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SHADOW OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE (SOMC) Policy Statement and Position Papers September 11>12,1994 PPS 94-02 BRADLEY POLICY RESEARCH CENTER Public Policy Studies Working Paper Series W I L L I A M E. SIMON GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION UNlVEKSriYOFRCXHESnTER ROCHESTER, NEW YORK 14627 Shadow Open Market Committee TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Table of Contents i SOMC Members ii SOMC Policy Statement Summary 1 Policy Statement 3 The Cost of Go-Stop-Go H. Erich Heinemann 9 Budget Progress? Mickey D. Levy 29 Economic Outlook Mickey D. Levy 39 M2 and Base Growth Allan H. Meltzer. 61 A Note on Recent U.S. Productivity Growth William Poole 65 Recent Behavior of M2 RobertH. Rasche 73 Myths in the Report of the Bretton Woods Commission Anna J. Schwartz. 77 i. September 11-12,1994 SHADOW OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE The Shadow Open Market Committee met on Sunday, September 11,1994 from 2:00 PM to 6:30 PM in Washington, D.C. Members of the SOMC: Professor Allan H. Meltzer, Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213 (412-268-2282 phone, 412-268-7057 fax); and Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC (202-862-7150 phone) Mr. H. Erich Heinemann, Chief Economist, Ladenburg, Thalmann & Co., Inc., 540 Madison Avenue-8th Floor, New York, New York 10022 (212-940-0250 phone, 212-751-3788 fax) Dn W. Lee Hoskins, Chairman and CEO, Huntington National Bank, 41S. High Street, Columbus, Ohio 43287 (614-480-4239 phone, 614-463-5485 fax) Dr. Mickey D. Levy, Chief Financial Economist, NationsBank, 7 Hanover Square, New York, New York 10004 (212-858-5545 phone, 212-858-5741 fax) Professor Charles L Plosser, William E. Simon Graduate School of Business Administration and Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York 14627 (716-275-3754 phone, 716-461-3309 fax) Professor William Poole, Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island 02912 (401-863-2697 phone, 401-863-1970 fax) Professor Robert H. Rasche, Department of Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48823 (517-355-7755 phone, 517-336-1068 fax) Dr. Anna J. Schwartz, National Bureau of Economic Research, 269 Mercer Street - 8th Floor, New York, New York 10003, (212-995-3451 phone, 212-995-4055 fax) ii. Shadow Open Market Committee SOMC POLICY STATEMENT SUMMARY Washington, D.C., September 12—The Shadow Open Market Committee warned the Federal Reserve today not to "overreact to a short-term increase in inflation." The SOMC, a group of academic and business economists who regularly comment on public policy issues, predicted that inflation would increase "near-term as a delayed response to the excessive money growth of the past." The Federal Reserve's goal, the SOMC said, "should be to achieve stable prices over time as a means of promoting real economic growth." The Shadow Open Market Committee meets in March and September. It was founded in 1973 by Professor Allan H. Meltzer of Carnegie-Mellon University and the late Professor Karl Brunner of the University of Rochester. In its policy statement, the Shadow Committee stated that "inflation is caused by excessive aggregate nominal demand, not by real economic growth. The main reason for current concern about inflation is, as always, past growth of money and the monetary base—the excessive monetary stimulus that we criticized in 1992 and 1993." The SOMC rejected the theory that the Federal Reserve should wait until the economy was close to full employment before acting to reduce inflation. This recommendation is not new, the Committee said. "It calls for a return to the policies that failed in the 1960s and 1970s...Rising inflation was the unintended consequence of a policy program to trade higher inflation for temporary increases in growth and employment" The committee also criticized Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan for using "a shifting series of indicators to describe monetary policy. Gold, commodity prices, real interest rates, the neutral interest rate, and other measures are put forward as guides to past or future policy. The one measure that is hardly ever mentioned is the one the Federal Reserve controls—MONEY. We continue to urge the Federal Reserve to control growth of monetary aggregates and to use the information about future inflation provided by sustained growth of the monetary aggregates." The SOMC reviewed the performance of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, now 50 years old. "The two institutions could be eliminated or replaced by a single smaller agency with limited functions: (1) certification and information gathering, and (2) making transfers or concessional (subsidized) loans to the poorest countries. 1 September 11-12, 1994 "The Fund and the Bank are able to obtain information from member countries more readily than private lenders. Certification is relied on by private lenders and investors. Governments, acting together, make transfers and concessional loans to the poorest countries in the world. Although such loans often delay reform, they are likely to continue. An institution with information about the countries and their policies can play a modest role by combining transfers with advice and encouragement of reform." 2 Shadow Open Market Committee SHADOW OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE Policy Statement September 12,1994 The Federal Reserve has moved decisively to sustain long-term growth and reduce future inflation. The Shadow Open Market Committee applauds the Federal Reserve's actions this year and President Clinton's support of its actions. Since March, year-to-year growth of the monetary base—bank reserves and currency—has fallen from above 10 1/2 percent to about 9 1/4 percent. For the past six months the base has increased at an 8 percent annual rate. This is the maximum rate we recommend at our meetings in September 1993 and March 1994. We are now on a path that, if sustained, is consistent with inflation of 2 to 3 percent. Modest further reductions are necessary if price stability is to be achieved. Therefore, the Federal Reserve should reduce base growth to 7 percent in 1995. MONETARY POLICY The effects of current policy actions on inflation will not be fully evident for months. We expect inflation to increase near-term as a delayed response to the excessive money growth of the past The Federal Reserve should not overreact to a short-term increase in inflation. The goal should be to achieve stable prices over time as a means of promoting real economic growth. Inflation is caused by excessive aggregate nominal demand, not be real economic growth. The main reason for current concern about inflation is, as always, past growth of money and the monetary base—the excessive monetary stimulus that we criticized in 1992 and 1993. The Federal Reserve was slow to respond to the prospect of inflation. The first response in February was a small and hesitant step. But the cumulative impact of Federal Reserve actions in 1994 has lowered base growth to a more appropriate range. A year ago we warned that more rapid growth of the monetary base relative to growth of nominal GDP would remain compatible with low inflation only if the public continued to add to cash balances at a 5.5 percent annual rate. This would have required a continued decline in long-term 3 September 11-12,1994 interest rates. We were skeptical that this would occur. We expected interest rates to rise and growth of average cash balances to slow relative to nominal GDP. For the year ending June, growth of average cash balances (Ml/GDP) slowed almost to zero and long-term interest rates rose. We remain concerned, however, about the Federal Reserve's analysis and discussion of monetary policy. There are two principal issues. One is reliance on the alleged relation between inflation and unemployment or real growth. The other is the reliance on an ever-changing set of indicators to guide monetary policy. Some have urged the Federal Reserve and other central banks to rely on the relationship between inflation and unemployment known as the Phillips Curve. They argue that a central bank can reduce unemployment for as much as two or three years without risk of inflation. On this theory, the time for action to reduce inflation is when the economy is close to full employment. This policy recommendation is not new. It calls for a return to the policies that failed in the 1960s and 1970s. Policymakers in that period did not intend to create rising inflation. Rising inflation was the unintended consequence of a policy program to trade higher inflation for temporary increases in growth and employment. Attempts to exploit this tradeoff have always failed. It has taken many years to rid the economy of the effects of a decade or more of mistaken policies. A main lesson of the recent experience is that estimates of a Phillips curve tradeoff are unreliable guides for policy. In his testimony to Congress and in public statements, Chairman Greenspan uses a shifting series of indicators to describe monetary policy. Gold, commodity prices, real interest rates, the neutral interest rate, and other measures are put forward as guides to past or future policy. The one measure that is hardly ever mentioned is the one the Federal Reserve controls—MONEY. We continue to urge the Federal Reserve to control growth of monetary aggregates and to use the information about future inflation provided by sustained growth of the monetary aggregates. THE ECONOMY, THE BUDGET AND THE ADMINISTRATION The budget deficit has fallen. The basic budget, net of interest payments, is again in surplus. The administration boasts about the decline in the budget deficit and takes credit for the change. Its claim, repeated many times, was that deficit reduction lowered interest rates and stimulated the economy. 4 Shadow Open Market Committee Competent economists know that this argument is false. Tax increases do not increase growth. Changes in the deficit have, at most, modest effects on interest rates. Interest rates typically rise and fall with economic growth and expected inflation. Interest rates were lower a year ago because economic growth was slow and inflation was subdued. Since that time, the average growth rate has more than doubled. Growth has been about 4 percent for the last four quarters. As we expected, interest rates rose with growth and with increased concern about future inflation. Recent reductions in the deficit have resulted from the unwinding of the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), reductions in defense spending, and legislated tax increases. The RTC spent $66 billion in 1991 to bail out failed thrift institutions. In 1993, the RTC made a net contribution of $28 billion by selling assets, a contribution of $94 billion toward a lower deficit. Net contributions from the RTC will continue this year and next. Since 1989, defense spending has fallen from 27 percent to 19% of government outlays. However, the administration has increased our current or future military commitments as it has reduced military spending. This inconsistent strategy can lead to an inability to fulfill commitments. Legislated tax hikes reduce saving and investment and lower long-term economic growth. Long term, higher taxes reduce economic activity. They should not be confused with fiscal responsibility. THE LONGER-TERM OUTLOOK The administration assumes that long-term growth is about 2 1/2 percent a year or slightly higher. To sustain this growth rate, productivity growth must return to a growth path that has not been sustained since the early 1970s. We doubt that this will be achieved. With current labor force growth about 1 percent a year, the economy's long-term growth path is not much more than 2 percent Slower productivity growth will reduce taxrevenuesbelow projections. By 1998 at the latest, budget deficits will start to rise as a share of GDP. The principal reasons are well-known—rising spending for entitlements, particularly health care. After 1998, caps on discretionary spending expire. These caps are estimated to reduce discretionary spending by 2 percent of GDP between 1993 and 1998. Removing the caps may be followed by a new surge in discretionary spending. 5 September 11-12, 1994 It is irresponsible to offer new entitlements for health care, welfare, and other social purposes. These expenditures will increase consumption at the expense of investment and slow long-term growth. The costs will be paid by the our children, and their children, because we will save and invest less and leave them a small capital stock. The budget problem is a spending problem and an allocation problem. More than 100 percent of the rise in budget deficits corresponds to the rise in transfer payments. Until growth of these programs is controlled, the programs will continue to be financed either by future generations or by selling assets to foreigners. THE FUND AND THE BANK AT FIFTY The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were conceived at Bretton Woods in 1944 and began life after World War II. The Fund was given responsibility for supervising the operation of the fixed exchange rate system. The Bank was to be responsible for lending to reconstruct wartime damage and for development. The fixed exchange rate system ended in 1973. Since that time, the IMF has looked for tasks to perform. It took responsibility for lending and credit certification during the debt problems of the 1980s. It stretched out the problem and delayed its resolution. Most recently, the industrialized countries gave the IMF a leading role as a lender to Russia and other former members of the Soviet bloc. Most the funds lent to these governments has been offset by capital flight from Russia. IMF lending thus helped to finance capital flight. The Bank was organized on the presumption that markets would supply few loans to developing countries. The debt problems of the 1980s showed that, for many countries, this presumption was wrong. A number of countries borrowed more than they were able to repay. The availability of loans from the World Bank and other international agencies at reduced interest rates encouraged developing countries to borrow, to close their markets to equity investors, and to restrict foreign ownership of domestic assets. The policy of relying on government borrowing was not in the interest of the borrowing countries. Several countries have recognized their previous mistakes and changed their policies. Private capital is now welcome in Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Peru, and in much of Asia. 6 Shadow Open Market Committee The success of a market-based approach to lending and borrowing raises questions about the appropriate roles of the Bank and the Fund. What do these institutions do that cannot be done as efficiently, or more efficiently, by private lenders? Although the Bank has a subsidiary to lend to private investors, the Bank and the Fund lend mainly to governments. The functions of the two institutions overlap much more than in the past; there is duplication without the gains from competition. Both continue to lend for stabilization or adjustment Many of the short-term loans, in which the Fund specialized at an earlier time, roll over and are extended for longer terms. They are, in fact, long-term loans. The Bank no longer concentrates on projects such as dams and roads. It, too, lends to facilitate adjustment The two institutions could be eliminated or replaced by a single smaller agency with limited functions: (1) certification and information gathering, and (2) making transfers or concessional (subsidized) loans to the poorest countries. The Fund and the Bank are able to obtain information from member countries more readily than private lenders. Certification is relied on by private lenders and investors. Governments, acting together, make transfers and concessional loans to the poorest countries in the world. Although such loans often delay reform, they are likely to continue. An institution with information about the countries and their policies can play a modest role by combining transfers with advice and encouragement of reform. THE BRETTON WOODS (VOLCKER) COMMISSION These proposals differ from the recent report of the Bretton Woods Commission chaired by Paul Volcker. The Commission offers myths about both the past the present and misguided policies for the future. The Bretton Woods system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates broke down because the system was flawed. The main flaws in the system were: (1) no effective restriction on U.S. inflation, (2) no mechanism for devaluing the dollar when the U.S. inflated, and (3) no recognition of changes in the real