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4/28/2022

Remarks by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen on Economic Lessons and Principles in Relief and Recovery | U.S…

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Remarks by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen on
Economic Lessons and Principles in Relief and Recovery
April 27, 2022

WASHINGTON - Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen delivered remarks at the Brookingʼs
Hamilton and Hutchins Center event Recession Remedies: Lessons Learned from the US
Economic Policy Response to COVID-19.

As Prepared for Delivery
Iʼd like to thank the Hamilton Project and the Hutchins Center for hosting this important
conference. I am especially honored to participate in todayʼs event with former Treasury
Secretary Bob Rubin. And I congratulate the authors of the volume on recession remedies for
assembling a thoughtful collection of essays. This book is a useful guide for policymakers
preparing to address future economic challenges.
Like many of the scholars engaged in this two-day event, I am no stranger to business cycles.
My career has spanned three years at the Council of Economic Advisers and almost two
decades at the Federal Reserve. Over this period, the U.S. has experienced seven recessions—
varying in origin from a financial crisis to the bursting of the tech bubble to a global pandemic.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, economists observed what they called the “Great Moderation.”
Many hypothesized that a combination of structural economic changes coupled with
monetary policy innovations had permanently dampened the business cycle. Unfortunately,
the financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing Great Recession dashed that hope. Economies
remain vulnerable to major shocks. Most recently, the global pandemic, and now Russiaʼs
invasion of Ukraine, underscore the likelihood of large economic shocks and disruptions that
must be addressed. Downturns are likely to continue to challenge the economy.
Recessions exact heavy tolls. For example, the average output loss during the last seven
recessions is roughly 3.2% of GDP. Excess unemployment—unemployment in excess of the
estimated natural rate—during the ensuing recoveries averaged about 4.5 percentage points.
Moreover, deep and long-lasting recessions appear to permanently lower the path of potential
output. Thus, entirely appropriately, policymakers typically seek to mitigate these costs by
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Remarks by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen on Economic Lessons and Principles in Relief and Recovery | U.S…

implementing policies designed to ignite a quick and strong recovery. That is one of the most
important responsibilities of policymakers and has been a central focus of the Biden
Administration since the outset.
Accordingly, my remarks today will focus on the current recovery. And I will highlight some
“lessons learned” for recovering from future recessions.
A first observation is that, conditional on the inevitability of large negative shocks, countries
will fare better if their economies are more resilient and less fragile. Research that improves
our understanding of the transmission channels of disruptive shocks can improve our
resilience. Improved understanding of breaks in supply chains, increases in commodity prices,
bursting of asset bubbles, and labor and productivity shocks can help policymakers implement
reforms that bolster our economic resilience.
To take one example, a wealth of research preceding the financial crisis of 2008, but not
su iciently appreciated at that time, has now given policymakers a much better
understanding of the linkages between financial markets and the real economy. It explains
how risks to financial stability emerge and how policymakers can monitor the economy to
detect growing threats in real time. Importantly, it explores financial regulations that are
needed to diminish financial stability risks. In the a ermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the
Dodd-Frank Act mandated new regulations intended to diminish financial sector fragility. Far
more stringent capital and liquidity standards were imposed on Americaʼs largest and most
systemic banks.
The e ectiveness of these measures was tested during the pandemic. They enabled
Americaʼs banks to weather the pandemic shock while meeting the credit needs of a
recovering economy. But the crisis also revealed that significant vulnerabilities in the nonbank
financial sector had not been addressed, and, consequently, the Financial Stability Oversight
Council and the Biden Administration are working to mitigate these remaining threats.
In recent weeks, energy price movements have been another significant source of global
economic shocks. The Biden Administrationʼs proposed energy agenda is designed to
diminish our reliance on fossil fuels and help achieve greater energy independence. These
shi s will mitigate our future vulnerability to oil price shocks. At the same time, they will abet
the transition to cleaner energy sources which will, in due course, lessen the risks tied to
natural disasters and climate change. Over the long run, such measures will reduce volatility
while also lessening the depth of future recessions.
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Remarks by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen on Economic Lessons and Principles in Relief and Recovery | U.S…

