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IO .h\i pa V. | 4 Z Departmentof WASHINGTON. D C 20220 TELEPHONE WO4-2041 I FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE September 1, 1974 SIMON ANNOUNCES HIGH LEVEL U.S. - ISRAELI MEETINGS Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon announced today that three of the subcommittees operating under the Joint U.S. - Israel Committee for Investment and Trade will be held here in Washington September 4 through September 6. ’’These meetings," Simon noted, "are an important step in our efforts to add a new dimension to the long-standing framework of economic relations between Israel and the U.S." Meetings of the^subcommittees on Capital Investment, Trade, and Raw Materials are being held to prepare for the inaugural meeting of the Joint Committee in Washington next November. The subcommittee on Research and Development will meet in Israel in the near future. Simon noted that "in addition to exploring ways of facilitating foreign private investment in Israel, and moving to expand trade between Israel and the U.S., we will be examining means to help Israel meet its raw material needs." The Joint Committee and the four working subcommittees are the result of discussions Simon held with Prime Minister Rabin and Finance Minister Rabinowitz during Simon’s visit to Israel last July, and were announced in a Joint Statement issued in Israel July 18 at the end of the visit. Treasury Secretary Simon ana Israeli Finance Minister Yehoshua Rabinowitz are co-Chairman of the Joint Committee. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Gerald L. Parsky is Executive Secretary of the Joint Committee and will have a key role in the working level meetings held in Washington. Members of the U.S. delegation will include senior officials from the State and Treasury Departments as well as the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture, and the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations. oOo WS-88 DepartmentoftheTREASURY WASHINGTON, DC 20220 TELEPHONE W04-2041 September 3, 1974 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE TREASURY?S WEEKLY BILL OFFERING The Treasu / De; ¿rtment, by this public notice, invites tenders for two series of Treasury bills to the aggregate amount of $4,400,000,000, or thereabouts, to be issued September 12, 1974, as follows: 91-day bills (to maturity date) in the amount of $2,600,000,000, representing an additional amount of bills dated June 13, 1974, or thereabouts, and to mature December 12, 1974 (CUSIP No. 912793 VC7) , originally issued in the amount of $1,902,535,000, the additional and original bills to be freely interchangeable. 182-day bills for $1,800,000,000, or thereabouts, to be dated September 12, 1974, and to mature March 13, 1975 (CUSIP No. 912793 VZ6). The bills will be issued for cash and in exchange for Treasury bills maturing ¿September 12, 1974, outstanding in the amount of $4,404,980,000, of which Government accounts and Federal Reserve Banks, for themselves and as agents of foreign and International monetary authorities, presently hold $2,907,835,000. These accounts | may exchange bills they hold for the bills now being offered at the average prices of accepted tenders. The bills of both series will be issued on a discount basis under competitive and noncompetitive bidding as hereinafter provided, and at maturity their face amount will be payable without interest. They will be issued in bearer form in denominations of $10,000, $15,000, $50,000, $100,000, $500,000 and $1,000,000 I ; (maturity value) and in book-entry form to designated bidders. Tenders will be received at Federal Reserve Banks and Branches up to the closing | hour, one-thirty p.m. , Eastern Daylight Saving time, Monday, September 9, 1974. Tenders will not be received at the Treasury Department, Washington. ( must be for a minimum of $10,000. $5,000. Each tender Tenders over $10,000 must be in multiples of In the case of competitive tenders the price offered must be expressed on the basis of 100, with not more than three decimals, e.g., 99.925. ■ n o t be used. Fractions may It is urged that tenders be made on the printed forms and forwarded ■ i n the special envelopes which will be supplied by Federal Reserve Banks or Branches ■ on application therefor. Banking institutions and dealers who make primary markets in Government ■securities and report daily to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York their positions (OVER) - 2- with respect to Government securities and borrowings thereon may submit tenders for account of customers provided the names of the customers are set forth in such tenders. own account. Others will not be permitted to submit tenders except for their Tenders will be received without deposit from incorporated banks and trust companies and from responsible and recognized dealers in investment securitiei Tenders from others must be accompanied by payment of 2 percent of the face amount of Treasury bills applied for, unless the tenders are accompanied by an express guaranty of payment by an incorporated bank or trust company. Immediately after the closing hour, tenders will be opened at the Federal Reserve Banks and Branches, following which public announcement will be made by the Treasury Department of the amount and price range of accepted bids. Only those submitting competitive tenders will be advised of the acceptance or rejection thereof. The Secretary of the Treasury expressly reserves the right to accept or reject any or all tenders, in whole or in part, and his action in any such respe shall be final. Subject to these reservations, noncompetitive tenders for each issue for $200,000 or less without stated price from any one bidder will be accepted in full at the average price (in three decimals) of accepted competitive bids for the respective Issues. | Settlement for accepted tenders in accordance with the bids must be made or completed at the Federal Reserve Bank on September 12, 1974, in cash or other immediately available funds or in a like face amount of Treasury bills maturing September 12, 1974. treatment. Cash and exchange tenders will receive equal Cash adjustments will be made for differences between the par value of I maturing bills accepted in exchange and the issue price of the new bills. Under Sections 454(b) and 1221 (5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 the amount of discount at which bills Issued hereunder are sold is considered to accrue! when the bills are sold, redeemed or otherwise disposed of, and the bills are ex cluded from consideration as capital assets. Accordingly, the owner of Treasury bills (other than life Insurance companies) issued hereunder must include in his income tax return, as ordinary gain or loss, the difference between the price paid I for the bills, whether on original issue or on subsequent purchase, and the amount 1 actually received either upon sale or redemption at maturity during the taxable year for which the return is made. Treasury Department Circular No. 418 (current revision) and this notice, prescribe the terms of the Treasury bills and govern the conditions of their issue! Copies of the circular may be obtained from any Federal Reserve Bank or Branch. TREASURY Ìf Departmentofthe iSHINGTON, D.C. 20220 tfi cpwnwc w h a on/ii TELEPHONE W04-2041 L rL and i r it ie i FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE kount is ANTIDUMPING INVESTIGATION INITIATED ON CERTAIN NON-POWERED MECHANICS' TOOLS FROM JAPAN Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, David R. Macdonald, announced today the initiation of an antidumping investiga tion on certain non-powered mechanics' tools from Japan. •y those respe® th icep tecs for I The term "certain non-powered mechanics' tools" encompasses punches, chisels, hammers and sledges, vises, C-clamps, micrometers, vernier calipers, dial indicators, and battery service tools. The announcement followed a summary investigation conducted by the U.S. Customs Service. Information received tends to indicate that the prices of the merchandise sold for exportation to the United States are less than the prices of such or similar merchandise sold in the home market. '74, Notice of this action will be published in the Federal Register of September 5, 1974. mry tal te of I :he During the period of July through December 1973, imports of certain non-powered mechanics' tools from Japan were valued at roughly $4 million. | iccrue ex- iry ils paid count Le Lssue ti. * * * * * FOR. IMMEDIATE RELEASE September 6, 1974 MACDONALD TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERPOL MEETING David R. Macdonald, Assistant Secretary (Enforcement, Operations, and Tariff Affairs) announced today that the United States will participate in a conference on inter national fraud to be held in Paris, September 9-12. Law enforcement officials from more than 40 countries are expected to take part in the meeting which is being sponsored by INTERPOL. The participants will analyze a variety of crimes in an effort to share their knowledge and develop more effective methods for preventing and detecting violations. The topics will include, among others, fraudulent banking, insurance, and securities operations. Representatives from the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Justice and Treasury Departments will attend. oOo WS-90 Removal Notice The item identified below has been removed in accordance with FRASER's policy on handling sensitive information in digitization projects due to copyright protections. Citation Information Document Type: Transcript Number of Pages Removed: Author(s): Title: "Today in Congress" Date: 1974-09-03 Journal: Volume: Page(s): URL: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Department of ¡WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 theJREASURY TELEPHONE W04-2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE September 5, 1974 TREASURY ANNOUNCES TAPERED ROLLER BEARINGS FROM JAPAN ARE BEING SOLD AT LESS THAN FAIR VALUE Assistant Secretary David R. Macdonald announced today that tapered roller bearings from Japan are being, or are likely to be, sold at less than fair value within the meaning of the Antidumping Act of 1921, as amended. The term "tapered roller bearings" means equally matched, conically shaped rollers, equally spaced by means of a cage, which roll easily in a tapered raceway formed by an outer ring or cup and an inner ring or cone. Tapered roller bearings are used primarily in transport equipment such as trucks, autos, and trailers. Notice of the determination will be published in the Federal Register of September 6, 1974. The case will now be referred to the Tariff Commission for a determination as to whether an American industry is being, or is likely to be, injured. In the event of an affirmative determination, dumping duties will be assessed on all entries of tapered roller bear ings from Japan which have not been appraised and on which dumping margins exist. A notice of "Withholding of Appraisement" was issued on June 5, 1974 which stated there was reasonable cause to believe or suspect that there were sales at less than fair value. Pursuant to this notice, interested persons were afforded the opportunity to present oral and written views prior to the final determination in this case. During the calendar year 1973, imports of tapered roller bearings from Japan were valued at approximately $16 million. * * * * of TREASURY jjjf RUM Department the September 5, 1974 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESS: The Secretary of the Treasury, William E. Simon, and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Dr. Arthur F. Burns, will be meeting this weekend in Europe with their counterparts from a small number of other major countries. The meeting was scheduled during Secretary Simon1s talks with European officials during his visit to Europe in July and will be one of a con tinuing series of consultations among these officials to insure close cooperation in inter national financial affairs. 0 O0 ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE WILLIAM E. SIMON SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY BEFORE THE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION FIFTH BUSINESS CONDITIONS MANAGEMENT BRIEFING SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY DALLAS, TEXAS FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 6,1974 FREE ENTERPRISE AND INFLATION Today I want to discuss the threat that inflation poses for the American economic system of free enterprise. For almost two centuries, since this country was just a bare foothold in the wilderness, we have placed primary reliance on private decision making and open markets. That approach has served us well. In material terms it has put this Nation in a position of unrivalled economic leadership in the world. Even more important, in my view, the system has helped us preserve our most cherished personal and political freedoms. Thus I believe that preservation of our free enterprise system should be a basic goal for all Americans. Free enterprise should need no defense, but I think it does. Because it is more vulnerable today than it has been at any time since the Great Depression of the 1930s. At that time the problem was mass unemployment. Such economic extremes inevitably give rise to public discontent and calls for action. And in a democratic system, government must respond. But it must respond in a way that does not destroy what has served us so well« WS-89 2 Four decades ago, when we were in the grips of depression, we determined that we would never again permit a recurrence of mass unemployment. That was a correct decision -- and it is as correct today as it was then. But in the 1930s we also began to make some national decisions that were wrong. We started a trend of having the government do too much for people. That trend has been building momentum ever since, and in the past couple of decades it has carried too far. In trying to do too much for people, the has ended up by accomplishing too little. In too much for people, the government has taken spending commitments that drain our resources Federal budget an inflationary juggernaut. government trying to do on open-ended and make the The danger to our free enterprise system today is not the threat of mass unemployment, it is the threat of prolonged high inflation. I am concerned that we have not yet fully recognized the dimensions of this threat. For if the rate of inflation is not reduced to tolerable levels, the American public will demand direct action to hold down wages, prices, profits and interest rates. Such action would not end the inflation but, if accepted as an economic way of life, it could mean the erosion of our economic system -- the system that has provided the American people with more and better homes, automobiles, leisure, education and almost everything else worth having -especially personal and economic freedom -- than any other nation on earth. I am not talking about economic ideology. This is the 20th century and we can't go back to laissez-faire, or some other mythical system. Government has always had an important role to play in our economic life. But we have also had the good sense in this country to allow maximum scope for competition and individual initiative. The Case For Private Decisions The case for private decision making in a market system is based upon a very basic and fundamental fact: It works. The marketplace is an efficient system when it is allowed to operate with the necessary freedom. Indeed, the price 3 system is not only the most effective method of determining what, and where, and how economic activity shall take place in a free society, it is the only feasible method. If markets and prices were not used to provide the signals of our economic life, what would we use instead? We would use some governmental planning mechanism. But this is an enormously large and complex economy. Even the Washington bureaucracy would not be enough. Every industry, every commodity and every community would need its own contingent of planners. And although there might be plenty of volunteers at the start, they wouldn't be around for long. Their bewildering assignment would be to insure that the right commodity or service was available at the right time to the right person. It just couldn't be done. No, if we want the system to work for us, rather than us working for the system, we cannot do better than competitive markets. Furthermore, once detailed economic planning is substituted for the market mechanism, most of our economic freedom is gone. And when economic freedom is gone, our chances of retaining political and other freedoms would be close to zero. Nothing in this life is perfect and the market system is no exception. The market system does not automatically dispense social justice; nor does it meet all our collective needs. At times, extraordinary circumstances prevent the market from operating even reasonably well. The government may have to step in to deal with the situation. Government should also be ready to step out when conditions return to normal. It is clear that we must take care of those who are in need and insure that all of our citizens are in a position to live out their lives in dignity. Those who cannot help themselves must be helped. Further, the economy must function within an adequate framework - 4 - of law. And to operate properly, competition must be vigorous. For these and other reasons, government has many important functions. It must enforce the laws. It must provide for the common defense. It must provide essential public services. It must protect the environment. It must enforce standards to protect the public health and welfare. It must insure that competitive conditions are maintained. Most important, it must protect individuals against thé extremes of economic adversity. It is also appropriate to recognize some recent accomplishments of the market approach. After August 1971 when we removed the artificial constraint of fixed exchange rates, the dollar moved to a more competitive level internationally. In doing so, it pulled our trade balance out of its chronic deficit (until the oil embargo struck). Similarly, the 180-degree change that was made in Federal agricultural policy in 1972 and 1973 •— ending acreage limitations and other restrictions on farm production permitted wider latitude for the normal price incentives to operate and encouraged maximum agricultural output. Food prices are high but they would have been higher still without this important change in national policy. I think Harry Reasoner of CBS News got to the heart of this matter of the benefits of competition. He made this comment during the energy crisis, back when gasoline was scarce and if you could find any at all you had to wait in long lines to get it and you didnft get the extra services you used to always get automatically. 5 As Harry Reasoner put it: "The reason you got your windshield washed was that a man wanted to sell you gas. If he automatically sells all the gas he can get, where is your buyer's edge? They have lived with this problem for years in societies where there was never enough to go around. It's a new one for us. With a dirty windshield in a station which is out of gas anyway; you are down to depending on saintliness. I am not knocking saintliness, but over the centuries, in the ordinary day to day rut, competition cleans more windshields." I think that sums up very nicely the advantages of the American system: competition does clean more windshields. The Rise of Bii Let me turn now to the question of whether our economic system can coexist with big government. It is an unfortunate fact that government is an increasingly important factor in our day-to-day economic and financial life. Whether or not the economy can thrive depends on whether government can carry on its essential functions while keeping its spending under some kind of control. I will tell you quite frankly that I think Federal expenditures are growing much too rapidly and that they must be restrained. It took us 185 years to get to the $100 billion mark in Federal expenditures, only nine more years to reach the $200 billion mark, and just four more years . to get to $300 billion. And this doesn't even take account of all the extensions of Federal credit through various guarantees and the like which caused total Federal and Federally-assisted borrowings to account for almost two-thirds of total funds raised in the capital markets in fiscal year 1973. In 13 of the past 14 years the Federal budget has been in deficit. The fiscal results of the first half of that period were dominated by the Vietnam buildup which culminated in a $25 billion budget deficit in Fiscal Year 1968 -- this at a time when the economy was already operating above full employment. The second half of the period has been largely free from the need for increased defense expenditures. Other Federal expenditures have, however, taken up the gap. In the 1974 Fiscal Year just completed, defense expenditures were $78 billion, roughly the same as they were in fiscal 1968. In marked contrast, all other categories of Federal expenditures rose by about $90 billion, roughly $60 billion of the increase was in social security, veterans benefits and welfare programs. Another $15 billion of the rise went for health, education, and manpower. Most of the remaining increase was accounted for by higher interest payments on the national debt. All of this would probably be termed "uncontrollable" in the budgetary sense of the term. Indeed, it concerns me that by the time all the uncontrollable items are listed, each year's budget is virtually immune to cuts. Our budgets are uncontrollable in every sense of the word if we accept the fallacious assumption that once a law is enacted it can never be changed I do not accept that. In our modern economy, there are strong pressures for Government to play a major role in the social welfare area. The public recognizes the desirability of establishing a minimum floor of economic well-being for the less fortunate. We have always been a compassionate people. But in recent years we have used the Federal budget as an instrument of social reform without adequate reckoning of the cost. I want to make my position clear on this matter. I favor large expenditures for social purposes. Although I think we should insist upon maximum scope for self-help and individual initiative, we must help those of our citizens who need and deserve help. If that requires even larger social welfare programs, and it may, I favor that also. My only point is that we must pay for those programs. If we refuse to do so, then the budget will be virtually out of control, inflation will be rampant, and the very people we tried to assist will be the ones most penalized. High and rising Federal expenditures inevitably mean high and rising taxation. Either we get higher taxes directly, or the resulting budget deficits produce inflation which is the most insidious and indiscriminate tax of all. And both inflation and taxation can have, and no doubt have had in this country, an adverse effect on incentives to save and to invest. Without an adequate volume of saving and investment, we would not be able to put into use the 7 scientific advances and new technology that are coming off the drawing board, and we would not be able to expand and improve our productive and distribution systems. As a result, National economic growth would be stunted and there would not be a larger pie to slice up each year. Without attempting to turn back the clock, we need to examine how far the essential incentives of the free enterprise system have been eroded in the past few decades. I believe that the private enterprise system is capable of strong future performance. However, there have been some inroads into the vitality of the system and we must shift our emphasis from consumption to savings and investment. We must get back to the fundamentals and emphasize growth in productivity. The Inflation Threat A major threat to free enterprise and its ability to survive is a big government that cannot balance its books. The Federal Government has a monopoly of the monetary and fiscal powers. Abuse of these will ruin any system. History is littered with the wreckage of political systems that failed to cope with inflation. A strong government can control inflation. The question is whether it will. It seems to me that two roads are open. One road leads us to an emphasis on restraint and maximum reliance on competition and productivity. That is the road to travel in my opinion. It can take us back to reasonable price stability at high levels of employment. But we must recognize that there have been years of fiscal and monetary abuse, which cannot be undone overnight. Thus, fiscal and monetary restraint must be exercised patiently and consistently for a sustained period of time. The other road leads back to controls. Controls appeal to our desire for action, to our wish for a quick and easy solution. But controls do nothing to remove the causes of inflation, and they exact a heavy cost in the form of distortions of the productive structure. Wages and profits take turns being squeezed. As things get worse, the bureaucratic temptation is always to clamp the controls on a little tighter. Controls are the enemy of the market and could kill the economic system as we know it. The process 6f curbing inflation will not be costless. This is a fact we all must fully understand. Federal spending programs will have to be stretched out. The pleasures of a tax cut will have to be foregone. Credit will not be available easily or cheaply. Growth in business sales and profits will not be as ebullient. And for a time unemployment will have to remain slightly higher than we would like. - 8 - These costs of the anti-inflation effort mast be offset as best we can -- through improved unemployment insurance, and other programs. However, not all of the costs can be offset. Yet we must bear them, because the costs of continued inflation are far greater. If we lose this battle against inflation, or retreat into a maze of controls, we lose our chance for a healthy, growing economy that can sustain full employment. I believe Americans sense this and are ready for a concerted, and lengthy, effort to return to a more stable economic environment. Conclusion It is clear to me which policies we should follow. We must remove the causes of inflation, not just treat the results. I am confident that with the support of the American people inflation can and will be ended. The traditional American economic system must be defended from this grave threat. The free enterprise system is worth defending. Its advantages have been stated eloquently. I close my own remarks with these words, which are probably not those of Abraham Lincoln, although they have sometimes been attributed to him. "You cannot bring about prosperity by discouraging thrift. You cannot strengthen the weak by weakening the strong. You can not help the wage earner by pulling down the wage payer. You cannot further the brother hood of man by encouraging class hatred. You cannot help the poor by destroying the rich. You cannot keep out of trouble by spending more than you earn. You cannot build character and courage by taking away man’s initiative and independence. You cannot help men permanently by doing for them what they could and should do for them selves .I +0 ** oOo m HHHHI IHI thRJUSURY Wìepartmentof TELEPHONE W04-2041 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESS FINANCIAL CONFERENCE ON INFLATION Attached is a letter Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon has sent to members of the banking and finance community invited to attend the ’’Financial Conference on Inflation” September 20, 1974. Also attached is the list of delegates who have been invited and the preliminary agenda. The U.S. Senate delegates will be announced later. WS-91 TP* <QT * TEXT OF THE LETTER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY WILLIAM E. SIMON HAS SENT TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE "FINANCIAL CONFERENCE ON INFLATION" BEING HELD IN WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER 20, 1974 Dear : I am pleased to learn that you have accepted the President's invitation to the Conference on Inflation on September 27 and 28 and the Financial Conference on Inflation on September 20. At the banking and finance meeting, we will concentrate on a broad range of issues relating to inflation. We are anxious to have your thinking on this, the nation's number one problem--on its causes, its effects, and its cures. Special emphasis will be devoted to fiscal and monetary policy, the capital markets, the international situation, and financial institutions. Attached is a preliminary agenda which outlines the format of the meeting and the major subjects that will be covered. We are preparing a compendium of selected papers on each of these topics. We invite you to submit a one-page summary of your views on any of the agenda items for inclusion in this document. We need to receive these summaries by September 13, so that we can distribute the compendium to all participants in advance of the meeting. An outstanding group of congressional leaders, government officials, economists, and business and financial leaders have accepted our invitation. I am confident that we in government will benefit from your advice and discussions, and I am going to conduct the meeting with that goal in mind. 2 The meeting on the 20th will be held at the Statler-Hilton beginning at 9:00 a.m. I would also like to invite you to a reception and dinner for the participants on the evening of the 19th. This dinner will be held in the Executive Dining Room at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 Seventeenth Street, N.W., at 7:00 p.m. We will keep you advised of any other details of the Conference, and I want to say again how much I appreciate your acceptance. Sincerely, William E. Simon MEMBERS OF BANKING AND FINANCE COMMUNITY INVITED TO ATTEND THE FINANCIAL CONFERENCE ON INFLATION WASHINGTON, D.C. SEPTEMBER 20, 1974 HELD AT THE REQUEST OF PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD AND THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES TREASURY DEPARTMENT The Honorable William E. Simon Secretary of the Treasury U.S. Department of the Treasury 15th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20220 The Honorable Stephen S. Gardner Deputy Secretary U.S. Department of the Treasury 15th, and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20220 The Honorable Jack F. Bennett Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs U.S. Department of the Treasury 15th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20220 The Honorable Edgar R. Fiedler Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy U.S. Department of the Treasury 15th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20220 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES The Honorable Barber B. Conable, Jr. U.S. House of Representatives Rayburn House Office Building Room 2429 Washington, D.C. 20515 The Honorable Wright Patman U.S. House of Representatives Rayburn House Office Building Room 2328 Washington, D.C. 20515 The Honorable Henry S. Reuss U.S. House of Representatives Rayburn House Office Building Room 2186 Washington, D.C. 20515 1 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (cont'd) The Honorable J. William Stanton U.S. House of Representatives Rayburn House Office Building Room 2448 Washington, D.C. 20515 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM The Honorable Arthur F. Burns Chairman Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 20th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20551 Mr. Bruce K. MacLaury President Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 250 Marquette Avenue Minneapolis, Minnesota 55480 Mr. J. Charles Partee Managing Director, Office of Research and Economic Policy Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 20th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20551 OTHER REGULATORY AUTHORITIES Mr. Thomas R. Bomar Chairman Federal Home Loan Bank Board 320 First Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20552 Mr. Ray Garrett, Jr. Chairman Securities and Exchange Commission 500 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20549 Mr. Herman Nickerson, Jr. Administrator National Credit Union Administration 2025 M Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20456 Mr. James E. Smith Comptroller of the Currency Department of the Treasury Washington, D.C. 20219 < 3 ® 2 Mr. Frank Wille Chairman Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 550 17th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20429 COMMERCIAL BANKING Mr. Richard P. Cooley President and Chief Executive Officer Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Post Office Box 44000 San Francisco, California 94144 Mr. Gaylord Freeman Chairman of the Board First National Bank of Chicago One First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60670 Mr. David B, Harper President First Independence National Bank 234 State Street Detroit, Michigan 48226 Mr. Milton J. Hayes Chairman Government Fiscal Policy Committee Independent Bankers Association 1725 DeSales Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Mr. Richard D. Hill Chairman of the Board Frist National Bank of Boston 100 Federal Street Boston, Massachusetts 02110 Mr. Rex J. Morthland President, American Bankers Association The Peoples Bank and Trust Company of Selma Post Office Box 799 Selma, Alabama 36701 Mr. David Rockefeller Chairman Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. One Chase Manhattan Plaza New York, New York 10015 3 Mr. Robert H. Stewart, III Chairman of the Board First National Bank of Dallas Post Office Box 6031 Dallas, Texas 75283 Mr. Thomas I. Storrs Chairman of the Executive Committee North Carolina National Bank Post Office Box 120 Charlotte, North Carolina 28255 Dr. Charles J. Zwick President Southeast Banking Corporation 100 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 CONSUMER REPRESENTATIVES Dr. Gwen Byrners Professor and Chairman of the Department of Consumer Economics Cornell University Ithaca, New York 14850 Ms. Sylvia Porter Syndicated Financial Columnist 30 East 42nd Street New York, New York 10017 ECONOMISTS Dr. George Leland Bach Professor of Economics and Public Policy Stanford University Stanford, California 94305 Dr. Robert G. Dederick Senior Vice President Northern Trust Company 50 South LaSalle Street Chicago, Illinois 60690 Economist 4 ECONOMISTS (confd) Dr. Otto Eckstein Department of Economics Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138 Dr. Milton Friedman Department of Economics University of Chicago 1126 East 59th Street Chicago, Illinois 60637 Dr. Tilford C. Gaines Senior Vice President and Economist Manufacturers Hanover Trust 350 Park Avenue New York, New York 10022 Dr. Paul W. McCracken Senior Consultant U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of the Secretary 15th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20220 Dr. Arthur M. Okun Senior Fellow The Brookings Institution 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Dr. Raymond J. Saulnier Department of Economics Barnard College Columbia University New York, New York 10027 ECONOMISTS (cont'd) The Honorable George P. Shultz Executive Vice President Bechtel Corporation 50 Beale Street San Francisco, California 94119 The Honorable Charls E. Walker President Charls E. Walker Associates 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 Dr. Marina Whitman University of Pittsburgh Department of Economics Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260 INSURANCE Mr. Archie R. Boe Chairman of the Board Allstate Insurance Co. Allstate Plaza Northbrook, Illinois 60062 Mr. Donald MacNaughton Chairman of the Board Prudential Insurance Company of America Prudential Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 Mr. W.J. Kennedy, III President North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Co. P.0. Box 201 Durham, North Carolina 27702 Mr. Ralph S. Saul Vice Chairman of INA Corporation Insurance Company of North America 1600 Arch Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 6 INVESTMENT COMMUNITY Mr. Robert H.B. Baldwin President Morgan Stanley and Company 1251 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York 10020 Mr. Robert H. Bethke President, of the Executive Committee Discount Corporation of New York 58 Pine Street New York, New York 10005 Mr. William H. Franklin Chairman Caterpillar Tractor 100 N.E. Adams Street Peoria, Illinois 61629 Mr. J. Henning Hilliard Chairman J.J.B. Hilliard, W.L. Lyons, Inc. 545 South Third Street Louisville, Kentucky 40202 Mr. Paul R. Judy Chairman A.G. Becker 2 First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60670 Mr. Harvey E. Kapnick, Jr. Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Arthur Anderson and Company 69 Washington Street Chicago, Illinois 60602 Mr. Ralph F. Leach Chairman of the Executive Committee Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York 23 Wall Street New York, New York 10015 Mr. Gustav L. Levy Partner Goldman, Sachs and Company 55 Broad Street New York, New York 10004 7 INVESTMENT COMMUNITY (cont'd) Mr. James J. Needham Chairman The New York Stock Exchange, Ine. 11 Wall Street New York, New York 10005 Mr. Donald T. Regan Chairman of the Board Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. One Liberty Plaza 165 Broadway New York, New York 10008 Mr. Robert V. Roosa Partner Brown Brothers Harriman and Company 59 Wall Street New York, New York 10005 Mr. Martin E. Segal Chairman of the Board Martin E. Segal Company 730 Fifth Avenue New York, New York 10019 Mr. Carlton P. Wilson President and Director Robert W. Baird and Company, Inc. 731 N. Water Street Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201 LABOR REPRESENTATIVES Mr. Howard Coughlin President Office and Professional Employees International Union 265 West 14th Street New York, New York 10011 Mr. John Tomayko Director, Insurance Pension United Steelworkers of America 5 Gateway Center Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222 fcf~ 8 SAVINGS INDUSTRY Mr. Morris D. Crawford, Jr. Chairman of the Board Bowery Savings Bank 110 East 42nd Street New York, New York 10017 Mr. Robert Ray Dockson President California Federal Savings and Loan Association 5670 Wilshire Boulevard Los Angeles, California 90036 Mr. Gilbert R. Ellis President Household Finance Corporation Prudential Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60601 Dr. Grover W. Ensley Executive Vice President National Association of Mutual Savings Banks 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10017 Mr. Richard G. Gilbert President Citizens Savings Association 100 South Central Plaza Canton, Ohio 44702 Mr. M.R. Hellie President Credit Union National Association, Inc. 1730 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Mr. Norman Strunk Executive Vice President U.S. League of Savings Associations 111 East Wacker Drive Chicago, Illinois 60601 9 Agenda for September 20 Finaneial Conference on Inflation 9:00 AM - Introduction 9:10 AM - Economic Situation and Policy Briefing Council of Economic Advisers 9:25 AM - Briefing on the Budget Office of Management and Budget 9:40 AM - Fiscal Policy Major Fiscal Objectives and Options for Fiscal Years 1975, 1976, and Beyond Possible Cuts in Federal Spending Possible Changes in Federal Taxation: Current Levels, Incentives, Deterrents, Equity 11:30 AM - Monetary Policy Current State of Domestic Financial Markets Current Monetary Policy: Given the Circumstances, has 'it been too Tight or about Right? What Should the Future Course of Monetary Policy be? 1:00 PM - Lunch 2:00 PM - Capital Markets and Capital Formation Discussion of the Dimensions of Future Capital Requirements for Energy, Mass Transit, Housing and All Other Needs of the Economy -- Policies to Increase the Total Volume of Saving and Investment Policies to Insure Adequate Financing through the Equity and Long-Term Debt Markets 2 3:00 PM - International Economic Policy and Inflation Discussion of the Appropriate U. S. Role in International Economic Policy International Financial Aspects of World Inflation 4:00 pM - Financial Institutions and Inflation Possible Changes that should be made in Laws and Regulations Affecting Financial Institutions to Assist in the Fight Against Inflation 4:30 PM - Wage-Price Policy How Should the Wage-Price Monitoring System be Operated? 5:00 PM - Other Suggestions to Combat Inflation 6:00 PM - Adjournment of Formal Session « * ADVANCE FOR A.M. NEWSPAPERS MONDAY. SEPTEMBER 9. 1974 / TREASURY OUTLINES RESTRICTIONS ON GOLD FUTURES The Treasury has received a number of inquiries as to whether U.S. firms and individuals may now purchase or sell gold futures contracts, providing for delivery of the gold after the date when gold ownership will become legal. These inquiries have been prompted by Public Law 93-373, signed by President Ford on August 14, 1974, which provides for the termination of all existing restrictions on the ownership of gold on December 31, 1974 or on such earlier date as the President finds and reports to Congress that deregulation of gold would not have an adverse effect on the nation's inter national monetary situation. This law does not in any way limit the continued present applicability of the Gold Regulations. These regulations will not lose their force and effectiveness until December 31, 1974 or the date of a Presidential determination reported to Congress. Acquisition of future interests in gold is restricted under the Gold Regulations. Under the Regulations, the acquisition of any interest in gold, except for licensed industrial, professional, artistic or numismatic uses, is prohibited. A gold futures contract, even though providing for delivery after December 31, 1974, gives the purchaser a present interest in gold, and consequently such contracts are in violation of the Regulations. Moreover, except for the above-mentioned licensed uses, gold in any form for present or future delivery may not be purchased or sold on any exchange within the United States. The Regulations also prohibit the purchase or sale of any present or future interest in gold in any form, direct or indirect, for speculative purposes. For example, the Regulations prohibit a seller from holding rare gold coins as a hedge against a contractual obligation to deliver gold bullion to purchasers after termination of the Regulations. In addition, firms may not accept orders for gold for delivery after termination. oOo WS-9 3 (Over) 2 However, it would be consistent with the Regulations for United States firms to advertise that they will be engaged in the sale of gold to the general public after termination and invite prospective customers to submit names for inclusion on mailing lists for receipt of prospectuses, order forms, and other literature. Adver tising may describe merchandise which a firm expects to offer for sale after termination, but may not provide details as to quantities, prices, and time for delivery of articles, such as to create an inference that a customer’s response would result in a contract for future delivery of gold. 0O0 TREASURY Departmentalthe IlN G T O N D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04-2041 T T FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE _ September 6, 1974 Government Files Appeal in Import Surcharge Case Today the Department of the Treasury announced that the ' Department of Justice filed an appeal by the Government in I the case of Yoshida International/ Inc, v. United States. The appeal, filed today in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, seeks the reversal of the July 8, 1974, decision of the Customs Court. The Yoshida decision declared invalid Presidential Proclamation 4074 of August 15, 1971, under which an additional duty of 10% ad valorem was levied upon most articles imported into the United States between August 16, 1971 and December 20, 1971. oOo WS-92 Federal Financing Bank lending activity for the period August 26, 1974, to September 6, 1974, is as follows: -- The Bank purchased $2 million on August 26 and $2.3 million on September 6, of notes issued under the HEW Medi cal Facilities Direct Loan Program (Hill Burton). This brings the amount borrowed under this program to $2 2.'? million under a total commitment of $27.6 million. — On August 27 Amtrak borrowed an additional $5 mil lion from the Bank under an outstanding loan commitment of $200 million. — On September 3 the Bank made a $125 million 91-day loan to the Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae) to refund a maturing $100 million note held by the FFB and to furnish additional funds for Sallie Mae operations. The interest rate on the new loan is 9.89 percent. The Federal Financing Bank was established by an Act of Congress last December (Public Law 93-224) to consolidate the financing of various Federal agencies and other borrowers whose obligations are guaranteed by the Federal Government. The Bank began operations last May. oOo 202- 964-2615 Press inquiries: LENDING ACTIVITY AUGUST 26 - SEPTEMBER 6, 1974 Departmentoft h e f R R V ISHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04 2041 i FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY THE FORD ADMINISTRATION AS VIEWED FROM THE TREASURY Warren F. Brecht Assistant Secretary for Administration U. S. Department of the Treasury Convocation Address DePauw University 1f Introductory Remarks A. I am honored to be the opening convocation speaker for the new school year. Over the years since I graduated from DePauw, I have continued to follow the progress of the University. I continue to be impressed with DePauw's overall program and philosophy: a relatively small, topnotch student body; the broad-gauged liberal arts focus; a high calibre and diverse faculty; a curriculum that is continually changing with the times; and finally a construction program that is based on a sound long-range plan. B. It has been 10 years since I last visited Greencastle. I am most impressed with all the major construction and the progress that it conveys. Yet, I am somewhat saddened by the demise of Minshall Lab. I still have memories as a freshman pledge guarding the Sigma Chi bell, spending a number of nights in the bushes around Minshall Lab trying to catch a certain Phi Psi named Naus Thompson who successfully rang the bell about 20 times before we WS-94 2 finally caught him. Like war stories, I am not sure I would want to repeat those experiences, but I am glad I experienced them at the time. C. DePauw has had quite an influence at the Treasury Depart ment. Those currently in the Office of the Secretary besides me include: Edward Roob, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Debt Management; William Hausman, Director of the Office of Operations under the Assistant Secretary for Enforcement, Operations and Tariff A f f a i r s ; and Charles Arnold, Senior Public Information Officer. In addition, Joseph Barr was a former Secretary and Under Secretary of the Treasury during the Kennedy and Johnson Adminis trations and presently is the newly appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the financially plagued Franklin National Bank of New York. D. The main theme of my address today is the Ford Administration as viewed from the Treasury (which really means as viewed by me). I will talk about two broad aspects : 1. The general tone as characterized by a more open administration, a more cooperative relationship with the Congress, a restoration of confidence in our national government, and a renewed sense of ethics. 3 2. I will focus on the President's major domestic priority, which is licking inflation and stabilizing the economy. (This is not only the President's major priority, but clearly a major responsibility of the Treasury Department.) In closing, I will relate some of my own observations and experiences as a Presidential Appointee under two Presidents and three Secretaries. I will also talk briefly about career opportunities in the Federal Government. A more Open Administration; Cooperative Relationship with Congress; and Restoration of Confidence m Government A. Let's look first at the general tone President Ford has set in the four weeks since he took the oath of office. In the remarks following his swearing-in as our 38th President, he said to the American people: ", . . 1 feel it is my first duty to make an unprecedented compact with my countrymen. Not an inaugural address, not a fireside chat, not a campaign speech--just a little straight talk among friends. And I intend it to be the first of many. [About the Congress, he said] 4 "... Those who nominated and confirmed me as Vice President were my friends and are my friends. They were of both parties, elected by all the people and acting under the Constitution in their name. It is only fitting that I should pledge to them and to you that I will be the President of all the people. [and finally] ". . . I n all my public and private acts as your President, I expect to follow my instincts of openness and candor with full confidence that honesty is always the best policy in the end." B. A few nights later, in an address to a joint session of Congress, President Ford said: ". . . A s President, within the limit of basic principles, my motto towards the Congress is communication, conciliation, compromise, and cooperation." C. In his first press conference August 28, the President again pledged an open Administration to guard against future Watergates; his code of ethics, he said, would be "the example that I set." 'XL 5 D. All of the above, I believe, reveals a good deal about the kind of person President Ford is and how he will function as our national leader. It reflects a high degree of openness and honesty, of cooperation between the Congress and the Executive Branch, and of the strong desire to rally the people of this country. E. Through several Treasury examples, I would like to illustrate how President Ford's leadership approach will enable the Executive Branch and the Congress, working together, to move forward on some cf the tough issues of the day, particularly the severe economic problems which do not lend themselves to easv-? clear solutions.. 1. The President's Trade Bill is a specific case in point. The proposed Trade Bill is a major key to international trade reform, which together with monetary reform, is intended to lead to a more stable world economic order. It would provide broad authorities to the President and his delegates to negotiate reduced tariffs and other non-tariff trade barriers on a reciprocal basis as well as permit the raising of such tariffs and trade barriers on a selected basis against countries whose trade practices discriminate against the United States. The passage of this Trade Bill is essential before the 6 United States can meaningfully participate in the current international negotiations through GATT f£% and Trade). This is the Bill that until recently was embroiled in an impasse over the question of the Soviet Union's Jewish emigration practices. While the underlying issue of individual freedom is important, we are now hopeful of Congress, Secretary of State Kissinger and others will be able to find a common the basic rights of individt111 allowing the important trade legisla- rm Act is another example where I believe we will see a more positive and cooperative working relationship between the Executive Branch and the Congress, Ironically, a major impetus behind the .Budget Reform Act was to prevent former it Nixon from going against the will of Congress by impounding appropriated funds to reduce Federal While the Act itself ;¡ay have teen born out of an adversary, proceeding, the'-'real guts of the Act call for the Congress to set overall spending S limits and priorities at the beginning of each session he addressed 7 against the overall ceiling rather than on a piecemeal buildup, as has been the case up until now. Through this process hopefully both the President and the Congress will be conscious of the overall budgetary ceiling and working together, will achieve a more financially responsible budget— something vital toward getting our country on a more solid financial footing. In fact, if carried out as intended, the Budget Reform Act could turn out to be the most important piece of economic legislation since the Employment Act of 1946. 3. Another example vitally affecting Treasury is the Tax Administration System in the Internal Revenue Service. This country's tax administration depends heavily on voluntary compliance, with enough of an audit and enforcement presence to assure the general public that the system works well and to assure the vast majority of citizens who conscientiously report and pay their tax liabilities that those who do not will be found out and punished. Activities surrounding the former President and alleged pressures by White House staff on IRS have raised serious questions of public morality The Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service have been working very hard to assure ourselves and the public that potential abuses will not happen 8 in the future. Again, I believe the tone set by President Ford will be a major help in restoring public confidence in what is the best tax adminis tration system in the entire world. Privacy and computers (data banks) is another area where I see substantial improvements ahead under President Ford. Again, because of the abuses or attempted abuses of power through unauthorized use of confidential data, the whole subject of data banks, computers, telecommunications and rights of privacy has come under sharp focus in recent months. Unfortunately, the issues have been looked at in a certain state of hysteria. This has resulted in almost total paralysis of any new computer and telecommunica tions systems which have as their noble objectives the improved operational efficiency and effectiveness of government. In the last several months, the Treasury Department has had the development and procurement of several computers and computer systems suspended untilj this whole privacy issue is resolved. These have included simple replacement computers which are urgently needed to cope with the legitimate workload growth in places like 1RS, in some cases simply to replace machines which are badly worn out. In these v 'l instances, there are no terminals and no telecommuni cations lines which could possibly be tapped into by unauthorized persons. With a new President, I am now confident that these highly emotional issues can be addressed in a more rational manner and that truly constructive improve ments and safeguards, where necessary, will be recommended and implemented. The above example, incidentally, I have felt personally since I have the overall responsibility in Treasury for major computer and telecommunications systems. F . These are just a few examples that come to mind— all of stand a much better chance of successful accomplish ment now under the more open, cooperative Ford Administration. G. I should point out that Secretary Simon fits in extremely well with the Ford style. 1. Bill Simon has practiced openness and candor from the day he joined the Government, first as Deputy Treasury Secretary, then as Federal Energy Administrator, and recently as Secretary of the Treasury. 2. Throughout this period he has established the respect Congress, others in the Executive Branch, and 10 the press corps for his frankness, ready accessibility and yet tough-mindedness. 3. He has constantly prodded the rest of us to do likewise— something which suits me also. Ill. Inflation and the Economy A. I now would like to turn to the more specific and very serious problem that is on practically everyone's mind— the pervasive problem of double digit inflation and its impact on the American economy. I am hesitant to discuss this serious and complex subject in much depth. Although I was an economics major at DePauw, I never practiced it. The Treasury Department, of course, has a heavy responsi bility for economic policy, but it is not my own area of responsibility. Yet, I have received considerable exposure to economic problems and policy matters from sitting in on the Secretary's daily staff meetings of top policy officials and keeping abreast of various economic papers, speeches, and Congressional testimony. B. In his August 28 press conference, President Ford, in discussing domestic priorities stated: "Reducing inflation is so paramount that I really don't have a number two priority. If we can take care of inflation and get our economy back on the road to a healthy future, I think most of our other domestic problems will be solved." 11 C. The problem of inflation is also Secretary Simon's number one concern. On several recent occasions he has commented on the intolerable rate of inflation, the first sustained seige of rapid peace-time inflation Americans have expe rienced. The American people don't understand how double digit inflation happened and they lack confidence that the Government can solve it. It is of little comfort that our rate of inflation is "only about 12 percent a year" when in most other parts of the developed world it is much higher. For example, Japan is experiencing an inflation rate of 30 percent. Italy, Great Britain and France have current inflation rates in the range of 15 to 20 percent. West Germany is one of the few indus trialized nations whose inflation rate is not quite so unacceptable as ours— less than 8 percent. D. At the risk of over-simplification, the unacceptable price explosion we have experienced in 1973 and 1974 has been primarily due to two general factors: 1. A series of severe temporary shocks that originated largely outside the U.S. economic system. 2. Almost a decade of excessively stimulative fiscal and monetary policies under both Democratic and Republican Administrations. 12 E. The temporary outside shocks included: 1. Worldwide agricultural crop failures in 1972, which caused an explosive rise in the price of farm products. 2. A worldwide economic boom, experienced by all of the developed countries simultaneously, which put enormous pressure on the prices of internationally traded raw materials. 3. The two devaluations of the dollar. 4. The sudden Arab oil embargo which led to a quadrupling of the price of imported crude oil. 5. Finally, the end of formal wage and price controls on April 30 was an additional temporary force which raised prices and wages faster than normal. F. But aside from these severe temporary jolts, our general economic policies over the past 10 years have been very stimulative and, as a result, we were unable to absorb these one-time shocks. For example, during the decade 1955-1965, federal spending rose at an annual rate of only 6 percent. Since 1965, however, federal expenditures have risen 10 percent per year. occurred in monetary policy. A similar change in pattern The nation's money supply, as regulated by the Federal Reserve System, rose an 13 average of 2-1/2 percent per year in the 1955-1965 decade. Since 1965, the money supply has increased an average of 6 percent per year. It is no coincidence that the earlier period was marked by stable prices, whereas the most recent period was one of record peace-time inflation. G. This country has been living beyond its means for so long that the inflationary forces have become deeply imbedded into our entire economic system— especially in the pattern of price expectations and wage settlements. It is for these reasons that President Ford, Secretary Simon and other leaders in this country are now being very careful not to promise any miracles. It will take a long time and be a tough process to stem the tide of rising prices and to get our economy back on a more stable basis. will take several years, or more. shortcuts. It There are no easy We believe a more restrictive fiscal policy of federal budget cutting coupled with a continuing restraint on monetary policy are basic to controlling inflation. Yet, we also recognize the need for some measures of relief for certain casualties and inequities of inflation. For example: Proposed improvements in the system of unemployment compensation. 14 — Possible public service employment programs to go into effect if the overall unemployment rate exceeds a certain percentage. — Subsidies to financial institutions to augment the very tight supply of mortgage funds to relieve strains in the housing industry, which always gets hit the hardest when inflation becomes serious. — Relief to public utilities unable to cope with the enormous increase in the price of raw energy. H. Another economic policy issue that we are particularly concerned about is how to generate the enormous volume of savings and capital investment that will be needed in the next decade and beyond. The trend in this country has been more toward consumption and less toward invest ment. Since 1960, for example, the percentage of total output for plant and equipment spending, housing, and public investment in the United States has been signifi cantly lower than in most other developed countries. At the same time, the projected capital requirements for major priority areas over the next 10 years and beyond stagger the imagination. One representative study, for example, calls for a minimum of $850 billion for capital investment in the U.S. in the energy field alone (Project Independence), and some estimates are even higher. Then there are the major capital investments required for such things as new mass transit systems, housing, pollution control, as well as to expand basic industrial capacity. Although business is often looked at as the whipping boy and profits as a dirty word, the fact is that profits and retained earnings are a most important source for the capital investments so urgently needed in the coming years. I. President Ford is moving promptly, carefully, and thoroughly to review the economy and economic policy. He has stated that there are no easy answers and at times the going may be tough. During this month, there will be a series of conferences throughout the country chaired by top government leaders and covering a number of areas, including: labor, state and local government, agriculture and food, transportation, business and manu facturing, housing and construction, health, banking and finance. These conferences will culminate in a major Conference on Inflation in Washington September 27 and 28. These conferences will be a bi-partisan affair, involving not only members of the Executive Branch and the Congress but, most important, leaders from the business community, labor and the academic world. While 16 attempting to deal with some of the more troublesome problems on an ongoing basis, the President sincerely hopes that out of these sector conferences and the main Conference on Inflation at the end of September will come a better understanding of how we deal with the inflation problem. Although the President has made some of his views known such as a strong aversion to restoring wage and price controls, and a strong resolve to cut the Federal budget, it would be inappropriate at this time for me to predict where all of this will lead. In fact, the President has stressed that these conferences are to be truly open forums; and are not intended to railroad through preconceived notions. In keeping with my earlier remarks, however, the President certainly has the support of the Congress in dealing with these most difficult problems. IV. Closing Remarks A. We have covered a lot of ground this morning on how the Ford Administration is likely to operate— the more open Administration, the more cooperative relationship with Congress, and the efforts to restore the public's confidence in government and a renewed sense of ethics. We have looked at the very serious problem of inflation, its causes, and the general plan for addressing this number one domestic priority. 17 B. In closing, I would like to share with you some of my general observations about government service. As Treasury's Assistant Secretary for Administration the past 2-1/2 years, I can say without question this has been the most professionally rewarding period of my career. And most of my career has been spent in the private sector. My responsibilities cut across the entire Treasury Department— handling the Department's budget and financial management, personnel management, organizational and management reviews, audit, computers, facilities, and various other administrative programs.' I am very much involved with improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the Treasury Department and its bureaus. C. While admitting a bias, I believe the Treasury Department is one of the best in the Federal Government. Not only do we deal with policies and operations that are vital to the very existence of government— we have a long history dating back to 1789 and the founding of our Constitution. D. During my three years in Government, I have gained an appreciation and respect for a number of dedicated career civil servants as well as a top-notch group of appointees. Unfortunately, government servants in this country too 18 often have not been held in the highest regard. When I was in college and graduate school, a government career was not something many people aspired to. E. Times have changed, however, and I would strongly encourage you to consider career opportunities in the Federal Government. Don't overlook the fact that Federal pay scales— particularly at the middle level— now compare favorably with business and the professions. F. The Treasury Department alone will be hiring about 5000 new employees at the professional entry level this year. Most of the new hires will be recruited by our bureaus directly from the college ranks. Currently the best career opportunities with the Treasury are in accounting, law enforcement and general administration in such bureaus as the Internal Revenue Service, the Customs Service, the Secret Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire arms, the Bureau of Government Financial Operations, and the Comptroller of the Currency. I believe the opportu nities for public service can be very rewarding and hope that a number of you will seriously consider a career in government. of TREASURY Department the ASHINGTON, D.C|2G220 , TELEPHONE W04-2041 1 » 1|1 H M FOR RELEASE AT 12 NOON T U E S D A Y , SE PTE MB E R 10, 1974 ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE DAVID R. MACDONALD ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY (ENFORCEMENT, OPERATIONS, AND TARIFF AFFAIRS) BEFORE THE AMERICAN IMPORTERS ASSOCIATION NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 197^ IT’S HIGH NOON AT THE CUSTOMS CORRAL (OR HOW FAST CAN YOU DRAW BACK?)" It is both an honor and a pleasure to be with your Association today for my first major speech as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. I had a profitable exchange of views with your President, Mr. Katz, and Messrs. O ’Brien, Gitkin, and Casey during their recent trip to Washington, and I look forward to similar exchanges in the future. As a lawyer before joining the Government, I specialized principally in public offerings, private corporate financing, mergers and acquisitions, and other corporate legal problems. It probably is not obvious to you, therefore, why I was appointed Assistant Secretary in charge, among other things, of tariff affairs and of the 185-year old Customs Service. I can only say that having Customs, Secret Service, Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Mint, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, not to speak of Foreign Assets Control and the Consolidated Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, George Shultz thought I would make a good utility infielder. When I took office, my income dropped in the same proportion as the size of my office increased — which Secretary Simon advised me was a fair exchange, considering that I was also being granted the privilege of working for the Treasury Depart ment. Having been here for five months, I must say that I agree with him. There is, however, one way in which my being unfamiliar with the Customs Service, its procedures and policies, may be helpful. The lack of any preconception regarding Customs operations brings into immediate and sharp relief those facets WS-95 - 2 - of the Customs Service which are unique. The sight of^a missionary boiling in a pot may be old hat to the cannibals, but it will probably leave a sharp impression on first-time visiting missionaries. In the same way, those who deal daily with Customs may have become inured to its unique statutory procedures. To a newcomer like myself, however, the entire process, governed by a statute originally enacted in 1789 and revised only in piecemeal fashion since that time, resembles a scene from the Western frontier in the nineteenth century. Perhaps the best way I can convey this is by way of meta phorical scenario — as you may know, we government employees are prone to talk in terms of scenarios — and that scenario, if I were writing it, would go as follows: It's approaching high noon at the old Customs saloon. "Doc" Customs, the owner and general law-and-order man in the territory is lounging at the bar. Doc is a little ill-at-ease — ■ rumors have been flying that Sam Importer, from the dreaded Importer gang, is in town and looking for trouble. A confronta tion is at hand. Common belief is that the Importer gang rustled some cattle from Doc Customs’ corral last year, but no one knows exactly how much, because the Customs hands have such a large spread that it’s difficult to keep track of the total herd. In any event, a bead of sweat breaks out on Doc’s forehead as he tosses down his drink and starts checking his weapons. Doc has a lot of weapons, but he knows that Sam Importer laughs at the ineffectiveness of all of them except one - Doc’s gun. This unique firearm is known as the Section .592 Magnum. It has the combined qualities of a gatling gun and a 10-pound smooth bore cannon. It’s not too good at long distances but it’s deadly at close range. The only problem with the Section .592 Magnum is that sometimes it’s difficult to identify the victim afterwards. As the sun approaches its zenith in the sky overhead, the townsfolk draw their shades and lock their doors — all except a small boy loitering near the swinging doors of the Customs saloon. "Get away boy," murmers Doc. "I’ve gotta have a clear line of fire in order to nail Sam Importer the second he comes through the swinging doors." -3,TWhy donTt you wait until he gets inside the room and then fire?” asks the kid innocently. "You don’t understand, boy," replies Doc. "If I don’t blast Sam Importer just at the moment he comes through those swinging doors, I ’ll never get another chance." The clock ticked on toward twelve. His hand creeps toward his holster. Doc’s muscles tighten. The whinnying of a horse outside breaks the silence. Doc realizes that this is it — only one man can be outside and that man is coming in. The swinging double doors burst open — there, big as life is Sam Importer. "I’ve got an itchy trigger finger and I ’m looking for the Doc," he roars.*• # * # The remainder of the scenario is strangely missing. Some people, mostly from the Importer- gang, speculate that Doc emptied his .592 into Sam as he came through the door*, only to find that Sam really did have an itch in his trigger finger which he wanted the Doc to treat with Cornhusker’s Lotion for Men. Doc, according to this version, promised to remove the .592 bullets at his first opportunity. Others, principally the hands on the Customs ranch, allowed that Sam Importer not only did not get shot, but that he made off with several bottles of unmetricated liquor before Doc could get his gun out of his holster. Whichever way the story really came out, this allegory does have a moral. That moral is that the Customs laws and procedures are antiquated relics from another era — the era of the Cali fornia gold'rush, the, three-masted square rigger, and the pony express. This is not to say that the ancient Customs practices have never produced anything worthwhile. Nathaniel Hawthorne was inspired to write The .Scarlet Letter as a result of working as a Customs weigher and grader in Salem, Massachusetts. The experience of Chester Alan Arthur as Chief of the New York Customs Port undoubtedly stood him in good political stead when he later became President. Despite these intangible benefits, something has to be done in order to bring the Customs entry and clearance procedures out of the rigging and into the airconsitioned business offices of the twentieth century. -4- This is not to criticize the people at Customs who are involved in the process of clearing merchandise for entry. The fact that the process works as well as it does under existing primitive groundrules is a compliment both to the thousands of dedicated Customs 'officers and to the importers and customs brokers with whom they deal. It is conventional wisdom that the personal element is always able to botch up the most artfully and accurately designed program. The fact that the present Customs entry and clearance procedure works as well as it does, in my opinion, is proof that the reverse is also true — that people can make things work in spite of design deficiencies. I am here today to discuss possible remedies for these design deficiencies, and to solicit your help in bringing them to fruition. The remedies presently contemplated are two pronged. First, there is involved the controls over the physical entering of the goods. The incredibly complex entry procedures must be simplified without threatening the revenue or sacrificing the administration of the two hundred odd laws, in addition to the Tariff Act, that Customs must administer at ports-of-entry and along land and sea borders. Second, the legislatively mandated procedure for reporting, paying duties and enforcing duty payments must be brought into line with the automated practices presently utilized by most businesses. The modernization of the entry procedure, as many of you know, has already been commenced under the leadership of the present Commissioner of Customs, Mike Acree. Briefly, the streamlining of the entry procedure involves three main functional Customs ■ ^ areas: immediate delivery control, automated entry screening, ■ 2 and collection processing. I i ■ t The immediate delivery control portion of the program . !£ involves the creation and maintenance of an automated inventory H j of all merchandise released under current Customs' bonding H c procedures. This procedure allows expeditious entry of the goods while tracking and reporting to Customs any subsequent failure to file the required entry documentation. It relieves ■ t the Customs import specialist of many clerical functions, H g permitting him to concentrate on more complex and difficult H t entries, thereby improving Customs1 efficiency. Thé system provides the capability for prompt final action regarding entry transactions, which is accomplished by producing daily bulletin ■ w notices of liquidation rather than weekly postings that currently® i are experiencing a three-week delay. We believe that the daily H t t g 5bulletin notices of liquidation will give a more timely notification of trade community financial liability to Customs, in addition to removing the red tape that, surrounds the physi cal movement of goods at the docks. This system was inaugurated at Philadelphia, with the immediate delivery control successfully installed and opera tional since April 197^* Present plans are to implement the system in New York in 1976. The automated entry screening procedures verify, and per form calculations on, data obtained from formal entries filed by customs brokers and importers. Many of the procedures of entry processing currently performed clerically will upon adoption of the system, be automatically performed. Duty computations will be made and merchandise subject to quota provisions or Internal Revenue taxes will be identified. Addi tionally, methods will be used to identify merchandise which, by past experience, may require extensive review by import specialist teams. The collection^ processing subsystem, the third function, will automate the billing and cashier functions and establish an accountability for all collected funds. Thus, under the proposed system, assuming that an appro priate bond is on file with Customs, the importer can obtain release of his merchandise after Customs examination without the payment of duty. Customs will produce a monthly statement that will allow the importer to make one payment for trans actions performed at various U. S. ports. Paperwork which presently prevents entries from being liquidated for four weeks or more will be completed in a matter of days. Perhaps the most significant result of the program will be that ^importers will be able to deal with Customs as a single service instead of dealing separately with separate ports, with the concomitant variation in requirements and procedures. Prom our standpoint at Treasury, we believe this system will remove many of the routine clerical tasks from our inspectors and import specialists and will, therefore, allow them greater time to perform their professional judgment func tions. It will simplify Customs’ relations with the many other government agencies that they serve. Almost an incidental -6 result Is the faster and more accurate management information which is generated in order to make better decisions for improved service. Of great importance to us, of course, is that Customs can develop this system within their current capabilities. It does not require massive reorganization or the appropriation of huge amounts of additional funds. There are many details of this system which remain to be worked out. Customs must and will work with importers, brokers, bonding companies, common carriers and others. In this connec tion, I note that a general briefing between Customs and the AIA regarding this entire concept was held last month. Just as important to the people in this room as the modernized physical entry procedures is a related legislative program which we presently contemplate proposing to Congress. The substantive details of this program have not been worked out, and will not be worked out without an opportunity for importers, borkers, freight forwarders and other interested parties to be heard. The essense of the program as now envisaged, however, would be the replacement of the entry-by-entry payment system with a procedure whereby Customs duties would be reported and paid on a periodic basis by those importers, and only those importers, who qualify for such treatment. In order to adopt this procedure without threatening the revenue, a statutory basis which enables Customs to audit the declared tax liability of the importer is necessary. Thus, the proposed legislation would require the maintenance of books and records by the importer relating to his business; would grant the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate the right to audit those books; and would empower the Secretary or his delegate to require their production as well as the appearance of the importer himself for the purpose of giving testimony regarding his import activities. I would like to emphasize here and now that any existing bookkeeping system maintained by an importer which is sufficient to reveal his financial condition and results of operations should also satisfy the proposed legislative requirement to maintain books and records. We have enough paper and forms in the Government now to satisfy the most discerning bureaucrat. No duplicate bookkeeping system should be required and, in fact, all those who presently pay income tax must meet similar legal requirements under the Internal Revenue laws. Our experience, -7 - however, has led us to conclude that existing civil enforcement powers are so truncated and that existing discovery procedures are so inadequate that the ability of Customs to find out the facts in an orderly manner is severely hampered. The result has been to turn the process into an adversary contest with, as you know, extremely high stakes. We anticipate creating effective methods of proceeding to collect the correct duty by the civil administration of the laws without resorting to procedures which are more nearly akin to criminal procedures. At the same time, we propose, without endangering the revenue, to reduce the myriad of procedures and documentation required by filing repetitive entry documents and duty payments. As business practices become more and more technologically oriented, the retention of these green eye shade procedures becomes not only an anomoly, but also an unnecessary obtacle to further modernization. The Internal Revenue Service, along with countless private businesses, long ago recognized that benefits in terms of efficiency and economy, without weakening verification controls, could be obtained from a system of periodic account reporting. This system is equally suitable to the processing of repetitive, large-volume imports. However, without the recordkeeping and verification authority proposed in the legislation, any change from entry-by-entry reporting to a periodic return system would, in our view, endanger the revenue. In addition, the proposed alternative method of reporting and paying Customs duty would be entirely voluntary with the importer. We do not expect to require the importer to bypass the entry-by-entry method of importing unless he believes it to be advantageous to himself. In this way both we at Treasury and the importing community can experiment, with a view to ascertaining whether the new procedures will be bene ficial to each of us. Philosophically speaking, I do not personally believe that the proposed periodic reporting and payment concept can be successfully inaugurated unless the system of reporting is geared to existing business reporting methods of the importer. The success of the voluntary filing system of the Internal Revenue Service is in my view, based upon the fact that income tax reporting is built around an existing business bookkeeping and financial reporting system which is normally audited and utilized for shareholder reporting and internal management use. This is why we feel confident that we can assure you that no new bookkeeping requirements will be instituted. To do so ■ - 8 - would, in and of itself, defeat the system. In fact, the ultimate purpose of the new system would be to work toward a single set of records which businessmen can maintain that will be adequate for all governmental reporting and taxpaying functions. You should be aware that transactions between related importers and exporters as reported to Customs will be examined on an integral basis with the same transactions as reported, for example, to the Internal Revenue Service. Ki The question may have occurred to you by now whether the penalty provisions of Section 592 would be retained for those imports brought in under the new procedures. I can only say at this time that we would listen to any suggestion that would result in more sophisticated enforcement procedures which are equally effective in protecting the revenue. I underline that condition. Speaking of Section 592, I should mention that we intend to publish major portions of the Treasury guidelines governing mitigation procedures in the relatively near future. At the same time, while we are always willing to listen to suggestions for procedural improvements, I would not anticipate any change in the manner of use of Section 592 beyond those changes which were suggested by the AIA and others and were subsequently adopted by Treasury. Until adequate medical help is available, the in terrorem effect of exorcising duty violations by Customs witch doctors will have to remain in place. We also look forward to seeing your representatives in Washington. We at Treasury and Customs desire to work with you who are closely involved in the importing process to improve that process. Having worked in what I now call the "private sector" for many years, I am well aware that a continuing dialog must be maintained between industry and government in order to promote a clearer perspective of importing activities by Customs and of Customs’ activities by the importing community. I have only one recommendation to make regarding your visit. Don’t come in with an itchy trigger finger — just belly up to the bar and the verbal libations will be on the house! Thank you. -y FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE SE PT EM B E R 10, 1974 TREASURY BILL OFFERING REDUCED The amount of Treasury bills offered today for sale in the regular weekly auction of September 16, for delivery September 19, was reduced to $4.3 billion, $100 million less than last week’s offering and $200 million less than the amount of bills maturing on September 19. The Treasury's short-term cash outlook is such that it is expected that the amount to be offered in the auction of September 23 will also be $200 million less than the amount maturing. The reduction may not be continued in subsequent weekly offerings. oftheTREASURY Department lASHINGTON, D.C 20220 TELEPHONE W04-2041 TOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE September 10, 1974 TREASURY’S WEEKLY BILL OFFERING The Treasury Department, by this public notice, invites tenders for two series of Treasury bills to the aggregate amount of $4,300,000,000, or thereabouts, to be issued September 19, 1974, as follows: 91-day bills (to maturity date) in the amount of $2,500,000,000, or thereabouts, representing an additional amount of bills dated December 19, 1974 $1»901,235,000, June 20, 1974, (CUSIP No. 912793 VD5) , originally issued in the amount of the additional and original bills to be freely interchangeable. 182-day bills for $ 1,800,000,000, or thereabouts, to be dated lid to mature and to mature March 20, 1975 September 19, 1974, (CUSIP No. 912793 WA0) . The bills will be issued for cash and in exchange for Treasury bills maturing September 19, 1974 , outstanding in the amount of $4,512,195,000, of which Government Accounts and Federal Reserve Banks, for themselves and as agents of foreign and international monetary authorities, presently hold $2,772,325,000. These accounts tiny exchange bills they hold for the bills now being offered at the average prices <?f accepted tenders. The bills of both series will be issued on a discount basis under competitive and noncompetitive bidding as hereinafter provided, and at maturity their face liioimt wi 1i be payable without interest. They will be issued in bearer form in (^nominations of $10,000, $15,000, $50,000, $100,000, $500,000 and $1,000,000 (maturity value) and in book-entry form to designated bidders. Tenders will be received at Federal Reserve Banks and Branches up to the closing ■°ur> one-thirty p.m., Eastern Daylight Saving time, Monday, September 16, 1974. ■tenders will not be received at the Treasury Department, Washington. ®nat be for a minimum of $10,000. ■>>000. Tenders over $10,000 must be in multiples of In the case of competitive tenders the price offered must be expressed on ■ e basis of 100, with not more than three decimals, e.g., 99.925. ■t Each tender be used. Fractions may It is urged that tenders be made on the printed forms and forwarded ■ the special envelopes which will be supplied by Federal Reserve Banks or Branches ■ application therefor. Banking institutions and dealers who make primary markets in Government ■ curities and report daily to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York their positions (OVER) -2with respect to Government securities and borrowings thereon may submit tenders for account of customers provided the names of the customers are set forth in such tenders. own account. Others will not be permitted to submit tenders except for their Tenders will be received without deposit from incorporated banks and trust companies and from responsible and recognized dealers in investment securiti Tenders from others must be accompanied by payment of 2 percent of the face amount of Treasury bills applied for, unless the tenders are accompanied by an express guaranty of payment by an incorporated bank or trust company. Immediately after the closing hour, tenders will be opened at the Federal Reserve Banks and Branches, following which public announcement will be made by the Treasury Department of the amount and price range of accepted bids. Only thosi submitting competitive tenders will be advised of the acceptance or rejection thereof. The Secretary of the Treasury expressly reserves the right to accept or reject any or all tenders, in whole or in part, and his action in any such resp shall be final. Subject to these reservations, noncompetitive tenders for each issue for $200,000 or less without stated price from any one bidder will be accept in full at the average price (in three decimals) of accepted competitive bids for, the respective issues. Settlement for accepted tenders in accordance with the bids must be made or completed at the Federal Reserve Bank on September 19, 1974, in cash or other immediately available funds or in a like face amount of Treasury bills maturing treatment. September 19, 1974. Cash and exchange tenders will receive equal j Cash adjustments will be made for differences between the par value of maturing bills accepted in exchange and the issue price of the new bills. Under Sections 454(b) and 1221 (5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 the amount of discount at which bills issued hereunder are sold is considered to accrJ when the bills are sold, redeemed or otherwise disposed of, and the bills are ex cluded from consideration as capital assets. Accordingly, the owner of Treasury bills (other than life insurance companies) issued hereunder must include in his I income tax return, as ordinary gain or loss, the difference between the price pail for the bills, whether on original issue or on subsequent purchase, and the amounj actually received either upon sale or redemption at maturity during the taxable year for which the return is made. Treasury Department Circular No. 418 (current revision) and this notice, prescribe the terms of the Treasury bills and govern the conditions of their issm Copies of the circular may be obtained from any Federal Reserve Bank or Branch. ìrs SSL OF DeportmentoftheJREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 I Tf fpwìinf uuru -m u I TELEPHONE W04-2041 ^ U U Lb 'CUi MHRÌ FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE September 10, 1974 PARSKY TO LEAD HIGH-LEVEL DELEGATION TO SAUDI ARABIA Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon announced today that Assistant Treasury Secretary Gerald L. Parsky will lead a high-level delegation to Saudi Arabia for meetings of the U.S.-Saudi Working Groups on Agriculture and Science and Technology. ’’These meetings,” Simon noted, "evidence the continuing desire by the U.S. to broaden economic relationships with the Saudis and will make a further contribution to our mutual efforts to bring peace and economic prosperity to the Middle East.” Parsky, who is the Executive Secretary of the U.S.Saudi Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation described the Working Groups as ”an important means to assist the Saudis in their desire to industrialize and diversify their economy." The Working Groups are made up of senior officials from the National Science Foundation and the Departments of State, Agriculture and Interior. Among the items to be discussed are: integrating the development of science and solar technology in the industrialization program for Saudi Arabia, desalination technology, and methods of developing an agriculture infrastructure. Parsky will depart from Washington, D.C., Wednesday, September 11, and return to Washington on Thursday, September 19. o 0 o WS-97 of TREASURY Department the A/AiSHINGTON, D.C. 2022$ ■ TElEPHONE W04-2041 H ■ FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE I J September 11, 1974 TREASURY ISSUES COUNTERVAILING DUTY ORDERS IN THREE COUNTERVAILING DUTY INVESTIGATIONS Assistant Secretary of the Treasury David R. Macdonald announced today the issuance of countervailing duty orders with respect to imports of non-rubber footwear from Brazil and Spain, and bottled green olives from Spain. These actions were taken pursuant to Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1303). Under this section, the Secretary of the Treasury is required to assess an additional duty equal to the amount of a "bounty or grant" paid or bestowed on merchandise imported into the United States. In all three cases such bounties or grants were found. Accordingly, the countervailing duty orders set forth the rates of the additional duties required to offset the export incentives. * These actions will be published in the Federal Register of Thursday, September 12, 1974. Countervailing duties will become applicable 30 days after publication of the orders in the Customs Bulletin. In the case of non-rubber footwear from Brazil, a Countervailing Duty Proceeding Notice was published in the Federal Register on March 8, 1974. Based upon the informa tion presented and the nature of the Brazilian subsidy system, the countervailing duty rate has been estimated to be 12.3 percent for imports from manufacturers which export 40 percent or less of the value of their total sales and 4.8 percent on imports from manufacturers which have exports accounting for more than 40 percent of total sales. Since these rates have been calculated on a representative sample of Brazilian exporters, the Treasury Department is prepared to consider precise information with respect to any firm involved and adjust the countervailing duty rate as appropriate. During calendar year 1973, imports of non rubber footwear from Brazil were valued at $81 million. (OVER) 2 In the proceedings on non-rubber footwear and bottled green olives from Spain, Countervailing Duty Proceeding Notices were published on July 16, 1974. Based upon the information presented, the countervailing duty rates have been ascertained to be 3.0 percent for non-rubber footwear and 2.9 percent for bottled green olives. During calendar year 1973, imports of non-rubber footwear and bottled green olives from Spain were valued at approximately $189 million and $38 million respectively. # # # of TREASURY Department the IN G im D.C. 2022» ! TEt£PH(Mt£ W04-2Ô41 Hi September 10, 1974 MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS: Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon will open a meeting of Federal officials and key representatives from the state public regulatory commissions on the financial problems facing the electrical utility industry, at 3:00 p.m., Wednesday, September 11, 1974, at the Federal Power Commission in Hearing Room A. Other Federal officials who will participate include: Arthur Burns, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board; L. William Seidman, Executive Director, Summit Conference on Inflation; Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior; Russell E. Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency; Dixy Lee Ray, Chairman, Atomic Energy Administration; John C. Sawhill, Administrator, Federal Energy Administration; John Nl Nassikas, Chairman, Federal Power Commission; Arthur F. Sampson, Administrator, General Services Administration; and Richard E. Wiley, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission. The meeting will be open to the press. oOo Departmentof thefREASURY TELEPHONE W04-2041 jl D.C. 20220 September 9, 1974 FOR RELEASE 6:30 P.M. RESULTS OF TREASURY’S WEEKLY BILL AUCTIONS Tenders for $2.6 billion of 13-week Treasury bills and for $ 1.8 billioi of 26-week Treasury bills> both series to be issued on September 12, 1974, ¡vs The details are as were ouer.ed at the Federal Reserve Banks today RANGE OF ACCEPTED COMPETITIVE BIDS: 13-week bills maturin'* December 12, 1974 Price mmm Low 97.720 a/ 97.686 97.700 "*“ 0 Average !*J Excepting 1 Equivai ent Annual Rate 9.020% 9.154% 9.099% 26-week bills ma tur ing March 13, Price Ü 1975 Equivalent Ann vial Rate 95.464 95.452 95.460 8.972% 8.996% 8.980% 1/ tender of $50,000 Tenders at the low price for the 13-weel- bills were alio t ted Tenders at the low price for the 26-week bills were allu 5:ted 92%. 59%. TOTAL TENDERS APPLIED FOR AMD ACCEPTED BY FED!1EAL RESERVE DIST R tCIS: District Boston Newr York Phi lai el phi.a Cleveland Richmond Atlanta Chicago St. Louis Minneepo! 11 : Kansas Cicv Dali as San Francis TOTALS A d plied For Accepted 44,320,000 $ 54,720,000 $ 1,926,830,000 3,015,035,000 47,450,000 47,450,000 60,615,000 61,115,000 64,345,000 71,345,000 53,120,000 54,220,000 171,725,000 262,525,000 51,490,000 44,490,000 16,310,000 16,310,000 58,895,000 51,060,000 39,655,000 29,055,000 217,795,000 90,795,000 $3,950,555,000 $2,600,115,000 Applied For Accepted $ 47,105,000 $ 30,710,000 3,094,640,000 1,459,490,000 21,985,000 97,990,000 71,025,000 42,675,000 59,805,000 36,455,000 36,370,000 44,680,000 41,835,000 221,510,000 22,970,000 57,520,000 5,525,000 15,775,000 37,860,000 50,755,000 20,730,000 46,330,000 43,800,000 260,425,000 b/$4> 067,560,000 $1,800,405,000 Ib/Includes $ 5 7 6 165 000 noncornpet-itive tenders accepted at average pr ice. tenders accepted at average price [17 These rates are on a bank discount basis. The equivalent coupon issue yields are 9 .4 4 % for the 13—week bills, and 9 .5 4 % for the 2 0 -week biI 1• |c/ Includes $ 434|335*000 noncompetitive DepartmentoftheTREASURY ASÉfNGTON, D C 20220 TELEPHONE W04-2041 REVISED MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESS September 9, 1974 FINANCIAL CONFERENCE ON INFLATION There are three attachments to this memorandum: 1. A revised list of individuals who have accepted invitations to participate in the "Financial Conference on Inflation" September 20, 1974 in the Federal Room, Statler Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C. (This list now includes U.S. Senators, etc.) 2. The text of the letter sent to conference delegates by Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon. (This text--reproduced here as a convenience to you--was included with the September 6 delegate list.) 3. The agenda for the September 20 meeting. (This was also part of the material released on September 6.) WS-91 MEMBERS OF BANKING AND FINANCE COMMUNITY WHO WILL ATTEND THE FINANCIAL CONFERENCE ON INFLATION WASHINGTON, D.C. SEPTEMBER 20, 1974 HELD AT THE REQUEST OF PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD AND THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES The Honorable William E. Simon Secretary of the Treasury Department of the Treasury 15th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20220 Mr. Roy Ash Director Office of Management and Budget Old Executive Office Building 17th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20500 Dr. George Leland Bach Professor of Economics and Public Policy Stanford University Stanford, California 94305 Mr. Robert H.B. Baldwin President Morgan Stanley and Company 1251 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York 10020 The Honorable Jack F. Bennett Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs Department of the Treasury 15th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20220 Mr. Robert H. Bethke President Discount Corporation of New York 58 Pine Street New York, New York 10005 Mr. Archie R. Boe Chairman of the Board Allstate Insurance Company Allstate Plaza Northbrook, Illinois 60062 Mr. Thomas R. Bomar Chairman, Federal Home Loan Bank Board 320 First Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20552 1 The Honorable Arthur F. Burns Chairman Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 20th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W, Washington, D.C. 20551 Dr. Gwen Bymers Professor and Chairman of the Department of Consumer Economics Cornell University Ithaca, New York 14850 Mr. Richard P. Cooley President and Chief Executive Officer Wells Fargo Bank, National Association San Francisco, California 94120 Mr. Howard Coughlin President Office of Professional Employees International Union 265 West 14th Street New York, New York 10011 Mr. Morris D. Crawford, Jr. Chairman of the Board Bowery Savings Bank 110 East 42nd Street New York, New York 10017 The Honorable Carl T. Curtis United States Senate New Senate Office Building Room 2213 Washington, D.C. 20515 Dr. Robert G. Dederick Senior Vice President and Economist Northern Trust Company 50 South LaSalle Street Chicago, Illinois 60690 2 Mr. Robert Ray Dockson President California Federal Savings and Loan Association 5670 Wilshire Boulevard Los Angeles, California 90036 Dr. Otto Eckstein Department of Economics Harvard University 231 Littaner Center Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138 Mr. Gilbert R. Ellis President Household Finance Corporation 3200 Prudential Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60601 Dr. Grover W. Ensley Executive Vice President National Association of Mutual Savings Banks 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10017 The Honorable Edgar R. Fiedler Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy Department of the Treasury 15th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20220 Mr. William H. Franklin Chairman Caterpillar Tractor Company 100 N.E. Adams Street Peoria, Illinois 61629 Mr. Gaylord Freeman Chairman of the Board The First National Bank of Chicago One First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60670 Dr. Tilford C. Gaines Senior Vice President and Economist Manufacturers Hanover Trust 350 Park Avenue New York, New York 10022 3 The Honorable Stephen S. Gardner Deputy Secretary Department of the Treasury 15th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20220 Mr. Ray Garrett, Jr. Chairman Securities and Exchange Commission 500 North Capitol Street» Room 812 Washington, D.C. 20549 Mr. Richard G. Gilbert President of Citizens Savings Association 100 South Central Plaza Canton, Ohio 44702 Mr. Alan Greenspan Chairman Council of Economic Advisors Old Executive Office Building Washington, D.C. 20506 Mr. David B. Harper President First Independence National Bank 234 State Street Detroit, Michigan 48226 Mr. Milton J. Hayes Chairman Government Fiscal Policy Committee Independent Bankers Association of Americ American National Bank of Chicago 33 N. LaSalle Street Room 1619 Chicago, Illinois 60602 Mr. M.R. Hellie Pres ident Credit Union National Association, Inc. 1730 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W. Suite 810 Washington, D.C. 20036 4 Mr. Richard D,. Hill Chairman of the Board First National Bank of Boston 100 Federal Street Boston, Massachusetts 02110 Mr. J. Henning Hilliard Chairman J.J.B. Hilliard, W.L. Lyons, Inc. 545 South Third Street Louisville, Kentucky 40 202 Mr. Frank J. Hoenemeyer Executive Vice President Prudential Insurance Company of America Prudential Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 The Honorable Ernest F. Hollings United States Senate Old Senate Office Building Room 432 Washington, D.C. 20510 The Honorable Jacob Javits United States Senate Old Senate Office Building Room 326 Washington, D.C. 20510 Mr. Paul R. Judy Chairman and President A.G. Becker § Company, Incorporated 2 First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60670 Mr. Harvey E. Kapnick, Jr. Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Arthur Anderson and Company 69 West Washington Street Chicago, Illinois 60602 Mr. W.J. Kennedy, III Pres ident North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Co. P.0. Box 201 Durham, North Carolina 27702 Mr. Ralph F. Leach Chairman of the Executive Committee Morgan Guaranty Trust Company 23 Wall Street New York, New York 10015 5 Mr, Gustav L. Levy Partner Goldman, Sachs and Company 55 Broad Street New York, New York 10015 The Honorable Russell B. Long United States Senate Old Senate Office Building Room 217 Washington, D.C. 20510 Mr. Bruce K. MacLaury President Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 250 Marquette Avenue Minneapolis, Minnesota 55480 Dr, Paul W. McCracken Senior Consultant Department of the Treasury 15th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20220 Mr. Rex J. Morthland President American Bankers Association The Peoples Bank and Trust Company Post Office Box 799 Selma, Alabama 36701 Mr. James J. Needham Chairman of the Board New York Stock Exchange 11 Wall Street New York, New York 10005 Mr. Herman Nickerson, Jr. Administrator National Credit Union Administration 2025 M Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20456 Dr. Arthur M. Okun Senior Fellow The Brookings Institute 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 6 Mr. J. Charles Partee Managing Director Office of Research and Economic Policy Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 20th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20551 The Honorable Wright Patman U.S. House of Representatives Rayburn House Office Building Room 2328 Washington, D.C. 20515 Ms. Sylvia Porter Syndicated Financial Columnist 30 East 42nd Street New York, New York 10017 Mr. Donald T. Regan Chairman of the Board Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. One Liberty Plaza 165 Broadway New York, New York 10006 The Honorable Henry S. Reuss U.S. House of Representatives Rayburn House Office Building Room 2186 Washington, D.C. 20515 The Honorable John J. Rhodes U.S. House of Representatives Rayburn House Office Building Room 2310 Washington, D.C. 20515 Mr. David Rockefeller Chase Manhattan Bank, National Association One Chase Manhattan Plaza New York, New York 10015 Mr. Robert V. Roosa Partner Brown Brothers Harriman and Company 59 Wall Street New York, New York 10005 Mr. Ralph S. Saul Vice Chairman Insurance Company of North America 1600 Arch Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 7 Dr, Raymond J, Saulnier Professor Emeritus of Economies Barnard College Columbia University 5-A Lehman Hall New York, New York 10027 The Honorable George P. Shultz Executive Vice President Bechtel Corporation 50 Beale Street San Francisco, California 94119 The Honorable J. William Stanton U.S. House of Representatives Rayburn House Offfice Building Room 2448 Washington, D.C. 20515 Mr. Robert H, Stewart III Chairman of the Board First International Bancshares, Incorporated Post Office Box 6031 Dallas, Texas 75283 Mr. Thomas I. Storrs Chairman of the Executive Committee North Carolina National Bank Post Office Box 120 Charlotte, North Carolina 28255 Mr. Norman Strunk Executive Vice President U.S. League of Savings Associations 11 East Wacker Drive Chicago, Illinois 60601 Mr. John Tomayko Director, Insurance Pension United Steelworkers of America 5 Gateway Center Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222 The Honorable Charls E. Walker President Charls E. Walker Associates 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 8 The Honorable Frank Wille Chairman Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 550 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20429 Mr. Carlton Wilson Chairman of the Board and Director Robert W. Baird and Company, Inc. 777 East Wisconsin Avenue Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201 Dr. Charles J. Zwick President Southeast Banking Corporation 100 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 9 TEXT OP THE LETTER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY WILLIAM E. SIMON HAS SENT TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE '•FINANCIAL CONFERENCE ON INFLATION" BEING HELD IN WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER 20, 1974 Dear : I am pleased to learn that you have accepted the President’s invitation to the Conference on Inflation on September 27 and 28 and the Financial Conference on Inflation on September 20. At the banking and finance meeting, we will concentrate on a broad range of issues relating to inflation. We are anxious to have your thinking on this, the nation’s number one problem--on its causes, its effects, and its cures. Special emphasis will be devoted to fiscal and monetary policy, the capital markets, the international situation, and financial institutions. Attached is a preliminary agenda which outlines the format of the meeting and the major subjects that will be covered. We are preparing a compendium of selected papers on each of these topics. We invite you to submit a one-page summary of your views on any of the agenda items for inclusion in this document. We need to receive these summaries by September 13, so that we can distribute the compendium to all participants in advance of the meeting. An outstanding group of congressional leaders, government officials, economists, and business and financial leaders have accepted our invitation. I am confident that we in government will benefit from your advice and discussions, and I am going to conduct the meeting with that goal in mind. 2 The meeting on the 20th will be held at the Statler-Hilton beginning at 9:00 a.m. I would also like to invite you to a reception and dinner for the participants on the evening of the 19th. This dinner will be held in the Executive Dining Room at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 Seventeenth Street, N.W., at 7:00 p.m. We will keep you advised of any other details of the Conference, and I want to say again how much I appreciate your acceptance. Sincerely, William E. Simon Agenda for September 20 Financial Conference on Inflation 9:00 AM - Introduction 9:10 AM - Economic Situation and Policy Briefing Council of Economic Advisers 9:25 AM - Briefing on the Budget Office of Management and Budget 9:40 AM - Fiscal Policy Major Fiscal Objectives and Options for Fiscal Years 1975, 1976, and Beyond Possible Cuts in Federal Spending Possible Changes in Federal Taxation: Current Levels, Incentives, Deterrents, Equity 11:30 AM - Monetary Policy Current State of Domestic Financial Markets Current Monetary Policy: Given the Circumstances, has it been too Tight or about Right? What Should the Future Course of Monetary Policy be? 1:00 PM - Lunch 2:00 PM - Capital Markets and Capital Formation Discussion of the Dimensions of Future Capital Requirements for Energy, Mass Transit, Housing and All Other Needs of the Economy Policies to Increase the Total Volume of Saving and Investment Policies to Insure Adequate Financing through the Equity and Long-Term Debt Markets 2 3:00 PM International Economic Policy and Inflation Discussion of the Appropriate U. S. Role in International Economic Policy International Financial Aspects of World Inflation 4:00 PM Financial Institutions and Inflation Possible Changes that should be made in Laws and Regulations Affecting Financial Institutions to Assist in the Fight Against Inflation 4:30 PM Wage-Price Policy How Should the Wage-Price Monitoring System be Operated? 5:00 PM Other Suggestions to Combat Inflation 6:00 PM Adjournment of Formal Session DepartmentoftheTREASURY IINGTON, D.C. 20220 I TELEPHONE W04-2041 X. Corrected Copy September 11, 1974 MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESS On September 20, 1974, Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon will chair the "Financial Conference on Inflation." The meeting will take place in the Federal Room, Statler Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C., beginning at 9:00 a.m. The meeting is open to news media, but seating space is limited. Print media should contact Charles Arnold on 964-2041 and electronic media should contact James Parker on 964-2041 by Monday, September 16 if you wish to cover this event. We will issue invitations on a first come--first serve basis. To aid you in making a decision you should know that we will be providing written transcripts of the meeting periodically throughout the day. Our best estimate is that transcripts of the entire morning session--which ends at 1:00 p.m.--will be available at approximately 3:00 p.m. And, if all goes as planned, transcripts of the afternoon session will be available at 8:30 or 9:00 p.m. oOo k$HINGT0N, 20220 TELEPHONE W 04-3041 m September IO FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 1974 EMERGENCY LOAN GUARANTEE BOARD APPROVES LOCKHEED LOAN The Emergency Loan Guarantee Board approved today the request of Lockheed Aircraft Cooperation and its lending banks for permission for the Company to borrow / from the banks up to an additional $25 million under Government guarantee, which, when drawn down, will bring total borrowings permitted under Government guarantee up to $245 million. Lockheed is authorized under the terms of its agreement with the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board to borrow up to a maximum of $250 million under Government guarantee. oOo WS-98 REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM E. SIMON SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY BEFORE THE NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL AT THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AUDITORIUM WASHINGTON, D. C., SEPTEMBER 10, 1974 I ¡ I ■ One of the most important tasks facing our Government is the development of a sound energy policy. In this effort, the Federal Government must work with industry. Our choices have been quite clear: either we make the necessary commitments to develop our natural resources or we will become increasingly vulnerable to further economic and political coersion from foreign suppliers. As we all know for many years, energy policy was based on the assumption that we would always be able to get all the energy we wanted at bargain rates. Foreign oil was inexpensive and limitless in quantity. This policy proved to be a double-edged sword, however. It resulted in a decline in exploration and production here at home and an increase in our dependency on supplies from other nations. In fact, domestic oil exploration has declined since 1956 and production since 1971, as American producers took advantage of the economic incentives offered abroad. At the same time, our demand for energy was increasing rapidly at an annual rate of 4 to 5 percent a year. The result was that at the time of the embargo, we were dependent on foreign oil for over o Exploration for natural gas, our cleanest burning fuel, has also been discouraged, by artificially low prices. Low rates, regulated at the wellhead, inflated the demand for natural gas, and reduced the market share for competing fuels, especially coal. We have been working hard to convince the Congress to deregulate prices for "new" natural gas. This may be the most important energy legislation today. It would permit prices to seek competitive levels, stimulating exploration and production, and reducing demand. In time, a free market would allocate supplies to the most efficient and highest priority users. WS-96 2 Looking at the mistakes over the last two decades -- and there were many --we can see how a legacy of government action and inaction has systematically eroded our production systems. It is clear that in the past we have failed to understand or anticipate the wide variety of factors which determine total energy supplies, and have failed to exercise the political will to provide the necessary legislative climate. We also miscalculated the skyrocketing demand for oil as a replacement for other available or unusable sources of energy. In some ways, the Arab oil embargo should be viewed as a blessing in disguise. It highlighted the potential vulnerability of the United States because of our growing dependence on foreign oil, and thus transformed America’s energy picture from a long-range problem into an immediate one. In fact, it telescoped for everyone historic trends that developed through a generation of decisions by government -- by the private sector -- and by the American people as a whole. We were fortunate that it occurred at a point in time when we were not yet too reliant on foreign supply. We are still 85 percent self-sufficient in energy. It's true that with respect to petroleum, we rely on imports to the extent of about 38 percent of our needs. However, it is better to have had an embargo when our reliance was at 38 percent than to have one when that dependence is at 50 or 60 percent. And that’s exactly what will happen if we don't make the necessary commitments now to develop our domestic resources. I am concerned, however, that all of us are forgetting too quickly about the embargo. It’s quite easy to get action in the midst of a crisis. It's not so easy when the crisis is behind you. What we must do is not to allow the American people to forget. The thrust of our efforts must be toward energy self-sufficiency. The first major objective must be to eliminate waste through energy conservation programs. We must aim to reduce the growth in our energy demand from the four to five percent annual rate, heretofore approximately three percent. We believe this can be done without disrupting some economic growth. f 4 — Second, we must renew all of our efforts to conserve land reduce our overall consumption. -- Third, we must move towards the removal of price controls ¡from oil and natural gas, and we must phase out the regulations land allocation programs which have so disrupted marketing patterns. -- Fourth, we need to greatly accelerate our Federal leasing programs on Federal Lands for both oil and coal. -- Finally, and related to all of these, we must decide on a ■package of energy legislation and work with the Congress to ensure ■that it will be passed during the next year. This effort is ■desperately needed to break the log jam of energy bills which are ■pending in Congress. Let the economists have their dispute on the costs. None lias ever been able to measure the cost of our national security. In my judgment, we really have no alternative to achieving ■the goals of self sufficiency. If our energy industries are liot able to meet the challenges of increasing supplies, and if jwe cannot succeed in reducing demand, our dependence on foreign fiations for vital energy commodities will continue to grow. We iannot afford to let this happen. We have the resources and the ■i; l| -- all we need to do is to make the necessary decisions. Thank you. 0 O0 3 The second major objective must be to stimulate the development of domestic energy resources. We must accelerate the development of oil and natural gas; we must boost coal production and bring on-line coal liquefaction and gasification capacity; we must develop the promise of our vast oil shale reserves; and expand our nuclear and geothermal power. We must develop a realistic, believeable program to accomplish this -- not only because it will bring us self-sufficiency, but as important because the OPEC nations are looking to see if we are willing to make the necessary decisions to achieve this self-sufficiency. I suggest that immediately we begin an all-out effort to remove the Governmental restraints which have held back our domestic industry in recent years. Now I am sure that each of you could compile his own list of Governmental impediments. The National Petroleum Council has warned of many in the past, but only now is there growing recognition of just how bad government controls have been. Clearly, the Government has posed, and con tinues to pose the major obstacle in the short and medium-term to efficient market allocation in energy. We regulate the price and distribution of natural gas; we manipulate the pricing and distribution system in oil; we require lengthy and cumbersome processes for obtaining licenses and rate approvals; and impose environmental restraints of questionable validity upon both the production and combustion of fossil fuels. As we develop our long range energy policies, we must also set some short term goals. These goals should be clearly under stood and stated and explained at each step to the American people. In my mind, the framework should involve several major areas of action, including passage of a legislative package, changing of existing regulatory procedures, and conservation efforts. -- First, we must make an all-out attempt to produce additional supplies of oil. The potential for this production could be met through a variety of measures such as: maximizing production at Elk Hills and proceeding with exploration on Naval Petroleum Reserve #4 reopening the Santa Barbara Channel, reevalauting upward the maximum effective rate of certain oil fields and increasing secondary and tertiary recovery from existing fields. Departmentof th e J R E A S lIR Y ÈHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04-2041 EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE AT 3:00 P.M., EDT WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 19 74_______ __ OPENING REMARKS BY WILLIAM E. SIMON SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY BEFORE FEDERAL OFFICIALS AND REPRESENTATIVES FROM STATE PUBLIC REGULATORY COMMISSIONS ON THE FINANCING PROBLEMS FACING THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY AT THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION SEPTEMBER 11, 1974, 3:00 P.M. Good afternoon, I don’t have to tell you that the financial plight of the utility industry is a matter of utmost importance to our nation and our economy. Without adequate utility service, business cannot expand its productive capacity and consumers cannot enjoy the standard of living we have accepted as the American right. It will require a new partnership of Federal and State officials to return this vital industry to good health. I am glad to open this meeting which I hope will mark the beginning of a number of discussions to improve consensus and cooperation toward solving a national issue. Most of you know that the financial condition of the utility industry has been deteriorating steadily for the last several years. But with the explosion in oil prices and other inflationary pressures the industry’s financial problems have been intensified. Rate increases, while considerable, have not been enough to meet the surging costs of fuel, construction and money. As the industry’s liquidity, earnings and fixed charge coverages have weakened, utilities have lost the ability to raise essential capital. Without normal access to long-term financing, utilities have been forced to turn to short-term sources of credit, a dangerous and limited practice. Con tinued reliance upon financing of this sort has seriously weakened the creditworthiness of these companies. The utility industry today requires massive capital invest ment for needed additional facilities. It is ironic that at a time when our nation desperately needs to increase its nuclear generating capacity, construction programs are being slashed. WS-99 2 It is estimated that in the next five years, the electric utility industry alone will spend $90 billion, up 46 percent over the preceding five years. To finance this, it is necessary to increase sales of long-term debt securities and new common equity 52 percent and 75 percent, respectively, over the same period. Unfortunately, the entire utility industry is facing these immense capital needs at a time when our capital markets are depressed and troubled by inflation and the profitability and liquidity of the industry is diminishing alarmingly. The cash flow of the electric utility industry as a per centage of its capital outlays has dropped from 59 percent in 1964 to 31 percent in 1973. Between 1964 and 1973 the industry’s after-tax profits increased only 2 percent per year. During that same period, interest costs have increased 14 percent per year. It is little wonder then that interest coverage has been cut in half from about 5 times in 1963 to about 2.5 times in 1973. But that is the average. Many utilities are not earning enough to cover interest twice, which is the minimum amount of safety investors will normally accept. These companies are effectively barred from both the bond market and the equity market. Since April 1974, 44 utilities have had to postpone or change the terms of planned securities offerings. The cause in every case was investor concern over the safety, liquidity and return offered by utilities securities. Lack of access to the capital markets has forced at least 18 major electric utilities to delay or cancel outright signifi cant portions of their construction programs. The kilowatts of planned capacity in plants being delayed represent 29 per cent of their total generating capacity in service. The managements of these companies attribute inadequate cash flow and return on equity as the principal reasons for the deferrals. Unless these projects are restored in the near future, more brownouts and blackouts are likely in the next few years. It must be recognized that until load factors are improved and demand peaks are reduced, electric utilities will require continuing improvement in their internal cash flow. In the same vein, gas and other utilities will need cash flow improvement as long as the cost of capital and inflation continue at current levels. Fuel costs have quadrupled since the beginning of 1973 and construction costs for fossil and nuclear plants are growing at a rate of 9 percent and 12.5 percent, respectively. At the . same time, internal cash flow is growing at only 7 percent per year. Clearly the industry cannot withstand a continuation of these trends for very long and survive. 