terms of trade. The result was inflation in all major countries and misaligned exchange rates. Years of meetings and official discussions never resolved the system's problems. All the policymakers were able to agree on was creation of some useless pieces of paper called special drawing rights. The present international monetary system is not ideal. Improvement will only come about if each major country chooses to pursuefiscaland monetary policies to achieve sustained growth and price stability. No shortcuts or clever schemes for coordinating actions can substitute for 7 September 11-12, 1994 disciplined policies. Attempts to block market adjustment of exchange rates by government policy are disruptive and costly. The Commission's proposals for "better international policy coordination aimed at stabilizing exchange rates" deserve the neglect they will surely get. 8 Shadow Open Market Committee THE COST OF GO-STOP-GO H. Erich HEINEMANN Ladenburg, Thalmann & Company, Inc. Action by the Federal Reserve System to boost the discount rate and the Federal funds rate to 4 and 4.75 percent, respectively, will make a tight monetary policy even tighter. While the Fed's money squeeze is not likely to put a noticeable dent in the economy in 1994, it will increase the risk of recession in 1996. Business activity has already slowed, but our work suggests that the deceleration was more a result of fiscal drag from higher marginal tax rates than from monetary restraint. Productivity was down in the second quarter, as we predicted last spring. Inventories of electronic gear have started to build, and producers of heavy construction equipment say they see signs of softening in their order books particularly for publicly funded projects. Real retail sales fell in July. Total vehicle sales have dropped substantially. Single family housing starts have been flat since October. Exports remain an area of remarkable strength. Real merchandise exports were a record $484 billion at a seasonally adjusted annual rate in the second quarter, up more than 9 percent from 1993. That was almost double the growth of 5 percent one year earlier. We doubt that U.S. export sales can grow at this rate for an extended period. More likely, real exports will continue to rise along the 7 percent trend line typical since 1989. American producers regularly achieve trade surpluses in four major sectors: services, industrial materials other than oil, capital goods other than automobiles and agriculture. In the nation's overall balance of trade, these areas of comparative advantage are more than offset by ongoing deficits in oil, consumer goods and automobiles. In the wake of the Federal Reserve's rate action, officials may postpone the next increase in their interest rate target until after the mid-term elections in November. Meanwhile, bonds are oversold. The trading rally in bonds could bring yields close to 7 percent. 9 September U-12, 1994 Assuming the monetary authorities continue on their current course over the next 18 to 24 months, then theriskof a recession during the 1996 Presidential campaign shouldrisesubstantially. The longer the money squeeze continues, the deeper that downturn is likely to be. Conventional wisdom notwithstanding, we believe that higher inflation is on the way—not because employers hired too many low-skill workers, but because the Fed printed too many high-powered dollars. We think inflation is likely to accelerate to a range of 4 to 5 percent in 1995, regardless of actions that the central bank may or may not undertake in 1994. Aftereffects from easy money in 1991, 1992 and 1993 have already put their price structure into motion. The Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy by setting a target for short-term interest rates. Since Fed officials cannot control day-to-day demand for short-term credit (or even know what that demand may be), they must supply whatever amount market players want at that target price. Incoming economic data suggest that the Fed's current target of 4.75 percent for overnight money market loans (the Federal funds rate) is above market equilibrium. Consequently, the money managers must reduce the supply of bank reserves to prevent rates from falling. Total bank reserves, the high-powered money that is raw material for the money supply, dropped sharply in thefirsthalf of August to a level $ 1.4 billion below that of last February. Since last fall, reserve growth has declined substantially (Chart 1). At present, reserves are slightly lower than they were in October 1993. By contrast, from July 1992 to October 1993, reserves rose at a 16 percent rate. The abrupt closing of the monetary faucet has been a principal factor triggering the slump in the prices offinancialassets thus far in 1994. There is little that monetary policy can do to prevent inflation from accelerating, but the central bank could do a lot of damage by forcing an unsustainable contraction in the money supply. That course would continue the go-stop-go pattern of Fed policy. Policy that is too tight begets policy that is too easy, just as policy that is too easy begets policy that is too tight. There is a golden mean, but the Fed has not found it. The mantra in Manhattan is that rising employment leads to higher wages and that higher wages fuel inflation. We believe that the analysis is wrong, but that the conclusion is right Higher inflation is on the way. However, rapid growth in payroll jobs suggests weakness as much as strength. In July, as has been the true since 1991, most the new jobs were low-productivity, short-hour and low-pay. 10 Shadow Open Market Committee Moreover, since January the number of jobs has risen by 1.9 million, but the number of workers has gone up only 556,000. This indicates that people are taking second and third (presumably part-time) jobs to maintain family income. Growth in full-time employment has indeed been sluggish. The low quality of the ongoing growth in jobs shows clearly in the data on personal income. Real after-tax income per job declined from March to June and has grown at an annual rate of less than 1 percent over the past two years—indeed over the last 20 years. That indicates a weak foundation for sustained expansion in consumer spending. The rapid rise in the employee headcount in a relative handful of industries (generally with the lowest productivity) implies that profit margins in these businesses are—or soon will be—under downward pressure. If profitability declines, then hiring will soon slow—most likely before the mid-term elections this fall. At the national level, productivity dropped during the second quarter. Total hours worked rose at a rate of 6.47 percent, the highest in a decade, but output of goods and services went up only 3.7 percent The Commerce Department said gross real product per hour in the nonfarm business sector fell at a rate of 1.4 percent this spring, in contrast to a 3.3 percent gain in the first quarter. This negative swing implied substantial negative pressure on profit margins. Consumer spending rose at a $ 10.8 billion rate in the second quarter down from the $40 billion increase during the winter months. Most of the slowdown was in durable and nondurable goods, but service spending also rose at a slower pace. Total vehicle sales were at an annual rate of 13.8 million units in July, down by almost 1 million units from the prior month—the fourth consecutive monthly drop. Vehicle sales averaged 14.4 million units at seasonally adjusted annual rates in the last three months, down at a 21 percent rate from the comparable period ending in March. Consumption has been rising faster than real income for more than two years. This cannot continue—income will pick up, spending will slow, or some combination. This spring, both incomes and spending were slower, but spending slowed more than income. Sales of new homes fell sharply in June. Leading homebuilders say a substantial recovery from the June sales level is not likely. A slump in home sales will likely translate to lower housing starts and cuts in construction jobs during the summer and fall. "Normal" links between housing starts and bond yields appear to support this conclusion. 11 September U-12, 1994 Investors should recognize that the current expansion is narrow and therefore vulnerable to a setback. Since 1991, real GDP hasrisen$441.3 billion. Volatile, cyclical sectors of the economy —consumer durables, business plant and equipment investment, housing and inventories —accounted for $376.2 billion or 85.2 percent, of the gain. Normally, the cyclical sectors are about one-quarter of the economy. Currently, these chronically unstable industries make up 27.7 percent of GDP, the highest since data were first compiled in 1929. Relatively stable noncyclical sectors (about 75 percent of the economy) have accounted for less than 15 percent of the expansion. In capital goods, demand has focused narrowly on information processing and related equipment and trucks and buses. Other types of investment are at a 35-year low as a share of GDP (Chart 2). Inflation accelerated in the second quarter. The fixed-weight deflator for gross domestic purchases rose at a rate of 3.2 percent, up from 2.5 percent. Ladenburg's Baseline Forecast indicates inflation will accelerate to a 5 percent rate in 1995, a delayed response to the Federal Reserve's easy money from 1991 through 1993. Consumer spending was surprisingly soft in the second quarter. Real personal consumption goods rose at an annual rate of only 1.8 percent during the April-June period, down from 5.4 percent in the first three months of the year and 6.3 percent in the fourth quarter of 1993. A drop in auto sales played a major role in the slump, but real outlays for nondurables were down too. Other major sector of GDP—fixed investment, net exports and government—either slowed or exerted a drag on economic activity. The real value of business investment in equipment was up at a rate of 6.5 percent in the second quarter, down from 10.6 percent last winter and 27.5 percent during the final three months of 1994. The only big uptick in the second quarter was business inventories. Stocks of unsold goods accounted for $31 billion of a total second-quarter gain of $49 billion in real GDP. Real final sales to domestic purchasers appear to haverisenat a rate of 2 percent, down from 3.9 percent in the first quarter and 6 percent in late 1993. Much of the inventory surge was in imports. Nevertheless, cutbacks in production seem inevitable. That should set the stage for more sluggish expansion during the second half of 1994 in a range of 2.5 to 3 percent (see the attached Baseline Forecast). You should note the anomaly 12 Shadow Open Market Committee of the surging job count this spring, accompanied by a slowdown in final demand ("A Million Jobs in a Slowing Economy"). Four business sectors accounted for the bulk of the hiring both in the second quarter and the expansion that officially started in the second quarter of 1991. Construction, retailing, business services (including temp jobs) and health services were responsible for 67 percent of the 930,000 jobs that private employers added in the April-June period. That was somewhat below the average of 75 percent over the last three years. We believe these employers are not beginning to add new workers at a marginal loss. Put simply, if a firm adds 100 people to its payroll, the unit profit on their additional output will be less than average unit profits on the output for the previous, smaller work force. This pattern appears to be a replay of 1988 and 1989, when marginal losses in private services set the stage for the 1990-1991 recession. The service sector has dominated U.S. employment for a half century. Service producing industries account for more than 90 of every 100 jobs that employers have added since World War II—more than 71 in private firms and 19 in government Construction and non-production jobs in manufacturing accounted for the balance. Production employment in manufacturing hasn't changed since 1946, even through output is up more than 500 percent. The growth rates of population, the labor force and total employment all slowed markedly in the 1990s. In the last five years, the number of payroll jobs rose 3.97 million, compared to average five-year growth of 6.1 million since 1946. A total of 3.75 million (95 percent) of these new jobs were in the Big Four sectors—construction, retailing, business services (including temp jobs) and health services. More than 62.3 percent of the civilian population over age 16 was working during the second quarter, just seven-tenths of a point below the record in the first quarter of 1990. There were 122.4 million workers in June, 66 million men and 53 million women. More than 100 million workers had full-time jobs. The bulk of the 22 million people working part-time (17.3 million or 78 percent) were doing so voluntarily. Large-scale displacement in the workplace of older, experienced men by younger, less experienced women appears to be coming to an end. Women aged 25 to 44 were 13.6 percent of the civilian workforce in 1960, 24.9 percent in 1991 and 24.5 percent today. Men aged 45 to 64 13 September 11-12,1994 were 23.3 percent of workers in 1960,14.7 percent in 1991 and 15.3 percent today. The change in the age and sex composition of the work force coincided with a slowdown in growth of productivity and real income per worker. Most employment gains since 1991 have been in smaller states. Total employment in California, New Jersey and New York averaged 25.7 million in the second quarter, down 969,000 from the peak in second quarter of 1990. Elsewhere employment is up. All three states have relatively high taxes and government regulation. The European community has the most comprehensive system of social services and taxes to match. It now has average unemployment of more than 11 percent, compared to 6 percent in the U.S. As a result, productivity and profitability were down in the handful of industries that have done most of the hiring. The implication is that the second quarter spike in hiring won't continue. This conclusion is supported by our analysis of the main reasons why the economy slowed. One, in recent months, real retail sales have averaged more than 51 percent of real after-tax income, by far the highest since 1959. As a result, the personal savings rate slumped to a 45-year low during the past year. Against this setting, consumers were bound to cut back. Two, the basic federal budget (exclusive of net interest payments) moved to a substantial surplus in the first half of 1994 compared to a peak deficit of $ 103.1 billion in third quarter of 1992. Our data suggest the basic budget is the best measure of the impact of the sharp reduction in deficit spending. Three, the Federal Reserve has shifted to tight money. To date, Fed actions have had little effect on the real economy. The central bank must sustain a restrictive policy for an extended period to change spending patterns. Obviously, however, the longer tight money persists, the greater the risk of an economic downturn. Conventional wisdom is that a slower growth rate signifies a corresponding drop in the risk of inflation. We disagree. The rate of inflation rose 50 to 75 basis points in the second quarter of 1994. The consumer price index, the CPI minus food and fuel (so-called core inflation) and the overall producer price index all showed faster rates of increase during the spring quarter than last winter. While the rates of increase in these broad-based indices are still modest (mostly about 3 percent or less), they show clear signs of having bottomed for the current business cycle. The most 14 Shadow Open Market Committee dramatic change was the consumer price index for commodities, which rose at a 2.1 percent annual rate. Over the prior 10 months, this measure of the prices people pay for goods rose a rate of nine-tenths of one percent. Higher oil prices are likely to add to the acceleration. Both the timing and the amount of the pickup in prices are consistent with our forecast of stagflation in 1995 (see the Baseline Forecast). We believe inflation is caused by government printing too many dollars, not by employers hiring too many workers. Thus, despite 8 million unemployed workers, prices are moving higher. Long-term rates have gone up almost 200 basis points as market participants hedge the pending erosion in the real value of their principal. During 1991,1992 and 1993, the Federal Reserve increased total reserves in the U.S. banking system by almost 50 percent. Total reserves, the raw material for the money supply, are the best indicator of Federal Reserve policy. Recently, sustained accelerations and decelerations in the growth of total reserves have influenced price behavior with a lag of about three years (Chart 3). We believe that the low rate of inflation in the last year and one half was a direct result of an exceptionally tight monetary policy from 1987 through 1990 (Chart 3). We also believe that the inflationary influence of easy money from 1991 through 1993 will be increasingly apparent in the months ahead. Leading indicators of inflation are easy to see. Commodity prices have gone up as they always do at this stage of the cycle. The price of gold is flirting with $400 an ounce. However, these indicators are symptoms of the inflation process. The underlying cause is record growth in domestic spending money, fueled by expanding bank reserves. Rapid money growth lies behind the increase in national income to an average of $5.3 trillion in the first quarter. That represented a 7 percent rate of gain during the past one and one-half years —more than double its growth from 1990 through 1992. More dollars are chasing the available supply of goods. 