Full text of New England Economic Review : September 1960

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Achieving Success in Specialty Paper
With some 5,000 different kinds of paper in production, paper manufacturers have
a wide choice of product. Although any one manufacturer is not equipped to produce
all varieties, he does have considerable flexibility. If he faces a competitive disadvantage in manufacturing one product, he can try another.
One New England paper company, for instance, began making filter paper for a
cigarette manufacturer at the beginning of the filter boom. It was a great business
until the tobacco company began making its own filter. Now the paper company is
turning its efforts to vacuum cleaner filter bags.
Many of the more successful paper firms make products which are far removed
from the simple concept of paper. Paper is frequently used as the carrying medium
for special plastics, chemicals, or resins.
Skillful product development and marketing have been the means of survival for
some southern New England paper mills, which face several economic disadvantages. These mills are "nonintegrated," which means they do not produce their
own pulp. They must pay about twice as much for their wood pulp as the "integrated" firms, except for occasional periods when the pulp market is depressed.
This differential arises because nonintegrated mills must pay for additional proc(Continued on page 2)

-/I~ - ~ New England,

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1970: $28 Billion in Liquid Savings,page 5.
Department Store Sales Gain, page 6.
Compacts Highlight Automotive Market, page 7.

PAPER COMPANY PROFIT PERFORMANCE
1947-1958 Average

U. S. Integrated Companies .......... .
U. S. Nonintegrated ............ .. .. . .... . .
New England Noninteg rated ( 39 companies) ..
Successful New England Nonintegrated ( 7 com panies) .... .. ...
. .... . ... . . .

Net Profit
as%
of Sales

Net Profit
as% of
Net Worth

8.7
4.6
3.7

12.1

5.5

10.0

9.5
6.5

Source: American Paper and Pulp Assn. and sample of 39 New England
companies.

essing and transportation costs when the production and use of pulp are at separate locations.
In order to transport the pulp it must be dehydrated, packed, shipped, and then returned to
slush form before going through the papermaking process. A nonintegrated New England
firm making a standard paper product has a 5 to
10 percent production cost disadvantage in pulp
costs in comparison with the integrated firms.
Similarly, the production costs of New England
firms can be up to 5 percent higher than firms in
other parts of the country because of higher fuel
and electricity costs.
Another problem for the nonintegrated New
England firm is equipment obsolescence. Wide,
modern Fourdriniers (the basic paper-making
machine) can operate at 2,000 feet or more per
minute, but many of the older machines in New
England have a maximum capability of 500 feet
per minute.
In labor costs, however, some New England
mills have an advantage over other regions. Labor wage rates, particularly for skilled labor, are
lower than in any other region of the country.
This may amount to a savings of up to 5 percent
of total production costs for some high quality
papers - providing the manufacturing equipment used is comparable to that used in the
higher wage regions. But many of the nonintegrated mills in New England use obsolete equipment and their output per dollar of wages is
actually less than that of similar mills in other
parts of the country.
Although many nonintegrated mills do produce some standard grades of paper to fill up the
running time of their machines so as to cover
overhead costs, very few attempt to produce a
standard large volume grade of paper as their
primary product. In the past they have been able
to compete with integrated mills by manufacturing products which required a combination of
different types of fibers, i.e., waste paper, rags,
jute, and many different grades of wood pulp.
Recently new technology has permitted wood
pulp fibers to be substituted for waste paper and
rags in the production of paperboard, writing
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paper, and numerous other products. As a result
the more creative New England mills are now
turning to synthetic and glass fiber. They are
also manufacturing products that need special
treatment or coating. This specialization is practical for a small firm because finishing and converting equipment is generally much less expensive than the basic paper-making machine.
Various types of coating equipment cost from
$40-50,000, compared to several million dollars
for a new Fourdrinier machine.
There are about 85 nonintegrated New England paper mills. They employ a work force of
about 20,000 and have a daily productive capacity of close to 6,000 tons, which represents
over 40 percent of New England's total paper and
paperboard manufacturing capacity. The products of these mills range from standard paper,
such as offset printing grades, to specialties, such
as oil filter paper for automobiles. The production
of about 20 firms consists entirely of specialized
products.
In the postwar period New England's nonintegrated paper mills have shown a poor profit
and sales performance in comparison with other
firms in the nation. The table on this page shows
this for a sample of 39 firms which represents 70
percent of the nonintegrated capacity in this
region. However, seven of these 39 companies
have been reasonably successful.

