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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Testimony of Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and
Financial Crimes Elizabeth Rosenberg Before the Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs Committee, U.S. Senate
May 31, 2023

As Prepared for Delivery
Chairman Brown, Ranking Member Scott, and Distinguished Members of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on “Countering China: Advancing U.S. National
Security, Economic Security, and Foreign Policy.” I also want to thank the Committee for its work
on addressing our relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Your partnership is
critical to clearly convey to the leaders of the PRC that the United States speaks with one voice in
advocating for our national interests and protecting our national security.
The United States and the PRC are the two largest economies in the world. For decades, the PRC’s
economy grew as it implemented market reforms and opened itself up to the global economy. And
despite the current tension in our relationship, cooperation between our two countries is
absolutely critical in addressing important global challenges like the climate and managing
international debt distress. As Secretary Yellen has recently noted, the United States does not seek
conflict, but rather a constructive and fair economic relationship with China, one where we can
work together, when possible, for the benefit of our countries and the world.
That is why we seek expanded engagement with the PRC to work through the difficult issues that
we face. While no two countries’ interests will ever perfectly align, responsible nations must ensure
that those differences do not threaten each other’s safety and security.
Our economic approach to China is guided by three objectives: securing the national security
interests of the United States and our allies and partners and promoting respect for human rights;
seeking an economic relationship with China that fosters growth and innovation in both countries
through healthy competition; and cooperating on the urgent global challenges of our day.
As a steward of the U.S. economic and financial system, the Department of the Treasury plays a
vital role in protecting U.S. national security. For most of the post-9/11 era, Treasury’s targeted
national security work involved cutting terrorists and WMD proliferators off from the U.S. and

international financial system. But now, in addition to addressing these threats, Treasury plays a
key role in conducting broader economic statecraft to advance a host of our national interests.
As I have responsibility for coordinating Treasury policies to address, expose, and target national
security threats, I will address security challenges related to the PRC, and the tools at Treasury’s
disposal to address them.

SECURITY CHALLENGES RELATED TO THE PRC
As an overarching principle, we deploy economic tools in line with the principles that Secretary
Yellen has laid out: narrowly scoped and targeted to clear objectives; easily understood and
enforceable, and readily adaptable when circumstances change; and whenever possible,
coordinated with our allies and partners.
The first of our national security concerns related to the PRC is its challenge to global norms—
norms that have maintained peace and had a part in enabling the PRC’s economic growth.
Just recently at the G7 Hiroshima Summit, leaders discussed economic coercion. As the G7 leaders
recognized, economic coercion “not only undermines the functioning of and trust in the
multilateral trading system, but also infringes upon the international order centered on respect for
sovereignty and the rule of law, and ultimately undermines global security and stability.”
Specifically, we have seen instances when the PRC has not only targeted U.S. persons, but also
those located in our allies and partners like Australia, Canada, South Korea, the Philippines, and
Lithuania. Another way we have observed China exploit economic vulnerabilities and
dependencies is through enabling corruption. Take, for example, Wan Kuok Koi, a PRC national
and former member of the Communist Party of China’s Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference. Wan, also known as Broken Tooth, and his organization, the World Hongmen History
and Culture Association, were designated by Treasury in December 2020 for corrupt practices,
specifically the use of economic and business influence to co-opt elite figures in Malaysia and
Cambodia. It should come as no surprise to Beijing that the economic, finance, and trade teams
among the G7 are actively thinking through ways to build resiliency and support one another as
well as other nations.
We also see efforts by PRC-related actors to conduct economic espionage against sensitive sectors
of the economy. A recent example is the 2022 criminal prosecution by the Department of Justice
and sentencing of Yanjun Xu, a PRC intelligence officer ultimately convicted of attempting to steal
technology and proprietary information from aerospace companies based in the United States and
abroad. This opacity in the PRC military-industrial complex and its military-civil fusion strategy is a

