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67™ CONGRESS : : : 2D SESSION DECEMBER 5, 1921-SEPTEMBER 22, 1922 SENATE DOCUMENTS V ol. 1 WASHINGTON s GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : : 1921 67t h C o n g r e s s \ 2d Session ) q1 ?1 N t a t? SENATE / D ocument | No g6 LOANS TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS RESUME OF THE LAWS UNDER WHICH LOANS WERE MADE TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS DURING . AND SINCE THE WAR AND THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE LOANS AS DISCLOSED BY CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT, THE STATE DEPARTMENT, THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT, AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY PRESENTED BY MR. REED . DECEMBER 6, 1921 — Ordered to be printed WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1921 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY. SIXTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION. KNUTE NELSON, o f Minnesota, Chairman. W IL L IA M P. DILLINGH AM , o f Vermont. CHARLES A. CULBERSON, o f Texas. FRAN K B. BRANDEGEE, o f Connecticut. LEE S. OVERMAN, of North Carolina. W ILLIA M E. BORAH, o f Idaho. JAM ES A. REED, o f Missouri, A L B E R T B. CUMMINS, o f Iowa. HENRY F. ASHURST, o f Arizona. L e BARON B. COLT, o f Rhode Island. JAMES K. SHIELDS, o f Tennessee. THOMAS STERLING, o f South Dakota. THOMAS J. W ALSH, of Montana. GEORGE W. NORRIS, o f Nebraska. RIC H A R D P. ERNST, o f Kentucky. SAMUEL M. SHORTRIDGE, o f California. G e o r g e L. T rea t , A ssistan t Cleric. C a rl W . B o r d s e n , A ssistant Clerk. 2 UNITED STATES FOREIGN LOANS DURING THE WAR AND SINCE THE WAR. Resume of the various laws under which loans were made to foreign Gov ernments; loans made to foreign Governments during the war and since the war; and the outstanding features of these loans as disclosed by the investigation of all of the foreign-loan correspondence left with the United States Senate Judiciary Committee. P repared for t h e C o m m i t t e e b y D o n M . H u n t . During the progress of the war Congress passed four acts known as the four Liberty loan acts. Shortly after the close of the war Congress passed an additional act known as the Victory loan act. The provisions of the first Liberty loan act are practically the same as those in the second, third, and fourth Liberty loan acts. The fol lowing are the important sections of these acts relative to the making of foreign loans: AN ACT To authorize an issue o f bonds to meet expenditures for the national security and defense, and for the purpose o f assisting in the prosecution o f the war, to extend credit to foreign Governments, and fo r other purposes. S e c . 2. That for the purpose of more effectually providing for the national security ancl defense and prosecuting the war by establishing credits in the United States for foreign Governments, the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President, is hereby authorized, on behalf o f the United States, to purchase at par, from such foreign Governments then engaged in war with the enemies of the United States, their obligations hereafter issued, bear ing the same rate of interest and containing in their essentials the same terms and conditions as those of the United States issued under authority of this act, to enter into such arrangements as may be necessary or desirable for establish ing such credits and for purchasing such obligations of foreign Governments and for the subsequent payment thereof before maturity, but such arrangements shall provide that if any of the bonds of the United States issued and used for the purchase of such foreign obligations shall thereafter be converted into other bonds of the United States bearing a higher rate of interest than 3| per cent per annum under the provisions of section 5 of this act, then and in that event the obligations of such foreign Governments held by the United States shall be, by such foreign Governments, converted in like manner and extent into obligations bearing the same rate of interest as the bonds of the United States issued under the provisions o f section 5 of this act. For the purposes o f this section there is appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of $3,000,000, or as much thereof as may be necessary: Provided, That the authority granted by this section to the Secretary o f the Treasury to purchase bonds from foreign Governments, as aforesaid shall cease upon the termination of the war beUveen the United States and the Imperial German Government. These sections are from the first Liberty loan act approved April 24,1917 (40 Stat., p. 35). The second Liberty loan act approved September 24,1917 (40 Stat., p. 288), contains substantially the same clauses relative to making 3 4 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E . loans to foreign governments and accepting their obligations. It increases the amount and in section 2 provides that the obligations to be received from foreign governments must mature at a date not later than the bonds of the United States issued under and by virtue of the authority of the two Liberty loan acts. Under and by virtue of this authority so granted the Secretary of the Treasury made the loans and accepted obligations from foreign governments. The obligations so accepted, however, were not drawn in accordance with the terms of the Liberty loan acts, which provide that they shall bear the same rate of interest and contain in their essentials the same terms and conditions as those of the United States issued under the Liberty loan act. On the contrary, all obligations of foreign governments, accepted by the Treasury Department have been demand obligations, none of them having a fixed maturity. Because of the fact that the Treasury Department had already accepted demand obligations from foreign governments under the first Liberty loan act, they had the following sections adopted in the second liberty loan act. Sec. 3. The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized, from time to time, to exercise in respect to any obligation of foreign governments acquired under authority of this act or of said act approved April 24, 1917, any privilege of conversion into obligations bearing interest at a higher rate provided in or pursuant to this act or said act approved April 24, 1917, and to convert any short time obligations of foreign governments which may have been purchased under the authority of this act or of said act approved April 24, 1917, into long-time obligations of such governments, respectively, maturing not later than the bonds of the United States then last issued under authority of this act or of said act approved April 24, 1917. as the case may be, and in such form and terms as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe; but the rate or rates of interest borne by any such long-time obligations at the time o f their acquisition shall not be less than the rate borne by the short-time obligations so converted into such long-time obligations. The act then provides that the Secretary of the Treasury may sell the obligations of foreign governments and apply the proceeds on account of the principal loaned them. The third Liberty loan act increases the appropriation made in the second Liberty loan act to $5,500,000,000. (Approved Apr. 4, 1918, 40 Stat., p. 502.) The