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REAL ESTATE RESEARCH

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March 2, 2018

REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Real Estate Research provided
analysis of topical research and
current issues in the fields of housing

Tax Reform's Effect on Low-Income Housing

and real estate economics. Authors
for the blog included the Atlanta Fed's

The recently enacted Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 substantially reduced
corporate taxes, from 35 percent to 21 percent. Some commentators and

RECENT POSTS

Jessica Dill, Kristopher Gerardi, Carl
Hudson, and analysts, as well as the

practitioners have voiced concerns
about how the new tax law will affect
demand for Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC), America's primary

Assessing the Size and Spread of
Vulnerable Renter Households in

Boston Fed's Christopher Foote and
Paul Willen.

mechanism for producing new or refurbished affordable housing units. According
to Dawn Luke, chief operating officer with Invest Atlanta, the lowering of the

the Southeast
What's Being Done to Help Renters

In December 2020, content from Real
Estate Research became part of

corporate tax rate continues to present challenges to the market in terms of
LIHTC pricing, with credit prices being lowered by as much as 16 cents on the

during the Pandemic?
An Update on Forbearance Trends

Policy Hub. Future articles will be
released in Policy Hub: Macroblog.

dollar for projects in the near-term pipeline. Luke says this means that several
affordable housing projects could become bottlenecked as developers scramble

Examining the Effects of COVID-19
on the Southeast Housing Market

Disclaimer

to find subsidy to fill this gap. In addition, this firm expects that declining
demand for LIHTCs will generate 20,000 fewer low-income housing units a year,

Southeast Housing Market and
COVID-19

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a roughly 15 percent decline.

Update on Lot Availability and
Construction Lending

It's worth taking a few moments to review how the LIHTC actually works. The
LIHTC program, created as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, allows

Housing Headwinds
Where Is the Housing Sector

developers to receive tax credits in exchange for committing to rent their units for
30 years to households earning less than 50 to 60 percent of the area's median

Headed?
Did Harvey Influence the Housing

income. Private developers apply to receive an LIHTC subsidy through their
state housing authorities, and are allocated a subsidy equal to a percentage of

Market?
Is the Share of Real Estate Sales to

construction and eligible soft costs. Developers awarded an allocation receive a
10-year annuity of nonrefundable tax credits that they can use to offset positive

Investors Increasing?
CATEGORIES

future federal income tax liability. For example, through the program, the
developer of a $10 million apartment building could receive up to $1.17 million a

Affordable housing goals

year for 10 years. (This assumes that, to receive a basis boost, the developer
would receive a 9 percent allocation and the project would be located in either a

Credit conditions
Expansion of mortgage credit

sufficiently low-income neighborhood or a high-rent metro area.)

Federal Housing Authority
Financial crisis

Due to the rental restrictions, it is virtually impossible for LIHTC properties
themselves to generate enough tax liability to claim the full value of allocated tax

Foreclosure contagion
Foreclosure laws

credits, so developers need to have either sufficient other federal income tax to
offset or the income tax of a limited partner. These outside investors, usually

Governmentsponsored enterprises
GSE

organized through a partnership called syndication, would contribute a fixed
dollar amount to the developer upon completion of the subsidized property in

Homebuyer tax credit
Homeownership

exchange for 99.9 percent of the equity, including allocated tax credits, of the
project.

House price indexes
Household formations

The allocated tax credits themselves offer a dollar-for-dollar reduction in future

Housing boom
Housing crisis

tax liability, so changing the corporate tax rate does not directly reduce their
statutory value. So why might the after-market value of the credits fall with the

Housing demand
Housing prices

new tax law?

Income segregation
Individual Development Account

First, the recent tax cuts reduce the pool of firms with sufficient tax liability. If a
business has less tax liability than it has tax credits, that business would

Loan modifications
Monetary policy

effectively leave money on the table. The business would have to at least wait
until it had enough tax liability to claim the subsidy. Several past investors in

Mortgage crisis
Mortgage default

LIHTC properties, including Fannie Mae , learned firsthand how illiquid their
LIHTC investment actually was after the 2008 financial crisis. With the lower

Mortgage interest tax deduction
Mortgage supply

corporate rate and other favorable provisions that are coming out of the new tax
law, some firms that previously may have found the investment profitable may

Multifamily housing
Negative equity

well reconsider.

Positive demand shock
Positive externalities

Even firms that expect to have large profits may now have greater uncertainty
about their future taxes as they work through the 1,100-page bill . The

Rental homes
Securitization

increased risk could cause firms to value less any future reductions in their tax
liability.

Subprime MBS
Subprime mortgages

The owner of an LIHTC project, like owners of all residential buildings, gets to

Supply elasticity
Uncategorized

deduct the building’s depreciation over a 27.5-year schedule. These depreciation
allowances, coupled with LIHTC rental restrictions and relatively high operation

Upward mobility
Urban growth

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costs due to compliance with those restrictions, often result in large expected tax
losses that go beyond the allocated tax credits. For example, the $10 million
apartment building mentioned above would be expected to generate more than

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$290,000 in depreciation allowances a year that outside investors not limited by
passive-loss restrictions (such as C corporations) could use to offset other
taxable income. The reduction in the corporate rate from 35 percent to 21
percent would lead to about a $626,000 decrease in outside investors’
willingness to pay developers for those deductions under reasonable
assumptions. (A potential headache is that depreciaton allowances are subject to
recapture if the project is eventually sold for more than tax basis. This provision
rarely needs to be enforced.) This represents a 5.9 percent reduction in the
overall valuation of the investment, which could require additional debt on the
property and perhaps make some projects no longer feasible.
At the same time, lower taxes should expand the supply of market-rate housing.
Only a small fraction of low-income households occupies newly built, rentcapped homes produced under the LIHTC. Most of these households use their
own earnings or HUD vouchers to pay the market rents for older, existing
apartments. A recent study by Stuart Rosenthal in the American Economic
Review showed that while newly constructed units are often unaffordable for
most households, they eventually supply the majority of future low-income
affordable housing. This "filtering down" occurs as a result of physical
depreciation or shifts in style or location preferences. If lower taxes generate
new market-rate construction—and thus increase the aggregate supply of
housing—these lower taxes should lower rents throughout the market or
increase landlord participation in HUD voucher programs.
Eriksen and Lang suggest

two changes to the LIHTC program that would

increase the supply of affordable housing produced under the program without
increasing tax expenditures. The first, and most immediate, would be simply to
make the allocated tax credits through the LIHTC program refundable, because
uncertainty about future tax liabilities reduces both the pool of otherwise eligible
investors and the market value of allocated tax credits. Making this change
would also give some developers at least the option of claiming the credit
themselves rather being forced to partner with outside investors. The second
change would allow developers to claim an actuarially equivalent subsidy over a
shorter time period than the currently required 10 years. Developers and LIHTC
investors are thought to have a much higher cost of capital than the federal
government. In the extreme, allowing developers to claim the full value of
refundable tax credits when projects are completed would give them the greatest
flexibility in financing their projects.
Increasing the supply of housing affordable to low-income families could be
achieved using other policies that focus on reducing other barriers to increasing
housing production, like state and local zoning laws that limit the location and
density of multifamily housing. A bill working its way through the California
legislature would appear to be in this spirit.
Chris Cunningham is a research economist and associate policy adviser at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta; Mike Eriksen is associate professor of real
estate in the Linder College of Business at the University of Cincinnati.
The views expressed here represent those of the authors and not the Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System.
March 2, 2018 in Affordable housing goals, Housing demand, Housing
prices, Multifamily housing, Rental homes | Permalink