New Product Development
One characteristic of the successful mills is
their emphasis on developing new products. Because nonintegrated firms do not produce their
own wood pulp, they have greater flexibility than
integrated firms in trying out radically different
fibers to create unique specialty papers. For example, one company once ran tobacco leaves over
a conventional paper machine to see if it could
make a cigar wrap. This same company is now
using cotton fibers to manufacture a nonwoven
interlining for wash and wear apparel.
The product development of the successful
specialty mills is centered around the idea of developing a high technical competence in a particular area of fiber products. For example, one
small concern has become a leader in certain
highly technical saturation and filter papers by
setting up a close-working relationship with both
suppliers and customers. Specifications for new
fibers or fiber-resin combinations are worked out
jointly with large suppliers, including chemical
companies. The firm also maintains a continuous,
intensive search for new product ideas, especially
in growth industries such as electronics and plastics. At the same time, the company maintains a
close contact with all its customers, not only to
learn of their existing requirements but to anNew England BUSINESS REVIEW

ticipate any possible new specialty paper needs.
Not all of the successful firms, however, concentrate on specialties. Some have found that
their most profitable products are technical
grades which are produced in substantial volume.
Total industry production of such "semi-specialties" usually runs between 25 and 50 thousand
tons a year compared with 10 thousand tons or
less for specialty products. One New England
company with a wide range of products regards
its technical papers as its principal source of profits and its highly technical grades primarily as
potential additions to the semi-specialty lines as
the market for them expands.
One large national firm has chosen to buck the
trend toward specialty paper production in
southern New England. Two years ago, it established a large modern nonintegrated paper
mill in southern Connecticut to manufacture
facial and toilet tissue and table napkins. This
mill obtains its dry wood pulp from Canada and
thus suffers from higher production costs common to all nonintegrated mills. But nearness to
the New York-New England market offsets this
disadvantage. Transportation costs of the final
product are reduced and distributors can be
given faster service.

Product Line Planning and Control
Product line success requires constant re-examination of the "product mix" and planning for
future changes in market and
technology. This does not require that a firm hire a number
of full time, high-salaried staff
people to make long-range plans.
It does mean that members of
the executive team regularly
exchange views and think of
how their day-to-day decisions
will affect the firm's long-run
position.
In one successful firm executives in sales, manufacturing,
and finance annually draw up
X/
separate plans for the "perfect
xx
product mix" for their company broken down by months
for the succeeding year. This
mix is supposed to be the ideal
combination for the firm of
production grades, semi-specialties and specialties. But naturally the manufacturing executive is more concerned with
production problems and less
concerned with sales difficulties
than is the sales manager, and
vice-versa. As a result, the
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chief executive irons out differences in series
of meetings which include discussion of the
firm 's long-range sales goals and capital improvement plans.
In contrast the less successful firms seldom
have any clear-cut ideas of their long-range goal.
New grades of paper are added in response to the
competitive pressures of the moment with little
thought given as to whether or not these lines add
strength to the company's operations. Many of
the companies are completely unaware of modern
cost control techniques and lack a clear picture of
the relative cost of their different products. One
manufacturer has stated: "We can sense whether
we are losing money or not. If our bank balances
are slipping, and our costs are creeping up, then
we begin to get suspicious about those products
whose prices we have been unable to raise."

Merchandising
An imaginative sales organization is maintained in most of the successful specialty mills.
One manufacturer, for example, has successfully
promoted colorful premium priced table napkins
which housewives use as part of an attractive
table place setting. This same mill has pioneered
in developing deluxe, embossed, linen-like napkins sold initially to the restaurant and institutional trade. To promote this type of sale the firm
hired a man experienced in the restaurant business. The company also developed napkins bear-

NONINTEGRATED PAPER MILLS
SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND

xx
X

)(

0)/

lxx><

)(
)()(

)(

x~"llxll'

