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CONTENTS MONDAY , APRIL 22, 1991 Openingstatement ofChairmanRiegle . OpeningstatementofSenatorDixon......... Page 1 4 WITNESSES 2 Ed Derwinski , Secretary , Department ofVeterans Affairs , Washington , DC RaoulLordCarroll ,oftheDistrict ofColumbia ,tobe President ,Government 3 National Mortgage Association ,Washington ,DC .... 9 Response towritten questions ofSenator Riegle . 210 Response towritten questions ofSenator Sasser hicalsketchofnominee Biograp B12 16 TUESDAY , MAY 7, 1991 Opening statement ofChairman Riegle ...... s of: g statement Openin Senator Moynihan.. 25 28 31 37 39 51 Senator Warn er . Senator Dixon Senator Sanford.. Senator Sasser.. .. WITNESSES LawrenceLindsey ,ofVirginia ,tobe a member oftheBoardofGovernors of theFedera l Reserv e .. 33 76 Biographical sketch ofnominee National Association ofFederal Credit Unions ,letter ofsupport ofnomi n ee Response towritten questions ofSenator Riegle (III) 87 88 NOMINATION THE OF RAOUL LORD DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DENT , GOVERNMENT CARROLL , , OF , TO BE PRESI NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION MONDAY , APRIL 22, 1991 U.S. SENAT E , COMMITTEE ON BANKING ,HOUSING,AND URBAN AFFAIRS, n,DC. ingto Wash The committee met at 10:10a.m.,in room SD -538 ofthe Dirksen man of gle e Offic e Buil ding , Jr. (chair Senat ,SenatorDonald W. Rie iding thecommittee) pres . OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN RIEGLE The CHAIRMAN .The committeewillcome toorder. Letme welcomeallinattendance thismorning .We arepleased nomineepresent to havea Presidential whom I willshortly com ment on . He isaccompanied bytheSecretary ofVeterans Affairs ,Edward Derwinski .We arealsopleased tohavehim heretoday- and I will sayjusta bitmoreaboutthatina moment. We are herethis morningtoconsider thenomination of Raoul Carroll tobe thePresident of theGovernmentNational Mortgage Association , morecommonlyknown asGNMA . Mr. Carroll , I want to welcomeyou before the committee and publicly congratulate you on yournomination . GNMA isperhaps best knownforits mortgage -backed securities , theMBS Program , whichincreases theavailability ofmortgage creditforfederally insuredmortgagesby attracting new sourcesof capital tothemortgage market . Throughthisprocess , GNMA's mortgage -backedsecurities serve toincrease theavailability ofcredit forhousing inallareasofthe country , and to assurethatsuchcredit isavailable at reasonable interestrates. The neteffect isgreater home ownership opportunities fora broadrangeofAmericanfamilies . Giventhealarming declines we haveseeninourNation's home ownership rates during thelast fewyears ,therole ofGNMA infos tering home ownership ismore critical thanever . Yet,we must also beverymindful ofGNMA's fiscal stability asitseeks tofulfill its mission infostering theAmerican dreamofhomeownership . Soclearly there areimportant tasks aheadand,Mr.Carroll , you bring a diversified array of legal expertise tothis challenge andI (1) 2 lookforward tohearing yourpersonal statement this morning ,and alsodiscussing withyousomeof theissues thatfaceGNMA . At thispoint , letme acknowledge thepresence ofa member of President Bush's Cabinet ,anda former Housecolleague anda good friend ,Ed Derwinski ,who isherewithyoutoday . We areverypleased tohaveyou,Mr.Secretary ,tocomeandbe present atthis hearing .I thinkitshowsimportantly yourfeeling aboutthisnominee. Why don't youpullthatmicrophone overand we wouldbede lighted tohearyourstatement atthis time. STATEMENT OF ED DERWINSKI ,SECRETARY ,DEPARTMENT VETERANS AFFAIRS ,WASHINGTON OF ,DC Secretary DERWINSKI .Thank you,Mr. Chairman ,I willbe brief . I am herewithmixedemotions ,sinceGNMA's gainistheVA's loss .Mr. Carroll has beena veryeffective GeneralCounsel forus and hasserved withspecial distinction inthetimewe were formu lating policies inthenewlycreated Department . He hasbeena very ,verystrong supporter ofreforms thatwe haveembarkedupon, and he has beena towerofstrength and a strongrightarm to me . At the same time, I realize thatthisassignment forwhichyou areconsidering him isa verychallenging assignment . Hislegal background isespecially suited forit ,andtherefore itiswiththis sort ofmixedfeeling oflosing a verykeyally ,butyetatthesame timewiththe satisfaction of knowinghe is goingon togreater heights thatI am verypleased tocommend him toyou inhispro fessional capacity asan outstanding gentleman ,dedicated public servant ,and a very ,veryeffective public official . Mr.Chairman ,I am pleased inthatspirit torecommend Mr. Carroll toyouandthemembersofyourcommittee . The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate yourstatement , as thecommittee does . I have known you now for25 years , and I know when you comeandmake a personal statement ofthatkinditsignifies how strongly you feelaboutthisnominee .That has important weight withme ,and itdoeswiththis committee . I appreciate those comments ,andI appreciate thetimethatyou have takentocome and presentthem . DERWINSKI Secretary .Thankyou. . The CHAIRMAN.Iam goingtogo toMr.Carroll tasks . andgeton toother yourself Iwanttoallow youtoexcuse Mr.Carroll ,letme now askyoutostand andletme administer the oath. [RaoulCarrol l dulysworn.] TheCHAIRMAN .Letme again welcome you.Ihavehadtheoppor tunityto meet your lovelywifeand your sister who are herewith youtoday ,somaybeyouwouldlike tojust introduce themtothe room sowe willhaveitas partoftherecord thattheywere present ,and anybodyelse who may be accompanying you who you wouldlike tointroduce this morning . 3 TESTIMONY OF RAOUL LORD CARROLL OF THE DISTRICT OF CO LUMBIA , TO BE PRESIDENT , GOVERNMENT NATIONAL MORT GAGE ASSOCIATION Mr.CARROLL .Thank you,Mr.Chairman . I wouldliketointroduce my wife , Elizabeth Carroll who iswith me today ,and my sister ,V'nell Carroll ,who isalsowithme today . Otherpeople intheroominclude many ofmy staff fromtheOffice ofGeneral Counsel oftheDepartment of Veterans Affairs , and many oftheofficials withwhom I will be working ,hopefully ,in theverynear futureat GNMA . Thank you. The CHAIRMAN .Thank you. We are very pleased to have your family and the other guests who accompany you today.Let me now invite you,Mr. Carroll, to make whatever opening personal comments that you would like to ma ke . Then,when you conclude that ,we will getintoa discussion . Mr. CARROLL .Again,goodmorning .Mr. Chairman ,first ofallI wouldliketo thankSecretary Derwinski , a truly distinguished American,forintroducing me . During thepastyear ,I havelearned many things fromtheSec retary ,butmostimportant I believe - and you well know thisabout him- isthathe can manage ina trulydynamicenvironment with bothtoughness anda sense ofhumor.Thesearetwoskills Ihope tobring ,ifconfirmed ,totheOffice ofthePresidency ofGNMA . Iwill also greatly missthepeople attheDepartment ofVeterans Affairs . I havehad a veryenjoyable and rewarding experience with them . Mr.Chairman ,itisa privilege forme toappear before youtoday as President Bush's nominee to be the President of the Govern ment NationalMortgageAssociation ,alsoknown as "GNMA ." I am honored bythe confidence President Bushand Secretary Kemp haveshowninme byselecting me forthis position . ina mannerthatup thatresponsibility I willstrive tofulfill . service ofpublic standards the veryhighest holds To be confirmed tothisposition wouldresult intherealization of one ofmy highest professional goals .For almosta decade , asyou know, Mr. Chairman , my professional life has beensubstantially devotedto helpinglow-and moderate -incomeAmericansrealize theirdream of havinga comfortable and safehome in whichto raisea family . As President ofGNMA ,Ibelieve Iwouldbeserving inoneofthe ve programs arecrucial andVA guarantee The FHA insurance mostimportant agencies responsible forfacilitating thatdream. to buy toenablefamilies neededassistance hicles whichprovide issuers as ofprivate its network ,through homes.GNMA ,inturn fam fordeserving be available money will suresthatthemortgage when theyarereadytobuy. ilies capital tomortgage GNMA's facilitation ofthe flowofprivate of therealization linkinthechaintoward isthecrucial lenders . theAmericandream ofhome ownership I am excited abouttheopportunity tojoinSecretary Kemp and hisverydistinguished staff atHUD in working toachieve thead 4 ministration's goalofexpanding affordable housing andhome own ershipopportunities forallAmericans. I am particularly pleased aboutassuming the leadership of GNMA becauseof itsfinereputation as one of thetrueGovern ment success stories .The professional staff atGNMA isextremely well regarded byvirtually everyone whohasworked withthem. Already , several pastPresidents ofGNMA havecontacted me to offer their congratulations , and eachhascommentedon thequality of the staff . Ilookforward to working withsuchdedicated men andwomen in theverynearfuture . Under former PresidentArthur Hill'sdirection , GNMA was made stronger through theimplementation ofnumerous reforms that helped lead toincreased profitability from$54million infiscal year1989toover$385million infiscal year1990 . Iintend tobuild on these successes byexploring new waystoim proveGNMA's internal controls and enhancingitsprofitability ; and,by continuing tomake theagencymoreefficient , effective , and responsive inmeetingtheconcerns oftheindustry and the needsofAmerica's mortgage borrowers . In particular ,I am interested in continuing thedevelopment of GNMA's riskanalysis systems , and in the establishment of effi disposition cient asset policies . I also look forward tobuilding on andimproving theworking re lationships betweenGNMA and itssister Federal agencies , includ ingtheFHA ,theVA , and theRTC ,as wellasGovernment -spon soredenterprises FannieMae and Freddie Mac. Overthepasttwo decades , GNMA hasserved a vital rolein makinghomeownership an affordable reality fornearly 13million Americanfamilies . In successfully carrying out thisrole ,GNMA hashelpedeliminate regional differences in theavailability of credit andreduced mortgage interest rates formillions oflowand moderate -income families who mightnototherwise havebeenable to afforda home . I lookforward againtoworkingwithSecretary Kemp and with themembersofthis committee inexploring new waystoenhance GNMA's ability tocarryoutitsvital mission . Mr. Chairman,at thi s time,I willbe happy toanswer any ques tions you may have. Thank you verymuch. The CHAIRMAN .Thank youvery much. Iappreciate thatstatement ,andyournomination aswell .Before we begin ,I havea statement fromSenatorDixontobe inserted in the record. STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON Senator Dixon.Mr.Chairman ,before ustodayisthenomination of Raoul Lord Carroll to be President of the Government National Mortgage [GNMA ]Association atHUD . The purpose ofGNMA mortgage -backed securities istoattract nontraditional investors into theresidential mortgage market .This isan extraordinary important programgiventhecurrent needfor theproduction oflowandmoderate -incomehousing today . 5 As my colleagues know,I am also particularly concerned about mortgagediscrimination .I suggested toMr. Carroll thatI willbe calling on hisgoodoffice toassist theSubcommittee on Consumer and Regulatory Affairs , whichI chair , initsefforts tofight and eradicate thishousingdiscrimination problem. I lookforwardtoMr. Carroll's confirmation and workingwith him as President ofGNMA in thenear future . Thank you,Mr. Chairman . The CHAIRMAN.Itcrosses my mind thatifI wantedtoreally get a thorough understanding ofyourbackground and history , I ought to probably call yoursister up tothewitness table ,because I am sureshecouldtell me allthethings I really needtoknow thatoth erwise I may notlearn -although ,I sense thatifyoursister islike mine,shewouldonlytell allthegoodthings . Mr. CARROLL . She is very good about that , Mr. Chairman . [Laughter .] The CHAIRMAN.I thoughtshemightbe.So we willnotcallher today ,forthatveryreason . Butinlooking atyourpersonal background ,Iam struck indoing sobythinking that , witha lotofhardwork,youhavecomea long way since driving thattaxicab backinNew York Cityintheearly 1970's . Mr. CARROLL.That istrue.I have not had to work as hard since . The CHAIRMAN .Butitisinteresting toseethedifferent things youhavedoneovera period oftimetoprepare yourself ,andtode velop yourself professionally tocomeforward todaytobe ableto stand on thethreshold ofassuming these veryimportant national responsibilities . Of course youhave beendoingthatasGeneral Counsel atthe Department ofVeterans Affairs ,but thisI thinkisa new assign ment ofgreatimportance tothecountry ,and I thinkonethatwill testyou innew ways. So I want tosay , as we start down throughsome ofthepoints I wanttodiscuss withyou,that assuming yourconfirmation ,whichI do,I lookforward toyou doinga fine pieceofworkhere and us having a goodworking relationship backandforth personally ,and withrespect tothis committee . Letme now cover someitems thatI wanttodevelop withyou.I want you to describe forme , ifyou would, yourfamiliarity with GNM 's portfolio portfolio manage ,andelaborate onanyrelevant ment experience that youhavehadduring your career . Mr. CARROLL.Thank you,Mr. Chairman . I am familiar thatGNMA presently haswithin itsportfolio ap proximately $16billion worthofservicing rights .Mostofthatisre latedto single familyhousing . Some of itisalsomultifamily , as wellasmanufactured housing . Inmy pastbackground ,I havenotbeeninvolved inthemanage mentofmortgage servicing rights , but Ihavebeeninvolved for manyyears inthedevelopment oflowandmoderate -income single family andmultifamily housing ,usually inmy role asbondcoun sel ,or underwriter's counsel representing housing authorities or underwriters intheproduction oflow-and moderate -incomehous ing 6 The CHAIRMAN .So on theissuethough of portfo liomanageme nt, assuch,thatisgoingtobe more orless a new area foryou? Mr. CARROLL .Thatwouldbe a new areaforme ,Mr. Chairman. That is correct. The CHAIRMAN . In yourqualifications statement , you indicate thatyouregularly review theactivities ofGNMA ,Fannie Mae,and Freddie , and GNMA programmatic guidesforissuers and default experiences . Again,I want tohaveiton therecord .In what professional ca pacity didyouhavetheoccasion tofocus on theseissues ? Mr.CARROLL .On twooccasions ,Mr.Chairman ,again beginning withmy private sector experience as a bond counseland under writers 'counsel ;and more recently as theGeneralCounsel ofthe Department ofVeterans Affairs . As youknow,Mr.Chairman ,within theDepartment ofVeterans Affairs , we do have a relatively small , in comparison to GNMA , mortgagesecuritization program . It relates to what we callour vendee loans. The DepartmentofVeterans Affairs issues approximately $800 million worthof mortgagesecurities a year. That programhas beenverysuccessful overthelast yearand a halfsinceI and my staff have beenworkingthere . We came intotheDepartment withtheintent ,hopefully ,ofjoin ingwiththeprofessional staff thereto develop thatprogram , whichatthetimewas initsinfancy , and notasefficient as we be lieveditcould be. Inthatcontext ,ithasbeennecessary tofollow bothwhatFannie Mae hasbeendoing ,and what GNMA and Freddie Mac havebeen doing ,and we havedonethaton a routine and regular basis . The CHAIRMAN . You havealsoindicated inyourqualification statement thatyou have keptabreast of recentdevelopments in credit reformasitrelates toGovernment -sponsored enterprises . Do you feelthatGNMA , and Freddie Mac, and FannieMae shouldhave thesame regulator ? Ifso,why ? Mr. CARROLL .Mr. Chairman ,I understand thatcertainly itisthe viewofOMB thattheyshould all betreated alike .Prior tobecom inga Government official , I wouldhavefelt thatthere wouldbe some different treatment for GNMA which does not have the same standing ,statutory or otherwise ,as theGovernment -sponsored en terprises . I certainly wouldliketoconfer withthiscommittee and confer further withOMB toseeiftheir viewshavenotchangedon that . Quite candidly ,however ,my viewisthatGNMA should probably be treated differently and notregulated thesameway as Fannie Mae and FreddieMac . GNMA isa Government agency .Theother twoareGovernment sponsoredenterprises . The CHAIRMAN.I thinkitisimportant tonotethat ,ifconfirmed , you do notwork forOMB !You work independent ofOMB .Thatis notto saythatyou do nottalk , and thatyou do not reason and think about problems together ,butyourresponsibilities arediffer entand morebroadthanthat ,asI am sureyou know. 7 So I thinkitisveryimportant thatwhatever yourprofessional view,whateverprofessional view you developas time goeson,that youexhibit andholdtheindependence thatyourposition requires . Mr.CARROLL .I guarantee it ,Mr.Chairman . The CHAIRMAN. Otherwise , thesejobsare not much worth having ,ifthey do nothavethat ,asIam sureyouknow.SoIthink in thespirit of workingwithothers throughout theGovernment , youhavean obligation tospeak yourown mindandsetforward positions thatyou thinkare right . And sometimespeoplesome place oranother may notagree withit ,butI viewthatasthees sential obligation ofyourwork. I wantyoutoknowthat we will stand behind yourability and latitude tospeakyourmind.I want tobe surethatyou feelcom fortable --infact ,thatyou willdo so. Mr.CARROLL .Again ,onlybyexample ,Mr.Chairman ,Icanpoint outthatwhileI was attheDepartment ofVeterans Affairs we had many discussions withOMB regarding theDepartment ofVeterans Affairs Program. 'MortgageSecuritization I think itisfair tosaythatwe movedthemsubstantially inthe direction ofwhat we wantedtodo withinthe Department , and I position wouldexpect tohavethesame success inmy subsequent . The CHAIRMAN.Some individuals withinthehousing finance in dustry haveasserted thatthereisno significant secondary market mortgages forlow-and moderate -incomemultifamily . Such individuals pointto Freddie Mac'sdifficulty in itsmulti family program ,and theDepartment's own problems insubsequent termination ofthecoinsurance programasindications of this fact . I am wondering , whatisyourviewofthis assertion ? And what do you thinkthe roleof GNMA shouldbe in the multifamily arena? Mr. CARROLL . Mr. Chairman , I believe that , to theextentthat GNMA's overall mission istosupport and facilitate development of low-and moderate -incomehousing , including multifamily housing , GNMA oughttohavea role . I am certainly not an expert intheir present programs , but itwouldbe my intention to explore that from thetimeofmy arrival toseeifthereisnota way toincrease our rolein that area. , as you know, in the The CHAIRMAN. We have a realproblem fora more and more difficult isbecoming wherehousing country . issue . I viewitasanurgentnational numberofpeople large When we seeontelevision scenes oftheKurdish people ,dispos sessed and scrambling justtostayalive ,itisjusta heartbreaking scene . But we do nothave to go thereto findproblems thatare similar to thatrightherein our own communities , as you well know . todaythatarestrug country we havegotfamilies Allacross this andsomewithone,but ,somewithtwoparents economically gling over tojustputa roof trying withsmallchildren inmany cases shelters areoverflow .And allofourhomeless headatnight their . thecountry ingthroughout It seems to me thatwithinthe bounds of what isfeasible and mostpractical ,we havegottofinda way tobroadenoutthehous ingopportunities here . Itisnota one-dimensional problem ,obvi ously ,itisa multidimensional problem . 8 A substantial partofitI thinkdoesrelate tothequestion of whetherornotwe canfinda way tofacilitate an expansion oflow andmoderate -income multifamily opportunities ,andobviously the financing thatgoeswith that. So Iwouldaskyou,just personally ,toreally zeroinon thatbe causeI thinkthat,butforthegraceofGod ,we couldbe inanybody else's shoes .We happentobe inourown shoes , and we arein stronger situations todaythana lotofotherpeople inoursociety who have not been as fortunateas we have . . really seeanimpact So Iwouldhopethatinthatareawe could ,butiftheviewoftheman or woman who isinthe Itisnoteasy isthatwe aregoingtofinda position atthetopoftheorganization progress in thatarea,usuallyithappens. way to make a little Letme ask you. How willHUD's new dele gatedproce ssingpro gram affe ctGNMA' s business? Mr. CARROLL. Mr. Chairman, that is not a subjectarea with whichI am veryfamiliar . So what I wouldliketodo isrespond to you inwriting tothatquestion ,ifI may . The CHAIRMAN .Very good. Letme askyouifyouhaveanyplans now astohow youwould allocate resources tomonitorandrvewGNMA's portfolio .I guess thatisanotherway of saying , and askingwhetherthe present systems andpersonnel aresufficient toaccomplish thattask . Mr. CARROLL. Mr. Chairman, I believethatthe presentsystems to hascontinued .I know thatmy predecessor areverygoodindeed . do likewise lookatwaystoimprovethem.I will As farasstaffing isconcerned , I believe we havean excellent staff andthey havethecapability todothe job .Again , itissome thing thatIwill look atwhenIassumetheposition .Butright now, I believe inbothofthosetwo areasGNMA jobtoa verygoodjob . isdoinga pretty good The CHAIRMAN .I am wondering ifyouhaveanythoughts asto what criteria we shouldusefromboth a programmatic perspective andfroma safety andsoundness perspective toaccurately measure theperformance ofGNMA overtime ? Mr. CARROLL . Mr. Chairman , I thinkone ofthethings thatwe mightlookat, and certainly something thatI willwantto lookat, isthe level ofdefault among our issuers . GNMA doesapprovetheissuers ofitsMBS's,and ifwe havea program whichminimizes thedefault rateovera period oftime ,I think it isa verygoodway of measuring theeffectiveness of GNMA . Whether or notwe canissue moreMBS'sinanygiven yearcer tainly involves circumstances beyondjustwhat goeson inside of GNMA .Butifwe canminimize theprogram's exposure toissuer default and maximizetheflowofcapital back tomortgage lenders sotheycanlendtolow-and moderate -income Americans , thenI thinkthatisa verygoodway ofmeasuring performance . The CHAIRMAN.I have askedeveryotherHUD nomineebefore thiscommittee fortheir personal commitmentthatifat any time theyseeorsense any evidence offraud ,orabuse ,orpolitical favor itism of anykind ,thattheywouldtakeappropriate steps todeal withitand stopit. 