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3/2/2023

Remarks by Under Secretary for Domestic Finance Nellie Liang During Workshop on “Next Steps to the Future of Mone…

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Remarks by Under Secretary for Domestic Finance Nellie Liang
During Workshop on “Next Steps to the Future of Money and
Payments”
March 1, 2023

As Prepared for Delivery
Thank you to the organizers of todayʼs workshop for inviting me to speak about next steps to
the future of money and payments.[1]
Roughly one year ago, President Biden signed an Executive Order (EO) calling for a
government-wide approach to the responsible development of digital assets.[2] The goal of
the EO is to promote responsible innovation, while also mitigating risks to users, the financial
system, the economy, and national security. In response, Treasury prepared reports on the
future of money and payments; current use cases of crypto-assets and their e ects on
consumers, investors, and businesses; and an action plan to mitigate the illicit finance risks of
these assets. The Financial Stability Oversight Council published a report on the financial
stability risks of digital assets and identified regulatory gaps.
Failures of large crypto firms, runs on stablecoins, and substantial investor losses in the past
year confirmed many of the concerns raised in the reports. Commingling of customer and firm
assets, conflicts of interests, and lack of risk management and other standards contributed
to these episodes. These developments reinforce the recommendations that were made for
regulators to vigorously enforce existing laws to protect consumers and prevent use of
crypto assets for illicit finance, as well as to continuously monitor whether emerging products
or services require new regulations. In addition, the reports recommended for Congress to
expand regulatorsʼ authorities where gaps have been identified, including with respect to
regulation of stablecoins.
My remarks today will focus on the future of money and payments and, more specifically, on
central bank digital currency (CBDC). Central banks are at the heart of the global monetary
system. Central bank money anchors the value of commercial bank money, and provides a riskfree asset for settling interbank transactions. Central bank payment systems serve as the
backbone for payment systems more generally. Given the central bankʼs key roles, changes in
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the design of central bank money and payments are likely to have profound implications for
financial health of consumers and the economy.
CBDC is one of several options for upgrading the legacy capabilities of central bank money.
Another is real time payment systems: The Federal Reserve has indicated that it expects to
launch the FedNow Service this year, which will be designed to allow for near-instantaneous
retail payments on a 24x7x365 basis, using an existing form of central bank money (i.e., central
bank reserves) as an interbank settlement asset. In contrast, a CBDC would involve both a
new form of central bank money and, potentially, a new set of payment rails. Both real time
payment systems and CBDCs present opportunities to build a more e icient, competitive, and
inclusive U.S. payment system.
In the United States, policymakers are continuing to deliberate about whether to have a
CBDC, and if so, what form it would take. The Fed has also emphasized that it would only
issue a CBDC with the support of the executive branch and Congress, and more broadly the
public.[3] Even as policy deliberations continue, the Fed is conducting technology research and
experimentation to inform design choices so that it is positioned to issue a CBDC if it were
determined to be in the national interest.
With that frame in mind, let me describe the steps we are taking to advance work on policy
issues posed by the prospect of a U.S. CBDC, and to engage internationally to support
responsible development of global CBDCs.

ADVANCING W ORK ON POLICY ISSUES F OR A U.S. CB DC
Treasuryʼs Report on the Future of Money and Payments [4] called for a Treasury-led
interagency working group (CBDC Working Group) to advance work on CBDC. One of the
central tasks for the CBDC Working Group is to complement the Fedʼs work by considering the
implications of a U.S. CBDC for policy objectives for which a broader Administration
perspective is helpful. To give you a sense of how we are pursuing this work, I will describe our
approach to thinking about CBDC options, the policy questions we are attempting to answer,
and the kinds of recommendations we hope to develop.