)()(

Fi tchburg

~)(

i~h.l\1,-

•

Ho lyoke

~x" t/':·• Spr)( )(ingfield

W orceste r
)(

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)()(
)(

Hortford

e ,})<ir><

)(

SALES GROWTH OF PAPER COMPANIES
1947-1958
50

United Stole$

New Engl,;1nd

T onnage

Nonintegroted,
New England

Dollar Value, Deflated

Successful Nonintegroted,
New England*

*soud

on sompf~ of

39 lirnn

ing promotional messages for advertising use.
The advertisers bear a substantial part of the
cost of these napkins, and the mill can sell this
product at about half the cost of regular napkins.
This firm's merchandising skill is combined with
a unique ability to do quality printing on extremely soft napkin paper stock.
The more aggressive mills watch the product
lines of large companies in search of a small volume product which the small firm can produce
more efficiently because of greater flexibility. But
two can play this game, and a competitive disadvantage facing most independent mills is the
loss of their new products to larger mills. These
smaller mills, which must innovate to survive,
always face the danger that an integrated mill
will take over their largest volume product and
make it more cheaply. This danger is lessened for
paper manufactured from many different wood
pulps or from other materials.
Another major problem facing specialty producers is their dependence on a few large customers. This problem is particularly serious because some of the most profitable accounts are
often lost through technological change in the
fast growing end-user industries. One company
attacked this problem through an arrangement
for long-term contracts with several of its large
customers. The company was allowed to charge a
premium price for what it sold to them as long as
it carried out a definite product improvement
program to meet the customers' changing technological needs.
Because of the critical importance of management in the success of the mills the more creative
firms in New England, even those which are
family owned, have made an effort to attract outsiders with new ideas. Sometimes they have managed to get highly capable technical directors
and sales managers from larger, integrated firms.
A major factor which caused these executives to
leave a larger firm was the greater freedom of ac4

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tion and recognition for achievement in the small
creative firm.
The aggressiveness of the field sales effort is
another characteristic of the successful mills.
Salesmen are thoroughly trained, carefully supervised, and compensated in such a manner as to
encourage an active search for new customers and
new product ideas. A number of the specialty
mills hire only trained chemists or engineers as
salesmen to help customers write specifications
for new products and anticipate new specialty
paper needs.
In contrast many of the salesmen for the less
successful firms have little technical training and
have almost no interest in product development.
Many of their salesmen often put in as little as
one third of their time in the field, spending the
remainder on details such as sales correspondence
and order processing, which could better have
been delegated to lower paid personnel at the mill.

Mergers
The problems of the independent mills have
caused many of them to merge with larger integrated firms. The merger gives assurance of a
source of pulp supply during periods of shortage.
The greater financial resources of the larger company provide an inducement to mills with capital
needs. But the most important motivation is
usually the research laboratories and nationwide
marketing facilities of the larger companies. The
merger gives the larger firm the small mill's capacity and the know-how of the work force in
manufacturing many different types of specialty
papers. This skill is difficult to duplicate in a
larger mill accustomed to manufacturing production grades of paper.
It seems quite probable that the unfavorable
economic conditions which the southern New
England mills have faced will become more intense in the years to come. Many large firms are
developing wood pulps which will supplant raw
wood pulp fiber. The trend toward larger corporate units and national sales organizations continues. Every year large expenditures on research
and development become more essential for survival. Whether the nonintegfated mills can survive will depend on their willingness to learn from
the experiences of the successful members of
their group. Creative firms have pointed the way,
adaptive ones are starting to follow, but many of
the mills, unless saved by merger, may well go
out of business.
This article is based on a doctoral t~esis by Stu<?-rf: U. ~ich
at Harvard Graduate School of Bus11;1ess Adm~nistration,
where he is assistant professor of busmess adm1rustrat1on.
The study, Product Policies of Non_intet,ratef;l New England
Paper Companies, was conducted with the aid of a res~arch
grant from the Federal Reserve Bank of ~oston. ~op1es. of
a condensed version of the thesis will be available th!s commg
winter, and requests for copies may be made at any time to the
bank's research department.