fourth Liberty loan act increases the amount appropriated or provided for by $1,500,000,000 making a total of the four Liberty loan acts of $10,000,000,000 for the purposes set forth in the act. The fourth Liberty loan act was approved July 9, 1918 (40 Stat., p. 844). The Victory loan act, approved March 3, 1919 (40 Stat., p. 1309), after the date of the armistice, provides that the Secretary of the Treasury can, with the approval of the President, establish credits for foreign governments for the purposes only of providing for the pur chase of property owned directly or indirectly by the United States and for the purchase of wheat which has been guaranteed by the United States. We, however, need pay no attention to the Victory loan act in con sidering these foreign loans, as the Secretary of the Treasury states in his report for 1920 that no obligations of foreign governments were accepted under the Victory loan act. In addition to the authority granted in the acts above referred to for the acceptance of obligations of foreign governments, Congress FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 5 passed an act which authorized the Secretary of War to sell surplus war materials remaining in Europe after the war to foreign govern ments and accept their obligations in payment thereof. (Act May 10, 1918, 40 Stat., p. 548.) Congress also passed an act providing $100,000,000 for European relief. (Act of Feb. 25, 1919, 40 Stat., p. 1161.) Congress also pro vided that the United iStates Grain Corporation should supply flour and wheat for the relief of European peoples to the extent of $50,000,000. (Act Mar. 30, 1920, 41 Stat., p. 548.) Under these two acts last referred to numerous obligations of foreign Governments were accepted. The above acts constitute all of the authority under which the Secretary of the Treasury could act on the acceptance of European obligations. Under the Liberty loan act, up to the date of the armistice, Novem ber 11,1918, approximately $8,000,000,000 had been loaned to foreign Governments. Since the date of the armistice approximately $1,500,000,000 has been loaned to foreign Governments. Credits have been established for foreign Governments, on which advances have not as yet been made, to the extent of approximately $129,000,000. O f the original $10,000,000,000 provided for by Congress, approxi mately $300,000,000 over and above the $129,000,000 already referred to remain. I f the present Secretary of the Treasury takes the same position as the former Secretary of the Treasury, namely, that he has the right under the law to continue making these loans, then the $300,000,000 and the $129,000,000 above referred to are still avail able for this purpose. On November 15, 1920, the latest available report, various foreign Governments were indebted to us for interest on these obligations to the extent of approximately $693,000,000. On November 15,1920, the sum total of foreign obligations received on account of sales of surplus war supplies amounted to $563,000,000. Foreign obligations received from the American Relief Adminis tration on account of relief rendered pursuant to the act approved February 25, 1919, and held by the Treasury as custodian, amount in all to $84,000,000. From the correspondence and data available to this committee, copies of which are attached hereto, it appears that Treasury Depart ment officials of the TJnited States were aware of the fact that they had no legal authority to continue the loaning of money raised from the people of the United States by the sale of Liberty bonds and by taxation to foreign Governments, for the purpose of prosecuting the war, after all hostilities had ceased. As evidence of this fact, the following paragraph appears in the report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1918, page 37: On the morning of November 15, 1918, there remained an available authori zation for the establishment of credit in favor of foreign governments amount ing to $1,828,023,334. To what extent these governments will require further credits before the termination of the war depends upon factors that can not now be determined. It is important that our foreign loans be discontinued as soon as may be, having due regard to the conditions of our industries and the essential needs of the foreign governments; in the meantime they should be held down to a minimum. Nevertheless, until certain of the allied countries can resume their normal activities the United States should be prepared to 6 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. sell them on credit, even after the declaration of peace, foodstuffs, raw ma terials, and manufactured products of which they may be in need. I shall recommend the enactment of legislation extending the authority to establish credits in favor of foreign governments for a reasonable period and within reasonable limits for these needs grouping out of the war. In accordance with the statement made in the 1918 report above referred to, Secretary McAdoo did appear before the House Com mittee on Ways and Means on December 12, 1918, and asked for legislation to extend his authority to make foreign loans. He stated in part: It seems to me the part of prudence and wisdom, as well as enlightened self-interest, to make the balance of the existing appropriation for the purchase of obligations of foreign governments, available for advances for purposes grow ing out of war needs. The purposes to which I particularly refer, as growing out of the war situa tion, and which I had in mind in making this recommendation, are the supply ing of foodstuffs and materials for sucli time and to such extent as may be necessary to tide allied countries over until they are able to resume the pur chase of food supplies through the ordinary channels, to aid in the recon struction of the devastated areas of Belgium, Northern France, Italy, and else where, generally to assist in restoring the economic life of those allied coun tries most seriously affected by the war. It is impossible to determine the amount of the aid which it may be desired to give until both the extent of their requirements and the extent to which the countries themselves can be financed in other ways have been investigated. I do not recommend that one and a half billion dollars be placed at the dis posal of the Allies; I only ask that the Treasury be put in a position to make advances up to that amount for purposes tvhicli may be approved, with of course the approval of the President always, and coming within the terms of the bill, at such times and under such conditions as the circumstances may call for. * * * The amount that is estimated be made available under the existing appro priation is, as indicated in my letter of December 5, 1918, about $1,500,000,,000. In considering this sum, it is pertinent to observe that before the war the annual investment by Great Britain in Colonial and foreign securities and ventures was estimated at not less than $1,000,000,000. The proposed addi tional advances of $1,500,000,000 constitute only a small proportion of the needs of France and Belgium for the work of restoration, but icith judicious manage ment the advances made by our Government, to the extent they may be made at all, will make possible the tiding of these nations over the period of transition. Now, gentlemen, this suggestion about the enlargment of the poiver to make loans out