3 Twenty-six bond rating reductions or suspensions during 1974 have added to the financing problems of utilities. The fact that there ^has been not a single bond upgrading this year confirms my belief that this unhealthy trend is worsening. Of course, one of the major problems is that the regulatory process was not designed to function in a highly inflationary environment. Many states have experimented successfully with ad hoc procedures: interim and make-whole mechanisms, automatic pass-throughs and permitting construction work-in process to be used in rate calculations. We applaud these thoroughly construc tive innovations and urge that all state regulators adopt such processes. There is little disagreement that bringing inflation under control commands the highest national priority. It is a terribly difficult challenge, which requires painful decisions both at the Federal and State level. Without a sound utility industry, business, jobs and services to the public cannot expand and Project Independence cannot succeed. To achieve these goals, the users of electric, gas and telephone service must pay the economic cost of providing that service. That is a good part of your challenge — to adjust the rate structure in a manner approved by your State Legislature so that utilities can finance their expansion in an orderly fashion and investors will again support the industry. A reasonable return on investment cannot be constrained by an artificially low ceiling — it must be sensitive to changing economic conditions. I believe this critical problem must be solved, within the utility rate structure, the tax system and the regulatory processes we will discuss today. The Federal Government must take a leadership role and assist the regulatory commissions in every way that it can. We need to work together to find the solutions. The American people will not accept and the American economy cannot survive a diminishing supply of energy that threatens our entire way of life. We cannot go through the trauma of more blackouts and brownouts, and worse, economic stagnation, that inevitably will follow if we foolishly restrict the construction of the generating capacity essential to our present and future energy needs. You will hear from my distinguished colleagues during this meeting. We are here to share our views and thoroughly explore the issues I have described. This meeting could be the first of a larger series to overcome the problems we face and to preserve and strengthen an essential industry. Thank you. 0 O0 Removal Notice The item identified below has been removed in accordance with FRASER's policy on handling sensitive information in digitization projects due to copyright protections. Citation Information Document Type: Transcript Number of Pages Removed: Author(s): Title: CBS Evening News, "International Worries" Date: 1974-09-07 Journal: Volume: Page(s): URL: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Removal Notice The item identified below has been removed in accordance with FRASER's policy on handling sensitive information in digitization projects due to copyright protections. Citation Information Document Type: Transcript Number of Pages Removed: Author(s): Title: CBS Evening News, "Recommendation Rejected" Date: 1974-09-06 Journal: Volume: Page(s): URL: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Removal Notice The item identified below has been removed in accordance with FRASER's policy on handling sensitive information in digitization projects due to copyright protections. Citation Information Document Type: Transcript Number of Pages Removed: Author(s): Title: NBC Nightly News, "Advice Rejected" Date: 1974-09-06 Journal: Volume: Page(s): URL: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Removal Notice The item identified below has been removed in accordance with FRASER's policy on handling sensitive information in digitization projects due to copyright protections. Citation Information Document Type: Transcript Number of Pages Removed: 2 Author(s): Title: NBC Saturday Night News, "International Economic Problems" Date: 1974-09-07 Journal: Volume: Page(s): URL: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis https://fraser.stlouisfed.org DepartmentofthefREASlUfif TELEP flSHINGTON* aC. 20220 WÓ4-2041 *789 September 12, 1974 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE TREASURY’S 52-WEEK RILL OFFERING The Treasury Department, by this public notice, invites tenders for $1,800,000,000, September or thereabouts, of 24, 1974, 3 64 -day Treasury bills to be dated and to mature September 23, 1975 (CUSIP No. 912793 WT9). The bills will be issued for cash and in exchange for Treasury bills maturing September 24, 1974, outstanding in the amount of $1,802,240,000, of which Government accounts and Federal Reserve Banks, for themselves and as agents of foreign and international monetary authorities, presently hold $925,385,000. These accounts may exchange bills they hold for the. bills now being offered at the average price of accepted tenders. The bills will be issued on a discount basis under competitive and noncompetitive bidding as hereinafter provided, and at maturity their face amount will be payable without interest. in denominations of They will be issued in bearerform $10,000, $15,000, $50,000, $100,000, $500,000 and $1,000,000 (maturity value) and in book-entry form to designated bidders. Tenders will be received at Federal Reserve Banks and Branches up to the closing September hour, one-thirty p.ra., Eastern Daylight Saving time, 18, 1974. Washington. Wednesday, Tenders will not be received at the Treasury Department, Each tender must be. for a minimum of $10,000. $10,000 must be in multiples of $5,000. Tenders over In the case of competitive tenders the price offered must be expressed on the basis of 100, with not more than three decimals, e.g., 99-925. Fractions may not be used. It is urged^ that renders be .made ou the printed forms and forwarded in the special envelopes which will be supplied by Federal Reserve hanks or Branches on application t-h r e r o r , Banking institutions and dealers who make primary markets in Government ecurities and report daily to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York their positions (OVER) - 2- with respect to Government securities and borrowings thereon may submit tenders for account of customers provided the names of the customers are set forth in such tenders. o\m account. Others will not be permitted to submit tenders except for their Tenders will be received without deposit from incorporated banks and trust companies and from responsible and recognized dealers in investment securities, Tenders from others must be accompanied by payment of 2 percent of the face amount of Treasury bills applied for, unless the tenders are accompanied by an express guaranty of payment by an incorporated bank or trust company. Immediately after the closing hour, tenders will be opened at the Federal Reserve Banks and Branches, following which public announcement will be made by the Treasury Department of the amount and price range of accepted bids. Only those submitting competitive tenders will be advised of the acceptance or rejection thereof. The Secretary of the Treasury expressly reserves the right to accept or reject any or all tenders, in whole or in part, and his action in any such respect shall be final. Subject to these reservations, noncompetitive tenders for $200,000 or less without stated price from any one bidder will be accepted in full at the average price (in three decimals) of accepted competxtive bids. Settlement for accepted tenders in accordance with the bids must be made or completed at the Federal Reserve Bank on September 24, 1974, cash or other immediately available funds or in a like face amount of Treasury bills maturing September 24, 1974. Cash and exchange tenders will receive equal treatment. Cash adjustments will be made for differences between the par value of maturing bills accepted in exchange and the issue price of the new bills. Under Sections 454(b) and 1221(5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 the amount of discount at which bills issued hereunder are sold is considered to accrue when the bills are sold, redeemed or otherwise disposed of, and the bills are ex cluded from consideration as capital assets. Accordingly, the owner of Treasury bills (other than life insurance companies) issued hereunder must include in his income tax return, as ordinary gain or loss, the difference between the price paid for the bills, whether on original issue or on subsequent purchase, and the amount actually received either upon sale or redemption at maturity during the taxable year for which the return is made. Treasury -Department Circular No. 418 (current revision) and this notice, prescribe the terms of the Treasury bills and govern the conditions of their issueCopies of the circular may be obtained from any Federal Reserve Bank or Branch. Removal Notice The item identified below has been removed in accordance with FRASER's policy on handling sensitive information in digitization projects due to copyright protections. Citation Information Document Type: Transcript Number of Pages Removed: Author(s): Title: CBS Morning News, "Secret Meeting" Date: 1974-09-10 Journal: Volume: Page(s): URL: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Removal Notice The item identified below has been removed in accordance with FRASER's policy on handling sensitive information in digitization projects due to copyright protections. Citation Information Document Type: Transcript Number of Pages Removed: Author(s): Title: NBC Nightly News, "Energy Pricing Dispute in Administration" Date: 1974-09-10 Journal: Volume: Page(s): URL: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Removal Notice The item identified below has been removed in accordance with FRASER's policy on handling sensitive information in digitization projects due to copyright protections. Citation Information Document Type: Transcript Number of Pages Removed: Author(s): Title: News 4 Today: "Closed Meeting" Date: 1974-09-10 Journal: Volume: Page(s): URL: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis https://fraser.stlouisfed.org THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY W A S H IN G T O N S£P 1 1 1974 Dear Mr. President: There is forwarded herewith a draft bill "To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to restrict the authority.for inspection of returns and the disclosure of information with respect thereto, and for other purposes. " It would be appreciated if you would lay the proposed leg islation before the United States Senate, This proposal has been developed in conjunction with current Administration initiatives in the privacy area. The proposal is also being sent to the Speaker of the House Inspection and disclosure of tax returns and tax return information is presently governed by section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code and by Executive Orders and Treasury Regulations adopted pursuant to the authority provided in that section. This statutory and regulatory ap paratus has generally worked very well. The number of complaints or aüegations of abuse has been very small, particularly when one con siders the immense volume of returns and associated information pro cessed each year by the Internal Revenue Service. Nevertheless, we believe it is important that the American tax payer know who will have access to information reported on his tax returns and under what circumstances the law makes that information available to others. Therefore, we have completely reexamined the existing rules with a view to ensuring the m a x i m u m confidentiality of tax returns and tax return information consistent with effective tax administration and legitimate needs of other federal agencies to obtain tax information for law enforcement and statistical pûrposes. and of states for purposes of their own tax administration. The proposed legislation would establish a general rule that all tax returns and related information are confidential and m a y not be disclosed except as authorized by this legislation. The principal* instances in which tax return information would be made available to agencies or persons outside the Internal Revenue Service are described below. £ - 2 - Specific statutory authority for access to tax returns by the tax writing committees of Congress would be continued as under present law. Other committees would be permitted access to tax returns only by Congressional resolution substantially in accordance with present procedure. The practice under which a number of committees have obtained tax returns pursuant to Executive Orders would be terminated, and control of Congressional access to tax returns would be placed in the Congress itself. Federal agencies seeking access to tax returns or other informa tion concerning a taxpayer from the 1RS for law enforcement purposes would have to satisfy new statutory criteria which would be both more specific and more restrictive than under present law. The items of information that could be supplied pursuant to a request for a tax check would be strictly limited and would be specified in the statute. The Social and Economic Statistics Administration in the Depart ment of Commerce would continue to have full access to tax return data for the purpose of its use of information on tax returns for statis tical purposes. Other agencies, as well as the states and any other person, could contract for special statistical studies to be undertaken by the internal Revenue Service but would, of course, have to bear the cost of such studies. In recognition that facility or other limitations might make it impractical for Internal Revenue Service personnel to conduct all such special studies that might be requested, provision is made for the Service to contract with other federal agencies or persons (which, might include-the requesting party) to carry out such studies. .Where such contracts are executed, the outside contractor would be fully subject to all of the safeguards, including the criminal penalties for unlawful disclosure, that are provided to ensure m a x i m u m protection of the confidentiality of tax information. In general, the proposed statutory provisions would be more detailed than under present law, under which most restrictions are ' contained in regulations or Executive Orders. This statute would narrowly restrict the discretionary authority of the Internal Revenue Service to disclose tax information. The Service would, however, be authorized to withhold disclosure on a finding that the administra tion of the Federal tax laws would be seriously impaired'by such dis closure. <? -3 The draft legislation also contains provisions respecting access to tax returns by states and by other persons, procedures that must be followed in requesting tax information and in handling tax informa tion, and record keeping requirements respecting requests for tax information and the disposition of such requests. A separate Executive Order will be issued to impose limitations on access by White House employees to tax returns and tax return in formation. Such access will be permitted only upon a request signed personally by the President. The provisions of the bill are discussed more completely and in greater detail in the enclosed explanation. The Office of Management and Budget has advised that, from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the presentation of this proposal for the consideration of the Congress. Sincerely yours*/ The Honorable •James O. Eastland President pro tern of the United States Senate Washington, D. C. 20510 Enclosure PROPOSAL TO AMEND SECTION 6103 AND RELATED CODE SECTIONS HAVING TO DO WITH DISCLOSURES OF FEDERAL TAX RETURNS AND RETURN INFORMATION As a general rule, section 6103(a) of the Code presently makes tax returns a matter of public record but authorizes inspection only upon order of the President and under regu lations based upon his Executive Orders. Section 6103(b) specifically authorizes disclosure of income tax returns to State and local tax authorities upon request by a State governor for purposes of State'or local- tax administration. Section 6103(c) authorizes inspection of corporate income tax returns by shareholders owning 1 percent or more of the corporate taxpayer’s stock. Section 6103(d) authorizes inspection of returns or return information by the tax writing committees of Congress- and by any select committee authorized to inspect returns or return information by Congressional resolution. Finally, section 6103(f) compels the Secretary or his delegate to tell any inquirer whether or not a person has filed an income tax return for a particular -' . . Section 7213(a) imposes criminal penalties on any Federal officer or employee who makes an unlawful disclosure of income tax return information and on any person who unlawfully prints or publishes income tax return information. Section 7213(b) imposes corresponding penalties on officers, employees, or agents of a State or political subdivision of a State who un lawfully disclose such information. The maximum effort has been made under the existing statute and regulations to assure the confidentiality of tax returns and tax return information consistent with effective Federal tax administration and the legitimate needs of o'ther Federal agencies for tax information for law enforcement and statistical purposes and of the States for purposes of their own tax administration. Nevertheless, the existing statutory and regulatory apparatus does not adequately inform the A.menca taxpayer as to who will have access to his tax return and tax return information and for what purposes. Accordingly, the proposed revision of section 6103 reflects a complete re examination of the present rules and is based on the funda mental principle that tax returns and return information should be held confidential and private except as otherwise clearly provided by statute. 2 Set out below is a description of existing law and practice under sections 6103 and 7213 in major areas and an explanation of how this proposal would affect the pres ent situation. * 1, Definition of Tax Return and Return Information Existing regulations define "return" to include in formation returns, schedules, lists, and other written statements which are designed to be a supplement to a return or a part of a return. The terra is also defined to include "[o]ther records, reports, information received orally or in writing, factual data, documents, papers, abstracts, memoranda, or other evidence . . . relating to [a return].’1 ■M Because disclosure standards properly applicable to a return itself may, in varying circumstances, be different from those applicable to Internal Revenue Service files relating to a return and to information in Service files relating.to a taxpayer's past, present, or future tax lia bility, the legislative proposal makes a definitional dis tinction between a tax return and tax return information. The proposed definition of "return" is not significantly different from the basic definition of "return" in existing regulations. The proposed new definition of "return infor mation," however, is considerably more specific and detailed than the existing supplemental definition of "return" quoted above from existing regulations. The proposed new definition of "return information" is intended to cover information of any kind filed with, or compiled by*, the Service which relate to a taxpayer's past, present, or future tax liability. The new definition would specifically cover private letter ruling issued pursuant to a request made before enactment of this legislative* proposal- and all requests for technical advice made by Service personnel to the National Office, regardless of when made. Future private ruling letters generally would be confidential only to the extent permitted by the Freedom of Inforpjation Act or other Federal legislation. . Also pro tected is tax information furnished to the Secretary or his delegate in connection with tax administration and accepted j by him as confidential pursuant to regulations. ■- 3 - 2. Federal Tax Lav; Administration Under existing regulations, tax returns and return information are freely available to officers* and employees of the Treasury Department whose official duties require such access. By the same token, tax returns and return in formation are open to Justice Department attorneys and U.S. attorneys where necessary in the performance of official duties relating to Federal tax administration. While the existing rule applicable to Treasury Depart ment officers and employees has been retained, the rule applicable to Justice Department attorneys and U.S. attorneys has been clarified. The use to which tax returns and return information are appropriately put by these attorneys in a tax context is in preparation for tax litigation or in an investi gation pointing toward tax litigation. As will be described below, the proposal restricts actual disclosure in an adminr judicial tax proceeding of a third party1s return or .return information as to a third party. Accordingly--and logically--access by Justice Department attorneys and U.S. attorneys to returns and return information in preparation for tax litigation should be limited in a similar fashion. These attorneys would have access, of course, to returns of, and return information regarding, a taxpayer who is or may _ be a party to litigation. In the case of a third party, returns and return information would be made available only if the third party consents or if such returns and return information have or may have a bearing on the.outcome of the possible or actual litigation for particular reasons specified by the statute. l o C-l U w X 3. V V. u Federal Non-Tax Law Administration By' regulation based upon an Executive Order, any Federal department or agency may, upon request and subject to the approval of the Secretary or his delegate r inspect tax returns and return information in connection with a matter officially before that department or agency. - 4 - This access to tax returns and return information has resulted in extensive disclosure of tax returns and return information for use in a variety of Federal activities. While access to tax.returns is undoubtedly useful, and per haps essential, to the proper functioning of some Federal departments and agencies, the volume of data'and other information obtainable has reached such proportions as to prompt legitimate concern over the ability to maintain the appropriate degree of confidentiality. Because of the obviously demonstrable need of the Social and Economic Statistics Administration for returns and return information for research and for statistical purposes, the legislative proposal would make returns and return information available for such purposes upon request by the Secretary of Commerce. No statistical study could be made, public, however, if it in any way 'identified a particular taxpayer or could be so used. Likewise, because of the close relationship between the collection of Social Security taxes and administration of the Social Security Act by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the legislative proposal would continue existing HEW access to returns and return information for this purpose; and access would also be extended to the Labor Department and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation for purposes of admin istering the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. In the case of other Federal departments and agencies, acce: to returns and return information in something other than statistical form would be limited to returns and return information which, for particular reasons specified by statute, have or may have a bearing upon the outcome of an administraçive or j u d i c i a l proceeding (or investigation leading to such a proceeding) in a matter relating to the enforcement of’ a Federal statute. Be cause the actual use of returns and return information, in such a proceeding ‘is restricted as described belov?, the initial access by the Federal department or agency for purposes of preparing for a proceeding is restricted in a similar fashion. This pattern thus corresponds generally to that proposed for dis closure to Justice Department attorneys and U.S. attorneys in tax matters which has just been described. It is further provided that "the Secretary or his delegate may withhold requested returns and return information to the extent: that he finds that disclosure would seriously impair Federal £ax law administration*| In the event that such a determination were made, the proposed statute calls for a consultation on the matter between the head of the requesting Federal department or agency and the Secretary of the T r e a s u r y . I f I after such consultation, the issue of disclosure has not been resolved, a final determination would be made by the President or his delegate. Because a number of Federal departments and agencies may well need tax return information in statistical form for various purposes, new section 6108 would authorize the Commissioner to provide statistical studies upon request, provided such statis tics dio not reveal, directly or indirectly, any taxpayer’s identity. Further, a proposed amendment to section 7513 would authorize the Commissioner to contract with any Federal agency, including the requesting agency, to prepare the statistical study if the Internal Revenue Service V7ere unable to do the work itself. State and Local Tax Law Administration T T,>. Vlit V n f ~ t 1 ■v--r'i o •.section 6103(b) of existing law, and income tax return information are, upon the written request of a State governor, open to inspection b y any official, body, or commission lawfully charged with the administration of State tax laws for the purpose of such administration. Further,' section 6103(b) authorizes the governor to direct that tax returns and return* information be furnished to local taxing authorities for use in administering local tax laws. Tax returns and return information which are supplied to tax off 5.cials at, say, a county or city level ma y* not be in variably subject to appropriate safeguards on confidentiality w u e h the Service has the right to expect and a duty to protect. . 'Cv?ise, political considerations may produce unwarranted interest in tax information at even higher levels for non-tax Purposes. The legislative proposal would limit access to tax returns^and return information to a State body, agency, or commission lawfully charged with State tax: law administration and only for purposes of such administration. It is further Provided that returns and return information would be available to State tax officials only to the extent rhat the Secretary or his delegate does not determine that disclosure would seriously impair Federal tax law administration. - 6 - 5. Judicial and Administrative Tax Proceedings Under existing regulations, tax returns and return infor mation are available upon request by attorneys of the Justice Department and U.S. attorneys for use in any Federal or State tax litigation if the Federal Government is interested in the result. * This broad right of access can result in'seriously breaching the confidentiality of tax returns and return in formation relating to taxpayers who are not parties to the litigation. This can come about through the introduction in evidence of third party returns and return information where such returns or information may be considered relevant in some way to the outcome of the litigation. For this reason, the legislative proposal imposes strict conditions upon the use of third party returns and return in formation in Federal tax litigation where thé third party- does not consent to such usé. Essentially, the proposal would re strict the use of third party returns and return information to those instances where the return or return information has or may have a bearing on the outcome of the litigation for reasons specified by the proposal, and then only.to the extent of such bearing. Additionally, third party returns and return information (a) could be used to impeach the testimony of the third party if he were a witness in the proceeding or to impeach the testimony of any other witness regarding a transaction with the third party and (b) could be 'disclosed to the extent required by the Constitution or, in a criminal proceeding, 18 U.S.C. 3500 or Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Even if a third party*s return and return information could otherwise be disclosed by application of these rules, they could not be used if the Secretary or his delegate determined* that disclosure would seriously impair Federal tax law-administration. Once again, any such determination would be subject to the procedure described above calling for consultation between the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury with a final deter mination to be made, if'necessary, by the President or his delegal 6. Judicial and Administrative Non-Tax Proceedings Here cigain, present regulations effectively provide that the Department of Justice may, upon request, use third party 7 returns and return information in non-tax litigation where the Federal Government is interested in the result. The necessity for protecting any taxpayer*s right to privacy with respect to his tax affairs is even more acute in this area than in.that of tax litigation Since Federal tax adrainistration is in no way involved in the litigation. Accordingly, the proposal would limit the use of any tax payer's returns and return information in non-tax judicial and administrative proceedings to a Federal proceeding to which the United States is a party and then o n l y #if the tax payer himself is a party to the proceeding or consents to the use or if the information has a bearing upon the outcome of the proceeding because of a transactional relationship between the taxpayer and a party to the proceeding. As in tax litigation, a third party's return or .return information could also be use-d in the litigation under certain circum stances to impeach a witness and to the extent required by the Constitution, 18 U.S.C. 3500, or Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Once again, the returns and return information could be withheld, suhi^ct t-w» cedure outlined above, upon a finding by the Secretary or his delegate that Federal tax lav; administration would be seriously impaired. 7. Prospective Jurors and Possible Criminal Activities Under existing regulations, attorneys of the Department of Justice cannot have access to tax returns for purposes of examining prospective jurors but are authorized to deter mine from the Internal Revenue Service whether or not a prospective juror has been under tax investigation. The statutory proposal would broaden these ruJLes to permit use of return information by these attorneys to impeach a pro spective juror in Federal litigation, w h ü e retaining the present rule applicable, to inquiries regarding tax investi gations of prospective jurors. In the interest of serving the basic, ends of criminal justice, the proposal would direct the Secretary or his dele gate to notify the Attorney General as. to possible violations - 8 of Federal criminal laws which come to his attention as the result of his own access to return information. The proposal would also give the Secretary or his delegate discretionary authority to so notify State or local law enforcement agencies of a possible violation of State criminal laws. 8. S trike Force Participation The proposal would specifically authorize disclosure of certain return information by Treasury.Department* employees who participate jointly with another Federal agency in an enforcement activity relating to Federal criminal laws. This proposal is principally directed to Service participation with the Department of Justice in the Federal Organized Crime Strike Force program. The statute would only permit disclosure by participating "Service employees to other Federal employees involved in the enforcement program of return information re ceived or developed from sources other than the taxpayer him self and then only to the extent required by the investigation. 9. Congressional Committees Section 6103(d) authorizes unlimited disclosure of returns and return information to the three tax writing committees of Congress and to any select committee authorized by Congressional resolution to inspect returns and return information. Returns and return information may be furnished to any such committee sitting in executive session. Numerous Congressional committees other than those referred to in section 6103(d) have traditioncl sought and obtained returns and return information through specific Executive Orders. The legislative proposal would tighten existing lav; in some respects and broaden it in others. The three tax writing committees of Cong-ress would |continue to have access to any tax returns and return information upon request, and this right would be specifically extended to the Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation. Any other Congressional'committee*s access to tax returns and return 9 informâtionj however, would have to be by way of a resolution of the appropriate house of Congress. Further, returns and return information furnished to any Congressional committee would have to be furnished in closed executive session. 10. The President Since tax returns and return information are presently disclosable to the extent authorized by the President, it stands to reason that he now has the right to inspect such returns and return information as he may determine. Because the proposal removes Presidential discretion in the disclosure of tax returns and return information, it grants to him specific authority to see returns and return information pursuant to Executive Order and grants to him the further authority to * designate in his Executive Order an employee or employees of the White House Office to receive the returns or return in formation on his behalf. * 11. P * /T> v 4iO T.T-Î. ^ O n rt jl l u 1 JL Section 6103(c) authorizes the inspection of a corporation’s income tax returns by any holder of 17, or more of the corpo ration's stock. In an attempt to head off possible mischief, the regulations deny this right to a shareholder v;ho acquired his stock interest for that purpose. . Income, estate, gift, ~ unemployment, and certain excise tax returns are presently open to the filing taxpayer, the beneficiary of a trust, a trustee in bankruptcy, and a member of a. partnership. Income tax returns of a deceased taxpayer are also open* to the repre sentative cf his estate and, along with estate and gift tax returns, to certain other persons upon a satisfactory showing of a material interest. . The proposal- deletes the "17» stockholder" rule of section 6103(c) because the rule encourages inherently improper and severely damaging disclosures and because SEC rules now require touch of the information contained in many corporate returns to be made publicl The regulatory rules regarding disclosure to persons v/ith a material interest have been largely retained - 10 but tightened to prohibit disclosure of tax return information where disclosure would seriously impair Federal tax law administration. l 12. Contractors Under the authority of section 7513, the Secretary or his delegate may contract for the photographic reproduction of tax returns and return information, and disclosure is, of course, authorized for this purpose. At the same time, dis closure must necessarily be made to certain other contractors and their employees who furnish property and services in con nection with the general administration of the tax laws by the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service. The'legislative proposal deals with this problem under current lav? by specifically authorizing the disclosure of tax returns and return information to any person to the ex tent necessary in, or to facilitate, the contractual pro curement of property or services by the Treasury Department or the Service for tax administration purposes. At the same time, however, the proposal would amend section 7213 to extend to these persons the criminal penalties provided for unauthorized) disclosure. ■4 • % 13. . Misstatements of Fact Existing law does not provide clear authority permitting the Secretary or his delegate to disclose return information with respect to a particular taxpayer in order to correct a misstatement of fact published or disclosed with respect to that taxpayer's return or his dealing with the Service, The proposal would permit the Secretary or his delegate to dis close tax return information, or any other information, with respect to that taxpayer under these circumstances to the extent necessary to correct his public misstatement in the interests of Federal tax administration. 14. Tax Checks Although there is no specific authorizing provision under existing law, tax check information on prospective appointees 11 to, and employees of, the Federal Government is presently being furnished upon request. Occasionally, such informa tion is also furnished to a State Government in connection with a prospective appointee to State office. è The legislative proposal restricts tax checks to prospective appointees of the Executive or Judicial branch of the Federal Government, and then only upon Written request of the White House, a cabinet officer, or the head of a Federal establishment. The information to be disclosed in a requested tax check is then limited to Whether the indi vidual has filed income tax returns for the last 3 years, has failed in the current year or preceding 3 years to pay any tax Within 10 days after notice.and demand or has been ‘' ’'assessed a-'-négligence ‘penalty dùr'ing' this period', has been under any criminal tax investigation and the result of any such investigation, and has been assessed a civil penalty for fraud or negligence. » 15. Taxes Imposed by Subtitle E \ Existing law affords no specific statutory protection to returns and return information relating to alcohol, tobacco, and firearms taxes imposed by subtitle E of the Internal Revenue Code. In connection with its own law enforcement programs, the Department of Justice has^ traditionally had access to such returns and return information. Accordingly,* the proposal would grant specific statutory access to these returns and return information by a Federal officer or em ployee v?hose official duties require such access.*• 16. Waivers- of Confidentiality Ko authority presently exists which would permit the , Secretary or his delegate to disclose returns or return in formation with respect to a taxpayer to someone to whc-iQ the taxpayer himself wanted his return or return information dis closed. The legislative proposal would permit disclosure in the discretion of the Secretary or his delegate if -requested 12 - by the taxpayer involved but then only to the extent that such disclosure would not seriously impair Federal tax law administration. 17. Section 6103(f) * The required disclosure to any person of information as to whether another taxpayer has filed an income tax return for a particular year is plainly contrary to the most basic principle of taxpayer privacy.. For this reason, the proposal would delete present section 6103(f) of the Code. 18. Judicial Review ■ •* •*The •proposal provides j that 'the exclusive'.'remedy for.-an'* ’• alleged violation"of section 6103 shall be a proceeding under section 7213. Judicial review of any determination permitted or provided by statute to disclose or not to disclose a return or return information is thus limited to a proceeding under sec* *on 7213 % 19. Penalties for Unauthorized Disclosure Section 7213 makes it unlawful for any Federal or State C\* *icial or employee to make a disclosure of income tax return .information which the Code does not authorize and makes it ' unlawful for any person to print or publish any such infor mation except as authorized by the Code. The legislative proposal expands the scope o£ section 7213 in three significant respects. First, section 7213 would aPpl>r to unauthorized disclosure of any tax returns or return information. Second, the criminal sanctions are extended to former officials or employees of the Federal or a State Govern ment. Third, the criminal sanctions are extended to private contractors and their officers and employees (or former ofricers and employees) who make unauthorized disclosure of returns and return information to which they have been given statutory access. A BILL A. TO a m e n d the I n t e r n a l R e v en u e Code of 1954 to r e s t r i c t the a u th o r ity f o r in s p e c tio n of r e t u r n s a n d the d i s c l o s u r e of in f o r m a tio n with r e s p e c t t h e r e t o , | a n d fo r o t h e r p u r p o s e s . Be it e n a c te d by the S enate and H ouse of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the U nited S ta te s of A m e r i c a in C o n g r e s s a s s e m b l e d , SECTION 1. A M EN D M EN T O F 1954 CODE. W h e n e v e r in th is A ct an a m e n d m e n t is e x p r e s s e d in t e r m s of an a m e n d m e n t to a s e c t i o n o r o t h e r p r o v is io n , the r e f e r e n c e i s to a s e c tio n o r o t h e r p r o v i s i o n of the I n te r n a l R e v en u e Code o f 1954. SEC. 2. C O N FID EN TIA LITY AND DISCLOSURE O F R E T U R N S AND RETU RN INFORM ATION. Section 6103 ( r e l a ti n g to p u b lic ity of r e t u r n s and d i s c l o s u r e of in fo rm a tio n as to p e r s o n s filin g in c o m e ta x r e t u r n s ) is a m e n d e d to r e a d a s follow s: "SEC. 6103. CO N FID EN TIA LITY AND DISCLOSURE O F R E T U R N S AND R E T U R N INFORM ATION. "(a) G e n e r a l R u le . - "(1) C o n fid e n tia lity and d i s c l o s u r e . - - R e t u r n s and r e t u r n i n fo r m a tio n s h a l l be c o n fid e n tia l a n d no p e r s o n d e s c r i b e d in s e c t i o n 7213 (a s h a ll p e r m i t in s p e c tio n of o r d i s c lo s e r e t u r n s o r r e t u r n i n f o r m a tio n , nor s h a ll a c o u rt, a d m i n i s t r a t i v e body, o r o t h e r p e r s o n o r d e r s u c h i n s p e c tio n o r d i s c l o s u r e , e x c e p t to su c h p e r s o n s and f o r s u c h p u r p o s e s a s a r e a u th o riz e d by th is t it l e . - 2 - "(23 D e fin itio n s. - - F o r p u r p o s e s of th is s e c t i o n - •% . "(A) R e tu r n . - -T h e t e r m ’return* m e a n s any ta x o r i n f o r m a tio n r e t u r n o r d e c l a r a ti o n of e s t im a t e d tax r e q u i r e d by, o r p ro v id e d fo r o r p e r m i t t e d u n d e r, the p r o v is io n s of th is t itle file d by, on b e h a lf of, o r w ith r e s p e c t to any p e r s o n w ith the S e c r e t a r y o r h is d e le g a te , and any a m e n d m e n t o r s u p p le m e n t t h e r e to o r c la im f o r re fu n d , in clu d in g s u p p o r tin g s c h e d u le s , a tta c h m e n ts , o r l i s t s w hich a r e d e sig n e d to be s u p p l e m e n ta l to, o r b e c o m e p a r t of, the r e t u r n s o file d . "(B) R e tu r n in f o r m a tio n . —T he t e r m 'r e t u r n i n f o r i mation* m e a n s - (i) any d a ta in clu d in g a t a x p a y e r ’s id e n tity , the n a tu r e , s o u r c e , o r a m o u n t of h is in c o m e , p a y m e n t s , r e c e i p t s , d e d u c tio n s, e x e m p tio n s , c r e d i t s , a s s e t s , l i a b i l i t i e s , n e t w o rth , tax lia b ility , ta x w i t h h e ld , d e f ic ie n c ie s , o v e r a s s e s s m e n t s , o r tax p a y m e n ts , w h e th e r the t a x p a y e r ’s r e t u r n w a s, i s being, o r w ill be e x a m in e d o r s u b je c t to o t h e r in v e s tig a tio n o r p r o c e s s i n g , o r any p a r t i c u l a r of any da ta , in w h a te v e r f o rm (w h e th e r a s a r e p o r t , in v e s tig a tiv e f ile , m e m o r a n d u m o r o t h e r d o c u m e n t, in c lu d in g a r e g i s t r a t i o n s t a te m e n t d e s c r i b e d in s e c tio n 6057) o r m a im e r r e c e i v e d by, r e c o r d e d by, p r e p a r e d by, o r f u r n is h e d to the S e c r e t a r y o r h is d e le g a te w ith r e s p e c t to a r e t u r n a s d e s c r i b e d in s u b p a r a g r a p h (A) o r w ith r e s p e c t to th e e x is te n c e of the a m o u n t of the l ia b ility of any p e r s o n u n d e r th is title fo r any tax , p e n a lty , i n t e r e s t , fin e, f o r f e i t u r e , o r o th e r im p o s itio n , o r o ffe n s e , but, f o r p u r p o s e s o f th is su b d iv is io n (i), no t in clu d in g any s u c h d a ta (o r p a r t i c u l a r th e re o f) in clu d ed in a d o c u m e n t (o r r e q u e s t o r c o r r e s p o n d e n c e f o r o r w ith r e s p e c t th e re to ) d e s c r i b e d in (ii) (w ithout r e g a r d to the d a te l im ita tio n th e re in ) o r (iii); (ii) any l e t t e r , a d v ic e , o r o th e r d o c u m e n t i s s u e d b y * / the S e c r e t a r y o r h is d e le g a te p u r s u a n t to a r e q u e s t m a d e t h e r e f o r on o r b e f o r e , by, o r on b e h a lf of, any p e r s o n o t h e r than an o f f i c e r o r e m p lo y e e of the D e p a r tm e n t of th e T r e a s u r y a c tin g in h is o ffic ia l c a p a city, and any s u c h r e q u e s t , o r any c o r r e s p o n d e n c e f o r o r w ith r e s p e c t to su c h d o c u m e n t o r any p o r tio n th e r e o f , w hich is in te n d ed to be u se d to d e te r m i n e o r a ff e c t the a p p lic a tio n of any r u l e contained in th is t i t l e , r e l a t e d law , o r tax t r e a t y to the fa c ts and c i r c u m s t a n c e s of a p a r t i c u l a r t r a n s a c ti o n , a r r a n g e m e n t , o r r e t u r n file d o r to be file d by the p e r s o n to w hom su c h d o c u m e n t is fu rn is h e d ; - 4 - "(iii) any m e m o ra n d u m , a d v ic e , o r o t h e r d o c u m e n t issued! by the S e c r e t a r y o r h is d e le g a te p u r s u a n t to a r e q u e s t by, o r on b e h alf of, any o f f i c e r o r em ployee of the D e p a r tm e n t of th e T r e a s u r y a c tin g in h is o ffic ia l c a p a c ity , and a n y s u c h r e q u e s t , o r any c o r r e s p o n d e n c e f o r o r w ith r e s p e c t to s u c h d o c u m e n t o r any p o r tio n th e r e o f , w h ich is intended to be u s e d by h im to d e te r m i n e o r a ffe c t the a p p lica tio n of any r u le c o n ta in e d in th is t it l e , r e l a t e d law , o r lax t r e a t y to the fa c ts and c i r c u m s t a n c e s of a p a r t i c u l a r t r a n s a c ti o n , a r r a n g e m e n t , » • o r r e t u r n file d o r to be filed by any p e r s o n to w hom s u c h d o c u m e n t r e l a t e s o r m a y r e l a t e ; and n(iv) any o th e r d ata of the type d e s c r i b e d in (i) w hich is f u r n is h e d to the S e c r e t a r y o r h is d e le g a te in connection w ith tax a d m i n i s t r a t io n and a c c e p te d a s c o n fid e n tia l p u r s u a n t to r e g u la tio n s p r e s c r i b e d by the S e c r e t a r y o r h is d e le g a te , w h e th e r o r not su c h data (or p a r t i c u l a r th e re o f) d e s c r i b e d in (i) o r su c h d o c u m e n t (or r e q u e s t o r c o r r e s p o n d e n c e f o r o r w ith r e s p e c t th e r e to ) d e s c r i b e d in (ii) o r (iii) m a y be in a n y m a n n e r in s p e c t e d o r d i s c lo s e d u n d e r the p r o v is io n s of s e c tio n 6104 o r any o t h e r p r o v i s i o n of th is title . "(C) T a x a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . - - T h e t e r m 't a x a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' m e a n s the a d m i n i s t r a t io n , m a n a g e m e n t, c o n d u c t, d ir e c tio n , and s u p e r v i s i o n of the e x e c u tio n and ap*plication of the i n t e r n a l r e v e n u e law s o r r e l a t e d s t a t u t e s (o r i e q u iv a le n t la w s and s t a t u t e s of a State) and ta x c o n v e n tions to w hich the U nited S ta te s is a p a r t y and th e d e v e lo p m e n t and f o r m u la tio n o f F e d e r a l ta x p o lic y r e l a t i n g to e x is tin g o r p ro p o s e d i n t e r n a l r e v e n u e la w s , r e l a t e d s t a t u t e s , and ta x t r e a t i e s , a n d in c lu d e s a s s e s s m e n t , c o lle c tio n , e n fo r c e m e n t, litig a tio n , p u b lic a tio n , and s t a t i s t i c a l g a th e r in g fu n c tio n s u n d e r s u c h la w s , s t a t u t e s , % o r c o n v e n tio n s. "(D) S ta te . - -T h e t e r m 'S ta te ' m e a n s th e 50 S t a te s , the D i s t r i c t of C o lu m b ia , the C o m m o n w e a lth of P u e r t o R ic o , p o s s e s s i o n s o f the U nited S ta te s , and o t h e r p l a c e s u n d e r the s o v e r e ig n ty of the U nited S ta te s . n (E) T a x p a y e r id e n tity . - -T h e t e r m 't a x p a y e r id e n tity ' m e a n s the n a m e of a p e r s o n w ith r e s p e c t to w hom a r e t u r n is file d , h is m a ilin g a d d r e s s , and h is t a x p a y e r id e n tify in g n u m b e r (as d e s c r i b e d in s e c t i o n 6109) o r a c o m b in a tio n th e r e o f . n(F) I n s p e c tio n . - -T h e t e r m s 'i n s p e c t e d ' and 'i n s p e c t i o n ' m e a n the v is u a l e x a m in a tio n of a r e t u r n o r r e t u r n in f o r m a ti o n . -6 - "(G) D i s c l o s u r e . - -T h e t e r m ’d i s c l o s u r e ’ m e a n s the m a k in g known to a n y p e r s o n in any m a n n e r w h a t e v e r a r e t u r n o r r e t u r n in f o rm a tio n . . M(b) D is c l o s u r e to S tate T ax O ffic ia ls . - - R e tu r n s and r e t u r n i n f o r m a tio n , e x c e p t w ith r e s p e c t to t a x e s im p o s e d b y c h a p t e r s 35 and 53, s h a ll be open to in s p e c tio n by o r d i s c l o s u r e to any S ta te a gency, body, o r c o m m is s io n law fully c h a r g e d w ith ta x a d m i n i s t r a t io n f o r the p u r p o s e of, and only to the e x te n t n e c e s s a r y in, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of a s p e c if ic ta x law o f s u c h S tate and s h a l l be u s e d only f o r s u c h tax a d m i n i s t r a t io n . T he in s p e c tio n s h a l l be p e r m i t t e d , o r the d i s c l o s u r e m a d e , only upon w r i t te n r e q u e s t of the h e a d of su c h S tate a g en c y , body, o r c o m m is s io n , d e s ig n a tin g the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f su c h a g e n c y , body, o r c o m m is s io n to m a k e the in s p e c tio n o r to r e c e i v e the r e t u r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n on b e h a lf of s u c h a g en c y , body, o r c o m m is s io n . H o w ev er, s u c h r e t u r n in f o r m a tio n s h a l l not b e d is c lo s e d to s u c h State a gency, body, o r c o m m i s s i o n to the e x te n t th a t the S e c r e t a r y o r h is d e le g ate d e te r m i n e s th a t su c h d i s c l o s u r e would s e r i o u s l y i m p a i r the a d m i n i s t r a t io n of F e d e r a l tax la w s . "(c) D is c lo s u r e to P e r s o n s H aving S u b s ta n tia l I n t e r e s t . - ” (1) T he r e t u r n of a p e r s o n w ith r e s p e c t to w hom the r e t u r n is file d s h a ll, upon w r itte n r e q u e s t , be open to in s p e c tio n by o r d i s c l o s u r e t o - "(A) in the c a s e of the r e t u r n o f an in d iv id u a l, th a t in dividual; - 7 - f,(B) in the c a s e of an in c o m e ta x r e t u r n filed jo in tly , e i t h e r of the in d iv id u a ls w ith r e s p e c t to whom the r e t u r n i s file d ; ” (C) in the c a s e of th e r e t u r n of a p a r t n e r s h i p , a n y p e r s o n who w a s a m e m b e r of su c h p a r t n e r s h i p d u r in g any p a r t of th e p e r io d c o v e r e d b y the r e t u r n ; "(D) in the c a s e of the r e t u r n of a c o rp o ra tio n -"(i) any p e r s o n d e s ig n a te ^ b y \ r e s o l u t i o n of its b o a r d of d i r e c t o r s , o r o t h e r s i m i l a r g o v e rn in g body, ,!(ii) any o f f i c e r o r e m p lo y e e of s u c h c o r p o r a t io n upon w r i t t e n r e q u e s t sig n e d b y any p r i n c i p a l o f f ic e r and a t t e s t e d b y the s e c r e t a r y o r o th e r o f f ic e r, ,f(iii) if the c o r p o r a tio n w a s an e le c t i n g s m a l l b u s i n e s s c o rp o r a tio n u n d e r s u b c h a p te r S of c h a p te r 1, a n y p e r s o n who w a s a s h a r e - • h o ld e r d u rin g a n y p a r t of the p e r i o d c o v e r e d b y s u c h r e t u r n d u r in g w hich an e le c tio n w a s in e ffe c t, o r — 8 - n (iv) if the c o r p o r a tio n h a s b e e n d i s so lv e d , a n y p e r s o n a u th o r iz e d by a p p lic a b le S tate law to a c t f o r the c o r p o r a t io n o r any p e r s o n who th e S e c r e t a r y o r h is d e le g a te fin d s to h a v e a m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t w hich w ill be a f f e c t e d by in f o r m a tio n co n ta in e d th e r e in ; n (E) in thé c a s e of the r e t u r n o f a n e s t a t e - M(i) the a d m i n i s t r a t o r , e x e c u to r , o r t r u s t e e of s u c h e s t a t e , and n(ii) any h e i r a t law , n e x t of kin, o r b e n e f i c i a r y u n d e r the w ill, of the d e c e d e n t but on,ly if the S e c r e t a r y o r h is d e le g a te fin d s th a t s u c h h e i r a t law , n e x t of kin, o r b e n e f i c i a r y h a s a m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t w hich w ill be a ffe c te d by i n f o r m a tio n c o n ta in e d th e r e in ; and n (F) In the c a s e of the r e t u r n of a t r u s t - "(i) the t r u s t e e o r t r u s t e e s , jo in tly o r s e p a r a t e l y , and "(ii) any b e n e f i c i a r y of su c h t r u s t but only if the S e c r e t a r y o r h is d e le g a te fin d s th a t s u c h b e n e f i c i a r y h a s a m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t w hich w ill be a ffe c te d by in f o r m a tio n c o n tain ed t h e r e i n . - 9 - * “ (2) If an in d iv id u a l d e s c r ib e d in p a r a g r a p h (1) i s le g a lly in c o m p e te n t, th e a p p lic a b le r e t u r n s h a ll be open to in s p e c tio n by o r d is c lo s u r e to the c o m m itte e , t r u s t e e , o r g u a rd ia n o f h is e s ta te . "(3) If an in d iv id u a l d e s c r ib e d in p a r a g r a p h (1), o th e r th an an in d iv id u a l d e s c r ib e d in s u b p a ra g ra p h (E) (i) o r (F) (i) of su c h p a r a g rap h , h a s d ie d , the a p p lic a b le r e t u r n m a y b e in s p e c te d b y o r d is c lo s e d t o - "(A) the a d m in is tr a to r , e x e c u to r, o r t r u s t e e o f h is e s ta te ; and "(B) any h e ir a t law , n e x t of kin , o r b e n e f ic ia r y u n d e r the w ill, of s u c h d e c e d e n t, o r a d o n ee of p r o p e r ty , b u t only if the S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te fin d s th a t su c h h e ir a t law , n e x t of k in , b e n e fic ia ry , o r donee h a s a m a te r ia l i n te r e s t w hich w ill be a ffe c te d by in fo rm a tio n c o n ta in e d th e r e in . "(4) If substantially all of the property of the person with respect to whom the return is filed is in the hands of a trustee in bankruptcy or receiver, such return or returns for prior years of such person shall be open to inspection by or disclosure to such trustee or receiver, but only if the Secretary or his delegate finds that such receiver or trustee has a material interest which will be affected by information contained therein. - 10 - "(5) Any r e t u r n to w hich th is s u b s e c tio n a p p lie s s h a ll a ls o b e open to in sp e c tio n by o r d is c lo s u r e to the a tto rn e y in fa c t, duly a u th o riz e d in w ritin g , o f an y of th e p e rs o n s d e s c rib e d in p a r a g ra p h (1), (2), (3), o r (4) to in s p e c t the r e t u r n o r r e c e iv e th e in fo rm a tio n on h is b e h a lf, s u b je c t to th e c o n d itio n s p ro v id e d fo r th e r e in . n (6) R e tu rn in fo rm a tio n w ith r e s p e c t to an y r e t u r n s h a ll a ls o be open to d is c lo s u r e to any p e rs o n a u th o riz e d b y th is s u b s e c tio n to in s p e c t su c h r e t u r n b u t only to the e x te n t th a t the S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te d e te rm in e s th a t su c h d is c lo s u r e w ould not s e r io u s ly im p a ir the a d m in is tr a tio n o f F e d e r a l ta x la w s . I f,(d) D is c lo s u re to C o m m itte e s of C o n g re s s . - - mm C o m m itte e on W ays and M e an s, C o m m itte e on F in a n c e , and J o in t C o m m itte e on I n te rn a l R ev en u e T a x a tio n . - -U pon w r itte n r e q u e s t fro m th e C h a irm a n of the C o m m itte e on W ays and M eans of the H ouse of R e p r e s e n ta tiv e s , th e C h a irm a n of th e C o m m itte e on F in a n c e o f th e S e n a te , o r th e C h a irm a n o f the J o in t C o m m itte e on I n te r n a l R ev en u e T a x a tio n , th e S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te s h a ll f u r n is h su c h c o m m itte e s ittin g in c lo s e d e x e c u tiv e s e s s io n w ith a n y r e t u r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n . n (2) C hief of S taff of J o in t C o m m itte e on I n te rn a l R ev en u e T a x a tio n . - ‘- U pon w ritte n r e q u e s t fro m the C h ief of Staff o f th e J o in t C o m m itte e on I n te r n a l R ev en u e T a x a tio n , th e S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te s h a ll fu r n is h h im w ith any r e t u r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n . Such - 11 V - C hief of S taff s h a ll have the r ig h t to su b m it any r e le v a n t o r u s e fu l in fo rm a tio n th u s o b tain ed to any c o m m itte e d e s c rib e d in p a ra g r a p h (1) s ittin g in c lo s e d e x e c u tiv e s e s s io n . "(3) O th e r c o m m itte e s . - -Upon w ritte n r e q u e s t fro m th e c h a ir-m an of a c o m m itte e o f th e S enate o r H ouse (o th e r th an a c o m m itte e sp e c ifie d in p a ra g r a p h (1)) s p e c ia lly a u th o riz e d to in s p e c t r e t u r n s o r r e tu r n in fo rm a tio n b y a re s o lu tio n of the S en ate o r H ouse o r , in th e c a se of a jo in t c o m m itte e (o th e r than the c o m m itte e s p e c ifie d in p a r a graph (1)), b y c o n c u r r e n t re s o lu tio n , th e S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te sh a ll fu rn is h su c h c o m m itte e s ittin g in c lo se d e x e c u tiv e s e s s io n w ith any return or return information which such resolution so authorizes \ the c o m m itte e to in s p e c t, n (4) A g en ts of committees and submission of information to Senate or House.- -Any committee described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) or the Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation shall have the right, acting directly, or by or. through such examiners or agents as the Chairman of such committee or such Chief of Staff may designate or appoint in writing, to inspect returns and return information at such time and in such manner as he may de termine. Any relevant or useful information obtained by or on behalf of su ch committee pursuant to the provisions of tin's subsection may be submitted by the committee to the Sen rite or the House, or to boll the Seriate and the House, a s the case may be. The Joint Committee on I n te rn a l R ev en u e T a x a tio n m a y a ls o su b m it su c h in fo rm a tio n to an y c o m m itte e d e s c r ib e d in p a r a g r a p h (1) s ittin g in c lo s e d e x e c u tiv e s e s s io n . •n (e) D is c lo s u re P u r s u a n t to E x e c u tiv e O r d e r . - -U pon o r d e r o f th e P r e s id e n t, th e S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te s h a ll f u r n is h th e P r e s i d e n t, o r su c h e m p lo y ee o r e m p lo y e e s of th e W hite H o u se O ffice a s th e P r e s id e n t m a y d e s ig n a te in su c h o r d e r to r e c e iv e on h is b e h a lf, a n y r e t u r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n . "(f) D is c lo s u re to C e rta in F e d e r a l O ffic e rs and E m p lo y e e s fo r P u r p o s e s of Tax A d m in is tra tio n , e tc . --(1 ) R e tu rn s an d r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n s h a ll, w ith o u t w r itte n r e q u e s t, b e open to in s p e c tio n by o r d is c lo s u r e to o f f ic e rs an d e m p lo y e e s of th e D e p a rtm e n t of th e T r e a s u r y w hose o ffic ia l d u tie s r e q u ir e su c h in s p e c tio n o r d is c lo s u r e . M(2) A r e t u r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n w ith r e s p e c t te ta n y ta x i m p o se d by th is title upon a ta x p a y e r s h a ll, w ith o u t w r itte n r e q u e s t, b e open to in s p e c tio n by o r d is c lo s u r e to a tto r n e y s of th e D e p a rtm e n t of J u s tic e (in clu d in g U nited S ta te s A tto rn e y s ) p e rs o n a lly an d d ir e c tly en g ag ed in , and s o le ly fo r th e ir u s e in , p r e p a r a tio n fom ariy p ro c e e d in g (o r in v e s tig a tio n w hich m ay r e s u l t in a p ro c e e d in g ) b e fo re a F e d e r a l g ra n d ju r y o r any F e d e r a l o r S ta te c o u rt in a m a t t e r in v o lv in g tax a d m in is tr a tio n b u t o n ly - (A) if the ta x p a y e r is o r m ay be a p a rty to su c h p ro c e e d in g ; (B) if the ta x p a y e r c o n se n ts ; o r (C) if su c h r e t u r n o r r e tu r n in fo rm a tio n h a s o r m ay h av e a b e a rin g on the o u tco m e of su c h p ro c e e d in g b e c a u se -(i) tr e a tm e n t of an ite m w ith r e s p e c t to a p e rs o n who is o r m a y b e a p a rty to su c h p ro c e e d in g is o r m ay be d e te rm in e d , in w hole o r in p a r t , b y r e f e r e n c e to the tr e a tm e n t of an ite m on su c h r e tu r n ; (ii) su c h r e t u r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n r e l a t e s o r m ay r e l a te to an is s u e in the p ro c e e d in g ; o r (iii) th e lia b ility o f the p a r ty u n d e r th is title f o r any ta x , p e n a lty , i n te r e s t, fin e, f o r f e itu r e , o r o th e r im p o s itio n , o r o ffe n se , w hich is o r m ay b e the s u b je c t of the p ro c e e d in g is o r m ay be d e te rm in e d , in whole o r in p a r t, by r e f e r e n c e to su c h r e t u r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n . "(g) Disclosure to Federal Officers and Employees for Purpose of Federal Law Administration (Other Than Tax Laws). --(1) Upon request in writing by the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary or his delegate shall furnish any return or return information reflected on such return to officers or employees of the Social and Economic Statistics Administration (or successor administrations or estab lishments thereof) of the Department of Commerce for the purpose of research and statistical studies and compilations to be conducted - 14 - o r p r e p a r e d by su c h A d m in is tra tio n a s a u th o riz e d by law , p ro v id e d th a t no su c h o ffic e r o r em p lo y ee s h a ll p u b lis h o r o th e rw is e d is c lo s e an y r e tu r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n ex cep t in s t a t i s t i c a l fo rm w hich can n o t be a s s o c ia te d w ith, o r o th e rw is e id e n tify , d ir e c tly o r i n d ir e c tly , a p a r t i c u l a r ta x p a y e r. M(2) A r e t u r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n w ith r e s p e c t to any tax im p o se d b y th is title upon a ta x p a y e r s h a ll, upon r e q u e s t, b e open to o f f ic e rs o r e m p lo y e e s o f a d e p a rtm e n t, a g en c y , o r o th e r E x e c u tiv e e s ta b lis h m e n t of th e F e d e r a l G o v e rn m e n t p e rs o n a lly an d d ir e c tly en g ag ed in, and s o le ly fo r t h e ir u s e in, p r e p a r a tio n fo r any a d m in is tr a tiv e o r ju d ic ia l p ro c e e d in g (o r in v e s tig a tio n w hich m a y r e s u l t in su c h a p ro c e e d in g ) p e rta in in g to the e n fo rc e m e n t of a s p e c ific a lly d e sig n a te d F e d e r a l s ta tu te (not in v o lv in g tax a d m in is tra tio n ) to w hich the U nited S ta te s (o r a d e p a rtm e n t, a g en c y , o r o th e r E x e c u tiv e e s ta b lis h m e n t of the F e d e r a l G o v ern m en t) is o r m a y be a p a r ty b e fo re any F e d e r a l g ra n d ju ry , c o u rt, d e p a rtm e n t, a g e n c y , o r o th e r E x e c u tiv e e s ta b lis h m e n t but o n ly - - . n(A) if the ta x p a y e r .is o r m ay b e a p a rty to su c h p ro c e e d in g ; n (B) if th e ta x p a y e r c o n se n ts ; o r n(C) if su c h r e t u r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n h a s o r m a y h a v e à b e a rin g on th e o u tc o m e of su c h p ro c e e d in g b e c a u s e - - - 15 - "(i) th e re w a s o r m a y have b e e n a tr â n s a c tio n a l re la tio n s h ip b etw een a p e rs o n w ho is o r m ay be a p a rty to the p ro c e e d in g and the ta x p a y e r, "(ii) su c h p e rs o n is o r m a y be a s u c c e s s o r in i n t e r e s t of th e ta x p a y e r, o r "(iii) s u c h r e t u r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n w ill o r m a y c o r r o b o r a te o r c o n tra d ic t o th e r in fo rm a tio n o b ta in e d in su c h p ro c e e d in g o r in v e s tig a tio n . The in sp e c tio n o r d is c lo s u r e s h a ll be p e rm itte d only upon w r itte n request, s e ttin g fo rth the r e a s o n s fo r su c h r e q u e s t, th e a u th o rity u n d e r which the p ro c e e d in g o r in v e s tig a tio n is b e in g c o n d u cted , an d the p a rtic u la r s u b p a ra g ra p h of th is p a ra g ra p h upon w hich the r e q u e s t is based and sig n e d by the h e a d of su c h d e p a rtm e n t, a g e n c y , o r e s t a b lishm ent o r , in th e c a s e of the D e p a rtm e n t of J u s tic e , sig n e d by the A ttorney G e n e ra l, D eputy A tto rn e y G e n e ra l, o r an A s s is ta n t A tto rn e y G eneral, o r by the D ir e c to r of th e F e d e r a l B u re a u of In v e s tig a tio n . However, su c h r e t u r n cr. r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n s h a ll n o t be d is c lo s e d to the e x te n t th a t the S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te d e te r m in e s th a t su c h d isc lo su re w ould s e r io u s ly im p a ir the a d m in is tr a tio n o f F e d e r a l tax laws. In the e v e n t th a t the S e c re ta r y o r h is d e le g a te m a k e s su c h a d e te rm in a tio n , the S e c r e ta r y s h a ll c o n su lt w ith the h e ad of th e r e questing d e p a rtm e n t, a g en c y , o r e s ta b lis h m e n t, o r , in th e c a s e o f a - 16 - r e q u e s t by th e D e p a rtm e n t of J u s tic e , w ith th e A tto rn e y G e n e ra l. If, a f t e r su c h c o n s u lta tio n , the is s u e h a s not b e e n r e s o lv e d , a fin a l d e te rm in a tio n s h a ll be m a d e by th e P r e s id e n t o r h is d e le g a te . / "(3) An o ffic e r o r em p lo y ee of the D e p a rtm e n t of th e T r e a s u r y p a rtic ip a tin g w ith o f f ic e r s o r e m p lo y e e s of a n o th e r d e p a rtm e n t, agency, o r o th e r E x e c u tiv e e s ta b lis h m e n t of the F e d e r a l G o v e rn m e n t in a jo in t \ in v e s tig a tio n p e rta in in g to the e n fo rc e m e n t of F e d e r a l c r im in a l la w s m a y , to the e x te n t r e q u ir e d b y su c h in v e s tig a tio n , d is c lo s e to su c h o th e r o f f ic e rs o r e m p lo y e e s r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n w ith r e s p e c t to a tax . im p o se d by th is title upon a ta x p a y e r o th e r th an r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n fu rn is h e d to the S e c r e t a r y o r h is d e le g a te by su c h ta x p a y e r. M(h) D is c lo s u re of C e rta in R e tu rn s and R e tu rn In fo rm a tio n f o r T ax A d m in is tra tio n P u r p o s e s . - "(1) D is c lo s u re by in te r n a l re v e n u e o ffic ia ls and e m p lo y e e s fo r in v e s tig a tiv e p u r p o s e s . --A n in te r n a l re v e n u e o ffic ia l o r em p lo y ee m a y , in co n n ec tio n w ith h is o ffic ia l d u tie s w ith r e s p e c t to a tax im posed b y th is title , d is c lo s e r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n to the e x te n t th a t su c h d i s c lo s u r e is n e c e s s a r y in a r r iv in g a t a c o r r e c t d e te rm in a tio n of ta x , lia b ility fo r ta x , o r th e am o u n t to be c o lle c te d , o r o th e rw is e in the e n fo rc e m e n t of any p ro v is io n of th is title . "(2) D is c lo s u re of a c c e p te d o f f e r s - in - c o m p r o m is e . - - R e tu rn in fo rm a tio n s h a ll be d is c lo s e d to m e m b e r s of the g e n e r a l p u b lic to the e x te n t n e c e s s a r y to p e r m it in s p e c tio n of any a c c e p te d o f f e r - i n - c o m p r o m is e u n d e r s e c tio n 7122, r e la tiv e to th e lia b ility fo r a ta x im p o sed by th is title . - 17 - "(3) D is c lo s u re of am o u n t of o u tsta n d in g lie n . - - I f a n o tic e o f lie n h as been file d p u rs u a n t to s e c tio n 6323 (f) o r c o rre s p o n d in g p ro v is io n of p r i o r in te r n a l re v e n u e la w s, th e a m o u n t of th e o u tsta n d in g o b lig a tio n s e c u re d b y su c h lie n is a u th o riz e d to be d is c lo s e d a s a m a t t e r of p u b lic r e c o r d an d m a y b e d is c lo s e d to any p e rs o n who f u rn is h e s s a t is f a c to r y w ritte n e v id e n c e th a t he h a s a rig h t in th e p r o p e r ty s u b je c t to su c h lie n o r in te n d s to o b tain a r ig h t in su c h p r o p e r ty . "(4) D is c lo s u re in ju d ic ia l and a d m in is tr a tiv e tax p ro c e e d in g s . - A r e tu r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n w ith r e s p e c t to any ta x im p o s e d by th is title upon a ta x p a y e r m a y be d is c lo s e d in a F e d e r a l o r S ta te ju d ic ia l o r a d m in is tra tiv e p ro c e e d in g p e rta in in g to ta x a d m in is tr a tio n b e fo re % any F e d e r a l o r S tate g ra n d ju r y , c o u rt, d e p a rtm e n t, o r E x e c u tiv e e sta b lis h m e n t, b u t o n ly - "(A) if th e ta x p a y e r is a p a rty to su ch p ro c e e d in g ; "(B) if th e ta x p a y e r c o n se n ts ; "(C) if su c h r e t u r n o r r e tu r n in fo rm a tio n h a s o r m ay h a v e a b e a rin g on the o u tc o m e o f su ch p ro c e e d in g b e c a u se -"(i) tr e a tm e n t of an ite m w ith r e s p e c t to a p a r ty to the p ro c e e d in g is o r m a y be d e te rm in e d , in w hole o r in p a r t , by r e f e r e n c e to the tr e a tm e n t of a n ite m on su c h r e tu r n , "(ii) su c h r e tu r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n r e l a t e s o r m ay r e l a te to a tr a n s a c tio n a t is s u e in th e p ro c e e d in g , o r . - 18 - n(iii) the lia b ility of the p a rty u n d e r th is title fo r any ta x , p e n a lty , i n te r e s t, fin e , f o r f e itu r e , o r o th e r im p o s itio n , o r o ffe n se w hich is the s u b je c t of the p ro c e e d in g is o r m a y be d e te rm in e d by r e f e r e n c e to su c h r e t u r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n ; "(D) to th e e x te n t n e c e s s a r y to im p e a c h a w itn e s s in th e p ro c e e d in g r e s p e c tin g te s tim o n y a s to a tr a n s a c tio n w ith the ta x p a y e r if the ta x p a y e r is n e ith e r a p a r ty to , n o r a w itn e s s in, su c h p ro c e e d in g ; "(E) to th e e x te n t n e c e s s a r y to im p e a c h th e te s tim o n y of the ta x p a y e r if the ta x p a y e r is a w itn e s s in th e p ro c e e d in g ; ,1(F) to the e x te n t re q u ir e d by o r d e r of a c o u rt p u rs u a n t to 18 U. S. C. 3500 o r R ule 16 of th e F e d e r a l R u le s of C rim in a l P r o c e d u r e , su c h c o u rt b ein g a u th o riz e d in the is s u a n c e of su c h o r d e r to give due c o n s id e ra tio n to C o n g re s s io n a l p o lic y fa v o rin g th e c o n fid e n tia lity of r e t u r n s and r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n a s s e t f o rth in th is title ; .o r "(G) to th e e x te n t re q u ir e d by th e C o n stitu tio n o f th e U n ited S ta te s . H o w ev er, su c h r e t u r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n s h a ll n o t be d is c lo s e d to th e e x te n t th a t the S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te d e te r m in e s th a t su ch d is c lo s u r e w ould s e r io u s ly im p a ir th e a d m in is tr a tio n of F e d e r a l ta x la w s. In the e v e n t th a t the S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te m a k e s su c h a / - 19 - d e te rm in a tio n w ith r e s p e c t to d is c lo s u r e in a ju d ic ia l p ro c e e d in g to w hich the U nited S ta te s is a p a rty , th e S e c r e ta r y s h a ll c o n s u lt w ith the A tto rn e y G e n e ra l. If, a f te r su c h c o n su lta tio n , th e p s s u e h a s n o t been r e s o lv e d , a final d e te rm in a tio n s h a ll be m a d e by th e P r e s id e n t o r h is d e le g a te . "(5) D is c lo s u re of r e tu r n in fo rm a tio n to c o r r e c t m is s ta te m e n ts of fac t. - -T h e S e c re ta ry o r h is d e le g a te m a y , in h is d is c r e tio n , d i s c lo se su c h r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n o r any o th e r in fo rm a tio n w ith r e s p e c t to any sp e c ific ta x p a y e r a s he c o n s id e rs a d v is a b le fo r p u rp o s e s of tax a d m in is tra tio n , an d to th e e x te n t n e c e s s a r y , to c o r r e c t a m i s s t a t e m en t of fa c t p u b lish ed o r d is c lo s e d w ith r e s p e c t to su c h ta x p a y e r ’s r e tu r n o r h is d e alin g w ith the In te rn a l R evenue S e rv ic e . ” (6) D is c lo s u re to co m p e te n t a u th o rity u n d e r in c o m e tax c o n vention, --A r e tu r n o r r e tu r n in fo rm a tio n m a y be d is c lo s e d to a c o m p eten t a u th o rity of a fo re ig n g o v e rn m e n t w hich h a s an in c o m e tax convention w ith the U nited S ta te s but only to the e x te n t p ro v id e d in , and su b je c t to the te r m s and co n d itio n s of, su c h co n v en tio n . "(7) F e d e ra l and State a g e n c ie s re g u la tin g tax r e t u r n p r e p a r e r s . - T a x p a y er id e n tity in fo rm a tio n of any tax r e t u r n p r e p a r e r (as d efin e d in se c tio n 6690 (e)) m ay be d is c lo s e d to any F e d e r a l o r S tate a g en c y , body, o r c o m m issio n c h a rg e d u n d e r the law s of the U nited S ta te s o r any State o r p o litic a l su b d iv isio n of a S tate w ith lic e n s in g , r e g i s tra tio n , o r re g u la tio n of tax r e t u r n p r e p a r e r s . - 20 - "(i) D is c lo s u re of R e tu rn s and R e tu rn In fo rm a tio n fo r P u rp o s e s O th e r T h an T ax A d m in is tra tio n . - M(l) D is c lo s u re in nontax ju d ic ia l and a d m in is tr a tiv e p r o c e e d in g s , --A r e t u r n o r r e tu r n in fo rm a tio n w ith r e s p e c t to an y tax im p o se d b y th is title upon a ta x p a y e r m a y be d is c lo s e d in a ju d ic ia l o r a d m in is tra tiv e p ro c e e d in g p e rta in in g to a s p e c ific a lly d e sig n a te d F e d e r a l s ta tu te (not in v o lv in g tax a d m in is tra tio n ) to w hich th e U nited S ta te s (or a d e p a rtm e n t, a g en c y , o r o th e r E x e c u tiv e e s ta b lis h m e n t of the F e d e ra l G ov ern m en t) is a p a rty b e fo re any F e d e r a l g ra n d ju ry , c o u rt, d e p a rtm e n t, a g en c y , o r E x e c u tiv e e s ta b lis h m e n t but o n ly - "(A) if the ta x p a y e r is a p a rty to su ch p ro c e e d in g ; \ n{B) if the ta x p a y e r c o n s e n ts ; n(C) if su c h r e t u r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n lias o r m a y hav e a b e a rin g on th e o u tc o m e o f su c h p ro c e e d in g b e c a u s e - n (i) th e r e w as a tr a n s a c tio n a l re la tio n s h ip b e tw ee n a p a r ty to the p ro c e e d in g an d the ta x p a y e r, or "(ii) su ch p a rty is a s u c c e s s o r in i n t e r e s t of the ta x p a y e r; "(D) to th e e x te n t n e c e s s a r y to im p e a c h a w itn e s s in th e p ro c e e d in g r e s p e c tin g te s tim o n y a s to a tr a n s a c tio n w ith th e ta x p a y e r if th e ta x p a y e r is n e ith e r a p a rty to , n o r a w i t n e s s in, su c h p ro c e e d in g ; * "(E) to th e e x te n t n e c e s s a r y to im p e a c h th e te s tim o n y of the ta x p a y e r if the ta x p a y e r is a w itn e s s in the p ro c e e d in g ; n (F) to th e e x te n t re q u ire d by o r d e r o f a c o u rt p u r s u a n t to 18 U. S. C, 3500 o r R ule 16 of the F e d e r a l R u le s of C rim in a l P r o c e d u r e , su c h c o u rt b e in g a u th o riz e d in the is s u a n c e of su ch o r d e r to give due c o n s id e ra tio n to C o n g re s s io n a l p o lic y fa v o rin g th e c o n fid e n tia lity o f r e t u r n s and r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n a s s e t fo rth in th is title ; o r n (G) to th e e x te n t re q u ire d by the C o n stitu tio n o f th e U n ited S ta te s . H ow ever, s u c h r e t u r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n s h a ll no t be d is c lo s e d to the e x te n t th a t the S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te d e te r m in e s th a t su ch d is c lo s u re w ould s e r io u s ly im p a ir the a d m in is tr a tio n of F e d e r a l tax law s. In the e v e n t th a t the S e c re ta r y o r h is d e le g a te m a k e s such a d e te rm in a tio n , the S e c r e ta r y s h a ll c o n su lt w ith the A tto rn e y G e n e ra l if the U nited S ta te s is a p a rty to the p ro c e e d in g o r th e D e p a rtm e n t of J u s tic e r e p r e s e n ts arA epartm im t, ag en cy , o r o th e r E x ec u tiv e e s ta b lis h m e n t of the F e d e r a l G o v e rn m e n t w hich is a p a r ty to the p r o ceeding, o r w ith th e h ead of su c h d e p a rtm e n t, a g en c y , o r e s t a b l is h m en t if th e D e p a rtm e n t of J u s tic e does n o t s o r e p r e s e n t the d e p a rtm e n t, agency, o r e s ta b lis h m e n t. If, a f te r su c h c o n su lta tio n , the is s u e h a s not been re s o lv e d , a fin a l d e te rm in a tio n s h a ll be m a d e by th e P r e s id e n t o r h is d e le g a te . - 22 - **(2) D is c lo s u re of c e r ta in r e t u r n s and r e tu r n in fo rm a tio n to S o c ial S e c u rity A d m in is tra tio n and R a ilro a d R e tire m e n t B o a rd . - -T h e S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te is a u th o riz e d to d is c lo s e r e t u r n s and r e tu r n in f o r m a tio n - n (A) w ith r e s p e c t to ta x e s im p o sed by c h a p te r s 2, 21, an d 24, to th e S o cial S e c u rity A d m in is tra tio n fo r p u rp o s e s of its a d m in is tra tio n of th e S o cial S e c u rity A ct; n (B) w ith r e s p e c t to a p lan to w hich p a r t I of s u b c h a p te r D of c h a p te r 1 a p p lie s , to the S o cial S e c u rity A d m in is tra tio n fo r p u rp o s e s of c a r r y in g out v . i ts re s p o n s ib ility u n d e r se c tio n 1131 of the S o cial % ' S e c u rity A ct; and S " (c ) w ith r e s p e c t to ta x e s im p o se d by c h a p te r 22, to the R a ilro a d R e tir e m e n t B o a rd fo r p u rp o s e s o f its a d m in is tra tio n of the R a ilro a d R e tir e m e n t A ct. "(3) D is c lo s u re of r e t u r n s and r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n to th e D e p a r t m e n t o f L a b o r and P e n sio n B e n e fit G u a ra n ty C o rp o ra tio n . - -T h e S e c re ta r y o r h is d e le g a te is a u th o riz e d to fu rn is h r e t u r n s and r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n to the p r o p e r o f fic e rs and e m p lo y e e s of th e D e p a rtm e n t o f L a b o r and th e P e n s io n B en efit G u a ra n ty C o rp o ra tio n f o r p u rp o s e s Of the a d m in is tra tio n of T itle s I and IV of th e E m p lo y ee R e tir e m e n t In co m e S e c u rity A ct. - 23 - "(4) D is c lo s u re of r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n a s to P r e s id e n tia l a p p o in tees and c e r ta in o th e r F e d e r a l G o v e rn m e n t a p p o in te e s . - -T h e S e c re ta r y o r h is d e le g a te is a u th o riz e d to d is c lo s e to a duly a u th o riz e d r e p r e s e n ta tiv e of the E x e c u tiv e O ffice o f the P r e s i d e n t o r to th e head of an y d e p a rtm e n t, ag en cy , o r o th e r E x e c u tiv e e s ta b lis h m e n t o f the F e d e r a l G o v e rn m e n t, upon w ritte n r e q u e s t o f su c h r e p r e s e n ta tiv e o r head, o r to the F e d e r a l B u re a u of In v e s tig a tio n on b e h a lf of su c h r e p r e s e n ta tiv e o r h e a d , r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n w ith r e s p e c t to an in d iv i dual who i s d e sig n a te d a s b e in g u n d e r c o n s id e ra tio n f o r a p p o in tm e n t to a p o sitio n in the E x e c u tiv e o r J u d ic ia l B ra n c h o f th e F e d e r a l G o v ern m en t. Such r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n s h a ll be lim ite d to w h e th e r t such an in d iv id u a l— n (A) h a s file d r e t u r n s w ith r e s p e c t to the ta x e s im p o se d u n d e r c h a p te r 1 fo r not m o re th an th e i m m e d ia te ly p re c e d in g 3 y e a r s ; "(B) h a s fa ile d to pay any ta x w ith in 10 d a y s, a f te r n o tic e an d d em an d , o r h a s b e e n a s s e s s e d a n y p e n a lty u n d e r th is title fo r n e g lig e n c e , in th e c u r r e n t y e a r o r im m e d ia te ly p re c e d in g 3 y e a r s ; n (C) h a s b een o r is u n d e r in v e s tig a tio n o f p o s s ib le c rim in a l o ffe n s e s u n d e r the in te r n a l re v e n u e la w s an d the r e s u l t of an y su c h in v e s tig a tio n ; and "(D) h a s b een a s s e s s e d any p e n a lty u n d e r th is title fo r fra u d . - 24 - T he o ffic ia l to w hom su c h r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n is d is c lo s e d is a u th o r iz e d to d is c lo s e su c h in fo rm a tio n to h is s u p e r io r o f f ic e r s . D is c lo s u re of T a x p a y e r Id e n tity In f o r m a tio n .'-- T h e S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te is a u th o riz e d , upon w ritte n re q u e st* to d is c lo s e t a x p a y e r id e n tity in fo rm a tio n t o - "(1) any F e d e r a l ag en c y fo r p u rp o s e s of a s s is tin g su c h a g en cy in lo c a tin g a p e rs o n w ith r e s p e c t to whom a r e t u r n h a s b e e n file d ; "(2) any S ta te a g en c y , body, o r c o m m is s io n d e s c r ib e d in s e c tio n 6103 (b) fo r p u rp o s e s o f a s s i s t i n g s u c h agency, body, o r c o m m is s io n in lo c a tin g a p e rs o n w ith r e s p e c t to w hom a r e t u r n h a s b e e n file d o r c o m m u n ic a tin g w ith su c h p e rs o n to a d v is e him th a t he m a y b e e n title d to a re fu n d , o r to a s s i s t su c h a g en c y , body, o r c o m m is s io n in its a d m in is tr a tio n o f th e tax law s of su c h S tate; "(3) th e D e p a rtm e n t of H e a lth , E d u ca tio n , and W e l f a r e , o r a p p ro p r ia te S ta te an d lo c a l w e lfa re a g e n c ie s r e p o r tin g to su c h D e p a rtm e n t, fo r p u rp o s e s of a s s is tin g F e d e r a l, S ta te , and lo c a l w e lfa re a g e n c ie s in lo c a tin g a n in d iv id u a l d e s c rib e d in 42 U. S. C. 610 w ith r e s p e c t to w hom a r e t u r n h a s b e en file d ; and - 25 - "(4) the press and other media for purposes of notifying persons entitled to tax refunds when the Secretary or his delegate, after reasonable effort and lapse of time, has been unable to locate such persons. "(k) Disclosure of Returns and Return Information to Designee of Taxpayer. --The Secretary or his delegate may, subject to such re quirements and conditions as may be prescribed by regulations, disclose the return of any taxpayer, or return information with respect to such return, to such person or persons as such taxpayer . may designate in a written request for such disclosure, or to any other person at the taxpayer’s request to the extent necessary to comply with a request for information or assistance made by the taxpayer to such other person. However, return information shall not be disclosed to such person or persons to the extent that the Secretary or his delegate determines that such disclosure would seriously impair the adminis tration of Federal tax laws. "(1) Certain Other Persons. --The Secretary or his delegate is authorized to disclose returns and return information to any per son, including any person described in section 7 513 (a), to the extent necessary in connection with contractual procurement of services or property for purposes of tax administration. n(m) Disclosure of Return Information Concerning Prospective Jurors and Possible Criminal Activities. -- - 26 - "(1) Prospective Jurors. -"(A) Return information with respect to any tax imposed by this title upon a taxpayer shall be disclosed to an attorney of the Department of Justice (including a United States attorney) in connection with a judicial proceeding described in paragraph (h)(4) or (i)(l) of this section to the extent necessary to answer an inquiry by such attorney as to whether a prospective juror has, or has not, been investigated by the Secretary or his delegate. "(B) Return information with respect to any tax imposed by this title upon a taxpayer shall, upon request, i be disclosed to an attorney of the Department of Justice (including a United States attorney) in connection with a judicial proceeding described in paragraph (h)(4) or (i)(l) of this section for use by him solely for purposes of i m peaching a prospective juror upon examination of such prospective juror, and such return information may, in the discretion of such attorney, be delivered to the court for such use or action by the court as the court m a y deem appropriate. "(2) Possible Criminal Activities. -"(A) Return information with respect to any tax imposed by this title upon a taxpayer shall, if such return information comes to the attention of the Secretary or his delegate, be d is c lo s e d by the S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te to th e A tto rn e y G e n e ra l o r h is d e le g a te to th e e x te n t n e c e s s a r y to a p p r is e the A tto rn e y G e n e ra l o r h is d e le g a te of a c tiv itie s -w hich m a y c o n s titu te , o r m a y h av e c o n s titu te d , a v io la tio n of F e d e r a l c rim in a l la w s. n (I3) R e tu rn in fo rm a tio n w ith r e s p e c t to any ta x im p o se d by th is title upon a ta x p a y e r m a y , if su c h r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n c o m e s to th e a tte n tio n of the S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te , be d is c lo s e d , in the d i s c re tio n of the S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te , to an o ffic e r of any d e p a rtm e n t, a g en c y , body, o r c o m m is s io n o f a S tate (o r p o litic a l su b d iv isio n of a S tate) c h a rg e d w ith the e n fo rc e m e n t of c rim in a l law s of su c h S ta te to the e x te n t n e c e s s a r y to a p p r is e su c h o ffic e r of a c tiv itie s w h ich m ay c o n s titu te , o r m ay hav e c o n s titu te d , a v io la tio n of su c h c rim in a l la w s. ’ M(n) D is c lo s u re of R e tu rn s and R e tu rn In fo rm a tio n W ith R e s p e c t to T ax e s Im p o se d by S u b title E ..- - R e tu r n s and r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n w ith re s p e c t to ta x e s im p o se d by s u b title E of th is title ( r e la tin g to ta x e s on alcohol, to b ac co , and f i r e a r m s ) s h a ll be open to in s p e c tio n by o r d i s c lo su re to o f f ic e rs and e m p lo y e e s of a d e p a rtm e n t, a g e n c y , o r o th e r E xecutive e s ta b lis h m e n t of the F e d e r a l G o v e rn m e n t w hose o ffic ia l d u tie s re q u ire su c h in s p e c tio n o r d is c lo s u r e . - 28 - "(o) R e m e d y fo r U n a u th o riz e d D is c lo s u r e . - -T h e e x c lu s iv e re m e d y fo r a n a lle g e d v io la tio n of th is s e c tio n s h a ll be a p ro c e e d in g u n d e r s e c tio n 7213, and no c o u rt s h a ll h a v e ju r is d ic tio n to re v ie w a d e te rm in a tio n th a t a r e t u r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n is o r is n o t open to in s p e c tio n o r d is c lo s u r e o r to d e te rm in e th e la w fu ln e ss o f an y such in s p e c tio n o r d is c lo s u r e e x c e p t in su c h a p ro c e e d in g , n (p) P i 'o c e d u r e s .- "(1) M a n n e r, tim e , and p la c e of in s p e c tio n s . - -R e q u e s t f o r in s p e c tio n and the d is c lo s u r e of a r e t u r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n s h a ll be m a d e in su c h m a n n e r and a t su c h tim e and p la c e a s s h a ll be p r e s c r i b e d b y the S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te . n (2) C o p ie s of r e t u r n s . --A copy o r c e rtifie d copy of a r e t u r n s h a ll, upon w ritte n r e q u e s t, be fu rn is h e d to any p e rs o n to w hom d is c lo s u r e o f su c h r e t u r n is a u th o riz e d o r who is a u th o riz e d to in s p e c t th e r e t u r n . Such copy s h a ll h a v e th e s a m e le g a l s ta tu s a s th e o rig in a l; and any su c h copy s h a ll, if p r o p e r ly a u th e n tic a te d , b e a d m is s ib le in e v id e n c e in an y ju d ic ia l o r a d m in is tr a tiv e p ro c e e d in g a s if it w e re the o r ig in a l, w h e th e r o r not the o rig in a l is in e x is te n c e . A r e a s o n a b le fee m ay be p r e s c r i b e d fo r fu rn is h in g su c h copy. "(3) Disclosure of return information. --Return information disclosed to any person under the provisions of this subchapter may be provided in the form of written documents, reproductions of such * documents, films or photoimpressions, or electronically-produced tapes, disks or records, or by any other mode or means which, in the o pinion o f th e S e c re ta r y o r h is d e le g a te , a r e n e c e s s a r y o r a p p r o p r ia te . A re a s o n a b le fee m a y be p r e s c r i b e d fo r d is c lo s in g su c h r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n . "(4) R e c o rd s of in s p e c tio n and d is c lo s u r e . - -T h e S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te s h a ll m a in ta in a r e c o r d of a ll r e q u e s ts f o r i n s p e c tion and d is c lo s u r e of r e t u r n s and r e q u e s ts f o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n and of r e t u r n s in s p e c te d and r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n d is c lo s e d u n d e r th is se ctio n (o th e r th an r e t u r n s and r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n in s p e c te d o r d i s closed u n d e r th e a u th o rity of s u b s e c tio n (f), (h), (i) (1) o r (j)), and such r e c o r d s s h a ll b e a v a ila b le fo r e x a m in a tio n b y the J o in t C o m m it tee on In te rn a l R evenue T a x a tio n o r th e C h ief of S taff of su c h J o in t C o m m ittee. T h e S e c re ta r y o r h is d e le g a te s h a ll, a t th e r e q u e s t of such C h ief of Staff, fu rn is h to h im a s u m m a ry of su c h r e c o r d s a t such tim e o r tim e s an d in su c h fo rm an d c o n ta in in g su c h in fo rm a tio n as the C hief of S taff m ay d e sig n a te in su c h r e q u e s t. n (5) S a f e g u a r d s .- - A n y d e p a rtm e n t, a g en c y , o r o th e r E xecu tiv e .e s ta b lis h m e n t of the F e d e r a l G o v e rn m e n t d e s c rib e d in s u b se ctio n (f) (2) o r (g) o r any S tate a g e n c y , body, o r c o m m is s io n d e sc rib e d in s u b s e c tio n (b) s h a ll, a s a co n d itio n fo r r e c e iv in g r e t u r n s o r r e tu r n in f o r m a tio n - "(A) e s ta b lis h and m a in ta in a s e c u r e a r e a o r p la c e in w hich su c h r e t u r n s o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n s h a ll b e s to re d : - 30 - RBb] r e s t r i c t a c c e s s to the r e t u r n s o r r e t u r n i n fo rm a tio n on ly to th o se p e rs o n s w hose d u tie s o r r e s p o n s ib ilitie s r e q u i r e a c c e s s and to w hom d is c lo s u r e m a y b e m a d e u n d e r the p ro v is io n s of th is title , n(C) p ro v id e su c h o th e r s a fe g u a rd s a s a r e n e c e s s a r y o r a p p ro p r ia te to p r o te c t th e c o n fid e n ti a lity of th e r e t u r n s o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n ; and n(D) w hen th e r e t u r n s o r th e r e t u r n in f o r m a tio n p ro v id e d by th e S e c r e t a r y o r h is d e le g a te in th e fo rm o f w r itte n d o c u m e n ts, re p ro d u c tio n s of su c h d o c u m e n ts, film s o r p h o to im p re s s io n s , o r e l e c tro n ic a lly - p r o d u c e d ta p e s , d is k s o r r e c o r d s h a s s e r v e d i t s p u rp o s e - in th e c a s e of a S tate a g en c y , body, o r c o m m is s io n d e s c r ib e d in s u b s e c tio n (b), r e t u r n to th e S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te su c h r e t u r n s o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n (alo n g w ith a n y c o p ie s m ad e th e re fro m ) o r fu rn is h a w ritte n r e p o r t to the S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te th a t th e r e t u r n s o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n h a s b e en d e s tro y e d o r o th e rw is e m a d e u n d is c lo s a b le in an y m a n n e r w h a te v e r; and - 31 " (ii) in the c a s e of a d e p a rtm e n t, a g e n c y , o r e s ta b lis h m e n t d e s c rib e d in s u b s e c tio n (f) (2) o r (g), e ith e r - "(a) r e t u r n to th e S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te su c h r e t u r n s o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n (alo n g w ith any c o p ie s m ad e th e r e f ro m ) , . "(b) o th e rw is e m a k e su c h r e t u r n s o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n u n d is c lo s a b le in a n y m a n n e r w h a te v e r, o r "(jc) to the e x te n t n o t s o r e tu r n e d o r m a d e u n d is c lo s a b le , e n s u re th a t the c o n d itio n s o f s u b p a ra g ra p h s (A), (R), and (C) o f th is p a ra g r a p h co n tin u e to be m e t w ith r e s p e c t to su c h r e t u r n s o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n , e x c e p t th a t the c o n d itio n s of s u b p a ra g ra p h s (A), (B), (C), and (D) s h a ll c e a s e to ap p ly w ith r e s p e c t to any .r e tu r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n if, and to the e x te n t th a t, su c h r e t u r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n is d is c lo s e d in th e c o u rs e , o r m a d e a p a r t of the r e c o r d , of any ju d ic ia l o r a d m in is tr a tiv e p ro c e e d in g d e s c r ib e d in p a ra g r a p h (h)(4) o r (i)(l) of th is s e c tio n . "(6) R e g u la tio n s . - -T h e S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te is a u th o riz e d to p r e s c r i b e su c h re g u la tio n s a s a r e n e c e s s a r y to c a r r y o u t the p ro v is io n s o f th is s e c tio n . " .T - 32 - SE C . 3. ST A T IST IC A L PU 13LIC AT ION S AND STUDIES S ec tio n 6108 (re la tin g to p u b lic a tio n of s t a t i s t i c s of in c o m e ) is a m en d ed to r e a d a s follow s: SE C . G108. "(a) ST A T IST IC A L PU BLICA TIO N S AND STUD IES P u b lic a tio n o r O th e r D is c lo s u re of S ta tis tic s o f In c o m e . - - T he S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te s h a ll p r e p a r e and p u b lish a n n u a lly , and m ay in h is d is c r e tio n p u b lish o r o th e rw is e d is c lo s e a t any tim e , s t a t is ti c s re a s o n a b ly a v a ila b le w ith r e s p e c t to th e o p e ra tio n s of th e in te r n a l re v e n u e la w s , in clu d in g c la s s if ic a tio n s of ta x p a y e rs and of in c o m e , the a m o u n ts c la im e d o r allo w ed a s d e d u c tio n s , e x e m p tio n s, and c r e d its , and any o th e r f a c ts d e em ed p e rtin e n t and v a lu a b le . "(b) S p e c ia l S ta tis tic a l S tu d ie s. - -T h e S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te is a u th o riz e d , upon w r itte n r e q u e s t by an y p e rs o n o r p e r s o n s , to m a k e s p e c ia l s t a t i s t i c a l s tu d ie s and c o m p ila tio n s of r e t u r n in f o r m a tio n (as defin ed in s e c tio n 6103 (a) (2) (B)), and to fu rn is h to s u c h p e rs o n o r p e rs o n s any d a ta o b tain ed fro m su c h s p e c ia l s t a t i s t i c a l s tu d ie s and c o m p ila tio n s in s t a t i s t i c a l fo rm . T he c o s t of p e rfo rm in g su c h s p e c ia l s t a t i s t i c a l s tu d ie s and c o m p ila tio n s s h a ll be p a id b y su c h p e rs o n o r p e rs o n s . "(c) O th e r P u b lic a tio n s . - -T h e S e c re ta r y o r h is d e le g a te m a y p r e p a r e and p u b lish su c h o ffic ia l r u lin g s , p r o c e d u r e s , and s i m i l a r in fo rm a tio n of th e In te rn a l R evenue S e rv ic e a s h e , in h is d is c re tio n , c o n s id e r s n e c e s s a r y to p ro m o te u n ifo rm a p p lic a tio n of th e ta x la w s. - 33 - “ (d) T a x p a y e r Id e n tity . - -N o p u b lic a tio n o r o th e r d is c lo s u r e of s ta tis tic s o r o th e r in fo rm a tio n r e q u ir e d o r a u th o riz e d by s u b s e c tio n (a), special* s t a ti s t i c a l s tu d y a u th o riz e d by s u b s e c tio n (b), o r i n f o r m atio n a u th o riz e d by s u b s e c tio n (c) s h a ll in any m a n n e r p e r m i t th e s ta tis tic s , stu d y , o r any in fo rm a tio n so p u b lis h e d , fu rn is h e d , o r o th e rw ise d is c lo s e d to b e a s s o c ia te d w ith , o r o th e rw is e id e n tify , d ire c tly o r in d ir e c tly , a p a r t i c u l a r ta x p a y e r. SEC. 4. IN SPECTIO N O F C ER TA IN RECORDS BY LO CA L O F F IC E R S . S ectio n 4102 (re la tin g to in s p e c tio n of r e c o r d s , r e t u r n s , e t c . , b y lo cal o ffic e rs ) is a m e n d ed to r e a d a s fo llo w s: "S E C . 4102. IN SPE C TIO N O F RECO RD S BY L O C A L O F F IC E R S . U n d er r e g u la tio n s p r e s c r i b e d b y th e S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te , r e c o r d s r e q u ir e d to be k e p t w ith r e s p e c t to ta x e s u n d e r th is p a r t sh a ll b e open to in s p e c tio n by su c h o f f ic e rs of a S ta te , th e C o m m o n w ealth of P u e rto R ico , the D is tr ic t o f C o lu m b ia, a p o s s e s s io n of the U nited S ta te s , o r a p o litic a l su b d iv isio n of an y o f th e fo re g o in g , a s s h a ll be c h a rg e d w ith th e e n fo rc e m e n t o r c o lle c tio n of a n y ta x on g a s o lin e o r lu b ric a tin g o ils . M SEC. 5. P E N A L T Y FO R UN AUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE O F IN FO RM A TIO N . S ectio n 7213 (re la tin g to u n a u th o riz e d d is c lo s u r e of in fo rm a tio n ) is am en d ed by s tr ik in g o u t s u b s e c tio n (c), re d e s ig n a tin g s u b s e c tio n s (d) and (c) a s (c) and (d) r e s p e c tiv e ly , and by a m e n d in g s u b s e c tio n (a) to r e a d a s fo llo w s: - 34 A. "(a) R e tu rn s an d R e tu rn In fo rm a tio n . - n(l) F e d e r a l e m p lo y e e s and o th e r p e r s o n s . - -It s h a ll b e u n law fu l fo r an y o f fic e r o r e m p lo y e e of the U nited S ta te s or an y p e rs o n d e s c r ib e d in s e c tio n 6103 (1) (o r an o ffic e r or e m p lo y e e of a n y su c h p e rs o n ), o r any p e rs o n who w as f o r m e r ly any of th e fo re g o in g , to d is c lo s e o r m a k e known in a n y m a n n e r w h a te v e r to any p e rs o n , e x c e p t a s a u th o riz e d in th is t it l e , an y r e t u r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n (as d e fin ed in s e c tio n 6103(a)(2)); and it s h a ll be u n law fu l fo r any p e rs o n to p r in t o r p u b lis h in any m a n n e r w h a te v e r n o t p ro v id e d b y law an y r e t u r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n a s so defined; and \ a n y p e r s o n c o m m ittin g a n o ffe n se a g a in s t th e fo re g o in g p ro v is io n s h a ll be g u ilty of a m is d e m e a n o r and, upon c o n v ic tio n th e re o f, s h a ll be fin ed n o t m o re th an $ 1 ,0 0 0 , o r i m p ris o n e d n o t m o re th an 1 y e a r , o r both, to g e th e r w ith th e c o s ts of p ro s e c u tio n , and if the o ffe n d e r b e a n o ffic e r o r e m p lo y e e o f the U nited S ta te s , he s h a ll be d is m is s e d fro m o ffice o r d is c h a rg e d fro m e m p lo y m e n t. "(2) S ta te e m p lo y e e s .- - A n y o f f ic e r, e m p lo y e e , o r a g e n t, o r f o r m e r o f f ic e r, e m p lo y e e , o r a g e n t, o f any S ta te (a s d efin ed in s e c tio n 6103 (a) (2)) who d is c lo s e s o r m a k e s know n in a n y m a n n e r w h a te v e r to any p e rs o n , e x c e p t a s a u th o riz e d in th is title , any r e t u r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n (a s d e fin e d in s e c tio n 6103 (a) (2)) a c q u ire d by him o r - 35 - a n o th e r p e rs o n u n d e r s e c tio n 6103 (b) s h a ll be g u ilty of a m is d e m e a n o r , and upon c o n v ic tio n th e re o f, s h a ll be fin ed n o t m o re th an $1, 000, o r im p ris o n e d not m o re th'an 1 y e a r , o r b o th , to g e th e r w ith the c o s ts of p ro s e c u tio n . SEC. 6. PROCESSING O F RETU R N S, R E TU R N IN FO R M A TIO N , AND O TH ER DOCUM ENTS. S ectio n 7513 (re la tin g to r e p ro d u c tio n of r e t u r n s an d o th e r d o c u m en ts) is am e n d ed to r e a d a s fo llo w s: "SEC . 7513. MAKING SP E C IA L ST A T IST IC A L STUDIES OR PROCESSING OR REPRO D U CIN G O F R E T U R N S, RETU R N INFO RM A TIO N , AND O TH ER DOCUM ENTS. n (a) In G e n e ra l. - -T h e S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te is a u th o riz e d to c o n tra c t, in a c c o rd a n c e w ith re g u la tio n s to be p r e s c r i b e d by th e S e c re ta r y o r h is d e le g a te , w ith any d e p a rtm e n t, a g e n c y , o r o th e r E x ecu tiv e e s ta b lis h m e n t of the F e d e r a l G o v e rn m e n t, an y S tate ag en c y , o r any p e rs o n fo r th e p u rp o s e of m a k in g s p e c ia l s t a ti s t i c a l s tu d ie s (as d efin ed in s e c tio n 6108 (b)) o r of p r o c e s s in g o r m a k in g r e p r o ductions by an y m e a n s w h a te v e r of a n y r e t u r n o r r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n (as d efin ed in s e c tio n 6103 (a) (2)), d o c u m e n t, o r o th e r m a t t e r . For p u rp o se s of th is s e c tio n , the te r m 'p ro c e s sin g * in c lu d e s s e r v i c e s involving s y s te m d e sig n ; a d v ic e , m a in te n a n c e , and tr a in in g in c o n nection w ith su c h s y s te m s (and o p e ra tio n to the e x te n t n e c e s s a r y o r d e s ira b le fo r s u c h p u rp o s e s ); o r o th e r a s s i s t a n c e in c o n n e c tio n w ith such p r o c e s s in g . "(b) R e g u la tio n s . - -T h e S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te is a u th o riz e d to p r e s c r i b e re g u la tio n s to p ro v id e su c h s a fe g u a rd s a s in th e opinion - 36 - of the S e c r e ta r y o r h is d e le g a te a r e n e c e s s a r y o r a p p r o p r ia te to p ro te c t r e t u r n s , r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n , d o c u m e n ts, o r o th e r m a t t e r (and r e p r o d u c tio n s of an y of th e fo re g o in g in any fo rm w h a te v e r) 'd e s c r ib e d in s u b s e c tio n (a) a g a in s t any u n a u th o riz e d u se o r an y u n a u th o riz e d d is c lo s u r e . Kfc) P e n a lty . - - F o r p e n a lty fo r u n a u th o riz e d u se o r u n a u th o riz e d d is c lo s u r e of in fo rm a tio n co n tain ed in r e t u r n s , r e t u r n in fo rm a tio n , d o c u m e n ts, o r o th e r m a t t e r , s e e s e c tio n 7213. SE C . 7. T E C H N IC A L AND CONFORM ING AM EN D M EN TS. (1) S ec tio n 6106 (re la tin g to p u b lic ity of u n e m p lo y m e n t tax r e tu r n s ) is h e re b y re p e a le d . (2) S e c tio n 6110 (re la tin g to c r o s s r e f e r e n c e s ) is a m e n d e d by s tr ik in g out p a ra g r a p h s (2), (3), (4), and (5), and by in s e r tin g in lieu th e r e o f n(2) F o r in s p e c tio n of c e r ta in r e c o r d s c o n c e rn in g g a so lin e o r lu b r ic a tin g o ils by lo c a l o f f ic e rs , s e e s e c tio n 4102. n (3) S ectio n 6323 (re la tin g to v a lid ity and p r io r ity of tax lie n s a g a in s t c e r ta in p e rs o n s ) is am e n d ed by s tr ik in g out p a ra g r a p h (3) o f s u b s e c tio n (i). (4) S u b se c tio n (e) of s e c tio n 7213 (re la tin g to c r o s s - r e f e r e n c e s ) is a m e n d e d .b y s tr ik in g out p a ra g r a p h (1) and in s e r tin g in lie u th e re o f n (l) P e n a ltie s fo r d is c lo s u r e of in fo rm a tio n by p r e p a r e r s of r e t u r n s . - ' F o r p e n a lty fo r d is c lo s u r e o r u s e of in fo rm a tio n by p r e p a r e r s of r e tu r n s , s e e s e c tio n 7 2 1 6 ." - 37 - (5) S e ctio n 7515 ( re la tin g to s p e c ia l s t a t i s t i c a l s tu d ie s and c o m p ilatio n s a n d o th e r s e r v ic e s on re q u e s t) is h e re b y r e p e a le d . (6) S u b se c tio n (c) of s e c tio n 7809 ( re la tin g to d e p o s it o f c o l lec tio n s) is a m e n d e d by s tr ik in g out in p a ra g r a p h (1) th e w o rd s ’’se c tio n 7515 ( r e la tin g to s p e c ia l s t a t i s t i c a l s tu d ie s and c o m p ila tio n s for o th e r s e r v ic e s on r e q u e s t ; ” and in s e r tin g in lie u th e r e o f ’’s e c tio n 6103 (p) ( r e la tin g to fu rn is h in g of c o p ie s of r e t u r n s o r o f r e t u r n i n fo rm atio n ) and s e c tio n 6103 (b) ( re la tin g to s p e c ia l s t a t i s t i c a l s tu d ie s and c o m p ila tio n s ;’’ Technical changes to change table of -contents to be added. ✓ DepartmentoftheTREASURY kHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04-2041 J 7 89 ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE WILLIAM E. SIMON SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY BEFORE THE REPUBLICAN TRUNK 'N TUSK CLUB PHOENIX, ARIZONA SEPTEMBER 13, 1974 DEL WEBB’S TOWN HOUSE 9:00 P.M. It will be no news to you when I say that inflation is our number one economic problem. I have been saying that, over and over again, ever since my first day as Secretary of the Treasury. But I’m not the only one. Almost everyone holds that view, because inflation dominates our everyday lives. The inflation has gone on so long and become so intense that it has done damage to every sector of our society. It has hurt everyone -- people at all income levels, corporations, financial institutions, local governments -- everyone. And m /*■» *4» r\ -C muo u ui. r»1"1 an j x c neto iiui u uixo cxu.cix)' ctjiiva cue puui Inflation is unfair. Those who are least able to protect themselves frequently end up bearing the heaviest burden. Individuals and families..who have depended upon the Federal Government to preserve the purchasing power of the dollar feel frustrated. People are disillusioned with their government. They are losing confidence that the government will be able to solve the inflation problem. It is not going to be easy to bring inflation under control. But we are going to do it. I have no doubt about that. However, we must have a better understanding of the causes and cures. For example, we must understand that inflation is not just an economic problem, it is a political problem as well. I don't mean politics in the partisan, how-do-we-get-elected sense, but in terms/uovernment leaders of whatever political persuasion representing and responding to the will of their constituents. That is politics at its best. The Origins of Inflation The industrialized countries of the world have all suffered an horrendous bout of inflation over the past decade -- the United States less than most (although I take little comfort from that fact.) W S -101 - 2 - ■ I think it is fair to conclude that in almost every case a major cause of the inflation was political. In saying that, I do not mean to imply that inflation has only the single dimension of government economic policy. Inflation is a complex process with many causes. For example, we are all aware of the series of outside shocks that hit our price level during the past two years. ° World production of wheat and coarse grains declined a disastrous 3 1/2 percent in 1972,. which resulted in a 36 percent increase in farm prices and a 20 percent increase in consumer food prices during 1973. ° Every industrialized nation in the world experienced strong growth in 1973, and this unusual simultaneity put strong pressure on all internationally-traded raw materials. In the United States, wholesale prices of crude materials, excluding food, increased 31 percent during 1973. ° The devaluations of the dollar made the food and industrial raw material price explosion even worse, because the United States suddenly became the most favorable place for other nations to obtain those hard-to-get raw materials. This was good news for our international trade position, but it put substantial additional pressure on domestic prices. ° And of course, at the end of 1973, the Arab Nations quadrupled the price of crude oil, which put great pressure on the prices of almost all goods and services produced in the United States. ° And finally, the end of wage and price controls just a few months ago added a new burst of price pressures to the current situation. All of those forces, however, are one-time events. While they are with us, they have an enormous influence on the general price level. For the most part, however, the influence of those 3 3 events is temporary. And when these special forces have passed and most are in the phase-out stage now - - w e find that the problem of inflation is still with us, as strong as ever. At the end of this year, after the food and fuel and other special factors have receded, our price level will probably still be rising by something in the neighborhood of 9 percent per year, perhaps more. % And the reason we still find such a horrendous rate of inflation in the system after the special factors have run their course is that over a long period of time political decisions have been tilted in the direction of inflation. We have increased Government spending faster than we have been willing to pay for it through taxation. We have created too much new money and credit, so that more borrowing has taken place than could be financed out of savings. By those actions we permitted, encouraged,.even forced the demand for goods and services to outrun the productive capacity of our economy. The inevitable result was inflation. What this boils down to is that our economic reach has been greater than our grasp of how the economy works. Our eyes have been bigger than our stomach. We have not learned that the standard of living in an economy cannot grow more rapidly than productivity. We do not want to accept the idea that resources are scarce and that if we make a decision to give more to some people in the society we are at the same time deciding to take those resources away from somebody else. Moreover, if we do not make the take-away decision explicitly by cutting Federal spending elsewhere, for example -- we do not escape that decision. It is accomplished instead by the tax of inflation. My basic point is that in making many of the decisions that are so crucially important for inflation we act through our political system. It is a political decision whether or not a government spending program is accelerated or throttled back. It is a political decision whether or not taxes are raised or lowered. It is a political decision whether or not we use a Federal program to funnel cheap credit to special sectors of the economy. And for too many years now, too many of these political decisions have been going the wrong way. From a political point of view, it is always easier to spend than to tax. From an economic point of view, that excessive spending levies the cruelest and most indiscriminate tax of all inflation. 4 The Cure To correct the inflation problem is every bit as difficult and complex as the inflation itself. There are no simple quick solutions. Back in 1971, some of us thought there might be, but now that controls have had their try we know better. % No, if we are to lick this inflation, we will have to go back to fundamentals. One such fundamental is more savings and investment. As I mentioned earlier, the demands of the American people go far beyond the capacity of the economy. It is of vital importance, therefore, that we continue, and accel erate the upward trend of productivity. It is no accident that economies, such as Japan or Germany, that devote a large proportion of their output to capital for mation have also experienced rapid gains in output per man-hour. By contrast, the United States has put a rather small share of its output into new plant and equipment -- about 15 percent versus an average of about 19 percent in the other industrialized nations -- and we have also had a much slower rate of productivity advance. The need for emphasizing capital formation should be « 1 a n -v» c iv^ai • In addition, however, there are important new investment requirements that go beyond the normal need to replace and expand the existing stock of productive capital. There are many of these new investment requirements, including pollution con trol, new systems of urban transportation, and energy. The^ latter is the most important by far. Project Independence is estimated to take from three-quarters to one trillion dollars of new investment over the next decade or so. In recent years energy has accounted for about one-fifth of total investment, in the forseeable future, however, that proportion will have to rise to about one-third. It is clear, therefore, that our future needs for saving and investment represent an enormous challenge above and beyond what is normal for the American economy. Indeed, investment will have to take a rising share of economic output at the expense of consumption and government spending. To do this, we will have to make several important changes in our policies. First, Government spending will hcive to be curbed to make economic room for the added investment. Second, 5 profits will have to grow to provide both the incentive and the wherewithal for investment. We cannot look upon profits as an unnecessary evil, as I fear many Americans now do. We must avoid legislation and regulation that is punitive of profits honestly earned. If we do not, capital formation will be inhibited and the real purchasing power or workers* earnings will grow more slowly. Third, we must reverse our long-held policies that penalize saving and encourage consumption. Our tax system should be re-examined to this end. Federal Reserve Regulation Q, which limits interest paid on savings accounts, should be revised at the earliest opportunity. And we should permit the normal incentives of the price system to operate freely. We must not impose artifical government constraints, as for example we have done for so many years, and are still doing, in regulating the price of natural gas. It is instructive to recall what took place after August 1971, when we removed the artifical constraint of fixed exchange rates that had produced an overvalued dollar for so many years. In the free market, the dollar moved to new, more competitive levels and our trade balance, which had been in a nose dive for many years, returned to surplus. Similarly, when we changed agricultural policy 180 degrees to permit maximum production, American farmers responded to the incentives of the market place by planting large amounts of additional acreage. Food prices are high, and the drought in the Midwrest this summer has aggravated the situation, but food prices would have been higher still without the shift in policy. These are just two examples of what the market place, given reasonable freedom and time, can achieve in overcoming serious economic problems. That Old-Time Religion Another fundamental part of the fight against inflation is sufficient monetary and fiscal restraint to keep the demands for economic output within our capacity to meet them. Indeed, if we are to squeeze out the high rate of inflation that is now thoroughly embedded in our system, we will have to operate with a margin of slack in the economy. This does not mean that economic policy should be harsh and brutal. Not at all. A deep recession would not help the cause of price stability -- quite the contrary, because a deep recession would force us back into strongly stimulative policies that in the end would create still more inflation. Frequent and abrupt changes in economic policy are almost as disastrous as no restraint at all. - 6 - It took We did not get into this Situation overnight, It will and monetary excesses years of economic, financial, has its costs, take time to cure. The anti-inflation fight We will have to take some unpleasant-tasting medicine, and we will have to continue to take it for a prolonged period, We will have to give up some Government spending programs, and unless growth in Federal spending can be cut back appre ciably we. will have to forego the pleasures of a tax cut. Credit will have to be less easily available. Business profits cannot grow quite so buoyantly. Unemployment will have to average slightly higher than it otherwise would. These are not negligible costs. But if we are to regain control over inflation, there is no other way. The costs of continued rapid inflation, which is the alternative, are far greater. And that brings us back to politics again. For a long time, my major concern has been whether the American people and their Government would have the sustained political will for this fight. I think there is more hope now than ever before. The double-digit inflation of this past year has frightened many people, and made them more willing to support tough anti -inflation policies. Good economics is getting to be good politics. Even this pendulum can swing too far. We must fight and win the battle against inflation, but not by forcing a heavy sacrifice on the economically weak and disadvantaged. Some increase in unemployment from present levels is inevitable. But we can, and must, cope with that problem more imaginatively than in the past. Other sectors of the economy -- such as housing -- may need some special and temporary assistance. In short, the burden of dealing with inflation should be shared as equitably as we can manage it through the political process. But there is no escape from the need to pursue basic economic policies that will bring inflation under better control. Inflation is the economic problem of our times as surely as deflation and mass unemployment was the economic problem of the 1930s. To deal with it effectively we must be willing to bear the cost of fiscal and monetary restraint. Conclusion But we must always remember that we can deal effect ively with inflation. Fighting inflation is not just a spectator sport, but a serious endeavor that will require a complete 7 7 team effort. And that team is all of us, Congress, the Executive Branch, business, labor and the American people. We have a great system of government -- the best system in the world. This country has always been able to solve its problems by working together, and I am confident we will unite in this fight and by doing so we will beat inflation. 0 O0 T" FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE F riday, September 13, 1974 STATE OF TENNESSEE AND OFFICE OF REVENUE SHARING CONCLUDE AGREEMENT The U. S. T reasury Departm ent's O ffic e o f Revenue Sh arin g and the S ta te o f Tennessee concluded a j o in t a u d it agreement in Washington, D. C. t h i s week. A ccording to the terms o f the p act, the Com p troller o f the T reasury o f the S ta te o f Tennessee w ill a u d it general revenue sh a rin g funds in Tennessee s ta te agencies and more than 400 u n its o f lo c a l government. The a u d it s w ill be performed by Tennessee S ta te a u d ito rs or independent p u b lic a ccou n tan ts, u sin g standards and procedures put forward by the O ffic e o f Revenue Sh arin g in i t s p u b lic a tio n "A u d it Guide and Standards fo r Revenue Sh arin g R e c ip ie n t s ". The Tennessee agreement was signed on Tuesday, September 10, by W illiam R. Sn o d gra ss, T ennessee's C o m p troller o f the Treasury and Graham W. Watt, D ir e c to r o f the U. S. Treasury Departm ent's O ffic e o f Revenue S h a rin g. - 2 - Tennessee i s the t h ir d s ta te to s ig n a j o i n t a u d it agreement w ith the O ffic e o f Revenue S h a rin g. S im ila r p acts were concluded e a r li e r t h i s ye ar w ith the s ta te s o f New York and M ich igan. In a cce p tin g r e s p o n s i b i li t y fo r making revenue sh a rin g a u d its o f s ta te departments and agencies and lo c a l u n its o f government, Tennessee has jo in e d the O ffic e o f Revenue S h a r in g 's Cooperative S ta te A u d it System, a program auth orized by revenue sh a rin g law. "The C ooperative S ta te A u d it System we are developing w ith the a s s is t a n c e o f s t a t e governments w ill make i t p o s s ib le to a u d it u n its o f government th a t re ce iv e shared revenues a t the le a s t p o s s ib le c o st to a l l , " acco rd in g to Graham Watt. "The Federal government w ill not be req uired to d u p lic a te an a u d it system a lre a d y in p la c e ," he sa id . A u d its in clu d e both f in a n c ia l p ra c tic e s and compliance w ith c iv il r ig h t s and oth er p r o v is io n s o f the revenue sh a rin g law. In a d d itio n to in fo rm a tio n provided by s ta te s through the Cooperative S ta te A u d it system , the O ffic e o f Revenue Sh arin g w ill perform i t s own a u d its on a random b a s is and in v e s t ig a t e a lle g a t io n s o f noncompliance w ith revenue sh a rin g law whenever and wherever they may occur. As p re se n tly a u th o riz e d , the general revenue sh a rin g program w ill d is t r ib u t e $30.2 b i l l i o n to n e a rly 39,000 u n its o f s ta te and lo c a l govern ment over a f iv e -y e a r period th a t ends w ith December 1976. A lre a d y, -3 - i t more than $14 b i l l i o n have been returned to s ta te s and lo c a l governments. The next r e g u la r , q u a rte r ly payment o f shared revenues w ill be issu e d in October. # ASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04-2041 FOR RELEASE AT 6:00 P.M. EDST, September 16, 1974 REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM E. SIMON SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY BEFORE THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER WOMEN'S CLUB 1607 - 22ND STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1974 AT 6:00 P.M. It is a pleasure to be in such talented and attractive company this evening. Despite the fact that it is such pleasant company, I want to discuss an unpleasant subject -our current economic difficulties and what we should do about them. ' In a little more than a year we will be celebrating our National Bicentennial. It will be a time to review the achievements of the past and to establish new goals for the future. We will want to look back to see where we have been and look ahead to see where we are going. The American economic system has served us well. Great material progress has been achieved over these past two centuries. No other nation has known our material pros perity or abundance. No other people have enjoyed for so long that full measure of economic freedom that generations of Americans have enjoyed. We have attained a level of prosperity in which the "poverty line" in the United States is the threshhold of wealth in many nations of the world. What the socialist system promises its workers in some distant future the American system already provides our people. It was an accident of history, but of symbolic significance that the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith was published the same year Thomas Jefferson penned the Declaration of Indepen dence. For, just as the principles of Jefferson and his generation have guided the1political life of this nation for two centuries, so the economic principles of Adam Smith and those that followed in his footsteps have been the guiding lights of our economic history. That approach has been the path of progress. In material terms it has put this Nation in a position of unrivalled economic leadership in the world. Even more important, the 2 system has helped us preserve our most cherished personal and political freedoms. We have relied on markets rather than on detailed regulation of economic life by the government. We have depended more on the ’’invisible hand” of Adam Smith than on the heavy hand of economic planning. Competition, not coercion, has kept things moving. Not the exertion of government, but the ideas, energies and talents of individuals acting alone and acting together -- within our economic system -have been the sources of our progress and prosperity. All of this is familiar to you. Anyone who ever read a newspaper editorial -- and for all I know some of you have written reams of them -- is familiar with the case for free enterprise. What does that have to do with today’s problem? Today’s problem is inflation -- double-digit inflation. That is foremost in your government’s concern -- and in the concerns of the American people. Every public opinion poll, indeed every trip to the supermarket, testifies to the dominating, almost overwhelming, importance of inflation as the economic problem of our times. Inflation at these intolerable rates must be brought to an end. It is equally important that we deal with the inflation problem in a way that is equitable and consistent with our economic and political traditions. I think that we will. But we should not underestimate the difficulty of the task, or the threat that inflation poses for our economic system. Our economic system is more vulnerable today than it has been at any time since the Great Depression of the 1930's. Then the problem was mass unemployment. Four decades ago, when we were in the grips of depression, we determined that we would never again permit a recurrence of mass unemployment» That was a correct decision -- and it is as correct today as it was then. But in freeing the economy from the risk of mass unemploy ment, we have not yet solved the problem of preventing high rates of inflation. I am concerned that we have not yet fully recognized the dimensions of this new threat. I do not think it lies in the danger of financial collapse. Insurance and bank deposits and a vigilant Central Bank shield us from that risk. 3 Ironically, the danger lies more in what we may do to the economic system, rather than what it may do to us. For, if the rate of inflation is not reduced to tolerable levels, the American public will demand direct action to hold down wages, prices, profits and interest rates. Such action would not end the inflation but, if accepted as an economic way of life, it could mean the erosion of our economic system -the system that has provided the American people with more and better homes, automobiles, leisure, education and almost everything else worth having -- especially personal and economic freedom -- than any other nation on earth. I am not talking about economic ideology. This is the 20th century and we can’t go back to laissez-faire, or some other mythical system. Government has always had an important role to play in our economic life. But we have also had the good sense in this country to allow maximum scope for com petition and individual initiative. The Case For Private Decisions The case for private decision making in a market system is based upon a very basic and fundamental fact: it works. The marketplace is an efficient system when it is allowed to operate with the necessary freedom. Indeed, the price system is not only the most effective method of determining what, and where, and how economic activity shall take place in a free society, it is the only feasible method. If we want the system to work for us, rather than us working for the system, we cannot do better than competitive markets. Once detailed economic planning is substituted for the market mechanism, most of our economic freedom is gone. And when economic freedom is gone, our chances of retaining political and other freedoms are close to zero. Nothing in this life is perfect and the market system is no exception. The market system does not automatically dispense, or guarantee, social justice. The market does not insure that the collective needs of society will be met. Indeed, there are times -- the Depression was one -- when extraordinary circumstances prevent the market from operating well, at which time government intervention is not only wise, but critical. It is clear that we must take care of those who are in need and try to insure that all of our citizens are in a position to live out their lives in dignity. Those who cannot help themselves must be helped. Further, the economy must function within an adequate framework of law. And if it is to operate properly, competition must be vigorous. 4 Government has many vital functions. It has the responsibility for guaranteeing the security of the Nation from foreign enemies, and the security of its citizens from domestic violence. It has the obligation of fairly enforcing the laws. It must provide basic public services. It must protect the environment. It must enforce standards to protect the public health and welfare. It must insure that competitive conditions are maintained. And it should step in and protect individuals against the extremes of economic adversity over which they have no control. But I think it is most unwise for Government to attempt the detailed regulation of prices and costs. We have done so during and after wartime periods. We did so after August 1971 with our various freezes and phases. We now know from this recent experience, from our past history, and from our fund of economic knowledge, that wage and price controls do not work in a free society. They have never worked. But while wage and price controls would fail miserably at curing the serious maladies in the American economy, they would succeed marvelously in crippling the economic system to which Americans owe so much. It is upon the advocates of controls that the burden of proof must fall. Where are the historical examples of success to justify the price paid in the loss of individual freedom? What reason is there to believe that the collective decisions of ten thousand bureaucrats represent better the interests of the American consumer than the free decisions of millions of American citizens? The decisions of the marketplace are to be preferred over controls imposed by men not because the marketplace produces ideal results but because controls have proven themselves, time and time again, to be costly, coercive, inefficient and unjust. Certainly, no evidence has been unearthed in recent to cause one to reverse that verdict. ye ars But I am under no illusions. The American people are fed up with inflation. They want it stopped, and stopped soon. They are not going to be patient indefinitely. In the last analysis, the public wants results and will not be convinced of the inherent virtues of free markets if all they seem to pr01“ 5 is rising prices. Therefore, control of inflation demands the highest priority. We must remove the causes of inflation, not treat the results. Above all, we must avoid being drawn back into a maze of controls which would only make a bad situation worse. Government and Inflation Let me turn now to what I think we in Government should be doing. First, and perhaps most important of all, we should be listening and learning. We have every reason to be humble in the face of double-digit inflation. The ongoing series of conferences which will culminate in the White House Conference on Inflation later this month provide those of us in Government with an unparalleled opportunity to learn from others. I attach the highest importance to this series of conferences about which I will have more to say in a few minutes. The other main thing we in Government must bear down on is the Federal budget. It ill behooves the Government to call for sacrifices until it puts its own fiscal house in order. Frankly, I think that Federal expenditures have been growing much too rapidly and that they must be restrained. Let us look at the record. Not until 1961, when our Nation had been in existence for 185 years, did the Federal budget cross the $100 billion mark. Only nine more years were required for it to cross $200 billion, and it took only four years after that to cross the $300 billion mark. And this doesn’t even take account of all the extensions of Federal credit through various guarantees and the like which caused total Federal and Federally-assisted borrowings to account for almost two-thirds of total funds raised in the capital markets in fiscal year 1973. In 1929 the total expenditures of state, local, and federal government amounted to only 10 percent of the Nation’s gross national product, today they consume almost a third of the GNP. Nor is the much debated defense budget responsible for the growth in size and power of government. Except for a temporary interruption during the Vietnam years, the defense budget as a percent of gross national product has been de clining steadily for two decades. Between fiscal years 1968 and 1974 defense expenditures did not rise at all, and they have declined by about one-fourth after rough correction for inflation. During that same period, so-called human resources 6 spending mushroomed at a rapid rate. Of the $90 billion increase in federal spending, $60 billion went for social security, veterans' benefits and welfare. Another $15 billion went for health, education, and manpower. Most of the balance went to finance the rising interest bill on the ever-mounting national debt. In the budgetary sense of the term, all of this might well be considered "uncontrollable." Indeed, when all the "uncon trollable" items are listed in the budget each year, there seems to be very little left to cut. Our budget, however, is un controllable, only if we accept the false assumption that once a law is enacted by Congress, it can never be altered or repealed.