Full text of New England Economic Review : December 1963

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

Part II, State Loans and Loan Guarantee Programs

New War Between the States
In Part 1 of this series (October, 1963), the Bu~iness Development Corporation
movement was described as the first of the "Blue" industrial development weapons.
In effect, this typically Yankee movement represents an extension of the commercial
hanking system in order to pool greater risks. While primarily aimed at furthering
state economic development, the movement was also an attempt to stem the development of direct and indirect credit programs by government.
Although useful and successful as a supplier of risk money, the movement has
not completely succeeded in warding off direct state loan programs. In fact, states
as Yankee as they come - Maine and New Hampshire - under pressure of slow
economic growth have yielded to the use of state money and credit for industrial
loans.
The use of public money for such private purposes is not new. In fact, defaults
(Continued on page 2)

~(

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

New England's Inconstant Growth Rate.page 6,

on state and municipal loans in the 19th century
led many states to enact specific constitutional prohibitions against such use of public funds. As the
competitive war between the states has grown more
intense, however, many of these prohibitions have
been dropped. At present the financial impact of
state loans and loan guarantees is relatively insignificant. Still, some aspects of the state direct loan
programs are potentially dangerous for reasons
discussed below.

Industrial Building Authorities
An industrial building authority is essentially a
state-sponsored loan insurance program for industrial buildings. In principle it is quite similar to
the FHA insurance provided by the Federal Government for home loans. The state authority insures a
loan ranging up to ·90 percent of the land and building costs. The loan itself is placed with some private
lender such as a bank or insurance company. To
back the loan, the state pledges its full faith and
credit and usually provides a reserve fund for claims
in the case of a default.
Loan insurance programs now exist in seven
states. Collectively, they have only 15 years of experience. So far no losses have occurred. Two defaults did occur in Maine, but both buildings were
soon leased at terms covering the defaulted principal
and interest. Some critics have been disturbed because of the state's contingent liability resulting
from such a building authority. Judging from past
experience. however. this risk does not appear significant. Almost all the programs have the security
of a first mortgage position on tangible industrial
property distributed throughout the state. Moreover,
while most of the firms do not have prime credit
ratings, their leases provide additional security.
Barring a major depression it seems unlikely that
most programs will become continually dependent
on state funds.
The actual cost of this insurance is borne primarily
by the borrower through a % to 1 percent charge
on outstanding balances. This revenue is usually
enough to cover the direct administrative charges
and to add to the fund. Sometimes administrative
costs are absorbed by the respective state industrial
development agencies until sufficient volume warrants a full-time staff. The board which actually
reviews the application is made up of bankers and
other interested citizens who serve without pay.

2
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Excluding the insurance fee, interest charged by
the lender ranges from 5 to 6 percent. The upper
rate is thus 3/4 of a percent higher than FHA home
mortgage loans which are of longer average duration. When the service charge is added to the basic
interest rate, the total cost to the borrower is between 6 and 63/4 percent. Altogether the cost of this
financing is slightly higher than conventional bank
mortgages.
In well-established programs the insurance fee
has been large enough to cover administrative cost
and to help build the reserve fund. The riskless
nature of the loan usually permits the bank to lower
its interest charge to at least partially offset the
service fee. It is conceivable that the service charge
in the future could be reduced to ¼ percent at
least for some loans. At such a low rate, some banks
might use this program extensively if only to be
exempt from the legal restriction limiting the amount
of a bank mortgage loan to two-thirds or threefourths of the assessed value of land and buildings.
Historically banks have shied away from mortgages on industrial building especially if the resale
value of the property was at all questionable. A byproduct of this program is that the bankers' resale
problem is reduced. Compared with similar uninsured loans, those that are insured are easier to
sell and therefore more desirable assets. This feature may make such insurance an extremely significant form for financing industrial building.
A state program for industrial mortgage insurance makes risk credit available to some capital-shy
firms with good income prospects. Any increase in
the efficiency of the state's industrial plant enhances
its over-all competitive position. With little encroachment on public funds such a program may
stimulate a large amount of new industrial building
in the future. A similar program, the Federal home
mortgage insurance plan, encouraged new home
building of almost revolutionary proportions.
Two New England states, Maine and Rhode
Island, are the pioneers with a combined 11 years
of experience in the program.
They have extended insurance
Neufor loans of almost $26 million,
England
representing most of the loans
Experience
insured to date in this program.
If their experience is typical, building insurance is
primarily useful for established firms within the
state employing fewer than 200 workers. However,
New England BUSINESS REVIEW

