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8

! d Session"3}

JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT

MONETARY POLICY AND THE
MANAGEMENT OF THE PUBLIC DEBT

REPORT
OF THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GENERAL CREDIT CONTROL
AND DEBT MANAGEMENT
OF THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

P r i n t e d f o r the use of the J o i n t Committee on the Economic Report

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
20499




WASHINGTON : 1952

JOINT

COMMITTEE

ON THE

ECONOMIC

REPORT

(Created pursuant to sec. 5 (a) of Public Law 304,79th Cong.)
JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, Wyoming, Chairman
E D W A R D J. H A R T , New Jersey, Vice Chairman
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama
W R I G H T P A T M A N , Texas
PAUL H. DOUGLAS, Illinois
R I C H A R D BOLLING, Missouri
W I L L I A M BENTON, Connecticut
C L I N T O N D. M c K I N N O N , California
ROBERT A. TAFT, Ohio
JESSE P. WOLCOTT, Michigan
RALPH E. FLANDERS, Vermont
C H R I S T I A N A. H E R T E R , Massachusetts
ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
J. CALEB BOGGS, Delaware
GROVER W. ENSLEY, Staff Director
JOHN W. LEHMAN, Clerk

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GENERAL CREDIT CONTROL AND D E B T MANAGEMENT
W R I G H T P A T M A N , Texas, Chairman
PAUL H. DOUGLAS, Illinois
R I C H A R D BOLLING, Missouri
RALPH E. FLANDERS, Vermont

JESSE P. WOLCOTT, Michigan

HENRY C. MURPHY, Economist to the Subcommittee

il




LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

D E A R S E N A T O R O ' M A H O N E Y : There is transmitted herewith the
Report of the Subcommittee on General Credit Control and Debt
Management.
This Subcommittee, which was appointed by you in the spring of
1951, has made an intensive study of the general field assigned to it.
I n the fall of 1951, after a long period of preparation, it addressed a
series of questions to the principal officers of the Federal Government
concerned with monetary policy and debt management, and to numerous persons in the private economy. An excellent response was
had from those addressed, both inside and outside the Government,
and the results, published by the Subcommittee in February 1952 in
a two-volume document entitled Monetary Policy and, the Manage-

ment of the Public Debt; Their Role in Achieving Price Stability and

High-Level Employment, served as the basis for the subsequent hearings of the Subcommittee, which extended from March 10 through
March 31, 1952.
The procedure of the Subcommittee is described at length in the
Foreword to the document just referred to and in my opening statement at the hearings. I t is also described briefly in the Introduction
to the appended Report. Throughout the entire inquiry the Subcommittee has worked together in a spirit of cooperative endeavor and
every member has made a substantial contribution to our joint product. I wish to take this occasion, on behalf of the whole Subcommittee, to thank again those who answered our questionnaire, the
witnesses at our hearings, and all others who have contributed so
effectively to the successful completion of our work.
The report covers a wide variety of subject matter, and, dealing as
it does with material which has so often been treated more in the heat
of the emotions than in the light of the intellect, shows a surprisingly
large area of agreement. We believe that this widening of the area of
agreement on matters on monetary policy and debt management, both
among the members of the Subcommittee and among students of the
subject generally, represents the principal accomplishment of our
inquiry. The extension of areas of agreement by patient discussion
represents the democratic process at its best; the persistence of residual
areas of disagreement shows that the process is the democratic process
indeed, for complete agreement can seldom be attained this side of
either Utopia or Tyranny.
We express our special appreciation to Dr. Henry C. Murphy for
his services as Economist to the Subcommittee. His technical competence and resourcefulness were of invaluable assistance to the Sub-




m

IV

L E T T E R OF

TRANSMITTAL

committee. We are grateful to the International Monetary Fund for
the loan of his services to the Joint Committee on the Economic Keport for this assignment.
Finally, I want to express my personal thanks to all members of
the Subcommittee for their cooperation in conducting this study of
general credit control and debt management.
Respectfully submitted.
WRIGHT

PATMAN,

Chairman, Subcommittee on General Credit Control and Debt
Management.
JUNE 26,

1952.




CONTENTS
Pagt

Summary of findings and re commendations
Introduction
....
I . Fiscal and monetary policy since the outbreak i n Korea
A. Price movements following the outbreak i n Korea
1. The period of price rise, June 1950-March 1951
2. The period of relative price stability, March 1951March 1952
3. Could a more vigorous monetary policy have averted
the price rise?
B. The wisdom of monetary and debt management policy following the outbreak i n Korea
1. Factors which had to be considered i n the period,
June 1950-March 1951
2. The actions of the monetary and debt management
authorities, June 1950-March 1951
3. Monetary and debt management policy since March
1951
I I . Fiscal and monetary policy for the future
A . Over-all role of fiscal and monetary policy; appropriate fiscal
policy
B. Role of monetary policy
1. Cost vs. availability of credit—
2. Private vs. public credit
3. Government lending and loan guaranty agencies
4. Corporate self-financing
5. Interest rates and long-term bond prices
6. Efficacy of general monetary policy
C. Selective credit controls and the voluntary credit restraint
program
1. Selective credit controls
2. The voluntary credit restraint program
D . Management of the public debt
1. General debt management policy
2. Issuance of purchasing power bonds
E . Congressional mandate? on economic policy.—
I I I . Bank reserve requirements
A. Functions of bank reserve requirements; changes in requirements
B. Extension of requirements to nonmember banks
C. New forms of reserve requirements
I V . The machinery for the determination of monetary policy
A. Legal status of the Federal Reserve System
B. Independence of the Federal Reserve System
C. The position of the Federal Reserve banks and the Federal
Open Market Committee
D . The composition of the Board of Governors
1. Tenure of members
2. Number and compensation of members
3. Designation of Chairman
4. Qualifications for membership
E . Coordination of fiscal and monetary policy
F. Finances of the Federal Reserve System
1. Private ownership of the stock of the Federal Reserve
banks
2. Disposition of the earnings of the Federal Reserve
banks
3. Tax exemption of the dividends on Federal Reserve
bank stock
4. Budgetary and auditing procedures-




v

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9
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24
24
25
28
31
31
31
32
33
34
35
35
35
36
36
37
38
38
39
39
43
43
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46
49
49
51
53
55
55
55
56
56
56
59
59
61
61
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VI

CONTENTS
Page

V. The gold standard
Statement of views by Senator Douglas
Statement by M r . Wolcott
Appendix (Treasury-Federal Reserve accord)
L I S T OF T A B L E S A N D

_

65
69
78
79

CHARTS

TABLES

1. Increases in the prices of leading import commodities i n the United
States, June 1950-March 1951
2; Comparison of change i n wholesale price index i n the United States
with that i n principal countries of Europe and the British Commonwealth, June 1950-March 1951 3. Factors affecting the money supply, June 30, 1950-March 28, 1951
4. Increase i n reserves available for expansion i n the banking system,
June 30, 1950—March 28, 1951
5. Factors affecting the money supply, March 28, 1951-March 26, 1952..
6. Increase in reserves available for expansion i n the banking system,
March 28, 1951-March 26, 1952
7. Effect of hypothetical increases i n interest rates on the price of a 20-year
2% percent bond

11
13
15
16
18
18
35

CHARTS

1. Selected economic factors i n the post-Korean boom
2. Prices, production, and the money supply, 1919-51
3; Money supply, turn-over of bank deposits, and wholesale prices,
January 1950-February 1952




12
20
21

MONETARY POLICY AND THE MANAGEMENT OF
THE PUBLIC DEBT
SUMMARY

OF

FINDINGS

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

I . FISCAL AND M O N E T A R Y POLICY SINCE THE OUTBREAK I N KOREA

1. Wholesale prices in the United States rose about 16 percent
between June 1950 and March 1951. This rise might have been
moderated somewhat by the earlier adoption of a more restrictive
monetary policy. But the use of monetary measures sufficiently
powerful to have averted most or all of the rise probably would have
had consequences even more undesirable than the rise itself. Reviewing the circumstances of the period, it is an open question
whether the somewhat more restrictive monetary policy which followed the Treasury-Federal Reserve "accord" of March 4, 1951,
should have been applied earlier.
[With respect to the timing, Senator Flanders notes that the
predecessor subcommittee recommended in January 1950 that the
freedom of the Federal Reserve to restrict credit and raise interest
rates for general stabilization purposes should be restored even if
this involved higher debt service charges and greater inconvenience to the Treasury in debt management. In his estimation, an "accord" established at that time would not have been
too early.]
2. Wholesale prices reached a peak in March 1951 and declined
about 4 percent during the following year. Some of the credit for
this turn in the price situation is doubtless due to the more restrictive
monetary policy following the accord and some is doubtless due to the
imposition of price and wage controls in January 1951. For the most
part, however, it appears to have been a natural reaction from the
wave of "scare buying" set off by the Korean outbreak and would
have occurred in any event.
3. An examination of the relevant data shows remarkably little
correlation between price changes since the outbreak in Korea and
changes in either the money supply or in the budgetary position of the
Federal Government. During the period of rapid price rise the budget
was strongly over-balanced and the money supply was increasing
very slowly; during the subsequent period of price stability and decline
the budget showed a deficit and the money supply was rising much
more rapidly. These factors doubtless had an influence on prices;
but, in the short run, this influence was outweighed by that of other
factors. I n the long rim, however—when other factors tend to average out—changes in the money supply and in the budgetary position
of the Federal Government are likely to have a decisive influence.
They are important at all times because they are subject to the conscious control of the Government, whereas the factors originating in




1

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MONETARY POLICY AND M A N A G E M E N T OF T H E PUBLIC DEBT

the "outside economy" are not. I t is only by persisting in appropriate
fiscal and m o n e t a r y policies that the Government can make its full
contribution to price stability and high-level employment over the
longer period.
4. The differences between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve
during the period between the outbreak in Korea and the accord were
rather small when viewed in perspective. Prior to the turn of the
year 1950-51, they were concerned principally with short-term interest
rates. I t was not until early 1951 that the Federal Reserve evidenced
a desire to increase the long-term interest rate above 2% percent. An
examination of the confidential correspondence between the Treasury
and the Federal Reserve, and of the Federal Reserve with the President, shows, for the most part, that each agency was striving to serve
the public interest as it saw it. The officials of the Federal Reserve
System, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the President, however,
appear at times to have interpreted agreements differently and not to
have been aware of each other's interpretations. This might have
been avoided by better staff work and by staff attendance at top-level
conferences.
5. We believe that general monetary, credit, and fiscal policies
should be the Government's primary and principal means of promoting the ends of price stability and high-level employment and that
whenever possible reliance should be placed on these means in preference to devices such as price, wage, and allocation controls and, to a
lesser extent, selective credit controls—all of which involve intervention in particular markets. Nevertheless, under present circumstances—in which we do not yet know the full impact on the economy
of the defense expenditure program—we believe that it would be
improvident to repeal the legislative authority for either price, wage,
and allocation controls or for selective credit controls.
[Mr. Patman believes that the disadvantages of selective controls over consumer and housing credit are so great that the
authority for the imposition of these controls should be repealed
immediately.]
I I . FISCAL AND M O N E T A R Y POLICY FOR THE F U T U R E

6. We reaffirm the recommendation of our predecessor subcommittee that a flexible fiscal policy producing a surplus of revenues
over expenditures in periods of high prosperity and a surplus of expenditures over revenues in periods of depression should be a principal
reliance of the Federal Government in promoting price stability and
high-level employment.
7. We believe that monetary policy (variations in the ease or
tightness of credit) should also be used as a principal means of seeking price stability and high-level employment. I t must be used with
caution, however, in order to insure that measures taken to halt an
inflation do not aggravate a subsequent period of depression, or vice
versa.

[Senator Flanders feels that resoluteness in the use of monetary
policy should be emphasized as well as caution; effective efforts
to check inflation should not be unduly inhibited by alarms about
possible subsequent depressions, or vice versa.
There is much to be said for more frequent small changes in
credit policy. This would help get the country out of "crisis



MONETARY POLICY AND MANAGEMENT OF T H E PUBLIC DEBT

3

psychology" in these matters. Furthermore, skillful steering,
whether of an automobile or of the national economy, is brought
about by small, frequent adjustments.]
8. Selective credit controls interfere with the allocation of resources
which would occur under the unfettered operation of the price system. In the absence of affirmative evidence to the contrary, the
allocation of resources which would result from the free operation of
the price system must be considered that most likely to maximize
social welfare. Selective credit controls should be used with especial
caution, therefore, and only when thoroughly justified by special
circumstances.
9. The voluntary credit restraint program, initiated in March
1951 and terminated in May 1952, was probably helpful in restraining
inflationary pressures during the period in which it was in effect.
Programs of this character are easily subject to abuse, however, and
are unlikely to be uniform in their distribution of burden. They also
tend to become less effective with the passage of time. We believe
that such programs should be resorted to only under extraordinary
conditions.
10. Neither the problems of monetary policy nor those of debt
management can be solved in isolation from the other. We recommend that the Treasury and the Federal Eeserve should continue to
endeavor to find by mutual discussion the solutions most in the public
interest for their common problems, with final appeal to Congress.
11. We recommend against the issuance of securities the terms of
repayment of which are determined wholly or partly by changes in
the purchasing power of the dollar.
12. The principal mandate concerning economic policy at present
given by Congress to both the Treasury and the Federal Eeserve
System is that contained in the Declaration of Policy in the Employment Act of 1946. Neither agency has any clear directive other than
this to seek the ends of price stability and high-level employment.
The declaration of policy does not directly mention price stability,
but this can be inferred and the Treasury and the Federal Eeserve
each state that they have taken it into account in their own interpretations. We agree with these interpretations, but suggest that further
studies be made of the wording of the declaration in order to secure
a more balanced emphasis. We do not believe that this is a matter
of great urgency, however, as each agency is in fact interpreting the
present declaration in the same manner as it would if the aim of price
stability were more explicitly spelled out.
I I I . B A N K EESERVE

EEQUIREMENTS

13. We believe that nonmember banks should be required to maintain the same reserves as member banks and should be given equal
access to loans at the Federal Eeserve banks. This change is desirable both in order to increase the effectiveness of credit control and to
spread its cost more uniformly over all banks. We see in it no threat
to the dual banking system.
14. While we see no immediate need for the imposition of higher
reserve requirements or for reserve requirements of new forms (e. g.,
requirements which might be met in whole or in part by Linited States
securities or requirements expressed as percentages of assets rather
20499—52



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4

MONETARY POLICY AND M A N A G E M E N T OF T H E P U B L I C DEBT

than of liabilities), we believe that further consideration should be
given to the adoption of legislation providing the Board of Governors
with additional powers over bank reserve requirements for use at its
discretion. The time to provide such powers is during a period of
quiescence in inflationary pressures and not when the discussion of
them would dramatize and so intensify existing pressures.
I V . T H E M A C H I N E R Y FOR T H E D E T E R M I N A T I O N OF M O N E T A R Y
POLICY

15. The independence of the Federal Reserve System is based, not
on legal right, but on expediency. Congress, desiring that the claims
of restrictive monetary policy should be strongly stated on appropriate occasions, has chosen to endow the System with a considerable
degree of independence, both from itself and from the Chief Executive. This independence is in no way related to the unsettled question
of whether the Board of Governors is or is not a part of the Executive
Branch of the Government. I t is naturally limited by the overriding
requirement that all of the economic policies of the Government—
monetary policy andfiscalpolicy among them—be coordinated with
each other in such a way as to make a meaningful whole. The independence of the Federal Reserve System is desirable, not as an end
in itself, but as a means of contributing to the formulation of the best
over-all economic policy. In our judgment, the present degree of
independence of the System is about that best suited for this purpose
under present conditions.
16. The independence of the Federal Reserve System must be an
independence within and not from the Government. The determination of monetary policy is an important public function and
cannot be finally delegated to private parties.
17. The three principal instruments of Federal Reserve policy are
the determination of rediscount rates, the variation of reserve requirements, and open-market operations. These three instruments must
be used in conjunction to serve a common end, and there is no rational
basis for the assignment of the most important of them, open-market
operations, to a body (the Federal Open Market Committee) different
from that controlling the other two (the Board of Governors). Nevertheless, we recommend the continuation of the Federal Open Market
Committee as a useful link between the directors and managements
of the individual Reserve banks, on the one hand, and the Board of
Governors, on the other. Such a continuation presents some danger
that the Open Market Committee (not all of the members of which
are responsible either directly or indirectly to the electorate) might at
some future date adopt an open-market policy not compatible with
the over-all economic policy of the Government as approved by Congress. In such an event this recommendation would have to be
reconsidered.
18. We note with concern the complete absence of any representation of labor on the directorates of the Federal Reserve banks, despite
the fact that labor is so vitally affected by monetary policy. We
recommend that the Board of Governors give consideration to including representatives of labor among those whom it considers
eligible for appointment as class C directors.



5

MONETARY POLICY AND MANAGEMENT OF T H E PUBLIC DEBT

[Senator Flanders believes that class C directors should represent the broad public interest and to this end well-qualified
representatives of labor should be eligible. However, he is
opposed to any requirements which would tend to make these
directorships partisan by parceling them out to members of
special-interest groups, whether business, agriculture, or labor.]
19. We recommend that the term of office of members of the Board
of Governors be reduced from 14 to 6 years and that members of the
Board be made eligible for reappointment.
[Senator Flanders favors a reduction in the term of office of
members of the Board of Governors from 14 to 10 years, a reduction in the number of members of the Board from 7 to 5, and the
removal of the limitation on eligibility for reappointment. His
proposal would permit two appointments to the Board in each
Presidential term but would not permit a President to appoint a
majority of the Board in a single term (except through appointments due to death and resignations). He believes that such an
arrangement would achieve the best balance between the objectives described in the text of the Report.]
20. In order to insure the selection of persons of the highest caliber
as members of the Board of Governors, we recommend that the number of members of the Board be reduced from 7 to not more than 5,
and that the salary of the Chairman be raised to the same level as
that of Cabinet members—namely, $22,500—and the salaries of other
Board members be raised to $20,000 a year. We also recommend
that the number of Federal Reserve bank presidents on the Federal
Open Market Committee be reduced so as to maintain, as far as
possible, the present proportion between members of the Board of
Governors and Federal Reserve bank presidents in the composition
of the Committee.
4 21. We recommend that the law be amended so that the designation of the Chairman of the Board of Governors by the President
shall run for a term beginning shortly after the commencement of
each presidential term.
. 22. We recommend that the present geographical and other qualifications for appointment to membership on the Board of Governors
be eliminated and the appointments be left to the full discretion of
the President and the Senate.
23. We believe that it is not merely the right but the duty of the
President to seek to coordinate the economic policies of the Govern
ment by discussion with all agencies participating in their formulation, including the Federal Reserve System.
24. We recommend that a consultative and advisory council of the
type recommended by Secre1
Snyder be established on an experimental basis by executive
Such a council would have no
directive powers over its members. If the council works well in
practical operation, Congress might give consideration at a later date
to establishing it by legislation and providing it with a small staff of
its own, as suggested by Mr. Ruml.
25. We recommend that the Joint Committee on the Economic
Report, either through frequent meetings of the full Committee or
through the appointment of a standing subcommittee, as the Chairman may see fit, should maintain more active liaison at the top level



6

MONETARY POLICY AND MANAGEMENT OF T H E PUBLIC DEBT

with the Federal Reserve and the executive agencies, including the
proposed consultative council. Good liaison is now maintained at
the],staff level.
26. In order to insure, as far as possible, that balanced consideration is
given at the top-policy level to the implications, advantages, and disadvantages of proposed fiscal, monetary, and other economic policies,
we recommend that adequate funds be provided for the economic
staffs of the Treasury Department, the Council of Economic Advisers,
and the Department of Commerce. (The special financial structure
of the Federal Reserve System insures that the advantages of monetary policy, especially restrictive monetary policy, will be adequately
presented.)
27. The private ownership of the stock of the Federal Reserve banks
serves partly as a symbol of the will of Congress that, subject to its
final authority, it has chosen to leave to the System a great deal of
autonomy in its day-by-day and year-by-year operations, and partly
as a convenient link between the Federal Reserve banks and the business andfinancialcommunities. As long as this ownership continues
to serve a useful purpose, we see no reason why it should be disturbed.
28. The gross earnings of the Federal Reserve banks are derived
from the exercise, under exclusive privilege granted by Congress, of
{)ublic functions (including the issuance of money) of an intrinsically
ucrative character. After the payment of necessary expenses and
of dividends on private capital, they are the property of the Federal
Government, subject to the disposition of Congress. No stockholder
of the Federal Reserve banks or any other person has any legal or
moral interest in these earnings beyond his right to receive dividends
in the amount determined by statute. At the present time the Federal
Reserve banks pay 90 percent of their net earnings after dividends to
the Treasury in accordance with an order of the Board of Governors
issued pursuant to an obscure and long-dormant provision of the
Federal Reserve Act. While we approve of the action of the Board of
Governors in this respect, we recommend that legislation be enacted
providing that 90 percent of the earnings of the Federal Reserve banks,
after expenses and statutory dividends, be paid to the Treasury as a
franchise tax.
29. We recommend that legislation be enacted providing that the
dividends on all stock of the Federal Reserve banks (not merely those
on stock issued after March 28, 1942) should be subject to Federal
income taxation in the same manner as other income.
30. We recommend that the Board of Governors should be required
to submit annually its budget and the budgets of each of the 12 Federal Reserve banks, together with a statement of performance on the
budgets of the previous year, to the Banking and Currency Committees of each House for such consideration and action as these Committees consider suitable. (The effect of the procedure here recommended would be confined to improving the information of the legislative committees. In the absence of further legislation—which is
not here recommended—the Board of Governors and the Federal
Reserve banks would continue to conduct their finances without
Congressional approval.)
[Senator Flanders dissents from this recommendation. While
the recommendation, if adopted, would, in itself, make no change
in the present independence of the Federal Reserve System in the



7

MONETARY POLICY AND MANAGEMENT OF T H E PUBLIC DEBT

management of its finances, he believes that the necessity for
this closer surveillance has not been demonstrated and that it
might prove an entering wedge for a subsequent impairment of
the System's independence.}
31. We recommend that the accounts of the Board of Governors
should be audited annually by the General Accounting Office. This
should be a post-audit only and the authority of the Comptroller
General should be limited to reporting to Congress any expenditures
or other actions of the Board which he considers to be improper and to
making such suggestions as he considers appropriate. A full copy of
each such audit should be filed with the Committees on Banking and
Currency of each House for such consideration and action as they consider appropriate.
[Senator Flanders dissents from this recommendation as stated.
He would, however, be willing to see the Board of Governors
included in the following recommendation (32).]
32. We recommend that each of the 12 Federal Reserve banks
shoidd be audited at least annually by an outside auditor appointed
by its Board of Directors and approved by the Board of Governors.
We recommend further that the General Accounting Office be authorized to perform such audits if requested by a Federal Reserve bank.
The full reports resulting from such audits, by whomever performed,
should be filed with the Banking and Currency Committees of each
House in the same manner as previously suggested for the budgets of
the Board and of the banks, and for the audits of the Board.
[Senator Flanders would include the Board of Governors as
well as the Federal Reserve banks in the scope of this recommendation (except, of course, that in the case of the Board of
Governors the appointment of auditors would require no approval).]
V . T H E GOLD STANDARD

33. The United States dollar is now on an international gold
standard and the price of gold is fixed at $35 a fine ounce. Except
for a small margin between the authorized buying and selling rates,
the price of gold cannot be changed except by act of Congress. This
price is implemented by the willingness of the United States Treasury
to sell gold to, and buy gold from, foreign governments and central
banks in such amounts as may be necessary to maintain the international value of the dollar. We believe that this form of the gold
standard has proved its worth in maintaining the stability of the
United States dollar in world markets, and we recommend that it be
continued.
34. We believe that to restore the free domestic convertibility of
money into gold coin or gold bullion would militate against rather than
promote the purposes of the Employment Act, and we recommend
against such restoration.







