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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Remarks by Under Secretary for Domestic Finance Nellie Liang at
the 2022 Treasury Market Conference
November 16, 2022

As prepared for delivery

INTRODUCTION
Good morning. It is great to be back in person at this conference. I would like to begin by
thanking our colleagues in the Inter-Agency Working Group on Treasury Market Surveillance
(IAWG) for co-hosting this conference.[1] The collaboration between IAWG members has been
tremendously important as we prioritize efforts to strengthen the resilience of the Treasury
market. The feedback from many of you to implement those priorities has also been very
useful. I believe that collectively, we have made significant progress on a path to a more
resilient market. We have introduced some significant changes and proposals, but there is still
more to do. Today I would like to begin by offering some brief observations about current
Treasury market liquidity conditions. After that, I will highlight the overall work of the IAWG, and
then provide more detail about a key workstream led by Treasury to improve data quality and
transparency in the Treasury market.

TREASURY MARKET LIQUIDITY
The Treasury market plays a critical role to finance the federal government, support the broader
financial system, and implement monetary policy. A liquid, well-functioning market is key to
supporting those objectives. Market liquidity is often characterized by the cost and ease of
transacting, and can vary with changes in the financial environment.
Over the past year or so, liquidity conditions in the Treasury market have shown some
deterioration, but I believe these conditions largely reflect the heightened uncertainty about
economic and geopolitical conditions. It is not surprising that it is somewhat harder and more
expensive to trade, but there is a significant amount of trading. Moreover, to date, we have not
seen strong signs that the decline in liquidity is driving up financial volatility.

To start, it is clear that the disruptive impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine, combined with lingering
uncertainties regarding supply chain disruptions as well as uncertainties about the persistence
of higher inflation, have led to substantial asset price volatility this year in both domestic and
global financial markets. As indicated in Figure 1, the volatility of the yields of the 2-year and 10year Treasury notes have risen, but it has risen more notably for the 2-year than for the 10-year,
reflecting the greater scale of near-term uncertainties.
Historically, volatility has a significant negative effect on liquidity conditions. This relationship
is illustrated in Figure 2 by the inverse relationship between the volatility of yields and market
depth, which in this chart is measured by the depth of resting orders on a central-limit order
book in the electronic interdealer segment of the market. Market depth for the 2-year note
currently is very low, near the lows of March 2020, as has been pointed out by many observers.
But volatility is notably higher than in 2020, and to a large extent, responsible for pushing
liquidity lower. By contrast, current market depth for the 10-year note is well above March 2020
lows despite similar levels of volatility in the two periods.
In addition, investors often cite price impact, or the price movements that can occur as a result
of their trades, as a key concern. As seen in Figure 3, an estimate of price impact indicates that it
has increased across tenors, but relatively less for the 10-year than for the 2-year note, again
linking back to the relatively higher volatility at the front-end than the longer-end. Another
measure, bid-ask spreads, shown in Figure 4, have also increased across tenors, but show
episodic spikes in the 2-year note.
While these indicators paint a picture of higher costs and less ease of transacting in Treasury
securities that are linked to higher volatility, so far, the market, more broadly, has continued to
operate well during these particularly volatile times. As the next figure shows, transaction
volumes have not indicated any sustained decline in the significant activity that clears through
the Treasury market each day. Trading volumes are high, at an average above $600 billion per
day in recent months. Regular conversations with market participants indicate they have been
able to effectively transfer a substantial amount of interest rate risk. Compositional trends,
such as whether trading is occurring in the interdealer or dealer-to-customer venues, or the
relative participation by different types of intermediaries, have also remained steady. As the
next figure shows, the volume reflects an increase in net selling of off-the-run securities, though
the extent and pace has been far more moderate than the tremendous amount of net selling by
end-users in March 2020.

Overall, investors in recent months have been able to continue to transfer risk in large size at all
tenors, though at somewhat higher cost, reflecting greater uncertainty. Still, there is a risk that
more negative shocks could lead to disruptions in market functioning, particularly if the shocks
were amplified by leverage, funding mismatches, or other constraints at Treasury market
participants. It is therefore important we continue to closely monitor this critical market for
signs of rising vulnerabilities.