of the present available appropriation for that purpose, to foreign governments, is largely a counsel of prudence. I do not know that anything will be required. Certainly if the Congress should not be in session after March, next (and it won’t be for a short time, at any rate, I imagine, because even if an extra session were instantly called, it would take a reasonable time for the Congress to organize), if in the interval any exigency arose where it was obviously to our interest to make further loans to foreign govern ments, certainly the Treasury ought to be put in a position to meet those exigencies. * * * Then, again, there are reconstruction questions which are coming up all the time and which will become more and more urgent with the return of peace, questions of food supply, etc., which will have to be decided instantly. And if the occasions should arise, where it was in our own interest (even if we did not care about the interest of these other people, but in our own interest), to protect us in our economic situation, to make this advance, and we had no power to do it, we might bring some injury to ourselves. And, therefore, I think we ought to have the power necessary, so that ice can act if an exigency arises. * * * The purpose of this amendment is to enlarge the power so that you may lend for other purposes than those necessitated by the war * * * I f ive are given the authority in the proposed amendment here to lend money to the allied Governments for reconstruction purposes, food, or any other purpose contemplated by the amendment to the extent such loans may be FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 7 made in the fiscal year 1920, tve might have to sell more bonds or war savings stamps or short-time certificates. Mr. T r e a d w a y . It is entirely indefinite at the present time; no applications have come forward from representatives of governments which you have in mind? Secretary M c A d o o . Belgium, Serbia, and France have all made intimations they would like to know if we would make such loans. * * * / have answered we have no power to consider such loans now ; we have no authority to make such loans. I do not know that we shall have to at all, even if this authority is granted. Shortly after the above testimony was given in the House Ways and Means Committee, on December 16, 1918, Secretary McAdoo resigned and Secretary Carter Glass took his place. Secretary Glass appeared before the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, February 15, 1919, on a hearing on the fifth Liberty bond bill, known as the Victory loan bill. At the outset of his testimony before this committee he presented to the committee a tentative draft of a bill which gave him the addi tional authority referred to in the McAdoo testimony, namely, the authority to continue the loans authorized for war purposes during peace time for reconstruction and food relief. On page 17 of the fifth Liberty bond bill hearing Secretary Glass states: For these reasons I urgently ask the authority to broaden the purposes for which the loans to foreign governments may be made. I do not ask an in creased appropriation, and it would not be my purpose to avail of the authority where commercial loans or the powers of the War Finance Corporation could, in my judgment, be used to meet the requirements. I do, however, feel very strongly that before the Congress adjourns powers should be given sufficiently broad to enable the situation to be dealt with. We are creditors o f the Euro pean Allies to the extent of over $8,000,000,000, and we have a very real interest in the early restoration of their economic life and their ability to enter upon foreign trade. * * * I am convinced that exports must be greatly curtailed unless the Government for the present emergency (and only during that emergency) lends financial aid along the lines I have indicated. I view with the greatest concern the task o f raising the funds needed by the Government this year; but I am, never theless, willing somewhat to increase those needs for this purpose, being satis fied that the resultant effect will be such that the task as a whole will thereby be lightened. At the same hearing, page 36, Mr. Rathbone, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, testified as follows: At the present time our authority to advance is limited to the purpose of the national security and defense and the prosecution of the war. The authority we ask now is to make advances for the purpose o f promoting commerce. Again, on page 39, Mr. Rathbone states: This bill ( the proposed bill drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury) extends the time for the making of the loans and the purpose for which the loans may be made. In selling railway material, or in selling cotton, you can hardly say nono that would be in aid of the prosecution of the war, or for the national security and defense. Now, we are limited in making advances to aid in the prosecution of the war and for the national security and defense, and that is the reason we inserted the provision we might make loans to promote foreign commerce. The House Ways and Means Committee did not agree with either Secretary McAdoo or Secretary Glass, and refused to grant the au thority requested. The result was that they drew a new bill, which passed substantially as drawn and which differed radically from the 8 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. bill as proposed by Secretary Glass. The new bill culminated in the Victory loan or fifth Liberty loan act. The attitude of the House Ways and Means Committee was shown by the speech of Congressman Kitchin, chairman of the committee, in the House of Representatives on February 25, 1919, found in the Congressional Record, on page 4273, of that date, which is in part as follows: Section 7 (the section extending the authority for foreign loans) needs a little explanation. Secretary McAdoo, before he left the Treasury Department, and Secretary Glass asked the Ways and Means Committee to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to establish credits in the United States in behalf of foreign Governments to the amount of the unexpended balance of the amount that we authorized in former acts, which is about one bilUon and a half dollars. In other words, they asked that tee should loan our allies one year after the termination of the war one and one-half billion dollars. By that we would have to go out in these Liberty or Victory loan campaigns and ask the people to subscribe a billion and a half dollars more than was necessary to meet the debts of our Government, that we might lend it to foreign Governments, so that the foreign Governments could lend it to their citizens to buy from our citizens, or the foreign Governments could buy direct from our people or from our Government what they desired. The committee thought we ought not to do that, and I think the committee was unanimous in the opinion that certainly this was not the time for the Government to loan a billion and a half dollars more to the Allies, especially when we had to go and get it from taxation of the people or by selling bonds to the people to get the money. To say the least, we felt that to provide for such a loan at this time was premature. It is sufficient to say that the authority was not granted, but the Treasury Department continued making the loans to foreign Govern ments