INTRODUCTION
The Subcommittee on General Credit Control and Debt Management was appointed by Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney, Chairman of
the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, early in April 1951.
Somewhat more than a year before (in January 1950) a previous subcommittee—the Subcommittee on Monetary, Credit, and Fiscal
Policies, under the chairmanship of Senator Douglas—had submitted
a report dealing with fiscal and monetary policy. Since that time
the invasion of South Korea by Communist forces, beginning in late
June 1950, had caused a marked increase in international tension and
the launching of a greatly enhanced program of defense expenditure
by the United States and, to a lesser extent, by the other countries of
the free world. Accompanying this increase in tension and increased
planning for defense expenditure was a world-wide increase in prices,
coming in two waves—one immediately following the outbreak in
Korea and the other following the Chinese intervention in November.
Wholesale prices in the United States rose altogether about 16 percent
between June 1950 and March 1951.
During the period of this rapid rise in wholesale prices, the budget
of the United States Government was not merely balanced but showed
a substantial surplus. This coincidence of a rapidly rising price
level and an over-balanced budget naturally caused many people to
question whether the price rise could not, and should not, have been
averted by the more vigorous use of monetary policy. This question
was given especial point by the large price rise which had already
occurred since the end of the war; by the report of the previous subcommittee, which had recommended a more vigorous use of monetary
policy; by a return to a more vigorous use of monetary policy in certain European countries, notably Belgium and Italy; by a revival
among many academic economists in the United States of confidence
in the efficacy of monetary policy as a means of combating inflation;
and, most important of all, by a prolonged struggle between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System over the extent, if any, to which
general credit policy should be used as a means of combating the
post-Korean inflation in the United States. This struggle had just
terminated in a so-called "accord" between the two agencies, announced on March 4, 1951. The extent of the disagreement between the
two agencies during the struggle and the points upon which they were
now in agreement were equally unknown. The announcement of the
accord simply said:
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have reached full accord w i t h
respect t o debt-management and monetary policies to be pursued in furthering
their common purpose to assure the successful financing of the Government's
requirements and, at the same time, to minimize monetization of the public debt.

I t was against this background t h a t the present Subcommittee
commenced its work. T h e two tasks before i t were, broadly, to
s t u d y and make recommendations concerning (1) the appropriate
policies, and particularly the appropriate monetary policies which




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MONETARY POLICY AND MANAGEMENT OF T H E PUBLIC DEBT

should be used in promoting economic stability, and (2) the appropriate governmental machinery^ for implementing these policies.
As the first step in its inquiry, the Subcommittee sent questionnaires
to the heads of the principal Government agencies concerned and to
many persons in the private economy. The questions were different
for each class of respondent, depending on the interests and special
sources of information of each, and, in the case of those addressed to
Government agencies, involved the preparation of a considerable
volume of background material. The questions, which were developed
in discussions with the respondents and others extending over a period
of several months, were published by the Subcommittee in October
1951 in a pamphlet entitled Questions on General Credit Control and
Debt Management. The answers to these questions, containing much
valuable material on the issues before the Subcommittee, were published in February 1952 in a two-volume document entitled Monetary
Policy and the Management of the Public Debt; Their Role in Achieving

Price Stability and High-Leva Employment.1 This document, which is
hereafter cited as the Compendium, served as the basis for the subsequent hearings of the Subcommittee, which extended from March 10
through March 31, 1952. Many of the witnesses at the hearings had
been contributors to the Compendium and all of them were furnished
copies to^ study as an aid in preparing their testimony. General
reference is made to both the Compendium and the Hearings for support
of the subsequent discussion and conclusions in this report (and in
many cases for argument supporting other conclusions, as most of the
matters dealt with are highly controversial). I n the interest of
brevity, particular reference is made only in cases where it appears
especially helpful to the discussion.
i Senate Document No. 123, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.




I. FISCAL

A.

PRICE

AND

M O N E T A R Y

POLICY

I N

KOREA

MOVEMENTS

FOLLOWING

SINCE

THE

THE

OUTBREAK

1. The Period of Price Rise, June 1950-March

OUTBREAK

IN

KOREA

1951.

Wholesale

prices in the United States rose about 16 percent between June 1950
and March 1951. The increase in prices which followed the outbreak
of hostilities in Korea was world-wide in scope and was greatest in
internationally-traded raw materials. The increases during this
period in the prices of each of 14 leading commodities imported into
the United States are shown in Table 1. The average price of all
commodities imported into the United States increased during this
period by 57.1 percent, as shown in Chart 1, taken from the testimony of Roy Reierson, Vice President of the Bankers Trust Company
of New York. The increase in the average of all wholesale prices in
the United States during this period was somewhat less than that in
most of the other principal trading countries of Western Europe and
the British Commonwealth, as shown in Table 2. This comparison
is not in any way intended to acquit the responsible policy-making
authorities of the United States, including Congress, the Treasury
Department and the Federal Reserve System, for any failure on their
part to adopt appropriate policies during this period, but merely to
indicate the scope of the problem with which they were confronted.
T a b l e 1.—Increases in

the prices of leading import
commodities
States, June 1950-March
1951

Commodity and unit

Newsprint (per short ton)
Sugar (refined per 100 pounds)
Copper (per 100 pounds)
Coffee (per 100 pounds)
Woodpulp (per short ton)
Flaxseed (per bushel)
Cocoa (per 100 pounds)...
Hides (per 100 pounds)
Copra (per 100 pounds)
Coconut oil (per 100 pounds)
Tin (per 100 pounds)
Wool tops (per 100 pounds)
Burlap (per 100 pounds)
Rubber (per 100 pounds)

$101.00
7.60
22.30
47.80
118.00
4.00
30 80
23.20
8.60

14.00
77.80
178.00
16.40
30.90

Month

Price

November 1950..
September 1950..
October 1950 ...
September 1950January 1951
March 1951
September 1950..
December 1950..
February 1951...
February 1951...
February 1951...
March 1951
February 1951...
January 1951

$106.80

8.10
24.50
56.10
140.00
4.90
42 00
37.70
13.80
24.30
182. 70
360.00
34.00
73.50

the

United

March 1951 price

Peak price
June
1950
price

in

Index
June
1950=100
106
107
110
117
119
122
136
162
160

174
235
203
207
238

Index
June
1950=
100

Price

$106.80
8.10
24.50
54 80
140.00
4.90
38.40
35.70
13.80
24.00
147.40
360.00
34.00
72.20

106
107
110
115
119
122
125
154
160
171
189
203
207
234

Source: International Financial Statistics, monthly bulletin of the International Monetary Fund,
11

20499—52

3




12

M O N E T A R Y POLICY A N D M A N A G E M E N T OF T H E P U B L I C D E B T
CHART 1.—SELECTED ECONOMIC FACTORS I N THE POST-KOKEAN BOOM
Per c e n t
Increase

Item

P r i c e s o f Import Commodities

37*6

Manufacturers 9 Hew Orders

Business I n v e n t o r i e s
P r i c e s o f Farat Products
Bank Loans
Wholesale P r i c e s
P l a n t and Equipnent Outlays
Wage and S a l a r y Incones
I n d u s t r i a l Production
Consumer Spending
Turnover or Money Supply
Federal Spending
Consumers* P r i c e Index

2.9

Money Supply

NOTE.—The beginning and ending dates and the definition of money supply used in
preparing this chart (taken from the testimony of Mr. Roy Reierson at p. 647 of the
Hearings) are somewhat different than those used elsewhere in this report. These differences are of no importance as far as the argument of the report is concerned.




13

MONETARY POLICY AND MANAGEMENT

OF T H E PUBLIC

DEBT

TABLE 2.—Comparison of change in wholesale price index in the United States
with that in principal countries of Europe and the British Commonwealth, June
1950-March 1951
Country

Price index March 1951
(June 1950=100)

New Zealand
Union of South Africa
Portugal
India
Canada
Ireland
UNITED

STATES

Switzerland
Norway
Western Germany
Italy
United K i n g d o m
Australia
Netherlands
Denmark
Sweden
Austria
Greece
France
Belgium
Finland
Spain

108
108
109
111
115
115
116

118
120
122
122
122
123
126
127
128
129
129
130
131
136
136

Source: International Financial Statistics, monthly bulletin of the International Monetary Fund.

One explanation which has commonly been given for price increases
on other occasions was notably absent during the period under discussion. During the nine months from July 1950 through March
1951 the Federal G overnment operated at a cash surplus in an aggregate amount of $7.7 billion—or at a surplus of $5.1 billion on a conventional accounting basis. This surplus was in part the result of
some reduction in non-defense expenditures. To a greater extent
it reflected the effect of the rapid increase in prices, production,
and business activity following the outbreak in Korea upon revenues
due under existing law. But it was also due in part to the prompt
action of Congress in raising taxes to meet the prospective rise in
defense expenditures. The effect of these tax increases was much
more important, however, in the following period (discussed subsequently) in preventing the fiscal situation from worsening more
than it did. They were a necessary and important step in any adequate long-run program to safeguard the purchasing power of the
dollar. But, their results in the period under discussion were a
disappointment to those who believed it possible to place almost
exclusive reliance onfiscalpolicy in maintaining price stability.
The Defense Production Act of 1950, authorizing the direct control
of prices and wages, became effective on September 8, 1950. A
comprehensive freeze of prices and wages was not undertaken, however, until January 1951—and was then based on wages prevailing
on January 25, 1951, and on the highest prices at which goods had
been sold during the period between December 19, 1950, and January
25, 1951. Prior to this comprehensive freeze, only two selective
control orders had been issued, one applying to the price of automobiles and the other to the price of hides. Aside from these two
orders, exclusive reliance was placed upon appeals for voluntary



1 4

MONETARY POLICY AND M A N A G E M E N T

OF T H E P U B L I C

DEBT

cooperation.1 I t is probable that during the period under review
the anticipation of the imposition of mandatory controls raised prices
at least as much as they were held down by the use of hortatory
techniques and by the two controls actually imposed.
The Defense Production Act also authorized the control of consumer
and housing credit, and in September the Board of Governors issued
Eegulation W, imposing selective controls on instalment credit. In
October, it tightened the terms on instalment credit set by Regulation
W and issued Regulation X, imposing selective controls on credit for
the purchase of new housing. In January and February 1951,
Regulation X was broadened to include certain commercial construction. The rise in instalment credit, which had been very rapid in the
months immediately following the Korean outbreak, soon leveled off
and the outstanding amount did not increase appreciably during the
year 1951. The regulation of new real estate credit was less prompt
in taking hold due to the large number of loans for which commitments
had been made at the time it went into effect—which commitments
were exempted from the terms of the Regulation. Naturally many
commitments were hastened in anticipation of the imposition of the
Regulation. I t seems, on the whole, that the selective regulation of
real-estate credit had no net restraining effect on inflationary pressures
during the period up to March 1951.
During this period, while prices were rising rapidly, some modest
steps were taken toward the institution of a stronger monetary policy.
These steps were confined principally to increases in short-term interest
rates. (It is recognized that the cutting edge of monetary policy, at
least during the early stages of its application, consists largely in a
reduction of the availability of credit rather than in an increase in its
cost. Nevertheless, making due allowance for this qualification,
changes in interest rates are the most convenient quantitative measure
of changes in the intensity of a general credit restriction.) The
average yield on three-month Treasury bills advanced from 1.17
Percent in June 1950 to 1.39 percent in February 1951, while that on
'reasury bonds with more than fifteen years to maturity or earliest
call date advanced from 2.33 percent to 2.40 percent. These increases
occurred before the "accord" between the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve System, which was reached on March 4, 1951. As shown by
the record, they were, for the most part, opposed by the Treasury.
Despite the degree of reduction in the availability of credit reflected in the increases in interest rates just mentioned, total bank
loans increased by $10.5 billion—one of the largest increases which has
ever occurred in a period of equal length. In evaluating this increase,
it should be remembered that Congress had decided that the defense
build-up should proceed, as far as possible, by the expansion of
privately owned plant capacity rather than principally by the coni The Defense Production Act states In part:
"SEC. 402. (a) In order to carry out the objectives of this title, the President may encourage and promote
voluntary
action by business, agriculture, labor and consumers. * * *
44
(b) (1) To the extent that the objectives of this title cannot be attained by action under subsection (a),
the President may iss^e regulations and orders establishing a ceiling or ceilings * *
Some advisers of the Economic Stabilization Agency believed that these provisions constituted a mandate from Congress to give the voluntary method "a fair trial" before using compulsory methods, while
other advisers disputed this contention. The relevant Committee reports provide little support for it.
It should be remembered in this connection that the price-fixing power was conferred upon the President
by Congress on its own motion rather than upon his request.




15

M O N E T A R Y P O L I C Y A N D M A N A G E M E N T OF T H E P U B L I C D E B T

struction of Government-owned plant capacity, as had been the case
during and preceding World War I I . This policy tended, on the one
hand, to reduce the volume of Government expenditures, and, on the
other hand, to increase the strain on privatefinancialresources and so
to cause a greater demand for business loans from banks and other
lenders. The proportion of bank loans used for plant expansion
directly connected with the defense effort seems to have been larger,
however, during the following year (when the total loan expansion was
smaller) than it was during the period under discussion.
During this period of rapid expansion of bank loans, the privately
held money supply (defined in accordance with the usage of Economic
Indicators as adjusted deposits plus currency outside of banks) increased only $2.5 billion (1.5 percent) during this period. The most
important of the offsetting factors which held down the increase to
such small proportions were a decline in the Government security
holdings of the banking system2 and an outflow of gold. The factors
affecting the money supply during this period are analyzed in Table 3.
TABLE 3.—Factors affecting the money supply (consolidated accounts of the Federal
Reserve banks, all commercial banks, mutual savings banks, and the Postal Savings
System), June SO, 1950, to March 28, 1951
[Billions of dollars]

Increase i n loans
Increase i n investments other t h a n Government securities
Decrease i n Government securities
Decrease i n gold stock

+10. 5
+1. 3
— 4. 0
— 2.4

Increase i n net assets of banking system
Increase i n capital a n d miscellaneous accounts, net

+5. 4
—0. 3

Increase i n assets held per contra t o deposits and currency
Increase i n cash and deposits held b y the Treasury and deposits held by
foreign banks (not p a r t of the money supply)
Increase i n Treasury currency (not issued by the banking system)

+5. 1

Increase i n money supply

—2. 6
(0
+2. 5

1

Less than $50 million.
NOTE.—Direction of change of individual items indicated in words; "plus" and "minus" signs indicate
effect on money supply. Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Eeserve System,

During the period under review the reserves available for expansion
in the commercial banking system increased by a net amount of $1.1
billion. The factors which resulted on net balance in this increase,
and the nature of the concept itself, are shown in Table 4. I t will be
noted that of the $4.3 billion increase in Reserve bank holdings of
Government securities during the period, about $2.4 billion was
offset by a net outflow of gold and another $2.0 billion by the increase
in reserve requirements which became effective in January and
February 1951. Excess reserves increased about $300 million and
the remainder of the increase in available reserves was used to support
the expansion of the banking system during the period.
* An increase in the Government security holdings of the Federal Reserve banks was more than offset
by a decrease in the holdings of other banks.




16

M O N E T A R Y POLICY A N D M A N A G E M E N T OF T H E P U B L I C D E B T

TABLE 4.—Increase in reserves available for expansion in the banking system,
June SO, 1950, to March 28, 1951
[Billions of dollars]

Increase in Government security holdings of the Federal Reserve banks__ + 4 . 3
Increase in all other Federal Reserve credit
4-0. 9
Decrease in monetary gold stock
— 2. 4
Decrease in money in circulation
4-0. 1
Other factors, net
4-0. 2
Increase in member bank reserve balances
+3. 1
Less: Increase i n required reserves due to increases i n reserve requirements
— 2. 0
Increase during period i n reserves available for expansion

4-1. 1

NOTE.—Direction of change of individual items indicated in words; "plus" and "minus" signs indicate
effect on member bank reserve balances available for credit expansion. Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

The substantial increase in prices between June 1950 and March
1951, occurring during a period of relatively strong fiscal policy (i. e.,
a relatively large budget surplus) but of relatively weak monetary
policy (i. e., relatively easy money), together with the rough equality of
the percentage increase in bank loans (20 percent) and in wholesale
prices (16 peicent) during the period, naturally raised the question
in many minds of whether the price rise could not have been averted—
or whether it could not then be stopped—by the adoption of a strong
monetary policy. This was the situation at the time the present
Subcommittee was appointed.
2. The Period of Relative Price Stability,

March 1951-March

1952 —

The average level of wholesale prices, after reaching a high in March
1951, stabilized and then turned slightly downward. The average
level of all wholesale prices declined about 4 percent during the year
following March 1951 and stood about 12 percent above its 1947-49
average in March 1952. Consumers' prices—which normally lag after
wholesale prices and which had advanced about 8 percent during the
period between June 1950 and March 1951—slowed down their rise
markedly and rose onlv about 2 percent during the year which ended
in March 1952.
A number of causes could be assigned for this abrupt charge in the
inflationary situation. Much attention was given in the testimony
to an attempt to arrange these causes in order of significance. Those
which appear most important to the Subcommittee are listed here
without prejudice as to order:
(a) The international inflation in raw material prices had run its
course. Most raw material prices had reached their high and turned
down by early 1951. (From the viewpoint of the world as a whole
this was, of course, an effect rather than a cause of the diminution in
inflationary pressures. But, from the viewpoint of any individual
country—even the United States—it was a cause and an important
one of a diminution in domestic pressures.) The sharp rise in the
prices of raw materials may have been partly caused by the stockpiling
methods of American Government and business, and the down-turn
may have been in part brought about by changes in these methods.
(b) The wave of "scare buying" on the part of both business and
consumers had spent itself. Consumers who had rushed to buy goods



17

MONETARY

POLICY AND MANAGEMENT

OF T H E P U B L I C

DEBT

during the earlier period found that most types of goods were still
available, while they themselves were short of cash or faced with
greatly increased debts. A natural revulsion set in which was reflected
in an increase in consumer savings from a low of 2.2 percent of disposable income in the third quarter of 1950 to a high of 9.2 percent of
disposable income in the third quarter of 1951. A corresponding
revulsion took place in the attitude of businessmen with respect to
their inventories.
(c) The price and wage controls—which had been the occasion of
anticipatory increases as well as of restraint in prices and wages
during the earlier period—became purely restraining influences, the
effectiveness of which may be variously evaluated. At the same time,
the backlog of commitments made in anticipation of the selective
regulation of real estate credit began to be worked off, so that this
selective regulation came to have a substantial net restraining effect
on new housing starts and on expenditures for construction.
(<d) A more active monetary policy was inaugurated, commencing
with the Treasury-Federal Reserve accord of March 4, 1951.3 This
more active policy was reflected (subject to the qualifications made
earlier) in an increase in the yield of three-month Treasury bills from
1.39 percent in February 1951 to 1.66 percent in March 1952, and in
an increase in the average yield of Treasury bonds with a maturity or
earliest call date of 15 years or over, from 2.40 percent to 2.70 percent.
Furthermore, in the same month as the accord—March 1951—a
formal Voluntary Credit Restraint Program was launched under the
auspices of the Federal Reserve System. The effectiveness of this
program, which is difficult to measure, would, of course, be felt only
in the totals of credit extended and not in the interest rate figures
just quoted.
I t is difficult to measure the effectiveness of this increase in the
intensity of monetary policy (including the Voluntary Credit Restraint
Program). Money supply (privately-held deposits plus currency
outside of banks), which had increased only $2.5 billion during the
nine-month period July 1950 through March 1951 (characterized by
relatively easy money), increased $10.4 billion during the year of
somewhat more stringent monetary policy which followed.4 The
factors affecting money supply during this period are analyzed in
Table 5. The most important factors accounting for the striking
difference between the two periods are (1) the Government security
holdings of the banking
system, which had fallen in the first period,
rose in the second,5 and (2) the monetary gold stock, which had fallen
8 The substance of the Treasury-Federal Reserve accord was an agreement that the Federal Reserve would
pursue a somewhat more restrictive monetary policy than theretofore, that the Treasury, in cooperation
with this policy, would offer a new 2% percent nonmarketable bond in exchange for certain of its outstanding
marketable 2V6 percent bonds, and that the Federal Reserve would cooperate in insuring the success of
Treasury short-term borrowing operations d irins: the remainder of the year at rates consistent with the
Federal Reserve rediscount rate of I H percent (which "in the absence of comoelling circumstances not then
foreseen" would continue unchanged until the close of the year"). The accord, the terms of which had never
previously been revealed, was described in identical language by the Secretary of the Treasury ar d 'he Chairman of the Board of Governors in answers to the Subcommittee's questionnaire (Compendium, pp. 74-76
and 349-351). This identical reply is reprinted in full in the Appendix to this Report.
4
I t should be noted that the first period is 9 months, the second a full year. There is also some tendency
for March figures to be seasonally low. The contrast—and the variance from a priori expectations—is,
nevertheless,
remarkable.
5
Government security holdings of the Federal Reserve banks rose in the first period and fell in the second,
but the Government security holdings of other banks fell in the first period and rose in the second. I n
each case the changes in the holdings of other banks fi. e., commercial and mutual savings banks and the
Postal Savings System) were larger and dominated the movement of the consolidated series. The difference between the two periods is as much a commentary on fiscal policy as on monetary policy—in the first
period the total debt was falling and in the second period it was rising. I n each period it all had to be held
by some one.




1 8

MONETARY POLICY AND M A N A G E M E N T

OF T H E PUBLIC

DEBT

in the first period, rose in the second. Total bank loans, which had
risen by $10.5 billion in the first (nine-month) period, rose by $5.2
billion in the following year, and it appears were more largely concentrated on purposes having to do with the defense effort in the
second period than in the first. The principal factors affecting
member bank reserve balances during the later period are summarized
in Table 6. The addition to the reserves available for commercial
bank expansion, which had been $1.1 billion in the earlier nine-month
period, was $1.3 billion in the later one-year period. The Government security portfolio of the Federal Reserve banks declined slightly
in the later period, but gold, which had beenflowingout of the country
in the earlier period, was flowing in during the later. Money in
circulation, which had remained unchanged during the earlier period,
increased substantially during the later period.6
TABLE 5.—Factors affecting the money supply (consolidated accounts of the Federal
Reserve banks, all commercial banks, mutual savings banks, and the Postal Savings
System), March 28, 1951, to March 26, 1952
[Billions of dollars]

Increase
Increase
Increase
Increase

in
in
in
in

loans
investments other t h a n Government securities
Government securities
gold stock

+5.
+1.
+1.
4-1.

2
5
4
4

Increase i n net assets of banking system
Increase i n capital and miscellaneous accounts, net

+9. 5
—1.0

Increase i n assets held per contra t o deposits a n d currency
Decrease i n cash and deposits held b y the Treasury a n d deposits held b y
foreign banks (not part of the money supply)
Increase i n Treasury currency (not issued b y the b a n k i n g system)

+8. 5

Increase i n money supply

+1. 9
+0.1
+10. 4

NOTE.—Direction of chango of individual items indicated in words; "plus" and "minus" signs indicate
effect on money supply. Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE 6.—Increase in

reserves available for expansion in
March 28, 1951, to March 26, 1952

the banking

system

[Billions of dollars]

Decrease i n Government security holdings of t h e Federal Reserve b a n k s . Decrease i n all other Federal Reserve credit
Increase in monetary gold stock
Increase in money i n circulation
Decrease in Treasury, foreign bank, and other nonmember deposits i n the
Federal Reserve banks
Other factors, net
-

—0.
—0.
+1.
— 1.

1
4
4
3

Increase in member bank reserve balances

+1. 3

+1. 5
(*)

i Less than $50 million.
NOTE.—Direction of change of individual items indicated in words; "plus" and "minus" signs indicate effect
on member bank reserve balances. Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
• Treasury, foreign bank, and other nonmember deposits with the Federal Reserve banks—fluctuations in
which are not of long-run significance but which occasionally dominate the situation in periods as short as
a year—were extremely important in the later period, as the Treasury balance with the Federal Reserve
banks declined from the unusually high level of $1.1 billion on March 28,1951 to substantially zero on March
26,1952. There is at least a possibility that, if this decline had not occurred, there would have been some
offsetting increase in Federal Reserve credit of some type. Indeed, the portion of the decline immediately
following the March 15 tax date had been arranged by the Treasury, presumably in collaboration with the
Federal Reserve, in order to avoid the Federal Reserve operations which might otherwise have been necessary in order to have averted a temporary credit stringency.