15 i. THALMANN / HEINEMANN ECONOMIC RESEARCH Baseline Forecast - September 1994 THE ECONOMY: Gross Domestic Product ($87) PctChg Personal Consumption ($87) PctChg Business Investment ($87) PctChg Structures ($87) Prod. Dur. Equip. ($87) Residential Invest. ($87) PctChg Change in Inventory ($87) Net Exports ($87) Government Purchases ($87) Pel Chg Final Domestic Sales ($87) Pet Chg Gross Dom. Prod. ($ Current) Pet Chg Disposable Income ($87) Pet Chg Savings Rate (Percent) Operating Profits ($ Current) PctChg Industrial Prod. (1987=100) PctChg Housing Starts (Mill. Units) PctChg Tot Vehicle Sales (MiU Units) Pet Chg Nonfarm Payroll Jobs (Mill) Pet Chg Unemployment Rale (Percent)* Comp. Per Hour Non-Farm Bus** PctChg Productivity Non-Farm Bus** PctChg Unit Labor Cost Non-Farm Bus** PctChg G D P Deflator (1987= 100) PctChg CPI Less Energy (1982-84= 100) PctChg F e d ! Deficit ($ Current NIA) FINANCIAL MARKETS: Federal Funds Rate Three-month Bills (Discount) Prime Rate, Major Banks 30-Year Treasury Bonds Money Supply (M-l, $ Current) PctChg Velocity (Ratio: G D P to M-l) Trade-Weighted $(1973=100) IV'93 A 194 A 11*94 A HI'94 F IV'94 F T95F H'95 F IIF95 F IV95F 1993 A 1994 F 1995 F $5,218.0 6.26% $3,506.2 3.97% $627.2 21.09% $148.7 $478.5 $224.5 28.16% $10.8 ($82.2) $931.5 -0.13% $5,289.4 6.02% $6,478 1 7.69% $3,747.8 4.32% 4.0% $533.9 36.99% 112.90 6.76% 1.476 61.00% 14.546 32.49% 111.363 2.21% 6.53% 160.4 2.5% 117.2 4.9% 136.9 -2.3% 124.1 1.35% 151.6 3.07% ($220.1) $5,261.1 3.35% $3,546.3 4.65% $643.6 10.88% $144.1 $499.4 $229.9 9.97% $254 ($104.0) $919.9 -4.89% $5,339.7 3.86% $6,574.7 6.10% $3,779.2 3.39% 3.6% $508.2 -17.9% 115.20 8.40% 1.364 -27.07% 15.540 30.27% 111.976 2.22% 6.57% 162.8 6.1% 118.0 2.8% 137.9 3.0% 125.0 2.67% 152.6 2.75% ($176.2) $5,310.2 3.79% $3,558.6 1.39% $657.9 9.19% $150.7 $507.3 $234.0 7.33% $56.3 ($112.9) $916.3 -1.56% $5,366.8 2.05% $6,685.5 6.91% $3,804.7 2.73% 3.9% $547.3 34.5% 116.40 4.23% 1.41 15.42% 14.880 -15.94% 112.993 3.68% 6.16% 163.1 0.7% 117.2 -2.7% 139.1 3.5% 125.9 3.01% 153.7 2.91% ($145.0) $5,344.6 2.6% $3,577.7 2.2% $675.5 11.1% $151.9 $523.6 $240.6 11.7% $51.3 ($120.1) $919.7 1.5% $5,413.4 3.5% $6,792.3 6.5% $3,819.8 1.6% 4.1% $553.3 4.5% 117.3 3.2% 1.37 -12.2% 14.0 -21.9% 113.3 1.1% 6.1% 165.1 4.9% 117.8 2.1% 140.1 2.9% 127.1 3.8% 155.2 4.0% ($134.9) $5,374.8 2.3% $3,606.0 3.2% $688.4 7.9% $153.5 $534.8 $240.1 •0.8% $48.3 ($128.7) $920.7 0.4% $5,455.2 3.1% $6,898.9 6.4% $3,838.9 2.0% 3.9% $560.0 4.9% 118.4 3.9% 1.35 -5.9% 14.1 2.4% 113.7 1.2% 6.0% 167.1 $5,407.3 2.4% $3,625.6 2.2% $702.5 8.5% $156.5 $546.1 $243.1 5.2% $46.7 ($132.5) $921.9 0.5% $5,493.2 2.8% $7,012.7 6.8% $3,654.8 1.7% 3.8% $566.7 4.9% 119.1 2.3% 1.35 2.0% 14.3 8.2% 114.1 1.7% 5.9% 169.2 5.2% 118.9 1.5% UZ4 3.6% 129.7 4.2% 158.4 4.4% ($128.0) $5,438.9 2.4% $3,645.9 2.3% $713.3 6.3% $158.5 $554.8 $245.5 4.0% $50.5 ($139.2) $922.8 0.4% $5,527.6 2.5% $7,122.8 6.4% $3,873.3 1.9% 3.7% $572.3 4.1% 120.1 3.2% 1.32 -9.6% 14.2 -3.9% 114.3 0.7% 5.7% 171.5 5.4% 119.4 1.9% 143.5 3.4% 131.0 4.0% 160.1 4.5% ($137.2) $5,469.7 2.3% $3,666.9 2.3% $725.8 7.2% $159.9 $565.9 $244.7 •1.3% $55.5 ($147.5) $924.2 0.6% $5,561.7 2.5% $7,250.9 7.4% $3,888.9 1.6% 3.6% $578.0 4.0% 121.2 0.6% 1.34 6.1% 14.3 ^4% 114.6 0.8% 5.6% 173.7 5.5% 120.0 1.9% 144.8 3.6% 132.6 5.0% 162.2 5.1% ($148.6) $5,497.4 2.0% $3,682.7 1.7% $736.3 5.9% $163.3 $573.0 $247.2 4.1% $59.5 ($153.4) $925.1 0.4% $5,591.3 2.1% $7,374.2 7.0% $3,902.5 1.4% 3.5% $581.3 2.3% 121.8 2.0% 1.27 •18.5% 14.1 -5.7% 114.8 0.9% 5.5% 176.2 5.7% 120.5 1.6% 146.2 4.0% 134.1 4.8% 164.3 5.3% ($163.9) $5,134.6 3.12% $3,458.7 3.26% $591.6 12.49% $147.7 $443.9 $213.1 8.17% $15.3 ($73.9) $929.8 -0.76% $5,193.1 3.67% $6,343.3 5.37% $3,704.1 1.54% 4.13% $485.8 19.91% 111.03 4.19% 1.295 7.21% 13.887 8.24% 110.521 1.77% 6.75% 158.9 3 4% 115.5 1.6% 137.6 1.7% 123.54 2.18% 150.1 3.10% ($241.4) $5,322.7 3.7% $3,572.2 3.3% $666.3 12.6% $150.1 $516.3 $236.1 10.8% $45.3 ($116.4) $919.1 -1.1% $5,393.8 3.9% $6,737.9 6.2% $3,810.7 2.9% 3.9% $542.2 11.6% 116.8 5.2% 1.37 6.1% 14.6 5.3% 113.0 ^2% 6.2% 164.5 3.6% 117.9 £0% 139.5 1.5% 126.6 2.5% 154.6 3.0% ($145.7) $5,453.3 2.5% $3,655.3 2.3% $719.5 8.0% $159.5 $560.0 $245.1 3.8% $53.1 ($143.2) $923.5 0.5% $5,543.4 2.6% $7,190.1 6.7% $3,879.9 1.8% 3.6% $574.6 6.0% 120.5 3.2% 1.32 -3.7% 14.2 -2.6% 114.45 1.3% 5.7% 172.65 4.9% 119.70 1.6% 144.23 3.4% 131.84 4.2% 161.23 4.3% ($144.5) 2.99% 3.06% 6.00% 6.13% $1,121.4 9.80% 5.78 94.83 3.21% 3.24% 6.02% 6.56% $1,138.2 6.13% 5.78 95.56 3.94% 3.99% 6.90% 7.36% $1,144.9 2.4% 5.84 92.93 4.6% 4.3% 7.4% 7.7% $1,157.4 4.4% 5.87 89.7 5.1% 4.8% 7.8% 8.1% $1,168.1 3.7% 5.91 89.4 5.5% 5.2% 8.0% 8.2% $1,176.2 2.8% 5.96 91.2 6.0% 5.6% 8.2% 84% $1,182.5 Z\% 6.02 90.9 6.3% 5.9% 8.4% 8.6% $1,192.9 ^3.6% 6.08 91.8 6.6% 6.3% 8.6% 8.8% $1,201.4 2.9% 6.14 91.6 3.02% 3.01% 6.00% 6.60% $1,077.9 11.52% 5.89 93.17 4.2% 4.1% 7.0% 7.4% $1,152.1 6.9% 5.82 91.9 6.1% 5.6% 8.3% 8.5% $1,188.3 3.1% 6.05 91.4 A=Actual F=Forecast Billions of dollars unless noted. •Break in series, January 1994. * Compensation, productivity and unit labor costs Sources: Haver Analytics; Heinemann Economic Research 5.1% 116.4 Z1% 141.1 2.9% 128.4 4.1% 156.7 3.9% ($126.8) index numbers, 1982=100. 193 A $ Change $14.6 PctChg 1.16% $ Change $30.1 PctChg 2.39% $ Change $34.2 PctChg 2.69% $ Change $78.4 PctChg 6.26% $ Change $155.3 PctChg 3.12% Personal Consumption ($87) $13.8 1.10% $22.0 1.75% $33.0 2.60% $34.0 2.71% $109.2 2.19% Business Investment ($87) Structures ($87) Prod. Dur. Equip. ($87) $19.4 $0.9 $18.4 1.54% 0.07% 1.46% $20.7 $0.1 $20.7 1.65% 0.01% 1.65% $16.9 $0.2 $16.6 1.33% 0.02% 1.31% $29.3 $12 $28.2 2.34% 0.10% 2.25% $65.7 ($21) $67.7 1.32% •0.04% 1.36% $2.7 0.21% ($41) -0.33% $4.7 0.37% $13.5 1.08% $16.1 0.32% $11.9 ($19.1) ($141) 0.94% -1.52% -1.12% $0.4 ($117) $2.8 ($59) ($170) $2.5 •0.46% -1.34% 0.20% ($22) $4.1 ($03) •0.18% 0.33% -0.02% $12.9 ($415) ($7.1) 0.26% •0.83% -0.14% $21.8 1.73% 3 19% $41.4 $56.9 4.48% 2.98% Change In Inventory ($87) Net Exports ($87) Government Purchases ($87) Final Domestic Sales ($87) GDP ($87) Four qtr chg (%) ill THE ECONOMY: Gross Domestic Product ($87) Residential Invest ($87) 3.29% 3.19% $76.7 6.12% 3.11% $183.9 3.69% 1994 F IV94 F 111*94 F 1194 A THE ECONOMY: Gross Domestic Product ($87) $ Change $43.1 PctChg 3.3% $ Change $49.1 PctChg 3.8% $ Change $34.4 PctChg 2.6% $ Change $30.2 PctChg 2.3% $ Change $188.1 PctChg 3.7% Personal Consumption ($87) $40.1 3.1% $12.3 0.9% $19.1 1.5% $28.4 2.1% $113.5 2.2% Business Investment ($87) Structures ($87) Prod. Dur. Equip. ($87) Hi 194 A 1.3% -0.4% 1.6% $14.3 $6.6 $7.9 1.1% 0.5% 0.6% $17.6 $1.2 $16.3 1.3% 0.1% 1.2% $12.9 $1.7 $11.3 1.0% 0.1% 0.9% $74.7 $2.4 $7£4 1.5% 0.0% 1.4% $5.4 0.4% $4.1 0.3% $6.6 0.5% ($05) •0.0% $23.1 0.4% III 1.1% -1.7% -0.9% ill 2.4% -0.7% -0.3%, ($50) ($7.2) $3.4 -0.4% •05% 0.3% ($30) ($85) $0.9 •0.2% •0.6% 0.1% $30.0 ($42.6) ($10.6) 0.6% •0.8% •0.2% $50.3 3.9% 3.7% $27.1 2.1% 4.0% $46.6 3.5% 4.0% $41.7 3.1% 3.0% Residential Invest ($87) Change In Inventory ($87) Net Exports ($87) Government Purchases ($87) Final Domestic Sales ($87) GDP ($87) Four qtr chg (%) III95F II95 F 195 F $200.7 3.9% 1995 F IV95 F THE ECONOMY: Gross Domestic Product ($87) $ Change $32.5 PctChg 2.4% $ Change $31.6 PctChg 2.4% $ Change $30.8 PctChg 2.3% $ Change $27.7 PctChg 2.0% $ Change $130.6 PctChg 2.5% Personal Consumption ($87) $19.6 1.5% $20.3 1.5% $21.0 1.6% $15.7 1.2% $83.1 1.6% Business Investment ($87) Structures ($87) Prod. Dur. Equip. ($87) $14.1 $2.9 $11.2 1.1% 0.2% 0.8% $10.8 $2.0 $8.7 0.8% 0.2% 0.7% $12.5 $14 $11.1 0.9% 0.1% 0.8% $10.5 $3.3 $7.1 0.8% 0.2% 0.5% $53.2 $9.5 $43.7 1.0% 0.2% 0.8% $3.0 0.2% $2.4 0.2% ($08) •0.1% $24 0.2% $9.0 0.2% ($16) ($39) $1.2 -0.1% -0.3% 0.1% $3.8 ($66) $0.9 0.3% •0.5% 0.1% $5.0 ($83) $1.4 0.4% -0.6% 0.1% $4.0 ($59) $0.9 0.3% •0.4% 0.1% $7.7 ($26.7) $4.4 0.1% -0.5% 0.1% $38.0 2.9% 2.8% $34.4 2.6% 2.4% $34.1 £5% 2.3% $29.6 2.2% 2.3% $149.7 2.8% Residential Invest ($87) 1 1993 A IV93A III93A 1193 A Change in Inventory ($87) Net Exports ($87) Government Purchases ($87) Final Domestic Sales ($87) GDP ($87) Four qtr chg (%) GROUTH IN TOTAL BANK RESERVES HAS SLOUED SHARPLY 00 Notes: The chart shous year-ouer-year changes in total bank reserves adjusted for shifts in reserue requirements. Federal Reserue Board data in millions of current dollars. First half August 1994 plotted. Uertical lines shou recessions. Sources: Hauer Analytics; Heinemann Economic Research FEDERAL RESERUE POLICY IMPACTS INFLATION UIH A LONG LAG C H 20x A N G 16x -I E I Bank Reserues (Left) Core Inflation (Right) 6.GOX 5.Z5X \2y. I N 8* A P E R C E N T N P E R C E N C H A N G E 4x. 0 I I I I I I I I I i I I I I I Jan 1985 Notes: Jan 1987 Jan 1989 Jan 1991 Jan 1993 Jan 1995 Jan 1997 The chart shous three-year annualized rates of change in total bank reserues, lagged 36 months (left scale, line) and one-year changes in core inflation (CPIU less food and fuel, right scale, dot). Uertical lines shou the recession. Sources: Hauer Analytics; I 'I I I I I I I 1 I I I 1 I I 1 I I I I I I I 1 l i f Heinemann Economic Research THE BASIC FEDERAL BUDGET IS IN SURPLUS P E R C E N T — Basic Federal Budget Balance o Ql 1976 Ql 1978 Ql 1980 Ql 1982 Ql 1984 Ql 1986 Ql 1988 Ql 1999 Ql 1992 Ql 1994 Notes: The chart shous the basic surplus (+) or deficit (-) in the federal budget as a percent of GDP (revenues less expenditures other than interest). Underlying data in current dollars, SAAR. NIA basis. The vertical lines show recessions. Sources: Ha tier Analytics; Heinemann Economic Research PRODUCTIUITV IS UP IN MANUFACTURING, FLAT ELSEUHERE I N 150.0 D E X 137.5^ a s TT Nanuf actur i ng Product i u i ty Nonmanuf actur i ng Product i u i ty 9 125.0-1 8 2 = 112.5 1 0 0 100.0 IN 87.5-Lr Ql 977 Notes: T Ql 1979 Ql 1981 Ql 1985 Ql 1987 I I Ql 1989 Ql 1991 I I I I Ql 1993 The chart shous indexes of output per hour of all persons in manufacturing (line) and nonnanufacuturing (dot). Nonmanufacturing calculated from Bureau of Labor Statistics data, SA. Log scale. The uertical lines shou recessions. Sources: Hauer Analytics; Ql 1983 1 Heinenann Economic Research I Ql 1995 CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE 8F THE CAPITAL GU8DS MARKET P E R C 9.75X E N T 9.00* Inuestnent less Computers and Trucks (Left) Computers and Trucks (Right) 8 F 8.25/. ] G D 7.50* P 6.75* A Ql 1959 Notes: Ql 1967 Ql 1971 Ql 1975 Ql 1979 Ql 1983 Ql 1987 Ql 1991 Ql 1995 The chart shous fixed inuestment less information processing and related plus trucks and busses (line) and information processing and related plus trucks and busses (dot) - both as a percent of GDP. The uertical ljnes show recessions. Sources: Ql 1963 Hauer Analytics; Heinemann Economic Research NONFARM PAYROLL EMPLOYMENT Patterns of Recession and Recovery en cs Months from Cyclical Peak 7 Prior Recessions + 1990-91 Recession Zg IPE 3 ^ 9 5. 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ONNaw(ONO(ONsin^on*-*-«D«wo)«o©inosiq'-cp^qnq<poiin lcod^ioc>i^K^WWt^d^^^doJcdcow^C5«coc»ior».^cv ^ • » - T » v O O O O P > ( OJOJOJOiOJOJOJOJOJ( q o j r - K q q o t q q q q o j v - q c o ^ r q q q ^ q o j O j ^ o i ^ q q q ^ q q q o j q q q q ^dNKK«^Nioaoid«)ifliocd(bWddNNin«-oiioNNinao^;0^0NQ 0)0)oorwntinw<D(ONcoo)0'-Nnp)r)r)in«)(DNO(0»a>§oooiO)p)g9 t()lO<OO(D0(DO0O(D(O<O(DIDNNNNNNKNNNNNNNNSI>0NNh>0N s o ^ t N q v q q i - e p i q s w T - o o q c o j f j ^ a q i o q N O w i o t q t o t r o e o q ^ri?^r^ioioSif)S2SSSS!oSSSSSio<o£©w«)S©SSSSSS2S<o 0 ) ^ M ^ l O S O ) d ^ n i d d o i N m N O ) N « N C Q ^ ^ K O N l A N d ^ l O o i N W N d f O I O oncD^oNonoxDi-coinnioioiANioonco^MN^tviotOjN^attnNv 0J040J0J0J0J0J0J0J0i0J0J0J0i0J0i0i0J0J0l0lc0C0OOC0nC0OnC0C0OC0C0C0C0C0 O O r - r - r - r - i - N W N W O n n n * t i n i n i n i f i ( D ( D » S N S 0 ) C 0 0 0 0 ) O ) 0 ) 0 ) O O O O qojoiqooj^q^^qojojcocococoqv-afOOJcoojcoco^^ocncoooojNcoooj N d d N d N d N ^ d d d d d r ^ N d o d d r d d r t d r t d o i ^ N o i r t s d mnocoocococoococococococococococOcoococococofOcocococococococo<*<t<r<* UJ 0. 93*8i2imi*3lf8lllml5*?l8ll!m S ^ ? 3 Shadow Open Market Committee Table 1 - Part 2 Federal Reserve Action and Monetary Growth (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) Large Time Deposit Ratio Nondeposit Uabll. Ratio Foreign Deposit Ratio (18) Savings Adjusted Reserve Date [ Ratio (3/10) Jul 91 Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan 92 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan 93 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan 94 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul AugPE 0.0140 0.0141 0.0141 0.0142 0.0144 0.0147 0.0148 0.0153 0.0155 0.0157 0.0159 0.0159 0.0159 0.0161 0.0166 0.0169 0.0172 0.0174 0.0175 0.0175 0.0176 0.0177 0.0180 0.0180 0.0182 0.0183 0.0185 0.0188 0.0190 0.0190 0.0189 0.0190 0.0190 0.0190 0.0189 0.0188 0.0188 0.0188 Currency Ratio (2/4) & Small Time Deposit Ratio (5/4) 0.4364 0.4361 0.4365 0.4351 0.4304 0.4280 0.4237 0.4182 0.4148 0.4147 0.4110 0.4139 0.4134 0.4116 0.4104 0.4058 0.4027 0.4033 0.4031 0.4066 0.4084 0.4094 0.4031 0.4035 0.4026 0.4030 0.4033 0.4031 0.4019 0.4022 0.4063 0.4107 0.4145 0.4194 0.4236 0.4264 0.4278 0.4328 (6/4) 3.5622 3.5335 3.5114 3.4757 3.4163 3.3753 3.3128 3.2461 3.2011 3.1731 3.1215 3.1154 3.0698 3.0214 2.9777 2.9183 2.8670 2.8352 2.7989 2.7896 2.7691 2.7467 2.6847 2.6587 2.6217 2.5964 2.5682 2.5431 2.5189 2.5042 2.4988 2.4896 2.4853 2.4922 2.4906 2.4782 2.4615 2.4718 (7/4) (8/4) 0.3492 0.3511 0.3405 0.3436 0.3420 0.3306 0.3221 0.3190 0.3158 0.3057 0.2969 0.3005 0.2980 0.3060 0.2990 0.2964 0.2920 0.2861 0.2757 0.2830 0.2944 0.2931 0.2847 0.2864 0.2872 0.2889 0.2917 0.2925 0.2957 0.2955 0.2925 0.2906 0.2983 0.3021 0.3048 0.3170 0.3221 0.3219 0.7776 0.7612 0.7472 0.7249 0.6988 0.6803 0.6598 0.6387 0.6215 0.6096 0.5917 0.5828 0.5660 0.5569 0.5430 0.5237 0.5072 0.4973 0.4835 0.4793 0.4705 0.4731 0.4611 0.4535 0.4444 0.4407 0.4353 0.4336 0.4269 0.4242 0.4267 0.4188 0.4126 0.4141 0.4184 0.4184 0.4204 0.4275 25 0.0160 0.0157 0.0154 0.0151 0.0154 0.0160 0.0161 0.0144 0.0140 0.0145 0.0142 0.0145 0.0151 0.0137 0.0147 0.0144 0.0139 0.0146 0.0138 0.0140 0.0135 0.0129 0.0131 0.0129 0.0133 0.0125 0.0128 0.0426 0.0126 0.0135 0.0126 0.0122 0.0118 0.0125 0.0119 0.0123 0.0125 0.0119 Money Treasury Deposit Ratio Multiplier 0/4) (2+4/1) 0.0350 0.0285 0.0447 0.0471 0.0463 0.0405 0.0521 0.0389 0.0307 0.0268 0.0314 0.0376 0.0290 0.0327 0.0411 0.0308 0.0230 0.0269 0.0453 0.0404 0.0237 0.0275 0.0269 0.0348 0.0333 0.0307 0.0367 0.0217 0.0161 0.0268 0.0386 0.0400 0.0249 0.0350 0.0358 0.0165 0.0166 0.0171 j 2.7804 2.7828 2.7823 2.7881 2.8048 2.8108 2.8301 2.8447 2.8566 2.8571 2.8717 2.8611 2.8681 2.8743 2.8722 2.8879 2.8991 2.8982 2.9026 2.8867 2.8782 2.8768 2.9007 2.9023 2.9058 2.9051 2.9026 2.8985 2.9021 2.9039 2.8888 2.8701 2.8571 2.8382 2.8243 2.8154 2.8142 2.7943 September 11-12, 1994 Table 2 Federal Reserve Action and Monetary Growth (Compound Annual Rates of Change) This Is accounted for by changes In the: Date Jul 91 Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan 92 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan 93 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan 94 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul AugPE Monetary Growth (M-1) Federal Reserve Actions (Monetary Base Growth) Contribution of the Money Multiplier Adjusted Reserve Ratio Currency Ratio Savings & Small Time Deposit Ratio Large Time Deposit Ratio NonDeposit Liability Ratio Foreign Deposit Ratio Treasury Deposit Ratio 0.14 0.53 0.17 0.60 -0.02 0.57 1.00 0.22 -0.07 0.01 0.51 -0.59 0.81 0.39 0.01 -0.07 0.65 1.05 -0.09 0.01 0.03 0.92 2.12 0.06 -0.01 0.20 0.66 1.46 -0.02 0.40 -0.45 -0.00 0.80 2.46 0.33 0.47 0.06 0.76 2.41 0.11 0.35 0.73 0.14 1.92 0.01 -1.62 -5.05 -11.89 0.22 -4.27 -0.19 0.37 0.75 2.18 0.01 -0.26 0.38 -0.01 -0.16 0.26 0.34 0.67 -0.02 0.10 1.85 -0.18 0.07 -0.39 0.45 2.40 -0.60 -0.07 0.99 0.50 3.12 0.44 0.81 0.01 0.11 2.53 0.38 0.81 0.02 2.54 0.22 -0.10 0.26 -0.02 0.15 0.83 -0.78 0.03 0.44 0.59 1.55 0.27 -0.01 -0.39 0.23 0.50 0.75 0.02 0.39 -0.51 0.92 -0.08 0.01 -0.06 0.03 0.49 0.03 -0.01 0.41 0^58 3.04 •0.38 0.01 0.37 -0.09 1.27 0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.36 1.46 0.11 0.03 -0.07 0.16 1.12 -0.28 -0.01 -0.13 0.26 1.35 0.97 0.01 -0.06 0.11 1.63 0.49 -0.00 0.58 -0.28 2.13 -0.80 -0.07 0.20 0.02 1.10 -0.69 0.05 0.17 -0.14 0.31 -0.08 0.02 0.45 0.11 0.53 0.79 0.02 -0.40 0.32 0.22 -0.45 -0.03 -0.17 -0.06 -0.31 -0.04 0.03 -0.24 -0.15 0.09 0.95 •0.02 0.00 -0.61 0.61 -0.00 -0.00 -0.09 -0.03 0.29 •0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.33 •0.48 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 0.01 -0.01 0.22 0.79 -1.23 0.60 0.34 8.28 0.49 8.88 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 0.20 0.02 -0.12 0.88 -0.23 3.52 3.65 •0.88 10.66 14.18 1993-IH 1993-IH 1993-IH 1993-IH 1993-IH 1993-IH 1993-IH 1993-IH 1993-IH 1993-IH -0.03 0.01 0.17 1.30 0.35 •0.02 0.53 -154 10.18 10.72 1993-IIH 1993-IIH 1993-IIH 1993-IIH 1993-IIH 1993-IIH 1993-IIH 1993-11H 1993-IIH 1993-IIH 0.09 -0.01 0.59 1.47 0.28 -0.09 9.84 -2.20 0.12 9.96 1994-8 Month! 