| In a time when inflation, fueled partly by federal spending, has become the true scourge of the American working Class, I do not accept that proposition. Let me make my position clear. I am not opposed to government social programs. I am not opposed to increases in worthwhile programs --nor the introduction of new endeavors. Ours is a prosperous and wealthy nation with the wherewithal to more than adequately meet its social obligations. But we have been trying to have it both ways. We want the expensive social programs - -or seem to -- but we don't want to pay the taxes to support them. The bill is presented all the same and must be paid. The inflation created in substantial part by the fiscal policies of the past dozen years is truly the cruelest of all taxes -- and the most insidious. Speculation and debt have been rewarded; savings and thrift penalized. Perhaps not even the Vietnam war itself has done more to sap confidence in the Government of the United States and the future than this inflation, this surreptitious tax which has quietly con sumed the savings and pensions and insurance of the working people of this nation year in and year out for the last decade. Not the Arab nations of the Middle East nor the drought of the Middle West created the inflation we know today. Yes, the rising price of oil and gas, and the rising price of food and fiber contributed materially to the intensity of our present inflation. But the ultimate burden of responsibility must rest squarely upon the Government of the United States. With the exception of these special one time factors, inflation is not an import; it is home-grown; it is produced right here in the United States, right in the Nation's capital. A - 7 The time has finally come to bring federal spending under genuine control. President Ford has announced his intention to set a spending target of less than $300 billion for the current fiscal year. That will not be easy. It will require very painful political decisions. There is reason for some optimism since Congress has revised its own budgetary procedures and stands ready to cooperate in the essential effort. Yet it is a measure of how uncontrollable federal spending has become that even if we are successful -- and that is by no means certain -- federal spending will still rise by $30 billion over the previous year -- more than 10 percent. Is it any wonder that we have inflation? The Federal budget is well on its way to becoming an economic juggernaut. We must bring it under control before it smashes all hope for our long-run financial stability. The Conference on Inflation The importance of controlling inflation is widely recognized. I have emphasized my own belief that we should avoid wage and price controls like the plague and work to bring our runaway federal budget under control. But the inflation problem is complex and worldwide. No simple remedies are at hand. If there were an easy way out, someone would have found it long ago. I think we have taken a big step in the right direction by initiating the series of conferences on inflation leading up to the final sessions on September 27 and 28. These are, as you know, bipartisan in conception and execution. The conferences will draw on the best thinking this Nation can bring to bear on the inflation problem. They allow the public to see, and although on a necessarily limited scale, to participate directly in a dialog on the major economic problem of our time. A cynic might say that government conferences and commissions are sometimes used to push problems out of sight. Or that government conferences are convenient ways to set a private stamp of approval on a course of action government is going to take away. Neither charge is valid in the present situation. 8 The conferences on inflation are a genuine effort to examine as intensively as we can the courses of action open to us. We do not expect unanimity of opinion. It may be that no clear consensus will emerge. But the process strikes me as very worthwhile. The conferences to this point have been interesting, stimulating, and even provocative at times. They have also had the beneficial result of contributing to the long slow process of educating the American people to how complex and difficult the inflationary problem is. I am looking forward with great anticipation to our own Treasury conference on banking and finance this Friday, and the other meetings to come. The entire process is in our best national t r a d i t i o n o p e n , direct and oriented to solving a problem. Conclusion We have a most serious problem in the current inflation there is no doubt about that. I am confident, however, that by working together we can find a solution and over time get the economy back on a path of steady growth with reasonably stable prices. Why am I optimistic? Primarily because the inflation problem is now beginning to get the undivided attention of the Nation and its Government. Perhaps by the time of our Bicentennial, we will have demonstrated that as in the time of Thomas Jefferson and Adam Smith good economics has once again become good politics. 0 O0 Deportmentof ^T LZI TELEPHONE W04-2041 ISHINGTON, D.C. 20220 ■ HH wÊËM 9m FOR RELEASE MONDAY, 1:00 P tM t< CDT WARREN F. BRECHT ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ADMINISTRATION U. S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REMARKS BEFORE THE AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION NATIONAL PERSONNEL CONFERENCE MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA SEPTEMBER 16, 1974 1:00 P.M., CDT I1 Introductory Remarks A. I am honored to participate with you in the opening day of the ABA National Personnel Conference. In preparing for this address, I read the conference program and its focus on the decision maker. The planning committee is to be commended for developing such a substantive personnel conference. The need for communication and exchange of ideas has never been so critical as now. B. Just over a year ago, I was assigned the overall respon sibility for the equal employment opportunity program at the Treasury Department. parts: The program is made up of two the in-house program for Treasury's 110,000 employees, and the program all of you are more familiar with, which assures that the commercial banks and savings institutions are meeting their contractual obligations under Executive Order 11246 and Treasury regulations governing equal employment. I have taken my new 2 responsibilities seriously and welcome this opportunity to share with you some of my thoughts, concerns and what I see in the future. C. Since it was first introduced in 1961, affirmative action toward equal employment opportunity has become an accepted principle of national policy. In practice, however, affirmative action has been assailed by criticism from two divergent points of view. One view clamors that affirmative action plans have been so ineffective and half-heartedly pursued that they only scratch the surface of inequality in employment for minorities and women. The other view holds that affirmative action has developed into a system of possible discrimination in reverse. D. Furthermore, depending on what kind of study one reviews, diverse results are portrayed. Some studies indicate disquietingly that in the 13 years of affirmative action policy, blacks, other minorities and women are still drastically underemployed in every category except in the most poorly paid and undesirable jobs. Such studies indicate that in the highest paid and most highly regarded levels of jobs, minorities and women are found in only the rarest of incidents. From these kinds of studies, it might follow that if equality is ever to be achieved, affirmative action efforts will have to be pursued with nuch greater vigor, commitment and «"•ompateiice. 3 E. On the other hand, other studies indicate that opportu nities for blacks and other minorities in the past 13 years have increased notably— that fewer black families now live below the poverty level and that blacks and other minorities are moving more and more into the main stream of the world of work and job opportunities. F. I suspect the real status today is somewhere between these divergent views. In any case, I believe the government’s mission and your mission in carrying out equal employment opportunity is becoming increasingly complex. These days we are finding more militancy and less patience; and it is not just among the blacks. In fact, women's groups have been among the more active and vocal in the past year. Then we have the problems of the Spanish speaking, the American Indians and more recently, clamors from the coalitions of Oriental people Within the last several weeks, affirmative action employ ment requirements for the handicapped have been added. If we also consider the special emphasis programs for Vietnam veterans, the problems of age discrimination, and the potential backlash of white male employees and the impact of unions, we begin to see the full scope of the problems currently being faced by you as decision makers. And I haven't even mentioned the disclosure pr^bl^ms under the Freedom of Information Act and recent 4 court decisions. So, while the record to date, particu larly in the banking industry has been impressive in many cases, I believe we really have our work cut out for us in the months and years ahead. II. Progress in the Banking Industry A. Before looking at what is ahead, however, I would like to comment on the progress and accomplishments of the banking industry to date. Overall, you are to be commended on the efforts and results over the past decade and particularly the last 5 years. We in Treasury are aware that in recent years decision makers in the banking industry have become involved and have made decisions which have had a real impact on employment problems of minorities. We are aware that a number of banks beginning about 1968 moved aggressively to get involved in urban problems, to develop meaningful equal opportunity programs for minorities, and to become involved in a way that was both in their enlightened self-interest and in assuring compliance with the public policy and laws governing equal employment, B. In terms of numbers alone, the results have been excellent. In the period of approximately 5 years, employment of minorities in the banking industry tripled— going from about 40,000 to about 120,000. We in Treasury are aware 5 of a number of progressive and innovative programs individual banks and in some cases groups of banks or the ABA have developed and implemented. I would like to mention some of these special efforts: 1. Special skills training in reading, writing, math and clerical skills which young people need but too often minorities do not receive in the public schools. 2. Revamped training programs in the banks to deal with a new kind of work force, made up of people who are not trained and qualified, but who are trainable and qualifiable, thereby enabling thousands of minority young men and women to enter the working world previously beyond their hopes. 3. Participation in job fairs which have concentrated on recruiting and hiring minorities and women. 4. The efforts some banks have made in setting up recruiting vans which go out into the minority communities,not only to hire those who want to work, but to encourage those who have not thought about working, at banks. 5. The films and film strips developed by some banks and the ABA directed toward convincing blacks and Spanish speaking that there ia a future f~r them in banking careers. 6 6. Awareness programs for helping supervisors and managers deal with equal opportunity and minority problems more effectively. 7. Efforts to encourage minority and women employees to participate in the regular bank training programs both in-house, through the American Institute of Banking, and through tuition refund programs so that they will gain skills development and move up the career ladder. 8. A work-study program for high school youth, the pur pose of which is to. provide an income-producing exposure to work in an integral part of the bank's operation, and at the same time to provide a means by which the education of potential dropouts can be increased and made more meaningful. 9. The National Urban League study done for the ABA at black colleges to determine why blacks were not applying for jobs in banking, and the positive steps you have taken to do something about it. 10. And finally, perhaps a little late but nevertheless significant, the efforts many of you are now taking for the women on your work force, particularly those who have the skills and potential for management positions and who are now being encouraged to participate 7 in various training programs to gain upward mobility and higher positions in your bank. This is an essential first step toward women being promoted to management jobs. I also understand that women are now beginning to appear in much larger numbers at the various graduate schools of banking and at various AIB offerings. C. While the above list of accomplishments is commendable, we must recognize that all is not sweetness and light. Many banks, probably the majority of banks, are doing a conscientious and effective job in setting and achieving their equal employment affirmative action plans. Yet, the overall performance is uneven and some members of the banking community still have done very little or have only given lip service to equal employment opportunity for their employees and prospective employees. In fact, in the last several months the Treasury Department has had to issue two show cause letters to banks whose per formance up until then was sufficiently unacceptable that we had to threaten withdrawal of federal deposits unless immediate improvement was demonstrated. D. Even for the banking industry as a whole, we cannot rest on our laurels. As I mentioned earlier, in terms of numbers, your results are indeed impressive. But numbers 8 alone are no longer enough. Employees are increasingly clamoring to be developed and promoted to higher paying and more responsible positions. For bank management, this means you will have to give increasing attention to upward mobility and career development programs. This is particularly true for women who in terms of numbers alone have all along represented the majority of your employees. E. As a special emphasis program, upward mobility especially appeals to me. We have just instituted a department-wide upward mobility program in Treasury, with emphasis on career counseling, specially tailored developmental pro grams, and movement of employees out of dead-end positions by restructuring jobs and career ladders. The upward mobility program appeals to me because it cuts across all levels and types of people, be they black or white, male or female, advantaged or disadvantaged. It is the one special emphasis program that potentially offers much to so many who are willing to put out that little extra to take advantage of the program. III. Future Trends— What I See Ahead A. I would now like to talk about some of the things I see ahead in the equal employment opportunity program,includ ing compliance requirements and disclosure reqi” cements. 9 First, I would like to comment briefly on the Labor Department Orders No. 4 and 14, which implement the basic Executive Order 11246, as amended. B. Order No. 4 essentially sets forth to federal contractors the specific requirements for developing and implementing an affirmative action program. Firms found not in com pliance with Order No. 4 may face termination or cancella tion of contracts or be barred from future contracts. For banks, the cancellation of a contract means the loss of federal depository status. C. Order No. 14, on the other hand, provides instructions to compliance officers on the conduct of EEO compliance reviews. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance has issued these instructions to provide uniformity in the equal opportunity evaluation of all federal contractors by the 15 compliance agencies. As revised, Order No. 14 is now more stringent in requiring certain things to be done within a tighter time frame. It also sets forth additional items for our compliance officers to review. Consequently, it is important that you as bank management become as familiar with the requirements of Order No. 14 as you are with Order No. 4 to make sure you are fully ‘prepared to satisfy the compliance requirements. / 10 D. I understand an ABA task force has been working to develop a uniform reporting format to facilitate a bank's preparation for a Treasury Department compliance review; and that this format will comply with Orders No. 4 and 14. We are also pleased with the affirmative action guide book the ABA has developed to provide much needed guidance for smaller banks. You are to be commended on both these efforts. E. Next, I would like to talk about a stronger enforcement posture on the part of the Treasury Department. If the Treasury is to be criticized for its performance as a major compliance agency, it may be because we have not been tough enough; or at least in the eyes of some critics we have not evidenced our toughness by issuing show cause letters or cancelling a bank's federal depository status. Please understand that we have no intention of down playing the positive approach of technical assistance and moral suasion which we believe has been most effective on the whole. In fact, I don't know of another trade association which has dealt as openly with its federal compliance agency as has the American Bankers Association and its member banks. Overall, I believe this has been an effective approach in the past and I do not intend to see it diminished. 11 F. Yet, in any industry there are some who may not take things seriously unless a tougher enforcement stance is also exerted when warranted. Furthermore, there are increasing pressures on Treasury and other Federal Government agencies to do a more effective and more comprehensive job of enforcing EEO contractor compliance. G. This past week, for example, you may have read about the recent GAO investigation prepared for Congresswoman Martha Griffiths' Joint Economic Subcommittee, which apparently shows that federal compliance officers have frequently allowed contracts to be awarded without deter mining if the companies have complied with non-discrimination regulations. According to GAO, of some 120 affirmative action plans accepted by government agencies, almost half did not meet criteria established by the Labor Department's Office of Federal Contract Compliance. H. GAO concluded that the Labor Department has been lax in its performance of implementing the Executive Order and that most federal agencies are reluctant to enforce sanctions against companies that do not conform to the regulations. Congresswoman Griffiths, in commenting on the study, stated: "In the last year alone the Federal Government purchased over $50 billion worth of goods and services. The force which it could exercise in reducing 12 discrimination among those firms which vie for $50 billion worth of business is tremendous. Yet the government's effort . . . can only be described as puny." X . it should be noted that GAO's audit was concentrated at the Labor Department and two of the largest compliance agencies, the General Services Administration and the Department of Defense. Nonetheless, there is a clear message for the Treasury Department and all of you gathered here that if anything, our efforts to enforce the EEO and civil rights acts must be conducted with increasing vigor. J. I would now like to comment on the disclosure require ments under the Freedom of Information Act and the proposed amendment to that Act. As many of you know, requests for EEO compliance information on banks have become increasingly troublesome to both the Treasury Department and the banks involved. We have increasingly received requests from public interest groups for data which had previously been submitted in confidence but since the Alameda County case have now been determined as releaseable. As some of you are aware, I recently was required to release to a women's group certain bank EEO data which previously had been furnished in good faith with ui e understanding it would be held in confidence 13 The Alameda County case changed all that and after much agonizing and several meetings with the Labor Department, the Justice Department and representatives of the banks themselves, I finally determined I had no choice but to release certain of these data. K. Now a pending amendment to the Freedom of Information Act would set time limits that agencies must meet on informa tion requests they receive from the public. Furthermore, as the bill now stands, the government would be liable for payment of court and attorney fees if it loses a Freedom of Information case to a private citizen. On top of that, government employees could be suspended for up to 60 days without pay if their decision to withhold information is overruled by a court. L. Although the authors of the legislation contend that these tightened provisions are intended more as a prod than a punishment to eliminate the foot dragging techniques many agencies have used in the past, there are certainly some sobering aspects to this pending amendment. It is increasingly clear that agencies must review material very carefully in conjunction with the Justice Department before deciding to exempt it under terms of the Freedom of Information Act. 14 M. Finally on future trends, you all must be aware of the increasing number of corporations that are winding up on the losing end of federal discrimination suits. In the banking industry alone, the court decrees on the Bank of America and the Bank of California are a costly trend. I am aware of two major banks that have recently taken the initiative to set up trust funds for special skills training and career development for minorities and women, as well as setting more vigorous recruiting goals. These banks, in effect, have said "we are not going to wait for a court decree? rather, we are going to move ahead on our own." Perhaps more of us should take similar initiatives. IV. Closing Remarks In closing I would like to leave with you a few thoughts about my philosophy and approach to the equal employment program: A. The subject of Equal Employment Opportunity is sometimes thought of as a "can of worms "— we hear a lot about grievances and lack of progress. Let's think positively; let's focus on the good things we are trying to do and on successes we have achieved to date. We must recognize we can't turn things around over night? but we in manage ment must make clear our serious inteuc— we need to "talk 15 / it up," and we can never rest on our laurels because the situation is so dynamic. B. It is important that in establishing an equal opportunity program we develop a solid base and then build from there. I do not believe in a lot of shallow publicity or tokenism y :S ■T' in high level positions. I am less concerned whether we have a lot of women and minorities in top management positions today, provided we are hiring meaningful numbers of minorities and women at the professional entry level and are developing individually tailored programs to move these individuals up the career ladder within a realistic time frame. I do not believe it is realistic to produce "instant executives" unless this groundwork has been laid previously. C. As personnel directors, you have a most important role of assuring that your top management commit themselves to achieving the bank’s affirmative action goals and timetables. I believe that top management in turn must impress upon each supervisor that his or her performance and consequently salary advancement will be determined not only on the basis of past performance, but on the .ze basis of significant results in helping the bank achieve fe its goals and timetables in the equal employment field— ll just as they are evaluated on their success in achieving - 16 many of the other goals and timetables management has established. D. Thank you for inviting me to share these thoughts with you. Good luck on the remainder of this conference. DepartmentoftheTREASURY USHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04-2041 FOR RELEASE AT 6:00 P.M. EDST, September 16, 1974 REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM E. SIMON SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY BEFORE THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER WOMEN'S CLUB 1607 - 22ND STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1974 AT 6:00 P.M. It is a pleasure to be in such talented and attractive company this evening. Despite the fact that it is such pleasant company, I want to discuss an unpleasant subject -our current economic difficulties and what we should do about them. In a little more than a year we will be celebrating our National Bicentennial. It will be a time to review the achievements of the past and to establish new goals for the future. We will want to look back to see where we have been and look ahead to see where we are going. The American economic system has served us well. Great material progress has been achieved over these past two centuries. No other nation has known our material pros perity or abundance. No other people have enjoyed for so long that full measure of economic freedom that generations of Americans have enjoyed. We have attained a level of prosperity in which the "poverty line" in the United States is the threshhold of wealth in many nations of the world. What the socialist system promises its workers in some distant future the American system already provides our people. It was an accident of history, but of symbolic significance, that the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith was published the same year Thomas Jefferson penned the Declaration of Indepen dence. For, just as the principles of Jefferson and his generation have guided the political life of this nation for two centuries, so the economic principles of Adam Smith and those that followed in his footsteps have been the guiding lights of our economic history. That approach has been the path of progress. In material terms it has put this Nation in a position of unrivalled economic leadership in the world. Even more important, the WS-102 I - 2 - system has helped us preserve our most cherished personal and political freedoms. We have relied on markets rather than on detailed regulation of economic life by the government. We have depended more on the ’’invisible hand’’ of Adam Smith than on the heavy hand of economic planning. Competition, not coercion, has kept things moving. Not the exertion of government, but the ideas, energies and talents of individuals acting alone and acting together -- within our economic system have been the sources of our progress and prosperity. All of this is familiar to you. Anyone who ever read a newspaper editorial -- and for all I know some of you have written reams of them -- is familiar with the case for free enterprise. What does that have to do with today’s problem? Today’s problem is inflation -- double-digit inflation. That is foremost in your government’s concern -- and in the concerns of the American people. Every public opinion poll, indeed every trip to the supermarket, testifies to the dominating, almost overwhelming, importance of inflation as the economic problem of our times. Inflation at these intolerable rates must be brought to an end. It is equally important that we deal with the inflation problem in a way that is equitable and consistent with our economic and political traditions. I think that we will. But we should not underestimate the difficulty of the task, or the threat that inflation poses for our economic system. Our economic system is more vulnerable today than it has been at any time since the Great Depression of the 1930’s. Then the problem was mass unemployment. Four decades ago, when we were in the grips of depression, we determined that we would never again permit a recurrence of mass unemployment. That was a correct decision -- and it is as correct today as it was then. But in freeing the economy from the risk of mass unemploy ment, we have not yet solved the problem of preventing high rates of inflation. I am concerned that we have not yet fully recognized the dimensions of this new threat. I do not think it lies in the danger of financial collapse. Insurance and ban deposits and a vigilant Central Bank shield us from that risk. 3 Ironically, the danger lies more in what we may do to the economic system, rather than what it may do to us. For, if the rate of inflation is not reduced to tolerable levels, the American public will demand direct action to hold down wages, prices, profits and interest rates. Such action would not end the inflation but, if accepted as an economic way of life, it could mean the erosion of our economic system -the system that has provided the American people with more and better homes, automobiles, leisure, education and almost everything else worth having -- especially personal and economic freedom -- than any other nation on earth. I am not talking about economic ideology. This is the 20th century and we can’t go back to laissez-faire, or some other mythical system. Government has always had an important role to play in our economic life. But we have also had the good sense in this country to allow maximum scope for com petition and individual initiative. The Case For Private Decisions The case for private decision making in a market system is based upon a very basic and fundamental fact: it works. The marketplace is an efficient system when it is allowed to operate with the necessary freedom. Indeed, the price system is not only the most effective method of determining what, and where, and how economic activity shall take place in a free society, it is the only feasible method. If we want the system to work for us, rather than us working for the system, we cannot do better than competitive markets. Once detailed economic planning is substituted for the market mechanism, most of our economic freedom is gone. And when economic freedom is gone, our chances of retaining political and other freedoms are close to zero. Nothing in this life is perfect and the market system is no exception. The market system does not automatically dispense, or guarantee, social justice. The market does not insure that the collective needs of society will be met. Indeed, there are times -- the Depression was one -- when extraordinary circumstances prevent the market from operating well, at which time government intervention is not only wise, but critical. It is clear that we must take care of those who are in need and try to insure that all of our citizens are in a position to live out their lives in dignity. Those who cannot help themselves must be helped. Further, the economy must function within an adequate framework of law. And if it is to operate properly, competition must be vigorous. 4 Government has many vital functions. It has the responsibility for guaranteeing the security of the Nation from foreign enemies, and the security of its citizens from domestic violence. It has the obligation of fairly enforcing the laws. It must provide basic public services. It must protect the environment. It must enforce standards to protect the public health and welfare. It must insure that competitive conditions are maintained. And it should step in and protect individuals against the extremes of economic adversity over which they have no control. But I think it is most unwise for Government to attempt the detailed regulation of prices and costs. We have done so during and after wartime periods. We did so after August 1971 with our various freezes and phases. We now know from this recent experience, from our past history, and from our fund of economic knowledge, that wage and price controls do not work in a free society. They have never worked. But while wage and price controls would fail miserably at curing the serious maladies in the American economy, they would succeed marvelously in crippling the economic system to which Americans owe so much. It is upon the advocates of controls that the burden of proof must fall. Where are the historical examples of success to justify the price paid in the loss of individual freedom? What reason is there to believe that the collective decisions of ten thousand bureaucrats represent better the interests of the American consumer than the free decisions of millions of American citizens? The decisions of the marketplace are to be preferred over controls imposed by men not because the marketplace produces ideal results but because controls have proven themselves, time and time again, to be costly, coercive, inefficient and unjust. Certainly, no evidence has been unearthed in recent to cause one to reverse that verdict. years But I am under no illusions. The American people are fed up with inflation. They want it stopped, and stopped soon. They are not going to be patient indefinitely. In the last analysis, the public wants results and will not be convinced of the inherent virtues of free markets if all they seem to prod 5 is rising prices* Therefore, control of inflation demands the highest priority. We must remove the causes of inflation, not treat the results. Above all, we must avoid being drawn back into a maze of controls which would only make a bad situation worse. Government and Inflation Let me turn now to what I think we in Government should be doing. First, and perhaps most important of all, we should be listening and learning. We have every reason to be humble in the face of double-digit inflation. The ongoing series of conferences which will culminate in the White House Conference on Inflation later this month provide those of us in Government with an unparalleled opportunity to learn from others. I attach the highest importance to this series of conferences about which I will have more to say in a few minutes. The other main thing we in Government must bear down on is the Federal budget. It ill behooves the Government to call for sacrifices until it puts its own fiscal house in order. Frankly, I think that Federal expenditures have been growing much too rapidly and that they must be restrained. Let us look at the record. Not until 1961, when our Nation had been in existence for 185 years, did the Federal budget cross the $100 billion mark. Only nine more years were required for it to cross $200 billion, and it took only four years after that to cross the $300 billion mark. And this doesn’t even take account of all the extensions of Federal credit through various guarantees and the like which caused total Federal and Federally-assisted borrowings to account for almost two-thirds of total funds raised in the capital markets in fiscal year 1973. In 1929 the total expenditures of state, local, and federal government amounted to only 10 percent of the Nation's gross national product, today they consume almost a third of the GNP. Nor Is the much debated defense budget responsible for the growth in size and power of government. Except for a temporary interruption during the Vietnam years, the defense budget as a percent of gross national product has been de clining steadily for two decades. Between fiscal years 1968 and 1974 defense expenditures did not rise at all, and they have declined by about one-fourth after rough correction for inflation. During that same period, so-called human resources 6 spending mushroomed at a rapid rate. Of the $90 billion increase in federal spending, $60 billion went for social security, veterans’ benefits and welfare. Another $15 billion went for health, education, and manpower. Most of the balance went to finance the rising interest bill on the ever-mounting national debt. In the budgetary sense of the term, all of this might well be considered ’’uncontrollable." Indeed, when all the ’’uncon trollable’’ items are listed in the budget each year, there seems to be very little left to cut. Our budget, however, is un controllable, only if we accept the false assumption that once a law is enacted by Congress, it can never be altered or repealed In a time when inflation, fueled partly by federal spending, has become the true scourge of the American working class, I do not accept that proposition. Let me make my position clear. I am not opposed to government social programs. I am not opposed to increases in worthwhile programs -- nor the introduction of new endeavors. Ours is a prosperous and wealthy nation with the wherewithal to more than adequately meet its social obligations. But we have been trying to have it both ways. We want the expensive social programs -- or seem to -- but we don’t want to pay the taxes to support them. The bill is presented all the same and must be paid. The inflation created in substantial part by the fiscal policies of the past dozen years is truly the cruelest of all taxes -- and the most insidious. Speculation and debt have been rewarded; savings and thrift penalized. Perhaps not even the Vietnam war itself has done more to sap confidence in the Government of the United States and the future than this inflation, this surreptitious tax which has quietlyxonsumed the savings and pensions and insurance of the working people of this nation year in and year out for the last decade. Not the Arab nations of the Middle East nor the drought of the Middle West created the inflation we know today. Yes, the rising price of oil and gas, and the rising price of food and fiber contributed materially to the intensity of our presen inflation. But the ultimate burden of responsibility must rest squarely upon the Government of the United States. With the exception of these special one time factors, inflation is hPt an import; it is home-grown; it is produced right here in the United States, right in the Nation’s capital. - 7 The time has finally come to bring federal spending under genuine control. President Ford has announced his intention to set a spending target of less than $300 billion for the current fiscal year. That will not be easy. It will require very painful political decisions. There is reason for some optimism since Congress has revised its own budgetary procedures and stands ready to cooperate in the essential effort. Yet it is a measure of how uncontrollable federal spending has become that even if we are successful --and that is by no means certain -- federal spending will still rise by $30 billion over the previous year -- more than 10 percent. Is it any wonder that we have inflation? The Federal budget is well on its way to becoming an economic juggernaut. We must bring it under control before it smashes all hope for our long-run financial stability. The Conference on Inflation The importance of controlling inflation is widely recognized. I have emphasized my own belief that we should avoid wage and price controls like the plague and work to bring our runaway federal budget under control. But the inflation problem is complex and worldwide. No simple remedies are at hand. If there were an easy way out, someone would have found it long ago. I think we have taken a big step in the right direction by initiating the series of conferences on inflation leading up to the final sessions on September 27 and 28. These are, as you know, bipartisan in conception and execution. The conferences will draw on the best thinking this Nation can bring to bear on the inflation problem. They allow the public to see, and although on a necessarily limited scale, to participate directly in a dialog on the major economic problem of our time. F A cynic might say that government conferences and commissions are sometimes used to push problems out of sight. Or that government conferences are convenient ways to set a private stamp of approval on a course of action government is To take away. Neither charge is valid in the present situation. 8 The conferences on inflation are a genuine effort to examine as intensively as we can the courses of action open to us. We do not expect unanimity of opinion. It may be that no clear consensus will emerge. But the process strikes me as very worthwhile. The conferences to this point have been interesting, stimulating, and even provocative at times. They have also had the beneficial result of contributing to the long slow process of educating the American people to how complex and difficult the inflationary problem is. I am looking forward with great anticipation to our own Treasury conference on banking and finance this Friday, and the other meetings to come. The entire process is in our best national tradition --open, direct and oriented to solving a problem. Conclusion We have a most serious problem in the current inflation there is no doubt about that. I am confident, however, that by working together we can find a solution and over time get the economy back on a path of steady growth with reasonably stable prices. Why am I optimistic? Primarily because the inflation problem is now beginning to get the undivided attention of the Nation and its Government. Perhaps by the time of our Bicentennial, we will have demonstrated that as in the time of Thomas Jefferson and Adam Smith good economics has once again become good politics. 0 O0 DepartmentoftheTREASURY HINGTON, D C 20220 TELEPHONE W04-2041 FOR RELEASE 6:30 P.M. September 16, 1974 RESULTS OF TREASURY’S WEEKLY BILL AUCTIONS Tenders for $2.5 billion of 13-week Treasury bills and for $ 1 . 8 billion of 26-week Treasury bills, both series to be issued on September 19, 1974, were opened at the Federal Reserve Banks today. The details are as follows: RANGE OF ACCEPTED COMPETITIVE BIDS: 13-week bills maturing December 19 , 1974 Price High Low Average 97.942 97.923 97.931 Equivalent Annual Rate 8.142% 8.217% 8.185% 11 26-week bills maturing March 20, 1975 Price Equivalent Annual Rate 95.865 a/ 95.815 " 95.853 8.179% 8.278% 8.203% 1/ a/ Excepting 1 tender of $2,425,000 Tenders at the low price for the 13-week bills were allotted 21%. Tenders at the low price for the 26-week bills were allotted 44%. TOTAL TENDERS APPLIED FOR AND ACCEPTED BY FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICTS: District Applied For Accepted Boston $ 63,090,000 $ 42,865,000 New York 3,678,485,000 2,020,655,000 Philadelphia 47,975,000 40,830,000 Cleveland 83,215,000 58,195,000 Richmond 41,675,000 38,130,000 Atlanta 58,570,000 37,630,000 Chicago 234,140,000 47,140,000 St. Louis 50,285,000 29,670,000 38,925,000 Minneapolis 6,225,000 Kansas City 62,140,000 41,105,000 Dallas 35,060,000 24,060,000 211,515,000 San Francisco 114,460,000 TOTALS Applied For $ 35,240,000 2,404,315,000 34,450,000 52,465,000 41,070,000 35,640,000 167,335,000 42,060,000 26,550,000 34,885,000 26,745,000 169,315,000 $4,605,075,000 $2,500,965,000 b/$3,07 0,07 0,000 Accepted $ 22,205,000 1,486,250,000 17,995,000 41,225,000 23,220,000 24,635,000 75,540,000 24,850,000 6,310,000 26,780,000 14,745,000 36,330,000 $1,800,085,000 c/ includes $574,855,000 noncompetitive tenders accepted at average price. 1/ The se rates are on a bank-discount basis. The equivalent coupon-issue yields are 8.47% for the 13-week bills, and 8.68% for the 26-week bills. FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE September 16,1974 TREASURY FINANCING TO USE NEW BIDDING METHOD The Treasury will refund the $2.0 billion of notes maturing on September 30, 1974, by auctioning $2.0 billion of 2-year notes maturing September 30, 1976. This is the first rollover of the quarterly cycle of 2-year maturities started in 1972. The auction will be held on Tuesday, September 24. For the first time in a Treasury auction, bidding will be on a yield basis rather than a price basis. Bidders are asked to state the percentage yield they will accept to two decimal places, for example 8.47 percent. The coupon will be set, after the auction, to the 1/8 of one percent which is nearest to the average yield on accepted tenders and which produces an average price at or below par. Each successful competitive bidder will pay the price equivalent to his bid. Noncompetitive bidders will pay the average price. The new bidding method will permit pricing close to par and eliminate the risk of setting a coupon which, because of a change in the market between the coupon announcement date and the auction date, would result, on the one hand, in a price so far above par as to discourage bidders or, on the other hand, result in a price so low that the sale would have to be cancelled to avoid placing the purchasers in an unanticipated tax position in which the excess of the ma turity value over the initial discount price would be taxable as ordinary income. To shorten the time between the auction date and the issue date, coupon securities will not be delivered on the issue date of September 30. They will be delivered on or about October 8. However, any successful bidder who needs a security for trading, collateral or other purposes before the delivery date may request an interim certificate. Interim certificates will be bearer securities, equivalent in all respects to the 2-year Treasury notes except that they will not have coupons attached and must be exchanged for regular coupon securities in order to collect interest. (Over) - 2- Each tender for the notes must be in the amount of $10,000 or a multiple thereof, the same minimum tender required on Treasury bills of a maturity up to one year. Previous auctions of two-year notes have permitted tenders as low as $1,000, the minimum tender normally required on sales of longer term Treasury bonds. The decision to in crease the minimum tender on this auction was taken in the light of current liquidity drains on thrift institutions upon which the nation depends for the bulk of its mortgage finance for housing. oOo oftheTREASURY Department ISHINGTON, D C. 20220 TELEPH0fÉ»ffl4-2Q41 llllllIl r September 16, 1974 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE TREASURY FINANCING The Treasury will auction under competitive and noncompetitive bidding $2.0 billion, or thereabouts, of 2-year notes to refund the same amount of notes maturing September 30, 1974. The coupon rate for the notes will be determined after tenders are allotted. Some of the notes will be allotted to Government accounts and the Federal Reserve Banks in exchange, on a noncompetitive basis, for any portion of their $0.2 billion holdings of the maturing notes that they choose to exchange. The method of auction to be used for this issue of notes will differ from Ithat used for previous auctions of Treasury securities. Competitive tenders for these new notes must be expressed in terms of annual yield in two decimal places, e.g., 8.47, rather than in terms of a price, as has been the procedure in other auctions. Tenders at the lowest yields, and noncompetitive tenders, will be accepted to the extent required to attain the $2.0 billion offered. After a determination is made as to which tenders are accepted, a coupon yield will be [determined to the nearest 1/8 of 1 percent necessary to make the average accepted [price 100.00 or less. That will be the rate of interest that will be paid on all |of the notes. Based on such interest rate, the price on each competitive tender Iallotted will be determined and each successful competitive bidder will pay the ¡price corresponding to the yield he bid. Price calculations will be carried to Itwo decimal places on the basis of price per hundred, e.g., 99.92, and the Ideterminations of the Secretary of the Treasury shall be final. Tenders at a ■yield that will produce a price less than 99.51 will not be accepted. The notes to be issued will be Treasury Notes of Series J-1976 dated ■September 30, 1974, due September 30, 1976 (CUSIP No. 912827 DX7) with interest ■payable semiannually on March 31 and September 30. They will be issued in registered land bearer form in denominations of $10,000, $100,000 and $1,000,000, and in |book-entry form to designated bidders. Delivery of bearer notes will be made on or ■about October 8, 1974. A purchaser of bearer notes may elect to receive an ■interim certificate on September 30, which shall be a bearer security exchangeable |at face value for Treasury Notes of Series J-1976 when available. Tenders will be received up to 1:30 p.m., Eastern Daylight Saving time, ¡Tuesday, September 24, at any Federal Reserve Bank or Branch and at the Bureau of ■the Public Debt, Securities Transactions Branch,Washington, D. C. 20226; provided, fowever, that noncompetitive tenders will be considered timely received if they are ¡mailed to any such agency under a postmark no later than Monday, September 23. Pach tender must be in the amount of $10,000 or a multiple thereof, and all tenders fust state the yield, if a competitive tender, or the term "noncompetitive” , if a noncompetitive tender. The notation "TENDER FOR TREASURY NOTES" should be printed ft the bottom of envelopes in which tenders are submitted. The Secretary of the Treasury expressly reserves the right to accept or reject iny or all tenders, in whole or in part, including the right to accept more or less than $2,000,000,000 of tenders, and his action in any such respect shall be final. Subject to these reservations, noncompetitive tenders for $500,000 or less will be tccepted in full at the average price of accepted competitive tenders, which price - 2- will be 100.00 or less. Commercial banks, which for this purpose are defined as banks accepting demand deposits, and dealers who make primary markets in Government securities and report daily to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York their positions with respect to Government securities and borrowings thereon, may submit tenders for the account of customers, provided the names of the customers are set forth in such tenders. Others will not be permitted to submit tenders except for their own account. Tenders will be received without deposit from commercial and other banks for their own account, Federally^-insured savings and loan associations, States, political subdivisions or instrumentalities thereof, public pension and retirement I and other public funds, international organizations in which the United States holds membership, foreign central banks and foreign States, dealers who make primary markets in Government securities and report daily to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York their positions with respect to Government securities and borrowing I thereon, Federal Reserve Banks, and Government accounts. Tenders from others must be accompanied by payment of 5 percent of the face amount of notes applied for. Payment for accepted tenders must be completed on or before Monday, September 30, 1974. Payment must be made at the Federal Reserve Bank or Branch or at the Bureau of the Public Debt in cash, 6% Treasury Notes of Series E-1974, which will be accepted at par, or other funds immediately available to the Treasury I by that date. Where full payment is not completed in funds available by the paymenl I date, the allotment will be canceled and the deposit with the tender up to 5 percent I of the amount of notes allotted will be subject to forfeiture to the United States, I The Treasury will construe as timely payment any check drawn to the order of the Federal Reserve Bank or the United States Treasury that is received at such bank or at the Treasury by Wednesday, September 25, 1974, provided the check is drawn on a bank in the Federal Reserve District of the bank or office to which the I tender is submitted, Other checks will constitute payment only if they are fully and finally collected by the payment date. Checks not so collected will subject the investor's deposit to forfeiture as set forth in the preceding paragraph. A check payable other than at a Federal Reserve Bank received on the payment date will not constitute immediately available funds on that date. Commercial banks are prohibited from making unsecured loans, or loans collateralized in whole or in part by the securities bid for, to cover the deposits | required to be paid when tenders are entered, and they will be required to make the usual certification to that effect. Other lenders are requested to refrain from making such loans. All bidders are required to agree not to purchase or to sell, or to make any agreements with respect to the purchase or sale or other disposition of the notes bid for under this offering at a specific rate or price, until after 1:30 p.m., Eastern Daylight Saving time, Tuesday, September 24, 1974. REMARKS OF JOHN A. BUSHNELL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY FOR DEVELOPING NATIONS FINANCE BEFORE THE CONSULTING ENGINEERS COUNCIL AND THE INTERNATIONAL ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES COUNCIL AT THE INTERNATIONAL CLUB, WASHINGTON, D. C. 12:00 NOON, SEPTEMBER 17, 1974 The International Development Banks and Procurement Mr; Chairman, Gentlemen: As a newcomer to problems of the international development banks and procurement, I appreciate this opportunity to obtain your views and suggestions. We at the Treasury Department have found our relationships with the Consulting Engineers Council and the International Engineering and Construction Industries Council to be fruitful. Personal contacts -- and particularly the two Hershey Conferences on procurement -have made possible the sort of dialogue between business and government that help us in our efforts to improve the procurement systems of the development banks. Too often the role and the importance to economic develop ment of the international development banks -- and of other aid programs --is considered only in terms of the amounts of financing provided. This is not my view. The great ad vantage developing countries have today in comparison with economies which modernized a half-century ago is that they can tap the immense reservoir of technical and managerial expertise that has been built up in the developed economies. This knowledge and experience is what is really valuable for the less developed countries. The financial resources pro vided through the development banks and other assistance programs are mainly just a means of purchasing this knowledge whether the knowledge is transmitted through such services as your firms provide or in the machinery and equipment pur chased with the loans. 2 In short, I believe the underlying basis of economic development is precisely the sort of knowledge and expertise which is your business. One need look no further than the eagerness of those countries with newly increased oil revenues to acquire such services to confirm the paramount importance of your services. Increasingly the communist countries are showing the same sort of eagerness to tap the cumulative experience of the U.S. technical community. Given my philosophy on this point, a key question I would like to raise with you today is how well do the de velopment banks do in maximizing the transfer of technical and management skills to the less developed countries? How could they do better? The bottom line on the annual statement for the development banks should be their total contribution to development through the provision of technology, funds, and encouragement to adopt economic policies to support economic and social development. But the bottom line for your firms depends on how much business you can get in competition with your competitors from around the world. I have lots of opportunities to hear from various developing countries how they think the banks are doing. This is an opportunity for me to hear from you what your problems are. We believe your Organization is vital for articulating U.S. business needs to the various executive departments of the government. It is also important for explaining to the Congress the importance of the international development banks to long-range U.S. interests. In these times of rapid inter national political and economic change, the importance of these banks in fostering open market economies cannot be underestimated. Their efforts in the areas of institution building, good economic management, financial efficiency, rational economic planning, and international trade are conducive to the development of private enterprise. And all of this brings the borrowing countries into the international financial and commercial system. Contrary to popular belief the banks actually help the U.S. economy, even in the short run. The net balance of pay ments result of U.S. participation in the World Bank, for example, has been positive in four of the last five fiscal years, with a combined net inflow of $1.5 billion. Procure ment generated by the international financial institutions’ loans is important not only for the U.S. trade account but also for market penetration and the transfer of American technology to the developing countries. 2 . \\6 In short, I believe the underlying basis of economic development is precisely the sort of knowledge and expertise which is your business. One need look no further than the eagerness of those countries with newly increased oil revenues to acquire such services to confirm the paramount importance of your services. Increasingly the communist countries are showing the same sort of eagerness to tap the cumulative experience of the U.S. technical community. Given my philosophy on this poini , a key question I would like to raise with you today is how well do the de velopment oanks do in maximizing the transfer of technical and management skills to the less developed countries? How could they do better? The bottom line on the annual statement for the development banks should be their total contribution to development through the provision of technology, funds, and encouragement to adopt economic policies to support economic and social development. But the bottom line for your firms depends on how much business you can get in competition with your competitors from around the world. I have lots of opportunities to hear from various developing countries how they think the banks are doing. This is an opportunity for me to hear from you what your problems are. We believe your organization is vital for articulating U.S. business needs to the various executive departments of the government. It is also important for explaining to the Congress the importance of the international development banks to long-range U.S. interests. In these times of rapid inter national political and economic change, the importance of these banks in fostering open market economies cannot be underestimated. Their efforts in the areas of institution building, good economic management, financial efficiency, rational economic planning, and international trade are conducive to the development of private enterprise. And all of this brings the borrowing countries into the international financial and commercial system. Contrary to popular belief the banks actually help the U.S. economy, even in the short run. The net balance of pay ments result of U.S. participation in the World Bank, for example, has been positive in four of the last five fiscal years, with a combined net inflow of $1.5 billion. Procure ment generated by the international financial institutions’ loans is important not only for the U.S. trade account but also for market penetration and the transfer of American technology to the developing countries. 3 I'm sure you are interested in the current lending outlook in the banks and the possible effects on U.S. procurement. In the fiscal year ending last June, World Bank and Inter national Development Association lending commitments reached $4.3 billion, an increase of about 27 percent over the previous year. Similarly, the Inter-American Development Bank increased lending in 1973 by 11 percent ov°r 1972 to reach $880 million. The Asiar Development Ba^k, the youngest regional bank to which we belong, hopes to commit $400 million calendar year o.nd to increase lending Dy $30 million annually over the next few years. The types of projects funded may be almost as important in determining the amount of U.S. procurement share as the overall lending level. Many of you may think that the policies being stressed to reach the poorest 40 percent of the world's population will lead to a reduction of lending for power, transportation, communications and large-scale industry as the banks increasingly commit themselves to rural development, education, rural water supply, population, and urban develop ment projects. But the dollar amount of conventional infrastructure loans is not decreasing, and will likely not decrease in the near future even though lending for the socalled social sectors may rise as a percentage of total commitments. It is, of course, true that loans for the social sector involve more local procurement than conventional infrastructure projects. But I understand that so far the United States has done reasonably well in procurement on projects in these sec tors. To maintain this record American firms will need to be flexible and aggressive. Specifically for you consulting engineers, those firms which adapt to the multi-disciplinary approach implied in these projects will be particularly suc cessful in working on the various bank projects in the years ahead. The geographic distribution of loans by the international financial institutions with major increases for the poorest areas of the world -- mainly in Africa and Asia -- represents a challenge for the United States as we are not as strong, commercially, in these regions as we are in our traditional trade areas of Latin America and Europe. 4 However, with this international financial institutions’ expansion in Africa and Asia -- where historically Europe and Japan dominated trade -- I believe American exporters will come to appreciate more fully the objectivity of international competititve bidding system used by the banks. We believe that the banks’ procurement systems ensure efficiency of public expenditures and equity as regards sources of supply among member countries. And while we, as a member country of the banks, will work to improve procurement operations, we do not believe that a superior alternative procurement system exists. Specifically, we do not anticipate any change in tne policy that, in general, procurement be open to all member countries of each respective bank. Tying contributions to procurement from a single country would be contrary to the international nature and economic goals of these institutions, and could work to our detriment. Under the current system, for each dollar the U.S. contributes to the banks, American firms are eligible for approximately three dollars on procurement contracts, because the U.S. contribution is matched by con tributions from others. We have an equal opportunity to compete and our success will depend on our motivation and abilities. Declining U.S. procurement shares during the recent past reflected, in large part, the over-valuation of the dollar relative to other major world currencies. However, with the dollar devaluation and rates of inflation in some other de velopment countries even higher than ours, international competitive bidding rules have again begun to help American firms overcome European advantages in Africa and Japanese predominance in Asia. We just received the latest results on U.S. procurement from our executive director at the Asian Development Bank. As of June 30 of this year, the U.S. share or procurement, including consultant services, from the ADB’s Ordinary Capital operations stood at 12.4 percent; this represents a steady increase from a level of about 8 percent a year ago. A recent General Accounting Office report credits exchange realignments for a 70 percent increase in foreign contracts won by American engineering and construction firms in 1973 in connection with projects financed from all sources, including the international financial institutions. A jump from a 1972 figure of $3.6 billion to $6.1 billion in one year is a welcome sign for all U.S. exporters. Of course, the American consulting firms represented here are in a more enviable position than the remainder of American business. You represent an industry where our 5 competitive advantage is particularly great and your share of bank-generated procurement was 36 percent for the Interna tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development in fiscal year 1973 and 34 percent for the Asian Development Bank in calendar year 1973. For the Inter-American Development Bank we do not have an exact figure, but the percentage is even higher be cause of our strong competitive position in this hemisphere. To the extent that American consultants get contracts, we may be assured that U.S. suppliers and contractors p^e not dis couraged. Turning to the U.S. Government’s po15cy towards the in" ternational development banks, you can be confident that our support and leadership role in the multilateral development institutions will be continued. One of President Ford’s first acts upon taking office was to sign the $1.5 billion International Development Association replenishment bill. Just last week in a message to the Congress, the President reiterated his support for the Asian and African Development Bank authorization bills. And yesterday, in a letter to Congressman Gonzalez President Ford wrote, "Like the other international development lending institutions in which the United States participates, the Asian Development Bank supports important international economic and foreign policy objectives of the United States." As I said, the Administration supports the authorizing legislation before the House for $412 million for the Asian Development Bank and a $15 million contribution to the African Development Fund. Over the next few years we anticipate U.S. funding of these banks to continue on a scale reflecting our economic strength and interests in the developing countries of the world. As with other members of these banks, we want to ensure our fair sliare of procurement. In the last two or three years the Departments of Treasury, State and Commerce have sought to increase government support of U.S. business efforts to obtain contracts arising from international financial institu tions’ loans. The State Department has invigorated its commercial representation abroad and Commerce has instituted a number of information programs -- the Exporters Information Reference Room and the the TOPS computerized information system should be known to you. We at Treasury, through the Officevof International Development Banks and through our executive directors at the international financial institutions, have sought to monitor and modify, where necessary, the international financial institutions’ procurement policies. 6 At Treasury’s instigation, various studies of specific procurement practices have been undertaken; the quality, quantity, and promptness of early warning information has been improved; and data reporting on the U.S. procurement share has been upgraded. We will remain responsive to the views of organizations like the Consulting Engineers Council. Along that line, I should say a few words about a recent General Accounting Office report, which some ox you have see.., entitled "Improved Government Supperl Can Increase U.S. Share of Foreign Engineering and Construction Projects;" One GAO recommendation was that Treasury seek a cnange in the World Bank guidelines that discourage the short-listing of more than two consulting firms from any one country. We have investi gated this issue and are not sure that such a modification would be to your benefit. The rule is not now rigidly en forced and, as it stands, could work in favor of U.S. firms, given the increasing bank emphasis on Africa and Asia, where an expansion of the short-lists would probably hurt rather than help you to get more business. The existing policy gives borrowers the benefit of diversity in project experience and technical approach. The GAO report also mentions a topic about which we have been deeply concerned -- accusations of bias in the banks. A consultant was hired by Treasury to investigate the problem and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has also explored the question. Neither the IBRD, Treasury, nor our executive directors have uncovered any evidence of bias. For the few instances of substantial improper behavior generally on the part of borrowers or consultants -- remedial machinery exists with in the institution and has been utilized by our executive directors. We are prepared to react most strongly If evidence of bias is produced. Currently, U.S. nationals comprise 26.5 percent of the World Bank’s professional staff, approximately 25 percent of Inter-American Development Bank’s professional staff, and nearly 10 percent of the Asian Development Bank’s professionals But we want to see more Americans in the Bank’s staffs -- not because we expect our own citizens to compromise the inter national character of the banks -- but because the institutions will benefit from American expertise and outlook. You consulting engineers can be proud of your share of international financial institutions-generated procurement. But for ultimate American success, you and your colleagues in business and we in government must rededicate ourselves to aggressive marketing, hard work and Yankee ingenuity. You ( - 7 - have a great deal to offer the developing countries, But a maximum contribution to development and to your own profits will require aggressive efforts on the spot in developing countries. To continue helping you we must have your views on a regular B*sis, because it is only your practical experienc? tnat can give us realistic guidance in this matter of pro curement. Since m my job I have .major responsibility for overseeing the U.S. Government rcie in relation to the inter national financial institutions, I would especially like to have your candid views. 0O0 Department of theTREA SU RY lASHINGTON, D,C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04 2041 September 17, 1974 NOTE TO FINANCIAL WRITERS: Jack F. Bennett, Undersecretary for Monetary Affairs of the Department of the Treasury, will hold a backgrounder on international monetary issues and the IMF/IBRD annual meeting Wednesday, September 25, at 4 pm. The backgrounder will take place in Room 4121, Main Treasury building. of TREASURY Department the MHINGTON, O.C. 20220 p TELEPHONE W04 2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE September 17, TREASURY’S WEEKLY BILL OFFERING The Department of the Treasury, by this public notice, invites tenders for two series of Treasury bills to the aggregate amount of $4,300,000,000 , or ¡thereabouts, to be issued September 26, 1974, as follows: 91-day bills (to maturity date) in the amount of $2,500,000 000» or [thereabouts, representing an additional amount of bills dated June 27, 1974 [and to mature December 26, 1974 (CUSIP No. 912793 VE3)» originally issued in [the amount of $ 1,900,585,00ft the additional and original bills to be freely [interchangeable. 182-day bills, for $1,800,000,000, or thereabouts, to be dated September 26, 1974, and to mature March 27, 1975 (CUSIP No. 912793 WB8) • The bills will be issued for cash and in exchange for Treasury bills maturing [September 26, 1974, outstanding in the amount of $4,501,665,000, of which ¡Government accounts and Federal Reserve Banks, for themselves and as agents of [foreign and international monetary authorities, presently hold $2,554,865,000. ¡These accounts may exchange bills they hold for the bills now being offered at Ithe average prices of accepted tenders. The bills will be issued on a discount basis under competitive and non competitive bidding, and at maturity their face amount will be payable without ¡interest. They will be issued in bearer form in denominations of $10,000, $100,000, $500,000 and $1,000,000 (maturity value), and in »ook-entry form to designated bidders. »15,000, $50,000, lenders will be received at Federal Reserve Banks and Branches up to Pne-thirty p.m., Eastern Daylight Saving time, Monday, September 23, 1974. Penders will not be received at the Department of the Treasury, Washington. Pach tender must be for a minimum of $10,000. multiples of $5,000. Tenders over $10,000 must be in In the case of competitive tenders the price offered must | ^‘Pressed on the basis of 100, with not more than three decimals, e.g., 99.925. fractions may not be used. banking institutions and dealers who make primary markets in Government (OVER) - 2- securities and report daily to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York their positions with respect to Government securities and borrowings thereon may submit tenders for account of customers provided the names of the customers are set forth in such tenders. own account. Others will not be permitted to submit tenders except for their Tenders will be received without deposit from incorporated banks and trust companies and from responsible and recognized dealers in investment securities. Tenders from others must be accompanied by payment of 2 percent of the face amount of bills applied for, unless the tenders are accompanied by an express guaranty of payment by an incorporated bank or trust company. Public announcement will be made by the Department of the Treasury of the amount and price range of accepted bids. Those submitting competitive tenders will be advised of the acceptance or rejection thereof. The Secretary of the Treasury expressly reserves the right to accept or reject any or all tenders, in who lie or in part, and his action in any such respect shall be final. Subject to these reservations, noncompetitive tenders for each issue for $200,000 or less without stated price from any one bidder will be accepted in full at the average price (in three decimals) of accepted competitive bids for the respective issues. Settlement for accepted tenders in accordance with the bids must be made or completed at the Federal Reserve Bank or Branch on September 26, 1974, in cash or other immediately available funds or in a like face amount of Treasury bills maturing September 26, 1974. ment. Cash and exchange tenders will receive equal treat Cash adjustments will be made for differences between the par value of maturing bills accepted in exchange and the issue price of the new bills. Under Sections 454(b) and 1221(5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 the amount of discount at which bills issued hereunder are sold is considered to accrue when the bills are sold, redeemed or otherwise disposed of, and the bills are excluded from consideration as capital assets. Accordingly, the owner of bills (other than life insurance companies) issued hereunder must include in his Federal income tax return, as ordinary gain or loss, the difference between the price paid for the bills, whether on original issue or on subsequent purchase, and the amount actually received either upon sale or redemption at maturity during the taxable year for which the return is made. Department of the Treasury Circular No. 418 (current revision) and this notic prescribe the terms of the Treasury bills and govern the conditions of their issue. Branch. Copies of the circular may be obtained from any Federal Reserve Bank or of TREASURY Department the »SHINGTON. D C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04-2041 FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY 10:00 A .M . SEPTF.MRER 17 , 1974 . ------------------------------------- 1-------------------------------------------------- i ------------------STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM E. SIMON SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY BEFORE THE HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE WASHINGTON, D, C. SEPTEMBER 17, 1974 . f \ N J Mr. Chairman and Members of this Committee: I am glad to be here this morning to participate in these first hearings of the House Budget Committee. I have been an enthusiastic supporter of budget reform since I first came to the Treasury, and I am pleased to see that you are moving so very promptly to implement the Budget Reform and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. This is an important time for the Budget Committee to begin its work. In my judgment, there is nothing we can do that is more important for the economic welfare of the American people than to reduce the very rapid momentum that has built up in the growth of Federal expenditures.. We need a strengthened decision making process to impose discipline on the budget. The need for more effective control over federal expenditures has been apparent for some years, but the emergence of intolerably rapid rates of inflation has recently brought the issues into much sharper focus. How did we get into this inflationary mess? I will not try to retrace all the causes of the current inflation, or try to fix the blame one place or another. Without too much risk of oversimplification, I think it is fair to say that the price explosion of 1973-74 is primarily attributable to (a) a series of severe temporary shocks that originated mostly outside the U. S. economic system and (b) almost a decade of excessively stimulative fiscal and monetary policies. The outside shocks are, by now, familiar to all of ns: the world-wide agricultural crop failures of 1972, enormous pressures on the prices of internationally traded WS-103 2 raw materials, two devaluation of the dollar, and the Arab oil embargo. In addition, the end of the controls program has been operating as an additional temporary force to raise some prices and wages faster than otherwise would have been the case. Taken together, these temporary factors may explain upwards of one-half of our current rate of inflation. All these special factors, as important as they have been, are of a temporary, one-shot nature. Had our general economic policies not been too stimulative, the outside shocks would have had only a one-time effect. Once they had worked their way through the system, the inflation would have settled down again to a tolerable rate. But our general economic policies have, in fact, been far too stimulative for a long period of time. Let me give you two examples of how policy changed in the mid1960s. First, on the fiscal side: from 1955 to 1965 Federal expenditures rose at roughly a 6 percent annual rate. From 1965 to 1974, however, Federal expenditures surged to a 10 percent annual rate of growth. This rapid spending growth created huge Federal deficits which, coming as they did during periods of high business activity, added enormously to economic demands. These deficits were, therefore, directly responsible for creating strong upward pressures on the price level. Second, monetary policy also broke out of a previously established pattern. From 1955 to 1965 the money supply grew at a 2 1/2 percent rate. Since then, the growth rate has more than doubled to a 6 percent annual pace. It is no accident that during the earlier period we had a rather stable price performance, but since 1965 we have had the worst peacetime inflation in our history. What has and is happening, then, is that the excessive budget deficits and the excessive growth of money and credit in recent years prevented the "temporary*' price pressures from running their course and fading away. Instead, much of the inflation from the outside shocks is or soon will be deeply embedded in our entire system. It is or soon will be embedded into the pattern of wage 3 settlements and into the structure of interest rates. It is or soon will be embedded into the economic expectations of consumers, of workers, of investors, of businessmen -everybody. And because this inflation is becoming so deeply embedded, squeezing it out of the system will be a long, tough process. It is a most difficult challenge for economic policy. 1^2 ' ) Our only viable primary policy, in my opinion, is to apply the necessary fiscal and monetary discipline persistently and consistently to keep total demands on the economy within the limits of its capacity to produce. This will also help us achieve the premier long-term goal of economic policy, which is to make sure that during the next decade our economy generates the enormous volume of savings and investment that will be necessary for Project Independence, new mass-transit systems, housing, environmental improvement, and all the other capital re quirements of our society. I beleive that we will have to raise the share of national output devoted to savings and investment by a substantial margin. It is not widely recognized that our investment performance has been relatively poor. Since 1960, plant and equipment spending in the United States was only 15 percent of total output, whereas France invested 18 percent, Germany 20 percent and Japan 27 percent. And furthermore, for gross domestic investment (which includes inventories, housing and public investment), the proportions for 1973 are: United States 17 percent, France 26 percent, Germany 25 percent and Japan 37 percent. It will not be a simple matter to raise our investment share; quite the contrary. We will have to change our many policies that encourage consumption at the expense of savings and investment. Among the most important changes that we will have to make is to maintain regular surpluses in the budget, so that the Federal Government would be adding to the supply of savings available to the private economy, instead of using up those savings -- as we have been doing in 13 of the past 14 years. If we could main tain, on average, a budget surplus equal to even one-half percent of GNP, we would add about 3 percent to the flow 4 of savings available to the private sector. And the chances are that over the longer term we will need an appreciable budget surplus to augment the stream of private savings. On this point, I think we should remember that the Federal Government has a greater impact on the financial markets than is indicated by the deficit in the Unified Budget For one thing, the Export-Import Bank and the Postal Service are not in the budget and, correspondingly, their credit demands do not get included in the budget deficit. Much more important, there is a large volume of credit that is guaranteed by Federal agencies -- to assist public and private housing, urban and rural development, shipbuilding and railroads, health, education, small business, and other functions. These all represent demands that we in the Government place on the financial markets. It is not often realized how large these demands are; in fact, in many years the net borrowings for these programs exceed the deficit in the Unified Budget, as shown in the table below. (Note that these figures do not include the borrowings of the Federally sponsored agencies: the Federal National Mortgage Association the Home Loan Bank System, and the Farm Credit System.) Fiscal Year 1971 39 72 ]9 73 1974 Unifled Budget Deficit •(b i.I 1 ions o f Additional Federa 1 Cred it doll a rif} Total -23.0 -23.2 -14.3 - 3.5 -16.8 -18.0 -15.6 -16.8 -39.8 -41 .2 -29.9 -20.3 J 975 (est.)-H .1 -14.9 -26.3 5 If the sponsored agencies are also added in, the Federal presence in the credit markets reaches rather startling dimensions. In the fiscal year 1973, total Federal and Federally assisted borrowings accounted for abobt 60 percent of all the funds raised through borrowings in the capital markets. This is a trend which concerns me greatly. I hope that your Committee will take a large view of its responsibilities and look beyond the budget, as it is conventionally defined, to the off-budget outlays, credit guarantees, and government actions generally that commit economic resources and add to the already heavy pressures on our capital markets. Let me emphasize that the fight against inflation will take years. There are no shortcuts, no acceptable quick solutions. The balanced application of fiscal and monetary restraint is the answer. Balance is the word I want to stress. When the budget is weak and overstimulates the economy, the monetary authorities have no choice but to bear the entire burden of stabilization policy. This places heavy strain on our financial markets and imposes a dis proportionate adjustment on particular sectors, such as housing. More fiscal restraint would remove the need to press monetary restraint quite so hard. There are those who question the effectiveness of restrictive fiscal policy to counter these fundamental inflationary pressures. In my view, however, the evidence of experience is clear that fiscal restraint applied con sistently and in tandem with monetary restraint can bring inflation under control. Inflation is an exceedingly complex process and no simple chart will ever be able to give us the answer to the inflation problem. I believe, however, that the attached chart captures the essence of the budget’s contribution to the control of inflation. It can be seen that the actual budget position (top panel) does not correlate closely with the rate of infaltion (bottom panel). This is where the full employment budget proves itself to be a useful guide to economic policy. The full employment calculation adjusts the budget data to remove the impact of the economy on the budget, and thereby brings out the impact of the budget on the economy. When the full employment budget position (middle panel) is compared to the rate of inflation, a fairly striking pattern emerges. There is a strong general re lationship between the two. In the broad sweep of things, it is clear that sustained and sizable budget surpluses are associated with below-average inflation and sustained and sizable budget deficits are associated with above-average inflation. 6 There are two years during the 26-year span covered by the chart in which the inflation is far higher than can be accounted for by fiscal policy. These years are 1950-1951 and 1973-1974, which were the two occasions when commodity inflation (food and industrial raw materials) had an extra ordinarily large, one-time impact on the general price level. Aside from these two occasions, the relationship strongly supports the general notion that budget deficits are in flationary and budget surpluses are not inflationary. ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENTS Any well-conceived anti-inflation program must also have regard for the casualties of inflation and for those whose earnings may be interrupted for a time by a program of disinflation. Without getting into detail, let me say that I believe we can gradually reduce inflation without suffering massive unemployment. For a time, we will have to live with more unemployment than we would like, but it will not have to be a large amount. To deal with this contingency, we have proposed improvements in our system of unemployment compensation, and I again urge Congressional passage of that legislation. The Administration is also considering whether or not an expansion of the present public service employment program would make a useful contribution to economic stabilization. This is one of the issues on which there has been much discussion, and considerable controversy, at the Conference on Inflation held thus far. Strains in the financial markets have had particularly adverse effects on the housing and utility industries. In May we put forward a $10 billion program to augment the supply of mortgage funds, and on September 11, Federal officials and state utility regulators met to explore solutions to the critical financial problems facing the utility industry. The surging costs of fuel, construction and money have placed intense financial strains on both industries, producing dangerously low earnings for many companies. In the utility industry, regulatory lag has intensified the problems. While state and local regulatory bodies have jurisdiction to act, the Administration is examining what might be done to speed up the needed changes. The Administration believes that raising utility rates now to a level sufficient to cover the real economic costs of providing those services is deflation ary in the long run. The expansion of credit in the housing industry and tax and other Federal initiatives in the utility industry are exactly the kind of solutions which are required now to lay the foundation for gradual disinflation. Some of the necessary economic adjustments will be painful and at times will raise prices in the short run, but all will have a common long-term goal -- reducing and eventually eliminating inflation. -7 WHERE TO CUT It is easy for me to come before you and say that we must cut the budget. The next step, however, is the tough one: Where should the cuts be made? What specific programs are to be eliminated or at least stretched out? This is the nub of the issue, and although the general idea of cutting the budget has gained in popularity, that is almost certainly not true for individual programs. Specific budget cuts are never popular. Nobody wants to see their own high-priority areas cut back; that is entirely understandable. But the time has come when we must make some hard choices. President Ford has announced that our target is a figure in this fiscal year of under $300 billion. If we are to bring the budget in on target, there is no alternative but that some individual programs will have to give way. I think you will agree with me that this hearing is not the place to decide where to cut the budget. We now have a new mechanism that provides the Legislative and Executive Branches of Government with the means to cooperate closely on budget matters, and we should use this mechanism to determine our budget priorities. Another evidence of closer cooperation in the economic area is the fact that the Congress and the Executive Branch have jointly set in motion the series of meetings which will lead up to the Conference on Inflation later this month. I believe these meetings are making an important contribution to the economic education of the American people; the difficult and complex nature of the inflation problem is clear for all to see. I want to stress the cooperative nature of the vital effort to bring the runaway Federal budget under better control. We must strike a necessary balance between what is economically practical and what is politically practical. We must be sure that in making cuts in specific programs we do not turn back the clock on economic and social progress in this Nation. We must take a thoughtful, careful approach to the task of pruning the budget, rather than taking a meatax, across-the-board approach in which the good programs get cut along with the bad. And we also need the kind of tough give-and-take that is the hallmark of democratic government. It will not be an easy task but it is a vital one and I look forward to working on it with you, Mr. Chairman, and the other Members of this Committee. 0O0 -2 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 Percent Change Percent of GNP Percent of GNP NOTES TO CHART Panel 1 The budget data shown here are the actual surpluses and deficits, on a national income accounts basis, for calendar years expressed as a percent of Gross National Product. Note that these data are plotted on an inverted basis in order to provide an easier visual comparison with the inflation rate. Panel 2 These budget data are the same as in Panel 1 except that the surpluses and deficits have been adjusted by the. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis to a full-employment basis by standardizing the figures to a constant 4 percent unemployment rate. The bars are plotted -- for the purpose of better displaying the relationship between the budget and inflation -- as deviations from the average surplus for 1948-73 of 0.8 percent of GNP. (Panel 1 was not plotted this way because the average was virtually equal to zero.) Panel 3 Inflation is represented here by percent changes in the GNP deflator from the previous year. In effect, therefore, the inflation measure is charted with a 6-month lag compared to the budget data in Panels 1 and 2. The bars are plotted as deviations from the 1949-74 average price increase of 2.9 percent. Source of data: U.S. Department of Commerce DepartmentoftheTREASURY ASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04-2041 S e p te m b e r FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 17, 1974 DAVID R. MACDONALD HEADS DELEGATION TO INTERPOL Washington, D.C-Assistant Secretary of the Treasury David R. Macdonald announced today that the United States is participating in the 43rd General Assembly of the International Criminal Policy Organization - INTERPOL - to be held in Cannes, France, September 19-25. The United States Delegation headed by Mr. Macdonald will consist of representatives of the Federal enforcement agencies of Treasury: H. Stuart Knight, Director, U.S. Secret Service; Vernon D. Acree, Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service; Rex D. Davis, Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; and Louis B. Sims, Chief, INTERPOL National Central Bureau. Other representatives will include: Glen E. Pommerening, Assistant Attorney General, and Carl W. Belcher, Chief, General Crimes Section, Department of Justice; Nicholas P. Callahan, Associate Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and John T. Cusack, Chief, International Operations Division, Drug Enforcement Administration; James F. Greene, Deputy Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service; William J. Dailey, Acting Chief, Air Operations Security Division, Federal Aviation Administration; and Lauren J. Goin, Director, Office of Public Safety, Agency for International Development. WS-104 (more) 2 Top criminal enforcement officers from the 120 INTERPOL member countries will be represented at the Assembly. Discussions will range from international crime and narcotic trafficking to counterfeiting, air hijacking and firearms trafficking. INTERPOL is an inter-governmental organization designed to foster mutual international policy assistance on criminal violations and the prevention of crime. 0O0 hlNGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04-2041 FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY SEPTEMBER 19, AT 1:30 P.M. \ STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE WILLIAM E. SIMON SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY BEFORE THE CONFERENCE BOARD AT THE WALDORF ASTORIA HOTEL, NEW YORK, NEW YORK THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1974 AT 1:30 P.M. "INTO THE NEXT DECADE" As we meet here today, the nation is preoccupied with inflation. It is foremost in the concerns of government officials in Washington, and as the surveys clearly show, it is foremost in the minds of the American people. And rightly so. For the current inflation is the worst in our peacetime history. Not only is it eroding the value of the savings, income, pensions, and insurance policies of our people, it is also destroying something more precious: The confidence of Americans in their government, their future, and their free enterprise system. In the unwritten social contract between free citizens and their government, Americans place their faith in the central government to protect the value of the dollars they earn. And in that responsibility the United States Government has failed the American people. A few people actually prosper during inflation. But for most of us, and especially for the poor and the pensioners, there is no safe harbor. To them, the only relevant questions are how long the storm will last -- how much the savings of a lifetime will be carried away. It is thus not only economic stability that dictates an early end to this double-digit inflation -- but social justice as well. Bringing the current inflation under control will not be an easy or painless process. But it is a necessary process, because inflation is the most insidious, regressive and unjust tax a democratic government can impose. WS-105 Some argue that the price of ending inflation is too high, that we cannot afford to cut back on Federal spending, that we cannot accept even slightly higher unemployment, that we cannot pay the kinds of interest rates we have now any longer. Well, I say we cannot afford not to take this medicine now, because allowing the current inflation to continue will bring even more trouble to our economic system. Painful as the cure is going to be, it will be less traumatic and less costly than allowing this double-digit inflation to continue. Over the past decade and a half, political men of both parties made some easy and popular decisions. Today, however, if we are to control inflation, political men of both parties are going to have to make some difficult and unpopular decisions. But it is not the short-term crisis of inflation I want to discuss this afternoon. Rather, it is the long-run future, the prospects for continued prosperity into the next decade. Policies for the Long Run The late Lord Keynes had a famous retort to those who would venture to discuss economics over the long run. "In the long run,” he observed, "we are all dead.*' Well, certainly, that is true of men. But it is not necessarily true of nations and peoples. And if men in high office can resist the temptation to rely on politically attractive short-term palliatives and can instead make the tough but right decisions.here in 1974, we can help achieve, prosperity for the American people in 1980 and 1985. In this regard, the economic factor that we should be most concerned with is the growth in productivity of The American worker, the rate of increase in output per man hour. We know from both economic theory and from history that pro ductivity is a crucial factor in the performance of our economy, because our standard of living cannot rise any faster than the productivity of our workers. Let me repeat that statement for emphasis, because it is a fact of overriding importance: The standard of living of the American people cannot rise faster than the productivity of our workers. If everybody understood that fact, I believe our economic policies could be improved measurably, because 3 we would spend much less time fighting about how to divide up the total economic pie, and more time taking the actions necessary to create a larger pie. Before coming to New York, I reviewed a table containing figures for productivity growth of the major nations of the Western world. From that table, it is immediately evident that between 1960 and 1973, the growth in productivity of the average American worker was the lowest for any major industrial nation in the Western world. Our annual rate of growth in productivity amounted to only about 3% a year -against almost 6% for the French and Germans, and more than 10% for the Japanese. And the reason that the United States stands at the bottom of the scale is very clear. During the same dozen years the United States was devoting only about 18% of its total output to capital investment -- one of the smallest percentages of any nation in the Western world. Among those nations willing to devote a quarter or a third of their output to investment, the rates of productivity growth were double and triple that of the United States. Of course, we want to remember that all investment is not in machines or mortar. We invest as well in our labor force, in making it more skilled and better educated. In fact, this investment in "human" capital probably has as much economic value as our stock of physical capital. And in knowledge and skill of our workers -- although no direct com parisons are available -- it is my guess that the United States is not behind. Each year, the new class of-entrants into the labor force is more capable of coping with changing technology than the last. In addition, we should note the uptrend in spending for new plant and equipment since 1971. At present, that uptrend shows no sign of abating. However, I don’t think the present and prospective volume of capital investment is big enough. It is not enough to satisfy either the expectations of the public, or the promises of our politicians, or most important the basic needs of our economy. Let me list ju-st a few of the demands on our capital in the coming decade. There is an agreed-upon necessity to replenish the existing housing stock, to provide new rapid 4 transit systems for many of our cities, to rebuild some of our basic industries to make them more competitive with those abroad. There is the political commitment to clean up the national environment, and there is Project Independence -our national commitment to bring an end to an excessive American dependence upon foreign sources of energy and oil. Each of these programs will require enormous sums. Each of these programs will have to compete for a limited supply of investment capital with our traditional requirements of re placing schools and plants and other conventional needs. It was with these enormous demands for the investment dollar in mind, that the Council of Economic Advisers was directed to study the nation1s future requirements for in vestment capital. Without predicting or anticipating the results of that study, let me give you my views. A Reversal of Priorities I believe there has to be a major reversal of economic priorities in the United States. We have to turn away from primary emphasis upon consumption, and toward a new emphasis upon saving and investment -- and away from a situation where government spending consumes more and more of the gross national product with each passing year. The historical average of the past dozen years with only some 18% of the nation*s product ploughed back into investment, is simply,unsatisfactory. If we intend to maintain investment at no more than that level through the coming decade, then we should begin scaling down our hopes and hedging on our promises about new housing, meeting our energy and environmental needs, and re-invigorating American industry. If however, we are going to build for the future, then we have to start making sacrifices for that future. Where is the new capital to come from? What are the sources upon which the United States must rely? The first source is the pool of profits earned annually by business and industry. Historically, the role of profits in our system has been to provide both the incentive and the wherewithal for in vestment. In the political environment of the past decade, however, that role has become less and less understood by the American people. To many Americans, profits are not the legitimate and honest return on investment. They are rather the immoral rewards of corporate greed -- the conspicuous consumption of Big Business at the expense of the common man. Today, not only the role of profits, but the historical level of profits is grossly misunderstood. In one major survey of U. S. opinion, Americans thought profits accounted for 28% of the sales of American corporations. The true figure is less than five percent. Less than one nickel out of every dollar in sales in this country goes into corporate profits -- a ratio that in many parts of this country is less than the take of the state government. In some industries, like food retailing, profit margins are hovering around one percent. But, try to argue that position, in some political forums, or on some campuses in this country, and you will be fortunate if you are only called a liar. Let's look at the figures. In 1973, after-tax profits of all non-financial corporations increased $12 billion, 23 percent over the year previous. That is the official figure, and on the surface it would appear to represent a sparkling performance. But a huge slice of that increase amounted to nothing more than inflationary increases in the value of inventory and undervaluation of depreciation. Indeed undistributed corporate profits, after taking out the impact of ,inflation on inventory values and.capital consumption allowances increased only $3 billion last year. Furthermore, if the inflation of the intervening period is also taken into account, the undistributed profits of nonfinancial corporations in 1973 were less than one-fifth of what they were in 1965. And if this nation is going to accumulate the investment capital necessary to fund our domestic needs -- then that profit picture has to be dramatically improved The electric utilities industry presents a graphic case in point. Government rate-setters who regulate the profits of the electric utilities have -- for obvious political reasons been slow to react to the skyrocketing cost of fuel and other commodities the utilities need to use. As a consequence, after tax profits of the utilities have been squeezed in the midst of an energy crisis when those profits are vitally needed for investment. 6 From 1964 to 1973, the utilities industry cash flow rose from $3.3 billion to $5.9 billion. Capital outlays in the same period rose from $5.5 billion to $18.7 billion. As these figures suggest, the low rate of profit allowed by government authorities, is threatening to destroy the industry*s ability to find the funds to do its jobs. If the utilities are continually denied necessary rate increases, then the country will pay one day for these temporarily reduced rates in black outs and brownouts, in the midst of some summer hot spell or winter storm. Summed up then, my concern is this. Profits are the fuel of the engine that pulls the train of American business and industry, the train that carries as cargo the jobs of twothirds of the working men and women of this nation. If the nation doesn*t understand that, if through hasty or unwise legislation we restrict or diminish these profits further, some Americans feel some short-term satisfaction at the dis tress of business -- but the nation will pay for that temporary gratification in lost jobs, in diminished prosperity, and in failure to achieve the grand goals we have set for ourselves as a people. Let us look at those goals -- and what they require. Estimates of the capital requirements of the energy industry -to achieve Project Independence -- range from 750 billion to a thousand billion dollars. Pollution control is estimated to require over the next decade another 100 billion dollars. The cost of rebuilding basic industries that have languished in recent years -- steel, paper, cement, fertilizer, zinc, others --'could require another $50 billion-or more. The needs for urban transportation systems, housing and other major programs could add scores to that already astronomical sum. And these come on top of the conventional requirements. Without doubt, then, one of the crucial economic questions of the coming decade is this: Where will the United States find the investment capital to meet the challenges that we have imposed upon ourselves? In the traditional metaphor, we can go two ways: Either we re-slice the investment pie -- with a larger share going to energy, and less to traditional investment needs. Or we can enlarge that investment pie, by diverting resources away from consumption and into savings, away from government expendi ture and into private investment. 7 That last is the only workable approach with the prospect of success. And in encouraging savings, that most important step the United States Government can take is to get a grip on the double-digit inflation described at the outset of my address. Inflation is the silent partner of speculation and the enemy of thrift. What reason on earth is there for a family to put its savings into a bank at five or six percent interest annually, when inflation is consuming 10 or 12 percent of the principal every year? So, if we are to increase the volume of savings, and the funds available for investment, we have to remove the greatest disincentive to savings today -- inflation. That is priority number one; priority number two is a change in the budget policy that has guided the government for the past dozen years. The basic budget objective has been to run a balanced budget over the cycle: to run deficits in years when there is slack in the economy, and surpluses in years when the economy is overheated. However, over the past 14 years, the United States Government has run one surplus, and thirteen deficits. The budget has not been balanced over the cycle. Indeed, in those years, we have added more than $100 billion to the national debt. We have increased government spending faster than we have been willing to pay for it through taxes. We have created too much money and credit, so that more borrowing has taken place than can be financed out of savings. By these actions, we have permitted, encouraged, even forced the demand for goods and services to outrun our productive capacity. We should not then be surprised that the inflation is embedded so deeply in this economy. After all, we have been planting the seeds for the better part of a decade. In the long run, what can we accomplish by shifting to a balanced budget policy? First, we would enlarge the flow of savings available to the private sector, because the govern ment could reduce its claims on the capital markets. Government would no longer pre-empt so vast a share of funds needed by home-builders and others, who are now shouldered out of the capital markets by the superior credit ratings of the Federal Government. Second, balanced budgets in the future would provide the necessary fiscal restraint critical to the control of inflation. 8 And there are other steps government might take to encourage saving at the expense of consumption, to provide greater funds for investment. Unproductive government restraints on industry -- such as maintaining artificially low prices for electricity and natural gas -- can and should be lifted. While politically popular in the short term, we pay the full economic price, inevitably, in the long run. Today, government in this country consumes about 30 percent of the gross national product. We are paying, frankly, for more government than we need, more government than most of us want. The time has come to start moving in the other direction -- leaving more of the output of the nation in the hands of its people, and their private in stitutions . To some people, that idea implies leaving more income and wealth in the hands of the rich, and less for the poor. Not so. Not at all. You only have to look quickly at the history of our economy to appreciate that the growing pros perity of America has been widely shared by all groups. Thirty years ago, Joseph Schumpeter, the great disciple of American capitalism, wrote: "Queen Elizabeth owned silk stockings. The capitalist achievement does not typically consist in providing more silk stockings for queens, but in bringing them within the reach of factory girls in return for steadily decreasing amounts of effort." Well, if not silk stockings, then certainly nylon stockings for the factory girls of America -- and washers and dryers and automobiles and television sets and packaged foods and all sorts of other things in a variety and abundance unknown in the history of man. And that prosperity can and will continue to grow, if government will only build its incentives toward saving, not spending -- and if government will start following that advice itself. 0O0 lASHINGTON, DX 20220 TEtXPHQNÉ W04-2P41 AUTOMATIC RELEASE AT 8:00 P.M., September 18, 1974 REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM E. SIMON SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES BEFORE THE ANNUAL UNITED NATIONS AMBASSADOR’S DINNER HELD UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF "U. N. WE BELIEVE" GRAND BALLROOM, WALDORF ASTORIA HOTEL WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1974 AT 8:00 RM. I am pleased and honored to be here with you tonight as we re-dedicate ourselves to the purposes of the United Nations. We have heard the moving words of the preamble to the U.N. Charter, reminding us eloquently of the basic principles we have sought to follow in the conduct of our affairs since the end of the Second World War. Those words remind us also that, whatever the difficulties we have experienced in seeking to aPPly.these principles, the alternatives to a cooperative world order are far worse. These principles reflect recognition of the interdependence of thè peoples of the world, and I want to begin this evening by considering with you some of the common concerns that emerge from that interdependence. This growing interdependence among all peoples has many dimensions. The existence of the United Nations, composed of nations and societies representing a great diversity and broad spectrum of ideologies, gives expression to our recogni tion that interdependence has a^ political,dimension. Now I realize that in some circles "political" has almost a pejorative connotation, but I consider it to be an honorable word and representing a creative aspect of our lives. We in the United States have learned much from alternative systems abroad, and we hope that others are learning from ours. We see this interdependence in its cultural and artistic dimensions all about us. Here an American home is landscaped ln a way that reflects the lean and Spartan beauty of a Japanese garden. There an American University’s concert series includes symphony orchestras from London, Warsaw, and Moscow. Eskimo carvings rest easily and artistically in homes from the Orient to the tropics. And the Colonel’s Kentucky Fried Chicken is available to throngs of customers in Tokyo.’ WS-106 2 You would expect any Secretary of the Treasury or Finance Minister to spend some time talking about the economic and financial dimensions of our growing interdependence, and I do not propose to make this evening an exception to that rule. There are some important things to say about these matters. Let me give you my theme at the outset. The basic theme of my remarks is one of realism and also of hope. While the gravity of the world’s current economic problems must be faced candidly, the present turbulence is the prologue to a new era of rising material levels of living widely shared. Historians will not be writing of these years as the descent into some new Dark Age. It is the Administration’s firm objective to see that these years are antecedents to a period of new and vigorous economic progress, with its benefits widely diffused. It is useful to stand back and get some perspective on current trends toward international economic interdependence. For some, such things as the oil embargo or bad crop yields in various parts of the world would come immediately to mind. These events have served to remind us all that the material well being of peoples separated by national boundaries is closely intertwined. And in this year in which our own crop prospects are disappointing we are fortunate that agricultural output in other regions will be relatively high. These, however, are ad hoc events, and it is doubtful that they tell us much of enduring significance. The current world inflation and its impact on the U.S. economy have shown all of us the persuasive nature of these relationships. If we were to turn the calendar back only three years to mid- 1971, we would find ourselves looking at a world in which most of the major economies were operating with sub stantial slack. The United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Italy -- in all these countries, economic activity was below full utilization of their labor and other productive resources. Then two things happened. The exchange rate of the dollar was readjusted, and the industrial world moved into a synchronized boom. The large and diversified U.S. economy then found itself influenced in a major way by external forces. Pressures on raw materials prices were world wide. During 19'jj the rise in our own merchandise exports, responding to the wor boom and more favorable exchange rates for the dollar, was equal ‘to almost one-third of the rise in our production of g°ocl1 and during 1973 -- up to the oil embargo -- the rise in new exports in real terms was just over 40 percent of the rise m I the U.S. production of goods. We cannot understand our domest economic developments in recent months unless we take into account these external influences. 3 It is when one probes more deeply that we begin to see in perspective the almost relentless march of growing inter dependence. Suppose we look at what has happened during, say, the 10 years from 1963 to 1973. During that decade the world’s output of goods and services was increasing at the rate of just over 5 percent per year. When we turn to world trade, however, we find that in real terms its volume was rising at the rate of about 9 percent per year. The volume of trade, in short, was expanding nearly twice as rapidly as total output. Now this, when you stop to think about it, is what we would expect from an international economic system performing reasona bly well. With rising material levels of living we would expect consumers increasingly to reach beyond local and national boundaries for the things they buy, and we would expect busi nesses increasingly to internationalize their markets. In this way we gain the improved productivity that comes from increased specialization and enlarging markets. Further, with the growing incomes that result, consumers internationalize their patterns of consumption. Thus a family in Japan can buy from an American mail order house, and a family in this country sits in Danish chairs, wearing Spanish shoes, listening to a record player made in Canada -- thereby enriching the material standards of all. We are, however, painfully aware that a continuation of this progress is by no means automatic. The list of the common economic problems which challenge that progress is now familiar. We are confronted by a rapid inflationthat has proved as tenacious as it is pervasive. Nations struggle to adjust to sharply increased oil bills that pose difficulties for all oil importing countries but fall particularly cruelly on some. There is concern that the world may be thrown into deep recession, concern that our financial structures may be inadequate to the new tasks they face, concern that the world will retreat into an era of protectionism. While I find some of these concerns less immediate than others, I do not under estimate the dangers such concerns themselves represent. These problems have become the more troublesome because they raise questions of equity and justice. In each of our countries suffering from rapid inflation, we see our tasks of restoring stability made more difficult by the efforts of groups disadvantaged by an inequitable inflation to regain lost ground. Internationally, serious men ask about the justice of allowing the power of a cartel to gain for a few at the expense of the many an accumulation of wealth un paralleled in the history of mankind. 4 Conseqeuntly, this maze of problems poses not only a challenge to our continued economic progress; it also con stitutes a threat to the fundamental harmony among nations that the United Nations was designed to foster. It is of the utmost importance that we keep our channels of communication open in these troubled times. Our experience within the framework of the cooperative institutions developed in the aftermath of World War II, although not unblemished, has been uniquely favorable. The ruins of war have been rebuilt. A liberal trade and payments order has been constructed! within which trade and investment flows have served as a power- 1 ful motor of our prosperity. A concerted effort has been launche' and maintained, to bring that prosperity to all nations of the world, where it had previously been reserved to the few. A key element in that favorable experience has been the willingness of nations to reject narrow, short-sighted and highly nationalistic solutions in favor of mutually agreed answers. In the early postwar years, the United States, with the trauma of the 1930’s still fresh in its memory, opted for an interdependent world. With an inordinate proportion of the world’s wealth and productive capacity concentrated in the hands of this country, we might have done otherwise. But we did not, and now that world is a reality-- one from which there must be no retreat. As we look ahead, vigorous and orderly economic progress for the peoples of the world can resume if we have the clear eyed will to do the things that we know need to be done. The first requirement of our response to the challenges, of today is for the major world economies, including the United States, to restore order in their own domestic economies. We are all, of course, influenced by external economic developments, but governments tend to use that obvious fact to excuse in action on the things that need to be done at home. I can assure you of the firm resolve of this Administration to restore stability in the United States. We recognize that inflation has become so imbedded in our economy that to squeeze it out will be a long, tough process. There will be no quick solutions, no short-cuts. We recognize also that whatever the causes of our inflation, we must deal with it with the tools we have available. In the U.S., as around the world, that means basically fiscal and monetary policies. - 5 - The implication of our policies is that our economy will operate for some time at less than maximum capacity > so as to provide the framework in which inflationary pressures can be exorcised. For a time , we will have to live with more unemployment than we wou Id like. We are aware that excessive policies of restraint could plunge the United States into deep recession, and we will watch the evolution of economic activity closely. Should the balance of the dangers in the present situation shift unexpectedly from inflation to depression, we will act. But the present primary danger is inflation, and nothing could be more disastrous than to direct our policies to fighting a depression that does not exist at the expense of our efforts against a virulent inflation that does. 6 In this interdependent world, our efforts to contain inflation represent an essential, and perhaps our most important contribution to the preservation of a cooperative economic order There are, however, other pressing problems, in the main linked directly or indirectly to this past year’s increases in oil prices, which challenge international harmony. We find the international financial scene dramatically altered by the abrupt quadrupling of oil prices of the past year. It is now estimated that OPEC countries will this year accumulate $55 billion -- more or less.-- in revenues beyond those needed to meet their current requirements for imports of consumer and investment goods. On the one hand, this implies a vast accumulation of wealth on the part of a small group of countries. On the other, it implies a corresponding reduction in the incomes of those nations which must pay the higher oil prices. Much attention has been turned to the problems created by this drastic reallocation of income. In the United Nations General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the UNCTAD, the Committee of Twenty, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development -- the list is too long to complete -- we have sought to assess and deal with this problem. What have we learned; what have we done? We have learned first that the problem is cause for concern but not panic. Our Colleagues from the OPEC countries have prove! themselves conservative and prudent investors, well aware of thei own stake in the stability of the international financial system Our private financial markets have adjusted in the face of large new capital flows, proving themselves willing to accept the challenges posed, and to do so in a responsible manner. We have seen governments respond individually and collectively: The OPEC countries have made encouraging steps to extend financial assis tance to at least some of their customers; the resources of the International Monetary Fund have been expanded by the creation of a new oil facility; governments are devising new means of raising funds internationally. At the same time, I believe most realize that the oil consuming countries cannot, and will not, continue indefinitely to pay the current oil bill. In part, this is because no countrf however strong it appears today -- can borrow indefinitely to / finance current consumption. In part, this result will follow inevitably because utilization of oil has become less attractive. We have only to look at what has happened to oil consumption thus far this year to find clear evidence of a drop in demand. The result has been a swelling of oil inventories, and cutbacks in oil production. Further the development of alternative sources is just begun, but in time oil will be found from non-OPEC sources, and non-oil sources of energy will be developed. To me, it is not a question of whether oil prices fall but when. If they fall before the redistribution of world income and wealth that present prices imply has too embittered the oil consuming countries; before the world becomes locked into the development of alternative sources to over priced oil; before the economic consequences become too severe; then we may some day look back and value the lessons we have learned. If oil prices fall later rather than sooner, serious damage -- perhaps irreparable damage --. will be done to our bright hopes that a rational world community can solve its problems in a cooperative manner. In the meantime, we all seek to mitigate the dangers inherent in the present situation. For its part, the United States intends neither to make the financing problems of others more difficult by seeking out OPEC monies nor to restrict the outflows of funds from this country which may assist others. We have no desire to offer special incentives to OPEC monies, nor do we want to place impediments in their way. In this regard, a good deal of confusion seems to persist about our expressed willingness to make available to OPEC countries special issues of U. S. treasury securities should they wish. It seems frequently to be overlooked that there are at present 23 - 24 billion dollars of similar issues outstanding -issued to countries such as Germany and Canada as a matter of mutual convenience. For the investor, such issues offer the primary advantage of being able to move rather large sums of money without affecting market rates. For the United States, these arrangements mean we are able to organize our debt management policies in a more orderly fashion. But there are no special incentives; -- no special interest rates, no indexation, no guarantees.; There has been a great deal of discussion in our international forums of the possibilities of mitigating the damage done to the poorest countries most seriously affected by the oil price increases. From these discussions has emerged a needed consensus 8 on the priority to be given by the world community of nations to assisting these countries. There have also been encouraging steps by the oil exporting countries to provide some con cessional aid to these countries directly. But much remains to be done. Our efforts to mitigate the dangers of the present situation do not begin and end with financing quest ions. We can all be pleased with the action of the developed countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development last May to agree to avoid recourse to new restric tive actions affecting trade and other current account transacti ons. We can take satisfaction that the C-20 recommended la st June that the full membership of the IMF adopt a similar res olution; and it is important that the members move promptly and broadly to subscribe to that pledge, as the U. S. has already done. To mitigate problems is not to solve them. As we continue to work toward solutions we can be glad, however, that our channels of communication among nations are functioning and even expanding. I particularly welcome the prospect that the government boards of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank will at their forthcoming annual meetings establish a new Ministerial Committee on the Transfer of Real Resources and that this group will give priority attention to the problems created for the developing countries by the recent price changes. Their work will usefully complement the work going forward in other forums, including that begun at the Special Session of the General Assembly this past spring. Also at the 'IMF-/IBRD annual meetings, we expect to establish a new Ministerial Committee on the International Monetary System to carry on and broaden the work of the Committee of Twenty. Still other forms of cooperation are being developed. Since early this year, considerable progress has been made in establishing a new framework for cooperation on energy matters within the context of the Energy Coordinating Group. At the same time, the United States and other countries have been exploring new methods of cooperation with the countries of the Middle East. I myself made an extensive trip to that area this summer. - 9 Informal as well as formal consultations are of great value in these times. Informal talks are, of course, a virtually continuous process. One such arrangement which I have found particularly useful is the quiet meeting with my fellow Finance Ministers and Central Bankers from several major countries. I returned from such a meeting in France only ten days ago con vinced of the value of these talks over a range of problems. Reasonable people sometimes ask whether the multiple channels of communications among governments and the peoples of the world really offer the answers to our common problems. The essence of the answer to questions of this nature seems to me that each new channel opened brings the peoples of this world a step further toward commitment to cooperative solutions. In some instances, this is the result of involving additional individuals, ministries, or even countries, in the search for cooperative solutions. In others, the important thing is that a type of dialogue is possible in one forum that is not in another existing one. The many ways in which such a senior level dialogue goes on bring together responsible officials and provide them with the opportunity to get to know each other and to learn to work together. In the process, each comes to understand better the problems, the goals and the policies of others. In the end, the result is -- hopefully -- that shocks, surprises, and unilateral actions taken without awareness of the impact on others are fewer. Nations are better able to anticipate the impact of their actions on others and thus to minimize the potential for conflict. But I do not think I have to convince this group of value of good communications among nations. For that is the United Nations is all about; that is why we are here and that is why the United Nations will continue to play vole in promoting peace and understanding among peoples. 0O0 the what tonight ; a vital oftheTREASURY Department SHINGTOli DC. 2022Ü TELEPHONE W04-2Q41 September 18, 1974 FOR RELEASE 6:30 P.M. RESULTS OF TREASURY’S 52-WEEK BILL AUCTION Tenders for $1.8 billion of 52-week Treasury bills to [September 24, 1974, and to mature September 23, 1975, were [Federal Reserve Banks today. The details are as follows: R ange of accepted c o m p e t it iv e bids : be dated opened at the (Excepting 4 tenders totaling $3,940,000) ¥ High L0V7 Average Equivalent annual! rate 8.250% Equivalent annual rate 8.437% Equivalent annual rate 8.341% 91.658 91.469 91.566 Tenders at the low price were allotted 27%. ¡TOTAL TENDERS APPLIED FOR AND ACCEPTED BY FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICTS: District Boston New York Philadelphia Cleveland Richmond Atlanta Chicago St. Louis Minneapolis Kansas City Dallas San Francisco TOTALS Applied For Accepted I 17,670,000 2,291,815,000 30,160,000 41,565,000 47,190,000 10,840,000 245,640,000 30,405,000 9,255,000 14,010,000 17,940,000 130,435,000 $ 7,670,000 1,393,510,000 5,160,000 16,535,000 31,190,000 10,840,000 198,090,000 22,405,000 9,255,000 8,130,000 13,940,000 83,435,000 $2,886,925,000 $1,800.i60,000 1/ This is on a bank discount basis. ■/ Includes $118,150,000 / 2 The equivalent coupon issue yield is 9.03% noncompetitive tenders accented at the average price. theTREASURY J Departmental iMcmiu D nr ËSHINGTON, .C. 2022D H TELEPHONE W04-2041 MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESS September 18, 1974 Financial Conference on Inflation The starting time of the Financial Conference on Inflation has been changed to 8:15 a.m., September 20, 1974. Close-up photography of participants while they are at the Conference table will be limited to a brief period at the opening of the meeting. Also changed is the site of the meeting. It will now be held in the Presidential Room of the StatlerHilton Hotel, Washington, D.C. Since this is a much larger room, there is no longer a limit on the number of seats available to the press. The press room in the hotel will be the Ohio Room. At intervals throughout the day--approximately two hours after the close of each segment of the Conference-transcripts of the proceedings will be available in the Ohio Room. At the conclusion of the meeting--approximately 6:00 to 6:30 p.m.