MONETARY

POLICY AND MANAGEMENT

OF T H E PUBLIC D E B T

19

The results are certainly not impressive as a demonstration of the
short period efficacy of general monetary policy, but must be judged
in the light of the available alternatives. In the absence of the stronger monetary policy represented by the "accord," the money supply
might have risen more sharply and bank loans have leveled off less
than they did.
A striking sidelight is the absence of short period correlation between
changes in prices and changes in the money supply. The money
supply increased very little during the period of sharply rising prices,
but commenced to rise briskly after prices had leveled on. The
history of changes in prices and money supply over a much longer
period, as reviewed in the testimony before the Subcommittee, shows
a general correspondence between changes in prices and changes in
money supply (adjusted for the growth of the economy and for changes
in customs with respect to the holding of cash balances) over long
periods, but a notable absence of short-run correlation between such
changes. This is brought out very well in Chart 2, taken from the
testimony of Mr. Reierson. In the short run, changes in the velocity
of circulation—over which the authorities have little control—are
likely to be of greater importance. In the period between the Korean
outbreak and early 1952, short-run changes in prices correlated very
well with changes in velocity and not at all with changes in money
supply. This is shown clearly in Chart 3, which was introduced in
the hearings by Senator Flanders. On the basis of the evidence, the
Subcommittee is convinced of the importance of changes in the money
supply in influencing prices in the long run, but does not believe that
short-run changes in the money supply provide a reliable basis for
explaining short-run price changes.
While the factors just discussed, and doubtless others, were operating to check the inflation, thefiscalsituation worsened—although, due
to the extremely high taxes imposed after Korea and raised again in the
fall of 1951, it continued remarkably good considering the tremendous
rise in defense expenditures. As contrasted with the budgetary surplus (on a conventional accounting basis) of $5.1 billion during the
nine months ending in March 1951, there was a deficit of $5.0 billion
in the year ending in March 1952. On a cash basis, the surplus of
$7.7 billion in the earlier period was contrasted with a deficit of $0.6
billion in the later period.7
The Subcommittee is inclined to assign some of the credit for the
turn in the inflationary situation to each of the positive factors cited
above but cannot say confidently which of them should be accorded
primacy, or the order in which they should be arranged. Neither can
it be sure what weight should be given to the worsening in the fiscal
situation as an offset to the positive factors.
Over the period actually under review it may well be that the more
superficial factors listed under (1) and (2) were of the greater importance. Over a longer period of time, however, the fiscal and
monetary factors would doubtless be dominant. Even in the short
run, they are of special importance because, unlike factors originating
in the "outside economy," they are subject to a considerable degree
* Although the change in thefiscalsituation doubtless worked in favor of higher prices for the period as a
whole, the large "tax bite" in March 1951 may have contributed to the down-turn which began in that
month.

20499—52

6




20

M O N E T A R Y POLICY A N D M A N A G E M E N T OF T H E P U B L I C D E B T

CHART 2.—PRICES, PRODUCTION, AND THE MONEY SUPPLY, 1 9 1 9 - 5 1

RATIO SCALE
NOTE.—The definition of money supply used in this chart (taken from the testimony of
Mr. Roy Reierson at p. 638 of the Hearings) is somewhat different than that used throughout the remainder of the report. The essential characteristics of the chart, however, would
be the same with any definition of money supply.




21 M O N E T A R Y P O L I C Y A N D M A N A G E M E N T O F T H E P U B L I C D E B T

CHART

3.—MONEY

SUPPLY,

TCJRN-OVER OF B A N K

DEPOSITS, AND

PRICES, J A N U A R Y 1950-FEBRUARY 1 9 5 2
[1947-49=100]

Source : Introduced by Senator Flanders; appears a t p. 720 of the Hearings.




WHOLESALE

2 2

MONETARY POLICY AND M A N A G E M E N T

OF T H E PUBLIC

DEBT

of control by the Government. I t is only by persisting in appropriatefiscaland monetary policies that the Government can make its
full contribution to price stability and high-level employment over
the longer period.
3. Could a More Vigorous Monetary Policy Have Averted the Price

Rise? The preceding discussion gives rise to the question: "Could a
more vigorous monetary policy have averted the price rise between
the outbreak in Korea and March 1951?" This breaks down into
the two sub-questions: (1) Would the earlier adoption of the monetary
policy represented by the "accord" have averted the price rise, and
(2) could it have been averted by a much more vigorous monetary
policy?
The monetary policy initiated by the accord was not a particularly stringent one. At their low during the year following the
accord, the prices of 20-year 2%-percent Government bonds did
not fall appreciably below 96, nor did the yield on such bonds rise
appreciably above 2.80 percent. I t is doubtful that a monetary
policy of this order of stringency, if it had been adopted promptly
after the outbreak in Korea, would have had a substantial effect in
moderating the price rise which followed. The great bulk of the
opinion expressed in the hearings was that the effect of such a policy
would not have been substantial, and the bulk of the opinion of the
professional economists who answered the questionnaire was that
the expansion of credit was not the principal cause of the postKorean price rise (Compendium, pp. 1043-1066).
The reasons for these opinions are clear. The forces working for a
price rise were powerful. The outbreak of war seemed imminent.
Consumers were badly scared that prices were going to rise substantially and, even more important,, that goods would become unavailable.
They hastened to the stores "to get there before the hoarders."
These sentiments were shared by businessmen here and abroad—who
repeated the same actions at their level. The demand for raw materials was sharply augmented, causing price rises of the magnitude
shown in Table 1 (p. 11). Consumers and businessmen generally held
large cash balances and other types of liquid assets. The low level of
business loans relative to the gross national product showed that large
numbers of business firms had large unused lines of credit of A - l
quality which the banks would have been loath to dishonor. Neither
would instalment sales have been materially discouraged by a slight
rise in their (already high) implicit interest rates. A monetary policy
of the intensity of that subsequently initiated by the accord would
not have prevented the banks from honoring their prime lines of credit
(including those to instalment finance companies) by selling shortterm governments—which they held in abundance—at prices very
close to cost and by selling long-term governments at yields of around
2.80 percent.
The above discussion refers principally to the so-called "mechanical"
impact of an increasing intensity of monetary policy. In addition,
actions of a deflationary character by the Federal Reserve System—
such as increases in the rediscount rate—of ten have an additional
psychological impact through their effects on the expectations of
businessmen. In this way, actions by the Federal Reserve System
often have a much greater influence on the price situation than would
appear justified by their direct effects alone. The early months after



23

MONETARY

POLICY AND MANAGEMENT

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the outbreak in Korea, however, were an unpromising time for such an
additional psychological impact ,, to have much effect. There had
been an "inventory adjustment a year earlier; business had been
rising since the fall of 1949 and had a substantial momentum which
was accelerated into a boom by the outbreak of hostilities. Expectations were sanguine and were further heightened by talk, including
statements by Government officials, of impending shortages. They
were not likely to be greatly affected by, say, an additional % of 1
percent rise in the rediscount rate.
Under the circumstances, it seems futile to suppose that such a
small change in monetary policy could have made a substantial
difference in the price rise following the outbreak in Korea. I t would,
of course, have made some difference—and there can be many shades
of opinion as to how much—but the difference could scarcely have been
decisive.
[ C O M M E N T BY SENATOR FLANDERS: While not disputing the
above appraisal of economic conditions, I believe that a somewhat
more restrictive monetary policy such as followed the "accord"
should have been adopted at least early in 1950. The predecessor
subcommittee recommended in January 1950 that the freedom of
the Federal Reserve to restrict credit and raise interest rates for
general stabilization purposes should be restored even if this
involved higher debt service charges and greater inconvenience
to the Treasury in debt management. The present report now
endorses this recommendation. See p. 36.
I feel that there is much to be said for more frequent small
changes in credit policy. This would help get the country out of
"crisis psychology" in these matters. Furthermore, skillful
steering, whether of an automobile or of the national economy, is
brought about by small, frequent adjustments.]
This is not to say, however, that a sufficiently vigorous policy could
not have completely averted the price rise. There is no doubt that a
monetary policy so vigorous as to have caused a 20- or 30-point decline
in the prices of Government securities and forced banks to cancel the
lines of credit of even their best customers could have averted the
increase in the wholesale price index completely. But it could have
done so only by an averaging process. Some prices—copra, tin, lead,
wool, rubber, jute—were bound to rise, and the average could have
been maintained only by forcing other prices down to maintain the
average. This might have resulted in a serious depression, and in
the actual fact such a policy had few serious advocates.
[ C O M M E N T BY SENATOR FLANDERS: In my estimation there
was little probability of a serious depression in the months following the Korean outbreak. The fear of creating a depression
through more stringent monetary policy at that time seems
unwarranted. Monetary policy anords a considerable degree of
flexibility and I do not believe that its effective use should be
unduly inhibited in times of inflation (or deflation) by the fear
that it will produce a disastrous deflation (or inflation).
Nevertheless, I do not think it would have been wise or feasible to depend on monetary measures to prevent any rise in the
general price level immediately following June 1950. Such a
course would have made it more difficult to achieve desired
increases in defense output and productive capacity.



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MONETARY POLICY AND M A N A G E M E N T

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The same arguments, of course, would apply to fiscal policy
and tax increases which would have been severe enough to prevent any rise in the price level in this period.]
I t does not follow at all, however, that there was no choice between
such drastic action and no action at all. On the contrary, there is
reason to believe that the situation was one in which the relationship
between action and result would have been fairly continuous—i. e.,
that the size of the results obtained would have been proportioned
to the vigor of the action taken. But the circumstances were such
that the yield in results per unit of action taken would probably have
been low—and there were other reasons, to be discussed presently,
for acting with moderation. Under these conditions, the question
of the intensity of the action which should have been taken was one
of judgment, upon which reasonable men could and did differ.
B.

THE

W I S D O M OF M O N E T A R Y A N D D E B T M A N A G E M E N T
FOLLOWING THE OUTBREAK I N K O R E A

1. Factors Which Had to be Considered in the Period, June

POLICY

1950-

March 1951. Three important considerations confronted the monetary authorities following the outbreak in Korea: (1) the purchasing
power of the United States dollar had to be maintained; (2) production
had to be maintained and increased to a sufficiently high level to provide for the necessary rearmament with a minimum impairment of
the civilian standard of living; (3) the financial markets and the
confidence of the investing public in United States securities had to be
maintained so that the Treasury couldfinancea total war if that became necessary. These objectives were in part conflicting and it was
not possible to achieve all of them perfectly.
I t has already been suggested that the purchasing power of the
dollar could have been maintained completely only by forcing down the
prices of enough commodities to average out those which were being
forced up by the exigencies of the world and national situation. I n
an economy such as ours (and every other free-enterprise economy
of which we have record), in which neither wages nor the majority of
prices are easily reduced, an effort to force down prices could have
resulted only in frustration and unemployment. I t would have been
decidedly incompatible with achieving the second objective—that of
high production. On the other hand, a single-minded devotion to the
objective of high production might have resulted in unrestrained
inflation.
In the meantime, both the Treasury and the Federal Reserve
System had to give thought to the possibility of the outbreak of war.
In such an event, it would have been necessary to borrow large sums
of money at rates of interest which investors would have considered
fair and equitable, and which would have been as little likely as
ossible to cause difficulties in the subsequent postwar period (either
ecause they were too high or too low). During the war period itself,
however, it would have been necessary to rely for the control of inflation principally upon high rates of taxation and upon the direct control
of prices and wages and upon the allocation and rationing of goods
and materials. At the time of the outbreak in Korea the interest
rate for long-term Government borrowing was 2% percent, and had
remained at that level for nearly ten years. Investor confidence in



25

MONETARY

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DEBT

the rate was high (see particularly Chap. X I I I of the Compendium,
Replies by Government Security Dealers) and it might have taken a
long period to establish an equal degree of investor confidence in any
other rate, either higher or lower. This period could have been ill
afforded in the event of the immediate outbreak of war, and under
the circumstances it is not surprising that the Treasury placed great
emphasis on the maintenance of stability in the Government bond
market. The fact that war did not break out should not make this
concern seem puerile in retrospect. Fiscal preparedness, like military
preparedness, serves the national interest best when it does not need
to be called into action.
*
The fiscal and monetary authorities had to, and did, give considerable weight to each of these objectives. That the Federal Reserve
placed great emphasis on the objective of price stability, the Council
of Economic Advisers on the objective of high production, and the
Treasury on the objective of fiscal preparedness, is not surprising in
view of the major preoccupation of each agency. I t is possible that
each of these agencies may have somewhat overweighted that aspect
of most direct concern to it relatively to the other two, but each
seems to have made a genuine effort to view the situation as a whole.
In retrospect, it seems that it might have been desirable to have
instituted a somewhat stronger monetary policy (like that of the
accord) somewhat sooner, but it is difficult to be too positive when
we go back and recreate the atmosphere and expectations of the
period. Perhaps the situation was best summed up by Mr. W. L.
Hemingway, representing the American Bankers Association, who,
in answer to a question, said (Hearings, pp. 342-343):
* * * I have this feeling, that after the outbreak of the Korean war that
nothing would have stopped a certain amount of buying. The money was i n
the hands of the people, and they were afraid that there would be a shortage of
goods,^o they went i n and bought, and there was no way to stop that.
Now, i t is possible t h a t a tighter money market might have prevented some
manufacturers and merchants from increasing the inventories as much as they
did; t h a t is a matter t h a t no one can tell. I t is purely a matter of surmise; but
I am certain that there would have been a tremendous amount of buying because
the people had the money; i t was i n the banks, in their safe-deposit boxes, and i n
their pockets.
Now, the first question, as to when i t would have been advisable to tighten up
the money after Korea, is pretty hard to say, there was one condition there that
the Secretary of the Treasury and the members of the Federal Reserve Board, the
Open Market Committee, had to consider, and that was the danger of a foreign war.
Y o u remember how all this talk existed about Russia, how we might get into
t h a t difficulty, and they wanted to be very careful that they did not do anything
t h a t would snake the credit i n the Government's security markets, because they
might be called on to finance a tremendous war, and i t was not an easy question to
decide. Whether i t was decided right or wrong, why, that is just a matter of
opinion.
I t h i n k , perhaps, after the feeling had grown that the danger of imminent war
was over t h a t they might have acted a little sooner and, perhaps, have stopped
some of the inflation.

2. The Actions of the Monetary and Debt Management Authorities,

June 1950 to March 1951. The Subcommittee approaches the subject
of the personal relationships involved in the formulation of monetary
policy and the management of the public debt with reluctance. The
Joint Committee on the Economic Report was conceived as a forum
in which ideas rather than personalities would contend for supremacy,
and the Subcommittee would have avoided any inquiry into the



2 6

MONETARY POLICY AND M A N A G E M E N T

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personal aspects of the subject had it not feared that, in the existing
situation, this would have involved more loss than gain in the clarity
of the issues. The Subcommittee's interest lies in the future and not
in the past and its comments on this subject, as on all others, are
presented for their value in preventing the repetition of past errors
and in securing a more effective formulation and administration of
monetary and debt management policies in the future.
The Secretary of the Treasury, in his answer to question No. 17 in
the questionnaire sent him by the Subcommittee (Compendium, pp.
50-74), presented an extended discussion of Treasury-Federal Reserve
relationships since the end of World War I I and particularly during
the period between the outbreak in Korea and the accord. Although the answer of the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System to the corresponding question asked him in
the Subcommittee's questionnaire was fully responsive, it did not contain detail corresponding to that included in the Treasury's answer;
neither was such detail presented by Chairman Martin in his testimony
before the Subcommittee. A presentation of the Federal Reserve
side of the relationship, although in somewhat less detail than Secretary Snyder's presentation was, however, included in the testimony of
Allan Sproul, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
and Vice Chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee. His
testimony will be found at pp. 506-552 of the Hearings. I n addition,
the Federal Reserve and the Treasury furnished, at the request of the
Subcommittee, a file of their mutual correspondence and of the correspondence of the Federal Reserve with the President between June
1950 and March 1951, bearing on the principal issues of monetary
policy and debt management. This file will be found at pp. 942-966
of the Hearings.

Marriner Eccles and Thomas B. McCabe, both former Chairmen of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, were each
invited to appear before the Subcommittee. Mr. Eccles submitted a
statement, which appears on pp. 907-909 of the Hearings, in which he
discusses the merits of several issues before the Subcommittee but
does not go into the matter of Treasury-Federal Reserve relationships.
He stated:
* * * these matters have been adequately covered, particularly i n the
testimony of Allan Sproul, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
and I am i n full agreement w i t h what he had to say w i t h respect to these subjects.

Mr. McCabe wrote the Subcommittee a letter in which he commended Mr. Sproul's testimony and the working of the TreasuryFederal Reserve accord, and said that he would prefer not to appear
before the Subcommittee to cover once more ground which he believed
had already been well covered by Mr. Sproul.
An examination of the information submitted to the Subcommittee
seems to show that, on the whole, both the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve were endeavoring during the entire period to serve the public
interest as they saw it. During most of the period their differences
were very small as seen from the outside and were concerned principally with short-term rates of interest.
During the first part of the neriod covered by the correspondence
included in the file (which begins on July 12,1950), the Federal Reserve
was urging both an increase in short-term interest rates and the issu


MONETARY

POLICY AND MANAGEMENT

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2 7

ance of a 2% percent long-term nonmarketable bond, to be continuously available "on tap." The Treasury resisted both suggestions,
although, possibly as a compromise measure, it opened the 2% percent
Series F and G savings bonds to large-scale institutional i n v e s t m e n t for
limited periods during the fall. On October 30, 1950, Chairman
McCabe wrote to Secretary Snyder:
Since our meeting on Thursday, October 26, a meeting of the Federal Open
M a r k e t Committee has been held. The Committee has been and is in complete
agreement t h a t under present conditions i t is necessary to protect the 2V% percent
rate (par) on the longest t e r m Treasury bonds now outstanding. The Committee's policies have been determined in accordance w i t h that conclusion.

The meeting referred to in Chairman McCabe's letter was presumptively with the President, as he (Chairman McCabe) said in a letter
to the President, dated December 9, 1950:
* * * Y o u can rest assured t h a t we are f u l l y conscious of the magnitude
o f the financial problems t h a t face us, and t h a t we w i l l do all in our power t o
insure the successful financing of the Government's needs.
Y o u w i l l recall t h a t I mailed you a copy of m y letter of October 30 to John
Snyder in which I outlined the policy to be pursued by the Open Market Committee in accordance w i t h the assurance which I previously gave to you and
J o h n i n your office on October 26.
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

* * * We have conducted our operations i n strict accord w i t h the policy
w h i c h I outlined to you and John.

The first suggestion that the long-term interest rate should be
«increased appears in a memorandum submitted to Secretary Snyder
on January 3, 1951 by Mr. Sproul, speaking for himself only. However, by February 7, 1951, this view seems to have been officially
adopted by the Open Market Committee, as Chairman McCabe
said in a letter to Secretary Snyder on that date:
* * * We should like to discuss w i t h you at an early date a coordinated
credit policy and debt-management program which would assist in the highly
i m p o r t a n t fight against inflation and improve public confidence in the market
for Government securities. We would suggest as a basis for t h a t discussion a
program along the following lines:
(1) The Federal Reserve, for the present, would purchase the longest-term
restricted Treasury bonds now outstanding i n amounts necessary to prevent
t h e m f r o m falling below par.
(2) I f substantial Federal Reserve support of the longest-term restricted bond
is required, you would be prepared t o announce t h a t at an appropriate time the
Treasury would offer a longer-term bond w i t h a coupon sufficiently attractive so
t h a t the bond would be accepted and held by investors. I t would be announced
t h a t outstanding long-term restricted bonds would be exchangeable for the new
bond and t h a t the new bond would be offered for cash subscription by nonbank
investors on a basis to be determined.
We should like t o discuss w i t h you possible features for the new bond t h a t would
remove or reduce the need for Federal Reserve support of the market in the future.
(3) For the purpose of restricting the creation of bank reserves through sales
of short-term securities t o the Federal Reserve, particularly by banks, the comm i t t e e w o u l d keep its purchases of such securities t o the m i n i m u m amounts
needed t o m a i n t a i n an orderly money market.
Under this policy, banks would be expected to obtain needed reserves primarily
by borrowing f r o m the Federal Reserve banks. I f demands for expansion of
bank credit and bank reserves should continue, short-term interest rates presumably w o u l d adjust t o a level around the discount rate.

The proposals in this letter, of course, foreshadow the actual accord
adopted about a month later.
On the whole, the correspondence is not that between two agencies
each with an inflexible position, but shows a considerable amount of
20499—52



6

2 8

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DEBT

five and take. I t is of particular interest in this connection that the
ederal Reserve itself did not reach the position reflected in the accord
until some time around the turn of the year—well after the Chinese
intervention in Korea.
The correspondence does show, however, a number of difficulties in
procedure. The agencies were often dealing with one another at
arm's length when more frequent face-to-face conferences, especially
at the staff level, might have promoted greater understanding. I t is
also regrettable that several of the key conferences were attended by
the principals only and left a misunderstanding as to what had been
actually agreed on, which might have been avoided had there been
adequate staff representation and a prompt preparation and interchange of official minutes.
There are two cases in which this lack of effective staff liaison was
especially important. On the one hand, it appears that Secretary
Snyder went to the hospital for an eye operation early in February 1951
believing, in good faith, that the other parties in interest had agreed on a
moratorium of action until he returned to his office, while the members
of the Open Market Committee had no such belief. Better staff
work could have averted this misunderstanding. On the other hand,
it is difficult to explain or to excuse the action of the White House
secretariat in furnishing to the press a statement giving what purported to be the substance of an agreement reached at a White House
conference on January 31, 1951, contrary to the understanding of the
Federal Reserve participants in the conference and without prior
clearance or discussion with the Chairman or any representative of
the Board of Governors. These misunderstandings are deeply to be
regretted, and it is hoped that the record appearing in the Compendium
and Hearings of this Subcommittee may be of help to public officials
and students of public administration in preventing similar occurrences
in the future. Despite these misunderstandings, however, the Subcommittee believes that the record shows principally the actions of
men of good will trying to work out a solution for an exceedingly
complex problem.
3. Monetary and Debt Management Policy Since March 1951.

The

great majority of witnesses before the Subcommittee believed that
the monetary and debt-management policies pursued since the accord
have been appropriate to the underlying economic situation. This
was true not merely of the official witnesses—who were responsible
for the formulation of the policy and defended it of necessity—but
also of the witnesses from both the financial and academic communities. This view is, on the whole, supported by the answers in the
Compendium, as far as they bear on this subject and giving consideration to the earlier date at which they were prepared. While the
predominant view'appeared to be in favor of present policies, there
was a considerable body of opinion to the effect that the Treasury
should make a more strenuous effort to sell long-term securities at
somewhat higher interest rates than those then prevailing and a
rather more considerable dissatisfaction with the then terms of
Series E Savings Bonds. Since the close of the hearings, the Treasury
has met these criticisms in part by a revision in the terms of savings
bonds of all series and by an additional offering of 2% percent nonmarketable bonds. Dissents on the easy money side were much fewer



29

MONETARY

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than those on the tight money side, but this may have been due in
part to the preponderance of witnesses directly or indirectly connected with thefinancialcommunity.
The Subcommittee is, on the whole, satisfied with the monetary and
debt management policies in the year following the accord. Wholesale prices declined slightly, the cost of living was fairly stable, and
there were some deflationary factors in the business situation. On the
other hand, with the major impact of defense expenditures still to
come, the Subcommittee feels that it would be improvident to return
to the monetary policies prevailing before the Korean outbreak.
The Subcommittee commends both the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve for their cooperation since the accord and trusts that they
will continue aflexiblepolicy adjusted to the situation as it develops.
I t makes no more specific recommendation on general monetary and
debt-management policies for the immediate future. (A discussion
of more general principles appears later in this report, see pp. 31-41.)
The Subcommittee believes that general monetary, credit, and fiscal
policies should be the Government's primary and principal means of
promoting the ends of price stability and high-level employment and
that whenever possible reliance should be placed on these means in
preference to devices such as price, wage, and allocation controls and,
to a lesser extent, selective credit controls which involve intervention
in particular markets. The Subcommittee cannot accept a system of
price, wage, and allocation controls as a permanent feature of the
American economy. Nevertheless, under present circumstances—in
which we do not yet know what will be the full impact on the economy
of the defense expenditure program—the Subcommittee feels that it
would be improvident to repeal the legislative authority for price,
wage, and allocation controls, and recommends that this authority be
extended until the full effects of these expenditures have been felt.
I t makes the same recommendation with respect to the legislative
authority for the existing selective credit controls, but expresses satisfaction that the administrative authorities have shown themselves
ready to liberalize or eliminate these controls as soon as such action is,
in their judgment, consistent with a policy of economic stability.
[ C O M M E N T BY M R . P A T M A N : I believe that the disadvantages
of selective controls over consumer and housing credit, as set
out on pp. 36-37, are so great that the authority for the imposition
of these controls should be repealed immediately.]