STATE DIRECT LOAN AND LOAN GUARANTEE PROGRAMS
ALASKA

■

I I
I I

HAWAII

I

I
I

I

E

------.J ',
I

-----r __
:
I

I

I

\

j \_{_
----,---

/

I

\I

/I
\

r

\

,---------~

I
f'' ____ ,___

I

I

/

\

I

l

I

(

I

_

■ Building

l
I

\

)

\( ----1-------~•
)
:
:
'

".---

I
\
r"
1.------,l

:---------',

/

L_

\

I

t
~--~
'

)

\

Aulhorities-Loan Guorantees

State Guarantee of Municipal Bonds

■

Direct Industrial Loans - All Areas

/.--,--I
I
I
I

,'

:
I

__,___r--..----J

~

'l

I -----~

/

~ Direct Industrial Loans - Only For Labor Surplus Areas
~ Defined By The State

'---.

I

_.,,--~~,

E - Electric Power Facilities Only
N - Nat Yet Active

Direct Industrial Loons - Jointly With Federal ARA
Only For Depressed Areas

the use of one-fourth of the insured loans for relocation and expansion of out-of-state firms shows
the program's ability also to attract industry into
the state. Since their start, the programs have helped
these two states create or sustain about 7,200 jobs.
Connecticut's recently activated building insurance program indicates the usefulness of this type
of insurance in a relatively prosperous state. If the
present rate of application and approval continues,
the responsible officials feel that the initial authorization of $25 million may be fully used before the
end of its first year of activity. Such volume represents substantial modernization of plant facilities
for small and middle-size firms.
Connecticut's program has the added feature of
varying the service charge according to the degree
of risk determined by both the firm's credit rating
and the plant's resale potential. This important
innovation may provide for broader use of the
program.
Almost all state development officials in New
England are pleased with their handiwork. The
initial response to Connecticut's program surpassed
the most optimistic expectations of its officers.
Maine's representatives call the building authority
DigitizedDecember
for FRASER
1963
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

"extremely effective- the backbone of Maine's program." Rhode Island leaders agree that it is a
"significant contribution."
One criticism of the building authority movement
is that in general initial appropriations have been
too small to provide adequate
reserves for possible defaults.
One
Maine's current reserve covering
Reservation
1/17 of outstanding loans and
1/ 40 of maximum insured loans
comes closest to being adequate. Reserves theoretically should be sufficient for most short run
contingencies without resorting to special bond
issues or emergency appropriations. Without adequate reserves, insurance programs may become
unduly conservative in order to protect themselves.
Also they may meet with less than full acceptance
by the banking community.

Direct Loan Programs
Interstate competition for industry has led some
states to use state money extensively in direct loan
programs as opposed to loan insurance programs.
Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, and Kentucky account for most of the experience to date.
3

