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Minutes for

To:

Members of the Board

From:

Office of the Secretary

February 19, 1963

Attached is a copy of the minutes of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve .System on
the above date. 1/
It is not proposed to include a statement
With respect to any of the entries in this set of
minutes in the record of policy actions required to
be maintained pursuant to section 10 of the Federal
Reserve Act.
Should you have any question with regard to
the minutes, it will be appreciated if you will advise
the Secretary's Office. Otherwise, please initial
below. If you were present at the meeting, your
initials will indicate approval of the minutes. If
you were not present, your initials will indicate
only that you have seen the minutes.

Chin. Martin
Gov. Mills
Gov. Robertson
Gov. Balderston

_ZL

Gov. Shepardson
Gov. King
Gov. Mitchell

1/ Meeting with the Federal Advisory Council.

A meeting of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
with the Federal Advisory Council was held in the Board Room of the
Pederal Reserve Building in Washington, D. C., on Tuesday, February 19,
1963, at 10:30 a.m.
PRESENT:

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Martin, Chairman
Balderston, Vice Chairman
Robertson
Shepardson
Mr. Sherman, Secretary
Mr. Kenyon, Assistant Secretary

Messrs. Martin, Murphy, Petersen, Stoner, Hobbs,
McRae, Zwiener, Maestre, Moorhead, Breidenthal,
Aston, and McAllister, Members of the Federal
Advisory Council from the First through the
Twelfth Federal Reserve Districts
Mr. Prochnow, Secretary of the Council
Mr. Korsvik, Assistant Secretary of the Council
The following officers had been elected by the Federal Advisory
C°Lincil for the year 1963:
President
Vice President
Secretary
Assistant Secretary

George A. Murphy
Robert B. Hobbs
Herbert V. Prochnow
William J. Korsvik

The following had been elected by the Federal Advisory Council as
of the Council's Executive Committee for the year 1963:
George A. Murphy, ex officio
Howard C. Petersen
Robert B. Hobbs, ex officio
J. Finley McRae
Kenneth V. Zwiener
This being the first meeting of the Board and the Council in 1963,
Chat
tmen Martin welcomed the new members of the Council (Messrs. Martin,
Stem
-et, and Aston) and expressed appreciation on behalf of the Board for
the
work done by the Council. In doing so, he referred particularly to

C324
2/19/63

-2-

those persons who had served as President of the Council during his tenure
as a member of the Board of Governors and also noted the service rendered over
4

Period of time by Messrs. Prochnow and Korsvik as Secretary and Assistant

Secretary, respectively, of the Council.
Before this meeting there had been distributed a memorandum listing
the

topics suggested for consideration.

The topics, the statement of the

ecluncil with respect to each, and the substance of the discussion at this
'flee ting

were as follows:
1.

What are the observations of the Council regarding (a)
recent domestic economic developments, and (b) the business
outlook for the first half of 1963 and the year as a whole?
(c) Do the members of the Council believe that the improvement in business psychology reported at the November
meeting with the Board has strengthened further since that
time, remained about the same, or receded?

(a) Recent domestic economic developments indicate a continuation
of the mixed trends that have prevailed the past several months. While
the spending behavior of consumers, as evidenced by retail sales and
in particular by the volume of new model automobiles sold, has been
encouraging, the decline in new orders for durable goods, the failure
of industrial production to rise, and the uncertainty created by the
Budget message, together with the discussion of a possible tax cut,
have clouded the immediate outlook.
(b) Despite these imponderables, however, the Council anticipates
that business in the first half of 1963 will continue to show the moderate
improvement that characterized the last six months of 1962. The outlook
for the last half of 1963 is less certain.
(c) The Council believes that the improvement in business
Psychology reported at the November meeting has receded somewhat since
that time. Developments in Europe, Canada, and Cuba, together with the
Problems associated with the balance of payments, budget deficits, and
especially the proposed tax legislation, have lessened the favorable
sentiment in the business community.
In comments supplementing the statement by the Council, President Murphy
"ted that the various yardsticks of business activity looked quite good at
the
Present time. He thought it could be said that the typical businessman

f;25
2/19/63
/4a8

-3-

cautiously optimistic.

Seldom, however, had he seen a time when there were

11°re questions in the businessman's mind.

There was confusion with regard to

the Cuban situation, and the French veto of British entry into the European
C011111on Market was a matter of concern to businessmen doing an international
business.

