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\iE"'~. \\:1 \0 , A\~ ptf \J,11l6 i '"' 1 \ A \ / \ I '" LJ8RARY pnnlVl 110~O JUL 241972 TREASURY DEPARTMENT The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY STATEMENT BY TIlE HONORABLE JOHN B. CONNALLY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY BEFORE THE BANKING AND CURRENCY COMMITTEE u.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WEDNESDAY, MARCH 1, 1972 Mr. Chairman and Members of this Distinguished Committee: I welcome the opportunity to appear today to express my strong support for the Par Value Modification Bill (HR 13120) and to urge its prompt enactment. This bill has one essential purpose, and a very important purpose--to establish a new par value for the dollar at the equivalent of $38 per ounce of gold, as part of a general realignment of world currencies. The agreement reached at the Smithsonian Institution last December 18 was an unprecedented step in wor1d.monetary affairs. It was the first negotiated multilateral exchange rate rea1ignment--the first attempt to reorder the entire pattern of exchange rates among major currencies to seek a better equilibrium. Countries in large and persistent balance- of-payments surp1us--Japan, Germany, and others--agreed to 0-259 - 2 increase the par value of their currencies. We, for the United States, agreed to propose to the Congress a reduction in the par value of the dollar, by increasing the dollar price of gold by 8.57 percent. The total of the agreed exchange rate changes is sizable. We calculate that it is equal to a weighted average realignment of approximately 12 percent between the dollar and the currencies of our major industrial competitors, excluding the Canadian dollar which continues to float. I do not expect the currency realignment alone to solve our international financial and economic problems. no panacea for these difficulties. major progress. There is But it does renresent Exchange rate changes have a pervasive quality--in time they work their way through the entiLe fabric of the economy, influencing all aspects of foreign trade and payments. The multilateral realignment. chnnging not only the dollar relative to other currencies but also the relationship of the other currencies among themselves, should strongly promote an improved equilibrium in the entire worldwide payments structure, enabling the monetary system to operate more smoothly and more effectively. Another dimension of our overall effort concerns trade arrangements. Material has been submitted to the Committee on the results of recent trade negotiations with our major - 3 - trading partners. He made clear in the Smithsonian Agreement that we would not propose devaluation of the dollar until at least the first phase of these negotiations was completed and the results made available for Congressional scrutiny. These negotiations have signalled a change in the u.S. a~proach. That approach continues to look oubvard, toward expanded trade. But it recognizes that liberal policies in the United States must, in the last analysis, rest on the firm economic and political base of equitable opportunities for our exporters abroad. We mean to pursue that objective with diligence and vigor. I believe it is not only in our self-interest but that of the ~.,or1d community, for in the absence of success our will and capacity to support liberal trade and payments policies will inevitably be eroded. I can report we have concluded agreements of value with the European Community and particularly Japan. These provide some im- mediate progress toward improving our access to foreign markets. They look to more comprehensive negotiations this year and next. These agreements are useful first steps. They do not represent full success, but they are a beginning. Regrettably, we have not been able to reach agreement with Canada. \.:]e are concerned that a number of trade agree- ments and arrangements with that country, established at an - 4 earlier time in a quite different economic environment , need to be brought into better balance in accord with present needs and realities. While the two Governments have remained some distance apart on this matter, we intend to continue to seek appropriate means of achieving our objectives. Combined with the necessary changes in par values by other countries, devaluation of the dollar will formalize the pattern of exchange rates negotiated last December and which s~nce markets. then, de facto, has prevailed in the exchange The formal change in par value does not end the suspension of the convertibility of the dollar into gold or other reserve assets that was initiated on August 15 of last year. The prime consequence of the international realign~ent of currency values is, of course, to improve substantially the competitive position of and overseas markets. u.s. producers, in both domestic Over time, these changes should work strongly toward restoring a trade surplus for the United States. I believe these changes can and will be achieved consistent with the needs of our trading partners. A healthy external position for the United States economy demonstrably requires a substantial improvement in our trade position. It seems to me evident that a healthy world economy, a stable monetary system, and a liberal trading order rest in part - 5 - on our success in achieving that objectivew \ve have made clear on many occasions that we do not expect the currency realignment to correct our trade and payments position quickly. We expect--and our trading partners expect--the U.S. underlying balance of payments to remain in deficit this year. Experience by other countries shows the initial price effects of currency realignment on imports and exports are all too likely to be perverse. Moreover, cyclical factors may be less favorable to the U.S. balance this year, with our economy growing more vigorously than those of most of our major competitors. In contrast, the full benefits of favorable changes in physical volumes of trade due to the shifts in exchange rates may not be felt for two years or more. We anticipate that our basic deficit (which includes current account plus long-term capital flows) will be substantially below the roughly $11 billion deficit recorded last year. The official reserves transactions deficit (which also includes short-term capital flows) should be enormously reduced from the highly abnormal $30 billion recorded last year. The Treasury did not share the exaggerated hopes of some that there would be a massive return flow of dollars - 6 - to the U~:',i ted ;:; i.::at~:~; iliiinedi at.~ 1y after the Sr;'li thsonian Agree- ment. Likewis~, '\t.!e de; not &hare tr,e abrupt r"i-\7 ing to pessimism in some quarters when these •..mfounded expectations were not realized. One of the most hel':?ful things we could have now is a greater senSE> of realism in vie't-Jing the international monetary scene. Aft~r all, we've had quite an upheaval. Some of the presumptions of the past are no longer valid and the process of change inevitably results in some uncertainties. It's going to take time to achieve a more satisfactory pattern of world payments, and to revise and improve our international monetary system. But we have also made large and demonstrable progress in establishing the basic conditions to restore equilibrium. I am confident the benefits will become apparent as we move ahead. I want to emphasize the devaluation of the dollar b·reaks with most earlier currency devaluations in one important respect. It came not at a time of overheating and excess demand at home, but at a time of economic slack. In this cont.ext, the so-called "classic" measures to accompany devaluation--tight money and restraint--to release additional resources for export are not necessary. they would be harmful. Indeed, in our present circumstances, Instead, we can welcome the stimulus to domestic jobs and production implicit in the international adjustment. As a rule of thumb--but no more than that--each $1 billion improvement in the trade balance nught bring a gain - 7 of about 60,000 jobs. The gain in jobs from realignment would not be immediate. It would come over a period of two years or morp th~ ~1ong with improvement in the trade balance. Apart from these economic effects of the realignment, the change in Dar value of the dollar more or less automatically entails some changes in the asset and liability position of the United States Government, expressed in dollars. One effect is to m.c,intain the relative share of U.S. participation in international financial institutions and, thus, our share of the m'mersh:tp and votin3 power. The adjustments in assets anci liabilities can be condensed into four categories: (1) The dollar value of our gold holdings ~li11 increase by some $828 million, or 8.57 percent, resulting in an equivalent cash gain for the Treasury and reduction in our borrowing need. (2) Our International Monetary Fund subscription will be increased in terms of dollars by 8.57 percent. This increases our rights to draw foreign currencies from the Fund by $575 million. Our obli3ation to provide additional dollars to the Fund will increase by only $525 million, since that part of past subscriptions paid in gold will be revalued without additional dollar payments. These monetary trans- actions have no budgetary or cash impact. - 8 (3) Maintene.nce of value of the paid in subscriptions to the international development institutions will require as much as $406 million. Initially, these subscriptions will be paid in letters of credit, as but!<.lralvn upon, this will entail both a cash and budgetary drain. be sp~ead The impact, however, will over a period of ten years or more, and not begin until fiscCI.I year 197L:·. (4) Our subscriptions to the callable capital of the international development institutions will increase by some $663 million. These subscriptions provide ultimate security for the private market bor~owings of these institutions; they have never been called in the past, and it is highly unlikely they uould be called in future. tion re~resents Thus, this obliga- a remote contin3ent liability, without budgetary or cash impact. It is contemrylated that the various obligations incurred by maintenance of value requirements, however t'emote, ,·Ii 11 need to be covered by appropriations in an approximate amount of $1.5 to Sl.6 billion. These appropriations, of course, only <.leal with the liability side of the equation 8.nd do not reflect the offsetting gains. - 9 Over-all, the net result of the series of transactions will be: --In terms of its effects on Treasury cash, to increase our resources, through the write-up of our gold holdings. --In terms of budgetary expenditures, a probable rough balance be~7een savings on interest expense (as a result of the added cash resources of the Treasury) and the additional paid-in capital subscription to the international development institutions. ~-In terms of our over-all asset and liability position, an approximate offset between added contingent and deferred liabilities and the increased value of our gold and capital subscriptions. In addition to these adjustments in assets and liabilities, net losses on certain operational foreign exchange accounts, including both so-called swaps and foreign currency borrowing, maintained by the Exchange Stabilization Fund and the Federal Reserve will be absorbed by those institutions. These losses are presently estimated at about $145 million for the ESF and under $200 million for the Federal Reserve. These losses do not affect the budget except, indirectly, to the extent a reduction in net Federal Reserve profits reduces its payments to the Treasury. - 10 In the international negotiations following the suspension of convertibility on August 15, a prime United States objective '-Jas to obtain a maj or international currency realignment. I woulci recall to the Committee that we entered these negotiations with the strong view that the preferable course would be to achieve the necessa~y ~ealignment without disturbing the long-established official dollar price of gold. That conclusion 1;oJas based on several considerations. \,\Te 'tvished to emphasize the view that, over time, the monetary role of gold should diminish, anQ we did not wish to foster speculation over price increases that would tend to maintain that role. Moreover, unilateral U.S. action to change our stated price for gold did not appear a useful method of achieving the desired realignment of exchange -rates because of the probability that other countries would follow suit in whole or in part by changing the price of gold in their currencies. The net effect would have been a general increase in the official price of gold. Thus, international agreement on an appropriate pattern of exchange rates was the heart of the problem. As the negotiations progressed, however, certain other countries strongly resisted a realignment of exchange rates not accompanied by formal devaluation by the United States - 11 in terms of the official gold price. At the same time, the negotiations confirmed that, whether or not the United States agreed to change the dollar price of gold, the size of the effective exchange rate change would be determined by the decisions of our trading partners with respect to their own parities. In this difficult negotiating situat~on, the conclusion was reached that, if a change in the dollar price of gold was to be included, we could obtain an earlier and more favorable resolution of the realignment question. At the same time, we limited the change to a level acceptable to other industrial countries without substantial emulation. This was the nature of the bargain concluded at the Smithsonian-combining the maximum feasible exchange rate realignment with an increase in the official dollar value of gold as well as decreases in the value of gold expressed in terms of a number of other currencies. I want to make clear that this decision does not change our view that the monetary role of gold shoulL continue to diminish--a trend already well established. In this instance, a change in the official dollar gold price has been necessary to facilitate a currency realignment. At the same time, the official price of gold in terms of a number of other currencies will decline. These changes in no way indicate that gold - 12 provides a satisfactory basis for supplying necessary increases in world liquidity in the years ahead. I believe the difficulty oi these recent negotiations, and the ensuing speculation in private gold markets, emphasize further the need to mO-ve a\-Jay from dependence on gold in the monetary system internationally, an objective long since achieved by virtually all counti:ies domestically. I rio not believe that our objective of reducing the monetary role of gold vlould be furthered by bills now before the Congress to facilitate private holding of gold. In fact, such legislation might simply foment gold speculation and raise entirely unnecessary questions of our intentions in that respect. This is a matter that should be considered and resolved at a later date, when the monetary role of gold has been definitely settled as part of over-all monetary reform. In the period ahead, we must resolve not only the question of the rol8 of gold in the international monetary s~stem but other also many1Critical problems of reform. Today, I hope the Committee will direct its attention to the single issue in the bill before you--devaluation of the dollar as part of a general currency realignment. I urge you to report this bill promptly and favorably, without complicating amendments. Swift enactment oj: a clean bill vJill serve to consolidate - 13 the neH pattern of exchange rates which has been negotiated. It ~vill remove a source of uncertainty for the markets. It the will allmv us to turn our full attention to Tsearch Eor solutions to fundamental problems in our monetary and trading structure. The new pattern oE exchange rates thus consolidated ~vill pro-fide an opportunity to rebuild our nation's external strength. But realignment alone ~'7i 11 not assure that strength: --He must intensify our efforts .cor better balanced trading arrangements that provide our exporters with equitable access to markets. Lowering our export prices accomplishes little if other trade barriers frustrate our efforts to expand overseas sales. --He must achieve growth without inflation. Renewed growth is essential to raise our productivity. I have great confidence in the ability of our country--industry, labor, and government--to control costs and prices not just as well as our competitors, but better than our competitors. --He must restore the visor of our export industries, and imyJrove our technology. These are fundamental requi~ements. achieved without determination and effort. They will not be But vle are moving in the right direction, and I C2.nnot doubt that this nation will measure up to the tasks. 2/29/7 2 The Departmento! the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04·2041 FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE JACK F. BENNETT DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF TdE TREASURY FOR MONETARY AFFAIRS BEFORE THE HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ON H.R. 11877 AND S. 2297, THE NATIONAL CAPITAL TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 1971 WEDNESDAY, MARCH 1, 1972, AT 10:00 A.M. Mr. Chairman and members of the committees, Secretary Connally is testifying this morning before the House Banking and Currency Committee on the proposed Par Value Modification Act, called the "Gold Bill." I sometimes am sure you can appreciate, therefore, why he was not able to accept your invitation to be here me this morning. But just last night he asked to convey his sincere regrets, and he asked me to do my best to make clear the Treasury Department's strong support of the proposed National Capital Transportation Act of 1971. and in particular Mr. The Treasury Department, Frank Cavanaugh, Associate Director of the Office of Debt Analysis, who is with me this morning, have worked closely with the Department of Transportation and with Metropolitan Area Transit Authority the Washington (WMATA) to develop the financing plans which would be implemented under the legislation before you. - 2 - Revenue bond financing of the METRO was provided for in the WMATA Compact and Was authorized by the Congress in the 1969 Act. The possibility of a Federal guarantee of the bonds was recognized in the Compact; the Compact specifically permits a Federal guarantee so long as such guaranteed issues are approved by the Secretary of the Treasury. until now, Yet, the Congress has not been asked to authorize a Federal guarantee of the bonds, and it was expected that the bonds would be issued on the same basis as most other municipal bonds, that is, without a Federal guarantee and with the interest on the bonds exempt from Federal income taxation. Since the enactment of the 1969 Act, however, WMATA nas encountered two major obstacles to its contemplated borrowing arrangements. First, as Secretary Volpe testified, WMATA's revised financial plan last year showed that the estimated net cost of the METRO would be almost $450 million higher than the net cost assumed in 1969. Second, WMATA waS advised by its private financial consultants that in their opinion, the Authority's bonds could not be marketed without either a Federal guaranteee or - 3 - some form of pledged taxes by the participating local jurisdictions. Even if the additional $450 million of costs were fully offset by increased Federal and local government grants, we were advised that investors could not be attracted to unsecured t :ansit revenue bonds at anything like reasonable rates of interest. Originally it was planned that Some security for the bondholders would be provided by service contracts with each of the participating jurisdictions, but it was found that such s~curity could not be provided under the existing Constitution of Virginia. I understand that the possibility of developing Some form of pledge of local taxes bonds was to secure the transit then considered but had to be ruled out because of the serious legal problems and the delays perhaps in terms of years -- which would be encountered in gaining the necessary approvals by the eight participating local jurisdictions. Moreover, it was realized that a guarantee by the Federal Government, as compared to various tax pledges by the participating local governments, would clearly be a more effec~ive means of attracting investors and thus reducing the interest rate which the Authority would be required - 4 - to pay on its bonds. The decision was made therefore to request authority for Federal guarantees. In keeping with established Congressional and Administration policies, provides the proposed legislation that the interest on the guaranteed obligations to be issued by the Authority after enactment of the legislation shall be subject to Federal income taxation. A similar provision appears in three Acts passed by the Congress in 1970 to provide for Federal guarantees of taxable municipal bonds for rural water and sewer facilities medical facilities (P.L. 91-609). (P.L. (P.L. 91-617) 91-296), and new communities Without this provision the Federal Government would be in the position of guaranteeing tax-exempt bonds. The Treasury Department has opposed tax-exempt bond guarantees, reports in a number of to committees of the Congress, for four fundamental reasons: 1. The guarantee of tax-exempt obligations is an inefficient form of subsidy since the Federal tax revenue loss probably exceeds the interest savings to the borrower resulting from the tax exemption. 2. The guarantee of tax-exempts disproportionately benefits investors in the higher Federal income tax brackets and thus fosters inequities in the Federal income tax system. - 5 - 3. The guarantee of tax-exempt obligations heightens the competition for the limited amount of funds available to State and local borrowers from the market for tax-exempt securities and raises the cost of financing other local projects for which direct Federal credit aid is not provided. 4. Such guarantees conflict with Federal debt management policy since they would create a class of tax-exempt securities which the Federal Government itself is prohibited from issuing by the Public Debt Act of 1941. The Congress, by its actions has given evidence of agreeing ~ith these Treasury reasons. In order to offset the additional interest cost to WMATA from taxable bond financing, the bill provides for payment by the Secretary of Transportation of 25 percent of the net interest cost on the Authority's obligations. This Federal interest subsidy is expected to be offset by additional Treasury tax receipts res~lting from the use of taxable, rather than tax-exempt, bond financing of the METRO. The 25 percent direct interest subsidy, coupled with the Federal guarantee, will assure that WMATA's net borrowing rate will be in line with the rates on the highest quality tax-exempt municipal bonds. - 6 - Because of the reduced borrowing rate an additional $300 million of METRO bonds can be supported from system revenues, and there will still be sufficient revenues in excess of debt service requirements to provide an adequate margin of safety to protect the Federal Government's interests as guarantor. Thus the proposed combination of a Federal guarantee and interest subsidy on the bonds will be sufficient to make up for $300 million of the $450 million shortfall in WMATA's revised financial plan. total borrowing will increase, $1.2 billion, While WMATA's from $900 million to there should be no significant change in the required fare structure or in the financial soundness of the system. To maintain the present cost-sharing formula, under which the local governments aSSume one-third of the net costs of the METRO and the Federal Government assumes the remaining two-thirds, the local government should pay $150 million of the estimated $450 million increase in the net cost of the system. This additional local payment is provided for in the proposed legislation by th~ requirement in section 101 for a local matching - 7 - contribution not less than 50 percent of the $300 million amount of additional borrowing. In the drafting of this proposed legislation the interested Federal agencies and WMATA have sought to provide the most efficient bonds. To this end, market:~g of the METRO an essential provision in the bill is the authority in section 101 for the Secretary of Transportation to borrow from the Secretary of the Treasury if at any time the moneys available to the Secretary of Transpol_ation from appropriations are insufficient to enable him to discharge his guarantee and interest subsidy payment responsibilities. borrowings necessary. Such from the Treasury are not expected to be Yet the borrowing authority is essential to aSSure the lowest possible market interest rate on the METRO bonds. That is, investors will be willing to purchase the METRO bonds at low interest rates because of the assurance that funds will always be available for the Secretary of Transportation to make timely payments of any amounts required under his guarantee and interest subsidy contracts. In conclusion Mr. Treasury, Chairman, on behalf of 'the I should like to urge your support for the - 8 - proposed National Capital Transportation Act as it lies before you. r would be happy to attempt to answer any questions you may have. 000 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 March 1, 1972 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE WITHHOLDING OF APPRAISEMENT ON PENTAERYTHRITOL FROM JAPAN The Treasury Department announced today that the Bureau of Customs is instructing Customs field officers to withhold appraisement of pentaerythrito1, including nitration grade pentaerythrito1, monopentaerythrito1, technical pentaerythrito1, dipentaerythrito1, tripentaerythrito1, and mixtures thereof, from Japan pending a determination as to whether this merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold at less than fair value within the meaning of the Antidumping Act, 1921, as amended (19 U.S.C. 160 et seq.). Pentaerythritol is used chiefly in the manufacture of alkyd resins, varnishes, plasticizers and explosives. Under the Antidumping Act the Secretary of the Treasury is required to withhold appraisement whenever he has reasonable cause to believe or suspect that sales at less than fair value may be taking place. A final Treasury decision in this investigation will be made within three months. Appraisement will be withheld for a period not to exceed six months from the date of publication of the "Withholding of Apprai.sement Notice" in the Federal Register. Under the Antidumping Act, a determination of sales in the United States at less than fair value requires that the case be referred to the Tariff Commission, which would then consider whether an American industry is being injured. Both dumping margins and injury must be shown to justify a finding of dumping under the law. The total value of pentaerythrito1 imported from Japan during the period from January 1971 through October 1971 amounted to approximately $1,250,000. II II II The Department 01 theTRfASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE March 1, 1972 TREASURY ISSUES COUNTERVAILING DUTY PROCEEDING NOTICE ON COMPRESSORS AND PARTS THEREOF FROM ITALY The Treasury Department announced today that it has issued a countervailing duty proceeding notice covering compressors and parts thereof from Italy. Compressors are found principally in refrigerators, air conditioners, and other cooling units. Their basic function is to convert the freon from its gaseous form into water. The notice states that the Treasury has received information that Italian compressors and parts thereof receive certain payments upon export to the United States. If the payments constitute the payment or bestowal of a "bounty or grant" within the meaning of the United States countervailing duty law, the imports in question would be subject to an additional (countervailing) duty equivalent to the net amount of the bounty or grant. The notice invites submission of comments in time to be received within 30 days from the date of publication in the Federal Register. It is scheduled to be published on March 2, 1972. If the Treasury finds that bounties or grants are being paid or bestowed within the meaning of the countervailing duty law, it will issue a countervailing duty order proclaiming the amount of countervailing duties to be assessed as imports of compressors and parts from Italy. The countervailing duty would become effective 30 days after publication of the order in the Customs Bulletin Based upon information presently available, compressors receive payments amounting to 35 lire per kilogram, or approximately 2.7 cents per pound. Compressor parts receive payments ranging from 15 lire per kilogram, or approximately 1.1 cents per pound, to 80 lire per kilogram, or approximately 6.1 cents per pound. During the period January 1971 through November 1971, imports of Italian compressors and compressor parts totaled approximately $15 million. The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE March 1, 1972 ANTIDUMPING INVESTIGATION INITIATED ON STAINLESS STEEL AUTOMOBILE SPLASH GUARDS FROM CANADA The Treasury Department announced today the initiation of an antldumping investigation of imports of stainless steel automobile splash guards from Canada. Splash guards are mounted to automobl Ie fenders for the purpose of preventing damage caused by sand, gravel, salt and other road debris. The Treasury announcement followed a summary investigation conducted by the Bureau of Customs after receipt of a complaint alleging that dumping was taking place in the United States. The total value of stainless steel automobile splash guards imported from Canada during the period from January 1971 through December 1971, amounted to approximately $50,000. II /I # The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 Wednesday, March 1, 1972 RELEASE 6:30 p.m. RESULTS OF OFFERING OF $3.0 BILLION STRIP OF WEEKLY BILLS The Treasury Department announced that tenders for additional amounts of fifteen Les of Treasury bills to an aggregate amount of $3,000,000,000, or thereabouts, to Lssued March 6, 1972, which were offered on February 24, 1972, were opened at the ~ral Reserve Banks today. The amount of accepted tenders will be equally divided 19 the fifteen issues of outstanding ~easury bills maturing March 30, April 6, Ll 13, April 20, April 27, May 4, May 11, May 18, May 25, Jun~ 1, June 8, June 15, ~ 22, June 29 and July 6, 1972. The details of the offering are as follows: rotal applied for - $6,365,800,000 rotal accepted $3,000,300,000 }E OF ACCEPTED PETITIVE BIDS: High Low Average Approximate equivalent annual rate of discount based on 73 days (average number of days to maturity) Price 99.327 99.301 99.309 (includes $152,175,000 entered on a noncompetitive basis and accepted in full at the average price shown below) !I 3.31~ 3.447~ 3.408~ 11 Excepting 1 tender of $900,000 %of the amount bid for at the low price was accepted ~ TENDERS APPLIED FOR AND ACCEPTED BY FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICTS: trict Applied for Accepted ton York ladelphia veland h.mond anta $ $ ~ago Louis neapolis sas City las Francisco TOTALS 313,950,000 2,890,425,000 269,100,000 188,325,000 56,250,000 115 ,950,000 754,725,000 105,225,000 697,950,000 250,500,000 73,950,000 649,425 ,000 $ 6,365 ,"775 ,000 This rate is on a bank discount basis. 247,125,000 976,500,000 153,600,000 79,~0,000 9,000,000 93,225,000 330,825,000 72,300,000 655,875,000 247,500,000 40,875,000 93.525.000 $ 3,000,300,000 The equivalent coupon issue yield is 3.48%. !' 1 1 TIlE D[PART~lENT OF TIlE TI~L!\SllRY 2 OF RE~IARKS 1- 5 6 7 8 9 HONORABLE JOlIN B. SECRETARY OF BEFORE CON~'!J\LLY, THL TREi\SURY TIlE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF TJIE MORTGAGE BANKERS OF AMERIC~ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 February 25, 1972 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 [This transcript was prepared from a t3pe recording.] 2 ~1ay I extend to you ~1R • I 2 ,I visitors to Houston a belated welcome. We are delighted to 1 I, I .) have you here and we hope you come back often . We have with us today a number of local friends and 4- 5 we appreciate your being here. Without further ado, I would like 6 7 you your first Vice President, Fverett MR. 9 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 to ~fatson. [Applause. ] 8 10 to'pr~sent ~~TSON: Ladies and gentlemen, once In a gener- ation there walks a man upon the scene who by the very ma~nitud( of his personality and his deeds leaves an indeligible mark in history and in the minds and hearts of all of thOSE he has touched. Our honored guest today is such a man. lIe has rIsen from the humble sandy fields of South Texas to a pinnacle of international stature that brings pride to all who k~ow him. Throughout his adult life, he has built an exceptional record of achievement and success in hoth private end public life. He served as an aide to th,e former President Lyndon B. Johnson when }·fr. Johnson was a young member of the United States House of Representatives. lIe served him agc:in when he was Senator Lyndon B. Johnson. In the decade that followed, our guest huilt a b rill i an t bus in e s s car e e r wit h the 1 ate Sid \'"r. Ric h a r d son . Once again he returned to public service as Secretary of the 1 Navy under the late President John F. Kennedy. A year later 2 he returned home and was elected Governor of Texas over a field of five well-known oppbnents, including an incumbent Governor and an incumbent attorney general. 5 lIe was twice reelected to that post by overwhelming margins. During his service as Governor, he brought neh' 6 7 stature and dignity to that office and maintained the highest 8 level of popularity In history before retiring voluntarily in 9 1969. After two years of successful private practice as 10 11 12 13 14 15 a senior partner with one of the largest law firms in the United States, he again answered the call to public serVlce jus t a lit tIe m0 ret han aye a rag 0 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 he a c c e pte d a p poi n t - ment by President Richard Nixon as Secretary of the Treasury of the United States. His performance In that position has impressed 16 17 '" her. Washington, the Na tion:, and the wo-rld. lIe has met some of the greatest problems that face· this Nation In a century with courage and skill and has been ac.claimed hy friend and foe alike. It is significant in OLr rank that In an election year when a crowded field of candidates from one party and an incumbent President in the other vying for puhlic attention and headlines, that the most talked about and precious political figure in Arlerica tod;ly in ne\':s rooms in Washington, 4 l I n boa r d roo msin r, fa n hat tan, 2 1n 1 i v in g roo ms ] n Pe 0 ria 1 s a non-candidate for President. That is why there is growing talk wherever you go that the. man who has counseled and served three Presidents 5 has got a greater destiny in the service in this country. 6 does us great honor in joining us today. He 7 Ladies and gentlemen, the Secretary of the 8 Treasury of the United States, the Honorable John B. Connally. 9 [Applause.] SECRTITARY CONNALLY: 10 Master of ceremonies, President- Jackson, Mr. 11 12 13 14 15 16 Thank you very much. Hatson. You know, Everett, I couldn't help but think as you were introducing me and telling about all the jobs I had had and things' I had done and the places I had been, tha t people that don't know me might think I am a pretty shiftless fellow. [Laughter.] But r-realy don't think I am. But I was impressed 17 18 by Everett's introduction. It reminds me of the pastor who had pr~p&red a very special sermon, and on the Sunday he was 19 to delive~~ it a blizzard hit, and an old rancher came to the 20 town and decided he would do some shopping. It was the first 21 time he had been In in about a month so he decided he 22 couldn't get home hecause of the hlizzard and he would go to 23 church the next morning. Sure enough, this pastor found that 24 the only parishoner present was tIlis old rancher. 25 5 Well, the preacher had "forked on this sermon for a 1 2 week and he had it all down and the thought was in his mind .) whether he ought to give it. 1· here ,\'as this lone rancher out there and whether or not he After all, he had a church and I 5 6 1 I ought to just get down out of the pulpit and go out and shake II I hands with him and thank him for coming and tell him he I 7 8 i appreciated it and save his sermon for a lar':;er croh'd on another day. Well, he decided he had prepared it for this special 9 10 day, this particular Sunday and he was going to deliver it, 11 regardless of the size of the audience. 12 great eloquence, great feeling, great humbleness and 13 sincerity. 14 the pulpi t to shake hands 'vi th the old rancher who sa t there 15 entranced by the sermon and he said, "Well, Zeke, how did you 16 like that sermon?'" 17 So he did, with And when it was allover, he walked down out of The old rancher kind of scratched his head and ,;aid, 18 "Well, parson, it's good, but," he said, "I was reminded, 19 just looking here," he said, "on a day like this when the 20 sno'''' is allover everything, covering the ground," he sa id, 21 "you kno,,,,, I hauled a whole truckload of hay out to my ca 22 in the pas tures and," he sa id, "bu t if onl y one old cow ShOi-:S 23 up, I don't d U In P the "I hoI e loa d . " 24 [Laughter.] 25 But I will tell you, In this jntroduction this ~r.le 6 1 mornIng you got the whole load, I Hill tell you that. [Laughter.] 2 But I wish I could have been here yesterday instead of· today. 5 [Laughter, applause.] 6 I would tave liked to have been here ~when my dear 7 friend, Wright Patman, whom I have kno\\'n from my days, my 8 young days when I first went to Washington in 1939, was 9 speaking to you. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 I re~lly woul1 have liked to have heard his modern version of interest rCites. [Laughter. ] And his predictions of the dire things to come. I \vonder, I didn I t hear the whole speech, I didn I t get a chance to read it -- when he was talking about interest rates of thirty and forty years ago, during the thirties, being down to 2.5 percent, did he also mention the unemployment rate during that period? [Laughter.] 'It was -- well, it was a little over -- during the 20 five-year period, it was a little over 14 percent, the unem- 21 ployment rate, running all the 22 23 24 25 cent unemployment. w~y up to as high as 25 per- As a matter of fact, from about 1929 to 1933, it dropped from about 47 million people employed to 38 million people, it dropped by 9 million people in 36 months unemployed, that number out of a job. -, I And I was struck -- now, let me say at the outset 1 just so the record is clear here, so there is not any confusion 2 in any of your minds -- unfortunately I have to say this in the presence of tHO '1 5 0 f my dea res t fr iends and my banker s, t·rr. Jam e sA. Elk ins, Jr. and t·! r. Nat Rag e r s . I a P.1 not a h i g h interest rate man, let me make that clear. 6 I 7 I {Laughter.] 8 I Everett alluded to the fact that I Has once associ- 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 a ted w~i_ th Sid IV. Richa rdson and Ha rry Bas s in Fort Worth, and one of the things I learned, which I never followed -- you know, young people get good advice and they never take it -but Mr. Richardson never served on a bank board in his life and he repeate(lly Has asked to serve on bank boards. no, he said I am not about to. [Laughter.] And he didn't want to think like a banker, he 17 19 20 21 22 lIe said I am a borrower, not a hanker. 16 18 He said wanted t) think like a borrower. Well, that is the Nay I am. I still think like a borrower and interest rates to me still are too high. So to that extent I agree with the distinguished Chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee, Chairman Patman. I think they are too high. But having said that, you don't say P.1UC}l, you have 23 24 to analyze why they are high. And I don't want to necessarily take off today in defense of the thrift institutions, hanks, 25 other~, 1 insurance companies, and because that is quite a load 2 to carry. o are paying 4.5, 5, and receitly 5.S percent for money, it 4· a little difficult for them to think about loaning it out at 5 2.5 percent. But it is significant that \Vhen those institutions 6 [Laughter.] 7 That much I think is fairly clear. IS And ahout forty 8 years ago -- of course, I didn't have any money ]n those days 9 and I don't kno\V whether they had CD's or not. 10 until the last three or four years I ever heard of a CD, you 11 kno\V. 12 thirties so I don't know that they were paying anything for 13 money in those days. 14 and just put it on deposit for safe-keeping and the banker 15 used it. It wasn't Certificates of deposit were unknown in the middle I thought you took money to the bank That is the way I grew up. But times have changed and I think basically it is 16 17 not qui t e fa i r tot a 1 k abo u t what con cl i t ion s are to d i1 Y co rl1 - 18 pared to what they were forty years ago in an insolated 19 instance, just talking ahout fair interest rates, or anything 20 else, because we live in a different world from what we lived 21 in forty years ago, or fifty years ago. Or" if you want to be even more precise, we live In 22 23 24 25 a different world from what we did ten years ago, and tllat par t 0 f what I ,,' ant tot a I k toy 0 II abo u t to day, and in the process I want to cover a numher of different things. IS I don't need to talk to you about housing In par- 1 2 ticular, because you know more about it than I do. I don't ~ really need to talk to you about money or the cost of it or interest rates, because you deal with it all day every day. 5 You know as much about it as I do. 6 So there is no point In belahoring you with all of 7 the things that you already know. Perhaps it would best 8 serve me and most interest you to try to viChI some of our 9 problems from a little different perspective and talk about 10 them. 1 1 1 think really to analyze where we are in talking 12 to you today, whetl1er we are talking about economic problems, 13 whether we are talking about budget deficits, whether we are 14 talking about international trade, balance of payments, or 15 whatever. 16 thing s . 17 saying to you that we a.re living in a time of enormous, 18 drastic, exciting and challenging change. 19 We really ought to put into context all of these And 1 et me very br :'_cfly try to do tha t, hy simply ff you are like nearly every other American that' 20 know of, in the last few days you have been transfixed, 21 completely captivated by the President's visit to China and 22 by what we have reen able to see of China, and you have been 23 thrilled by the progress that has apparently heen made and 24 excited by the prospects of what it means In tlds decade and 25 in the decades to come, of harmony, of peace, of progress, 1 between that nation of 800 million people, so dominant of all 2 of Asia, and the United States, so po\vcrful among the nations of the free world. And yet we shouldn't get our hopes too high. We 5 shouldn't get our hopes too high. 6 great potential trade opportunities with China. 7 point out to you that last year the latest figures we have 8 indicate for this enormous land mass known to us as mainland 9 10 13 world tr~de 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 last year. Now, to put that into perspective, that is almost precisely what the little island of Taiwan did with 15 million people. They did $4 billion in world trade last year. So to assume that we are going to immediately open 14 15 Yet, let me China, comprising 800 million people, they did $4 billion in 11 12 We think in terms of the up enormous trade opportunities with China or it is going to mean much to us, I think is assuming too much. can be h~pe And yet there that the removal of the barriers will permit some, and throlgh this economic expansion and ecbnomic activity we can begiIL to understand and to know each other better and let commerce do what diplomacy sometimes cannot do. Let commerce open the doors, give the opportunity for people to talk and to understand and to appreciate each other. But this symbolizes much of the change that surrounds this nation today, and I want to try to cast this change in a \.; a y t hat will c au s c you tot 11 ink a bit hut not i 11 the 5 ens c 11 1 2 .) discourage you or scare you. Let's think for :1 moment. Last year, the President himself talked ahout American revolution when he recommender. L.i the Congress that we reform the structure of the federal government and com- 5 press eight maj or departments into four, and I tId nk it should 6 be done, no question about it. 7 We talk about changes that are occurrIng ln the 8 structure of state government, constitutional revisions In 9 state after state, restructuring, reforming of the agencies 10 and the departments through which state and local .governments 11 do their business. 12 We look at our school system. We now have the 13 courts saying that the traditional method of financing public 14 SCllool systems in America is unconstitutional, that you can't 15 do it by property taxes alone any more, not in the manner in 16 which they have been levied. 17 You look at the federal courts again, and they ~ay 18 that you can 't have the school systems that you have al'valS 19 had because you have to inject an element of busing to 20 achieve certain objectives in the school system. 21 22 enormous impact. This has an All of tllese things have an enormous im)3ct. Here in Texas, you have a federal court agaIn salIng 23 that the districts which the Legislature dre\'! for the 24 congressional districts of 25 Th iss h a k e sun the \\' hoI cst r u c t u reo f go v ern r.1C n t . th~ state arc unconstitutional. And the 12 1 court says, "I will draw the lines myself or get someone to 2 draw them." .) rogatives. IIe assumes unto himself the legislative pre- So this shakes up people. 1 So there is turmoil and 5 there is torment in our school system, which is very funda- 6 mental and very basic because this affects the young people 7 of this country and they are th~ hope of the future of this 8 Nation. So people are unsettled. You can talk ahout crime and what it is doing, the 9 10 unsettling nature of it. 11 and ""hat it is doing, how unc;ett1ing it is to business and to 12 people, how they concern themselves with the air we breath, 13 the water we drink, the impact that it is going to have on 14 the industrial might of this Nation, the job opportunities 15 for people. 16 17 20 21 22 23 24 25 And can it be kept within reason? This is a very unsettling, tumultuous change in this society as we know it. And all of these tllings I mentioned, without trying 18 19 You can talk about the environment to get into the merits of anyone 6f them, nevertheless the accumulated effect of all of them is having a profound change. And our international situation, international economIC situation. Last year, 1971, for the first time since 1888, tJlis Nation ran a deficit in its trade balances, for the first time since 1888. This should tell us sOT'1cthing. 13 Our balance of payments last yeJr ran a deficit of 1 $29.6 billion, the largest by far in the llistory of this 2 Nation. This should tell us' something. This caused the President to act as he did, very courageously, on August 15, 4 to suspend the convertibility of the dollar, an enormous .5 6 impact on the world monetary system. 7 change. It "8 and abroad. 9 IS And this is a great a change in the economy, an economy at home It is a change in the structure of government 10 itself. 11 today under attack. 12 been a time in the history of America when business as such 13 was more suspect, more criticized, more defiled than it is 14 today. You're under attack. But it doesn't stop there. '15 16 But it doesn't just stop with business, which is I bu~;iness There has never It doesn't stop with the institutions or the structure of government itself 17 I or the e'.:cnomy of this country, or the environment. It 18 permeate3 even the religious 19 under attack, all of tIle faiths, the Protestants, the Jewish, 20 the Catholics -- the priests want to marry -- all of them. 21 They want a change. 22 23 institutions~ They are also There is an upheaval, there is a torment there is a turbulence in all of the life that we lead. Now, what does this mean to us? Well, it doesn't 24 mean that it is something that should frighten us. 25 shouldn't scare us. It But it is something He oup,ht to he a,,"arc Itt 1 of. We ought to be aware of it In the sense that we arc not 2 gOIng back to ",hat we knew. .) in the early 1950's or what happened in the 1930's, you're 4- talking about history and YOll can read ahout it in history 5 books, and experience is a great teacher, and frequently you 6 can judge the future by the past. 7 it alone by the past. 8 9 When we talk about ",helt happened But you can't just judge And in this whole structure, we talk today of unemployment. We have 5.9 percent, according to the latest 10 figures of unemployment, and much is made of it. We are 11 conducting a study now, the preliminary results of it clearly 12 show that the structure of the unemployed 11as changed and 13 changed very rapidly, and changed just In the last few years. When you talk about what was happening In the late 14 15 forties and the early fifties, certainly during the thirt·;es, 16 your work force was entirely different. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 You hear people today talking about we are on the throes of a depression, of a great recession. at all. Why? And. yet I don't believe that at all, no: Because I think everything points to just the opposite. Savings are up at an all-time high. Last year'; savings, in terms of ratio to disposable income, was 8.1 percent, and it continues unabated. Savings are 11 igh. Personal income this ycar ,d1l he 8 pcrcent ahove \\'hat it ,·:as last year, 8 percent. Estimated corporate profits wi1] l,c up 15 1 16 percent over what they were last year. People are employed; people are unemployed. 2 Yes, there are too many people unemployed, and we are doing our 4 best to try to bring down those numbers of unemployed people. 5 But you again have to put this into perspective, because 6 approximately 60 percent of these people who are unemployed 7 8 9 10 11 have never been employed, have never been employed. are not in the labor force today in that sense. They They are not people that we traditionally think of as the head of a family, who has been employed, wLo is nol'! out of work. That isn't the case at all. About 60 percent of those of the five million who 12 13 are unemployed have never heen employed. 14 lng about those unemployed, let's talk about those who are 15 gainfully employed. On the annualized hasis of January, there were 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 While we'are talk- 80,636,000 people gainfully employed at the highest wages In the history of this Nation. to stop. And I don't think that is going Now, when you consider 86,636,000 gainfully employed, when you consider that 60 millior Americans are under the age of 18, and 20 million American~ are over the age of 65, this begins to put into perspective how effective tIlis economic system is and of which you are a part and "'hich you partially finance. [Applause.] So I don't think, in the first place, husiness ought 1 2 to hang its head in shame about anything. There are too many .) people going around the country today attacking business. 1 What is.business? 5 conduct themselves to provide goods and services. 6 all it is. 7 talk about it? 8 face up to whatever problems we have, and this is what I am 9 trying to talk about this morning. It is a legal entity through which people Why should you be ashamed of it? I That IS Why don't we Let's face up to some of these things. 10 Let's talk about this deficit. 11 enormous deficit that we have in this fiscal year. 12 President doesn't like it, I certainly don't like it. 13 not a deficit spending man, never have been, don't intend to 14 ever become one. 15 the time when we have the largest deficit In the history of 16 the country. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Sure, it Let's IS an And the I am And yet I am Secretary of the Treasury at And that reminds me of when the President talked to me about going up and being Secretary qf the Treasury. I assured lim that I didn't think it was probably a wise idea, that I probably wouldn't feel at home in a Republican administration, with a bunch of Republican colleagues. He said, "Oh, John," he said, "come on, we are gOIng to make you feel at home because I assure you, you are going to feel right at home as a Democrat," and, sure enough, I do. [Laughter, applause.] 17 Because He have got the l:lrgest "dcfici t in history, 1 2 and the largest balance of payments deficit in history. [Laughter.] Well, what is your alternative, what is your choice? 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 It isn't just a question of what you did, it is what could you have done. budget? Impose taxes? Reduce taxes? Have a balanced What would that do? Nothing, in my judgment, except turn th~_s economy into a tail-spin and create more problems and a bigger deficit and have more unemployment and less economic expansion and activity, and it would be exactly the opposite of what everyone of you in this room would want. We have just gone through a tax reduction In order to find some type of stimulus to the economy to get it moving, because if we want to accomplish the things that people talk about, that people hope for and d~eam of, if you want to help the handicapped, if you want to help enrich ~}le lives of the poor, if you want to clean up this environme'lt, I if you want t6 do and take these great social strides, I assure you the only way you are going to do it is with an expanding economy, and that is what we are trying to do. are trying to get an expanded economy_ He We are trying to get back some of the economic vitality of this c6untry. But let me point out to you that this deficit IS 24 not an accident. 25 You C:ln he critical of it, and a lot of 18 1 people are, but you rught to know that it happened not just by,· 2 accident. It is a deliberate thing, and the deficit of 1973 is also deliberate, but it w~s done for a purpose. It was 4 done for a reason. 5 of it, but at least it wasn't accidental. 6 judgment, the combined judgment that we had ahout how we 7 should try to solve some of our problems. 8 9 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 It was the best And unfortunately you can't always isolate these ryroblems, that we talk about today. We are being criticizeQ abroad by nations around the 10 11 You may argue with the logic, the merit world, because they say our interest rates are too low over here and there is an outflow of dollars into the European community and creates an enormous huildup of [uro dollars, because OUT interest rates are too low in disparity to theirs. Well, what is the answer? terest rates? No, I don't think so. For us to raise our InWe are not unmindful of the fact that our short-term rates are low. outset our long-term rates werenft~ I said at the I don't think they are low enough. While lYe are talking al~out deficits, there is some 22 question ahout wllat impact these deficits are going to have 23 on interest rates. 24 country that really feel that to finance' this deficit, we 25 are going to urjve up interest rates. And there are a great many people in t]lis We thoug~t a great deal 1 ~} 1 about that, and I don't think tllat is so. I disagree with a 2 great many of the people who predict that, and some of them ~ are economists and some of them are large institutions of 1 this country. But the mere fact that we have a deficit, a planned 5 6 deficit indicates that we don't have the economic vitality, ? that we don't have the demand, and the very situation that 8 created the deficit is also a si tuation in which I think 9 there 1S enough ma rgin in the money markets to lv-here we are 10 not going to drive up interest rates, at least not any of the 11 lona-term rates. ." 12 as 13 was up to 317 ycsterday, and that is a fairly substantially 14 low rate, and very materially below its high of last year. i,~ has been. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 " It was down to 292 ahout ten days ago; it But I have traveled a great dcal around and speaking 15 16 The short-term rate might well fluctuate, with our international friends who find it advantageous sometimes, f~r reasons of their own, to be critical of us. I was, as you kY.O\"l, in Rome earlier in the year ,before the Smithsonian meeting, around the first of December, and I was struck by a sign that I saw there. Everywhere we go we were very cordially treated, as a matter of fact. But I-have gotten the feeling all last fall, when I Has traveling and talking with these international monetary conferences, th[lt the good-bys that I got were al\\rays a little more enthusiastic than the hellos I 20 1 received. 2 [Laughter.] ~ And I was particul~ry struck In Rome when I went down to the fountain, where you always toss in three coins, 5 you know, and it had a little sIgn up there that said, "If 6 U.S., throw four." 7 [Laughter.] 8 But it is a world without any easy problems that I 9 know of, and we haven't solved all of our international 10 monetary problems. 11 economic problems. We haven't 30lved all of our domestic I hear a great deal of criticism, and read more 12 13 really than I 11ear ahout the Pay Board and the Price Commis- 14 sian, 15 just don't see how it can ,,-'ork." and'~hen is it going to work, it going to work. I Well, if you want. to be a pessimist, you can say 16 17 that, and it just can't work. 18 alternative? 19 It has to work. 20 IS 21 IS ~ry Again, though, what IS the answer to you IS that it is gOIng to work. We are going to make it work, because there not any alternative. Do you want to go back to inflation? Do you want 22 to go back to 7 and 8 percent in:lation? 23 year we arc going to have an 24 mately $100 billion in 1972. 25 And to put it into perspective, let me point out to you that incri~ase Now, we tl1ink this in the GNP of approxi- Now, that is a large figure. 21 1 our anticipated 9 percent increase in GNP in 1972 will be 2 equivalent to the entire gross national product of the ~ United Kingdom, to put it in~o perspective. So every year, if we get a 9 percent growth, we are 1 5 growlng in the United Kingdom in new plants. That is the 6 size of this economy, and when you start dealing with it, 7 and when people expect you to perform miracles, they are 8 unreasonable in their request and their demands. How are you gJing to take -- we had a freeze, and 9 10 the President very wisely and very courageously imposed a 90- 11 day freeze beginning August 16th on this American economy. 12 It was an unprecedented step in peacetime, but in my judgment, 13 agaIn, it was called for. 14 proved it was a very WIse decision. Now, it had to be follo,.,ed hy somethjng. 15 16 17 20 21 22 23 21 25 You can't keep this dynamic economy completely In chains forever, so we have what is known as Phase II. So what do we do in Phase II? Well, among other tJling3, the Price Commission and 18 19 And I think facts then and now the Pay Board, for that matter, tries to separate out as ~uch as possible, realizing that you can't set up and you ought not try to set up a bureaucracy large enough and strong enougll and permanent enough to control every facet of this economy. You just cannot and ought not do it in peacetime, and none of us are for it, none of us want to do it, and we don't plan to do it. 22 1 So we estnhlished in tIle Price Commission a threC'- 2 tier system. .) he in this, or you knoh some folks that arc, ancl this is a 1 high honor to be in tier numher one. 5 of the big ones in the country. 6 [Laughter.] ? But nevertheless, there are approximately 1,500 First, tier numher one -- some of you all may This means you are one 8 companies In America that are in tier number one. They are 9 the ones who have to so-called pl"e-notify before they can 10 raise prices, they have to notify the Price Commission what 11 the.y are going to raise prices on and how much they are going 12 to ra.Ise them. Now, tier number two, what is it? 13 It is the next group of companies, a latge, large numbci of companies. 14 They , 15 don't have to pre-notify. 16 i quarter. 17 18 19 ,I we ~re n~t They just have to report every Well, the first quarter isn't up yet, so, you know, writing or reading or talking about what they are doing. Now, the third group comprIses the vast, vast 20 number cf business enterprises in this Nation, millions of 21 them, wh) don't even have to pre-notify or report 22 They are jllst subject to the rules and the regulations and 23 the statute, and they arc subject to being inspected and 24 audited hy the Internal Revenue Service, and they arc suhject 25 to fines if they violate the ru1ps and the regulations. ~~nything. But 23 1 beyond tha t, they don't have to not ify, they don't have to 2 pre -notify, they don't have to report, and these arc the ~ millions of business establi~hmcnts, the smaller ones In the country. So what do you' read about? 5 All you read about are 6 the big ones, and the only ones of those you read about are 7 those who are asking for price increases. 8 of the 1,500 major companies in America, over 1,000 of them 9 have indicated that they don't intend to raise price·at all. So you don't read about them. 10 Let me tell you, You read about only 11 those that are asking for price increases. - The same thing 12 is true In the labor field. the Pay Boa r d 13 D. red 0 Now, ,vhat the Price Commission, in g - - I t h ink the y are do i n g a ve r y goo d job. 14 Now, when you think that they had to start on 15 Nov9mber 15 and build a staff, write the rules, write the 16 I 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 regulations, set up an administration, to try to deal with the literally billions of transactions In this country every day carried on by tens of millions of businesses in t]lis country, it is a monumental task. And anybody can complain and anybcdy can criticize, and I am here to concede and I will stipulate today that it is not perfect and it is not going to be perfect. But I am also here to tell you that you are not going to get rid of it until we do break the back of inflation, and that incilldes the inflationary aspects 24 1 2 of interest rates, becausc we can't stand it. [Applause.] Now, finally, we ought to make up our minds in this changing world what kind of a nation we want to be, <.nd \o,'C 5 can't -- I was impressed by one other thing that I have been 6 seeing on television. 7 of thousands of people riding bicycles, and it is good for 8 the legs and good for the back and good for the heart, but I 9 doubt if we can sell it in this country. I was impressed by the literally tens 10 [Laughter.] 11 It would cure a lot of our pollution problems. I 12 was struck with the orderliness and the precision and the 13 obvious discipline that we have been witnessing, and in a way 14 it is great. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 2 ",) 24 25 But I don't believe I \~·ant to sign up just yet. [Laughter.] I like what I have got. make this system work? Now, how are we gOIng to When \ve start looking around the 'Jorld and we start complaining about this American system of fr!e enterprise, you know, it IS one thing to criticize it, it is something else to replace it. What do you want to substitute for it? a better system? Do you know Do you know any place in the world that is bettcr housed and hetter fed, where people have more leisure, where they have more frcedoT:1, more independence, more opportunity to usc their own initiative, their 0\\'11 ir.13gjnation, 2S 1 use the i row n t a len t.s 2 want to build or do? 0 f \oJ hat eve r kin c.l toe rea t c w11 ate vcr the )' I was struck when we went to the Azores to meet President Pompidou. We flew in to this island that was 5 settled really before the United States, some time before 6 the United States. 7 for four-hundred yenrs. 8 cent. 9 the white painted cottages. 10 a patchwork form, all rj.mmed with rock walls, free-standing 11 rock walls placed there lovingly by hand, rock by rock. 12 It really has been fairly well settled Flying in, it is absolutely magnifi- You see the red roofs, the red tile roofs. You see the fields laid out in And the pastures are frequently no higger than half 13 the SIze of this room we are ill. 14 are not enormous. 15 of the most lovely sights lIve ever seen. 16 17 18 19 20 You see They arc very small. It IS just a solid patchwork. They It IS one So I rode around for an hour or two and begall asking questions about it. And I talked about these lovely white-washed houses and I saw a water hydrant, and I said, "Is this a little fountain?" They said, "No, that IS the village water supply." And to make a long story short, J found that on this magnifi- 21 cent little island they have no indoor plumbing at all, no 22 running \vater at all. 23 only two villages on the seven islands had electricity. 24 others have none at all. 25 Of the seven islands, I was told that Ano their annual Income, average annual Income The 15 26 1 $160 per year. And I thought what a lovely sight, and yet 2 when you pierce the su~facc and get down and study what the facts are, how vastly different it can be. 4 5 And r was reminded. of the old saying, "Beauty is only skin deep." What kind of a system do you want to have? How are we gOIng to compete? lvhat 6 are we going to build? And I 7 have gotten into the world trade problem this mornIng hecause 8 I don't have time. 9 have been trying to cover a number of different subjects so r have talked too long as it is, but I 10 that at least from my perspective you can get a feel for 11 some of the things that you have to cope wit}l, that we are 12 trying to help this Nation cope with. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 r want to finally say that don't just look to the government, don't look to us for all the answers hecause we don' tha're them, and we are not going to have them. The government is not that wise. r was in Houston, Texas just about a year and two months a1:0 and r will just be perfectly frank and say I don't recall anybody around here that thought r was especially endowed with any great wisdom. [Laughter.] And frankly, r don't think I gained any when r automatically or magically crossed the Potomac River, either. [Laughter.] Because all the wisdom 1S not there and We' don't 27 1. have all the answers, and no administration docs, nor should 2 it. .) mar e and m0 r e 4 of. labor, the leadership of managemen t, the leader s11i p of 5 business and the leadership of government are-going to have 6 to form a quadrigae of support, of dedication, and of purpose 7 if we are really going to survive in this competitive "orld 8 In which we live, and it is that. 9 But the combined genlus of America docs have it, and \V ear ego in g to h a vet 0 \\' 0 rk. The 1 e a d e r s 11 i p And all that we do, all that we can do, all 10 hope to do is build upon a sound economic base. 11 finally close by saying to you: 12 You have 13 heard that. 14 nation, internationally. 15 in any sense we are incredibly strong, and every nation In 16 the world recognlzes it. 17 we Let me The United States In one sense IS weak. You have heard me say it. t~at We are broke as a We owe more than we can pay. But There is nohody even close to us. I said to you a moment ago that just our 9 percent 18 growth In 1972 represents the total gross national product 19 of the United Kingdom or of France. 20 to us see a behemoth, a giant, an economic giant of tremendous 21 proportions. 22 23 24 25 So other nations looking Now, what do we do ahout it? this strength? What do we do with Nell, today we furnish the leadership for the f r e e \\' 0 rId and, bel i eve me, no 0 the rna t ion can or will do it except the United States. l\O 0 nth i sea r t h one C.1I1 do it, 28 1 even if they wanted to. If there is to be a security shield, a military 2 ,) strength in the free world, °i t has to largely be provided by the Un i ted S tat e s 0 r i t wi 11 no t be pro v i d cd . I t i s t he 5 free world and we in particular that have to have a nuclear 6 capability and a strength in which to match those nations In 7 the Communist world who still view us as a threat. 8 strength has to be provided by the United States. And that And if we are to provide the diplomatic leadership, 9 10 if we are to provide the military strength, if we are to pra- II vide the nuclear shield for the free world, then I assure you 12 that we are going to have to have the economic vitality and 13 the foundation of economic strength in this country to 14 support both of those things. ·If we are to continue to gIve aid, military and 15 16 17 18 19 economic, to the developing nations of the world, we can only do so so long as we can afford tc do so and so long as we have the economic strength to surport it. 22 23 24 25 IS really the choice that we have in this :ountry. Do we turn our back? 20 21 And this ship? Do we give up this leader- Are we willing to throw in the sponge? What kind of a country do you want? fight for? What do you do? \Vhat arc you Hilling to What arc you willing to sacrificc for? Are you happy with whnt you havc? But how much of it did you carn? I don't Sure, you arc. mCClI1 tllC uollars in 2~ 1 your bank account. I am talking about the privileges and the 2 freedoms and the immunities that you have. Very fe\V of us con'tributed much to what this Nation today-. We are inheri tors. We are inheri tors of a grea t 1 IS 5 legacy, a great legacy of strengt}}, of freedom, of compassion, 6 concern, not only for ourselves and our own and our future but 7 for people throughout this \Vorld. 8 And what is your responsibility and mine IS simply 9 not to merely eat the succulent fruit of the trees planted 10 by our ancestors but to do some plowing and planting of our 11 own, to enrich, to build, to strengthen this system that has 12 produced more for more people, more food, more clothes, 13 better housing, more luxuries, more privileges, more freedoms 14 than any people have ever enjoyed in the history of the world. 15 We have to convince ourselves, we have to constantly 16 reinstill in ourselves a sense of dedication and a sense of 17 purpose for tllis Nation if indeed we are to have a purpose. 18 Thank you very much. 19 [Applause.] 20 21 22 23 24 25 The Department of the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE March 3, 1972 WITHHOLDING OF APPRAISEMENT ON INSTANT POTATO GRANULES FROM CANADA The Treasury Department announced today that the Bureau of Customs is instructing Customs field officers to withhold appraisement of instant potato granules from Canada pending a determination as to whether this merchandise is being sold at less than fair value within the meaning of the Antidumping Act, 1921, as amended (19 U.S.C. 160 et seq.). Under the Antidumping Act the Secretary of the Treasury is required to withhold appraisement whenever he has reasonable cause to believe or suspect that sales at less than fair value may be taking place. A final Treasury decision in this investigation will be made within 3 months. Appraisement will be withheld for a period not to exceed 6 months from the date of publication of the "Withholding of Appraisement Notice" in the Federal Register. Under the Antidumping Act, a determination of sales in the United States at less than fair value requires that the case be referred to the Tariff Commission, which would then consider whether an American industry was being injured. Both dumping margins and injury must be shown to justify a finding of dumping under the law. During the period from August 1970 through December 1971, instant potato granules estimated to be valued at approximately $1,120,000 were imported or ordered by United States purchasers from Canada. If March 3, 1972 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE The Federal Administrative Serv-ices Officers Group, an organi=2tis:: to further improve efficiency, economy, and quality in administrati":e services throughout the Federal Service, has selected Mr. Robert R. Fredlund, Director of Administrative P-.cograms, Department of the Treas:.:.:c:: ~ to be its nevI Chairman, and Mr. Hilliam H. O'Donoghue, Director of Administrative Services, Department of Justice, to be its new Vice Chairman. During the past year, the Group, vlhich was organized through the efforts of Mr. Donald B. Moore, Director of Administrative Serv-ices~ Department of Commerce, its first Chairman, and Mr. Richard D. Althaus, former Director of General Services, Department of Housing and Urban Development, its first Vice Chairman, has regularly met to discuss such matters as office design, l~out, and landscaping -- improved space utilization -- effective telecommunications -- more economical and efficie~: methods of procurement and supply -- printing management -- buildings management -- and other areas important to productive working enviror~:e~~s. At its last meeting, the Group met with Commissioner of Public Buildings, Art Sampson, and his key staff including Mr. George Per~r~an, Region:,l Director of Public Buildings Serv-ice, to discuss means of improving communications betlveen GSA and the Federal Agencies in the • Washington, D. C., Metropolitan Area, vlith a view to providing the Dest possible working relationships. The Department of the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 °TION: TELEPHONE W04·2041 FINANCIAL EDITOR March 6, 1972 ELEASE 6:30 P.M., RESULTS OF TREASURY I S WEEKLY BILL OFFERING The Treasury Department announced that the tenders for two series of Treasury , one series to b~ an additional issue of the bills dated December 9, 1971 ,and ther series to be dated March 9, 1972 ,which were offered on February 29, 1972, opened at the Federal Reserve Banks today. Tenders were invited for $2,400,000,000, ereabouts, of 91-day bills and for $1,800,000,000, or thereabouts, of 182-day The details of the two series are as follows: 91-day Treasury bills maturin6 June 8, 1972 Approx. Equiv. Annual Rate Price OF ACCEPTED TITIVE BIDS: 99.116 ~ 99.097 99.102 High Low Average 3.497% 3.572% 3.553% 11 182-day Treasury bills maturin6 September 7, 1972 Approx. Equiv. Price Annual Rate 98.099 3.760% 98.072 3.814% 98.081 3.796% Y ~ Excepting 1 tender of $50,000 83% of the amount of 91-day bills bid for at the low price was accepted 72% of the amount of 182-d~ bills bid for at the low price was accepted TENDERS APPLIED FOR AND ACCEPTED BY FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICTS: trict ton York ladelphia V'eland 1IJ1ond mta :!ago Louis leapolis sas City las Francisco TOTALS AEElied For $ AEElied For $ 11,240,000 2,939,450,000 18,990,000 49,800,000 15,970,000 59,205,000 230,880,000 41,285,000 27,250,000 28,640,000 45,745,000 14° 02 29° 02 °00 Accerted 20,525,000 $0,525,000 3,396,455,000 27,440,000 38,255,000 23,055,000 38,030,000 258,490,000 63,810,000 28,020,000 39,185,000 33,000,000 162 02 73° 02 °00 2,050,705,000 12,440,000 38,255,000 12,885,000 28,030,000 109,790,000 46,810,000 13,020,000 28,120,000 17,000,000 320297°02°00 $4,128,995,000 $2,400,550,000 ~ludes $189,085,000 £I $3,608,745,000 0 AcceEted $ 1,240,000 1,571,110,000 2,840,000 7,450,000 5,970,000 23,705,000 126,880,000 20,085,000 6,250,000 10,755,000 20,445,000 3~390.2000 $1,800,120,000 ~ noncompetitive tenders accepted at the average price of 99.102 $ 78,855,000 noncompetitive tenders accepted at the average price of 98.081 ~se rates are on a bank discount basis. The equivalent coupon issue yields are 3 %for the 91-day bills, and 3.92% for the 182-day bills. ~ludes The Deportment 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 'OR IMMEDIATE RELEASE March 7, 1972 TREASURY'S WEEKLY BILL OFFERING The Treasury Department, by this public notice, invites tenders :or two series of Treasury bills to the aggregate amount of i 4,200,000,000, or the reabouts , for cash and in exchange for Trea~ury lills maturing March 16, 1972, in the amount of $3,901,460,000, IS follows: 91-day bills (to maturity date) to be issued March 16, 1972, .n the amount of $2,400,000,000, or thereabouts, representing an ldditional amount of bills dated December 16 , 1971 , and to mature une 15,1972 (CUS!P No.912793 NF9) priginally issued in ~e hamgunf99tf{$ 1~600~4QOiOOOfan additional S2041310,000 was issued on a~C 1 I. 1 tae aud1t ona and or1g1naI D111~ to De freely nterc ctngea e. 182- day bills, for $1.800.000.000, or thereabouts, to be dated arch 16, 1972, and to mature September 14, 1972 CUSIP No. 912793 PC4). The bills of both series will be issued on a discount basis under ompetitive and noncompetive bidding as hereinafter provided, and at ,aturity their face amount will be payable without interest. They will e issued in bearer form only, and in denominations of $10,000, 15,000, $50,000, $100,000, $500,000 and $1,000,000 (maturity value). Tenders will be received at Federal Reserve Banks and Branches up o the clOSing hour, one-thirty p.m. ,Eastern Standard ime, Monday, March 13, 1972. Tenders will not be received .t the Treasury Department, Washington. Each tender must qe for a linimum'of $10,000. Tenders over $10,000 must be in mUltip'les of 5,000. In the case of competitive tenders the price offered must be xpressed on the basis of 100, with not more than three decimals, .g., 99.925. Fractions may not be used. It is urged that tenders be .ade on the printed forms and forwarded in the special envelopes which ill be supplied by Federal Reserve Banks or Branches on application herefor. Banking institutions generally may submit tenders for account of ustomers provided the names of the customers are set forth in such enders. Others than banking institutions will not be permitted to (OVER) - 2 - submit tenders except for their Qwn account. Tenders will be recei~ without deposit from incorporated banks and trust companies and from responsible and recognized dealers in investment securities. Tenders from others must be accompanied by payment of 2 percent of the face amount of Treasury bills applied for, unless the tenders are accompanie~ 'by an express guaranty of payment by an incorporated bank or trust company. Immediately after the closing hour, tenders will be opened at the Federal Reserve Banks and Branches, following which public announcement will be made by the Treasury Department of the amount and price range of accepted bids. Only those submitting competitive tenders will be advised of the acceptance or rejection thereof. The Secretary of the Treasury expressly reserves the right to accept or reiect any or all tenders, in whole or in part, and his action in any such respect shall be final. Subject to these reservations, noncompetitive tenders for each issue for $200,000 or less without stated price from anyone bidder will be accepted in full at the average price (in three decimals) of accepted competitive bids for the respective issues. Settlement fori accepted tenders in accordance with the bids must be made or completed at the Federal Reserve Bank on March 16, 1972, in cash or other immediately available funds or in a like face amount of Treasury bills maturing March 16, 1972. Cash and exchange tenderll will receive equal treatment. Cash adjustments will be made for differences between the par value of maturing bills accepted in exchange and the issue price of the new bills. Under Sections 454 (b) and 1221 (5) of the Internal Revenue C~e of 1954 the amount of discount at which bills issued hereunder are sola is considered to .accrue when the bills are sold, redeemed or otherwise disposed of, and the bills are excluded from consideration as capital assets. Accordingly, the owner 8: Treasury bills (other than life insurance companies) issued hereunder must include in his income tax return, as ordinary gain or loss, the difference between the price paU for the bills, whether on original issue or on subsequent purchase, a~ the amount actually received either upon sale or redemption at maturitJ during the taxable year for which the return is made. Treasury Department Circular No. 418 (current revision) and this notice, prescribe the terms of the Treasury bills and govern the conditions of their issue. Copies of the circular may be obtained f~ any Federal Reserve Bank or Branch. 000 The Department o[ the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY EXCERPTS FROM REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE EDGAR R. FIEDLER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY FOR ECONOMIC POLICY AT A SYMPOSIUM ON BUSINESS PLANNING SPONSORED BY THE INSTITUTE FOR INTERINDUSTRY DATA NEW YORK, N. Y., MARCH 7, 1972, 12:30 P. M. Recent economic signs and portents appear to be confirming the widespread expectations of a healthy advance in business activity through 1972. A few statistics -- retail sales, notably -~ are falling a little short of expectations, but other series are exhibiting as much or even more strength than anticipated at the turn of the year. Both private and Government surveys of capital spending plans plus the upswing in equipment orders indicate that business fixed investment is likely to outrun earlier projections. Similarly, housing starts seem destined for a stronger performance in 1972. The January figure for starts is over 2.5 million units, and this coupled with the continuing heavy flow of savings into financial institutions suggest that forecasts for residential construction will have to be revised upward. The leading business indicators have taken a fairly vigorous posture of late, and there have even been a few tenuous signs of life among the long-dormant indicators of businessmen's inventory policies. While several uncertainties are still with us -- e.g., the timing of the rebound in the trade balance -- on the whole the evidence available to us now adds up to a healthy advance -not a rampant boom but a rise in economic activity during 1972 sufficient to put a meaningful dent in the unemployment rate. The impact of Phase lIon the price-wage stabilization program is difficult to assess at this juncture, since we are currently navigating in uncharted economic waters. The reports now coming in on consumer and wholesale prices and on average C-261 - 2 - hourly earnings reflect the anticipated post-freeze "bubble." On the whole, however, the recent price and wage figures do not contain anything that is inconsistent with the program's goals for 1972, i.e., reducing the rate of inflation to an annual rate below 3 percent by the end of this year. My own belief is that the program is working reasonably well and has a good chance of achieving its goal. Evidence on the financial outlook for 1972 is highly mixed. Heavy demands for funds are coming from the consumer for both housing and consumer credit -- and from the Federal Government. At the same time, improved corporate liquidity and the sharply rising cash flow available to corporate treasurers suggest a reduction in corporate bond issues this year. Demands from sta~e and local governments should be lower this year if, as seems likely, a substantial Federal revenuesharing program is enacted. Savings generated by individuals promise to be well sustained. The balance of these forces is, as always, difficult to judge. At the moment, the best bet appears to be that we are not likely to see wide swings in interest rates over the balance of this year. The Deportment 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. O.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04·2041 FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE PAUL A VOLCKER UNDER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY FOR MONETARY AFFAIRS TO THE MONEY MARKETEERS AT THE BANKERS CLUB, NEW YORK, NEW YORK TUESDAY, MARCH 7, 1972, AT 5:30 PM A NEW LOOK AT DEBT MANAGEMENT I want to say first how delighted I am to be attending, for the first time, a gathering of the Money Marketeers. I never attended the lectures of Marcus Nadler. But no one brought up, as I was, in the bond markets of the 1950's could fail to be aware of the benign influence of the man and of the intellectual ferment and enthusiasm he engendered among his students -- from the most experienced bond men to the rawest recruits. alive. This organization has kept that spirit With so many familiar faces here, with so close a friend as Bob Kavesh brilliantly carrying on the tradition at NY~ with so convivial an atmosphere, I am almost tempted i to beg for honorary membership here and now -- before you have to hear the speech! C-262 - 2 My intention is to talk about a subject that has gotten much less attention in recent years than when Marcus Nadler was here: Federal debt management. My reason is only partly that debt management is, at the moment, one of our leading growth industries. There are, in addition, a number of longer-term questions and issues that seem to me to need more ventilation in the financial community as we shape a debt management philosophy for the 1970's. In the perspective of the whole postwar period, the decline in emphasis on debt management has been striking. When I first went to work in Wall Street -- not so long ago monetary policy, fiscal policy, and debt management were considered more or less equal building blocks of national economic policy. As Aubrey Lanston used to put it, it was a three legged stool, and we would forget one leg at our peril. Somewhere along the line, though, debt management seems to have been dropped from the triumverate. Moreover, if my antennae are at all sensitive, we hear much less concern today about the traditional canons of "sound" finance that - 3 - used to be pronounced with such feeling about the Government debt even if no one was quite agreed as to what they were. This may be partly a matter of fashion. In little more than a decade, we have seen first the "fiscalists" and then the "monetarists" riding high, each in turn, in my view, overemphasizing the contribution and potential of one policy instrument. But, in the case of debt management, it has been more than fashion that accounts for the diminishing attention. The simple fact is that, if attention is directed solely toward the conventional direct Treasury debt, it has declined drastically in relation to the size of our economy and our financial markets. At the end of World War II, the Treasury debt was fully half of the net public and private debt in the United States and equalled about two-thirds of the GNP. Then -- to paraphrase one dead (and inaccurate) politician -- as went the Treasury debt, so went the Nation. Today, that debt, while absolutely 22 percent larger, is only one-seventh of total debt and amounts to less than one-third of the GNP. - 4 Moreover, while Treasury debt once was important in every maturity area, the protracted absence of the Treasury from the long-term market because of the 4-1/4 percent interest rate ceiling has concentrated our debt at the short and intermediate area. With only a few long-term issues outstanding -- all closely held and with special advantages for limited purposes -- it appears the Treasury has more or less lost touch with the capital markets, leaving them to the exclusive province of other public and private borrowers. Finally, experience has not been encouraging with respect to the vigorous countercyclical use of conventional debt management policy. There are theoretical doubts as to its effectiveness and, even more, practical obstacles to its implementation. Looking at debt management more broadly, there is a striking phenomenon working in the opposite direction -but a phenomenon still submerged in the public consciousness. I am thinking of the exceptional rise in the size and impact of Federal agency programs, mostly of an extra-budgetary character. These agencies, in combination, have assumed a massive role in economic stabilization, most obviously, but - 5 - certainly not exclusively, in the housing area. In the process, the Treasury has consciously given priority to their needs, including encouragement of longer-term financing, where needed, to support the program objectives and preserve the integrity of the agencies' individual financial structures. The proliferation of these agencies has given rise to problems of coordination and policy unknown in the days when the direct Treasury debt loomed relatively much more important -- a problem to which I shall return later. Whatever the reasons for diminishing public concern with debt management in past years, there is ample reason to pay attention today. We are faced with the need to finance back-to-back deficits totaling over $60 billion in two consecutive fiscal years. On top of those deficits, the expansion of Federal credit programs means that perhaps half of the net increase this year in all credit market instruments will, in one way or another, be associated with the programs of the Federal Government. That is a chilling projection. It more than justifies - 6 a careful look at past policies and intensive exploration of new approaches and new techniques. Nor can we intelli- gently approach the current problem without concern for the whole range of economic goals and without thinking through the longer-run implications for debt management itself. Our first task in the Treasury debt management area, of course, is simply to raise very substantial amounts of money in the market, without undercutting the desired stimulus inherent in the deficits themselves. Simultaneously, we must handle maturing securities, although that task is not especially heavy this year. Thirdly, we want to achieve these essentials in a way consistent with orderly and efficient handling of the debt in the longer run. That requires attention to maturity areas that may now be overloaded, avoiding undue concentrations of new debt, and consideration of techniques that may facilitate and minimize the cost of the eventual refunding of that debt. In all of this, there must, I believe, be an underlying presumption that our debt operations cannot be considered exclusively a matter of economical and efficient financing. - 7 - As a public responsibility, they must be geared to support our broader economic objectives, domestic and international. I recognize there is a sharp disagreement over what that glittering generality should mean in practice. Indeed, there is one vocal school of thought which goes to the extreme of arguing that the best the debt managers can do is "be neutral." Stay "out of the way" they seem to be saying -- out of the Fed's way, out of th e Budget Bureau's way, and certainly out of Fannie Mae's and Ginny Mae's and Sally Mae's way, maybe even out of the way of the men like AT&T and GMAC. The trouble with that counsel seems to me obvious. When we have large deficits to finance, there are no mechanical guidelines for keeping debt management neutral. The securities have to be placed somewhere, and that "somewhere" will make a difference to other borrowers and to monetary policy. Naturally, we want to be conscious of the impact and, where possible, turn it to our advantage. same time -- and this is the real challenge in dealing At the - 8 - with debt -- we cannot singlemindedly focus on our problems today, without thought for all those tomorrows when our successors will need to deal with what we have wrought. The central fact for the debt managers in 1972 is that we will need to raise some $35 billion of new money, assuming the budget estimates are realized and we end the year with a reasonable cash balance. We have expressed the view that, in the current and foreseeable economic environment, that task can be managed without either rekindling inflation or an escalation in longer-term interest rates. The basic element in our thinking is, of course, the fact that there is slack in the economy, and related slack in financial markets -- a high savings potential and a tempering of competing credit demands. Long-term rates, in particular, are still historically very high, producing an exceptionally sharp yield curve, a phenomenon certainly explained in part by remaining inflationary expectations. A priority task of our total policies is to reduce and eliminate those expectations. We can go a long way in that direction this year. As we do - 9 - so, declines in long rates could help restore what, by past standards, would be a more normal interest rate alignment. There are more technical reasons to suggest the added Federal debt can potentially be "shoehorned" into the market reasonably smoothly. Specifically, our analyses do not bear out predictions that we will inevitably need to draw out large volumes of individual money to accomplish the job. Given the slack in the economy, a relatively strong expansion in bank credit and the money supply should be both desirable and anticipated. With corporate liquidity more comfortable, we anticipate much more of that credit base can and will be employed in Government securities. Corporations themselves will probably be in a position to resume large-scale buying. this reflects their rising liquidity. In part, The con- centrated attention given last year to large foreign central bank purchases of Governments often ignored the fact that those dollars - 10 originally came from the United States -importantly from corporations. If we cannot look forward to renewed foreign buying and I do not -- I also do not look forward to the related drain of funds from domestic markets. We also anticipate more active State and local purchases. Indeed, to the extent revenue sharing adds to our deficit and their liquid resources, the immediate impact will be to provide an offsetting demand for our securities. Altogether -- and allowing for Federal Reserve purchases the statistical analysis suggests we can manage equably without sizeable purchases either by individuals or foreigners. There are always uncertainties about whether, in practice, it works out so smoothly. Certainly, the recurrent scarcity of short-term debt in the past year should evaporate. Stability depends critically on the course of the economy and prices. But, in the light of the facts now at hand, the collective market judgment embodied in the relative stability of interest rates since the budget announcement - 11 - seems to me fully supportable. The second of the problems I mentioned earlier refunding -- is fortunately limited. Our quarterly maturities average only $4 billion, below recent years and an amount that, in itself, is not troublesome. Consequently, we have considerable flexibility in handling those requirements, including a potential for combining refundings with cash generating operations or with operations to improve the debt structure, as was done in February. Neither the cash raising nor the refunding problem can be separated from the longer-range problem of maintaining a reasonably spaced maturity structure and efficient techniques for rolling over our debt with minimal disturbance. The striking innovation in debt management technique recently has been the extension of the auction process beyond the bill area. I cannot claim that approach has yet been fully tested in adversity. But I can say it has met or surpassed every expectation so far, to the advantage of the Treasury and the market. I am confident it will pass - 12 further testing with larger amounts and longer maturities. In the process, we are prepared to explore further variants, including (as the maturity is extended) the possibility of awarding all bids at the stop-out price to encourage wider investor participation. Perhaps more importantly, we are considering whether the successful experience with auctioning offers an opportunity to routinize or regularize the handling of more of our debt, as we have done for many years in the bill area. Against the day when truly long-term financing may again be appropriate, we should also consider the wisdom of providing more notice to the market of such an offering than has been the practice in the past; there are advocates of repetitive small sales several times a year, or simply longer advance notice prior to a more sizeable sale. These are matters upon which we want and need more advice from those participating in the markets. We have already had discussion with our regular advisory groups. They have prodded our own thinking. Without attempting final judgments this evening, I would like to - 13 review some of the ideas for public discussion. The regular auction of Treasury bills is often pointed to as a model for the relatively routine, trouble-free handling of substantial blocks of securities. Given the substantial cash needs ahead of us, I think you can anticipate, as our recent operations suggest, placement of more debt in this area. As we do so, we want to consider the desirability of phasing out the ni~month issue in favor j of the one-year maturity and perhaps shifting the annual issue from month-end dates into a fifty-two week pattern. In considering these technical possibilities, there appears to be room for substantial increases in the bill issue without overloading the supply going to private holders. The increased size of the Federal Reserve portfolio arid large foreign holdings have actually reduced the supply of bills to private domestic buyers over the last two years. Relative to other forms of short-term debt, the Treasury bill has actually been declining in importance. More basic questions arise in connection with extending essentially the same technique of regular auctions to longer paper of two or three year -- or even longer -- maturities. - 14 In contrast to building up the present concentration of note and bond maturities at quarterly intervals, to be handled flexibly at the Treasury's discretion at maturity, it is contended the practice of more frequent but also more routine rolling over of relatively short-term notes might: reduce market uncertainties and adjustments caused by large intermittent financing operations; create sustained and broadened buyer interest through greater assurance as to the future availability of securities of a given type; and reduce the periods when the Federal Reserve may feel constrained from major policy changes by the fact the Treasury is approaching, in, or just completing a major refunding. Obviously, many technical questions arise as part of any such judgment. Should the new maturities be monthly or quarterly? How large should the issues be? Should the auction technique be changed? - 15 How can the needs of the less sophisticated investors who may not wish to engage in frequent auctions be accommodated? Further steps toward regularization could potentially be made through a commitment regularly to refund present quarterly maturities into pre-specified areas of the market. As I suggested a moment ago, we could also extend the logic to the regular sale of small issues of long-term bonds. But, when I press the logic of that approach to its extreme, some of the drawbacks are obvious. Regularization and routinization are nice sounding words; straightjacket and rigidity are not. From where I sit, I cannot help but be conscious of the number of times in which particular market or economic objectives may influence the Treasury's thinking as to the form of a particular financing. than the past few weeks. I need look back no further For some time in our tentative planning, we had felt the logic of our cash and debt management needs suggested the desirability of offering a short - 16 or medium-term note late in February or early in March. When the time came to raise the money, however, a different logic prevailed. Meeting our near-term cash needs through a sizeable offering of bills, tailored precisely to fit within the remaining leeway under the debt limit, was in accord with both our international and domestic market objectives. Specifically, the immediate impact of the offering could more appropriately come in the short bill area, where rates relatively were quite low, than in an area that might risk interfering with a welcome firming tendency in the note and bill markets. Of course, there are potential pitfalls in the exercise of this type of flexibility. The discipline of regulariza- tion and future commitments may be needed, some would argue, to meet the longer range objectives of debt management by offering protection against what, in retrospect, might sometimes appear to be "taking the easy way out." You will not expect me to confess to personal sins in - 17 that respect! I would contend the progress toward redevelop- ing the market in the ten to fifteen year area and the persistence of longer.term options on our regular refunding operations speaks for itself. At the same time, I would concede there is a recurrent tension between longer range debt management objectives and the desire to tailor each operation to fit the economic circumstances of the moment. The proper balance between a relative routine scheduling of debt operations to meet continuing objectives and the desirability of retaining adequate short-term flexibility in the hands of the Treasury can and should be re-examined. Finally, a few words on the problem of the really longterm bond market. It seems to me that, looking down the road, the Treasury will want to have continuing contact with that area of the market., In my judgment, this is not primarily a matter of achieving some target average maturity, or even of proper maturity spacing. More importantly, we should retain the potential for directly influencing that market, however infrequently we wish to use our influence. To accomplish this purpose, at least a minimum number of readily tradeable issues are probably necessary. - 18 - In concept, the task of re-establi$hing such a market does not look forbidding. years alone, privat~ and After all, in the last three Stat~ and loeal borrowers have raised some $135 billion in the capital markets. The purposes I have in mind could be accomplished with only a relatively tiny fraction of that flow. The practical difficulty is the familiar cliche: No time seems to be a good time for offering long-term Treasury securities -- either rates are too high or there is a desire to maximize the flow of funds to other borrowers. Today we have some of both. So here, too, is an area where we would invite your thinking and your reactions in shaping our longer-term program. Before concluding, I do want to say a few words about the hottest new item in thinking about debt management in Washington these days. - 19 - As I indicated at the start, the coordination and control of the market borrowing activities of the numerous Federal and Federally-sponsored agencies has become both more important and more difficult. As these agencies have proliferated in number and scope, some Federal activity in the securities markets is occurring on roughly every two out of three business days. The aggregate volume of funds absorbed by these agencies is about as large as the Federal deficit, even in this period of swollen deficits. We have proposed legislation, in the form of the Federal Financing Bank Act, to help bring order out of the actual and potential confusion and congestion in the Federal agency markets. The legislation has three main purposes: First, the Bill would establish a new financing vehicle, the Federal Financing Bank, which would consolidate the financing of a number of Federal programs which are now financed individually in the private securities market. By reducing the number and types of separate issues, we will achieve a substantial savings in borrowing costs. - 20 - Second, the Bill would provide for better coordinaation by the Secretary of the Treasury of Federal agency financing plans, consistent with better satisfaction of their requirements. This will be achieved by assuring early focus on the market financing requirements for Federal programs and then, in many cases, substituting the broader and more efficient financing potential of the Financing Bank for the market entry of individual agencies. Better over-all coordination will be possible of the market borrowings by the Treasury, the Federal Financing Bank, and those Federally-assisted borrowings not financed directly through the Bank. Third, the Bill would provide for subsmission to the President of budget plans for loan guarantee programs. This will assure more effective coordination of loan guarantee programs with other Federal progrruns and with over-all economic and financial policies. In preparing the Federal Financing Bank legislation for submission to Congress and subsequently, we have had extensive - 21 discussions with the various Federal agencies involved, with public interest groups representing State and local governmental authorities, and with various associations representing industry, banking and the securities industry. We are gratified by the degree of support among those in the financial community dealing with the problem on a daily basis. Indeed, we find few opposed to the basic concept, in or out of Government. Quite naturally, there are those who, while welcoming the concept in general, would beg out for themselves on grounds that their case is "special." Of course, it is pre- cisely the proliferation of special cases that makes the problem! There are also some specific areas of concern which reflect lack of full understanding and, therefore, warrant comment. First, the Federal Financing Bank is a financing vehicle only. The Bank will not add to or subtract from existing Federal credit programs. It would simply exist to facilitate the financing of the programs which Congress has created or will create in the future. The Bank is not a device to remove programs from - 22 the Federal budget. It does not affect the existing budget treatment of Federal credit programs. The Federal Financing Bank in no way infringes on the prerogatives of State and local governments in their access to the tax exempt municipal bond market -- it is not an Urbank. The Financing Bank will acquire securities only in instances where the Federal Government is otherwise involved through guarantees or other forms of financial backstopping. Some tax exempt issues, such as Public Housing Authority and Urban Renewal Authority obligations, do fall into that categoryo By removing this source of pressure on the municipal bond market, State and local borrowers should find a more receptive market for their other issues. We are strongly convinced that enactment of the Federal Financing Bank Act will substantially improve th~ efficiency with which the Government's borrowing is accomplished without - 23 - any significant detrimental effect on other securities markets or on the way the securities industry serves its basic function of mobilizing capital. Our principal opponent, particularly in a year in which the Congress is easily distracted by issues with more political appeal is apathy. To overcome that, we will need the support of all of those professionally concerned with the problem of Government finance. I make this "pitch" to you with no apologieso The concern of the Money Marketeers with economic policy and the problems of Government finance is well established. Indeed, there is no group that has more successfully combined business and education through the years with the pleasures of professional companionship. having me. --000-- Thank you for The Department o{ the TREASURY WASHINGTON. O.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04·2041 FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY REMARKS BY RICHARD V. ADAMS SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY (DEBT MANAGEMENT) BEFORE THE CONFERENCE OF THE MID-CONTINENTAL DISTRICT SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION WEDNESDAY, MARCH 8, 1972, 10:00 A.M., C.S.T. It is a pleasure to be here in Chicago today at this conference of the Mid-Continental group of the Securities Industry Association. By way of background, I might explain that the Treasury . Special Assistant for Debt Management works in the area of planning the Treasury's financing operations and works also with various Federal agencies in coordinating their market borrowing activities. I came to the Treasury about nine months ago from commercial banking where I had been managing a bank bond portfolio. A move of this sort is something like moving to the other side of the same counter. As bankers, we were always trying to figure out what the Treasury and the Federal Reserve were going to do that would affect the bond market and at the Treasury, we are trying to guess what the banks will do about buying Treasury issues. Of course, what we at - 2 Treasury call debt management, the banks have developed a euphemism for. They call the management of their debts liability management. Maybe that's what we should call it in Government -- liability management somehow has a little nicer ring to it. In any case, we do have a Federal debt to manage -- about $426 billion of it now and it's heading higher, as you have no doubt seen, with the unified budget deficit for this fiscal year projected at $38.8 billion and for 1973 a further deficit of $25.5 billion. of this size. situations. We are not happy about the need for deficits But this is one of these bad news-good news The bad news is, of course, the absolute size of the projected deficits which rubs against the grain of our traditional ways of thinking about fiscal policy. The good news, on the other hand, is that these deficits will provide a needed economic stimulus and that the deficits are manageable in the sense that financing them will not impinge on an already overburdened money and capital market. In talking about Federal debt management today, I would like to say something further on this matter of the budget, then to talk about the debt management aspects of these deficit! - 3 - and finally to cover briefly the matter of the financing of Federal agency and Federally-guaranteed borrowings. This last item involves the Administration's proposal to create a Federal Financing Bank. Now on the Federal deficits for FY 1972 and 1973, there is no question that the budget numbers that were released in late January caused concern in the financial markets. The concern stemmed from a wide-spread feeling that (1) deficits of this size are in and of themselves going to intensify our inflation and (2) that at the very least, financing these deficits will have the effect of driving up interest rates. Both of these assumptions are worthy of a further examination. Budget deficits or budget surpluses are just one of a number of forces at work in the economy at any given time. There are usually more important fundamentals affecting prices and interest rates, and the budget has to be viewed in the context of underlying economic conditions. Looking at the history of our Federal budgets, you discover that there is no reason to conclude that budget deficits automatically lead to inflation and escalating interest rates or, for that matter, - 4 that surpluses mean low interest rates and less inflation. In looking at the record, what stands out is the fact that our major inflations in the United States are associated with wars and that peak interest rate levels are related to our inflations. As far as budget deficits or surpluses in and of themselves are concerned, there is no one-to-one relationship between them and inflation and money rates. Taking the last 20 years or so, we ran surpluses during two out of the three Korean war years and nevertheless had a sharp inflation and substantial increases in interest rates. A recession followed the Korean war in 1953-54 and inflation and interest rates subsided despite a large budget deficit in FY 1954. As the economy expanded in 1955-57, a sharp rise in prices and interest rates occurred even though the Government ran sizable surpluses during most of the period. In all but one of the eight fiscal years, 1958 through 1965, Federal deficits were incurred. These years were characterized by the existence of unutliized resources and unsatisfactory levels of unemployment. Inflation was virtually dormant and interest rates, after 1959, were remarkably stable. - 5 - More recently, the 1965-69 period was a time of inflationary boom -- again associated with war. levels became intolerable. Inflation and interest rate Here in this superheated climate very large deficits did indeed aggravate the inflation and the rise in interest rates of the late 1960's. This quick review of recent history suggests clearly, I think, that it is one thing to run a large deficit in an overheated, full employment economy like FY 1968, but quite a different proposition in the present environment when we are moving in transition from war to peace and when fiscal stimulation is needed to speed the transition. Now to put the FY 1972 and 1973 budgets in their proper context, we have to look at our economic objectives and our current progress toward these objectives. Our objectives are as the President stated them last August: (1) to break the back of inflation. (2) to promote sustainable economic growth. (3) to create jobs and reduce unemployment. (4) to work toward restructuring the international monetary system. - 6 The steps already taken in furtherance of these objectives are well known; a major reduction in personal and business income taxes, automobile excise tax cut, an international currency realignment and a coherent wage price stabilization program which we know as Phase II. These steps are producing good results, evidenced by a real growth rate in the economy of nearly 6 percent in the last quarter of 1971. Further substantial gains in economic activity are occurring so far this year. However, we must sustain this developing business expansion. The Federal budget in FY 1972 and 1973 will act to reinforce the major economic policy initiatives taken in recent months. In summary, we regard the budgets for fiscal 1972 and 1973 as appropriate stimulants for the economy. We do not regard these budgets as inherently inflationary nor do we believe that financing these deficits will produce a major escalation in interest rates. All of this is not to say, however, that we do not have a large financing job ahead of us over at least the rest of year. The new budget figures put a greater emphasis on debt management. th~ - 7 - Based on our projections for the weeks ahead, our remaining gross market borrowing requirements through April will be about $5.4 billion, including $2.4 billion to be raised via continued $300 million weekly additions to the bill auctions. Our May and June requirements will depend on actual budget developments but will be fairly large in any case. The period we are in now, March-June, is where the unusual Treasury borrowing pressures on the market will occur. Normally, in the first half of the calendar year, the Treasury retires some debt out of seasonally heavy tax collections but this will not be the case this year. Fortunately, these unusual borrowing requirements will not be impinging on already overloaded credit markets. The present relatively low short-term rate structure indicates a substantial capacity to accommodate the Treasury. It re- flects the low level of credit demand in the private sector, the substantial foreign purchases of short-term Treasury securities in recent months and an accommodative monetary policy. These conditions are generally expected to persist at least until the present business expansion has progressed far enough to absorb a significant portion of the unutilized resources existing in the economy. - 8 - Moving into the first half of FY 1973, we will continue to be active borrowers in the capital markets as we finance the seasonally heavy portion of the deficit for the fiscal year. However, the size of the financing job during that period will be more in line with that of previous years, and as such, it will be seasonally heavy but not extraordinarily so. In addition to the cash raising job ahead of us, we have three quarterly refunding operacions in the balance of the year. We are fortunate that the size of these operations is not large. Securities that will have to be refunded this year total $12.2 billion privately-held or about $4 billion per quarter. These amounts are quite manageable and should cause no special difficulty. In our cash financing and refunding operations this year, we do have to recognize and deal with the problem of debt structure. In recent years, our deficits and our inability to sell Treasury securities beyond 7 years because of the 4-1/4 percent interest rate ceiling have resulted in a substantial in the average length of the privately-held debt. d~l~ In mid-1965, the average length was 5 years, 9 months and it is now 3 years, 3 months. This is not as alarming as it may seem since during - 9 the past 6-1/2 years, the privately-held marketable debt has increased very little as the Federal Reserve and the various Government accounts on balance have acquired most of the new Treasury issues. So the debt structure problem is really that of avoiding having big, unwieldy maturities coming due at anyone time. With our quarterly maturities this year fairly light, we should find it possible to couple our regular refunding operations with other operations designed to relieve congestion in specific maturity areas and to accomplish some lengthening into the 10-year and 10ngerarea. The reception of the advance refunding of the February and May 1974 maturities and the size of the exchange into ten-year obligations suggests that the market is receptive to moderate-sized issues of longer-term Treasuries now that we have authority to issue a limited amount of bonds without regard to the 4-1/4 percent interest rate ceiling. With the large financing requirements arising from our deficits, there is considerable thought among Government securities market participants from whom we have received - 10 - helpful advice, that our financing operations should become more regularized and routine in the manner, Dar example, of our weekly Treasury bill auctions. The main arguments in favor of this are said to be: (1) It would reduce market disturbances. (2) It would remove an element of uncertainty from the market. (3) It would reduce the need of the Federal Reserve to act in special ways to accommodate Treasury financings. In other words, it would reduce the need for "even-keel." Offsetting the advantages of regularizing debt management, however, is a resulting loss of flexibility. To debt managers, it is not so clear that automatic and inflexible procedures are completely desirable. Flexibility is needed to permit taking advantage of market demands in specific maturity areas or conversely to avoid putting undesirable pressure on unreceptive market sectors. Our recent offering of short- term bills is a case in point. Here market demand as evidenced by relative interest rate levels was strongest in the short-ten sector of the market. At the same time, it was also desirable - 11 - to minimize pressures in the intermediate and longer-term market. The short-market therefore represented the best opportunity. As a practical matter, in financing our large budget deficits during the months ahead, we will almost automatically be tending to regularize more of our debt. This is because a substantial portion of the deficit will be financed in the short-term market, simply because this is where the greatest absorptive capacity is. To the extent that we sell bills, which will be routinely rolled over, we are moving in the direction of automating debt management. We may further this tendency by issuing short-term securities other than bills on a regular basis because we recognize that in present circumstances some degree of regularization has merit. At the same time, however, we will wish to retain flexibility in handling our quarterly refundings and in interim cash raising operations in intermediate and longer-term maturities. Now, there is one other new item in debt management which I would like to discuss and that is the Administration's proposal to improve the borrowing efficiency of the Federal agencies through the proposed Federal Financing Bank Act of - 12 1972. This pending legislation, as many of you know, has three main features: First, the bill would establish a new financing vehicle, the Federal Financing Bank, which would consolidate the financing of a number of Federal programs which are now financed individually in the private securities market. By reducing the number and types of separate issues we will achieve a substantial savings in borrowing costs. Second, the bill would provide for coordination by the Secretary of the Treasury of Federal agency financing plans. This will assure early focus on the market financing requirements for Federal programs and better overall coordination of the market borrowings by the Treasury, the Federal Financing Bank, and those Federally-assisted borrowings not financed through the Bank. Third, the bill would provide for submission to the Presid ent of budget plans for loan guarantee programs. These programs - 13 would continue to be excluded from the Federal budget totals, but the President would be permitted to place limits on them when necessary in view of overall fiscal requirements and demands for credit. This will assure more effective coordination of loan guarantee programs with other Federal programs and with overall economic and financial policies. I won't belabor the need for the Federal Financing Bank. I know this audience is well aware of the Federal debt management problems arising from the current fragmentary approach to Federal financing. During the course of our discussions of the Federal Financing Bank with the various agencies involved, with public interest groups and with capital market participants, considerable support for the legislation has developed. Most people agree that the economical financing of the Government's activities and programs is clearly in the public interest. However, there are some specific areas of concern with respect to this legislation which have come up and - 14 which warrant emphasis and comment here. The Bank would not be a program agency. That is, it would neither add to nor subtract from existing Federal credit assistance programs. The Bank would not be authorized, nor would the Secretary of the Treasury be authorized, to make any judgments with respect to the recipients of Federal credit aid. The Bank is designed merely to improve the financing of programs otherwise authorized by the Congress. The Federal Financing Bank would not be another big bureaucracy. It would rely upon the existing staff and facilities of the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve banks in its borrowing operations. In fact, the establishment of the Bank would reduce Federal bureaucracy since it would eliminate the need for establishing new financing staffs for each new Federal credit program or agency. The Federal Financing Bank is not a device to remove programs from the Federal budget; nor - 15 is it a device to bring programs back into the budget. The Bank would in no way affect the existing budget treatment of Federal credit programs. If a program is now financed outside of the budget, that treatment would continue. If a program is now financed in the budget, that treatment would continue. How these programs should actually be treated in the budget may be debatable. But that debate involves more than just financial questions; it goes to the heart of budget policy and resource allocation. Pending the resolution of these broader questions, I think that we in the financial community have a responsibi~~ty to do the best job possible in the financing of the Government's programs. This legislation would in no way change the financing of those Federally-sponsored agencies which are now completely privatelyowned and which issue obligations not directly guaranteed by the Government. Those agencies, - 16 namely FNMA and the institutions of the home loan bank system and the farm credit system, would continue their present practice of consulting with the Secretaty of the Treasury and borrowing directly in the private market. Those agencies would not be authorized to borrow from the Bank but would undoubtedly benefit from this legislation, because the Federal Financing Bank would reduce the number of names and competing issues in the agency securities market and would contribute generally to more orderly market conditions. The Bank would not heap new demands on the securities market. Most guaranteed loans, such as the regular FHA and VA mortgages, are generally originated, serviced, and financed by widely dispersed lenders, rather than in the securities market, and these practices would continue. The programs which would be financed through the Bank are the ones which are already being financed in the securities market. By - 17 consolidating this financing, and replacing a variety of less efficient securities with a single more marketable instrument, the Bank would actually reduce the market impact of Federal borrowing activities. The Federal Financing Bank Act is not an assault on the tax-exempt municipal bond market. Rather than involving the Federal Government in the tax-exempt market, the Bank would permit the Federal Government to withdraw from that market. Under existing arrangements Federal agencies finance some of their programs in the municipal market by means of Federal guarantees and debt service subsidies on tax-exempt obligations, e.g., for public housing and urban renewal. These programs currently require about one out of every eight dollars invested in tax-exempt obligations. The Federal Financing Bank would permit the removal of the financing of these programs from the tax-exempt market, thus reducing pressures on - 18 that market. Consequently, State and local governments should benefit, in terms of more receptive markets for all their borrowings, by enactment of this legislation. Concern has been expressed about other legislative proposals, which would permit the Federal Government to subsidize all municipal bonds, either through a new central financing institution or through interest subsidy payments on taxable municipal bonds. The concern, as I understand it, is that the Federal subsidy will be so irresistible to local officials that it will lead to a drying up of the tax-exempt bond market, to Federal control over municipal finance, and to Federally-imposed restrictions on the volume or purpose of municipal borrowing. We feel strongly, as is evident from our revenue sharing proposals, that State and local governments should have more, rather than less, financial independence. - 19 Yet, in the case of certain high priority national programs, where the Congress has in fact determined that Federal credit aid is essential, e.g., for public housing, Federal controls and subsidies are already facts of life. Financing those programs through the Federal Financing Bank will result in significant savings to Government at all levels and will not involve the Federal Government in any municipal borrowing or project it is not already involved in. If the Congress should determine at some future date that direct Federal subsidies or guarantees should be made available for all of the bonds or notes of all 50 states, or just for municipalities, or just for the weaker borrowers, or just for general obligations rather than revenue bonds, or just for certain essential public facilities, then, in that legislation, decisions must be made with respect to the degree of Federal control, the degree - 20 - of subsidy, and the method of financing. The Federal Financing Bank Act does not prejudge those issues. I hope these comments have been helpful in clarifying our intent in proposing the Federal Financing Bank legislation. We have attempted in drafting this bill to assure the best possible market for the Financing Bank issues. These securities will be full faith and credit obligations of the United States and will be backed by the Treasury so as to assure timely payment and minimize borrowing costs. We expect these issues to be second only to the Treasury's direct issues in marketability. We solicit your support in gaining early enactment of this legislation by the Congress. The Department o[ theTREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 March 8, 1972 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE ATF TO BE TRANSFERRED TO TREASURY AS NEW BUREAU Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally announced today that the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division (ATF) of the Internal Revenue Service will be transferred July 1 to the Treasury Department as a full Bureau. The transfer is the result of a comprehensive study ordered last July. The study determined that placing the functions of the IRS Division under the Assistant Secretary in charge of all other Treasury enforcement bureaus would result in improved coordination and control and greater flexibility, without disturbing revenue functions. The new bureau will report directly to Eugene T. Rossides, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement, Tariff and Trade Affairs and Operations. He will take over policy direction immediately while detailed plans are worked out for the formal transfer on July 1. The ATF now employs nearly 4,000 persons in 42 branch offices and 376 other locations throughout the nation. Congress appropriated $72 million for Fiscal 1972 operations of the unit. Revenue collections in the calendar year 1971 totaled $7 billion. The ATF is responsible for such matters as: Collecting excise taxes on alcohel and tobacco products. Regulating and supervising the alcohol and tobacco industries. Administering certain controls on the manufacture, import, trade and disposition of firearms and explosives. C-264 more 2 Combatting illicit distilling and bootlegging. Investigating violation of the gun and explosives control regulations. The unit is headed by Rex D. Davis. 