CBDC Options
As a digital form of a countryʼs currency, a CBDC would likely have three core features. First, it
would be legal tender. Second, it would be convertible one-for-one into other forms of
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central bank money—reserve balances or cash. Third, it would clear and settle nearly
instantly.[5] Beyond these core features, creating a CBDC would involve many design choices.
An especially important decision is whether to have a wholesale CBDC, a retail CBDC or, both.
In characterizing wholesale and retail options, we have found it useful to think about how
each would di er from central bank reserves – in particular, whether the core di erences
relate to “technological features” or “access features,” i.e., the users that would be able to
access the CBDC.
For wholesale CBDC, the basic di erence from central bank reserves would relate to
technology. For example, a wholesale CBDC could be a tokenized central bank lability, which
potentially could support around-the-clock payment activity, atomic settlement of
transactions, certain types of programmability, or other benefits. By contrast, the accessrelated features of a wholesale CBDC may or may not di er from central bank reserves. A
wholesale CBDC could be accessible to financial institutions that are currently eligible for
central bank accounts, or to a wider range of financial intermediaries. But while policymakers
might consider granting access to a wholesale CBDC to institutions not currently eligible for
central bank accounts, that decision would be an independent choice, rather than a necessary
consequence of having a wholesale CBDC.
Of course, technological di erences between a wholesale CBDC and reserves could still have
significant practical implications. For example, a wholesale CBDC could support interbank
settlement among commercial banks if they were to issue tokenized deposits, or provide a
risk-free settlement asset for tokenized securities transactions. A wholesale CBDC might also
be used as a backing asset for stablecoins, which could make it easier to transfer value among
stablecoins, in addition to supporting greater interoperability and choice. Depending on
design, a wholesale CBDC may also enable more e icient cross-border payments by increasing
the speed of settlement or through participation in new multilateral platforms for crossborder payments.[6] At the same time, some of the potential benefits of a wholesale CBDC
might also be possible through upgrades to existing central bank payment systems, including
interlinking systems in di erent jurisdictions or new multilateral platforms based on these
systems.[7]
With retail CBDC, by contrast, the most important di erence from central bank reserves is
related to access features, not technology features. Unlike central bank reserves, a retail
CBDC would be a digital liability of the central bank that is accessible to the general public. In
its CBDC discussion paper, the Fed has stated that a potential U.S. CBDC, if one were created,
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would best serve the United States by being “intermediated,” meaning that the private sector
would o er accounts or digital wallets to facilitate the management of CBDC holdings and
payments.[8] In terms of technology, a retail CBDC might involve a di erent architecture
compared to a CBDC that is intended solely for wholesale use.
A retail CBDC could contribute to a more competitive and innovative payment system; support
financial inclusion; and help preserve the singleness of the currency.[9] The extent to which a
retail CBDC would promote these objectives would depend on many further design decisions,
including decisions about the range of intermediaries that would act as service providers in
the CBDC ecosystem, and the requirements to which those intermediaries would be subject.
There are also risks of a retail CBDC, including the potential for runs into a retail CBDC that
could destabilize private sector lending during stress periods.

Policy Questions for the CBDC working group
As I mentioned a few moments ago, the CBDC Working Group is intended to complement the
Fedʼs e orts by considering the implications of a U.S. CBDC for policy objectives for which a
broader Administration perspective is helpful. These objectives fall into a few main areas.
The first set of objectives relate to global financial leadership, including the global role of the
U.S. dollar. This role confers both economic and strategic benefits on the United States.
Economic benefits include lower transaction and borrowing costs for U.S. households,
businesses and government, while strategic benefits include influence over the architecture of
the international financial system.[10] In my view, global demand for the dollar stems from
structural factors – such as our respect for the rule of law, the strength of our economy, and
the depth, breadth, and openness of U.S. financial markets – that are fundamentally
independent of whether the United States has a CBDC. Nevertheless, we are thinking about
whether a U.S. CBDC, to the extent it has functionality that traditional forms of central bank
money lack, could help to preserve the dollarʼs global role. We are also thinking about whether
a U.S. CBDC could help reduce undesirable frictions in cross-border payments or other
activities.
The second set of objectives relate to national security. The United States uses sanctions
and other financial measures to address national security threats and deny criminals and
other illicit actorsʼ access to the U.S. and international financial system. The e ectiveness of
these tools rests in part on the strength and centrality of the U.S. financial system and the
role of the dollar. Some have suggested that the development of foreign CBDCs, including
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multi-CBDC platforms, could diminish the use of the dollar and e ectiveness of our tools in
this space. In addition, the U.S. and the global financial system benefit from secure and
resilient payment systems that have strong cyber security protections and protect user data.
Yet new payment systems, including foreign CBDCs, may be designed without appropriate
consideration of cybersecurity and resilience measures. We are assessing the magnitude of
these and other potential national security risks, and whether a U.S. CBDC or other tools
could help to counter these risks.
The third set of objectives relate to privacy, illicit finance, and financial inclusion. A U.S. CBDC
would need to both protect the privacy of users and minimize the risk of illicit financial
transactions. In addition, given that the United States has the largest unbanked population
among G-7 countries on a per capita basis and that payments are expensive for some users, a
potential U.S. CBDC should be evaluated on whether it can promote inclusion and equity in the
delivery of financial services.
Across these three interests – global financial leadership; national security; and privacy, illicit
finance, and inclusion – CBDC design choices are likely to involve trade-o s. As an example,
one way of reconciling privacy with illicit finance concerns in a retail CBDC might be to have a
tiered structure in which less data are collected for small dollar transactions or small volume
accounts. But limits on the amount or number of transactions could make a retail CBDC less
useful to end-users.[11] This suggests a three-way trade-o among privacy, countering illicit
finance goals, and inclusion. The CBDC Working Group will work to identify trade-o s and
possible ways of reconciling objectives, including looking ahead to possible technological
advances that could reduce the size of any trade-o s.