Many companies had been set to move forward with expansion or new

installations in Great Britain to cover the Common Market area, but those
Plans were now being held in abeyance.

In addition, there had developed a

series of misunderstandings between the Government and the business community,
th the result that the typical businessman had become unusually concerned
bc'ut political factors and their potential impact on the economic picture.
There followed a series of comments by the other members of the Council

14ith regard to developments in their respective districts.

While there were

tilinor variations in the reports from district to district, in general the
"
Inments reflected an opinion that business conditions were currently quite
4°°43 with an expectation that this situation would continue to prevail at
least through the first half of 1963.

Among the favorable factors cited by

41enthers of the Council were the volume of retail trade, including automobile
"lee, the comparatively low levels of inventories, corporate profits, and
aar
icultural conditions.

At the same time, business psychology was judged to

be affected adversely by numerous uncertainties in both the domestic and
itIternational areas.

Items referred to frequently as being of an unsettling

01' troublesome nature were the developments in connection with the current tax
Pr°Posals, rejection of the British bid for entry into the Common Market,
Pending or prospective wage negotiations, particularly in light of the terms
Of the
recent dock strike settlement, and the trend of relationships between

4'ilg'

-4-

2/19/63

the Government and private business.

The recent statement by the President

Plitting the need for a tax cut in terms of forestalling a possible recession
1448 said to have been surprising and disconcerting.

Against this background,

it was suggested that business optimism tended to be more restrained than
144 otherwise be the case.
Question was raised as to the general reaction to the Administration's
131.4Xam of tax reduction and reform, in reply to which President Murphy stated
that the
reaction was one of disappointment.

The average businessman was

worried about the continued unbalanced Federal budget and the further deficit
that the
proposed tax reduction program would create.

The businessman had hoped

'r tax reduction in areas that would tend to promote additional capital
fe
8Pending, but he did not find that incentive in the current proposals.

Analysis

indicated that these proposals would take a substantial group of people off
the

tax rolls and reduce the tax obligations of another sizable group.

However,

1411en it came to the middle income class, no substantial improvement was seen.
There was almost a feeling that the benefits would be so modest as to cast
4°413t on whether the whole program was worth pushing.

As far as corporate

tsl aa were concerned, the improvements were regarded as modest, but to the
There appeared to be a great deal of concern with respect to the proof the tax program that would in effect place a 5 per cent floor under
iickized deductions, it being felt that this would have severe repercussions
0
4 the financing of private charitable and educational institutions.
Inquiry was made as to whether it seemed to be the judgment of the
buft.
illness community that the tax bill was not of an incentive nature, and there
44asred to be unanimous concurrence by members of the Council in a comment

f;27
2/19/63
by

President Murphy to the effect that an adverse reaction was almost universal.

Remarks by individual members of the Council centered generally around the
view that the current tax program, if enacted, would be unsuccessful in re10Ving disincentives in the present tax structure in such manner as to promote
better business psychology, encourage greater productivity, and lead to more
business investment.

It was felt that the tax program would not provide

istiediate stimulation to the economy, the advantages contained therein being
Projected too far into the future.

The view also was expressed that the

teeulting budget deficits, at least in the near run, might run the risk of
criticism by foreigners on the ground of fiscal irresponsibility.
Asked whether it could be inferred from the foregoing remarks that the
4'4 Proposals were believed to constitute a psychological deterrent from the
Ill:endpoint of the business community, President Murphy indicated that this
1/48 the widespread reaction.

Businessmen were almost unanimously disappointed.

Although it was recognized the tax program provided distinct improvement in
so

e respects, the general sentiment with regard to the program was not good.
In reply to a question concerning the reaction from the budget stand-

Point) President Murphy commented that the average businessman was accustomed
to operating within his budget.

This was sometimes difficult, but there were

Penalties involved if this principle was not observed.

To the typical

busi
-flessman there was not much difference between the principles that must be
Observed
by his company and the principles that should be observed by the
Q°Vernraent.

There was believed to be a general feeling on the part of business-

throughout the country that a better job should be done with the Federal
budget.

?")4,..;

2/19/63

-6There followed comments by other members of the Council along the same

lines, and the discussion of this topic concluded with remarks by President
14111ThY on the implications of the riban problem from the standpoint of hemi4111eric vulnerability to Communistic infiltration and the substantial financial
burden

that might be involved for the United States over a period of time.
2.

In the opinion of the Council, what factors in the current
economic picture suggest the most strength or encouragement?
Conversely, what factors appear to be of greatest concern?

