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9/30/2020

Remarks of Deputy Secretary Justin Muzinich at the 2020 U.S. Treasury Market Conference | U.S. Department of the T…

Remarks of Deputy Secretary Justin Muzinich at the 2020 U.S.
Treasury Market Conference
September 29, 2020

Thank you for the opportunity to address the Treasury Market Conference again this year, a
year in which we’ve faced so many unexpected and challenging developments. If we could
meet in person, we would again be at the NY Fed, which would have been especially
appropriate this year because the NY Fed, and the rest of the Federal Reserve System, have
been invaluable partners during this unique period.

In addition to thanking the Fed, I want to emphasize what an honor it is to serve the country
in this moment of national reckoning. The COVID-19 outbreak has been a traumatic
experience for so many Americans, and has severely disrupted our economy and our way of
life. While I have always regarded public service as a privilege, it has been a particular honor
to serve in this time of need, and to contribute, alongside many at this conference, to our
collective national response.

My remarks today will cover three areas. First, I will discuss the unprecedented demand for
liquidity at the start of the crisis that disrupted the Treasury market. Next, I will move beyond
the Treasury market to discuss broader policy responses undertaken by the Administration
and the Federal Reserve. Finally, I will pose some questions that I believe are important to
study in order to inform future policy.

TREASURY MARKET CONDITIONS

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Beginning with the Treasury market itself, March and April saw a sudden, drastic flight to
safety in the face of a rapidly changing economic outlook. Treasury yields declined by more
than 100 basis points in a matter of days. As is well established, these events disrupted
Treasury market liquidity, sending bid-o er spreads to many multiples of their usual levels,
with greater stress in longer maturities and “o -the-run” securities, as Figure 1 shows.

But this period was not an ordinary blip in liquidity conditions, it was a nearly unparalleled
disruption that required significant purchases by the Federal Reserve to restore market
functioning. What made this event unique? While many observers have focused on
dynamics in a particular market segment or a specific trading strategy, the behavior of the
Treasury market was really a combination of two broad developments: first, a rush for
liquidity and safety by nearly all categories of investors and, second, a significant reduction in
liquidity provision by both dealers and principal trading firms (PTF).

On the investor side, as risks from COVID began to build in the last week in February and first
week of March, flows exhibited typical “flight-to-safety” behavior, primarily into shorter
maturity, on-the-run coupons as Figure 2 shows.

While short-dated coupons o en see greater demand during volatile periods, by the second
week of March concerns had su iciently escalated that investors were showing a strong
preference for bills, the most liquid and shortest maturity of all Treasury securities. This can
be seen in the reversal of net flows into coupons and customer net purchases of bills, which
sent bill rates briefly negative, and in the massive growth of government money market fund
assets (Figure 3).

The $13 trillion o -the-run Treasury market (vs. $250 billion on-the-run market) was subject
to the same net selling pressure as on-the-run coupons.

The net selling was broad-based, and was sustained over several days as seen in Figure 4.
Asset managers sold longer-dated o -the-run Treasuries to position ahead of outflows.
End-investors such as pension funds rebalanced portfolios a er initial large price gains in
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their Treasury holdings and sizable losses in equities. Levered investors unwound futures
basis trades, as Figure 5 suggests, in part because of margin increases and unexpected
deviations between cash and future markets.

Meanwhile, foreign institutions sold nearly $300 billion of Treasuries in March. Central banks
in particular sought dollar liquidity by selling shorter-dated coupon securities in order to
raise cash for currency defense and to help meet the liquidity needs of their domestic
financial institutions, as Figure 6 shows .[1]

Simultaneous with this widespread demand for liquidity across many segments of investors,
liquidity providers also pulled back. As volatility increased, there was a corresponding
decline in interdealer Treasury market depth, as market makers decreased the size of trades
they were willing to make because of the additional price uncertainty, as seen in Figure 7.

While increased volatility typically drives some reduction in market depth, this was
exacerbated by other factors a ecting both traditional dealers and PTFs. On the traditional
dealer side, heavy one-sided volumes and balance sheet pressures quickly strained the
ability of dealers to intermediate customer flows. For example, banks faced demands from
other business segments, such as customers drawing down credit lines.

