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PROPOSALS TO ENHANCE THE
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT

HEARING
BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 16, 2009

Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services

Serial No. 111–74

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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts, Chairman
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
MAXINE WATERS, California
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois
NYDIA M. VELÁZQUEZ, New York
MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
BRAD SHERMAN, California
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
RUBÉN HINOJOSA, Texas
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
CAROLYN MCCARTHY, New York
JOE BACA, California
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
AL GREEN, Texas
EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri
MELISSA L. BEAN, Illinois
GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
RON KLEIN, Florida
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
BILL FOSTER, Illinois
ANDRÉ CARSON, Indiana
JACKIE SPEIER, California
TRAVIS CHILDERS, Mississippi
WALT MINNICK, Idaho
JOHN ADLER, New Jersey
MARY JO KILROY, Ohio
STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio
SUZANNE KOSMAS, Florida
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
JIM HIMES, Connecticut
GARY PETERS, Michigan
DAN MAFFEI, New York

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama
MICHAEL N. CASTLE, Delaware
PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
RON PAUL, Texas
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
WALTER B. JONES, JR., North Carolina
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
GARY G. MILLER, California
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia
JEB HENSARLING, Texas
SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey
J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
TOM PRICE, Georgia
PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina
JOHN CAMPBELL, California
ADAM PUTNAM, Florida
MICHELE BACHMANN, Minnesota
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan
KEVIN McCARTHY, California
BILL POSEY, Florida
LYNN JENKINS, Kansas
CHRISTOPHER LEE, New York
ERIK PAULSEN, Minnesota
LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey

JEANNE M. ROSLANOWICK, Staff Director and Chief Counsel

(II)

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CONTENTS
Page

Hearing held on:
September 16, 2009 ..........................................................................................
Appendix:
September 16, 2009 ..........................................................................................

1
57

WITNESSES
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2009
Aguilar, Orson, Executive Director, The Greenlining Institute ...........................
Andersen, Leslie R., President and Chief Executive Officer, Bank of
Bennington, on behalf of the American Bankers Association (ABA) ...............
Antonakes, Hon. Steven L., Commissioner of Banks, Commonwealth of Massachusetts .............................................................................................................
Johnson, Hon. Eddie Bernice, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Texas .................................................................................................................
Kennedy, Judith A., President and Chief Executive Officer, National Association of Affordable Housing Lenders (NAAHL) ...................................................
Pinto, Edward J., Real Estate Financial Services Consultant .............................
Roberts, Benson F., Senior Vice President for Policy and Program Development, Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) .........................................
Stegman, Michael A., Ph.D., Director, Policy and Housing, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation ..........................................................................
Taylor, John, President and Chief Executive Officer, National Community
Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) .........................................................................
White, Lawrence J., Professor of Economics, Leonard N. Stern School of
Business, New York University ..........................................................................

46
44
14
1
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43
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15

APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
Johnson, Hon. Eddie Bernice ...........................................................................
Aguilar, Orson ..................................................................................................
Andersen, Leslie R. ..........................................................................................
Antonakes, Hon. Steven L. ..............................................................................
Kennedy, Judith A. ...........................................................................................
Morial, Marc H. ................................................................................................
Pinto, Edward J. ...............................................................................................
Roberts, Benson F. ...........................................................................................
Stegman, Michael A. ........................................................................................
Taylor, John ......................................................................................................
White, Lawrence J. ...........................................................................................
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED

FOR THE

RECORD

Frank, Hon. Barney:
Excerpt from Bloomberg.com, dated June 17, 2004 ......................................
Cleaver, Hon. Emanuel:
Text of H.R. 1728 ..............................................................................................
Watt, Hon. Melvin:
CRA Statute ......................................................................................................
Written statement of David Hanzel, Director, ANHD INC. ................................
Remarks by FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair to The New America Foundation
conference: ‘‘Did Low-Income Homeownership Go Too Far?’’: Washington,
D.C., December 17, 2008 .....................................................................................
(III)

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IV
Page

Letter to Senator Robert Menendez from Chairman Ben Bernanke, Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, dated November 25, 2008 ........
Letter to Chairman Frank from Daniel A. Mica, President & CEO, the Credit
Union National Association (CUNA), dated September 16, 2009 ....................
HUD Housing Counseling Grant Funding for ACORN Housing Corporation
2001–2008 .............................................................................................................
Written statement of the Independent Community Bankers of America
(ICBA) ...................................................................................................................
Written statement of the National Alliance of Community Economic Development Associations (NACEDA) .............................................................................
Written statement of the National Association of Federal Credit Unions
(NAFCU) ...............................................................................................................
Written statement of National People’s Action .....................................................

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PROPOSALS TO ENHANCE THE
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
Wednesday, September 16, 2009

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in room
2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Barney Frank [chairman of the committee] presiding.
Members present: Representatives Frank, Waters, Maloney,
Gutierrez, Watt, Moore of Kansas, McCarthy of New York, Baca,
Lynch, Miller of North Carolina, Scott, Green, Cleaver, Ellison,
Klein, Wilson, Perlmutter, Donnelly, Foster, Carson, Adler, Himes,
Maffei; Bachus, Royce, Manzullo, Biggert, Capito, Hensarling,
Neugebauer, Bachmann, Marchant, McCarthy of California, Posey,
Jenkins, Lee, Paulsen, and Lance.
The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. And I am going
to make a proposal. We have a lot of interest here, and so we are
going to expand the opening statements to 40 minutes, but I wonder if we would have unanimous consent to let our colleague Ms.
Johnson speak first and then do the opening statements.
So Congresswoman Johnson is one of a number of Members who
has had a great interest in this, our colleague Congresswoman
Waters and others have been very much in the forefront here. Congresswoman Johnson has filed a very comprehensive bill to improve and expand the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and it
really makes me appreciate your being here and we will take your
statement now. So please go ahead.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON,
A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF
TEXAS

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, and to also Ranking Member Bachus and members of the committee. I am honored to testify on behalf of enhancing and modernizing the Community Reinvestment Act.
I represent an extremely diverse congressional district that includes low- and moderate-income areas as well as the very wealthiest neighborhoods in Dallas County, Texas. Neighborhoods in my
district have historically been subject to redlining by banks, which
is the practice of denying loans and services to people based on
where they happen to live. Congress has passed a number of laws
designed to combat redlining and eliminate housing discrimination,
and the CRA is one such law that helps to ensure equal services
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2
to all people. Unfortunately, we all know that redlining still occurs,
and I am here to discusses some of my concerns with the current
law and the need for modernization.
The CRA encourages banks to invest in the communities in
which they operate. It is an established system to monitor and rate
the way in which banks lend to all their customers, for home mortgages, small business creation, and economic development. The
CRA uses the mechanism of public accountability to achieve its
goals rather than impose quotas or set specific credit targets. It
rates banks on their practices, making them more transparent. The
CRA also enables Federal institutions that examine banks to delay
or deny a bank’s request to merge with another lender, open a
branch or extend any of its services, depending on its CRA rating.
The CRA currently applies only to banks and thrifts. It does not
apply to any of the financial institutions that lend money, like
bank affiliates and independent mortgage companies. During the financial downturn, people have blamed the CRA and its low- and
moderate-income recipients of loans for the meltdown in the housing market and thus the financial crisis. However, the facts tell a
different story. The vast majority of subprime loans originated at
independent mortgage companies and bank affiliates, 75 percent or
more by most accounts.
Most subprime lending occurred between 2003 and 2007, decades
after the CRA became law in 1977. All stakeholders agree that
CRA has worked, banks are making money. Since 1996, banks
under CRA have made community development loans totaling more
than $407 billion. They have also made $581 billion in small business loans in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods from 1996
through 2007.
In 2007, in my district alone, nearly 200,000 CRA-covered small
business loans were made valued at over $4.4 billion. Over 73,000
CRA-covered small business loans were given to small businesses
with revenues of less than a billion dollars. Over 12,000 CRA-covered prime home loans were originated, equaling over $1.1 billion.
One important outcome of the enactment of CRA is that responsible lending in these communities is profit for banks and thrifts.
The truth about CRA is that it encourages prime lending. It offers
incentives for safe and sound loans and foreclosure prevention efforts, including counseling for loan recipients, modifying loans, and
investing in funds that finance loan modification. CRA also penalizes banks and thrifts through reduced CRA ratings if they engage
in predatory or discriminatory lending or lending or services that
have a negative impact on the community.
CRA has thus been an extremely successful law. However, CRA
needs to be updated. Representative Luis Gutierrez and I have introduced H.R. 1479, the Community Reinvestment Modernization
Act. The CRA Modernization Act increases the responsiveness and
accountability of banks to all communities, rural as well as urban.
It would require CRA exams in the great majority of geographical
areas that banks serve. Currently, CRA examines banks in areas
where they have branches, but not in other areas where they lend
through brokers. This bill would address racial disparities and
lending by requiring CRA exams to explicitly consider lending and
services to minorities in addition to low- and moderate-income com-

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munities. The bill also requires the reporting of race and gender
borrowers of small business loans and would require data collection
of deposit and savings accounts.
This bill has worked. It would require the Federal Reserve Board
to create a database from foreclosures and loan modifications,
which would be linked to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data.
The rating system of CRA exams would be enhanced and banks
would be required to submit public improvement plans that are
subject to public comment when they earn low ratings in any of the
service areas. The Federal regulatory agencies would be required
to hold more meetings and public hearings when banks merge and
when banks seek to close branches.
The CRA Modernization Act would establish CRA requirements
for all affiliates and subsidiaries of banks, independent mortgage
companies, mainstream credit unions, insurance companies, and
securities firms. And this is not to say that many of them are in
compliance with CRA without having the responsibility. But any
type of loophole that could be found would be sought by financial
institutions. So that is why it covers all of these entities.
In 2006, in my district in Dallas County, 72 percent of all black
and 56 percent of all Hispanic borrowers were issued subprime
loans, whereas 28 percent of all loans to Anglo borrowers were
subprime. Even middle- and upper-income minorities experienced
significant lending disparities. During 2007, in my district, 32 percent and 28 percent of the loans to middle- and upper-income African Americans and Hispanic women borrowers were high cost,
whereas 17 percent of the loans were high cost to Anglo middleand upper-income women.
The high black and Hispanic lending disparities are driven by
non-CRA-covered institutions. These disparities are not only occurring in my district, they are occurring in communities across the
United States. It is happening to all of our constituents. Most likely
it is happening to yours when you check the record.
This year Representative Gutierrez and I introduced the CRA
Modernization Act, which updates the current 32-year-old law to
reflect the modern financial landscape, and I hope this hearing will
bring much needed awareness and attention to long overdue CRA
reform. I believe by modernizing CRA we will see fewer home foreclosures and see smart and safe investments in our communities,
exactly what our struggling economy needs right now.
And again I would like to thank you, Chairman Frank, and
Ranking Member Bachus, and members of the committee for allowing me to testify on behalf of enhancing and modernizing the Community Reinvestment Act. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Representative Johnson can be found
on page 58 of the appendix.]
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Representative Johnson. And this is
an issue that will be on the agenda of this committee. As people
know, we will be for the next couple of months focused legislatively
on the whole question of financial reorganization, but the question
of the CRA and, in my judgment, making it more effective, improving a good program, will be one of the first things we will turn to
later this year or early next year.
I thank you. The witness is excused and I will now begin—

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Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say, Congresswoman
Johnson, one of the most pleasurable evenings I have ever spent
was you and I and one or two others dining in Abuja some years
ago, and that was a delightful night. And I think CODELs, although they are sometimes criticized, I think they give Members
the opportunity sometimes to discuss issues and get to know one
another and their different points of view. I just wanted to express
my respect for you.
Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. I do remember that; it was
pleasant.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And we will begin on our
side with the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, for 3 minutes.
Mr. GREEN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank
Representative Johnson, a fellow Texan also, for her testimony and
for this legislation that she has put before us.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you as well and other members, the ranking member for this hearing. I think it is exceedingly
important. I think it is important because it gives us an opportunity to not only look at the expansion of the CRA, but also to talk
about some of the things that the CRA has done to be of benefit
to us and to eliminate some of the confusion that surrounds the
CRA.
The CRA was started and implemented in 1977 because of redlining, some areas not able to get loans. CRA mandates that loans
be made with safety and soundness in mind. It is important to note
that the CRA did not create 3/27s and 2/28s, did not create prepayment penalties that coincided with teaser rates, that the CRA did
not require large balloons. The CRA has always been an entity, a
piece of legislation, if you will, that dealt with safety and soundness. And it is unfortunate that there is so much confusion surrounding the CRA, but I do thank God for Chairman Bernanke,
who has indicated that the CRA was not the cause of the current
crisis. Comptroller of the Currency John Dugan has so much as indicated that the CRA is not the culprit behind the subprime mortgage crisis. And of course, Chairwoman Sheila Bair has indicated
that the CRA is not at the root of this crisis. And I think this affords us an opportunity to determine how we can expand upon it
and make it an even greater benefit to us.
Finally, I am concerned that at a time when the CRA can be of
great benefit we find that some banks, by way of anecdotal evidence, and I do hope that we can get some empirical evidence
today, by way of anecdotal evidence, are cutting back on their CRA
efforts, they are cutting back on their CRA department. Some
banks are doing quite well with it, but there are others who have
persons who are sort of token CRA representatives who do other
things within the bank and the CRA is a part-time effort.
I think that this is a time for us to strengthen the CRA, not
weaken it, and I appreciate this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, and
yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GUTIERREZ. [presiding] Congressman Royce, you are recognized for 4 minutes.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. According to
Larry Lindsey, who is a former Federal Reserve Governor, while
the CRA was not the main culprit in the financial collapse, they

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certainly played a role. And in fact Mr. Lindsey said CRA regulations actually led to the creation of subprime mortgages. As Mr.
Lindsey recently described, during the housing boom years, it
would have been a real, in his words, ‘‘CRA black eye’’ for a bank
to reduce the number of loans it was making in a particular area.
However, given that the most creditworthy borrowers had already
received loans, a less creditworthy group had to take their place.
So the former Federal Reserve Governor goes on to note the role
that CRA played in the development in the noncomforming secondary mortgage market, which included subprime mortgages.
Whether or not you believe CRA may have been this significant
a contributor to the financial collapse, moving forward, I think one
of the things that it is critical that we discuss here in this committee is to answer a key question, does CRA require a bank to
make loans that are less creditworthy than those the financial institution is making elsewhere? I think that is something that the
panelists might want to think on a little bit, who are going to talk
to us in a minute. If this is in fact the case, I believe a fundamental
reform of CRA is in order. Providing credit to creditworthy borrowers is a useful concept that was abandoned during the housing
boom. While this took place throughout the financial system, Congress should not be actively discouraging this practice.
Similarly, government mandates in the form of affordable housing goals led the GSEs to purchase over $1 trillion in subprime
loans and Alt-A loans, $1 trillion. Beyond causing the failure of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and by the way when I say failure
of Fannie and Freddie, that was 80 percent of the losses right there
for those two GSEs. Besides doing that, the proliferation of these
loans was a major contributor to the financial collapse.
Artificial government enforced mandates based on altruistic goals
have a tendency to result in unintended consequences and cause
more harm than good. Instead of looking to the ways in which we
could expand the number of institutions that must abide by CRA
regs, I think we should reassess the role of this and other government mandates and reassess the role specifically that this played
in the financial collapse and consider scaling them back and relying more on the market in these kinds of circumstances.
And I would just like to quote from an article in the L.A. Times
on October 25, 2008, ‘‘ACORN, for example, has used the CRA as
leverage to compel banks to create pools of loans for low- and moderate-income families. Its efforts generated about $6 billion in loans
to these borrowers while also generating funds for ACORN’s nonprofit housing corporation. Supporters call that a win-win scenario,
critics say it is legalized extortion.’’
Now many have also noted their ability to stall mergers between
financial institutions with complaints that are filed by CRA. In
fact, according to Stanley Kurtz, a senior fellow at the Ethics and
Public Policy Institute, ‘‘Bank merger or expansion plans rarely
held up under CRA until the late 1980s when ACORN perfected its
technique of filing these CRA complaints.’’
So whether or not as enthusiasts for CRA you believe that they
played a role in the financial problems, I think we do come back
to that question: Is CRA being used by activist organization like
ACORN to generate funds from financial institutions? It seems to

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me undebatable that the observation made by the Ethics and Policy
Institute fellow there is in fact spot on in terms of the methodology
here.
I would just like to close by quoting from ‘‘The Housing Boom
and Bust,’’ by Tom Sowell, author of ‘‘Basic Economics.’’ But Sowell
quotes in here on page 66 of ‘‘The Housing Boom and Bust,’’ ‘‘Mortgages made under the Community Reinvestment Act were especially vulnerable during the housing downturn to the detriment of
both borrowers and lenders. For example, lending done under Community Reinvestment Act criteria, according to a quarterly report
in October 2008, constituted only 7 percent of the total mortgage
lending by the Bank of America, but constituted 29 percent of all
the losses on the mortgages.’’
So again, you just have an enormously disproportionate amount
of the loss here coming from the CRA loans.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. You are welcome. Next, will be the Chair of the
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and a coauthor of the bill
that Representative Johnson referred to, the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Gutierrez, for 3 minutes.
Mr. GUTIERREZ. Thank you, Chairman Frank, for holding this
very important hearing, positive changes in our banking system.
We will be having a hearing on Congresswoman Johnson’s bill in
our subcommittee. Give her time to do that and we will look at
community reinvestment and the reauthorization and strengthening.
Look, over the past 31 years, the Community Reinvestment Act
succeeded in opening up our banking system to communities and
consumers who had been excluded from the mainstream banking
system. By giving all our communities access to savings accounts,
affordable mortgages, and student loans, the Community Reinvestment Act has helped many families achieve their own American
dream.
Everybody would think that CRA is only about mortgages. There
is a lot more than simply mortgages. There remain, however, some
who still question, as we have heard here this morning, the value
of CRA and those who would blame the current crisis on this landmark legislation.
I want to address those who would state or insinuate that CRA
caused the crisis with a quote from Sandra Braunstein, the Director of the Division of Consumer and Community Affairs of the Federal Reserve System. And she did this right here in this committee
room on March 11th, ‘‘We have run data on CRA lending, and
where loans are located we found that only 6 percent of all higher
cost loans were made by CRA-covered institutions and neighborhoods targeted, which would be low- to moderate-income neighborhoods covered by CRA. So I can tell you, she ends, if that is where
you are going, CRA was not a cause of this loan crisis.’’
Furthermore, at the same hearing Michael Middleton, the president of Middleton Bank and speaking on behalf of the American
Bankers Association, stated, ‘‘We really find that CRA is a tool, not
an obstacle.’’ And I mention also that all our affordable loans are
current, none of them are in default at his bank.

