View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

S. HRG. 111–8

MODERNIZING AMERICA’S FINANCIAL
REGULATORY STRUCTURE

HEARING
BEFORE THE

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

JANUARY 14, 2009

Printed for the use of the Congressional Oversight Panel

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

(

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00001

Fmt 6011

Sfmt 6011

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00002

Fmt 6019

Sfmt 6019

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

MODERNIZING AMERICA’S FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE

S. HRG. 111–8

MODERNIZING AMERICA’S FINANCIAL
REGULATORY STRUCTURE

HEARING
BEFORE THE

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

JANUARY 14, 2009

Printed for the use of the Congressional Oversight Panel

(

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON

47–928

:

2009

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800
Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00003

Fmt 5011

Sfmt 5011

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL
PANEL MEMBERS
ELIZABETH WARREN, Chair
SEN. JOHN SUNUNU
REP. JEB HENSARLING
RICHARD H. NEIMAN

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

DAMON SILVERS

(II)

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00004

Fmt 5904

Sfmt 5904

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

CONTENTS
Page

Opening statement of Professor Elizabeth Warren ..............................................
Statement of Hon. Jeb Hensarling, U.S. Representative from the State of
Texas .....................................................................................................................
Statement of Mr. Damon Silvers ............................................................................
Statement of Hon. John Sununu, U.S. Senator from the State of New Hampshire .......................................................................................................................
Statement of Mr. Richard Neiman .........................................................................
Statement of Mr. Gene Dodaro, Acting Comptroller General of the United
States Government Accountability Office; accompanied by Mr. Richard J.
Hillman and Ms. Orice M. Williams ...................................................................
Statement of Ms. Sarah Bloom Raskin, Commissioner, Maryland Office of
Financial Regulation ............................................................................................
Response to written question submitted by: Damon Silvers ................................
Statement of Mr. Joel Seligman, President, University of Rochester .................
Statement of Dr. Robert Shiller, Arthur M. Okun Professor of Economics,
Yale University .....................................................................................................
Statement of Dr. Joseph E. Stiglitz, University Professor, Columbia Business
School ....................................................................................................................
Statement of Mr. Marc Sumerlin, Managing Director and Co-Founder, The
Lindsey Group ......................................................................................................

1
2
4
5
7
8
49
70
72
84
89
120

WITNESS LIST

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

Panel One:
Gene L. Dodaro, Acting Comptroller General of the United States, Government Accountability Office; accompanied by: Richard J. Hillman,
Managing Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment
Team, Government Accountability Office, and Orice M. Williams, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment Team, Government
Accountability Office .....................................................................................
Panel Two:
Sarah Bloom Raskin, Commissioner, Maryland Office of Financial Regulation ..............................................................................................................
Joel Seligman, President, University of Rochester ........................................
Robert J. Shiller, Ph.D., Arthur M. Okun Professor of Economics, Yale
University ......................................................................................................
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Ph.D., University Professor, Columbia Business
School .............................................................................................................
Marc Sumerlin, Managing Director and Co-Founder, The Lindsey Group .
Peter J. Wallison, Arthur F. Burns Fellow in Financial Policy Studies,
American Enterprise Institute .....................................................................

(III)

VerDate Nov 24 2008

04:59 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 47928

PO 00000

Frm 000005

Fmt 05904

Sfmt 05904

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

8
49
72
84
89
120
142

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00006

Fmt 5904

Sfmt 5904

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

REGULATORY REFORM HEARING
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 14, 2009

U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL,
Washington, DC.
The panel met, pursuant to notice, at 11:40 a.m. in Room SR–
253, Russell Senate Office Building, Professor Elizabeth Warren
presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR ELIZABETH WARREN,
CHAIR OF THE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

Professor WARREN. The Congressional Oversight Panel has two
duties. Our first, to oversee the expenditure of funds from the socalled ‘‘Troubled Asset Relief Program,’’ requires us to issue monthly reports discussing the management of the $350 billion allocated
so far by the Congress to the Treasury Department.
But it is the second function that draws us here today. Congress
has asked that we deliver in very short order a report ‘‘analyzing
the current state of the regulatory system and its effectiveness at
overseeing the participants in the financial system and protecting
consumers and providing recommendations for improvement, including, among others, whether there are any gaps in existing consumer protection.’’
We are grateful to have the assistance of so many thoughtful experts in this task.
The last time America faced a financial crisis of greater magnitude was in the 1930s. The policymakers who steered the country
out of that dark hour put in place a regulatory architecture that
served America for more than half a century. Had those leaders
chosen a different path, a path without deposit insurance, without
banking regulation, without a Securities and Exchange Commission, we would be a very different country today.
Today’s policymakers stand at a similarly important point of inflection. The path they take from here will shape this country deep
into the 21st Century. What we get right may not only save an
America that is in danger of losing its economic security, it may
also shape a new America that is stronger than ever. But what we
get wrong may batter a weakened country, leaving it staggered and
vulnerable. We will pay for errors we make here as will our children and our children’s children.
Alan Greenspan now tells us the very premise of deregulation
was misplaced and that he was surprised by this crisis. George
Bush tells us that we must abandon capitalism in order to save it.
(1)

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00007

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

2
These leaders make it clear that the old orthodoxies are dead.
What they do not make clear is how we go forward.
The questions we ask today are ultimately very simple. What
went wrong, and how do we make very sure that these problems
are not repeated in the future?
I appreciate that any problem may have multiple causes, and I
fully understand that financial markets have more twists and
turns than the back streets of Boston, but underlying the complex
maneuvering in the current economic system are some basic truths
about how financial institutions failed the American people and
how those whose jobs it was to monitor and to regulate those institutions also failed us.
Now, with the country in crisis, the American people must not
only bear the broken promises of Wall Street and the regulators
who were supposed to hold deception and risk in check, they must
also bear the double-burden of spending their tax dollars to bail out
those who failed.
We are not here to discuss regulation as a political issue or regulation as an academic exercise. Regulation is a means to an end,
not an end in itself. More importantly, it is a means not just to
help the financial system as a whole but those who give that financial system purpose, American businesses and American families.
The stakes on financial regulation have not been higher during our
lifetimes.
Today, we will hear from a variety of experts as they give their
perspectives on what went wrong and what can be done to ensure
future stability. We have purposely solicited witnesses from a wide
range of ideological perspectives and with a broad diversity of prescriptions for our future.
On our first panel, we will be joined by Gene Dodaro, the Acting
Comptroller General of the Government Accountability Office. Mr.
Dodaro will discuss a recent GAO Report on Regulatory Reform. He
will be accompanied by Richard Hillman and Orice Williams, also
with the GAO.
Our second panel I will introduce just before they start.
With that, I will yield to my colleague, Congressman Hensarling,
for his opening statement.

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

STATEMENT OF HON. JEB HENSARLING, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS AND MEMBER OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL

Representative HENSARLING. Thank you, Madam Chair. We certainly look forward to the testimony of the witnesses. I’m certainly
impressed again by the variety and expertise that will be brought
to this panel.
In a city where it’s difficult to find consensus, I think there is
at least consensus around the idea that we need regulatory reform
within our financial markets, but more regulation simply for regulation’s sake will probably do more harm than good.
Many believe that—look for opportunities to use the present recession to essentially bootstrap a certain ideological agenda and to
thrust that into the body politic. The battle cry is deregulation has
caused this recession, only regulation will prevent future recessions.

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00008

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

3
First, I observe in my own estimation, we haven’t had significant
deregulation in decades. There have been reforms. There has been
some modernization.
Second, I don’t view this as a matter of deregulation versus regulation. Frankly, I think the far more important dichotomy is that
between smart regulation and dumb regulation. I think smart regulation will help markets become more competitive. I think smart
regulation will effectively police markets for fraud and misrepresentation.
I think smart regulation will empower consumers with effective
disclosure, perhaps in contrast to voluminous disclosure, so that
those consumers can make rational decisions. I think smart regulation will help reduce systemic risk.
On the other hand, I think dumb regulation will hamper competitive markets. I think it will stifle innovation that has helped
put people into homes that otherwise perhaps would never be able
to afford them. I think dumb regulation creates moral hazard, and
I think we are unfortunately reaping what has been sown previously as far as dumb regulation is concerned with respect to
moral hazard.
I think dumb regulation will remove and minimize personal responsibility from the economic equation to the detriment of our society. I think it needlessly would restrict personal freedom. I think
dumb regulation is pro-cyclical and ultimately will pass on greater
costs than benefits to our consumers in our nation.
Now, I have served in Congress. I’ve had the privilege of serving
in Congress for the last six years. I spent the previous 10 years in
private business. I have not observed that regulators are inherently
more intelligent than regulatees nor have I concluded that regulatory institutions are any more infallible than private businesses
and private institutions.
For example, if regulators are so wise, why did IndyMac fail?
Why did we have the S&L debacle of the early to mid ’80s? And
in fact, there appears to be now general agreement among most
economic historians that the Great Depression would have been a
garden variety recession had it not been for grievous public policy
errors in monetary policy, trade policy, and tax policy.
And so, additionally, I would observe that those who are proposing even more restrictive regulatory proposals as a cure to our
woes, that many of the proposals that are being proffered already
appear in the EU, among certain other industrialized nations, and
yet they have not seemed to be insulated from the economic woes
that befall our nation at this time.
To state the obvious, families are struggling in this economy.
They need help. They need public policies that help preserve and
grow their job opportunities. They need public policies that increase their take-home pay so they can meet their mortgage payments, their health care payments, and they need public policies
that don’t send the bill for all of this to their children and their
grandchildren.
And finally, to the business of this panel, they need reform and
modernized capital markets regulation. In that regard, I think the
recommendations that we make to Congress will be very, very important. We must examine all the but-for causes, all the contrib-

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00009

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

4
uting causes to our economic turmoil and make sure that we make
smart regulatory recommendations and be careful that, as we make
these recommendations, that we are not simply solving the problem
of this recession and laying the groundwork for an even greater recession to befall us in the years to come.
We all must be mindful of the Hippocratic Oath, first do no
harm. It is my hope that our panel will do more good than harm
with our regulatory recommendations.
With that, Madam Chair, again I thank you and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Professor WARREN. Thank you, Congressman. The Chair recognizes Damon Silvers.

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

STATEMENT OF DAMON SILVERS, MEMBER OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL

Mr. SILVERS. Yes. Good morning, and thank you, Chairman Warren.
Today, the Congressional Oversight Panel takes up its mandate
to examine reforms that will strengthen our financial regulatory
system and protect our nation from a repeat of the current financial crisis or a worse version of it.
I am profoundly grateful to the witnesses and the staff for bringing this hearing together on such short notice and in such an effective manner.
Several themes have emerged already in relation to needed reform, themes involving both regulatory substance and regulatory
structure.
We also face a number of complex dilemmas, again involving
both regulatory substance and regulatory structure.
I am certain today’s extremely distinguished panels will help us
formulate specific policy responses to weaknesses in our regulatory
system and help us think through those more difficult conceptual
problems that have been brought into focus by the financial crisis.
As we begin this hearing, let us keep in mind that financial markets are not ends in themselves nor do they exist to make market
intermediaries wealthy. The purpose of financial markets is to facilitate the transformation of savings into profitable investment, to
allocate our society’s resources to productive purposes.
When regulatory systems fail, when financial markets and financial institutions become manufacturers of bubbles and Ponzi
schemes of one kind or another, then our wealth as a society is dissipated and our society’s needs go unmet.
With that in mind, I think we have already learned some lessons
of the financial crisis. First, we as a nation cannot continue a Swiss
cheese regulatory system. As President-elect Obama has said, and
I quote, ‘‘We must regulate financial institutions based on what
they do, not what they are. We must bring the shadow markets
and shadow institutions into the light of disclosure and accountability.’’
Second, we must abandon the idea that sophisticated parties
should be allowed to act in financial markets without any regulatory oversight. Big sophisticated and yet reckless financial actors
have done a lot of damage to our financial system and to our economy.

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00010

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

5
Third, we need strong independent regulators, not weak compromised regulators. Some of this comes down to leadership which
cannot be legislated, but some of it comes down to structure and
mission. If we say we don’t want ‘‘enforcement-oriented regulators,’’
we should not be surprised when our laws go unenforced.
Fourth, effective financial regulation is made up of several distinct objectives. We need a regulatory system that facilitates transparency and accountability, that polices safety and soundness when
there are public guarantees or systemic risk in play and that protects the vast majority of us who are neither expert nor powerful
when we seek financial services.
We should learn the lesson of having asked the Federal Reserve,
a self-regulatory body, to both protect homeowners in the mortgage
market and ensure the safety and soundness of bank holding companies. We ended up achieving neither goal. Not every regulator
can serve every regulatory function and some functions are in tension with each other.
And now for some challenges. What do we do about financial institutions that are both commercial and investment banks and currently receive implicit federal guarantees covering their entire businesses? Do we break them up? How do we address this? Do we try
to withdraw the implicit guarantee? Do we regulate their entire
businesses, like they were all just commercial banks? Do we charge
risk-based premiums for each line of business? This is a genuine
dilemma. The answer is not obvious.
Some have suggested that somewhat technical developments in
finance, such as the rise of mark to market accounting, the widespread availability of short selling, and the prevalence of multilayered securitizations, significantly contributed to the financial
crisis.
What each of these developments has in common is that they appear to make financial institutions more responsive to and integrated with financial markets. Is this a good thing or a bad thing?
To what extent should these developments be limited or reversed?
Can they be reversed even if we wanted to?
Finally, we have globalized financial markets. How do we set a
global regulatory floor? The answer to that question again is not
obvious.
I am looking forward to an in-depth examination of these and
other issues today.
Thank you.
Professor WARREN. Thank you, Mr. Silvers. Senator Sununu.

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SUNUNU, FORMER U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE AND MEMBER OF
THE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and good
morning to all of our witnesses.
There are a few goals that I think ought to come out of a hearing
like this and I appreciate those that are attending today for being
here. It’s very important because, first and foremost, whether
you’re a panelist or a member of Congress, you can’t possibly be an
expert in all these areas.