In the opinion of the Council, the persistent strength of consumer
buying is a major source of encouragement in the current economic picture.
This factor and the absence of growth in inventories suggest that new
orders and production will probably rise, resulting in some improvement
in employment, income, and over-all economic activity. A build-up of
inventories by steel users in anticipation of a strike could also contribute
to a rise in business in the months immediately ahead.
Excess productive capacity, the lack of vigor in capital expenditures, the relatively high level of unemployment, and recent developments
in labor negotiations, such as the newspaper strikes and the departure
from the guidelines in the dock strike settlement, are currently matters
of economic concern.
It was noted that the foregoing questions had been dealt with rather
fullY in connection with the discussion of the preceding topic.

In reply to a

question as to whether it seemed likely that there would be economic distortions
71.thin the current calendar year due to anticipation of a steel strike,
141'. Zwiener commented that until the terms of settlement of the dock strike
ere

the

announced the steel industry had seemed relatively confident.

outlook appeared somewhat more ominous.

Now, however,

Discussion following the publication

°f the General Motors financial report for 1962 also portended an element of
lillt'est that was not previously in the picture.

by the
Ilext

Further, the recent announcement

same firm of its intention to build inventories substantially during the

few

months suggested some resultant adverse effect during the second half

°f the year.

,

2/19/63

-73.

What are the prospects for loan demand at banks during
the next several months, including demand in various
loan categories? Is the liquidity of the banking
system considered ample to accommodate the present and
foreseeable volume of credit demands?

The members of the Council anticipate a moderate increase in
loan demand during the next several months. Some increase in loans
is likely to occur in the durable goods sector, especially if steel
users add to their inventories because of the possible reopening of
the steel labor contract. The members of the Council believe that
the liquidity of the banking system is adequate to accommodate the
present and foreseeable volume of credit demands.
In comments supplementing the Council's statement, President Murphy
r40ted that the volume of loans was reasonably high at present but that the
banking system had been able to take care of credit demands without difficulty.
in fact, competition for loans was intense, especially in the area of constructtpn loans and mortgages.

In that area there had been some signs of softening

4f rates, reflecting the competition attendant upon the effort of the banking
industry to put available money to work.
the

Liquidity yardsticks suggested that

banking system was in a fairly comfortable position and that it should be

able to
take care of any foreseeable increase in loan demand.

Loan-deposit

l'atios of New York City banks at present were slightly under 60 per cent, while
°es the country the average was about 57 per cent, these figures reflecting
'
444
4° substantial change over the past several years.

In the Second District it

being estimated that loan volume would step up somewhat in the period until

the end of June; prospects beyond that date were not clear.
Comments by other members of the Council were generally along the same
Mr. Hobbs foresaw no appreciable change in loan demand in the Fifth
bistrict, although it seemed likely that any change would be on the up side
1.4ther than otherwise.

Mr. McAllister commented that his view regarding the

2/19/63

-8-

ability of west Coast banks to take care of prospective loan demand was based
°Il an assumption that approximately the same monetary policy as now prevailed
votad be continued.

Mr. Petersen noted that a significant longer run problem

ilftived the ability to retain in the banking system the present volume of time
deposits.
There followed a discussion emanating from a question regarding the
Status of the secondary market for negotiable certificates of deposit.

Comments

by some members of the Council suggested improvement in the secondary market
for c
ertificates issued by banks outside New York City.

In this connection,

it was noted that the most recent figures showed the volume of outstanding
certificates issued by New York City banks to be about $2.2 billion, with a

NA

estimate that there might be outstanding around $4 billion of such

eertificates issued by other banks.

Inquiry was made whether it might be

reasonable to suppose that one-third of the certificates that were issued subappeared in the secondary market, and a view was expressed that this
Percentage might be on the high side.

President Murphy observed that there

appeared to be a tendency on the part of corporate treasurers to place in
tiegotiable certificates funds for which there was no foreseeable need for periods
Of

'say, six to nine months.

He felt that in these circumstances the certificates

tisuallY would not be sold, although occasionally corporations might sell a
certificate and use the proceeds to buy another certificate at a higher interest
ate.

Mr. Hobbs mentioned that his bank had recently purchased a quantity of

certificates for its portfolio, having found that a better yield was available
the
These certificates were purchased in the secondary
4 on Treasury bills.
n4ltket, it was brought out; banks were not known to have issued certificates
to
other banks.

2/19/63

-94.