NEXT ST EPS F OR U.S. CB DC
In the coming months, leaders from Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and White House o ices,
including the Council of Economic Advisors, National Economic Council, National Security
Council, and O ice of Science and Technology Policy, will begin to meet regularly to discuss a
possible CDBC and other payments innovations. To support these discussions, the CBDC
Working Group is developing an initial set of findings and recommendations. These may
relate to whether a U.S. CBDC would help to advance the policy objectives described above;
the features that a U.S. CBDC would need to advance these objectives; options for resolving
CBDC design trade-o s; and areas where additional technological R&D would be useful. Full
consideration of these issues for a possible CBDC – wholesale, retail, or both – will take some
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time to complete, but the Working Group plans to provide interim public updates. Also, as
recommended in Treasuryʼs Report on the Future of Money and Payments, the Federal Reserve
is encouraged to provide periodic public updates as it continues its research and technical
experimentation on CBDCs.

ADVANCING W ORK ON INT ERNAT IONAL ENGAGEMENT
In addition to advancing work on the policy implications of a U.S. CBDC, another purpose of
the CBDC Working Group is to engage with allies and partners to promote shared learning and
responsible development of CBDCs.
As others have observed, jurisdictions around the world are exploring CBDCs. According to
the Atlantic Councilʼs tracker, 114 countries, representing over 95 percent of global GDP, are
exploring CBDC. 11 countries have fully launched CBDCs, while central banks in other major
jurisdictions are researching and experimenting with CBDCs, with some at a fairly advanced
stage. The Bank of England (BOE) and HM Treasury (HMT) recently published a consultation
paper assessing the case for a retail CBDC and outlining a proposed technological model.[12]
BOE and HMT now are entering the design phase of their work, estimated to take two to
three years, a er which the BOE and the UK government will decide whether to build a
“digital pound.” In addition, there are multiple cross-border CBDC pilots, which involve central
banks, international organizations such as the Bank for International Settlements, and private
financial institutions.
Regardless of whether the United States decides to adopt a CBDC, the United States has an
important set of interests in this work. We have an interest in ensuring that CBDCs interact
safely and e iciently with the existing financial infrastructure; that they support financial
stability and the integrity of the international financial system; that global payment systems
are e icient, innovative, competitive, secure, and resilient; and that global payments systems
continue to reflect broader shared democratic values, like openness, privacy, accessibility, and
accountability to the communities that rely upon them.
To inform global e orts to explore CBDCs, we plan to make contributions in two critical areas:
international standard-setting, and technical expertise.

