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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY Treasury Sanctions Key Actors in Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program March 30, 2022 WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasuryʼs O�ice of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned an Iran-based procurement agent and his network of companies that procured ballistic missile propellant-related materials for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self Su�iciency Jihad Organization (IRGC RSSJO), the IRGC unit responsible for the research and development of ballistic missiles, as well as Iranʼs Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI), an element of Iranʼs Defense Industries Organization (DIO). OFAC is also taking action against a key Iranian intermediary involved in the procurement of parts used to develop missile propellant on behalf of PCI. Todayʼs action follows Iranʼs missile attack on Erbil, Iraq on March 13 and the Iranian enabled Houthi missile attack against a Saudi Aramco facility on March 25 as well as other missile attacks by Iranian proxies against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and are a reminder that Iranʼs development and proliferation of ballistic missiles continues to pose a serious threat to international security. “This action reinforces the United Statesʼ commitment to preventing the Iranian regimeʼs development and use of advanced ballistic missiles,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Brian E. Nelson. “While the United States continues to seek Iranʼs return to full compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, we will not hesitate to target those who support Iranʼs ballistic missile program. We will also work with other partners in the region to hold Iran accountable for its actions, including gross violations of the sovereignty of its neighbors.” Treasuryʼs actions are being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters. The Department of State designated the IRGC RSSJO pursuant to E.O. 13382 on July 18, 2017 for its role in the research and development of ballistic missiles. PCI was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 on July 8, 2008 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Iranʼs DIO, an Iranian arms manufacturer. Mohmmad Ali Hosseini and His Procurement Network Iranian procurement agent Mohammad Ali Hosseini has utilized a network of companies, including Iran-based Jestar Sanat Delijan and Sina Composite Delijan Company, to procure ballistic missile propellant and related materials in support of Iranʼs missile program. Hosseini has been personally involved in high-level meetings and traveled with senior IRGC RSSJO o�icials and, in his role as the manager of Sina Composite, procured processing machines for nitrile butadiene rubber (NBR) from China using falsified shipping documents. Hosseini personally arranged for the purchase and shipment of NBR processing machines, as well as an inert gas jet milling system from Chinese suppliers. Jet mills, also known as fluid energy mills, are used in the production of solid missile propellant. Sayehban Sepehr Delijan, a company also controlled by Hosseini, acted as the co-signee for the NBR shipment. Sepehr Delijan has also previously positioned itself as a company willing to assist in the export of petroleum products from Iran and the import of advanced technologies. Mohammad Ali Hosseini is being designated for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the IRGC RSSJO and PCI. Sina Composite is being designated for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the IRGC RSSJO. Sepehr Delijan and Jestar Sanat are being designated for being owned or controlled by, directly or indirectly, Mohammad Ali Hosseini. Procurement Intermediary for Parchin Chemical Industries Todayʼs action also targets P.B. Sadr Co. which has acted on behalf of PCI as a key intermediary to procure parts that are used to develop missile propellant. PCI has procured centrifuge spare parts used in the production of ballistic missile propellant valued in the hundreds of thousands of dollars from suppliers in China. Tehran-based P.B. Sadr Co. served as the recipient of the centrifuge components on PCIʼs behalf. P.B. Sadr Co. is being designated for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, PCI. SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS As a result of todayʼs action, all property and interests in property of these targets that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. OFACʼs regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within the United States (including transactions transiting the United States) that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons. In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the individuals and entities designated today may themselves be exposed to sanctions or subject to an enforcement action. Furthermore, unless an exception applies, any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction for any of the individuals or entities designated today could be subject to U.S. sanctions. The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from its ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFACʼs Frequently Asked Question 897, here. For detailed information on the process to submit a request for removal from an OFAC sanctions list, please here. View identifying information on the individuals and entities designated today.
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