--there will be a summation of the day’s activities. Transcripts of this summation and all preceding discussions will be available at both the Ohio Room and the 15th Street entrance of Main Treasury at approximately 9:30 p.m. A final list of participants is attached. MEMBERS OF BANKING AND FINANCE COMMUNITY WHO WILL ATTEND THE FINANCIAL CONFERENCE ON INFLATION WASHINGTON, D.C. SEPTEMBER 20, 1974 HELD AT THE REQUEST OF PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD AND THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES The Honorable William E. Simon Secretary of the Treasury Department of the Treasury 15th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20220 Mr. Edwin G. Alexander President First S§L Shares, Inc. Denver, Colorado 80211 Dr. George Leland Bach Professor of Economics and Public Policy Stanford University Stanford, California 94305 Mr. Robert H.B. Baldwin President Morgan Stanley § Company, Inc. 1251 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York 10020 The Honorable Jack F. Bennett Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs Department of the Treasury 15th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20220 Mr. Robert H. Bethke President Discount Corporation of New York 58 Pine Street New York, New York 10005 Mr. Archie R. Boe Chairman of the Board Allstate Insurance Company Allstate Plaza Northbrook, Illinois 60062 Mr. Thomas R. Bomar Chairman, Federal Home Loan Bank Board 320 First Street, N UW. Washington, D.C. 20552 1 The Honorable Arthur F. Burns Chairman Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 20th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20551 Dr. Gwen Bymers Professor and Chairman of the Department of Consumer Economics Cornell University Ithaca, New York 14850 Mr. Richard P. Cooley President and Chief Executive Officer Wells Fargo Bank, National Association San Francisco, California 94120 Mr. Howard Coughlin President Office and Professional Employees International Union 265 West 14th Street New York, New York 10011 Mr. Morris D. Crawford, Jr. Chairman of the Board Bowery Savings Bank 110 East 42nd Street New York, New York 10017 Dr. Robert G. Dederick Senior Vice President and Economist Northern Trust Company 50 South LaSalle Street Chicago, Illinois 60690 2 Dr. Robert Ray Dockson President California Federal Savings and Loan Association 5670 Wilshire Boulevard Los Angeles, California 90036 Dr. Otto Eckstein President, Data Resources, Inc. Professor of Economics Harvard University 231 Littaner Center Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138 Mr. Gilbert R. Ellis President Household Finance Corporation 3200 Prudential Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60601 Dr. Grover W. Ensley Executive Vice President National Association of Mutual Savings Banks 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10017 The Honorable Edgar R. Fiedler Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy Department of the Treasury 15th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20220 Mr. William H. Franklin Chairman Caterpillar Tractor Company 100 N.E. Adams Street Peoria, Illinois 61629 Mr. Gaylord Freeman Chairman of the Board The First National Bank of Chicago One First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60670 Dr. Tilford C. Gaines Senior Vice President and Economist Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. 350 Park Avenue New York, New York 10022 3 The Honorable Stephen S. Gardner Deputy Secretary Department of the Treasury 15th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20220 Mr. Ray Garrett, Jr. Chairman Securities and Exchange Commission 500 North Capitol Street, Room 812 Washington, D.C. 20549 Mr. Richard G. Gilbert President of Citizens Savings Association 100 South Central Plaza Canton, Ohio 44702 Mr. Alan Greenspan Chairman Council of Economic Advisors Old Executive Office Building Washington, D.C. 20506 Mr. David B. Harper President First Independence National Bank 234 State Street Detroit, Michigan 48226 Dr. Gabriel Hauge Chairman Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. 350 Park Avenue New York, New York 10022 Mr0 Milton J* Hayes Chairman Government Fiscal Policy Committee Independent Bankers Association of America Consultant, American National Bank of Chicago 33 N. LaSalle Street, Room 1619 Chicago, Illinois 60602 Mro M.R. Hellie President Credit Union National Association, Inc. 1730 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W., Suite 810 Washington, D.C. 20036 Mr. Richard D. Hill Chairman of the Board First National Bank of Boston Boston, Massachusetts 02110 - 4 - Mr. J. Henning Hilliard Chairman J.J.B. Hilliard, W.L. Lyons, Inc. 545 South Third Street Louisville, Kentucky 40202 Mr. Frank J. Hoenemeyer Executive Vice President Prudential Insurance Company of America Prudential Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 The Honorable Ernest F. Hollings United States Senate Old Senate Office Building Room 432 Washington, D.C. 20510 The Honorable Jacob Javits United States Senate Old Senate Office Building Room 326 Washington, D.C. 20510 Mr. Paul R. Judy Chairman and President A.G. Becker § Company, Inc. 2 First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60670 Mr. Harvey E. Kapnick, Jr. Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Arthur Andersen § Co. 69 West Washington Street Chicago, Illinois 60602 Mr. Louis 0. Kelso General Counsel Bangert § Co., Inc. Ill Pine Street San Francisco, California 94111 Mr. W. J. Kennedy, III President North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Co P. 0. Box 201 Durham, North Carolina 27702 Mr. Ralph F . Leach Chairman of the Executive Committee Morgan Guaranty Trust Company 23 Wall Street New York, New York 10015 5 Mr. Gustave L. Levy Partner Goldman, Sachs and Company 55 Broad Street New York,New York 10015 The Honorable Russell B. Long United States Senate Old Senate Office Building Room 217 Washington, D.C. 20510 Mr. Bruce K. MacLaury President Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 250 Marquette Avenue Minneapolis, Minnesota 55480 Dr. Paul W. McCracken Senior Consultant Department of the Treasury 15th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.Co 20220 Mr. Rex J. Morthland President American Bankers Association Chairman, The Peoples Bank and Trust Company Post Office Box 799 Selma, Alabama 36701 Mr. James J. Needham Chairman of the Board New York Stock Exchange 11 Wall Street New York, New York 10005 Mr. Herman Nickerson, Jr. Administrator National Credit Union Administration 2025 M Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20456 Dr. Arthur M. Okun Senior Fellow The Brookings Institute 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Dr. James O ’Leary Vice Chairman U.S. Trust Company 45 Wall Street New York, New York 10005 6 Mr. J. Charles Partee Managing Director Office of Research and Economic Policy Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 20th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20551 The Honorable Wright Patman U.S. House of Representatives Rayburn House Office Building Room 2328 Washington, D.C. 20515 Ms. Sylvia Porter Syndicated Financial Columnist 30 East 42nd Street New York, New York 10017 Mr. George Preston President U.S. League of Savings Associations 1709 New York Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 Mr. Donald T. Regan Chairman of the Board Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. One Liberty Plaza 165 Broadway New York, New York 10006 The Honorable Henry S. Reuss U. S. House of Representatives Rayburn House Office Building Room 2186 Washington, D.C. 20515 The Honorable John J. Rhodes U.S. House of Representatives Rayburn House Office Building Room 2310 Washington, D.C. 20515 Mr. David Rockefeller Chase Manhattan Bank, National Association One Chase Manhattan Plaza New York, New York 10015 Mr. Robert V. Roosa Partner Brown Brothers Harriman and Company 59 Wall Street New York, New York 10005 7 The Honorable William V. Roth United States Senate New Senate Office Building, Room 4327 Washington, D.C. 20510 Mr. Ralph S. Saul Vice Chairman Insurance Company of North America 1600 Arch Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 Dr. Raymond J. Saulnier Professor Emeritus of Economics Barnard College Columbia University 5-A Lehman Hall New York, New York 10027 Mr. Walter Scott Associate Director Office of Management and Budget Old Executive Office Building 17th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20500 The Honorable George P. Shultz Executive Vice President Bechtel Corporation 50 Beale Street San Francisco, California 94119 The Honorable J. William Stanton U.S. House of Representatives Rayburn House Office Building Room 2448 Washington, D.C. 20515 Mr. Robert H. Stewart III Chairman of the Board First International Bancshares, Inc. Post Office Box 6031 Dallas, Texas 75283 Mr. Thomas I. Storrs Chairman of the Executive Committee North Carolina National Bank Post Office Box 120 Charlotte, North Carolina 28255 Mr. John Tomayko Director, Insurance, Pension and Unemployment Benefits United Steelworkers of America 5 Gateway Center Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222 8 The Honorable Charls E. Walker President Charls E. Walker Associates 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 The Honorable Frank Wille Chairman Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 550 17th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20429 Mr. Carlton Wilson Chairman of the Board and Director Robert W. Baird and Company, Inc. 777 East Wisconsin Avenue Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201 Dr. Albert M. Wojnilower Vice President, Economist The First Boston Corporation 20 Exchange Place New York, New York 10005 Mr. John W. Wright President Wright Investors’ Service Wright Building Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Mr. Walter Wriston Chairman First National City Bank 55 Wall Street New York, New York 10015 Dr. Charles J. Zwick President Southeast Banking Corporation 100 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 9 HINGTON. D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04-2041 FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY r STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM E. SIMON SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY BEFORE THE SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1974 AT 10:00 AM ROOM 3302 NSOB MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE:^ I am pleased to participate today in yoi^ir investigation into various aspects of our domestic and international energy policies. It is important, I think, for the Congress and the Administration jointly to discuss possible policies to respond to the ever-changing world energy situation. The problem we are discussing here today -- the abrupt increase in the price of oil -- is one of major importance to all participants in the world economy. For oil consuming nations, whether industrial or developing, oil price increases have fanned inflation, adversely affected living standards, distorted economies and created payments problems. For oil producing countries, high prices have brought exceptionally high incomes in the short run, but also the danger of a drastic erosion of their income in the longer run. Consuming nations should not accept the indefinite continuation of oil prices at current levels. Producers will not lower prices until they come to realize that lower prices will be in their own best interest. If progress is to be made toward ‘ lower prices, consuming and producing nations must develop a common understanding of the extent and nature of the price problem, and where each nation’s self-interest ultimately lies. If this is to be achieved, and I cannot emphasize this too strongly, we in the United States must he willing to back up our talk with concrete actions both domestically and in the international arena. Only if oil producers can be made to understand the gravity of our problem and our resolution to redress it through our own efforts, if necessary, can they be persuaded that the prompt reduction of oil prices will be to their advantage. 2 Before discussing the actions that we have undertaken, and those that still must be initiated, I would like to review the current international oil situation and the impact of the higher prices. The OPEC countries will probably receive about $80 billion in 1974 in payment for petroleum operations -- over five times what they received in 1972. Current prices and production rates are actually generating payments- at an annual rate of $100 billion per year, but the time lags are such that their total receipts for the calendar year are likely to be some $20 billion lower. They will receive perhaps $5 billion from exports of other commodities and services. Of these $85 billion of receipts, the OPEC countries will probably spend about $30 billion on imports of goods and services, leaving some $55 billion to invest outside their borders. As has become increasingly clear in recent months, high oil prices that have generated these revenues have also created or have exacerbated a number of serious economic problems. Most directly, the oil price increase has been a major contributor to worldwide inflation. Measurement of the inflationary impact of the oil price increase is of course a complex task, but some preliminary estimates are available. The impact of increased oil prices as a percentage of GNP are themselves sizeable, on the order of 1 to 3 percent for the major industrial countries, but even these considerably understate the full inflationary impact of the oil price increases. More comprehensive estimates suggest that the quadrupling of oil prices over the past year, when its effects are fully felt, will have contributed in the range of 5 to 8 percentage points to the increase in our wholesale price index. This is on the order of almost half the increase in the U.S. wholesale price index from mid-year 1973 to mid-year 1974 of roughly 14 percent. For many other oil importing nations the contribution of the oil price in creases to inflation will be even greater. As one facet of the inflationary shock of high oil prices we can see how the sectoral balances in national economics have been altered. Sectors in which petroleum represents high input face relatively higher costs and weaker demand than others; Our automobile industry is suffering from significant) reduced sales. Our airlines industry is pleading for special governmental relief from the vastly increased fuel costs. Electric utilities find it difficult to attract the investment money they need. 3 6 These sudden shifts cause the loss of output and create unemployment even when some sectors of the economy are still at full capacity. A fall in the price of oil would alleviate thesa problems and permit recovery in output and employment. In addition to directly affecting prices, employment, and output, high oil prices affect the performance of the world economy through their impact on the international financial system. With the OPEC countries running large surpluses in their goods and services balance, the oil importing countries as a group cannot avoid equivalent deficits. They are simply unable to pay for their oil imports in full with goods and services at this time. They are compelled to borrow. This is a drastic change for the industrial nations of the world which, collectively, have been accustomed to surpluses in their goods and services account and to being net lenders on the international scene. The developing countries, which’ have been borrowing to finance their economic development, now find they must borrow to finance essential current consumption as well, unless they are prepared to cut back on their development programs or depress the living standards of their people. It is not clear that the oil importing countries are all prepared to accept the vast amount of borrowing implied by these changes, at least at current levels of output and real income. Of course, a willingness to borrow does not necessarily create the ability to do so. It is true that since the OPEC countries have no alternative to lending their surpluses abroad, funds are available in the aggregate to meet the new deficits of the industrial countries and the larger deficits of the developing nations. Lenders, however, are likely to prefer lending to the strong rather than to the weak. As the external debts of the oil consuming countries grow -- particularly if the borrowed funds are used largely to finance consumption rather than to increase output -private lenders are likely to become increasingly reluctant to extend further credit to borrowers in weaker countries. Consequently, governments are faced with the need to supple ment the private markets and to work out techniques for officially channeling funds to certain borrowers. The IMF has inaugurated a new special oil facility; understandings have been reached which permit the use of gold reserves as collateral thereby facilitating the negotiation of bilateral credits; the Governors of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank are preparing to establish at the end of this month a Ministerial Committee on the Transfer Resources which will take up, as its most urgent task, Pr°klems faced by the developing countries most seriously affected by the oil price increase. 4 For a fuller description of the recycling issues and our responses to them, I am providing a more detailed paper to the committee. Each of these problems is to one degree or another manageable, but that does not in any way justify the present price of oil in world markets, or reduce our determination to resolve the root cause of the problems -- the high oil^ prices themselves. None of these problems would be plaguing us today if the operation of the world oil market were free from manipulation by the governments of oil producing states. Underlying market forces prove that there is a large potential oil surplus which, in a free market, would be reflected in lower prices. The high oil prices had scarcely taken effect when growing production levels and decreased demand caused considerable softening of the oil market. During the summer, when oil demand is at its seasonal low, the level of actual excess production approached three^ million barrels a day. The excess was absorbed by substantial increases in inventories, including inventories at sea created by ordering tankers to steam at speeds as low as 5 knots. In August, the surplus seems to have fallen to about 500,000 barrels per day due to reduced production in Venezuela, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere. Our latest evidence is that production is slightly up once again, and that the surplus may now approach 900,000 barrels per day. Nor is this the full story: current production potential is even higher than current production, perhaps by as much as 4 - 5 million barrels per day. If the oil market were free from interference, the price would drop. Governments of the oil producing countries are, however, acting determinedly-and in substantial concert to maintain present prices. How long OPEC members will be able to continue this policy in the face of new production else where and the need to agree on mutually satisfactory production cuts among themselves is unclear. What is clear, however, is that a small number of producing states are exercising a monopoly power, manipulating the oil market by limiting production and raising prices. As long as this continues the consuming nations cannot rely soley on market forces to generate a decline in price. The policy the producers are pursuing is bad policy-bad from the standpoint of their own interests. Sòme of the pitfalls are of a political nature. But in economic terms, cutting back production in the attempt to preserve' the high price is extremely short-sighted. This policy will cause consuming nations to go all out for the conservation of energy» 5 to step up investment programs which expand the production of oil in non-OPEC areas as well as non-oil sources of energy and to intensify research and development of new techniques for obtaining energy. The OPEC countries will, in a relatively short period of time, find their market for oil tending sharply downward. And once gone, even lower prices will not bring it back. Our Treasury studies of supply and demand elasticity for oil indicate that reduction in demand need not be very great to reduce the total size of the market for OPEC oil significantly in future years. Reductions in demand due to present prices coupled with increases in competing supplies will result in a steady reduction in OPEC's market. For a wide range of plausible demand supply elasticities, recent price increases, if maintained, will cost OPEC a sizeable fraction of its sales beginning later this decade. Even now, one can see significant developments that should bring home the validity of these predictions to OPEC leaders. The worldwide consumption of oil has held to below pre-embargo levels, with most major consuming nations experiencing reductions in demand of 3-5 percent below 1973 levels. In addition, new discoveries of oil have been accelerated outside the OPEC nations. In fact, significant discoveries have been made in 26 separate areas of the world since 1973. Some of the finds hold considerable promise for relieving the world's dependence on the OPEC nations. More over, there is an increasing substitution of fuels throughout the world in an effort to decrease dependence on oil. As a result, world coal production may be some 70 million tons higher in 1974 than would have been expected without the oil price increases. Yet these efforts are just beginning. The implications of these developments for OPEC are clear: unless prices fall, the demand for oil exports from the current oil producers will be sharply lower in 1980-85 than it is now. This simple message has yet to sink in, apparently, but it is one that we will continue to deliver. Of course, 1980 is six years away, ana consuming nations cannot absorb the economic impact of the current oil prices for that length of time. If we cannot convince the oil producers that lower prices are in everyone's ultimate selfinterest, we must be prepared, as a nation and as a member of the international community, to take concrete actions in defense of our economic interests. We must demonstrate our determination to escape the OPEC grip. 6 In particular, we must take action to: Develop our domestic energy resources Limit our domestic energy demand, and Forge effective consumer nation unity In designing our future policies, we must recognize that the policy problems generated by $10/BBL oil differ from those caused by $3/BBL oil. The energy market operates in another world from the one we knew a year ago. With the advent of the new price levels, there is no need for massive governmental interference in the domestic market in an effort to avoid dependence on imported oil at some future date. What is needed now is a willingness to remove the government from areas where its activities have been an impediment to greater domestic output and conservation. With this in mind, the Administration has taken or intends to take a variety of actions in both the domestic and foreign arenas. The goals of our domestic program are: To reduce our near-term dependence on imported oil through domestic supply increases and conservation, and In the longer-term, to reduce that dependency further through the exploitation of other domestic sources of energy, including alternative fuels and technologies. Appropriately designed and implemented, Project Inde pendence will provide a context in which market-oriented energy policies can be effective. Clearly, the government has posed and continues to pose a major obstacle in the short and medium term to efficient market allocation in energy. We regulate the price and distribution of natural gas; we manipulate the pricing and distribution system in oil; we require lengthy and cumber some processes for obtaining licenses and rate approvals; and we impose environmental restraints, sometimes of questionable validity, upon both the production and combustion of fossil fuels. Thus, as we develop our long range energy policies, we must also set some short term goals. These goals should be clearly understood and stated and explained at each step to the American people. In my mind, the framework should involve several major areas of action, including passage of a legislative package, changing of existing regulatory procedures, and conservation efforts. First, we must make an all-out attempt to produce additional supplies of oil. The potential for this production could be met through a variety of measures such as; opening Elk Hills and Naval Petroleum Reserve #4 to fuller development and production, reopening the Santa Barbara Channel to production with appropriate environmental safeguards, re-evaluating upward the maximum effective rate of certain oil fields. -- Second, we should move towards the removal of price controls from oil and natural gas, and phase out the regulations and allocation programs which now disrupt production and marketing patterns. Third, we need to accelerate our Federal leasing programs on Federal lands for both oil and coal. Fourth, and related to all of these, we must decide on a package of energy legislation and work with the Congress to ensure that it will be passed promptly. This effort is badly needed to break the log jam of nearly 800 energy bills which are pending in Congress this year. Hopefully, Congress will approve legislation needed to achieve our goals and which will also include: Deepwater ports legislation, and energy facilities siting bill, legislation to create the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Energy Tax Package, the Surface Mining Act, and legislation creating the Department of Energy and Natural Resources. Our ultimate goal should be one of moving the U.S. from its present non-renewable hydrocarbon energy base to a renewable energy base. Achievement of these goals will, of course, include the development of solar, geothermal, nuclear, and eventually fusion power. The switch over to these sources will extend over a period of many years, but what is needed now is a clear national commitment to increase our domestic energy production ln areas and forms consistent with market forces. Such a commitment need not, and should not, imply that essential social and environmental concerns must be neglected. On the contrary, such concerns must be fully taken into account. But protection against social abuses must be provided without unduly dampening incentives to expand production. 8 We will not be able to convince OPEC nations that we will succeed in reducing our vulnerability unless we act in the areas X have mentioned and unless we take further steps to reduce our demand for oil in the short run. We must make a national commitment to energy conservation, which will only succeed if it is undertaken on a solid foundation of demand restraint made effective through new energy related taxes or tariffs. We must develop much greater efficiency in the use of energy. Measures to implement this commitment would give us added weapons for dealing with the inflationary and economic disruptions caused by the present price levels of oil imports. The second major prerequisite for effective action on prices is consumer nation unity. We have been promoting this objective in three major ways: First, we have been developing, in the Energy Coordinating Group established at the Washington Energy Conference, a program of joint action in order to guard ourselves against future oil supply embargoes. This program is now embodied in a draft International Energy Program (IEP) which we hope to put in final form as a recommendation to member governments later this week in Brussels. The emergency cooperation program included in the IEP is designed to protect us against the sort of oil blackmail we faced last year. We must be free from this threat if we are going to guard our interests in the world oil market. Basically, the emergency program now under discussion in the ECG would call for commitments by the participating countries in four areas. -- We would agree to come to each others* aid in the event any consuming nation was singled out for an oil cutoff -- the one-for-all and all-for-one principle 41 and we would therefore hope to deter .embargoes as well as spread their burden should they occur. 9 -- We would all agree to cut our consumption of oil by a common percentage in an emergency, -- We would agree to develop a common level of emergency self-sufficiency, largely through use of oil stocks, so that by drawing on these stocks we could endure a large cutback longer. -- We would reallocate the available oil among the countries of the group, taking into account the prescribed consumption restraint and stock drawdown obligations in order to equalize, to some degree, oil supply losses. This program is not a permanent solution to the problem of our heavy dependence upon imported oil, which in turn is the basis for OPEC*s success in raising oil prices to their present levels. Therefore, we have also embodied in the IEP the second major thrust of our program for consumer nation unity. This second initiative is the creation of a framework for a cooperative effort to reduce, over the long term, consumer nation dependence on imported oil. As an initial focus for our efforts we have included programs for cooperative action in the areas of research and development; the accelerated development of conventional resources, conservation, and uranium resources. As the IEP reaches fruition and a new International Energy Agency comes into being, we hope to be able to develop a more detailed and comprehensive program; for only by mutually reducing our dependence on imported oil will we be able to reduce our ultimate vulnerability to oil supply and price manipulation. We are confident that this major international initiative will be concluded shortly, probably in October, and we attach great significance to it. The third major area in which we are developing consumer nation unity is in cooperation to mitigate the effects of high oil prices. We have participated in the creation of a special facility within the International 10 Monetary Fund for loans to countries experiencing financial difficulties because of the high oil prices. We have also been cooperating with other consumers in the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD and in the World Bank in a reexamination of aid allocations so as to concentrate assistance on the most severely impacted less developed countries. We have actively supported the establishment of a new Ministerial Committee in Real Resources transfer, to be established by joint action of the IMF and the World Bank which would focus urgently on the needs of developing countries. Both in the IMF and in the OECD we have participated with other nations in a voluntary pledge to refrain from mutually destructive trade policies. In all of these various organizations, we have been attempting to maintain and to build a framework of mutual assistance and cooperation in dealing with our common problem of high oil prices. In working for consumer nation unity we have no desire to provoke a confrontation with the oil producing countries. Many of them are participants in the financing arrangements. We are trying to develop understandings with oil producers on our mutual interests. We seek to show the producers that they have lost sight of the important inter-connections of the world economy, as well as the long term dynamics of the market system. We seek their understanding that price levels unrelated to market conditions, unrelated,to revenue needs of the producers, and unrelated to the prices of long term substitute supplies promise short term hardship and long run instability, for us now and for the oil exporters later. Only if we can re-create a mutuality of understanding with producers will we be able to avoid the unfortunate consequences of the present level of oil prices. In order to facilitate this understanding, as well as for reasons related to peace in the Mideast, we have been developing a series of programs under the aegis of our Joint Commissions with the. Saüdis and the Iranians. We have also been in close contact with other oil producers in a less formal way. 11 Our intentions in all of this are clear: We want to help these nations achieve their aspirations of becoming advanced industrial and agricultural societies. We believe that their desire to modernize their economies is both legitimate and laudible, but we believe that they should understand that their long term interests lie in maintaining good relations with industrialized nations and in following pricing and supply policies that guarantee them something other than a declining market for their oil. I have attempted to outline our analyses of the current situation in the world oil market, and the steps we are taking or hope to take to deal with it. I believe that the policies we have adopted are both sound and fair, and I would hope that others would see them in a similar light. I have been disappointed in the results of the efforts we have made to date, particularly the recent actions by the oil producers at the OPEC meeting in Vienna. Due to the immense significance of the problem of high oil prices, and due to its serious impact on the world economic system, we may be forced to re-assess certain aspects of our policy, as well as to develop new policies that will increase our leverage. We would do this most reluctantly, but we as well as others must recognize the seriousness of the problem and the absolute necessity to find a solution to it. In any event, we will need to demonstrate our willingness to take effective action in the energy area, and effective action will require the cooperation and determination of the Administration, the Congress, the American people, and other consuming nations. I hope that we can have the support of you gentlemen in furtherance of our efforts. Thank you. 0O0 j DepartmentoftheTREASURY &HINGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04-2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE September 20, 19 74 THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE QUADRUPLING OF THE PRICE OF OIL SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH TESTIMONY BY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY WILLIAM E. SIMON SEPTEMBER 18, 1974 The Magnitudes of Current Money Flows The current and expected magnitudes of money flows associated with international trade in oil have to be estimated. Official reports from oil exporting countries are fragmentary and available only with long time lags. Several important countries have not yet disclosed information on their receipts in 1972. Only a few countries have reported receipts for any part of 1974. We estimate that OPEC countries received $15 billion from oil trade in 1972 and $25 billion in 1973. Our current estimate for receipts in 1974 is $80 billion. Current prices and production rates are generating payments at an annual rate of $100 billion and some analysts are using this figure for calendar 1974. The lags in actual payments are substantial, however, and our $80 billion estimate takes these lags into account. Estimates are highly uncertain because the unprecedented changes in price imposed by the governments of oil-exporting countries over the last year have caused the importing countries to reduce the consumption of oil and to seek alternative sources of energy. The volume of oil trade in prior years is no longer a reliable base for estimating volume in the future. Thus, estimates of the volume of oil likely to move in international trade in 1974 and the period ahead vary widely. Furthermore, contractual arrangements between the governments of the oil-producing states and the major producing companies are in process °f renegotiation and terms under which oil will be produced and exported as well as the division of beneficial ownership °f the oil-producing companies is not yet known. In estimating money flows associated with international rade in oil it is essential to distinguish between payments y importers of crude, petroleum and petroleum products in various countries throughout the world to the sellers of such products, primarily the international oil companies and, in turn, the payments by these companies to the governments °f the oil-exporting countries. There are important differences between the amount of the payments by the oil imports and amounts received by the governments of the oil-exporting countries from oil operations. These differences include the cost of transportation, in some instances the cost of processing oil (if such processing is done in countries where it essentially constitutes a transit trade), the profits of the companies, and changes in receivables and payables. In the early part of 1974, changes in receivables and payables were extremely large and the investment incomes being shown by the international oil companies were large. Both the changes in receivables and payables and the figure for investment incomes are, however, subject to major modification because the contractual relationships between the companies and the governments of the oil-exporting countries are not yet settled and are subject to retroactive adjustment. The uncertainty in these contractual relationships results primarily from the lack of firm understandings concerning the amount of oil considered by the governments of the oil-exporting countries to be their share of the output, and the price paid by the companies for the amount of oil repurchased by them from the governments. Thus the companies do not necessarily know the total costs of the oil they have sold. Furthermore, in some instances, they are also exposed to uncertainties with respect to the prices they can charge to the final importers. These uncertainties not only affect the profit obtained this year, but also the size of the debt the companies have to the oil-exporting countries. This debt arises primarily from the delay in the payments of the difference between the ultimate total price of the repurchased oil, and the interim payments which presumably have been made currently, in relation to actual oil shipments at prevailing tax and royalty rates. We estimate that OPEC receipts from petroleum operations were about $30 billion in the first half of 1974, with $50 billion to come in the second half. There are also wide variations in the estimates of the payments expected to be made by the OPEC countries for imports of goods and services -- purchases on current account. Our best guess is that in calendar 1974 the OPEC countries will make payments for goods and services imports totaling roughly $30 billion, of which $12 to $13 billion may have accrued in the first half of the year. Siïice we estimate that these countries will earn about $5 billion from exports not associated with petroleum, our estimate of 'their surplus on current account, excluding any government grants, is roughly $55 billion. of do J .T fir3 1 9 7 3 _________________ i i >t . 1 1 L.'rporiM <*i * mm ________t 9 7^ Q-l Q-2 Q-J Q-4 Q-l Q-2 4,456 1,032 1,081 1,066 1,277 1.507 1,850 1,445 924 134 144 121 122 1,705 1,032 - 173 208 133 159 401 248 32 47 36 38 406 244 44 46 32 40 409 249 43 45 34 38 . 489 i 291 54 70 31 43 556 338 60 70 44 L . 44 c91 457 82 04 39 §| 1,142 \ 559 23 20 111 314 13 69 66If. 7 26 24 . 1,599 771 56 21 119 442 41 * 369 185 6 4 32 100 4 24 1 13 368 190 . 7 4 26 101 5 24 2 9 375 173 17 9 25 104: 5 29 3 10 487 223 26 4 36 137 5 44 3 9 542 237 39 8 36 138 7 56 5 16 737 345 34 7 49 215 10 53 5 19 I 970 1971 1972 1973 2.583 2,869 3,323 1,269 759 127 173 84 126 11298 767 .134 141 117 U9 623 326 22 11 62 141 875 482 32 23 84 164 to Countries I.at in America Venezuela Ecuador Bahamas »rinidnd A. Antilles Middle East Iran ■ . Iraq Syria Knwa it Saudi Arabia | Qatar ‘ United Arab Em. Oman Baht ain dj < 4gl/ 12 19 121 9 JMulonei. ia 266 263 308 442 102 94 106 140 121 . 119 Airica A U»i r ia T misia :i|i bya 425 62 49. 108 77 129 433 82 42 78 63 168 428 98 55 85 76 114 710 160 60 104 225 161 160 30 8 28 50 44 213 42 20 32 • 73 46 176 37 9 24 67 39 161 51 23 20 35 32 283 85 25 21 113 39 303 68 13 32 108 82 (63) (362) (13) (55) (636) (10) (16) (150) (2) (18) (129) (3) (10) (148) (3) (12) (209) (2) (ID (204) (5) (12) (23C) (13) 385 219 158 388 239 210 399 227 173 477 278 159 545 338 283 679 507 29.0 Egypt Nigeria of Special Category (iHilitory) t (55) (39) hit in America (352) (445) Middle East Ai vita (48) (35) Exports E x c l. Special Category 1,230 LiLiu America 271 Middle East A fr tea 377 Exports 1,243 430 398 1,382 780 415 1,650 963 700 J[/ Excluding Canada. 2/ liu lud*.*:» exports to Qatar, United Arab Em«?0mnn and Yemc Arab Republic. 3 The $30 billion figure for current imports of goods and services takes into consideration the inevitable time lags which these countries encounter in spending the increased revenue available to them. There are delays in planning the expenditures of funds whether these monies are spent on consumer goods, capital equipment, or armaments, Even when decisions have been made as to the goods to;be purchased it takes time to negotiate contracts for thé desired goods and services and additional time to obtain deliveries. Many of the oil-exporting countries hope to use the bulk of their increased earnings for industrial development and for the strengthening of their military establishments. The time lag between orders and delivery for goods of this nature can extend for several years and although some contracts may call for progress payments there are substantial lags in the expenditures of funds associated with imports of this type. U.S. imports of petroleum and products were about $4.7 billion in 1972 and $8.1 billion in 1973. (These figures include imports into the Virgin Islands, which are not included in the figures for U.S. trade published by the Bureau of the Census and $1.1 and $1.4 billion, respectively,) for imports from Canada which is not a member of OPEC). For the first half of 1974 U.S. imports were about $11.8 billion ($10 billion excluding Canada), and in the last two quarters of the year they may amount to about $14 billion ($12 to $12.5 billion excluding Canada), Investment incomes derived by U.S. corporations from their foreign affiliates operating in petroleum production, processing, and marketing amounted to $2.8 billion in 1972, and $4.3 billion in 1973. The figures for the first half of 1974 are not yet available, but, subject to later revision to take account of retroactive changes in contracts with the oil-exporting countries, may have been $3-1/2 to $4 billion. We do not have separate figures on payables and receivables of the U.S. petroleum companies from their international operations, but rough estimates would indicate that their debts to the oil-exporting countries may have risen during the first half of 1973, perhaps by as much as $5 billion. Both the investment incomes of U.S. oil companies and the increase in their payables to the oil exporting countries arise from their world-wide operations and not only from U.S. imports. Table 1 shows U.S. merchandize exports to each of the OPEC countries for the years 1970 to 1973 and quarterly f°r 1973 and the first half of 1974. Data on exports of services to these particular countries are not available but are not believed to be significant. 7 4 As mentioned above, crude Treasury estimates suggest a balance*of payments position for the OPEC countries combined in the calendar year 1974 as follows: ("billions of dollars) Receipts associated with petroleum trade 80 Other goods and services exports 5 Imports of goods andservices Balance on current account excluding government grants -30 55 These estimates suggest that the OPEC countries will have roughly $55 billion to invest in 1974. Many of these countries appear to attach great importance to maintaining as much anonymity with respect to their investments as possible. Thus very little information is provided by the authorities of any of these countries on the disposition of their investments. We have pieced together information derived from many different sources. What we have is fragmentary. Many of the reports cannot be confirmed. We can do no more than offer a very rough guess as to where funds may have been invested thus far m 1974. We estimate that the OPEC countries may have had a surplus of somewhere between $25 and $28 billion between January 1 and August 31, 1974. Of that $25 to $28 billion, about $7 billion appears to have been invested in the U.S. Roughly $4 billion was invested in various types of marketable U.S. government securities including some so-called "agency” securities. Most of the remainder was placed with commercial banks in the United States, although a few hundred million dollars may have gone into corporate securities and real estate. We suspect -- although we have no firm supporting evidence -- that $2 billion or more was invested in Europe through direct placement loans to official or quasi-official agencies, plus direct purchases of private securities and re*l eState, At least $3 billion may have been invested 111 ^ sterling, some of which no doubt involved Purchases of British government securities and some sterling deposits in British banks. We by OPEC lending reflect have received a good many reports of commitments countries to developing countries and multilateral insitutions. Some of these reports appear to firm commitments and some reflect tentative agreements 5 or statements of intent which have not yet been translated into firm programs for action. Altogether the reported commitments would add up to more than $15 billion. Terms of these commitments vary widely. Some call for outright grants. Some involve soft loans and some loans on near commercial terms. Some call for immediate disbursement but most imply that the funds will be disbursed over a considerable number of years. We are not able to determine the amount of money which has actually been transferred under these and earlier commitments thus far in 1974. We think it reasonable to conclude, however, that as much as $3 billion was transferred during this period to developing countries and the multilateral banks including purchases of IBRD bonds amounting to approximately $500 million. Our assumption is that most of the remaining $10 to $13 billion (of the $25 to $28 billion surplus) is currently being held in Euro-dollar and other Euro-currency deposits in banks outside the U.S., largely in London. In the past few months there appears to have been some evolution in the pattern of investment by the OPEC countries, with a larger share of the funds going into long-term, direct placement loans and into the securities of major governments than appeared to have been the case in the earlier months of the year. This very logical development may have come about in part because the OPEC governments have had more time to plan the investment of their funds, whereas initially they were merely left on deposit with commercial banks. In part, it may have come about because banks have, in some cases, reduced their offers for large-scale short-term deposits, thus creating a financial incentive for the investing governments to look for other outlets for their money. Banks are increasingly serving as brokers in arranging the direct placement of OPEC funds with longer-term borrowers and OPEC countries have increasingly, gone into national capital markets to buy government securities. Special arrangements have also been made for direct loaps to governments in several cases and in one case, for a $1 billion deposit as an advance payment for imports. Prospects for Payment in Goods and Services The capacity of the various exporting countries to absorb imports differs materially. There is little doubt that countries with sizeable populations such as Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Algeria and Venezuela will have little difficulty in using their oil income for imports of goods and services. For these countries surpluses are temporarily deriving simply from the fact that it takes time to plan, procure, and obtain delivery for the types of gbods they wish to buy. Libya cannot easily use all of its income for capital equipment or civilian consumption but has been placing large orders for military equipment and may extend grants to nations with which it is in sympathy. 6 The countries of the Arabian Peninsula, however, have relatively small populations and their requirements for imported goods and services are limited. Some of these countries might continue to run substantial surpluses for some years to come if the oil price were to stay at its present level. Even these countries, however, expect to increase their imports very substantially and quite rapidly. The government of Saudi Arabia, for instance, is currently budgeting expenditures of $12.5 billion, approximately four times the level of the previous budget year. This increase can be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in an increase in imports of almost the same magnitude although there will, no doubt, be a substantial time lag involved. Each of the oil-producing countries has its own priorities and is developing its own plans with respect to the use of its oil revenues. All of the countries are placing great emphasis on industrial development. They see an unprecedented opportunity to move into the processing of oil and gas and the production of manufactured items in which oil and gas constitute a major input. In some cases there are likely to be major outlays to improve and expand the infra-structure of the country. Several of the countries have extensive plans for strengthening their military establishments and can be expected to utilize a substantial percentage of their surpluses for military equipment. The U.S. will probably be a major supplier of military equipment, although by no means the only country furnishing arms. Much of the military equipment being ordered by these countries is currently in short supply and delivery is expected to be staggered out over an extended period of time. The scope for substantial development efforts by the oil-producing countries permits the utilization of a significant portion of the receipts of these countries.Announced objectives, both inter-regional and international, must be translated into major flows. Transfers can be of both a pure development nature or can represent long-term investments on more commercial terms, or both. In investing their surplus funds, the governments of the oil-producing countries will have access to a wide variety of financial instruments in many parts of the world. They will have the same opportunities as are open to any large investor and will be able to employ talented investment advisors. Each nation will no doubt choose its own investment strategy and there is no reason to expect they will all make the same choices. Some may place primary emphasis on the income yield of their investments while 7 others may give greater weight to the question of the preservation of their capital. Some of these countries have apparently also placed a high value on anonymity that is, placing their funds in such a way that the identity of the owners cannot be traced. Some may fear that host countries, if able to identify the beneficial owners of large investments, might use their capability to freeze the assets to induce modification of government policy. In the final analysis, unless the OPEC countries choose to leave their oil in the ground, a very poor investment, or give their money away, they must invest the funds they do not spend on imports of goods and services for some kind of financial asset. Today's $10 per barrel of oil if left in the ground as an investment alternative to financial assets earning 8%, would have to rise in price to $21.59 per barrel by 1984, an unlikely prospect. Our expectation has been that these countries would invest in a very wide variety of assets in a great many countries. We see no reason to assume that their investments will seriously disrupt world markets. While huge in terms of international payments patterns and transfers of wealth, these OPEC current account imbalances represent only a small fraction of world financial markets. Thus we would not expect the oil payments situation to substantially alter average yields in world financial markets, nor to cause serious difficulties^for financial markets in absorbing such funds. It is quite possible that there will be some impact on the yield structure of financial assets due to stronger liquidity preferences on the part of OPEC investors than on the part of the average investor. Indeed, some decline in short maturity rates relative to longer maturity rates has already occurred m the Euro-dollar market. It is not clear, however, whether there will be a lasting shift toward lower short-term rates. As OPEC investors decide on more diversified investment strategies and private lenders and borrowers adjust to t e new patterns of lending, there may be little long-term impact on the maturity structure of financial yields. Furthermore, the drive to develop alternative sources of energy will increase the demand for capital. Thus, despi the prospect of huge OPEC surpluses, we look to a world which is short of investment capital. Indeed, the more difficult problem is to provide increased domestic savings to finance our investment needs, not to find profitable outlets for OPEC investments. 8 It would be virtually impossible to make additional real transfers on the order of $50 to $80 from oil-consuming to oil-producing countries over the space of a year. This is due more to the lack of ability of the oil producers to absorb quickly such a huge increase in real resources than an inability of the oil-consuming nations to provide these resources. This does not mean, however, that a problem of overall payments imbalance need exist. The excess of oil country receipts over their imports of goods and services will be matched by an accumulation of financial assets. To the extent that these financial instruments have competitive rates of return, their real economic value will equal the aggregate current account imbalance between oilproducing and consuming nations. (Where there is concessionary financing, of course, accumulated assets will be valued at less than the current payments imbalance.) As was indicated above, there would be little problem with the world’s financial markets providing attractive investment opportunities such that OPEC producers can invest their oil receipts in profitable investments. Over time as OPEC absorptive capacity grows the accumulation of financial assets by the oil producers could be expected to reverse itself. Thus much of the real transfer of goods and services in payment for oil would be deferred until later years when the OPEC countries as a group become "mature creditors," absorbing a greater value of goods and services than their current export receipts. The fact that transfer of real goods and services would follow a different time pattern than oil receipts would not imply that a balanced real value of claims would not occur during the interim. The lack of good assets for oil producers to invest their receipts does not, however, imply that there may not be serious problems associated with the current level of oil prices. For many countries increased oil payments represent an intolerable tax on their meager resources, one which they cannot reasonably be expected to pay either currently, or in later years through commercial borrowing. Likewise increased oil prices have contributed severely to an already unprecedented rate of world inflation. Solution to the financial problems associated with the oil price increases must not be confused with solution to the real underlying economic problems. The resolution of such problems must be in a lowering of oil prices. 9 It is essential that the oil-producing states come to recognize that their own national interests lie in lower oil prices, both in terms of their narrow self-interest in maintaining their markets for future oil sales and because of their stake in the operation of the international economic system. Current Recycling Problems The sudden appearance of large OPEC surpluses has created strains on the banking system. But these strains have induced the banks and other financial institutions to devise new methods and new techniques which enable them to cope with most of the problems. The system is in no real danger. We must be sure that regulatory and supervisory authorities in the various countries watch carefully to guard against mismanagement and speculative excesses by banking institutions. The Comptroller of the Currency is expanding the examination of international banking operations. The German authorities, who had earlier established new procedures and guidelines to limit foreign exchange transaction by banks have established a ’’liquidity bank” and have proposed legislation to revise certain banking laws. We must make sure that our procedures for assuring the liquidity of our financial systems are effective. Central bankers from the major countries announced last week that this is being done. We have no indication that the banks cannot handle the intermediation problem. As their financial assets grow, many of the oil-producing countries are coming to realize that they will not be able to use their money for goods and services in the near future and that they would be well advised to place these funds in longer-term maturities/ We have already seen some indications that a significant portion of the funds being placed with the banks is going into medium-term time deposits and certificates of deposit. As time passes we expect the financial system to adapt to the increased volume of oil-producer surpluses and new investment channels to be opened up through which funds can be recycled. The Euro-currency market apparently continued to expand very rapidly through the early part of the year. In the last few months, however, its overall growth appears to have leveled out. While partly a reflection of factors unrelated to oil payments, this may also be due in part to the banks encouraging OPEC lenders to go elsewhere. There will, no doubt, continue to be strains on the system but we see no reason why these strains cannot be dealt with. The system remains sound. 10 At the same time it must be recognized that the longer the OPEC surpluses (and, consequently, the oil importing country deficits) continue, the more difficult it will become for countries in a weaker financial position to borrow through the private markets. Both Italy and the United Kingdom are currently experiencing very large current account deficits, deficits which are only partially attributable to the oil price increase. Recently, the Italians have had some difficulty in finding financing through the private markets which would be adequate to meet their needs and they have turned to the IMF and to their EC partners for help. The United Kingdom has undertaken some official and quasi-official borrowing in the international capital market but has not had any difficulty in attracting enough foreign capital to meet its financing requirements. With these countries as with others, however, the ability to obtain financing from private sources will depend heavily on the private market's assessment of the countries' economic outlook. If the private markets are convinced that the governments of these countries are moving resolutely to reduce inflation and to eliminate deficits other than those attributable to the petroleum price, they should be able to find financing. There are a number of developing countries whose prospects even before the oil price increase were such that they had little or no recourse to private markets. Some of these countries have been very seriously affected by the oil price increase and it is going to be necessary for governments to focus urgently on this problem. A ministerial committee will be established through a joint resolution of the IMF and the IBRD at the end of this month. One of its first tasks will be to seek a solution to the problem of these most seriously affected countries. Outlook for Oil-Importing Countries The oil price increase has radically transformed the balance of payments prospects of most of the major industrial nations in the world as well as many developing countries. Nations which have been accustomed to trade and service surpluses and net capital exports now find themselves faced with heavy trade and payments deficits and a need to borrow. The size and speed of the required adjustment will cause economic strains and political pressures. There will be a temptation for each country to attempt to improve its position. 11 Thus there is a danger of resort to "beggar thy neighbor" policies. Fortunately, this danger is fully recognized by the governments of these nations. The 24 members of the OECD last May undertook a pledge to refrain from the introduction of new trade measures which would either restrict imports or subsidize exports. The IMF has invited all of its members to undertake a voluntary pledge to refrain from trade measures for balance of payments purposes. These are healthy indications of the widespread recognition of the dangers and o£ a determination to resist the pressures for mutual damaging policies. The United States will be exerting every effort to prevent the adoption of mutually damaging policies. 0 O0 Removal Notice The item identified below has been removed in accordance with FRASER's policy on handling sensitive information in digitization projects due to copyright protections. Citation Information Document Type: Transcript Number of Pages Removed: Author(s): Title: CBS News: "Simon Responds to Criticism" Date: 1974-09-19 Journal: Volume: Page(s): URL: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis https://fraser.stlouisfed.org DepartmentoftheTR[fl$llIf Y iSHINGTON, D.&20220 TELEPHONE W04-2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE September 20, 1974 Contact: 964-2108 OES CONSIDERS FURTHER ACTION FOLLOWING COURT DECISION IN CALIFORNIA WAGE CASE The Treasury Department*s Office of Economic Stabilization and the Justice Department are considering further actions that may be taken following the decision by the United States Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals on September 19, 1974 in the case of the United States vs» State of California. The Court ruled that the Office of Economic Stabilization, Department of the Treasury, the successor to the Cost of Living Council, cannot prevent the State of California from paying its approximately 180,000 employees salary increases for work performed during the period July 1, 1973, through April 30, 1974, even though retroactive payment of these salary increases would violate the terms of decisions issued by the Cost of Living Council. Among the actions the Office of Economic Stabilization and the Justice Department, could seek is final resolution of the issue by the Supreme Court. The T.E.C.A. decision will not become effective for at least 30 days. During this period, the regulations and decisions issued by the Office of Economic Stabilization, the Cost of Living Council, and other agencies of the Economic Stabilization Program will remain in effect. The regulations provide that it is unlawful for wages and salaries to be paid retroactively for work performed on or before April 30, 1974, except as permitted under the Economic stabilization Program rules that were in effect at that time. oOo WS-109 ofthefREASURY Department jSHINGTQN, DX. 20220 TELEPHONE W04-2041 EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL 3:30 P.M., EDT, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1974 REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM E. SIMON SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY BEFORE THE 1974 WORLD ENERGY CONFERENCE q p p r TAT FVFNT COBO ARENA, DETROIT, MICHIGAN MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1974 It is an honor and indeed a great personal pleasure for me to welcome delegates and distinguished guests participating in this vital session of the World Energy Conference. All of us are here today, not merely as representatives of our respective countries, but as representatives of the world community. We share a single purpose: the task of developing policies that will enable man to satisfy his vital energy needs. In reflecting on what the environmental, the economic, and indeed the human cost of energy will be, we can no longer limit ourselves to the boundaries of our individual countries. There is, indeed, a ripple effect in fulfilling the world’s energy needs^. Decisions made in one country affect the very fabric of life throughout the rest of the world. Such decisions demand a continuing spirit of cooperation among the countries of the world. By building an international framework of cooperation among nations, I am convinced that we can overcome the problems that face all of us in the energy area today, and establish a permanent and equitable structure for world-wide economic development. As we discuss various phases of energy policy today, I think it is important to recognize that the root of our current problems lies within ourselves -| within our past failures to acknowledge and act in accordance with our mutual interdependence. There are several specific areas in which we have so failed. an individual basis, we here in the United States and decision makers in other industrialized nations have abused our energy resources. Shortsightedness has lulled us into believing that °ur abundant and cheap energy supplies could continue indefinitely, and so we have failed to come to grips with the rate of growth °i our people’s energy demands. We have failed to develop our ws-no 2 own domestic energy resources adequately, and have leaned instead upon those of other nations. As a group, all of us have failed to coordinate national energy policies. Incredible as it seems, we have not even adequately discussed their interrelations at high political levels. In fact, in the energy area, we are only now beginning to collect adequate information and data on world demand and supply, oil supply arrangements between consumer and producer nations, and future prospective resources, so that we can adopt realistic energy policies. Because of all these failures, we now find ourselves at a crossroads. We are faced with hard choices that will influence all future generations of the modern world we live in. As a great statesman of our nation once pointed out, those who ignore the lessons of the past are doomed to relive them. Let us, instead, learn from the past, and forge together a new atmosphere for orderly world economic growth. We must commit ourselves to work against unconstrained bilateral arrangements which will, in the long run, defeat the very goals we agree on. We must, henceforth, work always within the umbrella of international cooperation. At this conference we will be sharing in a unique perspective on the components that make up the energy challenge. I think it is essential that we focus on a number of interrelated issues: The proper balance between our respective needs for adequate supplies of energy and our common environmental goals; The availability of oil and natural gas resources, and the role these energy sources should play in our world energy outlook; The promise offered by the world’s massive coal resources that hold forth to us all a whole system of alternative energy sources ; Nuclear power, and the role it will play now and in the future; And, as I have already indicated, the international aspec of our common energy future -- the inescapable fact that we can no longer think of developing only ’’domestic” energy policies. We must evolve a world approach. Throughout our discussions, I think it is important to focus on how we can match the international dimensions of the energy challenge with international opportunities, not just to the industrialized nations, but for the entire world communityOur energy problems will demand more of us all: more of our technology, of our science, of our economics, of our natural resources, and of our human spirit. 3 i One important thing to emphasize is that last winterfs embargo only highlighted a problem that has been developing for a generation -- and gone practically unheeded in the United States - - b y our Government, by our private sector, and by our people. This is despite the fact that for two decades we have had a succession of warnings: hearings before our Congress, alarm from our industry, and analyses by the world scientific community that we were moving on a collision course with future realities. We were fortunate in the United States that the embargo occurred at a point in time when we were not yet irretrievably reliant on foreign supply. The U.S. is still 85 percent self-sufficient in energy. Our domestic situation was grave, but not impossible. I am concerned, however, that many of us may forget too quickly. It’s always easy to get action during a crisis. It's not so easy to get response when crisis is behind you. We simply cannot afford to forget that the problem is still with us. And so, the thrust of our efforts in the U.S. is towards energy self-sufficiency. As you all know, we have called this effort Project Independence. It is designed to ensure expansion of our domestic energy production, so that we will no longer be so helpless in times of economic disruption, or the threat of such disruption, from a sudden curtailment of vital energy supplies. We are doing this in several ways. First, we are proceeding to reduce waste through energy conservation programs. Our growth in energy demand must be at least halved over the next twenty years, from a four to five percent annual rate, to f.two or three percent rate. It will not be easy, but we believe this can be done without disrupting orderly economic growth. Second, we must stimulate the development of domestic energy resources. We must accelerate the development of oil and natural gas, boost coal production, and bring on-line coal liquefaction and gasification capacity. We must develop the promise of our vast oil shale reserves, and expand our use of nuclear and geothermal power. We must develop a coordinated, realistic program to accomplish all of this -- not only because it will increase our se ^'Sufficiency, but because the oil-producing nations are watching. It will indeed be noticed that we are willing to maxe the necessary decisions to achieve a more balanced international bargaining relationship. 4 As a first step, we must begin an all-out effort to remove the Government-imposed restraints which have curtailed our domestic industry’s efforts in recent years. Despite the best intentions of the draftsmen of the Government’s past policies, we continue to pose the major obstacles to the short and medium-term efficient market allocation of energy. We regulate the price and distribution of natural gas; we manipulate the pricing and distribution of oil; we have created a Frankenstein of administrative delay in the obtaining of licenses and rate changes. In our enthusiasm to make good after generations of neglect, we have imposed severe environmental restraints upon both the production and combustion of fossil fuels, before knowing as much as we should about not only their need, but their ultimate effects. All of these efforts must be reexamined. In addition, as we develop our long-range energy policies, we must set some short-term goals. These must be clearly understood, and explained at each step not only to the American people, but to the entire world. I believe this framework should involve several major areas of action, including a comprehensive legislative package, changes in existing regulatory procedures, and conservation efforts. First, we must make an all-out attempt to produce additional supplies of oil. This production could be developed through a variety of measures: We could open Elk Hills and Naval Petroleum Reserve #4 to higher levels of production, re-open the Santa Barbara Channel to production under strict environmental controls, reevaluate upward the maximum effective rate for certain oil fields, and increase secondary and tertiary recovery efforts from existing fields. Second, we must each renew our individual commitments as citizens to conserve energy and reduce our overall consum ption Third, we must move towards removal of restrictive price controls from oil and natural gas, and phase out price and allocation programs which have so disrupted marketing patterns. We could begin by reducing the amount of our domestic crude production subject to such controls, but this would be just an interim measure. Ultimately, these controls must go if we are to have a domestic production market with maximum incentives to increase our daily output. 5 Fourth, we need to greatly accelerate Federal leasing programs for both oil and coal. ■" Finally, and related to all of these, we must develop energy legislation and work closely with the Congress to ensure that it’s enacted. I believe the time has clearly come, for instance, for a statement of National Energy Policy, in an Act patterned after both the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the Mining and Mineral Development Act of 1970. We can no longer afford to treat energy considerations on an ad hoc basis, and put out brush fires only after they have begun to affect vital national interests. Energy considerations should be geared into all our federal efforts, and I will propose this to the President for inclusion in a legislative package. At the same time that we develop this short range program, we must look towards increased coal production, and work to make gasification and liquefaction of our coal and oil shale reserves on a commercial scale a reality. With one trillion, 500 billion tons of identifiable coal reserves, we possess half of the free world’s known reserves-one-third of which is economically recoverable today. By the same token, we have an estimated one trillion, 800 billion barrels of oil locked in the shale of our Western States. That is enough to meet our total needs for decades to come. It is up to the Federal Government and private industry to bring the promise of these reserves into the market place. Nuclear power today provides about the same amount of the Nation's energy as firewood. It's time to accelerate the development and use of this important source. It's only through a concentrated effort on all these fronts that we can achieve the ability for self-sufficiency. You will note that I said the "ability" for self-sufficiency. That does not mean that the United States will not continue to import. In fact, our program is based on the assumption that we will import. However, our reliance will not be such that we will have to depend on one set of suppliers. 6 Seen in this way, I do not view Project Independence as a move toward autarchy but rather as part of a worldwide effort to bring greater balance to world energy supply and demand. We all live in an energy interdependent world, and we in the United States see Project Independence as a means to reduce our own call on oil available to the international market. As we begin our panel discussion, I would stress that we are facing a dramatically changed energy scene in the world of the future. The present condition is unstable, and the short-term gains of wealth and power which some are experiencing are already proving undesirable in the longer scheme of affairs The world is reacting to current prices by cutting consumption, and expanding productive capacity of energy. For instance, outside of the OPEC countries, there are renewed efforts for oil and natural gas: The North Sea, in spite of the hazardous drilling conditions, yields new additions to proven reserves each month, and promise of even greater finds. Southeast Asia, while it is still in the first generation of exploration, has great promise of new supplies. Recent discoveries in West Africa have demonstrated great supply potential. And within our own hemisphere, Mexico has made dramatic finds that will literally re-vitalize their oil industry, and could lead to surpassing the production level of the late 1920’s. Thus, the short-run actions of some oil exporters have, in fact, insured that the value of oil in the ground will fall over the next decade. We may be able to do a lot by governmental regulations and cooperation, but we cannot repal the law of supply and demand. Today, however, we must recognize that the present price levels present grave potential economic problems not only f°r consuming nations, but even more so for the producing nations. No benefits derive for price levels which result in unemploy' ment and inflation throughout Europe and Japan, and damage the world economy as a whole. The international investments of all nations are in jeopardy, and the old fable of the goose that laid the golden egg can be seen developing in t o d a y ’ s headlines and international cable traffic. Consumers now suffer from the effects of the sharp and sudden upswing in prices. Producers are likely to suffer at some later time from the downswing in prices caused by the market’s strong reactions t0 present high prices. It is clearly in the best interests of the oil producers that the world economy maintain sound growth. 7 Prices lower than those being charged at present would be in the economic interest of both producers and consumers. High cost alternative sources would not then be encouraged to so great an extent, while the producers can expect not merely short term, dangerous and distortive national incomes, but the more meaningful and truly valuable growth represented by expanding economies which develop the capacity to absorb in creasing imports of capital and technology. Ideally, what is needed is a diversity of consumers and producers operating in a cooperative international framework. Together, we can prevent unemployment. Together, we can prevent a worldwide monetary crisis. Together, we can maintain economic progress. I believe there are grounds for optimism. The world has the capacity and resources to meet our energy needs, and the United States stands ready and willing to help build a structure of international cooperation with producers and consumers alike. Thank you. 0 O0 DepartmentoftheTREASURY . • y <V.:.BUREAU OF THE MINT îf JBu I WASH.. O.C. 20220 - W04-5011 FOR IMMEDIATE R E L E A S E September 20, 1974 INSPECTION O F G O L D A T F O R T K N O X The inspection by Members of Congress on September 23, 1974, of U. S. gold stocks stored at the Fort Knox (Ky. ) Bullion Depository marks a unique departure from the long standing and rigidly enforced policy of absolutely no visitors, Mrs. Mary Brooks, Director of the Mint, announced today. "On April 28, 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt inspected the Bullion Depository, " Mrs. Brooks said. "His visit was the one and only time a gold vault was opened for inspection for anyone other than authorized personnel. "The Congressional inspection adheres to the new open door policy of the government announced by President Ford. Treasury Secretary William E. Simon issued the invitation to Congressmen to inspect the gold at Fort Knox. By also inviting the press to witness the Congressional inspection, the Mint is clearing away the cobwebs and re-assuring the public that their gold is intact and safe. For the first time photographing is being permitted inside the Depository. " After the Congressional inspection, the Bullion Depository will once again be closed to visitors. On September 24, 1974, a special settlement (audit) is scheduled to begin and at its conclusion a report on the audit will be issued. The audit will be performed by a committee of auditors from the U. S. General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Department of the Treasury. The auditors from the Treasury will be drawn from the Office of the Secretary, the Bureau of Government Financial Operations, the U. S. Customs Service, and the Bureau of the Mint. In addition, the committee will include technicians from the Bureau of the Mint who are trained in assaying and weighing gold bullion. The monetary gold stock of the United States totals 276. 0 million fine troy ounces valued at $11.7 billion at the official rate of $42. 2222 per fine troy ounce, and is stored in various federal depositories (table attached), the largest of which is at Fort Knox, Kentucky. 147. 4 million fine troy ounces, valued at $6. 2 billion, is stored in 13 vault compartments at the Fort Knox Bullion Depository. -oOo- MONETARY GOLD STOCK O F THE UNITED STATES (in m illio n s of ounces) Account of th e U. S. T r e a s u r y F o r t Knox 147.4 D enver M int 54. 9 New Y ork A s sa y O ffice 54.1 San F ra n c is c o A s s a y O ffice 10.6 FR B New Y ork - S pecial C ustody A cct. 4 .2 Bank of E ngland 1. 3 Bank of C anada 1 .4 O th e r .1 274. 0 Exchange S tab iliza tio n Fund T o tal 2. 0 276. 0 William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury Chairman Washington, D.C. September 20, 1974 Held at the Request of President Gerald R. Ford and the Congress of the United States P a rticip a n ts Financial Conference on Inflation D r. Gwen B ymers The Hon. W il l ia m E . S im o n Secretary of th e T re a su r y Washington, D.C. P ro fe s so r a n d C h a irm a n o f th e D e p a r tm e n t o f C on su m er E con om ics Me. Edwin 6 . A lexander President Cornell University Ithaca, New York FirstS&L Shares, Inc. Mr. R ichard P. Cooley Denver, Colorado P r e s id e n t a n d C h ief E x e c u tiv e Officer Db. George L eland B a c h Professor of E con om ics a n d P u b lic Policy StanfordUniversity Stanford, California Wells Fargo Bank, National Associa tion San Francisco, California Mb. H oward Coughlin Office and Professional Em ployees International Union NewYork, NewYork P re sid e n t, Mb. Robert H. B. B a l d w in President, Morgan Stanley pny, Inc. NewYork, NewYork & Com-. The Hon. J ack F . B e n n e t t Under Secretary o f th e T r e a s u r y fo r Monetary A ffairs Washington, D.C. Mb. Robert H. B e t h k e President DiscountCorporationof NewYork NewYork, NewYork Mb. Archie R. B oe Chairman of the B o a rd AllstateInsurance Company Northbrook, Illinois Mb. Thomas R. Bomab Federal Home Loan Bank Board Washington, D.C. Chairman, Mr. Morris D. C rawford, J r. C h a irm a n o f th e B d a rd Bowery Savings Bank NewYork, NewYork D r. R obert G. D ederick S e n io r V ice P r e s id e n t a n d E c o n o m ist Northern Trust Company Chicago, Illinois D r. R obert R ay D ockson California Federal Savings and Loan Association Los Angeles, California P re sid e n t, D r. Otto E ckstein P re sid e n t, Data Resources, Inc. P ro fe s so r o f E con om ics, Harvard Uni versity Cambridge, Massachusetts The Hon- Arthur F. B urns Mb. Gilbert R. E llis Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Washington, D.C. Household Finance Corporation Chicago, Illinois Chairman, C h a irm a n iii Dr. Grover W. E nsley Mr. Milton J. H ayes E x e c u tiv e V ic e P r e s id e n t C h a irm a n National Association of Mutual Sav ings Banks NewYork, NewYork Government Fiscal Policy Committee Independent Bankers Association of Ameifica C o n su lta n t, American National Bank of Chicago Chicago, Illinois Mr. M. R. H ellie T h e H on. E dgar R. F iedler A s s is ta n t S e c r e ta r y o f th e T r e a s u r y f o r E con om ic P o lic y Washington, D.C. H. F ranklin Caterpillar Tractor Com Mr. W illiam C h a irm a n , pany Peoria, Illinois P r e s id e n t Credit Union National Association, Inc. Washington, D.C. Mr. R ichard D. H ill C h a irm a n o f th e B o a rd C h a irm a n o f th e B o a rd First 'National Bank of Boston Boston, Massachusetts The First National Bank of Chicago Chicago, Illinois C h a irm a n Mr. Gaylord F reeman D r. T ilford C. Gaines S e n io r V ice P r e s id e n t a n d E c o n o m ist Manufacturers Hanover Trust New York, New York T h e H on . Stephen S. Gardner D e p u ty S e c r e ta r y o f th e T re a su r y Washington, D.C. Mr. B ay Garrett, J r. C h a irm a n Securities and Exchange Commission Washington, D.C. Mr. R ichard G. Gilbert P re sid e n t Citizens Savings Association Canton, Ohio Mr. J. H enning H illiard J. J. B. Hilliard, W. L. Lyons, Inc. Louisville, Kentucky Mr. F rank J. H oenemeyer E x e c u tiv e V ic e P re sid e n t Prudential Insurance Company of America Newark, NewJersey T h e H on. E rnest F. H ollings U n ite d S ta t e s S e n a te Washington, D.C. T h e H on. J acob K. J avits U n ite d S ta t e s S e n a te Washington, D.C. Mb. P aul R. J udy C h a irm a n a n d P re sid e n t A. G. Becker & Company, Inc. Chicago, Illinois Mr. Alan Greenspan Mr. H arvey E. K apnick , Jr. C h a irm a n C h a irm a n a n d C h ief E xecutive Officer Council of Economic Advisors Washington, D.C. Mr. D avid B. H arper P r e s id e n t First Independence National Bank Detroit, Michigan D r. Gabriel H ague C h a irm a n Manufacturers Hanover Trust New York, New York IV Arthur Andersen &Co. Chicago, Illinois Mr. Louis O. K elso G en eral C ounsel Bangert &Co., Inc. San Francisco, California Mr. W. J. K ennedy, III North Carolina MutualLife Insurance Company Durham, North Carolina P ré sid e n t, Mb. Ralph F. L eaoh Chairman of th e E x e c u tiv e C o m m itte e Guaranty Trust Company NewYork, NewYork Morgan Mb. Gustave L. L evy ¡Partner 'Sachs and Company NewYork, NewYork I the Hon. B u ssell B. L ong Goldman, United States S en ate Washington, D.C. Mb. Bbuœ K. Mac L aury President Washington, D.C. T h e H on. W right P atman U .S. H o u se o f R e p r e s e n ta tiv e s Ms. Sylvia P orter S y n d ic a te d F in a n c ia l C o lu m n ist NewYork, NewYork Mr. George B. P reston P r e s id e n t U.S. League of Savings Associations Washington, D.C. Mr. D onald T. R egan C h a irm a n o f th e B o a rd 'Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Minneapolis, Minnesota Db. Paul W. M cCra cken Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. NewYork, NewYork ,Senior Consultant, D e p a rtm e n t o f th e Treasury T h e H on . H enry S. R euss Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C. Mb. Rex J. Morthland IPresident, American Bankers AssociaI tion IChairman, The Peoples Bank and I Trust Company Selma, Alabama Mr. J ames J. N eedh a m IChairman of th e B o a rd NewYorkStockExchange [NewYork, NewYork Mr. H erman N ick er so n , J r . ¡Administrator National Credit Union Administration Washington, D.C. U.S. H o u se o f R e p r e s e n ta tiv e s T h e H on. J ohn J. R hodes U .S. H o u se o f R e p r e s e n ta tiv e s Washington, D.C. Mr. D avid R ockefeller C h ase M a n h a tta n B a n k , National As sociation NewYork, NewYork Mr. R obert V. R oosa P a r tn e r Brown Brothers Harriman and Com pany NewYork, NewYork T h e H on. W illiam Y. R oth U n ite d S ta te s S e n a te IDb. Arthur M. O k u n ISenior Fellow Washington, D.C. ITheBrookings Institution [Washington, D.C. Mr. R alph S. iSaul [Dr. J ames O’L eary Vice Chairman Insurance Company of North America Philadelphia, Pennsylvania |Ü-S. Trust 'Company [NewYork, NewYork P r o fe s s o r E m e r itu s o f E con om ics p Ib. J. Charles P artee iManapinsr D irector, Office of Research I andEconomic Policy poardof Governors of the Federal Re serve System [Washington, D.C. V ice C h airm an D r. R aymond J. S aulnier Barnard College, Columbia University NewYork, NewYork Mr. W alter S cott A s s o c ia te D ir e c to r Office of Management and Budget Washington, D.C. y T h e H on. George P. S hultz T h e H on. F rank W ille E x e c u tiv e V ice P r e s id e n t C h a irm a n Bechtel Corporation San Francisco, California Th e H on. J. W illiam S tanton U .8. H o u se o f R e p r e s e n ta tiv e s Washington, D.C. Mb. R obebt H. S tewabt III C h airm an o f th e B o a rd First International Bancshares, Inc. Dallas, Texas Mb. T homas I. Stores C h a irm a n o f th e E x e c u tiv e C o m m itte e North Carolina National Bank Charlotte, North Carolina Mb. J ohn T omayko Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora tion Washington, D.C. Mb. C. P. W ilson C h a irm a n o f th e B o a rd and Director Robert W. Baird and Company, Inc. Milwaukee, Wisconsin Db. Albert M. W ojniloweb V ice P r e s id e n t a n d Economist The First Boston Corporation NewYork, NewYork Mb. J ohn W. W eight P r e s id e n t Wright Investors’ Service Bridgeport, Connecticut D ire c to r Insurance, Pension and Unemploy ment Benefits United Steelworkers of America Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Mb. W alter W biston T h e H on. Chabls E. W alker Db. C harles J. Zwick P r e s id e n t P r e s id e n t Charls E. Walker Associates Washington, D.C. VI C h a irm a n First National City Bank NewYork, NewYork Southeast Banking Corporation Miami, Florida A M andate T o F ig h t In flatio n The Financial Conference on Inflation held in Washington on Sep tember 20,1974, was one of a series o f meetings leading to the Confer ence on Inflation, September 27-28, 1974. The sessions were designed to call forth the ideas of concerned individuals from all sectors of American society. It was the response by President Ford and the Con gress to the Nation’s first domestic priority—a mandate given by the people to discuss problems and explore solutions regarding our eco nomic realities. The Financial Conference drew together representatives from gov ernment, the banking and investment community, labor and con sumer interests as well as professional economists. Explaining the areas under consideration, Treasury Secretary William E. Simon stated in a letter to participants that “special emphasis will be devoted to fiscal and monetary policy, the capital markets, the international situation and financial institutions.” Moreover, the Secretary indicated that the topics to be dealt with included productivity, the condition of stock and bond markets, credit and interest policies and the international movement of money in and out of the country. “The Conference on Inflation is a bipartisan effort to deal with our number one domestic problem,” President Ford has stated, recog nizing that this mandate, whether expressed in the opinion polls or communicated to Congressmen, is the urgent call and desire on the part of the American public for action to curb inflation. “To restore eco nomic confidence,” the President said in his initial message to Congress and the people, “the government in Washington must provide leader ship.” Expressing his expectations for the conference program, Mr. Ford remarked, “We need to have attainable answers sharply defined and carefully sorted out with all the pluses and minuses of each clearly stated.” And in taking up this theme, Secretary Simon wrote, “We are anx ious to have thinking on this, the Nation’s number one problem—on its causes, its effects and its cures . . . I am confident that we in govern ment will benefit from this advice and discussion.” vii I i Table o f Contents Page I. Agenda---------------------------- ------------------------------------II. Introduction by the Secretary of the Treasury-----------I III. Opening Statements: Briefing by the Council of Economic Advisors---------Briefing by the Office of Management and Budget— Briefing by The Federal Reserve Board-----------------Opening Statements from Delegates----------------------I IV. Fiscal Policy: Discussion Papers from Delegates--------------------------Conference Proceedings----------------------------------------I V. Monetary Policy: Discussion Papers from Delegates--------------------------Conference Proceedings_________________________ I VI. Capita] Markets and Capital Formation: Discussion Papers from Delegates--------------------------Conference Proceedings__ ________________________ IVII. International Economic Policy: Discussion Papers from Delegates--------------------------Conference Proceedings___________________________ will. Financial Institutions and Inflation: Discussion Papers from Delegates--------------------------Conference Proceedings____________ IIX. Wage-Price Policy: Discussion Papers from Delegates_________________ Conference Proceedings___________________________ I X. Other Suggestions to Fight Inflation : Discussion Papers from Delegates_________________ Conference Proceedings___________________________ I XI. Summation______________________________ ________ IXII. Pictures and Biographies of Conference Participants— t i l l . Addendum________________________________________ *_ 3 7 13 21 35 41 157 177 195 211 225 239 265 275 285 293 309 315 327 347 355 359 399 I. Agenda A gend a fo r Septem ber 20 Financial Conference on Inflation 8:15 a.m. Introduction—The Honorable William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury 8:25a.m. EcoTiomic Situation and Policy Briefing—The Honor able Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers 8:40a.m. Briefing on the Budget—Walter Scott, Associate Direc tor, Office of Management and Budget 8:55 a.m. 9:10a.m. JlO:30a.m. ■10:40a.m. ■12:30p.m. 11:30p.m. ■2:10 p.m. 2:40 p.m. Federal Reserve Board Briefing—The Honorable Arthur Burns, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Rownd Table Discussion (3 minutes for each conferee) Coffee Break Round Table Discussion ( continued) Limch Fiscal Policy To Deal W ith Inflation Major Fiscal Objectives and Options for Fiscal Years 1975,1976, and Beyond Possible Cuts in Federal Spending Possible Changes in Federal Taxation: Current Levels, Incentives, Deterrents, Equity Monetary Policy To Deoil W ith Inflation Current State of Domestic Financial Markets Current Monetary Policy: Given the Circumstances, is It Too Tight, About Right, or Too Easy ? What Should the Future Course o f Monetary Policy Be? Capital Markets and Capital Formation Discussion of the Dimensions of Future Capital Require ments in an Inflationary Economy —Policies To Increase the Total Volume of Saving and Investment —Policies To Insure Adequate Financing Through the Equity and Long-Term Debt Market 3 :30 p.m. 4 :00 p.m. International Economic Policy and Inflation Discussion of the Appropriate U .S. Role in International Economic Policy International Financial Aspects of World Inflation Fina/ncial Institutions and Inflation Possible Changes That Should Be Made in Laws and Regulations Affecting Financial Institutions To Assist in the Fight Against Inflation 4 :30 p.m. Wage-Price Policy To Deal W ith Inflation How Should the Wage-Price Monitoring System Be Operated ? 5 :00 p.m. Other Suggestions To Combat Inflation 5 :30 p.m. Conchidi/ng Remarks 6 :00 p.m. Adjournment of Formal Session 4 I. Introduction by the Secretary of the Treasury INTRODUCTION The Honorable William E. Simon Secretary of the Treasury SECRETARY SIMON: Ladies and gentlemen: I think we better getgoing. It is indeed a pleasure to welcome you to this Financial Conference on Inflation. My opening remarks will be brief. Along with the public, we,in Government, are here to listen and learn. There is no needfor me to stress the importance of our deliberations. The continuation of current high rates of inflation will wreak havoc in our country. We must prevent that. We are going to prevent that. But, even when we have put the worst of present inflation behindus, our banking and financial system will face some old problems and many new challenges. We have asked you here today to explore these issues, and consider how the banking and financial communities can best serve the interests of the American people. We are grateful that you have responded. Strong economic performance obviously depends on the con tinued smooth and reliable functions of our financial markets andfinancial institutions.. which I have always felt are the centerpiece of our free enterprise economy. Borrowers, both here and abroad, depend on our markets and ourinstitutions for the funds that are essential to carry on economic activity. Savers, both private and institutional, lookto our markets for secure and profitable investment oppor tunities. Our financial markets are large, and they are efficient, institutions are carefully regulated and the public's deposits are insured. There are many elements of strength in our financial picture. k 7 Yet, we know that the current inflation is placing great strains upon our financial markets and institutions. Interest rates have been driven to unparalleled heights. Our equity markets have fallen off sharply. Some sectors of the economy, especially housing, find the availability of credit sharply reduced. And, above all, there has been a continuing erosion of financial confidence. All of these disturbing developments are due, in the final analysis, to our failure to deal successfully with inflation. The United States, as we all know, has no monopoly on the problem of inflation. Even among the major industrial nations, price levels have been rising at rates that only a few years ago would have been assumed to apply to seme coun tries with less well-disciplined and developed institutions for the management of their economic policies. The rate in which the purchasing power of money has been depreciating here and abroad is constituting a grave threat, not only to the orderly economic progress, but even to our liberal, social and political institutions. No group in our society is more acutely sensitive to these dangers than the leaders of our financial community. The pres ent inflation has, of course, been aggravated by special factors which are very familiar to all of you: the explosion in oil prices, the devaluation of the dollar, the simultaneous boom in all the industrialized countries and removal of wage and price controls which brought the inevitable bulge. Indeed, about one-half of our current inflation can be explained by these special factors. We also know, however, that how explosive the effects of these special factors turn out to be depends heavily on the existence of generalized inflationary pressures in our economy. A generally stable economy can absorb shocks, much more readily than an economy already tightly stretched. Unfortunately, most major industrial nations have been stretching for some time to maintain high rates of growth, and minimal levels of unemployment. These are commendable objec tives but their unswerving pursuit has left more countries very susceptible to inflation. In most nations, general economic policies have been too inflationary. 8 In the most recent period, for example, of the 24 OBCD countries, twenty of them had budget deficits. These deficits at a time of generally heavy demands on general productive capacity had to be financed and these financing requirements tended to force excessively explosive monetary and credit policies. The record of the last two years is not a good one^ if high rates of inflation are disturbing, the wide variations in rates of inflation internationally carry with than a measure of hope. They suggest that this Nation is not helpless on a sea of world inflation. Good policies still pay off. Nations that have pursued this inflationary policy have lower rates of inflation. We are, of course, heavily influenced by world events. But, we can, by the patient and prudent management of our economic policies reduce our own rate of inflation and we then eliminate the malignant tendencies at home for prices to rise because prices are rising as the inflation feeds on itself. We have, I believe, an unparalleled responsibility, but we also have an opportunity. We have more scope than any other Nation to deal with our domestic inflation. And the difference between a good and a poor U. S. performance in regaining economic stability will pro foundly affect the course of the world economy and its social and political institutions for years to come. The economy, however, is no machine with dials and levers, marked fiscal or monetary or other policies. Economic policy is not just a matter of mechanics or algebra. Policies must be implemented through our democratic institutions. They must, therefore, have the consent of our free people. And this requires that all of us feel and have a sense of involvement in the shaping of those policies which so profoundly influence our own lives. I, therefore, welcome you to this meeting in this spirit. Our problems are complex. There are no instant solutions. Yet we can still be masters of our fate. The capacity of a free people to find and implement solu tions must never be sold short. And the shape of democratic institutions here and abroad will be profoundly affected by our success in this quest for economic stability and, therefore, by our deliberations here today. I would now like to call on Allen Greenspan who will give us a briefing on the state of the economy and the outlook. 9 BRIEFING BY THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS MR. GREENSPAN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. What I ’d like to do is just briefly review what I think is going on in the economy generally, and how its interfacing with the financial system at this point, and why w e ’re seeing in a sense some very extraordinary strains emerging in both areas. In fact, what we're observing at the moment are the impacts of inflation holding down economic acti vity, in fact, suppressing it, and concurrently causing considerable distortions and pressures and strains in the financial structure. What we are actually observing, of course, is merely the process by which inflationary expectations working their way into the decision-making process tend to have extraordinary and almost unprecedented impacts on some of our financial institutions and some of the financial ratios which w e ’re used to looking at. One of the things one concludes, incidentally, this is something which the Secretary said very early °n !n remarks, that w e ’ve had a taste of double digit inflation in this country. We've had it for a long time, too long a time, too many months. And, what we must conclude from it is that our system cannot take this indefinitely. If you extrap olate the strains that we now already see as a con sequence of what we have for an extended period of time, the institutions -- economical, financial, structural -- begin to break down because they are essentially constructed or have been developed over the decades in the context of low, single digit inflation, and it's by no means clear or had not been clear, I should say, how significant this element was until we actually have tested it, and having ^ested it, we found that it does not respond terribly 13 Clearly, we see -- I don’t have to go through examples, I'm sure that all of you are most familiar with all of the various problems that each and every institution is having, but that clearly the savings and loans are under extraordinary pressure; insurance companies, banks, business -- especially smaller business -- were having difficulty getting financing. The system clearly does not work well under these conditions. Now, when you look at the impact of inflation ary expectations on the physical aspects of the economy, what you see is that consumers who essen tially tend to pull back when they are confronted with inflation are doing precisely that. Whenever you have a household which is caught up in inflation and in fears of being able to make ends meet, grave concerns about whether six months from now the electric bills or rent or health costs to life would be astronomical. What happens is if you cannot plan your family expenses, you tend to hold back on numbers of discretionary-type expenditures, attempt to save more, and as a consequence, what occurs is that the uncertainty generated in the consumer markets as a consequence of this induces a significant suppressing of consumer markets, and this obviously is what we have been observing for too long a period, and it is one of the major, if not the major, element inducing the sluggishness in our economy. Inflationary expectations, however, do not work symmetrically, and, in effect, tend to affect busi ness decisions in precisely the opposite manner. What happens, of course, is that both plant and equipment expenditures and inventory purchasing under inflationary expectations tend to accelerate. Now, while this certainly gives an aura of physical volume strength in the economy, it is clearly an artificial, unsustainable and not a very healthy form of economic expansion. Obviously, in the capital expenditures area, when you have expected price increases, the impact of this is largely to immediately cause expected rates of return on new facilities to rise rapidly and, as a consequence, the usual expenditure pro cedures that are involved in a company tend to un earth very large budget items, and this is what we have seen in the last number of quarters. 14 If we take a look at capital appropriations, they're just way above expenditures. Backlogs of unexpended outlays are rapidly rising, even adjusting for price change. This is even still true in the electric utility area, where we've seen some very dramatic curtailments of late. In the inventory area, we see, of course, the usual expected accumulation which occurred mostly through 1973 and early 1974. As price expectations grow, orders to basic materials producers went up sharply, lead times on delivery stretched out very sharply, and it's only now that we're beginning to see some easing occurring in that sort of process, largely because inventory levels have finally risen in terms of day's supply or in any other measurer to exceptionally high levels. And looking now at the process of orders beginning to slip, you get that sense that lead times are pulling in and the inven tory process is now turning over on us, and we're beginning to see the usual signs of this sort of inventory slippage which I think will proceed for a while. In fact, were it not for this still very buoyant capital goods market, even with all of the retrench ments we're seeing, inventory liquidation could be quite substantial. But because of the fact that a very large block of the inventories in our system are supported by the capital goods markets, the extent of inventory retrenchment is likely to be held in check, and as a consequence, the degree of physical volume decline implied in the inventory sector is not — at least as we can see it at this stage--of exceptional concern. Nonetheless, when you put all of these things together, you do come out with an economy, an eco nomic outlook which is scarcely one that can be described as buoyant. On the contrary, it looks poor. The economy is clearly soft and is softening, and one begins to see the effects of the inflationary expectations them selves working the economy down in its rate of growth and into something which is now pretty close to the zero area, maybe a shade negative, so far as the outlook is concerned. Nonetheless, we still find extraordinary credit I emands, and the reason we are, of course, is that at is financed are current dollars and not physical ^uymg volume, and these numbers are really quite 15 And one of the difficulties we see, even as we get that sense of ease, is that we have been finan cing the current dollar growth in our GNP in part by reducing the liquidity of the business sector, and concurrently, observing significant increases in loan deposit ratios or other measures of illiq uidity in the commercial banking system. If, in fact, one were essentially to project the types of flows of funds which are implicit in what we are observing so far as this last year or year and a half is concerned, we rapidly get to a very tight corporate liquidity, even worse than it is now, and a very tight commercial banking system pressures. And so what we're seeing is the economy is attempting to adjust to this financial drain. There's several incidental problems associated with these financial difficulties. For example, a very large part -- in fact, recently almost all -- of inven tory growth and book financing of inventory has reflected inventory profits, and even though these, as you know, don't really create cash, our evidence suggests that one, not only do corporations pay taxes on these inventory profits and hence have a drain out of their system, but it also looks as though a substantial proportion are paying cash dividends against this stuff which also must be re plenished in the financial system by borrowings. So what we have seen in this type of problem is that there is a sort of financial capacity on growth which has sort of limited the dollar expan sion of our system if one looks in terms of business and financial balance sheets. And with this type of extraordinary inflationary pressures, in a sense the inflation is eating up all of the current dollar growth, leaving negligible or even less than negligible amounts for real activity. Nonetheless, the system, despite its strains, is showing some very extraordinary flexibilities. Conventionally, the normal period we expect that small corporations and unincorporated businesses are financed through larger companies. We always find, for example, if you will look at the receivables-payables balances of these cor porations and smaller businesses, there is always a net lending from the larger corporation, to the smaller corporation, or the unincorporated business. 16 It appears now that with the smaller companies having difficulty borrowing that part of a very heavy loan demand that we see at the larger banks is reflecting the phenomenon of large corporations acting as so-called financial intermediaries to supply funds basically to their customers. It's the type of sort of semi-emercengy type that one sees in an extraordinarily complex financial system that we have. And even though there are strains, pressures and the like, and ob viously numbers of changes that probably are required as far as structural, financial reform, it is still, nonetheless, truly remarkable how efficient the structure and the system is working, even in the fact of this extraordinary pressure. flexibility But you cannot expect it to go on. You cannot expect that the system will function in a continuously viable way under the conditions that we now have with respect to inflation. And this is all the more reason why inflation which has been a major public enemy number one to virtually every sector of the economy that one can imagine -- it finds its way in every nook and corner of our system and it is clearly causing great struc tural problems in our economy and in our financial system, which is one of the basic reasons why we really have no choice. We cannot live with inflation. It’s not a fact of saying, "Well, here it is, let's try to find the mechanism to deal with it." I don't think we've got that choice, at least in the short run. We may in the longer run. There are a number of notions about indexing and a variety of changes which might conceivably make large changes, but that's something that's in the future. You can't get diere from here. And the only way to restore a basic balance is largely and in fact essentially to bring down the inflation rate back to more normal dimensions. I don't see any alternative to that. I wish there were, but they're not so far as I can see, and therefore, this is the reason why I think that the priority of curtailing the inflationary load in our system is extremely high, and the sooner we resolve this problem, the better. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 17 m. Briefing by the Office of Management and Budget BRIEFING BY THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET SECRETARY SIMON: Now Walter Scott, the Associate Director of the Office of Management and Budget will brief us on budget policy. Wally! I I MR. SCOTT: Clearly, fiscal policy is one of the key tools of the Federal Government we must employ in terms of facing up to the challenge of inflation. Following luncheon today we'll be looking in greater depth in an open discussion. At this time what I'd like to do is try to provide you with a rather simplified understanding of the nature of the expenditure side of the budget, where we are in it, how we got there. Hopefully, this background will give you a little sense of the political and practical re alities that we must face up to if, in fact, we are to make major cuts in the budget this year as well as next year. And in saying this, it's not my intent to suggest that the budget can't be cut. Whether we have a $300 billion budget or $400 billion budget, cuts will always be difficult. There will always be further claims as to what the Government's role within the economy should be. Essentially, the decisions that must be made are ones that relate to what can we afford to have government doing within our economy. I believe each of you has a set of charts that has been distributed to you, six charts that I'd like to take you through, because I think they help lay out some of the dimensions of where we are. The first one sets forth Federal budget outlays rom 1961-75 in both constant and current dollars. as you can see Federal outlays in current dollars nave tripled over the past decade and a half. r , ^ t^le first 150 years of our country, the federal expenditures were $100 billion. In 1961 21 they were $100 billion. In this year they will be close to $300 billion. The growth in Federal outlays looks very different, however, when you consider the impact of rising prices. In constant dollars, putlays rose 50 percent between 1961 and 1968. Since that time real Federal spending has remained relatively level. Now if we can move to the next chart which lays out Federal outlays as a percent of GNP. Over the 15-year period which is chart you'll note there is a break in Over this period, GNP has ranged from to 21.6 percent. Again, it peaked in butter year of 1968. covered in the the scale. 18.1 percent up the guns and While a portion of the GNP the Government spends has declined somewhat since 1968, it has clearly not reached the levels where it stood at the early 1960's. If, in fact, we've been successful in cutting the budget for Fiscal 1975 year that we are in now, these figures could be a little lower in that last bump at the end of it. These figures could be a little lower. Move to the next chart. This chart lays out for you the composition of the Federal budget, and, as you can see, while the budget has been relatively flat in constant dollars since 1968, this has masked substantial changes that have taken place in spending during that period. Essentially, as it becomes clear in this chart, the -cutback reduction in Defense expenditures has given us the dollars to expand social programs and payments to individuals and programs of that nature. The 1975 budget level of Defense spending is lower than at any time since before the Korean build up. From 46 percent of the budget in 1961, 29 per cent in 1975. Military manpower in this period has declined from three and a half million men in uniform to 2.4 million in 1974, the lowest level since 1950. Payments to individuals is now the largest cate gory in the budget, having increased from 27 percent in 1961 up to 54 percent in 1975. In constant prices, payments to individuals have tripled during this time. Real Federal grants to 22 State s have also tripled over the 15-year period, . having leveled off, however, in the last two or three [years of that period. Real outlays for interest and other non-defense Irose by 44 percent between 1961 and 1968, and since :then have declined steadily and are now below their I1961 levels. There are a number of reasons for this: jfirst, it reflects the decreases that have taken place in the space program and foreign aid, ^s well as the increases in the sales of offshore oil lands and, finally, the removal from the budget of another number of agencies that were previously included within the figures. Now, lets look further in the next chart into the composition of the budget and an understanding of what must be done if, in fact, we're to balance the budget in 1976 and to cut Federal spending below the $300 billion figure in 1975. I think and hope this will give you some sense of the budget momentum that we are dealing with, whereby even a small cut in the 1975 budget will manifest itself more sub stantially in later years, or even a small new pro gram that is initiated in 1975 typically tends to expand in the years ahead. This is a somewhat unusual cut of the budget but gives you a sense of controlability or non-controlability. The first major heading on the chart under mandatory spending consists of contractual obliga tions. These are such things as the interest on the Federal debt as well as contracts which have been entered into in prior years, which, to cut those in this year would indicate a requirement that we either renate on contractual obligations of some sort or attempt in a unilateral fashion to reopen negotiations. This may be a bridge that is alf built or some kind of, as I said previously, entered into contract. The next major area, and that consists, as you can see, of about a quarter of the Federal budget. The next major category which is close to half r it is entitlement programs. ale T^ese are largely benefit payments to individu as and consist of such items as Social Security, 23 558-812 O - 7 4 - 3 Medicare, Medicaid, general Revenue Sharing, essen tially items which have been laid out in law where., if someone is qualified under the basic laws they can present themselves for payment and automatically receive whatever the entitlement benefits are under that individual program. To, in fact, make major cuts within those program areas will require changes in the law either in terms of the benefits which people receive or the inclusion of a number of people who are encompassed in the basic programs. Thus, as you can see, roughly 70 percent of the budget falls in these areas where either legislation will be required, essentially mandatory spending under the existing laws today. The remaining 30 percent we have more discretion over. This breaks out primarily as 60 percent of it is in defense spending, as you can see. Most of this is in personnel costs. To reduce that figure sub stantially would require a major change in our troop structure. As you are aware, there have been -- in the recent congressional action there has in fact been, in fact, been a cut in the Defense budget which would reduce these figures something close to $2 billion below the level at which they included in this par ticular table. Further cuts will be resisted very strongly by the President because of the need for keeping our country strong if we are to have a strong position in terms of dealing with other foreign pow ers in honoring our international commitments. This brings us down to $35 billion of non-de fense discretionary spending. Here, also, the biggest chunk of it, $20 billion, is in personnel costs. As you are aware there has been recently initiated a cut of 40,000 in Federal employment which should, in fact, bring this figure down to something close to $300 million. I might mention as an aside, the level of Fed eral civilian employment now is approximately the same as it was in the late 1940’s. Essentially, the growth in the Federal Government has not been in terms of services performed by the Federal government but has been largely in terms of the transfer of kinds of payments that have not been particularly comsumptive of employment. A further element of what has been happening 24 nre broadly in Government performing of services, ünrine the same period of time states and local j governments' employment has risen from about 3 million Lmlovees up to something on the order of eleven and a half million. So that the gain of total government employment has been almost solely on the state and local government side as they have performed more of the services of tne people of our country. A little item here is offset, which, as I men tioned before, include offshore oil receipts as well as contributions to the employer retirement fund. Now, if we can move to the next chart which lays out in a little more detail what those discretionary non-defense outlays consist of. Even here, unfor tunately, more than half of these programs tend to be in the area of health, welfare kinds of activities. Also included in this list as you can see are such things as the atomic energy programs which are quite basic to the project independent efforts that are taking place. To give you again an idea of the difficulties in cuts even in this kind of a list, you'll note Federal highways in here are $700 million. This implies cut ting the Federal highway level this year by $4.6 bil lion because of the fact that only 15 percent of those dollars are spent in the first year and, ob viously, the balance would be over the next four to m e years. Now if we could move on to the next chart which gives you, lays out the entitlement programs. And it's the second area where, obviously we've got to be taking hard looks to determine whether, in fact, cuts can be made. Benefit program payments to individuals account for 94 percent of the outlays under these entitlement programs. Obviously, this is a particu larly difficult area to cut because more than twothirds of the benefits are paid to individuals for retirement benefits and for Medicare. And these individuals -- such as older people have borne a rath er substantial burden of the inflation w e ’re exper iencing today. F I hope that gives you some perspective in terms nni-W +re we.are in the Federal budget and again, I am ° attempting to suggest these cuts can't be made. I ’m k°wever, that it is going to require broad dedicated efforts on the parts of both the Conless and the Executive Branch as well as the American 25 people to recognize will be impositions within this budget, so that it requires effort. Thank you. 26 that there will be burdens, there brought about as a result of cuts and it won't be an easy process, a totally and broadly disciplined 8 FEDERAL OUTLAYS AS A PERCENT OF GNP PERCENT COMPOSITION OF REAL FEDERAL O U TLA Y S (CONSTANT 1975 DOLLARS) $Billions FY 1975 BUDGET - COMPOSITION OF OUTLAYS (IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS) MANDATORY SPENDING CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS: NET INTEREST__________________________________________________________ 23.0 HOUSING SUBSIDIES AND INSURANCE, FARM SUPPORTS, ETC________________________________ 5.8 OTHER PRIOR-YEAR OBLIGATIONS__________________________________________ DEFENSE_______________________________________ NONDEFENSE________________________________________________________ 53.1 (23.0) (30.1) SUBTOTAL CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS________________ ____ 81.9 ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS___________________________________________________ 142.1 LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIARY________________________________________________ 1.1 TOTAL, MANDATORY SPENDING_________________________________ 225.1 DISCRETIONARY SPENDING DEFENSE:_________________________________________________________________ 57.1 PERSONNEL___________________ (37.0) ALL OTHER_____________________________________________________________ (20.1) NONDEFENSE:_______________________________________ 35.1 PERSONNEL_____________________________________________________________ (20.0) ALL OTHER____________________________________________________________ (15.1) TOTAL, DISCRETIONARY SPENDING___________________________ _____ 92.2 O F F S E T S (OFFSHORE OIL AND RECEIPTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO EM PLO YEE RETIREMENT F U N D )____________________________________________ -11.8 T O T A L — ------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------- 305.4 DISCRETIONARY NON-DEFENSE OUTLAYS, 1975 (Excluding Personnel Costs) 1975 O utlays ($ b illio n s) P rogram Health (largely research and training)........................ ........ . ........ .......... NASA research and development................................. ......................... | Foreign aid (largely P. L. 480 and Indochina reconstruction)........................ Atomic energy....................................... . ..................................... ..... Child nutrition program.......................................... Education programs................................................ ............................. Comprehensive manpower assistance....................................................... Extended unemployment benefits (proposed legislation)................................. Veterans medical care...................................................................... . Federal aid highways.................................... Housing and Community Development Act................................................ Coast Guard operating expenses....................................................... & . . . Corps of Engineers and reclamationconstruction........................................ Department of Justice........................................................................... Payments and loans to the District of Columbia......................................... All other............................................................................................ Total, discretionary non-defense outlays........... ................... 2.2 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 1.0 15.1 ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS, F IS C A L YEAR 1975 Outlays ($ billions) Benefit payments for individuals Direct Federal: Social Security (OASDI) and railroadretirement.................... Civil Service and military retirement................................ Medicare...................................................................... Veterans benefits........................................................... Supplemental security income............ Food Stamps.................................................................. Disabled coal miners.... ..................... Grants to States: Public assistance (AFDC)........ ............... ......... ............ .. Rehabilitation and social services...................................... Medicaid...................................................................... Unemployment insurance............................ ............. . Subtotal, payments for individuals....... ............... 4.6 3.1 6.3 8.3 134.4 Other General Revenue Sharing.......................... Postal Service..................................................................... Legislative and judiciary.... ; ................................................ Subtotal, other.................................... 6.2 1.6 1.1 8.8 Total........................ .................... 1/ S u b s t a n t ia l o v e r la p b e tw e e n p r o g r a m s . 65.1 13.1 14.2 10.1 4.8 4.0 .9 Beneficiaries —^ (millions) 32.1 2.3 12.2 7.3 5.0 15.8 .5 11.5 10.0 28.6 1 . 9 ?' 143.2 2/ A v e r a g e n u m b e r o f b e n e f ic ia r ie s p e r week. im Briefing by The Federal Reserve Board STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE ARTHUR F. BURNS Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System MR. BURNS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The purpose of this meeting, as we all know, is to seek Ithe advice of this able and distinguished group. jJ as well as other Governmental officials, need your ■counsel. I want to learn all that I can from you, but I also ■deem it my responsibility to comment briefly on this country's [financial condition and on the stance of Federal Reserve [policy. Our nation is now in the grip of a dangerous inflation [which has been gathering force over the past ten years. As aresult of the inflation, our nation's capacity to produce [has suffered a set-back. While shortages of materials, com[ponent parts and equipment have diminished in the past three or four months, they remain acute in many of our industries. As a result of the inflation, consumer purchasing power is being eroded. During the past year, the take-home pay of the typical worker declined five percent in real terms. As a result of the inflation, the real value of the savings deposits, pensions and life insurance policies of theAmerican public has diminished. As a result of the inflation, corporate profits derived from operations have stagnated, a fact that is concealed by accounting techniques that have been devised for inflation-free ¡times. As a result of the inflation, financial markets have been [experiencing strains and stresses, interest rates have soared. 35 Some financial and industrial films have found it more diffi cult to roll over their commercial paper or to raise needed funds through other channels. Savings flows to thrift insti tutions have sharply diminished and stock prices have plum meted. In short, as a result of the inflation, much of the plan ning that American business firms and households customarily do has been upset,and the driving force of economic expanse has been blunted. It should not be surprising, therefore, that the physical performance of the economy has been sluggish in recent months and that unemployment is now larger than it was last fall. We cannot realistically expect a resurgence of economic activity until confidence in our nation's economic future is restored. I do not think we can do this without making pro gress in checking the disease of inflation. As you know, Federal Reserve has lately been pursuing a policy of slowing down increases of money and credit with a view to moderating the forces of inflation. We have tried to employ the monetary brakes firmly enough to get results, but we have also been mindful of the need to avoid any general credit stringency. Thus, the supply of money and credit has continued to grow, although at a slower pace than in recent years. The narrowly defined money supply, that is, currency plus demand deposits, has grown so far this year at an annual rate of fiveand-a-quarter percent, in contrast to an average of seven per cent daring the past three years. If the time deposits of commercial banks except for their large certificates of de posits are also included in the money supply, the annual rate of growth this year has been thus far eight percent, in con trast to an average of ten-and-a-half percent during 1971 to 1973. Clearly, the American economy, taken as a whole, is not being starved for funds. On the contrary, the growth of money and credit is still proceeding at a faster rate than is con sistent with general price stability over the longer term. Yet, the demand for money and credit has been rising ata very much faster pace than the supply. As a result of the huge demand for borrowed funds, credit markets tightened this year and interest rates rose to levels such as we have not previously known. 