View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

12/28/2023

Treasury Targets Network Financing Houthi Attacks on International Shipping | U.S. Department of the Treasury

Treasury Targets Network Financing Houthi Attacks on
International Shipping
December 28, 2023

WASHINGTON — Today, the Department of the Treasuryʼs O ice of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) designated one individual and three entities responsible for facilitating the flow of
Iranian financial assistance to Houthi forces and their destabilizing activities. Among those
designated today is the head of the Currency Exchangers Association in Sanaʼa, and three
exchange houses in Yemen and Türkiye. These persons have facilitated the transfer of millions
of dollars to the Houthis at the direction of U.S.-designated Saʼid al-Jamal, who is a iliated
with Iranʼs Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF).
“Todayʼs action underscores our resolve to restrict the illicit flow of funds to the Houthis,
who continue to conduct dangerous attacks on international shipping and risk further
destabilizing the region,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial
Intelligence Brian E. Nelson. “The United States, along with our allies and partners, will
continue to target the key facilitation networks that enable the destabilizing activities of the
Houthis and their backers in Iran.”
The Houthisʼ continued attacks against international shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of
Aden have sharply curtailed the free flow of commerce through the region and represent a
clear violation of international law. Since October, the Houthis have recklessly launched
numerous missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) at commercial vessels transiting near
Yemenʼs coastline.
Todayʼs action is being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority in Executive Order
(E.O.) 13224, as amended. Saʼid al-Jamal was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended,
on June 10, 2021 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or
technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF. The IRGC-QF
was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 25, 2007 for providing support to multiple
terrorist groups.

EXCHANGE HOUSES FACILITAT ING IRANIAN SUPPORT F OR
T HE HOUT HIS
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2014

1/4

12/28/2023

Treasury Targets Network Financing Houthi Attacks on International Shipping | U.S. Department of the Treasury

The Saʼid al-Jamal network relies on a web of exchange houses based throughout the Middle
East to facilitate the movement of Iranian funds to Houthi-aligned financial firms in Yemen.
These funds are ultimately transferred to the Houthis or a iliated businesses located
throughout the region.
Türkiye-based Al Aman Kargo Ithalat Ihracat Ve Nakliyat Limited Sirketi (Al Aman) serves
as a waypoint for money sent by the Houthisʼ Iranian financiers to the groupʼs businesses in
Yemen. The IRGC-QF has deposited millions of dollars into Al Aman for onward shipment to
Yemen, where the funds are ultimately deposited into the accounts of Nabco Money
Exchange and Remittance Co. (Nabco), a successor company to the U.S.-designated AlHadha Exchange Co. established a er the U.S. sanctioned the exchange house.
Al Aman has similarly worked with U.S.-designated Yemeni exchange house AlAlamiyah Express
Company for Exchange and Remittance (AlAlamiyah) to transfer funds from Türkiye on behalf
of the Houthis and the Saʼid al-Jamal network. AlAlamiyah has moved tens of millions of
dollars in support of Saʼid al-Jamalʼs e orts to fund the Houthis.
Nabco, led by Nabil Ali Ahmed Al-Hadha (Nabil Al-Hadha), the president of the Currency
Exchangers Association in Houthi-controlled areas in Sanaa, serves as a financial intermediary
to transfer funds to and from Yemen and has received millions of dollars in this fashion from
the IRGC-QF on behalf of Saʼid al-Jamalʼs network. Millions of dollars have similarly passed
through Nabil Al-Hadhaʼs accounts in Türkiye, which are then deposited in Houthi-a iliated
accounts in Yemen. These funds are then converted into Yemeni rials by Yemen-based, Houthirun Al Rawda Exchange and Money Transfers Company (Al Rawda) in order to conceal this
operation.
Saʼid al-Jamal has worked with Iranian o icials to move money into accounts based at Al
Rawda. Al Rawda itself has moved millions of dollars in Iranian financial support to Yemen via
Türkiye on behalf of the Saʼid al-Jamal network. These funds are transferred abroad to
Houthi-a iliated companies. Al Rawda simultaneously serves as an intermediary to transfer
funds from the Houthi-controlled Ministry of Defense to the groupʼs front line fighters.
Alalamiyah and Al-Hadha Exchange Co. were previously designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as
amended, on February 23, 2022 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided
financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Saʼid
al-Jamal.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2014

2/4

12/28/2023

Treasury Targets Network Financing Houthi Attacks on International Shipping | U.S. Department of the Treasury

Nabco Money Exchange and Remittance Co. and Al Rawda Exchange and Money Transfers
Company are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially
assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or
services to or in support of, Saʼid al-Jamal. Nabil Ali Ahmed Al-Hadha is being designated
pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for owning or controlling, directly or indirectly, Nabco
Money Exchange and Remittance Co.
Al Aman Kargo Ithalat Ihracat Ve Nakliyat Limited Sirketi is being designated pursuant to E.O.
13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material,
or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, AlAlamiyah Express
Company for Exchange and Remittance.

SANCT IONS IMPLICAT IONS
As a result of todayʼs action, all property and interests in property of the designated persons
described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons
are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly
or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked
persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or
exempt, OFACʼs regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or
transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated
or otherwise blocked persons.
In addition, financial institutions and other persons that engage in certain transactions or
activities with the sanctioned entities and individuals may expose themselves to sanctions or
be subject to an enforcement action. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution
or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated person, or
the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFACʼs ability to designate
and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the
SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring
about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking
removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFACʼs Frequently Asked
Question 897 here. For detailed information on the process to submit a request for removal
from an OFAC sanctions list, please click here.
Click here for more information on the individuals and entities designated today.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2014

3/4

12/28/2023

Treasury Targets Network Financing Houthi Attacks on International Shipping | U.S. Department of the Treasury

###

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2014

4/4