000 UNITED STATES SAVINGS IINDS ISIUED AND REDEEMED THROUGH February 29, 1972 (Dollar amounts in million. - round.d and will not nece .. arlly add to total.) DESCRIPTION JRED ries A-1935 thru D-1941 ries F and G-1941 thru 1952 ~ies J and K-1952 thru 1957 AMOUNT ISSUEDlI AMOUNT REDEEMEDlI AMOUNT OUTSTANCINGV % OUTSTANDING OF AMOUNT ISSUED 5,003 29,521 3,754 4,998 29,495 3,744 5 26 10 .10 .09 .27 1,910 8,423 13,538 15,808 12,438 5,663 5,390 5,585 5,534 4,851 4,196 4,397 5,024 5,124 5,340 5,162 4,867 4,758 4,463 4,485 4,564 4,429 4,964 4,828 4,710 5,079 5,030 4,775 4,483 4,680 5,263 114 368 1,716 7,564 12,194 14,157 10.990 4,843 4,472 4,555 4,437 3,838 3,319 3,451 3,871 3,890 4,010 3,842 3,570 3,387 3,135 3,052 2,974 2,794 2,930 2,842 2,767 2,845 2,789 2,560 2,256 1,950 1,206 194 859 1,344 1,651 1,448 820 918 1,030 1,097 1,013 877 945 1,153 1,234 1,330 1,320 1,297 1,371 1,328 1,432 1,590 1,635 2,034 1,987 1,943 2,234 2,241 2,215 2,228 2,730 4,057 114 -128 10.16 10.20 9.93 10.44 11.64 14.48 17.03 18.44 19.82 20.88 20.90 21.49 22.95 24.08 24.91 25.57 26.65 28.81 29.76 31.93 34.84 36.92 40.98 41.16 41.25 43.99 44.55 46.39 49.70 58.33 77.09 100.00 ~TURED ~ies E2I : 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 195B 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 196B 1969 1970 1971 1972 Unclassified rotal Series E .es H (1952 thru May, 1959) l/ H (June, 1959 thru 1972) rota! Series H rota! Series E and H { Total matured Series Total unmatured Grand Total - 496 180,242 132,703 47,539 26.38 5,485 8,237 3,848 2,657 1,636 5,580 29.83 67.74 13,721 6,505 7,216 52.59 193,963 139,208 54,755 28.23 38,277 193,963 232,241 38,237 139,208 177,445 41 54,755 54,796 .11 28.23 23.59 • accrued dJ ac aunt. rede~Jon 11'1 01 own., value. bCJlld. m.v h. ItA'd and will ••m - Inter.at lor .dditinn.' rvtrlnd. IIft"r arldlnlt' IJ'UIturltv d.t",a_ The Department o[ the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE March 9, 1972 TREASURY REMINDS THAT DISCOUNTS ON CERTIFICATES, OTHER DEPOSITS, IS INCLUDIBLE IN 1971 GROSS INCOME The Treasury Department today reminded taxpayers that a portion of the "original issue discount" or interest on certificates of deposit and certain other deposits made during 1971 with banks, domestic building and loan associations, and other financial institutions must be included in gross income in their tax returns for the year. The Department said that many taxpayers apparently are unaware that a portion of the discount, determined on a monthly basis, must be included annually in gross income. Certificates of deposit are the most common type of deposit arrangement covered by the requirement. Also covered are bonus savings plans and time deposit open accounts. To illustrate how a taxpayer determines the amount of original issue discount or interest to be included in his 1971 gross income, the Department provided this example: On January 1, 1971, the taxpayer purchased a $10,000 certificate of deposit from his bank. The terms of the certificate provide that upon redemption at maturity on December 31, 1975, he will receive from the bank $10,000 plus 6 percent compound interest from the date of purchase, or $3,382.26. Thus the stated redemption price at maturity is $13,382.26. The $3,382.26 is original issue discount, which the taxpayer must include annually in his gross income on a monthly pro rata basis. The ratable monthly portion of the discount is $56.371 ($3,382.26 divided by the 60-month maturity period of the certificate). The original issue discount includible in the taxpayer's gross income for 1971 is $676.45 ($56.371 times 12 months). Under regulations which Treasury adopted December 28, 1971, banks have until March 15, 1972 to provide depositors an Internal Revenue Service Form, 1099-0ID, showing the amount of original issue discount they should include in their 1971 gross income. (OVER) - 2 - The Treasury urged taxpayers who have questions about the rules for original issue discount or the nature of their deposit arrangements to contact a Taxpayer Service Representative at their local Internal Revenue Service office. 000 The Department of the TREASURY TelEPHONE W04·2041 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 RELEASE UPON DELIVERY REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE EUGENE T. ROSSIDES ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY (ENFORCEMENT, TARIFF AND TRADE AFFAIRS, AND OPERATIONS) before the ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NEW YORK PRESS ASSOCIATION ROCHESTER, NEW YORK March 10, 1972 8:00 p.rn o PRESIDENT NIXON'S WAR ON DRUG ABUSE Mr. Rossides, in an address before the Annual Convention of the New York Press Association in Rochester, New York, Page --Saluted the French Customs Service for the largest heroin seizure in history • • • • • 1 --Called for full community support and cooperation with local and state enforcement agencies, stating no community will conquer the heroin problem unless and until they cooperate fully with state and local enforcement agencies . • • • • . • • • 2 --Announced the results of Treasury's IRS Drug Trafficker Program from July 1 to date • . 4 and Tables I and II 413 targets in 31 states, 38 cities and the District of Columbia; $13,616,900 in jeopardy assessments and $1,700,000 in regular assessments; $3,300,000 in cash seized and $300,000 in property seized; 6 criminal tax cases pending in Federal 6 - 2 Page District courts, 9 criminal tax cases recommended for prosecution and one conviction for tax evasion--5-year prison sentence. --Gave the rc~3ult.3 for New York Stdtf- . .. ~. .4 & 5 Table III 92 targets selected from New York; $492,100 in jeopardy assessments, and $2,500,000 in cash seized. ---Announced a new goal -- 600 drug tr-afficker targets under tax investibation by .JUI:e 30, 1972 . 15 • • • • • • • • c ••••••••••• 6 The Department o[ the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE EUGENE T. ROSSIDES ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY (ENFORCEMENT, TARIFF AND TRADE AFFAIRS, AND OPERATIONS) before the ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NEW YORK PRESS ASSOCIATION ROCHESTER, NEW YORK March 10, 1972 8:00 p.m, PRESIDENT NIXON'S WAR ON DRUG ABUSE The extraordinary seizure on March 2, 1972, by the French Customs of 937 pounds of heroin, the largest such seizure in history, has demonstrated to the 'world once again that the international and national heroin smugglers, 'wholesalers, traffickers, and dealers can be beaten. We salute seizure and on French Customs at the Italian Government for moving against the French Customs Service on this the subsequent seizure by the on March 6 of 321 pounds of morphine border and we salute the French their overall efforts in forcefully the traffic in heroin. We can assume that a substantial portion, if not all, of the heroin was destined for the United States. These seizures give renewed inspiration to all of us involved in combatting this evil. 66 - 2 These recent French seizures are another reflection of President Nixon's foreign policy initiatives, to secure the cooperation of the world community in the comprehensive war against drug abuse. Although, in my judgment,we are turning the tide on the supply of heroin, much, much more remains to be done before we reach our goal. So my message tonight is one of challenge and hope. The hope stems from the fact that President Nixon's war against drug abuse is succeeding. He has: 1. Arrested the United States' incredible downward slide into drug abuse; 2. Alerted the international community to the global problem of drug abuse. More has been done by the international community to attack drug abuse in the last three years than in the previous thirty years. Many people have asked me 'what they can do to help. "Am I not really powerless to do anything?" My response is that everyone can help. There must be cooperation in the treatment and rehabilitation areas, but that is not enough. I say that no community in this country will conquer the heroin problem unless and until the people of the community support and cooperate fully with their local and state enforcement agencies o Over 350,000 men and women in those agencies stand as the first line of defense internally against drug abuse There must be a full cooperative effort between the people and their law enforcement agencies. o - 3 - What, specifically, can an individual do? There is no magic. The individual should honor his duty as a citizen and give any information he may have which could lead to arrest of a drug dealer. Community leaders should speak out, at every opportunity, against those who are running the heroin trade. A heroin trafficker could be anyone. He can be a member of any ethnic or racial group. Blacks are bleeding blacks, whites are bleeding whites, and Spanish-speaking people are bleeding Spanishspeaking peopleo I believe that progress has been made in bringing the people in the various communities throughout the nation and their state and local law enforcement agencies into a closer understanding and relationship. Moreover, the attack on heroin can be the mechanism for a full working partnership which will have additional advantages to 'society. The weekly press can play a unique role in this effort since you serve particular communities. You should consider stressing to your readers the urgent need for support of and cooperation with the state and local enforcement agencies~ presidential Tax Program Against Middle and Upper Echelon Traffickers, Smugglers, and Financiers President Nixon's initiative of June, 1971, in proposing tax investigations against the middle and upper echelon narcotics traffickers, is succeeding and is adding to the success of the President's overall war against drug abuse, particularly heroin abuse. - 4 I am pleased to report to you tonight that we have achieved the following since July 1, 1971: 1. 413 targets in 31 states, 38 cities and the District of Columbia, were selected by the Treasury's Target Selection Committee and referred to the Internal Revenue Service. Under the direction of IRS Commissioner Johnnie Walters, 300 Treasury Agents are presently conducting intensive tax investigations of the targets (see attached Table No. I). 2. $13,616,900 in jeopardy assessments and $1,700,000 in regular assessments have been made; and over $3,300,000 in cash and over $300,000 in property have been seized during this period. 3. One man has been convicted in St. Louis and sentenced to imprisonment for five years and fined $3,000 for violation of the Internal Revenue Code; six other criminal tax cases are pending in Federal District Courts in New York, Miami, Detroit, and Indianapolis, and nine additional cases have been recommended for prosecution (see attached Table No. II), New York State 92 of the 413 targets are from New York State-25 targets in Manhattan, 11 in Brooklyn, 20 in Queens, 15 in the Bronx, five in Nassau County, one in Suffolk County, and four in Westchester County; three targets are in the Albany area and eight in the Buffalo area (see Table No. III). - 5 - Jeopardy assessments in New York State total $492,100 and over $2,500,000 in cash have been seized in New York State. We are working very closely with the local and state law enforcement agencies in New York. Because of the close cooperation established with the District Attorneys in New York City and with the New York City Police Department, we expect additional targets in the coming months o • We believe this represents a substantial achievement. And, we have only just begun. It confirms our prediction to the Appropriations Committees in the Congress that this program Ilwill make a major additional contribution to the President's offensive against drug abuse." Institutionalized Nationwide Tax Investigative Program Treasury's IRS Narcotics Trafficker Program has been institutionalized on a nationwide and permanent basis In each area of the country, cadres of Treasury Agents have been established to concentrate full time on tax investigations of major narcotics figures. o The word for the drug traffickers is "get out of the illegal drug traffic or face up to intensive tax investigations." Target Selection At Treasury, the program is under the direction of Martin R. Pollner, Director, Office of Law Enforcement,who is also the Chairman of the Target - 6 - Selection Committee. Members of the Committee are drawn from the Treasury Department, its Bureau of Customs and Intelligence and Audit Divisions of IRS, and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Potential targets are selected based on information received from various Federal, State, and local enforcement agencies e Once selected, the names are transmitted to the IRS for investigation o Before a suspect is identified as a target, the Committee requires substantial information that the subject is involved in middle and upper echelon narcotics trafficking, smuggling, or financing. Cooperation with State and Local Enforcement Agencies We have initiated a program to bring State and local enforcement agencies into a cooperative effort with us by: (1) writing to the Chiefs of Police in 755 cities having a population in excess of 25,000; and (2) contacting key enforcement officials in major states. We have asked that they furnish us with the names of the middle and upper echelon drug traffickers in their states and cities and with intelligence information on these individuals. Computers Computers will facilitate the year in, year out scrutiny of the finances of each of the drug traffickers. By computerizing our information each year, we will be able systematically and quickly to examine each trafficker targeted under the program. 600 Targets by the End of FY 1972 Initially, our projection was 400 targets by June 30, 1972, the end of FY 1972 We have set a new goal, which will be difficult to reach, of 600 targets by June 30, 1972 Q 0 - 7 Background to Presidential Tax Program Secretary John B. Connally, in the spring, recommended to the President this nationwide program. president Nixon announced the program of tax investigations of major narcotics traffickers on June 17, 1971, as part of a message on his multidimensional approach to combat drug abuse. The program is designed to take the profit out of the illegal traffic in narcotics and thereby further disrupt the traffic. This is to be accomplished by conducting systematic tax investigations of middle and upper echelon narcotics traffickers, smugglers, and financiers. These are the people who are generally insulated from the daily operations of the drug traffic through imtermediaries. Reflecting the high priority given this program by the President, Congress provided financial support for it amounting to $7.5 million in Fiscal 1972 and authorization for 541 additional positions in IRS-200 Treasury Intelligence Agents, 200 Treasury Revenue Agents, and 141 support personnel. Treasury has coordinated this tax program with the anti-smuggling drive of its Bureau of Customs, the drive against narcotics distribution of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and the prosecution efforts of the Tax and Criminal Divisions of the Department of Justice. New procedures and techniques have been established and older ones have been streamlined, in order to reduce the time required for completion of successful financial investigations, and to bring the cases to court more expeditiously. - 8 - This program is a major enforcement effort but it must be emphasized that it is only one part of this Administration's comprehensive drive against narcotics. Multi-Dimensional Program President Nixon started his war on drugs the first month of his Administration when he established the Interdepartmental Task Force on Narcotics, Marijuana and Dangerous Drugs that led to Operation Intercept in September, 1969, and Operation Cooperation in October, 1969. He has escalated that war with a series of action programs, and progress has been made. First, he elevated the drug problem to the foreign policy level and has taken personal initiatives in soliciting the cooperation of other governments. The aim of our diplomatic efforts is to have each nation do its share and meet its responsibilities in the worldwide war against drug abuse. In September, 1971, he created a Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control under the Chairmanship of Secretary of State William P. Rogers a On June 30, 1971, there was a joint announcement by Prime Minister Erim of Turkey and President Nixon that Turkey had decreed that after the one-year delay required by the law of Turkey, cultivation of the opium poppy would no longer be legal in Turkey. Progress of a similar kind was made in another part of the world when the Royal Laotian Government enacted a new law outlawing opium production and trafficking in that country. Cooperation has been achieved with the Governments of South Vietnam and Thailand for suppression of illegal traffic in dangerous drugs. - 9 - Multilateral action through the United Nations has been stimulated. A United Nations Fund for Drug Control has been established. The United States has already contributed $1 million and pledged $1 million more. Bilateral arrangements have been concluded with Canada and Mexico for cooperation and mutual assistance along our land borders, and with Turkey and France to control drug trafficking and smuggling. Of course, the role of the press to provide full exposition, on a continuing basis, of the actions or lack of actions of foreign governments, as well as our own government, is vital. Second, he placed particular emphasis on the crucial roles of education, research, and rehabilitation and provided increased funds in these three essential areas. The Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention was established on an interim basis in June of 1971 under Dr. Jerome Jaffe to coordinate Federal action in the fields of education, research, and rehabilitation. In 1971, nearly 150 million dollars were devoted to education, research, and rehabilitation. That figure will be doubled in 1972 and increased further in 1973. Third, he recommended differentiation in the criminal penalty structure between heroin and marijuana; and flexible provisions for handling first offenders. Treating marijuana as though it were the same as heroin created serious problems in convincing young people who were conditioned to be skeptical of all established programs that there was any logic or reason in the attack on drug abuse. The minimum mandatory penalties created - 10 - serious problems for prosecutors and judges dealing with first offenders. The essence of the President's proposal was adopted by the repeal of the minimum mandatory sentence provisions that under many circumstances required prison terms, without probation or parole, for handling even the smallest quantities of marijuana. This permits the courts to make reasonable distinctions between youths with small quantities of marijuana and dealers in heroin. The courts were also granted the important discretion on any drug offense to clean the slate on the first offender by striking from the record mention of the first offense without adjudication of guilt. Model State narcotics legislation, also recommended by the President, has been adopted by 26 states and is being considered in 15 others. Fourth, he stressed total community involvement-as I have discussed here tonight--the private sector as well as governmental agencies--in this anti-drug abuse program. Fifth, he provided a substantial increase in budgetary support for Federal law enforcement in this area. In December, 1969, Congress provided $8.75 million for 915 additional men and equipment for the drug antismuggling program of the Bureau of Customs. In 1971, Congress authorized for the Customs program an additional 1,000 personnel and major additions to equipment. Comparable increases have been made in funds provided for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. I have already reviewed the $7.5 million appropriation fur i~easury's IRS Narcotics Trafficker Program. - 11 - As the President stated on January 28, 1972: "As far as law enforcement obligations relating to drug abuse are concerned, the level has increased more than eightfold in our first three years in office--from $20.2 million to $164.4 million. We plan to increase this figure by another $64.6 million next year to the $229 million level." Sixth, he recognized the central role of the states and the need for close Federal-state cooperation in a unified drive against drug abuse. The pioneering efforts of Governor Rockefeller and the enormous resources applied by New York State to the war on drug abuse have been of tremendous assistance to the Federal Government's efforts. More recently, on January 28, 1972, the President established the Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement in the Department of Justice headed by former Commissioner of Customs Myles J. Ambrose. This program will concentrate an assault on the street level heroin pusher. The new office will be working closely with state and local enforcement agencies. In this program, we have seen for the first time the total involvement of the institution of the Presidency in the battle against drug abuse. It is this program that has given me the basis for the cautious optimism I am expressing. In my opinion, drug abuse, particularly with regard to the supply of heroin, has reached its peak and has leveled out. Perhaps it has even begun to recede. But certainly I am aware, as each of you is, that we have a long hard battle ahead of us to bring that line back down to the level on the chart from which it started! 000 TABLE I STATE Alaska Arizona California Colorado Connecticut Florida Hawaii Georgia Illinois Indiana Louisiana Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Missouri Nevada New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina Ohio Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina Tennessee Texas Vermont Virginia Washington METROPOLITAN AREA Anchorage Phoenix Los Angeles San Francisco Denver Hartford Miami Honolulu Atlanta Chicago Indianapolis New Orleans Baltimore - D.C. Boston Detroit St. Paul St. Louis Las Vegas Newark Albuquerque Albany Buffalo New York City & suburbs Greensboro Cleveland Cincinnati Portland Philadelphia Pittsburgh Providence Columbia Nashville Austin-Houston Dallas Burlington Richmond Seattle 1 14 22 24 2 7 50 6 16 20 6 7 13 6 23 1 5 1 25 7 3 8 81 3 5 2 1 8 6 1 1 2 25 1 2 1 7 413 Treasury Department Office of Law Enforcement - SELECTED TARGETS I·1arch 10 I 1~72 TABLE II 1/ Jeopardy Assessments- $13,616,900 Regular Assessments $ 1,700,000 Total Assessments $15,316,900 " t"lons-2/ Tax Year T ermlna Dollars Seized $ 3,330,700 Property Seized (Fair Market Value) over $ Cases recommended for prosecution 300,000 9 Criminal tax cases ln U.S. Courts awaiting trial 6 Criminal tax cases completed (5-year prison sentence and $3,000 fine) 1 1/ "" 1 assessments of taxes - Jeopar d y assessments are addltlona made where a return has been filed, but where circumstances exist under which delay might jeopardize collection of the revenue. ~/Termination of tax year is a computation of the tax due and assessment made where the time for filing the return has not become due where circumstances exist under which delay might jeopardize collection of the revenue. Treasury Department Office of Law Enforcement March 10, 1972 TABLE III NEW YORK STATE TARGETS 92 New York State 25 New York County Kings County Queens County Bronx County Nassau County Suffolk County Westchester County 11 20 15 5 1 4 Albany Area 3 Buffalo Area 8 b/ $492,100 , t 'lons2/ Tax Year Termlna Dollars Seized $2,507,500 Jeopardy Assessments 1/Jeopardy assessments are additional assessments of taxes made where a return has been filed, but where circumstances exist under which delay might jeopardize collection of the revenue. ~/Termination of tax year is a computation of the tax due and assessment made where the time for filing the return has not become due where circumstances exist under which delay might jeopardize collection of the revenue. Treasury Department Office of Law Enforcement . March 10, 1972 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 March 10, 1972 FOR TIMMEDIATE RELEASE TREASURY SECRETARY CONNALLY NAMES CLIFFORD C. SOMMER AS NEW SAVINGS BONDS CHAIRMAN FOR THE STATE OF MINNESOTA Clifford C. Sommer, Vice President, Northwest Bancorporation, Minneapolis, has been appointed volunteer State Chairman for the Savings Bonds Program in Minnesota, Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally announced today. The appointment is effective immediately. He succeeds George H. Dixon, President, First National Bank of Minneapolis, who has served since April 1970. Dixon has been given the Treasury's Award of Merit. Sommer has been Steele County Savings Bonds Chairman for 11 years. As State Chairman, he will head a committee of business, financial, labor, media, and governmental leaders who -- working with the Savings Bonds Division -- assist in promoting the sales of Savings Bonds. He is immediate Past President of the American Bankers Association and Chairman of its newly constituted Governing Council. Sommer, who has been active in many areas of banking, is a Director of the Security Bank and Trust Co., Owatonna, having served as President from 1955 to 1971 and Chairman of the Board in 1971. He served as a Senator in the State Legislature from January 1967 until January 1971. He is an alumnus of the University of Minnesota and a lieutenant commander, U. S. Naval Reserve ( Retired ). Sommer and his wife, Eleanor, have two married daughters and two grandchildren. 000 The Deportmento! the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 March 10, 1972 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE TREASURY SECRETARY CONNALLY NAMES ELWOOD E. LEONARD, JR., AS NEW SAVINGS BONDS CHAIRMAN FOR THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND Elwood E. Leonard, Jr., President, H & H Screw Products Hanufacturing Co., Lincoln, has been appointed volunteer State Chairm81' for the Savings Bonds Program in Rhode Island, Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally announced today. The appointment is effective immediately. He succeeds William H. Smith, President, Maurice C. Smith Co., Inc., Providence, who has served since January 1960. Smith has been given the Treasury's Award of Merit. Leonard will head a committee of state, business, financial, labor, media, and governmental leaders who -- working with the Savings Bonds Division -- assist in promoting the sales of Savings Bonds. He has previously served as a "Take Stock in America" Campaign Chairman. Leonard was born in Taunton, Mass., where he attended public schools. He moved to Rhode Island in 1941. From 1943-45, he served as a cadet in the U. S. Army Air Corps. In 1951, he received the degree of Doctor of Science in Mechanical Engineering from Brown University. He joined H & H immediately following graduation and was named President in 1958. Leonard is director, corporator, or trustee of a long list of business, educational, cultural, charitable, and civic organizations o He is a member of the pawtucket-Blackstone Valley Chamber of Commerce and the Rhode Island Sons of the American Revolution. He is married to the former Barbara Martin; they have six children -- Karin, William, Barbara Ann, Cynthia, Edward III, and Anthony. 000 The Deportmento! the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 March 10, 1972 FOR TIMMEDIATE RELEASE TREASURY SECRETARY CONNALLY NAMES E. CLAYTON GENGRAS AS NEW SAVINGS BONDS CHAIRMAN FOR THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT E. Clayton Gengras, Chairman of the Board and President, Security Insurance Group, Hartford, was appointed by Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally as volunteer State Chairman for the Savings Bonds Program in Connecticut, effective immediately. He succeeds G. Harold Welch, President, Harwel Corp., New Haven. Welch, who has served since March 1949, assumes the post of Chairman Emeritus; he received the Treasury's Award of Merit. Gengras has been Hartford Geographic Chairman of the U. S. Industrial Payroll Savings Committee. As State Chairman, he will head a committee of state, business, financial, labor, media, and governmental leaders who -- working with the Savings Bonds Division -- assist in promoting the sales of Savings Bonds. He is active in a number of civic, cultural, educational, religious, and charitable projects. In 1963, he was appointed Knight of Saint Gregory by Pope Paul VI. Gengras was born in West Hartford, where he lives with his wife, Elizabeth, and six of their ten children. 000 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IWvlEDIATE RELEASE March 13, 1972 TREASURY ISSUES DUMPING FINDING WITH RESPECT TO ICE CREM~ SANDWICH WAFERS FROM CANADA The Treasury Department announced today that it has issued a dumping finding with respect to ice cream sandwich wafers from Canada. The finding will be published in the Federal Register of March 14,1972. On October 26, 1971, the Treasury Department advised the Tariff Commission that ice cream sandwich wafers from Canada are being sold at less than fair value within the meaning of the Antidumping Act, 1921, as amended. On February I, 1972, the Tariff Commission Issued a determination that an industry in the United States Is being injured by reason of the importation of ice cream sandwich wafers from Canada sold, or likely to be sold, at less than fair value within the meaning of the Antidumping Act, 1921, as amended. After these two determinations, the finding of dumping automatically fol lows as the final administrative requirement in antidumping investigat ions. During the period Apri I 1970 through December 1971, ice cream sandwich wafers valued at approximately $460,000 were imported from Canada. /I /I /I The Deportmento! the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE March 13, 1972 TREASURY ANNOUNCES ADOPTION OF FINAL REGULATIONS ON MINERAL DEPLETION DEDUCTIONS The Treasury Department today announced the adoption of final regulations concerning percentage depletion deductions for "hard minerals" -- that is, for minerals other than oil and gas. These final regulations adopt the proposed regulations that were published on October 1, 1971, with a number of changes reflecting comments that have been received in written statements and at the public hearings that were held on February 23, 1971. These regulations provide general rules for determining whether or not a process applied by a miner is part of the mining treatment for the ore or mineral. If it is a mining treatment process, the value it adds to the mineral is included in the amount qualifying for percentage depletion. In establishing these rules, the regulations are based upon the provisions of a Senate amendment to the Public Debt and Tax Rate Extension Act of 1960. Those statutory changes were enacted to over-rule a line of court decisions that had allowed integrated miner-manufacturers to compute their depletion allowance on the value of manufactured products rather than limiting the value to include only mining processes. The new statute established a list of '~ining processes" that would be allowed and another list of "manufacturing processes" that would not be allowed. These regulations represent the culmination of an effort that extends back to 1959 when the Treasury Department asked Congress for changes in the statute. During the intervening period several versions of these regulatory provisions have been published and commented upon by the affected taxpayers and the interested public. These regulations have been carefully drafted to reflect this history as well as C-267 - 2 the experience of the Internal Revenue Service in administering these provisions. In addition to the rules relating to the question of mining treatment processes, the regulations also contain provisions for determining the value of the ore or mineral at the point where mining ends and manufacturing begins -the so-called cut-off point. These rules provide several different methods for determining that value and also indicate when the different methods are applicable. One of these methods, based upon a rate of return on investment, is currently being studied and is shown as reserved at the appropriate point in the text. The Treasury Department also said it had concluded that no Environmental Impact Statement unuer section 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act was required. Treasury said that it had carefully considered the question of whether such a statement was necessary in August of 1971 before the proposed regulations were published and again this year before the final regulations were adopted. In this regard, it should be noted that the depletion allowance is Congressional action and not an agency action. Taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service have been applying these basic statutory provisions since 1961. These regulations are a public statement of the interpretation of the statute by the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service. The final regulations were filed as a public document with the Federal Register on March 10, 1972, and will be published during the week of March 13, 1972. 000 The Deportmento! the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 rENTION: TElEPHONE W04·2041 Harch 13, 1972 F INANC IAL ED I'I'OR ':t RELEASE 6: 30 P. r-i. , RESULTS OF TREASURY'S vT.EEKLY BILL OFFERING The Treasury Department announced that the tenders for two series of Treasury lIs, one series to b~ an additional issue of the bills dated December 16, 1971 , and = other series to be dated March 16, 1972 ,which were offered on March 7, 1972, re opened at the Federal Reserve Banks today. Tenders were invited for $2 ,400 ,000 ,000 , thereabouts, of 91-day bills and for $1,800,000,000, or thereabouts, of 182-day lIs. The details of the two series are as follows: OF ACCEPTED v1PETITIVE BIDS: ~GE High Low Average 91-day Treasury bills maturing June 15, 1972 Approx. Equiv. Price Annual Rate 99.060 ~ 99.010 99.028 3.719% 3.916% 3.845% 182-day Treasury bills maturing September 14, 1972 Approx. Equiv. Price Annual Rate 97.903 97.861 97.879 E./ 4.148% 4.231% 4.195% :J:./ a/ Except 1 tender of $940,000; E./ Excepting 2 tenders totaling $800,000 60% of the amount of 91-day bills bid for at the low price was accepted 3% of the amount of 182-d~ bills bid for at the low price was accepted .rAL TENDERS APPLIED FOR AND ACCEPTED BY FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICTS: )istrict 30ston ~ew York 'hiladelphia aeveland <ichmond itlanta ~icago ;t. Louis 1inneapolis Cans as City )allas Jan Francisco TOTALS AEElied For $ 18,690,000 2,913,130,000 31,100,000 28,265,000 1l,885,000 44,985,000 190,535,000 51,170,000 17,820,000 36,570,000 35,165,000 81,660,000 AcceEted 8,690,000 $ 1,978,630,000 24,330,000 28,265,000 11,885,000 39,985,000 146,535,000 50,170,000 7,820,000 36,570,000 19,365,000 47,860,000 AEElied For $ 10,845,000 2,520,825,000 7,255,000 40,810,000 2,420,000 26,640,000 136,345,000 32,740,000 15,320,000 23,425,000 28,860,000 169,975,000 AcceEted $ 845,000 1,609,375,000 7,255,000 22,960,000 2,420,000 10,170,000 47,645,000 16,740,000 6,765,000 18,225,000 6,860,000 50,875,000 $3,460,975,000 $2,400,105,000 ~ $3,015,460,000 $1,800,135,000 ~ Includes $217,405,000 noncompetitive tenders accepted at the average price of 99.028 Includes $ 80,285,000 noncompetitive tenders accepted at the average price of 97.879 These rates are on a bank discount basis. The equivalent coupon issue yields are 3.94% for the 91-day bills, and 4.35% for the 182-day bills. The Departmento! the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE March 14, 1972 TREASURY ANNOUNCES INITIATION OF FOUR ANTIDUMPING INVESTIGATIONS The Treasury Department announced today the initiation of four antidumping investigations. These antidumping investigations will cover imports of card clothing from the United Kingdom, neopentyl glycol from Japan, collapsible baby strollers from Japan, and manual hoists from Luxembourg. The Treasury announcement followed summary investigations conducted by the Bureau of Customs after receipt of complaints alleging that dumping of the above-mentioned imports was taking place in the United States. Card clothing is an item used to comb cotton, wool and other fibers to prepare them for spinning purposes. During calendar year 1971, imports of card clothing from the United Kingdom were valued at approximately $270,000. Neopentyl glycol is a chemical used primarily in the manufacture of polyester resins which are in turn used as inert finishes for plastic products. During calendar year 1971, imports of neopentyl glycol from Japan were valued at approximately $250,000. During calendar year 1971, imports of collapsible baby strollers from Japan were valued at approximately $100,000, and imports of manual hoists from Luxembourg were valued at approximately $470,000. 000 The Deportment 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04·2041 March 14, 1972 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE TREASURY'S WEEKLY BILL OFFERING TIle Treasury Department, by this public notice, invites tenders for two series of Treasury bills to the aggregate amount of $4,200,000,000, or thereabouts, for cash and in exchange for Treasury bills maturing March 23, 1972, in the amount of $3,909,510,000, as follows: 91-day bills (to maturity date) to be issued March 23, 1972, in the amount of $2,400,000,000, or thereabouts, representing an additional amount of bills dated December 23, 1971, and to mature June 22, 1972, (CUSIP No. 912793 NG7), originally issued in the amount of $1,601,755,000 (an additional $204,310,000 was issued on March 6, 1972), the additional and original bills to be freely interchangeable 0 182_ day bills, for $ 1,800,000,000, or thereabouts, to be dated March 23, 1972, and to mature September 21, 1972 (CUSIP No. 912793 PD2) 0 The bills of both series will be issued on a discount basis under competitive and noncompetive bidding as hereinafter provided, and at maturity theii face amount will be payable without interest. They will be issued in bearer form only; and in denominations of $10,000, $15,000, $50,000, $100,000, $500,000 and $1,000,000 (maturity value). Tenders will be received at Federal Reserve Banks and Branches up to the closing hour, one-thirty p.m., Eastern Standard time, Monday, March 20, 1972 Tenders will not be received at the Treasury Department, Washington. Each tender must be for a minimum'of $10,000. Tenders over $10,000 must be in mU1tip'les of $5,000. In the case of competitive tenders the price offered must be expressed on the basis of 100, with not more than three decimals, e.g., 99.925. Fractions may not be used. It is urged that tenders be made on the printed forms and forwarded in the special envelopes which will be supplied by Federal Reserve Banks or Branches on application therefor. 0 Banking institutions generally may submit tenders for account of customers provided the names of the customers are set forth in such tenders. Others than banking institutions will not be permitted to - 2 submit tenders except for their Qwn account. Tenders will be recel~ without deposit from incorporated banks and trust companies and fr~ responsible and recognized dealers in investment securities. Tenders from others must be accompanied by payment of 2 percent of the face amount of Treasury bills applied for, unless the tenders are accompanie~ by an express guaranty of payment by an incorporated bank or trust company. Immediately after the closing hour, tenders will be opened at the Federal Reserve Banks and Branches, following which public announcement will be made by the Treasury Department of the amount and price range of accepted bids. Only those submitting competitive tenders will be advised of the acceptance or rejection thereof. The Secretary of the Treasury expressly reserves the right to accept or re;ect any or all tenders, in whole or in part, and his action in any such respect shall be final. Subject to these reservations, noncompetitive tenders for each issue for $200,000 or less without stated price from anyone bidder will be accepted in full at the average price' (in three decimals) of accepted competitive bids for the respective issues. Settlement for accepted tenders in accordance with the bids must be made or completed at the Federal Reserve Bank on March 23, 1972, in cash or other immediately available funds or in a like face amount o~ Treasury bills maturing March 23, 1972 Cash and exchange tender~ will receive equal treatment. Cash adjustments will be made for differences between the par value of maturing bills accepted in exchange and the issue price of the new bills. 0 Under Sections 454 (b) and 1221 (5) of the Internal Revenue C~e of 1954 the amount of discount at which bills issued hereunder are sold is considered to .accrue when the bills are sold, redeemed or otherwise disposed of, and the hills are excluded from consideration as capital assets. Accordingly, the O\>Hle ,~, Treasury bills (other than life insurance companies) issued hereunder must include in his income tax return, as ordinary gai~ o~ loss, the difference between the price paU for the bills, whether on original issue or on subsequent purchase, and the amount actually received either upon sale or redemption at maturity during the taxable year for which the return is made. y Treasury Department Circular No. 418 (current revision) and this notice, prescribe the terms of the Treasury bills and govern the . conditions of their issue. Copies of the circular may be obtained from any Federal Reserve Bank or Branch. 000 The Deportment 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04·2041 FOR RELEASE AT 7:30 P.M. WEDNESDAY, MARCH 15, 1972 REMARKS BY THE HONORABLE JOHN B. CONNALLY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY BEFORE THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS HAROLD PRATT HOUSE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK WEDNESDAY, MARCH 15, 1972, AT 7:00 P.M. On this date, seven months ago, the President of the United States initiated what has come to be known as the New Economic Policy. The goals of that policy were three: First, to curb the insidious inflation imperiling our domestic stability and well-being; Second, to stimulate responsibly the healthy growth of our domestic economic activity and to provide the necessary jobs for American workmen; and, Third, to strengthen our Nation's position both for more successful competition within and for more constructive influence upon the world's systems of international trade and finance. C-269 - 2 - It was recognized at the time that none of these goals would be mation. or could be -- attained simply by their proclaFulfillment of such objectives, separately or together, is a monumental task. Nonetheless, it can be said that implementation of the President's policy has achieved striking progress in all spheres. In this context, I want to consider with you tonight the progress which has been made -- and the opportunities for still greater progress which have been brought into being -- in just one of these spheres: that is, in regard to the foreign monetary policy and international economic leadership of the United States. When the President acted last August, there was implicit in his decision a recognition that the industrial and trading nations of Europe, North America and the Pacific have come to the end of what might be called "The Postwar World." That world was shaped and faithfully served by agreements, arrangements and attitudes born of another time. At the time of conception, during and just after World War II, it was undeniably the reality that the United States - 3 - stood apart, strong and unscarred, in a world weakened and disfigured by a generation of tension, conflict and devastation. Under conditions then prevailing, men could and did -- reason that the strength of the United States was strength to which others might cling as they undertook the long and demanding labors of restoring their own societies and their own economies. Furthermore, in that time, Americans themselves could and did -- accept as the basis for their own policies that what was good for the world must be, in the end, best for the United States itself. Accordingly, out of that time there came into being a world in which the United States willingly assumed responsibilities others could not bear, willingly bore burdens others did not share, and willingly lived with competitive disadvantages so that others could build their strength. Over the span of a quarter of a century, those arrangements remained unchanging even as the world itself greatly changed. The realities, reason and rationales of the 1940's eroded, yet the underlying structure of world trade and - 4 finance stood still. By the end of the decade of the '60 ' s, it was supported not by a solid foundation but only by a base of custom, convenience, and occasional contrivance. Thus it was, in the months immediately preceding the President's announcement last year, that developments in the world payments system forced upon us all acknowledgement of the unreality of the arrangements by which we were still attempting to abide. As you recall, one year ago, at the end of the first quarter of 1971, it became apparent that the United States and its principal trading partners were moving toward crisis in the payments system. Over the full year of 1970, our official reserve transactions balance had run to a record deficit of about $10 billion. If temporary, that could have been absorbed. In just the first three months of 1971, however, the deficit in those transactions equalled and exceeded the half-yearly rate for 1970. The storm warnings were hoisted. The dollar flow pouring overseas in 1971 had become the unwanted orphan of - 5 - its father so eagerly courted by all the world a few years ago. As speculation took hold, defensive measures were put in place. currencies. Germany and the Netherlands floated their Switzerland and Austria revalued. Other European countries employed a variety of measures trying to cope with the all but indigestible inflow of short-term funds. Relief was only brief and fleeting. By mid-year, our trade balance was showing ominously rapid declines, confirming and accelerating the trends of the last part of the 1960's. Projections confronted us with the prospect of the first substantial trade deficits of the century in both 1971 and 1972. We were forced to consider deeply the full implications of the massive deterioration in our trade balance. - 6 Finally, we also faced the intolerable arithmetic of our international reserve position. The ratio of our reserve assets to our liquid liabilities had still been in our favor at the end of the 1950's, but by 1971, we had more than five dollars of liquid liabilities for each one dollar of reserve assets. This was the balance sheet confronting the Nation and the President seven months ago. The fact is that we had expended our surplus and extended our credit until both were exhausted. The post-war world brought some glorious achievements. But the essential underpinnings of that system were gone. By any objective reading, it was entirely obvious that what was not good for the United States certainly was not good for the world. The developments of 1971 -- and the longer-term trends projected from them -- clearly meant that the industrial nations were hurtling toward a time of tension and paralysis. Under such an economic climate, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to carry forward with the - 7 great and urgent works of peace and accord between the blocs of East and West. Under such a climate, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to sustain and nurture the Twentieth Century's thrust toward liberality in trading relations between industrial nations. Furthermore, such a climate could only give impetus on both sides of the Atlantic and on both sides of the Pacific to protectionism, parochialism, and the ultimate folly of economic isolationismo This was a situation demanding initiative and action. Yet it was this very necessity for action which brought home most forcefully the obsolescence and inadequacy of those arrangements, which shaped and served the postwar world. In a situation indicating a need for devaluing the dollar, we could not act freely without other currencies moving with us. - 8 - In a situation obviously requiring that the explosive growth of the economy of Japan be fit into a balanced structure of trade, old arrangements of the postwar world found the United States accepting Japanese exports at a rate five times greater than the countries of the roughly equivalent market of the European Community. In a situation already inviting concern over restrictive t~riffs and quotas, national attitudes emerging -- or re-emerging -- in recent years facilitated the spread of discriminatory preferences by the strongest trading nations in Europe. At a time when the United States has negotiated limits on further growth of imports of textiles and steel into OUr market, already neavily p~n~trated by foreign suppliers, the surplus countries of Europe and Japan have maintained quotas established years ago, virtually to exclude a variety of "sensitive" goods. But there was -- and is -- a still greater problem. When the United States faced the necessity for acting, we were confronted with the fact that tOday's world provides no fully adequate machinery for reconciling all the interests involved. - 9 Closely and critically inter-related as our world is in this last one-third of the century, it remains true that there was not last year -- and there still is not this year -- a forum in which decisive negotiations could be undertaken or lasting results accomplished across the full range of monetary and trade issues involved. Against this background, for the United States to act effectively and with dispatch seven months ago, it was necessary for us to act in a unilateral manner wholly uncharacteristic of either our traditions or our desires. This is not a state of affairs we wish to see prolonged. Yet, in saying this, I must say that this is an area to which we need to give attention at horne, as well. The developments of 1971 -- and, in particular, the events of the past seven months -- demonstrate convincingly that our own system is not properly or realistically structured to cope with the making or the implementation of foreign economic policy. This is a function both of organization and of outlook. It is, also, a function of what we may hope is now - 10 - a passing period in our national experience. With the onset, first, of World War II and, then, of the Cold War tensions, we were thrust suddenly into a position of world leadership for which there were no precedents. By the nature of the challenges which those years presented, our popular attitudes, our political dialogue, and the performance of our National Government were all shaped by the era's priority emphasis upon military strategies and political alignments. Our interest in -- and, to some extent, our basic understanding of -- the economic relationships between nations remained an area of far lesser priorities. - 11 With good hearts, good intentions, and good feeling, we proceeded into the realms of foreign economic policy, confident that the strength of our economic position must be inexhaustible and convinced that, in any event, the making of economic policy was subordinate to the making and maintenance of policy assuring the mutual security of the Western world. In this spirit, we gave little thought to the organization of our Government for purposes of making and implementing foreign economic policy. For both the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch alike, the postwar world was a time of preoccupation with strengthening and streamlining mechanisms designed to respond to armed danger. That such priorities were proper is beyond debate. But the developments of the past year have emphasized what should have impressed itself upon us more strongly years ago: other priorities have risen in our midst. As early as the late 1950's, when our international deficits suddenly grew much larger, the first warning clouds were present -- only to be brushed away. Then, over the - 12 years of the 1960's, we saw the nature of the industrial world had, indeed, changed. The dependency of those nations ravaged by World War II yielded to the industriousness of their peop1e~ and both the European Community and Japan emerged as vigorous competitors -- first reducing their need for the products of U. S. industry and then learning how to sell to us in vo1tuues not dreamed of a decade earlier. While this was occurring,we, in this country, were preoccupied with a decade of ferment, change, and social upheaval. At home, we faced up to problems without parallel in other industrial nations of racial tension, decaying cities, and population growth and mobility. Abroad, we became entangled in a prolonged and divisive war. It is only realism to acknowledge that, in both private and public sectors, these priorities distracted attention from other fundamental needs. We welcomed a domestic boom. and let inflation get out of hand. But we budgeted loosely The erosion in our external economic position was aggravated, and we wishfully - 13 coasted on the illusion that confidence in the dollar could be sustained apart from the underlying economic reality. Now that is clearly changed. In the public sector, we must give to foreign economic policy that same intensive effort and emphasis which, until now, has been principally reserved for foreign military and political policies. The conduct of foreign economic policy today is characterized by traits of ponderousness, division of responsibility, rivalry, and, in some sectors, innocence. Too often, in times past, it has been fragmented and immobilized by concern for other sectors of our foreign policy. New organizations -- and new missions for old organizations -- are clearly required if the Chief Executive is to have the scope of counsel required for decision and the sensitive apparatus required for securing coherent implementation of decisions. Similarly, the private sector is no less concerned. Industry, labor, and Government must realize that their - 14 traditional adversary roles are not always suited to the new realities of the international environment. They, together, have the obligation of finding ways of becoming far more efficient and imaginative competitors in the far more competitive world we now face beyond our borders. What I am saying, essentially, is this. Over the mid-century, we in this country have dwelled upon the growing closeness of the world. In the main, our thoughts about the implications of modern communication, transportation, and other technology have related largely to the impact upon the matter of peace or war. NOW, in this era ahead, those thoughts must relate to the impact, which is both far larger and far more intimate, of this closeness upon our daily economic life. In these times, as much as in all times past, traders are destined to succeed, where soldiers and diplomats could not succeed, at weaving the countries and continents of this planet into one world. I speak as I do of these things because I feel that our concerns with such matters say more than anything else - 15 of the very great distance we have come. One year ago, certainly, such subjects would not have seemed relevant and urgent. Today, the realities are apparent because -- as I said at the beginning -- the President has openly faced the problem, pointed to the new priorities, and successfully launched the process of adjusting to them. In negotiations with Japan, Canada, and the European Community, and in the Smithsonian Agreement reached by the Group of Ten, significant gains have been made toward evolution of the policies and structures which this new era so clearly requires. At the same time, I believe it must be said that this is not a period in which final decisions will be -- or can be -- quickly reached. National positions on complex questions of trade and money well up from the whole of national history, experience, perception, and, very often, prejudice. New imperatives are not readily recognized, new visions are not readily embraced. Having initiated this - 16 present period of re-examination, reconsideration, and reformulation of existing agreements and arrangements, the United States readily acknowledges the need of others -- as well as its own need -- to contemplate' future courses with care and thoughtfulness. At the outset, we anticipated that there would be misunderstanding and even misrepr2sentation of our purposes and objectives. Needless to say, we have not been dis- appointed. In the heat of last August, the new policy was acclaimed by many abroad -- and some at home -- as a return to protectionism or even to isolationism. Similarly, after the Smithsonian Agreement was announced, voices again were raised warning that the United States would not act, as agreed, to increase the price of gold to $38 per ounce. The intemperateness of these misrepresentations already has been answered. removed. The temporary import surcharge has been Agreements have been reached committing the United States and other major trading nations to begin comprehensive negotiations aimed at expanding trade by - 17 reducing both tariff and non-tariff barriers. At the initiative of the Administration, Congress is proceeding promptly on the legislation changing the par value of the dollar. Certainly the commitment of the United States to a liberal trade and payments system is unchanged and unchangeable. Yet it is the very depth of that commitment which requires us today to speak with new frankness -- and to act with new directness in our efforts to move toward arrangements accommodating to today's new realities. There may be Some tempted to seek some profit for their own interests from promoting the instability -- or even the wreckage -- of the international monetary system. The United States regards such parochialism only as folly. Our basic point of departure is the Smithsonian understandings. The new exchange rates provide a realistic framework and a fresh opportunity for our own efforts a framework forged in the crucible of hard bargaining on all sides. At the same time, the Smithsonian Agreement contemplates that negotiations should proceed on the longer-range issues - 18 involved in building a new monetary system. The question of convertibility of the dollar into reserve assets, upon which so much attention has been focussed, is certainly one of those issues. to the others. But it is just one -- inextricably linked That is the context in which it was put at the Smithsonian, and that is the context in which we intend to proceed. More than that, we believe premature commitments could only undermine the stability we seek. I distinguish sharply between premature efforts to restore convertibility and the more technical problem of finding means to facilitate the operations of the International Monetary Fund during this interim period. The Fund has been operating since August 15 without placing special burdens on any member. The future problems seem to me manageable -- not simply by looking to the United States to provide whatever reserve assets may be convenient to others, but by truly cooperative efforts in which others participate in accordance with their strength. - 19 These concerns, of course, are all part of broader and longer-term monetary reform. We have not yet put forward an "American Plan" for the future shape of the international monetary structure. We shall not do so until we have fully wrestled with the complexities of this most complex subject. Nor do we intend to make our decisions until such time as our internal discussions and debates are fully complete and our thinking can be tested against the thinking of others. Reform of the world's trade and payments structure will not be achieved quickly or easily. Behind the facade of technicalities, basic issues of national policy must be faced and basic differences must be reconciled. We need to fit the reform in a longer vision of a world economic and trading order. Does the European Community want to function as a tightly-knit monetary unit, with its members able and willing to renounce independence of action in international monetary affairs? decide. That is a matter for the Europeans to But we cannot escape a close interest in whether - 20 - monetary unity is a potentially liberalizing and stabilizing force in world financial affairs or will be converted into a vehicle for promoting an inward-looking, defensive bloc. There are other questions to face. In future arrangements, how will we overcome philosophical and practical differences between those favoring relatively liberal and unrestricted trade and payments systems and those who regard controls as essential permanent fixtures in any structure? For our part, we want maximum freedom for international flows of investment capital as well as goods. We realize, however, that others seemingly prefer restricted capital and money markets, whether as counterparts to regional trading blocs or otherwise. To what extent can differences in national monetary policies be accommodated? In an interdependent world, linkages between markets cannot be ignored. Yet countries have different economic structures, different problems, and different monetary and interest rate traditions. Other questions could be raised. Not least among them, of course, is the difficult question of the forum - 21 or forums -- best serving the ends of such negotiations. Discussions of changes bearing on the interests of all nations must be broadly representative. They should be linked to the relevant institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund. At the same time, there is a critical point in the size of a group capable of conducting manageable and effective negotiations without becoming merely an academic seminar. The Group of Ten has, in the past, provided a useful forum. That Group, however, is limited to industrial nations and wealthy nations. It provides no link to trade and other aspects of the problem. voices certainly must be heard. Other groups and other The representational pattern of the IMF Executive Board provides one possible approach. In concept, some new grouping could be devised. I have no settled answer to this question of the forum. I do feel we should work to resolve the question promptly and then proceed to more substantive issues. To that end, I have asked Under Secretary Paul Volcker to begin conferring with officials of other countries to explore possible solutions to this and other problems. In the light of his - 22 - discussions, I am prepared to participate in meetings -- formal or informal -- as may be needed to facilitate progress in these matterso During these recent months, I have sometimes heard the accusation that I have become a sort of bully boy on the manicured playing fields of international finance. not expect me to accept that characterization. You will But I will plead guilty to speaking in plain words as directly as I can. I do so because nuanceS and ambiguous phrases can only mislead the American people as to the urgency of the problems we face. Equally, our friends abroad should know of our determination to solve those problems, with good will but with firm resolve. With that determination and resolve, I am convinced that the dollar will again be a currency sought after throughout the world, fully capable of carrying its share of the burdens of international finance. Indeed, I believe there is a truly unique opportunity for all nations to begin - 23 building a durable trade and payments structure based on equity and realism. Without the actions initiated seven months ago, that opportunity would not exist today. We would have had, at best, a much smaller realignment, no meaningful trade negotiations in sight, and, worse still, no adequate realization here or abroad of the tasks that lie ahead. As we continue our efforts in the international forums whatever they may be -- I do emphasize my conviction that we also need to act within our own system, public and private, if we are to grasp our opportunities. The structures of our Government in the area of foreign economic policy needs repair. We need to adhere to the discipline of sound fiscal and monetary policies at home. We have come to the end of the postwar world. We are willing, I am sure, and we must be able to contribute constructively, effectively, and responsibly, to the building of a new world in which money, trade, and investment serve as instruments of gain and progress for all peoples. --00000-- The Department 01 theTRfASURY TelEPHONE W04·2041 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 OR IMMEDIATE RELEASE March 17, 1972 TREASURY'S MONTHLY BILL OFFERING The Treasury Departmen,t, by this public notice, invites tenders for '0 series of Treasury bills to the aggregate amount of $1,700,000,000, , thereabouts, for cash and in exchange for Treasury bills lturing March 31, 1972, in the amount of $1,700,605,000, follows: 275-day bills (to maturity date) to be issued March 31, 1972, l the amount of $500,000,000, or thereabouts, representing an Iditional amount of bills dated December 31, 1971, and to mature cember 31, 1972 (CUSIP No. 912793 NP7) priginally issued in the lount of $1,200,475,000, the additional and original bills to be 'eely interchangeable. 365-day bills, for $1,200,000,000, or thereabouts, to be dated ,rch 31, 1972, and to mature March 31, 1973 :USIP No. 912793 PV2) 0 The bills 'of both series will be issued on a discount basis under lmpetitive and noncompetitive bidding as hereinafter provided, and at lturity their face amount will be payable without interest. They will ~ issued in bearer form only, and in denominations of $10,000, $15,000, iO,OOO, $100,000, $500,000 and $1,000,000 (maturity value). Tenders will be received at Federal Reserve Banks and Branches up o the closing hour, one-thirty p.m., Eastern Standard ime, Friday, March 24, 1972. Tenders will not be received t the Treasury Department, Washington. Each tender must be for a inimum of $16,000. Tenders over $10,000 must be in multiples of 5,000. In the case of competitive tenders the price offered mu~t e expressed on the basis of 100, with not more than thcee decimals, .g. 99.925. Fractions may not be used. (Notwithstanding the fact hat the one-year bills will run for 365 days, the discount'rate will e computed on a bank discount basis of 360 days, as is currently the ractice on all issues of Treasury bills.) It is urged that tenders be ade on the printed forms and forwarded in the special envelopes which ill be supplied by Federal Reserve Banks or Branches on application 1erefor. - 2 Banking institutions generally may submit tenders for account of customers provided the names of the customers are set forth in such tenders. Others than banking institutions will not be permitted to submit tenders except for their own account. Tenders will be received without deposit from incorporated banks and trust companies and from responsible and recognized dealers in invesbment securities. Tenders from others must be accompanied by payment of 2 percent of the face amount of Treasury bills applied for, unless the tenders are accompanied by an express guaranty of payment by an incorporated bank or trust company. Immediately after the closing hour, tenders will be opened at the Federal Reserve Banks and Branches, following which public announcement will be made by the Treasury Department of the amount and price range of accepted bids. Only those submitting competitive tenders will be advised of the acceptance or re,iection thereof. The Secretary of the Treasury expressly reserves the right to accept or reject any or all tenders, in whole or in part, and his action in any such respect shall be final. Subject to these reservations, noncompetitive tenders for each issue for $200,000 or less without stated price from anyone bidder will be accepted in full at the average price (in three decimals) of accepted competitive bids for the respective issues. Settlement for accepted tenders in accordance with the bids must be made or completed at the Federal Reserve Bank on March 31, 1972, in cash or other immediately available funds or in a like face amount of Treasury bills maturing March 31, 1972; provided however, that settlement -for tenders submitted to the Federal Reserve Banks of Philadelphia and Chicago, or tofue Federal Reserve Bank Branches in Baltimore and Pittsburgh, must be completed at those Banks or Branches on April 3, 1911 and must include three days' accrued interest if settlement is made with other than Treasury bills maturing March 3l.Cash and exchange tenders will receive equal treatment. Cash adjustments will be made for differences between the par value of maturing bills accepted in exchange and the issue price offue new bills. Under Sections 454 (b) ?nd 1221 (5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 the amount of discount at which bills issued hereunder are sold is c~nsidered to accrue when the bills are sold, redeemed or otherwise d1sposed of, and the bills are excluded from consideration as capital ~ssets. Accordi?gly, the owner of Treasury bills (other than life 1nsurance compan1es) issued hereunder must include in his income tax return, a~ ordinary gain or loss, the difference between the price paid for the b1lls, whether on original issue or on subsequent pur:chase and the. amount actually received either upon sale or redemption at mat~ritY dur1ng the taxable year for which the return is made. Treasury Department Circular No. 418 (current revision) and this notice, prescribe the terms of the Treasury bills and govern the conditions of their issue. Copies of the circular may be obtained from anv Federal Reserup R~nk nr R~~n~~ The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 FOR RELEASE ON MARCH 20, 1972 MAURICE H. STANS AWARD FOR DISTINGUISHED FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT The first annual Maurice H. Stans Awards for Distinguished Federal Financial Management were today announced jointly by Treasury Secretary John B. Connally, Office of Management and Budget Director George P. Shultz, Civil Service Commission Chairman Robert E. Hampton, and Comptroller General of the United States Elmer B. Staats, Principals of the Joint Financial Management Improvement Program. This award, established earlier this year through a grant from the Stans Foundation, was created by Mr. Stans to give public recognition to Federal employees who, through the practice of effective financial management, have achieved significant economies, efficiencies and improvements in the Federal Government. The award W1nners are: John P. Abbadessa of Rockville, Maryland, Controller, United States Atomic Energy Commission. Mr. Abbadessa holds a Masters Degree from the Wharton School of Finance, University of Pennsylvania,and is a Certified Public Accountant. J. Patrick Dugan of Bethesda, Maryland, Senior Vice President and Treasurer-Controller, Export-Import Bank of the United States. Mr. Dugan is a graduate of the University of Notre Dame, and is a Certified Public Accountant. Each award recognizes personal competence and leadership resulting in notably exceptional accomplishments in the application of effective financial management. The awards, in the form of an engraved bronze placque and lapel pin, will be presented at a luncheon during a Financial Management Conference at the Washington Hilton Hotel on March 20. This Financial Management Conference, sponsored by the Joint Financial Management Improvement Program, is being held to emphasize opportunities for improved financial management in the Federal Government. About 400 top level management officials from approximately 50 Federal agencies will participate in the Conference. The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE EUGENE T. ROSSIDES ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY (ENFORCEMENT, TARIFF AND TRADE AFFAIRS, AND OPERATIONS) before the NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF HISPANIC LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, INC. BROTHERHOOD IN ACTION, INC. 40th STREET AND SEVENTH AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY March 20, 1972 10:30 a.m. PRESIDENT NIXON"S WAR ON DRUG ABUSE I want to discuss with you today Treasury's IRS Narcotics Trafficker Program and its relationship to the president's War on Drug Abuse. President Nixon's initiative of June 1971, in proposing tax investigations of middle and upper echelon narcotics traffickers, is succeeding and is adding to the success of the President's overall war against drug a~use, particularly heroin abuse. I am pleased to report to you that we have achieved the following since the inception of the IRS Narcotics Program in July 1, 1971: 1. 484 targets in 33 states, 42 cities and the District of Columbia,were selected by the Treasury's Target Selection Committee and referred to the Internal Revenue Service. Under the direction of IRS Commissioner Johnnie Walters, 362 Treasury Agents are presently conducting intensive tax investigations of the targets (see attached Table No. I). - 2 2. $13,881,900 in jeopardy assessments and $1,700,000 in regular assessments have been made; and over $3,396,000 in cash and over $440,000, in property have been seized during this period, to be applied toward payment of taxes and penalties due from the targets. 3. 10 Criminal tax cases are pending in Federal District Courts in New York, Miami, Detroit, Baltimore, and Indianapolis, 6 additional cases have been recommended for prosecution, one man has been convicted in St. Louis and imprisoned for five years for violation of the Internal Revenue Code (see attached Table No. II). New York State 99 of the 484 targets are from New York State -- 27 targets in Manhattan, 12 in Brooklyn, 21 in Queens, 17 in the Bronx, five in Nassau County, t'wo in Suffolk County, and four in Westchester County; three targets are in the Albany area and eight in the Buffalo area. Jeopardy assessments in New York State total $492,100 and over $2,500,000 in cash have been seized in New York State (see Table No. III). We are 'working very closely with the local and state law enforcement agencies in New York. Because of the close cooperation established with the Ne'w York City Police Department, we expect additional targets in the coming 'weeks. We believe this represents a substantial achievement. And,we have only just begun. It confirms our prediction to the Appropriations Committees in the Congress that this program 'will make a major additional contribution to the president's offensive against drug abuse." In developing and executing this program we recognize the challenge that is posed, to those of us engaged in law enforcement and to the general community, for 'without both 'we cannot beat the heroin problem. - 3 Many people have asked me what they can do to help. "Am I not really powerless to do anything?" My response is that everyone can help. There must be cooperation in the treatment and rehabilitation areas, but that is not enough. I say that no community in this country will conquer the heroin problem unless and until the people of the community support and cooperate fully with their local and state enforcement agencies. As you are aware more than others, a heroin trafficker could be anyone. He can be a member of any ethnic or racial group. Blacks are bleeding blacks, whites are bleeding whites, and Spanish-speaking people are bleeding Spanish speaking people. I believe that progress has been made in bringing the people in the various communities throughout the nation and their state and local law enforcement agencies into a closer understanding and relationship. Moreover, the attack on heroin can be the mechanism for a full working partnership which will have additional advantages to society. I am particularly pleased to speak before your organization and I want to congratulate you, because I know of the fine work of this organization and of its members to develop a close and cooperative relationship between law enforcement agencies and the community. We at Treasury recognize that t~e over 350,000 men and women in the State and local enforcement agencies stand as the first line of defense internally against drug abuse. There must be a full cooperative effort between the people and their law enforcement agencies. Because of the effort we have been making, I am confidant that we are reducing the supply of heroin. Just recently the Washington Post carried an article noting the decline in heroin quality, availability and the raise in price. Citing comments of members of the Washington Metropolitan Police Department, the article notes: -- the scarcity of heroin in recent months. - 4 "Records of chemical tests of narcotics bought on the street by undercover D.C. vice squad officers show that the purity of heroin averaged 3 percent for the first time last month, the lowest since intensified testing began in 1969." "The heroin market on the street is so tight, ..,. that D.C. vice squad officers went for one 24-hour period • • • this recently 'without making a buy. was the first time that had happened in recent years." "The decline in quality by more than half since 1969 means the effective cost has more than doubled." The article observes that this development occurs "at a time 'when the Internal Revenue Service is investigating persons suspected of being top heroin 'wholesalers for possible income tax evasion." Drug Traffickers "get out of the illegal drug traffic or face up to intensive tax investigations" This IRS Narcotics Trafficker Program has been institutionalized on a nationwide and permanent basis. In each area of the country, cadres of Treasury Agents have been established to concentrate full time on tax investigations of major narcotics figures. The word for the drug traffickers is "get out of the illegal drug traffic or face up to intensive tax investigations." Target Selection At Treasury, the program is under the direction of Martin R. Pollner, Director, Office of Law Enforcement, 'who is also the Chairman of the Target Selection Committee. Members - 5 of the Committee are drawn from the Treasury Department, its Bureau of Customs and Intelligence and Audit Divisions of IRS, and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Potential targets are selected based on information received from various Federal, State, and local enforcement agencies. Once selected, the names are transmitted to the IRS for investigation. Before a suspect is identified as a target, the Committee requires substantial information that the subject is involved in middle and upper echelon narcotics trafficking, smuggling, or financing. Cooperation with State and Local Enforcement Agencies Our program includes close cooperation with State and local enforcement agencies. (1) We have written to the Chiefs of Police in 755 cities having a population in excess of 25,000; and (2) we have established contact with key enforcement officials in major states. We have asked that they furnish us with the names of the middle and upper echelon drug traffickers in their states and cities and with intelligence information on these individuals. Computers Computers will facilitate the year i , year out scrutiny of the finances of each of tile d:t-t, '. t2c ~ii.ckers. By computerizing our information eacb year, we w ~;, r ,;le systematically and quickly to examine each trafficker a~getpd under the program. 600 Targets by the Erd Jf FY 1972 I n 1' t '1d.i.'1 y, our nrojection was 400 targets by June 30, 1972. We have now set a ne June 30, 1972. anc d~:_ffL_'1.) t goal of 600 target3 by In this connection I call on a~l of you present to contact the Chief of the l.::~te lligence L· ',1 Lsion of IRS in your area. You could thus assiEC us bot!:; r::' ~J'lrr'ishi-ng names of major narcotics traffickers and by ci'.~ni:'-d 19 intelligence inforrra tion on those engaged in the illicit traffic. - 6 Background to presidential Tax Program Secretary John B. Connally, in the spring, recommended to the President this nationwide program. president Nixon announced the program of tax investigations of major narcotics traffickers on June 17, 1971, as part of a message on his multi-dimensional approach to combat drug abuse. The program is designed to take the. profit out of the illegal traffic in narcotics and thereby further disrupt the traffic. This is to be accomplished by conducting systematic tax investigations of middle and upper echelon narcotics traffickers, smugglers, and financiers. These are the people who are generally insulated from the daily operations of the drug traffic through intermediaries. Reflecting the high priority given this program by the President, Congress provided financial support for it amounting to $7.5 million in Fiscal 1972 and authorization for 541 additional positions in IRS -- 200 Treasury Intelligence Agents, 200 Treasury Revenue Agents, and 141 support personnel. Treasury has coordinated this tax program with the antismuggling drive of its Bureau of Customs, the drive against narcotics distribution of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and the prosecution efforts of the Tax and Criminal Divisions of the Department of Justice. New procedures and techniques have been established and older ones have been streamlined, in order to reduce the time required for completion of successful financial investigations, and to bring the cases to court more expeditiously. This program is a major enforcement effort but it must be emphasized that it is only one part of this Administration's comprehensive drive against narcotics o - 7 - Milti-Dimensional Program president Nixon started his war on drugs the first month of his Administration when he @stablished the Interdepartrrental Task Force on Narcotics, Marijuana and Dangerous Drugs that led to Operation Intercept in September 1969, and Operation Cooperation in October 1969. He has ~ije~lated that war with a series of action program~, and pregress has been made. First, he elevated the drug problem to the foreign policy level and has taken personal initiatives in soliciting the cooperation of gther governme~t~. The aim of our diplomatic efforts is to have each nation do its share and meet its responsibilities in the worldwide war against drug abu8@. In September 1971, he created a Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control under the Chairmanship of Secretary of State William P. Rogers. On June 30, 1971, Prime Minister Erim of had decreed that after of Turkey, cultivation be legal in Turkey. there was a joint announcement by Turkey and President Nixon that Turkey the one-year delay required by the law of the opium poppy would no longer Progress of a similar kind was made in another part of the world when the Royal Laotian Government enacted a new law outlawing opium production and trafficking in that country. Cooperation has been achieved with the Governments of South Vietnam and Thailand for suppression of illegal traffic in dangerous drugs. Arrangements have been concluded with Canada and Mexico for cooperation and mutual assistance along our land borders, and with Turkey and France to control drug trafficking and smuggling. - 8 - Multilateral action through the United Nations has been stimulated. A United Nations Fund for Drug Control has been established. The United States has already contributed $1 million and pledged $1 million more. The fruits of President Nixon's foreign policy initiative are no'where more evident than in France, 'where the extraordinary seizure on March 2, 1972, by the French Customs of 935 pounds of heroin, the largest such seizure in history, has demonstrated to the 'world once again that the international and national heroin smugglers, wholesalers, traffickers, and dealers can be beaten. We salute the French Customs Service on this seizure and on the subsequent seizure by the French Customs on March 6 of 321 pounds of morphine at the Italian border. We salute as well the French narcotics agents on their seizure on March 16 of 220 pounds of pure heroin and their discovery of a functioning heroin laboratory. We congratulate the French Government for their overall efforts in forcefully moving against the traffic in heroin. We can assume that a substantial portion of the heroin 'was destined for the United States. These seizures give renewed inspiration to all of us involved in combatting this evil. U. S. Ambassador Arthur K. Watson deserves tremendous credit for the close cooperative effort between France and the United States against the drug traffic. Ambassador Watson, since his appointment, has placed this Presidential foreign policy initiative at the top and has worked strenuously on this matter with all levels of the French Government. I have personally visited with Ambassador Watson and can attest to the depth of his concern on this subject and the leadership he has shown. I recall vividly his intense feelings as he described a tour he took in Manhattan and the South Bronx, including a heroin detoxification center. - 9 Second, president Nixon placed particular emphasis on the crucial roles of education, research, and rehabilitation and provided increased funds in these three essential areas. The Special Action Office for Drug Abuse prevention was established on an interim basis in June of 1971 under Dr. Jerome Jaffe to coordinate Federal action in the fields of education, research, and rehabilitation. In 1971, nearly 150 million dollars were devoted to education, research, and rehabilitation. That figure will be doubled in 1972 and increased further in 1973. Third, he recommended differentiation in the criminal penalty structure between heroin and marijuana; and flexible provisions for handling first offenders. Treating marijuana as though it were the same as heroin created serious problems in convincing young people who were conditioned to be skeptical of all established programs that there was any logic or reason in the attack on drug abuse. The minimum mandatory penalties created serious problems for prosecutors and judges dealing with first offenders. The essence of the president's proposal was adopted by the repeal of the minimum mandatory sentence provisions that under many circumstances required prison terms, without probation or parole, for handling even the smallest quantities of marijuana. This permits the courts to make reasonable distinctions between youths with small quantities of marijuana and dealers in heroin. The courts were also granted the important discretion on any drug offense to clean the slate on the first offender by striking from the record mention of the first offense without adjudication of guilt. Model State narcotics legislation, also recommended by the President, has been adopted by 26 states and is being considered in 15 others. Fourth', he stressed total community involvement -- as I have discussed here this morning -- the private sector as well as governmental agencies -- in this anti-drug abuse program. - 10 - Fifth, he provided a substantial increase in budgetary support for Federal law enforcement in this area. In December, 1969, Congress provided $8.75 million for 915 additional men and equipment for the drug anti-smuggling program of the Bureau of Customs. In 1971, Congress authorized for the Customs program an additional 1,000 personnel and major additions to equipment. Comparable increases have been made in funds provided for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. I have already reviewed the $7.5 million appropriation for Treasury's IRS Narcotics Trafficker Program. More recently, on January 28, 1972, the President established the Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement in the Department of Justice, headed by former Commissioner of Customs Myles J. Ambrose. This program will concentrate an assault on the street level heroin pusher. The new office will be working closely with state and local enforcement agencies. As the President stated on January 28, 1972: "As far as law enforcement obligations relating to drug abuse are concerned, the level has increased more than eightfold in our first three years in office--from $20.2 million to $164.4 million. We plan to increase this figure by another $64.6 million next year to the $229 million level." Sixth, he recognized the central role of the states and the need for close Federal-state cooperation in a unified drive against drug abuse. The pioneering efforts of Governor Rockefeller and the enormous resources applied by New York State to the war on drug abuse have been of tremendous assistance to the Federal Government's efforts. - 11 - In my judgment, President Nixon's War against drug abuse is succeeding. He has: 1. Arrested the United States' incredible downward slide into drug abuse; 20 Alerted the international community to the global problem of drug abuse. More has been done by the international community to attack drug abuse in the last three years than in the previous thirty years. In this program, we have seen for the first time the total involvement of the institution of the Presidency in the battle against drug abuse. It is this program that has given me the basis for the cautious optimism I am expressing. In my opinion, we are turning the tide on the supply of heroin. I believe it has reached its peak and has leveled out. Perhaps it has even begun to recede. But certainly I am aware, as each of you is, that we have a long hard battle ahead of us to bring that line back down to the level on the chart from which it started! 000 TABLE I STATE Alaska Arizona California Colorado Connecticut District of Columbia Florida Hawaii Georgia Illinois Indiana Louisiana Maryland Massachusetts .~.1ich igan Minnesota Missouri Nevada New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina Ohio Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia METROPOLITAN AREA Anchorage Ptloenix - Tuscon Los Angeles San Francisco Denver Hartford Washington, D. C. Miami Honolulu Atlanta Chicago Indianapolis New Orleans Baltimore Boston . Detroit St. Paul St. Louis Las Vegas Newark & Suburbs Albuquerque Albany Buffalo New York City & suburbs Greensboro Cleveland Cincinnati Portland Philadelphia Pittsburgh Providence Columbia Nashville Austin-Houston Dallas Salt Lake City Burlington Richmond Seattle Parkersburg' SELECTED TARGETS 1 18 22 26 3 8 13 S4 7 17 28 8 11 3 11 23 1 7 1 28 7 3 8 88 ,.4 2 S 17 6 1 1 2 27 1 1 2 1 7 1 4ff"" Treasury Department Office bf Law Enforcement March 20,1972 TABLE II Jeopardy Assessmentsl/ $13,881,900 Regular Assessments $ 1,700,000 Total Assessments $15,581,900 Tax Year Terminations~/ Dollars Seized $ 3,396,100 Property Seized (Fair Market Value) over $ 440,000 Criminal tax cases in U. S. Courts awaiting trial 10 Cases recommended for prosecution 6 Criminal tax cases completed (5-year prison sentence) 1 l/ Jeopardy assessments are additional assessments of taxes made where a return has been filed, but where circumstances exist under which delay might jeopardize collection of the revenue. 2/ Termination of tax year is a computation of the tax due and assessment made where the time for filing the return has not become due where circumstances exist under which delay might jeopardize collection of the revenue. Treasury Department Office of Law Enforcement March 20, 1972 TABLE III NEW YORK STATE TARGETS New York State New York County Kings·County Queens County Bronx County Nassau County Sufflok County Westchester County 99 27 12 21 17 5 2 4 Albany Area 3 Buffalo Area 8 Jeopardy Assessments l / Tax Year Terminations 2 / Dollars Seized $492,100 $2,507,500 1/ Jeopardy assessments are additional assessments of taxes made where a return has been filed, but where circumstances exist under which delay might jeopardize collection of the revenue. 2/ Termination of tax year is a computation of the tax Que and assessment made where the time for filing the return has not become due where circumstances exist under which delay might jeopardize collection of the revenue. Treasury Department Office of Law Enforcement March 20, 1972 The Department o{ the TREASURY WASHINGTON, O.C. 20220 ~TENTION: TElEPHONE W04·2041 FINANe 1::3..1 E!- ~,~ l, - lR RELEASE G: 30 Tb.e 'ITeasury Depart.ment announced th8.t lhe tender2 fo:c two series of Treasury .lis, one series to be an additional issue of t~e bi}_l.s dated. December 23, 1971 , and le other series to be dated Ma.ret 23, 1.972 v.;hich v;ers cffered on Mareh 14, 1972 ~re opened at the Federal. Reserve Banks today. IE:J"1.ers 'I>lere invited for $ 2,400 000 000 , thereabouts, of 91-day bills and ICl' $ 1,800,00,J,000 0r thereabouts, of 182 ~dayt ,lis. The details of the two series 3xe !is follows: JfGE OF ACCEPTED IMPETITIVE BillS: High Low Average 91 -day Treast..ry bills maturing Jurle 2?, 1§.Z_2_ __ Approx. Equiv. Annual Rate Price 99.819 99.002 99.009 cd -' :3.88l% 30948% 3.920% ~ Excepting 1 tender of $830,0(1); ~I Excepting 19% of the amount of 57% of the amount of 182 -day Treasury 'bills _____ ffi_aturing September 21, 197~ Approx. Equi v . Priee Annual Ra. te 97,831 97.806 97.813 1 'EJ tender c::f $.'3()~·I: .' 91day bills bid for at the ~ow price was 182day bills bid f0r 2.t the 1m" price was ~ccept~~ acc~pte:.1 TAL TENDERS APPLIED FOR AND ACCEPTED BY FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICTS: District Boston New York Philadelphia Cleveland Richmond Atlanta Chicago St. Louis Minneapolis Kansas City Dallas San Francisco TOTALS Applied For $ 22,480,000 2,932,480,000 25,030,000 24,465,000 40 ,8.50 ,ooe 5"1,295,0(C 326,790,000 64,485~I)OO 25,785;000 41,080,000 35,1=)95,000 217,900,00,J Acc e.pted~_ _ $ 12,480,000 1 ,854: 73.c : ';1)0 17, :=<3C , CC C; 24 .4~'= ; 'I':)] '2S;; 350; OJ!) 4:3 ,295 ~rJCC; 185,74'J:OOO 44,765,000 22,165,000 34,67C,000 17,695,000 l "7 ~50 ,,~r\ -,_J... , 'J, , l,"v' ) Applied For $ 33,85(),~00 ? ,3ll,4CO ,ooe, ACCPpt2d "f 2, '250,000 1,556,640,000 2 9 } c: f S , ~ J C\ 4 ,2G.S ~OoO 56 ,SJO ,~O') 29,805,'JOC 3G , 315) (;()8 209,210,000 45,265,000 14,4:50,000 12,355,000 10,680,000 119;(60,000 :W ~ 215,000 13,915,000 12,325,000 8,.'355,01)0 18,41.'3,000 24,375,0(,10 3(1,855,000 ~~Sl ,,24:5 . JC') ( 07 ;'~ 795 L_ O~'('<' ,'\.. V $3,815, 335 ~ CJ'JO t d' ~.J. "'-r,r:> ~-roY'8C~ prl',,,,,,, nJf 99.009 Includes $211,165,000 noncompetiti've :~2nrt21'S c,.cc:e-,J e . .i.l.. L "- o.,~~ 't>C ~~Includes $ 92,295,000 noncompeti tt ve tender s ace er·te(':;' at the aver2cge price of 97. 81S These rates are on a bank disco;l~t basi3. lr,( '3qui'.-s.l::",..r, 2C),Jp0n iesUE: yields are L 01 %for the 91 -day bills, and. 4: Ae% for ':~h ~ -:_,:,:, -6_il.~~ c)'il~ .-::. The Department 01 theTRfASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Ma r c h 21, 19 7 2 TREASURY'S WEEKLY BILL OFFERING The Treasury Department, by this public noti~e, invites tenders for two series of Treasury bills to the aggregate amount of $4,100,000,000, or thereaboutf:, for cash and in exchange for TreaRury bills maturing March 30, 1972, in the amount of $4,107,255,000, as follows: 91 -day bills (to matur:i~!:"y date) to be i.ssued March 30, 1972 Ln the amount of $ 2,300,000,000, or thereabouts, representing an idditional amount of bills dated December 30,1971, and to mature June 29, 1972 (CUSIP No. 912793 NH5),originally issued in :he amount of $1,601,370,000 (an additional $204,310,000 was issued on 1arch_ 6, 1972), ~he additional and original bills to be freely lnterchangeab1e. 182 - day bills, for $ 1,800,000,000, or thereabouts, to be dated furch 30, 1972, and to mature September 28, 1972 CUSIP No. 912793 PEO). The bills of hoth series will be issued on a discount basis under ompetitive and noncompetive bidding as hereinafter provided, and at aturity the~i face amount will be payable without interest. They will e issued in bearer form 00)Y, ~nd in denominations of $10,000, 15,000, $50,000, $lOO~000. $~0G,OOO and $1,000,000 (maturity value). Tenders will be received at Federal Reserve Banks and Branches up o the clOSing hour, one-thirty p.m., Eastern Standard ime, Monday, March 27, 1972. Tenders will not he received t the Treasury Department, Washington. Eac}l tender must be for a inimum·of $10,000. Tenders over $10,000 must 0e in mUltip"ies of 5,000. In the case of competitive tenders the price offered must be <pressed on the basis of 100, with not more than three decimals, .g., 99.925. Fractions may not be used. It is urged that tenders be ide on the printed forms and forwarded in the special e~velupes which III be supplied by Federal Reserve Banks or Branches cn application lerefor. Banking institutions generally may su~rnit tenders for account of Istomers provided the ~ames of the customers are set forth in such ~nders. Others than banking institutions will not be permitted to - 2 submit tenders except for their own account. Tenders will be recei~ without deposit from incorporated banks and trust companies and from responsible and recognized dealers in investment securities. Tenden from others must be accompanied by payment of 2 percent of the face amount of Treasury bills applied for, unless the tenders are accompaniea by an express guaranty of payment by an incorporated bank or trust company. Immediately after the closing hour, tenders will be opened at the Federal Reserve Banks and Branches, following which public announcement will be made by the Treasury Department of the amount and price ran~ of accepted bids. Only those submitting competitive tenders will be advised of the acceptance or rejection thereof. The Secretary of the Treasury expressly reserves the right to accept or reiect any or all tenders, in whole or in part, and his action in any such respect shall be final. Subj ect to these reservations, noncompetitive tenders for each issue for $200,000 or less without stated price from anyone bidder will be accepted in full at the average price (in three decimals) of accepted competitive bids for the respective issues. Settlement for accepted tenders in accordance with the bids must be made or completed at the Federal Reserve Bank on March 30 , 1972 , in cash or other immediately available funds or in a like face amount o! Treasury bills maturing March 30, 1972. Cash and exchange tenders will receive equal treatment. Cash adjustments will be made for differences between the par value of maturing bills accepted in exchange and the issue price of the new bills. Under Sections 454 (b) and 1221 (5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 the amount of discount at which bills issued hereunder are sold is considered to accrue when the bills are sold, redeemed or otherwise disposed of, and the bills are excluded from consideration as capital assets. Accordingly, the owner of Treasury bills (other than life insurance companies) issued hereunder must include in his income tax return, as ordinary gain or loss, the difference between the price paid for the bills, whether on original issue or on subsequent purchase, and the amount actually received either upon sale or redemption at maturity during the taxable year for which the return is made. Treasury Depa:::-tment Circular No. 418 (current revision) and this notice, prescribe the terms of the Treasury bills and govern the , conditions of their issue. Copies of the circular may be obtained from any Federal Reserve Bank or Branch. 000 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE March 21, 1972 TREASURY ANNOUNCES FINANCING PLANS The Treasury Department announced today that it is discontinuing for the time being the additions to the weekly bills which had been initiated on February 17. A total of $1.8 billion of new cash has been raised through these additions. The Department also announced that it is offering for auction on Tuesday, March 28, $1-3/4 billion or thereabouts of a 3-year 5-7/8 percent note maturing on May 15, 1975. Payment for the notes, to be issued on April 3, 1972, may be made through Treasury Tax and Loan Accounts. The sale of the note is expected to meet cash requirements through at least mid-May, when there is a regular quarterly refunding. The reduction in the Treasury's cash requirements from earlier projections primarily reflects larger current revenue collections than previously anticipated. The improvement in the revenues appears related to some overwithholding of personal income taxes following the change in withholding schedules required by the Revenue Act of 1971 and made effective in January. Overwithholding can be eliminated by actions by taxpayers themselves. In particular, taxpayers with only one wage earner in the family or in higher income brackets with larger than normal itemized deductions may find it desirable to adjust the number of their exemptions for withholding purposes, as permitted by law, to bring the amounts withheld into close relation to their ultimate tax liability. The Treasury also noted it is reviewing the possibility of introducing some changes in its financing techniques to identif~ ways its routine debt management operations, including both its refunding and new cash raising operations, might be facilitated. Pending completion of this review, no announcement of changes are anticipated over the next month. The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04·2041 IMMEDIATE RELEASE March 21, 1972 DETAILS OF TREASURY ANNOUNCEMENT OF AUCTION OF $1-3/4 BILLION OF NOTES The $1-3/4 billion, or thereabouts, of 3-year Treasury Notes to be sold at auction .er competitive and noncompetitive bidding will be issued on April 3, 1972. The /8% Treasury Notes of Series F-1975, will be dated April 3, 1972, and will mature 15, 1975. The ~ notes will be issued ~in registered and bearer form in denominations of tp, ~l 000 d> , 000, tplO,OOO, <plOO,OOO and tp1,000,000. Interest will be payable on November 15, 2, and thereafter on May 15 and November 15 until maturity. Tenders for the notes will be received up to 1:30 p.m., Eastern Standard time, sday, March 28, 1972, at any Federal Reserve Bank or Branch and at the Office of Treasurer of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20220; provided, however, that competitive tenders will be considered timely received if they are mailed to any h agency under a postmark no later than Monday, March 27. Each tender must be in the amount of $1,000 or a multiple thereof, and must state price offered, if it is a competitive tender, or the term "noncompetitive lt , if it a noncompetitive tender. The price on competitive tenders must be expressed on the is of 100, with two decimals, e.g., 100.00. Tenders at a price less than 99.26 will be accepted. Fractions may not be used. The notation "TENDER FOR TREASURY NOTES" uld be printed at the bottom of the envelope in which the tender is submitted. Public announcement will be made of the amount and price range of accepted tenders. se submitting tenders will be advised of the acceptance or rejection thereof. The retary of the Treasury expressly reserves the right to accept or reject any or all ders, in whole or in part, and his action in any such respect shall be final. ject to these reservations noncompetitive tenders for $200,000 or less will be epted in full at the average price (in two decimals) of accepted competitive tenders. s price may be 100.00, or more or less than 100.00. Commercial banks, which for this purpose are defined as banks accepting demand osits, may submit tenders for account of customers provided the names of the tomers are set forth in such tenders. Others than commercial banks will not be mitted to submit tenders except for their own account. Tenders will be received without deposit from commercial and other banks for their account, Federally-insured savings and loan associations, States, political subiSions or instrumentalities thereof, public pension and retirement and other public (OVER) -2funds, international organizations in which the United States holds membership, fore~ central banks and foreign States, dealers who make primary markets in Government securities and report daily to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York their positions wi th respect to Government securities and borrowings thereon, Federal Reserve Banks, and Government accounts. Tenders from others must be accompanied by p~ent of 5 percent of the face amount of notes applied for. Payment for accepted tenders must be completed on or before Mond88', April 3, 1972, at the Federal Reserve Bank or Branch or at the Office of the Treasurer of the United States in cash or other funds immediately available to the Treasury by that date. ~ qualified depositary will be permitted to make settlement by credit in its Treas~t~ and loan account for the amount of the notes allotted to it for itself and its custome!'l Where f'ull payment is not completed in funds available by the payment date, the allotmel will be canceled and the deposit with the tender up to 5 percent of the amount of notes allotted will be subject to forfeiture to the United States. Nonbank investors should understand that their checks will constitute payment only if they are f'ully and finally collected by the payment date Mond8¥, April 3, 1972, Checks not so collected will subject the investor' s deposit to forfeiture as set forth in the preceding paragraph. A check payable other than at a Federal Reserve Bank received on the payment date will not constitute immediately available funds on that date. The Treasury will construe as timely payment any check payable to the Federal Reserve Bank or the Treasurer of the United States that is received at such bank or of. fice by Wednesd8¥, March 29,1972, provided the check is drawn on a bank in the Federal Reserve District of the bank or office to which the tender is submitted. Commercial banks are prohibited from making unsecured loans, or loans collateraliZi in whole or in part by the notes bid for, to cover the deposits required to be paid whel tenders are entered, and they will be required to make the usual certification to that effect. other lenders are requested to refrain from making such loans. All bidders are required to agree not to purchase or to sell, or to make ~ agreements with respect to the purchase or sale or other disposition of the notes bid for under this offering at a specific rate or price, until after 1: 30 p.m., Eastern Standard time, Tuesday, March 28, 1972. The Deportment of the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 FOR RELEASE AT 2:00 P.M. CST REMARKS OF THE', HONORABLE PAUL A. VOLCKER UNDER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY FOR MONETARY AFFAIRS AT THE DEDICATION OF THE NEW RTE-ASEA CORPORATION PLANT WAUKESHA, WISCONSIN THURSDAY, MARCH 23, 1972, AT 2:00 P.M. I am delighted to be able to participate in these dedication ceremonies. Two companies -- one Swedish, one American -- joining hands in a new venture seems to me a cause for celebration, not just for Waukesha but for the Nation. The RTE-ASEA Corporation will blend Swedish technology and experience with American manpower and management. It will create jobs in Waukesha, bring capital to the U. S., and, not least, develop markets and profits~r both partners o In all these ways, it is a manifestation of international cooperation, industrial and financial, which can serve and benefit all. We in the U. S. pride ourselves on our industrial leadership, design, and efficiency. Yet, here is - 2 concrete evidence of the wayan infusion of new ideas and new influences from abroad can contribute to our strength and efficiency. Our Government welcomes such cooperation, and I know the Swedish Government does as well. I am particularly happy to see this visible example of the benefits of foreign investment here in Wisconsin. In recent years, we have heard a great deal of comment about foreign investment in the other direction -- from the U. S. to other countries. That is not surprising, for there has been a good deal of it; overseas investments of private U. S. citizens and firms now total more than $100 billion. About three-fourths of that total is in the form of direct investment, where a U. So-based business has a major or controlling voice in management. Some of the comment about this development has not been favorable. There is concern here and abroad about the impact of the flow of capital on our balance of payments. There has been concern at home about possible displacement of jobs. There has been concern abroad - 3 - about new competition, or "foreign" influence in particular industries. But these complaints too often obscure the simple fact that just as in the case of Waukesha today -- the influx of foreign capital, technology and management is usually welcomed, and eagerly sought, by those most directly concerned; and the direct benefits to both parties usually bring broader benefits as well. The U. So Government does, in fact, reluctantly maintain some controls over investment outflows. We have done so for nearly a decade, but we continue to view these restraints only as an expedient during a period when our balance of payments has been weak. President Nixon has made clear our determination to achieve and maintain a payments equilibrium that is not dependent on such controls. Investment as well as trade decisions should be responsive to market forces and business judgments. We are working toward that objective. Much less attention has been paid to the importance of foreign priv8.te investments in the u. S., such as the - 4 facility we are dedicating today. But the fact is those investments are also substantial and growing rapidly. At the end of 1970, they amounted to $45 billion. Indeed, few realize that, in recent years, private long-term investments in the United States by the major countries of Western Europe have actually exceeded our investment~ there. Since 1966, the U. S. actually has been a net importer of long-term private capital from Western Europe in the amount of $4.5 billion. This dramatic growth in foreign investment in the U. S. discredits the outmoded view of a world in which the United States lavishly buys up industry abroad, in industrial as well as developing countries. It is true the bulk of the inward investment has been in U. S. securities rather than direct investment. But, plainly, international investment has become a two-way street, with both sides heavily traveled. Foreign invesement has a long history in the United States. Until World War I, it played a major role in the economic development of the United States, helping to build our railroads and develop our land and industry. Although - 5 - we shifted fifty years ago from a net debtor to a net creditor Nation, we have continued to have an open door. For my part, I would not only keep the door open, but would put out a welcome mat. And I believe that investors from overseas will find that the recent currency realignment makes the United States more competitive and, therefore, a more attractive place to invest. Our long-standing open door approach to the foreign investor has remained unaltered in a period of farreaching change in our external economic relationships. Actions by the President last August 15 -- and the period of intensive negotiation that followed -- signaled the start of a new chapter in world economic historyo In a real sense, the "Post-War Era" of world economics has ended. It has ended not because the policies failed in their basic purposes of encouraging trade, investment and development. Nor have those basic purposes changed. Rather, an era has ended because of fundamental changes in the world economy that demand a reshaping of monetary and and trade institutions, and a reshaping of our policies in this country. - 6 The "Post-War Era" was a time of predominant American leadership, rooted in the financial, competitive, and technological might with which we emerged from World War II. To our credit, we turned that economic power to constructive ends. But, in the process, we permitted our competitive vitality to erode. We under- took burdens that others were not ready or capable of accepting. We often discounted heavily the economic or financial costs incurred in the pursuit of our political and defense policies. For too many years, we watched our balance of payments and trade position weaken, while counting on ingrained confidence in the dollar to see us through. Inevitably, this approach could not be sustained. The international monetary system, dependent on the stability of the dollar, came under heavy strain. As our competitive position weakened, so did the essential public support for liberal and outward-looking trade policies. Our will to maintain our defense and aid commitments was increasingly challengedo - 7 We are now embarked on the difficult process of meeting this challenge with new policies and new attitudes. We sought, and achieved, a basic realignment of currency values. This provides a landing pad for restoring our financial position. But we cannot count on exchange rates to do the whole job. To help restore our balance of payments position and, equally important, to help meet the legitimate complaints of U. S. industry and agriculture, we have urgently asked our major trading partners to reduce barriers to United States products. Already, we can report the successful conclusion of a first round of negotiations with Japan and the European Communities. We are also seeking a more equal sharing of defense burdens. We are reviewing our aid program to make it more responsive to today's requirements. But, in some ways, the process of change has barely begun. In the end, there can be no substitute for action to spur productivity, growth, and price stability at home. To put it plainly if we do not work hard, if we do not work together, if we do not work with pride in - 8 achievement -- there is no way we will be able to meet our responsibilities in a competitive world. The problems we face today are in large measure the inevitable problems of living in an open and interdependent world. There are those who, facing these problems, would choose to turn their backs on these problems, to shelter themselves behind walls. But that is not the way of a strong America or a strong world. An open society is competitive. work. It entails risks and But the benefits are immense, in peace and prosperity. The new enterprise we are dedicating today is tangible evidence of some of those benefits, and I am particuarly pleased to welcome ito 00000 The Deportment 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE March 23, 1972 TREASURY ANNOUNCES CADMIUM FROM JAPAN IS BEING SOLD AT LESS THAN FAIR VALUE The Treasury Department announced today that cadmium from Japan is being, or is likely to be, sold at less than fair value within the meaning of the Antidumping Act, 1921, as amended. Notice of the determination will be published in the Federal Register of March 24, 1972. Cadmium is principally used in the nickel-cadmium alkaline battery and as a pigment in paints. The case wi II now be referred to the Tariff Commission for a determlnation as to whether an American industry is being, or is likely to be, injured. In the event of an affirmative determination, entries of cadmium from Japan wil I be subject to the assessment of dumping duties. A notice of Withholding of Appraisement was published in the Federal Reg Ister of December 24, 1971, wh i ch stated that there was reasonab Ie cau'se to believe or suspect that there were sales at less than fair value. Pur- suant to this notice, interested parties were afforded an opportunity to present oral and written views prior to the final determination in this case. During the period from January 1971 through December 1971, cadmium valued at approximately $1,800,000 was imported from Japan. II II If The Departmento! the TREASURY TELEPHONE W04·2041 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE March 23, 1972 TREASURY DISCONTINUES ANTIDUMPING INVESTIGATION OF SHOEBOARD FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM The Treasury Department announced today a final discontinuance of its antidumping investigation of shoeboard from the United Kingdom. Shoeboard is the hard substance in the toe and heel of shoes. On January 20, 1972, the Department publ ished a tentative discontinuance notice after it was determined that importations of shoeboard from the United Kingdom terminated in October 1970 and p robab 1y wou 1d not be resumed. This notice also invited submissions of written views and/or requests for an opportunity to present views orally. No submissions or requests were received. During the period from January 1970 through October 1970, shoeboard valued at apprDximately $40,000 was imported from the United Kingdom. There have been no importations since October 1970. # # # The Deportment 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELE'ASE March 23, 1972 TREASURY DISCONTINUES ANTIDUMPING INVESTIGATION OF RAILWAY TRACK MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT FROM AUSTRIA The Treasury Department announced today a final discontinuance of its antidumping investigation of railway track maintenance equipment from Austria. On December 22, 1971, the Deparment published a 6-month "Withholding of Appraisement Notice" in the Federal Register which stated that there were reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that there were sales at less than fair value. This notice also indicated that interested parties could make written submissions or request an opportunity to present their views orally at the Treasury Department. Subsequent information submitted in writing and orally indicated there were sales at less than fair value. However, these sales at less than fair value were determined to be minimal in relation to the total value of sales. Moreover, formal assurances were received from the manufacturer that he would make no future sales at less than fair value. During the period from January 1971 through January 1972, imports of railway track maintenance equipment from Austria were valued at approximately $1.3 million. # # # Removal Notice The item identified below has been removed in accordance with FRASER's policy on handling sensitive information in digitization projects due to copyright protections. Citation Information Document Type: Transcript Number of Pages Removed: 8 Author(s): Title: "Today Show" Interview with John Connally Date: 1972-03-24 Journal: Volume: Page(s): URL: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis https://fraser.stlouisfed.org The Departmento! the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 rENTION: ~ TELEPHONE W04·2041 FINANCIAL EDITOR RELEASE 6: 30 P.M., March 24, 1972 RESULTS OF TREASURY'S MONTHLY BILL OFFERING The Treasury Department announced that the tenders for two series of Treasury lis, one series to be an additional issue of the bills dated December 31, 1971 ,and e other series to be dated March 31, 1972 , which were offered on March 17, 1972 re opened at the Federal Reserve Banks today. Tenders were invited for $500,000,000 thereabouts, of275 -d~ bills and for $1,200,000,000 or thereabouts, of 365 -day Us. The details of the two series are as follows: . NGE OF ACCEPTED MPETITIVE BIDS: High Low Average 275-d~ Treasury bills maturing December 31, 1972 Approx. Equi v . :. Price Annual Rate 96.566 !I 96.532 4.495i 4.540i 96.554 4.511i!l 365-day Treasury bills maturing March 31, 1973 Approx. Equiv. Annual Rate Price 4.620% 95 .316 EJ 4.700% 95.235 95.274 4.661% Y EJ !I Excepting 1 tender of $375,00C; Excepting 2 tenders totaling $745,000 64% of the amount of 275-day bills bid for at the low price was accepted 15~ of the amount of 365-d~ bills bid for at the low price was accepted TAL TENDERS APPLIED FOR AND ACCEPTED BY FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICTS: District Boston New York Philadelphia Cleveland Richmond Atlanta Chicago St. Louis Minneapolis Kansas City Dallas San Francisco TOTALS AcceEted AEElied For 320,000 $ 10,320,000 $ 394,250,000 1,165 ,350 ,000 260,000 260 ,000 1,010,000 7,010,000 300,000 300,000 1,llO,000 1,110,000 88,165 ,000 177 ,165 ,000 1,740,000 10,740,000 570,000 570,000 1,475,000 11,475,000 800,000 23,100,000 10,305,000 126,600,000 $1,534,000,000 $ 500,305,000 El AEl21ied For $ 10,360,000 1,913,245,000 11,920,000 20,715,000 1,375,000 1,940,000 136,185,000 14,7 45,000 500,000 21,000,000 24,020,000 164,270,000 AcceEtecl $ 360,000 962,725}OOO 1,920,000 20,715,000 1,375,000 1,940,000 87,185,000 7,745,000 500,000 4,150,000 6,020,000 106,020 ,000 $2,320,275,000 $1,200,655,000 9J Includes $ 13,095,000 noncompetitive tenders accepted at the average price of 96.554 Includes $ 24,400,000 noncompetitive tenders accepted at the average price of 95.274 These rates are on a bank discount basis. The equivalent coupon issue yields are 4.70 %for the 275 -day bills, and 4. 