ENHANCING TREASURY MARKET RESILIENCE
Let me turn to the official sector’s recent efforts to enhance the resilience of the Treasury
market. The market has changed significantly over time, with changes in technology,
participants, and regulations, and Treasury debt outstanding has grown substantially.
Moreover, episodes of significant market stress in recent years highlight the need for the official
sector to consider and take actions to ensure that the market operates efficiently and
effectively, and that liquidity is resilient and elastic. Actions to enhance resilience are designed
to support the Treasury market’s ability to absorb, and not significantly amplify, adverse market
shocks that could lead to breakdowns in intermediation. These actions are not meant to
eliminate the kinds of changes in liquidity, those due to increases in volatility, like we have seen
in recent months. Moreover, we do not expect actions could fully insulate market liquidity from
unpredictably large exogenous shocks, such as the pandemic, even with substantive reforms
under consideration or already implemented.
When I spoke at last year’s conference, the IAWG had just released a Staff Progress Report on its
review of potential policies to enhance Treasury market resilience.[2] In September, Treasury
released a fact sheet, highlighting 12 key actions taken across the official sector to make
progress in building resilience.[3] And just last week, the IAWG released a second Staff Progress
Report to summarize recent accomplishments and provide greater perspective about some
future work.[4] All told, the official sector has made tremendous progress in a short period of
time, though there is still much work ahead. We will hear about some of these efforts later
today, which include proposals for enhanced oversight of participants and venues and to
centrally clear more Treasury transactions, analysis of options for establishment of more
uniform leverage requirements across participants, and a study of the potential benefits of allto-all trading.
I will focus on recent accomplishments and the road ahead for two parts of a workstream
focused on improving data quality and availability that Treasury is leading. The first is related to

data collection in the non-centrally cleared bilateral repo market by the Office of Financial
Research (OFR), and the second is related to data collection of transactions in the secondary
cash market and efforts to improve public transparency of that data. The work to improve data
quality and availability in the Treasury market was developed to support the official sector’s
ability to assess market conditions and preparedness to respond to market stresses, and also to
provide transparency that fosters public confidence, fair trading, and a market ecosystem that
provides for more resilient and elastic liquidity.

OFR’S NON-CENTRALLY CLEARED BILATERAL REPO PILOT
One of the largest remaining gaps in Treasury market data for the official sector is the noncentrally cleared bilateral repo market, where transactions are conducted between two firms
without a central counterparty. At the beginning of this year, the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York updated its primary dealer statistics collection to capture primary dealer repo activity (in
Treasury securities and other collateral classes) in the different repo market segments, as can be
seen in Figure 7. As a whole, primary dealer (reverse repo) outstanding has been roughly $2
trillion in the past few years. According to the new data, about 60 percent of primary dealer repo
lending and about 40 percent of primary dealer repo borrowing occurs in the non-centrally
cleared bilateral repo market segment. This suggests an important gap to fill, to collect
information on primary dealers’ counterparties and the terms of the trades to be able to assess
leverage in the Treasury market and the market’s resilience to various shocks.
To assess filling this data gap, OFR conducted a pilot data collection on the non-centrally
cleared bilateral repo market in June 2022, covering nine U.S. registered broker-dealers over
three days in that month. This pilot was conducted after extensive consultation with market
participants and drew upon findings from an earlier pilot completed in 2015.[5]
Enough of the recent pilot data has been collected for us to share some preliminary
conclusions. Based on our initial observations for the first day of the collection, the pilot
confirmed that participants conduct significantly larger volumes of transactions in this segment
of the repo market than in centrally cleared segments. This preliminary result is consistent with
the previous estimates and further illustrates that this collection helps to fill an important gap.
In addition, the pilot data indicates that Treasury securities are the dominant collateral in the
market, representing almost 95 percent of repo and 85 percent of reverse repo. The prominence
of Treasury and agency securities is similar to activity in other repo market segments.

We can also see who dealers are lending to and on what terms. While there are a variety of
borrowers, such as banks and other broker-dealers, the largest group in the data collection are
hedge funds. Being able to look at hedge fund exposures will be very helpful for evaluating
when leverage or other vulnerabilities in the Treasury market are increasing.
With respect to terms and standards, the pilot indicates that borrowing rates in the noncentrally cleared bilateral market are similar to those in other repo market segments. In
particular, the distribution of rates for overnight Treasury securities collateralized repo is similar
to rates in the centrally cleared market.
But there are two significant distinctions of note, in maturities and in haircuts. This segment of
the market has more trades with longer maturities. Less than 40 percent of the data collected
from the pilot participants are overnight, compared to more than 70 percent in the centrally
cleared market, and more than 30 percent of total volume has maturities of more than 30 days.
In addition, and as previewed in 2015, almost 75 percent of repo transactions collateralized by
Treasury securities and about 25 percent of repo transactions collateralized by non-Treasury
securities are traded at a zero percent haircut. In certain cases, these haircuts may represent
netted packages, where dealers enter into offsetting repo and reverse-repo trades with their
counterparties, but it will be important to assess how these practices affect risks.
The preliminary analysis indicates that having robust data on this market is important for better
understanding how to improve Treasury market resilience. The differences in maturities and in
haircut practices raise important questions about how this market meets the needs of different
types of counterparties. They also reinforce the need to be able to monitor this segment of the
market for emerging financial stability risks.
OFR will continue to study data from this pilot collection, collaborating with the IAWG members
and Financial Stability Oversight Council’s working group on hedge funds. These efforts are also
informing a rulemaking by the OFR to establish a permanent collection of data for this
significant segment of the Treasury repo market.