9 I mean by that ,notonlyjust comingdownastoughasnails on anysituation like thatthat youcatch windof ,butifthere isa per sistent problem I wouldexpect tohaveitreported tothis commit teedirectly . You willneverbe more than2 minutesaway froma phone,and I am veryeasytoreachifany problemlikethatarises .So I would like yourpersonal assurance thatifyou seeorsenseanything like that ,youwill moveon itimmediately .And ifitisa situation of sufficient gravity ,that youwill inform thecommittee ofit . Mr.CARROLL .You certainly havemy assurances ,Mr.Chairman . The CHAIRMAN. I thinkthatisveryimportant .As I said , I put thatquestion toeverybody .Sothatquestion isnotdesigned foryou personally , but we have had enough problemsgoingback over time,and some still up intheairasyou know insome ofthehous ingareasthatare still unresolved . So we wanttoleave thatchapter behind us.So ifanybody ever tries anything thatraises a flaginyourmind,Iwant youtobejust aboutasbluntasI am sureyoucanbe when you needtobe. Mr. CARROLL.I will ,Mr. Chairman. TheCHAIRMAN.Verygood. We may haveother questions tosubmittoyou fortherecord from othercolleagues . Senator Garnwantedtobe herethis morning andwasnotable to do so. He wantedme toexpress hisregret forthat .Butother members ofthecommittee ,totheextent thattheyhavequestions ,willfor ward thosetoyou. yournomi withyouandsupport toworking ButI lookforward nation ,and I lookforwardtoworkingwithyou. Mr.CARROLL .Thankyouverymuch,Mr.Chairman . The CHAIRMAN .With that,thecommitteestandsin recess . [Whereupon ,at10:30 a.m. ,thecommittee was adjourned , subject tothe call oftheChair .] 10 RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR PIEGLE FROM Raoul Lord Carroll U.S.DepartmentofHousing and UrbanDevelopment Washington ,D.C.20410-1000 . MAY 7 isü OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR LEGISLATION AND CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS Honorable Donald W. Riegle , Jr. Chairm an Committee on Banking , Housing and Urban Affairs United States Senate Washington , DC 20510-6075 Dear Mr. Chairman : This responds to your April 23, 1991 letter in which you requestedresponsesto questionsposed by CommitteeMembers as follow-up to the April 22 hearingon Raoul L. Carroll's nomination to be the President of the Government a National Mortgage Association . Mr. Carroll's responses to thequestions are enclosedalong with his correctedcopy of the hearingtranscript . If further informationis needed, please contact Paul Ruppert of my staff at (202) 708-0005 . Very sincerelyyours, Lhaa Ba IvanA. Ránoop her Ass istan t Secre tary (Acting) Enclosures 11 Chairman Riegle Ques tions for the Rec ord Q.1. How will the Department's delegatedprocessingprogramimpact GNMA'S operations A.1. GNMA does not anticipateany materialor adverse impact on its operations as a result of the implementation of FHA'S delegated processing program . GNMA currently provides , and has provided in the past , a means to securitize FHA -insured multifamily loans thereby returning capital to multifamily lendersand assistinginproviding adequatehousingfor low and moderate - income families . GNMA will be able to provide for the securitization of this fully-insuredprogramas the loans are originatedand availablefor securitization . GNMA, unlike many other federal loan programs, does not, and estimatesshow that GNMA will not, requireany subsidyin order to meet its loan guaranty obligatior.s . Moreover , G NM A is at the forefront of federal programs in estimating and managing credit GNMA has developed extensive computer systems which will risk . al low to it be tt er un de rst and th e cr edi t ri sk in her en t in its In addition, as part of the annual audit of its financial program . statements by an independent accounting firm , GNMA reviews the Through these steps , GNMA already estimates of future loss . quantifies its credit risk on an annual basis, accomplishing one of the main goals of credit reform . GNMA's implementation of the rigid reporting requirements of credit reform would , therefore , generate little additional information to assist in the assessment of the credit cost of Federal programs . Implementationof credit reform as currentlycontemplated , would, however, have a significantimpact on the operations of GNMA . A completely duplicative and complicated general ledger system would have to be established , major computer systems would be revised and up to ten addi ti on al s ta ff persons (over the 69 currently employed) would be needed to meet credit reform reporting obligations . In addition , credit reform may result in the application of additional burdensome requirements on private sector issuers of GNMA securities and additionally encumber the efficiency of operations of federal progr loan G NM A ams . has begun planning to implement cre dit reform . Nonetheless, as a program which traditionally has required no federal subsidy and which has traditionally earned revenue in excess of its expenses on an accounting basis, would seem to fall outside the scope of programs and costs intended to be addressed by credit reform . 12 RESPON SE TO WRITT EN QUESTI ONS OF SENA TOR SASSER FROM Raoul Lord Carroll Q.1 . W ith the opportunity decl ine to in inter est refinance rate s , the mortgages th ere on may b e an many of the defaulted properties serviced by GNMA and/or assigned to FHA a result of the defaultsof severalcoinsuringlenders. as Some have advocated that HUD could save significant sums of money if GNMA would participatein a processto reinstatethe defaultedmortgages. Are budgetarysavingsachievable ? Would GNMA facilitate in such a program ? A.1 . The Government National Mortgage Association ("GNMA ") currentlyholds a number of mortgagesfor whichrefinancing is a viable alternative . GNMA is activelyparticipating with the Federal Housing Administration ("FHA ") in an effort to reinstatedefaulted , formerlycoinsuredmultifamilyloans. To date , these efforts have involved a form of refinancing which allows for the reduction of a project's debt service payments by substituting low floating-rate, tax-exemptbonds for fixed rate tax exempt bonds . To date , GNMA has been able to utilize these procedures to refinance successfullyapproximately $110,000,000 of defaulted loans . These refinancingshave reducedthe expenseof carryingthe loans. However, there are many mortgagesin the GNMA portfolioof assets acquired as a result of issuer defaults which are incapable of being successfully refinanced . Many of these loans are delinquentor were over-mortgagedby the initial coinsuring lenders to the point where there is virtually no chance of the loan ever becoming current , even if refinanced at a lower interest utilizing the most rate creative refinancingtechniquesavailable . Once a mortgage has been converted to full insurance (under the coinsuranceprogramregulations ) and assignedto the FHA, the mortgageis no longerunderGNMA'scontrol. We understand that the FHA intendsto deal appropriatelywith refinancing requests for those GNMA committed is loans . to working with the FHA to reduce the overall Departmentalloss caused by the coinsuranceprogram through refinancing when appropriate. 13 2.2 . The Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1990 created a new systemof budgetaccountingfor FederalCreditprograms. How will "credit reform " change the operations of Ginnie Mae ? What problems are anticipated in the implementation of credit reform ? A.2 . GNMA has begun planning to implement credit reform . Early analysis indicates that , at a minimum , implementation of credit reform will require : -- Creationand maintenanceof a separategeneralledger and treasurysystemto track pre- and post-creditreform activity, allocatingrevenueand expensesfirst between pre- and post-credit reform activities . The system will then require allocation of post-credit reform revenues and expensesbetween each of up to 30 separate-annual components (matching the life of a GNMA security); Revision of all pool submission documents , related processingproceduresand computersystemsto allow for tracking of loan pools by year of issuance; Creationand revisionof multiple internalcomputer systems to allow for tracking of information on a year by-year basis ; and Revision accounting of all systems master to subservicer provide for and contractor by reporting contractorsand master subservicersin the appropriate pre- and post-creditreformcomponents . GNMA estimates that the above changes could result in the expenditure of up to $ 10 million in systems revision costs and the dedicationof additionalstaff resourcesto develop and implement the accounting systems described above . GNMA estimates that credit reform implementation would result in the addition of up to ten additional staff persons (over the 69 currentlyemployed ) to handlethe increasedadministrative burdens of credit reform . Q.3. Coopers and Lybrandis performinga comprehensivereview of GNM A'S pr og ram s . What are the parameters of this study and what are some of the initial findings? When will this study be available to the Congress ? A.3. The question refers mostlikelyto a CoopersandLybrandstudy the scope of which is limitedto analyzingthe adequacy of GNMA'S current single-family program guaranty fee . The guarantyfee, which is determinedby statute, is paid to GNMA by the issuer on a monthly basis and is calculated upon the amount of the remaining principal balance of the mortgages 14 underlyingthe GNMA-guaranteedsecurity. GNMA feels this study is extremelyimportantto GNMA'seffortsto ensurethat adequate funds are reserved to properly account for any potentiallosses that might occur as GNMA performsits vital function of providing liquidity in the secondarymortgage market for government guaranteed or insured mortgages . The current schedule calls for the delivery of the final versionof the guarantyfee study by July 1, 1991. Q.4. What have been the total unrecoveredlosses and increased administrative costs to GNMA from: A ) VA No-bid loans; B ) CoinsuredLenders; and c ) mobile home defaults ? A.4 . GNMA has incurred direct losses as set forth below : A ) VA No -bid loans : 1) Losses from VA No-bid loans erode the capital of GNMA issuers and thereby increase the risk of default of GNMA issuers . VA No -bids have been a primaryfactorcontributingto issuerdefaultsthat otherwisewould not have occurredand are directly relatedto GNMA'srecording(since the beginningof FiscalYear 1987) of $354 millionin liabilitiesfor estimatedfuture losses in creatinga reserve for losses in the single-family program. GNMA has alreadyrealized$110 millionof theseestimated losses to date . 2) GNMA'S subservicersestimate that GNMA has incurred direct , out -of-pocket VA No-bid losses of approximately $6,000,000 between October 1990 (when GNMA begantracking No-bid lossesseparately ) and on February 1991 loans currently held by GNMA . These losses are based upon an average VA No -bid lossof approximately $20,000 perNo-bidloan, which is consistent with the industry average. B ) Coinsured lenders : GNMA began experiencingsignificantdefaults by coinsuring lenders in February 1989. Direct expenses from the default of coinsuringlenders between February 1989 to February 1991 w ere approximately $10.5 million . C ) Mobile home defaults: Direct expenses from the default of mobile home issuersbetweenFebruary1986 to February1991were approximately $423 million . 15 The only administrativeexpense directly linked to issuer defaults is the expense of subservicing the acquired portfolios . Becausethis expenseis paid on a per-loan basis, subservicingexpense increasesas the size of the portfolio serviced by GNMA increases as a result of issuer defaults . The increasebetween FY 1989 and FY 1990 was approximately $600,000 and would have been higher if significantcost savingshad not been achievedthroughthe implementation of master subservicingcontracts . Other administrativeexpenses , such as additionalstaff and computer resources are more difficult to quantify but also increase directly withthe sizeof the acquired portfolio . 17 Membershi ps: List below all memberships andoffices held inprofessional ,fraternal ,business ,scholarly , civic ,charitable andothe rorganizat ions . Office held (if any) Organization Americançenterfor Int'l Leadershi p , Baltimore, MD Chairman ( 1988-89 ). Nat'l Association of SecuritiesProfessionals D.C. Bar Association New York State Bar D.C. Black Assistant U.S. 198 6-88 N /A 1985-89 N /A 1979 -Present N /A 1976 -Present President Attorney Association Omega Psi Phi Fraternity 1985 -Present N /A Nat'l Associa tion of Bond Lawyers Datos Chapter Basileus 1970-71 1 981- 83 1970-Presen t. (Inactive) ofjob ,nameof titl the eordescrip tion luding below all positi ldsinc ecolleg e,inc : List onshe Emp record loyment nt. lusive ofinc employme ent,location ofwork,anddates employm General Counsel; U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, Wash. D.C. Present October 1989 -- Partner, Bishop, Cook,Purcell & Reynolds, Wash. D.C. October 1986-Sept. 1989 s, Wash . D.C. Partner, Hart, Carroll & Chaver October 1981-Sept. 1986 AssociateMember, Board of Veterans Appeals, Wash. D.C. October 1980-Sept. 1981 AssistantU.S. Attorney, Dept. of Justice, Wash. D.C. t. 1979 -Oct. 1980 Sep Officer, U.S. Army, Dept.of the Army, May, 1972 -Sept. 1979 . tingCorp. , N.Y , New York TaxiDriver, Chad Opera 1 April 1973-April 1974 2 19 Political contributions : Itemize all political contributions of$500ormoretoanyindividual ,campaign organiza . tion ,political party , political action committee orsimilar entity during thelast eight years andidentity thespecific amounts ,dates ,andnames oftherecipients . $5,000; April 1989; RepublicanNation al Committee, Washe. Daca Qualifications : State fully your qualifications toserve intheposition towhich youhave been named . (attachsheet) (See Attachment "A"). Future employm ent relationships : 1.Indicate whether youwill sever all connections with your present employer ,business firm ,association ororganization if youare confirmed bythe Senate . Y es By Resig nationEffe ctiveon Confirmat ionDate 2.Asfar ascanbeforeseen ,state whether youhave anyplans after completing govern mentservice toresume employment ,affiliation orpractice with your previous em player ,business firm ,association ororganization . NO 3.Hasanybody madeyoua commitment toajob after youleave government ? 4. Do youexpect toserve thefull termforwhich youhavebeenappointed ? Yes 20 conflicts Potential ofinterest : 1.Describe anyfinancial arrangements ordeferred compensation agreements orother continuing dealings with business associates ,clients orcustomers whowill beat. fected by policies whichyouwill influence intheposition towhichyouhavebeen nominated . N one 2. List anyinvestments ,obligations ,liabilities ,orother relationships whichmight involve potential conflicts ofinterest with theposition towhich youhave been nominated . N on e 3.Describe anybusiness relationship ,dealing orfinancial transaction (other than tax . paying ) whichyouhavehadduring thelast 10 years withtheFoderal Government , whether for yourselt ,onbehalf ofa client ,oracting asanagent ,that might inany wayconstitute orresult ina possible conflict ofinterest with the position towhich you havebeennominated . No ne 5 21 4.List anylobbying activity during the past 10years inwhich youhave engaged for the purpose ofdirectly orindirectly influencing thepassage ,defeat ormodification of anylegislation atthenational level ofgovernment oraftecting the administration and execution ofnational laworpublic policy . No n e 5.Explain howyouwill resolve anypotential conflict ofinterest that maybedisclosed by estotheaboveitems . yourrespons N /A Civil , rminal and Investigat ory actions : 1.Give thefull details ofanycivil orcriminal proceeding inwhich youwere a detendant oranyinquiry orinvestigation bya Federal ,State ,orlocal agency inwhich youwere thesubject oftheinquiry orInvestigation . LimitedPartnershipvs. Thereis a pendingcivil suit, VermontInvestment Ct. of , Superior Christopher A. Hart, et al., CivilActionNo. 90-2126 The claim is for breach of lease terms . All the District of Columbia. claims have been denied. Plaintiff's claims , if valid , arose after I withdrew from the firm . I am a named defendant because I was an officer intheprofessional corporation atthetimethelease wassigned . 2.Give thefull details ofanyproceeding , inquiry orinvestigation byanyprofessional association including anybarassociation inwhichyouwerethesubject ofthepro ceeding ,inquiry orinvestigation . No ne 6 23 Attachment A Page Two later, we have a programwhich routinely raises over ninety-five cents ($ .95) per one dollar ($1.00) of assets sold . Expenseshave been trimmedsubstantially during the same period . The VA now sells approximately Eight Hundred Million Dollars ($800,000,000 ) of mortgagebackedREMIC securitiesa year to a very receptivemarketwith a full VA guarantyon the underlying loans . We are still workingon furtherrefiningthe product. It should be noted that these changeshave taken place without increasingthe government'srisk and, therefore , the programhas retainedthe supportof Congressand relevant executivedepartmentofficials . As a resultof my substantialexperiencewith housing production , mortgage finance, mortgagesecuritization and the capitalmarkets, I believe I am exceptionally well suited to assume the presidencyof GINNIEMAE. In closing, I should further note that my experiences with the agency have caused me to have a very high regard for the staff, and I know that it is well regardedby all the constituentgroups that work with the people there on a regular basis . I , too , look forward to workingwith the many fine professionals at GINNIEMAE. NOMINATION GINIA , TO GOVERNORS OF LAWRENCE BE LINDSEY , OF VIR A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE TUESDAY , MAY OF 7, 1991 U.S. SE NAT E , COMMITTEE ON BANKING,HOUSING,AND URBAN AFFAIRS, gton, DC . Washin e met at2:40p.m.,inroom SD -538 ofthe Dirkse n The committe ing,Senato r DonaldW. Rie Senate Office Build gle,Jr.(chairmanof tee)pres iding the commit . OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN RIEGLE The CHAIRMAN.The committee willcome to order . Letme wel come allthosein attendancethisafternoon . We're a little latein starting duetothefactthatwe wereanticipating a voteon the Senate flooratexactly 2:30and,as isoften thecase , thattimegot moved.And,aswell ,downstairs in theFinance Committee ,whereI serveasamember ,we arehavinga hearing thisafternoon on the proposedUnited States Mexican Free Trade Agreement . Carla Hills andtheLaborSecretary andtheDirector oftheEnvironmen talProtection Agencyare alldownstairs testifying , and thathas alsorequired my attendance . I'mtoldthatSenatorWarneriscomingforthepurpose ofintro duction .And ,we'llcallon SenatorWarner when he arrives . Thisafternoon's hearing ison thenomination ofLawrence Lind sey to the FederalReserveBoard forthe remainderof a term endingintheyear2000. Mr. Lindsey isan economist on leave from HarvardUniversity who has servedas SeniorStaff Economist at theCouncil ofEconomicAdvisers ,and mostrecently asSpecial As sistant to thePresident forPolicyDevelopment . Thefact thatthis isan extremely important position inourGov ernmentisverymuch apparent atthepresent timebecause ofthe economicrecession thatwe'redealing withand thehardship that we'reseeing throughout theeconomy . We just saw a reduction in thediscount raterecently asan effort totrytobringinterest rates downgenerally andputsomeadditional strength into theeconomy , and we'll seetheeffect thathasastheweeksgo by. A new appointee to theFed willimmediately havean opportuni tyand a responsibility totrytoreverse thedifficulties thatwe see today in theeconomy . The taskisin large measurethatof at tempting totrytobring aboutan economic expansion , while atthe same timerestraining inflation . We'll be interested in learning today moreabout Mr.Lindsey's views on monetary policy general (25) 26 lyandalso insomemoredetailed respect tohisviews on thestate oftheeconomy:wherewe areand wherewe mightbe going . In addition ,the FederalReservehas substantial bank and finan cial marketregulatory responsibilities . Thereareseveral recent proposals ,including theadministration's ,thatwouldmake major changesin theFed'sregulatory role . In hiscurrent position , Mr. Lindsey was theWhiteHousechief's participant inthedevelop mentoftheadministration's banking reform proposal .The Fedand others haveproposed some ofthekey provisions in thatproposal , including thosedealing withthemechanismforproviding funding totheFDICwiththebankregulatory design ,andwiththemerging ofbanking incommerce .So,we will wanttohearMr.Lindsey's views todayonthose issues andother issues thatareraised by the administration's proposal . Also , Mr. Lindsey's professional work isfocused on analysis of theeffects oftaxchanges . He'swritten a provocative bookinwhich heclaims ,forexample ,andI'mquoting : The Reagantax cutscontributed onlytrivially to theboomingdeficits of the 1980's. And inanother quote: TheReagan boomwas disti rapidgrow ngu eci ish ally thinbus ine edby anesp ss in vestment . And ,anotherquote: deroftheworldeconomy. isonceagainthe lea The Unit edStates Itakesomestrong exception tothese last comments ,andthey're a matter ofconcern tome,quite frankly , ifthose continue tobe your views. Let me ask forthesakeofsetting thestageforour discussion todayifsomeonewouldgo overand put the two charts up. The first chartshowsnetbusiness investment as a percent ofnetna tional product . Thischartshowsas a percentage of netnational product theamountofbusiness investment invarious timeperiods , thefirst one being1952–61 .And thenitgoesin10-yeartimeperi ods: 1962-71 , 1972–81and 1982–90 . What one can clearly seein looking atthis chart isthatwe wereintherangeof3 percent to4 percent in eachof thosefirst threedecades . But, in the 1982-90 period , we seea verymeasurable dropin termsofthathistorical performance , dropping downtosomething just slightly over2 per cent . Thatwouldstrike me as a measureofthefactthatnetbusiness investment ,rather thanbooming ,was,infact ,retreating relative towhatwe had seeninearlier periods . Letme askthattheother chart be putup now.Thisonealso reflects a veryserious erosion intheU.S.financial position ,inmy view. And this is a chart that shows America's slideout of the creditor nation status inthemid-1980's ,whichismeasuredby that bluezoneabovea zeroline , to theredarea , whichisthedebtor nationindication , withthe UnitedStates plunging down intoan international debtor position in $100billion increments , down through theendof1990 ,wherewe wereup intherangeofnearly $700billion , in termsof ournetdebtor position , and certainly 27 continues at a veryhigh .Our tradedeficit headed for$1 trillion totakeusdown overtime. continue ,evennow,whichwill level At thesametime ,measures ofcomparison withhow we're doing , say,vis -a-vistheJapanese ,intermsofinvestments arealsoalarm ing.The latest datathatI haveindicates thattheyhavebeenput tingabout5 timestheamount ofinvestment in equity capital in theirbusinesses as we wereintheUnitedStates .Theircapital in vestmentrates areway aboveoursand othereconomies aswell . I don'twant us to kidourselves aboutthe natureofwhere Amer performing icaistodayandwhetherornotitisreally inan excep tionally positive fashion comparedwiththe restof theworld , or whether we'vegotsomeveryserious problems . IfIthought thatyouwereconvinced that things werejust terrif ic and thatwe'rejustriding a gigantic boom, I thinkI'dbe con vinced thatyouwerethewrongperson forthejob .Now,I'm1 vote and thereare99 others .But,I havethedeepest and themostseri ous interest inwhat kindofeconomic trendlines we'reriding into thefuture .And yourviewson thatareveryimportant tome. So,when we getintothattoday ,it's more thanan academicex ercise . I thinkit'sthe most important question to be askedin terms of the kindsof policy decisions and orientation thatyou wouldbringtothistask . With that ,letme call on Senator Garn.And then,ina moment, I'll call on youtointroduce membersofyourfamily and others thatareheretoday . SenatorGARN .Thank you,Mr. Chairman. Due tothelateness ofthehour,I willnottakethetimeofDr. Lindsey tomake an opening statement atthis time. The CHAIRMAN .Very good. I alsohavea statement fromSenator Moynihanon behalf ofthe nomineethathe wouldlikemade a partoftherecord .And so I wouldaskthat ,without objection ,itbe made a partoftherecord . [The complete prepared statement ofSenator Moynihanfollows :) 29 2 a Governor of the Federal Reserve System, an arm of governmentwhich was created to be independentof partisan politics in order to safeguardthe stabilityof our monetary system . Dr. Lindsey is a man of fine intellect , as I am sure many of you have already discovered. He is an economist , policy analyst and public administratorwith considerableand proven skill . d istinc tion . He has served in two Administrations with In e ac h ca se , he has moved up quickly into positions of greaterimportance , influence and responsibility . President Bush has made a fine choice in nominatingDr. Lindsey . I am sure that the committeewill enjoy questioning him and learningmore on his views as they consider his confirmation . 