View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

Minutes for

To:

April 111 1961

Members of the Board

From: Office of the Secretary

Attached is a copy of the minutes of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on
the above date.
It is not proposed to include a statement
With respect to any of the entries in this set of
minutes in the record of policy actions required to
be maintained pursuant to section 10 of the Federal
Reserve Act.
Should you have any question with regard to
the minutes, it will be appreciated if you will advise
the Secretary's Office. Otherwise, please initial below.
If you were present at the meeting, your initials will
indicate approval of the minutes. If you were not present,
Your initials will indicate only that you have seen the
minutes.




Chin. Martin
Gov. Szymczak
Gov. Mills
Gov. Robertson
Gov. Balderston
Gov. Shepardson
Gov. King

Minutes of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Oh Tuesday,
April 11, 1961.
PRESENT:

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

The Board met in the Board Room at 10:00 a.m.

Balderston, Vice Chairman
Mills
Robertson
Shepardson
King
Sherman, Secretary
Kenyon, Assistant Secretary
Molony, Assistant to the Board
Fauver, Assistant to the Board
Hackley, General Counsel
Farrell, Director, Division of Bank Operations
Solomon, Director, Division of Examinations
Hooff, Assistant General Counsel
Leavitt, Assistant Director, Division of
Examinations
Mr. Achor, Review Examiner, Division of
Examinations

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Items circulated to the Board.

The following items, which had

been circulated to the members of the Board and copies of which are
ttached to these minutes under the respective item numbers indicated,
were

aPproved unanimously:
Item No.

Iutter to Chemical Bank New York Trust Company,
t;:7 York, Nev York, approving an extension of
14.1e to establish a branch at Third Avenue and
st
Street.
Letter to
Chemical Bank New York Trust Company,
'lel,/ 11
c)rk, New York, approving an extension of
'
tim
e
-I4reetto
establish a branch at 501 East 79th
tett
,,l er to the Presidents of all Federal Reserve
ta
tc-);:s regarding information to be furnished to the
otZ1 on (1) leases entered into for the rental of
ri
space, including space used exclusively for
(A al agency activities, (2) space within a Bank:
a ecl. building leased to tenants, and (3) renewals
„
—'uterminations of leases.




1

2

3

4/11/61

-2Item No.

Letter to Bank of Belle Fourche, Belle Fourche,
South. Dakota, approving the establishment of a
branch at
Spearfish, Lawrence County.
Application of State Street Bank and Trust Company (Item No. 5).
There had been distributed to the members of the Board copies of a memofrom the Division of Examinations dated April 5, 1961, regarding
t4e application of State Street Bank and Trust Company, Boston,
Maseachusetts, for permission to merge with Rockland-Atlas National
1341* of Boston and to operate branches at the present seven offices of
the national bank.

The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and the Division

cl Examinations both recommended approval.

The reports of the Comptroller

ot the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on the
e°111Petitive aspects of the proposed merger indicated that in the view of
those agencies the transaction would not have an adverse effect on
e°731Petition. The Department of Justice noted that the merger would
ex
hance the ability of the resulting bank to compete with Boston's
z est institution, which had assets in excess of all other Boston banks
eoMbined.

However, other recent combinations in the area, together with

the °Ila under consideration, would leave Boston in the position of
4°Ing four large banks with 79 offices and, contrastingly, four
relatively small banks with only six offices. Thus, a high degree of
barar4
--'ng concentration would be further enhanced. Such consolidations,
the ,
%Justice Department stated, were indicative of the trend in the




°
-I 2c
,JAy
-3area that would place the smaller banks in increasingly disadvantageous
competitive positions, and give rise to further consolidations with
slltstantially adverse competitive results.

The Department further

stated that it seemed obvious that a combination of the two banks
ProPosing to merge would eliminate very substantial competition in
ec)nnilercial banking in the area, and that it would constitute a further
Ste
lp tuward oligopoly in banking in Boston.

Thus, the proposed

e°4solidation would have substantial adverse effects on competition
14 coMmercial banking in the important Boston area.
In stating the basis for proposed approval of the merger, the
of Examinations pointed out that there were nine commercial

baro,

•

in Boston operating 87 offices in Suffolk County with aggregate

clePosits of individuals, partnerships, and corporations exceeding $2.2
11"11°11. The merger would combine the third and fifth largest banks.