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So let all of those who would question the efficacy and value of
CRA during this hearing keep those two quotes in mind.
I also notice some of you here want the CRA to be included in
the legislation moving forward to create the Consumer Financial
Protection Agency. While the impulse to strengthen the enforcement provisions of CRA are noble, this is such an important issue
that we should not chance weakening it by including it in a larger
regulatory reform package.
Early in this Congress, I pledged to Congresswoman Johnson and
members of the National Community Reinvestment Coalition that
I would hold a hearing on H.R. 1479, and I renew that pledge
today. This fall that hearing will take place on that very important
legislation. I look forward to that opportunity.
And lastly, let me just state that statistically the question that
Congressman Royce raised, is it necessary to give out these kinds
of loans that are risky loans and that are subprime, that the
subprimes, that they pushed these subprimes to meet their CRA.
The fact is that hundreds of millions of dollars in mortgages were
given to Latinos and African Americans that were subprime and
they qualified for conventional, not subprime loans. So the community exists because the fact existed in the past, subprime loans are
pushed on communities not because of CRA, but to exploit those
communities.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Next the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Hensarling,
for 6 minutes.
Mr. HENSARLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do look forward
to hearing from our witnesses, but I must admit with three different panels, I do note the absence of ACORN. ACORN has been
a very vocal supporter of CRA, they have certainly appeared before
this committee before, but I guess between countless acts of voter
fraud, shakedowns of financial institutions, offering counsel on how
to set up tax-evading brothels exploiting teenage girls, not to mention picking up tens of millions of dollars in taxpayer subsidies, I
suppose they just found themselves too busy to make time to appear before us today.
Regardless the subject before us is a serious one, I believe that
the Community Reinvestment Act has had a proud genesis. Thirtytwo years ago, in 1977, redlining was clearly not insignificant. Too
many low-income and minority individuals’ credit opportunities
were simply limited to a handful of banks that might have been
reachable on a city bus route. Thirty-two years later, much has
changed. Interstate banking, branch banking, Internet banking,
and risk-based pricing have helped revolutionize and democratize
credit as never before. If you can gain access to a public library
Internet or a toll-free line you can unlock countless, countless opportunities for credit cards and home loans that would have been
unthinkable 32 years ago.
Market competition from companies like Lending Tree and
bankreg.com, cardhub, and many others, now provide low-income
Americans with a platform to access competitive bids on financial
products all across the United States of America, not just in localized communities.

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Now unfortunately the recession, not to mention legislation
passed by this committee regarding home mortgages and credit
cards, continues to erode credit opportunities for many low-income
Americans. This is regrettable. But that brings us to the great
irony of this hearing: 32 years ago, if you look at the Congressional
Record, the debate surrounding CRA was that discriminating financial institutions were denying credit opportunities to low-income individuals and minorities. Today, the debate is about greedy
financial institutions exploiting low-income individuals and minorities by making too much credit available to those communities. So
it somewhat begs the question, which is it, is it too much credit or
is it not enough credit? I find it difficult to have it both ways.
Regardless of what CRA was, today it is a costly and redundant
anachronism that has contributed to our economic crisis and still
enables certain activist groups to functionally shake down and intimidate financial institutions harming credit opportunities for all
Americans.
The Federal Reserve data has shown that well over 99 percent
of banks are already in full compliance with CRA, and studies
show that community banks throughout America can spend anywhere from $20,000 to $90,000 a year to comply. So alluding to the
testimony of the gentleman from California, it begs the question,
are we simply having banks pay these great sums of money to
prove that they are doing something that they would do anyway or
are we forcing them to make loans that are not financially stable
loans and that indeed contributed to our economic crisis? One
should be very, very careful.
When we talk about CRA loans contributing to the economic crisis, I have long contended it wasn’t the size of the loans, it was the
precedent of the loan, the precedent of having the United States
Government put their imprimatur on a system that did not raise
up the economic opportunities of the borrower, but instead lessened
the credit standards of the lender. And we know for a fact it was
in 1997 that the GSEs and CRAs converged in a landmark event,
the first securitization of CRA loans, a $384 million offering guaranteed by Freddie Mac. Over the next 10 months, Bear Stearns
issued $1.9 billion of CRA mortgages backed by Fannie or Freddie.
In between 2000 and 2002, the business accelerated. Fannie issued
$20 billion in securities backed by CRA mortgages, and I believe
the rest is history.
Now when we get back to compliance cost, every community
banker I speak to tells me that if they simply had the money that
they are spending on the compliance cost, they could instead capitalize at least a couple of small businesses in their communities.
And we know the facts. Since President Obama was inaugurated,
and the Congress passed his economic plan, over 3 million of our
countrymen have now lost their jobs and we have the highest unemployment rate in a quarter of a century, not to mention a tripling of the national debt.
Now one thing our committee could do that would take a huge
step in creating more jobs in America is to simply repeal the CRA.
To help those of low income, we must increase their economic opportunities, not decrease the lending standards. And to fight discrimination, does anybody really doubt the Obama Administration

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will not vigorously enforce the Equal Opportunity Act and the Fair
Housing Act? I think not. I think it is time to repeal CRA.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. I yield myself 30 seconds, and I yield 31⁄2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California just to say, no, ACORN
hasn’t testified here for a while, and while we talk about money for
ACORN, I have asked the committee staff to look into the largest
single source of funding for ACORN of which I am aware, the Bush
Administration. Under the Presidency of George Bush, ACORN received more than $8 million from HUD, having nothing to do with
the CRA of course. ACORN got $8 million from HUD under the
Bush Administration, averaging about a million dollars a year, for
work and housing counseling. I have asked that we check in other
areas. But as I said, the Bush Administration so far appears to me
to have been the largest single source of funding.
Mr. HENSARLING. Would the gentleman yield?
The CHAIRMAN. I will yield to the gentleman.
Mr. HENSARLING. Well, knowing our chairman’s predilection to
want to break precedent with anything that President Bush did, I
would offer that perhaps this is a great opportunity.
The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I understand that. No, I realize the gentleman may be a little embarrassed about this, because we have
heard all this denunciation of ACORN, and in fact it was the Bush
Administration that was a major funder of it and gave them over
a million dollars a year just in that one program. I don’t believe
they are now getting the same amounts, I am not aware of it, but
of course the Obama Administration has not had time to do very
much. The fact is that in every year of the Bush Administration,
ACORN got more than $1 million in funding for HUD. And I just
have this—I understand that some of my colleagues think the
world was created 4,000 years ago and that evolution is wrong, but
it wasn’t created on January 21, 2009. There was a history of these
events and part of that history is a significant finding stream to
ACORN from the Bush Administration.
The gentlewoman from California.
Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members. I knew that when we held this hearing this morning that
ACORN would be at the center of the discussion because of all of
the news that is being shared with the world about an undercover
operation that has taken place where there is an attempt to prove
that ACORN is a criminal enterprise or organization that is receiving money from the Federal Government. We don’t know what has
taken place in that undercover operation by private conservatives.
Let the investigation go on, but that should not interfere with or
in any way intimidate us in our pursuit of equality in the mortgage
lending area. We are here to talk about CRA and a bill that is
being offered by Congresswoman Eddie Bernice Johnson, and I
think it is good that we take the opportunity to discuss CRA every
year, every 2 years, to see what it is doing, whether or not it is
living up to the mission that was created for it by this committee
or whether or not we need to strengthen CRA to make sure that
opportunities are being made available to those who have been excluded historically and traditionally.

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And so let me just say this. The business about the CRA being
responsible for the economic crisis or the subprime meltdown is absolutely not true. To single out CRA and say for some—all of these
were CRA loans or most of them were CRA loans and those loans
were given to people who could not afford to pay them, pay back
those loans and that they were all risky loans and they should not
have been made, well, that is a stretch. As a matter of fact, let me
just say and remind everyone about redlining and what was taking
place prior to CRA and CRA enforcement. When I was a member
of the California State Assembly, we spent an awful lot of time trying to undo redlining. This was when financial institutions literally
drew a line around communities and refused to make loans. And
so CRA has helped to eliminate that.
Now, if you want to talk about what causes the subprime meltdown, let’s take a look at Mr. Mozilo and the threat that he made
to Fannie and Freddie when he was writing bad loans, and they
had salespeople on the street literally writing them out of the back
of their cars without experience and some who were committing
fraud. If you want to talk about the greed when these loans were
packaged, securitized, and then Wall Street investment saw an opportunity to make money on subprime, if we want to get into that
discussion, there is a lot that we can talk about, but I think it is
quite unfair to use this as an opportunity to assign all of the problems to CRA.
Let us move on with the discussion, let us see where we can
strengthen this. I am not so sure that I am one who would like to
see it in the consumer financial agency that is being created, but
let us talk about its success and its failures, rather than simply accusing CRA of being responsible for the subprime meltdown.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from Minnesota for 4 minutes.
Mrs. BACHMANN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Stan Liebowitz, the
Ashbel Smith Professor of Economics at the University of Texas at
Dallas, said, perhaps the greatest scandal of the mortgage crisis is
that it is a direct result of an intentional loosening of underwriting
standards done in the name of ending discrimination, despite warnings that it could lead to widescale defaults. At the crisis core are
loans that were made with virtually nonexistent underwriting
standards, no verification of income or assets, little consideration
of the applicant’s ability to make payments, and no downpayment.
He went on to state that flexible lending programs expanded
even though they had higher default rates, the loans with traditional standards. And even today on the Web, you can still find
CRA loans available through ACORN with 100 percent financing,
no credit scores, undocumented income, even if you don’t report it
on your tax returns.
In light of recent egregious revelations surrounding ACORN and
with the American people to date demanding that Congress now
defund, fully investigate, and pull the tax-exempt status of
ACORN, including the 11 more arrests of ACORN workers in Florida and several undercover videos showing the group engaged in
giving individuals allegedly illegal tax and housing advice, many
questions have been raised about whether the banks have donated
large amounts of money to the organization to satisfy their CRA re-

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quirements. Right now we do not have enough transparency in the
CRA system to even understand the extent of such donations, and
we should take a serious look into that.
Peter Wallison is a Fellow in financial policy studies at the
American Enterprise Institute. He said that instead of a direct government subsidy, say, for downpayment assistance for low-income
families, the government has used regulatory and political pressure
to force banks and other government controlled or regulated private entities to make loans they would not otherwise make and to
reduce lending standards so more applicants would have access to
mortgage financing. The two key examples of this policy are the
adopted in 1977 and the affordable housing mission of the Government-Sponsored Enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
And Robert Leiken, who is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute and an economic adviser to the Clinton Administration on
financial industry deregulation in 2008, said, if the CRA had not
been so aggressively pushed, it is conceivable things would not be
quite a bad. People have to be honest about that.
Mr. Chairman, again our committee should be focused on preventing another fallout of our financial system and revisiting the
CRA to fully determine the role it played, that should be a part of
the process. Our committee should be focused on preventing another fallout of the financial system, and discussion of the CRA
would be to fully determine the role it played in the financial crisis.
To discuss expansion at this level now is truly irresponsible.
I want to thank everyone who is here, and I also thank the chairman for the opportunity to raise these issues, and I yield back.
The CHAIRMAN. I am always glad to give the gentlewoman from
Minnesota a chance to raise her issues.
The gentleman from Georgia for 2 minutes.
Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I certainly take strong issue with what has been said on the
other side, with all due respect. I think it is a cheap shot to try
to connect what is happening over there at ACORN with the CRA.
This is a very credible program. Let me just share with you what
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke says about this. He says,
‘‘Our own experience with CRA over more than 30 years and recent
analysis of available data, including data on subprime loans performance, runs counter to the charge that CRA was at the root of
or otherwise contributed in any substantial way to the current
mortgage difficulties.’’
Comptroller of the Currency John Dugan said, ‘‘The CRA is not
the culprit behind the subprime mortgage crisis or the broader
credit quality issues in the marketplace.’’
And FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair said, ‘‘I think we can agree that
a complex interplay of risky behaviors by lenders and by borrowers
and investors, that is what led to the current financial storm. To
be sure, there is plenty of blame to go around. However, I want to
give you my verdict on the CRA: Not guilty.’’
This is what the leaders of our system are saying, with all due
respect, and I think if you are going to measure CRA, let’s measure
them right. Let’s measure them by what their results have been in
helping with a tremendously difficult issue, and that has been to
go in and stop the redlining and discrimination of low-income and

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minority communities. They have done an excellent job, and we
need to move forward and reenergize the CRA, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. We have the last two members to speak, the gentleman from Texas. The time is working out equally. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Neugebauer, for 21⁄2 minutes. Why should
he be the only Texan who didn’t say anything today?
Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As we all know,
CRA was put in place in 1977 and the landscape of banking and
lending, as has been said, is much different now than it was then.
While I am not sure that lenders ever really need to be required
to make loans in communities they serve in order for those loans
to be made, it is reasonable for our committee to look at how well
banks are meeting the needs of their communities. Results of the
CRA exams show compliance with that law is 99 percent.
Today’s banking environment is much different than it was when
the law was enacted, and there is a lot more competition among
banks for customers. If customers find that things are not going to
work out with one lender, they have the option of seeing another
lender. But—and they have options in their own communities, but
to use lenders in other areas more easily as well. And so now it
is just not about getting a loan from the lender in your region, but
you can get loans from lenders from other regions.
Banks are watching their risk more carefully these days, and
hopefully lenders have learned from the mistakes of underwriting
standards that were too relaxed and forgetting that borrowers have
to show an ability to repay. Serving customers must be balanced
with safety and soundness, and I am concerned with proposals to
separate safety and soundness regulations and consumer regulation.
It is interesting that the Treasury proposal to move CRA regulation and compliance examinations away from the functional regulators to the new agency, the chairman has drafted a legislation
that keeps CRA regulation where it is. I am a little mystified. If
it is good enough to keep CRA regulation with safety and soundness regulator, I am wondering why we shouldn’t keep consumer
protection regulation coupled with safety and soundness regulation
as well.
No one on this committee wants a creditworthy small business
in their community to go without a loan or to hear about a working
family who was unable to get a mortgage that they could qualify
for. But we also have to ask whether CRA remains necessary to ensure banks are serving these needs in their communities and
whether these needs will be served without CRA requirements and,
more importantly, the cost of these programs.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. I will yield the remaining 21⁄2 minutes to the
gentleman from Indiana, but I will take 15 seconds to answer the
gentleman’s question. In the consumer area, we have all of those
programs which protect individuals. CRA is not individual, you do
not under the CRA get a right to get this or that. You do under
fair housing, etc. And that is the distinction and one that deals
with a broader set of policies. It is not an individual situation.
The gentleman from Indiana is now recognized for 2 minutes.

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Mr. CARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In this weakened financial system, the Community Reinvestment Act will play a vital role
in providing credit to disadvantaged communities that are often ignored or discriminated against by financial institutions. This Act
became necessary because, for too long, banks have ignored economically challenged neighborhoods and dismissed loan applications offhand regardless of the creditworthiness of borrowers.
CRA directs depository institutions to find ways to responsibly
invest in communities with which they do business. This has
worked very well for over 30 years, but the time has come to expand and modernize the reach of CRA to all financial institutions.
It is important that all Americans, regardless of social and economic factors, have an opportunity to access the capital they need
to start or expand small businesses or to purchase property.
In order to rebuild the financial sector, CRA needs to be broadened so that no financial institution will be allowed to engage in
discriminatory lending. CRA neither encourages nor condones bad
lending. In fact, only those who are creditworthy and have the resources to pay loans back qualify under CRA. CRA has led to an
increase in homeownership rates among low-income and minority
families, as well as the significant investment in affordable rental
housing, community facilities and broader community economic development. Since then, we have taken significant steps toward rebuilding our economy. This will protect investors and empower
communities. To achieve this, however, we need to modernize CRA
by expanding its reach and making it even more effective.
As we continue the ongoing effort to rebuild our financial system,
I believe it is vital that we maintain for CRA, which has provided
a foundation upon which low- and middle-income families can
begin building their lives.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. We will now ask our witnesses to come forward.
I do want to note that unfortunately, because of a family matter,
one of our witnesses that we were looking forward to hearing from,
Marc Morial, who is the president and chief executive of the Urban
League, will not be able to attend.
So I will recognize now the gentlewoman from California with regard to Mr. Morial.
Ms. WATERS. I ask unanimous consent to insert into the record
the testimony of Mr. Marc Morial, president of the Urban League.
Due to a family emergency, Mr. Marc Morial from the Urban
League was unable to testify today, and I request that his testimony be entered into the hearing record.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, is is so ordered. Let me now
say to the witnesses that any additional material in addition to
what they say orally that they want put in the record, whether it
is part of their statement or any supporting material, we will without objection accept for the record. So no one needs to ask for any
permission on that.
And we will begin with the bank commissioner of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Steven Antonakes.