Does the Council detect any symptoms of deterioration
in lending standards, particularly in the field of
real estate credit?

The Council has observed some deterioration in lending standards, particularly in the field of real estate credit. There has
also been some pressure to lengthen the maturities of term loans.
However, lending standards generally are consistent with sound
banking practices.
During a general discussion of this subject, in which all of the members
ef the Council participated, some

of the members expressed the view that a

deterioration of lending standards had occurred.

This was traceable, they

suggested, to factors such as the intense competition for loans, the continuatiQn over an extended period of time of a relatively easy monetary policy,
44d the necessity to provide for interest payments on a large volume of time
41°11eY.

Other members of the Council were less disposed to use the word

deterioration.

They conceded that in response to changing conditions there had

been changes in lending practices, which might be spoken of as in the area of
liberalization.

At the same time it was contended that there had been offsetting

factors, such as the introduction of more scientific management of loan portand that the modifications in lending practices had in numerous instances
contributed to meeting community needs in a manner that reflected credit on the
banking
system.

It was contended that liberalization of credit terms, by

lengthening of maturities for example, did not necessarily mean a lowering of
1441ity standards.

While there were scattered references to the possibility

°f imPrudent lending practices at smaller banks in an effort to improve earnings,
and also to the longer run import of trends that might be developing, it was
the general sentiment that such changes as had occurred to date in lending
Ilactices had not created a problem of substantial concern at this time.

2/19/63

-10In the course of the discussion, President Murphy referred to the recent

approval of a rather substantial number of new banking offices in one part of
the Second District and the tendency toward extension of less sound credits
that might result from an overbanked situation.
Reference was made by a member of the Board to expressions of concern
°nut a deterioration of consumer loan standards, particularly in the case of
silt° loans, that had been made by a group of consumer bankers who recently
Visited the Board's offices.

The comments made in response indicated that in

Some scattered instances auto loans of 42-month maturity were beginning to be
o
ffered.

This development was regarded as rather disturbing.

In general,

however, it was not felt that the consumer loan situation presented problems
Of

Particular concern at present from the standpoint of the commercial banking

sYstem.

It was noted that the volume of consumer loans outstanding did not

41315ear unreasonably high in relation to the level of personal income.
Question was also raised whether concern was felt about the continuing
iae in the level of farm land prices.

Mr. Breidenthal indicated that he

sensed considerable concern about this trend.

He noted, however, that in the

TeAth District this trend was particA.arly noticeable in the case of irrigated
land.

Mr. Aston observed that in the Eleventh District prices had risen most

'
l41el'e the land was located close to the larger cities.

At some point, he

snggested, the rate of return available from such land should tend to bring
the price to a plateau.

Mr. Zwiener brought out that the small farmer could

11(It afford to mechanize to the extent he desired. Therefore, he was willing
to
Pay a high price for additional land so as to increase his acreage to the
hint that such mechanization would be economically feasible.

Mr. Moorhead

If‘d11111,

-11-

2/19/63

commented that the large farmer was at present prosperous, whereas the small
farmer was gradually disappearing from the scene.

The large farmer was

/411ing to pay a relatively high cost per acre for additional land; he would
be able to obtain a reasonable rate of return whereas the small farmer could

5.

(a) The Board would appreciate comments with respect
to developments in the area of time and savings
deposits, including the trend of such deposits, the
cost burden of higher interest rate levels, and
whether the uses made by banks of funds represented
by such deposits have been consistent with accepted
standards of bank liquidity and asset quality.
(b) Does the Council believe that competitive abuses
are likely to arise from the rapidly expanding use of
negotiable corporate certificates of deposit or that
unsound banking conditions might arise from widespread
reliance on deposits of this type? How would the
Council regard an increase to 3-1/2 per cent in the
maximum permissible interest rate payable under
Regulation Q on time deposits having a maturity of
less than six months?

(a) Although time and savings deposits continue to expand,
the rate of increase has slowed considerably and is substantially less
than it was a year ago. Furthermore, because of shifts in the distribution of bank assets that were effected last year, the squeeze on
bank profits currently is less than it was a year ago. Accordingly,
the pressure to extend maturities and to buy higher yielding assets
has lessened somewhat. As the Council has observed, there has been
some liberalization in credit standards, but in general the lending
and investment policies have been consistent with accepted standards
of bank liquidity and asset quality.
(b) The Council does not believe that significant competitive
abuses have arisen from the rapidly expanding use of negotiable
corporate certificates of deposit or that unsound banking conditions
have arisen from widespread reliance on deposits of this type. However,
the growth of negotiable corporate certificates of deposit has resulted
in important shifts in the types of bank assets. A continuing expansion
in the use of these certificates of deposit will tend to lessen the
liquidity of the banking system because of the pressure to use these
funds profitably.
The Council believes that bankers generally would not presently
favor an increase to 3-1/2 per cent in the maximum permissible interest
rate payable under Regulation Q on time deposits having a maturity of
less than six months.