for reconstruction purposes after all hostilities had ceased. The following are some of the more important facts as disclosed by the correspondence between the Treasury Department and foreign Governments: Note: The citations given here refer to sections of this brief which follow: No. 1. Approximately $1,500,000,000 was loaned to foreign Gov ernments after all hostilities ceased. This money was raised from the American people by Liberty Loan drives and taxation and was authorized to be used for the purpose of the prosecution of the war and loaned to Governments then engaged in war with enemies of the United States. (See Treasurer’s Report, 1920, pp. 342-347; secs. 101, 116, 147.) No. 2. Treasury Department officials were aware of the fact that they had no authority to make such loans after hostilities had ceased. (See data above referred to; also secs. 8 ,1 1 8 ,1 1 9 ,1 2 5 ,135a, 137,151, 186.) No. 3. Millions of dollars worth of products purchased with United States money loaned to foreign Governments were sent di rectly to Germany with our sanction. In other words, money raised from the American people for the purpose of the prosecution of the war against Germany found its way into Germany with the sanction of the Treasury Department of the United States, while Germany was yet our technical enemy. (See correspondence under England on the sale of American pork products to Germany; secs. 16, 19, 20.) No. 4. Forty-eight millions of dollars of the American people’s Liberty loan money was used for the purpose of sending supplies into FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 9 Austria, which country was then our enemy. (See English, French, and Italian files; secs. 27, 168.J No. 5. Millions of dollars or this Liberty loan fund was loaned to foreign Governments and by them loaned to various relief and recon struction organizations, thus circumventing the act of Congress. (See Belgium file; also secs. 25, 29, 31, 33, 128, 147, 151, 162.) No. 6. Money was loaned by the United States to these various Governments so that they could repay it to the United States as in terest on loans already made. (Sees. 129,188, 19.) No. 7. Millions of dollars of this Liberty loan money were loaned to Great Britain, after all hostilities had ceased for the purpose of allowing her to build up her export trade and return to a normal basis. Thus the money raised from the American people to prosecute the war was used by Great Britain in competition with American foreign trade. (See sec. 7.) No. 8. One hundred thousand dollars of America’s Liberty loan money was used for expenses of the Russian delegation at the peace conference. This with the approval of the Treasury Department. (Sec. 73.) No. 9. Twenty-six thousand dollars of America’s Liberty loan money was used as expenses of the delegates from Liberia to the peace conference. This with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury and President. (Sec. J No. 10. Millions of dollars from this fund were loaned to Govern ments not then actually in existence. Czechoslovakia was not a nation until it was created by the treaty of peace of June, 1919. Serbia had no parliamentary form of government during the time it received loans from this country. (Secs. 116, 170, 172, 182.) No. 11. Moneys from this fund went with the approval of the Treasury Department to the aid of three separate de facto govern ments in Russia, namely, the Kerenski government, the Kolchak government, and the Wrangel government. (Secs. 82-93.) No. 12. The Treasury Department continued making advances to foreign Governments while, at the same time, it was holding consulta tions and parleys with foreign Governments on a possible cancella tion of all debts as proposed by these Governments; see secs. (3-a) 30, 36, 37, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 134b, 165. No. 13. Various branches of the United States Government made payments of cash to foreign Governments, which Governments were indebted to the United States both on loans and interest, when those payments should have been made to the United States Treasury and credited to the account of the-Government to which they were due. (Secs. 23, 66, 91, 98.) No. 14. Numerous loans were made from this fund for the purpose of increasing our influence in the European political situation at the peace conference; not for the purpose of the prosecution of the war. In this instance see Greece, sec. 99; see also secs. 3b, 115. No. 15. The Treasury Department allowed the payment out of this fund of interest and bonds of foreign Governments held by private citizens of the United States. These private loans were given prefer ence over the United States loans. (Secs. 61, 67.) No. 16. The Treasury Department continued making these loans to Governments supposed to be engaged in war with enemies of the 10 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. United States for the purpose of prosecution of the war after the peace treaty was signed and after January 10,1920, when the formal proces verbal of ratification was deposited, and the Governments receiving the money were actually and technically at peace with Germany. No. 17. Most of the money loaned to foreign Governments was used to make purchases in the United States. By continuing the making of loans to foreign Governments after the armistice so that they could return to normal, the Treasury Department prevented the United States from returning to normal, because the purchases made in the United States with such loans kept the prices in the United States at a war instead of a prewar level. (See secs. 10, 11.) No. 18. The Treasury Department accepted demand obligations from foreign Governments for all of the loans they made when all of the sections of the acts, authorizing these loans, provide for obli gations of the same tenor and effect as the particular Liberty loan by which the money was raised. The demand obligations, above re ferred to, having no maturity date and no definite interest-paying date, made it an easy matter for the foreign Governments to defer the payment both of principal and interest, as the whole matter was left in a very indefinite and uncertain state. (See secs. 3-6.) No. 19. Throughout the entire correspondence between the State Department, the Treasury Department, the President, and various foreign Governments, submitted to the committee, there is no record or mention that any of the departments of this Government re quested an opinion from the Attorney General as to their authority to continue making loans for the purpose of the prosecution of the war after all hostilities had ceased. In fact there is no record show ing that any legal opinion was ever asked in regard to this matter. The countries to which the United States loaned money are taken up in this brief in the following order: Great Britain, sections 1 to 47, inclusive. Russia, sections 48 to 98, inclusive. Greece, sections 99 to 115, inclusive. Czechoslovakia, sections 116 to 133, inclusive. France, sections 134 to 140, inclusive. Cuba, sections 141 to 142. Liberia, section 143. Bumania, sections 144 to 145. Belgium, sections 146 to 155, inclusive. Italy, sections 156 to 169, inclusive. Serbia, sections 170 to 192, inclusive. GREAT BRITAIN 11 SECTION 1. Great Britain. Under the various Liberty loan acts which authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President, to make loans to foreign