In addition to improving the resilience of the economy to shocks, it is imperative to build and
maintain an e ective and e icient set of recession remedies—recovery policies that shorten
the duration of recessions and mitigate economic pain. The construction of these recovery
policies must be informed by lived experience and rigorous evaluation of prior approaches,
including those employed to address the economic devastation of 2020 and the beginning of
2021—which is, of course, the central focus of this convening.
I will o er some reactions to the newly released volume. And I will suggest some further
guiding principles for recovery policy. But let me first pause to reflect on the current recovery
and the progress that has been made over the past year and a half.
From a historical perspective, it is important to emphasize that we have already witnessed a
rapid recovery buoyed by a substantial government response—beginning with the CARES Act
at the start of the pandemic, and continuing with the Consolidated Appropriations Act in late
2020, and the American Rescue Plan enacted in early 2021. These federal fiscal actions were
complemented by an unprecedented response by the Federal Reserve along with relief
instituted by national and subnational governments and central banks abroad.
These responses played major roles in igniting a robust recovery. Notably, the American
Rescue Plan played a central role in driving strong growth throughout 2021, with the United
States real GDP growth outpacing other advanced economies and our labor market
recovering faster relative to historical experience. This has meant diminished scarring and
less human su ering. Even through Delta and Omicron—and now a global supply shock due to
Putinʼs unprovoked actions in Ukraine—the Rescue Plan has allowed our economy to face
unknown risks from a position of strength.
As we retrospectively evaluate the merits of this approach, it is important to keep in mind two
key factors that influenced the chosen response.
First, these policies were adopted under conditions of substantial uncertainty. Throughout
2020, and into 2021, the path of the pandemic, including its severity and the role of future viral
strains could not be predicted. Given this uncertainty, the recovery packages sought to
protect against tail risk. They were not just tailored to address the median outcome. Let me
be clear: the tail risk in 2020 and 2021 was a downturn that could match the Great Depression.
It is fairly easy to evaluate policies ex post. But it is important to remember the dire
economic projections prevailed throughout the early days of the pandemic. In a survey
conducted in the spring of 2020, 37 percent of small business owners expected to be closed
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by yearʼs end. Zillowʼs baseline scenario for the housing market was a 60 percent decline in
sales with no price appreciation across 2020 and most of 2021. In mid-2020 the Congressional
Budget O ice projected that the unemployment rate would average 9.3 percent over 2021.
And, even in early 2021, the labor market recovery had stalled and the Blue Chip consensus
projected years of elevated unemployment. These were not worst-case scenarios, but rather
baseline projections. Tail risk scenarios were much worse.
Second, the scars from the Great Recession were still quite fresh. Less than a decade earlier,
the United States had lived through an extended, and o entimes slow, economic recovery in
which Americans became detached from the labor market, lost homes en masse, entered
bankruptcy and debt collection at alarming rates, and endured scarring that would last a
lifetime. Policymakers understood the imperative of exiting the downturn as quickly as
possible and ensuring that support reached those workers and households at greatest risk of
that scarring.
These factors influenced the design of the policies that were implemented. Moreover, as has
occurred in times of crisis, it is evident that some policy approaches presented significant
implementation challenges throughout the pandemic. These factors highlight the need for
reform of our recovery infrastructure.
In this vein, the Hamilton and Hutchins volume seeks to learn from recent experience and
identify key lessons for policymakers. It is an important e ort, and there are many critical
lessons to be gleaned from these studies. Iʼd like to highlight a handful of points that I
consider particularly salient.
Ganong, Greig, Pascal, Sullivan, and Vavra argue that unemployment insurance modernization
is critical. I strongly agree. In their words: “The trade-o between speed and accuracy does
not have to exist.” In that regard, recent actions taken by the Labor Department to
modernize unemployment insurance by preventing fraud, improving access, and reducing
backlogs represent meaningful progress and are key steps.
Gelman and Stephens helpfully explain that stimulus payments can be an e ective mechanism
for injecting cash into the economy quickly, but we must also continue to study the interplay
between cash support and the social safety net. The authors note, for example, that with
long delays in the receipt of unemployment insurance and significant earnings losses even for
workers who retained employment, rapid receipt of cash assistance served as a partial o set.
But better understanding of these interactions will help us pinpoint when and how cash
assistance should be delivered.