New England BUSINESS REVIEW

New England} 1970

$28 Billion in Liquid Savings
Savings held through institutions have grown
rapidly during this century. National holdings of
liquid savings rose from about $5 billion in 1900
to about $290 billion in 1959. This is a 58-fold increase, a much greater expansion than shown in
such economic measures as Gross National Product, national wealth, and total demand deposits,
all of which grew some 25-fold over this period.
Liquid savings consist of assets which can
easily be "cashed in," or transformed into cash
at stated values. The types included in this anal~
ysis are time deposits at commercial banks, savings deposits at mutual savings banks, shares of
savings and loan associations and cooperative
banks, and United States savings bonds. Equities
in life insurance policies are also included because
they are roughly equal to cash surrender values.
Liquid savings can also be held in currency and
demand deposits. These holdings are not included
in this analysis because of the difficulty of estimating holdings for saving~ and those for current
transactions. Credit union shares, amounting to
only about $34 million in New England, are also
excluded, because of the lack of historical data.
In broad terms, there are three outlets for savings. The saver can invest directly in some capital
good like farm or machinery. He can invest more
indirectly in capital goods by buying stocks,
marketable bonds, or mortgages. The least direct
way is for the saver to place his money with an
institution which does the investing for him.
Use by savers of institutions to invest their
money is termed the institutionalization of savings. Liquid savings rose from 25 percent of
GNP in 1900 to 53 percent in 1929, and have
since risen only slightly more, to about 60 percent in 1959. Thus the institutionalization of
savings proceeded at a three times faster pace
prior to 1929 than since.
In recent years liquid savings growth in New
England has tended to lag slightly behind that in
the nation. This is evident in most categories,
especially in time deposits at commercial banks,
shares at savings and loan associations and cooperative banks, and U. S. savings bonds. Presumably there is some shift within the region to
other forms of saving, notably common stocks,
but data is not available to confirm this.
What is the outlook for liquid savings for the
next ten years? Experience of the last 60 years
seems to rule out a decline in the ratio of liquid
savings to GNP. The choice thus reduces to
either a continuation of the postwar stability in
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LIQUID SAYINGS
New

Billions of Dollars
15
-1959

l!l!!!!!!!!!I

E ■ gland

1970 Projected

0
Tim• Oeposih

Sovings
Bonds

Soving1 &
loon

Shor.s

Life Ins
Equ,ti.s

Mutual

Total Liquid

Savings
Deposits

Savings

the ratio or a resumption of its earlier rise. Since
the postwar stability has now prevailed for 15
years, it seems best to expect a continuation for
the next 10, with perhaps some possibility for a
slow rise. The present and projected composition
of liquid savings in the region is shown above.
While liquid savings in New England are not
expected to rise as rapidly as in the nation over
the coming decade, the difference should be small
judging by postwar experience. If so, New Eng~
land per capita holdings in 1970 should continue
to be well above the national average, with the
present 40 percent edge narrowed only slightly.

Historical Trend
The behavior of liquid assets in relation to
Gross National Product raises a question: Why
should the ratio have risen for 45 years and then
remained stable for the next 15?
There appear to be no ready explanations for
the greater growth in liquid savings than in total
national weal th prior to World War II. One possibility lies in the slower growth of agriculture,
resulting in a smaller share of national income
that can be invested directly by the farmer in his
farm. But agriculture amounted to only 20 percent of GNP in 1909, so even a decline to zero
would not explain the liquid asset rise from 25
percent to 60 percent of GNP.
A stronger case can be made if this agricultural
decline is combined with the general rise in urbanization which saw large, specialized businesses
replace the small, owner-operated, and more selfThis article, <_>ne in a series of projections of the New Eng•
land economy, 1s_based on a study, New England Banking and
Othf!r Financial Functions in 1970, Copies of the full study are
available on request from the research department of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.

contained businesses. These shifts reduced the
possibilities of direct investment of savings and
led to institutionalization of the process.
Liquid assets are not related as much to national wealth, however, as they are to debt in the
nation. Liquid assets themselves are debt. They
represent, in the main, ownership in other debt,
since the principal assets of savings institutions
are debt instruments in the form of government
and private bonds and private mortgages. As
shown in the chart on this page, the relationship
between total debt and GNP has been fairly
stable over the long term, but the ratio of liquid
savings to total debt has grown.
Why have liquid savings stabilized at 35 percent of total debt (and at 60 percent of GNP}?
One possible explanation suggests that people
have, on the average, reached the desired amount
of liquid savings they want to hold relative to
their incomes. Additional amounts of savings are
put into bonds, stocks, and real estate.
The explanation appears to be refuted by the
fact that New England's liquid savings amount
to over 90 percent of disposable income as compared to an average ratio of just over 70 percent
for the nation (gross product data is not available by region). But New England is characterized by special features which may account for
the higher ratio. Agriculture is less important in
the region and the population is about 7 percent
older on the average; both factors are associated
with a higher relative level of liquid savings.