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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEVEN L. ANTONAKES,
COMMISSIONER OF BANKS, COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

Mr. ANTONAKES. Good morning, Chairman Frank, and distinguished members of the committee. My name is Steven Antonakes,
and I serve as the commissioner of banks for the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts.
Enacted over 30 years ago, CRA is the most significant of all
banking laws to address the practice of redlining or refusing to
lend in low- and moderate-income communities despite sound lending opportunities. Unfortunately, ongoing disparities between pricing the loans to white and minority borrowers clearly demonstrates
that more needs to be done.
Moreover, it will take years for many urban communities to recover from the devastation of the ongoing foreclosure crisis. More
so than ever before, access to sustainable homeownership opportunities in low- and moderate-income communities will be essential.
An argument has been advanced by some that CRA is the root
cause of the economic crisis in that it encouraged banks to sacrifice
underwriting standards to increase homeownership opportunities.
In my view, this contention is completely without merit.
First, while CRA requires banks to serve their entire community,
the Act specifically prohibits banks from making unsafe and unsound loans. The drafters of CRA recognized that unsustainable
loans are even more harmful to consumers and communities than
an absence of credit. CRA-covered lenders that engaged in high
risk lending, most notably Fremont Investment and Loan, Countrywide, Lehman Brothers, National City, IndyMac, and Washington
Mutual should have been strongly criticized by Federal regulators
in terms of CRA compliance for originating and funding mortgage
loans that borrowers could not afford.
Second, large lenders and Wall Street firms did not develop confusing and risky subprime mortgage loans out of an altruistic sense
of obligation to meet the needs of low- and moderate-income communities; they did so out of greed.
Massachusetts’ efforts to ensure banks serve their communities
predate the passage of CRA in 1977. In 1982, Massachusetts broadened the coverage of the CRA to cover credit unions. In November
2007, Governor Deval Patrick signed groundbreaking foreclosure
prevention legislation which extended CRA-type requirements to
nonbank mortgage companies.
Given today’s changing financial banking landscape, the ongoing
financial crisis, and the debate and consideration of the Obama Administration’s regulatory reform initiative, it is the appropriate
time to consider how CRA can be modernized to make it even more
effective in the years ahead.
In addition to extending CRA requirements beyond banks, Congress should consider the following: first, require affiliate lending
to be reviewed. Some of the largest banks in this country were either directly or indirectly in the subprime and nontraditional mortgage markets, and yet in nearly every case, the largest banks consistently received satisfactory or outstanding CRA ratings. Current
CRA ratings or regulations allow banks to have only their good
loans considered and can shield their bad loans in an affiliated in-

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stitution. Congress and the Federal regulators should close this
loophole and require all lending by affiliates to be included in the
review of a bank’s CRA performance.
Second, increased review standards for the largest institutions.
Existing Federal CRA regulations define a large bank as having assets over $1 billion. Some of these institutions are often examined
every 4 to 5 years if they have previously received a CRA rating
of satisfactory or outstanding. However, as the banking industry
has further consolidated, the $1 billion asset threshold has become
increasingly antiquated. The scope and frequency of CRA examination should be commensurate with the bank’s market share. A significantly more robust annual examination process should be undertaken for the top 20 bank lenders in the country.
Third, downgrade banks that originate unsustainable home mortgage loans. Massachusetts has adopted a suitability standard when
reviewing mortgage lenders’ CRA performance. Congress should
similarly amend the Federal law so that the origination of
unsustainable loans has an adverse impact on a bank’s CRA rating.
Fourth, mandate the evaluation of loan modification efforts. CRA
should be utilized to measure the pace, number, and quality of loan
modifications. This type of public analysis will provide greater incentives for banks to move more aggressively to avoid unnecessary
foreclosures.
And fifth, downgrade banks whose partnerships harm the underbanked. Congress and regulators should hold banks accountable for
activities that harm unbanked or underbanked consumers. The
spirit of CRA embodies an accessible banking industry which promotes savings and increased credit opportunities in order to promote upward economic ability. Practices of national banks and Federal thrifts to evade State consumer protection laws by partnering
with third parties to offer high cost payday loans, refund anticipation loans, or costly check cashing services are reprehensible. The
partnerships should be outlawed. Until they are, CRA should at
least be utilized to strongly criticize participating institutions for
engaging in these activities.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify and look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Antonakes can be found on page
78 of the appendix.]
Ms. WATERS. [presiding] Mr. White.
STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE J. WHITE, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, LEONARD N. STERN SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, NEW
YORK UNIVERSITY

Mr. WHITE. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and members of
the committee on both sides. My name is Lawrence J. White. I am
a professor of economics at the NYU Stern School of Business and
a member of the Financial Markets Working Group at the
Mercatus Center at George Mason University. I represent solely
myself at this hearing. Thank you for the opportunity to testify at
this important hearing on the Community Reinvestment Act of
1977.
My views about the CRA surely differ from those of many other
individuals who are testifying at today’s hearing. I believe that de-

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spite the good intentions and worthwhile goals of the CRA’s advocates, the CRA is an inappropriate instrument for achieving those
goals. Fundamentally, the CRA is a regulatory effort to lean on
banks and savings institutions in vague and subjective ways to
make loans and investments that the CRA’s proponents believe
those depository institutions would somehow otherwise not make.
It is a continued effort to preserve old structures in the face of a
modernizing financial economy. At base the CRA is an anachronistic and protectionist effort to force artificially a local focus for
finance in an increasingly competitive and electronic and ever widening realm of financial services.
Further, ironically, the burdens of the CRA may well discourage
banks from setting up new locations in low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods and thus providing local residents with better-priced
alternatives to high-cost check cashing and payday lending establishments.
There have recently been broader critiques of the CRA, arguments that the CRA encouraged banks to make subprime loans
which were then securitized and thus the CRA bears major responsibility for the mortgage meltdown and the subprime debacle. I believe that these critiques are badly aimed; the facts do not support
them. The CRA has multiple flaws, but responsibility for the
subprime debacle is not among them.
There is a better way.
First, to the extent that lending problems can be traced to discrimination against racial or ethnic groups or involving other categories of personal discrimination, the right tool is more vigorous
enforcement of anti-discrimination laws, notably the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act of 1974.
Second, vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws, especially
with respect to mergers, is necessary to keep financial markets
competitive so that banks and other lenders are constantly under
competitive pressure to provide attractive financial services offerings to their customers. If for some reason enforcement of the antitrust laws is deemed not sufficient in this respect, then policy makers should open entry into the business of banking to companies
that have a business model of providing good value to low- and
moderate-income households.
It is ironic, in my view, that many of the same groups that have
advocated more efforts to provide financial services to low- and
moderate-income communities were those who also opposed WalMart’s efforts to enter the banking business and thereby to offer
more and better and lower cost financial services to low- and moderate-income communities.
Consistent with this focus on providing good value to low- and
moderate-income households, vigorous competition should not veer
off into predatory practices in which aggressive sales personnel
take advantage of unsophisticated customers who are insufficiently
aware of better alternatives.
Third, to the extent that there are socially worthwhile lending
opportunities that somehow are not being satisfied by existing
lending institutions, these projects should be funded through the
public fisc in an on-budget and transparent process. The Community Development Financial Institutions Fund, authorized by the

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Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act
of 1994 and managed by the U.S. Treasury, is a good example of
this kind of public funding mechanism. To the extent that its current funding levels are inadequate, they should be increased.
Finally, if public policy persists with something that resembles
the CRA, the annual local lending obligations of banks should be
explicitly quantified. These obligations could then be traded among
banks so that a system could arise that is similar to the cap-andtrade system that has proved so successful for dealing with sulfur
dioxide emissions in a low cost and efficient manner.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify at this important
hearing this morning. I will be happy to answer questions from the
committee.
[The prepared statement of Professor White can be found on page
231 of the appendix.]
Ms. WATERS. Thank you. Mr. Taylor.
STATEMENT OF JOHN TAYLOR, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NATIONAL COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT
COALITION (NCRC)

Mr. TAYLOR. Representative Waters, Representative Hensarling,
and other distinguished members of the committee, thank you for
allowing me to testify. I am testifying on my behalf as well as for
600 organizations that NCRC represents, not to mention thousands
of organizations and individuals who care about fair and equal access to credit.
It doesn’t seem to matter how many facts we put forward and
how many notable economists like Bernanke and others who keep
saying over and over again the data does not support that CRA had
a negative impact other than perhaps given the benefit of the doubt
to some of them, even Larry Lindsey, that it had a very slight impact. It doesn’t seem to matter how often we say that, but I was
happy to hear Professor White say that the subprime debacle had
nothing to do with CRA. The facts don’t seem to matter, the myth
is going to continue, and so I am not going to address that. You
want to ask me a question, I will address that with you.
But let me say this, CRA is a very simple law; it is all of 2 pages
long. What it basically says is that banks will have an affirmative
obligation to meet the credit needs of the communities that they
are chartered to serve, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, simple.
Simple and consistent with safety and soundness, just in case
there is any doubt. So what does all that boil down to? It boils
down to this. Free market? Yes, we want a free market too. That
is what we are fighting for. CRA is all about the free market but
not free to exploit or free to ignore neighborhoods or free to ignore
certain peoples. A free market that really addresses the credit
needs and allows people to pursue their version of the American
dream the old-fashioned way. Like going to financial institutions
and being able to get access to credit and basic banking services.
And I once talked to Frank Luntz, hardly a bastion of liberal
thought, one of the most notable conservative pollsters there are in
this country. And he said that this ought to be—CRA ought to be
a Main Street tenet of the Republican Party as it is for the Demo-

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cratic Party. This shouldn’t be partisan because this is about safe
and sound lending and people having access to our financial services sector, to that free market that we believe in.
So those folks who were marching the other day, those blue collar workers, the truck drivers and people working bakeries and
newspapers, they ought to have the same chance when they walk
into a financial institution of getting a decent loan and getting
treated as a decent person and not have to be somebody wealthy
or some large corporation to be able to get access to credit and capital in this country. That is the law of the land. That ought to remain the law of the land. But there are ways that we can improve
this and those opportunities are before us now.
First, we need to expand the coverage. The idea that we have
these independent mortgage companies—who, by the way, if you
really want to look for the culprit, look to them. They are the ones
who create these high-cost loans that the gentlewoman from Minnesota confused with CRA loans. Those are the agencies. Those are
the ones issuing those loans that shouldn’t have been issued. Here
is my professor nodding on the right, my conservative counterpart.
Those were these folks. We need to expand CRA to make sure that
all segments of the financial services sector—let us face it, we now
know, right, there isn’t a segment of the financial services sector
that isn’t supported by the U.S. taxpayer. We now know that.
And those people marching the other day saw the billions of tax
dollars, trillions going to banks. Why can’t they and working class
people in this country and blue collar people who vote for you, why
can’t they have the same fair and equal access to credit and capital? So we need to expand it to credit unions, independent mortgage companies, to security firms. We need to end this business of
banks being able to not count areas where they are doing a lot of
lending as part of the CRA assessment area. Right now whole
swaths of where they do lending through brokers are not counted
in their CRA exam. That needs to change. We need to expand the
data enhancements. What we have in the way of small business reporting, where we can pinpoint census tracks by race, by gender,
mortgages and mortgage related products that are made, we can’t
do that for small business lending.
And as a result, we are really lagging in our ability to make sure
that access to credit and capital goes to underserved communities,
to people of color and to women. We really need to improve that.
We need to consider race on exams once and for all.
Frankly, we have—the law focuses on class, right, economics?
Making sure that you do not ignore low- and moderate-income communities. But even controlling, looking at CRA and controlling on
those exams for income and for housing starts and for creditworthiness, you still see a disparate difference in the treatment of African
Americans and Latinos. Mr. Hensarling, in your district, 68 percent
of African Americans in your congressional district got subprime
loans. Almost over 50 percent, almost 58 percent of Latinos in your
congressional district got subprime loans. And we know from
Fannie and Freddie when they were purchasing these loans and we
looked at their creditworthiness, that half of those, 50 percent of
those borrowers qualified for prime loans. Why shouldn’t we as a
bipartisan house Financial Services Committee and Congress be

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pushing for stronger, fairer, equal access that should just be the
law of the land. And then finally—my final point, Representative
Waters. I seem to have 30 seconds on this one. I don’t know if—
I am going the wrong way.
Ms. WATERS. Your time is up.
Mr. TAYLOR. May I—one sentence? We really need to have—
Ms. WATERS. We are going to come back and do questions. We
have to move onto the next one. Thank you. You can say this when
you get a question.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor can be found on page 186
of the appendix.]
Mr. Roberts, go ahead.
STATEMENT OF BENSON F. ROBERTS, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR POLICY AND PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT, LOCAL
INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORPORATION (LISC)

Mr. ROBERTS. Good morning, Ms. Waters, Mr. Hensarling, and
other members of the committee. My name is Benson Roberts. I
work for LISC, the Local Initiatives Support Corporation. We are
a community development organization. We work with community
groups and banks and States and localities and many other partners to rebuild low-income communities in urban and rural areas
around the country.
I want to focus on the community development aspect of CRA.
Many other people here today are addressing the crucial home
mortgage aspects of CRA. Community development is also a very
important part of CRA. By community development, I am talking
about rental housing development and finance. I am talking about
grocery stores, other retail, and other commercial facilities in lowand moderate-income communities. I am talking about community
facilities like health clinics and child care centers that help our citizens have access to the tools for self sufficiency and independence.
I am talking about partnerships with community development financial institutions such as Mr. White referenced earlier. CRA has
been crucial to this community development activity.
Banks have made billions of dollars of loans and investments for
community development, generating over a million affordable rental homes, millions of economic development space and community
space. And beyond those numbers, what CRA has done is to help
forge partnerships among the banks, the community groups and
other, for-profit, developers, States and localities to move these
communities back into stability and revitalization. And it has proven both safe and profitable.
Moreover, most Federal housing production and community development programs today rely on these partnerships. Without
these public-private partnerships and the private partner in them,
these Federal programs are going to be compromised. Less will get
done, more government money will be required for each project,
and there will be less business discipline in the process because we
need the banks to be part of the process in ensuring that these are
really done safely and successfully.
So many Federal policies made through this committee depend
on having strong bank participation in the process. We want these
communities and we want these public programs to be part of the

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mainstream, not to be isolated from the mainstream. These community development projects have done a great job at rebuilding
neighborhoods. We would invite you to go on tour with us or many
other people to see for yourselves what this is like. It is really remarkable and really heartening, I think.
Other people have cited Chairman Bernanke. I will do the same.
He makes the point that: ‘‘This community stabilization work is important for the overall economic recovery. Healthy and vibrant
neighborhoods are a source of economic growth and social stability.
Community development financial institutions and other community groups are already responding to the evident needs, but they
will require many willing partners to ensure success in the long
run, including governments, mortgage servicers and mainstream
lenders.’’
How is it going? Unfortunately, not very well these days, I am
afraid. While CRA and community development have in the past
fared very well, we have seen the effectiveness of CRA with respect
to community development erode over the last several years. Now,
it is true that things are particularly tough today in this financial
crisis, but the trend began well before then. We now have in lowincome housing tax credits, declining investments from over $8 billion in 2007 to about $5 billion last year. CRA can and should do
more to encourage broadening of the investor base by getting other
banks to participate. But the way CRA is structured, it really provides very little workable opportunity for many of the local and regional banks to get involved.
In economic development, we see the same thing, a real decline
in lending for economic development in low-income communities.
We still see investments flowing for new markets tax credits, but
it is very hard to get the loans on those properties. We are worried
that investment capital is drying up.
We have lots of recommendations. Some of them Mr. Taylor has
suggested we think have a lot of merit. We have other ideas as
well. But we really need to make CRA work for the rural communities, the smaller cities, the Gulf Coast, and many, many places
in this country that just can’t get the capital they need to help
America grow and recover.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Roberts can be found on page
170 of the appendix.]
Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much. With that, I will recognize
myself for 5 minutes. Mr. Taylor, I would like you to share with
us your suggestions about how we can get communities more involved with CRA. I was initially some years ago under the impression that community groups and organizations could go to their
local bank and ask to see the books and meet with the managers
and find out what was going on in their immediate communities.
But I have not found that to be true. Also, I don’t believe that local
communities are well informed about examinations and how they
can be a part of that. So would you help us to understand what
we should be doing to ensure enforcement and for participation by
our communities?
Mr. TAYLOR. Sure. First off, you are absolutely right. If you pass
a law but the sheriff isn’t interested in regulating the law, it is
going to be made hollow. And that is precisely what has happened.