II. FISCAL
A.

AND

MONETARY

POLICY

FOR

THE

FUTURE

O V E R - A L L R O L E OF F I S C A L A N D M O N E T A R Y P O L I C Y ; A P P R O P R I A T E
FISCAL POLICY

The Subcommittee's mandate did not extend to a detailed consideration of fiscal policy, nor was the subject of fiscal policy covered
other than incidentally in the Compendium or the Hearings. The
Subcommittee would nevertheless like to express its conviction that
sound fiscal policy—meaning by this sound policies with respect to
Government receipts and expenditures—together with sound monetary policy must be the foundation stones of any over-all program
seeking price stability and high-level employment. Four members of
this Subcommittee were members of the previous subcommittee under
the chairmanship of Senator Douglas, which considered the subject
offiscalpolicy at length, and all of us join in reaffirming the following
two recommendations made by that subcommittee {Report of the
Subcommittee on Monetary,

Credit, and Fiscal Policies, Senate Docu-

ment No. 129, 81st Cong., 2d sess., p. 1):
THE

ROLE

OF M O N E T A R Y , C R E D I T , AND F I S C A L POLICIES I N A C H I E V I N G
PURPOSES OF T H E EMPLOYMENT A C T

THE

We recommend not only t h a t appropriate, vigorous, and coordinated monetary,
credit, and fiscal policies be employed to promote the purposes of the Employment
Act, b u t also t h a t such policies constitute the Government's primary and principal
method of p r o m o t i n g those purposes.
F E D E R A L F I S C A L POLICIES

We recommend t h a t Federal fiscal policies be such as not only to avoid aggrav a t i n g economic instability b u t also t o make a positive and important contribut i o n to stabilization, a t the same t i m e promoting equity and incentives in taxat i o n and economy i n expenditures. A policy based on the principle of an annually
balanced budget regardless of fluctuations in the national income does not meet
these tests; for, if actually followed, i t would require drastic increases of tax rates
or drastic reductions of Government expenditures during periods of deflation and
unemployment, thereby aggravating the decline, and marked reductions of tax
rates or increases of expenditures during periods of inflationary boom, thereby
accentuating the inflation. A policy t h a t w i l l contribute to stability must produce a surplus of revenues over expenditures i n periods of high prosperity and
comparatively f u l l employment and a surplus of expenditures over revenues i n
periods of deflation and abnormally high unemployment. Such a policy must,
however, be based on a recognition t h a t there are limits to the effectiveness of
fiscal policy because economic forecasting is highly imperfect at present and tax
a n d expenditure policies under present procedures are very inflexible.
*

*

*

B. ROLE

*

OF M O N E T A R Y

*

*

*

POLICY

Monetary policy may be defined for the purpose of this discussion
as that policy which has for its immediate objective the establishment
of a desired degree of ease or tightness in the supply of credit and seeks
through attaining this immediate objective to contribute to economic
stability. As the Federal Reserve System is always pursuing some




31

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MONETARY POLICY AND M A N A G E M E N T

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DEBT

type of monetary policy, the money market can never i n the most
literal sense of the term be " f r e e . " The best working definition of a
" f r e e " money market, therefore, may be a market which (a) is n o t
firmly pegged and (b) i n which the existing level of rates has been
brought about by a monetary policy consistent w i t h economic stability.
Selective credit controls which restrict the availability of credit for
special purposes w i l l be considered separately.
A tight monetary policy makes money hard to get. Less money
w i l l be borrowed and less spending w i l l occur f r o m borrowed funds.
When interest rates are higher (and bond prices lower), some persons
holding liquid assets or fixed-interest-bearing obligations, who m i g h t
otherwise have sold them and spent the proceeds, w i l l prefer instead
to continue to hold them. As the greater portion of our money supply
consists of commercial bank deposits " c r e a t e d " b y bank loans and
investments, a less liberal lending policy on the part of banks w i l l
decrease the money supply and so increase the ratio between goods and
money. A tight money policy tends, therefore, to combat inflation.
Contrariwise, an easy money policy reverses the process just described
and so tends to combat depression. 1
These effects, i t is true, w i l l be offset to some extent b y the effects of
changes i n interest rates as costs, i n which aspect increased interest
rates will tend to increase prices as would increases i n any other
element of cost—and vice versa for decreases i n rates. B u t , except i n
industries where the ratio of capital to output is extremely high (e. g.,
hydroelectric plants), the net result is likely to be as previously stated.
The main lines of effect on the price level to be expected f r o m
monetary policy are therefore clear. B u t , before an unhesitating
recommendation can be made t h a t i t be used w i t h great vigor, account
must be taken of many qualifications and refinements.
1. Cost versus Arailability
of Credit—In
determining the degree of
ease or tightness existing i n the money market at any particular time,
two factors must be taken into consideration—(a) the cost, and (b)
the availability of credit. The cost of credit is reflected i n interest
rates and i n the other open or concealed charges.made for the lending
of money. The availability of credit, on the other hand, refers to the
readiness w i t h which a prospective borrower is able to obtain funds at
the rates nominally quoted for the type of loan which he seeks. T h e
Federal Reserve has urged that much greater emphasis than has generally been customary be placed on changes i n the availability of credit
as contrasted w i t h changes i n its cost.
Changes i n the supply of loan funds relative to the demand,
whether induced b y the monetary authorities or occurring autonomously, are generally first reflected p a r t l y i n the cost and p a r t l y i n
the availability of credit. Interest rates, like many other prices, are
" s t i c k y " and do not move readily over as wide an arc as m i g h t appear
to be justified b y changes i n the underlying supply and demand
situation. A tightening i n the money market is therefore likely i n i t s
early stages to be reflected largely i n increased difficulty i n securing
funds at the quoted rates. The quality of loans on which the same
* I n traditional theory there was added to these considerations a supposed tendency on the part of individuals to save more out of their income when the reward of saving in the form of interest rates was higher.
However, it is far from clear that this is true to a significant extent, except as higher interest rates encourage
the holding of liquid assets and fixed-interest-bearing obligations—which has already been taken account of.
N o effect of monetary policy on savings is therefore assumed in this report. But even without this assumption, the general case for the efficacy of monetary policy is a powerful one.




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interest rate is quoted varies c o n s i d e r a b l y , and banks and other
lenders tend to become more selective in their loans within each ratebracket in periods of increasing monetary stringency. This is the
basis for the claim that credit-tightening moves by the monetary
authorities reduce the availability of funds (and hence combat inflation) more than is shown by changes in interest rates. This is true
and significant, paiticularly in the short run—although it is not
entirely to be welcomed, as a good case might be made that the
available supply of credit would be utilized more effectively if it wero
distributed according to the criteria of the price system (i. e., to the
highest bidders) rather than rationed in accordance with the personal
preferences of the lenders. Lenders, however, are not likely indefinitely to pass up opportunities to raise their rates, nor—in the opposite
situation—are they likely to refrain indefinitely from cutting them
when this is necessary to secure business. Therefore, if any change
in the underlying demand and supply situation (as affected by monetary policy) persists, it will come to be reflected more-and-more in
t h e a c t u a l cost of borrowing money and less-and-less in changes in
availability. This point was made very well by Professor Samuelson
who said (Hearings, p. 696):
* * * i t is unthinkable t h a t over a period of time, of a few months, let
us say, or of over a year, or more t h a n a year, that a banker should act so irrationally t h a t when credit is scarce he w i l l hold his rates perfectly inflexible, and
a r b i t r a r i l y make trouble for himself b v refusing solid citiz3ns i n the community,
and some who t h i n k they are solid citizens, credit, and thereby bring upon himself all the troubles t h a t come f r o m rationing.
On the contrary, i t seems t o me t h a t after the shortest run, what he w i l l do
w i l l be w h a t any normal prudent commercially minded man would do: namely,
i f a t h i n g is i n short supply he w i l l gradually raise the interest charges on i t ,
and let the higher price help h i m do the rationing.

The time required for such a change in monetary conditions to
"work through" to a change in interest rates doubtless differs a great
deal from one type of lending activity to another and Professor
Samuelson's estimate of the required time may be low. In some fields
a number of years may be required. The important point, however,
is that changes in the underlying supply and demand situation
(always as modified by monetary policy) must be expected within a
reasonable period to have their principal effect on the cost of borrowing money. Changes in "availability" probably should be considered largely as transition phenomena—although they are very
useful in treating inflationary and deflationary pressures expected to
persist for only a relatively short time.
2. Private versus Public Credit—A tight money policy makes borrowing more costly and difficult while an easy money policy makes it
cheaper and easier. The purpose of a tight money policy is to combat inflation by reducing the total demand for goods and services.
The goods and services demanded by private borrowers (except in
the case of consumer credit) consist principally of those required for
capital formation. I t follows that the principal effect (and principal
object) of a tight money policy, as far as the private economy is concerned, is to reduce the volume of capital formation below what it
would have been had an easier money policy been pursued.
The Federal Government, in terms of amount of securities outstanding, is the largest borrower in the money market by a wide
margin—almost as large as all others combined. Other things being



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equal, the cost of its borrowings will rise and fall in rough proportion
with changes in the cost of borrowing to others.
Two attitudes with respect to such changes in the cost of money to
the Federal Government are possible. The first possible attitude is
that the Federal Government, like all other users of capital, should be
subject to the discipline of the money market and that one of the
functions of a tight money policy is to force the Federal Government
to reduce its expenditures (or to increase taxes), while one of the functions of an easy money policy is to encourage it to increase its expenditures (or to decrease taxes). The other view is that the receipts and
expenditures of the Federal Government are and should be determined
by a democratic process at the levels most suitable to the national
interest (including the national interest in combating inflation or
deflation) rather than by the condition of the money market. If the
second view is adopted—and the members of the subcommittee do
adopt it—then it follows that an increase in the rate of interest paid
by the Federal Government does nothing in and of itself to combat
inflation; on the contrary, it is actually inflationary to the (minor)
extent that it increases Government spending. An increase in the
cost of Government borrowing should, consequently, be accepted
only to the extent that it is a necessary concomitant of a corresponding
increase in the dearness or difficulty of private borrowing. As the
money market has a considerable degree of unity from the standpoint
of the lender, who has the opportunity to choose between competing
offers for his funds, the cost of money to the Federal Government must
fluctuate considerably with changes in the ease and tightness of the
private capital market. But a reasonable degree of insulation of part
of the Government security market from the influences affecting
private borrowing is desirable, other things being equal, both because
of the resulting interest saving to the Government (and so to the
taxpayers) and because the presence of some insulating devices is
likely in practice to increase the flexibility of monetary policy. The
most important insulating devices are selective credit controls and
bank reserve requirements. These are discussed elsewhere in this
report (pp. 36-37 and 43-48). While the Subcommittee does not
believe that the introduction of new insulating devices is necessary
at this time and is not sure that such devices would be practicable
even under other conditions, it recommends that they be kept under
continuing study by the monetary authorities.
3. Government Lending and Loon Guarantee Agencies.—It

is, of

course, obvious that monetary policy can influence the rate of capital
formation only when it can have an effect on the cost and availability
of credit. This is not the case if the influence of general monetary
policy in any field is offset by the promotional activities of Government agencies in increasing capital formation and easing credit in
that field. This has been true in several areas—of which by far the
most important is housing—throughout most of the postwar period.
I t would have been futile to have endeavored to reduce the volume of
new housing by a "strong" general monetary policy while at the same
time encouraging it by direct credit aids. This is not to pass on the
merits of the postwar housing finance program, which may be justified for other reasons. I t is merely to point out that general monetary
policy was thus deprived of one of the principal fields in which it
might have exerted an anti-inflationary influence.



MONETARY POLICY AND MANAGEMENT

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3 5

4. Corporate Self-Financing.—It should also be pointed out that the
great majority of capital expenditures by colorations in the postwar
period werefinancedfrom undistributed earnings and accrued depreciation and depletion rather than by new borrowing. As a consequence,
the influence which a strong monetary policy might have had on these
expenditures was greatly reduced.
This is in sharp contrast to the situation during the twenties and
most earlier periods, when most corporate business was much more
heavily dependent on bank financing. I t is of great interest to note,
in this connection, that the increase in prices and business activity
since Korea has placed an increasing number of businesses in a position where they have to seek regular or occasional commercial bank
accommodation, and has consequently strengthened the hand of
monetary policy for the future.
5. Interest Rates and Long-Term Bond Prices.—Changes in longterm interest rates, which may appear moderate at first glance, result
in remarkably large changes in the prices of long-term bonds. This
is illustrated in Table 7, which shows the amount which a 20-year
2% percent bond would fall in price with each successive one-half of
1 percent increase in its interest yield from 2% to 5 percent. The
table shows that such a bond would have to fall to about 79% in order
to increase its yield to 4 percent. The capital loss (realized or unrealized) which would be brought about by the resulting 20% point
decline is equal to the full coupon-carry on such a bond for more than
eight years. If part of the gross interest return was taken in taxes
(which cannot be entirely recouped by an allowance for a subsequent
capital loss), such a capital loss would eat up much more than eight
years' interest. Quite apart from the immediate effects of drastic
declines in long-term bond prices upon the solvency of financial
institutions—which cannot be dismissed as unimportant—such
declines leave lasting scars behind them on the memories of conservative investors and make them much more hesitant to undertake
commitments at modest interest rates in the future. This would not
be a serious difficulty if there were a reasonable assurance that a new
and substantially higher level of long-term interest rates would
persist for a long time to come. However, far from there being such
an assurance, the probability is that the desirable level of long-term
interest rates in a high-saving high-investment economy such as ours
will continue low for a long period. The Subcommittee, therefore,
appreciates and concurs in the evident intention of the monetary
authorities to avoid extreme changes in long-term interest rates.
TABLE 7.—Effect of hypothetical increases in interest rates on the price of a 20-year
2%-percent bond
Assumed y i e l d :

(Percent)
2 y2
3

3}i
4__

4}£
5

Market price
100.00
92. 5 2
85. 7 0
79.48
73.81
68.62

6. Efficacy of General Monetary Policy.—After allowing for all of
the qualifications and refinements just discussed, the Subcommittee
believes that general monetary policy has an important role to play
20499—52
6



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in achieving and maintaining price stability and high-level employment. The Subcommittee, after taking into account the evidence
submitted to it and the changed circumstances of the past two years,
sees no reason to alter the recommendation on this point made by the
earlier subcommittee under the chairmanship of Senator Douglas,
which reads as follows (Report oj the Subcommittee on Monetary, Credit,
and Fiscal Policies, pp. 1-2):
MONETARY AND D E B T - M A N A G E M E N T POLICIES

1. We recommend t h a t an appropriate, flexible, a n d vigorous monetary policy,
employed in coordination w i t h fiscal a n d other policies, should be one of the
principal methods used to achieve the purposes of the E m p l o y m e n t A c t .
Timely
flexibility toward easy credit at some times a n d credit restriction a t other times
is an essential characteristic of a monetary policy t h a t w i l l promote economic
stability rather than instability. The vigorous use of a restrictive monetary
policy as an anti-inflation measure has been i n h i b i t e d since the war b y considerations relating to holding down the yields and supporting the prices of U n i t e d
States Government securities. As a long r u n matter, we favor interest rates as
l o w as they can be without inducing inflation, for low interest rates stimulate
•capital investment. B u t we believe t h a t the advantages of avoiding inflation
•are so great and t h a t a restrictive monetary policy can contribute so much t o this
•end t h a t the freedom of the Federal Reserve t o restrict credit a n d raise interest
Tates for general stabilization purposes should be restored even if the cost should
prove to be a significant increase i n service charges on the Federal debt and a
greater inconvenience t o the Treasury i n its sale of securities for new financing
a n d refunding purposes.
C.

SELECTIVE C R E D I T CONTROLS AND T H E V O L U N T A R Y C R E D I T
RESTRAINT PROGRAM

1. Selective Credit Controls.—Selective credit controls endeavor to
restrict the amount of credit granted for specific purposes. Three
such controls, all administered or recently administered by the Federal
Reserve System, are now authorized by law. They are those imbedded
in Regulations T and U, which restrict credit for the purpose of purchasing or carrying marketable securities; Regulation X , which restricts credit for the purpose of purchasing new housing and certain
other new construction; and Regulation W, which restricts instalment credit for the purchase of specified types of consumer goods.
The operation of Regulation W was indefinitely suspended by the
Board of Governors, effective May 7, 1952.
Regulations T and U were issued pursuant to the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934. They are generally accepted—and are
accepted by the Subcommittee—as a part of our normal economic
machinery. Regulations X and W were issued pursuant to the
Defense Production Act and were generally considered to be temporary. The Board of Governors and the presidents of the Federal
Reserve banks, in response to questions addressed to them and
answered in the Compendium, stated that they did not believe that
any types of selective credit control other than those over security
credit, housing credit, and consumer credit would be practicable.
Selective credit controls reduce the amount of credit used for
specific purposes without increasing the cost or decreasing the availability of credit generally. Insofar as this applies to Government
borrowing, it constitutes a means of insulating the Government bond
market from credit controls designed to restrict private borrowing and
so is an advantage. But insofar as their repercussions apply to private



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borrowing, selective credit controls have the a priori disadvantage
that they tend to transfer the use of credit from more-wanted to
less-wanted channels as measured by the normal criteria of the price
system. I t follows that they should be used only when the social or
economic advantage of concentrating restraint on a selected type of
credit is manifest, and that they should generally be "backed up" by
some degree of general credit restriction to reduce the substitution
effect to a minimum. Another reason for preferring general credit
restraint to selective controls, other things being equal, is that the
restraint arising from a generally restrictive credit policy is anonymous and is likely to be accepted as a "law of nature," while the
restraint exercised by selective controls is far from anonymous and
is apt to be extremely irritating to those restrained.
The selective regulation of consumer credit inevitably has important
sumptuary and fair trade aspects. Many persons believe that people
should be restrained from buying, say, television sets on too-long
terms for "their own good" and that merchants should be restrained
from selling them on too-long terms because it is unfair to other
merchants. The Subcommittee doubts that these matters are a
proper concern of the Federal Government. In any event, its concern is limited to the credit control aspects of the regulation. I t
cannot agree, however,
with the opinion which has been expressed by
the Federal Reserve2 that selective credit controls should be administered primarily for their value in limiting the total amount of credit
outstanding. Selective credit controls, the Subcommittee believes,
should be administered as such and with a sympathetic regard for
the interests of the industries and consumers involved and not as
mere adjuncts of general credit control.
The Subcommittee does not believe that the authority of the Board
of Governors to regulate consumer and real estate credit should be
removed until it is certain that the full impact of defense expenditures
has been felt. I t expresses its satisfaction that the Board of Governors suspended the operation of Regulation W when, in the judgment of the Board, the selective restraint of consumer credit was no
longer necessary, and expresses its confidence that the Board will
continue to keep the situation under review in order to ruake sure
that neither Regulation W (if reimposed) nor Regulation X is allowed
at any time to interfere with the employment of resources for which no
suitable market exists elsewhere (having regard, of course, to the need
for converting convertible resources to national defense purposes).
[ C O M M E N T BY M R . PATMAN: I believe that the disadvantages
of selective controls over consumer and housing credit are so
great that the authority for the imposition of these controls
should be repealed immediately.]
2. The Voluntary Credit Restraint Program.—At the time of the
hearings, the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program, authorized by the
Defense Production Act and referred to earlier in this report, was still
in effect. This program was terminated on May 12, 1952. The
representatives of the Federal Reserve System and of the banking
industry appearing at the hearings expressed the belief that this program was an important factor in holding down the expansion of credit
* See the letter of the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to the Chair,
men of the Senate and House Committees on Banking and Currency reprinted in the Federal Reserve Bulletin for July 1951, pp. 748-751.




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i n pthe year following its inauguration i n M a r c h 1951. Each of them
testified, however, that this impact was extremely difficult to measure.
The Subcommittee is disturbed b y the longer-run implications of
programs of this type. The Voluntary Credit Restraint Program was
i n essence a program for selective credit control, administered voluntari l y by lenders i n accordance w i t h criteria which, i n the nature of the
case, must be vague and shifting. Such a program combines the disadvantages of selective credit control w i t h the further danger of
substituting the private prejudices of lenders for the criteria of the
price system. The Subcommittee is impressed b y the testimony
presented to i t that the program was most helpful i n a difficult period
and commends the spirit i n which i t was administered. I t expresses
satisfaction, however, that, i n the opinion of the Board of Governors,
the program is no longer necessary and the means for restraining credit
can be confined to those more likely to be satisfactory i n the long run^
D.

M A N A G E M E N T OF T H E P U B L I C

DEBT

1. General Debt Management Policy.—The Secretary of the Treasury
is entrusted w i t h the responsibility for the management of the public
debt. This is a heavy operating responsibility. A n unwise monetary
policy can greatly weaken the economy even over a relatively short
period of time. B u t an unwise step i n debt management can cause
great harm i n a single day, as the confidence of the people i n the credit
of the United States is the foundation stone on which our whole financial structure is built.
The confidence i n the public credit is not based upon any particular
interest rate on public securities. I t can be as great when Government borrowing takes place at 5 percent as i t is when Government
borrowing takes place at 2}{ percent. B u t i t is disrupted b y disorderly changes i n the prices of Government securities and depends
on the ability of the Government to sell securities at rates which are
generally considered to be fair and equitable.
I t i t also a responsibility of debt management to see t h a t the cost
of servicing the public debt is no greater than necessary to treat the
holders of Government securities fairly and to meet the requirements
of economic stability. The interest on the public debt must be paid
ultimately from the proceeds of taxation, and tax moneys should not
be expended except for an adequate consideration. This is true on
grounds of equity alone. B u t there are additional reasons based on
grounds of broad economic policy. As Secretary Snyder said i n
response to a question on the general economic objectives of the
Treasury i n the Subcommittee's questionnaire (Compendium, pp.
14-15):
* * * I do not concur i n the view t h a t the level of interest payments on
the public debt is of only minor significance for the economy as a whole. Some
of those who hold this view argue, first, t h a t the b u l k of our interest payments
represents only transfers of income f r o m taxpayers t o bondholders w i t h i n t h e
U n i t e d States, rather t h a n a consumption of real labor and materials; and, second,
t h a t those who receive the interest payments pay back a substantial p o r t i o n of t h e
amount in taxes.
While acknowledging the element of t r u t h t h a t these views contain, I cannot
conclude t h a t the interest burden on the public debt is of negligible importance.
I n the first place, those who pay the taxes a n d those who h o l d the securities are n o t
necessarily identical. I n the second place, the transfer of income t h r o u g h collect i o n of taxes and payment by the Government is never painless a n d costless,




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however wise the Government may be i n devising and administering tax policy.
W i t h taxes a t their present high levels, i t is increasingly difficult t o find additional
revenue sources t h a t are reasonably equitable and t h a t do not unduly impair the
incentives necessary t o the effective functioning of our free enterprise economic
system. For these reasons, the Treasury always endeavors to hold interest costs
on the public debt t o the lowest level consistent w i t h its other objectives.

Neither the problems of monetary policy nor those of debt management can be solved in isolation from each other. I t is necessary that
the Treasury and the Federal Reserve work together closely, and
that the aims of debt management and monetary policy be correlated.
This can be done only if the Treasury gives adequate consideration
to the requirements of economic stability, and if the Federal Reserve
gives adequate consideration to the need for maintaining confidence
in the public credit and to that for economy in public expenditure.
The Subcommittee believes that this will be best assured if the
Treasury and the Federal Reserve continue to endeavor to find by
mutual discussion the solutions most in the public interest for their
common problems, with final appeal to Congress.
2. Issuance of Purchasing Power Bonds.—The Subcommittee does
not believe that it would be wise to experiment with the issuance of
securities the terms of repayment of which were determined partly
<or wholly by the purchasing power of the dollar. In this it concurs
with the views of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Council of
Economic Advisers as expressed in the Compendium (pp. 142-149
and 888-889), with the views of a large majority of the economists
queried as expressed in the Compendium (pp. 1097-1114), and with
the view of the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System as expressed in the Hearings (pp. 137-138). The
principal arguments for and against issuing such a security are summarized on pp. 1097-1098 of the Compendium. The Subcommittee
finds the negative arguments much more persuasive. The terms of
repayment of such an obligation would be difficult or impossible to
administer both fairly and to the public satisfaction. Its issuance
would add yet another escalator clause to the large number already
existing and so add to the causes of economic instability, and would be
disruptive of private contracts, particularly those of savings institutions. Most important, it would undermine public confidence in the
future purchasing power of the dollar by giving the impression that
Congress had transferred its attention from preserving this purchasing
power to protecting particular classes in the community from a decline
which it considered inevitable. This is not the temper of this Subcommittee. I t believes that contracts expressed in fixed numbers of
dollars constitute a necessary and desirable part of the foundation for
our social and economic system, and that the efforts of the Government must be devoted to preserving the integrity of this foundation
rather than to endeavoring to provide a substitute.
E.

CONGRESSIONAL M A N D A T E S ON ECONOMIC POLICY

3

The Congressional mandates to the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve System setting forth the economic objectives toward which
they should strive are vague and diffuse. This is shown clearly in the
replies of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Board
* This section is concerned exclusively with Congressional mandates dealing with the economic policies
to be pursued by each agency. Questions relating to the subordination of one agency to another are handled
elsewhere in this Report.




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of Governors to questions asking them to describe the economic policy
directives given them by Congress and the economic policies which
they are actually following (Compendium, pp. 1-17 and 207-239).
Each agency affirmed that, in addition to directives contained in
legislation applying specifically to it, it considered itself bound by the
Congressional declaration of policy set forth in the Employment Act
of 1946. The great majority of witnesses, both governmental and
nongovernmental, who appeared before the Subcommittee expressed
their sympathy with the purposes of the Act and their belief that all
fovernmental agencies, including the Federal Reserve System, were
ound by the declaration of policy included in the Act. This declaration reads as follows:
The Congress hereby declares t h a t i t is the continuing policy and responsibility
of the Federal Government to use all practicable means consistent w i t h its needs
and obligations and other essential considerations of national policy, w i t h t h e
assistance and cooperation of industry, agriculture, labor, and State and local
governments, to coordinate and utilize all its plans, functions, and resources f o r
the purpose of creating and maintaining, i n a manner calculated t o foster and
promote free competitive enterprise and the general welfare, conditions under
which there w i l l be afforded useful employment opportunities, including selfemployment, for those able, willing, and seeking t o work, and to promote maximum
employment, production, and purchasing power.

The Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Council of Economic Advisers were each asked in the questionnaire whether they
considered this declaration to be balanced in its emphasis between
price stability (which it does not mention directly) and high-level
employment. Each of them replied in effect that, although its wording
might not be clear in this respect, they believed that the declaration
implied a concern for price stability and that they took this into
account fully when interpreting it.
There was much disagreement among the witnesses before the
Subcommittee concerning the practical importance of revising the
Congressional mandates governing economic policy. Some believed
that a revision of these directives was a matter of great urgency, while
others believed that it was of little practical importance. As an
example of opposing points of view, Professor Viner, who has had
many years' experience in advising both the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve System, said {Hearings, pp. 771-773):
* * * I know of no evidence to the contrary that there is no legislation
instructing any branch of the executive or instructing the Federal Reserve, which
mentions the question of price level, which speaks of inflation, which speaks of
deflation, or which clearly or unambiguously states that one of the primary objectives of the Federal Reserve is, to use the phrase t h a t you [Senator Flanders] used,
to maintain the purchasing power of the American dollar.
*

*

*

»*

*

*

*

I want independence for the Federal Reserve, provided the Federal Reserve
receives and acknowledges receipt of a genuine mandate to place great emphasis
on the stability of the purchasing power of the dollar.
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

I have seen subordinates in an important agency of the Government speak w i t h
great authority and stand up against their own immediate chief on the ground t h a t
they had a statutory authorization or mandate. I want to bring into the picture
the fact that what status a Government official has does not depend merely on his
own personality; i t does not even depend wholly on the scale and weight of his
organization or on the degree of his intimacy w i t h the President only. I t depends
greatly on these things, but also i t depends on what Congress h&s given h i m a



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mandate to do. I n particular, if he can bring his counsel along and say, " M y
•counsel tells me t h a t this act of Congress does not permit me to do that," that man
stands like the Rock of Gibraltar against any superior, including the President of
the United States.

On the other hand. Dr. Goldenweiser, for many years Director of
Research and Statistics of the Board of Governors, said (.Hearings,
pp. 787-788): *
While I am speaking, I would like to say another word about the mandate that
D r . Viner is so enthusiastic about. I do not think anything of i t at all. And I
t h i n k t h a t he is entirely incorrect in saying that all other agencies have mandates.
A great many institutions i n the Government have only very general mandates.
I t h i n k t h a t the mandate t h a t the Federal Reserve has, both in the law and in
t h e way the law has now been construed in connection with the Employment Act
and i n connection w i t h general public understanding, is very clear, that they have
a function to maintain economic stability, to the extent that i t can be done by
monetary means. That is very generally accepted. I t is vague. That is its
merit, because if you make i t specific, if you make i t rigid you are going to handicap
i t and you are going to be tied down tomorrow by the views that you hold today,
which is bad.
A n d if you make i t loose, as i t has been, as i t w i l l be before people can agree on
the formula or on a statement, then i t becomes completely unimportant. And
the argument about what to do is not going to be greatly changed.
I t h i n k there are very nice preambles to central bank organizations in a great
many countries. A n d I still would like to see a government of a central bank
t h a t thinks about those preambles i n the administration of the bank. They do
not accomplish anything, because the general purposes are clear, and particular
wording t h a t sounds beautiful at some time i n the history of the organization,
sounds very foolish, maybe 5 years later.
M r . M u r p h y t o l d me at lunch t h a t he wrote the preamble or an objective or a
mandate for the Central Bank of Iceland i n which he outlined four main considerations for t h a t particular community. A n d he said when those considerations are i n conflict, use your own judgment.
I would have no objection if we enumerated a lot of valuable objectives and
then said, " W h e n i n conflict use your own judgment," which, in the final analysis,
means j u s t use your own judgment all the time. There is no escape from judgment, and you do much better t o emphasize and expend your energies i n getting
the k i n d of people who w i l l use good judgment than in t r y i n g to devise a formula
t h a t w i l l make judgment unnecessary.

As a matter of good legislative practice, the Subcommittee believes
that the economic policy directives given by Congress to both the
Treasury and the Federal Reserve System should be clarified, but is
inclined to hold with Dr. Goldenweiser that the matter is not one of
great urgency. I t also agrees with Dr. Goldenweiser that any directives must be in general terms, setting forth each of the principal
desirable objectives of policy and leaving the solution of possible
conflicts to the agencies, subject to ultimate appeal to and decision
by Congress.
The Subcommittee believes that the best approach to clarifying
Congressional policy directives to the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve System would be through a revision of the Congressional
declaration of policy in the Employment Act of 1946, which constitutes
a directive to all agencies. Although it approves of the working interpretations put on this declaration by the principal governmental
agencies, it feels that, on the face of its actual wording, there is an
overemphasis on the maintenance of high-level employment and an
underemphasis on the maintenance of price stability. I t suggests
that further studies be made of this wording with a view to securing
a more balanced emphasis.







III.
A . FUNCTIONS

BANK
OF

RESERVE

BANK

REQUIREMENTS

RESERVE REQUIREMENTS;
REQUIREMENTS

CHANGES

IN

Prudent bankers have always held a portion of their funds in liquid
form in order to be sure that they would be able to meet their liabilities
in accordance with their contractual or customary terms. In most
countries the amount of such reserves has until very recent years
been left to the bankers' discretion. In the United States, however,
by long tradition, minimum reserves have been prescribed by law.
Prior to the establishment of the Federal Reserve System, national
banks in the three Central Reserve cities (New York, Chicago, and
St. Louis) held their reserves principally in specie, while banks in
other cities held their reserves partially in this form and partially on
deposit (directly or through banks in Reserve cities) in Central Reserve city banks. This system was not satisfactory for the reason,
among others, that the reserves of the smaller banks were likely to be
tied up in the event of a money-market panic affecting the Central
Reserve cities. One purpose of the Federal Reserve Act was to provide a better way of mobilizing the reserves of the banking system.
Since the early days of the System, required reserves of member banks
have had to be held entirely in the form of deposits with their Federal
Reserve banks.
The original purpose of establishing legal reserve requirements was
to insure that all banks met a minimum standard of prudence in the
amount of reserves they held. This was considered the only important
purpose of reserve requirements at the time the Federal Reserve Act
was passed.
Since the establishment of the Federal Reserve System, reserve
requirements have come to be looked upon primarily as instruments of
credit control, and this is their principal purpose today. Viewed in
this manner, required reserves, the amount and character of which
are prescribed by law, furnish the Federal Reserve System with a
fulcrum upon which it can rest the lever of credit control. If, for
example, required reserves must consist exclusively of deposits in
Federal Reserve banks1 and must amount to 20 percent of deposit
liabilities, then open-market operations which reduce available reserves
to, say, 18 percent of deposit liabilities will immediately put member
banks in debt to their Federal Reserve banks and so initiate a wave
of credit contraction. Contrariwise, an addition of, say, 2 percent to
reserve funds will make the banks expansion-minded—although here
the effect is not as certain as on the side of contraction. If such a
fulcrum were not provided by legal requirements, a large portion of
the reserve funds created or extinguished through Federal Reserve
1
This would not be affected in principle if vault cash were permitted to be included in required reserve?!
and there are other reasons—especially fairness to banks situated outside of Federal Reserve and Federa1
Reserve Branch cities (which must hold more vault cash than banks so situated)— why it might be advisable to do this.




43

4 4

MONETARY POLICY AND M A N A G E M E N T

OF T H E PUBLIC

DEBT

action might be absorbed in changes in the amounts of reserves which
individual banks thought it prudent to hold.
As the credit control function of reserves has come to be better
understood, their liquidity function has decreased in importance
because banks have come to realize that required reserves are not really
reserves at all in the liquidity sense, as they cannot be used either to
make loans or to meet the major portion of deposit withdrawals.
(If the required reserve percentage is 20 perecnt, then only 20 cents of
a $1 deposit withdrawal can be met from required reserves.) As a
consequence, banks have come to rely increasingly upon secondary or
excess reserves for their liquidity and the significance of legal reserve
requirements has come to be more and more concentrated on the
credit control function.
I t should be noted that the primary credit control function of
reserve requirements is to provide afixedfulcrum upon which the other
instruments of credit control—principally open-market operations and
rediscount policy—can operate. Since the Banking Act of 1935, the
Board of Governors has, in addition, been given considerable discretion in using changes in reserve requirements as a "moving part" in the
credit control machinery. Reserve requirements as so prescribed are
at the present time at their statutory maximum at all except Central
Reserve city banks, and are near their maximum there, so the present
discretionary authority of the Board of Governors is principally in a
downward direction.
Changes in reserve requirements require corresponding changes in
banking customs and have met with great resistance from the banking
community. Their effects are hard to predict and experience with them
has not been entirely happy. While the Subcommittee believes that
a continuance, and perhaps an increase in the authority of the
Board of Governors to change reserve requirements is necessary in
order to insure that the monetary authorities will have adequate power
to cope with economic instability, it expresses the view that changes
in reserve requirements should not be made lightly, but should be
reserved for rare occasions when major readjustments in the banking
structure are necessary.
B . E X T E N S I O N OF R E Q U I R E M E N T S TO N O N M E M B E R

BANKS

The reserve requirements established by Federal law and prescribed by the Board of Governors apply only to member banks.
Nonmember banks must conform to reserve requirements set by
State authority. These requirements are generally less onerous than
those set by Federal authority. This is true not only because they
are often lower in amount but because they can generally be met by
balances held with correspondent banks and, occasionally, by holdings of prescribed securities. The securities, of course, yield a direct
income, while the balances with correspondent banks yield an indirect income in the form of services, and member banks must maintain such balances in addition to their required reserves at the Federal
Reserve banks. (For a discussion of nonmember bank reserve requirements, including detailed tables describing the requirements on
a State-by-State basis, see Compendium, pp. 467-47




45

MONETARY

POLICY AND MANAGEMENT

OF T H E PUBLIC

DEBT

The present system is unfair to member banks and inadequate for
purposes of credit control. Member banks hold about 85 percent of
all deposits subject to reserve requirements (mutual savings banks
are here omitted from the discussion altogether). Nonmember banks,
which hold the remaining 15 percent of deposits, in effect get a free
ride, or in any event a cut-rate ride, at the expense of the remainder
of the banking system, as the cost of credit control (in the form of
lost interest on required reserves) is principally borne by member
banks. This is defended on the grounds (1) that it is necessary to
preserve the dual banking system, (2) that 15 percent of total deposits is so small a proportion that it can be disregarded, and (3) that
the credit control function of reserves is not important anyway.
Bankers were asked in the questionnaire whether, in their opinion,
reserve requirements applying to member banks should be applied
also to nonmember banks and the replies are summarized in the
Compendium (pp. 1168-1176). Not enough replies were received
from nonmember banks to provide a significant sample, but more than
half of the member banks replying answered "Yes." Most of the
bankers who believed that the extension should be made saw no
threat to the dual banking system and thought that the present
arrangement resulted in unfair competition from nonmember banks.
Most bankers opposing the extension saw a threat to the dual banking
system and felt that the possibility of member banks leaving the
System to seek lower reserve requirements elsewhere was a safeguard
against too-high reserve requirements being imposed by Congress or
the Board of Governors. Each of these conclusions and sets of
reasons is, of course, ex parte and the same would be true of arguments
by nonmember banks, who presumably would have opposed the extension. I t is equally understandable that such an extension was
opposed by all State Supervisors of Banking answering the questionnaire (Compendium, pp. 978-983).
Few of these replies took serious account of the credit control
function of reserve requirements. B u t Congress, which has the
responsibility for maintaining economic stability, as well as that for
m a k i n g provision for a sound monetary and banking system, must
give primary attention to that function. The Subcommittee sees
no threat to the dual banking system i n extending reserve requirements to nonmember banks. Extending deposit insurance to these
banks constituted no threat, and there will be no threat as long as
Congress continues to believe that the dual banking system serves the
best interests of the country. The Subcommittee therefore reaffirms
the recommendation of its predecessor subcommittee under the chairmanship of Senator Douglas, which reads as follows (Report oj the
Subcommittee on Monetary, Credit, and Fiscal Policies, pp. 2 - 3 ) : 2
We recommencj that all banks which accept demand deposits, including both
member and nonmember banks, be made subject to the same set of reserve
requirements and that all such banks be given access to loans at the Federal
Reserve banks.
* Mr. Wolcott appended the following note to this recommendation: "Mr. Wolcott dissents from this
recommendation. It is his opinion that the so-called dual banking system should be preserved in order that
possible checks and balances may be maintained to prevent unwise concentration of credit and economic
controls. He contends that any such centralization of banking authority might well be interpreted as a
step toward the nationalization of all banking and credit. That, instead, there should be full cooperation
between the State banking authorities and the Federal Reserve Board to remove any discriminations which
might seem to give advantage or disadvantage to either the Federal or State systems."




4 6

MONETARY POLICY AND M A N A G E M E N T

C . N E W F O R M S OF R E S E R V E

OF T H E PUBLIC

DEBT

REQUIREMENTS

The questionnaire addressed by the Subcommittee to the Chairman of the Board of Governors and the presidents of the Federal
Reserve banks asked a number of questions with respect to proposed
changes in the form of reserve requirements. The proposals on which
comment was requested included proposals that reserve requirements be based on type of deposit rather than on the location of the
bank, that secondary reserves be required in the form of United
States securities, that higher (possibly 100 percent) reserves be maintained against increases in either loans and investments or in deposits
during periods of national emergency, and that reserve requirements
generally be based on classes of assets rather than on classes of deposits. The Chairman of the Board of Governors and the presidents
of the Federal Reserve banks were not asked to take a position on
these proposals but merely to discuss their advantages and disadvantages. These discussions appear on pp. 463-489 and pp. 719731 of the Compendium. Discussions of some of these proposals by
the Council of Economic Advisers and by bankers replying to the
questionnaire appear on pp. 875-878 and 1176-1184, respectively, of
the Compendium.

The Board of Governors has on a number of earlier occasions, both
in its annual reports and through representatives appearing before
committees of Congress, requested authority to require reserves additional to those otherwise required, which additional reserves could be
held in the form of specified types of interest-bearing United States
securities. The pros and cons of this proposal are discussed in the
references just cited.
The President, in a memorandum dated February 26, 1951, addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Director of Defense
Mobilization, and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers,
asked this group to constitute itself a committee under the chairmanship of the Director of Defense Mobilization for the consideration of
a number of proposals for controlling inflation. He said in this memorandum:
Among other things, I ask t h a t y o u consider specifically the desirability of
measures * * * (2) t o provide the Federal Reserve System w i t h powers t o
impose additional reserve requirements on banks.

The Committee, which reported to the President on May 17, 1951,3
said with respect to this point:
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

(c) Reserve requirements of commercial banks have been raised v i r t u a l l y t o
the limits of existing authority.
I t is recommended that, as an emergency measure, legislation be sought t o
empower the Reserve authorities for a l i m i t e d period t o impose additional reserve
requirements, either increasing the authorized percentages or i n some other appropriate way t h a t w i l l have a m i n i m u m adverse effect on the Government security
market. The refunding and new issue operations of t h e Treasury i n the last
half of this calendar year alone amount t o i n the neighborhood of $50 billion.
Under these circumstances, i t is imperative t h a t any additional requirements for
bank reserves imposed by the Federal Reserve should be such t h a t t h e y do n o t
have a disruptive effect on the market for Government securities. I n view of
the emergency such requirements should apply t o all insured banks. T h e feasi* This report appears, together with the memorandum of the President, on pp. 125-133 of the Hearings;
the quoted portion of the memorandum is on p. 127 and the quoted portion of the report on pp. 131-132.




47

MONETARY

POLICY AND MANAGEMENT

OF T H E PUBLIC

DEBT

b i l i t y of permitting nonmember insured banks to hold the additional reserves
i n balances w i t h their correspondents should be explored.
The task force on supplementary reserve requirements has considered various
plans for reenforcing existing bank reserve requirements and has reported that
two plans offer the greatest promise, namely: (1) The loan-expansion reserve
plan and (2) the primary (securities feature) reserve plan, which provides for
additional required reserves and gives a bank, under conditions to be prescribed
by regulation, the option of holding the additional reserves in the form of cash
or Government securities.
The provisions of these plans may be summarized as follows:
Loan-expansion reserves.—Every insured bank receiving demand deposits, otheT
than a mutual savings bank, would be required to maintain additional reserves
equal to a percentage to be prescribed by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, of that part of its loans and investments in excess of a certain
prescribed base.
I n computing loans and investments, all assets of the bank would be included
except (1) cash, (2) balances due from banks, (3) direct obligations of the United
States, and (4) such special types of assets as the Board might prescribe from
time to time.
Primary reserves and Government securities.—Either in substitution for or in
addition to the requirement discussed above, an insured bank receiving demand
deposits, other than a mutual savings bank, might be required to maintain
additional reserves equal to a limited percentage of its demand deposits, in addition to the deposit balances now required.
Such percentages could be different w i t h respect to banks in central reserve
cities, reserve cities, or elsewhere.
I n lieu of such a deposit balance, a bank under certain conditions, could count
Government securities either at an amount equal to the dollar amount of the
deposit balance which the securities replace or at some lesser figure. For example,
the Board might prescribe that, for reserve purposes, $1.50, or $2 or $2.50 in
securities might be equivalent to $1 of cash.
W i t h i n a few days the Board of Governors will ask the Congress to consider
definitive legislation providing for supplementary requirements.

The request referred to in the last sentence of the quoted material
was never made. When Mr. Martin was asked the reason for this at
the hearings, he replied:
. . . the best made plans of mice and men "gang aft agley."

In the subsequent questioning by members of the Subcommittee, Mr.
Martin indicated that the Board's change of heart had occurred
partly because it had found that the moreflexibleopen-market policy
which it had adopted following its accord with the Treasury was
adequate for its present purposes, partly because the inflationary
situation was not then active, and partly because, with the public
debt rising instead of falling, it was afraid that the imposition of additional reserve requirements expressed in terms of United States
securities might be considered primarily a measure for the compulsory
holding of such securities rather than for credit control.
The Subcommittee finds these reasons moderately persuasive witih
respect to the immediate future, but believes that the entire subject
of reserve requirements needs much additional consideration from a
long-term point of view. I t has been our experience since the outbreak of the war in Europe in 1939 that each wave or incipient wave of
inflationary pressure has caused the Administration to appear before
Congress to ask for additional price control authority and the Federal
Reserve System to appear to ask for additional authority over credit
in order to combat existing or expected pressures. In order to obtain
this authority from Congress, they have had to dramatize and emphasize the extent of the pressures. This process, necessary as it may
have been under the circumstances, has contributed to inflationary



4 8

MONETARY POLICY AND M A N A G E M E N T

OF T H E P U B L I C

DEBT

expectations and so made the situation worse. The repugnance of
even stand-by price and wage controls to our fundamental economic
system may make a repetition of this unavoidable if it is necessary to
reimpose such controls in the future. But, as far as credit control
measures are concerned, it might be avoided if the Reserve System
were given the necessary powers in advance and had them ready to
use when occasion warranted. With this in mind the Subcommittee,
while it is unable to make a definite recommendation at the present
time, suggests that further consideration be given to the adoption of
legislation providing the Federal Reserve System with additional
powers over bank reserve requirements for use at its discretion.




IV.

THE

MACHINERY

FOR

THE

MONETARY

DETERMINATION

OF

POLICY

A . L E G A L S T A T U S OF T H E F E D E R A L R E S E R V E

SYSTEM

The United States Constitution gives Congress the power "to borrow money on the credit of the United States" (Art. I, sec. 8 (2) and
"to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin . .
(Art. I, sec. 8 (5)). These and other provisions of the Constitution,
as judicially interpreted and developed through years of precedent
and adaptation to changing economic conditions, have vested in the
Congress the power to determine what we now call the monetary
policy of the United States. This does not mean that Congress itself
can or should administer the monetary affairs of the Nation. Many
powers are given to Congress by the Constitution. Congress determines the policies pursuant to which these powers shall be exercised,
but relies upon the Executive to put them into actual effect. As
Mr. Lucius Wilmerding said in his testimony to the Subcommittee
(Hearings, p. 753):
T h e question of the status of the Federal Reserve Board is a difficult one t o
answer. I t depends at b o t t o m upon the view which one takes—or rather which
t h e Supreme Court m i g h t take—of the power of Congress, under the Constitution,
t o create agencies for the administration of its laws which are responsible directly
t o itself and not t o the President.
The idea t h a t Congress has such a power has frequently been entertained.
Back in Jackson's administration, H e n r y Clay and many others contended t h a t
the Treasury Department was not an executive department but an administrative
department—an agent of Congress. They argued that, since the Constitution
had given Congress the power to collect taxes—not simply to provide for their
collection—Congress could collect t h e m through an agent of its o v n . I n like
manner, one m i g h t now contend t h a t , since the Constitution has given Congress
the power of regulating the value of money, Congress may carry t h a t power into
execution itself, either directly or through an agent responsible only to i t . For
m y own p a r t I should consider such a proposition absurd. Congress can ordain a
rule; the Constitution has pointed out what branch of Government is to put into
ractical operation the rules which Congress has ordained and i t has made t h a t
ranch independent of Congress. When Congress created the Federal Reserve
B o a r d and assigned i t its duties, i t d i d all t h a t i t could do toward carrying into
execution its power of regulating the value of money. I t is neither called upon
nor empowered to carry i n t o effect the provisions of its own laws.

Acting on this sound principle of delegation, Congress has entrusted
the power and duty of executing its monetary policy to a number of
agencies. Important monetary powers have been delegated to the
Secretary of the Treasury (see Compendium, pp. 35-47), while other
powers of a monetary or quasi-monetary nature have been delegated
to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation, and possibly other agencies. The principal
monetary powers, however, have been delegated to the Federal
Reserve System.
In its questionnaire the Subcommittee asked the Chairman of the
Board of Governors and the presidents of the Federal Reserve banks
whether they considered their respective organizations to be a part of




49

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OF T H E PUBLIC

DEBT

the Executive' Branch of the Government (Compendium, pp. 239-248
and 648-653), and much discussion was had on this matter at the
hearings.
As far as the Board of Governors is concerned, there seems to be no
clearly adjudicated answer to this question. But, while the question
itself is an open one, it appears that the practical issues usually debated
under this head have been judicially determined, so that the question
is not really an important one. The Subcommittee was much impressed in this connection by the testimony of Mr. Wilmerding, who,
after stating that " * * * it is impossible to return a clear
answer to the question * * * about the Board's status," continued tBearings, pp. 753-754):
Fortunately, from a practical standpoint i t is not important that a clear answer
be given. Let i t be conceded for purposes of argument that the Federal Reserve
Board, unlike the Federal Trade Commission, is a part of the executive branch.
Would such a status alter in any practical way the relationship which has been
established by statute between the Board and the President of the United States?
I n particular, would i t give to the President, under the Constitution, a power t o
interfere with, set aside, correct, or revise, the decision of the Board in any matter
which has been committed by Congress to the Board's exclusive jurisdiction?
This question, I submit, can be answered w i t h a categorical negative. A long
line of opinions by the Attorneys General, acquiesced in by the Presidents, corroborated by the action of Congress, and the proposition that, when the execution
of a law has been committed by Congress to the exclusive jurisdiction of a subordinate department or officer of the Executive, the interference of the President
w i t h such execution, either in the form of direction beforehand or revision and
reversal afterward, so far from being permitted by the Constitution, would be a
usurpation on the part of the President which the subordinate department or
officer would not be bound to respect. I n such cases the duty of the President to
take care that the laws be faithfully executed extends no further than to see
that the officers to whom Congress has given an exclusive jurisdiction perform
their duties honestly and capably. I f they do not, he must, under the Constitution, remove them and appoint others in their stead, but, in the words of one of the
Presidents, "he cannot override their decisions and ought not to interfere in their
deliberations."
I n the light of these considerations i t is evident that the question of the status
of the Federal Reserve Board is purely academic. Congress has committed certain business to the exclusive jurisdiction of that Board, and this business it must
perform under the responsibility of its trust and not by direction of the President.
The case is the same whether the Board be considered in or out of the executive
branch.

The case of the Federal Reserve
presidents of the Federal Reserve
whether they considered the banks
Government or part of the private

banks is harder to define. T h e
banks, i n answer to a question
to be part of the United States
economy, said (Compendium, p.

649):
I n our opinion Federal Reserve banks are partially part of the private economy
and are part of the functioning of the Government (although not technically a
part of the Government).