Another possible explanation of the postwar
stability of the liquid savings ratio is that it is
only a temporary pause in the rise, caused perhaps by inflation. The postwar era is the longest
peacetime inflationary period following a war in
our history. The effect of this inflation on liquid
savings is probably not so much direct losses in
the purchasing power of these savings as the
great inflationary gains that have accrued to
other investments such as real estate and stocks.

Department Store Sales Gain
Sales of New England department stores appear headed for a record volume this year. At the
end of August sales were running 4 percent higher
than in 1959, which was tied with 1956 for top
dollar volume honors.
If allowance is made for vagaries of the calendar, including the shift in the date of Easter,
sales have consistently exceeded year-ago levels
except in May, when they equalled those in May
1959. The closeness of Easter to Mother's Day
may have reduced sales volume for the latter
event. Somewhat cooler and damper weather this
May than in 1959 also had a depressing effect on
the beginning sales of light-weight clothing and
other summer goods. Such sales picked up in
June, however, and continued above year-earlier
levels in July. Back-to-school promotions in
August fared better than in 1959.
Better-than-average sales gains have occurred
in departments selling a wide variety of goods,
such as cotton yard goods, costume jewelry,
handbags and small leather goods, shoes, children 's clothing, blouses, skirts and sportswear,
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floor coverings, lamps and shades, sporting goods
and cameras as well as most basement departments. Gains in sales of records have not been
sufficient to offset declines in sales of television
sets. Also trailing last year's results are sales of
women's and misses' suits, handkerchiefs, books
and magazines, and gift shop items.
The sales increases have been accompanied by
similar increases in the use of credit. The total
of charge accounts outstanding has risen 4 percent and instalment accounts 9 percent, sparked
by a 12 percent gain in revolving credit outstanding. Collection ratios on these accounts
have stayed close to year-ago levels so far this
year.
Inventories are higher than a year ago but are
generally in line with the increased sales levels.
With sales gains for the first eight months of the
year in hand, merchants are looking forward to a
continuance in the remaining months, hoping
that electioneering will not divert too much consumer attention from their wares and that consumer incomes will continue to rise.
New England BUSINESS REVIEW

Compacts Highlight Automotive Market
Stimulated by the increasing popularity of the
compact car, sales of new passenger cars in the
United States were 11 percent ahead of 1959 in
the first half of this year. Sales of standard-size
cars declined, but compacts more than made up
the difference.
Domestic manufacturers now offer six compact
lines. The Big Three introduced four of their own
compact models this year to meet growing domestic and foreign competition. With smaller
dimensions, economical upkeep, and lower selling
prices, the compacts showed great strength in
1959. The sudden switch in public preference to
the smaller car surprised most manufacturers.
The compacts claimed 10 percent of new car
registrations for 1959. This year their share of
the domestic market has been even greater. They
had captured 24 percent in March. April found
these little cars inching up to 28 percent of new
car sales. They were a significant factor in pushing back the standard-size car sales 13 percent
from a year ago. The standards rallied in May
apparently due to dealers' determination to move
them, and caused the compacts' share of the
market to drop two points to 26 percent.
One reason for the inroads the compacts are
making into the standard car market is price.
Their quoted price averages 9 percent less than
the low-priced standards. This means more cars
must be sold to yield the same revenue.
Sales of new cars (including imports) in 1960
are expected to reach 6.3 million, which would
represent an increase of some 300,000 over last
year. New passenger car registrations totaled
3,411,000 through June of this year. This compares with 3,087,000 in the first half of last year.
NewEngland'sshareofthissix-month 1960mar-

ketwas 195,000cars- 34,000more than last year's
period. This 21 percent jump shows a thorough
endorsement of the small car in the region. All six
states showed new car sales increases this year,
Massachusetts leading with 27 percent.
Another area where the impact of the compact
is felt is the used car market. Here again, the
price of the compact is a factor. A one-year-old
sedan, selling for about $3,200 new, would ordinarily fetch $2,600 in the used car market. Most
lending agencies want one third to one fourth
down and the balance in 24 months. But a customer will think twice when he can buy a new
compact for several hundred less, with a warranty, smaller down payment, and better terms.
This results in a tight squeeze on the used car
market. The dealer, anxious to sell his new cars,
is forced to buy the used car at a high price. He
runs into difficulty when he attempts to move
this expensively-bought used car at a profit or
minimum loss because of the competing compact.
The third place where the compacts are exerting pressure is foreign imports. U. S. manufacturers have been viewing with some alarm the
increase in sales of foreign cars from 379,000 in
1958 to 610,000 in 1959. Last year imports represented 10 percent of total U. S. sales.
U. S. economy cars are cutting into imports.
In this year's first quarter imports were selling
6 percent ahead of last year, one factor being
limited production of U. S. makes due to steel
strike influences, but the April figure shows a 10
percent drop. Total import sales through the first
half of 1960 are estimated at 271,000 units. This
is 7 percent less than the comparable 1959 figure.
Sports car impor ts are doing better, but sedans
are losing out. Sales of imports are not coming
as easily as in the past two years. New England,
however, managed to show a 9 percent increase