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And it relates a bit to what Mr. Roberts was talking about, the recent weakening of CRA by the regulatory agencies frankly who
simply don’t have public hearings like they used to, don’t count—
don’t reach out to community groups like they used to regularly
just to say how is this bank doing in your community, less frequent
exams. There has just been this plethora of moving away from the
enforcement under CRA.
So I think that the most important thing and this gives me the
chance to say the point I was trying to say, is the enforcement authority—we really need to have an enforcement authority who sees
it as their mission to protect the taxpayers, protect consumers, and
to ensure that the CRA is adhered to.
CRA is not a law about communities. CRA is a law about individuals, individuals having access to credit and capital and basic
banking services. And to think that the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act or the Fair Housing Act, as Mr. Hensarling has—and now I get
a chance to disagree with Professor White—that they will fill the
purpose of CRA belies a misunderstanding of what CRA is about.
Because the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Fair Housing
Act will prohibit you from discriminating if you are making loans.
If you choose not to make loans in neighborhoods, then you won’t
have to worry about the Equal Credit Opportunity Act or the Fair
Housing Act. It is CRA that brings you into those neighborhoods,
which is why we support President Obama’s initiative in the Consumer Finance Protection Agency that he proposed, that it includes
CRA because it is one thing to make sure they don’t discriminate;
it is another thing to make sure that they are doing business in
these neighborhoods to begin with.
So consumers can then educate themselves, can be in contact
with their banks, can do a lot to communicate. But the truth of the
matter is we need the regulatory agencies holding their hands to
the fire, having these banks not ignore neighborhoods and making
safe and sound loans, primarily prime loans available to people in
these neighborhoods.
Ms. WATERS. Thank you. Mr. White, I appreciate your testimony.
And even though you disagree with the mission of CRA, I thank
you for helping to clarify CRA’s role in the subprime meltdown or
lack of a role. But I would like to ask you, do you also agree that
CRA should be placed in the Consumer Finance Agency under the
new regulatory reform that we are discussing?
Mr. WHITE. That is a tough one, Representative Waters, since—
as you know from my testimony, I am not an advocate of CRA to
begin with. My first preference would be for it not to be there at
all. If there is going to be a Consumer Protection Financial Agency,
it strikes me that that ought to be focusing on consumer protection
and that means protection against predatory practices, against bad
information. I don’t see CRA as fitting into that particular framework.
Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas.
Mr. HENSARLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Antonakes,—I
am sorry. Did I pronounce that right? I believe in your testimony
you said that CRA does not require banks to make unsustainable

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loans. Does it require them to make sustainable loans if it doesn’t
require them to make unsustainable loans?
Mr. ANTONAKES. Representative, the law specifically requires
them to make loans throughout their local communities that are
written under the tenets of safe and sound underwriting practices.
Mr. HENSARLING. So arguably it is mandating that they engage
in some universe of sustainable loans. So it would be your opinion
that we need a law to mandate banks to make sustainable loans
rather?
Mr. ANTONAKES. It is my opinion that until loans are made
throughout communities, despite whatever the geographic or the
racial makeup of that community may be, that, yes, an affirmative
obligation to make loans throughout communities should exist until
we can demonstrate statistically that is no longer necessary.
Mr. HENSARLING. In Massachusetts, how many banks practice
racial discrimination? And can you tell me their names?
Mr. ANTONAKES. We examine banks on a regular basis. We have
primarily a community bank supervision in Massachusetts. We
have had some fair lending issues in the past. We don’t have any
at this current time. However, fair lending—
Mr. HENSARLING. So the banks that are under your jurisdiction,
as of today you can’t name any that are practicing racial discrimination; is that correct?
Mr. ANTONAKES. We have none that we have current fair lending
issue with. That is not to say that examination and supervision
should be abandoned however.
Mr. HENSARLING. Are the banks in Massachusetts exempt from
the Equal Opportunity Credit Act or the Fair Housing Act?
Mr. ANTONAKES. No, they are not.
Mr. HENSARLING. Do you believe that the Obama Administration
is failing to properly enforce these laws?
Mr. ANTONAKES. No, I do not.
Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Taylor, I heard what I would view as your
tortured logic. We will continue to agree to disagree on that particular point. I did hear you say, Mr. Taylor, that CRA is a simple
law. To a lot of bankers, it is simply just a very expensive law. And
I am still trying to figure out what we are getting at here in the
sense of—if we are not forcing banks to make unsustainable loans,
they are in the business of making sustainable loans.
So if there is a universe of citizens who are being denied credit
opportunities in the sustainable loan universe due to race, yes, as
individuals, the opposite of—you have the Equal Opportunity Credit Act, Fair Housing Act. You say that applies to individuals. If
they don’t make loans, they don’t come within the ambit.
Frankly, I would beg to disagree on that particular legal interpretation. So if we are not forcing them to make sustainable loans
they would already make, there is some universe of the loans we
are asking them to make that they wouldn’t otherwise make. So essentially we are asking the government to substitute its judgment
for the decisions of creditworthiness that would be derived from a
competitive marketplace. I have to tell you as I look at our first
trillion dollar deficit, as I look at Social Security going broke, as I
look at Medicare going broke, as I look at Medicaid going broke,
as I look at the National Flood Insurance going broke, the track

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record of government in deciding what type of loans and programs
are sustainable is not a good one. And so are we not coming up
simply with a universe of people who are either going to already
get loans that the banks are going to loan them anyway and charging the banks $30,000, $40,000, or $50,000 for the privileging of
doing what they are already going to do, we already have laws on
the books to make sure they don’t discriminate.
Again, it seems like a rather expensive anachronism today. And
Mr. Taylor, my time is running out, but I always enjoy hearing
from you.
Mr. TAYLOR. Sure. If you don’t mind hearing from me another
minute.
Mr. HENSARLING. Probably less than a minute, but go ahead.
Mr. TAYLOR. First off, as far as the government running things
and their function, I happen to think we have the greatest country
in the world, and I think our government has done a very good job,
including the Federal Government. By the way, you work here and
I don’t. And you have worked here for a long time. So I actually
don’t disparage the Federal Government the way you do. I actually
think in many years they have done a good job. I am here to help
them do a better job. You keep confusing racial lending with CRA.
You need to read the law, with all due respect, Representative. It
is an income law. It is about working class, blue collar people having access to credit and capital. And, yes, we would like to see race
considered because there still is a disparity in that.
But the key is this: If left to their own demise, financial institutions historically would have really ignored low-wealth neighborhoods in low-wealth populations. That is a fact. What happened is
they closed a lot of branches, they closed a lot of shops and in their
place in urban and rural areas came the payday lenders, the pawnshops, the subprime and the high-cost lenders. And that happened
under several Presidents’ watch. That is what we are trying to fix
to make this work properly, safely and soundly, and effectively in
these low-wealth neighborhoods. Thank you for listening to me.
The CHAIRMAN. I will now recognize myself. First, for some reason, the question of ACORN, I would guess we will amend in all
saying mighty obsessions from fairly small acorns will grow. This
one organization appears to be totally dominating the thinking of
my colleague, not during the period when the Bush Administration
was funding it. There was apparently a pass for the Bush Administration. I haven’t been able to find any insistence that we cut off
funding from ACORN when it was coming from the Bush Administration. There was also this question about their testifying. I
checked. The last time they testified when we were the Majority
was in June of 2007, which was probably the first time since we
had only taken over before. So they did testify once over 2 years
ago. The notion that some recent change has occurred has no basis.
But I also want to talk about the—the gentleman from Texas
talked about contradictions. It seems to me that he has himself
evinced one when he first said that the problem with CRA is that
it was forcing people to get mortgages where the lending standards
were relaxed.
He then said that because of the actions by this committee, the
credit card bill and the mortgage bill he said, we have cut off credit

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to low-income people. I wish that those were more true, that they
had gone into effect. The credit card bill which passed doesn’t go
into effect for some months, although I am inclined to think we
may have to push that up because the credit card companies have
been abusing it. The restrictions we have put on mortgages haven’t
gone into effect yet. We passed them. They haven’t become law yet
because the Senate hasn’t passed them. But the theory is this: He
says that there are people and those of us who support the CRA
who are pushing for relaxation of mortgage standards, of no-doc
loans that the gentleman from Minnesota mentioned. Exactly the
opposite is the case. It has been we on the Democratic side who
have consistently tried to enact regulations and laws to prevent
those abusive forms of loans. In 1994, when the Democrats last
controlled Congress before 2007, this committee passed—it wasn’t
me. It was my predecessor. It was the senior Democrat, John LaFalce—the Homeownership and Equity Protection Act, which mandated the Federal Reserve to put restrictions on mortgage lending.
And Mr. Greenspan refused to do it. And when some of us then
tried during the early parts of 2000 to press for legislation, we
were rejected. It was the Bush Administration in 2004 that mandated a significant increase in the number of mortgages for people
below the median that had to be bought by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.
In 2005, the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt, the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Miller, and myself, working with
Mr. Bachus tried to get legislation through to limit exactly the kind
of loans that the gentleman from Texas said have caused the problem. And the Republican leadership said, you can’t do it. We were
ordered not do it. And we have legislation pending now. The fact
is that many of us have been concerned about housing for lowerincome people, primarily rental housing. And that has been a big
debate. I do believe that it is a mistake to push people into homeownership when they are not economically and in some cases socially prepared to do it. I am very proud that Larry Lindsey, who
is a major official in the economic area in every one of the last
three Republican Administrations, President Reagan and both
Presidents Bush, cited me as one of the few elected officials who
has been consistently skeptical of this pushing of low-income homeownership. So we have tried very hard to do that.
Now we get to the CRA. The argument was first that the CRA
caused it. That is unsustainable. As Bush Administration officials
have said—Sheila Bair, George Bush’s appointee to head the
FDIC—I want to give you my verdict on CRA, not guilty. I ask that
the whole testimony go in here. So let the record show that CRA
is not guilty of causing the financial crisis. Another Bush appointee, Ben Bernanke. He is the chairman of the Federal Reserve.
He is now an Obama appointee. He was a Bush appointee when
he said that. Not just as chairman of the Federal Reserve, but previously as the head of the Council of Economic Advisors.
It is not true that CRA caused the problem. Here is what he
says, ‘‘The available evidence to date, however, does not lend support to the argument that CRA is to blame for causing the
subprime loan crisis. Our own experience with CRA over more than
30 years and recent analysis of available data’’—this is November

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of 2008—‘‘including data on subprime loan performance runs
counter to the charge that CRA was the root of or otherwise contributed in any substantive way to the current mortgage difficulties.’’
So since the basic argument has failed, we now have a second
level argument. It was the CRA that scared the banks into giving
money to ACORN so they could cause the problem. So then the
question is, did the CRA scare the Bush Administration? Was HUD
under George Bush, which was regularly funding ACORN, intimidated somehow by the fact that there was a CRA even though they
weren’t covered? Yes, there are some serious problems here. But
the notion that it was a CRA actually I have just been—late flash.
I will give myself 5 more seconds.
The total funding under the Bush Administration for ACORN is
now $14,215,475. I feel like I am running a telethon. So the Bush
Administration is now, I think, at first place at $14,215,000. I now
recognize the gentleman from Texas. Who is next? Mr. Neugebauer.
Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to go back
to your testimony, Mr. White. You said that banking has changed
a lot since CRA was instituted and as you stated, you are not a big
proponent of CRA. Is it that you think that task is already—could
be accomplished by abolishing CRA or is CRA failing to accomplish
its task and you think something different is needed? Can you
elaborate on that just a little bit for me?
Mr. WHITE. Thank you, Congressman. I think it is primarily the
latter, the intentions are good, but there are better ways than leaning on banks in this vague, ill-defined way to accomplish those
goals. As I indicated, first, if you think the problem is racial or
other kinds of discrimination, find those who are discriminating
and prosecute and fine them and throw them in jail, do the max.
Second, if you think it is a problem that they are lazy, they are just
not competitive—here are these profitable loans, these worthwhile
loans and they are just not finding it worthwhile because they are
lazy, they are incompetent, let us get more competition into this
area, let us encourage companies that have a successful business
model of providing good value to low- and moderate-income households, companies like Wal-Mart that were interested in entering
the financial services area, that were stonewalled, that were prevented from entering this area.
Let us encourage them to enter and provide those services. If
still there is not enough financial services, then let us do it through
the public fisc, let us do it in an on-budget and transparent way;
as I indicated the Community Development Financial Institution’s
Fund is a good framework. And if it is inadequately funded, let us
fund it more adequately. That is the way to deal with these issues.
Mr. NEUGEBAUER. And I still want to go back to that last part
there, the fund. How would you fund that?
Mr. WHITE. I will pay more taxes. And I think that it is simply
the right thing to do, and the Congress, the Obama Administration,
the American people should step up and be prepared to fund it
more adequately.
Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Mr. Roberts, did you want to respond to that?
Mr. ROBERTS. We are big supporters of the CDFI Fund as well.
But the CDFI Fund works because it leverages bank financing. The

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CDFI Fund leverages about 30 private dollars for every Federal
dollar. So if you take that $30 away, you are going to have to multiple the CDFI appropriation by 30-fold. And then you won’t get the
partnership and engagement of the local banks because the CDFIs
provide financing that complements what banks find more feasible
for them to do directly. And you don’t get the additional scrutiny
of the CDFIs that the banks provide because of their participation
and so you are putting it on the Federal Government to make all
kinds of very complex underwriting judgments about all kinds of
organizations out there. It just doesn’t work. This public-private
partnership is really what has transformed the effectiveness of the
Federal policies and I will also cite Chairman Bernanke in observing that mainstream financial institutions have been pulling away
from CDFIs, that CDFIs are liquidity constrained as a result.
They are unable to meet the needs of their communities in part
because they cannot raise the private capital anymore in this climate.
Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Mr. Taylor wants his standard last 30 seconds. So I am going to give it to him.
Mr. TAYLOR. Well, I want to keep trying to unconfuse people
here, Professor White and others. That a racial discrimination,
anti-discrimination law substitute for what the purpose and mission of CRA is. It doesn’t. Because CRA is about having an affirmative obligation to go in and offer product. If you offer—
The CHAIRMAN. Time is up.
Mr. NEUGEBAUER. You got your 30 seconds.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from North Carolina. But before
I do, I want to correct myself when I said that the Bush Administration had given $14,275,000 to ACORN. That is through HUD.
We don’t know whether they gave them money elsewhere. That
CRA may have been scarier than I thought to the Bush Administration. So the $14,275,000 funding from the Bush Administration
to ACORN only applies to HUD funding. We are checking on other
funding. The gentleman from North Carolina.
Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we benefit from
having a copy of the CRA law in the record and I therefore ask
unanimous consent to submit a copy of the—
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WATT. Mr. Taylor is absolutely right, I don’t know what all
this fuss is about and Mr. White, I am just baffled by your testimony. I am sorry. The notion that antitrust laws should be a substitute for CRA or that Wal-Mart should be a substitute for CRA
just—is just beyond me. I don’t understand that. Suppose, Mr.
White, that all of the banks in my community—I live in Charlotte—independently, they didn’t get together collectively and decide this, but all of them decided that they were going to—not
going to serve any part of the priority community, would that be
a violation of the antitrust laws?
Mr. WHITE. Congressman, I am not a lawyer. I don’t practice
law.
Mr. WATT. It is obvious if you think the antitrust laws are going
to cover a lot of the things that CRA covers. But you have testified
here as if the antitrust laws in some way are a substitute for CRA.
And then when I asked you a question, you say I am not a lawyer.

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Mr. WHITE. Sorry. Let me continue. However, my understanding
of the antitrust laws—I was the chief economist at the Antitrust
Division—
Mr. WATT. Just answer the question, Mr. White. Do you think if
all of these banks, independent of each other, decided that they
were not going to serve the minority community or put any
branches there or make any loans, that the antitrust laws would
have any application to that?
Mr. WHITE. From a conspiracy perspective, obviously, no.
Mr. WATT. Okay. All right. Again, I just don’t understand how
you can assert to us that the antitrust laws are somehow a substitute for CRA. Do you honestly believe that us authorizing WalMart to get into banking is going to be a satisfactory substitute for
CRA? That is what your testimony was, Mr. White.
Mr. WHITE. Congressman, I don’t understand what the argument
is—
Mr. WATT. I don’t understand it either.
Mr. WHITE. Profitable loans that somehow aren’t being made by
these profit-seeking institutions.
Mr. WATT. I understand that. I agree with that. But I don’t know
how you wipe the law off the book that says you shall make loans
in your community and solve a problem that you just acknowledged
is a problem. I agree that we are underserved in our community.
Do you think banks have any obligation to serve the communities
in which they operate?
Mr. WHITE. Congressman, I don’t see this kind of community
focus—
Mr. WATT. That is not the question I asked. Do you acknowledge
that banks have some obligation to serve the communities in which
they operate?
Mr. WHITE. Under the law—again, I am not a lawyer—apparently they do.
Mr. WATT. Okay. All right. And do you disagree with the congressional findings that regulated financial institutions have continuing and affirmative obligations to help meet the credit needs of
the local communities in which they are charted? Do you disagree
with that?
Mr. WHITE. I don’t think that is good public policy. I don’t think
that is the way financial institutions ought to be bullied or forced.
Mr. WATT. You don’t think that ought to be the law?
Mr. WHITE. It is a matter of public policy and I disagree. I respectfully disagree.
Mr. WATT. I would be—I would actually be happy for you just
testified you disagree with any kind of CRA obligation. But to come
in here and tell me that Wal-Mart is a satisfactory substitute for
this obligation just insults my intelligence. And to tell me that the
antitrust laws will solve the problem when the antitrust doesn’t
cover any of this obligation is just—I don’t understand that. I don’t
know how you can with integrity do that to this committee.
Mr. WHITE. Congressman, if the problem is not enough competition, then we want to make sure that—
Mr. WATT. If I thought that was the problem, I would solve it the
way you suggested. But the problem is lack of service, not lack of
competition.