90i for the365 -day bills. The Departmento! the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE March 27, 1972 TREASURY DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCES COUNTERVAILING DUTY ORDER ON TOMATO PRODUCTS FROM GREECE The Treasury Department announced today the issuance of a countervailing duty order against tomato products from Greece. Tomato products affected include tomato paste, peeled tomatoes,and tomato juice. A countervailing duty action arises under section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1303). Under this section, the Secretary of the Treasury is required to assess a duty equal to a bounty or grant which is paid or bestowed in the exporting country within the meaning of section 303. The order will be published in the Federal Register of March 28, 1972. Countervailing duties will be assessed 30 days after publication in the Customs Bulletin of April 12, 1972. The duties will thus become effective on May 13, 1972. Subsidies on tomato paste vary from about $25 - $67 per metric ton, or 8 - 17 percent F.O.B. value, depending on the concentration and packing. Subsidies on peeled tomatoes and tomato juice are approximately $11 per metric ton, or 3 percent F.O.B. value. During 1971 imports of tomato paste from Greece were valued at slightly more than $275,000. During the same period, imports of peeled tomatoes were slightly more than $77,000. The quantity of tomato juice imports was negligible. 000 The Deportment 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04·2041 TENTION: FINANCIAL EDITOR March 27, 1972 R RELEASE 6: 30 P.M. RESULTS OF TREASURY'S WEEKLY BILL OFFERING The Treasury Department announced that the tenders for two series of Treasury lis, one series to be an additional issue of the bills dated December 30, 1971 , and March 30, 1972 ,which were offered on March 21, 1972, e other series to be dated re opened at the Federal Reserve Banks today. Tenders were invited for $2,300,000,000, thereabouts, of 91-day bills and for $1,800,000,000, or thereabouts, of 182-day lis. The details of the two series are as follows: NGE OF ACCEPTED MPETITIVE BIDS: High Low Average 91-day Treasury bills maturing June 29, 1972 Approx. Equiv. Price Annual Rate 99.035 99.022 99.027 3.818% 3.869% 3.849% 182-day Treasury bills maturing September 28, 1972 Approx. Equi v . Price Annual Rate 97.807 97.797 97.799 4.338% 4.358% 4.354% Y 54% of the amount of 91-day bills bid for at the low price was accepted 52% of the amount of 182-day bills .bid for at the low price was accepted l'AL TENDERS APPLIED FOR AND ACCEPTED BY FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICTS: District Boston ~ew York Philadelphia aeveland Uchmond \tlanta ~icago n. Louis Hnneapolis (ansas City )allas lan Francisco TOTALS AEElied For $ 26,380,000 3,063,785,000 36,265,000 25,090,000 18,790,000 38,365,000 285,455,000 59,600,000 51,175,000 37,660,000 34,395,000 299,455,000 AcceEted $ 13,350,000 1,824,590,000 21,035,000 23,690,000 13,790,000 17,440,000 135,855,000 40,940,000 15,335,000 21,770,000 11,845,000 160,770,000 AEElied For $ 30,910,000 3,628,510,000 18,975,000 88,080,000 23,690,000 30 ,635,000 262,965,000 38,235,000 29,400,000 19,985,000 28,305,000 243,115,000 AcceEted 910,000 $ 1,572,790,000 8,975,000 9,220,000 12,690,000 6,560,000 18,820,000 12,735,000 3,000,000 9,605,000 5,605,000 143,970,000 $3,976,415,000 $2,300,410,000 ~ $4,442,805,000 $1,804,880,000 EI Includes $204,725,000 noncompetitive tenders accepted at the average price of 99.027 Includes $ 85,245,000 noncompetitive tenders accepted at the average price of 97.799 These rates are on a bank discount basis. The equivalent coupon issue yields are ).94 %for the 91-day bills, and 4. 51i for the 182 -day bills. The Departmento! the TREASURY TELEPHONE W04·2041 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 FOR LMMEDIATE RELEASE March 28, 1972 TREASURY'S WEEKLY BILL OFFERING The Treasury Department, by this public notice, invites tenders for two series of Treasury bills to the aggregate amount of $4,100,000,000, or thereabouts, for cash and in exchange for Treas.ury in the amount of $4,105,475,000, bills maturing April 6, 1972, as follows: 91-day bills (to maturity date) to be issued April 6, 1972, in the amount of $2,300,000,000, or thereabouts, representing an additional amount of bills dated January 6, 1972, and to mature July 6, 1972, (CUSIP No. 912793 NT9), originally issued in the amount of $1,601,305,000 (an additional $204,310,000 was issued on March 6, 1972), the additional and original bills to be freely interchangeable 182- day bills, for $ 1,800,000,000, or thereabouts, to be dated April 6, 1972, and to mature October 5, 1972 (CUSIP No. 912793 PF7)o The bills of both series will be issued on a discount basis under competitive and noncompetive bidding as hereinafter provided, and at maturity their face amount will be payable without interest. They will be issued in bearer form only, and in denominations of $10,000, $15,000, $50,000, $100,000, $500,000 and $1,000,000 (maturity value). Tenders will be received at Federal Reserve Banks and Branches up to the closing hour, one-thirty p.m., Eastern Standard time, Monday, April 3, 1972. Tenders will not be received at the Treasury Department, Washington. Each tender must ~e for a minimum'of $10,000. Tenders over $10,000 must be in mU1tip'tes of $5,000. In the case of competitive tenders the price offered must be expressed on the basis of 100, with not more than three decimals, e.g., 99.925. Fractions may not be used. It is urged that tenders be made on the printed forms and forwarded in the special envelopes which will be supplied by Federal Reserve Banks or Branches on application therefor. Banking institutions generally may submit tenders for account of Customers provided the names of the customers are set forth in such tenders. Others than banking institutions will not be permitted to 0 - 2 submit tenders except for their Qwn account. Tenders will be recei~ without deposit from incorporated banks and trust companies and from responsible and recognized dealers in investment securities. Tenders from others must be accompanied by payment of 2 percent of the face amount of Treasury bills applied for, unless the tenders are accompanied by an express guaranty of payment by an incorporated bank or trust company. Immediately after the closing hour, tenders will be opened at the Federal Reserve Banks and Branches, following which public announcement will be made by the Treasury Department of the amount and price range of accepted bids. Only those submitting competitive tenders will be advised of the acceptance or rejection thereof. The Secretary of the Treasury expressly reserves the right to accept or reject any or all tenders, in whole or in part, and his action in any such respect shall be final. Subject to these reservations, noncompetitive tenders for each issue for $200,000 or less without stated price from anyone bidder will be accepted in full at the average price (in three decimals) of accepted competitive bids for the respective issues. Settlement for accepted tenders in accordance with the bids must be made or completed at the Federal Reserve Bank on April 6, 1972, in cash or other immediately available funds or in a like face amount of Treasury bills maturing April 6, 19720 Cash and exchange tenders will receive equal treatment. Cash adjustments will be made for differences between the par value of maturing bills accepted in exchange and the issue price of the new bills. Under Sections 454 (b) and 1221 (5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 the amount of discount at which bills issued hereunder are sold is considered to accrue when the bills are sold, redeemed or otherwise disposed of, and the bills are excluded from consideration as capital assets. Accordingly, the owner of Treasury bills (other than life insurance companies) issued hereunder must include in his income tax return, as ordinary gain or loss, the difference between the price paid for the bills, whether on original issue or on subsequent purchase, and the amount actually received either upon sale or redemption at maturity during the taxable year for which the return is made. Treasury Department Circular No. 418 (current revision) and this notice, prescribe the terms of the Treasury bills and govern the conditions of their issue. Copies of the circular may be obtained from any Federal Reserve Bank or Branch. 000 The Deportment 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04·2041 AmNTION: FINANCIAL EDITOR ~,arch 28, 1972 The Treasury announced that it has accepted $1.75 billion of the $5.8 billion of tenders received for its new 5-7/8% 3-year notes auctioned today. The range of accepted bids was as follows: Price Approximate Yield High 100.5o~1I 5.69'/0 Low 100.20 5.80% Average 100.26 5.78% 1/Except one tender of $2,800,000 Accepted tenc1_ers j_llclud.e 88% of the amount bid at the low price, 8.nd. $0.5 billion of noncompetitive tenders accepted at the average pr.ice. 1 1 " THE DEPARTHENT OF TIlE TREASURY 2 .) REMARKS OF .4 HONORABLE JOHN B. CONNALLY, 5 SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 6 BEFORE THE 7 MIDDLESEX CLUB OF BOSTON 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 March 24, 1972 Boston, Massachusetts 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 [This trJ.nscript Has prcparcd frcm a t~rc rccordlnq.] 2 II .' 1 2 0 REPRESENTATIVE HECKLER: Thank you very much, Pill Lowe. Mr. Secretary, Governor and Mrs. Sargent, Senator 4 and Mrs. Brooke, my distinguished colleague Hastings Keith 5 and Mrs. Keith, Charlite Morrin, the incomparable, 6 distinguished 7 membe~~s of the Middlesex Club, and friends. NOW, it is time for the drawing and the door prize 8 tonight is someone special. 9 Spiro Agnew, or even Jack Anderson. It is not Martha Mitchell or 10 [Laughter.] 11 In fact, it is a man who is truly national, a man 12 for the Nation. 13 he bridges administrations, and he does so very well. 14 He bridges geography, he bridges politics, One is only to sit on the House Banking and Currency 15 Committee, as I have, and listen and watch John Connally in 16 action, testifying on Phase II or the international monetary 17 situation to be impressed very, vt!ry quickly. 18 Of course, he does have the added advantage of 19 having the Chairman of the committee, a native of Texas, who 20 realizes that John Connally, as a former governor, elected 21 three times, has reached a new pi1n ac le in American politics. 22 He is not addressed as governor but in the treatment that he 23 receives from the Chairman, he is truly a king. 24 25 Well, this all orders well for the fortunes of tIle President's program, and it benefits the adlninistr~tion, 3 1 although I am not sure that was what the Chairman had in mind 2 when he gave the Secretary such unusual welcome and such an o unusual entrance and introduction to the activities of the 4 Banking and Currency Committee. 5 This Secretary has fared well before that committeE. 6 His predecessor suffered greatly. The poor man had his very 7 integrity impugned constantly and dedicated Honnan though he 8 was, his integrity was always the subject of great question 9 by the Chairman. 10 But our present Secretary-has none of the liabilities 11 of his predecessor and the considerable asset of not only being 12 a Texan but really in fact having a true command of the subject 13 a presence and a persuasiveness that if you disagree with him, 14 makes you struggle to hold on to your own viewpoint, and if 15 you agree makes you unusually glad that you do. 16 He carne to Washington with very impressive creden- 17 tials. 18 Secretary Connally, it was all but overlooked that the new 19 Secretary brought with him a very rich background in business, 20 legal, corporate, agricultural affairs, as well as in public 21 service as Secretary of the Navy and Governor of Texas, and as 22 one who served with a distinguished war record. 23 When President Nixon shocks almost everyone by naming I am inclined to feel that Secretary Connally has 24 rather than over-analyzed for the wrong reasons. Everyone 25 so concerned \'lith his form they denlt really Zlnalyze the 15 4 1 substance of his programs or his postures. 2 pundits have a fair day and full play whenever the Secretary appears. The I.Jotornac For a while they spent all of their time in a frenzy 4 trying to ascribe modus for his basic appointment, both to 5 the President and to Mr. Connally, to read into the situation 6 all kinds of convollted political maneuvering and machinations. 7 And, frankly, I have to confess for my part, I was reading in 8 something of the same skepticism, bewilderment and a little 9 hostility that I read 10 Party and indeed in the press. 11 a~out and felt among the Republican Let me lay bare my soul and confess my mistakes in 12 public. Obviously this is a man who has served well with 13 great distinction. 14 a friend and, in fact, I am deeply impressed with his capacity, 15 his understanding, his dynamism, his po\vers of persuasion. 16 Peoplfr ask the question: why is John Connally in From a position of hostility I have become 17 government today, and I think they very rarely ascribe the real 18 answer. 19 in the public sector, very often there is no other real 20 challenge that is adequate to us. 21 accused of poli tical naivety, aftnr having served on the 22 Massachusetts Governor's Council, or indeed in the Congress 23 itself. 24 why John Connally is in government. 25 For those of this enorm~lS dimension who have served I don't think I can be But it seems to me that there is an overriding reason Whether one agrees or disagrees, one has to ~uitc II 1 casily and fairly discern his O\'1n priority with the national " 2 I interest~ ! I think he is a man who is genuinely motivated ,) and disposed to serving his country and to serving each one of 4 us as Americans. 5 it first tonight, and the country and we are the ,beneficiaries., 6 He has put his country first, he is putting Ladies and gentlemen, it is my great honor and 7 privilege to present to you the Secretary of the Treasury of 8 the united States, John B. Connally. 9 [Applause. ] 10 SECRETARY CONNALLY: 11 12 seated. Than~you very much. Please be Thank you very much. Congresswoman Heckler, Governor and Mrs. Sargent, 13 Senator and Mrs. Brooke, President Lowe, Senator 14 Congressman and Mrs. Hastings Keith, other distinguished head 15 table guests, Miss Hagforth, ladies and gentlemen. 16 ~1cKinsey, I must-confess to being somewhat overpowered by the 17 most gracious, fulsome introduction which I have just received 18 from your distinguished Congresswoman, Mrs. Heckler. 19 It reminds me of a story that happened really before 20 my active days in politics in Texas when another man named 21 Connally was entering the political scene. 22 the 1920's, the late twenties, and Tom Connally was then a 23 young Congressman making his first bid for the united States 24 Senate, running against a man named Joseph Weldon Bailey. 25 This was back in In those days they had no radio or tclcvi[:ion r so all, G 1 of the poli tical spcakings \-Jere in t.he parks. 2 great gatherings und i.t..'(1~; ,!uite an occasion. o have experienced such here in your own home state. 4 And they had I-1dllY of you Connally was relatively unknown in the southern part 5 of the state and he showed up at Corpus Christi on a Saturday 6 night for a great rilly, and there were two old nesters that 7 had been sitting out on the benches under the trees all 8 afternoon with nothing to do but whittle and talk, and they 9 were speculating on the political outcome of various races to 10 be held that. year. 11 Well, it so happened that Corpus Christi had a young 12 mayor named Roy Miller, who was known as "the boy orator. 13 was 27 years old when he became mayor of that city and was 14 indeed a great orator. 15 distinguished career there. 16 1/ He He later went to Washington and had a They knew the young mayor extremely well. He was a 17 very articulate and quite flambuoyant eloquent speaker. Well, 18 as Roy Miller, the mayor, and thiA young Congressman walked up 19 on the platform, one of these gentlemen turned to the other and 20 said, I 21 "~V'ho is that going up on tht~ He said, "I don't know. \1 platform with Roy Hiller?" He said, "I guess Roy is 22 going to introduce him though." 23 thing," he said, "I don it know who he is, bu t he is going to 24 get the darndest introduction a man ever got. 25 [Laughter.] He said, 1/ I \ViII te 11 him one II I 7 " And that is about the ~~y I feel tonight, Peggy. I think I hive just received an introduction that I don't deserve , but I nevertheless appreciate it. [Laughter. ] 5 You know, I am particularly delighted to come to this 6 club. One of the newsmen asked me this afternoon if I was 7 going to use this occasion to announce my switch. 8 [Laughteri applause.] 9 And I assured him that I had a little more sense of 10 history than that. 11 [Laughter.] 12 That I was at least going to relish for some time 13 with the distinction of being the only Democrat in 107 years 14 to address this congregation, and I wasn't about to destroy 15 that record tonight. 16 [Laughter, applause.] 17 You know, when I was appointed, Congresswoman 18 Heckler alluded to the fact that it upset quite a number cf 19 people in the country. 20 few and stunned some. 21 [Laughter.] 22 Pleased none. 23 [Laughter.] 24 Including me, I might add. 25 [Laughter.] It bewildered others. It angered a II 8 I 1 I3u t one man ~. 2 pLil: t icu L:lr ly I thoug 11 t l-Ju t hi s .L iny c: r 011 what was running through the minds of most, in expressing his own bewilderment by a very simple statement of only three 1 words. It is amazing and how lasting three words can be. 5 And he said, and I quote, "Can he add?" 6 [Laughter, applause.] 7 Well, you knov:, after I got there I shortly learned 8 to count in groups of ten. 9 [Laughter. 1 10 I learned, among other things, to pile up bills, as 11 our deficit clearly shows. 12 [Laughter.] 13 I understand that you are confronted with similar 14 mathematical difficulties here in your own state today. 15 [Laughter, applause.] 16 I understand that your Constitution, like ours 1n 17 Texas, prohibits deficit spending. 18 [Laughter.] 19 But the bills are piling up in Boston faster than 20 they are in Washington, so I thougtt I might help do my part 21 to try to help solve your problem, and I want to share the 22 secret of my success with your distinguished Governor, with 23 whom I so deeply sympathesize tonight. 24 [Laughter.] 25 l\nd I \-lant to pre sen t hir:! .J. m~ tnod for II 1 9 I [Laughter, applause.] 2 Charles Horrin just knew that I was gOlng to bring you the keys to the Treasury and indeed I would have, but 4 among friends I never believe in making an empty gesture. 5 [Laughter, applause.] 6 In all seriousness, I want to pay my deepest 7 respects to your distinguished Senator, Senator and Hrs. 8 Brooke, for your presence here this evening, Senator. I am 9 personally pleased and flattered that you would come. I know 10 that there are tremendous demands on your schedule and the 11 other Congressmen who are here. 12 your presence. 13 I am equally grateful for To Margaret Heckler, I must say to all of you in 14 all candor that maybe the fact that Wright Patman is from 15 Texas has a little something to do with the kind of treatment 16 I that I get before that committee, but I don't want those of 17 I you in tte banking fraternity here to think that I have too 18 much inf] uence with him. 19 [Laughter.] 20 Because you will be asking me to do things I know I 21 can't do. Now, he doesn't like you all and --- 22 [Laughter.] 23 So I hope you won't give me an assignment to try to 24 25 I lmprove your image wi th tha t distinguished ChcJ.irman of the Banking and Currency Commit~ec. 10 1 [Laughter. ] 2 But I also must confess to you In public, if confessions are indeed the thing of the evening, Margaret, that I have great respect for Mr. Patman. He has been in the 5 Congress, he is dean of the Texas delegation, he has been 6 there many, many years, and I 7 chairman of every congressional committee, as a matter of 8 fact. am very respectful of every 9 [Laughter. ] 10 But I must say that your distinguished Congresswoman 11 is somewhat of a striking influence on that committee to me, 12 for some reason, and I 13 most penetrating questions, and unfortunately you all have not 14 kept her there long enough yet to where she has seniority to 15 move up that line, and by the time they get down to her 16 you know, they take the questions in order of seniority of 17 people of either side of the aisle, and by the time i 18 her turn I am a bit beaten and bedraggled, and when she stlrts 19 coming at me with those penetrating questions about what will 20 they think on Main Street in Fall River, and I haven't been to 21 Fall River and I don't know. want you to know that she has the 1: com~s 22 [Laughter, applause.] 23 And I find it very difficult to answer her questions. 24 [Laughter.] 25 It is indeed a trcrr.cnc~ous thrill for r:1C to DC hc;:-c 11 1 and to be in such a magnificent gathering of people in such a 2 great and wonderful state that has contributed so much to the o character and the strength and the history and the richness of 4 this Nation and all that it means in terms of personal freedom 5 for people. 6 You know, when I became a member -- or before I 7 became a member of this administration, when the President 8 first talked to me about :"t, whf=n I innocently walked into his 9 office thinking we were going to talk about the Foreign 10 Intelligence Advisory Board, I was rather stunned and shocked, 11 and I said to him, when he finally asked me to take a place in 12 his Cabinet, I said, "Well, Mr.. President, I am deeply 13 honored. 14 think I would be out of place in a Republican Cabinet. 15 just really think I would." 16 I am grateful beyond my ability to express. He said, "No, no, John, you won I t be." He But I I said, HI'Ve 17 are going to do everything possible to make you feel at home. 18 And I want you all to know that 19 that today we have the largest budget deficit and the largest 20 foreign deficit we have ever had. h~ II has been a man of his word, 21 [Laughter, applause.] 22 But, you know, in traveling around the world, it has 23 been a great experience for me and there have been a lot of 24 rich and rewarding days. 25 and Rome and talked to these finarice ministers of other But somehow, as I went to London , 1 12 II nat.lons, and tdC Group of Ten, i t_ o~currccJ. to mc, and. pcrll.Ji):J 2 it was just a sensitivity that I had, that after a meeting or .) two, that the good-byes were always a bit more enthusiastic 4 than the-hellos. 5 [Laughter. ] 6 But I wasn't really too upset about it really until 7 we got to Rome, and then I was disturbed about a little s1gn 8 there, because in that great famous fountain, you know, in 9 which you are supposed to throw three coins. 10 up there that said, "If U.S. citizel1, throw four." It had a sign 11 [Laughter, applause.] 12 It has been a difficult time for me to try to learn 13 all of the difficult problems that the Treasury Department 14 deals with, running all the way from printing of the currency 15 to minting the money, to running Customs and the Internal 16 Revenue Service,-and keeping the public accounts and financing 17 the deficits, and a great many other things. 18 And when I get to feel sorry for· myself I just sit 19 back and pause and think and try to reflect a bit and realize 20 that I.doL't have it really as bad as some of the other 21 fellows down there. 22 State Department who are trying to understand Chinese and 23 Russian I think of those fellows over at the and Henry Kissinger all at the same time. 24 [Laugh ter. ] 2b And I just think that I am more [orl\lnllt(~ :)(~ril,l!1s II 1 13 than most. 2 o But I didn't come here to compete with the Dob Hope of Boston, Mr. Charlie Morrin, tonight 4 [Laughter, applause.] 5 And trying to be clever, because I am really not a 6 very clever fellow, and I never like to fly under false 7 colors. 8 frankly, I have in my heart, that I want to talk to you about. 9 I carne here to say a few things to you that, very I hope it will be somet!1ing that will be of interest to you. 10 I think it sbould be. 11 way that you will find it of interest, and perhaps do it 1n 12 a way that you will think about it for a while. 13 I hope I can -present it in such a Normally, my speeches are at an inverse ratio to the 14 length of the introductions I get, and Margaret tonight gave 15 me quite a lengthy one, so you nOL~ally can expect a short 16 speech, but 107 years is a long time to wait. 17 [Laughter.] 18 And you may be like the old rancher out in Montana 19 that showed up one day in town to do his shopping for the 20 month and a blizzard hit and he was snowed in. 21 couldn't get back to the ranch. 22 it. 23 could move. 24 25 He really r:1here \'las just no \..;ay to do As a matter of fact, the snow drifts were so high no one lIe hadn't been to church in a long time so Sunday morning he just decided, since he w~s 1n to~n, he ~8uld go to 14 He Ha.lr:r;rJ 1 n he ~'7rl c; 1 church. 2 the only one. o had decided ten days before that he was going to prepare a 4 very special sermon for this occasion, and he had done it 5 and had it, he had it down, he had read it and had memorized 6 it. 7 relish and he looked out and here was this lone rancher. 2 rt r l 1- }l'"' n Yl 1" fellow in church, It was a special Sabbath day and the preacher He really had been anticipating this dey with great 8 The preacher said to himself, "Shall I go down and her~ 9 just shake his hand and thank him for being 10 greetings and go on my way, or shall-I just really deliver 11 the sermon?" 12 occasion and I am going to deliver it; I shouldn't be guided 13 by whether or not I have a full house or one person. 14 and exchange lie thought, "Well, I wrote the sermon for this And he gave it. If When he was over, he went down 15 and said, "We 11, Zeke, what did you think of the sermon? II 16 said, "Well, pastor, I will tell you." 17 great. " 18 couldn't help but thinking: 19 weather is bad and you can't move around and the cattle c~n't 20 find grass, I load myoId truck up and I drive out with lo~ded 21 just as full as I can with hay and I drive out in the pasture. 22 "But," he said, "preacher, if there ain't but one old cow 23 that shows up, I don't dump the whole load. He said, "It was good." He said" He "It was But he said, "You know, I On a day like this, when the II 24 I (Laughter, applause.] 25 I But unfortuantely for you, you've got a full house. II 15 II 1 [Lau<]hter. J 2 We live in the most troublesome, tormented times that I think this Nation has ever known. 4 And I would like for you to think with me a bit tonight about some of this torment. 5 We can think back over the years, the past few, we 6 can think about the divisiveness of a war in Vietnam, we can 7 think about what it has produced at home, we can think about 8 riots in the streets and 9 about the rebellion against the parents, against the establish- 10 ment, we can- think about even the President of the united 11 States, who said last year, in addressing the Congress, in 12 his State of the Union Message, that he was proposing a 13 revolution in the structure of government itself. 14 President Nixon used that word "revolution." O~ the college campuses, we can think And 15 We have seen vast changes in the educational world 16 in the United States, and we are still in the throes of this 17 great turmoil. 18 upset the traditional financing 19 American. 20 throughout this Nation that they ~dve to use busing in order 21 to bring about racial equality, a:~ this has brought great 22 torment to the school systems of A~erica. 23 But it hasn't ended just there. We have seen the courts of the united States 0: the public school system of We have seen courts saying to school districts It is not just in 24 the educational institutions, in the grade schools or on the 25 college campusc s . You a:Ce sec ing tolli1 y t.he mas t \0/ iJe :.; I)re.:hl " 16 1 attack against business, against this free enterprise system 2 that has ever been launched in the history of America, no o question about it. You have seen the loss of confidence and the ques- 5 tioning in the minds of those who haven't completely lost 6 confidence in the ability of government, 7 and national levels, to respond to meet the needs of the 8 times in which we live. th~! state, local 9 We see a nation tormented by the costs of the jreat 10 welfare programs, and yet without any real hope that, as they 11 are structured today, that they are going to solve the 12 problem that all of us reach and strive to solve. 13 So this torment and this change is sweeping this 14 country, through our educational system, through our system of 15 free enterprise, through our governmental system. 16 hasn't stopped there. 17 institutions of America, in the Protestant faith, in the 18 Jewish faith, and the Catholic faith, the great changes trat 19 people want to bring, the great changes being wrought. 20 But it It is also rampant in the religious And I think it is time that we also recognize that l.n 21 the field of international trade, international finance ard 22 international relations, that this also is a period of change. 23 And let me try to draw you a brief but vivid picture of where 24 we are in some of these cases, and why we are there. 25 Let's picture for one moment something th~t most of 17 1 us can remember. In the immediate afterma th of vlor Id \Jar I If 2 this Nation stood supreme, it o unscarred and unscathed in terms of its physical complexion 4 within our own borders. 5 nation. 6 military strength, we had the economic vitality, we had the 7 manufacturing and the productive capacity. stoo~ relatively untouched, We were a strong, vibrant, vital We had all of the power in the world, we had the No other country in the world was even in our class. 8 9 We were indeed then a super power in every sense of the word. 10 And we set out then, we set out then_to share the largess, to 11 share the abundance, and this Nation responded as it has 12 always responded, with a sense of care, a feeling of 13 compassion, and a great rr,anifesttation of generosi ty, to share 14 the abundance and the riches of this land with peoples around 15 the world, and we did that. We helped to rebuild and rehabilitate peoples and 16 17 nations. 18 bring about some stabili ty, some ,:irce from sorrow and wars, 19 to try to establish some elements of peace in a world that 20 had been torn, repeatedly torn by great strife in times of 21 war. 22 We exercised the degree of leadership to try to And we were successful to a remarkable degree. We 23 did indeed rebuild nations and we strengthened people. Then 24 we ourselves, acting in the role of leadership, became In- 25 valved in LClas Clnd Cambodia, und J..:.r.cn in Victno.m. r~llcn Jurill') 18 r:~t1_c1r 1 the sixties we bcgan a torment and a turmoil ln this 2 that occupied the minds and the thoughts and the energics of J most of the leaders of this country for an entire decade. 4 And during this decade there came to economic power and 5 economic strength other nations in the world. 6 Japan today is an incredibly strong nation. Germany 7 today, an incredib:ly powerful nation. 8 really in the world· today are the two that lay vanquished and 9 in waste a quarter of a century ago. 10 about, and it is to our credit that-we did. The bvo most powerful We largely brought this 11 But now the very system that permitted us to do 12 that is under question as to whether or not we can indeed 13 continue. 14 have been exhausted and we have extended our credits in the 15 international terms to the breaking point. 16 The reserves that we had twenty-five years ago Japan -now has $17 billion in foreign 2.sset reserves, 17 and we anticipate it will be over $20 billion by the end cf 18 this year. 19 approximately $12.5 billion. 20 And we have liquid liabilities of $60 billion. 21 it. 22 Germany has approximately $16 billion. We have But they don't owe anything. We can't pay So we are faced \vi th the proposi tion of looking at 23 a change, at a change in the structure of our relationship 24 with our trading partners around the world because \,rc longer support it. CLln no 19 1 Now, how does this so drastically affect us? It 2 affects us, among other reasons, because, as President Nixon o has so clearly said, we are not living in a world that the 4 United States so clearly dominates. 5 open the emergence of Russia as a great economic force of 6 225 million people have begun to spread their'influence 7 throughout the reaches of this planet we call earth. We can see with one eye I 8 Mainland China, 800 million people, the oldest 9 civilization on this earth. 10 they be? 11 dedicated, they can be substantially whatever they want to 12 be. 13 understood that, and he went to China for the purpose of 14 opening a dialogue. 15 of contir!uing and enriching and enlarging a dialogue, because 16 he :<nows that out of these two great areas are coming t\vO 17 world powers. Who can tell? What will they do? What will Incredibly-disciplined, incredibly And the President of the United States saw that. 18 lIe And he is going to Moscow for the purpose Western Europe is coalescing as never before, not in 19 modern times, to form a single unit, to become an economic 20 power, in their minds hopefully superior to that represented 21 by the Urited States of America. 22 currency. 23 They seek their oVln common They have now the ir Ovln conunon market. Japan sits, an island by itself and yet 1n a world bv 24 itself. 25 today_ So these are some of the forces with which we deal And it 1S in the realizc:lt:ion of some of these p~cblc;:~s II 7.0 1 that the President did, on August 15, take very sweeplng dras- 2 tic action that had an impact on every phase of the domestic .) economy and the international economic situation and the 4 international monetary situation. 5 time really in the history of this Nation wage and price 6 controls upon this American system. 7 He didn't want to do it. He imposed for the first He doesn't believe in 8 controls. ,9 period of time. 10 forces of supply and demand were no-1onger working,_that forces 11 had been built in this country that denied the free play of 12 those forces, and that we were experiencing a rapid inflation 13 at the same time that we were witnessing an unacceptable degree 14 of unemployment. 15 He doesn't think that they will work over a long But he felt that the forces, the economic So he set about to bring under control this raging 16 inflation, to e£fect an expanded economy, to provide the jobs 17 that American people want. 18 convertibility of the dollar in order that we might have time 19 to breathe and to plan and to reBtructure an international 20 monetary system that had been so one-sided that it fell of 21 its own weight with the emergence of these great powers as 22 peers of this great Nation. 23 At th~ same time he suspended the These were very far-reaching, very drastic actions courag~ous 24 taken by a very President of the united States, 25 because no one could be sure -- 21 1 [Applause.] 2 No one at that moment could be sure precisely what o was going to happen. No such action had been taken under circumstances such as these. But the American people responded 5 as he felt they would respond, in their own interst, in the 6 interest of stability of this Nation. 7 frankly, they sensed the urgency and the need even more than 8 many of their leaders did throughout the country. Now, what has happened? 9 Obviously, it couldn't last They responded because, The freeze lasted for 90 ~~ch 10 days. 11 You can't keep a nation of 200 million people, with the most 12 complex economic system in the world in chains, in a strait- 13 jacket for too long. It would be completely unacceptable. 14 It has never worked. It won't work over a protracted period 15 of time. 16 longer. It had to end. So we entered Phase II, and the President called on 17 the American people for their utmost cooperation, and basically 18 we have t.ad it. 19 four labor leaders walking off the Pay Board. 20 on a 21 occasion in which I have met the press, is the Pay Board going 22 to work. 23 work, it has to work. morn~.ng And I was asked program this morning, and again today at every' My answer uniformally has been yes, it is going to I have been asked why did they leave, 24 25 Yesterday we witnessed the sad spectacle of leave \·;11011 they ~;Llid thdt lhe ,),CtiCl1:.:3 o~ Llw 1)2,/ ..;hy did they I. ~C~HJ \;ere.! 7.2 1 so partisan. I said I can't explain that. 2 answer to that. .) these: I don't know the All I know arc the facts, and the facts are Notwithstanding the charge of favoritism, the facts 5 are these -- out of 54 major decisions of the Pay Board, 36 of 6 those decisions -- not 36 percent -- 36 of those decisions 7 labor was on the majority side. 8 in the Pay Board, only 13 of those decisions found labor in 9 the minority. 10 seems to me the facts are clearly ev_ident that it was favor- 11 itism in their favor. 12 [Applause.) 13 But walk off they did, and that is their privilege. Of those 54 major decisions And if indeed there has been favoritism, it 14 No one should be required to serve where they don't want to 15 serve. 16 reasons, political or 17 the interest of the American people above their own personal 18 or political reasons, but they didn't. I am sorry they did. I r8gret that, whatever their p~rsonal, that they couldn't have put 19 [Applause. ) 20 But let me assure you that the Pay Board will go 21 forward. 22 is going to function, because it has to functi~n. 23 dealing wi th something here tha t we have to control. 24 live with the rate of inflation that we were building In '67, 25 '68, and It is going to function And the Price Commission '69, \\Ihcn we were fuelinq the fires of tIle We are \'le can't vJar in ') ) /_ .J 1 Vietnam with the tremenuous outlays that we were havinq ln 2 this country. o and it was rising and rising very rapidly. 4 work and "it is going to work. 5 And we are prepared to take whatever actions necessary to 6 make it work. 7 we believe in the future of this country, and because we We were running an inflation rate of 7 percent, And it has to Let there be no doubt about it. Not becuase we believe in controls but because I 8 believe in doing whatever is necessary. 9 [Applause.] 10 On_the international economic front, we are going 11 back into negotiations with our friends and allies around the 12 world, and we are going to try to make some changes in our 13 trade arrangements with them. 14 nor tough nor mean nor undiplonatic for the sake of being any 15 of those things. 16 We are not going to be a bully And I have alluded to the fact that I have been 17 called tte "bully boy of the manicured playing fields of 18 internatj onal finance," and I deny the charge. 19 [Laughter.] 20 I 21 don't accept that characterization. I have been, in your jnterest, a bit firm at times. 22 [Laughter, applause.] 23 And I know this, and it 1S just this simple -- ever y -\ 24 body talks about the international finance being a 25 mys tery, th<1 t i t is shrouded ina !11y~3 tieJllc tllLl grc~t t i s inczl p(l L 1c I 1 of comprehension except by the most education in internatjonal 2 finance. o that he was the greatest expert in the world, and he said, 4 have studied at Harvard and I have done graduate work at the 5 London School of Economics, and I have got graduate degrees 6 from the Saur Bon and I am the finest expert: in the world. 7 understand economics so fully and so completely t.hat I 8 explain it in the most simple terms that any layman can 9 understand." And I am about like that economist was who admitted He said, "I explain it this way." 11 I can I 10 "I He said, "I've been rich and I've been poor, and rich is better." 12 [Laughter, applause.] 13 Now, that is the way we a.re a.s a nation, we've been 14 rich and we've been poor. 15 better. 16 or two. We are poor now, and rich is But we are not rich. 17 Now, let me give you an example For twenty-two years we've been running deficits in 18 our balance of payments. 19 had all the reserves. 20 billion, of the $40 billion of gold reserves that existed in 21 the world. 22 together. 23 to a moment ago. 2<1 afford to be morc than generous. 2~ IIi extravag<Jllt. Now, we could afford to do it. We Right after the war we had over S25 We had more than all the rest of the world put We had all the productive capacity, which I alluded We could afford to be generous. We could \'/e could afford to bc He gave it 3.uu.j, arid tha t is f inc. But '.:r.} (lon t I II 1 live that way today. 2 Things have changed. Now, the thing that the rest of the world has to ~ decide, . the first thing,when we go into these international 4 conferences, after twenty-two years of our deficits, which 5 simply means that during that time they ran surpluses', are 6 they now willing for us to ever run a surplus. 7 first 8 change the rules of the game, that's all. 9 below cost. .question that has to be answered. Now we can't do that any more. 10 That is the We have got to We've been selling Now, we have got to 11 buy at a discount. 12 not? 13 they don't, we will have to be prepared to look after our own 14 interests. 15 Now, are they going to let us do it or That is the first quest~on they have to decide. And if And this United States, in the aftermath of World 16 War II, assumed a role of leadership which it neither sought, 17 asked for, wanted, or even in a sense anticipated. 18 were again the lone surviving 19 strength, so we assumed the role of political leadership and 20 the economic leadership and the military leadership of the 21 free world. 22 world, and we provided the economic vitality. 23 the technology. 24 shipped that 25 it is now coming home to us in nat~on But we with any substantial We provided the secu:7i.ty shield for the free We pro~ided technol~gy, We provided the expertise in management. We that management around the world, and terrlls of [1. ni ':';llL2d tJ .cu,~ \..:.; L;; • II 26 1 And it is closing the shoe factories in I1ussachusetts, and it 2 is closing the textile mills in Massachusetts and South o Carolina and elsewhere throughtout this Nation. It has affected us -- it has run every American 5 business out of the radio manufactu~ing products. 6 last week, General Electric announced they \7ill make no more 7 toasters, no more irons, and a few other things, because they 8 can't compete. 9 Just this Now, under these circumstances, what do we do? Last 10 year, against Japan -- let me give you an example or two that 11 will highlight the problems that we have. 12 a balance of payments surplus of $5.9 billion. 13 Kingdom ran a balance of payments surplus of $2.4 billion. 14 NOW, in the case of the United Kingdom, that was the largest 15 balance of payments ever in the history of the 'Jni ted Kinsdom. 16 NOW, that 17 money around. doesn~t las~ Japan year ran The Ur.'i ted snund too much to us, the way we throw $2.4 billion, that doesn't sound like much, 18 [Laughter. ] 19 But let me put it in perspective for you. This year 20 we will increase our gross national product by $100 billion 21 over last year. 22 will be more than the total GNP of the United Kingdom. 23 be equal to the total GNP of France. 24 bigger. 25 last That $100 billion growth in the United S1·.ates It will We are eleven times If \oJe ran a surplus as lar<]e as the united }~inljc1on YO('1(" , \oJe would run u sur!Jlus of $25 billion. )\nd hOh' II 1 27 long vlould our friends permit that? They wouldn't want to do it. 2 o are dealing with. But that is what we That is the problem we are dealing with. And why are we working at it,"because in a sense everything I 5 you touch, when you talk about inflation, when we talk about 6 expanding this econ()my, when we talk about providing jobs, ? and we have provided 1,700,000 new jobs since June of last 8 year, and yet there is still 5.7 percent unemployed. Why? Of all of these people that are unemployed, 9 unemploy~d 10 approximately five million today, let me_again put 11 that in perspective. 12 ployed people in America today have never worked before in 13 their lives, 60 percent of them haven't. 60 percent of the total number of un2ffi- 14 [Applause. ] 15 NOW, 16 [Laughter. ] 17 They are young people, they are not all w~lfare ~hey cases. are women, there are 18 others, entering the labor force ior the first time. 19 is significant that today we have 80,623,000 people gainfully 20 employed at the highest wages ever in the history of the 21 United States. 22 have to be competitive in the world markets, and this is why 23 we are going to continu~ this fight against inflation, this 24 18 But to keep them But it employed, we are going to why we are not going to let or,].J.nized lo.00r or organizcJ II 2d 1 assume that they are gOlng to be bigger than the government of 2 the United States. [Applause.] o . Finally, let me conclude, after too long a speech, 5 that please remember that with all our problems, with all our 6 difficulties, what else can you compare to this Nation? 7 Where else can you compare? 8 We have done more for more people in more ways than any 9 society ever created by man, and today the united States There is no comparison, really. 10 [Applause.] 11 And today the united States still occupies a unlque 12 role of leadership. 13 a security shield for the free world. 14 provide the political and the economic leadership for the free -15 I Today the United States still provides Today we still have to world, and it is a costly role of leadership that we occupy. I 16 But we- can't turn our back on it. 17 by being ahead of the game. 18 ventive. 19 talents of people. 20 exist in Doston University. 21 that 22 Wellesley and Tufts and all the rest. We have done it vle have done it by being in- We have done it by giving free play to the individual exi~t in MIT. \ve have done it through the brains that We have done it through the brains We have done it through the brains of 2 ..)7 [l\pplause. J 24 I I3u t I (lrn sure I d idn I t name thel') all, ;)cca US'~ you ,I 25 II hl1vC CJot so Pl<lny up here, \vc sl.·nu dS r,1<H1V 'j'ex,-I:, ;\"l_\:lH:, lJC-J~; II 29 1 and girls up here as we can, hoping they will get smart and 2 come home, but you keep them all. [Laughter.] o Assume we give up this role of leadership. 5 you think is going to assume it? 6 assure you, there is no one, no one to assume it. 7 United States continues the role of leadership of the free 8 world or we all cast adrift. 9 Who can assume it? Who do Let me The The President of the Cnited States knows that. 10 understands that. 11 air 12 colloquies of Harry Truman. 13 John F. Kennedy, of Massachusetts. 14 rough bark of Lyndon Johnson, of Texas. 15 uniquely skilled to be President af the United States. 16 is a student. 17 in his habits and in his mind. 18 do all things, that he can't see 19 everyone. He is a man who doesn't have the_patrician of Franklin Roosevelt. He doesn't have the homespun He doesn't have the charisma of I He is a scholar. He knows himself. 20 He And he doesn't have the But he is a man He He is a man \vho is disciplined H8 knows that he can't see and ~veryone, that he can't meet He knows his strengths and he 21 knows his weaknesses. 22 standing, he has a deep-seeded perception of what this Nation 23 1S. 24 of this Nation. 2G He has an And above 311 else, he has an under- unquench~ble thirst to expand the opportunities lIe has an undeniable dedication to expanu . . the strength und the influence o f this cic'InOCrclcy Lilllt \·.'t· helve 30 And he has an unquestioned COU.1.:llg~ to take 1 created here. 2 whatever actions are necessary to try to accomplish these .) objectives. . The question that we have today and next week and 4 5 the week after is what kind of a nation do we want. 6 you want to be? 7 do you want the United States to be? 8 inward? 9 10 What do What do you want Massachusetts to be? What Do you want it to turn One of your distinguished Congressmen who I have great affection for, Burke, of Massachusetts, ranking man l I o n Ways and Means, has introduced a bill, the Burke-Hartke 12 bill, with Hartke of Indiana. 13 It might protect a shoe factory or two in Massachusetts and 14 a few other industries throughout the United States. 15 is a protectionist measure that begins to turn this Nation 16 in~lrd 17 far. 18 on itself~ It is a protectionist measure. But it to look on itself, and I think it goes too I don't think we can do that. I think we are a Nation among nations, and I think 19 we have to learn to continue to live, and I think we ought to 20 be a lead8r in expanding and in breaking down the barriers 21 that exift between countries. 22 this role of leadership, that we have to exercise it in a way 23 to try to expand the influence of this democracy. 24 can I t be done unless you want it done. 25 Itl ere not the f u t u:r~ t~ And I think while we exercise () f L~ h .j s co U n t 1 Y - - i But it t lS, ..If I 1, \ V 11 1 judgment, in some doubt, because 2 this country are as committed today as they were almost two- o hundred years ago. 4 understand what commitment and what dedication and what 5 courage is, because it first flowered and bloomed here in 6 this city, in this State, within a stone's throw of where we 7 are tonight. 8 I am not sure the people of And you of all people should know and And if we have lost that sense of history, if we 9 have reached the point where we assume that we can merely 10 reap and enjoy the fruits of a rich-legacy, that we-had very 11 little to do with, if we think that we can enjoy the privileges, 12 the immunities of free people, without contributing something 13 to the preservation of those freedoms and those irrmunities, 14 we couldn't be more wrong. I 15 [Laughter.] 16 If we are a lesser people than those that every 17 school child in America has read &bout, when he read about 18 the old North Church and Faneuil Lall. 19 mitted and less courageous than they, then perhaps this country 20 has more troubles than I think. If we are less com- I don't think ,.,e are le~ s commi tted. 21 22 we are less determined. 23 . have to manifest those qualifies. 24 I stand 25 II through your efforts. I I don't think I think we need to understand that we I think we have to under- tha t wha tever this Na tion wants to be, it has to be 'l.nd it is \\-i th th,1 t I 1c.:n,.70. ~','c arl~ 32 1 going to be whatever we want to be. 2 Thank you very much. o [Applause.] [Whereupon, the above-entitled address was concluded. ] 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 I Ii II The Deportment 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE ~arch 30, 1972 IMPACT OF RECENT INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY REALIGNMENTS ON TREASURY DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATIO~~ OF ANTIDUMPING ACT Eugene T. Rossides, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement, Tariff and Trade Affairs, and Operations, today issued the following statement: Questions have arisen regarding the effect of recent international currency realignments on the Treasury Department's administration of the Antidum~ing Act. That Act requires the Secretary of the Treasury to find dumping when: (a) The Treasury Department has issued a determination of "sales at less than fair value"~ and (b) The Tariff Commission has issued a determination that the "less than fair value" imports have caused, or are likely to cause, injury to a u.S. industry. In the normal situation, a "sale at less than fair value" takes place when the adjusted ex factory price of the merchandise sold by the foreign exporter to a purchaser in the United States is less than the adjusted ex factory price of such or similar merchandise sold by the foreign exporter to a purchaser in its home market. The recent appreciation of foreign currencies in relation to the dollar has effectively increased the adjusted home ~arket ex factory prices of foreiqn merchandise, as expressed in dollars. This raises the possibility that some of these home market prices may now exceed the adjusted ex factory prices of such or similar merchandise sold to the United States. To the extent this is so, this could create margins that could form the basis for a determination that sales at less than fair value have occurred or are occurring. C-271 (OVER) -2- Such margins are avoided to the extent that foreign exporters revise their prices either by raising their prices to the United States or by lowering the home market prices. If on the other hand, a foreign exporter chooses in such a situation to absorb the increased cost associated with an appreciation of its home market currency, vis-a-vis the dollar, in order to maintain the competitive position of its product in the u.s. market, and fails to lower its home market prices correspondingly, margins may well be created which could form the basis for a determination of sales at less than fair value. Such margins, if more than minimal in relation to the volume of sales, would warrant a determination of sales at less than fair value in such cases. In some instances, a foreign exporter, or its u.S. subsidiary, may have no choice but to absorb some or all of the increased costs associated with a currency appreciation. This would occur in a situation in which a fixed-price contract for the sale of merchandise to the United States is entered into prior to the date of any currency appreciation and the merchandise is not imported until after the effective date of the appreciation. Whether or not any apparent dumping marqins would be created in the case of such involuntary absorption and, if so, whether such margins would be considered as warranting a determination of sales at less than fair value can only be determined after the examination and consideration of many factors, including all the circumstances surrounding a qiven contract and the importations made pursuant to it. 000 The Deportment 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE March 29, 1972 The following attended a meeting in the Treasury today with Secretary John Connally to discuss meat prices. Attachment C-273 1 OFFICIALS OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT The Honorable John BG Connally Secretary of Treasury The Honorable Earl Lo Butz Secretary of Agriculture The Honorable Peter Peterson Secretary of Commerce The Honorable Herbert Stein Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers The Honorable Marina Whitman Member, Council of Economic Advisers The Honorable Virginia Knauer Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs Elizabeth Hanford Assistant to Mrso Knauer Mro Edgar Ro Fiedler Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy Mro James McLane Deputy Director, Cost of Living Council Mro Jo Dawson Ahalt, Economist Cost of Living Council Mro William No Walker Deputy Director for Consumer Affairs, Cost of Living Council Mro Richard Lyng Assistant Secretary of Agriculture REPRESENTATIVES OF RETAIL FOOD CHAINS Acme Markets, Inc o Paul Jo Cupp Chairman of the Board Allied Supermarkets Inco Thomas McMaster Chairman of the Board Leonard Levitt Vice President, Wage-Price Controls Ervin Levinson, Vice President, Marketing First National Stores Inc o Lowell Gramer Vice President, Meat Operations Austin Lyne Vice President, Sales Development Grand Union Coo Charles Go Rodman President Ernest Ho Berthold Vice President, Meat Operations Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Coo William JoKane Chairman of the Board Jewel Tea Companies, Inc. John M. Mugar, President, Star Markets (Division of Jewel Kroger Co. Robert O. Aders Chairman of the Board Lucky Stores Wayne H. Fisher, Jr. President Jerry Sgobassi Vice President, Meat Operations National Tea Co. Bruce Krysiak President Safeway Stores William Mitchell President Stop & Shop Companies Inc. Richard Spears Vice President, Supermarkets David Ginsberg Washington Counsel Supermarkets General Frank Tucker Vice President, Perishables James Dougherty General Counsel The Deportment 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04·2041 FOR RELRI\SE FRIDAY A.H.' s lw\CH 31 , lSY{2 lill·V\RKS OF JUDGE 3AHUEL R. PIERCE, JR., GENERAL COUNSEL, ON PROPOSED HEGULATIOliS ON FINANCIAL RECORDKEEPING AND FEPORTING OF CUrffiENCY AIID FOREIGN TRANSACTIOI'm Department of the Treasury ~oday issuE~ regulations -v.~ ir:.plelTcnt Illitlt:= I anel II cf publ:Lc Law 91-503, the Flnar,cia~. Recoru]\:eepinb alld Currency and. ForeiGn Transactions Hep:Jrtinc Act of 1970. 'l'hesc rcgulations \.;ill become effective on July 1, 19~(2. T~c Ac(!ordinG to Treasury General Counsel Samuel R. Pierce, Jr., the issuance of these regulations is a further step in the major efforts of this Administration directed tOvrard frustratinG or8anized and white collar criminal elements who use secret foreign account:..! to asstst in concea1in8 SUbstantive violations of Llrue ~;mueglin[:;, securities, gambling, and currency laws, as well f!S the untaxed income generated from these and other illegal activities. The regulations are expected to benefit both such foreignrElated and domestic law enforcement efforts without burdening lC6itlmatE commerce. The regUlations i{ill: Hequire all persons mair,taining foreign accounts to disclose that fact on their Federal income tax returns, and to maintain adequate records of such accounts; Require all persons transportine, mailing, or shipping from the United States to a foreign country, or receiving from without the United states, currency or bearer instruments in amowlts in excess of $5,000, to report such transactions to the Customs authorities; Require fincUlcial institutions to secure a social security or taxpayer identification number with respect to each account opened after June 30, 1972; C-272 - 2 - Require all financial institutions to make reports to the Treasury of unusual currency transactions involving amounts of more than $10,000; Require financial institutions to keep for five years records of all transfers into or out of the United states involving more than $10,000; Require financial institutions to keep for five years certain other records which will be useful for law enforcement purposes. In addition to the above, the regulations require banks to retain for a period of two years records which would be needed to reconstruct a deposit or share account and to trace a checlt deposited in such account. Treasury will continue to study both the types of records to be kept and the most desirable retention period in order to maximize enforcement benefits and minimize unnecessary and burdensome paperwork. Assistant secretary Eugene T. Rossides will head a small group within the Treasury to work with the financial commwlity in this effort. The new regUlations are a revision of proposed regulations which were published in the Federal Register on June 10, 1971. The rev~s~ons reflect the many pertinent and useful comments received regarding the proposed regUlations. In revising these regUlations the Department has taken account of all comments received, and every effort has been made to insure that the final regulations will serve their law enforcement purposes, while at the same time not interfering with legitimate international monetary transactions, unduly burdening financial institutions or others, or imposing unreasonable requirements that would serve no useful purpose. In doing this we have taken account of existing recordkeeping procedures and the lengths of time existing records are ordinarily kept. An internal committee ,,,ithin the Treasury Department has spent a considerable amount of time revising and reviewine the regUlations in the light of the comments received, to be sure that these objectives are accomplished. Governmental access to these records is not changed by either the statute or the regulations, but will continue to be subject to the requirements of existing law regarding subpoena and other legal processes. Attachment TITLE 31 - MONEY AM> FINAlfCE: TREASURY CHAPrER I - MONETARY OFFlCE3, DEPAR'lMENT OF THE TREASURY On June 10" 1971, a notice of proposed rule making to imple- ment the provisions of Titles I and II of Public Law 91-508 (84 stat. 1114 et seq.)" was published in the Federal Register (36 F.R. 11208 (1971». In accordance with the notice, inter- ested parties were afforded an opportunity to submit written cClDDlents. After consideration of all such relevant matters as were presented by interested parties regarding the rules proposed, the regulations set forth below have been ad ;t t';u.Jilt!!IlLe T. Rossides Assistant Secretary 2 PART 102 - mSTRU~IONS RELATING TO REPORTS OF CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS Part 102 is repealed effective July 1, 1972. PART 103 - FINANCIAL RECORDKEEPING AND REPORTING OF CURRENCY AND FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS Sec. SUBPART A - DEFINITIONS 103.11 Meaning of terms SUBPART B - REPORTS REQUIRED TO BE MADE 103.21 Determination by the Secretary 103.22 Reports of CUrrency Transactions 103.23 Reports of Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments 103.24 Reports of Foreign Financial Accounts 103.25 Filing of Reports 103.26 Identification Required SURPART C - RECORDS REQUIRED TO BE MAINTAINED 103.31 Determination by the Secretary 103.32 Records to be Made and Retained by Persons Having Financial Interests in Foreign Financial Accounts 103.33 Records to be Made and Retained by Financial Institutions 103.34 Additional Records to be Made and Retained by Banks 3 Sec • ....... 103.35 Additional Records to be Made and Retained by Brokers and Dealers in Securities 103.36 Nature of Records and Retention Period 103.37 Person outside the United States SUBPART D - GENERAL PROVISIONS 103.41 Dollars as Including Foreign Currency 103.42 Photographic or other Reproductions of Government Obligations 103.43 Availability of Information 103.44 Disclosure 103.45 Exceptions, Exemptions, Modifications, and Reports 103.46 Enforcement 103.47 Civil Penalty 103.48 Forfeiture of Currency or Monetary Instruments 103.49 Criminal Penalty 103.50 Enforcement Authority with Respect to Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments 103.51 Effective Date AUTHORITY: The prOVisions of this Part 103 issued under sec. 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 84 Stat.1114, 12 U.S.C. 182gb; 84 Stat. 1116, 12 U.S.C. 1951-1959; and the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, 84 Stat. 1118, 31 U.S.C. 1051-1122. SUBPART A - DEFDITIORS §l03.ll 4 Meaning of Terms When used in this part and in forms prescribed \Dlder this part, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof, terms shall have the meanings ascribed in this section. Bank. (a) Each agency, branch or office within the United states of any person doing business in one or more of the capacities listed below. (1) a canmercial bank or trust canpany organized under the laws of any state or of the United states; (2) a private bank; (3) a savings and loan association or a building and loan association organized under the laws of any state or of the United states; (4) an insured institution as defined in section 401 of the National Housing Act; (5) a savings bank, industrial bank or other thrift (6) a credit union organized under the laws of any institution; state or of the United states; and (7) any other organization chartered under the banking laws of any state and subject to the supervision of the bank supervisory authorities of a (b) state. Each agent, agency, branch or office within the United states of a foreign bank. 5 Broker or dealer in securities. A broker or dealer in securities, registered or required to be registered with the securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. CUrrency. The coin and currency of the United States or of any other country, which circulate in and are custanarily used and accepted as money in the country in which issued. It includes united States silver cert1ticates, United States notes and Federal Reserve notes, but does not include bank checks or other negotiable instruments not custanarily accepted as money. Danestic. When used herein, refers to the doing of business within the United states, and limits the applicability of the provision wherein it appears to the performance by such institutions or agencies of t'unctions within the united states. Financial institution. Each agency, branch or office within the United states of any person doing business in one or more of the capacities listed below: (1) a bank; (2) a broker or dealer in securities; (3) a person who engages as a business in dealing in or exchanging currency as, for example, a dealer in foreign exchange or a person engaged primarily in the cashing of checks; (4) a person who engages as a business in the iSSUing, selling or redeeming of travelers' checks, money orders, or similar instruments I except one who does so as a selling agent eccllls1vely or as an incidental part of another business; 6 (5) an operator of a credit card system which issues, or authorizes the issuance of, credit cards that may be used for the acquisition of monetary instruments, goods, or services outs-ide the ua1ted states.' (6) a licensed transmitter of funds, or other person engaged in the business of transmitting funds abroad for others. Foreign bank. A bank organized under foreign law, or an agency, branch or office located outside the United states of a bank. The term does not include an agent, agency, branch or office within the United states of a bank organized under foreign law. Investment security. An instrument which (1) is issued in bearer or registered form; (2) is of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets or canmonly recognized in any area in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for investment; (3) is either one of a class or series or by its terms is divisible into a class or series of instruments; and (4) evidences a share, participation or other interest in property or in an enterprise or evidences an obligation of the issuer. 7 MOIletar;y instruments. Coin or currency ot the United states or of any other COtmtry, travelers' checks, money orders, investment securities in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery, and negotiable instruments (except warehouse receipts or bills of lading) 111 bearer f'orm or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery. The term does not include bank checks made payable to the order of a named person which have not been endorsed or which bear restrictive endorsements. Person. An individual, a corporation, a partnership, a trust or estate, a joint stock company, an association, a syndicate, joint venture, or other tmincorporated organization or group, and all entities cognizable as legal personalities. Secretary. The Secretary of the Treasury or any person duly authorized by the Secretary to perform the f'tmction mentioned. Transaction in currency. A transaction involving the physical transfer of' currency fran one person to another. A transaction which is a transfer of' funds by means ot bank check, bank draft, wire transfer, or other written order, and which does not include the physical transfer of currency is not a transaction in currency within the meaning of this part. United states. The various States, the District of' CollBbia, the Caamonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the territories and possessions of the United States. 8 SUBPART B - REPORTS RmUIRED TO BE MADE §103.21 Determination by the Secretary The Secretary hereby determines that the reports required by this subpart have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings. §103.22 Reports of Cu-~ency Transactions Each financial institution shall file a report of each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency or other payment or transfer, by, through, or to such financial institution, which involves a transaction in currency of more than $10,000. Except as otherwise directed in writing by the Secretary, this section shall not (1) require reports of transactions with Federal Reserve Banks or Federal Home Loan Banks; (2) require reports of transactions solely with, or originated by, financial institutions or foreign banks; or (3) require a bank to report transactions with an established customer maintaining a deposit relationship with the bank, in amolmts which the bank may reasonably conclUde do not exceed amounts camnensurate with the customary conduct of the business, industry or profession of the custClJ'ler concerned. A report listing such custClJ'lers who engage in transactions which are not reported because of the exemption contained in this paragraph shall be made to the Secretary upon deaand therefor made by him. 9 §l03. 23 R~orts (a) of Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments Each person 1;iho physJcally -c!'&::J.spvr··Cs, mails, or ships, or causes to "be pilYGically currency or other monetary trarjSp~jlted., instrume~ts L~ ar~ mai':"ed Ol~ shipped, aggregate amount exceeding $5,000 on anyone occasion from the United states to any place outside the United sta"ces, or into the United states fram any place outside the United states, shall make a report thereof. A person is deemed to have caused such tr~lsportation, mailing or shipping when he aids, abets, cOLl!lsels, commands, procures or requests it to be done by a financial institution or any other person. A transfer of funds through normal banldng pro- cedures which does not involve the physical transportation of currency or monetary instruments is not required to be reported by this section. (b) Each person who receives in the United states cur- rency or other monetary instruments in an aggregate amount exceeding $5,000 on any one occasion which have been transported, mailed, or shipped to such person from any place outside the United states with respect to which a report has not been filed under subsection (a) of this section, whether or not required to be filed thereunder, shall make a report thereof, stating the amount, the date of receipt, the form of monetary instruments, and the person from whcrn received. (c) This section shall not require reports by (1) a federal reserve bank, (2) a bank, a foreign bank, or a broker or 10 dealer in securities,in respect to currency or other monetary instruments mailed or shipped through the postal service or by cammon carrier, (3) a person who is not a citizen or resident of the United states in respect to currency or other monetary instruments mailed or shipped from abroad to a bank or broker or dealer in securities through the postal service or by cammon carrier, (4) a cammon carrier of pas- sengers in respect to currency or other monetary instruments in the possession of its passengers, (5) a common carrier of goods in respect to shipments of currency or monetary instruments not declared to be such by the shipper, (6) a travelers' check issuer or its agent in respect to the transportation of travelers' checks prior to their delivery to selling agents for eventual sale to the public, nor by (7) a person engaged as a business in tpe transportation of currency, monetary instruments and other commercial papers with respect to the transportation of currency or other monetary instruments overland between established offices of banks or brokers or dealers in securities and foreign banks. (d) This section does not require that more than one report be filed covering a particular transportation, mailing or shipping of currency or other monetary instruments with respect to which a complete and truthful report has been filed by a person. However, no person required by subparagraphs (a) or (b) of this section to file a report shall be excused from liability for failure to do so if, in fact, a complete and truthful report has not been filed. 11 §103.24 Reports of Foreign Financial Account~ Each person subject to the jurisdiction of the United states (except a foreign subsidiary of a United. states pt;rson) having a financial interest in, or signature or otl'1er authority over, a bank, securities or other financial account in a foreign country shall report such relationship as required on his federal income tax return for each year in which such relationship exists, and shall provide such information concerni.."1g oo;<ch such account as shall be specified in a special tax fom. to §103.25 '[,e filed by such persons. Filing of Reports (a) Reports required to be filed by the first parB8raph of Section 103.22 shall be filed on or before the forty-fifth day following that on which the reported transactions occur. They shall be filed with the Camnissioner of Internal Revenue on forms to be prescribed by him, with the approval of the secretary. All information called for in such forms shall be furnished. (b) Reports required to be filed by Section 103.23(a) shall be filed at the time of entry into the United States or at the time of departure, mailing or shipping from the United States, unless otherwise directed or permitted by the Commissioner of Customs. They shall be filed with the Customs officer in charge at any Customs port of entry or departure, or as otherwise permitted or directed by the Commissioner of Customs. If the currency or other monetary instruments with respect to which a report is 12 required do not accompany a person entering or departing from the United states, such reports may be filed by mail on or before the date of entry, departure, mailing or shipping, with the Commissioner of Customs, Attention: D. C. 20226. Currency Transportation Reports, Washington, They shall be on forms to be prescribed by the Secretary and all information called for in such forms shall be furnished. (c) Reports required to be filed by Section I03.23(b) shall be filed with the C~missioner of customs within thirty days after receipt of the currency or other monetary instruments. They may be filed with the Customs officer in charge at any port of entry or departure, or by mail addressed to the Commissioner of Customs, Attention: Currency Transportation Reports, Washington, D. C. 20226. They shall be on forms to be prescribed by the Secretary and all information called for in such forms shall be furnished. (d) Forms to be used in making the reports required by Sections 103.22 and 103.23 may be obtained from any Internal Revenue office; in addition, forms to be used in making the reports required by Section 103.23 may be obtained from any office of the Bureau of Customs. §l03.26 Identification Required Before effecting any transaction with respect to which a report is required under the first paragraph of Section 103.22, 13 end Verification of identity for e. customer of th;:: finaXlcial. inEtitlltion depositing or withdrawing fUl1.d.s may\:1e by or other mlIIlber on the books of the ~'eference iEst:'~ :'J.tion " identity in any other Cfise may "be by exsmi-nation, to his account Verification of foT' example, of a driver's license, passport, alien iQentification card, or other appropriate document normally acceptable as cation. R means of identifi- 14 The Sec:t'e~a:r':I ~,('reb;, dctenrlines th,it the records required to nal, tax, r)r i:e;Z'...l1.atory invest.igatio:ns or proceedings. §l03.32 ReC0ris "to be Made and Retained by Persons Having Interests in Foreign Financial Accounts Fin~ncial Records of accounts required by Section 103.24 to be reported on a federal income tax return shall be retained -by each person having a fL~ancial interest in any such account. Such records shall contain the name in which each such account is maintained, the number or other designation of such account, the name and address of the foreign bank or other person with whom such account is maintained, the type of such account, and the maximum value of each such account during the reporting period. Such records shall be retained for a period of five years and shall be kept at all times available f-'or ir,spection as authorized by law. In the computation of the perj.od of five years, there shall be disregarded ffilY period beginning with a date on which the taxpayer is indic ted or infc)nrration instituted or: account of the filing of a false Gr :i:'raucLuley;t :<.:der8.1 jricorr.e tax return or failing to file a feder8.l. ir:cOIrlc tax l'et 'cuT} J a".d ending vi th the date on which final dispos i tim; is jf:aoe of the cri.r:J.inal proceeding. 15 §103.33 Records to be Made and Retained by Financial Institutions Each financial institution shall retain either the original or a microfilm or other copy or reproduction of each of the following: (a) a record of each extension of credit in an amount in excess of $5,000, except an extension of credit secured by an interest in real property, which record shall contain the name and address of the person to whom the extension of credit is made, the amount thereof, the nature or purpose thereof, and the date thereof; (b) a record of each advice, request, or instruction received regarding a transaction which results in the transfer of funds, or of currency, other monetary instruments, checks, investment securities, or credit, of more than $10,000 to a person, account, or place outside the United states; (c) a record of each advice, request, or instruction given to another financial institution or other person located within or without the United states, regarding a transaction intended to result in the transfer of funds, or of currency, other monetary instruments, checks, investment securities, or credit, of more than $10,000 to a person, account or place outside the United states; 16 §103.34 Additional Records to be Made and Retained by Banks (a) With respect to each deposit or share account opened with a bank after June 30, 1972, by a person residing or doing business in the United states or a citizen of the United states, such bank shall secure and maintain a record of the taxpayer identification number of the person maintaining the account; or in the case of an account of one or more individuals, such bank shall secure and maintain a record of the social security number of an individual having a financial interest in that account. (b) Each bank shall, in addition, retain either the original or a microfilm or other copy or reproduction of each of the following: (1) Each document granting signature authority over each deposit or share account; (2) Each statement, ledger card or other record on each deposit or share account, showing each transaction in, or with respect to, that account; (3) Each check, clean draft, or money order drawn on the bank or issued and payable by it, except those drawn on accounts which can be expected to have drawn on them an average 17 of at least 100 checks per month over the calendar year or on each occasion on which such checks are issued, and which are (i) dividend checks, (ii) payroll checks, (iii) employee benefit checks, (iv) insurance claim checks, (v) medical benefit checks, (vi) checks drawn on governmental agency accounts, (vii) checks drawn by brokers or dealers in securities, (viii) checks drawn on fiduciary accounts, (ix) checks drawn on other financial institutions, or (x) pension or annuity checks; (4) Each item other than bank charges or periodic charges made pursuant to agreement with the custaner, canprising a debit to a custaner's deposit or share account, not required to be kept, and not specifically exempted, under subparagraph (b)(3) of this section; (5) Each item, inc luding checks, drafts, or transfers of credit, of more than $10,000 remitted or transferred to a person, account or place outside the united states; (6) A record of each remittance or transfer of funds, or of currency, other monetary instr\Dl1ents, checks, investment securities, or credit, of more than $10,000 to a person, account or place outside the United states; 18 (7) Each check or draft in an amount in excess of $10,000 drawn on or issued by a foreign bank, purchased, received for credit or collection, or otherwise acquired by the bank; (8) Each item, including checks, drafts or transfers of credit, of more than $10,000 received directly and not through a domestic financial institution, by letter, cable or any other means, from a person, account or place outside the United states; (9) A record of each receipt of currency, other monetary instruments, checks, or investment securities, and of each transfer of funds or credit, of more than $10,000 received on anyone occasion directly and not through a domestic financial institution, from a person, account or place outside the united states; and (10) Records prepared or received by a bank in the ordinary course of business, which would be needed to reconstruct a demand deposit account and to trace a check deposited in such account through its domestic processing system or to supply a description of a deposited check. This subsection shall be applicable only with respect to demand deposits. 19 §l03.35 Additional Records to be Made and Retained by Brokers and Dealers in Securities (a) With respect to each brokerage account opened with a broker or dealer in securities after June 30, 1972, by a person residing or doing business in the united states or a citizen of the united states, such broker or dealer shall secure and maintain a record of the taxpayer identification number of the person mainta1ning the account; or in the case of an account of one or more individuals, such broker or dealer shall secure and maintain a record of the social security number of an individual having a financial interest in that account. (b) Every broker or dealer in securities shall, in addition, retain either the original or a microfilm or other copy or reproduction of each of the following: (1) Each document granting signature or trading authority over each customer's account; . (2) (2), (3), Each record described in section 240.17a-3(a)(1), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) of Title 17, Code of Federal Regulations; (3~ A record of each remittance or transfer of funds, or of currency, checks, other monetary instruments, investment securities, or credit, of more than $10,000 to a person, account or place outside the united states; (4) A record of each receipt of currency, other monetary instruments, checks, or investment securities and of each transfer ot funds or credit, of more than $10,000 received on any 20 one occasion directly and not through a domestic financial institution, from any person, account or place outside the United states. §l03.36 Nature of Records and Retention Period (a) Wherever it is required that there be retained either the original or a microfilm or other copy or reproduction of a check, draft, monetary instrument, investment security, or other similar instrument, there shall be retained a copy of both front and back of each such instrument or document, except that no copy need be retained of the back of any instrument or document which is entirely blank or which contains only standardized printed information, a copy of which is on file. (b) Records required by this subpart to be retained by financial institutions may be those made in the ordinary course of business by a financial institution. If no record is made in the ordinary course of business of any transaction with respect to which records are required to be retained by this subpart, then such a record shall be prepared in writing by the financial institution. (c) Records which are required by Section l03.3 4 (b)(lO) to be retained by banks shall be retained for a period of two years. All other records which are required by this subpart to be retained by financial institutions shall be retained for a period of five years. All such records shall be filed or stored in such a way //C/ as to be accessible within a res.;~'Yi[,:'- :'...~- C)t;CV'.. oi -: ill!'''') 21 taking into expired since the .I.·ecord vas rrk-;d.e. §l03.37 Person Outside the Un:::""~F.c. c;. Tt.,c,s funds, or of currency, other mOl1etexy i.nstri.!TIlents, checks, invest- ment securities, or credit to the domEstic whose address is knO\/TI by <~e gCC:ClUl1t of a person per,e,er_ lilakln[1, the rem::'.. ttance or transfer .. to be outside the United States, sh8.11 be deemed to be a remittance or transfer to a person outside the United states, except that, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary, this section shall not apply to a transacticn on the books of a domestic financial institution involving the account of a custClIler of such institution whose address is wi thin approximately fifty miles of the location of the institution, or who is known to be temporarily outside the United states. 22 §l03. 41 nollers as : Ee -1_ud.:Lng Foreign Currency Vl~C:_·2V(_.,~· §l03. 42 --' -.-----~---------- :~:irt ir tOt:; Photograp;'i.,~ an ~-Jm(·unt is stateJ in dollars, it shall or Other Reproductions of Government Ob liga"l1. 011~. Nothing hereil: contained shall require or authorize the microfilming or other' reVfo.illction of (J) currency or other obligation or security of the United states as defined in 18 u.s.c. 8, or (2:; any obligation or other security of any foreign government, the reproduction of lfhich is prohibited by law. §l03.43 Availability of Infonnation The Secretar.:r may make any information set forth in any reports recf:ived pursuant t,(· this part available to any other department or agency of the United states upon the request of the head of such department or ae;enr.y, made in i-!ri ting and stating the particular information desired, the criminal, tax, or regulatory investigation or proceeding in connection with wbich the information is sought, and the official need therf:for. §l03.44 Disc lus~lre All reports req;lirp:J.. lL'1der this part and all records of such reports are s pec:ifiC'ally exempted from disclosure under section 23 §l03. 45 Excep-cions " ."~-"~ - J:::,~::'l!"_r(J\'.' -I" - --",,,->~,.~- .• wri tten order or aut ,(lOT ~,?;atici' authorized. by '~, ~ t- ·~C(l~'J, r:3..;.~li ---' - - .. -..:..- ·_o......:.L ______ ~. _ .R.:-"o\)rts _____.':~.,.........._. _-"~ ~.xem~otions 8 t.8tut,E'", this part. ./ " -"'--or" zatl.' 011 J .....~. 8J~J i..... . 1 J . . . t . .. \ define all terms used herei."1. §l03.46 Enforcement (a) Respons~,bil..i.':-:z,' requirements of this part i5 respect to national ban':f\.S delega~~n 8..1',;1., 'f:, 3.Tlk3 Reserve System, with respect Reserve System,: for AsslU:ing r:ampliance with the t~) ~'_r; -:'.::1E' Iistrj ct of Coltnnbia; statE; baz;.k lTleLbe:cs 8f the Federal 24 (4) to the Administrator of the National Credit Union Administration, ",,"itt respect to federal credit unions; (5) to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, with respect to all other banks except agents of foreign banks which agents are not supervised by state or federal bank supervisory authorities; (6) to the Securities and Exchange Camnission, with respect to brokers and dealers in (7) se~urities; to the Commissioner of Customs with respect to §l03.23 and §l03.48; (8) to the Carnmissioner of Internal Revenue except as otherwise specified (b) ~1 this section. Over-all responsibility for coordinating the pro- cedures and efforts of the agencies listed herein and assuring compliance with this part, is delegated to the Assistant Secretary (Enforcement, Tariff &ld Trade Affairs, and Operations). reports shall be made by Periodic each such agency to the Assistant Secre- tary, with copies to the General Counsel of the Treasury Department and to the Commissioner of L~ternal Revenue. 25 §103.47 Civil Penalty (a) For any willful violation of any requirement of this part, the Secretary may assess upon any danestic financial insti tution, and upon any partner, director, officer or employee thereof who willfully participates in the violation, a civil penalty not exceeding $1,000. (b) For any failure to file a report required tmder Section 103.23 or for filing such a report containing any material omission or misstatement, the Secretary may assess a civil penalty up to the ainount of the currency or monetary instrunents transported, mailed or shipped, less any amount forfeited under Section 103.48. 26 §103.48 Forfeiture of Currency or Monetary Instruments Any currency or other monetary instruments which are in the process of any transportation with respect to which a report is required under Section 103.23 are subject to seizure and forfeiture to the United states if such report has not been filed as required in Section 103.25, or contains material omissions or misstatements. The Secretary may, in his sole discretion, remit or mitigate any such forfeiture in whole or in part upon such terms and conditions as he deems reasonable. §103.49 criminal Penalty (a) Any person who willfully violates any provision of this part may, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $1,000 or be imprisoned not more than one year, or both. Such person may in addition, if the violation is of any provision authorized by Title I of Public Law 91-508 and if the violation is committed in furtherance of the commission of any violation of Federal law punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, be fined not more than $10,000 or be imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (b) Any person who willfully violates any provision of Title II of Public Law 91-508, or of this part authorized thereby, where the violation is either (1) cc.mmitted in furtherance of the canmission of any other violation of Federal law, or 2'7 (2) caami tted as part ot a pattern ot illegal activity 1nvolv1l'lg transactions exceeding $100,000 in any tvelve-month period, may, upon conviction thereot, be tined not more than $500,000 or be :1mprisaned not more than tive years, or both. (c) Any person who knowingly makes any talse, ticti tious or traudulent statement or representation in any report required by this part may, upon conviction thereot, be tined not more than $10,000 or be imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. §l03.50 Ebtarcaaent Authority with respect to Transportation ot CUrrency or Monetary Instruments (a) It the Secretary has reason to believe that currency or monetary instr\lllents are in the process of transportation and with respect to wbich a report required under Section 103.23 ot this part bas not been tiled or contains material anissions or misstate- aents, he may apply to any court of canpetent Jurisdiction for a search warrant. Upon a showing of probable cause, the court may issue a warrant authorizing the search of any or allot the following: (1) One or more designated persons. (2) One or more deaf. gnated or described places (3) One or more dea1gnated or described letters, or premis.es. parcels, packages, or other physical objects. (4) One or more designated or described vehicles. 28 Any application for a search warrant pursuant to this section shall be accompanied by allegations of fact supporting the application. (b) This section is not in derogation of the authority of the Secretary under any other law or regulation. §l03.51 Effective Date This part shall became effective July 1, 1972. Currency Transaction Report 4789 onn Replaces TCR-I) File a separate report for each transaction 1I1/1WI1I~ 9 72) 1.~/f1III!It 0, the Treasury (Complete all applicable parts-see 'instructions) nternl l Revenue ServIce M,5' Identity of person who conducted this transaction with the financial institution ~8me (Last, first and middle initial) Social security number ~umber and street Business, occupation or profession :ity or town, State and ZIP code 1:m"D "Person or organization for whom this transaction was completed (Complete only if different than Part I) Name Identifying number Number and street Business, occupation or profession City or town, State and ZIP code l:mllil Description of transaction (If additional space is needed, attach a separate schedule) 1. Nature of transaction (check the applicable boxes) o Deposit o Withdrawal o Currency exchange o Check--------_._cashed ----2. Total amount of currency transaction '(in U.S. dollars) --~-~-- o o o o Check purchased Traveler's checks purchased Security purchase (specify) ..................................................................... . Other (specify) 5. If other than U.S. currency is involved, please furnish the following information: I Currency name 4. Date of transaction (Month, day and year) 3. Amount in denominations of $100 or higher ----~ country. . I Total amount of foreign currency __ 6. If a check was involved in this transaction, please furnish the following information. (See ._--_. . . . :instructions): ..---------'----------Date and amount of check Payee Drawer of check Drawee bank and City of location liltilN' Type of identification presented in this transaction By customers: I By others: o Savings account number ................................. . ! o Checking account numbeL ............................. .. Share account numbeL ..................................... . o Loan account number ........................................ . o o Safety deposit box number ................................ o Other ail::;: ] ! o Driver's permit o Passport o Alien ID card (specify) State Number Country Number Country Number [J Other (specify) Financial institution reporting the financial transaction , Identifying number (see instructions) Name and address Business activity Sign ~ lere -_ ............ ---- ... -- ---------_ ... -_... -.. -_ ..... -_ .... ----- .. --Authorized signature TrtI. .. -_ ....... --- -_ ........ ----------_ .. _ Oat. '1-'757 General Instructions Part This report is required by Treasury Department regulations (31 Code of Federal Regulations 103). July .. Who Must File.-Beginning . I, 1 ?72, each financial 'nstitution (as described in these InstructIOns) shall file are· ~ort of each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency or other payment or transfer, by, throu~h, to such financial institution, which involves a transaction In currency of more than $10,000. Exceptim'rs.-Financial institutions are not required to tile Form 4789 for transactions: (1) with Federal Reserve Banks or Federal Home Loan Banks; (2) solely with, or originated by, financial institutions or foreign banxs; or (3) between a bank and established customers maintain· ing a deposit relationship with the bank, in amounts which the bank may reasonably conclude do not exceed amounts commensurate with the customJry conduct of the customer's business, industry or profession. However, upon request each bank shall submit a report listing those customers who engage in transJctions which were not reported because of the exemption in (3). When and Where to File.-This report shall be filed on or before the 45th day fellowing the date of the transaction with the Internal Revenue Service Center, 11601 Roosevelt Boule· vard, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19155. Forms may be ob· tained from any Internal Revenue Service office. Identifying Number.-Social security number or employer identification number if other than individual. ?r Identification Required.-Before any transaction is effected financial institution shall verify and record the identity, and 'ecord the account number on its books or the social security )r taxpayer identification number, if any, of a person with vhom or for whose account such transaction is to be effected. lerification of identity for a customer of the financial institu· ion depositing or withdrawing funds may be by reference to lis account or other number on the books of the institution. 'erification of identity in any other case may be by exam ina· ion, for example, of a driver'S license, passport, alien identifi, at ion card, or other appropriate document normally accept· ble as a means of identification. I Penalties.-Civil and criminal penalties are provided for ailure to file a report or to supply information, and for filing I false or fraudulent report. See sections 103.47 and 103.49 If the regUlations. ipecific Instructions Part 1.-(1) In the address block, enter the permanent address of the person conducting the transaction. (2) In the social security block, enter the socia: security number of the person conducting the transaction. If the person has no num· ber, write "None" in this block. Part 11.-(1) In the name block, individuals should enter their last name, first name and middle initial, if any, in that order. All others should enter their complete organization name. (2) In the identifying number block, enter the social security number or employer identi. fication number. Part III, line 6.-This part should be completed only where :heck is cashed or a bank check is purchased with currency. Part IV.-See instruction "Identification Required," above. V-Institutions may also enter in the name and address block other identifying inforrnatioft. Definitions Bank.-Each agent, agency, branch or office within the United StJt •.'s of a for(;ign bJnk and each agency, branch or office Within the United States of any person doing business in one or more of the capacities listed below: (1) a cor'lmercial bank or trust company organized under the laws of any state or of the United States; (2) a private bank; (3) a savings and loan association or a building and loan assocla~ion organized under the laws of any state or of the United States; (4) an iI1sured institution as defined in section 401 of the National Housing Act; (5) a savings bank, industrial bank or other thrift institu· tion; (6) a credit union organized under the laws of any state or of the United States; and (7) any other organization chartered under the banking laws of Jny state and subject to the supervision of the bank supervisory authorities of ~ state. Currency.-The coin and currency of the United States or of any other country, which circulate in and are customarily used and accepted as money in the country in which issued. It includes United States silver certificates, United States notes and Federal Reserve notes, but does not include bank checks or other negotiable instruments not customarily ac· cepted as money. Financial Institution.-Each agency, branch or office within the United States of any person doing business in one or more of the capacities listed below: (1) a ban,,; (2) a broker or dealer in securities, registereu .~. (equired to be ~egistered with the Securities and Exchange Com· m i ssi0n 'Jnder the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; (3) '" r:;er;Gr. who engages as a business in dealing in or e;,changi,lg currency as, for example, a dealer in for· r:igil exchange or a person engaged primarily in the cashing of checks; (4) a aerson who engages as a business in the issuing, seiling or redeeming of travelers' checks, money or· ders or similar instruments, except one who does so a's a s811ing agent exclusively, or as an incidental f)3rt of dncther business; (5) an operator of a credit card system which issues, or authorizes the issuance of, credit cards that may be used for the acquisition of monetary instruments, goods. or services outside the United States. (6) a licrnspd transmitter of funds, or other person en· gaged in the business of transmitting funds abroad for ot hers. Person.-Afl individual, a corporation, a partner~hip, a trust ar estate, a joint stock company, an associati~n, ~ syn· dicate, iair,t venture, or other unincorporated orga.n~zatlon or group, ar"ld ali entitles cognizable as legal personalities. Transactio": in Currency.-A transaction involving the phys· iC<l1 transfer Q: currency from one person to another. A trans· action VJ:ilch is a T,9C;fer of funds by means of bank che~k, bank draft, Wire tr3;;sfer, or other written order, and which does not Inciude the physical transfer of curr~ncy IS not a transaction in currency within the meaning of thiS part. Report of International Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments D.,.rtmenl " tbl Tro.,ury 11dIm1' RlVlnu. S,rvie. 1@1t] Date of currency or monetary instrument activity . ... ..... ...........• 19 This form is to be tiled with the Bureau of Customs Person Transporting, Mailing, Shipping, or Receiving a Monetary Instrument (Items 5 through 11 are applicable "to alien irn:lividuals only) 1. Name (last or family, first. and middle) or business name 2. Identifying number 3. Check whether the currency or monetary instrument was: (a) 0 Received (b) Shipped or mailed: Into the U.S. From the U.S. (see instructions) 4. Permanent address in United States or abroad o o 5. Address while In the United States 6. Date of birth (month. day, and year) I 8. Visa date (c) Carried by traveler (check a p. plicable block and enter city): I 7. Alien registration card number. if any 9. Place United States visa was issUed 10. Of what country are you a citizen or subject? 0 Entering the U.S.City •.•.•.......••••••...•...... 0 leaving the U.S.City /11. Passport number and country 12. Were you acting as an agent, attorney. or in other capacity for anyone in this currency or monetary instrument . activity? • , D Y e s If "Yes," please complete the following: 0 No CI) Name of person in whose behalf you are acting ••.......•....•.•.........................• _ ••..•...•..••..••••.•.••••.•.•••.••••.••••....••...... (b) Complete address of that person ..•.....••....................•..•........•............•....•• _ •.•••••....•..••••.••••••.•••......••.•••.....•.•...... (c) Business activity. occupation or profession of that person QijtMlj,) Currency and Monetary Instrument Information (See Instructions) 13. Type and amount of currency and lor monetary instrument: Ca) (b) 0 0 0 Coins (specify amount) • Currency (specify amount) • • • • • • $ .• _ .......•.. _ ......•.•.. • ._ ••• _. ___ •• ___ •• _____ •__ • • • (e) Bearer instrument (specify type and amount) .•••.•• _••••••••••••• _._ •••••••• _••••••.• __ ._ •••• _•••••• __ •••• __ 1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Cd) Total amount (add lines (a), (b) and (c» . • • $ 14. If other than United States cu~ren~y is involved, please complete the following: Ca) Currency na me ••• , ••••••. _•••••• _ ••• _.~ •..••• _•••••••••...••.•.. _'" , ••. , ••••• _.••• ___ ..••.•. '_'_"_"""'" ••••.•.•••• _••••••• '_""""""""'" . (b) Cou ntry """"" •••••••••••......•.•...•.••••.•.•.•••••......... "" ._ •..•..••..•...•••••.•••.••.•• _._._ •• __ •••••••••••••....••••••••••••..•••..••.•.... (c) Equivalent in United States dolla~ (specify .~mount) . • $ 5. Name of person from whom the currency or monetary instrument was received (to be completed by recipients only>. .............. . 6. If the currency or monetary instrument was mailed, shipped. transported or carried please complete the following: (a) Method of sh Ipme'1t """ ...........•......................... '" ................ '" ............................................................... . (b) Nar1e of tr3rS;Jor:er or C2"r:er Under J:ena:t!es, of perJu~j. I ~to:",lare t::at I have exarr.,ned thiS report. and to the be5t of my knonie:_ ..=:: and belIef It IS true, c.::>rrcct and CCr;1~ ~te. ,ign Here ~ ............. __ ...................................................................................___ ......................... _..................... _., .. . Slenatu" - •••••• - ••• '" .-••• -•••••••-••••••••••••..•••.. -. Ti iii (o;;,;.r.· ,ie.)··············· -... -. "'-"""" -... -... ' --'-'" . .-......... ·······liiii............. , ..... . Instructions This report is required by Treasury Department regulations (31 Code of Federal Regulations 103). July Who Must File.-Beginning 1, 1972, each person who physically transports, mails, or ships, or causes to be physically transported, mailed, or sh ipped. currency or other monetary instruments in an aggregate amount exceeding $5,000 on anyone occasion from the United States to any place outside the United States, or into the United States from any place outside the United States, shall make a report thereof. A person is deemed to have caused such transportation, mailing or shipping when he aids, abets, counsels, commands, procures or requests it to be done by a financial institution or any other person. A transfer of funds through normal banking procedures which does not involve the physical transportation of currency or monetary instruments is not required to be reported. Also each person Who receives in the United States currency or other monetary instruments in an aggregate amount exceeding $5,000 on anyone occasion Nhich have been transported. mailed, or shipped to such person from any place outside the United States with respect to which a report has not been filed shall make a report. Exceptions.-The following persons are not required to file reports: (1) a Federal reserve bank, (2) a bank, a foreign bank, " a broker or dealer in securities in re;pect to currency or other monetary inltruments mailed or shipped through the )ostal service or by common carrier, (3) a person who is not a citizen or resijent of the United States in respect to :urrency or other monetary instruments nailed or shipped from abroad to a bank lr broker or dealer in securities through ;he postal service or by common carrier, .4) a common carrier of passengers in 'espect to currency or other monetary nstruments in the possession of its pasiengers, (5) a common carrier of goods n respect to shipments of currency or nonetary instruments not declared to be iuch by the shipper, (6) a travelers' check ssueror its agent in respect to the trans. lortatlon of travelers' checks prior to heir delivery to selling agents for even. ual sale to the public, nor by (7) a peron engaged as a busi ness I n the transortatlon of currency, monetary instrulents and other commercial papers With !spect to the transportation of currency r other monetary instruments overland etween established offices of banks or ~okers or dealers in securities and forIgn banks. When and Where to File: A R .. . eClplents.-Each person who reo .'Ive-;, currency or other monetary instru- ments shall file Form 4790, within 30 days after receipt, with the Customs officer in charge at any port of entry or departure or by mail with the Commissioner of Customs, Attention: Currency Transportation Reports, Washington, D.C. (5) a savings bank, industrial bank or other th rift institution; (6) a credit union organized under the laws of any state or of the United States; and 20226. B. Shippers or Maiters.-If the currency or other monetary instrument does not accompany the person entering or departing the United States, Form 4790 may be filed by mail on or before the date of entry, departure, mailing, or shipping with the Commissioner of Customs, Attention: Currency Transportation Reports, Washington, D.C. 20226. . C. Traveters.- Travelers shall file Form 4790 at the time of entry into the United States or the time of departure from the United States with the Customs officer in charge at any Customs port of entry or departure. An additional report of a particular transportation, mailing, or shipping of currency or other monetary instruments, is not required if a complete and truthful report has already been filed. However. no person otherwise required to file a report shall be excused from liability for failure to do so if, in fact, a complete and truthfu I report has not been filed. Forms may be obt3ined from any Internal Revenue or Bureau of Customs office. Penalties.-Civil and criminal penalties are provided for failure to file a report, supply information, and for filing a false or fraudulent report. In addition, the currency or monetary instrument may be subject to seizure and forfeiture. See sections 103.47, 103.48 and 103.49 of the regulations. Definitions Bank.-Each agent, agency, branch or office within the United States of a foreign bank and each agency, branch or office within the United States of any person doing business in one or more of the capacities listed: (7) any other organization chartered under the banking laws of any state and subject to the supervision of the bank supervisory authorities of a state. Foreign Bank.-A bank organized under foreign law, or an agency, branch or office located outside the United States of a bank. The term does not include an agent, agency, branch or office within the United States of a bank organized under foreign law. Broker or Dealer In Securitles.-A broker or dealer in securities, registered or required to be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Identifying Number.-Individuals should enter their social security number, if any. However, aliens who do not have a social security number should enter passport or alien registration number. All others should enter their employer identification number. Investment Security.-An instrument which: (1) is issued in bearer or registered form; (2) is of a type comrvJnI'1 dealt in upon securities exchanges ( larkets or commonly recognized in .JnYlrea in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for investment; (3) is either one of a class or series or by its terms is divisible into a class or series of instruments; and (4) evidences a share, participation or other interest in property or in an enterprise or evidences an obligation of the issuer. (3) a savings and loan association or Monetary Instruments_~oin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers' checks, money orders, investment securities in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery, and negotiable instruments (except warehouse receipts or bills of lading) in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery. The term does not include bank checks made payable to the order of a named person which have not been endorsed or which bear restrictive endorsements. a bUilding and loan association organized under the laws of any state or of the United States; a partnership, a trust or estate, a jOint (1) a commercial bank or trust com- pany organized under the laws of any state or of the United States; (2) a private bank; (4) an insured institution as defined . in section 401 of the National Housing Act; Person.