36 These high interest rates have imposed a heavy burden on ■businesses and families across the nation. Home building in ■particular is highly sensitive to money market developments. ■Soaring interest rates and reduced availability of mortgage ■credit have greatly aggravated the condition of that indusItry, which was already suffering from sharply higher land and Iconstruction costs, from the erosion in the purchasing power Iofconsumer incomes and from the over-building of the last Itwoyears. The overheating of the economy from which we have recently ■suffered is, however, now in process of being corrected. ■Federal Reserve policy has contributed to this development. IInview of the intensity of the inflation, a policy of modlerate monetary restraint remains appropriate. But I also feel that it would be undesirable to further ■intensify monetary restraint. In any event, market forces are no longer driving interest ■rates to ever-higher levels. In fact, short-term market inter jest rates have recently receded from the extraordinary peaks ■reached this summer and long-term market rates have stabilized [ormoved down a little. Mortgage interest rates and institutional interest rates are, however, sticky and traditionally lag behind market rates. The recent movements of interest rates are encouraging, Ibutwe cannot count on any large or lasting decline of inter[est rates until borrowers and lenders in the market perceive [that the Federal Reserve is no longer pursuing a lonely strug gle against inflation. Monetary policy is much too blunt an instrument to be relied upon exclusively in what should be a national effort to bring inflation under control. We at the Federal Reserve hope that financial institutions will proceed more cautiously in their lending policies but with a full sense of awareness of the basic needs of their communities. We also hope that fiscal policy will soon actively join in the struggle against inflation. A fiscal policy that is tilted towards surpluses instead of deficits can make an enormous contribution to curbing inflation and to lowering interest rates• I referred earlier to the strains and stresses in finan cial markets. Let me add, in this connection, that while tenslons in financial markets remain acute, they have been reduced to some degree in recent weeks. This is evidenced by omew at smaller risk premiums on securities of borrowers of less than prime quality. 37 Also, while it is still difficult to place lower grade issues of commerical paper or of corporate bonds, the flow of such instruments appears to be better than in the early simmer. In closing, I want to make several terse observations on financial policy: First, inflation cannot be brought under control without causing inconvenience, some disruption and even hardship. By alleviating the harsh and uneven impact of its restrictive policies, the Federal Government will have a better chance of persevering in a policy of containing inflation. Second, bankers and other financial managers have lately become more prudent, partly on their own account and partly because of increased vigilence by the bank regulatory authorities. Third, the Federal Reserve system fully recognizes its responsibility as a lender of last resort and can be counted on to come to the assistance of financial institutions that are caught in a temporary liquidity squeeze. Fourth, and finally, while the Federal Reserve must per severe in the struggle against inflation, we shall also see to it that the supply of money and credit continues to expand. There will be no credit crunch in our country. Statements by Conference Delegates MR. SIMON: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And now we will proceed, as I said last night, to go around the table, soliciting the -very brief views. Due to a very tight agenda, I feel compelled to reiterate that I am going to have to keep a tight clock on the participants. So, forgive me in advance if I am rude, and I will be cutting off at the end of three minutes. DR. CHARLES J. 2WICK, PRESIDENT, SOUTHEAST BANKING CORPORATION MR. ZWICK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My condolences to Mr. Alexander. (Laughter.) MR. ZWICK: I would like to make several simple points: First, being that to deal with the inflationary problem will require a series of actions over a long period of time. Notwithstanding that, I believe we must start with a simple, clear-cut unambiguous signal to the American public that the Government is serious about this problem. It requires an act, I believe, of moral leadership on the part of the Government, and I would propose such an action this morning. I would make a second suggestion that we stop talking about things we are "not" going to do, because over a long |period of time, we may have to change our minds as to what we will, in fact, do. Now, to a specific action, which I think would indicate to the American Public that we are serious about this problem, and that we do intend to do something about it, 11 would propose that the Executive Branch of the Government recommend to the Congress that a joint resolution be passed to jgive the President the power to withhold sufficient fbnds from current appropriations to meet 150% of any desired cut in jFederal, expenditures. Stating it simply, if we believe a I$5billion cut for FY 1975 is appropriate in various programs, jwe give the President the authority to cut $7-1/2 billion. The 41 excess of $2-1/2 billion then can be used in consultation with the Congress to reinstate programs when further analysis indicates that a major dislocation would result. I would exempt from this hold-back authority only direct payments to individuals for such items as veterans benefits, Social Security payments, and Medicare. If such a joint reso lu tion were passed quickly, the Administration could immediately take steps to reduce Federal spending and provide the needed moral leadership and, also, do the detailed analysis that is required to indicate how the desired budget level can be reached sensibly. President Ford could propose to Congress next January exactly how he would accomplish the cut-back and the needed appropriate actions could take place at that time to validate the $5 billion cut. Now, it seems to me this proposal has the virtue of being simple and, therefore, it could be implemented immediately, and it would provide the American people with a tangible evid ence that the Government is serious in its efforts to reduce inflation. We do have precedents for such a resolution in the expendi ture limitation provisions of the 1968 Surtax Legislation, and in the Budget Reform Act of 1974. Either of these approaches could be adopted for this critical need. We do not need, I believe, long technical arguments about detail. We need an immediate and clear-cut act of moral leadership on both the part of the Executive and the Legislative branches of Government. Thank you. 42 m. WALTER WRISTON. CHAIRMAN, FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK MR. WRISTON: Mr. Secretary, the fiscal side was covered just ahead of me. I would like to say a word on the monetary [side. I think, if our goal is to reduce inflation and to reduce both s h o r t - teim and long-term interest rates, the Federal Reserve should not deviate substantially from its policy objec tives this year. I think it is a truism that the money in our pockets has no value in and of itself. It has only a scarcity value and, ifall of us had all of the money that we wanted, the value of the dollar would approach zero. This is the reason that the amount of money supplied by the Federal Reserve System is absolutely crucial to the control [of inflation. So far, they have failed to validate our inflationary expectations, and that is working back through the system, as [Mr. Greenspan has said. Inflation is an addiction, like a drug addiction or alcohol, and as it starts, most people perceive that they will benefit. But, as it gains strength, we see that it destroys the country. Kicking a habit is never very pleasant, and there isn't any easy, simple, wonder drug to get us out of it. It is a long and painful process. And, therefore, we must devise ways to take care of those who are hurt during that process in a fair and equitable way. But, as far as a simple solution is concerned, there is none. Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you, Mr. Wriston. 43 MR. JOHN W. WRIGHT, PRESIDENT, WRIGHT INVESTORS* SERVICE MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to precede my remarks by saying how thankful I am that we now have a Ford who listens better and, as a result, can be expected to have better ideas. I am very thankful for this break-out that is represented here this morning from a rather small and, I believe, inadequate circle of men whose opinions and prejudices and decisions have, for some years, determined our fortunes and controlled our lives. I am thankful for this opportunity to participate. Today, looking back over the last five years, it seems obvious to me that it would be fair to say that never before have so many been so wrong so often! Instead of exporting our products, we have been exporting our capital. Instead of expanding our production, we are now trying to restrict our consunption. Instead of increasing competition, we are diminishing it. Instead of strengthening and expanding our capital and equity markets, we are weakening and shrinking them. Instead of fostering free enterprise in this country, we are suffocating it. Instead of building a nation of capitalists and managers, we are transforming the partnership which we had into a nation of debtors and creditors. And, instead of providing a stable monetary base for our national growth, we have depleted our domestic money supply and we have failed utterly to control the enormous proliferation of U.S. dollars abroad. And this is, in fact, in my opinion, the true cause ofthe inflation which is now raging throughout the world, and which is consuming our .country. Now, why has this come to pass? Because we, the people, the people in this room, many of whom are custodians of much of our nation's accumulated savings and accumulated capital, have been too busy with our own affairs to get the facts and do the thinking ourselves, because we have accepted the generalities, the misconceptions, and the academic doctrines of yesterday. Instead of taking a hard look our selves at the facts of today. We remember that, after the Middle Ages, the medical pro fession was hipped on phlebotomy. They got everybody to believe that blood letting was a cure for everything from insanity on. I think we have much the same situation today. This is why I ask you to consider and lend your shoulder to the beginning ofa movement for a general, thorough-going reform of our nation s 44 economie and monetary management. Now, I have no time to go into specific proposals. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you, Mr. Wright. Russell Long very kindly gave you 30 seconds of his time, ¡which I subtracted from him. DR. ALBERT M. WOJNILOWER, VICE-PRESIDENT, ECONOMIST, THE FIRST BOSTON CORPORATION MR.' WOJNILOWER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is too late to undo the financial and economic distress many of our citizens have already undergone, and which, for others, is already beginning; but, perhaps, we can help to pre vent its happening again. Already the market place is worrying that measures likely to be taken to shore up the weakening economy may push up the cost of living rather than pull it down; and that the earliest signs of business revival may trigger a fresh outburst of still more rapid inflation and higher interest rates. Such inflationary expectations tend to be self-fulfilling, at least for a while, and they threaten to impede both the reduction of inflation, and the maintenance of high employment. Strict credit restraint is, and always has been, essential to price stability. In our economy, that means restraint of commercial banks, because of their great size and scope, and ability to continue to expand credit by tens of billions of dollars, even when other lenders have been put out of action. In 1973 and 1974, in contrast to previous inflationary episodes, banks have been officially assured that they will always be able to buy funds at a price; and these assurances, coupled with the spread of so-called floating rate arrange ments, as a result of which neither the bank nor the customer stands to lose very much when interest rates rise, bank credit restraint has been virtually nonexistent until recently. The simplest way to prevent this from happening again as it will at the very next opportunity -- is to set a legisla tive ceiling on the banks' prime loan rate. Then banks and their clients, and the investing public, will again know, firmly, that whenever the cost of money in the market place is nearing the critical zone, banks will have to curtail their lending unless they wish to give their profits away; and a brake will be put on inflation. The beneficial side effect will be to help re-balance our investment toward human and community capital, including hous ing. Unfortunately, most investments in education or home ownership yield no predictable cash flows, as contrasted with business investment in machines. And, therefore, human invest ment cannot compete effectively in a free market place, even though it is the more important kind of investment. We have been on the wrong track, I believe, domestically as well as internationally, in seeking more efficient and 46 |unregulated financial markets. These markets are prey to [volatile and crowd psychology, and shifts of expectations. Yet, by the stroke of a pencil, they consummate transactions that constitute economic marching orders for whole societies. Instead of speeding these markets up, we need to slow them down to a more human pace. Our inflation results in major [part from trying to fit a financial jet engine on to a human tricycle. The same kind of loss of human perspective that afflicts so much of our life today. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. MR. CARLTON WILSON, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD AND DIRECTOR, ROBERT W. BAIRD AND COMPANY, INC. MR. WILSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. President Ford and you, Mr. Chairman, have identified inflation as the number one problem in this country. This is encouraging. We hope that it will follow that its treatment and ultimate solution will become our number one priority. The initiation and leadership in developing the motivation and will to fight inflation must start with the President and the Congress. We under stand when we say this that a very small part of our $305 billion budget is discretionary. The people in this country must be told directly the causes of inflation, a positive program for remedy presented, and told of the sacrifices they must make. They will listen. They will understand. They will respond. They want and need to participate. If the basic causes of inflation are attacked, most of our other problems will disappear. Interest rates will recede and stabilize, prices of goods and services will stabilize, wage rates will stabil ize, and savings and investment will return. At these intolerable rates, inflation can no longer be treated on an ad hoc or crisis basis. Such treatment will only increase the bleeding which must, in our opinion, be treated with major surgery and not band-aids. The recommendations for treatment and remedies for inflation have been well documented at this and other conferences on inflation. And we have been both startled and encouraged at the unanimity of opinion from all sectors, both public and private. I won't reiterate those cures and programs that we think are necessary. We think they will be spoken to around the table. I would make only one other observation. In addition to a very positive domestic program, in our opinion, this country must assume a more aggressive role on the international economic and financial front. Our products, our services, our technology and our dollars are competing all over this small world. Better cooperation among all countries is a neces sity, if stable conditions are to be achieved at home. 48 THE HONORABLE CHARLS E. WALKER, PRESIDENT, CHARLS E. WALKER ASSOCIATES MR WALKER: Mr. Secretary, to avoid being re petitive, I would like to associate myself fully with the views of Dr. Greenspan, Dr. Burns, Dr. Zwick on the Budgef, Mr. Wriston, and what Mr. Wilson just said, and use my three minutes instead to throw a big rock at one segment of the news business. Being out of government, I can perhaps do so without being accused of trying to intimidate news people or manage the news. Mr. Secretary, I believe that TV news, particu larly the commerical networks, is doing a lousy job in helping the nation deal with its pressing econpmic problems. For as the writing press has been doing an increasingly effective job in this area, TV seldom earns even passing marks. This is not simply my own bias. In recent months, I have surveyed a representative group of outstanding economists, veterans of both Democratic and Republican Administrations. While they believe that the quality of econo mic reporting on TV has improved, they are convinced that it still lags far behind the written press, and as to analysis by economic events by generalists reporters and anchorpersons -- well, I had rather not repeat some of the comments I have received. Documentaries sometimes receive but D minus or F for execution. A for effort A majority of Americans receive all or most of their news from TV. They deserve to be fully and accurately informed. But that's not all. Economic problems, especially inflation, can only be solved through the political process. How can a public that is both ill-informed and mis-informed morning, noon and night by well-meaning but inadequately trained newspeople, reach the right conclusions about public economic policy as a basis for expressing their wishes in the voting booth? In can cite chapter and verse to support my po sition* but time doesn't permit. Instead, I want to be positive and suggest two approaches to curing this problem. First and obvious, TV should place good 50 economic journalists on their reportorial, editorial and production staffs. Why don’t they? I guess it costs too much and d o e sn 't have enough "entertainment value". My second suggestion is devised in full cogni zance of the vital role of the First Amendment; freedom of the press is essential. But the First ¡Amendment is no license for either ignorance or lousy reporting. I therefore propose that each of the networks establish a distinguished bipartisan economic review board perhaps consisting of former members of the President's Council of Economic Advisors to review, after the fact, TV reporting, analysis, and docu mentaries in the economic area. These reviews could be held privately by the network and provided only to top news executives land producers. This approach would not perfect TV economic journalism overnight but it would be a step in the right direction. And if the TV people don't start to do a better job in the economic journalism sooner, rather than later, our chances of dealing successfully with both jthe current inflation and later economic problems ¡will be greatly reduced. As Churchill said, democracy is the worst form of government, except for all others. But even in a democracy, the only sure treatment for maladies harmful to the body politic will come from a public that is informed fully, accurately, and on a timely (basis. Thank you very much. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you, Charls. 51 MR. JOHN TOMAYKO, DIRECTOR, INSURANCE, PENSION AND UNEMPIDYMRNT BENEFITS, UNITED "STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA ~ ~ MR. TOMAYKO: Mr. Secretary, coining from labor, I must say at this time that I am enjoying the remarks of the bankers and the financiers, the economists, so much, and since this is their day, I will pass. (Laughter.) SECRETARY SIMON: I thank you very much. Russell Long his 30 seconds back. I will give w THOMAS I. STORRS, CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, —W irTH CAROLINA MTIUNAL BANK MR. STORRS: Mr. Chairman, there is obviously a great deal [of interest in this meeting in my part of the country. I have ■gotten an avalanche of mail from people in North and South ■Carolina. This has had three common themes. Inflation is of [great concern to these people. Secondly, they hold the [Federal Government fully responsible for many of the actions [that have caused this inflation. And third, they look to [Federal action for correction. They are virtually unanimous [in urging lower Federal spending with no ’’sacred cows.” They mention $300 billion limit, but they are also con cerned with funds that are disbursed outside the Budget. I [fully concur in this view. There is broad concern with the [economic costs of other Federal programs and their contribution [to rising prices. Clean air is wanted, but the question comes up how clean [and how soon. Auto safety is a desirable objective, but how [safe and at what cost? I certainly concur in this. There is further concern expressed with impediments to ■free competition which raise costs and prices. Repeatedly I lam told that these should be attacked, as should any other ■aspect of costs and prices which are susceptible to correction lat this time. | The silliest I heard mentioned, of course, was the double ■Fare for taxis from New York to the New York airport, since they lare unable to pick up fares to go back to the city. But not so silly is our entire posture in regulation of ■ransporation. Such things as the Davis Bacon Act, which was Reeded back in 1934 to support wages, but is clearly infla tionary today. I There is a need for a thoroughgoing review at all levels if government as part of a broad attack on prices of govem■ental regulation of industry which results in increased costs fithout increased benefits to the consumer. I finally, as to monetary policy, I expected to get a great pal of criticism as to the crushing impact the policy has had ■l cer aim sectors of the economy. This was not forthcoming. | as greatly impressed with the opinion, widely held, that it fPProPriat:e in the circumstances; that its effects are Itself^ ’ a cannot be relied upon to do the job by InvpJ?16 Pr°kiem cries out for every action possible by | nt, by labor, and by business. Equity is important but 53 the absence of pain is impossible. Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: 54 Thank you. MR. ROBERT H. STEWART III, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, FIRST ~~INTERNATIONAL BRANCSHARES, INC. MR. STEWART: Mr. Secretary, you just returned from Dallas a few days ago, so what I may say may be repetitious to you, but I would like to make just a couple of comments about our great area which has been immune in the past to most of the economic ups and downs, and I guess right now we are still in better shape than most parts of the United States. But the businessmen in our area are unusually pessimistic. The people in the food business, the electronic, the oil, they need capital and their real apprehension is their lack of access to the debt and equity market, as Allan Greenspan said yesterday. The erosion of personal wealth in our area has been staggering. Maybe this is due to the many successes of the past. I don’t know. And lastly, the real estate business, which may be overall our largest industry in the Southwest, the many components, not just homebuilding but the industrial and commercial, the mortgage, REIT and, in Dallas, in the Houston area, we have one of the largest homebuilders in the word, and I believe the largest mortgage company in the United States. These people are really concerned, and if in my judgment short-term rates don't move below the long-term rates in the near future, there could be serious problems. Thank you. 55 558-812 O - 7 4 . 5 THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT. BECHTEL CORPORATION MR. SHULTZ: Mr. Secretary, Chairman Bums, Chairman Greenspan, Members of the Congress. I would like to focus your attention on four words which I recognize in themselves pick up much of what has been said. The first word it seems to me and the basic watchword that has to be followed is "discipline" — discipline on the budget, discipline on the off-budget borrowing, discipline on monetary policy, discipline of our political process as it seeks to satisfy special interests against the general interest, and so on. So I think that's the first word, and it applies across the board, and unless it hurts a little bit, it isn't being applied. The second word I would call your attention to is "patience." And there is no doubt about the fact that for a policy to su cceed, it has to be pursued for a while. There is no substitute for patience in this effort that we are all involved in. The third word I would focus on is "diversity." It seems to me that it isn't only monetary policy, it isn't only the Budget, but it is many other things that have to be looked to if we are going to succeed in this area. Just to name some — so that there can be seme specificity here — the trade bill, I think, offers many things that will help us in the battle of inflation. There are things that can be done and there are also sore things that ought not to be done, I think, in the area of taxes that will help us. There is a lot to be done in the area of special things that Government does that help particular seg ments of the economy but damage the general interest without a doubt that should be examined; and certainly new ones should not be created as is constantly being threatened. So those are examples of the sort of diversity of effort that I have in mind, and they are only examples and illustrations. My final and fourth word that I would focus on is "reasonableness"; that is, if you are going to have su stain ed discipline, it can't be so unreasonable that it just blows everything up. There is no point in trying to cut the budget or saving 56 that you are going to cut out of that budget things that aren't Igoing to cane out. So one has to, it seems to me, be reason able about it in recognizing on the budget, for example, that probably the most important effects of anything you do today are going to be reflected two or three years from now, which is only more reason for exercizing discipline today. So those are the four words I would focus on, and I think there is undoubtedly — everyone can see the kind of content that lies behind them. Discipline, patience, diversity in approach and reasonableness. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 57 DR. RAYMOND J. SAUINIER, PROFESSOR EMERITUS OF ECONOMICS. BARNARD COLLECT ? MR. SAUINIER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a short statement here that I will supply you with for the record and take the few minutes that I have to surrmarize what is in it. The first point I would make, Mr. Secretary, is that I have the distinct impression that the country is closer to a financial crisis today than certainly the public understands. And it may even be true — and I speak respectfully — it may even be true that it is closer to financial crisis than the financial people of the country understand. So I take a very serious view of the importance of this meeting here this morning. The problem, of course, is infla*tion. More than that, it is that we are relying on money policy to cure inflation; and that is really at the botton of all the structural problems and structural risks that we face. On money policy, I would like to associate myself with what Arthur Bums has already said. And while I would say that I five percent at the present time is a respectably appropriate rate of increase of the money supply, as I read the figures, it I has been a lot less than five percent in the last two months. And I would hope that the Federal Reserve System would see a possibility to allcw the money supply to increase over the next I two or three months by something a little more than the three percent which I read for the immediate past. The rest of the story has to do basically with the budget and with certain structural changes that I think are needed. On the budget, Mr. Secretary, 295 billion seans to me to be the right number under the circumstances. But I knew that that is not going to be reached unless Congress helps. I understand as I read the papers that the Congress intends to ccme back after the November election recess. And I would like to suggest that it make budget control, expendi ture control in the budget, the principal, if not the sole it®, 11 of its business in that special session. New, going beyond that, I would suggest, Mr. Secretary — I and there are ideas set forth in this paper — I think there is I something new needed in our whole program, something beyond money policy, something beyond fiscal policy. And that is an apparatus in the executive branch set up quite specifically/ explicitly, to control all those activities of the Federal Government that affect costs and prices. And, believe me, there are a lot of them. 58 I am talking about procurement, lending money, guaranteeing loans, Davis-Bacon, setting floors, ratcheting up the floor of wages, and all of that. This doesn't require legislation. But it requires an exercise of the discretion that the Executive Branch already has. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you, Mr. Saulnier. 59 MR. RALPH S. SAUL, VICE-CHAIRMAN, INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA --- -— MR. SAUL: Mr. Secretary, Thank you. My comments just focus on one point: namely, what we can learn from the experience of the past decade about the impact of inflation upon our capital markets. First, I think we have seen that inflation seriously disrupts the functioning of our long term: debt and equity markets and it seriously erodes securities' values. I don't think we fully appreciate the extent of this erosion that has occurred, for example, in pension funds and in the premium writing capacity of the insurance industry. Without the securities markets as a source of capital, corporations have had to turn to the short term market or to the banks for credit. I don't think over the long run we can prudently finance this economy on short term credit. We need the se curities markets as a source of long-term capital. Second, I think we should ask the question why high interest rates, at least until recently, have not curtailed bank borrowing. It seems to me we have to ask the questions which were posed by Dr. Wojnilower in his remarks, whether the persistence of inflation may not have a lot to do with some loss of control over credit creation in this economy. Third and last, the Federal government and its agencies can preempt as much of the capital markets as they choose. When the Government preempts credit, it does so on the basis of legislative decisions -the decisions that may not take into account the costs of using resources. If there is one message that emerges to me from the experience of the past decade, it is that the fundamental cause of inflation arises from de mands upon our capital resources imposed legislative ly and by Government. The most challenging problem, as a number of us already pointed out, is to bring 60 our rising expectations into line with our diminish ing resources. Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. 61 MR. ROBERT V. ROOSA, PAR1NER BROWN BROTHERS/ HfiKRIMfiN AND COMPANY MR. ROOSA: Mr. Secretary, I suppose it was understood, but I feel disappointed that none of the Governmental spokesmen in introducing this meeting reminded us that we are in the midst of a worldwide inflation. And while their implications are correct, I believe the lead given by this country in resisting and containing inflation is crucial. We do have to recognize that the worldwide nature of this problem, centering currently in that sector of the carmodity area that we know is monopolistically controlled by the OPEC cartel, create environmental problems of a different kind to which I think we have to be directing a high proportion of the effort and even of the time here. I know that you personally have done so. I want to endorse and urge that there be renewed and strengthened American leadership led by the Treasury Department, if I may be so explicit, in order to assure a closer and more effective harmonizing of policies among the oil-importing countries as a critical move forward toward that lowering of oil prices that may parallel the reduction in other ccmmodity prices that's now beginning to occur across the world. I think we need a strengthening through the leadership of the Treasury Department in the harmonizing of policies among nations toward the managing of exchange rates. We have had long enough fluctuating rates of a wild kind to realize they add at least as much to worldwide inflationary pressures as used to be alleged against a fixed rate system. We have to find the middle road, a managed exchange rate system in which I think U. S. leadership is crucially important. And then, looking around the world at prospects for the next year, I see all those countries who expect growth in GNP, expecting to get it through increased real exports. There is not going to be a demand for those exports in the OPEC countries — the only big earners — it's going to have to be here. I think we have a real opportunity, if we make sure that our frontiers are open, that the goods that are exported by others flaw in freely; we reestablish American preeminence in favor of the principles of free trade and its goods that combat inflation. I wouldn't be overly preoccupied with the chance that con trol of the Budget on the expenditure side is going to provide all the relaxation scope needed by Federal Reserve policy. We are going to have to do what Steve and Buddy Storrs have men tioned — get a coherence in Government's influence on all parts of the inflation process domestically and I endorse vdiat they have said. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you, Mr. Roosa. 62 MR. DAVID ROCKEFELLER, CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION MR. ROCKEFELLER: Mr. Secretary, I agree very much w ith what Bob Roosa has just said, that infla tion i s a global problem that requires worldwide cooperation for its ultimate solution. On the domestic front, the greatest need, in my judgement, in dealing with inflation, is to restore public confidence in our Governmental and private institutions. I believe that the public looks to the President for leadership in providing a compre hensive); balanced and credible program for combat ting inflation. The program, it seems to me, should be pursued aggressively and above all, consistently. I believe that it should include the following elements: Greater fiscal restraint as has been suggested by a number of people; continuing, but perhaps gradually lessening monetary restraint; tax and other measures to promote more savings and investment; recognition that there must be tradeoffs between very important [environmental protection, on the one hand, and ade quate economic growth on the other; emphasis on in creased productivity; voluntary restraint in price and wage increases on the part of both business and labor -- encouraged, but not dictated by Government; a well-organized on-going program of conservation of energy and other scarce resources, the supply of which cannot quickly be increased and which are the cause to a considerable extent of inflation at the [present time. I Everyone in our society, it seems to me, must feel that he has a personal part to play in com batting inflation. That is not the case at the present time. The importance of combatting infla tion and what each of us needs to do and can do must be explained, it seems to me, by the Govern ment in a massive on-going educational program. I If these things are done promptly, I believe ■that significant progress towards reducing inflation ►an be made in a reasonable period of time. I I would add, though, one cautionary note: Unfortunately, the essential remedies that must be 63 taken to combat inflation will necessarily be pain ful and, unfortunately, they will hurt some sectors of our society more than others. And therefore, in equity, it seems to me that Government, while pur suing these necessary policies, must also be very much mindful of those who are seriously disadvan taged, so that they will not be obliged to carry a disporportionate share of the burden. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. SECRETARY SIMON: 64 Thank you, Mr. Rockefeller. , nnNATD T. REGAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, MERRILL, IWT.------- ----- T ymgh. ' “PIERCE. FENNER' "AND SMITH, MR. REGAN: Mr. Secretary, we are all more or Bess familiar with the plight of Wall Street and with bur financial markets, and I am sure that if anyone I s n ' t familiar, there are many in the room who will be glad to enlighten them. But, contrary to expecta tions you won't hear from me about that, except to b a ll attention, Mr. Secretary, to one group of infla tion 's victims who haven't been given much attention, |nd these are the stockholders of America, 30 million [of them. They are individuals, they are voters, they bre workers, they are savers. They and institutions [such as pension funds, insurance companies, private C o lle g e s , universities, charitable institutions colE e c t i v e l y , they've lost over $500 billion in market [value since January of 1973. That's a little over [a year and a half. Now, that sum of money is equal Ito h a l f the personal income for the entire United [states in 1973 on seven times the annual rate of [savings. The stock market, as of last Friday, actually is [within percentage points of being in the worst de cline of this century, when adjusted for purchasing [power. But even as you shed a tear for those victims, fend who knows, there may even be a few of them in this [room, remember, there are no winners in inflation. ■Everyone is the loser. And the inflationary cures ■that are utilized must include provisions to help the [victims who are unable to help themselves. Now, how Ito solve inflation? There is no panacea, no one answer. recognize. That we My oversimplified and understated answer is less consumption and more investment. I mean less consump tion by all of us, starting with the Federal Govern ment, going through state and local governments and less spending by individuals, particularly in shortage preas such as petroleum products, papers and metals fend the like. 65 . The savings thus achieved should be channeled in a more productive capacity. Later today we will dis cuss just how to do that. All I will say now, is if we can use both the carrot and the stick, tax policies, which are well considered, both can be and should be so used. But to win a fight that involves too many dollars and too few goods, to me in simple terms, means hold down on the dollars, spend less, save more and more investment in American industry. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. SECRETARY SIMON: 66 Thank you, Mr. Regan. MR. GEORGE PRESTON/ PRESIDENT, U«S. LEAGUE OF SAVINGS ""Assocm'icm' MR. PRESTON: Mr. Secretary, do you mind if I stand? I savings and loan associations around the United a national trade organization, the U. S. League of Savings Associations. re p re s e n t 4,600 S ta te s . We are We have a five-point recommendation program, sir. We endorse entirely the concept of balancing the Federal even if it does take a tax increase. A surplus is necessary. Though not popular, but if a tax increase is nec essary, we endorse that. Budget, We say to the Fdderal Reserve Board that they should con tinue their restrictive monetary policy. They should not [relax it too quickly, even though this is very much of a hardIship on the thrift institutions. We recormend most enthusiastically, and with confidence, [a new tax incentive to encourage savings to increase the [capital base. In other words, save more and spend less. We believe [that this could be a most significant cure for the ills of Iinflation. The Federal Government — my fourth point — should [announce its willingness to become the employer of the last [resort. In other words, outlawing unemployment. Fifth, a special tax incentive should be utilized to [increase the productivity in appropriate areas of our general [economy. Finally, Mr. Secretary, I would like to announce to this [group an Anti-Inflation Campaign that the U. S. League of [Savings Associations will launch in early October. Because [of our deep concern over the effects of inflation an American [society, in aiming to be of maximum help in mobilizing public pinion for controlling inflation, and to gain support from fcie American people, we do intend to launch a massive campaign [in early October, a broad scale advertising and public educa tion on behalf of the President's anti-inflation war. It will If anational television, magazine and newspaper battle under the theme: "There is no living with inflation." I Communications will go out to our 57 million savers and pur 14 million borrowers. We believe the American people, ■jr* Secretary, need some frank talk on the causes of inflation, its devastating effects; but more important, what the pnencan people can do about it. 67 Thank you, sir. SECRETARY SIMON: 68 Thank you very much. MS> SYLVIA PORTER, SYNDICATED FINANCIAL COLUMNIST MS. PORTER: Mr. Secretary, I speak today as a representative of the consumer. In the inflation fight to date, the consumer has been lectured, ex horted, patronized, but not enlisted. I believe this is an extraordinary oversight. The consumer of the United States wants to be a par ticipant, not a pawn. There is an unspoken cry in the hearts of millions of us, -- "What can I do?" -- ✓ that the President can and should answer. Therefore, I suggest, one, that work should begin at once on preparations for the President’s call for cooperation at the consumer level, volun tary, but very definite cooperation. * Two, representatives of the widest groups of consumers should be called to meetings in Washington, to be informed of the plans and hopes to be asked, policy suggestions and for practical ways the pro gram can be carried out. All consumer groups‘covering all types of or ganizations, educational, religious, civic, whatever, should be invited. The groups may be broken down so that each one is small enough to be productive. I have seen this sort of call for action work magnificently under far less urgent circumstances. Three, the help of professionals in the fields of public relations, advertising, and the like, should be enlisted. They would leap to the oppor tunity. I Four, the program should be identified with the phite House to give it stature and to give it dura tion, but this program is to be implemented at the ¡regional and local, not the national, level. This is a key aspect of it. L j^ve* a^ter the details have been carefully porked out, the President himself should issue a pajor policy statement and kick off the call for voluntary cooperation via a prime time TV address 69 There are several illustrations that will come quickly to your mind, as they did to mine. There must be hundreds that are far more superior. For instance, victory gardens. The community garden concept could be spectacularly expanded, even in the most densely populated areas such as I come from. Millions of publicly-owned acres could be made suitable for community gardens. Recycling. Scrap collection and sale by the communities themselves would pay off handsomely in every way. Energy conservation. I am utterly dismayed by the return in this country to the burnit-up philosophy. Energy conservation measures must be revived and maintained by businesses, by home-owners and by individuals. This would be both an anti-inflation and a consumer unifying force. Educational pamphlets explaining in easy-tofollow language the many significant ways consumers can help cut down living costs in all areas could be inexpensively printed and widely circulated by or ganizations at the regional and local level. As the Red Cross teaches swimming, so it could teach other vital subjects. Mr. Secretary, while admittedly sketchy, if this idea is found worthy, it could easily be car* ried on from here and have an electrifying effect. SECRETARY SIMON? 70 Thank you, Ms. Porter. HR. JAMES O'LEARY, VICE CHAIRMAN, U.S. TRUST COMPANY MR. O'LEARY: Mr. Chairman: I agree thoroughly with the views that were presented earlier by Alan Greenspan, Arthur Burns, and most of the people who have spoken. I would like to make a few comments to sharpen some of the points that have already been made. Early this year, the decision was made to com bat the double digit inflation and the wave of infla tion expectations through a policy of credit re straint. As short-term interest rates have risen to record levels, the major non-bank financial insti tutions, the savings and loan associations, the mutual savings banks and the life insurance companies, in particular, have been hit with a tremendous dis intermediation. These institutions are the heart of the long term capital market. Given the high level of short term rates, and the expectation at least until re cently, that this will continue for sometime, the non-bank institutions as a whole have virtually stopped making new forward commitments to buy bonds and mortgages, and they have become extremely liquidity conscious. The result, as we all recognize, has been the drying up of the availability of home mortgage financing, commercial mortgage financing, and a sharp reduction in long-term corporate bond and equity financing. By summer, we had begun to develop a viscious circle: Borrowers who could not be accommodated in the long-term capital market were forced to turn to the short-term money markets, essentially, the banks for accommodation. Similarly, the Government-sponsored agencies such as the Federal Home Loan Banks and Fannie Mae had to come to the market with massive short-term financing to help support the home mortgage market. Thus, we nad a process in which upward pressures on short availability of long-term financing, wnich in turn increased the demand for short-term inancing. This put greater upward pressure on snort-term rates and further hurt availability in the tong-term markets. 71 558-812 0 - 74-6 The Fed now has all the monetary aggregates, as Arthur Burns indicated, down to an expansion rate which is exerting a real bite on real business activ ity. Since early July the authorities have been trying to bring short-term rates down gradually, i applaud this and I think they can safely go further, especially if we get some real fiscal restraint, without weakening their fight against inflation; I was delighted to learn recently of the plans worked out in discussions with the Federal Reserve Advisory Council and the Federal Reserve Board to develop a program to allocate bank credit on a guide line basis to the highest priority uses in this period. If such a program can be made effective - and I think it can - it can be useful as a means of keeping credit availability taut, but?at the same time per mitting the Fed to encourage a gradual decline of short-term rates, which would be healthy. It is absolutely essential, as everyone around this table has said, to achieve real fiscal restraint, to take some of the burden off the Fed and the money markets. I fear that no matter how well we perform in monetary and fiscal restraint, the inflation rate may, and probably will, stay high and that the public will demand a return to compulsory price-controls. It is for this reason that I think we should be open-minded about adopting a guidelines approach and public pressure to moderate wage prices. SECRETARY SIMON: 72 Thank you, Mr.' O ’Leary. DR. ARTHUR M. OKUN, SENIOR FELLOW, THE BROOKINGS ~ INSTITUTE MR. OKUN: Mr. Secretary, I was glad to hear you stress the many routes and the complexity of the in flation of 1973 and 1974, and your words have been reiterated by several previous speakers. I think it's important to recognize that; and to recognize its contrast with, let’s say, the 1966 to 1968 period of inflation which, from my autobigraphical regret, can very readily be traced to one principal source, mainly excesses in the Federal budget. This time it's different. There are a great many sources. The Government, in its fiscal monetary policies, has clearly contributed to inflation. There have been excesses. But, I think these excesses have to be put into perspective -- in the perspective of the other special fact that give us inflation and a perspective of change in the economic scene that we have now. There are lots of steps that we might well have taken -- should have taken in 1972 and 1973. But the battle of 1972 and 1973 cannot be fought and won in 1974 or 1975. I think it's clear that the boom is dead and I think it's clear that it would make no sense to flog a dead boom. In this context, I think it is clear that what we are talking about is the institution of procedures of discipline that will remove the Federal Government itself as a source of instability in the economy. And I think it's terribly important to do and much more important than what the precise number is, is the picture of control of discipline of some re straint and sacrifice that begins at home with the management of the Federal Government's budget and its monetary policies. 73 But the sacrifice has to begin at home, but it can't end at home. Let me just spend my last minute deriving a little sermon from one small example that reaches the newspapers today. The President's request for a three-month delay in the Federal pay increase was not persuasive to nearly two-thirds of the Senate and I think I can understand to some degree why it wasn't persuasive. One small example that I might give is the same day that the Federal pay hold-down request was made, there was another story in the newspaper rumoring the de-control of all prices of crude oil. On a conservative estimate, that de-control would cost this nation an extra nine billion dollars of inflation in 1975, in contrast to the holding down Federal pay of $700 million dollars. Moreover, the request was not accompanied by any other indication that anybody else is going to be asked to make sacrificies to do any restraint. No steps were taken to ask producers to give up their shields against price competition -- whether its transportation regulation or Davis-Bacon or resale price maintenance. No financial institution has been systematically asked to channel funds into socially-productive uses at moderate costs. No price or wage restraint has thus far been requested in any systematic fashion. I suspect that and the sacrificies of the Federal Government will be a lot more credible and a lot more persuasive if they are accompanied by a broader and more eclectic program that ask all groups in the private sector to participate in this battle to end inflation. SECRETARY SIMON: 74 Thank you, Mr. Okun. MR. HERMAN NICKERSON, JR., ADMINISTRATOR, -- NATIONAL 'CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION" MR. NICKERSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As the regulator for about 12,800 Federal corporations, represented by eighteen million people, I am sure that the Chairman of the Banking and Currency Committee knows that we reach into every voting district of the United States and have about a ten-percent ability to go to the polls. We would like to offer two points: First, be mindful in your dealings with the small thrifts that disintermediation moves capital out of us, when you get to demoninations of a thousand dollars. We would like to encourage the rise to the $10,000 and higher and this way avoid some of our disinter mediation of our limited capital. Second, we think increased productivity across the country. I remember in studying Napoleon, he said, "Give me enough multi-colored ribbon and I will conquer the world." If you give me enough national awards, I think our program of thrift and thrift-award is an example that others might try. In legislation, since we have a number of distinguished legislators present, we need three things: We need a discount fund to give us a business-management liquidity within my agency ; we need variable share accounts, and we need an automatic loan-renewal program -to be legislated. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you, Mr. Nickerson. 75 MR. JAMES J. NEEDHAM, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, Nfcto YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MR. NEEDHAM: Thank you Mr. Secretary. I would like to associate myself with the remarks that Sylvia Porter made. The New York Stock Exchange for over a year-and-a-half has been concerned about this problem and we have made numerous studies and analyses and we have made them available to your Department, Mr. Secretary, and we would be delighted to make them available to others who are interested in them. To be specific, which is what the President has asked us to do, we propose that an anti-inflation act of 1975 be adopted which will establish the twineconomic policy objectives of maximum utilization of our national labor force and uncompromising mainten ance of a framework of stable prices. Some specific anti-inflationary measures which strongly merit consideration include: A legislative commitment to reduce Federal expenditures consistent with the aspirations and security of more than 200 million Americans Second, a mandatory program to re-establish the traditional American habits of thrift and sound per sonal financial planning, to immobilize over-indul gence, purchasing power without a tax increase and to restrict the inflationary impact of on-going wage settlements. Third, a realistic approach to building a strong er element of productivity into the economy by eliminating structural rigidities and existing laws governing key economic activities. Fourth, a more rational evaluation of the im pact of tax policy on our national economic health with particular attention to the treatment of in vestment credits, capital gains and corporate sav ings. 76 Fifth, creation of a national nonpartisan commi sion on capital resources under the aegis of the executive office to examine our national options for dealing with the threat of a major shortage of in vestment capital in the years ahead. Finally, only if these conferences fail, should temporary credit and capital investment restrictions, and particularly, bank lending guidelines be consid ered as a means of easing inflationary pressures. Now, what we have to do is three-fold: We must maintain the initiatives developed in convening the current series of the national economic conferences, we must demonstrate to the American people that their leaders are both determined and capable of developing workable answers to their and our national and econo mic dilemma, and finally, Mr. Secretary, we must act. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you, Mr. Needham. 77 MR. REX J. MORTHLAND, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION MR. MORTHLAND: An essential ingredient of any program to curtail the present inflation and to prevent its recurrence depends upon the public understanding of the complex nature and the interrelated nature of the elements of our economic system. It has a second dimension: We must have the willpower to carry out that understanding, once we have attained it. I would like to discuss very briefly a framework of simple but basic economic forces that I think we need to recognize, because the responsibility of gaining this public understanding lies on the participants of this conference and on Congress and the Administration. Many of our problems are caused by seeking solutions to one problem in our economy without considering the repercussions of those solutions on the rest of the economy. We live in a political and economic democracy in which the citizens have relative freedom of choice. The basis of con sumption is production. We cannot consume, as a society, more than we produce, plus the accumulated production of the past. Our wants and desires exceed our resources so that some of them go unsatisfied; hence the need for willpower, or determination, or discipline. To maximize returns, we have to establish an order of priority of our desires, both for us as individuals, and for our Government and society. The establishment of our national priorities essentially has to come from Congress. The long-run objective of our society is a comfortable standard of living for all people but it cannot be attained without the use of capital goods. We face a shortage of capital now and in the foreseeable future and, hence, an accumulation of capital should be given a high order of priority in this list. The financial markets -- both on the demand and on the supply side -- consist of a series of interrelated and inter connected, though sometimes specialized, markets; but there are no water-tight compartments in it because there are enough suppliers and enough users who will either place funds in two or more areas, or who will borrow in those areas. The most efficient way to allocate capital resources is through a system of institutions competing under equal terms. 78 And "efficiency” is defined here as maximizing a return to the saver and minimizing the cost to the borrower. Borrowers and savers do try to attain this maximization. A system of forced specialization, either on the supply or demand side, would not be the most efficient system for our economy even if it were possible. But, it is not possible by any means short of a couplete control of the entire economy, and I don’t think that we look for that. If there are some areas of high social priorities that don't receive enough resources through the competitive money market conditions, we should encourage the flow of funds into those areas by inducements that are extended to all institutions or to all borrowers of a given type. Any changes made in our financial institutions should be made in a phased-in method so that we save all of the resources and capital invested in it. The Financial Insitutions Act as drawn up and as presented to Congress, does observe these major forces and offers the best means of restructuring our system of depository financial institutions. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you, Mr. Morthland. MR. BRUCE K. MACLAURY, PRESIDENT, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS MR. MACLAURY: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. The common theme today and in previous sessions has been expenditure restraint. It seems to me one of the problems is that we are playing with slippery numbers in this respect and I thought that Wally Scott's presentation of the charts made this perhaps apparent -- that he spoke of de-budgetization of various agencies over the past - Post Office; Fannie Mae, and some others. I think it would be useful to take a look at the same numbers with those figures put back in that we have been taking out over the last 15 years. And, in that context, I would like to make a suggestion that, in connection with the overall look at budget expenditures, that the new Budget Committees in the Congress are undertaking, that there ought to be a similar look at the totality of credit programs, guaranteed subsidies, and so forth, in the Congress, so that we know the overall claims upon capital mar kets that are being exercised by the Goverment di rectly and indirectly. The second point: Expert concern has been expressed about the stresses being placed on finan cial institutions and about the lack of funds going into thrift institutions and, thus, into housing. I would like to second Rex Morthland's comment that it seems to me that the Financial Institutions Bill, which has languished, provides in its provi-: sions for flexi ility of financial institions both on the ability to pay, interest to consumers, and de positors, and, perhaps, on the ability of thrift institutions in particular to restructure their assets so that they can make variable loans; and, finally, I would like to associate myself with Charlie Zwick's interesting proposal, which I had not thought about before, of a practical way in which Congress could authorize withholding of funds. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 80 MR. GUSTAVE L. LEVY, PARTNER ~ goleman , saghs 'mrcmm: MR. LEVY: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. As you all probably know, I am in the investment banking business. In World War II, I remember reading in the New York Times that, in the priorities for draft deferments, investment bankers were second from the bottom. The only one lower was the manufacturers of artificial flowers. I hope our importance today is more than that. I am sure it is, because we are charged with finding the huge amount of capital that is necessary to finance our industry today, and in the years ahead. Now, I am not asking any favors for our investment bank ing industry, but I do believe -- as I am sure we can roll with the punches -- however, I do believe that in order for us to maintain a balanced capital structure in industry, induce ments must be put forward for individuals, institutions, and foreigners to invest in our stock market. Such inducement should be of the kind of $500 to $1,000 tax deduction on interest income of individuals, depositing in thrift institutions of all kinds, including thrift depart ments of commerical banks. Also, dividend exemptions for individuals should be increased, if not abolished altogether. Also, in recent months, many corporations have been urging managers of pension funds to invest their cash flows in debt instruments, particularly of a short-term nature. This is completely self-defeating, because these same corporations are complaining that the prices of stocks do not reflect inherent values. It is essential in the long run for our markets to more truly reflect inherent values that corporations may finance in the sale of common stock, as well as a sale of debt. Therefore, corporations should be urged not to instruct their money managers to avoid purchases of equities. I'm sure that these managers, over the long run, will do very well with the balance portfolio of debt instruments and common stock. And lastly, Mr. Secretary, I urge and I hope that, as a 81 result of these conferences, a plan will evolve. I also learned in the Army that a good plan, well executed, is better than no plan at all, and I'm sure that you will come forth with a plan and I'm sure it'll be a good one. Thank you very much. SECRETARY SIMON: 82 Thank you, Mr. Levy. I MR. RALPH F. LEACH, CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COWITTEE, “ MORGAN 'GUARANTY •TRUST CCM>ANY MR. LEACH: Mr. Secretary, I may be deceived by the tenor I o£ some of the meetings that have been held. It appears to me I that bipartisan agreement across the Country is that inflation I must be stopped. • • This agreement is in some way similar to that reached in I the mid 1940’s on the need to assure high levels of employment. The Employment Act of 1946, you'll recall, was passed in I the atmosphere of: First, a recollection of 14% to 25% 1 unemployment in the 1930's; and Second: I veterans. Concern about the employment of returning The Employment Act had been a major issue in the 1944 1 election. 1 I would like to see at this point a Congressional debate I on the topic of inflation and I would hope that, as a result, 1 Congress would indicate to the Country, either through an I amendment to that Act, or a new Price Stability Act, that main■ tenance of price stability is absolutely essential to the mainI tenance of a high level of employment. We have learned something since 1946. It is now apparent I that price stability should have been a part of the full | employment effort from the beginning. In the long run, inflaI tion is a major factor in the destruction of domestic I employment. While inflationary policies may, at times, have provided I some increase in employment in the short term, even that effect I is doubtful at present. In debating the Price Stability issue, worldwide economic interdependece would clearly be a key factor. Inflation inevitably produces agitation for protective measures to insulate domestic markets from foreign competition. That's a path to rigidity and inefficiency, and to foreign retaliation. 83 By itself, this is a powerful reason for concern with rapid inflation. If, as I suspect, a concensus would be reached that in the long run inflation does destroy employ ment, then a national commitment to price stability should be sought by both business and labor. This Country's objective should be to strive for a steady increase in the real take-home pay of the workers. Labor would be far better served with policies which provide a 3% wage increase with no change in prices, than it would be with a 13% wage increase coupled with a 10% price increase. An explicit Congressional directive would be of great value as a background for the setting of mone tary policy. Most students of the Federal Reserve System feel that the Employment Act of 1946 contains an inflationary bias and, therefore, the monetary authorities would be aided by an explicit Congres sional statement on price stability. From the standpoint of business and financial markets, inflationary expectations have been a major factor in investment decisions. I would predict that if, in the course of Congressional debate, sentiment appeared to be jel ling in favor of a national commitment to price stability, financial markets could well respond positively and dramatically to the changed outlook. Business decisions, in turn, might respond favorably due to changes in perspective rates of re turn on capital investments, and in decisions on inventory policy. Thank you, Mr. Leach. 84 MR. W. J. KENNEDY III, PRESIDENT, NORTH CAROLINA MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY ” MR. KENNEDY: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. The position of the Life Insurance Industry should be clear from the publicity given to the position of the Industry by the Institute of Life Insurance and other Industry spokesmen. Therefore, I'm not going to dwell on this particular area. I had some difficulty in determining just who I did represent on this august body. I do feel, though, that I would be remiss if I did not voice my concern in one particular area and that is that the burden for correcting the inflationary spiral should not be placed on those at the lowest level in our economic ladder. We talk basically about maintaining a restrictive monetary policy and a reduction in Federal spending -- both of which actions will result in increased unemployment as well as the reduced flow of funds for social programs. I am particularly sensitive to this as a Black American because we, as a group, already burdened with the unemployment rate that is twice that for the general population, and an income gap that is widening rather than narrowing of the lower income levels for Blacks. And while I recognize that certain actions must be taken, we should be sure that the consequences of these actions are equitably spread. Moving from this area and taking a brief look at the capital markets, we recognize that erosion has taken place in the confidence of the public, in the Investment Banking Business, and in the equity markets, and marketing in general. There was a similar erosion of confidence in the Commercial Banking System in the early Thirties, and that was relieved •? as far as the small depositor was concerned - - b y the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 85 Subsequentlyj the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation was established for the Savings and Loan Industry. Perhaps there is some application here for the Investment Banking Industry to restore the small investors confidence in that Industry. Beyond this, I would suggest that the alternative Capital Tax Gains Benefits should be extended to the millions of small investors as it is to the larger investors; those persons whose combined normal and surtax rate is less than the maximum capital gains tax rate, are excluded from any benefit of the alternative capital gains tax rates. I believe in the progressive tax system as opposed to the regressive tax system, and that the philosophy should be extended to the capital gains taxes, an incentive for the small investor to get back into the equity capital market. Any improve ment in the availability of the equity capital will relieve the debt demands to some extent and, thereby, result in lower interest rates. Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: 86 Thank you, Mr. Kennedy. MR. LOUIS 0. KELSO, GENERAL COUNSEL, BANGERT Iflp COMPANY, INC. MR. KELSO: Thank you. Mr. Secretary, your staff estimated that you wouldn't reach me until right after your coffee break, and some charts which I really need to refer to, haven't been distributed. SECRETARY SIMON: All right. with you after the break. I will start * % 87 558-8X2 0 - 74 - 7 MR. HARVEY E. KAPNICK, JR., CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,' ARTHUR ANDERSEN AND COMPANY MR. KAPNICK: Mr. Secretary, I have three ob servations to make to start with. First of all, I believe that a program is needed, and it is needed now, to be announced to the American people, if we are to reestablish credibili ty in America. We've had a new foreign policy; we've elimina* ted to a degree the abuse of power; and the economic problems facing America now are crucial. No. 2: I believe that we should all recognize that any time we had bad financial information, we make bad decisions. I believe that good, sound, financial data is essential, and this will be recognized by the Ameri can people and will be good politics in the future. Today, we do not have good, sound, financial data. No. 3: I think that macro-economics discus sions are good, but individuals lose job individual by individual, and companies go bankrupt, company by company, and I believe that we are facing one of the most serious capital crisis that we have ever had in America. For example, we talked a great deal about the budget. The budget is a $5 billion problem. The fictitious inventory profits in American business today is providing taxes of $10 to $15 billion to! the Federal Government, and taking it out of the private industry. This is capital consumed. No. 2: Until we recycle oil profits, and the increase in oil costs, this capital has been con sumed. Further, legislation recently enacted is going to cost American corporations some $10 billion. Until funds are provided to each individual corpora tion to fund these, we're going to see serious results. 88 The results of these three items are $40 bil lion. We need to find solutions to each of them, or inflation will continue. Bankruptcies will occur; people will lose jobs. I recognize that monetary policy and balanced budgets are necessary, but I also realize that we need to adopt a program where we adjust profits of American business to stop the devisiveness which is going on in America between those who want to unite to fight inflation. I believe further that international trade and economics is absolutely necessary; that we address because the rest of the world is looking for leader ship, and we need to restore balanced taxation in America. The Tax System should be used to achieve Social progress. Now, if ever, we need savings incentives imme diately. We need to eliminate income taxes on dividends. We need a new inflation-proof security, because that will do more to eliminate the tax shel- r ters which are wasting much of the capital in this country and really provide real savings incentives. We need incentives to provide for jobs and pro ductivity. We need to simplify some of our depre ciations so American individuals and consumers i understand why these are given and that they’re not loopholes. We cannot destroy individuals in the process that w e ’re going through in the next few months. And therefore, I recommend very strongly that a transitional credit be given to everybody in the low I income group. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. 89 MR. LOUIS 0. KELSO, GENERAL COUNSEL, BANGERT § COMPANY, INC. SECRETARY SIMON: MR. KELSO: Mr. Kelso, are you ready now? Yes. SECRETARY SIMON: I don't know how you are going to get through all of these charts in three minutes! MR. KELSO: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. This is going to be the fastest presentation of this subject that I have done. Let me say that my analysis of the cause of in flation and the cure for inflation is not based on the conventional wisdom. For this I make no apology because it seems to me that the conventional wisdom has been pretty consistently followed for the last 40 years, and has brought us to where we are. Let me turn immediately, then, to the charts that have been distributed to you and lead you rather quickly through them. The first one is simply designed to remind you that there are economics where there are almost no laws, no solid dependable principles, there is at least one, and that is that the total amount of pur chasing power generated automatically in the market economy is exactly equal to the market value of the goods and services produced. Our problem is a problem of creating a matching of that purchasing power with the people who have un satisfied needs and wants. The second charge is my estimate of what has happened in the means of producing goods and services. From the beginning of history, when, perhaps, 95% of the total input into the economy was labor, today we are at a point where, if labor were competitively valued -- and I call your attention to the fact that almost every conceivable law that we have is designed to create an artificial price for labor, if it were competitively evaluated, we'd find out that approx imately 90% of the total input comes from Capital and not Labor. 90 Chart 3 contains two diagrams on it, the first of which is to illustrate conventional finance. I point out that Model One, the model of conven tional finance, reflects the fact that 98% of total new capital formation in the U. S. economy, averaged over the last 15 years, is financed out of cash flow, or borrowings repaid out of cash flow. This tech nique builds the incremental productive power of capital into a stationary ownership base. All of the qualitative studies that have been made to date show that 5% of the people -- 5% of the consumer units -- own all the productive capital. The stock held by the remainder, the other capital assets, is negligible. Model 2, on that page, is a new technique of finance, one that’s been used in well over 100 corpo rations so far, and provides low cost capital to growing enterprises. It’s my belief that this is the basic model for a technique of finance that can finance the fourand-a-half trillion dollars or so of new capital formation that we need in the next ten years, and do it in ways that builds capital ownership into the labor force, using the logic that business has always used for itself; namely, to invest in things that will pay for themselves so that labor doesn’t have to take something out of its pocket or paycheck. Chart Number 4 is designed to show what this means in the big picture. You have the same corporation -SECRETARY SIMON: I'm sorry, Mr. Kelso, that's four minutes and we'll take a break now and we will reassemble promptly at the end of ten minutes. (Recess.) 91 SECRETARY SIMON: I am just told by an informer that out in the hallway, I had been accused of being like Mussolini who makes the show run on time, and that has given me great courage. And while I don't like to be compared to Mussolini and I certainly don't want to have happen to me what happened to him, I would appreciate it if everybody would resume their seats. Before we continue around the table, there are several of our Congressional representatives who have to get to the Hill, and I am going to call on one right now just slightly out of order. It is going to be a pleasure for me to exercise a threeminute rule on Congressmen. This is quite a switch, Mr. Chairman. THE HONORABLE ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, UNITED STATES SENATE MR. HOLLINGS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I've been trying to figure out what I would do listening, were I the President. Obviously, number one you'd balance the budget. Secondly, you would take the financial experts, like Dr. Burns, Mr. Greenspan, and you financial boys, and start doing something about bringing the dollars back home rather than the deserters, set some kind of financial policy with respect to credit controls, money supply. Thirdly, you can't get credibility in this field of finance until we first get credibility on fuel. We have no energy strategy in this nation. We've been recommending and it's been opposed by the White House consistently an energy policy council very similar to the Council of Economic Advisors, so it could coordinate disparate agencies, departments and efforts so that there would be a long-range credible program, and then, of course, I'd come to Sylvia Porter's program of conservation and consumer participation. Now, I'll only comment on number one, balancing the budget, because like Pogo, we are the enemy and it's with us. I mean all of us. And we are about here in proportion. We have about eight from the Hill or Congress and we've got about 80 all around, so we are about ten percent of the problem, and each speaker makes us about 90 percent of the problem. And I want to bring that into perspective. Everyone of you every time you testify say that if we cut that ten billion or we balance that budget, that it'll only really mean some onetenth of one percent to the inflation rate. But it's got a 92 better psychological value, and I believe that. But I then believe also that there are other things to be done. Now, on balancing that budget, Mr. Zwick, I think it was, had a good idea; but we been changing off from that because well, the Congress has really been limiting the presidential powers. Lyndon never told us the truth about the war , and ver acity did not improve under Richard Nixon, and we hesitate in the Congress trying to give the power of impoundment. On the other hand, we’ve done this. In 1967, by public law -- and I'll leave this with the Chaiiman I- 90-218, the 90th Congress in December, after the fiscal year had been in course some five months almost, on December the 18th passed a joint resolution, a very simple little thing of a page-and-ahalf, whereby we cut down on personnel two percent, about ten percent on the controllables other than personnel, we gave a contingency fund to President Johnson, and in essence, we cut some 4.9 billion dollars in the very closing days. That was after the Congress had already cut out 5.1 billion. Now, that's about what we've done already. Already this year we've cut right at 5.7 billion from that 305 first submitted in January by President Nixon. And if we continue on with Health, Education and Welfare, the cuts in military construction, foreign aid, I think they're about four more billions. Then we'll be right near a seven to eight billion dollar cut in new budget authority, constituting, about a four billion cut in actual outlays. And so to bring it within that area or within five billion in actual outlays, all you need is a little joint resolution similar to Public Law 90-218, and finally, Mr. Secretary, you need it now. Don't want to wait until after this blooming election. That's the only reason you got any of us up here. You wait until after the election and we'll have hearings, we'll study, we'll get consultants, and nothing will get done. The main point is, if the President is serious about this, it isn't so traumatic to come through at the very end and cut back these departments. You can spell it out. In other words, what impoundments we let go interior, which was a lot of public parks and fish hatcheries, we increased that Interior budget some $765 million for fiscal '75 over '74. And I called the White House and asked them to hold up on that like they did on Agriculture. 93 We can still get back with Interior a little percentage, still get back a pork barrel, public works. We can do this before October the 15th, and I think it’s vitally important so this whole crowd and that some of the savings and loan people won't be berating the Congress all Fall long and the Government that the whole thing is that the Government's gone wild. We've got, on the contrary, for us to join hands, and you reinstill confidence. Let the president draw the line and say, "Here's how we're going to do it before October the 15." Then we can reinstill confidence in Government and then some of these other voluntary programs for conservation and consumerism can follow on. Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: 94 Thank you, Mr. Hollings. MR. PAUL R. JUDY, CHAIRMAN AND PRESIDENT, A. G. BECKER ~~~S COMPANY, INC. MR. JUDY: Thank you, Bill. I'd like my comments just to cover three areas, some of which have already been covered. I'd like to emphasize some things, therefore. First, in Bill's introductory remarks and Bob Roosa's comments, it was pointed out that our inflation is part of a world-wide phenomenon. It's the accumula tion of a number of causes and I'd like to comment just briefly on two. One: Shortages and threatened shortages in basic resources. In this area, I think we find two general categories, natural shortages, both long and shorter term in character: Secondly, monopolistic shortages or threatened shortages, nationalistic in character. The second general area of causes of world-wide inflation, greater growth of consumption levels or aspirations which have been outstripping the longer term rate of output potential of past and future savings, and investment. So it's part of a bigger picture. Commenting just briefly on the monopolistic shortages aspect of world-wide inflation, I honestly don't think that there's an economic solution to this. There are some short-term financial solutions. I think the leaders in the world are busy at these. Fundamentally, though, we cannot have inter economy transfer prices which don't have any relation ship to natural costs and returns on investments. This will lead relatively quickly to substantial cost distortions throughout the world, unnatural, unsound diseconomic resource applications, unsus tainable redistribution of wealth. These are political matters, and I strongly urge our Government to pursue political solutions to these matters. Turning, now, to the domestic economy. Again, we have natural inflation due to natural shortages of basic materials. We have our own form of high con sumption levels and aspirations and our own shortages 95 of savings and investment levels. Here, I think the Government can make a strong impact in terms of guiding1and,influencing and estab lishing the rules for the game. I comment on five areas One, free prices. Fundamentally, when the infla tion has a strong material shortage thrust to it, we must keep free pricing. This curtails marginal con sumption and it stimulates investment to increase output. The fundamental problem in the utility industry is one of pricing. It’s that simple. Proper pricing will finance the utility industry. Secondly, Government must monitor our markets to be sure they’re maintained free and competitive, so that's always been the policy of Government, but it's particularly important in these times, to insure the absence of monopolistic pricing in our own domestic economy. Third, the Government has every right and it's the only and sole role of Government to use taxation. Taxation should involve trade-offs of incentives and penalties. We have to put more space between the immediate benefits and pleasures of consumption ver sus the more patient enduring values of savings, par ticularly in equity risk savings. There're a variety of specific programs the Government could use here, excise taxes on consump tion, particularly in priority resources, tax credits or exemptions on interest on personal savings accounts, lower capital gains taxes on personal investments, investment tax credits for industry in selective areas. SECRETARY SIMON: 96 Thank you, Mr. Judy. MR. FRANK J. HOENEMEYER, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, ~ PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA MR. HOENEMEYER: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I would like to start by casting my vote for sound fiscal and monetary policies. Without them inflation won't be cured, and it can't be cured in a short time span without severe dislocations. So we have to adopt sound policies, stick with them and be patient. Longer range, one of the cures for inflation is to increase our productive capacity, but to do this we must first generate the savings. I feel there must be more tax incentives or rather fewer tax penalties for saving. There is and will be a scarcity of all capital, but especially equity capital. I believe there should be lower taxes on capital gains, especially for investments held for a longer period of years. The investment tax credit has been very helpful in providing retained earnings and consideration should be given to increase the rate for public utilities from four percent to otherwise standard seven per cent. Utilities need help desperately, and this would not only give them some direct help but also might lead the state public utility commissions to be more realistic in rate relief. As for the use of our scarce capital resources, I would like to offer two thoughts. First, I suggest that we stretch out some of our environmental im provement goals. There is no question that we should [reduce pollution and health hazards in our manu facturing plants. But capital spent this way is not available for increasing productive capacity. Secondly, I suggest we consider carefully what we do to cure the problems of the housing industry. Undoubtedly, something needs to be done to help jthose savings institutions badly hit by disinter mediation, and the financial institutions bill would help greatly here* 97 Also, something must be done to.help increase the employment of construction workers. But this does not necessarily mean that we should increase housing construction. Prudential is a mortgage lender nationwide, and we find the housing market very spotty. In some areas of the country vacancy rates are under two percent, but in other areas, it is ten to 15 percent and overall, the vacancy rates do not, in my opinion, suggest a real housing short age. So, while something should be done to ease the unemployment of construction workers, I feel alter natives to housing should be explored. This might be, for example, an excellent time to build and modernize our mass transit system. Thank you. 98 MR. J. HENNING HILLIARD, CHAIRMAN, J.J.B.HILLIARD, U.L. LYONS',' INC.----------------------------------- MR. HILLIARD: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I'd like to emphasize that inflation is an intangible. It's not something we can whittle with a knife orwe can mold with hammer and nails. It's a condition in the minds of men and women. And our Government creates fears in the minds that bring about the in flation that we're so concerned with. Our Government can also mold confidence that will alleviate that inflation. Now, we've talked a great deal fc^is morning about fiscal policy. We've talked a great deal about the need to balance our budget in this particu lar fiscal year. And this is important. But it's much more important to instill in the minds of people confidence in our fiscal policy by setting up a machinery that will create a balanced budget over a period of years and that will build up surpluses in good years and it will only create a deficit in very, very bad years. Others will speak and have spoken on the sub ject of raising capital and how it can be raised and our need to raise it. But in my mind one of the most important things that we need to do is for our Government to help destroy the idea that profit is a dirty word. If we can do this, then the public will return to our capital markets. We will have good capital^markets; we will need some incentives, yes, but we can create pride and satisfaction in saving and investing. Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: ThAnk you. 99 MR. RICHARD D. HILL, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, FIRST n A t i o n a l ~ b a n k of b o s t o n MR. HILL: Mr. Chairman, I doubt that we will find here very many innovative cures for the disease of inflation. The cause of the illness seems to be understood and a reversal of this pro cess, that is, the achievement of budgetary balance and surplus must be the answer. Monetary policy, as Dr. Burns says a blunt instrument, will respond to this, but no longer can be expected to lead the way to restored health. Bandages are often needed to stem the flow of blood while the basic remedy is being applied,and in the process of applying these bandages, I hope we will examine the inflationary, perhaps long-term infla tionary implications of each one of these bandages. While on the subject of bandages, I have two suggestions, which admittedly are palliatives, not basic cures. The first, Mr. Chairman, is to help you in your proposal to increase Federal taxes on automotive fuel. The idea is an excellent one, but politically dubious. As an alternative, you might consider the manda tory purchase at the pump of a ten cent Federal savings stamp for each gallon of fuel. This could be sold to others or accumulated and redeemed at banks for the lowest denomination savings bonds. This will have the effect of increasing savings and, hopefully, reducing consumption of a scarce resource. The second suggestion has to do with our troubled bond and equity markets. While much attention must be paid in the future to the actuarial adequacy of our Social Security System, it might be helpful to permit the trust fund to invest a portion of its cash flow in corporate bonds and common stocks, hopefully including public utilities and possibly transportation companies. This should give some muscle tone to the financial markets,and in a non-subsidized way, channel resources to some vital industires. SECRETARY SIMON: 100 Thank you, Mr. Hill. MR. M. R. HELLIE, PRESIDENT, CREDIT UNION NATIONAL - ASSOCIAT TON",' TNCV---- ---------- : -- -----------MR. HELLIE: Thank you, sir. I’d like to make it very clear at the outset that I am not an economist. However, I, like each of the other persons assembled here have a substantial under standing of the financial difficulties our nation's families are attempting to cope with. Leaving the specifies to others more expert than I, it is I believe, the quality of life about which we are speaking. It is this concept around which we and our Government need to relate our activities now and in the future. Our own national self-interest must assume the first priority, and I further assume that this places the well-being of the nation's citizens within this first priority. Please note I did not say "welfare", but instead, "well-being". In reaching conclusions as to what priorities are preeminent for our citizens, what priorities require the premier call on our resources, capital and energy, I would think that shelter and sustenance come first. Please note I did not say housing and food. Because those words are too delimiting in what they connote. I submit that the delay of a constantly-increas ing standard of living may no longer be possible. I submit that succeeding generations may have some difficulty in maintaining the same standard of living to which current generations have become accustomed. I suggest that a Council on National Priorities, composed of concerned citizens, may provide some assistance to our Government in setting the difficult guidelines which will be necessary. That American ethic, the quantity of life may have need of sub stantial revision. Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. 101 MR. MILTON J./HAYES, CHAIRMAN, GOVERNMENT FISCAL POLICY COMMITTEE, INDEPENDENT BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA; CONSULTANT, AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO MR. HAYES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, on the budget, I'd just like to point out, I'd like to see an abandonment of the full em ployment budget. It's not an accurate description of our income and therefore cannot be an accurate description of our expenditures. Second, I would like to direct my next point to the attention of the Honorable Congressman Reuss. We must realize that sooner or later we have to come to an accommodation with gold. In the past, no serious inflation has been cured if the money was distrusted by the people. I therefore urge that the beginning steps be taken to bring the dollar back into the discipline of gold. I propose that this be done immediately by the following steps: One. an ounce. Raise the official price of gold to $75 Two. Issue the additional gold certificates representing the difference between the present $42.22 an ounce and the new figure of $75 an ounce. However, these certificates are to be frozen as a backing to the currency and not used by the Treasury Department to pay current bills as was done in the previous increases. This is a vital step and must be part of the legislation authorizing the new official price of $75 an ounce. Studies must then go forward to have a statu tory backing of the currency. History shows that unless there is a forced discipline in the matter of maintaining a sound currency, the nature of man is such that debasement is an easy course, and will continue to be followed until the financial structure of the nation collapses. 102 If these steps are taken, we will find that confidence in the dollar will be restored at home and abroad, that the people will trust the value of their money, that savings will flow back into our savings accounts and funds will be returned from Switzerland, that natural forces will cause decline in many basic commodities from their present speculative heights and the rate of inflation will fall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you, Mr. Hayes. 103 558-812 0 - 74 - 8 DR. GABRIEL HAUGE, CHAIRMAN, MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST COMPANY MR. HAUGE: Mr. Secretary, following several weeks of inflation summitry leaves one with certain impressions. First, I think it can be said there’s agreement there is a certified dragon out there, but there is no Saint George on the scene yet. Perhaps what we are doing here today is trying to help fashion his sword. Next, it seems to me that the major cost of inflation is getting clear and that’s how to get out of it. We've decided not to get out of it in a lump. We're going to try to get out of it on the installment plan, but that's got to be effective and got to be paid up. The problem seems to be how to dig the country out of the hole it is in without making the hole a lot bigger. And here we run into the fears of peo ple who talked about stagflation. My own judgement is that at this time we've got to run the risk on the downside rather than on the upside and that's re versing the whole philosophy since the end of World War Two. Further, we've seen, I think, in these sessions, as we've read them and looked at them on television, that advice often comes without directions as to how to use it. I think of that in connection with the budget matter. I think of that in connection with all the advice given to Mr. Burns about how to ease the money situation. We've got to be as specific as we can. And finally, it's clear that when economics is really important it becomes politics. That leads me to a disturbing thing that has sur faced again here today. There has been a lot of talk about people and the Government -- "we and they". I'd always thought this was our Government and that what they do is a response to what we want, or, if it doesn't, it ought to.~ That probably gets us down 104 to the reality of this problem and many others. We are a nation of client organizations and Senator Hollings referred to it. We’re very loyal to our loyalties. It is hard for us to lift them up to this whole great problem and it applies to every one of us, whether we're members of a school board, hospital boardT, or a splendid idealistic organization. We're going to go and get the money from the public till. t I think every one of us has got to go back and ask the question where we are every time. How is it going to impact on the problem we are trying to get? I thought it was awful when Herb Stein was roasted when he pointed this out before he retired. Why, of course, the public isn't responsible for it. Of course, the public is. You and me in the organi zations that are constantly demanding something from our Government. Mr. Secretary, I planned to say something this afternoon on one or other of these matters, but it's clear that the topics that have been ticked off this morning are all relevant and have to be put together. Fiscal and monetary policy clearly have a role. They are necessary but not sufficient, in my opinion. We've got to face the question of how effectively can demand inflation cut cost inflation, widening supply bottlenecks, monitoring stabilization. I thought Ralph Leach was right as rain in the question he raised. We cannot run this country solely on a job standard. And what he calls for I think is a realization of that. 95 percent of the labor force is entitled to some consideration as well as the 5 percent, because we can deal with the 5 percent, I hope, in ways that don't jeopardize the 95. We've also got to be concerned with the inequi ties in the way we fight this problem and as Bob Roosa pointed out, with the international dimension. But the application of proper measures in these areas with the conviction to make them work and com ing back to you and me as citizens I think we can do a good job. Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you, Mr. Hauge. 105 MR. DAVID B. HARPER, PRESIDENT, FIRST INDEPENDENCE NATIONAL “11--------MR. HARPER: pass. 106 -- ---- -------------------- In the interest of not being repetitious, I MR. RICHARD G. GILBERT, PRESIDENT, CITIZENS SAVINGS ASSOCIATION MR. GILBERT: I'd like to mention a few ideas not mentioned and perhaps emphasize a few others. I, too, would like to see the full employment budget scrapped as a concept; I'd like to see Federal taxes increased to aid in the balancing of the fiscal 75-76 budget. In addition, I'd like to see a price tage for all new legislative proposals for expenditures, both long- and short term price tag, along with a revenue source placed along with those bills. I would like to see the amendment of the Employment Act of '46 to include the concept of price stability and recogni tion that supply and production are also parts of the supplydemand equation. Further, I think labor, including organized labor, should be called on to limit its request for wage increases to some thing below productivity increases to afford some reward for capital; and further, I would like to see in the financial area the Hunt Commission report passed, nob just the Adminis tration's report. I would like to see the Hunt Commission version totally reviewed because the Administration bill ignores the regulatory section. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you, Mr. Gilbert. 107 DR. T ILFORD C. GAINES, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND ECONOMIST MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. MR. GAINES: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I'm in agreement with almost everything that has been said here, so I ’ll forego reading my writ ten remarks and just volunteer a few informal obser vations . First, it has been suggested in some elements of the press that these meetings are an exercise in PR futility. I heartily disagree with that. I don't think any of us haS deluded himself that we're going to come up with brilliant new ideas that are going to turn the entire situation around. If we accomplish nothing more than some degree of public education and if we achieve nothing more than some degree of public support, well, certainly, our time will have been well spent. Secondly, many very useful suggestions have been made today and in earlier sessions for long-range reform that will help to prevent inflation in the future. In particular, I like the suggestion that we slaughter the sacred cows, namely, those pieces of legislation that provide protection for certain groups from the market process. And I would add one additional long-range suggestion. I would like to see the President establish a new Hoover Committee similar to the one set up by President Truman for an in-depth review of all budget expenditures. It's very easy to make sweeping recommendations that five or ten billion be cut from the budget, but true in-depth studies are necessary if that'g going to be done wisely. Third, I think we have to recognize the nature of the present recession that we're in. It's a very unusual recession. If it were an ordinary one we might be able to relax monetary and fiscal policies and still make progress against inflation. But there is one peculiar element in this recession that pre vents that from being feasible, namely, there are still serious bottlenecks in many critical materials areas. 108 So that there is a serious question as to how far we could go in stimulating economic recovery without running into a bottleneck problem. In other words, easier policies would only add to further inflation. Fourth: Picking up that point: the suggestion has been made in earlier sessions that monetary policies should be eased. I don’t know what those suggestions mean. If one looks at the credit and money aggregates over the past year, it's certainly hard to identify policy as exceedingly tight. I think the Fed should continue on the course it is now on and I commend their present effort to bring down short-term interest rates without compro mising their basic policy objectives. Further, on budgetary policy, I agree complete ly that we should move as promptly as possible to a balanced budget position, either through the expen diture reductions or tax increases and I would be hopeful that we might bring some of the off-budget agencies back into the budget as we move toward this balanced budget objective. At the same time things should be done to ameli orate the impact upon certain parts of society and economy. In particular, I'm very much in favor of a broader public employment program. I would be in favor of open-ending rights to unemployment. There are various things that can ease the im pact. I also like the suggestion of something like a one-thousand dollar exemption on the first onethousand dollars of interest income earned in savings accounts. 109 MR. GAYLORD FREEMAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARDj THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO MR. FREEMAN: Inflation is the result of a variety of practices which are popular. To overcome inflation requires policies which are unpopular. To encourage the Administration and the Congress to adopt the necessary but unpopular dis ciplines and to pursue them for an adequate period, they must have the support of the people. The people, in order to give this support, must have con fidence in the integrity and the judgment of the Government leaders. To generate that confidence, the Government -- and I believe that means the President -- must talk to the people repeatedly, identifying the causes of inflation, discussing alternative cures and frankly describing the burdens which the cures will entail. The President should urge the people to assess the degree to which they are suffering from inflation and balance that against the inconvenience they may suffer from an effective anti-inflation program. He should urge them to discuss this trade-off with their Congressmen during the forthcoming adjournment. They should indicate whether or not they are prepared to accept the dis ciplines of a protracted anti-inflation program. When Congress reconvenes, it should reflect the judgment of the people. As a part of a broader program, monetary policy could be eased a little bit with some resultant modest decline in interest rates. Fiscal policy must do far more than just achieve a budgetary balance. To improve national productivity, it must encourage investments. This will require incentives to save. Corpora tions should be offered incentives to invest in more produc tive facilities. The Treasury and the accounting profession should coop erate to achieve a more accurate reporting of the size and economic function of profits. To justify public support, the burdens of the anti-inflation program must be equitably distributed. Aid should be offered to housing, possibly through sub sidized interest. The cost of increased aid to the unemployed should be offset by increased taxes on those who remained employed. Revenue loss through incentives to save should be re couped through increased personal tax rates. Incentives for 110 to invest should be offset by an increase in corporate tax rates . c o rp o ra tio n s If further revenue is needed to balance the budget excise taxes should be increased on scarce commodities such as petroleum products. The dozens of laws designed to prevent price competition should be repealed. No other Government is sufficiently strong to mount such an expensive program. Today and possibly only for a short time our Government has the unique strength and widespread support to initiate such an anti-inflationary program if the public is convinced that it is necessary, effective and fair. Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you, Mr. Freeman. Ill MR. WILLIAM H. FRANKLIN CHARIMAN, CATERPILLAR TRACTOR COMPANY ‘ ' MR. SIMON: If I could ask everyone to please again, speak into the microphone. Some of our re corders are having trouble picking your words up. MR. FRANKLIN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I would like to speak for the moment on one of the cures for inflation. It is, I am certain, a production of more goods. To produce more goods, we will have to have industry install increased capac ities . To install increased capacities will require capital. Add to that the demands for capital for pollution control and capital to end our depend ence on imported oil and you have a horrendous de mand for capital over the next several years. Now, we know that one of the best sources of capital is a strong profit base. Retained profits are not only a source of capital in themselves, but they are the base from which corporations can borrow money or sell stock in the equity market. With that background, I’d like to share with you some figures that I have here and were put out by the July issue of the Axe-Houghton § Company. They start out with reported profits before taxes which were $65 billion in 1965 and rose to $96 billion in 1973, an increase of almost fifty percent. They then adjust those profits with two factors: one, depreciation on replacement value and, two, inventory profits. You have now not a fifty percent increase, but a drop from $36 billion to $23 billion or almost a third. But the most startling thing of all is they then deduct the dividends paid and you have then a retained adjusted earnings which dropped from $19 billion in 1965 to one-and-one-tenth billion in 1973. I submit that’s nowhere adequate to support the capital needs that we have. We must have incentives for the formation of capital and corporations must have help in obtaining capital. SECRETARY SIMON: 112 Thank you. DR. GROVE W. ENSLEY, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, ~~NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS MR. ENSLEY: Mr. Secretary, Chairman Patman and distinguished members of the Congress: It is the responsibility of the Federal Government under the Employment Act of 1946 to serve as the economic balance wheel in our private enterprise system, offsetting excesses in the private sector and cushioning the impact of external forces. The Act can only be effective if the clearly implied mandate of price stability contained in that Act is given its proper emphasis. In a very non partisan way this was the way the Joint Economic Committee proceeded during the first decade under that Act and as one of the distinguished sponsors of that Act, Chairman Patman can testify. This essential interpretation of the Act should be reactivated through a determined policy of fiscal restraint including, if necessary, tax increases. As the Joint Economic Committee initiated at the outset of the Korean War, remember that substantial Federal undertaking was financed on a pay-as-you-go basis with only moderate inflation and at very low interest rates. The underlying and most significant inflationary force in the United States in the past decade has been Federal budget deficits and expansive Federal credit programs outside the budget. Unless the rate of inflation abates more rapidly than antici pated or serious unemployment actually develops, a budget surplus or at least a balance should be the objective of public policy. Ideally, it would be desirable to create a budget surplus to offset at least, in part, the stimulating effect of heavy borrowings by Federal agencies that operate outside the budget. This would reduce the intolerable burden currently placed upon monetary policy which has resulted in inadequate private credit and excessively high interest rates. 113 Major victims of this have been thrift insti tutions and their depositors, home mortgage borrowers and the housing industry. To achieve a more neutral Federal fiscal policy, expenditures should be reduced to less than $300 billion in the current fiscal year. The need for stringent expenditure control is all the more necessary since, at least in one area, increases in spending may be necessary to relieve inequities resulting from a vigorous anti-inflationary effort. In this regard consideration must be given to a lengthening period of unemployment compensation, to manpower re-training and to public service employ ment which would enable Government at all levels to act as an employer of last resort in areas where unemployment is intolerably high. Reductions in expenditures should have top priority in achieving fiscal restraint. If expendi tures are not reduced sufficiently, however, then a tax increase appears absolutely necessary if in flation is to be controlled and if continued over reliance upon monitary restraint is to be avoided. Any tax change should be structured so as one: to encourage private savings and productive invest ment, and, two, to restrain consumption in areas which are in particular short supply, as for example, selective excise taxes designed to encourage pro duction of low powered fuel-saving automobiles. Thank you very much. 114 MR GILBERT R. ELLIS, CHAIRMAN, HOUSEHOLD FINANCE — CORPORATION MR. ELLIS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I believe the major fiscal objective for this year and future years is to bring the Federal budget into balance, preferably by expense control, not tax increases which seem to just stimulate new spending programs. Spending for the fiscal 1975 should be held in the range of the two hundred ninety-five to $300 billion, which is still $26 to $32 billion above the actual fiscal 1974 level. Congress and the Executive Branch have established control over agency expenditures and borrowings which are now excluded from the official budget. These agency borrowings along with the Government-generated debt have an inflationary impact on the economy and seriously affect the availability and cost of funds for the private sector. In order to demonstrate earnestness of commit ment, there should be across-the-board cut in all ex penditures, followed by selective cuts of greater amounts. For example, cuts in Federal spending must include so-called entitlement programs such as gen eral revenue-sharing and assistance programs. Defense which looms so large in our total budget must be scrutinized carefully and cut. In view of the criti cal situation there should be a moratorium on new spending programs and no sacred cows. Tax incentives are needed to further stimulate savings and direct investment. Consideration should be given to eliminating Federal tax liability on in terest income up to a certain dollar level. Savings institutions should be allowed to have greater flexibility in establishing rates of interest paid on savings accounts so as to be more responsive to market conditions and to encourage savings. There should be changes in capital gains taxes to relate the rate to the length of the holding period. Corporations need relief from unrealistic rates of dollar levels of depreciation. Special investment tax credit provisions for investment in critically short capacity areas should be consi- 115 dered. Once again, it is important to emphasize that any short fall and Federal Government revenues as a result of such tax relief must be offset by corresponding and equal cuts in spending or, less desirable, in creases in other taxes. The single, most effective act to insure adequate equity in long-term debt mar kets would be a total priority commitment of both the Executive and Legislative branches of the Federal Government to a balanced budget and continued but less severe monetary restraint. This must displace the so-called full employment goal as the nation's number one priority. The unemployed, however, must not carry the full burden of a shift in emphasis. Adequate levels of taxation of the employed must be established to support adequate levels of compensa tion for the unemployed but willing worker. It must always be remembered that the surest way to protect the long-term capital funds market is to provide a stable currency. When a currency loses its value, it loses one of its primary reasons for being. And finally, lets get going and make decisions, even though not perfect and politically palatable. SECRETARY SIMON: 116 Thank you. dr . T OTTO ECKSTEIN, PRESIDENT, DATA RESOURCES, INC., OF ECONOMICS, HÄftVÄRD UNIVERSITY r OFE^'OR MR. ECKSTEIN: Secretary Simon, Members of the Congress, Fellow Delegates: First, let me congratulate the Federal Reserve System for their modest move towards ease. It is a pleasure for us to see that the Federal Reserve has, in fact, assessed the risks, both on the inflation and on the employment side and has felt free to move at least away from its previous p o sitio n . Now, my recommendation to them would be that they now move gradually to a five to six percent money growth that would still be far short of encouraging the inflation. It would represent a much smaller increase in money than in prices and would leave nothing for growth output and we think that would be the limit of what their ambitions should be at this .time. At a later date they might well wish to move to a lower rate of money growth, but only at such time to improve the structure of the economy so that, in fact, we have taken the inflationary bias out of the structure itself out of the way we have set our prices, wages, our government policies, regulate our industries and all the rest. Now in the case of the budget, let me emphasize only one point. It is important to cut the budget some because it has been made a symbol of the inflation fight and it is the most direct contri bution that Government can make in a hurry, but I would warn you that the battle against inflation will not be decided finally in the budget. The budget was only a small component in all the causes that got us to where we are today and whether we reduce the budget by a few billion, which is the maximum practical or not will affect the short-term inflation rate, but at most a few tenths of a point. I would emphasize that the long-range budget has to be correct and that we make a mistake in focusing all our energies on this one issue. My basic recommendation today is a very simple one. I would urge the Federal Government not to pursue our objectives one at a time. I would strongly urge you not to make 1975 the year of the great infla tion fight, and 1976 the year of rising unemployment. 117 That’s exactly how we got into this situation we are in. Let me review a few figures, not just for the United States, but for twelve industrial countries as a combination. .During the years 1959 to 1970, the industrial countries rose only about three-and-a-half percent a year after fully taking out all of the inflationary effects. In 1971 and 1972 the world-wide rate of increase of money after inflation was a full eight percent, far and away the highest seen in the post-war period. Similarly, while the budgets did not increase as much as it did during the Vietnam War, it was during the period 1971-'72 that the budget rose in the United States at seven percent a year after inflation, and since late '72 it has not increased at all. What we need to get out of this current situation, in effect, is to put an end to this kind of one objective at a time: Now it's inflation, now it's employment roller-coaster ; and let the economy develop in a more orderly fashion. Now, I would urge that we disengage gradually from the very tight policies that we have and disengage from the inflation in an orderly way, and that our goals be be attainable and not unrealistic. I think we cannot press the economy too hard. We will crack the financial system before we will crack the inflation. Our equity markets are already gone as a practical source of capital and some of our debt markets are going. We have already waited at least three to six months too long to figure out some way to channel money into housing if we don't want selective controls, and it is incumbent on the financial industry and its regulators to figure out some other way to have all sectors of our capital needs participate in the limited capital. One other thing, we don't have much time in getting our program out. We do have the summit meetings and we are getting a lot of ideas on the table and I think they are a very welcome move, but the people need quick action. Let me give you just one example: -- 118 aj SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you, Mr. Eckstein. I gave you four minutes, and I am not as tight with the clock as I pretend to be. 119 558-812 0 - 74 - 9 DR. ROBERT RAY DOCKSON, PRESIDENT, CALIFORNIA FEDERAL s a y i n g s An d l o a n a s s o c i a t i o n ? MR. DOCKSON: He could have had some of my minutes Mr. Secretary. First of all, I want to thank you Mr. Burns and Mr. Greenspan for the excellent explanation of the situation we find ourselves in at the present time. I, like Mr. Stewart, though, have heard from a very sizable number of some of the leaders in the Los Angeles area. And the theme running through those letters, all of them, seem to cause me to have to associate with several of the speakers who have already spoken: Mr. Saulnier, Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. Preston and Mr. Ensley and Mr. Eckstein. They have said the same things that I find running throughout the correspondence we receive. The idea of a fiscal restraint policy is expressed in no uncertain terms in these letters, even to the extent of a tax in crease if that be necessary, I find myself in agreement with the idea of back ing off of the very tight monetary policy that we have been following. I find that if the back of in flation is truly to be broken, the bomb has to be busted on the boom. Our need to lessen the monetary restraint will come about because we must spread *•■<- we must find ways of spreading the cost of this inflation to other areas than the few areas that are actually carrying the load at the present time. We have a great need to increase productivity and production in this country. We must increase capital formation. As had been expressed by Mr. Franklin and others, this need means you cannot lick inflation unless we increase the supply of our goods and services that we offer. Mr. Preston offered one way and only one way that we might be able to increase savings. To in crease the savings rate, he suggested a thousand dollars -- I believe it was a thousand-dollar tax exemption on the first thousand dollars of interest earned. 120 This could be given to the saver regardless of where he places his funds, whether he places them in commercial banks or the savings and loan institutions. As it goes into the savings and loan institutions, some of us strongly believe that there is a real pos sibility that the withdrawal disintermediation that is taking place now will either be brought to a halt, or it certainly will be lessened. If this is done, the housing industry that is in dire need at the present time -- and not only in need, it is at the bottom in our area -- that we could pick it up, and housing would begin to increase employment, begin to increase income, and it would expand the taxing base. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. 121 DR. ROBERT G. DEDERICK, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND ECONOMIST NORTHERN TRUST COMPANY MR. DEDERICK: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. As Alan Greenspan has said, there are two key inflation problems at present. One is inflation per se, and the other is the confidence debilitating inflation psychology, which it has generated with its consequent public demand to do some thing quickly. Now, to eliminate inflation and ultimately inflationary psychology will require a long, hard slog over a period of several years. The alternative in all our policy of demand restraint, the only policy approach which could offer rela tively near-term relief now that controls have been publicly discredited, would be to run too great a risk. World economy and its financial institutions are suffici ently vulnerable at present that such an approach would run the risk of generating a severe and prolonged business set back. It might have been a viable alternative five years ago or even two years ago; it is not a viable alternative now. Thus, the fundamental program must be one which is long term in orientation. This means it must be multifaceted and designed in such a way as to maintain public support over an extended perior. It includes these five features; one, sustained -- I emphasize sustained — along with the sustained, moderate, and I emphasize moderate -- demand restraint sufficient to produce sustained, moderate, excess capacity over a period of several years. Two, relief measures to aid the most severly hurt by this effort. These measures could be coupled with offsetting expenditure cuts or tax increases. Three, selective measures to boost productive capacity in areas of capacity, again to be fiscally offset elsewhere. Four, a vigorous effort to eliminate structural features of the economy which lead to higher costs and prices. I include here those forms of taxes which most add to cost, in the latter case to be fiscally offset elsewhere. Five, a vigorous effort to bring down oil prices which literally threaten at their present level to bring down the world economy. 122 Such, an approach has one big failing: it does not meet the immediate need to reduce inflationary' psychology and reduce the demand to satisfy the public's demand for action. What is needed is an easily understood piece of evidence of genuine Government commitment to inflation control. Wall Street Journal readers may know there is one, but the public at least must get the message as well. The single action most likely to signal this commitment would be a Congressional -- and I emphasize Congressional -enactment of a ceiling on fiscal 1975 Federal spending at $300 billion, i.e., lower than now seems likely, and for a commitment to continue discipline in fiscal '76. Overall, in order that overall Government policy be one of moderate demand restraint to meet ray earlier criteria, it would be necessary to couple this increased spending restraint with a corresponding easing of monetary restraint. It is too late to tighten fiscal policy without, at the same time, making a corresponding easing of monetary policy. It is not too late, however, to make this change in mix. Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. 123 MR. MORRIS D. CRAWFORD, JR., CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD. BOWERY SAVINGS BANK MR. CRAWFORD: Mr. Secretary, just a few gen eral remarks from the bottom of the disintermediation barrel with a few specifics this afternoon. As to monetary policy, painful as it is today for the thrift institutions, I hope the Fed persists in its policy with further moderation as soon as that is responsibly possible. I would express the plaintive hope that that day is not too far off. As to fiscal policy, although it may not be the whole answer, it seems to me that bringing the bud get into balance or preferably to a surplus position as soon as possible is essential, I realize this poses very difficult political problems, and I guess I am guilty of some political naivete, but I find it very difficult to believe there’s any budget, private or public, that can’t be cut two or three percent, especially when the cost of not doing so may be so prohibitive and the longrange benefits of doing so can be so great. Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: 124 Thank you, Mr. Crawford. HOWARD COUGHLIN, PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND PROFES« fTTONAL EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL U NION~ MR MR. COUGHLIN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We feel that there is no simple solution to the problems of inflation. We do think, however, there are areas in which we must move to alleviate spiralling inflation. There should not be any^ additional grain deals such as the Russian grain deal of 19 72. Devaluations of the American dollar, however/ necessary, brought about the subsequent export of farm products and crude materials in short supply. While we understand that export controls may re sult in retaliatory measures by our trading partners throughout the world, we do strongly feel the need for export controls in order to eliminate the possi bility of shortages in this country due to the ab sence of a sound export control policy. The effects of the tremendous increases in the price of oil and petroleum products by the oilproducing countries is known to all of us, and while we do not pretend to have a solution to this problem, we do feel that a way should be found to cope with this ponbtamt: threat to the American economy. Tight money and soaring interest rates have crippled home construction. The Federal Reserve Bank should be directed by the Congress to allocate bank credit at reasonable rates for such purposes as low, moderate and middle income housing and other community facilities such as schools and hospitals. Reasonable interest rates should also be made available for the construction of essential public utility plants. Tight money and abnormally high interest rates have added five point three billion dollars to the public debt between 1973 and 1974. This is not only adding to the burdens of the taxpayer, it is feeding inflation and placing addi tional pressures on city, state and local govern ments. We also advocate the élimination of tax loopholes and the imposition of an excess profits tax. Wage and price controls, equitably and absolute ly applied should be considered seriously during this 125 emergency. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. SECRETARY SIMON: 126 Thank you, sir. A/ J RICHARD P. COOLEY, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OTCUTIVE OFFICER,' WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL MP rssociATiw MR. COOLEY: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I ’d like to associate my remarks with Mr. Dockson, with disintermediation. Branch banks, which are practically all over the west, and other thrift institutions, are the principle source of housing financing and are unable to compete for funds. r v This unavailability of funds, together with increasing prices due to inflation, higher interest rates, more restrictive terms and conflicts with usury laws in some areas is resulting in a severe decline in housing starts. Most builders are highly leveraged in the re duction in volume and increased costs and carrying inventories is creating serious credit problems. Housing has a great multiplier effect on our economy, both on the way up and on the way down, and as a larger number of starts of the past reach com pletion and new housing starts decline, the reverse multiplier is affecting the construction industry and businesses supplying goods for new homes. Unemployment in the construction industry is Ialready too high and will increase. High interest rates are considerably increasing the cost of other real estate projects under way, many of which are Ifunded on a variable basis. This is a major concern and affects not only the project owner but also all financial inter mediaries participating^in the real estate market. This situation, along with cost overruns re sulting from increased,material costs, exists in many major real estate projects in the United States, and in addition to creating credit problems, increa ses the need for additional financing. Higher interest and construction costs also in crease potential bankruptcies in this field. For confidence and to encourage savings, the subject of incentives to thrift institutions needs a priority rating including the suggested tax-free status of up to one thousand of interest. 127 Variable mortgage rates are needed to encourage lenders and to protect borrowers in periods of de clining rates, and also I think we should consider increasing the FDIC insurance up to fifty thousand dollars for savings accounts. The real estate industry is the hardest hit sector of our economy in the current inflationary high interest period, and will add further to our economic slowdown if not given immediate relief. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 128 r nR GWEN BYMERS, PROFESSOR AND CHAIRMAN OF THE — De p a r t m e n t off' c o n s u m e r e c o n o m i c s , Co r n e l l u n i versity " MS. BYMERS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary: I am here as a consumer representative to a point of view. However, I want to say at the outset that I have no constituency and that I am speaking for no organized consumer group. e x p ress I am a professor of consumer economics in the York State College of Human Ecology. Some of you may know it by the name of College of Home E c o n o m i c s , Cornell University. New Everyone here seems to agree that the problem is serious enough to deserve priority attention. I am not sure that any of us are willing to forego current income increases to allow the system to catch up. Part of the present inflationary problem is struc tural, they -tell.