1994-8 Month* 994-8 Month! 1994-8 Month! 1994-8 Monthf 1994-8 Month! 1994-8 Month? 1994-8 Month! 1994-8 Month!1994-8 Months 0.06 -6.33 0.16 -0.00 -0.14 0.01 -6.10 0.14 9.23 3.13 -0.04 -6.92 -1.31 -0.28 -0.05 0.02 -0.61 -6.83 •6.22 2.35 6.24 8.91 6.31 10.46 16.71 11.58 18.03 21.04 12.41 8.05 15.10 0.51 14.61 17.02 17.21 19.68 16.15 10.34 10.25 2.85 5.63 8.32 26.57 10.68 12.20 10.00 11.49 9.23 10.22 6.66 5.49 5.69 3.89 -1.37 1.71 3.98 7.86 -2.20 7.76 7.82 6.51 7.76 8.62 8.75 8.71 13.82 6.92 7.79 8.28 5.10 11.26 14.04 18.26 12.09 10.89 10.73 8.26 9.89 9.41 8.97 14.61 9.95 10.56 10.33 12.66 11.08 8.59 5.86 12.33 14.24 9.71 6.80 7.87 8.03 8.37 6.51 -1.52 1.09 -0.20 2.70 8.09 2.83 9.31 7.22 5.49 0.26 6.82 -4.59 3.35 2.98 -1.05 7.59 5.26 -0.39 1.98 -7.04 -3.78 -0.65 11.95 0.73 1.64 -0.33 -1.17 -1.85 1.63 0.80 -6.85 -8.55 -5.82 -8.17 -6.16 -4.05 -0.51 -8.71 -1.40 -1.23 -0.69 -0.71 •2.88 -3.73 -1.52 -5.67 -3.90 25.13 -2.87 0.19 -0.49 -3.09 -8.29 -4.27 -4.88 -0.91 -0.12 -0.82 -2.38 -0.28 -4.08 0.24 -1.40 -1.03 -1.87 -5.04 -5.04 1.15 1.45 -1.27 -0.26 0.10 1.46 -0.29 0.11 -0.15 -1.54 0.59 -0.65 1.86 7.85 3.85 7.69 9.08 6.25 -2.25 6.56 -4.99 0.91 3.73 3.30 7.96 6.16 -0.60 0.26 -6.81 -2.97 -0.76 11.98 -0.70 1.21 -0.67 -0.47 0.52 3.75 -0.81 -8.00 -8.31 -6.51 -7.25 -7.31 -4.70 -0.79 -7.76 26 Shadow Open Market Committee Table 3 Federal Reserve Action and Monetary Growth (Compound Annual Rates of Change) THREE-MONTH MOVING AVERAGES This Is accounted for by changes In the: Date Jul 91 Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan 92 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan 93 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan 94 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul AugPE Monetary Growth (M-1) Federal Reserve Actions (Monetary Base | Growth) 10.35 9.32 7.16 8.56 11.16 12.91 15.44 16.88 17.16 13.83 11.85 7.88 10.07 10.71 16.28 17.97 17.68 15.39 12.24 7.81 6.24 5.60 13.51 15.19 16.48 10.96 11.23 10.24 10.31 8.70 7.45 5.94 5.02 2.74 1.41 1.44 4.52 3.22 5.70 7.00 7.37 7.37 7.63 8.38 8.69 10.43 9.82 9.51 7.66 7.05 8.21 10.13 14.52 14.80 13.75 11.23 9.96 9.63 9.19 9.42 11.00 11.18 11.71 10.28 11.18 11.35 10.77 8.51 8.93 10.81 12.10 10.25 8.13 7.57 8.09 7.64 Contribution of the Money Mult)pller Adjusted Reserve Ratio 4.65 2.33 -0.21 1.20 3.53 4.54 6.74 6.45 7.34 4.32 4.19 0.83 1.86 0.58 1.76 3.18 3.93 4.15 2.28 -1.82 •2.95 -3.82 2.51 4.01 4.78 0.68 0.05 -1.12 -0.46 0.19 -1.47 -4.87 -7.07 -7.52 -6.72 -6.13 -3.57 -4.42 -1.36 -1.27 -1.11 -0.88 -1.42 -2.44 -2.71 -3.64 -3.70 5.18 6.12 7.48 -1.06 -1.13 -3.96 -5.22 -5.81 -3.35 -1.97 -0.62 -1.11 -1.16 -2.25 -1.37 -1.75 -0.73 -1.43 -2.64 -3.98 •2.98 -0.81 0.44 -0.03 -0.48 0.43 0.42 0.43 -0.11 Currency Ratio Savings & Small Time Deposit Ratio 1.13 1.05 0.80 0.95 1.33 1.54 2.02 2.11 2.27 -2.52 -2.60 -3.15 1.43 1.50 2.46 2.68 2.73 1.97 1.64 0.96 0.99 0.64 1.48 1.60 1.93 1.29 1.31 1.37 1.70 1.62 1.18 0.65 0.35 0.15 •0.00 0.13 0.33 0.14 3.97 1.78 -0.53 0.60 3.02 4.52 6.46 6.87 7.67 4.36 3.52 -0.23 0.83 -0.12 2.65 5.00 5.81 4.51 1.94 -2.39 -3.17 -3.51 2.75 3.51 4.17 -0.05 0.02 -0.21 1.26 1.15 •1.69 -5.71 -7.61 -7.36 -7.03 •6.42 -4.27 -4.42 27 Large Time Deposit Ratio NonDeposit Liability Ratio 0.58 0.57 0.54 0.58 0.70 0.75 0.79 0.74 0.76 -1.19 -1.19 -1.31 0.60 0.50 0.70 0.75 0.87 0.63 0.55 0.36 0.40 0.19 0.31 0.30 0.44 0.30 tf26 0.18 0.32 0.30 0.21 0.17 0.21 0.24 0.01 -0.10 -0.09 -0.12 0.30 0.12 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.26 0.28 0.19 -1.34 -1.25 -1.35 0.10 -0.15 0.07 0.07 0.27 0.16 0.27 0.07 -0.15 •0.29 -0.02 0.12 0.10 -0.06 -0.08 -0.09 -0.16 -0.10 -0.03 0.10 -0.04 -0.15 •0.24 -0.31 -0.28 -0.23 Foreign Deposit Ratio 0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 •0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 Treasury Deposit Ratio | 0.00 0.06 -0.06 -0.14 -0.21 0.05 -0.07 0.08 0.12 -0.27 •0.49 •0.69 -0.04 -0.03 -0.14 -0.11 0.07 0.24 -0.17 -0.20 0.08 0.31 0.23 -0.14 -0.10 -0.07 -0.04 0.27 0.39 0.22 -0.33 -0.52 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.30 0.31 September 11-12, 1994 Table 4 Date Federal Reserve Action and Monetary Growth (Compound Annual Rates of Change) (Memo) Reserve Growth Rate Reserve Three-month Growth Rate Moving Average Month to Month Jul 91 Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan 92 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan 93 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul 5.41 6.08 3.30 8.88 20.62 21.64 10.46 47.68 17.55 7.92 16.29 -2.97 1.10 21.20 39.70 30.66 22.62 5.61 0.60 6.01 7.96 1.55 35.66 1.99 12.29 7.12 15.23 23.77 14.61 -1.37 -0.78 6.66 -2.67 -3.94 -4.97 -1.97 -3.36 -0.64 Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan 94 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul AugPE 8.12 6.79 4.93 6.09 10.93 17.05 17.57 26.59 25.23 24.38 13.92 7.08 4.81 6.44 20.67 30.52 31.00 19.63 9.61 4.07 4.85 5.17 15.05 13.06 16.64 7.13 11.55 15.37 17.87 12.34 4.15 1.50 1.07 0.02 -3.86 •3.62 -3.43 •1.99 1991 7.72 1992 18.15 1993-IH 8.96 1993-IIH 11.94 1994-8 Months -1.46 -13.40 Source: Federal Reserve Board; Helnemann Economic Research 28 Shadow Open Market Committee BUDGET PROGRESS? Mickey D. LEVY NationsBanc Capital Markets, Inc. Washington policymakers, still fixated on budget deficits, see great "progress" in the budget. From a peak of $290 billion in Fiscal Year 1992, the deficit will be approximately $205 billion in 1994 (which concludes this September) and is projected to fall to approximately $170 billion in 1995. Thus, excluding net interest outlays, the budget will be in surplus for the first time since 1989. But when evaluated from other equally important fiscal policy considerations, this progress is illusory. The deficit reduction has been generated by a reversal of the earlier cash-flow outlays for the Savings and Loan bailouts, legislated tax hikes, and stronger economic growth. Spending for entitlement programs continues to rise sharply, while spending for investment-oriented activities and defense shrinks. Tax policy continues to discourage private saving. These policies dampen long-run economic growth. Policymakers leave untouched the structural flaws that are the sources of the fastest growing spending programs. The structural (standardized employment) budget deficit is projected to resume its rise in 1996, even with no new spending programs, and jumps sharply in 1999 when the spending caps on discretionary programs are lifted. And there is a mounting backlog of pending legislation that is potentially very expensive, including health care reform, the crime bill, and welfare reform. Crucially important to economic performance is how the budget allocates national resources, regardless of whether spending is financed by taxes or borrowing, and how that allocation affects long-run economic growth as well as how it achieves redistributive goals. In this light, progress on the budget is unidimensional and unbalanced. RECENT BUDGET TRENDS On the surface, the recent deficit reduction has been impressive. The deficit will be 3.1 percent of GDP in 1994, compared to an average of 4.8 percent in 1991-1992. It is projected to fall below 2.5 percent of GDP in 1995, its lowest level since the late 1970s. This would help stabilize the public debt-to-GDP ratio at approximately 51 percent; this ratio soared from 26.8 percent in 1980 to 44 percent in 1990 and exceeded 50 percent in 1992 for the first time since 1958 (see Chart 1). 29 September 11-12,1994 But a dissection of the deficit reduction reveals a less impressive pattern—one that has negative implications for economic performance. The largest source of the recent deficit reduction has been the reversal of government spending for the S & L bailouts. Those outlays, which rose to a peak of $66.1 billion in 1991 as the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) acquired assets of failed depository institutions, shifted to negative outlays of $28 billion in 1993 as these assets were sold (proceeds from the RTC asset sales are counted as negative spending.) More net asset sales by the RTC are expected to generate negative outlays of a lesser magnitude in 1994 and 1995. Excluding deposit insurance, the rise in government spending and deficits from 1988 to 1991, and the subsequent improvement, were much less dramatic. The continued decline in defense spending has been another source of deficit reduction. With the exception of the Gulf War, defense spending has declined continuously since 1989. Its average annual decline from 1990 to 1993 was slightly less than 1 percent; that pace accelerated to a 4.1 percent decline in 1994. Measured in terms of shares of national resources, these declines have been even more dramatic: since 1989, defense spending has fallen from 26.6 percent to 19.0 percent of total federal spending, and from 5.9 percent to 4.2 percent of GDP. Net interest outlays have stabilized since 1992, as the lower interest rates since 1990 have temporarily offset the debt service costs of the rising publicly-held debt. However, they will resume rising in 1995; in fact, virtually all of the upward revision of spending projections in the Administration's Mid-Session Review of the 1995 Budget (July 1994) were due to the impact of the rising interest rates on net interest outlays. Meanwhile, spending on domestic programs has continued to soar (see Table 1). From 1990 to 1994, spending on entitlements and other mandatory programs has risen approximately 8.8 percent annually, even faster than in the 1980s. The fastest growth occurred in Medicaid, which has risen at a whopping 19.6 percent rate. All means-tested entitlements, including Medicaid, have risen 15.7 percent annually. This reflects in part the early 1990's recession-related increase in welfare recipients. During this same period, spending on nonmeans-tested entitlements, including social security, Medicare, and other retirement programs, has grown at a 7.1 percent pace, more than double the rate of inflation. Tax revenue growth has accelerated dramatically in 1994, increasing nearly 10 percent. This surge reflects the tax hikes legislated by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93) and a sharp pickup in economic growth and taxable incomes. This compares with the 2.8 percent average annual rise form 1990 to 1992, and the 5.7 percent increase in 1993. 30 Shadow Open Market Committee THE CURRENT SERVICES BUDGET OUTLOOK The deficit is projected to recede substantially in 1995. The Administration projects a deficit of $167 billion, the lowest level since 1989. It projects 7.4 percent growth in revenues—more than twice the rate of inflation—and only 2.3 percent growth of spending. Individual income taxes are projected to rise 8.6 percent, thanks to the tax increases and continued healthy economic growth. The slow spending growth stems from continued declines in defense spending, net asset sales from the RTC, and only 0.7 percent rise in spending on nondefense discretionary programs, which assumes adherence to the OBRA caps. Continued rapid growth in entitlement and other mandatory spending is anticipated. The Congressional Budget Office is even more optimistic, projecting a deficit of $162 billion. Under current law, the budget deficit is projected to level off in 1996 and then increase throughout the remainder of the decade. Once again, rising spending is the culprit. In recent decades, revenues have remained in a very narrow range around 18 to 19 percent of GDP. All of the deficit increase has been attributable to spending rising as a share of GDP. Current services tax revenues will remain very close to 19 percent of GDP through the 1990s, while spending will be between 21.5 and 22 percent of GDP. Thus spending rises faster than taxes in dollar terms. Beginning in 1999, when the he OBRA caps on discretionary spending expire, current services projections of deficits rise sharply. Ironically, the Administration's decision in 1993 to alter the Treasury's debt management strategy and shorten the duration of government debt—essentially betting that short-term interest rates would stay low—may prove costly to taxpayers. The Administration has raised its projections of net interest outlays, and uncertainty about future costs have heightened, particularly as the Federal Reserve pursues a disinflationary monetary policy. Based on these projections, structural deficits persist. The CBO's standardized-employment deficit, which excludes deposit insurance, remains around 2.5 percent of potential GDP and begin rising late in the decade. A MORE REALISTIC VIEW The vastly improved deficit outlook is based on several heroic and unrealistic assumptions about economic policymaking; first, that the increasingly stringent spending caps on discretionary spending imposed by OBRA are adhered to, and second, that none of the pending legislation for 31 September 11-12,1994 health care reform, welfare reform, or crime prevention are even enacted, or if health care reform becomes law, the Administration's projected cost savings, not the CBO's deficit-widening estimates, are correct. So much for rosy budget forecasts. Beginning in 1994, OBRA imposed a single cap on the three categories of discretionary spending, i.e., defense, international, and domestic discretionary (from 1991 to 1993, separate caps applied). Spending for these discretionary programs requires action by Congress's appropriation committees, in contrast to spending for entitlements that are automatically paid to beneficiaries that meet certain requirements. The OBRA spending caps through 1998 become increasingly stringent, and adhering to them will require increasingly restrictive cutbacks by the appropriation committees. This will generate increasingly contentious tradeoffs among the programs vying for the shrinking budget resources. In 1994, the cap was achieved by cuts in defense spending sufficient to offset increases in outlays for domestic programs. The caps require freezing 1995 outlays at 1994 levels and then reducing inflation-adjusted outlays by approximately $51 billion by 1998. Many of these domestic discretionary programs, including education, training and social services, transportation, income security, and natural resources and the environment, are important and visible. The same, of course, is true of defense. Accordingly, the probability of legislative slippage in adhering to these spending caps is high. Also at issue is the potential tradeoff between national security needs and the magnitude of the defense downsizing necessary to achieve budget objectives. Pending initiatives for health care reform, welfare reform, and crime prevention—all in various stages of legislative consideration—are potential budget-busters. The cost of a health care package is highly uncertain; as evidence, the Administration originally projected its proposal would save $38 billion over 5 years, while the CBO estimated the same proposal would raise the deficit by $67.8 billion. Since then, leading alternative proposals have emphasized universal coverage over cost containment. While the Administration supports leading universal coverage alternatives, its latest budget projections continue to assume the large savings estimated in its earlier optimistic projections. The leading health care proposals are all open-ended entitlements that would raise the demand for medical services and rely on various kinds of market and nonmarket mechanisms to constrain costs. The cost-containing ability of these mechanisms are at best uncertain, and at worst, ineffective and economically distorting. While leading proposals may minimize projected effects on the budget 32 Shadow Open Market