46-442 0 - 91 - 2 30 I will also attempt tointerrupt theproceeding atsuchtimethat Senator Warnercomesbecause we wanttohavehiscomments . Letme now askyoutostandand taketheoath . Do youswearthatthetestimony you areabouttogiveisthe truth ,thewholetruth andnothing butthetruth ,sohelpyou,God? Mr. LINDSEY. I do,Senator. The CHAIRMAN. Do you agreeto appearand testify before any dulyconstituted committeeoftheSenate? Mr. LINDSEY.Yes,sir . The CHAIRMAN.Verygood. Senator Warnerhasnow comeinto theroom.Letme invite you, Senator ,tocomeon up tothetable ,andI knowyouhavesomein troductory commentsyouwishtomake. SenatorWARNER. I wouldjustapologize . We had a votesched uledfor2:30 .I was thereon thefloor . But,Ithink whatI'll doisjust submit this fortherecord andnot delaythe hearing . This is such an outstanding man , he doesn't need senatorial introduction . You're on yourown.(Laughter .] [The complete prepared statement ofSenator Warnerfollows :] 31 JOHN JohnDames WARNER 225 AUSSELL SENATE OFFICEBUILDING WASHINGT ON,DC20$10-4601 (202)224-2023 A VIAGINI CONSTITUENT SERVICEOFFICES COMMITTEES ARMED SERVICES SELECT COMMITTEE UnitedStatesSenat e ON INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENTAND PUBLICWORKS 490WORLDTRADECENTER NORFOLK VA 23510 1624 (804) 441-3079 PARCEL POST BUILDING 1100 EAST MAIN STREET RICHMOND VA 23219-3538 (804 ) 771-2579 235 FEDERAL BUILDING 180 WEST MAIN STREET ABINGDON VA 24210 0887 (703)628 8158 DOMINION BANK BUIL 213 S JEFFERSON ST SUITE 1003 ROANOKE VA 240 11-1714 (703)982-4676 SPECIAL COMMITT EE ON AGING STATEMENT BEFORE OF THE ON SENATOR SENATE THE THE B. FEDERAL WARNER COMMITTEE NOMINATION LAWRENCE TO JOHN BANKING OF LINDSEY RESERVE BOARD MAY 7 , 1991 Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am pleased to introduce Mr. Lawrence B. Lindsey, who has been nominated to be a governo r of the Fed eral Res erve Board . It is my privilege to recommend Mr. Lindsey to the President. Mr. Lindsey, a longtime resident of Virginia, has enjoyed a varied and extensi ve car eer . He is currently an Associate Director for Domestic Economic Policy in the Office of Policy Developm ent at the White Hous e . He has been there since 1989 . Mr. Lindsey's past experience is equally impressive. served as an Executive Competitiveness. Director He served for the President's as a senior He Council staff economist for on t ax policyfor the Councilof EconomicAdvisors , and he taught economi cs as an AssociateProfessorat HarvardUniversity . Mr. Lindsey's educational background , as well as his honors and awards , speakwell for his dedicationto his profession . He receivedhis undergraduate degreefrom BowdoinCollegewherehe was Phi Beta Kappaand graduatedMagnaCum Laude. He received his graduate degree and Ph.d in economics from Harvard 32 -2 University. He was awardedthe OutstandingDoctoralDissertation Award , was a Citicorp/Wriston Fellow for Economic Research, and was elected to the National and Finance Committee . Tax Association's Federal Taxation Mr. Lindsey has also enjoyed extensive international consultingexperience . He has served in the Republic of Ireland , West Germany , Sweden and the United Kingdom . While abroad , he was involved in consortiums on tax reform, tax rate reduction and the role of personal tax rates and tax revenues. Lastly, the nominee boasts an extremely impressive list of publicationswhich is too extensiveto presentin its entirety. The list includesbooks, magazine , newspaperand journalarticles as well as testimonypresentedbefore the House Ways and Means Committee . Lawrence Lindsey will make a great contribution as to the Federal Reserve Board , and I endorse a g overn or his nomination . Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee for your attention to this matter . 33 Mr. LINDSEY.Thank you , Senator. Warnerwas Secretary The CHAIRMAN.Youknow, when Senator what he usedtodo,you know. He'dbringthese oftheNavy,that's , now you up tothedeckand he'dsay, “Allright youngofficers .” And thensteer thisship .] [Laughter The CHAIRMAN .Now, we dohavea votethat's starting .We'll go fora short period oftimeherebefore we'll havetorecess long enough togo and vote. I knowyourwifeis present .We'dlikeyoutointroduce herand any othermembersofyour family thatmightbe here ,or anyone accompanying elsethat's you. Mr.LINDSEY .Yes,Senator . My wife ,Susan .I'mlucky enoughto haveherjoinme today . Thank you verymuch . you go aheadand beginany opening The CHAIRMAN. Why don't seehow farwe get commentsyou wishto make. And thenwe'll . forthevote briefly we havetorecess before Mr. LINDSEY.Thank you. TES TI MO N Y OF LA W RE NC E LI ND SE Y ,OF VIRGIN IA ,TO BE A M EM BE R O F T HE BO AR D OF GO V ER NO RS OF TH E F ED ER AL R E SE RV E Mr.LINDSEY .Chairman Riegle ,membersofthecommittee ,itisa privilege toappear before youthis afternoon asa nominee toserve on theBoardofGovernors of theFederal Reserve System . honoredme by askingme to servein President Bush has greatly devoteallof my , I'll by the Senate . If confirmed thiscapacity thatyouandthePresident thetrust tofulfill and ability energy inme. willhaveplaced I'mmostdeeply grateful forthekindwordsofSenator Warner , who isfrommy home State ofVirginia ,forhisconfidence ,and also for the generous support ofSenator Moynihan ,whom I've known and worked withformany years. Fora numberofreasons ,this isa particularly exciting and chal lenging timeto be considered forthe position of Federal Reserve Governor. First , theeconomyisata crucial point inthebusiness cycle . Policy makers ,particularly those withresponsibility formonetary policy , facea challenging task . Concernaboutthe healthof the economyandespecially forthose individuals who areunemployed promptsonetofavorpolicies thatwillaccelerate economic growth . At the same time,history has taughtthatexcessive monetary easeleads tohigherinflation as theeconomyrecovers .Greatcare mustbetakentostrike balance theproper . Careful thoughtand balanced action willalsobe neededas the Nation reforms andstrengthens itsfinancial services industry . The Federal Reserve willplay roleinthatprocess a crucial intheyears aheadasoneoftheprincipal regulatory organs ofGovernment . America needsfinanci almarket rules appropri atetooureconom iclea dersh ippos ition intheemergin g glob almarke t ofthe 21st centur y. We alsoneed consi stentand equi tableappli catio n ofour regul ation s. 35 In my case ,theidealistic tendencies oftheacademic ivory tower have been temperedby practical political experience . Conversely ,theharsher demandsofpolitical life havebeensoft enedby timeforacademic reflection . Ibelieve that this background will behelpful inthecollegial ,yet , policy and decision oriented environment of theFederal Reserve . agenda and challenging Reserve faces an ambitious The Federal thatI me ,I believe intheyearsahead.ShouldtheSenateconfirm . those challenges tomeeting contribution can make a useful I cannot promise this committee thatmy confirmation will solve our Nation's bankingproblems , and therecession , or usherin a new age ofpricestability . But, I can and do pledgethat , ifI'm confirmed , the Nationand the Federal Reservewillhavemy unflinching commitment , time andenergy devoted toaddressing those tasks . Thank you verymuch,Mr.Chairman . The CHAIRMAN .Very good. We'llshortly begoing ,I think ,tothesecond bells on thisvote ,so we'll justgetstarted here . I'vebeengoingthroughyour résumé here,which I looked at previously ,and I seetheexperiences that you'vecited ,thetimeat Harvard ,thetimeas a faculty research fellow ,yourtimeontheCouncil ofEconomic Advisers . Itappearstome that , essentially ,thebulkofyourbackground training wouldbe inacademic areas ,aswellasadvisory positions inGovernment. Would thatbe a fair statement ? Or,whatelse ? Mr. LINDSEY .Yes,Senator ,I believe that's accurate . The CHAIRMAN. Now ,I takeitthatyou don'tthinkthelackof any direct business experience isa handicap intermsofyourabili tyto beable tobring thatkindofperspective tobearhere ? Mr. LINDSEY .Senator , I don't thinkso.I thinkI have,inmy uni versity time,had managerial experience .I'musedtoworkingwith staffs .I had40teachers and 1,000 kidsI wasresponsible for .So,I understand thechallenges ofa manager ,butyou're right ,I have notbeen inthe private sector . The CHAIRMAN .When youwanttotrytogeta private sector as sessment ,and I'msureyou talktoany number ofpeople and I'm sureyouwouldhavebeentalking withpeople fromthesedifferent policy positions you've beenin,who doyoutalktoon themanufac turing side ? Who aresomeofthepeople thatyou relyon foradvice and insight who would be some ofthe kindsofpeoplethaton some kindofa regular orperiodic basis youwouldtalk tojust totakea reading onwhat's happening intheeconomy ? Mr. LINDSEY.Well,Senato r,inmy curren t positio n,Imeet regu larl y withany numberofreprese ntati vesof busine ssandindust ry who come through. The CHAIRMAN.But,who do you seek out? Who do you pick up thephone andca llwhen you wanttogeta readin g as to what' s goin g on out ther e with peopl ewho run busi nessand, youknow, aretry ingtomake a go ofitinthepriva tesector ? Mr. LINDSEY .Well,I thinkthatI wouldcall academic economist friends of mine who have worked forbusinessorganizations . The conference board,forexample. 36 Ialso havefrien dswho arerespo nsible ,have beenent repre neurs , partic ularl y in high -techareas ,inbiote chnol ogy. And I findthatI haveno shortage ofindividuals who wantto giveme their advice .And I've learned thathavinga goodearisa veryimportant part ofmy responsibilities . So I do feel thatI'mopentoanyonewho wouldexpress their views . TheCHAIRMAN . Letme putus intoa recess herebriefly . The second bells haverungandSenator GarnandIhavetogoover and vote .We'll be backjustassoonaswe cangethere . The committeestands in reces s.[Recess.) The committee willresume . I don'tknow exactly what our out lookisforadditional votes ,butwe're going tostayherethis after noonuntil we'vegonethrough theseissues . We are pleased to have beenjoinedby SenatorSarbanes , and alsoSenator Dixoncame by and left hisstatement , whichwe'll makea partoftherecord ,without objection . ts ofSena torsDixon and San ed statemen eteprepar [The compl ow:] fordfoll 37 MAY 7,1991 > STATEMENT OF SENATOR SENATE NOMINATION BANKING HEARING ALAN J. DIXON COMMITTEE ON LAWRENCE LINDSEY MR .CHAIRMAN , I AM PLEASED TO BE HERE THIS AFTERNOON AS THE SENATE BANKING LAWRENCE COMMITTEE CONSIDERS LINDSEY TO BE A GOVERNOR THE NOMINATION ON THE FEDERAL OF RESERVE BOARD . I UNDERSTAND THE GROWTH THAT MR .LINDSEY HAS WRITTEN A BOOK CALLED EXPERIMENT . AND ,I UNDERSTAND THAT THE BOOK ARGUES ,IN EFFECT ,THAT THE REAGAN SUPPLY -SIDE POLICIESWERE A BIG SUCCESS ,A POSITION WITH WHICH MOST MAINSTREAM ECONOMISTS WOULD DISAGREE ,I BELIEVE. THIS AFTERNOON ,I HOPE WE WILL EXPLORE WHETHER OR NOT "GOVERNOR LINDSEY" WOULD TAKE A RIGIDLY IDEOLOGICAL AND EXCLUSIVELY SUPPLY -SIDE APPROACH TO ISSUES PUT BEFORE HIM AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE . WOULD "GOVERNOR LINDSEY "ARGUE ,FOR EXAMPLE ,THAT THE MARKET -PLACE CREATES SUFFICIENT DISINCENTIVES AGAINST DISCRIMINATION AND OTHER CONSUMER CONCERNS THAT THE FED 38 NEED NOT WORRY ABOUT MORTGAGE DISCRIMINATION OR OTHER "CONSUMER ISSUES"? WOULD "GOVERNOR LINDSEY "BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE UNITED STATES MOVING IN 1981FROM BEING THE WORLD'S LARGEST CREDITOR TO THE WORLD'S LARGEST DEBTOR IN 1989--A SHIFT OF $0.8TRILLION IN NET FOREIGN INVESTMENT "GOVERNOR CONCERN WORKING LINDSEY " SHOW AMERICANS SUFFICIENT IN FORMING MONETARY ? WOULD FOR AVERAGE POLICY? THESE ARE CONCERNS OF MINE AND PROPER CONCERNS ,I BELIEVE,OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD AND ITSGOVERNORS . I HOPE THAT THIS AFTERNOON'S RELATED BANKING HEARING POLICY MATTERS . WILL EXPLORE THESE AND 39 Tempenfora OPENING HEARING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ON THE NOMINATION TO BE A MEMBER TERRY OF LAWRENCE SANFORD LINDSEY OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS FREDERAL OF THE RESERVE MAY 7 , 1991 Thank you , Mr. Chairman . I appreciate your calling for this hearing and look forward to hearing the views of Mr. Lindsey . I must say at the outset , however , than I am quite troubled by a number of the things Mr. Lindsey has written , particularly in his recently published book, TheGrowth Experiment : Economy How the New Tax Policy Is Transforming the U.S. From what I have read , this book clearly takes the view that the 1981 tax cuts were only a minimal cause of our tremendousbudgetdeficitand that more of the same is what we need to build a better, strongernation. I don't know of anything that could be further from the truth . I am extremely concerned about placing someone on the Federal Reserve Board who takes the Reagan Administration's "don't worry, be happy" mentalityto heart, while we have watched the rich get much richer, the poor get much poorer ; our cities and states fall into fiscal crisis from being asked to shoulderan ever increasingarray of problemsthat 42 The CHAIRMAN.In theinterest oftimenow,I want tojustraise oneitem .And thenI'mgoing togotoSenator Garnandgoto Sen ator Sarbanes. You should infer frommy commentsaboutsomeofthequotes thatItook fromyourbookandmy own sense as towhathappened in the 1980'sand where we are now ,thatI thinkthateconomic as sessment justdoesn't makemuch sense . Now,Iknow youprobably havejust asstrongly a held viewon theother side .But,I guessI wouldlike tohearan explanation fromyouastowhy,with the statistics thatI've cited ,hugestruc tural deficits now intheFederal budget , a very substantial trade deficit - someimprovement ,butstill verylarge , hugeoverhang of debtthroughout theeconomy ,serious recession on ourhands , cap investment looking pretty anemicwhenyoureally compareit ital withothercountries ,how doI make a silk purseoutofallofthat rather perverse economic dataand thosetrendlines ,whichI think arereally quite adverse toourfuture ? Mr.LINDSEY . Senator ,letme saythatI shareyourconcern about thelevel ofsavings and level ofinvestment inAmerica . We canallagreethatAmericawouldbe better offifwe had more.And I thinkthatthetasksaheadattheFed inthemonetary sphere touchtosomedegree on that . In looking atthe1980's ,I thinkit's important toputthem into thecontext ofthechallenge that weentered the1980's with . I suppose it's truewithgenerations as well . Eachgeneration makesforward steps ,butthenextgeneration inherits new prob lemsthat ,although theprevious generation hadsolved someprob lems,new problemsemerge. I thinkthat , when onelooks attheunderlying inflation ,unem ployment tradeoff thatwe beganthe1980's with ,Ithink there was substantial improvement .I thinkwe had a substantially improved functioning ofourmarketeconomyas thedecadewenton. In thelongrun,I thinkthatisthe greatstrength oftheAmeri can economyand theonethatwillbemost helpful inthedecades marketplace ahead,aswe entera global . But,I share yourconcern about getting thesavings rate up.Ab solutely The CHAIRMAN. Well, I remember when RonaldReagan took overthePresidency and,ifmy memory isright and I thinkitis ,he budget saidthatwe'dhavea balanced by 1984 . Well,1984came and went.And 1988wentby.And 1990wentby. And we're in1991. And no onereally yetsees outon thehorizon a balanced budget . Do youseeone?Imean,areyouwilling tohangyourprofession alhaton a dateby whichyouthink iswe're going tohavea bal ancedFederalbudget? Mr. LINDSEY .Well , itverymuch dependson ourpolicy decisions . In thebookthatyou cited ,what I laidoutwas a scenario where,if we hadaverage economic growth and4-percent inflation ,Icarted thepathofrevenues ,compared ittothechart ofspending with an assumption aboutspending . And thatwaswhatwe wouldbeable to have with zerorealspendinggrowth . In otherwords, has spending keep pacewithinflation . And thenriseat 2 percent a year. 43 And,underthat scenario ,we wereabletoobtain budget surplus es by later inthedecade ,actually ,by mid-decade . Now ,when thebookwas written ,again , that's basedon the as sumptions .We havenotrestrained thegrowth ofspending ,aswas suggested in thebook.Nor havewe attained therateofeconomic growth growth ,theaverage rate ofeconomic ,inrecent years . But,I do thinkthat ,overthelonghaul,giventhatrevenues will rise faster thantheeconomy ,ifwecan simply restrain therate of spending growth totherateofinflation or,at most,totherate of economic growth ,thetaxline will overtake thespending line . The CHAIRMAN .As I understand it ,whatyouhad projected and thought mighthappen was less spending and greater growth , we didn't gettheless spending . We gotmore thanyou anticipated . AndI wouldthinkthatthatoughttohavedriven thegrowth line up evenhigher onthetheory that ,ifyouaddadditional stimu lus,yougetmoregrowth . Now, maybeyouwouldarguetothecontrary , butwhathap penedtothegrowth ?Why did itfall short ?[Pause .) Mr.LIND SEY . The reaso n I pauseisyou'reaski nga verygood ques tion,onewithmany answers. Inpart ,I thinkwe'veseena slowdownbecause we areattheend ofa period ofextended economic growth ,what hasturnedouttobe thelongest peacetime expansion we've hadinAmerican history . Thereweresome signslate lastyear,duringtheyear ,thatthe economywas slowing down.I thinkthattheIraq -Kuwaitcrisis sent whatwas a slowgrowing economy into a negative growth situation . I think that the lossin consumer confidence had a tremendous amount todo withthat. So, again , thereare many, many reasons explaining why the economyhasslowed down.Theyinclude thenormal business cycle typeofreasons — theIranIraqwar,monetarypolicy . Itisimportant when you examinethedeficits aswelltoconsider the natureof the deficit and how much fiscal stimulusone would getfromeachparticular kindofspending . A numberofcommentators havenoted ,forexample ,that ,inour effort to make surethatdepositors in financial institutions get their money,itcosts theGovernmentmoney.But, it's notnecessar ily clear that you'll geta substantial fiscal stimulus fromthat .The individuals who aregetting their moneyguaranteed thinkthey havethemoneyalready ,andsotheydon't feel anywealthier from thatspending : edpict urewithregardtothe licat n,it's a very,very comp So,agai tion l. , aswel luspartofyourques l stimu fisca The CHAIRMAN. Let me goto SenatorGarn. Senator GARN .IfI may follow up on thatspecifically . Would you amplify youranswer onhow muchimpact youthink thatmonetary policy had on the recession and theway the Fed has conducted monetarypolicy ? Mr.LINDSEY .Well ,it's always difficult ,Senator ,toputa precise quantification on thingsuntil we geta lotmore data . And, even then , it's somewhatdoubtful . I don'tmean touse thatas an evasion ,however. I thinktha t inthelatter part oflastyear,inretrosp ect,mone tarypolicywas below what would be desi rable . 