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Minutes for To: Members of the Board From: Office of the Secretary March 17, 1959 Attached is a copy of the minutes of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on the above date. It is not proposed to include a statement with respect to any of the entries in this set of minutes in the record of policy actions required to be maintained pursuant to section 10 of the Federal Reserve Act. Should you have any question with regard to the minutes, it will be appreciated if you will advise the Secretary's Office. Otherwise, if you were present at the meeting, please initial in column A below to indicate that you approve the minutes. If you were not present, please initial in column B below to indicate that you have seen the minutes. A Chin. Martin Gov. Szymczak Goy. Mills Gov. Robertson Gov. Balderston Goy. Shepardson x 0,(A3 Minutes of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on Tuesday, March 17, 1959. The Board met in the Board Room at 10:00 a.m. PRESENT: Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. Balderston, Vice Chairman Mills Robertson Shepardson Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. Sherman, Secretary Kenyon, Assistant Secretary Thomas, Economic Adviser to the Board Hackley, General Counsel Molony, Special Assistant to the Board Shay, Legislative Counsel Noyes, Adviser, Division of Research and Statistics Solomon, Assistant General Counsel Benner, Assistant Director, Division of Examinations Conkling, Assistant Director, Division of Bank Operations Collier, Chief, Current Series Section, Division of Bank Operations Proposed revision of condition reports (Item No. 1). There had been distributed to the members of the Board copies of a memorandum from the Division of Bank Operations dated March 14, 1959, presenting certain proposed revisions in the weekly condition reports from banks in leading cities designed to enhance the usefulness of those reports. It vas indicated that the proposals resulted from periodic System staff review of the report form and the selection of reporting banks, and that the proposals had been considered by the System Research Advisory Committee and an associate committee composed of economists from every Reserve Bank and the Board's staff. Approval of the Board was requested for clearing the recommendations with interested agencies and obtaining 984 -2- 3/17/59 agreement by the other Federal bank supervisory agencies to a revision in the loan schedule (Schedule A) of the call report of condition so as to add an item of loans to financial institutions other than banks and redefine other loan items. This would enable banks to establish a consistent classification system for record-keeping and reporting purposes and diminish classification difficulties and inaccuracies in reporting. Submitted with the memorandum were drafts of letters to the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation regarding the proposed changes in Schedule A of the call report. The memorandum expressed the hope that it would be possible to begin using the revised call report not later than in connection with the call at the end of this year. Also, it was hoped that a slip-sheet could be attached to the mid-year call informing banks of the basis to be required thereafter and requesting them to report their loan data on the revised form as well as on the present basis. This would have the advantage of obtaining data on both bases for one date and thus providing comparative statistics. The revised weekly resort could then be insti- tuted early in July, with reporting banks requested to report on both bases on the beginning Wednesday date. Following comments by Mr. Thomas on the background, nature, and intent of the proposals, and by Mr. Conkling on the favorable results °f preliminary checking with staff members of the other Federal bank supervisory agencies, the Board authorized taking the necessary steps )S5 -3- 3/17/59 to obtain the agreement of the other bank supervisory agencies to the suggested changes in the loan schedule of the call report of condition. A copy of the letter sent to the Comptroller of the Currency pursuant to this action is attached as Item No. 1, and a similar letter was sent to the Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. It was understood that advice on the status of the matter would be sent to the Presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks. was raised regarding the Federal Advisory Council. Question then After some discussion of this point, it was agreed to advise the Council by letter after clearance from the other bank supervisory agencies had been obtained, thus serving to afford the members of the Council an opportunity to submit any comments they might desire while at the same time avoiding undue delay in instituting the proposed changes. Agreement was expressed with the suggestion that the advice to the Federal Advisory Council should emphasize the objective of the proposals, namely, an improvement in available data, in order to avoid any misunderstanding. Messrs. Benner and Conkling then withdrew from the meeting. Letter to Senator Johnson. Pursuant to the discussion at Yesterday's meeting, there had been distributed