The r
esulting bank, with 18.7 per cent of area deposits of individuals,
Partn
erships
-, and corporations, would rank second in size of the area

be'llks, but it would be only about one-third the size of the largest bank
14 Boston.

While the merger would eliminate the smallest of the five

Boston commercial banks and competition between the two banks
1111kgved, the resulting bank could, because of its increased size,

lero 4

capacity, and broader banking services, as well as strengthened

rflazi

agement, stimulate competition in Boston and the greater Boston

41e**()P°11-tan area as it would be able to compete on more effective terms




4/11/61
with the significantly larger First National Bank of Boston, with those
banks now affiliated with Baystate Corporation and with the Shawmut
gr°1-1P of banks, and with the mutual savings banks.

The merger should

result in intensified competition among the four large commercial
banks that would exist after the merger had been consummated.

There

remain alternative banking outlets in the area, and the merger
eh°104 not create an environment in which the small banks would find it
111°re difficult to operate.
Question was raised whether the Board should proceed with
eQnsideration of the matter today, with five members present, or
Ilhether it should defer consideration of the proposal until a time
hen more members of the Board were present.

After discussion of the

raet°rs involved, including the prospective schedule of attendance at
meetings, it was decided to proceed with consideration of the
Qase

At the Board's request, Mr. Solomon made a statement which he
efaced by saying that the Division of Examinations considered this
'
131
elose and difficult case. Continuing, he said that basically the
diff,
-culty arose out of consideration of the competitive factor because
the other factors required by the statute to be considered appeared to
be ba
-s-,cally satisfactory or neutral.

In this connection, he noted

that in the application it was claimed that the resulting bank would
be

).e through the merger to improve its management because it would




12 4
4/11/61

-5-

the services of the president of the national bank.

As to the

competitive situation, this was complicated by the fact that there were
several different ways of looking at the matter.

One way would be to

look at the city of Boston and its commercial banks.

Here it was found

that the large First National Bank of Boston overshadowed the whole
Picture, having more deposits than all of the other banks combined,
l'hether one looked at deposits of individuals, partnerships, and
corporations or at total deposits.

After First National, there were

r°111" other fairly large banks and then four fairly small banks. (An
ad-ditional outlying bank was established December 14, 1960.) The
Pr°Posed merger would combine the third and fifth largest banks, and
the

resulting bank would definitely be second in size.

However, the

l'esillting bank would still be only about one-third the size of First
44ti°1141.

As to banking offices, each of the banks proposing to merge

nuy o
perated seven offices and the application indicated that it was
40t

t"r0Posed to close any of the offices.

Thus, the resulting bank

17°124 have 14 offices, compared with 27 operated by First National and
'
32 °Perated by the National Shawmut Bank of Boston.

If the merger was

Q(Instlitmated, the resulting bank would have about 19 per cent of total
411°81ts of individuals, partnerships, and corporations. In addition,
the
lse was in the city of Boston a branch of Brown Brothers Harriman and
COJth
VE4V)

Private bankers of New York City; it was not known exactly how

kalvOf the deposits of this firm came from the Boston area.




Further,

VA,:bk)

4/11/61

-6-

there were in Boston a large number of mutual savings banks having
aggregate deposits of around $1.7 billion.

There was always a question

as to the weight that should be given to savings bank deposits in a
Particular situation.

Obviously, there was a certain amount of

competition between them and the commercial banks, but not exactly the
same kind of competition as among commercial banks themselves.
A further complication, Mr. Solomon pointed out, was that the
113ston area had recently grown more on the outskirts than within the
city Proper.

In Massachusetts a bank can have branches only in the

sa'rue county in which it is located.

Thus, Boston banks could have

bran
ches in Suffolk County, but it was in the surrounding counties that
121°st of the recent growth had occurred.

While First National Bank had

ri° branches in those suburban areas, there were two large bank holding
ecelPanies to be considered.
Ett

One time was legally affiliated with First National Bank but apparently

1.748 not at present.
lia.8

The first was Baystate Corporation, which

The second was Shawmut Corporation, which admittedly

affiliated with the National Shawmut Bank of Boston.