45 Thatmadeitvery ,verydifficult forthese individuals toattract investors becauseit's so highrisk . And so I thinkthatoneofthekey reasons forsmallbusiness is thatwe needtosortofright thebalance . Ratherthanhavea playing field that's uphill against smallbusi nessraising capital ,we need tohaveonethat's morebalanced . SenatorGARN. Do you believe thattheFederal Reserves needto be involved in banksupervision and regulation in orderto have inputformonetarypolicy ? Mr. LINDSEY . Well ,you're asking a goodquestion .I'll tell you,it wouldbe oneI couldanswerbetter and withmore detailed knowl edgeina yearorso,I hope. Sena torGarn.How aboutasimpl e yesor no? Mr.LINDSEY .A simple yes.I'll start withthat .And thereason I do, Senator ,isthatIthink that ,ifyou're concerned about liquidity crises ,about thestate ofbusiness loandemandandwhat-have -you, havingyour finger on the microdata , havingfeedback come up throughthechannelsisvery,veryimportant . Senator Garn.Well,let me sayrespectfully thatMr. LINDSEY.That would be my answer. SenatorGARN . My answerwouldbe no. Mr. Greenspandoesn't agreewithme. PaulVolcker didn't agreewithme.I veryrarely . findanybodyon theFed who does . But,wesimply have ,inmy opinion ,a proliferation ofregulation and examinations . I haveneverunderstood thatanswerfromany ofyouon theFed, orproposed membersoftheFed,thatyouhave todo ityourself inordertoplaywiththeM's. We'vegotFDIC.We'vegotallkindsofagencies outthere .I can't believe thatwe havetohavethatoverlap and duplication ofrules and regulations . And that , in workingforthesame Government , thattheinformation thatIagreewithyouthatyou do need there's no doubtaboutthat- butyou havetohaveyour own exam ining force andregulatory force inorder togainthatinformation . You can'ttrustone of the otherregulatory bodies ; becauseI do thinkwe needsomestreamlining ,somereduction oftheoverlap andduplication . I belie ve the first pla ce to star t istheFed,and giv e you more time to play withyour M's, unfette red with that regu lator y burden . Thank you,Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN .Thank you. SenatorSarbanes . Sena torSARBANES.Mr.Lindse y, areyou on leavefrom yourposi tionat Harvard ? Mr. LINDSEY.Yes,I am ,Senator . Senator SARBANES .Well,how longhaveyoubeenon leave ? Mr. LINDSEY.I'vebeen on leavenow sinceJanuary31,1989. Senator SARBANES . So, yourpresence down hereat least was temporary in nature ? Isthatcorrect ? I mean,you wereassuming a return toHarvard ? Mr.LINDSEY .Ididn't knowwhatIwasgoing todo,Senator .And I thought itbesttohavean option . SenatorSARBANES . So, you'vemaintained thisHarvardconnec tionduringthetimeyou've beendown here. 46 Isthatcorrect ? leavefromHarvardUniversity . I havemaintained Mr. LINDSEY . .Yes,Senator I've beendown here since Senator SARBANES . Allright . Now, forwhatgeographic region areyou beingappointed totheBoardtorepresent ? Mr. LINDSEY .I'm representing theRichmondFederal Reserve District ? SenatorSARBANES . What'syourconnection withthe Richmond Federal Reserve District ? Mr. LINDSEY . I own a houseinVirginia .It's theonlyhousethat my wifeand I own. I pay incometaxesthere ,personal property taxesthere ,votethere .We'veactually spenthalfourmarriedlife there ,in two stints . Senator SARBANES .How much ofyourlife haveyouspent there ? Mr. LINDSEY.Fiveyears . Senator SARBANES .Out ofhow many? Mr.LINDSEY . Thirty -six . Senator SARBANES .Well ,halfofyourmarried life isnothighly relevant to thenexuswith the Richmond ReserveDistrict ,isit ? or,myMr.LINDSE Y.Well,Senat Senator SARBANES . Why do youthink thatrequirement isinthe Reservelaw?Why was itputthere law,intheFederal ? Why do we requirement havea geographical ? Mr. LINDSEY .I would- I'dhavetogo backand checkthe1913act tobe sure .My suspicion istogetpeople witha variety ofback grounds and geographic distribution . SenatorSARBANES. Wasn'tone intentat leastto getpeoplefrom intheeconomic who participated ofthecountry regions different Reserve Boardmakingna regiontositon theFederal life oftheir monetarypolicy tionwide ? Mr.LINDSEY . Verywellcouldhavebeen,Senator . SenatorSARBANES. I don'tunderstandhow you underany stretch forthe Richmond would meet thatcriteria of the imagination . Reserve District Have you everengaged in economic activity in thatDistrict other thansimply living there for5 years while you've beenwork inginWashington? Mr. LINDSEY r,no. .Asid e frombeinga taxpaye And ,I voted. Senator SARBANES . Do youthink there's a credit crunchunder way rightnow ? Mr.LINDSEY .Yes, Senator .And I do in thiscontext . I thinkof theterm "credit crunch," thebestdefinition thatI'veseenis:a sig nificant increase inthestandards forcredit availability . regionsof industries , particular And I thinkthatin particular toexperi . Ithink ,ifonelooks true ,thatisespecially thecountry Riegle made earlier Senator - anda point encesinthelate1980's inthose was appropriate standards incredit some increase perhaps industries. Howev er,I sharewhat I thin k isyourconcernthat ,inmany cases,tha t incre asein stand ardshas gonetoofar. Senator SARBANES .What do you thinktheFed can do aboutit ? Mr.LINDSEY .Well ,there area numberofthings thattheFederal Reserve hasalready done.I thinkonepositive stepwas theFederal 47 a setof together toclarify getting Reserveandtheotherregulators assets on and valuing of valuingassets forpurposes regulations bank balancesheets. I thinktha t tha t willhave more impa ct astimegoes on,asregu latorsand bankers become familiarwith it. I thinkthatthe reduction in interest rates , whilenota direct way of solving the credit crunch , isan indirect way when you lower the costof funds , make more funds available . I thinkthat you're makingaccess tothose funds tomoreandmoreborrowers . So I think those aretwoimportant steps thathavealready been taken.And I thinkthatmore willfollow . Senator SARBANES .Do you thinkthatan increase in thedeficit wouldimpactnegatively on thelevel ofinterest rates ? Mr. LINDSEY . I thinkthatitwoulddependon what the funds were expendedfor . SenatorSARBANES.Let'sassume it's tocuttaxes . Mr.LINDSEY .Ithink that — again ,itwoulddepend onwhattaxes were cut . If ,forexample ,taxes on thesupply ofloanable fundswerere duced ,I think you may notseeanincrease ininterest rates .We're experiencing that , for example , inthecaseofwhattypes oflevels ofinsurance tochargebanks. There'sa limitto the amount. I don'tknow what thatlimitis. But,certainly increasing theBIFpremium ,whichisa formoftax , would— there's an exampleofwhereitwouldreducetheavailabil ityofloanable fundsand drive up interest rates . So , again , itwoulddependverymuch on thenatureofthe ex penditure orthenatureofthetaxinvolved . Senator SARBANES .How didthis nomination come about ? Mr.LINDSEY .Well ,all I knowandcananswer isfrommy experi ence. And, latelastsummer, RogerPorter , who'sthe personI report to,and MichaelBoskinspoketome and askedme ifI would consider havingmy name included , amongothernames. And I thought aboutit . I talked tosomefriends .And,saidyes. Senator SARBANES .Had youindicated an interest intheposition , yourself ? . theyspoketome ,Senator Mr.LINDSEY .Notbefore theredoingyourjob, SARBANES Senator .You weresortofsitting , and theycame so tospeak ,down attheWhiteHouseon thestaff Re on theFederal inserving ,“Areyouinterested toyouand said serve ?" Mr. LINDSEY.Yes,Senator . The CHAIRMAN.Thank you,Senator Sarbanes . Senator D'Amato . Senator D'AMATO.Thank you,Mr.Chairman . Mr.Lindsey ,let me askyou,haveyoubeenfollowing theFederal Reserve's policy as itrelates tointerest rates ,and thedebate that haspursued within thecouncils oftheFederal Reserve ? Mr.LINDSEY .Senator ,Ihavenotbeenprivy tothedebate within the councils . Senator D’AMATO .You mean youhaven't heardanything about it? 48 Mr. LINDS EY. All I can tell you is what I read inthepaper . In thatsense ,I haveno private knowledg e ofthedebate s.Thatisone ofthe restri ction sona desi gnee ,a Govern ordesi gnee . SenatorD'AMATO . Beforeyou became a designee .This has been going onfor a period oftime ,hasn't it ? Thequestion asitrelates to whatthepolicy shouldbe withrespect tointerest rates ? What are thepolicies asitrelates totheregulators ,andtheReserves andthe requirements forReserves ? Has thatnotbeenan ongoing matter ofconcern fora period of timenow,prior toyourbecoming a designee ? Mr. LINDSEY .Senator ,letme saythatI am verymuch awareof discussion ofthoseissues .I may havemistook yourquestion .I do nothaveany knowledge oftheprivate deliberations within the Federal Reserve , butI am awareofthegeneral debate aboutthose issues . Senator D'AMATO .Wouldyoucaretosharewiththis committee what yourthoughts havebeenwithrespect tothat ? Do you think thattheFederal Reserve hasmoved expeditiously enoughas itre lates to ,let's say,thediscount rate ,andlowering thediscount rate ? Or,has itmoved precip itousl y? Or,hasitmoved jus ? t abouton target And whatrelevance doyouthinkthatallplays intheeconomic situation thatwe now face? Mr.LINDSEY . Senator , inmy view ,therate of moneycreation , > the growth ofthemoneyaggregates ,particularly during thelatter halfoflast year ,was probably tooslow . I think ,tosomeextent , thathasbeenrectified inrecent months. Senator D'AMATO .Do youthinkit's beenpossibly tooslowand rectified in recentmonths ? Mr. LINDSEY . I thinkthatitwas certainly tooslowin the last yearand haslargely beenrectified inrecent months. SenatorD'AMATO.Letme askyou,ifyouweretolookin thelast 10-yearperiod oftime,do you know what thelowpoint forthedis count rate has been ? Mr.LINDSEY . In thelast10years ,we areprobably atthelow point rateright inthediscount now. Senator D'AMATO.Do youknow ifthediscount ratewas everthis lowprior ? Mr.LINDSEY .Oh ,yes,itwouldbe in theSenator D'AMATO.Well,inthelast decade . Mr. LINDSEY.In thelastdecade. Senator D'AMATO .Thelast 5 years .Let's putitthat way. Would itsurprise --letme be fairto you. I'm not trying to woulditsurprise youtoknow thatthediscount ratewas5.5per cent-that's the same ratethatitisnow- intheperiod ofAugust 1986through August1987 ? Wouldthatsurpris e you ? Mr. LINDSEY. No ,itwould not surpri seme . Senator D'AMATO.Itwouldn't? Well, as an economist , woulditseem toyou thatthediscount rateof 5.5percent backin 1986 — and youremember. You were workingintheWhiteHousein1986 ,weren't you? Mr. LINDSEY. No. Sena torD'AMATO.No? Where wereyou then ? 49 Mr. LINDSEY .I was atHarvard . Senator D'AMATO.That's why you lost trackofit ,huh? Mr.LINDSEY .Ivorytower ,Iguess . That's right . [Laughter .] SenatorD’AMATO .Well,letme ask you.Let'slookat the econom indicators , andallofthose ,etcetera icperiod in termsofgrowth thatwe know aboutthe healthof theeconomy. Ifyou can look - don'task me to name a specific back toAugust1986and reflect . On July4, we had the . Yes, I could thingbackthen. I couldn't of Liberty , and itwas thehundredth forthe Statute dedication fiftieth had their about - my motherand father .That's dedication , but-be recall couldn't , I probably . Anythingelse anniversary ,wouldyousaythatthe ofAugust1986 , and1987 tweentheperiod ,strong ? prosperous economywas rather Mr. LINDSEY. Yes,Senator, itwas. Senato r D'AMATO.Very strong ? [Pause.] Do you thinkthatthediscount ratethentoday ,was the econo my - how wouldyou ratetheeconomy today? ,ina reces ,certainly ,orhasbeen Mr. LINDSEY .Theeconomyis sion . ? ,inyouropinion Senator D'AMATO.Arewe ina recession Mr. LINDSEY . Well, I thinkwe certainly were throughthefirst quarter year this . Senator D'AMATO .You weredoing verywell .Now you're begin ningtogetlike a politician . Are we ina recession today ? Mr.LINDSEY .Um -probably : Senator D'AMATO.Didthathurtyou tosaythat ? Mr. LINDSEY.Well,I ofcoursewish we were not. Senator D'AMATO .Well ,IhadGreenspan here - listen ,don't hesi tate . Itonlytookhim a yearand a halfof me askingthesame question every timehe cameastowhenhe wasgoing tolower the discountrate. Imean,youknow that .Theyprepped youforme,didn't they ? Mr.LINDSEY . I'msorry ,Senator ?WhatSenatorD'AMATO. Let's getto the point . Do you thinkthedis count rate iswhereitshould beatthepresent time ? Areyousatis fiedthatit's lowenoug Do youthink theeconomy needs anyadditional stimulation ? Mr.LINDSEY .Ifthequestion is :IfIwereconfirmed ,wouldIraise orlower thediscount rate ,I wouldhavetosayitwoulddepend on thedatathatwas available tome thenand Ido commend,I think theFed made theright move last week in cutting therateto51/2 percent . I would want to- I know SenatorGarn doesn't thinkwe should wait formore data either. Senator D'AMATO .We should what ? Mr. LINDSEY .Waitformoredata .But,I thinkI wouldbeSenator D'AMATO.Well,you havetobeblind ,deaf ,and dumb not toknow thatwe'reina recession .I don't know what thehecktook Greenspan solong andtheBoardoverthere tofind out.It's given a man who isdeadartificial respiration so,fine , you'll savetherest helpofthem,butyou didn't Senator GARN .I already gavehim thesame speech .Not quite as colorfully ,but- 50 [Laughter .] Senator D'AMATO.Well,Ijustwant toknow what we'regoingto be in for,Jake. Are we going tohavesomebody who saysallthese nicethings and thenwhen we come up- Senator Garn .I agree .I saidtheywaitedtoolong ,theyweretoo slowand theyoughttotrust their gut and quitwaiting formore reports . SenatorD'AMATO. And the reports don'tsay a darnedthing anyway . Do you really thinkemployment's up? I wonderwhere theygotthosefigures ,and whattheydiscounted . But , thatlittle light wenton, soI'll passtoanother roundof questions tosomebodyelse . The CHAIRMAN . Senator Sasser. Senator SASSER .Thank you verymuch,Mr.Chairman . I havea statement ,Mr.Chairman ,whichI wouldaskappear in the record. The CHAIRMAN.Withoutobjection ,soordered . Senator SASSER .Intoto ,asifread . [Thecomplete prepared statement ofSenator Sasser follows :) 51 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JIM SASSER ON THE NOMINATION OF LAWRENCE LINDS EY , MA Y 7 , 1991 THANK YOU MR . CHAIRMAN, FOR CALLING THIS HEARING ON THIS IMPORTANT DEEP NOMINATION THE RECESSION . CRISIS SINCE . THE THE ECONOMY BANKING DEPRESSION SYSTEM IS AS IS WE ALL KNOW MIRED EXPERIENCING ITS IN A GREATEST . INDEED, THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE COMMENT OVER THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF OR SO ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE IN RESPONDING TO THE ECONOMIC DISASTER THAT WE SEE ALL ACROSS THE COUNTRY . THE FEDERAL CURRENT SIZE OF RESERVE THE IS IN A CRITICAL FEDERAL BUDGET GIVEN POSITION . DEFICIT THERE AREN'T THE MANY OPTIONS FOR A FISCAL STIMULUS TO GET THE ECONOMY MOVING AGAIN . MONETARY POLICY RECESSION . AND BANKING CALLED COULD THERE ARE SYSTEM UPON FOCUSSED . TO ON DICTATE VERY THE SERIOUS LENGTH CONCERNS AND DEPTH ABOUT OUR OF THIS NATION'S THERE IS SOME QUESTION THAT THE TAXPAYERS MAY BE BAILOUT BOTH THESE THE FDIC . ISSUES I THINK THE FED NEEDS TO BE . SO THEREFORE , I LOOK FORWARDTO HEARINGDR. LINDSEY'SVIEWS ON THESE THAT ARE MATTERS THE MONETARY CRUX OF THE POLICY FED'S AND MISSION . BANKING WE ARE REGULATION FAMILIAR TO SOME DEGREE WITH DR . LINDSEY'S SUPPLY SIDE TAX IDEAS , BUT KNOW VERY LITTLE ABOUT HIS EXPERTISE IN THE MATTERS THAT HE WOULD PRESIDE OVER AT THE FED . THANK YOU MR . CHAIRMAN . 52 Senator SASSER .Dr.Lindsey ,looking backoverthecourse oflast year ,evenlate 1989 ,itappears tome that theeconomy hasshown rather significant signs ofweakness .The lastquarter of 1989 , for example , in thelastquarter , theeconomygrew at lessthana 1 percent realrateofgrowth . Throughthefirst 6 monthsof1990 ,theindicators wereuniform lybad, according totheeconomists thatI talked to.And probably themostalarming thing wasthatthebanking system wasshowing serious signs ofweakness . Unemploymentwas goingup.And hous inginthefirst 6 monthsof1990was inthemostdramatic decline since1982. Now , the Fed didnotmove until the middleof 1990to reduce interest rates .And thatwas a veryminoradjustment . And Dr. Greenspan made itclear atthattimethattheyweren't doingthis inan effort tospurtheeconomy ,butrather this wasbeing doneto counteractthework of overzealous bank examiners who had causeda creditcrunchbecauseof the pressurethey were putting on thebanks and thebanks didn't want to lend. And itwasn'tuntilverylatelastfall , actually , December , if memoryserves me correctly ,thattheFedactually begantolower rates. Now,this happened ,ofcourse ,after nearly every forecaster told us we wereinarecession . We now learnthat ,officially , thereces sionstarted in July. Ittookthe Fed from Julyto Decemberto begin lowering rates . And this raises a lotofquestions inmy mindabout whattheFed shouldhave been doing. Letme just putyoubacktoJanuary 1990andlet's saythatDr. Lawrence Lindsey wassitting ontheBoardoftheFedatthattime . Wouldyouhavebeenurging further and moreaggressive rate reductions during calendar 1990 ? Mr. LINDSEY.Senator , I do notknow what data would have been available tome as a GovernoroftheFederal Reserve Boardback then .Today ,we havetheadvantage ofhindsight . From hindsight , I believe thatmonetary growthwas tooslow , particularly during thelast three -quarters of1990 . I thinkthat , to someextent , thatslowmoney growthhas been rectified since January ofthis year .Therate hasbeenrectified . But, I can't - I don'tknow what I wouldhaveknown ifI were there .I really can't answerwhat I wouldhavebeenarguing . But,I do know fromhindsight thatI believe money growthwas tooslow last year . SenatorSASSER . Well, what would you be advising now with regardto interest rates ? Mr. LINDSEY . I thinkthat ,knowingwhat I know now,thatthe > votelast weekwasan appropriate one.I think itwasoneI would have cast. And I wouldwanttostudythedatathatwas before me, data from thebankingsystem , whichI'm not privyto now, and take thatintoconsideration beforemaking a definitive judgmenton that matter . Senator SASSER . Well , now, Dr.Lindsey , I'mnotan economist , butitbecameobvious tome atleast by themiddleoflast yearthat we had serious problems .And I, alongwithothers ,began admon 53 ishing Dr.Greenspanwhen he appeared before the BudgetCom mitteeand alsobeforethe Banking Committee that, in my view, the Fed was overly concerned aboutinflation , thatinflation was notthedanger tothis economy ,thatthedanger really wasinim minentandimpending economic slowdown . We wereunabletogettheFed's earatthattime.But,justtothe layman,and I'dcharacterize myselfas a laymanineconomic mat ters - perhaps knowledge a little superior totheaverage layman . I'd give myself that credit without hoping toappear immodest -but itwas apparent to usatthattimethattheeconomywasslowing down anditneededthestimulus oflowerrates . Now,this comesaroundtoyourphilosophy withregard tothe Fed and how you wouldviewyourjobthere ,viewyourrole . Do youthink thattheFedshould bejust solely reactive asithas been overthe pastfew years ? Or, isit your viewthattheFed oughttobe proactive ? ThattheFed,through itsmonetary policy , oughttobe attempting toleadthiseconomy ,toleaditon togreat ergrowthina noninflationary way? Mr.LINDSEY . Senator , I think itimportant thatwhenwe- when any policymaker makes a decision , thattheyhave theireyeson thefutureand tryto takeactions todayto achieve thefuture result thattheyviewdesirable . And,inthatsense ,ifit's proactive ,I thinkthattheyshould be proactive . Senator SASSER .But,inother words ,ifyouhadyourchoice be tweenjustsitting backand reacting towhat hasoccurred ,perhaps evenreacting 6 monthstoolate ,youwouldchoose tohavetheFed takea moreactive roleand tryto leadthiseconomythrough mon etarypolicy ? Mr.LINDSEY .IfI might ,asan example ,Senator ,we havea rela tionship between thelevel ofmoney- I'mgoing to pickM -2 asan example- and the levelof futureeconomicactivities 6 or 9 months hence. When youhavea target level ofactivity 6 or9 monthshence ,if youmakean assumption about the - thetechnical termisvelocity . Itmeanshow fast themoneyturns over . Youhavean idea ofwhat yourtarget level ofmoney stock should be today . So,inthatsense ,yes ,theFedshould belooking downtheroad 6 or 9 monthstothedesired level ofeconomic activity at thattime andsetting its monetary aggregates ,itspolicy toattain monetary aggregates todaytoeffect thatdesired result down the road. SenatorSASSER .And thatdesired result wouldbe enhancing eco nomic growth? Mr. LINDSEY .That desired result wouldbe maximum economic growthwithout accelerating inflation ,yes. Senator SASSER .Well ,Dr.Lindsey ,we havean areaofagreement there .Now ,letme move on toanother areawhereI thinkwe may havea disagreement . You're a prolific writer andyouwrote inoneofyourbooks ,andI quote it,that: Despite claims tothecontrary Mr. Chairman , I thinkI may be overrunning my timethere . That redlight's goneon. 54 The CHAIRMAN .Well ,thatmay be.Did youhavemorethanone additional question right now? Or did youwant toraise one more and thenwe'll go? We'vebeenkindofflexible duringthediscussion . Senator SASSER .There's somebodybeenwaiting here.I'mreally hesitant togo forward .It's Senator The CHAIRMAN.Fine.Let's go toSenator Mack. Senator Mack.I'dbehappytoyield on my time. I was not herewhen you first came, so letme welcomeyou beforethe committee . And I am alsovery interested in your re sponses . Let's justgo backto the lastpointthatSenatorSasser raised . And Iwouldmake thecommentinthebeginning thatIdon't think thattheFedcan servetwo masters .I mean, we'reallverycomfort ableusingthat phrase , “maximum growthwithprice stability ," you know.But,thebottomlineisthattheFed hastomake choices fromtimetotimebetweenthosetwoverylaudable goals . And therealquestion is , ifyouhad topickbetween those two, whatdoyou think theFed's role is ?Isitprice stability ? Or,isit ,in fact ,trying toproduce economic activity ? you'reaskingthekey ques Mack,I think . Senator Mr.LINDSEY thatI have learnedistheneed tion .I thinkthatone ofthe lessons objectives . tobalanceoftenconflicting I thinkthat,intheimmediate term , there may be thequestion ofthetradeoff betweeninflation and economic growth . I think thattheFedisuniquely abletopursue long -termobjec tives ,given its independence ,thelength oftenure ofthemembers . And I thinkthat , in thelongterm,therereally isno conflict be tweenprice stability andeconomic growth . In fact ,were we ableto reduce- SenatorMACK . Let me justhop in there . That'sunderthe as sumption that really theprimary objective isprice stability .Ithink implying that's whatyou're there . consistently overa longenough thepolicy IftheFed maintains , thatwe will the valueof the dollar periodof timeto maintain . underthosecircumstances growthopportunity have our greatest Mr.LINDSEY .We will haveourgreatest growth opportunity ,I be lieve ,ina period of- yes .Ithink yousaid itbetter thanIcould say it,Senator Senator Mack.Thenyouagree withthat ? ofmonetary -term objective Mr. LINDSEY . I thinkthatthelong there . Ithink thatthepathofgetting stability policy mustbeprice at minimum price stability one.We want toattain isa challenging run. costtotheeconomy,intheshort In thelongrun,we agreethatitistheobjective thatisbestfor theeconomy .And I thinkthata prudent ,sustained effort atgradu ally reducing therate ofinflation isthebest way.Itmustbe credi bletoconvincemarketsthattheFed means business . But,I believe italsomust be steady and gradual togivemarkets a chancetoadjust tothedeclining rateofinflation . But,yes,thatiscertainly --that's thetaskahead.That'sthetask ahead forthe Fed forthe decade. SenatorMack . Let me refocus thisin sayingI thinkwhat I wouldbe mostinterested inat thispoint ,and Ithinkitwouldbe 55 veryhelpful to thecommittee ,too, isto,giventhecomment that youwouldsupport orthatyouthink thattheFedmadetheright decision ,forexample,in loweringthe discountrateto 5.5percent , what kindofdatawillyoube most inclined totakea lookat? Willyoube looking at theactivities within oureconomyinthe senseofproduction and thosekindsof- or willyou be looking to themonetaryaggregates ,asthey're sometimes referred to? Which ofthosetwo areasareyou mostinclined to lookfor , for information ? Mr. LINDSEY .Senator ,thebigproblem withdataissomedata's goodforsome things and some's goodforotherthings .And letme pick- Senator MACK.You soundjust like oneoftheeconomics profes sorsthatI had attheUniversity ofFlorida . goodorbad. know ifthat's Mr.LINDSEY .Idon't SenatorMack .Well,it's an indication thatyou allhavea tend encytousethesame kindoflanguage . Mr. LINDSEY. Iguesswe do. The level of nominalGNP isprobably the one single variable that the Federal Reserve