ADDITIONAL PUBLIC TRANSPARENCY FOR TREASURY
SECURITIES
Turning to transparency to the public for the cash Treasury market, let me briefly recap several
steps that have been taken in the past few years before turning to next steps. In 2017, the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) began collecting transaction data from its

members through the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) and providing that data
to the official sector. Release of weekly aggregate volume data to the public began in March
2020, which by chance turned out to be the week with the highest reported volumes since data
collection began in mid-2017. Then in 2021, FINRA enhanced the public release by providing
more historical data back to 2019 and making changes to accommodate the re-introduction of
the 20-year bond. Based on feedback from market participants, the additional release of
aggregate statistics has been a valuable resource to evaluate how much and in what sectors
trading is occurring. In particular, the aggregate statistics have provided insight into parts of the
market that have traditionally been less transparent, such as trading in the dealer-to-customer
segment and in off-the-run Treasury securities.
This past summer, the SEC approved another FINRA proposal to increase the frequency of
releasing aggregate data from weekly to daily, and to include additional statistics such as daily
trade counts and average prices. Based on guidance from FINRA, we anticipate this new daily
aggregate data will be released to the public beginning sometime in the first quarter of 2023.
Given broad market participant support for the public release of the aggregate data, Treasury
along with the IAWG members, believed it was appropriate to consider a policy for additional
public transparency of transaction data. To assess next steps and collect feedback from the
public, Treasury published a request for information (RFI) in June. Treasury stated in the RFI
that additional insight into Treasury securities transactions “may enhance liquidity by fostering
a greater understanding of market activity across market segments,” and “may also promote
greater competition in the Treasury securities market.” The RFI sought input on the potential
benefits and risks of additional public transparency, as well as on a range of illustrative
scenarios for what public transparency could look like. As a follow-up, we also requested input
from the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee (TBAC).
Responses to the RFI noted several potential benefits of additional transparency. First,
additional transparency may improve investor confidence, particularly in times of stress and in
less liquid securities. Investors may gain more assurance from observing executed transactions
rather than indicative quotes and may therefore be more willing to remain engaged in the
market. Second, additional transparency for transactions may support greater price discovery
and thereby expand the supply of liquidity. RFI responses noted price data are unevenly
available, and may depend upon access to certain venues, costly subscriptions, or direct
participation in a transaction. Respondents argued that broader access to pricing information
would allow for better evaluation of execution costs, enhanced risk management, more efficient

price discovery, and increased competition. On this last point, several RFI responses noted
academic research has generally found that post-trade transparency for other fixed-income
markets, like corporates and mortgage-backed securities, tends to increase competition and
benefit investors through reduced transaction costs.
At the same time, feedback highlighted potential risks related to additional transparency. Most
RFI responses noted that releasing information too quickly or with too much detail could end up
reducing liquidity. Responses also indicated these risks could be particularly acute for less
liquid segments of the Treasury market, such as off-the-run securities. Concerns from
intermediaries and end-users tended to focus on the ability of intermediaries to effectively
transfer risk in large size, or for less liquid securities if information were to be released that
could be used to trade against the intermediary. In such a scenario, the intermediary would
face increased risks to execute transactions, which would likely result in increased costs passed
on to end-users. In the worst-case scenarios, which could include stress episodes, respondents
noted that intermediaries might be unwilling to transact in less liquid securities.
Feedback also offered a broad range of possible paths forward, though we see some areas of
consensus. For one, nearly all responses indicated that any additional transparency should
proceed gradually, and that the initial focus should be on more liquid segments of the Treasury
securities market. In addition, feedback advised that the release of information be calibrated to
mitigate potential risks for large trades or for trades in less liquid segments. It was very clear
that a “one-size-fits-all” approach was viewed as inappropriate and potentially harmful.
Treasury greatly appreciates all the input we have received on this topic over the last several
months. Based on the feedback, we believe that additional transparency can provide
meaningful and lasting benefits on net for the Treasury securities market. We also agree that we
should proceed in a gradual and calibrated manner. In particular, we are proposing that the
next step should be to release transaction data for on-the-run nominal coupons, with endof-day dissemination and with appropriate cap sizes.
To speak a bit more about this proposed policy, let me first discuss why we are focusing on onthe-run nominal coupon securities. These benchmark securities represent the most liquid
segment of the Treasury securities market, and price information for the on-the-run securities
are a fundamental reference point across financial markets. Looking at Figure 8, when
compared to off-the-runs, on-the-runs account for a substantial share, up to 80 percent, of
nominal coupon volume. Providing additional transparency for on-the-runs would be
consistent with market participant feedback that data for these securities has greater benefits

