant date. Expectations that the price of oil will be higher
in the future motivate investment funds
to take positions in these contracts, and as
demand for futures contracts increases, so
does their price, which also moves the current oil price.
Decomposing Oil Prices
in the Past Decade

Real Crude Oil Prices

DOLLARS PER BARREL

H

istorically, the long-run primary
driver of oil prices has been global
demand.1 An expanding global economy
demands more raw inputs, including oil,
and that increased demand pushes up
their price.
However, the past decade (2000-09) saw
a rapid proliferation in the financialization of commodities, i.e., the creation and
trading of financial instruments indexed to
commodity prices. Estimates indicate that
assets allocated to commodity index trading
rose from $13 billion in 2004 to $260 billion
in March 2008. Many people, including
policymakers and economists, have posited
that because this rapid and unprecedented
growth in commodity index trading coincided with a boom in commodity prices,
speculation by financial traders—and not
supply and demand—drove the recent
bubble in commodities.2 (See Figure 1.)
Such charges are perhaps strongest in
oil markets, where large investment banks,
hedge funds and other investment funds
have invested billions of dollars in oil
futures contracts over the past decade. In
our current research, we investigate these
allegations.3 Specifically, we disentangle
the contribution of four factors to oil price
movements. Successfully identifying the
true drivers of oil prices over the past decade
is critical for efficient resource allocation
and policy design.

2006

2008

2010

SOURCE: Energy Information Administration (EIA) and Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS).
NOTES: Prices are deflated using CPI and expressed in year 2000
dollars. The different background colors delineate the periods over
which we compute price changes in Figure 2.

Figure 2 illustrates the degree to which oil
price trends over various parts of 2000-09
are attributed in our model to each of the
four elements discussed above. We identify
periods by the beginning and end of distinctive trends, rather than by evenly spaced time
intervals, in order to best capture the net
contribution each factor made to each trend.
(See shading in Figure 1.) The black line
shows the modeled percent change in real
oil prices during each time period, and the
bars illustrate the percentage point contribution made by each of the four elements.4
For example, factors related to global supply
pushed modeled oil prices about seven percentage points higher between 2000 and 2004
than they would have been otherwise, while
changes in global demand drove modeled oil

green bar exceeds even the blue bar during
the mid-2006 to mid-2008 period.) On the
flip side, however, both oil inventory demand
and global supply fail to explain much if
any of the subsequent decline in oil prices in
the second half of 2008. In total, oil supply
contributed perhaps the least to both the
boom and bust in oil prices, consistent with
previous findings.
On balance, the evidence does not support
the claim that a sudden explosion in commodity trading tectonically shifted historical
precedent: Global demand remained the primary driver of oil prices from 2000 to 2009.
That said, one cannot completely dismiss a
role for speculation in the oil bubble of the
past decade. Speculative demand can and
did exacerbate the boom-bust cycle in commodity prices. Ultimately, however, fundamentals continue to account for the long-run
trend in oil prices.

ENDNOTES
1
2
3
4

5

See Kilian.
See Tang and Xiong.
See Juvenal and Petrella.
While the four components discussed can
account for the large majority of oil price
changes, the model that we estimate does not
require, or assume, that all factors important
to oil prices are included. The allowance for
omitted factors explains why summing the
four individual contributions may not always
equal the total change. Also note that because
we are interested in comparing relative trends
and not levels, we make the normalization of
indexing all factors to the same baseline level
in 2000.
See Tang and Xiong.

R EFE R ENCES
Juvenal, Luciana; and Petrella, Ivan. “Speculation in the Oil Market.” Working Paper
2011-027B, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
January 2012.
Kilian, Lutz. “Not All Oil Price Shocks Are
Alike: Disentangling Demand and Supply
Shocks in the Crude Oil Market.” American
Economic Review, 2009, Vol. 99, No. 3,
pp. 1053-69.
Tang, Ke; and Xiong, Wei. “Index Investment
and Financialization of Commodities.”
Working Paper, Princeton University,
January 2011.

Luciana Juvenal is an economist and Brett
Fawley is a senior research associate, both at
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Ivan
Petrella is an assistant professor in the department of economics at Birkbeck College, University of London. For more on Juvenal’s work, see
http://research.stlouisfed.org/econ/juvenal/

FIGURE 2
Decomposition of Percent Change in Oil Price
60
50
40
30
PERCENT CHANGE

When Oil Prices Jump,
Is Speculation To Blame?

prices about seven percentage points lower
over the same span than they would have
been otherwise.
During the past decade, just as historically, global demand was the primary driver
of oil prices: The blue bars representing the
contribution of global demand are the largest
and show the greatest co-movement with
the total change in oil prices. Moreover, the
decline in the real price of oil in the second
half of 2008 can be traced predominantly to
the sharp reversal in worldwide demand that
resulted from the financial crisis and ensuing
global recession.
Figure 2 also reveals, however, that speculative demand did materially contribute to the
increase in oil prices from 2004 to mid-2008.
In particular, the contribution from speculation to rising oil prices (red bar) exceeded the
combined contribution of global supply and
inventory demand (purple and green bars)
from 2004 to mid-2006. Overall, we estimate
that speculation accounted for about 15 percent of the measured rise in oil prices from
2004 to mid-2008.
It is noteworthy that this trend began in
2004, which is when significant investment
from index funds started to flow into commodities markets. Interestingly, speculation
played a much smaller role during the second
phase of rising prices, from mid-2006 through
mid-2008, underscoring that gains from
speculation decrease as current oil prices
increase. Higher oil prices require that speculators allocate more investment funds upfront
to purchase the same quantity of contracts,
yielding a lower return as a percent of investment for the same dollar increase in oil prices.
But in the second half of 2008, just as in
2004 to mid-2006, speculation was again the
second most-important factor driving oil
prices: Only the blue and red bars can significantly explain the decline in oil prices, or
“popping” of the bubble, during the second
half of 2008. Just as the recession that was
caused by the financial crisis decreased global
demand for oil, the financial crisis also hurt
the risk appetite of financial investors for
risky commodities in their portfolios, consequently pushing prices down.5
Looking to the other factors, oil inventory
demand played only a marginal role in the
oil price buildup from 2004 to mid-2006
but accounted for a large share of the spike
from mid-2006 to mid-2008. (Note that the

20
10
0
–10
–20
–30
–40
–50
–60
–70
–80

2000.1-2003.12
Global Demand

2004.1-2006.6
Inventory Demand

2006.7-2008.6
YEAR/MONTH
Global Supply

2008.7-2008.12

2009.1-2009.12

Speculative Demand

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. See Juvenal and Petrella.
NOTE: Square markers identify the total percent change in oil prices over the period identified on the x axis. Colored bars illustrate the
percentage point contribution made by the four factors of interest. We identify periods by the beginning and end of distinctive trends.
(See shading in Figure 1.)

The Regional Economist | www.stlouisfed.org 13

m a r k e t s
Market Value of U.S. Corporations

LOG SCALE

New Technology
May Cause
Stock Volatility
By Adrian Peralta-Alva

T

he fact that the market value of firms
traded in U.S. stock markets displays
considerable fluctuations over short time
periods is very well-known and receives a
great deal of attention in the press. From
the perspective of economic theory, this
elevated level of short-run volatility in the
stock market is very challenging to understand because fundamentals—i.e., variables
that one would consider key determinants
of market values, such as profits, dividends
or output growth—do not fluctuate nearly
as much.
Should Investors Focus
on the Long Run?

From a macroeconomic perspective, if
stock market volatility were confined to
short-term horizons, then it would not be of
great concern because the volatility would
wash out in the long run. However, the
stock market displays pronounced movements that are also long-lived. The relevant
data are summarized in the figure.
The stock market value of all publicly
traded U.S. corporations increased at a very
fast pace during the 1950s. During the 1960s,
it slowed down substantially. Stock market
values declined by 57 percent from their
peak in 1972 to 1974 and did not start growing until the 1980s. From the mid-1980s to
2000, equity values rose steadily, more than
tripling. From 2000 to 2010, in spite of large
year-to-year fluctuations, equity values did
not display any particular trend.
The welfare implications of such strong
changes in market valuations may be profound. An individual considering retirement
in early 1974, for example, would have seen
her stock market wealth go down by 50 percent in that year. More important, the stock
14 The Regional Economist | April 2012

market did not recover from this negative
shock until well into the 1990s. Retirement
prospects would look very different for somebody considering retirement in about 1990.
By then, the stock market had recovered, and
a twofold increase in valuations would take
place during the following decade.

Historically, firms that are
traded in the stock market
tend to be well-established
firms that are, therefore,
more likely to use established
technologies. As a result,
the slowdown in productivity
might have affected, in a
particularly strong fashion,
publicly traded firms and their
market valuation.
The Role of Technology

One of the possible explanations for the
observed changes in the long-term trends
in the stock market is changes in technology.1 The production structure of the U.S.
economy has been transformed at its most
fundamental levels during the past four
decades, and these changes are reflected in
asset valuations.
First, the U.S. economy slowed down substantially about the mid-1970s as productivity growth was cut in half and stagnated for
the next two decades. This is the famous
productivity slowdown, which might also
have signaled that existing technologies

and production methods could no longer
continue to be the engines of growth.2 Historically, firms that are traded in the stock
market tend to be well-established firms that
are, therefore, more likely to use established
technologies. As a result, the slowdown
in productivity might have affected, in a
particularly strong fashion, publicly traded
firms and their market valuation.
Interestingly enough, some small, incipient sectors of the economy were experiencing a productivity boom simultaneous
with the productivity slowdown of the
mid-1970s.3 The 1970s, and most certainly
the 1980s, signaled the beginning of the
information technology (IT) revolution.
Many of the major economic players of the
1990s, and even of today, were born in the
middle of this revolution. However, most
of the firms employing these new technologies would not go public until the late 1980s
or early 1990s, and only then would stock
markets start to recover.
Using Theory to Account for the Facts

To better understand how the aforementioned technological shocks might translate
into stock market fluctuations, it is useful
to recall some basic economic principles.
A key complication behind stock market
valuations is that they are forward-looking
by nature. Ownership of a share of equity
entitles the holder to a fraction of the stream
of future dividends distributed by the firm
and to the expected capital gains (or losses)
that may result from selling such a share.
The value of shares must, therefore, equal
the expected discounted value of dividends
plus expected capital gains.
Using this basic theory, think about the
possible impact of the mid-1970s slowdown

5.45
5.20
4.95
4.70
4.45
4.20
3.95
3.70
3.45
3.20
2.95
2.70
2.45
2.20
1951

endnotes
1
2
3

4

5

These ideas are explored in a fully blown
general equilibrium model in Peralta-Alva.
See Griliches for a survey of the productivity
slowdown literature.
Productivity decompositions by sector, with
an emphasis on measuring the productivity
of the information technology sector, can be
found in Jorgenson.
The present value of a flow that starts at value
X and grows at rate g discounted at rate r is
(1+r)X/(r–g).
See Jovanovic and Rousseau.