can affectthe most . Senator Mack .Didyou say“canaffect themost?” Mr. LINDSEY .Can affect themost. The problemiswe getit12timesa year.And 8 ofthetimesare revisions oftheother4 times . So it's not thatgreata continuing pieceofdata. The monetary aggregates whichyoumentioned ,M -2,we getona weeklybasis .They're a pretty goodforecaster ofwheretheecono my isgoingdowntheroad .They're notperfect though .That's the problem. So I thinkthatyou haveto lookat nominalGNP as your ulti matetarget ,themonetary aggregates asa confirming numberthat you getmore frequently . And thenI thinkyou should alsobe sensi tive to conditions in markets ,commodityprices , theyield curve , thewholearray ofdatathatthemarkets aretelling youwhether you're doinga goodjobornot. So Iwould say thatallofwhat you mention , nominalGNP is yourultimate objective , moneyasan intermediate termobjective , withtheseothermarketsignals telling you thumbsup or thumbs down alongtheway. Senator Mack .In thedebate thattookplaceintheFed,I think , inNovember-December1989 ,therewas an attemptby theFed to bringshort -term interest ratesdown.And,again ,therewas some dissension . I thinkWayne Angelwas theone thatvoiced hiscon cernaboutthedirection theFed was taking , by arguing thatthe markets wouldreact to youraction as being inflationary . Long term interest rateswillgo up. And that' s exactlywhat happened. What makesyoulookatthesituation now,forexample ,withthe mostrecent decline inthediscount rateand saying fromwhatyou can see — notnecessarily what theFed islooking at,butwhat you canseethatthat's notinflationary ? Mr. LINDSEY .Long-terminterest rates didnotrespondthistime theway theydidthen .Therewas also — we wereata position in thecommoditymarketsand intheforeign exchangemarketsthat 56 indicated a lotmore confidence inan anti -inflationary stance .That was true now and was not true before. And soI thinktheyield curve ,commodity markets andforeign exchange marketwouldbethethree things Iwouldpoint toinsup portofthe Fed'srecentaction . Senator Mack .Thank you,Mr.Chairman . The CHAIRMAN. Thankyou,Senator Mack. I'mnextinthequeuehere.But,Senator Sasser ,didyou want to pursuea question now? And I'dbe happytoyield my timetoyou, and thengo after you intheorderon theDemocratic side . Senator SASSER .Justonequestion ,ifI may,Mr.Chairman . Ihad notedthatDr.Lindsey isa prolific writer and he's just published a new book , a few monthsago, ifI'm not mistaken , or maybeevenmorerecently thanthat ,dealing withtheeconomic matters and taxpolicy asI recall inthedecadeofthe1980's . And,Dr.Lindsey ,you wroteinthatbook,and I quote : Despite claims tothecontrary ,theReagantaxcuts contributed onlytrivially to theboomingdeficits ofthe1980's . Now ,I findthattobe a veryinteresting statement because , ac cording tothe Office of Managementand Budget , andthiswas thenPresident Reagan's own Office ofManagementandBudget , the1981taxcutoccasioned a revenue loss ofapproximately $1.4 billion . Now,by theendof this year ,this revenue hemorrhage isgoing tobe approaching $2 trillion . Imay havesaid$1.4billion whenI meant tosay $1.4trillion a moment ago. But,when you lookattheincreasing budgetdeficits inthe1980's and theexplosion ,virtual explosion thatoccurred in thenational debt ,a $2 trillion increase intheReagan -Bushyears alone ,when you contrast thatwiththefactthatit took us almost200yearsto build up an indebtedness of$950billion ,roughly ,I don't seehow youcanignore thisrevenue loss ,or saythatitcontributed only trivially to thebudgetdeficits . Itappears tome the biggest taxcutinhistory ,and we endedup withthebiggest deficits in history . And I seemy friend , the distinguished Senator from New Mexico, has arrivedhere on the committeeand I remember when hewaschairman oftheSenate Budget Committee andwasstriving manfullywith then MajorityLeader Dole to tryto findsome way tostopthisrevenue hemorrhage and tostoptheexplosion thatwas taking place inthedeficit . Now ,how do you explain thefactthatthistaxcutdidnot con tribute significantly tothis explosion inthedeficit ? Mr.LINDSEY .Senator ,themethodology I usedinmy bookwasto akethe1980fiscal policy , President Carter's last fiscal policy ,asa baseand comparewhathappened during the1980's compared to Carter fiscal policy asa basis . The basis forcomparison was asa share of GNP . I took the- Senator SASSER.The defi citas a share of GNP ? Mr. LINDSEY . That'sright . The tax, I brokeitdown intotax share ,domesticspending , defensespending and interest .I charted— 57 Senator SASSER .Allasa percent ofGNP ? Mr.LINDSEY .Allasapercent ofGNP . Let me explain briefly why I thoughtitimportant to do that . The numberwhichyoucorrectly cited wouldbe therevenue loss had we maintained 1980taxrates inplace . Now,ifthatwerethecase ,it's important tokeepinmindthat a marriedcouple witha taxable incomeof$45,600 would be inthe 49-percent marginal taxrate bracket . Thatsingle individuals earn ingbelow- Senator SASSER .Well ,letme stopyouthere , Dr.Lindsey . Will you agreethat , ifwe had keptthetaxpolicy inplace ,thatwas in place in 1990 ,wouldyou agreewiththosewho saythatwe would now berunning a budget surplus ? Mr. LINDSEY . I thinkthatthatwouldbe a difficult question to answer. I wouldhave to lookverycarefully at thenumbers . My suspicion wouldbe thatitwouldhavebeenverydifficult tohave had thekindofeconomic expansion thatwe had duringthe1980's when the American middle classhad to share half theiradditional income at themargin with youthereandsay Senator .Well, ifI couldjustinterrupt SASSER so thesedaysand has beenrepeated . It's becomefashionable this wisdomthatwe had becomingsortofconventional much thatit's ofthecoun inthehistory recovery economic thelongest sustained . tryduring the1980's That's notaccurate ,as Iexpect youknowfromyourstudy ofeco nomics . There havebeen longersustained periods of economic growththantheoneinthe1980's . But,we went throughthemostserious recession ,indeed ,depres sioninthiscountry ,in1981and 1982since theGreatDepression of the1930's . And thatoccurred after this taxcutwentintoplace . Mr.LINDSEY .I'mnotsurewhatyourquestion is , Senator . IfI could— the question about the levels of taxescontributing to the- SenatorSASSER . Well, that's the thrust of the question , so go aheadandtrytoanswerthat . Mr. LINDSEY . What I didwas,again , tookthe1980fiscal policy of PresidentCarter as the base. Senato r SASSER.Right. Mr. LINDSEY .Comparedwhat actually happenedtothetaxshare ofGNP ,tothespending shares ofGNP ,andtookthose differences betweentheCarterlevel and what actually happened , and added them up.And theresult was thatabout20percentoftheincrease in the deficit could be attributedto the taxes. The vastbulkwas attributable totherise inthedefense shareof GNP during the1980's . Senator SASSER . Now ,butyou're talking intermsofthedeficit as percentage ofGNP .And you're talking intermsoftaxesaspercent of GNP . Well, now, taxes , as percent of GNP , when you takeFederal , State ,and local taxes ,really ,havetheychangedappreciably over thepastdecade? Mr. LINDSEY.We are Senator SASSER . In other words ,aswe cutFederal taxes ,local and Statetaxeshave gone up? 58 Mr. LINDSEY .I'mmostfamiliar withtheFederal numbers ,which iswhatI useformy book . Today ,Federal taxesareroughly the samepercentage ofGNP astheywerein1980. Theymay be a few tenths ofa percent one way ortheother .But,essentially ,theyare thesame percent ofGNP todayas theywerein1980 . Senator SASSER .And thisisafter we havebeenaddingbackaddi tional revenuesto fill in the voidthatwas leftby the 1981tax cut. In otherwords, ifwe'dleft the 1981tax cutwhere itwas, it wouldhavebeenas a percent ofGNP , thetaxes in 1990would have been lower Mr.LINDSEY .Yes,that's correct . Senator SASSER [continuing ].Thantheywerein1980 . Mr. LINDSEY.Yes . Senator SASSER .Well,my time's up again ,Mr.Chairman . The CHAIRMAN.Thank you,Senator Sasser . SenatorDomenici. Senator DOMENICI .Thank you verymuch,Mr.Chairman . And I wantedtosaytoyou thatI know,Mr. Chairman ,I know you'regenuinely interested in some issues beyondtoday . And I wanted to saytoyouthatI thinkfrommy standpoint on your banking reform and BIF and thoseissues , that I haven'thad a chance to tell you,but I thinkI willhavea little more timeand lookforwardtoworkingwith you and SenatorGarn. I thinkwe oughttoreally do something inthatreformarea .And I want tobe partofitfortheremainder of theyear. Thank you,Mr.Chairman . Mr.Lindsey , let me askyou.You obviously area very ,ashistory ofthis office goes ,you're veryyoungtobeappointed totheFederal Reserve Board ,which ,soyoudon't misunderstand , isveryexciting to me . I'm gladwe didn't appoint one oftheBoardofGovernors fromoutthere inoneoftheregional Fed offices . And I'mglad we pickedsomebodylike you. But,letme askyouwhy do you wantthisjob? Mr. LINDSEY . Senator ,I havealways liked jobsthatpresent a challenge .And,atthemoment,I can't thinkofanymore challeng ingposition thatI would be considered for . The Board of Governorsmust make difficult decisions in the shorttermaboutthebusiness cycle ,tryand getus on theroadto recovery . As one of the leading financial regulatory institutions , it's gota numberofverydifficult challenges aheadofit . And I think , inthelongterm,we havean opportunity togradu allyreduce therateofinflation inthiscountry , toreturn thecoun trytoa period ofprice stability andsubstantially lower interest rates. And thosearethreetoughchallenges .And I'vealwayslikedto riseto a challenge . Senator DOMENICI . So,without makingyourjobtoobig,do you conclude , basedupon your knowledge of theFederal Reserve's power,that ,asan independent agency ,ithasas much or more to say aboutthe future of the Americaneconomyand growthand prosperity as any institution around? Mr. LINDSEY .I thinkthatit's toughto saythatone institution hasasmuch ormore power.What I wouldsayisthattheFed isin theposition toprovide liquidity oftheeconomy .The Fed isableto 59 influence through monetary policy thelevel ofnominal GNP inthe economy. But,theFedisalsoquite limited withregard totaxand regula torymatters , budgetpolicy . Italsohasa very , veryimportant effect ,anda fargreater effect onthelevel ofreal economic growth . role ,an important a necessary that theBoardplays SoI think .Theyallhave any oneoftheplayers dowithout role ,butitcan't than veryhardtosayoneismoreimportant .So it's tobe involved the other. Senator DOMENICI .I don't thinkI saidthat .Ijust said you're a veryimportant Mr. LINDSEY. Very challengi ng,yes. Senator DOMENICI (continuing ).Institutional player inAmerica's prosperity and futuregrowth. Letme askyou.I didn't readyourbookand I surely don't want my good friend , the chairmanof the BudgetCommittee , to at tribute tome concerns thatI may or may nothave. Let me just suggest I don't know thatI was overly concerned abouttaxcutsas I was aboutwhetherornotwe weregoingtospendtoomuch. I foundatonepoint thatitwasmore difficult togetspending cutsthanitwastorecommend sometaxincreases atonepoint .I can't believe thatthat's theway things oughttobe,butI didfind thattwice inmy 8-or9-yeartenure asonewho was movingthe BudgetCommittee inoneway oranother and,thus ,theSenate . But,let me askyouthis .We hada bigrecession attheendofthe Carteradministration yearsofRonaldReagan intheearly . ession ? yzedthatrec Have you everanal And,ifyou have , haveyou concluded thatwhether or notthe Federal Reserve Board's policies had a lottodowiththelength and depthofthatrecession ornot? played an impor .I haveno doubtthatFed policies Mr.LINDSEY wasmadeinboththelegislative .Ithink thata decision tantrole branchesand alsothe FederalReservethatwe could and executive the ofinflation ,veryhighrates thevery totolerate notcontinue . inthelateseventies was experiencing country And so a decision was made toend thatinflation . ratecame aboutvery, in the inflation I thinkthatthereduction . expected towhatmostpeople ,relative ,veryquickly verysuddenly in a inflation to 4-percent digit inflation We wentfromdouble quickreduc ,whichwas a remarkably period ofabout18months rate. tionintheinflation You werequite right inthatthatwasa verypainful transition . But, I don'tknow if I would necessarily criticize the dilemma decision makersbackthen.Itwas necessary facing togetthe rateof inflation down,andIthink theydidsoexpeditiously andrelatively efficiently . Senator DOMENICI .Yes.Ididn't necessarily askyoutocriticize .I merelyaskedyou tomake an observation astowhetherornotthe institution youseektojoinwas a significant player inthelength and depthofthe recession . Mr. LINDSEY.Absol utely. Senato -onquest .And Imightaskasa follow r DOMEN ICI ion: What'sthemostimportant orsignificant problemthatwe facein economic growth theUnitedStates withregard tosustained ? 60 Mr. LINDSEY .I thinkourNo.1 challenge probably isourNation's educational system . Making surethatour workerscan compete withthosearoundthe world. Ithink reducing theburden ofFederal Government onthecredit marketsisalsoquite important . I wouldrankthosecertainly asoneand two. SenatorDOMENICI . Well, then, ifthosearethe kindsofthings thataregoing tocause ustohaveless sustained economic prosperi tyand less sustained growththanwe should otherwise have,letme way: putitanother What isthesymptomthatwillreflect itself inthiseconomythat willshow we'renot doingas wellas we couldand we coulddo better ifwe didbetter inthese areas you're speaking of? Isitinflation ? Isitlackofproductivities ? What isit? Mr.LINDSEY .Well ,I thinkthatwe do facea productivity chal lenge , notin absolute senserelative to our past , butin thesense thatother nations aremovingquite aggressively . And I think that problem we musttackle thatproductivity ,yes. Senator DOMENICI .Mr. Lindsey , there aresomeintheFederal ReserveSystem - I don'tknow allofthosethatyou wouldjoinif you getconfirmed , but certainly I'vereadwhat some ofthem out in the hinterlands say in thevariousFederalReserveRegional Boards . Itseemsto me theyareoverwhelmingly on thesideofbeing much liketheWest Germans.They almost have a total fearofin flation .Theywrite aboutit .Theytalkaboutit .Anything youall do up herethatdoesn't actinthedirection ofgetting inflation down tozero , you're harmingtheAmericaneconomy .In fact ,I thinksomeofthem wouldlike negative inflation . And I haven't seenthator heardhow itworked,but So,letme askyou,itseemstome theFederal Reserve Boardis reacting cyclically toinflation and responds almost overwhelmingly totherateofinflation as a precursor toactivities on their partto loosen money supply and lessen thecostofmoney. Do youagree thatthatistheprincipal basis foraction inthe pastand what willyou baseyourson? Mr.LINDSEY .On thesecond partofyourquestion ,I do notbe lieve thatthefocus on inflation iswhereprimaryemphasis should be. I think thattheprimary emphasis should beon the rateof nominal GNP growth .Ithink thatiswhattheFedisable toaffect most directly . I think ,intheintermediate term,it's important tofocus on rates ofgrowth ofmonetary aggregates .But, I also think it's important tolookat theperformance ofmarketconditions ,thefactthatwe concern haveslack ,we haveunemployment ,isofgreat . Therearea wholerangeofissues thatare important tobalance . Inflation Ithinkwill bejustoneofthoseconcerns . Senator DOMENICI .Frankly , I want you toknow thatI consider thatanswertobe one ofthemost important inmy judging , my po sition withreference toyourconfirmation . So, letme ask a foll ow-on question . 61 I have heard the Chairman of the Federal Reserve discussAmer ica's future sustained growthand what he perceives tobe thekind of sustained growththatwe canhavewithout inflation ,whichI am not suggesting thatyou should notbe concerned aboutinflation as itapplies tosustained growth . But, tell us how youasan expert ineconomics viewAmerica's sustained growthandtheimpactforsustained growth oninflation and aretheresome limiting aspectsto Americatodaywithrefer encetosustained GNP growth thatishealthy thatyoumightfeel strongly about . Mr. LINDSEY. Withregard towhattheFederal Reserve caninflu ence,Idobelieve that ,inthelongrun,ifwe areable togradually reducetherate ofinflation , attain something resembling price sta bility - andletme define thataswhereinflation doesnotenteras a concern inbusiness decisions —we will seea decline inthelong term costoffunds , particularly ofequity capital toAmericanbusi ness . I think that wouldmake a verypositive contribution toourrate of realeconomicgrowth. So,Iwouldsaythat ,inthecontext ofwhatthechairman -what you saythechairmanissaying - inthe longrun, thereisno con flict betweenprice stability and realeconomic growth . Becauseof interactions withourtaxsystem , bringing downinflation will help lowerthecostofcapital toAmericanbusiness . SenatorDOMENICI . Mr. Chairman , wheneveryou thinkI should be through The CHAIRMAN . Yes. I want to go anotherroundhere in a minute .Why don't youdo onemore and thenwe'll- Senator DOMENICI . And I'll stayaroundfora second round .I don't wanttouseup yourtime . The CHAIRMAN .Good. Senator DOMENICI . Letme putthis question , this point , another way.And I wanttocomebacktothecost ofcapital shortly , on my second round. growth -population demographically But,isthere a relationship tosustain eco and ourability and thelike- intheUnitedStates nomic growthornot? Mr. LINDSEY .Thereisno question thatdemographics playan im portant role .Ithink ,during the 1990's ,wehavean opportunity for themtoplaya positive role ,particularly in real wages , since the baby-my generation , thebabyboomers ,arecomingintoourmost productive years ,it's important thatthecountry notsquander that opportunity . But,demographics areonly oneofthemanyfactors that affect economic growth . The rateofcapital formation , therateoftechno logical progress arealsoveryimportant . Senator DOMENICI . Mr.Chairman , I'dyield atthispoint . And, thank you forthe time. And ifyou have a secondround, I'll wait. TheCHAIRMAN .Oh,yes ,we will because we're notgoing tohurry this . Thisisan important confirmation hearing and we'veresched uledittoaccommodate members . And sowe're going totakeaslongaswe need .And I'mveryin terested you'reasking in thequestions . Thereareseveral things thatI wanttocoveratthis point . 46-442 0 - 91 - 3 62 Where didyouvotein1988 ? Mr. LINDSEY.I voted in Massachusetts. The CHAIRMAN.And was therean election in 1990in Virginia ? Warner,forexample , was Mr.LINDSEY . Yes,therewas.Senator . on the ballot The CHAIRMAN .And wheredidyouvotein1990 ? Didyouvotein Virginia ? Mr. LINDSEY .I votedinVirginia . TheCHAIRMAN .Soyou changed yourvoting registration some time then between 1988 and 1990? Mr.LINDSEY .I changed itveryshortly after movingtoVirginia . TheCHAIRMAN .Allright . Isityourintention -andI don't want youtohedgeon me here.I wantyoutogiveme thefull answer . Notthat youwouldn't ,butIwanttoemphasize thefact . Thisisa 9-yearterm . Isityourintention toserve thefull 9 years? Mr. LINDSEY .Yes, Senator , as longasI feel I'mmakinga contri > bution , I willbe a member of theFederal ReserveBoard, to the year 2000. The CHAIRMAN .Yes,Iknow ,but Idon' t want any Mr.LINDSEY.Yes,it 'smy intenti ontoservethefu ll9 year s. The CHAIRMAN .OK .I mean,youdon't really foresee exhausting yourinterest overthe9 years ,Itakeit ,inthatassignment ? Mr. LINDSEY.That'scorr ect. The CHAIRMAN. Now, I want togo backtoan examplethatyou ofthe about theeffect Sasser . You weretalking usedwithSenator the downduring in1981andwereinplace thattookplace taxcuts fora incomelevel to a taxable 1980's . And I thinkyou referred like wassomething , I thinkthefigure .IfI heardyouright couple $46,900 . Isthatright ?Or,whatwas thenumber? Mr. LINDSEY . Thatcould be a guess . I thought I said$45,600 . But The CHAIRMAN .Well ,youprobably did .Forty -five thousand six hundreddollars . And thatwas the taxable incomefigure fora family oftwo? Mr. LINDSEY.A married couple. The CHAIRMAN.Americancoupleand Mr.LINDSEY.Marri ed coup le. The CHAI RMAN .Wh at year ? Mr.LINDSEY .Thatwouldbe anytimeup to1980. Well ,thelast yearwould be in 1980. The CHAIRMAN. 1980. Allright . Well,let's take1980 . Now ,letme tell you what troubles me .Giveme yourbestprofes sional estimate astowhatpercent oftheAmerican people in1980 couples wouldhavehad taxable incomeof$45,600 ormore? Mr. LINDSEY .Marriedcouples ? I wouldsaythenumberwouldbe 20 percent . TheCHAIRMAN .I think that's high .You may beright andImay be wrong. My guesswouldbe that , ifyou go backto 1980 ,I think themedianincomeinthecountry fora family at thattime-not justa coupleoftwo- was probably around$20,000 ,or close toit . 63 My guesswouldbe thatfortaxable incomesfora couple , $45,600 isprobably inthetop15percent ,maybehigher thanthat .But,you say 20 percent . Let'ssayitis20percent . If20 percent atthatlevel arehigher , then 80 percent are beneath thatlevel ,aretheynot? Mr. LINDSEY. Yes . The CHAIRMAN . I guess I'mtroubled by examples thatarede signed to make a point thatIthinkhavea loadofideology in them . I mean,a pointofviewthatismore concerned withexam plesthattalkabout20 percent ofthepopulation andnot80 per cent ofthepopulation . And I guess my concern wouldbe that , when an example like that isused , I thinkitreally tilts theanalysis offitsaxis .I don't sayit's anelitist illustration ,butIthink it's adistorted illustration interms ofwhat life islike formostpeople inthecountry . And that's why I thinkthereare an awfullotoffrustrated peopleinthecountry who don't evenin 1991earn$45,600 and neverwillintheir lifetimes , andthey're probably sick todeathof taxpolicies that areaimedatsomebody else other thanthemselves . Theproblem istaxes havegoneup quite substantially inthelast several years , partly because Social Security taxes havegoneup, apart fromtheincometaxchanges .And,ofcourse ,we've beentap pingtheSocial Security reserves topayforthegeneral cost ofGov ernment ,asI'msureyou know. I askedSenator Moynihanon thefloor theotherday: How much moneyfrom the Social Security reserves had been transferred outandtakenoverandspent onthegeneral operations ofGovernment. And thefigure thathe gaveIthinkwas $260billion$240to$260 billion .Itwas inthatrange . An awful lotofmoney: ButI think it's a little bit ofa shell gamethat's beengoing on withwho paystaxes , atwhatmarginal ratesandwhat's itreally done totheeconomy? And we're still left withthese yawning deficits thatI think fly directly intheface oftheanalysis that's inyourbook ,andwhich I think youessentially holdtotoday .Youmay makesome adjust mentsintheway youpresent it ,and I've listened andIappreciate thecourtesy and inthe fashion inwhichyou putyouranswers . But, I haven't heardanything yetthatreally cutsagainst what you'vepresented inthebookasa viewofthe1980's .And I'mtrou bledabout that view ,quite frankly ,because Ithink it's off -base . Iwanttohave you look attwocharts .Wouldsomeonetakethese two charts down? Ireferred toone ofthesebefore . Thisislooking atdecade longperiods . ThisisGovernment data ,they're fromthe Department ofCommerce ,sothey're national income statistics . And on theone,itshowsnetbusiness investment asa percent of net national product . And itshows business investment falling sharply inthe1980's inrelationship towhatithadbeenineachof thethree decades leading up tothe1980's . Now,when I say“fall ingsharply ," whatI meanisbeingcutby 40 percent . I mean,a verysubstantial percentage reduction . Then, ifyou taketheotherchart ,consumption expenditures asa percent ofnet national product overthesamedecades , whatyou find isthat consumption jumpedup quite substantially . 