View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

11/30/2023

Treasury Targets DPRK’s International Agents and Illicit Cyber Intrusion Group | U.S. Department of the Treasury

Treasury Targets DPRK’s International Agents and Illicit Cyber
Intrusion Group
November 30, 2023

Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States
Sanction DPRK for its November 21 Satellite Launch
WASHINGTON — Today, in coordination with foreign partners, the U.S. Department of the
Treasuryʼs O ice of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned eight foreign-based Democratic
Peopleʼs Republic of Koreaʼs (DPRK) agents that facilitate sanctions evasion, including
revenue generation and missile-related technology procurement that support the DPRKʼs
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Additionally, OFAC sanctioned cyber
espionage group Kimsuky for gathering intelligence to support the DPRKʼs strategic
objectives.
Todayʼs actions are in response to the DPRKʼs November 21 claimed military reconnaissance
satellite launch and demonstrates the multilateral e orts of the United States and foreign
partners to hinder the DPRKʼs ability to generate revenue, procure materiel, and gather
intelligence that advances the development of its WMD program and the unlawful export of
arms and related materiel from the DPRK.
“Todayʼs actions by the United States, Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea reflect our
collective commitment to contesting Pyongyangʼs illicit and destabilizing activities,”
said Treasuryʼs Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson. “The
DPRKʼs use of overseas laborers, money launderers, cyber espionage, and illicit funding
continue to threaten international security and our allies in the region. We will remain focused
on targeting these key nodes in the DPRKʼs illicit revenue generation and weapons
proliferation.”

DPRK ILLICIT ECONOMIC ACT IVIT Y
Todayʼs actions target the DPRKʼs access to revenue and weapons, generated through stateowned entities, banks, and trading companies, specifically through their globally deployed
trade and bank representatives. These individuals provide critical access to foreign
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1938

1/5

11/30/2023

Treasury Targets DPRK’s International Agents and Illicit Cyber Intrusion Group | U.S. Department of the Treasury

technology vital to the DPRKʼs domestic weapons program and enable DPRK revenue
generation through access to the international financial system. A portion of the revenue
from these activities has been funneled towards domestic WMD-related technology and
missile systems.
OFAC is designating eight individuals that are associated with U.S.-designated DPRK stateowned weapons exporters, financial institutions, and front companies including Green Pine
Associated Corporation (Green Pine), Foreign Trade Bank of the Democratic Peopleʼs Republic
of Korea (FTB), KoryoCommercial Bank LTD. (KCB), Korea United Development Bank (KUDB),
and Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies (MOP).

DPRK W EAPONS SALES REPRESENTAT IVES
U.S. and UN-designated Green Pine is responsible for approximately half of DPRK arms and
related materiel exports. The Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB)-controlled Green Pine
specializes in the production of maritime military cra and armaments and has
provided both technical assistance and weapons to Iranian defense-related firms.
Kang Kyong Il and Ri Sung Il are Tehran, Iran-based Green Pine representatives. Kang
Kyong Il has attempted to sell Chinese-origin aluminum and Ri Sung Il has worked with
other DPRK representatives to sell conventional weapons to foreign governments.
Both Kang Kyong Il and Ri Sung Il have travelled to China together on multiple
occasions.
Kang Phyong Guk is a Green Pine representative in Beijing, China and is a central liaison
between Green Pine and its overseas representatives.
Ri Sung Il, Kang Kyong Il, and Kang Phyong Guk are being designated pursuant to E.O.
13551 for acting or purporting to act, for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Green Pine, an
entity that was included in the Annex to E.O. 13551.

DPRK F INANCIAL REPRESENTAT IVES
The DPRK continues to use agents and individuals associated with its state-owned entities
and banks to access the international financial system to conduct illicit financial activity. They
have long-standing networks of front or shell companies and use embassy personnel to move
money and procure materiel for the DPRKʼs WMD and ballistic missile programs as well as to
procure conventional weapons.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1938

2/5

11/30/2023

Treasury Targets DPRK’s International Agents and Illicit Cyber Intrusion Group | U.S. Department of the Treasury

So Myong is the chief representative of FTB in Vladivostok, Russia and has facilitated
financial transfers on behalf of designated DPRK financial institutions and weapons
trading entities and including representatives, of the U.S.-designated Second Academy of
Natural Sciences. So Myong is designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having acted or
purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, FTB.
Choe Un Hyok is a KUDB representative in Russia who has coordinated multiple payments
to an entity subordinate to the U.S. and UN-designated, Munitions Industry
Department. Choe Un Hyok is designated pursuant to E.O. 13722 for having acted or
purported to act for or on behalf, of, directly or indirectly, KUDB.
Jang Myong Chol is a KCB representative in China that has facilitated transactions worth
hundreds of thousands of dollars. Jang Myong Chol is designated, pursuant to E.O. 13810
for having acted or purported to act for on or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, KCB.