Moreover, such giant industrial states as Ohio and
New York are just entering the field.
In twenty years of collective experience, industrial
loan programs in 11 states have provided $60
million of long-term loans for industry, primarily in
depressed areas, and have incurred only small
losses- .05 percent of the total above.
Although these programs were first directed to
depressed areas, many now encompass the whole
state. If the states continue to vie with each other,
they may start offering interest-free loans to encourage industrial development. The next step would
be outright capital gifts. Conceivably states might
find themselves deeply involved in the banking
business with most industry demanding the subsidy.
Furthermore, state direct loan programs are partially dependent on artificially low interest rates
made possible by the general revenue of the state
or tax exempt securities. When a tate lends at its
lon g- term borrowing cost, its tax exempt borrowing
privileges are transferred to private industry. If state
direct loan programs were to be greatly expanded.
the result would be a large increase in the volume
of tax exempt securities. It is highly unlikely that
the Federal Government would tolerate indefinitely
another inroad on its tax base. Even without federal
intervention, a large increase in the supply of tax
exempts would mean that the states would have to
pay more for the money they borrow.
Most states, recognizing the potential dangers of
the use of state credit have built into the programs
some restrictions which limit the
use of state credit for industrial
Needed
purposes. However, these restricSafeguards
tions have not been adopted in
every state, and they could be
eroded through the force of interstate competition.
Unless minimum safeguards are adopted and maintained by most states, federal legislation may become
necessary. Some highly desirable limitations for
state direct loan programs are:
Depressed Areas Only- The use of direct loans
by a state should be limited to its less prosperous
areas. Of the 14 states using this development tool,
only eight have included this provision.
There seems little justification for extensive use
of state funds to aid industrial growth in relatively
healthy areas. In those localities, the building authority form of insurance could provide feasible
projects with ample funds at reasonable rates, such

4
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

as 6 or 6% percent.
Several state programs are in fact designed simply
to supplement the Federal Redevelopment program
for direct loans to industries in depressed areas.
These state programs usually provide half of the
needed state and local share where the depressed
communities have difficulty in meeting their participation requirements ( 10 percent).
Minimum Interest Rates- Interest rates should
be sufficient to cover both the state's cost of borrowing and the administrative costs of the lending program. Some states charge less. Pennsylvania and
Ie w York charge as little as 2 or 2¾ percent for
direct loans in depre sed areas even though the
actual or expected cost of money to the state is 3
percent or more.
A minim urn rate providing a floor against the
forces of interstate competition should be established. This should be high enough to cover costs
and make loans self-liquidating. A rate of 31/~ or
-l- percent would minimize the danger to state tax
fund s. but at the same time maintain the advantage
of offering higher risk loans at lower cost than can
be provided by commercial lenders.
No Alternative Source- State loans should be
extended only when financin g i not available from
conventional financial institutions. Where financing
by private sources is adequate, there is no need to use
public tax funds. Unfortunately, six states have not
included this clause, probably the most important
of all safeguards. Where the financial needs can be
serviced through the cooperation of several banks
jointly, the use of state funds should be withheld,
even though it is to the financial advantage of the
botTO\\ er to obtain state funds. This omission might
be extremely dangerous except that many states
without this provision have included a requirement
for bank participation.
Bank Participation- The requirement that banks
participate in state loans is widespread. The range
of participation varies from 10 to 50 percent among
the states. Typically, the bank receives the first
mortgage position for this participation.
ew
Hamp hire and Hawaii are the only states where
the regulations do not require some form of bank
participation. This safeguard enables the directors
of the state loan program to take advantage of the
experience of commercial lenders. It also calls the
attention of commercial lenders to the need for particular financing.
New England BUSINESS REVIEW