national security concern of the United States and one of the reasons why many PRC aerospace
companies are currently subject to economic restrictions, including from the U.S. Treasury.
We are also concerned about PRC-based transnational crime, including professional money
laundering, cyber-criminal networks, and drug trafficking. Last year, Treasury submitted to
Congress our assessment on money laundering threats emanating from the PRC, which
highlighted many of these criminal activities. We continue to pay close attention to this type of
criminal activity, and on April 23, Treasury identified and sanctioned Wuhan Shuokang Biological
Technology Company and its leadership for the sale of fentanyl precursor chemicals. This action
complemented indictments from the Department of Justice last month that connected these PRC
companies to drug cartels in Mexico. These actions not only are against the letter of U.S. law and
contrary to our national security interests—they also have had a devastating effect on our
communities.
Nor can we overlook PRC’s human rights abuses. Treasury has acted to promote accountability for
the ongoing abuses in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong. In addition, we have acted to promote
accountability for PRC-based entities connected to serious human rights abuses, such as the
Treasury designations of Dalian Ocean Fishing, Pingtan Marine Enterprise, and their affiliates. Over
the years, vessels affiliated with Pingtan violated multiple countries’ laws across the Pacific Ocean,
including in Ecuador and Indonesia. Dalian Ocean withheld food and pay from their crew, refusing
to let some of them disembark for over a year. On one vessel where crew were abused, five
crewmembers died.
Another growing concern we have is the PRC’s role in geopolitical conflict around the world. While
the PRC seemed initially apprehensive about its economic relationship with Russia after Russia’s
full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we have seen bilateral China-Russia trade tick up, including certain
transactions that the United States has now identified as circumventing U.S. sanctions and export
control laws. Take King-Pai Technology Hong Kong, for example. This PRC-based supplier, now
subject to blocking sanctions as well as export restrictions on the Commerce Department’s Entity
List, supplied the Russian military-industrial complex with components used in cruise missile
guidance systems. Another example is designated PRC-based firm Spacety (Changsha Tianyi Space
Science and Technology Research Institute Co. LTD), which sold radar satellite imagery that
enabled the transnational criminal organization Wagner Group to enhance its combat operations
in Ukraine on behalf of Russia. In coordination with our interagency partners, we will continue to
expose and disrupt PRC entities that provide support for the Russian war effort.
The PRC has also been troublingly consistent in its support for North Korea, which allows
Pyongyang to conduct numerous weapons tests contrary to international law. In the meantime,

North Korea has relentlessly worked to maintain and improve its weapons systems, including an
ICBM capable of striking the continental United States, and multiple missiles it has flown over
inhabited Japanese territory. These increasing capabilities, combined with the hostile rhetoric
coming from North Korea, are direct threats to the national security of the United States and its
partners and require a U.S. response; and we believe the PRC can and should play a more
constructive role in stabilizing the region.
Finally, we are closely watching the PRC’s own rapid militarization of international spaces. This
militarization takes many forms. Earlier this year in the South China Sea, for example, the PRC
Coast Guard directed a military-grade laser at Philippine Coast Guard personnel and just last
month, the PRC Coast Guard also aggressively maneuvered near Philippine patrol boat lawfully
operating within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), nearly causing a collision. As
Department of Defense officials at multiple levels have attested, the PRC has also increased
activity along its border with India, and routinely engages in risky operational behavior in
international airspace over the East and South China Seas. Each time the PRC conducts risky
military activities, there is a chance for a mistake or miscalculation, which again goes directly
against our national security interests in preserving freedoms of navigation and overflight and
keeping our allies and partners secure. This is why the People’s Liberation Army is already subject
to many financial and economic restrictions—we do not want funds and goods to go to the PLA to
enable this type of destabilizing behavior.

TREASURY’S NATIONAL SECURITY TOOLS
I want to turn now to our tools at Treasury, and how we deploy them in service of our national
security concerns.
First, Treasury publicly exposes threatening activity. This can, for example, take the form of
targeted financial sanctions, when we designate individuals and entities undermining U.S. national
security. By publicly outing these individuals and entities through a designation, financial
institutions and other organizations are able to build a fuller picture of the illicit activity and take
action to distance themselves from the threats.
The second way we act to protect U.S. national security interests is through targeted disruption
and interdiction efforts. Treasury regularly engages the private sector directly, providing
information to help financial institutions, money service businesses, and other actors in the
economic and finance space to identify and disrupt violations of our sanctions laws and
regulations. Treasury also engages partners and allies who share similar concerns and are willing
to take joint actions and enforcement.

A third way we protect our national security interest is by raising international financial standards
and building partner consensus. Leadership in the Financial Action Task Force, the international
standard-setting body for anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, is a
major way we accomplish this. For example, my team helps lead the international virtual assets
contact group, working to define the rules of the road for international financial systems in
regulation of digital assets and countering their use in money laundering. By leveraging this
international forum and building consensus around model laws and best practices, we increase
the costs for actors to reject these norms.
To conclude, the United States can effectively manage our relationship with China by clearly
conveying our interests and intentions, and by talking to each other about real examples, as I have
done today. Indeed, the health of the global economy rests on how we, both the United States and
the People’s Republic of China, can manage our relationship and address pressing shared
challenges. And while it is my job to address our national security interests through financial
measures, I share Secretary Yellen’s view: the world is big enough for the both of us. Our path is not
preordained nor are we destined for open conflict, so long as we both choose to communicate
clearly and act responsibly.