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00011

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

6
I hope that our witnesses today will help us understand how we
got to this point, help us understand the inherent weaknesses in
the structure of our regulatory system, but equally important, understand the weaknesses in the operation of that system: how you
can have a good system of regulation, good rules and laws in place,
good organizational structure. But let’s face it, regulators themselves can fail to identify trends, can fail to see problems, can fail
to exercise due diligence. So structure is important but the operation of those systems are equally important. Finally, we need to
consider human behavior, understand how market behavior helps
drive or create some of the problems we’ve seen both in the real
estate markets, the securities market, and in the oversight of those
markets.
Second, I think our panelists today can really help us understand
the complexity of our financial services regulatory system and I
don’t think this can be over-emphasized.
Our system, by and large, was created incrementally. Many,
many different pieces of legislation, passed not over a few years,
but over many decades. Many of the elements of our financial services regulatory system date to the 1930s and 1940s, and that
means, by definition, that they were not designed expressly for the
modern financial services system that we see today.
I think we need to look hard and carefully at that complexity because complexity can create gaps, and complexity can create duplication. Either can cause significant unintended consequences. As a
further result of the complexity, I think it’s fair to say that the financial services regulatory system is not well understood by many
members of Congress, especially those that don’t sit on the committees that oversee or have responsibility for this regulatory system.
We are in a position, given our structure of government, that those
members of Congress will be responsible for acting on the recommendations of this panel, and acting on the various recommendations that are put forward in public by our panelists
today. We need to help them to understand that complexity.
As an example of the incremental way in which our regulatory
structure is created, we don’t have to go back any farther than the
well-publicized financial scandals of 2000, 2001, 2002, and the response to that which was Sarbanes-Oxley. That was a well-intentioned piece of legislation. There are many elements in that legislation that are probably of value, but it is clear that that attempt at
regulatory reform, driven by contemporary events, did little or
nothing to forestall the crisis that we’re dealing with today. So a
process of incremental revision has not served us very well in the
United States.
Finally, I’d encourage our panelists to be specific. The legislative
process is about as far removed from academia as you can get. That
doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be informed by both theory and ideas
that come from an academic source, but we have to deal with the
hand that we’ve been dealt which is the current regulatory structure. We need to work from that structure to one that works better
for all the shareholders and participants.
So we need to be practical, we need to be specific, and, of course,
we need to work in a very diligent way. These are issues that the
panel is going to be addressing in the coming weeks, and these are

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00012

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

7
issues that the Congress will be dealing with extensively in the
months ahead.
Thank you very much.
Professor WARREN. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Neiman.

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

STATEMENT OF MR. RICHARD NEIMAN, MEMBER OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL

Mr. NEIMAN. Good morning. I thank all the witnesses for being
here today.
We are at an exceptional moment in our nation’s history where
the financial system is at greater risk than any point in the past
hundred years. The strain has revealed significant underlying
weaknesses in the existing supervisory system not only in the U.S.
but worldwide.
While regulatory reform is an ongoing process, I believe that
there are four key areas to include in any immediate action plan.
I base this on a broad range of experience over my last 30 years,
having started as an attorney at the OCC, as an attorney within
financial institutions, as an executive as well as a regulatory consultant and compliance consultant, and now, for the last two years
as a state bank supervisor.
I welcome your views on the wide range of issues, but I am especially interested in your recommendations in four key areas.
First, on consumer protection. In fulfilling our consumer protection responsibilities, our top priority must be to address the
subprime mortgage defaults and foreclosures that triggered the
current market turmoil and harmed so many homeowners, neighborhoods and economies.
Second, the role of the states. As the business of banking institutions has become more national in scope, they often complain that
it is burdensome to comply with consumer protection regulations in
50 different states. Federal regulators of banks, thrifts and credit
unions, therefore, have preempted the consumer protection rules of
the states who sounded the early warning on predatory lending.
Preemption issues remain a major concern.
Third, there are gaps in regulatory coverage, both structurally at
the agency level but also institutionally at the institution level as
well as the product level.
And fourth, systemic risk. I believe that it is crucial at this stage
that we develop a better mechanism for controlling systemic risk
across the diverse players and financial services industry. We want
to encourage innovation that has long given the U.S. an economy
that is second to none, but we need to strengthen our regulatory
tools by making sure that all market participants whose failure
would pose risks to the broader financial system are subject to supervision.
These issues of regulatory reform affect us all because instability
in the financial markets affects the broader economy. As we have
seen in the past few months, financial market instability jeopardizes retirement savings, access to consumer credit and student
loans and the financing of businesses large and small, the revenues
of state and local governments, and the fiscal condition of the nation.

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00013

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

8
Now, as much as many of us agree that this is the right time
in our nation’s history to address regulatory reform, we must also
acknowledge that there is no perfect regulatory model. We only
have to look to the many nations in the world that adopt different
regulatory schemes and recognize that none of those jurisdictions
were spared a crisis or problem.
Therefore, in addition to restructuring our regulatory architecture, we need to have more effective regulations and more effective
supervision. I believe that the power of this panel really is that we
bring together a broad expertise with different backgrounds across
different ideological viewpoints as well as political parties.
The Panel’s power is also in being able to call out experts like
yourselves in a broad input, for external input from academics,
from industry, and from the public. But I think the greatest power
of this panel is our diversity and to the extent that we can reach
consensus on these important issues of the day. I think that will
be very, very meaningful to Congress.
So again, I thank you all for being here today and I look forward
to your testimony and questions.
Professor WARREN. Thank you, Mr. Neiman. We begin then with
Mr. Dodaro.
I want to thank you again, Acting Comptroller, for being here
and for coming to talk with us about your Regulatory Reform Report, and thank you again, Ms. Williams and Mr. Hillman, for
being with us.
Mr. Dodaro, I’d like to start with your opening statement. Your
entire statement will be in the record, of course. So if you would
hold your oral remarks to five minutes, we’d be grateful.

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

STATEMENT OF MR. GENE DODARO, ACTING COMPTROLLER
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Mr. DODARO. Good morning, Chair Warren, Members of the Congressional Oversight Panel. We are very pleased to be here today
to assist your deliberations on the financial regulatory system.
As you mentioned, we issued a report last week. In that report,
we traced the evolution of the financial regulatory system over the
last 150 years to lay out and make sure everybody understood the
incremental nature, as Mr. Sununu mentioned in his opening comments to that system.
We also outlined developments in the financial markets and institutions that have challenged that regulatory system in the past
several decades and we lay forth for your consideration, I think it’s
very relevant to your deliberations, a framework for crafting and
evaluating proposals to modernize the financial regulatory system
structure going forward.
Our basic conclusion was that the current financial regulatory
structure is outdated, fragmented, and not well suited to the 21st
Century challenges. There are many issues that we point to in our
report as to the basis for our conclusion there. I’ll mention three
this morning.
First, regulators have struggled and often failed to mitigate the
systemic risk of large interconnected financial conglomerates or to
effectively ensure that they manage adequately their own risk.

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00014

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

9
Second, there have been the emergence of several institutions
and entities that are less regulated and have posed challenges to
the system. These include non-bank mortgage lenders, hedge funds,
and credit agencies.
Lastly, there have been an array of products put forth on the
market that are very complex and have challenged both consumers
and investors and the regulators going forward. Here, I would refer
to the credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations, and various mortgage products that have been put forward as well as overthe-counter derivatives, all of which have been less regulated than
many aspects of the commercial banking sector.
Now, moving forward and trying to address these vulnerabilities
is a complex task that needs to be deliberated on and taken with
care to make sure there aren’t unintended consequences of moving
forward as well as preserving the inherent benefits of our current
financial regulatory system, including the ability to foster capital
formation and economic growth over a period of time. So there
needs to be a balance and here we need to strive as a nation to
achieve that balance going forward.
To assist in this deliberation, we’ve put forth a framework for
consideration so that it can be looked at as a system and not just
to make piecemeal changes to it. We list nine characteristics that
need to be considered. I’ll mention a few critical ones here.
First, there needs to be clear, explicit goals for the regulatory
system set in statute to provide consistent guidance over time. Reform also needs to be comprehensive. It needs to address some of
these regulatory gaps, both in institutions and products, going forward.
Oversight of systemic-wide issues is another characteristic. No
one regulator right now is charged with looking at risk across the
entire system, to monitor it, to provide alerts, or to deal with it in
advance going forward. That’s an issue that we believe needs attention.
The system needs to be flexible and adaptable. In this case, you
need to make sure that innovation is still permitted while managing risk going forward, so that we maintain the benefits of innovation of the system. It needs to be efficient. We need to look at
the overlapping nature of some of the regulatory organizations that
have been put in place in time and make the system more streamlined and efficient going forward.
We need to look at consumer protections again. Disclosures are
very important as well as financial literacy issues and other key
factors that should be part of the overall approach here going forward. The independence of the regulators is another very important characteristic to make sure that they’re funded, they’re
resourced, and they have proper statutory independence to be able
to do what’s necessary, and we need to protect the taxpayers. We
need to deal with moral hazards approaches and provide safeguards in place so that the losses, if they occur, are borne by the
industry and not by the taxpayers going forward.
We would be happy to answer your questions at this time, and
again thank you for inviting us to be here.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dodaro follows:]

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00015

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00016

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 37 here 47928A.001

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

10

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00017

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 38 here 47928A.002

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

11

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00018

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 39 here 47928A.003

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

12

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00019

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 40 here 47928A.004

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

13

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00020

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 41 here 47928A.005

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

14

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00021

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 42 here 47928A.006

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

15

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00022

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 43 here 47928A.007

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

16

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00023

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 44 here 47928A.008

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

17

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00024

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 45 here 47928A.009

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

18

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00025

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 46 here 47928A.010

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

19

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00026

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 47 here 47928A.011

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

20

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00027

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 48 here 47928A.012

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

21

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00028

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 49 here 47928A.013

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

22

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00029

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 50 here 47928A.014

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

23

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00030

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 51 here 47928A.015

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

24

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00031

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 52 here 47928A.016

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

25

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00032

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 53 here 47928A.017

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

26

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00033

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 54 here 47928A.018

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

27

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00034

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 55 here 47928A.019

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

28

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00035

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 56 here 47928A.020

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

29

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00036

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 57 here 47928A.021

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

30

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00037

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 58 here 47928A.022

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

31

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00038

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 59 here 47928A.023

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

32

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00039

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 60 here 47928A.024

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

33

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00040

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 61 here 47928A.025

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

34

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00041

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 62 here 47928A.026

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

35

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00042

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 63 here 47928A.027

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

36

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00043

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 64 here 47928A.028

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

37

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00044

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 65 here 47928A.029

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

38

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00045

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 66 here 47928A.030

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

39

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

40
Professor WARREN. Thank you, Mr. Dodaro. I really appreciate it.
Thank you, and thank the GAO for your thoughtful and detailed
report. I read it with great interest. It has very, very good ideas
in it.
If I can, I want to focus on one in particular to get us started
with our questions today and that is, you highlight in your report
how consumer and investor protection has been distributed across
a range of agencies, at the federal level, federal and state, that
there are many actors who have some small part of consumer regulation, and that I believe, as you put it, one of the consequences
of this is it creates a low priority for many of those agencies who
have other responsibilities and has made for ineffective regulation
in this area.
You suggest in your report that one agency devoted to consumer
financial issues, which would be responsible to the President and
to Congress and to the American people, might be a solution to this
problem.
Can you say more on the consumer side about how one agency,
it would be a very different way to look at this problem, how it
might solve some of the problems that you have identified?
Mr. DODARO. Well, first, our work has shown over a period of
time that this is an area where, while there are some benefits to
having multiple people involved looking at this, and I think this is
one area where having the state involvement as well as the federal
involvement, to go to Mr. Neiman’s opening comment, is a positive
development, but there needs to be a better overall structure in
place across the federal departments and agencies to be able to
deal with this.
I’ll ask Rick to elaborate on our work a bit. We don’t actually,
you know, make a recommendation that this be done but we think
it has merit, a lot of merit that should be explored going forward.
Our work has consistently shown, whether we’re looking at credit
cards, mutual fund fees, or others, that the disclosures to the public aren’t clear. They don’t really understand these issues. Clearly,
this was an issue with the various mortgage products that were
put forth on the market in the past.
We’ve done work saying that the Committee on Financial Literacy that’s set up at the federal level doesn’t have a strategic plan,
isn’t funded properly to continue to provide, you know, education
in this field as well. So it has a lot of dimensions. Oftentimes it
doesn’t get as much attention, as we point out in our report, as necessary. So making it a clear priority, setting up a structure again
in this overall framework going forward, I think, is a worthy area
to be very carefully explored by this panel and then the Congress
as it goes forward.
Professor WARREN. Mr. Hillman, would you like to add to that?
Mr. HILLMAN. Yes. I think that the comments that you made are
right on target from the standpoint that the consumer protections
are really as fragmented as our regulatory system is currently fragmented and that can cause inconsistencies, overlaps, and gaps in
ensuring that consumers are best protected, and this current crisis,
with what has been taking place with the subprime mortgage market and other areas, has clearly demonstrated that there needs to
be improvements in the consumer protection area.

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00046

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

41
Moving more towards a single regulator to oversee consumer protection areas is definitely an idea that merits additional attention.
There are many options with which to establish a new regulatory
structure. Moving towards a single regulator or moving towards
what is referred to as regulation by objective or a Twin Peaks
model where you have a safety and soundness regulator and a consumer protection regulator both afford you opportunities to enhance the visibility of consumer protection issues in a reformed
regulatory structure.
So we believe, as a result of our work, that that is a serious issue
that needs to be debated to determine how best to ensure consumer
protections are delivered in the most effective means.
Professor WARREN. All right. Thank you. I’m going to switch
areas just because our time is very limited. You focused, I thought,
very helpfully in the report on the importance of identifying and
regulating systemic risk, obviously a terrible problem right now,
and others have also talked about this, Chairman Frank, the
Treasury Department.
Can I ask you to comment just briefly on the question of whether
the appropriate entity to identify and regulate systemic risk should
be placed within the Fed or within a new regulatory body, a new
regulator to look specifically at systemic risk? Do you have a comment on that, please?
Mr. DODARO. Yes, there’s various trade-offs associated with making that decision. Obviously the Federal Reserve’s focus on monetary policy is important and they need to maintain their independence in that regard.
One of the areas that we’ve looked at over the past is how some
other countries have handled this particular issue. The United
Kingdom in particular went to a single financial services authority,
a single regulator, while maintaining the Central Bank functions
in a separate entity and given the current situation, they are reevaluating some of those issues.
Part of the issue there is how much the Central Bank really
needs to know about what’s going on within the financial institutions around the country to put them in a monetary policymaking
position. So this is an area we don’t have a ready answer for you
today, but I think it’s an area that needs to be carefully considered
going forward in the debate because there are some serious tradeoffs associated with providing all of these types of authorities to
one entity.
Professor WARREN. Thank you. I appreciate it, and I’m out of
time.
Congressman.
Representative HENSARLING. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr.
Dodaro, thank you for appearing today, and thank you again for
the quality of the work of the GAO. I find the reports to be helpful,
comprehensive.
In the report that I have before me, there is a short discussion,
I guess, of our history of the financial regulatory system, a number
of observations you have for the framework for this panel and Congress and other policymakers going forward.
What I don’t necessarily see, though, is an analysis from GAO on
the significant ‘‘but for’’ factors that have led us to the economic