Much evidence was introduced on this subject and appears in the
Compendium and the Hearings. There are many things to be taken
into consideration. The stock of the Federal Reserve banks is owned
by their member banks. But the capital so contributed is a negligible
proportion of the assets of the banks and is limited to a fixed return,
however great may be the profits of the Reserve banks. The Reserve
banks are given sweeping exemptions from taxation. But, Congress
can and has given equally sweeping exemptions to private corporations. The majority of the directors of each Federal Reserve bank is
elected by its member banks. But, the power of the directors to



51

MONETARY

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DEBT

direct is limited; the principal policy decisions are made or dominated
by the Board of Governors, which is appointed by the President with
the consent of the Senate. On the whole, the Subcommittee sees no
objection to this hard-to-define position of the Federal Reserve banks.
The Federal Reserve System has been a helpful institutional development. Its roots are sunk deeply in the American economy and it has
borne good fruit. This is more important than that each portion of
it be subject to classification by species and genus according to the
rules of a textbook on public administration.
But, one fact with respect to the legal status of the Federal Reserve
banks stands out, and it is the only fact of importance. Congrescreated the Federal Reserve banks and Congress can dissolve them or
can change their constitution at will. On dissolution the entire surplus of the banks would become by law the property of the United
States. Ultimately they are creatures of Congress.
B . INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

The first question which must be raised in any discussion of the
independence of the Federal Reserve System is "independence from
what?" I t is sometimes contended that the Federal Reserve System,
like a 19th Century central bank, should be, at least formally, independent of its government. I t was possible to make a plausible case
for this position when the principal trading nations of the world were
on a gold standard and the "rules of the game" under this standard
were conceived to be automatic—requiring much technical skill but
no judgment concerning the ultimate ends of economic policy for their
successful operation. I t is not necessary to inquire whether this concept was ever valid. The United States is now the only large nation
in the world on an international gold standard, and neither the United
States nor any other country is going to allow its monetary policy—
i. e., its internal price level and its internal level of employment—to be
determined by the "automatic" requirements of an international
standard. To permit this would be tantamount to renouncing the
responsibility of the Federal Government, recognized by it in the
Employment Act of 1946, for maintaining conditions conducive to
high-level employment.
The Subcommittee, therefore, rejects the idea that the Federal
Reserve System should be independent of the Government. I t
agrees with Mr. Sproul, who said in a letter to the Subcommittee
CHearings, p. 983):
* * * I t h i n k i t should be continuously borne i n m i n d that whenever stress
is placed upon t h e need for the independence of the Federal Reserve System i t
does n o t mean independence from t h e Government b u t independence within the
Government. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Federal Reserve System is, and should be, in close and continuous
contact with the financial and business communities. The financial
and business communities should participate to the fullest extent
possible in the formulation of monetary policy. But, they must be
junior partners. There can be no independence from the Government.
The independence of the Federal Reserve System, which remains
to be considered, is, therefore, to use Mr. Sproul's words "independence
within the Government." This independence is of two kinds—
independence from the President and independence from Congress.



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MONETARY POLICY AND M A N A G E M E N T OF T H E PUBLIC DEBT

The question of independence from Congress is a very special one
and discussion of it will be reserved for the section on "The Finances
of the Federal Reserve System."
I t has already been pointed out that, irrespective of whether the
Board of Governors is or is not a part of the Executive branch,
Congress can and has endowed it with a substantial degree of independence from the President. The President appoints the members
of the Board of Governors, subject to the confirmation of the Senate,
and designates the Board's Chairman. Pursuant to his inherent
powers as Chief Executive, he may remove any member of the Board
for malfeasance, incompetence, or neglect of duty. Some powers of
the Board have been delegated to it by the President, pursuant to
acts of Congress vesting the powers originally in him. The President
can supervise the execution of these powers and can redelegate them
if he sees fit. But, aside from this, the Board is formally independent
in the exercise of its judgment and can made such decisions as it
believes to be in the public interest. This was agreed by a great
majority of the persons replying to the questionnaires or testifying
at the hearings.
But, the formal independence of the Board of Governors from the
President is inevitably limited by the hard fact that fiscal and monetary policy must be coordinated with each other and with the other
policies and objectives of the Government if the Government is to
be of the greatest service to the Nation. As the Council of Economic
Advisers says (Compendium, p. 850):
A problem of greater practical importance, however, is presented b y the fact
t h a t stability is only one of the objectives of the Government, and monetary
policy is only one of the methods of achieving stability. When various objectives
must be promoted simultaneously, a combination of policies needs t o be chosen
t h a t will promote these different objectives w i t h o u t tearing down one t o b u i l d
up another.

This means that the Board of Governors must inevitably discuss
and endeavor to reconcile its differences with the Executive agencies.
What is needed is not the best monetary policy or the best fiscal
policy, each as ends in themselves, but the best over-all economic
policy. This is naturally most likely to be attained, from the point
of view of the Federal Reserve System, when its influence in Government policy formation is at a maximum. A good case was made at
the hearings that the over-all influence of the Federal Reserve System
would be increased if it were less independent and more highly integrated with the Executive branch. (See especially the testimony
of G. L. Bach, Hearings, pp. 748-752.) Dr. Goldenweiser had earlier
supported this view in part in his book, American Monetary Policy,
but modified his position materially in his testimony before the
Subcommittee.
The final aim, of course, is not that the Federal Reserve System
should be independent, but that the country should have a sound
economic policy. The independence of the Federal Reserve System
is a relative, not an absolute, concept. I t is good insofar as it contributes to the formulation of sound policy, and bad insofar as it
detracts from it. Measured by this standard, the Subcommittee is
inclined to believe that a degree of independence of the Board of
Governors about equal to that now enjoyed is desirable. Many of
the policies which the Federal Reserve must advocate to maintain



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M O N E T A R Y POLICY A N D M A N A G E M E N T OF T H E PUBLIC DEBT

the soundness of the dollar during times of inflationary pressures are
unpopular; yet it is necessary that they have a strong advocate in
order to avoid a built-in inflationary bias in the economy. This end
is best served by endowing the Board of Governors with a considerable degree of independence—thereby enhancing its bargaining power
in the determination of over-all policy. But, the Board of Governors,
like all other parts of Government, must play as part of a team, not
as an outside umpire, and must ultimately abide by the decisions
which are made by Congress.
C. THE

P O S I T I O N OF T H E F E D E R A L R E S E R V E B A N K S
FEDERAL O P E N M A R K E T COMMITTEE

AND

THE

The previous discussion of the independence of the Federal Reserve
System has been principally in terms of the independence of the
Board of Governors from the President. But, the Federal Reserve
banks also have a considerable degree of independence from the
Board of Governors. At one time this idependence was much greater.
The original Federal Reserve Act appears to have conceived the
individual Federal Reserve banks as important policy-making agencies
and the Board of Governors (then the Federal Reserve Board) as
principally a regulatory agency, like the Interstate Commerce Commission. The subsequent trend has been toward a somewhat greater
degree of independence of the central board from the President but
a much diminished autonomy for the individual banks. The most
important changes in this direction were made by the Banking Act
of 1935, but it has been the trend for the whole period since the adoption of the original Act and is, for the most part, merely a reflection
of the growth in the importance of monetary policy and the recognition of the fact that this policy cannot be determined by regions but
must apply over an entire currency area.
The directors of the individual Federal Reserve banks have a large
degree of responsibility with respect to the business management of
their institutions but relatively little authority in the determination
of monetary policy. They are, for the most part, men with a large
amount of business experience and a broad point of view with respect
to the public interest. They are an invaluable link between the
Government and the business community. Because of them, the
Government is better able to understand the point of view of business
and business is better able to understand the point of view of Government. The Subcommittee believes that it is important that their
responsibility, not merely in the business management of their banks
but also in the formulation of monetary policy, should be kept sufficiently great to attract men of high caliber. In the absence of affirmative evidence to the contrary, it is inclined to believe that the present
degree of responsibility is satisfactory.
Class A and B directors of the Federal Reserve banks are by law
elected by, and members of, the financial and business communities.
Class C directors, comprising a third of the whole, are appointed by
by Board of Governors to represent the public interest. The Subcommittee commends the Board of Governors on the appointments
which it has made to class C directorships of members of the academic
community and others in an especially advantageous position to take
a view detached from the particular interests of business and finance.



5 4

MONETARY POLICY A N D M A N A G E M E N T

OF T H E PUBLIC

DEBT

I t expresses some concern, however, with respect to the complete
absence of any representation of labor, despite the fact that labor is
so vitally affected by monetary policy. This lack is, in large part,
a remnant of the thinking of a generation or more ago, when the
Federal Reserve System was conceived simply as an aid to commerce
and industry and not as an agency for formulating monetary policy
for the benefit of the whole people. The Subcommittee suggests,
in this connection, that the Board of Governors give consideration to
including representatives of labor among those whom it considers
eligible ior appointment as Class C directors.
[COMMENT BY SENATOR F L A N D E R S : I believe that class C
directors should represent the broad public interest and to this
end well-qualified representatives of labor should be eligible.
However, I am opposed to any requirements which would tend
to make these directorships partisan by parcelling them out to
members of special-interest groups, whether business, agriculture,
or labor.]
The influence of the directors of the Federal Reserve banks on the
formulation of monetary policy is in large part intangible and is both
difficult and unrewarding to measure and to define. But, the most
important single way in wbich the directors have an impact on central
policy decisions is through the participation of the presidents whom
they have elected in the deliberations of the Federal Open Market
Committee. (This Committee, established by statute, consists of all
members of the Board of Governors and the presidents of five of the
twelve Federal Reserve banks serving, except for the president of the
New York bank, in rotation. The presidents are elected by the
directors of the respective banks subject to the approval of the Board
of Governors. The Committee has final authority over all purchases
and sales of Government securities and acceptances by the Federal
Reserve banks.)
The three principal instruments of Federal Reserve policy are the
determination of rediscount rates, the variation of reserve requirements, and open-market operations. These three instruments must
be used in conjunction to serve a common end, and there is no rational
basis for the assignment of the most important of them, open-market
operations, to a body different from that controlling the other two.
(The Board of Governors has final authority over both variations in
reserve requirements and the determination of discount rates. See
Compendium, pp. 275-279.) The explanation of the present System is
therefore historical and not logical. Its justification is that it provides an important link between the directors and managements of the
individual Federal Reserve banks and the formulation of monetary
policy. Its danger is that it might result on some future occasion in
the adoption of an open-market policy not compatible with the
over-all economic policy of the United States as approved by Congress.
This would be more likely to happen during a period of deflation than
during one of inflation, and need not occur at all if both Congress and
the Open Market Committee are endeavoring to effectuate the
objectives of the Employment Act. If the decisions of the Open
Market Committee should ever serve as an obstacle to the implementation of the economic policy of Congress, its separate existence
should be reconsidered. Barring such an event, however, the present
arrangement serves a useful purpose and the Subcommittee sees no
reason to disturb it.



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MONETARY

POLICY AND MANAGEMENT

OF T H E PUBLIC

DEBT

D . T H E COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS

1. Tenure of Members.—Members of the Board of Governors are
appointed for fourteen-year terms of office and are not eligible for
reappointment after they have served a complete term. This tenure
and ineligibility for reappointment was originally provided for by the
Banking Act of 1935, and was based in part upon a concept of the
Board as the "Supreme Court of Finance." I t was a natural corollary
of this concept that the Board should be insulated from all outside
influences likely to affect its impartiality. This was sought to be
accomplished by long terms of office and ineligibility for reappointment.
The Subcommittee does not believe that the analogy of the Board of
Governors with the Supreme Court is valid. The Board of Governors
is primarily a policy-making, not a judicial or quasi-judicial body; and,
as the ends of economic policy are matters of judgment, it should have
its mandate from the people (expressed through appointment and
confirmation by the elected officers of the Government) periodically
renewed. On the other hand, it is especially important that the Board
of Governors maintain a continuity of policy and not be easily affected
by passing currents of public opinion. The founding fathers recognized the necessity of a compromise between the objectives of responsiveness and of continuity in their provision for staggered terms for the
members of the Senate, and it is upon this analogy rather than upon
that of the Supreme Court that we should base our views with respect
to the appropriate tenure for members of the Board of Governors.
Chairman Martin suggested (Compendium, pp. 301-302) that the
term of members of the Board of Governors be reduced to six years
and that the prohibition against reappointment be removed. The
Subcommittee is impressed with this suggestion and recommends
that it be given consideration by the appropriate legislative
committees.
[COMMENT BY SENATOR FLANDERS: I favor a reduction in the
term of office of members of the Board of Governors from 14 to
10 years, a reduction in the number of members of the Board from
7 to 5, and the removal of the limitation on eligibility for reappointment. This would permit two appointments to the
Board in each Presidential term but would not permit a President
to appoint a majority of the Board in a single term (except
through appointments due to deaths and resignations). This
arrangement, it seems to me, would achieve the best balance
between the objectives described in the text.]
2. Number and Compensation of Members.—It is of great importance
that the chairman and members of the Board of Governors should be
persons of the highest possible caliber. In order to help achieve this
end, the earlier subcommittee, under the chairmanship of Senator
Douglas, recommended (Report of the Subcommittee on Monetary,
Credit, and Fiscal Policies, p. 31):
* * * (a) decreasing the number of members of the Board of Governors
f r o m seven t o not more t h a n five i n order to make the position attractive to more
capable men and t o lessen the t e m p t a t i o n to appoint men of lesser stature, and
(b) raising t h e salary of the Chairman of the Board of Governors to the same
level as t h e salaries of Cabinet members—namely, $22,500—and raising the
salaries of other Board members t o $20,000 a year.




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MONETARY POLICY AND M A N A G E M E N T OF T H E PUBLIC DEBT

We reaffirm this recommendation and commend it to the attention
of the appropriate legislative committees. We also recommend that
any reduction in the number of members of the Board of Governors
be accompanied by a pro rata reduction in the number of Federal
Eeserve bank president members of the Federal Open Market Committee so as to preserve, as far as possible, the present ratio between
members of the Board of Governors and presidents of the Federal
Eeserve banks in the composition of the Committee.
3. Designation of chairman.—The President now has the power to
designate a member of the Board to be Chairman and one to be Vice
Chairman, each to serve for a term of four years. This designation
has not worked satisfactorily in practice, however, because the term
of designation does not at present coincide with the term of office of a
President but may end at any time during a presidential term. The
Committee is impressed, therefore, with Chairman Martin's suggestion (Compendium, p. 302) that the law be amended so that the
designations may run for terms beginning shortly after the commencement of each presidential term.
4. Qualifications for membership.—The statute at present provides
that—
I n selecting the members of the Board, not more t h a n one of w h o m shall be
selected from any one Federal Reserve district, the President shall have due
regard to a fair representation of the financial, agricultural, industrial and commercial interests and geographical divisions of the country.

The geographic portions of this provision have reduced the flexibility of the appointing authority in seeking the best possible membership for the Board, while its non-geographical portions reflect in part
the older concept of the Federal Reserve System as simply an organization for the "accommodation of commerce and industry" rather
than one whose primary responsibility is the formulation of monetary
policy in the public interest. I t is, of course, important that the
Board include in its membership persons understanding of and
sympathetic to the various interests in the county, and the President
and the Senate may be expected to insist upon this, but it is also
important that men be appointed with a broad understanding of
the economic bases of monetary policy. The Subcommittee believes
that, in the long run, the quality of membership of the Board would
be improved if the present qualifications were removed and the
appointments left to the full discretion of the President and the
Senate.
E . COORDINATION OF FISCAL AND M O N E T A R Y

POLICY

As already stated, the Subcommittee believes on the one hand that
the present degree of independence of the Federal Reserve System
should be maintained and, on the other hand, that neither the Treasury
nor the Board of Governors should be subordinated to the other.
I t is vitally necessary, however, that monetary policy, fiscal policy,
and all of the other economic policies of the Government should be
coordinated so that they will make a meaningful whole, working in
the direction of price stability, high-level employment, and a dynamic,
free-enterprise economy. I t is not merely the right but the duty of
the President to seek to effect this coordination—by direction with
respect to the agencies under his control and by persuasion with respect to the agencies which are not. The Secretary of the Treasury



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MONETARY POLICY AND M A N A G E M E N T OF T H E PUBLIC DEBT

expressed this duty of the President very clearly when he said, in his
answer to an inquiry in the questionnaire concerning the settlement of
policy conflicts between the President and the Federal Reserve
{Compendium, p. 30):
I t h i n k one of t h e most i m p o r t a n t steps toward providing a quick means of
settling such disputes w o u l d be a public, and a congressional, recognition of the
fact t h a t i t is natural, proper, and desirable for the President to seek to settle
t h e m b y having all the interested parties sit around a table to discuss their differences w i t h h i m . T h a t would seem to be an almost axiomatic method of solution
of a dispute. Y e t , i n some quarters, if the President should ask the Chairman or
any other member of the Board of Governors to come to the W h i t e House to
discuss differences of policy which were having some effect on Government objectives, there w o u l d be loud objections and charges of attempted domination or
dictation. I do not t h i n k t h a t any President, i n the present state of the law,
w o u l d seek t o dictate t o or interfere w i t h the Federal Reserve. B u t since the
t w o — t h e President and the Board—are assumed to be independent of each other,
t h e very essence of t h a t independence should be recognized—that they should
each have the r i g h t — a n d the d u t y — t o discuss the problem freely around a table
together. This should be encouraged b y the Congress and the public, rather
t h a n discouraged. Discouragement comes from charges or insinuations that such
conferences amount to attempted dictation. I t would encourage such discussions
and conferences if this committee of the Congress would publicly recommend
them.

The Secretary of the Treasury also suggested, in his reply to the
Subcommittee's questionnaire and in his testimony before the Subcommittee, that the coordination offiscaland monetary policy would
be further facilitated by the establishment of an interagency consultative committee. He said {Compendium, pp. 31-32):
The creation of a small consultative and discussion group w i t h i n the Government, t o consist of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Board of
Governors, the Director of the Budget, the Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisers t o the President, and the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. I w o u l d have this group meet informally but regularly and freq u e n t l y for the purpose of discussing domestic monetary and fiscal matters w i t h
each other. Heads of the lending agencies would be called i n for these meetings
f r o m t i m e t o t i m e when the discussions involved their programs. This group
w o u l d i n a w a y be a k i n d of parallel t o the National Advisory Council which
works i n the field of foreign financial matters. I t would also be akin to the Council suggested b y the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government (the Hoover Commission) i n its report on the Treasury Department.
T h e Council there suggested (Recommendation No. 9) was to advise on policies
and coordinate the operations of the domestic lending and Government financial
guarantees.

This recommendation resembles in many respects the recommendation of the earlier subcommittee under the chairmanship of Senator

Douglas, which said 1 {Report of the Subcommittee on Monetary, Creditf
and Fiscal Policies, p. 4):

We recommend the creation of a National Monetary and Credit Council which
w o u l d include the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the heads of the
other principal Federal agencies t h a t lend and guarantee loans. This Council
should be established by legislative action, should be required t o make periodic
reports t o Congress, and should be headed by the Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisers. I t s purpose should be purely consultative and advisory,
and i t should not have directive power over its members.
i Mr. Wolcott appended the following note to this recommendation: "Mr. Wolcott joins in recommending the creation of a National Monetary and Credit Council, but disagrees with the recommendation that it
should be headed by the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. In his opinion, this would concentrate too much power in the Executive over the volume and cost of credit. He recommends, instead,
that the Chairman of the Credit Cot ncil be a peison c f neutral interests removed as much as possible from
the direct influence of either the Executive or the Federal Reserve Board. He also agrees that periodic
reports should be made to Congress by the Council."




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MONETARY POLICY A N D M A N A G E M E N T OF T H E P U B L I C DEBT

Much discussion of this recommendation of the Secretary of the
Treasury was had during the course of the hearings. I t was strongly
supported by some witnesses and strongly opposed by others. The
opposition was based principally on the ground that it might be used
as an instrument for bringing undue pressure on the Federal Reserve.
Chairman Martin took no position on the recommendation in his
statement to the Subcommittee. In the subsequent questioning he
indicated a marked lack of enthusiasm for it, but expressed no active
opposition. Mr. Beardsley Ruml made the support of such a council
the principal point in his statement to the Subcommittee, but went
further than Secretary Snyder by insisting that such a council, if it
were to be effective, must be established by statute and must have
at least a small staff of its own rather than depending exclusively on
the staffs of the member agencies.
The Subcommittee is impressed with Secretary Snyder's recommendation. It notes that the council which he proposes would be consultative and advisory only and would have no directive powers over
its members. It would consist of a small number of persons, each
with a program to administer (sometimes on his own responsibility
and sometimes in conjunction with colleagues) and each with the right
and duty of advising the President. The increased understanding of
each other's problems which participation in such a council would
bring to each of its members might make an important contribution
to the practical administration of the several programs and might
also improve the quality of the advice given to the President by each
of its members individually. The functions of such a council would
not overlap those of the Council of Economic Advisers—the primary
responsibility of which is to advise the President of its^rstf choice on
each of the economic issues with which he is confronted, unfettered by
any implied commitments arising from attempted mediation between
operating agencies.
While the Subcommittee sees merit in Mr. RumPs proposal that the
proposed council should be established by legislation and should have
a small staff of its own, it believes that such action would be premature.
I t would prefer that the council be established on an experimental
basis by executive order and demonstrate its usefulness in actual
operation before Congress is called upon to legislate with respect to its
permanence and future status.
The problems of coordination offiscaland monetary policy are not
entirely those of the executive agencies and the Federal Reserve.
They are also the problems of Congress. The Employment Act of
1946 set up a coordinating agency on the Congressional side in the
Joint Committee on the Economic Report. Like the proposed consultative council and the Council of Economic Advisers, its powers are
consultative and advisory only, but it is the only committee of Congress whose mandate extends to the entire field offiscaland monetary
policy and its relationship to economic policy generally. The Subcommittee believes that the Joint Committee on the Economic
Report, either through frequent meetings of the full Committee or
through the appointment of a standing subcommittee, as the Chairman may see fit, should maintain more active liaison at the top level
with the Federal Reserve and the executive agencies, including the
proposed consultative council. I t commends the liaison now existing
at the staff level.



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M O N E T A R Y P O L I C Y A N D M A N A G E M E N T OF T H E PUBLIC DEBT

Finally, if correct decisions on problems of economic policy are to be
reached a t the highest levels, i t is essential that the groundwork be
well laid and t h a t the implications, advantages, and disadvantages of
each proposed avenue of policy be thoroughly explored. The special
structure of the Federal Reserve System insures that the claims and
advantages of monetary policy w i l l always secure proper attention at
the staff level. The funds for this purpose are independent of Congressional appropriation, and the Subcommittee is recommending that
this independence be continued. This presents the danger, unless
provision is made for adequate staff work i n other agencies, that the
advantages of monetary policy, especially restrictive monetary policy,
may be overemphasized due to an unconscious "institutional bias" on
the part of the Federal Reserve staff. This danger can best be
avoided if adequate provision for staff work is also made i n the Council
of Economic Advisers, the Treasury Department, and the Department of Commerce—which have different and partially offsetting
institutional preconceptions. The staffs of these agencies are dependent on appropriation procedure and the Subcommittee urges that they
should be provided w i t h funds sufficient to insure, as far as possible,
t h a t a well-rounded view of the implications, advantages, and disadvantages of fiscal, monetary, and othei economic policies w i l l
always be available at the top-policy level.
F . F I N A N C E S OF T H E F E D E R A L R E S E R V E SYSTEM

The independence of the Federal Reserve System from the President has been discussed earlier. B u t , the concern of the Subcommittee w i t h the detailed finances of the System derives principally
f r o m the significance of these finances i n giving i t a substantial degree
of independence f r o m Congress itself. This independence has an
impact on the formulation of monetary policy and hence is of direct
interest to the Subcommittee.
1. Private Ownership of the Stock of the Federal Reserve Banks.—

The stock of the Federal Reserve banks is owned by the member
banks. The total amount of capital so supplied to the Federal Reserve
banks amounted at the end of March 1952 to $242 million, or about
K of 1 percent of their total resources of $48.6 billion. (The surplus
of the Reserve banks on the same date amounted to $565 million, but
the shareholders have no ownership interest in this surplus, which
would revert to the United States if the banks were dissolved, see
below, p. 61.) I t is clear, therefore, that the capital provided by
the private shareholders of the Reserve banks is not a substantial
factor either in assisting in their operations or in insuring their solvency. If the Federal Reserve banks depended upon their capital
for their solvency, we would be confronted with the paradox that
the institutions upon which the solvency of the entirefinancialstructure of the country rests would be themselves the most narrowly and
precariously financed institutions in the whole structure. In fact,
this is not the case and we are confronted with no such paradox.
The solvency of the Federal Reserve banks depends, not upon their
capital structure, but upon their legal status, upon the lucrative (and
exclusive) functions which have been entrusted to them, and, above
all, upon the fact that they may issue money which is a liability of
the United States.