-An individual, a corporation, stock company, an association, a syndi· cate, jOint venture, or other unincorporated organization or group, and all entities cognizable as legal personalities. The Departmento! the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04·2041 REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE EUGENE T. ROSSIDES ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY (ENFORCEMENT, TARIFF AND TRADE AFFAIRS, AND OPERATIONS) BEFORE THE DIRECTORS' CONGRESS OF THE AMERICAN FOOTWEAR INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION AT LA COSTA, CALIFORNIA ~h 2, 1972 10:00 A.M. THE ANTIDUMPING ACT, 1921 THREE YEARS OF REJWENATION INTRODUCTION u.s. In his Report to the Congress of February 9, 1972, on Foreign Policy for the 1970's, President Nixon stated: "The year 1971 marked a turning point in the world economy. We undertook a series of far-reaching measures which revitalized our foreign economic policy and set the stage for fundamental and long term reforms in the international economic system." What the President was referring to, of course, was his New Economic Policy which established a milestone in the financial and trade fields. The Policy served notice on our principal trading partners that: " • • • no longer will the American people permit their government to engage in international actions in which the true long-run interests of the U.S. are not just as clearly recognized as those of the nations with which we deal." - 2 - Although this last quotation was extracted from a speech made by Secretary Connally in Munich last May -- several months before the New Economic Policy was announced -it nevertheless is as true now as it was at the time it was delivered. Nowhere can this be better illustrated than by the actions taken by this Administration over the last three years to rejuvenate the Antidumping Act. ANTIDUMPING ACT -- ITS OBJECTIVE The Antidumping Act, 1921, as amended, is intended to nullify the impact on domestic industry of international price discrimination which injures United States producers. From an affirmative standpoint, the statute fosters international trade on a fair and equitable basis. In the view of the Treasury/the aim of the Act is clear to defend American industry against unfair international pricing practices. It is not designed as a prop for American industry to assist it in meeting fair and open competition from abroad. In the context of the Antidumping Act, an "unfair" sale or, if you will, international price discrimination, occurs when a foreign company sells a product for less in the United States than in its home market, thereby causing injury to U.S. industry. IMPACT OF ANTIDUMPING ACT AS OF JANUARY 1969 There may be disagreement as to the interpretation of some of the finer points of the Antidumping Act and its administration in the past. There appears, however, to have been general agreement at the time this Administration took office that the Act had a relatively minor impact not - 3 - only on international trade matters generally, but more importantly, in defending American industry from injurious international price discrimination. The reason for this was rather obvious. Important antidumping investigations were taking two years and even longer to complete. Investigations that take that long tend to be devoid of economic significance to the domestic industry. Many American concerns suffering from unfair international trade practices were compelled to bear their lot patiently until the Treasury had completed an exhaustive investigation ferreting out all of the underlying facts. Moreover, import trade suffers too when the spectre of a dumping investigation hovers for an overlong period even if the investigation ends with a determination that the goods have not been sold below fair value. Delays can cause unfair and inequitable treatment to everyone concerned regardless of the ultimate outcome of the investigation. Accordingly, acceleration of our dumping investigations, without sacrificing reasonable thoroughness, introduced a specific element of fairness of its own, which benefited all. STEPS TAKEN BY TREASURY TO REJUVENATE ADMINISTRATION OF ANTIDUMPING ACT Procedural and Manpower Changes Treasury Management Survey In April, 1969, we initiated a Treasury management survey of the administration of the Antidumping Act to determine why it was taking so long to decide these cases and what could be done to improve the situation. It seemed to us that it had to be possible to reduce the investigation period without derogating from the essential fairness of the Treasury's investigation procedures. - 4 This study revealed that there was inadequate staff assigned to the processing of antidumping cases; that the limited staff was inadequately supervised; and that the investigation process was handicapped by cumbersome procedures inherited from the distant past. These factors, taken together, were delaying inordinately decisions on cases of vital concern to American industry. Decisions Following Management Survey Increase in Manpower The Commissioner of Customs was directed to increase the manpower assigned to this area. Treasury stressed to him and his senior staff the importance it attached to this field and that antidumping work was now to be upgraded so that Customs officers assigned to antidumping would realize that it offered broad, future opportunities for promotion in the career service. By November, 1970, the headquarters professionals had been increased from 5 to 21. The additional personnel were transferred to antidumping from other assignments to which the Bureau of Customs had agreed to give a lower ?riority pending Treasury's request for supplemental funds. The President submitted to the Congress his request for supplemental funds for this program. Treasury's Appropriations Committees in the House and Senate (together with the members of the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committees) gave full bipartisan support to the request. In December, 1970, the Congress enacted the President's antidumping supplemental appropriation bill which provided funds for 41 professionals for antidumping and related matters. This gave us the means to continue the advancement already made and to institute additional procedural and policy reforms. The 41 positions were filled by the middle of 1971, and the new personnel have now been trained to administer the Antidumping Act effectively. We are also - 5 - in the process of increasing and improving the training of our manpower abroad so that Customs representatives responsible for carrying out antidumping investigations overseas will be thoroughly knowledgeable in the intricacies of the law and its administration. Establishment of Office of Tariff and Trade Affairs At the Treasury level, I confined the responsibilities of my deputy for Customs to administration of the Treasury laws concerned with unfair international trade practices and other related tariff matters. Three professional staff officers were assigned to him and he was made the Director of a newly established Office of Tariff and Trade Affairso The Secretary has recently approved the expansion of this office with still more personnel. We have thus institutionalized the changes that had been made and established a more permanent mechanism for adequate Treasury supervision in this area. We now have the basis for insuring that the Treasury Department will have an ongoing operation for proper supervision and administration of the international price discrimination statutes. Timetable for Collection and Collation of Information Another decision made was to establish firm timetables for each step in the collection and collation of information by Customs. In the past, it has taken as long as six months to decide whether a "complaint" was sufficiently meritorious to justify the formal initiation of an antidumping investigation. Such decisions are now being made in approximately one month. - 6 - Questionnaires to foreign exporters and letters replying to typical inquiries have been standardized. Firm time periods are being established for replying to such questionnaires. Much of the clerical work involved in the processing of letters and questionnaires is being simplified by the use of modern tape typewriters and calculators with memory capabilities. Conferences with attorneys are being restricted to set periods when the antidumping case handler is fully prepared to discuss particular aspects of an investigation with interested attorneys. The day when attorneys could drop in on case handlers without prior appointment is a practice of the past. Most important of all, the case handlers and Customs representatives abroad have been given a renewed sense of the urgency and the importance of their work ·and impressed by the need for completing their investigations as rapidly as possible. Results in Processing Cases Treasury has now reached its first goal of complet;ng antidumping cases on the average within one year from the date the case is presented. Our next objective is to reduce the time required for the handling of normal cases still further, to approximately 270 days. I have announced this new timetable to the Bureau of Customs which is already initiating steps to see that it is carried out. I would like to add one word of caution. Because of the Treasury's continued emphasis on the essentiality of fairness in rendering decisions in antidumping cases, it may occasionally be necessary to allow a somewhat longer time for particularly complicated cases. The normal cases, on the other hand, will be completed in accordance with the schedule that I have outlined. - 7 - This achievement in speeding up our investigations is due in large part to the foresightedness of a number of officials. It stems in the first instance from the desire of the President to redress the United States' adverse competitive situation. Its accomplishment is owing in large part to Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy, and later Secretary Connally, without whose active support the results outlined above would have been impossible. Moreover, the improved procedures could not have become a reality if it had not been for the bipartisan cooperation of the Congress which approved the additional appropriations for supplementing Treasury's manpower requirements in this field. No matter how effective a policy may be, its implementation,in the final analysis, depends on the dedicated men and women in the career service who devoted long hours and hard work to our common objective. Policy Changes The efforts to improve the administration of the Antidumping Act were accompanied by a thorough review of policy. This review, which is continuing, has already resulted in significant changes. Price Assurance Policy In May, 1970, Treasury formally announced a change in the policy with respect to price assurances in antidumping investigations. We took this action after concluding that the previous - 8 policy of readily accepting price assurances was actually encouraging sales at less than fair value in the United States. Under that policy, foreign firms seeking to sell their merchandise in the U. S. market had no need to give even a passing consideration to the antidumping implications of the step they were about to take. There was no reason why they should do so under the old rules. Let us discuss for a moment what happened under the earlier price assurance policy. A foreign concern would price its merchandise in the U. S. market at whatever level it considered necessary to compete effectively. Since its product was normally unknown to the American consumer, it would generally price its merchandise below the level of its American competitors in order to attract customers. If the foreign competition started to make itself felt and resulted in an antidumping complaint being filed with the Treasury Department, the foreign firm still had no cause for undue concern. Treasury's antidumping investigations would, under the former procedures, often take over two years, and even longer to complete. Moreover, if the Treasury Department tentatively concluded that the merchandise was being sold at dumping margins, price assurances could be offered and would almost invariably be accepted by the Department. By this time, with the firm's product well known to American consumers, the foreign concern could afford to raise its prices to the level of its American competitors without fear of a drastic drop in sales. Better yet from the standpoint of the foreign manufacturers when the Treasury Department accepted price assurances, it would issue a formal determination of No Sales at Less Than Fair Value. To say the least, this determination was misleading, since there had in fact been sales at dumping margins. Under the new policy, price assurances are accepted only when the dumping margins are minimal in relation to the volume of sales involved. Moreover, in those cases where price assurances are accepted, the case is no longer terminated with - 9 - a determination of No Sales at Less Than Fair Value as it was under the old price assurance policy. We felt that such a determination after the acceptance of price assurances was a misnomer. Accordingly, the Treasury Department revised its regulations in cases where price assurances are accepted so as to provide for discontinuance of investigations. This procedure, I feel, realistically expresses exactly what takes place in a price assurance case. Under the new policy, if price assurances are rejected, the case is then referred to the Tariff Commission for, as you know, before a finding of dumping may be issued and dumping duties assessed, it is necessary under the Antidumping Act that there be a determination of sales at less than fair value by the Treasury Department and a determination of injury by the Tariff Commission. The objective of the new policy is to induce foreign concerns to take the Antidumping Act into account before they engage in sales to the United States. The 25 Percent Rule The Antidumping Act provides that in normal situations fair value shall be determined by comparing the ex factory home market price of the merchandise under investigation with the ex factory price at which the merchandise is sold in the United States. If the price in the United States is less than the home market price, then there are "sales at less than fair value" within the meaning of the statute. The Act also states that in situations where the quantity of merchandise sold in the home market is so small in relation to the quantity sold for exportation to countries other than the United States as to form an inadequate basis for comparison, then third country price should be used as the basis for compari son. - 10 The Antidumping Regulations originally provided that generally for purposes of determining what constituted an "inadequate basis of comparison" for fair value purposes, home market sales would be considered to be inadequate if less than 25 percent of the non-U. S. sales of the merchandise were sold in the home market. The selection of home market or third country price for fair value comparison can easily be crucial to the results of antidumping investigations, for frequently home market price tends to be higher than third country price. This is particularly true where merchandise is sold in a protected home market and, when sold in third countries, is exposed to the vagaries of world competition. It has been Treasury's experience that cases arise where sales in the home market are adequate as a basis for fair value comparison, even though less than 25 percent of the non-U. S. sales are sold in the home market. Accordingly, on May 22, 1970, the Treasury Department revised its Antidumping Regulations to eliminate the 25 percent rule. All that is required under the Regulations, as now revised, is that the sales in the home market be adequate for purpose of fair value comparison. GENERAL REVISION OF ANTIDUMPING REGULATIONS The Antidumping Regulations have been in effect in substantially their present form since July 1, 1968, when they were amended to conform with the provisions of the International Anti-Dumping Code. We felt that with all the changes in the administration of the law that had taken place, it was now time to take another broad look at the Regulations and the administration of the law. Accordingly, the Treasury ~epartment-announ~ed last year that it was reviewing its Regulations and invited suggestions from the public as to how they might best be improved. I am happy - 11 - to state that the Treasury Department will be announcing within the next few days proposed changes in the present Antidumping Regulations. Since the Notice of Proposed Rule Making has not yet been published, I do not feel that it would be proper for me to say at this time what the specific proposals are designed to accomplish. I can assure you, however, that all the individual changes in the Regulations are aimed at one broad objective-strict administration of the Antidumping Act so as to make it an even more effective instrument in defending the United States against unfair international trade practices, consistent however with fairness to all parties concerned. RESULTS TO DATE As a result of the Administration's rejuvenation of the Antidumping Act, the American public's interest in this law has increased noticeably. Complaints filed during the past three years have been 50 percent greater than during 1966-l~68. And the number of final decisions published by the Treasury over the same time periods has increased by 80 percent. These figures are particularly noteworthy when account is taken of the fact that accomplishments such as these over a three-year time span are, of necessity, gradual. They cannot be achieved overnight or even in one year. Thus, our record during calendar year 1971 must overcome the start-up inertia which is inevitable before a new approach and policy can be put into motion. In closing, I want to emphasize that the Administration strongly supports a freer trade policy. Our rejuvenation of the Antidumping Act, so as to defend American industry from unfair international trade practices, is part and parcel of - 12 - this policy. Despite what some of our foreign trading partners may have said on this subject, the increase in the Treasury and Customs staff for the purpose of administering the Antidumping Act more effectively is fully consistent with a liberal trade policyo The President has made it clear that he intends to meet the challenge of the future by stimulating our economy to ensure our continued efficient and competitive position in the world. This means that inflation and unemployment in the United States will be reduced while investment in new plants and equipment by the private sector are stimulated 0 While building this stronger eccnomy at home, we must remain outward looking and international in our initiatives overseas. This Administration is committed to such a course. As Secretary Connally said when he addressed the Economic Club last fall: '~e do not intend to become provincial. We shall not resort to protectionism. We shall carry our burdens on the international scene. But to do so it is essential to attain an equilibrium in our overall financial balance with the rest of the world. We seek no advantage of others. We propose to suffer no disadvantage. We seek a balance which will be to the benefit of all the nations." '~t stake are not narrow or selfish economic goals; beyond a fair balance of opportunity, we seek none. The basic issue is much broader. It is nothing less than rebuilding the economic foundation for promoting economic development, military security, and the free flow of commerce. - 13 - "To fail in our effort would be to fail not only as an Administration, nor even as a Nation. At stake is nothing less than the foundation for the freedom and security of this generation, and those that follow." 000 The Departmento! the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04·2041 'OR IMMEDIATE RELEASE March 31, 1972 TREASURY ISSUES DUMPING FINDING WITH RESPECT TO DIAMOND TIPS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM The Treasury Department announced today that it has issued l dumping finding with respect to diamond tips for phonograph leedles from the United Kingdom. The finding will be published .n the Federal Register of April 1, 1972. On November 18, 1971, the Treasury Department advised the ~ariff Commission that diamond tips for phonograph needles from :he United Kingdom were being sold at less than fair value within :he meaning of the Antidumping Act, 1921, as amended. On February 17, 1972, the Tariff Commission issued a letermination that an industry in the United States is being .njured by reason of the importation of diamond tips for phonorraph needles from the United Kingdom sold, or likely to be sold, It less than fair value within the meaning of the Antidumping Act, .921, as amended. After these two determinations, the finding of dumping autoatically follows as the final administrative requirement in ntidumping investigations. During the period January 1971 through December 1971, diamond ips for phonograph needles valued at approximately $325,000 were nported from the United Kingdom. 000 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TION: TelEPHONE W04·2041 __.::~:.._ FINANCIAL EDITOR ~972 'Z ELFASE 6: 30 P. M. , L~URY' RESULTS OF ~~:::~-.:- S 0?FERTI~G BliL The Treasury Department 8JlJlounced that the tenders for two series of 'ITeasury , one series to be an additional issue of the bills dated 0" 2-'1U2.!'=." :: ~ 2..972 ,and ,ther series to be dated A;ri2.. 6 ~ ___ 972 ,which were offered on : :2.r2!: 28 ~ 1972, opened at the Federal Reserve Banks today. Tenders were invited for $2: 3JC, COO, JOO, .ereabouts, of 9 ___ -day bills and f'JY $::..~S:::::~=::::=:::=: or thereabouts, of ~S2-day The details of the two series are as follows: : OF ACCEPTED :TITIVE BIDS: 9 ___ -day Treasury bills maturing J~y 6. ~972 Approx. Equiv. Price Annual Rate High 99.0SJ :::. -:-l9::: Low Average 99.0:4 99.040 ::.522~ ::"B2-day Treasury bills maturing C2~~ber 5, 1972 Approx. Equi v . Price Annual Rate 4. :12~ 4.391~ 4. 387~ 97.320 a :."79S::': Excep: 1 ~e:1dey - '-~''l'' 1""\ '-' 9 ___ -day bills bid for at the low price was accepted 81% of the amount of ___ S2-day 66% of the amount of bills bid for at the low price was accepted I ~-~ a' J ~ '-, ~ "- '-' TENDERS APPLIED FOR AND ACCEPTED BY FEDLRAl RESERVE DISTRICTS: itrict iton r York .ladelphia ~veland :hmond .anta .cago Louis lIleapolis lSas City ~as I ...;.,. "- Applied For $ 19,80C,000 _ :x: "t' :,374,390,OJC 33, 92:J ,~'2C' 'Z~c:: -",1'"'\,,) ,0 ...:........, , ,.....,...... v , ____ _ l .. ......,... G;:'~ ...; '-''-'' r; ~ -"-' ~2 ~ ::5:- ~ =-='::' :2 ~~~=-.'2=~~ ~::~= , '"'''1""'\ ~ '"',--;~ ~---" '- '-' '-' '-' ,"--" 3 "- '- '-" -8 -"- .. '2:::::-:: '-''--....- 5,125,::;00 . . . ....,"'" ~ '- '- 22,975~:)OJ '- ::::,-. '\ ,...., -., ,- ',.-. .............. . : : . . :=---=._'-''- 37~eJ5,OO:: --r- 234,940, J,)C ............. , ,-. ~ TOTALS - ...'::;-1'"'~ .: : '- 30,142,000 ~ ~ '""' 7.- --; 35., JC<) ::::8'""' '-'-'" <.-- .............. ( , ~r" y c. , ,7-" ..:'- '-- ..., - ! _ ...... '"' --- -- :cludes $187,310,002 noncompeti ti ',re te:1cie!'s Icludes $ 88,375,:)0; n':>r..~o:r:petiti-le teder.s r- o lese rates are on a ba.'1k ciisC~)1.L'1t tas:s. 19 ~ for the 9='-dCi.y bills, and ~.: 3{ foy :::e l -,....,.. ---' .-.,,. __- =_ '-"' ,485, J~~\~ ::1 ~ 452, ']:=::1 =-5,:::3S~JJ~ ~~ ~~.~.~== ::.42-=!J22 --,::,i- : ;::-:::: ................. --.... _ ~ -Cl?'~- 1""\",,1""\ ~- "",......""\ ~.= ~ ~ ~ .,. . ., ,;;" =~ - ~ '- '-' '"" '"' ........ -..., 9,102,20C ~~'""' ,-" '- '- '-' '-' '-' -...-.,-. -'= . - - -- . -- '- - ~~~ -= "-' ~ '- '- ,-,' J....... 5:4 7 0,JJO ____ , '-<'v, . . . --..\. - ",-..-'-- .-., -) 24,390,2,)0 - .. .. :::: -= '-- ....... -- - ,ceo ,....., "'" =::::- """ '""', . . . . -"---=.--- --'-- ~-.::::..'-~'-~'-'--- .. '- ,-. z - -" '"',...." ...... 34,~25:2JJ Francisco 1~32E:,205~OOO c? ~ 8,935,:J':' 10~ ,. Accepted $ 2,350,000 r-, "' ...... """ -'-'~~-"-'~'--''-'- ,-",,-,,,-' ,'-' '"" v 5~ ~530 Au-plied ?or Accepted '- -,-... L- ~ I"'~ '-' '-- ' - The Department of the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 1972 Nation's Currency Gets New Signature The first ciollar bills with the signature of the new Treas1lrer of the United States, Romana Acosta Banuelos, were run off the press today at the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. The bills, which also bear the signature of Secretary of the Treasury, John B. Connally, will start circulating later this year as current supplies of currency are depleted or retired. Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs Paul A. Volcker, representing Secretary Connally, and Mrs. Banuelos attended a brief ceremony this morning as the first bills, bearing her signature, came off the presses. As is traditionBl~ Secretary Connally got the first sheet of bills and the Treasurer got the second. The new bills bear her full name "Romana Acosta Banuelos" in the lower left hand corner of the currency. Mr. Connally's signature is directly opposite on the right hand corner. The new Connally-Banuelos bills will replace the old ones bearing signatures of Secretary Connally and the late Dorothy Andrews Kabis, who died in July 1971. Her successor, Mrs. Banuelos, took office Jan. 3, 1972, following nomination by President Nixon last September, and confirmation by the Senate on Dec. 6, 1971. She was sworn in by Secretary Connally on Dec. 17, 1971. Born in Miami, Arizona, Mrs. Banuelos is the thirty-fourth treasurer and sixth woman to hold office since it was established in 1789. A California businesswoman and organizer of the Pan American National Bank in East Los Angeles, Mrs. Banuelos is married to Alexander Banuelos. She is the mother of two sons and a daughter. The new series of Federal Reserve notes, designated 1969B for the $5 through $100 denominations, and 1969C for the $1 denomination will be released through the Federal Reserve System, probably in May. It will require several months to supply all banks with the Connally-Banuelos currency. The $1 denomination will be released to banks first. The serial numbers of the notes will not revert back to zero, but will continue in their regular numerical sequence. . C-274 000 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 )R IMMEDIATE RELEASE TelEPHONE W04·2041 April 4, 1972 TREASURY'S WEEKLY BILL OFFERING The Treasury Department, by this public notice, invites tenders :)r two series of Treasury bills to the aggregate amount of 4,100,000,000, or thereabouts, for cash and in exchange for Treasury Uls maturing April 1~, 1972, in the amount of $4,106,900,000, 9 follows: 9l-day bills (to maturity date) to be issued April 13, 1972 the amount of $2,300,000,000, or thereabouts, representing an ~ditional amount of bills dated January 13, 1972, and to mature lly 13, 1972 (CUSIP No.912793 NU6 ) ,originally issued in ,e amount of $1,600,200,000, the additional and original 'bills to be ~eely interchangeable. 1 182 - day bills, for $1,800,000,000, or thereabouts, to be dated ri1 13, 1972, and to mature October 12, 1972 ~SIP No. 912793 PGS). The bills of both series will be issued on a discount basis under Impetitive and noncompetive bidding as hereinafter provided, and at turity their face amount will be payable without interest. They will issued in bearer form only, and in denominations of $10,000, 5,000, $50,000, $100,000, $500,000 and $1,000,000 (maturity value). Tenders will be received at Federal Reserve Banks and Branches up the closing hour, one-thirty p.m., Eastern Standard me, Monday, April 10, 1972. Tenders will not be received the Treasury Department, Washington. Each tender must be for a nimum·of $10,000. Tenders over $10,000 must be in mUltiples of ,000. In the case of competitive tenders the price offered must be pressed on the basis of 100, with not more than three decimals, g., 99.925. Fractions may not be used. It is urged that tenders be de on the printed forms and forwarded in the special envelopes which Ll be supplied by Federal Reserve Banks or Branches on application !refor. Banking institutions generally may submit tenders for account of stomers provided the names of the customers are set forth in such lders. Others than banking institutions will not be permitted to - 2 - submit tenders except for their own account. Tenders will be recel~ without deposit from incorporated banks and trust companies and frQl responsible and recognized dealers in investment securities. Tenderi from others must be accompanied by payment of 2 percent of the face amount of Treasury bills applied for, unless the tenders are accompanil by an express guaranty of payment by an incorporated bank or trust company. Immediately after the closing hour, tenders will be opened at the Federal Reserve Banks and Branches, following which public announcement will be made by the Treasury Department of the amount and price range of accepted bids. Only those submitting competitive tenders will be advised of the acceptance or rejection thereof. The Secretary of the Treasury expressly reserves the right to accept or reject any or all tenders, in whole or in part, and his action in any such respect shall be final. Subject to these reservations, noncompetitive tenders for each issue for $200,000 or less without stated price from anyone bidder will be accepted in full at the average price (in three decimal! of accepted competitive bids for the respective issues. Settlement fOI accepted tenders in accordance with the bids must be made or completed at the Federal Reserve Bank on April 13, 1972, in cash or other immediately available funds or in a like face amount ( Treasury bills maturing April 13, 1972. Cash and exchange tender will receive equal treatment. Cash adjustments will be made for differences between the" par value of maturing bills accepted in exchange and the issue price of the new bills. Under Sections 454 (b) and 1221 (5) of the Internal Revenue C~e of 1954 the amount of discount at which bills issued hereunder are sole is considered to accrue when the bills are sold, redeemed or otherwise disposed of, and the bills are excluded from consideration as capital assets. Accordingly, the owner of Treasury bills (other than life insurance companies) issued hereunder must include in his income tax return, as ordinary gain or loss, the difference between the price pa~ for the bills, whether on original issue or on subsequent purchase, anC the amount actually received either upon sale or redemption at maturit) during the taxable year for which the return is made. Treasury Department Circular No. 418 (current revision) and this notice, prescribe the terms of the Treasury bills and govern the . conditions of their issue. Copies of the circular may be obtained fr~ any Federal Reserve Bank or Branch. 000 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 April 6, 1972 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE WITHHOLDING OF APPRAISEMENT ON DRYCLEANING MACHINERY FROM WEST GERMANY The Treasury Department announced today that the Bureau of Customs ia instructing Customs field officers to withhold appraisement of drycleaning machinery from West Germany pending a determination as to whether this merchandise is being sold at less than fair value within the meaning of the Antidumping Act, 1921, as amended (19 U.S.C. 160 et seq.). Under the Antidumping Act the Secretary of the Treasury is required to withhold appraisement whenever he has reasonable cause to believe or suspect that sales at less than fair value may be taking place. A final Treasury decision in this investigation will be made within three months. Appraisement will be withheld for a period not to exceed six months from the date of publication of the "Withholding of Appraisement Notice" in the Federal Register. Under the Antidumping Act, a determination of sales in the United States at less than fair value requires that the case be referred to the Tariff Commission, which would then consider whether an American industry was being injured. Both dumping margins and injury must be shown to justify a finding of dumping under the law. The total value of drycleaning machinery imported from West Germany during the period from July 1970 through Novembel 1971 amounted to approximately $4 million. # # # # The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 II~ REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE EUGENE T. ROSSIDES ASS ISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY (ENFORCEMENT, TARIFF AND TRADE AFFAIRS, AND OPERATIONS) before the ANNUAL SPRING LUNCHEON of the ITALY-AMERICA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INC ESSEX HOUSE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK April 6, 1972 1:00 porn. 0 PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEW ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE DOCTRINE OF FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE President Nixon's New Economic Policy, announced on August 15, 1971, marked a watershed in world history, not just U.S. history. The president's actions marked the end of one era -- "the end of the post-war 'world" as Secretary Connally said last month -- and the dawn of a new era in international economic relationshipso The President's goals were three -- to curb inflation, to generate jobs by stimulating responsible economic growth, and to strengthen the position of the United States in the international trade and financial community. Today, I shall talk primarily about the u.s. position in international trade--a Doctrine of Fairness--with special emphasis on Treasury's role and responsibilities in this area and the need to perfect international organization and procedures for effective solutions of trade problems. - 2 - Why Are We in a New Era? At the end of World War II, the United States was the wealthiest, most powerful nation on earth. A large part of the world was in ruins, physically, politically, and economically, after the holocaust that it had just experienced. The United States exhibited truly unselfish and generous leadership in an effort to bring these ravaged areas back to normal. We did this in our own long-range national interest but at considerable sacrifice. It made sense for the United States to do everything possible to assist both our former allies and enemies to regain their feet. And so, we literally showered U.S. dollars and expertise on these countries. The American taxpayer accepted the burden of the nearly $150 billion in economic and military aid that was made available over the past 25 years, for he understood the relationship between a prosperous world economy and his own well-being. But, conditions have changed and we now find ourselves confronted with an entirely different picture. Although the United States is still the most important free world power, it is no longer the only free world power. Other nations are again in a position to challenge us economically and politically. The United States is now one giant among several. The Long-Run Task What does this new era signify for the United States and the rest of the trading world? Essentially, the long-run task facing the United States and the world community is the creation of an international economic system which, on the basis of mutual advantage, - 3 - will stimulate international trade and freer competition, draw nations and people together, and thus form the basis for a lasting peace with prosperity. Progress Made Since August 15, 1971 In his policy role as chief economic spokesman for the President, Secretary Connally has already sketched in broad outline fonn the new policies to be followed. Considerable progress has been made in the seven and one-half short months since August 15, 1971. The Smithsonian Agreement of December 18, 1971, was a significant breakthrough and has given the new era a substantial forward thrust. That agreement included a multilateral realignment of exchange rates, commitments to discuss more general reforms of the international monetary system, and commitments to begin discussions to reduce trade barriers, including some most harmful to the United States. For its part, the United States agreed to recommend to the Congress that the price of gold in dollars be raised when progress had been made in trade liberalization. On February 9, Secretary Connally transmitted to the Congress a draft bill providing for devaluation of the dollar by 8.57% to $38 per ounce of gold. In signing that bill into law on Monday, April 3, the President said that the basic significance of the Smithsonian Agreement and the legislation is: " ... that it provides for continued cooperation among our allies and ourselves--and thus strengthens our unity--as we work toward an 'open world' based on a more balanced monetary system and a more equitable international trading environment." - 4 Simultaneously with the smithsonian Agreement, commitments were made by some of our allies to assume a larger share of the costs of common defense. Substantive agreements have also been reached with the European Community and with Japan to remove or lower certain barriers against U.S.products and to support multilateral and comprehensive trade negotiations in 1973, meanwhile solving more immediate problems in 1972 through the GATT. The Administration will seek the necessary legislative authority for these comprehensive negotiations. Doctrine of Fairness in International Trade-Abroad and at Home Abroad These are some of the accomplishments to date on the international trade front. All of the United States efforts in international discussions have been dedicated to one objective--the establishment of a Doctrine of Fairness in International Trade. The President and Secretary Connally have served notice that the United States is no longer going to compete with one hand behind its back. To compete fairly abroad, we must have fair access to the markets of Europe, Asia, South America, Africa, and the rest of the world. I do not mean to imply that the United States is expecting to obtain something for nothing. But in our trade negotiations we do have a right to demand a fair bargain. We insist only on the right to compete fairly abroad. As Secretary Connally said in Munich last May: - 5 - " ... no longer will the American people permit their government to engage in international actions in which the true long-run interests of the U.S. are not just as clearly recognized as those of the nations with which we deal." The point he conveyed to all is that the United States can no longer stand by complacently when markets are closed to us or where the "rules of the game"seem to be rigged against us. When our foreign friends complained about the temporary 10% additional duty adopted as part of the President's new economic program, they did not mention in their complaints the barriers they maintain against U.S. exports to their countries. These barriers take various forms--quotas no longer justified by economic factors, discriminatory taxes such as progressive taxes on horsepower directed at the export of U.S. automobiles, discriminatory tariff arrangements such as the Common Market preferences and reverse preferences, which establish a lower tariff on the exports of Common Market members than on those of the u.S. and others into third markets, both in developing and developed countries. These were not wiped out by the Smithsonian Agreement. We have a long way to go in order to achieve for American industry a fair break in international trade. - 6 - Let me make it clear that we are not seeking special treatment for the United States. We recognize that some of our practices are regarded by other countries as discriminatory. We do not pretend to be blameless in this regard. At Home--Treasury's Role in Combatting Unfair Trade Practices Against this backdrop, there are very positive measures this Administration has already taken at home to rectify our trade imbalance and protect jobs in the U.S. From the inception of President Nixon's Administration, the Treasury Department has vigorously attacked discriminatory pricing techniques of foreign exporters. Treasury and its Bureau of Customs have accelerated and expanded the use of statutes specifical:y designed to protect U.S. industry against unfair foreigr competition. We have institutionalized the supervision of the administration of the Antidumping Act and the countervailing duty statute and other aspects of tariff and trade relations by setting up an Office of Tariff and Trade Affairs in the Office of the Secretary. The Antidumping Act is designed to prevent injurioLs international price discrimination--typically, selling in the U.S. market at prices lower than in the foreign home market. The countervailing duty statute is designed to counteract and prevent foreign subsidies on exports to the U.s. The Treasury, under this Administration, has rejuvenated what was largely a moribund Antidumping Statute. We have significantly increased actions under this statute in the past three years. We have eliminated loopholes. And we have expedited consideration of - 7 - complaints from domestic manufacturers by adding manpower and streamlining procedures. In short, Treasury is now administering the Antidumping Act· more in the manner intended by Congress and which industry has a right to expect, although more is needed. Perhaps, criticism from abroad had to be expected. But, the point is that these actions are taken and justified in defense of fair trade--and without a sense of fairness, the prospects for freer trade would be bleak. Now, we are studying possible refinements and expansions of the use of these measures which protect U.S. industry against unfair competition. In new proposed antidumping regulations which will be published in the near future, we plan to clarify and tighten further the procedures of the Antidumping Act. Amendments of our Antidumping Act and countervailing duty statute may be required to achieve freer and fairer competition in international trade. And, once the long-range adjustments of tariffs, quotas, and other barriers are accomplished, these same measures can serve to maintain the integrity of those agreements. International Reforms In analyzing what we can do to enable u.s. producers to compete more effectively under fair rules of international trade, we must of necessity examine closely the implementation of those rules and even question the nature of the rules themselves. We face a situation in which such basic GATT rules as most-favored-nation treatment are increasingly violated. We are also ccncerned that foreign dumping and subsidizing of exports to third countries have the - 8 - effect of freezing u.s. manufacturers out of these markets. Moreover, while we favor U.S. capital investment abroad on as liberal terms as our balance of payments allows, we cannot continue to permit U.S. capital to create jobs abroau if domestic u.s. manufacturers are prevented by discriminatory barriers from selling in these markets on equal terms. If the GATT itself proves unable to face up to the realities of today's world, and we hope that it can measure up to its responsibilities, we may have to give thought to other ways of meeting the needs. If we are to reach our goal of a bright new international future, the rules and procedures of the past must be adapted to the world of the 1970's. There is clearly a need for an international forum or forums in which the interrelationship of all the factors affecting international economic matters-monetary, tax, and trade--can be discussed, not piecemeal, but as part of a whole problem of economic health for all participating nations. Secretary Connally, in his March 15 remarks, stressed the need to recognize such links in the international economy when approaching the issue of monetary reform. Indeed, the international discussions of last fall, following the President's declaration of his New Economic Policy, were successful in achieving the recognition of the interrelationship between international monetary and trade matters. Accordingly, the President placed in the hands of Secretary Connally, his chief economic spokesman, the broad responsibility and negotiating authority to do the job. secretary Connally has commissioned Under Secretary Volcker to discuss with our principal trading partners the development of an appropriate forum or forums. Under Secretary Volcker has recently talked with his colleagues - 9 - in Europe and hopes to go in the next week or so to Japan for discussion of this matter. Implementation Versus Policy-Making It has often been said, "Important as it is to make policy, it is even more important to implement it." It could very well be that more forceful administration of the Antidumping Act and countervailing duty law in earlier years would have eased our problems today. I can well remember my confirmation hearing when each and every question of the Senate Finance Committee dealt with these two statutes and whether I intended to enforce them. For months thereafter, the same Senators were telling me, rfyou have those statutes, use them." Well, this Administration has used the Antidumping Act effectively and, as I mentioned, is reviewing the countervailing duty law. But, there are other aspects of implementing trade policy in day-to-day operations which strongly affect our international trade and our balance of payments. The main day-to-day operating bureau in the u.S. Government affecting international trade is the Bureau of Customs. Secretary Connally has directed that the trade and tariff aspects of that Bureau's operations be given the highest priority. This included not only the operating responsibilities of the Bureau of Customs in the area of antidumping and countervailing duty, but also its role in classification and valuation of imported merchandise, administration of quotas and marking requirements, prevention of smuggling, monitoring voluntary restraint arrangements, and investigation of commercial frauds. We also have under way a Treasury study to analyze the data that is available in international trade matters. Here again, the Bureau of Customs is the prime source for data regarding trade matters and yet, for analyzing and - 10 - interpreting that data, its resources have not heretofore been fully utilized. This also we are moving to correct. The Future In swmnary, President Nixon's Administration has moved forcefully to improve our international trade and monetary position. We have given our anti-price discrimination tools the most vigorous exercise they have ever had. We have negotiated the removal of various trade barriers and set the stage for an overhaul of the international trade mechanisms in the near future. Secretary Connally has demonstrated what can be accomplished by a single chief economic spokesman for the President. We are seeking an international forum which ~vill enable us to deal with the problems in their full depth and perspective. And we have identified the need within the Executive Branch to institutionalize these capabilities. The President has made it clear that he intends to meet the challenge of the future by stimulating our economy to ensure our continued efficient and competitive position in the world. This means that inflation and unemployment in the United States will be reduced while investment in new plants and equipment by the private sector are stimulated. While building this stronger economy at home, we must remain outward looking and international in our initiatives overseas. This Administration is committed to such a course. Of course, our foreign friends and trading partners must be equally outward looking and international in their approach to their problems. All Americans and all countries must be willing to make the necessary sacrifices and, as a result, all Americans and all countries will be beneficiaries. - 11 - What we seek are the conditions that will encourage freer and fairer trade throughout the entire world, develop growing domestic enterprise and employment, and insure these gains against the erosion of inflation. The President's New Economic Policy advances these goals by laying the foundation for peace with prosperity throughout the world. 000 Harch 31, 1972 UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS ISSUED AND REDEEMED THROUGH (Dollar amounts in millions - rounded and will not necessarily add to totals) DESCRIPTION lED ~s A-1935 thru D-1941 ~s F and G-1941 thru 1952 es J and K-1952 thru 1957 AMOUNT ISSUEDY AMOUNT REDEEMEDY AMOUNT OUTSTAN DINGY 5,003 29,521 3,754 4,998 29,495 3,744 5 26 10 .10 .09 .27 1,910 8,427 13,548 15,811 12,441 5,666 5,394 5,588 5,539 4,856 4,200 4,401 5,031 5,130 5,347 5,169 4,875 4,763 4,472 4,491 4,570 4,437 4,973 4,836 4,717 5,088 5,039 4,783 4,491 4,689 5,360 608 340 1,718 7,571 12,204 14,169 11,001 4,849 4,479 4,563 4,446 3,845 3,326 3,458 3,879 3,899 4,019 3,851 3,580 3,400 3,148 3,066 2,991 2,810 2,950 2,862 2,782 2,873 2,807 2,595 2,281 1,992 1,416 192 855 1,344 1,642 1,440 817 914 1,026 1,093 1,010 874 943 1,151 1,232 1,327 1,318 1,295 1,363 1,324 1,425 1,580 1,626 2,022 1,974 1,936 2,215 2,232 2,188 2,210 2,697 3,943 608 12 10.05 10.15 9.92 10.39 11.57 14.42 16.94 18.36 19.73 20.80 20.81 21.43 22.88 24.02 24.82 25.50 26.56 28.62 29.61 31. 73 34.57 36.65 40.66 40.82 41.04 43.53 44.29 45.75 49.21 57.52 73.56 100.00 3.53 rURED es ElI : 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955· 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 fnciassified 'otal Series E ~s H (1952 thru May, 1959)}j H (June, 1959 thru 1972) otal Series H otai Series E and H {Total matured ,eries Total unmatured Grand Total "10 OUTSTANDING OF AMOUNT ISSUED - 329 180,989 133,161 47,828 26.43 5,485 8,299 3,859 2,678 1,626 5,621 29.64 67.73 13,784 6,537 7,247 52.58 194,773 139,698 55,075 28.28 38,277 194,773 233,050 38,237 139,698 177,935 40 55,075 55,115 .10 28.28 23.65 accrued discount. 'ad_Dlption value. 101 ownar bonds may be held and will earn interest lor additional periods after ori~inal maturity dales. The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 For Immediate Release April 7,1972 secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally announced today that he is ordering withdrawal of a proposal to reorganize certain dis'tricts wi thin the Bureau of Customs. On March 10, 1972, the Department of the Treasury published in the Federal Register a notice of proposed changes in district organization within customs Regions I and VI. This proposed rule-making would have consolidated the Customs districts of providence, Rhode Island, and Bridqeport, Connecticut, into the Boston district, and the Customs districts of Port Arthur and Galveston, Texas, into the Houston district. In view of the public comments received in response to the notice, Secretary Connally determined that it would not be in the public interest to proceed with the proposed reorganization at this time. He has directed that an appropriate notice withdrawing the proposed rule-making be published in the Federal Register at an early date. 000 C-276 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 ~DIATE RELEASE TelEPHONE W04·2041 April 7, 1972 STATEMENT OF EUGENE T. ROSSIDES ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY (ENFORCEMENT, TARIFF AND TRADE AFFAIRS, AND OPERATIONS) NINE MONTH REPORT OF THE TREASURY/IRS NARCOTICS TRAFFICKER PROGRAM On June 17, 1971, as part of a major message on his multi-dimensional narcotics program, President Nixon announced the Treasury/IRS Narcotics Trafficker Program. On July 1, 1971, the program was initiated. In each area of the country, cadres of Treasury Agents were established to concentrate full time on intensive tax investigations of major narcotics traffickers, smugglers and financiers. I am pleased to report on the results of the first three quarters. In the initial nine-month period (July 1 - March 31, 1972), we have achieved the following: 1. 530 targets in 34 states, 52 cities and the District of Columbia were selected by Treasury's Target Selection Committee and referred to~e IRS. Under the direction of IRS Commissioner Johnnie Walters, 369 Treasury Agents are presently conducting intensive tax investigations (See attached Table 1); 2. $31.8 million in taxes and penalties have been assessed under the program, of which more than $4.1 million has already been collected in the form of cash or valued property; 3. 2 men have been convicted of criminal tax charges; 9 other criminal tax cases are pending in Federal District Courts in N.Y., Miami, Detroit, Los Angeles, Indianapolis, and Baltimore; and another 12 investigations have been completed with prosecution recommendations. - 2 - We believe this represents a significant achievement. It confirms our prediction to the Appropriations Committees in the Congress that, by focusing attention on the key figures responsible for the narcotics distribution, this program "will make a major additional contribution to the President's offensive against drug abuse." The program is designed to take the profit out of the illegal traffic in narcotics and thereby further disrupt the traffic. This is to be accomplished by conducting systematic tax investigations of middle and upper echelon narcotics traffickers, smugglers, and financiers. These are the people who are generally insulated from the daily operations of the drug traffic through intermediaries. The word for the drug traffickers is "get out of the illegal drug traffic or face up to intensive tax investigations. 000 TABLE I STATE METROPOLITAN AREA Alabama Alaska Arizona California Mobile Anchorage Phoenix - Tucson Los Angeles San Francisco Denver Hartford Washington, D. C. Miami Honolulu Atlanta Chicago Indianapolis New Orleans Baltimore Boston Detroit St. Paul St. Louis Las Vegas Newark & Suburbs Albuquerque Albany Buffalo New York City & Suburbs Greensboro Cleveland Cincinnati Portland Philadelphia Pittsburgh Providence Columbia Nashville Austin - Houston Dallas Salt Lake City Burlington Richmond Seattle Parkersburg Mil\iaukee Colorado Connecticut District of Columbia Florida Hawaii Georgia Illinois Indiana Louisiana Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Missouri Nevada New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina Ohio Oregon Pennsylvania Rhotie Island South Carolina Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin SELECTED TARGETS 1 1 20 23 26 7 9 14 54 7 18 36 8 11 3 11 27 1 7 1 30 7 3 9 89 8 7 2 7 22 9 1 4 2 31 1 1 2 1 7 1 1 ITO 34 States 52 cities and the District of Columbia Treasury Department Office of Law Enforcement March 31, 1972 TABLE II Target Assessments: Regular Assessments $ 2,521,168 Jeopardy Assessments l / $ 8,037,736 $10,558,904 sub-Total Spontaneous Assessments~/ (Jeopardy Assessments Terminationsli ) ~nd Tax Year Total Assessments $21,193,386 $31,752,290 Tax Year Terminations Dollars Seized $ 3,633,497 Property Seized $ 440,000 Cases Recommended for Prosecution 12 Criminal Tax Cases in u.S. Courts awaiting trial 9 criminal Tax Convictions 2 1/ Jeopardy assessments are additional assessments of taxes made where a return has been filed, but where circumstances exist under which delay might jeopardize collection of the revenue. 2/ Spontaneous Assessments are expedited assessments made against narcotics traffickers as a result of seizures by other law enforcement agencies of large sums of cash or other assets during the course of an arrest or a search. Because of .the expedited procedures employed, the figures for spontaneous assessments are frequently in excess of the amount ultimately determined to be due. 3/ Termination of Tax Year is a computation of the tax due and assessment made where the time for filing the return has not become due where circumstances exist under which delay might jeopardize collection of the revenue. Treasury Department Office of Law Enforcement April 7, 1972 TREASURY'S I.R.S. NARCOTICS PROGRAM Number of Targets by State 530 ~".,:~ ·r~··"'-"'-"'-'-.""'~"'. , ...'---1 -'~ .... t· -:~~~,./~ _. ..~"L ~ ~G ,. .. '" 1-'7;;;-. ..· -..· -..·-..·-.. I '•• "O\. )\ ---71 t·. ·· . . . . '"" I 1 1. .. 7 "'"CO ..... 20 HAWAII 7 7 "',... ~ 1 ; -...r= ........ M£;tl~: ntl tI.,&A1\oIOO fI ntl TllUSIIII't OIl, .... 1.>.. " " - March 31, 1972 .....,.... ",l 27 Ii\ J ~ .,.JoSIIIIIGtOI' 0 to. • ----------------- O.f ."0..... ') .J r .~ ""~, 7 lot", I ~~ < • .\ ) ~ ~\,,~.- I I ......... ="\... ] _\. ~'_ I 1 ~ ' ' -' /.... ~r f/~Iv.;~"'-~/~"rO ...,. ..•. j /e04o_,,00 ~rp:-.\. t*.. ..... I 1 II ....,.\C" G - .. ', '.\' ..111 ..... ")&\ 14 4/7/72 BACKGROUND PAPER secretary John B. Connally, in the spring of 1971, recommended to the President this nationwide program. President Nixon announced the program of tax investigations of major narcotics traffickers on June 17, 1971, as part of a message on his multidimensional approa~h to combat drug abuse. The objective of the program is to disrupt the narcotics distribution system by taking the profits out of the illegal traffic in drugs. Reflecting the high priority given this program by the President, Congress provided financial support for it amounting to $7.5 million in Fiscal 1972 and authorization for 541 additional position in IRS -200 Treasury Intelligence Agents, 200 Treasury Revenue Agents, and 141 support personnel. Treasury has coordinated this tax program with the anti-smuggling drive of its Bureau of Customs, the drive against narcotics distribution of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and the prosecution efforts of the Tax and Criminal Divisions of the Department of Justice. We have also had the full support and cooperation of State and local enforcement agencies in the conduct of this program. This program is a major enforcement effort but it must be emphasized that it is only one part of this Administration"s comprehensive drive against narcotics. Multi-Dimensional Program President Nixon started his war on drugs the first month of his Administration when he established the Interdepartmental Task Force on Narcotics, Marijuana and Dangerous Drugs that led to Operation Intercept in September, 1969, and Operation Cooperation in October, 1969. He has escalated that war with a series of action programs, and progress has been made. First, he elevated the drug problem to the foreign policy level and has taken personal initiatives in soliciting the cooperation of other governments. The aim of our diplomatic efforts is to have each nation do its share and meet its responsibilities in the worldwide war against drug abuse. - 2 - Second, he placed particular emphasis on the crucial roles of education, research, and rehabilitation. The Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention was established within the White House under the direction of Dr. Jerome Jaffe to coordinate Federal action in the fields of education, research, and rehabilitation. In 1971, nearly 150 million dollars were devoted to education, research, and rehabilitation. That figure will be doubled in 1972 and increased further in 1973. Third, he recommended differentiation in the criminal penalty structure between heroin and marijuana; and flexible provisions for handling first offenders. Fourth, he stressed total community involvement the private sector as well as governmental agencies -in this anti-drug abuse program. Fifth, he provided a substantial increase in budgetary support for Federal law enforcement in this area. Sixth, he recognized the central role of the states and the need for close Federal-state cooperation in a unified drive against drug abuse. More recently, on January 28, 1972, the President established the Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement in the Department of Justice headed by former Commissioner of Customs Myles J. Ambrose. This program will concentrate an assault on the street level heroin pusher. The new office will be working closely with state and local enforcement agencies. In this program, we have seen for the first time the total involvement of the institution of the Presidency in the battle against drug abuse. The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 7, 1972 TREASURY ANNOUNCES SPECIAL SECURITIES ARRANGEMENT WITH GERMAN BUNDESBANK The Treasury today announced an arrangement with the German Bundesbank to issue to the Bundesbank $2.5 billion of medium-term special, non-marketab1e Treasury securities in exchange for a like amount of shorter-term special, non-marketab1e and marketable Treasu~y securities now held by the Bundesbank. This arrangement represents a continuation of the program of investments entered into with the Buridesbank and announced in June 1971 and the new investments are to be issued on s~i1ar terms to those of last year. Of the total of $2.5 billion, approximately $600 million is being exchanged from shorter-term special non-marketab1es earlier acquired by the Bundesbank. The remaining $1.9 billion will be exchanged by the Treasury for short-term marketable Treasury bills held by the Bundesbank. These bills, which have weekly maturity dates spread fairly evenly throughout the second quarter of this year, will be available for gradual sale in the market in the light of emerging Treasury cash requirements and market conditions. C-278 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE June 28, 1971 TREASURY ANNOUNCES SPECIAL SECURITIES ARRANGEMENT WITH GERMAN BUNDESBANK The Treasury today announced an arrangement with the German Bundesbank for the purchase by the Bundesbank of up to $5 billion of special Treasury securities. This operation will be completed within the next few weeks. The arrangement reflects the willingness of the United States, recently expressed by Secretary John B. Connally, to assist with appropriate dollar investment outlets for foreign central banks which have received large amounts of dollars. The securities are medium-term, nonmarketable U. S. Treasury notes with maturities of one to five years. Interest rates on these obligations will be in line with rates on outstanding Treasury securities of comparable maturities in the domestic market at the time of issuance~ In accordance with the terms of the notes, should the Bundesbank require early redemption, proper advance notice is necessary and the interest rates would be adjusted downward to reflect the shorter life of the obligation. Of the total of up to $5 billion, $3 billion has already been accomplished. This amount was partially financed by the Bundesbank through the retirement of approximately $2 billion of short-term special Treasury securities acquired earlier in the year. To the extent outstanding special securities now held by the Bundesbank are not retired, the Treasury's market borrowing requirements later this Summer will be reduced. C-83 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE JOHN B. CONNALLY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION AND MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS TUESDAY, APRIL 11, 1972, 9:45 A. M. It is a pleasure for me to appear before this Committee on behalf of the President to urge enactment of H.R. 6962, a bill to create a Depa~tment of Community Development. The Administration is deeply appreciative of this opportunity to make a summation of its case in behalf of this particular reorganization proposal. My purpose today is to affirm the concern of the President that we complete action on this vital reorganization and that we do so without amendments which would undermine the central purposes or the effectiveness of the new departme'lt. As you know, two weeks ago the President sent to the Congress a message calling for action on the departmental reorganization proposals which he initially placed before the Congress on March 25, 1971. In this message the President called attention to H.R. 6962 and observed: 279 "Prompt, favorable action on this bill would represent a much-n~eded victory for common sense and the public good. Its defeat or emasculation would serve no interest except entrenched privilege and private advantage, and would cruelly disserve the interest of literally thousands of urban and rural communities with millions of people who are tired of waiting for Washington to get itself together and help - 2 - them. I urge all those concerned with the cause of ixectttive ~.organization to redouble their efforts to bring H.R. 6962 to my desk for signature during 1972 ••• " It was my privilege to serve as a member of the President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization, which intensively studied the organieation of the domestic departments and made the recommendations on which much of the current ~eorganization plan is based. We found,~n .our revi~w, as had other commissions and't~sk forces which had preceded us, that our departments were simply not organized or equipped to deal effectively with the problems before us. No where was this clearer than in the vital area of assisting communities -- urban, suburban and rural -- in their development as wholesome, viable places in which to work and live. The e£isting picture is one of a number of departments providing piecemeal, overlapping, poorly coordinated support to physical and institutional development within our communities. The origins of this situation go back to the way our departments have evolved over the past century, with their concern over clientele, over means instead of ends, and over jurisdiction in the face of competing agencies. We have learned the hard way, and the case for reorganization can no longer be ignored. We cannot charge one department with housing and community planning and another with highway programs. We cannot organize around arbitrary distinctions between large and small towns. And we cannot expect three or four agencies to be effective in providing virtually the same assistance for sewage treatment and other commuhity facilities. The Federal government's organization does not adequately reflect the fact that the problems of communities are basically similar regardless of where one lives. People require adequate housing, roads, community facilities, and community institutions. There is no reason why a citizen should have different benefits of life in one location as compared to another, just because the Federal Government is not organi~ed'to distribute equitably and effectively funds and other forms of assistance. Nor should the efforts of one agency run counter to those of ~nother as has too often been the case. - 3 - As a former Governor, I can assure you that we have done poorly in helping State and local governments improve their capability for planning and management because of the Federal disarray. Agencies at the State and local level now have to work with too many Federal agencies and it is often close to impossible for them to secure prompt and consistent action in meeting their needs. While there has been broad, bipartisan support for the concept of a Department of Community Development, I understand this Committee has received objections to the placement in this department of certain rural development programs of the Department of Agriculture, and the highway functions of the Department of Transportation o I would like to emphasize that the Administration regards the inclusion of these programs in the new department as critical to the realization of the objectives of this reorganization o Let me turn first to the proposed placement of the housing and community facilities functions of the Farmers Home Administration and the programs of the REA in the Department of Community Developmento The President is deeply concerned that the needs of small communities and rural areas not be neglected o In his message of February 1, 1972, on rural development, he emphasized the interrelationships between rural, urban, and suburban problems and urged that the Department of COmmunity Development be established, to assure maximum impact for every dollar spent for rural development 0 The Committee has heard testimony from those who preter the conversion of the Department of Agriculture into a department concerned with rural development as well as the efficient production and marketing of food and fibero In my judgment this approach would be harmful to the farmer as well as rural America, and would constitute an unsound basis for organizing a departmento If we take the misguided path of attempting to split the Nation between its urbanized areas and those of less dense population we will only be aggravating the problems of duplication, conflict and confusion which already are proving so frustrating to State and local officials and to the publico - 4 All my life I have been associated with rural America and its needs o I think I understand a little about why we have fallen short in giving rural communities the support which they need o In my judgment the Department of Agriculture can never do its basic job of assistance to farmers and at the same time develop the expertness and machinery to administer large and complex community development programs o All communities need housing, need public utilities, need water and sewer services, need roads and highways, need constructive planning and need 'institutions for effective citizen andgpvernmental action o This being the case, we need a single Department, under one Secretary who is concerned with the direction and coordination of all Federal programs aimed at helping our communities o The fear has been expressed that the new Department of Community Development will be dominated by a concern for the large cities o There has also been much criticism about the way HUD has attended to rural needs o First, I would like to emphasize what others have said: If we move into the Department of Community Development the programs which belong there, including those concerned with rural development, we will have a new department characterized by a balanced organization and a Secretary with the authority to fight for the needs of all communitieso He will have a mission which will permit him to give his undivided attention to community I think it can be established that HUD has done development much more for rural communities -- even under its present charter -- than it receives credit foro But we should not blame HUD for its shortfalls when many of the tools to serve rural America were in the hands of other agencies over which it has had no effective controlo 0 Let me now turn to the highway issueo When the President recommended moving highway and mass transporation functions to DCD last year, he had compelling evidence that the bulk of the problems associated with our highway programs related to the impact of roads on the communities which they served or traversed o He noted that the location of the highway organization of the Government has been changed frequently since the first Federal Roads Act and that each move took into account changes in the nature of highway needs o - 5 - Virtually every significant event involving highways in the past year has served to make clear the jeopardy in which our highway programs have been placed as a result of the rising concern wfrh their impact on communities and their environment. I am surprised that there are still those who contend that we can build highways and then let communities emerge willy-nilly around them o This is thinking out of the past. If we are to continue to provide needed highways, future progress must take place within the department best able to assure that Federal highway programs contribute to balanced, attractive and coordinated community development 0 I know there are those who are concerned over the impact of the Department of Community Development on the Departments of Agriculture and Transportation o I want to stress to this Committee that both Departments will remain strong and viable without the programs proposed for transfer to DCD o The Congress is in the excellent position of being able to establish the new Department this year without in any way committing itself to el~ination of any Executive Department other than the Department of Housing and Urban Developmento No functions of government more directly or broadly affect the quality of life in this nation than those related to community developmento This country can no longer tolerate unmanageable governmental organization, providing a piecemeal approach to this fundamental need o Ho Ro 6962 answers this need o It would give us a single department under one official, accountable to the President, the Congress, and the people -~ providing leadership and assistance to developing communities across this broad lando I urge prompt enactment o I would be pleased to answer questions which you, Mro Chairman, or members of the Committee may haveo 000 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 'OR TelEPHONE W04·2041 IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 10, 1972 RAYMOND F. HARLESS, IRS CAREER OFFICIAL, NAMED TO DEPUTY COMMISSIONER'S POST Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally announced today the Ipointment of Raymond F. Harless, a career official, as Deputy Immissioner of the Internal Revenue Service. Mr. Harless' Ipointment is effective immediately. Mr. Harless, who has been IRS District Director in m Francisco since July 1970, replaces William H. Loeb, who ~cently retired. In his new post, the second highest in the IRS, ~ will be Deputy to IRS Commissioner Johnnie M. Walters. Secretary Connally said that the appointment of Mr. Harless Deputy Commissioner "is in line with the Treasury Department's licy of recognizing and advancing outstanding career officials." Mr. Harless began his IRS career in 1946 as a revenue agent in n Francisco. After holding a series of increasingly responsible sitions, he was selected in 1956 for the IRS executive development urse 0 On completing the program, Mr. Harless was named Assistant strict Director in Detroit. After serving there and in a similar sition in Chicago, he returned to San Francisco in 1960 as the S Western Region's Assistant Regional Commissioner for Audit. held that position until he became IRS District ~irector in 11 Franc isco. Born in San Francisco, Mr. Harless, 52, received a B.S. accounting from the University of California in 1942,_and an M.S. He ~ree from the California Institute of Technology in 1943. ~ved in the Air Force in --World War I I. Mr. Harless is married to the former Helen McCastline of Francisco. They have three children. 000 ',80 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE JOHN B. CONNALLY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION AND MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS TUESDAY, APRIL 11, 1972, 9:45 A. M. It is a pleasure for me to appear before this Committee on behalf of the President to urge enactment of H.R. 6962, a bill to create a Depaf"tment of Community Development. The Administration is deeply appreciative of this opportunity to make a summation of its case in behalf of this particular reorganization proposal. My purpose today is to affirm the concern of the President that we complete action on this vital reorganization and that we do so without amendments which would undermine the central purposes or the effectiveness of the new departme 1t. 1 As you know, two weeks ago the President sent to the Congress a message calling for action on the departmental reorganization proposals which he initially placed before the Congress on March 25, 1971. In this message the President called attention to H.R. 6962 and observed: ·279 "Prompt, favorable action on this bill would represent a much-needed victory for common sense and the public good. Its defeat or emasculation would serve no interest except entrenched privilege and private advantage, and would cruelly disserve the interest of literally thousands of urban and rural communities with millions of people who are tired of waiting for Washington to get itself together and help - 2 - them. I urge all those concerned with the cause of executive reorganization to redouble their efforts to bring H.R. 6962 to my desk for signature during 1972 ••• " It was my privilege to serve as a member of the President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization, which intensively studied the organieation of the domestic departments and made the recommendations on which much of the current reorganization plan is based. We found,~n.our revi~w, as had other commissions and" task forces which had preceded us, that our departments were simply not organized or equipped to deal effectively with the problems before us. No where was this clearer than in the vital area of assisting communities -- urban, suburban and rural -- in their development as wholesome, viable places in which to work and live. The eKisting picture is one of a number of departments providing piecemeal, overlapping, poorly coordinated support to physical and institutional development within our communities. The origins of this situation go back to the way our departments have evolved over the past century, with their concern over clientele, over means instead of ends, and over jurisdiction in the face of competing agencies. We have learned the hard way, and the case for reorganization can no longer be ignored. We cannot charge one department with housing and community planning and another with highway programs. We cannDt organize around arbitrary distinctions between large and small town9. And we cannot expect three or four agencies to be effective in providing virtually the same assistance for sewage treatment and other commuhity facilities. The Federal government's organization does not adequately reflect the fact that the problems of communities are basically similar regardless of where one lives. People require adequate housing, roads, community facilities, and community institutions. There is no reason why a citizen should have different benefits of life in one location as compared to another, just because the Federal Government is not organized "to distribute equitably and effectively funds and other forms of assistance. Nor should the efforts of one agency run counter to those of ~nother as has too often been the case. - 3 - As a former Governor, I can assure you that we have done poorly in helping State and local governments improve their capability for planning and management because of the Federal disarray. Agencies at the State and local level now have to work with too many Federal agencies and it is often close to impossible for them to secure prompt and consistent action in meeting their needs. While there has been broad, bipartisan support for the concept of a Department of Community Development, I understand this Committee has received objections to the placement in this department of certain rural development programs of the Department of Agriculture, and the highway functions of the Department of Transportation o I would like to emphasize that the Administration regards the inclusion of these programs in the new department as critical to the realization of the objectives of this reorganizat ion 0 Let me turn first to the proposed placement of the housing and community facilities functions of the Farmers Home Administration and the programs of the REA in the Department of Community Developmento The President is deeply concerned that the needs of small communities and rural areas not be neglectedo In his message of February 1, 1972, on rural development, he emphasized the interrelationships between rural, urban, and suburban problems and urged that the Department of Cbmmunity Development be established, to assure maximum impact for every dollar spent for rural development 0 The Committee has heard testimony from those who preter the conversion of the Department of Agriculture into a department concerned with rural development as well as the efficient production and marketing of food and fibero In my judgment this approach would be harmful to the farmer as well as rural America, and would constitute an un80und basis for organizing a department g If we take the misguided path of attempting to split the Nation between its urbanized areas and those of less dense population we will only be aggravating the problems of duplication, conflict and confusion which already are proving so frustrating to State and local officials and to the publico - 4 All my life I have been associated with rural America and its needs o I think I understand a little about why we have fallen short in giving rural communities the support which they need o In my judgment the Department of Agriculture can never do its basic job of assistance to farmers and at the same time develop the expertness and machinery to administer large and complex community development programso All communities need housing, need public utilities, need water and sewer services, need roads and highways, need constructive planning and need 'institutions for effective citizen andgpvernmenta1 action o This being the case, we need a single Department, under one Secretary who is concerned with the direction and coordination of all Federal programs aimed at helping our communitieso The fear has been expressed that the new Department of Community Development will be dominated by a concern for the large cities o There has also been much criticism about the way HUD h~s attended to rural needs o First, I would like to emphasize what others have said: If we move into the Department of Community Development the programs which belong there, including those concerned with rural development, we will have a new department characterized by a balanced organization and a Secretary with the authority to fight for the needs of all communities o He will have a mission which will permit him to give his undivided attention to community I think it can be established that HUD has done development much more for rural communities -- even under its present charter -- than it receives credit foro But we should not blame HUD for its shortfalls when many of the tools to serve rural America were in the hands of other agencies over which it has had no effective contro1 o 0 Let me now turn to the highway issue o When the President recommended moving highway and mass transporation functions to oeD last year, he had compelling evidence that the bulk of the problems associated with our highway programs related to the impact of roads on the communities which they served or traversed o He noted that the location of the highway organization of the Government has been changed frequently since the first Federal Roads Act and that each move took into account changes in the nature of highway needs o - 5 - Virtually every significant event involving highways in the past year has served to make clear the jeopardy in which our highway programs have been placed as a result of the rising concern with their impact on communities and their environment e I am surprised that there are still those who contend that we can build highways and then let communities emerge willy-nilly around them o This is thinking out of the pasto If we are to continue to provide needed highways, future progress must take place within the department best able to assure that Federal highway programs contribute to balanced, attractive and coordinated community development 0 I know there are those who are concerned over the impact of the Department of Community Development on the Departments of Agriculture and Transportation o I want to stress to this Committee that both Departments will remain strong and viable without the programs proposed for transfer to DCD o The Congress is in the excellent position of being able to establish the new Department this year without in any way committing itself to elLmination of any Executive Department other than the Department of Housing and Urban Developmento No functions of government more directly or broadly affect the quality of life in this nation than those related to community developmento This country can no longer tolerate unmanageable governmental organization, providing a piecemeal approach to this fundamental need o Ho Ro 6962 answers this need o It would give us a single department under one official, accountable to the President, the Congress, and the people -~ providing leadership and assistance to developing communities across this broad lando I urge prompt enactment o I would be pleased to answer questions which you, Mro Chairman, or members of the Committee may haveo 000 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY PRESS CONFERENCE held by TREASURY UNDER SECRETARY for MONETARY AFFAIRS PAUL A. VOLCKER in the U.S. DELEGATION OECD OFFICES, PARIS, FRANCE MARCH 28, 1972 This transcript was made from a tape recording. Greetings Ladies and Gentlemen, I think we might begin. There is some interest, I take it, that I might meet with you and I just thought that it was most convenient if we did it all together here. I haven't anything special that I want to start with, but I would just say that I will be on the record here. Of course, I don't think it is fair for me to attempt to discuss the WP3 meeting which has just started, so if you would not expect me to volunteer or respond to questions on the WP3 meeting, itself, I think we can proceed and I am open to questions. Recently, QUESTION: /Mr. Volcker, there have been some reports that the United States Treasury is considering gold sales and these reports had an effect on the gold market yesterday, knocking down the price about 25 cents an ounce. I wondered if you might be able to comment on it. ANSWER: I should say the first I have seen of those reports is what I read in the Paris Herald-Tribune this morning. I think the only comment I can make is that I think our views on the role of gold in the longer run have been made clear, perhaps ad nauseua You know that we look for that to have a diminishing role in the 3ystem and I think we ought to explore alternative policies in that respect and alternative techniques in that respect certainly in connection with the longer term issues that are before us. term problem. That is one facit of the longer- Certainly I know of no action planned at this - 2 - time nor would I contemplate any action apart from discussions that we might have with our partners on this matter and we have had none. QUESTION: Mr. Under SecretarY,could you tell us roughly what you see as the time table or scenario for the discussion of the issues of longer-term monetary reform which were left over from the Smithsonian agreement over the next months or years so that we get roughly the right respective. ANSWER: Well, I think in the most general terms this has begun - - maybe never stopped is the right word. But so far it has been primarily limited to some discussions within the Executive Board of the Fund. We want to move ahead in this, I think, just as fast others are ready. We do have a question of resolving the appropriate forum here, and, at the same tiree, think the appropriate substantive issues ought to b~~raised. I think we are dealing with some extremely fundamental questions here and they're not simply limited to the monetary system. There are inter-relationships with trade. There are inter-relationships with fiscal po~ whic~ in their broadest sense, economy directl~ particulari1y impinge upon the external taxes, subsidies, all the rest. I think one of the lessons of recent experience is that all these problems are inter-related so there is a very sizeable agenda and a difficult agenda because beneath all the techniques that get discussed so avidly there are some very basic issues on the organization - 3 - of the world economy. There will be philosophical divergences and there will be, in particular instances some divergences of interest that are going to take some time to resolve. We want to build a monetary system for a generation, so to speak, and that is not something you do, at the least, on the back of an envelope. It involves, I think, an agreed view or consensus on the outlook for the world economy and the organization of the world economy. There are some interesting developments here in Europe and that is one aspect of it. How do they fit into a world whule? Some of this, I think, is reflected in our views towards the forum issue itself, which we would like to dispose of just as rapidly as we can. But we want to do it in a way that provides an appropriate back drop, appropriate environment for conducting these discussions. We don't have any fixed views on just how this should be done. As Secretary Connally indicated I think we have certain criteria in mind -- certain characteristics that any foum should have and I might just review that a bit because that is one of my current concerns. There is the question -- you might call it fair representation. You get a fair balance of the different interests in the world involved and you don't get some over balanced and you have a balanced representative group representing all the important interests. At the same time I would put down another criteria that it has to be of a managable size. That is a matter of numbers, in a sense, and I would think preferably, when one is looking for an - 4 efficient negotiating forum, one would think of less than 20, but let us think of something like 20 necessarily at all the preferred size. as a maximum, not If you would ask me for an outer limit that might be it. I think fair representation, managable size -- I think we should approach this with a broad perspective and I would include several things under that heading. As I mentioned a moment ago, we are not just dealing with some narrow monetary techniques here. I think we have to recognize, for instance, the inter-relationships with the trading order. this is a question. Now how you do But we would not want to see the agenda so circumscribed or the group so circumscribed that these interrelationships are kind of ruled out of order because they are not our of orde~They are part of the problem and we have to take account of these inter-relationships and have a forum that fairly reflects that. I think that even within the monetary area there are some rather broad issues of the adjustment process, national attitudes that are inherent in the monetary problem itself that sometimes are shoved under the table or obscured by concentration too strongly, simply, on Some particular techniques. Let me give you an example of the kind of thing I think of -- talking about an asset settlement system, full convertibility -- many of these plans discussed. They should be discussed. It is fine. But we have to look at the implicatic of those systems and we have to look behind the mechanics. ~e -5United States starts with a lot of liabilities and not many reserves. If we are going to run that kind of a system, I think, for instance, you have to look forward to a substantial period of US surpluses if the United States is going to regain its financial position and make that kind of a system work. So, naturally, we ask the question -- if that is the implication of this kind of a scheme, well, which countries are willing to look forward to this period of substantial deficit that offsets the American surplus? this And if there isn't a willingness to face kind of a prospect, well, we'd better consider that in shaping the monetary system. There is no sense in making a monetary system that rests for its stability on this kind of presumption but nobody agrees with the presumption. So that kind of question, I think, has to be put on the table and explored. Finally, I think, we want to say a balanced, wide, institutional participation apart from the countries involved, as I suggested, in the representation issue. I think there are a lot of talents, expertise, points of view to be brought to bear on this issue and I think there is some presumption, quite reasonably, that in the monetary area particularly the Fund has a special role to play but that should not be to the exclusion of other groups. of other groups. It must not be to the exclusion Here, we discuss these problems and relevant aspects of it in the DEeD all the time, for instance, and what role can this organization bring to bear? How can it participate? How should it get into the more narrowly monetary issues? What - 6 role is there for the calling upon, say, the expertise of the BIS and other groups? We want to bring in other various points of view -- what I termed in Washington last week, I guess, fresh air from whatever direction the air is fresh and look at this in a rounded way. I don't think any of this dictates any particular organizational pattern. I think you can probably say that no existing forum fully meets by itself, if you look at any existing forum and look at it in a vacuum, I don't think any of them fit all these criteria. But through some combination of forums or through some new forum I don't think these are- at all impossible kind criteria. 0: We want to come to some conclusion on this relative!] quickly and I would aim to devote, not to the exclusion of substance, but a considerable amount of my efforts in tre cornin~ weeks in trying to resolve this and will get some preliminary expression of views by some people while I am here in Europe this weeko I don't think that can be anything more than preliminary but I am prepared to come back just as soon as anybody is willing to have me, I suppose, and explore these issues in more detail and attempt to get them resolved not only in -- I don't limit that comment just to Europe because as my earlier co~nments imply there are more than the United States and Europe involved here. QUESTION: Have you had any initial reaction from the other members of the Group of Ten on these plans? - 7 - ANSWER: much here. I don't think enough to dignify very I will be getting some this week but we haven't sat down -- Mr. Connally made a speech, as you know, and he roughly outlined these kinds of views. I am not -- it is perhaps too much to say you are encouraged because I just haven't had that much reaction. I am not unencouraged by what scattered rreactions I have heard but it is really unfair to say more than that because I will only really begin to get the reactions now and we begin to see them face to face now. QUESTION: Do you really tllink when talking about groups of not more than 20 system that's going to carry out major surgery and build a to last a generation and the other situations, in your earlier words, that a group of 20 would work? Is it your hope that the Common Market nations would have a single representative? ANSWER: You are concsnwwith whether a group of 20 is too big or too small? Well I feel, as I suggested, when we are writing on a blank sheet of paper and could write down an ideal group -- you would start with a number smaller than that. I think that is probably about the maximum you can expect as an active negotiating group. Even then at some stage you are going to have to bring in a wider group or have Some facility for dealing with a wider group. One problem with the size, quite frankly, is if every Common Market country is to be represented you start out with I don't know what -- ten potentially? - 8 QUESTION: Is it the US government's hope that the Common Market countries would talk with a single voice? ANSWER: Well, I would say, in general, if the common market talks with a single voice and that is consistent with talking flexibly that would be an assistance to the negotiation. I am not sure those two criteria are fully compatible. But since you ask me ideally, it would obviously facilitate things if they not only talk with a single voice but could talk with a single voice. QUESTION: think this is But do you feel, in your soundings, do you realis~If you were mentioning 20, I take it that the would and the could are mutually exclusive? ANSWER: I have given up nothing at this stage because we haven't got -- as I suggested -- there is more than one way to skin a cat. I wouldn't want to go above 20. know what the views of the Common Market are now? I don't We would prefer a smaller group. QUESTION: ANSWER: How small a group would you ideally prefer? There is no magic number. thrust of my comment. I think that is the I don't think we can call a magic number but if you told me what was ideal I would say 10 or 12 would be plenty to have sitting around the tableo QUESTION: We have 10. - 9 ANSWER: We've got ten. That particular group, by itselfaslsuggested, doesn't quite meet all the criteria that are involved here but I don't exclude a combination of possibilities. QUESTION: There have been suggestions that the United States is less than happy with the Fund. (Inaudible) You have mentioned other groups as the OECD, the BIS , etc. in the same breath as the IMF. Does this mean that you feel that the IMF needs some rethinking of its own? ANSWER: I don't think anything I say can be interpretered as criticism of the Fund and I suggested that the Fund has perhaps a special role to play here. What I am suggesting is the Fund isn't the repository of all wisdom. It has particular points of view which are useful but it is not the only point of view. They have a particular institutional setting and a particular institutional history, which has its values. It has, in some sense perhaps, some deficiencies when one is looking at restructuring their very organizationo It has been very much limited to the monetary area and I think one of the - 10 - questions, for instance, that arises out of this whole a truly longer term question-~s discus~oo whether in our international institutional structure itself there shouldn't be closer integration between the trade institutions and the monetary institutions. That is an i~sue that ought to be looked at. Shouldn't GATT be involved in some extent since that is an issue. GATT again isn't inviolate as one looks down the road and tries to structure the future, so I don't think we can consider this the exclusive province of any group, recognizing that the Fund certainly has a close and prDnary interest in the thing. QUESTION: Do you rule out any further meetings of the Group of 10 or Deputies of the Group of 10? ANSWER: QUESTION: ANSWER: No. You would not be opposed? Well if the Group of 10 has a useful purpose to plaY,let us have it play it. As I suggested, the Group of 10 in and of itself, as presently constituted, I don't think meets all these criteria. That doesn't mean that the Group of 10 necessarily has to be abandoned and never meet or whatever. Maybe there is no single forum that answers all these questions but then we have to get some way of integrating various forums. QUESTION: Do you contemplate that the Group of 20 or whatever it is would have an independent Secretariat, ad hoc or permanently? - 11 ANSWt.;R: This is the kind of has to explored. Secretariat. quest~.on vJhich obviously In my thinking, it would have no substantial But it might well be useful ... it might well be essential that there be a minimal Secretariat and an Executive D~ector, a Chairman or wha~ever, that is going to devote, if not full time, a very appreciable amount of time to organizing the negotiation, so to speak. But if you are suggesting an elaborate Secretariat, I don't think that is necessary because there are good and efficient and effective existing Secretariats,. certainly the Fund Secretariat, for instance, is there to be drawn upon and should be drawn upon. We would want to draw upon the talent wherever it is. QUESTION: Do you contemplate the possibility the Chairman of this group might be not a national financial minister but somebody appointed specifically to fill this spot? ANSWER: I think anything is open at this stage. think I can express a judgment on that issue. I don't You may have a chairman at the finance minister level, could well be a finance minister, but does he have somebody to assist him, at less than the finance minister levels? A finance minister is not obviously, in himself, a Secretariat or full time or anything like a full time man. You can get a finance minister to chair a meeting and obviously pay some attention but who follows through, who organizes the work, how the meeting agenda is developed and so forth. There is going to be obviously some one to pay attention to these matters. - 12 - Ql' :2:STION: Cou 1d you answer the question whether (where?) rLJu/,hly the "rump'! Secretariat would be based or the Executive !Jircctor or Chairman? '~NSWER: I don 't know why you say "rump" Secretariat? I can't answer those questions because I did not come over here ~vith any blueprint. I cane over here with a desire to sound out what others might think on these matters and I think you will find us flexible and open minded within the context and criteria I suggested. QUESTION: How would you feel, Mr. Under Secretary, with the problem of dollar weakness over the extended period that these negotiations will take place if this - do you have any plans - what are your thoughts about coping with the problem? ANSWER: You are making a presumption that I am not ready to make Mr. Farnsworth. I think our point of departure is certainly the basic Smithonian Agreement and we are assuming that in effect, that is the interim arrangement and we are proceeding on the basis certainly of those exchange rates and related arrangements and we intend to continue to do so. think other countries intend to do so. That is what was I hope, at the Smithonian and I think was resolved. I resol~( That is t~ interim arrangement. QUESTION: But there are some demands for interim convert- ibility, for example, in this type of thing and there are questions. - 13 - ANSWER: premature. Our position is quite clear. These demands are Convertibility is something to be looked at in the context of the longer term reform. whole system. Smithonian. It has implications for the That is what was precisely agreed to at the I don't think it would be wise for the United States to undertake commitments of a sartthat are subject to doubt and question. I simply don't think that would be a stabilizing influence during this interim period. We will look at that in the context which I think was intended and we should look at it in that context. QUESTION: The point is also raised about what they call mini-convertibility, in which the British would be able to pay. At any rate, what are your views on this? You see I think that Secretary Connally made some reference to indicate that the United States would look with favor on this now and would try to accommodate as much as it could. ANSWER: You detect changes in attitude that I do not think are valid. We have always looked at this as a technical issue that has to be looked at and resolved. I would suspect in coming weeks there would be conversations on this and we will look at it and try to resolve it. I don't think there can be any expectation, given the current position of the United States, that we resolve it single handly at any means. I suppose that is what we are saying. We are not in a position to solve problems single handedly any more. And contributions have to be in some relationship to the strength of various countries externally and the strength of their reserve position - 14 - and the strength of their balance of payments. I think this is the basic message, if you will, that we have been trying to say since August 15th. The United States position has eroded for a long series of years. be a change here. external position. We have Th~re our position in the past. ~o There has to find the way to strengthen our rightly have been complaints about Well let us look at ways to examine that position because the long term erosion has accelerated in recent years and you are not going to have a stable monetary system without a stable dollar and a stable United States and a strong United States balance of payments position. This is at the heartof a good many of these issues and it is a hard and difficult problem. We have been trying to say that since August and let us not underestimate the problem. some progress. We have made We have got a structure of exchange rates that we are ready to work within and that will help things but that is not the end of the story. We have got a lot of other actions and activities to engage in over a period of time to restore the external position of the United States and we have to look at monetary arrangements partly from the view point of those that are liveable in this kind of context and its fundamental to this whole problem. Our pos ition is not what we would like to see it in and it is going to take some time to restore it and it is going to take hard and even aggressive effort by the United States in a number of areas. Things that we could tolerate for a long perioc of time cannot be tolerated if we are going to move in a positiOf - 15 - where the United States position is strong. Presumably, that is what people want and we want to move in that direction in a way consistent with a liberal orientation and certainly an outward view from the United States. We want to move in a way that removes barriers (and there are plenty of them!) that inhibit our exports, for instance, and not in away that closes economies or areas. Ul That seems to us not only essential and desirable economically in terms of political pressures but I think that is the only reasonable way in which we could move because the current position of the United States is unsustainable politically within the United States as well as externally. If we cannot move in a direction of restoring the strength of our external position we will have failed. QUESTION: It has been reported that the United States is resigned to living in a world of major economic power blocs rather than the more mUlti-(?) world of the GATT and the IMF as conceived. Is that so, and is that consistent with what you just said about the liberal philosophy? ANSWER: Well blocs is rather an (?) word. I think we ought to certainly base the view of the world on some appreciation of what the practical realities are. I think the movement toward monetary unity, for instance in Europe, seems to be here and present. That seems to be the direction in which Europe wants to move and is moving. I do not think we need to resist monetary unity in Europe or should resist it if that's what they want. I don't necessarily call that a bloc. I guess - 16 - VCll -' can call it a bloc but it's got both potential goods atd potential problems from the standpoint of the world. I guess we want to maximize the goods and minimize the problems. We frankly see tendencies in different directions in Europe, T~1ere is some convergence on the idea of wanting unity. Whether that is a unity that closes within itself or opens out to the rest of the world, I think is the question and it's a question that in the end is going to be answered by Europe not by the United States. I suppose in that sense we're disquieted by some trends we see within Euro~e and I don't think we can (?) that, but that is not our objective and this is one of those areas where the linkages with non-monetary policies are so clear and evident. There are direct monetary implications or financial implications in the area of controls where we may have some differences in philosophy. Does Europe want to build a wall of financial controls around itself? as the Cormnon Market or Europe generall~1 they want discrimination in trade? Favored Nation treatment. Is discrimination in trade sees it interent? Do We base policies on Most Non-discrimination in financial affairs is the financial parallel of Most Favored Nation. which direction does Europe want to go here? should be asked this question. Well, I think they This is one of those underlying issues in monetary and trade reform that have to be resolved and I think our answer to that is quite clear. We don't resist the unity of Europe -- never have, we've encouraged it. an official American policy. It has been If that turns inward on itself, - 17 we are not going to be very happy. I don't think Europe basically should be very happy but that's going to be a question for Europe. I hope not a question for Europe alone. It is something that has to be worked out with others and I hope international discussions will influence that development. But we would be blind to say that is not an issue. I think there are other issues. They are basic apart from the issue of monetary unity in Europe in general. philosophies on the control issue. Different We see the necessity to have a strong current account in the United States and we want a liberal investment order as well as a liberal trading order to help support that. Well if that is not congruent with the rest of the world's desires, they would rather have controls, we are going to have to hear about that and resolve that issue. There are difficult issues of the national independence of monetary policy that run behind this. want? How much independence do people How much are they willing to sacrifice to an international authority? This is no issue that is unique to the United States. This is an issue that every country has to face rather directly and adopt a philosophy that is consistent with others. Some of these issues appear quite evidently in a current context. is worried about too many dollars, I understand now. liberalize outward investment? Why not Or does that reflect some philosophy that we do not want investment liberalized. want to live within a block. Europe That we I'm just picking out one little symbol and I wouldn't make much importance of this. It sounded - 18 - interesting that in the United Kin8dom, for instance which is presumably worried about too many dollar inflows, they didn't do much to liberalize the outflows, really, and the measure that they took to liberalize the access of companies in the U.K. to sterling was with a discrirn~natory action. It liberalized in part if you were outside a depressed area for Corrnnon Market countries. They are not worried about inflows of marks and francs and all the rest presumably but those companies can borrow sterling and American companies cannot borrow sterling. So it is got to bring in the dollars from abroad if it wants tc expand. I don't know. Does this indicate anything of the philosophy in which Europe wants to move? If so, let's take account of that. Now I only picked that out as one little thing. I think you are all familiar with the general nature of the problem and perhaps conflict within Europe as to what direction they want to move in these respects. We would like to get these issues I might say on the table and discussed just as soon we can because they lie at the heart of what is going to be a long process and I think inevitably in some respects controversal process. QUESTION: What role do you think does the high-level OECD Trade Committee have in the working out of these plans? ANSWER: It's dealing w.th some aspects, I think. I view their role as essentially a temporary one but this is, I think, the creation of that group and the deliberations of that group - 19 - are in fact a symptom of the kind of problems that I am talking about and an attempt to take a view and put it in cont2xt but I am not ready to attach any permanence to that particular body or approach. But again we are not wedded to any particular institutional approach here within the criteria I suggested and certainly in the monetary area the Fund has a particu lar role to play which we fully recognize. QUESTION: How strongly do you feel about the idea of auto- matic discipline on surplus countries, so that they must take certain actions automatically if they have surpluses? ANSWER: We feel very strongly that this is a problem and it is a particular problem with certain types of systems. If you ask me how strongly we feel about any particular device at this stage of the game, not very strongly. We do not know what the right device is, but the problem seems to us quite evident, and in fact becomes more severe with some kinds of monetary systems that seem to be popular in some circles. If you are goind to have a tightly constructed asset settlement system --- :0 use the technical jargon--- well, as I suggested, I think the short-term implication of that (and the short-term is quite a few years) is the United States better run a surplus. And the longer term implication is you cannot be put in a position of running a deficit for any period of time a That is a fundamental economic fact that adjustment process is going to have to work. How's it go ing to have to work? You know, you can have such a tight asset settlement system that you're forcing changes in exchange rates every three weeks - 20 - when something gets out of whack. I'm exaggerating with every three weeks, but is that what people are really talking about in these kinds of terms? You've got to put that kind of issue on the table, if, or maybe there's some other adjustment techniqu What is it? Tariffs? Trade policy? .W1~atever. But let's not talk about that kind of system without simultaneously consideri~ what it's implications are for the pattern of international payments. And, how are you going to keep that pattern? How are you going to make these adjustments? If you're not willing to make the adjustments, let's not talk about that kind of a system QUESTION: When the United States was the largest creditor country in the war and afterwards, we fought against any type of automatic disciplines for, I believe we were against any type of automatic disciplines for surplus countries. Do you think that the present surplus oountries like Germany and Japan will accept with a system like this with any ANSWER: grea~equanimity? I think that's an interesting question which is better directed to the other countries. But this is precisely the kind of implication that has to be put on the table. I would point out in reference to the American experience. It's so long since we were in surplus that I find it difficult to cast myself back in that point of history. What we in fact did, we were, for a long period of time, a potential surplus country that turned ourselves into a deficit country. Alright, because we recognized that in those circumstances the other countries were weak, they had to build their asset position. So, to ask - 21 - this question, who is the United States of the 1970s? willing to run those deficits for the 1970s, to restore r. '1~S . kind of balance? I think that's a very good w~y to put '.l- lL.. The United States ran it during the 50s and the United Stazes ran it during the 60s. They ran it too long. to play that role in the 1970s? ~i .~ -,-:lV Bu t ivho 1 s \\ It's not the United States. Yon know, we ran out of gas in that role. And, so, let's consider who's going to play the role in the future, if you're going to have that kind of a system. And maybe any kind of a system lS going to be dependent upon that. This raises another kind of problem that cuts across all these issues. The United States relative to other countries 01 the irrrrnediate post-war period was obviously very strong. It \/2S the United States in one position and in some degree all other countries and in a greater or lesser degree in another position, hy a very large order of magnitude. It doesn't exist any more. It doesn't exist particularly with the growth of Europe and tne growth, the unity of Europe and the growth of Japan. Now that has, I think, certain implication for, you might think of as the Constitution of the monetary system. Who runs it? WelL, you know nominally the 1.M.F. ran it, and the I.M.F. is ar impor·· tant institution in the, you could say that in the 50s or 60s. But the I.M.F. had the United States behind it. going to be behind it in the future? power centers here of much more equal clearly a Constitutional issue here. You kno~}, who'~ You've got a number of weight. And there's How do these power centcrs work together when you don't have one that's dominant. A very - 22 - oasic issue of international monetary, financial trading organization. QUESTION: ANSWER: ? (Scarce Currency Clause?) Well, this kind of discipline on the surplus, so to speak, isn't a new idea as you suggest. at Bretton Woods, neven been effective. It was thought of How do you, you can think of this problem and how to make the scarce currency clause in the I.M.F. effective. esting clause. tL~e, You know, it's rather inter- It says if you got a surplus for any period of all sorts of QUESTION: ANSWER: But it's never been invoked, has it? Well, it may not as it's, there's a question whethf it's constructed in a way that facilitated it, its invocation. Haybe a refurbishing of the scarce currency clause will do the job. That's something to be looked at. That's certainly what y,'€ are talking about, in effect, whether you take that precise aveOl or not. The problem, which is not a new problem was recognized the time of Bretton Woods. You know this so-called Bretton ~, Wood~ system really hasn't worked the way the founders envisaged. envisaged such things as scarce currency clauses and a lot of discipline on the surplus countries. a very simple reason. And they envisaged it for They probably envisaged the kind of, what ,.vould nO\oJ be called an asset settlement system. And, I guess all 11m saying in that respect is that if you go back to the original vis ion of the I.M.F. founders, don't forget about some of these very important problems that the founders were in fact very concerned with. Now implicitly the decision sys tern. I don't mean by the United States, OJ collectively. That clause then did not seem so important but once go back to that kind of a system it becomes very QUESTION: ),0,- importc;~lt. May I ask what areas of the world do YOLl VVarti-:: to see in the Group of 20? ANSWER: It has been suggested the possibility th3t adopt the representational pattern that is now on the I.M.I'. board. QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you have been saying that YOll want this on the table and you want this and you want these other things on the table. Are you imputing that there are people who do not want them on the table? ANSWER: I don't know. I am imputing that a lot of the discussion that I see in the press has a kind of preoccupation with some surface mechanics that I do not think puts these issues on the table. The issues are kind of brushed aside Some concern about mechanics. In the broadest sense, 1n obvi::::"j sJ this process takes place simultaneously but in the broadec.:t sense the mechanics flow in place when you have got the philosophy straight, not the reverse. philosophy to fit the mechanics. You do not make up the As a practical matter chc discussion proceeds simultaneously. QUESTION: ANSWER: How long do you think the (Assessment?) It is going to take a period of time. It \,17 ill l~; rot \1 - 24 ,-,':,'o~hing I,.'e dre going to finish this year certainly, in my He don ill>.' '. L l.' , L I t know whetherv:e'll finish it next year. We ta lking about a major reconstruction of the monetary system I think the important thing is to get at it, and we are rt~adv to get at QUESTION: question. • +- ~~. I would like to pick up on my colleague's Do you get the feeling that some people are not ,villing - other of your partners - are not willing to get at it? ANSWER: I think it would be unfair to characterize my partners' attitudes before the discussions proceed in an intens ive \Vay. I \.<1OU I can only say I am not going to criticize my partner! ld . .. If you think it is fa ir that I think the pres s has perhaps neither always appreciated the depth of some of these problems, or market operators who quite understandably say, you know) do something, do anything, make us feel better. I wish I could make them feel better but there are some real issues here and there is no automatic simple solution here. QUESTION: •.. You say you don't think anything will be done till next year. I mean is this because of political considerations, elections ..•. - 25 ANSWER: No, no I do not. For a very simple reason. I do not think that we can work through these problems, if you are thinking of the American election. QUESTION: ANSWER: Well other elections too. People always have el2ctions and I would not worry excessively about the elections. I just myself -- maybe I will be pleasantly surprised but talking about putting a new system sort of in being by the fall of this year, as a practical judgment does not seem to me to be in the cards. Now if it is possible, fine. basic judgments are involved. I suppose if it was possible I -It is not th2 best time In the world to make a basic decision of this sort on the eve of a Presidential election -- I would freely admit that. But I don't think that is a relevant consideration since I don't think we are going to be at that stage by the fall in any event. QUESTION: Do you really think that anybody --- the average man will understand tre ANSWER: (?)? We are not talking about the average man, I think we are talking about, I should say even an extraordiGary president, I won't call him an average President. He is not going to be prepared to make a decision of this sort on the eve of an election but I don't think that is a relevant consideration. It does not enter into our thinking because I don't think we are going to be prepared to go with that - 26 kind of a package in September of this year. think that is on. feelings. I just don't Here I can, I think, speak of my colleagues' I do not know one government, maybe I am wrong. But I don't know of one government that has that kind of timetable anywhere near in mind. QUESTION: Are you going to wait until the next meeting of the Fund to have formal discussions on these things or are they going to be he Id ad hoc whenever any so rt of other bodies get together? ANS\,JER: I would expect discussions long before the next annual meeting of the Fund. I would hope that this forum -- tit question of the formal forum so to speak can be resolved very quickly. QUESTION: ANSWER: Such as the meeting right now? Oh no, in a perspective of weeks. But as your question implies I don't think all discussion has to cease befc the establishment of a formal forum. these questions on QUESTION: t~ I think we are putting table so to speak now. At the Rome Group of 10 meeting, one authority discussed, then under consideration only, the devaluation of the dollar of the order of 8 to 10 per cent (?) only being a half way solution to the fundamental disequilibrium cy,f tre United States. Would it be your view now that that would be d correct characterization of what came out of the Smithsonian Agreement? ANSWER: Well, I am not ~oing te ~hara~L~rI it as - 27 -- It is not a full solution. solution. Til or ki ng I wi~l We never It is obviously a help. and th inking \vi thin t ha t say what is obvious but is )::t . rat t? ,-::. c:mE:':JOl> ~ xc hange Oft2J ,~." ovctl~o~2J_ gets cepends on the performance of our ;],)mest:'Lc eCODC':-J.'''