R EFE R ENCES
1956

1961

1966

1971

1976

1981

1986

1991

1996

2001

2006

2011

Market value of U.S. corporations in real terms and in log scale. Each decimal point on the log scale represents
approximately a 10 percent change.
SOURCE: Table L213 of the Flow of Funds of the U.S. (shares at market value) divided by the GDP deflator taken from the U.S. National Income and
Product Accounts.

in existing technologies. Since the stock
market had reached a period of relative
stability during the 1960s, people might
have thought that dividends would grow at
a relatively stable rate for years to come. As
a back-of-the-envelope calculation, consider
a fictitious firm that pays an initial dividend
distribution of $100 and that the expected
dividend growth rate is 3 percent per year
(which corresponds to the average growth
rate of the U.S. economy during the 1960s).
If the interest rate is 5 percent (the average
during the relevant period), then this firm
is worth $5,250.4
The productivity slowdown can be
thought of as a sudden decline in the
expected growth rate of the economy,
from 3 percent to 1.5 percent. Let’s further
assume that this slowdown is perceived to be

The perception of a slowdown
in the expected growth rate
of dividends is enough to
generate large changes in
stock market prices.
long-lasting. According to the theory, the
value of the firm is now updated to $3,000.
These numbers imply that a sudden
slowdown in the expected growth rate of the
economy may translate into a drop in the
stock market! It is important to notice that
dividends do not have to fall for the stock

market to fall. The perception of a slowdown in the expected growth rate of dividends is enough to generate large changes in
stock market prices.
Hence, basic economic theory seems to be
useful to understand the stock market crash
of the mid-1970s. What about its subsequent stagnation and eventual recovery?
Microsoft, Cisco, Yahoo and the like are
products of the information technology
revolution. But IT firms did not start
trading in the stock market immediately.
Indeed, data show that firms take 20 years
on average to go from main initial innovation to actual listing in the stock market.5
IT-producing firms were important forces
driving the recovery of the stock market of
the 1990s. But to move the stock market
overall, it is necessary that a large number
of firms and sectors recover in value. And
this is another reason for the stagnation in
the 1970s. New firms have the comparative
advantage in adopting new technologies, and
adoption of new technologies takes time. The
recovery in the stock market, therefore, was
delayed because the firms and technologies
that would bring growth back did not enter
in full force until decades later.
Adrian Peralta-Alva is an economist at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. See http://
research.stlouisfed.org/econ/peralta-alva/ for
more of his work.

Griliches, Zvi. “Productivity Puzzles and R & D:
Another Nonexplanation.” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1988, pp. 9-21.
Jorgenson, Dale W. “Information Technology
and the U.S. Economy.” American Economic
Review, Vol. 91, No. 1, 2001, pp. 1-32.
Jovanovic, Boyan; and Rousseau, Peter L. “Why
Wait? A Century of Life before IPO.” American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 2, 2001,
pp. 336-41.
Peralta-Alva, Adrian. “The Information Technology Revolution and the Puzzling Trends in
Tobin’s Average Q.” International Economic
Review, Vol. 48, No. 3, 2007, pp. 929-51.

Related Reading
on Stock Market Volatility

© shut terstock

What Happened to the U.S.
Stock Market? Accounting for
the Past 50 Years
In this article in the November/
December 2009 issue of our
research journal, Review, Adrian
Peralta-Alva and Michele Boldrin,
a research fellow at the St. Louis
Fed, raise questions about the
widespread belief that, in the long
run, the market reverts to wellestablished fundamentals. See
http://research.stlouisfed.org/
publications/review/09/11/
Boldrin.pdf

The Regional Economist | www.stlouisfed.org 15

m a r k e t s
Market Value of U.S. Corporations

LOG SCALE

New Technology
May Cause
Stock Volatility
By Adrian Peralta-Alva

T

he fact that the market value of firms
traded in U.S. stock markets displays
considerable fluctuations over short time
periods is very well-known and receives a
great deal of attention in the press. From
the perspective of economic theory, this
elevated level of short-run volatility in the
stock market is very challenging to understand because fundamentals—i.e., variables
that one would consider key determinants
of market values, such as profits, dividends
or output growth—do not fluctuate nearly
as much.
Should Investors Focus
on the Long Run?

From a macroeconomic perspective, if
stock market volatility were confined to
short-term horizons, then it would not be of
great concern because the volatility would
wash out in the long run. However, the
stock market displays pronounced movements that are also long-lived. The relevant
data are summarized in the figure.
The stock market value of all publicly
traded U.S. corporations increased at a very
fast pace during the 1950s. During the 1960s,
it slowed down substantially. Stock market
values declined by 57 percent from their
peak in 1972 to 1974 and did not start growing until the 1980s. From the mid-1980s to
2000, equity values rose steadily, more than
tripling. From 2000 to 2010, in spite of large
year-to-year fluctuations, equity values did
not display any particular trend.
The welfare implications of such strong
changes in market valuations may be profound. An individual considering retirement
in early 1974, for example, would have seen
her stock market wealth go down by 50 percent in that year. More important, the stock
14 The Regional Economist | April 2012

market did not recover from this negative
shock until well into the 1990s. Retirement
prospects would look very different for somebody considering retirement in about 1990.
By then, the stock market had recovered, and
a twofold increase in valuations would take
place during the following decade.

Historically, firms that are
traded in the stock market
tend to be well-established
firms that are, therefore,
more likely to use established
technologies. As a result,
the slowdown in productivity
might have affected, in a
particularly strong fashion,
publicly traded firms and their
market valuation.
The Role of Technology

One of the possible explanations for the
observed changes in the long-term trends
in the stock market is changes in technology.1 The production structure of the U.S.
economy has been transformed at its most
fundamental levels during the past four
decades, and these changes are reflected in
asset valuations.
First, the U.S. economy slowed down substantially about the mid-1970s as productivity growth was cut in half and stagnated for
the next two decades. This is the famous
productivity slowdown, which might also
have signaled that existing technologies

and production methods could no longer
continue to be the engines of growth.2 Historically, firms that are traded in the stock
market tend to be well-established firms that
are, therefore, more likely to use established
technologies. As a result, the slowdown
in productivity might have affected, in a
particularly strong fashion, publicly traded
firms and their market valuation.
Interestingly enough, some small, incipient sectors of the economy were experiencing a productivity boom simultaneous
with the productivity slowdown of the
mid-1970s.3 The 1970s, and most certainly
the 1980s, signaled the beginning of the
information technology (IT) revolution.
Many of the major economic players of the
1990s, and even of today, were born in the
middle of this revolution. However, most
of the firms employing these new technologies would not go public until the late 1980s
or early 1990s, and only then would stock
markets start to recover.
Using Theory to Account for the Facts

To better understand how the aforementioned technological shocks might translate
into stock market fluctuations, it is useful
to recall some basic economic principles.
A key complication behind stock market
valuations is that they are forward-looking
by nature. Ownership of a share of equity
entitles the holder to a fraction of the stream
of future dividends distributed by the firm
and to the expected capital gains (or losses)
that may result from selling such a share.
The value of shares must, therefore, equal
the expected discounted value of dividends
plus expected capital gains.
Using this basic theory, think about the
possible impact of the mid-1970s slowdown

5.45
5.20
4.95
4.70
4.45
4.20
3.95
3.70
3.45
3.20
2.95
2.70
2.45
2.20
1951

endnotes
1
2
3

4

5

These ideas are explored in a fully blown
general equilibrium model in Peralta-Alva.
See Griliches for a survey of the productivity
slowdown literature.
Productivity decompositions by sector, with
an emphasis on measuring the productivity
of the information technology sector, can be
found in Jorgenson.
The present value of a flow that starts at value
X and grows at rate g discounted at rate r is
(1+r)X/(r–g).
See Jovanovic and Rousseau.

R EFE R ENCES
1956

1961

1966

1971

1976

1981

1986

1991

1996

2001

2006

2011

Market value of U.S. corporations in real terms and in log scale. Each decimal point on the log scale represents
approximately a 10 percent change.
SOURCE: Table L213 of the Flow of Funds of the U.S. (shares at market value) divided by the GDP deflator taken from the U.S. National Income and
Product Accounts.

in existing technologies. Since the stock
market had reached a period of relative
stability during the 1960s, people might
have thought that dividends would grow at
a relatively stable rate for years to come. As
a back-of-the-envelope calculation, consider
a fictitious firm that pays an initial dividend
distribution of $100 and that the expected
dividend growth rate is 3 percent per year
(which corresponds to the average growth
rate of the U.S. economy during the 1960s).
If the interest rate is 5 percent (the average
during the relevant period), then this firm
is worth $5,250.4
The productivity slowdown can be
thought of as a sudden decline in the
expected growth rate of the economy,
from 3 percent to 1.5 percent. Let’s further
assume that this slowdown is perceived to be

The perception of a slowdown
in the expected growth rate
of dividends is enough to
generate large changes in
stock market prices.
long-lasting. According to the theory, the
value of the firm is now updated to $3,000.
These numbers imply that a sudden
slowdown in the expected growth rate of the
economy may translate into a drop in the
stock market! It is important to notice that
dividends do not have to fall for the stock

market to fall. The perception of a slowdown in the expected growth rate of dividends is enough to generate large changes in
stock market prices.
Hence, basic economic theory seems to be
useful to understand the stock market crash
of the mid-1970s. What about its subsequent stagnation and eventual recovery?
Microsoft, Cisco, Yahoo and the like are
products of the information technology
revolution. But IT firms did not start
trading in the stock market immediately.
Indeed, data show that firms take 20 years
on average to go from main initial innovation to actual listing in the stock market.5
IT-producing firms were important forces
driving the recovery of the stock market of
the 1990s. But to move the stock market
overall, it is necessary that a large number
of firms and sectors recover in value. And
this is another reason for the stagnation in
the 1970s. New firms have the comparative
advantage in adopting new technologies, and
adoption of new technologies takes time. The
recovery in the stock market, therefore, was
delayed because the firms and technologies
that would bring growth back did not enter
in full force until decades later.
Adrian Peralta-Alva is an economist at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. See http://
research.stlouisfed.org/econ/peralta-alva/ for
more of his work.

Griliches, Zvi. “Productivity Puzzles and R & D:
Another Nonexplanation.” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1988, pp. 9-21.
Jorgenson, Dale W. “Information Technology
and the U.S. Economy.” American Economic
Review, Vol. 91, No. 1, 2001, pp. 1-32.
Jovanovic, Boyan; and Rousseau, Peter L. “Why
Wait? A Century of Life before IPO.” American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 2, 2001,
pp. 336-41.
Peralta-Alva, Adrian. “The Information Technology Revolution and the Puzzling Trends in
Tobin’s Average Q.” International Economic
Review, Vol. 48, No. 3, 2007, pp. 929-51.