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00047

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

42
turmoil that we see today. I think we’re all believers of the adage
that those who do not learn the lessons of history are condemned
to repeat them. So am I missing that from this work? Was that not
in the scope of the work or has GAO come to some conclusions
about the primary ‘‘but for’’ causes of our present economic turmoil?
Mr. DODARO. Well, the report does focus on some of the developments that have happened in the financial marketplace that have
challenged the regulators, but it was not within the scope of it to
talk about all the underlying economic situations that have gone
before there.
I would ask if my colleague Ms. Williams could elaborate on that.
Ms. WILLIAMS. No. I think it’s accurate that we did not specifically set out in this report to lay out the reasons for the current
economic turmoil in the market. We simply used this as an additional data point, in addition to other problems that have existed
in the markets over several decades to illustrate this is yet another
example that points to serious questions about the regulatory
structure.
Representative HENSARLING. In dealing with the issue of consumer protection, on page 18 of your report, you state, ‘‘Many consumers that received loans in the last few years did not understand
the risk associated with taking out their loans.’’
After first being elected as a member of Congress, my wife and
I purchased what we referred to as an old, expensive condominium
in the Alexandria area. My five- and six-year-old referred to it as
the itty-bitty teeny-tiny house.
When faced with the real estate closure of that condominium, I
remember being given a voluminous amount of documents, almost
none of which I’ve read, notwithstanding the fact that I’ve actually
had a short, un-illustrious legal career and had to read that stuff
at one time.
I remember asking the real estate agent who actually reads this
stuff, and the answer was about one out of a hundred home purchasers. I said, ‘‘Well, who’s the one?’’ And they stated a first-year
law student at one of the local law schools.
[Laughter.]
Representative HENSARLING. My question is, should consumers
know what mortgage products they sign and can they know? Is
there a concept—is it possible for regulators to have/promote effective disclosure, again as opposed to what I would refer to as voluminous disclosure? Has the GAO concluded that consumers can
and should understand the risk associated with their mortgage
products?
Mr. DODARO. First, we’ve made a number of recommendations;
I’ll ask Mr. Hillman to elaborate on those, in a series of products
over time, about making the disclosures more understandable to
consumers. There’s ways to do research on this, to do some testing
as to what the consumers would really understand and put in
place.
As I’ve also grown to appreciate over time, some of the disclosures are in, as you mentioned, teeny-tiny condominium—or in
teeny-tiny print—so they’re even hard to read, but there are a
number of ways that we believe and have recommended that the

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00048

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

43
disclosures could be improved over time, and I also, though, would
not also overlook the issue of financial literacy training to the population at large over a period of time.
Representative HENSARLING. I see my time is winding down. I’d
like to try to squeeze in at least one more question here.
Did the GAO look at the enforcement mechanisms that are in
place to deal with mortgage fraud? According to FINCEN, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, mortgage fraud has increased
something along the lines of 1,400 percent in this decade. A lot of
predatory lending, frankly a lot of predatory borrowing. I think according to FINCEN a majority of the mortgage fraud occurred from
borrowers misrepresenting their income, misrepresenting their assets, misrepresenting their occupancy.
Anecdotally, I’ve spoken with a number of U.S. Attorneys, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. They’re focused on terrorism. Unless you’re into
seven and eight figures fraud, they don’t even look at it.
So has the GAO undertaken a look at what would it mean to
simply enforce some of the antifraud regulations that are on the
books today?
Professor WARREN. Mr. Dodaro, we’re out of time. So I’m just
going to ask you to limit yourself to just a sentence on this, if you
could, or Mr. Hillman.
Mr. HILLMAN. I’d be pleased to respond and your question again
is right on target.
We have not done any specific work as relates to the elements
of mortgage fraud and the growing nature of that, but we have recently completed two pieces of work in the Bank Secrecy Act area
which looks at the extent to which depository institutions are preparing suspicious activity reports and currency transaction reports
to help law enforcement agencies tackle that problem and try to determine the most efficient means for depository institutions to comply with the Bank Secrecy Act.
Representative HENSARLING. Thank you. Thank you, Madam
Chair.
Professor WARREN. Thank you, Congressman. Mr. Silvers.
Mr. SILVERS. Again, let me express my thanks to the GAO for
your assistance to our panel in our brief period of existence and for
your own work on the TARP Program.
Your report and your comments before us this morning refer at
some length to unregulated both financial institutions and financial
products. This follows, I think, a long series of GAO reports dating
back to Long Term Capital Management in relation to some of
these same issues.
Could you expand on your thinking in that area and with particular reference to the proposition some have raised, including, I
think, some witnesses that will follow you, that many of these
products and funds are essentially well-known things in new legal
garb and ought to be regulated based on economic content rather
than legal form?
So, for example, a credit default swap looks a lot like bond insurance.
Mr. DODARO. I think basically, and I’ll ask Ms. Williams to elaborate on this a little bit, you know, our work in this area dates back

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00049

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

44
to the 1994 report where we raised questions about the derivatives
and the development at that period of time.
I think this is an area where there needs to be—and whatever
changes are made to the regulatory framework, you can deal with
the existing set of institutions and products now, but looking forward is really the challenge, I believe, going forward. As new products are developed, there needs to be some attention made by the
regulators to make a gauge as to what the risk would be, whether
it fits in to an already-existing regulatory screen and make a conscious decision of how it should be regulated, and then also monitor
that very carefully going forward and make proposals, if they don’t
already have the authority.
So I think the challenge really there is how to address new products going forward as well as dealing with what we already have.
Mr. SILVERS. Can I, before you ask our colleague to contribute?
Are you suggesting that you would support regulatory frameworks,
like for example the ′33 and ′34 securities laws, that give broad jurisdiction, broad conceptual jurisdiction to regulators who follow
the activity rather than approaches that sort of wall regulators in
around particular legal forms?
Mr. DODARO. Yeah. Yes, I mean, there needs some authorities on
a risk-based basis. You don’t want to go too far in such a way that
it stifles innovation, but there has to be a risk assessment tool built
in that we think would provide a better safeguard going forward.
Ms. WILLIAMS. And just to add, we have several elements that
really speak to that. That’s what we’re getting at when we talk
about the need for comprehensive regulation as well as flexible and
nimble and that’s to allow the structure to adjust as entities and
products morph and to be able to follow the economic substance of
the product and also look to the institution and gauge its impact
on the overall financial system and not be locked into a statutory
definition.
Mr. SILVERS. Would I be correct, in following up with that, that
you would look in this respect to regulation, for example, with a
particular financial product or institution that currently is outside
the regulatory scheme, that you would look both at, for example,
transparency, accountability and capital requirements as required
by the particular activity going on? Am I clear in what I’m asking?
Ms. WILLIAMS. I would think that would have to be part of the
debate. As you decide how far to go with regulating that particular
entity, based on its risk to the system, you would have to evaluate
if it would be appropriate for all of those items that you listed to
be applied.
Mr. SILVERS. And there’s really two levels here. One is in the individual regulatory scheme that would be put in place, but also this
entity that would focus on systemic risk would also have some responsibilities in this area and to coordinate with the individual regulatory entities.
Coming to the systemic risk question, one item in the debate
that’s not, I think, been entirely clear and focused but seems quite
important to me is the approach to systemic risk regulation, whether one essentially tries to identify systemically-significant institutions ex-ante, in advance, and regulate them with special—bring
special regulatory tools to bear in advance or whether you—wheth-

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00050

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

45
er it is better not to do that, whether it’s better to essentially act—
determine who’s systemically significant in midst of crisis, which is,
I think, essentially what we’ve done recently, what’s your thinking
about that question?
Mr. DODARO. Two thoughts. One, I think in putting a new regulatory structure in place right now, there has to be a recognition
of these large financial conglomerate entities that do in fact right
now have significance to the system at large and there has to be
an appropriate structure put in place to deal with that going forward, recognizing we’re in a global environment and we need to
have those entities to be competitive, but it shouldn’t be static.
I think one thing that’s really surprised everybody is the speed
in which these things have happened and you can’t wait to be in
a reactive posture. That is just not going to serve us well. We need
to put a durable system in place that’s going to be able to recognize
what we already know but yet be flexible enough to be proactive
going forward if we’re really going to mitigate things, given the
current globalized environment.
Mr. SILVERS. Thank you.
Professor WARREN. Thank you. Senator Sununu.
Senator SUNUNU. Mr. Dodaro, I’m going to give you an opportunity here now to give us some good news.
[Laughter.]
Senator SUNUNU. In your evaluation of the regulatory system
and the events that led up to the current crisis, what did you find
that operated effectively? What seemed to be working, and what
best practices within our regulatory structure should we look to expand or reinforce?
Mr. DODARO. Well, I think, you know, basically we have a regulatory system, you know, where the regulators are, you know, developing mechanisms to try to coordinate with one another to deal
with some of the things. So I think the dialogue among the regulators has improved, although it hasn’t gotten to the point of where
we would recognize that it’s the most effective and efficient way to
be able to handle the system going forward.
I think in the current environment and dealing with the situation, the regulators have, you know, acted, I think, to try to deal
with and stem and mitigate the effects of the current system going
forward with the tools that they have at their disposal to be able
to do that and to have acted, you know, in order to try to deal with
some of the issues going forward.
There are a lot of very talented people in the financial regulatory
area. We have a lot of, you know, well-intended systems in place
to be able to do this. In areas where there’s been traditional oversight, for example, in the commercial banking industry, we think
some of those things have worked, you know, effectively over time,
you know, given some of the incremental changes that you mentioned.
I would ask just Rick or Orice if I’ve missed anything. I don’t
want to miss any good news.
Mr. HILLMAN. I’d just like to reiterate what Gene was saying in
that, given the fragmented regulatory structure that we currently
have in place, one of the major benefits of that fragmented structure is that these individual regulators have deep pools of knowl-

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00051

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

46
edge and an understanding of their individual markets that they’re
overseeing. So in this particular financial crisis, given the more effective coordination that has taken place across regulators, between
the Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve, including
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in their particular
areas of expertise and the authority that they provide, this has allowed for a more concerted strategy to address the case-by-case
problems that have been confronting our financial markets over
this past summer.
Senator SUNUNU. In Recommendation Number 5, you talk about
the importance of eliminating overlap. Could you give us an example of specific areas where you saw this overlap and perhaps some
of the problems it created?
Mr. DODARO. Basically, the one area where we’ve recommended
that it be dealt with is in the banking area. Right now, you have
five entities that have responsibilities at the federal level and in
that regard, I think there’s some merit of looking at that. In the
futures and the security areas, the SEC and the Commodities Future Trading Commission could be considered for consolidation as
well. Those would be the two primary areas that we would highlight as meriting consideration.
Senator SUNUNU. On the issue of consumer safety, Mr. Hillman
used the phrase ‘‘working to ensure that consumers are best protected’’ and talked a little bit about the Twin Peaks Model which
separates this responsibility for consumer protection.
But that can create significant problems in that there are elements of consumer protection or consumer services that could and
would have a direct effect on the safety and soundness of the institution. It would be a mistake to have an agency or an organization
responsible for those consumer protection initiatives without also
having an obligation and a responsibility to think through exactly
what the effect on this regulation would be on safety and soundness.
How do you reconcile that problem and how can you advocate a
Twin Peaks Model if it separates those two obligations and responsibilities?
Mr. HILLMAN. The work that we have done in looking at various
alternative regulatory structures suggests to us that there are definite strengths and weaknesses across a whole series of possible options for reforming our regulatory structure and there really, quite
frankly, is no silver bullet.
Looking at the Twin Peaks Model where you have oversight by
objective, looking at safety and soundness issues or looking at consumer protection issues, it does afford the opportunity to enhance
the visibility from a consumer protection standpoint, but your comments are very on target when you suggest that separating consumer protection from the safety and soundness issue can cause
problems.
One area, for example, that could be a problem has to do with
really assessing reputational risk. There’s issues associated with
the operations of enterprises and institutions that can cause
reputational risk and also harm investors and you really need to
look at that at a holistic level. So there’s strengths and weaknesses
to each approach.

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00052

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

47
Mr. DODARO. And I think at a minimum, there needs to be clarity of the goals and objectives that are put in place for whatever
system’s put in place and part of the reason we created the nine
characteristics is that there’s a tendency to want to gravitate to a
quick organizational fix by either centralizing or decentralizing
something. Often that doesn’t work. It’s not as simple as that
might seem, even appealing as it may be.
This is one area where once you set what kind of structure you
want in place, even if you don’t go to a centralized approach, you
need to make clear what the responsibilities would be and in the
framework in which you’re talking about, and I think that’s an
area where I’d want to make sure that, you know, our message
that the minimum requirements need to be really clearly spelled
out as to what you expect and what this Congress expects in this
area.
Senator SUNUNU. Thank you.
Professor WARREN. Thank you. Mr. Neiman.
Mr. NEIMAN. Yes, I’d like to follow up on that line of questioning
because in your written testimony, you do note that unfair consumer lending practices can have safety and soundness implications and I agree with that assertion. And you also noted that if
consumer protection and safety and soundness responsibilities were
housed in different agencies, that appropriate mechanisms for
interagency coordination would be required.
Now, do you have any specific recommendations for processes to
overcome those operational challenges or does the fact argue in
favor of keeping consumer protection and prudential supervision
within the same agency?
Mr. DODARO. Well, a lot would depend—I’ll ask Rick, who’s been
focusing on our work here, to comment. A lot would depend on
what type of other changes are made in the system to the financial
regulatory apparatus that would be put in place. So you’d have to
consider that in arriving at the answer.
But Rick?
Mr. HILLMAN. There’s definite trade-offs that take place, depending upon which option you end up choosing. If you’re looking at a
bifurcation of safety and soundness in consumer protection issues,
it’s definitely going to put a premium on coordination and communication and collaboration between those entities that have those
responsibilities.
If you put it in one organization, you have the opportunity to
share expertise and information across those two important issues
but then you may lose focus as to what you’re really looking to
achieve.
So depending upon whichever structure you ultimately move to,
Gene is absolutely right, we need to establish what goals need to
be in place to ensure effective consumer protection and have those
goals drive down the regulatory process to achieve them.
Mr. NEIMAN. In that same section you talk about overlapping jurisdiction of regulators and to a certain extent in certain areas it
can be burdensome, but in other areas it can provide appropriate
checks and balances. From my experience as a state regulator, I
have seen that play an important role where we work very cooperatively and serve with our countervailing federal regulators.