!. .i r1',(".o< that is fundamental -- how well we do on prices, how well we do in promoting an orderly but not inflatimu.::.y <..,dv2nc2. \,]e have a total program introduced at the same tir'~e suspension of convertibility was introduced designed for jl-,st that objective. I tuink basically the prospects for the American economy taking together the price performance, thi? expansion performance is probably better than any other around the world at this point in time. m~jor country We are moving in the right uirection but I do not want to imply by that that we have solved the problem domestically. suggest anything else. I would not Ivant to It is the key to a favorable outcome. But in addition to that, we think that there are a lot of trade barriers around the world which are somewhat biased against the United States, for instance. The United States is in a position where our cost of production for basic agricultural commodities approximates half of that in the Market. Well, that sounds pretty good. competitive advantage. market? Co®~on We've got a great How much access do we have to that How much is that situation being correcte(i by the actions being taken in Europe? Is this another one of those symptoms, a much more fundamental symptom of the kind of - 28 - ching chat I mentioned earlier 9 that Europe essentially "ants to go it alone ~ Here is an important trading sector in which the United States has an enormous competitive advanta~ l)Ur europe:: \...;ants to go it alone in this area J Well, that is rather an inhibition if that attitude were to persist on Our d~)ility to make an adjustment. What about the preferential agreements and the spread of preferential agreements in Europe? Is this a contribution to the adjustment process or is this an inhibition on the adj ustment process to say nothing of its implications for a multilateral world or kind of integrated world society? Nov; I by no means want to pick on Europe. problems with other sectors of the world. trade surpluses. We have had Japan has enormous How quickly are they going to move to liberalize in the interests of their own consumers as well as in the interests of the world economy? triple play at work here. There is kind of a You know, we take 30 percent of the Japanese exports and it is not entirely accidental, I think, that the Common Market takes 6 percent. I don't think that is purely a reflection of relative competitive positions. There aLe a good many arrangements of one sort of another in place here that inhibit what would seem to be a reasonable adj IJstment process. kind of development. We are concerned about precisely that We'd ask our trading partners, are you 100king for free trade, does that mean free trade for the Japanese exports as well as for others, or is this some kind a uore limited concept of liberal trade that people have - 29 - in mind? If so, let's know about it. So their exchange rates are not the answer to this questtol1 lH our opinion, by any means. We have done the exchange rate bi t. 2 But there are lot of other compcnents of the problem that remain to be worked on. QUESTION: Not all the trade barriers are biased against the United States, some of them are biased against other countries. ANSWER: We are all guilty in this respect. a question of relative importance. I think it is In some important areas and this is a question of what contributes to an adjustment that one wants to see. But if you wanted me to say the United States has no trade barriers I am not going to say so ~ecause obviously it does. QUESTION: How precisely do you expect to get your agreement on this forum. I mean will there be private soundings, with various people, will there be a meeting similar to todayrs meeting or something? ANSWER: Well, today's meeting is accidental In the sense that it is a WP3 meeting which is .•. QUESTION: How will we know that you have an agreement on the procedures when .•• - 30 \';ell, 1 presume when \Ve get agreement it P.NSVTER: bec~,slt' l~nC\vn ~.."i 11 that th.ere is a consensus on how to proceed but I think that it will take a lot of bilateral contacts, informal contacts. QUESTION: ANSWER: game, yes. (?) I would think primarily at this stage of the But we are ready to facilitate this process any way that seems best. We will meet bilaterally, jointly, multilaterally. QUESTION: Are you going to have bilateral meetings during this trip now? ANSWER: Well, I will have contacts with the various officials here and I am sure ••. QUESTION: ANSWER: Where else are you going? Well I am just going to Portugal with this Bellagio affair right nowo there. There will be a few other officials We will have some opportunity to talk. pared to come back to Europe or elsewhere. But I am pre- I would like to be home with the family for Easter, but I mean I am prepared to come back. QUESTION: ANSWER: How long will you stay on this trip? Just till tomorrow. - 31 QUESTION: ANSWER: QUESTION: You are leaving tomorrow? Yes. Mr. Volcker, if this matter is of such great urgency why don't you organize a conference in Which this question on the forum and other matters are on the formal agenda? ANSWER: We are willing to proceed, we want to proceed as fast as seems reasonable. If it seems useful to organize a conference we would organize a conference. We would not want to haggle for six weeks over organizing a conference. But we have no predilections against conferences -- if they are going to be useful. I am not sure there is a consensus that a conference is useful. QUESTION: ANSWER: If so, we will have a conference. What will be the next step then after ... I think that at this point my intention would be essentially some bilateral soundings or, I don't know whether I would dignify it with multilateralo You know I don't confine myself to sitting in a room with one person if it seems more useful talking with several at the same time. It may well be we will talk with several at the same time. But I would guess right at this particular stage the best way to proceed is by contacting my counterparts or other ministers in Europe or elsewhere and get their views, get them as directly and concretely as we can. We want to go home and make up our - 32 own mind on the specifics of tie matter which were now, as I suggested, quite open-minded about. What kind of mechanism best meets, best goes towards meeting the kind of criteria I set out. Thank you gentlemen. The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 NTION: TelEPHONE W04·2041 FINANCIAL EDITOR April 10, 1972 RELEASE 6: 30 P.M. RESULTS OF TREASURY'S WEEKLY BILL OFFERING l~e Treasury Department announced that the tenders for two series of Treasury 3, one series to be an additional issue of the bills dated January 13, 1972 , and April 13, 1972 , which were offered on April 4, 1972, )ther series to be dated opened at the Federal Reserve Banks today. Tenders were invited for $2,300,000,000, lereabouts, of 91-day bills and for $1,800,000,000, or thereabouts, of 182-day ). The details of the two series are as follows: ~ OF ACCEPTED ~TITIVE BIDS: High Low Average 91-day Treasury bills maturin~ July 13, 1972 Approx. Equiv. Annual Rate Price 99.067 99.043 99.057 3.691% 3.786% 3.731% Y 182-day Treasury bills rnaturinB October 12, 1972 Approx. Equiv. Price Annual Rate 97.886 97.843 97.865 4.182% 4.267% 4.223% Y 10% of the amount of 91-day bills bid for at the low price was accepted ll%of the amount of 182-day bills bid for at the low price was accepted TENDERS APPLIED FOR AND ACCEPTED BY FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICTS: Louis leapolis las City Las Francisco AEElied For $ 21,145,000 3,073,960,000 35,780,000 18,760,000 11,440,000 36,285,000 218,785,000 47,120,000 28,990,000 39,130,000 35,560,000 96,145,000 Acce12ted $ 10,145,000 1,917,960,000 15,780,000 18,760,000 11,440,000 27,285,000 125,785,000 40,320,000 20,990,000 29,130,000 13,560,000 69,145,000 AE121ied For $ 13,780,000 2,802,555,000 5,505,000 20,715,000 14,445,000 23,500,000 200,695,000 29,345,000 28,800,000 19,695,000 29,565,000 99,945,000 Acce12ted 3,780,000 $ 1,561,355,000 5,505,000 15,515,000 10,445,000 11,100,000 89,030 ,000 20,345,000 18,800,000 9,695,000 7,565,000 46,945,000 TOTALS $3,663,100,000 $2,300,300,000 ~ $3,288,545,000 $1,800,080,000E./ trict ton York ladelphia vel and Wlond mta ~ago :ludes $195,470 ,000 noncompetitive tenders accepted at the average price of 99.057 :ludes $ 93,220,000 noncornpeti ti ve tenders accepted at the average price of 97.865 ~se rates are on a bank discount basis. The equivalent coupon issue yields are ~ for the 91-day bills, and 4.38% for the 182-day bills. The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 April 11, 1972 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE ANTIDUMPING INVESTIGATION INITIATION ON PIG IRON FROM BRAZIL The Treasury Department announced today the initiation of an antidumping investigation of imports of pig iron from Brazil. The Treasury announcement followed a summary investigat ion conducted by the Bureau of Customs after receipt of a complaint alleging that dumping was taking place in the United States. The total value of pig iron imported from Brazil during the six-month period from September 1971 through February 1972 amounted to approximately $2.2 million. 000 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 April 11, 1972 ?OR IMMEDIATE RELEAg TREASURY'S WEEKLY BILL OFFERING The Treasury Department, by this public notice, invites tenders :or two series of Treasury bills to the aggregate amount of ;4,100,000, 000, or thereabouts, for cash and in exchange for Treasury dlls maturing April 20, 1972, in the amount of $4,105,740,000, IS follows: 91-day bills (to maturity date) to be issued April 20, 1972 ,n the amount of $2,300,000,000, or thereabouts, representing an :dditional amount of bills dated January 20, 1972, and to mature 'u1y 20, 1972, (CUSIP No912793 NV4 ), originally issued in he amount of $1,600,815,000, the additional and' original bills to be reely interchangeable. 182- day bills, for ~,800,000,000, or thereabouts, to be dated pri1 20, 1972, and to mature October 19, 1972 8USIP No. 912793 PH3) 0 The bills of both series will be issued on a discount basis und~~ )mpetitive and noncompetive bidding as hereinafter provided, and at lturity their face amount will be payable without interest. They will ! issued in bearer form only, and in denominations of $10,000, .5,000, $50,000, $100,000, $500,000 and $1,000,000 (maturity value). Tenders will be received at Federal Reserve Banks and Branches up ) the closing hour, one-thirty p. m., Eastern Standard .me, Monday, April 17, 1972 Tenders will not be received the Treasury Department, Washington. Each tender must qe for a ,nimum'of $10,000. Tenders over $10,000 must be in multip·les of 1,000. In the case of competitive tenders the price offered must be pressed on the basis of 100, with not more than three decimals, g., 99.925. Fractions may not be used. It is urged that tenders be de on the printed forms and forwarded in the special envelopes which 11 be supplied by Federal Reserve Banks or Branches on application ere for. 0 Banking institutions generally may submit tenders for account of stomers provided the names of the customers are set forth in such ~ders. Others than banking institutions will not be permitted to - 2 - submit tenders except for their own account. Tenders will be recei~ without deposit from incorporated banks and trust companies and from responsible and recognized dealers in investment securities. Tenders from others must be accompanied by payment of 2 percent of the face amount of Treasury bills applied for, unless the tenders are accompan by an express guaranty of payment by an incorporated bank or trust company. Immediately after the closing hour, tenders will be opened at th, Federal Reserve Banks and Branches, following which public announcemel will be made by the Treasury Department of the amount and price range of accepted bids. Only those submitting competitive tenders will be advised of the acceptance or rejection thereof. The Secretary of the Treasury expressly reserves the right to accept or reiect any or all tenders, in whole or in part, and his action in any such respect shal be final. Subject to these reservations, noncompetitive tenders for each issue for $200,000 or less without stated price from anyone bidder will be accepted in full at the average price (in three decima of accepted competitive bids for the respective issues. Settlement f accepted tenders in accordance with the bids must be made or complete at the Federal Reserve Bank on April 20, 1972, in cash or other immediately available funds or in a like face amount Treasury bills maturing April 20, 1972. Cash and exchange tend will receive equal treatment. Cash adjustments will be made for differences between the par value of maturing bills accepted in exchange and the issue price of the new bills. Unde r Sec t ions 454 (b) and 1221 (5) of the Inte rna 1 Revenue CuG of 1954 the amount of discount at which bills issued hereunder are sc is considered to Bccrue when the bills are sold, redeemed or otherwis disposed of, and the bills are excluded from consideration as capital assets. Accordingly, the ownet" L,Z Treasury bills (other than life insurance companies) issued hereunder must include in his income tax return, as ordinary gain or loss, the difference between the price pc for the bills, whetner on original issue or on subsequent purchase, ' the amount actually received either upon sale or redemption at matur: during the taxable year for which the return is made. Treasury Department Circular No. 418 (current revision) and thi~ notice, prescribe the terms of the Treasury bills and govern the . conditions of their issue. Copies of the circular may be obtained f any Federal Reserve Bank or Branch. 000 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 MMEDIATE RELEASE 12, 1972 VERNON D. ACREE NAMED COMMISSIONER OF BUREAU OF CUSTOMS Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally today announced the appointment of IRS Assistant Commissioner Vernon D. Acree as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. Mr. Acree will direct the operations of the 14,000 personnel of the Bureau under the supervision of Assistant Secretary Eugene T. Rossides. He replaces Myles J. Ambrose, who was recently named to head the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement in the Department of Justice. In making the announcement, Secretary Connally said that he "selected Mr. Acree, a 30-year career law enforcement official, to ensure that the Treasury Department will continue to play a lead role in President Nixon's anti-narcotics program." At the same time, the Secretary stated that he has "directed that the tariff and trade aspects of the Bureau of Customs operations be given the highest priority." Mr. Acree, 52, has been with the Federal Government since 1937 in progressively responsible positions and was appointed IRS Assistant Commissioner on September 1, 1959. He is a founder of the Association of Federal Investigators and served as its national President in 1964-65 and on its Executive Committee for several terms. He has been a lecturer and organizer of many conferences and seminars on law enforcement conducted by the Association, several universities, and the Brookings Institute. During World War II, Mr. Acree served with the Army's Criminal Investigation Division (CID) in Europe. - 2 - Mr. Acree has received a number of awards: In 1964, the Treasury Department's Gold Medallion Exceptional Service Award; In 1966, the Arthur Flemming Award by the D.C. Junior Chamber of Commerce as one of the outstanding young men in Government; In 1968, the Leadership Award of the Association of Federal Investigators; and In 1970, a National Civil Service League Career Service Award as one of the Government's ten outstanding career executives. A native of Washington, D.C., Mr. Acree attended local schools and the University of Minnesota. He is a member of the American Legion and has been active in 'work for the Boy Scouts of America. He resides in Fairfax, Virginia, with his wife, the former Doris Wight of Washington, and daughter, Beth. The Acrees have three older children, sons Darrell, who lives in Washington, and Allan, of Bethesda, Maryland; and a daughter, Mrs. Jean Winters, of Falls Church, Virginia. 000 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 ADVANCE FOR RELEASE IN A.M., WED., APRIL 12, 1972 JAMES w. DONLEY APPOINTED AS SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally, today announced the appointment of James W. Donley as Special Assistant to the Secretary (Public Affairs). He succeeds the late Calvin E. Brumley. Mr. Donley has been Vice President and Assistant to the Chairman of Edward Gottlieb & Associates, a New York public relations counseling firm for the past year. He specialized in financial relations counseling to corporations, including a major bank holding company. While at Gottlieb, he was also President of Multi-Guide Publishing Company and Publisher of Medi-Guide, the Physician's Conference and Travel Journal. Previously, Mr. Donley was Senior Vice President of the Thomas J. Deegan Company, Inc., a management counseling firm, and head of its West Coast office in Los Angeles. Prior to that he was Director of Business Communications for the New York City Department of Commerce. He began his career in communications at Time Incorporated in 1960 where, during six years, he was a promotion executive in the international division, Assistant to the Publisher of Time and Assistant to the corporate Vice President. Mr. Donley, 37, was born and raised in Hudson, Ohio. He graduated from Denison University in Granville, Ohio, and has a Master's degree in international business from the Wharton School of Finance. He was a public information specialist with the U.S. Army in Europe. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Citizens Union of New York and past member of the Board of Governors of the New York Young Republican Club. Mr. Donley and his wife, the furmer Francis Elizabeth Jordan of Portland, Maine, live in Greenwich, Connecticut with their two-year~ old daughter, Dana Louise. 000 C-282 1 1 THE DEPARTilEtJT OF TIlL THL:!I,.SURY 2 RE! 1ARI(S OF 4 HOHORABLE JOHN B. CONlJALLY, 5 SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 6 BEFORE THE 7 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS 8 10 11 12 13 14 It> IE 17 April 10, 1972 18 Chicago, Illiriois' 19 20 21 22 23 , 24 25 I I II [This transcript was prepared from a tape recording.] f! 2 1 MR. !-1AYS: If John Connally hcl.d stayed in the busi-- 2 I· ncss he entered upon leaving the Navy, after \']orlc1 Har II, he J might have had to pay a $35 registration fce to attend this 4 convention instead of appearing here as an invited and 5 honored guest. 6 In 1946, he helped to organize na.dio station KVET, 7 in my horne tovln of Austin, Texas, and served for nearly four 8 years, until 1949,' as its President and General ?~anager. 9 1949 an opportunity even more glittering than broadcasting 10 presented itself, a chance to rejoin his old mentor, then 11 senator Lyndon B. Johnson. 12 broadcasting and returned to his earlier loves, law and 13 politi~s, In I 14 So John Connally left Austin and and broadcasting's loss became the Nation's gain. Ultimately, President John F. Kennedy designated :ir. 15 Connally Secretary of the Navy, and three years later, in 16 Dallas, on November 22, 1963, he was critically wO'lnded while 17 riding with President Kennedy when the President was 18 assassinated.o 19 In 1962, Mr. Connally resigned as Secretary ot the 20 Navy to run as Governor of Texas. 21 in 1964 and 1966 he was elected to two additional terms, 22 he has served for six years as the Governor of my state, and 23 he is as good a Governor as Texas or any other state has ever 24 had. 25 He won that election, and In 1971 he was nOMinated by President Nixon to Thus, 3 Secretary of the Treasury. 2 broadcasting and welcome hir:1 not only as one of our or:ln but J as a great American in the fullest sense of the Hard . .4 So we forgive hi~ 1 departure from Will you welcome now, please, the Secretary of the 5 Treasury of the united states of American, the Honorable John 6 Connally. 7 [Applause.] 8 SECRETARY CONNALLY: 9 Hr. Hays, Chairman Campbell, PresidGnt Haslu.:;ki, Thank you very mu"";h. 10 Dr. stephens, Dr. Graham, merrlbers of the Federal Communlca tion. 11 Commission, other distinguished head table guests, ladies and 12 gentlemen. 13 First, may I bring you the personal greetings of the 14 President of the United states who asked me to convey to you 15 his deepest appreciation for the outstanding service Hhieh 16 thi s indus try has rendered this Nation since 17 half century ago. j. ts founding a 18 [Applause.] 19 He also asked that I convey to you his highest 20 respects for your willingness to continue to accept the 21 challenge to inform, the American people in times of turn oil 22 and turbulence which this IJation faces. 23 greetings from him with great relish, I· must say, because I 24 knO\'l th<lt he meant thelil in all sincerity. 25 regrets that he couldn't he here himself. And I bring thos8 I KnO\" th(1t he 1 And I must say that I am grateful for the privilcg(~ 2 of being here because I have indeed attencled other mcctinr;s ~ of this great organization, and I have indeed paiG by regis 4 tration fees in the past. 5 though that I left broadcasting was that elere were times 6 when I was afraid I couldn't continue to afford to pay the 7 registration fees. I suppose one of the reasons 8 [Laughter.] 9 And it is well that I did, because I am sure that 10 with the new rules and regulations that face many of you 11 today, I probably couldn't get my license renewed anyway. 12 [Laughter, applause.] 13 And I wish I could have donG what I would really 14 like to do. I was not here privileged to hear Dr. Graham 15 this morning. 16 my choice and had a tape recording of ",hat he said this 17 morning, I would merely like to ackno\.vledge the introduction, 18 express my gratitude for being 19 and let his message be 20 it would be far better than 21 that all he did was lay down I said to him a bit ago that if I really had ~ere, repeat~d to you, because I assure you list~ning th~ and then press the tape to me. But he said no, broad general guidelines. 22 [Laugh ter . ] 23 He was sure"that he, as well as everyone here, ex- 24 pected me to deal somevlhat in morc specific terms. i I I 1 25 [Laughter. ] 11 I' I 5 ~]cll, 1 indeed, if I do deell in specific terms, I ~Nill 2 assure you i t J the guidelines. not be in the field in which he laicl dm·m 4 [Laughter.] 5 You know, you are quite unfortunate today, more 6 unfortunate than JOu know, you have a full house. 7 the old I10ntana preacher who had prepared his special sermon 8 for this particular Sunday, was confronted with a great 9 problem when a blizzard hit to,,;rn. 10 church only to find one old rancher ".;rho had come in on 11 Saturday to do his shopping, got caught in the blizzard and 12 couldn't get home and, because he hadn't been in' church. in 13 almost a year, decided he would just attend. 14 And unlike He opened the doors of the Sure enough, the two looked at each other, one fro~ 15 the pulpit and one from thepe"." 16 decide whether or not he ,.;'as going to deliver this very 17 special sermon that he had. 18 very specific message, but he 19 to it. 20 I prepared it really without regard to the size of the crowd 21 who would here it, this is the 22 ahead and deliver it. 23 The preacher was trying to He had worked on it, he had a o~ly had one fellow to listen He thought perhaps it vrould be wasted. ~ccasion He said, no I for it, I will go When it was allover, he asked the rancher, he said, 24 "Zeke, wlla t diel you think abou t my sermon this morning? 25 said I "~'lell, preacher, it is fine." He said, 'f It \'laS II very lIe 6 1 good. Eu t," he said, "you knm'l, I can't he lp bu t CO::1ntcn t. on 2 a bad, cold day like this, when we have had a blizzard and .) snOvl is covering the ground and nothing can move, 4 If 5 to try to give some hay to my cattle. 6 always stack it full, of course, but if I get out there, 7 preacher, and find just one old cow, I ddn't dump the whole 8 load. II he said, I try-to load up myoId truck and get out in the pastures II And he said, II I II 9 [Laughter, applause.] 10 But unfortunately, you have got a full house here 11 today, you are apt to get the full load. 12 [Laughter. ] 13 But in all seriousness, I came here today first 14 because I have a great personal admiration and respect for those (,I you \..rho made up this organization, that brings back 16 many memories for me. 17 was in Chicago in this hotel, and so from that standpoint it 18 has' a ,"ery personal meaning for me. 19 The first meeting that I ever attended But more than that, I came because of the makeup of o:~:Tanization, 20 this to try to say some things to you that I 21 hope yew will feel are important, because I most certainly do. 22 So I am going to try to tell you some things that I have in 23 my own thought, my own mind, with the express hope that some 24 of it might indeed coincide with your own thoughts, and betl"leen 25 us we can do something about it. \ I I 7 1 2 I think it is f air to say tha t le l .. live in a ti~-:1c trouble and turmoil and trial and dissension in ]\JTIerica. don't think there is any doubt about that. ~'le of I can start ,·:i tl1 4 the diVisiveness of vietnan and, regardless of the merits of 5 it, this is an issue that has plagued this Nation for all of 6 the decade of the sixties and even into the seventies, and 7 it has been divisive. 8 But it is not just the divisiveness of vietnam. There is dissension at home, dissension over our educational 10 system, dissension over busing that is running deep nm., 11 throughout the school systems of America. 12 selves have questioned the financing of the public school 13 systems of this land. 14 applied on the local level can no longer be the basis for 15 supporting and sustaining public education as we have always 16 k::lo\'ln it. 17 The courts them- They have held that property taxes We have seen the revolt of the young people, the 18 questic,ning by the youth of America about the tradi tional 19 .values. 20 attack 21 businefs. 22 You are under attack as never before in the history of this 23 country. 24 25 You have seen business as such, '!business" under 2S never before. Your own industry is a part of that Your own industry is a part of that establish:'1ent. Groups are challenging your right to determine things for yourselves. They ar2 saying that you have no 8 1 to use your own judgment. 2 cause you are a broadcast industry, that you cLln't even sell The Con<Jress itself says th<l.t be- cigarettes, and the other media can but you can't . .4 You are the victi~ of a great deal of emotion 5 throughout this country, just as many other establishrnents 6 are. 7 ment. 8 question the Congress, '"ants to question the government, the 9 honesty and the integrity of it. 10 do, to criticize those in political life, and welcome to 11 the fraternity, because you are now subjected to some of the 12 same criticism that those of us in political life have been 13 for a long, long time. 14 And it doesn't stop just with the It is true of the Conqress. b~siness establish- Everybody wants to It is the popular thing to Your motives are being questioned. Your objectivity 15 is being questioned. 16 questioned. 17 to the point of placing your licenses in jeopardy. 18 are in a posi·tion to understand something of 19 ing in this broad land. 20 Your ability and your judgment is being Your sense of fairness is being questioned, even ~"hat So yo~ is happen- But it doesn't stop just with the business est~blish· It has invaded the 21 ments or the schools or the government. 22 provinces of the religious institutions as well, the 23 Protestant, the Jewish and the Catholic, all of them. 24 are in upheaval, they are in turmoil. 25 standards are being questioned. They Their mores and their 9 1 So we indeed live in a time of uncertainty, of in- 2 stabili ty. And more than tha t o change. 4 challenges for all of us. 5 Let me very quickly, in order to try to bring things into 6 perspective for you, go back over the brief twenty-five-year 7 period or twenty-seven years since World War II. 8 posturing this now primarily in economic terms. fo '(de. live 'in a time of groat. And the t\vO together holds great problems and. great We live in a time of great change. And I am Think of whex;-e we ,,,ere at the end of Hor Id Har I I, 9 10 in 1946. 11 stood alone in its capacity to produce, stood alone with a 12 viable economy. 13 the earth was in wrack and ruin, buildings destroyed, th8 14 productive capacity demolished and devastated, millions of 15 homes destroyed, tens of thousands of people i:hemselves 90ne 16 as a result of a great holocaust of a war. 17 This Nation, among all the nations in the worid, Nearly every other country on the face of The united States had the strength, the only rema1n- 18 ing strength .. 19 We had all of the reserves 1n the world. 20 billion of the $40 billion of gold reserves that existed on 21 this earth in our treasuries and in Fort Knox. 22 We had the only viable economy in the world. We had $25 or $26 So we set about, as a nation of compassionate 23 people, to share the bounty of this land with the people of 24 the world, to rebuild and to rehabilitate, in a physical 25 sense areas of the world that b:J.d been destroyecl, and to 10 rckin<lle the spirit of a subjugated people. 2 ful we were. .) we no longer stanel alone. 4 we have our extended our credit to the point that today, 5 Vlithin the last twelve months, you have seen a devaluation 6 of the dollar, th3 first time and the only time since the 7 depression days of the early thirties, in 1934. 8 l\nd hO~;l ~;uccess·- 1 We have indeed been successful, because today \"1e hClve expended our surplus a.nd No,v, 'vhat does this mean? It means more than just 9 a problem of international monetary affairs, because money 10 really is a sterile object. 11 It is really not vlorth anything except as it ref lects the 12 credit and the stability and the strength of the nation that 13 issues it. It doesn't produce anything. So should we be concerned about it? 14 si~:uation Should we be 15 concerned about the economic 16 selves today? 17 reasons. 18 and this is why on August 15 he took the drastic actions 19 that he did, actions unprecedent~d in the history of this 20 country. 21 Yes, I think so. And the President of l\Jhy? in which we find our- I think so for a number of ~he United States thought so, Because foresa\v \-That \vas happening to this 22 country at home and abroad, and he knew '.ve could no longer 23 live with this raging "inflation that had become a part of our 24 lives in the latter part of the sixties and the early part 25 of the seventies. He knew it had to stop. 11 1 He knew that the pyramiJing of costs r the cscalatioJ: 2 of the labor costs and. the Hages and. the prices had to be oJ stilled. He knew that ""Je had to suspend the convertibility of the dollar, that we had to say to our people at home as 5 well as the people abroad that we had to stop, we have to 6 pause, we have to reflect, we have to take stock of where we 7 are and where we're going, because he realized better than 8 most that the leadership in the poli tical arena and the 9 security in the military field 10 for the free world for a quarter of a century was indeed in 11 jeopardy if 12 it. '\~!e did not havl~ that this Nation has proviued the econoP.lic strength to sustain So he had the courage, he had the ray] courage to 13 14 take unprecedented action and put a freeze on the entire 15 economy of this country, and to suspend, the convertibility of 16 the dollar, to take these unprecedented steps that sent 17 shock waves around the 18 surprise anyone, not that he wanted to shock anyone, but 19 because he felt it was absolutely essential in our own inter- 20 ests and the interests of our friends and freedom that '\..,e do 21 it. 22 wor~d -- not because he wanted to And what has been the aftermath anu where are we? 23 The freeze was follo\,,6d by Phase II, and I am constantly 24 asked, is it going to work? 25 supports it. Well, it woti't work if no one It won't work if all \ve get is a constant 12 1 criticism and carping. 2 tion. o of the American people to make it ",ork, because it is essen- 4 tially"a voluntary program, and we can't hire enough 5 controllers to make it work against an unwilling people. 6 it ough not to be on that basis, because none of us who have 7 a part in administering the ~rogram want to administer the 8 program, we don't believe in wage and price controls, we 9 believe in a free enterprise system in this country, we 10 believe in the capitalist system that has made this country 11 wtat it is today, none of us want to put shackles on this 12 economy or to put this Nation in a straitjacket; but neither 13 do we want to see the ruin that inevitably accompanies run- 14 away inflation, and that is what we had. It won't \Vor}: if there is no cooy)<;ra-- It vlon' t wor]:: if there is no \villingness on the part 15 But So you have got wage and price controls, and you 16 ask me is it going to work, the answer is, yes, it is going 17' to \Vork, because there is no alternative to it. 18 doesn't work, what will you have? 19 ~ize 20 Nothina lS. 21 world. ~ve 22 to leave one. 23 glaring, some of them small, but always enough where sonebody 24 that \vants to criticize can find something to carp about. 25 it. If it Sure,-everybody can criti- It is not going to be perfect, we all know that. This society isn't. We didn't find a perfect are not going to build one and we are not going It is going to have f la\vs in it, some of theJl1. Now, it has to work, because the truth of the matter 13 1 2 ~ .4 is Hhat I said a moment ago, the President realized that tho I' poli tical leadership which this IJation has <ll\'lays provid(~cl for the free world, and the security shield which we have provided for freedoD around this world is wholly dependent 5 upon the economic viability of this Nation to support it and 6 to sustain it. So \ve have to improve this econor.tic system, and it 7 s~lpport 8 has to be done Hi th the knmvledge and \vi th the of the 9 American people. 10 character, just as our tax collection system is basically 11 voluntary in character. And it has to be basically voluntary in 12 But let me give you some startling news. 13 ran a survey in the southeastern part of the United states, 14 \\Thich has just been finished, 15 returns of people who had their returns prepared by others. 16 We call them preparer-returns. 17 sample of them, a fairly large sample of several hundred of 18 them. 19 returns prepared by others for taxpayers, we found 97 percent 20 were fraudulent -- 97 percent were fraudulent. 7e 't.. ~:.Tere We recentl investigating the We checked those returns, a And you will be interested to know that of those 21 Is this symptomatic of '!,,,hat is happening in thi.s 22 country? He, have the finest tax collection system in the 23 world, beyond any question. 24 is going to be effective, it is going to be one that evokes 25 and meri ts the confidence of the lI.merican people so lonq as Now, it is going to be good, it lit 1 it is done fairly and as long as it 2 long as it 1S 15 done c;quita:Jly LlIHl ~o done honestly. Obviously, this requires new action on our part, and 4 we are going to take it, because there are already 40 indict- 5 ments as a result of those inspections that 6 are going to checJ: hundreds of thousands and perhaps even 7 millions of returns now that we had not anticipated checking, 8 because this is indeed an incredible performance, where we 9 check and find 97 percent fraudulent returns where people 10 ask others to help them in the preparation of them. 11 \'le made. And t,ve So I say to you sinply that this system that we 12 have in this country depends entirely on the voluntary com- 13 pliance of the American people, vlhether you are talking about 14 the payment of taxes or whether you are talking about wage 15 and price controls. 16 Now, hOl,v important 1S it? Just this important: If 17 we don't recognize some of the problems that we have, if we 18 don't recognize that times have changed, if we don't recognize 19 that the largess of this Nation ihat was bountifully bestowed 20 upon other peoples in other lands produced competitors that 21 are real and continuing, if we don't come to the realization 22 and soon that we are no longer on a pedestal by ourselves, 23 that we are only nOH a nation among equals, if we don't 24 understand that \ve are off of that perch, that \ve clon' t sta.nu 25 alone, if we don't understand that Cor:ununist Russia is 15 1 spreading its economic ten tac 1es, its mov inc; ou t in to the 2 Horld markets, if \ve don t under~tand the significClncG of thc~ ~ President's visit to mainland China, that this anticipates 4 what we know must come, that 800 million people will take 5 their place in the economic \'lorld are going to be a factor 6 to be considered, if we don't understand that today you see 7 a coalescing of the Corunon ['1arket to an unusual degree I and 8 a creation of a Common 9 strengthened in 10 econonic force in this '-lorld, if you don't think Japan is 11 an economic force by itself. -- you couldn't be more wrong, if 12 you don't read the statistics, because in spite of the 13 revaluation of 17 percent in December, their balance of 14 p~yments 15 nation in the world, in spite of the revaluation of 16.9 16 percent, their balance of payments surplus this year is 17 going to be larger than last year because their exports are 18 running 25 percent above \vha t t ley \Vere in 1971. 19 I ~veste:rn ~~arket broadened and expanded and Europe that is going to be a third last year was $7.9 billion, the highest of any O If you don't think this means competition for us 20 from that part of the world and from the European part of 21 the world and every other part 22 more VlTrong. 23 ~f the world, you couldn't be Now, what are we going to do about i~? ~re we 24 going to close our eyes and say this is a matter for the 25 secretary of the Treasury with monetary magic? I don't know IG 1 any tricks, and I sure don't have a bag of thcf'1 t.hat 2 to solve this o solve. basic economic problems. 4 The only reason we have an economic problem is because we 5 have an economic problem, because we have a trade proLle~, because monetary magic 1S .1S 'Joi);(; not going to These are economic problens. proble~. So we have to face up to the fact that we live in 6 7 a competitive vlorld, we live -in a world 6f peers and, 8 frankly, they are more efficient than we are in many ways. 9 They are certainly more dedicated than we are in many ways. 10 They are challenged more than we. 11 out-plan us. 12 economic days in our lives, and we might as well face up to 13 it. They out-work us. They And we are in frankly for some fairly rough This is rough economic competition from abroad. 14 \7e 15 are obviously going to be plagued by continuing turmoil and 16 trials and tribulations at home because of the unrest that 17 is seething and is a part of this Nation and of this changing 18 society of which we are a part. 19 And how essential is it that we maintain a perspec- 20 tive of what we want to be, of what we are, or what duties 21 and obligations r.-le have? 22 have to be concerned about our competitive capabilities is 23 that we should want to maintain the standard of living that 24 we have in the United states. 25 ground. \']0 One of the reasons \vhy \-le obviously We shouldn't want to lose really ought to continue to make some strides. 17 1 l3u t more than tha t, vIe have to HlU.kc some vcr; bas ic 2 decisiohs about what kind of a nation .) NhCl t do 4 challenging the policies of'the estClblishrnent, so to speak. 5 Vlhat arc we going to be? 6 the problems around us? ? I 8 I ",ant to be? '\:/e arc going to b"::"; • :everyone is challeng ing \1ha t we are, Are we going to close our eyes to Are we going to continue to try to be a leader of the free people of the vlorld? If so, it has certain costs. ~tlho 9 tain sacrifices. 10 the 11 anwer 12 work. 13 political leadership of the free world and provide the 14 military shield, the security shield for the free world, my 15 answer has to be in the affirmative. 16 Pr~ce 1S Now, if He don't, He have to make cerwill? You ask me if and t-vage Boards are going to be successful, my yes, because there is no alternative. It has to You ask me are we going to continne to maintain the If we don't, who will? We didn't ask for the mantle I? of leacership that has been ours since the end of the '.-1ar, but 18 we havE it. 19 ~uild a protective wall around this~a~ionmd try to live 20 \vi thin ourselves? 21 haven't done it since the first Pilgrims landed at PlYMouth 22 Rock and started forging their way west. 23 Do you 'vant to cast it aside? I think not. Do you r:Tant to He have never done it. , He He didn't do it in the 19GO' s Hhen 'de said \'18 Hant 24 to go to the moon, and He \Vent. ne have never been a na tion 25 that was willing to be harnessed within the confines of the 18 But these are SOi:1C of tJv~ c1cci~io;1~; 1 geography of this lJation. 2 wc hLlvc to make. .) going to have to have a perspective and a dedication thClt is 4 unlike anything we have seen in the last few years in this 5 country, and it has to be a conscious decision on the part of 6 everyone. 7 1\.i1Cl if <I'l(~ "lUnt to r:takc ther1, then 1,'.'C arc And don't look just to Washingtor. to supply the anS"("ler 9 part of it, because you represent an industry that, more 10 than any other in this rJation, has an impact on the minds and 11 the thoughts of every American every hour of every day. T 12 because you largely have part of the anS~'ler, 8 And what are you telling them? a good Are you telling 13 them about a wreck on Third street, and you are giving them 14 three seconds on what the Dow Jones was today. 15 extent of your newscasts on the economic situation in the 16 country. 17 ne\'7S or are you trying to give them some balar,ce and some 18 perspective in what our l problems are and how we solve them? 19 That is the Are you giving them' spectacular and start:ling We have a great many problems. We have problems and 20 we are going to continue to have them. 21 education, we have problems of the environment, we have 22 problems of .purifying the air and cleaning the water, no 23 question about it, 24 it. 25 ~nd We have problems of we have to establish priorities to do Bu t to turn over to those who sec nothing bu t tILt t 19 1 2 .) .4 the conscious decisions of this government 1'l0ulJ inlleccl be a i mistake, because all things must COr'l.e in their O\'7n tir.te and in their o\..,n place and in their O~;ln priori ties . So it is really for each of us to decide ~lat kind 5 of a nation we want. 6 time and again that he doesn't have the ? have all the answers, that he tried to 8 he can a best he can. a foreign policy, that he 9 very politically perilous mission to China, nGt because he 10 wants to make news, because he can make news any 11 hour that he wants to by stepping out of that oval office to 12 appear before the press corps. 13 recognized that here was a great emerging nation containing 14 one-fourth of the people on this earth that hd to be brought 15 into the partnership of nations. 16 I think the President has tried to say a~swcr, he art~culate ~oesn't the best u~dertakes d~y, a any But he did it because he And he is going to Moscow.· Not because he 17 ,,,ants a trip. 18 this visit might hold some promise, some promise for stilling 19 the first that burn in the hearts of many that might suddenly 20 flare up in a conflagration that would encompass us all, and 21 he is going because he thinks there is some hope of providing 22 some stability and some peace in this .world at a tiMe when 23 indeed we have unrest at home, uncertainty and instability in 24 our own midst. 25 He has been there. lvhy? But because he knovls that . He has taken the actions on the econo:nic.front. He 20 1 has shown great perception, great understanding and grcnt 2 courage. :J people agree vli th everything the federal govermncnt does. 4 But there must be a time when objectivity and fairness itself 5 requires some semblance of objectivity in the consideration 6 of the policies of this government, local, state and 7 national. 8 No one expects, no one asks that the American I am not talkin-g on a partisan basis. I am simply 9 saying that if all of us spend all our time criticizing 10 government, the structure of governr.lent and the policies of 11 government, the days are numberecl before \ve sow enough 12 discord and dissent in the minds of people to where they will 13 indeed lose confidence in government, and a democracy in 14 which there is no confidence in government will not be a 15 democracy long. 16 T!Jhen there is a total lack of f ai th in the governing 17 process, there can be but one answer and that is the despotism 18 of dictatorship, and in a real sense what we are talking about 19 is the preservation and the conservation of this society of 20 free men and free women. 21 with all our frailtie~ and all our weaknesses and 22 all our shortcomings, let's occasionally sit back and let's 23 think and let's reflect and let's give credit for the fact 24 that whatever our weaknesses we have indeed accomplished 25 somethinC] in this country. And let's quit assuming that our 21 1 particular generation, or that the young generation lias sud- 2 denly been endowed by an almighty beine; wi th tLe \'lisc1om that o has been denied centuries of mankind. 4 tha. t s<1me of us are Vlrong in Vlanting some change s . 5 entirely possible that the system that has evolved through 6 all of the civilization since the beginning of time might 7 have some substance to it. 8 fairness and success in it. 9 sometimes to say we have indeed created a form of goverr~ent 10 that has fed better, fed more, housed better, housed more, 11 clothed better, clothed more, given more, more time, more 12 leisure than any other system ever devised by man in the 13 history of the world. 14 [Applause.] 15 Finally, \vhen we talk about all of the things that It 1S entirely possible It is It might hav~ some element of It might be well for some of us 16 W2 want to do, let's finally come to the reali za tion th"a t a l l 17 of us can't do our thing our way all the tine; that in a 18 nation of over 200 million people, some bf us have to exercise 19 "some restraints, and that there haVe to be certain rules and 20 regulations that govern and guide us all, moral and physical 21 rules itpd regulations and restraints. He are not all that \vise. 22 And \vhen \vo think we are 23 I hope everyone within the sound of my voice will remember 24 that he or she is not responsible for r:luch ",hieh T:le enJoy 25 today. You contributeu miqhty Ii ttlc to it. ;'lc arc the I 1 inheritors, we are the inheritors of a great legacy of frG8Jo~, 2 and you want freedom in this industry, and you want freedor.! .) in America, and you vlant the freedom of speech and you want the freedom of the press. But did you provide it, did you 5 start it? There are very few signers of the Declaration of 6 Independence or the Consti tu tion of the Uni ted Sta tes in 7 this room today. We are inheritors of a great legacy of strong men 8 tvlo-h~ndred 9 and great women who i.1a.ve over 10 us the richest and the ripest fruits that mankind has ever 11 enjoyed. 12 obligation that surpasses lying on our backs gathering the 13 fruit off the tree and in a 14 eating it to our satisfaction without occasionally understand- 15 ~ng 16 fertilize it in order that future generations might 113.ve some 17 hope of enj oying ,·,ha t And I submit to you that we have some duty and some Thank you 19 [Applause.] 21 22 23 24 25 laz~ fashion suckerin0 it or that vve also have to plo\v the ground and we have to 18 20 years provided for ~'le have already had in such abundance. very much. The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 April 12, 1972 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE DECISION ON VINYL ASBESTOS FLOOR TILE FROM CANADA UNDER THE ANTIDUMPING ACT The Treasury Department announced today that a final determination has been made that vinyl asbestos floor tile from Canada is not being, nor likely to be, sold at less than fair value within the meaning of the Antidumping Act, 1921, as amended (19 u.s.c. 160 et seq.). A Notice of Tentative Negative Determination was published in the Federal Register on January 26, 1972. This notice invited interested parties to submit written views or arguments, or requests for an opportunity to present their views orally. No submissions or requests were received. During the period from January 1971 through December 1971, imports of vinyl asbestos floor tile from Canada were valued at approximately $650,000. 000 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 MEMORANDUM TO CORRESPONDENTS: April 13, 1972 Attached is a series of letters exchanged between Treasury Secretary John B. Connally, Chairman of the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board, and Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United States, outlining their respective views on the authority of the General Accounting Office to review the activities of the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board. 000 Attachments C-283 MP.R 3 0 1972 Dear ElMrI 8l:lee HCri~ o-t )"Oal> 1rl~ at PebruU"J' 10. 1m. ~tna the autborit7 ~ the ~n1 Aecwnttna otti" to nriw. the actlY1t1e. ot tbe _~~r«t' JAM ~ Bcud. I haft rn1.evect tbe m1ro .tt,.~ apia. AI bow, rf~..~l"'. or ~ .ottlee Mw e_.Iue4 aDd verified tM ~e0Ut48 ~ tM ~ LeU. ~ loUd. OD tbe but. of . . J'niw or t!le how' .... I oca\t. . to boUft'ft tbat the ccmo1us1o:a ~aaM4 b7 tbe ICaT'd 1t. JIGNabaJt 1911eet1Dc. at act tOl"Ul 1ft f1l7 l.tt.er ... or DeGl?~ 9. 1971. . . eotI'ecrt w t_t. it Vb not the ln~ ot CoDpeo tliat the declalou t4 70Q _tr'ft', "tea '* tho t1;)aM bel reri~l Jq tbe O~~ Ac:eCW1tltlc~. III .-ehlaa tbd eone1ustoa. tm Uoe;r\t eD:! It.• • tatt.",. euctul att~ntloa. 'to tho pt'00"1!I1ou or thl: ~~ Md McOUDtinlJ A~ ot tho ~~tlVll Re~..1~lQU ~ tIt 19a.6, aQr1 tho Aceoanttnc ~ A~lt1.r.6 Act ~ 1950. 1m. !be HoMrAbla lQaer D. staat. C~ller ~ ttl tM tlaitN ftatea General Aceount1~ otnoe lIUt14l»C ....l.G S~t_ !f. V. Vub1nrton, I). c. ~ COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES WASHINGTON. D.C, IOU' B-l69300 FES 101972 Dear John: em December 9 you wrote me that records or the Emergency LOaD Guuantee Board t which has guaranteed a loan, to the 'Lockheed Corporation, would not be ave.11able to the Gener81 Accounting Ottice in carl"7ing out its aud! t and review responsibIlities. Your letter indicates that there Is· nothing in the EmergencY' Loan Guarantee Act t or its legislntlve history, ..bich provides for a GAO review ot the Board's activi~ie8 and suggest that Congress might need to pass additional legislation to make it clear that GAO bas this authority • • I am afraid tha.t your staff han overlooked the basic authority of GhO as set forth io'the Budget and Acc'-ountlng Act ot 1921 to audit the activities ot the GovernMent ngencie~. Also included in the Act is the right ot access to the records of ~he agencies. In sbort, there would have been no reason for the Congress to repeat this a.uthori ty in connection with the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act. I wonder if you would not wnnt to take a personal look at the situation. Best visbes. Sincerely, (Signed) ELMER Elmer B. Gtaats '!'he Honoro.ble John B. Connally Secretary of the Treasu.ry DEC 9 1971 Thb 18 to turt~ rHl.'QI1~ to • u Chatr.zl or the to ~ ~r ~ 2l. 1911 btu~ LoCi ~ Do&rd ~1na tba\ rcC!~ of the Board be tJ&de na1101$ to the 0tMre1 AeoouraUaa otnce tor 1U l'CTi..w. la rov 1nter J'OU !Ja41eate JOUl' aatbc;rltt to r6v1ev 4ec~ of tho Boar<l ea4 Ita ftCOZU t.. touBc.t 1D the ~ Mlt AceCWttS. Mt. or 194, ~ kC1e 1&ttw B~1aIt1oa ~ f4191t6 a.a \bel AccOllllttas ana AoIitlfts Ad lit 19'0. llOa:r~ Y1abe. to ~ .. tullJr ... pou1bl. viUt the a~~ .AocOl£1t!n.3 I~ nnf'~ ~16(l'J'1n& )"OUr reqetat. hOftYe'.t. tlw ~~ e~l..do4 Ita ~ ou };O~r 11 tbat it yq JWt the intent or ~ ~ t!tc OeAucl ~o=.t1QS ottic- I'QYlew lta ~~ou.. i'ht.t beU~ b&aod 0I!l it. !be Gtt1ce. *' u BoVt!'. ~~a\and1ng C£ ybc.t ~-o.a luteD..'}~ to be acC~ll:iM~ b7 the ElAcm!~l\...'7 Lca:l Guamnteo It ~t:1I 1$9~ C~ral AeeQUllt~ ON'1ee to rnlev t.t_ a~1l:1oM of the ElMrgcmq I.otl.a ..ror the Aot.. aual"~tc:e BOard, VS maklQ1 it clear tba\ 'h'! GAO tau trh1I --1t7. ~ p;:ae~t.0J:7 l.ecUlatlcu oawld " ~.4 CoDcra~!ttono1 rt:-vlw of 10M ~ utten t. ~ ill th~ o.=~" Act! ~ GAO U 4~4 to e.u41t the bonOttel" I1l:1 ~ tinllDgs to the Doe.rd aM to the C~'81 C'pc!lJ.(td M s.to. Ia4 the Do4r4 1:1 4irceWd to r:a&k1t t& 8'tu.ll report- f4 1ta O,perU1ons t~ tho C~G.. \"e t1ll4 :tGtMnZ :l.Q t~ CJuarMtH Act or ita last.latin h18t4:7 wteh AGOlt. un 1J4eDt tba.t eocrpeUtt/I ~ or the ncaN'. opt-nt1QQS VIr« t.o be Nde k tM c~ or that. tn Doardt. d"utons 1ta'e to bo nvlt1Ptcl bt tho OcaonJ. ~1QG otftoe. ~ ~ aa «ll*Ut1~ to ...1t: ..n \1!11qQe~ by the ~ ctCInStltutd bJ' tho COQtlNSC 18 tbe d~um1n&tlO!!, callG" tar Act. lnoluMllg the erit1enJ. t1nd Jug or ~hC'r tatl..lare to ~oe .. loa voul~ ba~ M acVqrQ em:~ Ql tlle CtC~. v. vould Iso M.:.~ 'to d1ectwt th1.a Ulatte:- turt~ v1th 7011 i t 7CIII vtah. Qu~5t1o:u conC(!~1ng tM bAala t~ tl1e 4~1ts1.0l'l also r:.ny bo dlracteJ t.o £2.!'.%Ut:"1 n. Piuee, ~ •• C~cmU Counul ot tbe tftuUX7• .e.nJ ~Qtlve l>1rector to tt= .!!oud. DoaN·. tak~Q the lJ.bert7 of tumiah11W • cORY of lette~ to lie tcunba' 1IS.th • COW ~ ~ riD"),., I b&w 1971 Sept~r ?~, ~:1POUO to t,bs l~03OJ"&~b JobB S~. CbaS..raa of the eCQllltt~. oa ~1og. Bot:alns Ud Urbaft Aft'tirs u4 t1se lron~nbu \t~ 1'*tmm~ ~ of ttt. Hoa=e BMklQl aaJ 70fIr s..t. CVnnq C<alit\e". (Signed) John B. CnnnallT ...bU. 2', 1J71 IMu lk. Ituul You lett_ ctated Sept._ 21, U71, .-d4r_ea Co die . . . . .1. 301mB. Coau1l.)', c::b.a1nwa 01 &be EaaqaDCJ I.oaa Gua'aAtea 108cl ......... I:M"':wecl •. Tea lett.. vU1 .. broqbt to the att_tioo ef eM toea Qaar_C_ ..... at it. Dat __ t1q. . h., .2q..., Ut_ the IoucI baa 1la4 _ opporeaait)' tct 001Ul14. Jou leereta7 CQaaJ1J or ,'* ~t to ~.nav ita I"&corda, eltbec I trW CD .,d.eac. with fwtbc. 1 do eee ba11eft tho Boercl'. eoulcl. .tlOD of 10M' requaat ehou14 PnYfJDC Che Geural AcC:CMIIlUDa office &_ ~eaefD.l . . aucU.t of toc» ... AlnI'aft CorporatiOil .. ia r"ukecl uD4er the a._qUe)' Loa Cuu_C. . Act. V.., .1ManlJ 70ur8. '(S1gne'd) Samuel B. Pierce... lr... I I '.1 a. ,Wee. Jr. IuftU. . Dinctft "'aacr toaD Guu_tee load !La BoDOl"abl. u.. B. Staat-. co.ptrolle~ ~a1 of the \JDLted ltat. . vUh1qtoD. D. C. ,20548 COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES WASHINGTON. D.C. 10UI B-169300 September 21, 1971 Dear Mr. Chairman: As you are aware the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act, lUblic Law 92-70, requires the General Accounting Office to make a detailed audit of any borrower with respect to which a loan guarantee is made. In this connection, a meeting to initiate our.review was held on September 16, 1971, between representatives of our Office and Mr. Tim Greene, Secretary of the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board. The discussion centered on three areas; decisions of the Board in appr~ving, executing, and administering any guaranteed loans; the provisions of the guaranteed loan agreements established between the Board and the borrower; and the audit of the borrower. Mr. Greene had some question concerning our authority and responsibility for review of Board decisions. As you know the authority and responsibility of the GAO for making audits and investigations of Government agencies are stated in a number of laws including the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921; the Legislative Reorganization Act, 1946; and the. Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950. For example, Section 312 of the Budg~t and Accounting Act requires the Comptroller General to examine all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement or application of public funds and report to the Congress the results of such examinations. Section 313 of the same Act states that all departments and establishments shall furnish information as may be required of them by the Comptroller General. It further provides that the Comptroller General shall have access to any books, documents, papers or records of such departments or establishments. Section 2 of "this Act defines department or establishment to include boards such as the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board. In view of the fact that Lockheed has already received a substantial amount of the guaranteed loan and is likely to receive additional amounts in the near future, we are anxious 50TH ANNIVERSARY ...,." _ nr7T to begin our work as soon as possible. We would appreciate advice as to when the records of the Board can be made available for review. 1y Y(:J. Comptroller General of the United States Honorable John B. Connally, Jr. Chairman, Emergency Loan Guarantee Board ~he The Department 01 the TREASURY TelEPHONE W04·2041 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY STATEMENT BY RICHARD V. ADAMS SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY (DEBT MANAGEMENT) BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL PARKS AND RECREATION OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS ON H. R. 10751 THURSDAY, APRIL 13, 1972 AT 10:00 A.M. Mr. Chai rman, I am pleased to be here today to express the views of the Administration on the borrowing provisions of H.R. 10751, the "Pennsylvania Avenue Bicentennial Development Corporation Act." Subsections (9) and (10) of section 6 of the bill would authorize the proposed development corporation to borrow money either from the Treasury Department or from the private market. We have no objection to the proposal to borrow from the Treasury, but we strongly recommend against the proposed authority for the Corporation to borrow in the private market. Such market borrowings would clearly be substantially more costly than borrowings from the Treasury, and the additional borrowing costs would be borne by the Federal taxpayer. - 2 - While the Congress has authorized a number of Federal and Federally-sponsored agencies to borrow in the private market to finance privately-owned or selfsupporting business-type activities, market borrowing authority is not authorized for Federal agencies performing governmental functions financed by the general taxpayer. Subsection (g) of section 2 of the bill states a Congressional finding "that the powers conferred by this Act are for public uses and purposes for which public powers may be employed, public funds may be expended, and the power of eminent domain and the police power may be exercised, and the granting of such powers is necessary in the public interest." The public character of the proposed development corporation is also evident from the facts that the Corporation would be included in the Federal budge~, would be wholly owned by the Government, and would be conducting Government functions with Government employees and with appropriations from the general fund of the Treasury. We believe that every effort should be made to minimize the costs to the Government of financing such an activity. - 3 - It has been estimated that the Corporation would borrow approximately $125 million between the time of enactment of this legislation and July 1, 1981, and the bill provides that the maturities of such borrowings shall not be in excess of 40 years. The actual cost of market borrowing by the Corporation would depend upon conditions in private financial markets and on such market factors as the amounts, maturities, timing, and other terms and conditions of each borrowing. Yet, based on our experience with other direct and guaranteed borrowings by Federal and Federally-sponsored agencies, the interest rates which the Corporation would be required to pay on obligations issued in the private market would probably be at least a full percentage point above the Treasury's current borrowing rate. Assuming that the Corporation issues 8 percent bonds in the amount of $125 million amortized over a period of 40 years, the Corporation would be required to pay an extra $43 million in interest because of the additional 1 percentage point on market borrowings as compared to direct borrowings from the Treasury. Thus, since the Corporation's outlays would be included in - 4 - total Federal budget outlays regardless of whether it borrows from the Treasury or from the market, actual Federal outlays over the life of the Corporation's borrowings would be increased by $43 million. The discounted present value of this increased Federal cost would be $14 million. In addition to the extra interest costs, the Corporation would also incur additional personnel costs because of the debt management functions which the Corporation would be required to perform in connection with its private market borrowings. Preparation of each market financing over the authorized 9 year borrowing period would require a great deal of financial expertise and a considerable expenditure of time by the staff and officers of the Corporation. We believe these essentially debt management functions of the Federal Government should be performed by the Treasury Department, which is already equipped to do the job. Another significant cost item would be the payments by the Corporation to private financial advisers, bond counsel, and underwriters necessary to successful placement of the Corporation's securities in the market. - 5 - While these costs vary considerably, depending upon a number of factors, they may well average from 1/2 to 1 percent of the total amount borrowed, or from $625,000 to $1,250,000 on the contemplated borrowing of $125 million. Such payments would not be required 1f the Corporation were to borrow only from the Treasury. In short, Mr. Chairman, market borrowing by the Corporation would be very costly to the Government, and we see no offsetting benefits from such borrowings. We are also concerned with the undesirable precedent which would be established by enactment of market borrowing authority for the proposed Corporation. Because of the marketing and other problems resulting from the present proliferation of borrowing activities by Federal agencies, largely in connection with loan guarantee programs financed outside of the Federal budget, Secretary Connally submitted proposed legislation to the Congress in December 1971 to establish a Federal Financing Bank to coordinate and consolidate such borrowings. We believe that our overall efforts to achieve greater efficiency in the financing of Government programs would suffer a setback if the Congress were now to authorize market borrowings by Federal budget agencies financing subsidized activities. - 6 - Consequently, the Treasury Department has submitted specific amendments to your Committee which would delete the market borrowing authority contained in subsection (9) of section 6 and make conforming changes to subsection (10) so that the Corporation would be authorized to borrow from the Treasury in the manner proposed by the Administration and provided for in an earlier version of this legislation, H.R. 18677, 9lst Congress. If amended as suggested, the Department would have no objection to the financial provisions of the bill. 000 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 13, 1972 UNDER SECRETARY CHARLS E. WALKER TO HEAD U.S. DELEGATION TO FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK AT VIENNA, AUSTRIA Charls E. Walker, Under Secretary of the Treasury, will head the United States Delegation to the fif~h annual meeting of the Asian Development Bank in Vienna April 20-22. Under Secretary Walker will be Temporary Alternate Governor for the United States, representing Treasury Secretary John B. Connally, who is the U.S. Governor of the Bank. Deputy Under Secretary of State Nathaniel Samuels, Alternate U.S. Governor of the Bank, also plans to attend these meetings if possible. Mr. SEw:.ie1s will be in Moscow for maritime negotiations during part of the ADB conference, and, therefore, his plans are tentative. The U.S. delegation also will include Samuel R. Pierce, Jr., General Counsel of the Treasury, John M. Hennessy, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Mr. Herman Barger, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, and ~bassador Artemus E. Weatherbee, U.S. Director of the Bank at its ~ni1a headquarters 0 The Asian Development Bank began operations in 1966 to help accelerate economic growth of developing Asian nations \fembership includes 23 Asian nations as well as 14 non\sian countries. Donor countries subscribe to 68 percent )f the Bank's capital shares with the United States and Japan laving equal subscriptions of 20 percent each. The Bank has mde over $600 million in loans to date. Q C-284 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 STATEMENT OF CHARLOTTE TUTTLE LLOYD ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL, u. s. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND GOVERNMENT INFORMATION OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, ON FREEDOM OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS April 14, 1972 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am Mrs. Charlotte Tuttle Lloyd, an Assistant General Counsel of the Office of the General Counsel, Treasury Department. My responsibilities include providing advice, under the supervision of the General Counsel, on legal questions of administrative procedure arising in the Office of the Secretary and, where appropriate, on Departmentwide questions. I am also one of the two Treasury members of the Administrative Conference of the United States. It is a privilege to report on compliance with the Freedom of Information Act by the Treasury Department. I trust that I will be able to clarify areas of concern to the Subcommittee. This report is presented under four headings, covering first, the overall compliance with the Freedom of Information Act by the Office of the Secretary and other bureaus and offices, excepting the Internal Revenue Service, which has reported separately; secondly, the use of administrative classifications of documents; third, the functioning of the Treasury Library as a public reading room, and fourth, improvements in our operations now in progress. I. Overall compliance with the Act. This is a brief review of our compliance with the Freedom of Information obligations placed upon Federal agencies in 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1), (2) and (3). As of the effective date of the Act, July 4, 1967, the Office of the Secretary and almost all of the bureaus and offices of the Treasury had revised their disclosure regulations for publication in the Federal Register, together with their Statements of Organization, Functions and Procedure. The Office of the Secretary Administrative Circular No. 159, dated June 1, 1967, provided internal guidance throughout the Department on the meaning and requirements of the Act, and the appropriate methods of compliance. Copies of the present disclosure regulations, and of all internal instructions on compliance, including Administrative Circular 159 and its first 3 supplements, have been provided to this Subcommittee in response to Chairman Moorhead's questionnaire of August 17, 1971, as attachments to the response by General Counsel Pierce with his letter of October 12, 1971. All the Attachment s (2) -2regulations fixed procedures for the submission of requests, for their consideration, for appeals from any denials of information, and for charges for minimum necessary expenses. In order to facilitate compliance with subsection (a)(2), Treasury agencies established public reading rooms. The Treasury Library was designated as the public reading room in Washington, D. C., for all materials required to be made available to the public under this subsection, except materials from the Internal Revenue Service, the Bureau of Customs, and the Bureau of Narcotics, then part of the Department. This designation was made in Administrative Circular 159, with more detailed directions on use of the Library given in Supplement No.1, Revised, of July 3, 1967. The basic regulations of the Treasury Department for use by all agencies not having complete separate regulations, namely, Part 1 of Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations, described the materials to be made available to the public in the public reading room through the definitions of "Statements of policy and interpretations" not published in the Federal Register, and of "Administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff" (§ 1.3(c), (d». I t is important to note that the definition of manuals and instructions to staff reflect the discussion of these documents in the legislative history of the Freedom of Information Act, namely that these documents do not include "instructions which set forth criteria or guidelines in auditing or inspection procedures, or in the selection of handling of cases, such as operational tactics, allowable 1 tolerances, or criteria for defense, prosecution or settlement of cases." Since July 4, 1967, additional matters have been made available in the public reading rooms which were considered of interest to the public, particularly comments received from the public in response to notices of proposed rule making, where the comments were not requested to be, and found appropriately to be, kept confidential,2 and comments on cases in which there was substantial public interest. As a result of our efforts to comply with subsection (a)(2), there has been a great deal of Treasury documentation provided in the Treasury Library as the principal public reading room for Treasury operations, other than those of the Internal Revenue Service and the Bureau of Customs. Treasury compliance with the requirement in subsection (a)(3) to make identifiable records available to persons upon request is reported at some length in the response of our General Counsel of October 12, 1971, to Chairman Moorhead's questionnaire of August 17, 1971. Our response covered the Office of the Secretary and 8 additional bureaus and offices, excepting the Internal Revenue Service, which had been asked to report separately. believe that this response shows substantial and cooperative compliance with the intent of the Act. Out of a total of the 987 requests of which we had specific record for the 4-year period following the effective date of the Act, 50 were denied in part and 61 were fully denied. r 1/ 2/ House Report 1497, 89th Congo 2d Sess., 7-8 31 CFR 1.4(h), added 36 F.R. 13835, July 27, 1971. -3- Only 5 denials were appealed within the Departm~nt. Two cases only had been taken to court, and both were terminated by the plaintiffs. Since our report to this Subcommittee last October, there have been two more court cases. In one of these, City of Concord v. Ambrose,3 in the Northern District of California, the district court denied to the plaintiff certain surveillance training manuals for Bureau of Customs agents. In the other case involving disclosure of customs entry documents, Devlin v. the Department of the Treasury,4 in the District of Columbia district, the matter is still at the pleadings stage. In order that all the administrative officials in the various bureaus and offices of the Department acting upon Freedom of Information requests should have the benefit of the principles and guidelines on this subject in Recommendation 24 adopted by the Administrative Conference of the United States at its 5th Plenary Session, this Recommendation was circulated to heads of bureaus through Supplement No. 4 of February 10, 1972, to Administrative Circular 159. Copies of this Supplement were recently provided to your staff1 since it was issued subsequent to the material provided to this Subcommittee by the General Counsel last October. It should be remembered that the requests considered to be Freedom of Information requests, to be handled in accordance with the Act and regulations, are a very small part of the inflow of requests from the public for information. Many thousands of pieces of mail are received in the Main Treasury Building every month, much of it asking for information which is routinely provided. The Executive Secretariat handled over 2800 pieces of mail addressed to the Secretary or the Under Secretary last February alone. The Bureau of the Mint, in providing numismatic information and materials, is the largest user of the mails next to the IRS among the Treasury bureaus. In a single week the Office of Public Affairs handles about 1500 requests for information from the general public and over 250 news media requests. That office also provides news of Treasury operations to 375 news media outlets and maintains a mailing list of over 3000 names. The Public Affairs Office provides a news room for full-time use by 4 wire service reporters and for occasional use by the other 70 correspondents who regularly cover the Treasury Department. A request for information is treated as a Freedom of Information request only if it raises difficult and novel questions of disclosure. Our repcrc to this Subcommittee could enumerate less than 1000 over a 4-year period, although there might have been a few score more if complete tabulation of all questions raised in all the bureaus was justified by the time and expense involved. II. Administrative class ifications "Limited Offic ial Use" and "Offic ial Use Only". Information on the meaning and authorized use of these class ifications was submitted to your Subcommittee with the General Counsel's response last October, in answer to question 4 of Chairman Moorhead's questionnaire. The authority for these classifications is stated in Part II 3/ ~I Civil No. C-7l 1796 ACW riui1 Ar~inn ?n~_7? -4of Treasury Order 160 which, as revised in 1968, contains the instructions on the relationship between these classifications and the Freedom of Information Act, which were spelled out in Supplement 2 of August 14, 1967, to Administrative Circular 159. Copies of both the Order and the Supplement were submitted with the General Counsel's response. However, I am attaching copies of Part II and Supplement 2 to this Statement for inclusion in the record because of their importance to the matters presently under consideration. In accordance with these instructions, the legend "Limited Official Use" is to be used for non-defense documents of an important, delicate or sensitive nature which should be treated confidentially and restricted to the officials who have a need to know such information. These documents are to have the protection accorded to confidential documents of a defense nature. The legend "Official Use Only" is to be used for non-defense documents which should be safeguarded but to a lesser degree and are to be handled in a manner which will not make them available to unauthorized persons. The attached directives make clear that the marking of documents with these legends is only a preliminary determination that they are not to be disclosed under the Freedom of Information Act. The legends are intended to be warnings to officials, conveying the admonitions that distribution within the bureau or office is restricted and that disclosure to the public requires special consideration and a decision by the responsible official. In fact, the original and primary purpose of these legends has been to restrict the distribution of the covered documents within the particulu offices concerned with them. The legends were adopted in Treasury in 1954 to conform to the legends adopted by the State Department at that time for non-defense materials described as "certain types of personnel records, information received through privileged relationships, and matters which if released would offend foreign govermnents and peoples." This designation of the precise legends to be used, from among a variety of restrictive legends, followed advice given in 1953 by the Attorney General to the Civil Service Commission agreeing that the use of the term "Confidential" provided for in the 1953 Executive Order 10501 for defense information was not as appropriate as "Official Use Only" for test materials and investigatory personnel files which needed protection from unauthorized disclosure. We believe that the use of these legends is consistent with, and justified by, the Freedom of Information Act, considering both its terms and its legislative historyo The provisions in section 552(a)(2) for making available to the public statements of policy not published in the Federal Register, and staff manuals and instructions to staff, recognize that this disclosure is selective and is to be made in accordance with published rules. As preViously stated, the basic Treasury regulations published in 31 CFR Part 1 make clear that the material made available under this subsection does not include internal management instructions or studies which are of such a character that they shoUld not be made -5- available to unauthorized persons. Furthermore, the specific exemptions under section 552(b) include exceptions justifying the use of these legends when a distribution warning is needed. These exemptions include (2) for internal practices, (4) for private confidential information, (5) for internal memorandums of a sensitive, policymaking nature, (6) for personnel files, and (7) for investigatory files. These exemptions are applied in accordance with our published regulations, as the Act requires. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has an additional administrative classification to carry out exemption (8) for reports of bank examinations. This statement reads, "This report of examination is strictly confidential. " By way of example, these legends are used in the Office of the Secretary on between-office memorandums on trade negotiations, antidumping investigations and narcotics control programs; on Foreign Assets Control private license application files; on the periodic fiscal "Memorandum for the President" for signature by the Secretary, advising the President of Treasury's financing plans and on the "Financing Schedule" prepared monthly showing agency and Treasury financing scheduled for the following 2 or 3 months, arranged according to sale dates, which schedules are considered declassified after all financing to which they relate has been officially announced. Additional Office of the Secretary usage is on records of pending and recent gold and foreign exchange transactions and of other financial dealings with foreign governments or international financial institutions. I am advised that there is no occasion to use these legends in the Office of Economic Opportunity Program, in the Bureau of Public Debt, in the Office of the Treasurer of the United States and in the Bureau of Accounts, except with respect to incoming classified State Department material. In the Bureau of Customs the legends are used in law enforcement instructions and guidelines for personnel in appraisement, classification, examination of merchandise, and investigative activities. III. Functioning of the Treasury Library as a Public Reading Room. There has been some misunderstanding concerning the removal from the open shelves of the Treasury Library of Internal Revenue Service documents marked "Official Use Only". I believe that the reason for this removal and its consistency with the Freedom of Information Act may be explained in the light of the following facts. Prior to the effective date of the Act, the Treasury Library was a relatively small, internal facility, designed to provide necessary Treasury and other reference material to officials of the Office of the Secretary in fiscal, legal, economic and other operational fields. In recent years the Library, now housed in an expanded area, has become one of the major Government libraries in the City of Washington, with more than 175,000 volumes on its open shelves, including law books, works on domestic and international finance and economics, and Treasury publications. The Library is used extensively by journalists, financial writers, private attorneys and other members of the public for whom special tables, marked "For Public Use," are kept available. The gues t book, kept -6- at one of the two entrances to the Library, discloses 924 signatures for the calendar year 1971, but many members of the press and other outside users of the Library do not sign the guest book. The Library receives a continuous flow of Treasury Department documents from bureaus and offices, which are accessioned as quickly as possible by a limited staff. The staff devotes a considerable amount of time to assisting members of the public in obtaining materials. The fa'ct that certain documents were marked "Official Use Only" was not questioned, in view of the burden of duties upon the staff. The officials in charge of the disclosure of information in the Internal Revenue Service were not aware that the original system of transmitting to the Treasury Library for Treasury official use of "Official Use Only" documents had continued subsequent to the time that the Treasury Library was designated the public reading room. Their attention was not called to this until a court request for one of these documents, addressed to the Internal Revenue Service, and a disclosure of the presence of these documents upon the shelves by a journalist who had made use of them. "Official Use Only" documents, in accordance with the regulations I have recited, do not belong on the open shelves in a public reading room. Their availability to the public must be determined by separate consideration by appropriate officials. Consequently, the "Official Use Only" documents were removed from the Treasury shelves with the concurrence of the General Counsel's Office and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration until further determination could be made concerning them. Instructions have been issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration that such documents shall not be placed on open shelves in any public reading room until they have been properly declassified. IV. Improvements in progress. Treasury Order 160 must be revised prior to June 1, the effective date of Executive Order 11652, in order to conform to the new directives in that Order for the classification and declassification of defense materials. This revision is expected to include a revision of Part II of the Treasury Order on the use of administrative classifications in order to fix responsibility for the dec1assifi.cation of documents classified "Limited Official Use" or "Official Use ('n1y", ~TiLn the requirement that this declassification occur as soon as the r~ason for the original classification no longer holds. The revision will probably require an automatic declassification, after a given number of years, unless otherwise specifically authorized. At the same time, attention is being given to improvement of the disclosure regulations generally, particularly as a result of consideration of Recommendation 24 of the Administrative Conference, and of inquiries made by oversight committees of the Congress. This completes my written submission. I shall be glad to try to answer questions or to obtain answers from the appropriate officials in the Department. THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY WASHINGTON July 16, 1968 TREASURY DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 160, REVISED (Supersedes Treasury Department Order No. 160, Revised of March 23, 1962, and Ame~at No.1, dated JUDe 27, 19(2) SAFEGUARDING OFFICIAL INFORMATION PART I: SAFEGUARDING OFFICIAL INFCEMATION IN THE INTERESTS OF THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STAn;S PART II: SAFEGUARDING NON· DEFENSE OFFICIAL INFORMATION REQUIRING CONFIDENrIAL HANDLING . . ...................... . PART II 1. Purpose. The purpose of Part II of this Order is to provide authority for the administrative classification of certain non-defense official information which requires confidential handling and which is not subject to classification safeguards or dissemination restrictions imposed by law or by Executive Order No. 10501. Classification UDder this Part represents an initial determination that the information is exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. 552(b). If a request far information classified under this Part is received under 5 U.S.C. 552(a), a determination must be made pursuant to 31 CFR 1.4(b), or UDder the appropriate regulations of the bureau concerned, as to whether the record should be made available under 5 U.S.C. 552. 2. Classification Categories. Non-defense official information which is not entitled to protection under Executive Order No. 10501, ~s amended, but requires confidential handling shall be classified administratively and marked accordingly, in compliance with the following classes and guides: (a) Limited Official Use. To be used for non-defense documents or material of an important, delicate or sensitive nature which should be treated confidentially and restricted to the officials and their immediate subordinates who have a need to know such information. Documents or materials so marked shall be haLdled and transmitted in a manner equivalent to "Confidential" in Part I (b) Official Use Ocly. To be used for non-defense documents or materials which should be safeguarded, but to a le s ser degree than "Limited Official Use ll , and which have wider distribution than "Limited Official Use". Documents or materials so marked shall be restricted to official use and handled and transmitted in a manner which will not make them available to unauthorized persons. 3. Authori ty to Classify. Authori ty to administratively classif.y non-defense information or material "Limited Official Use" shall be exercised only by persons covered in Part I, Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of this Order. Authority to administratively classify information or material "Official Use Only" shall be exercised only by those persons set forth in Part I, Sections 4(a) and 4(b), of this Order and other persons to whom they delegate such authority. Delegations of authority to classify "Official Use Only" may include authority to redelegatej however, the redelegated authority shall be limited to as few persons as is consistent with the orderly and expeditious transaction of Government business. 4. EXisting Categories. Any bureau which already has in use its own classification categories for non-defense official information or material may continue to use such classifications if the bureau head finds that its present system will serve its purposes better than the classification categories in Part II of this Order. Each bureau electing to continue its present system shall furnish the Executive Secretariat and the Director, Office of Security, definitions of its classification categories, including the degree of safeguarding for each category. In addition, each such bureau shall assure that the definitions of its classification categories are known to those persons, if any, outside the bureau who are or shall become authorized recipients of the bureaus' classified non-defense information or material. EFFECTIVE DATE 1. This Order shall become effective upon issuance. H~H.~ Henry H~ Fowler TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 omcr06 tlllIISTUTIVI SERVICES Administrative Circular No. 159 Supplement No.2 August 14, 1967 To Heads of Bureaus, Treasury Department SUBJECT: Classification of records and information subsequent to the Freedom of Information Act As a consequence of the coming into effect of the Freedom of Information Act (Public Law 90-23, 5 U.S.C. 552), there has developed a misunderstanding concerning the classification of documents under Treasury Department Order No. 160, Revised, as amended. The purpose of this Circular is to advise on the continued use and effect of the classifications provided for in the Treasury Order in the light of the new public information law. (1) Treasury Order No. 160, Revised, as amended, continues in full effect. (2) Bart I of the Treasury Order implements Executive Order 10501, as amended, which is directed to safeguarding official information in the interests of the national defense. The designations TOP SECRET, SECRET, or CONFIDENTIAL should not be carried on information or records unless the information or records fall within the definitions in section 1 of Executive Order 10501 or a·statute expressly requires such designations. (3) Part II of the Treasury Order provides authority for the administrative classification of certain non-defense information and records which require confidential handling and which are not subject to classification under Executive Order 10501. Under Part II the following designations may be used in classifying records and information: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE or OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Since the designation LIMITED OFFICIAL USE requires the handling and Keep Freedom in Your Future With U.S. Savings Bonds - 2 - of information or records so classified with security equivalent to "CONFIDENTIAL" in Part I of the Order, care should be taken to restrict the use of this designation. tran~ittal (4) If a request is made under the Freedom of Information Act by a private person for records administratively classified LIMITED OFFICIAL USE or OFFICIAL USE ONLY, the classification should not be considered determinative as to whether or not the particular record requested falls within the exemptions in 5 U.S.C. 552(b). Therefore, on request for a record, a determination must be made pursuant to 31 CFR 1.4(b) (or under the appropriate regulations of the bureau concerned) whether the record should be made available under the Freedom of Information Act. (5) If a request is made under the Freedom of Information Act for records classified under Part I of the Order as TOP SECRET, SECRET, or CONFIDENTIAL, the classification will be considered to be a determination that the records are exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1). Normally the records would not be subject to disclosure and no further determination need be made by the bureau involved. However, if a bureau has adopted a regulation similar"to the one adopted by the Office of the Secretary in 31 CFR 1.5(b), the bureau should deter.mine whether in the particular case there is need to rely on the exemption. Prior to making such a record or part thereof available, the record or part thereof must be declassified in accordance with the Treasury Order. /)cg£{t-~~&!A~~~~ V J~ J. Coughli Deputy Director of Administ ive Services The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 14, 1972 ANTIDUMPING INVESTIGATION INITIATED ON RECORD CHANGERS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM The Treasury Department announced today the initiation of an antidumping investigation of imports of record changers from the Uni ted Kingd om. The Treasury announcement followed a summary investigation conducted by the Bureau of Customs after receipt of a complaint alleging that dumping was taking place in the United States. The total value of record changers imported from the United Kingdom during the period from January 1971 through December 1971 amounted to approximately $43,000,000. 1 2 PRESS COI'~FE~L1JCE u. S • A. 4 AS BROADCAST OVER 5 VOICE OF ,-\;1I:!\ICA 6 HITH ? HONORABLL JOHN 13. CONNALLY, 8 SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 April 15, 1972 Washington, D. C. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 [This transcrijJt ':las prcpar~d fro'":1 u. t3De rccordinq.] 2 2 place of Issues in the lIews o time next week. I '.'lhich ,·,il1 1)e heard at i ts 4 Press Conference U.S.A. 5 [Husic.] 6 From ~\Tashington, r.c~uular .' the Voice of )\.merica brings you 7 Press Conference 8 Each week at this time, reporters interview a personality in 9 the news. U.S.~., an unrehearsed discussion program. 10 To introduce our guest and the news correspondents, 11 here is Les Higbee, this "'veel:' s moderator of Press Conference 12 U.S.A. I1R. HIGBEEi 13 14 Our guest today is the Honorable John B. Connally, Secretary of the Treasury. At the time !-lr. Connally took office in February last 15 :'~onetar 16 year, he also became U. S. Governor of the International 17 Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 18 the Inter--American Development B'3.nk, and the l\.sian Development 19 Bank. 20 During the past year, ,"'r. Connally has played a key 21 role in the continuing efforts toward international monetary 22 reform. 23 guided the ~"age-price control program in the administration's 24 25 And as head of the Cost of Living Council, he has anti-inflation campnign. secretary Connlllly i~. a grClduate of tl'.c :Jnivcrc;i t-; School, has practiced la,',r 1n his home ~~ta lr: of 1 of 'l'exCls 2 Texas, and has been active in business enterprises there. J began his public cnreer as AdMinistrative Assistant Lyndon B. 4 Johnson; when the former Pres ident v]as a member of the U. S . 5 Senate. 6 1,,:11'1 lIe Hr. Connally was appointed Secretary of the Navy by 7 President Kennedy in 1961, rp.signing to seek the office of 8 Governor of Texas, 1n which he served three terms. 9 Mr. Secretary, welcome to Press Conference U.S.A. 10 SECRETARY CONNALLY: 11 12 13 14 15 Thank you, sir. I am delighted to be here. ~·1R. HIGBEE: Now ,,,ill the members of our panel please identify themselves. f1R. Philadel~hia SLEVIH: Joseph Slevin, Syndica ted Columnist, Enquirer. 16 MR. MARK: Ross Mark, Daily Express of London. 17 r'IR. TRAVI\ST: 18 ~R. HIGBEE: 19 20 Jerry Travast, Detroi t NevIs. Mr. Slevin, would you take the first question, please? MR. SLEVIN: Mr. Secretary, how do you view the busi- 21 ness ou ':~'.ook; do you think the economy "...,ill grow a t the pace 22 that President Nixon forecast in January? 23 SECHETARY CONNALLY: flr. Slevin, I really do. I ~trong 24 think, as a matter of fact, we arc seeing a very, very 25 economic expansion of t.he uni ted States to(1Z1Y, a.nc1 I thil'lL ZF; 1 2 o the year progres~;es 6 incrc~Cl::;c. ,sincerity and Hith all conficJcncp I I rC:llly thiJ';~ I lTl all tllat we are gOlnq to h;l\Tf~ quite a good year. i·1R. 5 it Hill How lonq do you think it SLEVIN \>Jill tab:::! to get back to full eI'lploYfT1o.nt, ~1r. Secretary? 5ECRE'rARY COIJN1'.LLY: \)ell, !Ir. S:.Gvin, I think that 7 is a question I really can't answcr unless 'lIe eJtter1.pt to define 8 I, full employment. 9 when we got the figures, 620,000 new people had been e~ployccJ 10 in thG united states, making a total of 81,200,000 people 11 gainfully employed in this country. 12 ever in the history of the Nation. 13 new jobs that were found, over 700,000 people registered for 14 jobs so that in effect i'le had an increase in the number of 15 unemploycd. 16 l' Let p.1e approach it thi s \vay. Las t month f That is the highest total But in spite' of ~he 620,000 How long this is gOlng to keep up, I don't kno~. 17 Frankly, \,·,e are seeing a nc\V phenomena in the social str1lcture 18 of Arnerica. 19 entering the labor force. 20 we found 620,000 new jobs last month, that is the highest 21 number for any month since 1967, five years, and still 22 lose ground. 23 nore, I don't think, and particularly when you consider the 24 fact that of the S, 20D, 000 that are toclay class uS uncrl;--doY('l1, \'1e are seelng more \'lomen and more young peoDle And ln spite of the fact, as I say, YYll 50 I don't kno\'l \\rhat full employment is any .) have 'D(~V(; r Harked be,: fore. c~ 0 L I c -, n 't r () (-,. t1. 1-.) T Lt _ _ _ <..--,1 '''1 '...". ,1..-= I n )-_ j J question, other than thClt. ;~O\'l, I think. \'1e arQ going to continuC! to :ll1Ve econom1c cxpanS1on. I thillk '.:<3 are goir:q to contir.ue to creel te 5 new job. 6 the lahor force in these nUMbers, then I frankly 7 say 8 that VIe use for the uneP1ployed 'dill stay fairly high, 9 than \ve ,·;ould like tc see it. -- But so long as we have more and more people entering that I a~ afraid to have to 3ay that this rate, this specific number 10 I1R. 11 !'1R. liARK: IIIGBI:E: ~'lr 1\1r. hig~1er . ! lark? Se~retary, last month in Europe there 12 \Vas SOJ'1e rather hectic speculation against the dollar aga1n, 13 and thi s ".TClS met bv trerr.endous calP1 in 14 CalJ:1 real or is it assumed? S:CCRETl'.RY CCLJNALLY: 15 ~-Jd.shington. No, I think it is very real. 16 It is real, for a number of reasons. 17 cavalier about this, but we think that we are on the road to a 18 very strong econoT:1ic expansion. 19 better job in fighting inflation ~han any najor industrial 20 nation 1n the world. 21 our \'lase:, Clre incrc3sins at a lesser rate than the o'c:ler 1n- 22 dustrial nations of the world. 23 year \-]C 24 t;1ClD most other cO'Jntries, ~1J1(1 th'1t there is t]oinS to I J~no\-: \-.'12 ~'le are. And I don't want to be think He are doing a \'7e thin}~ So \:7e think a t our Dr ice sane the end of t~l i Clre goiner to h'<lve our si tuation l)(~tter in contr01 '-('r 'J:;-: s ( 1 tha t '..Ie are i nc1cec..1 :cunninrr 4 by some perha9~) as a little jibe or jest, 5 talk a.bout the convertibili ty of thp <..101Iar, and I ab.,rays li1-:e 6 to point out that the dollar is 7 convertible into any goods or services that anyhodv in the 8 world wants to buy from the United states. J 9 HR. HARK: I call it: convertibl~, t)jcy riqht today fully In fact, !lr. Secretary, tllC cheaper 10 dollar abroad, the speculation lJringing down tlw price of the 11 dollar abroad might in fact \'lork for tile Uni ted Sta ::es? 12 SECRETARY CONNALLY: Well, we don't obviously like I Don't think this is (:Tood 13 to see speculation in the dol1Clr. 14 for anyonc. 15 realignment of exchange rates, \vhich 16 the dollar considerably, and 17 caused it but nevertheless they ;,'Jere there. 18 nothing '\vorse .than to have a bad situation than to fail 19 recognize that you have a bad situation. 20 up to it, in great cooperation and a great spirit of 21 tion wi th all our principal trading partners, entered in-:o 22 this unique agreement "Ii th respect to the realigI1ncnt of c:(- 23 change rates, anu I think this year anJ next YC'<lr is 'J01 ne) 24 ;,C(~ the a va s ~ It is certainly not good for us. ~:le ~.'Je ~'le had t:-w think is going tv help regret the cir-:::umstances that Anu there i!3 So I think '-. 72 faced il 1provenen t bo tIl in the tr {)c1o lJa lance', () f 1 ":0 Coo~)(:ra- to 1 2 r1R. 'l'Rl\V7\ST: ~;ocrctar} r ;lr. .) the President on his trip to .4 Does tha t indica te tha t Otta~"Ta did ,lot Va'll o.Cco;<l~nny in the past feT:l dC1yS . our trade pro!Jlcr:ls Tdi th Canada arc so 5 tough that it '-'lould have been uselesfOj for you to hav~ gone 6 with him? 7 SECRETARY CONN!\.LLY: IJo, no, I don't think' anything 8 is so tough that we Hon' t 9 commi tted to go and planned to go 10 mind. 11 into anything like tough trade negotiations or tradG negotia- 12 tions tough or otherwise. 13 that the President 14 should, in r.1y judgment specif ically concern themselves h'i tIl. 15 face up to it. ,i th T•• lJo, I think differc~llt }-'.e had ideas in 7his was not a trip that had been designed to enter Tl1ese are not the sort of things of the Uni tec1 Sta tes Cl.nd You know, when you g~t T~r. Trudeau into these trade negotintions, 16 you have to be prepared to get down into the minute details of 17 all types of arguments and trades and, frankly, these types 18 of negotiations should not be carried on at the highest :_evels 19 of government, and no one ever contemplated that they \·!oulc1 20 be ln this case. 21 i'1R. And I didn't need to make the trip. rrRl\.V7\S'l' : One of our big aut~10bile pnc~, 22 Canada, and continues to be, of course, the 23 which we contend is unfair unduly to the Unitecl States, c1e:-;pite 1 lIlnerican point of Vle\·, on thi:-;,· or is the c1 iS~)D.ri t j 2 the ;lixon adr:linistration and Geor<Je ':eany as Llcute on the ~ trade with Canada as it may be, say, on the Price 4 on the Pay Board? SECRETARY CONNALLY: 5 hel~ ~)ct"c)(:n Comrni~sion, I don't think we are getting 6 any particular from labor on this issue, not because of 7 any political partisanship, in my view, but simply because I 8 don't think they fully understand what the facts are. 9 they are beginning to realize the impact that the automotive 10 agreement is having on automobile production in the united 11 States, but I don't think they fully understand it yet. 12 MR. HIGBEE: Mr. Slevin? 13 i'lR. SLEVIlJ: r'~r. I think Secre tary, vou have Bade it c Ie ar 14 that you do not think the negotiatinq of a ne . ." monetary agree- 15 ment should be carried on within the Group of Ten forum that 16 negotiated the Smithsonian agreement. 17 you want? SECRETARY CONNALLY: 18 What kind of forum do Me. Slevin, let me take a very perhRps_b~ 19 minor exception to that 20 have tried to make it clear that I did not think that the 21 negotiations should be carried on solely within the Group of 22 Ten. 23 adding only one word. I I think the Group of 78n has a role to play in the syste~, 24 deliberations on a new international monetary but I 25 think frankly that there should be adc1itional farUlY> in ':::licI1 () 1 the matter is also consicl.crccl. and_ clir:cus;--;ed in groat c1._'i_·~LiJ 2 and vlitllout having any fixed or fino vie 1:1s on it to tllC~ cx- - ,) clusion of any ideas, I ,",auld say that discussions should .4 deed be carried on by the nations, ei ther formally or 5 informally, the members of the Group of Ten. 6 I think, in addit.ion to that, di~cussions I .. 1 " -- should be ~oard 7 carried on by the nations that comprise the Executive 8 the International j'1onetary Fund. 9 even a third more or less ad hoc group should pot be con- 10 suIted at least, and I would think that the United States 11 would go out of its way probably to discuss with nations not 12 represented on either group some of the problems' that we will 13 face in the new monetary system. 14 l1R. SLEVIN: And then I am noi.: sure that There have been suggestions that other 15 countries should do more to help the United St:l.tes and the 16 dollar, to take greater responsibili ties. 17 can they do, should they do to help this count:cy? 18 SECRETARY of CON~JALLY: I-'Jha·t sort of ::hings I'lell, I, of course, al\·,ay~~ get 19 back to what I believe to be the very fundamental question, 20 that we can't really ever solve our monetary problems 21 \ye talk about a system tha t permi ts very frequent revalucn:ions 22 and devaluations of various currencies around the \yorld, unless 23 there is a better equilibrium established with respect to 24 trade matters because, after all, this 25 discrepa.ncy in balance of pclymcnts, if ll1cre be onc. lS unl~ss ~'711(1t prO(lL1C('S the 1 2 . some cases. I thin}: this is vcr;y true of Japan . any bones about it. .4: I have told mv friends in Janan thot .L they have certain practices tha t they enC) age in tha t \1e think 5 is to our detriment, and that so long as we take 30 percent of 6 all the products that we ship in \vorlc1 trac"'.e, that there is a 7 limi t 8 market without also having access to their market for some of 9 our pooeuts. tc hOH much we can permit them to sa tura te the J-Jrerican The same 10 lS ~'7e true of nations around the world. 11 are going to have to all come to grips with changes in our 12 trade practices. 13 rest of the ,",orld is gOln<] to have to P.1aJ::c a func1ar1cntal de- 14 cision before we can establish any new monetary 15 they have to for themselves individually and collectively 16 answer the question, are they ever going to be willing for the 17 Unitec1 States to run a surplus. Finally, I would simply say that most of the 18 ~IR. ~LEVIN: 19 SECRETARY CONNh.LLY: syste~, and Does that mean they have to run deficits. Tl1a t rneans they have to rCln year~:. 20 deficits. 21 Our c1eficits are somebody's snrpluses. 22 any type of convertibility then we obviously have to have a 23 system that ".rill perP1it us to qCl_in as Hell as lose, or 24 never hllve any realistic convr:rti 1)i1i 1:.\7. 25 Uow, ';,'e have run a deficit for t'"mnty-b'lo nm-" for us to rnaintLlin 110 can 11 1 the strict monetary sen:.;c, convc;rt5bility into reserv''; 2 then ~ the united States to run surpluses at some time. "de are goinq to have to have 1 !·lR. HIGBLE: 5 HR. Hl\HK: D:oc'.?l:S systef:l that 17ill pr.3r:'li t Cl ilr. r'lark? 'This follo':,1s on 11r. Slevin's question tremen~ous I 6 dealing with the Common T1arket. 7 in l\merica for Bri tish 8 years 9 you give us some idea of the sort of things, the considerat.ions 10 that have caused this lack of enthusiasm in Washington? There is enthusiasm , I ~ntry to the Common 'larket for many and no'i'! it seems t.o be t:enpered by some caution. SECnLTARY CONlJALL?: 12 I am not sure ,that I reflect all of the vie~..ls 13 in i'?a:-;hington, by any manner or means. I 14 that I don't, that I reflect a minority viel1point. 15 Let me ans~.ver 11 Could it for myself I and that are extant frequently think. I don't think there is any diminution of enthusiasm 16 for Bri tain' s entry into the Comrl'\on narket. I think if there 17 is any caution in the minds of people in Hashington today, it 18 lS 19 perform during the decade of the ~eventies. tha t we vie':l the Comillon !'larke',: now 1n terms of hm) \l1i 11 it By O'ivn view is that, 20 in spi te of the best intentions g()vcrnment,~ of individuals and of 22 Cornmon i'1arket is trying to perfect itself as an econo;l1.ic unit, 23 as a political unit, a§ a financial unit, that it inevit~bly 24 18 qoing to look im·lard. 25 don't s~y that critically. I that at a time ~,\T:1en 21 11 as to. It I ClP1 I,! e ~ rca 11 11 u;:: .-d1 • the .7\ n t..1 I saylnq "it, I hone, ohjcC'Livc1v I 12 1 and in all fairness, without nny critici~m at aJl. 2 think you are going to he lookinq im:larc1 bcc(1u::~c tllCJ. t i::; '"There ~ your problems are going to be. 1 I sit at that desk all day long and I give my attention to 5 things that are pressing me the greatest, and we all do, and 6 that is what you are going to be doing, all of you in Europe. Bull di(fer~nt frOM MC. And it is no th~ So I think what concerns us is thE, t, given the se ? re~ct, h~w 8 circumstances, if this be true, then how do we 9 we conduct ourselves in international monetary affairs and in 10 world trade matters. 11 There 12 the inward-looking. 13 :·1R. HARK: 1S do That is the only reason for cautior .. no criticism, and I am not in the least critical for I think it is inevitable. This then comes back to your point that 14 there has to be a bvo-way street in trade. 15 Common ~larket Obviously, the will be looking for surpluses 16 SECRETARY CONNALLY: 17 MR. HARK: Yes. and it \ViII have to come to some form 18 of negotiation. with the united states on exchanging surpluses 19 and deficits over the years. SECRETARY CONNALLY: 20 And \ve are going to be loo}: ing , 21 so 22 the European Community and other nations around the world. 23 24 25 '\.Je are going to have to obviously' he in consultation ';'i th nR. HIGBEE: He Hill have more questions for Secretary Connally in just a mo~ent. You are 100kil1CJ to Press Conf0rencc U.~; .1\., ;;rouqht 13 1 to you each 'dcck at this ti!~\c. ~v the '.Toicc of /\TYWricCl. 2 .) Our guest Secr(~tary toda~T of the Treasury. is the lIonorable John 11. Connally, Correspondents on our pa.nel include> Joseph Slevin, thc Phi lade 11)hia En'1u irer; Ros s T'1ark, London 5 Daily Express; and Jerry Travast, Detroit News. 6 r,1r. Travitst I Hill you continue, please? 7 HR. TRAV~.sT: Secretclry Connally, it has been several 8 weeks no\'1 since four of the five labor members of the Pederal 9 Pay Board walked off the job ccntending that the Nixon adminis- 10 tration was, in their words, anti-labor. 11 which are related in connection with that. 12 Pay Board effectively been crippled or liberated by their de- 13 parture; 14 come back on the board? 15 I have two questions One is, has the Z\nd, b.vo, do you see any real hope that labor may SECRETARY CONNALLY: Mr. Travast, I would say, in 16 answer to the first question, that no, the Pay Board has not 17 been crippled by the departure of the four labor members who 18 walked off of it. 19 In response to your second question, I don't antici- 20 pate at all that the labor members will come back. Now, may 21 I respond a bit further to both of those by sinply saylng 22 that I think the Pay Board, notwithstanding the departure of 23 the labor members, can continue to operate just as effectively 24 and pcrhClps even more efficiently than it has in the TJ..l.st,ullCl 25 I thin1-: it \'Till do so \\1ith the somo objcctiviLv. 1 2aclministration favors big business, that it i;; allti·-lLl];or. ,) Hell, the truth of the matter 4 cisions that were taken while the labor memhers sat on 5 Pay Board -- there were 54 in number -- labor was in the 6 majority on 3G of those decisions, and in the minority only 13 7 times. 8 over two-thirds of the time. 9 lS, if you view the Tl1C1jor de- Nov], those are the facts. th~t So they uere in the maj ori ty Now, I don't think that this administration should 10 be classed as anti-labor; 11 classed as pro-labor. 12 The Pay Board hopefully is objective. 13 job to stop inflation in this country, as is the Price Commis-- 14 sian, and I think they are doing it with great dedication and 15 with considerable success. on the other hand, it should not be The Pay Board is hopefully not either. It is trying to do a 16 HR. HIGBEE: !1r. 17 MR. SLEVIN: Mr. Secretary, do you think thougt the Slevin? 18 American people are giving the Price Commission the suppcrt it 19 must have if it is to be effective? 20 SECRETARY COaNALLY: I1r. Slevin, that is quest~_onable 21 I frankly don't think they are giving it quite the support that 22 I think i t needs or even deserves. 23 deal of question in the minds of most peorle as to \',rhether or 24 not it is going to be effective, and I re<]rct thClt. 25 that it had a higher dc<]ree of I think there is a great 1pport. Sl.. I thin]: it I ,..,.,i5;1 ncc<1~~ ,'..11 J :) 1 the support 'd(~ can possibly glVC it 2 really be effective only if there ,) high degree of voluntary compliance 'f,vi th its rules and Hi th 4 its regulations. 5 M~. SLEVIN: f 1S bcctlusc it is (l'oil1(J to great cooperation Clncl a Hha t do you thinJ: the chances are now 6 then that the united States will achieve the President's goal 7 of slowing the inflation to 2~5 to 3 perc~nt by the end of 9 SECRETARY CONNALLY: I think good f ~1r. Slevin, I 10 really do. I think we have made headway up to now and, again, 11 we have to I guess you have to be somewhat of a seer or a 12 prop~et 13 gone through the worst period, in My judgment, that we are 14 goinCJ to sec. 15 number of times, and a number in the 16 it, that following the lifting of the freeze itself that we 17 were 18 ent figuces were used, 60 days, 90 days, 19 --. in Hhich ,de were going to feel the hulge f 'de \'lere going to 20 see reaction to the freeze in terms of price increases and 21 wage increases. 22 and perhaps be somewhat optimistic. goi~g 110\'';, We have just if you will recall, 1'I1r. Slevin, \'7e ad~inistration . 1 S3.1('. a repeated to enter into a period perhaps of 90 days -- differ~ome Now, we have had that pretty much. as high as 120 It is significant 23 to me that last week the new wholesale pricc index came out and 24 \olent up only onc·.. tcnth of onc percent. 25 because it may reflect i~O'.. T, this is Si(1l1if.i.C'ln anc1 I lHlderlinc the '.'lord "I:l;l1" .-.- It '· l \ \ Ie, incrcCl.sc~J. 2 these Hage und price .) expect to sec a <J-reater leavening of :)riccs and \·laqc:" really 5 thin]~ So I think fro:'1 :;cre on "C cl.lvl I "w have got an excellent chance of hi tting t~c 2.5 to 3 percent. HIGB:SE: 6 I1R. 7 J1R. I'lARK: ~lr. nark? '1'he Pres ident has been to China and is 8 about to go to the Soviet Union raising a question of trade 9 vii th Communist Bloc cO·lntries. 10 credit to the Soviet Union and China different from what we 11 have seen in the past? SECRETARY COiE1ALLY 12 ~ 11ill there be an extension of I would nbt want to anticipate 13 \Vhat might come out of the President I s visit. 14 think that \'lould be \,li thin the realm of possi:,Jili ty. 15 sion has been made on it. 16 conversations go, that we could extend some credit to the 17 Soviet Union. 18 ~lR. 19 unredeemed 20 again? 21 CZ-il~ rll\RK: There Czarist bonds. I certainly :Jo dcci- It ma:' well be, depending on lS hO~,'7 the al'"ays the business here of JIas that co,e up for negotiatiom SECRETARY COlnm.LLY: I don I t recall that that is, but 22 we have that problem with all the countries in the world. 23 have got problems like' tha t wi th Crea t Dri tain, \-:i th France! 24 and other countries around t:1e 1,,,rorlc1, so I thin}: this cer- 25 tainly ",ill be one m.3tter th.J.t \·"i11 be discussed, or the 17 I thin}: that certainly 11ill Jx~ a rr:,lttr:;r 1 matter of lenu--Ieasc. 2 that will be on the agenda, and tha repayment of lend-lease oJ items. 4 rE~. ~11\IUZ; 5 SECRETARY COimALLY: Do you recall hOH much that is offhand? Oh, it varies. It depends 6 aga1n, this is one of those things that depends on who 1S doing 7 the calculatin<], do you add the interest or don't you, and if 8 so hOT:" much interest do you charge. 9 between I guess $500 and $700 million, in that range. 10 11R. HIGBEE: 11 T-1R. TRAVAST: But it will run some1dhere Hr. Travast? Secretary Connally, 'va are at that 12 point in the year when income tax day is upon all the }\J:1erican 13 people. 14 SECRETARY CONNALLY: 15 ~1R. 16 SECRETARY' CONNALLY: 17 TRAVAST: A black day. That's right. A bright day for the TreCl.sury ane a black day for everyone else. ~·1R. 18 TRAVAST: \'Jell, that is exactly \·;rhat I "las 19 about to ask, and that is, are we runn1ng on schedule, 1n your 20 terms, 21 begin tl-,.c ne\,7 one \'7i th a defici t? 22 the picture? q~.ven the fact that ....,e 24 running 25 amount a~1eac1 C1 t the fiscal year and \"ill ir1!JrovcJ.l.~nt Do you see anv l Ara we maintaining, are we calling behind? SECRETARY 23 ~egan CON1~ALLY: ?Jo, our collections Clre actuClll'.' and \'78 are ah0.Cl.d of projection') by th i stine. Nm· r , lJart ()f tha t I.'lre: d i1. consi.c1cr.:1')lr:; t tr i~)l1 tc' tn 0'/(' r - JY 1 Hithholdinq. 2 Last year He unclcr-Hothhc:ld. t~e and now we arc over-withholding. <1 If.1e The lalll "rEi S CllClnc;(?cl hRve hoen tryinq as bost knolv hOv7 through employer groups, through radio and tele- 5 vision spots, and everything else to ask people to fill out 6 their W-4 forms 7 are entitled to under the law. 8 success in persuading pecple to do that and consequently we are 9 over-withholding for the moment. 10 our collections are running ahead of our projections and we 11 are doing exceedingly well. 12 a~d claim an additional dependent which they !·1R •.TRAVAST: But we haven't had Much But even putting that aside, ~)e So this would then, in your opinion, 13 another sign that the economy is on the mend in the United 14 states? 15 SECRETARY CONNALLY: 16 MR. HIGBEE: !·1r. Slevin? 17 HR. SLEVIN: Hr. Secre tary, hOyT soon do you anticipat YGs. 18 the United States will be able to get rid of wage-price con- 19 troIs? 20 SECRETARY CONNALLY: ~p'?aking. In the price anJ pay 21 'lye had 22 realm, our objective was arithr,wtic in character. 23 ought to bring price -- the ra te of inflation c1m'll1 \·!i t~l regard 24 to both of these factors to bob-Icon 2. S anc} 3 perccnl, th.l.t 25 'Ivi th rc spcct to 1"Tago s they b'IO objectives, broadly Mr. Slevin, when we started out OlF}! 1t to :)c dO':lll to rt \\10 r:l :Iq(~ said '1.. 7e of .ri. S 1 percent. 2 1Jow, I think we can acconp1ish that objective l.JY the end of the year. 4 equallY'inportant if not more important, and that is to try to 5 purge, to try to expunge from the A:nerican mind that we are on 6 this vicious cycle of inflation in this country, and to try to 7 per~;uc.~de 8 indeeC live for a period of time and a number of years without 9 this horrendous inflationary cycle eating us up. 10 But 'de had a second obj cct ',-,hich I think l~ .) and to convince the Ame:::-ican people that l,:le can Now, 'I think we are going to achieve the arithmetic 11 goals. And whether or not we are going to reach the second one 12 by the end of the year, 13 think they are going to be on beyond the end of the year. HR. SLEVIN: 14 I don't know. If we don't, then I Hell, once this inflation psychology lS 15 expunged, if it is, do you think that it will be possible then 1E just to decontrol or \vill some new system have to be devised 17 for a continuing period? SECRETARY CON:~ALLY: 18 (10, I' really think if 'de opera te 19 ~s 20 \vill, I think we can elir:tinate the controls. 21 need a '"lew sys ten. 22 '.-lell as I think 'de can, and if we do as well as I think vIe t·m.• SLEVIN: I don't think You don't hold wi th those \'1ho believe 23 that the United states' economy has become inflation prone, 24 that there arc structural changes in the 1\J1erican 25 SECRErl'ARY COIJIJJ\LLY: \'7(~ 11, cconol\~'? there 3.re s truc tur a 1 ':,12 1 changes in the econoP.1Y, of courS0, 2 continued demands. D system of supply and demand econoRic theories 1S indeed a 4 fantasy. 5 econom1C theories, but I don't think it has reached the point 6 where we have to look at permanent controls as a part of the 7 structural economic sY3tern of the United States. tha. t tend to auq(;r [or To say that we are operGting J.n a pure He are not. 8 ~1R. 9 MR. MARK: HIGBEE: There arc factors that belie those r1r. nark? For many years the united States deliher- 10 ately ran deficits to help the rest of the '-7orld have a stable 11 economy. 12 surpluses. 13 the Ar.l<:~rican econony thclt has to be eradicated? 14 nOv7 tha t 15 deficits in American history and --- 16 It deliberately held back surpluses, agricultural lIa.s this produced sort of an inherent ~'Jeakness in last month, I think i t SECRETARY CONNALLY: ~'7as I am thinking one of the wors t trade Yes, i t has done several things 17 to us, !1r. nark. ]\mong oth2r things, it has convinced all of 18 the Amer ican people erroneous ly no'..! tha t ",e \'7Cre indeed 19 ,,,ere the biggest and the strongest and the richest a.nd the most 20 vital and the most efficient. 21 that there has been an enorr1OUS c'1 an cr G 1n the last decade. 22 i'Jow, there are certain areas of our economy \oThere 23 the most efficient, by far, but this is true prirrtarily 1n 24 agriculture. 25 in the \·lorld, '.vith u real productivity rate of u})out G r':rcent r ~:,e J\nd the truth of the P.1atter is ~'Te still are I'Ve have the rrtost efficient agriculturLl.l syStC~l 21 1 per year. 2 ture, but thllt is about all. J than the Germans or the French or the Britisll or the Japanese 4 or a grdat many other nationalities in other things is going 5 too far. 6 when we were indeed the most vital economy existing in the free 7 world, we did convince ourselves of all these things, that we 8 could just kind of loaf along and take it easy and we would 9 still be able to out-distance all the other countries in the 10 world. 11 rea Ii ze tlla t . 'Ide arc more efficient But unfortunately, over the last quarter of a century We don't know it in business. nesses they don't know it. 14 15 To say that But that is not true any more, and we haven't come to 12 13 It is a fantastic rate of productivity in agricul-- T1R. nARK: agricul~ural We don't know it in government. You are not producing these tremendous surpluses you used to, are you? SECRETARY COUNALLY: 16 In many of our busi- Some of them \.,e are. But last 17 year "le exported $7.5 billion worth of agricultural cor:unodi ties 18 It \\7a8 19 we are not producing these surpluses is because of the type of 20 subsidy program that we have in the united states. 