-12-

2/19/63

President Murphy noted that there was some difference of opinion within
the Council with regard to the desirability of an increase to 3-1/2 per cent
in the maximum interest rate payable on time deposits having a maturity of less
than six months.

Some members would like to see the regulation of interest

rates on time deposits eliminated entirely, but the majority would not.

As

to the banking fraternity as a whole, he thought it safe to say that a large
raaJority of bankers would favor the retention of Regulation Q and retention of
the Present maximum permissible rates.
President Murphy referred, in this connection, to the developments
that had occurred after the maximum rates were adjusted to their present levels.
There was a general tendency to go to the new ceiling rates immediately, and
that could occur again.

If the restrictions were eliminated entirely, he was

inclined to feel that the banks might proceed somewhat more cautiously.

In

eaPect to negotiable certificates of deposit, he noted that the issuing banks
had spread out the maturities fairly scientifically.

At his bank there were

fairlY even maturities over a period of months, with a scale of rates designed
t° Produce this result.

If there should be a relaxation of maximum rates in

the short-term time deposit area to the extent suggested by the Board's question,
conceivably the end result could be a concentration of time money on a very
short-term basis.
Mr. Petersen observed that the action of the banking system following
the

relaxation of Regulation Q rates had tended to increase bank demand for

1(Ittgages and longer-term investments, and also to assist in the maintenance of
lic/rt-term rates.
been

From this standpoint, he judged that the Board should have

pleased with what had developed.

As to a possible further relaxation of

10
• st,

2/19/63

-13-

NNilati0n Q, Mr. Petersen said he was one of those who felt that it would be
Preferable if the maximum rate limitations were eliminated.

This view, he

added, was not in accord with the view of most bankers in the Third District.
Basically, the majority of bankers wanted to be protected against the foolishness
Of the fellow across the street, particularly where a large proportion of bank
assets was represented by savings funds.
taken

Turning to the discussion that had

place during the past several months regarding the consequences of the

°vement to a 4 per cent maximum rate, Mr. Petersen noted that it had developed
that the earnings of banks, at least the larger banks, were good in 1962.

In

his opinion, the principles involved in the question now presented by the Board
were

essentially the same as those that had been involved earlier in deciding

whether to increase the maximum rates to their present levels.
Of

The question

Protectionism again was involved.
Mr. Zwiener said he supposed an overwhelming majority of the bankers
the Seventh District would say that they did not want the present ceilings

changed,

However, he also supposed that those bankers issuing negotiable

certificates of deposit would like to have enough flexibility to protect their
15"ition in the event of a further increase in the Treasury bill rate.

Generally

allesking, the hanks operating in the money market probably would prefer to see
keD
QouLation Q provide such a wide range of latitude as to minimize the temptation
f°r everyone to go to the maximum.

He doubted that bankers would move quickly

to 4 rate of 3-1/2 per cent on time deposits under six months.

In summary,

the money market banks probably would favor the suggested change while other
batiks probably would be opposed to it.
Mr. McAllister expressed the view that most bankers in the Twelfth
Dis

trict would be opposed to the suggested change.

Corporate treasurers might

2/19/63
be tempted to take more of their demand money and seek to put it into time
deposits of short maturity at rates up to 3-1/2 per cent.

This would amount

to a step in the direction of paying interest on demand deposits.
Mr. Maestre expressed the view that the suggested change would be a
/Ili-stake at this time.

He asked how far banks could go in taking short-term

si°11eY and lending on a long-term basis in order to make a profit.
After Mr. McRae had expressed himself adversely with respect to the
suggested change, a member of the Council asked for background information and
inquired whether there was pressu.:e for such a move.

Chairman Martin replied

that there was no great pressure at the moment; the question had been raised
f°r the purpose of discussion.

In general, the principles involved were much

the same as those involved in consideration of the most recent increase in
Somewhat more specifically, however, there was

Nmation Q maximum rates.

the tie-in with the balance of payments problem and the effect on that problem
Of the movement of short-term funds.