Baystate

Q°11trolled seven banks with 80 offices in the surrounding counties and
A00 n1
lion of deposits, while National Shawmut Bank and its
e.rfiliated holding company banks in the surrounding areas had $570
4111/ion of deposits and 54 banking offices.

If the deposits of its

€1rfilleted institutions were counted, National Shawmut would be
Qonsiderably larger than the bank resulting from the proposed merger.




4/11/61

-7Turning back to the commercial banking situation in the city of

33°ston proper, Mr. Solomon commented that the percentage of deposits
°f State Street Bank and Trust Company, now standing at 14, would rise
to 19 if the merger were consummated.

This compared with about 52

National Shawmut Bank would have

Per cent for First National Bank.

411°1-111c1 14 per cent of the total and the New England Merchants National
1341alcabout 10 per cent.

The percentages of the remaining four banks

were very small.
With regard to the report on competitive factors submitted by
the Department of Justice, Mr. Solomon commented that although it was
a rather adverse report, it did not seem quite as vigorous as some of

the reports that had been submitted by the Department.
In summary, Mr. Solomon said that taking into account the mutual
/lnge banks, which offered a certain degree of competition, and taking
Int° account the holding company subsidiary banks operating in the
811burbs,

it seemed to the Division of Examinations that a favorable

l'ee°Mmendation could be justified.

However, the Division recognized

that this was not an open and shut case.
Mr. Hackley said that in this case, as in all such cases, the

b.
--40 question was one of judgment as to whether, on balance, approval
Ni°111(1 be in the public interest.

This judgment must be made after

Nleig'lling not only the competitive factor but also the several so-called

bant,
--lng factors mentioned in the statute. In his opinion, this case




4/11/61

-8-

involved a close question of judgment.
On

competition in different ways.

One could look at the effect

On the one hand, it could be argued

that the merger would to some extent intensify and increase competition.
On the
other hand, it would eliminate a significant amount of existing
e°111Petition between the two banks involved, and it could well have an
adverse effect on competition in the future, in light of the fact that
there would be four large commercial banks having almost 95 per cent
the total deposits of individuals, partnerships, and corporations
held by the banks in the city of Boston.

In that situation there was

ba.S18 for a possible judgment that the merger would have a potentially
eciverse effect in the future, as well as serving to eliminate existing
e°111Petiti0n.

Looking at the so-called banking factors, there seemed to

be °IllY the suggestion that the merger might enable the resulting bank
to obtain better management.

To the Legal Division this seemed a

1"8.ther weak argument, particularly in view of the size of the applicant
b44k.

It was also suggested that the resulting bank would have a larger

3-eliding limit and therefore would be better able to compete for larger
aec°1-Ints.

However, he (Mr. Hackley) felt there was a serious question

Ilhether the admittedly adverse effects on existing competition were
Ilfriciently outweighed by the suggested benefits to warrant a conclusion
the..

on balance the merger would be in the public interest.

The views

of the Department of Justice would be significant if bank mergers were
Ilbiect to the Clayton Act because the merger would eliminate a




4/11/61

-9-

substantial amount of existing competition.

However, bank mergers are

not subject to the Clayton Act. Whether the Justice Department would
131'°ceed under the Sherman Act if the merger were approved could not be
Predicted, and probably this should not be a relevant consideration in
l'°11111111g a judgment under the bank merger statute.
Mr. Hooff commented that the small banks in Boston apparently
/4°Illa. be no worse off if the merger were consummated than they were now.
48entially, the situation might be viewed in terms that there were at
Preseat five substantiFil commercial banks in the city and that the
Q°481Anzation of the merger would result in a reduction of this number
t° f°11r.

The question whether a reduction in number from five to four

81101-11c1 be allowed was a matter for the Board's determination in its
disc
retion.
In reply to a question by Governor Shepardson, Mr. Solomon
eqressed the view that the applicant bank haa a reasonable basis for
linliting its lines of credit to 10 per cent of capital and surplus,
'
611:though under Massachusetts law loans up to 20 per cent of capital and
.131us are permissible.
111
'

The applicant bank apparently felt that the

Of 10 per cent contained in the National Bank Act was a prudent
ren,s,r
st't1 ement. In other words, it apparently felt that the limit of
10 1)e
r cent in the Federal statute was a more sound standard than the
Per cent found in the State law.