Related Reading
on Stock Market Volatility

© shut terstock

What Happened to the U.S.
Stock Market? Accounting for
the Past 50 Years
In this article in the November/
December 2009 issue of our
research journal, Review, Adrian
Peralta-Alva and Michele Boldrin,
a research fellow at the St. Louis
Fed, raise questions about the
widespread belief that, in the long
run, the market reverts to wellestablished fundamentals. See
http://research.stlouisfed.org/
publications/review/09/11/
Boldrin.pdf

The Regional Economist | www.stlouisfed.org 15

c o mm u n i ty

p r o f i l e

Burned by Loss
of Manufacturing,
Rural County Vows To Diversify

Work is almost done on the new man-made lake.
PHOTO © Brian marsh

By Susan C. Thomson

S

ometime this summer, a man-made,
1,000-acre recreational lake is due to
open to the public in Carroll County, Tenn.
The new lake is a $22.5 million public
investment in the tourism potential of a
rural county that seeks economic development and diversification.
As recently as the mid-1990s, one of every
five county jobs was in the apparel industry,
says Brad Hurley, president of the Carroll
County Chamber of Commerce, which
doubles as the county’s economic development arm. Factories making shirts, pajamas
and jeans employed people by the hundreds.
By 2000, after a cascade of plant closings, all
of those jobs had vanished.
As the industry was folding, county leaders made a vow. “What we did was say: ‘We
never want that to happen again. We don’t
ever want to be dominated by one area of
the economy,’ ” Hurley says.
The time was right for a hard new look at
16 The Regional Economist | April 2012

a bold idea first floated in the 1970s: Dam a
local creek to make a lake. A plan to do so
had made it through the Tennessee House
of Representatives in 1984 but failed to get
necessary environmental approvals.
By 2000, the county had come up with a
new, more environmentally sensitive plan
for a different creek, and that year county
voters narrowly approved a $10-a-year
vehicle tax to go toward lake construction. Then came years to secure all of the
permits and to survey, buy and clear the
land. In 2008, construction started, with
the centerpiece—a 2,400-foot-long, 60-foothigh dam. By this past spring, the big hole
had been pumped full of water and stocked
with fish.
The lake is three miles south of Huntingdon, Carroll County’s seat, where Dale Kelley is mayor. Widely viewed in the county
as a visionary, he had long been the lake’s
No. 1 champion. Taking office in 1992, he

Huntingdon/Carroll County, Tenn.
by the numbers
		
Population

City | County

3,985 |

28,518*

Labor Force

NA |

13,448**

Unemployment Rate

NA |

12%**

Per Capita Personal Income

NA | $25,680***

* U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 census
** BLS/HAVER, December 2011, seasonally adjusted
*** BEA/HAVER, 2009

largest Employers
Noranda USA Inc.

400 †

McKenzie Medical Center

300 †

Bethel University

300 † †

Baptist Memorial Hospital

230 †

Carroll County Government

192 † †

Republic Doors & Frames

150 †

†		Self-reported
† †		SOURCE: Carroll County Chamber of Commerce

turned his sights on a city downtown he
describes as “dead on the vine” at the time.
Characteristically, he proposed an imaginative remedy: a performing arts center.
To realize his dream, the city bought
and tore down a strip of vacant buildings
taking up one side of its courthouse square
and in their place erected the Dixie Carter
Performing Arts and Academic Enrichment Center. Opened in 2005, the center
is named for the actress known for playing
Julia Sugarbaker in television’s “Designing
Women” series. In Huntingdon, she’s also
known as a hometown-girl-made-good and
a high school classmate of Kelley’s. Carter
supported the project, which includes a
two-story, 471-seat theater named for her
husband, actor Hal Holbrook, who helped
design it.
The Dixie, as locals call it, presents
professional performances nearly every
other weekend. Highlights of the 2011-2012
season have included sold-out appearances
by Pat Boone, an Eagles tribute band and
country singer-songwriter “Whispering”
Bill Anderson. The center is home to local
theater groups and offers dance, pottery and
music classes for children and adults.
The city got a $1 million state grant
toward the project’s total cost of $3 million.
Additional contributions have reduced the
city’s debt to under $1 million, and fundraising continues, Kelley says. The city also
makes up any deficit in the center’s approximately $1 million-a-year operating budget.
Yet, the center has already paid for itself,
he says. “Its impact on downtown Huntingdon has been dramatic.”
All of the courthouse square buildings are
full now, their facades postcard-pretty, and
business has perked up on the side streets, as
well. The revitalized downtown, catalyzed
by the Dixie, has enhanced the city’s livability, image and sales tax revenue, Kelley says.
Michael E. Cary, president of Carroll
Bank & Trust, counts the lake and the Dixie
as major steps forward for a county where
the unemployment rate spiked at 18 percent
during the last recession. Although the
rate has been trending down since, Cary
says the area remains in a “semirecessed
state,” unemployment its biggest economic
challenge.
Mike Taylor, president of Republic Doors
& Frames, agrees. His company, maker of

Top: The Dixie, formally known as the Dixie Carter
Performing Arts and Academic Enrichment Center, opened
in 2005 and is given credit for reviving Huntingdon’s
downtown. The city got a $1 million state grant for the
$3 million project, and fund-raising continues to pay for
the rest. The city also makes up any deficit in the center’s
approximately $1 million-a-year operating budget.
Middle: Before the Dixie, downtown was “dead on
the vine,” according to Mayor Dale Kelley. But the Dixie
sparked a movement, and now all of the buildings on the
courthouse square, as well as many on side streets, are
occupied. Many have also been renovated, as were these
on the left.
Bottom: At Republic Doors & Frames, Norman Burnham
welds hardware reinforcements into a steel door frame.
Employment at the company is down to 150 from 286 just
three years ago. Mike Taylor, the company’s president, has
yet to see an upturn on the horizon. Unemployment in the
area is down from 18 percent during the recession, but the
rate is still high—12 percent.
PHOTOs by Susan C. Thomson

The Regional Economist | www.stlouisfed.org 17

c o mm u n i ty

p r o f i l e

Burned by Loss
of Manufacturing,
Rural County Vows To Diversify

Work is almost done on the new man-made lake.
PHOTO © Brian marsh

By Susan C. Thomson

S

ometime this summer, a man-made,
1,000-acre recreational lake is due to
open to the public in Carroll County, Tenn.
The new lake is a $22.5 million public
investment in the tourism potential of a
rural county that seeks economic development and diversification.
As recently as the mid-1990s, one of every
five county jobs was in the apparel industry,
says Brad Hurley, president of the Carroll
County Chamber of Commerce, which
doubles as the county’s economic development arm. Factories making shirts, pajamas
and jeans employed people by the hundreds.
By 2000, after a cascade of plant closings, all
of those jobs had vanished.
As the industry was folding, county leaders made a vow. “What we did was say: ‘We
never want that to happen again. We don’t
ever want to be dominated by one area of
the economy,’ ” Hurley says.
The time was right for a hard new look at
16 The Regional Economist | April 2012

a bold idea first floated in the 1970s: Dam a
local creek to make a lake. A plan to do so
had made it through the Tennessee House
of Representatives in 1984 but failed to get
necessary environmental approvals.
By 2000, the county had come up with a
new, more environmentally sensitive plan
for a different creek, and that year county
voters narrowly approved a $10-a-year
vehicle tax to go toward lake construction. Then came years to secure all of the
permits and to survey, buy and clear the
land. In 2008, construction started, with
the centerpiece—a 2,400-foot-long, 60-foothigh dam. By this past spring, the big hole
had been pumped full of water and stocked
with fish.
The lake is three miles south of Huntingdon, Carroll County’s seat, where Dale Kelley is mayor. Widely viewed in the county
as a visionary, he had long been the lake’s
No. 1 champion. Taking office in 1992, he

Huntingdon/Carroll County, Tenn.
by the numbers
		
Population

City | County

3,985 |

28,518*

Labor Force

NA |

13,448**

Unemployment Rate

NA |

12%**

Per Capita Personal Income

NA | $25,680***

* U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 census
** BLS/HAVER, December 2011, seasonally adjusted
*** BEA/HAVER, 2009

largest Employers
Noranda USA Inc.

400 †

McKenzie Medical Center

300 †

Bethel University

300 † †

Baptist Memorial Hospital

230 †

Carroll County Government

192 † †

Republic Doors & Frames

150 †

†		Self-reported
† †		SOURCE: Carroll County Chamber of Commerce

turned his sights on a city downtown he
describes as “dead on the vine” at the time.
Characteristically, he proposed an imaginative remedy: a performing arts center.
To realize his dream, the city bought
and tore down a strip of vacant buildings
taking up one side of its courthouse square
and in their place erected the Dixie Carter
Performing Arts and Academic Enrichment Center. Opened in 2005, the center
is named for the actress known for playing
Julia Sugarbaker in television’s “Designing
Women” series. In Huntingdon, she’s also
known as a hometown-girl-made-good and
a high school classmate of Kelley’s. Carter
supported the project, which includes a
two-story, 471-seat theater named for her
husband, actor Hal Holbrook, who helped
design it.
The Dixie, as locals call it, presents
professional performances nearly every
other weekend. Highlights of the 2011-2012
season have included sold-out appearances
by Pat Boone, an Eagles tribute band and
country singer-songwriter “Whispering”
Bill Anderson. The center is home to local
theater groups and offers dance, pottery and
music classes for children and adults.
The city got a $1 million state grant
toward the project’s total cost of $3 million.
Additional contributions have reduced the
city’s debt to under $1 million, and fundraising continues, Kelley says. The city also
makes up any deficit in the center’s approximately $1 million-a-year operating budget.
Yet, the center has already paid for itself,
he says. “Its impact on downtown Huntingdon has been dramatic.”
All of the courthouse square buildings are
full now, their facades postcard-pretty, and
business has perked up on the side streets, as
well. The revitalized downtown, catalyzed
by the Dixie, has enhanced the city’s livability, image and sales tax revenue, Kelley says.
Michael E. Cary, president of Carroll
Bank & Trust, counts the lake and the Dixie
as major steps forward for a county where
the unemployment rate spiked at 18 percent
during the last recession. Although the
rate has been trending down since, Cary
says the area remains in a “semirecessed
state,” unemployment its biggest economic
challenge.
Mike Taylor, president of Republic Doors
& Frames, agrees. His company, maker of

Top: The Dixie, formally known as the Dixie Carter
Performing Arts and Academic Enrichment Center, opened
in 2005 and is given credit for reviving Huntingdon’s
downtown. The city got a $1 million state grant for the
$3 million project, and fund-raising continues to pay for
the rest. The city also makes up any deficit in the center’s
approximately $1 million-a-year operating budget.
Middle: Before the Dixie, downtown was “dead on
the vine,” according to Mayor Dale Kelley. But the Dixie
sparked a movement, and now all of the buildings on the
courthouse square, as well as many on side streets, are
occupied. Many have also been renovated, as were these
on the left.
Bottom: At Republic Doors & Frames, Norman Burnham
welds hardware reinforcements into a steel door frame.
Employment at the company is down to 150 from 286 just
three years ago. Mike Taylor, the company’s president, has
yet to see an upturn on the horizon. Unemployment in the
area is down from 18 percent during the recession, but the
rate is still high—12 percent.
PHOTOs by Susan C. Thomson

The Regional Economist | www.stlouisfed.org 17

e c o n o my

“I think at first the lake is going to be a
challenge. But when it gets filled and
everyone hears about it, you’re going
to get a boost for the area, not just this
community.”
—Ryan Dyer, owner of Mallard’s
Restaurant, just off the square in
Huntingdon

“Health care has really grown here. … A
lot of it is the aging of the population, and
this is sort of a retirement area. I think
it’s nice to live in a community that people
would want to retire in.”
—Rita Foster, director of home care,
hospice, rehab, occupational health and
community service, Baptist Memorial
Hospital, Huntingdon
18 The Regional Economist | April 2012

reinforced security doors for commercial
and institutional uses, enjoyed its busiest
and most profitable year in 2008, he says.
A year later, when the market for the company’s products dropped 40 percent, the
company slashed its local workforce of 286;
it’s now down to 150. He is not yet foreseeing an upturn.
According to the Chamber of Commerce,
more people leave than come to Carroll
County for work. So, its unemployment rate
is, to some extent, a function of a continuing
series of plant closings in recent years in
contiguous counties.
Amid the many shutdowns, Noranda
remains the standout exception. The
nationwide aluminum company gained a
foothold in Huntingdon in 1979 when it
bought an existing plant. In 2000, with
assists from state grants, state tax credits and local property tax concessions, it
opened a $240 million, state-of-the-art
plant on the same site.
The two-plant operation turns molten
metal into thin, miles-long sheets and ships
them out as rolls weighing tons. Late last
year, the company announced that it was
studying the feasibility of adding a $40 million, 40,000-square-foot recycling center
to the complex. It would create 30 jobs,
company officials say.