than costs. Furthermore, a comparison to Treasury futures suggests transparency for highlyliquid contracts has not hampered overall activity. Indeed, as shown in Figure 9, Treasury
securities cash and futures volumes on an interest-rate risk basis track each other very closely,
even in periods of stress, despite the futures market being more transparent.
Second, a policy for the end-of-day release of transaction data stems from the fact that current
FINRA rules require that transactions be reported by the end of the day. However, the SEC
recently approved a FINRA proposal to reduce the reporting requirement to 60 minutes, and we
believe eventually shortening the period of dissemination to closer to 60 minutes would be
beneficial and would still allow sufficient time for market participants to handle large
transactions. In fact, data from FINRA’s TRACE has indicated that the time needed to trade a
large block in the on-the-runs is typically less than 10 minutes, as shown in Figure 10.
Third, we agree that information for very large trades should be released cautiously, with the
actual size of the trade masked at the point of dissemination, similar to practices used for other
fixed income markets. At this point, the precise “cap sizes” will still need to be determined
through further engagement with the IAWG members and market participants. However, we
anticipate caps may be tiered based on the interest rate risk profile, with initial caps set
conservatively and reviewed periodically.
We expect that after a sufficient period of time and experience with additional transparency for
on-the-runs, we will consider releasing transaction data for other highly liquid Treasury
securities. Of course, any expansion would involve an evaluation of the effects of additional
transparency on liquidity, recognizing that the benefits and costs may vary with each increment,
as well as input from market participants.
To summarize, we are proposing to provide transaction-level transparency to the public,
starting gradual and in a calibrated way. We will walk, not run. There remain some details to
work out, and we look forward to further engagement with IAWG members and market
participants in coming months.

TREASURY BUYBACKS
Finally, there has been a lot of market attention on a potential Treasury buyback program.
Therefore, I want to reiterate our update on such a program from the most recent quarterly
refunding announcement. Treasury continually evaluates potential debt management tools,
including buybacks, that help us meet our objective of achieving the lowest cost of debt

financing over time. Buybacks could have several potential uses, including liquidity support
and cash and maturity management. Treasury is gathering information on this topic from
market participants, including through questions for the TBAC in August and to the primary
dealers in October. We have not made any decision on whether or how to implement a buyback
program but expect to share our findings on buybacks as part of future refundings.

CONCLUSION
To conclude, I again want to thank everyone for their support as Treasury and all of the IAWG
members have studied and considered several significant policies over the past year to improve
the resilience of the Treasury market. While I see a lot of progress to date, there is clearly more
ahead, and we look forward to the ongoing collaboration to address these complex yet critical
topics. Thank you.
The slides and figures referenced in the Treasury Market Conference remarks are available here.

[1] The Inter-Agency Working Group on Treasury Market Surveillance (IAWG) is composed of staff from the U.S. Department of
the Treasury, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
[2] “Recent Disruptions and Potential Reforms in the U.S. Treasury Market: A Staff Progress Report” (Nov. 8, 2021), available
at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/IAWG-Treasury-Report.pdf

.

[3] “Fact Sheet: Progress of the Inter-Agency Working Group on Treasury Market Surveillance in Enhancing the Resilience of
Treasury Markets” (Sep. 22, 2021), available at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/IAWG-Progress-Fact-Sheet.pdf

.

[4] “Enhancing the Resilience of the U.S. Treasury Market: 2022 Staff Progress Report” (Nov. 10, 2022), available at
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/2022-IAWG-Treasury-Report.pdf

.

[5] Baklanova, Viktoria, Cecilia Caglio, Marco Cipriani, and Adam Copeland (2016) The U.S. Bilateral Repo Market: Lessons from a
New Survey. Office of Financial Research Brief 16-01 https://www.financialresearch.gov/briefs/2016/01/13/us-bilateral-repomarket-lessons-from-a-new-survey/