View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

3/19/2020

Treasury Sanctions Global Iranian Nuclear Enrichment Network | U.S. Department of the Treasury

Treasury Sanctions Global Iranian Nuclear Enrichment Network
July 18, 2019

WASHINGTON – Today the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s O ice of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) took action against a network of front companies and agents involved in the
procurement of sensitive materials for sanctioned elements of Iran’s nuclear program. The
individuals and entities targeted today are based in Iran, China, and Belgium and have acted as
a procurement network for Iran’s Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA), which plays a crucial
role in Iran’s uranium enrichment nuclear program through the production of centrifuges used
in facilities belonging to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). Treasury sanctioned
TESA on November 21, 2011 pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which provides the
authority to impose sanctions on proliferators of weapons of mass destruction.
“Treasury is taking action to shut down an Iranian nuclear procurement network that leverages
Chinese- and Belgium-based front companies to acquire critical nuclear materials and benefit
the regime’s malign ambitions. Iran cannot claim benign intent on the world stage while it
purchases and stockpiles products for centrifuges,” said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin.
“The U.S. government is deeply concerned by the Iranian regime’s uranium enrichment and
other provocative behaviors, and will continue to target all who provide support to Iran’s
nuclear program.”
Among the materials sought by this global network, comprised of seven entities and five
individuals, were items controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a multinational export
control regime. Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), which endorsed
the JCPOA, the sale, supply, or transfer to Iran of NSG-controlled items requires advance, caseby-case approval from the UN Security Council, with very narrow exceptions that do not apply in
this case.

BAKHTAR RAAD SEPAHAN: IRAN, BELGIUM, AND CHINA
SUPPLIER SUPPORT NETWORK
Iranian firm Bakhtar Raad Sepahan, in coordination with its Belgium-based o ice, facilitated
deals for the purchase of hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of Chinese-origin aluminum
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm736

1/4

3/19/2020

Treasury Sanctions Global Iranian Nuclear Enrichment Network | U.S. Department of the Treasury

products and their shipment from China to Iran on behalf of TESA. The aluminum goods are
required for use in Iranian centrifuges, which are manufactured by TESA, and includes some
items controlled by the NSG.
Afsaneh Karimi-Adegani is an employee of Baktaar Raad Sepahan with a background
specializing in aspects associated with nuclear engineering. Karimi engaged China-based
aluminum suppliers in order to fulfill procurement contracts with TESA. Karimi coordinated
with Bakhtar Raad Sepahan’s Belgium-based o ice, TAWU Mechanical Engineering and Trading
Company (TAWU BVBA), and TAWU BVBA’s managing director to procure the aluminum goods.
TAWU BVBA is Bakhtaar Raad Sepahan’s Belgium-based o ice. In coordination with Bakhtar
Raad Sepahan, TAWU BVBA brokered deals for the aluminum goods required for use in Iranian
centrifuges. Sohayl Talebi is the managing director of TAWU BVBA, with an extensive
background in metallurgical engineering. He coordinated with Karimi to procure aluminum
goods on behalf of TESA.
Talebi established China-based Sanming Sino-Euro Import and Export Co., Ltd to facilitate the
acquisition of, and payments for, Chinese-origin aluminum goods. Talebi used Sanming SinoEuro to arrange shipments of aluminum goods to Iran.
China-based Henan Jiayuan Aluminum Industry Company, Limited contracted to sell aluminum
goods worth more than half a million dollars, including NSG-controlled items, to TAWU BVBA for
use by TESA, and coordinated the shipment of the aluminum goods from China to Iran with
TAWU BVBA and Bakhtar Raad Sepahan.
Bakhtar Raad Sepahan, Adegani, TAWU BVBA, Talebi, Sanming Sino-Euro, and Henan Jiayuan
are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide,
financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of TESA.
Sanming Sino-Euro is also being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or
controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Talebi.

TAMIN KALAYE SABZ ARAS COMPANY (SABZ CO.): IRANBASED TESA SUPPLIER WITH CHINESE PROCUREMENT
PARTNERS
Iran-based Sabz Co. held a contract with TESA for alloy parts that was worth tens of thousands
of dollars. It entered agreements with Chinese companies to purchase metal materials for end-

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm736

2/4

3/19/2020

Treasury Sanctions Global Iranian Nuclear Enrichment Network | U.S. Department of the Treasury

use by TESA. Sabz Co. contracted with a Chinese company to purchase metal materials that
match a part used in Iranian gas centrifuges machines.
Salim Borji, the managing director of Sabz Co., has led Iranian delegations to China to meet with
metal suppliers and has signed contracts with, and made payments to, Chinese suppliers on
Sabz Co.’s behalf. Mehdi Najafi is a representative of Sabz Co. who has worked with Chinese
suppliers to procure various metallic products for TESA.
China-based Suzhou Zhongsheng Magnetic Company Limited and Suzhou A-One Special Alloy
CO., Ltd contracted to sell metallic products to Sabz Co. for shipment from China to Iran. Both
Suzhou Magnetic and Suzhou A-One worked with Sabz Co. representative Najafi. Suzhou A-One
sold aluminum products to Sabz Co. that are associated with Iranian centrifuges that are
manufactured by TESA.
Sabz Co. and Najafi are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or
attempted to provide, financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or
services in support of, TESA. Borji is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or
purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Sabz Co. Suzhou Magnetic and
Suzhou A-One are being designated for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial,
material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Sabz Co.

MOHAMMAD FAKHRZADEH
Mohammad Fakhrzadeh, a commercial director for TESA, has coordinated the purchase of
various Chinese-origin aluminum goods that are associated with Iranian centrifuge
components.
Fakhrzadeh is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or purporting to act for or on
behalf of, directly or indirectly, TESA.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of these persons that are in
the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported
to OFAC. OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or
transiting) the United States that involve any property or interest in property of blocked
persons.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm736

3/4

3/19/2020

Treasury Sanctions Global Iranian Nuclear Enrichment Network | U.S. Department of the Treasury

In addition, person that engage in certain transactions with the individuals and entities
designated today may themselves be exposed to designation. Furthermore, any foreign
financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant
financial services for any of the individuals or entities designated today could be subject to U.S.
correspondent account or payable-through account sanctions.
Identifying information related to today’s action.
####

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm736

4/4