Mr. Solomon doubted that anyone

Q°11.1a-' quarrel too strongly with the right of the bank to follow this
thm
,ory.




4/11/61

-10Mr. Hackley commented that the legislative history of the bank

Inerger statute indicated that the bank supervisory agencies were entitled
to consider the competition of mutual savings banks and other financial
institutions.

That was a relevant consideration in this case.

However,

the veight to be given to that consideration was a matter for the
j114;1ent of the Board.
Governor Mills said that he concurred in the favorable recomttlerldation of the Division of Examinations.
cli4

not

He went on to say that he

find the same difficulties in the case that the Division of

ce.141/lations, and apparently the Legal Division, had encountered in
reaching
about

a conclusion.

He felt that it was necessary to be cautious

making statements concerning possible adverse competitive effects

elIC12 having made such a statement, to stand on it as a consideration of

slIch a nature as to disqualify further examination and analysis of an
cation of this kind.

When talking about competition, he did not

thlnk that one could necessarily measure it in tangible terms.

The

ell-III-I-nation of an existing bank might at the same time permit competition
11131441'd into a larger area, and this, with equal weight and force of
allent, might be in the public interest.
'
a:t1011,

In the case under consider-

he thought that this was true.
Governor Mills noted that there were two areas of competition

to co
nsider:

the city of Boston and the greater Boston metropolitan

" In the larger area, there were a number of separately incorporated
al'ec




-11satellite communities, constituting together an integral part of a
single community.

If attention, however, was focused on the city

Or Boston proper, it would be found that the banks that were in
clirect competition were those dealing largely on a wholesale basis in
the downtown part of the city.

The smaller banks that might be

c°nsidered to be subject to an adverse competitive exposure were in a
sense specialized banks, each serving a distinct clientele.

Thus, the

bahks actually in direct competition in the city were five in number.
If this merger were approved, the effect would be to create relative
eqUalitY, except for First National Bank, in an area where competition
e°111d. be profitably enhanced in the public interest.
Governor Mills also pointed out that State Street Bank and
Trilst Company and the New England Merchants National Bank had historically
c°11fifled a major part of their activities to the trust business.

While

e°41131ercial banking activities had not been incidental to the trust
bilsilless, they had been subordinate to it, to a degree that would not

be f°11ad to prevail generally.
In a city the size of Boston proper, Governor Mills said, there
ere reasons
to believe that a merger of these two banks involved in
the
clIrrent application would be beneficial community-wise by providing

a larger pool of resources for credit purposes.

As to the greater

10st°a
metropolitan area, comprising a population over 2 million, the
barlk

that would be created through the merger would be a relatively




4/11/61

-12-

sraa1l bank to serve a community with the commercial, industrial, and
Personal activities that abound throughout the area concerned.

When

the greater Boston area was considered, it was found that the proposed
bellk would be in competition with substantial institutions representing
the Shawmut Corporation and Baystate Corporation.

Further, while there

ight be no legal ties at present, there were ties of sentiment and
14terest between First National Bank and Baystate that in effect exerted
espread competitive influence with which the merged institution

4

*4°4-141

have to contend.
tions
Also, Governor Mills pointed out, there were fringe considera

that must enter into the judgment of the Board in coming to a decision.
It

1445

savings
important, for example, that there was a myriad of mutual

bani„ .
in the Boston area.

In effect, they were in competition with

areas.
ec)rninercial banks to a greater degree than would be true in other
This was recognized by the Board in the Springfield case in 1957, where
keY Point in the decision that permitted Baystate to acquire a second
be
llk in Springfield was the fact that in a homogenous community, with
savings banks.
satellites around it, there were important mutual

Under

services
148.8eachusetts law, mutual savings banks are permitted to render
bronA
elsewhere, and
-4er in character than permitted to such banks
'
rendered by savings
inlY of a broader character than the services
'
celte
and 1area.
'‘uan associations, which also compete in the Boston

It

had
eetried significant that neither of the banks proposing to merge




JL• OIJA.
,

-13ever made any strong effort to attract time deposits; they had relinquished
that field to the savings banks.