PHOTO by Susan C. Thomson

As manufacturing has shrunk as a share
of Carroll County’s economy, some of the
resulting employment slack has been taken
up by health care and higher education.
Enrollment at Bethel University, sponsored
by the Cumberland Presbyterian Church,
soared 128 percent to 2,975 students from
2004 to 2009, according to The Chronicle
of Higher Education. The count includes
students studying toward a growing array
of online bachelor’s and master’s degrees,
at the university’s various other Tennessee locations and on its home campus in
McKenzie, Carroll County’s largest city, a
dozen miles north of Huntingdon.
That campus, with 800 students now,
includes a science building and three residence halls, all built in the last several years.
A new 126,000-square-foot student center
with a cafeteria, gymnasium and chapel is
under construction.

Susan C. Thomson is a freelance writer and
photographer.

8
4
PERCENT

2
0
–2
–4
–6
–8
–10

Q4
06

07

08

09

10

PERCENT CHANGE FROM A YEAR EARLIER

6

6

11

CPI–All Items
All Items Less Food and Energy

3

0

February

–3

07

08

09

10

11

12

NOTE: Each bar is a one-quarter growth rate (annualized);
the red line is the 10-year growth rate.

I N FLATI O N - I N D E X E D TREA S UR Y Y IEL D S P REA D S

RATES ON FEDERAL FUNDS FUTURES ON SELECTED DATES

.16

11/02/11

01/24/12

12/13/11

03/13/12

.15
.14
PERCENT

3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
–0.5
–1.0
–1.5
–2.0
–2.5

5-Year

March 16, 2012

09

10

.12

.10

20-Year

08

.13

.11

10-Year

11

.09

12

March 12 April 12 May 12 June 12 July 12 Aug. 12
CONTRACT MONTHS

NOTE: Weekly data.

C I V ILIA N U N E M P L O Y M E N T RATE

I N TERE S T RATE S

11

6

10

5

10-Year Treasury
Fed Funds Target

9

4

8

PERCENT

Bottom: Bethel University, in nearby McKenzie, has seen a building boom in the past couple of years.
The boost in students and employees has helped to counteract the decline of manufacturing in the area.

C O N S U M ER P RI C E I N D E X

7

1-Year Treasury

1

5
4

3
2

6

February

07

08

09

10

11

February

0

12

07

08

09

10

11

12

NOTE: On Dec. 16, 2008, the FOMC set a target range for
the federal funds rate of 0 to 0.25 percent. The observations
plotted since then are the midpoint of the range (0.125 percent).

U . S . AGRI C ULTURAL TRA D E

FAR M I N G C A S H RE C EI P T S

90

230
210

75
Exports

BILLIONS OF DOLLARS

Top: Noranda, a nationwide aluminum company, is bucking the trend of a decline in manufacturing. It operates two plants in
Huntingdon, employing a total of 400 people, making it the largest employer. The rolling mill (above) has the lowest conversion
cost (excluding metal) for foil stock production in North and South America, according to the company.

g l a n c e

REAL G D P GR O W T H

PERCENT

PHOTO © Noranda aluminum holding corp.

a

Eleven more charts are available on the web version of this issue. Among the areas they cover are agriculture, commercial
banking, housing permits, income and jobs. Much of the data is specific to the Eighth District. To see these charts, go to
stlouisfed.org/economyataglance

PERCENT

“The challenge ahead of us is bringing
in more industry. We have a great
foundation in Noranda. ... We need some
good jobs. The greatest need here now is
employment.”
—Fred Ward, pastor,
First Baptist Church, Huntingdon

The county’s robust health-care sector is
visible in dozens of medical offices, clinics
and agencies, many clustered around its two
hospitals, Baptist Memorial in Huntingdon
and McKenzie Regional in McKenzie, both of
which have been expanding services. The latter’s neighbors include the McKenzie Medical
Center, a one-stop primary care clinic with a
pharmacy, labs and 30 providers, including
physicians, nurse practitioners and physician
assistants. A 40,000-square-foot addition
that was finished last year more than doubled
the center’s space; the addition made room
for more specialists and diagnostic services
and includes a sleep lab, new administrative
offices and an open-sided MRI.
Hurley says 1,450, or 12 percent, of county
jobs are in health care today. The sector
has grown significantly but not to a point of
dominance, and the county’s economy has
grown more diversified than before, he says.
He describes his job of making sure it stays
that way as something of a juggling act.
“You need to take all of these balls and
keep them up in the air,” he says.
One of those is manufacturing. Hurley
says his office is doing everything possible to
attract tenants to the county’s four industrial
parks. Although the competition is tough,
it’s “a process that we have to continue
because manufacturing jobs pay so well,”
he says.
The lake is yet another ball.
With 22 miles of jagged shoreline and an
average depth of 20 feet, it will be the largest
man-made lake in western Tennessee. Its
location—25 miles north of Interstate 40, a
two-hour drive northeast from Memphis or
west from Nashville—makes it “very marketable within 250 miles,” Hurley says.
The lake will open with two beaches and
a boat launch. Fishing is expected to be a
big draw, but that won’t start until its stocks
reach catchable size, next year at the earliest.
Residential and commercial development is
seen as following in good time, generating
jobs and tax dollars.
“At the end of five years, you’ll be able to
see firsthand the growth and real potential
of the lake,” Hurley says.

BILLIONS OF DOLLARS

Carroll County Voices

a t

60
Imports

45
30
15
0

Trade Balance

07

08

09

10

11

NOTE: Data are aggregated over the past 12 months.

190
170
150
130
110

January

12

90

07

Crops

Livestock

08

09

January

10

11

12

NOTE: Data are aggregated over the past 12 months.
The Regional Economist | www.stlouisfed.org 19

e c o n o my

“I think at first the lake is going to be a
challenge. But when it gets filled and
everyone hears about it, you’re going
to get a boost for the area, not just this
community.”
—Ryan Dyer, owner of Mallard’s
Restaurant, just off the square in
Huntingdon

“Health care has really grown here. … A
lot of it is the aging of the population, and
this is sort of a retirement area. I think
it’s nice to live in a community that people
would want to retire in.”
—Rita Foster, director of home care,
hospice, rehab, occupational health and
community service, Baptist Memorial
Hospital, Huntingdon
18 The Regional Economist | April 2012

reinforced security doors for commercial
and institutional uses, enjoyed its busiest
and most profitable year in 2008, he says.
A year later, when the market for the company’s products dropped 40 percent, the
company slashed its local workforce of 286;
it’s now down to 150. He is not yet foreseeing an upturn.
According to the Chamber of Commerce,
more people leave than come to Carroll
County for work. So, its unemployment rate
is, to some extent, a function of a continuing
series of plant closings in recent years in
contiguous counties.
Amid the many shutdowns, Noranda
remains the standout exception. The
nationwide aluminum company gained a
foothold in Huntingdon in 1979 when it
bought an existing plant. In 2000, with
assists from state grants, state tax credits and local property tax concessions, it
opened a $240 million, state-of-the-art
plant on the same site.
The two-plant operation turns molten
metal into thin, miles-long sheets and ships
them out as rolls weighing tons. Late last
year, the company announced that it was
studying the feasibility of adding a $40 million, 40,000-square-foot recycling center
to the complex. It would create 30 jobs,
company officials say.

PHOTO by Susan C. Thomson

As manufacturing has shrunk as a share
of Carroll County’s economy, some of the
resulting employment slack has been taken
up by health care and higher education.
Enrollment at Bethel University, sponsored
by the Cumberland Presbyterian Church,
soared 128 percent to 2,975 students from
2004 to 2009, according to The Chronicle
of Higher Education. The count includes
students studying toward a growing array
of online bachelor’s and master’s degrees,
at the university’s various other Tennessee locations and on its home campus in
McKenzie, Carroll County’s largest city, a
dozen miles north of Huntingdon.
That campus, with 800 students now,
includes a science building and three residence halls, all built in the last several years.
A new 126,000-square-foot student center
with a cafeteria, gymnasium and chapel is
under construction.

Susan C. Thomson is a freelance writer and
photographer.

8
4
PERCENT

2
0
–2
–4
–6
–8
–10

Q4
06

07

08

09

10

PERCENT CHANGE FROM A YEAR EARLIER

6

6

11

CPI–All Items
All Items Less Food and Energy

3

0

February

–3

07

08

09

10

11

12

NOTE: Each bar is a one-quarter growth rate (annualized);
the red line is the 10-year growth rate.

I N FLATI O N - I N D E X E D TREA S UR Y Y IEL D S P REA D S

RATES ON FEDERAL FUNDS FUTURES ON SELECTED DATES

.16

11/02/11

01/24/12

12/13/11

03/13/12

.15
.14
PERCENT

3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
–0.5
–1.0
–1.5
–2.0
–2.5

5-Year

March 16, 2012

09

10

.12

.10

20-Year

08

.13

.11

10-Year

11

.09

12

March 12 April 12 May 12 June 12 July 12 Aug. 12
CONTRACT MONTHS

NOTE: Weekly data.

C I V ILIA N U N E M P L O Y M E N T RATE

I N TERE S T RATE S

11

6

10

5

10-Year Treasury
Fed Funds Target

9

4

8

PERCENT

Bottom: Bethel University, in nearby McKenzie, has seen a building boom in the past couple of years.
The boost in students and employees has helped to counteract the decline of manufacturing in the area.

C O N S U M ER P RI C E I N D E X

7

1-Year Treasury

1

5
4

3
2

6

February

07

08

09

10

11

February

0

12

07

08

09

10

11

12

NOTE: On Dec. 16, 2008, the FOMC set a target range for
the federal funds rate of 0 to 0.25 percent. The observations
plotted since then are the midpoint of the range (0.125 percent).