Governments then engaged in war with enemies of the United States for the purpose of the prosecution of the war, a sum of $4,277,000,000 was loaned to Great Britain. Up to November 15, 1920, the latest available report, Great Britain was indebted to the United States for interest on this loan to the sum of $314,582,824.97. Approximately $3,950,000,000 of credit was established for Great Britain prior to November 11, 1918, the date of the armistice, and approximately $330,000,000 of credit was established to Great Britain since that date. We hold no obligations of Great Britain for surplus munition of for food supplies sold to her after the armistice. The following are some of the outstanding facts concerning the loans to Great Britain, as shown by the correspondence attached hereto: None of the money paid by the United States to Great Britain for the transportation of troops was credited to the account of Great Britain as a partial payment on her loan or interest. All of it was paid directly to the British Government. Large sums of money were loaned to Great Britain and by her re loaned to France, Italy, and Belgium. Some of these reloans con tained the express provision that the produce and merchandise pur chased with these loans was to be purchased from Great Britain. Money raised from the American people by Liberty loans and taxation found its way ultimately into the hands of the enemy. The correspondence shows that this was first done when Great Britain purchased a large amount of pork products in this country and, with the approval of the Treasury and State Departments of the United States, resold this pork product to Germany for German relief. The correspondence also shows that $48,000,000 of this sum was loaned to England, France, and Italy, and by them reloaned to Austria, which country was our enemy. The correspondence shows that large sums of this money were loaned to England for the express purpose of allowing her to return to normality. The correspondence shows that in at least one in stance the officials of the Treasury Department recommended loans to England, so that she could compete with the United States in foreign trade, and so that England could build up her merchant marine to prewar level, so that the money of the United States was used against the United States in developing England’s merchant marine and export trade. The correspondence shows that while we were loaning these enor mous sums to Great Britain, so that she could return to normality, 13 14 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. she was using large sums of money to obtain a world-wide monopoly in oil and oil fields. The report of Mr. Skinner, the American com mercial attache, shows that some of this British money gained con trol of the Royal Dutch oil interests, which company has large hold ings in the United States, Mexico, and South America. (See sec. 9.) The committee will undoubtedly be interested in the attached cor respondence showing the various communications and proposals received from Great Britain in regard to a cancellation of all loans: SECTION 2. Situation of English and American Loans November 2, 1918. N o v e m b e r 2, 1918. : Your letter of the 28th instant has been duly received, presenting an approximate estimate of the cash position of the British Treasury in the United States for the month of November and the estimated expenditures of the British Treasury in the United States for that month. In order to have these figures accord with the plan that the bank balances in the United States of the British Treasury should average $50,000,000, the advance to your Government from the United States Treasury on Thursday, the 7th instant, should be $10,000,000 instead of $20,000,000, as stated in your preliminary figures. If you find that the disbursements of the British Govern ment to the United States have to be met more rapidly than you now antici pate, I shall be glad if you will advise me accordingly, with a view of increasing the advances to your Government from the Treasury so as to maintain the average bank balance at $50,000,000. On the other hand, I should like it under stood that if as a result of the expenditures of your Government in the United States proceeding less rapidly than you now anticipate, or of other receipts of the British Government in the United States not included in your estimates, the bank balances of your Government in this country are increased beyond the average of $50,000,000, you will advise this department accordingly, with a view o f decreasing the proposed advance to your Government from the Treasury during the current month. I am, my dear Sir Hardman, Very truly, yours, D e a r S ir H a rd m a n A lbert R a t h b o n e . S ir H a r d m a n L ev e r , The Plaza Hotel, New York City. B r it is h W ar M is s io n , O f f ic e of t h e B r i t i s h T r e a s u r y R e p r e s e n t a t iv e , 23 Wall Street, New York City, November 29, 1918. Hon. A l b e r t R a t h b o n e , Treasury Department, Washington, D. C. D e a r Mr. R a t h b o n e : I have pleasure in presenting the following approximate estimate of the cash position of the British Treasury in the United States of America for the month o f December (figures in millions) : 40 December 2. Balance in hand (estimated)--------------------------------------------Estimated expenditure December 2------------------------------------—10 December 3. Balance in hand---------------------------------------------------------------Receipts United States Treasury--------------------------------------- 20 France---------------------------------------------------------------- 10 Estimated expenditure December 3 and 4-------------------- 30 30 24 ------ +6 15 FOREIGN LOANS AN D A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. December 5. Balance in hand---------------------------------------------------------------Receipts: United States Treasury-------------------------------------- 30 Italy------------------------------------------------------------------6$ Estimated expenditure December 5 to 9_______________ 36$ 42$ 36 --- —6 December 10. Balance in hand---------------------------------------------------------------Receipts: United States Treasury--------------------------------------- 25 France__________________________________________ 10 30 Estimated expenditure December 10 and 11___________ 35 24 --- +11 December 12. Balance in hand__________________________________________ Receipts: United States Treasury--------------------------------------- 30 Italy____________________________________________ 6$ Estimated expenditure December 12 to 16-------------------- 41 36$ 40$ ---------- — 4 December 17. Balance in hand (carried forw ard)-----------------------------------Receipts: United States Treasury__________________________ 20 France__________________________________________ 10 37 Estimated expenditure December 17 and 18___________ 30 22 ------ +8 December 19. Balance in hand__________________________________________ Receipts: United States Treasury__________________________ 30 Italy------------------------------------------------------------------6$ 45 Estimated expenditure December 19 and 23___________ 36$ 44$ --December 24. Balance in hand__________________________________________ Receipts: United States Treasury__________________________ 10 France__________________________________________ 10 Estimated expenditure