Their judgment might be questioned, but

theY had accepted the competition from the mutuals without making any
sel'iolls endeavor to compete for time deposits.

It also seemed significant

that the majority stockholders of the two banks, on a composite basis,
/4el'e mutual savings banks, which would indicate that the mutuals were
11°.t concerned about the effect of the merger.
Governor Mills repeated that it was his belief that the application
ecruld reasonably be approved.

In his judgment, the factors involved

liere not nearly as closely balanced as they apparently were in the judgment
Or

others.

Coming back to general principles, he reiterated that he

th011gbt it was necessary to be cautious, really aside from this particular
ease/ about the kind of statements that the Board brought into its
deeieicms.

In the case of the application of Northwest Bancorporation

to acquire shares of the First National Bank of Pipestone, Minnesota,

the 130ard had expressed the judgment that savings and loan associations
811°1-ad not be taken into consideration in appraising competition in the
' rlg

field.

Actually, there were all shades of competition from

were
fillaacial intermediaries, and the mutual savings banks in Boston
11tely competitive.

Personally, he would think that the savings

1051t associations also were competitive to the extent that they
along with commercial banks, in attracting deposits and in
re

--. estate financing.




4/11/61

-14Governor Robertson said that he could not concur in the recommen-

dati°n of the Division of Examinations.

This application involved two

sizable institutions that served exactly the same territory; they were
competitive with each other in every respect.

The merger would eliminate

that competition without any question, and therefore it seemed necessary
to look to the other factors mentioned in the statute to see if there
vere favorable aspects.

The only claim advanced with any vigor by the

4PPlicant was the need to obtain the president of the other institution
to serve as president of the resulting bank, but this was not the only
vaY that good management could be Obtained in an institution of this
812'e. To base a merger application primarily on a desire to have the
13rss1dent of the merging bank become executive officer of the resulting
1)44k seemed rather ridiculous, and he would discount that argument.

As

to the need for a larger loan limit, the limit of State Street Bank and
trust Company had gotten as large as it was now by virtue of a previous
flier
ger within the past several years.

Further, the applicant bank was

11c)t using the loan limit that it now had available.

Under State law

the limit was 20 per cent of capital and surplus, and the applicant had
the right to use that limit, but it had voluntarily accepted the 10
iper cent limitation prescribed by Federal statute.

If the bank had used

a limitation of 15 per cent, it would have had a larger loan limit
th4ri
was proposed for use after the merger now under consideration.
Aec°l'a.ingly, he would discount that argument completely so far as it




•

4/11/61

-15-

i-ght be a basis for offsetting what he considered to be the adverse
effect on the public interest of diminishing competition.

He did not

see that the applicant had submitted any basis for approval of the
Proposal except that, as aforesaid, it would like to accomplish the
Merger and to have better management.

The community involved was

Undoubtedly the leading community in the whole of New England from the
standpoint of finance, trade, and other measurements, and already the
111-11nber of banks was small as the result of mergers in the past.

If

°wn Brothers and Harriman were included, the total would be six, but
'
131
ill terms of commercial banks the merger would reduce the number to four.
Moreover, additional mergers could be proposed on the basis of exactly
the same reasoning as given in support of the present proposal.

For

the reasons he had stated, he did not feel that the proposed merger
1.1°111d be in the public interest.
Governor Shepardson stated that he. had encountered a great deal
f difficulty in resolving his views on this case.

He had given

eollsideration to the points raised by Governor Mills and to those
raised by Governor Robertson, but it seemed to him there was a real
ipr°hlem in trying to weigh the competitive aspects of the proposal.

For

example, there was the question of the extent to which the group

°r larger
Re 17,,
-.118

banks and the group of smaller banks in Boston were competitive

inclined to the view that there was not a great deal of competition

betv
een the two groups; the smaller banks would appear to be more in the




4/11/61

-16-

n8.ture of specialized institutions than large city financial institutions.
Then too, he was concerned about the reduction of alternative sources
or banking facilities so far as the larger banks were concerned.

It

c°11-14 be argued either way; that is, that competition among the remaining
bellks would be strengthened or that competition in the community would
be 'reduced significantly by the elimination of a sizable and apparently
Successful competitor.