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00053

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

48
You also indicate that with respect to enforcement activities, that
is a less burdensome area, and where I assume what you’re getting
at is more cops on the beat rather than less is important.
Would you elaborate on the balance between checks and balances
and overburdensome regulatory overlap?
Mr. DODARO. Yeah. I think the real goal would be to capitalize
and build upon those things that are working well right now and
that provide those checks and balances.
I think, you know, our view on overlapping regulations is more
at the federal level than it would be between the Federal Government and at the state level. So I’d want to clarify that. I think
there’s distinct advantages of having the states be involved in this
process going forward. We think there are opportunities at the federal level. So you need to preserve the checks and balances.
It’s a big system. It’s complicated. It’s moving fast. States give
you a decentralized sort of eyes and ears on the ground across the
country and I think you don’t want to lose that ability to be able
to do that going forward, but that’s our—most of the focus is at the
federal level.
Mr. NEIMAN. Thank you.
Mr. HILLMAN. And particularly to your point on the checks and
balances, while GAO has not made any proposals suggesting how
to reform the financial services sector, we have suggested, though,
that we need to seriously look at some consolidation of the financial
services sector and that is not to say that we are trying to eliminate competition across regulators. That would be an inconsistent
reaction to what our view is.
You know, competition across regulator agencies helps to ensure
innovative structures within the federal and state levels and in
some form would likely be benefited by preserving the regulatory
competition that exists. The question is, though, is there too much
competition now across the many organizations that exist?
Mr. NEIMAN. Have you addressed in any way the issues around
federal preemption of state laws, particularly state consumer laws?
Mr. HILLMAN. We acknowledged in prior work concerns associated with federal preemption, particularly as it relates to the Office
of Comptroller of the Currency, and in steps taken earlier this decade to limit visitorial powers associated with states’ interaction
with national banks and as a result of that work had suggested
that the OCC could do a much better job of determining how they
could best incorporate state banking authorities and powers within
the confines of what they were referring to with their visitorial
powers.
Mr. DODARO. We’d be happy to provide that for your record consideration.
Mr. NEIMAN. Thank you.
Professor WARREN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Neiman.
That’s going to conclude the testimony for Panel 1. The press of
time bumps into the magnitude of the task that we have undertaken.
I want to ask if you would be willing to answer written submissions from the panel on the record that we would send to you in
the next few days.

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00054

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

49
Mr. DODARO. We’d be happy to assist this panel in its important
task in any way we can. Certainly.
Professor WARREN. Thank you, Acting Comptroller Dodaro, and
thank you, Ms. Williams. Thank you, Mr. Hillman. The panel appreciates your taking the time in coming here.
Mr. DODARO. Thank you very much.
Professor WARREN. Thank you again. We now call the second
panel, if you’ll come forward, please.
Thank you. I’m pleased to welcome our second panel of witnesses. We are joined by Sarah Bloom Raskin, Commissioner of the
Maryland Office of Financial Regulation, by Joel Seligman, President of the University of Rochester, Robert J. Shiller, the Arthur
M. Okun Professor of Economics at Yale University, Joseph
Stiglitz, University Professor, Columbia Business School, Marc
Sumerlin, Managing Director and Co-Founder of The Lindsey
Group, and Peter J. Wallison, Arthur F. Burns Fellow in Financial
Policy Studies of the American Enterprise Institute.
Welcome to all of you. I will dispense with more and just say, can
we start? Each of you will have your full statements on the record,
of course. If I can ask you to limit your oral remarks to five minutes, and we’ll start with Ms. Raskin.

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

STATEMENT OF MS. SARAH BLOOM RASKIN, COMMISSIONER,
MARYLAND OFFICE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION

Ms. RASKIN. Thank you. Good morning, Madam Chair and Members of the Panel. My name is Sarah Bloom Raskin, and I am
Maryland’s Commissioner of Financial Regulation.
I’m pleased to be today to share a state perspective on regulatory
restructuring. While changing our regulatory system will be complex, four simple concepts should guide us. In evaluating any proposed reform of our financial regulatory system, we must ask (1)
does it enhance transparency, (2) does it enhance accountability, (3)
does it promote the public interest, and (4) does it address systemic
risks?
We often hear that the consolidation of financial regulation at
the federal level is the modern response to the challenges of our financial system. I want to challenge this idea.
The 6,000+ state chartered banks now control less than 30 percent of the assets in our banking system, but they make up 70 percent of all U.S. banks. Thus, while these institutions may be smaller than the international organizations now making headlines and
winning bail-outs, they are absolutely critical to the communities
they serve.
Since the enactment of nationwide banking, the states have developed a highly-coordinated system of state-to-state and state-tofederal bank supervision. This is a model that embodies the American dynamic of both vertical and horizontal checks and balances,
an essential dynamic that has been sharply missing from certain
areas of federal financial regulation with devastating consequences
for all of us.
Remember the ultimate Madisonian theory behind separated
powers. This design would restrain ambitions, prevent capture by
specific factions and avert corruption. The very definition of tyranny, Madison thought, was the collapse of all powers into one.

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00055

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

50
The problems we face today do not come from regulatory federalism, but, rather, from the convergence of regulatory centralization and good old-fashioned regulatory capture. Bank regulators
like to say that our job is to take away the punch bowl once the
party really gets going, but our federal banking regulators made
themselves the ruling chaperons of the party and worked with
their friends on Wall Street to spike the punch bowl.
The current crisis has thus revealed shocking defects in regulatory and political will in Washington. Perhaps it is true, as the
GAO asserts, that the gaps in our divided regulatory structure
made it more difficult to understand the gravity of the risks that
were building in the system. Perhaps. But the disasters we have
experienced are not failures of structure. They are failures of execution, political will, and policy.
I do not want to discount the need for significant regulatory
changes and we outline these gaps in our submitted testimony, but
those reforms will not address the underlying problems if we fail
to understand and address why the federal system did not adequately respond.
From the state perspective, it’s not been clear for many years exactly who was hosting the party, who was chaperoning and who the
special guests were. The nation’s largest and most influential financial institutions have themselves been major contributing factors in our regulatory system’s failure to respond to this crisis.
From our foxholes at the state level, we have watched the regulatory apparatus in Washington show tell-tale signs of classic regulatory capture, political, economic and intellectual capture, by the
regulated industry.
If this is right, a consolidation of regulatory authority at the federal level would only exacerbate rather than relieve our troubles.
From this standpoint, many of the policies of TARP and other federal responses to contain this crisis interfere with our ability to
prevent the next crisis.
It would be like saying in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and its
aftermath that the solution is to get rid of local fire departments
and first responders and centralize more authority and power in
FEMA. Regulatory capture becomes more rather than less likely
with a consolidated regulatory structure.
It was the states that attempted to check the unhealthy evolution of the mortgage market and apply needed consumer protections to the tidal wave of subprime lending. It was the states and
the FDIC that were a check on the flawed assumptions of the Basel
II Capital Accord.
Professor WARREN. Ms. Raskin, your time is up. Can I ask you
to conclude?
Ms. RASKIN. Yes, I’ll finish up. The lesson of this crisis should
be that these checks need to be enhanced, multiplied and reinforced, not eliminated.
If we’ve learned nothing else from this experience, we’ve learned
that big organizations have big problems and as you consider your
responses to this crisis, I ask that you consider reforms that promote diversity and create new incentives for the smaller, less-troubled elements of our financial system rather than rewarding the
largest and most reckless. At the state level, we’re constantly pur-

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00056

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

51

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

suing methods of supervision and regulation. I appreciate your
work toward this goal and I thank you for inviting me to share my
views today.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Raskin follows:]

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00057

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00058

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 95 47928A.031

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

52

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00059

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 96 47928A.032

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

53

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00060

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 97 47928A.033

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

54

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00061

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 98 47928A.034

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

55

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00062

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 99 47928A.035

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

56

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00063

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 100 47928A.036

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

57

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00064

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 101 47928A.037

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

58

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00065

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 102 47928A.038

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

59

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00066

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 103 47928A.039

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

60

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00067

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 104 47928A.040

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

61

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00068

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 105 47928A.041

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

62

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00069

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 106 47928A.042

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

63

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00070

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 107 47928A.043

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

64

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00071

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 108 47928A.044

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

65

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00072

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 109 47928A.045

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

66

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00073

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 110 47928A.046

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

67

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00074

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 111 47928A.047

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

68

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00075

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 112 47928A.048

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

69

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00076

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 001 47928A.125

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

70

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00077

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 002 47928A.126

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

71

72
Professor WARREN. Thank you, Ms. Raskin. President Seligman.

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

STATEMENT OF JOEL SELIGMAN, PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF
ROCHESTER

Mr. SELIGMAN. Professor Warren, Members of the Panel, I’m delighted to join you.
There is today an urgent need for a fundamental restructuring
of federal financial regulation, primarily based on three overlapping causes.
First, an ongoing economic emergency, initially rooted in the
housing and credit markets, which has been succeeded by the collapse of several leading investment and commercial banks and insurance companies, dramatic deterioration of our stock market indices and now a rapidly-deepening recession.
Second, serious breakdowns in the enforcement and fraud deterrence missions of federal financial regulation, notably in recent
months, as illustrated by matters involving Bear Stearns and the
four then independent investment banks subject to the SEC’s
former Consolidated Supervised Entity Program, the government
creation of conservatorships for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the
Bernie Madoff case, and, more generally, a significant decline in
the number of prosecutions for securities fraud, at least in 2008.
Third, a misalignment between federal financial regulation and
financial firms and intermediaries. The structure of financial regulation that was developed during the 1930s has simply not kept
pace with fundamental changes in finance.
Against this backdrop, I would offer the following broad principles to guide consideration of a restructuring of federal financial
regulation.
First, make a fundamental distinction between emergency rescue
legislation which must be adopted under intense time pressure and
the restructuring of our financial regulatory system which will be
best done after systematic hearings and background reports.
Second, the scope of any systematic review of financial regulation
should be comprehensive. This not only means that obvious areas
of omission today, such as credit default swaps and hedge funds,
need to be part of the analysis but also means, for example, our
historic system of state insurance regulation should be re-examined
as well as current securities laws exemptions for areas, including
municipal securities.
A re-examination also is urgently needed of the adequacy of the
current regulation of credit rating agencies and the scope of investment adviser exemptions. In a world in which financial holding
companies can move resources internally with breathtaking speed,
a partial system of federal regulation runs an unacceptable risk of
failure.
The fact that the Federal Government provided over $100 billion
to insurance giant AIG alone suggests that insurance regulation is
no longer purely a state matter.
Third, Congress especially should focus on the structure of financial regulation rather than addressing specific standards at too
great a level of granularity.
With respect to structure, I would propose consideration of a revitalized approach to federal financial regulation that, at the high-

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00078

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

73

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

est level, designates the Federal Reserve System as the apex or supervisory agency for all financial regulation with the expressed
mission to address and minimize systemic risk. This is not a Twin
Peaks model. This is more a holding company structure where the
company must have comprehensive access to data and confidence
in examinations to be able to address the problems of systematic
risk which are not limited to any area.
Second, to preserve the expertise necessary to industry-specific
regulation, I would nonetheless suggest consolidating industry-specific regulatory areas—agencies in areas such as banking and
thrifts, securities and commodities, to preserve expert examination,
inspection and enforcement roles.
Particular attention should be devoted to revitalizing enforcement, including the effective use of private rights of action and selfregulatory organizations to complement the role of the federal regulatory agencies.
And third, effectively allocate unregulated areas so that we eliminate today’s regulatory holes.
Let me suggest in closing that there is a wise caution that a
member of your panel suggested before. While I believe that any
new system of federal financial regulation should be comprehensive, the fragility we have seen in global financial markets in recent months inevitably will reduce for a time willingness to rely
solely on self-interests of the market to provide optimal behavior.
As SEC Chair Christopher Cox memorably wrote when the Commission disbanded the Consolidated Supervisory Entity Programs,
‘‘Voluntary regulation does not work.’’
The challenge in a new order will be also to avoid the tendency
to over-regulate. Independent regulatory agencies, such as the
SEC, have shown talent in customizing congressional enactments
often enacted in times of crisis to achieve the best balance between
investors and industries. That talent today also is urgently needed.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Seligman follows:]

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00079

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00080

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 118 47928A.049

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

74

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00081

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 119 47928A.050

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

75

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00082

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 120 47928A.051

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

76

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00083

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 121 47928A.052

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

77

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00084

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 122 47928A.053

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

78

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00085

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 123 47928A.054

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

79

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00086

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 124 47928A.055

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

80

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00087

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 125 47928A.056

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

81

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00088

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 126 47928A.057

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

82

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00089

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 127 47928A.058

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

83

84
Professor WARREN. Thank you, President Seligman. Dr. Shiller.

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT SHILLER, ARTHUR M. OKUN
PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, YALE UNIVERSITY

Dr. SHILLER. I have written two books about what we should do
in this crisis. One of them called Subprime Solution came out in
September and one of them with George Akerlof called Animal
Spirits will come out next month.
I cannot summarize all of the things I said in those books, but
basic point, I think that we need to democratize finance and we
need to develop new financial institutions. This is a time when we
have to have the spirit of the New Deal about us, that we are going
to create something that will bring us into the 21st Century.
In my brief remarks, the point is that we have to go for specific
ideas, not just rearranging the regulators. It’s not about saying no,
it’s about coming up with something new. So I want to give some
examples of new ideas.
One of them is from the Squam Lake Working Group which advises academics. It goes back to an idea of Mark Flannery, and the
idea is that firms or banks particularly should be encouraged to
issue a new kind of debt which we call regulatory convertible debt.
Regulators get involved in telling companies they can issue this
debt and it will count as capital. It will convert to equity if a trigger is reached which could be merely that the regulator decides
that we’re in a financial crisis or it could be based on some objective trigger.
But the point is that the capital that banks have would be automatically increased by converting debt to equity at a time of crisis.
This is very different than having TARP come in with public money
and contribute it to capital at a time of crisis and it would prevent
the kind of—this is really central because it would prevent the kind
of downward spiral that created the crisis we’re in. This is financial
innovation that works at the fundamental problem of systemic vulnerability.
Now some other ideas. One is from my book. We ought to—the
government ought to be subsidizing personal financial advice. This
is expensive, but it is important. The crisis was substantially due
to errors that people made and I would track that back to the fact
that they were not getting advice.
The cheap thing to do is financial education. That can be really
cheap. All we have to do is think of a curriculum and put it on the
Web, but that doesn’t work for many people. They cannot read the
complicated brochures alone. They need someone to help them.
Third idea. It’s really yours, Elizabeth. The idea of a financial
products safety commission. I’ll let you explain that, but I think,
once again, it is about democratizing finance, about having someone representing the individual.
Fourth point. I think the real fundamental problem which
underlies this crisis is a failure of risk management and so instead
of saying no to new financial derivatives, we have to make them
work better for everyone and I think that means expanding the
scope of our financial markets. Notably, real estate is a risk which
is underlying this crisis and is not hedgeable, it’s not manageable,
and the kinds of securities that we’ve developed to manage such

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00090

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

85

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

risks entail unfortunate counterparty risk and systemic risk. So we
have to think about how to make it possible for a broader array of
risks to be managed.
Finally, I talk about in my Subprime Solution book a new mortgage institution that we could create which would be helpful in
managing the risks of families. I call it a continuous work-out
mortgage.
This would be a mortgage that would automatically adjust the
payment the way a work-out does in response to objective factors,
continuously and automatically. That is, for example, if we fall into
a recession or we see a big drop in home prices, there would be a
formula written into a mortgage contract that would automatically
adjust down the payment and the principal.
If we had had such a thing in place today, it would have prevented a lot of economic suffering. Instead of having families go
through months or years of difficulty in paying their mortgage and
then running out of money and going in begging for help, we would
have had them helped automatically. These are the kinds of ideas
that I think we have to think about. It’s ideas that are innovations
and that represent creative new solutions to the problems that
we’ve seen.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Shiller follows:]