Limited to Land and Buildings-State loans
should be limited to land and buildings. Nine states
also provide long-term loans for machinery and
equipment. If a state underwrites the entire cost of
a project, it assumes most of the risks and leaves
the "owners" virtually no financial liability. Such a
situation hardly encourages sober management
judgment. Furthermore, much equipment is useful
only for specific purposes, with little resale value,
thus raising the risk to state funds. A possible alternative to limiting loans to land and buildings is a
maximum of 75 percent of the cost of land, building, and equipment.
Community Participation-A common, though
perhaps not as essential, requirement is community
participation. This requirement varies. In ten states
the local community must provide from 5 to 20
percent of the loan. In one state the local foundation
is merely a legal mechanism to administer the loan.
Only three states have omitted a provision for .local
support.
Such a requirement moderates the extent of a
state loan program by providing another "board of
. "
review.
Despite these reservations, it cannot be denied
that direct loan programs are effective tools for
the states which have adopted
A
them. Like the building authority, the direct loan program has
Powerful
been
used primarily by estabTool
lished firms within the state employing fewer than 200 workers. Another similarity
is the proportion of firms from out-of-state ( about
one-quarter) , using the direct loan program. However, this program :financed significantly more
newly established firms-40 percent of all loans
compared to only 2 percent for building authorities.
This might indicate that the direct loan program
has taken more inherent risks. In addition, a
greater proportion of direct loans were made to
firms with 200 to 500 employees.
The most developed program is the Pennsylvania
Industrial Development Authority (PIDA). Describing its achievements, a representative of the
State's Department of Commerce said:
As of April 1963, PIDA made 286 loans of
$38,006,445 on projects to cost $107,966,389;
anticipated employment is 45,454 and anticipated
payroll is $171,108,046. These loans are primarily for relocations and expansions and many

December 1963
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

of them would not have taken place in Pennsylvania were it not for PIDA.
This program is limited to Pennsylvania's less
prosperous areas. As a supplement, another program
for statewide building insurance has been introduced
this year. This combination has much to recommend
it to states interested in promoting industrial development through direct loan programs without becoming overextended.
Perhaps the most unorthodox use of state funds
for industri.al development purposes has taken place
in New Hampshire. State funds there were used not
only for industrial parks but also for speculative
building-that is, building without specified tenants.
Although the program has been remarkably successful ( of the 7 buildings put up, 6 were eventually
filled) the authority has recently adopted a more
conservative approach. In the future, emphasis will
be on building to meet the needs of a specific industrialist. Furthermore, loan guarantees will be
emphasized in lieu of direct loans of state funds.

Primary Significance
State development financing devices are primarily
significant for making industrial building projects
possible, rather than providing lower than average
interest rates. There is little justification for providing money at artificially low rates. It is doubtful that
saving of even 2 or 3 percent on interest cost has
much influence in determining the location of a
plant, other factors considered.
By providing a mechanism for the pooling of high
risk loans, a state can make a real contribution to
both the state and the national economy through
encouraging innovation and greater efficiency. Even
if adopted in all 50 states, the building authority
would contribute to economic growth. This is not
necessarily true of the state direct loan program.
Without necessary safeguards, interstate competition
may bring about undesirable changes in our financial and government institutions.

The New England Business Review is produced
in the Research Department. Edwin C. Gooding was
primarily responsible for the article, "New War
Between the States - Part II, State Loan and Loan
Guarantee Programs." Supplementary material is
available on request.

5

New England's Inconstant Growth Rate
The rate of growth of the New England economy
has slowed down this year from its pace in the 19601962 period when its increase in personal income
matched the Nation's. Estimates by Business W' eek
for the first nine months of this year indicate that
the region's personal income was up only 3.0 percent
over the same period last year. This compare with
a 5.2 percent increase in the Nation.
Regional economic indicators other than personal
income also show little growth. During the first ten
months of 1963. total nonagricultural employment
m ew England was virtually unchanged from the
same period last year. In contrast, the Nation had
a 2 percent rise.
With little change in employment and a stable
workforce, the region's seasonally adjusted unemplo) ment rate has declined only slightly so far this
year. from 5.6 percent last January to 5.5 in October.
In the ation the rate declined from 5.8 percent to
5.5 percent over this period.
To be sure, some types of regional activity are
holding near their previous highs or forging ahead.
Department store sales so far this year are running
4 percent above la t ) ear's level. Construction contracts, after a spectacular advance of 17 percent in
1962 over 1961, increased by 3 percent through
October from the corresponding period last year.
When all type of activity are aggregated. however.
as in the income and employment data, the region's
growth is clearly less than a year ago.