to the members of the Board copies of three alternative drafts of material that might be sent in letter or enclosure form to Senator Lyndon Johnson of Texas for his Use in replying to a constituent, Mr. H. E. Cutcher of Lockhart, Texas, -Ii- 3/17/59 who had interpreted certain remarks by Congressman Patman in the Congressional Record to mean that the Federal Reserve Banks were allowed to "give away" tax money to the commercial banks. A fourth alternative draft, prepared by Mr. Thomas, was distributed at this meeting. After consideration of the alternative drafts from the standpoint of the approach that would be most helpful to Senator Johnson in responding to his constituent, the suggestion was made that the Board's reply be relatively brief and couched in lay language. Such a letter, it was suggested, might refer to the right of individual banks to apportion the use of resources at their disposal, as distinguished from the function of the Federal Reserve System in providing and absorbing total reserves in accordance with the needs of the economy. It was further suggested that the draft statement prepared by Mt. Thomas, euPPlemented by portions of one of the other drafts, be sent as an enclosure to Senator Johnson in order to provide a more thorough description of the role of the Federal Reserve System in regulating the supply of money and credit. Agreement was expressed with such a response, and it was . 91 that a letter and enclosed statement framed along such .2.2 111 lines would be prepared. Messrs. Young, Director, and Head, Economist, Division of Research and Statistics, entered the room at this point. -5- 3/17/59 Replies to Douglas-Patman questions (Item No. 2). With a covering memorandum from Mr. Young dated March 16, 1959, there had been distributed to the Board draft replies to certain questions that Senator Douglas and Congressman Patman had addressed to Chairman Martin on the occasion of his appearance before the Joint Economic Committee on February 6, 1959. The first question, raised by Senator Douglas, was whether it would not be preferable in implementing monetary and credit policy for the Federal Reserve to rely on open market operations to achieve restraint or ease and refrain from changing discount rates. The second question, raised by Mr. Patman, related to the effect of the Federal funds market on the Federal Reserve discount operation. The third question, also raised by Mr. Patman, related to whether interbank deposits had not increased rapidly and were not approaching the level that existed prior to the passage of the Federal Reserve Act. The general reaction of the Board to the proposed replies was favorable and suggestions were limited principally to changes deemed advisable in the interest of clarification and improved phraseology. At the conclusion of the discussion, unanimous agreement was reached on the form of the replies to be made to the three questions, and it was understood that the replies would be transmitted to Chairman Douglas in such form. Copies of the transmittal letter sent to Chairman Douglas pursuant to this action and of the replies enclosed therewith are attached hereto under Item No. 2. -6- 3/17/59 Messrs. Young and Hald then withdrew from the meeting. Testimony on reserve requirement legislation. March At the meeting on 6, 1959, it was agreed that Vice Chairman Balderston would appear on behalf of the Board before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee on March 23, 1959, at hearings with respect to proposed reserve requirement legislation. Accordingly, there had been distributed to the Board under date of March 161 1959, a draft of statement to be presented by Governor Balderston. This draft was almost identical with a draft of possible statement prepared under date of June 51 1958, by Messrs. Thurston and Molony following discussion of an earlier draft by the Since no hearings on reserve requirement legislation were Board. held during the last session of Congress, occasion had not arisen to use the statement. At the request of the Board, Hr. Thomas described certain material that might be used to augment the draft statement. However, it was deemed preferable to adhere basically to testimony in the form of the distributed draft, with the understanding that the additional Material referred to by Mr. Thomas would be put in a form in which it would be available to Governor Balderston at the hearing if there should be need for it. Certain other substitutions and modifications also were mentioned by Mr. omas.The reaction to them was generally favorable and it was understood that a revised draft reflecting them would be -7- 3/17/59 ony by the distributed prior to further consideration of the testim Board. the type Governor Balderston then presented for consideration certain of responses that might be most appropriate in the event first of these questions were addressed to him at the hearing. The standards related to a possible request for a spelling out of the individual that the Board might utilize in considering requests from sion to member banks in central reserve or reserve cities for permis carry lower reserves. Views expressed by members of the Board on this discussion point suggested the inadvisability of being drawn