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The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. I was going to ask Mr. White a question.
And it comes from an article written by Stanley Kurtz, as senior
fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Institute. His argument is
this. He says ACORN’s local CRA enabled pressure tactics served
to entangle the financial system as a whole in the subprime mess.
This is his thesis. He says by using CRA and ties to sympathetic
congressional Democrats, ACORN succeeded in drawing Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac into the very policies that led to the current
disaster. And here is the way in which he lays out this case. He
says ACORN’s efforts to undermine credit standards in the late
1980’s taught it a valuable lesson. However much pressure ACORN
put on banks to lower credit standards, tough requirements in the
secondary market run by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac served as
a barrier to change.
Back then, Fannie and Freddie refused to buy loans that failed
to meet high credit standards. If, for example, a local bank buckled
to ACORN pressure and agreed to offer applicants a 5 percent
downpayment rate instead of the normal 10 to 20 percent, Fannie
and Freddie would refuse to buy up the mortgage. That would
leave all of the risk of these shaky loans with the local bank. So
again and again, local banks would tell ACORN that because of
standards imposed by Fannie and Freddie, they could lower their
credit standards only by a little.
So the 1980’s taught ACORN that their Washington lobbyists
would have to bring inside pressure on the government to undercut
credit standards at Fannie and Freddie. Only then would local
banks consider making loans available to customers with bad credit
histories, with very low wages, with virtually nothing in the bank
and even with bankruptcies on record. And precisely because
ACORN’s local pressure tactics were working, banks themselves
wanted Fannie and Freddie to loosen their standards still further
so as to buy up still more of the high-risk loans they had made at
ACORN’s assistance.
So by 1993, a grand alliance of ACORN, national Democrats and
local bankers looking for someone to lessen the risks imposed on
them by CRA and ACORN were uniting to pressure Fannie and
Freddie to loosen credit standards still further. He goes on in the
article to explain that ACORN called for at least half of Fannie and
Freddie’s loans to go to low-income customers. At first, the Clinton
Administration offered to set aside 30 percent, but eventually
ACORN got what it wanted.
By early 1994, the Clinton Administration floated plans for committing $1 trillion in loans to low- and moderate-income home buyers which would amount to about half of Fannie Mae’s business by
the end of the decade. Wall Street analysts attributed Fannie’s
willingness to go along with the change to the need to protect itself
against still more severe congressional attacks. And this sweeping
debasement of the credit standards was touted by Fannie Mae’s
Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, and Obama advisor, James A.
Johnson. This is also the period when Fannie Mae ramped up its
pilot programs in local partnership with ACORN, all of which became precedence and models for the pattern of risky subprime
mortgages at the root of today’s crisis. At both the local and na-

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tional level, ACORN served as the critical catalyst, levering pressure created by the Community Reinvestment Act and pull with
Democratic politicians to force Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into
a pattern of high-risk loans and a disastrous disregard of the most
basic financial standards. I know there are other factors in here because I know in 1992 the CRA Act—the GSE Act was passed setting those mandates that Congress basically set those housing
mandates for the GSEs.
But Mr. White, I was going to ask you if you believe that lowering those standards, getting standards down to zero percent or
3 percent or 5 percent in connection with the push to have half of
the portfolio held by the GSEs in subprime and alt-A contributed
to housing bubble and to the problem?
Mr. WHITE. Congressman, I have no knowledge at all about
ACORN’s actions, what they did, what they didn’t do. So I really
cannot comment on that. As my testimony indicated, everything I
know about who was originating the subprime mortgages, who is
investing in them, they are primarily non-CRA covered institutions.
Where you did have CRA-covered institutions like Washington Mutual, like Wachovia, like the depository side of Countrywide, like
Citi, they were investing because they saw this as a profitable investment, not because of CRA.
There is excellent empirical work that has been done by economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Elizabeth
Laderman and Carolina Reid. I urge everyone in this room to read
that article. It is excellent.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. White. The time has expired. I
recognize the gentlewoman from New York.
Mrs. MCCARTHY OF NEW YORK. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman. And I thank you for the hearing. I am really finding
this extremely interesting. I am also one of those Representatives
who has very wealthy people in my community. The majority of
them are probably middle-income families and I have underserved
areas. But listening to this conversation from both sides of the
aisle, from everything I understood, CRAs were to help all people,
not just minorities.
Now, I have an area—a community came to me several years
ago. They had no bank, they had no food store. All they had were
payday loan places to go cash their checks. Yes, they have small
homes. But they are all hard workers and over the years we have
been able to have CRAs come in. We have had community developments coming in. And I have to say, you drive down Main Street
nowadays, and it is a busy place. You have a beauty shop, you have
a bank, you have the supermarket. These are things that work.
Now, did anybody ever come in there? It is not that the residents
didn’t want it. And by the way, from what I can see, banks, when
they do go into these communities, make money. That is why I am
seeing a battle going on right now in my district because I have
credit unions that want to go into the underserved area and now
all of a sudden, I have banks that want to come into the underserved area. Nobody is telling them to go in there. They want to
go in there. They work. They need to cash their paycheck. They
need to take out loans to buy a home.

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These are things that are going on. So my concern is, if we did
what were the CRAs, who would come in to some of these communities? We have rural areas in the west, that whole towns are shut
down and a community development can go in there and help
them. CRAs can go in and help them rebuild their towns. We have
seen it. But you have to have faith in the community. And I think
that is the important thing. Mr. Taylor, you have been shut off so
many times, getting 30 seconds right at the end.
From hearing your testimony, I certainly agree with you on the
majority of issues that you are talking about. But when I talk
about modernizing or reforming the Community and Reinvestment
Act, what the effect such as payday loans and other services that
may be underserved in low-income areas are the only things that
they have to rely on. What is going to happen to people when they
need to cash their check? And I will give you some time to answer
those questions.
Mr. TAYLOR. Sure. And that is a very good example of the regulatory malaise that we have suffered over the last several years
where full service bank branches have been able to close their
branches and in their place have popped up these hybrid, high-cost
alternative basic banking services like payday lenders, pawnshops,
and check cashers. And community groups, many of our members
have struggled with financial institutions to try to get them to open
branches all over the country in underserved areas.
And they do it kicking and screaming. But I have to say—and
I will give you examples, like Houston’ fifth ward, which is a predominantly African-American community that didn’t have a single
bank branch in it. We challenged this bank to try and open a
branch there. They said there is no way, it is not profitable. They
forget the fact that while the average income may be less, there is
a denser population, so there is more incomes. Low- and moderateincome neighborhoods does not mean everybody is not working. It
means about 15 percent of them are not. That means 85 percent
of the people in those neighborhoods are working and they need
basic banking services.
So what happened to this bank? They opened a branch in Houston’s fifth ward. They predicted that maybe in 5 years, they would
be profitable. Within the first year, it became the most profitable
branch in this bank’s network, that first year. And this is true in
Roxbury where I come from, in other communities around the
country where they have opened branches and they have found indeed there is a pent-up demand, indeed they can make a profit. So
I think what we really need to do is—I would like to see those payday lenders go out of business altogether. I would like to see the
check cashers have a nominal impact in these neighborhoods.
I would like to see the same kind of basic banking services that
are available to upper- and middle-upper-income white Americans
available to blue collar, white, black, brown Americans throughout
this country. I think that would be a Democratic society and a fairer system.
Mrs. MCCARTHY OF NEW YORK. We have heard the argument
here on those kind of hearings from the other side of the aisle, that
a lot of their constituents like going to the payday and they don’t
want to see them closed. But just to close your argument, and I

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know you have said it a million times. Kenneth Lewis, CEO of the
National Urban League Annual Conference spoke there. And he basically talked about how Bank of America supports CRAs, they
have had good relations with it, and they see it as a future for
many, helping middle-income and lower-income families. So I
thank you for your testimony and I yield back the balance of my
time.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Marchant.
Mr. MARCHANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to focus
my questions on the expansion of the CRA into other financial institutions. For Mr. Taylor, is it your opinion that the—if the CRA
even if the CRA was properly enforced under current law that it
would not provide sufficient community investment or community
loans?
Mr. TAYLOR. If it was properly enforced, it would be helpful, but
it wouldn’t do as much as we could do to bring more capital and
credit to underserved neighborhoods.
Mr. MARCHANT. But to the banking commissioner, you testified
that you currently do not have any banks that—in Massachusetts.
Is this State charter or State and Federal charter?
Mr. ANTONAKES. State charter.
Mr. MARCHANT. State charter that are in noncompliance and that
are written up under CRA?
Mr. ANTONAKES. Not at the current time. There was a time in
which we had a significant portion that were not compliant. But at
the current time we have—I believe it is—I believe we have—all
of our banks are in compliance.
Mr. MARCHANT. Under H.R. 1479, the CRA has expanded the
independent mortgage companies, mainstream credit unions, insurance companies, security firms, and investment banks. Now, if—
from the argument of simplicity and the argument of enforcement,
if the opinion is that CRA is not being enforced currently among
the banks and it has not been effective, how would you add all of
these additional entities in there which obviously have very complicated implications as their loan portfolios?
Mr. ANTONAKES. I would argue that the law is not consistently
applied and certainly there are ways to improve and that is what
we are discussing today. And 30 years is a long time in banking,
in the industry and banking practices have changed. Secondly,
there are new players in the market. And I think that is what has
to be reflected as well. Let me say this about our application of
CRA to credit unions. We have applied CRA to credit unions since
1982, and there has been a lot of discussion regarding regulatory
reform, about a regulatory arbitrage and a race to the bottom.
In Massachusetts, if you are a State-chartered credit union, you
will comply with CRA. You can flip to a Federal charter if you want
to lawfully and you can get out from under that obligation. In 27
years, no Massachusetts State-chartered credit union has ever
flipped its charter to evade its CRA responsibilities. Is there an increased compliance cost associated with CRA? Yes, there is. One I
think we have to make sure is appropriate and commensurate with
the market share of the institution. Those credit unions that have
flipped charted in a few instances for other reasons have all told

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us that we maintained our CRA program after we started operating under a Federal charter because it was good business.
Mr. TAYLOR. Can I answer that?
Mr. MARCHANT. I would like to hear Mr. Taylor’s opinion.
Mr. TAYLOR. First off, I do want to thank you because it sounds
like you are really thinking this through and it is a very thoughtful
question. And it gives me the opportunity to say you are absolutely
right, a number of these agencies would have to either create new
departments to be able to regulate under CRA or, as it should be,
it moves over to the Consumer Finance Protection Agency. We
could have one agency that works on this law along with the others
that applies to all the financial services sector so that you can
streamline the process for having this oversight with the single
agency rather than having multiple agencies now develop new departments.
Mr. MARCHANT. Expanding it into, for instance, investment
banks, securities firms, what would be the name of a security firm?
Mr. TAYLOR. The name of a security firm?
Mr. MARCHANT. Would it be Goldman Sachs? I am trying to understand—
Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, it would be. But it would be obviously.
The CHAIRMAN. It would have to be; there aren’t many others
left.
Mr. TAYLOR. Obviously, those without a retail presence would
have a different obligation. Their obligation would be to make sure
that they are actually securitizing loans that relate to low- and
moderate-income products that have been generated by the financial services sector. If they say, for example, we are not going to
securitize any loans that are not—let us take mortgages—not on
houses that are worth less than $400,000, well, that pretty much
cuts out most of the middle class and low- and moderate-income
people altogether.
So they have an obligation to report what they are doing and not
doing to—also to be able to do investments in institutions that act
as intermediaries and partners with the financial institutions,
banks to have those security firms and investment banks invest in
them so they can develop jobs, housing, rental housing. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Time has expired. I now recognize the gentleman
from Texas. And he has agreed to yield me 30 seconds. We heard
from the gentleman from California that if you are Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac—I want to add a couple of facts. I am quoting now.
‘‘In 1996, the Department of Housing and Urban Development required that 42 percent of Fannie and Freddie’s mortgage financing
should go to borrowers with income levels below the median. Clinton administration.’’ ‘‘In 2004, HUD revised these goals, increasing
them to 56 percent and additionally mandated that 12 percent of
all mortgage purchases be ‘special affordable’ loans, made to borrowers with incomes less than 60 percent of the median, a target
that ultimately increased to 28 percent for 2008.’’ ‘‘After this authorization to purchase subprime securities, subprime and nearprime loans increased from 9 percent in 2001 to 40 percent in
2006.’’
Now, obviously, we are talking here about the Bush Administration from 2001 to 2006 and the Bush Administration that brought

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this up from 42 to 56 and specifically mandated 12 percent be for
people below median. And I do not like to quote without giving
credit. So let me note that I am quoting from the Hensarling
amendment added to the mortgage bill at the motion of the gentleman from Texas. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green.
Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me move quickly.
Friends, thank you for your testimony. Just for the record, if you
agree that the CRA was not, not, N-O-T, a cause of this financial
crisis, will you kindly raise a hand? Let the record reflect that all
have concurred that the CRA is not the cause.
Now, Mr. Taylor, you have been very courageous today and I
thank you. You have indicated that facts don’t seem to make a lot
of difference in this conversation, this dialogue. I would like to say
argument, but I am not sure that it really is an argument at this
point. And do you agree that you have said that the facts don’t
make a lot of difference? Is this true? Did you say this?
Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, I did.
Mr. GREEN. Would you agree then it is not about facts when
facts don’t make a difference? Would you agree with this premise?
Mr. TAYLOR. Yes.
Mr. GREEN. If it is not about facts, what is it about, Mr. Taylor?
Mr. TAYLOR. I suppose it is politics, it is posturing. Unfortunately, what it is not about is trying to make sure that this free
market, this financial services system works to the benefit of all
people, including working class people and people who are working
their way up the economic ladder. Because if you don’t have access
to quality products from banks and others so that you can build
wealth, you are not going to be very successful in this democracy,
in this capitalist system. That is what this is all about unfortunately. I honestly don’t get some of the Republicans. I don’t get it
at all frankly because they ought to be embracing the CRA because
it is about making the free market work in a safe and sustainable
way and making sure that their constituents who are not wealthy
people, but some of them are presumably working class people,
that they have the opportunity to try to build wealth and realize
their version of the American dream. I don’t get it.
Mr. GREEN. Let me intercede and make a couple of comments
quickly and perhaps you will have an opportunity to respond to
some other things. You mentioned Texas, and Houston, Texas. I am
aware of what you speak. And the truth be told, once the first bank
came in and started to rake in the dollars in the coffer and the coffers started to expand, other banks decided that this is really not
a bad idea. And we now have many banks that have gone into
some of these neighborhoods simply because someone forced literally the first to go in, forced in a sense they were cajoled and encouraged. No one did it physically.
Mr. TAYLOR. That there was a law that required it—the CRA.
Mr. GREEN. The CRA as strong as it is didn’t do enough to help
us to the extent that I would like to see us helped. Finally, I want
to make a comment to no one in particular, but just the people. It
is easy to be your brother’s keeper when you don’t have to keep
your brother. We have a lot of folks who talk about keeping their
brothers until it is time to be the brother’s keeper. And at that
point, CRA becomes invidious, community development bloc grants

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become too much for those who have too little. They always seem
to find a way to be their brother’s keeper until it is time to keep
their brothers. I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New Jersey.
Mr. LANCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield 30 seconds to Mr.
Hensarling.
Mr. HENSARLING. I thank the gentleman for yielding just to respond to our chairman’s comments. As I listened to his words, it
seems like he doesn’t debate the facts. He just simply wants to assess the blame. And I know that no one will miss President Bush
more than our chairman. But I don’t see him denying the fact—
The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HENSARLING. It is not my time.
The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman yield? No. I don’t deny the
fact. I just would note that in 2004, when the Bush Administration
upped those homeownership goals, I objected to them. So I am very
much acknowledging the facts and putting the blame where it lies,
on George Bush, not CRA.
Mr. HENSARLING. Assuming the gentleman still continues to
yield time—and I know that the gentleman quoted from an amendment of mine. I will take the chairman at his word that he fought
that proposal. I assume that it is in the record. But again, it was
the chairman who said, I believe, when it comes to dealing with
safety and soundness issues on Fannie and Freddie, that he wanted to roll the dice. And so I will return—
The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask for unanimous consent for an additional minute. And I will take 30 seconds and yield to the gentleman. Yes, I did say that. I was talking about affordable rental
housing and I am a little surprised that the gentleman said he will
take me at my word. I will provide for him the quotation from
Bloomberg in 2004 when I specifically was quoted as objecting in
the article by Jim Tyson to that increase in homeownership goals
saying it was bad for Fannie and Freddie and bad for the homeowners.
Yes, I was willing to do more and gamble for what was rental
housing. And I will supply to the gentleman that quotation from
2004 and put it in the record and yield to him the rest of his time.
Mr. HENSARLING. Well, certainly it is not necessary and I apologize if it appeared that I wasn’t taking the chairman at his word.
I take the chairman at his word. I don’t recall that specific debate,
but I take you at your word. But again, I think the facts speak for
themselves as to what happened, what contributed to the cause in
the subprime debacle. We will continue to debate it. Again, all I
have heard from the chairman is not necessarily debating the facts,
simply who is to blame. And I thank the gentleman from New Jersey for yielding.
Mr. LANCE. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. With unanimous consent, we will give the gentleman 5 minutes.
Mr. LANCE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. And the rest of the members will ask him not to
yield to us again.
Mr. LANCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Number one, let me say
that from my perspective, I certainly respect the point that the

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CRA is not responsible for the subprime crisis. I have a great respect for Larry Lindsey and also for Ben Bernanke. Number two,
I hope that this Congress defunds ACORN. And I am sorry that
there was funding by the Bush Administration, and now by the
Obama Administration, and I think ACORN has widely been discredited.
Number three, I think that banks are chartered to be responsible
to their communities both at the State and the Federal level. Number four, however, to get to my line of questions, the Congressional
Research Service has indicated that some bankers have identified
CRA as the most burdensome regulation placed upon them. And
this has been the experience based upon discussions I have had
with bankers in the district in New Jersey I represent. Does the
panel have recommendations on how to simplify the regulations
that currently exist regarding CRA? Yes, sir?
Mr. ROBERTS. Yes. There are some regulations that are too complicated. There are a lot of restrictions on where banks can get
credit for making loans and investments. Instead of saying go and
lend to low- and moderate-income places, the rules basically say,
we are only going to give you credit if you invest within a certain
radius of where you are. And if you want to join with other banks
and work together, we are not going to give you credit if some of
those other loans go elsewhere. And this rule makes it very hard
to get things done. Another example is: in New York, a key part
of the financing for rental housing are letters of credit. It has been
almost impossible for the banks to get CRA recognition for their
letters of credit. They are incredibly important to the system.
Mr. LANCE. That would be a commonsense reform in which we
should engage statutorily in your judgment. Mr. Taylor, your
views?
Mr. TAYLOR. First, I don’t know how old that document is you
are reading from. Do you have it in front of you? Because it sounds
pretty dated. Because actually it is dated, right?
Mr. LANCE. I do not have a date on it.
Mr. TAYLOR. We actually follow this pretty well and I think the
complaints from the banking institution as regards to CRA regulation have been pretty quiet and pretty subdued over the last several years. Furthermore, you should probably know, you probably
already do know that the bankers and the American Bankers Association support expanding CRA to credit unions and others.
Mr. LANCE. I am not suggesting—
Mr. TAYLOR. No. I am saying that if they support expanding it,
I doubt that they would continue to argue that it is too burdensome
for them. I just haven’t heard that. And what I have read is that
of all the regulations that are imposed on them, it is really not
the—
Mr. LANCE. The bankers with whom I have spoken in my district—
Mr. TAYLOR. Can I have their names, sir? I am just kidding.
Mr. LANCE. I would be happy to supply the bankers with whom
we have discussed this.
Mr. WHITE. Well, first let me address what John was just saying.
Of course, the bankers would want to have the pain expanded, misery loves company. That doesn’t come as a surprise. As I indicated