-me,.and for consumers this means we need to recognize that food,, fuel and shelter costs have undergone structural price shifts that we may have to learn to live with. When these are translated into higher wages, higher wage agreements, we simply push ourselves up another notch on the inflation ladder. As I have reviewed or listened to these meetings and read about them in the New York Times for the [last couple of weeks, I've been impressed that each s p e c i a l interest group that sat around a table such as this has put forth solutions that seem to disre gard the total impact of what they were proposing. Now, I would say that it is patently unjust for ¡those who have control of the nation's cash balances land concern for their real value equities to put [too much of the pressure of adjustment onto the low end of the income scale. If we have to conclude these discussions ¡recommendations that increase unemployment or ¡the benefits to the welfare recipients, we're the cost in the wrong place, as far as I am concerned. I think that I intend to ask this with reduce putting after- 129 noon that any solutions, that are proposed seriously by the Administration be accompanied by an economic impact statement. The burden of correction seems to me to need to be borne equitably across the population. Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: 130 Thank you. MR. ARCHIE R. BOE, CHAIRMAN, OF THE BOARD, ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY MR. BOE: Mr. Secretary, it’s extremely difficult to give any wise dissertation on the complex subject of inflation in three minutes, so I will merely list some priority items which we feel will have a posi tive benefit in reducing inflation to an acceptable level. Number one, we believe a balanced Federal budget should be a primary target, not only for this fiscal year but for all the years in the foreseeable future. We realize that it is difficult to reduce expendi tures during inflation, but we are required to do so in business, and'it is a rare occasion when you can’t reduce expenses of an agency or department four to five percent. Now, many benefits would accrue from this, but I think the most important one is that it would build confidence in our nation. It’s going to be very difficult to ask the public to make sacrifices in controlling inflation when the Federal government is following an irresponsible policy. Number two, Congress should apply a strict costbenefit analysis to all legislation so that we know how much price inflation we are actually legislating each year. OSHA, clean air, clean water, noise reduction are all very worthwhile programs, but they are creating billions of dollars of price increases each year. Can they be slowed down and spread over a longer number of years so they do not add fire to this in flationary spiral? Number three, limitation should be placed on the amount of financing done each year by Governmental agencies which are outside the Federal budget^. Certainly, this financing places a strain on the en tire monetary system and adds to our inflationary problems. Number four, we certainly endorse the program of providing incentives for people to save and not spend, and possibly the one which has been discussed, of maybe the first one thousand dollars of interest and dividends a family receives could be tax-free. 131 Number five, we believe it's necessary to provide tax incentives to business for the expansion and modernization of industrial capacity to increase capacity in output per manhour. The investment credit must be retained and pos sibly increased for some important industries. Number 6, we think it's important to provide tax incentives for investment in American industry by reduction in the capital gains taxes on a sliding scale downward according to the number of years the assets have actually been held. Number seven, we recommend the Federal Reserve System should adopt a long-range policy on money supply and not have it fluctuate, which creates many, many problems, and probably this long-range policy should start out here at an annual rate of about six percent a year. The last point I want to make is that wage and price controls should not be adopted. They just raise havoc with the entire economy, and some day we have to have a lot of make-up work and we are just postponing the real problems that they create. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. SECRETARY SIMON: 132 Thank you. MR. ROBERT H. BETHKE, PRESIDENT, DISCOUNT CORPORATION O f n e w YUM ------------MR. BETHKE: Mr. Secretary, you know that every man in this room spent many an hour on this problem, and some undoubtedly have woken up from dreams think ing about it. And w e ’ve come down with prepared statement^, with detailed, specific recommendations that we ought to get into this afternoons What w e ’re really talking about is probably the most important war our country every fought, if you think in terms of its impact on our own and our children’s life style, on our freedoms, on the sys tem of Government. And if w e ’re going to have success on this, I just want to make a couple of principles, rather than specifics. From this point on every presidential and every leadership state ment must be very blunt, honest, unglossed. This is what the people are crying for. That produces cre dibility and you'll get some followship. Furthermore, we've all got a duty to inspire that get-going power that Americans have to produce more, to save more, to waste less. I think it's high time that we reconvince our selves that Americans can once again show the Japan ese, the Germans, and all others, that we can be the wonder people, the wonder workers of the world. Now, as a footnote to this: It's high time that it becomes fashionable and prudent for elected officials to have to be known as inflation fighters. It's high time in our own families that when you sit down with your wife, she says: "Well, honey, what are we going to do about it". I know all the stuff you|re saying. Each one of us has to make some sacrifice, some contribution. Well, in conclusion, we'd better get out of these meetings a crisp list of recommendations that the people can understand, that they'll get behind. There's got to be a very powerful dynamic Cabinet Level officer, plus a President who really drives home how we're doing on it, even the road blocks, and avoid at all costs a couple of months from now the public and ourselves saying, you know: These meetings were a mighty fine one-month crash course §1 economics, but nobody's following the lessons. 133 MR. ROBERT H. B. BALDWIN, PRESIDENT, MORGAN STANLY AtJD'' W M , ,l'T i r --------------- MR. BALDWIN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. After having had so many speakers appear be fore me, I am beginning to understand what it's like to grow up with a last name like Charles Zwick. I speak from the viewpoint of one who is in timately connected with the cppital raising mechanism of this country. I cannot stress strongly enough the impact that inflation is having on the capital markets of our country and the world. We have seen prices of common stocks * price; earnings ratios and yields at levels approaching their lows since the days of the Thirties. This has effectively closed the equity market as a source of capital to all except Public Utilities which are forced to finance even at these low levels. Responding to inflationary expectations, in vestors have shown a reluctance to commit to long term bond issues or mortgages. There has also been a flight to quality which has widened the yield spreads between Triple-A companies and lesser rated companies. As a result, many companies, particularly Public Utilities, have found themselves financing at higher and higher rates and for shorter and shorter periods. I point out a recent 5-year, 13% issue of Duke Power, as:.a prime example. In addition, a whole host of companies have had no recourse to the market but have, of neces sity, turned to the banks as a lender of last resort. It is becoming abundantly clear that in the years ahead, we are going to be a capital short coun try, and, therefore, if we wish to increase produc tivity, provide additional?jobs for the growing work force of this country, and to assure an acceptable level of growth in this country, we must do everything possible to encourage savings and capital formation at every level in the United States. However, unless we bring inflation under con trol, thereby reducing inflationary expectations, we will have an even greater short-fall in savings and 135 558-812 0 - 74 - 10 capital formation. I believe that the American people recognize inflation as Public Enemy No. 1, and will be willing to see Government take those actions and will, them selves, be willing to make those sacrafices to bring inflation under control. I would point out in some comments that have been made before, that interest rates benefit bankers, investment bankers, and brokers. I might just say that high interest rates kill investment bankers and brokers and I don't think bankers would vote for them either, yet we do support the policies that Dr. Arthur Burns and the Federal Reserve have gone to because we feel it's important to get inflation under control. Thus, although we are in a also represents the opportunity things for the long run, rather which may seem expedient in the trying period, it to do the right than those things short run. I've got four recommendations that I suggest to the President: 1. Make no promises upon which he can't deliver. Deflating inflation is a long term project. ?. In cutting the budget, there will be a serious problem of setting national priorities. We are trying to do too much, too fast in this country. I subscribe to Charlie Zwick's concept. 3. Develop a continuing partnership of Govern ment, Labor, Business and the Public in licking in flation; and 4. Take initiative to establish an interna tional group from countries around the world to attack world-wide inflation. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 136 DR. GEORGE LELAND BACH, .PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY jSIANFORD: UfrlVERStlY MR. BACH: Mr. Chairman, I would like to use my three minutes to talk about the causes of inflation because I think it's necessary to look at an aspect of the problem we haven't talked much about if we're going to have a good base for talk ing about Monetary Policy this afternoon. Although special developments, like the recent Food and Energy crises may temporarily dominate price movement, the fundamental cause of inflation in the United States, I think, is "excess income claims," validated by expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. Workers, businessmen, farmers, the elderly, National Defense proponents, all of us together, have come to demand -almost as if it were a Divine right --a rising total of wages, profits, prices, Social Security benefits; education; you-name-it; a total that substantially exceeds the output of the economy at stable prices. In the old days, these higher wages and prices would have priced products and labor out of the market before long, with unemployment and recession halting inflationary pressures. But today the Federal Reserve, the White House, and Congress, given the nation's high priority on the growing unemployment, generally increase Government spending, and the money stock to avoid substantial unemployment, albeit at the cost of validating the inflationary price and cost increases. Then the wage price -- wage price spiral --is set up for another round-up in the newer, higher plateau. Any economist can tell you one sure-fire way to stop this cost-push, demand-pull inflation spiral is to cut the growth of the money stock to zero, shift Federal budgets to a large surplus, and the growth in spending and prices will soon grind to a halt, at a terribly high cost in unemployment and, prob ably, financial panic. What we need now, above all, is some way to slow the growth of wages, prices, and Government benefits, so that mon etary fiscal policy can hold the growth in total spending to a reasonable non-inflationary rate, without generating unaccept able unemployment. To put the matter bluntly: what this implies is that an aggregate policy -- that is to say, fiscal policy and monetary policy -- call it the "old time religion" or anything else -cannot be successful unless it is accompanied by restraints in price setting, and in claims on the Government. 137 Perhaps a restrictive monetary fiscal policy alone can induce wage and price restraint without generating a major recession. But the recent evidence is not encouraging, and it is very unlikely, I think that the Congress and the American people will stand still for a really long, major recession if that’s what it takes to do the inflation job by itself. This leads, of course, to the probable need for a national consensus on wage/price restraint, and income policy, if you wish, to be used cooperatively with the moderately restrictive aggregate demand policy to help the Federal Reserve. I should like, this afternoon, to argue the case of such a cooperative set of policies if we're going to lick the inflation problem. Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: 138 Thank you. MR. EDWIN G. ALEXANDER, PRESIDENT, FIRST SAVINGS AND LOAN SHARES, INC. MR, ALEXANDER: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Zwick, I appreciate your condolences! My problem is that everything I was going to say as the first speaker has already been said with a great deal more to boot. In addition to representing First Savings and Loan Shares, I also represent the National Savings and Loan League which is a National Trade Association and, if I may, I’d simply like to underscore three suggestions that have been made repeatedly, I am sure you must all be impressed, as I am, with the almost unanimous support of the idea of stronger fiscal policy, and I would like to underscore all of those suggestions that have been made with regard to gaining public support for that fiscal policy. I think it's totally unreasonable to expect the Congress to support a balanced budget and a strong fiscal policy if they do not have the support of the people who voted them into Congress. They get there by counting votes, and if the voters don't support that, obviously the Congress isn't going to support it. So I think all of the suggestions, the Congress ional debate, the contact of the S § L customers, bank customers, all the suggestions that have been made to gain that support, I think are terribly important in terms of bringing about the general support of a stronger fiscal policy. Secondly, I support and underscore the idea that we need more capital formation --be that in the form of savings accounts, the stock market -- whatever forms of increased capital formation -- the mechanisms we have in this country it's in my view probably the most important short-range/longrange problem we have. We've squandered a lot of our wealth over the past two or three decades, and it's important that we not only recoup the squandering that's gone on, but we have to increase the amount of capital that's available in our economy. Thirdly, I >agree with the suggestions that we should adopt the Financial Institutions Act. I think it needs seme more work before it should be adopted by the Congress, but I think in the course of doing that we need to eliminate the argument over whether we are going to have rate control in that Bill. I think it's vital that we continue rate control until we can bring about a restructuring of the assets, so that it's 139 literally ridiculous to think that the Savings and Loan Industry -- and those financial institutions that have large investments and long-term securities -- mortgage loans to be specific -- can be responsive to competitive circumstances with regard to institutions that have short-range, or short term type assets. And I think what should be introduced into the adoption of the Financial Institutions Act is some method of varying the interest income on long-term securities -particularly mortgage loans. It's vital that some effective variable rate be built into that asset structure so that these institutions in the future can be more competitive and more responsive to the kind of conditions we have experienced in the last ten years. Thank you very much. SECRETARY SIMON: 140 Thank you, Mr. Alexander. SECRETARY SIMON: Now, prior to going to lunch, I'd like to call on our Congressional Delegation and start with the Chair man of the House Banking Committee. THE HONORABLE WRIGHT PATMAN, U. S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES Achieving a solution to the economic dilemma besetting the Nation -- soaring inflation and deepening recession -requires major changes in the ways in which monetary policy has developed, and the structure, of their financial system. For decades, the leadership of this country has attended only to the symptoms of perennial periods of inflation, high inter est rates, and rising unemployment. All that has been gained by these actions is a temporary reduction in the nation’s economic fever, while the underlying illness continues to exist. We have been badgering the symptoms of our troubles while the basic causes remain untouched. A real improvement, a stable productive, prosperous economy, will continue to elude us unless the Administration, the Congress, we, who are gathered here and others in and out of Government, are willing to recognize this paramount fact and act on it forthrightly and with political courage. The major problem, today, I think, of course, is inflation. We must stop inflation; but we cannot stop inflation by increasing interest rates. The Federal Reserve has given that a trial for Sh years. Many of us were watching it and calling it to the attention of the people in the Congress all that time, but the Federal Reserve has continued to use high inter est rates -- higher and higher interest rates --to stop inflation. Now, when you increase interest rates, you, of course, increase prices; even the goods on the shelves go up immediately. And, as you increase prices, you have inflation. Now, you cannot cure that inflation by going back and starting over with high interest rates again. It just causes more and more inflation. . You cannot balance budgets by high interest rates and you cannot cure inflation by high interest rates, j Now, the truth is, that whenever you cause interest rates to be increased -- and the Federal Reserve, of course, has that power -- they are doing if of course from their standpoint in the public interest and believe that they are right -- but they are causing inflation with it, and inflation cannot be stopped with more high interest rates, I repeat. Now, then, if you were to have your house on fire, and you 141 wanted to put out the fire, you wouldn't use gasoline instead of water to put that fire out. But that's exactly what you are doing when you use interest rates, high interest rates, in the way and manner that the Federal Reserve is using them now. And I think that in the portfolio of the Federal Reserve Banks amounting to $82 billion now, everyone of their bonds, uncan celled bonds, somebody had bought those bonds, or some entity of Government, or private industry, and paid money for them and the Federal Reserve acquired those bonds through the open market committee by giving United States currency for them. So they are paid for -- absolutely paid for -- and usually when you pay a debt in Government or out, you get the debt can celled. But these debts were not cancelled when they were bought. They were put in this portfolio of bonds and held, and the Government is collecting money from the taxpayers, from $5 to $7 billion a year interest on those bonds that have been paid for once. I asked Mr. William McChesney Martin, who was quite know ledgeable in affairs of this kind, and he admitted that they were paid for once. They have been, and now then, if they're not cancelled as they should be when they're paid for, we'll have to pay for them again. And that will be not $82 billion inflation: it will be twice that, $164 billion inflation. So you cannot stop inflation using a system like that, and it has been used for 60 years, and there's no audit of the Federal Reserve Banking System that has ever been made by the General Accounting Office which audits every major part of Government except the Federal Reserve. And they refuse to be audited. And there is not a thing wrong with our country and its money that a good audit of the Federal Reserve System would not cure. Now, I just want to bring that to your attention. Be sure and don't overlook it in your final report because you cannot afford to. The structure of our financial system must be changed to provide improved liquidity and increased competition for all sectors of our economy, especially priority areas such as Housing, Consumer, State and Local Governments, and small- and medium-size businesses. Federal regulations of financial institutions must be reorganized and streamlined to assure that these goals are expeditiously achieved and maintained. Specialized lending institutions, savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, credit unions and finance companies must be allowed to expand their lending activities and their financial services they provide, so that they can adequately compete for funds and borrowings and, incidentally, I can add, to properly pro tect and serve the public interest. 142 The nation’s major tax of financial institutions must be required to meet our priority credit needs in a way in which all will share this burden equitably, and without economic destruction. The changes advocated -- unless made -- will be producing little more than empty promises or gestures. The degree of success of these Summit meetings will depend on the willingness of the Congress and the Ford Administration to go beyond these narrower interests and seek the answers that truly represent the public needs and desires, and Mr. Chairman, I would like to have permission to file an additional statement setting forth my views in regard to this matter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. 143 THE HONORABLE JOHN J. RHODES, U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CONGRESSMAN RHODES: Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity‘•and, particularly, I want to thank the people who are present here today for being here and for adding so much to the sum total of my intelligence, and I think human intelligence by the words you have said and the words which you will say. There has been a great deal of wisdom displayed here today and I think the country should be great ful for it, and will be very grateful when they see the results of what should come out of meetings like this. I was glad that Bob Roosa mentioned that we are not the only nation in the world with an inflation problem and, certainly, the wrenching effect of the sudden increase in the price of petroleum, and petro? leum products, has had a ripple effect throughout the world economy which can't be discounted by anybody here, and I don't think that it is. Also, it seems to me that we suffer from a de mand-pull inflation on a global basis and Charlie, whether or not we can blame it on your favorite bete noire -- the TV industry, or who it is, I don’t know, but the facts are that the whole world has become aware of the good life, and many of the people now feel that they have the wherewithal to get it, and they want it yesterday. And it all adds up to the fact that the industrial plan of the world, the raw material facilities, acquisition facilities of the world have not been capable of fulfilling these needs. Now, that is, in my opinion, the long-run problem which must be faced by all of us and one of the ways which Government can help, of course, is in the area of capital formation. It is going to take as was mentioned -- tremendous amounts of capital to satisfy this demand. In the short run, of course, I think we are all interested in setting our sights towards satisfying the demand;but, also, in cooling the demand to the point that it is somewhat manageable. And that, I guess, is where Government comes 144 I in and I suppose that is the reason that almost @ that it is up to the Federal Government to do something ab out balancing its bud get* everybody here has said I I certainly agree with that. I think that it < lean be done. I think that, in fact, it must be done, land I venture to say that it will be done. I would like though, before I quit, to remind I those of you in the room that this is not a problem I which only the Federal Government can solve. This is I a problem for Business, for Management, for Labor, I and for the American people, because it is a type I of inflation which is a different breed of cats from I the kind we have previously had. So it will be my hope that the people here would I consider this as perhaps something which they could IIdo and should do. I You know, when you have a demand/pull inflation 1 and a capital shortage, it becomes very necessary ] that that capital be allocated in the public interest and you allocate it in the public interest by putting |it in those areas where shortages have occurred and |are present. I don't know any people in the world Jwho are better at allocating capital than the people in this room and those you represent. I I would hope that you would take this as that ipart of your job, or at least part of your job in solving this whole problem to engage more fully than you have yet, in the proper allocation of the capital which is available. Thank you,"Mr. Ehairman. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you Congressman. 145 THE HONORABLE JACOB JAVITS, UNITED STATES SENATE SENATOR JAVITS: Mr. Chairman, I am sorry that I have arrived rather late but I had a slight distraction in New York, which makes my schedule a little difficult. But I am delighted to fit in at this point of the program because I do have some suggestions, and I have been briefed as to what has occurred here this morning. In the first place, I would like to emphasize the urgency of the hour. Personally, I deprecate even the 30 days to have these mini-summits and the summit, and then the 30 days prob ably which it will take to screen everything out. I think we are in such urgent need for affirmative govern mental action that even 60 days is a very serious delay, and so I hope very much that all of our suggestions will be extremely practical and very direct, and rather immediate. And so I have proposed what to me is a 6-point program which I would like to briefly tick off. First, as to wage and price stability: As you go out into the field you find that this is the main thing on people's minds. They want to know: "What can we do about it promptly?" So I would strongly urge that the President ask the Congress to give the Council on Wage and Price Stability sub poena power and the power to delay wage or price increases for a limited period -- say 60 days --so that there may be public exposure of the reason for major price and wage increases with a tendency therefore to restrain them if that is at all possible, without wage and price controls, which seem to be out of the question. Second: I think we need a policy of credit allocation and that, in my judgment, could be coupled with an easing of monetary policy on the part of the Federal Reserve Board which, up to now, has been asked to go it alone. The critical need being to bring down the cost of money, just like the critical need is to stabilize the cost of every thing else because, right now, the consumer -- both of money and of goods -- does not know how fast or far this is going to run away. I shall, myself, propose legislation to establish a voluntary credit Allocation System within the Federal Reserve Board, and point out that this was done during the Korean War with a Capital Issues Committee. 146 Third: I think we urgently need a conservation program for gas and oil, one of the two major sources of our recent price inflation, the other being, of course, food. We need drastic action to reduce demand and thus cool price pressures, while we take the needed actions to cut waste and maximize our Project Independence output. I would consider the departure from the conservation practices of last winter's gas lines as being one of the most shameful chapters in the history of this country. If you want to talk to the OPEC Nations, you've got to talk from a position of strength, and the only way we can get that is by cutting down on our own requirements. That, they will understand very, veiy quickly, and we cannot afford the hemorrhage we are enduring today of $25 billion a year in balance for us and $70 (billion) for the world, rapidly going up to $100 (billion). Fourth: We need a major effort to increase productivity and my suggestion for that - there are many others -- is the establishment of Regional and Industry Productivity Councils, such as we had in World War II, and they were very successful. We had 5,000 of them then and it is my belief that labor is ready to cooperate. I am the ranking member of the Labor Committee of the Senate. I don't think I am talking through my hat. Also, I think we need special treatment for the utilities in the productivity area, which are in terrible trouble, and I hope the President will urge the Congress to "up" the tax deduction for the Investment Tax Credit from four to seven percent. Fifth: I think we need promptly, passage of a Trade Bill; increased public service employment; the budget reform (I am a member of the Budget Committee, and that we are undertaking right now); and a genuine tax reform, which will be very pleasing to the consumer because he wants to see fairness down the line. As a matter of fact, if there is anything to the new politics, it is the fact that people generally want to see people treated alike, and no favorite classes or enclaves in this country. Of course, I understand you have already dis cussed keeping the Federal budget to or below the $300 billion level and that, to me, would also include the necessary allow ance for a Public Service Employment Program, which I estimate at $500,000; Arthur Bums as $800,000; and Secretary Simon has also expressed himself on that score; but that ought to come out of the $300 billion budget. 147 And finally, Mr. Chairman -- and then I shall be through -- prompt action to shore up the international monetary situa tion and that would include publication of petro-dollar flows. Where is this enormous amount of money going? And the agree ment to prevent bank failures other than those attributable to bad management, as well as the development of new institu tions internationally, and the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board have led in that, as well as the Secretary of the Treasury, to develop new institutions and instruments to accept and manage the flow of oil revenues or to turn them down in the banking system, if it is simply going to drown the World's Banking System in a lot of loose dollars. We have to, in my judgment, be a lot tougher than we have been. Now, these are the prescriptions. I would add one other, Mr. Chairman, and that is some special treatment of the build ing industry, which urgently needs some form of RFC or some form of secondary credit device by which, if necessary, Government credit may be extended to it so that it may operate at slightly above the rate at which the Government still com mands credit. It cannot finance, and it cannot pay these rates, and it is dragging the rest of the economy down with it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. SECRETARY SIMON: 148 Thank you, Senator. TOE HONORABLE HENRY S. REUSS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CONGRESSMAN REUSS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I sympath ize with Professor Bymers of Cornell a moment ago when she said as a consumer representative she spoke for no organized group. I am in the same position. I speak for no organized group -- I am here as spokesman for the Democratic Party. We have had a great deal of advice from our distinguished guests from the financial community. It comes through loud and clear to me that the advice is "Cut the budget, cut the budget, cut the budget." Let me say that the Office of Management and Budget has already caught the perfume and is laying about with the right good will cutting the veterans’ education, and slashing mass transit, and restricting health and other people-oriented programs. As far as I am concerned, I have never seen a budget that couldn't stand some cutting, and this can. There is waste in it. There are low-priority items in it that ought to come out. I am delighted that my friend John Rhodes is on the new Budget Committee and I believe that the Congress can and will cut the present budget requests. But, my friends, let's not get a fixation about this. In fact, Treasury borrowing, which is the horror that you all have been exposing has not increased at all this year. Treasury borrowing from the public has gone down by a couple of billion dollars and in the last year net Treasury public borrowing has gone up something like two or three billion dollars. Mean while, borrowing by corporations, mainly from banks and what is left of the bond market, has increased in the last year by seme $50 billion; seven, eight, nine, ten times of the Treasury's little diversion from the credit market. Much of this huge increase now at more than a trillion dollars of borrowing has gone not into anti-inflationary things like building homes, which stop up purchasing power, or pro ductive capital investment which increase productivity and lower costs, but into bidding up the price of inventories and supplies and real estate into facilitating anti-competitive corporate takeovers, into improvident foreign lending and foreign exchange speculation, and, in some cases, see Herstatt, maybe Franklin, maybe Lloyd's speculation. The result, if the financial community here today gets what it asks for, namely, big cuts in the Federal spending and borrowing, and that's about it, the result is simply going to jbe that there will be a larger credit pie available to the 149 banking and the financial community, which for them will be continued to be diverted to these inflationary causes. Now, my advice, my dear friends, is that instead of asking everybody else to tighten their belts, the banks and other fin ancial institutions similarly situated take their lcfen port folios as of September 1, apply to them the excellent criteria developed by the Federal Reserve which, by and large say "no” to inflationary loans, "yes’' to anti-inflationary loans, make yourselves a target for the next year and every week see how you are abiding by that target. The House Banking and Currency Committee stands ready to help you in that great task. Now, sure, this may lower your short-term profits, but you will be getting something much, much sweeter than exor bitant short-term profits. You will be getting the true know ledge that you are really helping your country and that you are playing your part in the social contract that all of us have to play. So lets close ranks. We can lick inflation and recession if we will all but follow the truth wherever it may be. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. SECRETARY SIMON: 150 Thank you, Congressman. THE HONORABLE WILLIAM V. ROTH, UNITED STATES SENATE SENATOR ROTH: Mr. Secretary, I would like to start out by associating myself very much w ith the remarks of Professor Bach of Stanford. Time does not permit me to go into too much detail, but I would like to, like Jack Javits, make a number of points. Number one, there has been a little talk about the cred ibility of the Government figures. I don't only think we ought to back off the full-employment budget, but I think we ought to get off the unified budget and go back to the Administrative budget when we are talking about whether or not we are in the black or the red. To me it is chicanery, it is false to claim we have a balanced budget when we are balancing that budget by borrowing from Social Security and other types of retirement or trust plans. That's recommendation number one. Number Two, I think there is a consensus, short range, that we ought to do something about the current budget. A number of us have had proposals in the Congress to give the President the power, with certain .safeguards, to take such action, but I urge this group today to make sure that there is a follow-through and that Congress does not leave before November 11 or 15th when we go heme without taking such action. But my real concern about the Federal budget is long range. I know it is nice to say to the President and to the Congress that you got to show the leadership, statesmanship, and I think that's right. But the one thing that concerns me very much when we talk about keeping the budget in balance, and I have been one that has consistently voted for that, is that every group, makes no difference whether it is business or labor or any other group, always points the finger to the other guy. You hear labor talk about we should do away with the oil depletion allowance. I hear business talk about the BaconDavis Act. I never see the Wall Street Journal talk about doing away with subsidies in the Post Office for the newspapers. We really got to have some leadership. There’s got to be some kind of consensus, in my judgment, developed “among the nation, and that all groups have to be less selfish and take a broader look. So I would urge this group as we go down the weeks and 151 558-812 0 - 74 - 11 days ahead that we try to develop programs that are in the national interest. Very frankly, you have heard today sane people say we need capital formation, and I think that makes good sense. At the same time, you got labor saying that per haps we should have an excess profits tax. Somehow, business, labor, and consumer, and the rest have to sit down together and try to develop a national policy or we are not going to have any effective action by Congress. We are going to con tinue to try to please everybody and end up pleasing nobody. I would also say the same thing is true in tax reform. Somehow we got to quit being business and labor. I would like to know what you people as business leaders, as financial leaders, where is the fat in your activity? What can Congress do to cut waste and fat in your area? We need to be more blunt with ourselves and not always place the finger towards the other guy. I think that I would just like to make two or three other points. First of all, I think we do need an international confer ence, because inflation is not a local problem, as you well know. I very strongly agree with Sylvia Porter when she says we've got to bring the consumer into this. And I think they are willing. For the first time, I find the public concerned about spending, and they are willing to get in and help very strongly. To those who urge public employment, I think that's nec essary. I would hope we could have your ideas how public employment could be productive. How it could be used for example to help solve the problems of energy. We need training programs that are combined with other needs. In closing, the principal point I want to make is that we got to have business and labor and the other groups working together if we are going to meet this problem effectively. We cannot continue this past practice of always trying to point the finger in some other direction. We had that example, let me say -- I had most businessmen say, and I supported the 90-day delay for pay raise for the Federal employees, but I found very little support among either business, particularly, or labor, for the 90-day delay that Jack Javits talked about in inflationary price and wage increases. We are in this together and that's the only way we can solve it. 152 THF. HONORABLE J. :WILLIAM STANTON, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CONGRESSMAN STANTON: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Ladies and Gentlemen, at a dinner, one of our former colleagues from Ohio, Senator Stephen Young, was the last speaker. Only about 15 had preceded him at that time, but when he came to the m icrophone he said he felt like Lana Turner’s ninth husband on their wedding night. He went on to explain that her hus band went into the boudoir and as he went to bed he hesitated. She looked at him and said, ’’Don’t you know what to do?” He said, 'Yes, I know what to do, I am trying to think of a way to make it interesting.” I feel somewhat like that, because the ideas and the suggestions that have come forth in the last three and a half hours, not to be repetitious, Mr. Secretary, but to press Upon the panelists here that it is my understanding that President Ford and Senator Mansfield called for this Conference to try to reach a consensus of how we can best tackle our problem of inflation. These suggestions this morning have been forth coming and I look forward to them discussed in greater detail this afternoon. I believe in listening though Mr. Secretary, that I was most impressed by those who felt that it is equally important not only of what we do, but how we implement what we do. And I was indeed pleased that so many took the time to recognize, as Mr. Rockefeller and many others did, that it is a question not only of financial crisis, but a crisis of confidence in this country in which we probably in public life feel maybe more than some of the other gentlemen and ladies that have come here today. But it is important, as Sylvia Porter said, that we do implement down through and up through the consumers and as Ms. Bymers said, even down to considering the economic impact studies of what we do. Because it does boil down, the ball jgame is, of course, it is the American people's dollar. Mr. Secretary, as we go forth, I have every confidence in this great country of ours that this problem will be licked, like Mr. Reuss does. You will get and receive in the Admin istration and in the business world full cooperation from the I United States Congress in this regard. It is a bipartisan problem. It is a bipartisan answer if there is going to be one. So, Mr. Secretary, let me say I do look forward to this I afternoon and I do want to say in closing, for one, I sinIcerely appreciate the time and effort that all of you have I come to join with us as we tackle this problem. Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you, Congressman. I can just reiterate what you said. Obviously, a great deal of thought went into your presentations this morning and on behalf of all my colleagues in the Government, I sincerely'appreciate it. We will now adjourn. Luncheon will be right here in the room on my left. We will come back promptly and start the afternoon session at 1:30. Thank you. (Whereupon, at 12:35 o'clock, p.m., the Conference recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p.m.) 154 Mr.Gilbert R. E llis Chairman and President Household Finance Corporation Confidence in the future of this economy and its monetary system is absolutely essential to the successful implementation of a program to control inflation. T his confidence can only come about as a result of a total priority commitment on the part o f both the Executive and Legislative branches of the Federal Government to a balanced budget and continued, although less severe, monetary restraint. In order to demonstrate earnestness of commitment, there should be an acrossthe-board cut in all expenditures, follow ed by selective cuts o f greater amounts. Cuts in federal spending must include so-called entitlem ent programs and in view of the critical nature o f our situation, there should be a moratorium on new spending programs. Control over the expenditures and borrowings o f federally spon sored credit agencies is necessary. These agency borrowings along with government guaranteed debt have an inflationary impact on the econ omy and seriously affect the availability and cost o f funds for the private sector. Dr. Grover W . E nsley Executive Vice President National Association of Mutual Savings Banks The underlying and most pervasive inflationary force in the United States in the past decade has been federal budget deficits and expan sive federal credit programs outside the budget. U nless the rate o f in flation abates more rapidly than anticipated or serious unemployment develops, a budget surplus—or at least a balance—should be the ob jective of public policy. Ideally it would be desirable to create a fed eral budget surplus to offset, at least in part, the stim ulative effect of heavy borrowings by the federal agencies that operate outside the budget. This would reduce the intolerable burden currently placed on monetary policy which has resulted in inadequate private credit and excessively high interest rates. Major victim s have been th rift institu tions and their depositors, home m ortgage borrowers, and the housing industry. 157 To achieve a more neutral federal fiscal policy, expenditures should be reduced to less than $300 billion in fiscal 1975. W ith respect to spe cific programs, we do not have the expertise to weigh the relative merits of the wide range of existing federal national security, social welfare and other programs, which may all be desirable in their own right. W e believe, however, that inflation is o f emergency proportions, and that no federal program should be immune to the strictest scrutiny. The need for stringent expenditure control is all the more necessary since, in at least one area, increased spending may be necessary to alle viate inequities resulting from a vigorous anti-inflation effort. In this regard, consideration must be given to a lengthened period of unem ployment compensation, manpower retraining, and public service em ployment which would enable government at all levels to act as “em ployer of last resort” in areas where unemployment is intolerably high. Reductions in expenditures should have top priority in achieving fiscal restraint. I f expenditures are not reduced sufficiently, however, then a tax increase may be necessary if inflation is to be controlled and if continued over-reliance on monetary restraint is to be avoided. Any tax change should be structured so as: (1) to encourage private saving and productive investm ent; and (2) to restrain consumption o f items which are in particularly short supply, as, for example, se lective excise taxes designed to encourage production of low-power, fuel-saving automobiles. The most effective action that could be taken quickly would be to pro vide tax exemption or a tax credit for interest earned on savings ac counts. W hile it is important not to im pair federal revenues at this tim e, this kind of tax relief provides several overriding advantages. It would stim ulate saving, essential in the projected period o f capital shortage. In particular, it would alleviate disinterm ediation at mort gage-oriented th rift institutions, and provide funds for credit-starved housing markets. And finally, the estimated revenue loss—about $2 bil lion in the case of a $1,000 exemption—is probably less than the cost of direct subsidy programs to housing, through an expanded GNMA/ FNM A tandem plan, subsidized FH L B advances to savings institu tions and/or other direct subsidy programs which may be adopted if the housing crisis worsens. It is the responsibility of the federal government to serve as the eco nomic balance wheel in our private enterprise system , offsetting ex cesses in the private sector and cushioning the im pact of external in flationary forces. This essential function should be restored through a determined policy of fiscal restraint, shaped in a manner to promote 158 equity among income groups and to promote private saving, the basic source of funds for noninflationary capital form ation and increases in productive capacity. Mb. Gaylord F reeman Chairman, The F irst National Bank o f Chicago In the face of inflation, stagnation and an inadequate savings stream to meet our overwhelming capital needs, if fiscal policy is to adequately finance the government in a non-inflationary way, it should be designed to— |S Stim ulate Productivity; 2. Moderate Consumption; and 3. Equalize the Burdens o f the Anti-Inflationary Program. 1. American labor needs more and better tools if it is to produce more and enjoy more. One o f the major causes o f our inflation has been inadequate productivity due to insufficient investm ent in more produc tive equipment. Inflation further discourages needed investment. S ig nificant tax incentives should be employed to increase investm ent, per haps by relating depreciation of new plant, equipment and energy sources to future replacement cost or a govem m entally-determ ined equivalent formula rather than to historical cost. 2. Fiscal policy should moderate both private consumption and gov ernment expenditures. W hile it may not be necessary to lim it the rise in consumption at this tim e, the program should seek to avoid any toorapid expansion in the future. Savings should be encouraged perhaps by an interest credit sim ilar to the dividend credit (but applied only to increases in savings). Incidentally, this should be helpful to the thrift institutions. Balancing the overall budget (including the federal agencies) would be most helpful. Although the manner of financing determines the ex tent thereof, any budget deficit tends to expand the money supply. While monetary expansion from this cause may have no economic re sult different from other elements increasing the money supply, a bal anced budget would be understood by the citizenry as an acceptance by the government of disciplines comparable to those to which they are to be subjected. Hence, it would have desirable political significance. It would have added economic significance if the budget were balanced by reduced governmental expenditures rather than higher taxes as this would permit increased savings and investment. 3. To be effective, an anti-inflationary program must be sustained for several years. To make this possible the program must have the support of the people. That support requires both (a) more accurate profit reporting and (b) an equitable distribution of the burdens result ing from the anti-inflationary program. 159 A. For 1973 and again this year many billions of dollars and spurious inventory profits are being reported, misleading investors, workers and the government. Despite “record earnings’’ according to the latest figures of the Department of Commerce, after-tax profits of nonfinancial corporations in 1973 (after correction for under-depreciation and inventory profits) were 10 to 30 percent below those for 1965. This compares with more than a 76 percent increase in per capita disposable personal income during the same period. This unrealistic reporting is sufficiently serious, and the need for more accurate appraisal of the size and economic function of corporate profits is of such importance that the Treasury should work with the accounting profession to develop more accurate concepts of corporate profits both for tax purposes and public reporting. B. I f business gets more realistic depreciation for new equipment, then the corporate sector as a whole ought to make up that revenue loss through a somewhat higher tax rate on corporate profits. If the anti-inflationary program results in additional unemployment, the government should supply those so laid off with reasonable income and meaningful activity, for they should not suffer a loss in order to preserve the purchasing power of the incomes of those still employed. I f necessary, this increased expense should be offset by increased personal income tax rates on those who remain employed, but this increase should terminate automatically when the unemployment rate drops back below a specified minimum. As many of the unemployed will be young, perhaps the government should greatly augment its apprentice training program. For the first time in years such a composite program, including both a balanced budget and tax reform, is politically possible. The Congress and the Administration can work together in mutual respect and the people can be led to accept some unwelcome but equitablydistributed disciplines in the knowledge that this is in their own longrange interest. D r . T ilford C. G a in es Senior Vice President and Economist, Manufacturers Hanover Trust (1.) The major objective of fiscal policy for the current fiscal year 1975 and for as far ahead as there is any visibility should be control of price inflation. W ithin that major objective, there are a great many options open to minimize the inequitable effect of restrictive policy upon different groups in the society. The anti-inflation objective would call for bringing the unified budget into surplus as early as possible. Also, thought should be given to bringing some or all of the sponsored agencies back into the budget, 160 in order that the unified budget documents might give a more accurate picture of Federal finance. An overriding need for many years ahead will be to provide the long-term capital funds needed to support the capital demands of industry, residential construction, and of state and local governments. The Federal government could make an important contribution by becoming a net saver itself, by running consistent budget surpluses. Meanwhile, as a growing number of people have pointed out, the hardships created by such a policy for certain groups in the economy could be dealt with by specific and not too expensive programs aimed directly at the problems. There is almost unanimous consensus now that a much expanded public employment program should be adopted to provide job opportunities for those young people and others who lack the essential skills needed in a modern industrial economy. In addition, and without significant budgetary expense, the eligibility period for Social Security benefits could be open-ended, so that a temporarily unemployed worker would not arbitrarily lose his source of income at the end of some specified period of weeks. Also, it might be possible to structure unemployment benefits so that those who had been in the labor force a brief period of time would be entitled to minimum benefits while long-term members of the labor force would be entitled to benefit levels representing the major part of the income that they lost when they became unemployed. The object should be to maintain a restrictive fiscal policy while taking all necessary action to avoid inequitable consequences of that policy among groups in the population. - While the economy presently is in a recession, no thought should be given to a general tax reduction to help stimulate economic activity. In view of the bottlenecks created by shortages of certain strategic materials, there is serious doubt that fiscal policy efforts to accelerate economic growth could accomplish anything except add further to our inflation problems. In fact, a tax increase—perhaps the excise tax ongasoline—would be helpful. There is not the space to detail the many ways in which the present tax structure might be made more equitable as it bears upon various groups in the economy. In terms of equity, however, perhaps the most important is recommendation that the Congress avoid further reliance upon payroll taxes, the most regressive of all taxes, as a source o f reve nue for general budget expenditures. One of the most pressing challenges the U.S. economy confronts in the years immediately ahead is encouragement o f business capital spending in industries where capacity is inadequate and simultane ously encouragement of the rate of savings that will be necessary to finance this investment. Tax policy could and should be instrumental inachieving this joint objective. 161 The most important capacity shortages are in the basic materials industries—oil, steel, non-ferrous metals, etc. Side-by-side with these shortages, there is excess capacity in a number of fabricated goods industries. In this setting, the investment tax credit should be used as a selective instrument to encourage investment where most needed and to avoid encouraging investment where it is less needed. Flexibility could be achieved by providing for variable tax credit rates for dif ferent industries. A number of forecasts suggest that there will continue to be a short fall between the demands for long-term capital by industry, housing and government and the supply of savings. Savings could and should be encouraged through tax policy. First, some amount of interest income might be made tax-exempt for personal tax-payers. This ex emption might apply to all types of interest income or might be restricted to interest from certain types of institutions, e.g., the thrift institutions. Similarly, the amount of dividend income exempt from Federal income taxes could also be increased substantially above the present exemption. In short, the object of tax policy should be to move the unified budget as promptly as possible to balance or surplus, while simultane ously introducing greater flexibility toward achieving important objectives. (2) I f fiscal policy is to be appropriately restrictive to deal with the inflationary atmosphere that we have created in the past many years, it is essential that the tightest possible rein be kept on Federal spending. It is not possible in a brief statement to indicate precisely where substantial cuts might be realized, but one thing is transparently obvious to anyone familiar with the budget. The possibility for re ducing expenditures is unquestionably greatest in the single biggest component of the budget, namely defense spending. One cannot be familiar with budget allocation and supply contracting arrangements in the Defense Department without being appalled at the degree of waste. I f the Defense Department is considered a sacrosanct portion of the budget, progress toward a restrictive policy stance might well be impossible. In addition, greater recognition has to be given to the fact that the simple process of taking a governmental function out of the budget and declaring that it is a “private corporation” in no way lessens the in flationary consequences of that operation nor its impact upon capital markets. Restructuring of the budget along the lines of the original unified budget that was adopted in 1968 based upon the Kennedy Committee Report should be encouraged. Finally, if progress is to be made in economizing in the whole range of government expenditures, thought should be given to re-establish ing a committee similar to the Hoover Committee—under President 162 Truman to take an intensive look at the myriad of details within the spending practices of all departments of government. M. R. H ellie President Credit Union National Association, Inc. Persistent and substantial growth in Federal Government spend ing without corresponding tax increases has been a notable aspect of fiscal policy during the past 10 years. The resulting monetization of the Federal debt has been one of the major causes of present inflation ! and high interest rates. Therefore, any anti-inflation fiscal policy must set Government and agency spending at a level which will have i minimal impact on financial markets. Failure to achieve such a revenueexpenditure balance will, in large part, offset any gains which could I bemade from the easing of monetary policy. A positive factor for the long run is the development of the new Congressional budget process. The use o f this process, developing a closer relationship between Congress and the executive on budget j matters, will allow for greater discussion and better understanding of the impact of Federal spending on the level of economic activity.* At this time it would be unwise to commit the 1976 budget to any particular level of spending or surplus/deficit position. In light of the many economic problems facing the Nation, it would be well to maintain maximum flexibility and adjust spending in response to the changing economic circumstances of the intervening months. E x cessive focus on the Federal budget carries the danger of over simplifying the problem. H enning H iujIard Chmrma/ri J. J. B. Hilliard, W. L. Lyons, Inc. I find almost universal agreement that one of the most important elements in the effort to slow the growth o f inflation must be control of Federal spending. This control must start with a balanced budget. The philosophical question to be answered in cutting Federal spending is whether to have preferential cuts or across-the-board cuts. Because of the necessity for prompt action, across-the-board cuts seem to be preferable at this time. Such action would negate the m ultiplicity of arguments that would arise over the defense of pet projects and pro grams. However, across-the-board cuts should not be left to the execu tive alone. There should be a congressional mandate that across-theboard cuts take place immediately at a given level. Only if both Congress and the executive work together on this can the effort be successful. 163 In the event that spending cuts are insufficient to bring our spending in line with our revenues, then new taxes should be imposed. These should be in the form of a national sales tax. Such a tax would act as a brake on consumer spending without removing incentives for saving and capital spending that are at this time necessary in order to build new jobs and create greater productivity in our economy. M r. H arvey E. K a p n ic k , J r . Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Arthur Andersen & Co. BASIC PHILOSOPHY Government services must be paid for currently. Our elected rep resentatives established programs and once established we have a responsibility to fund. We cannot spend more than we receive over any long period. Therefore, except in time of national emergency, a ballanced budget is desirable. We accept the philosophy that our ability to continue social progress is dependent upon maintaining a sound econ omy. We also accept the philosophy that a graduated tax system or the ability to pay will achieve the best equity among taxpayers—but the rates for any segment cannot be confiscatory or it w ill create deter rents to produce to capacity by either individual or business. SOME CONCERNS WITH THE PRESENT SYSTEM Piecemeal reform requiring further reform has created significant confusion and dissension with allegations of “loophole,” “give-away,” “special interest benefits,” etc. An inflationary economy highlights in equities causing further dissension rather than unison against a com mon enemy. Confiscatory rates occur in an inflationary economy be cause of increases which only maintain equal purchasing power for individuals, especially low income groups, and corporations with fic titious inflationary profits. Thus, taxes can consume needed capital and destroy an individual’s ability to cover basic human needs in an in flationary period. AN EMERGING CAPITAL CRISIS Because of (1) capital required to pay taxes on fictitious inventory profits, (2) transfer of additional capital resulting from increases in the Arab oil cost, (3) amounts required to fund pension plans as required by recent legislation, (4) allocation of funds to risky “tax shelter” investments, and (5) the need to refinance debt of corpora tions which has grown significantly in recent years, a capital crisis of major proportions can be emerging unless action is taken immediately to alleviate spme of the basic problems. 164 TO RESTORE “ BALANCED TAXATION5’ WE NEED Ultimately, major revision is needed in our income tax system to achieve “balanced taxation,” and simplification is required if our sys tem is to remain effective. In summary, we need (1) savings incentives to save vs. consume, (2) productivity and capital recovery incentives to increase productivity and, thus, standard of living for all, (3) incen tives to efficiently move capital to our highest social priority, (4) to provide a “brake” on total spending by government and (5) a pro gram to maintain equity during transition to a higher price level re sulting from inflation. We should recognize that a great deal of the eroding confidence can be restored by announcing an effective program now. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS NOW BECAUSE OF SERIOUS INFLATION AND CAPITAL CRISIS 1. To encourage savings—thus savings incentives: A. To encourage savings with investments in stock —eliminate tax on stock dividends when paid in lieu of cash with tax paid upon sale of stock. B. To encourage savings for retirement—increase individual taxpayers’ deduction for self-initiated pension plans with tax payable after retirement. C. To encourage savings and investment in bonds, by individ uals, Arabs, and pension funds. Authorize “inflation proof” de benture with regular savings rate of interest, plus capital adjustment of face value annually, based on change in index such ' as GNP deflator, with payment of such adjustment at maturity of bond and with such capital adjustment a current deduction by issuer. 2. To encourage productivity—thus productivity or capital incentives: A. In lieu of multitude of all various options, provide for alter native 50% write-off of plant and equipment as incurred, with tax benefit used to reduce cost of property and straight-line depre ciation over economic life used for both tax and book purposes. B. To retain capital in corporations for improving productivity, provide for deduction of increase in value of inventory based on change in price level with amount of such price change going directly to capital and, thus, not inflating reported earnings. This would be similar to L IFO but would retain value of inventory on balance sheet at current value and, thus, not distort various financial ratios. 3. To maintain equity during transitional period to higher price levels: 165 A. Increase annually graduated tax brackets based on change in GNP deflator. B. Allow “transitional inflation credit” for low income groups *to maintain purchasing power and offset with “transitional in flation surcharge” of like amount for all income in excess of $25,000 for individuals and corporations. 4. To maintain “brake” on government spending: A. Provide for mandatory surcharge on all incomes in excess of $10,000 for individuals and corporations to cover deficit for past fiscal year. B. Allow Congress by specific vote to suspend such surcharge in any year. 5. To move capital to highest social priority: A. Reduce capital gains tax after appropriate holding period so that movement of capital is not artifically restricted. Once a new approach is adopted to try to develop the concept of balanced taxation within broad categories of objectives as illustrated above, the general public can better understand the incentives being allowed and the social purpose for such incentives. The concept could be applied even further to individuals where such deductions as inter est on mortgages and taxes on homes encourage home ownership, medi cal deductions offset basic needs, etc. Social programs can and will be better understood and conflict between various segments of our coun try eliminated if such an approach is pursued. Appropriately commu nicating the purpose of incentives or deductions is as important as the deduction its e lf! M r. B ruce K. M acL aury President Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis In the past year, monetary policy has shouldered too large a part of the task of resisting inflation. As a result, interest rates have been pushed to extraordinary heights and capital formation depressed, par ticularly in the housing sector. Fiscal policy must now take a more active role in slowing the rise in prices. The announced goal of cutting expenditures to no more than $300 billion in fiscal year 1975 seems highly desirable, both as a symbol of administration determination to attack inflation and as a means of getting Congress to reconsider its many programs and formulate standards for evaluating them. (Similar expenditure restraint must be extended in Fiscal Year 1976 budget.) W ithin the $300 billion total, an amount of perhaps $3 to $4 billion should be allocated to an ex panded public employment program that goes into effect when the unemployment rate goes above 6*4 percent. Such a program seems absolutely essential for an equitable sharing of the burdens, while 166 reducing the risk of an early abandonment of the entire anti-inflation effort. Tax rates should be changed to provide relief for those who have suffered most from inflation and to improve the market for equity capital. A. Relief could be given by granting every taxpayer a $100 tax credit. Relief plus reform could be achieved by reducing payroll taxes and gradually shifting social security financing to general revenues, mainly the income tax. B. A step should be taken now to eliminate the double taxation of corporate income by permitting corporations to deduct a specified amount, say 20 percent, of dividends in computing their tax. The effect would be to increase cash flow, earnings, and the market value of equities. Households and pension funds would gain an immediate increase in their net asset value. Further, this change would begin to remove the present disincentive to equity financing and thus help to put business firms on a sounder capital base. C. Tax revenue lost through the changes suggested in A and B should be recouped to the greatest extent possible by enacting the Administration’s windfall profits tax, increasing the tax on preference income, ending the percentage depletion allowance, etc. Mr. Rex J. M orthland President, American Bankers Association MAJOR FISCAL OBJECTIVES FOR F Y 1 9 7 5 , 1 9 7 6 , AND BEYOND Deficit spending under present economic conditions fuels inflation and curtails anti-inflationary policy options in the monetary field. For the immediate future, we recommend that spending be held to $300 billion during this fiscal year, and to $310 billion during F Y 1975/76. In addition, more attention must be paid to the impact of burgeoning off-budget agency financing and government guarantees in the capital markets. Congressional action to limit the annual total of such financ ing should be considered immediately. CHANGES IN THE MIX OF FEDERAL SPENDING j We recommend that discretionary expenditures be cut wherever jfeasible to achieve the above targets. Programs promising the most i favorable impacts on productivity, employment, saving and capital jformation should not be cut. Some increased spending on a pilot public employment program may be appropriate. PROPOSED CHANGES IN FEDERAL TAXATION j The basic structure of the Federal income tax system should be changed to eliminate the “inflation-bonus” accruing the government 167 via inflation. The recent revision of the Canadian Federal Income Tax system provides a useful model. Incentive features of the tax system should be changed to encourage savings and investments and to reduce incentives to consumption spending. The proposed $1,000 interestexemption on personal savings and time accounts deserves careful con sideration; as does the proposed tax credit for housing and other priority investments as noted in the Financial Institutions Act (S. 2591). Spending reductions must be achieved to offset the revenue losses of these measures. Finally, full Congressional implementation of the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is critical, and the “full employment-balanced budget” concept should not be used to gloss over the inflationary effects of governmental deficits. D r . A rthur M. O k u n Senior Fellow The Brookings Institution 1. The assignment of federal expenditure policy in F Y 1975 should be to demonstrate clearly that the budget can be controlled at reason able and realistic levels. Federal outlays have been a source of un certainty and instability in both private and public planning, and that destabilizing role should be terminated once and for all. The nev spirit of executive-legislative cooperation and the new Budget Com mittees of the Congress should facilitate the task. 2. For F Y 1975, $300 billion and $305 billion are both defensible targets for federal outlays. Indeed, the differences between them are negligible in terms of economic impact. The smaller figure might mean a lowering of a few tenths of a point in interest rates and the inflation rate, at the expense of lowering real G NP growth of a few tenths of a point, and raising the unemployment rate perhaps a tenth of a point. Both the benefits and the costs represent trivial changes in the over all economic picture. That picture points to a weak economy in late 1974 and 1975. W ith some help from recent monetary-fiscal restraint, the boom is now dead and buried. 3. The assignment requires setting realistic targets and implement ing them with broad support, and with efficient, cool, and deliberate management. Calling the shot and making it is v ita l; the precise shot that is called is far less important. The principle has several corol laries: a) Fiscal discipline should be properly described as one part of the cure for inflation. Only a small part of the recent 8 percent stepup in the inflation rate (from 3 percent at the end of 1972 to 11 per cent today) can reasonably be attributed to fiscal excesses. That con trasts with 1966-68, when the inflation was propelled mainly by the budget, b) Anti-inflationary determination should be displayed on all fronts. For example, press rumors on imminent decontrol of the price 168 of “old” oil (an extra $9 billion dose of inflation for 1975) weaken the credibility of the whole economic program, c) Proposed budget cuts should be made with a scalpel, not an ax. A s George Shultz remarked, when a proposal to cut weekly unemployment insurance benefits was included on one list o f cuts, he felt that the list had discredited itself, d) Targets should be set at levels that will not require either account ing gimmickry or inefficient interruptions of federal activities. 4. For fiscal 1976, a growth of expenditures of $30 billion, or roughly 10 percent, holding taxes constant, would be in the ball park. That would add a little further to the restraint in the federal budget and make room for additional relaxation of monetary conditions. There is no case for a net tax increase on present prospects (unless one is re quired for a health insurance program). Indeed, if the priorities point that way, the growth of federal spending could readily be held below $30 billion, thus permitting a tax cut. Whether such a P Y 1976 budget turns out to be balanced or in deficit or in surplus will depend, as it should, on the strength of the economy, which will be reflected in federal receipts. It would probably take a stronger recovery of income and output than is now expected in order to bring federal revenues into the range of $330 to $335 billion needed to balance that budget. But, only if the economy is stronger than the prolonged weakness now envisioned by most forecasters, would a bal ance or surplus be appropriate. Budget balancing in a very weak economy would be doomed to failure and would be as destabilizing as deficits are in a strong economy. Mr. D onald T. R egan Chairman of the Board Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. Leadership in the war against inflation must come from the Federal Government. It must come now. Every weapon, fiscal, monetary or otherwise, must be employed. Sound fiscal policies at all levels of gov ernment are the most potent weapon in our arsenal to combat inflation. As a first step, there should be an immediate reduction in the level of expenditures budgeted for fiscal 1975. An effective way to accom plish this and to avoid prolonged debate about particular programs would be to insist upon moderate reductions across-the-board. I rec ommend a two-to-three percent reduction for every branch, depart ment, agency. Such an action would avoid serious damage to any single program. But it would have the effect of reducing fiscal 1975 spending to around $300 billion. State and local governments should be urged to follow the leadership of the Federal Government. As we look ahead to fiscal 1976 and beyond, every effort should 169 be made to balance the budgets at all levels of government. Such near and longer-term restraints by all governments would relieve the de mand pressures that are fueling inflation and are straining our econ omy beyond its capacity. Fiscal policy should be aimed at expanding the nation’s industrial capacity to meet future needs, particularly in areas where shortages exist. And investors, who are the source of funds for this expansion, must be attracted back into the capital markets. Investment must be encouraged by changes in our tax and other laws. The investment tax credit should be increased, particularly for energy development. Capital gains taxation should be reformed to encourage equity investment. Withholding taxes on dividends and interest to foreign investors should be eliminated. These fiscal policies combined with similar vigorous actions in monetary and other policies should enable our nation to get a handle on inflation. T h e H on . H enry S. R etjss U.S. House of Representatives. Recommendations from the Financial Conference on Inflation, September 20, to the Economic Summit meeting on September 27-28 should include the following proposals: Fiscal Policy—Federal Taxation: Any policy to fight inflation must defuse the wage explosion already beginning to occur, as workers at tempt to catch up with last year’s inflation and protect themselves against this year’s. A social contract, in which the government pledges social security tax and/or income tax relief for low- and middle-income people and in which workers pledge to restrain their wage increase demands, would reduce cost-push inflationary pressures while protect ing the average worker against rising prices. Such tax relief must be balanced, to avoid unwanted fiscal stimulus, by tax reform to end out moded and inequitable tax subsidies and by other revenue-raising measures. Monetary Policy—Credit Allocation: The Federal Reserve should pursue responsible monetary restraint, keeping money supply growth to around six peercent for the immediate future. A t the same time, we must establish a system with clear ground rules for channeling the limited supply of credit away from inflation ary uses, such as real estate speculation, conglomerate mergers, and commodity buildups, and toward interest-sensitive essential needs such as productive capital investment, low- and middle-income housing, small businesses and farms, public utilities, and state and local governments. International Economic Policy: To bolster international confidence, let the U .S. lead in putting together a consortium of the leading in dustrial nations (a) to guarantee that the world’s major banks will 170 not be allowed to fail for lack of liquidity (as opposed to mismanage ment, for which salvage operations ought not to be attem pted); (b) to adopt coordinated programs to conserve fuel, thus reducing shortrun dependence on the oil-exporting countries, and food, thus easing the prospect of mass starvation in Asia and Africa. TVage-Price Policy: To forestall future price rises, we must increase supplies of scarce materials, through a broad range of policies in cluding advance planning, monitoring of potential shortages, sensible import and export policies, and elimination of artificial barriers to competition. Dr. R aymond J . S aulnier Professor Emeritus of Economics Barnard College Columbia University The following recommendations are offered with respect to Federal spending policy: 1. The target total o f Unified Budget outlays for Fiscal 1975 should be set at $295 billion. This would allow a spending increase of $26.7 billion (10%) over Fiscal 1974—a cut in spending plan, but not a cut in actual outlays. Actually, a more appropriate target would be a percentage increase in outlays less than the expected inflation rate—say 8%—but this would allow outlays of only $290 billion in Fiscal 1975 and would seem impossible of achievement, the more especially because Congressional actions taken to date suggest spending (if not restrained) well above the $304.4 billion total put forward in the January 1974 budget. The $295 billion target will itself be difficult to achieve: the 1974 budget message points out that only $84.4 billion of the projected $304.4 bil lion outlays are in the “relatively controllable” category, and that 90% of the nearly 30 billion increase in outlays originally projected between Fiscal 1974 and Fiscal 1975 are “mandatory increases . . . unavoidable under present law.” 2. The extent to which outlay increases are mandated under present law makes it obvious that a significant restraint on spending cannot be achieved without new legislation. This could be passed early in the 1975 Congressional session, provided the urgency is recognized, but if Congress chooses to reconvene after the November election recess it should be urged to make expenditure control be first if not the only item of business in its calendar. 3. It is imperative to exercise restraint also on expenditures by “offbudget” agencies and government—sponsored enterprises. These have increased from $4.2 billion in Fiscal 1972 to an estimated $15.6 bil lion in Fiscal 1974—it is impossible to believe they will drop to $4 billion in Fiscal 1975, as the January 1974 budget message estimates 171 they will. More likely, expenditure will increase immensely over the already swollen Fiscal 1974 total unless restraints are imposed. In the present circumstances, the rule should be a lessor percentage increase in these of budget outlays than in the expected inflation rate, which suggests holding them to an increase of say 8%. 4. Off-Budget outlays, which consist largely of loan disbursements are now so large, so difficult for an outsider to follow, so little under stood by the public, and make such prodigious demands on capital markets that there is an urgent need to reexamine the way they are reported in budget accounts. As it stands, the so called “unified budget” is no longer even remotely “unifying” of Federal outlays. An Execu tive Branch task force should be appointed at once, under a mandate to reconstruct budget accounting to correct this deficiency and it should be required to complete its restructuring of accounts in time to make the results at least a tentative basis of budget presentation for Fiscal 1976. 5. The “full employment budget surplus” concept should be dropped unceremoniously from budget presentations. It has given nothing but wrong guidance on Fiscal policy. 6. It is impossible for anyone outside government—indeed for any one outside the Budget Bureau—to write a full and operationallyadequate bill of particulars on where to make specific adjustments in spending plans. This can only be done in the Budget Bureau. What is needed is a list of adjustments that would hold the total to $295 billion in Fiscal 1975, accompanied by a statement of actions—legislative or discretionary—necessary to put them into effect. Obviously, one has to look to areas of proposed spending in which in creases are largest, but categories of spending must be rated also ac cording to their priority in an economy that is destructively inflation ary. This points clearly to defense, where an outlay increase of $6.2 billion (7.8%) is projected, and to H EW , for which (according to the January 1974 Budget) spending increases of $14.2 billion (14.7%) are planned. But there are doubtless many other areas (International Affairs and Finance; Space Research and Technology; Agricultural and Rural Development; Natural Resources and Environment) where adjustments could appropriately be made. I f necessary, a Presidential Commission should be enpaneled at once to report a spending priority list within 60 days. M r . R obert H. S tewart , III Chairman ~ First International Bancshares, Inc. A t least two fundamental conceptual changes in the federal budget system would seem to be in order. 172 First, use of the so-called full employment budget—with all o f its built-in expansionary biases—should be left solely to those profes sionals who appreciate some o f its weaknesses and its strengths. Per haps its official use as an analytical device should be limited to the Council of Economic Advisors and its staff, who would utilize it along with other tools in periodic evaluations of the economy’s performance. Surely we have now learned about the largo fiscal policy mistakes that this approach can camouflage. Second, adoption a few years ago of the unified, budget concept was a large step towards improving the process. But, it should have better been called the “partially unified budget” concept. Fiscal activities of the off-budget agencies have grown rapidly and, at particular times, have been a very large marginal presence on the demand side of the money and capital markets. I f their budget figures are not unified into the unified federal budget, perhaps that could appear in a special ref erence section of the budget document for policy guidance. Given current and prospective economic conditions, it is highly un likely that the budget for Fiscal 1975 can be brought into near-balance in the nine months that remain. But, a large start must be made this year by minimizing the deficit (some say it is to be $9.5 billion; some say it is to be $15 to $20 billion unless serious restraints are adopted quickly). In future high employment (95%) years, it is imperative that projected increases in budget expenditures be at least in line with the expected performance of the overall economy and thus with projected increases in revenues (given a stable tax structure). And in future 95% employment years, balanced budgets or budgets in surplus are mandatory. Given current and prospective political conditions, it would appear that a uniform, across-the-board percentage cutback in federal spend ing in program areas that are reachable would result in less oratory and controversy. Reachable program areas should include both some so-called controllable and some so-called noncontrolla'ble areas. Specific legislative actions by the Congress would be required in the latter. Charles J. Z w i c k President Southern Banking Corporation A thorough analysis of “cutting the Federal budget” is clearly beyond the scope of this meeting. In the brief time available, only asimple answer can be given, and therefore this must be related to a simple question. I will try. The appropriate size of the budget can be considered from two points ¡of view—one as a technical exercise to balance aggregate demand within the total economy so that there is a correct amount of slack 173 to dampen inflationary expectations. This would, of course, include specific recommendations for program reductions. Such a technical evaluation can be carried out more appropriately in an environment other than this conference. The second view of “cutting the budget” is to consider it a matter of equity, a moral issue, if you will. The American people believe that the Federal Government is to a large degree responsible for the cur rent inflation. They therefore believe as a matter of equity the Federal Government should do something about its spending plans before asking individuals and businesses to tighten their belts. Viewed in this manner the issue is not whether the budget should be held to $300 billion or reduced further, but will the Government make a real effort to help contribute to the solution of a problem it had a large part in creating. What we need, of course, is a procedure which allows the Govern ment to provide the needed moral leadership. I will propose a simple procedure which could be implemented quickly and which would avoid many of the technical issues—these, of course, will have to be handled at a later date. 174 fiscal policy SECRETARY SIMON: afternoon session. to deal with inflation Gentlemen, we will start the Just a couple of ground rules, so we can continue to move along as we did this morning. I thank you again for not only your thoughtful comments but also |for keeping relatively within the time frame, and for your patience with me as well. This afternoon, we have got the major topics that you see on your agenda with the allotted times. jWe have picked a discussion leader for the first two topics and two discussion leaders for most of the balance of the topics. The discussion leader has been told to keep his opening remarks in the three-minute range, and I use |the term "range” because we don't have the constraints that we did this morning, but I really would prefer Ithat they didn't run over four. Then we will have a give and take, you giving it |and we taking it, that is; and if there are any ques tions from the Government people up here, just ask to be recognized and we can ask questions, but primar ily, as this morning, this is Government listening to you, and we benefiting from your sound advice. I am going to limit individual comments on the various areas of discussion as I did this morning, so that anybody who has something to say will have an opportunity to say it. So fiscal policy, in dealing with inflation, will be opened up by Dr. Gabe Hauge, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., New York. DR. HAUGE: Mr. Secretary, in looking over the job of opening up this big subject in the time allotted, all I can say is that you are going to witness the first three-minute mile in history. The goal, I would take it, of our proceedings here is to try to fashion a way whereby we can re duce the rate of inflation to a point where it can he ignored in making calculations about the future. 177 We used to think of that in the range below two percent. What it is now, I don’t know. But if we want to get some targets in front of us, and I think it's useful, if we start with the 12 percent rate of CPI and shoot for a reduction of half to a third in the next year, and cut that by half at the end of 1976, it seems to me that for our own purposes we have something that is reasonable. Now, fiscal policy presumably relates to spend ing, taxing and borrowing at the Federal level. In approaching this part of anti-inflationary program, I think it is only fair to recall one does it against a background of the revolution of rising expectations that was preached not only for the developing world but for the developed world some years ago. The whole emphasis has been on stimulation and expansionist trend in the ecomony. That kind of policy was in support of the idea that we could somehow, were entitled to have, a rapidly rising public standard of living, in addition to a rapidly rising private standard of living at the same time. It was going to be La Dolce Vita, indeed. Now we have found that there is a come-uppance to that, and we are trying to see whether fiscal policy is relevant to the future. Some doubts have been raised, some in this room, in a muted sense, that we are a little too concerned about the Budget, it is only a few billion here and there, that the big impact is in the private sector, and I think those facts are as indicated. But it is probably fair to say that fiscal policy considerations have a bigger dimension to them, and I want to come back to that. First, it seems to me that the Administration has an opportunity right now that should not be lost; and that is to shape up what in the world this con cept of a budget is that is guiding us. We have had what is called a unified budget, but as was pointed out this morning, many expenditure and loan programs have been moved off that budget, for reasons that fit the idea of the expansionist trend without having too many numbers to embarrass the concept. 178 I must confess, I was never intrigued with the idea of the full employment budget from the begin ning. Those of you who can remember the discussion will recall how we were promised a fiscal dividend. It has turned out to be a fiscal mortgage. My own feeling is to underscore what has been said about this by many people this morning; that for whatever use it may have in the recesses of OMB, it either has to be drastically rehabilitated or it should be given a decent and preferably a low-cost funeral very promptly. I would agree with Senator Roth, that we ought to get back to an administrative budget, in terms of putting it all on a piece of paper as to what is involved. Now, in approaching, Mr. Secretary, the problem here in this area, I think it’s very clear at once that many of the things that are talked about are quite long-term. We are really talking about ’74, '75 and '76. So the short-term goal tends to focus on what I think Alan Greenspan called the other day "measures to reduce Government borrowing." I think that is a rather nifty phrase, because it is that that has had the most adverse impact with respect to infla tionary developments, in my opinion, not the few [extra billion dollars in the demand dimension; and because of the difficulties on the tax side, that comes to an expenditure control. [ It seems to me we ought to try to beat the $300 billion level if we can on expenditures for ’74 and '75, and including, as Senator Javits, I think, said Ithis morning, a provision for the public employment [program. I personally would like to see debated the pos sibility of folding the public employment program funding into the general revenue sharing plan. I tried it out at lunch and there was some support and some attack, but it would be good to hear it discussed, maybe. We are all hopeful about the Budget Control Act and from Congressman Reuss at lunch we found some hopeful views of the future. 179 Charlie Zwick's proposal ought to be discussed, and I hope that the members of the Congress who are here will devote themselves to that. Because of the way the public is pointing its finger at the Govern ment, with respect to the cause of inflation in the last Gallup Poll, 48 percent cited the Government as a principal cause, and business, believe it or not, below labor as responsible for inflation -- well, I think here is an area where the Congress, with our support, can do something. In the field of taxation, I think one starts with the fairly clear evidence that the Internal Revenue Code over the years has been weighted in favor of consumption as against investment, and that this, of course, has reflected the prevailing bias we referred to earlier. I think the case for a general tax increase or a general tax cut has not been made. I think the idea of that being part of a social contract, I would like to hear the representatives of labor here express themselves on whether or not some kind of a tax re duction for working people who are engaged in labormanagement bargaining would have any significance -would be affected in any significant way, if related to the tax reduction related to the wage bargaining. I have never heard such a view expressed. The idea has been presented mainly by academic people, and I would like to hear labor speak on it, Finally, I think we have to stop taking produc tion and distribution for granted, that business somehow will do it, regardless of the circumstances. I think that production and distribution needs care and feeding just like consumption needs care and feeding; and that points us to longer term changes, I think, to encourage saving and investment. So what we have to focus on in this area is what can be relevant in the next 18 months, as against the next five years. I hope that has opened a few doors, Mr. Secretary, and with that I will subside. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you very much, Gabe. Comments? I thought I would hear from Otto Eckstein, who was just saying "For example" when I said "Thank you" before. MR. ECKSTEIN: 180 I will pass on this one. SECRETARY SIMON: Yes, sir, Bob Roosa? MR. ROOSA: On the fiscal side, there has been a lot of reference, in passing, this morning to the Usefulness of variation in taxes as well as expendi ture, although the emphasis concentrated on the hatter. I think there is real virtue, and we ought to Leigh it, at least, here, in thinking of the use that Light come from an additional excise tax on gasoline, frhe principal argument that I have heard against it Hs that it cuts too hard on the lower income people, Lho depend on the use of the automobile; and I think that whatever the revenue produced by such a tax, bart of it should then, in a sense, be offset through deduction in the income tax burden on lower income people. But I think the principal virtue of such a tax is ¡that we need a further reminder, particularly in the current year, when we seem to be skating through without the shortages which are bound to come a little further ahead. We need a further reminder of the need to conserve in particular on this form of oil energy, and I don’t see any harm, if we are going ko have trouble in controlling expenditures, in hav ing a little tax dividend left over to provide for pat reduction in Government borrowing -- if we jhaven't used all the proceeds of an excise on gasouine to provide tax relief for the lower income brackets. It does seem to me this is action which could jbe considered promptly, and would have a role both jin helping to limit the use of our expendable fuel, [help limit that drain on the balance of payments, land at the same time contribute some relief towards jthe lower income brackets, where the pain of in flation is so great. SECRETARY SIMON: Yes, sir, Charlie? DR. WALKER: I would like to add my support to prhat Bob said about seriously considering a Federal gasoline tax. I advocated in a column in the Wash ington Post a year ago that we double or triple the [ederal gasoline tax, and then had to start dodging for quite a while both Congress and clients. I wanted to add to that, however, and in terms of P-ts political saleability, I think, particularly piphasize the important aspect of emphasizing the the use of the funds. I think Bob is right in the basic direction he was pointing. But, the one thing I would add, if the tax were doubled or tripled, and I am kind of intrigued also with Dick Hill’s idea, and I want to think about it a little bit, would be to use at least a portion of the funds that would help further Project Independence, particularly in the R and D direction. If you are going to put more taxes on energy, use some of the proceeds to help solve the energy problem. The second point I want to make has to do, as being one of the culprits that's been involved in the administrative budgets to unified budgets to full employment budgets, to wherever we are now, I am in fundamental agreement with both Gabe and Senator Roth about the objectives they are talking about. ' The problem, as I see it, is one of those that arises in a democracy when politics and economics collide, and the built-in propensity to overspend as a result of the democratic process. People like more spending, and they don't like high taxes, and they don't like tight money, so you have this natural propensity. To the extent, then, that a return to the administrative budget, or some other approach, which would create a bias in the legislative pro cess against spending, impediments -- and maybe the Budget Impoundment Act -- can work in this direction. In other words, I am not concerned so much as to how you get there, Senator Roth, if you can get this sort of bias or slowing or deterrent to overspending -because I disagree very much, I think it is with Art Okun,that it was only the '65 to '68 experience over the last ten years. I think we have overspent basically throughout the whole period. SECRETARY SIMON: Kapnick. Thank you. Yes, sir? Mr. MR. KAPNICK: On taxes, I believe that we have to have better communication between government, the industry and the American people. I would like to encourage you to think in terms of trying to cate gorize these various areas so that the entire American people better understand the reasons that these are given. I think also that I would like to encourage us to think in terms of automatic financial controls to eliminate these budget deficits, unless positive ac tion is taken. And I believe that you can categorize these various areas such as savings incentives we 182 have talked about, productivity incentives, the in centive to own your home, which is the interest de duction, and I think it would be better understood. Then I believe that we should adopt a surcharge to balance the budget each year, unless positive action is taken by the Congress. Congress, we have to recognize, are our elected representatives, and [if they decide these are the best programs and they £re efficient, then we have to take the responsi bility to fund them. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Yes, sir? MR. HILLIARD: Point one, on the subject of taxa tion, Mr. Kapnick just brought up the question of a [surcharge. I would like to raise the question of tax equality. I expect I am going to step on a few toes mere but there are certain industries in this country [that possess a favored position as far as Federal [taxation is concerned and I don’t think we need to [rack our brains too far to recognize them. The oil industry for years had a depletion [allowance and it paid comparatively low income taxes compared to its total income. The investor owned [life insurance industry has a very favored position [tax-wise. There are accounting procedures and other tax preferences that benefit some public utilities even [though they are very needy. I understand their blight but these should be equalized. And if my friends in the banking industry are waiting for the Ihoe to drop, why, I ’ll drop it now because certainly they enjoy tremendous tax favoritism in the country, Pnd if, some of those were equalized, I would think fo surcharge would be needed. SENATOR LONG: SENATOR SIMON: May I comment on that? Please, Mr. Chairman. I SENATOR LONG: If you look at the taxes that the pil companies are paying at the local level and take into account -- without even taking into account the ■ax on their product which is the gasoline that they produce, just leave that out -- but you take into account all the taxes that the oil industry pays, for example, in Louisiana, even if they are not mak ing a nickel, out of that, we tax them 12 percent on gross. That’s whether they make money or not. The average for manufacturing is five percent on gross for all taxes. Now in Louisiana we hit them for twoand-a-half times that much before we ever asked whether they made any money, then, of course, we hit them with an income tax if they did make something. If you take that into account and in the foreign lands you take into account what these foreign governments are taking away from them on the produc tion, they are paying more taxes than anybody, even the liquor people, where taxes exceed the cost of production by nine-to-one. So that, I mean, in gross, they are paying more taxes than anybody, any body on earth, and so, when you want to talk about somebody’s tax burden, you ought to look at the en tire thing. Now, furthermore, insofar as anybody in Govern ment is getting any kind of a tax advantage, if it's been going on for a long time, that has been dis counted at the marketplace. Anybody who has studied economics, if you graduated from college, should have gone far enough in it to have heard of the free flow of capital, that money flows into things more profitable, and the money flows away from things that are not very profitable, all things considered, in cluding taxes. So, if you are going to heavy up on taxes on the oil industry, all you are going to do is to postpone the day when we find enough capital in this industry to shorten up this energy crisis. Now, it seems to be a prevailing Government deficit that is creating this inflation -- nothing further from the truth, in my opinion. Louisiana spends about $2 billion a year at the state level. Now, $1 billion, half of that, comes out of Federal Government. Look at those charts you have presented here. If the Federal Government wasn't paying its money through to these states, we would have an enormous Federal surplus. But, if you take into account the state budgets, they are not borrowing money, they are reducing their bond issues because of these high interest rates and they think it's a poor time to borrow. 184 You take their surplus and lay that against the federal deficit and, Government as a whole, is runling a surplus this year of over $11 billion and that's right there in the President's Economic Re tort. So, that can't be what's causing the infla tion*. Inflation is being caused because the OPEC ¡countries trebled the cost of energy for us and it tanked up all the energy around the world along with I t . And, what we are going to have to do, as I see ft* is to try to channel our investments in the areas ■that are going to increase production, increase pro ductivity and especially make the increases in those fereas where we have the shortages, to hope to bring [hat back into line. Now, my good friend, Scoop Jackson, and quite a ¡few other people see the way to solve it is to tax the eyeballs out of the oil business, just tax them lout of business -- get rid of them. I don't think ■that will solve the energy crisis. I think you are going to have to solve it by prevailing upon some body to make more investments in providing energy for Irou; and because it's only when you are able to see the prospect of producing your own requirements that t see the prospect of getting these OPEC countries {to be more reasonable in the price that they charge ■for it. Now, with regard to tax increase, gentlemen, I {handled some tax increase bills, and I want you to know its's just a great deal easier to pass a taxIcut than to pass a tax-increase. I've tried it both ways. (Laughter.) And if you want to pass some big tax increases, {you'd better have a tax-cut on the other end for iSomebody, because it takes that to put it through. Ind you gentlemen can expect that the average tax bill that goes through, by the time it gets through with the amendments that will be offered on the [House side and the Senate side, it will wind up giv ing away more revenue than it gains. I can recall Richard Nixon wanted to save that surtax. He wanted |lo save what was left of it which was five percent age points when he first went in. And how the Dem ocratic caucuses resolved that there was to be no p x increases, which is just extending the tax that Existed for another six months. So, no tax increase without tax reform. Well, by the time they got through tax reforming which was tax increases on.business, they had fin- ’ ally managed to raise $7 billion dollars by repeal ing the investment tax credit and things of that sort. Meanwhile, they found some appealing things to put some tax cuts with, so the tax cuts worked out to $9 billion. And you would think that would stimulate the economy but they did such a fine job of taxing everybody in business to, they found we were in a recession within six months. And that can very well be the trend of what's happening now. Look at the House of Representatives, They are getting ready to send us a tax bill. I don't know whether they completed their work on it. It's 52 tax bills all rolled into one. They might not have the final amendment on that^Vou watch the final amendment, Xt will be to take every nickel that you gained plus something and give that to labor. You watch. SECRETARY SIMON: Bob Baldwin. MR. BALDWIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I would like to go back to some of these possible cuts in Federal spending. I came to Washington as a neo phyte in the summer of '65 just at the time we were starting expenditures in Vietnam and just before we went into the Great Society and I have watched many of the programs grow over the years and I am struck by two things: One, we had what was called a fit in the Defense Department, which was a five-year defense projection. Charlie Zwick knows all about that. So now, we are aware of what the over-runs are i nj the Defense Department and they were rather large 1 then and I was trying to work on them and we are still trying to work on them. But I am struck by the fact that we have no five-j year projections when we put other programs in other areas of the budget for five years out and then see what those over-runs are, And it seems to me that this would be a very major discipline on expendi tures that we have made in those areas and I think the point was made earlier. The second point that I would like to make is, we are going to have to de cide between certain alternatives, not only in the spending but what we had in past programs, whether in the Clean Air Act or Safety Act or something li^e that. 186 ■ There are tremendous capital expenditures being Ipmiired as a result of those; and a lot of them are |eJy desirable, but I think we are going to have to Ipread them out over a period with a capital forma tion we have got coming ahead of u s . SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Mr. Bethke. MR. BETHKE: Just quickly on taxes. The general needs are pretty clear, but get to some specifics. I f one talks with your own families or particularly our young people today, those that are in their twenties and thirties, I think they would all back soie specific taxes like an extra heavy surtax, ex cise tax, call it, on large, new automobiles, based (on weight, on horsepower, which would both conserve fuel and material. I think they would back a bit more gas tax, pro viding it was exempted from mass transportation use |nd trucking. I know they would back some increases I n the excise taxes on luxuries like jewelry and Eerfumes and cigaretts and even liquor, or certainly liquor. You can go on like that, plus anything that liberalizes a taxation on net new productive capacity And it doesn't have to be only in the shortage industries, and it should be certainly there, but also in agriculture. It's that sort of thing I Ihink we should aim at. You have a grass roots back ing for this type of taxation, at least. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Yes, Jim. MR. O'LEARY: Mr. Chairman, I ’d like to call attention to a point that is of particular importance with respect to the budget concept and that is, this morning it was said by one or two speakers that actu ally the demands on the credit markets by the Federal Government were comparatively small and that the pro blem lay in the private area of the ecomony. ■ Let me give you just a couple of facts here, which I am sure are familiar to you Treasury people, but I think should get out on the table, and that is that in the flow of funds accounts of the Federal •serve, in the first quarter of this year, the net increase in direct issues by the U. S. Government ¡amounted to $10.3 billion at an annual rate; and in second quarter, $3.6 billion, at an annual rate. 187 The demands looked moderate, but if you move down to the Government-sponsored agencies, you see that in the first quarter they were running at a net increase of $9.3 billion and in the second quarter at an annual rate of $19 billion. And in the second quarter the Government-sponsored agencies were actu ally providing in terms of funds advanced at an annual rate of $27 billion. My own feeling is that when the third quarter figures are available, it’s probably going to be another $10 billion on top of that. In other words, it seems to me we are kidding ourselves, if we do not include those Government-sponsored agencies in the burden that's being imposed by the Government in those markets; and the important thing is that the demand for funds by those agencies is completely in elastic. They will go for those funds regardless of what the interest rate is and has an especially hard effect in the whole interest rate situation, and I think this should be definitely part of our discus sion. This is what seems, to me, leads me to feel, that we have got to have a different, more realistic bud get concept than we have, in bringing those agencies back in to the whole budget picture. SECRETARY SIMON: Yes, Mr. Needham. MR. NEEDHAM: I am glad I deferred to you be cause that was one of the points I wanted to make. I can't stress too heavily the importance of bringing these agency debts within control of the Congress. This is a very bad situation and despite what Con gressman Reuss said this morning, I don't have the figures with me, but if someone wants to challenge them I will obtain them. The Federal, State and Local Governments have taken 60 percent of the avail able credit from the United States in the last several years and that's an increase that's been building up since the mid-sixties. So I think, clearly, it's safe to say that the United States and other forms of Government within the United States have contributed to the scarcity of funds. Now, I think one of the points that's being miss ed here is the fact that we are not just talking about cutting our programs; I think what we are trying to tell you, is that we have lost faith of the ability of the United States Government to manage money. 188 I think the strains put on the Secretary of the /Treasury and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve loard are just impossible. And what we think is, (there has to be some fiscal responsibility in the iongress and in the Executive Branch before any one [of us - I, at least speaking for the group that I associate with most often - would be willing to pay Inother dollar in taxes. What we are telling you is: |ou have got all you are going to get. _ Now, let me talk about the excise tax on gasoline Jiat's retrogressive and already we are just talk ing about a way of diminishing the demand for energy from the OPEC countries and already some of it's sticking to the Federal Government's hands. _ So I would have to oppose it because unless we ire going to have the same opportunity to sit here land tell you when you can take that tax off, I would be opposed to it. Now, on tax equality, Senator Long, you were very Eloquent and persuasive and I think, perhaps Mr. Hilliard, if I may just expand on his remarks. We are looking, for example, in the securities industry for tax equality with other financial institutions and I am not going to trot out the numbers that show that some type of financial institutions pay nine teen percent is tax and others pay out five -- I have tjhem here -- but the point is, if you want the free (capital market system to work and I believe you do, ahd I know you do - then you've got to give the [securities industry the same opportunity to compete funds that these other financial intermediaries ftve. And I think, too, that we have programs which we submitted to your committee and we have submitted itpem to the Treasury Department. And when we talk about increasing savings in the ■lited States, I would like to tack on to something Hat Chairman Burns advanced several months ago, Herein he had proposed a withholding tax, which Huld be equivalent to a savings program, and then ■vested by the Federal Government until an appro bate time. I took exception to the ability of the Hderal Government to hold onto it. I just think the Hderal Government has enough to hold onto. I would H?e to propose a savings program that would be keyed Hto a cost-of-living number and I would like to give V a specific illustration. 189 Let's assume for the moment that we were talking about people who earn $15,000 or more a year. In that, we agree that the guideline-pay increase is five percent. Now, if we start with someone who is making $20,000, that's the example I have here, and he is given a raise of eight percent, then three or three percentage points would be set aside in a Keogh type savings plan wherein he would have the option of in vesting it either in Government securities or in some other type of security that would suit his invest ment purposes. And them, at an appropriate time, \ certainly a death or total disability, he would be allowed to withdraw; or in the event the consumer index stayed fairly constant for six or twelve month period, he would be allowed to withdraw it then. I think that's the way to take the demand out of the economy -- to force all of us to save more -and I just offer this as one example that originated with Chairman Burns. As far as I know, and we re fined it, it's in the document we submitted to you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, very much. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Congressman Reuss: CONGRESSMAN REUSS: Gabe Hauge posed his many interesting questions whether the so-called "social contract" which the Government might see fit to make with labor would find acceptance by labor. Of course, nobody can tell because it hasn’t been tried. By and large, the concept of the social contract is that if the Government could tell wage earners that by and large some of their losses are losses -• by not asking for too high wage increases would be made up by a modest tax cut. If some of their job fears were alleviated by some of the employment pro grams that have been suggested and if by and large there was some suggestion of the equality of sacri fice, then wage earners might be disposed to ask for less in the wage bargain; and, incidentally, to strike less than would otherwise be the case. We can't tell what would happen here because it hasn't been tried, but looking abroad, there are instructive lessons to be learned. In the Federal 190 Republic of Germany ten years ago or more, the Government tried a concerted action program of just this sort which worked very well and in part contri buted to the economic miracle of West Germany. In little Austria they did the same thing, call ing it a social bargain, and one of the reasons ¡ustria is surviving and is not a parasite is be cause of that. Just within the last week in the United Kindom101 that I would propound the United Kingdom as a odel of economic management -- but anyway, they are irying an income policy there and everybody is sur prised the Trades Union Congress at Brighton came [through with some self-imposed wage guidelines which |iave appealed to British management as a model of inoderation. So I suggest that the only way you find out is jto show some leadership and try and have faith in Ihe proposition that if the Government of the United ¡States will deal fairly with the four-fifths of the nation which are wage earners, the chances are rea sonably good, that it will deal fairly with their [Government. I think we ought to try it. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you, Congressman. We fare going to have to move along to George Schultz. MR. SCHULTZ: One general proposition and then |ollow it with three specific things. The general proposition is to strike a blow for Irhat might perhaps be called the new "old-time {religion”. That is, its amazing how fast counter cyclical fiscal policy has gone out of style and Ihere seems to be the notion that we should balance Ihe budget at all times at all costs. It doesn’t seem to me that we want to do that; and rather that ;we should have some sense of balance about our objective along the lines that Otto Eckstein talked Ibout this morning. So that's my first point on the ludget side. The second point is that it seems to me that it Is extremely useful to set targets. The $250 billion larget that was set was widely thought to be un attainable and it was attained. The $270 billion larget was thought-to be unattainable and it was ¡attained. „ My guess is that if a $300 billion target is really set out there, even though it is thought by many to be unattainable, it can be attained. So I think the use of targets of that kind is very use ful; and I would suggest following Mr. Baldwin's comment, that an effort be made to set a target for both the appropriations -- what might be expected to result in immediate outlays for the year -- and the authorizations, so that we are forcing ourselves to look down the road across the board in the Budget. So that is my second suggestion. The third, having to do with the off-budget problonthat has been mentioned, in which I think is a very serious problem, if there is resistance to putting those agencies back in the budget, some headway can be made by putting them within the Fed eral Financing Bank. So that their borrowings are at least coordinated by the Secretary of the Treasury. And, if you are really bold, give the Secretary of the Treasury just a little bit of authority to have some say, at least when the borrowing would take place, and maybe even a little of whether. Then you begin to get some kind of control over these agencies' borrowings. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Senator Javits? SENATOR JAVITS: The only suggestion that I wanted to make was that, instead of looking at the budget problem strictly on the cut side, why not look at it also on the addition side. In other words, if you want a quick budget re duction to the $300 billion level, why not look at such taxation as can be readily agreed to and utilize some of that. It is pretty well acknowledged, and I understand clearly how Senator Long feels about it, that there will be some windfall tax respecting the unusual pro fits attributable to the transitions to very much higher oil prices. Mr. Bethke suggested some possibilities in the area of taxation. And in view of the feeling of people like Henry Reuss and myself that there are certain aspects of this budget that are going to suffer unwisely and of the general agreement on publt service employment, shouldn't the United States Government also consider quick additions to income which is just as good as budget cuts in order to facilitate our tax? 192 ¥. Monetary Policy Discussion Papers from Delegates r. K ich ard P. C ooley President and Chief E xecutive Officer Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. With disintermediation, thrift institutions which are the principal housing financing are unable to compete for funds. This Wailability of funds, together with increasing prices due to infla tion, higher interest rates, more restrictive terms and conflicts with Bury laws in some areas is resulting in a severe decline in housing tarts. Most builders are highly leveraged and the reduction in volume Jnd increased cost of carrying inventories is creating serious credit problems. Housing has a great multiplier effect on our economy both In the way up and the way down and as the larger number of starts |f the past reach completion and new housing starts decline, the reJrse multiplier is effecting the construction industry and businesses applying goods for new homes. Unemployment in the construction Industry is already too high and will increase. J High interest rates are considerably increasing the costs of other jjal estate projects underway many of which are funded on a variable late basis. This is a major concern and affects not only the project Owner lut also all financial intermediaries participating in the real estate parket. This situation along with cost overruns'resulting from inJeased material costs exists in many major real estate projects in the ■nited States and in addition to creating credit problems increases the leed for additional financing. Higher interest and construction costs Iso make planned projects economically unfeasible, thus effecting Jonomic growth. [The subject of incentives to thrift institutions need priority rating, Including the suggested tax free status of up to $1000 to $2000 of Interest. Variable mortgage rates are needed to encourage lenders and jto protect borrowers in periods of declining rates. [The real estate industry is the hardest hit sector of our economy in Ie current inflationary/high interest period and will add further to fnr economic slowdown if not given immediate relief. ¡ource of W - Tilford C. G aines Vice President and Economist [Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. 1(1) The recent clamor for an easier monetary policy is hard to un■rstand. The U.S. economy is in a recession, but it has been a mild re195 cession and there is no evidence to support fear that it will become more severe, although there is evidence to suggest that it might be relative]] prolonged. Federal Reserve policy can scarcely be described as overlj tight when one looks at what has happened to the monetary and credit aggregates over the past six months to one year. What is of overriding importance is that were the Federal Reserve System to back away from its anti-inflationary efforts to restrain money and credit growth at this point, the damage to public and international confidence could be incalculable. It is difficult to know what is exactly the right monetary policy for the sort o f situation that we now are going through, but it is reason able to think that what the Federal Reserve System is attempting to do through its money and credit targets is about right to avoid serious recession and at the same time exert a continuing drag upon price inflation. My recommendation, therefore, would be for a continuation of present policy. A t the same time, I would hope that the recent effort of the Federal Reserve System to nudge short-term interest rates lower without compromising the basic objectives of policy will be successful, There has been a more than usual number of business failures in recent months, and there might be a significantly larger number in the months, just ahead, solely because of the cost of money. I f the Federal Keserve is able to get short-term interest rates down without speeding up money or credit growth, it could make a very important difference fo r many individual companies and for the health o f the economy as a whole, Looking to the future, the object of monetary policy should be to continue its growth targets in the money and credit aggregates^ levels sufficiently below the ongoing rate of price inflation so as hi continue to exert a drag on inflation. Hopefully, within the next two or three years monetary policy might be able to settle into a fixed se of growth targets, consistent with reasonable price stability, thalj could then be maintained for a number of years ahead. (2) Domestic financial markets are currently in a state approach ing disarray. This is true of the equity market, the bond m arket, the mortgage market, and to a much lesser degree o f the money market The single most important reason for this condition is the cu rren t rate of price inflation an ddeep-seated fears that inflation will not be con trolled. Going beyond the expectation of inflation, and what that fearful expectation is doing to the state of the market, lie more direct con sequences of inflation. On the one hand, virulent inflation is under cutting the ability of the public to save and thus make funds available to the (financial markets. On the other hand, inflation has added im mensely to credit and capital demands by artifically inflating the values of current assets on corporate balance sheets, the cost of repl* ing capital equipment far in excess of depreciation allowances, the cost 196 If residential real estate, and the cost of all other major investments If this character. In combination, inflation has created a basic imbalfcce between the demands for credit and capital funds and the availIble supply of such funds. I An easier monetary policy would compound rather than correct this Iroblem. Recent suggestions for a system o f credit allocation imply I degree of wisdom that no one in the financial community would ■retend to have and that the Government should not profess to have, rhe net result of a formal allocation system probably would be far bore harmful than helpful. Present unstable market conditions will tot be corrected until there is evidence that price inflation is being brought under control, along with evidence that the flow of savings Is more adequately meeting the demands for funds. In this regard, a federal budget surplus would be most useful. | There is one additional element in current market conditions that Is of great importance but difficult to measure. That is the weak capital position of the principal broker, dealer and underwriting operations in ourfinancial markets. Losses of recent years have so reduced the capital ■ase of these companies as to raise questions about their ability to provide the underwriting and trading capability that will be needed in Ihe years of heavy demands on the financial markets that lie ahead of us. Careful attention should be given to possible methods for at■acting new capital into U.S. financial markets. Ik Rat Garrett, J r. MOhairman ■Securities and Exchange Commission ■It is well known that stock prices generally have been declining Iyer the past 18 months and are now very low relative to prices during lie prior decade. Investors have a widespread disinclination to pur■lase equity securities, and, as a result, companies of every sort are ¡finding it difficult or impossible to raise new equity capital on any jtarms. They are likewise finding it difficult to raise long term debt Icapital. ■Cash offerings of all new corporate securities, which grew from B2 billion in 1968 to $45 billion in 1971, fell to less than $33 billion P 1973. Common stock offerings, which more than doubled from ■68 to 1972 to reach $10 billion, declined to $7.8 billion last year W are at a rate well below that currently. ■In addition to other factors causing these declines, I wish to empha s e two factors relative to government impact on the debt and equity markets. ■(1) Increased offerings of government securities have probably contributed to private industry’s difficulty in raising investment 197 capital during the last two years. From 1 9 7 1 to 1 9 7 3 , corporate offerings declined by $ 1 2 billion, while U . S . government and government agency offerings increased by $9 billion. (2) There is a close inverse relationship between interest rateson Treasury bills and stock prices. See the attached graph. We think that deliberations on the economy and inflation should take these factors into consideration. The Dow Jones Average and Treasury Bill Rate show a strong tendency to move in opposite directions. . . This has been true in most recent periods of major DJI change... Percentage T IM E P E R IO D May .69 - Aug 69 Nov 69 - Feb 70 May 7 0 -M a r 71 Mar 71 - Aug 71 Nov 71 - Apr 72 Jul 72 - Jan 73 Jan 73 - Aug 73 Oct 73 - Dec 73 D J 1 + + + - 13.5% 10.0% 35.0% 6.9% ' 15.0% 11.0% 14.2% 14.0% Change T R E A S U R Y B I L L RATE + 20.3% + 11.1% - 50.0% + 54.3% - 22.2% 4- 22.5% + 74.0% + 5.7% M. R . H ellie President Credit Union National Association, Inc. While there is reliable evidence that the Federal Reserve has ex panded the money supply excessively in recent years, monetary policy; in th© immediate past period seems to have been appropriate, giv®j 198 the economic conditions of the period. However, the policy was be coming unduly restrictive as a result of the failure to use other appro priate anti-inflation tools, including fiscal measures. Recent signs indicate that the Fed has, in fact, loosened the policy somewhat, and it would be hoped that the money supply would be allowed to grow at a rate approximating the long term rate of growth of the U.S. economy. Mr. R ichard D . H ill Chairman o f the Board First National Bank of Boston Current monetary policy is one of vigorous restraint. The Federal Reserve has doggedly attempted to slow the growth of money and credit since late 1972. Unprecedented inflation and the accompanying deterioration in the debt and equity markets have swelled credit needs of bank customers and resulted in record growth in bank lending. Rather than excessively strain bank liquidity, the Federal Reserve completed the removal of Regulation Q ceilings on large negotiable certificates of deposit in May of .1973. This has enabled banks to ac quire funds to better meet their lending commitments. Inasmuch as inflationary pressures are expected to be strong well into 1975, the demand for credit will continue to grow despite a sluggish economy. In addition to these short-term borrowings, liquidity is being pro gressively reduced by rapidly rising factor costs. I f the momentum of current forces is allowed to continue we anticipate an unacceptable level of bankruptcies. Thus we conclude that the Federal Reserve has assumed the difficult task of controlling inflation by cutting the growth rate o f money and credit and yet not draining liquidity to the point that financial crisis results. The policy tentatively may be judged a success, and the perserverance of the Fed is encouraging. A t the same time, how ever, we caution the Fed not to overdo the degree of restraint. In addition to a sharp rise in factor costs, many businesses are now suffering greatly from high interest charges and bankers are justi fiably concerned that they cannot continue to pay such high rates and still survive. We urge the Fed to strive for a degree of restraint which continues to limit inflation, but which achieves a lower level of interest rates than is presently in effect. Perhaps a rate structure consistent with a prime rate of 9-10 percent would be appropriate for the near term. Finally, it is important to keep in mind that there is more than just the monetary dimension to economic policy, and the key to rational strategy rests heavily on obtaining a balance between monetary and fiscal measures. Thus, while we argue for some easing in Fed policy to avoid unnecessary financial strains, we also would like to see clear signs of a more prudent stand on federal spending. In our opinion, 199 holding the budget to $300 billion, or preferably less, is essential. A clear statement of purpose to this effect would make it easier for the Fed to alter its stand. Some call fiscal prudence a “tired old remedy which won’t work.” We suggest that there is no evidence of this for the remedy has not been tried. Mr. R alph F. L each Chairman o f the Executive Committee M organ Guaranty T rust Company The state of disarray in financial markets is too well known to require either detailed narrative or statistical description. The decline in the market value of outstanding equities and the attendant difficulty in raising many significant amounts of new equity through stock issues has been widely discussed. The high cost and limited availability of long-term money for either public issues or private placements is well documented. The huge demand for bank credit that is at least partially a result of the drying up of other sources of short-term and long-term financing, has been noted by both official and private observers. Business loans at all large banks are up at about a 25% annual rate since the first of the year and the rate at New York City banks is over 30%. As shor]t rates have spiraled upward, savers have shifted funds from institutions to direct market investment—with obvious adverse implications for the availability of mortgage credit. So-called tiered markets have been developed, both in the T7.S. and the Euro-dollar market, and lesser known credits have either been compelled to pay a premium to renew borrowings or have literally been unable to roll them over. This problem may be accentuated by the concentration of large liquid balances in the hands of oil producing countries. It is a tribute to the strength and flexibility of our financial markets that these huge shifts in fund flows have been achieved without even greater disturbance than we have seen thus far. Basically these market conditions are the product of inflation. But in the case of financial markets the related concern arising from the expectation of continuing inflation and of the impact on those mar kets of further efforts to check inflation is also important. Obviously, progress in the effort to slow the upward spiral of prices would do more than anything else to help restore normality in finan cial markets. It would reduce both inflationary expectations and the anticipatory fear of further general and selective credit restraints. Hopefully the rate of inflation will be reduced as a result of policy actions previously taken and others that will be taken, partially as a lesult of these conferences. Meanwhile, progress toward normality in financial markets could be hastened b y : 1. Overt action to lessen inflationary expectations. 