December 24__________________ 37 20 12 ------- December 26. Balance in hand__________________________________________ Receipts: United States Treasury__________________________ 30 Italy------------------------------------------------------------------6$ Estimated expenditure December 26 and 30___________ —8 36$ 44$ +8 45 16 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. December 31. Balance in hand__________________________________________ Receipts: United States Treasury__________________________ 10 France__________________________________________ 10 37 20 Estimated expenditure December 31_________________ January 12 ------ +8 2. Balance in hand__________________________________________ 45 The expenditure coming in course o f payment during December, particularly in respect of food and cereals, is considerably above the average. The balances stated include all the cash resources of the British Treasury in the United States, leaving no further funds available for the purpose of meeting capital liabilities. I beg to request on behalf of my Government that advances be made by the United States Treasury on the dates named. The figures of the advances will be reduced by any further sums which may be reim bursed by Italy during the month in respect of British claims still outstanding. I am, dear Mr. Rathbone, Yours, sincerely, S. H a r d m a n L e v e r , Financial Secretary to the Treasury. SECTION 3. Demand Obligations Were Taken by Treasury Department as a Temporary Measure. London, November 80, 1918. S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , Washington: Urgent 4189. November 30, 8 p. m. McAdoo from Crosby, 802. Referring to Treasury’s addressed to Sir Hard man Lever, date not given, in which attention is called to the fact that the Sec retary of the Treasury is under no commitment to convert existing obligations into long-time obligations. The chancellor writes me as follows: “ Will you be so good as to inform the Secretary of the United States Treasury that while I am, of course, aware that the British treasury obligations held by the United States Treasury are at present in form and in fact demand obligations, my understanding of the position is that he has only wished to keep them in this shape pending the final determination as to the most appropriate form of fund ing bonds into which they are to be ultimately converted and that there is not, in fact, any intention on his part to demand payment from us or to take any other advantage from the present form of the obligations except to retain a free hand as to the manner in which they shall be eventually funded. “ The above had, of course, always been the informal understanding between the responsible representatives of both Governments, but in view of the letter communicated by Sir Hardman Lever I think it better to put it in writing.” Hope your personal views on this subject will be indicated to either the borrow ing Governments or to your subordinates before January 1, next. L a t jg h l in . SECTION 3-A. First Cancellation Proposal, December 4, 1918. London, December 4, 1918. S ecretary of S ta t e , Washington, D. C.: Important, 4307, December 4, 6 p. m. McAdoo from Crosby, 811. Chancellor revived suggestions made before of possibility of cancellation of all loans made by one associated Government to any other for the conduct of the war. I stated that so far as I know such an FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 17 idea had never for a moment been entertained by you and the subject was dropped. Similar suggstions in unofficial but important quartrs are not infre quent in London and Paris. Second. Keynes has suggested in several conversations theory that future aid to Allies should now be taken over by us so that as nearly as possible our loans to Allies should equal those o f the British. This thought appears also in letter from the chancellor to me received to-day referring to Italian situa tion in which statement is made that chancellor called attention o f Stringher to fact that aggregate of British Government loans to Italy were double those of the United States and that their further action toward Italy must be deter mined by Italian arrangements with us. Third. It seems not improbable that war debts of allied countries and future credits will figure at the peace conference in an endeavor to conciliate rival claims for large indemnities and other advantages. Fourth. Under these circumstances it appears probable that by now insist ing upon our obligations as being not only technically but in every sense true demand obligations we may thus cause considerable friction and increase the probability that a situation considered dangerous by the borrowing Govern ments would be presented to the peace conference as a matter for adjustment at its hands. The contention will no doubt be made that in lending to treas uries known to be empty we could not legitimately expect immediate payment on demand and that any use of the technical position by us for obtainment of other objectives could be construed as an act of bad faith. Fifth. I f you desire to keep the financial relations free from such possibili ties and unless political department of our Government prefers to preserve existing situation for such use as President may determine, I have to suggest, in addition to recommendation conveyed in my No. 802, that a somewhat more definite statement be made to the allied borrowing Governments of your views on this subject. Think all allied Governments, especially British and French, desire a frank discussion, with the view o f agreeing upon the earliest maturities at which they could be expected to liquidate their obligations, with the necessary provisos for protecting dollar exchange and other conditions appearing in draft of bond prepared and shown to allied financial representa tives in the summer of 1917 [only date]. Davis and Cravath agreed with above views. L a u g h l in . SECTION 3-B. Norman H. Davis Advises Against Discontinuing Foreign Loans, as It Would Affect Our Influence at the Peace Conference. S p e c i a l U n i t e d S t a t e s C o m m is s io n e r o f F i n a n c e i n E u r o p e , Sunderland House, Gurzon Street, London, W. I., December 5, 1918. D e a r R a t h b o n e : In continuance o f my letter written to you yesterday, I understand that Italian prewar total imports amount to 6,000,000,000 lire and their total exports to 4,000,000,000 lire. In addition to this, they received about 1,000,000,000 lire from tourists’ trade and a like amount from Italian emigrants. It is apparent, therefore, that Italy will have to improve consid erably its prewar trade in order to obtain sterling and dollars with which to pay the interest on their debts to the United States and England. I think, therefore, that we will have to carry their interest for them for probably two or three years in addition to granting certain credits during the next few months for the purchase of raw materials with which to start their export trade. As the $6,500,000 transferred weekly by Italy to England covers prin cipally cereals, it certainly will not be necessary to continue this, or at least very much of this, after the 1st of February next, having already been taken care of in the loan for the wheat. Italy is to get a credit of 18,000,000 florins from the Dutch, and is also to have 40,000,000 pesos o f the credit which is practically closed with