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in my testimony, if you are going to keep CRA and do anything
about it, quantify it. Change it from this vague leaning on type of
regulation, quantify it.
Mr. TAYLOR. Quotas.
Mr. WHITE. Make it clear.
Mr. LANCE. Thank you. Commissioner Antonakes, do you have a
view on how we might improve the system?
Mr. ANTONAKES. Sure, Congressman, I do. I think we have to acknowledge that diversity of our banking system is very important
in this country. The large money center banks had to leverage during this period the community banks have continued to lend. So I
do think we have to increase the risk base manner in which we supervise with CRA compliance. There is a very big difference in how
we should—
Mr. LANCE. —versus the largest banks in the—
Mr. ANTONAKES. The largest banks in the country.
Mr. LANCE. And I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GREEN. [presiding] The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Capito for
5 minutes.
Mrs. CAPITO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I am going to pass on
questions in the first panel. Thank you.
Mr. GREEN. The Chair recognizes a person who should have been
recognized, Mr. Cleaver, for 5 minutes.
Mr. CLEAVER. Thank you.
I am having a really weird experience serving in Congress. And
I guess over the last few months, I am experiencing things that I
just didn’t believe to be a part of life, real life. And it is just amazing and that is—and I guess I just didn’t understand how we are
supposed to function here. I didn’t come up to function in a way
that I have seen, which is no matter what, we are required, I think
in this body to challenge indisputable, unarguable facts, no matter
what, we just ignore it. Since I have been here, I see people talking
right past each other. And I don’t even know why some of this conversation is going that is taking place.
I have a lot of follow up with what Congressman Mel Watt had
earlier said. He introduced the CRA to the record. He wanted it to
be placed in the record. I want to quote from the Act. I know that
is not the way we are supposed to conduct business here, but I
think this is important. According to the Act, ‘‘lending is supposed
to be consistent with the safe and sound operation of such institutions from the Act.’’ That is not my philosophy, it is not biblical.
It is the facts, it is what is in the law. I will yield to anyone on
the panel, in Congress, in the audience, or on the Redskins. If they
can read from the Act anything that says something contrary to
what I just read. I will yield to anyone on the planet.
Yes, sir, I want you to stand up and state your name.
Mr. PINTO. I am going to be on the next panel. My name is Ed
Pinto. I am representing myself—
Mr. GREEN. Mr. Cleaver, let me do this, this is a little bit irrelevant. Why don’t we hear from the gentleman on the next panel,
and I am confident that we will be back.

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Mr. CLEAVER. Well, we may not need to hear from him. If he
doesn’t have the bill, and is not going to read from the bill, it is
irrelevant to the question I asked. Do you have a bill?
Mr. PINTO. I have the—
Mr. CLEAVER. Were you getting ready to read from the bill?
Mr. PINTO. I have the post bill, I don’t have the existing bill.
Mr. CLEAVER. Maybe I wasn’t clear. I want anybody to read from
the bill anything contrary to what I just read.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GREEN. Let me do this. We will make sure that you have a
copy of the bill and when we return, you’ll have an opportunity to
read.
Friends we have two votes, this should take approximately 30
minutes. We will recess for approximately 30 minutes—hold it for
a moment, I am being given some additional intelligence.
We have one additional member who would like to ask questions,
I am told he is immediately available, Mr. Ellison, and as soon as
he comes in, we will take him and have him ask his questions.
Mr. Ellison, we will recognize you for 5 minutes.
Mr. ELLISON. All right, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am multi-tasking here. Mr. Taylor,
as you know, the CRA offers great flexibility to cover institutions
with how they can comply. Have these particular institutions found
innovative ways to which to do so such as funds that invest directly
in underserved communities?
Mr. TAYLOR. Yes. In fact, the banking industry has been very
creative and I think somewhat aggressive in trying to find and
work with organizations like LISC and other intermediary organizations, with community development organizations, community
development and financial institutions, a number of other mechanisms to try and serve on the underserved populations. And then
some of the larger banks have created whole community development departments, investment departments and community development, affordable housing programs, very innovative, creative and
very effective programs.
Mr. ELLISON. Thank you. Should Congress consider including
broker dealers under the CRA?
Mr. TAYLOR. Say it one more time.
Mr. ELLISON. Should Congress consider including broker dealers
under the CRA?
Mr. TAYLOR. What has happened in the evolution of the financial
services sector is that in lieu of branches, many of these financial
institutions, the banks, have been using brokers and broker dealers
as a way of accessing or creating large—sending product into communities. And I think it is high time that this got looked at within
their CRA exam as part of what they are doing and not doing in
underserved communities.
Mr. ELLISON. Thank you.
This question is to everybody, feel free to dive in. What are your
thoughts regarding whether authority relating to the CRA should
continue to remain with the functional regulators or should be
moved to a new consumer financial protection agency. I invite anybody to answer that one.

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Mr. ANTONAKES. Congressman, I will start. I support the creation of the CFPA as a rulemaking body, I think primary enforcement should be retained with the prudential regulators, however I
believe that CFPA should have the ability to step in if they deemed
deem enforcement to be unsatisfactory by the Federal regulators.
Mr. ELLISON. So like back stop jurisdiction.
Mr. ANTONAKES. Correct.
Mr. ELLISON. Others?
Mr. TAYLOR. I think it is imperative that the Consumer Finance
Protection Agency include oversight of CRA. What more evidence
do we need from the existing regulatory agencies who treated this
law like a stepchild regulation for most of its history. Ignored it for
many periods and really have just simply ended the public hearings, created great inflation, CRA great inflation where beginning
in the 1990’s, you looked at for the first 5 years, 5 percent of banks
failed the CRA ratings, some years it was as close at 10 percent,
so now it is consistently less than 1 percent, even in the period
where we had the worst lending practices in modern history.
So we need someone whose mission it is to look out for the taxpayer, to look out for the consumer, to look out for the homeowner,
the small businessperson so we need the CFPA to have oversight
on this.
Mr. ELLISON. I would like to follow up on that question. I am
aware that there have been different grades that the industry has
received with regard to CRA compliance, and now it is like less
than 1 percent, before it was not nearly that high. And yet we have
seen the proliferation of fairly disturbing practices. How do you account for that?
Mr. TAYLOR. Well, I can’t. But I can tell you having served on
the Consumer Advisory Council of the Federal Reserve and worked
with all these Federal agencies, we have been frustrated over the
years, terribly frustrated in trying to get them to focus, indeed
focus on a lot of predatory lending and the problems that brought
this Nation economically to its knees. And we just haven’t been
able to make any headway. Even the recent rules that the Fed finally released, they released them in July 2008, long after the
economy had collapsed, long after they knew that these were problematic. So the sheriff dropped the ball, they did not enforce the
law.
Mr. ELLISON. But the sheriff got an ‘‘A.’’ The sheriff was passing
out—
Mr. TAYLOR. I don’t know who gave the grade.
Mr. ELLISON. You know what I mean, though. Mr. Roberts, do
you want to dive in?
Mr. ROBERTS. Right. If you make an analogy here between CRA
grades and school grades, on CRA, you can get an ‘‘A,’’ ‘‘B,’’ ‘‘D’’ or
‘‘F;’’ you can’t get a ‘‘C.’’ And that is required by the Congress. So
if you are a regulator, you are going to give somebody who is really
a ‘‘C’’ student a ‘‘B’’ or going to give them a ‘‘D?’’ ‘‘D’’ is pretty bad.
Mr. ELLISON. So what you are saying is we need to reform the
way we rank CRA compliance?
Mr. ROBERTS. Absolutely. I would add a ‘‘C’’ grade, a low satisfactory grade. And then I think we need to have both carrots and

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sticks to encourage good performance and discourage poor performance.
Mr. ELLISON. Okay, okay, very good. Mr. White, you didn’t weigh
in on this one.
Mr. WHITE. I was asked this question before by Representative
Waters. I don’t see CRA as being part of the CFPA.
Mr. GREEN. You will have to make it brief, because we have a
vote.
Mr. ELLISON. Well, that is all the time I have, thank you very
much.
Mr. GREEN. We will stand in recess for approximately 30 minutes.
Mr. WHITE. Will you need this panel?
Mr. GREEN. The panel is excused. Thank you for your attendance
and for your testimony.
[recess]
Mr. GREEN. We shall now reconvene the hearing. I would like to
introduce the third panel and thank the persons who are part of
this panel for waiting and being so patient. We have with us: Judith A. Kennedy, president and chief executive officer of the National Association of Affordable Housing Lenders; Michael A.
Stegman, Ph.D., director of policy and housing at the MacArthur
Foundation; Mr. Edward Pinto, real estate financial services consultant; Ms. Leslie Andersen, chief executive officer, Bank of
Bennington, on behalf of the American Bankers Association; and
our final witness will be Mr. Orson Aguilar, executive director of
The Greenlining Institute.
All witnesses having been introduced, I shall now ask that each
witness have 5 minutes to summarize your testimony, after which
you will be subjected to questions. We will start with Ms. Kennedy.
STATEMENT OF JUDITH A. KENNEDY, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING LENDERS (NAAHL)

Ms. KENNEDY. Thank you, and good afternoon. As I was preparing for this testimony, I kept thinking about a eulogy Senator
Ted Kennedy delivered 3 years ago at a service for Senator Proxmire. Senator Ted Kennedy opened by saying that Senator Proxmire was a true American profile in courage. I assumed it was because of the infamous, famous, genocide treaty that the Senator
worked so hard to have enacted. But in fact, Senator Kennedy recognized Proxmire for his Banking Committee work first, saying
nearly 30 years after he passed it, his Community Reinvestment
Act has produced literally hundreds of billions of dollars worth of
private sector investment in our Nation’s urban and rural communities.
And not many others can claim such an accomplishment. He
made America a better place with CRA. I absolutely agree. After
the memorial service, you won’t be surprised to hear that the Senator, his wife, and I talked about what was happening in the GO
zone and how to use CRA to better help redevelopment.
Our mission, NAAHL’s mission is 100 organizations, banks, nonprofits, foundations, and others all devoted to funneling those hundreds of billions of dollars of private capital leveraging scarce

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funds. You heard Buzz Roberts, one of our board members, speak
earlier about leveraging 30 to 1. On affordable rental housing, CRA
leverage is about 25 to 1. So it has been a huge success story and
I think probably not well-known. For example, we had $100 billion
invested in low-income housing tax credits in 20 years, and $8 billion in new markets tax credits in just 7 or 8 years. Every year,
for the last 5 years, CRA-reportable HMDA data confirmed $400
billion in loans made by banks to low- and moderate-income people—$50 billion way understates loans made on family affordable
rental housing.
So you won’t be surprised I am here to say, don’t throw the baby
out with the bathwater, and don’t cut the baby in half. This is huge
business, and it does not involve lowering of standards. We should
recognize though that the regulations haven’t caught up with best
practice by banks under CRA. We should also recognize that CRA’s
success story has been focusing on community development needs,
i.e. the needs of low- and moderate-income people. So as you go forward, our recommendations are really going to be around. Don’t
lose the focus, don’t undermine the success by asking CRA to do
what other laws were intended to do.
First and foremost we say, please address the weaknesses in the
current regulatory structure. The deferred maintenance in updating the regulations, the process by which the examinations go on,
all are badly in need of updating.
But second, do no harm, for more than 30 years, this law has encouraged insured depositories to meet the credit needs of their communities on safe and sound terms, and any changes in the law
should be carefully considered, practical to implement, and
incentivize lenders to engage in high-impact activities. But finally,
address the dual mortgage problem. In 2001, NAAHL partnered
with former, now deceased, Fed Governor Ned Gramlich to highlight the craziness of a dual mortgage market. In 2004, we did another symposium and we could never communicate adequately the
chaos that the unregulated alternative network of mortgage originators was wreaking, we now know.
So is CRA is a success story? Absolutely. Maybe one of the successes is CRA has created a cadre of bankers and banks who now
get it. They recognize that you can do good in underserved, as
Caroline McCarthy spoke of today, on fair terms and make money.
We think it is going to be critical that CRA is revitalized for
preservation of affordable rental housing. Let me give you one Alabama example, I can’t help it, not just Rosa Parks Homes, in the
last 5 years, 41 banks in Alabama, through our nonprofit Alabama’s Multifamily Consortium, have developed two 56-unit elderly
properties in Birmingham. Beautiful blessings on their communities.
One of the more interesting things that has happened with CRA
money recently in the State of California where they have these
budget problems, our member Low Income Investment Fund has
been essentially asked by daycare centers and charter schools to reinsure the State of California. When California can’t provide subsidy money owed to daycare centers and charter schools in low-income areas, somebody still has to still provide the milk. And so our
Low Income Investment Fund has been using CRA dollars from

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banks to extend bridge loans to these entities to provide what they
need for the low-income kids so parents can go to school—go to
work, maybe go to school too.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Kennedy can be found on page
144 of the appendix.]
Mr. GREEN. We will come back to you when the questions are
asked. Let us move forward.
Let me make this comment for the record: all statements will be
placed in the record without objection, so as you summarize, know
that you are doing so with the understanding that your statement
will be a part of the record. Mr. Stegman?
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. STEGMAN, PH.D., DIRECTOR, POLICY AND HOUSING, JOHN D. AND CATHERINE T. MACARTHUR FOUNDATION

Mr. STEGMAN. Good afternoon. While I appear here as an employee of the MacArthur Foundation, the opinions I express this
afternoon are my own.
I have been a longstanding student of the Community Reinvestment Act, and believe there is solid evidence it has been directly
responsible for increasing lending for low-income home purchases
and, in Chairman Bernanke’s words, serving as a catalyst inducing
banks to enter underserved markets that they might otherwise
have ignored.
In my professional experience, I have never come across a CRA
mortgage program whose underwriting guidelines didn’t require
certification of our income or that employee deeply discounted teaser whose payments were guaranteed to explode shortly into the
loan term. Or enabled the low- or moderate-income borrower to decide for herself what her monthly loan payments would be are allowed deeply negative amortization. In fact, most CRA programs
with which I am familiar also require escrow accounts to assure
the borrowers timely payment of real estate, taxes, and insurance
obligations. This explains why an accumulating body of research
confirms that CRA-driven mortgage portfolios outperform other
market segments in recent years. A case in point is research that
my UNC colleagues and I have conducted over much of the past
decade, which tracks the performance of a $4.5 billion portfolio of
nearly 50,000 CRA loans originated by 36 lenders across the country.
Our search finds—and controlling for loan vintage origination
date, borrower credit and loan characteristics—the estimated cumulative default rate for a comparable group of subprime borrowers was about 31⁄2 times greater than that experience with the
CRA borrowers.
Next, I will weigh in on the ongoing discussion of the policy rationale from posing community reinvestment requirements on financial institutions. The most common argument is grounded in institutions receipt of Federal deposit insurance and related charter
benefits. While this is a powerful argument and one most frequently cited for expanding CRA coverage based on the extension
of FDIC insurance to an array of Wall Street investment and insurance firms, I think there is an even more compelling argument for

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extending CRA requirements to many more mortgage-related institutions.
I embrace former Federal Reserve Governor Lawrence Lindsey’s
public goods argument for imposing CRA obligations on financial
institutions, that is, it is in the national interest and for the common good that low- and moderate-income populations fully participate in the American economy and that this is not possible unless
the financial services and credit needs are as well served as those
of higher income populations. A public goods argument recognizes
that shrinking share of the mortgage mart accounted for by CRA
covered loans, covered institutions and that absent a duty to serve
that would apply to the broader financial services sector the credit
needs of underserved population will continue to be under supply
because the economic returns of providing such services to them
cannot be fully captured by any individual supplier. Much about
credit markets and financial service providers has changed since
the CRA was enacted and even since the Clinton era reforms. We
now recognize that the terms of credit are as important as the
availability of mortgage finance in underserved communities, and
the principle of sustainable mortgage finance is important to consider within a CRA context. As is the notion of negative credit for
institutions or their subsidiaries or affiliates that provide abusive
loan products, inside or outside their assessment areas.
There is also more market concentration today among CRA-covered institutions than in past decades. Today, America’s 10 largest
CRA-covered institutions have combined deposits of more than $3.1
trillion and a 45 percent market share. In my view, not only should
this top tier of depository have affirmative obligation to meet the
credit needs of the designated communities, but Congress should
impose upon them an additional duty to lead the financial services
industry in the development commercialization and scale up of innovative, affordable and sustainable credit products and financial
services in low-income communities. One needs look no further for
such a precedent than a new rule being promulgated by Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac’s now regulator.
The Federal Housing Finance Agency has imposed on the GSEs
a duty to serve specified mortgage finance needs of underserved
markets that are above and beyond Fannie and Freddie’s affordable housing goal purchase requirements. I believe that this top
tier of CRA-covered institutions should have a similar duty to serve
as beacons of innovation and creativity that is over and above their
traditional CRA requirements. Whatever form enhanced CRA
might take, it goes without saying that the bedrock principle
should be retained that no CRA mandate should impair an institution’s safety and soundness, nor should it ever require banks to become subsidizers of last resort. However, there is an important difference between the requiring covered institutions to offer financial
services or credit products that are unprofitable over the long-term.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Stegman can be found on page
176 of the appendix.]
Mr. GREEN. I am going to have to intercede. We will come back
to you, and you will have an opportunity to continue. Mr. Pinto,
you are recognized for 5 minutes.