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00091

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00092

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 133 47928A.059

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

86

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00093

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 134 47928A.060

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

87

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00094

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 135 47928A.061

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

88

89
Professor WARREN. Thank you, Dr. Shiller. Two books, five minutes.
Dr. Stiglitz.

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, PH.D., UNIVERSITY
PROFESSOR, COLUMBIA BUSINESS SCHOOL

Dr. STIGLITZ. Thank you for holding these hearings.
I feel quite strongly that part of the reason that our financial
system has performed so poorly is inadequate regulation and regulatory structures. There’s a lack of confidence in our financial system which is well earned, but how can there be restoration of confidence when all we have done is to pour more money into the
banks? We have changed neither the regulatory structures, the incentive systems, nor even those who are running these institutions.
While everyone talks of the need for better regulation, the devil
is in the details. Some have pushed for cosmetic reforms instead of
the real reforms that we need. Those who engage in deceptive financial practices will push for deceptive regulatory reform.
It is hard to have a well-functioning modern economy without a
sound financial system. However, financial markets, as has already
been said, are not an end in themselves but a means. They are supposed to mobilize savings, allocate capital, and manage risk, transferring it from those less able to bear it to those more able.
By contrast, our financial markets have encouraged excessive
consumption and have misallocated capital. Instead of managing
risk, they created it. These problems have occurred repeatedly and
are pervasive. This is only the latest and biggest of our bail-outs,
each of which reflects a failure of our financial system to fulfill its
basic functions, including ascertaining creditworthiness.
The problems are systemic and systematic. These failures are in
turn related to three more fundamental problems. Markets only
work well when there are well-designed incentives, a high level of
transparency, and effective competition. America’s financial markets fail on all accounts.
Markets only work well when private returns are aligned with
social returns. Incentives matter, but when incentives are distorted, we get distorted behavior. Our banks have incentives designed to encourage excessive risk-taking and short-sighted behavior. Lack of transparency is pervasive in financial markets and is
in part the result of flawed incentive structures. Indeed, those in
the financial markets have resisted improvements, such as more
transparent disclosure of the cost of stock options. This provided incentives for bad accounting.
Failure to enforce strong competition laws results in institutions
that are so large they are too big to fail and almost too big to be
bailed out. That provides an incentive to engage in excessively
risky practices.
When financial markets fail, as they have done, the costs are
enormous. There are, as economists put it, severe externalities. The
losses include not only the budgetary costs in the hundreds of billions of dollars but also costs to the entire economy, totaling in the
trillions, before we have fully recovered. The damage to our standing in the world is inestimable.

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00095

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

90
Good regulation can increase the confidence of investors in markets and serve to attract capital to financial markets. It can also
encourage real innovation. Much of our financial market’s creativity was directed to circumventing regulations, taxes, and accounting standards. Accounting was so creative that no one, not
even the banks, knew their financial position.
Meanwhile, the financial system didn’t make the innovations
which would have addressed the real risks people face, such as how
to stay in their homes when interest rates changed or economic
conditions changed. Professor Shiller has shown how it’s easy to
come up with innovations of this kind. Not only did they not do
this, but they also resisted these kinds of innovations.
In short, regulations can help markets work better. We need regulations to ensure the safety and soundness of individual financial
institutions and the financial system as a whole to protect consumers, maintain competition, ensure access to finance for all, and
maintain overall economic stability. They need to focus both on
practices and products.
It has been commonplace to emphasize the need for more transparency, which is why any retreat from mark to market would be
a mistake, but we should realize that lack of transparency is a
symptom of deeper problems. Even if transparency issues were
fully addressed, much more needs to be done.
For instance, even if there were full transparency, some of the
products the financial markets created were so complex that not
even their creators fully understood their risk properties. We have
to ensure that incentive structures do not encourage excessivelyrisky short-sighted behavior. We need to reduce the scope of conflicts of interest which are rife within the financial system.
Securitization, for all the virtues of diversification, has introduced
new asymmetries in information, forcing originators of mortgages
to bear some of the risk and mitigate some of the resulting moral
hazard.
Derivatives and similar financial products should neither be purchased nor produced by banks, unless they have been approved for
specific uses by a financial products safety commission and unless
their use conforms to the guidelines established. They should be instruments for laying off risk, not instruments for gambling. Regulators should encourage the move to standardized products; greater
reliance on standardized products, rather than tailor-made products, may increase both transparency and efficiency of the economy.
Professor WARREN. Dr. Stiglitz, can I ask you to wrap up your
opening remarks?
Dr. STIGLITZ. Okay. There are a large number of other reforms
that I talk about in my written testimony.
Let me just conclude by saying TARP has failed partly because
of the failure to do anything about regulation. We need to impose
conditionality on the use of the funds if we are to have any confidence that the next tranche of funds have better outcomes than
the last tranche of funds.
We need, as Professor Shiller pointed out, to encourage more innovation. One way of thinking about this is if we had taken $700
billion and created a new institution which had used a normal le-

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00096

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

91

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

verage of 10:1, we could have created a flow of credit of $7 trillion.
We would have done far better if we had started fresh, rather than
bailing out the failed institutions of the past.
Now, no one has proposed that, but the point I wanted to make
is that we are putting an awful lot of money in the system. We
have had repeated bail-outs, not just the S&L bail-out, but also the
Mexican, Indonesian, and Korean bail-outs of the financial markets. These were not bail-outs of the countries: They represent
failed lending practices of our financial institutions.
Unless we impose better, smarter regulation, we will have another one of these encounters in a short period of time.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Stiglitz follows:]

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00097

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00098

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 143 here 47928A.062

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

92

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00099

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 144 here 47928A.063

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

93

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00100

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 145 here 47928A.064

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

94

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00101

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 146 here 47928A.065

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

95

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00102

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 147 here 47928A.066

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

96

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00103

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 148 here 47928A.067

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

97

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00104

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 149 here 47928A.068

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

98

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00105

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 150 here 47928A.069

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

99

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00106

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 151 here 47928A.070

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

100

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00107

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 152 here 47928A.071

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

101

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00108

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 153 here 47928A.072

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

102

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00109

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 154 here 47928A.073

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

103

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00110

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 155 here 47928A.074

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

104

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00111

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 156 here 47928A.075

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

105

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00112

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 157 here 47928A.076

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

106

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00113

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 158 here 47928A.077

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

107

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00114

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 159 here 47928A.078

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

108

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00115

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 160 here 47928A.079

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

109

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00116

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 161 here 47928A.080

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

110

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00117

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 162 here 47928A.081

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

111

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00118

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 163 here 47928A.082

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

112

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00119

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 164 here 47928A.083

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

113

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00120

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 165 here 47928A.084

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

114

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00121

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 166 here 47928A.085

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

115

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00122

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 167 here 47928A.086

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

116

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00123

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 168 here 47928A.087

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

117

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00124

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 169 here 47928A.088

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

118

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00125

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 170 here 47928A.089

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

119

120
Professor WARREN. Thank you, Dr. Stiglitz. Mr. Sumerlin.

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

STATEMENT OF MR. MARC SUMERLIN, MANAGING DIRECTOR
AND CO-FOUNDER, THE LINDSEY GROUP

Mr. SUMERLIN. Madam Chair, Members of the Panel, thank you
very much.
My name is Marc Sumerlin. I’m Managing Director of The
Lindsey Group, an economic consulting firm. Previously, I was Deputy Director of the National Economic Council in 2001 and 2002.
We are in the midst of an economic contraction that is currently
mirroring the worst months of the 1974 recession, one of the sharpest post-World War II periods of decline for our country. Despite all
of the actions to date, it has been impossible to completely stop the
deterioration because the economy is deleveraging and in fact
needs to shed leverage after a decade of excessive borrowing.
Credit market liabilities in the United States soared from 250
percent of GDP in 1997 to 350 percent of GDP in 2007, reaching
over $50 trillion. Over this time, the economy has suffered from the
rapid deflation of two asset bubbles. While both consumers and the
financial sector still need to reduce their debt burden, a central
goal of the emergency policies has been to slow the pace of
deleveraging to minimize the negative feedback loops that occur
during a sharp economic downturn.
The goals of longer-term reform strategies are quite different and
should focus on preventing excessive leverage from happening in
the next cycle. In thinking about reform of the regulatory structure, I believe it is imperative to consider the proper role of monetary policy as well.
In my written testimony, I have described in detail where I believe policy across government failed in the past. Now, I’d like to
focus on three broad recommendations, all centered on preventing
excessive leverage from building up again.
The first recommendation is for the Federal Reserve to take a
more active role in preventing asset and credit bubbles from forming in the first place, as I believe is mandated under the Federal
Reserve Act.
During the 1990s, there emerged a widespread belief that central
bankers had learned from their inflationary mistakes of the past
and that another end-of-history moment had arrived where everyone could relax or at least prosper.
There was a new consensus view that monetary policies should
effectively target a low level of goods and services inflation while
ignoring asset prices, except to the extent that they signal a change
in future inflation. Not only would asset bubbles in credit not be
resisted but policymakers believed they should aggressively lower
interest rates after an asset bubble pop to mitigate the damage.
This created an asymmetric bias that traders referred to as the
‘‘Greenspan Put.’’ This bias towards easing monetary policy also
created a bias towards over-valued assets that would eventually
collapse under their own weight. In fact, financial bubbles are dependent on an accommodative monetary policy in the first place.
The Federal Reserve needs to take a more active role in promoting financial stability. While the Fed has from creation adopted
the lender of last resort role, it has not always embraced the policy

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00126

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

121
of mitigating boom-bust cycles in asset prices, but under the Federal Reserve Act, the Central Bank is obligated to ‘‘maintain long
run growth of monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with
the economy’s long-run potential to increase production.’’
This gives the Federal Reserve a responsibility to prevent asset
bubbles since they are fueled by excess credit.
The second recommendation is to shift housing policy from subsidizing leverage to promoting equity, as the Central Bank was not
the only part of government that was complicit in the housing and
credit bubble.
Government housing policy has been designed to directly subsidize leverage. The most expensive housing policy the U.S. has is
the tax deduction on mortgage interest payments, which lowers
borrowing costs. This is why realtors commonly refer to your interest payments as your ‘‘tax deduction.’’
Both the Clinton and the Bush Administration have pushed various programs that supported easier access to housing credit and
lower downpayments which, by definition, create leverage. At the
same time, the private sector seemed determined to outdo the government’s lead at the peak of the bubble.
In 2005, a remarkable 43 percent of all first-time homeowners
put zero down or took out a mortgage in excess of the value of the
home. It’s worth emphasizing here that buying a house without a
downpayment is not homeownership. It is renting with risk. To the
extent possible, government subsidies to leverage should be replaced with broader programs that help build equity, such as downpayment matches for new homeowners.
My last recommendation is to support a binding limit on the
amount of leverage that is permitted by banks and other financial
institutions that act as banks. A large part of the financial system,
most notably commercial banks, under the regulation of the FDIC,
already has a limit on their leverage. These banks are subject to
a simple leverage ratio that caps their assets relative to their capital. Notably, investment banks were not subject to this limit.
For covered banks, if the leverage ratio drops below four percent,
the FDIC must start supervisory intervention and if the leverage
ratio drops below two percent, the bank is considered critically
undercapitalized and is shut down. This system means that any
bank that is leveraged more than 25:1 will be under intense regulatory scrutiny. Banks hate these simple calculations because they
cannot easily be skirted, which is the very point.
It is worth remembering that banks are inherently risky entities.
John Maynard Keynes once quipped that ‘‘a prudent banker is one
that fails at the same time that all other bankers fail.’’ But this inherent riskiness is why banks need more limits in other parts of
the economy.
A binding leverage ratio is a simple, transparent, and blunt form
of regulation, all attributes that could make it a useful form to
bank regulators around the world.
Professor WARREN. Mr. Sumerlin, could I just ask you to finish?
You’re over time.
Mr. SUMERLIN. Absolutely. The last point I would make, adding
to that, is at the same time, all efforts have to be made to move
off-balance sheet activity back on balance sheet, as will soon be re-

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00127

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

122

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

quired under FAS–140, and I’d just like to make one more note,
that both the housing and credit bubble were exacerbated by the
psychology of a bull market, which is important to always keep in
perspective, which adversely affected the judgment of homebuyers,
market participants, and regulators.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sumerlin follows:]

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00128

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00129

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 178 here 47928A.090

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

123

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00130

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 179 here 47928A.091

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

124

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00131

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 180 here 47928A.092

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

125

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00132

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 181 here 47928A.093

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

126

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00133

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 182 here 47928A.094

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

127

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00134

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 183 here 47928A.095

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

128

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00135

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 184 here 47928A.096

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

129

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00136

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 185 here 47928A.097

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

130

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00137

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 186 here 47928A.098

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

131

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00138

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 187 here 47928A.099

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

132

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00139

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 188 here 47928A.100

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

133

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00140

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 189 here 47928A.101

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

134

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00141

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 190 here 47928A.102

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

135

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00142

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 191 here 47928A.103

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

136

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00143

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 192 here 47928A.104

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

137

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00144

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 193 here 47928A.105

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

138

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00145

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 194 here 47928A.106

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

139

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00146

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 195 here 47928A.107

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

140

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00147

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert graphic folio 196 here 47928A.108

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

141

142
Professor WARREN. Thank you, Mr. Sumerlin. And Mr. Wallison.

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

STATEMENT OF MR. PETER J. WALLISON, ARTHUR F. BURNS
FELLOW IN FINANCIAL POLICY STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

Mr. WALLISON. Thank you.
I’m very pleased to have this opportunity to testify today and I
assume my prepared remarks will be——
Professor WARREN. Of course.
Mr. WALLISON [continuing]. Put in the record. My testimony actually will focus mostly on safety and soundness regulation, but I’d
be happy to answer questions about any other kind of regulation.
With the limited and disastrous exception of the major investment banks, the Federal Government has never regulated the safety and soundness of financial institutions for which it does not assume some financial responsibility. There are sound and strong
reasons for this.
First, regulation itself introduces moral hazard. Participants in
the financial markets may believe that government supervision reduces the likelihood of missteps or failure and this impairs market
discipline.
Second, regulation also impairs competition, suppresses innovation, increases consumer costs, and enhances the likelihood that
taxpayers will be called upon to bail out regulated companies.
Third, there is no policy reason why the government should take
responsibility for preventing the failure of financial institutions
that it does not back. In general, business failures are good for the
economy and the financial system. They remove bad management
and bad business models and make room for good management and
business models. If regulation is in fact effective in preventing bad
management from failing—which is doubtful in any case—it would
be preserving bad management and business models.
Fourth, regulation is apparently not effective in preventing business failures. We can see that from the current financial crisis in
which heavily-regulated commercial banks are in the most trouble.
In fact, given the disastrous conditions of the banks, it is difficult
to understand why anyone would be calling for the regulation of
other participants in the financial system.
If regulation does not prevent failures, why impose its costs on
consumers and taxpayers?
Nevertheless, only a recently-landed Martian would not realize
that there is a major move afoot in Congress to broaden the scope
of regulation to include other participants in the financial markets.
The ostensible reasons for this are usually two. Regulation, it is
said, will improve transparency and reduce systemic risk. As outlined in my prepared testimony, neither reason is persuasive.
Transparency itself is a reasonable goal, but it is not worth the
tangible and intangible costs of regulation when institutions are
dealing solely with sophisticated counterparties. These counterparties can fend for themselves and know what questions to ask.
As to reducing systemic risk, there are no examples of the failure
of a non-regulated institution causing systemic risk, including
LTCM, Lehman and AIG or any of the hedge funds that have
closed their doors this year.