Argentina, and this should assist most materially in covering their neutral requirements. I have had a talk with Keynes regarding the $10,000,000 a week advanced to France for transfer to the British. He is reluctant to see this stopped, but I told him of your views regarding this matter and advised him informally not to make any further advance commitments expecting to be covered from this S, Doc. 86,67-2----- 2 18 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. source. Roughly speaking, as I remember, about half of this amount is required to cover foodstuffs purchased from us which Keynes admits has been substantially taken care of from February 1 in the loan made for the pur chase of the 100.000,000 bushels of wheat. Most of the other half of this amount is used for neutral tonnage and insurance on same, and, as I explained to Keynes, the francs purchased by our nationals should give them sufficient dollars or sterling to cover this amount. Keynes, of course, is afraid of our shutting off on this, because they have probably been using some of the funds received from the sale of francs for American and British private require ments to meet some of their expenditures here, which has prevented them from the necessity of borrowing for some time from the British, except for payment of interest. They have, however, I judge, been covering most of their require ments here from the sale of their own war bonds, which has been done with the approval of the British Treasury. From the Treasury standpoint it is advisable, of course, to cut off as soon as possible our advances to the allied Governments. But, on the other hand, from a political standpoint it may be advisable not to cause too much anxiety just before the peace conference. As I have already advised you, the British treasury has notified the French and Italian treasuries that they are through making advances to them. They have either done this in order to force them on us or for political reasons in order to force their opinions at the peace con ference in consideration of then agreeing to additional advances. The British treasury attitude regarding relief has changed considerably from what it was when I left here in October. In discussing the question of relief to Belgium and Serbia, Keynes told me substantially that he had changed from his original idea of dividing the financial assistance into three parts, because in view of the fact that they have advanced considerably more than w^e have to these coun tries, we should be willing to finance practically all of the relief. I told him that we might be willing to finance the relief to the extent o f the supplies fur nished from the United States, but it would not be because they had advanced more or less to these countries than we have, and that we would not even dis cuss any arrangements on the basis of what they had done before we came into the war, nor should we take the position that the war should be continued for a year or two in order to enable us to loan as much to the other Governments as the British had loaned them. McAdoo’s resignation has increased the uncertainty and unsatisfactory situa tion here, which makes me want to go home. Auchinoloss, however, has ex pressed a definite desire to have me remain in Paris with the peace delegation for financial work, and I shall return to Paris at the end o f this week and have a further talk with him. In the meantime I hope to hear something from you which may clarify the situation. With best regards, I am, Sincerely, yours, N o r m a n H. D a v is . Hon. A l b e r t R a t h b o n e , Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. P. S.—Hoover and Hurley are not in agreement as to the administration of the enemy tonnage if procured for the relief requirements. Hurley returned here last night and Hoover returns to-morrow, but I suppose the difference will be adjusted. Hoover seems quite prepared to follow the views of the Treasury in regard to the financing of relief. I suppose you have already considered the possibility and advisability of applying whatever sums we have to pay for the German ships and for the enemy property taken over by the custodian (and which will probably be pay able to France and Belgium as indemnity) to the liquidation of French and Belgian obligations. D e c e m b e r 6, 1918. D e a r R a t h b o n e : Keynes told me yesterday that Lever had reported an inter view with you and your refusal to advance funds to take up their February 1 maturities. He seemed very muchly worried about it, and stated, in substance, that they could not possibly be in a position to pay this off by that time and that he thought we ought to make the advance. I told him that this was essentially a matter which must be handled in Washington, because the changed conditions had necessarily altered the position of the Treasury. I assume that you naturally doubt the power of the Secretary of the Treasury or the advisabil FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 19 ity of making such an advance. It seems to me they should be able to float a renewable loan in the United States, provided this does not conflict with any o f Leffingwell’s plans for domestic finance. Keynes took the position that even in normal times the only possible way they could pay this off would be to sell sterling against dollars or to ship gold, and that as they have to apply all o f the dollars received from the sale of sterling to meet their purchase requirements, and that as they can not spare the gold, it is rather difficult to know what to do. I merely call your attention to the fact that if they can not place a new loan and you wish to assist them in the matter, our Army will owe the British, according to present estimates, about $400,000,000. a part of which might be applied for the above purpose. I realize that this would be a certain camouflage if they are still borrowing from us at the time these accounts are paid. I do not remember the class of securities that are back of this loan or how rapidly they could be sold to pay oft’ the loan, but it had occurred to me that you might make a definite short-time loan against those securities for later treatment, but not knowing the conditions at home I could not give a definite opinion, even if it were desired. Another word about Italy. I am told our total prewar exports to Italy amounted to about $160,000,000 per annum. If this is correct, it w^ould seem that, aside from advancing them the money to liquidate their war contracts in the United States and the $90,000,000 already advanced for wheat, they should not require very much more from us. I inclose herewith copy of a letter and statement received from the British treasury regarding Italian neutral expenditures. [Not received for file with this letter.] Sincerely, yours, N o r m a n H. D a v is . Hon. A l b e r t R a t h b o n e , Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. SECTION 4. In Possible Repayments Advances for Food and Clothing Were to Be Con sidered the Same as Advances for Reconstruction. D e c e m b e r 13, 1918. London. For Crosby from Rathbone. Treasury 687. Embassy’s 4505, December 11, 10 a. m. Your 829. First. In our 627 to Paris referring to continuation o f your numbers 811 and 814, and particularly to paragraph 3, we asked you to advise British, French, and Belgian treasuries that before any arrangements are effected making British loans