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MONETARY POLICY AND M A N A G E M E N T OF T H E PUBLIC DEBT

What, then, is the significance of the private ownership of the stock
of the Federal Reserve banks? This question is answered in part in
the following colloquy between Senator Flanders and Dr. Goldenweiser (Hearings, pp. 774-775):
Senator FLANDERS. I would like t o ask some questions of D r . Goldenweiser.
Y o u addressed yourself to the question, " W h a t should be the role of the private
financial community i n the formulation of monetary p o l i c y , " and i n t h a t connect i o n I was interested i n the implications of the stock ownership feature of the
Federal Reserve System and the independence of its supply of funds. A t least
ownership has some significance, i t seems t o me, i n the independence of the Federal Reserve System of the Federal budget.
Do you t h i n k t h a t is a fortunate or unfortunate feature?
M r . GOLDENWEISER. I t h i n k its independence of the budget is v i t a l , v i t a l l y
important to the Federal Reserve because the sort of functions i t performs i t
could not perform effectively if i t had to have appropriations.
I think t h a t if i t had to have appropriations its organization w o u l d be subject
to a great deal more political pressures t h a n i t has been.
You have here an organization t h a t over the years has b u i l t u p the best economic staff i n the world. You have the k i n d of service t h a t arises f r o m the possibility of cutting red tape, of complete freedom f r o m pressure for political appointments, and i t would be highly undesirable and destructive of the public interest
to interfere w i t h the functioning of the Federal Reserve i n t h a t way.
Now, the ownership of the stock, as everyone here seems to agree, has become
a very minor matter. I t is not a source of funds. I do not remember what the
capital is now, but i t is i n the minor hundreds of millions, whereas the resources
of the Federal Reserve are i n the tens of billions, so t h a t you can see t h a t the ratio
is negligible.
I think t h a t i t is of no particular consequence i n t h a t respect, and I t h i n k t h a t
if one were revising the banking system, t h a t stock ought to be abolished, because
I t h i n k i t stands for a wrong principle, but, as I said at some length, I t h i n k i t has
lost all practical importance, and I t h i n k this is—
Senator FLANDERS. You do not believe i n changing things simply because they
are illogical as long as they are working all right?
M r . GOLDENWEISER. T h a t is right. I t h i n k t h a t the most effective things i n
the world are illogical, and t h a t logic can be one of the most destructive things i n
the world.

The private ownership of the stock of the Federal Reserve banks,
then, is one of those anachronisms which, although it has lost its
original significance, lives on because it continues to be practically
useful. One of its functions is to serve as a memo from Congress to
itself that it has chosen to leave to the System a great deal of autonomy
in its day-by-day and year-by-year operations. This is so because,
as long as the private ownership continues, the System will not be
amenable to the ordinary techniques of detailed Congressional control.
The private ownership of the stock of the Federal Reserve banks
also serves as a practical and well-understood link between the System
and the private business community, and has been of great help in
obtaining the services of able men as directors of the Federal Reserve
banks. In theory, an equally effective link might be established by
other means—as by the election of local advisory committees—but
a newly-established link would not enjoy the sanction of tradition and
it would be difficult to devise one which would conform so well to the
mores of the business and financial communities. As Mr. A. L. M .
Wiggins said so ably on this point {Hearings, pp. 220-221):
The question has been raised as to whether or not the stock of t h e Federal
Reserve banks should be owned b y the Government instead of by t h e member
banks. I n m y opinion i t should not be owned by the Government.
The Federal Reserve banks represent a combination of Government a n d private
business under which the control is vested i n the Government. B u t i t is t h r o u g h
the ownership of the stock b y the banks t h a t the Reserve System mobilizes the




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MONETARY POLICY AND M A N A G E M E N T OF T H E PUBLIC DEBT

services of able individuals as directors. These men represent private enterprise
and represent the public, and while the control is vested i n the Board of Governors
almost entirely, a t the same t i m e these directors bring the viewpoint of business,
industry, and agriculture and banking to the officers of their banks. I t h i n k t h a t
i t is highly i m p o r t a n t for the Reserve banks to maintain close touch w i t h conditions prevailing i n their respective districts, and this is the only official relationship of the Federal Reserve System w i t h business, agriculture, and industry.
The members elect, i t is true, p a r t of the board, the Board of Governors appoint
p a r t of the board, and if the Government owned the stock there would be no
particular basis on w h i c h member banks would select men to serve on the boards
of these respective banks. I n fact, I t h i n k the relationship should be encouraged
rather t h a n discouraged, and I have been able to find no sound reason for the
Government to acquire the stock i n the Federal Reserve banks unless the ultimate
objective is to destroy the independence of the System and make i t merely a
Government bureau.

The Subcommittee accordingly sees no reason why this memo and
link should be disturbed as long as it continues to serve a useful
purpose.
2. Disposition of the Earnings of the Federal Reserve Banks.—The

gross earnings of the Federal* Reserve banks are derived from the
exercise, under exclusive privilege granted by Congress, of public
functions (including the issuance of money) of an intrinsically lucrative
character. After the payment of necessary expenses and of dividends
on private capital, they are the property of the Federal Government,
subject to the disposition of Congress. No stockholder of the Federal
Reserve banks or any other person has any legal or moral interest in
these earnings beyond his right to receive dividends in the amount
determined by statute.
At the present time the Federal Reserve banks pay 90 percent of
their net earnings after dividends to the Treasury in accordance with
an order of the Board of Governors issued pursuant to an obscure and
long-dormant provision of law (Sec. 16 of the Federal Reserve Act,
4th paragraph) authorizing the levy of interest on the amount of
Federal Reserve notes not covered by gold. While the Subcommittee
approves of the action of the Board of Governors by which this return
of earnings to the Treasury is now being made, it believes that it would
be better if provision for such return were made by straightforward
legislative action. I t recommends, therefore, that legislation be
enacted providing that 90 percent of the earnings of the Federal
Reserve banks after expenses and statutory dividends be paid to the
Treasury as a franchise tax. I t recommends that the remaining 10
percent of earnings be allowed, for the time being, to accumulate in
the surpluses of the several banks in order to permit the capital funds
of the System to increase with the economic growth of the country
and to provide a buffer against possible losses in future open-market
operations.
3. Tax Exemption of the Dividends on Federal Reserve Bank Stock.—

Dividends paid on the stock of the Federal Reserve banks are at the
present time tax exempt, provided that the stock was issued on or
before March 28, 1942. Otherwise, such dividends are taxable in the
same manner as other income (Hearings, p. 911). This differentiation is presumably (the Committee Reports are not explicit) based on
that in the Public Debt Act of 1941, which provided that the interest
on United States securities issued after February 28, 1941, should be
subject to Federal income taxation but did not disturb the exemption
of securities outstanding on that date.



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MONETARY POLICY A N D M A N A G E M E N T OF T H E P U B L I C D E B T

The Subcommittee does not believe that the analogy between the
contractual tax-exemption provisions of United States securities and
the statutory tax exemption of dividends on stock of the Federal
Reserve banks is well taken, and recommends that the appropriate
legislative committees consider the subjection of all dividends on
Federal Reserve bank stock to Federal income taxation, either by
direct legislation or by provision for the recall and reissue of all outstanding stock of the Federal Reserve banks.
4. Budgetary and Auditing Procedures.—The principle that the
gross earnings of the Federal Reserve banks after the payment of
necessary expenses and dividends are the property of the Federal
Government implies the further principle that these funds should
be prudently handled and that the expenses charged against them
should be no greater than necessary to accomplish the public purposes
of the System. This, in turn, leads to a consideration of budgetary
and auditing procedure.
The Chairman of the Board of Governors urged very strongly in
his testimony to the Subcommittee that the independence of the
System depended on its right to use its earnings to pay its expenses as
it saw fit, without appropriation from Congress. The Subcommittee
is inclined to agree with this observation, noting that the independence
in question is an independence from Congress, notfrom the Chief Executives

As previously indicated, such degree of independence from Congress
as the Federal Reserve System enjoys is due to the judgment of Congress that its own long-run purposes—which are those of the United
States as a whole—will be best served by such a temporary self-denial
of a portion of its inherent prerogative. The Subcommittee believes
that this policy of Congressional self-denial should be continued, as it
is fearful that if the Federal Reserve System were subjected to standard appropriation procedure—with all the structural changes in the
System which this would imply—the role of monetary policy in the
economic affairs of the Government would inevitably be curtailed and
an important bulwark against inflation would be weakened. I t does
suggest, however, that the Board of Governors should each year submit its budget and the budgets of each of the twelve Federal Reserve
banks, together with a statement of performance on the budgets for
the previous year, to the Banking and Currency Committees of each
House for their information and such action and consideration as
they may consider suitable. (The effect of the procedure here recommended would be confined to improving the information of the legislative committees. In the absence of further legislation—which is
not here recommended—the Board of Governors and the Federal
Reserve banks would continue to conduct their finances without
Congressional approval.)
[COMMENT BY SENATOR F L A N D E R S : I dissent from this recommendation. While the recommendation, if adopted, would, in
itself, make no change in the present independence of the Federal
Reserve System in the management of itsfinances,I believe that
the necessity for this closer surveillance has not been demonstrated and that it might prove an entering wedge for a subsequent impairment of the System's independence.]
The Subcommittee's questionnaire asked the Chairman of the Board
of Governors to describe the auditing procedures of the Federal Reserve System. This description appears on pp. 307-314 of the Com


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M O N E T A R Y P O L I C Y A N D M A N A G E M E N T OF T H E PUBLIC D E B T

pendium.
I t consists briefly of provision for internal audit i n each of
t h e twelve Federal Reserve banks, an annual audit of each bank b y
examiners f r o m the staff of the Board of Governors, and a semiannual audit of the Board of Governors b y examiners from the staff
of one of the Federal Reserve banks designated for this purpose b y
the Board. T h e Subcommittee made no further examination of the
details of this procedure, b u t is inclined to question the adequacy
of what is essentially a self-audit. I t , therefore, commends the action
of the Board of Governors (taken before the submission of the answers
to the questionnaire) i n employing an outside firm of public accountants to audit the accounts of the Board. I t does not consider
this action sufficient, however, and recommends that the law be
amended to provide t h a t an annual audit of the accounts of the Board
be made b y the General Accounting Office. I t recommends, however,
t h a t this should be a post-audit only and that the authority of the
Comptroller General should be limited to reporting to Congress any
expenditures or other actions of the Board which he considers to be
improper and making such suggestions as he considers appropriate.
I t believes t h a t a f u l l copy of such audit, including all confidential
sections, should be filed w i t h the Committees on Banking and Currency of each House for consideration i n executive session, directly
or through subcommittees, and for such subsequent action as they
consider appropriate. I t does not see how such an audit could i n any
w a y impair the desirable degree of independence of the Board of
Governors.
T h e audit of the individual Federal Reserve banks is more important
and involves greater problems. The Chairman of the Board of
Governors urged upon the Subcommittee (in executive session) that
a mandatory audit of the individual banks b y the Comptroller General
would be an affront to the directors of the twelve banks and would
alter essentially the present character of the System. The Subcommittee has given sympathetic consideration to this plea on the
p a r t of the Chairman, b u t is nevertheless not satisfied with the present
procedure. I t suggests as a possible compromise that the law be
amended to require t h a t each Federal Reserve bank be audited a t
least annually b y an outside auditor nominated by its Board of
Directors and approved b y the Board of Governors, and that the law
be further amended to authorize the General Accounting Office to
perform such audits, if requested, charging therefor a fee equal to
their actual cost including overhead expenses as (finally) determined
b y i t . The report resulting f r o m each audit of a Federal Reserve
bank, b y whomsoever performed, including all confidential sections,
should be filed w i t h the Banking and Currency Committees of each
House i n the same manner as previously suggested for audits of the
Board.
[ C O M M E N T BY S E N A T O R F L A N D E R S :

I

concur i n this

recom-

mendation so far as i t applies to the audit of the Federal Reserve
banks. I believe, however, that the Board of Governors should
have the same freedom as here proposed for the Federal Reserve
banks i n choosing its auditor.]







V. T H E

GOLD

STANDARD

Since the passage of the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, the international
value of the United States dollar has been definitely tied to a fixed
amount of gold. This amount of gold has been l/35th of afineounce
continuously since January 31, 1934. According to a legal opinion
submitted to the Subcommittee by the counsel for the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (.Hearings, p. 139), it cannot
be changed except by act of Congress, nor can the corresponding price
of gold ($35 an ounce) be changed without act of Congress except for
a narrow margin between the authorized buying and selling price
set by the International Monetary Fund in accordance with the
Articles of Agreement of that organization as approved by Congress
in the Bretton Woods Agreements Act of 1945. This international
value of the dollar is implemented by the willingness of the United
States Treasury to sell gold to, and buy gold from, foreign governments and central banks in such amounts as may be necessary to
maintain the international value of the dollar. As a consequence,
the dollar is a "hard currency" acceptable throughout the world and
is convertible into all other currencies at not less than its par value.1
There can be no question of the continuing ability of the United
States to make good on its commitment to preserve this convertibility
because of the strength of our export trade and because our official
gold stock is much larger than our quick liabilities abroad plus any
balance of payments deficits which we might incur and have to meet
in gold.
United States currency, however, is not redeemable in gold coin or
bullion, either for domestic holding or for private holding abroad
(as far as the latter comes directly under the purview of the United
States at the time of export). This matter was considered by the
predecessor subcommittee under the chairmanship of Senator Douglas,
which said (Eeport of the Subcommittee on Monetary, Credit, and
Fiscal Policies, p. 3):
W e b e l i e v e t h a t t o r e s t o r e t h e free d o m e s t i c c o n v e r t i b i l i t y of m o n e y i n t o g o l d
c o i n or g o l d b u l l i o n a t t h i s t i m e w o u l d m i l i t a t e against, r a t h e r t h a n p r o m o t e , t h e
purposes of t h e E m p l o y m e n t A c t , a n d w e r e c o m m e n d t h a t no a c t i o n i n t h i s
d i r e c t i o n be t a k e n
*
*
*.

This Subcommittee has given further consideration to the advisability of restoring the free domestic convertibility of money into gold
coin or gold bullion and concludes that such a policy would be unwise
either at the present time or as an ideal for future action.
1
The Canadian dollar at the time of writing stands at a premium of over 2 cents relative to the United
States dollar. This proir ium is, of course, much greater than the cost of shipping gold from New York to
Montreal or from Washington to Ottawa (greater, that is, than the "gold export point" under the traditional gold standard) and it may, therefore, appear that the United States dollar is not convertible into the
Canadian dollar at par. The diff culty, however, is that, while the United States has declared a legal par
value for its dollar in terms of gold to the International Monetary Fund in accordance with the Articles
of Agreement, and is willing to buy and sell gold in any amounts necessary to implement this par value, the
Canadian government at the present time has no legal par value for its dollar in terms of gold and is not
willing to buy or sell gold (in the present case buy gold) in order to implement the traditional par value of
100 Canadian cents equals 100 American cents.




65

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MONETARY POLICY AND MANAGEMENT OF T H E PUBLIC DEBT

The official gold stock of the United States amounted at the end of
March 1952 to about $23.3 billion. This is less than 13 percent of
the total privately-held money supply (deposits adjusted plus currency outside of banks) of $182.9 billion on the same date. This
means that an undertaking to redeem money in gold would be one
which the Government could meet only in fair weather when persons
having the right to demand gold were not disposed to do so. As the
ratio between gold and money supply is not likely to change radically
in future years (the total gold stock of the world, including that in
private hoards as well as in official reserves, is probably
less than onethird of the present United States money supply2), a return to the
free domestic convertibility of money into gold would represent as
much of a gamble at any future date as it would now.
The advantages of the United States continuing on an international
gold standard are manifest. Gold is the most generally acceptable
medium for the settlement of international balances that the world
has yet been able to devise, and the certainty that the United States
will always pay or accept any balances due on international account
in gold makes the dollar a universally acceptable means of payment in
world trade. I t is a major aim of the international economic policy
of the United States to promote the sound growth of multilateral
trade and to discourage bilateral and discriminatory trade practices.
These are fostered by non-convertible currencies, and one of the most
important things which the United States can do to promote multilateral trade is to continue the international gold convertibility of its
own currency and to encourage and assist other countries in making
their currencies convertible. This is the effect of the present international gold standard of the dollar. The restoration of domestic
convertibility—which would tend to draw additional gold stocks to
the United States—would increase the difficulties in the way of other
countries which are now striving to restore the external convertibility
of their currencies and so would place further obstacles in the way of
the healthy growth of multilateral world trade.
In the domestic field, however, the risks of gold convertibility are
high and the advantages are questionable. I t has already been
pointed out that the present gold stocks of the United States are less
than 13 percent of the privately-held money supply and that there is
little prospect of this proportion increasing materially in the future.
I t is true that this proportion was often even smaller in past years. At
the end of June 1929, for example, the monetary gold stock of the
United States amounted to only 7.3 percent of the money supply on
that date.
The limited stock of gold relative to the possible demands on it if
we should return to domestic convertibility is in fact the heart of the
argument in favor of such a return, as the case is often put. A return
to domestic gold convertibility is meant as a means of disciplining the
Government. As Professor Walter E. Spahr said in his answer to a
question of the earlier subcommittee under the chairmanship of
Senator Douglas.3
9
The total world stock of refined gold is estimated at about $60 billion (at $35 a fine ounce) of which somewhat. less than $40 billion is in official stocks and about $20 billion is in private hands. The gold in private
hands includes that in the form of jewelry, etc., and other bonafideindustrial and artistic forms, as well as
that held in private hoards.
* A Compendium of Materials on Monetary, Credit, and Fiscal Policies, pp. 361-362 (Senate Document
No. 132, 8lst Cong., 2d sess.); quoted in the Report of the Subcommittee on Monetary, Credit, and Fiscal
Policies, p. 42.




67

M O N E T A R Y P O L I C Y A N D M A N A G E M E N T OF T H E P U B L I C DEBT

The gold standard w i t h provision for redemption i n effect provides a system of
golden wires t o every individual w i t h dollars, over which he can send messages of
approval or disapproval t o the central signal board. When our Government
took the people's gold and thrust irredeemable promises to pay on them, i t cut
all these wires to the central signal box. The people were cut off. The lights
went out on the central signal system and the people were left helpless. Thus
absolute control of the people's gold and public purse passed to their government.
The latter had freed itself from receipt of signals of disapproval and from any
effective check. The spending orgy is the result. Vote-buying goes on and can
go on without let or hindrance. The people are helpless; the Government is the
boss; irresponsibility is i n the saddle and i t cannot be checked. The understanding, concerned, and responsible men i n Congress are i n the minority and are
helpless. Government spending and bureaucracy are out of control. Apparently
this course cannot be brought to a halt except by restoring to our people control
over their purse. T h a t can be done only by the institution of redeemability of
the promises to pay of the Treasury and banks.

The Subcommittee rejects the view that the Government of the
United States should be controlled by "a system of golden wires"
and reaffirms its faith in the ballot box.
Experience shows, moreover, that these golden wires are more likely
to be pulled to prevent the Government from relieving distress in a
period of depression than to restrain inflation in periods of prosperity.
Attention has already been called to the fact that the monetary gold
stock of the United States amounted to only 7.3 percent of the money
supply in mid-1929. A serious drain on this gold stock would, through
the operation of the fractional reserve system, have caused a disastrous
multiple contraction in the money supply. But no one worried about
that at the time because no one wanted gold. Confidence was high
and people preferred goods and stocks and real estate. The internal
convertibility of the dollar in no way restrained the inflationary stock
and real estate markets of the twenties. I t was not until the deepest
part of the depression, just prior to the Bank Holiday, that the internal
drain on gold gained momentum and contributed to the collapse of
our monetary system. In the meantime, the necessity of being prepared for such a drain had contributed materially to the inactivity of
the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve System—which had, for
the most part, stood idly by watching the monetary base of our economic system ebb away.
The messages coming over the golden wires were not helpful during
either the twenties or the thirties. They had often been wrong before.
Wide extremes of boom and depression and of high and low prices
occurred repeatedly during the many years of gold convertibility.
During periods of expansion the messages coming over the wires were
usually those of approval of expansionary policies; during periods of
depression the messages were those of disapproval of all expansionary
efforts toward recovery. Gold convertibility when we had it did not
contribute to sound monetary policy, and it is sound monetary policy
which promotes economic stability.
As Mr. Allan Sproul, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, said to the Annual Convention of the4 American Bankers
Association in San Francisco in November, 1949:
* * * We had an embarrassing practical experience with gold coin conv e r t i b i l i t y as recently as 1933 when lines of people finally stormed the Federal
Reserve banks seeking gold, and our whole banking mechanism came to a dead
stop. The gold-coin standard was abandoned, an international gold bullion
standard adopted, because repeated experience has shown that internal converti4
M r . Sproul stated at the Hearings (p. 539) that his views on this matter were exactly the same as in 1949.
The address is reprinted on pp. 643-552 of the Hearings; the quoted portion is on p. 548.




68

MONETARY POLICY AND MANAGEMENT OF T H E PUBLIC DEBT

bility of the currency, at best, was no longer exerting a stabilizing influence on
the economy and, at worst, was perverse i n its effects. Discipline is necessary
i n these matters but i t should be the discipline of competent and responsible men;
not the automatic discipline of a harsh and perverse mechanism. I f you are not
willing to trust men w i t h the management of money, history has proved t h a t
you will not get protection from a mechanical control. Ignorant, weak, or irresponsible men will pervert that which is already perverse.

The Subcommittee agrees with Mr. Sproul; a return to the domestic
convertibility of gold would be equivalent to a vote of no confidence
in the monetary authorities of this country, including both the
Treasury and the Federal Reserve System. I t would represent an
abandonment of the policy of the Employment Act of 1946 and the
ideals for which it stands. I t would turn the monetary navigation
of the United States over to an automatic pilot which took no account in its computations of human suffering and unemployment.
The Subcommittee does not believe either that a return to domestic
convertibility is now opportune or that it should be accepted as an
ideal for the future.