64 And so,youknow, again ,I studied someeconomics attheHar vardBusiness School andother places andfromwhatI remember ofwhat I studied , in applying ittothis , itlookstome as ifwhat happened isthattheway we reconfigured ourpolicies ,we ended up withmoreconsumption andless investment and we're paying forittoday . And I justdon'twant thenotions thatdrovethosekindsof im balances and thattilted us offouraxis and I thinkhavegivenus bad results . I thinkthatdebtornationstatuschartoverthere is nota badgeofhonorintermsofhow we performed inthelast sev eral years withrespect tobeing able tocompete inthis internation aleconomy . I don't thinktheFederal budgetdeficits asthey've accrued area badge ofhonoreither .And I'mterribly troubled about those . . inoureconomyisa realproblem Ithinktheunderinvestment distribution ,although inincome And Ithink someoftheinequities extent right now,I to getoffonthattoanygreat I'mnotgoing here . problem think areanother But,itseemstome that , you know,I guessI wouldfeelthat therehas to be some effort made to reconcile thesetrendlinesin this datainlight ofallofthesupply side ,ifI may inallduere spect sayso,sophistry that we heard downduring the1980's . You know, it's notjust therecession andwhat's happening with theunemployment levels , it's these longer termunderlying trend lines theyareactually in some respects more disturbing because youassumethatyou'll getsomeimprovement coming outofa re cession hereatsomepoint , atleast God hopethatwe will . letyourespond pointhere,andthen I'll I wanttomake another always ad we haven't , I think thatI'mmaking tothetwopoints we probably requirements ,although regional strictly tothese hered it's im fora reason . I think there I thinkthey're should because ofthecountry parts togetthepeoplefromthedifferent portant views . regional those different reflecting Ithinkattributing youassomeone fromtheRichmond District is really essentially a circumvention .One cansaythathaving started tovoteinVirginia in1990andowning a house there nowputsyou 3 2 & 2 2 I inthatregion .But I don't thinkthat's what thelawintended . I thinkitwas designed togetpeople who had somelongand deep knowledge inthedifferent regions ofthecountry tocomeon theFederal Reserve Boardandtoreflect thedifferent geographic understandings andrealities ,andsoforth . Now, whether it's a serious enoughmatter inand ofitself to 4 N bearinyoursuitability toserveI thinkisa question thatmembers have toweighforthemselves . But,IguesswhatI'mmoreactually concerned aboutinthatarea isthequestion of your experience . You're obviously a verygood scholar anda person witha veryheavyacademic and policy adviso ry background in Government . You obviously haveenjoyed the confidence ofthepeople who've asked youtodo that .And I think that's a tribute toyou. I thinkthoseareveryimportant partsof your résumé . And I admirethosethings . I thinkthosearevery soliditems to have on a résumé . I'mnotsure that , quite frankly , thatiswhatshould constitute thebackground ofsomebody todaygoingon theFederal Reserve 1 ( 1 8 65 an engaging todayand you're . And we'venevermet before Board ofthat . and I'mveryrespectful person andthoughtful omicand fi tryisinecon nkthecoun ernisI thi I guessmy conc y need somevery heavy nk we reall ulty ialdiffic , and I thi nanc e inall ectiv of the key ceandknow-how andpersp erien weightexp ncialpolicy areas. I thinkwe need thaton the omicand fina econ Fed. It's noteasytogetgoodpeople toserve inGovernment , butI thinkit's veryimportant what goesintomonetarypolicy decisions , how practical istheinsight ,how seasoned isit ,how deepistheex perience basethatsomebody isdrawing on,andquite frankly , to havesomeone with a strongly heldphilosophy , whatever ithap penstobe. Whetheritagrees withmine or yoursor somebody else's issomething I putquite fardownthelist ofreally highly rel . evant qualifications . You'reway abovetheintelligence minimum thatwe wouldneed because you're obviously an extremely thoughtful individual . The questio n here is : What'stheexperie ncebase? What's the know -how ? What'stheper spect ive ? What's thevantage poin t thatone brin gs? An d I would hope to getin the timewe have lef t, in termsof whatyoumigh t wanttosay inresp onsetowhat I'v ejus t sai d and to fur Domenici mightask or oth , therque stion t Senator ers s tha moreofa senseof thedepthof persp ectiv t andknow e andinsigh how thatyou bringwithrespe ctto how thiseconomyworks. That's why I asked , who youcall inthemanufacturing sector . calling I'msurethere will bea lotofpeople you,assuming you're confirmed forthisseat . I'm lessinterested in thatthanwho you call andwhereyougetyourinformation andhowbroad itisand how deepitis. I mean,obviously ,ifyouhadhadsomebusiness background ,you know,thenthatautomatically carries withita certain kindofa preparation and qualification ; that's notherein thiscase .So I'm interested inwhatreally constitutes thebaseofexperience upon which you draw. I wantedto be veryfrankin telling you what someofthethings arethatareinmy mind,andI'dbehappyto haveyou respond tothat . . .Thank you,Senator Mr.LINDSEY I think ,with regard tothe 1980's ,there's a question ofviewing theglass ashalf full orhalf empty .And there's many verycompli catedquestions involved withthedata . Thestatistics you present areofcourse quite right .Theonecon cernonemighthave islooking atthetrends .Oneofthereasons ,or thereason ,thatwe saw theresults inthischartwas theveryhigh rateofdepreciation duringthe1980's .Grossdomestic investment . The share , ourGNP ,we weredevoting toactually setting aside as itcameoffthe- asitwasproduced - seta record in1986. Because cia 'sbehindthedepre edquest ion licat :What A very ,verycomp ofveryhighdepreciation ,we had a lownetnumber. tion data ? So, again , I thinkthatreasonable individuals can lookat the same dataand say: 66 Istheglass halffull orisithalfempty? Senator ,withregard to- I'm36years old . The CHAIRMAN. I understand . Mr.LINDSEY .Ihavebeenvery privileged inmy current position as Special Assistant tothePresident forPolicy Development to meetwithmany individuals ,depending on theissue involved . Ihavemetwith CEO's ,withplenty ofvice presidents forGovern mentrelations , withregard totheproblems thattheyseeinthe economy .It's aregular part ofmy job . llfor ssesisI have a lousyreca se one of my weakne I suppo t. veoff iceas a resul neverrun for electi names.And I guessI'll .I think ous cont acts allthe time withpeople But,I havetremend rtantpart b. sanimpo ofmy jo that' One criticism of the FederalReservewhich I'm not sure ifit's true ,butI've certainly heard ,istheysitina marblepalace on Con stitution Avenue and don'thave contact . Letme assure you, Senator , thatthatisnothow I wouldview my jobasGovernor .I havealways felt thatoneisbestwhenone seeksa variety ofviews , when oneseeksoutindividuals through outthecountry , listens towhat theyreally havetosayand, hope fully , asa Governor , oneofmy responsibilities will betotravel aroundthe country to allthe FederalReserveDistricts to see what's happening ontheground tobusiness conditions there . . there TheCHAIRMAN.Well,letme juststopyouright right now? problems areoureconomic How serious You're taking a lotoftemperature readings , and soforth . Soam I.Iwouldlike tocompare whatI'mhearing withwhatyou're hear ing. How serious areoureconomic problems atthemoment? Mr. LINDSEY . Thereisa shortrun issue and a longrunissue .The shortrun issue iswithregardto thecurrent stage of thebusiness cycle . It's veryhardtotell whetherwe arenow on theway outof therecession ,or whether that will bea quarter orsohence . We'vegotsomeverymixedsignals recently . Certain industries , particularly theauto industry , isinvery , verydifficult shape .I think ,inpart , thathastodo withcredit marketconditions . . Again , shape , verydifficult isinvery Commercial realestate . marketconditions tocredit attributable largely that's regulatory andequitable When I spokeoftheneedforconsistent . inmind inparticular twomarkets ,Ihadthose standards On the other hand , ourexport sector seemstobe doingquite improvement well .We havehadremarkable inmanufacturing pro ductivity during thelast 10years .Infact ,totherate that's compa rable tomanufacturing productivity growth inJapan ,andabout3 timesthatinEurope. So, I think ,insomesectors ,themanufacturing outside ofautos , we'redoingreasonably well . In theshortrun,therefore , thepicture , I thinkisa mixedone. Inthelonger run,Ithink we havelongrun problems asa Nation . Ishare yourconcern about thesaving rate .There's noquestion we needtogetthatup.We needtoimprove theeducation ofourchil dren as well. Thosearelongrun factors .TheFederal Reserve's ability towork inthelongrun isprimarily oneofmovingthecountry gradually 67 towardprice stability . With price stability ,therealafter -taxcostof equity capital willfall . That will be oneofthebestthings thatwe coulddo forAmerican business . So,asa Federal Reserve Governor dealing withthelong runproblem ,Ithink thatwe dohavetopursue a consistent policy ofreducingthe rateof inflation The CHAIRMAN.Well,letme Mr. LINDSE Y [con tinui ng).Inachievi ngpric estabilit y. The CHAIRMAN . Earlier youseemedtoputa lesser weighton in flation fighting totheextent thata couple ofreporters brokea chairtogetthaton thewire . Thathappenswhen you areon the Federal Reserve Board , youcancreate thissuddenexodus ofre porters thatrun forthephone. But,while tomy earyouseemedtobeputting a lower premium on inflation perseearlier ,I thought Ijust heardyouputa higher premiumon itnow. to ,I thinkitisimportant . Iftherewas a question Mr. LINDSEY differentiate betweentheshortrun and thelongrun. I think there isnoquestion that thesingle long runobjective of theFed throughout this decade , throughout therest ofmy term will betogradually reduce therate ofinflation .Thatissomething we candointhelongrun. Thediscussion Iwashaving atthemoment,andI'msorry ,which Senator was itwith ? The CHAIRMAN .Itmay havebeenSenator Domenici orSenator Mack . Mr. LINDSEY . Ithad to do with whetherthereshouldbe an exclu sivefocus on inflation and makingshortrun policy decisions .And thereI do notbelieve thereshould be.I believe inthe shortrun it isimportant to strike a balance between theneedforeconomic growth ,theneedformaintaining lowunemployment ,andconcerns about inflation . That's why I am a believer thattheapproach toreducing infla tionmust be a gradual one,whichwilltakemostoftherestofthe decadetoaccomplish . The CHAIRMAN . SenatorDomenici. Senator DOMENICI .Letme talkaboutthata little bit . Itseemstome thatessentially theway youwill getinflation undercontrol ina society ,an economic systemlikeAmerica's , isto increase productivity ata sustained rateand across theboardif possible . Now,frankly ,oneofthemisunderstandings ofthedecade ofthe 1980's , after you gotoutoftherecession ,isthatmanufacturing productivity intheUnitedStates ,which inthedecadeofthe1970's was deplorable , cametotheforefront andbecamevery ,veryposi tive. Now itmay bethat itissucha challenging field thatwe may havetobe atitallthetime.Frankly ,theJapanese don't beatusin technology applications andscience breakthroughs assomepeople think . Theyliterally beatus intheapplication ofmanufacturing theproducts and bringing theproducts tomarket . Not brandnew ones, but onesthatareneeded. So itseemstome thatintheUnitedStates ,thosewho areinter estedin getting inflation undercontrol have to be equally con 68 cerned abouthow do you increase productivity and whatareits components . Soletme just askyouifI am correct ,we areverygoodatmeas uring productivity inthemanufacturing oftheUnited States .But contrary to public opinion , and an average kindof talkabout America's economywherewe saylet's go lookattheFordplant andifitisworking wellwe areincreasing ourproductivity ,70per centofAmerica's GNP isnotmanufacturing . IfI am right , only30 percent is.So70 percent somewhere else .And a lotofthat70per centisin realservice -oriented activities and then a bunch of itis ina sortofhybrid , wherewe don't quite know wheretoputityet, ifI readwhatpeople like youwrite . Butlet's takewhereare we today andtrytomeasure productivi tyofthatservice sector . Itseemstome we'reinbadshape . We don'tknow how to do it. Mr. LINDSEY . Senator , you're absolutely right . ChairmanBoskin setpriorities forimproved datameasurement andoneof thelead ingoneswas getting atjusttheissues thatyou aretalking about . A lotofthewaysthatwe measure productivity now intheserv ice sector areawfulandwe havetofinda better way ofdoingit andimproved datacollection isoneofthewaysofdoing that . And Ithink thechairman isposing a series ofverycost effective statistical improvements fortheFederal dataestablishment . SenatorDOMENICI . Do you know whetherthe FederalReserve Boardhassome way oftrying tomeasureoverall productivity that includes their own special way ofmeasuring service sector produc tivity increases ? . They working atit . I know theyareconstantly Mr.LINDSEY thattheyareconstantly andI think there havea verygoodstaff looking . atchallenges As faras specifics , I don'tknow. But thatwouldcertainly be a fruitful areaforresearch at the Fed. Senator DOMENICI . Letme justtakeoneservice sector activity . Therearereally two giants thatarepublic innaturethatI know. One iseducation andone ishealthcare . And I assumethatthey arebothkindofin themonstrous category among themyriadof service activities . younot belie t,or do youbelie vethat theeverincreas vetha ingcostofhealth care isa sig nific rrenttolong-term sus antdete Do tained growth inAmerica,or isitnotrelevant? Mr. LINDS EY.Itisa majorproblem. Senator DOMENICI .And thathastodo withsustained growthand productivity increases asa majorproblem ;isthatcorrect ? Mr.LINDSEY.Inthehealthcare industry ? Senator DOMENICI .Yes.Tellme why itisa majorproblemeco . theway todo it .Maybe that's nomicwise Mr. LINDSEY .We havea situation wherewe havevirtually un limited demandandwhenwe measure productivity itisveryhard . How canyoutell how much postponing someone's death 6 months , a year , 18 months'worth , you can't puta price on it .The way we measure output isby measuring input . And thatisa lousy way of figuring outproduct activity . 69 why .Tellme quickly Senator DOMENICI .Strike theproductivity impacton costof healthcarehave a negative doesthespiraling future . economic , ifitdoes America's Mr. LINDSEY.We have virtually no checkson the commitment of resources , of new resources there . Thoseareresources thatoften couldbe usedelsewhere .And ingeneralthereisno markettypeof check ,consumer check ,between buyinghealth careorbuying an othergoodor investing inanother good . That's really theproblem . Senator DOMENICI .My last question hastodo withcapital forma tion . Has the currentsituation with reference to theCommunist regimes movingtowardcapitalism and theneedforcapital there , doesithavea negative effect on capital availability hereandcap formation ital ? And ifitdoesordoesn't , wouldyoujustanswer when you answerthatquestion tell me what isthemajorproblem youseewithreference to capital formation intheUnited States . Mr. LINDSEY . The answertothequestion aboutoverseas ,thereis no question thattheworldwide demand forcapital hasincreased as a result ofchanges intheEastern bloc . Withregard tocapital formation intheUnited States , I think thatwe have interaction betweenour taxsystemand regulatory policy andinflation whichdrives up thecost ofequity capital . Andone thing theFederal Reserve cando,in gradually reducing theinflation rate ,istotakeouttheextrainflation taxinteraction . Senator DOMENICI .Do youthinkthedecade ofthe1980's ,once therecession abated ,wasa positive economic period fortheUnited Statesoverall ? positive . ,itwasclearly .Inmy view,Senator Mr.LINDSEY SenatorDOMENICI . I havebeen heardto saythatforallthose who bemoanitthatifwe could clone itforthenext342or4 years atitspeak,mostpeople wouldoptforittomorrowmorning . And letme close my remarksby saying thatI really believe we areconfusing whathappened toAmerican values withwhathap penedtotheAmericaneconomy.And I thinkmaybe we oughtto be concernedaboutvalues . But I am not at allsurethattheyarethesame or thatthey run - thatwe canhaveeconomic prosperity and still havea differ entvaluesystemthanwe havecurrently intheUnitedStates . The factthatyou are worriedabouteducation , I am closeto comingto conclusion and thenI willquit , thatour education systemisnot so bad but thatthe valuesthatare attendant to youngpeople iswhatisscaring us.But I can't provethatyet. Letme tell youthatI am pleased tobe hereandI hopethatI cansupport you forthis job. Thank you. Mr. LINDSEY.Thank you,Senator. The CHAIRMAN.I mightjustsayIhavegreatregard forSenator Domenici ,and we haveserved together fora longtime,and I am justreflecting . We useas a national figure a highschool dropout a point rateinAmericaofabout26percent .Itmay be offa ortwo; it dependson whereyou are.The Japanese highschool dropout rate isabout2 percent .We may havea values problem ,and I thinkin some areas we do havea values problem .We alsohavea verytan gible highschool dropout rateproblem .I don't knowhow much it is drivenor not drivenby values , but I am convinced thatifa 46-442 0 - 91 - 4 70 country runsthose differentials yearafter yearafter year ,theyare goingtoend up way down theline ,and thatiswhat ishappening to us,at least in thatarea,I think. SenatorDOMENICI. Mr. Chairman, I am having somebody see from Colorado whetheryou'rerightor whetherthatresearcher Postovertheweek pagespreadintheWashington who hada full ,91 ,ultimately .In fact ,he says good .He was pretty endisright theyearbefore to graduate thatwasexpected oftheclass percent States . intheUnited fromhighschool last graduated We don't makethemall graduate whenthey're supposed to.We havean open-endedinand out.And he says ,by thetimewe'refin ished ,91percent ofAmericans thatweresupposed tograduate ,get a highschool diploma ,did. Now thatdoesn't mean I'msatisfied withthesystem .But I think thattherearesome veryinteresting facts aboutthatthatare comingoutnow. TheCHAIRMAN .Letme askyouthis ,Mr.Lindsey .Do youthink the interest rateshouldbe lowernow ? Can the Fed takethe rates down fromwheretheyarenow inyourview? Mr.LIND SEY.Senato r,Icannotcommit myself . The CHAIRMAN . I'mnotaskingyou tocommityourself . I'm asking you foran opinion . When you getthere ,you're goingto havetolookatthedataand you may want torevise youropinion . Butyouareobviously a person thatdigests a lotofinformation . You arehereas a nomineebecause you arethought topossess an expertopinion . And basedon whatyou now know, do you think thattheratesshould be lowerthanwhattheyaretoday ? to lookat is rate thatthemostimportant .Ibelieve Mr.LINDSEY .And I think investment business long-term rate.That iswhat drives ofthe FederalReserveshouldbe togetthat thatone ofthe focuses ratedown. long-term interest neces ,itdoesn't ,withpropermonetarypolicy And I thinkthat policy monetary away.Proper short rates right sarily meancutting can getthelongratedown. The CHAIRMAN.So you rankthe longratehigherthan,say, the prime rate , which isobviously not a longrate , in termsof its impacton theeconomy ? Mr.LINDSEY .Yes,withbusiness investment . The CHAIRMAN.I thinkthat's quite right on business investment ifyou're trying tobottom outofrecession . We hadAlanGreenspan here10daysago.He told usthereces sionwasstill worsening ,andwe hadn't hitbottom yet .He wasn't sure where the bottom was . When you're in thatkindofa condition how important isthe primerate ? Mr.LINDSEY .Thereisno question thattheprimerateisimpor tant , particularly withregard tobusiness inventories , carrying business inventories withregard tolarge businesses .Because many cyclical changes oftenhavea stronginventory component tothem. Thereisno question thattheprimeratealsoplays a role . Butwithregard tolong -termgrowthinbusiness investment ,itis the long-term rate. The CHAIRMAN. Itisinteresting .I talkto the headsof the auto mobile companies quite often ,asyou mightimagine ,because they 71 are centered inmy Stateand itisa majorpartofthenational and regional economy ,andcertainly a majorfactor inmy State econo my . Auto sales ,ofcourse , havebeenveryweak and thatispartof what hascaused this recession .We havehadreported losses inthe domestic industry approximating $5 billion .Itisa majorproblem . They are of the viewthatthe primerate , ifitwere to come down , would probably be more helpful withrespect to consumer psychology and helping tobottomoutthisrecession and getting economicactivity toturnup again . Wouldyouagree ordisagree withthat ? Mr. LINDSEY .I thinkfromtheir view ,theyareon target . But what we have isinventories .I thinkthatisreally one ofthebig costsnow intheautoindustry , thehighcostofcarrying theinven tories .And I thinkthatiscorrect .I do notarguewiththem atall . The CHAIRMAN .What wouldhappeniftheFedweretodropthe discount rate another half a percentage point inyouropinion . Mr. LINDSEY .Well,on theshortend,my suspicion wouldbe that short -term rateswoulddropveryclose to one-halfa point . With regardtotheprimeIcouldn't tell forsure .Iwouldsaythatitwould decline . Itmay or may notgo a full one-halfpoint , but I would imagineitwouldbe followed by a decline inprime . The CHAIRMAN.DoestheFed havetheroomtodo that ? What wouldthatdo tolongrates ,do yousuppose ? Mr. LINDSEY .Ithinkthatisthe$64question . The CHAIRMAN .What isyourjudgment? Mr. LINDSEY .I wouldwanttoreally lookverylongandhardat theconditions intheyield structure ,in foreign exchange markets and commodity markets ,particularly withregard tothelast reduc tionbecausewe justhad a test . On thequestion you areasking , I wouldwant toseehow mar ketsrespondoverthenextfewweekstothatlast reduction before deciding how theywouldrespond toanother reduction . The CHAIRMAN .Somepeople feel that theFedhasthelatitude to go lowerand theyoughttogo lowerand trytoturnthisrecession around .I takeitthatyouarenotprepared toagree withthatas such ? Mr. LINDSEY . I would like to see the reactionto the last cut before deciding whetherornotitwas timeforanother cut. Again , I hopethatovertimethewholeyield curvecancome down, thatwe can bringdown therates .But whetheror notthat action should takeplace tomorrow ,nextweek,3 monthsfromnow, I would want to wait and see. thisyear running The CHAIRMAN . Now with the Federaldeficit not , let's $380 billion - takeiteasy up in the rangeof probably break the chairs. With the Feder al budge t thisyear probab ly goingto come in around$380bi llion ,giveor take - itcou ldbehig herthanthatde pendi ngon how weak theeconomy remai ns,becau sethatisver y cost lyin defici t terms— how much doesthat redu ce the lati tudeof the FederalReserveBoard with resp ectto what itcan do with monetary policy ? 