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00148

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

143

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

Lehman’s failure did not cause systemic risk. No institution
failed or was threatened with failure because Lehman collapsed.
The market freeze-up after Lehman was not caused by losses coming from Lehman’s failure but by a sudden recognition on the part
of banks and others around the world that their counterparties
might be very weak and unstable and that the U.S. Government
could not be expected to rescue them.
Accordingly, the proponents of new regulation, based on the danger of systemic risk, should explain why it is suddenly necessary.
Finally, it would be a very bad idea to empower some agency, the
Federal Reserve or anyone else, to identify systemically-significant
institutions and regulate them as such. This would have very adverse effects on competition. By creating the impression that some
institutions are too big to fail—which is what it means to be designated as systemically significant—such a policy would create an
unlimited number of Fannies and Freddies that would have huge
competitive advantages over others in the same industry.
As we can see from bank regulation, traditional financial supervision does not work anyway and will not prevent financial failure.
To be sure, there are some areas where regulation is necessary, especially when financial institutions, like commercial banks, are
backed by the Federal Government. The GSEs are another example.
Accordingly, in my prepared testimony, I recommend a few major
changes in traditional regulation for these cases of necessary regulation. The purpose of these reforms is to enhance market discipline and make regulation counter-cyclical rather than pro-cyclical as it is today.
To assist creditors and counterparties, I suggest that regulators
should work with analysts and the regulated industry to create
metrics or indicators of risk-taking. These would be published regularly and help potential creditors understand the risks that regulated institutions are assuming.
Professor WARREN. One more paragraph.
Mr. WALLISON. This would make market discipline much more
effective. I also recommend various steps that will make regulation
counter-cyclical, including changes to fair value accounting, requirements for regulators to consult market sources for risk assessments, requirements for capital increases when asset values are
rising, and the enhancement of the role of short sellers and hedge
funds.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wallison follows:]

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00149

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00150

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert offset folio 203 here 47928A.109

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

144

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00151

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert offset folio 204 here 47928A.110

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

145

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00152

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert offset folio 205 here 47928A.111

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

146

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00153

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert offset folio 206 here 47928A.112

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

147

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00154

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert offset folio 207 here 47928A.113

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

148

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00155

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert offset folio 208 here 47928A.114

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

149

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00156

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert offset folio 209 here 47928A.115

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

150

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00157

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert offset folio 210 here 47928A.116

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

151

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00158

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert offset folio 211 here 47928A.117

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

152

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00159

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert offset folio 212 here 47928A.118

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

153

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00160

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert offset folio 213 here 47928A.119

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

154

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00161

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert offset folio 214 here 47928A.120

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

155

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00162

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert offset folio 215 here 47928A.121

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

156

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00163

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

Insert offset folio 216 here 47928A.122

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

157

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

158
Professor WARREN. Thank you, Mr. Wallison. In fact, Mr.
Wallison, I’ll just come back to you, so you’ll get a chance to talk
some more.
I was struck by your comment when you said regulation doesn’t
prevent failures, see the recent bank failures.
Mr. WALLISON. Yes.
Professor WARREN. But I also listened to Ms. Raskin and Ms.
Raskin, if I made my notes right, said in effect that federal regulators were captured and they really did a pretty lousy job whereas
the state regulators were watching, the state regulators saw it, and
they waved as many flags as they could. But failure seems to accompany those who are governed by regulators who are not independent or, to say it another way, non-regulation regulation seems
to lead to failure.
Can you respond to Ms. Raskin’s point?
Mr. WALLISON. Sure. I think I can. I have no faith, of course, as
I suggested in my oral testimony, in regulators per se. I don’t think
they’re any smarter than the people that they are regulating and
in fact they are always relatively behind the curve. We assume
that regulators are actually overseeing risk-taking, and they are
not.
The only group that actually is interested in preventing risk-taking are creditors. Creditors are not benefited by risk-taking. And
as a result, we ought to do everything we can to assure that creditors get the information about the risks that the institutions are
taking so that they can make appropriate choices in lending money
or withholding money from financial institutions, especially regulated institutions.
Professor WARREN. Sir, I just want to make sure I’m understanding the point. Regulators are not smart enough to regulate or
they simply won’t regulate?
Mr. WALLISON. Oh, I think they would love to regulate. In fact,
they—for the larger institutions here in the United States, the
larger banks, there are regulators in those institutions 100 percent
of the time.
Professor WARREN. Maybe that was Ms. Raskin’s point.
Mr. WALLISON. Yes, of course, but I’m saying that no regulation
is going to be satisfactory if we are relying simply on government
people going in and looking at what the institutions are doing.
The ones who are really effective at regulation are the ones who
have the incentive to do so, I believe, and those are the creditors,
the people who are asked to lend the money or make deposits in
those institutions or be counterparties in transactions. They need
the information that they are not getting from the institutions to
decide whether risks are being taken.
Professor WARREN. Ms. Raskin, maybe I could give you a chance
to respond as a regulator.
Ms. RASKIN. Yes, thank you. I do believe that regulation works.
I think that there are systems in place currently that primarily
permit a great deal of coordination between state regulators and
federal regulators.
We have seen through recent history that regulators have been
very nimble at the state level, have been very precise in dealing
with the problems that have arisen, particularly the number of

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00164

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

159
foreclosures, that we’ve been dealing with on a massive level at the
state level.
So I do believe that regulation works. I urge, though, the panel
to consider when they design a new system for organizing the regulatory boxes that checks and balances be considered, that accountability be built in and that mechanisms be adopted that permit coordination among the different regulators.
Professor WARREN. President Seligman, I have the sense you’d
like to respond to this.
Mr. SELIGMAN. Effective regulation can increase confidence in
our markets. We’ve seen, for example, during the time of the SEC
the percentage of investors in this country grow from 1.5 percent
to approximately 50 percent, the value of equity and debt in this
country grow from 90 billion to close to 12.6 trillion.
At the same time what you referred to as non-regulation regulation can undermine this confidence and the classic recent illustration that has so far been reported upon is Bear Stearns where you
had too few individuals involved in administering the SEC’s Consolidated Supervisory Entity Program. When problems were
flagged, they did not go up the chain of command. You had certain
wrong rules, and I commend to your attention the report of the
SEC’s Office of Inspector General on Bear Stearns which documents that you have to have people who believe in regulation to
administer it if you’re going to in turn prevent financial misconduct.
Professor WARREN. Thank you very much. I’m nearly out of time.
So I’m going to go to Congressman Hensarling.
Representative HENSARLING. Thank you, Madam Chair. I again
thank the panel.
Mr. Wallison and Mr. Sumerlin, I think you both wrote about
Fannie and Freddie in your testimony. I’m not sure I heard it or
saw it in the other testimony.
Mr. Wallison, in your testimony, you speak about Fannie and
Freddie were largely responsible for the vast inflation of the housing bubble, and Mr. Sumerlin, I believe you write in your testimony
that the GSEs, Fannie and Freddie, encouraged loans to people
who could not afford them and essentially helped destabilize our
housing market in direct contrast with their mission.
I would like to give you two gentlemen, starting with you, Mr.
Wallison, an opportunity to elaborate on your thoughts on precisely
the role of Fannie and Freddie in our economic turmoil and also
speak, if you would, specifically to their affordable housing mission.
Mr. Wallison.
Mr. WALLISON. Fannie and Freddie represent an effort on the
part of Congress to achieve a national housing goal without appropriating funds. Instead, what Congress did was used two private
companies to make loans that they might not otherwise have made,
except for certain housing goals that they were required to meet.
As a result, Fannie and Freddie contributed about 40 percent of
all the subprime and Alt-A loans that we are currently struggling
with in our economy by buying loans from originators that would
not otherwise have been marketable. That distorted our financial
system and has ultimately been the cause of the tremendous losses
that we are going to suffer in housing.

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00165

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

160
Representative HENSARLING. Mr. Sumerlin.
Mr. SUMERLIN. During the 1990s, both of the GSEs continually
lowered their downpayment requirements of what type of loans
they would buy.
Now, when the loan went below a 20 percent downpayment, it
still had to have some form of mortgage insurance, but loans were
being securitized through Fannie and Freddie that did have lower
and lower downpayments. This is, as you know from my testimony,
something that I believe is a problem when you have excess leverage to homeowners.
During, the peak of the housing boom, they were operating, just
as were private firms, in buying and thereby aiding mortgages that
should never have been given. I think the GSEs, given their link
to government, do tend, when they do something, to put more of
a stamp of approval on it, than when other people do and therefore
they had a special role to be even more diligent and the GSEs
had—from the beginning, were undercapitalized and had an incentive problem where they could essentially privatize profits and socialize losses and that’s the framework for taking on——
Representative HENSARLING. Is it your opinion that but for their
government sanction duopoly status that they would not have been
able to do what they did?
Mr. SUMERLIN. They certainly would not have been able to do
what they did with the scale they did. I mean, they existed on that
scale because of their link to the Federal Government.
Representative HENSARLING. Mr. Sumerlin, also in your testimony, you speak extensively, I believe, on the Federal Reserve policies, particularly in dealing with our last financial crisis after the
dot-com bubble and 9/11, and I think on Page 8 of your testimony,
I had not realized this, for three straight years, the Fed fund rate
was essentially negative, as you put it, the equivalent of free
money.
I think there was a body of work that would suggest that the
seeds for this financial crisis were, frankly, sown in trying to deal
with the aftermath of the last financial crisis.
Would you speak a little bit more extensively about your view of
the role of the Federal Reserve’s easy money policy enabling the
crisis that we find ourselves in?
Mr. SUMERLIN. I think that once you get yourself into a boombust cycle, you start doing emergency policies and other things to
mitigate the current problems and you don’t always know where
you’re going to end up.
Once we had the enormous tech bubble where the PE ratio, the
S&P, for instance, got up to 45, about three times its historic average, and then in 2001, when—starting in March of 2000, we had
about $5 trillion in asset losses and the government starts to react
to that, and deflating asset bubbles can be very vicious economic
events, and part of the reaction to that was the Federal Reserve
from 2002–2003–2004, real interest rates, meaning adjusted for inflation, were effectively zero, which is like free money.
Part of the other issue was the Federal Reserve, by being completely transparent that it was going to take a very gradual path
that lowered bond volatility. Volatility, and other sort of things,
which encouraged financial entities to take on more risk and in

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00166

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

161
some cases, some financial entities, like pension funds insurers,
they need a seven percent, eight percent nominal return, and when
you’re operating in a very low nominal return world, they start to
leverage up to try to hit the return they need to meet their internal
targets.
Professor WARREN. Thank you, Mr. Sumerlin. Thank you. We’re
over time. Congressman, thank you.
Mr. Silvers.
Mr. SILVERS. Thank you, Madam Chair. President Seligman, I
understand you have some time constraints here. I would appreciate it if you would in writing advise us as to specific steps to
strengthen the Securities and Exchange Commission in light of
your testimony. Specifically, though, my question to you is there’s
been some talk about unified consumer protection financial services
in a regulatory body.
Do you view the types of substantive consumer protection that
we see in insurance, mortgages, credit cards, as being easily
mergable with the sort of disclosure-based investor protection that
the SEC does?
Mr. SELIGMAN. I think it’s a tough analysis that has to be done.
I do think, for example, a potential merger of the SEC and CFTC
makes good sense for a number of reasons. I do think there needs
to be very thoughtful analysis as to whether or not certain aspects
of insurance should be subject to federal regulation.
I do think, however, that when you try to create one consumer
and investor agency across the board you risk dissipating the expertise necessary to effective regulation and what I’m very much
concerned about when I look at the experience, whether it’s of the
SEC or other agencies, when their mandate becomes too broad,
they tend not to be able to focus on everything equally well. There
is a real value to expertise.
The countervailing challenge, and it’s been well illustrated in the
recent past, is regulatory arbitrage and, for example, when you
have five depository institution regulators, the ability of those regulated to pick and choose which format they’ll be subject to does create a kind of tendency towards a race to the bottom.
So it’s going to take very, very systemic analysis. It shouldn’t be
done quickly. You need to have sufficient hearings. You need to
have sufficient reports so you can reach the appropriate outcomes.
Mr. SILVERS. Thank you. Ms. Bloom Raskin, you are the only
member of our panel who is actually involved in the housing crisis
and the foreclosure crisis in any direct way right now in your capacity.
Can you shed light on the relative responsibility in your view,
based on what you’ve seen, of the GSEs and GSE-financed mortgages on the one hand and of the non-GSE entirely private sector
firms on the other that were so much encouraged in the last eight
years?
Ms. RASKIN. I’d be happy to and that’s—it’s an excellent question.
What I can speak to certainly is the work that we have been
doing in Maryland regarding the foreclosure crisis and we identified quite early that mortgage servicers were in fact a linchpin to
working through a lot of the problems of loan modification and the

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00167

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

162
need for sustainable mortgage modification, and to that extent,
what we have done, and I think states are very well positioned to
do, is to work individually, and it’s hard work, it’s a lot of heavy
lifting, but to work individually with mortgage servicers which we
have done.
We have hammered out agreements one by one with them in
which we require certain operational fixes being made within the
relationship between the borrower and the servicer and we have
worked very hard in that regard.
We have also put in place a monthly reporting system by which
we collect data on a monthly basis from the mortgage servicers
that are doing business within our state and in this way we have
been able to track modification efforts and we’ve been able to measure the sustainability of those modifications.
This to me are—these are two examples of how we have been
able to work on a local level without really the involvement of the
GSEs and Fannie and Freddie but with the servicers over whom
we do have some regulatory authority.
Mr. SILVERS. Thank you. Professor Stiglitz, in your written testimony, you raised a question of whether the Federal Reserve as currently structured is an appropriate umbrella regulator.
I think, Mr. Sumerlin, you also have some concerns about the
Fed in your testimony you gave this morning.
In order, Professor Stiglitz, could you comment on what changes
might be necessary to the Fed for it to play the role some envisioned for it?
Dr. STIGLITZ. First, let me say I share the view of several people
on the panel that the Fed was too easily captured by the spirit of
the bubble that was going on. The metaphor that was given of a
punch bowl that was spiked is, I think, absolutely correct.
That’s why I think it’s important to make sure that the Fed becomes more representative and much more explicit about its mandate. In the United States and around the world, there has been
focus only on inflation. There have been explicit discussions not to
worry about assets and I think Mr. Sumerlin is exactly right, that
the Fed needs to understand that financial instability is far more
of a risk for long-term economic growth than an increase in inflation from two percent to 2.5 percent.
Professor WARREN. Can I ask you just to wrap up just because
we’re over time?
Dr. STIGLITZ. Okay. The single most important thing is to make
sure, like they do in Sweden, for instance, that there are representatives on the Federal Reserve Board of people whose views may not
be quite consistent with those in the investment community, such
as from the labor community.
Professor WARREN. Thank you. Senator Sununu.
Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Madam Chair. Listening to the testimony and some of the answers to questions, I want to begin with
an observation. I believe that Mr. Wallison’s point—that even in
areas where he would agree that regulation should be imposed because of a government guarantee, the regulators can still cause significant problems—is not at odds with the points made by Mr. Seligman and Mrs. Raskin.