21 type' of subsidy that In effect keeps our problems t.Ji thin our 22 Q'.vn country. 23 3. great year for agriculture. Nov], one of t~e It reasons lS a Now, contrary to the aqricultural policies of the 24 European comTimni ty, their policies a.re fashioned in such a 25 \vily that it tends to throH the ir prol) 10m on the T.vor Ic1 ['F1rLe ts . 22 1 !H~. 2 Thank you, r'lr. Secretary. ,) 4 HIGBEE: I 'P.1 sorry, qcntlefTlen, our tine i~.; up. ,Thank you, meMbers of the press. Our guest today \>7as the Honorable John B. Connally, 5 Secretary of the Treasury. 6 Here Joseph Slevin, Philadelphia Enquirer; :Ross !'1ark, the 7 London Daily Express; and Jerry Travast, the Detroit News. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Correspondents aslcing the questions . . .wes T !-1 l0'.)ee, . 1 Th 1S 1S ~ :~n ,. t on. "', aSIl1ng T7 [~1usic.] ANNOUNCER: You have been listening to Press Conference U.S.A., broadcast by the Voice of A~erica. Issues in the News, usually heard at this time, will be presented at its reC}ulC'lr time next [Husic. ] ~.,eek. The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 17, 1972 MEMBERS OF HOUSE BANKING AND CURRENCY COMMITTEE WILL ATTEND FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK IN VIENNA, AUSTRIA, APRIL 20-22 Congressional advisers to the U.S. Delegation attending the Fifth Annugl Meeting nf the Asian Development Bank in Vienna, Austria, .April 20-22 ~ill include the following members of the House Banking and Currency Committee. Congressman Thomas L. Ashley, D-Ohio, Congressman Ben Bo Blackburn, R-Ga., Congressman Garry Brown, R-Mich., Congressman William P. Curlin, Jr., D-Ky., Congressman Thomas S. Gettys, D-S.C., Congressman Charles J. Griffin, D-Miss., Congressman Richard T. Hanna, D-Calif., Congressman J. William Stanton, R-Ohio, Congressman Robert Go Stephens, Jr., D-Ga. The UoS. Delegation, headed by Treasury Under Secretary Charls E. Walker, will leave Washington April 18. The Asian Development Bank began operations in 1966 to help accelerate economic growth of developing Asian nations. Membership includes 23 Asian nations as well as 14 nonAsian countries. Donor countries subscribe to 68 percent of the Bank's capital shares with the United States and Japan having equal subscriptions of 20 percent each. The Bank has made over $600 million in loans to date o C-285 000 The Deportment of the TREASURY WASH1NGTON. D.C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04·2041 FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY REMARKS OF EUGENE T. ROSSIDES ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY (ENFORCEMENT, TARIFF AND TRADE AFFAIRS, AND OPERATIONS) before the MARINE EXCHANGE OF THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY REGION and THE CARGO PROTECTION COUNCIL OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, INC. ST. FRANCIS HOTEL, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA April 17, 1972 1:15 p.m. TREASURY'S ACTION PROGRAM TO COMBAT THEFT OF INTERNATIONAL CARGO This Administration, I am proud to report, has made substantial progress in the fight to curb theft of international cargo. While the tide is turning, more needs to be done. Lets look at the record of what Treasury has accomplished. Early in this Administration, President Nixon directed an all out drive against drug smuggling and organized crime. These became Treasury's highest priorities in the area of law enforcement. It became evident in 1969 that the long-neglected problem of cargo theft fell into both these priority areas, and Treasury therefore developed an action program and charged the Bureau of Customs with implementing it. The Treasury program has two main thrusts-prevention of theft by improving cargo security and deterrence of theft by intensifying our law enforcement efforts. C-288 - 2 - The Preventative Program There are four separate but interrelated parts to our preventative program. First, we issued several regulations to improve the security of high risk cargo. Second, we instituted pilot programs in New York, San Francisco and Oakland to demonstrate that if a few basic security measures are adopted cargo theft can be significantly reduced. Third, Treasury, on behalf of the Administration, proposed legislation to Congress which would give Customs the additional tools it needs to combat cargo theft and pilferage effectively. The passage of this legislation, known as the Customs Port Security Act would, in my judgment, result in the reduction of cargo theft to a minimum at all airports of entry throughout the United States within 6 months to one year and a substantial reduction of cargo theft at all seaports of entry within one year. Fourth, we published the Standards for Cargo Security to stimulate carriers and other operators of cargo terminals to improve voluntarily the physical and procedural security of their facilities. We hope that these standards will be observed by the industry and produce a reduction in cargo theft. Although the Treasury Department's preventative program centers on international cargo at ports of entry an important by-product is improved security for the large amounts of domestic cargo flowing through or temporarily stored at the same facilities. Furthermore, the measures we are urging as a minimum response to this problem are equally applicable to terminals handling domestic cargo. The Law Enforcement Program Last month I ordered a nationwide step-up in our law enforcement efforts and we are already beginning to see some results. - 3 - 1. East Coast On the East Coast since March 3, 1972, we have apprehended 91 individuals on cargo theft charges and recovered merchandise valued at $140,000. The close relationship between this drive against cargo thieves and Customs other law enforcement missions can be readily seen in the following cases. In New York:Customs Agents working with the New York City Police Department were able to crack two truck hi-jacking rings, arrest a total of 7 individuals and recover two truck loads-of electronic equipment and general merchandise valued at $105,000. In both cases, the "hi-jacks" proved to be phony ones-i.e. the truck driver simply gave~up his load to accomplices. The role of organized crime in these cases is being investigated further. In Miami, Customs Patrol Officers on a routine cargo security patrol of the seaport observed a crew member acting suspiciously. He left his ship carrying a suitcase which he loaded into a vehicle parked on the dock. When the car attempted to leave the dock, it was stopped and a search of the suitcase revealed 70 plastic bags of pure heroin. The crew member and two other persons in the car were arrested and twenty-two pounds of heroin, having a wholesale 'value of $2.5 million, was seized. 2. West Coast On the West Coast since March 3, 1972, we have made 38 apprehensions and recovered merchandise valued at $68,000. One case in Seattle involved the recovery of $8,000 in frozen lobster tails and one arrest. Another in Los Angeles involved the arrest of four men who hi-jacked a truck containing electronic equipment and china valued at $18,000. Two of the persons arrested for cargo pilferage here on the West Coast were found to have marijuana and dangerous drugs in their possession. - 4 - I am pleased to report that this West Coast effort is receiving the full cooperation and support of all five u.s. Attorneys--James Browning, Jr. in San Francisco; Stanley Pitkin in Seattle; Harry Steward in San Diego; Willian Keller in Los Angeles; and Sidney Lezak in Portland. In addition to added pressure against drug smuggling and organized crime one of the goals of this stepped up enforcement campaign is to put the brakes on petty thievery which, when multiplied over and over again, constitutes an insidious and dangerous attack on our transportation system. Senator Bible deserves a great deal of credit for focussing attention on the nationwide nature of the cargo theft prdblem through the hearings held by the Senate Select Committee on Small Bussiness. Senator Bible's estimate that cargo theft amounts to $1.5 billion annually has received much attention and it does underscore the magnitude of the problem. In fact, the depredations of cargo thieves cost much more; in lost sales, markets, and jobs, in swolen insurance rates, and especially in unfair competition to the honest businessman. The government is also directly affected. Treasury may not be able to collect customs duties and internal revenue taxes on imported merchandise that has vanished, and income taxes are lost because the importers have lower incomes and claim deductions for their uninsured theft losses. And the loss of export cargo hurts our precarious balance of payments. As a result of the hearings held by Senator Bible's Committee, the Interagency Committee on Cargo Security was formed in 1971 to coordinate the response of the various agencies of the Federal government. Customs, which has been active in this area since 1969, spearheads this effort at all seaports and airports. The following is a brief report on the substantial progress that Treasury has made so far and what still needs to be done. - 5 - 1. The Car90 Security Regulations The first phase of the Treasury cargo security program involved writing regulations to increase the protection given cargo in international trade and to tighten up carriers accountability for cargo in their custody. Most of these regulations became 'effective on April 1, 1971. The physical security regulations require all carriers to have special areas for the storage of hich value and brokenpackaged merchandise and, at airports, an adequate number of lockable vehicles to transport such cargo from aircraft to terminal. Failure to comply can result in the denial of a permit to unlade international cargo. These regulations resulted in a substantial improvement in the security of high-ris~ easily pilferea cargo. 2. The Pilot Projects The new regulations, which merely apply sound security measures where laxity had become a tradition, were developed partly out of Customs' experience with a pilot project still in progress at New York's JFK International Airport. Measures prescribed in the regulations have been put into practice there, plus,others recommended by Customs for greater cargo security, such as locked boxes to keep papers out of unauthorized hands and the use of cameras which simultaneously photograph the person who receives the merchandise, his identification card and a special pick-up form. The program has been getting results. In the program's first year reported cargo thefts at JFK declined by 28% and the dollar value of stolen goods by 69% (from $3.3 million). For the six-month period ending November 31, 1971, reductions of 27% in number and 45% in value, were achieved. This trend has continued to date. I must point out that these figures were obtained from the Airport Security Council which deserves a great deal of credit for the success of this program. - 6 - Similar pilot projects have commenced at selected piers in New York, San Francisco, and Oakland. Customs has just finished a comprehensive security survey of Piers 19 and 23 in San Francisco and Berth H in Oakland. It is too early to tell if we are going to have as dramatic results on the San Francisco waterfront as we had at JFK Airport, but the initial results on the New York waterfront have been very encouraging. 3. Treasury's Legislative Proposal An important part of the Treasury Department program was to develop Federal legislation that would plug the loopholes still existing in Customs'· control of the movement of international' cargo so that it could tackle the cargo theft problem with full effectiveness. Called the "Customs Port Security Ac~" (S. 1654, the Bennett Bill, and the identical H.R. 8476, the Mills-Byrnes Bill), it was referred a1ffiost one year ago to the Senate Finance and the House Ways and Means Committees. Its main features are the establishment of natio'nal standards for cargo security, the screening of persons seeking access to high-risk areas, and the restructuring of certain penalties to facilitate prosecution of cargo theft cases. The most important provision in the Customs Port Security Act is the one giving the Secretary of the Treasury authority to establish national standards for cargo security at all ports of entry. These standards will relate to matters such as special storage areas for high-value merchandise, lighting, fencing, alarm systems, patrols and guards, and separate private parking areas. I would like to emphasize that we are talking about measures as basic as putting";up fences and locking doors. The lack of these basic physical and procedural safeguards is responsible for a large portion of the cargo theft problem today. - 7- We recognize that it may not be necessary for a particular facility 1::.0 obserV'.= all of these standards and still provide adequate security. You m~y be assured that the District Director and Regional Commissioner of Customs will have full authority to grant waivers er exemptions to any carrier or terminal operator that demonstrates that a particular standard is impractical or unnecessary for its facility. Because issuing these national standards may not be sufficient to curb theft in all instances, the bill also authorizes the Secretary to designate special "Customs-security areas" within ports where he finds there is an unusual risk of theft. Customs-security areas would be subject to more stringent security measures, the Secretary could require businesses whose employees sought access to these areas to be licensed, and anyone entering would have to display an approved identification card or badge. Customs officers would carry out these procedures and control the restricted areas. However, the main thrust of the bill is to empower the Secretary of the Treasury to make certain that minimum security measures are adopted at all international ports of entry. By requiring the same minimum security standards at all ports and terminals, the proposed legislation avoids any port obtaining a competitive advantage over another--a major defect of some regional programs to combat cargo theft. At the same time, it provides flexibility and controls costs by spotting "Customs-security areas" only where and when they are needed;not an entire port if a dock area could be specified as especially vulnerable to theft, not an entire airport if a particular carrier terminal could be pinpointed. Treasury, in fac~, expects that few "Customs-security areas" will be established and that those that are will not be needed long. - 8 - The Treasury Department and its action arm, the Bureau of Customs, views passage of the Customs Port Security Act as an appropriate development of Customs' inherent strength. The Bureau is the only enforcement agency with a presence, and over 180 years of experience, in all of the nation's ports of entry. To carry out its mission to collect revenue and to intercept contraband, it has acquired a tremendous expertise in cargo security matters. The proposed legislation is supported by groups which know about international cargo, including the Transportation Association of America, the American Importers Association, and the American Institute of Marine Underwriters. We are still hopeful there w~ll be hearings on the bill in this session of Congress. 4. The Voluntary Program and the Standards for Cargo Security In the meantime, to provide guidance to industry and Customs officers in locating and correcting security problems, Customs developed and issued in January, 1972, the "Standards· f·or· C·argo seouritl: II These standards, which will form the bas1s for he national standards to·be issued pursuant to the Customs Port Security Act, constitute the physical and procedural security measures which we believe should be implemented by most terminal operators to provide a minimum level of cargo protection. Underneath each standard in this pamphlet there is set forth some "recommended specifications" or suggested ways of meeting it. There may be alternate means of meeting some of these qeneral standards and each terminal operator should determine what remedial action is most appropriate. We hope that these standards will be observed by the industry and that there will be a significant reduction in cargo theft as a result. 9 - While Customs can lead the way, businesses engaged in handling cargo have the primary responsibility for achieving good cargo security. The joint C ustoms-indu8uy effort was the key to success at JFK Airport. Customs helped develop a few common sense rules and saw to it that all airlines participated. The airlines at JFK -under the guidance of their own Airport. Security Council -- then pitched in wi th determi.n.~ll)lr to implement the protective measures needed at each terminal. This is the sort of venture that succeeds. I am confident that with the cooperation of the Cargo Security Council of Northern California Customs and industry can achieve similar results in the San Francisco area. Conclusion I can assure you that this is an action program which has made maximum use of the limited resources available. It also ties in with two top priority concerns of President Nixon--the drive to stop smuggling of narcotics and dangerous drugs into the United States and the campaign against organized crime. If the drug smuggler can remove packages containing narcotics before entry is made, he does not have to fear the more rigorous inspection of cargo which Customs has implemented in order to reduce the influx of illegal drugs into this country. For organized crime, cargo theft has become a profitable business, especially at large deep-water ports and at major airports. For example, there was considerable evidence that organized crime was responsible for the substantial losses experienced at JFK before the institution of the pilot project. In my judgment, the tide is turning in the war on theft of international cargo. With the cooperation of the cargo handling industry and only a modest addition of funds and authority) Treasury - 10 - should be able to reduce cargo theft at our major airports and seaports to a minimum within a very short time. While I am optomistic, passage of the Customs Port Security Act and your full cooperation is needed if we are to succeed. 000 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE EUGENE T. ROSSIDES ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY (ENFORCEMENT, TARIFF AND TRADE AFFAIRS, AND OPERATIONS) before the TOWN HALL OF CALIFORNIA BILTMORE HOTEL, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA April 18, 1972 1:00 p.m. PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEW ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE DOCTRINE OF FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE President Nixon's New Economic Policy, announced on August 15, 1971, marked a watershed in world history, not just U. S. history. The president's actions marked the end of one era -- "the end of the post-war world" as Secretary Connally said last month -- and the dawn of a new era in international economic relationships. The President's goals were three -- to curb inflation, to generate jobs by stimulating responsible economic growth, and to strengthen the position of the United States in the international trade and financial community. . Today, I shall talk primarily about the U. S. position in international trade -- a Doctrine of Fairness -- with special emphasis on Treasury's role and responsibilities in this area, and the need to perfect international organization and procedures for effective solutions of trade problems. Why Are We in a New Era? At the end of World War II, the United States was the wealthiest, most powerful nation on earth. A large part of the world was in ruins, physically, politically, and C-287 - 2 economically, after the holocaust that it had just experienced. The United States exhibited truly unselfish and generous leadership in an effort to bring these ravaged areas back to normal. We did this in our own long-range national interest but at considerable sacrifice. It made sense for the United States to do everything possible to assist both our former allies and enemies to regain their feet. And so, we literally showered U. S. dollars and expertise on these countries. The American taxpayer accepted the burden of the nearly $150 billion in economic and military aid that 'was made available over the past 25 years, for he understood the relationship bet'ween a prosperous world economy and his own well-being. But conditions have changed and we now find ourselves confronted with an entirely different picture. Although the United States is still the most important free 'world power, it is no longer the only free world power. Other nations are again in a position to challenge us ,economically and politically. The United States is now one giant among several. The Long-Run Task What does this new era signify for the United States and the rest of the trading world? Essentially, the long-run task facing the United States and the 'world community is the creation of an international economic system 'which, ' on the basis of mutual advantage, 'will stimulate international trade and freer competition, draw nations and people together, and thus form the basis for a lasting peace with prosperity. Progress Made Since August 15, 1971 In his policy role as chief economic spokesman for the President, Secretary Connally has already sketched in broad outline form the new policies to be followed. The domestic and international fronts,which cannot be separated, have seen considerable progress in the eight months since August 15, 1971. - 3 - On the domestic side, economists are virtually unanimous that activity is expanding vigorously_ Industrial production rose strongly in March, the seventh consecutive monthly advance. The other two economic indicators for March presently available -- total employment and retail sales -- also showed strong gains. Employment rose by 620,000 to 81.2 million -- the largest gain for a month since mid-1967. These indicators are further evidence that the economy is in a strong expansionary phase. J On the international side, the Smithsonian Agreement of December 18, 1971, was a significant breakthrough and has given the new era a substantial forward thrust. That agreement included a multilateral realignment of exchange rates, commitments to discuss more general reforms of the international monetary system, and commitments to begin discussions to reduce trade barriers, including some most harmful to the United States. For its part, the United States agreed to recommend to the Congress that the price of gold in dollars be raised 'when progress had been made in trade liberalizat ion. On February 9, Secretary Connally transmitted to the Congress a draft bill providing for devaluation of the dollar by 8.57% to $38 per ounce of gold. In signing that bill into law on Monday, April 3, the president said that the basic significance of the Smithsonian Agreement and the legislation is: " ..• that it provides for continued cooperation among our allies and, ourselves--and thus strengthens our unity--as we work toward an 'open world' based on a more balanced monetary system and a more equitable international trading environment." Simultaneously with the Smithsonian Agreement, commitments were made by some of our allies to assume a larger share of the costs of common defense. - 4 Substantive agreements have also been reached with the European Community and with Japan to remove or lower certain barriers against U. S. products and to support multilateral and comprehensive trade negotiations in 1973, meanwhile solving more immediate problems in 1972 through the GATT. The Administration will seek the necessary legislative authority for these comprehensive negotiations. Doctrine of Fairness in International Trade -Abroad and at Home Abroad These are some of the accomplishments to date on the international trade front. All of the United States' efforts in international discussions have been dedicated to one objective--the establishment of a Doctrine of Fairness in International Trade. The president and Secretary Connally have served notice that the United States is no longer going to compete with one hand behind its back. To compete fairly abroad, we must have fair access to the markets of Europe, Asia, South America, Africa, and the rest of the world. I do not mean to imply that the United States is expecting to obtain something for nothing. We recognize that some of our practices are regarded by other countries as discriminatory. But in our trade negoitations we do have a right to demand a fair bargain. We insis.t only on the right to compete fairly abroad. As Secretary Connally said in Munich last May: " •.. no longer will the American people permit their government to engage in international actions in -which the true long-run interests of the U. S. are not just as clearly recognized as those of the nations with which 'we deal." - 5 - The point he conveyed to all is that the United States can no longer stand by complacently when markets are closed to us or where the "rules of the game" seem to be rigged against us. When our foreign friends complained about the temporary 10% additional duty adopted as part of the President's new economic program, they did not mention in their complaints the barriers they maintain against U. S. exports to their countries. These barriers take various forms--quotas no longer justified by economic factors, discriminatory taxes such as progressive taxes on horsepower directed at the export of U. S. automobiles, discriminatory tariff arrangements such as the Common Market preferences and reverse preferences, which establish a lower tariff on the exports of Common Market members than on those of the U. S. and others into third markets, both in developing and developed countries. These barriers were not wiped out by the Smithsonian Agreement. Moreover, I regret to say that some new actions have been taken since the date of that agreement. For instance, the Netherlands has put a quota on electronic goods from Japan. That action has the effect of putting further pressure on our own market. We have a long way to go in order to achieve a fair break in international trade for American industry. and agriculture. Since the post~war years, the United Kingdom has maintained quotas for balance of payments reasons on imports from the dollar area of fresh, frozen, and canned grapefruit, orange juice, and rum--this despite the fact that the balance of payments justification for these quotas has long since passed. Indeed, the British are now in balance of payments surplus, and removal of these quotas, which the Unit~d States has been seeking for over 20 years, is certainly long overdue. Is this fair trade? - 6 Similarly, France imposed quotas several years ago for balance of payments reasons on imports of semiconductors. Although the French authorities have liberalized these quotas over the years, an intricate licensing system inhibits our exporters from supplying the French market. The balance of payments justification for protection has long since ceased and this obstacle to trade should have been eliminated years ago. Is this fair trade? In the past few weeks, the European Community has instituted a new system of compensatory duties so as to continu to protect its domestic agricultural maEkets from more efficient foreign production in the face o~ the recent currency realignments. In so doing, the European Community did not hesitate to break the negotiated rates (to which all negotiating parties are supposedly bound) on some 40 million dollars' worth of trade. They did this despite the fact that it was a clear violation of the GATT. The United States has some interest in the EC's actions, for our cost of productionfur basic agricultural commodities approximates half of that in the Common Market. Is this fair trade? The Community's regulations have restricted Japanese imports to 6 percent of that country's overall exports-this in contrast to the 30 percent which Japan exports to the United States. By restrictions such as these, the Common Market has literally forced the Japanese to concentrate their export drive on the United States. Is this fair trade? Japan now has $17 billion in foreign assets reserves. We have approximately $12.5 billion. While the United States had a balance of payments deficit last year--and has had one for over 20 years--and our first trade deficit since 1888--Japan had a trade balance surplus last year of 7.9 billion dollars, the highest in the world and this year's balance for them will be even larger since their exports are likely to run 20% above 1971. - 7 - Many factors, in addition to U. S. policy, contributed to Japan's economic success. Japan, which was a.llowed to maintain quotas for balance of payments reasons when it entered GATT, still retains many of these quotas, this despite an economic recovery which is com..monly referred to as the . Japanese miracle. "Administrative guidance" by Japan which impedes our exports and focuses on their export drive to the U. S. is a central factor in Japan! s economic success. Is this fair trade? At Home--Treasury's Role in Combatting Unfair Trade Practices Against this backdrop, there are very positive measures this Administration has already taken at home to rectify our trade imbalance and protect jobs in the U. S. From the inception of President Nixon's Administration, the Treasury Department has vigorously attacked discriminatory pricing techniques of foreign exporters. Treasury and its Bureau of Customs have accelerated and expanded the use of statutes specifically designed to protect U. S. industry against unfair foreign competition. We have institutionalized the supervision of the administration of the Antidumping Act and the countervailing duty statute and other aspects of tariff and trade relations by setting up an Office of Tariff and Trade Affairs in the Office of the Secretary. The Antidumping Act is designed to prevent injurious international price discrimination--typically, selling in the U. S. market at prices lower than in the foreign home market. The countervailing duty statute is designed to counteract and prevent foreign subs idies on exports to the U.S. The Treasury, under this Administration, has rejuvenated what was largely a moribund Antidumping Statute. We have significantly increased actions under this statute in the past three years. We have eliminated loopholes. And we have expedited consideration of complaints from domestic manufacturers by adding manpower and streamlining procedures. - 8 In short, Treasury is now administering the Antidumping Act more nearly in the manner intended by Congress. This is what industry has a right to expect. But more is needed. Perhaps, criticism from abroad had to be expected. But, the point is that these actions are taken and justified in defense of fair trade--and without a sense of fairness, the prospects for freer trade would be bleak. Now, we are studying possible refinements and expansions of the use of these measures which protect u. S. industry against unfair competition. In new proposed antidumping regulations which will be published this week, we plan to clarify and tighten further the procedures of the Antidumping Act. Amendments of our Antidumping Act and counter\Biling duty statute may be required to achieve freer and fairer competition in international trade. And, once the long-range adjustments of tariffs, quotas, and other barriers are accomplished, these same measures can serve to maintain the integrity of those agreements. International Reforms In analyzing "what "We can do to enable u. S. producers to compete more effectively under fair rules of international trade, we must of necessity examine closely the implementation of those rules and even question the nature of the rules themselves. We face a situation in which such basic GATT rules as most-favored-nation treatment are increasingly violated. We are also concerned that foreign dumping and subsidizing of exports to third countries have the effect of freezing U. S. manufacturers out of these markets. Moreover, while we favor U. S. capital investment abroad on as liberal terms as our balance of payments allows, "we cannot continue to permit U. S. capital to create jobs abroad if domestic U. S. manufacturers are prevented by discriminatory barriers from selling in these markets on equal terms. - 9 If the GATT itself proves unable to face up to the realities of today's world, and we hope that it can measure up to its responsibilities, we may have to give thought to other ways of meeting the needs. If we are to reach our goal of a bright new international future, the rules and procedures of the past must be adapted to the world of the 1970's. There is clearly a need for an international forum or forums in which the interrelationship of all the factors affecting international economic matters--monetary, tax, and trade--can be discussed, not piece-meal, but as part of a whole problem of economic health for all participating nations. secretary Connally, in his March 15 remarks, stressed the need to recognize such links in the international economy when approaching the issue of monetary reform. Indeed, the international discussions of last fall, following the President's declaration of his New Economic Policy, were successful in achieving the recognition of the interrelationship between international monetary and trade matters. Accordingly, the president placed in the hands of Secretary Connally, his chief economic spokesman, the broad responsibility and negotiating authority to do the job. Secretary Connally has commissioned Under Secretary Vo1cker to discuss with our principal trading partners the development of an appropriate forum or forums. Under Secretary Volcker has recently talked with his colleagues in Europe and has been in Japan over the past weekend for discussions of this matter. Implementation Versus Policy-Making It has often been said, "Important as it is to make policy, it is even more important to implement it." - 10 It could very well be that more forceful administration of the Antidumping Act and countervailing duty law in earlier years 'would have eased our problems today. I can well remember my confirmation hearing when each and every question of the Senate Finance Committee dealt with these two statutes and 'whether I intended to enforce them. For months thereafter, the same Senators were telling me, . "You have those statutes, use them." Well, this Administration has used the Antidumping Act effectively and, as I mentioned, is reviewing the countervailing duty law. But, there are other aspects of implementing trade policy in day-to-day operations which strongly affect our international trade and our balance of payments. The mrum day-to-day operating bureau in the u. S. Government affecting international trade is the Bureau of Customs. Secretary Connally has directed that the trade and tariff aspects of that Bureau's operations be given the highest priority. This included not only the operating responsibilities of the Bureau of Customs in the area of antidumping and countervailing duty, but also its role in classification and valuation of imported merchandise, administration of quotas and marking requirements, prevention of smuggling, monitoring voluntary restraint arrangements, and investigation of commercial frauds. We also have under 'way a Treasury study to analyze the data that is available in international trade matters. Here again, the Bureau of Customs is the prime source for data regarding trade matters and yet, for analyzing and interpreting that data, its resources have not heretofore been fully utilized. This also we are moving to correct. The Future In summary, President Nixon's Administration has moved forcefully to improve our international trade and monetary position. We have given our anti-price discrimination tools the most vigorous exercise they have ever had. We have negotiated the removal of vanious trade barriers and set the stage for an overhaul of the international trade mechanisms in the near future. - 11 - Secretary Connally has demonstrated what can be accomplished by a single chief economic spokesman for the president. We are seeking an international forum which will enable us to deal with the problems in their full depth and perspective. And we have identified the need within the Executive Branch to institutionalize these capabilities. The president has made it clear that he intends to meet the challenge of the future by stimulating our economy to ensure our continued efficient and competitive position in the world. This means that inflation and unemployment in the United States will be reduced while investment in new plants and equipment by the private sector are stimulated. While building this stronger economy at home, we must remain outward looking and international in our initiatives overseas. This Administration is committed to such a course. Of course, our foreign friends and trading partners must be equally out'ward looking and international in their approach to their problems. As Secretary Connally said when he addressed the Economic Club of New York last fall: "We do not intend to become provincial. We shall not resort to protectionism. We shall carry our burdens on the international scene. But to do so it is essential to attain an equilibrium in our overall financial balance with the rest of the world. We seek no advantage of others. We propose to suffer no disadvantage. We seek a balance which will be to the benefit of all the nations." "At stake are not narrow or selfish economic goals; beyond a fair balance of opportunity, we seek none. The basic issue is much broader. It is nothing less than rebuilding the economic foundation for promoting economic development, military security, and the free flow of commerce. - 12· - "To fail in our effort would be to fail not only as an Administration, nor even as a Nation. At stake is nothing less than the foundation for the freedom and security of this generation, and those that follow." All Americans and all countries must be willing to make the necessary sacrifices and, as a result, all Americans and all countries will be beneficiaries.' What we seek are the conditions that will encourage freer and fairer trade throughout the entire world, develop growing domestic enterprise and employment, and insure these gains against the erosion of inflation • . The President's New Economic Policy advances these goals by laying the foundation for peace with prosperity throughout the world. 000 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 IMMED IA TE RELEAS E April 18, 1972 STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EUGENE T. ROSSIDES ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY (ENFORCEMENT, TARIFF AND TRADE AFFAIRS, AND OPERATIONS) NINE MONTH REPORT ON TREASURY/IRS NARCOTICS TRAFFICKER PROGRAM On June 17, 1971, as part of a major message on his multi-dimensional narcotics program, President Nixon announced the Treasury/IRS Narcotics Trafficker Program. On July 1, 1971, the program was initiated. In each area of the country, cadres of Treasury Agents were established to concentrate full time on intensive tax investigations of major narcotics traffickers, smugglers, and financiers. I am pleased to report on the results of the first three quarters. In the initial nine-month period (July 1, 1971-March 31, 1972), we have achieved the following: 1. 530 targets in 34 states, 52 cities and the District of Columbia were selected by Treasury's Target Selection Committee and referred to the IRS. Under the direction of IRS Commissioner Johnnie Walters, 369 Treasury Agents are presently conducting intensive tax investigations (see attached Table I); 2. $33.6 million in taxes and penalties have been ed under the program, of which more than $4.1 D ha~already been collected in the form of cash .ued property; 0.. 2 3. Two men have been convicted of criminal tax charges; nine other criminal tax cases are pending in Federal District Courts in New York, Miami, Detroit, Los Angeles, Indianapolis, and Baltimore; and another 12 investigations have been completed with prosecution recommendations (see attached Table 11)0 California 49 of the 530 targets are from California, one criminal tax case is awaiting trial, and three other cases have been recommended for prosecution. $2,548,700 in taxes and penalties have been assessed and $170,900 in cash and $40,000 in property have been seized under this program in California (see attached Table III). We believe that this represents a significant achievement. It confirms our prediction to the Appropriations Committees in the Congress that, by focusing attention on the key figures responsible for the narcotics distribution, this program "will make a major additional contribution to the President's offensive against drug abuse." The program is designed to take the profit out of the illegal traffic in narcotics and thereby further disrupt the traffic. This is to be accomp1isheq by conducting systematic tax investigations of middle and upper echelon narcotics traffickers, smugglers, and financiers. These are the people who are generally insulated from the daily operations of the drug traffic through intermediaries. The word for the drug traffickers is "get out of the illegal drug traffic or face up to intensive tax investigations." 000 TABLE I STATE METROPOLITAN AREA Alabama Alaska Arizona California Mobile Anchorage Phoenix - Tucson Los Angeles San Francisco Denver Hartford Washington, D. C. Miami Honolulu Atlanta Chicago Indianapolis New Orleans Baltimore Boston Detroit St. Paul· St. Louis Las Vegas Newark &Suburbs Albuquerque Albany Buffalo New-York City &Suburbs Greensboro Cleveland Cincinnati Portland Philadelphia Pittsburgh Providence Columbia Nashville Austin - Houston Dallas Salt Lake City Burlington Richmond Seattle Parkersburg Miluaukee Colorado Connecticut District of Columbia Florida 'Hawaii Georgia Illinois Indiana Louisiana Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Missouri Nevada New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carol ina Ohio Oregon Pennsyl vania Rhotle lsI and South Carolina Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin SELECTED TARGETS 34 States S2 cities and the District of Columbia Treasury Department Office of Law Enforcement April 17, 1 , 1 20 23 26 7 9 14 S4 7 18 36 8 11 3 11 27 1 7 I SO 7 3 9 89 8 -7 2 7 22 '9 1 4 2 31 I I 2 I 7 I I rn 1972 TABLE II Target Assessments: Regular Assessments $ 3,224,200 Jeopardy Assessments l / $ 8,310,300 Sub-Total $11,534,500 Spontaneous Assessments 2/ (Jeopardy Assessments and Tax Year Terminations].!) Total Assessments $22,110,700 $33,645,200 Tax Year Terminations Dollars Seized $ 3,719,700 Property Seized $ 433,700 Cases Recommended for Prosecution 12 Criminal Tax Cases in U8S. Courts awaiting trial 9 criminal Tax Convictions 2 1/ Jeopardy assessments are additional assessments of taxes made where a return has been filed, but where circumstances exist under which delay might jeopardize collection of the revenue. 2/ Spontaneous Assessments are expedited assessments made against narcotics traffickers as a result of seizures by other law enforcement agencies of large sums of cash or Qther assets during the course of an arrest or a search. Because of .the expedited procedures employed, the figures for spontaneous assessments are frequently in excess of ~e amount ultimately determined to be due. 3/ Termination of Tax Year is a computation of the tax due and assessment made where the time for filing the return has not become due where circumstances exist under which delay might jeopardize collection of the revenue. Treasury Department Office of Law Enforcement April 17, 1972 TABLE III CALIFORNIA SAN FRANCISCO/LOS ANGELES TARGETS iln Francisco 26 Angeles 23 )8 San Francisco Los Angeles $ $ lI'get Assessments: Regular Assessments )(mtaneous Assessments 1 / . (Jeopardy Assessments 2 / and Tax Year Termina tions 3/) Total Assessments LX 313,500(2) 1,628,200(10) 33,50G(3) 574,200(7) $1,941,700 $ 607,700 68,500 102,400 Year Terminations Dollars Seized Property Seized (Fair Market Value) over $ ,ses recommended for prosecution 2 minal tax cases in u.S. Courts ,waiting trial 40,000 1 1 See Footnote 2, Table II. See Footnote 1, Table II. See Footnote 3, Table II. easury Department fice of Law Enforcement April 17, 1972 April 17, 1972 BACKGROUND PAPER Secretary John B. Connally, in the spring of 1971, recommended to the President this nationwide program. President Nixon announced the progrw~ of tax investigations of major narcotics traffickers on June 17, 1971, as part of a message on his multidimensional approa~h to combat drug abuse. The objective of the program is to disrupt the narcotics distribution system by taking the profits out of the illegal traffic in drugs. Reflecting the high priority given this program by the President, Congress provided financial support for it amounting to $7.5 million in Fiscal 1972 and authorization for 541 additional position in IRS -200 Treasury Intelligence Agents, 200 Treasury Revenue Agents, and 141 support personnel. Treasury has coordinated this tax program with the anti-smuggling drive of its Bureau of Customs, the drive against narcotics distribution of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and the prosecution efforts of the Tax and Criminal Divisions of the Department of Justice. We have also had the full support and cooperation of State and local enforcement agencies in the conduct of this ~~ram. This program is a major enforcement effort but it must be emphasized that it is only one part of this Administration"s comprehensive drive against narcotics. Multi-Dimensional Program President Nixon started his war on drugs the first month of his Administration when he established the Interdepartmental Task Force on Narcotics, Marijuana and Dangerous Drugs that led to Operation Intercept in September, 1969, and Operation Cooperation in October, 1969. He has escalated that war with a series of action programs, and progress has been made. First, he elevated the drug problem to the foreign policy level and has taken personal initiatives in soliciting the cooperation of other governments. The aim of our diplomatic efforts is to have each nation do its share and meet its responsibilities in the worldwide war against drug abuse. - 2 - Second, he placed particular emphasis on the crucial roles of education, research, and rehabilitation. The Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention was established within the White House under the direction of Dr. Jerome Jaffe to coordinate Federal action in the fields of education, research, and rehabilitation. In 1971, nearly 150 million dollars were devoted to education, research, and rehabilitation. That figure will be doubled in 1972 and increased fUrther in 1973. Third, he recommended differentiation in the criminal penalty structure between heroin and marijuana; and flexible provisions for handling first offenders. Fourth, he stressed total community involvement -the private sector as well as governmental agencies in this anti-drug abuse program. Fifth, he provided a substantial increase in budgetary support for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Bureau of Customs and initiated the IRS drug tax drive in this area. More recently, he established the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement in the Department of JUstice to concentrate an assault on the street level heroin pusher. The new office will be working closely with state and local enforcement agencies. Sixth, he recognized the central role of the states and the need for close Federal-state cooperation in a unified drive against drug abuse. 000 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE JOHN B. CONNALLY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 1972, 10:00 A. M. Mr. Chairman and Members of this Distinguished Committee: There are few material things more important to our Nation and our industrial civilization than energy. Our industry, transportation and the public utilities which light, heat, and cool our homes, hospitals, and schools must have energy generated from oil, gas, coal, nuclear and hydropower, and other sources in order to function. In spite of this, I am afraid it takes a Northeast brownout or a Suez crisis to waken the public to its reliance on energy. Unfortunately, between emergencies the public tends to take energy for granted, and tends to disregard the compelling need for a strong and effective policy on energy geared to avoid national catastrophe in the future. I do not consider myself one of the governmental architects of U. S. energy policy. The Treasury, however, has a basic role to play in the tax, balance-of-payments and general economic aspects of energy policy, and has worked very closely in recent years with those agencies having the fundamental responsibility for developing the country's energy policy. In addition, I feel that my past 2xperience in oil and gas matters has given me some degree of expertise in this complicated field. Please keep in mind, however, that my remarks represent my personal views and those of my Department. I neither consider myself a spokesman for the Administration on energy matters, nor would I want my remarks construed as having Administration approval. While my statement does not represent any official Administration position, I can say that it probably does not differ significantly from our National Energy Policy as it stands now and as it may be expected to develop in the foreseeable future. C-286 2 Our energy policy, as I see it, 1S based on the following: security of supply of energy sources for the United States. adequacy of supply of energy sources for the Free World. minimization of import impact as a key element of a viable trade and balance-of-payments situation. minimization of real cost to U. S. consumers consistent with the foregoing. fair treatment of the world's producing and consuming countries. On June 4, 1971, the President, in his Energy Messa5e, sketched out a National Energy Policy. However, in two 1mportant areas, there have been unfortunate delays in implementing his proposals. We still do not have a Department of Natural Resources and, because of court action, we cannot even manage to get on with the President's very good proposal to accelerate leasing on the Outer Continental Shelf. In addition to this, we have yet to lay the first mile of the Alaska pipeline; needed refinery capacity on the East Coast has had to be delayed indefinitely because of concern over the local environment; and there are many who oppose imports of oil because of the danger of spills, of building deep-water ports to accommodate giant tankers because of the industrialization involved, of mining shale or coal because of damage to our countryside, and of building nuclear plants. In the case of nuclear plants, we even have sub-division between ~he groups emphasizing possible radioactivity, those concerned with landscape deterioration and those who warn of the threat to the marine ecology. I do not mean to make light of these concerns. Individually, they all make sense. But, taken together, I think they are putting us in an insecure position. We find that instead of getting on with the truly immense task of preventing an energy crisis, which would mean for our citizens anything from great inconvenience to real deprivation, and which could throttle our economy, we are not even being permitted to begin steps we know must be taken to avert this crisis. 3 I feel a deep sympathy for the growing national concern for a clean environment -- for the desire to place a lower priority on industrial progress and a higher priority on other more basic values which an industrial society tends to forget. However, while I subscribe heartily to the goal of zero environmental damage, I must reject the mischievous unreality of zero industrial growth. With this as a background, let me discuss with you some of the suggestions that have come across my desk on what should constitute a sensible energy policy for our country. Expanded Imports and Storage Facilities We have received many communications based on the assumption that U. S. oil, gas and other hydrocarbon resources are In scarce supply. Building on this assumption, the suggestion has been made that we do away with our restrictions on oil imports and conserve our scarce energy resources by devising a system of imports plus greafly expanded storage facilities. The conclusion logically follows from the hypothesis. However, the hypothesis is inaccurate. Our oil and other hydrocarbon resources are not scarce. We have vast resources of hydrocarbons. We need not fear running out of these resources physically. As you know, in addition to huge, untapped oil and gas reserves on our Outer Continental Shelf on all our coastlines, we have great potential for oil and gas in Alaska. There are most probably still plenty of rich finds in oil and gas awaiting discovery in other inland areas of the "lower 48", and there is much oil to be recovered through new techniques from established fields. To this, we add the oil and gas which can be made from coal and shale, plus direct burning of coal through clean-air "stack-gas" procedure's, giving us a potential for at least several hundred years supply of clean energy. Since, by the turn of this century, we expect to rely increasingly on nuclear power for our clean energy needs, it should be obvious that we face no foreseeable shortage of hydrocarbons for energy purposes. I think it makes more sense to keep these vital domestic industries going and making use of this rich store of untapped energy resources instead of increasing our import bill by huge amounts. Additional storage for emergencies may very well be a sound idea. But I feel it would be sheer folly to ignore our domestic hydrocarbon potential and put all our security bets on a system of foreign imports and domestic storage depots. Energy Crisis With their attention thus focused on our virtually inexhaustible supplies of hydrocarbon resources, critics of governmental policy -- in this case oil policy -- then raise the question of whether the energy problem which the oil and gas industry keeps warning us about is nothing more than a false alarm scare story. To this I reply that, in my view, we do face a possible but avoidable energy crisis in the next few years. This potential crisis has surfaced partly because of the economics of world oil supplies, partly because of justifiable new concern for the environment, and partly because of over-zealous tactics of some conservation and environmental groups which are keeping us from developing and obtaining more of our energy needs from domestic sources. We fully intend to avoid this crisis, in spite of these problems. The President, in his Energy Message, mapped out our course which is to place primary reliance for our energy needs on domestic sources, solve our environmental problems with dispatch and have government-indust consumer cooperation in developing our substitute oil, geothern steam and nuclear energy resources. Import Ceiling Working from this analysis, various suggestions have been made to put a new ceiling on imports. This, the argument goes, would give the industry the firm assurance it needs to go to the expense of expanding domestic output. This suggestion cannot be rejected out of hand. After all buttressing the argument for a ceiling, we have our Mandato~ Oil Import Program. Our oil imports, including residual fuel oil, are now at about 25 percent of consumption, more than double the permitted proportion of imports at the commencement of the Mandatory Oil Import Program. But setting a new ceilin~ lS not the answer. Assuring adequate energy supplies to our economy is too important to permit us the luxury of putting all of our eggs in one supply basket. U. S. Governmental policy is clearly to rely to the greatest extent feasible on domestic sources of energy. The Oil Policy Committee and the Energy Committee of the Domestic Council implement this policy with two basic ideas in mind -- keep thi s country I s energy supplies based on secu~e sources and to prevent an energy shortage occurring at any tl~ 5 At the same time, as I have noted, environmental cODplaints and problems have slowed down the timetable of energy development. Artificially low natural gas prices have sharply reduced natural gas availabilities, fo~cing us to consider much more expensive foreign sources for thls cleanest of fuels. We may, therefore, need to import more than we would prefer to in order to avoid energy shortages. But we sympathize with the idea of minimizing our reliance on imports. We want to stop the rising trend of imports and, if possible, reverse it. But we had better not tie our hands with a rigid ceiling. Prorationing There are those who ask us if we really intend to place primary reliance on our domestic hydrocarbon resources, why don't we get rid of prorationing and thus cut our imports right now? The response to this suggestion is that, apart from the political problems involving national versus state and local jurisdiction, prorationing is probably the least understood aspect of our oil situation. Whatever criticism one could have leveled against it in the past just does not apply today. Texas has been close to and is currently producing at 100 percent of capacity. Most of the little remaining surge capacity we felt we had for an emergency is probably gone. Up to now, we were getting, in effect, free and convenient storage ready for energy use. Now, this leeway appears to have ended. Unless we can get some more surge capacity from secure domestic or nearby sources, we may have to go to considerable expense to build special storage facilities to give us some minimum additional emergency supplies. Import Impact There is a body of opinion that questions how, aside from the security aspects of the problem, Treasury can express concern with the adverse trade impact of unrestrained oil imports while opposing restrictive quotas on other imports. As we see it, the potential impact of unrestrained oil and gas imports is of such a great magnitUde as to pose a special threat to our trade balance and to the very viability of the international trading system. If oil imports had not been restrained beginning in 1959, the economics involved would have contracted domestic production ~nd exploration sharply. I venture to say qur annual oil lmport bill, instead of being $3-3-1/2 billion, as it is today, Would have been over $10 billion. We most probably would not have had any Alaskan oil development. Our trade problem, now causing us IDttch concern, would have surfaced much earlier. 6 By the 1980's, unless we move along expeditiously with a National Energy Policy based on domestic sourcing, we will be faced with an adverse trade impact of much greater magnitude. At the same time, many other developed countries, blessed with little of the energy resources which are part of America heritage, will find their energy import bill proportionately higher than ours. In these circumstances, increased domestic oil and gas production will make it possible for us to continue our other imports at higher levels than we could otherwise afford, contributing to the viability of the international trading systpm. Natural Gas Some people have wondered how we could countenance the prospect of higher LNG imports and crude oil and oil product imports for manufacturing synthetic gas in view of our over-all position on oil and gas imports. As I recently noted in a statement to the Senate Interim and Insular Affairs Committee, the President's Economic Report in both 1971 and 1972, stated that allowing freer play of m~~ forces in the case of domestic natural gas would expand these supplies at lower prices for consumers than they would have tc pay for foreign gas. This policy has had our hearty support. The Federal Power Commission has already taken some necessary steps along these lines. This approach is laying a firm basis for slowing down the growth of reliance on foreign sources of clean energy. The fact remains that we probably have to rely on grow~g amounts of imported gas and synthetic gas feedstocks for the next few years. Because of the recent sharp increase in domestic requirements for clean energy, the domestic natural gas supply has not been able to keep up with the rising demand at the artificially low prices prevailing for many years under government rulings. The bargain prices at which natural gas has been avail~l in our country has resulted, not only in widespread household use, but in verv extensive industrial use. If we are to keep our economy run~ing at high levels while moving in the directi of the clean environment we all want, we will have to pay mo" for our energy. As it turns out, even with higher prices permitted for new domestic gas accruals, we will not get all the natural gas we need on time and we will have to import at SUbstantially higher prices all the natural gas and synthetic gas we can use for an interim period. We favor a National Energy Policy which is designed to keep this interim period as short as possible. We wish to avoid lockin~ the consumer into high-priced gas imports beyond the tlme needed to locate, produce and deliver more adequate supplies of less expensive domAstic natural and synthetic gas and other forms of clean energy. 7 Conservation We have been a surplus energy country for so long that we have become wasteful. The automobile, with which Americans were reputed to have an ongoing love affair, is now, in many quarters, characterized as a polluting, energy-wasting culprit. That sounds almost like a marriage gone wrong. I think the marriage can be saved and that our automobile industry has seen the light and the way to cut pollution way down toward zero. We now have to think in terms of engines that get many more miles per gallon and still do not contaminate the air we breathe. We need mass transportation and we need it fast in the next few years. We need tighter-built, better-insulated houses. We need an individual awareness that if we are to get the energy we need at a price we can afford, we had better turn off some lights, turn down the heat, run the car less and generally conserve energy. However, regardless of what we can save through conservation, our energy needs will continue at extremely high levels. We are the world's greatest consumers of energy. This has been an important element in the so-called American Way of Life. We can and will remain the world's greatest consumers of energy. But, in addition to being much more careful with its use, we will need to find and develop and bring on stream vast amounts of clean energy. This is because our population, even at close to so-called zero growth, will still be growing. We do not propose .to bring our industrial growth to a halt. We will need more energy each year into the foreseeable future. Foreign Oil and Gas I want to emphasize again that I feel that, for security purposes and in 6~der to avoid a major international payments problem, the most prudent course is to place our basic reliance for the satisfaction of our energy needs on domestic sourcing. However, we will be hard-pressed to accomplish this in the time frame we now have, and at the economic costs we would wish to accept. Therefore, as I noted earlier, we must look abroad for increasing amounts of oil and gas and for crude oil and products from which we can produce pipeline quality gas. The international oil situation is currently in ferment. The countries comprising the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), have strengthened their cartel t~ the extent that they are confronting the international ~ll companies and the consuming countries in a manner unparalleled In recent economic history. The developed countries which signed the Coffee Agreement some years ago and which have been urged to sign other commodity agreements by the developing countries might well be considering now how attitudes change when the shoe is on the other foot. Canada and Venezuela, who only recently were looked to by us as attractive sources for imported oil are, for various reasons, not quite the bright, prospects they were only two years ago. I do not think that this is a proper forum or that I am the proper speaker to say much more on this subject at this time. Negotiations of many types are in progress and I.would not like to interfere. I would only wish to say that the United States and other oil-consuming countries will now be drawn closer together in their common .interests. I foresee, not a period of s lowdown in capital investment and exploration. but one of expansion. I see more countries involved, both as hosts and investors. Perhaps some international institutional arrangements may be needed. In this decade, upwards of $500 billion will have to be invested and spent by the international oil industry to provide the facilities and the working capital to help satisfy the world's growing demand for energy. Much of these funds may not be forthcoming if the climate for investment continues to deteriorate abroad. Such a prospect cannot be accepted with equanimity by a world increasingly dependent on imported energy resources. Taxes and Incentives The Treasury Department and the energy and environmental protection agencies will be reviewing the tax and incentive laws and the many proposals which have been made to get our clean energy program into high gear. These studies will cover all aspects of the problem -- domestic and international. Oil, gas, shale, coal, nuclear power, geothermal steam, solar energy -- whether in the United States, in OPEC countries or in new energy source provinces abroad -- all will be included. Where appropriate, we will invite other consuming and producing countries to participate in the deliberations which concern their welfare -- and we expect them to want to invest in and to budget for the energy we all require. Conclusion We propose to move ahead with a program which will insure our country and all the countries of the free world adequate clean energy resources, obtained in the least environmentdamaging manner humanly possible, delivered· through means made as environmentally safe and ecologically acceptable as they can be made, at a cost which will reward finders ~ owners of oil substantially but not extravagantly and at a price which consumers over the world can afford. 9 Gentlemen, this is how I feel about our energy problems. We are all here for the same purpose. Let us get on with this task as quickly as we can. There have been enough delays. Let us start leasing, exploring, drilling,pipelining, shipping, refining, and using more prudently the resultant clean energy this country needs to keep our people employed, our economy going, and our society alive and thriving in a healthy environment. 000 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 ,ENTION: FINANCIAL EDITOR mRELEASE 6: 30 P.M. TelEPHONE W04·2041 April 17, 1972 RESULTS OF TREASURY'S WEEKLY BILL OFFERING The Treasury Department announced that the tenders for two series of Treasury .11s, one series to b~ an additional issue of the bills dated January 20, 1972 , and Ie other series to be dated April 20, 1972 , which were offered on April 11, 1972, !re opened at the Federal Reserve Banks today. Tenders were invited for $2,300,000,000 'thereabouts, of 91-day bills and for $1,800,000,000, or thereabouts, of 182-day 11s. The details of the two series are as follows: .NGE OF ACCEPTED IMPETITIVE BIDS: High Low Average 91-day Treasury bills maturin~ July 20, 1972 Approx. Equiv. Annual Rate Price 99.031 99.021 99.027 3.833% 3.873% 3.849% 11 182-day Treasury bills maturin~ October 19, 1972 Approx. Equiv. Price Annual Rate 97.860 97.826 . 97.837 4.233% 4.300% 4.Z78% Y 93% of the amount of 91-day bills bid for at the low price was accepted 36% of the amount of 182-d~ bills bid for at the low price was accepted rAL TENDERS APPLIED FOR AND ACCEPTED BY FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICTS: )istrict 30ston ~ew York Jililadelphia !level and tichmond ltlanta :hicarro 0 it. Louis linneapolis ansas City lallus an Francisco TOTALS A12121ied For 7,915,000 $ 3,548,620,000 31,945,000 26,205,000 8,380,000 44,855,000 297,660,000 41,345,000 30,780,000 36,215,000 47,800,000 72,105,000 Acce12ted 7,915,000 $ 2,093,140,000 11,545,000 20,075,000 8,280,000 16,885,000 49,100,000 25,695,000 10,780,000 21,625,000 25,450,000 10,030,000 AEElied For $ 5,395,000 2,676,620,000 4,840,000 19,645,000 ll,715,OOO 33,945,000 188,085,000 26,430,000 25,750,000 24,755,000 28,930,000 79,155,000 Acce:Qted 5,395,000 $ 1,604,120,000 4,665,000 11,725,000 8,715,000 15,945,000 57,255,000 23,610,000 19,750,000 14,755,000 9,930,000 24,595,000 $4,193,825,000 $2,300,520,000 ~ $3,125,265,000 $1,800,460,000 ~ Includes $188,995,000 noncompetitive tenders accepted at the averaGe price of 99.027 Includes $101,525,000 noncompetitive tenders accepted at the average price of 97.837 These rates are on a bank discount basis. The equivalent coupon issue yields are .94 %for the 91-day bills, and 4.4?:Pjo for the 182 -day bills. The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 18, 1972 TREASURY'S WEEKLY BILL OFFERING The Treasury Department, by this public notice, invites tenders for two series of Treasury bills to the aggregate amount of $4,100,000,000, or thereabouts, for cash and in exchange for Treasury bills maturing April 27, 1972, in the amount of $4,105,835,000, as follows: 91-day bills (to maturity date) to be issued April 27, 1972, in the amount of $ 2,300,000,000, or thereabouts, representing an additional amount of bills dated January 27, 1972, and to mature July 27, 1972 (CUSIP No. 912793 NW2),originally issued in the amount of $1,603,210,000, the additional and" original 'bills to be freely interchangeable. lB~ day bills, for $l,BOO,OOO,OOO, or thereabouts, to be dated April 27, 1972, and to mature (CUSIP No. 912793 PJ9)'. October 26, 1972 The bills of both series will be issued on a discount basis under. competitive and noncompetive bidding as hereinafter provided, anG at ~turity their face amount will be payable without interest. They will be issued in bearer form only, and in denominations of $10,000, $15,000, $50,000, $100,000, $500,000 and $1,000,000 (maturity value). Tenders will be received at Federal Reserve Banks and Branches up to the closing hour, one-thirty p. m., Eastern Standard time, Monday, April 24, 1972. Tenders will not be received at the Treasury Department, Washington. Each tender must be for a minimum'of $10,000. Tenders over $10,000 must be in multiples of $5,000. In the case of competitive tenders the price offered must be expressed on the basis of 100, with not more than three decimals, e.g., 99.925. Fractions may not be used. It is urged that tenders be made on the printed forms and forwarded in the special envelopes which ~ill be supplied by Federal Reserve Banks or Branches on application therefor. Banking institutions generally may submit tenders for account of :ustomers provided the names of the customers are set forth in such tenders. Others than banking institutions will not be permitted to - 2 submit tenders except for their own account. Tenders will be rece1~ without deposit from incorporated banks and trust companies and fro. responsible and recognized dealers in investment securities. Tenders from others must be accompanied by payment of 2 percent of the face amount of Treasury bills applied for, unless the tenders are accompani by an express guaranty of payment by an incorporated bank or trust company. Immediately after the closing hour, tenders will be opened at the Federal Reserve Banks and Branches, following which public Hnnounceme~ will be made by the Treasury Department of the amount and price range .'f accepted bids. Only those submitting competitive tenders ~vill be advised of the acceptance or rejection thereof. The Secretary of the Treasury expressly reserves the right to accept or reiect any or all tenders, in whole or in part, and his action in any such r-espect shall be final. Subject to these reservations, noncompetitive tenders for each issue for $200,000 or less without stated price from anyone bidder ~'ill ~e accepted in full at the average price (in three decimal of accepted competitive bids for the respective issues. Settlement h accepted tenders in accordance with the bids must be made or: completed at the Federal Eeserve Bank on April 27, 1972, in cash or other immediately available funds or- in a like face amount Treasury bills maturing April 27, 1972. Cash and exchange tende will receive equa~ treatment. Cash adjustments will be made for differences between the par value of maturing bills accepted in exci~2nge and the issue price of the new bills. :'o,'(.:r C:ec tiCt1S 454 (b) and 1221 (5) of the Internal Kfvenue CV~_ or 1_')5:. ::he ,·:til~"JnL of discount at which bills issued hereutid~r are sol is C~:,,-- ~~del-eu,o pce rue when the bills are sold, redeemed or otherwiSE Gi. s p ( n L Cl G f \ 'H'd t h (:' b i 11 s are e xc 1 u d e d fro m con sid era t ion as cap it a1 as;:e::s. r.ccC'ldingly, the Uv'.'e'. Tl'."'easury bills (other than life in~llran,~e :~[jmrdnies) issued hereunder f:1USt inClude in his income :::ax z.-etu:-:" as Gldinary gain or loss, the difference between the price ?ai fOi:" the hill::o, w>:ct~<:?L OIl original issue or on subsequent plJr.::,hase, ar the amount actually received either upon sale DC redemption :.it maturit during the taxable year for which the return is ma~e. Treasury DE::partfTent C'i.rcular No. 418 (current rev::::iir'ri) and th~s not~...:e, Dl"C'scribe t:e terms of che Treasury bill..:; ane.; gl:\/ern the . condit:iu('s of their issue. Copies of the cirCUlar may he C'brained frc any F~deral Reserve Bank or Branch. 000 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 AUTOMATIC RELEASE AT 11:30 AM VIENNA TIME, APRIL 19, 1972 (5:30 AM EST) REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE CHARLS E. WALKER UNDER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE AUSTRIAN NATIONAL BANK VIENNA, AUSTRIA WEDNESDAY, APRIL 19, 1972, 11:30 AM DOMESTIC ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES Returning to Vienna always provides me with a double pleasure. It gives me a chance to revisit many of your beautiful and historic sites. But more importantly, it provides me with an opportunity to visit old friends from international monetary conferences. Since my last visit here in 1964, many far-reaching developments have affected domestic economies as well as the operation and structure of the international monetary system. Undoubtedly the most significant was set in motion last August 15 when President Richard M. Nixon announced a sweeping set of economic policies designed to curb inflation, Increase employment and restore balance to the U.S. trading accounts. These policies included: a 90-day freeze on wages, prIces and rents (socalled Phase I, which was followed by a flexible control system known as Phase II); restoration of the tax credit for business investment in productive equipment; C-289 -2- repeal of the excise tax on automobile purchases; income tax cuts for individuals; cessation of purchases and sales of gold with foreign governments and central banks; and a temporary surcharge on about half of the goods imported into the United States. Those parts of this New Economic Policy which could be handled administratively were effective immediately. In addition, Congress moved rapidly in enacting the tax portions of the program. With the consummation of the Smithsonian Agreement on December 18, the import surcharge was dropped and the President asked Congress for an increase in the price of gold. Again, Congress responded speedily and the legislation was signed into law on April 3. These new policies have been reported and analyzed by the international press and have been discussed extensively at international forums for the past eight months. Quite naturally the discussions here in Europe and elsewhere around the world have focused on currency realignments, trade negotiations and prospects for establishing a new monetary system. The impact of these policies on the U.Sr economy, although equally important, has not received as much attention abroad as it deserves. Therefore, I would like -3- to use these few minutes to review some significant developments in the domestic economy of the United States and perhaps put the new policy in better perspective. In doing so, we might address ourselves to three questions: 1. Why was the New Economic Policy adopted? 2. How successful has the policy been to date? 3. What are the prospects for the future? Why the New Economic Policy Was Adopted A few vocal critics would have us believe that the New Economic Policy was adopted because the old policy was a miserable failure. Not so. The Nixon Administration policies of 1969 (an extension of the Johnson Administration policies of 1968) had succeeded in the initial and distasteful task of cooling a badly overheated economy. The forces of demand-pull inflation were brought under control. Then, as the economy moved into a mild recession and unemployment rose, expansive policies were effectively used to stimulate domestic demand. The slide in industrial production was reversed and unemployment topped out as employment rose fast enough to absorb the net addition of new workers to the labor force. In addition, the rate of inflation subsided somewhat In the first half of 1971 relative to the extremely rapid pace of 1969 and 1970. -4- If the old policy was thus working, why the New Economic Policy? For one thing, the old policy was not working fast enough. Unemployment remained too high, both in humanitarian and economic terms. And the slowness in bringing inflation under effective control was trying the patience of the American people. Second, as most Europeans were aware, developments ln 1971 in international trade and monetary relations demonstrated clearly that new policies were badly needed. The overvaluation of the dollar was reflected in the first U.S. trade deficit Slnce 1888, along with recurring currency crises. The negative impact of the trade deficit on U.S. output and employment was sufficient reason for new departures. But the pressing need to negotiate fairer trading relationships, increased military burden-sharing among Free World nations, and significant changes in the international monetary system added greatly to the urgency of the situation. Unfortunately, before August IS neither the forum nor the fulcrum for such negotiation existed. But with the dollar float and the temporary surcharge, a fulcrum was created. The nature of the forum is still under discussion. Third, in 1971 the people of the U.S. came to understand that for too long our nation had taken its economic might and -5- high productivity for granted -- that while we had enjoyed the luxury of reducing Federal tax rates on individuals, we had been paying far too little attention to the growing need to promote the genuine savings and investment the mainspring of economic growth and competitiveness. "Productivity," and the need to stimulate it, moved in 1971 from the language of the economist into the public domain. And this was good, for it provided the atmosphere and understanding necessary for Congressional approval of President Nixon's proposed restoration of the investment credit, as well as Congressional ratification of the earlier administrative action (challenged in the courts) to liberalize the tax treatment of depreciation. The Revenue Act of 1971 did contain some appropriate cuts for low-income individual taxpayers. But the major thrust of the legislation was to undo the damage to the investment process resulting from 1969 legislation, and also to move toward reshaping our Federal tax system so as to foster rather than penalize productivity and efficiency.* *One piece of paper carried the day in both House and Senate. This table compared the acquisition costs in 1970 of new productive equipment, adjusted for corporate tax rates, depreciation systems, and investment credits, among the U.S., Japan, and major countries of the European Community. The results showed that a piece of equipment that cost the U.S. businessman 100 cents on the dollar cost only 79 to 83 cents in these principal competitor countries. The Administration successfully argued that the provisions of the Revenue Act which reduced these costs to 87 cents in the United States were fully justified as a partial step in removing the bias of the U.S. tax system against productivity. -6- Fourth, by the summer of 1971 it had become clear to President Nixon and his economic aides that although the battle against demand-pull inflation had been won, inflationary expectations remained almost as widespread and strong as ever. This view that the u.s. economy would be plagued with steeply rising prices, year after year after year, had two very serious implications. In the first place, it meant that the instability in financial markets that is bred by inflationary expectations would continue and perhaps intensify. Expecta~ions of endemic inflation have a double impact on interest rates. First borrowers rush in to borrow today in order to beat tomorrow's price increases. Second, savers sooner or later realize that the 4 or 5 percent they earn at the bank or the savings and loan association is, in real terms, wiped out by rising prices. They therefore move to protect themselves by taking their money out of the bank or the savings and loan ("disintermediation") and investing it directly in highyielding government and private securities. Both of these factors send interest rates to the sky. These ultra-high interest rates significantly affect every aspect of economic activity. They are especially damaging to American home buyers and the thousands of state and local government units in the United States. -7- Just as inflationary expectations may cause interest rates to rise to ultra-high levels, the level of rates can in turn be viewed as one of the better indicators of such expectations. Inflationary expectations were probably at their peak in early 1970 when Treasury notes and bonds were yielding 8 percent and corporations were paying 9 to 10 percent for long-term funds. The Nixon Administration was therefore extremely pleased ~nd optimistic when interest rates began to decline in 1970 and on into the early months of 1971. The trend helped convince us that our policies were indeed working, and working well. Imagine our dismay, then, when yields turned sharply in the late winter of 1971 and moved back toward the peaks reached a year earlier. Not only did this reversal threaten to undermine what has turned out to be the biggest housing boom in U. S. history. Ultra- high rates could also curtail progress in other areas of the economy. Why did inflationary expectations re-emerge with such force? There are some who believe that the Administration's overly optimistic economic forecast in January major factor. I doubt it. 1971 was the Much more fundamental was the clearly emerging failure of the economy to move back rather speedily and handilY, as earlier expected, to the wageprice stability that is the sine qua non of a healthy -8- industrial economy. And, just as the phenomena of cost- push inflation and the wage-price spiral engender inflationary expectations, such expectations themselves reinforce the spiral In our earlier postwar experience, wage-price stability had generally returned to the economy within a year or so following the peaking out of demand-pull inflationary pressures. The stability resulted from a decline in the rate of increase of labor compensation and an increase In output per manhour. Pay settlements tended to peak out within a few months after demand-pull pressures subsided. Administration economists were therefore hopeful that the wage settlement by the General Electric Company in January 1970 -- at about 8 percent for the life of the contract -- woull mark the topping out of compensation increases. We had hoped and bel ieved that the rate of increase would begin to fall back and before too long - - wi thin a year or so - - would be back on track wi th productivi ty gains, or increases in output per manho The urgency of achieving this stable relationship--which means steady uni t labor costs and thus no upward pressure from wages on prices -- was demonstrated by the fact that, despite a rebound in productivity growth during 1970 and the first half of 1971, continuing sharp increases in wages resul ted in a rise in unit labor costs at an annual rate of 4 1/2% over that perio -9- But wage settlements did not recede. Organized labor badly burned by long-term contracts which had not sufficiently allowed for the inflation, catch up. This VJ2.S mo~ed strongly and effectively to '.l::~deystandable and perhaps not too damaging--if it were a one-time adjustment. What was very disturbing, however, was the tendency of labor -- with might add -- to leapfrog into ~he futu~e by attempting to negotiate contracts with a sum certain to offset the expected inflation which most people were aga~~ v12wlng as inevitable. The continuation of cost-push inflation with a vengeance-and the prospects for a very long and drawn-out period of adjustment back to stable unit labor costs -- was brought horne hard to Admi~istration analysts last summer by the behavior of the wholesale price index for industrial commodities. It is this index which is most closely related to unit labor costs. In the six months prior to the wage-price freeze, this index rose at the highly disturbing annual rate of 5.7 percent. This reflected the strong thrust of cost-push inflation, and it portended considerable pressure on prices at the retail level. With this background, it should be clear that the major purpose of the wage-prlce freeze, and the subsequent control program, was to eliminate the inflationary expectations which had re-escalated interest rates and which were cuntinuing to spark wage settlements far in excess of any conceivable gains in outPUt per manhour. -10- Stated differently, the basic theory of Phases I and II of the New Economic Policy is to temporarily reinforce the market processes with an artificial control mechanism. We believe that if we can significantly dampen inflationary expectations, the time needed to make the transition from severe demand-pull inflation to a situation of wage-price stability can be greatly reduced. The New Economic Policy: An Evaluation How is the United States doing under this new policy? In my judgment, very well. During the early stages of the gO-day freeze, some very limited surveys indicated that the program was not effective. However, when the gO-day period ended, the price indexes showed clearly that the freeze worked. Moreover, economists, businessmen and consumers all agree that it was successful. The Phase II program has now been in operation for five months and some American observers have made the premature judgment that it is failing. I think it only fair to point out that this is an election year at home and some of the charges about the effectiveness of the program are politically motivated. In appraising the progress of the program, it is important to look at the right indicators. -11- Take the consumer price index. Certainly it is of great importance to the average American family. like to see it stabilize. We would very much But with 22 percent of the index representing food, and with the patent impossibility of controlling prIces of raw agricultural products, the short-run behavior of that index obviously is going to be affected substantially by forces of nature. I might note parenthetically that the U.S. consumer doesn't realize what a great buy he has in food. It uses up less than 16 percent of his take-horne pay -- down from 22 percent twenty years ago. And I might add that the u.s. consumer pays about half the price for agricultural products that the European consumer pays. The key price index to watch in gauging the success of Phase II is the index for wholesale industrial commodities. It is these commodities that are most affected by cost-push pressures. Significantly, the Administration did not proclaim victory in the Phase II fight because the overall wholesale price index rose only ~ percent last month. Within the average, we noted that industrial commodities rose .3 percent and that's too much. But we also noted that the latter increase followed an average monthly rise of .6 percent in the three months December through February, reflecting the "bulge" at the end of Phase I which we had anticipated, and even warned about. In the future, the industrial index may jump around and may have additional "ups" as well as "downs" -- those are -12inevitable vagaries of monthly data. But I submit that the behavior of the index last month is a cause for optimism. At the least, it greatly weakens the position of those labor leaders and others who, politically motivated, wrongly and demagogically concluded that the increase in meat prices in the u.s. signified that "Phase II is a shambles." Another significant indicator of the success of Phase II -- and one that bodes well for the future of both the workingman and the stabilization program -- is a statistic which hasn't received proper attention either in the or abroad. I u.s. refer to the rapid recent increases in real take-home pay -- what a worker with three dependents has left over after taxes are paid and rising prIces have been adjusted for. Between 1965 and 1971, this index rose at the almost standstill annual rate of 0.2 percent. Between August 1971 and February 1972, however, real take-home pay advanced at an almost phenomenal annual rate of 5.4 percent. This ultra-high rate of increase cannot continue. But the restoration of a forward advance in this figure after several years in the doldrums is mightygood news to the American workingman. And I think it is an exceedingly good omen for the success of the New Economic Policy. -13- This doesn't mean that wages are shooting skyward, out of control. job. The fact is that the Pay Board has been doing a good Labor has been treated fairly; so has the public. As compared to its initially stated goal of holding wage increases to 5 1/2 percent, the sum total of its rulings to date -appropriately weighted and including all the big settlements is to allow pay increases (including fringes) of just over 5 percent per year. That sounds good to me and 1S another reason for my optimism about Phase II. The final evidence that I would point to on the pr1ce side of the New Economic Policy pertains to interest rates. After President Nixon announced his program on August 15, interest rates declined sharply, especially short-term rates. Since that time short-term rates have risen as the pace of economic activity in the United States has quickened. Long-term rates also have risen somewhat from their lows, but consumer mortgage rates have continued to decline. I am personally convinced that the long-term interest rate~structure in the United States still contains a substantial margin reflecting hedging against inflation. This means that we have not yet convinced our borrowers and lenders that we are determined to bring inflation under control. Once this determination becomes clear, and movers -14- of money in particular begin to look with even more favor on long-term debt agreements, the impact on long-term interest rates can be very favorable indeed. Consequently, a big part of the interest rate problem can be viewed as one of communication and education. Again speaking personally, I am convinced that the United States, wit its tremendous capacity for generating genuine savings, can achieve stable and strong economic growth with a long-term interest rate structure at or lower than the one we now have. But this can and should be achieved not through overly expansivi monetary policies, but by convincing the financial community through words and performance that we can and will win the battle against inflation. We are making progress. On the employment and output side of the New Economic Policy, almost all the news is favorable. To cite a few significant indicators Industrial production has advanced for seven months runnin and is now almos t four percent higher than a year ago, hay grown at an annual rate of seven percent since last August Housing starts continue at an all-time high, and nothing short of a catastrophe can prevent 1972 from matching or bettering the record performance of 1971. The leading bus iness indica tors have been ris ing smartly f e igh t months running, wi th advances predominating in ever~ sec tor of th is broad 1 i s t of s er ies . Worth spec ia1 note 1 the marked improvement shown by the sensitive measures of labor-market conditions -- the workweek, hiring rate, help-wanted advertising, etc. This widespread strength clearly portends a continuing expansion in employment and production through the remainder of 1972. -15- Despite the existence of what has been mistakenly referred to as a large volume of unused capacity, a capital spending boom of significant proportions seems to be emerging in the United States with outlays expected to increase by 10 1/2 percent this year. Since last July alone, employment has risen by 2.3 million, or at an annual rate of four percent. If such growth continues, unemployment should come down, and perhaps rather rapidly. The only two major sectors which have under-performed relative to our January forecasts are business accumulation of inventories and our trade account. The latter IS worrisome, but all of us knew that the Smithsonian Agreement would take some time to influence our trading position. And the short-term weakness in inventories can actually indicate considerable and greater strength for the future. Now that retail sales seem to be moving up -- with consumer confidence rising -- sooner or later the thin inventory-sales ratios will cause businessmen to rebuild depleted stocks. Indeed, there are signs that the fundamental turn in inventory policy already has occurred. What are the Prospects for the Future? We believe the economy of the United States will continue its strong expansion throughout 1972 and on into 1973. We have forecast a growth in the Gross National Product of $100 billion for 1972. That figure represents a growth of about 9 percent -- 6 percent of which will be real growth -16and approximately 3 percent in the form of price increases. We expect profits to increase by 16 percent over 1971. We expect unemployment to be nearing the 5 percent mark by year-end 1972. Does my unabashed optimism over the outlook for economic activity in the United States indicate that a return to demand-pull inflation is just around the corner? Do the big deficits we are now incurring point in the same direction? No, not if we watch our step. The deficits we now have are easy to finance in an economy in which, despite the New Economic Policy gains, still has considerable slack. The danger point is down the road. As unemployment moves down toward and through 5 percent, then we shall have to be increasingly careful that we don't overshoot the mark with expansionary policies. If we overshoot, we could again face the same set of problems we've been trying to solve for half a decade. But you can be assured that Administration policymakers are fully cognizant of that danger. repeat the error -- We are not about to "too much money chasing too few goods" that caused all of our trouble in the first place. -17- Beyond Phas e I I Can we ever agaln return the decision-making process to the market place, at least to the extent it existed before August 1,5? I hope so, but I rather doubt it. Although I do think we have a better-than-even chance of almost going back~ Let me emphasize most strongly that I have no fear at all that the United States has cast its lot toward permanent controls of the Phase II type. not allow it. The American people will Democracy ln our country is true democracy. Just as the American people forced their representatives in Government to jettison price controls in 1946 much too soon after the end of. World War II, so will they demand an end of Phase I) if ~aIJd when shortages replace plenty and rationing become,s necessary. Stated differently, a fundamental reason for optimism over Phase II, enforced without a gigantic bureaucracy, is that goods are plentiful. We are not trying to substitute a control system for the fundamental disciplines necessary to c.ool.an ov,erheated economy. Expansive policies are definitely in order. But as we move back towards full employment, as some goods come into short supply, as consumers find that they can't'-buy -what they want -- well, you can rest assured that they will transmit their displeasure to members of -18- Congress in no uncertain terms, and that will mean the end of controls. I do not expect this to happen before Phase II has accomplished its essential task. Still this does not mean a return to business as usual. Perhaps Paul McCracken, former Chairman of President Nixon's Council of Economic Advisers, suggested the answer over three years ago when he stated that Big Labor, Big Business, and Big Government should enter into a social compact aimed at limiting the pressures on prices that grow out of the economic power of unions to set wages or bus ines 5 ·to s·et prices at levels higher than they would be if we had more effective competition. I was skeptical of that idea three years ago. not today. achieved. I am I am in some degree optimistic that it can be This is because the whole experience of the recent inflation in the United States has been so wrenching and traumatic for almost everyone concerned. Who gained? The workingman? His real take-home-pay, as a1ieicty noted, rose at a dismal rate of only .2 ·p·e'fcerif 6·etween 1965 and 1971. The big money wage incre~ses disappeaied-ort the way to the store. The corporation and its stockholders? Corporate profits topped out in 1969 and dropped sharply Tn ·-1970, -19- falling to the lowest levels relative to gross national product since the 1930's. The banks? The higher interest rates on loans reflected -- and were offset by -- similar Increases In ,rates on the time deposits that are now so important a$ a source of lendable funds. No, few people gained from an inflationary boom which looked so good on the surface but down deep was so bad. As a result, the prospects for getting representatives of labor, business and government to sit down at the table and attempt to agree on wage and price policies that result in stable unit labor costs and a stable price structure that is fair to the consumer -- these prospects for some form of social compact -- look pretty good to me. Business and labor would spurn such an opportunity at their peril. Because sooner or later the American people will insist upon fundamental legislative and regulatory actions to effectively reduce the abuse of economic power -- and sooner, rather than later. -20- By way of summarizing these remarks, I would like to stress three points: First, the United States did not ignore its responsibility for dealing with domestic inflation prior to August IS, 1971. Through the use of restrictive fiscal and monetary policies, we had cooled a badly overheatedoconomy. However, the return to a growth pattern with stable prices and declining unemployment was proceeding too slowly in terms of both international and domestic considerations. The New Economic Policy was designed to meet both objectives. Second, the United States economy has responded to the new policies and we expect continued growth in employment while at the same time reducing inflationary pressures. Finally, the Nixon Administration realizes full well that a healthy and growing U. S. economy is absolutely essential if Free World nations are to grow and prosper. International monetary agreements, international trading arrangements and mutual security efforts will be meaningless gestures if they are not supported by strong national economies. Vigorous expansion of the United States economy today is the best argument against emerging protectionist sentiments. For that reason, I can appreciate your interest in our domestic economy, because it will have a thorough impact on the growth of Free World trade. -00- The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 FOR I~~EDIATE TelEPHONE W04·2041 nELEASE April 18, 1972 TR£ASURY ANNOUNCES ACTIONS ON FOUR INVESTIGATIONS UNDF.R THE ANTIDUMPEJG .l\CT Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Eugene T. Rossides announced today Treasury's actions with respect to four investigations under the Antidumping Act of 1921, as amended. In two of the cases there are final determinations of sales at less than fair value with simultaneous withholdings of appraisement and referrals of the cases to the Tariff Commission j:or injury determinations; in the third case, the Treasury is withholding appraisement pending completion of its investigation; and in the fourth, the Treasury is amending an Antidumping Proceeding Notice. All decisions will be published in the Federal Register of April 19, 1972. In the first case, the Treasury Department announced that welded-wire mesh for concrete reinforcement from Belgium is being, or is likely to be, sold at less than fair value. The case will now be referred to the Tariff Commission for a determination as to whether an American industry is being, or is likely to be, injured. Simultaneously with the determination of sales at less than fair value, the Treasury Department issued a three-month withholding of appraisement order covering imports of this merchandise from Belgium. The significance of the three-month withholding of appraisement is that imoorts of the merchandise will not be appraised for the three months pending the Tariff Commission's determination. If the Tariff Commission issues an affirmative injury determination, dumping duties will be assessable effective as of the date of the withholding action. If the Tariff Commission issues a negative injury determination, the case is closed, and no dumping duties will be assessed. During the period from January 1971 through December 1971, imports of welded-wire mesh for concrete reinforcement from Belgium were valued at approximately $260,000. In the second case, the Treasury announced that hand pallet trucks from France are being, or are likely to be, sold at less than fair value. This case will also be referred to the Tariff Commission for a determination as to whether an American industry is being, or is likely to be, injured. -2As in the first case, a three-month withholding of appraisement notice is being issued simultaneously with the determination of sales at less than fair value. During the period from November 1970 through February 1972, imports of hand pallet trucks from France amounted to over $900,000. In the third case, Assistant Secretary Rossides announced that the Bureau of Customs is instructing its field officers to withhold appraisement of hat bodies of fur, not on the skin, from Czechoslovakia pending a determination by the Treasury Department as to whether this merchandise is being sold at less than fair value. Under the Antidumping Act, the Secretary of the Treasury is required to withhold appraisement whenever he has reasonable cause to believe or suspect that sales at less than fair value may be taking place. A final Treasury decision in this investigation will be made within three months. If a determination of sales at less than fair value were to be made in this investigation, the case would then be referred to the Tariff Commission for an injury determination. Both sales at less than fair value and injury must be shown to justify a judgment of dumping. The total value of hat bodies of fur, not on the skin, imported from Czechoslovakia during the period from January 1970 through December 1971 amounted to approximately $450,000. In the last case, the Department announced that the "Antidumping Proceeding Notice" relating to sulphur, including elemental sulphur and nonelemental sulphur from Canada, which was published in the Federal Register of February 24, 1972, is being amended to restrict its application to just elemental sulphur from Canada. Nonelemental sulphur includes sulphur in combination with other elements. Some of the common forms of nonelemental sulphur are sulphuric acid and sulphur dioxide. Elemental sulphur, on the other hand, is sUlphur which is not in combination with other elements. 000 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 18, 1972 TREASURY ISSUES PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO ANTIDUMPING REGULATIONS Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Eugene T. Rossides announced today a Notice of Proposed Rule Making amending the Treasury's Antidumping Regulations. The changes are intended to insure that the Antidumping Act is made more effective in defending u.s. industry against unfair international trade practices in the dumping area, while at the same time providing complete fairness in antidumping investigations. With a view to speeding up antidumping investigations, the amendments would establish specific timetables for processing cases. Another amendment provides special procedures tor accelerated renewal of an investigation which was p~eviously discontinued on the basis of price assurances, where the Treasury has reasonable cause to believe that the assurances may have been violated. Still other amendments affect the technical adjustments which nay be made in comparing the prices at which merchandise is sold abroad with those in the United States. On April 13, 1971, a notice was published in the Pederal Register which announced that the Treasury Department "as reviewing the Antidumping Regulations. Interested persons "ere invited to submit suggestions for improving the Regulations, ~fter consideration of all the suggestions and a review of ~e Department's administration of the Antidumping Act, the rreasury concluded that various amendments to the Regulations ;hould be proposed. A period of sixty days will be provided before final ldoption of the proposed amendments in order to enable .nterested persons to submit comments. These should be Iddressed to the Commissioner of Customs in Washington, D. C. The new amendments would apply to all antidumping ~oceedings with respect to which no decision, final or _ entative, nor a notice of withholding of appraisement has een pUblished as of the date the amendments become effective. 000 0-290 ORR 643.3 R DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY BUREAU OF CUSTOMS [19 CFR PART 153J Procedures Under Antidumping Act, 1921, as amended NOT ICE OF PROPOS ED RUl E MA KING A notice was published In the Federal Register of April 13, 1971 (36 F.R. 7012), that the Treasury Department was reviewing Its regulations (19 CFR Part 153) relati"ng to procedures under the Antidumping Act, 1921, 85 amended <19 U.S.C. 160 et seq.). Interested persons were Invited to submit suggestions for Improving the regulations to the Commissioner of Customs not later than 60 days after the publication of the notice In the Federal Register. On June 15, 1971, the time for submissions was extended until June 30, 1971 (36 F .R. 11526). After consideration of al I of the suggestions received pursuant to the notice, It has been concluded that certain amendments to the regulations should be proposed. The primary purpose of the proposed amendments Is to insure that the Antidumping Act continues to be administered with'a view to defending United States Industry effectively against unfair international trade practices In the dumping area, whl Ie at the same time providing for complete fairness In the antidumping Investigations. To this end, the pro- posed amendments cal I, among other things, for more expeditious processing of antidumping Investigations. 2 Notice Is hereby given that It Is proposed to amend certain sections of Part 153 of the Customs Regulations (19 CFR 153), and to add certain other sections. I. Sections 153.30 and 153.31 are proposed to be amended to establ Ish limits on the time within which an Antidumping Proceeding Notice normally will be published subsequent to the receipt, In satisfactory form, of Information alleging Injurious sales at less than fair value and on the time within which a Withholding of Appraisement Notice, a Notice of Tentative Negative Determination, or a Notice of Tentative Discontinuance of Antidumping Investigation no.mally wi I I be published following the publication of an Antidumping Proceeding Notice. 2. Sect Ion 153.8 I s proposed to be amended by de Iet I ng the word "rea- sonably" wherever It appears before the words "direct relationship" In order to make It clear that only circumstances of sale which are directly related to the sales of the merchandise under consideration wll I be taken Into account. Under the proposal, such Items as bad debts and general advertising wi II no longer be al lowed as differences In circumstances of sale. 3. Section 153.15 is proposed to be amended to provide for the re- opening of discontinued antidumping Investigations by the publication, forthwith, of a Withholding of Appraisement Notice when the Secretary, subsequent to the discontinuance, has reason to believe or suspect that merchandise which was the subject of the dlscountlnued Investigation, Is being, or Is likely to be, sold at less than fair value. Additionally, It Is proposed to amend paragraph (a) of section 153.15, by deleting the :5 word "changed" before the word "circumstances" so as to make clear that cIrcumstances which were not known at the time of the Initiation of the Investigation may be taken Into account. 4. Sections 153.33 and 153.37 are proposed to be amended to pro- vide that all requests for an opportunity to make an oral presentation be accompanied by a statement outlining the Issues which the person making the request wishes to discuss, and to provide, further, that if the request Is granted, the Secretary or his delegate wll I advise the persons Involved as to which issues are appropriate for discussion. 5. In addition, a number of other technical amendments are proposed. Based on the foregoing, It is proposed that the fol lowing amend- ments be made to Part 153 of the Customs Regulations (19 CFR Part 153): 4 PART 153 - ANTIDUMPING Section 153.8 is amended by deleting the word "reasonably" before "dl rect re Iat Ionsh i p" I n paragraphs (a) and (b>' Section 153.8, as amended, will read as follows: 153. 8 Fair value; circumstances of sale. (a) General. In comparing the purchase price or exporter's sales price, as the case may be, with the sales, or other criteria applicable, on which a determination of fair value Is to be based, reasonable allowances wll I be made for bona fide differences In circumstances of sale If It Is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the amount of any price differential is wholly or partly due to such differences. Differences in circumstances of sale for which such allowances will be made are limited, in general, to those circumstances which bear a direct relationship to the sales which are under consideration. (b) Examples. Examples of differences In circumstances of sale for which reasonable allowances generally wi II be made are those Involving differences in credit terms, guarantees, warranties, technical assistance, servicing, and assumption by a seller of a purchaser's advertising or other sel ling costs. Reasonable allowances will also generally be made for differences In commissions. Except in those instances where It Is clearly established that the differences In circumstances of sale bear a direct relationship to the sales which are under consideration, allowances generally wi I I not be made for differences In research and development costs, production costs, and advertising and other sel ling costs of a seller unless such costs are attributable to a later sale of merchandise by a purchaser; provided that reasonable allowances for seiling expenses generally will be made In cases where a reasonable allowance is made for commissions in one of the markets under consideration and no commission is paid In the other market under consideration, the amount of such allowance being limited to the actual sel ling expense incurred in the one mar-ket or the total amount of the commission al lowed in such other market, whichever Is less. (c) Relation to market value. In determining the amount of the reasonable allowances for any differences in circumstances of sale, the Secretary wi I I be guided primari Iy by the effect of such differences upon the market value of the merchandise but, where appropriate, may also consider the cost of such differences to the seller, as contributing to an estimate of market value. 5 Section 153.13 Is amended by adding a new sentence at the end thereof reading: "If there Is not a clear preponderance of the merchandIse sold at the same prIce and weighted averages of the prIces of the merchandise sold are determined by the Secretary to be inappropriate, the Secretary may use any method for determining fair value whIch he deems approprIate." 153.13 SectIon 153.13, as amended, wi II read as follows: Fair value; sales at varying prtces. Where the prices in the sales which are beIng examIned for a determinatIon of fair value vary (after allowances provided for in sections 153.7, 153.8, and 153.9), determination of faIr value wll I take Into account the prices of a preponderance of the merchandise thus sold or weighted averages of the prices of the merchandise thus sold. Unless there is a clear preponderance of merchandise sold at the same price, weighted averages of the prices of the merchandise sold normally wI II be used. I f there I s not a clearprenol1der-ance of the merchandise sold at the same price and weIghted averages of the prices of the merchandIse sold are determIned by the Secretary to be inapproprIate, the Secretary may use any method for determi n I ng fa I r va I ue wh i ch he deems appropr i ate. SectIon 153.15 is amended by substituting "Discontinuance of antldumping investIgatIon." changed circumstance." for "FaIr value; revisIon of prIces or other In the main heading; by substItutIng "Price assurances, termination of sales or other circumstances." continuance of InvestIgatIon." for "Dls- In the headIng of paragraph (a); by insertl ng the words "and assurances have been rece I ved to th I s effect" after "revl s ion" in subparagraph (I) and after "resumed" I n subparagraph (2), by deleting the word "changed" before "cl rcumstances," and by substItutIng "NotIce of Tentative DiscontInuance of Antidumping Investigation" for "notice to this effect" In paragraph (a); by substItuting "Notice of Tentative Discontinuance of Antidumping Investigation." for "Notice." In the heading of paragraph (b); by providing that the "Notice of Ten- 6 tative Discontinuance of Antidumping InvestIgation" shall set forth a description of the merchandise Involved, that Interested persons shall be given an opportunity to present their views under a procedure similar to that set forth in section 153.33(b), by substituting "discontinuance" for "termination" In the first sentence and "discontinuing" for "terminatllll I n the second sentence, by add I ng the words "or assurances of terml nation of sales to the United States, and price revisions" after the phrase "price assurances" in the third sentence, and by substituting "wi II" for "shall" wherever the latter occurs in paregraph (b); by adding a new paragraph (c), relatinQ to the for.m of a statement of assurances; by adding a n. paragraph (d) prov i ding for the pub I i cat Ion of a "01 scontl nuance of Antidumpi ng Invest i gat i on" not Ice I n the Federa I Reg Ister; by add Ing a new paragraph (e) to provide for final discontInuance after withholding of appraisement or notice of tentative negative determination; by adding a new paragraph (f) to provide for periodic reports by foreign exporters; and by adding a new paragraph (g), relating to the reopening of a dlscontinued investigation. Section 153.15, as amended, will read as follows: 153.15 Discontinuance of antidumping investigation. (a) Price assurances, termination of sales or other circumstances. Whenever the Secretary of the Treasury is satisfied during the course of an antidumping investigation that either: (I) Price revisions have been made which eliminate the like I i hood of sa Ies at Iess than fa i r va Iue and that there is no Ii kellhood of resumption of the prices' which prevai led before such revision, and assurances have been received to this effect; or (2) Sales to the United States of the merchandise have terminated and wil I not be resumed, and assurances have been received to this effect; 7 or whenever the Secretary concludes that there are other circumstances on the basis of which it may no longer be appropriate to continue an antidumping investigation, the Secretary may publ ish a "Notice of Tentative Discontinuance of Antidumping Investigation" in the Federal Register. (b) Notice of Tentative Discontinuance of AntidumpinQ InvestiQation. The notice wi I I set forth a description of the merchandise involved and state the facts rei ied upon by the Secretary in publ ishing the notice and that those facts are considered to be evidence warranting the discontinuance of the investigation. The notice wi I I also state that interested persons shal I be given the opportunity to present their views under a procedure simi lar to that set forth in section 153.33(b), and unless persuasive evidence or argument to the contrary is presented within such period as is specified in the notice the Secretary wi I I publish a final notice discontinuing the investigation. The tentative acceptance of price assurances or assurances of termination of sales to the United states, and price revisions or the termination of sales to the United States wil I not prevent .the Secretary from making a determination of sales at less than fair value in any case where he considers such action appropriate. (e) Statement concerninq assurances. Assurances provided for In paragraph (a) shal I be in substantially the fol lowing form: I hereby certify that I am (an officer) (attorney-in-fact) of (name of foreiqn manufacturer, producer or eXDorter) and am authorized, on behalf of (name of foreign manufacturer, producer or exporter), to qive assurances that: (Select the appl icable provision.) I. AI I future sales of (commodity) by (name of foreign manufacturer, producer or exporter) for exportation to the United States shal I be made at prices which are not less than fair value within the meaning of the Antidumping Act, 1921, as amended (19 U.S.C. 160 et seq.) and that (name of manufacturer, producer or exporter) shal I make a report to the Commissioner of Customs which shall contain or be accompanied by the information required by section 153. 15(f), Customs Regulations (19 CFR 153. 