Yet, despite these challenges for traditional dealers, their share of trading on electronic interdealer platforms actually increased. This was primarily because PTFs reduced their trading
activity and liquidity provision even more. As seen on Figure 8, the PTF share of volume fell
to well below 50 percent across tenors. PTF trading algorithms o en utilize cross-market
data from cash and futures markets, and the extreme volatility caused many correlations to
break down, while circuit breakers in the futures market also made liquidity provision more
challenging.

In summary, there was a perfect storm of overwhelming liquidity seeking flows by a wide
range of investors, and reduction in liquidity provision from both traditional dealers and
PTFs. While the Federal Reserve eventually had to conduct large purchases to promote
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stability, it is worth remembering that the Treasury market, unlike some other markets, was
still able to facilitate unprecedented trading volumes throughout this incredibly di icult
period. In fact, Treasury market volumes reached a record high of $1.3 trillion in a single day,
and were sustained for many weeks, as Figure 9 shows.

We will continue to study this critical period, to better understand the factors a ecting
liquidity supply and demand and the fundamental strengths of the deepest and most liquid
market in the world.

B ROADER POLICY RESPONSES

While the Treasury market is always a focus for the Treasury Department, the COVID-19
crisis has also necessitated much broader policy responses.

In the interest of time, I will focus my remarks on the week of March 16th, one of the most
dramatic weeks for financial markets since the Great Depression. On Monday, the stock
market opened to severe volatility, tripping the market-wide circuit breaker for the third time
in several days and halting trading for 15 minutes. The S&P 500 ended the day down 12%, its
worst single-day performance since 1987. As equity markets experienced sharp declines,
funding markets began to seize up because of the uncertainty in the business environment.
The understandable concern was that if Americans stayed home and business revenue fell
dramatically, capital providers would be less willing to extend financing, compounding
di iculties for business in an already fragile position.

This risk became starkly visible on Monday, March 16 in the commercial paper (CP) market,
which was largely “open" only for the highest quality, very short duration paper. That day the
total value of commercial paper issued with a duration of 80 or more days fell to $1.9 billion
from $9.4 billion one week before, and rates on 90-day AA non-financial paper moved up to
1.34% from 0.88% one week before. Therefore, on the morning of Tuesday, March 17, the
Federal Reserve announced that it would establish the Commercial Paper Funding Facility
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(CPFF) to buy 90-day commercial paper from a broad range of companies. This backstop
created comfort for businesses that the Federal Reserve would be a buyer of new CP
issuance, but it did not resolve liquidity and pricing pressure in the market for already
outstanding CP. Money market mutual funds are among the largest holders of CP, so the
liquidity crisis in the outstanding CP market began a ecting money market mutual funds.
This risked devolving into a downward cycle, where CP market pressure created concerns for
money markets, and outflows from money markets would cause more selling of CP, feeding
a reinforcing negative loop.

In response, a er market hours on Tuesday, the Federal Reserve announced that it would
establish a second facility, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), opening on Friday March
20. The PDCF sought to provide liquidity to primary dealers, who in turn could smooth
market functioning. However, the PDCF alone was insu icient to resolve the disruption to
money market mutual funds, partially due to primary dealer balance sheet constraints.

So late in the evening on Wednesday, March 18, the Federal Reserve announced the
establishment of a third facility, the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF),
providing a strong incentive for banks to support money markets. Critically, MMLF terms
made eligible any transactions executed starting that same day, March 18, until the opening
of the facility on March 23, so that the facility would have an e ect even before opening. The
MMLF achieved its intended goal as market participants again started providing much
needed liquidity to money market mutual funds and CP markets .[2]

Reflecting on these events, we went from volatile, though functioning markets the week
before to watching a liquidity crisis evolve with remarkable speed before our eyes. Liquidity
concerns transferred from one market segment to another – from new CP funding, to
existing CP markets, to money markets – and liquidity concerns soon became market
functioning concerns. The 2008 crisis had moved from Wall Street to Main Street. This crisis,
on the other hand, started with Main Street businesses shutting down as required by the
pandemic, and the concern the week of March 16 became that a financial market crisis would
also develop, creating further instability for so many Main Street businesses that rely on
financing. The situation was especially urgent because financing would be more important
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than ever for American businesses in the challenging period of reduced activity that lay
ahead. The Treasury and Federal Reserve teams, including Secretary Mnuchin and Chairman
Powell, were in constant contact to address the situation. While much more work needs to
be done to analyze that week and our response, looking back on it six months later does
provide two initial lessons.

