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MONETARY POLICY AND THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION FEBRUARY 25, 2015 Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services Serial No. 114–4 ( U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE WASHINGTON 95–048 PDF : 2015 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES JEB HENSARLING, Texas, Chairman PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina, Vice Chairman PETER T. KING, New York EDWARD R. ROYCE, California FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico BILL POSEY, Florida MICHAEL G. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan SEAN P. DUFFY, Wisconsin ROBERT HURT, Virginia STEVE STIVERS, Ohio STEPHEN LEE FINCHER, Tennessee MARLIN A. STUTZMAN, Indiana MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida ROBERT PITTENGER, North Carolina ANN WAGNER, Missouri ANDY BARR, Kentucky KEITH J. ROTHFUS, Pennsylvania LUKE MESSER, Indiana DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona ROBERT DOLD, Illinois FRANK GUINTA, New Hampshire SCOTT TIPTON, Colorado ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas BRUCE POLIQUIN, Maine MIA LOVE, Utah FRENCH HILL, Arkansas MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking Member CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York NYDIA M. VELÁZQUEZ, New York BRAD SHERMAN, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts RUBÉN HINOJOSA, Texas WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts DAVID SCOTT, Georgia AL GREEN, Texas EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut JOHN C. CARNEY, JR., Delaware TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama BILL FOSTER, Illinois DANIEL T. KILDEE, Michigan PATRICK MURPHY, Florida JOHN K. DELANEY, Maryland KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio DENNY HECK, Washington JUAN VARGAS, California SHANNON MCGAHN, Staff Director JAMES H. CLINGER, Chief Counsel (II) VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI CONTENTS Page Hearing held on: February 25, 2015 ............................................................................................ Appendix: February 25, 2015 ............................................................................................ 1 55 WITNESSES WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2015 Yellen, Hon. Janet L., Chair, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ................................................................................................................... 5 APPENDIX Prepared statements: Moore, Hon. Gwen ............................................................................................ Yellen, Hon. Janet L. ....................................................................................... ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD Yellen, Hon. Janet L.: Monetary Policy Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to the Congress, dated February 24, 2015 .................................... Written responses to questions for the record submitted by Representative Duffy ....................................................................................................... Written responses to questions for the record submitted by Representative Hurt ........................................................................................................ Written responses to questions for the record submitted by Representative Luetkemeyer .......................................................................................... Written responses to questions for the record submitted by Representative Moore ...................................................................................................... Written responses to questions for the record submitted by Representative Mulvaney ................................................................................................ Written responses to questions for the record submitted by Representative Sinema .................................................................................................... Written responses to questions for the record submitted by Representative Waters .................................................................................................... Written responses to questions for the record submitted by Representative Huizenga ................................................................................................ (III) VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 56 57 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 68 124 129 132 136 138 146 149 158 VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI MONETARY POLICY AND THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY Wednesday, February 25, 2015 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, Washington, D.C. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room HVC–210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Jeb Hensarling [chairman of the committee] presiding. Members present: Representatives Hensarling, Lucas, Garrett, Neugebauer, McHenry, Pearce, Posey, Fitzpatrick, Luetkemeyer, Huizenga, Duffy, Hurt, Stivers, Fincher, Stutzman, Mulvaney, Hultgren, Ross, Pittenger, Wagner, Barr, Rothfus, Messer, Schweikert, Dold, Guinta, Tipton, Williams, Poliquin, Love, Hill; Waters, Maloney, Velazquez, Sherman, Meeks, Capuano, Lynch, Green, Cleaver, Moore, Ellison, Perlmutter, Himes, Carney, Foster, Kildee, Delaney, Sinema, Beatty, Heck, and Vargas. Chairman HENSARLING. The Financial Services Committee will come to order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess of the committee at any time. Today’s hearing is for the purpose of receiving the semiannual testimony of the Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on monetary policy and the state of the economy. We should advise all Members that today’s hearing will end at 1 p.m., in order to accommodate the Chair’s schedule. I now recognize myself for 3 minutes to give an opening statement. As Chair Yellen delivers her semiannual report today, we have an opportunity to examine the state of the Fed’s balance sheet, but it is the precarious state of family balance sheets that must be foremost on our minds. That coincidentally is the title of a recent report by the Pew Charitable Trust, which rightly concludes that, ‘‘Many American families are walking a financial tightrope.’’ Since the President embarked on his economic program, middle-income families have found themselves with smaller paychecks, smaller bank accounts, and further from financial independence. Millions have become so discouraged trying to find a job that they have simply given up and left the workforce. Although we have happily seen some recent improvement in our economy, Americans are still mired in the slowest, weakest recovery of the post-war era, this in spite of the single largest monetary stimulus in America’s history. Why is this recovery so anemic? No doubt, it is hampered by Obamacare, the Dodd-Frank Act, and the other roughly $617 billion in new regulatory costs imposed by the Administration. This is something monetary policy cannot remedy. On top of this is the (1) VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 2 burden of $1.7 trillion in new taxes that fall principally upon our engines of economic growth: small businesses; entrepreneurs; and investors. Monetary policy cannot remedy this either. Then there is the doubt, uncertainty, and regulatory burden that grows as more and more unbridled discretionary authority is given to unaccountable government agencies. Although monetary policy cannot remedy this, it can help. During the most successful periods of our Fed’s history, the central bank appeared to follow a clear rule, methodology, or monetary policy convention. Today, however, it favors a more unpredictable and somewhat amorphous ‘‘forward guidance,’’ which creates uncertainty. For example, just moments after the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) released its policy statement on December 17th, the Dow surged over 300 points, seemingly based upon nothing more than the substitution of the word ‘‘patient’’ for the phrase ‘‘considerable time.’’ And when Chair Yellen’s predecessor once publicly mused about the mere possibility of tapering Quantitative Easing, markets took a deep dive. Thus, there does not appear to be all that much ‘‘guidance’’ in the Fed’s ‘‘forward guidance.’’ As one former Fed President recently wrote, ‘‘Monetary policy uncertainty creates inefficiency in the capital market. The FOMC gives lip service to policy predictability, but its statements are vague. The FOMC preaches that policy is datadependent, but will not tell us what data and how.’’ Many prominent economists believe that the American people will enjoy a healthier economy when the Fed begins to adopt a more predictable method of rules-based monetary policy, one of its choosing. Opponents argue any reforms threaten the Fed’s monetary policy independence, but the greatest threat to the independence of the Fed comes from the Executive Branch, not the Legislative Branch. While the Federal Reserve Chair testifies publicly before this committee twice a year, she meets weekly with the Treasury Secretary in private. And for decades, there has been a revolving door between Treasury officials and Fed officials, which continues even today. With respect to reform, accountability, and transparency on the one hand, and independence in the conduct of monetary policy on the other, these are not mutually exclusive concepts. After DoddFrank, a quadruple balance sheet, massive bailouts, unprecedented credit market interventions, and the financing and facilitation of trillions of dollars of new national debt, this is clearly a very different Fed. Chair Yellen, I will listen very carefully to constructive suggestions that improve Fed reform ideas, but I for one believe Fed reforms are needed, and I for one believe Fed reforms are coming. I now recognize the ranking member for 3 minutes. Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And welcome back, Chair Yellen. Since you last joined us in July, the economy has enjoyed a string of positive developments. In the past 3 months alone, we have seen the best stretch of hiring in 17 years, GDP growth is up, and the outlook for inflation continues to remain low. There is no VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 3 doubt now that the post-crisis policy of quantitative easing, which you have extraordinarily championed in the face of countless Republican attacks, has played a major role in turning the economy around. But while I could talk all day about the macroeconomic gains we have made, the brutal truth is that millions continue to teeter on the brink of severe poverty and financial collapse. People in my district are still struggling to recover from the crisis. Systemic inequities distort progress and opportunity for tens of millions of Americans, most especially low- and middle-income Americans, and communities of color. A look at the data presents a staggering picture of the racial wealth gap, which continues to widen. While some home values have increased, Black communities have failed to bounce back. In 2013, the number of White families with underwater mortgages was 5.45 percent compared to 14.2 percent for African-Americans. One-in-nine White Americans have less than $1,000 in assets. But for Latino-Americans, that ratio is one-in-four; for African-Americans, it is one-in-three. The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis reports that the average wealth level for Whites is $134,000 as compared to an astonishing $14,000 for Latinos and $11,000 for African-Americans. And in retirement, there is a dramatic disparity. In 2013, White families had over $100,000 more in average liquid retirement savings than African-Americans. Meanwhile, the rich get richer and Republicans push policies that would only exacerbate this inequity, not stem it. Chair Yellen, as you discuss the state of our economy, I am particularly interested in hearing how the least fortunate among us are faring in this time of unprecedented growth for big banks, Wall Street, and the wealthiest among us. And I would like to hear your view on how we can provide more opportunity to this often overlooked segment of our population. So, in light of this sobering wealth gap, I am basically astounded that Republicans continue politically to be motivated in the ways that they are. I welcome you, Chair Yellen, and I look forward to your views on these important issues. And I yield back the balance of my time. Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Huizenga, chairman of our Monetary Policy and Trade Subcommittee, for 2 minutes. Mr. HUIZENGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will point out to our ranking member that what motivates me—and I think my fellow Members—is making sure that the Federal Reserve is doing its job properly. Last Congress, when we did a Federal Reserve Centennial Oversight Project looking at the last hundred years of the actions of the Fed, it became clear that the Federal Reserve has gone above and beyond its original mandate mission of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. In fact, since the enactment of DoddFrank, the Federal Reserve has gained unprecedented power, influence, and control over the financial system, which was already quite strong, while remaining shrouded in mystery for the American people. VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 4 Additionally, given the interconnectedness of the global financial system, there is no doubt that the Federal Reserve’s monetary policies have significantly impacted the international markets and foreign economies as well. I am concerned how the Fed’s decisions are influencing other central banks and interested how it will shake out as we are seeing our friends and economic partners seemingly going in the opposite direction from where we are going. Needless to say, the Fed’s recent high degree of discretion and its lack of transparency in how it conducts monetary policy suggests, as the Chair had said, that reforms are needed. Likewise, I am also concerned that the Fed’s regulatory policies and development of these policies are sort of layered in one uncoordinated mandate on top of another without examining the impact on hardworking American families and small businesses on Main Street. The Federal Reserve has proven time and time again that its government-knows-best approach doesn’t hold the cure for what ails the economy. I know you were not here for the passage of DoddFrank. Much like me, you are just living with the echo effects of it. But not only are innovators, entrepreneurs, and job creators uneasy to invest because of the environment that has been created by this failed framework, hardworking middle-income families are paying the price, I believe. It is time we restore certainty as well as fiscal responsibility, and we must lift the veil of secrecy to ensure that the Fed is accountable to the people’s Representatives, the same people who created the Federal Reserve in the first place. It is time to bring the Federal Reserve out of the shadows and provide hardworking taxpayers with a more open and transparent government. I am excited for today’s hearing. And, frankly, I hope we do more of it. Thanks. Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, the ranking member of our Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, for 2 minutes. Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the ranking member. And I thank the Chair for appearing today. Thank you very much. I am very much concerned about many things. Obviously, with the Fed, we have to balance the transparency of the Fed with the independence of the Fed, and in so doing, there are some rhetorical questions that I think are appropriate. Do we want Congress to gain control of the Fed? The independence is an important aspect of the Fed’s existence since 1913, and the Fed has served us well. Do we want the same Congress—that cannot fund Homeland Security—to have control of Fed funding? Do we want the same Congress—that cannot draw conclusions as to how we should reform immigration in this country—to have control of the Fed? I think it is important for us to have opportunities to have transparency but not at the expense of the independence of the Fed. We understand the mandates, and the low interest rates have made a difference. I compliment not only you but also Chair Bernanke because he stood fast in some difficult circumstances. And I think the Fed has made a significant difference in the recovery that we find ourselves experiencing. VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 5 We have not come far enough. I join the ranking member with her comments with reference to certain segments of society that have been left behind. We have to do more, but I don’t want to sacrifice the independence of the Fed for transparency. I yield back. Chairman HENSARLING. Today, we welcome the testimony of the Honorable Janet Yellen, Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Chair Yellen has previously testified before this committee, so I feel confident that she needs no further introduction. Without objection, Chair Yellen’s written statement will be made a part of the record. Chair Yellen, you are now recognized for your oral testimony. Thank you. STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JANET L. YELLEN, CHAIR, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM Mrs. YELLEN. Thank you. Chairman Hensarling, Ranking Member Waters, and members of the committee, I am pleased to present the Federal Reserve’s semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress. In my remarks today, I will discuss the current economic situation and outlook before turning to monetary policy. Since my appearance before this committee last July, the employment situation in the United States has been improving along many dimensions. The unemployment rate now stands at 5.7 percent, down from just over 6 percent last summer and from 10 percent at its peak in late 2009. The average pace of monthly job gains picked up, from about 240,000 per month during the first half of last year to 280,000 per month during the second half. And employment rose 260,000 in January. In addition, long-term unemployment has declined substantially. Fewer workers are reporting that they could find only part-time work when they would prefer full-time employment. And the pace of quits, often regarded as a barometer of worker confidence in labor market opportunities, has recovered nearly to its pre-recession level. However, the labor force participation rate is lower than most estimates of its trend and wage growth remains sluggish, suggesting that some cyclical weakness persists. In short, considerable progress has been achieved in the recovery of the labor market, though room for further improvement remains. At the same time that the labor market situation has improved, domestic spending and production have been increasing at a solid rate. Real gross domestic product is now estimated to have increased to the 33⁄4 percent annual rate during the second half of last year. While GDP growth is not anticipated to be sustained at that pace, it is expected to be strong enough to result in a further gradual decline in the unemployment rate. Consumer spending has been lifted by the improvement in the labor market as well as by the increase in household purchasing power resulting from the sharp drop in oil prices. However, housing construction continues to lag. Activity remains well below levels we judge could be supported in the longer run by population growth and the likely rate of household formation. VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 6 Despite the overall improvement in the U.S. economy and the U.S. economic outlook, longer term interest rates in the United States and other advanced economies have moved down significantly since the middle of last year. The declines have reflected, at least in part, disappointing foreign growth and changes in monetary policy abroad. Another notable development has been the plunge in oil prices. The bulk of this decline appears to reflect increased global supply rather than weaker global demand. While the drop in oil prices will have negative effects on energy producers and will probably result in job losses in this sector, causing hardship for affected workers and their families, it will likely be a significant overall plus on net for our economy. Primarily, that boost will arise from U.S. households having the wherewithal to increase their spending on other goods and services as they spend less on gasoline. Foreign economic developments, however, could pose risks to the outlook for U.S. economic growth. Although the pace of growth abroad appears to have stepped up slightly in the second half of last year, foreign economies are confronting a number of challenges that could restrain economic activity. In China, economic growth could slow more than anticipated, as policymakers address financial vulnerabilities and manage the desired transition to less reliance on exports and investment as sources of growth. In