Committee deficit, they involve hidden taxes and costs by shifting the burden directly to the private sector. Importantly, whether or not these costs are reflected in the federal budget, they certainly raise the costs of business and employment. The Administration's crime bill, still facing House-Senate reconciliation, would raise spending an estimated $33 billion over 5 years if enacted. While well-intended—almost everybody wants lower crime—some of its good provisions are overwhelmed by numerous other provisions that would (re)institute costly urban programs that have failed in the past. The Administration did not include the cost of its proposed crime bill in its Mid-Session budget projections. The initiative to reform welfare programs is still pending, and its potential budgetary impact is uncertain. GOVERNMENT PURCHASES, TRANSFER PAYMENTS, AND TAXES: IMPLICATIONS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE The mix of government spending and the burden of taxes have both direct and indirect impacts on the allocation of national resources, with important implications for economic performance. Government purchases of goods and services, including defense purchases, nondefense purchases for transportation, infrastructure, natural resources, etc., and state and local purchases for education, police, etc., directly consume resources, making them unavailable for private consumption. In contrast, transfer payments do not directly absorb resources, but instead redistribute claims on resources from taxpayers to beneficiaries. As such, transfer payments, including social security, Medicare, net interest costs, income security programs, etc., are counted as negative taxes in the National Income and Product Accounts. Whereas purchases directly allocate national resources and affect economic performance, transfer payments have significant indirect economic impacts through their influence on decisions to work, save, and invest In general, therisingtide of transfers that redistribute income from savers and investors toward consumption-oriented activities have had a significant and cumulative depressing affect on long-run potential growth. This trend of taxing and redistributing income constrains long-run standards of living. A comparison of two trends, tax receipts minus transfers (net receipts) illustrates the extent of the ongoing shift in the uses of national resources through the government's budget (see Chart 2). Tax receipts net of transfers have continued their long decline as a share of GDP; while gross tax revenues have not changed materially as a percent of GDP, transfer payments have continued to rise rapidly, driven by soaring entitlements and net interest outlays. (The sharp fall of taxes less 33 September 11-12,1994 transfers relative to GDP in the early 1990s reflected in part the temporary surge in RTC's outlays for deposit insurance). Meanwhile, total government purchases continue to recede, as government purchases for defense have fallen while spending on domestic discretionary programs (infrastructure, science and technology, transportation, natural resources, etc.) have risen. The implications of these trends are the following: more than 100 percent of the rise in federal spending and deficits has been attributable to the rise in transfers, while the government's direct absorption of private resources has been declining in real terms; taxpayers are receiving fewer and fewer goods and services from the government for the taxes they pay, while a larger portion of their taxes are redistributed through transfer programs; and this redistribution reduces national saving and investment while adding to consumption. Moreover, the increasing reliance on income-based taxes (personal and corporate income taxes and FICA taxes on wage income) further discourages saving and investment The budget process itself reinforces these trends, while enactment of pending legislation would add significantly to them. Beginning in 1986, the Budget Control Act (Gramm-RudmanHollings) excluded from sequestration social security and other transfer programs, thereby forcing cuts in the investment-oriented discretionary programs. Amended by OBRA93, higher spending now is allowed for entitlement programs if they do not raise deficits (pay-as-you-go), while discretionary programs face increasingly stringent, binding caps on spending. These artificial restrictions reflect and reinforce the deficit bean-counting mentality on federal budgeting that has resulted in a reduction of resources allocated to investment-oriented activities and the ever-growing volume of redistributive transfer payments. This hampers the long-run capacity to grow. Enactment of health care reform, welfare reform or a crime bill would only add to therisein transfer payments. Either these legislative initiatives add to the deficit or arefinancedby taxes, or do not show up in the budget because their costs are shifted directly to the private sector through employer mandated health insurance has no bearing on the general issue of resource allocation or economic performance. Similarly, higher entitlement spendingfinancedby higher taxes (to comply with OBRA's pay-as-you-go provision) is not costless just because it does not raise deficits. These important issues of resource allocation have taken a back seat to the narrow focus on the budget deficit While Congress is unwilling to address glaring structural flaws in the fastest growing entitlements, it is more than willing to add expensive and wasteful amendments to pending legislation to raise the probability of enactment This is not sound fiscal policy, regardless of the temporary favorable deficit trend. 34 Shadow Open Market Committee Chart 1 Federal Budget Trends Federal Spending and Tax ReceiDts (Percent of GDP. Fiscal Years) 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 — 1976 1978 Revenues 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 Outlays Federal Budget Deficit (Sum of past 12 Months) -100 -350 Publicly-Held Debt-to-GDP Ratio 70% r 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 35 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 September] 1-12, 1994 Table 1 The Mix and Growth of Federal Spending (Fiscal Years) 1990 1994 1990-1994 Level in Bil $ % of Total Level in BH $ Discretionary 501.7 40.1 545 37.2 11 202 Domestic 182.5 14.6 244 16.6 7.5 28.7 19.1 1.5 20 1.4 1.2 0.4 Defense 300.1 24.0 280 19.1 -1.7 -9.4 Mandatory 567.4 45.3 794 54.1 8.8 105.7 Social Security 246.5 19.7 317 21.6 6.5 32.9 Medicare 107.4 8.6 158 10.8 10.1 23.6 Medicaid 41.1 3.3 84 5.7 19.6 20.0 59.9 4.8 72 4.9 4.7 5.7 112.5 9.0 163 11.1 9.7 23.6 58.1 4.6 -5 •0.3 • -29.4 Net Interest 1842 14.7 202 13.8 13 8.3 Offsetting Receipts •58.8 4.7 •68 -4.6 •3.7 -4.3 12517 100.0 1467 100.0 4.0 100.0 International % of Total Avo. Annual % Change % Share of $ Change Other Retirement & Disability 2 Other Deposit Insurance Total ' Estimates for FY 1994are from the Congressional Budget Office, The Economic and Budget Outlook: An Update. August 1994. Includes food stamps, family support, supplementary security income, veterans pensions, child nutrition, earned income tax credit, student loans, unemployment compensation, farm price supports, and other programs. Most of the increase in outlays in this category occurred in the means-tested programs, which jumped from $58.8 Bil. in 1990 to a projected $95 Bil. in 1994. In addition, unemployment compensation increased by approximately $10 bttlion. 2 36 Shadow Open Market Committee Chart 2 Government Purchases and Tax Receipts Net of Transfer Percent of GDP Total Government 24% . , 68 70 — , 72 74 76 78 , . . 80 82 84 Total Government Purchases (Federal and State & Local) — r 86 88 90 92 94 92 94 Total Tax Receipts Net of Transfers Federal Government 68 70 72 — 74 76 Federal Purchases 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 —— Federal Tax Receipts Net of Transfers 37 September 11-12,1994 38 Shadow Open Market Committee ECONOMIC OUTLOOK Mickey D. LEVY Nationsbanc Capital Markets Inc. The rate of economic growth is beginning to moderate following a period of robust expansion. Real GDP is projected to expand at an approximate 3.0 percent rate in the second half of 1994 and 2.5-3.0 percent in 1995. Inflation is expected to rise modestly, even as economic growth slows. The Federal Reserve's recent anti-inflation policy will constrain inflation pressures and limit the rise in inflation expectations. The structure of the economy remains strong, pointing toward sustained economic expansion, although the government's fiscal and regulatory policies constrain long-run potential growth. APPROACHING A MORE TYPICAL EXPANSION As the expansion has matured, it has become more similar to recent cycles. The economy recovered slowly from the April 1991 recession trough, as the many structural adjustments in various sectors, particularly the defense downsizing, inhibited the rate of growth. As a consequence, during the first two years of rebound, cumulative rises in nominal and real GDP, employment, and real disposable income were anemic relative to recent recoveries. The expansion accelerated in mid-1993. Real GDP grew 4 percent from second quarter 1993 to second quarter 1994, and many key measures of economic performance are starting to catch up with the patterns of recent expansions. Although the expansion is now in its fourth year, its characteristics in the last year have been similar to the early stages of recent recoveries. From second quarter 1993 to second quarter 1994, real domestic demand grew 4.8 percent Consumption growth of 3.5 percent exceeded the 2.8 percent growth of real disposable income, suppressing the rate of personal saving below 4.0 percent Business investment advanced robustly (13.2 percent), particularly in information processing equipment The net export sector has deteriorated and subtracted 0.8 percent from domestic production, as imports of consumer and producer goods have soared with the stronger economic growth. Analogous to the early stages of recent recoveries, a cyclical jump in productivity suppressed unit labor costs. In the year ending first quarter 1994, productivity in the nonfarm sector jumped 39 September 11-12, 1994 3.1 percent, compared to its 1.0 percent average annual rise in the 1980s. While compensation increases have leveled off about 3.0 percent, unit labor costs actually declined in the second half of 1993 and have increased only 0.7 percent year-over-year. These developments have contributed to receding inflation and building corporate profits and cash flows. Through Spring 1994, all broad measures of inflation—the CPI, PPI, and GDP deflator —receded gradually; since then, they have begun to tilt up modestly. The widening margins and rising product demand have lifted after-tax operating profits 14.8 percent in that last year. Since Fall 1993, interest rates have also behaved similarly to recent early-recovery spurts in real economic growth, as the yield curve hasflattenedmodestly with short-term rates rising faster than long-term rates. Employment has also played catch-up. Whereas the economic rebound through 1993 was attributable primarily to productivity gains, job growth has jumped significantly in 1994 while productivity growth has slowed. So far this year, monthly payroll increases have averaged 269,000 compared to 160,000 in 1993, and the unemployment rate has fallen to 6.1 percent from 6.7 percent a year ago. DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS Several characteristics distinguish this expansion from previous ones, and these distinctions hold the key to future economic performance. The government's fiscal policy has remained restrictive, in sharp contrast to the stimulative fiscal thrust in all recent recoveries. Taxes were raised substantially in 1990 and gain in 1993, the latter pushing maximum marginal tax rates above 40 percent The federal defense downsizing has generated reductions in real government purchases. These trends have significantly reduced the cyclically-adjusted budget deficit Another general characteristic of this cycle has been the many noncyclical adjustments, beginning well before the recession, that have affected the growth and mix of output during the recovery. More accentuated than in recent cycles, these adjustments made the recession seem more severe than aggregate statistics indicate, and clearly have inhibited the gains during the subsequent expansion. Reflecting these factors, the rebound of nominal GDP has been significantly slower than in previous cycles. During the first two years of recovery, nominal GDP grew 5.2 percent annually, in contrast to an average of 9.6 percent in recent cycles. In the last year, nominal GDP has accelerated 40 Shadow Open Market Committee to 6.1 percent growth. At the same time, increases in the GDP deflator have fallen slightly. This change in the mix of nominal GDP between real output and inflation has contributed significantly to the recent period of strong economic growth. One may also argue that the Federal Reserve's move to a tighter monetary policy has been more timely than in previous cycles, when delayed responses to accelerating nominal spending and price pressure allowed inflation to rise significantly. Just as the Fed has tended to ease for too long in expansions, it has invariably followed such periods with overly tight policy, generating recession. While the Fed has tightened aggressively so far in 1994, this followed an overly accommodative stance in 1992-1993. Nevertheless, the Fed now seems committed to lower inflation, has become more aware of the costs of its past mistakes, and has taken appropriate steps to limit any rise in inflation. THE OUTLOOK FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND INFLATION The pace of domestic demand growth is projected to moderate toward year-end and throughout 1995. The factors underlying this slowdown are the building impact of the monetary tightening and higher interest rates, the higher taxes and restrictive fiscal policies, and the general maturing of the expansion that will bring growth toward its long-run trend. The Fed's shift toward monetary restrictiveness is clear in the trend of bank reserves and the narrow monetary aggregates. Bank reserves have declined since February and are now at the same level as October 1993. This follows two years of 16.6 percent average annualized growth. Ml growth has slowed similarly, expanding at a 3.0 percent pace since February, while its year-over-year growth has fallen to half of its previous 12 percent rate. The slowdown in the monetary base has been much more modest—it has continued to grow at a 7.5 percent rate—reflecting the persistently rising demand for currency from abroad. Meanwhile, M2 growth has remained very modest, less than 2.0 percent in the last year, and has been decelerating gradually. Associated with this monetary slowdown has been a significant rise in short-term interest rates and a flattening of the yield curve, both symptoms of monetary tightening. The timing of this monetary restrictiveness on domestic demand is uncertain in part due to the excess liquidity that has been provided previously. Moreover, bank reserves and Ml have been suppressed by the sharp reduction in mortgage refinancing that has accompanied the change in the Fed's posture. At issue is the extent to which the sharp declines in income velocities when the Fed was easing in 1992-1993 will be retraced as the Fed tightens and short-term interest rates rise. 41 September!1-12, 1994 Clearly, however, the shift toward monetary restrictiveness has had a telling financial market response, with a marked shift in the level and term structure of rates and a reallocation of assets among different asset classes. This suggests that some impact on aggregate demand and output is to follow. To date, the impact of the sizable tax increases on income and capital, as well as the ongoing defense downsizing, has been overwhelmed by the tailwinds of monetary ease. As the monetary restrictiveness absorbs the excess liquidity, the higher taxes may begin to bite into economic activity. In fact, selected evidence of slower economic growth has begun to merge, although it is measured against the earlier unsustainable spurt of activity. Consumption growth has slowed since the Spring. In particular, automotive sales have receded, although some of this decline has been the result of insufficient inventories. Department store sales have weakened modestly. Surveys of consumer confidence have drifted lower from their peaks, although they remain high. Housing activity is firm, but slightly below Spring levels. Only business investment has continued to rise robustly. As a result, domestic final sales have slowed to a 1.4 percent growth rate in second quarter 1994 from 6.5 percent