The first lesson is how important design choices are in establishing 13(3) emergency lending
facilities. For instance, one might have imagined that the CPFF, in which the Fed committed
to buy new issue CP, would have calmed the secondary CP market, since corporates could
have refinanced existing paper by issuing into the Fed facility. Or one might have assumed
the PDCF would have solved the related money market concerns by giving Primary Dealers
access to cheap financing to profitably purchase money fund assets. But while these two
facilities played important roles, it was the MMLF that saw the most volume ($50 billion in
two weeks) and made the biggest di erence.

This was because of some important design choices. One was the choice of participants. The
Fed could have set up the MMLF, like the CPFF, to interact directly with those who needed
liquidity. This would have required the Fed to buy money market mutual fund assets directly.
But instead, the facility channeled support through the banks, and the banks in turn
engaged with the markets. This was an important decision because it allowed speed. The
Fed was able to use its existing bank relationships to get the facility launched within days. By
comparison, had the facility needed to purchase directly from money market mutual funds, it
could have taken weeks to get o the ground, like the CPFF did, because of the need to
register new counterparties less accustomed to dealing directly with the Fed.

Another key design choice was making the MMLF non-recourse. The PDCF allowed the 24
primary dealers to buy assets from money market mutual funds and use those assets as
collateral when borrowing from the Fed. But this borrowing was on a recourse basis. Making
the MMLF non-recourse (combined with exempting MMLF assets from risk-based and
leveraged capital ratios) significantly reduced the risks for banks. This created su icient
incentives for banks to robustly participate, restoring market functioning.

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From choice of counterparties to recourse decisions, design nuances made a big picture
di erence.

In addition to the importance of facility design, a second lesson from that week concerns the
tools available to policymakers in a crisis. A er 2008, the Dodd-Frank Act reshaped financial
regulation, creating new tools (such as Orderly Liquidation Authority and the Financial
Stability Oversight Council). But Dodd-Frank also curtailed or eliminated other tools, in part
to ensure political accountability. In particular, Dodd-Frank eliminated the FDIC’s authority to
issue blanket guarantees of bank debt, ended Treasury’s authority to guarantee money
market mutual funds, and required that the Federal Reserve obtain Treasury’s approval for
emergency lending programs under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.

These changes meant political leaders had to act this year. In the CARES Act, Congress
temporarily li ed the restrictions on FDIC guarantees of bank debt and on Treasury
guarantees of money market mutual funds, though these powers have not been invoked.
Similarly, Treasury and the Federal Reserve have worked closely together on the emergency
lending facilities to provide crucial support to the economy. To be sure, a future crisis may
require di erent policy tools, and strong collaboration between Treasury and the Federal
Reserve is not guaranteed. But it is reassuring to know that faced with the first significant
shock since the Dodd-Frank reforms, policy makers were able to act swi ly and forcefully to
produce a bipartisan and successful result.

LOOKING F ORW ARD

I would like to devote the remainder of my time to three forward-looking next steps and
broader questions.

First, the Treasury market TRACE data[3], which we announced the release of at last year’s
conference, was a critically important resource in helping us understand Treasury market
developments during the crisis. Since last year’s conference, we have continued to work with
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o icial sector partners and FINRA to consider ways to analyze and enhance the data and
have identified areas where further upgrades would significantly improve our assessment of
market conditions. For example, identification of trading strategies beyond basis trades,
further granularity on trading venues and methods of execution, and greater precision of
timestamp reporting would ensure the data is an accurate representation of participant
activity. We look forward to working with our o icial sector partners and to sharing our
insights at future conferences.