On the matter of the loan limit, he thought

there was also a difficult question as to whether the applicant bank was
f°11°/fing a prudent practice in failing to avail itself of the limit
PrcEvided by State law and instead following the limit prescribed for
lAti°nal banks.

Further, there was the competition afforded by the

olltlYing banks, particularly those representing Baystate Corporation
ar4 Si..awmut Corporation, and this factor should be taken into account.
These

Points illustrated the complications that he found in this case

In t
rYing to arrive at a satisfactory answer.
to

At the moment it seemed

that the principle of attrition was important, and that the reduction

43-In
'

of 8.1ternative banking sources had to reach a stopping point at some place.
This
roposal would reduce alternative banking sources, and the number
p

existing banks was not large for a community the size of Boston.
It 1418 his present thinking that in the longer run this further reduction
be adverse to the public interest.
Governor Robertson made the further statement at this point
that the
record seemed to indicate that the two banks proposing to merge




-17not only been able to compete with each other but also had been
able to compete with the larger institutions on a fair basis.

Their

earnings had increased in each of the past five years, and they were
not low, as would be the case if the banks in question were severely
hatidicapped in competing with the larger institutions.
Governor King commented that he had been on occasion a borrower
*oulbanks that could not or did not desire to handle the entire amount
of the
loan, and he had seen the ease with which it was possible to share
8. line

of credit with other banks.

From that viewpoint, he could not

41 much importance to the thought that the institutions in question
"
not be able to compete with the larger banks.
and he thought they had been competing.
44a* appeared to be good institutions.

They could compete,

Both banks were quite sizable

In fact, he was somewhat

—prised that the applicant bank, in submitting its application, had
allvanced as a reason for the merger a desire to improve its management.
Me bank had other means to expand and to build its organization, but
it pr
°leased that it needed to strengthen its management through the
Droposed merger.
Governor King also said that although he realized no two cases
Irere identical, he viewed this application as somewhat similar in general
cha•racteristics to the application of the Citizens Fidelity Bank and
"Company of Louisville, Kentucky, that the Board denied last year.
'44




tJ4)1

-18He then stated that he would favor denying this application.

He had

he
tIlea to find some way of supporting approval in his own mind, but
e°414 not find a sufficient basis.
approval.
Governor Balderston stated that he would favor

He

said that he had included in his analysis the mutual savings banks,
*Itch

were somewhat akin to commercial banks in the services they

rendered.

and
He had also included in his analysis Brown Brothers

which
liarriman because of its size and the nature of its operations,
Maae him feel that it could properly be classified with the group of
larger banks in Boston.

He had further included in his analysis the two

h°14
ing companies operating a substantial number of banking offices
oiltside the city proper but within the greater Boston metropolitan area.

Ther were
it
two considerations that troubled him, because he found
difficult to reconcile them clearly in his mind and because he thought

thel'e was
was
some inherent conflict in them, The first consideration
that of dominance of market power.

To him that was related to the

baolUte size, and also the relative size, of the largest bank, or on
aion the largest pair of banks.
'
°ces
held

In this case the largest bank

more than 50 per cent of total deposits of the Boston commercial

bank,

--°.

ge
In such a situation, he felt it behooved the Board to encoura

e sense
e°4115etition by strong rivals, rivals large enough in the absolut
for banking business
44d Strong enough in the relative size to do battle

ith the largest institution. That consideration inclined him toward




*

4/11/61

-)

-19-

aPProval.

On the other side was the consideration of providing adequate

freedom of banking choice for depositors and borrowers.

The limits of

that freedom were narrowed, at least to some degree, whenever two banks
Illerged.

However, the degree of importance that he attached to the

redUction of banking choices depended on the number of banks that were
left.

Here there would remain in the city five large banks, plus

several smaller banks and the mutual savings banks.

Accordingly, in

this instance he would give somewhat less weight than usual to this
Particular consideration.
'

Further, this application did not seem to

r4ise a question that frequently confronted the Board in such cases;
that is, the nurturing and care of the smaller independent banks.

As

he saw it, the small independent banks would be affected adversely by
the growth of the larger banks whether the latter be few or considerable
i4 nUmber.