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00168

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

163
In fact, I think the points that you made reinforce this point.
There may be other areas where there’s disagreement, but the example of the SEC’s Consolidated Capital Rule, and the example of
regulatory capture—and let’s name names, at the OTS—these are
two of the oldest and, one might argue, most experienced federal
regulators that took specific action or failed to take specific action
that made this crisis much worse.
I think we need to be cognizant of that and actually use that as
a basis for the recommendations that we make. I also think that
speaks directly to Mr. Wallison’s concern about the way in which
existing regulatory structure can make the problem worse. Now,
they could also help deal with problems, and I believe that they
should.
I’d like to go to Mr. Seligman, though, not to talk about the
CFTC/SEC consolidation to which I’ll come back. You mentioned
something else—a federal voice for insurance regulation and the
concept of a federal charter, an optional federal charter for insurance, which the Treasury Blueprint also discussed.
How do you think that a federal voice for insurance regulation
might work? Do you think it’s necessary, given the national scope
and the global scope of some of these insurance companies that we
see today? AIG is obviously high profile but there are many others.
But equally important to the other panelists, those in closest proximity to you, can we still maintain a meaningful voice for state regulation in an environment where we have an optional federal charter or federal insurance charter?
Mr. SELIGMAN. I think there are two separate reasons you should
look hard at a new federal role with respect to insurance.
The absolutely imperative one now is systematic risk; that is,
there are aspects of at least certain insurance corporations which
required ultimate federal rescue packages which, because of
counterparties, were viewed as of similar consequence to commercial banks and investment banks.
There is a separate point, and that is that insurance regulation
may be anachronistic. It is the only major financial sector which is
essentially purely at the state level. This creates, among other
things, potential competitive disadvantages in the global economy.
It creates the kind of problems that the Securities Acts in the
1930s or certain of the banking legislation has addressed through
preemptive mechanisms and federal mechanisms.
It seems to me what we ultimately would be most wisely moving
towards was federal insurance regulation above certain thresholds,
perhaps on an optional basis but more wisely I would suggest on
a mandatory basis, through a chartering mechanism and state insurance regulation on a residual basis, the way you have it in——
Senator SUNUNU. Mandatory based on the aggregate assets of
the insurance company or mandatory based on the size of the policy?
Mr. SELIGMAN. I think that is the kind of question we need to
systematically review. I don’t want to shoot from the hip on it, but
I will suggest to you that I know there are a number of leaders of
major insurance companies right now who would suggest to you
that it is easier to deal potentially with one federal regulator than
55 state and similar regulators that they now have to address and

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00169

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

164
that to have one set of standards would potentially give them competitive advantages in a global economy.
Senator SUNUNU. Do you still see a role for meaningful participation by the states to provide——
Mr. SELIGMAN. Absolutely. State securities regulation is absolutely vital for a number of reasons. It enhances the enforcement.
It deals with local problems. It is a laboratory by which new ideas
can originate, but at the same time for firms, either in interstate
commerce or above certain thresholds, the notion that we would
continue to rely on state securities regulation today would be dysfunctional.
Senator SUNUNU. On the recommendation that the SEC and
CFTC be combined, what do you—and I know this is an area where
you’ve done a great deal of work—but what would you identify as
the most specific obstacles to combination and how do you recommend we overcome those obstacles?
Professor WARREN. And since we’re out of time, could I ask for
just a condensed answer since I know this is in your testimony?
Mr. SELIGMAN. Very simply, in a sentence, that the oversight
committees in Congress for securities and commodities regulation
are separate.
Senator SUNUNU. It’s a turf war.
Mr. SELIGMAN. It is a turf war. It is not principled. It is not wise.
Senator SUNUNU. I don’t know if that makes the problem of consolidation easy or more difficult.
Mr. SELIGMAN. Unfortunately, you do know.
Professor WARREN. Thank you. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. NEIMAN. I’d like to stay with Professor Seligman and follow
up on your ideas for the role of the Federal Reserve as an apex
agency, as a systemic regulator.
If you could expand upon that as to why the Federal Reserve is
the appropriate entity, and how would it operate differently than
we are seeing the Fed operate in our current environment?
Mr. SELIGMAN. It has been the emergency entity since at least
the 1987 market crash time after time. What it doesn’t have is the
right information flows, confidence in the underlying examinations,
so that it can anticipate problems and try to obviate risk.
You have three choices ultimately: the President’s Working
Group, the Department of the Treasury, or the Fed. The Fed has
been the one that operationally seems most competent to address
this.
What you want is not a Twin Peaks Model which suggests that
at a similar level you both have safety and solvency and investor/
consumer protection. What you want is a very different type of approach where you have one agency that unequivocally receives all
relevant information and can address systematic risk and respond
to it the way the Fed implicitly has been doing for some time now
but properly armed so that they’ve got confidence in information
flows.
And second, then you want to preserve industry expertise in a
series of agencies. While it’s a very crude and imperfect analogy,
what was done with intelligence services after 9/11 where you have
a national intelligence director but separate intelligence agencies is
a better model than the Twin Peaks.

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00170

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

165
Mr. NEIMAN. Thank you. Mrs. Raskin, it’s a pleasure that you
were able to join us and have a fellow regulator here and in fact
it’s probably a unique experience where a panel is made up, the
sole regulator is the state regulator. So welcome.
Some have suggested that the dual banking system might make
it more difficult to prevent or manage crises and to Mr. Seligman’s
point, the response to 9/11, we moved to a more coordinated approach by creating a consolidated agency.
Is that comparison apt? And what are your thoughts on the risks
associated with moving toward a consolidated approach, the opportunity if you had a single regulator of missing red flags and eliminating checks and balances?
Ms. RASKIN. Well, I think it’s a very apt analogy and I think that
the dual banking system has actually been the savior here in mitigating even greater harm that could be coming from the financial
crisis that we are now all living through.
So I believe that the checks and balances that are in place by virtue of that system are a good example and a good model for study
as we move forward in deciding what a regulatory, a new regulatory system might look like. So I do think that the state examiners, the state supervisory role has been an important check. I
think that state-chartered institutions, by virtue generally of their
size, have been able to be a good shock absorber to a lot of the systemic risk consequences we’ve been experiencing.
Mr. NEIMAN. Thank you. Dr. Shiller, I was very interested in
your concept of the continuing work-out loan and would probably
want to follow up with you after, but in the minute we have left,
have you done any analysis or research around the unintended,
possible unintended consequences of that in terms of impact on the
market, the ability of lenders to hedge their risk? Could it result
in higher interest rate loans, shorter-term loans, and what would
be the impact and expected reaction to the marketplace?
Dr. SHILLER. Well, my proposal is a market-based solution and
it involves the government only as a regulator that would make
this possible.
You’re asking questions that are difficult. How would market
prices be impacted by an institution like this? In terms of mortgage
rates, it’s possible that a continuous work-out mortgage would have
a higher interest rate because you’re getting some kind of insurance, but it shouldn’t be considered a bad thing if people have to
pay a higher interest rate. They’re getting a kind of risk protection.
But on the other hand, we don’t know how much higher because
it affects the whole economy and the whole systemic risk to the
economy. So having something that protects mortgage borrowers
built into the initial mortgage improves the resilience of the whole
economy and in the long run it might produce even lower mortgage
rates.
Mr. NEIMAN. Have you seen any other jurisdictions, countries, or
financial institutions that have adopted it?
Dr. SHILLER. This has not been adopted in any country as far as
I know, but we are coming into a new century and things have to
change and I think it’s entirely plausible that as our financial markets develop, we will build in more protections for people and this

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00171

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

166
is the trend we’ve seen in the past and I expect it to continue in
the future.
Mr. NEIMAN. Thank you.
Professor WARREN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Neiman. We’re
going to do a second round of questions, if you’ll bear with us, and
I wanted to start, if we could, with Dr. Stiglitz.
I was captured by your remark and I know there’s a reference
to it as well in your testimony, that TARP has failed and it has
failed in part because of the failure to put any conditions on how
the money has been distributed. And you talk about the counter
factual. If we had taken $700 billion and simply infused it in a new
institution, how the world would look a little different right now.
You make the point about imposing conditions on extending
TARP funds. Can you just elaborate on that, Dr. Stiglitz? What
would be your top three recommendations?
Dr. STIGLITZ. Yes. I listed in my testimony a number of recommendations. Obviously, there’s broad consensus that the notion
of our pouring money into these banks and having the money pour
out in the form of dividends or bonuses, or in the form of acquisition of other healthy banks does not lead to more lending. That
would be an obvious condition.
A second set of conditions is that there are a large number of
practices that everybody has identified as having contributed to the
problem: Bad incentive structures, bad lending practices, exploitive
anticompetitive practices in credit markets, and predatory lending.
We are now in effect partial owner of the banking system of
these large banks and yet we’re like a ‘‘slum lord.’’ We’re condoning
these actions by providing money and allowing the banks to continue some of these very bad consumer and investor practices.
A third thing I would do picks up on what the Commissioner
said. We have some banks that are in better shape than others.
These are the banks that actually were spending more of their time
actually lending to small- and medium-size enterprises. These include community banks and many of the banks that are regulated
by the states.
They should have been the ones getting a disproportionate share
of the money, not the banks with gambling propensities that have
proven their incompetency or those that prided themselves on having moved out of the ‘‘storage’’ business and lending business into
the moving business.
We’ve been subsidizing this moving business. We should have
been focusing on lending and asking what parts of the financial
sector will get the flow of credit restored. Finally, we need to do
something about the foreclosures.
Professor WARREN. Good. Thank you. That’s very valuable.
Thank you.
I want to ask, and I’ll spread this across people, if you have different thoughts, to talk about the massive failure in the credit rating agencies that gave us the AAA ratings to instruments with
enormously high risk, these private credit rating agencies that the
government simply embraced and gave legal consequences to that.
Can you speak to structurally how we might alter that, how we
might think about a different way to do this? Did I see you shake
your head no, President Seligman?

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00172

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

167
Mr. SELIGMAN. No, I didn’t mean to shake my head no, but what
I—you have a Hobson’s choice at the moment. You either are going
to have credit ratings paid for by users or providers. We have a
system where credit ratings at the moment are paid for by providers. It creates a conflict of interest. It does create a situation
where the oversight until very recently has not been as systematic
as it should be.
You now have the SEC engaged in a catch-up effort with a significant report recently and some proposals which will be considered in the next Administration.
The choices that are also on the table that you may want to
think about, one has been the notion of the SEC placing less reliance on credit ratings and before we go there, we have to think
through very carefully what happens then. That will mean more reliance in effect on those who provide information to the marketplace and not having any outside evaluation.
Second, the notion of the government being engaged in credit rating strikes me as not a thoughtful or appropriate one for the same
reasons that we rejected merit regulation in the 1930s in the securities industry.
Professor WARREN. Dr. Stiglitz, could you add on this?
Dr. STIGLITZ. Yes, I think that it is a very difficult problem. The
current system is flawed in the incentives that underlie the way
the credit rating agencies work. They were also very much taken
up with the same flawed models that the banks were using, and
so it was partly their incentives and partly their analytic frameworks.
In other areas, like medicine, we rely on governments to rate
products and see whether they are safe enough to be used and to
identify the circumstances in which they can be used.
It seems to me that that analogy is appropriate for financial
products as well.
Professor WARREN. Thank you very much. We’re on time here.
Congressman Hensarling.
Representative HENSARLING. Thank you, Madam Chair. Professor Shiller, I actually—your book on the Subprime Solution is
one of six presently sitting on my desk. I haven’t read it yet. I look
forward to reading it. At least you made a few bucks off of me.
I think I heard in your testimony, I think you said that you advocate federal subsidies of financial literacy, and I certainly share
your enthusiasm for the broader subject of promoting financial literacy within our country. I’d probably prefer the incentive structure as opposed to the subsidy structure.
But I ask the question. As there are various policy proposals
pending within Congress that some would argue would essentially
bail out a huge universe of borrowers who may not have known
about the mortgage products that they signed up for, maybe they
should have known, but what incentive do they have to become financially literate if we essentially absolve them of personal responsibility?
Dr. SHILLER. Well, I think we are going through a national tragedy right now of foreclosures and in many cases these people didn’t
know what they were getting into and so I think that part of our
civil society is that we have to bail out many of these people. But

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00173

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

168
I think that it’s really important at this time to think about the
longer term and to think about how we can change the system.
Right now, we have a system in which most people get no financial advice from a disinterested party. They get advice from sales
people of one sort or another who have an incentive to sell them
their product.
What I would like to see is a system in which people are getting
advice from someone who signs a statement of loyalty to the client
and announces that he or she will not take commissions or kickbacks of any form and that this would be a long-term relationship
a person could develop, like with a physician but with a financial
advisor, who you could go to and say should I really take this mortgage, is this really good for me?
That’s something that is a costly thing. I think the government
should subsidize it and that it would ultimately improve the whole
atmosphere of——
Representative HENSARLING. Well, and again, I share your enthusiasm for financial literacy, and I certainly can’t do it justice,
but I know Thomas Jefferson at one time said something along the
lines of if you disagree with how your neighbor is acting within the
marketplace, we shouldn’t try to restrict his freedom, we should inform his discretion.
So I certainly agree with that, but it seems to me when it comes
to financial literacy, there would be no greater course than actually
having foreclosure proceedings initiated against you and yet we
know that even those who are having their mortgages reworked
under various programs, the repeat rate of default, I believe and
I don’t have the statistic at my fingertip, is somewhere in the
neighborhood of 40 percent. So that’s still somewhat question. I’m
not sure there could have been a more effective course in financial
literacy than that.
If I could, let me change subjects here. Mr. Wallison, in your testimony, I don’t think we’ve touched upon this subject previously,
and that is the subject of mark to market.
Certainly again as a philosophical and principle position, I believe that more transparency is better than less transparency. I
think the opaque quality of a number of these very complicated investment vehicles have exacerbated our problem, but how do you
mark something to market when there isn’t a market, and isn’t the
accounting rule itself that’s the problem or is it really the intersection of mark to market with certain of our regulatory capital standards?
Mr. WALLISON. Well, Congressman, it’s both in a way. The reason I mentioned mark to market in my prepared remarks is that
the problem we have today is that fair value accounting is a problem when there is no market, but it’s also a problem when there
is a market. It’s highly pro-cyclical. When asset values are going
up, it is possible to write up your assets and look much more profitable, borrow that much more money and increase the bubble that
is developing.
On the way down, when everyone is panicked and running for
the doors and doesn’t want to buy anything, then fair value accounting works in the opposite direction and——