15(t», for such period ot time and at such intervals as the Secretary may deem appropriate; or 8 2. AI I sales of (commodity) by (name of foreiqn manufacturer, producer or exporter) for exportation to the United States have terminated and shal I not be resumed. Officer or Attorney-in-fact (d) Final discontinuance. As soon as possible after the publication of a t'Notice of Tentative Discontinuance of Antidumping Investigation" the Secretary wi II determine whether final discontinuance is warranted and, if he so determ i nes, pub Ii sh a "Di scont i nuance of Antidumping Investigation" notice In the Federal Register. (e) Final discontinuance after withholdinq of appraisement or notice of tentative negative determination. The procedure specified in paraqraphs (b) and (d) wi I I not apply if the decision to discontinue an antidumping investigation is made by the Secretary after a withholding of appraisement notice or notice of tentative negative determination has been published and interested parties have already been afforded an opportunity to present their views pursuant to the provisions of section 153.37 or !53.33(b>' In I ieu thereof, a "Discontinuance of Antidumping Invest i gat i on" not i ce will be pub I i shed in the Federa I Reg i ster. The notice wi I I set forth a description of the merchandise involved and state the reasons upon which the discontinuance is based. (f) Periodic reports by foreiqn exporters. Whenever an investigation has been discontinued by the Secretary on the basis of price assurances, the foreign manufacturer, producer or exporter of the merchandise which was the subject of the discontinued investigation shal I thereafter make a report to the Commissioner of Customs for such period of time and at such intervals as the Secretary may deem appropriate. The periodic reports to the Commissioner of Cu~-,tGrns ~Jt:n(;ri)"Y shu 11, .J~ dO"'orm i ned by the Secretary, conta i n or be accompan i ed by the fo I low i n9 : (I) Prices at, and the terms and conditions on which, the merchandise is being sold for export to the United States and in the applicable foreign market (or information regarding constructed value as set forth in section 206 of the Antidumping Act, 1921, as amended (19 U.S.C. 165»; (2) Publ ished price lists, if any; (3) Information regarding discounts, quantities Involved on a per sale basis, shipping charges, packlnq costs and other circumstances of sales in the two markets under consideration; 9 (4) Information reqarding differences in cost of manufacture where similar merchandise is compared pursuant to section 153.9; and (5) Such other information which the Secretary deems appropriate. (9) ReopenlnCl of discontinued investiaation. In the event that the Secretary determines, subsequent to the discontinuance of an investigation pursuant to paragraph (d), that there are reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that there are or are I ikely to be sales to the United States at less than fair value, he wi I I reopen the investigation by publishing forthwith in the Federal Reqister a "Withholding of Appraisement Notice" with respect to the merchandise. If prior to the discontinuance of the investigation, importers and exporters concerned had requested a 6-month withholding of appraisement pursuant to section 153.34(b), when the investigation is reopened the Secretary may withhold appraisement for 6 months. If no such requests have been received, the Secretary may withhold appraisement pursuant to section 153.34(a). The wIthholding of appraisement may be made effective with respect to merchandise entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption not more than 90 days before the date of pUblication. Whenever an investigation Is reopened, interested persons wi I I be given the opportunity to present their views pursuant to section 153.37. A new section :53.17, relating to fair value determinations in exporter's sales price situations involving merchandIse not resold in the same condition as imported, is added to read as fol lows: 153.17 Fair value; merchandise not resold in the same condition as Imported. If exporter's sales price (as defined in section 204 of the Antidumping Act, 1921 (19 U.S.C. 163», is appl icable and the Imported mercandise is not resold to an unrelated United States pvrchaser in the condition in which it was imported, the Secretary may use such reasonable basis as he deems appropriate to determine exporter's sales price. A new section 153.18, relating to fair value comparison, which would provide for a comparison between purchase price or exporter's sales price and the applicable home market price or price to third countries at the same Ieve I of trade, is added to read as fo I lows: 153.18 Fair value; level of trade. The comparison of the purchase price or exporter's sales price (as defined In sections 203 and 204, respectively, of the AntIdumpIng Act, 1921, as amended (19 U.S.C. 162, 163», as the case may be, with the applicable price in the home market of the country of exportatIon (or, as the case may be, price to third country markets) will generally be made at the same Ieve I of trade. However, I f the Secretary finds that the sales of the merchandise to the United States or In the applicable foreign market are Insufficient In number to permit an adequate comparison, the comparison will be made at the nearest comparable level of trade and appropriate adjustments shall be made for differences affectIng price comparabIlity. Section 153.23 Is amended by adding to subparagraph (3) of the fol towing: parag~ph (c) "(v) Disclose the names of partIcular persons from whom confidentIal information was obtained, If nondisclosure of the names has been requested." S9 that the subparagraph, as amended, reads as follows 153.23 Avallabi Ifty of InformatIon In antidumping proceedlnqs. **** (3) I nformat Ion ord' narl f V regarded as cont I dent Ia I • Information will ordinarily be regarded as confidential If its disclosure would: (1) Disclose business or trade secrets; (II) Disclose production costs; (111) Disclose distribution costs, except to the extent that such costs are accepted as justIfying allowances for quantity or differences in circumstances of sale; (f v) 0 I sc lose the names of pa rt I cu Iar customers or the price or prices at which particular sales were made; or (v) Disclose the names of partIcular persons from whom confidential Information was obtained, if nondisclosure of the names has been requested. (5 U.S.C. 552). Section 153.30 Is amended by Inserting U(a) PUblication of AntidumpIng ProceedIng Notice." before th~ first sentence of the sectIon; by substItuting "Secretary" for "Corrml ss loner", by de letl ng the phrase", with the approval of the Secretary,"; by substituting "to" for "which may", and by substltutfng''w for "sha II" I n the first sentence of paragraph (a); redes Ignat I ng present par graphs (a), (b), (c), and (d), as subparagraphs, respectively, (2), (3),(4) (5); by adding a new subparagraph (I), reading "(I) A description II of the merchandise Involved."; by substituting "proceeding" for "Information" in redesignated subparagraph (2); and by adding a new paragraph (b). Section 153.30, as amended, will read as fol lows: 153.30 Antidumping Proceeding Notice. (a) Publication of Antldumpinq Proceeding Notice. If the case has not been closed under section 153.29, the Secretary wi II publish a notice In the Federal Register that information In an acceptable form has been received pursuant to section 153.25 or 153.26. This notice, to be referred to as the "Ant I dump I ng Proceed i ng Not ice", wi I I spec I fy-(I) A description of the merchandise involved. (2) Whether the proceedIng relates to al I shipments of the merchandise In questIon from an exporting country, or only to shipments by certain persons or firms; In the latter case, the names of such persons and firms will be specified. (3) The date on which· Information in an acceptable form was received and that date shall be the date on which the question of dumping was raised or presented for purposes of sections 201(b) and 202(a) of the Ant Idump i ng Act, 1921, as amended (19 U. S.C. 160 (b) and 161< a» • (4) The fact that there Is some evidence on record concerning Injury to or likelIhood of injury to or prevention of establishment of an Industry in the United States. (5) A summary of the information received. If a person outside the Customs Service raised or presented the question of dumping, his name may be included In the notice unless a determination under section 153.23 requires that his name not be disclosed. (b) Time limit on publication. Generally, antidumping proceeding notices issued pursuant to section 153.30 shal I be published In the Federal Register within thirty days after the date that information was received pursuant to section 153.25 or 153.26 in a form acceptable to the Commissioner. section 153.31 Is amended by deleting present paragraph (b) and substituting a new paragraph ·(b) to read as follows: 153.31 Ful I scale investigation. **** 12 (b) Pricing information. Ordinarily, the Commissioner will requl~ the foreign manufacturer, producer, or exporter to submit pricing InfonRetlOl' covering a period of at least 120 days prior to the date that Information In a form acceptable to the Commissioner was received pursuant to section 153.25 or 153.26. The Commissioner may, however, require the submission of pricing information for such longer period as he deems necessary; and he may also require the submission of pricing Information on a current basis during the course of the investigation. Section 153.32 is amended by adding a new paragraph (c), relating to time limits on investigations, to read as fol lows: (c) Time limit on investigations. Generally, within six months, or in more campi icated investigations, within nine months, after the date of the pub I i cat i on of an Ant i dump i ng Proceed i ng Not i ce, the Secretary will publish in the Federal Register a "Withholding of Appraisement Notice" (section 153.34), a "Notice of Tentative Negative Determl nation" (section 153.33), or a "Notice of Tentative Discontinuance of Antidumping Investlgatl~ (section 153.15), as appropriate. However, if the Secretary decides that the appropriate tenative decision cannot satlsfactori Iy be made within ~e nine month period, he wil I publish a notice of that fact in the Federal Register, together with the reasons therefor. The notice also will announce the length of additional time, usually not more than three months, within which the appropriate action wi I I be taken. Section 153.33 is amended by adding "a description of the merchandise Involved and" after "include" in paragraph (a); by adding a new sentence reading "All such requests shall be accompanied by a statement outlining the Issues wh i ch the person wishes to discuss." after the first sentence in subparagraph (2) of paragraph (b); and by substituting the words "In regard to those issues which the Secretary or his delegate has determined to be appropriate for discussion" for "and to supply such further Informatlor or argument as may be of assistance in leading to a conclusion as to the accuracy of the information in question" in the penultimate sentence of subparagraph (2) of paragraph (b). as follows: Section 153.33, as amended, will read 153.33 Negative determination. (a) Not ice of Tentat i ve Neqat I ve Determ i nat Ion. Ifit appears to the Secretary that on the basis of information before him a determination of sales at not less than fair value may be required, he will publish In ~ 13 Federal Register a "Notice of Tentative Negative DeterminatIon," which will Include a description of the merchandise Involved and a statement of the reasons upon whIch the tentative determInation Is based. (b) Opportunity to present vIews. (I) Written. Interested persons may make such written submIssIons as they desire, within a period which wit I be specified In the notIce, with respect to the contemplated action. Appropriate consideration will be given to any new or addtional information or argument submitted. (2) Oral. If any person believes that any Information obtained by the Bureau of Customs in the course of the antidumping proceeding is Inaccurate or that for any other reason the tentative determination Is in error, he may request in writing that the Secretary of the Treasury afford him an opportunity to present hIs views In this regard. All such requests shall be accompanied by a statement outlining the Issues which the person wishes to discuss. Upon receipt of such a request, the Secretary wi I I notIfy the person who supplied any Information, the accuracy of which Is questioned and such other person or persons, if any, as he in his discretion ~y deem to be appropriate. If the Secretary is satIsfied that the circumstances so warrant, an opportunity wil I be afforded by the Secretary or his delegate for all such persons to appear, through their counselor In person, accompanied by counsel if they so desire, to make known, their respective points of view In regard to those Issues which the Secretary or his delegate has determined to be appropriate for discussion. The Secretary or his delegate may at any time Invite any person or persons to supply him orally with Information or argument. (e) Final determination. As soon as possible thereafter, the Secretary wIll make a final determination and publish his determination In the Federal Reg Ister. (d) Negative determination after issuance of a withholdln~ of appraisement notice. The procedure specified In paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) wll I not apply if the decision to issue a negative determination Is made by the Secretary after a withholding of appraisement notice has been Issued and thereafter he has afforded Interested parties an opportunity to be heard pursuant to the provisions of section 153.37. In lieu thereof a final negative determInation wi II be published setting forth the statement of reasons. Section 153.34 Is amended by substItuting "Secretary" for "Commissloner lt and by deleting the phrase", wIth the approval of the Secretary," wherever either Occurs In paragraphs (a) and (b); by redesignating subparagraphs (I) and (2) of paragraph (a) as (2) and (3), respectively, and adding a new subparagraph (I) readIng "(I) a description of the merchandise involved;"; 14 by substituting the phnlse "withholding of l!Ippralsement notIce" for "Investigation" In redesignated subparagraph (2) of parl!lgrl!lph (a)i by de letl ng the words "by the Importer l!Ind the exporter" I n new subparagraph (3) of paragraph (a); by deleting the phrase "from Importers and ex- porters concerned" In paragraph (b); by substituting "the Secretary's" for "his" and "each" for "the" preceding "district dIrector of Customs" In paragrl!lph (c); and by deleting paragraph (d). SectIon 153.34, as amended, wIll read as follows: 153.34 Withholdin~ of appraIsement. (a) Three-month perIod. If the Secretary determines durIng the course of his I nvest I gat Ions that there are reasonab Ie grounds to be I i eve or suspect thl!lt any merchandise is being, or Is lIkely to be, sold at less than Its fore I gn market va I ue (or, I n the absence of such va I ue, then Its constructed value) under the Antidumping Act, and- If there Is evIdence on record concern I ng i nj ury or If ke II hood of I nj ury to or prevent Ion of estab II shment of l!In Industry of the United States, he shall publish notice of these facts In the Federal Register In a "Withholding of Appraisement Notice" Indicating: (I) A descriptIon of the merchandise Involved; (2) That the belief or suspIcIon relates only to certain shippers or pnoducers, If this Is the case and that the wIthholding of appraisement notIce Is limIted to the transactIons of such shippers or producers; and (3) The expiratIon date of the notIce (whIch shall be no rrore than 3 months fnom the date of publicatIon of the notice In the Federal RegIster, unless a longer period of withholding of appraisement has been requested pursuant to paragraph (b) and has been approved by the Secretary.) This withholding of appraisement notice wi I I be Issued concurrently with the Secretary's determination pursuant to section 153.35, unless appraIsement Is being withheld pursuant to paragraph (b) of this s~ctlon. (b) Six-month period. At any time prIor to the Issuance of the wIthholding of appraisement notice referred to in paragraph (a) of this section, Importers and exporters concerned may request that the period of withholding of appraisement extend for a period longer than 3 months, but I n no case longer then 6 months. Upon rece I pt of such a request the Secretar wi I I decide whether appraisement should be withheld for a period lonqer than 3 months. If the Secretary decides that a period of wlthholdlnq of appraisement longer than 3 months Is Justified, he wi II publIsh a wlthhoi dl ng of appra I sement notl ce upon the same bas I sand contal nl ng Information of the same type as Is required by paragraph (a) of this section, except that the expiration date of the notice may be 6 months from the date of publicatIon of the notIce In the Federal Register. 15 (c) Advice to District Directors of Customs. The Commissioner shall advise al I district directors of Customs of the Secretary's actton. Upon receipt of such advice each district director of Customs shal I proceed to withhold appraisement in accordance with the pertinent provisions of section 153.48. Section 153.35 is amended by deleting the word "adequate" in paragraph (a) and by adding the word "involved" at the end of that paragraph; and by subst i tut i ng "exporter or exporters or producer or producers, if the determination covers shipments by less than al I of the exporters or producers" for "supplier or suppliers, if practicable" in paragraph (c). Section 153.35, as amended, wi II read as fol lows: 153.35 Affirmative determination; general. > If it appears to the Secretary on the basis of the information before him that a determination of sales at less than fair value is required, unless the withholding of appraisement notice was issued pursuant to section 153.34{b), he wi II publish in the Federal Register his Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value. This determination wi II include: (a) A description of the merchandise involved; (b) The name of each country of exportation; The name of the exporter or exporters or producer or producers, if the determination covers shipments by less than al I of the exporters or producers; (e) (d) The date of the receipt of the Information in an acceptable formi (e) Whether the appropriate basis of comparison is purchase price or exporter r s sa Ies pr ice; and ' (f) A statement of reasons upon which the determination is based. Section 153.37 is amended by substituting "Withholding of Appraisement Notice" for "Affirmative Determination" in the heading; by adding a new sentence following the first sentence to read: "All such requests shall be accompanied by a statement outlining the issues which the person wishes to dlscu·ss."; by substituting "in regard to those issues which the f6 Secretary or his delegate has determined to be appropriate for discuSsion" for "and to supply such further Information or argument as may be of assistance in consideration of the matter" in the third from last sentence: and by subst i tut i n9 "w i II" for "sha II" I n the next to Iast sentence. SectIon 153.37, as amended, will read as fol lows: 153.37 Withholdinq of Appraisement Notice; opportunity to present views. As soon as possible after the publication of the withholding of apprals~ ment notice if any person believes that for any reason the withholding actl~ is in error, he may request that the Secretary of the Treasury afford him an opportu n i ty to present his views In th is rega rd. AI I such requests sha" be accompanied by a statement outlining the issues which the person wishes to discuss. Upon receipt of such a request the Secretary will notify each person who suppl ied any information, relied upon in connection with the withholding action, and such other person or persons, if any, as he may deem to be appropriate. If the Secretary is satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, an opportuni.ty wi II be afforded by the Secretary or his del~ate for al I interested persons to appear, through their counsel or in person, accompanied by counsel if they so desire, to make known their respective points of view in regard to those issues which the Secretary or his delegate has determined to be appropriate for discussion. Unless for unusual reasons It Is clearly impracticable, such meeting wit I be held within 3 weeks of the date of the publ icatlon of the notice of withholdinq, unless such notice was issued pursuant to section 153.34(b), when It will be held within 5 weeks of such publication. Reasonable notice of the meeting will be Qlven. I Section 153.39 is amended by inserting "set forth a description of the merchandise Involved and" after "which notice wil I" in the first sentence and by substituting "wi II" for "shall" in the last sentence. Section 153.39, as amended, wll I read as fol lows: 153.39 Revocation of determination of sales at less than fair value; determination of sales at not less than fair value. If the Secretary is persuaded from information submitted or arguments received that his determination of sales at less than fair value was in error, and if the Tariff Commission has not yet issued a determination re I at i ng to I nju ry , he wII I pub I ish a not ice of "Revocat Ion of Determl nation of Sales at Less Than Fair Value; Determination of Sales at Not Less Than Fa i r Va Iue J" or, if appropr i ate, a not Ice of "Mod If i cat i on of Determ i nation of Sales at Less Than Fair Value", which notice wi II set forth a description of the merchandise involved and state the reasons upon which it was based. He wi II notify the Tariff Commission of his action. 17 Section 153.41 Is amended by substituting a new paragraph (c), wIth the heading "Notice of tentative determination to rrodlfy or revoke dumping finding." (d). for the present paragraph (c) and by adding a new paragraph Paragraphs (c) and (d) of section 153.41, as amended, wi I I re~d as follows: 153.41 * ~odiflcatlon ** or revocation of finding. * (c) Notice of tentative determination to modify or revoke dumpTno fInding. If it appears to the Secretary that a modification or revocation of an existing dumping finding may be appropriate, he will publish In the Federa I Reg i ster a "Not' ce of Tentat I ve Determ i nat Ion to Mod i fy or Revoke Dumping Finding," which wi II Include a description of the merchandIse Involved and a statement of the reasons upon whIch the tentative determination is based. The notice wi II also state that Interested parties wi II be given the opportunity to present their views under a procedure simi lar to that set forth In section 153.33(b), 'and unless persuasive evidence or argument to the contrary is presented within such period as Is specified in the notice the Secretary wi I I publish a final Determination to ~di fy or Revoke Dump i ng Find I ng. Cd) Final determination. As soon as possible after publication of a "Notice of Tentative Determination to Modify or Revoke Dumping Finding," the Secretary wil I make a final determination and wi I I publish his determination in the Federal Register. Sect i on 153.48 is amended by subst Itut I ng "Secretary's" for "Commlss i oner' s" In the first sentence of paragraph (a). Paragraph (a) of section 153.48, as amended, wi II read as follows: 153.48 Action by the district director of Customs. Ca) Appraisement withheld; notice to importer. Upon receipt of advice from the Commissioner of Customs pursuant to section 153.34, the district director of Customs shal I withhold appraisement as to such merchandise entered or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption, after the date of pul-ticatlon of the "WithholdinO of Appraisement Notice," unless the Secretary's Withholding of Appraisement Notice specifies a different effective date. Each district director of Customs shall notify the importer, consignee, or agent immediately of each lot of marchandis? with ~spect to which appraisement Is so withheld. Such notice shal I !rrlr,-~te: (I) the rate of duty of the merchandise under the applicable Item ot the 18 TarIff Schedules of the United States If known; and (2) the estimated margin of the special dumplnq duty that could be assesed. Upon advIce of a finding made in accordance with section 153.40, the dIstrIct director of Customs shal I give immediate notice thereof to the Importer when any shipment subject thereto is improrted after the date of the ffndlng and information is not on hand for completion of appraisement of such shipment. Sections 153.49, 153.50, and 153.51 are deleted. Sections 153.52 through 153.59 are renumbered, consecutively, sections 153.49 through 153.56, and the reference in renumbered section 153.50 (presently section 153.53) to section 153.54 is amended to read sectIon 153.51. Renumbered section 153.50. as amended, wi II read as follows: 153.50 Release of merchandise; bond. When the district director of Customs In accordance wIth sectl~n 153.34(c) has received a notice of withheld apprasiement or when he has been advis~d of a finding provided for in section 153.40, and so long as such notice or finding Is In effect, he shal I withhold release of any merchandise of a class or kind covered by such notice or finding which Is then in his custody or Is thereafter Imported, unless an appropriate bond Is filed or Is on fl Ie, as specified hereafter in section 153.51, or unless the merchandise covered by a specified entry wi 11 be appraised wltho~ regard to the Antidumping Act, 1921, as amended. Renumbered section 153.51 (presently section 153.54) Is amended by deleting "and the Importer or his agent has f lied a cert I f Icate on Form 3 (SectIon 153.49)" and substituting l1and the resale price In the United States Is unknown" In the first sentence of paragraph (b) thereof. Paragraph (b) of renumbered section 153.51, as amended, wil I read as fol lows: 153.51 Type of bond required. **** (b) Bond on Customs Form 7591. If the merchandise Is of a class or kind covered by a flndlnq provided for in section 153.40 and the resale price In the United States is unknown, the bond required by sectIon 208 of the Antidumping Act, 1921 (19 lJ.S.C. 167), shall be on Customs Form 7591. In such case, a separate bond shof: be required for each entry or withdrawal, and such bond shall be ir addition to any other bond required by law or reguIL,tlon. The record of sales required under the condItIon of the bond of Customs Form 759' sha II I dentl fy the entry cover I n9 the merchandise and show the name and address of each purchaser, each seiling price, and the date of each sale. The face amount of such bond shall be equal to the estimated value of the merchandise covered by the finding. 19 Renumbered section 153.56 <presently section 153.59) Is amended by Inserting "where purchase pr I ce I siess than fore I gn market va I ue," be fore "the spec Ia I dumping duty", and by Inserting "or agreement to purchase" after "date of purchase" I n the first sentence thereof; and by insert I ng "where exporter's sales price is less than foreign market value," after "section 207," In the second sentence thereof. Section 153.56, as amended, wll I read as fol lows: Method of comput I ng dump i nq duty. 153.56 If It appears that the merchandise has been purchased by a person not the wIthin the meaning of section 207, Antidumping Act, 1921 (19 U.S.C. 166), where purchase price is less than foreign market value, the special dumping duty shall equal the difference between the purchase price and the foreign market value on the date of purchase, or agreement to purchase, or, If there Is no foreign mar~et value, between the purchase prIce and the constructed value, any foreign currency involved being converted into United States money 8S of the date of purchase or agreement to purchase. I fit appears that the merchandise Is Imported by a person who Is the exporter within the meaning of such section 207, where exporter's sales price Is less than foreign market value, the special dumping duty shall equal the difference between the exporter's sales price and the foreign market value on the date of exportation, or, If there Is no foreign market value, between the exporter's sales price and the constructed value, any foreign currency involved being converted Into United States money as of the date of exportation. e~orter It Is proposed that these amendments shal I apply to all antidumping proceedings with respect to which neither a decision, final or tentative, nor a notice of withholding of appraisement has been published as of the d8te the amendments become effective. (Sees 'II, a~ . 201 , 202 , 203 , 204 , 205 , 206 , 207, 208, 209, 212, 213, 42 Stat • amended, 12, 13, as amended, 14, 15, as amended, 18, as amended, secs. 406, 407, 72 Stat. 585, sec. 486, 46 Stat. 725, as amended; 19 U. S .C. 160, 161,162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 171, 172, 173, 1486.) Prior to final adoption of the proposed amendments, consld0ratlon wi II be given to al I relevant data, vIews, or arguments which are submitted in writing to the Commissioner of Customs, Washington, D.C. than 60 davs frnm +ho ,f::,+o nf nlll·tllr-;,.+Inn nf 20226, not later this notice In the Federal Reqlster. 20 Written material or suggestions submitted will be available for public inspection in accordance with section 103(b) of the Customs Regulations (19 CFR l03.3(b» at the Bureau of Customs, Washington, D.C. Commissioner of Customs Approved , ;AP R 1 G1912 / / )', /.-(/ '. , (:'1" I ,: , , ...... /·"r,,:. " ...( / ,~ Eugene T. Rossides Assistant Secretary of the Treasury / .' " Edwin F. Rains The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 ~ TelEPHONE W04·2041 IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 19, 1972 TREASURY EXPLAINS CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH :~ORT-IMPORT BANK OBLIGATIONS QUALIFY AS DISC EXPORT ASSETS The Treasury Department today explained the conditions under .ch obligations issued by the Export-Import Bank of the .ted States will constitute qualified export assets of a ~stic International Sales Corporation (DISC). The Internal Revenue Code -- Section 993 (b) (7) -- provides, part, that obligations issued by the Export-Import Bank of ~ United States constitute qualified export assets of a DISC such obligations are acquired from the Bank. Treasury's Indbook for Exporters," published in January 1972 to provide ~rmation on the DISC program, states that obligations of the ort-Import Bank will qualify as DISG export assets if bought m the underwriting syndicate which purchased the obligations m the Bank. In today's announcement, Treasury said that a person who otherwise entitled to DISC benefits and who purchases from person obligations issued by the Bank, will be considered have purchased these obligations from the Bank if, with pect to any issue, they are purchased on or before the 90th after any part of such issue was first offered to the public. s the further condition specified in the Handbook -- that chases must be made from the underwriting syndicate ~- will be required. 000 291 The Department of the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 19, 1972 TREASURY'S MONTHLY BILL OFFERING The Treasury Departmen.t, two series of Treasury bills or thereabouts, for Gash and maturing Ap ri1 30, 1972, as follows: by this public notice, invites tenders for to the aggregate amount of $ 1,700,000,000, in exchange for Treasury bills in the amount of $1,701,685,000, 275-day bills (to maturity date) to be issued May 1, 1972, in the amount of $500,000,000, or thereabouts, representing an additional amount of bills dated January 31, 1972, and to Mature January 31, 1973 (CUSIP No.912793 PT7 ), originally issued in the amount of $1 , 200 , 370 , 000 , the additional and original bills to be freely interchangeable. 365-day bills, for $1,200,000,000, or thereabouts, to be dated Ap ri 1 30, 197 2 , and to rna t u reAp r i 1 30, 1 9 7 3 (CUSIP No. 912793 PWO). The bills of both series will be issued on a discount basis under competitive and noncompetitive bidding as hereinafter provided, and at maturity their face amount will be payable without interest. They will be issued in bearer form only, and in denominations of $10,000, $15,000, $50,000, $100,000, $500,000 and $1,000,000 (maturity value). Tenders will be received at Federal Reserve Banks and Branches up to the closing hour, one-thirty p.m., Eastern Standard time, Tuesday, April 25, 1972. Tenders will not be received at the Treasury Department, Washington. Each tender must be for a minimum of $le,OOO. Tenders over $10,000 must be in multiples of $5,000. In the case of competitive tenders the pr-ice offered mu~t be expressed on the basis of 100, with not more than thcee decimals, e.g. 99.925. Fractions may not be used. (Notwithstanding the fact that the one-year bills will run for 365 days, the discount rate will be computed on a bank discount basis of 360 days, as is currently the practice on all issues of Treasury bills.) It is urged that tenders be ~de on the printed forms and forwarded in the special envelopes which will be supplied by Federal Reserve Banks or Branches on application therefor. - 2 Banking institutions generally may submit tenders for account of customers provided the names of the customers are set forth in such tenders. Others than banking institutions will not be permitted to submit tenders except for their own account. Tenders will be receive without deposit from incorporated banks and trust companies and from responsible and recognized dealers in invesnment securities. Tenders from others must be accompanied by payment of 2 percent of the face amount of Treasury bills applied for, unless the tenders are accompanied by an express guaranty of payment by an incorporated bank trust company. Immediately after the closing hour, tenders will be opened at th, Federal Reserve Banks and Branches, following which public announcemeL will be made by the Treasury Department of the amount and price range accepted bids. Only those submitting competitive tenders will be advised of the acceptance or reiection thereof. The Secretary of the Treasury expressly reserves the right to accept or reject any or all tenders, in whole or in part, and his action in any such respect shal: be final. Subject to these reservations, noncompetitive tenders for each issue for $200,000 or less without stated price from any one bid~ will be accepted in full at the average price (in three decimals) of accepted competitive bids for the respective issues. Settlement for accepted tenders in accordance with the bids must be made or completec at the Federal Reserve Bank on May 1, 1972, in cash or other immediately available funds or in a like face amount Treasury bills maturing April 30, 1972. Cash and exchange tendecs will receive equal treatment. Cash adjustme will be made for differences between the par value of maturing bills accepted in exchange and the issue price of the new bills. Under Sections 454 (b) and 1221 (5) of the Internal Revenue Code, 1954 the amount of discount at which bills issued hereunder are sold { considered to accrue when the bills are sold, redeemed or otherwise disposed of, and the bills are excluded from consideration as capital assets. Accordingly, the owner of Treasury bills (other than life insurance companies) issued hereunder must include in his income tax return, as ordinary gain or loss, the difference between the price pai for the bills, whether on original issue or on subsequent purchase, an the amount actually received either upon sale or redemption at maturit during the taxable year for which the return is made. Treasury Department Circular No. 418 (current revision) and this notice, prescribe the terms of the Treasury bills and govern the conditions of their issue. Copies of the circular may be obtained fro any Federal Reserve Bank or Branch. 000 The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 20, 1972 JOHN J. McGINNIS NAMED SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS Treasury Secretary John B. Connally announced today the appoi~tment of John J. McGinnis to the position of Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security Affairs. He succeeds Anthony J. Jurich who is now with the State Department. ~. McGinnis was formerly Deputy Special Assistant to the ~cretary for National Security Affairs. Before joining Treasury in 1969, Mr. McGinnis was Manager of Program Control and Management Systems, Radio Corporation of America, Camden, New Jersey. Born in New York City, New York on January 25, 1928, he attended Hofstra University, Hempstead, New York and received degrees of Bachelor of 'Science and Masters in Business Adminis tration 0 He has also been a member of the faculty of Rutgers University and Pennsylvania State University. Mr. McGinnis and his wife, the former Lorraine Jan~t Hirn of New York City, live in Vienna, Virginia with their two children, John and Deborah. 000 C-292 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS - -FIFTIE~H ANNIVERSARY 1972 CONVENTION -- - Wednesday, April 19, 1972 Shorehall Hotel Washington, D. C. C. A. Me KNIGH'l', President, ASNB . .lIN PHILLIPS, Program Chairman J,. aso HUltPHY; Floor Manager 01 ) .j , 1 SECRE~t'A~Y SECRETARY CONNF.LI.Y: 4 104 OF' '.rRE TREll..sURY Thank you v~ry much, 1>ir. McKnight, Mr. Deck and distinguished head table guests; z.tembzrs 5 of the Association, ladies an.d gentleman. 6 I am delighted that I'm not a candidate, announced 7 . or unannounced, ~or any office in either party, so I can ind!3cd 8 be here today a.nd I am grateful for the privilege of being 9 here. 10 I feel in all fairne~s that I should enter a 11 disclaimer as to certain things that Mr. Deck has said in his 12 introduction about 13 me, but perhaps I will not be too specific. I will merely say that I don't agree with eV'erything 14 that he said, nor does my lack of refutation signify or 15 indicate approval of the accuracy of each and every one of 16 his statements. 17 The nice things I would like to admit to, but he 18 might have been given a little bit of erroneous information 19 about offers that have been made and decline-d. 20 event, 2t very grateful to you for a very gracious and a very extravagant 22 introduction. 23 24 In that I won't pursue it further except to say that r~m Faced with four inquisitors, I assume that they will be primarily interested in front page material, so my opening 105 ej 10 1 2 I' II1\ cmtanent today" In any event, I think you all should know that I'm i a always qui te nervous when I make any kind of a speech before 4 any kind of gatherinq. 5 trhis is particularly true before such a distinguished , gathering of newspaper editors, and just to be sure that I 7 was not too rela,:ed, they' va asked these four distinguished 8 gentlemen 'i:o come dr)wn here and occupy their chairH. 9 If 1 ever. saw buzzards on a roost 10 (G:Jnp-ral laughter.) 11 I must say I've had a great many t.hings happen in 12 my lifetime, various speaking enqagements, but nothing quite 13 so disquieting. 14 15 16 17 18 19 10 21 23 ej 9 1 (General lallgh-ter.) 2 But seriously, I am indeed grateful to you because 3 it gives me a chance to say seme things to you that, frankly, 4 I would like to say. 5 in hearing them but I assume that thi s is what these four 6 qontlemen are going to do. 7 aOO\lt. the things you are most concerned with, so I will say a 8 few things that I feel very deeply and very strongly, that 9 mig~t You may not be the least bit interested They're going to raise questions or might not be uppermost in your own mind. We live in probably the most turbulent and tormented 10 11 times in the long history of this nation, and I think this is 12 tru.:! -- 1 think everybody 1102:'8 or les8 admits to ·this -- this 13 ,torment and this turbulence 1s a part of every facet of 14 I A.m~!·:ical1 life. It certainly is a part of school life in this na-cion. 'i5 We see in courts in California, Texas and else.where, 16 me';-~hods by 17 strike down the laws and the procedures and the 18 which we have traditionally financed public school ed.ucation 19 in America. 20 East 21 students. 22 We have seen i:.he na1:ion plag1.1ed, NO:1:"th and South~ and west with the queation of husing Beyond any question the educational. ~f: school sYf.~b:.):n itself t i~:s financing, 23 from a standpoint of its curriculum as well. as IA is and has been in a stata of turmoil, but i.t ji.lst. does not 25 SblP I d at the educational institutions. It cert~d.nly lV.:.:l ej 10 107 enterpris(~s 1 permeated the bUGiness Z part of the economic life of the country, this tor:neut, this a turbulence, this frustration, this 4 of the nad.on. I"t is a d5.ssati~faction. Business today is under attack as it never has been 5 before in the history of this nationo • being pictuX'ed a:3 an ogre, as a heartless legal entity designe,l 7 to suck from the veins of the soc:iety everyt.hing- that it can 8 wi thout returning anything in response. 9 Business generally is It has been pictured as an entity totally without 10 any compassion or concern for the needs and wants of the 11 American people and the workmen of this country. 12 ~Jo1Jrnal yest8:cday morning did c: very excellent 13 the Wall Strent 14 job in objectively pointin9 cut \>Jhat b\l.siness is ~ ;;lud \.,ho is 15 the beneficiary of business in AI'lerica .. !..,et me just point out t.o you one or 16 i t\t.70 tcm~\ because::! 17 r 18 he took the ca.se of General r-iotors. and I dorl' t ne'::essarily 19 want to defend General Hotors but: I don't cb:joct 20 I 21 bus iness of them all, Generfll Mot.ors 22 thin1~ H~ it is so pertinent -- if I can find ·them. t.,.,) think tbey!Z'e :eigh.t -- he ';:ook the example .')f ·i.:h() i-e. if bj.g~fes·~: Corpora·~-.ion. He said, here are some highlights of i 1.:3 sho~1ing 03.11 of th(~ recc:"rt~_y 23 released annual l:"eport of 1971 24 General Motors took in, and where the money ,,,7cmt.; .;lI:d Motors received ~:-!3, ~~9 t.LI15.. olJ'_. sa1.cl v );lOp-ey that G~nel:'al Nml, where d:i.C: ~_c. T:'- ej 11 108 1 II This is big business; what does it mean'? Hha\.: impact 2\ does it have? Well, they paid out $.13. SO 0 billion -- I 'm 31 roilnding the figures -- to suppliers. 4 from whom they bought things and ! 5 II employed G I country. j ~'1ho These are the people in turn hired peoplG, people, and created pal':t of the prosperiity of thj.~;) Thirteen billion dollars 't'lent to suppliers, t.o 7 employees, the workmen themselves, tilose who tunl out the 8 products; $9.448 billion for taxes, and I am slightly interested 9 in that: $2.560 billion for depreciation allowance; $873 millioll iO ' to the General Motors 11 stocY~olders. Out (.£ !;29 billion received, ~::hey go1: $905 milliofl..i 12 for expansion and modernization and so for·cll: $950 mill.icm. 13 'l'he net of ;l t 14 two and one half tirn\2:s as much as the stockholders did, and tli.';' i5 employees racei ved just a £xl:ctionunder ten times as much as 16 the stockholders did J and in effect the stock.hoJders got 17 3 1/2 percent. i~ I tha ';::al~ collectors across t:h.a count1:Y got: That is the net of it. Yet, all indust.J:Y and all business i!:': l.lll.de:r- attack, 18 ne~l!jpaper 19 and thnt includes the fraternity, cmd thC3.': includes 20 your mm television and your own radio facilities tha.t a.re 21 now 22 and challenge your right to renewal of your :U.censcs i and 23 many of you are under joint Qwnership and many of yon are not r 24 bu-" all business i3. picture!d as totally obliviot'l.s t.o the 25 surroundinCJs, to the environment, to being attacked by people that con~e in~:o YOllr C(;H'J'(\\:.•D. tJ.CS t.ht~ ecoyogy 0;': '!:'LLc:';.:,~ ~ ej 12 'I 'I p j ~~1 109 are a part, but it doesn't just stop there. lJ ~ ;1 It c€~rtainly has permeated the religious in;:;titutions 3 of America and all the churches, all the synagogues, all the 4 cathedrals; they are lln.der a'ctack, they are in upheaval. 5 Their ultimate f?lths a.re b;:::d.ng questioned: their mores are 6 certainly 7 \i.llde~:- qu~sts.on. It doesn I t just stop ·there 0 All gov~:!rm\iun·':;. is being 8 sUDjec'l:ed 'co the most severe crit.icism, probably, :'.1l t.he 9 history of this country, and it is being done in all gmTernment 10 local, state, anc federal levels. Not only the institution of 11 government but 'almost every single program is being questioned" 12 nQt in an object! ve and a fair basis with real 13 but always with a critical vein, always assuming that there 14 is something wrong with this country, that there is something 15 wronq with our institutions 16 17 0 Well, sure there is. with our institutions. perspi~cti ve Sure; there's somet~ing They are not perfect. wrong They weren't 18 desiqned to be 7 they' re not. going to be, not in your lifetime 19 or my lifetime or in centuries of those who :(0110\'1 20 we are not perfect and we can't devise something without fault 21 and without shortcomings. 22 But let me say to you that inevitably th~ u.s because criticism has reached the point, whether you talk about the economy -24 as and let's talk about that for a moment. is the price and wage program going to I am constantly asked, work~ are ":.he controls I I 110 ! ej 13 1 2 I I g0i41g 'co do their job. ·;:hei~c·;cb. Yes, I "think they are going to d.e I 3! I 4j I 5 hav~ t.o do ·their job. We don v t have any choicE;. t-lh (:l.t. alt;:;:rnat.ive'i' 8oci.r.~t~[ wnen you look a'c a great many thin9s in -<.::his 6 is the '1 you need to look, not only at the f aUl ts; the shortC!)l1Ullgs and 8 the \o1eaknesses of the inati ttl"l:;~onal programs, but :YOll have to 9 also analyze what the alternatives are, and the wage and price control progri:!llB, to :::;~lre ~ they' re going to work. Have they had troubles? 11 Sure, they've h2d t.roubles. Yes f they are. b(~yond 12 Are they going to have more troubles? 13 any question. 14 done very well ind.eed, as a matter of fact, ~nd le1:' me give 15 you some figures. 16 But what have they done? 1 ~~ink On t.he Pa.y Board, they have made a they have ntFt'.be~: of 17 decisions since t:he program started last November 14th" and in 18 Category 1, 19 States, the cumulative weiiJhted average for catego:~y 1 20 businesses 21 14th on the \veighted average was 5.10%. U their standard of 5.5 percent. are -the la:rgest businesses in t:h(: United thi. above 5000 employees -- the inci:easc s:':..nce Novemb€' Now, in Category 2, these are the businesses betweer' 23 24 2.c; th~;;sc 1000 and 5000 employees, I t: froIn February 14th was the cumula ti va av<.;!x'age i .. 52 p.~rcent. j TI r-""'- ej 14 III 1 making very substantial progress 1 and t.he cu.:mula:i:i ire ·"12ight8d Z average of the 3 were pl.lt into effect, the average increase for t.hese two cate- I . 4 'qorl.es 5 6 t\,10 since November 14th when the \'lage controls representing millions of workers, is 5.03%, and I think "that's making very substantial progress. ! On the price side, yes, \Ole've had inflation; no I 1 I g'Uc:Jtion about i 1::. W:~ I yr-J had inc::e£::J2s, bttt 'V€! 'h<T:'~ b::ld 9 I freeze 1a9-<: f£,11, t.l1at iIJh::m th!':!se controls were taj~en off r t~OVt~rnber \'1hen Phu3e II began on 11 bulge; there was going to be a bulge in the pay incre6.ses, '/2 there 13 notwithstanding that t Jack Rayson said p no later than this woek 14 that the price incrElases represented 1.5% of the revenues of 15 those companies who had asl'ed fc\r price increases, and the 16 increa!3(;ls that: had been permitted by the Pric·a Commission repr.:; 17 sented only 3.2% of those comm:>dities for which inc:reases had 18 be~n 19 \'lfiS ll}th, the;:e i'las go:~ng 10 going t:o be a bulge in the price increases. asked r l'md and I subrni t to you that that is a px,"e:.:::t.y good rec(. No\-" it just. so happens that duringt:1e fh::Jt 1l 20 quarter we did have a deflator of 6.2%. 21 knew it was going to be high. 22 to be a It's high I' but i',le It couldn't be an/thing else. After you release the reins of the ~bso}. ute ireeze r 23 you in¢vitably got the bulge that we predic,ted d.nd that 24 actually occurred, so that you've got 6.2 percent GNP deflated 25 for the first quart.er, but ....his was the rough Lruar';:;er. I ej lS li? II ., One full percentage point of that were govern.Tt:ent 2 pay increases, so you can reduce it to 5.2 percent, but the 3 net of it is, I think ~e' re on the road to do precisely ~Ilhat 4 we set out to do. 5 I think the program is going to be a success, G II provided we can keep some degree of confidence in it and some i degree of volmLi.::.ary compliance in it, and it is essentially 8 a program of voluntary oompliance just as the oollaction of 9 taxas is, but agc:'.in here is a case ·where we have people running 1Q over the COWl try 11 about the inequities of ·the tax program, talking about the 12 loopholes in tne tax program as if the entire thing was 13 monstrosity and evil in its concept, and iniquitous in its 14 administration" 15 spent over one hundred years in the Congress, and there is not a single Bill 16 today, denouncing the government, talking c~nd yet these are the same people who have ~elating to taxes that bears their llame. And sure, they talk about loopholes 17 a 0 ivr.l.at loopholes? 18 I ask first, are they talking about charitable de.:il1ctions to 19 churches, museums, educational institutions? loophole? 20 I don 9 t 'l'hat is a think it is, but that's "That they're tal kin 9 about. 21 Are you talking about knocking out v 22 interest deductions on home mortgages? 23 that's what they're talking about. 24 loophole. 25 Il elirn..~_nating That's a loophole; I don't call that a the ej 16 You talk about capital 1 geins~ 2 destroy the real estate industry of the coun'l:ry or the financ:L:l.:: S institutions of the country. 4 I hit I don t t want to see the DO\'l-Jones 500 in a week's time by knocking out capital gains. 5 don't think it is a loophole. G by the Congress of the United States. 7 loophole. 9 It is a conscious decision nade I don·t call it a You talk about interest-free muni.cipal bonds.. 8 I booJ~. a loophole by some definitions; not in my That's It is a very to deliberate decision that the ·Congress of the United States which II permits local units of government to issue tax-free municipal 1.2 bond'Sl nothing wrong with it, nothing evil about it. It is a poliCY decision that this government bas made that has been '4 15 id existence for decades and for.. generations, and furthermore they cannot do anything about it. He had a 'tax reform act in 1969. 16 17 18 19 20 people that r'W\ around today talking about 25 a"'layi:.~e a municipality to issue tax-free bonus in l:€n:urn fm~' right of a federal subsidy. N()"~ I the cities were :t-~ind on the football tea'll, and the coach 24 of these a~~l loopholes tried to do something about t.aking 21 23 Some of these same back, he said, stodd Johnny in. his play. of likf..: i:he kept He said, yo·;.'\ng balfhack 'Ccl:;..~,r;';ii::.h'~ c~.li quarb:~~:'- hi:,.; plr:ly, CO.:U This went on three times, and each time it: get. stopped on the line of sorimmage, and finally on the ~c,,;:c i:'} 11 ej 11 I down the coa~h called t.Il,:; cparberback over and 9aid c ~'};lat' s 2 the matter 3 quarterback shook his head and said, I told you to give him the 4 ball, and t.he little boy finally said, Ccach I yes, sir, :( knovl. 5 But Jot-.:'lny, he don ~ t wa71t thE !J2.11. 8 ! 10 ic~ 11 J:"Wl I toJ.d you to send Johnn~l in. .., ",'--'n _" ... >.... _ . -:'.4w'J. o """'-.' T!,.e ) Now that IS about the 'Vlay these cities are. Ithese 9 I want: f ~o <~ J.10'{o79 -take dOoll'';: Some of want to 9i ve the ci \:ies a subsidy" 2.~'.'ay the right t:o issue municiP,3:1. bond3. \.fa;.li;I:·:l n t i on mat in "they don't want COZ'lg.t"(;!es E; subsidy. They Eut the 'l'hsy made a and they couldn f t do any'thing. Politically, you can ~ t do that.. 12 You canr:::)t 'coke .it away from thel!i v so t.here's no point tryjong to go aloound 0 trying 13 14 you? ( l1a·"'e·~-] ~ -.. 1... J .. <..i.. 6 7 ,\"1i th Ito ;;,0';;1 on the basi,') ti1at. '15 16 dj,~.3sadoDfaGtion ',Uscon;:.en-;.:., 8offi'::d':j;.")d~' t arour~d O{:hc;rs go with the federal government s getting something for nothing. taHdn.g about all these rich folks Let me give you a few figures on tilat9 17 who don' t pay i8 About 74.5 million individual income tax re·turns werel:il.ed 19 20 Iin I 1970, and a mor'~ .i::a.<{~!g 0 lG~:' of ti:.emu than one-xi.J?w of taxabl\"5:, bore no °cax.:;::s. 21 you ~ 11 be surpris?d to knm.;; t..hat ·i.;.;,WSE:, YOl.l' 14.9 milli.on returns non- 11 also be interasted to know that all but 39 rOOO of thase were fj_led by a person ~l:U:h an adjusted grOGS incOlWl of less than $lOqOOO, but you would also be 23 24 i,'/En-°e I intere:-Tted -i;o l(l"l(J." that most of the rem~cil1dl2r ..'(':;r~; :_n the between $10,000 and $25,000 category, so a great many peo?la filed l ej 18 that filed returns didn v t pa.y ·:~:2.XGS 1':;.5':: yea~:. Z 3 4 pr()graTi~5 it is VEry easy to ha critical, bu:t ~:;hm·. ~fon ge·t: dom: 5 to f;he problE.m of trying to Hori:: out 6 equitable solu.tions, that are fair t.O the ta:-:p,';\y:;r;;", of t.his 7 country f tllat c're fair t.o the govcrn.i1lents f }.ocal 8 federal.1 it is not em easy p:::oblem .. 9 But in any event {:his government to just criticism. 12 back, because that ;'=>,re st.:Jlu·i;j.o1l8 deserve~; It deserves more than slander. dc~asionally fe:. ti'lt:.l.:: it and more thnn It occasionall something right is doneo t3 (Applat'.se ~ ) 14 Let me also point out that I was amazed and I was 15 appalled last yea.r, right after the President~ showed magnificel: 16 courage in doing what. he did on August; 15th, not only to meElt 17 the problems B.t home but to meet the problems overS'3as in 18 imposing a 10 percene surcharge and suspendi.ng the converti- 19 bili ty of the dollar Why? 20 $ !-lot because he t-7antea to, bu'': because over L 21 II lonf] pe~'iod of tima W€~ had reached a point in thi8 country II 22 d'I whE-:}:e there "t>n'.s no acceptable alternat:ive for what h8 did, II 23 . and h ..J ~~h(jwed grea'c courag0 in doing it. i'..:nd \vha.t happened? 24 2S tr:.·:';.i.'1g to negl~tiatG ~ ~Vhile \.:e were in ·the proc8ss of we t'1ere pictured and painted ~.,ir:I~! :'~1l;i ef 19 ,'J _) U' h,) lLi 1 4,ain, and very frankly, in many of your publicatic.ns: 0.5 tei,1S 2 unreasonable and demanding and ·tough a.nd undiplornai:.ic. Well, at times we ~;'ierE probably al1 of those t. hin 9 s , 3 j I but probably not enough of them at any time I ge·t all that. we But were e I unl..e~sonable? ~ie 4 5 deserved.. Had 7 "vIe didn 9 t we demanding, were we been? Had thls nai:ion been? t-:1hnt. had we done? All we had done" all this nation had dona, wa::: given 8 9 hecaune away $150 billion to try to rehabilitate, reconstitute ~,d 10 rebuild the victims of this great World War through \'1hich we 11 had gone. 12 compassion; we gave our concern and we rebuilt the world. 13 That is all W 't-ie ga'\fE: of our material resources i we gav'e of ou:r have done. We did it to such 14 3 great degree, with such t5 outstanding gnnerosi ty: that we had expended our m·m rmrpluses 16 and we had exterlided our credit to t.he breakin.g point I toJhere 17 all of our friends, \-7hom we have succored so well I said l,ie 18 have no confidence in you, 19 business, and 20 tfe 21 about, that it was time that we do something to look after the 22 American interest. 23 We are overriding the interest of our friends. 14 problems with Gur friends. ~~ey you don't know how to run your were right because we should have done what did long before we did it, but very few voices were ever rai~~ It was always, we're being overbearing. Wetr~ creating No friend can ever be bought t not by an baC 1-""J'idual , Ii ei 20 117 " or not by a natlon. The only true f~iend is one t-J:~.:, h:'i8 a I 1 ., !respect ~ 3 for you, and I assu:r'e you tllat - 'WA =}' r1 ~1~ I":h' no~_~ng 'A..h 1n ~ e oonduct of those negot.iations that c:i;'eated contemp'.::, but 4 hopefully, 5 so~e respect. In any event we tried our best to see that the 5 interests of t.bis nation were represent'ad, and then we tried 7 to say to allQf our friends at home and abroad that we did 8 indeed mean business, that we had indeed entered a new day, anf. 9 that we bad gone so 10n9' on a certain course that we now had to cbanqe that course. 10 t,1()\'i', ho';'; else is s31f-flagellation .r,anifr::s'i:l;:d in t.hL, 12 society of: curs? t'le have>. a classic example here n1cr:mtly. 13 is qoing on right today, and I was astounded,. in ove!: two hours 14 of t.estimony by Secretary of State William Roqar::3 hefore the 15 Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, I do not recall a 16 single Senator of either party saying one word of denouncement 17 against the North Vietnamese who have beyond any doubt 18 entered upon a m".ssive military invasion of South 20 of ai ~'ler party. 21 criticism, of questions. On the other hand, there was Why don't we get out? 22 ~by What are we doing? nur.lber of years. 24 I I!j t~.,o ~enator hours of Why are we there? are we bombing? The answers are very clear and t.hey· 23 2.'; ~J'ietnam. Not one single word was uttered by a single 19 It You can question whe~").,-::;;:: have been there in the first place, but wr.;:. 0): hE:.'.'7(:-) not: been \',;'0 are t1:·s~ce., for a s~lOuld Ti.:':);;'>: ,j 21 i',yho question 2 ~~ l --~ the most, or tr4083 1tlhc \ apprmred ,;j,e most. at i:he time that we went there in 1964, in 1965. 3 He haa e, con.cern ft;'n~. t.he 4 United States has a concerll, 5 of our remaining troops in Viet!';',am. 6 troops. 7 entitled to SODS plaudits, it seems to me, for living up to e a c;omrni tt.ment th.at he made .. 9 to He has withdrawn almo3t 13 He is liT! <·!:ldr~'Jing tnos'3 500~OOO of them, and he is He is "Tinding dO'Hn the war in Vietnam, and our peace negotin'cicm'J h.t~V{2 bee:<~ on tile tahle and proposals haye been on '! t I, the table since; ,Jar. . uary. 12 cafet.y I didn't 9'et a rC::;3i.)OnSe Did hl'(! g-et a proper' response? at th3 peace table in Paris. We All we got was a massive invasion by the Communists of North Vietnmn agains' the people of South Vietnam, and we are answerihq, as the Presi- 15 16 dent said repeatedly, \-Ie l'la would, that we t'ITould use the bombai:'::: we would use t.he Navy, that we would not use the ground troops 17 until all of our people have safely lef·t that land and until 18 Vietnamization had an opportunity to work. So in the final analysis, without trying to use more 19 20 examples, 21 cri tical that those in the press and those in poli t.ics use somr; 22 restraint in the all-out criticism which '"e i'u.w.t. t.O inev~.. tably 23 inflict upon ourselves and upon our ins ".:ituti.ons • 24 I think in this political year of 1972 it is absolutel I personally believe that there i3 25 1confidence in qovernment in the United stat;.G~; f! f grovii;g li1.ck of I ,I. I!j 22 of anyone man or anyone party. 2 3 What is the inevitable re.sn.llt? 41' unsllsto.ined ana llnsup.,ort"d 1>1 a high A democrncy d'~g"ee of public confi- ;rna whet is the alternative to a 5 den(~e 6 demc}cracy? 7 dict.atorship.. 8 in politics and in t1:"lerxcass and in t.h.e pu.hlic service to give 9 BOml3 of our tbOl.i:ght '12 'l'he alternative to a democracy in this land is a That is the altm:native, so it behoo"'les each of u and s(),ne of om. . ti.me to try to objectively portray 'i,';hut this nE',tion is and v;llat it has been and 10 11 cannot lcng survive. I hopes , I \~hat it to h .1. Rave t,;.? bean so neglectful? Have we failed so Let's ask ourselves, is there ,3.11y".yhere in the world 14 15 where people are better fed or better housed or better clothed? 16 Is t~ere anywhere in the world where there are more freedoms? How many countries in the world have the freedom of 17 18 assembly such as youtihave here, or even more than t.hat, how 19 many countries in the world have the freedom of the press 20 which you enjoy? How many, how many have the freedoms that we 21 inalienable rights, and they are, in the language of 22 conr~ider 23 the Constitution and our Bill of Rights, but they 24 fragile 25 a~ ~re as the political stability of the system under which they operate and no more, and when that political system begins 'I ;j 23 " .j I to totter and to weaken, then you can be sure tha-c you::::-. righi:s and your privileges and your immunities, your ri9'hts as free ::! ~~ il r.,!,j'-: i:1l1.c1 women.. begin t.o ~l;eake:l and b'~gil1 t:o;:o-i.:t.9r '. No nation as complex as this can surv3~ve without .; ! 5 rulos under which we all live and abide, and if. (5 destroy those institutions of government, we are in essence 7 destroying the very fabric of this society. 8 yes. 'Vle tend to Improve them, Demol.ish them, no. It is with that thought that I leave you then. Each 10 one of us, it seems to me, has a very great duty and a very 11 great obligation, to criticize, yes1 to disagree, yes; but 12 also we have as leaders, if indeed we want to be leaders in our community or in our nation - \'18 have a sol(~m.'l obligation t4 to be fair f to be objective, and to keep in perspective Hhat 15 we are and what we hope -to be and what we have accomplished 16 and I submit to you that for all of our frailties, there is 17 no region of this planet, there is no nation on this earth, 18 that has done as 19 in as many ways as has this democracy of 20 America. wel~ in as short a time for as many people 21 Thank you very much. 22 (Applause. ) 23 24 25 I 1l b~e United States of 1 2 3 IF;}$P.i~OGAr.i:ORS ~ "-..n"'_~""'~."_ =-------=--~_ 4 5 EDWARD R. COay v THE WALT" STro~ET. !jot~PJ.~AI~ ED J. DOOLEY I! SAN FRANCISCO EX.;-'~'1!NER NELSON P. POYNTER, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES 7 8 biR. DOOLEY: 9 10 Mr. Secreta:c.."Y t I don' t CONNl~LY: 12 at 2: 15, ruld I 1 V(-! got 1: 27.. 13 thinJ~.. Am I ':'lrong? MR. DOOLEY: 15 SECRETARY CONNALLY: It's 2:27. I'm wrone;. I have used it all. I apoloqi%e to you. 17 That just shows you those of 18 . make horrendous mistakes. U9 in government can I used it all. lim reminded of the TV commercial .. if that's not cur-- 19 21 We were supposed to break u,? ··You've gl/t about 4:;' lllinubes, I 14 20 how much buz~al:'ds have lef·~: dmm here. time \fe SECRETARY 16 kJiO'H' sing in this particular crowd -- I just can't believe I used the whole thing. ~ (General laughter.) SECRETARY CONNALLY: 23 minutes. Well, we can go ahout 20 I'll keep my answers brief. MR. DooLBY; \fe1l, before we gtt:t i:nto ;TIon-r::y rr·£ittr~.'r.., 1 ..... .L ')'-' "n e !Cl,.. .. ' .(:'a.:..i. :; . (;""~,"~~ ~ ~~. ,~. ~ 3 #'c"l!n"~ v..... \,. 4 tally, rtmnlng a,}a.inst. Bill Hobby of t.:he Hl)us·"t.on h::!~t" Jo'~ .u... OV. ~ - ~ "11Q ~ '.:i ')"'011'~ ".... ' .• ~·'·'"·\-n.''' '.~ 400 ....... ~ .. ,1'0.",-'- -:- r 5 6 MRa DOOIJEY ~ 7. SECRETARY CONNALLY: 8 MR.. D()OLEY: 9 I don"t anticipab::: that I will. l-lhat if your brot."I1er ge'tH in a li. ttle 1.:::'( si tuation and ~?}::m. get a telephone call? SECP.~TIHtY 10 t1 anyt.hing.. 12 ffiw.ch. 13 Wi.ll you go to Texas and f';ampaign? I a2s~:;r,::.:1 CorUUH.,LY: Wil J. yet' go do:'·Jn t.!-,.ezy·' '? He has not askec. ::ns: to do ha d,clGsn! ,t feel like I can MR .. DOOLEY.: h:~lp him very Some of our Texas G!di to~:-;:; and 2\,SNE 14 have described you as the leader of the Republican" or 15 cor~servati"le 16 17 '\ving of the Democratic party. In case Mr. Agnew is not on the ticket and Mr. Nixon asks you to run, will you change your registration and 18 . become a part of the ticket? 19 20 SECRETARY CONNALLY: Well, you've co-"ered a lot of ground now. 21 (General laughter.) 22 SBCRETARY CONNALLY: I have to first 2.ssurne that th~~ 23 Vice President E not on the ticket, and I'm not willing to 24 make that assill"1\ption, and secol'ldly I I have to [.S SUi.ne t.hat It m going to be asked to be on the ticket, and. then I h..::-,v3': '::0 ej 26 2 II J I' anm,'~r. d I j\1;.;,0L: dc·' L ,; t believe I ca.n do all that in one I h91i;;:;"J"8 ~< ~ m going to pass that question by simply 1 4 I say in9 5 I I have no pl('.lI'.s to do anything. toward any political off:Lce~ I don lot ant.icipate ·that the Vioe President \.,.,i11 6 7 8 I have no aspirations be on the 11 ticl~e'l:: L.G:: again, and if he isn't, I don't anticipate that I wil.l be, So I just don't thin!< I can give you any 1: 9 Ii better answer than that. ,., I It) III i 0/ I' help 1i~ i I You ]m"", we can speculate all day, b\..l.t that doesn" t l·iR. DOOLBY ~ Hell, letOg go to the ot.her end. n ,. the even"·, of a dead.lock in Miami, I' , i. vert muci10 i I '. ,', ... ~'1Ould In you possibly be a I 15 fall-back candidate? SECRETA,,\RY CONNALT..IY: It \"ould have to be a whale of a deadlock. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 (General laughter.) SECRETARY CONNALLY: It 11 tell you, if they get down to me they're going to be on about the 72nd ballot, I imagine. (General laughter.) ~1R. POYNTER: You have proved that you could add~ Mlat we would like to know is, can you divide and subtract. SECRETAR!{ CONNALLY: depends on 'what the subject is. Can I divide and subtract? It i ej 27 12~ 1 given the Administration 2 in'ceres'c rates, 3 any time in history. this way, "'"".. ".L oJ'" • 1 i: larA. SECRETARY CONNALLY: Mr.. Poynter, let me answer it now, know because I don' t any ot.her 'c~().y to answer it product.ive. U or determin.e t:he avai labi 1ity of money at ce:ctain rates .. 15 18 down and they have come down in every single category. recent,weeks 19 20 21 22 II 24 25 ~e In short-ter.m Treasury bills have gone back up_ They were as low as 2892 percent interest, and they are well back. up, a point above that. That isnit really what concerns us, thouqh. 17 i8 None of us know how you can effectively dictate All of us are interested in In'cerest. rat.es coming 12 14 Q rates is because all of us are convinced it would be counter- 10 13 . a'(: The reason we have not imposed a eeiling on,interest 8 9 our ho ..-ro. . .·; '. .~.,.{.jQ are mo!."e mass l.• ve that we would freeze the price of interest? 6 7 to f.:Lx The question is, at what point would you recommend 4 5 ar,,·a -t.:~he PCi!Hl." What we are· more interested' in i8 seeing the long-term interest rates come down, particularly on home mortqages,a~d we have made some headway in the last few months on long-term interest rates. NOW', none of us, as far as I know I certainly have no hesitancy whatever in imposing a ceiling on interest rates if I think it is necessary to do the job .. Now frankly, we have proceeded on the assumption d 28 2 them, that interest ra'i;es wou1d indeed come Nrn.; if it appears thai:. that ia i.1.ot g'oing to YIork, 3 4 and at what point this ,\.;ould become clear I aln not sure todClY I 5 but I think you to,ill find no reluctance 6 it. 7 8 9 01"1 You spoke of loopholes. MR. POYNTER: Are ~~ere any of the present deductions ti,at you regard as a loophole? SECRETARY CONNALLY: eve~l No, I wouldn't point at .my one ~~em 10 of them, because 11 the Amarican taxpayer, is there by all Act 12 there for some reason. 13 our pclrt to impose one of that is O,f Congr<'~ss; and i_ t ' n Now you rriight questi()n whether or not a particular 14 incentive should tie there or whather or not there is a aoeial 15 need for a particular provision. That's a question of judqment, 16 a question of your own ideas or of your own philosophy, or 17 perhaps of qovernment, but I frankly do not class these things t8 and others about which I speak as loopholes. POYN~R: The figures came out last week that 19 MR. 20 97 percent of 21 help, in renderinq their tax retQrnS g were fradulsnt; not ~lose who receive help, so called professional mistakes but fraudulent. 23 Do you believe that figure? 24 SECRETARY CONNALLY: 25 Well, these figures arose out of a survey that we made in the Southeast.el:"tl part of t.h~~ ~!l e; 29 H r I / v'G l Un! ted Stat~s. 126 Nr~v: l i t i~ j' • simply because we made the smnplc of we1.l over j but these returns were suspect in the first place so the .. percentage, the 91 pereent, is an absolute, accurate figure on 5 those that we tested, but I don't think that would hold up G nationwide on all of the returns. 7 ~OO re·;;.urns ~ Again, I want to make clear here that I am not 8 talking about established concerns. 9 the certified public accountants and so forth, who obviously to I am not talking about assist a great many people in preparing their returns. 11 The principal ones we're speaking about are what I 12 would class as the one-man operations where you see a little 13 'siqn on a little house '=lr 14 says Income Tax Service or similar words. 15 people, Where we have encountered inaccurate returns to this 18 extent - .. it concerns us, and very frankly" it means two 11 things.. t. •• a little office somewhere, and it These are the types () It means we're going to examine hundred$ of thousands mere returns than tie normaliy would have this year. It means we're going to ask for additional auditors 10 and agents for the Internal Revenue Service, because the whole 11 foundation of the tax system in this country, in revenue ~ collecting, is on a voluntary complianca basis. ~ we have the most effective, most efficient system ~ in the world, by far, and we're going to take whatever strin- J$ gent actions are neaessary to be sure that the American people 1 are .,. ":' -, i\lH.• 2 . ~~.'. - .U.r i.~..:. 3 4 last July "to $38 . . B bi11ion< 5 or a littl~ NC-,'1 I beljJ~v6' '.qe 1 :cc em (nO bill~ ... "··: morc_ (; ... 8 deficits. are running too hlgh and arc t.o·;) j,llfla~;i::ma):.:l 0 9 .. 10 mavh~ 11 the 12 n b..i.d for a. 'tax ..vcu i'11J.l pres~n';':: aClJept this one. A·.llninistr:d.:ion inc:r.e'3.3(~ SECR·~:;·J.1P.HY 13 i.;:i. Novera:Oer, \}ould you ant.:1..cip:J,te e2.rly next year? COmmLLY: I wov,ldn' t be prep,;n:ed to say 14 that we \'lould go for a tax increase early next. yea;,: at this 15 point in time.. 16 Administ.ration certainly 'lIQuId want to examine very closely 17 and very thoroughly the on-going programs that are nOH bein.g 18 funded to see if we can't cut substantial portions of those 19 programs out. I think before we do that, I think this Now, we didn't do this in the last year simply 20 21 because we felt that \lTe needed a fiscal stlm1.l1ant. 22 ,#lhy Y01.1'Ve got that big deficit, but I ·vloul(.:, cmticl_pate thi.l.t 23 therl:1 would be a thorough examination of a great man:! of 24 programs # and frankly I think t.he Al7'ericB.n • to it • F~:JpJ~ This is t:t~CfY;: ","'::(-e anti '(:led ....... .. , .l:"(.~'I.\·J.r~:L.~j·t.:.:~,.1. ~·.>.f~·.~·.: . .L(:I ~;'v. :r .... ':.! -~ '~ we ~ '.TJ:':l funded them Hit.ll has to hu ,"o:cthy, all th·::!' :money ab.road, I take it in ,:~->. '~e mone-::ary field 0 a.lr:lo noticed you made a recent speech II and I'd like t.o quote you if I may: lSI have sometimes heard the acousation tJ..'1at I have become a sort of bully-boy on the manicured playing fields of international SECRETARY CONNALLY: What • s the r~ext sentence? the next sentence. MR. CONY: That;s all I have. (General laughter.) SECRE'rARY CONN~U.LY: financ~." All right. Read f. . :........ . II 3 I' IIL·1 4 II 5 I G fe~l it inn't. 1 with fil1ance rttinLste,;;s aroun_d the 8 ~lOrld? 9 10 what your vantage point is 11 I do deserve that characte:d.. zatioIl, and I have been qi.!L te firnl .. 12 I havenct: been a bully .. I wish you 13 (~ould I suppose in some p·eople" s eyes D have been with me Hhen vTC ~rere 14 15 of all t.hose n"i,:mtn.s c-f ccrlv()T.sation, bilatoral and 16 latera.l, and it. Z:.!.nally 11 CCllr'.E! to me and said, '<Ie can' t 18 going to have -co settle it, tim€'! and again. carn~:. down CQ"ltn try ItP.~H:i- ilf.b:n:: conn t.ry agree among o\lrsel V'es. You're So I hadnat bullied them so badly, and I hadn!t 19 bec~ 20 so overbearing that I had completely lost their confidence 21 their respect, and the truth of that matter is, in t.he fin?1 22 analysis they could not agree among themselves. 23 agree ,.,hat their relative exchange rates should be r ana. in 24 some cases I negotiated. ?'._0 J! II They could I was the negotiator; I \lIas the r,lediator ):.-, 0].:' j1.';):. , e: ,., J-' 1 '" {'.aL--" ,".,:""1 J-...oAoo 4...·n.,.~:~i'·: _~~ '-',t-. . {_'- __ i.'l.",.'-~__ ..,:'.:,C"::': . ,.•••., :3~·~.,',',' ' ....: 0' ,~- '.'j'f.~___ :_,,;,_-... ...... .. ',' \.:.......... ."_ (,,~L : ....... ). .,.. _,:1 _\.;.I....~ ~.',['oJ':/, ~~_!.~··t~i·."",;··.':' ,.,. :.. .. \ .... . 'i .'i l',<J.'1J:-: z.na ;.?vc:ry 9 persuasion I htld. 10 (Genorz,l laughter and applause_) HR. CONY: 12 i.n~:€!I. naticn.al Ie 11 a~31" a closing question to on YOlol I,.bnetar;{ affairs" What is the ad'TC':.".ntage to the U _50 of our. d:cagtJing 13 14 our feet in t-ej'.. m~j of a nt;Ht1 monetary 8ystem? 16 alJ~ Paul Volcker; iEi in Japr.·m today. He's boen in Eurc,pe. 17 19 saying ..::0 . them -.- 20 what they're prepared to do. -)/1 30m;J clue f:ccrm them r..,;'~).y.. .:!f. t,.:.:J We thL11-t that: if we look toward the return to a system of fixed ~xch~'-lge ra.tes 1" t..Jo .. ~. re 'i.'i1ai ting for. Let me try to explain it in this 21 22 \>1C' ~·]hicb. and any sort of convertibility of ·;.:he dollar 1 is what they all say t.hey t,ant.., then obvict:.oIy '~1~~ g r(. ~jOinl;! . ". -,.. " ..;~ t.e: p :n ,I! 1 ...., to 3 for some period. ~rmit r"~ 4 the United States to run ~ '" S t'U.·p J_us at s orne . t~me Now, :Eor tu'ent.y-·two yeal:s we've run a defi<~it. 5 Now, as I said in my remarks a moment ago, vIe ha:ve exhausted~ 6 substantially exhe,llsb;d, Our reserves in terms of our debts. 7 Our credit is e~~t.ended; they complain constantly abou'1: the 8 nwr..QOl:' 9 hold in banks in their reserves. 10 of your dollars around the world, the dollars '''hich the:r m5.nds: They havt,,\ to ;:'aaka up their are they willing for us to rWl 11 surplus? Now let me give you an example. Last year, the 12 United Kingdom ran a balance of payments surplus. of $2.4 13 billion. 14 our economy, but that is the larCJest balance of payments surplus 15 in the history of the United Kingdom. 16 That doesn' t sound liJ{e much to us with the size of Now I on a relative basis, if we had rlm a surplus 17 of that size, we would have had a balance of payments last 18 year -- surplus -- of approximately 19 we're eleven times higger than the United Kingdom. 20' a. United Kingdom every year. $~6 billion, because We grmrV Every year. OUr growth this year, 1972, will be $100 billion 21 ~ greater than it was last year, and that's greater than ~ the total Gross National Product of the United Kingdom, ~4·S0 you have to keep things in perspective. tZ'e '0 had of payments surplus las r::. ye,1r of HaN', if they ~"ill $~O b111i'))1. le';: us run a sl.u::plt':;s or that. fo,r a couple of iea:7S running, we f 11 t;:tlk bility because w~·l1. be in but that '9 the fir~,t decision ~10~: o,.;rilLLng lib:? (~bcnt coave~ti- position '-'lhere •. . . e car) ccnvert., ,1 th\~y hav~~ to mak~ now. Tf th ~y; re not. <t:iI1ing for m3 to run ,;) 1,;Then theyi:ce -t:.'i1.~O surplu~:; then for us to run a s'ilrplus in our balance of payments. 1. om sorry to take so long to anSlqer that ~ very important q~estion MR. CONY: It' a a and a very pertinent question. ~ank lliR. Me KNIGTrr: you. Thank you. SECHETi\RY CONNl'..LLY ~ Thank you V(,H.Y much. (Applause. ) MR. for a very r-tc KNI0HT: spLd. ted Mr 0 Secret:.ar~', thank you very much and stirr,t'lla"cing lunch3Cln?rog~'am u and I cut it off only because we have anotLer :i.ro.port..:lrl'c proqram '1cheduled, for the Empire Room in fifteen minut.:2.3; and one, 1,:;'8':' ·..:eminder: the ballot box is open; phy~~icn.lly t ~_ t is a'l: t;:\,;~ 133 4 6 7 3 9 10 i1 12 13 15 16 18 19 20 22 Room. ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY PRESS CONFERENCE held by TREASURY UNDER SECRETARY for MONETARY AFFAIRS PAUL A. VOLCKER at the HOTEL OKURA TOKYO, JAPAN APRIL 15, 1972 This transcript was made from a tape recording. Mr. Volcker: I should say that I'm delighted to be in Tokyo for the first time since I have been Under Secretary. I have been looking forward to this for some time and I'm glad the occasion has arisen because of the personal delight in being in Tokyo as well as the chance to talk informally and in a calm atmosphere with government officials and others in Tokyo. I know that Mr. Connally, my boss, when he was here billed himself as a gentle spring breeze but I think, given the season of the year, I should be entitled to at least the same characterization upon my arrival in Tokyo. I think I would point out that the major purpose of my coming at this time.is to discuss, essentially, multilateral issues. We have in a sense come to, I think, a new stage in the evolution of monetary affairs and economic affairs where we want to get to work with more intensity with the problems of monetary reform and reform of the trading system as we move ahead. Questions of the appropriate forum of forums for discussing this issue arise and I've been discussing that with my counterparts in the Japanese government as well as some exchange of very preliminary views on substance. These conversations were not designed to arrive at a conclusion. They're of an exploratory nature and we didn't arrive at conclusions at this stage. We - 2 - are in a process of exploration that will last at least for some weeks. QUESTION: Has there been any firming up of your proposal on this so-called forum for action in negotiating international monetary reforms? ANSWER: We have no specific concrete proposal at this time for the forum. We have in mind some very definite consider- ations and criteria that any forum or forums should meet in dealing with this problem .. But we think that there are a number of ways' in whi~h these criteria could essentially be met and we haven't got a specific proposal. What we are doing is trying to explore and see what the reactions and views of our major trading partners are and then against that background we may De prepared to make a very specific proposal. We have no concrete proposal at this time including, I must say, some of those that I saw in the Japanese press upon my arrival. We have no such specific proposals. QUESTION: You mentioned in your opening remarks that the process of exploration will last for at least some weeks. I got the implication that it is like six weeks and then you'd have a conclusion. ANSWER: I'm glad yeu asked that question. Because I was afraid that I left a little ambiguity in what I said. When I speak of a matter of weeks as a process of exploration, I refer - 3 - specifically to the question of forum. On the substantive of issues we are engaged, obviously, in a very major and fundamental look at the monetary system and world economic relationships. The process of developing a consensus on that --- arriving at a oonclusion --- negotiating the specifics weeks. is not a matter of It's a matter that's going to occupy our attention for a long and I'm afraid an extended period of time. QUESTION: When do you think you'll be in a position to make your specific proposal for the forum? Will it be next month? ANSWER: I think the question implies a kind of process that I'm not sure will take place. I think that it is one possibility that we will come to the kind of conclusion and make a definite proposal of our own. It may well be that a sort of consensus evolves less formally and it would be difficult to date when that consensus took place. I would suspect with this kind of process the latter development is more likely than the former and I would hope in the matter of the next month or So some consensus would arise on this issue whether it's in the form of a American proposal of a proposal afanother country of a less formal process of consensus. If I may just add to. that answer, I would not think of this process as having any specific target date. I know when I went to Europe recently and we discussed this some, the general - 4 consensus of other governments is, well, this is something they wanted some tim e to think about. And they would come back and give some reaction in the course of the next week or so. And this will be a process of give and take in arriving at a consensus. QUESTION: In considering any fundamental refonn on the international monetary system, do you conceive of the coming Presidential election in the United States as being an obstacle to this? If you don't, I wonder what sort of. an ongoing thought you have about what the international monetary restructuring should be like? ANSWER: So far as the first part of the question is concerned, no, no obstacle whatever. I think this is a process that is going to take some time and go right through our election period and thereafter. So far as the shape of the future monetary system is concerned, I don't think it's useful to try to be precise at this point in terms of any mechanics or details. would say the opposite. Indeed, I I think there has been some concen- tration, some focusing of attention on some of the mechanics of the system, in a sense prematurely, because what we've got to settle and arrive at is some broad philosophy, if you will, some broad consensus as to what we want, what the objectives are. And then I think the mec~cs will fall into place rela- tively earily, whatever those mechanics are: convertibility, - 5 - SDR's, role of gold, exchange rate regime, the type of exchange rates that one has. All those problems can be solved if we have a consensus on what the broad objectives are. We'd like to focus attention on that prior fundamental question at this point. What kind of a monetary system, what kind of a world economic order would we like? Let me illustrate just to make this a bit more concrete on the kind of questions that arise. The United States has been in deficit in its balance of payments for some twenty years. That's the way the system operated, so to speak. This was con- venient in some ways, I think in many ways, for other countries. Maybe it was convenient for the United States. But whether or not it was convenient we feel that we've come to the end of that road. That cost can no longer be sustained. We've run out of credit; we've run out of assets, so to speak, and we now look toward a kind of system or many people look toward the kind of system where the system forces an equilibrium. And we accept that as one approach toward international financial reform. I would go further and say that certain types of systems would require that the United States be in surplus for a while. After twenty years of deficit we feel we are entitled to run a surplus and that would be good for the world financial system. But that Unmediately raises a question. truism. We face a mathematical If the United States is in surplus, other countries must be in deficit. And are other countries willing to be in - 6 - deficit? And what are the mec~sms in the system that would bring about and help assure that kind of result? not easy questions. These are They involve important questions of national attitude and national policy as well as monetary issues and they should be openly discussed if we are going to have a sensible monetary reform that works and doesn't break down. QUESTION: This I believe is your first bilateral with another government of the question of the forum. Are you planning sUni1ar trips elsewhere or talks in Washington with other members of the Ten or outside the Ten? ANSWER: I was in Europe last week, I guess it was, and had a little chance to discuss this then, both in an informal multilateral setting and to some extent bilaterally. I would expect to be going back to Europe in relatively few days, partly to continue this discussion. I haven't got any specific plans beyond that but the Unplication of your remarks that we will be having continuing discussions, bilaterally or multilaterally on this question is certainly correct. QUESTION: I wonder if, in· these discussions, you discussed, I am sure that you discussed, I am sure that you did discuss the Unbalance in the world balance of payments situation? You also probably discussed the recovery of restoration of some equilibriu in the U.S. - Japan balances. I wonder whether you also or whether another subject came up and that is the so-called theory - 7 of the responsibility of Japan in this area because of the enormous reserves that it holds. Could I ask you if these points did come up and can I ask you what your views are on the responsibilities of Japan as a major surplus nation? ANSWER~ Well, I think your assumption is correct that these subjects came up but they came up against a background that the vast majority of our time was spent lateral issues. ~n the multi- We, in the United States, have a very large imbalance in our payments of which we ane~infully we are dedicated to eliminating that imbalance. aware and We feel that we have taken vigorous steps in that direction, in part, through the exchange rate realignment, of course, that you are familar with and that provides a certain platform and framework for dealing with this problem. But the answer doesn't lie fully in exchange rates and we've been concerned with other aspects of the problem as well and we recognize that we have a major challenge ahead of us. I think we recognize that this takes time. The exchange rate changes themselves take time to work themselves through the economy and most economists have the opinion that this takes a period of two years or more to fully have its reflection in the trade balance and in the balance of payments generally. We have a very, what we think is a very vigorous program at home to restore price stability and restore the productivity of the American economy and in the long term this, too, is not - 8 only beneficial, it's essential to a lasting adjustment. Indeed, I think the prospects for the American economy, considering both the growth prospects and the price prospects together are as favorable or more favorable than any other industrialized country at this time and that is the best possible foundation for working through this problem over a period of time. Given that background from the standpoint of the United States, I think we recognize that in this area problems are inherently not utilateral, but multilateral. Our deficits are someone else's surpluses and vise versa and when we adjust others must adjust. I think that's inherent in this kind of problem and it's neither a mystery to you nor a surprise to you for me to make the observation that we have a large deficit and Japan has a very large surplus, and that as one considers this adjustment process without implying any theoretical theory of responsibility, the adjustment has to corne in both directions, so to speak. Now the same comments I made about taking time (in applicatio to our deficit) I think are relevent to looking at the same process from the other direction and looking at surpluses. Cer- tainly, in allowing for the time necessary when one looks at this process, as our deficit disappears the surpluses must disappear. Otherwise the deficit won't disappear. I think there is a recognition of that, certainly, among the officials and others I have talked to in Japan. - 9 - Now you're here in Japan in a situation in which domestic business trends, a slower growth pattern than you have been used to may, at this time, be aggravating the external surplus. I suppose I could only share the view that I have heard and seen expressed within Japan that both the more rapid expansion of the Japanese economy and a direction of your resources in the direction of fundamentally improving the quality of life of the Japanese citizen are fundamentally the medicines that are of assistance and very important assistance in restoring an external equilibrium. And I don't think this should at all be put in the context of sacrifice. Here it's a question of, as I say, improving the quality of life. I would like to think that increased imports to a significant extent could Dnprove the quality of life and at the same time make ari adjustment, make a contribution to this adjustment process which I think is absolutely necessary if looking at it from the standpoint of the United States, if the United States is going to be able to make the adjustment. It is necessarily a mutual process. I would summarize SDnply by saying I think this adjustment has to be made and it's in everybody's interest that it be made to the maximum extent possible by outward-looking, liberal policies that are in the joint interest. QUESTION: You mentioned that fundamental reforms are going to take some time before it comes about, if it does. - 10 In the inter~, what does the United States plan to do to maintain confidence with the doDar in foreign exchange markets and to prevent the type of speculations flurries and other unrest that we've seen recently, and what should countries like Japan and Europe do also to contribute to this effort? ANSWER: I think without question, the central and fundamental point here must be the performance of the U.S. economy itself and the basic adjustment process of our balance of payments. This situation will be as stable and as confidence- inspiring as our performance on prices, our performance in getting a vigorous but non-inflationery recovery of the American economy and making steady progress towards correcting that underlying balance of payments deficit. Now without that no financial manipulation, no financial gtmmicks, no financial mechanisms are going to insure: stability. Because this is the basic underlying force at work and to the extent that that adjust: ment process is speeded, facilitated by the actions of other countries, that's the best possible fundamental medicine towards maintaining the calm and stability of financial markets. I would say, further, as the situation is better understood, as the implications of the Smithsonian Agreement are better under stood, we have seen what I've called elsewhere a kind of creeping confidence returning, I t~ink, to financial markets. And I think if the fundamentals are working in the right direction, we can expect that to continue and if the fundamentals aren't working in the right direction, we're going to have difficulties. - 11 - And we shouldn't get our eyes diverted from those very fundamental factors. QUESTION: Earlier in talking about what might be done with respect to the international monetary regUne and reform of the system, you said that it was conceivable that a number of ~pproaches might be tried with respect to a forum for such discussion. I wonder if you could tell us, in your discussions with representatives of forums. other countries, of these possible Have there been any that you have eliminated as being not useful? Second, that you're coming to Japan, in talking with high-ranking officials of the government of Japan, and I ask the same question: ANSWER: it's ~portant have there been any you've elUninated? Let me answer that question this way. We think that a forum have a fair representation of the world's economic interests. That means among other things that the interest of the developing countries have to be taken into account. We think it's ~portant that the forum not be too large because then it becomes difficult to manage as a negotiating forum. We think it's important that we don't treat the monetary issues in isolation from issues of trade, of issues of tax policy that inevitably affect the international environment, inevitably affect the shape of the world economic order. - 12 - If any existing forum met adequately all those criteria, I probably wouldn't be in Japan today, and we wouldn't have to conduct these discussions, because we could just take the existing forum. I think by ~p1ication meets adequately all these criteria. no existing forum At the same time I don't think it's necessary to say any existing forum need be dismissed or dispanded. Maybe we have a combination of forums and proceed on that basis. and old. Maybe we proceed with some oombination of new And we're approaching the problem with all these possibilities in mind. I would think, judging upon what conver- sations I have had so far, that there is some agreement that no existing forum fully meets the job before us. But it's too early to say just what the appropriate conclusion is in terms of new forums. QUESTION: Is a further revaluation of the yen re1event at this point? ANSWER: I think we did the exchange rate bit at the Smithsonian and we're proceeding on that basis. QUESTION: What reaction did you get to this whole philosophical presentation about monetary and trade matters being linked? You've talked at great length about the whole thrust of your presentation. What is your ~pression of the reaction you've gotten from Japanese officials? ANSWER: Many developments in Japan exceed my expectations. I think the general, as you put it, and maybe I put it, philo.sophical point about the interrelationships is basically accepted .. - 13 I would say that, not only in my conversations here, but elsewhere. I think the logic of the link is recognized. Now when one gets into the details of how one implements this concept, there is room for discussion and question and this is precisely the kind of discussion and question that we must get mto and resolve so that we can proceed. But I would say I am encouraged by the recognition of the fact that there are linkages and it would not be satisfactory to proceed without recognition of these linkages. Let me make one thing clear here, in case there is any room for misunderstanding. When I talk about trade in this context I'm talking, in a sense, about the rules of the game for trade, the Most Favorited Nation Clause, the role of trade measures in the adjustment process. I'm not talking about speci- fic trade negotiations in terms of tariffs or quotas on particular products. That's a different matter. talking about here. That's not what I'm I'm talking about the organization of the world trading system. QUESTION: In considering a solution of it's balance of payments problem, is the United States willing to accept any sort of restraints or curbs on its overseas investments program (inaudible) insist on complete freedom for overseas investment? ANSWER: I think we've made clear and the President has made clear repeatedly in recent years that we look toward a kind of system with maximum freedom, not only for trade but for investment. n~rinn~l We don't like to think of building a new inter- financial system that is dependent upon controls on - 14 investment. We seek an equilibrium in the market. Now this is an issue that unquestionably will be discusse, during this whole process. Philosophies may differ on that score but I think our philosophy has been made plain; the spirit in which we approach this issue. I think there are practical questions here, too, particularly in the environment of the United States as to how effective and sustabnsb1e such controls are. They may be a weak reed to lean upon when more fundamental forces are not in equilibrium. Thank you gentlemen. I say again how much I appreciate being here and I think of how impressed I am about the vitality of the relationship between Japan and the United StatE and the extent of the common interest we have to go through some contentious periods in the economic arena that we have hac The Department 01 the TREASURY TelEPHONE W04·2041 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 FOR RELEASE AT 11 A.M. VIENNA TIME, APRIL 21, 1972 (5:00 AM WASHINGTON TIME) REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE CHARLS E. WALKER UNDER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES AND TEMPORARY ALTERNATE GOVERNOR FOR THE UNITED STATES BEFORE THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK VIENNA, AUSTRIA FRIDAY, APRIL 21, 1972 At the outset, let me express the appreciation of the United States delegation to the government of Austria for its gracious hospitality, and also for the excellent arrangements made for our meeting in this beautiful city. Secretary Connally, who has asked me to send greetings and express his regrets for being unable to attend, will be even more disappointed when I inform him of the wonderful hospitality. , . I would also like to welcome the delegation from the Kingdom of Tonga as a new member of the Asian Development Bank. The Asian Development Bank has now passed the mid-point of its 'first decade of operation. This transition point is an appropriate time for a hard look at what the Bank has achieved in these first, critical, five years, and also to chart the next five years. There is every reason to regard the progress of the Bank to date with great satisfaction. After what some considered a slow start, the Bank demonstrated in 1970 that it was capable of achieving a high level of lending. By lending in excess of $250 million in 1971 it has now shown that it can maintain such a lending level as well. For many borrowing countries, Asian Bank financing has corne to represent an impressive proportion of total financing received from external Sources, and in particular from multilateral sources. The testing phase of the Bank is likewise over with respect to the establishment of its credit standing in international markets. Borrowings are now approaching $200 million. C-293 2 The Bank thus is now a full-fledged member of that group of international institutions that successfully serve as intermediaries between private capital markets and the capital needs of developing countries. The way is now open for the Bank to carry out a selective borrowing strategy. It can and should aim at further diversification. And its borrowing decisions can and should be scaled to an appropriate level of liquidity in relation to loan operations. The Bank has matured organizationally as well as operationally -~ a fact well symbolized by its impending move into a new permanent headquarters building provided by the government of the Philippines. While consolidating its internal organization, the Bank has also been pioneering in the field of external relationships with borrowing member countries, apart from direct lending operations. Extensive assistance to members on project preparation since the Bank's early years is now bearing fruit, where otherwise the formidable task of project planning would have been an insuperablE obstacle. On a still broader plane, the Bank's sponsorship of regional surveys, such as the recently completed regional transportation survey, should provide further guideposts to usefuJ areas of operation by the Bank in the future. With the initial phase of "the Bank's operations now safely behind, I believe the consensus is that the Asian Development Bank is fulfilling ·the hopes held by its founders in 1965 and 1966. It is here; it is operating well; it is now an important factor in Asian development. It has enjoyed the support of the United States since its inception. Last month President Nixon signed legislation authorizing a U. S. contribution of $100 million to the Bank's special funds supplementing the original U. S. subscription of $200 million to the ordinary capital of the Bank. An appropriation request for funds in implementation of this authorization is now before the Congress. Once Congress has acted on this request, we shall then be in a position to look further at the ordinary capital needs of the Bank. It is my firm hope that the Bank will continue to enjoy the full support of the United States. I believe that it will. At the same time it is always necessary -- particularly for me as I view the scene from my perspective in the Treasury -to be keenly aware of the many factors that bear on our support for economic development overseas, and on the way in which that support can be expressed. 3 Let me share with you some of the things that we must take into account. Most obviously, the strength and direction of our domestic economic growth will always be an important factor in our ability to provide resources for external assistance. The United States economic picture is now very bright. We are expanding in a balanced and sustainable pattern. The official expectation is that the U. S. economy will grow bv $100 billion this year. I personally feel that we will exceed the $100 billion goal. At the same time we are making progress in the battle against inflation. We anticipated a bulge in the battle against inflation. We anticipated a bulge in the economic indicators of price levels following the 90-day freeze on prices and wages. We have had the bulge. However, it is significant to note that the industrial commodities component of our wholesale price index -- the most meaningful current indicator of price behavior rose by .3 percent in March which was only half the increase registered in the three preceding months. We will continue to take whatever steps are necessary to dampen inflationary expectation. As the economy grows and we return to a more stable pricing system, unemployment will drop. Since the middle of 1971 the United States has increased employment by close to 2-1/2 million jobs. That is a remarkable performance. Yet, because of the rapid growth of our labor force, the unemployment rate has remained at unacceptably high levels. We expect our unemployment rate to drop to 5 percent by the end of this year. In short, the outlook for the U. S. economy is very good. We are expanding .. We are winning the fight against inflation. And we will reduce the level of unemployment. Even if our most optimistic expectations are fulfilled, however, it should be clear that requests for foreign assistance funds, including those for international institutions; will be competing against domestic needs that cannot be deferred. There is, too, a sharply heightened feeling in the United States today that the economic interests of our country have not been given sufficient weight in international policy" making. What follows from this is that financial and other burdens traditionally accepted without question by the United States can no longer be automatically accepted on that basis. The new international economic environment is radically different from the familiar "post war period" that must now be regarded as definitively ended. Now, the United States is-compelled to weigh its actions in terms of the benefits and the burdens that will result, as we presume others have done and still do. Some examples of the way these broad factors relate to the international financial institutions come readily to mind. 4 Tne United States clearly favors an international trade and payments system that provides maximum freedom in the interchange of goods, services and investment capital. Ne have accepted the premises on ~hich regional financial institutions were brought into being in the belief that our larger goals could be served thereby. As a regional institution, the Asian Bank is in a position to encourage an outward-looking constructive regional spirit that is fully consistent with the world system toward which I hope we are all striving. To the extent the Bank's activities are oriented in this direction, they serve as a positive factor in the total equation of our foreign assistance effort. Likewise, the support of the business community in the United States is an important component of what ultimately emerges as the political will to support overseas development. Th':"s is) I am SU.l.~e, true of other donor countries as ~vell. I think there is a special responsibility on the part of international institutions to ensure that the benefits of the business generat~d by the development process do not accrue disproportionately to some while the burdens fall disproportionately on others. The problems involved here are as varied as the mix of goods and services that go into a development project. But whether they involve tariffs, or bidding procedures, or contractor qualifications requirements, or any other such factor, they are surely capable of solution -- if the fundamentaJ approach is one of achieving absolute fairness among supplier nations. Yesterday the distinguished President of the Bank noted with g~od reason that in 1971 " ... the spectre of protectionism ·,:as ralsed after 30 years of restless slumber ... " I must be frank to state that such forces are especially strong among organized lajor grou~s in the United States. These forces have recently been manifested in the introduction of o~~ibus .trade legislation which, if enacted, would turn the clock back many years and surely damage severely the interests of all Free World nations. 5 Following President Nixon's announcement of new economic policies last August, and related to international negotiations that then ensued, many observers both in the United States and abroad attributed similar protectionist sentiment to the Nixon administration. I categorically deny that this is true. It is a mistake to identify a fir~ resolve to achieve fairness in international trade with protectionism. To a man, the policymakers in the Nixon administration are strongly dedicated to liberal and Sxpanding multilateral trade, with minimum hindrances. B~t the simple fact is that, to many U.S. working men, my country's trade deficit appears, rightly or wrongly, to translate into export of jobs. This is one fundamental reason for the spreading protectionist sentiment in the United States. President Nixon and his policymakers are therefore confronted with a difficult challenge to the exercise of political statesmanship--defined as the act of making possible what is indeed necessary. In this instance, the absolute necessity is to first blunt and then turn back domestic pressures toward economic isolation in the United States, and to do so through actions which will expand rather than contract world trade. You can be sure that this approach lies at the very heart of the international thrust of the New Economic Policy. In retrospect, it is quite clear that, as we always intended, the import surcharge was a temporary means of protecting our position while achieving by other means, including a successful exchange rate realignment, a strengthening of the U.S. balance of payments position, which is surely in everyone's interest. And you can also be sure that in continuing negotiations in the inseparable fields of trade and money we shall strive for solutions that will contribute to the rising standards of living which grow out of truly liberal trading relationships. Mr. Chairman, it is one of the hallmarks of President 'Watanabe's distinguished guidance of the affairs of the Bank that he looks to the future. I would like to offer some ideas for the future that seem to us worthy of attention by the Bank as it continues to serve the development needs of Asia. First, the requirements for basic infrastructure in many of the countries of the region remain great and must, in the nature of development assistance, absorb a substantial amount of funds. The Bank must scrutinize its activities carefully, however, to ensure that appropriate consideration is also given 6 to lending for such purposes as education, and credit and other facilities for small farmers. Second, it is clear that environmental problems are not confined to the developed countries. The cessation of growth cannot be the solution for such problems, either for developed or developing countries. I doubt that the Bank's resources permit it to playa significant role in regard to existing industrial pollution problems, but the Bank can certainly insist in connection with its lending that the environment not be further impaired. Third, as I noted earlier, the Bank is moving toward the role of principal international lender in many countries of the region. With this role will come new responsibilities. For example, the Bank will have to go beyond consideration of the economics of the particular project or sector and give far greater consideration to the economic policy and performance of the borrowing country itself -- ensuring while doing so that there is full coordination with other international lending agencles. And there is as well the need to make further progress toward equipping the Bank with a means for systematically and independently appraising the effectiveness of its operations. Modern program evaluation techniques are a management tool of proven utility. The precise way to do this is less important than the resolve to establish it at an early date. Mr. Chairman, the Bank's record in the past has been commendable. Its agenda for the future is a full one. Meeting the challenges facing it will require great energy on the part of its management, as well as continuing faith by all of us in what cooperative international action can accomplish. Let this annual meeting serve as an occasion for the renewal of that faith. - 0 - The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 TelEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 21, 1972 WARREN F. BRECHT IS NAMED ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF TREASURY FOR ADMINISTRATION Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally today announced the appointment of Warren F. Brecht to be Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Administration. He succeeds Ernest C. Betts, Jr., who resigned from the Treasury post earlier this year. Mr. Brecht, 39, has been Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Management and Budget since last July. In his Treasury position Mr. Brecht will direct the Department's administrative functions including personnel, budget and finance, audit, management and organization, planning and program evaluation, administrative programs, and central services. Prior to his Interior Department appointment, Mr. Brecht had been a principal with Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., a New York-based international public accounting and consulting firm. His home was in Darien, Connecticut. Between 1965 and 1969 he had been Partner in Charge of Administration. for Peat, Marwick, Livingston & Co. of Boston, Massachusetts. During 1961, when associated with Management Systems Corporation of Cambridge, Massachusetts, Mr. Brecht was a member of the original project team that designed the cost system for the Navy Polaris p'roj ect. A native of Detroit, Michigan, Mr. Brecht is a graduate of DePauw University, where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. He holds a Master's Degree in Business Administration from Harvard Business School where he was graduated with distinction. C-294 (OVER) - 2 - During the 1960's, Mr. Brecht resided in Lexington, Massachusetts, and was active in church and community affairs. From 1955 to 1957, he served as an Air Force officer assigned to the Headquarters, Air Materiel Command. Mr. Brecht resides in Rockville, Maryland, with his wife, the former Joyce Southard of Toledo, Ohio, and their four chi1dren--Amy, Stephen, David, and Peter. 000 1 1 THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 2 3 REMARKS OF 4 HONORABLE JOHN B. CONNALLY, 5 SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 6 BEFORE THE 7 FOR'I' WORTH BAR ASSOCIATION 8 DINNER HONORABLE JUSTICE CALVERT 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 April 14, 1972 Fort Worth, Texas 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 [This transcript was prepared from a tape recording.] 2 1 .. MR. KELLY President Bill Dean, Chief 2 Justice Calvert, distinguished members of the Supreme Court, ~ Lieutenant Governor Ben Barnes, Attorney General Crawford 4 Mardon, Senator Wayne Connally, other honored guests, ladies 5 and gentlemen. There is one facet of Secretary Connally's multi- 6 ? talented personality that has thus far failed to receive proper 8 recognition. 9 of his favorite sports is golf and, considering the fact he He is, believe it or not, quite an athlete. One 10 only gets to playa few times a year, he is pretty good at it. 11 He hits quite a long ball off the tee, but he has been known 12 to hook it occasionally. Last New Year's Day the Secretary was kind enough to 13 14 invite me for a round of golf. 15 up as the Secretary's opponent and my partner, a weak pluyer 16 to begin with, turned out to be, of all people, the Trea3urer 17 of the Democratic National Committee. 18 assigned one caddie and, as you would naturally expect, lIe was 19 considerably more attentive to the Secretary than the rest of 20 us. 21 As luck would have it, I wound The foursome was One thing occurred during the course of play t1at 22 struck us as rather odd. The Secretary and the caddie were 23 frequently engaged in serious conversation, but we attributed 24 no special significance to it at the time. 25 close and everything was at stake on the last hole. The match was The 3 1 finishing hole in this particular course was a long par five, 2 with water on the left of the fairway. in part by a large billowing palm tree. The water was shielded My partner and I 4 managed to get off the tee and into play on the last hole. 5 The Secretary then stepped up to hit. 6 look that has become so familiar to 7 world, he took a mighty swing. 8 Sure With that tenacious econom~.sts throughout the enough, the ball went towering to the right, 9 but then it began to hook 10 trying desperately to muffle a laugh, said to me, "I think 11 the Secretary is in the water." 12 partner's f,indings, having thought I saw the ripples caused a~d come back left. My partner, I quickly confirmed my I 13 by the explosion of the ball hitting the water. 14 We then quickly drove to our own balls, still'trying 15 to conceal from the Secretary our pleasure in his seeming 16 dilemma. 17 standing beside this large billowing palm tree and pointing up 18 into it. 19 then proceeded to drop a ball squarely in the middle of the 20 fairway. 21 Suddenly, as we looked around, the Secret.ary was His caddie began to nod his head vigorously anj My partner and I quickly drove over and discr€.e'tly 22 inquired what the problem seemed to be. The caddie promptly 23 informed us that the Secretary's ball was lodged in the top 24 of the palm tree and that under the winner rules of this 25 course the Secretary was entitled to a free or unpenalized 4 o o o 1 drop. 2 any further questions. The Secretary then glared at us and asked if there were ~ •• ~ N o N •G Realizing the improvidence of appeal, we -agreed that ~ w •Co 4 it was, after all, a very good rule indeed. 5 then proceeded to par the hole but still shaking with this 6 unforeseen turn of events, and my partner and I each had 7 double bogies and we lost the match. ~ 8 The Secretary The next morning, bright and early, my partner carne 9 running into my room and asked me if I remembered those serious 10 conversations that had taken place between the Secretary and 11 the caddie in the previous day's match. 12 page 74 of the Los Angeles Times, and down at the bottom of the 13 page, in small print, there was a little story under the 14 following caption, and I quote: 15 Local Caddie Extension of Time to Pay Federal Income Taxes." He then handed me J ~ ( L ~ C ~ ( ~ "Treasury Department Grants 16 [Laughter, applmlse.] 17 Mr. Secretary, for the sake of the international 18 press that follows you around, J. should point out that I did 19 take certain minor liberties with that story. ~ o o o N 20 Ladies and gentlemen, 1 proudly present to you the U a t o 21 former Governor of Texas, the fc·rmer Secretary of the Navy, 22 the Secretary of the Treasury of the united States, an 23 advisor, counserlor and friend of three Presidents, a business- 24 man and lawyer of distinction and achievement, and a man who ; .• ~ c ~ w ~ , ~ I ~ II 25 has demonstrated to the world his capacity to occupy any office: I I: I 5 0 0 0 G •• II 1 2 N of public trust in this land, one of the great Texans of all ,i, Ii; I times, John Connally. ,! !i 0 N •• ~ ,• 0 ;) 4 6 Thank you very much. :1 Please be I seated. I Dr. Mardon, Chief Justice Calverl:, Chairman Dean, 7 Mr. Moore, Miss Calvert, other distinguished head table 8 guests, and Mr. Kelly. 9 , i SECRETARY CONNALLY: f 5 ,:1 [Applause. ] II , ! ; I\ [Laughter. ] 10 I trust that you realize that the real significance 11 of that story was in one short slurred sentence, in which Mr. 12 Kelly informed this distinguished audience that he and his 13 partner on the last hole remained in play. 14 was a rather significant change from their past behavior. J ( L I assure you that ~ a t ( ~ 15 [Laughter.] 16 Now, Dee, if you had told them that I stclrted to the 17 left and wound up on the right, it might have been a believable 18 story, but very few in this audience will believe the ccntrary, 19 that I started out to the right and veer left. (I) o o o 20 [Laughter, applause.] c· 21 Judge Walker, I do indeed bring you glad ·• 22 about your income taxes. 23 aer permitted to claim an additional exemption, and for those .~·• 24 of us our age that is something. ,..o 25 an additional exemption this year, and if you don't really know I III o ci o 0E :: tidi~gs Be sure to file your W-4 form. You ~ ~ iii ;, · [ But you are entitled to claim. II :\ I: I' 6 0 0 0 1 how to fill out your form, we have assigned 15,000 Internal 2 Revenue Agents throughout the Nation to help the less gifted ;) in advice and assistance in the preparation of their forms, 4 so I know it will bring indeed great tidings to many here 5 tonight. I ~ • ~ II! N 0 N •• ~ •t Q f 6 :1 I I Mr. Chairman, it is very obvious to me that you haven ~,d 7 at least in recent days sought public office._ Perhaps you 8 never intend to. j II 1 ~ Your behavior would indicate such. 9 [Laughter. ] 10 But if I may be privileged to do so, I would like to 11 make amends for an oversight or two on your part, without being 12 unduly critical. , 13 in which we live and the movements that are now sweeping the 0 14 country, but because I have always believed -- and if I hadn't 15 thought of it myself, I assure you Nellie would have planted 16 the thought -- that very few of us, from Judge Calvert on 17 down, ever accomplished much without the undying devotion and 18 help of our wonderful wives. 19 of the justices who are here tonight, and Martha Greenhjll, 20 will you please stand. And I don't do this just because of the times J J ( L ' c ( ~ And I want to introduce f') 0 0 0 N Ii ci 21 [Applause.] 22 And Mrs. Denton, will you please stand. 23 [Applause ] .· 24 And Mrs. Sears McGee, will you please stand. .. 25 [Applause. ] c E 0\ ! c •• ~ ~ ui ; I ~ •• ~ 0 " i th~ wives 7 o , o 1 And Mrs. Torn Reevely. 2 [Applause. ] o f f II A N I o N ,• :5 ~ •ot And Mrs. Price Daniel . Mrs. Jean Daniel, the former ,I i I 4 K II First Lady of Texas. 5 [Laughter. ] 6 Zollie, I believe I am correct, your wife is not with 7 you b)night. Is that correct? I I I 1 II I 8 , • I believe the other wives of the justices have been 9 introduced and I want you to know that a few of us are aware 10 of your presence, and I don't want the press to misunderstand 11 this in any sense. 12 about Mr. Dean not having sought nor intending to seek public 13 office does not in any way -- should be interpreted as a 14 reflection of my own plans, one way or the other. The mere fact that I made the comment J ( ~ D l ( ~ 15 [Laughter. ] 16 17 18 19 for me, a personal privilege for me to be here, to pay tribute 20 not only to him but to his lovely wife, because they have been 21 a magnificent team in all of their endeavors. 1'1 o o ~ 22 Few men, I think, have ever had a greater influence 23 on me than the Chief Justice whom we honor tonight, in my ..• 24 formative years. .. " 25 are a year or two older than I am and you did start a ; ~ ~ ~ o And forgive me, Mr. Chief Justice, but you I \ 8 0 0 0 ,• 1 distinguished career at a very early age. But in my formative n 2 years, the Chief Justice was already embarked on a distinguishe1i .) career, in the law, as Speaker of the House, where he rendered 4 great service, where he manifested great courage, where he 5 demonstrated a love of the state, of this Nation, and where he 6 time and again exhibited the courage to bespeak that devotion 7 and that courage. N 0 N •• « ~ •0t .. Ii II ~ f Ii I I II Ij I,I ~ Courage I think has been the hallmark of his long 8 9 life and his long and productive life, because he has always, 10 as Judge Walker said a moment ago, he has had the inner 11 strength, he has had the 12 to do what he thought was right, without really stopping to 13 pause and think about the costs or whether it was going to be 14 popular or whether it was going to be unpopular. confidence~ \ he .has had the serenity J ~ ~. I ~ ( ~ 15 And in the final analysis I don't know of a greater 16 tribute that you can pay a man in public life than to say that 17 about him, because indeed his life has been an example for all I ,I 18 to follc)w. It has been dedicated, all of his efforts, all of 19 his work, his opinions are scholarly opinions, yet they are 20 not only legalistically scholarly, they are always tempered 21 with a I!ompassion and a concern, always reflecting a sense of 22 tolerance, of understanding, of reason, good sense, and good ~ 23 judgment. ~ •·• ·•• l 24 Calvert's life. ,.. 25 ~ 0 c 0 N Ii ci c· 0 ; E c ·• ~ ~ Q And those things have all been a part of Bob And so for one who has always admired him, for one I· ,I 9 o o o 1 who has tried to learn by his actions and his behavior and his 2 example, I count it a great personal privilege to be here on ~ •• ~ N o N • a• ,• this podium this evening, because he manifests and symbolizes ~ o & 4 the strength of this democracy. 