DPRK F RONT COMPANIES
Additionally, OFAC is designating two individuals that have generated revenue for the
Government of North Korea and were previously designated by the European Union for
generating revenue through the exportation of DPRK workers.
Choe Song Chol and Im Song Sun have represented front companies for UN and U.S.designated MOP. MOP was designated pursuant to E.O. 13722 for having engaged in,
facilitated, or been responsible for the exportation of workers from North Korea [OFAC
Press Release]
Choe Song Chol and Im Song Sun are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13810 for being
North Korean persons, including a North Korean person who has engaged in commercial
activity that generates revenue for the Government of North Korea or the Workerʼs Party of
Korea.

A CYB ER ESPIONAGE UNIT W IT H ST RAT EGIC
SIGNIF ICANCE
Active since 2012, Kimsuky is subordinate to the UN- and U.S. designated Reconnaissance
General Bureau (RGB), the DPRKʼs primary foreign intelligence service. On August 30, 2010,
OFAC designated the RGB by adding it to the annex of E.O. 13551. OFAC subsequently redesignated the RGB on January 2, 2015 pursuant to E.O. 13687 for being a controlled entity of
the Government of North Korea. Malicious cyber activity associated with
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1938

3/5

11/30/2023

Treasury Targets DPRK’s International Agents and Illicit Cyber Intrusion Group | U.S. Department of the Treasury

the Kimsuky advanced persistent threat is also known in the cybersecurity industry as APT43,
Emerald Sleet, Velvet Chollima, TA406, and Black Banshee.
Although Kimsuky is primarily an intelligence collection entity, its cyber espionage campaigns
directly support the DPRKʼs strategic and nuclear ambitions. Kimsuky primarily uses spearphishing to target individuals employed by government, research centers, think tanks,
academic institutions, and news media organizations, including entities in Europe, Japan,
Russia, South Korea, and the United States. Kimsuky employs social engineering to collect
intelligence on geopolitical events, foreign policy strategies, and diplomatic e orts a ecting
its interests by gaining illicit access to the private documents, research, and communications
of their targets.
Kimsuky is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13687, for being an agency, instrumentality, or
a controlled entity of the Government of North Korea.

SANCT IONS IMPLICAT IONS
As a result of todayʼs action, pursuant to E.O.s 13687, 13382, 13551, 13722, and 13810, all
property and interests in property of the persons named above that are in the United States,
or in the possession or control of U.S. persons, are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In
addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more
blocked persons are also blocked.
Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or otherwise exempt,
OFACʼs regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting)
the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or
otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or
provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person or the
receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the individuals or entities
designated today may themselves be exposed to designation. Furthermore, any foreign
financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant
financial services for any of the individuals or entities designated today could be subject to
U.S. correspondent or payable-through account sanctions.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from its ability to designate and
add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1938

4/5

11/30/2023

Treasury Targets DPRK’s International Agents and Illicit Cyber Intrusion Group | U.S. Department of the Treasury

List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring
about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking
removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFACʼs Frequently Asked
Question 897.
For additional information on the DPRK Cyber Activities refer to the Guidance on the North
Korean Cyber Threat.
For additional information on Kimsukyʼs recent social engineering operations refer to
the Joint Cyber Advisory DPRK Using Social Engineering to Enable Hacking
techniques and procedures Joint Cybersecurity Advisory

, its tactics,

.

For additional information on DPRK illicit finance and procurement activities see the North
Korea Ballistic Missile Procurement Advisory and the FinCEN Advisory on North Koreaʼs Use of
the International Financial System

.

For detailed information on the process to submit a request for removal from an OFAC
sanctions list, please click here.
Find identifying information on the individuals sanctioned today here.

###

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1938

5/5