in fourth quarter 1993. They are projected to reaccelerate through most of the remainder of this year, averaging 3.0-3.5 percent, and grow approximately 2.5-3.0 percent in 1995. The deteriorating trade deficit is expected to stabilize toward year-end and improve in 1995, adding to GDP growth. Import growth is projected to decelerate in response to slower domestic demand growth and the higher relative cost of imports (import prices rose about 10 percent annualized in second quarter 1994, and prices of nonpetroleum imports are beginning to pick up). Exports are expected to accelerate in 1995 from their already rapid pace (real exports grew 7.1 percent in the last year), benefiting from economic recovery in Europe and Japan. Inflation is projected to increase modestly, even as real economic growth slows. Through 1995, the CPI is projected to accelerate gradually to approximately 3.5-3.75 percent from its current year-over-year pace of 2.8 percent, while the GDP deflator should tend toward 3.0 percent from its present 2.0 percent rate. To date, several factors have kept inflation low. First, inflation is caused by the excess of nominal spending over productive capacity, not by strong economic growth. Rapid increases in business investment have expanded industrial capacity, while the modest acceleration of product 42 Shadow Open Market Committee demand and nominal GDP has constrained the ability of business to raise prices. Accelerating price increases have been limited to selected products in strong demand but these have been offset by slower price increases or outright decline for products in weak demand. Secondly, strong increases in productivity have offset wage increases to constrain unit labor costs, and labor markets are only selectively tight. Thirdly, on average, increases in nonwage costs of production have remained low as decelerating increases in nonwage compensation (including health and pension benefits) have offset accelerating prices of certain commodities and industrial materials. But now inflation is tilting modesdy upward. Unit labor costs are rising as employment and aggregate hours worked jump and productivity gains abate. In recent months, producer prices have accelerated at both the intermediate and finished goods levels The recent acceleration in GDP and product demand will allow price increases across a broader array of consumer goods and services. In recent cycles, as expansions have matured, the inflation portion of nominal GDP has risen gradually while real growth has tended toward its long-term trendline. Nominal GDP growth of 5.5-6.0 percent in 1995—a modest slowdown from its recent trend—would generate a rise in the GDP deflator to approximately 3.0 percent while real growth slows to about 2.75 percent. More rapid nominal spending growth would strain industrial and labor capacity and push inflation higher. However, the Fed's recent monetary tightening limits any sustained acceleration of aggregate demand. THE OUTLOOK FOR INTEREST RATES Short-term interest rates have risen to reflect the acceleration in economic growth and the associated monetary tightening. The Fed's two recent half-point hikes in the funds rate have increased its inflation-fighting credibility andflattenedthe yield curve. Thus, a higher portion of interest reflects expected real return and a smaller portion reflects expectations of inflation and other risks. Whereas most of the curveflatteningthrough July occurred in maturities beyond 5 years, the Fed's half-point more inraid-Augustgenerated a substantial flattening in the shorter maturities (up to 2 years). This terra structureflatteningand the failure of bond yields torisemore significantly, despite the earlier erratic decline in the U.S. dollar, clearly signals the heightened credibility of the Fed. This sets a positive tone forfinancialmarkets, limiting the negative impact of inflation pressures. 43 September 11-12, 1994 However, the Fed is expected to raise the funds rate further, to around 5.25-5.5 percent, as it continues to constrain inflation. As long as economic growth remains strong, further curve flattening is likely to occur primarily by short-rate rising. The present 7.7 percent yield on the long Treasury bond embodies either expectations of stronger potential economic growth or risk of a significant rise in inflation. The former seems unlikely in light of the thrust of fiscal policy, which discourages saving and investment and constrains potential capacity. As the Fed continues to pursue a low inflation objective and economic growth moderates to its long-term trendline, a further curve flattening will occur as bond yields recede towards 7.0 percent. However, this may not occur until 1995, as bond yields remain around 7.5-7.75 percent as they digest modestly higher inflation. SUSTAINABILITY OF THE EXPANSION The structure of the economy is solid and points toward sustained expansion, although risks exist Inflation remains low and the Fed's monetary policy is expected to limit inflation pressures. The significant restructuring of business finances and production processes has eliminated many of the potentially disruptive excesses in the economy. Debt burdens have been lowered. Unit labor costs have been reduced below inflation, generating strong profits and cash flows that provide a base for permanent job gains. Rapid business investment has raised capacity, while inventories are low relative to sales and output Household balance sheets are vastly improved, as more than half of the 1980's sharp rise in debt burden has been retraced. The defense downsizing is well underway, and its primary impact will be regional and sectoral, and not threatening to the overall expansion. U.S. unit labor costs are at or below those of other industrialized nations, and exports continue to rise, even as major trading partners struggle to recover from recession. Exports are receiving an additional boost from NAFTA and should continue to strengthen with overseas economies, shrinking the trade and current account deficits. There are no immediate threats to expansion. Given past Fed patterns, the risk of excessive monetary tightening is of some concern. The Fed may target the funds rate too high and in doing so drain real money balances over a sustained period, in an overzealous attempt to slow real growth, maintain its inflation-fighting credibility, or stem a disorderly decline in the U.S. dollar. Responding to the dollar would be particularly bothersome insofar as the recent fall in the currency, amid monetary tightening and a flattening yield curve, seems clearly to be a nonmonetary phenomenon. While the Fed's funds rate targeting is a recipe for monetary policy excesses and recent money growth has slowed sharply, the previous accommodative policy provides a cushion. 44 Shadow Open Market Committee The recent thrust of fiscal policy—tax increases, cuts in defense purchases, an ongoing reallocation of spending toward consumption-oriented entitlements and away from investmentoriented activity, as well as the systematic tax bias against saving—has not unhinged the recovery and is unlikely to do so. It does, however, reduce long-run potential growth. Similarly, enactment of potentially costly pending legislation for health care reform, the crime bill, or welfare reform, may change the mix of output, but its short-term impact on economic growth would likely be minor relative to its cumulative impact on long-run potential output. 45 Senior Vice President Chief Financial Economist September 11-12, 1994 NationsBank NationsBanc Capital Markets. Inc. 7 Hanover Square - 15th Floor New York. NY 10004-2616 Tel 212 858-5545 Fax 212 858-5741 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVES MICKEY D. LEVY CHIEF FINANCIAL ECONOMIST NATIONSBANC CAPITAL MARKETS, INC. SHADOW OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE WASHINGTON, D.C. SEPTEMBER 12,1994 46 A subsidiary of NationsBank Corporation Shadow Open Market Committee p. S QUARTERLY DATA 1 Nominal GDP GDP Domestic Demand Final Sales Domestic Final Sales Disposable Personal Income I Residential Investment 9 Business investment 1 Inventory Investment | Government Purchases 1 Exports | Imports I Current Account | GOP Deflator I Employment Costs (Private) | Unit Labor Costs (Non-Farm) 1 Productivity (Non-Farm) 1 Compensation (Non-Farm) 8 Corporate Profits ATT I Operating Profits A/T 1 Net Cash Row I I 1993 111 1 6359.2 J 5139.4 1 5225.8 1 5126.5 1 5212.8 1 3708.4 1 1 1 1 I 1 (ci J 1 1 1 1 (al (al (al ^ 211.0 597.9 13.0 931.8 595.3 681.6 -27.9 123.7 118.9 137.7 115.8 159.4 288.9 323.6 540.6 N A Levels 1994 1 rv 6478.1 6574.7 5261.1 5218.0 5365.1 53005 5235.7 52075 5339.7 5289.4 37795 3747.8 3546.3 229.9 224.5 6275 643.6 25.4 10.8 919.9 931.5 619.6 6255 723.6 707.4 -31.9 -30.6 124.1 125.0 120.7 119.9 137.9 136.9 118.0 1175 162.8 160.4 299.4 3105 324.1 342.4 565.5 5725 levek S P H O [ T I Quarterly % Change (annualized) 1994 1993 II 1 II • l 111 IV 6685.5 6.9% I 6.1% 3.8% 7.7% 3.8% 3.3% 2.7% 53105 6.3% 4.4% 5.0% 5423.1 5.8% 4.0% 1.4% 5253.9 6.4% 35% 25% 5366.7 3.9% 2.0% 4.5% 6.0% 3.4% 0.8% 3804.7 2.7% 4.3% 1.4% 4.7% 4.0% 3.9% 3558.6 7.3% 10.0% 9.4% 285% 234.0 10.9% 657.9 125% 21.1% 9.2% N/A N/A N/A 56.3 N/A -4.9% -1.6% -0.1% 916.3 1.1% 15.8% -3.5% -3.2% 21.7% 642.7 9.5% 18.9% 7.4% 16.0% 755.6 -2.7 NA NA -1.3 -2.3 1.3% 1.0% 2.9% 2.9% 125.9 3.7% 2.7% 3.4% 3.4% 121.8 139.1 3.5% 3.0% -2.3% -15% -2.7% 2.8% 4.9% 4.3% 1175 0.7% 6.1% 2.5% 2.8% 163.1 7.4% -3.5% 7.4% 1.4% 321.6 6.7% -5.3% 5.8% 7.4% 345.9 1.2% 4.6% 582.5 I 2.9% 1.8% I Monftfy% Change fI Yr-to-Yr% Change 1994 1993 111 5.2% 3.0% 3.9% 2.8% 3.8% 2.0% 3.4% 7.2% 12.6% N/A -0.7% 2.5% 10.0% -9.2 2.1% 3.7% 13% 1.7% 3.0% 23.0% 35.6% 12.2% IV 1 5.0% 5.4% 3.1% 3.7% 3.9% 4.5% 3.0% 3.5% 3.9% 4.4% 0.5% 33% 3.0% 3.8% 8.1% 93% 16.0% 14.9% N/A N/A -1.0% -0.7% 5.8% 55% 12.4% 11.9% -65 -12.1 1.8% 1.7% 3.6% 3.3% 0.6% 0.3% 1.9% 3.1% 2.5% 3.4% 17.1% 9.7% 20.6% 14.6% 13.9% 12.6% 12 Month% Change _n 1 6.1% | 4.0% 4.8% 3.3% 4.1% I 2.8% 3.5% 13.4% 135% N/A -1.4% 7.1% 12.8% NA 2.0% 33% 0.7% i | I I I [ 2.3% I 3.0% 12.9% 14.8% 10.9% | I I I j MONTHLY DATA Jut-94 Aup>94 May-94 Jun-94 May-94 1 0.0% 57.8 57.7 57.5 565 (bi 112.951 113.334 113.585 113.764 252 18.077 2 6.1 1 Unemployment Rate (ci 6.1 6.0 6.0 -0.4 0.3% 34.5 34.7 34.6 34.8 1 Average Workweek (sa) 1 11.11 11.08 11.09 1 Avg. Hourly Earnings (sa) 0.4% 11.13 -3.4 NA 13.7 14.4 14.6 1 Total Vehicle Sales, ind. LL Trucks! 7.1 1 Domestic Unit Auto Sales 6.5 7.4 ! -4.1% 6.9 1 Industrial Production 0.3% NA 116.9 116.3 1175 0.0% NA 83.9 83.9 83.7 1 Capacity Utilization 120.6 120.4 119.9 05% 1215 PPI 0.4% 137.1 137.1 1 PPI Ex. Food & Energy 1375 1375 148.1 NA 148.6 147.7 05% CPI 156.3 1 CPI Ex. Food & Energy 157.0 03% NA 156.7 183.4 1 Retail Sales -0.0% NA 184.8 184.9 1 Housing Starts NA 1415 1.4% 1351 1491 -1.7% NA 1357 1 Permits 1337 1316 1 Federal Budget Surplus/Deficit (dl 4.9 NA 14.9 -335 -32.1 1.4% NA 144.8 149.4 j Durable Goods Orders 1515 0.8% NA 1 Manufacturing Orders 2733 279.8 ! 277.4 0.4% NA 5692.9 1 Personal Income ($87) 5663.0 5655.7 0.3% NA 3562.8 3570.1 3558.7 1 Consumption ($87) NA NA 1 Personal Saving Rate (c) 0.0 4.0 3.9 0.1% NA 101.5 101.5 101J 1 Leading Economic Indicators 15% NA NA 889.8 8855 1 Total Business inventories 0.01 NA NA 1.41 1.41 1 Inventory/Total Sales (c] -1.0 NA NA -9.4 -9.5 1 International Trade JcJ 047~ 4.61 4.50 459 1 3 Month Bill (cj 435" 0.42 6.18 6.13 5.93 5.97 I 2 Year Note (c] 754 7.30 051 7.10 7.18 1 10 Year Note (c] 0.14 7.49 7.58 7.40 7.41 1 30 Year Bond (c) 1.3% 3797.5 3718.3 3737.6 3708.0 1 DJIA 0.8% 46454 451.40 454.83 450.90 1 SAP 500 -1.7% 8956 89.06 91.60 92.79 1 U.S. Dollar (FRB) 0.3% 100 98 103 104 I Yen/$ 1.56 -2.5% 1.57 1.63 1.66 1 DM5 NA 05% 1153.7 1146.4 1142.9 I M1 0.1% NA 3601.9 3587.9 35955 1 M2 -0.7% 59819 59532 59708 59910 1 Bank Reserves 1 C*l Loans & Non-Financial CP I Consumer Credit I K H L ^| 8 4 9 £ B ^8553 NJ^J ^ J L ^ (a) Quarterly % changes are not annualized (b) Monthly changes are in levels (c) AW changes are in levels or basis points (d) Monthly: change from same month last yean Annual: sum of past 12 months 1 Purchasing Managers Index 1 Non-Farm Payrolls 1 1 Mickey D. Levy, Chief Financial Economist (212) 858-5545 Jun-94 -0.3% 383 35 0.0 -0.6% -0.1% -1.3 -2.9% 0.5% 05% 0.4% -0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.8% -9.4% -3.0% 3.8 15% 0.8% 0.1% 0.3% 0.1 05% 0.5% 0.00 0.1 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.01 0.8% 0.9% -1.3% -15% -1.8% 0.3% -05% -03% 13%^ Jul-94 Auq-94 May-94 -2.8% 0.5% 13.6% 2.4% 179 251 -0.1% 1 32 0.1 0.0 -0.9 03% -0.6% 0.3% 03% 05% I 2.6% NA -5.0 23 2.7% 14.8% -65% 5.7% NA 03% 3.3% NA 0.0% 05% 0.5% 05% 0.4% 0.1% 0.0% 2.4% NA 03% 2.8% NA 05% 6.6% NA -0.1% 20.1% NA 4.7% 21.9% NA 1.6% -2083 NA 6.4 17.8% NA -4.3% NA I 11.7% -23% 55% NA 0.5% 3.5% NA -05% -0.7 NA NA 33% NA 0.0% 3.5% NA NA -0.04 NA NA -4519 NA NA 158" 0.11 051 1.99 0.05 050 1.14 -0.06 050 0.49 -0.09 0.18 6.6% 2.1% -0.5% 1.3% 2.8% -0.8% 2.8% 05% -2.8% -6.0% 1.5% -4.0% 3.1% -3.7% -05% 7.0% NA 0.6% 2.1% NA 0.4% 5.6% -0.5% 05% Jun-94 17.8% 2.7% 0.3% •0.9 0.6% 2.5% 4.4 1.9% 5.9% 3.5% 0.8% 0.6% 2.6% 2.9% 7.3% 9.1% 17.3% -204.5 14.3% 9.5% 5.6% 3.4% -0.1 3.5% 3.9% -0.04 -1716 1.12 1.77 1.14 0.59 6.4% 1.5% -05% -4.5% -1.7% 6.5% 1.7% 4.7% Jul-94: 16.8% 2.7% 0.4% -0.7 0.6% 2.7% -0.0 -1.7% 5.7% 35% 15% 0.5% 2.8% 2.9% 6.6% 13.7% 14.4% -1985 12.6% 9.1% 6.3% 2.9% NA 3.7% NA NA NA 138 2.06 1.49 0.95 5.4% 0.9% -5.8% -8.6% -8.6% 65% 1.9% 3.9% Auq-94 ' 13.8% 2.8% 0.7% -0.6 -03% 2.5% NA 10.1% NA NA 2.1% 1.9% NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 1.49 2.18 1.56 1.17 5.6% 25% -5.4% -3.7% -7.7% NA NA 2.6% ^ T J ^ M M L 1MM-L mvsm± 1 2 5 ^ ^ * J A 09AWW 47 Peter E. Kretzmer, Economist (212) 858-5 09/06/94 September J1-12, 1994 Chart 1 Selected Indicators: Employment and Earnings Non-Farm Payroll Employment Manufacturing Jobs 2% 20000 V 19500 0% | o | 19000 __Y_*tJ / ^ o -2% "§ i § 18500 - i © 3 "i -4% 18000 h 89 90 91 92 93 94 17500 95 — Total Nonfarm Estab.: All Employees (Sa, Thous) — Year/Year ; uninini IIIUIIIII iiiiniiiiiii,ii " • " " • " 89 90 91 i • i i i i 90 91 92 93 94 89 95 90 - © ! • /Ar^ l/V M i 4.5% 0.64 4.0% -~- H i 0.62 ! i 10.50 l^-VV i - 1 10.00 9.50 9.00 \\^j^ I I I I I t i 1 : I l,..i^Lt.....lMi.iiiMii.iiiiiinilniinininiii.iiiifii 89 90 91 92 3.5% _ 0.60 i M 3.0% I IVArtfV 93 t 1 2.5% 2.0% i j IIHIUIIIII i 94 1.5% 95 j 1 i 1 1 91 92 93 94 95 0.54 , 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 h I ! 1i ! ! ' A 1 , j j i • | !y 1 i 0.58 0.56 p /i !V!\f! 11 . M ' • Vi ! ! ! /• j 1 I ] i i \\\\ 1 ! i 11 ! 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 — Total Private Nonfarm Establishments: Avg. Hourly Earnings —Year/Year NationsBanc Capital Markets, Inc. ; Employment/Population Ratio 11.50 , i j — Civilian Labor Force: Unemployment Rate, (SA, w/break) Average Hourly Eamings I Y\i\. A ! / r\ \^v " "" i i 11 n n m i i 11111 n i i i n 1111 11 n 111111 n 11 n n 1111, " — Manufacturing Average Weekly Hours (NSA) 11.00 -6% 95 ys i l l i i i n i i t m m i i t n n i m m i n n n i l t m m n i i t i m i m t i i l . n i i n i i . i l 89 94 Unemployment Rate I i ' 93 - Manufacturing: All Employees, (SA, Thous) — Year/Year Average Workweek in Manufacturing 39 92 r• • " " • • " ' u n n m n | — Civilian Labor Force: Employment Ratio (SA, w/break) 48 09/08/S4 Shadow Open Market Committee Chart 2 Selected Indicators: Income and Profits Real Disposable Personal Income 89 90 91 92 93 94 Real Per Capita Income 95 89 90 91 92 — Real Disposable Personal Income, ($87) — Real Per Capita Income, ($87) — Year/Year — Year/Year Personal Saving The Mix of Profits 60 & 40 c O 20 c J£ Q\ PV$c\£ ^SXI T ^ j . A. a S ^ ^ £ -20 '^ -40 89 90 91 92 93 94 — Personal Saving Rate (%) 90 — Domestic 1 I I I t 91 — i i 92 —Non-Financial i i » . A. k cf 500 I 450 400 h \KJ \ * 350 F \\y 89 i i i 90 £• W 1i i i 91 , 92 i, i f 1 130 20 f i .„ 1, 93 c CO JZ o 10 1 8 Q. i i i L,, • i i 1 94 -10 95 - Corporate Profits with IVA & CCaadj ($BH) — Undistributed Corporate Profits — Year/Year —Year/Year NationsBanc Capital Markets. Inc. 49 94 i » i l 95 ^ Rest of the World 40 600 550 1 > i . 