The Massachusetts Problem
To a considerable extent the region's slower
growth this year reflect the relatively static situation
prevailing _in Massachusetts. The other New England
states as a group show an advance over last year
well above that of Massachusetts in most economic
indices. Personal income is up only 1 percent in
Massachusetts while the rest of Iew England shows
a 5.0 percent rise, close to the ation 's 5.2 percent.
This lag in Massachusetts is due chiefly to a slackening in employment. So far this year nonagricultural
employment in the State has declined one-half percentage point, wherea the other five New England
states show a 1 percent gain.
The weakness in the Massachusetts' economy is
also reflected in its unemployment rate, which this

6
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

year is averaging a half percentage point above its
level last year at 5.8 percent of the workforce.
The remainder of New England, on the other
hand, is averaging 5.3 percent, the same rate as
last year.
The rise in unemployment is spread throughout
Massachusetts. Except for Boston, all the State's
major labor markets show an increase in unemployment through July of this year. Unemployment rates
have averaged 8.2 percent, compared to 7.5 percent
over the same period last year.
To di cover the underlying causes of the slowdown in Massachusetts, it is necessary to examine
the component sectors of the economy. So far this
year nonmanufacturing employment has continued
to advance with jobs up more than 1 percent over
1962 levels. This, however, is still less than half the
rate in the ation. Growth in this sector has no
doubt been dampened by the decline which has
taken place in manufacturing. This year until now
employment in manufacturing has averaged 3 percent lower in the State than last year. This has
occurred while the rest of New England was maintaining its year-ago level.
The trend of manufacturing employment in Massachusetts began to fall and to diverge from the rest
of the region and the United States at the beginning
of 1962. Ever since, the gap ha widened steadily.
In comparison with the 1957-1959 period, Massachusells' level of employment in soft goods industries was consistently lower than its neighbors' and
the ation 's over the 1960-1963 period, but the level
in the durable goods sector was high enough to offset thi through 1961. After that, however, employment in hard goods began to decline. Now it i!; lower
than the average for the remaining states of the region and for the Nation.
Well over half the employment drop in durable
goods has occurred in the electrical machinery industry, where electronics production is concentrated.
Employment there shows a 7 percent decline through
October of this year compared to the corresponding
period a year ago. In the Boston area alone, the
industry's decline represents a loss of about 5,300
jobs. As noted in the November Business Review,
new orders for the industry have been slow in commg; by the end of September they were down by
New England BUSINESS REVIEW

ELECTRICAL MACHINERY EMPLOYMENT
Percent
l40 Index: 1957 _59 =100 Seasonally Adjusted

tammg their year-ago
production levels.
The Future

New England's prospects next year depend
to a large extent on
120
whether the Massachusetts' economy begins
to show improvement
110
over its relatively static
position of the moment. Some signs indi100
cate that the State's setback may be only tem90....__ _ _ _ _____.._ _ _ _ _ _
porary.
1960
1961
1962
1963
According to a survey made by this Bank,
Massachusetts' manufacturers are spending 13 perover 3 percent from 1962 :figures. All other durable
goods industries except for instruments have also
cent more for new plant and equipment this year
than last. This is despite the 5 percent cutback in
registered some employment loss over the period.
outlays by the State's electrical machinery proOver one-half of Massachusetts' durable goods
ducers. The gain is more than double that expected
employment is concentrated in industries, such as
for New England as a whole and for the Nation.
electrical machinery, which are highly dependent on
Moreover, preliminary spending plans for 1964,
expenditures for defense and space exploration. The
as formulated in August and September of this year,
State's share of defense prime contract awards fell
indicate that eight manufacturing industries, inby a percentage point between fiscal 1962 and 1963
cluding transportation equipment, instruments,
to 4.2 percent of the national total. This meant an
paper, and printing, expect to increase outlays in
absolute decline of $250 million in these awards for
Massachusetts.
Massachusetts. These awards do not include subThree-fourths of the respondents expect their sales
contracts received by firms in the State. However,
to improve next year, while only 7 percent foresee
previous studies have indicated that the trends of
a decline.
subcontracts and prime contracts tend to move
The ability of Massachusetts' manufacturers to
together.*
obtain increased defense and space business wi11
In Massachusetts' nondurable goods industries
have much to do with the realization of these exonly food and printing show employment gains
pectations. A study by the Greater Boston Economic
this year over last. The largest employment decline
Study Committee found that almost one-half of sales
this year has occurred in leather and shoes. Emby
the electronics industry in that area goes to the
ployment through October of this year was averagFederal Government, while less than an eighth is for
ing 0 percent, or more than 3,000 jobs, below the
households and other private consumers. This points
comparable period last year. This is in contrast to
up a serious problem for the State, and for the rethe rest of New England, where employment in
leather and shoes shows virtually no change from
gion as a: whole. Industrial composition has changed
year-ago levels.
from a concentration in textile production to one in
space and defense related industries which rely to
This pattern of shoe employment is a reflection
a large extent on government orders. This, of course~
of production levels within the region. Shoe output
can lead to sharp fluctuations in growth. A wider
by Massachusetts firms is 5 percent below last year,
while firms in the rest of New England are maindiversification of markets among the government,
industrial, and consumer sectors would be helpful
*See, "Military Expenditures in New England," Research
Report No. 14 (1961), Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
in reducing these wide swings.
130