into a of specific standards because this might tend to circumscribe the e requireBoard in discharging its administrative functions if reserv Committee ment legislation of the type before the Banking and Currency Should be enacted. The suggestion was made that it might be appropriate to make use of examples drawn from requests made of the Board by member to banks under the present statutes, without specific reference individual applicant institutions. It was also suggested that there which be drawn up for Governor Balderston's use a list of factors to the Board might be expected to give consideration in handling any requests from member banks under revised statutes. Balderston The second possible question referred to by Governor the same range of related to a charge of inconsistency in establishing banks while at the requirements for central reserve and reserve city 990 -8- 3/17/59 same time indicating unwillingness to discard the central reserve city classification. After some discussion of this point, it was understood that further thought would be given to the subject and that the staff would prepare certain material in support of the validity of maintaining a distinction between banks in central reserve and reserve cities based on the nature of business conducted. The meeting then adjourned. Secretary's Note: Pursuant to recommendations contained in memoranda from appropriate individuals concerned, Governor Shepardson today approved on behalf of the Board increases in the basic annual salaries of the following persons on the Board's staff in the amounts indicated, effective March 22, 1959: Edythe J. Bascom, Records Clerk, Office of the Secretary, from $41014.o to $4,135. Paula G. Hauprich, Stenographer, Legal Division, from $40 230 to $4,325. Gerald F. Millea, Chief, Division Administration Section, Division of Research and Statistics, from $9,050 to $9,290. Joseph B. Dunn, Assistant Federal Reserve Examiner, Division of Examinations, from $6,135 to $6,285. Doris J. Hodge Secretary, Division of Bank Operations, from $4,190 to $4,340. Kathryn A. Jackson, Statistical Clerk, Division of Bank Operations, from $4,040 to $4,190. Charlie H. Ward, Laborer, Division of Administrative Services, from $3,150 to $3,245. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM Item No. 1 3/17/59 WASHINGTON 25, D. C. ADDRESS OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE TO THE BOARD March 17, 1959 The Honorable Ray M. Gidney, Comptroller of the Currency, Washington 25, D. C. Dear Mr. Gidney: The Board is planning revisions in the condition reports received weekly from member banks in leading cities in order to Obtain some additional information needed for more effective analyses of credit and business developments. One of the principal changes the Board would like to make would be the addition of an item covering loans to financial institutions to be shown separately. It is felt that if this change is made a similar separation should be made in loan schedule A of the call report of condition. The Weekly condition form has been comparable with the official call form since 1938, through combinations of items, and it does not seem practicable to ask weekly reporting banks to report on a basis substantially different from the call report. If agreement is reached among the supervisory agencies on loan schedule A, it is contemplated that the weekly reporting member banks will be asked to report a two-way breakdown of the new item as defined for call report purposes: (a) loans to sales 'inance„ personal finance, and other business credit companies, and . 1:)) loans to all other financial institutions (mainly, mutual say-S banks, insurance companies, mortgage ccmpanies, savings and loan associations, and Federal lending agencies). i The purpose of the separation of loans to financial institutions from other bank loans is to provide a cleaner commercial loan figure and to identify that part of bank credit that flows directly to and from business. A separate figure on loans to financial institutions would provide users with a more accurate measure 9' the amount of bank credit that is being channeled through those financial intermediaries. The proposal also contemplates a redefinition of real estate mortgages acquired under repurchase agreements (now reported aa real estate loans) so that they would be treated as loans to The Honorable Ray M. Gidney -2- be mortgage companies, to insurance companies, etc.; this would subies securit on tions instruc ng reporti consistent with present ject to repurchase agreements. you It will be appreciated if you will advise us whether hoped is it so, If ls. proposa the of n are agreeable to the adoptio not that the revised form and instructions could be cleared for use been have staff your of Members call. later than the 1959 year-end informed of the proposals. , Chairman of A similar letter is being sent to Mr. Wolcott tion. Corpora ce the Federal Deposit Insuran Very truly yours, (Sioied) Merritt Sherman Merritt Sherman, Secretary. BOARD Ow GOVERNORS oorti e A01 y 'r OF THE f- p 1 ,11• ' WASHINGTON H. 0 Item No. 2 3/17/59 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM OFFICE OF THE VICE CHAIRMAN ; 4 <' V'St ' :t114101.'p :" 4: March 20, 1959 The