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2/24/2022

Treasury Targets Key Houthi Finance Network in Coordination with Regional Gulf Partners | U.S. Department of the Tre…

Treasury Targets Key Houthi Finance Network in Coordination
with Regional Gulf Partners
February 23, 2022

WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasuryʼs O ice of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC) is designating members of an international network funding the Houthisʼ war
against the Yemeni government and increasingly aggressive attacks threatening civilians and
civilian infrastructure in neighboring states. Led by the U.S.-designated Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and Houthi financier Saʼid al-Jamal, this network has
transferred tens of millions of dollars to Yemen via a complex international network of
intermediaries in support of the Houthisʼ attacks. Despite persistent calls for peace from the
international community, the Houthis continue their destructive campaign inside Yemen, and
have repeatedly launched ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles that have struck
civilian infrastructure in neighboring states, resulting in civilian casualties. Todayʼs action is
taken in close coordination and collaboration with regional Gulf partners.
“Despite pleas to negotiate an end to this devastating conflict, Houthi leaders continue to
launch missile and unmanned aerial vehicle attacks against Yemenʼs neighbors, killing innocent
civilians, while millions of Yemeni civilians remain displaced and hungry,” said Under Secretary
of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson. “The United States
continues to work with our regional allies to act decisively against those who would seek to
prolong this war for their own ambitions. Houthi leaders must cease their campaign of
violence and negotiate in good faith to end the conflict.”
Todayʼs action is being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority Executive Order
(E.O.) 13224, as amended. The IRGC-QF was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 in 2007 for
supporting Lebanese Hizballah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other terrorist groups.
On June 10, 2021 OFAC designated al-Jamal and members of his network pursuant to
E.O. 13224, as amended, for their role in generating revenue through the sale of commodities
such as petroleum to fund the Houthis. Al-Jamal directs a web of front companies and vessels
that smuggle fuel, petroleum products, and other commodities to customers throughout the

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Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Al-Jamal is aided by Turkey-based Abdi Nasir Ali Mahamud and
his network of businesses, which have served as a cover for al-Jamalʼs activities.

SAʼID AL-JAMALʼS INT ERNAT IONAL T RADE NET W ORK
Al-Jamalʼs network has generated tens of millions of dollars in revenue with the aid of a
diverse array of international commodity traders, including Mahamud, UAE- and Swedenbased Abdo Abdullah Dael Ahmed (Dael), and UAE-based Greek businessman Konstantinos
Stavridis (Stavridis).
Dael has helped al-Jamal and Mahamud launder and transfer millions of dollars in support of
their network. The Dael-operated, Yemen-based Moaz Abdalla Dael Import and Export (Dael
Import and Export) has transferred over $10 million to al-Jamal. Dael Import and Export has
worked with Mahamud and his company, the Treasury-designated Adoon General Trading FZE,
to import goods into Yemen, allowing al-Jamal to move funds into Yemen in support of the
Houthis.
Stavridis has used his company Fani Oil Trading FZE (Fani Oil) to purchase gasoline from alJamal, the proceeds from which were ultimately sent to the Houthis. Mahamudʼs Adoon
General Trading FZE helped facilitate the deal. Fani Oil has created fraudulent shipping
documents to facilitate the sale and shipment of gasoline worth tens of millions of dollars.
Abdo Abdullah Dael Ahmed, Moaz Abdalla Dael Import and Export, and Konstantinos Stavridis
are all being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted,
sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services
to or in support of, Saʼid al-Jamal. Fani Oil Trading FZE is being designated pursuant to E.O.
13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, directly or indirectly,
Konstantinos Stavridis.
Treasury is also taking action today against Turkey-based JJO General Trading Gida Sanayi
Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi and UAE-based Al Foulk General Trading Co. L.L.C, companies
directed by Mahamud and Dael, respectively. JJO General Trading Gida Sanayi Ve Ticaret
Anonim Sirketi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned,
controlled, or directed by, directly or indirectly, Abdi Nasir Ali Mahamud. Al Foulk General
Trading Co. L.L.C is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned,
controlled, or directed by, directly or indirectly, Abdo Abdullah Dael Ahmed.

EXCHANGE HOUSES F UNDING T HE HOUT HIS
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Proceeds from al-Jamalʼs operations are funneled through a complex international network of
intermediaries and money exchange houses. Turkey-based Garanti Ihracat Ithalat
Kuyumculuk Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi (Garanti Ihracat) has facilitated millions of dollarsʼ
worth of transactions for al-Jamal, including transfers in support of oil shipments to China
and Syria. Syrian regime-a iliated, Treasury-designated businessman Muhammad Baraʼ Qatirji
has used Garanti Ihracat to send millions of dollars to al-Jamal for oil shipments.
In addition to Garanti Ihracat, al-Jamal has been aided by Yemen-based money exchange
houses AlAlamiyah Express Company for Exchange and Remittance and Al-Hadha
Exchange Co., both of which have moved tens of millions of dollars in support of al-Jamalʼs
e orts to fund the Houthis.
Garanti Ihracat Ithalat Kuyumculuk Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi, AlAlamiyah Express Company
for Exchange and Remittance, and Al-Hadha Exchange Co. are all being designated pursuant
to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial,
material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Saʼid al-Jamal.

ILLICIT SHIPPING COMPANIES AB ET T ING T HE SAʼID ALJAMAL NET W ORK
India-, Singapore-, and UAE-based Aurum Ship Management FZC (Aurum) has generated
millions of dollars in profit while managing ships connected to al-Jamal and Mahamud,
including the St. Kitts and Nevis-flagged Light Moon, formerly known as the Three, and the
Triple Success, which Treasury previously identified as a vessel in which al-Jamal has an
interest. Employees of Aurum have bribed flagging authorities to ignore sanctions-evasion
activities by ships in the al-Jamal network. Aurum has also managed ships transferring oil to
Houthi-controlled ports in Yemen.
Aurum Ship Management FZC is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for
having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support
for, or goods or services to or in support of, Abdi Nasir Ali Mahamud.
The al-Jamal- and Mahamud-owned Light Moon, which has been used to illicitly ship
petroleum products, has sought to disguise its activities by turning o its Automatic
Identification System (AIS), an internationally accepted maritime safety system, while
conducting operations. The Light Moon is being identified pursuant to E.O. 13224, as
amended, as property in which Abdi Nasir Ali Mahamud has an interest.
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OFAC is also designating Aurumʼs managing director, Chiranjeev Kumar Singh, and a shell
company, Peridot Shipping and Trading LLC. Following the Triple Successʼ identification,
Singh and Aurum worked with Mahamud to provide critical support to the vessel.
Chiranjeev Kumar Singh is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having
acted for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Aurum Ship Management FZC. Peridot Shipping
and Trading LLC is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned,
controlled, or directed by, directly or indirectly, Chiranjeev Kumar Singh.

SANCT IONS IMPLICAT IONS
All property and interests in property, subject to U.S. jurisdiction of the persons designated,
are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with the
designated persons or their blocked property. In addition, any entities that are owned,
directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.
Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or otherwise exempt or
authorized, OFACʼs regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or
transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated
or otherwise blocked persons. In addition, foreign financial institutions that knowingly
facilitate significant transactions for, or persons that provide material or certain other
support to, the persons designated today risk exposure to sanctions that could sever their
access to the U.S. financial system or block their property or interests in property under U.S.
jurisdiction.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from its ability to designate and
add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN
List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring
about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking
removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFACʼs Frequently Asked
Question 897 here. For detailed information on the process to submit a request for removal
from an OFAC sanctions list, please here.
View identifying information on the individuals and entities designated today.
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