Second, turning towards broader financial markets, another critical topic for future
consideration is the role of market intermediaries during times of stress. Periods of high
volatility and uncertainty o en increase demand for liquidity. However, such conditions may
also reduce the supply of liquidity, as financial intermediaries focus on their own liquidity
position. Banks and broker-dealers entered the crisis in very strong financial position,
partially as a result of reforms a er 2008. Yet while this strength was vital to preventing the
crisis from being magnified, it was not enough on its own to ensure proper market
functioning. During March and April, there were substantial disruptions to market
functioning, including some reports of dealers ceasing to make markets at times. In the end,
intervention by Treasury and the Federal Reserve became necessary.

This episode raises important questions for policymakers. Did regulatory constraints or
internally-driven risk management decisions limit dealers? Should we explore ways to
enhance the resilience of liquidity provision in periods of stress? Under what circumstances
should we expect the Federal Reserve to need to step in as the lender of last resort? If a
sudden global pandemic requires intervention to support markets, is that necessarily a
systemic problem, or is it a logical response to an unlikely event?

Finally, going forward policymakers should also reflect on the outflows from certain types of
money market mutual funds. There are three categories of money market mutual funds:
government, prime, and tax exempt. All o er daily liquidity and investors view them as cashlike instruments, but prime and tax-exempt funds o en invest in assets that do not have
cash-like liquidity. In normal times, money funds can easily manage the flow of redemptions
by keeping some assets in liquid investments. However, large-scale redemptions, perhaps
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sparked by concerns in other markets like commercial paper, can cause investors to perceive
a “first-mover advantage” and race to redeem before a fund’s liquidity resources are
overwhelmed. This can quickly spread instability from troubled funds to the rest of the
money fund industry and the broader financial system.

To be sure, developments since the 2008 financial crisis reflect important progress. When the
Reserve Primary Fund “broke the buck” in 2008, a stampede of prime fund investors sought
to withdraw funds quickly while their funds still priced at $1, starting a run that only abated
when Treasury established a money fund guarantee program. The SEC’s 2010 and 2014
reforms made critical progress on several fronts, including floating NAVs of institutional
prime and tax-exempt funds (out to four decimal place) and requiring all money market
mutual funds to hold at least 30% of their assets in instruments that are liquid within a
week. When a fund drops below the 30% threshold, its board may decide whether to gate or
impose fees on redemptions.

However, the events of this past March show that those reforms may not be enough. For
example, one might ask whether we have exchanged one psychological bright line for
another. While the 2008 episode centered on “breaking the buck”, in 2020 market
participants worried that a fund dipping below the 30% weekly liquid assets threshold could
similarly accelerate fund redemptions.

Whether the bright line is stable NAV or a 30% liquidity test, we need to remember that
bright lines have the potential to cause investors to redeem before the line is crossed,
creating run dynamics. While policymakers were able to avert a run, it is worth asking
whether there are ways to enhance the liquidity resources available to funds without using a
bright line test or whether there are ways to draw a line without creating a first-mover
advantage.

To conclude, let me once again say how proud I am of the work of the cross-government
economic team, including members of both parties on Capitol Hill, for acting decisively in
response to the extreme disruption of COVID-19. While all countries have faced economic
challenges from the pandemic, the U.S. was in a unique position because of the size and
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importance of our financial markets to the global economy. We remain extremely focused on
creating the conditions to allow for a full economic recovery. As has been true since the
nation’s founding, much has been done, but much remains to do. I am confident the
American spirit of inquiry and action will see us through to a bright future.

[1] Eventually this was addressed when the Federal Reserve provided expanded swap lines, so that foreign governments could source
dollar liquidity by posting Treasury securities as repo collateral instead of selling Treasuries.

[2] Within a few days, the Federal Reserve announced adjustments to the terms of the CPFF and the MMLF to expand the scope of
eligible securities, and in the case of the CPFF, lower the pricing. The Federal Reserve’s willingness to adjust the terms of these
facilities so quickly demonstrated responsiveness to market feedback.
[3] The Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) data is provided to the official sector by the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA).

View Appendix Images Here.

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