93 Undistributed Corporate Profits Corporate Profits 300 —1 89 09/08/94 September 11-12, 1994 Chart 3 Indicators of Production Industrial Production Industrial Production: Durable & Non-Durables 120 8 115 _ / v r^J / 105 /v/ y f v *\ S 110 r~ \ . / \ £y i ^ V*\ / v ^ r 6 f lllllllllll 89 milium 90 Z 0) 0 £ ^r 8 0% a. -2 w ^ -5% iniiiiini 92 liiiiiiiiii 93 iiuitinii 94 -10% -6 95 M s;<H V-» / \^\» _ ^ ^y \~^. •*x~ / • V" -4 IIIIIIIHHI 91 5% 4 V 100 10% iiiiiinin iniiiiini iiiiiiiiin iiiimiiii iniiiiini iiiiiiiiin 89 90 — Industrial Production Index (SA, 1987 = 100) —Year/Year 91 92 93 94 95 — Durable Goods, (SA, 1987) — Non-Durable Goods, (SA, 1987) NAPM - Composite Index Capacity Utilization 95 90 I85 I Q- 80 75 AN I /f U U n j i II I H I I M I I I I I I H \\\\ \ \ A v\ M 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 — Capacity Utilization: Total Industry —NAPM, Composite Index Aggregate Hours Worked Durable Goods Orders 20% 89 90 91 92 93 94 89 95 NationsBanc Capital Markets. Inc. 91 92 93 — Nonfarm Business Sector —Year/Year — New Orders, Durable Goods Industries 90 50 94 Shadow Open Market Committee 09/08/94 Chart 4 Selected Indicators: Consumption Real Consumption Consumer Confidence Index 3600 6% A J k/ vu VV\y 2 3400 I 3300 3200 90 91 92 % ta £7o > O il (0 <D 0% > uiuumi munuu I1III1U.UJL l l l U M l l l l l , l u i U M U I I .1JIIIIII.H1 89 4 " 11 tJ 3100 w JA vS is 93 94 -2% 95 89 — Total Personal Consumption Expenditures, (82, $Mil) —Year/Year I 1850 ph V /y \ 1 1800 / ^ / 1750 1700 , i „i 89 i— i l l 90 <f V 1 91 1 yw 3% !5 *•» » i i i I 93 94 W ** 180 L A milium 140 89 95 / h ^yy J- 160 0% 1 92 i- I 200 2% $ i i i iMiiiniti 90 r _ ^ 92 93 (0 o > 5% o $ 0% >- liinnniij. iininmii I I I 11 l l l l I H 91 10% 94 -5% 95 12 550 500 / 450 5 400 rpvv L \\\ A 300 250 v/ p yvl Nr Retail Auto Sales Light Truck Sales 350 ir-*\ —Furniture & Household Appliances - Personal Consump ($87) —Year/Year — PCE: Services ($87) — Year/Year —I 95 15% g 220 h I 1 % >• i 94 260 240 * • 93 <*-"• Ay L 92 Real Consumption of Furniture & Household Appliances 4% 1900 91 — Consumer Confidence Index, SA Real Personal Consumption Expenditures Services 1950 90 ver- 3500 l luilliillll 89 K y J-W ^L \..J 11 \ g 10 1 91 92 93 94 J • I I 11 I I I I I 11 l I I I I I I I 11 I 11 11 n I • I I • I • i I I I I I I i I m 89 95 90 91 92 93 i I i I n I I ll I I I 1 1 I I I I 1 I I I I I 94 95 —Total-Domestic and Imported Retail Unit Auto Sales, SA (Mil.) 51 NattonaBanc Capital Martcata. Inc. tyVNWl/ 8 - Domestic Unit Truck Sales - Light 0-10,000 lbs.. GVW 9 / ^ l i i i M i i n u i i i i m i u i i i i i i i i n i i I i n ii m m i m i i i i i i i i l 90 fcrK o ^> 09/09/94 Chart 4A The Current Expansion in Perspective Real GDP Nominal GOP Q1 Q2 Q3 04 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q1 Q13 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 1 r Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 , • Q12 Q13 Quarter of Expansion Quarter of Expansion m Average of Four Previous Expansions *» Current Expansion Average of Four Previous Expansions • • Current Expansion ft. Real Disposable Income Employment 20 1 —L^f i 16 10 CD >k Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Quarter of Expansion r Average of Four Previous Expansions - • Current Expansion NationsBanc Capital Markets, inc. Q11 Q12 Q13 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q6 Q9 Q10 Q11 Quarter of Expansion \ Average of Four Previous Expansions + Current Expansion Mickey D. Levy, Chief Financial Economist Shadow Open Market Committee Chart 5 Compensation, Productivity and Unit Labor Costs Compensation 12% 10% 2 8% 6% to CC 4% 2% 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 — 95 Labor Compensation Per Hour. Nonfarm Business Sector, Year/Year Productivity 10% i 8% © • 6% : 2 AOL I to 4% § 2% o B 0% i i i ! '• i I S\ 1 f \ i ' \ i ' A t^/K M i 1111 i i 111 11111 i 1 ! i i i . ! I ' i 1 j i 1 1 •.:''• ; y \ i x~ j ; \i \y \ s ! j i ' < i /\ i l l . yT rvJL*i A ;\ i i 1 W i . 1 1 ! ' 1 ! 1 I I ' 1 i ^ i ! i ' ; 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 90 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 -6% 1 | A! iy^^i i l k\\ / H ^ W \[/"i^^R J^y' I^VAI I j ! j i r ft A / I vy- i — J ^r\ ~i . i 7M rm , i i M I • ! * 1 '•/ i1 i! ii \\ -2% -4% • ' f\4r K to * I 91 92 93 94 — Manufacturing Sector Output Per Hour of An Persons (SA, 1987=100) Year/Year — Nonfarm Business Sector Output Per Hour of All Persons (SA, 1987=100) Year/Year 95 Unit Labor Cost Inflation 20% j 15% i 10% * 5% ' I f ! 'i / \ i i \ j / 1 1 • -5% r I i ! ^^^f 1 7 ' O 3 o% -10% ! I \ 1 ! I i . i i i t i i i„j.i | : ! i ! : i A ' ' ! 1 i i i i i n i ii i i i i t 1 ii i M I i 1 i l l ; - • ! i ' \/3f\ ! i ! ! 1! i1 ! | ij i Yk< „ • i1 V; \ p4y / w~t^K7M ^ V7r\l i ! : ! i ~ 1 1 L.L..I ! i i ' 1 u !•••!... I ^ ! IT ' .,;„.!.J... 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 NattomBanc Capital Marfcats, Inc. — Manufacturing Sector Unit Labor Costs (SA, 1987=100) Year/Year — Nonfarm Business Sector Unit Labor Cost (SA, 1987=100) Year/Year 53 i 1 i Ij 95 09/06/94 September! 1-12, J994 Chart 6 Selected Indicators of Inflation Consumer Price Index Producer Price Index 8% © | o ^ A 6% '! £ M l\ 4% (0 ^ i 2% © > o \ is o% | 2% 89 90 91 92 93 94 * \ / 1 | lllllllllllllllll 89 95 J 90 - CPI-U, All items (SA) — CPI-U, All items ex. food & energy (SA) V-*^/7 I "" " I l l l l l ,u 91 u •utn ii n u n i m i n t i i i i n i i i i i i — 92 93 94 95 - PPI-U, All items (SA) - PPI-U, All items ex. food & energy (SA) GDP Deflators Employment Costs 5% © c 4% O § 3% © 89 1% 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 90 80 20% ? I 70 o 60 s 50 >- s i 40 I 30 91 92 93 94 » 94 1 95 1 1\: ^\ 1 \ J \ i VJK \ i ii I I m m 89 95 • CRB Spot Market Index — CRB Futures Price Index - JOC Industrial Price Index NattonsBanc Capital Markets, Inc. 93 NAPM: Survey of Prices Commodity Prices 90 92 - Compensation. Pvt Industry — Wages. Pvt Industry r Benefits. Pvt Industry - GDP Fixed Weight Deflator -.GDP Implicit Deflator 89 91 -A r v 91 r fvj V i i 1 : i i i u m i t A H n u n ii n i t I I m n m m 90 r ' 92 l u i i i i i n 11 93 i niniiiu 1 94 — NAPM Survey-Diffusion Index. Prices. SA, (%) 54 95 Shadow Open Market Committee Table 1 Federal Reserve Objectives and Monetary Policy Federal Reserve Objectives a n d Actual Performance Selected Economic Variables, Percent Change Real GDP CPI Inflation Nominal GDP Central Tendency Forecasts Q4s93 - Q 4 : 9 4 Q4s94 - Q4r95 Feb* Forecast July Forecast July Forecast 3% - 3.25% 3% - 3.25% 2.5% - 2.75% about 3% 2.75% - 3% 2.75% - 3.5% 5.5% - 6% 5.5% - 6% 5% - 5.5% Actual Performance 4.0% yr/yr; 3.6% in 1 st half of 1994 2.8% yr/yr; (2.7% since 1993:1V) 6.1 % yr/yr; (6.5% since 1993:1V) The Fed's Money Supply Targets a n d Actual Trends Bank Reserves Ml M2 M3 Debt Money Growth Targets Q4r93 • Q4s94 Q 4 r 9 4 - Q4s95 Feb* Target July Target Target not targeted not targeted 1-5 1.5 1-5 04 04 04 48 48 3-7 55 Annualized % Change Last 3 Months -2.5 4.5 1.1 1.7 5.1 Last 6 Months 4.0 3.6 1.6 0.4 5.3 Yr/Yr 2.6 6.2 1.9 1.4 5.4 09/06/94 September 11-12, 1994 Chart 7 Bank Credit Conditions Commercial & Industrial Loans 89 90 91 92 93 U.S. Government Securities held at Commercial Banks 94 95 88 — Commercial & Industrial Loans -Yr/Yr 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 — U.S. Government Securities — Yr/Yr Real Estate Loans Loans to Individuals 20% 15% I §> 10% c § 5% § | 0% £ -5% I k_i i V- J I i j i j J ^\ ^A i J 111111111111 n 111111 t k i m 11 -10% 89 90 91 m i n ii i t n i i i m i 92 93 illinium 94 95 — Loans to Individuals Small Time Deposits NonFinancial Commercial Paper 60% c 40% 5 pi 1 i! 1200 ;i 1 I ! r*f\ i i i il i i cent 1000 : ! o 20% w. <D Q. 1 1100 t : VAA j i 900 1 800 0% |! >- ! ! VT i !' ;| 700 90 91 92 93 94 95 h i, i • i lllllllllllllll 1 Inniiniuiiiii 89 90 \ I i 1/ \ i tmmmmiiiiitiiiiiiiiiiiiiii 91 92 93 10 c CO JZ O +* c -10 o -20 °- r llllllllllllllllHII 94 95 — Money Stock: Small Time Deposits-Total (SA) —Year/Year — NonFinancial Commercial Paper NattonsBanc Capital Martwta. Inc. K I ! 88 -20% 89 ^^qf^\. | X sV^ \ 20 56 .30 09/06/94 Shadow Open Market Committee Chart 8 Selected U.S. Interest Rates Federal Funds Rate Inflation-Adjusted Federal Funds Rate o *-* 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 Treasury Yields Inflation-Adjusted Treasury Yields 20 15 10 15 I 10 CL ll I I I I 0 ! U i • i ' • hill 5 :; 1 ! ! M l 0 1 I • i I i R I I ; i r 'm V ! , ! . "i i I 1 ! ! J#^ ^I \wm^, \ ^\&l J ' mill 1 ^ !1 ! 1 * i i 1 I • I I ' ! 1 1 !' • i i l l ; -10 ^ 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 - 3 Month Bill i - 3 Month Bill - 30 Year Bond - 30 Year Bond Treasury Yield Spread Corporate Spread over Treasuries r 3 a. 2 0 LJ 76 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 - Spread: 30 Year T Bond - 3 Month T Bill — Moody's Baa Corporate - Treasury Composite Yield NationsBanc Capital Markets, Inc. 78 57 94 Table 2 Trends in International Trade and Capital Flows Merchandise Trade Deficit Trends in Imports & ExDorts o 700 600 <A r> <"/ ug HB i -50 500 o m c 400 o S 300 nk g -100 o m m* > ^ -150 «u / ^ ^ ssL 1 200 111 100 til i 111 111 111 i 1II III! i l l 1 III! Ill 1 11 1 II III _u_u ±ixl -200 \ iiuiniilimimtmuu mmnliiiium «MIMflMUiMli mamtpiiiiiijinMiui ttilWIi niMiiinuiMiilmuuiiiuiiiu 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 12 Month Trade Balance: Customs Value (SA) — Imports (Annual Rate, SA) •— Exports (Annual Rate, SA) 00 I U.S. International Trade & Capital Flows U.S . Bilateral Merchandise Trade Flows NSA, Bil $, Annual Rate Q2:94 Q2:91 Imports Exports TrodeBolonco Imports Exports TradeBalance 1 Canada 95.2 90.8 -4.4 130.8 118.8 -12.0 Mexico 31.6 34.4 2.8 48.4 50.4 2.0 Japan 83.6 48.4 -35.2 113.6 52.0 -61.6 China 16.0 6.4 -9.6 35.6 10.0 -25.6 European Union 86.0 107.2 21.2 111.6 101.6 -10.0 OPEC 32.0 18.8 -13.2 31.6 16.8 -14.8 Latin America 59.6 59.2 -0.4 82.8 85.6 2.8 Asia (NICS) 56.0 45.6 -10.4 68.0 57.6 -10.4 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Current Account $2,316 5,031 (11,438) (44,461) (99,769) (125,381) (151,203) (167,099) (128,197) (102,815) (91,747) (6,943) (67,886) (103,895) Capital Account ($28,854) (31,113) (29,917) 24,644 79,017 101,960 121,294 171,539 140,902 49,744 51,829 46,620 84,993 82,799 The first four columns ore in millions of dollars. Financed Privately ($31,035) (25,801) (22,414) 25,000 84,494 109,757 87,354 115,998 102.092 65,275 17,772 20,757 41,886 12,802 Financed by % Financed by Central Bonks Central Banks (7.6%) $2,181 17.1 (5,312) 25.1 (7,503) 356 (1.4) (6.9) (5,477) (7,797) |7.7) 33,940 28.0 5S,S4\ 38,810 (15,531) 34,057 25,863 43,107 69,997 32.4 27.5 (31.2) 65.7 55.5 50.7 84.5 Shadow Open Market Committee Chart 9 09/07/94 Selected International Financial Trends Inflation Adjusted Short-term Interest Rates Inflation Adjusted Long-term Interest Rates 10 i u r— i A <\ u 0 LD r i — ^ \PN^L Y 1 P-. i i.i., LULL. i n LULJL _UUL JJUL. _l_l_l_ - U - L . i u ± U M u L U JLJJL l i t * Japan 20 50 15 i \ V v/" AJ M -200 LJi-l 1 1 1 1 1 M1I Il l l l l l l l l l 80 83 86 V 92 .^Q I li ii ii ii ii ii li 11 I I ii n u l l i i i i i i i n i li m i I I n n I I m i M U M 95 80 160 2.00 140 1.80 v M_^JJ llllltlllll llllllllll! lumniiii tniiiiinil 1. m i n u n 90 91 http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ NationsBanc Capital Markats, inc. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 92 83 86 DM/$ 2.20 89 K AH & 180 80 v4 c Yen/$ 100 n 10 IIllllllllll 89 120 * Japan \ \ -150 i A fci kw \ jt % Japan Current Account Surplus 100 V t r^. v_ — United States —Germany The U.S. Current Account Deficit o g -50 o -100 —V 7 Lit k^M i fc r £ f «f£ ^^ * m^ -5 L- I I I ! XXX. xxx. XXX n i l J J U . JLJJL JULX J-UL XXX. XXX. XXX. 'ixxx. XXX. 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 III 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 — United States —Germany i CI ercen o i ^ 93 94 95 59 89 92 95 September 11-12,1994 60 Shadow Open Market Committee M2 AND BASE GROWTH Allan H. MELTZER Carnegie Mellon University and American Enterprise Institute We often differ about ease and tightness because some rely more on M2 growth and others on base growth. The chart, labelled U.S. performance, compares the steady state rate of inflation implied by the following rule: "*r = ( / - v V i where m is the four quarter growth rate of base or M2, y* is the 12 quarter moving average of real output growth, and v*is the 12 quarter moving average of the relevant velocity growth. The predicted inflation, PRPR1, uses the base. PRPR3 (or 6) uses M2 growth. The black dots are 4 quarter rates of change of the deflator. The chart suggests that the two again give very similar forecasts. The errors terms on the following chart show that this has been true more often than not. (Errors are differences between actual inflation and predicted.) The recent divergence, from 1990 to 1993, has now gone away. Both predictions are for approximately 2.5 percent inflation as a steady state result of growth and accumulation of cash balances at recent rates. 61 The Error Terms — US P4-PRPRC) where i= 1.3,6 006 fr. 0.04 w 0.02 K; \/ ;#. 0.02 i I. t^ \ \ / / \., \ I if * J. i V, "I H% / \ // \ -0X18 Jl 80 L_l_ J 81 I I t 82 w /V * * I y LJ.J 83 I I i I I I I I i 1 • I I ' 84 85 86 ERROR1 Disk 2: File:B:\US_RULE.WK3 Graph: RULE N /\ y -0.04 -0.06 VK ' .1 .1 . M I I I I ? I I 87 -^- 88 B9 ERROR3&6 50 91 I 1 I I I I 92 L_J L_!_ 94 The U.S. Performance Inflation •112 0.03 - 0.06 en 0.04 0.02 -0.02 1—rir1 80 81 82 83 84 85 , Actual Price Level Grovrth a Disk2:File:B:vRULE19l9.WK3 Graph: INFLATION 87 PRPRl 88 89 90 -&- PRPR3&6 91 92 93 94 September 11-12, 1994 64 Shadow Open Market Committee A NOTE ON RECENT U.S. PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH William POOLE* Brown University U.S. productivity growth has risen over the last several years, creating hopes that the longer-run performance of the U.S. economy is improving. A simple calculation makes clear how important this issue is: if productivity growth had continued after 1973 at the same rate as from 1947 to 1973, productivity today would be 51 percent greater than it actually is. If the number of hours worked were the same, GDP would be 51 percent larger than it actually is. The United States could deal with its many problems a lot more easily if GDP were that much larger. Figure 1 provides an overview of U.S. productivity performance since 1947; the upward bend of the productivity line since 1990 show up clearly. Some questions: • How solid is the evidence that productivity growth has risen? • What are the implications of changes in productivity growth for monetary policy. As for the first question, the evidence is not at all solid. Analysis of productivity is bedeviled by measurement problems and the difficulty of sorting out long-run changes from short-run cyclical patterns. Zvi Griliches, in his presidential address to the American Economic Association last January, emphasized the importance of data limitations in tracking productivity changes and understanding their causes. Economists have not been very successful in explaining what has happened to the economy during the last two decades, nor have they been able to agree on what should be done about it I will argue that data and measurement difficulties may in fact be a major source of this failure. This point will be made not to provide us with an alibi, but rather to temper the pretentiousness of some of our pronouncements and to1 urge us toward the more mundane task of observation and measurement. It seems unlikely that mismeasurement can explain the decline in productivity growth of the magnitude experienced after 1973, but smaller changes, such as the rise in productivity growth over the last few years, might be partly or even mostly due to changes in measurement techniques. The basic problem is that the division of total dollars spent on goods between quantities and prices is highly suspect for many products. For complex products, with changing characteristics and quality, 65 September 11-12,1994 measurement of output (and therefore also price per unit of output) is subject to enormous conceptual and practical difficulties. These problems are most severe in service industries, which have been increasing as a share of total GDP. Putting measurement issues aside, interpreting recent developments is difficult because productivity has pronounced cyclical pattern. Over the business cycle, firms adjust output more quickly than they adjust labor input. During a cyclical contraction, output falls more quickly than employment and hours worked (as reported in official statistics, anyway), and so output per hour —labor productivity—falls, or rises more slowly than normal. During cyclical expansions, firms increase output more rapidly than hours of labor input, and so labor productivity rises. The conventional wisdom is that the U.S. economy is now operating at or close to full employment, given the structure of the labor market and size of the capital stock. The table shows the annual rate of productivity growth from one cycle peak to the next and from each cycle peak to 15 quarters after the cycle peak. If we knew the economy were now at a cyclical peak, we would compare peak-to-peak productivity growth to see how the recent growth rate compares to previous peak-to-peak growth rates. However, the growth rate of productivity over the 15 quarters from the last cycle peak to 1994:1 probably overstates the peak-to-peak growth rate. From Figure 1 and the table, it is clear that productivity growth usually slows markedly in the quarters before the cycle peak. For example, the growth rate of productivity from the cycle peak in 1981:111 to the cycle peak in 1990:111 was 1.06 percent, but the growth rate over the 15 quarters form 1981:111 to 1985:11 was 1.37 percent Comparing 15-quarter periods after cycle peaks, it is true that productivity growth over the 15 quarters after the last cycle peak was higher than for any peak since the one in 1969, and that is indeed a welcome development Some analysts have also taken heart from the improved performance of manufacturing productivity, which shows up clearly in Figure 2. (The BLS series on manufacturing productivity begins in 1977.) The problem with interpreting this series is that many manufacturing firms have been restructuring by contracting out services. Service employees such as janitors and lawyers within manufacturing firms are counted as manufacturing employees, but when manufacturing firms contract out janitorial and legal services these same individuals are counted in the service sector where measurement of output is extremely difficult Thus, the improvement in manufacturing productivity may be totally spurious. 