The Chairman added that personally he

did not look with too much favor on the separation of domestic and foreign
ttrae deposits from the standpoint of interest rate limitations.
As the discussion continued, Mr. Stoner remarked that he would not like
to see the suggested change made, although at present there appeared to be an
element of inconsistency.

He added that banks in part of the Fourth District

had retained a maximum rate of 3 per cent on savings deposits, yet showed a
&°°d gain in such deposits.
Mr. Hobbs said he was one of those who favored the elimination of all
l'sstrictions.

He inquired whether in actuality the Board's suggestion was not

directed at time deposits with maturities from 90 to 180 days, and response was
aade to the effect that the question had not been phrased in precise terms.

4)f'4

2/19/63

-15Mr. Aston indicated that he would not favor the suggested change at

this time, although his view might be different in the event of an upward
movement in the general structure of interest rates.

He felt that the banking

"em was able to live satisfactorily at present under the existing provisions
Of Regulation Q and that adoption of a change such as suggested would get
closer to the point of paying interest on demand deposits.

If the change were

Made, he was apprehensive of a repetition of developments such as occurred
/411e11 Regulation Q was last revised.

This might have serious implications

because he did not know how, given the present rate structure, banks could use
more short-term deposits and break even on them.

Some banks might get hurt.

Mr. Moorhead expressed himself in favor of the suggested change.

The

banks had created a new money market instrument that was now important in the
Posit picture.

Within this setting, he felt that any restrictive ceiling

°A rates was dangerous, more so than borrowing short and lending long.

He

14°41d feel more secure if there was fairly good assurance that the banks would

be able to keep the deposits they had gained.
President Murphy indicated that he would be more in favor of eliminating
411 limitations on the payment of interest on time deposits than increasing
he maximum rate on short-term time certificates.

Ti the latter course were

f°1-lowed, he was fearful of a mass movement to the new maximum rate.

in this

e°11/1fttion, he referred to the repeal of the rate limitation on certain classes
foreign time deposits and expressed the view that the situation had been
working out well, with the banks bidding for the foreign funds as needed.

the
a

If

rate limitations on all time deposits were eliminated, he would hope for

similar approach.

2/19/63
Inquiry was made as to whether the Board had authority to eliminate
maxtuum rates on time deposits, and the answer was in the negative.

Chairman

Martin noted that there was some feeling that it would be permissible under
the

statute to fix a maximum rate so high as not to represent any real re-

striction.

On the other hand, there was also some feeling that this would

Violate the spirit of the law.
The discussion of this topic concluded with comments by President Murphy
O

certain longer run projections indicating a substantial further increase in

the aggregate of savings funds held at commercial banks, mutual savings banks,
44d savings and loan associations.

There was also a brief discussion of the

P°88ible effects on competition for savings funds if the insurance of deposits
arld of share accounts should be increased beyond the present maximum figure.
6.

Has the Council noted any tendency toward heightened
concern on the part of the business and financial
community with respect to U. S. balance of payments
developments? Are the difficult negotiations going
on within the European Economic Community a factor to
be taken into account and a subject of concern to bank
customers?

The Council has noticed increasing concern on the part of the
business and financial community with respect to the U. S. balance
of payments. Customers who have international investment and/or
trade interests are particularly concerned not only with balance of
payments developments, but also with the difficult negotiations going
on within the European Economic Community.
The discussion began with comments by some members of the Council to

the

effect that the balance of payments problem was becoming increasingly a

4atter of concern to businessmen and a topic of general conversation.

This did

4°t mean, however, that all those who were becoming more familiar with the
terminology of the balance of payments understood the full implications of

the

Problem or the measures that might be required to cope with it.

f'"?1

-17-

2/19/63

Mr. Martin suggested that the prospect of a heavily unbalanced budget
7444 an unfavorable psychological factor.

While the average businessman was

becoming more familiar with the language of the balance of payments, his
understanding of developments was limited.

There seemed to be a feeling of

concern about the fact that foreign countries were being importuned to make
advanced debt repayments to the United States; such prepayments seemed to
tePresent a borrowing against the future.

In general, the businessman felt

that the current business situation was quite favorable, with good profits
being recorded, but he foresaw constantly increasing pressure for taxes to cover
domestic and world-wide Governmental programs, all of which would enable the
G°vernment to bring more and more areas of the economy under its control.
Peelings of uncertainty and anxiety were being created.
Chairman Martin commented at this point that the discussion was now
beginning to touch upon a problem of much concern to the Board; namely, whether
the domestic economy would be stimulated by a further easing of money.