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STATEMENT OF EDWARD J. PINTO, REAL ESTATE FINANCIAL
SERVICES CONSULTANT

Mr. PINTO. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you
very much for this opportunity to testify. I have 15 years experience in affordable housing lending. I was Fannie Mae’s Chief Credit Officer from 1987 to 1989. While at Fannie, I had the pleasure
to work extensively with the late Gale Cincotta, the founder of National People’s Action. Some of you may be aware that Miss
Cincotta is affectionately known as the mother of CRA. She and I
collaborated over a 3-year period to develop a carefully designed
program whereby Fannie would purchase CRA loans originated by
local banks. I would like to remind you of some of the things that
Ms. Cincotta would say before committees like this about high-risk
lending. She spent 30 years, ‘‘Fighting abuse, fraud and neglect of
the FHA program that has destroyed too many neighborhoods, too
many family’s dreams of homeownership.’’ She warned that ‘‘poor
lending practices lead FHA to have a national default rate 3 to 4
times the conventional market and in many urban neighborhoods
it routinely exceeded 10 times.’’
I have spent the last 14 months researching what caused the real
estate bubble and the subsequent financial meltdown estimating
CRA lending volumes and loan performance was particularly difficult and opaque. For example, my research found that FHA’s percentage of new foreclosure starts has steadily increased over the
last 60 years from 0.06 percent in 1951, to 2.36 percent in 1998
when Gale testified, to 4.4 percent estimated for this year.
Gale was appalled at FHA’s default rate in 1998. Based on my
CRA research, I believe she would call CRA lending toxic. She
would tell you that the American nightmare foreclosure, as she
called it 11 years ago, has now spread to virtually every corner of
these United States. Over a 17-year period, 1992 to 2008, this was
a total of $6 trillion in announced CRA commitments—680 times
the cumulative volume of $9 billion during the entire first 15 years
of CRA. Ninety-four percent of this $6 trillion was made by just 4
banks, and you all know their names: Wells Fargo; JPMorgan
Chase; Citibank; and Bank of America. It is those four banks and
banks they purchased or merged with that accounted for 94 percent
of those commitments. I don’t have time to explain how CRA enabled these and other ‘‘too-big-to-fail’’ banks to accomplish this.
Single family loan production originated pursuant to CRA totaled
almost $3 trillion over the period 1993 to 2008. Ninety percent,
here is where I agree with the other witnesses, 90 percent of CRA
lending was not classified as high rate subprime, even though most
of it had subprime and other high risk characteristics.
How do I define subprime? FICO scores that are below 660 representing credit impairment or very high LTVs, or other qualifying
terms that are high risk, excessively high risk. It is estimated that
the GSEs alone purchased 50 percent of CRA production to help
meet their mandated affordable housing goals. The combination of
CRA originations and non overlapping GSE AH acquisitions over
$7 trillion over the same period.
There is little in the way of concrete information on CRA performance but consider the following: Third Federal Savings and
Loan in Cleveland has a 35 percent delinquency rate and every sin-

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gle loan was fixed rate, every single loan did not have the characteristics that people talk about as being bad. They had characteristics that were high risk and they have led to a 35 percent delinquency rate versus 2 percent for the rest of its entire portfolio.
Third Fed’s involvement represents a case study as to how CRA
was sued to weaken credit standards and I refer you to footnote
number 1 in my written presentation.
Sure, Bank of Chicago has a 19 percent combined delinquency
and non accrual rate for its entire single family mortgage portfolio
and they were the Nation’s first community development bank.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac acquired trillions of dollars in high
LTV loans that were to meet the affordable housing goals, many
of which were CRA over the period 1993 to 2007. They acquired 62
percent of all such loans. They acquired trillions in credit-impaired
loans over the same period; again, many of them were CRA. These
trillions drove up the Nation’s homeownership rate and after being
level for 30 years. The GSA’s delinquency rate on 1.5 trillion high
risk loans 85 percent of which are affordable housing with 15.5 percent in June of this year. That is 61⁄2 times the 2.4 percent delinquency rate on the GSA’s traditionally underwritten loan. This
flood of high risk and CRA and age lending drove house price bubble that I have a chart in my prepared remarks.
In 1998, Ms. Cincotta expressed a wish that FHA’s default rate
would be on par with the GSEs. Unfortunately, she got her wish,
CRA and age loans acquired by the GSAs have a delinquency rate
equal to FHA.
Mr. GREEN. Mr. Pinto, I have to intercede. We will have to intercede and we will move now to Ms. Andersen. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pinto can be found on page 162
of the appendix.]
STATEMENT OF LESLIE R. ANDERSEN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, BANK OF BENNINGTON, ON BEHALF
OF THE AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION (ABA)

Ms. ANDERSEN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
my name is Leslie Andersen. I am president and CEO of the Bank
of Bennington headquartered in Bennington, Nebraska. I am
pleased to be here today to present the views of the American
Bankers Association on the Community Reinvestment Act. ABA believes that compliance with the spirit and the letter of the Community Reinvestment Act is healthy. Forging partnerships and developing a deeper understanding of the perspectives of all parties has
led to an open and effective system that now most closely reflects
bank’s involvement in serving our communities. This evolution has
not been without difficulties, but it has lead to improvements, and
this afternoon I would like to talk briefly about the changes that
have taken place as CRA has evolved and suggest changes that will
further strengthen it.
CRA implementation has matured and clearly demonstrates that
banks do serve their communities well. The bank regulators’ initial
attempt to meet the mandate of the Act put emphasis on process
rather than performance. CRA examinations became paper trails
for talking the talk, rather than the recognition that banks were
walking the walk. The dissatisfaction on the part of bankers, com-

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munity organizations, and regulators led to important changes in
the regulatory requirements and examination process. These include balancing the burden between smaller and larger institutions, enlarging the range of lending that received CRA credit in
rural communities and requiring consideration of any evidence of
discriminatory lending or violations of consumer protection laws.
Moreover, the CRA examination process is now an open one incorporating public opinion as well as the regulators’ review of
banks’ compliance.
Now it would be an exaggeration to say that banks are content
with the burdens that remain, but the new CRA regulations are
certainly a marked improvement over the old regulations and now
better reflect banks’ contributions to their communities. The bottom line is that banks that do not serve the credit needs of their
entire community do not prosper.
Drill down in a CRA public evaluation and you will read about
how we compete for market share across all income levels in all
neighborhoods. It is therefore not surprising that the banking industry excels at satisfying community credit needs. Looking forward, bankers believe that the CRA process must continue to
evolve to meet changing markets and participants.
There are several ways that improvements can be made. First,
regulators need to adjust the process to encourage responsiveness
to market changes. For example, there seems to be widespread consensus that financial literacy for all consumers is critical to allow
individuals to function appropriately in today’s increasingly complex economy. However, ABA members report being constrained by
examiner interpretations of the regulations and guidance about
what types of financial education they can offer their communities
that will pass supervisory muster as CRA.
In addition, although there has been progress made since the last
time ABA testified on this subject, we continue to press the agencies for giving the appropriate CRA credit as community development activity to investments in minority owned and women owned
institutions.
Second, the CRA regulations and examination are still too complex and should be simplified. Maintaining CRA simplicity is important for any modernization effort. Adding burdensome data reporting requirements will not materially improve an examiner’s
ability to evaluate a bank’s record of CRA performance, but will
create expenses that could be used to actually support the community. Third, the reach of CRA should be extended to cover all depositories. CRA itself is tailored to the banking industry. However
it contains core concepts that should be applied to other depository
institutions, particularly credit unions who are increasingly seeking
community based charters. These core concepts include: helping to
meet the financial needs of the institution’s entire chartered community safely and soundly; applying standardized but flexible criteria to measure performance; and providing public visibility for
the resulting evaluation.
In conclusion, ABA believes there has been a significant evolution of the implementation of the Community Reinvestment Act.
We believe that changes to simplify the process, add flexibility, and
provide viability for all depository institutions will continue to im-

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prove CRA for the future. I would be happy to answer any questions the committee has.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Andersen can be found on page
67 of the appendix.]
Mr. GREEN. Thank you.
Mr. Aguilar?
STATEMENT OF ORSON AGUILAR, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE
GREENLINING INSTITUTE

Mr. AGUILAR. Good afternoon. Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, thank you for being here to listen to my testimony. My
name is Orson Aguilar, and I am executive director of an organization called The Greenlining Institute. I am here to provide eight
simple suggestions for how we can make CRA better. First, I would
like to say CRA has been successful and one of the things you also
notice is we have had a love/hate relationship with CRA. Even
though it has done a lot, we think it could do a lot more if implemented in a manner in which we agree with many of the points
made by our colleagues in the banking sector. Despite the CRA’s
success, more can be done, and I am going to provide recommendations.
First, I think we need a new vision for CRA. The landscape has
changed, as people said, it has been 32 years since we first implemented CRA. We need to focus on wealth creation. Credit to me is
about putting people in debt. I want to see CRA enhance economic
opportunities, enhance wealth creation so that all communities can
participate in capitalism.
In my written testimony, I give some specifics on issues we can
focus on, homeownership, business ownership, business contracts,
equity investments, checking accounts and the list goes on. But if
we can focus on wealth creation, I believe it gives us a solid vision
for moving forward.
Second, focusing on wealth creation we can see that we can do
more in areas of consumer protection. I will give you a quick example. There are a lot of complaints about overdraft fees at banks.
One of the things that we have realized is that these types of practices not only strip wealth, but also make people, especially people
from the communities that I come from, not want to continue working with banks. We think it is a negative for the banks in the
short-term, but it will be very negative for them in the long-term.
Third, CRA should leave room for creativity and leadership. We
also believe it has become too much of a numbers game, some
banks that so extraordinary leadership often get satisfactory and
some banks who get outstanding it is hard to tell why. Some of the
things that we would like to consider is that there should be more
room for flexibility and individual creativity and leadership on certain CRA factors.
Fourth, we need to measure the effectiveness of CRA for all
Americans. And we can only measure the effectiveness with more
comprehensive demographic data. Many people assume within this
committee today we have heard diversity data being used in the
context of discrimination. We like to think of it in terms of how do
measure progress to make sure that all sectors of our Nation
whether it be women, African Americans, Latinos, Asians or Native

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Americans are succeeding in some of the key indicators that I listed below. There is also a false assumption that if we just stick to
income data, that we will be able to capture communities of color.
As we have seen, even when you look at subprime lending and control for FICO scores and income, you still see African Americans
and Latinos twice or even 3 times as likely to receive subprime
loans.
I would like to say diversity is growing, there is a growing consensus that diversity is a safety and soundness issue. The Federal
Reserve of Boston said this back in 1992, that diversity at all levels
should be evaluated and there is increasingly more conversation
and discussion about how diversity leads to greater effectiveness.
Fifth, CRA needs to be more to support small business. We believe small business contracts do a lot to increase the viability and
soundness of these banks, therefore we urge that every CRA regulator gather data on the race and gender of contracts awarded. If
we work with many of the banks, many of the banks provide that
information to Greenlining and other organizations, they could do
this at no additional cost to them.
Sixth, we need to extend CRA to other institutions. If we stick
with the mission and vision of wealth creation, we realize that
there are other banking institutions or other institutions in general
that provide activities for wealth creation. This should be brought
into CRA in a manner that makes sense for them and in a manner
that speaks to their strengths.
Seventh, we need a more effective rating system. As we have discussed, 99 percent of the banking institutions receive satisfactory
or outstanding. We do believe that there should be perhaps more
ratings, we mentioned an outstanding-plus, for example, to encourage more competition amongst the banks to achieve for higher leadership and more creativity.
Finally, philanthropy should be a stronger part of CRA, especially during these times where you see a lot of foundations cutting
back on their investments to our communities. Philanthropy should
be weighted more heavily on the CRA exam.
With that, I would be happy to take any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Aguilar can be found on page 61
of the appendix.]
Mr. GREEN. Thank you.
I will now yield to Mr. Watt for 5 minutes.
Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pinto, let me just ask you a couple of questions, are FHA
loans and CRA loans synonymous?
Mr. PINTO. No, I estimate about 15 percent of all the CRA loans
were FHA.
Mr. WATT. All right. Ms. Cincotta, is she still living?
Mr. PINTO. She died, I belive, in 2001. She was instrumental in
getting CRA passed in 1977.
Mr. WATT. Okay. I guess I am a little reluctant to argue with
somebody who is not here. You seem to be testifying in her behalf
to the facts that you believe she would want you to report, many
of which I have read and don’t relate necessarily to CRA at all. If
a bank doesn’t choose to classify something as a CRA loan, would
you treat it as a CRA loan anyway?

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Mr. PINTO. No.
Mr. WATT. And the fact that banks have high default rates on
those loans that they haven’t classified as CRA, you would think
would be an indictment of CRA in general?
Mr. PINTO. I don’t think I referred to any of those banks.
Mr. WATT. And you think Ms. Cincotta would consider it an indictment?
Mr. PINTO. I said I don’t think I referred to any banks that have
delinquency rates on CRA loans—I cited—
Mr. WATT. Well, your testimony suggested that really none of
this stuff that you testified about really—I reviewed over 40,000
pages of documents, the process relative to estimating CRA lending
volumes and loan performance was particularly opaque and difficult, yet you go on to generalize about a bunch of things related
to CRA that you acknowledge your research doesn’t document. I
can’t figure out what it is you are saying about CRA, which is what
this hearing is about.
Mr. PINTO. Okay, Third Federal CRA loans—
Mr. WATT. I understand, but I want to know about CRA, what
are you saying about CRA? Do you support CRA? Or do you think
Ms. Cincotta would come in here today and tell us that we should
do away with CRA?
Mr. PINTO. What I am suggesting is that I have submitted a
prima facie case that CRA loans have performed poorly, I provided
evidence of that.
Mr. WATT. I haven’t seen any evidence in this statement, because
you started out by saying that you couldn’t get the information that
correlates what you have analyzed with CRA.
Mr. PINTO. No.
Mr. WATT. The question I want to know is, you think Ms.
Cincotta, if she were here today, would come in here and tell this
committee that we should do away with CRA?
Mr. PINTO. I think Ms. Cincotta would say, find out how the CRA
loans have performed in reality before you make any changes and
you can find that out.
Mr. WATT. Well, that is fair. I am not going to argue with Ms.
Cincotta’s—that conclusion. It is kind of hard for me to argue with
somebody who is not here.
Mr. PINTO. Well, I am here, and I would make the same statement.
Mr. WATT. Well, but you know everything you have said here you
represented on behalf of Ms. Cincotta.
Mr. PINTO. It is my opinion, yes.
Mr. WATT. You are kind of hiding behind somebody who is deceased, and I think that is a little unfair to reach conclusions. I
hope her family would support what you are saying here today because unless you are suggesting that she would support doing away
with CRA or substantially watering it down, I am not sure I understand what it is you came to talk about. We all want to make it
more transparent, but I take it that banks who were doing things
that were irresponsible were making a conscious decision that they
shouldn’t be doing those things under CRA, because CRA specifically says that you ought to do what is in the interest of safety and
soundness. Do you read CRA to say something different than that?