Honorable Paul H. Douglas, Chairman, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Washington, D. C. Dear Mr. Chairman: ions asked Attached is a memorandum of reply to quest n Patman at the of Chairman Martin by you and by Congressma ary 6,19S9. Hearings before your Committee on Febru es responsive and of I trust you will find these repli interest to the Committee. Sincerely yours, C. Canby B4Jderston, Vice Chairman. Attachment and Congressman Replies to Questions by Senator Douglas Hearings ttee Commi Patman at Joint Economic 1959 February 61 Question by Senator Douglas: Would it not be preferable, in im- the Federal Reserve to rely on plementing monetary and credit policy, for but refrain from Open market operations to achieve restraint or ease, ces interest rates generally Changing discount rates? In these circumstan credit restraint. would not rise, or not rise as much, in periods of ity, would you When there is considerable unemployment and excess capac r interest rates agree that this result would be desirable, since highe would tend to "hold back full recovery?" Answer: unt rate is one aspect As an instrument of credit policy the disco ement to cf the discount operation as a whole, which functions as a compl the open market instrument. In a period of rising business activity, debanks are unable to rnands for bank credit may rise to such an extent that meet these demands on the basis of their existing reserves. There are essentially two ways in which banks can obtain additional reserves; the reserves by purFederal Reserve System can, on its own initiative, supply t; alternatively, banks cha se of Government securities in the open marke borrowing at can on their own initiative increase their reserves by Federal Reserve Banks. would promote growth When credit demands are in such strength as services availcredit and money in excess of the expansion of goods and staable for purchase, the Federal Reserve, in the interest of economic meet such demands. bilitY, tempers the amount of reserves available to When the Federal Reserve does not furnish on its initiative all of the ret demands from "laves sought by banks in circumstances of very active credi -2en. economy as a whole tend to tight private sources credit conditions in the able reserve funds are not adeIndividual banks, finding that their avail may react to the situation quate to permit them to meet all credit demands, or by borrowing from their either by selling or running off liquid assets, effect is likely to be a rise Federal Reserve Bank. In either event, one in market interest rates. adjust its position will Which method a particular bank uses to and amounts of securidepend on a number of factors, including the kinds ng rate on these ties or other open market paper in its portfolio, its earni discount window. securities, and the rate it must pay on borrowings at the to the Federal Reserve Banks are generally reluctant to become indebted constrained to liquiexcept for very short periods, and when in debt feel weakened if market date assets. The deterrents to borrowing are greatly higher than Yields on securities owned become and remain substantially ed to the discount rate. In these conditions, banks may even be induc difficult effective adminborrow for profit, a development which renders istration of the discount window. r bank requests for Federal Reserve Banks, in acting on membe the needs of credit, must therefore weigh each request in the light of are being put, and the the individual bank, the uses to which reserves banks general character and rate of credit expansion in the economy. While reserve IllaY expect that requests based on temporary needs resulting from is recognized that beyond their individual control will be met, it not a right. Continued bc)rral.dng at the Federal Reserve is a privilege, shifts or unsound expansion 13°Iir°14ing under circumstances pointing to unhealthy cr credit will be discouraged. Federal Reserve Regulation A0 revised in February 1955, sets forth the following guiding principles applicable to member bank borrowing: Federal Reserve credit is generally extended on a short-term basis to a member bank in order to enable it to adjust its asset position when necessary because of developments such as a sudden withdrawal of deposits . or seasonal requirements for credit beyond those which can reasonably be met by use of the bank's own resources. Federal Reserve credit is also available for longer periods when necessary in order to assist member banks in meeting unusual situations, such as may result from national, regional) or local difficulties or from exceptional circumstances involving only particular member banks. Under ordinary conditions) the continuous use of Federal Reserve credit by a member bank over a considerable period of time is not regarded as appropriate* In applying these principles it is of prime importance that the general reluctance of banks to borrow at the Federal Reserve be reinforced by a discount rate with real deterrent power at times when a tempering of bank credit growth is in the public interest. In other words, in order to make the discount mechanism an effective supplement to open mcket oPerations the Federal Reserve is obliged to maintain discount rates not markedly lower than market yields on the most readily available alternative source of bank reserves, Treasury bills. If the Federal Reserve in these circumstances did not adjust its discount rates to keep them "in touch" with market rates, the task of administering the discount Ilindaw to prevent excessive credit expansion would become very difficult. In the absence of a rate deterrent to borrowing, Federal Reserve 13ank officers would be without workable guidelines in acting on a l'eat number of borrowing requests from banks) many of whom would be in the position of profiting directly from the relatively low rate on b°1Tow , tge. -14.