The

t41ated question involved the extent to which the balance of payments was
'
affected by interest rate differentials.
"
4 the availability of money.

The problem went to both the cost

If an effort was made to reduce interest rates

to be
one-half per cent, for example, the availability of money would have
increased substantially.

This in turn involved the problem of interest rate

telationships internationally.

As he had said on a number of occasions, it

/448 his view that the domestic and international problems could not be separated.
subPresident Murphy expressed the view that if money should be made
atantially easier, the Council would be likely to report a deterioration of
the banks would
lending standards at its next meeting with the Board, because

-18-

2/19/63

he under real pressure to put the additional funds to work.

The Council members

saw no evidence that legitimate demands for credit were going unsatisfied.
banks were trying hard to find ways to make loans.

The

If more funds were avail-

able, he found it difficult to foresee how they would be used.
President Murphy noted that United States banks doing an international
business were making more and more commitments abroad, indicating that their
reserve positions were not uncomfortable.

The foreign commitments that he

knew about were sound, but he did not know how far the banking system should
8° in that direction.

Part of this foreign lending reflected interest rate

differentials; foreign companies could come into the U. S. market and borrow
at

rates that were attractive by standards in their own countries.

If money

'ere eased further, he felt that the banking community might be forced into
doing some things that the best judgment of bankers would lead them to question.
he felt confident that the balance of payments would be affected adversely.
Chairman Martin then commented that although loan demand had been
quite good during the past year, the conventionally-defined money supply had

begun to contract again recently.

Business activity appeared quite good.

however, there were those who maintained that the Federal Reserve had been
f°110wing too restrictive a monetary policy because of the failure of the
111°4eY supply to increase more rapidly.
The members of the Council having indicated that they did not agree,
Chairman Martin turned to the substantial growth of time and savings deposits
°Vet" the past year and raised the question whether there was agreement with

his
Eig

conclusion that a substantial portion of such deposits might be regarded
virtually the equivalent of demand deposits.

2/19/63

-19President Murphy expressed the view that much of the increase in time

dePosits represented money that had come out of the bill market and the commercial
Paper market.

Today's corporate treasurer was a sophisticated businessman who

knew to the dollar how much money needed to be kept on demand deposit.

Even

in the absence of the increase in time deposits, President Murphy felt that

the demand deposit picture would have been roughly the same because the
enrPorate treasurers would have found other avenues of investment for their

Mr. Aston observed that reference frequently was made to a so-called
hard core of time and savings money.

In his judgment, however, there was no

hard core of negotiable certificates of deposit.

As he saw it, they reflected

PurelY a switch in form of investment for the purpose of seeking a rate of
interest.

He went on to say that in the Eleventh District time and savings

clePosits traditionally had been low in relation to demand deposits until
recently.

He felt that a large proportion of the recent increase in such

deposits actually represented investment money rather than what might be called
true savings.

In his opinion, under certain conditions the negotiable cer-

tificates of deposit might dry up as fast as maturities occurred, with greater
4etiVity in the secondary market as more favorable rates became available from
Other forms of investment.

This money, he thought, would be available to the

banking system only as long as the rate was favorable in comparison with the
eturn from other forms of investment.
In further discussion, Mr. Petersen referred to balance of payments
developments and pointed out that around the middle of 1962 official statements
and estimates had given rise to a considerable degree of optimism.

However,

,
1

A

-20-

2/19/63

When the figures for the third quarter became available, the situation was seen
to have
deteriorated and the feeling of optimism was replaced by one of
disappointment.

The Canadian dollar crisis admittedly had introduced an

eXtraordinary factor into the picture, but he felt there may have been a
tendency for official statements to go too far in the direction of suggesting
that the problem was moving toward a solution.

This made it all the more

disconcerting when statistics released later showed that the trend was not
favorable.
Breidenthal addressed himself to the question whether some portion
of time
and savings deposits should not be considered as part of the money
suPPlY.

He had always felt that a part of such deposits should be included,

although
he was not prepared to say what percentage would be appropriate.

There

Ilere economists who would say that commercial banks should not hold time and
8aving8 deposits, that they did not add anything to the money supply.

Never-

theless, looking at the recent trend of demand deposits as compared with the
atcNth of time deposits, it was his view that some portion of the latter could
reasonably be included.
Governor Balderston pointed out that prior to the change in Regulation
q time and savings deposits had been growing at an annual rate of about 12
Per cent.