S T A T E M E N T OF V I E W S B Y SENATOR DOUGLAS
The w o r k of the Subcommittee on General Credit Control and
D e b t Management has made a valuable contribution to the understanding of problems i n the fields of monetary policy and the national
debt. I count i t an honor to have been a member of the Subcommittee and wish to acknowledge the splendid accomplishment of its
Chairman, Representative W r i g h t Patman, and the highly competent
services of its staff. L e t me also acknowledge w i t h a sense of appreciation the generous treatment that the Subcommittee's present
report accords to the work of the Subcommittee on Monetary, Credit,
and Fiscal Policies, of which I served as Chairman, now somewhat
more t h a n two years ago.
There is much i n the present report with which I am i n cordial
agreement. There is also much to which I take so little exception
that special comment is not i n point. However, there are at least
two points i n the analysis that seem to me to be erroneous i n their
implications, one point of suggested policy that seems to me certain to
prove mischievous, and several recommendations that tend i n a general
direction contrary to m y own point of view. There is sufficient
difference of emphasis between the report and m y own thinking that
I believe m y best contribution to the work of the Subcommittee can
be made b y this separate statement, i n part reviewing and restating,
and i n part clarifying m y own position.
Two

MATTERS

OF A N A L Y S I S

1. I n the report's review of events since the outbreak of the N o r t h
Korean attack, attention is drawn to the world-wide rise i n the
prices of certain volatile, internationally-traded raw materials.
Internal versus external factors after Korea
I t is said t h a t the intention is merely to indicate the magnitude of
the inflation problem. B u t the effect of the emphasis appears to
involve a n implicit argument not so much about the magnitude as
about the nature of the problem. I t is assumed that some factor
was operative outside the United States inevitably making for a rise
of prices within the United States, and that our own monetary policy,
therefore, probably had b u t a minor influence in producing the
inflation. I f I correctly appraise its implications, this emphasis
minimizes the efficacy of the restraining monetary policy, which we
m i g h t have adopted, and condones the unrestrained policy that we
actually pursued.
There is doubtless some t r u t h i n the allegation that the outbreak
of the Korean war necessarily created world-wide excitements and
fears, which i n a degree, were unrelated to the United States monet a r y policy of the moment. I t must be remembered, however, that
the U n i t e d States is a dominant buyer i n the world market for most
internationally traded raw materials. A flight from the American
69




7 0

MONETARY POLICY A N D M A N A G E M E N T

OF T H E PUBLIC

DEBT

dollar into goods and commodities, therefore, would have an extremely important causative influence on the world prices of these
materials. An inflation of credit in the United States, which permitted and encouraged such a flight from the dollar, either domestically or internationally, would therefore seem to me to be a powerful
contributing factor to the world-wide inflation noted in the report.
Short-run versus long-run considerations

2. The report concedes that changes in the money supply have a
decisive influence on the price level, but it qualifies this by saying that
this principle is true only in the long-run. The implication would
thus be that monetary policy is relatively unimportant in the short-run.
This implication, if I sense it correctly from the Subcommittee's
report, is one that I cannot accept. The long-run, after all, is made
up of short-runs. If it be assumed that monetary policy has no effect
in each of a series of short-runs, then it can have no effect in the longrun.
Money supply and the willingness to save or spend

I would admit, of course, that the willingness of people to use or
hold money is not entirely dependent on increases or decreases in the
supply of it. A war scare, for instance, might well cause people to
spend money that they would not spend in the absence of such an
influence. However, even though such a factor might, if powerful
enough, cause prices for a time actually to move contrary to changes
in the supply of money, I am strongly of the opinion that increasing
or decreasing the money supply would nevertheless materially affect
the expectations of people with respect to the value of their money
and, hence, would materially affect the magnitude, and usually the
direction, of short-run price level oscillations.
The discussion of this point is important because of its bearing
upon monetary policy. If the report's contention is true, that there
is no direct relation between money supply and prices in the short
run, then we would be precluded from ever using monetary policy to
curb an inflation, for in practice we are always confronted, in fact,
only with the short run.
Actually, at any particular point in time, we must act with respect
to monetary policy on one of three possible assumptions. If it is
assumed that there is no probable, direct, short-run relation between
the money supply and prices, then we would be wasting time, when
confronted with an immediate situation, in giving any consideration
at all to the possible effects of changes in the money supply. On such
an assumption, reliance would necessarily have to be placed on the
direct control of the economic system rather than on general monetary
and credit controls, which the report says should be the principal
and primary means of achieving stability.
Or, it may be assumed that there is an inverse relationship between
money and prices. If this were true as a general proposition, we
would be led into such absurd policies as, on the one hand, contracting
the money supply when prices are falling, in order to raise the price
level, or, on the other hand, flooding the country with money when
prices are rising, in order to prevent an inflation.
There remains, then, only one sensible assumption. This is the
assumption that even in the short run the probabilities are overwhelmingly in favor of prices moving directly with changes in the



71

MONETARY

POLICY AND MANAGEMENT

OF T H E PUBLIC

DEBT

money supply, although, perhaps, w i t h some occasional time lag.
I f we thus act on a sensible assumption i n each and every short run,
I am sure we would also, as short runs inevitably succeed each other,
make sense i n the long run.
JFlight from money after Korea influenced by previous monetary policy
I n the situation immediately following the N o r t h Korean attack,
I would willingly agree t h a t restraint on the money supply alone
m i g h t not have completely controlled the rise of prices. The memory
of war shortages was everywhere i n the minds of consumers and producers. The people of the U n i t e d States, and the peoples of the world,
had experienced more than a decade of inflationary finance. The
American economy was awash w i t h money, as a number of witnesses
i n the Hearings observed. I n such a situation, I can agree w i t h the
Subcommittee report that a certain rise i n the general price level, as
people fled f r o m money to goods, was probably inevitable. This
circumstance, however, does not minimize b u t emphasizes the importance of monetary policy.
The readiness of the American people to fly frantically from their
money was itself i m p o r t a n t l y conditioned by the preceding inflationary
monetary policy—a policy t h a t was i n some measure necessary during
the war years b u t was, to m y mind, inexcusable i n the postwar period.
I n large part the American people fled from their money after Korea
because they had learned f r o m many years' experience that nothing
effective ever seemed to be done to protect the holders and savers of
money b y restraining an inordinate increase i n its supply. Precisely
because of the preceding lax, confused, and imprudent monetary record, the immediate post-Korean situation demanded prompt monetary
restraints.
I believe t h a t p r o m p t and determined action, quite within the range
of practical policy, would have materially altered people's expectations
regarding the desirability of holding or saving money, even granting
the preceding experience, and would thus have materially dampened
down the inflationary oscillation that actually occurred. The failure
to take restraining measures promptly, and the actual supplying of
more t h a n a billion dollars of additional bank reserves, which further
encouraged the flight f r o m money to goods, was i n my judgment a
gross blunder, which far outweighed any offsetting gains to the
American economic system.
A

M A T T E R -OF P O L I C Y

The Subcommittee clearly stresses the fact that there are two attitudes of m i n d w i t h regard to the Government bond market—one being
t h a t the Government should borrow at rates established b y the market,
s u b m i t t i n g itself to the same disciplines as private borrowers; the
other being t h a t the Government, i n its borrowing activities, should
have an insulated market. This problem goes to the very heart of
m a n y issues b u t receives less attention i n the Subcommittee's report
t h a n i t deserves.
W e had, i n fact, for m a n y years been giving the Government a protected market for its borrowings, a policy that was discontinued only
recently. As a direct result, we produced a serious inflation. Indeed,
i t 'was the inflation growing out of this effort to insulate and protect the



7 2

MONETARY POLICY A N D M A N A G E M E N T

OF T H E P U B L I C

DEBT

Government's market that originally gave pertinence to this inquiry
and to the deep public concern for the value of the dollar.
The word "insulation," as used in the Subcommittee's report, is
soft, pleasant, and enticing, and the report is quick to point out that
it wants the insulation to be reasonable. The word "rigging" would
be harsh, brutal, and repulsive. Yet I think the truth is, if we are not
very careful, that the principle of insulation will become the practice
of rigging. We will have the creation of an artificial market by devices
resolutely denied to privatefirmsbut eagerly adopted, in the future as
they have been in the past, by the Government itself.
The evils of a protected bond market

The principle of insulation presents the grave danger of evils that
are catastrophic in their realization. One danger is that the Government cannot, in the end, produce rigged markets for its own securities
and then hold the private economy to a standard offinancialmorality
that it refuses for itself. The end result of such a double standard of
financial morality is simply the destruction of confidence in the
integrity and purposes of Government. A particular phase of this
destruction of confidence relates to the Government's credit: insulated
and rigged markets do not in the long run maintain but rather destroy
the credit of the Government.
Another evil of an insulated and rigged market is that the Congress
and the Executive in their financial planning, not merely with regard
to the total of expenditures but especially in weighing the advantages
of taxation versus those of borrowing, become deceived regarding the
cost of borrowing. Another great evil, finally, is the one we have
already experienced. In practice, the principle of insulation simply
means that whenever the public is unwilling to surrender its money
voluntarily on the terms and conditions that the Government offers,
the "insulation" comes to consist merely in the creation of new and
additional supplies of money to take the Government's securities off
the market.
The process of bank credit expansion

Let us remember the process by which this comes about. When the
Federal Reserve System feels compelled to support the price of Government securities in the interest of maintaining yields below the market rate, it does so by purchasing Government securities with its own
newly created credit. This credit appears in the form of enlarged
reserve balances of commercial banks. In this form it provides the
basis for a multiple expansion of loans and investments by the banks.
When this new money, created by the banks on the basis of their
enlarged reserve balances, goes into the hands of the borrowing public,
it is used to buy goods and services. If the resources of the country
are already fully employed, the expenditure of this new money can
have little or no effect in increasing production. I t serves, rather,
merely to bid up the prices of the relatively fixed supply of existing
goods and services and thus generates inflation.
I t seems to me that this process of creating bank reserves and
new money, merely for the purpose of giving the Government a protected securities market, often in contradiction of more fundamental
considerations, has gone quite far enough in our country. There is
one method of protecting the market for its securities that the Government properly possesses: the power to tax. I believe this is a



73

MONETARY

POLICY AND MANAGEMENT

OF T H E PUBLIC

DEBT

sufficient protection, since it gives the Federal Government a prodigious advantage over any private borrower, and we will do well
resolutely to avoid all enticements looking to other kinds of insulation,
rigging, and pegging. I would regard stability of the price level as
far more important to the economic and social well being of the country
than any artificially maintained stability of the interest rate.
Government should compete in the money market

The Government is quite able to compete in the money market. If
it will but do so, allowing itself only the advantage accruing to Government as the ultimate taxing power, we shall then be in a position to
permit our monetary authorities to reduce or restrain the growth of
the money supply when a plethora of money is producing an inflation
and, by the same token, to increase the money supply in a deflationary
situation—when the increased money would not only affect prices
but also call into use idle manpower, plant, and materials, and hence
increase the real national income iteself.
The market for Government securities would thus obviously be
affected from time to time, both directly and indirectly, by the
monetary policy pursued by the System. But the purposes, criteria
of success, and tests of action by the System would differ fundamentally
from those that would be applicable if we followed the principle of
insulating the Government securities market. The Executive and
Congressional branches of Government, moreover, would thus be in
an obviously better position to use intelligently a compensatory fiscal
policy, which was discussed in considerable detail in our report of 2
years ago.
THE

RECOMMENDATIONS

I t has seemed to me urgently necessary that the Federal Reserve
System, if it is to have its present or increased monetary powers,
must also have (a) an independence clearly sufficient to prevent its
coercion, of course, by any private interest or, what is equally important, by the Executive Branch of Government; (b) its monetary
responsibilities sufficiently fixed in law, and sufficiently differentiated
from those of other agencies of Government that the monetary
responsibilities of the System are clear to other agencies, to the public,
to Congress, and to itself; and (c) the principles of its action also
sufficiently fixed in law that they will be known to the Executive, the
Congress, the public, and, above all and most important, to the
Federal Reserve System. I t is only in these terms that I am able to
think of the independence of the System and to judge proposals for
its reorganization; for, as the report correctly observes, the problem
of independence cannot be discussed in a vacuum but can only be
meaningfully discussed in terms of independence to do what, when,
and how; and, I must insistently add, in terms of responsibility for
doing what, when, and how.
The several recommendations of the Subcommittee, in the light of
my preoccupation with independence for the Federal Reserve System
in the terms I have stated, fail to go to the heart of the problem. The
report, for instance, suggests increased powers over bank reserves; a
smaller Board of Governors; a consultative council on monetary
problems, established by Executive Order; a closer and clearer
dependence of the Chairmanship of the Board on the term of the



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President; and shortened terms for the members of the Board of
Governors.
Individually the recommendations are not ojfundamental
importance
These recommendations, w i t h the probable exception of the one
regarding reserve requirements, are not, to m y w a y of thinking,
matters of any great substance. None of t h e m represents a point
that I would care at this time to argue individually or at length.
I n the present state of confusion regarding responsibilities and
principles of action, however, the t o t a l effect of these recommendations is not, as the report asserts, to leave the System " a b o u t as i t i s "
w i t h regard to independence, b u t they actually serve to weaken i t
substantially.
For instance, power over reserve requirements is a useful tool and
supplementary instrument of monetary policy. I f used to " i n s u l a t e "
the Government bond market, however—in short, if used to create a
captive and coerced market—it could prove u t t e r l y mischievous. A
smaller Board, w i t h shortened terms, m i g h t be a more effective working body if the principles and responsibilities of monetary policy were
clear. Lacking such clarity, however, these recommendations,
together w i t h the clearly indicated dependence of the Chairmanship
upon the Presidency, and the proposed abolition of geographical
qualifications for Board members, would simply mean t h a t i n practice
the Board of Governors would be effectively brought into subservience
to the currently ruling Executive and his political purposes.
The proposal for a consultative council (though I am shocked a t
the suggestion t h a t the Council be established b y Executive order)
could be a most useful instrument if, again, there were clarity regarding responsibilities and principles. I n the absence of such clarity i t
would be, to all intents and purposes, simply another method of bringing the System under the domination of the President and of the p a r t y
i n power.
Collectively they can be dangerous in absence of a policy mandate
As I appraise them, then, these recommendations might, under other
circumstances, represent desirable b u t minor changes. Nevertheless,
I believe them to be dangerous i n the absence of a clear mandate
making the Board of Governors f u l l y responsible for the monetary
policies i t pursues and i n the absence of a statement of the general
principles of monetary policy for which the System is accountable.
This, to be sure, is simply a reaffirmation of m y opinion, w h i c h I w a n t
unequivocally known, t h a t the most urgent and paramount business
i n the field of monetary policy is that of a clear Congressional directive
to the Federal Reserve System, to w i t , a mandate, as we have come
to call i t . W i t h o u t such a clear mandate, setting f o r t h responsibilities
and the general terms of policy, there can be no such thing as accountability or evaluation of performance.
I would concede the difficulty of w r i t i n g a mandate. B u t if i t
is alleged that the difficulties are so great t h a t they cannot be surmounted, then that contention is tantamount to saying t h a t we do
not know what k i n d of a general monetary policy we desire; and, if we
do not know what k i n d of a monetary policy we want, then we had
better simply abolish the instruments of monetary policy, for they are
entirely too dangerous to be used for ill-considered purposes.



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What a mandate should consider

A mandate must involve certain considerations:
(a) In my opinion, it should make a clear differentiation between
the responsibilities of the Federal Reserve System and the responsibilities of other agencies, the Treasury, for instance, because, since
both are dealing with money, there is likely to be great confusion regarding the differing responsibilities of each agency.
Treasury-Federal Reserve responsibilities

I note this point for two reasons. The first relates to a most elementary principle of administration: without differentiation of responsibility there can be no accountability. The second reason is the
fact that there was a pervasive tendency on the part of some witnesses
to adopt the "common responsibility" theory of Treasury-Federal
Reserve System relations.
I have noted with care the testimony of Mr. Snyder, the Secretary
of the Treasury, and of Mr. Martin, the Chairman of the Board of
Governors. I would like to compliment them on the ability and good
will shown in their oral testimony and on the contributions that their
staffs have made to the work of this inquiry. But I strongly urge
that the "common responsibility" theory of Treasury-System relations can, in the end, only result in confusion, misunderstanding, and
the avoidance of responsibility. With the best will in the world, this
theory leads inevitably to recrimination, to mutual admonition, and
to repeated investigations, such as this one, which arises so largely out
of the painful and exhausting effort to discover who did what, when,
why, and to whom.
Fortunately, the necessary differentiation between the responsibilities of the Treasury and of the Federal Reserve System is easily
made. The Secretary of the Treasury has a very great responsibility
in advising the Congress with regard to problems in thefieldsof taxation and borrowing. He has a profound responsibility in arranging
the maturities of the public debt, the terms and conditions of debt
instruments, the coupons that he will offer to the market, and related
matters. The Secretary of the Treasury should be (as I believe he is)
solely and exclusively accountable in thesefields,and he should not
be admonished, cajoled, or heckled with volunteered advice by the
Federal Reserve System.
On the other hand, the problem of the Federal Reserve System is
to regulate the quantity of reserve money that it creates, either
through its own investment account or lending activities, and to do
so, as I believe necessary, in accordance with principles established in
law. It, in turn, should not be admonished, cajoled, or heckled by
volunteered advice from the Treasury.
I make these points insistently because I sense in the record of the
past several years a tendency for each of the two agencies to be as
much interested in the affairs of the other as in its own, to the confusion and detriment of both. In voicing this opinion, I want to make
it clear that I am by no means accusing the Treasury and acquitting
the System.
" Good fences make good neighbors"

I want to observe that there is a fundamental and unavoidable
difficulty in the giving of advice to the System by the Secretary: he



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cannot possibly divorce himself from his borrowing problems, and the
advice he gives the System will tend to be largely ex parte. The
System, of course, is in precisely the same position vis-&-vis the Secretary: its advice on terms, maturities, coupons, and so forth, will
inevitably be conditioned by its abiding concern with the problem of
whether or not the Treasury's action makes more or less difficult the
System's regulation of the money supply. The advice given by the
System to the Secretary will also tend to be ex parte.
In short, I make the point of differentiation of responsibility, and
make it insistently, because it seems clear to me that we will have a
better end result, and that the Treasury and the System will be better
neighbors in the long run, the less they invite themselves in to play
in each others' backyards. The proper principle is, "Good fences
make good neighbors!"
A norm of action for the Federal Eeserve

(b) A mandate to the Federal Reserve System must also establish
a norm of action in terms of general principles. The norm of action
for the Federal Reserve System need not and should not be detailed.
No one is nowadays so naive as to imagine that monetary policy by
itself can totally abolish the business cycle; but the terms of such a
mandate, as I see it, should be clearly written around the intent of
Congress that monetary policy be used as a counterweight to cyclical
economic fluctuations. That is, it should be the clear intent of the
Congress, I believe, that the System shall use its powers to increase
the money supply in times of depression and to diminish or restrict
the expansion of the money supply in times of boom. The recognition
of boom and depression, at least in their grosser symptoms, is surely
not now beyond the Board of Governors and its staff, if they are not
bewildered by other and irrelevant considerations. The levels of
employment, production, and substantial stability of the general price
level: These will suffice.
If it is said, as I am sure it will be, that a monetary policy based
upon such a mandate may not be perfect, then I want to say quite
emphatically that it will be infinitely better than what we have been
treated to these past several decades, and that the Congress will have,
at the very least, a benchmark for judging the performance of the
Federal Reserve System and a basis for adjusting Congressional policy
directives to the System in the light of experience.
Mandate should be in Federal Eeserve Act

(c) In my opinion, a mandate to the Federal Reserve System
regarding monetary policy should be placed directly in the Federal
Reserve Act. The mandate should not be inferential, implicit, or
interpretative.
Inferences and interpretations are subject to change without notice
and are quite certain to be given a secondary significance. The
monetary confusions of these latter years seem to me to have carried
us far beyond the place in history where a mandate might satisfactorily
have rested on interpretation of the Full Employment Act or be subordinated within the language of that law.
If there is to be a mandate to the Federal Reserve System—and
I have made it clear that I believe there must be—then I urge that
we should have the forthrightness to tell the Federal Reserve System,



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directly, in its own legislative charter, what it is that we expect—what
we expect the System to contribute toward the maintenance of stable
price levels, and high-level employment, and by what means.
On the record of the past several years it seems quite clear to me
that the Federal Reserve System—through no basic fault of organization, structure, or personnel—has been quite confused regarding its
responsibilities and the fundamental reason for its being. I do not
believe that this situation can now be corrected by inference or indirection.
Let me close by a further word of congratulation to an esteemed
colleague, Representative Wright Patman, whose conduct of the hearings was the very model of fairness.
PAUL H .

DOUGLAS.

I concur in the views expressed by Senator Douglas.




JESSE P . W O L C O T T .

STATEMENT BY MR. WOLCOTT
I concur with the views expressed by Senator Douglas and find
them to be quite consistent with the report of the Monetary Subcommittee of 2 years ago to which I agreed, with certain "footnote"
exceptions and reservations.
In regard to the current report, there are a number of items on which
I desire to take exception or to express supplementary comment.
These, I believe, cannot be adequately treated by footnotes in the
text and will require some time on my part to formulate them. I
shall therefore avail myself of the privilege offered by the chairman
to issue a statement of views at a later date.
I regret that pressure of work in the Banking and Currency Committee and on the Housefloorfor some weeks past has made it impossible
to present my additional views at this time. Moreover, I feel that
the questions of monetary policy and debt management are of such
major importance that I do not wish to express myself on them in
report form without careful and adequate consideration of the committee's report as well as the formulation of such differing or supplementary views as I may feel to be justified.
Since it is indicated that the committee's report is to go to the
printers tomorrow (June 26), I do not desire to delay its publication.
When the current pressure of work of the House is completed, I shall
then have the opportunity to consider the report carefully and
formulate my statement on these matters for release as soon as possible
thereafter.
JESSE P .
78




WOLCOTT.

1451

APPENDIX
TREASURY-FEDERAL

RESERVE

ACCORD

The Treasury-Federal Reserve accord of March 4, 1951, was
described to the Subcommittee in identical language by the Secretary
of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System. This description is as follows (<Compendium,
pp. 74-76 and 349-351):
Throughout t h e period f r o m August 1950 t o February 1951, there were frequent
consultations between Federal Reserve and Treasury officials, and on some occasions w i t h t h e President, concerning the coordination of monetary and debt
management policies. These discussions preceded the working out of the accord
between t h e Treasury and t h e Federal Reserve concerning policies t h a t deal w i t h
their related problems.
T h e following j o i n t announcement was made on M a r c h 3, 1951, for publication
M a r c h 4, b y t h e Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Board of
Governors a n d of t h e Federal Open M a r k e t Committee of the Federal Reserve
System:
" T h e Treasury a n d the Federal Reserve System have reached f u l l accord w i t h
respect t o debt-management a n d monetary policies t o be pursued i n furthering
their common purpose t o assure the successful financing of the Government's
requirements and, a t t h e same time, to minimize monetization of the public d e b t . "
T h i s statement reflected agreements t h a t had been reached, following extended
discussion between representatives of the t w o agencies, regarding their m u t u a l
a n d related problems. T h e presumed area of difference had become greatly
magnified i n the newspaper a n d other public discussion and there was urgent
naed t o reassure the public t h a t the Treasury and the Federal Reserve were i n
agreement as t o proper debt management and monetary policies i n the situation
then existing.
T h e Treasury a n d Federal Reserve felt t h a t everything possible should be done
t o terminate the unwholesome situation t h a t had developed and t o coordinate the
debt management responsibility of the Treasury w i t h the Federal Reserve responsibility for restraining credit expansion. I t was the immediate object of the
Treasury t o restore conditions i n the market t h a t would be favorable t o refinancing
t h e large volume of m a t u r i n g obligations, as well as financing several billions of
new money required during the remainder of the year. I t was the immediate
object of t h e Federal Reserve t o endeavor t o curb tne unprecedented inflationary
loan expansion t h a t h a d continued uninterruptedly since Korea by minimizing
t h e monetization of the public debt and by making i t necessary for member banks
t o borrow f r o m the Federal Reserve i n order to obtain additional reserves. W i t h
these basic objectives i n view, representatives of the fiscal and technical staffs of
t h e Treasury a n d the Federal Reserve had been designated to engage i n a series
of discussions a n d t o formulate a proposal which might serve as a basis for policy
decision.
T h e discussions between t h e Treasury and the Federal Reserve had made i t
clear t h a t there were many areas of agreement between the Federal Reserve and
t h e .Treasury w i t h respect t o t h e solution of these problems; that the cooperation
between t h e Treasury a n d the Federal Reserve had been of exceptionally high
order on most matters of m u t u a l concern; t h a t there are bound to be differences of
opinion n o w a n d then between agencies, as there are between individuals i n the
same agencies; b u t t h a t such differences could be diminished by closer, regularized
liaison w i t h respect t o m u t u a l problems. I t was agreed that there were b o t h
immediate a n d long-run factors w h i c h had t o be taken into account i n arriving
a t a n accord, and t h a t the purpose of t h e negotiation was t o reach agreement upon
policies t h a t w o u l d reduce t o a m i n i m u m the monetization of t h e public debt
w i t h o u t creating a n adverse market^psychology w i t h reference t o Government
securities.




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First, consideration was given t o the matter of long-term bonds overhanging
the market and at the time being offered for sale daily i n large amounts. I t was
agreed that a substantial portion of these bonds could be taken off the market by
a Treasury offer to exchange for t h e m a nonmarketable 2% percent, 29-year bond,
redeemable at the holder's option before maturity only by conversion into a 5-year
marketable Treasury note. The purpose of offering this new security, as announced by the Treasury, was t o encourage long-term investors t o retain their
holdings of Government securities, i n order t o minimize the monetization of the
public debt through liquidation of outstanding holdings of the Treasury bonds of
1967-72. The Federal Reserve agreed t o help the Treasury i n explaining to large
institutional investors the nature and purpose of this new issue. The extent of
the acceptance of the offering testified t o the success of this j o i n t endeavor.
Second, there was the problem of the long-term Government securities which
private holders might t r y to sell on the market after the terms of the exchange
offering became public. I t was agreed t h a t a limited volume of open market
purchases would be made after the exchange offering was announced; and t h a t
if sales on the market were excessive, the situation would be assessed daily, the
market would be kept orderly, and open market purchases, if any, would be made
on a scale-down of prices.
Third, the pending task of refunding the large volume of short-term securities
maturing or callable i n the near future presented difficult problems both for the
Treasury and for the Federal Reserve. I t was agreed t h a t the Federal Reserve,
in order to minimize monetization of the debt, would immediately reduce or discontinue purchases of short-term securities and permit the short-term market t o
adjust to a position at which banks would depend upon borrowing at the Federal
Reserve to make needed adjustments i n their reserves. This contemplated a
level of short-term interest rates which, i n response t o market forces, would fluctuate around the Federal Reserve discount rate. I t was expected t h a t during the
remainder of the year the Federal Reserve discount rate, i n the absence of compelling circumstances not then foreseen, would remain at 1% percent and t h a t the
Federal Reserve would operate to assure a satisfactory volume of exchanges i n the
refunding of maturing Treasury issues.
Fourth, the raising of new funds by the Treasury t o finance the defense mobilization program presented other problems. I t was recognized t h a t there were no
substantial amounts of nonbank funds seeking investment, and t h a t i t would be
some time before such funds would accumulate. I t was agreed t h a t more frequent
conferences between the Treasury and Federal Reserve officials and staff should
be held so that the Federal Reserve might collaborate more closely w i t h the
Treasury i n working out a joint program of Government financing as well as i n
maintaining orderly markets for Government securities.




o