- The need for frequent reappraisal of the discount rate in order to maintain the effectiveness of the discount operation as a credit instrument is recognized in the Federal Reserve Act itself. Section 14(d) of the Act empowers each Federal Reserve Bank "To establish from time to time, subject to review of the Board of Governors of the Feddetermination and rates of discount to be charged by System, Reserve eral for each class of paper, which bank reserve the Federal of accommodating commerce view a with fixed shall be bank shall establish such such each but and business; oftener if deemed necessary or davs rates every fourteen added) s by the Board;"(fEaic At times conditions are such that market rates and discount rates vary from each other for extended periods. When credit demands are relatively light and banks have abundant reserves with negligible borrowings, short-term market rates are likely to fall well below tLe discount rate. This occurred in 1954 and also in 1958. There have been other times when market rates have remained above the discount rate for a considerable period and have been little affected by changes in the discount rate. For example, last year the market yield on 90-day Treasury bills rose sharply from below 1 per cent in July to around 2-3/4 per cent by early October, while discount rates were raised from 1-3/4 per cent to 2 per cent in August and September, aS shown on the attached chart. Since early October the yield on 90-day Treasury bills has fluctuated generally within a narrow range--between 2-5/8 and 3 per cent, while discount rates were raised in late October to 2-1/2 per cent and in early March to 3 per cent--a total increase of 1percentage point. Rates on longer term securities likewise rose _5_ sharply in the summer and early fall and have shown little further change since early October. In this period member bank borrowings have averaged close to 500 million, a much smaller amount than prevailed in other recent years when market interest rates were around present levels. The recent period provides an excellent illustration of the fact that market rates are strongly influenced by other factors than Federal Reserve Policies, Rising market rates of interest almost inevitably follow along with rising business activity because expansion of credit demands are an essential accompaniment of such a rise. The discount rate is essentially a technical rate, relating to the availability of borrowed reserve funds for banks. It is not a rate at which public and private borrowers in the market can avail themselves of funds. In periods of active credit demands market rates will generally array themselves in closer relationship to the discount rate, because banks are always in a position to supplement their lending capacity by borrowing at the Federal Reserve. It is to keep this source of supplementary lending power under continuous and effective regulation that the Federal Reserve must rely on flexible adjustment of the discount rate to °hanging market and economic conditions. In any case, if the discount rate were not used for this purpose but access to the discount window were limited by instruction, a similar impact on market rates of interest would occur, as individual banks sold Treasury bills or other securities to acquire the reserves denied through the discount window. Conceivably) the short-run impact on market rates would be greater. -6Question by Mr, Patman: What is the effect of the Federal s discount operation? Are not bank Funds Market on the Federal Reserve Rederal Reserve? using this market really by-passing the Answer: Funds Market2 a loosely The existence of the Federal ng excess reserves lend these bc1organized mprket in which banks havi enables many banks to manage ances to other banks, usually for one day, of tolerance than would othertheir reserve positions to a closer degree the banking sysem has fewer wise be possible, The net result may be that also a smaller total voluma of Pockets of excess reserves, and perhaps un reserve reserves. Another way of saying the same thing is that short-r more nearly opti7aum use shifts through the Federal Funds Market result in by the banking system of the existing reserve base, with less use of Reserve Bank credit, al banks borrowing reserves From the standpoint of the individu ciency in the Federal Funds Market as a way to adjust to a reserve defi adds a liability to its balance sheet° In this respect Federal Funds the Federal Reserve. In either b°rr wing is similar to borrowing from t; if the need for se) adjustment by borrowing is a temporary expedien " its holdings of