U . S . AGRI C ULTURAL TRA D E

FAR M I N G C A S H RE C EI P T S

90

230
210

75
Exports

BILLIONS OF DOLLARS

Top: Noranda, a nationwide aluminum company, is bucking the trend of a decline in manufacturing. It operates two plants in
Huntingdon, employing a total of 400 people, making it the largest employer. The rolling mill (above) has the lowest conversion
cost (excluding metal) for foil stock production in North and South America, according to the company.

g l a n c e

REAL G D P GR O W T H

PERCENT

PHOTO © Noranda aluminum holding corp.

a

Eleven more charts are available on the web version of this issue. Among the areas they cover are agriculture, commercial
banking, housing permits, income and jobs. Much of the data is specific to the Eighth District. To see these charts, go to
stlouisfed.org/economyataglance

PERCENT

“The challenge ahead of us is bringing
in more industry. We have a great
foundation in Noranda. ... We need some
good jobs. The greatest need here now is
employment.”
—Fred Ward, pastor,
First Baptist Church, Huntingdon

The county’s robust health-care sector is
visible in dozens of medical offices, clinics
and agencies, many clustered around its two
hospitals, Baptist Memorial in Huntingdon
and McKenzie Regional in McKenzie, both of
which have been expanding services. The latter’s neighbors include the McKenzie Medical
Center, a one-stop primary care clinic with a
pharmacy, labs and 30 providers, including
physicians, nurse practitioners and physician
assistants. A 40,000-square-foot addition
that was finished last year more than doubled
the center’s space; the addition made room
for more specialists and diagnostic services
and includes a sleep lab, new administrative
offices and an open-sided MRI.
Hurley says 1,450, or 12 percent, of county
jobs are in health care today. The sector
has grown significantly but not to a point of
dominance, and the county’s economy has
grown more diversified than before, he says.
He describes his job of making sure it stays
that way as something of a juggling act.
“You need to take all of these balls and
keep them up in the air,” he says.
One of those is manufacturing. Hurley
says his office is doing everything possible to
attract tenants to the county’s four industrial
parks. Although the competition is tough,
it’s “a process that we have to continue
because manufacturing jobs pay so well,”
he says.
The lake is yet another ball.
With 22 miles of jagged shoreline and an
average depth of 20 feet, it will be the largest
man-made lake in western Tennessee. Its
location—25 miles north of Interstate 40, a
two-hour drive northeast from Memphis or
west from Nashville—makes it “very marketable within 250 miles,” Hurley says.
The lake will open with two beaches and
a boat launch. Fishing is expected to be a
big draw, but that won’t start until its stocks
reach catchable size, next year at the earliest.
Residential and commercial development is
seen as following in good time, generating
jobs and tax dollars.
“At the end of five years, you’ll be able to
see firsthand the growth and real potential
of the lake,” Hurley says.

BILLIONS OF DOLLARS

Carroll County Voices

a t

60
Imports

45
30
15
0

Trade Balance

07

08

09

10

11

NOTE: Data are aggregated over the past 12 months.

190
170
150
130
110

January

12

90

07

Crops

Livestock

08

09

January

10

11

12

NOTE: Data are aggregated over the past 12 months.
The Regional Economist | www.stlouisfed.org 19

d i s t r i c t

o v e r v i e w
FIGURE 1

ENDNOTES

Credit Reallocation: Nation and District
30
25

Eighth District

3

U.S.

5

4

The Eighth Federal Reserve District
is composed of four zones, each of
which is centered around one of
the four main cities: Little Rock,
Louisville, Memphis and St. Louis.

6

15

7

10

R EFE R ENCES

0

Haltiwanger, John. “Job Creation and Firm
Dynamics in the U.S.” Unpublished manuscript, May 2011. See http://econweb.umd.
edu/~haltiwan/c12451.pdf
Herrera, Ana M.; Kolar, Marek; and Minetti,
Raoul. “Credit Reallocation,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 58, 2011, pp. 551-63.
See www.clas.wayne.edu/multimedia/
usercontent/File/herrera/HKM_JME.pdf
Jayaratne, Jith; and Strahan, Philip E. “The
Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence from Bank
Branch Deregulation.” The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, Vol. 111, No. 3, 1996, pp. 639-70.
See www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2946668.pdf
Liborio, Constanza S.; and Sánchez, Juan M.
“Employment Dynamics during Economic
Recoveries.” Economic Synopses, Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, January 2012a. See
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/es/
article/9108
Liborio, Constanza S.; and Sánchez, Juan M.
“Starting a Business during a Recovery: This
Time, It’s Different.” The Regional Economist,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, January
2012b. See www.stlouisfed.org/publications/
re/articles/?id=2195

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from Standard and Poor’s Compustat data.

20 The Regional Economist | April 2012

Credit creation is the sum of
debt of firms with rising debt
plus debt of newborn firms.
Credit destruction is the sum
of debt of firms with shrinking
debt plus the debt of closing
firms. Credit reallocation,
instead, is the sum of credit
creation and destruction.
debt of firms with rising debt plus debt of
newborn firms. Credit destruction is the
sum of debt of firms with shrinking debt
plus the debt of closing firms. Credit reallocation, instead, is the sum of credit creation
and destruction. To illustrate, imagine an
economy with only two firms. If one firm
increases its debt from $75 to $125 and
another firm decreases its debt from $125
to $75, the net change in total debt would
be $0. However, credit reallocation would
be $100 (or 50 percent when calculated as in
Herrera et al.). The analysis hereafter will
focus on the reallocation of total debt.

Credit reallocation is computed at the
national and Eighth District levels using
Standard and Poor’s Compustat. The measure of debt considered, total debt, is defined
as total liabilities. The sample size for the
nation is 21,493 companies, including
Wal-Mart, Exxon Mobil, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, General Electric and General
Motors. The sample for the District includes
only 68 firms headquartered within the
Eighth District boundaries. Among them
are Wal-Mart, International Paper, FedEx,
Emerson, Tyson Foods and Murphy Oil.
The strength of economic activity is usually
reflected by high reallocation of credit. Figure 1
shows the evolution of reallocation during
the past 30 years.6 For each economic cycle
since 1982, the maximum growth of reallocation is reached just before or shortly after the
beginning of the recession. Specifically, credit
reallocation peaked in the U.S. at rates of
19 percent, 17 percent and 16 percent in 1988,
2000 and 2007, respectively. The same pattern is depicted in the Eighth District, where
credit reallocation rates reached 25 percent,
21 percent and 13 percent in 1990, 2000 and
2006, respectively.7 During the latest economic downturn, the rate of credit reallocation in the nation decreased by roughly
one-third, while for the District the drop was
even higher, declining to half of the prerecession level. This pattern is similar to what happened around the previous two recessions.
Figure 2 decomposes reallocation into
credit creation and destruction from 2006

credit reallocation was significantly lower
than in 2008-2009—a decrease of roughly
48 percent—due to very low levels of both
credit creation and destruction. While credit
creation decreased by 44 percent, credit
destruction decreased by 55 percent in the
District during this period.
The evidence above suggests that by
the end of 2010 credit markets had not yet
recovered to prerecession levels of dynamism,
as measured by reallocation of credit among
firms in the nation and the Eighth District.
This trend, together with evidence of weak
reallocation of employment and sluggish
startup activity, seems to indicate that economic activity as of the end of 2010 had not
yet recovered its previous strength.
Juan M. Sánchez is an economist and Constanza S. Liborio is a research associate, both
at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. See
http://research.stlouisfed.org/econ/sanchez/
for more on Sánchez’s work.

FIGURE 2
Average Annual Credit Creation

Average Annual Credit Destruction
8

15

20

U.S.

U.S.
District

Average Annual Credit Reallocation

District

6

U.S.
District

15

10

5

0

PERCENT

economic growth by improving the allocation of capital.4
To understand the definition of credit
reallocation, we need to introduce two
related concepts: credit creation and
destruction.5 Credit creation is the sum of

through 2010. The far left panel of the figure
displays average annual levels of credit
creation for three periods: 2006-2007 (the
economic peak before the Great Recession),
2008-2009 (a period affected by the Great
Recession) and 2010 (a period of economic
recovery). Blue and red bars represent credit
creation in the nation and the District,
respectively. The middle and far right panels display the same information for credit
destruction and credit reallocation.
The weakness of credit reallocation experienced since the latest recession started is
evident in the nation and the District. At the
national level, creation of credit increased in
2010 to 7 percent but was far from its prerecession level. In contrast, credit destruction
appears to have experienced a declining
trend: Destruction of credit was 8 percent in
2006 and 4 percent in 2010.
Firms headquartered in the Eighth District
also experienced a negative trend in credit
reallocation despite the increase in credit
destruction during the recession. In 2010,

PERCENT

As stated by University of Maryland
economics professor John Haltiwanger, the
sorting of successful business endeavors from
unsuccessful ones is a central and necessary part of our market economy, and it is
essential that the public and policymakers
understand this process.1
Our previous studies show that the reallocation of employment has been low in the
current recovery compared with what happened in past recoveries.2 Business Employment Dynamics data from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics reveal that employment
turnover was significantly lower following
the Great Recession than following the
former two recessions, in 2001 and 1990. The
same trend appears in the creation of startups.3 By the first quarter of 2010, business
closings declined to prerecession levels for
both the nation and the Eighth District, but
business formations were slower to recover.
Although these studies analyze the behavior of the labor market and small firms
(those entering and exiting), little is known
about reallocation of resources among
larger, more-established firms. This article
concentrates on credit flows among publicly
traded firms at the national level and also
examines a sample of firms headquartered
in the Eighth District. Studying the reallocation of financial resources (e.g., credit)
is important: Economists Jith Jayaratne and
Philip Strahan argued in their 1996 study
that the intrastate branching reform in the
United States played an important role in

NOTE: Time series were smoothed using a two-period moving average process. Shaded areas are years in which at least part of a recession was
experienced, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).

PERCENT

ach year, while thousands of businesses grow and succeed, many others weaken and shut
down. These dynamics, in turn, are reflected in the flow of factors of production (i.e., labor
and capital) that are constantly being reallocated among businesses.

See Haltiwanger.
See Liborio and Sánchez, 2012a.
See Liborio and Sánchez, 2012b.
See Jayaratne and Strahan.
This article follows the methodology in
Herrera et al.
The time series displayed was smoothed using
a two-period moving average process.
District statistics display higher volatility due
to their smaller sample size.

5
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

By Constanza S. Liborio and Juan M. Sánchez

2

20
PERCENT

Reallocation of Credit,
a Measure of Financial Activity,
Has Yet To Bounce Back

1

4
2

2006-2007

2008-2009

2010

0

10
5

2006-2007

2008-2009

2010

0

2006-2007

2008-2009

2010

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from Standard and Poor’s Compustat data.
The Regional Economist | www.stlouisfed.org 21

d i s t r i c t

o v e r v i e w
FIGURE 1

ENDNOTES

Credit Reallocation: Nation and District
30
25

Eighth District

3

U.S.

5

4

The Eighth Federal Reserve District
is composed of four zones, each of
which is centered around one of
the four main cities: Little Rock,
Louisville, Memphis and St. Louis.

6

15

7

10

R EFE R ENCES

0

Haltiwanger, John. “Job Creation and Firm
Dynamics in the U.S.” Unpublished manuscript, May 2011. See http://econweb.umd.
edu/~haltiwan/c12451.pdf
Herrera, Ana M.; Kolar, Marek; and Minetti,
Raoul. “Credit Reallocation,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 58, 2011, pp. 551-63.
See www.clas.wayne.edu/multimedia/
usercontent/File/herrera/HKM_JME.pdf
Jayaratne, Jith; and Strahan, Philip E. “The
Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence from Bank
Branch Deregulation.” The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, Vol. 111, No. 3, 1996, pp. 639-70.
See www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2946668.pdf
Liborio, Constanza S.; and Sánchez, Juan M.
“Employment Dynamics during Economic
Recoveries.” Economic Synopses, Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, January 2012a. See
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/es/
article/9108
Liborio, Constanza S.; and Sánchez, Juan M.
“Starting a Business during a Recovery: This
Time, It’s Different.” The Regional Economist,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, January
2012b. See www.stlouisfed.org/publications/
re/articles/?id=2195

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from Standard and Poor’s Compustat data.