66 Shadow Open Market Committee The rate of productivity growth has little direct implication for monetary policy. The Federal Reserve's primary responsibility is maintenance of low inflation. Given the rate of money growth, higher productivity growth will yield lower inflation. However, the Fed does not implement its monetary policy by fixing the rate of growth of money. The Fed's current approach to policy is to raise interest rates in response to actual or incipient pressures toward higher inflation. Higher productivity growth might show up in less apparent pressure toward higher inflation, as measured by early warning signs of inflation itself. A more important influence on monetary policy is likely to be Fed attitudes toward the rate of growth of real GDP. If real GDP seems to be growing "too" rapidly, given the Fed's estimates of productivity growth and labor force growth, then the Fed will implement more restrictive policy actions. If underlying productivity growth is really higher than the Fed's estimates, then the more restrictive policy will prevent the economy from growing as rapidly as it could in the short run. Conversely, if productivity growth is lower than the Fed's estimates, the policy will inadvertently be less restrictive than it should be, and inflation will rise. The Fed is, I believe, well aware of the dangers of trying to depend too much on uncertain estimates of long-run productivity growth, and so is unlikely to base its policy on these estimates to any significant extent. As the figures and table make clear, productivity growth varies so much in the short run that any change in long-run productivity performance will not be clear for some years. As a final note, it is interesting that the slowdown in productivity growth after 1973—a slowdown that now seems so obvious from Figure 1—was not generally accepted as a long-run change until late in the 1970s. In the Economic Report of the President for 1977, the Council of Economic Advisers lowered its estimate of productivity growth.2 This new estimate, however, was not without controversy. In early 1977, in a Brookings Panel paper, George L. Perry argued that the evidence for a trend break in productivity growth was unclear.3 He believed that 1974, a year of sharp productivity decline, was very unusual, and he employed a dummy variable for that year in his statistical analysis. When the Brookings Panel next took up the issue, in 1979, there was no longer any doubt that productivity growth had declined substantially.4 This experience with judging productivity growth in the mid 1970s should serve as a warning to policymakers today. Recent productivity growth does seem to be higher than before, but tying policy in any close way to estimates of productivity growth is hazardous. 67 September 11-12,1994 NOTES *I thank Data Resources, Inc. for providing access to its data bank, from which I drew the data for the figures and tables. 1 American Economic Review 84 (March 1994), p. 10. 2 See especially pages 45-46,52-56 in the 1977 Economic Report, which was the final Report by the Greenspan Council. The CEA reduced its estimates of productivity growth to 2.0 percent, which in the event was too high. 3 "Potential Output and Productivity," in Arthur M. Okun and George L. Perry, eds., Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1977:1, 11-47. (See especially pp. 34-38). 4 J.R. Norsworthy, Michael J. Harper, and Kent Kunze, "The Slowdown in Productivity Growth: Analysis of Some Contributing Factors," and Peter K. Clark, "Issues in the Analysis of Capital Formation and Productivity Growth," in Arthur M. Okun and George L. Perry, eds., Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1979:2, 387-431. 68 Shadow Open Market Committee Figure 1 Output per Hour, Private Business Sector 1947:1-1994:11 1.2 Jj> 0.8 s CO O s 3 •a c 0.6 0.4 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 69 1975 19B0 19B5 1990 1994 September J]-12,]994 Productivity Growth Rate (percent per year) 1 1 Cycle Peak to Cycle Peak | Period | Number of Quarters | Growth Rate | | Cycle Peak to Cycle Peak Plus 15 Quarters | Period | Growth Rate 48:IV-53:II 18 4.24 48:IV-52:III 4.40 53:11-57:111 17 2.35 53:11-57:1 2.40 57:111-60:11 11 2.42 57:111-61:11 2.89 60:11-69: IV 38 2.92 60:11-64:1 4.08 69:IV-73:IV 16 2.51 | 69:IV-73:III 73:IV-80:I 25 0.64 73:IV-77:III 80:1-81:111 6 1.00 80:I-83:IV 1.03 1.06 81:111-85:11 1.37 81:111-90:111 36 | 1 90:111-94:11 70 2.45 ! 1.52 1 2.02 | Shadow Open Market Committee Figure 2 Output per Hour, Manufacturing 1977:1-1994:11 71 September 11-12. 1994 72 Shadow Open Market Committee RECENT BEHAVIOR OF M2 Robert H.RASCHE Michigan State University Two years ago I commented on the then mysterious behavior of M2 since early 1991. It was noted that the slow growth of M2 principally was attributable to the decline in small time deposits. One hypothesis then current was that this decline was associated with the thrift crisis; indeed Chairman Greenspan cited that explanation in his testimony to Congress. I proposed an alternative hypothesis, namely "that the recently observed behavior of small time deposit balances is a normal portfolio adjustment in response to the prevailing structure of interest rates, and would have occurred regardless of the severity or existence of the thrift crisis." I also suggested that further reductions in the fed funds rate in an effort to stimulate M2 growth were likely to be futile; that a more productive approach, if higher growth in M2 was desired would be to increase the funds rate target. The Fed maintained the three percent funds rate target until February, 1994. From September, 1992 through February, 1994, the outstanding stock of small time deposits continued to fall from 911.0 billion to 774.5 billion, or by 16.2 percent. During the same period of time, savings deposits increased from 1160.3 billion to 1220.9 billion, or 5.1 percent. Savings deposits were almost constant from the middle to the end of 1993. Money market mutual funds reached a peak in mid 1991 then declined until early 1993 and remained almost unchanged throughout the rest of the year. After the Fed increased the funds rate target, starting in February, 1994, the behavior of these three components of M2 changed dramatically. Two months later small time deposits reached a trough, and have risen in each of the following three months for which data are presently available. Outstanding money market mutual funds jumped by about 3.7 percent from March to April, 1994 and have remained at the higher level since. In contrast, savings deposits reached a peak of 1221.9 billion in March, 1994 and have fallen each following month to 1202.2 billion in July, 1994, a decline of abut 1.6 percent All of these reactions appear consistent with the hypothesis that the "peculiar" behavior of M2 resulted from predictable portfolio adjustments to the existing term structure of interest rates. Available data indicate that CD rates and money market mutual fund rates have moved up sharply with short-term market rates (see Figure). In constrast, average savings deposit rates appear to be quite stable in the 2.5 percent range. Given the latest increase in the funds rate target, it is likely 73 September 11-12,1994 that money market mutual funds rates and small time deposit rates will again rise (if they have not already done so by the time that we meet). My prediction is that growth in money market mutual funds and small time deposits will accelerate, though if saving deposit rates continue to exhibit the sluggishness that characterizes their historical behavior, then it is likely that this component of M2 will continue to exhibit negative growth in the near future. The net outcome of such portfolio adjustments is that M2 growth will likely increase above recent past levels, but explosive growth is not likely. M2 velocity, which has risen sharply in recent years (see attached figure) is likely to remain at historically high levels in the immediate future. 74 17.5 2L 17.5-1 RTBMON I RTBMON RSTD6 RM1 15.0 RMMF 15.0-1 12.5 12.5 10.0 10.0 7.5 7.5 H 5.0-1 5.0 2.5-1 2.5 0.0 X a I ' ' ' I ' • ' I ' • • I • ' ' I • • ' I ' ' • I ' • ' I ' ' ' I ' • ' I ' ' ' l • ' ' I ' 81 84 87 93 90 I • i • I • • • I • • • I • • • I • ' • I ' 84 1 _ I ' " • I • • • I ' ' • I • ' ' I ' ' • I • • • I ' • • I 87 90 l 93 r- <§- 17.5 RTBMON ROCD 15.0-1 12.5 10.0 7.5-1 5.0 J 2.5 J 0.0 i ' • • i • ' • i • • 81 • i ' • • i ' ' • 84 i » ' * t * ' ' i ' ' • 87 i • • • r ' ' ' i * r T 90 93 M2 Velocity, 59:1 -94:2 1.880 1.840 1.800 -\ 1.760 1.720 SO * 1.680 1.640 1.600 1.560 -I 1.520 i—i—i—i—i—i—s—i—m—i—i—i—i—i—i—i—i—i—i—i—r 61 69 77 Quarters i—i—r 85 i—i—r Shadow Open Market Committee MYTHS IN THE REPORT OF THE BRETTON WOODS COMMISSION Anna J. SCHWARTZ National Bureau of Economic Research A 43-member commission, convened by Paul Volcker and co-chaired by three international bankers, has published a nine-page report—Bretton Woods; Looking to the Future—on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the original Bretton Woods Conference. Later this year the commission will publish a volume including a staff review of its deliberations and a set of some 20 odd papers prepared by individuals as background for, but not endorsed by, the commission. The commission was convened to review the Bretton Woods system and its institutions and "to ask whether the present multilateral economic arrangements are up to the challenges ahead, and to what extent they may need reform." It looks ahead but also looks back, and what the commission offers are myths about the past and present. My report organizes the commission's recommendations under two main headings: international monetary reform and the IMF, international development assistance and the World Bank Group. I limit my comments to the report's observations about exchange rates and its international monetary reform recommendations. In reviewing the Bretton Woods system, the report's verdict on the IMF is that, "It was effective in this role for both the industrial and the developing countries in its first two and a half decades." A contradictory view, at least with respect to the industrial countries, has been expressed (Dornbusch, 1993): "In relations among the industrial countries, the IMF has been patently unsuccessful. In the immediate postwar period, the Fund could not get itself to accept the European Payments Union and as a result was left on the sidelines. It never recovered except for a brief moment in the management of sterling crises. Since then the Fund has not been doing any better." In reviewing the post-Bretton Woods period, the report deplores the absence of a "sustained coherent approach to exchange rate management" The critique of existing arrangements states: "Financial market volume and volatility have increased. Exchange rates have become sensitive and their movements sometime extreme... There have been prolonged periods of misalignment among the major currencies." The conclusion is that "the costs of extreme exchange rate misalignment and volatility are high." 77 September U-12, 1994 No paper is referenced as evidence for extreme volatility, prolonged periods of misalignment, and high costs. In fact volatility has not interfered with an increase in the volume of international trade. The core of the case for exchange-rate management and for target zones, however, is the concern about misalignment. No specific cases are mentioned, and the report provides no clue on how exchange rates consistent with the fundamentals will be determined, or how credibility of fixed rates or target zones will be maintained if capital movements are not restricted. If costs are the issue, why did the commission not assess the costs of exchange rate management? The report compares the reduction in long-term growth in the major industrial countries from about 5 percent a year under Bretton Woods to about 2.5 percent a year since the early 1970s, and concludes that "the loss of exchange rate discipline has played a part" in accounting for the decline. Again no evidence supports this assertion. Exchange-rate arrangements did not cause Bretton Woods period prosperity. In the first place, monetary and fiscal expansion accompanying full-employment policies worked until the public caught on that increased spending produced price increases at the expense of output and employment gains. In the second place, international trade grew thanks to GATT successes in reducing tariffs. These were the important cause of Bretton Woods period prosperity. To achieve more satisfactory performance, the report recommends "better international policy coordination aimed at stabilizing exchange rates." Before that can happen, however, the major industrial countries need to strengthen their fiscal and monetary policies for "greater overall macroeconomic convergence." This, according to the commission, is the first of two steps to international monetary reform. The second step is "a more formal system of coordination, involving firm and credible commitments, to support these policy improvements and avoid excessive exchange rate misalignments and volatility." The report refers to "firm commitments," "coherent and credible" commitments, "explicit and clear" commitments by major industrial country governments to "respond appropriately to changes in international economic conditions with adjustments in macroeconomic policies and with currency intervention." Intervention is to be limited to the dollar, the deutschmark, and the yen. In view of the recent disarray in the EMS where, commitments notwithstanding, Germany failed to "respond appropriately," what is the basis for the commission's recommendation? It seems to be empty rhetoric. 78 Shadow Open Market Committee In the commission's view, the central role in implementing monetary reforms should be played by the IMF. It proposes restoring the Fund to its original focus on international monetary issues, after having been diverted to provision of longer term assistance to developing countries, thus duplicating World bank functions, and to structural transformation of the former communist countries. There is no detailed discussion, however, of the monetary reforms nor of their implementation. Instead, the report merely urges the IMF to concentrate on short-term macroeconomic stabilization, but does not make clear whether these stabilization efforts are to be directed to developing and transforming economies or to the industrialized economies or both. Executive Directors are to guide IMF management and "at the same time exert influence on their own countries." The report suggests that IMF quota shares need to be reallocated in line with members' relative economic importance, that the IMF should be less secretive, and should seek close ties with the new World Trade Organization. It defends the Fund against charges that its conditions for financing are harsh, but acknowledges that criticisms of the IMF "sometimes influence the attitude of member governments toward the IMF in destructive ways." The Bretton Woods Commission report is a reliable account neither of the Bretton Woods experience and of its aftermath nor a usable blueprint for introducing a future fixed rate exchange rate reigme, if that is what the commission longs for. Its advice for renewing the IMF is bland. 79 September 11-12, 1994 REFERENCE Dornbusch, Rudiger, 1993, "Comment." In A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System. M.D. Bordo and B. Eichengreen (eds.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 102. 80