72 Do theFederal deficits hem intheFed,and ifso,towhatextent, intermsofits latitude tomovemonetary policy aroundtotryto, say,getlowerinterest rates ? Mr.Lindsey .There's no question thatfiscal policy hasan impor tantimpacton theeconomy ,on inflationary expectations ,on price movements , on interest rates ,what have you. And they then impacton thedecisions thattheFed will make. Iwill stress thatIthink that thatrelationship isan indirect one and itisimportant tostudytheunderlying dataasopposed to whatmay behappening today ortomorrow withregard tothedefi cit. process ,partofthestabilizing partiscyclical Thelarge . since theearly1980's beencyclical The CHAIRMAN.Theyhaven't , but theyhavebeen to a limited extent Theyhave beencyclical ,havethey ? any smaller gotten andtheyhaven't verylarge Mr. LINDSEY .That iscorrect. The CHAIRMAN.They seem tobe cyc lical on thesideofgetting bigge r. What isyourestimate astowhenyouthink we mightseea bal ancedFederalbudget? Mr. LINDSEY.Senator TheCHAIRMAN .Bythetime yourtermisup,theyear 2000 ? Mr. LINDSEY .I wouldhopewe wouldgetonebefore that . The CHAIRMAN. We would allhope thatbut, as a practical to? thinkwe'relikely matter ,do youreally predict cannot whatisgoingto , I really Mr.LINDSEY . Senator inin large I willnotbe involved happen.Itdependson decisions . .So I am sorry ,taxdecisions decisions :spending measure TheCHAIRMAN.Ifwe usethelast 11years asa guide ,ifwe just tookthoseas a trendlineguideand tried to decide where that mightbe taking us,istheremuch reason tothinkthatwhen ithas beengoingup likethisovera period oftimethat ,allofa sudden , it's goingtogo downby thesame amountand gettozero ? Mr. LINDSEY. I think - I don't know ifI would follow- I share yourdesire forlowerdeficit .I don't know ifI woulddo thekindof extrapolation linear you just did. The CHAIRMAN .Maybenot .Maybeyouseesomething thatwill bringusdown and getusoffthattrendline . Mr.LINDSEY .I think working infavor ofdeficit reduction is- for every1 pointincrease inrealgrowthintheeconomy ,theFederal Government collects substantially morethan1 percent morereve nue.Forinflation ,itisslightly more than1 percent more revenue . uresin line with As longas youcankeep the Federalexpendit e th, the taxlin r than GNP grow fully lowe th,or hope GNP grow e isno way n, ther g line .But agai uallycatchthespendin l event wil ined dingisrestra tono morethan the lhappen unlessspen thatwil e ofGNP growth. rat The CHAIRMAN. How serious are our bankingproblemsat the moment ? Mr.LINDSEY .I think theyarea matterofsignificant concern .I thinktosome extentthingshave improvedslightly . Ifyou had askedme thatquestion last December , I may have been more pessimistic thanIam now.ButIthink we arebeginning toseea response toregulatory actions . 73 I mentioned ,inresponse toone ofyourearlier questions regard ing the agreement betweenthevarious bank regulators on how one shouldevaluate asset values forbanks .One partofthatisstill out forpublic comment .Ithink thatwhenthatprocess isfinished that would alsobe helpful . I alsothinkthatthereduction in interest ratessince thenhasbeenhelpful withregard tothebankingsitua tion. So although things haveimproved ,Ithink itisstill a matter of serious concern . The CHAIRMAN .I know you workedon theadministration's fi nancial banking reform proposals . Do yousupport theproposal to allownonfinancial firms toacquire banks ? Mr. LINDSEY .I do inthecontext thatitwas placed intheadmin istration proposal , and itwas as a way ofincreasing capital avail ability forthebanking industry and itwouldcomeaboutonlyin circumstances where therewas adequatecapital in the bank in question . Letme say ,having thatasa bottomline conclusion ,thatthere are many prosand many constogetting tothatbottomlineconclu sion . AndI fully appreciate some ofthe concerns thatyou and othershaveexpressed withregard tothat . The CHAIRMAN .Letme askyouthis .Do youfeel sufficiently fa miliar withtheregulatory restructuring proposals inthat package tobe abletosaywhetheryou support them ornot? Mr. LINDS EY.Yes,Isupportthem. The CHAIRMAN.Any reserv ation s? Mr. LINDSEY . I wouldphrase itthisway: The one thingthat struck me themostinworking onthat issue wasthat there isno single right issue to any problem . You'vegota wholerangeof issuesout there. What I believe theTreasury package represents isa list ofgood answers thatwhenputtogether ina balanced formprobably repre sentsthebestpackagethatcouldhang together as a wholepack age. To saythat ,aretherereservations , couldthings be done an otherway,thereisno question .But thereisno single right answer . The CHAIRMAN. Ifyou lookat itnow withtheFed haton, the Fed hasargued thatitneedssomesupervisory responsibility for international sizebanks? Mr. LINDSEY.Yes . The CHAIRMAN .Would you agreewiththat? Mr.LINDSEY .Again,I thinkI wouldbe abletoanswerthatques there .The BushTaskForce I hadsomeexperience tionbest after . Anotheris backin 1984came up withthatasone ofthechanges and the proposal betweentheTreasury's oneofthedifferences . Bush Task Forcewas justthe pointyou mentioned Ithink itisa veryarguable case .Ithinkitcango either way.I am willing to say thatthat isnot the kindof difference thatI wouldfall on my swordon. I thinkitisone thatcouldgo either way . has advancedtheposition The CHAIRMAN. The administration when theFDIC needstoborrowmore money,whichtheyare that todo,thattheyoughttocome borrowitfromthe nowbeginning ? here tobesetting .Isthata goodprecedent Federal Reserve 74 Mr. LINDSEY .The precedent was setinthe1930's .Thatwas how the FDICThe CHAIRMAN .Are we in the 1930's ? Mr. LINDSEY .No.But theprecedent existed . The choice really — there werefourchoices .One, youcouldnot bailouttheBIF, butI don'tthinkthatisa goodone. You could havetheFed do it ,youcould have Treasury do it , oryoucould decide bothinthecases ofloans ,oryou couldhaveitthattheBIF put up the money or theTreasury or the Fed put up the money and theBIF didnothavetorepayit . Froma fiscal policy perspective ,itreally doesn't matterwhether itbe theFedor theTreasury .And thereason thattheTreasury study picked theFedwasthatprecedent that Ijust mentioned . The CHAIRMAN . Well , I understand thattheypicked theFed. We'vegottomakea decision up here .Do youthink itoughttobe the Fed ? Mr. LINDSEY.I don'tthinkitmatters ,Senator . interesting The CHAIRMAN.That's . Therearesomeother questions thatIam going tosubmit toyou fortherecord and askyou torespond to. I wanttoposeoneimportant question herethatwe posetoall prospective nomineesto independent regulatory agencies , and I think itisparticularly relevant inyourcasebecause youcomeout ofan administration thatobviously hasbeendoing a lot ofjawbon ingon the Fed. Thereare some peoplethathavesuggested that you are really designedto be the administration's man on the Fed because youarecoming fromtheWhiteHouseandyouhavebeen made toqualify fortheRichmondseat , ifyou will ,and I have al ready said that Ihavesomequestion about that . I needto know two things in thisarea .One isthatyou infact wouldbean independent memberoftheFed,andImean absolute lyindependent andgive JohnSununuoranybody else thattried to impingeon yourindependence thecoldshoulder . I needtoknow thatand thatistheeasiest part. And thesecond partisI needtoknowthatyouhaveenoughin dependence ofmind thatyou arenotgoinginwitha fixed notion , whetheritissupplysideeconomics out ofthe 1980's orwhatever , thatineffect gives you a locked mentality andwoulddestroy your independence ofthought , forreasons ofthefact that you've already made up yourmind fromsome rigid ideology or an ideological set of notions. I wouldlike you tocommenton bothofthose . Mr.LINDSEY .Senator ,letme assure youIam absolutely commit tedtothecomplete independence oftheFed. I thinkthatisits greatstrength . My career , I think , demonstrates thatI make up my own mind and,when attheFederal Reserve ,I willmake up my own mind. With regardto ideology , I wouldpointout some commentsof supply siders aboutmy books .One ofthethings I foundwasthat the demand sideeffect from the tax cutswas as large , perhaps larger ,thanthesupplysideeffects . So I don't thinkthatI havea rigid ideological position oneway ortheother .And Ithink Iwill committhatI will make every effort tokeepmy mindopenwith regardtothe information thatcomes beforeme . 75 TheCHAIRMAN .Iappreciate that . Ithasbeena longhearing thisafternoon .We havehad tomove iton a coupleofoccasions . We had itscheduled earlier as an ac commodation toyou.But we had memberson bothsides who could not be present at a datethatwe had before , so we have had to changeittomake itbe a day at whichyou couldbe present and theycouldbe present aswell . So thathastakenus a little longer . Iappreciate yourcomments today andwe thankyouforyourtes timony. Mr.LINDSEY .Thank youverymuch,Senator . The CHAIRMAN.Verygood. The committeestandsinrecess . [Whereupon ,at5:11 p.m. ,thehearing wasadjourned .] [Biographical sketchof nominee , response to written questions , and additional material supplied fortherecord follow :] 76 STATEMENT FOR COMPLETION BY PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES Name : L awrenc Lindsey Benjamin e (OTHER ) (FIRST (LAST) tionto which Posi nominated: Governor, Federal Reserve System Dateofbirth : (18 DAN Maritalstatus : 7 (MONTH) 54 Date of ination nom : Peekski ll , New York Place of birth : (YEAR) Married Fullname of spouse: Susan Ann (McGrath ) Lindsey Name and ages ofchildren : Educatio n: Dates attended Institution Bowdoin Colleg e Degrees received Dates of degrees 1972-1976 A.B. Harvard University 1977-1981 M.A. 1981 Harvard University 1984-1 Ph.D. 19 85 985 * 1 976 *During that academic year I was on the faculty as an instructor, pending completion of my dissertation I was not an en rolled stud ent Honors andawards : List below all scholarships ,fellowships ,honorary degrees ,military medals ,honorary society t. itions routstanding service orachievemen hips recogn fo members ,andanyotherspecial Citicorp/Wriston Fellow for Economic Research , 1988. nal Tax , Outstanding Doctoral Dissertation Award Natio Association, 1985 for Simulating the Response of Taxpayers to Changes in Tax Rates . 1976 . Noyes Prize in PoliticalEconomy , Bowdoin College, Elected to Phi Beta Kappa, Alpha of Maine, 1975. 1 77 Memberships: ,scholarly , ,fraternal ,business andoffices heldinprofessional List belowallmemberships organizat civic ions . ,cha ritable andother Officeheld (if any ) Organization Dates Phi Beta Kap pa 1975 -present Federal Taxation Tax As sociat Na tional T ax Associ Am erican Ec onomic Nation al s ion & Finan ce Com m . 19 86-198 9 ation 1984 -present Ass oc . 1983-present Employment record :List below all positions held since college ,including the title ordescription ofjob ,name of employment ,location ofwork,and datesofinclusive employment . Special Assistant to the President for Policy Development The White Associate House , 1/90 Director pre sen t for Domestic Economic Policy , Office of Policy Development , The White House , 1/89 presen t (on leave ) Associate Professor, Economics, Harvard University, 7/88- pres. . 6/85-6/88 , HarvardUniversity ,.Economics AssistantProfessor Instructor , Economics , Harvard University 2/84-5 /85 Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research, 9 / 84-1 / 89 Senior Staff Economist for Tax Policy , Council of Economic Advisers, 7/83-8/ 84 Staff Economist, Taxation, Council of Economic Advisers, 9/82 -6/83 Junior Staff Economist, Public Finance, Council of Economic Advisers, 9/81-6/82 TeachingFellow, HarvardUniversity , 9/78-8/81 2 Resea rch Assi stant , Nation al Burea u of Ec onomic 6/78-8/81 Researc h 78 Emplo yment Rec ord conti nued TeacherAide for the LearningDisabled, LakelandSchool district , New York , 1/ 77-6/ 77 Salesperson , Gazelle Products , Waterville , Maine , 9/ 76-12 / 76 Owner /Operator, The Hot Dog Stand , Bath , Maine , Summers 1975 and 1976 . 79 Government experience: List anyexperience inordirect association with Federal ,State ,orlocal governments ,in . cluding anyadvisory ,consultative ,honorary orother part -timeservice orpositions . Special Assistant to the President for Policy Development The W hite Ho use Associate Director for Domestic Economic Policy , Office of Policy Development , The White House Senior Staff Economist for Tax Policy , Council of Economic Advise rs Staff Economist , Taxation , Council of Economic Advisers Junior Staff Economist , Public Finance , Council of Economic Published writings : Advise rs Li stthetitles ,publish ofbooks ,art ,reports orotherpublishe ersanddates icles d mater ials you have written . Pleas e see a ttachm ent Politi cal s ation affili ities andactiv : List all memberships andoffices held inandservices rendered toall political parties or election committees during thelast 10 years . Member, Wayland Town Republican Committee , Wayland , MA 1985-89 Chairman , 1988-89 3 80 PUBLICATIONS The Growth Experiment : How the New Tax Policy Is Transforming the U.S. Econo my . Basi c Books , Inc. , New York , 1990 . "Managing the Variability of the Social Security System With the Personal Income Tax ", in Weaver (ed . ) Social Security's Looming Surpluses, American Enterprise Institute, 1991 (forthcoming). " The University and the Reemergence of Economic Individualism", in Hanson and Meyerson (ed . ) Higher Education in a Changing Economy , American Council on Education, 1990 . "Did New York's Tax Cuts Work ? " NY : The City with Ed Rubenstein . Journal , Autumn 1990 "Let's ,Push Now for Capital Gains Tax Cut , " USA Today, September 21 , 1990 . "Envy is No Basis for Tax Policy," TheWashington , Post, March 20 , 1990 . " It's Time for Another Cut in Tax Rates ," Forbes , March 5 , 1990 , pp . 82- 86 . " Tax Induced Trading : The Effect of the 1986 Tax Reform Act on Stock Mar ket Activ ity " The Jour nal o f Finan ce with Paul J. Bolster and Andrew Mitrusi , June 1989 . "Budget Neutral Options to Encourage Charitable Giving ", in The Future of the Nonprofit Sector, Jossey-Bass , 1989 . " The Massachusetts Miracle ", Regulation, December 1988. "High Risks , High Rewards ", Currents, November/December 1988 , pp .1 0- 15 . "Massachusetts Miracle 5 , 1988 , p.A33 . or Mirage ?" The New York Times, October " Turning Deficit into Surplus " The Boston Herald , October 2 , 1988 , pp.23-26 . "Supply Side Lessons for Deficit Reduction " Business Economics : The Journal of the American Association of Business Economists, October 1988 . "Better Child Care Cheaper," The Wall Street Journal , July 5, 1988 . "Socialism and the Supply Side in Sweden ", The Wall Street Journal Europe , June 6 , 1988 . 81 "Who Managed the Massachusetts Miracle ?" Journal , April 5 , 1988 . The Street Wall " The Guru of Tax Cuts " The Sunday Times (London ), March 20 , 1988 . "Capital Gains " Tax Notes , January 25 , 1988 with Jane Gravelle . " Tax Cuts and Taxpayer Behavior : Alternative Explanations of Income Changes in the 1980s " in Tax Policy and the Economy Vol 2, Lawrence Summers (ed . ) National Bureau of Economic Research, 1988 . "Cut Capital Gains Taxes" The Journal of Commerce , December 29 , 1987 . "The Wrong Two Percent Solution" Novem ber The Journ al of Comme rce , 19 , 1987 . "Estimating the Behavioral Response of Taxpayers to Changes in Tax Rates : 1982-1984 With Implications for the Revenue Maximizing Tax Rate " Journal of Public Economics July 1987 . "Federal Deductibility of State and Local Taxes : A Test of Public Choice by Representative Government ", in Rosen (ed .) Fiscal Federalism , National Bureau of Economic Research : Cambridge ", 1987 . "Capital Gains Taxes Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986 : Revenue Estimates Under Various Assumptions ", National Tax Journal, September , 1987 . "CapitalGains Rates, Realizations , and Revenues" in The Effects of Taxes on Capital Accumulation, edited by Martin Feldstein , pp.69-97 , Universityof Chicago Press, 1987. "Criticizing the CBO Analysis of ERTA's Effect on the Distribution of Income and Taxes ", Tax Notes , May 4 , 1987, pp.491-496 . 11 Individual Giving Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986", in The Constitution and the Independent Sector, Independent Sector and United Way Institute: Washington, March 1987 . "Rates, Realizations, and Revenue of Capital Gains " in Taxes and Capital Formation, edited by Martin Feldstein, Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1987 . "Gifts of Appreciated Property : More to consider " Tax Notes , January5, 1987, pp.67-70 . "Revenue Response to the 1982 Personal Tax Cuts Notes , October 13 , 1986 . A Reply", Tax 82 "Misguided Capital Gains Levy " Wall Street Journal, September 10 , 1986 . "Capital Gains Tax Rates and Tax Revenues ", Testimony before the . Senate Small BusinessCommittee , The CongressionalRecord, Ju ne 4 , 1 986 . Lessonsof the 1981 Tax Cut", The Wall Street Journal , May 6, 1986 . "Tax Reform and CharitableGiving" in Philanthropy , Voluntary Action and the Public Good , Independent Sector and United Way Institute, March 1986 . "Revenue Response to the 1982 Tax Cuts ", Tax Notes , March 17 , 1986 . " The Effect of the President'sProposalon CharitableGiving", The National Tax Journal , March 1986 . " The 1982 Tax Cut : The Effect of Taxpayer Behavior on Revenue and Distribution" Proceedings of the National Tax Association , November 1985 . "Giving and Tax Cuts: Recent Experience " Tax Notes, September 16 , 1985 . "Tax Reform and Charitable Giving ", Testimony before the House . Committeeon Ways and Means, The Congressional Record, July 22 , 1985 . "Simulating Non-Linear Tax Rules and Non Standard Behavior : An Application to the Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions ", Behavioral Simulation Methods in Tax Policy Analysis, edited by Martin Feldstein , Universityof Chicago Press , 1983 . "Alternatives to the Maximum Tax on Earned Income ", Behavioral Simulation Methods in Tax Policy Analysis, edited by Martin Feldstein, University of Chicago Press, 1983 . "Is the Maximum Tax on Earned Income Effective ?" National Tax Journal , June 1981 . 83 Political contribut ions: ,campaign organiza contributions of$500 or moretoany individual itemize allpolitical tion , political party . political action committee or similar entity duringthelast eight yearsand identify thespecific amounts ,dates ,and namesoftherecipients . N one Qualifications : State fully yourqualifications toserve intheposition towhichyouhavebeennamed. (attach sheet ) Future employment relationsh ips: 1.Indicate whether youwill sever all connections with yourpresent employer ,business firm ,association ororganization ifyouareconfirmed bytheSenate . Yes . Resignation from Harvard effective upon confirmation . My current employment with the Executive Office of the President-atso terminates upon the start of my employment at the Fede ral R eserve 2.Asfarascanbeforeseen ,state whether youhave anyplans after completing govern . mentservice toresume employment ,affiliation orpractice with yourprevious em. ployer ,business firm ,association ororganization . Non e 3. Has anybodymade youa commitment toa jobafter youleave government ? No ted? etheful lter m forwhichyouhave beenappoin 4. Doyouexpect toserv Yes 84 Qualifications I beli eve tha t my car eer as a professional economist has provided me with the tools , background , and insights necessary to make a significant contribution to the country as a Governor of the Federa l Rese rve Sys tem . I h ave been fort unate to ha ve been able to participate in the formation of economic policy in two Adm inist ratio ns as well as cond uct aca demic re searc h and develop a university curriculum based on contemporary economic thought and policy . As Special Assistant to the President for Policy Development, I have been responsible for developing policy and analyzing the range of microeconomic and macroeconomic issues facing the country today . In recent months , my primary mission has been to work with the Departmentof Treasuryin developing a comprehensive banking and financial services reform package . This has exposed me to the cutting edge of thinking and policy creation in this important area of Federal Reserve responsibility. My three years on the staff of the Council of Economic Advisors and two years at the Office of Policy Development have provided me with a broad exposure to the process of policy formation in two Administrations . My four and one half years on the faculty of Harvard University involved both research on key public policy issues and the development of comprehensive academic curriculum . The latter included the creation of a course on American Economic Policy with particular emphasis on the effects of monetary and fiscal policy. My academic research has been published in leadingeconomicjournalsincludingthe Journalof Financeand the Journal of Public Economics as well as in research volumes sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute and the National Bureau of Economic Research . This research has led to awards from both the NationalTax Associationand the Citicorp /Wriston Fellowship. I believe that this combination of academic and practical experiencein the realm of public policyqualifiesme to meet the intellectual and decision making challenges faced by a Governor of the Federal Reserve System . 