Digitized December
for FRASER1963
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

- L_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . __ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,

7

NEW ENGLAND MANUFACTURING
Percent
130

COIIERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL LOANS
$ Billions
1.8

Seasonally Adjusted
Index: 1957-59· 100

DISTRICT 1

1.7
120

MANUFACTURING INDEXES (seasonally adjusted)
1957-59 = 100
All Manufacturing

NEW ENGLAND
pOct. '63
Sept. '63
Oct. '62
122
120
117

UNITED ST A TES
Oct. '63
Sept. '63
Oct. '62
127
126
120

Nonelectrical Machinery
Electrical Machinery
Transportation Equipment

130
130
148

125
132
142

122
130
138

131
134
131

129
134
129

123
130
122

Textiles, Apparel, Leather
Textiles
Apparel
Leather
Paper

105
106
111
n.a.
118

105
108
108
98
117

102
107
103
96
113

122
121
129
n.a.
128

121
120
127
106
127

116
115
121
101
121

-

NEW ENGLAND

UNITED ST A TES

Percent Change from,

BANKING AND CREDIT
Commercial and Industrial Loans ($ millions)
(Weekly Reporting Member Banks)
Deposits ($ millions)
(Weekly Reporting Member Banks)
Check Payments ($ millions)
(Selected Cities)
Consumer Installment Credit Outstanding
(index, seas. adj. 1957 = 100)
DEPARTMENT STORE SALES
(index, seas. adj. 1957-59

=

100)

EMPLOYMENT, PRICES, MAN-HOURS & EARNINGS
Nonagricultural Employment (thousands)
Insured Unemployment (thousands)
(excl. R.R. and temporary programs)
Consumer Prices
(index, 1957-59 = 100)
Production-Worker Man-Hours
(index, 1957-59 = 100)
Weekly · Earnings in Manufacturing ($)
OTHER INDICATORS
Construction Contract Awards ($ thous.)
(3-mos, moving averages Aug., Sept., Oct.)
Total
Residential
Public Works
Electrical Energy Production (4weeksending Nov.2, 1963)
(index, seas. adj. 1957-59 = 100)
Business Failures (number)
New Business Incorporations (number)

8

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Oct. '63

Sept. '63

Oct. '62

Percent Change from:

Oct. '63

1,644

-

2

+

4

36,231

5,207

+

2

+

6

+15

12,958

+12

Sept. '63

Oct. '62

2

+

6

135,284

0

+

6

200,643

+11

+12

+

139.8

+

1

+

9

154.6

+

1

+12

112

-

9

+

1

113

-

7

+

3,839
112

0
1

+

0
5

58,320
1,325

+

0
3

+

+

-

5

0

+

1

107.2

0

+

1

0

+

1

104.4

1

+

2

1

+

6

100.53

0

+

4

+17
+19
+14
+ 7

108.7
(Mass.)
97.3

-

92.40
(Mass.)