In this case the ability of the small banks to survive apparently

1c31-11d not be substantially affected by the proposed merger, and he did not
t°resee that the opportunity of starting new banks in the area would be
jured by the merger.

Consequently, he would support the recommendation

the Division of Examinations.
Mr. Hackley stated that in his previous comments he had been
elpressing his personal difficulty in finding demonstrable reasons under

the

so-called banking factors to offset the reduction of competition
that
lias mathematically certain. However, that was not intended to be

4 recommendation by the Legal Division.




Under the competitive factor,

4/11/61

-20-

he vent on to say, the Board is required to consider the effect of the
Proposed merger on competition, and there might be under that factor
bc/th favorable and unfavorable considerations, as apparently there
vere in this case.

The elimination of competition between the two banks

illvolved in the proposed merger could be mathematically demonstrated,
elld therefore it was an adverse factor.

The extent to which the merger

Irlight enhance competition with the larger banks was more difficult to
demonstrate mathematically, but it might be just as valid a consideration.
14 this case it appeared to come to a matter of disregarding the so-called
ba4king factors and making a judgment as to whether the possible enhanceIllerit of potential competition that could not be mathematically demonstrated
41'e sufficient to offset the elimination of existing competition that
e°1114 be mathematically demonstrated.
After further discussion, Governor Shepardson stated that he
lisheci to make an additional statement with regard to his position. He
haa
indicated previously that he found a great deal of difficulty in
l'es°17ing this case.

The discussion today, particularly the remarks

or Governor Balderston and Mr. Hackley which were made subsequent to
his ,
'wn previous comments, had caused him to think further on the relative
eight that should be given to the reduction of alternative banking
11();
'
ees as contrasted with the possible strengthening of competition in
the
area where the merger was to occur. Originally he had separated the
la
'
r'gel" group of banks from the other banks, with the feeling that the




4/11/61

-21-

latter were not a significant competitive factor.

However, in the

deci 4
-8-‘011 made in the Baystate case in 1957 the competition of the mutual
8aviags banks was given considerable weight.

He had not agreed with the

138-Y8tate decision, because it countenanced the elimination of a strong
dependent bank in an area where there were few independent banks.
Nevertheless, the competitive situation of the other banks in relationship
to the largest bank in Boston could be related to the action that the

Ikerd

took in the Baystate case.

Also, he had supported the majority

vieW in the Firstamerica case in California in 1959 when the Board
decided to permit an effort to build up a strong competitor to the
cl°41111ant banking institution.

Further, a factor involved in the Board's

liecieion in 1960, with which he concurred, to approve the merger of the
1141‘ris Trust and Savings Bank and the Chicago National Bank, both of
Clileago, was the prospective ability of the resulting bank to compete
171°Iie effectively with the two largest Chicago banks.
the

Having considered

further aspects of the matter, Governor Shepardson said, he would

vote to
approve the current application.
Accordingly, the application of State Street Bank and Trust
C P8-11Y was approved, Governors Robertson and King dissenting for the
l'e48°118 they hsci stated.

A copy of the letter sent to the applicant

1344k Pursuant to this action is attached as Item No.




5.

f r-

4/11/61

-22It was agreed that reference to this action would be included in

the veekly K.3 statement scheduled for release this afternoon or tamorrow.
The meeting then adjourned.




Secl'etary

,

BOARDOF GOVERNORS
141g0t,

.

\-.)1

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

01

A*
441.

0t,
'
t `t$

OF THE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

a 44

Item No. 1

4/11/61

ADDRESS OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE
TO THE BOAR,:

*
4440*

April 11, 1961

Board of Directors,
Chemical Bank
New York Trust Company,
New York, New York.
Gentlemen:
Pursuant to your request submitted through the
l'ederal Reserve Bank of New York, the Board of Governors
21'
the Federal Reserve System extends to October 9, 1961,
th
time within which Chemical Bank New York Trust Company,
Ne York,
New York, may establish a branch on the southeast
corner of Third Avenue and lust Street, New York, New York.




Very truly yours,
(Signed) Elizabelth L. Carmichael
Elizabeth L. Carmichael,
Assistant Secretary.

BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
WASHINGTON 25. D. C.