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Willen, Gerardi, and Lambie-Hansen rightly assess that mortgage forbearance relief was a
successful element of the relief e ort and a promising approach in future recovery packages,
although it was neither costless nor a panacea. Throughout the pandemic, the combination
of forbearance relief and the support from Treasuryʼs Homeownership Assistance Fund has
provided an important tool to preserve housing stability for American homeowners at risk.
Following Goodman and Wachter, the crisis has exposed the need for a more permanent
rental safety net. Housing stability is a foremost concern not just in downturns, but in
recoveries as well. During this crisis, Treasury was at the forefront of establishing—for the
first time—a national e ort at scale for rental assistance. Emergency Rental Assistance has
not only helped to keep evictions below their pre-pandemic levels, it has also enabled states
and localities to build an infrastructure for rental assistance going forward.
Finally, Aizer and Persico surmise that the rapid and sizable policy response will have longterm payo s in terms of childhood outcomes including nutrition, health, and academic
achievement. Indeed, I predict that researchers will establish that the Biden Administrationʼs
expanded Child Tax Credit increased childhood wellbeing during this crisis.
The preceding lessons come from interventions associated with the 2020 recession. There
are also general lessons from the pandemic experience and from past recessions.
First, it is imperative to address the specific source of crises. In 2008, recovery would have
been impossible without recapitalizing and restoring confidence in the banking system. In
2020, in contrast, recovery was tied to the progress of the pandemic. Vaccine dissemination
has been the most important element of the response. Other crises will have di erent
origins. It will be critical to address their root cause.
Second, we must consider equity. Downturns are o en most destructive for the most
vulnerable neighborhoods and populations, and especially communities of color. The
American Rescue Plan made sure that funds reached those communities with the most
serious damage. That included, for example: flexible rental assistance programs that did not
exclude the neediest renters because of overly stringent documentation requirements;
targeted outreach in a range of languages; and state and local funds used for investments
targeted to communities especially vulnerable to the pandemic.
Third, e ective automatic stabilizers—called “workhorse antirecession programs” in the 2019
book Recession Ready—are perhaps the most important policy tool, which is why President
Biden proposed them in his original Rescue Plan proposal. Every recession in recent decades
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has reinforced the need for a flexible, automatic response. Well-designed automatic
stabilizers are the best remedy. Preparing for the next recession means not only improving
existing stabilizers but expanding their reach to other forms of social support and building the
“pipes” to distribute relief in a timely manner.
Fourth, it is necessary to preserve attachment to the labor force in an economic downturn. As
a hangover from the Great Recession, the long-term unemployed and those out of the labor
force continue to su er its scars. While we need more work to best target our policy
response, in recent years weʼve worked with multiple new policy levers to keep workers on
payroll and o long-term unemployment. And the strength of the American Rescue Plan has
no doubt contributed to the record fall in long-term unemployment—a strong and positive
contrast to the lingering high numbers of long-term unemployed that we saw a er the Great
Recession.
Fi h, policymakers must support basic human needs, including housing, health care, and
nutrition. Denial of access not only results in immediate su ering, but also has long-term
consequences as well. Programs like the Biden Administrationʼs expanded Child Tax Credit
and Economic Impact Payments provided umbrella support for these needs, but more
targeted in-kind relief can also be an e ective tool.
Lastly, we need to invest in measurement, oversight, and accountability to improve impact.
Economists and other researchers need high-quality, high-frequency data to assess the depth
of recession in real time and to adequately evaluate the success of policy interventions. The
rapid onset of the pandemic recession dramatically highlighted the need for better data. And
despite admirable creativity by researchers in 2020 to assess the state of the economy, we
must invest now in better tools for monitoring. Similarly, comprehensive oversight and
accountability safeguards—designed in advance—are necessary to ensure that public
resources are appropriately deployed.
In conclusion, I commend the Hamilton Project, the Hutchins Center, and the contributing
authors for this important volume. Legislation over the past two years, unprecedented in size
and scope, was informed by a rich literature directed at improving recovery policies. The
pandemicʼs toll would have been much worse if not for policy response informed by careful
study. The research and insight presented in this volume will help guide America through
future recessions. On behalf of the millions of Americans whose lives will be a ected, I thank
you.
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