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Mr. PINTO. I read the regulations which have the force of law in
implementing CRA which require the banks that want to receive
an outstanding CRA rating have to use ‘‘innovative and/or flexible
lending practices.’’ And I would argue that the way those innovative and flexible lending practices have been implemented particularly by a subset of very large banks for their CRA lending has led
to toxic lending.
Mr. WATT. I appreciate it. Let me say I am delighted, I didn’t
mean to go off on Mr. Pinto, I am delighted we have some people
here who have been in this business and really supporting CRA,
including ABA and others who have worked closely with banks in
our communities to make lending available responsibly in every
community that we represent. I thank you and I yield back.
Mr. GREEN. Mr. Hensarling is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. HENSARLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Pinto, a lot of
questioning is surrounding your statement on page 4 of your testimony. Let’s revisit it. Ninety percent of CRA lending was not classified as high rate subprime even though much of it had subprime
and high credit risk characteristics. Later on, under this narrow
misleading definition, only 10 percent of CRA lending ended up
being classified as subprime. Ironically, the reason that these were
not high rate loans is that the big banks and the GSEs were subsidizing the rates as recent events have painfully demonstrated.
Could you elaborate on that portion of your testimony, please?
Mr. PINTO. Yes, my research has found that 90 percent of CRA
loans were done as fixed rate, they were done as not high rate
loans, they were done without the characteristics that many people
call the subprime characteristics. I have heard the numbers 2/28
and 3/27 are thrown out. The numbers I would focus on are 97 percent and 100 percent. The 97 percent loan was introduced as a result of CRA and affordable housing goals. The 100 percent loans
are introduced as a result of same thing. And as my testimony indicates, Fannie and Freddie purchased trillions of dollars of those
loans. Those loans were very high risk, they have been known as
high risk for decades but they were pushed by affordable housing
and CRA.
Mr. HENSARLING. What is your data point for that, that they
were pushed by CRA?
Mr. PINTO. I would quote the 1992 GSE Act, the Safety and
Soundness Act which Congress passed, where the GSEs were required to undertake a review of its underwriting guidelines and examine the ‘‘implications of implementing underwriting standards
that establish a downpayment requirement for mortgagors of 5 percent or less allow a use of cash on hand as a source for
downpayments and approved borrowers have a credit history of delinquency if the borrower can demonstrate a satisfactory credit history for at least a 12-month period ending on the date of the application for the mortgage.’’
The GSEs high-risk affordable housing acquisition is 50 percent
of which were CRA loans were made as a direct result of these congressionally mandated reviews.
Mr. HENSARLING. On page 5 of your testimony, footnote 2, it
says, ‘‘I believe that Fannie Mae purchased and securitized $201
billion of CRA loans in 2002, bringing a CRA cumulative total to

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$394 billion since 2000. CRA acquisitions totaled 25 percent of
Fannie’s total loan acquisitions in 2002 and 50 percent of its affordable housing loans.’’ Where do you find that fact?
Mr. PINTO. There is a press release that I can submit that
Fannie Mae produced, that goes through all these numbers, it a
Fannie Mae press release. That is what I meant by the term
opaque and difficult. I was able to, by reviewing these 40,0000 documents, generally on mortgage defaults, etc, find bits and piece
that piece this puzzle together, but it was very difficult. I said it
was difficult, but I didn’t say it was impossible. And the information I provide in my testimony is the result of that thorough research.
Mr. HENSARLING. So you conclude on page 5 of your testimony,
CRA created the supply and the GSEs created the demand. Do you
care to elaborate upon that?
Mr. PINTO. There is no coincidence that the explosion of CRA
commitments that started in 1992 coincides directly with the passage of the GSE Safety and Soundness Act of 1992; they were tied
together. Again, I can provide evidence from supporters of CRA in
books that they have written that document that correlation. And
what that correlation meant was the CRA supporters realized that
the bank couldn’t hold these books on their portfolios indefinitely,
you needed to liquidate them. And the way to get them liquidated,
meaning off their books and sold was to have Fannie and Freddie
buy them. And that was really the purpose of the 1992 Act as evidenced by the provision that I read and the mandates that were
inserted into the Act.
Fannie and Freddie ended up being the demand for the Act, for
the CRA loans, they were buying them, they were a willing buyer
and the banks who wanted to merge the four banks who bought up
all the other banks that ended up being the other 94 percent they
wanted to merge and so it was a marriage made in heaven, they
were the supply.
Mr. HENSARLING. A couple of quick questions in the remaining
time for Ms. Andersen. There are a couple of points in your testimony that are a little bit confusing to me. I think on page 1, you
essentially say that the ABA supports the Community Reinvestment Act. On page 4, you say banking institutions—I am paraphrasing—that do not serve the credit needs of their entire community do not prosper. Does your organization need to be told and
mandated to serve your communities of interest?
Ms. ANDERSEN. No, sir it does not. As a community banker, the
heart of what we do is serving our community, and the Community
Reinvestment Act simply documents what we do in the course of
business.
Mr. HENSARLING. I understand the ‘‘misery loves company’’ portion of your testimony. I yield back.
Mr. GREEN. Mr. Cleaver is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. CLEAVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Community Reinvestment Act, I will read again from the
Act, the CRA Act literally, literally requires that a banking regulatory agency evaluate how each of its regulated institutions affirmatively meets ‘‘the credit needs of its entire community, includ-

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ing low- and moderate-income neighborhoods consistent with the
safe and sound operation of such institutions.’’
And so, Mr. Pinto, you were going to lead from the CRA Act,
something that would contradict what I just read.
Mr. PINTO. Yes, as you know, regulations promulgated pursuant
to an Act have to enforce the law as the same as the Act, and the
regulations promulgated to implement CRA provide that the bank
wants to receive an outstanding CRA rating it has to use extensive
use of ‘‘innovative and/or flexible lending practices.’’ I would argue
that is inconsistent.
Mr. CLEAVER. What page is that on?
Mr. PINTO. It is not in my testimony; it is in the regulations.
Mr. CLEAVER. I sure would like to—I am sure you are absolutely
100 percent correct. I think the Nation needs to see it. Ms. Kennedy?
Ms. KENNEDY. I think there is some confusion about the regulation, it does encourage institutions to be innovative. And what that
has meant over the years is that institutions that want an outstanding CRA rating partner with blue chip, nonprofit experts,
think of Neighborhood Housing Services of Kansas City, which
counsel families who have very little money to bring to the closing
table, to prepare them for homeownership. So I think Mr. Pinto’s
interpretation of the regulation and his interpretation of all of the
public and private studies that have written over the last 10 years
that argue with Mr. Pinto’s conclusion, and in fact, Mike Stegman
is the expert on this, but the University of North Carolina Center
for Community Capital recently, and NeighborWorks America recently all confirmed the default rates on CRA loans are lower than
the average loan, let alone subprime.
There is one other fact I want to get on the record, because I
think it is really important Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were directed in 1992 that they could, if they wanted to, in order to support communities with credit needs. They never did that. Mr. Pinto
reflects the generation of Fannie Mae executives who resisted that.
But the tragedy is that in 2005, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac went
to HUD, and this was documented on the front page of The Washington Post last spring, went to HUD and persuaded HUD to give
them credit for affordable housing which were securities backed by
subprime loans that yielded higher than market rates. They didn’t
take less of a return, they found a way to game the system and
take more of a return, even as they were saying publicly that 50
percent of the loans should have been prime.
Mr. CLEAVER. I was actually on the Fannie Mae advisory committee at that time, appointed by a Republican because I don’t get
into this ideological stuff that doesn’t make sense, but at any rate,
if you would, Mr. Pinto, read the beginning of the statement that
you just read in response to Mr. Hensarling’s question, just the
first few lines.
Mr. PINTO. It is on page 8 of my submitted testimony. The regulator requires banks to demonstrate that they make extensive use
of ‘‘innovative and/or flexible lending practices’’ to get an outstanding rating. A single family is 50 percent of the weight of outstanding.

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Mr. CLEAVER. That was not the thing that I was speaking of. You
had just read a statement asking for—that spoke of a reconsideration or a consideration of, just moments—
Mr. PINTO. I am sorry, what?
Mr. CLEAVER. Just before the Chair called on me, you read a
statement where you talked about a new direction with regard to
CRA because Congress had—
Mr. PINTO. Oh, from the 1992 Act?
Mr. CLEAVER. Yes.
Mr. PINTO. The 1992 Act requires the GSEs to undertake a review of their—
Mr. CLEAVER. All right, thank you. I am cutting you off because
I—the point I am trying to make, and maybe I am making it poorly, is that there is nothing in this Act that contradicts this Act. Do
you agree with me, Mr. Pinto?
Mr. PINTO. I do not. How can you have a regulation that I read
and which has the force of law, and is interpreting that Act and
then say that can’t—that isn’t contradictory. The fact of the matter
is it is, and—
Mr. CLEAVER. So Congress passed the CRA and then unpassed
it?
Mr. PINTO. They effectively amended it.
Mr. CLEAVER. The same legislation?
Mr. PINTO. No, they effectively amended it through regulations.
Mr. CLEAVER. In 1992?
Mr. PINTO. In varying years.
Mr. CLEAVER. When they asked for a review. That is what you
said, review.
Mr. PINTO. A review, that is what Congress said, yes.
Mr. CLEAVER. Okay, just as a preacher, I think about synonyms
of review, examination, right? If you disagree with any of my synonyms, examination, commentary, critique, reappraisal.
Mr. PINTO. I agree that Congress will always provide a fig leaf
so that the fingerprints are not quite as clear.
Mr. CLEAVER. Do you know when they had the fig leaf meeting,
when the people gathered in the room to decide how to deceive the
American public with the fig leaf? Do you have any dates at the
meeting when they conspired to do this? Because those people don’t
need to be in public office if they met and conspired to fig leafs.
Mr. PINTO. All I know is that within 24 months of that direction
from Congress, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac started buying loans
like—
Mr. CLEAVER. You never used the word ‘‘directive,’’ you used the
worth ‘‘review.’’ I am just a Methodist preacher.
Mr. PINTO. I am just a simple observer.
Mr. GREEN. The gentleman’s time has expired.
Mr. CLEAVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GREEN. We will hear from Mr. Royce for 5 minutes.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In 1992, Mr. Pinto, the
Democratic-controlled Congress passed the GSE Act, which established the current regulatory structure over Fannie and Freddie.
And in this legislation, Congress mandated that the GSEs devote
a percentage of their businesses to three specific affordable housing
goals each year. As I said in my opening statement, these afford-

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able housing goals first established in 1992 led the GSEs to purchase over $1 trillion in subprime and alt A loans. Beyond causing
the failure of Fannie and Freddie because these accounted for
roughly 80 percent of the losses, the proliferation of these loans
was a major contributor to the overall financial collapse. In my
questioning to Mr. White on the previous panel, I detailed the illustrative lobbying that ACORN put on on behalf of CRA, and they
used CRA to argue for relaxing the previously stringent standards
of Fannie and Freddie.
Can you comment on this connection? Is there any connection between CRA and these looser standards that led to Fannie and
Freddie’s collapse?
Mr. PINTO. I didn’t bring it with me, but I can point you to the
book—I believe it is the one Gregory Saunders published. And he
is pro-CRA. He is very much in favor of CRA. And he outlined the
process that ACORN and others went through in 1992 and prior
to 1992 to get the affordable housing law implanted in the Fannie
and Freddie Safety and Soundness Act. I can describe it, but I
would rather provide the information directly from that book. All
I can say is that this language that I read from, that asked for this
study was part of that process. And there was no missing the signal of what Congress—at least the people who wrote this particular
provision—meant. Because as I say in my testimony, in 1990, only
8 percent of the loans in the United States, conventional conforming loans that were used for purchasing of homes were over 90
percent. By 2007, it was 29 percent. It went up every year.
Mr. ROYCE. It was 10 percent down or 20 percent down in 90 percent of the cases.
Mr. PINTO. 92 percent of the cases, 10 percent or more
Mr. ROYCE. 10 or 20 down as people will recall. And then what
happened as a consequence of changing it?
Mr. PINTO. I have the year by year, which I can provide. Just
bear with me a second. I have too many papers. It went from 8 percent to 10 percent to 12 percent to 14 percent. It eventually got to,
as I say, the 29 percent in 2007. But it was a year by year. It just
went up and up and up and up. And Fannie and Freddie—
Mr. ROYCE. And the usual loans then were 3 percent, were 0 percent.
Mr. PINTO. And in 1994, the 3 percent down loans were introduced as private loans. In 2000 or 2001, the 100 percent private
loan was introduced. Fannie and Freddie were the major purchases
of the 95 percent loan and then they became the major purchases
of 97 and then they became the major purchases of 100 percent.
Again, on the flip side of supply, the CRA loans were these exact
same loans.
Mr. ROYCE. So what we also see during that period of time—and
you have a graph of housing bubble. And you would argue that by
going to 0 percent down—of course I remember the number of
loans that were being flipped at that point in time. I think in 2005,
it was 30 percent of all loans in the United States according to the
Fed. You had people making loans. You had an impetus to get the
downpayments down to zero or as near zero as possible. You had
a consequence of that where it was driving a bubble in housing
market on top of the fact that low interest rates by the Fed—the

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Fed set the rates too low, underinflation rates, which was a mistake. But this on top of it was the icing on the cake helping drive
the bubble. Let me ask you another question. I heard from a former
employee of Freddie Mac that executives at the company wanted
to send a message to the market when they began purchasing
subprime and alt-A loans or alt-A mortgage backed securities for
their portfolio, that these loans were okay. In other words, if we
buy Countrywide, it is a signal to the market. They were told that
was just part of the request, basically sending the message to the
market that buying subprime is okay. Do you think there was some
such strategy?
Mr. PINTO. I do. In fact, I believe HUD was very instrumental
in getting Fannie and Freddie to do that. I believe the date was
not 2004. It was 1995 or 1996 when Fannie and Freddie got that
authority and they started buying those securities shortly thereafter. They ended up buying—I forget the exact amount—30 percent of all of those securities that were ever issued that were
subprime. And when they initially started doing it, I believe they
received a lot of applause from HUD and other regulators because
it was viewed as having exactly that potential impact.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Pinto. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GREEN. Thank you. Mr. Pinto, welcome to the committee.
Mr. PINTO. Thank you. It is a pleasure.
Mr. GREEN. It is my honor to have you before us, Mr. Pinto. Mr.
Pinto, you allege that a friend, a dear friend passed in 2001; is that
correct?
Mr. PINTO. I believe it was 2001, yes.
Mr. GREEN. And do you agree that the subprime fiasco developed
after 2001?
Mr. PINTO. I do not.
Mr. GREEN. Do you agree that what we are calling the current
crisis took place after 2001?
Mr. PINTO. I do not.
Mr. GREEN. When do you contend that it took place?
Mr. PINTO. It started in 1992, as the chart in my testimony indicates.
Mr. GREEN. I understand. And different people have different
opinions about it. Do you agree that—well, maybe I shouldn’t ask
you this, whether you agree. Have you had an opportunity—some
people have unique powers. Have you had an opportunity to talk
to your friend since 2001?
Mr. PINTO. I will use the same quote as the Secretary stated, ‘‘I
don’t channel these people.’’
Mr. GREEN. If you haven’t talked to your friend—in court we
have something known as hearsay, which is not admissible in
court. Admissible here. But it seems to me that you are introducing
something that we might call ‘‘never said.’’ Your friend never said
the things that you have attributed to her. Do you agree that she
never said these things about the CRA since she died in 2001 and
you have indicated that these things—much of it took place since
her death?
Mr. PINTO. What I had stated—and I have not indicated that she
would be in favor of—
Mr. GREEN. But did your friend say these things?

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Mr. PINTO. She said the things that I have in quotation marks.
Anything that is not in quotation marks—
Mr. GREEN. But did you not indicate that your friend would be
opposed to CRA now?
Mr. PINTO. I believe that she would ask you to find out what
happened because the same thing has happened with CRA—
Mr. GREEN. Did she say those words to you?
Mr. PINTO. She said them with respect to FHA.
Mr. GREEN. Did she say those words with reference to CRA?
Mr. PINTO. She was saying them with reference to FHA.
Mr. GREEN. So your answer is, she did not?
Mr. PINTO. She has not said anything to me since 2001. She
probably hasn’t said anything to you either.
Mr. GREEN. Well, she never said anything to me when she was
alive. But it seems to me that you are communicating with her
quite well. My concern is that you would take what you see as conjecture of a person who is no longer with us, who was supportive
of something and attribute words that this person may or may not
agree with. I will tell you that I think that is a little bit of a stretch
when you start to quote people who cannot speak for themselves.
I call that ‘‘never said’’ when you are talking about persons who are
no longer with us. But be that as it may, let me ask you, Ms. Kennedy. You quoted some statistical information with regards to lowincome tax credits. You gave some numbers. I would like for you
to repeat them and give us your source, please.
Ms. KENNEDY. The source of $400 billion a year in loans to lowand moderate-income persons or—and/or in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods is HMDA data, publicly available HMDA data.
The source for the $100 billion in banks tax credit investments is
publicly available performance evaluations of the banks on all of
the regulators’ Web sites. The source for the $30 billion of new
market tax credit investments is the Web site of the Treasury.
Mr. GREEN. Thank you. Ms. Andersen, you mentioned credit
unions as institutions that should be given some consideration to—
with reference to CRA. Credit unions usually say that they are performing quite well and they make loans in these low- and moderate-income areas, hence they should not come under the purview
of CRA. What would your response be to these contingents?
Ms. ANDERSEN. I would say that all depository institutions have
a responsibility to their communities and serving their communities. Through CRA, I am serving my community. We don’t know
that credit unions are serving their communities. It is a documentation issue.
Mr. GREEN. All right. And, Mr. Stegman, I had to terminate your
testimony before you finished. There was something more that you
wanted to add. I will allow you some time.
Mr. STEGMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a few things. If
we keep in mind that CRA-eligible loans refer to loans that are
made to families with incomes under 80 percent of the area median
income to really make the argument that families of very modest
means drove housing bubble to the point where prices doubled and
tripled over 3, 4, 5 years in these markets is simply unsustainable.
That argument just doesn’t hold water at all. The Fannie Mae
losses on the alt-A portfolios which are disproportionately respon-

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sible for losses are not to families with incomes under 80 percent
of median. They don’t involve income certification. They are to people with high credit scores and liar loans predominantly. The 2005
decision to allow these toxic securities to count as—towards affordable housing goals is quite contrary to historic kind of policy and
the intent of Congress under the 1992 law. So it just strikes me—
and lastly the issue of innovation and CRA regulations requiring
innovation, there is nothing in the regulations there is nothing implicit or explicit between CRA regulations and how examiners conduct their examinations that lead to liar loans; to option pick-a-pay
loans; to debt income ratios of 60 percent or more for mortgages
that don’t have escrow accounts, that have exploding ARMs. There
is just no connection between CRA and what examiners encourage
and look for in order to get an outstanding grade.
Mr. GREEN. I am going to have to thank you for your testimony.
I will remind members, you as well, that the entirety of your testimony will be made a part of the record. Friends, I know that there
is much more that can be said and probably should be said. But
at this point, I have to say that we would like to include certain
statements for the record. Without objection, the statements of the
following organizations will be made a part of the record: the Independent Community Bankers of America; National People’s Action;
the National Association of Federal Credit Unions; the Credit
Union National Association; the National Alliance of Community
Economic Development Associations; and finally, the Association
For Neighborhood and Housing Development.
We thank all of you for your testimony. The Chair will note that
some members may have additional questions for the witnesses
which they may wish to submit in writing. Without objection, the
hearing record will remain open for 30 days for members to submit
written questions to the witnesses and to place their responses in
the record.
Mr. CLEAVER. Mr. Chairman, after you gavel the meeting closed,
as a former judge, I would like to ask you after the meeting adjourns to explain the difference between a study and a law.
Mr. GREEN. All right, sir. Thank you very much. The hearing is
now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:53 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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September 16, 2009

(57)

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