5 in this land of free men and free \'mmen. 6 started in the most humble beginnings, witt,out the advantages 7 that many today think they must insist 8 He symbolizes all its good Here is one who upon~ But he was aware of what this country was, of the 9 opportunities that it afforded. He had a determination to use 10 his God given talents to develop them to their fullest, not 11 just to use them for his own selfish~urposes but to try to 12 use them for the benefit of others, to try to see that others 13 might have the opportunity that had been his. 14 indeed a man among men, because he has done more with less 15 opportunity than so many of us have ever done, and he 16 symbolizes again the strength of \'lhat this American democracy 17 real.ly is. J J ( , L o ~ And he is ~ 18 And in these turbulent times of the 1970's, let me 19 tell you that I think'it is well that we pause and that we 20 look at those like Robert W. Calvert who sit on this platform 21 tonight, and that we think for a moment. M o o o N Ii d "o ;, 22 [Applause. ] Iii 23 And look at these other distinguished judges. ., 24 known many of them. ,..o 25 as much about anyone of them, about Roy Walker and his lovely ~ • , ~ ~ ~ ~ I know all of them. I have I could say almost IIi I II :\ II 10 o o 1 wife, Joe Greenhill and his, Jim Denton, Sears McGee, Tom 2 Reevely, Governor Price Daniel, who has a unique career among o ~ •• ~ ~ N o N •• all the men who ever served this state. ~ ,o• No man to my 4 knowledge, and I am sure I am right, ever served before as 5 Speaker of the House, Attorney General, United states Senator, 6 three times Governor, and now Justice of the Supreme Court. [ 7 8 I This is I Texas~ the type of people you have on the Supreme Court of Zollie Stakely, the former justices that you have seen 9 introduced, Gordon Simpson, Jim Hart, and the others, Bob 10 Harwood, Jim Hamilton, Abner !'-1cCall, Judge Culver -- all men 11 of distinguished professional capacity butt more than that, 12 men of rare ability, men of integrity, men of honesty, men of 13 concern, men who are willing to give of themselves in order 14 that they might expand opportunities for people and to try to 15 preserve and to protect this democracy that permitted them to 16 flourish and their talents to be recognized. J ~ ~ f o ~ J 1'7 I think it is fair to say that today we are a 18 troublej Nation, we are a troubled world. 19 that this is the first and the only period of time in which 20 this Nation has been troubled or when this state has been 21 uncertain about its own future. 22 But I am not sure 'I'here are times in the affairs of all ages, of all , . ~ 23 generat ;ons, and of all centurl.'es when there are doubts, when 24 there a:e uncertainties, when there is instability, when there 25 is unrest, when there have been great changes in the structure w ..o t I! I I 1 j i 1 11 0 0 0 , •• ~ 1 of society, in the political system, in the economic system, 2 the social structure, and even the religious institutions that 3 men use. 4 is such unrest in this Nation now. N 0 N • (• And we are in such a period of time, because there ~ • ~ 0 ~ 5 All of our systems are under attack. Our political 6 systems are. 7 questioned, their honor and their integrity is being whispered 8 about when there is not one shred of evidence to support it. 9 You have men in this hall tonight who have been introduced, 10 the distinguished Attorney General, the Lieutenant Governor 11 of the state who have been indeed questioned in terms of their 12 own moral standards and their own ethics and their own honesty 13 and their integrity. Those who serve in public office are being J ~ ( , L a r ( 14 Why? Because they happen to serve in a time and a l 15 place where indeed there was wrongdoing. 16 has been indeed ferreted out, it has been punished, and yet 17 there are those in this society today who would smear all 18 with a brush of guilt by association. 19 .• There are those not only in this But that wrongdoing sta~e but throughout 20 this Nation who go from city to city to try to create unrest, 21 who try to create questions, who try to create suspicions and 22 disturbances, and even anger in the minds of the people against 23 those who would serve them in political office and in public 24 life at all levels of government. 25 nothing more dangerous can be done in this Nation than to try i ~ And I submit to you that I I j I 12 o o 1 to destroy the confidence of the American people in this 2 political system, because if indeed -- o ~ •• /I ~ N o N •• ~ 3 [Applause. ] 4 If indeed this political system does not enjoy the ~ 5 confidence of the American people, then I assure you that the 6 democracy of the united States says are nunbered. 7 is to follow it? 8 And what If indeed this democracy does not survive, and it 9 cannot survive without public confidence, if it does not sur- 10 vive, what then? 11 Is it enough just to say that all of you who hold 12 public office are a bunch of crooks? Is it enough to say that 13 those ",rho would serve in public office ,have no regard for the 14 people of this country, that they have no honor, that they 15 have no integrity, that they have no compassion or concern for 16 the people whom they purportedly serve? J ~ ( l , o t, ( ~ 17 Is it enough just to say that? 18 destructive force in this country? 19 down? 20 discriminating? 21 class? Is it enough to be a Is it enough just to tear Do we really realize what we are doing, without being I') o o o ~ Can we indict a people? Can we indict a o d co ; c c ·• I don't know of any profession in which there are 22 ~ ~ ~ ·. 23 not some who are guilty of indiscretions, at times even mal- 24 feasance. 25 A pastor or treasurer of a church or synagogue will depart with It is true in the ministry. You read about it often~ • ~ a " I I 13 o o o 1 all the funds. • 2 to destroy a banking system because of it. ,• :3 occasionally engage in wrongdoing, but we ought not to destroy • 4 a democracy because of it. 5 what we do. ~ ~ Banks occasionally embezzle, but we ought not Politicians N o N ~ C o f We ought to be discriminating in 6 [Applause.] 7 We should be intelligent enough to distinguish right 8 from ,.,rong, and that is what Bob Calvert has always done. 9 has al.ways distinguished between right and wrong. 10 has to make a decision, somebody has to decide, somebody has 11 to stand up and have courage. Somebody Today our educational systems are under attack. 12 He The J J : •o ~ ~sed 13 courts say that we can't sustain them financially as we 14 to. 15 that yO'll can't let the children go to the schools of their IG choice, they have to be bused, and that is not a very popular I? decision. The property tax is unconstitutional. other courts say ~ 18 There are other questions raised about the educationa 19 system and its abilities to survive. The economic system of 20 this country is certainly under question. 21 media 22 of ours is evil, that business is inherently so, that it has 23 no concern for people, that it . 24 ment, that these soulless corporations are created for the ..o 25 purpose of exploiting and eroding and destroying this land and ~ o ~ Yj\.1 Every day in every hear nothing but the fact that this economic system has.~o concern for its environ- ~ ii: If 14 0 0 0 ~ ~ ~ 1 all that is bountiful and beautiful in it. 2 But it isn't just the economic system, the business N 0 N • a .) system, and the business institutions that are under attack • 4 The religious system certainly is, all the faiths, the 5 Protestants, the Jews, the Catholics. 6 They are all in revolution. 7 herent principles in which we all believe. I w c• 0 [ 8 They are all in revolt. They are all questioning the inwith what results? There are times when we all think that somehow, 9 somewhere, without assuredly any divine assistance, that we 10 have been endowed with infinite wisdom to be able to perceive 11 all of the problems that others have-been blinded to, that we 12 alone have the courage to speak of them, and that in our ~ 13 generation we are going to cure the ills of mankind. l 14 is an intellectual arrogance without parallel in the history 15 of this Nation, and it is an intellectual arrogance that r6 surely contains the seeds of destruction of a democracy, becaus 17 we are not that wise. J J •a ( And this ~ We are the product of a long line of men and women 18 19 in all areas of this world who have for generation after 20 generation, for century after century, engaged /I) o o o ~ U ci co . ~n . I every conce1V1 1 21 able type of experiement, in developing a system of society ; ,c ~ ~ iii I 22 where people can live in a compatible atmosphere, one with 23 another. .• 24 ,..o 25 w I ~ There have been vast changes throughout the centuries in that type of system, and there will be more changes in that 15 o o o 1 type of system. 2 system which we know in this land. And there will be vast changes perhaps in the ~ •• ~ ;; We shortly ...till celebrate o ,, ~ the 200th Anniversary of the creation and the founding of ~ ,o• 4 this system. 5 perspective, this is -- we are youngsters. 6 a very short peritd of time. 7 tion counts its time and its age. And yet when we look at it, to put it into & 8 We have been here We are youngsters, as civiliza- We have done very little really in terms of what 9 opportunities we have to do. You have but to go to other 10 countires around the world. 11 the Sahara. 12 you can see the great creations, the great architectural 13 inventi V'eness of a Ramses II, of the Pharos of Egypt, you can 14 go into the Garden of Eden, as we knmV' it, the Valley of the 15 Mesopotamian, you can see the remains of the canals and the 16 irrigation system that 1,500 years before Christ were so 17 efficient, so productive ttlat it sustained 17 million people 18 and fed them well. You can go and visit the sands of You can visit the upper reaches of the Nile. And .I J ~ ~ o ~ ( ~ .,o o o N Ii ci t o 19 . And then you consider that because those people be- 20 came peaceful in their pursuits, because they became satisfied 21 with their affluence that they':hought their prosperity and 22 their well-being was never-ending. 23 of the north and overran them. 24 the irrigation system nor what it meant, so they were permitted 25 to be destroyed and clogged, and not in 3,500 years have those ; ,c ~ ~ vi And the Nomads came out The-Nomads didn't understand ; ·• ~ ~ •• ~ .o • 16 c c c ~ 4 4 ~ 1 same lands ever been able to sustain more than three million 2 people since. N c N ,• 3 Now, it may be that we have an inevitable destiny to 4 4 survive, but I wouldn't be willing to steak everything on it 5 unless we have men and women of courage, men and women of 6 capacity, men like Bob Calvert, who gave his whole life, all 7 of his productive life, not to garner great riches, not to 8 amass material affluance, but to lead a productive, creative, 9 constructive life, to leave an influence, to leave deep prints 10 in the sands of time in his profession, and in the history of 11 this democracy, in the halls of the legislature, and in the 12 books that record the decisions of the courts. 13 Calvert will long remain as a name that all aspiring young 14 professionals can utter with awe, that all of us can emulate 15 with great satisfaction, that all of us can admire with great 16 gratitude, because he cont:ributed, he gave. Robert w. J ~ ~ ~ ~ ( ~ 17 He was not a destructive force, he was a creative He un~erstood 18 force. that in this democracy that each has to 19 do his part, that none can really run from the role of respon- 20 sibility or the duties that he has as a citizen, because he co 21 can't shirk it. .• 22 w 23 It can only survive with those who understand that each of us 24 owes 25 to enlarge, and to enrich the freedoms, the freedoms of man, ~ o o o ~ U ri Q c c This society cannot survive populated by shirkers. ~ ~ ; ~ a duty and an obligation to build, to expand, to create, 17 0 0 0 1 so that man's mind might forever generate more and more, so 2 that man's genius can create. ~ •• ~ ~ N 0 , • ~ •,0 N 3 We sometimes get a bit blaze, it seems to me. 4 little over ten years ago, the President of the united States 5 said in the decade of the sixties we will go to the moon, and 6 it was an incredible unbelievable thought, but \.;e did. ? went to the moon. 8 even to the point where the American people began to bE! bored 9 by landing men on the moon. [ 10 , : •o A Ne We landed men on it, time and time again, How self-satisfied can \'Y'e be? How selfish can we 11 become? How unaware can we be that-in these changing times 12 that this economic system is going to evolve into sOI.1ething 13 different 'from what it is today, that this political system 14 surely will change, and that each of our rights and our 15 privileges may well be altered. J ~( ~ 16 But of one thing we can be sure, that if we do not 17 strive, each of us I day by day, protect-ing as best ''Ie rni::Jht, 18 preserving it as fully as we can, the privileges and rignts 19 which we have, through a judicial system that creates a Bob 20 Calvert, that permits a Bob Calvert to have such a profound 21 influence on this State and on this Nation. ,., o o o N Ii ci t o i> ,c ·• 22 If we don't contribute to that type of preservation, ~ 23 then surely we are all in trouble, and surely within a very 24 short span of time things will change. 25 tonight that every single one of you, whatever your feelings, ~ ~ . · . ~ o , And I submit to you 18 o o o 1 whatever your proclivities, whatever your ideologies, whatever 2 your personal choice, that you have a profound duty and obli- ~ •• ~ N o N •• ,•o gation to support this system of free men and free women, that ~ 4 you have a profound duty to talJ< and defend this system of 5 free men and free women, and you have a profound duty -- f 6 [Applause. ] 7 And you have a duty to point out its weaknesses, yes; 8 but you also, in all fairness and in a-l equity, need to put 9 into perspective that this system, with all of its weaknesses 10 and with all of its shortcomings, with all of its failings, 11 is a system that permits a Bob Calvert to be raised in an 12 orphan home and to become Chief Justice of the 13 of this great state, that this state is a system. Supren~e Court 14 [Applause.] 15 That this state does enjoy a system, that. this 16 American democracy is a civilization and a society of men and 17 women that has done more for more people, we have fed mO:L'e, 18 more fully, we have clothed more, more adequately, we ha'le 19 cared for more, more professionally, we have given assistance o ~ 20 to more, not only inour own land but around the world, $150 Ii ci C 21 billion in dollars alone, since World War II, to 22 and to rebuild nations which we helped destroy in times of 23 anger and war. I') o o o rehabil.~tate ; c S • ~ · 24 ~ • ~ ~ , 25 And is this wrong? this a decadent society? Is this a decadent system? Is I submit to you it was great, on a 19 0 0 0 ~ ~ ~ III 1 2 N recent sojourn with the President of the united states to a foreign land to see 200,000 people out on a cold morning with 0 N ~ • ;) ~ ,• 0 brooms in their hands sweeping the street. But I wouldn't 4 have liked to have been one of them, and I don't think you 5 would, either. [ 6 [Applause. ] 7 Now, it is great to see such discipline, it is grp.at 8 to see such discipline, but it is awesome to fear and to think 9 and to be aware of such regimentation. It was wonderful to see 10 it. 11 have read your history books. 12 dictatorship, one government of tyranny in all of the pages 13 of the recorded history of man where there wasn't discipline? It looked like a very orderly society, and it was. 14 You Can you point out to me one We are an undisciplined society, but we can't be a 15 wreckless society. And if we are going to be a sustainable 16 system af government, it has to be a government that recognizes 17 that we live under a system of laws and that, above all else, 18 we have to have a political system that permits freedoms to 19 flouriBh. 20 a jUdiciary that is unafraid, and Bob Calvert is a man 21 through)ut his long and distinguished career who has been a ·• 22 man committed to the enhancement of the society of which he iii 23 was a part, and he undertook each day to carry out his 24 responsibilities unafraid. And the very foundation of that political system is I') o o o r; rj o c o ; c c ~ ~ i ·• ··• ~ ~ ,.. a 25 Thank you very mnch. The Deportment of the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE EUGENE T. ROSSIDES ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY (ENFORCEMENT, TARIFF AND TRADE AFFAIRS, AND OPERATIONS) before the ROCHESTER SALES EXECUTIVES CLUB ROCHESTER CLUB, ROCHESTER, NEW YORK April 24, 1972 1:00 p.m. PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEW ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE DOCTRINE OF FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE president Nixon's New Economic Policy, announced on August 15, 1971, marked a watershed in world history, not just U. S. history. The President's actions marked the end of one era -- "the end of the post-war ·world" as Secretary Connally said last month -- and the dawn of a new era in international economic relationships. The President's goals were three -- to curb inflation, to generate jobs by stimulating responsible economic growth, and to strengthen the position of the United States in the international trade and financial community. Today, I shall talk primarily about the U. S. position in international trade -- a Doctrine of Fairness -- with special emphasis on Treasury's role and responsibilities in this area, and the need to perfect international organization and procedures for effective solutions of trade problems. Why Are We in a New Era? At the end of World War II, the United States was the wealthiest, most powerful nation on earth. A large part of the world was in ruins, physically, politically, and - 2 - economically, after the holocaust that it had just experienced The United States exhibited truly unselfish and generous leadership in an effort to bring these ravaged areas back to normal. We did this in our own long-range national interest but at considerable sacrifice. It made sense for the United States to do everything possible to assist both our former allies and enemies to regain their feet. And so, we literally showered U. S. dollars and expertise on these countries. The American taxpayer accepted the burden of the nearly $150 billion in economic and military aid that was made available over the past 25 years, for he understood the relationship between a prosperous world economy and his own well-being. But conditions have changed and we now find ourselves confronted with an entirely different picture. Although the United States is still the most important free worla power, it is no longer the only free world power~ Other nations are again in a position to challenge us economically and politically. The United States is nO"w one giant among several. The Long-Run Task What does this new era signify for the United States and the rest of the trading world? Essentially, the'long-run task facing the United States and the world community is the creation of an international economic system which, on the basis of mutual advantage, will stimulate international trade and freer competition, draw nations and people together, and thus form the basis for a lasting peace with prosperity. Progress Made Since August 15, 1971 In his policy role as Chief Economic Spokesman for the President, Secretary Connally has already sketched in broad outline form the new policies to be followed. The domestic and international fronts,which cannot be separated, have seen considerable progress in the eight months since August 15, 1971. - 3 On the domestic side, economists are virtually unanimous that activity is expanding vigorously. Industrial production rose strongly in March, the seventh consecutive monthly advance. The other two economic indicators for March presently available -- total employment and retail sales -- also showed strong gains. Employment rose by 620,000 to 81.2 million -- the largest gain for a month since mid-1967. These indicators are further evidence that the economy is in a strong expansionary phase. the international side, the Smithsonian Agreement of December 18, 1971, was a significant breakthrough and has given the new era a subs,tantial forward thrust. That agreement included a multilateral realignment of exchange rates, commitments to discuss more general reforms of the international monetary system, and commitments to begin discussions to reduce trade barriers, including some most harmful to the United States. For its part, the Unit'ed States agreed to recommend to the Congress that the price of gold in dollars be raised when progress had been made in trade liberalization. On On February 9, Secretary Connally transmitted to the Congress a draft bill providing for devaluation of the dollar by 8.57% to $38 per ounce of gold. In signing that bill into law on Monday, April 3, the president said that the basic significance of the Smithsonian Agreement and the legislation is: " ••• that it provides for continued cooperation among our allies and ourselves--and thus strengthens our unity--as we work toward an 'open world' based on a more balanced monetary system and a more equitable international trading environment." Simultaneously with the Smithsonian Agreement, commitments were made by some of our allies to assume a larger share of the costs of common defense. - 4 Substantive agreements have also been reached with the European Community and with Japan to remove or lower certain barriers against U. S. products and to support multilateral and comprehensive trade negotiations in 1973, meanwhile solving more immediate problems in 1972 through the GATT. The Administration will seek the necessary legislative authority for these comprehensive negotiations. Doctrine of Fairness in International Trade -Abroad and at Home Abroad These are some of the accomplishments to date on the international trade front. All of the United States' efforts in international discussions have been dedicated to one objective--the establishment of a Doctrine of Fairness in International Trade. The president and Secretary Connally have served notice that the United States is no longer going to compete with one hand behind its back. To compete fairly abroad, we must have fair access to the markets of Europe, Asia, South America, Africa, and the rest of the world. I do not mean to imply that the United States is expecting to obtain something for nothing. We recognize that some of our practices are regarded by other countries as discriminatory. But in our trade negotiations we do have a right to demand a fair bargain. We insist only on the right to compete fairly abroad. As Secretary Connally said in Munich last May: " ... no longer will the American people permit their government to engage in international actions in which the true long-run interests of the U. S. are not just as clearly recognized as those of the nations with which we deal." - 5 - The point he conveyed to all is that the United States can no longer stand by complacently when markets are closed to us or where the "rules of the game" seem to be rigged against us. When our foreign friends complained about the temporary 10% additional duty adopted as part of the President's new economic program, they did not mention in their complaints the barriers they maintain against U. S. exports to their countries. These barriers take various forms--quotas no longer justified by economic factors, discriminatory taxes such as progressive taxes on horsepower directed at the export of U. S. automobiles, discriminatory tariff arrangements such as the Common Market preferences and reverse preferences, which establish a lower tariff on the exports of Common Market members than on those of the U. S. and others into third markets, both in developing and developed countries. These barriers were not 'wiped out by the Smithsonian Agreement. Moreover, I regret to say that some new actions have been taken since the date of that agreement. For instance, the Netherlands has put a quota on electronic goods from Japan. That action has the effect of putting further pressure on our own market. We have a long way to go in order to achieve a fair break in international trade for American industry and agriculture. Since the post-war years, the United Kingdom has maintained quotas for balance of payments reasons on imports from the dollar area of fresh, frozen, and canned grapefruit, or~ge juice, and rum--this despite the fact that the balance of payments justification for these quotas has long since passed. Indeed, the British are now in balance of payments surplus, and removal of these quotas, which the United States has been seeking for over 20 years, is certainly long overdue. Is this fair trade? - 6 Similarly, France imposed quotas several years ago for balance of payments reasons on imports of semiconductors. Although the French authorities have liberalized these quotas over the years, an intricate licensing system inhibits our exporters from supplying the French market. The balance of payments justification for protection has long since ceased and this obstacle to trade should have been eliminated years ago. Is this fair trade? In the past few weeks, the European Community has instituted a new system of compensatory duties so as to contin{ to protect its domestic agricultural markets from more efficient foreign production in the face of the recent currency realignments. In so doing, the European Community did not hesitate to break the negotiated rates (to which all negotiating parties are supposedly bound) on some 40 million dollars' worth of trade. They did this despite the fact that it was a clear violation of the GATT. The United States has some interest in the EC's actions, for our cost of production for basic agricultural commodities approximates half of that in the Common Market. Is this fair trade? The Community's regulations have restricted Japanese imports to 6 percent of that country's overall exports-this in contrast to the 30 percent which Japan exports to the United States. By restrictions such as these, the Common Market has literally forced the Japanese to concentrate their export drive on the United States. Is this fair trade? Japan no\.;' has $17 billion in foreign assets reserves. We have approximately $12.5 billion. While the United States had a balance of payments deficit last year--and has had one for over 20 years--and our first trade deficit since l888--Japan hada trade surplus last year of 7.9 billion dollars, the highest in the world. This year's balance for them will be even larger since their exports are likely to run 20% above 1971. 3.2 billion dollars of Japan's trade surplus in 1971 was with the United States. - 7 - Many factors, in addition to U.S. policy, contributed to Japan's economic success. Japan, which was allowed to maintain quotas for balance of payments reasons when it entered GATT, still retains many of these quotas, this despite an economic recovery which is commonly referred to as the Japanese miracle. "Administrative guidance" by Japan which impedes our exports and focuses on their export drive to the U.S. is a central factor in Japan's economic success. Is this fair trade? We have heard from our good and valued neighbors to the north in great detail about the "unfairness" of the New Economic Policy from their standpoint. What our Canadian neighbors fail to mention, however, is that their basic balance of payments surplus has averaged 1.2 billion dollars annually over the last five years. What they also tend to overlook is that the patently onesided automobile agreement contributed to a swing of over 800 million dollars in our trade balance. While we impose no tariffs or barriers on Canadian exports of automobiles, Canada imposes a 15 percent tariff on individual purchases of U.s. automobiles. Although Canadian manufacturers may import American automobiles duty-free, this is only if they meet certain minimum Canadian production requirements. These provisions of the automobile agreement were intended as "temporary" safe~uards for our Canadian friends, which may have been appropriate at the time the agreement was negotiated. For the past three years we have been negotiating for the removal of these "temporary" safeguards, but to no avail . . . this despite Canada's continuing large balance of trade surplus with the United States -- a huge $1,880 million in 1971. Is this fair trade? Also, notwithstanding the balance of trade which is now so favorable to Canada, our friends to the north continue to be considerably less liberal than the United States in granting exemptions to returning tourists. Here again we have an example of a measure which might have been "temporarily" justified at the time it was introduced, but which is no longer supportable in the light of today's realities. Is this consistent with a Doctrine of Fairness? - 8 The Canadians likewise continue to insist on retaining other trade advantages which are a carryover from a bygone era when we were in a position to, and did, assist unstintingly our northern friends. Is this consistent with a Doctrine of Fairness? At Home--Treasury's Role in Combatting Unfair Trade Practices Against this backdrop, there are very positive measures this Administration has already taken at home to rectify our trade imbalance and protect jobs in the U.s. From the inception of President Nixon's Administration, the Treasury Department has vigorously attacked discriminatory pricing techniques of foreign exporters. Treasury and its Bureau of Customs have accelerated and expanded the use of statutes specifically designed to protect U.S. industry against unfair foreign competition. We have institutionalized the supervision of the administration of the Antidumping Act and the countervailing duty statute and other aspects of tariff and trade relations by setting up an Office of Tariff and Trade Affairs in the Office of the Secretary. The Antidumping Act is designed to prevent injurious international price discrimination--typically, selling in the U.s. market at prices lower than in the foreign home market. The countervailing duty statute is designed to counteract and prevent foreign subsidies on exports to the U.S. The Treasury, under this Administration, has rejuvenated what was largely a moribund Antidumping Statute. We have significantly increased actions under this statute in the past three years. We have eliminated loopholes. And we have expedited consideration of complaints from domestic manufacturers by adding manpower and streamlining procedures. - 9 - In short, Treasury is now administering the Antidumping Act more nearly in the manner intended by Congress. This is what industry has a right to expect. But more is needed. Perhaps, criticism from abroad had to be expected. But, the point is that these actions are taken and justified in defense of fair trade--and without a sense of fairness, the prospects for freer trade would be bleak. Now, we are studying possible refinements and expansions of the use of these measures which protect U.S. industry against unfair competition. In new proposed antidumping regulations which were published last week, we moved one step further in our plan to clarify and tighten further the procedures of the Antidumping Act. Amendments of our Antidumping Act and countervailing duty statute may be required to achieve freer and fairer competition in international trade. And, once the long-range adjustments of tariffs, quotas, and other barriers are accomplished, these same measures can serve to maintain the integrity of those agreements. International Reforms In analyzing what we can do to enable U. S. producers to compete more effectively under fair rules of international trade, we must of necessity examine closely the implementation of those rules and even question the nature of the rules themselves. We face a situation in which such basic GATT rules as most-favored-nation treatment are increasingly violated. We are also concerned that foreign dumping and subsidizing of exports to third countries have the effe.ct of freezing U.S. manufacturers out of these markets. Moreover, while we favor U. S. capital investment abroad on as liberal terms as our balance of payments allows, we cannot continue to permit U. S. capital to create jobs abroad if domestic U. S. manufacturers are prevented by discriminatory barriers from selling in these markets on equal terms. - 10 If the GATT itself proves unable to face up to the realities of today's world, and we hope that it can measure up to its responsibilities, we may have to give thought to other ways of meeting the needs. If we are to reach our goal of a bright new international future, the rules and procedures of the past must be adapted to the world of the 1970's. There is clearly a need for an international forum or forums in which the interrelationship of all the factors affecting international economic matters--monetary, tax, and trade--can be discussed, not piece-meal, but as part of a whole problem of economic health for all participating nations. secretary Connally, in his March 15 remarks, stressed the need to recognize such links in the international economy when approaching the issue of monetary reform. Indeed, the international discussions of last fall, following the president's declaration of his New Economic Policy, were successful in achieving the recognition of the interrelationship between international monetary and trade matters. Accordingly, the President placed in the hands of Secretary Connally, his Chief Economic Spokesman, the broad responsibility and negotiating authority to do the job. secretary Connally has commissioned Under Secretary Volcker to discuss with our principal trading partners the development of an appropriate forum or forums. Under Secretary Volcker has recently talked with his colleagues in Europe and Japan regarding this matter. Implementation Versus Policy-Making It has often been said, "Important as it is to make policy, it is even more important to implement it." - 11 - It could very ·well be that more forceful administration of the Antidumping Act and countervailing duty law in earlier years ·would have eased our problems today. I can well remember my confirmation hearing when each and every question of the Senate Finance Committee dealt with these two statutes and whether I intended to enforce them. For months thereafter, the same Senators were telling me, "You have those statutes, use them." Well, this Administration has used the Antidumping Act effectively, and as I mentioned, is reviewing the countervailing duty law. But, there are other aspects of implementing trade policy in day-to-day operations which strongly affect our international trade and our balance of payments. The main day-to-day operating bureau in the U. S. Government affecting international trade is the Bureau of Customs. Secretary Connally has directed that the trade and tariff aspects of that Bureau's operations be given the highest priority. This included not only the operating responsibilities of the Bureau of Customs in the area of antidumping and countervailing duty, but also its role in classification and valuation of imported merchandise, administration of quotas and marking requirements, prevention of smuggling, monitoring voluntary restraint arrangements, and investigation of commercial frauds. We also have underway a Treasury study to analyze the data that is available in international trade matters. Here again, the Bureau of Customs is the prime source for data regarding trade matters and yet, for analyzing and interpreting that data, its resources have not heretofore been fully utilized. This also we are moving to correct. The Future In summary, President Nixon's Administration has moved forcefully to improve our international trade and monetary position. We have given our anti-price discrimination tools the most vigorous exercise they have ever had. We have negotiated the removal of various trade barriers and set the stage for an overhaul of the international trade mechanisms in the near future. - 12 Secretary Connally has demonstrated what can be accomplished by a single chief economic spokesman for the President. We are seeking an international forum which will enable us to deal with the problems in their full depth and perspective. And we have identified the need within the Executive Branch to institutionalize these capabilities. The President has made it clear that he intends to meet the challenge of the future by stimulating our economy to ensure our continued efficient and competitive position in the world. This means that inflation and unemployment in the United States will be reduced while investment in new plants and equipment by the private sector are stimulated. While building this stronger economy at home,we must remain outward looking and international in our initiatives overseas. This Administration is committed to such a course. Of course, our foreign friends and trading partners must be equally outward looking and international in their approach to their problems. As Secretary Connally said when he addressed the Economic Club of New York last fall: "We do not intend to become provincial. We shall not resort to protectionism. We shall carry our burdens on the international scene. But to do so it is essential to attain an equilibrium in our overall financial balance with the rest of the world. We seek no advantage of others. We propose to suffer no disadvantage. We seek a balance which will be to the benefit of all the nations." "At stake are not narrow or selfish economic goals; beyond a fair balance of opportunity, we seek none. The basic issue is much broader. It is nothing less than rebuilding the economic foundation for promoting economic development, military security, and the free flow of commerce. - 13 - "To fail in our effort would be to fail not only as an Administration, nor even as a Nation. At stake is nothing less than the foundation for the freedom and security of this generation, and those that follow." All Americans and all countries must be willing to make the necessary sacrifices and, as a result, all Americans and all countries will be beneficiaries. What we seek are the conditions that will encourage freer and fairer trade throughout the entire world, develop growing domestic enterprise and employment, and insure these gains against the erosion of inflation. The President's New Economic Policy advances these goals by laying the foundation for peace with prosperity throughout the world. 000 The Deportment of the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 _TION: FINANCIAL EDITOR lOR RELEASE 6::30 P.M. April 24, 1972 RESULTS OF TREASURY I S WEEKLY BILL OFFERING The Treasury Department announced that the tenders for two series of Treasury January 27, 1972 , and ~eother series to be da.ted April 27,1872 , which were offered on A~ril 18,1972, ~re opened at the Federal Reserve Banks today. Tenders were invited for ~ 2,300,000,000 orthereabouts, of 91 -day bills and for $ 1,800,000,000 or thereabouts, of 182 -d~ bills. The details of the two series are as follows: bills, one series to be an add1 tional. issue of the bills da.ted RAOOE OF ACCEPTED 91-day Treasury bills COMPETITIVE BIDS: _ _.;;.m;.;.;a..;..tur=-i;;.;ngw.-....;J""":Ulz ___.-2;..;.7""',....;1:=;9;..;.7~2__ High Low Average ll~ Price 99.122 99.098 99.112 Approx. Equiv • Annual Rate 3.473% :3.568% :3.51:3% 182-day Treasury bills maturing October 26, 1972 Approx. Equi v . Price Annual Rate 97.988 97.959 97.976 :3.980% 4.0:37% 4.004% of the amount of 91-da¥ bills bid for at the low price was accepted '37% of the amount of 182-da¥ bills bid for at the low price was accepted roTAL TENDERS APPLIED FOR AND ACCEPTED BY FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICTS: District Boston New York Rlilade1phia Cleveland Rirlunond Atlanta Chicago St. Louis Minneapolis Kansas City Dallas San Francisco TOTALS Accepted Applied For $ 19,415,000 $ 7,415,000 1,86:3,075,000 2,976,275,000 15,405,000 15,405,000 21,180,000 21,180,000 1:3,235,000 22,685,000 31,955,000 48,740,000 167,125,000 212,065,000 50,:320,000 59,820,000 24,2:30,000 :32,010.,000 22,255,000 32,520,000 22,250,000 42,250,000 61,675,000 102,675,000 $3,585,040,000 $2,:300,120,000~ Applied For $ 17,7:30,000 2,59:3,7:30,000 2:3,445,000 21,510,000 5,070,000 27,350,000 187,465,000 37,290,000 32,020,000 22,855,000 28,775,000 125,535 ,000 Accepted $ 2,0:30,000 1,570,245,000 3,445,000 8,350,000 4,070,000 10,225,000 12:3 ,415 ,000 25,290,000 9,020,000 9,250,000 6,775,000 28,185,000 $3,122,775,000 $1,800,:300,000£1 YmCludes $176,515,000 noncompetitive tenders accepted at Wmcludes $ 89,160,000 noncompetitive tenders accepted at Y lhese rates are on a bank discount basis. 'ilie equivalent the average price of 99.112 the average price of 97.976. coupon issue yields are 3.59 % for the 91 -day bills, and 4.14% for the 182 -day bills. The Department of the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 25, 1972 TREASURY I S WEEKLY BILL OFFERING The Treasury Department, by this public notice, invites tenders for two series of Treasury bills to the aggregate amount of $4,100,000,000 J or thereabouts, for cash and in exchange for Treasury bills maturing May 4, 1972, in the amount of $4,106,755,000, as follows: 91-day bills (to maturity date) to be issued May 4, 1972, 1n the amount of $2,300,000,000, or thereabouts, representing an additional amount of bills dated February 3, 1972, and to mature August 3, 1972 (CUSIP No. 912793 NXO),originally issued in ~e amount of $1,600,025,000, the additional and original bills to be freely interchangeable. 182- day bills, for $1,800,000,000, or thereabouts, to be dated 4, 1972, and to mature November 2, 1972 (CUSIP No. 912793 PK6). May The bills of both series will be issued on a discount basis under competitive and noncompetive bidding as hereinafter provided, and at ~turity their face amount will be payable without interest. They will be issued in bearer form only, and in denominations of $10,000, $15,000, $50,000, $100,000, $500,000 and $1,000,000 (maturity value). Tenders will be received at Federal Reserve Banks and Branches up to the clos ing hour, one-thirty p. m., Eastern Daylight Saving time, Monday, May 1, 1972. Tenders will not be received at the Treasury Department, Washington. Each tender must be for a minimum'of $10,000. Tenders over $10,000 must be in mUltiples of $5,000. In the case of competitive tenders the price offered must be expressed on the basis of 100, with not moce than three decimals, e.g., 99.925. Fractions may not be used. It is urged that tenders be made on the printed forms and forwarded in the special envelopes which will be supplied by Federal Reserve Banks or Branches on application therefor. Banking institutions generally may submit tenders for account of CUstomers provided the names of the customers are set forth in such tenders. Others than banking institutions will not be permitted to (OVER) - 2 submit tenders except for their own account. Tenders will be received without deposit from incorporated banks and trust companies and from responsible and recognized dealers in investment securities. Tenders from others must be accompanied by payment of 2 percent of the face amount of Treasury bills applied for, unless the tenders are accompanil by an express guaranty of payment by an incorporated bank or trust company. Immediately after the closing hour, tenders will be opened at the Federal Reserve Banks and Branches, following which public announcement will be made by the Treasury Department of the amount and price range of accepted bids. Only those submitting competitive tenders will be advised of the acceptance or rejection thereof. The Secretary of the Treasury expressly reserves the right to accept or reiect any or all tenders, in whole or in part, and his action in any such respect shall be final. Subject to these reservations, noncompetitive tenders for each issue for $200,000 or less without stated price from anyone bidder will be accepted in full at the average price (in three decimalE of accepted competitive bids for the respective issues. Settlement for accepted tenders in accordance with the bids must be made or completed at the Federal Reserve Bank on May 4, 1972, in cash or other immediately available funds or in a" like face amount c Treasury bills maturing May 4, 1972. Cash and exchange tender will receive equal treatment. Cash adjustments will be made for differences between the par value of maturing bills accepted in exchange and the issue price of the new bills. Under Sections 454 (b) and 1221 (5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 the amount of discount at which bills issued hereunder are sold is considered to accrue when the bills are sold, redeemed or otherwise disposed of, and the bills are excluded from consideration as capital assets. Accordingly, the owner of Treasury bills (other than life insurance companies) issued hereunder must include in his income tax return, as ordinary gain or loss, the difference between the price paid for the bills, whether on original issue or on subsequent purchase, and the amount actually received either upon sale or redemption at maturity during the taxable year for which the return is made. Treasury Department Circular No. 418 (current revision) and this notice, prescribe the terms of the Treasury bills and govern the conditions of their issue. Copies of the circular may be obtained fraIT any Federal Reserve Bank or Branch. 000 The Department of the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 25, 1972 WITHHOLDING OF APPRAISEMENT ON CAST IRON SOIL PIPE FITTINGS FROM POLAND The Treasury Department announced today that the Bureau of Customs is instructing Customs field officers to withhold appraisement of cast iron soil pipe fittings from Poland pending a determination as to whether this merchandise is being sold at less than fair value within the meaning of the Antidumping Act, 1921, as amended (19 U.S.C. 160 et seq.). Under the Antidumping Act, the Secretary of the Treasury is required to withhold appraisement whenever he has reasonable cause to believe or suspect that sales at less than fair value may be taking place. A final Treasury decision in this investigation will be made within 3 months. Appraisement will be withheld for a period not to exceed 6 months from the date of publication of the "Withholding of Appraisement Notice" in the Federal Register. Under the Antidumping Act, a determination of sales in the United States at less than fair value requires that the case be referred to the Tariff Commission, which would then consider whether an American industry was being injured. Both dumping margins and injury must be shown to justify a finding of dumping under the law. During the two-year period from January 1970 through December 1971, imports of cast iron soil pipe fittings from Poland were valued at approximately $250,000. 000 The Department of the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 ATTENTION: FOR F INA..l\JC IAL ED ITOR RELEASE 6: 30 P.M. April 25, 1972 RESULTS OF TREASURY '~; MONTHLY BILL OFFERING The Treasury Department announced that the tenders for two series of Treasury bills, one series to b~ an additional issue of the bills dated January 31, 1972 , and the other series to be dated April 30, 1972 ,which were offered on April 19, 1972, were opened at the Federal Reserve Banks today. Tenders were invited for $500 ,COO ,000, or thereabouts, of 275-day bills and for $1,200,000,000, or thereabouts, of 365-day bills. The details of the hro series are as follows: RANGE OF ACCEPTED COMPETITIVE BIDS: High Low Average 275-day Treasury bills maturing January 31, 1973 Approx. Equiv. Price Annual Rate 96.780 96.737 96.766 365-day Treasury bills maturing April 30 , 1973 Approx. Equi v . Price Annual Rate 95.593 95.554 95.577 4.215% 4.272% 4.234% Y 4.347% 4.385% 4.362% Y 84% of the amount of 275-day bills bid for at the low price was accepted 2% of the amount of 365-day bills bid for at the low price was accepted ruTAL TENDERS APPLIED FOR AND ACCEPTED BY FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICTS: District Boston New York Philadelphia Cleveland Richmond Atlanta Chicago St. Louis Minneapolis Kansas City Dallas San Francisco TOTALS AEElied For $ 12,715,000 1,208,140,000 12,735,000 445,000 5,395,000 13,000,000 92,925,000 14,605,000 12,550,000 3,385,000 23,350,000 68,500,000 AcceEted 1,715,000 $ 404,340,000 2,735,000 445,000 395,000 3,000,000 46,725,000 3,605,000 10,550,000 2,285,000 3,350,000 20,900,000 $1,467,745,000 $ 500,045,000 AEElied For 12,550,000 2,070,400,000 12,260,000 9,730,000 1,415,000 24,780,000 149,055,000 30,990,000 15,700,000 18,150,000 24,480,000 86,455,000 AcceEted 550,000 $ 1,098,900,000 2,260,000 730,000 1,415,000 7,780,000 32,100,000 14,980,000 3,700,000 5,750,000 2,480,000 30,315,000 ~ $2,455,965,000 $1,200,960,000 $ EI yfucludes $16,015,000 noncompetitive tenders accepted at the average price of 96.766 b/fucludes $29,255,000 noncompetitive tenders accepted at the average price of 95.577 DThese rates are on a bank discount basis. 1he equivalent coupon issue yields are 4.40% for the 275-day bills, and 4.58% for the 365-day bills. The Department of the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 @ IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 26, 1972 TREASURY ANNOUNCES PAYDOWN ON MAY REFINANCING The Treasury announced today that it will auction $1-1/4 billion of I-year notes and to $500 million of 9-year 9-month bonds to the public to partially refund $2.4 billion notes maturing on May 15. The Treasury also said that it will use $700 million of its available cash to handle the balance of the maturities. Addi tional amounts of the notes and bonds will be allotted to Government accounts and the Federal Reserve Banks mexchange for their holdings of the maturing notes, which total $2.6 billion. up of The securities to be auctioned to the public will be: $1.25 billion of 4-3/4% Treasury Notes of Series E-1973, dated May 15, 1972, due May 15, 1973, (CUSIP NO. 912827 CRl) with interest payable on November 15,1972, and May 15, 1973; and up to An additional $500 million of 6-3/8% Treasury Bonds of 1982, dated February 15, 1972, due February 15, 1982, (CUSIP NO. 912810 BLl) with interest payable on February 15 and August 15. The notes and bonds will be issued in registered and bearer form in denominations of $1,000, $5,000, $10,000, $100,000 and $1,000,000. Tenders for the notes and bonds will be received up to 1:30 p.m., Eastern Daylight Saving time, Tuesday, May 2, 1972, at any Federal Reserve Bank or Branch and at the Office of the Treasurer of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20220; provided, however, that noncompetitive tenders will be considered timely received if they are mailed to any such agency under a postmark no later than May 1. Each tender must be in the amount of $1,000 or a multiple thereof, and must state the price offered, if it is a competitive tender, or the term "noncompetitive", if it is a noncompetitive tender. The price on competitive tenders must be expressed on the basis of 100, with two decimals, e.g., 100.00. Tenders at a price less than 99.76 for the notes and 97.76 for the bonds will not be accepted. Fractions may not be used. 'I'he notation "TENDER FOR TREASURY NOTES" or TENDER FOR TREASURY BONDS" should be printed at the bottom of the envelopes in which the tenders are SUbmitted. Public announcement will be made of the amount and price range of accepted tenders. Those submitting tenders will be advised of the acceptance or rejection thereof. The Secretary of the Treasury expressly reserves the right to accept or reject any or all tenders, in whole or in part, and his action in any such respect shall be final.. Subject to these reservations noncompetitive tenders for $ -::00 ,000 or less for the notes and $ 50 ,000 or less for the bonds will be accepted in full at the average price (in two decimals) of accepted competi ti ve tenders. The prices may be 100 .00, or more or less than 100 .00. (OVER) -2Commercial banks, which for this purpose are defined as banks accepting demand deposits, may submit tenders for account of customers provided the names of the customers are set forth in such tenders. others than commercial banks will not be permitted to submit tenders except for their own account. Tenders will be received without deposit from commercial and other banks for their own account, Federally-insured savings and loan associations, States, politica subdivisions or instrumentalities thereof, public pension and retirement and other public funds, international organizations in which the United States holds membershi foreign central banks and foreign States, dealers who make primary markets in Govern ment securities and report daily to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York their positions with respect to Government securities and borrowings thereon, Federal ReseJ Banks, and Government accounts. Tenders from others must be accompanied by p~ent 5 percent of the face amount of securities applied for. Payment for accepted tenders must be completed on or before Monday, May 15, 197; at the Federal Reserve Bank or Branch or at the Office of the Treasurer of the Unitec States in cash, 4-3/4% Treasury Notes of Series B-1972 or 6-3/4% Treasury Notes of Series D-1972, which will be accepted at par, or other fUnds immediately available to the Treasury by that date. Any qualified depositary will be permitted to make settlement by credit in its Treasury tax and loan account for the amount of securitiE allotted to it for itself and its customers. Where full payment is not completed in funds available by the payment date, the allotment will be canceled and the deposit with the tender up to 5 percent of the amount of securities allotted will be subject forfeiture to the United States. The Treasury will construe as timely payment any check payable to the Federal Reserve Bank or the Treasurer of the United States that is received at such bank or office by Wednesday, May 10, 1972, provided the check is drawn on a bank in the Federa Reserve District of the bank or office to which the tender is submitted. Other checks will constitute payment only if they are fully and finally collected by the payment da Monday, May 15, 1972. Checks not so collected will subject the investor's deposit to forfeiture as set forth in the preceding paragraph. A check payable other than at a Federal Reserve Bank received on the payment date will not constitute immediately available funds on that date. Commercial banks are prohibited from making unsecured loans, or loans collateralized in whole or in part by the securities bid for, to cover the deposits required to be paid when tenders are entered, and they will be required to make the usual certification to that effect. Other lenders are requested to refrain from making such loans. All bidders are required to agree not to purchase or to sell, or to make any agreements with respect to the purchase or sale or other disposition of the securitie bid for unaer this offering at a specific rate or price, until after 1:30 p.m., Easte DayJight Saving time, Tuesday, May 2, 1972. The Department 01 the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE EDGAR R. FIEDLER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY FOR ECONOMIC POLICY BEFORE THE MID-YEAR ECONOMIC OUTLOOK CONFERENCE OF THE CONFERENCE BOARD SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA THURSDAY, APRIL 27, 1972, 2:30 P.M. Those of us involved in the financial markets on a day-to-day basis necessarily and understandably center our attention heavily on short-term developments. Events like the latest success or failure of a bond underwriting and the most-recent 20-basis-point wiggle in the Treasury bill rate come to be the main focus of our work. Accordingly, anticipating or avoiding or exploiting those events becomes the purpose of our efforts. Unfortunately, in this hubbub of our workaday world, the longer run purposes of the financial system are frequently lost sight of. We tend to forget that the basic function of the credit markets is to bring lenders and borrowers together at minimum cost and with maximum benefits, not only to the lenders and borrowers but also to society as a whole. We tend to forget also that the lenders and borrowers are not merely the government and large private institutions that most of us represent directly, but include the millions and millions of individuals who now have or want mortgage loans, savings accounts, and so on. As we look back over the past half decade, it is clear that our financial system has not always served these longer run purposes well. The most dramatic examples were the severe disruptions experienced by the financial markets in 1966 and 1969-70. C-295 - 2 - Looking Ahead As we look ahead to the next five or ten years, it is equally clear that we must avoid repeating this kind of experience. Both the demand for and the supply of credit will increase sharply. To meet our private and national objectives for housing, pollution control, productivity enhancement, etc., we will need a financial system that can channel enormous flows of savings to a multitude of investors smoothly and efficiently -and without the large and frequent swings in interest rates that have so dominated the past half-dozen years. To help us achieve this important function, I believe we will want to consider carefully the work of the Hunt Commission (known formally as the President's Commission on Financial Structure and Regulation), which was appointed by the President early in 1970 and submitted its report at the end of 1971. Without commenting on all of the Hunt Commission's recommendations, I believe that some of their proposals can make a very useful contribution to the financial environment in which we will be living for the balance of this decade. We have to plan for a financial structure that will not only have the capacity to accommodate extremely large flows of credit in the years ahead, but will at the same time have the flexibility to cope with monetary restraint -- should it again be necessary -- without putting undue strain on the mortgage or municipal securities markets. We need to keep two primary objectives in mind for the proper functioning of our financial markets: 1) As the Hunt Commission recommends, we must make changes in the financial structure and its regulatory system in order to avoid the pressures on some financial institutions, as well as on whole sectors of the economy, that are produced during prolonged periods of monetary restraint. - 3 - 2) We should increase competition among financial units and broaden the powers of the thrift institutions. We want a financial structure that permits more branching than is now the case. We want financial institutions to be free to offer a wide variety of services in a highly competitive environment so that the cost to the consumer is reduced at the same time that the institutions gain additional safety through a diversification of assets. In my view, some of the Hunt Commission's recommendations go a long way toward fulfilling these objectives. Several of the Commission's recommendations, for example, would increase competition among financial institutions by granting thrift institutions the power to offer several financial services, including checking accounts, that are now the exclusive functions of commercial banks. In return, however, those thrift institutions would have to shoulder the same tax burden and the same regulation that are now carried by the commercial banking system. I also think the Commission's recommendation of empowering financial institutions to branch state-wide is a sound longer run goal that would have strong procompetitive effects, although the state-by-state impact would, of course, vary. If adopted, as I believe it should be, the state-wide branching provision would broaden the package of financial services available to the public and to small businesses -- especially in small communities of such states as Illinois. Entry into local markets by a number of competing financial institutions should lower the cost and improve the quality of financial services. The Hunt Commission also recommended a number of worthwhile changes in the regulatory environment. It would be helpful to place all commercial banks -- whether national, state, or nonmember banks -- on a common footing, and also to close the regulatory gap that exists now between various types of banks and thrift institutions. - 4 - These changes would reduce the disruption that IS produced during periods of policy restraint. As significant as these changes are, however, we must remember the overriding importance of avoiding the economic excesses that were responsible for the prolonged periods of monetary restraint in the latter half of the 1960s. It is doubtful that any financial structure can be designed that would not develop a few cracks under the stress conditions of 1966 and 1969-70. Accordingly, as we now move into an era of increasing demands for credit, we must be sure that economic growth remains orderly and balanced, and that it is accompanied by an appropriate mix of monetary and fiscal policies. We have seen quite clearly that monetary restraint, by itself, without supportive budget policies, requires a great deal of time to work and produces many hardships and distortions. A key to the achievement of our economic objectives is the efficient allocation of credit by free markets. This can be attained, however, only by avoiding the need for excessive monetary restraint. The business expansion of 1971 and 1972 has, I believe, been built on a foundation of sound monetary and fiscal policy stimulus, and it is important that these policies be kept in tune with the course of economic development in the future. The Great Overwithholding Caper In the context of these longer run goals, the credit conditions with which we are dealing in 1972 are unusual in several ways. One special feature of the current situation is the swing that has taken place in expectations for Federal demands on the financial markets. We started the year anticipating a budget deficit for fiscal 1972 of $38.8 billion, a level that startled quite a few people. Today, however, just three months later, we are looking for a much lower deficit. This development has come to be known in the Treasury (with a wry and slightly embarrassed smile) as "The Great Overwithholding Caper." - 5 - This situation is a direct outgrowth of the underwithholding of taxes that developed out of the 1969 Tax Reform Act. To correct this, the December 1971 tax legislation changed the withholding schedule in an attempt to bring taxes withheld closer to the actual tax liability. First, the schedule was changed to correct the underwithholding that had been taking place for two-earner families. Second, an additional withholding bracket was added at the upper end of the income range. And third, where the old schedule had utilized a straight 13 percent deduction at all levels of income, the new schedule provides for a maximum deduction of $2,000. These changes meant that a majority of workers -almost all who are the only earner in the family and most high-bracket taxpayers -- would have to adjust their withholding allowances by filing revised W-4 forms with their employers. Despite an intense campaign by the Internal Revenue Service to make this requirement known, and despite the actual increase in taxes withheld that almost every employee felt in late January (and it was this that we expected to have a big impact), the number of revised W-4 forms submitted was surprisingly small. The arithmetic of the overwithholding situation, as best we can estimate it, is as follows: if no taxpayers were to change their withholding allowances, the revised schedules would result in an increase in taxes withheld by some $10 or $11 billion annually. Approximately $6 billion of this relates to the single-earner factor, and the remainder relates to the two changes that primarily affect higher bracket taxpayers. The revenue estimates included in the Budget allow $2 billion for the impact of the new withholding schedules. That is, it was assumed that most taxpayers would change their W-4 withholding forms as required, which would neutralize $8-$9 billion of the maximum $10-$11 billion impact. It is now clear that our assumption of the mark. Our experience to date and suggest that overwithholding in calendar i.e., for the full year -- will run some above the Budget estimates. was far wide special surveys year 1972 -$6 to $7 billion - 6 - Art Buchwald had a clever article recently that may give us a clue to the lack of taxpayer response. Buchwald's column, which was in the form of a prayer to our Heavenly Father, included the statement, Those of Your humble servants on straight salary beg Thee to withhold more than we owe, so at the end of the fiscal year we will be granted a much.deserved refund. And, dear God, make sure that which is refunded by the Federal Government is not taken away from us by the state, and that which is refunded by the State is not taken away from us by the county, and that which is refunded to us by the county is not taken away by the town. Evidently there are quite a number of taxpayers who share Buchwald's point of view, and who are happy to have a tax reserve accumulate in their friendly IRS "bank account", despite the fact that they receive no interest. Fortunately, from the standpoint of economic policy, there are some built-in offsets to the overwithholding. First, many taxpayers may have filed new W-4 forms just these past couple of weeks, after they calculated their final 1971 tax return and looked at their particular situation for 1972. Second, many higher income taxpayers file quarterly estimated tax returns, and they are likely to make the needed corrections by making smaller estimated tax payments, or none at all, while continuing the higher withholding from their paychecks. Third, those taxpayers who have chosen not to file new W-4 forms, and who realize they are being overwithheld, are not likely to reduce their consumption patterns downward accordingly. For these three reasons, the economic impact of "The Great Overwithholding Caper" of 1972 will be much less than might otherwise be expected. In addition to the tax revenues that have been generated by the overwithholding, Treasury receipts are higher than expected. Both individual and corporate income tax collections have been coming in stronger than budgeted. In total, as we view it today, this increase - 7 - in receipts will reduce the Federal Budget deficit for fiscal 1972 by more than $6 billion compared to our expectations in January On the expenditure side of the Budget, I have no news to report. We are still using the expenditure totals contained in the Budget last January. The uncertainties about legislative actions that affect the Budget, notably the timing of revenue sharing, are still with us. But however this works out -- whether revenue-sharing funds (or any others) are disbursed in June or in August -makes little real difference. The only place that there will be a noticeable difference will be in the Federal Government's accounting records. This difference is merely a matter of which fiscal year the disbursements are recorded in. As to what I would regard as the important question -- the effect on the economy and the financial markets -- it appears to me that there is practically no difference in the impact between June and August. The Stabilization Program Another special feature of the current situation and a more crucial matter for the behavior of our financial markets during the remainder of 1972 is the Economic Stabilization Program and the outlook for inflation. A successful fight against the price disease will encourage saving and lending and will eliminate much of the large inflation premium that is now built into our interest rate structure. It is too early to say with any assurance how successful the stabilization program will prove to be. The evidence that will enable us to judge the underlying impact of Phase II is simply not yet available. What evidence we have for the economy as a whole is summarized in the table below. From that, I think we can say with confidence that inflation has been lower since the stabilization program began than it was previously. We cannot, however, judge what the eventual impact of Phase II will be. - 8 - Price and Wage Changes Before and During the Stabilization Program (Percent chanze, seasonally adiusted annual rate) Price or Wage Measure Six months prior to the Program: Feb. to Aug. 1971 During the Program: Aug. 1971 to March 1972 Consumer Price Index All items Food Commodities less food Services 1/ Rent I/ 2.8 4.9 4.1 5.4 3.7 4.5 3.9 1.2 4.6 3.1 2.3 5.7 1.8 3.5 2.8 Wholesale Price Index All Commodities Farm products, processed foods and feeds 2/ Industrial commodities 6.7 Earnings of Private Nonfarm Production Workers Earnings in current dollars Adjusted hourly 3/ Gross weekly Spendable weekly 4/ Earnings in constant dollars Adjusted hourly 3/ Gross weekly Spendable weekly 4/ 1/ 7/ ~/ 4/ 6.8 6.1 5.4 2.6 1.9 1.3 6.1 7.0 8.8 3.1 4.1 5.9 Not seasonally adjusted; data contain almost no seasonal movement Raw agricultural products are exempt from price controls. Adjusted for overtime (manufacturing only) and for interindustry employment shifts. Worker with three dependents. Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. - 9 - It may be useful to review the basic arithmetic of the economic stabilization program. The Pay Board started with a general standard of 5.5 percent and the Price Commission selected a goal of 2.5 percent. These, coupled with the 3 percent historical trend growth of productivity, make for a happy combination of consistent standards -- consistent with one another and consistent with the goals of the program. What has happened since then at both the Pay Board and the Price Commission appears to be in line with their general goals. Despite some highly publicized wage increases that far exceeded the general standard, and despite some loosening of that standard by the Pay Board, the Tier I settlements acted upon by the Board to date have averaged about 5 percent. From what we hear about the backlog of cases now at the Pay Board, this figure may rise slightly, but the best guess at the moment is that Tier I settlements will remain within or close to the general standard. The Price Commission's decisions to date for Tier I firms have permitted increases that have averaged 3.2 percent of applicable sales. When total sales of those firms are included in the calculation, the average price increase drops to 1.6 percent. Moreover, when the sales of those Tier I firms that have not yet been granted any price increases are added, the average price increase is only about 1 percent. What the underlying impact of the Commission's action on Tier I firms will eventually be is thus still difficult to say. Presumably it is somewhat higher than 1 percent but smaller than 3.2 percent. More significant for the overall stabilization program, however, is the forthcoming impact of two recent developments at the Price Commission. First, the Commission's profit margin rule is taking effect. This rule, which was always thought of by the Commission as its basic second line of defense, limits the profit margin of any company that has been granted a price increa~e to i~s . base period level. Thus, if a company's proflt margln rlses above its base-period level, and if the increase is not - 10 - explainable in terms special factors, the received may have to first-quarter profit this process has now of a seasonal pattern or other price increases that the company be cut back. With the filing of reports at the Price Commission, begun. The second recent development at the Price Commission will have an even greater impact. The Price Commission's rules require that productivity gains be subtracted from cost increases before any price increase is permitted. Until just recently, the Price.C?mmi~sion has been using company projections on productIvIty In their calculations. They found, however, that these . . figures were too low compared to the kind of productIvIty performance that we have seen in America~ industry on average in the past. Thus, many of the Increases g:anted by the Price Commission were probably too generous In terms of the Commission's basic goal. Accordingly, the Commission is changing its rules. Instead of using company productivity figures, they are going to use industry calculations made by the Bureau of Labor Statistics from data for the past ten years. This, they estimate, will reduce the average price increase that is approved by about one full percentage point -a very constructive change that will contribute importantly toward meeting our goal for inflation. These two developments at the Price Commission, coupled with the pay and price actions taken thus far for Tier I firms, suggest, to me at least, that the stabilization program will achieve its interim target of cutting the rate of inflation below 3 percent by the end of the year. This prospect will, I believe, become more widely accepted in the months ahead as the indicators of prices and wages begin to home in on our goal. I want to emphasize, however, that should we find that the program is not headed for its target, we will not hesitate to make whatever alterations in the program may be necessary. The Price Commission's action on its productivity rule is a fine example of how the program will be changed to make sure that the goal is met. • 11 - Current Financial Prospects Over the remainder of the year, developments in the financial markets are likely to reflect most importantly two features of the current situation. First, although business activity is rising rapidly, there is still a significant volume of unused resources -- both labor and capital -- available in the economy. Accordingly, the flow of new money and credit into the economy can and will be relatively larger than would be appropriate in more normal circumstances, and credit conditions generally can be more accommodative. Second, despite the stabilization program the financial markets are still feeling the hangover brought on by the monetary overindulgences and other economic excesses of the middle and late 19605. Accordingly, long-term bond yields still retain a large inflationary premium. The implication of these two features of the present situation is, it seems to me, that large flows of credit should continue to flow smoothly through the financial markets this year without wide movements in the general level of interest rates, particularly long-term yields. Normally, a vigorous business expansion brings with it a marked rise in interest rates. In the present situation, however, the fact that the economy is still a considerable ways from full employment -- in the financial markets as well as the labor markets -- and the prospect that inflation will slow suggest a noticeable absence of upward pressures on long-term yields. 000 The Department of the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 MEMORANDUM TO CORRESPONDENTS: Ap r i 1 27, 197 2 Attached is a letter from Treasury General Counsel Samuel R. Pierce, Jr. to Senator William Proxmire in response to a request by the Senator that Secretary John B. Connally, Chairman of the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board, appear before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs to discuss the question which has been raised concerning the authority of the General Accounting Office to review the decisions of the Board. 000 Attachment C-297 THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE TREASURY WASH I NGTON. D.C. 20220 April 27, 1972 Dear Senator Proxmire: This is in response to your request that Secretary Connally, as Chairman of the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board, appear before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs to discuss the question which has been raised concerning the authority of the General Accounting Office to review the decisions of the Board. Contrary to Mr. Staats' statement of April 12, 1972 that the Board has denied the General Accounting Office access to its books and records, the Board has cooperated with the GAO in permitting it to review all of the Board's financial records involving its receipts and expenditures. Thus, the statement that the Board has denied the GAO access to any of its records is simply inaccurate, and we are anxious that the record that has been developed to date in this matter be clarified. I should also add that the GAO has complete and total access to all of Lockheed's records, including all documents furnished to the Guarantee Board and to the participating banks. The GAO has a copy of the Credit Agreement, the Security and Pledge Agreement, and the Guarantee Agreement, which cover every aspect of the loan guarantee. These documents are also publicly available from the SEC. The only thing that has been denied to the GAO is access to the Board's records pertaining to its decision making process. These include the Board's minutes, containing expressions of judgments of the three-man Board and related internal memoranda and correspondence. In November, 1971, the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board requested and received my advice on whether the GAO has authority to review the Board's records pertaining to its decision making process. I advised the Board at that time -- and continue to believe -- that the GAO has no such authority. This advice was based on legal research, including a review of the pertinent legislation and its legislative history. In my opinion, Congress did not intend for the Board's decision making - 2 - process to be reviewed by the GAO when it enacted the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act. It vested this authority solely in a highly responsible three-man board consisting of Secretary Connally, Chairman Burns of the Federal Reserve Board, and Chairman Casey of the Securities and Exchange Commission. As required by the Guarantee Act, the Board will fully disclose its operations and the bases for its decisions when it reports to Congress in August of this year. Since the Board's action in this matter was based on my legal advice, the Chairman of the Board has asked me, in my capacities as Executive Director of the Board and as its General Counsel, to appear and explain the legal basis for the Board's position. I shall be happy to do so on May 4, 1972, or on a later mutually convenient date. SAMUEL R. PIERCE, JR. The Honorable William Proxmire United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510 The Department of the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE CHARLS E. WALKER UNDER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE THURSDAY, APRIL 27, 1972, 10:00 A.M., EST Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: It is a pleasure to appear before you today in support of H.R. 3807 regarding executives in the Executive Branch of the Government. I will not describe the proposed Federal Ex~cutive Service. Chairman Hampton of the Civil Service Commission has done this admirably both here and in the Senate. In his statements he also discussed major advantages of the proposed system. I agree with his discussion and wish only to add my own observations at this time. The management of any organization is only as effective as the managers who direct its operations. And I can say through hard-earned experience that flexibility is one of the most important assets of anyone who heads an organization and has to meet the needs of the moment. The proposed plan, in its various provisions affecting the Federal Executive Service, has just the flexibility that a good manager needs 0 I would like to endorse some of these flexible features as they relate to a large Cabinet Department such as the Treasury Department. C"296 First, I like the idea of a system which recognizes that cream comes to the top -- that the word "executive" means a person at the top levels of government regardless of the particular position he holds in the organization. I look forward to the prospect of being able to utilize virtually any executive on almost any kind of job that needs to be done. I don't want to worry about preparing documents, especially a position description, to try to find someone to do a particular job, and then prepare other documents to justify to the CSC the someone who is selected. I would like instead to feel free - 2 - to call on a "pool"of competent executives and utilize any of them as needed without the delays now experienced in trying to "qualify" someone for a particular job which is fixed in the "concrete" of a position description. Second, I think it is a good idea to assure those who have made careers of the government service that they will be given the opportunity, through a truly merit process, to reach the top levels of government and be assigned to work which in many cases was given only to noncareer executives in the past. And it is especially desirable that executives can be given a variety of assignments that will challenge and stimulate them. In this connection, I also favor the proposed provision for temporary "noncareer" executives who will be selected from industry and universities to take short-term specialized assignments without endangering the tenure of the career executives and without going through the long processes now involved in selection, even with the excellent cooperation of the CSC. And, finally, I applaud the provision to have also on board noncareer executives who reflect prevailing Presidential and Congressional policy. The ability to use career or noncareer executives on jobs simply because they ~ executives would provide maximum flexibility to agency heads. In our experience in Treasury in the last few years we have had constant changes in program emphasis. From the gold drain to today's economic stabilization program, we have had serious economic problems to face but we have had to struggle to get qualified people quickly or to get supergrade slots easily at the particular moment of need. The kind of system proposed here which provides for annual identification of anticipated needs would have made it much easier to furnish successive Secretaries of the Treasury with qualified people almost immediately. As it is, we have frequently had to juggle supergrade slots and have often had to "rob Peter to pay Paul." We have taken important supergrade slots from one office when they became vacant and placed them in another office because an unnatural priority system was necessary to get a particular program started, or because we might lose a likely candidate. For example, when the Bureau of Customs was reorganized and regional offices set up in 1964, we had to drop several supergrade jobs in the headquarters office and place them in the regional offices in order to get them started. But the people who worked in the headquarters office were over the field offices -- except in grade. It was an inequitable situation and not all the inequities have been cleared up yet. Such a practice is disruptive and timeconsumiag as well as inequitable to the people whose expected supergrade jobs are snatched away from them. In the proposed FES, agencies would have more freedom to base supergrade need! un ~isting and foreseeable programs. - 3 - I recognize the need of having always on board, knowledgeable, experienced career employees who are available to furnish background information needed to develop administration policies or to take actiono The proposed Federal Executive Service provides for a reasonable ratio between career and noncareer employees which will help assure continuity for those actions and programs that do not reflect party preferenceso This, too, is an excellent feature because in Treasury so many of our jobs require background knowledge and expertise acquired through experience over a period of timeo Another feature of the proposed system which I like because it would be most useful to the Secretary and others in the Treasury Department is the appointment procedureo Those of us responsible for carrying out Presidential and Congressional programs have got to be able to get people working immediately - before they can change their minds or before someone can change their minds for th ern By being able to appoint noncareer executives comparatively freely, essential programs can get started fastero 0 As a manager, I am particularly pleased with the proposed contractual aspects of the proposed serviceo It is a businesslike approach to holding competent career executives o Unfortunately, from tUne to tUne, persons get into executive positions through accident or sheer longevity, but they are not able to carry out their assignments effectivelyo The proposed 3-year employment agreement would at least help to remove the less competent person from an executive position more easily and more humanely than at present. Furthermore, the group of executives who have their contracts renewed will stand out as a nucleus of demonstrably informed, competent career-civil servants available to undertake any kind of assignment and provide invaluable background experienceo Certainly one of the most attractive features of the proposed plan is the flexible pay system which is geared to the individual himself, to his availability on the labor market, and to his contribution to governmento Frankly, from a management point of view, I would like to see it even more flexi~le than proposed, but, being in the Treasury Department, - 4 - I recognize that there is a need for some fiscal control Therefore, I cannot object too much to having the esc and Office of Management and Budget fix an average executive salary which cannot be exceeded but which can be adjusted from time to time for emergencies - within established minimum and maximum rateso 0 Provisions for (1) maximum utilization of executive skills to meet any needs rather than those particularized in organization charts and other documents; (2) obligatory training and development opportunities and (3) appeal rights of career executives who may object to certain assignments, are also desirable but not only from the point of view of management: they are desirable from the point of view of the executive himselfo Such provisions are, in fact, essential to a well-rounded executive employment system o One provision which I strongly favor is the annual requirement to analyze agency needs for executives based on present and anticipated agency programs, budget, staffing and legis1ation o This will compel all heads of agencies to look at their agencies critically and analytically in order to assure the necessary executive help in the ensuing year o It should also help to reduce the number of frantic requests for executives on an emergency basis throughout the yearo I believe that the creators of the proposed system deserve much praiseo They have provided a plan which carefully blends a manager's dream of efficiency with an individual's image of achievement -- by permitting maximum flexibility in getting a job done while at the same time allowing maximum opportunity for self-development o The Deportment of the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 27, 1972 TREASURY ANNOUNCES IMF DRAWING The Treasury annoo nced today that, in a unique transact:Lon related to repayment of indebtedness by the United Kingdom to the International Monetary Fund, the United States on April 28 will draw approximately 83 million pounds sterling from the International Monetary Fund. The drawing is in an amount equivalent to $217 million at the prospective new dollar parity, and equivalent to SDR 200 million. The technical effect of this U. S. drawing is to reduce the Fund's holdings of sterling and, thereby, to reduce, by an equivalent amount, the repurchase obligation of the United Kingdom to the Fund. In this manner, the transaction contributes to the total repayment by the United Kingdom of approximately $1.1 billion owed to the Fund by that country prior to this drawing. Pending its ultimate disposition, the sterling acquired by the United States enters into our monetary reserves. 000 C-298 The Deportment of the TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 TElEPHONE W04·2041 FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE EDWIN S. COHEN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY FOR TAX POLICY BEFORE THE FEDERAL TAX INSTITUTE OF NEW ENGLAND JOHN HANCOCK HALL, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS SATURDAY, APRIL 29, 1972, 12:15 P.M. It is a great personal pleasure to me to return to Boston to review with this distinguished audience the status of our work at the Treasury on some important tax matters and to share with you a few thoughts on tax issues that are currently being discussed. Two years ago you were kind enough to invite me to speak to you at this luncheon, and the program indicated that I was to give a half-hour talk to end at 2:15. duction I was given ended at 2:12. The gracious intro- It was not easy for a fellow with a Southern drawl to compress a half-hour speech into three minutes, and I am grateful to you for inviting me back for my remaining 27 minutes. There has been a good deal said of late in the political campaigns and elsewhere on the subject of taxes and the need C-299 - 2 for further changes. It is scarcely necessary to say that we must constantly be watchful of the operation of our tax system, and use our best efforts, research and debate to make it as fair and equitable as possible and make it best serve the economic and social well-being of the Nation. Undoubtedly changes can be made and should be made to correct some deficiencies in the tax system, to continue the process of improving its equity, and particularly to simplify this grievously complex law. To accomplish this end, however, we need to make calm and objective appraisals of available data, and to weigh carefully the alternatives and the practical consequences of possible revisions. On a matter so vital we cannot afford to fall prey to political promises and rhetoric uttered in the heat of a campaign year. Three months after taking office, the President sent to Congress in 1969 wide-ranging tax reform proposals. Almost the entire year 1969 was spent in public hearings, executive sessions, debates and drafting on the Tax Reform Act of 1969. On December 30, 1969 the President signed the bill into law. As the Congressional Committee reports stated, there was "no prior tax reform bill of equal substantive scope." - 3 - Another major tax bill, the Revenue Act of 1971, was signed into law last December 10. In addition to restoring the Job Development Investment Credit and affirming with some modifications the Asset Depreciation Range System established in Treasury regulations earlier in the year, the bill made important individual income tax and excise tax reductions. Effect of Extensive 1969-1971 Tax Changes A charge has recently been made that the changes in the tax laws and regulations since the beginning of 1969 have favored corporations to the disadvantage of individuals. is not so. This Treasury estimates show that the tax reform and relief provisions of the 1969 Act, the ADR regulations and the 1971 Act in combination have had the following effect: For the four calendar years 1969-1972 they will have increased corporate income taxes by an aggregate of $4.9 billion; decreased individual income taxes by an aggregate of $18.9 billion; and decreased excise taxes on automobiles and telephones, mostly affecting individuals, by $3.5 billion. - 4 - For the current calendar year 1972 they will have -decreased corporate income taxes by $0.4 billion; decreased individual income taxes by $12.0 billion; decreased excise taxes by $2.6 billion. For the l2-year span from 1969 through 1980, assuming economic growth, they will have -decreased corporate income taxes by an aggregate of $8.1 billion, an average of $0.7 billion a year; decreased individual income taxes by an aggregate of $140.7 billion, an average of about $11.7 billion a year; decreased excise taxes by $19.7 billion, an average of about $1.6 billion a year. Thus it cannot properly be said that the benefits of the 1969-1971 changes have viduals. f~vored corporations as against indi- Substantially all the reductions have gone to indi- viduals. I think it interesting to observe that the general reductions in the individual income tax levels made periodically in the past decade (1964, 1969 and 1971) have had the overall - 5 - effect of keeping the effective federal individual income tax level at about 10.6 percent of total adjusted personal income, roughly the level which it has averaged for the past 15 years. (It has varied from a low of 10.0 percent in 1965 to a high of 11.6 percent in 1969, averaging just below 10.9 percent). Had these reductions not been made, the effective income tax rate would today have risen to 14.7 percent of total personal income, almost a third higher than had previously existed. This would have occurred because of the operation of our progressive income tax structure on the increasing personal incomes that have resulted from inflation and rising standards of living and education. The tax reductions have counterbalanced these factors, leaving the net effective rate roughly the same. In considering the fairness of the changes made since the beginning of 1969 it is particularly important to note how the individual income tax reductions they produced have been distributed among the different income classes. is shown in the table below: This - 6 - Effect on Individual Income Tax Liability of Tax Reform Act of 1969, ADR and the Revenue Act of 1971 Full-year Effect at Calendar Year 1971 Levels of Income Adjusted gross income class ($000) Tax under 1968 law Tax Change under 1972 under law from 1968 law . 1972 Amount : Percent law 1/ ( .............. $ millions .......... ) ( ... %••• ) 0-3 3 5 1,469 3,488 265 1,995 -1,204 -1,493 -82.0 -42.8 5 - 7 5,543 4,025 -1,518 -27.4 7 - 10 12,263 10,112 -2,151 -17.5 10 - 15 22,065 19,202 -2,863 -13.0 15 - 20 15,287 13,891 -1,396 -9.1 20 - 50 19,375 18,377 -998 -5.2 50 - 100 7,344 7,217 -127 -1.7 100 and over 7,131 7,658 +527 +7.4 93,965 82,743 -11~222 -11.9 Total Office of the Secretary of the Treasury Office of Tax Analysis April 26, 1972 1/ Excluding surcharge. Note: Figures are rounded and will not necessarily add to totals. - 7 Taking into account all the changes for these three years, we find from this table that the income tax burden has been reduced in all of the income classes below the level of $100,000. The greatest percentage reduction of tax liability is 82 percent in the zero to $3,000 income class; and taxes have been reduced in gradually decreasing percentages in each higher income class to the $50,000 to $100,000 income level, where the reduction is only 1.7 percent. But the 1969-1971 changes have increased the tax liability of the income class above $100,000 by 7.4 percent. Thus in these three years from 1969 to date the greatest percentage reductions have been made in the low income groups, substantial reductions have been made in the middle income groups and yet significant increases have been made in the income levels above $lOO;OOO.These results reflect major achievements in eliminating previous inequities and producing a fairer system. The large decreases in tax on the low income groups occurred primarily because of the President's 1969 recommendation to Congress of the Low Income Allowance to remove from - 8 the federal income tax rolls substantially all persons below the poverty levels. This principle was adopted and has been followed and updated in the 1971 Act. Thus for 1972 and subsequent years single persons earning less than $2,050 will pay no federal income tax nor will a family of four pay tax if it earns less than $4,300. I think this principle is a major step forward in achieving equity in the federal income tax structure. Persons With High Adjusted Gross Income Much has been said recently about the fact that about 100 individuals in the United States in 1970 had "adjusted gross incomes" above $200,000 without paying any tax. have argued that this handful Some of cases shows that the system is unfair and that the rich do not pay taxes. I shall talk further about those few cases in a moment. But I do not think we should let that small group of individuals obscure the fact that, according to our preliminary data, there were in 1970 a total of some 15,300 persons in the country with adjusted gross incomes above $200,000, and that some 15,200 of them paid an average federal individual income tax of $177,000 each -- a total of some $2.7 billion. - 9 - This is an effective rate of 44.1 percent of their adjusted gross income and 59.5 percent of their taxable income. From this it is perfectly clear that in general the rich are paying federal income taxes in large amounts. And they are paying more than they were in 1968 while other taxpayers are paying less. Let me now refer to the cases of the few nontaxable persons with adjusted gross income above $200,000. The statistical data now shows that there were 106 such persons. The number of these nontaxable persons was down from 300 in 1969. The adjusted gross income on these 106 returns was less than 17 percent of that on the 300 returns in 1969. We have now done some further analysis of these returns and have classified them according to the five principal causes of nontaxability: foreign tax credit, deductions for taxes paid, deductions for charitable contributions, deductions for interest payments, and miscellaneous deductions. As to the seven cases in which nontaxabi1ity was due primarily to the foreign tax credit, it is interesting to note that these seven taxpayers paid income tax to foreign countries of about $1.5 million, an average of more than - 10 $200,000 tax per taxpayer. This represented an effective foreign income tax rate of 62 percent of their adjusted gross income and 70 percent of their taxable income. It is clear that while these individuals were not required to pay U. S. income tax, they were subjected to heavy income taxes abroad. Another group of 12 individuals whose adjusted gross income aggregated $4.1 million, paid no 1970 federal income tax because their deductions for state and local taxes exceeded $4.1 million. Substantially all these deductions were for state income taxes. A review of these returns suggested that these individuals had large amounts of nonrecurring income in 1969 on which they paid substantial state income taxes in the spring of 1970, which were deductible on their 1970 federal income tax returns. To check out this hypothesis, we have now obtained data as to the 1969 federal income tax returns of 11 of these 12 individuals and have found that the 11 persons paid 1969 federal income tax totalling about $18 million, an average of more than $1.6 million of tax per individual. The fact that they paid no federal tax for 1970 after paying huge taxes for 1969 is simply a result of the cash basis of accounting which is used by most individuals, - 11 - and the fact that the state taxes on their large 1969 income were paid in the spring of 1970. To change the tax laws to overcome this result for these dozen individuals would produce undue complexities and require additional expense for many thousands or millions of other taxpayers. This would not be worth the effort. No tax system can achieve perfection, certainly not without incredible complexities and expense. Another 12 cases involved individuals with adjusted gross income of $8.5 million whose principal deductions consisted of charitable contributions aggregating $4.2 million. The 1969 Act terminated the "unlimited charitable contribution deduction" provision of prior law and set the contribution deduction limit at 50 percent of adjusted gross income. It was recognized that if charitably inclined individuals can deduct their contributions up to one-half of their adjusted gross income, there will necessarily be a few cases in which other deductions for interest, taxes, medical expense, etc., will exceed the other half of adjusted gross income and result in nontaxability. In 55 of the cases interest paid was the principal deduction, aggregating $17.3 million. But in these returns dividends - 12 and interest received aggregated $16.5 million. In general, when interest is paid to borrow money needed to make investments on which dividends and interest income is received , the interest paid should be charged against the interest and dividends received and only the net profit should be reflected in adjusted gross income. If a man pays interest in his business, only the net profit goes into adjusted gross income. But for simplicity sake, the tax law for many years has said that where this occurs in an investment situation, the gross dividend and interest income is reflected in his adjusted gross income -- and makes him appear on the surface to be in a high income category -- while the offsetting interest expense that he incurs is classed as a personal deduction along with taxes, charitable contributions, casualty losses, alimony, etc. Possibly we should change the definition of "adjusted gross income" so that net investment income is treated like net business income. There are, however, some cases in this group in which the interest paid exceeds the investment income by substantial amounts. In these cases, as well as some others, there are indications that the minimum tax may be due for 1970 and may be assessed on audit. For 1972 and subsequent years, investment - 13 interest paid that exceeds by more than $25,000 the taxpayer's investment income may be disallowed as a deduction under the 1969 Tax Reform Act. The final category consists of 20 cases in which the principal deduction was miscellaneous deductions, aggregating $10.5 million. Of this total, more than $5.5 million represents items described in the returns generally as loss of securities pledged to secure loans, losses on guarantees of loans, and payments in settlement of litigation. Another $2.2 million of miscellaneous deductions represents an aggregate of accounting, bookkeeping and professional fees, and investment counsel and management fees. If these items are properly deductible -- and this can only be determined after audit it is because they represent expenses of earning business or investment income and may indicate that we should change the definition of "adjusted gross income" to drop these people out of the high income category. To illustrate, consider one of the returns that reported as the only income more than $400,000 of gambling gains and reported an equal amount as gambling losses under miscellaneous deductions, for a net income of zero. This return, too, will - 14 be audited; but if the return stands up under audit, we might consider levying an amusement tax, but the income tax is supposed to apply only to the successful gamblers. Now I do not mean to imply from this review of the 106 cases that there is not a constant need for vigilance and improvement in the tax laws. definite need. Most assuredly there is a I mean only to indicate that there is rel- atively little guidance to be gained from these particular returns in relation to major issues of tax policy, and the attention that has been devoted to them is unwarranted and unwise. Revenue and Other Effects of Recent Proposals There have been a number of proposals and bills introduced in the Congress to change the tax laws. deserve serious consideration. Some of these But many of them have been advanced with claims that by closing so-called "loopholes" in the tax law we can immediately raise vast sums of additional revenue. These claims, I submit, are quite exaggerated. Moreover, in many instances sudden tax changes made without substitution of other programs would damage the economy and endanger important social goals. - 15 Let me illustrate. One of the proposals made in a number of the bills recently introduced in the Congress is to tax capital gains at death. It has been asserted that this will raise in the first year some $2 to $3 billion in revenue, and that this was recommended in 1968 by the then Treasury staff. While the previous staff headed by my distinguished predecessor, Stanley Surrey, did recommend taxing capital gains at death, it also recommended (as do most of the pending bills) that only the gains accruing after the enactment of the new law would be taxed. As a result there would be relatively little revenue effect for some years to come. Moreover, the previous Treasury staff proposals recommended that the revenue gains in future years from taxing capital gains at death be used to reduce the burden of the estate tax, so that the total tax burden on persons dying would not be increased but would be reallocated among them. All of this requires careful thought and attention and a balanced program. In any event, it is not likely to produce signif.icant short-term revenue yields. Consider the proposals made in some of the bills with respect to the taxation of interest on state and local - 16 obligations. One of these bills would permit state and local governments at their option to issue taxable securities, with some amount -- ranging from 25 percent to 50 percent of the interest payments to be reimbursed to the states by the federal government. There may well be merit in this proposal, and indeed a form of this proposal was contained in the 1969 House bill; but it is clear that it will not raise any net revenue for the federal government in the short term at least, since it would only apply to future issues. Moreover any proposal would inevitably re- quire an alternative subsidy, which also would prevent any substantial net revenue gain. On the same subject, many of the proposed revisions of the minimum tax would include in the list of preferences subject to that tax interest on state and local bonds. The Congress concluded in 1969 that this should not be done, and my impression was that this was a very firm conclusion. But even if it were done, it is unlikely that such a rule would be applied to existing obligations; and the short-run revenue yield from including interest on future obligations under a minimum tax would be negligible. - 17 Again, there are various proposals to limit the tax benefits accorded to real estate investments. In 1969 we cut back extensively on these benefits to the extent of almost $1 billion in estimated long-run annual revenue yield, but we exempted from the new restrictions investments in housing. The housing exception was made because the Housing Act of 1968, which set as a goal the production of some 2-1/2 million housing units a year, was built around the then existing income tax incentives for housing construction. We have recently exceeded the 2-1/2 million housing unit goal for the first time in history, and it is a bright spot in the current economic recovery. Granted that there are problems with respect to the tax treatment of housing, it would be unwise at this point to remove these tax incentives without having a new governmental program as a substituteo If changes are to be made, they require a careful evaluation of the effect of the 1969 Tax Reform Act in the nonhousing field and the development of carefully designed substitute housing programs. These are difficult and time-consuming matters. There are further tax proposals to collect additional revenue by repealing the recently approved Asset Depreciation - 18 Range System and/or the Job Development Investment Credit. We have just been through a long period of analysis and debate on both ADR and the investment credit, and both were approved by the Congress. Before these depreciation and investment credit changes were made in 1971, our Treasury estimates showed that our income tax laws made the capital cost of business equipment higher than that of any other major industrialized nation in the Western World. The 1971 changes restored American business in this regard to a position somewhat more favorable than Canada, France and the Netherlands, but still behind West Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and others of our principal competitors in the world markets. Moreover, a recent Department of Commerce-SEC survey showed a very encouraging 10-1/2 percent rise in business expenditures for plant and equipment for 1972 over 1971. An even more recent McGraw-Hill survey just released shows a 14 percent rise. These are most encouraging developments another strong force in the economic recovery -- and I think it is far too early to consider changing this successful policy agreed upon only last year after so much careful deliberation. - 19 There are the usual round of proposals to reduce the tax incentives with respect to oil and gas. After a long series of debates in 1969, the Tax Reform Act increased the taxes on the oil and gas industry by more than $600 million. With the energy shortage that is facing us and the dire need for a coordinated energy policy, we should be sure that we move cautiously and intelligently with a coordinated energy resource program. Among the proposals for a quick increase in revenue yield is to change the minimum tax in various ways. One of the major minimum tax proposals is to eliminate the deduction for the regular income tax paid by the taxpayer in computing the amount subject to minimum tax. If the deduc- tion for the regular income tax were eliminated, the minimum tax would simply be a tax on items of preference income, regardless of the amount of regular income tax which the taxpayer is paying on his nonpreference income. Neither the 1968 Treasury staff proposals for a minimum tax, nor our 1969 proposal for a Limit on Tax Preferences (LTP) nor the current minimum tax law, would apply when the taxpayer has a relatively small proportion of tax preferences in relation ·to his total income. - 20 - To convert the minimum tax into a direct income tax on preference income without regard to nonpreference income would simply reduce the effect of tax incentives that the Congress has introduced in various parts of the tax law for purposes that it has deemed desirable. If those pur- poses are not desirable or the incentives are too great, they should be modified or eliminated, but there is no point in merely whittling them down by a complex separate tax on the allowed preferences. The point of the 1969 law and both sets of Treasury proposals was to impose an additional tax burden only when a taxpayer had so concentrated on taking advantage of the preferences that he was sheltering too high a proportion of his income. I would hope, there- fore, that before any such transformation of the minimum tax would be made, it would be given thorough consideration. The issues are far too important for hasty action. I believe these illustrations show that the claims that vast sums of immediate revenue can be raised from "loophole" closing are vastly exaggerated. Moreover, it shows, I believe, that in each important area there are serious problems that require calm, deliberative reflection; and that, in many - 21 - instances, such as housing, extensive consideration would have to be given to substitute programs that in themselves would involve serious questions of equity and practicality. This was the lesson we learned in the lengthy study and debate that occurred in the development and passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. It is a lesson that I think stands us in good stead today. There is one other lesson from the 1969 Act that I learned and I am sure you experts in the tax field, as well as the taxpaying public, will appreciate. That lesson is that we are in desperate need of simplifying the federal income tax law. I hope we can bend every effort toward that goal of simplification and eliminate attenuated distinctions and intricacies that confuse us all. Regulations Under the 1969 Act It is with great pleasure that I report to you today that we have substantially completed the job of drafting and publishing in proposed form for comment the extensive regulations under the Tax Reform Act of 1969. We had divided the regula- tions work under the 1969 Act into 179 different projects. We have made an intensive drive to finish this work, realizing - 22 the importance to the public of knowing the positions the Treasury proposes to take on the many important questions of interpretation that are involved. We have now published, or sent to the Federal Register for publication shortly, all but eight of these proposed regulations. Of the remaining eight, some had been deferred tempo- rarily because they will not have practical effect until a future date (such as the tax on excess business holdings of private foundations); some are being withheld from publication until other related proposed regulations have been finalized (such as the disallowance of deductions for excess investment interest, which depends upon interpretations proposed under the minimum tax); and some are procedural or of limited application. The only two regulations still to be proposed that I think will be of general interest are those relating to so-called "arbitrage bonds" issued by state and local governments and those under the new Section 385 that would establish guidelines for distinguishing indebtedness from stock. The arbitrage bond regulations have reached their final stages, but we have held up publication until we have had opportunity to confer - 23 further with representatives of state and local governments aboD of the problems that are involved. As to the regulations regarding the distinctions between indebtedness and stock, we have devoted considerable time and discussion to this difficult subject. But as you all know, we have gone almost 60 years without significant regulations in this area, and much as I would like to see that project brought to a conclusion, we have thought that other pressing matters deserve a higher priority. It is difficult to appreciate the several hundred thousand man-hours of time devoted by talented and dedicated men and women in the government service that have been required to analyze the problems, assemble the necessary information, reach decisions on so many difficult issues, and draft and review all these many regulations. As a rough guess, I would estimate that the proposed regulations under the Tax Reform Act of 1969 cover at least 8,500 typewritten pages. No other country in the world makes an effort to pUblish extensive regulations of this kind. To have accomplished this task under the 1969 Act within a period of two and a third years is a record heretofore unmatched, and I am sure you will agree - 24 - that the many persons on the staffs of the Commissioner and the Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service and of the Treasury deserve the greatest praise for their untiring and dedicated work on these projects. We are anxious to press onward to promulgating in final form all the regulations that have been proposed for public comment. We receive many helpful comments and criticisms, and review all of these before making final decisions. It is important that this process go forward to provide answers to the taxpaying public as soon as possible. We must also proceed with regulations under the Revenue Act of 1971, which the President signed into law on December 10, 1971. We have already issued proposed regulations under the Job Development Investment Credit and the Asset Depreciation Range amendments made by the 1971 Act, published an extensive pamphlet regarding the new Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) and issued guidelines under the new provision for deduction or credit for political contributions. But there are numerous other provisions under the 1971 Act, such as the deduction for expenses of working mothers, for which regulations must be provided. - 25 - Statistical Data re Effect of 1969 Act It is also of great importance to obtain statistical data upon which to base judgements as to the effects which have flowed from the many tax reform provisions of the 1969 Act. Most of the 1969 Act reforms became effective as of January 1, 1970, although some of them go into effect gradually over a period of years. Thus the 1970 income tax returns provide the first statistical information that we can obtain about the practical effect of the 1969 reforms. With respect to individual returns, this statistical data is obtained from transcripts made of a large sample of the approximately 75 million individual income tax returns. The data from the transcripts is then fed into a computer, and the first preliminary runs from the computer became available toward the end of last November. We now anticipate that the complete statistical report on 1970 individual returns will be available by mid-July and that printed copies will be publicly available about two months later. It is also quite important to obtain statistical data regarding the effect of the 1969 Act on corporations. Because of the time required to prepare the voluminous returns of - 26 - major corporations, most of them file estimated returns on March 15 and obtain extensions of time to September 15 for filing their final detailed returns. Hence the process of extracting the statistical data from 1970 calendar year corporation returns could not start until after September 15, 1971, and it is a much more complex task than is involved for individual returns. We expect the preliminary report from the corporate data to become available in August. Tables from the final 1970 corporate report will become available beginning in October. With all the extensive changes made by the 1969 Tax Reform Act, I think we should carefully review the individual and corporate data from the 1970 returns before we embark upon another round of individual and corporate tax reform. This data should be available in time for action in 1973, but it will not be available in time for action by Congress this year. Moreover, we should finish the process of finalizing the regulations under the 1969 Act this year in order that necessary and desirable legislative changes can be made intelligently. - 27 - A New Tax Reform Proposal I thought I should tell you today about a deep-seated division of opinion within the Treasury , heretofore unrevealed , regarding an important tax reform proposal. I had ordered that there be no internal memoranda written about it that might be leaked or subpoenaed, and until now the entire subject has been dealt with by magnetic tapes that self-destruct. For some time I have been looking for a simplified, equitable tax revision program. There is considerable research to indicate that, in general, tall people have a great economic advantage over short people and are far more successful as leaders in the business and political world. I have maintained, therefore, that the tax law should provide compensation for the inequities thrust upon the short people of the world. I would draw the line at a height of 5 feet 6 inches and provide half rates of tax for those below that level and the regular rates for those above. Because of the notch problem that might be involved at the dividing line, I would be willing to consider a sliding scale between 5 feet 6 inches and 6 feet. This proposal is easily administered by an objective standard and provides in my judgment a high degree of equity and fairness in the tax structure. I must confess, however, - 28 - that all those over 5 feet 6 inches in the Treasury -- and this represents a high percentage of the male personnel -- are opposed to my proposal. My research, however, discloses that most of the ladies in the Treasury will qualify and strongly support the proposal. Because of this division I have become a charter member of an organization to sponsor the proposal. It will probably be known as the Association of Short People -- or ASP's. The motto will be "Ad Astra per ASPera." We expect that there will be immediately created a competing organization to be known as the Association of Long People or ALP's. But standing firmly on our platform, we expect to look the ALP's right in the eye. To administer this system the ASP's are advocating the restoration of the old Form I040-A so that we can once again have the short form and the long form tax return. I have been asked what I would do about a joint return of a tall husband and a short wife (or the few vice versas). But I only deal with tax policy, and this seems to me an administrative matter that should be easily handled by the able Commissioner of Internal Revenue. - 29 I hope you will forgive me for ending my discussion of this most serious subject on a note of levity. I have tried to retain a sense of humor and proportion throughout my more than three years in office. In particular, I have tried to bear constantly in mind the words of the President in his Inaugural Address on January 20, 1969, when he advised us: "To lower our voices would be a simple thing. * * * "We cannot learn from one another until we stop shouting at one another -- until we speak quietly enough so that our words can be heard as well as our voices." 000 u.s. Treas. Treasury Dept. HJ 10 .A13P4 v.178 Press Releases Treas. HJ 10 • A13P4 u.s. Treasury Dept • AUTHOR Press Releases v.178 TITLE OATE LOANED PHONE NUMBER BORROWER'S NAME ---- - /- 11-Jt:r 1 • TJ -" -- /), --' ~~'"' ..... - I hniJ Uu ---