20 The Regional Economist | April 2012

Credit creation is the sum of
debt of firms with rising debt
plus debt of newborn firms.
Credit destruction is the sum
of debt of firms with shrinking
debt plus the debt of closing
firms. Credit reallocation,
instead, is the sum of credit
creation and destruction.
debt of firms with rising debt plus debt of
newborn firms. Credit destruction is the
sum of debt of firms with shrinking debt
plus the debt of closing firms. Credit reallocation, instead, is the sum of credit creation
and destruction. To illustrate, imagine an
economy with only two firms. If one firm
increases its debt from $75 to $125 and
another firm decreases its debt from $125
to $75, the net change in total debt would
be $0. However, credit reallocation would
be $100 (or 50 percent when calculated as in
Herrera et al.). The analysis hereafter will
focus on the reallocation of total debt.

Credit reallocation is computed at the
national and Eighth District levels using
Standard and Poor’s Compustat. The measure of debt considered, total debt, is defined
as total liabilities. The sample size for the
nation is 21,493 companies, including
Wal-Mart, Exxon Mobil, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, General Electric and General
Motors. The sample for the District includes
only 68 firms headquartered within the
Eighth District boundaries. Among them
are Wal-Mart, International Paper, FedEx,
Emerson, Tyson Foods and Murphy Oil.
The strength of economic activity is usually
reflected by high reallocation of credit. Figure 1
shows the evolution of reallocation during
the past 30 years.6 For each economic cycle
since 1982, the maximum growth of reallocation is reached just before or shortly after the
beginning of the recession. Specifically, credit
reallocation peaked in the U.S. at rates of
19 percent, 17 percent and 16 percent in 1988,
2000 and 2007, respectively. The same pattern is depicted in the Eighth District, where
credit reallocation rates reached 25 percent,
21 percent and 13 percent in 1990, 2000 and
2006, respectively.7 During the latest economic downturn, the rate of credit reallocation in the nation decreased by roughly
one-third, while for the District the drop was
even higher, declining to half of the prerecession level. This pattern is similar to what happened around the previous two recessions.
Figure 2 decomposes reallocation into
credit creation and destruction from 2006

credit reallocation was significantly lower
than in 2008-2009—a decrease of roughly
48 percent—due to very low levels of both
credit creation and destruction. While credit
creation decreased by 44 percent, credit
destruction decreased by 55 percent in the
District during this period.
The evidence above suggests that by
the end of 2010 credit markets had not yet
recovered to prerecession levels of dynamism,
as measured by reallocation of credit among
firms in the nation and the Eighth District.
This trend, together with evidence of weak
reallocation of employment and sluggish
startup activity, seems to indicate that economic activity as of the end of 2010 had not
yet recovered its previous strength.
Juan M. Sánchez is an economist and Constanza S. Liborio is a research associate, both
at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. See
http://research.stlouisfed.org/econ/sanchez/
for more on Sánchez’s work.

FIGURE 2
Average Annual Credit Creation

Average Annual Credit Destruction
8

15

20

U.S.

U.S.
District

Average Annual Credit Reallocation

District

6

U.S.
District

15

10

5

0

PERCENT

economic growth by improving the allocation of capital.4
To understand the definition of credit
reallocation, we need to introduce two
related concepts: credit creation and
destruction.5 Credit creation is the sum of

through 2010. The far left panel of the figure
displays average annual levels of credit
creation for three periods: 2006-2007 (the
economic peak before the Great Recession),
2008-2009 (a period affected by the Great
Recession) and 2010 (a period of economic
recovery). Blue and red bars represent credit
creation in the nation and the District,
respectively. The middle and far right panels display the same information for credit
destruction and credit reallocation.
The weakness of credit reallocation experienced since the latest recession started is
evident in the nation and the District. At the
national level, creation of credit increased in
2010 to 7 percent but was far from its prerecession level. In contrast, credit destruction
appears to have experienced a declining
trend: Destruction of credit was 8 percent in
2006 and 4 percent in 2010.
Firms headquartered in the Eighth District
also experienced a negative trend in credit
reallocation despite the increase in credit
destruction during the recession. In 2010,

PERCENT

As stated by University of Maryland
economics professor John Haltiwanger, the
sorting of successful business endeavors from
unsuccessful ones is a central and necessary part of our market economy, and it is
essential that the public and policymakers
understand this process.1
Our previous studies show that the reallocation of employment has been low in the
current recovery compared with what happened in past recoveries.2 Business Employment Dynamics data from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics reveal that employment
turnover was significantly lower following
the Great Recession than following the
former two recessions, in 2001 and 1990. The
same trend appears in the creation of startups.3 By the first quarter of 2010, business
closings declined to prerecession levels for
both the nation and the Eighth District, but
business formations were slower to recover.
Although these studies analyze the behavior of the labor market and small firms
(those entering and exiting), little is known
about reallocation of resources among
larger, more-established firms. This article
concentrates on credit flows among publicly
traded firms at the national level and also
examines a sample of firms headquartered
in the Eighth District. Studying the reallocation of financial resources (e.g., credit)
is important: Economists Jith Jayaratne and
Philip Strahan argued in their 1996 study
that the intrastate branching reform in the
United States played an important role in

NOTE: Time series were smoothed using a two-period moving average process. Shaded areas are years in which at least part of a recession was
experienced, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).

PERCENT

ach year, while thousands of businesses grow and succeed, many others weaken and shut
down. These dynamics, in turn, are reflected in the flow of factors of production (i.e., labor
and capital) that are constantly being reallocated among businesses.

See Haltiwanger.
See Liborio and Sánchez, 2012a.
See Liborio and Sánchez, 2012b.
See Jayaratne and Strahan.
This article follows the methodology in
Herrera et al.
The time series displayed was smoothed using
a two-period moving average process.
District statistics display higher volatility due
to their smaller sample size.

5
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

By Constanza S. Liborio and Juan M. Sánchez

2

20
PERCENT

Reallocation of Credit,
a Measure of Financial Activity,
Has Yet To Bounce Back

1

4
2

2006-2007

2008-2009

2010

0

10
5

2006-2007

2008-2009

2010

0

2006-2007

2008-2009

2010

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from Standard and Poor’s Compustat data.
The Regional Economist | www.stlouisfed.org 21

n a t i o n a l

o v e r v i e w

READER

FOMC Economic Projections for 2012
10

8.7

The U.S. Economy
Should Strengthen
As Year Goes By
By Kevin L. Kliesen

T

he U.S. economy ended last year on a relatively strong note. Or did it? Although
real GDP rose during the fourth quarter of
2011 at a 3 percent annual rate, which was
the largest increase in a year and a half,
nearly two percentage points of this growth
stemmed from the production of final goods
that were not sold—that is, the value of goods
flowing into private nonfarm inventories
(hereafter, inventory investment) rather than
into the hands of households, businesses, the
government or foreign purchasers.
Increases in inventory investment, particularly if unplanned, are sometimes viewed as
a precursor to slower growth. If firms unwittingly produce too much relative to actual
sales, they then have an incentive to curtail
production until this excess inventory is
eliminated. Indeed, forecasters expect firms
to temper their production in the first quarter
of 2012 to better match the demand for their
product. Accordingly, the expected swing in
the growth of real inventory investment from
positive to negative from the fourth quarter
of last year to the first quarter of this year is
projected to account for about two-thirds of
the expected slowing in real GDP growth
in the first quarter (from a 3 percent rate to
about a 2 percent rate).
The professional forecasting community
believes that the economy will continue to
grow at a relatively subdued pace beyond
the first quarter of 2012. For example, the
consensus of Blue Chip forecasters projects
that real GDP growth will average 2.2 percent
during the first half of this year and 2.5
percent during the second half. A similar
survey, by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (Survey of Professional Forecasters),
shows slightly more optimism about the
22 The Regional Economist | April 2012

PERCENT

8

8.4

2012 Projection

6
4
2
0

2011 Actual

1.6

2.7

2.5

Real GDP Growth

1.6

Unemployment Rate

PCE Inflation

SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
NOTE: Projections are the midpoints of the central tendencies. The actual and projected unemployment rates are for the fourth quarter of the
indicated year. The growth of real GDP and PCE inflation (actual and projected) are percentage changes from the fourth quarter of the previous
year to the fourth quarter of the indicated year. PCE is personal consumption expenditures.

second half: 2.9 percent. (In comparison, real
GDP growth for 2011 was 1.6 percent.)
Dueling Narratives

The consensus forecast is for continued
modest, below-trend growth in 2012.
(Although difficult to know for sure, many
economists believe that the economy’s trend
rate of growth is about 2.75 percent.) The
supporting narrative goes something like
this: First, Europe’s growth has slowed
markedly in response to its sovereign debt
and banking crisis; indeed, Europe might be
in a recession today. The crisis has not only
elevated volatility in U.S. financial markets,
which often erodes investor and consumer
confidence, but also will likely lead to weaker
exports to Europe and countries elsewhere
with important linkages to Europe. Second,
the housing market remains relatively weak,
foreclosures are high, and state and local
governments are reducing their discretionary outlays in order to close budget deficits.
Finally, with households apparently still
determined to pay down debt and increase
their saving rate, consumption spending—
the largest component of real GDP—is likely
to grow at exceedingly modest rates. With
the unemployment rate expected to remain
above 8 percent at the end of this year,
inflation will slow to about 2 percent after
measuring 3 percent last year.
There is a countervailing narrative, equally
plausible, which points to stronger economic
conditions this year than the consensus
forecast. The first argument of this narrative is that the impact of any European
recession on the U.S. has been overblown.
This is because the volume of U.S. exports
to Canada, Mexico and Asia is much larger

E X CHANGE

ASK AN ECONOMIST

Letters to the Editor

Richard G. Anderson is an economist in the
Research division. He joined the Federal Reserve
Board staff in Washington, D.C., in 1988. He
transferred to the St. Louis Fed in late 1992.
He is a native Minnesotan with a bachelor’s
degree from the University of Minnesota and a
Ph.D. from MIT in Cambridge, Mass. He is also a
visiting professor in the Management School
at the University of Sheffield, Sheffield, U.K., and
is a member of that school’s international academic
advisory committee. His research interests
include applied econometrics, macroeconomics
and financial markets. Beyond economics, he has extensive background and experience in
information technology. For more on his work, see http://research.stlouisfed.org/econ/anderson/

This is in response to the President’s Message that appeared in the
January 2012 issue. The message, by President James Bullard, was
headlined “The Economic Recovery: America’s Investment Problem.”
Dear Editor:
The “falsification of the truth” as highlighted in Mr. Bullard’s letter is
point-on. This type of testimony shows great leadership as we begin
to establish the new “baseline” in our return to a normal state of
economic principles. In my opinion, this housing bubble and its
impact on the traditional banking industry have created a generation
of borrowers whose psychology will take us a generation to transform. The admitting to what has caused these problems is a great
first step in transforming our abilities to fix these housing issues. I

than the volume of exports to Europe—and
growth in those first three markets is much
faster than in Europe. Also, U.S. banks and
money market funds have greatly reduced
their exposure to Europe’s banking and financial system. Second, the U.S. stock market
is up strongly thus far in 2012, and measures
of financial stress (e.g., the St. Louis Financial
Stress Index) and economic uncertainty have
fallen sharply. Third, the unemployment rate
has fallen much faster than expected, and job
growth is strengthening. From September
2011 to February 2012, private-sector job
gains averaged nearly 215,000 per month.
These developments, combined with a housing affordability index at record-high levels,
should begin to trigger faster growth of home
sales. Indeed, housing construction and
homebuilder confidence are rebounding, and
the declines in house prices have slowed. By
some measures, house prices rose modestly
over the second half of 2011.