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00174

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

169
Representative HENSARLING. In the five seconds I have left, what
would be your proposal?
Mr. WALLISON. Well, I think we ought to modify fair value accounting so that it tends to be counter-cyclical; that is, when assets
are going up, it should not allow increases in asset values on balance sheets, and when asset values are falling, when there’s a
panic going on, we should limit the degree to which they can be
written down, or have to be written down; or allow institutions to
treat these assets as held to maturity which is a much safer way
to value these assets.
Representative HENSARLING. Thank you.
Professor WARREN. Thank you. Mr. Silvers.
Mr. SELIGMAN. Could I just add one——
Professor WARREN. Yes, President Seligman.
Mr. SELIGMAN. You might want to take a look at a very recentlyreleased SEC Office of Chief Accountant Report on Fair Value Accounting which does focus on impairment issues. It’s actually somewhat similar to some of the points that Peter Wallison just made.
Professor WARREN. Thank you, President Seligman. Mr. Silvers.
Mr. SILVERS. Thank you, Madam Chair. There have been several
comments made in the written testimony and I believe this morning by panelists about the issue of incentives and particularly in
relationship to executives of institutions that are ‘‘systemically significant,’’ where there may be a public guarantee of some sort sitting around.
I’d be curious to know. I am familiar with the recommendations
from the Aspen Institute on both time horizons and symmetry,
avoiding asymmetry in compensation. I would hope the panel
might comment for a moment, starting with Professor Seligman, on
both are these good ideas and how would one implement them in
a regulatory and tax structure.
Mr. SELIGMAN. I’m not clear precisely what the specific recommendations you’re referring to. If you want to focus on executive
compensation which——
Mr. SILVERS. I’m interested in executive compensation as an
issue of incentives around time horizons and around asymmetry,
meaning the incentives to take large risks if you’re not fully exposed to the down side.
Mr. SELIGMAN. We have seen throughout the 1990s and into the
21st Century clear problems with respect to executive compensation, ranging from the initial treatment of stock options some 15–
16 years ago. The back-dating of options has been a scandal and
it’s being referred to in a number of enforcement cases, but it got
way out of hand. Disclosure and the ability of shareholders to understand what compensation levels are is a perennial challenge and
there have been proposals, including by the President-elect, that
there should be at least advisory votes on the part of shareholders
to address this area.
It’s one that requires attention. It’s one that I think should be
clearly on the priority list for the SEC as it comes into its new Administration.
Dr. STIGLITZ. I think it’s very clear from any analytic perspective
that the incentive structures that are commonplace do encourage
short-sighted and excessive risk-taking behaviors.

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00175

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

170
I think it would be easy, for instance, to base pay not on performance in one year but on performance over a longer time. Making
a longer-term horizon would be a relatively easy change.
Let me just emphasize one more point, which is that when pay
is related to stock performance, it has a further effect of encouraging bad accounting standards. That was what we saw in Enron.
It was not fixed in Sarbanes-Oxley, and so the problems go deeper
in that these incentive systems actually encourage distorted information, which really undermines the transparency, efficiency, and
confidence in our economy.
Mr. SILVERS. Secondly, the panel—much of the testimony we’ve
heard this morning has talked about regulatory gaps.
I would like panelists to react to the proposition that we ought
to regulate activity based on what it is economically and that we
ought to have transparency requirements, accountability requirements, and capital requirements in relation to that activity based
on what it is. If it’s insurance and we call it a credit default swap,
perhaps we ought to regulate it like insurance.
Comments?
Mr. SELIGMAN. You know, I thought the point of the GAO report
makes sense. Start with what are your objectives and if part of it
is systemic risk avoidance and reduction, then the gaps are seen
in a particular perspective. You simply can’t afford to have large
hidden aspects of our economy, whether it’s credit default swaps or
other aspects of OTC derivatives, hedge funds, or what have you,
and that strikes me as one way in which you get at this.
A second issue, though, is almost the behavioral arbitrage issue;
that is, in effect if you’re a hedge fund manager, you’re unregulated, but if you’re an investment advisor, you’re regulated by the
SEC, you create an incentive structure to move towards the unregulated segment of the economy and you, frankly, frustrate the
ability for examination and understanding what’s going on.
I suspect, though I do not know for sure, that when the ultimate
books are written on Bernie Madoff, you will discover that most of
the activity took place not in his registered broker-dealer operations but in ‘‘exempt investment advisor or hedge fund operations,’’ and in effect this was an example of behavioral arbitrage
where you had someone move to unregulated areas and we saw in
retrospect a very large price was paid.
Professor WARREN. Thank you. Senator Sununu.
Senator SUNUNU. Thank you.
Professor WARREN. Thank you, President Seligman. I know that
you have a plane to catch. We appreciate your being here and you
are excused. Thank you.
Senator SUNUNU. Mr. Wallison, you talked about devising regulation that was counter-cyclical and you mentioned the requirements
or rules regarding accounting for assets as an example.
Could you give a few other examples of recommendations that
you would make that you think could be implemented realistically
in the next few months that would also reinforce this counter-cyclical approach to regulation?
Mr. WALLISON. I think the central problem of pro-cyclicality is a
problem of human nature. We are always euphoric when things are
getting better, when asset prices are going up. We then become

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00176

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

171
very negative when things reverse and asset prices are going down.
Regulators are going to be subject to the same problem; that is,
when things are looking good, they are not going to stop the party,
even though they are supposed to take the punch bowl away. They
will not stop the party. Congress doesn’t want them to stop the
party.
We should have a law that requires the regulated institutions to
add capital at a time when asset prices are going up, when things
look very good.
It’s kind of a counter-cyclical capital requirement—not the kind
of capital requirement we have in prompt corrective action, that
the FDIC enforces for banks, where they require increasing institutional restrictions as capital declines. This would be increasing capital requirements as the institutions become more profitable, because we know that at some point in the future, things will reverse, the bubble will burst, and we are going to be faced with institutions not having enough capital.
Senator SUNUNU. Would you interpret the risk-weighted capital
approach of Basel II as being pro-cyclical in this regard?
Mr. WALLISON. You know, there are so many things wrong with
Basel II,——
Senator SUNUNU. Okay.
Mr. WALLISON [continuing]. I don’t even want to——
Senator SUNUNU. I only have two and a half minutes here.
Mr. WALLISON. Yeah.
Senator SUNUNU. That’s fine. We can talk about that later and
develop some comments for the record.
Mr. WALLISON. Okay.
Senator SUNUNU. Mr. Sumerlin, you talked about capital standards and having them binding, having them clearer, less subject to
subjective interpretation.
Can you expand on that a little bit, talk about what kind of a
system for setting capital ratios would make sense, what kind of
changes we need to make, and whether those capital ratios should
be based on institutional activity or size or other parameters?
Mr. SUMERLIN. I mean part of how I look at this is I look at what
regulations do I think worked and I think the leverage ratio of the
FDIC was helpful.
It would work in a similar way to what Mr. Wallison described
where, if during good times you wanted to buy a lot more assets,
you’d have to put in more capital and, you know, my preference for
regulation is I like it to be blunt, simple, enforceable, and to be sort
of a backstop and so that you don’t discourage sort of the types of
new innovation that Mr. Shiller’s talking about, but there is something there that catches you and says no, you don’t get to lever up
50:1 and that’s why I like this very simple leverage ratio just because I think it did prevent what might have been broader problems during a bubble.
If I could just make one more point on the mark to market idea?
You know, my own view is there is a price for everything and that
price sometimes might be zero and you might not like it, but there
is a price.
Now, with mark to market, I think one of the problems with it
is it’s a point estimate and so I would favor some sort of length-

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00177

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

172
ening of time where you’re averaging prices over a longer period
and that would smooth out in both the upside and the downside,
and if you look at even quarterly accounting right now what happens when a bank has to report its quarterly earnings, it will expand its activities in between the quarter and then they’ve got to
get the balance sheet down, get the balance sheet down, get the
balance sheet down for the report and so we do need to get away
from sort of the snapshot in time type of——
Senator SUNUNU. Let me ask you one question about a statistic
I think you used in your testimony, but it came as a shock to me,
even having looked at a lot of this material. It was that in 2005
43 percent of the people in America who purchased a home with
a mortgage put no money down.
Mr. SUMERLIN. Forty-three percent of first-time homebuyers.
Senator SUNUNU. In 2005, 43 percent of all first-time homebuyers.
Mr. SUMERLIN. Of all first-time homebuyers.
Senator SUNUNU. Put no money down.
Mr. SUMERLIN. Yes.
Senator SUNUNU. To the best of your knowledge, did any state
or federal regulators anywhere prohibit that or try to create a regulation that might have discouraged that kind of behavior which I
think most people would fairly describe as somewhat speculative?
Mr. SUMERLIN. I’m not aware of it. There’s nothing that worked.
I’ll put it that way.
Senator SUNUNU. Ms. Raskin, do you know of anything that
might have——
Professor WARREN. Senator Sununu, you’re over time now.
Senator SUNUNU. I wanted to give her a chance to respond. She
might have better information——
Professor WARREN. Sure.
Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. Than Mr. Sumerlin.
Ms. RASKIN. Clearly that practice has all but evaporated, truth
be told. The good thing, I think, is that a lot of states have now
passed laws that prohibit what are called stated income loans,
loans in which there is no documentation at all provided and
there’s no basis upon which the borrower has shown an ability to
repay.
Senator SUNUNU. Thank you.
Professor WARREN. Thank you. Mr. Neiman.
Mr. NEIMAN. Thank you. Dr. Stiglitz, in your testimony you talk
about the idea of ring fencing, to put greater standards in place for
systemically-significant institutions and commercial banks that
serve consumers and pension funds, and separating those out from
business activities that serve high net worth and capital markets
activities.
Can we draw such a bright line? Is that function—is it practical,
and I’d like you to just kind of elaborate on how that would actually be implemented or deployed?
Dr. STIGLITZ. It can’t be perfectly implemented, but I think it’s
absolutely necessary that we do something along those lines because we can’t be fully comprehensive in our regulation. Our financial markets are too complex.

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00178

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

173
On the other hand, we know that we have to have far better regulation of our commercial banks, which are systemically important.
If we don’t, the system will have another crisis, such as the one we
currently have.
We have to move towards some degree of ring fencing. In a way
we do that already; that is to say, we don’t want our banks to invest too much in a gambling institution or something like that.
The question is can we go further, and I think the answer is
clearly yes. If we have an unregulated, highly-leveraged institution,
like a hedge fund, operating out of a secret bank account, we
should say to the banks that they should not be lending to those
kinds of institutions, which are supportive of corruption and tax
evasion.
This is a matter of degree, but I think we can work much more
towards ring fencing these core financial institutions.
Mr. NEIMAN. Thank you. Mr. Wallison you’ve written a lot about
the role that CRA and the GSEs have played in contributing to the
crisis, and as you probably would not be surprised, I come at it that
the CRA was not a contributor and the data that I have seen in
terms of origination showed the majority of those originations came
from non-bank entities who were not subject to CRA.
Have you seen or are relying on data that would support your
basis of the role that CRA played in contributing?
Mr. WALLISON. The role that CRA played in contributing to our
current problem was simply a role in reducing the quality of the
mortgages. That’s why we got to the point where Marc Sumerlin
was mentioning that 43 percent of the people who bought homes
initially in 2005 had no downpayment. The purpose of CRA was to
force banks to make loans to people who could not otherwise get
mortgages.
I believe that we should have a homeownership policy, as we do
in this country, and it might require subsidies. But in the case of
CRA it just required banks to make loans they wouldn’t have otherwise made, and that forced them to reduce the quality of the
mortgages. It’s the only way they could do it. And so, what began
with CRA continued through the rest of the economy. It was picked
up by all kinds of other people who were making loans, unregulated lenders as they are called, and Fannie and Freddie bought
many of those loans, over a trillion dollars of those loans. $1.6 trillion of these bad loans are on Fannie and Freddie’s balance sheet.
It is not CRA——
Mr. NEIMAN. How much?
Mr. WALLISON. $1.6 trillion of subprime and Alt-A mortgages are
on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s balance sheets.
Mr. NEIMAN. Subprime and Alt-A?
Mr. WALLISON. Subprime and Alt-A. That’s right.
Professor WARREN. These are not originations, though.
This is including the amount that they were required to buy later
on, is that right?
Mr. WALLISON. They were required to by their affordable housing
regulations to buy these mortgages.
Professor WARREN. Not by the regulations. They’ve been required
by Congress to purchase.

VerDate Nov 24 2008

00:38 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00179

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6602

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928

174
Mr. WALLISON. Well, through the affordable housing regulations,
Congress——
Professor WARREN. No.
Mr. WALLISON [continuing]. Did not insist on——
Professor WARREN. No, not through originations. That’s the question I’m asking about trying to sort this out. I’m sorry, Mr.
Neiman.
Mr. WALLISON. My whole point is simply that CRA did not add
materially to the number of such mortgages. They were very small,
about three percent. What CRA did was start the process of making mortgages of lower quality and that’s the central problem we
have today.
It is true that we’ve had a big inflationary bubble because, perhaps, of the low interest rates that the Federal Reserve approved
for a long period of time. But what’s different about this bubble is
that the mortgages that are causing problems are very poor quality
mortgages. Otherwise, we wouldn’t have this financial crisis.
Mr. NEIMAN. Just to follow up on one point, the way we’ve seen
it operating throughout neighborhoods throughout the country, is
so much of that was originated by non-bank entities, not subject to
CRA. I’m not making any apologies for the large commercial banks,
investment banks, who participated—who funded that through the
securitization process, but it was not CRA that was driving that.
It was the securitization process and the misaligned incentives and
over-reliance on credit.
Mr. WALLISON. And Fannie and Freddie bought them.
Professor WARREN. I want to thank you all for being here. I have
special thanks that I need to acknowledge publicly to the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation for lending
us this lovely room for our hearing, but I especially want to thank
all of our witnesses for coming.
Mrs. Raskin, Dr. Shiller, Dr. Stiglitz, Mr. Sumerlin, and Mr.
Wallison, we appreciate your taking the time to prepare your testimony, to come here, and I hope you will be willing to answer questions that the panel submits in writing and have those questions
be on the record.
We appreciate your help very much and with that, this hearing
is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

SMARTINEZ on PROD1PC64 with HEARING

Æ

VerDate Nov 24 2008

07:15 Apr 01, 2009

Jkt 047928

PO 00000

Frm 00180

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6611

E:\HR\OC\A928.XXX

A928