2. Reassurance to the business and financial community that the 200 peak of financial stringency is behind us and that, while financial restraint may be required for sometime to come, the kind of cumulative crunch that appeared to be developing around mid-year is not likely to be repeated. 3. Laying to rest recurring rumors that selective ceilings or penal ties may be imposed on specific credit transactions. The latter two actions can be accomplished by the Federal Reserve and the Administration. To be credible, the former should involve specific action by the Congress, since rightly or wrongly, financial market participants and a large segment of the public feel that ulti mate authority in many critical areas—especially fiscal policy—rests with the Congress. One way this might be accomplished would be for Congress to act decisively to amend the Employment Act of 1946 to include price stability as an explicit objective. Mr. D onald T. R egan Chairman o f the Board Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. Our financial markets today are in disarray and thoroughly demoralized. Not only is the cost of money at historic highs, but, in the hot competition for available funds, many would-be borrowers are locked out completely. And many businesses which would turn to equity capital find that alternative even less feasible. Not only do the different seekers of cash compete for funds; the competition is also among the different types of markets. The short-term, long-term and equity markets interact. The high cost of raising funds in one brings about about unpalatable conditions in the others. Clearly, as long as the sum of our necessities plus our desires sub stantially exceeds the available amounts of goods and services, liberal augmentation of the money supply would simply worsen inflation. It is essential that we discipline our spending, both individually and as a society, until a reasonable supply-demand balance can be struck. At the same time we know that turning off the money spigot is no answer either, but it apt to lead to serious economic disruption. Under the present circumstances, high money costs themselves tend to turn into a significant contributor to price inflation. We feel the Federal Reserve’s presumed target rate of about 6% money growth is appropriate. Since growth in recent months was some what below this target, the Federal Reserve now has some room to maneuver on the side of moderate ease. This is welcome. We agree that the Federal Reserve’s primary concern should continue to be with monetary aggregates, rather than attempting to directly influence interest rates. We also recognize that the Federal Reserve has been 201 forced to accept the role of lender of last resort not only in our do mestic banking system but to the Eurodollar market as well. But too much relaxation could be extremely dangerous. While it could temporarily lower short-term rates, it also would foreshadow a long period of accelerated inflation and thus induce a new rise in long term rates. And before long, short-term interest would again be up to perhaps even more disturbing highs. There is traditionally quite a time lag between monetary policy changes and the response of the economy. But this time a turn toward an improved economic environment seems to be waiting mainly for greater availability of credit. Thus, the response to monetary changes should be quicker than usual, and the Federal Reserve can factor this into its decisions. Meantime, having the patience and fortitude to steer toward a 6% monetary growth target could be a major factor in producing a lower inflation rate by a year from now. Mr. R alph S. S aul Vice Chairman Insurance Company of North America Inflation is changing the character of all our financial institutions. The securities markets, particularly, have borne the brunt of our cur rent economic problems. During the past year, many corporations have been foreclosed from using the securities markets to raise long-term capital. Equity is sues—with few exceptions—cannot be financially justified. Stocks of sound companies with good records of earnings growth sell at below book value or at low price/earnings ratios because of lack of demand for equities—not because of the underlying fundamentals. In the bond market, it has been difficult, if hot impossible, to distribute most indus trial bond issues except for the highest quality borrowers. Many cor porations have had to turn to the short-term markets or to banks to supply their immediate credit needs. The malfunctioning of our debt and equity markets has seriously eroded securities values. We are only beginning to see the consequences of this erosion, e.g., in unfunded pension liabilities to corporate pen sion funds and in the premium-writing capacity of the insurance industry. Present trends, if continued, will seriously damage both the securi ties markets and the securities industry and lead to fundamental changes in the way we create and allocate capital. A s I see it, we urgently need a public agency or authority similar to the Federal Reserve System, with the primary mission of developing and im plementing policies that will strengthen our securities markets as 202 financial institutions. The existing regulatory structure, built around the SEC with a narrow statutory mandate and numerous and fre quently competing self-regulatory organizations, is not adequate to the task. A legislative priority in Washington should be the overhaul of that structure. Robert H. S tewart , I I I Chairman First International Bancshares, Ipc. Although conditions in the money market have improved slightly in recent weeks as a result of a very slight shift in the Federal Re serve’s policy stance, they still can best be characterized as tight and jittery. Conditions in the bond and equity markets continue to be chaotic. The record seems to show that monetary policy was too loose in 1972 and part of 1973. Perhaps it was about right in late 1973 and early 1974. Given the performance of monetary aggregates during the last three months, however, one is tempted to judge current policy as too tight. Maintaining the growth rate of the money supply below a 2% annual rate for long under current market conditions could be risky for the markets and for the real economy. Without turning over the rocks of whether one thinks monetary policy can deal effectively with controls—repressed inflation, or with supply-side-shortfall inflation, or with cost-push inflation, it seems clear that a shift upward to a money-supply target rate of growth in the 5 to 6% range will soon be in order. I f such a shift is “misinter preted” by market participants as a shift to ease, so much the better. The psychology of the money, bond, and equity markets should im prove almost overnight. Given current and prospective economic con ditions, a 5 to 6% target range cannot be labeled as inflationary. Mr. T homas I. S tores Chairman o f the E xecutive Committee North Carolina National Bank Monetary policy in 1974 must be viewed against the background of (1) significant prior mistakes of national economic policy (2) substantial increases in world commodity prices (3) the winter energy crisis (4) the lagged impact of two devaluations of the dollar (5) the removal of price and wage controls during the first half of 1974. It would be simplistic to assume that in the face of such pressures for expanded credit and an increased money supply, the Federal Reserve could have maintained the growth of monetary aggregates within some 203 predetermined limits of small magnitude. In fact, the money supply, narrowly defined, grew until recent months at a rate which would clearly have been unacceptable under other conditions ; more recently the rate of increase has fallen appreciably. Except for the first two months of 1974, monetary policy this year has been appropriate in that it has been as restrictive as was feasible in the circumstances. It has resulted in extremely high interest rates and severe tensions in credit markets. In recent months it has brought about a very restrictive lending policy in commercial banks, the full effects of which are still to be felt. These and other economic forces have raised serious questions as to the liquidity and solvency of many business firms, and these doubts in turn have led to more critical and sometimes superficial evaluation of the liquidity of financial institutions. The resulting stratification within financial markets has impeded the flow of funds to a wide range of firms, including some banks which normally acquire loanable funds in these markets. It would be appropriate at this time for monetary policy to be relaxed to a degree which is modest but which would be clearly per ceptible in financial markets. The emergence of other anti-inflation programs will make this modification of policy possible. The increas ing strains in credit markets and the foreseeable results of credit re strictions make it highly desirable. Mr. J o h n F. T omayko Director, Insurance, Pension and Unemployment Benefits United Steelworkers of America Our nation’s economy is presently suffering from rampant price inflation and a concurrent unacceptably high rate of unemployment. While traditional economic theory dictates that the rates o f inflation should be responsive to monetary restraint, that relationship must as sume that the initial cause of the inflationary spiral is excessive de mand for a limited supply of goods and services. Today’s inflation, however, is not of the demand-pull type, but rather it has been strongly influenced by a combination of independent forces, includ ing (1) the contrived and artificial shortages of raw materials such as petroleum and food stuffs; (2) excessive capital expenditures at the expense of consumer goods production ; and (3) unwise exporta tion of vital raw materials and farm products. Because the government has failed to recognize these real causes of inflation, the unimaginative and relentless tight money policy pro mulgated by the Federal Reserve Board will aggravate the inflation ary spiral rather than alleviate it. In fact, it is already the major contributor to inflation. 204 The labor movement is particularly concerned that the oppressively tight monetary policy has had a disproportionately harsh effect on the sector of our economy which can least afford to suffer—the nation’s poor, the unemployed, and the lower middle class worker. Corporations have outbid the consumer for the limited supply of available money, knowing well that their unstrained pricing policies will absorb the cost of their expenditures in the capital goods market. As a result, our traditional sources of funds for mortgages, small busi ness and consumer loans have dried up. As a result, residential con struction and retail sales, two important indicators of economy’s health, are depressed and getting worse. I propose, therefore, that the present course of monetary policy be changed through (1) a moderate expansion of money and credit; and (2) extension of credit on a selective basis to encourage growth in construction of housing, public facilities and selective industries where faced with excessive or chronic unemployment. In conclusion, if the labor movement is expected to pursue a policy of moderation of wage demands (in the face of declining real income), the financial sector of the economy, and particularly the Federal Re serve Board, must make an equal effort to see that the qualityy>f life of our nation’s working class is not unfairly endangered. Mr. J ohn W inth ro p W right President Wright Investors’ Service I. U.S. International Negotiation of An Agreement to Regulate the Creation of “Eurodollar” and Other Foreign Currency Deposits in Non-domiciled Banks. II. Enact Legislation to Insulate Domestic U.S. Monetary and Credit Policies from the Influence of Excessive Foreign Interest Rates and Capital Requirements. III. Limit by Legislation, Interest Rates on all Deposits Including Negotiable Certificates of Deposit to a Maximum of 1% Less than the Prime Bank Lending Rate or 5%, whichever is Higher. IV. Expand and Revise by Legislation, the Requirements for and Terms of Office of Membership of the Federal Reserve Board so as to Provide for Broader Representation of Public and National Interests. V. Expand by Legislation, the Federal Reserve Board’s Regulatory Powers to Include Variable Reserve Requirements Depending on the Proportion of Each Bank’s Loan Portfolio Allocated to National Economic Purposes and Priorities. VI. Establish by Legislation, More Precise Requirements and Procedures for National Economic and Financial Policies and the 205 to o 05 U.S. GNP VS THE MONEY SUPPLY Responsibility and Accountability of the Federal Reserve Board for Implementing These Policies. VII. U.S. International Negotiation to Create an Inflation-Proof Standard of Value in the International Monetary System. VIII. Repeal the One-Bank Holding Company Legislation and Limit Banks and Banking Corporations Strictly to Banking Func tions with No Involvement in Investments, Insurance or Other NonBanking Activities. IX. Establish by Legislation, a “Citizen’s Capital Investment Tax Credit” to Encourage Savings and Capital Formation by Individual Citizens and thus Reduce Inflationary Spending Demand while In creasing the Supply of Productive Capital. Mr. W alter B. W riston Chairman First National City Bank, New York If our goal is to reduce the rate of inflation and reduce both shortand long-term interest rates, then the Federal Reserve should not deviate substantially from its policy objectives pursued this year. The money in our paycheck or in our pockets has no value in and of itself. It has only a scarcity value. I f each one of us had all the money that we wanted, the value of that money to purchase goods and serv ices would approach zero. This is the reason that the amount of money which is printed by the Federal Reserve System is crucial to the con trol of inflation. It is a truism that the depreciation in the value of our money is another way of saying that our prices are going up. Whether you belong to one school of economists or to another, the foregoing logic is relevant to a consideration of the problem of inflation. I f the Federal Reserve prints more money than the goods which are avail able to be purchased, the price of those goods will obviously go u p ; on the other hand, if it does not print enough money to keep up with the increase in the productive capacity of the United States, the rate of price inflation w ill diminish. The annual rate of change in the narrowly defined money supply has been about 6% since the beginning of this year. This does not represent a materially smaller increase than that for all of 1973. The Federal Reserve has appeared to be more restrictive than it has actu ally been in nominal terms because the rate of inflation has acceler ated rapidly this year and with it very strong credit demands. I f the Federal Reserve were to deviate significantly from its target of a moderate rate of growth in money stock in an attempt to alleviate the inflationary demands for credit, it would be feeding the very virus we are attempting to eliminate. Interest rates have increased sharply this year not because the Fed eral Reserve has been significantly more restrictive than it was in 1973 207 but because inflation, including the higher price for oil, has driven the demand for credit substantially higher. Those who see the need for credit or the opportunity to employ borrowed money profitably at a time of rapidly rising prices have bid aggressively for the available supply of credit which, in fact, has increased this year in absolute terms. But that bidding has been considerably greater than the amount which the Federal Reserve has provided. Consequently, interest rates have increased. There are times when the Federal Reserve for periods of one or two months must expand money growth beyond its longer term target. But then it has corrected for this in the month following. Between February and May of this year the Federal Reserve significantly exceeded its long-term target, but from early June through August it undershot its longer run objectives. It may well be appropriate now for the Federal Reserve to become moderately more expansive to move back toward its long-term target. It is significant that short-term interst rates climbed by more than 400 basis points between February and June of this year when the Federal Reserve was highly expansive. But since June, short-term interest rates have essentially moved sideways while the Federal Reserve has become more restrictive and the rate ,of growth in short term credit has slowed down. It is not the Federal Reserve that determines major moves in short-term interest rates but the private marketplace. For example, more than $40 billion rolls over in the commercial paper market alone every 30 days. The Federal Reserve has slowed down demands in the economy by refusing to validate the inflationary expectations that were so rampant earlier this year. Any effort to reduce interest rates rapidly through an expansive monetary policy would shortly ignite those inflationary expectations and it would not be long before the private market demands for credit would drive interest rates even higher. At a time like this, efforts to reduce interest rates through a more expansive monetary policy are like trying to smother a fire with gasoline. 208 monetary policy to deal with inflation SECRETARY SIMON: We will now move to monetary policy to d.eal with inflation, which we have allowed 30 minutes for. Doctor Lee Bach, Stanford University. DR. BACH: Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by talking about two general points of perspective about monetary policy. The first one is, as one looks back over the preceding many summits, one sees a very large amount of agreement that monetary policy has been on the whole good, but it is-a little too tight. We ought to pull back just a little bit. Not too much, just a little bit. I think one should be a little cautious there. We are not going to solve the inflation problem by easing up on monetary policy. Whereas it may be a very good thing to do unless we have some other way to fight the inflation - just a little easing on monetary policy doesn’t solve the problem. It would be nice if it did. A second general perspective point I would like to raise is this: As I argued this morning, I think it is not possible to specify a correct monetary policy or level of restraint without reference to wage-price behavior. There is not today in our system an excess demand, in my judgement -- probably no excess demand at all. The real issue is cost-push and price-push, if I might put it that way today. The real issue, to put it another way around, is whether the Federal Reserve will put enough money in the system to validate the cost-push, the higher wages, tne higher prices being put there by workers, unions and by businesses. I think that's the way to look at monetary policy, as to whether it will go to the point of supporting those higher wages and prices and therefore providing a higher plateau from which we now go on up to another spiral. I argued that the issue this morning was whether the Fed would validate these higher prices and wages " I think Mr. Eckstein was right that we need be 211 awfully careful that we don't promise too much in our policies; that we don't think by a little bit of budget restraint we can really solve the infla tion problem. We cannot, is my argument this morning, I want to make it again today. Without an incomes policy of wage and price restraint, a kind of national consensus, to' a great extent, the Fed is tied down. It can really halt the thing only by incurring costs that are very great from a social point of view and I just do not think the American Public is going to stand still. I don't think the Congress will stand still for as tight a monetary policy to knock this inflation in the head. It has to do it all by itself. I think we are seeing today a kind of financial brinksmanship that is required of the Fed, the danger that it will tighten things so much that we will have serious financial trouble. I think it has done awfully well. We should be pleased with it. But I don't think that's the position we can safely put our financial authorities in over the longer period. We ought to try to get away from that situation, where they have to be sitting on the financial brink all the time because the financial pressures, the inflationary pressures, are so strong in the society all the time. It seems to me that only the strong leadership of the President, working with the Federal Reserve, working with the Congress, working with the people, can develop a social compact, to use the words others have used, that would be viable, that would make it feasible to hold the system down on the inflation front without generating a lot of un- ■ employment, without generating financial trouble. I have stressed these fundamental conditions for successful monetary policy rather than talking about the details of monetary policy; whether we should ease or tighten it a little bit now; whether we should try credit allocations or not. and the like. Incidentally, I think we should not. This because I think these fundamental conditions are the really crucial issues. The validation of wage-price spirals that has a nasty way of sort of always easing up and going a little further and you are ready to go up another step or two. We have to face the long-run issues. Looking to short run problems, day by day, the little 212 p i e c e s of the problem would not solve our g e n e r a l problem, I would argue. We cannot safely commit the Federal Reserve authorities to a life of persisted brinksmanship fighting inflation. It w o n 't stop the inflation and risks very great dangers to t h e economy. Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Mr. Wright. MR. WRIGHT: I must take issue with what seems to me to be the general misconception that the Federal Reserve Board should be faulted for having had excessive growth of the domestic money supply. There may be other faults, but that isn’t one of them. During the last five years, and I have distri buted this around so the facts are before all of you, the growth of a narrowly-defined so-called M-l money supply in the United Stages ha^,. averaged 6 percent a year. The growth of the gross national prod uct has averaged 8.4 percent a year. That adds up to me to the fact that there is less money for dollar of gross national product with which to finance it to provide the working capital than there was. Five years ago, the three year average was that the domestic money supply averaged 22.7 percent of the United States gross national product. Recently, th a t's down to twenty-one and a half percent. That's a considerable shortage. Now, if we took the inflation in dollars and spelled it out in current dollars, we find that the annual rate of increase of the domestic money supply has been four tenths of one percent in con stant dollars, and the average annual rate of in crease of gross national product in constant dollars has been 2.7 percent. So it is quite clear to me that the Federal Reserve Board cannot be faulted for having caused this inflation by excessive money supply during the last five years. Now, there is another fact that nobody says anything about. And that is, all the dollars that have been created in EuropeI Some of them have been transferred by the export of capital, but a lot has been created, simply by buying money and opening a demand deposit account in a European bank. 213 I believe it will astonish, completely astonish most of you, not all of you, to know that the size of the dollar money supply on deposit in European banks now is as great as the entire money supply on deposit in domestic banks. When you include that in the growth of dollars available in checking accounts, you find that for the last five years that has averaged altogether 14.6 percent annual rate of ¿Increase of dollars all over the world in the money supply as compared with an 8 percent rise in the gross national product. Now, if there is anything inflationary in this world, that’s it. And I suggest that we direct our attention as to how to get under control the dollars which had been created in European banks without any control at all by any part of the United States Government, including the Federal Reserve Board. Now, you will find in this little chart, which I have distributed, a series of 9 proposals and when I spoke this morning I suggested general reform. I will take time now only to ask your attention to the first three. The first of which is to negotiate without delay an international agreement to control the cre ation of dollar deposits in non-domiciled banks, that is, in European and other non-American banks -control that. I am sure it can be done, and we should reciprocate by permitting other nations to control currency deposits made in our banks in their currencies. I think it would be in the interest of all central banks, and I think they can be persuaded to agree to that. Along with that, I think it should be an article of United States national policy that we are not going to allow the level of interest rates in the United States to be determined in Europe. Obviously, and its been said many times, that if rates were higher in Europe, the Federal Reserve Board here has no alternative except to hold our rates up or else we have a flight of capital. 214 Lell that certainly is correctible by legislation and t a x a t i o n on excessive profits from that. We had s o m e t h i n g like that, not quite like it before, |nd that can be done. Finally, I would ask attention to one more thing. The so-called large $100,000 negotiable certificate of deposit. They were an animal created pnly about 12 years ago and they didn't amount to touch until 1970 when many people, including myself believed that the Federal Reserve Board overstay|ed a restrictive monetary policy and we came near a financial panic in this country. At that time, by [agreement, the Regulation Q limit on interest rates payable on large certificates of deposit was lifted and there was reason for it at that time. Because it permitted the banks to raise their rate, attract capital and make what they believed were their loan obligations and thus avoid financial panic. That time is long gone. Now that is the Frankenstein which has caused the continuous excessive rise of interest rates. The rise of interest rates which we have now in this country is not simply the fact that we are somewhat short of our working capital, bf our M-l money supply, it is because there has [been no ceiling on the interest rates which banks can pay on large certificates of deposit. There is still a ceiling on what you can pay the average citizen on small CD's, but not on the large amount. For that reason, and I am ending now, for that reason, I suggest that we immediately restore Regulation Q and that when we do so, we pass legislation which will set the absolute ceiling at pne percent less than the prime rate, instead of above or it with a minimum of five percent. Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: Alan Greenspan. MR. GREENSPAN: Mr. Wright, I would like to lomment on a couple of points on your chart, without joining to the substance of your policy recommenda tions as such. I In the first instance, it certainly is true |nat the Euro Dollar expansion has been extraor dinary, the rate of increase is substantial, as in 215 558-812 0 - 74 - 15 fact your chart shows, and it is a major new element of the international financial structure which think we have all been focussing on increasingly in recent years. However, I think that it is important to rec ognize when one is looking at the effective money supply on the issue of inflation, not to look on the source of the liabilities, but who owns it, It turns out, of course, the very substantial part of the liabilities of banks are held by citi zens. It turns out that something as I recall in the area of about $10 billion of the total Euro dollar market is held by American citizens; and since the money supply presumably works on the issue of inflation on the side of the holder rather than on the side of the liability, then one's attempt to estimate the total amount of either M-l or M-2 or what else we are doing, that technically should include the total domestic liabilities of banks to domestic citizens, plus the Euro-dollar assets of American citizens, and I think -- I have looked at that at one point. It turns out that it does not make a terribly great difference with respect to United States actual holdings. So that in effect the use of the money market data as an indicator does not in my view seriously bias the numbers. Secondly, you pointed out that the total real increase in the money supply, or M-2, moved pretty much with the real increase in gross national product and I think you concluded that that therefore was not a significant element in the price lever. What that implies algebraically is that the unit money supply, that is, the money supply divided by real GNP is moving directly proportional with the price level. And I think one of the more interesting correlations that we have seen of late has been in fact how closely the unit money supply growth has paralleled the price level; and in fact all it sug gests is the so-called income velocity, that is GNP in current dollars divided by the money supply» usu ally M-2, has been remarkably stable and, in fact, for more stable than it has been in the past. This is not strictly an academic issue, because what it is suggesting in effect is that in the Longer term sense money supply growth is a ipajor determinant of the price level; and I think that one of the reasons why many of us have been so concerned 216 Lbout the off-budget financing items of the Treasury ihas largely been that it is viewed as a sort of bremptive borrowing against private savings flows, thich in a sense elbows out of the capital markets brivate borrowers, who in turn press on the commer cial banking system to accommodate themselves in their credit demands. The commerical banks in turn have tried to create the reserve necessary to support the deposits associated with the credit expansion; (and it is this expansion of the monetary base which, at least in my view, is a major element in this acceleration that has occurred in M-2 that in effect the tremendous pressure on the commerical banking system of the spillover has just been almost impossible to accommodate; and as a consequence of this, we are looking at the financial roots of the (system. I certainly agree with you that the Euro-dollar (problem is something which requires a great deal fcloser look and its full implications I don't think (we fully grasp at this point. It is an extraordinarly large system. It has (got to have monumental effects and with the flows which go in and out of countries, plus the extra ordinary intertwining of interbank depositing which goes on in this market, suggests that this has grown into such an extraordinary system, that unless and until we can get a much closer look at it, especial ly now in terms of the oil revernue, that I think we are looking at a problem, the dimensions of which jwe haven't really got our fingers on. I agree with you, that something in this area {requires far greater study. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. A1 Wojnilower. DR. WOJNILOWER: I think what we should take with us from the last couple of points, is that even ■hough demand pull within the United States may be lore or less extinguished, there is a demand-pull jexerted from abroad which may be not merely cyclical, |ut which is the consequence of what in financial ■erms would be a very rapid equalization of levels |f wealth and standards of living between the United ■tates and the rest of the world under conditions 217 where United States capital is completely free to flow out and to help generate these enormous sources of demand from abroad on United States re sources . Now, it seems to me our policy ought to take into account foreign as well as domestic demands. In reference to what Professor Bach said earlier when he continued from this point, it is true we had an exercise of brinksmanship in Federal Reserve policy; that is, they go to one brink and the people there try to regulate and go to a different one. Sometimes they meet. But in my over 20 years of association with these markets, Federal Reserve policy has never been effective except when it was willing to go to the brink, and I think to some extent this is true also of monetary policy in other countries. The problem with incomes policies which certain ly make Federal Reserve policy easier to handle, is that they serve in our experience in the United States and in other countries, too, as an excuse overtly or covertly to avoid going to the brink to have easier policies, to avoid unpleasant choices because a couple of percent was chopped off the wage or price inflation, enabling people to believe were really right on front when they weren’t. And, so it seems to me, that if we had some kind of successful price and wage monitoring, it would need to be coupled with also some kind of automatically imposed break that prevented difficult fiscal and monetary choices from being delayed under the cover of a rather deceptive repression of infla* tion that can take place for six months or a year under incomes policies. The proposals -- I just want to close oy saying that the proposals Mr. Wright made which have to do with reinstating the regulation Q ceiling are really -- I consider them to be very similar in spirit to the proposal I made this morning to regulate the prime rate, which, to my way of thinking, is at the moment a more practicable and smoother way to achieve the objective, whereas now that Regulation Q has been released, putting that particular humpty-dumpty toy gether again I would think as a practical proposition would be very difficult. 218 I would just like to add, however, that I wouldn’ t be as nice to the banks as Mr. Wright, and I would set the ceilings so that their cost of money would be above their prime rate, rather than the other way around, in the limit; and if that situation were to be overhanging all the time, it would be much less likely to materialize as contrasted with the presentation, where such a development was considered impossible, and as a result, therefore, it naturally came about. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Dr. Bach. DR. BACH: I quite agree that an incomes policy has to be merged together to make any sense, with an ¡understanding by the Fed, with an understanding by the fiscal authorities, that it is all part arid parcel of a deal together, if you like. That is why I said that the President had to really take a leadership role on a meaningful social compact. The Government, including the Fed in effect would have to commit itself to play ball, and to hold down monetary and fiscal expansion at the same time. The second point is with reference to both the [other comments on the use of direct controls. This morning I heard some comments about by all means avoid direct controls over wages and prices. It seems that that argument is equally good about avoid ing direct control on interest rates paid by banks, and entered rates paid by other institutions. Our history suggests that those get us into pesses, they don’t solve problems. I have in mind things like Regulation Q, direct regulations of bank interest rates, and so on. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Steve Saulnier. DR. SAULNIER: Mr. Secretary, this morning and bn an occasion this afternoon, a reference has been bade to the possibility of instituting a program of lirect allocation or direct control, a voluntary pro gram of credit allocations by the financial system, pd I should like to express dissent from that. I Someone suggested this morning that we had had pat for the Korean period. We did have it in the prean period, and after it was all oyer, there 219 were analyses made to try to determine whether that voluntary credit restraint program had done anything constructive at all. And it is my distinct recollection that the answer to that question was that it had not. I find a good many people in the financial community saying something like this: that the Federal Re serve system ought to be easier in its provision of reserves, and then the banks ought to be asked to restrain themselves. What this comes down to me, is that someone is saying give the banks more money to lend and then tell them not to lend it. And I would forecast very little success for such a program. I think as A1 Wojnilower has just said, that there is no substitute for going to the brink. I think in the last few weeks or couple of months we have been as close to that as it is safe to be. But the only way to control credit, is by putting a real limitation on the amount of it that there is to lend. And I hope that this conference will not end with the notion in anybody’s mind that it can be done otherwise. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. MR. O ’LEARY: It isn't often that I disagree with my very good friend Steve Saulnier. I was involved in that voluntary credit restraint program -- I hate to have to admit that the Korean War period. I know it is a much maligned program and it is commonly said that it did not succeed in achieving anything at that time. I did see some real success in that program, and I think this is the time in which we ought to not be too categorical in rejecting any of the alternatives because my own feeling is that it would be helpful to have a voluntary program. In effect, what is happening is that the commercial banks, as I view the situation, are already on a voluntary basis, with guidelines, tending to try to allocate capital to the best uses. I think that it was a very constructive thing for the Federal Reserve Advisory Council in consultation with the Treasury to try to work out some guidelines of that sort. 220 T h is is a very complicated economy. The in v is ib le hand of Adam Smith isn’t going to take care o f everything in this situation. I think it would be helpful to relieve some of the pressures on s h o r t-te r m rates to have an effort made in this p a r tic u la r area. I also feel very much like Lee [Bach. I like the way he has approached his thoughts on monetary policy, and I think that the big danger [here is that there is going to be impatience with [fiscal and monetary restraint, because I don't think lit is going to have early results in bringing down [the inflation rate. We face the danger of a move, then, to full I think that an incomes Policy designed through guidelines to try to hold down settlements can help to steady the price, the inflation at this particular point in time, and give that must be the heart of anti-inflation, monetary and fiscal restraint an opportunity to work itself [through. blown wage-price controls. I don't think we ought to reject anything cate gorically here. I think a certain amount of credit [rationing -- the banks are already doing it. I feel tery confident of that in talking with many of them. It is a very constructive thing, and we ought not to, L any arbitrary wa/, rule out anything. We need an pverall program, and that is part of it. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you, Jim. We will just have Ralph Leach. Do you want to make a brief remark before we move to the next topic, blease? SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. 221 We are now going to move to capital -SENATOR LONG: May I make one suggestion? SECRETARY SIMON: Yes, I beg your pardon. SENATOR LONG: I think I could support a tax that strikes at those who are needlessly increasing the cost of their product, offset by a tax cut for those who are engaged in a cooperative effort be tween management and labor to reduce the price of their product to the consumer. A lot of people, if you give them enough encouragement, might be able to increase their units of production, keep the plant operating a few hours longer, produce a little more, put a little more on the market. I know, for example, that if you gave the oil companies that incentive -- I understand a little bit about their business while they are not asking for it, if you would say, MA11 right, now you take your volume stations and if you cut the price at those volume stations, because you can if you want to, we will give you a tax cut to go along with that. And we will let you advertise that this is an efficient, low-cost station.” Well, in that case you would see a lot of people pulling into those stations, in addition to those pulling in already, because they are getting the product cheaper there. The first thing you know, even the fellow that doesn't want to cut his price might find he has relatively little choice ^bout it, he has to do it. And anything that would help reduce the cost of living, I think, would be an appealing tax. There are some taxes we could pass. that type of thing would have appeal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think Capital Markets and Capital Formation i Discussion Papers from Delegates Mr. R o b e r t H. B . B aldw in I P resident I Morgan Stanley & Company Inc. ( Clients of Morgan Stanley & Co. have indicated a need for large sums Lf money in the form of equity or debt in the period 1975-84. Con sequently, the Firm has made extensive studies aimed at advising these ¡clients, with particular emphasis on whether the future total supply of [funds will meet the potential total demand. Our conclusion is that the bapital requirements of governments (Federal, State ¡and local) and Industry, which are necessary not only to provide a rising standard of living and a growing number of jobs but also to meet environmental standards and to help solve the energy requirements, can be met provided certain fundamental steps are taken fairly promptly. I I. It is our opinion that the rate of inflation must be lowered from the present double digit, figures to a significantly lower rate and that stringent fiscal and monetary polices must be followed even though temporarily the economy may remain in a recessionary phase for a longer period than most would desire. “Inflationary expectations” piust be broken. We are happy to see recognition of this problem by the Administration and we welcome the steps being taken in an effort io find practical solutions. These attempts are being undertaken none [oo early as we are already witnessing a breakdown in the capital raising ability of our securities industry which, in coping with its problems, needs a sympathetic attitude on the part o f government, particularly the SEC. Electric utility companies, unless their credit Is of the highest, find that they can no longer finance in the normal bay with long-term bonds without sinking funds and that, if they are ttortunate enough to be able to sell common stocks at all, they can only po so at prices well below book values per share. In our opinion, inpustry as a whole in recent years has relied too heavily on borrow ing, and it will be necessary for industry to raise substantial sums pf equity capital; it cannot do so on a reasonable basis during a period jof rapidly rising prices and high interest rates. III. It is our opinion that total savings must be increased, not only Ibsolutely but also as a percentage of gross national product. An inIrease in savings of individuals and of corporations is imperative, ■his can only be accomplished in a society which encourages profits lather than looks upon them as something evil and in a period when pe rewards of saving are not destroyed by inflation. This is one place 225 where Government can play a promient, role. Another is in the field of taxation. Space restrictions prevent any detailed recommendations, but basically Government policies must be geared to encouraging in vestment instead of consumption. A. — In dividual Savers—A number of tax changes could encourage savings. Only a partial list of suggestions would include (1) a re duction in capital gains taxes, especially when capital gains arise be cause of inflation and (2) increasing the amount of dividend income not subject to tax. B. —Corporations—The sources of corporations’ capital for invest ment and working capital are internally generated funds and external funds. Internally generated funds consist o f funds resulting from the investment tax credit, from depredation allowances and from retained earnings. Increased corporate profits can result in higher retained earn ings if dividends are not increased oommensurately, but an increase in retained earnings as a result of paying too little in dividends could be counterproductive i f stocks became less attractive to savers. After-tax cash flow, as distinct from retained earnings as reflected in accounts, can be increased by companies adopting LIFO accounting; those com panies not now using LIFO should be encouraged to do so. The Gov ernment, of course, can play a vital role in the field of taxation, andwe recommend both a permanent increase in the investment tax credit and adoption of new depreciation allowances which, in an inflationary era, will allow companies to recapture investments in a shorter period of time. III. An increase in savings of individuals and corporations, ac companied by an attitude in Government (including the State public! utility regulatory authorities) that is pro-profits, will do much to in crease the flow of funds into the long-term debt and equity markets. Demands for credit are so great, however, that there will be a needto change the share of total savings directed to various components of the economy. In particular, it is our opinion that the Federal Government must not compete with private industry for savings. We strongly re commend that the Federal Government move rapidly toward a ball anced budget and, in the future, a surplus. D r . B obert G. D ederick Senior Vice President and Econom ist Northern Trust Company In view o f the enormous needs for new investment over the nexi decades, it is essential that the nation’s long-term capital markets-j equity, bond, anjl mortgage—be capable of absorbing large volumes oj financing at moderate cost. As current experience indicates, there no automaticity involved in matching potential demands with ava j 226 lable supplies. Thus, if our investment requirements are to be satisfied, bublic policy must be closely concerned with the effective operation of ¡these markets. Action will be required on several levels. 1. ACHIEVING NONINFLATTONARY GROWTH A healthy economic climate is an absolute necessity for healthy long term capital markets. Above all, therefore, policy must be geared to breaking the current inflationary spiral and restoring the economy to a noninflationary growth path—one closely in line with underlying productive potential. Without substantial growth, the additional real income with which to make new savings and investments will prove inadequate; without reasonable price stability, savers will be unwillpng to commit funds to the long-term financing of investment at prices satisfactory to potential real investors. 2. BOOSTING THE SHARE OF NATIONAL INCOME AVAILABLE FOR SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT I While a necessary condition for healthy long-term capital markets, Inon-inflationary growth may not be sufficient in itself to assure that an adequate volume of external financing occurs. In such an event, direct [steps will be required to bring about a larger investable funds total— involving increases both in the public’s ability to save and its incentive to save, as well as actions to encourage greater capital inflows from abroad. I A variety of approaches are available, some of which would remove [existing contraints on the private market mechanism and some of which would offset remaining inadequacies in this mechanism. I One key step would be to hold down the growth of government Spending on public consumption and other nonproductive activities, jthereby reducing the aggregate tax burden. The benefit would be even greater if spending were to be constrained sufficiently to shift the Federal budget into surplus, thus providing funds for debt redemption, deducing the progressivity of the tax system would tend to raise the private savings share as well. Also beneficial would be moves designed to boost after-tax corpo rate profits—both in toto and for particular industries, e.g., the energy Ntor and public utilities. (The increased profitability would not only Reduce the need for external financing by the affected businesses, but Nuld also raise their attractiveness to potential providers o f such pnancing.) Included here would be such measures as increases in the investment tax credit, a further acceleration o f depreciation allow ances, removal of burdensome price restraints, and provision for the expensing of business firms’ environmental and anti-pollution expendi tures. 227 As regards individuals, their savings could be stimulated by elim inating various interest rate ceilings now in effect and by granting favored tax treatment either to the share o f income going into savings or to the dividends and interest earned on savings. 3. BOOSTING THE SHARE OF INVESTMENT FINANCED VIA LONG-TEKM SECURITIES Even if the total pool o f investable funds is sufficient to match po tential investment demands, the share devoted to equities and to long term debt instruments may be insufficient. Policy measures can be taken which relieve this problem—again involving either the removal of market constraints or the provision of special incentives. It is essential, o f course, that the distribution network for new and outstanding stocks, bonds, and mortgages be operating at a high degree of efficiency. This viability, in turn, requires that the institutions which make up the network be enabled to make a reasonable return on their own capital and that barriers to new entry be limited. Special measures may be necessary to bolster investment via each of the three broad areas—equities, bonds, and mortgages. Thus, for example, consideration should be given to granting more favorable tax treatment to capital gains and losses as a means of stimulating equity purchases. Meanwhile, Federal guarantees or interest rate sub sidies could be applied to long-term bonds issued by public utilities or other corporations whose expansion is viewed to be in the national interest. As for thé mortgage market, numerous special stimuli arej available—and applicable to both borrowers and lenders. In the case of borrowers, mortgage interest rate subsidies are an obvious—and already used—approach. The graduated payment mortgage is also worthy of experimentation. As for lenders, steps can be taken to in crease both their ability nad their incentive to grant mortgage creditincluding a relaxation o f usury ceilings, active encouragement of the variable rate mortgages in existing portfolios, a broadening of the asset buying and liability creating powers of thrift institutions, favored tax treatment of funds placed in savings accounts, and financial incen tives directed at increasing the share of funds allocated to mortgages by lending institutions. D r. O tto E ckstein President, Data Resources, Inc. Professor o f Economics Harvard University 1. O BJEC TIV E : Over the next few years, the United States should raise the fraction of its Gross National Product devoted to business fixed capital formation from the traditional 10^% to ap proximately 12%. This increased capital formation is needed to relieve 228 capacity shortages in primary processing industires, provide for the [general expansion o f the economy, introduce technological progress, |develop new energy sources, and improve the environment. 2. The process of capital formation is now being disrupted by the extreme swings of monetary policy and the worsening credit crunch. So far, most reductions in business investment plans, such as the re duced investments of the automobile and airline industries, have been justified by weakening markets. The reductions in electric utility in vestment, although hastened by financial difficulties, also reflect a 25% reduction in the projected capacity needs o f this industry by 1980 because of the lesser projected energy growth. If the current credit crunch continues and the economy stumbles from middling recession to severe recession, even the larger corpora tions will substantially reduce their investment plans as they did in 1970. This would worsen the inflation outlook during the next busi ness cycle upswing. Capacity shortages would develop too early, and the relief that could be achieved from our current problems would be [deferred. 3. In the longer run, a healthy financial system is necessary to [accomplish the effective transfer of savings into investment. The higher investment ratio will require a larger flow o f savings from the household sector to industry. Fortunately, the investment needs for housing in the later years of the 1970’s w ill be moderate by historical standards, and the repayment flows on existing mortgages will be ris ing rapidly. As a result, the household sector will be able to make available many billions of additional savings to help finance indus trial investments. 4. A healthy equity market has been a critical element in the per formance of the American economy. The equity market makes possible the financing of new companies and promotes the continued growth of rapidly expanding companies. It also provides a necessary supplemen tal source of capital to utilities and other capital intensive industries inhere a sound balance sheet requires a growth of equity beyond interpally generated funds. I More fundamentally, a healthy equity market promotes the compet itiveness of the American economy. I f the current stock market situa tion were to persist, there would be an increased concentration of the economy. The larger companies tend to be the most credit worthy and pave the ability to stand at the head of the line at the lending windows P large commercial banks. The banks would become as powerful [asthey are in Europe and Japan. I 5. Tax incentives to encourage capital formation: W hile the anti|nflation strategy prevents us from tax reduction on personal incomes, L would be inequitable to provide tax breaks for business. The effec tive tax rate on the federal corporate income tax has already fallen 229 from 40% in 1971 to 36% in 1973 under the impact of the investment tax credit, increasing foreign tax credits, and the DISC tax prefer ence. Selective tax or credit aid may be required for very specific sectoral problems in thè economy such as the primary processing industries and utilities. M r . R a y G arrett, J r . Chairman Securities and Exchange Commission Ensuring the availability of adequate long term capital over the next decade is clearly one o f the most necessary requirements for this country’s future economic growth. However, in addition to measures designed to make capital available for investment and to make invest ment attractive, we must be certain that the mechanism for raising equity and long-term debt is not destroyed by the disappearance of a high capacity, diversified, securities industry. The securities industry is in an alarming downward trend. New York] Stock Exchange member firms, which account for approximately 751 percent o f the revenues o f the industry, lost $66 million before tax in 1973 and have reported a $49 million loss for this first half of 1974. The profit problem is widespread: in eleven of the last twenty-fonrf months, 50 percent or more o f the New York Stock Exchange firms have reported losses. And between 1971 and 1973 the number of New York Stock Exchange carrying public customer accounts declined 16 percent. Further, it does not appear that the industry is simply suifer-j ing through the low point in this profitability cycle, offsetting high point in the late 1960’s. Our preliminary data indicate that f l return on equity in the industry currently is well below that ex-| perienced at the bottom of the previous cycle and about one-tenth of| the median rate o f the past seven years. An upward trend in prices and volume w ill benefit the securities inj dustry, but there are other adverse trends that need examination. D recommend that interested government agencies conduct a coordinated review o f the respective role of, and government policies toward, oiuj many different financial institutions considering both existing statutes and future requirements with respect to the process of capital forma-j tion for American industry. As one example, securities industry 1 expressed deep concern that the aggressive expansion of banks a bank holding companies into new services in recent years while securities industry has been declining, has created an unequal comj petitor for the securities industry, both because of the size of the banks and because they appear to be regulated by agencies whose primary] concern is the health o f the banking system. I f we are to preserve i 230 healthy securities industry independent o f domination by commercial banks, protective measures may be indicated. M. R. H ellie President Credit Union National Association, Inc. Persistent inflation has caused severe problems for the capital mar kets of the United States. To the extent that individuals view inflation as permanent, long-term commitments to the debt or equity markets become less attractive. In order to support the capital requirements necessary to expand our productive capacity and thereby lessen supply-induced inflation, it may be necessary to increase incentives to those willing to commit their funds to the long-term markets. It is important, however, that any incentives created apply equitably to all forms of capital commitments, be they equities, debt, or deposit and share accounts at financial institutions. To encourage savings and investment, all financial institutions should be granted the power to establish term savings, deposit or share accounts. Those individuals who prefer to make capital commitments through financial institutions should be given equivalent incentive to those that wish to invest directly in stocks or bonds. This incentive approach should increase the proportion of disposable personal income going to savings and lessen the demand-induced price pressures in the consumer sector. It would make more capital available to housing, and because of the time commitments, lessen the disintermediation impact onfinancial institutions during tight money periods. Mr. Gustave L . L evy Partner Goldman, Sachs and Company C apital M arkets and C apital F ormation 1. Two areas of government regulation seem to be having a particu larly negative effect on the efficiency and functioning of the financial markets. The first is the regulatory policies o f the various public utility commissions. W ith inflation pushing up the cost of long-term money, adequate rates of return on investment are necessary for utili ties if we are to have sufficient electric generating capacity. Second, t e regulations lim iting the interest rates paid by the major mortgage ending institutions are at the heart of the sharp declines of housing activity during periods of tight money. I would endorse measures over the long run to eliminate the ceilings on the rates that savings institutions can pay and at the same time give these institutions greater 231 558-812 0 - 74 - 16 flexibility in their investment policies rates of return on their invest ments can be increased to pay the higher savings rates. In the short run, a tax credit or exemption for some portion of interest earned on savings accounts would help. 2. Inflation is the basic cause of the current problems in the avail ability of capital funds. Inflation increases the risks faced by long-term investors in bonds and stocks. As a result, the cost of long-term money rises sharply and the flow of investment funds moves in the direction of shorter term securities. This threatens the supply of adequate long term investment funds which is critical to the long-term growth of the U.S. economy. A reduction in inflation is the major key to alleviating these problems. 3. In recent months, many corporations have been urging managers of their pension funds to invest their cash flows in debt instruments, particularly, of a short-term nature. This is completely self-defeating because these same corporations are complaining that prices of their stocks do not reflect their inherent values. It is essential in the long run for our markets to more truly reflect inherent values so that cor porations may finance, through the sale of common stock as well as the sale of debt. Therefore, in my opinion, corporations should be urged not to instruct their money managers to avoid purchases of equities. M r . B ruce K. M acL aury President Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Recent data on capital appropriations and on plans for plant and equipment spending indicate that capital formation is now moving ahead at a substantial pace in those industries where bottlenecks and shortages were recently acute, including steel, nonferrous metals, chemicals, petroleum, and paper. The obvious exception to this gen eralization is in the public utility sector where the greatest impedi ment to financing and construction appears to ¡be the reluctance of public service commissions to review and pass favorably on requests for rate increases. The federal government has already begun to use its influence to overcome this reluctance, and it should continue to do so. Home construction, an area o f special concern, has been greatly de pressed since the turn of the year. Raising Regulation Q ceilings would provide some relief. Other actions w ill also be needed. In choos ing them, emphasis should be placed on those measures that reduce or eliminate barriers to competition in the construction industry and to those that promise improvements in productivity. A mandatory credit allocation program to channel funds to es sential” areas should be avoided. Such a program would prove diffi232 cult if not impossible to administer fairly, and lead to a worse rather than better allocation of credit and resources. Demands on credit markets by federally sponsored agencies should be given much greater publicity, and subjected to Congressional scrutiny as a totality, in the same way that is now proposed for federal expenditures. Me.J ames J. N eedham Chairman of the Board New York Stock Exchange The NYSE is deeply concerned with the problem of continuing in flation, the consequent severe disruptions in the nation’s financial mar kets, and longer-run prospects of a tremendous shortage in the supply of sorely needed savings for investment purposes. This shortage threatens our national priorities not only in housing, energy, mass transportation and a lm~* of other critical areas, but in combating in flation itself. The Exchange’s research economists have prepared the attached de tailed projection of the capital needs and savings potential of the U.S. economy through 1985. Their conclusion is that a huge gap is in prospect, with savings falling short by as much as $650 billion over the next dozen years. Such a financial deficiency would, of course, be only a mirror image of a shortage in real resources—of physical capacity, essential materials and supplies, power and energy, and production and productivity. In an increasingly service-oriented economy, the achievement of productivity gains becames more difficult but no less urgent. As wage rates continue to climb, productivity improvements are an essential offset if inflation is to be curbed. Therefore, the immediate challenge of dampening inflation requires a strong upsurge in saving and investment to increase productive ca pacity, together with a determined effort to restrain cost-push pres sures generated by the continuing round of wage settlements. A decisive, comprehensive program is essential to achieving these objectives. I believe the following recommendations can play a sig nificant role in meeting the nation’s immediate and longer-run eco nomic needs: 1. A reduction in Federal expenditures would go a long way toward reassuring the American people of the government’s determination to curb inflation. Moreover, a reduction in Federal outlays would reduce Federal borrowing and ease monetary conditions even in the absence of any change in Federal Reserve policy. Essentially, I believe that monetary policy should be eased somewhat with a shift in the mix to ward more stringent fiscal measures. As an adjunct, the borrowing re quirements of the Federal credit agencies should be included in the total Federal budget. 233 2. A mandatory savings program should be developed to stimulate personal saving, immobilize purchasing power without a tax increase, and restrict the inflationary impact of current wage settlements. My suggestion is that wage gains in excess of some base pay and in excess of a specified percentage, say, 5% per annum, be channeled into sav ings by means of payroll deduction, with the proceeds invested in government or private securities, or other appropriate outlets. Not all pay increases would be affected. Families whose income is at or below a minimum essential level—using a cutoff point of, say $10,000 or $15,000 per year—would be excluded. Others would have to accept some belt tightening but only as far as income increases are concerned. Assume, for example, that a wage earner is granted an 8% increase over his current $20,000 annual salary—an increase of $1,600. He would receive in his paycheck an 8% increase on the exempt portion of his income, say $15,000, plus 5% of the increase on the $5,000 portion of his income which exceeds $15,000. Thus, his gross income would rise by $1,450 ( 8 % X $15,000 + 5% X $5,000). The reminder of the in crease, namely 3% on the $5,000 portion of his salary over $15,000— or $150—would be placed on behalf of the wage earner in a trusteed segregated account. In the example, therefore, $1,450 would be the in crease in gross salary paid out while $150 would be deferred. These deferred savings would be redeemable by the beneficiary or his heirs upon retirement or death, in the event of a family emergency, or at such time as the consumer price index has stabilized below a prede termined rate—say, 6% per annum—for a one-year period. Many as pects of such a national savings program would obviously have to be worked out very carefully. For example, it might be necessary to han dle professional and other self-employment income via tax returns. In any case, the details can be worked out to implement this concept and stimulate increased saving and investment, while helping to reduce inflation. 3. Structural rigidities should be eliminated in labor laws, agricul ture, foreign trade, communication, transportation and other indus tries. We are preparing a list of these institutional impediments to pro duction and efficiency. A rise in productivity must be high on the agenda of counter-inflationary policies. 4. Tax revisions are urgently needed, particularly in the treatment of investment credits, capital gains, and corporate savings. The NYSE has already proposed a detailed package of concrete tax changes which is attached. Additional tax incentives to increase output and capacity in our productive industries, including tax credits and more liberal depreciation allowances, are clearly needed. 5. Commission to Study Capital Flows. I also urge, as a high pri ority item, creation of a national, non-partisan Commission to focus on prospects of a major capital shortage and to present to the Presi234 dent and the Congress within six months a constructive program for dealing with this critical problem. This Committee should be respon sible for a full and comprehensive review of all options, including means to stimulate savings, appropriate tax and other policies, and methods of strengthening our capital markets. The Commission should operate under the aegis of the Executive Office, with members drawn from the Treasury, Federal Reserve Board, Council of Economic Advisers, the Senate and House, and knowledgeable representatives of the private sector. Should the momentum of inflation fail to yield within the foresee able future, and should financial market conditions remain in disarray, consideration might be given, as a last resort, to the possibility of temporary credit and capital investment incentives and guidelines, particularly bank lending guidelines, as a means of permitting an easing in the Federal Reserve’s tight monetary policies. I strongly oppose, however, any long-run government allocation of credit. Definitive policies are needed to strengthen the securities industry. In this area, the Exchange has already made specific legislative and regulatory recommendations aimed at preserving the vitality of the capital raising process in this country. It would be clearly unwise to force a hasty, basic restructuring of the securities markets at a time when continued effective operation of those markets is more essential than ever to the economic health of the nation. I have prepared a separate report on this subject under the topic of “Financial Institu tions and Inflation.” Mr. D onald T. R egan Chairman of the Board Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. We stand on the brink of an historic crisis for American capitalism, and the brink is crumbling. Inflation plays havoc with the availability and cost of money and capital. Savers are discouraged from making long-term capital commitments, and penalized by a rate of inflation that cruelly exceeds the rate of return. Borrowers are forced to pay bloated costs. A liquidity crisis widens and deepens with every day that inflation goes unchecked. The need for massive increases in productive capacity is imperative. Major materials producing and processing industries are operating at unsustainable rates of over 90 percent of capacity. Utilities, energy related industries, and others will need enormous sums of capital over the coming years. Part of the needed expansion capital must come from internal sources, and help is needed to enable companies to channel more funds into expansion. Investment tax credits should be increased, especially for energy-related and other priority projects. 235 A t the same time a large amount of the needed funds must be raised through the capital markets. The investment environment will be helped by progress in dampening inflation since investors can be offered attractive rates of return at a cost that the issuing company can afford. However, inflation progress alone will not fully restore health to the capital markets. Savings by individuals should be encouraged by government action. W ith the worst financial markets in 40 years, in vestors have become discouraged. They must be afforded incentives to return and provide the much needed capital. The most positive step would be to relax the capital gains tax, which has been an inhibiting factor for the nation’s 30 million investors. Elimination of the withholding tax on interest and dividends paid to foreigners is also essential. These withholdings inhibit portfolio in vestments from abroad, precisely at the moment when we seek such investments to relieve inflationary pressure on our capital markets, aid our balance of payments, and when we are struggling to provide op portunities for recycling the petro-dollars. Providing the needed capital also requires a healthy securities in dustry. This industry must be strong enough to finance the capital raising operations and to provide the large distribution network needed to place the new securities with investors throughout the na tion and, increasingly, throughout the world. Furthermore, the securi ties industry must be in position to operate an active secondary market because investors will buy new securities only if they have reasonable assurance that they can be re-sold whenever desired. Reforms which are in the best interests of the nation’s investors should be encouraged by all branches of government. 236 SI Capital Markets and Capital Formation Conference Proceedings CAPITAL MARKETS AND CAPITAL FORMATION SECRETARY SIMON: Now, we will move to the dis c u ssio n on the capital market and capital formation: Robert Baldwin of Morgan Stanley. MR. BALDWIN: I guess what we want to try and em phasize -- and it has been brought out in a recent r e le a s e by the New York Stock Exchange -- is that our s tu d ie s show that there is going to be a very large demand for capital in the next eight to ten years. In fact, as best we can see it, there will be inadequate capital to meet the demands and, in fact, putting it another way, whereas in the past 25 years, productive needs have determined how much capital is going to be raised, we see figures that would indicate to us that over the period through 1984, the amount of capital that can be raised will determine what productive capacity is put in. Now, this has tremendous significance for a whole society, and I think that we must try in this Country, to encourage profits rather than to look on them as something evil and to reward savings and make sure that they are not destroyed by inflation. Everyone, whether it is Government, Business, Labor, or Consumers, must realize that basically fu ture government policies must be geared to encour aging investment, rather than consumption, or we are going to be unsuccessful in meeting this demand and success will be a victory for all and not for any one segment. Now, if you look at the numbers, as we see them, just looking at the markets themselves, back in the Sixties, we were raising about a little over $1 billion in equity,* and raised between - in the early Sixties - about $4 billion of corporate bonds and $11 billion in the latter part of the Sixties. Our forecast would indicate that we are going to have to raise over $13 billion on an average, in corporate equities, and $23 billion in corporate bonds. Now, gentlemen, ladies and gentlemen, I just say that this is going to be impossible if we don't lick one thing first of all, and that is inflation; and two, make the proper incentives to save. 239 It was commented before that we had gone to the brink over the last two months, and I think that is true. I think there is going to be a continuing fall-out from what the inflationary expectations as people, as institutions, change their investing habits. And this is a very worrisome thing to us. I think, probably, as Ralph Leach stated very well, when he said that anybody mentions credit alloca tions, and you see people start to run for the banks. When people hear that there is going to be an inade quate amount of capital, they start running for the capital markets when they can. Unfortunately, in the case of our public utilities, they have had no place to go. They have raised as much money as they could in the capital markets, and then they've gone back to the banks. Now the banks are forced to tell them that they cannot accomodate them any more, and we see the wholesale cutbacks that are going to influence this country and the job generating capacity around the country. I think these are the basic points that I wanted to make, Mr. Secretary. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Ralph Leach. MR. LEACH: I would like to go back to some of the remarks that Alan Greenspan made this morning and, perhaps, associate myself also with Charlie Walkers' plea for greater understanding of some of the figures that are being given to the public. I think it has come to be widely appreciated that inflation has a very distorting effect on corporate profits. Specifically, inflation over states profits, because depreciation charges are inadequate in terms of the replacement cost of capital assets, and because so many businesses still use the first-in, first-out method of valuing inventories. This distortion of profits makes it very difficult to judge how high or low profitability now is in historical perspective. In the forth coming September issue of our Morgan Guarantee Survey, which will be published on Monday, there is an article which draws on the work of the Commerce Department analysts to try to eliminate inflation's 240 distorting impact on profits, and I will use Con gressman Patman’s device and ask to file an addi tional statement in the form of that article. I believe it is quite similar to one that Mr. Franklin referred to this morning, and I am told that a much more technical analysis of this subject is contained in an article in the Brookings Insti tutional Quarterly by Professor Nordhaus of Yale. After adjustment for inflation, corporate profitability is revealed to be comparatively low at present; certainly not high enough to justify much hope of pronounced generalized capital goods strength any time soon. And I doubt that many people will be surprised to learn that there is a very close correlation between corporate profit ability adjusted for inflation distortions, and capital formation. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Mr. Kelso. MR. KELSO: Mr. Secretary, I would like in connection with the discussion of the current subject -- the rate of new capital formation -- to tie into the Chart No. 4, which was in the series of charts that I distributed this morning, and to urge upon the Treasury and upon the Administration and upon Congress, the Analysis and study of, and really, the questioning of- what seems to me to be essentially an old banker's; myth; namely, the new capital form ation can only be financed out of past savings, or accumulated savings. They can quite as easily be financed out of pure credit and the technique of finance, which uses employee stock ownership trusts to simultaneously finance growth to build ownership -- that is to say, market power -- into the masses of the working population, and then to make that financing to the extent that regulations adopted by Federal Reserve may permit, to make that financing directly discountable with the Federal Reserve Bank, means that once you have used the savings in the system, the reserves of the insurance companies, that you can finance your growth on pure credit. You cannot, of course, finance consumption in this way. To do so would be suicidal because it is not selfliquidating. But new capital formation under the logic of business is self-liquidating and in a very short space of years the cost has been paid off and the tools go on pushing goods and services into the economy indefinitely. 241 Thus, it is almost the perfect counter-formula for the reversal of inflation: more and more goods and services, chasing fewer dollars. It seems to me that this is the gateway to raising the productiveness of our working population by building capital ownership into them and by being able to finance the incredible growth which we do face over the next ten years. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Otto Eckstein. MR. ECKSTEIN: Mr. Secretary, we have done some studies on this question: whether there is going to be a capital shortage or not, and the arithmetic that we come up with is something like this. Last year, we spent $137 billion on businessfixed capital formation. By 1980, if you add up the petroleum needs, and the utility needs, and all of the rest, that figure becomes $280 billion, or a doubling. Now, out of that $140 some odd billion dollar increase, perhaps $80 to $90 billion will come out of the internal profits after dividends and depre ciation allowances on business. Another $40 to $45 billion is likely to come out of personal savings, and the households, which at this time mainly finance housing, by that time w e ’ll be saving con siderably more than the housing industry will require. And so the financial industry will have to transfer a large block of savings from the household to the national sector. Then the rest, maybe it will come from smaller government deficits; maybe a little comes from abroad, but any way you look at it, you end up with a short-fall of anywhere from $5 to $20 billion. The question, therefore, is a very right one, and if we don't improve our financial system and take no other steps, of course, it will come mainly out of the housing, so every once in a while we will be putting housing through the wringer as we are doing at this time. 242 In devising policies to deal with the capital shortages, there are a number of different consider ations that go into it, and that we have to settle for ourselves before we come up with any one of the many proposals that have been floating around in this room and there are others that are not even in this room. ' . First, we have to ask ourselves: Do we want this extra capital formation to come out of internal funds of business, or are we going to try to empha size the use of a capital market -- in other words, not give liberal depreciation but give some kind of savings incentive. Second: How interested are we going to be in the widest dissemination of the ownership of Ameri can business? Are we going to try to encourage mass savings, as is Germany, or some more specific devices? Third: Wehave to ask ourselves: Are we going to focus on very specific capital shortages; the steel industry, the utility industry; at this time, a short-run basis, the housing industry, or are we all going to try to leave it all to the market and just augment total savings? Fourth: We have to ask ourselves: leave it to the market? Should we Should we leave it to higher prices? I think the shortage of primary pricing capa city is being cured in that way. The prices are up; the profit margins have widened; and the industries will be able to finance the larger part of their expansion out of the higher profits, which is exactly the way we teach it to our students. Now, the final consideration in dealing with the capital shortage is this: What is the question of timing? And in what context should this question be dealt with? Now, at the moment, we are saying the budget should be tough. We are all pretty proud of our? selves for having resisted the desires for a personal income tax reduction in the face of falling personal incomes, in real terms, in a weak economy. 243 We are saying, "No, we don’t do that." That then raises the question whether it is at all practical or fair to get very excited about, what, in one way or another, probably would be a business tax reduction at a time when we are so resisting the consumer tax reduction. One other point on this whole question of capi tal shortage: it is very difficult to assess the question at this time, and the numbers, as I have indicated, still have a considerable margin of error. The reason is we have been living through a period of monetary brinksmanship, as was pointed out by several speakers. And, of course, the disruption of investment plans that is created in a period of very tight money, in itself contributes to the shortage of physical capital in the next business cycle and so that, in itself, makes it very hard to assess what the savings investment flows would be if we could ever escape this roller-coaster of easy money and very tight money. Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: Mr. Gaines. MR. GAINES: A couple of brief points. First, the ones which Otto Eckstein has just mentioned here. My studies along the same lines as his, suggest that the incidence of need for capital spending is going to be so highly centralized in terms of the petroleum industry, the electric utilities, the communications, the metal industries, and so forth, that they, themselves, will not generate the internal cash flow to meet anything like the 80% or so that Otto has referred to here of their capital require ments . Granted that all industry might have a cash throw-off that could meet that requirement, but by and large, the industry's throwing off cash will invest that money in short term instruments and w i l l not be immediately available to the long-term c a p it a l market, where our problem actually exists. 244 The second point: If we wish to make it easier -- more feasible -- for industry to finance itself in the huge capital requirements in the years ahead, I would hope that consideration would be given to the adoption of some form of inflation-accounting and recognition of the effect of inflation upon c a p ita l replacement costs in our tax legislation. France, for example, since the Second World War, has periodically permitted industry to revalue its fixed assets at current replacement costs and compute depreciation against those current replacement costs. I would not propose, necessarily, that we go that far, but some recognition of what inflation has done to replacement costs, I think, would make it easier for industry to finance itself. The third point -- quite unrelated: Something that I have not heard mentioned here today in connection with the functioning of the capital markets, is the ability of our present underwriting brokerage trading system to do the job that is going to be required in the years ahead. What I have in mind, in particular, is that capital losses on Wall Street, and other financial communities, have been so large in recent years that their ability to make markets -- either as underwriters or as traders -- has been seriously eroded. An important question is how we attract new capital into the underwriting and trading institutions. Experiences of other wealthy indi viduals in recent years would not suggest that we might be able to rely upon that avenue as a source of funds. It is, perhaps, indelicate for a commer cial banker to make this last suggestion but, as a potential source of additional capital to do the underwriting and the trading job that will be needed in the years ahead, we must go back and take look at the Glass Steagall Act. Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: Mr. Kapnick. Thank you. I would like to comment just briefly on Mr. Leach's comments, and some of the others -- on the fictitious profits and inventory and the need to do something about it. I think, you know, that there is one tangible way that you could have immediate help to industry, and that is by some -- adopting some new approach to your LIFO method. I think that one thing that is very damaging to industry is the requirement of the IRS that they use the LIFO inventory valuation for both book and tax purposes, and that they can not include the inventory on their financial statements at current values, because it destroys their ratios. I can tell you that in discussing this with many industrial clients, that this becomes an abso lute problem because of the problem of ratios that they must meet under certain indentures, and certain debt instruments and this requirement by the IRS I think, could be immediately removed to help those who want to move to the LIFO inventory immediately. Long range, I think that it would be appropriate to adopt a new approach whereby, if a company took that deduction, that they did not include the amount in earnings, but that they credited the price level change directly to surplus, so that we would not have these fictitious profits in the future. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Charlie Walker. MR. WALKER: Mr. Secretary, could I say a word or two about tax policy and capital formation, and this is partly out of an economic background; partly out of a background of working with Senator Long and Senator Roth and others, on at least two major tax bills. I agree with Mr. Hauge that our tax system is biased in favor of consumption and against investment. And so I am going to start way out -- way out -and the way out start is the suggestion that we consider substituting a consumption-based value added tax, which is one that does not tax investment goods, completely for the corporate income tax. 246 Now, before I get shot down in flames, let me say a couple of things about this. The value-added tax has been roundly criticized Pin the Press -- and I think incorrectly -- as being a simple retail sales tax. It's not. It’s a tax ion gross sales by businesses all through the stages !of production, whether it is passed on or not de11pends upon the strength of final demand at the con sumer level. It may not be passed on. But to the [extent it is, we develop devices in the Treasury where you can easily make that sort of tax which is said to be regressive, to the extent passed on, you can make it neutral through income tax rebates, iYou can even make it progressive, as a matter of fact, if you lean over far enough and this quite clearly -- moving in this direction -- would shift 'the weight of the tax system more on to consumption land away from investment. There are many arguments for it. The biggest [argument against it is: It would put a lot of tax 'lawyers out of work because you would get away from !all of the problems of the Internal Revenue Code, of determining what is income in a corporation and what |are actually expenses, and what are actually de ductions . Okay. Too far, too way-out to consider now, |so let's go a little bit half way along the road here and look at a couple of other things. Let us explore, at least, what the French call the a'droit fiscal which is just another word for [reducing the double taxation of double dividends, by giving a credit to the individual taxpayer on his individual taxes for some portion of the tax that has previously been paid by the corporation before it pays the dividend. There are some very interesting developments in Western Europe in this respect, and, as I said, the a'droit fiscal is one. Also, of course, are reductions in taxes on capital gains. Perhaps, along the lines that seem to be developing in the Congress at the present time. 247 L But let me make my fundamental point. Let me apologize just a little bit -- not very much -- just a little bit for perhaps being a little too intemperate with the TV medium this morning. I usually destroy my first drafts, but I didn't have time to because I wrote, this at midnight last night. But what really bugs me in the TV media and, to some extent, in the written Press, is not to get over some fundamental points about economics, and the profit system, and the market economy. Corporations don't pay taxes. People do. The taxes are either passed forward to the ultimate purchasers, and if you double the taxes on the corporations that own the big super-markets that have about a penny for a dollar margin of profit, that is going to be passed forward and be a regress ive tax to the people that buy food, or it is passed backward to the owners of the business, reduces the return on investment, and stifles the flow of investment and capital into that business, the very shortage we are talking about. So the corporation is simply a tool for doing business, and a pretty darned good one, and very successful. People pay taxes, not corporations. The final point, the real question, is this -two questions, really. First of all, if it is, then, people who pay taxes, how much do the rich people pay and how much do the poor people pay? We are very concerned about that, and we want a reasonably progressive tax structure, and the Federal income tax structure, not including payroll taxes -- the Federal income tax structure is reasonably progressive from about zero to ten, the lowest brackets, up to about thirty-three per cent. The second question, and a very important question, is the impact of the tax system on jobs, on investment and capital formation as we are talking about now, on international competitiveness, which is the reason we got the investment credit and accelerated appreciation in 1971, and on the overall growth of the economy. 248 SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Gus Levy? MR. LEVY: I would like to answer the criticism that was made of the investment banking industry. I fully believe that the investment banking industry can handle the financing, the annual financing of $25 billion of bonds and six or seven or eight billions of common stock very simply. The thing that worries me primarily is that it is not going to be there to finance, because the problem is with equity selling five times earnings, to take an example, that means they have to return 20 percent on the money put up in order to prevent dilution of that equity. And if equity continues to sell at five percent, I don't see there is going to be any equity financing. If there is no equity financing, the structure of the balance sheets of major corporations will be so bad by financing for all debt that they will lose their ratings, they won't be able to finance the debt. So it able to -financed. nothing to strengthen to balance sold. is not .the problem of Wall Street to be Wall Street can finance what has to be Our worry is that there is going to be finance unless we do something to our equity market to provide the equity the balance sheets before debt can be As a matter of fact, Jim, you correct me on this, I believe the last figures of the capital and Wall Street firms and stock exchange firms were around 3.2 billion. The whole -- when we underwrite something, we are charged what we call a haircut. The haircut runs from 30 percent in common stocks to five percent, I believe, in AAA bonds. Well, there is no problem with financing or underwriting that amount of securities, 25 billion of bonds or seven or eight billions of common stock over a period of a year. 249 As a matter of fact, we recently underwrote, the Street did, without any problem, $650 million of city bank notes, and the Street had no problem. We can handle an issue like that a week or every day and have no problem. SECRETARY SIMON: Bob Dederick. MR. DEDERICK: At the risk of being a bit heretical, even to myself, I would just like to say that there is sort of an implicit assumption that goes through here, and with some people it is explicit, and that is that we do have a system biased towards consumption and away from investment, and in part, in consequence of that, we are going to have unsatisfied capital needs. I think that this case is unproved, really. It may be correct, I think it may not be. We talked about -- that we sort of overcommit ourselves in the Government area, and we may take considerable -we do a great deal of criticism of this. I think some of the shopping lists of what we are going to need in the investment area are really the same sort of thing. We have always had, if one looked ahead, enormous capital needs. Perhaps the only difference between the last few years and the decades before is that we never looked ahead before, and so we never knew the insoluble problems that lay ahead of us, and in consequence, the market made them not so insoluble after all. So I think what I am trying to say is that we really have to ask ourselves a question, do we need these. To be sure, all these items appear to be desirable, but it is the same thing, as I say", as regards Government programs. And thus we have to ask ourselves if we do need them, do we really recognize what is involved in satisfying them. We are really talking here in some of the position papers in any event about some rather dramatic changes in the tax structure, some rather fundamental moves, and we really have to ask ouselves, do we need these fundamental moves. 250 I think myself I would just say that many of these great unsatisfied needs as they appear to be are really a function of the fact that we have gone through an enormous inflationary boom, which has made us perhaps think we have more needs than we will in fact have, when we get into a normal environment. So my basic final point is that rather than taking this for granted and assuming that, "Some thing has to be done here," that we really re appraise the entire situation and try to ask our selves, can the market do this or do we really need these big changes that follow from the assumption that we have enormous demands. I for one think that the case is completely unproved. SECRETARY SIMON: Yes, I can't see all the way down to the end, there. MR. ENSLEY: Mr. Secretary, an effective action that could be taken to help with a capital shortage, the so-called shortfall that Otto Eckstein documented very well -- and there have been many other studies documenting this fact -- would be to provide tax exemption or a tax credit for some part of interest earned on savings accounts. Now, this was mentioned a time or two already today. You know, most western industrial countries do provide some type of tax incentive for savings. While it is important not to impair Federal revenues at this time, this kind of tax relief pro vides several overriding advantages. It would stimulate savings, essential in the projected period of capital shortage, and particularly it would alleviate very quickly disintermediation at thrift-oriented thrift institutions and provide funds for credit-starved housing markets, and finally, the estimated revenue loss, about two billion dollars in the case of a thousand dollar exemption, is probably less than the cost of direct subsidy-provided programs for housing through the expanded GNMA or FNMA tandem plan, subsidized FHLB advances to savings institutions, and our other direct subsidy programs which may be adopted if the housing crisis worsens. Thank you. 251 SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Who haven’t we heard from? there. Down at the end, MR. REGAN: Mr. Secretary, there is one tax I think should be discussed at this particular moment that I believe is impeding the formation of capital in the United States, and could be of great assistance :n relieving the capital shortage not only this year but in many of the years ahead. I am specifically referring to the withholding tax on foreigners. There are many countries with which the United States does not have tax treaties. Many of these countries are located in the Middle East. Most of these countries are the beneficiary now of an enormous amount of capital. On a govern ment -to -government basis this can be handled rather satisfactorily. But as these sums of money start to flow into the hands of individuals in the Middle East and other places, they are reluctant to invest in the United States if we are going to with hold on their interest and dividends. I suggest that when forming policies having to do with capital shortage, that that is one tax that should be kept in mind. SECRETARY SIMON: Don, that has already been agreed to. We did that six months ago and it is already in the bill in Ways and Means. MR. REGAN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. SECRETARY SIMON: Yes. MR. PRESTON: I would like to associate myself with the remarks of my good friend Grover Ensley of the Mutual Savings Banks. I will just take one minute to amplify. The Research Department of— the U. S. League made quite an intensive study of this matter, and our figures show that with the 1,000 tax exemption, we would attract roughly $24 billion annually in additional deposits to the savings and loan business alone. This does not, of course, include commercial banks, nor does it include the mutual savings banks. Now, the obvious question is, where would these funds come from? In our view, overwhelmingly these funds of $24 billion a year would come from existing account holders in savings associations, especially those who are presently drawing down their deposits and investing in fixed income market securities. We would not expect any significant shift from the stock market. Those people would continue to enjoy the advantages of capital gains treatment and so on. Nor do we believe there would be any shift from the Government market, who enjoy the tax deferral advantages and others. We do not believe there would be any shift from the U. S. Government securities and the municipal bond market, because of the inherent advantages they have. So the answer to the question on this agenda, how to create additional capital, we say the tax incentive is one very tangible method. Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. A1 Wojnilower. MR. WOJNILOWER: I think one should be very careful not to expect very much from policies that are supposed to alter people's preferences for con sumption versus saving, which have been for generations imbedded in the standard of living and the relative position of families in the country. This particular measure, I think, to provide tax exemption to savings accounts is one that might very well backfire and have to some degree the opposite result. First of all, there isn't any way, an easy way I can think of, to limit this tax exemption to new accounts as contrasted with existing accounts. And in the current inflationary environment, and recognizing that the old accounts greatly outnumber the new accounts you might get, it isn't at all clear but that you might not get more spending out of what is essentially a tax cut by giving people wore of an effective return on the accounts that 253 they already have than you would get new saving on the part of people who are newly attracted into the savings market. Secondly, if you limit this only to depository institutions and don’t include, for example, dividends on equities, and we can widen the scope, this would be one way of nailing the last tack into that particular coffin. So that it's very difficult to say where you would have to draw the boundaries or how you would draw the boundaries on such a tax subsidy without leaving outside some of that favored boundary some very essential parts of our capital markets. Finally, we do have to recognize that disinter mediation plays a role not in raising interest rates but in holding them down. That is, funds leave one type of institution and investment in order to go in to another, where the demand is more intense, and they hold down rates in the area into which they enter. And if you invent a successful device to increase the effective rate of return in one very large area, you have to ask yourself whether the bidders, in this case essentially the commercial banks and directly and indirectly their business customers, might not very well be in a much better position to up the ante that they are offering in the interest rate market so when you are all said and done, you are back where you started from except that you have a bigger Government budget deficit. SENATOR LONG: Might I mention the suggestion that I'm sending down to Bill Simon -- he hasn't seen it yet, I guess - but try to get this housing industry going again. Here is my suggestion. Let's assume that a person buys a hundred thousand dollar house and he borrows 90 thousand to pay it out, and then you have 30 percent plus inflation as you had this year. Now, that is a terrible beating for the lender to take on his money, regardless of what the interest rate is. But on the other hand, if you finance 254 that at the current high level of interest rates, when prices stabilize, if they ever do -- and we are trying to stabilize them -- then the borrower is go ing to take a terrible beating by having to pay that high interest rate that was occasioned during inflationary times. Canada tries to meet that by variable interest rates, and other countries have other methods. My suggestion would be that you would have what I would call appreciation mortgage that could be agreed to, that the Secretary of the Treasury would take a look at what the current level of interest rates are, and also at the degree of inflation that has occurred during the last year. He would then fix a percentage figure which would be added to the mortgage on the far end. [That would then mean that instead of a person owing $90 thousand on $130 thousand house, by virtue of inflation the house is now worth $130 thousand, so he would owe $100 thousand o n a $130 thousand house. And if that were done, it would be my thought that that appreciation fee should not be taxable, should be treated a a return of capital which, in the last analysis, it is when you look at the fact that the value of the capital had eroded. I^don't know whether I can sell it to Bill but I will make an effort to put it through. Simone SECRETARY SIMON: Frank Hoenemeyer. MR. HOENEMEYER: I would like to comment a little bit on what I see developing in the long-term debt markets. There were some statements earlier that if we gave some tax incentives to the savings institu tions, that this would draw money into housing, and it was sort of passed over, but it would draw money out of the bond market. Gus Levy expressed the opinion earlier that he saw no difficulty in financing the long-term debt requirements of our country. I do agree with him that there is a more serious problem in the equity markets, but as long-term investors look at what has happened to them over the past 10 or 20 years and they compare the results of -investments 255 in common stocks, the results of investment in long-term bonds or mortgages and the results of investment in short-term securities, it is veryobvious that the best investment has been short term securities. We are beginning to think that if inflation continues, that we are going to have to abandon one way or another the long-term market. Whether this becomes a variable interest rate or whether we are in fact lending on a short-term basis, this is going to put additional strains on corporations and on the economy. And I think this is -- I am not offering a solution to this problem of inflation, but I am just trying to point up another potential danger if we don’t lick the problem of inflation. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Bob Bethke. MR. BETHKE: Another possible approach to savings desire. Let’s all agree that we have to encourage ourselves and the public to save more, it is much better to have that money to use for productive capacity needs than taxation to do the job for us, and certainly savings takes away some discretionary buying power for a day when it will get us more goods. But is there a way to encourage some savings without the thousand dollar tax exemption which is bound to cost the Treasury a billion eight or two billion dollars a year at a time when you are trying to do the reverse, keep your revenues in focus? Well, I might quickly suggest that to encourage net new savings, that is our problem, we consider increasing the Federal deposit insurance coverage for mutual savings banks and S § L associations from $20 thousand to $40 thousand. This would alleviate, if properly presented, lots of concerns among individuals about the finan cial stability of individual institutions. We are 256 talking about the small, the common man. Second, I increase Regulation Q limits on savings deposits by even a quarter of one percent. This permits the Isavings industry to get into a whole new adver tising pitch, they are pretty good salesmen to begin with, they have done a good job in the face of tremendous disintermediation. That is not so much more pay-out that many of them would be dipping into their surplus accounts. Ilf there are any in that case, why not set up a special collateralized borrowing privilege at the Federal Reserve for a temporary period, collateral izing against their assets to get through this littl |period. Thirdly, what about allowing a tax deferment on a non-take-out or dividend paid savings account, any savings account that has an automatic interest reinvestment like the Series E bonds, allow that account to defer the tax payment for seven years just like the Series E bonds? This ought to be a fantastic appeal to a man about 58 years old. His children are educated and Igone, he can look forward to retirement when he is going to have a little less income. All of these things ought to give the savings institutions enough additional appeal that they can start holding their own in this stream of disintermediation, and be a lot better than tax increases or tax exemptions. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Senator Javits. SENATOR JAVITS: Mr. Chairman, I had first pledged myself to do all I can in respect to this problem of capital formation. Russell has come up with an idea and we have heard many other ideas. I think the legislators should decide that this is a critical aspect of firming up the economy and pledge themselves to active steps with respect to it promptly, because our problem is time. Secondly, X would like to raise two other questions of importance to the stock exchange which is here in the person of Jim Needham. One, if you want - - y o u ought to have more customers for stocks than you have. You don't have enough. Therefore, I think, you ought to apply yourselves to inducing corporations as part of their activities to set up, like they have done pension plans so brilliantly, a stock ownership plan, and I don't think there is anything to be afraid of there, and I think it is long overdue. If people at this late date are afraid of having a couple of workers on their boards, then they don't know what is happening in modern times. Secondly, in order to be conducive to that the worker can't tote around pieces of paper. So the early installation of some form of bankability in terms of entries instead of these pieces of paper which were swiped and otherwise manhandled would be extremely conducive to getting you more customers. I strongly urge that on you. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Congressman Reuss? MR. REUSS: In searching for capital formation, we may be overlooking, of course, what I think is the best source, namely, the 80 million-odd working families in this country. A working man, what can he do? He gets a totally unmarketable five-and-a-half percent or so on a savings bond, he goes to a bank or savings and loan and wants to plunk down his money and he is confronted by Regulation Q, which lowers the boom on the market rate of interest he would get. If he shows up -- if Archie Bunker shows up at the Treasury this week with a thousand dollars and says, "Give me that thousand dollar Treasury bill paying eight or nine percent that is so juicy," our friend Bill will tell him, "Sorry, we changed the rules. You have to have ten thousand." If, in short, we got rid of all of this dusty paraphernalia, Regulation Q, the artifical distinc tion between savings and loans and thrift institu- 258 tions and banks and all of the other archaic rules which are conspiring to add to the inflation, we might then be in a position to get hold of the best source of capital formation there is, namely, the American working people. Think it over. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you, Congressman. We will have time for one more. Jim Needham. MR. NEEDHAM: Mr. Secretary, if I may first respond to Senator Javits, I accept your suggestion, Senator. We are working on increasing the share in the population. Obviously, in this kind of en vironment, our efforts are not totally successful. That is probably an overstatement. On the second part of your question, with respect to the stock certificate, we are moving very slowly there but it is being worked on, and I point out to you, Senator, that our biggest problem is not with the vested interests as one might suspect, but rather with the individual himself who is very reluctant to part with that certificate, particularly because of adverse publicity. Mr. Secretary, while I do have the microphone, let me wrap up my point, here. I think that this subject of the capital shortage or shortfall is complex, and it is debatable, depending upon how you assign priorities to the needs of the American people. I come back to where I started, and I would like to suggest once again what we do need. We can separate this problem. It is not as urgent as some of the others. It has long-term implications. It really should be studied. I would like to suggest again that we have a national non-partisan commission appointed by the President with representatives from wherever, and ask them to study this matter and come up with a sensible, logical, thought-out program which could be submitted to the President and the Congress within six months. Finally, Mr. Secretary, I was just simply delighted to have a member of the banking community speak up on behalf of the capital needs of the bro kerage industry. We do have a program, it is called a stabilization reserve, which would give us the same benefits that flow to banks and insurance companies, and which they enjoy, which they are probably entitled to. That program has been presented to you, Mr. Secretary, and I guess as long as we have the support of one banker, we have the support of all of them. I urge you to act on it. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Just one second, and then we will have to move to the next subject. MR. SAULNIER: I will be very brief. I am surprised that this discussion of capital requirements and the ways in which we meet them in this country should proceed without very much attention being paid to the fact that this job is done in the USA by financial facilities, investment banking companies, and brokerage companies, and the brokerage companies today are going out of business. The personnel of the brokerage business is declining rapidly because there is no place, I would say, in the system today where the losses have been greater than they have been in that industry. I noticed that the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors didn’t get a very good press from a similar comment, but I will repeat it because it is a fact. Now, basically the only way to reverse this situation is an improvement in the economic climate, and in particular, some success in the fight against inflation. 260 But, I believe, Mr. Secretary, that it is a mistake at this time to be pushing for a system of negotiated commission rates. I have argued this point. I know that it is a controversial one and not everyone in the industry agrees. But I have a moderate proposal to make. That is that a hold ought to be put for the moment on the move to negotiated rates by May 1, 1975. Whatever you may think of this proposal or this method of conducting the securities business, on theoretical grounds, I think you would have to agree that this is a very, very timely procedure. So I say, put a hold on it, and I would secondly suggest that an investigation be launched, as quickly as possible, to determine what can be done to prevent further damage to these facilities of our country, and many of the suggestions that have been made here this afternoon it seems to me to be relevant to that end. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. 261 m. International Economic Policy Discussion Papers from Delegates 558-812 74 Mr. William H. F r a n k l in Chairman, Caterpillar Tractor Company The appropriate role of the U.S. in international economic policy as it pertains to the problem of worldwide inflation is one of leader ship in the following areas: 1. Foreign trade. The reduction of tariffs and nontariff barriers to trade makes more goods available at lower prices and hence helps to reduce inflation. The current trade bill should be acted on immediately and bargaining with other countries should begin at once. 2. Export controls. Export controls make less goods available to the countries that would have purchased the goods had they been avail able and hence help to increase inflation. The U .S. should press on with a round of discussions aimed at eliminating as many export controls as possible on a multilateral basis. 3. Exchange rates. The U.S. should continue to press for a perma nent flexible exchange rate system to facilitate increased trade. W ith a flexible system each country’s inflation can be confined to that coun try by making suitable changes in the exchange rate for its currency. 4. Balance of payments. The U.S. should continue to urge seeking a solution to the world’s balance of payments problem created by the new price of oil. I f the balances of trade deficits are not offset so as to reach reasonable balances of payments, the world may well see the proliferation of trade barriers, bilateral agreements, competitive de valuations, etc., all of which would be highly inflationary. The deficits can best be overcome by attracting foreign investment. To this end, foreign ownership of assets in the U.S. and other countries must not only be accepted, but welcomed. In addition, the U.S. should assume leadership in developing and adopting a code of conduct by govern ments which would assume the protection of foreign owned assets. Dr. T ilford C. G aines Senior Vice President and Economist Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. Until about two years ago upon world inflation was the national money market. Since other raw material prices has the principal international influence proliferation of dollars in the inter last last year, the increase in oil and introduced a new dimension that will 265 have the effect of turning the U.S. balance of payments around and that has already made the dollar a desirable rather than unwanted currency in world markets. Overall, the influence of the surpluses in the oil exporting countries has been anti-inflationary. The huge increase in energy costs has im posed a form of forced saving upon people in developed and develop ing countries around the world. To the extent that any country has offset this external discipline through its own internal monetary and fiscal policies, the result has been spiralling inflation and balance of payments weakness. Most developed countries, however, have adopted their policies to the constraints imposed by the higher price of petro leum products and, as a result, are in recession or, at best, a stagnant economic situation. For the time-being, in other words, the increase in oil prices, as well as other basic materials prices, has had an immediate inflationary effect but a longer-term deflationary effect. It is to be hoped that within a reasonable period of time the bulk of the oil surplus money will begin flowing into long-term investments, which will have the dual result of lessening international balance of payments problems and of improving the supply-demand balance in world capital markets, making lower levels of interest rates possible. Meanwhile, the situation in the Middle East is scarcely conducive to optimism that it will be possible to work our way through this difficult period in history without either political, military, or further inflationary flareups. M . R . H e l l ie President. Credit Union National Association, Inc. The effort to reform the structure and regulations of financial insti tutions that began with the appointment of the Commission on Finan cial Structure and Regulation in 1970 now appears to have a better chance to be accomplished by means of omnibus legislation. But it is more apparent than ever that the specific recommendations contained in F I A 1973 fall far short of the desired goal. The change in economic and political conditions since the submis sion of the Hunt Commission report and the legislative package drawn therefrom, dictates a fresh approach to the task of reforming the structure and regulations of financial institutions. We think each regulatory agency and the regulated industry should conduct a review of their existing regulations for the purpose of eliminating those that are unnecessary and updating the others. The goal should be to make financial institutions more efficient and competitive. Then the Treasury should meet with the various financial institu tions to revise and reform F IA 1973. Suggestions for revision from 266 the various financial institutions should be treated positively, while negative reactions from competing financial institutions should be of lesser influence. Through full participation and openness, a more credible and equi tably balanced package can be formulated to gain wider industry and congressional support. In keeping with this approach, the credit union movement is pres ently studying the full range of credit union member needs. Among the matters under discussion are: (1) The cost-price impact of the 12 percent maximum loan rate; (2) third party payments; (3) shares with varying rates and maturities; (4) a liquidity facility; and (5) greater credit union participation in the residential mortgage market. These studies are responsive to credit union members demands for a broader and more flexible range of financial services. It is time for a new look at the Financial Institutions Act. The new look should be made openly and forthrightly. Mr. B ruce K. M acL atjry President, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 1. It has been suggested that to facilitate recycling of oil revenues, the U.S. government should issue special debt obligations to members of OPEC and lend the proceeds to “needy” oil importing countries. It has also been suggested that U.S. government should extend guar antees to commercial banks to transform short-term OPEC deposits into long-term loans to oil importing countries. There is no good reason why U.S. taxpayers should assume default risks for members of OPEC. Instead, the U.S. should promote the establishment of a major re cycling facility in the IBR D . W ith such a facility in existence (which could lend to all governments including those of the LDC’s) members of OPEC would automatically be able to achieve a certain diversifica tion of risk. The U.S. might also stand ready to guarantee its pro portionate share of such a fund against losses. 2. Joint efforts among major countries to monitor—and lim it ex posure on—foreign currency and Euro-dollar positions of banks should be pursued with urgency. Similarly, clear responsibility for aiding international banks in difficulty should be established. Dr. Paul W. M cC racken Senior Consultant Department of the Treasury Even the large and diversified U.S. economy has learned that it can be profoundly affected by external economic influences. W hile the present inflation and instability of the U.S. economy is “home grown” to a substantial extent, these do not explain over half the double digit inflation that we have been experiencing. From the end of 1972 to the third quarter of 1973 (before the oil embargo dominated develop ments) , the rise in our exports of merchandise was equal to almost onethird of the rise in our output of goods. Demands from abroad were competing vigorously with overly rapid increases in domestic de mands, and these made a significant contribution to inflation. Again this year international financial strains have cast their shad ows over the American financial scene. The concerns about regaining stability are understandable, and policies must respond to these con cerns. We must, however, be clear about where we want to go. Two guidelines are particularly urgent. First, our problems heavily reflect overly expansive domestic mone tary policies, and there will be no solution until more prudent and disciplined policies are followed. No “gimmicks” and arrangements can release government from facing this requirement. Second, the new structures and arrangements which are needed must meet the test that they move us toward and not away from a lib eral international financial and economic order—toward freedom from controls, not a growing array of controls. I f we ad hoc our way with one control after another the world will (as has been true historically in these cases) look back and conclude that we are far down a road that we never really intended to travel. T h e H on . H enry S. R euss U.S. House of Representatives Recommendations from the Financial Conference on Inflation, Sep tember 20, to the Economic Summit meeting on September 27-28 should include the following proposals: Fiscal Policy—Federal Taxation: Any policy to fight inflation must defuse the wage explosion already beginning to occur, as workers at tempt to catch up with last year’s inflation and protect themselves against this year’s. A social contract, in which the government pledges social security tax and/or income tax relief for low- and middle-in come people and in which workers pledge to restrain their wage in crease demands, would reduce cost-push inflationary pressures while protecting the average worker against rising prices. Such tax relief must be balanced, to avoid unwanted fiscal stimulus, by tax reform to end outmoded and inequitable tax subsidies and by other revenue-rais ing measures. Monetary Policy—Credit Allocation: The Federal Reserve shou pursue responsible monetary restraint, keeping money supply (M) growth to around six percent for the immediate future. 