Q. On Jan. 25, the Federal Open Market Committee issued
a press release summarizing its “longer-run goals and
monetary policy strategy.” Chairman Ben Bernanke, in
his press conference on the same day, referred to 2 percent
inflation as an “inflation target.” Why did the FOMC set
an inflation target?

applaud Mr. Bullard for addressing this, and now it is up to each head

A. Setting a long-run inflation goal, or target, is an important element in achiev-

Fundamentals,” which appeared in the July 2011 issue.

ing the Federal Reserve’s mandate from Congress. Further, the FOMC has

Dear Editor:

behaved for a number of years as if a 2 percent long-run inflation rate was its

This was a good and very useful article. I referenced it in an article

target. The announcement removes any remaining doubts.

I’ve written for Business Economics. (Mr. Synnott’s article, “The Long

	Commentators sometimes incorrectly discuss the Federal Reserve as if it

Wave Revisited,” appears in the April issue of this National Associa-

were an independent fourth branch of government, similar to Congress, the

tion for Business Economics publication.) Thanks to the authors and

Supreme Court or the executive branch. It is not. The Federal Reserve was

The Regional Economist.

The Shadow of Rising Energy Prices

price controls. In the Employment Act of 1946, Congress charged the Federal

Admittedly, the risks to the outlook, while
receding, still appear higher than normal.
In this vein, one threat is rising energy and
gasoline prices, which usually exert a drag on
economic activity and raise inflation rates.
As yet, though, most forecasters and financial
market participants see little prospect of accelerating inflation over the near-term—despite
an extremely accommodative monetary policy
and large federal budget deficits. The FOMC
governors and presidents expect inflation to
average a little less than 2 percent in 2012.

Reserve with adopting policies to promote both maximum economic growth

Kevin L. Kliesen is an economist at the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. For more on his work,
see http://research.stlouisfed.org/econ/kliesen/

created by Congress in 1913, and Congress sets guidelines for the Federal
Reserve’s conduct of monetary policy.
	Prior to World War II, the Federal Reserve’s principal focus was on banking
and financial market stability, including providing additional money and credit
during economic expansions and assisting banks during financial panics.
As the war ended, Congress feared that high unemployment would follow
reductions in government spending and that inflation would follow the end of

of the household to begin to get their “financial” house in order, and
let’s return to the basics of consumer finance and to the new norm.
Rick Ocheltree, banking executive in Richmond, Va.

This is in response to “Commodity Price Gains: Speculation vs.

Thomas Synnott, adjunct professor of industrial engineering at
The Cooper Union in New York City
To read articles in past issues, see
www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/pastissues/
To write a letter to the editor online, go to
www.stlouisfed.org/re/letter
To send a letter through the mail, address it to
Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, editor, The Regional Economist,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Box 442, St. Louis, MO 63166.

and stable prices—the so-called dual mandate.
	Tension has often surrounded the dual mandate. The historical record suggests that policies to reduce unemployment may be ill-suited to periods of high
inflation and that policies to reduce inflation tend to slow aggregate demand
and increase unemployment. In its Jan. 25 announcement, the FOMC clarified
that its monetary policy is the primary determinant of the economy’s long-run
inflation rate. Because uncertainty regarding long-run inflation harms long-run

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stand how inflation and the cost of credit can affect your spending and

aspect of fulfilling the FOMC’s dual mandate from Congress.

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The Regional Economist | www.stlouisfed.org 23

n a t i o n a l

o v e r v i e w

READER

FOMC Economic Projections for 2012
10

8.7

The U.S. Economy
Should Strengthen
As Year Goes By
By Kevin L. Kliesen

T

he U.S. economy ended last year on a relatively strong note. Or did it? Although
real GDP rose during the fourth quarter of
2011 at a 3 percent annual rate, which was
the largest increase in a year and a half,
nearly two percentage points of this growth
stemmed from the production of final goods
that were not sold—that is, the value of goods
flowing into private nonfarm inventories
(hereafter, inventory investment) rather than
into the hands of households, businesses, the
government or foreign purchasers.
Increases in inventory investment, particularly if unplanned, are sometimes viewed as
a precursor to slower growth. If firms unwittingly produce too much relative to actual
sales, they then have an incentive to curtail
production until this excess inventory is
eliminated. Indeed, forecasters expect firms
to temper their production in the first quarter
of 2012 to better match the demand for their
product. Accordingly, the expected swing in
the growth of real inventory investment from
positive to negative from the fourth quarter
of last year to the first quarter of this year is
projected to account for about two-thirds of
the expected slowing in real GDP growth
in the first quarter (from a 3 percent rate to
about a 2 percent rate).
The professional forecasting community
believes that the economy will continue to
grow at a relatively subdued pace beyond
the first quarter of 2012. For example, the
consensus of Blue Chip forecasters projects
that real GDP growth will average 2.2 percent
during the first half of this year and 2.5
percent during the second half. A similar
survey, by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (Survey of Professional Forecasters),
shows slightly more optimism about the
22 The Regional Economist | April 2012

PERCENT

8

8.4

2012 Projection

6
4
2
0

2011 Actual

1.6

2.7

2.5

Real GDP Growth

1.6

Unemployment Rate

PCE Inflation

SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
NOTE: Projections are the midpoints of the central tendencies. The actual and projected unemployment rates are for the fourth quarter of the
indicated year. The growth of real GDP and PCE inflation (actual and projected) are percentage changes from the fourth quarter of the previous
year to the fourth quarter of the indicated year. PCE is personal consumption expenditures.

second half: 2.9 percent. (In comparison, real
GDP growth for 2011 was 1.6 percent.)
Dueling Narratives

The consensus forecast is for continued
modest, below-trend growth in 2012.
(Although difficult to know for sure, many
economists believe that the economy’s trend
rate of growth is about 2.75 percent.) The
supporting narrative goes something like
this: First, Europe’s growth has slowed
markedly in response to its sovereign debt
and banking crisis; indeed, Europe might be
in a recession today. The crisis has not only
elevated volatility in U.S. financial markets,
which often erodes investor and consumer
confidence, but also will likely lead to weaker
exports to Europe and countries elsewhere
with important linkages to Europe. Second,
the housing market remains relatively weak,
foreclosures are high, and state and local
governments are reducing their discretionary outlays in order to close budget deficits.
Finally, with households apparently still
determined to pay down debt and increase
their saving rate, consumption spending—
the largest component of real GDP—is likely
to grow at exceedingly modest rates. With
the unemployment rate expected to remain
above 8 percent at the end of this year,
inflation will slow to about 2 percent after
measuring 3 percent last year.
There is a countervailing narrative, equally
plausible, which points to stronger economic
conditions this year than the consensus
forecast. The first argument of this narrative is that the impact of any European
recession on the U.S. has been overblown.
This is because the volume of U.S. exports
to Canada, Mexico and Asia is much larger

E X CHANGE

ASK AN ECONOMIST

Letters to the Editor

Richard G. Anderson is an economist in the
Research division. He joined the Federal Reserve
Board staff in Washington, D.C., in 1988. He
transferred to the St. Louis Fed in late 1992.
He is a native Minnesotan with a bachelor’s
degree from the University of Minnesota and a
Ph.D. from MIT in Cambridge, Mass. He is also a
visiting professor in the Management School
at the University of Sheffield, Sheffield, U.K., and
is a member of that school’s international academic
advisory committee. His research interests
include applied econometrics, macroeconomics
and financial markets. Beyond economics, he has extensive background and experience in
information technology. For more on his work, see http://research.stlouisfed.org/econ/anderson/

This is in response to the President’s Message that appeared in the
January 2012 issue. The message, by President James Bullard, was
headlined “The Economic Recovery: America’s Investment Problem.”
Dear Editor:
The “falsification of the truth” as highlighted in Mr. Bullard’s letter is
point-on. This type of testimony shows great leadership as we begin
to establish the new “baseline” in our return to a normal state of
economic principles. In my opinion, this housing bubble and its
impact on the traditional banking industry have created a generation
of borrowers whose psychology will take us a generation to transform. The admitting to what has caused these problems is a great
first step in transforming our abilities to fix these housing issues. I

than the volume of exports to Europe—and
growth in those first three markets is much
faster than in Europe. Also, U.S. banks and
money market funds have greatly reduced
their exposure to Europe’s banking and financial system. Second, the U.S. stock market
is up strongly thus far in 2012, and measures
of financial stress (e.g., the St. Louis Financial
Stress Index) and economic uncertainty have
fallen sharply. Third, the unemployment rate
has fallen much faster than expected, and job
growth is strengthening. From September
2011 to February 2012, private-sector job
gains averaged nearly 215,000 per month.
These developments, combined with a housing affordability index at record-high levels,
should begin to trigger faster growth of home
sales. Indeed, housing construction and
homebuilder confidence are rebounding, and
the declines in house prices have slowed. By
some measures, house prices rose modestly
over the second half of 2011.

Q. On Jan. 25, the Federal Open Market Committee issued
a press release summarizing its “longer-run goals and
monetary policy strategy.” Chairman Ben Bernanke, in
his press conference on the same day, referred to 2 percent
inflation as an “inflation target.” Why did the FOMC set
an inflation target?

applaud Mr. Bullard for addressing this, and now it is up to each head

A. Setting a long-run inflation goal, or target, is an important element in achiev-

Fundamentals,” which appeared in the July 2011 issue.

ing the Federal Reserve’s mandate from Congress. Further, the FOMC has

Dear Editor:

behaved for a number of years as if a 2 percent long-run inflation rate was its

This was a good and very useful article. I referenced it in an article

target. The announcement removes any remaining doubts.

I’ve written for Business Economics. (Mr. Synnott’s article, “The Long

	Commentators sometimes incorrectly discuss the Federal Reserve as if it

Wave Revisited,” appears in the April issue of this National Associa-

were an independent fourth branch of government, similar to Congress, the

tion for Business Economics publication.) Thanks to the authors and

Supreme Court or the executive branch. It is not. The Federal Reserve was

The Regional Economist.

The Shadow of Rising Energy Prices

price controls. In the Employment Act of 1946, Congress charged the Federal

Admittedly, the risks to the outlook, while
receding, still appear higher than normal.
In this vein, one threat is rising energy and
gasoline prices, which usually exert a drag on
economic activity and raise inflation rates.
As yet, though, most forecasters and financial
market participants see little prospect of accelerating inflation over the near-term—despite
an extremely accommodative monetary policy
and large federal budget deficits. The FOMC
governors and presidents expect inflation to
average a little less than 2 percent in 2012.