in foreign car registrations over the first six
months of 1959.
Automobile credit extensions reached a record
high during the first half of this year both in New
England and the nation. Because repayments of
these loans are also high, the level of automobile
purchase credit rose about the same amount as in
the first half of 1959, and about one-third less
than during the boom auto year of 1955.
More varied lines, lightweight aluminum engines, 4-cylinder motors, and other innovations
are expected to give compacts a larger share of
the 1961 market. The increase in models will also
bring greater sales effort among manufacturers.
The die has been cast. The manufacturers are
retooling for 1961. When the new models come
out this fall, the compact car will be out in front.
September 1960

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BANKING

EMPLOYMENT-UNEMPLOYMENT

8illion1 ot 0oJlo •

New England

Millions

OffOSITS
-4.6
NONAGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT

A.2

3.8

..---------C-O_M_M_E_R_CI_A_L..,..l0_A_N_$_ _ _ _ _ _- - r

l.8

1.0 l-f\l'---..___ _ _...__ _ __.__ _ ___,__ _ _.l\f'--1

1956
*uv1sto

MANUFACTURING INDEXES
(seasonally adjusted)
All Manufacturing
Primary Metals
Textiles
Leather
Paper

1960

1958

UNITED STATES
(1957 = 100)

NEW ENGLAND
(1950-52 = 100)

MASSACHUSETTS
(1950-52 = 100)
July '60

June '60

July '59

July '60

June '60

July '59

July '60

June '60

July '59

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

125

126r
95r
50
127r
107

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

124
90
71
129
131

122r
95r
73
129r
124r

110
86
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

110
87
115
n.a.
112

108
81
121
111
114

94
50
129
111

NEW ENGLAND

UNITED STATES
Percent Change from:

Percent Chan&P. from:

BANKING AND CREDIT
Commercial and Industrial Loans ($ millions)
(Weekly Reporting Member Banks)
Deposits ($ millions)
(Weekly Reporting Member Banks)
Check Payments ($ millions)
(Selected Cities)
Consumer Installment Credit Outstanding
(index, 1950-52 = 100)
TRADE
Department Store Sales
(index, seas. adj. 1 947-49 = 100)
Department Store Stocks
(index, seas. adj. 1947-49 = 100)
EMPLOYMENT, PRICES, MAN-HOURS, & EARNINGS
Nonagricultural Employment (thousands)
Insured Unemployment (thousands)
(excl. R. R. and temporary programs)
Consumer Prices
(index, 1947-49 = 100)
Production-Worker Man-Hours
(index, 1950 = 100)
Weekly Earnings in Manufacturing ($)
OTHER INDICATORS
Construction Contract Awards ($ thous.)
(3-mos. moving averages May, June, July)
Total
Residential
Public Works
Electrical Energy Production
(index, seas. adj. 1947-49 = 100) *
Business Failures (number)
New Business Incorporations (number)
* Figure for last week of month

8
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July '60

June '60

July '59

+10

108,725

223,608

-11

+13

280.5

+14

149

167

+ 1
+15

53,171
1,693

+ 2
+23

126.6

96.9

- 4

4,463

8,677

-10

252.4

149

3,679
132

0
+ 7

129.3
(Mass.)
87.0

83.37

176,600
78,358
26,705
220

2
0

(Mass.)

6
+ 2
+20
+ 2

38
-28
-16
881
n.a. = not available
r = revised

July '59

June '60

126

July '60
31,241

1,469

91.14

3,468,636
1,421,594
660,457
272

-10
- 7
+ 4

- 7

1,146
14,676

+
+

8
2

-17
+ 6
+ 7

-14
-12

+7
-12

Nt!w England BUSINESS REVIEW

Full text of New England Economic Review : September 1960

FRASER