+

212,579
82,900
31,108
135

-

1
1
-28
- 1

+10
- 7
-27
+ 5

4,027,184
1,899,898
143

2
2
0
0

n.a.
975

n.a.
+23

-

n.a.
5

n.a.
16,741

n.a.
+22

p

=

preliminary

+
+

694,879

n.a.

=

+

3
2

n.a.
9

not available

New England BUSINESS REVIEW

1963 Index of Articles
New England Business Review, January through December

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON

BANKING AND FINANCE
Consumer Instalment Credit Up (July, p. 5)
Interest Rates on Time Deposits (Jan., p. 7)
New Cars and Longer Loans (Aug., p. 5)
New War Between the States ( Oct., p. 1)
New War Between the States: Part II, State Loans
and Loan Guarantee Programs (Dec., p. 1)
Stabilizing Foreign Exchange Markets (Mar.,
p. 1)
Time Deposit Operating Results, 1962 ( June,
p. 1)
•
Use of Cash in Payments (Sept., p. 5)

BUSINESS CONDITIONS
Annual Review of New England Business: 1962
Business Performance--Good Though Erratic
(Jan., p. 1)
New England's Inconstant Growth Rate (Dec.,
p. 6)
Review of the First Quarter: In Search of a Trend
(May, p. 1)
Review of the Second Quarter: A Mild Response
to an Uptrend (Aug., p. 1)
Review of the Third Quarter: A Variable Pattern
of Economic Strength (Nov., p. 1)

FOREIGN TRADE AND FINANCE
New England Investment Overseas (Feb., p. 1)
Stabilizing Foreign Exchange Markets (Mar.,
p. 1)

INCOME AND SPENDING
Consumer Instalment Credit Up (July, p. 5)
New Cars and Longer Loans (Aug., p. 5)
Outlays Up Slightly (May, p. 9)
Spring Spending Plans Maintained (Nov., p. 5)

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
New War Between the States (Oct., p. 1)
New War Between the States: Part II, State Loans
and Loan Guarantee Programs (Dec., p. 1)

INDUSTRY
Measuring New England's Manufacturing Production ( Oct., p. 6)
New Boston and New Concrete (Apr., p. 5)
New England's Inconstant Growth Rate (Dec.,
P· 6)
Nonelectrical Machinery-A Leader (Feb., p. 5)
Outlays Up Slightly (May, p. 9)
Spring Spending Plans Maintained (Nov., p. 5)
The New England Furniture Industry (July, p. 1)
Transportation Equipment-An Industry of
Growing Importance (June, p. 6)

EDUCATION
State Aid for Education in New England (Sept.,
p. 1)

POPULATION
People in New England (May, p. 6)

RETAIL TRADE
E:'.\IPLOY:'.\IENT AND WAGES
New England's Inconstant Growth Rate (Dec.,
p. 6)
New England's Long-Term Unemployed (Mar.,
p. 6)
Nonelectrical Machinery-A Leader (Feb., p. 5)
Reduced Unemployment in 1962 (Jan., p. 10)
Retaining the Unemployed: Part III, Retraining
-A Good Investment (Apr., p. 1)
The New England Furniture Industry (July, p. 1)
Transportation Equipment-An Industry of
Growing Importance (June, p. 6)


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Easter Sales Gain Modest (May, p. 4)
Last-Minute Rush Sets Record (Jan., p. 11 )

TAXES
State Aid for Education in New England (Sept.,
p. 1)

VACATION BUSINESS
Skiing Growth Continues (May, p. 5)
Strong Start to Ski Season (Feb., p. 7)
Vacation Season a Record, but . . . ( Sept., p. 5)