85 Potenti al con flicts arrangeme 1.Describ e anyfina ncial agreements ofinterest : ntsordeferre d compe nsation orother continuing dealings withbusinessassociates , clients or customerswho willbe af tected by policies whichyouwill influence intheposition towhichyouhavebeen nominated . None 2. List anyinvestments ,obligations ,liabilities ,orother relationships whichmight involve potential conflicts ofinterest with theposition towhich youhavebeennominated . None 3. Describe anybusiness relationship , dealing orfinancial transaction (other thantax paying )whichyouhavehadduring thelast 10 years with theFederal Government , whether for yourself ,onbehalf ofa client ,oracting asanagent ,that might inany wayconstitute orresult ina possible conflict ofinterest with the position towhich you have been nominated . None , except employment 5 86 4. List anylobbying activity during thepast10 years inwhichyouhaveengagedfor the purpose ofdirectly orindirectly influencing thepassage ,defeat ormodification of anylegislation atthenational level ofgovernment oraffecting theadministration and execution policy ofnational laworpublic . "Capital Gains Tax Rates and Tax Revenues", Testimony befor e the Sen ate Sma ll Bu siness Co mmitte e , T he Congressional Record , June 4 , 1986 "Tax Reform and CharitableGiving," Testimonybefore the House Committee on Ways and Means . The conges sion al Record , July 22 , 1985 5.Explain howyouwill resolve anypotential conflict ofinterest that maybedisclosed by estotheaboveitems. yourrespons I will make any divestment , as required ; and alter or sever any relationships , as required. Civil ,criminal and inves tigat ory actio ns: 1.Give thefull details ofanycivil orcriminal proceeding inwhich youwere a defendant oranyinquiry orinvestigation a Federal ,State ,orlocal agency inwhich youwere thesubject oftheinquiry orinvestigation . N one 2. Givethefull details ofanyproceeding , inquiry or investigation by anyprofessional association including anybarassociation inwhichyouwerethesubject ofthepro ceeding ,inquiry orinvestigation . None 6 87 T UT UL NAFC U NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OFFEDERAL CREDIT UNIONS P.O.Box 3769 WASHINGTON,DC 20007 (703)522-4770 May 6, 1991 The Honorable DonaldW. Riegl e Chairman Commi tteeonBankin g,Housing and Urban Affairs United States Senate Washington ,DC 20510 Dear Mr. Chairman: On behalf oftheBoardofDirectors andmembersoftheNational Association ofFederal Credit Unions ,Iwanttolend oursupport tothenomination ofLawrence Lindsey totheBoard ofGovernors oftheFederal Reserve System . InDr.Lindsey's capacity asAssociate Director for Domestic Economic Policy ofthe White House Office ofPolicy andDevelopment ,NAFCU hashada variety ofopportunities todiscuss economic andpolicy issues ofdirect consequence toournation's 14,000 credit unions . On these occasions we havebeenmostimpressed byhis acute understanding ofboth themicro andmacro processes which define ournation's economy . We believe Dr.Lindsey's experience andimpressive accomplishments within academia , the private sector ,andnowasaspecial assistant tothe President amply qualifies himfor this most critical position . Mr.Chairman ,Iwanttothank youandyour distinguished colleagues for this opportunity tocomment onLawrence Lindsey's nomination tothe Board ofGovernors ofthe Federal Reserve System . IfNAFCU may be of anyfurther assistance during these crucial nominating proceedings ,please call uponus. Sincerely , Jahin Starter John M. Stanton Chairman JMS :smb 88 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON May 22 , 1991 Dear Ms. Breneman : Attached please find the questions submitted by Senator Riegle and my answers to those questions . I have adhered to the format outlined in Senator Riegle's letter of May 13 . Thank you for your attention. hearing from the Committee. I look forw ard to Sinc er ely , Tau re nd nc se eß.Yu y Lawrence B. Lindsey Special Assistant to the President for Policy Development Ms. Lory Breneman Chief Clerk Committee on Banking , Housing, and Urban United Affairs States Senate 534 Senate Dirksen Office Building Washington, DC 20510-6075 89 In your view , how should the Fed conduct monetary policy? What should the Fed target and what should it take into consideration in changing its targets? Q1 . Al . Monetary policy should be directed at achieving the objectives of high employment, sustainable growth, and price stab ility . As a practical matter , monetary policy influences these objectives only indirectly, and with some lag . Theref ore , the Fe d shoul d mo nitor othe r ec onomi c data in gauging whether or not policy is on the right track . In particular , trendsin nominalGNP shouldbe watched closely . Monetary policy has its most immediate impact on the overall dollar volume of spending . The decomposition of nominal spending growth between real output growth and price increases tends to be determined more by underlying economic conditions that are not easily influenced by monetary policy . The goal for nominalGNP growth, in turn, is determinedby the three principalobjectivesmentionedabove. I would also attach a good deal of importance to the behavior of the money stock , especially M2 . Nominal GNP has tended over time to follow the trends in M2 growth and M2 is a variable that the Federal Reserve not only can influence over spans of a few months , but can monitor on a very current , weekly basis . M2 thus provides a reasonably good , if indirect , indicator of trends in nominal GNP which might not become evident until much more data becomes available . In highlighting nominal GNP and M2 as key indicators, I do not mean to imply that these should be the only things considered in a decision about policy. A full range of information about the condition of labor and capital markets must be taken into account . In particular, the yield curve in the credit market , the level and rate of change of commodity prices , and movements of foreign exchange rates , are all useful in assessing the efficacy of policy changes . 90 Do you believe the Fed has adequate tools to revive the economy in the near-term and control inflation in the longer Q2 . ter m ? A2 . One must be careful not to expect too much of a single policy tool , and the Federal Reserve should not be expected to be able to fine-tune the economy's performance , ensuring continuous healthy growth and consistently stable prices . Over the long run , monetary policy can be viewed as influencing primarily the price level , with real activity being more a function of such variables as population and labor force growth , technology, and growth of the capital stock what economists refer to as "supply " factors . Ho wever , in the short ru n , Federa l Rese rve act ions can ha ve a substa ntial influ ence on the aggregate demand for goods and services, and , when there are significant recession ary tendencies in the economy and tively lp nable growth. risingslackis dim risk, monetarypolicy i nginflat ionary can be used effec inish to he revive sustais Th e response of the financial markets and the economy to Federal Re serve action s may not alway s be the same , but I see no re ason to think that the System's policy tools are inadequate to perform these broad functions . Q3 . How conf ident are you that the re cessio n wi ll end so on ? Why ? A3 . One can never be absol utely confi dent of any econo mic forecast, and thus it is important that policymakers constantly monitor developments and be prepared to change course . That said , I belie ve that one can cit e som e in dicat ions that the economy is in the process of bottoming out . Consum er spendi ng seems to have firmed in the past few months , since the dropback in oil prices has reversed some of the prior erosion of purchasing power; lower interest rates evidently have stimulated a rise in home sales and housing starts; and inventory positions have been trimmed , notably in the motor vehicle sector , where production is rising currently after two quarters of sharp decline . These developments certainly do not ensure a quick upturn in business activity , but they have been important elements in past economic turnarounds and clearly are a hopeful sign in the present context . 91 g social security, which is funded separately, and Q4 . Excludin inte rest costs , wh ich are ca used by def icits , fede ral spen ding a percent of GNP declined in the 1980s, despite the defense If tax cuts didn't cause the deficit to soar , wha t as buil dup . did A4 ? . that There is no question , as I say in The Growth Experiment, th e de ficit s of the 1980s would hav e been smalle r had the 198 1 tax cut not been passed . The combination of demand side an d supply side effects from the tax rate reductions were not sufficient , in the aggregate, to fully recoup the revenue which was lost by reducing tax rates . Quantifying the extent to which the tax cuts contributed to the rising deficits is a complicated task , as your question implies . In The Growth Experiment , I took the 1980 share of GNP allocated to taxes, defense spending, interest, and non defense non-interest spending as a baseline . I then compared the actual share of GNP in each category in each of the years 1981-1987 with the 1980 level . In order to account for the effect of the added interest costs involved, I assumed that the government borrowedto make up the differenceand paid the prevailing interestrate on the amasseddebt. Thus , I allocated to tax cuts any interest that was owed as a result of the tax share of GNP falling below its 1980 level. Including these tax-cut-induced interest costs, the total cost of the tax cuts amounted to $130 billion of the $529 billion added deficit during the 1981-1987 period . Using this analysis produces the conclusionthat the greatmajorityof the rise in the deficit was attributable to increased defense spending. While I feel that this " share of GNP method " is the best approach to estimating the contributions of various factors to the rise in the deficit , I fully realize that there are other approaches. Of course , the best approach to fiscal policy is not necessarily to focus on a given number of deficit or surplus as optimal . Instead, national welfare is best served if a level of public spending on each program is selected so that the benefit of the last dollar spent at least equals the cost , including excess burden, of each dollar raised. Setting fiscal policy in line with that criterion will be the challenge of the 1990s . 92 Q5 . You've written that the expansion in the 1980s "revitalized " the economy . But annual income growth of low and moderate income families, the bottom 60% of the income less than 1% per year . Onl y the distribution, was anemic ric h did well . Should we be happy with those results? ! A5 . Senator, I completely share your concern about the slow pace of real incomegrowth for low and moderateincome families in America . In my opinion, we should be neither happy nor complacent about the results. In The Growth Experiment, I argued in Chapter 16 , entitled "Fairness for Families", that moderateincomeworking families , and particularlyworking women , are still overtaxed, in spite of the substantial tax rate reductions of the 1980s . To help tackle this problem, I recommended in Chapter 19 that we increasethe personalexemptionto $6000 for taxpayers and $3000 for dependents and couple it with a more generous child deduction care . In addition, being particularly concerned with the affordability of housing for middle income families, I recommended the substitution of limited deductibilityof home mortgageinterestpayments(up to $10,000) for all taxpayers , for the currentrules allowingfull deductibility for those who itemize. Under current law , itemizers tend to be more well to do , thus skewing the benefits of the home mortgage interest deduction toward the upper end of the income scale . There are many reasons for the low growth of real family in recent decades . Some are demographic, some incomes economic . I believethat the measuresI proposedin The Growth Experiment, while not a panacea, will go far to meeting the needs of low and moderateincomeworking familiesin America. 93 26 . The Administration proposes that deposit insurance premiums for banks be capped at 30 basis points . If w e a ss ess banks immediately to replenish the fund and cover what could be very high losses in the next few years , we run the risk of further weakening the banking system in what is already a diff ic ult time . But if we have a cap and set the cap too low , we increase the risk unnecessarily that taxpayers will eventually foot part of the bill for bank failures . A r ece nt analysis by the CBO suggests that banks do have the capacity to pay more than 30 basis points , if necessary . Do you su pp ort the Administration's 30 basis point cap, and, if so, by what analysis do you choose 30 basis points rather than some other n umb er ? 6 . There clearly is a trade-off involved here, as your question quite correctly notes . Unfortunately, even before one gets to the difficult political judgment about the appropriateness of placing an additional burden on the taxpayers, one is confronted with the impossibility of predicting the precise effects of any given premium level on the deposit insurance fund . No static comparison of the presentlevel of bank earningswith alternativeinsurance charges even if performed at a detailed, disaggregated level can yield a reliable estimate of the effects on either the banking system or the insurance fund . It is to be expected that a significantchange in the cost structureof banking, such as would be involved in a major further increase in premiums, would prompt a variety of adjustments in liability structures and the pricing of loans, deposits and other banking services . The competitiveeffectson banks vis-a-vis other financial intermediaries and markets would affect , in turn , the growth of the insurance base and thus the net revenue to the insurance fund . In the worst case , higher insurance premiums would increasethe numberof bank failuresenough to add significantly to costs faced by the fund. that can simulate Under There is no model all of these variables . the circumstances , I think the best that can be done is to recognize a couple of simple and obvious facts. First , our financial markets are sufficiently competitive that a hike in insurancecosts probablycannot be passed throughfully to bank customers . That competitive limitation on the pass throughof additionalcosts probablyis particularlyrelevant to the minority of banks that are not now in a strong position , with deep capital and healthy earnings; this suggests that the adverse effects on the banking system of a large increase in depositinsurancepremiumsmight be greaterthan any simple aggregative analysis would imply . Second , deposit insurance premiums have only recently been raised sharply from what they were just a couple of years ago , and we have not had an opportunity to observe the impact of that change ; it would seem prudentto assess that experiencebefore going very much further . Whether 30 basis points is just the right number to set as the cap , I don't think anyone can say . But I believe 94 there is a virtue in settingsome cap, to providethe banking industry, and investors and others who must assess its prospects , with a measureof certaintyabout the operating environment for at least a span of time . At a recent hearing, Paul Volcker pointed out that the argument for merging banking and commerce depended on an 27 . assumption that capital market imperfections prevented the economically optimal flow of capital into banking . He d oubte d that and questioned whether nonfinancial firms would want to make portfolio investments in banks without trying to capture other benefits that the firewalls were designed to prevent . Do you disagree? A7 . This is , to be sure , a comple x iss ue , and I under stand Ch airma n Volc ker's concern s . However , I would approach the question somewhat differently . In a sens e , the existing limitations on the ownership of banking firms by commercial enterprises are themselves a capital market imperfection , impeding a flow of investment into the banking industry . It is quite possible that, if the barrier were lowered, commercial firms would be inclined to make such investments . It s eem s to me a reasonable approach to leave this question to be answered by the mar ke t , so long as we are comfortable that we have erected adequate firewalls and other protections to avoid abuses or undesirable access to the federal safety net , as t he Tre asur y pro po sal seeks to do . If com merc ial firm s choo se not to avail themselves of this opportunity , we'll end up in essentially the same position we're in now, having lost nothing . If they do cho os e to inve st , th en we may find that the resulting firms , by being able to provide a broader range of serv ices , can more effectively meet the needs of the public ; whether such economies of scope actually would be realized is uncertain , but again would be something for the market to e d et e r mi n . 95 Q8 . You opposed the 1986 changes in capital gains taxation, and in a 1987 article projected sharp reductions in revenue sou rce . Your projection for 1987 was 40% below from that actual receipts , and you were 50% low for 1988 . Has t hat caused you to revise your thinking about the revenue effects of changes in capital gains tax rates? A8 . The 1987 article to which you refer , "Capital Gains Taxes Und er the Tax Reform Act of 1986 : Revenu e Esti mates Und er Various Assumptions , was a technical piece on tax simulation issues relating to capital gains . A total of 14 separ ate e estimate series were constructed reflecting differing revenu assumptions on the nature, timing, and magnitude of taxpa yer response to the 1986 tax rate changes , including a "baseline " or no -tax-change estimate . You are correct to note that the estimates , which were based on an another work of mine , "Capital Gains Rates , Realizations , and Revenues ", were well below the actual level Methodologically, the revenue estimating process can be separated into two parts . First , a baseline revenue estimate was generated based on assumptions about the likely rate of growth of capital gains realizations and receipts. This baseline assumed no changes in tax law and consequently, no tax-induced changes in taxpayer behavior . Second, different sets of behavioral assumptions were applied to the baseline to see what effect they had on the expected level of realizations and the consequent impact on tax revenue . A careful review of this process and the data that has emerged since the paper was written indicates that the principal reason for the discrepancy between predicted revenue and actual revenue can be found in the first step : creating a baseline revenue estimate . By and large, the discrepancy does not seem to be caused by the behavioral assumptions used . of revenue collected . At the time the paper was written in early 1987 , the latest detailed tax model data available was the 1983 Individual Tax Model File Public Use Sample . In order to create a baselinelevel of capitalgains for later years, an average annual rate of capital gains growth of 9.6 percent was assumed . (A detailed description of the assumptions appears on pages 495-497 of the paper . ) In fact , realizations grew at an annual rate of 18.2 percent , nearly twice as fast as predicted , and my estimate of baseline realizations for 1987 was reached in 1985 . Thus the forecast baseline level of capital gains was out of date long before the tax law change was implemented. Given the data we have available today , I would conclude that of the 14 sets of assumptions examined in the paper , the one that best fits our experience seems to have been the Prospectiveversionof the Auten-clotfeltermodel, which was particularlyeffectiveat predictingthe enormousbehavioral 96 response in 1986 to the prospect of higher capital gains tax rates the next year . In light of these results , the answer to your question is yes . I have revised my thinking on the revenue effect of capital gains tax cuts somewhat . The "Auten Clotfelter" behavioral model implies a revenue maximizing capital gains tax rate of 21 % . By contrast , the model I used as the "Lindsey " model in the paper implied a revenue maximizing tax rate of 18% . I would thus revise upward my estimate of the revenue maximizing tax rate for capital gains . 98 Q10 . In your book published last year entitled The Growth Experiment : How the New Tax Policy is Transforming the U.S. Economy, you state that the tax cuts of the early 1980's "made the U.S. once again the leader of the world economy ." One of your colleagues from Harvard, Professor Benjamin Friedman takes a different view of the tax and economic policiesof the ReaganAdministration in his book entitledDay of Reckoning. He contends in that book that the tax cuts of the early 1980's led to our massive budget deficits which we financein part by foreignborrowing . These budget deficits, in his view , contributed to our massive trade deficits . As a consequence whereas in the early 1980's we were the largest creditor nation in the world , we are now the largest debtor nation . He contends this development will undermine our nation's political and economic leadership role . He states for example on page 13 of his book : "World power and influence have historically accrued to creditor nations Over time the respect deference, that America had earned as and even a world leader will graduallyshift to the new creditornationsthat are able to supply resources where we cannot , and America's influence over nations and events will ebb . " Why do you contend then that the policies of the Reagan Administration have given the U.S. leadership of the world economy ? A10 . I fully share your concern about the size of the U.S. budget deficit and the desirability of increasing our nation's saving rate . There is no question that our economy would be better off today had we saved and invested more in the past ; there is no question that we will be better off in the future if we invest more today . My former colleague Benjamin Friedman, to whom you referred in your question , and I debated at the University Club here in Washington last July . To the surprise of most of those present, Ben and I agreed on virtually everything . We had similar estimates of the supply and demand side effects of the Reagan tax cuts , their effect on the economy , and policy prescriptions for the economy today . Specifically, we agreed on those aspects of the 1980s which were successful, and those which were not . You are correct in noting the deterioration of the net creditor position of the United States during the 1980s . The key question is whether the capital imported during the 1980s was wisely used . Gross private domestic investment rose as a share of GNP during this period. Some of this capital inflow also financed public sector capital formation, in the form of defense capital purchases and R &D . It remains an open question