Reserve with adopting policies to promote both maximum economic growth

Kevin L. Kliesen is an economist at the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. For more on his work,
see http://research.stlouisfed.org/econ/kliesen/

created by Congress in 1913, and Congress sets guidelines for the Federal
Reserve’s conduct of monetary policy.
	Prior to World War II, the Federal Reserve’s principal focus was on banking
and financial market stability, including providing additional money and credit
during economic expansions and assisting banks during financial panics.
As the war ended, Congress feared that high unemployment would follow
reductions in government spending and that inflation would follow the end of

of the household to begin to get their “financial” house in order, and
let’s return to the basics of consumer finance and to the new norm.
Rick Ocheltree, banking executive in Richmond, Va.

This is in response to “Commodity Price Gains: Speculation vs.

Thomas Synnott, adjunct professor of industrial engineering at
The Cooper Union in New York City
To read articles in past issues, see
www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/pastissues/
To write a letter to the editor online, go to
www.stlouisfed.org/re/letter
To send a letter through the mail, address it to
Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, editor, The Regional Economist,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Box 442, St. Louis, MO 63166.

and stable prices—the so-called dual mandate.
	Tension has often surrounded the dual mandate. The historical record suggests that policies to reduce unemployment may be ill-suited to periods of high
inflation and that policies to reduce inflation tend to slow aggregate demand
and increase unemployment. In its Jan. 25 announcement, the FOMC clarified
that its monetary policy is the primary determinant of the economy’s long-run
inflation rate. Because uncertainty regarding long-run inflation harms long-run

Know before you buy: CHeck out
Our new econ ed Mobile app
Check out the St. Louis Fed’s new Econ
Ed Mobile app for the iPad, iPhone and
iTouch. Our new app allows you to visualize and under-

economic growth, a long-run inflation objective (or target) is an important

stand how inflation and the cost of credit can affect your spending and

aspect of fulfilling the FOMC’s dual mandate from Congress.

saving decisions. What you find may surprise you! The Econ Ed Mobile

For related reading, see the President’s Message on Page 3.
Submit your question in a letter to the editor. (See instructions at right.) One question will
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The Regional Economist | www.stlouisfed.org 23

n e x t

i s s u e

c u r r e n t

re v i e w

More Insight from Economists
on Today’s Headlines

© istock photos

“Where Did You Go to High School?” Is Not a Frivolous Question

D

oes the type of high school you went to affect your future wages? Economists
generally agree that educational attainment affects people’s wages. For
example, a college degree usually leads to higher lifetime earnings than does a
high school diploma. These studies, however, do not typically assess whether
the type of institution matters. In the July issue of The Regional Economist, we
discuss whether the type of high school you attended—public, private or parochial
—affects your wages.

printed on recycled paper using 10% postconsumer waste

Our sister publication, the Review,
often covers topics straight from the
news, too. In the latest issue, read:
• why fiscal policy is simply not the
top tool to stabilize the economy,
• how a “60/40” home loan modification plan could save the housing
sector,
• why the Fed has historically been
reluctant to mention “full employment” as a separate policy objective
(despite the dual mandate) and
• why any credible analysis of unemployment must first look at the many
moving parts of the labor market.
To read these articles from the
March/April issue online, go to
http://research.stlouisfed.org/
publications/review/

economy

at

a

The Regional

glance

Economist

April 2012

REAL GDP GROWTH

4
2
0
–2
–4
–6
–8

Q4
06

07

08

09

10

PERCENT CHANGE FROM A YEAR EARLIER

6

6

PERCENT

VOL. 20, NO. 2

CONSUMER PRICE INDEX

8

–10

|

11

CPI–All Items
All Items Less Food and Energy

3

0

February

–3

07

08

09

10

11

12

NOTE: Each bar is a one-quarter growth rate (annualized);
the red line is the 10-year growth rate.

3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
–0.5
–1.0
–1.5
–2.0
–2.5

RATES ON FEDERAL FUNDS FUTURES ON SELECTED DATES

.16

11/02/11

01/24/12

12/13/11

03/13/12

.15
.14
PERCENT

PERCENT

I N F L AT I O N - I N D E X E D T R E A S U RY Y I E L D S P R E A D S

5-Year

.10

20-Year
March 16, 2012

09

10

.12
.11

10-Year

08

.13

11

.09

12

March 12 April 12 May 12 June 12 July 12 Aug. 12
CONTRACT MONTHS

NOTE: Weekly data.

C I V I L I A N U N E M P L O Y M E N T R AT E

I N T E R E S T R AT E S

11

6

10

5

10-Year Treasury
Fed Funds Target

4

8

PERCENT

PERCENT

9

7

2

6

1-Year Treasury

1

5
4

3

February

07

08

09

10

11

February

0

12

07

08

09

10

11

12

NOTE: On Dec. 16, 2008, the FOMC set a target range for
the federal funds rate of 0 to 0.25 percent. The observations
plotted since then are the midpoint of the range (0.125 percent).

U . S . A G R I C U LT U R A L T R A D E

FA R M I N G C A S H R E C E I P T S

90

230
210
Exports

BILLIONS OF DOLLARS

BILLIONS OF DOLLARS

75
60
Imports

45
30
15
0

Trade Balance

07

08

09

10

11

NOTE: Data are aggregated over the past 12 months.

190
170
150
130
110

January

12

90

07

Crops

Livestock

08

09

January

10

11

NOTE: Data are aggregated over the past 12 months.

12

U.S. CROP AND LIVESTOCK PRICES / INDEX 1990-92=100
235
215
195
175
Crops

155

Livestock

135
115
95
February

75
97

98

99

00

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

commercial bank performance ratios
U . S . B an k s by A sset S i z e / fourth Q U A R T E R 2 0 1 1

All

$100 million­$300 million

Less than
$300 million

$300 million$1 billion

Less than
$1 billion

$1 billion$15 billion

Less than
$15 billion

More than
$15 billion

Return on Average Assets*

0.87

0.62

0.62

0.60

0.61

0.77

0.69

0.92

Net Interest Margin*

3.53

4.01

4.01

3.92

3.96

3.97

3.97

3.42

Nonperforming Loan Ratio

4.21

2.80

2.68

3.32

3.02

3.57

3.31

4.49

Loan Loss Reserve Ratio

2.69

1.90

1.88

1.97

1.93

2.17

2.05

2.90

R E T U R N O N AV E R A G E A S S E T S *

NET INTEREST MARGIN*
0.78

0.49

1.08

0.77
0.86

0.36

Fourth Quarter 2011

3.97
3.84
3.86
3.73

Missouri

3.59
3.52

Tennessee
.90

1.20

PERCENT

0.0

Fourth Quarter 2010

3.04

0.6

1.2

1.8

3.6

4.2

4.8

Fourth Quarter 2010

1.98

Eighth District

3.43

1.58
1.54

Illinois
4.11

4.53

2.36
2.26

1.44

Indiana

3.28

1.90
1.94

Mississippi

3.56
4.55

.00 .50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00

2.78

1.74
1.59

Kentucky
3.50

2.20

2.16
2.06

Arkansas

1.79
1.92

2.98

3.0

L O A N L O S S R E S E RV E R AT I O

3.57
3.49

2.81

2.4

Fourth Quarter 2011

N O N P E R F O R M I N G L O A N R AT I O

Fourth Quarter 2011

4.08
4.03

Mississippi

.60

4.11

3.42

Kentucky

0.89

0.70

.30

3.76
3.73

Indiana

0.53

0.29

.00

4.32
4.13

Arkansas
Illinois

0.62

0.29

–.30

0.97

0.93

–0.21
0.68

3.97
3.81

Eighth District

Missouri

2.13
2.20

Tennessee

2.16

PERCENT

Fourth Quarter 2010

NOTE: Data include only that portion of the state within Eighth District boundaries.
SOURCE: FFIEC Reports of Condition and Income for all Insured U.S. Commercial Banks
* Annualized data

.00

.50

1.00

1.50

Fourth Quarter 2011

2.00

2.50

3.25

3.00

Fourth Quarter 2010

For additional banking and regional data, visit our web site at:
www.research.stlouis.org/fred/data/regional.html.

3.50

regional economic indicators
nonfarm employment growth / fourth Q U A R T E R 2 0 1 1
year-over-year percent changE
United
States

Eighth
District †

Arkansas

0.7%

0.4%

11.1

0.6

2.5

Construction

0.7

0.5

Manufacturing

1.8

Trade/Transportation/Utilities

Total Nonagricultural

1.3%

Illinois

Indiana

Mississippi

Missouri

Tennessee

0.0%

1.3%

0.7%

0.0%

1.0%

–1.4

0.0

0.0

3.0

0.0

NA

0.7

1.5

7.5

–4.6

–3.7

–3.8

NA

1.5

–3.2

1.9

1.5

2.6

–1.1

3.8

1.9

1.6

0.2

–0.6

1.2

–1.0

0.9

0.9

0.3

–0.9

–1.6

–3.6

–0.2

–3.8

–2.0

0.4

–1.6

–8.0

–2.8

Financial Activities

0.4

–0.5

2.7

–0.7

1.3

–3.7

0.8

–2.0

0.8

Professional & Business Services

3.5

2.5

0.6

3.0

0.1

6.7

6.3

1.7

1.4

Educational & Health Services

2.0

1.3

1.6

2.0

–0.4

2.2

3.8

0.3

1.4

Leisure & Hospitality

2.3

0.9

1.2

0.9

1.2

4.6

–2.0

–0.8

1.3

Other Services

0.1

–0.6

1.7

–0.9

–1.0

–0.9

–1.5

–1.1

1.0

–1.2

–0.6

1.7

–1.1

–2.6

–1.3

0.0

–0.6

1.6

Natural Resources/Mining

Information

Government

1.0%

Kentucky

† Eighth District growth rates are calculated from the sums of the seven states. For Natural Resources/Mining and Construction categories, the data exclude
Tennessee (for which data on these individual sectors are no longer available).

U nemployment R ates
IV/2011

EIGHTH DISTRICT PAYROLL–EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY 2011
III/2011

IV/2010

United States

8.7%

9.1%

9.6%

Arkansas

7.9

8.1

8.1

Illinois

9.8

10.1

9.7

Indiana

9.0

9.2

9.5

9.1

9.6

10.0

10.6

10.9

10.5

Missouri

8.1

8.6

9.3

Tennessee

8.7

9.2

9.6

Kentucky
Mississippi

Information 1.6%

Financial Activities
5.4%

Professional and
Business Services

12%

Trade,
Transportation
and Utilities

20%

Manufacturing

11.7%

Education and
Health Services

14.8%
9.7%

Construction 3.9%

16.5%

Leisure and
Hospitality
Other Services 4.1%

Natural Resources
and Mining 0.4%

Government

H ousing permits / fourth quarter

REAL PERSONAL INCOME* / fourth QUARTER

year-over-year percent change in year-to-date levels

year-over-year percent change

2.1
–10.5

–3.7

–28.1

Illinois

4.5

Indiana

2.0

Kentucky

2.0

–0.5

0.5

1.5

–1.0

0

4

2010

All data are seasonally adjusted unless otherwise noted.

8

12.0

Tennessee

12 16

PERCENT

3.2
2.3

0.7
4.0
1.4

Missouri

–14.8

2011

1.8

Mississippi

–32 –28 –24 –20 –16 –12 –8 –4

3.4

4.8
6.3

–9.0

4.0

1.0

Arkansas

4.0

–3.9

1.9

United States

4.5

3.0
2.3
4.1

0

0.5
2011

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

2010

*NOTE: Real personal income is personal income divided by the PCE
chained price index.

4.5