reserves continues, the bank will be obliged to reduce reserve posise curities or curtail its lending activities to bring its tion into balance. ral Funds may thus While an individual bank which borrows Fede 417°id borrowing at a Federal Reserve Bank, it does not necessarily des foil , -04 that the existence of the Federal Funds Market materially impe Federal Reserve discount policy. In the first place, participation in small number of the Federal Funds Market is confined to a relatively centers. In the banks, most of them the larger banks in financial Funds Market do not alter second place, transactions through the Federal m, which can the total supply of reserves available to the banking syste funds in be influenced by Federal Reserve policy actions. The supply of availability the market is closely related to the general state of reserve for the banking system. est When reserve availability is tight, inter or close to$ the rates in the Federal Funds Markets will tend to rise to$ limited at such times, discount rate. With the supply of reserve funds the discount mechanism, including the discount rate, can perform effecinstrument in tively its function of supplementing the open market is kept in alignment regulating the volume of money and credit so that it with the needs of the economy at a stable level of prices,' 10(1 -8Question by Mr. Patman: Have not interbank deposits increased to the passage of rapidly, approaching the same level that existed prior in too few the Federal Reserve Act when too much money was concentrated banks? Answer: banks Prior to the establishment of the Federal Reserve System, of kept substantial portions of their cash liquidity reserves in the form deposits at other banks. Under today's conditions, however, the first line of reserves of member banks is maintained in the form of legal reserves on deposit at Federal Reserve Banks. Under these circumstances, banks now maintain balances at other banks primarily as a part of corte check respondent relationships--for liquidity purposes, to facilita clearance, and to obtain a variety of services and advice. ially between The total of interbank balances increased substant ]939 and 19)45, as the table shows. There has again been some growth in the last year or so, but total interbank balances held at member banks were only S'600 million higher in 1958 than in 1945. New York banks ac- tually held fewer deposits due to domestic banks in 1958 than in 1945, althou:-;11 they continued to hold substantial deposits for foreign banks. Moreover, as uould be expected, a substantial portion of total intierbank balances held by member banks represented the approximately $4 billion Ilbich nonmember banks keep on deposit--an amount which in large part represents the legal and working reserves of nonmember banks. The growth of member bank interbank deposits for the period is of diminished significance when compared to the large growth in the total of demand deposits of all banks. Interbank deposits at member s of all banks banks, which represented 27 per cent of total demand deposit in 1939, declined by 1945 to 16 per cent, and in recent years have re- mained at about 11 per cent. March 17, 1959 .arn. 0 00, -10- VP, Seler:ted Data on InteTbank Demand Deposits and Total Demand Deposits, 1939-1958 (Millions of dollars) _ Year (June call date) All Nonmember banks-Demand deposits of domestic banks held commercial banks-balances due by member banks demand depoOlts from All menber 1Reserve l i adjusted S domestic banks banks New York 1 Chicago 1 city 1 Country Per cent of member bank interbank deposits to total demand deposits 1939 2,992 7146 2,920 1439 7,097 1/ 27,355 25.9 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 3,271 3,127 2,898 2,830 2,660 1,174 1,047 1,056 1,o55 962 5,510 5,220 4,773 4,751 4,460 1,108 997 885 798 762 11,064 10,391 9,612 9,433 8,864 1/ I/ 1/ 3,163 3,037 69,053 79,476 82,186 82,697 81,877 16.0 13.1 11.7 11.4 10.8 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 2,692 2,744 3,193 2,979 3,237 977 1,co6 1,136 1,175 1,287 4,848 4,996 5,624 5,744 6,220 650 913 1,060 1,049 1,212 9,368 9,659 11,013 10,947 11,956 3,214 3,394 3,833 3,843 3,958 85,040 88,960 94,754 96,898 98,132 11,0 10.9 11.6 11.3 12.2 1955 1956 1957 1958 3,129 3,00 2,775 3,084 1,125 1,149 1,133 1,211 5,979 6,078 5,648 6025 1,249 1,321 1,243 1,267 11,482 11,627 10,799 11,676 3,811 14,000 3,816 3,964 103,234 104,744 105,706 106,169 111 11.1 10.2 11.0 not strictly comparable. if Beginning with December 31, 1947, the all-bank series was revised; previous data estimated prior to 2947. partly are data .21 Excludes interbank and U. S. Government deposits and collection items; RATES MONEY PER CENT PER ANNUM WEEKLY PER CENT PER AN 11111111111 11111111111 11111111111 6 5 CORPORATE Boa MOODY'S J I ......— ai 1 04 i 1 ' i g i Cf, g 1 CORPORATE Aaa MOODY'S / / .- i r-0 -,--. It N COMMERCIAL PAPER/ ‘IIj OPEN MARKET 4 - 6 MONTHS ilIJA. . I if il# I 4., 1 LA '0 , I 1111 1 P1 ) 1 r r -r f i Mg F. R. DISCOUNT RATES ‘'t I C f • 2 ‘,....___ TREASURY BILLS MARKET YIELDS t ' AILAtiltl II 1956 lot•si Figur•s Plott•d: FEBRUARY 20 *pais a,fort/wan or no PtDdjLA.r.rt fry,. 1958 ItlIIIItIII tIIIIIIIIII 1960 0
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