the Euro area, recovery remains slow, and inflation has fallen to very low levels. Although highly accommodative monetary policy should help boost economic growth and inflation there, downside risks to economic activity in the region remain. The uncertainty surrounding the foreign outlook, however, does not exclusively reflect downside risks. We could see economic activity respond to the policy stimulus now being provided by foreign central banks more strongly than we currently anticipate, and the recent decline in world oil prices could boost overall global economic growth more than we expect. U.S. inflation continues to run below the committee’s 2 percent objective. In large part, the recent softness in the all-items measure of inflation for personal consumption expenditures reflects the drop in oil prices. Indeed, the PCE price index edged down during the fourth quarter of last year and looks to be on track to register a more significant decline this quarter because of falling consumer energy prices, but core PCE inflation has also slowed since last summer, in part reflecting declines in the prices of many imported items and perhaps also some passthrough of lower energy costs into core consumer prices. Despite the very low recent readings on actual inflation, inflation expectations, as measured in a range of surveys of households and professional forecasters, have thus far remained stable. However, inflation compensation, as calculated from the yields of real and nominal Treasury securities, has declined. As best we can tell, the fall in inflation compensation mainly reflects factors other than the reduction in longer term inflation expectations. The committee expects inflation to decline further in the near term before rising gradually toward 2 percent over the medium term as the labor market improves further and the transitory ef- VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 7 fects of lower energy prices and other factors dissipate, but we will continue to monitor inflation developments closely. I will now turn to monetary policy. The Federal Open Market Committee is committed to policies that promote maximum employment and price stability, consistent with our mandate from the Congress. As my description of economic developments indicated, our economy has made important progress toward the objective of maximum employment, reflecting in part support from the highly accommodative stance of monetary policy in recent years. In light of the cumulative progress toward maximum employment and the substantial improvement in the outlook for labor market conditions, the stated objective of the Committee’s recent asset purchase program, the FOMC concluded that program at the end of October. Even so, the Committee judges that a high degree of policy accommodation remains appropriate to foster further improvement in labor market conditions and to promote a return of inflation toward 2 percent over the medium term. Accordingly, the FOMC has continued to maintain the target range for the Federal funds rate at zero to a quarter percent and to keep the Federal Reserve’s holdings of longer term securities at their current elevated level to help maintain accommodative financial conditions. The FOMC is also providing forward guidance that offers information about our policy outlook and expectations for the future path of the Federal funds rate. In that regard, the Committee judged in December and January that it can be patient in beginning to raise the Federal funds rate. This judgment reflects the fact that inflation continues to run well below the Committee’s 2 percent objective and that room for sustainable improvements in labor market conditions still remains. The FOMC’s assessment that it can be patient in beginning to normalize policy means that the Committee considers it unlikely that economic conditions will warrant an increase in the target range for the Federal funds rate for at least the next couple of FOMC meetings. If economic conditions continue to improve, as the Committee anticipates, the Committee will at some point begin considering an increase in the target range for the Federal funds rate on a meeting-by-meeting basis. Before then, the Committee will change its forward guidance. However, it is important to emphasize that a modification of the forward guidance should not be read as indicating that the Committee will necessarily increase the target range in a couple of meetings; instead, the modification should be understood as reflecting the Committee’s judgment that conditions have improved to the point where it will soon be the case that a change in the target range could be warranted at any meeting. Provided that labor market conditions continue to improve and further improvement is expected, the Committee anticipates that it will be appropriate to raise the target range for the Federal funds rate when, on the basis of incoming data, the Committee is reasonably confident that inflation will move back over the medium term toward our 2 percent objective. It continues to be the FOMC’s assessment that even after employment and inflation are near levels consistent with our dual mandate, economic conditions may for some time warrant keeping VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 8 the Federal funds rate below levels the Committee views as normal in the longer run. It is possible, for example, that it may be necessary for the Federal funds rate to run temporarily below its normal longer run level, because the residual effects of the financial crisis may continue to weigh on economic activity. As such factors continue to dissipate, we would expect the Federal funds rate to move toward its longer run normal level. In response to unforeseen developments, the Committee will adjust the target range for the Federal funds rate to best promote the achievement of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. Let me now turn to the mechanics of how we intend to normalize the stance and conduct of monetary policy when a decision is eventually made to raise the target range for the Federal funds rate. Last September, the FOMC issued its statement on policy normalization, principles, and plans. The statement provides information about the Committee’s likely approach to raising short-term interest rates and reducing the Federal Reserve’s security holdings. As is always the case in setting policy, the Committee will determine the timing and pace of policy normalization so as to promote its statutory mandate to foster maximum employment and price stability. The FOMC intends to adjust the stance of monetary policy during normalization primarily by changing its target range for the Federal funds rate and not by actively managing the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. The Committee is confident that it has the tools it needs to raise short-term interest rates when it becomes appropriate to do so and to maintain reasonable control of the level of short-term interest rates as policy continues to firm thereafter even though the level of reserves held by depository institutions is likely to diminish only gradually. The primary means of raising the Federal funds rate will be to increase the rate of interest paid on excess reserves. The Committee also will use an overnight reverse repurchase agreement facility and other supplementary tools as needed to help control the Federal funds rate. As economic and financial conditions evolve, the Committee will phase out these supplementary tools when they are no longer needed. The Committee intends to reduce its security holdings in a gradual and predictable manner, primarily by ceasing to reinvest repayments of principal from securities held by the Federal Reserve. It is the committee’s intention to hold in the longer run no more securities than necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of monetary policy and that these securities be primarily Treasury securities. In sum, since the July 2014 Monetary Policy Report, there has been important progress toward the FOMC’s objective of maximum employment. However, despite this improvement, too many Americans remain unemployed or underemployed; wage growth is still sluggish; and inflation remains well below our longer run objective. As always, the Federal Reserve remains committed to employing its tools to best promote the attainment of its objectives of maximum employment and price stability. Thank you. I would be pleased to take your questions. [The prepared statement of Chair Yellen can be found on page 57 of the appendix.] VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 9 Chairman HENSARLING. Thank you, Chair Yellen. The Chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes for questions. Chair Yellen, I think I heard you say in your testimony that a modification of forward guidance will not necessarily lead to a modification of the target Fed funds rate. Is that what I just heard you testify? Mrs. YELLEN. Modification—not— Chairman HENSARLING. Forward guidance does not necessarily lead to a modification of your target Fed funds rate. Is that—I believe I read— Mrs. YELLEN. It means—a modification of the guidance would mean that we wish to consider whether or not to raise the Federal funds rate on a— Chairman HENSARLING. I am reading from your written testimony now: ‘‘It is important to emphasize that a modification of the forward guidance should not be read as indicating that the Committee will necessarily increase the target range.’’ Mrs. YELLEN. Yes. Chairman HENSARLING. Okay. Mrs. YELLEN. So— Chairman HENSARLING. I guess I just question, then, how much guidance there is in forward guidance. We have had this discussion before in private and public concerning a predictable rules-based monetary policy. Again, prior to becoming Chair, when you previously served as a Member of the Board, I believe you indicated that the Taylor Rule, in particular, ‘‘is what sensible central banks do.’’ In previous testimony, I believe your last testimony before our committee, I thought I heard you say that you still believed that but that the timing was not right because we are still in extraordinary times. Perhaps I am putting some words in your mouth, but that was the essence of what I thought I heard in your last testimony. And yesterday, before the Senate, you testified that, ‘‘I am not a proponent of chaining the Federal Open Market Committee in its decision-making to any rule whatsoever.’’ A couple of observations. I think you are familiar with the legislation that was furthered by Mr. Huizenga. Perhaps ‘‘rule’’ is an intimidating term, but under his legislation—call it rule, call it process, call it methodology—the Fed would set the rule, the Fed could waive the rule, the Fed could change the rule at will as long as it publicly told the rest of us what it was doing. I am not sure what, with respect to that proposal, the Fed would be chaining itself to, so I guess my question is this: Do you no longer believe that a rules-based policy like the Taylor Rule is what sensible central banks do? Is it a question of timing, or have you simply changed your mind? Mrs. YELLEN. What—the view that I was offering, that is a statement I made in 1995. I was comparing the Taylor Rule to other rules that were simpler and indicating that that was a rule that, up until that time, from the mid-1980s until the mid-1990s, had worked well. Chairman HENSARLING. Chair Yellen, it is just that your statement of yesterday doesn’t seem to leave a whole lot of wiggle room. VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 10 Mrs. YELLEN. I don’t believe in chaining—that the Fed should chain itself to any mechanical rule. I did not believe that in 1995; I do not believe it now. And I had the privilege to meet with Professor Taylor right after he proposed the Taylor Rule in 1993, and I agree with the views that he expressed then. If I could quote— Chairman HENSARLING. If we want the ability to— Mrs. YELLEN. He said, ‘‘Operating monetary policy by mechanically following a policy rule is not practical.’’ Chairman HENSARLING. Okay. Well, Chair Yellen, let me ask you this question. Mrs. YELLEN. —benchmarks that a central bank could refer to in deciding— Chairman HENSARLING. Let me ask you this question. It you had the ability— Mrs. YELLEN. And I continue to hold that view. Chairman HENSARLING. —to waive the rule and change the rule, how is one chaining themselves? Mrs. YELLEN. I don’t believe that any mechanical rule that links monetary policy to one or two variables, in the case of Taylor-Ruletype equations— Chairman HENSARLING. Okay. I understand— Mrs. YELLEN. —it is two variables. We take into account a wide range of factors that impact the performance over time of the economy and— Chairman HENSARLING. Chair Yellen, I think I understand your position. Mrs. YELLEN. —benchmark— Chairman HENSARLING. Forgive me, but I am beginning to run out of time here. The second and last question I will ask: Yesterday, you stated in Senate testimony that you are not seeking to alter Dodd-Frank, apparently in any way or form. This was in an answer to a question by Senator Warren, whom I believe may be fairly alone in believing that Dodd-Frank is sacred text. Your predecessor said, as a general matter, ‘‘Dodd-Frank is a very big, complicated piece of legislation that addresses many issues. I am sure there are many aspects of it that could be improved in one way or the other.’’ Your own General Counsel, Scott Alvarez, has indicated problems with the swaps pushout provision. Board Member Daniel Tarullo has indicated a concern for the SIFI designation level and expressed support for explicitly exempting institutions below a certain size from the Volcker Rule. Barney Frank himself has indicated a willingness and interest in changing nonbank SIFI designations, asset thresholds for automatic bank SIFI designations, Volcker Rule end-user margin, and QM treatment for loans held in a portfolio. And so my question is, particularly as the Fed is the prudential regulator for thousands of community banks that are withering on the vine, is there any context for the answer you give, or is it that you believe Dodd-Frank cannot be altered and should not be altered in any way? Mrs. YELLEN. We are not seeking, we are not asking the Congress to alter it. The Act provides considerable flexibility for the Federal Reserve and other regulators to tailor rules that are appropriate to the institutions that we supervise. And while if we were VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 11 starting from scratch, no doubt we would have suggestions for different ways of having formulated one thing or another, it has been a very useful piece of legislation. It has provided a roadmap for us to take strong action to improve the safety and soundness of the financial system. And we have found ways to use the flexibility that Act affords us— Chairman HENSARLING. Thank you. Mrs. YELLEN. —to appropriately tailor our supervision. Chairman HENSARLING. Okay. Contrary to your predecessor or Barney Frank himself, at the moment, you seek no modifications. The Chair is way past his time. The Chair now recognizes the ranking member. Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much, Chairman Hensarling. Madam Chair, since the chairman took that line of questioning, I think, prior to raising a question with you, it is important to know that the chairman and I have met on more than, I think, one occasion to talk about community banks and whether or not there were steps that could be taken that would ensure that the community banks are not overly burdened with regulations and to separate out the community banks from regionals and big banks. And so it is not that Mr. Barney Frank, or I, or others believe that there never, ever, ever, can be any modifications, any changes. We have always said that we are open to technical changes and to working in areas where there may be confusion or appears to be duplication. So I want you to know that some of what is being raised with you is in ongoing discussions. And certainly—hopefully—if we can get the cooperation from the opposite side of the aisle on some of these issues, then there may be some room for some technical changes or modifications. Having said that, I am interested in what is happening with our living wills. Under Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act—as you know, robust living wills under Title I of Dodd-Frank Act are crucial in order to ensure that we have truly ended too-big-to-fail. In the past few years, many members of the public wrote to the FDIC and the Federal Reserve expressing frustration that the public portions of living wills have been disappointing. Specifically, the lack of public information makes it difficult for members of the public to assess the progress that firms and regulators have made on achieving the goals of Dodd-Frank, which is to reduce the complexity of the world’s most significant financial institutions and allow them to be resolved under ordinary bankruptcy proceedings without endangering the broader economy. In an August 2014 press release, the Fed noted that both they and the FDIC will be working with large banks to explore ways to enhance public transparency of future plan submissions. I want you, if you can, to elaborate on this commitment. What additional information does the Fed plan on releasing to the public so that we can know whether or not you are doing what we intended in Wall Street reform? If each living will is thousands of pages long, does the public really have any transparency if the Fed is only releasing about 30 or so pages of the plans? Here is what I am concerned about: First of all, we understand that the submissions are certainly not adequate, that they are not what they should be in many instances. These banks are huge— VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 12 the big banks we are talking about. They are complex, and we believe that the very top—sometimes the CEOs don’t even know and understand the complexity of their institutions. And these living wills are extremely important if we are to have a plan by which we can resolve them in the event we determine that they are putting us all at risk. What can you tell us to update us about these living wills? Mrs. YELLEN. Let me say that we are taking the living wills process very seriously. We have worked closely with the FDIC, and last summer we issued a set of joint letters to the largest firms, establishing a clear set of criteria of things that we want to see in their next submissions. They are very significant steps that will improve the odds of resolvability under the Bankruptcy Code. We have told them, for example, that they need to establish a rational and less complex legal structure that would improve resolvability; that they need to develop a holding company structure to support resolvability; that they need to change the way in their—some of their derivatives contracts, stay provisions, include stay provisions that would aid resolvability. We have told them that they need to make sure that shared services that support critical operations in core business lines will be maintained throughout resolution. And we are working with the firms to make sure that by July of this year, when they make their next submissions, we see very meaningful improvements. And I will say that in some of the largest firms, we have seen very meaningful steps toward reducing the number of legal entities along the lines that we have suggested. If we do not see the kind of progress that we expect, we have told these firms that we expect to find their submissions not credible. So, we are taking this process very seriously. Now, these living wills, as you said, they are often tens of thousands of pages. They contain a great deal of confidential information that doesn’t really belong, I think, in the public domain. But we have insisted that they provide information to the public in the public portion of their submission. And we are working with them to try to increase the amount of information, the amount of detail that is in the public portion so that you would be able to get a better understanding of how they are proceeding on this. Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much. Let me just move to another subject area quickly, market manipulation. Paul Volcker, the architect of the Volcker Rule, has said that one key loophole that remains in his namesake rule is the merchant banking exemption, which allows our banks to engage in activity in the real economy. This includes activities like owning or controlling shopping centers, power plants, coal mines, even oil tankers. Traditionally, we have wanted to separate the business of banking from activities in the real economy because blurring these distinctions runs the risk of banks engaging in anticompetitive behavior, manipulating markets, driving up costs for consumers, or just accruing too much political power over our economy. Any thoughts about that? Mrs. YELLEN. With respect to physical commodities, the Fed is engaged in a very careful review of the activities that we have permitted along these lines. And with respect to the concerns they VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 13 raise about safety and soundness, we are likely to propose new rules during this year. With respect to market manipulation, where there have been allegations of banks in the commodity areas manipulating markets, market manipulation is something that the CFTC and the SEC are charged with overseeing. Ms. WATERS. I see. Thank you. Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Huizenga, chairman of our Monetary Policy and Trade Subcommittee. Mr. HUIZENGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Chair Yellen, I appreciate you being here again. Before I go into an issue of joint concern regarding political influence on the Fed, I do want to just briefly touch on where the chairman had gone regarding my Federal reform bill from last term with Congressman Garrett. And just to be clear, we don’t dictate a rule, we don’t say you can’t change a rule. What we are looking for are some clearer forward explanations about where you are going. And I do want to do this 4 times a year rather than twice a year. My friend from Texas had said that he was concerned about gaining control by Congress and that he was concerned that we might not be all that functional. I will note that the HumphreyHawkins Act, which was also viewed as draconian, having the Fed dragged up here twice a year, happened in that special Kumbaya era of Watergate, not exactly a time of great cooperation here on the Hill. But it was because of precisely making sure that the House and the Senate had proper oversight of an entity that they created, the Federal Reserve. And I am curious, shouldn’t we be equally or even more concerned about the threats posed by Executive Branch influence? And I think we have just hit on a perfect example of this: Sort of this absolutely no changes to Dodd-Frank sounds like a 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue policy rather than the policy that has been talked about by the ranking member or the former Chair, Barney Frank, or has been voted on by this committee. My friends across the aisle joined me in voting unanimously for two of my bills last term that changed Dodd-Frank: one dealing with points and fees; another dealing with derivatives reform. That was a nine-bill package that the Executive Branch officially opposed because it changed DoddFrank. And it sailed through this committee. You join us twice a year, but it is my understanding that you hold weekly lunches or near weekly lunches with Treasury Secretary Lew. In fact, last year, according to your public schedule in research done by The Wall Street Journal, from February through December alone you held 51 meetings with the White House and 23 meetings with lawmakers. I don’t know exactly who those lawmakers were; I was Vice Chair of this particular committee. We did not—a meeting with me was not one of those 23 meetings. But that was 42 hours versus 18 hours of your time meeting with that. That is three-to-one that you were dealing with the Executive Branch versus the Legislative Branch, and again, that is bicameral. And I would be curious if you were willing to share any of the written summary of the items discussed with Secretary Lew—that would VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 14 help with transparency—and any of the agreements that were made during these meetings. And if not, I guess I just really want to discuss the Fed’s independence. Is it being unduly influenced by the Executive Branch? Mrs. YELLEN. The Federal Reserve is independent. I do not discuss monetary policy or actions that we are going to take with the Secretary or with the Executive Branch. We confer about the economy and the financial system on a regular basis. We participate jointly in many international meetings, including those of the G7 and G20, and we confer on matters that are coming before those groups. Mr. HUIZENGA. I would love to have a summary of that, of those conversations. That would be wonderful. We do this in the open public. Mrs. YELLEN. Yes. Mr. HUIZENGA. You see our television cameras over here. This hearing is on C–SPAN and a number of other places right now. And I think my goal with that particular bill is to do more of this. I think this is healthy for us, and by ‘‘us,’’ I don’t mean us as a legislature; I mean us as a system. And as I said, I don’t want to see 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue policies getting pushed through the Fed because many of the Fed officials that the chairman talked about believe that we need to have changes to Dodd-Frank, Members across the aisle believe that we need to have changes to Dodd-Frank. And it is bothersome to me that it appears that you are taking the position of the White House. Mrs. YELLEN. We have come and made suggestions about changes to Dodd-Frank in situations where we felt it really hampered our ability to appropriately supervise an entity. A case in point would be the application of the Collins Amendment to our ability to design appropriate capital rules for insurance companies. Mr. HUIZENGA. I look forward to more of those conversations and— Mrs. YELLEN. I do also want to say that it is obviously critically important that the Federal Reserve be accountable to Congress. We are accountable to Congress, and I personally and the Federal Reserve as an institution seek to provide all of the input that Congress needs for appropriate oversight. My colleagues and I have testified 16 times during the last—over the past year. And staff have provided countless briefings, but it is clearly important for us to— Mr. HUIZENGA. Actually 23— Mrs. YELLEN. —it is clearly important for us to provide the— Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Wisconsin, Ms. Moore, the ranking member of our Monetary Policy and Trade Subcommittee. Ms. MOORE. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And, Madam Chair, it is such a delight to see you here today. I just wanted to start by pursuing an answer that you provided to the ranking member about the orderly liquidation facility implementation, and I just want to know about your—the cross-border mechanism for resolution. VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 15 Mrs. YELLEN. The orderly liquidation in Title II is a procedure set up in Dodd-Frank for liquidating a firm. We were discussing something different, which is Title I, which is the provisions that firms need to make in their living wills to be resolvable— Ms. MOORE. And right. So that is why I am saying— Mrs. YELLEN. —bankruptcy— Ms. MOORE. You just mentioned what is being done. Update us on what is happening with cross-border. Mrs. YELLEN. With respect to cross-border issues and derivatives contracts, one of the things that could make it difficult either in orderly liquidation or bankruptcy to resolve a firm or a contract provision that goes into effect, immediately requiring a firm to make payments to holders of derivative contracts, to be able to resolve a firm. It is important that there be at least a short time, a day or so, during which a stay is put in effect on those provisions. And we have asked the firms—it is one of the provisions of the living wills—the large firms, to change those contracts to provide for such a stay. And they have had discussions and we have with—the International Swaps and Derivatives Association is a private sector entity that has a master contract that governs this. Ms. MOORE. Thank you so much, Madam Chair. Mrs. YELLEN. We are making progress. Ms. MOORE. My time is eroding, and I am satisfied with that answer. Listen, let me congratulate you or thank you for your excellent speech on perspectives on inequality and opportunity from the Survey on Consumer Finances. The Dow Jones has hit 18,000, and we have had 59 months of private-sector growth, a record for the last 18, 19 years. And then, when I try to give this kind of speech in front of my constituents, they just kind of scratch their head because they are not feeling it. So when you talked in your testimony about your mission at the Fed to reduce unemployment and—I guess I just wanted you to comment on inequality and what you think that does to our economy. Mrs. YELLEN. There are many factors that are responsible, I think, for rising inequality. And many of the factors are structural; they have to do with the nature of technological change in globalization. Ms. MOORE. What can the Fed do? Mrs. YELLEN. What we can do is try to assure a generally strong labor market where it is possible for those who want to work to find jobs in a reasonable amount of time. We can’t determine the wages associated with those jobs or what sectors those jobs will appear in, but the policies that we follow and the general state of the economy have an important influence on the overall strength of the job market. And we are trying to achieve a job market where individuals who seek to work and want to work are able to find work. Ms. MOORE. Thank you. Representative Sewell and I wrote you a letter expressing our concern that all municipal bonds were excluded from being highly qualified liquid asset rules under Basel III, but you said you were considering including certain municipal bonds at a later time. Can you tell me where you are at on that? VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 16 Mrs. YELLEN. Yes. We are working very expeditiously on that and hope to be able to identify some of those bonds that would qualify for different LCR treatment. We are in discussions with the other banking agencies on that. Ms. MOORE. Thank you so much. I see my colleague, Mr. Ellison, has arrived, and I am running out of time, so he might want to ask some questions about this too. I know you are taking an aggressive stance to deter and punish banks and bank employees that are involved with tax avoidance and money-laundering schemes to fight terrorism, which we are all for, but that does seem to impede on the ability to provide remittances and even the tithes that people are—and we are wondering why you can’t surgically—what efforts are you making to surgically cut off these illegitimate activities and to try to continue the remittances because people are starving. Mrs. YELLEN. This is an extremely important problem, and we are trying to work with other agencies and talk with interested members of this committee to see if we can’t devise some way to assure that remittances get, for example, to Somalia or to other places. This is a very difficult problem because the laws that Congress has passed on—the Bank Secrecy Act—have significant sanctions for violations, and banking organizations are very reluctant to engage in relationships where they think they are putting themselves at risk. The Federal Reserve, in our supervision, we want to make sure they have appropriate procedures in place. We can’t force them to take risks in this regard that they are unwilling to take. And so, this is a difficult problem. Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentlelady has expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. McHenry, vice chairman of the committee. Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you, Chair Yellen. Thank you for being here. I just want to go back to the chairman’s original question. The Fed is currently not seeking any changes to Dodd-Frank. Is that correct? Mrs. YELLEN. Yes. Mr. MCHENRY. Okay. You previously did seek changes to DoddFrank, though, did you not? Mrs. YELLEN. We indicated that it would be very helpful to see a change in the Collins Amendment that would help us with— Mr. MCHENRY. So you no longer need any help with DoddFrank? Is that the case now? Mrs. YELLEN. We are certainly finding it possible to use flexibility that we have to implement regulations in a way we think is appropriate. Mr. MCHENRY. You weren’t currently in your seat that you are holding now when Dodd-Frank was implemented, but— Mrs. YELLEN. I was not. Mr. MCHENRY. —the Federal Reserve is the largest regulator in Washington, the largest regulator in the financial marketplace broadly, and perhaps the largest regulator in the world. So when we have these discussions about Fed oversight, a significant function of the Federal Reserve is on this regulatory aspect that was VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 17 greatly enhanced through Dodd-Frank. Is that right? A significant amount of your time is on the regulatory front, not simply the monetary policy front? Mrs. YELLEN. Yes. Mr. MCHENRY. Okay. Mrs. YELLEN. Correct. Mr. MCHENRY. So, with these enhanced regulations and enhanced regulatory powers that we have been given, the Federal Reserve has been given through Dodd-Frank, do you have any concerns that that erodes your independence largely because your role is so much greater now in terms of financial regulation than it was prior to Dodd-Frank? Does that erode in any respect, or does it concern you that it would erode your independence going forward? Mrs. YELLEN. I think where independence is very important is in the day-to-day conduct of monetary policy. We operate supervision and regulation jointly with other regulators under the oversight of Congress. Mr. MCHENRY. But you are not concerned about the independence of the Fed when it comes to the regulatory piece? We have regulators in here regularly, many of them are on budget, and we have to appropriate money. The Fed is very different in that respect. So do you have any concerns about these enhanced powers you have been given and congressional oversight of those powers? Mrs. YELLEN. Oh, I think congressional oversight is appropriate in all those areas. Mr. MCHENRY. So no— Mrs. YELLEN. It certainly is. Mr. MCHENRY. Okay. So you are very fine with the Congress having intense oversight of your regulatory agenda and powers. Mrs. YELLEN. We testify regularly on our conduct of supervision and regulation. We put all regulations out for public comment and— Mr. MCHENRY. Does that in any way run counter to your independence on setting monetary policy? Mrs. YELLEN. I think monetary policy is different. Mr. MCHENRY. No, but I am asking a different question than you are answering actually. Does that run counter to the Fed’s independence broadly when we have intense oversight of the majority of the day-to-day operations of the Federal Reserve? Mrs. YELLEN. I don’t think it runs counter toward independence. Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you. I appreciate it. Along those lines, the Fed has not processed additional regulations when it comes to capital and liquidity requirements for community banks and large banks. Are you done with the rulemaking when it comes to capital and liquidity? Mrs. YELLEN. I think we are largely done. However, we have recently proposed a rule for so-called SIFI surcharges which would be additional capital requirements for the most systemic banks that we think should operate in the safer and sounder fashion given the likely spillover of distress at those institutions. Mr. MCHENRY. But in the short- and medium-term, are the Fed’s proposals, when it comes to capital and liquidity, sort of through? VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 18 Mrs. YELLEN. Largely through, but there is a net stable funding ratio that we will propose probably later this year as a rule which could be thought of as a liquidity requirement as well and to— Mr. MCHENRY. And is that— Mrs. YELLEN. —supplement the liquidity coverage ratio. Mr. MCHENRY. Okay. So along those lines, this capital buffer that you proposed, the Dodd-Frank requirements that have been imposed on lending and community banks, in particular, and the cumulative effect of Basel, Dodd-Frank, and these capital surcharges, has the Fed undertaken a cost-benefit analysis on these regulations and the cumulative effect on lending, economic growth, job growth? Mrs. YELLEN. At the outset of this regulatory process, there was a detailed cost-benefit analysis that was done by global regulators working through the Basel Committee, and the finding was that the benefits exceed the cost. Mr. MCHENRY. Sure, sure, but— Mrs. YELLEN. Because the cost— Mr. MCHENRY. —has the Fed— Mrs. YELLEN. —is so much greater but— Mr. MCHENRY. Has the Fed undertaken that analysis? Mrs. YELLEN. —we were part of that project, undertaking that analysis. Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from New York, Ms. Velazquez. Ms. VELAZQUEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Chair, welcome. In a very positive sign for our economy, new jobs are being created at a rate not seen since the 1990s, averaging nearly 250,000 new jobs every month in 2014. To what extent has monetary policy been responsible for this improvement in our economy— Mrs. YELLEN. Well— Ms. VELAZQUEZ. —in the labor market? Mrs. YELLEN. Thank you. I think monetary policy has made a significant contribution. We found that the headwinds resulting from that financial crisis were really impeding the recovery of the economy, and we found that we needed to take extraordinary steps to get the economy moving. That is why, for example, we didn’t follow the dictates of the Taylor Rule or a rule like that. We put in place a great—well, in fact, a Taylor Rule would have called for negative levels of short-term rates which we couldn’t put in place. So we have used tools like forward guidance and our asset purchase programs to try to restore economic growth and job creation in this economy. And of course, it is many years after the financial crisis and households and businesses have gone through their own difficult adjustments, and to a great extent, restored their health and are now better positioned, but I think monetary policy played a critical role. Ms. VELAZQUEZ. On the other hand, Chair Yellen, the financial industry continues to complain that the new capital standards will negatively impact access to credit, especially for small businesses. However, banks are continuing to ease lending and expect robust growth in 2015. Is there any truth to that claim? VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 19 Mrs. YELLEN. We look very carefully at small business lending to try to determine what is causing it to grow so slowly. We hear both from the business side and from the banking side that, in fact, the demand for small business loans is not very high, and I think that the banking industry, at this point, is looking to give additional small business loans but is not faced with much demand. But I think the uncertainties caused by the crisis, also the fact that home values fell so much, often the value in a person’s home is an important source of funding for a new small business, so small business formation has been very weak, and I think individuals, in thinking about starting small businesses, given the uncertainty in the economic environment, have been risk-averse in their behavior, but we are trying to take the steps we can to make sure that funding is available. Ms. VELAZQUEZ. And that leads to my next question. You commented recently that rebounding housing prices have restored much of the housing wealth we lost during the recession with working families experiencing some of the largest gains. With the prospect of economically stimulating low interest rates coming to an end, does the Fed have other tools to help lower a middle-income family’s built wealth for the long term? Mrs. YELLEN. I think our main tool to help low- and moderateincome families build wealth, aside from making sure that banks satisfy their CRA obligations in making sure that they serve the needs of low- and moderate-income communities is that we need a strong job market and a strong economy where jobs are readily available for those who want to work. And we have provided a great deal of accommodation, even when the time comes to begin to raise our target for short-term interest rates, and we will continue to provide a great deal of support for the economy and make sure that we will continue to see a good job market that continues to improve over time. That is an important objective. Ms. VELAZQUEZ. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman HENSARLING. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Garrett, chairman of our Capital Markets Subcommittee. Mr. GARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Chair Yellen. I am just going to follow up on Chairman Huizenga’s issues for the so-called independence of the Fed. There has been a lot of press focus on this issue recently, probably because of the likelihood of the Audit the Fed legislation moving now in the Congress. The main criticism by you and folks over at the Fed has been that this legislation will somehow subject the Fed to inappropriate political pressure and force you to make decisions on political grounds instead of sound fundamental market fundamentals. As a matter of fact, you just said over at the Senate yesterday that Audit the Fed is a bill that would politicize monetary policy, and would bring short-term political pressure to bear on the Fed. In theory, having a technocrat like the Fed simply implement monetary changes based on basic facts sounds appealing, but in practice, that is not anywhere close to what happens at the Fed. Now, the Chair just gave one example of this. Let me run through seven examples or more by you and the Fed which clearly VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 20 indicate that the Fed is already acting and making decisions clearly on a partisan political basis. He mentioned, one, about the fact you have weekly meetings with the political and partisan head of the Department of Treasury. Another one is a very clear revolving door between political appointees at the Treasury and over at the Board of Governors. Third, former Chair Bernanke made an unprecedented decision to formally endorse the President’s failed and wasteful fiscal stimulus plan, the reason some gave was because he was trying to seek political favor for his reappointment as Chair. Fourth, and also by Chair Bernanke, his decision to announce QE3 just weeks before the President was to face the election back in 2012. Fifth, your meetings at the White House the day before the President’s—this year’s election, and sixth, your speech on income inequality, a major political theme in this past election, just weeks before the election. And finally, your meeting in an open door policy with liberal advocacy groups. Taken separately, it is one thing. Taken collectively, it is unbelievable that each one of these things could just have been coincidental. It paints a pretty damning picture. I think the Fed has already been completely immersed and guided by partisan politics. Now, if the press reports are accurate, in addition to this, you are lobbying the other side of the aisle extremely hard, and do not agree to requiring agencies to be more accountable and transparent. You are lobbying hard against having more confines around your ability to use your bailout authority. You are lobbying hard against being required to do more economic analysis of your rulemaking, and you are also lobbying hard against additional public scrutiny and congressional oversight. When one thinks about it, I am not sure who is lobbying more, you or the banks that you oversee. As far as who you are seeing in Congress, it is a 2–1 ratio whom you are lobbying hard with, Democrats to Republicans. And on your monetary decisions, which are being praised by the Democrats and being criticized by Republicans, it would seem you have already made monetary policy a partisan political exercise. And so, having Congress oversee your agency more thoroughly will not make it more political than it already is. You see, the whole original idea here about having political monetary decisions was that the political push would be to juice the economy with low rates in the short term by Congress to win reelection, but the exact opposite is happening right now, Chair Yellen. The people pushing back on your decisions are those arguing for a tougher monetary policy, not a looser one. This flies in the face of the original stated rationale for political independence in monetary policy. So on that last point, as far as meeting with outside liberal organizations, I wonder whether you can agree today that you will meet with folks from the other side of this specter, and meet with some of them who have a different view on this. Mrs. YELLEN. We are meeting with such a group on Friday. Mr. GARRETT. Who is that? Mrs. YELLEN. What is it called? The Americans for Principles in Action. VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 21 Mr. GARRETT. I appreciate your willingness to do that, and— Mrs. YELLEN. I’m sorry. We meet with a wide range of groups. I think it is a complete mischaracterization of our meeting schedules, and my meetings are entirely public. My schedule is completely in the public domain. I think if you actually look— Mr. GARRETT. That is where I am actually taking this from, this was just— Mrs. YELLEN. Yes, but I— Mr. GARRETT. —handed to me, so I am sure— Mrs. YELLEN. I’m sorry, but I think if you— Mr. GARRETT. It is good that this much of it is in the public domain because all we are trying to do is make it a little bit more in the public domain with regard to the regulatory section as far as—which you admitted to right here, that you are willing to have a robust oversight as far as Congress, but you didn’t answer one question, and I will just close on this. I only have 10 seconds left. The chairman of the subcommittee asked if you would make available the transcripts or summaries of those meetings that you have. You didn’t answer that question. Would you make those summaries available? Mrs. YELLEN. These are private one-on-one meetings, and I don’t think it is appropriate. If I had breakfast with you, I would not make a transcript of what we discussed over breakfast available. Mr. GARRETT. When you are discussing monetary and regulatory policy with the Secretary of the Treasury, a political appointee, it is a private matter? Okay. Mrs. YELLEN. We have a common interest and responsibility for the economy, and I think it is entirely appropriate that we confer on— Mr. GARRETT. Thank you. Mrs. YELLEN. —what we see happening in the— Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Capuano. Mr. CAPUANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Madam Chair, for being here. I tell you, I am shocked, shocked, I tell you, that you were actually meeting with the President or the Secretary of the Treasury or anyone else. You should be sitting in a closet making these decisions on your own. I am personally shocked that you or anyone else would care about growing income inequality. What a terrible, terrible thing to care about. By the way, my schedule is private. What I say in meetings is private, with my constituents, with people I don’t agree with, with people I agree with. If you open that door, I challenge all my colleagues, Democrat and Republican, to do the same, open every meeting you have with everyone, including lobbyists. By the way, Madam Chair, have you donated any money to a Member of Congress? Mrs. YELLEN. No. Mr. CAPUANO. Have the banks donated any money to a Member of Congress to your knowledge? Mrs. YELLEN. I am assuming they have. Mr. CAPUANO. I think they have. By the way, Madam Chair, I hope I am on your Christmas card list because I would be very of- VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 22 fended if I don’t get a Christmas card. With all of that nonsense aside, all of that hypocrisy aside, that doesn’t mean I agree with you on everything. I can’t tell you how strongly I disagree with the Fed’s recent decision to take municipal bonds and declare them not high quality liquid assets. They are still the safest investment in this country, and to tell banks they can’t hold them as capital needs, other than the risky ones—of course there are some risky munis, but most of them are safe. To tell them not to—you may as well tell those banks they should take their cash and stuff it in a mattress. That is the only safer place for investment. Mrs. YELLEN. But it is not a question of safe. It is a question of liquid and how rapidly these assets can be converted into cash. Mr. CAPUANO. They have never been a problem. And what this does is simply drive up costs to taxpayers and simultaneously reduce investment in economic enhancements. That is what munis are used for. It is a shortsighted, wrong policy, in my opinion, even though I am not on your dance card for many different things. I also want to talk a minute about too-big-to-fail. The FDIC, and you both basically said the last—the second, not the first, the second submission of these living wills were inadequate. Yet, the FDIC was pretty clear about it. I want to read—as a matter of fact, I would like to submit a copy of the comments from Vice Chairman Hoenig for the record. But in his comments, he said the plans provide no credible or clear path through bankruptcy that doesn’t require unrealistic assumptions in direct or indirect public support, and on and on and on. My time is running out. I want to get to one simple question. You said earlier you are going to give them a third try. We won’t know the results of that third try until a year or so from now, maybe longer. If they don’t meet your requirements at the third try, what you said is—I wrote it down here somewhere, something along the lines of you would be upset. You would say, oh, my goodness, you failed. Honestly, if my mother or my teacher or my priest told me, if you do those terrible things, I will be very disappointed, I don’t need to tell you, but when I was irresponsible, it didn’t much matter. Mrs. YELLEN. Congressman— Mr. CAPUANO. What are you going to do with— Mrs. YELLEN. I said we would find the plan— Mr. CAPUANO. What does that mean? Mrs. YELLEN. We would find them to be not credible if we do not see progress— Mr. CAPUANO. What does that mean? Mrs. YELLEN. —that we have asked. Mr. CAPUANO. What is the practical result of finding them not credible? Mrs. YELLEN. If we find them not credible, we then, along with the FDIC, would be in the position to impose additional capital and liquidity and other requirements— Mr. CAPUANO. You would increase capital requirements? Mrs. YELLEN. —from these firms. They would then— Mr. CAPUANO. Would you break them up? VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 23 Mrs. YELLEN. They would then have 2 years to—I believe it is 2 years to show us that they had made changes that we would then have to find— Mr. CAPUANO. So 5 years after Dodd-Frank, they still have potentially 3 years before there are any serious consequences to prove to you that they no longer operate a threat to the entire U.S. economic system? Mrs. YELLEN. We have put in place much higher capital standards and liquidity standards. Mr. CAPUANO. But they have been found insufficient by virtually everybody who studies these, except the Fed. Mrs. YELLEN. We issued a rule about how we would conduct the living will process. Mr. CAPUANO. The last line of Mr. Hoenig’s letter says, ‘‘In theory, Title I solves too-big-to-fail. However, in practice, it is not the passage of the law. Rather, it is implementation that determines whether the issue is resolved.’’ Madam Chair, I will tell you that it is insufficient at the moment. Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Neugebauer, chairman of our Financial Institutions Subcommittee. Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Chair Yellen, thank you for being here today. Over the last few years, there has been a lot of discussion about a financial institution being systemically important, and Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank sets an arbitrary threshold of $50 billion. That designation then triggers an enhanced prudential standards. Of course, as you and I have discussed, I am not a big fan of the SIFI designation because I believe it is an implicit designation of an institution being too-big-to-fail. And with that said, the $50 billion threshold that is currently in place isn’t, I don’t think, in my estimation, and I think a lot of other people’s, really working because it places an undue burden on the mid-sized banks that aren’t systemic to meet additional enhanced standards. And so, I want to applaud Congressmen Luetkemeyer and Stivers for their leadership in this issue. As you know, this month the Office of Financial Research (OFR) released a study examining, I think it is called systemic important indicators. It looked at five factors: size; interconnectedness; substitutability; complexity; and cross-jurisdictional activity. This came out of the Basel Committee, as you are aware. So does the Federal Reserve agree that these five factors that were used by the Basel Committee are the primary indicators of a financial institution’s systemic importance? Mrs. YELLEN. We would certainly look at factors like that and take those into account in deciding on an institution’s systemic importance. I completely agree that a $50 billion banking organization is very different in a systemic footprint than a $2 trillion organization, and Section 165 does allow the Board to differentiate among companies based on their capital structure, their riskiness, and their complexity, and we have done so in writing rules pertaining to the Section 165 standards. VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 24 So there is flexibility, not total, but a good deal of flexibility to tailor our supervision and requirements to the systemic footprint of the firms, and the requirements on the $50 billion firms are not the same as the requirements on the more systemic institutions. Mr. NEUGEBAUER. But basically the parameters that you have only let you determine what happens to people in the box. It does not let you determine who is and who isn’t in the box, and when you look at that study, what you realize is one of the least of the companies that has been determined to be systemic—there is a huge range between the firms that are larger and not systemic. I think if you look at that chart—and I am sure you have seen— we have a big gap there, and that big gap is problematic, and I think a lot of people think that we need to do better in that area. So if you think these standards are acceptable, then would you be receptive to accepting a different arrangement where you use standards that have been adopted by Basel, and if you—if the Fed has additional standards that you would like to include in that, so that everybody would know whether they were in the box or out of the box. Mrs. YELLEN. I think trying to draw any line and having some firms just below and some firms just above creates an element of arbitrariness, and wherever that line is, one retains that problem. So it is important that the statutes enable us to differentiate and try to tailor rules to different firms of different complexities that are important. There are some things that we must apply to every firm over $50 billion, and the same would be true if that were to change. Mr. NEUGEBAUER. The statute doesn’t allow you now to draw that line. The line is drawn for you, and so— Mrs. YELLEN. That is right. Mr. NEUGEBAUER. —do I hear you saying that you think that is a flawed process? Mrs. YELLEN. I am saying wherever you draw the line, there will be a kind of arbitrariness that is associated with it. If you drew it at $200 billion, I would still say that it shows most $200 billion firms are different than the very largest financial institutions, and we would still want the flexibility to be able to impose different requirements on those firms. Mr. NEUGEBAUER. So, requirements is what you should be drawing upon; is that what you are saying? Mrs. YELLEN. I am saying it— Mr. NEUGEBAUER. No, you said it was arbitrary, so should we not draw the line? Mrs. YELLEN. Congress chose to draw a line and to apply enhanced standards to a certain class of firms, and what I am saying is we absolutely recognize that within that large class of firms, they do differ in terms of their complexity and systemic footprint, and we need to tailor regulations that are appropriate and not identical for the largest and the ones that come closest to wherever that dividing line is. Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch. VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 25 Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Madam Chair. It is good to see you again. I was reading something recently in The Financial Times, Desmond Lachman of the American Enterprise Institute, and he talked about the appreciation of the dollar, we have a strong dollar, coupled with the substantial decline in international oil prices, and he said, ‘‘Those factors could very well reduce U.S. inflation to about zero by the end of the 2015.’’ He went on to write that it would seem reckless—this is his opinion— for the Federal Reserve to disregard such a prospect, especially at a time that recent political events in Greece and elsewhere are reminding us that the euro crisis is far from over. Can you speak to the concerns about the possibility that inflation could dip well below your 2 percent target over the next year? Mrs. YELLEN. Inflation is running below our 2 percent target even now. Total inflation over the last 12 months was seven-tenths of a percent, and we think that inflation is going to move lower before it moves higher for exactly the reasons you cited. Import prices have been falling in part because of the dollar, and declining oil prices have had a very major influence. And the committee has indicated that it expects that in its most recent statements. Now, we do think that the effects of these factors will be transitory, especially with an improving labor market that we expect inflation over the medium term, the next 2 or 3 years, to move up to our 2 percent target. We have said we are monitoring these inflation developments very carefully, and it is one of the key factors that will be driving our decisions about appropriate monetary policy, but we do think that these factors are transitory, and if we gain confidence that is the case on the basis of incoming data and continue to see the labor market improve, we would consider still raising rates, but we are very focused on the developments you cite. Mr. LYNCH. ‘‘Transitory’’ is the key term there, though. Mrs. YELLEN. Correct. Mr. LYNCH. And you think medium term, 2 to 3 years, is that— Mrs. YELLEN. Every 3 months, participants in the FOMC submit their own individual projections for the economy and in the December projections, which are included in your monetary policy report, participants indicated that they thought that inflation would be running in the 1.7 to 2 range at the end of 2016. Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. Mrs. YELLEN. And move up. Mr. LYNCH. You have been very thorough. I appreciate that. The next question I have is, under Dodd-Frank—this is something I supported, so I am to blame here—we were concerned about proprietary trading, so we put a provision where banks and covered funds would have to disassociate, and we actually require that they change their name so that there would be no confusion by the consumer that banks and funds are affiliated. And so we are requiring a lot of these funds to change their names, which is visiting a significant cost on some of these funds. There is a reputational cost for the funds that have done well and now they have to change their names. Is there any less costly way, less damaging way to accomplish our goal which was to bifurcate these two entities? VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 26 Mrs. YELLEN. Let me—I need to confer, look into that a little bit more carefully. Mr. LYNCH. Okay. Mrs. YELLEN. We have tried to use the ability we have to minimize some of, diminish some of the burden associated with these investments in these funds but— Mr. LYNCH. Yes. Mrs. YELLEN. —let me get back to you on what possibility we have. Mr. LYNCH. I can certainly understand where if you have a bank and then the fund is the same name with something added, the confusion would be palpable, but in some cases you have a bank and the fund is named—I won’t use any examples, but there is no confusion between the bank and the fund, and yet there is still, because they were previously owned by the fund, excuse me, owned by the bank, they are being required to change their name, and there just has to be a better way about this, I think. Mrs. YELLEN. Let me look into that, and I promise to get back to you on that. Mr. LYNCH. I appreciate that. My time has expired. Thank you very much. Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Luetkemeyer, the chairman of our Housing and Insurance Subcommittee. Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Madam Chair, it is good to be with you this morning. Thanks for coming. As the chairman of the Housing and Insurance Committee, I want to follow up sort on the lines of Congressman Neugebauer with regards to SIFIs, and my specific question would be with regards to insurance SIFIs. It is kind of interesting that the Fed is involved with FSOC, and as a result, agreed that three of our big insurance companies need to be designated as SIFIs. I would like to know where do you believe that you get this authority from to be able to designate an insurance company a SIFI? Mrs. YELLEN. I believe it is directly contained in Dodd-Frank. Mr. LUETKEMEYER. That is interesting because the former Financial Services Committee chairman, the name of the coauthor of the bill, Dodd-Frank, made this statement. He says, ‘‘As a general principle, I don’t think that asset managers at insurance companies that just sell insurance as it is traditionally defined are systemically important. They don’t have leverage. Their failure isn’t going to have a systemic reverberatory effect.’’ The coauthor of the bill did not intend for anybody to designate an insurance company as a SIFI, and I am curious as to whether you believe that the bill went further than he intended or how do you come up with the authority— Mrs. YELLEN. The question that the FSOC has had to address in each case where it has designated a company a SIFI is would its failure or material distress, pose systemic consequences to the U.S. financial system, and that involves a case-by-case analysis of the specific activities that those firms engage in. And some of the largest firms that have been designated SIFIs engage in capital markets activities— Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Well, Madam Chair— VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 27 Mrs. YELLEN. —that go well beyond traditional insurance. Mr. LUETKEMEYER. I am curious, though, there is no bank in the country, according to the records that I have been told in testimony in some other committees, that has more than 2 percent of their assets involved in an insurance company. Tell me how that makes an insurance company systemically important? Mrs. YELLEN. We have—the FSOC has put out on its Web site detailed discussions of the specific findings for the companies that it has designated and— Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Is there written criteria somewhere on this? Mrs. YELLEN. There are criteria. Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Is there a written criteria on how to get yourself de-designated as a SIFI? Mrs. YELLEN. There is no— Mr. LUETKEMEYER. What is the procedure for doing that? Mrs. YELLEN. The FSOC, I believe, is required to revisit every year the designation, and if there were a significant change in the business structure activities of a firm, the FSOC certainly could and would consider de-designating that firm. Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Okay. There is nothing in writing then, there are no rules out there. It is all arbitrary with regards to FSOC, whether— Mrs. YELLEN. It is not arbitrary. It involves detailed case-by-case analysis of individual firms. Mr. LUETKEMEYER. You just said in a comment to Mr. Neugebauer a minute ago that Dodd-Frank creates elements of arbitrariness with regards to— Mrs. YELLEN. No, I said cut off. Mr. LUETKEMEYER. —the designation of a cutoff. So there is arbitrariness, obviously, within the designation of these SIFIs, is there not? Mrs. YELLEN. I’m sorry, that is a very different thing. I said any dollar cutoff, to say anything above a specific dollar cutoff— Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Okay. So if you are saying certain— Mrs. YELLEN. —is a SIFI and should all be treated alike, that is arbitrary. And there are differences. There will be differences among the firms that are over a given size threshold. Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Okay. This size then? Mrs. YELLEN. No, it is not just size. In the case of SIFIs, the FSOC has put out it is the criteria that it looks at in doing detailed investigations of individual firms, and it has published the detailed reasons why it chose these firms for designation Mr. LUETKEMEYER. One of the firms was designated a GSIF, in other words, the international folks designated as a SIFI. Was that the reason that it was designated a SIFI here in this country? Mrs. YELLEN. No, because international designations have no impact— Mr. LUETKEMEYER. They have absolutely nothing to do with us designating here in this country as a SIFI. Mrs. YELLEN. Correct. There is a detailed procedure that the FSOC goes through in analyzing a firm. The firm has every opportunity to provide information about its activities and to understand the analysis that has led to a decision— Mr. LUETKEMEYER. I just have a few seconds. VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 28 Mrs. YELLEN. —to designate it. Mr. LUETKEMEYER. I just have a few seconds left here. But there is no way that an insurance company can know how to get itself undesignated as a SIFI because there is no written criteria out there. You just have to come to the Fed and kind of by— Mrs. YELLEN. The FSOC. Mr. LUETKEMEYER. —trial and error decide to deleverage part of your portfolio— Mrs. YELLEN. The FSOC. Mr. LUETKEMEYER. —and change your business model. Do they come to you first and say, if this happens, can we get de-designated, or how does that work? Mrs. YELLEN. To the best of my knowledge, there are no formal criteria, but the firms understand— Mr. LUETKEMEYER. There is formal criteria with which to designate them. There needs to be some formal criteria to de-designate them; do you not believe that? Mrs. YELLEN. The firms certainly could be de-designated if they change their business structure, and the FSOC would certainly consider that. Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman. Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. Picking up on the gentleman from Missouri, I hope that in designating SIFIs, you would focus on the size of the liabilities, not the size of the assets. Lehman Brothers didn’t have a problem with too many assets. The problem was too many liabilities. When you focus that on an unleveraged mutual fund, they don’t have any liabilities unless you fear that their depository safeguards are inadequate and somebody has absconded with the securities. If I pick a particular fund and they invest, the ups and downs are mine, not theirs. And as to insurance companies, we saw in the greatest stress test ever, 2008, that every entity that was directly regulated by State insurance regulators came out fine. You compare that to all the other regulators, and it is quite a record. I have a parochial question for you here. The New York Fed represents under 20 million people. The San Francisco Fed represents 65 million people, 3 times as many. One approach, and we have discussed this before, is breaking up the San Francisco Fed. We would like to have an L.A. Fed, but I want to bring up something else, and that is, could you go back to your Board and at least say that if you have more than 60 million people in your region, you get a permanent seat on the FOMC, not just New York? They are not more than 3 times more important than we are. Mrs. YELLEN. The structure at the Federal Reserve System was carefully debated by Congress when it established the Federal Reserve. Mr. SHERMAN. We were mining for gold back then. Mrs. YELLEN. I agree with you that there have been many changes in the economic landscape of our country since the Federal Reserve was established. Mr. SHERMAN. But you could establish a practice that any bank that represents over 60 million people always has a seat. VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 29 Mrs. YELLEN. This would be something Congress would need to do and— Mr. SHERMAN. It would be great if you could do it, but I am going to go to something else. Mrs. YELLEN. It is not something that we could do. I think— Mr. SHERMAN. We will. We will do a legal analysis on that. At least your heart is in the right place, and history will show you whether you can do it. Mrs. YELLEN. San Francisco is well-represented, and— Mr. SHERMAN. Let me move on to another issue. Mrs. YELLEN. Okay. Mr. SHERMAN. You have a bunch of economists who are telling you that maybe it is time to take away the punchbowl, maybe a couple of meetings from now. We are not economists here, but we all have districts that we are in touch with in a way your people can never—and let me tell you, it ain’t good out there. It is not ready. It is not a punchbowl. It is a lifeline. And whatever you are being told as to when to ‘‘take away the punchbowl,’’ add another 6 months or spend some time in my district, one or the other. Your statutory mandate asked you to have maximum employment, but there are those who are saying that, oh, maximum employment, that is an unemployment rate of 5.2, 5.5 percent. There are two possible definitions of maximum employment. One is what Congress intended, because we speak our own language: Maximum employment means everybody who wants a job gets a job. Then there is the economist’s view that maximum employment is as low as you can get the unemployment rate without wage inflation. America needs a raise. Are you for maximum employment even if that means there is some wage inflation? Mrs. YELLEN. Certainly, faster growth in wages would be merited just on the basis of productivity growth, and I fully expect that as the labor market continues to strengthen, as I hope it will, that wage growth will move up and Americans will find that they are getting a raise that would be a symptom of a healthier job market, and it is certainly something that we would like to see occur. It is hard to define maximum employment. Beyond some point, we are likely to see inflationary— Mr. SHERMAN. I am out of time. Mrs. YELLEN. —developments increase, and that— Mr. SHERMAN. One more question Mrs. YELLEN. —is part of our mandate, too. Mr. SHERMAN. And finally, would you support legislation that says that money of insurance affiliates that are affiliated with a failing depository institution cannot be transferred to save the depository institution without the consent of the State insurance regulators? Mrs. YELLEN. I’m sorry, I haven’t had a chance to consider such— Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. I will ask you to respond for the record. Mrs. YELLEN. Okay. Chairman HENSARLING. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Duffy, chairman of our Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee. VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 30 Mr. DUFFY. Chair Yellen, you have testified today that you believe that there should be a level of transparency and oversight that comes from the Federal Reserve. And with Dodd-Frank, you have moved from monetary policy, and the last time you testified, it was almost a third mandate, the regulatory role now with the Fed. Today, do you have a hard stop? Mrs. YELLEN. At 1 o’clock. Mr. DUFFY. 1 o’clock. I would agree it is 1 o’clock. You started testifying at 10:30, so you are going to testify for—started—questions began at 10:30, I would say. So we are going to hear from you and you are going to answer questions for 21⁄2 hours twice a year probably, but now that you have a much larger role, don’t you think that we should spend more time actually engaging in a conversation with you, not just on the monetary side, but also the regulatory side? It is going back to Mr. Huizenga’s question saying maybe you should come in 4 times a year, or we should have a hearing where everyone in the committee gets to ask you questions, but because of the increased role that the Fed now plays, shouldn’t we have increased oversight, which means longer hearings or more hearings? Mrs. YELLEN. I am always open to testifying and want to make sure that I provide the information that you need to conduct oversight of the Fed. My colleagues also have specific expertise and have testified before congressional committees, including— Mr. DUFFY. But you are more fun. Mrs. YELLEN. —this one. Mr. DUFFY. So would you testify for— Mrs. YELLEN. I’m not sure. Mr. DUFFY. —longer periods of time or increased hearings, would you object to that or would you be okay with that? Mrs. YELLEN. We will try to work with you to do something that is reasonable. Mr. DUFFY. I will characterize that as a non-answer, but let’s move on. I know that the Fed has been concerned about the concern that we have had about it getting politicized, and Mr. Garrett asked you some questions on it, and I know you would be concerned because you are opposed to our efforts to audit the Fed, and you have been very resistant to that effort. Mr. Garrett asked you about a speech that you gave 2 weeks before the election. Do you remember what that speech was about? Income inequality, right? Mrs. YELLEN. Yes. I think that is the— Mr. DUFFY. Let me ask my question. I know you don’t live in a closet. You are out there and amongst the people. Was there one party that was pushing the idea of income inequality over the other party in the last election? Was there? Mrs. YELLEN. I think, I believe that it is a problem that— Mr. DUFFY. No, no, no, no, answer my question— Mrs. YELLEN. —everyone in this room— Mr. DUFFY. —Chair Yellen. Mrs. YELLEN. —should be concerned about. VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 31 Mr. DUFFY. I agree, but was one party pushing that idea over the other party? Mrs. YELLEN. I have heard politicians on both sides of the aisle lament rising income inequality in the— Mr. DUFFY. That is not my question, Chair Yellen— Mrs. YELLEN. —plight of middle-class Americans. Mr. DUFFY. You are a smart, smart Chair. Was one party pushing income inequality in the last election over the other party? Simple answer. Mrs. YELLEN. I don’t know. Mr. DUFFY. You don’t know Mrs. YELLEN. I have heard both raise concern about this. Mr. DUFFY. Chair Yellen, I would— Mrs. YELLEN. I don’t believe that it has— Mr. DUFFY. I would venture to guess, if I asked— Mrs. YELLEN. —concern for this— Mr. DUFFY. Reclaiming my time, I would venture to guess, if I asked all of your staff behind you and everyone on either side of this aisle what party made income inequality a political issue, I think we would all get it right. But today you are not willing to tell us the answer to that very simple question, and you want to tell us that you are not getting involved in politics. But then again, 2 weeks before an election you are making political statements that are consistent with— Mrs. YELLEN. I am not making political statements. Mr. DUFFY. —the Democratic Party. Mrs. YELLEN. I am discussing a significant problem that faces America and— Mr. DUFFY. I would welcome that if you are talking about quantitative easing and how that has increased revenue at the top, or if you are talking about rules and regulations that keep the little guy from competing with the big guy. In Wisconsin, my biggest employers will tell me that if they were going to start their business that employs thousands of people today, they could never do it because there are too many rules and regulations. That they might not even get a bank to take a risk on them because of the pressure that they get from the regulators. This is tough stuff. And so I hear you taking a Democrat line as opposed to, look what has happened in the last 6 years. It has gotten worse with liberal progressive policies. It hasn’t gotten better, and maybe it is the liberal progressive policy that is the problem, not the answer. Maybe free markets and free enterprise are the answer to the problems of income equality. Mrs. YELLEN. I didn’t offer any policy recommendations whatsoever in that speech. Mr. DUFFY. But you offered a political backup. Mrs. YELLEN. I pointed to trends and— Mr. DUFFY. I only have 20 seconds Mrs. YELLEN. —discussed work that we do at the Fed. Mr. DUFFY. Have you heard of a program called Operation Choke Point? Mrs. YELLEN. Excuse me? Mr. DUFFY. Have you heard of a program called Operation Choke Point? VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 32 Mrs. YELLEN. Yes. Mr. DUFFY. Do you know what it is? Mrs. YELLEN. Yes Mr. DUFFY. Has the Fed been involved in Operation Choke Point? Mrs. YELLEN. No. The Department of Justice. Mr. DUFFY. Oh, I know, but—and also the FDIC, but are you telling me that the Fed has not been involved, whether it is called a different name, the program? Mrs. YELLEN. Not to the best of my knowledge. Mr. DUFFY. Not to the best of your knowledge. Okay. Do you guys look at encouraging banks to de-risk or use reputational risk as you analyze banks and how they do business with their clients? Mrs. YELLEN. We supervise them and look at how they manage their risks, including— Mr. DUFFY. Are you looking to de-risk? Me. YELLEN. —reputational risk—we tell them that they need to manage their risks. We never tell them— Mr. DUFFY. So you use up— Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman— Mrs. YELLEN. We never tell them not to do business with a client as long as they are— Mr. DUFFY. I yield back. Mrs. YELLEN. —controlling the risk of those relationships. Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Meeks. Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Chair, thank you for being here today. I have a few questions that I want to ask about a few concerns that I have. The first is something that we work with very—and I was concerned about very much during the 2008 recession, and that is dealing with the problem of too-big-to-fail institutions. I understand today there are still 11 banks in our country that are perceived to be too-big-to-fail. Some are even bigger today than they were 5 years ago. Now, I also hear that many banks have seriously reduced their risky trading activities, but that either other risks remain, or there are new risks that have arisen. So can you please give us an update on the too-big-to-fail problem and the issues so that we—because I don’t ever want to go down that road again. Mrs. YELLEN. We don’t want to go down that road either. DoddFrank gave us numerous tools to deal with too-big-to-fail, and we have used them. To start with our supervision program, our supervision program for the largest institutions has been completely revamped, and we do take into account the systemic risks that affect these banking organizations. We now engage in extremely rigorous stress testing in which we make sure that these large institutions could survive an extremely severe set of shocks and have enough capital to go on serving the needs of the country in terms of providing credit. We have ramped up capital standards and liquidity standards for these firms and have a range of enhanced prudential standards. We have tools and orderly liquidation that we could use that we did not have during the financial crisis such that if a firm were to encounter distress, VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 33 we have a way to wind that firm down. And this morning we discussed the living wills process and the fact that we are going to insist on changes that would make these firms also resolvable under bankruptcy. For the largest of the systemically important firms, we have put out a proposal that they be forced to hold additional capital based on the size of their systemic footprint over and above what any other institutions hold because of the impact that their failure could potentially have on the economy, and we are beginning to see discussions on—that these capital charges are sufficiently large that is causing those firms to think seriously about whether or not they should spin off some of their enterprises to reduce their systemic footprint, and frankly, that is exactly what we want to see happen. That is the purpose of them. Mr. MEEKS. So I should feel, at least be comfortable, even though we have 11 banks, some who have gotten bigger, that you are— that the work and/or the principles within Dodd-Frank are being adhered to and they are working, that we are not on the verge of having another risky situation where there is contagion in the market, that we should—it is working and— Mrs. YELLEN. I believe the financial system is much safer. There is twice as much high quality capital among the largest firms now than there was before the crisis, and I believe this list of steps I just gave are very significant. I am not going to say that the last step has been taken in the process of dealing with this. There is more on the drawing board. We are going to put out a requirement later this year that they hold enough long-term debt to facilitate the resolution. Mr. MEEKS. I see I am almost out of time. Let me just ask one other question, and this is on the wage increases recently. Some of the biggest, largest American businesses have announced increases in minimum wage, and some of the States have gone up. Is this a—or can it be a reflection of a larger economic trend with increases, and will this have a positive impact on the overall U.S. economy? Mrs. YELLEN. We have seen announcements of wage increases, and in specific cases, I can’t say what was behind it, but in the stronger job market where firms find it more difficult to hire the kind of workers that they want, you should expect to see more upward pressure on wages, and in that sense, hopefully it is a good sign that the economy and the labor market are improving. Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Lucas. Mr. LUCAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chair Yellen, I would like to address the Basel III leverage ratio rule as it relates to the treatment of segregated margin. As you know, Congress requires that the margin received from customers for clear derivatives belongs to the customers and is to remain segregated from the bank affiliated shared members’ accounts. As a prudential regulator charged with implementing the new capital requirements for these institutions, why then does the rule treat this customer margin as something the bank can leverage when clearly they cannot? VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 34 Mrs. YELLEN. Leverage requirements were intended to be a measure to constrain the overall size, or sort of a backup to riskbased capital charges that would be based on the overall size of a firm’s activities, and the activities you describe do add to the size of the balance sheet, so the leverage ratio does apply. But we are involved in discussions with our counterparts in the Basel Committee about this feature. Mr. LUCAS. I would just ask you to note that from the customer’s perspective, if his or her money is already segregated, if the bank cannot use it in one of their affiliated institutions, yet they are required to have more capital on top of their existing capital to take into consideration these accounts they cannot use, it just would seem to raise the overall cost of doing business, and therefore discourage participation in the market and reduce the number of ways that customers out there in the real world could address their risk. Mrs. YELLEN. I understand the problem, and there are complicated issues here that pertain to different accounting standards, but we are working to understand and address this issue. Mr. LUCAS. Clearly, I appreciate your understanding, and note that it is something that should be addressed because the impact on these products from customers who are not using them to speculate but generally to try to protect themselves from being detrimental would be unfortunate. One other question, Chair Yellen, that I have to ask, and being the first lay member of the committee now to get to ask a question, we have had a lot of discussion about the impact of policies and quantitative easing and a variety of issues over the last 6 years. Would it be possible, or maybe such a number exists, but you and I both know in the most simple definition of economics, economics is about taking finite resources and most efficiently allocating them among implement demands, the most elementary description of economics. Over the course of the last 6 years where the policy decisions have been made to, some would say, artificially restrain interest rates, in effect, dramatically causing interest rates to be less than they would normally have been, and at the same time, have an aggressive buying program on certain assets that would, in effect, hold up their value above and beyond what they normally would be worth, that there is a cost there. I occasionally have constituents, especially in the older part of my constituency, who have money either in bonds or in bank deposits because they want absolute safety, absolute security, who question me about the cost to them of this program. Would it be possible for someone on your staff to quantitatively produce a number about what the transfer of value or wealth or whatever you want to describe it over the last 6 years has been from one class to another of asset holders? I think it would be a fascinating number because there is a price that has been paid for this technique to try and keep the economy alive. Mrs. YELLEN. It has been a tough period for savers, and I have certainly heard from and interacted with many groups of retirees especially who were looking to supplement their retirement income with interest from safe assets, and it hasn’t been possible for them. VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 35 Mr. LUCAS. It reminds me of my period as a college student in the late 1970s and early 1980s when we went through what some would define as a superinflationary period where there was a dramatic shift from dollar-denominated assets over to anything that was real estate or stocks and bonds, that kind of a thing, and there was a price paid by that part of our society who was most thrifty, most careful, most cautious, most concerned about their old age, and I see that scenario again, and I would like to have, if it is possible, a number. Mrs. YELLEN. I agree with the fact that it has been hard for savers, but I don’t think it is right to think about this as some arbitrary policy the Federal Reserve put into effect. There is an underlying economic reality that we have to address, and that underlying reality is that there are many people who were looking to save and they would like to save in a way that is safe, but the rates of return they can earn depend on the strength of demand for those funds to borrow and spend and— Mr. LUCAS. But Chair Yellen, somebody has paid for— Mrs. YELLEN. —that just hasn’t been there. Mr. LUCAS. —the economic methadone that we have been existing on for 6 years. Mrs. YELLEN. I don’t think it is methadone. I think it is a reflection of an economy where the demand to borrow has been weak, and we are living in a market system, and the rates of return that savers get have to depend on the strength of demand for the funds they want to supply. Think about— Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green. Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you again, Madam Chair. Madam Chair, it is my belief that prior to 2008, AIG was an insurance company. Is that a fair statement? Mrs. YELLEN. Yes. Mr. GREEN. And as an insurance company, who knew that AIG was a part of the glue that was holding the world together? AIG, an insurance company by definition, under some standards, might not be declared a SIFI, but by virtue of what AIG was doing, AIG was clearly a SIFI in 2008. Would you please elaborate for just a moment on why you look to see what businesses are doing so as to determine whether or not they are a SIFI? Mrs. YELLEN. I think you have pinpointed it. You just answered the question, which is that firms may engage in activities that— capital market activities, whether it is derivatives activities or involvement in securities lending or wholesale financing that would create a situation where their material distress would create systemic consequences for the U.S. economy, and AIG is a case in point, and that is precisely the analysis that the FSOC is doing of individual companies when it decides whether or not to designate them. Mr. GREEN. Let’s talk about income inequality. Why is it important for us to pay some attention to the chasm that is developing between the very, very rich and those who have been not so fortunate in life? Why is this important, Madam Chair? Mrs. YELLEN. I think all of us treasure living in an economy where we feel that people who work hard and play by the rules can VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 36 get ahead and can see themselves succeed and advance, and we have been accustomed to that in this country generation after generation. And when we, over the last 25 or 30 years, realize that income inequality is increasing and it has been an inexorable rise, that is really, I think, a concern to—about the quality of life and the ability to get ahead and to see improvements. Mr. GREEN. And for the edification of people in general, would you give a working definition or a simple definition, as simple as you can, of income inequality? Mrs. YELLEN. There are many different measures of income inequality, but we can look at—one common ratio would be to look at the ratio of income earned at the 90th percentile of the income distribution to that at the 10th, or there are measures called Gini coefficients, other measures of income inequality. Regardless of what measure you look at, I believe what you see is rising inequality since the late 1980s. Mr. GREEN. Let’s simplify what you have said to a certain extent. I greatly appreciate it, but would we look at, for example, what a CEO, the average CEO was making compared to the worker, say in 1950, and then compare that to what the CEO is making today, maybe in 1950, let’s just use an arbitrary number, say about 50 times what the worker was making, and now the CEO makes 500 times what the worker is making? That kind of comparison, is that done? Mrs. YELLEN. That is another kind of comparison that one can look at. And I don’t know the numbers there— Mr. GREEN. No, no. The numbers— Mrs. YELLEN. —exactly, but they are pretty dramatic. Mr. GREEN. Yes, they are dramatic. And I use those numbers to illustrate just how dramatic things can be, not to contend that they are the exact numbers. But that is some of what we are experiencing, this unusual expansion of the chasm between workers and the CEOs. That is just one aspect of it. Let’s move now to meetings. How many meetings have you and your staff persons attended over the last year? Mrs. YELLEN. I’m sorry. How many meetings? Mr. GREEN. Yes, ma’am. Mrs. YELLEN. Have I attended? Mr. GREEN. Yes, ma’am, and your staff people. We were talking about meetings. Mrs. YELLEN. With Members of Congress? Mr. GREEN. Yes, ma’am. Mrs. YELLEN. I am not— Mr. GREEN. No way to know. Mrs. YELLEN. I am not sure. I have been to— Mr. GREEN. No way to know. Mrs. YELLEN. —many, many meetings. Mr. GREEN. How many meetings have you attended regarding Congress and congressional business, leaving your staff out of it? Mrs. YELLEN. I have had many individual meetings with Members of Congress. I don’t have an exact count, but— Mr. GREEN. Do you decline meetings with— Mrs. YELLEN. —beyond testimony, I— VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 37 Mr. GREEN. Do you decline meetings with Members of Congress? When Members ask for meetings, do you decline them? Mrs. YELLEN. No, I have not declined a meeting with a Member of Congress. Mr. GREEN. Finally, I would like to get a written response from you on how the President of a Federal Reserve Bank is appointed and how the public can have access to that process and input into that process. Mrs. YELLEN. Federal Reserve Bank Presidents are appointed by their boards of directors. The banking members, the so-called Class A directors, cannot participate in that process. So it is the directors who represent the public interest and not banks that run that process, and they make recommendations after thorough national searches, and the Board of Governors must approve those appointments. Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. GREEN. Thank you. Chairman HENSARLING. And—bless somebody. The Chair wishes to advise all Members also as a reminder that once the Chair and the ranking member complete their questioning, the Chair’s eyesight becomes far more acute on the clock, and Members are requested to leave the witness sufficient time to answer their questions in the 5-minute block. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Fitzpatrick. Mr. FITZPATRICK. Madam Chair, first off, thanks for your participation in today’s hearing. Last Friday, I joined business owners and community leaders back in my district in Pennsylvania to discuss the state of the Nation, and joining me at that meeting was a research analyst from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve, and she gave a detailed and very informative presentation about the status of our local economy, southeastern Pennsylvania, and the national economy. And while her presentation was great, I would say riveting even, from looking at the business leaders who were there, the takeaways from it were not always so. Here is how my hometown newspaper, the Bucks County Courier Times, put it in the lead sentence of their Sunday story, ‘‘Welcome to the new normal of slow but steady economic growth and higher ‘natural’ unemployment across the Philadelphia region.’’ Later in the same article, and this was a quote from the analyst, ‘‘We are in a new normal of lower growth in the long run, and we just need to get used to that.’’ This trend of lower levels of growth, slower growth, and higher levels of unemployment in the future is one that troubles me, and it is one that I hope Members of Congress and the Federal Reserve have not resigned themselves to. So my question to you is this: Do you think that this new normal that was discussed in Philadelphia this past week of slower growth that is being predicted, is that acceptable? Mrs. YELLEN. The recovery from the financial crisis has been very slow and painstaking, and only now are we getting close to what I would call full employment or operating at potential. And there are a number of reasons for that, including serious headwinds from the crisis. VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 38 Over the longer run, the pace of growth of an economy is determined by essentially three factors: the growth rate of the labor force; the growth rate of the capital stock; and the pace of productivity growth. So I think we don’t yet know what the new normal is in terms of what will be the levels of GDP growth over long periods of time. We do see, because of demographics, the population, the labor force is likely to grow more slowly going forward. And already we are seeing labor force participation rates drop for that reason. Productivity growth has also been very slow. And that would be a very depressing aspect if that turns out to be the new normal. Mr. FITZPATRICK. The question is, Chair— Mrs. YELLEN. We don’t yet know if that is the new normal. Mr. FITZPATRICK. Should we, on either side of the aisle, settle for that, what is being predicted by the Federal Reserve as slower growth and a higher normal rate of unemployment? Mrs. YELLEN. We are not predicting a higher normal rate of unemployment. The current range of estimates among FOMC participants about the longer run normal rate of unemployment is in the 5.2 to 5.5 range, and that is pretty similar, not much higher, than it was prior to the crisis, so— Mr. FITZPATRICK. But a much, a much lower participation rate, correct? Mrs. YELLEN. I think that mainly will be because of demographics. Labor force participation is probably depressed somewhat because of weakness in the economy, but in the long run, that is a trend reflecting demographics and aging population. Mr. FITZPATRICK. Madam Chair, many of us are concerned about the growth of entitlement spending and its effect on spending here in Washington and the debt. Entitlement spending is rising faster than the economy is being predicted to grow. Would you agree? Mrs. YELLEN. The long-run trends in entitlement spending are that they will grow substantially really as a share of GDP. Mr. FITZPATRICK. The demographics are not on our side. Mrs. YELLEN. Correct. It is partly because of an aging population. Mr. FITZPATRICK. The deficit is coming down, but the truth is the bubble of retirees has not hit us yet. Is that correct? Mrs. YELLEN. That is right. Mr. FITZPATRICK. What are you prepared to recommend? Mrs. YELLEN. My predecessor and I have consistently urged Congress to try to look at the long-run fiscal situation in a timely fashion to be able to deal with it. This is something we have known about for—there are no surprises here. We have known about this for the last 20 years at least, and the problem remains with us and I would urge Congress to address it. Mr. FITZPATRICK. I thank the Chair. Chairman HENSARLING. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Cleaver, for 5 minutes. Mr. CLEAVER. Madam Chair, thank you for being here. Mr. Chairman, I thank you and the ranking member. Let me first of all, before I get into questions, I am convinced that there will always be those who exploit the paranoia of the public with regard to the Federal Reserve. So I think it is impor- VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 39 tant that from time to time we erase the mystification around the Fed with the sterilization of exposure to the public. I am from— I represent Kansas City, Missouri. We have, of course, two Feds in our State because we are better than the other States. But what I think is very important, about 45 days ago, Esther George from the Kansas City Fed agreed to a meeting with a variety of people, including the head of the AFL–CIO, the mayor, the county executive, and me. We had activists in the community, economists, chamber of commerce. It was a fabulous meeting and an opportunity for a very good exchange—although we centered primarily on interest rates. But I just wanted to share with you that I think that is a way in which we can at least attempt to push aside some of the tension that is, I think, created by those who just don’t like the fact that we have a central bank. Mrs. YELLEN. I appreciate that. And I think that is something that is absolutely appropriate for all the Federal Reserve Banks to be doing. And those of us at the Board also meet routinely with a very wide range of groups representing all segments of American society: banks; business interests; consumer groups; representatives of low- and moderate-income groups; and unions. We have met with unemployed workers, and we really need to hear from all those who have a stake in the American economy and understand their perceptions and concerns. Mr. CLEAVER. I appreciate that. They also bring a large group of high school students here in the fall of the year. Mrs. YELLEN. Yes. I believe I met with that group of students when they came to Washington. Mr. CLEAVER. Now, I am a former mayor of Kansas City. Mike Capuano is a reserved person, who also served as mayor, and so I associate myself with the comments he made earlier, because I think munis are the mother’s milk for municipal development, and they are the safest of all bonds. And I think when the Fed and FDIC approved the liquidity coverage ratio rule, I am not sure— I would hope that the Fed and the FDIC would look at this issue that—municipal bonds may appear to be less liquid, and I think it is because liquidity should be measured on the insurer basis as opposed to the security basis. And I think if you factor this new look, munis are still the best thing going. And, I think every city in the country trembled at the approval of the liquidity ratio coverage that you and FDIC did. Mrs. YELLEN. We are working with the FDIC and the banking agencies to have a look at this. Mr. CLEAVER. Now, let me go to a question. Oh, my goodness. The chairman is probably going to give me another 2 or 3 minutes, but I won’t even get started. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back my 13 seconds. Chairman HENSARLING. The gentleman can submit his questions in writing. And as tempting as it was to give the gentleman an extra 2 minutes, the Chair will decline. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Hurt. Mr. HURT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 40 And Chair Yellen, thank you for appearing before us this afternoon. The last time that you were here, I talked to you a little bit about our district. I represent Virginia’s Fifth District, a very rural district. Agriculture is the primary part of our economy, which helps make up the primary part of the Virginia economy, which is agriculture and forestry together. At that time, I asked you about my concerns relating to the community banks and what is being done specifically to help them. You said when we talked last that, ‘‘We want to listen to their concerns and understand them, and we are doing our very best to listen and try to tailor an appropriate set of capital requirements and other regulations.’’ You went on to say that, ‘‘We want to do our very best to make sure that community banks aren’t burdened with all that regulation.’’ And I am sure you are familiar with the recent Harvard study that came out that tells us now what those of us back in the Fifth District already knew, which is that the community banks are hurting. For the last 20 years, we have seen their share of lending drop from 41 percent to 22 percent, I think. Since Dodd-Frank was enacted, we have seen their share drop 12 percent alone. I guess what I would like to hear from you today, because you didn’t get into the specifics at our last meeting, specifically what are we doing to stop this and what are we doing to reverse this trend so that we can have capital access for working families in places and districts like mine, capital access for small businesses and for our farmers? Mrs. YELLEN. I completely agree about the importance of community banks and the critical role that they play in providing credit to businesses and households in their communities. And, of course, they do suffer from significant regulatory burdens. In the EGRPRA reviews that we are doing, we are looking at the set of regulations that we have in place. We will be taking public comments and trying to identify ways in which we can reduce burden on those and other depository institutions. We have taken— Mr. HURT. Can you talk specifically about proposals that you think that will help stop this trend and in fact reverse it? Mrs. YELLEN. We have just begun that process and we are having public meetings and we will be taking comments and we will look to identify such initiatives. In terms of things we can do on our own, we are trying to improve the efficiency of our exams. We are conducting much more work offsite so that examinations are less burdensome to firms. We are simplifying and trying to tailor our pre-exam requests for documentation from these institutions. We are trying to help community bankers figure out what regulations they do have to pay attention to because they apply to community banks and which regulations just have nothing to do with them and they can ignore them. Several years ago, we formed a group called CDIAC, which is representatives of community banks from around the country from each of the 12 Reserve districts. Mr. HURT. Has that been useful? Mrs. YELLEN. It has been useful. Mr. HURT. Has it resulted in any— VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 41 Mrs. YELLEN. We have had very— Mr. HURT. —concrete proposals? Mrs. YELLEN. —detailed discussions to try to understand what their concerns are, and we have followed up on them when issues have arisen about the way in which our examiners conduct exams or practices that they may have that they see as impeding lending. We try to follow up, both internally and also with other banking agencies, to make sure that we are not imposing undue burden and are addressing the specific questions they have. At the Board, we have formed a new committee that focuses explicitly and exclusively on supervision of community banks to try to look for ways to speed up application processes and to reduce burden. So I know many of these banks are suffering with low interest rates. They also have compressed net interest margins. And that has hurt their profitability. That is a— Mr. HURT. Right. Mrs. YELLEN. —a part of the environment. Mr. HURT. My time is about to expire, but I would ask that you do everything that you can to continue to make this a front-burner issue because it is deeply affecting working families, small businesses, and family farmers all across my district. Thank you. Mrs. YELLEN. I hear you, and I promise to do so. Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Ellison. Mr. ELLISON. Welcome, Chair Yellen. And I also want to thank the chairman and ranking member of our committee. The last time we were together in this committee hearing, I think I raised the issue of Somali remittances, and at that time, I think I pointed out that as banks drop out of this business space, it is going to create a whole lot more pressure. I think, on February 6th or right around there, the last big bank that facilitates these remittances dropped out, and then an Illinois bank dropped out. At this point, I am told that there are no money service businesses providing remittances to Somalia. This is important for a lot of reasons. One is that people in my district rely on that, and they send their hard-earned moneys to their loved ones. And I believe this helps to stabilize Somalia as a country. They send way more remittances than we do foreign aid over there, and it is already a fragile state. It does have a government. It is not a failed state anymore, but it is a fragile one, and if we pull that rug out, I fear for national security issues. We just heard threats by Al Shabaab to our homeland, which is something that I am very much concerned about. And as we destabilize that country, I think it is bigger than just the humanitarian needs of individuals. We are now dealing with a really serious problem. So what can be done? Mrs. YELLEN. Congressman, I agree with you, it is a very serious problem. And it is causing a great deal of hardship. And we are meeting with interested Congressmen, including yourself, and with other banking agencies, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Treasury, to see what we can do to try to address this problem. It is a difficult problem to deal with, because BSA/AML rules impose VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 42 heavy sanctions. And banks have been penalized for violating those rules, so many of them are really very reluctant to want to take risks in their dealings when it may bring them in violation of those rules. As banking supervisors, we can’t insist or force them to do that. So I think this is—we need to have broad-based discussions, and conceivably it is something that Congress needs to look at also the way in which BSA/AML is— Mr. ELLISON. Forgive me for interrupting, Chair Yellen, but I would just like to point out that last time this Congress, which has been kind of known for its polarization, actually came together and passed legislation to try to reduce the regulatory burden and expense associated with compliance. I think we can do it again, but it would be nice if we could get some indication where exactly legislating would make a difference. As I understand it, there are some banks—or some regulators who believe that in Somalia, you not only have to know your customer; you have to know your customer’s customer. That is not the law. And I think clear guidance on this point would be important, and I think the Fed would be able to offer some good guidance to help banks understand what really is their obligation to know your customer; how far does it go? Is that something you think could happen? Mrs. YELLEN. I think we can certainly sit down and go over all of this with you and other interested Members and try to see where there is some scope to do something constructive to address this problem. Mr. ELLISON. Now, what about the Federal Reserve Federal— Fedwire? Could that be used to provide wire transfers to Dubai? Mrs. YELLEN. Well— Mr. ELLISON. I don’t want to put you on the spot now, but I just want to introduce the idea. Maybe you and your staff could go back— Mrs. YELLEN. It— Mr. ELLISON. Yes. Mrs. YELLEN. It is something that is only open to depository institutions, that individuals don’t deal with those systems. Mr. ELLISON. Right, but my point is we have a state where we have an active terrorist organization that is threatening us; we have a state that is fragile and has come out of 2 decades of civil war; and we have a humanitarian crisis. It seems to me if there is an occasion to try to get creative, this would be it. I am just coming up with some ideas here. What about third-party verification? There are some nongovernmental organizations on the ground in Somalia who might be able to verify the identity of the recipient of the remittances? Could a group like that be utilized? Mrs. YELLEN. I can’t give you definitive answers to these, but we certainly can sit down and talk about each of your suggestions in detail and try to work through them with you, and I believe the State Department will be involved in these discussions as well. Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. ELLISON. Thank you. Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Stivers. VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 43 Mr. STIVERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chair Yellen, thank you for being here. I really appreciate the time you are spending with us today. I have a quick question on monetary policy, and then I will spend most of my time on regulatory policy. To follow up with the gentleman from Oklahoma’s line of questioning, do you believe the Fed’s permanent or long-term low interest rates along with quantitative easing have encouraged both retirees and institutional investors in some cases to chase more risk in their investments? And if you could give me a yes-or-no answer, it would be great. Mrs. YELLEN. Yes. There— Mr. STIVERS. Thank you. Mrs. YELLEN. There has been some search for yield. Mr. STIVERS. And I would just hope you would take that concern and problem seriously when you look at your policies going forward. With regard to your regulatory role, the first thing is you have sensed some frustration maybe over the transparency issue with you coming here a couple of times a year and spending 5 hours. You probably know that, under Section 1108, the Federal Reserve Vice Chair for Supervision is also supposed to be appointed, confirmed by the Senate, and then come to us twice a year. I know that job has apparently been deemed unimportant by the Administration and they have not filled it for 6 years, but, given that Governor Tarullo is filling that role temporarily, would you commit to us today that you would let him come here twice a year in his acting role to share with us what the Fed is doing on regulation? Mrs. YELLEN. I would certainly discuss with him— Mr. STIVERS. I would ask you to look at that. We would appreciate it. I know it might take away some of the sense of frustration that you are feeling today, and I appreciate if you would take that under advisement and figure out if you can do it. I want to talk about your role in regulation with regard to small firms and then big firms. You talked about community banks. You had a robust dialogue with the gentleman from Virginia a minute ago. Are you familiar with the term that many community bankers have now coined called ‘‘trickle-down regulation?’’ Mrs. YELLEN. I have heard that term, but— Mr. STIVERS. Okay. Do you want me to define it for you, or would you like to define it in a very few words? Mrs. YELLEN. You can define that. Mr. STIVERS. Essentially, it is inappropriate regulation for the size or complexity of the bank. So what happens is, at every level, the regulator or supervisor in that area adds a little bit to what the law was or what to the person above them added, and by the time you get done—I will give you a couple of quick stories. In one case, and the former Governor of Oklahoma, Governor Keating, tells this story, but a bank that is about a billion dollars was told by its regulator that they need to do the same stress test that a $10 billion bank should do, because, at every level, they added more stuff. So it leads to extra cost and it really causes problems where these small banks have to merge, and it really creates problems for them. In one case, the banks did merge. A $2 billion bank VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 44 merged with another bank of about the same size. They had one guy who dealt with money transfers and things like that, and the regulator came in and said, ‘‘Well, at your size, you had one; now that you have doubled, you should have two people.’’ And they were doing it to try to get economies of scale. So I would ask you to take that trickle-down regulation seriously, and what the gentleman from Virginia already talked about. Please listen to these guys. They provide a lot of liquidity, a lot of money in our local communities for people to live their American Dream. You probably read The Wall Street Journal, but I gave you the article. I think my staff member just handed it to you. Did you happen to see The Wall Street Journal on February 11th, where the chairman of Goldman Sachs said that regulation is good for Goldman Sachs? And I will summarize it really quickly because I don’t want to read the whole thing. Essentially, he said that this heavy overregulation and heavy regulation will result in large global giants like Goldman Sachs gobbling up even more market share, making our too-big-to-fail problem greater—which he doesn’t say, but it is implied—and make it harder for new people to gain entry to the system. I would hope you would look at things like that as well. And now I will transition to a question, but I wanted to raise that as a concern. The gentleman from Texas and the gentleman from Missouri talked to you about the SIFI thing. So I gave you the OFR study that the gentleman from Texas referred to, and I understand there is a line-drawing problem, but it is pretty clear when you look at the complexity you have as a total risks, or at the highest, is 5 percent of overall risk in the system, which is the biggest one, but when you move below banks of about $250 billion, that risk goes— in fact, below $500 billion, that risk goes below 1 percent for all those folks. It seems to me we are wasting a lot of regulatory resources on smaller firms. I have a bill that would take the tailored living will approach and allow you to do some things with it, but— I am getting gavelled down here, but the one thing I would ask you is you said you already had the authority, but the CCAR stress test and the DFAST stress test, today you don’t have the authority to get rid of one of those. And, for a $50 billion institution, it creates a lot of burden. And so I would allow you to allow us to help you in this battle to have appropriate regulation. I am sorry for going over my time, Mr. Chairman. Chairman HENSARLING. The gentleman is right. His time has expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Perlmutter. Mr. PERLMUTTER. Madam Chair, it is great to have you in front of our committee again. Thank you very much. And I just came in, I am sort of bouncing between two committee hearings. We had Secretary Ernest Moniz testifying over in the Science Committee. So I am going to ask you some questions about oil and gas in just a second, but what I would like to do is start with your report. I always enjoy taking a look at the graphs that the Federal Reserve prepares. And I would like to start with page 3, your first graph basically, and to talk about the increase in employment that we have seen pretty much on a monthly basis. The report says that VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 45 about 280,000 people per month additional employment. Is that right? Mrs. YELLEN. For the last 6 months, it has been 280,000 a month; for the last 12 months, 267,000. Mr. PERLMUTTER. Okay. So just to put things back in perspective, at the end of the Bush Administration, the beginning of the Obama Administration, we were losing in the neighborhood of 700,000 to 800,000 jobs a month, were we not? Mrs. YELLEN. Yes. Mr. PERLMUTTER. So we basically have a swing of almost a million jobs a month? Mrs. YELLEN. We do. Mr. PERLMUTTER. Okay. I would say that is pretty successful, given where we were and where we are today. And looking at your chart No. 4, which is found on page 5, that is what is reflected in that chart, is it not? Mrs. YELLEN. Yes. Chart 4 is an index that our staff produced of labor market conditions. It takes many different aspects of the job market into account. And the size of the bar shows essentially the extent of improvement, and you see, it varies from month to month but a pattern of improvement. Mr. PERLMUTTER. The reason I am asking this is just some of the questions and some of the sort of approaches that have been taken would lead you to believe that we have struggled gaining jobs, but, at this point, we are on average almost 300,000 jobs a month. Mrs. YELLEN. Yes. For the last 3 months, we have actually had 336,000 jobs a month. Mr. PERLMUTTER. Some of my colleagues’ areas may be suffering—and I am sorry for that—but I can say, in Colorado, we are at a very good employment rate of in the neighborhood of 3.5 percent, which is better than we have been in many, many years. So we are feeling pretty good, which brings me, though, to a concern that I have and you discussed early in your testimony. And that is the effect of the recent decline in oil prices on economic activity. In Colorado, we have a pretty diverse economy, but we certainly are an energy-producing State. Texas is. A number of the States are. And so my concern is, given the dramatic drop in price—and this is what I talked to Secretary Moniz about—of oil, what effect do you think that is going to have? You said you thought the net effect would be positive on the U.S. economy. I guess my fear is back when I first started practicing law, the Saudis were—oil prices were at 30 bucks a barrel. They dropped to 10. It hurt Texas badly, it hurt Colorado, it hurt oil-producing and energy-producing States pretty substantially. And so my fear, looking out for my State, is I don’t want to see that happen again. And if it is coupled with a fragile Europe, which you talked about, I would be worried about the overall effect on the economy. And I would just like you to comment on that. Mrs. YELLEN. I indicated in my testimony this huge decline in oil prices is going to result in job loss, I think, in the energy industry. And if you wanted to turn to page 9 of our testimony of the Monetary Policy Report, you would see a graph of what has happened to domestic oil drilling rigs in operation, and you see that just plummeting over the last 3 to 6 months. So there is going to be re- VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 46 duced drilling, reduced capital expenditures in the energy sector, and it will have a negative impact on several States where that is important. Mr. PERLMUTTER. And I would just ask the Federal Reserve to continue to keep an eye on this sphere of the economy for the effects it might have overall. Mrs. YELLEN. Yes. We will. Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thank you. Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Mulvaney. Mr. MULVANEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Chair, I am going to do something I don’t usually do, which is talk for most of my 5 minutes today, to try and take advantage of the opportunity to try and explain why many of us here on both sides of this building are interested in more oversight of the Federal Reserve and why we are interested in the Audit the Fed Bill and similar types of measures. Earlier today you gave us your testimony, and you said something I thought was interesting, that one of the ways you plan on ending accommodation or at least tapering off of accommodation was to raise the rates that you pay on excess reserves. That surprised me. You weren’t going to choose to shrink your balance sheet. We could probably and should probably have an entire hearing on that, but by articulating that policy, that is a huge wealth transfer. I think that one of your Fed economists said it could be as much as $20 billion to $60 billion in money that will flow to the large banks that have the excess reserves. The President of the St. Louis Fed just said it could be about $50 billion, so in the same range, which I think would be more money in that single transfer than those banks made last year collectively. This includes foreign banks. So you come in and you talk very publicly about your feelings on wealth inequality and income inequality, yet at the same time, in the same moment, you articulate a policy that is actually going to transfer money from the taxpayers, which would go to them in remittances if you didn’t give it to the banks, and transfer it to large financial institutions, including foreign banks, and you add to that policy the policy which we have had for the last several years of this ultimate—this extremely low interest rate policy, which we know hurts savers. We have talked about that today with Mr. Lucas. We know that it devalues the dollar. So it hampers an ordinary family’s ability to run itself. And it discourages savings by discouraging—which hurts small business. So, at every turn so far, the policy you have articulated about how you are going to unwind and the policy that got us here in the first place, the policies that the Fed has adopted are actually making income and wealth inequality worse. Yesterday, you had a chance to talk a little bit about this with, I think it was Senator Brown. He asked you what you thought was causing wealth inequality and income inequality in this country. And you listed a couple of things. You talked about the global production chain depressing wages. You talked about the fact that the lack of organization of labor, which I assume means unions, was VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 47 also depressing wages. And previously I know that you have commented on the structural role of education and technology in expanding the inequality of wealth and income distribution in the country. And my simple point to you on those points is that monetary policy has nothing to do with any of that. Monetary policy has nothing to do with the global supply chain, nor should it. It has nothing to do with the organization of labor, goodness gracious, nor should it. And it certainly has nothing to do with the role of technology in education. In fact, I had a chance to have a very similar conversation with your predecessor about 2 years ago on something similar to this when I asked him about the role of monetary policy when it comes to the labor markets and the ability of the Fed and the labor—and monetary policy to drive labor markets, and this is what he said, ‘‘With respect to employment, monetary policy as a general rule cannot influence the long-run level of employment nor unemployment.’’ And that is certainly correct. I know that happens to be economic orthodoxy. In the long run, you all can’t have an impact on the labor markets. I know— Mrs. YELLEN. I— Mr. MULVANEY. I’m sorry, but let me finish. And if I do have time, I will let you comment at the end. So that, Madam Chair, is why we are interested in being more involved because you are sticking your nose in places that you have no business being. You have no business in the long-term labor markets. And to the extent you claim to want to help fix income inequality and wealth distribution in this Nation, in the view of many of us, you are actually making it worse. You are making it— Mrs. YELLEN. I— Mr. MULVANEY. You are—and, again, I will give you the opportunity at the end and the chairman may as well. You are favoring capital over labor and you are favoring Wall Street over the folks back home, and that, Madam Chair, is why we want to know more about how you operate, and that is why many of us support the policies contained in the Audit the Fed bill. Now, with that—and, again, I apologize for taking too much time—I would be happy to have your comments. Mrs. YELLEN. I strongly disagree that I have taken the positions that you have described. I have described trends in income inequality in the United States. I have never said that the Federal Reserve is the right agency to deal with those. When asked what contribution— Mr. MULVANEY. Then why are you talking about it? Mrs. YELLEN. Because I— Mr. MULVANEY. You are one of the most powerful organizations— Mrs. YELLEN. I have also— Mr. MULVANEY. —in the world. Mrs. YELLEN. I’m sorry. I have also talked about long-run budget problems and deficit problems— Mr. MULVANEY. But you— Mrs. YELLEN. —in this country, and they are your responsibility— Mr. MULVANEY. But you went to great lengths— VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 48 Mrs. YELLEN. —not mine. Mr. MULVANEY. —before, Madam Chair—and I think correctly so—to point out that you are not political. Mrs. YELLEN. I— Mr. MULVANEY. And when you start to talk about items that are outside of your jurisdiction— Mrs. YELLEN. Every Federal Reserve Chair— Mr. MULVANEY. —outside your portfolio, you are being political. Mrs. YELLEN. —all of my predecessors have talked about large important economic trends and problems affecting the country— Mr. MULVANEY. Well, you— Mrs. YELLEN. —whether it has to do with trade or productivity— Mr. MULVANEY. —agree with your predecessor— Mrs. YELLEN. —or developments in energy markets. Mr. MULVANEY. —that monetary policy— Mrs. YELLEN. And I feel— Mr. MULVANEY. —has an impact— Chairman HENSARLING. The time— Mrs. YELLEN. —I am entitled to do the same. Mr. MULVANEY. —on labor rights. Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. MULVANEY. Thank you. Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Himes. Mr. HIMES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Madam Chair, thank you so much for being here and for your patience over this lengthy period of time. I am actually going to pick up on this idea of commenting on large macroeconomic themes, which may be slightly outside of your purview, but nonetheless, obviously, the Fed and you have a view. We have had an interesting disconnect over these last many years on this committee and particular in this testimony in that as we were working through an economic recovery, my friends in the Majority have consistently demanded very substantial cuts, which would obviously translate into fiscally contractionary policy whereas consistently these reports under your predecessor identified fiscal policy as a very real risk to the recovery. And though your predecessor was careful about not overstepping his bounds, the implication was clear that being overly contractionary on the fiscal side would actually damage the recovery. Now we have experienced a pretty robust recovery. I actually asked your predecessor probably a year ago whether he could point to an industrialized country that had combined a recovery in GDP growth with a decline in the deficit in a more constructive and salubrious way than the United States, and he toyed momentarily with Germany but, at the end, said, no, he couldn’t point to another industrialized country that had gotten it right, by the way, perhaps in spite of us. So my question is, that is really pretty impressive testimony with respect to the economic recovery. We still see, if you check the shrines to the religion of debt on either side of the room, we still have this debate. So I guess my question is, looking back on fiscal policy, is it your belief that GDP would have grown more and employment would be higher if we had, in fact, been more expan- VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 49 sionary? And, conversely, if we would been more contractionary, would this recovery have been weaker? Mrs. YELLEN. I think in the early years after the financial crisis, fiscal policy provided considerable support to the recovery. Mr. HIMES. By which you mean, among other things, the American recovery, the stimulus. Mrs. YELLEN. Right, the stimulus. Mr. HIMES. Thank you. Mrs. YELLEN. And then the successful efforts to bring down the deficit by combinations of changes in taxes and spending have led to several years in which there has been a considerable drag on spending and on growth coming from fiscal policy. At this point this year, I think fiscal policy is relatively neutral. In a sense, it has become a plus for growth, because when something is a negative and then switches to being neutral in growth accounting terms, that is a contributor to growth. So, at this point, I think fiscal policy is roughly neutral. For a number of years, it was a drag on economic growth, and— Mr. HIMES. Is it fair for me— Mrs. YELLEN. —the Federal Reserve— Mr. HIMES. —to extrapolate—is it fair—I am sorry to cut you off— Mrs. YELLEN. Sure. Mr. HIMES. —but is it fair for me to extrapolate—you say it has been a drag on economic growth. Is it fair for me to extrapolate that the policies of this Congress have actually reduced potential employment? We would have more jobs had we been less contractionary fiscally? Mrs. YELLEN. I think it has been a drag in that sense. The Federal Reserve in conducting monetary policy has tried in a sense to take fiscal policy as a given and do what we can to stimulate job growth. And, I think we have had some success in that. Mr. HIMES. Thank you. One more question. I was interested to hear you say that you and your predecessor correctly have urged action by Congress to address the long-term unfunded liabilities associated with what we call the entitlements. You are not in the practice of speaking intuitively or qualitatively. I wonder if the Federal Reserve or if you have any estimates as to what the cost is of not acting to make Social Security and Medicare long-term sustainable. Is there a cost, either in terms of dollars or in terms of increased risk, to the full faith and credit that you can quantify for us? Mrs. YELLEN. I don’t want to say that there is a cost to full faith and risk. We look at CBO projections, and you can see that, over the next 15 to 30 years, debt-to-GDP ratios will rise in an unsustainable fashion without some changes in the pattern of spending or taxation that will, over time, in a full employment economy put upward pressure on interest rates and tend to crowd out private investment that contributes to productivity growth. And I think that is something that is a serious concern. Mr. HIMES. Thank you. And I do suspect that this institution will act because eventually, obviously, the growth in those programs will constrict discretionary VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 50 spending, but I am out of time. If the Fed could provide any sort of estimate to costs associated with inaction, that would be terrific. Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Ross. Mr. ROSS. Thank you. Chair Yellen, thank you for being here, and I appreciate your service and your patience today. I want to address my first part of questioning with regard to systemically important financial institutions, specifically with nonbank institutions. Recently, FSOC came out with a statement with regard to greater transparency, which I think is a very important step in the right direction. However—and as a voting member, I know you can appreciate this, and we look to you for guidance on this—I am very concerned that there are not guidelines being issued to mitigate the risk for nonbank financial institutions. For example, these institutions don’t know they are being considered and have no method or manner or notice to take corrective action. And my question to you first is, don’t you think that if we are going to start looking at nonbank financial institutions as systemically important institutions, we should at least not only offer transparency but should also offer them notice that they are being considered and offer them a path or at least an opportunity to get out? Mrs. YELLEN. I believe the new guidelines that were recently approved will give earlier notification to firms when they come under consideration so that they have an earlier opportunity to interact with staff and with the FSOC. I believe the new guidelines also will more clearly indicate what the metrics are, how they are computed, result in— Mr. ROSS. So you give them essentially due process, if you will— Mrs. YELLEN. Yes. Mr. ROSS. —to have notification that they are being considered, to allow them to take corrective action, and then to have the opportunity that if they are so designated, to get out of that designation and have it up for review every, say, 5 years? Mrs. YELLEN. It is, I believe, reviewed every year after a firm is designated. So we are reconsidering, I believe, every year. Mr. ROSS. Would you agree, in addition to the regulations, that we ought to just codify that as part of the Dodd-Frank Act so that we know that these nonbank financial institutions have a clear path of transparency and procedure to avoid and maybe even get out of being considered a SIFI. Mrs. YELLEN. So, we have tried to, through FSOC, create due process—I think there is due process—for firms to have input, to understand they are being considered, and to interact and provide the information. We are trying now to provide that in an earlier way so that they can have input earlier in the process. But we do reconsider every year firms can interact with— Mr. ROSS. But specifically nonbank financial institutions— Mrs. YELLEN. Yes. Mr. ROSS. —because there is a different standard, of course. Mrs. YELLEN. Yes. I am talking about— Mr. ROSS. For example, let’s take asset managers. What risk would an asset manager group pose to the financial system that VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 51 would constitute them to be considered a systemically important financial institution? It is not their assets that they are managing, it is others. Mrs. YELLEN. So if you are—recently the FSOC has put out a notice and asked for comments. It has shifted its focus to certain activities of asset management in general, not specific firms that could potentially pose risks. For example, there are a growing share of assets under management that provide liquidity to the investors and yet hold primarily illiquid assets. And the notice asks questions about whether or not there can be financial stability risks associated with that type of structure. So— Mr. ROSS. With regard to— Mrs. YELLEN. —the focus is not on individual firms. Mr. ROSS. Governor Tarullo thinks, I think, that we need to have a Collins Amendment fix to this. Would you agree with that? Mrs. YELLEN. I wouldn’t— Mr. ROSS. That there needs to be some clarification as to what constitutes a systemically important financial institution when it comes to asset managers. Mrs. YELLEN. There is a definition and a set of criteria about what constitutes a systemically important organization, and the FSOC is— Mr. ROSS. But it is not that clear. Mrs. YELLEN. —supplying that. Of course, it is not clear, and that is why— Mr. ROSS. We should clarify it. Mrs. YELLEN. —when any—I don’t think it can be just clarified in a very general mechanical way. It involves analyzing the activities of specific firms and asking the question, if those firms were to encounter distress, what would be the repercussions? And a great deal of analysis goes into understanding those issues before designating a firm. So, at the moment, on asset managers, the focus is on a different place, it is an activity-based analysis and not a firm-based analysis. Mr. ROSS. Thank you. Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. The Chair, taking note of the time, and knowing that Chair Yellen will be departing at 1 o’clock, that will allow us to clear two more Members. Presently, I have Mr. Carney on the Democratic side in the queue and Mr. Pittenger on the Republican side in the queue. The gentleman from Delaware, Mr. Carney, is now recognized. Mr. CARNEY. Thank, Mr. Chairman. Right under the wire here. Madam Chair, thank you for coming in today and for sticking with us for so long. I would like to talk briefly, if I could, about Dodd-Frank, rulemaking and implementation, and compliance. I looked through your report, and other than on pages 24 and 25—of course, this is a report on monetary policy—there is not a lot of discussion about it. And I wonder if you could direct me to some other document maybe that you have or if you could provide something in writing about kind of a scorecard: What rules have been implemented and done; what might be outstanding; and kind of characterize that work in some kind of way. VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 52 Mrs. YELLEN. I would be glad to do that. It is also the case that Governor Tarullo and others have testified even pretty recently about where things stand, but we would be glad to provide it for you. Mr. CARNEY. It may just be me that I haven’t seen all that and been able to compile it, but I would like to see it in one place just to kind of get a scorecard. There has been a lot of discussion about—today even in some of these things, and— Mrs. YELLEN. I will be glad to provide that. Mr. CARNEY. Yes. So I would like to go to the thing that you were just talking about in terms of SIFI designation. Governor Tarullo, you mentioned, he has spoken about it publicly, about the $50 billion threshold, that he didn’t think that is an appropriate threshold. I think in his speech he referenced a hundred billion dollars. As a practical matter, you can go down the financial institutions and say, yes, no, yes, no, that is not the way we do legislation, but there has been a lot of conversation about that, although today you seem reluctant to suggest a change on the threshold, even mentioning that it is—even though you mentioned that it is somewhat arbitrary. Could you just restate that? I know you probably said it a number of times. I have been in and out of the hearing; I haven’t heard all that. So, that is the first part. And the second part is, is there a better approach? And I know that others have asked that as well. Mrs. YELLEN. I don’t know if there is a better approach. It is natural, when designating that a certain set of enhanced prudential standards need to be put in place, to try to define what institutions they will apply to. And the simplest cutoff, there are many ways of defining a cutoff, but the simplest way is to choose some asset threshold and say, above this level, it applies. And, in a sense, any cutoff is arbitrary. It could have been different. I think recognizing that within Section 165, the Board is given a good deal of flexibility to tailor the actual provisions to accord with—obviously a $50 billion institution is not as systemically important, or unlikely to be, as a $2 trillion institution. And DoddFrank recognized that by giving the Board flexibility to tailor the rules to the specifics of the institution, its footprint, and within— there are some places where we don’t have such discretion, but where we do, we have tried to use that. Mr. CARNEY. Great. So moving along to the Volcker Rule and its implementation and bank compliance, how would you characterize that generally in terms of the rule itself and then compliance among particularly the big banks? Mrs. YELLEN. Volcker does apply to all institutions— Mr. CARNEY. I understand that. Mrs. YELLEN. —as a— Mr. CARNEY. I understand that. Mrs. YELLEN. —rule. When you say how will we—the rule has been finalized. Mr. CARNEY. Right. Mrs. YELLEN. The regulators, the banking institutions are working together jointly to figure out how to supervise in a consistent way across firms to make sure they are in adherence. And there VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 53 is a regular set of meetings among the supervisory agencies to respond to questions that arise in connection with— Mr. CARNEY. Recently, I think you issued an extension, if you will, on CLOs and their compliance. What was the rationale behind that? Mrs. YELLEN. It looked like there would be significant cost to a number of institutions and not just large institutions but also many smaller institutions. Mr. CARNEY. Losses because they would have to sell and— Mrs. YELLEN. Have to sell at a loss, that they had legacy holdings of these assets, which would be difficult to sell. Now, clearly, the rule went into effect that regulates all new acquisitions, all new investments. So this was a question of legacy investments. Mr. CARNEY. Right. Nothing going forward? Mrs. YELLEN. Nothing going forward is affected by that decision. Mr. CARNEY. And no delay with respect to going forward? Mrs. YELLEN. No. There is no delay in it. The rule affects everything going forward. Mr. CARNEY. I see my time is up. Thank you very much. Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. The last questioner will be the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Pittenger. You are now recognized. Mr. PITTENGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chair Yellen, there has been considerable commentary today about the current economic status and climate in the country. We heard from the ranking member about the plight of the minorities and low-income people and how they were suffering and the rich were getting richer. Mr. Sherman’s statement was that it is really nasty out there, not a pretty sight. We are in the highest regulatory environment that we have ever been in in modern history, a very high tax burden. And we have very strong Fed policies, very accommodating, frankly, to our current debt and the interest on the debt and the spending levels that are being sustained right now. Unemployment, as you stated, was 5.7 percent. That really doesn’t include those who have given up and includes part-time workers. Many analysts believe that is truly about 11 percent unemployment. So it isn’t a pretty sight by any real measure, and yet the Fed has played a part in that. Do you look back on that and feel that these policies have had outcomes that have been adverse to what was intended, have not reached your desired objectives, that perhaps the strong hand of the Fed and this high regulatory environment has not reached the intended desires that you would like to have seen? Mrs. YELLEN. I’m sorry. Are you referring to our own regulations? Mr. PITTENGER. Yes. Mrs. YELLEN. I think our own regulations are—they are certainly mandated by Dodd-Frank, and they are necessary to create a sounder and safer financial system. I think— Mr. PITTENGER. But the outcomes—you would say the desired objective, we haven’t reached that with these, with the current policies? Mrs. YELLEN. I think some of the distress in the country results from the fact that we had a financial crisis, and it was very severe. VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 54 And part of the reason we had that financial crisis is that we were—our supervision and regulation of the financial system wasn’t sufficiently rigorous and didn’t sufficiently take account— Mr. PITTENGER. On the other hand, you could say— Mrs. YELLEN. —of systemic risk that was building, and that is what we are addressing now. Mr. PITTENGER. Thank you. I would say to you that many could say the opposite, that it is the extended hand of the Federal Government that has tried to centralize and control the policies without rulemaking, without an open economic environment. I would like to ask you, Dodd-Frank created the Office of Women and Minority Inclusion. Are you familiar with that? Mrs. YELLEN. Yes. Mr. PITTENGER. In it, it was defined to provide a cost-benefit analysis on the impact of women and minorities. Has there been such a cost-benefit analysis? Mrs. YELLEN. Cost-benefit analysis? Mr. PITTENGER. On the regulations that have come out of DoddFrank and the impact on women and minorities. Mrs. YELLEN. Has there been a cost-benefit analysis? I’m sorry. I am going to have to get back to you on that. I need to look at that more carefully. Mr. PITTENGER. To my knowledge, there hasn’t been one to date, and I think that is—if that was the intended objective, I think it should be reached. One thing that was brought up, Madam Chair, was that the Fed has some of the brightest minds, economic minds, in the country, and I think I would like to just beg the question why there hasn’t been an effort to—by the use of these individuals, considering the very radical regulatory environment that we are in and the transition that has taken place, the impact of this on the economy and what you believe that the variables have created in terms of our economic growth and job creation—do you believe that there has been an adequate analysis of the impact of these regulations? Mrs. YELLEN. A careful impact study was done at the outset as capital and liquidity standards were being thought through, and the economic analysis showed that, given how very costly a financial crisis is, that the role of heightening standards in diminishing the odds of a financial crisis, that because of that, because of the serious costs associated with such crises, that the benefits exceeded the costs, at least within the range of capital and liquidity standards that we were contemplating. Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. I wish to thank our witness for her testimony today. I only wish she would stay a little longer. The Chair notes that some Members may have additional questions for this witness, which they may wish to submit in writing. Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5 legislative days for Members to submit written questions to this witness and to place her responses in the record. Also, without objection, Members will have 5 legislative days to submit extraneous materials to the Chair for inclusion in the record. This hearing stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 1:04 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI APPENDIX February 25, 2015 (55) VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 95048.001 56 VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 95048.002 57 VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 95048.003 58 VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 95048.004 59 VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\95048.TXT TERRI 95048.005 60 VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:02 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095048 PO 00000 Frm 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@FedFRASER