Item No. 2
4/11/61

AOORE98 OFFICiAL 1QRREBFON
TO THE BOARD

April 111 1961

Board of Directors,
Chemical Bank New York Trust Company,
'New York, New York.
G
entlemen:
Pursuant to your request submitted through the
I,
Reserve Bank of New York, the Board of Governors
°f the Federal Reserve System extends to October 17, 1961,
time within which Chemical Bank New York Trust Company,
"ew York, New York, may establish a branch at 501 East 79th
Street, New York, New Yor4.




Very truly yours
(Signed) Elizabeth L. Carmichael
Elizabeth L. Carmichael,
Assistant Secretary.

ENCE

Item No.

BOARD OF GOVERNORS

3

4/11/61

OF THE

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

S-1789

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
ADDRESS OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE
TO THE BOARD

April 11, 1961.

'Dear

Sir:

This supersedes the Board's letter of March 25, 1943
(S-62
of out'F.R.L.S. #3188), which requested information regarding rental
space by the Reserve Banks. The Board now feels that
tion
concerning space in Bank-owned buildings rented to tenants
six:0,111a,
"4-1Q also be obtained.
i.riform
Accordingly, it is requested that in the future the Board be
41ca„,7d of (1) leases entered into for the rental of outside space,
(2)"Lung space used exclusively for fiscal agency activities, and
and (431* space within a Bank-owned building leased to tenants, Renewals
'
erminations of leases should also be reported to the Board.
In connection with space leased for Bank use, data submitted
location, monthly or annual rental, number of square feet
space or cubic feet of vault space, use of such space, and
01,;4ation of lease. Concerning space occupied by tenants in Bankace buildings, please show name of tenant, number of square feet of
) monthly or annual rental, and expiration of lease.
ho

" show
Or a

Very truly yours,

Merritt Sh man,
Secrear

PRESIDENTS OF ALL FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS




BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

Item No. 4
4/11/61

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
ADDRESS OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCt
TO THE BOARD

April 11, 1961

Board of Directors,
Bank of Belle Fourche,
Belle Fourche, South Dakota.
Gentlemen:
Pursuant to your request submitted through the
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, the Board of Governors
Of the Federal Reserve System approves the establishment of
a branch at Spearfish, Lawrence County, South Dakota, by
Bank of Belle Fourche, provided the branch is established
within six months from the date of this letter.
It is understood that no further dividends will
be paid during 1961, and that cash dividends will not exceed
W10,000 for the years 1962 through 1964, inclusive, and that
salaries and fees paid to directors and inactive officers
will not be increased during the years 1961 through 1964,
inclusive.




Very truly yours,
(Signed) Elizabeth L. Carmichael
Elizabeth L. Carmichael,
Assistant Secretary.

44.410,}44
W ,
1 4kt
4

4eix
0*
41%
g
imt

441

BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

Item No.

5

4/11/61

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
ADDRESS OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE
TO THE BOARD

gmai
'4444o*

April 11, 1961

karA
`t Of

Directors,
Street Bank and Trust Company,
13°8t3r1)
Massachusetts.
Qeritlemen:

-tate

0044,
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, after
bepo:'.eration
of all the factors set forth in section 13(c) of the Federal
thet1',t Insurance Act, as amended by the Act of May 13, 1960, and finding
N:s,ation to be in the public interest, hereby consents to the merger
'Iltost- hQ-Atlas National Bank of Boston, Roston, Massachusetts, with and
Street Bank and Trust Company, under the charter and the title
orallch 4-atter
bank. The Board of Governors also approves the operation of
elty 0;%13
27 the resulting bank at the following locations, all within the
Boston:
30 Congress Street
199 Washington Street
71 Suiper Street
691 Boylston Street
80 Newmarket Square
23/A3 Washington Street
300 Vestern Avenue
iTe d This approval is given provided (1) the proposed merger is
',ace
eter-allithirl six months from the date of this letter and substantially
-ance with the Agreement and Plan of Consolidation, date
.):4.141)°
''olderel' 20
1960 and (2) shares of stock acquired from dissenting share-.
-'e dispo
sed of within six months from the date of acquisition.
'




Very truly yours,
(Signed) Elizabeth L. Carmichael
Elizabeth L. Carmichael,
Assistant Secretary.