Subsequently, they had grown at an annual rate of 18 per cent,

I'ellecting in part the issuance of negotiable certificates of deposit.

Having

in mind Mr. Aston's comments, he wondered how much of the increment could
etifiably be thought of as part of the money supply.
President Murphy expressed the view that this type of money might be
considered fairly secure if the banks had the necessary rate flexibility.

It

f'
2/19/63

-21-

bad been said by some that time deposits of foreign central banks could not
be counted upon because they would shift according to rate differentials.

Now

that the interest rate limitation on such deposits had been removed, however,
he felt rather confident that this money was more secure.

By the same token,

he felt a little more complacent about the negotiable certificates than some
(3f the other members of the Council, since corporations should continue to be
in e fairly liquid position for the foreseeable future.

If the banks had

leeway to compete ratewise, they should be able to retain these funds.

In

1962) he noted, the banks enjoyed their second best year in history from the
st
andpoint of earnings, showing that the funds obtained by offering higher
rates of interest had been put to work.

He continued to feel that the

savings dollar held in a bank was worth more to the community than the savings
dollar held in other financial institutions.

Therefore, he concluded that

recent developments had been constructive.
Chairman Martin then presented a hypothetical question involving the
P°esibility of an international payments crisis and inquired whether it was
felt by the Council that an increase in the discount rate would be effective
in such circumstances.

If one argued that capital movements were not affected

Substantially by interest rate differentials, one might also argue that an
increase in the discount rate at such a time would have little effect.
In the discussion that ensued, President Murphy suggested that the
hc)blem seemed to boil down largely to a question of confidence.

As

ell1Plified by the experience after World War IT, people were not likely to
tl'ansfer money to a country unless they thought it would be safe.

If

f°teigners were to lose confidence in the fiscal responsibility of the United

-22-

2/19/63

States, he doubted whether this could be corrected simply by an increase in
the discount rate.
Mr. Petersen expressed a somewhat different view, saying that it
seemed evident that short-term capital, at least, was influenced by interest
rate differentials.

In a situation such as suggested, it seemed to him that

it would be logical to use indirect controls first and see whether they were
effective.

Before turning to alternatives such as exchange controls, it

Would appear reasonable to try to curb claims against the dollar by
endeavoring to make it attractive on a rate basis to transfer funds to this
Country,
Chairman Martin noted the results of increasing the British Bank
114te and suggested it seemed to have had an impact from the standpoint of
imProving confidence in the pound sterling.
President Murphy agreed, adding that his previous remarks had been
directed more toward developments that might ensue as the result of
ekePticism about the ability of this country to keep its financial house
in order.

In an actual crisis, the natural move would be to attempt to

deal with it by an increase in the discount rate.

He hoped that such a

) would be effective, although he entertained some doubt.
ate!
7.

The Board would appreciate the Council's comments on
effects observed thus far from the depreciation and
tax credit provisions adopted in 1962.

With the exception of certain industries, the Council has
observed few effects that it would attribute to the depreciation and
tax credit provisions adopted in 1962.
The

Council's statement was noted, and there was no substantive dis-

cuasion of this topic.

2/19/63

-238.

What are the Council's views regarding the impact of
monetary and credit policy under current conditions?

The Council believes that current monetary and credit policy
has had a generally favorable impact on the economy. This policy
has been a constructive factor in the domestic economy and at the
same time has been helpful to the balance of payments.
This topic having been covered quite fully in previous discussion,

there were no further comments at this point.
Having been invited by the Board to comment on the proposed Regulation
11) Foreign Branches of National Banks, which had been published in the Federal
Ilegister as a notice of proposed rule making, the Council presented the
following statement:
The Council favors the revision of Regulation M intended to
carry out the purposes of P. L. 87-588, "To improve the usefulness
Of national bank branches in foreign countries." In considering
the Board's proposed revision, members of the Council have reviewed
the comments of certain national banks with branches abroad. The
Council believes that their suggestions merit consideration by the
Board.
Three of the members of the Council indicated that certain national
banks in their respective districts were of the opinion that the proposed
l egulation did not go far enough in the direction of providing latitude for
'
f°teign branch operations.

Their attitude toward the points made by those

banks was generally sympathetic.

They understood that the banks were

"Immunicating with the Board.
It was understood that the next meeting of the Federal Advisory
e"ncil would be held May 20-21, 1963.
The meeting then adjourned.

/(--

Secretary