Engagement on standards

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International standards help promote e icient and sound domestic financial systems and
global financial stability. They are both regulatory, like those standards developed by the
Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructure, and technical, like those created at the
International Organization for Standardization. With respect to payments, these standards
support technical, business practice, and legal and regulatory interoperability and alignment.
While CBDC-related technical standards such as digital identifiers and messaging formats
may sound esoteric, they have important policy implications such as for privacy. Governance
standards, including those linked to participation in cross-border CBDC arrangements, are
also critically important.
Treasury is working closely with our colleagues at the Fed and in other parts of the U.S.
government to ensure that U.S. interests are being e ectively represented in standardsetting processes. Fortunately, we are not starting from a blank slate. While CBDCs are
themselves new, there are longstanding standards for financial activity, many of which can
apply to CBDC no less than they do to legacy systems. Global anti-money laundering and
counter-terrorist financing standards, as set by the Financial Action Task Force, would apply
to CBDCs, and the U.S. government is working bilaterally and multilaterally to encourage
countries to apply and enforce the standards. We are also actively working with allies and
partners to identify where new standards may be needed. Our e orts to shape international
standards are a key part of the framework for international engagement on digital assets
that Treasury delivered to the President in July pursuant to the Digital Assets EO.
As we develop standards for CBDCs, we recognize that countries may make di erent design
choices based on their policy goals, legacy payment systems, and other di erences in national
facts and circumstances.[13] Especially in the context of a new technology, there are
opportunities to learn from a diverse set of approaches. At the same time, there are
significant benefits to supporting the interoperability of new payment systems, including
CBDCs.[14] We will continue to work with our allies and partners during our exploration and
development of CBDCs with these considerations in mind.

Sharing technology and technical expertise
In terms of sharing technology and technical expertise with other countries that are
developing CBDCs, the Federal Reserve plays a key role. This reflects the Federal Reserveʼs
expertise in developing and running payment systems, as well as the Fedʼs existing
relationships with central banks around the world. Others also have important roles. The
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National Science Foundation and the White House O ice of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP) are leading an interagency process to develop a national R&D agenda for digital
assets, including CBDCs. As part of this process, OSTP recently published a request for
information that, among other things, sought feedback on technologies that could protect
the privacy of CBDC users while also preventing the CBDC from being used by bad actors. As
with other new technological innovations, beneficial innovations with respect to CBDC are
more likely if we harness the expertise that exists across governments, universities, and the
private sector.

CONCLUSION
In summary, U.S. policymakers are evaluating whether a U.S. CBDC is in the national interest.
As part of this e ort, Treasury is leading an interagency CBDC Working Group to support the
Fed and develop recommendations related to policy objectives for which a broader
Administration perspective is helpful: global financial leadership; national security; and privacy,
illicit finance, and inclusion. Even as these deliberations continue, we recognize the
importance of helping to shape global CBDC outcomes by actively participating in global
standard-setting initiatives and by sharing technology and technical expertise with other
jurisdictions that are developing CBDCs.
###
[1] The workshop was organiz ed by The Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center, The Digital Assets Policy Project of the Harvard
Kennedy School Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government, The MIT Digital Currency Initiative, and Stanford
Universityʼs Future of Digital Currency Initiative.
[2] Exec. Order No. 14067, 87 Fed. Reg. 14143 (March 9, 2022).
[3] See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Money and Payments: The U.S. Dollar in the Age of Digital
Transformation

" (January 2022).

[4] U.S. Department of the Treasury, “The Future of Money and Payments

” (September 2022).

[5] Ibid.
[6] It is important to note, however, that frictions in cross-border payments reflect factors - such as di erences in technical,
business, and regulatory standards across jurisdictions -- that new technology by itself would not automatically overcome.
[7] Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, “Enhancing cross-border payments: building blocks of a global roadmap
” (July 2020).
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[8] In addition to being intermediated, the Fed stated that a potential U.S. CBDC would best serve the United States by being
privacy protected, identity verified, and transferable. See Board of Governors, “Money and Payments,” in note 3. Some of these
principles might also apply to a wholesale CBDC.
[9] Preserving the singleness of the currency would mean ensuring that money used in the U.S. economy is dollar-denominated
and convertible at par from one form or issuer to another. On the role of central bank money in supporting the singleness of the
currency, see Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, “The role of central bank money in payment systems

”

(August 2003).
[10] See Board of Governors, “Money and Payments,” in note 3.
[11] MIT Digital Currency Initiative, “CBDC: Expanding Financial Inclusion or Deepening the Digital Divide

” (January 2023).

[12] See Bank of England and HM Treasury, “The digital pound: A new form of money for households and businesses” (February
2023).
[13] Tobias Adrian, “Central Bank Independence and the Development of Payments and CBDCs” (January 2023).
[14] Agustin Carstens, “Interoperability in payments: for the old and the new?” (November 2021).

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