268 At the same time, we must establish a system with clear ground rules for channeling the limited supply of credit away from inflation ary uses, such as real estate speculation, conglomerate mergers, and commodity buildups, and toward interest-sensitive essential needs such as productive capital investment, low- and middle-income housing, small businesses and farms, public utilities, and state and local govern ments. y : : ■ A’' ' International Economic Policy : To bolster international confidence, let the U.S. lead in putting together a consortium of the leading indus trial nations (a) to guarantee that the world’s major banks will not be allowed to fail for lack of liquidity (as opposed to mismanage ment, for which salvage operations ought not to be attem pted); (b) to adopt coordinated programs to conserve fuel, thus reducing shortrun dependence on the oil-exporting countries, and food, thus easing the prospect of mass starvation in Asia and Africa. Wage-Price Policy: To forestall future price rises, we must increase supplies of scarce materials, through a broad range of policies includ ing advance planning, monitoring of potential shortages, sensible import and export policies, and elimination of artificial barriers to competition. Mr. D avid R ockefeller Chase Manhattan Bank, National Association For obvious reasons, this important conference today is focusing pri marily upon our domestic inflation problem. However, it would seem to be critically important that we spend a fair amount of time discuss ing the international ramifications of this truly global problem. To day, inflation affects all nations of the world and many in a consider ably more severe fashion than the United States. Indeed, literally for the first time, we are witnessing peacetime inflation on a worldwide scale. A high rate of inflation in one country cannot help but increase inflation in others—through its impact both on prices of imports and on prices of world commodities generally. It would seem to be imperative, then, that there be accelerated joint consultation, of the very closest kind, with our friends in the rest of the world. Policies considered in one country which will obviously have an impact in its relationships with other nations, might be re viewed on a consultative basis, prior to final implementation. In this regard, I find it encouraging that the Ministers of Finance of five major industrial countries, including the United States, met just recently to discuss their joint problems, as well as possible joint solutions. It would appear obvious that if one country inflates more than others and is faced with a subsequent loss o f markets, it often is tempted to fall back on such protective devices as tariffs, quotas, com petitive currency devaluations, and the like. 269 Beggar-thy-neighbor policies of this character are to be avoided at all costs. Permitting them to develop now would be to sacrifice many of the benefits which already have been derived from interna tional cooperations so painstakingly achieved over the past quartercentury and so essential to the future well-being of all nations. Indeed in my judgment our policy should be to encourage low-cost imports and to maximize trade between nations. For this reason, passage of the foreign trade bill, now before Congress, would be helpful in combat ting inflation over the longer run. This overriding need for continued cooperation between nations is especially evident when one examines the ramifications of the current energy situation. The four-fold increase in the price of oil by the oilproducing nations not only made a major contribution to the recent inflation, but also has left a legacy of financial turbulence, anxiety and disruption. A ll told, the oil consumers will run a deficit in their cur rent accounts with the oil producers this year of $60 billion or more. B y the end of 1976 these accumulated deficits may add up to as much as $200 billion. These are staggering amounts, with serious implica tions for the stability of international economic order. I f we are to find solutions to this challenge, I believe we must begin by renewing our efforts to bring together the industrial nations of Europe, the Far East and North America so as to devise common strategies to deal with the problems arising out of higher energy prices. We might begin by carrying forward the efforts initiated ear lier this year by Secretary Kissinger. Working with our Trilateral partners and the oil-producing na tions, launching a massive research and development program to find economically feasible alternative sources of energy would be desir able. This is essential both to help the world at large and to provide a continuing source of revenues to the oil producers after their re serves have been exhausted. A t the same time, we and other industrial nations should seek to undertake common programs for conserving on energy, thereby stretching out our available supplies. We must, I believe, as quickly as possible, develop new mechanisms and strategies to meet the mammoth recycling problems of countries suffering from serious balance of payments deficits because of higher oil prices. To accomplish this, the large surpluses earned by the oil producers must be channeled back to the deficit countries. This challenge cannot, in my judgment, be handled solely by the banks and the private market mechanisms as has been the case, to a large degree, up until now. It will increasingly require the combined efforts of governments and international institutions—a fact already being recognized through proposals such as the loan by G erm any to Italy, the new oil facility of the International Monetary Fund, and other actions now in the planning stage. 270 Of course, banks and other investment institutions should continue to play a major role. Their expertise and institutional networks are essential to the oil producers and oil consumers alike, and without them a lasting solution to the problem would be much more difficult, if not impossible. Indeed, there is room here for imaginative new ap proaches—innovations in the design of new financial instruments to meet the needs of oil producers while channeling scarce capital to in dustrial nations. Success in dealing with the recycling problem is also essential i f we are to achieve even a semblance of international monetary stability— a critical element in any program for combatting world inflation. And yet, in dealing with this aspect, as well as other components of this multifaceted problem, we must be aware of the risks of adopting measures which would lead any nation into a recession, which in turn could quickly spread to other countries. Only recently we have seen the temptations and dangers that arise for financial institutions when currencies of different nations fluctu ate widely against each other. Less well recognized, perhaps, is the fact that if the United States dollar is permitted to depreciate greatly against other currencies, the cost of all import items rises. This has certainly has been a contributing factor to United States inflation over the past several years. What we are seeking, is a return to a system that provides greater stability in international currency relationships. Hopefully this is a matter which will be given full consideration in meetings of the In ternational Monetary Fund early next month. Finally, I believe the United States should bend all its efforts to muster support for programs designed to restore greater international monetary stability. Once again, such a goal can only be achieved through cooperation by all key nations. It would seem to me that both recognizing the problem as international in scope, and, at the same time, arriving at solutions that take this interdependence into full account, is a primary requisite for our mutual success. R o b e r t V. R oosa Partner, Brown Brothers Harriman and Company Mr. The efficiency and scale of financial relations among countries have been increased so extensively in recent years that inflationary mo mentum, once started within the leading countries, spread rapidly to all. The flexibility in this financial machinery that had induced and supported record real growth through most of the postwar period be came over extended—spreading active demands across the globe at a pace that outran the global supply of goods and services that were 271 available at yesterday’s capacity, and costs, and prices. The dilemma today is how to check the temporary excesses of monetary demands being transmitted throughout the world without causing a breakdown of the financial mechanism, while at the same time promoting the sustained expansion of capacity and production which the world needs as the real offset to inflationary forces. Moreover, in today’s setting, any source of supply that can be de liberately controlled or limited—whether of raw materials, or finished goods, or labor—has an opportunity to extract a monopoly surcharge, For this and other reasons, great imbalances develop within the cost structures of each country and across their balance of payments fron tiers, with oil presently the prime example of the spreading of distortion. Clearly no one country can stop the excess demand and promote pro duction on a scale sufficient to solve its own problems alone—not with out inconceivably retrogressive to economic isolation. But the United States position is crucial, both through the example we set and through the weight of our own impact on the total results. Moreover, it is through our own currency, the dollar, and through the vast network of American financial facilities erected to service world requirements, that so much of the finance that is needed, as well as that which is excessive is now passing around the world. The urgent problems are: (1) to evert a disruptive breakdown of the financial mechanism, both through preventive action and through prompt shoring up of the repercussions of any individual failures that may occur; (2) to minimize the disruptive impact of oil payments; (3) to so use the generalizer restraint of monetary and fiscal action as to neutralize financial support for further cumulative inflation; (4) to induce the additional real saving and investment required for expanded capacity and output, and eventually a lowering of real costs; and (5) to cushion the more extreme inequities created during the transition from inflation to normality. Toward this end the United States should promote: (1) the closest possible harmonization in diagnosis and policy among the largest countries and the principal raw material producing countries, both for the short run and the longer run; (2) procedures for managing ex change rates to assure orderly flows of trade and payments among countries; (3) the stimulation of productive investment in extractive, manufacturing and service industries; (4) the assurance of adequate longer run demand to provide suitable returns from new investment and production as these emerge; (5) the closest approximation to free competitive conditions in all markets by combating, or offsetting mo nopolistic restraints; and (6) the introduction of selective measures temporarily to employed people and support industries that are dis placed during the process of achieving the other objective. 272 International Economic Policy Conference Proceedings INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND INFLATION SECRETARY SIMON: We are going to move on to the I i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic policy and inflation. Walter Wriston, First National City. MR. WRISTON: Mr. Secretary, I think in the last 125 years, since the end of the Second World War, the nations o f the world have been engaged in dis assembling the barriers to the movement of goods and [services and people across national boundaries. [Those barriers were built after the great depression, and their progressive lowering over the last 25 years has been very salutory for the growth of the economic communities around the world. I think that right now, we stand in some danger of voices urging that we go back to the jungle of economic nationalism again because of the pressure that is put on us, not just the United States, but on many countries around the world, through the taxes of |inflation. I think this is the time, quite the contrary, that we should take a leadership role in negotiating with our partners around the world in pursuing lower barriers to trade and investment. To this end, I would urge that we push ahead on the Trade Reform Act, which would give the Executive Branch of the Government the authority to negotiate for the lowering of trade barriers, both tariff and non-tariff barriers, all over the world. I think that we should support heavily the efforts of our Government to forge truly cooperative relationships with foreign governments in the area of monetary policy, and in general, even on some domestic monetary policies, because we do in fact live in a global economy. We would applaud the efforts of the central banks to get together to form some common policy on the international financial picture. I think we should also think about the fact that the trade barriers that we have erected in this country are very substantial, and basically deny the consumer the opportunity for a iower price for a product. 275 I would like to suggest as one starting point that we make a list of all the restrictive practices that have grown up over the years, not just the violations of the GATT treaty but all the tariff and non-tariff barriers which in fact raised the price level to the consumer. I think such an audit would form a useful starting point in assessing our own trade policies. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: Any comments? Sylvia Porter. MS. PORTER: Mr. Chairman, I not only second the remarks of Mr. Wriston, but I would like to say that we should assume much greater leadership than we have shown in many years in bringing together the oil consuming nations of the world, to take a comparatively common stand and certainly a coopera tive stance to deal with the actions of the oilproducing nations. While I would not like to coin a jingo phrase, it has entered my mind enough to repeat it here: that nations have gone to war for far less than has happened to the consuming nations of the world in the past twelve months. I would think that President Ford's favorite remark, cooperation, could be extended in our actions to bring together the consuming nations in much greater harmony to develop policies, perhaps in the sharing of our available oil supplies so that they will not consider us as, once again, a hated interloper in the developing of policies to deal with price hikes or tax hikes and the massive flows in conservation and in the pursuing of new sources of energy. And I think, Mr. Secretary, that this common front and cooperation should be extended in our thoughts about other crucial raw materials so that we may handle adverse steps that may be taken against us by producers of these other essential war materials before crisis is piled upon crisis. I have read Mr. Rockefeller's remarks and I urge you all to read them, too, with the seriousness with which I know he says them. I think Senator Javits just met this point in his final point today when he spoke about new policies on oil and monetary affairs. 276 I also believe, with all due respect to you, sir that we are too far timid in pursuing the improvement of our existing agreements, monetary agreements, and financial agreements among nations. And our action is far too timid for the problems Perhaps we don’t need new ones, perhaps all we need to do is to strengthen the existing ones. It is too late, I assume, for us to adopt any new policies or new speeches for the IMF meetings at the end of this month or early next, but it is not too late to talk in the corridors. Whatever progress we have achieved at Basil or at Geneva or in Washington or wherever, is to my humble mind far too little and far too dangerously slow. and the challenges that face us. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. I have hesitated during this day, even though on occasion I would have liked to respond to some of the suggestions, that Government is not always remiss in the area of consumer cooperation. We have been hard at work on that since last February in the suggestion of sharing oil that you mentioned. We have been meeting every three weeks for the last seven months on that and hopefully the agreement will be signed next month. They're over there working on the final arrangement for that [right now. I think everyone is very aware, as evidenced by the Big Five, if you will, finance ministers that have been meeting, four in the last year-and-a-half to two years and continue to meet on a continuing basis to discuss mutually our problems and the coordination of all our policies together in recognition of the interdependence and the dangerous elements that exist in this world today. But you people didn't come here to listen to me speak. MR. ROCKEFELLER: I'm delighted to hear what you just said and I think it's encouraging that these meetings have been going on and that results are to show themselves shortly. I think most of us were, in fact, disappointed that the initiative of Secretary''Kissinger , after his trip to the Middle East, his spectacularly success ful trip in the Mid-East in January, when he recommended a conference in Washington to discuss these problems, was not met with more general enthusiasm. It is true that there was a final agreement and that there have been meetings. We haven't heard very much about them and it's reassuring that perhaps we will in the future. But it does seem to me, in support of what Sylvia Porter has just said, that the increased price of oil and its implications for balance of payments and shift to resources in the world has, on the one hand, provided a new and over whelming threat to the world, which could be extremely grave if it's not dealt with. On the other hand, I think it equally offers a challenge and an opportunity if we will seize it to use this new threat as a reason particularly for the tri-lateral nations of Western Europe, North America and Japan, to work more closely together than they have in the past. I hope and feel this is a basic necessity, not that they should work exclusively and against the interests of any other group, but that they have a lot in common and that before they can deal effectively with the rest^of the world, they need to sort it out more than they have, hitherto, their mutual problems. Hopefully, having done that, I would hope that they would work more closely with the petroleumproducing nations to resolve the recycling problem which I still think is a very grave one, and also through a massive program of research and develop ment to develop new resources of energy so that in the future we won't be faced with some of the shortages that we saw particularly grave last year, but which I'm afraid are by no means over. It does seem to me that perhpas more has been done than is known to the public. That I would think, unless it's a great deal more, would make room for very considerable further international cooperation along these lines. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Charlie Walker. MR. WALKER: Mr. Secretary I agree very much with what Mr. Wriston said and what Ms. Porter said 278 and what Mr. Rockefeller said. I would like to add to that, however, something I think that is very important and that is, the c o m p e ll in g need in fact, we're way late--in this Government developing the type of comprehensive integrated, cohensive, international economic policy that can enable us to supply the leadership that the rest of the world is crying for. For too long, our international bargaining has been on a splintered basis: Foreign Minister vis-avis Foreign Minister; Finance Minister, vis-a-vis Finance Minister; Agriculture Minister, vis-a-vis Agriculture Minister; Trade Minister, vis-a-vis Trade Minister; Defense Minister, vis-a-vis Defense Minister; when you combine all of these factors in the United States, if you combine them, we have a tremendous amount of bargaining strength and a tremendous potential for leadership. Where the difficulty comes is partly in attitudes in some departments whiclji I won't identify, called the "Foggy Bottom" in Washington; partly because the buck on this issue, since it involes all of these different facets, has to go right straight to the oval office and the final decisions have to be made by heads of State. I would recommend for consideration to bring these bargaining eggs into one basket, something like an international economic quadriad consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Head of the National Security Council, when those are two different people, when and if they are two different people, and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, who would be the President's chief advisers in this area and then, in addition, and not just for parochial reasons and background, that the chief implementator and spokes man for such policy should be the Secretary of the Treasury. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Mr. KAPNICK: I believe, Mr. Secretary, that the last several speakers in commenting on the importance of a defined and unified foreign policy as a means of greatly facilitating our relations with our foreign neighbors, has an aspect similar to the problem that Senator Javits mentioned recently. 279 Just as we have failed to build a stock owner ship constituency into the American worker in the United States and their techniques for doing this that are highly sophisticated and efficient, we have also failed to develop on the part of our multi national corporations an international constituency. We put Twentieth Century capital instruments down in the middle of a Tenth Century wage structure. They pour out billions of wealth but the power of the citizens of the host countries to consume is not raised. The reaction that we have gotten from the Middle Eastern sheiks and shahs and what-have-yous, is, in part, our own fault in failing to build a corporate-an international corporate constituency in those countries. It seems to me that this should be a major facet of any consistent foreign policy that we may develop. SENATOR’LONG: I used to enjoy back there in the Eisenhower Administration referring to what I called the Republicans "good news" announcements that usually went something like this: "Hurray! Unemploy ment did not increase this month as rapidly as it increased the month before." It increased, of course, but not as rapidly. "Now, "Hurray! Crime did not increase this year as fast as it increased the year before." I’ve become very irritated and I know those in Government know it, about these so-called "good news" trade figures. They leave out the cost of the freight and the insurance on their imports. They add in the cost of everything you are giving away just as though you are being paid for it. For example, a billion dollar gift of grain to India goes down as though we made a billion dollars even though we never expect to get anything for it-i oh, a dollar back in here sometime,' just to keep it from being one-hundred % correct, put if you take away from the plus side what you've given away, and you add to the minus side the cost of the freight like everybody else does, then our deficit on an annual basis is five-and-a-half billion dollars more than they tell us. 280 Now, even when they get through leaving fiveand-a half billion dollars out, they then proceed to report it on a quarterly basis, so they only report one-quarter of what your loss is going to be for the year* Now, I wouldn't object so badly to losing the 5 1/2 billion plus a year on the trade figures if we were making it back with our investments, as some like to contend that we are. But you can't count that five billion dollars that our investments are earning us twice; you can't use that to pay for the troops in Europe, the troops around the world; a foreign give-away program to a hundred different nations and also use the same five billion dollars that your investments are earning for you and to pay off your trade deficit. If we can, and we're going to at least amend that Trade Bill, to make them tell us how much we are losing. Stewart Symington likes to say that each department blames somebody else for its cost. They'll say the military people will say, "Well, the troops in Europe ought to be laid over against the State Department budget," and then somebody else says, "Well, this ought to be laid against that." So each of them work it out in such a fashion that their program really isn't costing you any thing. When you get through adding up a long column of pluses and you get down to the bottom and you have a tremendous minus. Now, there are abroad, w e ’re told, about $160 billion Euro-dollars. Now they call them PetroDollars. Half of that got that way by our trade policies being overly-generous and letting the other fellow get the better of us all the time. We simply cannot continue that because that is playing a major part in this inflation. When you have all of those American dollars overseas, it means that you're going to have to pay more for what you're buying from abroad and that adds to the inflation. 281 So if we can, and I believe that we can at least do that in the Senate, we're going to try to move this nation toward what would be an honest balance of trade, and that would have to mean the we'll either have to sell more or we'll have to buy less. MR. KENNEDY: I'd like to make a comment about Mr. Kelso's remarks earlier. I think there has been surprisingly well handled recycling of sub stantial amounts of these petro-dollars in loans to under-developed countries, guarantees of credits to under-developed countries, loans to developed countries and as I believe Chancellor Healy remarked recently, the international financial mechanism has handled the balance of the funds with impressive skill and great courage. The remarks I made earlier about talk of wage and price controls and other credit allocation applies here as well. Many of the holders of these funds have a great passion for anonymity and to suggest much greater controls or research into the uses of those funds may well turn out to be one of the great mechanisms to move that money into other financial markets than the U.S. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. I think it might be useful if we took a five-minute recess, just sort of stand up and stretch right here. (Short recess.) 282 Financial Institutions and Inflation Discussion Papers from Delegates Mr. Morris D. C rawford, Jr. Chairman of the Board Bowery Savings Bank Dr. Grover W . E nsley Executive Vice President National Association of Mutual Savings Banks Inflation is indeed “domestic public enemy number one.” Among its chief evils is the inequitable impact resulting, in part, from imbal anced federal anti-inflation policies. The absence of fiscal discipline has led to excessive reliance on monetary restraint and skyrocketing interest rates—with major victims being thrift institutions and their depositors, home mortgage borrowers, and the housing industry. At savings banks, net deposit outflows, excluding interest, totaled $2.7 billion in the five month period from April through August 1974, over 21/2 per cent of total deposits outstanding, with even greater out flows in major metropolitan areas. Hew home mortgage commitments have virtually dried up. Housing starts have fallen to the lowest levels in over 4 years and further declines are imminent. Thrift institutions are unable to compete with commercial banks and the open market in periods of rapidly rising interest rates, since by law and orientation, their assets are predominantly in home mort gages and other long-term investments acquired earlier at low fixed interest rates. By contrast, earnings on commercial bank loans are predominantly tied to short-term open-market yields. Since the July 1973 changes in federal deposit interest rate ceilings, which narrowed differentials in favor of commercial banks, disinter mediation at thrift institutions has been seriously aggravated. During the 12-month period following this regulatory action, household sav ings deposit growth at commercial banks actually increased by 19 per cent over the previous year, contrasting sharply with declines of 43 per cent at savings and loans and 62 per cent at savings banks. The inflation-caused problems of mortgage-oriented thrift institu tions would be largely resolved : (1) if the increase in federal expendi tures is curbed and all necessary measures are taken to balance the budget or achieve a surplus, thereby permitting an easing of short term interest rates; and (2) if the asset and liability structure of thrift institutions is modernized to redress current competitive imbalances. 285 In both instances, decisive federal action is required. In the first, by subjecting each expenditure and revenue item in the budget to micro scopic scrutiny ; in the second, by enacting the broadened powers and federal savings bank charter authority provided in the pending Finan cial Institutions bill (S. 2591). Efforts to develop a variable-rate mort gage instrument, equitable to both lender and borrower, should also be pressed forward with appropriate legislation and public education programs. These economic policy and financial restructuring measures should be adopted without delay, but it will take time for their full im pact to be felt. Therefore, the following actions should be taken immediately. 1. Provide tax exemption or tax credit for a portion of interest earned on savings accounts. This would stimulate increased saving. In particular, it would expand the supply of housing credit—probably at less cost to the federal government than emergency subsidy programs. 2. Raise deposit insurance to $50,000 as provided in House-passed H.R. 11221, now pending in conference with the Senate. Depositors have become increasingly insurance conscious in recent months. 3. Raise minimum denominations on Treasury and federal agency obligations. In its recent report, the House Ways and Means Commit tee cautioned that low denomination offerings should not be at the expense of “serious dislocation” in savings markets. Recent Treasury offerings of $1,000 denominations have resn1fod in “serious disloca tion” at thrift institutions. 4. Strengthen federal deposit interest rate ceilings hy preventing circumvention of ceilings through hank holding company deposit-type issues as provided in Senate-passed S. 3838 and House-passed H.R. 15928. One final observation. These proposed measures and actions will assure the viability of thrift institutions and their continued com petitive presence in the financial system. Over the long pull, this will enable the small saver to maximize earnings on his savings and assure the availability of mortgage funds at the lowest possible cost. M r. R ex J . M orthland President, American Bankers Association INFLATION AND FINANCIAL PRESSURES Spiraling inflation i§ the prime cause o f today’s high interest rates. Comparcmentalization of financial institutions, and regulatory rigidi ties in pricing structures in combination with these rates, are produc286 ing serious stresses in some financial markets, especially the mortgage markets. PROPOSED CHANGES IN LAWS AND REGULATIONS Significant changes are required, as suggested in the Financial Insti tutions Act (S. 2591), to enhance the responsiveness of financial in stitutions in serving their fund-moving functions under today’s infla tionary pressures. A B A supports S. 2591 with minor modifications. In addition, we recommend that serious attention be given to proposed tax incentives to encourage savings and thereby discourage consump tion. Exemption from Federal taxation of the first $1,000 of interest on individual savings and time accounts should be considered imme diately. A tax credit for investment in housing and other social pri ority needs also warrants immediate attention. Vigorous action is needed at the state level to repeal or liberalize usury laws which prevent funds from reaching their intended beneficiaries. Trust departments should also be given greater latitude in offering services that involve gathering investment funds from small savers. CREDIT ALLOCATION As inflationary pressures mount in financial markets, pricing regu lations and other institutional restraints distort flows of funds to key areas such as housing. Such distortions would not be prevented by compulsory allocation of credit resources o f regulated financial insti tutions. Positive market-oriented incentives—such as tax exemption of interest on savings, and appropriate tax credits—are more effective in channeling adequate funds from the total market, both regulated and non-regulated, into savings and toward social priority loan areas. If additional incentives are required, direct subsidies to high priority user groups—e.g., housing subsidies to poor families—should be con sidered. These approaches make the social costs of favoring a given area or group obvious and amenable to adjustment when needed. Mr. J ames J. N e e d h a m Chairman of the Board New York Stock Exchange My comments in this area relate solely to the securities industry as a financial institution since this is the focal point of my expertise. The importance of strengthening the securities industry is not simply a parochial matter. It affects our future ability to raise huge sums of new capital required to stimulate economic growth, to meet the expectations of the American public for a rising standard of living, lor full employment, for minimizing inflation, and to satisfy the social 287 objectives of the nation. Without a viable securities industry, there is little hope of generating over $4y2 trillion in investment funds required by U.S. industry and government to 1985. A t present, the principal areas of concern to the New York Stock Exchange are the well-publicized problems o f the securities industry generally. These involve not only broad economic problems but also the current unprofitability and uncertainty about the future role and structure o f the industry. In more specific terms, there is a growing concern about the impact on the industry and public investors from negotiated commission rates and the changes which will be wrought in the industry as the result of the so-called Central Market System. The overall lack of industry profitability, uncertainty about the future prospects of the securities industry, the bleak economic picture generally, and the potential loss of revenues from the advent of negoti ated commission rates—could lead to a withdrawal of capital which finances securities industry operations and, more clearly, the failure to attract new capital in the industry. These prospects appear more certain when one reviews the investment opportunities for investment capital elsewhere outside the securities industry. I do not wish to repeat here all of the specific legislative and regula tory recommendations we have made to preserve the vitality of the capital raising process in this country. But I urge again that no hasty steps be taken which threaten to frustrate the continued effective operation of the securities industry. The industry cannot operate without an adequate base of capital. Since the beginning of this year, the industry^ total capital has al ready declined by $303 million. Profitable operations are the sine qua noth for retaining capital. This requires a better economic climate as well as a regulatory framework which recognizes the plight as well as the significance of the securities industry in the country’s financial network. In this connection, we have advanced the attached legislative pro posal to permit the securities industry to establish a tax stabilization reserve, This proposal recognizes that the securities industry is an essential financial intermediary and is subject to extremely severe cyclical fluctuations in earnings. The recommendation would merely grant securities firms treatment similar to that now accorded other financial institutions. We also urge that steps be taken to relieve and minimize the re porting and regulatory burdens on the securities industry. In that connection, we urge amendment of the Securities Act of 1934 to grant equal authority to all regulatory authorities and exchanges so as to relieve burdensome duplication. We also urge that the SEC be directed to study disclosure requirements to ease the complexities and expenses presently imposed on companies seeking to raise capital. 288 The securities industry is in crisis. Those who would perform surgery in its present weakened state should pay close heed to the importance of this sector of the financial industry in promoting es sential economic growth and in reducing overall inflation through an adequate flow of investment funds. 289 Financial Institutions and Inflation Conference Proceedings fin an c i a l institutions and inflation SECRETARY SIMON: Gentlemen, we are working our way a little bit into Financial Institutions and I n f l a t i o n . We will see if we can’t get through that in 20 minutes instead of 30, and maybe we'll just borrow five from the next subject. Charls Walker is going to lead off the discussion. MR. WALKER: M r S e c r e t a r y , if the five members of the Hunt Commission are here I'm not sure why I got this assignment. SECRETARY SIMON: Charlie. We knew you'd be impartial, MR. WALKER: If financial institutions are interpreted as referring primarily to privately owned institutions such as commercial banks savings banks, there is littie legislation that can be enacted that would greatly or signficantly reduce inflation because financial services simply do not loom that large in the cost of living. But, if inflation control is, as it should be considered in the broader context of economical and efficient service of consumer financial needs, then there is legislation under Congressional consideration-the Financial Institutions Act-^which should be enacted at the earliest possible date. I refer to the Nixon Administration's adaptions of the recommendations of the Hunt Commission. Although the issue is controversial, although I've learned today much less controversial than it was just a short time ago, a very strong case can be made that the reforms proposed will increase the competition among depository financial institutions, raise the rates consumers earn on savings. The legislation would eliminate the antiquated Regulation Q which is now administered and means the rich man gets 11 to 12 percent on his savings, while the person with less than a hundred thousand dollars to invest gets only about half that amount. It would increase the convenience to the consumer in using financial services and lower the cost of his mortgage loan. In addition, the legislation would in, my judgment, decrease the wide swings and interest rates on^and availability of^mortgage credit 293 over the business cycle. And also in the long run,increase the total flow of funds into housing. This last point is hotly contested by some people, but I think they're wrong. Since the proposals would broaden the lending and investing powers of thrift institutions, they could obtain more short-term assets which turn over quickly as in commercial banks, as opposed to long-term mortgages with locked-in yields. Therefore, they could compete more effectively with commercial banks and the open market in periods of high/short term interest rates. Disintermediation, although not eliminated, would be reduced. The long run expansion in mortgage credit would result in the faster deposit growth of the thrifts because the deposit powers would be broadened, even including something like checking accounts. These are institutions which cut their teeth on mortgage lending and are not about to turn their backs on it. Somewhat less of the total asset pie might go to mortgages. But the faster growth in the pie itself should easily offset the percentage reduction. Seventy percent of something is a lot more than 90 percent of nothing, in other words. In addition, the legislation would grant a tax credit to all mortgage lenders, not just thrift institutions, thereby attracting to mortgage lending many smaller and medium-size commercial banks which thus far have not gone far into the mortgage market. The irony involved in the opposition to the Hunt Commission proposals is that the reforms would take place regardless of whether Federal legislation along these lines is passed or not. Competitive and technological developments are inexorably moving the depository financial institutions in that direction. The only question is whether the facilitating legislation is enacted piecemeal and over several years at the state level or at one fell swoop at the Federal level. I think and hope it will be the latter and recent reports from the Hill are encouraging. If so, the cost of living, except perhaps in the mortgage rate area, is not likely to ratchet downward greatly as a result, but the beneficial impact on the financial consumer can be very great indeed. I submit for the record a much longer state ment I wrote for Business Week a,year ago» in which I said this is an idea whose time is coming and I think maybe it's an idea whose time 294 has come. T ied to that, two very quick points on the proposed deduction or credit for savings accounts. The two questions that were not discussed in the very excellent points made by A1 and others has to do with equitability of the proposal if it's a tax deduction. Coming off the top line, it means $700 to the 70 percent bracket taxpayer and $140 to Archie Bunker. If, on the other hand, you make it a tax credit and take it off the bottom line you have a real question of how much clout the credit would have in attracting new savings--a very important question. The other point is the danger of straight-out extrapolation of current events. I f you grant the incentive, and once these get in the law s, they’re awfully hard to get out. If the Treasury sticks to $10,000 note minimum, if it is true that short rates are the most important factor in this intermediation and if Walter Wriston and his people and others are right about b ill rate s coming down considerably more in the months ahead, possibly in the years ahead, in enacting the incentive do we risk pulling too much into the thrifts and housing with even more shortages for productive plant and equipment spending? Thank you very much. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Rusty Crawford from Bowery Saving Bank. MR. CRAWFORD: Mr. Secretary, inflation is indeed the Public Enemy Number One for the thrift in s t it u t io n s , their depositors and their borrowers. At savin gs banks and loans net deposit outflows total 2.7 billion in the five month period ending August, 1974, over two and a half percent of total deposits outstanding. New home mortgage commitments have virtually dried up. Housing starts have fallen to the lowest levels in over four years and further declines are imminent. This morning Alan Greenspan in his opening remarks referred to those institutions of our society which were structured to operate in a non- 295 inflationary climate or in a low single-digit inflationary climate and how ill-adapted they are to operate in double-digit inflation. This is the essential dilemma of the thrift institutions. We are frankly unable to compete with the commercial banks and the open market in periods of rapdily rising interest rates. This is because our assets are predominantly in home mortgages and other long-term investments acquired earlier at low fixed interest rates. By contrast, earnings on commercial bank loans are predominantly short-term or tied to short-term open market yields and are therefore more responsive to interest rate changes. The inflation-caused problems of thrift institutions would be materially reduced one, if the increase in the Federal expenditures is curbed and all necessary measures taken to balance the budget or achieve a surplus, thereby permitting a significant easing of short-term interest rates. And two, if the asset and liability structure of thrift institutions is modernized by enacting the broadened powers in the Federal Savings Bank charter authority provided in the pending Financial Institution bill. These economic policy and financial structuring measures should be adopted without delay. But it will take time for their full impact to be felt. Therefore, I believe the following actions should be taken as soon as possible. One: provide a tax exemption or tax credit for a portion of interest earned on savings accounts. I realize this is a controversial matter. It has come up on a number of occasions today. It will require very hard thinking by Congress and some very difficult priority judgments. We're convinced it would stimulate increased savings and particularly it would expand the supply of housing credit and probably at less cost to the Federal Government than the emergency subsidy programs. Two: raise the deposit insurance to $50,000, as provided in the House-passed bill which is now pending in Conference in the Senate. It's not surprising in the present climate that we find more and more people concerned with safety, as is 296 evidenced by their moving accounts, spreading accounts around to be sure they are covered by the present limits of Federal Deposit Insurance. Thirdly, to raise, or perhaps now, Mr. Secretary, to maintain the higher minimum denom inations on Treasury and Federal Agency o b lig a t io n s . That recent Tressury offering of $1,000 denominations resulted in very serious d is lo c a t io n at our thrift institutions. These proposed actions will help assure the viability of thrift institutions. Over the long pull they will enable the small saver to maximize earnings on his savings and assure the avail ability of mortgage funds at lowest possible cost. One caveat: None of the short-range remedies I referred to are going to improve thrift institutions’ earnings. And even enactment of the Hunt Commission recommendations or the Federal Institutions Act will only modestly improve earnings unless and until a really effective variable rate mortgage instrument is developed and put into place. Until that day comes, thrift institutions will continue to experience competitive disadvantages in periods of rapidly rising interest rates and will require some regula tion Q protection. •It hasn't been referred to too much, but I would like it to be understood,that it is not Regulation Q that limits the return on thrift institution savings accounts. It is the earnings of thrift institutions that sets those limits. As long as we are the principal suppliers of credit to the fixed interest long-term home mortgage market, as is really ordained by public policy today, there will be times in the business cycle when our payout is not as attractive as the open market. But I would remind you that of other phases of the cycle. W e ’re the best game in town. Thank you very much. SECRETARY SIMON. Thank you. Jim Needham. MR. NEEDHAM: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 297 The exclusivity of Charlie’s definition of a financial institution maybe leaves the securities industry out of it. We are depository, but we don't pay interest. Mr. Secretary, there are some things that could be done right away to reduce the cost of operation within the securities industry. And reduction in those costs would be an anti-inflationary step. I think we could all agree upon that. could be done very quickly, right now. And it On the Hill there is pending reform legisla tion and it should be a simple matter to insert in that legislation a grant of authority to the exchanges and to the NASD which would make them equal in their regulatory scope. If that were done, it would then be possible for a member firm or a registered broker-dealer, to state it differently, to select the regulatory organization they wish to subject itself to. That would eliminate the duplicative form-filing that goes on, the repeated examinations by various regulatory authorities and would all be vested in one place. And I'm certain that would save the securities industry millions of dollars. And to that end, Mr. Secretary, we have filed for the record,the statutory language necessary in order to accomplish that goal. And I urge the Treasury Department to support us in its sincere attempt to reduce thb. costs of operation within the securities industry. Secondly, Mr. Secretary,I would like to recommend that the Securities and Exchange Commission review its registration process to see if there is not some way to reduce the cost of filing. Legal fees, accounting fees, printing costs have all gone up, and it seems to me that within the context of protecting investors, that it ought to be a relatively simple task for the SEC to review its current practices to determine if the public interest in any way would be jeopardized by lessening the requirements presently in effect. Third, Mr. Secretary, I'd like to dust off the Gasch Report. The Gasch Report didn't receive much attention in Washington while I was here, but I did support it when I was a Commissioner of the SEC, and I continue to support it. And it seems to me that 298 this has an anti-inflationary impact as well. I’m also concerned, too, about another aspect of the scope of regulation -- not only of the SEC but at other regulatory bodies-wherein the judicial functions performed by the Agency which prosecutes, and prosecuted the alleged violators of its laws. It seems-to. me it’s time to move out of the regulatory agencies, the judicial function, and to put it into a separate Federal Court system. Lastly, and I won't dwell on this because we do have a laundry list of taxing forms -- it's absolutely clear to me and I am sure to everyone else that there is an important interrelationship between tax laws and the efficacy of whatever industry it is that we’re talking about. And therefore, Mr. Secretary, I respectfully urge you to give serious considerations to- the tax proposals the New York Stock Exchange has advanced. Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Jim O'Leary. MR. O ’LEARY. No. 28. Mr. Secretary, I may not be the best person to make this point. It might be Frank Hoenemeyer's province but I have had, as many of you know, a long experience with the Life Insurance business, and I think it is a mistake to limit this discussion just to the deposit institutions, and we should be thinking about the problem of the life insurance companies. The life insurance companies of the country have lent new money each year for the long term capital markets of something like $17 billion. Their gross cash flow in the long term markets is something in the order, maybe, of $35 million. I may be low on these figures. They are a tremendous factor in the corporate bond market; the commercial mortgage market; the residential mortgage market--particularly in the multi-family area. There are almost insoluble problems of a dis intermediation nature for the life insurance companies in a period in which interest rates are as high as they are. As everyone around this table recognizes--but I think ought to be stressed--is the fact that most of the life insurance cash value life insurance outstanding carries a contractual interest rate of 5%--borrowing rate of 5%. In the life insurance business today, there are some ’’Life" companies that have upwards to 50% of their policy reserves on ordinary life insurance now in policy loans. At this level of rates, the potential drain from those institutions has made them very, very gun shy about commiting money out into the loan markets. The effect on them alone really poses a very, very serious problem for the viability of the long term markets. There are ways that this problem could be dealt with. The life insurance companies, them selves, to some extent, have found ways to, in effect, charge a higher policy loan rate and to discourage borrowing against those policies. I would urge at the national level, a study of this. One of the great difficulties is in the State of New York, where there is a statutory interest rate of 5% which sets the practice generally throughout the country, because every company wants to do business in New York and, unless they abide by that 5% Statutory Ceiling, they cannot do business in the State of New York. There is no reason in the world why the Legislature there in the State of New York, if it were realistic in this situation, should not permit the life companies, at least on their new business, to write into those policies a policy loan rate that was consistent with what the level of interest rates is. So that this is an area of national policy in terms of the viability and the growth of long term capital markets that I think is highly important 300 to ta k e a look at, in terms of the money involved th e r e , it seems to me that it is a larger volume of money than would be true in the case of so many of th e deposit insititutions, and it is neglected in th is s o r t of discussion. Thank y o u . SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Rex? MR. REX MORTHLAND. I simply would like to second what Rusty Crawford had to say about the repressive effects on the payment of interest on time deposits, of the limitations on earnings. These, typically,--he didn’t use the word-these come about through the use of usury ceilings. We have wide diversities of them between S ta te s . They are established by the States, but in a s i g n i f i c a n t number of States, the usury ceilings r e a lly prevent the financial institutions--the in t e r m e d ia r y - -who really is a merchant who buys money and sells it. And they prevent the f in a n c ia l intermediary from charging a high enough rate t o the borrower to compensate the saver. When we are concerned about housing, we are concerned about any kind of borrowers, but in a capital shortage economy, one that basically has price bases, then we must be able to charge enough to the borrower to help allocate the resources as economically as possible. I know that the Federal Government itself-at least, I believe the Federal Government doesn’t want to go into the area of trying to set usury rates every place. We do have a provision in one of the Bills that has been passed in the Senate, and is possibly coming up in Conference, which would change one of the percentages in the National Banking Law. The point I am trying to make, though, is that in order to help the small saver, the financial intermediaries must be able to collect from the borrower a higher rate of return and, by numbers, I don’t have them in my mind, but the 301 number of savers far exceeds the number of borrowers if we have a consumer orientation. I discussed earlier this morning, briefly, the philosophy that I thought was behind the recommenda tions in the Hunt Commission Report, which now appears in the name of the Financial Institutions Act. So I shall not repeat them now. But I do repeat that the American Bankers Association as a whole--I w o n ’t say we have unanimity by any means, Mr. Secretary, but we have a consensus and we keep forging a little better consensus as it goes along--believes that the Financial Institutions Act--the philosophy behind it--is a move which will help us make the financial markets more efficient. We do repeat, though, that no set of financial institutions can operate effectively in a system of as high interest rates, and as wide fluctuation in interest fates and inflation as we have had recently. Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Mil Hayes. Mr. Hayes. I would like to emphasize again what Mr. Crawford and Mr, Morthland said: The Independent Bankers of America represent 7,000 banks in the country, mostly in the agricultural area. They are small savers that don’t get a chance to go in and bid for Treasury Bills in large amounts, nor for large C.D.’s . So any savings aspect that can be proposed, such as the tax proposal, would certainly bring in more savings. This area of the economy, by the way--I should point out--is very profitable now in the communities in which they operate. They have had fine years, and the savings are good, and banks are sound; but we can bring in more savings to these institutions. The largest one in our group now, one bank alone, is about a billion dollars; but most of the banks are between $5 and $10 million. So they are small banks in agricultural areas. 302 All of the points raised by Mr. Crawford and others about what can be done in those types of institutions, we would like to emphasize. Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON; Thank you. Bob? MR. DEDERICK: Said earlier, at the risk of [being considered a heretic, I guess I would have to [say now, at the risk of physical damage to myself, because I have two ’’savings types” beside me, I Ijust want to emphasize that we have to be awfully careful here to distinguish between short term, immediate problems, and those which are longer term in nature, and when looked at from a longer term point of view, may not be problems. I think in th is particular area, what we have to be awfully careful to do is to avoid confusing the short term needs of the Housing Industry with a longer term and, therefore, to avoid doing something now--taking steps now--which would have longer term implications. Up until very recently, I was not aware of any housing shortage. Not so long ago we were talking about an excess of housing. Again, we have been in an extraordinarily unusual environment, and we don’t want to put in p o lic ie s which, once this environment is gone, we 'w ill , perhaps, regret having it with us. Many of our problems today are the result of our p u t t i n g i n measures for short term need, which d isa p p e a r s, and yet the measures stay with us. But what I would emphasize is: housing may not be a p r io r it y need in the years ahead, a s it is right now, and so what we do in the way of relief ¡measures a t this time should be of the sort which are g e n u in e ly recognized as that, and which, there fore, a r e generally recognized as being subject to removal once the immediate term problem is passed. Thank y o u . SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Mr. Hoenemeyer. I'd just like to pick up on policy loans where Jim O'Leary left off. 303 This is a very serious problem for the Life Insurance Industry. Unfortunately, there is no short term solution to this. All of our policies--outstanding policies-do have fixed loan rates of 5% and, more recently, 6%; so anything that is done in this area today would not have any impact for some time to come. We are frustrated by trying to get the rate on policy loans changed. Unfortunately, legislators around the country--and these are subject to^State regulation--feel that any increase in the rates on policy loans is an additional charge against the small man. It's like raising usury rates and, actually, just the opposite is true because the small individual--the little individual -- is not the one who borrows on his insurance policy. It's the larger, more sophisticated individual who takes advantage of these low guaranteed rates. So we are very anxious--looking to the years ahead--to get some change, but it isn't going to be something that would have an immediate impact on our flow of funds. SECRETARY SIMON: Just one more; then we have to move to the next subject. MR. HARPER: I would just like to chat about a problem of the Central City Banker. We know very well that the well being of our banks financial stability depends upon the stability of our customers, and we have found that, in the central cities in this country, that we have a disproportionate number of individuals who are forced in and out of the labor market as the cycle changes. During a sharp decline--as the monetary policy that we're pursuing n0w will bring a b o u t - -then a greater number of people will be forced out of the labor market. I would like to submit to you this: That these individuals are individuals, speaking of public relations--these individuals are the individuals who have faith in this country because they go back into the labor market when times become good. 304 During a long incline--and I can see this during the late sixties--these individuals went out and purchased homes; they went out and bought a car. ¡As a matter of fact, during the peak of the incline, Isome unsophisticated bankers actually made auto loans to some of these individuals, only to have to reposses these autos later on. Now, I would submit: why should these in d iv id u a ls , speaking of equity--suffer the unusual burden of this type of system. I'd just like to lay this on the table. There's no way for me to leave here today without saying it. I think these individuals talk in g about tax inequality--Senator Long talking about the oil industry being taxed, overburdened-these individuals are supporting our economy. If you d id n 't have people willing to go in and out-because there's a growing mass of people who won't play the game any more; and that's the reason why we see welfare roles rising. People want stability, and there is a mechanism for stability and net income over time may be much better on welfare than i t will be going in and out of the labor market, supporting an economy. Today, no one has brought this problem up, I think, except Mr.Kennedy, and he only referred to it in the Labor Act. I don't know what that Act entails^ #ut I would probably b e lie v e that it would not address itself to the chronic problems that we have in cities. Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. 305 K . Wage - Price Policy Discussion Papers from Delegates Dr. George Leland Bach. P rofessor of Economics and Public Policy Stanford University Although special developments like the recent food and energy crises may temporarily dominate price movements, the fundamental cause of inflation in the U.S. (and most other major industrial na tions) is “excess income claims,” validated by expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. Workers, businessmen, farmers, the elderly, na tional defense proponents, all of us together, have come to demand, almost as if it were a divine right, a rising total of wages, profits, prices, social security benefits, national defense, education, you name Sit, that substantially exceeds the output of the economy at stable prices. In the old days, these higher wages, priees, etc. would have priced products and labor out of the market before long, with unem ployment and recession halting the inflationary pressures. But no longer. Today, the Federal Reserve, W hite House and Congress, given the nation’s high priority on avoiding unemployment, generally in crease government spending and the money stock to avoid substantial unemployment albeit at the cost of validating the inflationary cost and price increases. Then the wage-price spiral is set for another round up, from the new higher plateau of prices and money incomes as everyone tries again to increase his real income faster, with little fear that inadequate final demand will punish him. Any economist can tell you one sure-fire way to stop this cost-push demand-pull inflation spiral. Cut the growth o f the money stock to zero, shift the federal budget to a large surplus, and the growth in spending and prices will grind to a halt within a few months—but at a terribly high cost in unemployment and probably financial panic. What we need now, above all, is some way to slow the growth of excess income claims (wages, prices, and government benefits) so monetarynseal policy can hold the growth in total spending to a reasonably noninflationary rate without generating unacceptable unemployment. Concretely, what we need is strong Presidential leadership in estab lishing openly with business, labor, agriculture, the general public and jCongress a realistic, moderate set of guideposts for wages and prices, r° be backed up by an announced, moderately restrictive monetaryfiscal policy. Such guideposts need not involve absolute sacrifices by 309 any or all. I f we could thus get the economy growing fairly stably again, groups and individuals in the nation would only have to hold their claims for income increases to about % percent annually on the average, assuming that to be roughly the long-run growth rate in real output. To illustrate, if our short-run goal is, say, to slow infla tion to 5-6% next year, labor would need to agree to a wage guidepost of 8% or so, while product prices could rise no more than 5% or so. (The old early-1960s “guideposts”, with the substantial flexibility they had, suggest the appropriate general type of relationships.) The Federal Keserve would need to cooperate with a monetary policy lead ing to a growth in money GrNP of about 8/io% per year. In 1976, if all goes well, the amount of inflation could be further reduced, with slower nominal income rises while real incomes continued to rise in proportion to real output. The nation is ready for a strong program against inflation. But the President faces a major job of economic education. We must learn that we cannot have more than the economy produces ; widespread attempts to “catch up” or “get ahead” through escalated wage and price increases or government programs will simply lead to accelerated inflation, not to larger real incomes. The greatest contribution these “summit” meet ings can make is to drive this fact home to the American people—to us—and to provide a foundation for a temporary national “incomes policy” to work with monetary-fiscal policy in slowing the debilitating inflation. Perhaps development of guideposts should include some offthe-record hard bargaining sessions among business, labor, and a few government leaders—under real pressure from the American people and their leaders in Washington. What is needed is a relatively simple, well-understood policy; sporadic, ad hoc jawboning will accomplish| little, generate major inefficiencies and inequities, and prove economic ally and politically divisive. The only real anti-inflation alternative is to ask monetary-fiscal policy to do the job alone, with enormously costly recession ; or to move to mandatory direct controls, with their equally great economic inefficiencies and socio-political disruptions. It is stylish to say that history has shown that incomes p o lic ie s dont work. This is wrong. They have worked, both here andin E urope, for crucial periods when there was no substantial excess aggregate demand, as there is not in America today. They will not work when there is large excess demand, which is the reason they must be integrated with moderating monetary-fiscal policy to slow the inflation down. This argument does not, of course, imply that other measures, espe cially to increase productivity and supply generally may not also be important. 310 Mr. B ruce K. M acL aury P resid en t Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis The Council on Wage and Price Stability should have the power to subpoena records and the authority to delay wage settlements and price increases for ninety days in those major industries where compe tition appears to be of insignificant dimensions. The agency may have to establish guidelines for wages and profit margins to equitably ad minister such a program. Mr. Charls E. W alker P resid en t Charls E. Walker Associates Although there is a time and place for direct wage/price controls, the U.S. economy in 1974—75 affords neither the place nor the time. Arguments made for controls include: (1) Other policies are not working or are likely to work much more slowly than the public will tolerate; (2) a majority of the people appears to favor their reimposi tion; (3) controls can “buy time” for restrictive fiscal and monetary policies to do their work; and (4:) excessive “market power” of business and/or labor can only be controlled through direct Government inter vention. Arguments against direct controls include: (1) They are effective only under very special conditions—conditions which do not now pre vail in the U .S .; (2) they are inequitable, distort resource allocation in the short run, and impede production in the long run; (3) they deal with the symptoms rather than the causes of inflation; and (4) both business and labor are opposed to reimposition of controls, so that the probability of legislative authorization is slight. Any attempt to re-institute direct wage/price controls now would be a bad mistake. False hopes would be raised. Uneconomic actions would be fostered. Long-run supplies would be reduced. And, most important, early reiteration to the public (following the misguided attempt to freeze prices in mid-1973) that there is no Magic Wand in the fight against inflation would further impair national economic morale a morale that must be strong if inflation is in fact to be brought to heel. Inasmuch as the political cards are at least temporarily stacked against resumption of direct wage/price controls, the discussion above waybeacademic. But in fact it provides background for comments on a specific question posed to the Financial Conference on Inflation, 311 558-812 0 - 74 - 21 namely, “How should the wage-price monitoring system be operated?” The short answer to this question is “Very carefully.” The Council on Wage and Price Stability authorized by Congress in late August (see P.L. 93-387) may, if cautiously and wisely operated, lead the nation toward a “social compact for wage-price stability” among Big Busi ness, B ig Labor and B ig Government. But to rush out in that direction with early adoption of guidelines, while the economy and its consti tuent parts (particularly labor) is still adjusting to and catching up with recent double-digit inflation, could be highly counter-productive, perhaps hastening a return to direct controls. Can the Council do more than “not do harm” ? Yes, provided the President and the Council are willing to emphasize the two Congres sional directives dealing with fostering productivity and identifying inflation-generating laws and actions of the government. As to pro ductivity, both tax policies and labor-management relations are obvi ously of great importance. In addition, serious consideration should be given to shifting the functions of the National Commission on Pro ductivity, whose accomplishments have fallen far short of expectations since its establishment in mid-1970, to the Council on Wage and Price Stability. As to ameliorating the inflation-inducing actions of the government, President Nixon initiated a review of this problem through his Council of Economic Advisers last summer. In addition, former CEA member Hendrik Houthakker of Harvard stated in the Economists’ Summit that he had constructed a list of some 45 areas that deserve attention. Hence the Council on Wage and Price Stability might play its most significant role in building on these studies toward legislative and Executive Department action. Stated differently, to the Federal Gov ernment and its new agency, the Council on Wage and Price Stability, the best advice might be, “Physician, heal thyself” ! 312 IX. Wage - Price Policy Conference Proceedings WAGE -PRICE POLICY TO DEAL WITH INFLATION SECRETARY SIMON: We'll move now to the WagePrice Policy to Deal with Inflation. Dr. Arthur Okun of Brookings Institute. DR. OKUN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Lee Bach and Jim O'Leary have both made, to some degree, effectively, the case for doing something on the income p olicy front. Consequently, I'd like to spend some time, really, just posing the problem of wages and prices as I see it for 1975. It is really terribly hard to make a substantial dent in inflation for 1975 with current policies, because of the prospect of a pricewage price spiral and, specifically, because of the effort of American workers, unionized and nonunionized, to make up for their loss in real income that they have experienced in the past year by the only means available to them acting separately -namely, by trying to get a more rapid increase in money wages from their employer. In the past year, the take-home real value of an hour's worth or work on the average in the American economy, is down 3% for the American worker. Normally, it is up about 3% a year. The major problem in redressing this balance is that Labor's losses are not in the pockets of the typical American employer of Labor, he doesn't have it to give to them. The loss reflects the major increase in food and fuel prices that have tremendously increased l| n°t through their own fault or virtue -- the incomes of farmers and of producers at home and abroad. 315 Hence, any increase in wages at a more rapid rate, must be passed through by most employers into more rapid increases in prices. Recognizing this pressure, the typical forecast of professional economists these days, calls for an acceleration of wages to about 101 or more during 1975, compared with the 7% rate that they were run ning during '73 and early *74. Purely as a result of that, inflation is expected to stay close to the double digit level, showing very little relief even in an economy with very weak demand for labor and for goods. There are really three ways, I think, that we try to deal with this problem to adopt the strate gy for income inflation. It seems to me, in a sense, one can reinterpret old time religion -- very strong doses of monetary fiscal restraint, as a way of offsetting income inflation with deflation that comes from excess supply of machine and man. It means you have to push the economy down far enough to create enough idle labor and enough idle capital to hold down prices and wages enough to offset the upward push coming from income inflation. Now, every economist, who studies from past experience, will tell you that can work ultimately, but only ait an extremely high cost. And it is an arithmetic game that I don't want to get into, where by one can calculate that it may cost $250 billion of lost real income over three years, or $500 billion over eight years, if people do what comes naturally, and if the only tool used by Government is fiscal and monetary restraint to hold down the economy. Some of the optimists on old time religion that I know seem to believe that if the Government makes it clear that it will not ratify inflation this time, business and labor will not do what comes naturally; that they can change attitudes, that they can show more restraint spontaneously. I must say I don't understand what the mechanism is by which any group of workers or any individual 316 b u sin e ssm a n is expected to translate this ultimatum from i t s Government into its own behavior. It has to act to protect itself. It seems to me it is against the background of this huge problem of income inflation that one comes to propose some direct efforts to deal with :it specifically. One thing that does is: It puts -- it underlines the importance of having good price behavior in food |and fuel. Another thing it does is emphasize that excise taxes are inflationary. They make incomes inflation work, where there are excise taxes on any product that the consumer buys. I think in light of that, one of the things that we may have to compromise in the battle against inflation is the desire to get a more rational use of our energy resources through the price system. Beyond that, and obviously most significantly, is the question of whether you can change the wage and price decisions by some direct measures. And the basic element in that is essentially the incomes [policy -- the social compact the acceptance, basical ly by Labor, of some self-restraint on money-wage increases during the coming year. There is a real paradox in that because it asks [the party that has been injured significantly in the past year, not to strike back not to try to catch up, to recognize that it really cannot win [that kind of a battle; and it is in those terms that iit does seem to me that the good will of the Govern ment, in trying to negotiate restraint from business and, particularly, from labor, is best displayed by being willing to offer some kind of extra assurance or extra benefits that will help to insure that restraint on wages will lead to an actual resumption ¡of gains in real wages and, if that takes a tax [reduction, or subsidy, or some promise of an [ultimate tax reduction, I think it could well be worth the investment in the effort to negotiate that arrangement. 317 Thank you. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. Mr. John Tomayko of the United Steel Workers. MR. TOMAYKO: Mr. Secretary, I have a few remarks that I have been asked to prepare. I want to say, first, that since I was told to keep them very brief, I did't go into as much de tail as, perhaps, we should have on this very impor tant subject. But I want to assure the group that I appreciate very much the remarks that Dr. Okun has made, particularly on the need for catch-up. Before I say anything further, my new acquanintance over here, Mr. Leach, said that the quickest way that you can get price increases is by threatening price control. And he further said that the quickest way you can get wage increases is by threatening wage control. Well, I just don't understand the last part. We don't give ourselves increases in wages and we generally have a term in basic industries that is about three years. You have to wait for a long time to come up at bat; and that's why it was so important for Arthur to mention the catch-up, and I'm talking about organized workers and wage earners, Mr. Leach. It seems increase -- I employees can wage control, to me that doubt very rush in to and I want merely a threat of wage much if any of your you and say, "I want that that wage increase." "I don't think your employees are organized". Any you say, "You will like hell", and if they were organized, you'd tell them when the agreement terminates and when there's an opportunity to discuss it -- but I don't want to become argumentative. I do want to say this: That I have been with the Steel Workers Union for 38 years, and I am not an economist by any stretch of the imagination, and my principal function has been to negotiate collective bargaining agree ments in the fringe benefit areas. And there are many who think that that is not particularly in flationary. 318 I first became acquainted with the subject of Wage Stabilization under programs that were developed during the Roosevelt Administration and, more recently, when I served on the Health Services Industry Committee under President Nixon's Phase II. Now, President Ford held a conference with the leaders of labor last week. I am not an elected leader of labor. I'm a labor technician, employed by the Steel Workers Union. Now. President Meany stated Labor's position, and he stated it quite eloquently, and it would be presumptuous for me to take any other position; but I should briefly highlight what I understand is his stated position. Organized labor is deeply interested in halting the present inflationary spiral. We took President Nixon very seriously in 1971, and joined in what we thought would be a cooperative effort to get equality of sacrifice, only to discover in a few short months that certain sections of the national economy were more equal than others. Oh, yes§ Wages were controlled. The American people were gouged at the supermarket and squeezed into pay checks -- as Mr. Meany has said. Many prices were not frozen at all. Exempted from any freeze were interest rates, price of land, capital gains, dividends, and, also, profits were free to rise without any pretense of control. In fact, during this period of wage control, Business was given tax bonanzas and during President Nixon's Phase One through Phase Four the rate of inflation more than doubled. Now, no amount of rhetoric can hide the fact that there was no fairness, no equity or no justice in the controlled programs that were developed in the 1971-1974 period. Labor, therefore, is opposed to any repetition of such a control program in any form or any guise. And in conclusion, speaking as an individual deeply concerned with the welfare of this great country, I am convinced that organized Labor looks with hope to President Ford's war on inflation. As in the past when, when he determines that extraordinary stabilization measures must be taken Labor will cooperate fully as long as there will be equitable restrains on every phase of the economy, including prices, profits, dividends, rents, interests rates, interest rates, and executive compensation as ’ well as worker wages. Now, I spoke with President Able just yesterday before I come down here and he is happy that I have been given the opportunity to participate, to listen, to find out what you people have to say about the problems of inflation and he wants you to know that our Union looks optimistically towards Presi dent Ford's Economic Summit Conference. We would like for him to give the nation a breath of fresh air in order that we may restore the necessary health and vitality of this great nation. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you very much, John. Let me see if there are any people here that haven't made any comments today. I am trying to get everybody. SPEAKER UNIDENTIFIED: Mr. Secretary, I submit that there is a fourth wage price policy that is capable of making major headway in controll ing inflation that Mr. Okun did not mention in his i summary and this particular policy is one that does lie within the control and power of Labor under existing law, namely, a different kind of social contract or compact than that being talked about in Europe, than that being now somewhat talked about jj here as evidenced by this conference; a social contract between employer and employees that in re turn for financing a portion of the growth of the corporation in such manner as to use the logic of corporate finance which is to invest in things that will pay for themselves, to build ownership into the worker, for the worker in turn to flatten out his wage demands. This means simultaneously building an eventual second source of income into him. It means building economic security into him and it means simultaneously solving the economic growth problem of the economy. 320 This is a collectively bargainable subject today under existing law. Nothing new is needed |to do that so that it lies within Labor’s power. I am frankly appalled that Labor Union leader ship confines itself to jurisdiction over only one of the two factors of production and that is one that is growing weaker rather than stronger. Technology has the effect of pushing the burden of production off the worker onto the machine. It’s time for the Union to wake up and repre sent the worker, the Union leadership to represent the worker not only with respect to his job, but with respect to the capital ownership which he must have if he is going to be self-sufficient, selfsustaining and maintain an adequate income without inflationary impact. SECRETARY SIMON: George Schultz. MR. SHULTZ: For a long time -- it seems to me [that Dr. Okun and Mr. - - I think I will call you ["Doctor Tomayko" promote you to the ranks of the economists. I thought your statement was very much to the point and Dr. Okun's statement, you have pinpointed the problem for us very well. I would like to assume their statement of the problem and say a few words about this social con tract idea and try to be constructive about it, because I’ve thought about it a lot and I've tried to work one out once, and I think on the whole in early 1973 had all the makings in a broad, loose sense, a social contract and essentially it got broken up by things that took place outside of it, so to speak, mainly what took place in the prices of international traded commodities and a lot of associated events. So I think there are some things that can be done through the social contract route but I also [think there are some distinct limitations on things that can't be done. The statement has been made about the British [situation, I will say a statement has been made so I won t attribute it to myself; that the social contract 321 that is, the agreement between the Trade Union Congress and the Labor Party will well cut your taxes if you show restraint on wages. That social contract is not worth the paper its not written on. And I think that’s probably right and some sort of explicit effort to negotiate something like that here, I think would be subject to the same comment because I don't know who would speak to the Congress. It is very gratifying that two members have stuck with us all day and are listen ing to whatever one has to say and I think that we owe them a real vote of thanks for doing that. But nobody spoke for the Congress and a tax bill is a pretty wild thing when it gets going. You just don’t know what is going to come out of it for American Labor? I guess George Meany comes as close as anybody does, but then there's the AFL-CIO for the miners, truck drivers, automobile workers, to name three. And besides that, I think the steelworker, when it comes to bargaining, you figure you are doing that, So there is that dispersion plus the fact that roughly a little better than a fifth of the Labor force is in Unions or a little better than the non-agriculture Labor force, so there are a lot of people who wouldn't be a part of that social contract and you don't know who is speaking for somebody. So I think there are -limitations to sort of being very explicit about that idea. On the other hand, it seems to me that if a comprehensive economic program can somehow emerge, that people think is reasonable, fair, and the people working at it are fair and there has been a chance for a genuine input and that as things go along, there will be further opportunities for input and if things don't go as planned, there will be a readiness to change and to appraise in a reasonably realistic way, then it seems to me you have a basis for people doing what they think is best for themselves, nevertheless having a greater sense of common interest than they would have if they didn't have the same kind of feeling about what was happening to national policy. So I think as it's developing, these meetings that are being held have all the different g r o u p s that have something to say on the economy, are by way, 322 very good step in the direction of this sort of broad sense of social contract, and I think it is quite a welcome thing that not only is the Executive Branch represented, at least the two that I have been at but the legislative branch has also been present, an<i I think that this is something to be worked at very hard in this light. But without trying to pin people down to some notion that, all right, if we pass this tax bill, will you settle for a six percent wage increase or eight percent or some other wage increase? I just don't think the world works that way, but I do think it does respond to a real sense of the general interest if it can be put out there and put out there with enough confidence that perhaps can be sustained for a little while and all of us can thereby reap the benefits of it. SECRETARY SIMON: Thank you. 323 Other Suggestions to Fight Inflation Discussion Papers from Delegates G. Mr. E d w in A lexander P residen t First S&L Shares, Inc. A balanced budget must be the cornerstone in the nation’s fight against runaw ay inflation. To do this, we need a reduction in Federal spending by $10 to $15 billion. In addition, we urge that the 7 percent investment credit be extended only to those industries where supply shortages exist. The taxpayer should not have to subsize investment in industries where supply is adequate to handle demand. W e further believe the wage-price monitoring mechanism should be extended to the tax area— so that demand can be watched and so that tax increases can be im plem ented quickly if necessary. While we fight the battle against inflation through stronger fiscal that monetary policy need not bear the brunt alone, incentives for individual savings through the tax area should be implemented. For instance, we urge a deduction for up to $1,000 in interest earned from savings accounts—so that the average saver will not have his savings shriveled away by a shrinking dollar. A t the same time we recommend a new type of savings certificate, where part of the interest can be deferred as to payment and taxation until maturity. We believe that the Treasury Department should immediately make deposits o f tax and loan accounts in thrift institutions in the same manner as is now done, exclusively, with commercial banks. This, like the tax incentive, will result in increased money for the now-depressed housing market. The asset-liability structure of our financial institutions is far too rigid and inflexible to cope with today’s shifting worldwide demands for capital allocation. Financial institutions will be strengthened if the earnings on assets are made to vary with the cost of capital. To help achieve this, we strongly urge the implementation on a national basis of variable rate mortgage loan program. The unsettled times demand this—and i f implemented it would insure a reasonable flow of mortgage money at all times. Additionally, we urge enactment of the Financial Institutions Act of1973 with the exception that we believe no elimination of rate control authority should be effected at this time. Also, we believe the section of this legislation that calls for a tax credit for housing investment policy so 327 558-812 0 - 74 - 22 should be tabled pending completion of a number of important studies on the taxation of financial institutions. Lastly we recommend that legislation be enacted providing anex emption from State usury limits for all federally related mortgage loans. There is no question but that in many states these archaic rules are simply preventing families from securing the funds they needto purchase the housing of their choice. These laws, which were enacted to help families, are in fact hurting them. Families that want to purchase housing, should not have to bear the brunt of economic policies that have failed. W hile we all recognize that we must take difficult steps in order to cure the inflation cancer in our economy, we must also provide the wherewithal to insure that the basic needs o f our people are met. One such basic need is, of course, housing. To meet this dual objective, the recommendations of the National Savings and Loan League are aimed at two fronts: To insure the economy functions in the future on an even keel by balancing monetary and fiscal policies; and to develop short- and long-range answers to the particular problems facing the housing and home financing markets. D r . R obert R a y D o c k so n President California Federal Savings and Loan Association Regardless of the numerous arguments presented at these Confer ences called by President Ford, the fundamental truth is that we have reached a point where we must now correct the excesses resulting from the fiscal policies of the past. The large military outlays of the last decade, along with the more than $80 billion of Federal deficits, has pumped more dollars into our system than the value of the consumer goods and services produced. As a consequence, it is now imperative that Federal spending be curtailed and a sizeable budget surplus be planned. Both Congress and the Administration must prove to the American people that they recognize the need for a budget surplus by reducing Federal expenditures below the $300 billion level. This can be done if specific programs are eliminated and others significantly reduced. The will to do it must be found in the hearts of our Repre sentatives. A fter a sensible fiscal policy is implemented and there is evidence that the back of the inflationary spiral has been broken, the current highly restrictive monetary policy should be relaxed. Such relaxation should stimulate investments and thus increase our productive capacity so that the supply side can be increased at the same time demand is being depressed. In addition to the need for a more conservative fiscal policy, coupled with a less aggressive monetary policy, there is an overrriding need 328 to increase the rates of savings and capital formation. The demand for capital is astronomical and there is no way to meet this demand without pursuing policies that result in a higher aggregate level of savings. While it is important that a nation-wide publicity campaign be mobil ized to encourage people to save and to reduce their expenditures, the Government’s taxing powers also should be employed to encourage a higher savings rate. A tax incentive in the form of a tax exemption for interest income derived from savings placed with financial insti tutions would offer a most effective instrument to increase the size of the savings pool while simultaneously reducing consumption. Specifically, it is recommended that the first $1,500 of income earned on savings accounts in either commercial banks or thrift institutions be exempt from the Federal income tax. Such an exemption would benefit greatly the small saver as opposed to the institutional investor and, at the sam e time, would stimulate housing—the industry that has taken the brunt of the current tight monetary policy. Although the Treasury w ould have to estimate the exact cost of this kind of program, rough estimates indicate the cost would be less than $3 billion a year, far below the cost of the various subsidy programs being discussed. incentive along the lines recommended would have other effects. It would tend to reduce immediately the “disinter mediation” taking place with financial institutions and it would return a viability to their financial structure. These savings would be used primarily for home loans and new residential construction and thus employment in the construction industry would pick up and the Federal tax base would be expanded, offsetting the actual loss of revenue r e s u lt in g from the exemption. A tax exempt program of the nature o f t h a t described would reaffirm our Government’s recog nition o f the important role of the American home. ! A tax ancillary Mr. Milton J. H ates Chairnum Government Fiscal Policy Committee, Independent Bankers Asso ciation of America It is probably too simplistic and too self-evident to propose that a soundunit of currency will go a long way toward combating inflation. Thecounter-point could be made that even nations with a sound cur rencybacked by gold are today also experiencing inflation and this is true, especially in the case of Switzerland. However, monetary and fiscal responsibility may not be enough to control an inflation if the other policies of a nation tend to undermine the strength o f the cur rencyand have the citizens question the value of their money. History is replete with examples of Nations who have declined be cause the currency was debased and the savings of the people seriously eroded or destroyed. The United States must now face this question 329 squarely and take steps to reverse the process of undermining the cur rency that has been going on for too many years. The first and foremost move must be in the area of the budget. Im mediate action should be instituted to abandon the full employment budget and adopt ia 'budget based on actual income and expenditures. Then the budget must be brought into balance at once and kept in balance for the indefinite future. A ll the protestations about the im possibility of achieving this very necessary objective must be dismissed and all the pressure groups must be made to understand the absolute necessity of this action for the protection of the peoples’ savings. We must then take steps to bring the dollar back into the discipline of a gold backing. I propose this be done by the following actions: 1. Raise the official price of gold to $75.00 per oz. 2. Issue the additional Gold Certificates representing the difference between the present $42.22 official price and the new figure of $75.00 per oz. However, these Certificates are to be “frozen” as a backing to the currency and not used by the U.S. Treasury to pay current bills and thus increase the money supply as was done in the two previous increases in the price of gold. This is a vital step and must be part of the legislation authorizing the new official price of $75.00 an oz. Studies must then go forward to have a statutory gold backing to the currency—this should eventually serve to prevent the irresponsible actions by many segments of our society in demanding special heavy spending programs for a small percentage of the population. History shows that unless there is a forced discipline in the matter of main taining a sound currency the nature of man is such that debasement is an easy course to follow until the financial structure of a Nation collapses. I f these steps are taken we will find that confidence in the dollar will be restored, that the people will trust the value of their money, that natural forces will cause a decline in many basic commodities from their present speculative heights, and the rate of inflation will be substantially reduced. Time is of the essence in moving forward on this program. M. R. H ellie President. Credit Union National Association, Inc. Selected Data for JU L Y 1974 Loans outstanding at credit unions increased $365 million in July; seasonally adjusted, considerably more than the increase in the pre ceding month and more than twice the January-June average. During the last 3 months, loans were increasing at an annual rate of 15.5 percent, compared with 12.9 percent for the last 12 months. 330 [Dollar amounts in millions] Seasonally adjusted Item Unadjusted Increase or decrease (—) from: Outstanding this Prev. monthend monthend 3monthsagoat annualrate amount Percent Outstanding this monthend Increase or decrease (—) from: Prev. Year ago amount Percent Total assets/liabilities and capital__ .. $30,628 $198 $3, 680 13. 0 $30,612 $-185 $3, 535 13. 1 Federal_________ _______ State_________________ _ 15, 651 14,977 101 97 2, 004 1, 676 13. 9 12. 0 15, 635 14, 977 -148 -37 1, 931 1, 604 14. 1 12. 0 Loans outstanding____________ 23, 016 365 3, 352 15. 5 23, 166 366 2, 648 12. 9 Federal.__ _____ ____ ___ State______ ____ _____ _ 11,649 11,367 191 174 1, 836 1, 516 16. 8 14. 2 11, 731 11, 435 158 208 1, 379 1, 269 13. 3 12. 5 ____ _ __ Savings__ _____ Federal (shares) _____ __ State (share plus deposits).. 26,610 13, 692 12,918 78 40 38 3, 160 1, 820 1, 340 12. 8 14. 5 11. 1 26, 650 13, 719 12, 931 -162 -97 -65 2, 889 1, 563 1, 326 12. 2 12. 9 11. 4 N o t e —Monthly figures, except where otherwise indicated, are preliminary estimates based on reports furnished by a group of Federal and State-chartered credit unions that account for about 30 percent of credit union assets. Estimates are revised annually, m ainly to incorporate recent benchmark data. CO CO Credit union savings, on the other hand, increased only $78 million in July, on a seasonally adjusted basis. This increase was substantially less than the previous month’s gain and more than 75 percent smaller than the January-June average. On the basis of expansion during the last 3 months, savings were increasing at an annual rate of 12.8 per cent, slightly faster than for the year ended July 31,1974. Loan-to-share ratios increased during the month while liquid asset ratios declined. Credit union assets total $30.6 billion as of July 31,1974. C redit U nions S elected D ata Item T h is m o n th L a s t m o n th Year ago Number of operating credit unions 1--------- - 23, 028 23, 029 Federal------- ----------------------------Charters issued— -------------------Entered liquidation 2----------------State______________________ ____ 12, 842 25 17 10, 186 12, 834 37 14 10, 195 Number of members (thousands)-------------- 28, 700 28, 528 Federal credit unions---------------------State credit unions________________ Average savings per member------------------Federal credit unions (shares)-----------State credit unions (shares plus deposits) _ Delinquency rate:3 Federal credit unions: Number of loans---------------------Amount of loans---------------------Repayments ratio: 4 Federal credit unions---------------------State credit unions-----------------------Loan-to-share ratio: Federal credit unions with assets of: $2,000,000 or more----------------$500,000 to $1,999,999__________ Less than $500,000------------------Liquid asset ratio: 5 Federal credit unions with assets of: $2,000,000 or more____________ $500,000 to $1,999,999_________ Less than $500,000---- ------------- 15, 191 13, 509 $929 903 957 15, 100 13, 428 $940 915 968 2. 9 1. 8 2. 8 1. 8 2.6 9. 6 7. 4 8. 0 6. 7 9.9 83. 8 89. 5 93. 2 81. 9 88. 2 92. 3 82.9 43. 2 55. 3 56. 1 44. 7 57. 9 60. 6 47.0 23, 020 12, 716 28 29 10, 304 26, 839 14,153 12,687 $885 859 915 1.6 7.3 89.2 94 5 62.7 77.7 i D ata for Federal credit unions based on complete reporting. R ^ a y m en t^ ^ co rren tm o n tli *as a percentage of outstanding loans at endof preceding montb as reported by m onthly respondents. H . ,. «hares and loans to s Represents the sum of U .S. Government securities, savings and loan association shares, other credit unions as a percentage of notes payable and share accounts larger tnan $i>,uw. N ote .—R atios and averages based on data not adjusted for seasonal variation. 332 I Ms.Sylvia P orter Syndicated Financial Columnist Since I am attending this Pre-Summit Conference in the role of I representative of the consumer, it is in this role that I submit the following “other suggestion for controlling inflation.” / In the anti-inflation fight to date, the consumer has been lectured, exhorted, patronized—but not enlisted. Yet, it is the consumer who is being squeezed by tight and horrendously expensive credit, trapped by soaring prices, battered by crashes in the securities markets. I believe this is an extraordinary oversight. I also believe that con as eager to help combat inflation as we were eager in World War II to help combat Nazism. The consumer wants to be a participant i n this battle, not just a pawn. There is an unspoken cry of “WHAT CAN I DO T” in the hearts of millions of Americans that I the P re sid e n t can and should answer. (1) Work should begin at once on preparations for the President’s call for cooperation at the consumer level—voluntary but very def initely, cooperation. There need be no “stick,” such as rationing. And the“carrot” is implicit in the fact that the consumer is doing some thingpositive to help ease his or her own squeeze. (2) Representatives of the widest range of groups of consumers should be called to meetings in Washington to be informed of the plansandhopes, to be asked for policy suggestions and practical ways theprogramshould be carried out. A ll consumer groups, all national organizations of men and women, all types of educational, religious, civic, etc., organizations should be included. The groups may be broken downsoeach is small enough to be productive. I have seen this sort of callforactionwork magnificently under far less urgent circumstances. Itcouldhave an electrifying effect. (3) The help of professionals in the fields of public relations, ad vertising and the like should be enlisted. They would leap to the opportunity. (4) The program should be identified with the W hite House, to give itstature and insure its duration. (Perhaps, it might be placed under thecontinuing supervision of Virginia H. Knauer, Special Assistant tothePresident for Consumer Affairs.) But this program is to be im plemented at the regional and local—not national level. This is a key aspectof it. (5) After the details have been carefully worked out, the President himself should issue a major policy statement and kick off the call for voluntary cooperation via a prime time T V address. Here are several illustrations that come quickly to mind. There must be hundreds of others equally valuable or far superior. sumers are n o w 333 Victory Gardens: Whether on a community or on an individual family scale, the victory garden can help keep some lid on food prices as well as contribute importantly to the individual American’s feeling of participation. The “community garden” concept could be spectacu larly expanded with the cooperation of corporations, churches, civic groups, schools, nursing homes, etc. Millions of publicly owned acres could be made suitable for community gardens even in densely dodulated cities. Recycling: While local collection centers for waste paper, aluminum cans, bottles, etc,, have proved comparatively ineffectual, they have helped raise the public’s consciousness of the value of recycling in con serving our natural resources and helping to keep a lid on prices. Scrap collection and sale by communities themselves would pay off handsomely in every way. Energy Conservation: I, for one, am utterly dismayed by the extent to which the U.S. has returned to a “burn-it-up” philosophy. Energy conservation measures must be revived and maintained. The list of moves that can be made by businesses, homeowners and individuals is well known to you. This would be both an anti-inflation and a con sumer unifying force. Educational Pamphlets: Booklets explaining in easy-to-follow lan guage the many significant ways consumers can help hold down living costs—in all areas—could be inexpensively printed and widely cir culated by organizations at the regional and local levels. As the Red Cross teaches swimming, for instance, so it could teach other vital subjects. W hile admittedly sketchy, if found worthy, this idea could easily be carried on from here. II In my role as a syndicated columnist specializing in economics and finance, I also submit these suggestions in what must be briefest sum m ary: The U.S. must assume leadership in bringing together the oil con suming nations to deal with the oil producing countries and meet the exceedingly delicate problems arising out of the oil price increases and production-limiting maneuvers. This cooperation among con suming nations is absolutely imperative—in sharing of available oil supplies, in developing policies to deal with price hikes and oil money flows, in conservation, in pursuing new sources of energy. And this common front and cooperation should be extended to other crucial raw materials so that we may handle adverse steps taken by other producers of essential raw materials without first piling crisis upon crisis. I II Work must be speeded up well beyond what is apparent now on development of new international financial agreements and financial 334 Institutions_or perhaps strengthening of existing agreements and in- iitutions_to handle the challenges of massive flows of funds. Our Licies have been much too hesitant. Whatever progress has been Achieved as a result of our timid steps to date seems to me far too ¡little. President ^ ^ - U.S. League of Savings Associations We would suggest the following general anti-inflation programs and Licies by the Federal Government: I (1) Achieve a Federal budgetary surplus at the earliest possible date. If at all possible, such a surplus should be sought without an increase in taxes, but a surplus is necessary even if taxes must be [increasedto attain it. f (2) The Federal Reserve Board should restrain the growth of money supply and not relax its restrictive monetary policy too quickly—even though thrift institutions are particularly hard hit by tight money policies. ■ . I (3) New tax incentives are needed to encourage savings, thereby reducing inflationary pressures. We recommend a tax exclusion for the first $1,000 of interest earned on savings accounts at supervised finan cial institutions. j (4) The Federal Government should announce its willingness to serve as the “employer of last resort”. This would sever the presumed relationship between unemployment and the program of fiscal and monetary restraint so that anti-inflationary policies could be pursued [with vigor. [ (5) Special tax incentives should be utilized to increase the produc tivity in appropriate areas of the general economy. I Specific recommendations to improve the flow of funds, into the residential mortgage market: | (1) Swift Congressional action on H.R. 11221, the Depositary Insti tutions Amendments Act of 1974. Of particular importance is the increase in insurance of accounts coverage by the FSL IC and FD IC from$20,000 to $50,000. This would be of immediate practical help in assuring people that their money in financial institutions is completely safe, would encourage people to place their money in thrift institutions which are the backbone of the housing industry, and would not cost the Federal Government one additional dollar. We also ask support forthe House-passed provision to permit 100 percent Federal insurance for deposits of governmental units—another potential source of funds forour institutions and ultimately, homebuyers. (2) Reconsideration and reversal of the Treasury Department’s regulation which effectively prohibits the issuance of tax-deferred 335 savings accounts. This would permit savings associations to resume a useful service to many depositors—particularly those approaching retirement. ® (3) Support for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board’s efforts to encourage the use of a variable rate mortgage, thus encouraging lenders to make new commitments even under today’s trying conditions. (4) Separate the controversial subjects of ending savings rate con trol and repealing the bad debt deduction tax treatment for thrift institutions from discussions on the Financial Institutions Act, so that Congress might consider and move ahead quickly on this important legislation. M r. C arlton P. W ilson Chairman of the Board Robert W. Baird and Company, Inc. President Ford has stated loudly and clearly that inflation is the number one problem in the United States. That leadership in our gov ernment has even identified the problem is encouraging. As we meet for this Financial Conference on Inflation, let us not lose sight of the number one problem and the priority that its cure deserves. All that we discuss or debate should relate back to the first priority: How can this country cure an intolerable rate of inflation ? Our firm is a regional investment banking firm 'and our principal focus is doing business with the public. A ll of our capital over the years has been provided by retention of earnings and investment by our peo ple. In 1973, when the volume of corporate financing was off sharply, our investment banking deals managed or co-managed were up sharply, and we led all regional firms in this category. We have been in the top five regional firms in each of the past five years. W hile profitable in 1973 and so far in 1974, we have found it nec essary to reduce expenses by $1,500,000 so far in 1973-74. These are substantial reductions for a firm with gross revenues of about $12,000,000. We find ourselves suffering, with the industry, from all the well documented problems: low volume, rapidly rising costs, high in terest rates, uncertainty of regulatory rules, illiquidity of markets, etc. etc. However, we can relate all of these problems back to inflation. The intolerable rates o f inflation of the past three years are destroying the products we have to sell to investors. Inflation is destroying the individ uals incentive to save any kind of a savings vehicle. He is no longer will ing to make a long term contract. We can continue to try to attract him with innovative ideas such as variable rate notes, short term notes (Duke Power 13s) and perhaps others to come, but inflation at these rates is wiping out 30 million older people and middle income Ameri cans. These people are the country’s savers and investors. New legisla336 lion to increase social security benefits, pensions, health insurance are i . fee<iing the fire. And now the results of inflation are filtering back L 0 the capital markets. These markets are breaking down, as a result, fust as they have in other countries for exactly the same reasons. Our I ital nee(js by 1985 are estimated all the wiay from $2.6 trillion to K trillion with an estimate capital short fall of $400-$600. [ It is obvious that we must change our goals in this country. W e must content with a slower growth rate and a permanently lower mone tary growth rate. This must be accompanied by a balanced budget or Smaller deficits. I f these goals are defined, the alternatives accurately described, and the people are asked to make the necessary sacrifices to fcttain these goals, we believe they will respond. But it w ill take time End sacrifice. Unless government is willing to assume its painful role Bn“telling it as it is”, the alternatives are frightening. Provide us with the needed leadership to cure inflation and most of our serious prob lems will disappear. L h)R. Albert M. W ojnilower I Economist and Director I The First Boston Corporation I Our present economic condition is the legacy of a few short years during which the world business community learned that it is cheaper to buy today than to buy tomorrow, and that what is borrowed today Ian be paid back tomorrow in depreciated currency. U ntil quite re cently, many firms acted as though they really believed that risk could be safely ignored and that caution had been outlawed, much as in a world in which no one bothered to lock any door because some higher power has provided everyone with free theft insurance. This attitude pas found its fullest expression in the realm of finance. I When an illness is allowed to go untreated for too long, not many options remain open to the physician. The issue is no longer how to [restore the patient to good health but how to save him, and even some rather unpleasant treatment may be adjudged as preferable to doing nothing. Thus, there is little hope, in my judgment, of preventing the emerging recession. Too many sectors of our economy, mainly the jindustries and financial institutions serving the consuming public, are being ravaged by the inflation and its financial symptoms. They will Jcontinue to suffer until the inflation abates materially, which will [surely not happen overnight. By contrast other sectors in our economy, jmainly those catering to business and foreign demand, have benefited from the inflation and developed their long-range planning on the assumption that the prices of the products they sell will continue to outrage rising costs. For these important industries, the subsidence of inflation is likely to be fully as painful and injurious as inflation’s Ascendancy has been for so many others. 337 Nevertheless, I consider it important that certain steps be takenand others avoided—so that the recession may be mitigated and ulti mately do some good by nurturing a noninflationary recovery. The danger is all too tangible—and has been terrorizing the stock marketthat antirecession measures may cause prices and interest rates to chase each other upward still faster, even as real economic activity stubbornlyI goes on contracting and unemployment spreads. Such a conjunctureI is to be prevented at all cost, lest we arrive in a matter of months at that point of no return at which some people start to react to the* inflation by buying their next year’s shirts today, and then the shirts for the year after that (like steel, they will argue, you can always sell them to someone else if you don’t need them) while others decide to feast on steak and champagne today, because they have reason to fear that the money won’t even buy hamburgers a while later. P reventing E xcessive C redit E xpansion Inhibiting and reversing the inflationary trend and expectations necessitates firm control over the expansion of credit—a control so firmly set in place that the public can visualize it as surviving political counterpressure even after the initial anti-inflationary results. As a practical matter this means controlling the expansion of commercial bank credit, since the growth of other lenders has long ago been] pinched off by the overwhelming competitive power of the banks that has been released by the recent dismantling of many of the restric tions placed on them during the 1930’s. Controlling bank credit, in turn, must start with curbing the promises that banks make. Most im portant bank loans originate as the result of formal or informal credit lines or commitments issued by banks to their good clients. These promises, which can be cashed on the shortest of notice, are just as much a part of the nation’s spendable money stock as is thej money supply reported in the statistics that the Federal Reserve issues and they and we so closely watch each week. As long as loan commitments are readily available and widely merchandised—and the1 banks who make the promises are also able to deliver on them—infla tionary spending (or any other kind) is not inhibited. What happens if the promises are made but then the Federal Reserve tries to hold back the supply of funds that the banks need to make good? The cost of money rises sharply as banks bid for the available supply—and this invariably prompts the authorities to supply more funds than they originally intended, because everyone is afraid of sharply rising interest rates. Does the rise in rates deter the banks from issuing more promises? It used to, but no more. Until last year, the Federal Reserve’s regulation Q restricted the interest rate banks could pay to borrow large sums in the money market. Thus, whenever the price of money was near or beyond the maximum the banks were 338 Lllowed to pay, the banks’ ability to raise funds for lending was [sharply curtailed and likewise their ability to make new loan com mitments. Also, until last year, the banks’ freedom to raise the prime Lnd other lend in g rates was constrained. Consequently, when the banks’ host of borrowing money in the market rose in relation to what they could charge for their loans, their profit margin was squeezed and their ardor for new commitments cooled. But since early 1973, these automatic “shut-offs” on the banks’ pro motion of loan commitments have been removed. Moreover, the prac tice of charging a “floating” rate has become virtually universal for large loans. On such a loan, the customer undertakes! to pay a fixed Imark-up over whatever the bank itself has to pay for the funds lit passes through to him. The bank no longer needs to care at all what [interest rate it has to pay, because it will get even more back from [the customer. Nor do the borrowers care very much, because they [know that all their competitors’ interest costs are floating up (and [occasionally down) together with their own, so that all borrowers will [be passing through to consumers identical changes in their interest [costs. The loan expansion dial is set at infinity. The chief restraint of high interest rates on short-term and even much long-term borrowing has always been one of timing; in relation Ito the com petition, is it wiser to borrow (and spend) today or tomor[ row, or is it perhaps too late to borrow because my competitors were [smart enough to borrow earlier when money was cheaper? Under floating rates, this concern over timing is virtually completely dis[pelled, so that rises in interest rates exercise virtually no deterrent I effect. That is why short-term rates have been extraordinarily higher | than long-term rates. There is a grave danger, more over, foreshadowed by recent long-term floating rate bond issues, that this cancerous devel opment will spread to the long-term market. I f it does, any sustained return to single-digit interest rates will be foreclosed for the indefinite [ future. If interest rates do not do an adequate job of rationing credit in Ithe current environment, how does the market distribute credit ? After | all, the supply while excessive is not infinite. The answer is, when the I credit structure is encouraged to overexpand, it doesn’t take very long I for defaults, insolvencies, and bankruptcies to emerge. These have now I become the basis of credit allocation. To have allowed widespread default risks to reappear is playing with lightning; there is no telling I when and where default may strike and how many innocent parties— [creditors, vendors, suppliers, depositors—may be scarred. The majority of large market participants, of course, simply take | it for granted that the Government or Federal Reserve will supply the wherewithal to bail out the serious cases—as indeed they must in order to prevent irremediable damage to the economy. The unfortunate out come of this devil-may-care attitude has been, however, that the largest 339 banks around the world—those regarded as having unbreakable um bilical cords to the central banks’ money-printing presses—have been operating as though they were branches of central banks run for commercial profit. Because they have seen that it is to their advantage to try to increase their loans to the maximum, and because they and their depositors know that the Federal Reserve is more afraid of bank failures than are these banks themselves, their expansion has been! restrained only by the defaults of some of the firms with which they! have done business. The consequence of this ruinous competition from these banks is that, viewed in terms of their prospects for institutional survival, the stock, bond, mortgage, and foreign exchange markets, depositary savings institutions, and mutual funds are a shamblesand even the banking system is under suspicion to a degree unknown for more than 40 years. We have taken a long step backwards to the disaster-ridden banking arrangements of yesteryear in response to which the modern conception of central banking was evolved. Until less than 2 years ago, our infla tion, though stubborn, was not unusually rapid. The abdiction to the commercial banks of the de facto control over the growth of credit and money is, I am convinced, the principal cause of the exceptional virulence of inflation since then. B u sin e ss I nvestm ent I s N o P anacea Investment isn’t always a good thing—if it were, we should all be starving ourselves, early Communist style, to finance heavy industryand investment isn’t a monopoly of business firms. Investment con cerns creating resources for the future and the most important of these are to be found in our households. The building of the homes in which we live and bring up our children and the buying of cars and appliances which enable more members of each household to take on paying jobsj and to get to sources of training and education do not bear the statisti cal jobs and to get to sources of training and education do not bear the statistical label of “investment in plant and equipment,” but they are at least equally important. Such household-oriented activities, how ever, can never effectively compete for funds in free financial markets with business equipment, since they produce little or no cash flow and| since the benefits often accrue not to the would-be borrowers but rather| to their children or their community. I f we had a truly free market, all but the richest of us would sleep and eat in our offices or at ourI workbenches, because that is clearly the cheapest and most efficient method of organizing production. Inflation and high interest rates exacerbate the problems of thej industries and institutions that enable American families to live to gether in privacy rather than in factory dormitories, but these problems would persist in a high-employment economy even if there were no 340 iflation. The regulation of bank interest rates I have already proposed fill be of some help in rechanneling funds toward household investLnt but it will take a rather thoroughgoing reversal of current Govinment philosophy which favors deregulation of financial institutions, |id which mobilizes the Federal Reserve’s lender of last resort func ión primarily on behalf o f banks that lend primarily to business jms, to produce a better balancing of our financial structure between jumanand engineering values. I jduch of the business investment now surging forward is, I am coninced, based on unsound premises. The climate of scarcity that preails in many basic materials (although fewer and fewer of them of fte) reflects the unfortunate fact that over the last couple of years, lese commodities have turned out to be the most profitable asset to |wn—they have far outperformed money, foreign exchange, securities, abor skills, or finished goods as stores of value. Inventory profits have keenasource of gigantic profit increases to business firms not normally In the commodity business. Because buying cheap and selling dear is Lpiat business is all about, firms have naturally stepped up their inlentory orders enormously, beyond the capacity of the producers to lleliver—^but if prices were to settle, these orders would vanish and Lomeof the inventory buyers might even become sellers in competition kith the manufacturers. The desire to substitute inventories and ma ltones for cash, so as to boost profits further, largely explains why a fclimate of shortage continues to prevail in many markets even though leal final demands, and especially domestic consumer purchases, have »eenshrinking for 1 year or more. Self-aggravating runs from money Into commodities are typical of business upswings. In the past, how ever, credit restraint has curbed the ability to finance such purchases piuch earlier in the gam e: in the present, viewed on an international page, credit restraint has hardly begun to exert a meaningful checkrein. Control of B a n k L oan I nterest R ates To revive the public’s fading hope that inflation can be curbed it is essential first and foremost to reimpose a permanent ceiling on lank loan interest rates. The ceiling could be set at current levels; perhaps there will be opportunity to lower it in the future, but only in the most exigent circumstances and only by legislation should it be possible to raise it. The purpose, it should be reiterated, is not to hold town interest rates. Rather, it is to provide a clear and unmistakable earning to large lenders and borrowers, and to business planners, that whenever money rates in the open market are in or threatening to rise into the critical zone, banks will have to curtail their lending committents in order to protect their earnings. Thus banks could no longer jfiord to promise clients that large loans will be available under any ind all market conditions. Equally no borrower will be justified in 341 assuming that he is somehow immune from having his credit cut off] And the “suction” on the Fed to overissue money to validate excessive bank promises will be relieved. No doubt such a loan rate ceiling will on occasion, as in the past cause market distortions at the expense of some commercial banks] but I am sure we would gladly accept the reappearance of these local] ized irritations if they helped reduce the general worldwide inflation] ary disruption we are privileged to have now. As for the cost to the banks, they do after all enjoy a legal monopoly of demand deposits and checking accounts; unique access to the Federal Reserve as a lender of last resort; restrictions on the entry of new competitors; and the bene] fits of Government-gtiaranteed deposit insurance. Like other public utilities, they should expect to bear certain public-interest costs id return for these enormous privileges. My other recommendations run along the same lines. Existing inter] est rate and loan rate ceiling should be preserved where they still exist] (although the levels may need updating in some cases). Floating inter est rate securities, including variable rate mortgages and, if possible floating-rate commercial loans should be severely restricted or eveiu outlawed by regulatory policy. (Let us remember that only the Govj ernment and the Federal Reserve can credibly guarantee payment onj what are essentially open-ended contracts.) And controls over the] outflow of capital to the rest of the world will need to be reinstated to prevent circumvention of these rules (as well as for other reasons cited below). In the absence of measures to this or similar effect, I am quite certain! that inflation will, with fits and starts, continue to accelerate. Conse-I quently, I am also quite certain that such measures will eventually ba adopted. The later they come, the more Draconian they are apt to be, and the greater the price in terms of inflation and recession we will] have paid. D angers of a n U ncontrolled C apital O utflow Indeed, to the extent that we may be suffering a genuine rather! than a speculative heightening of scarcities, it is international in nature. For many decades, international financial flows (and often trade flows as well) have been dominated by political concerns such as wars and the rise of totalitarian regimes and/or have been administra tively regulated for balance-of-payments reasons. Since the beginning of 1973, paralleling the abolition cited earlier of our internal selfdisciplining financial regulations, international flows have also been rendered largely^ free of Governmental intervention. Generally spea • ing, American levels of resource endowment, accumulated wealth, anj consumption are far higher than in the rest of the world. The eM of free financial markets and trade must therefore be in the direction 342 of equalizing, by means of exports of goods and capital from the United States, the standard of living in the United States and that of the rest of the world. While this means a higher standard for the ¡world seen as a whole, it may not mean a higher standard o f living ¡for most of us. We have seen this conflict illustrated, in a rather special ¡but nevertheless instructive fashion, with regard to the grain trade, litis also taking place less dramatically—though it could snowball— insofar as OPEC oil revenues are being used to finance increased imports by the OPEC members and those other countries to whom they and their bankers choose to extend credit or grants, while the world pays its oil bills largely by borrowing funds coming from the United States. These are monstrous issues that far transcend economics, but it should be clear that only the; most gradual kind o f reduction of American living standards can be viewed as a viable policy for the long run. Translated into purely financial terms, the abolition of the controls over the outflow of U.S. funds has drastically reduced the scope for interest-rate reduction even in the best of circumstances, while the forthcoming freeing of Americans to purchase gold can at best do nogood, and at worst wreak havoc. L eave th e B udget A lone j Let me now turn to some things we ought not to do. We ought not to try to cut the budget deficit. To do so will be seen by the business [community as making large additional sums available for private bor rowing, especially by those industries whose spending is contributing most to the inflationary pressures. Moreover, if Congress reduces the deficit, the Federal Reserve will have to ease credit to bring down interest rates as its part of the bargain. The fear that credit may become unavailable is the major if not the only anti-inflationary deterrent now 6nplace, and it has been operating for only 6 months at most. The last thing we should do is to get rid of our only effective weapon. As to reducing Federal expenditure, whatever may be the pros and cons in the longer run, it is most unlikely that any cuts can be insti tuted the timing of whose economic impact can occur any time soon. Why reduce employment on the Federal payroll at a time when large sums are being earmarked for disbursement on public service employ ment ? Curtailment of military outlay on hardware and research and development would help relieve pressure on some of the “bottleneck” sectors in our economy, but such decisions cannot and should not be made to depend primarily on economic policy considerations. As to taxation, raising individual taxes seems inappropriate when pt is likely