to Belgium charge against indemnities United States Treasury desires to be informed of terms and scope of any such con templated arrangements and an opportunity to present its views before any such arrangements are entered into. Treasury feels that the policy of asking a lien on indemnities not yet arranged presents many difficult questions and that it can not express an official opinion without full consultation with other departments. It may be that provisions governing the question could be more conveniently and equitably arranged after or contemporaneously with the determination of the amount and form of indemnities. I suggest you discuss situation with the British Treasury and advise as to the reasons which lead it to consider action now desirable and whether it proposes to suggest the applica tion of the same principle to advances for reconstruction to France or other countries. Second. I should be glad if meanwhile British Treasury should find it prac ticable to postpone taking the step indicated, but do not feel warranted in ask ing it to do so. In general it should be understood and accepted by Great Britain and by any countries to which Great Britain and United States may both have made or be making advances that if any charge or lien is given to Great Britain the United States shall be entitled on demand later to receive an exactly similar lien for advances of the same general character. Third. We may desire to claim that our advances for food and clothing should be regarded for these purposes,as falling in same general class as advances A m e r ic a n E m b a ssy , 20 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. for reconstruction, and we are certainly not prepared to do anything that would constitute an admission to the contrary. Fourth. To the extent that France uses for reconstruction dollars which under present arrangements would be applicable to reduction of France’s net indebtedness to us, the indebtedness which would have been retired becomes an advance for reconstruction. This applies to all our special credits to France. A lb e r t R a th b on e, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. SECTION 5. Two Hundred and Fifty Million Dollars Credit to England to Meet Out standing Commitments and Make New Purchases Until Normalcy Is Restored. D ecem ber 18, 1918. A m e r ic a n E m b a s s y . Lon (bon: For Crosby from Rathbone. Treasury, 651. First. The following letter delivered to British representatives: “ In accordance with your request the Secretary of the Treasury is prepared to establish special credits in favor of the British Government up to $250,000,000, to be made available from time to time as may be agreed, against the duly executed obligations of your Government in substantially the form inclosed herewith. These special credits will be so established and advances made therefrom on the understanding (1) that your Government, in payment for sterling hereafter furnished by yonr Government at the request of the Secre tary of the Treasury (whether in pursuance of a request heretofore of here after made), will accept the surrender to its representatives in the United States of an equivalent principal amount of its obligations hereafter executed in the form inclosed, your Government, at the time of the surrender to its representatives of such obligations to make payment in dollars of the interest accrued thereon; (2) that your Government will from time to time, up to July 1, 1919, at the request of the Secretary of the Treasury, and on such dates as he shall request, deposit sterling to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States or to the credit of such other person as the Secretary of the Treasury may indi cate, with the Bank of England, or with such other depositary or depositaries in the United Kingdom as the Secretary of the Treasury may from time to time designate, up to an amount equivalent at the fixed rate of $4.76t7s to the pound sterling, to $250,000,000; (3) to the extent that the Secretary of the Treasury may cause reimbursement to be made in cash (dollars) to your Government for any sterling hereafter furnished at his request (whether in pursuance of a re quest heretofore or hereafter made) the special credits hereinbefore mentioned will be reduced by a corresponding amount. “ It is the expectation of the Secretary of the Treasury that the dollar funds provided to your Government through the use of these special credits will be sufficient to enable it not only to meet its outstanding commitments in the United States, but also such other purchases as it may desire to make in the United States until the normal peace channels of finance will be available for the pur poses of your Government.” Second. British representatives have agreed to understandings numbered one, two, and three in said letter, but further state that chancellor regards it as certain that some additional advance over the $250,000,000 will be required by British Government, and that chancellor is considering question and will com municate at an early day as to amount of such further requirements. Third. In view of arrangement made as above we no longer require British to obtain approval before entering into American contracts, and accordingly embassy’s 4667 from London, December 17, 10 a. m., your 841, and embassy’s 4669, December 17, 10 a. m., your S42, sent by Cook, requires no action or con sideration on our part. A lb e r t R a th b o n e , Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E . 21 B r it is h W ar M is s io n , O f f ic e of t h e B r i t i s h T r e a s u r y R e p r e s e n t a t iv e , New York City, December 18, 1918. Hon. A l b e r t R a t h b o n e , Treasury Department, Washington. D. C. D e a r M r. R a t h b o n e : In reply to your letter of tlie 18th of December, I have pleasure in formally confirming on behalf of my Government the request that I made to you that a special credit of $250,000,000 be opened in favor of the British Government on the understanding that advances thereunder will be liquidated by means of sterling credits furnished in London to the United States Government within the above total, as and when required by the Secretary of the Treasury. I agree on behalf of my Government to the understandings numbered 1, 2, and 3 in your letter, subject to which the special credit of $250,000,000 will be established by the Secretary of the Treasury and advances thereunder made by him. In regard to the last paragraph of your letter, I note that the Secretary of the Treasury’s expectation that the dollars provided by means of this special credit will suffice to enable my Government not only to meet its outstanding commit ments in the United States but also to make such other purchases in the United States as may be required until normal peace channels of finance are available. On this I confirm what I said to you verbally, that the chancellor o f the ex chequer regards it as certain that some additional advance over and above this $250,000,000 will be required by the British Government in order to meet its needs in the United States during the period of transition to normal peace con ditions. The chancellor of the exchequer is carefully considering this question and will communicate with you at an early date as to the amount of such fur ther requirements. Yours, very truly, S. H a r d m a n L e v e r , Financial Secretary to the Treasury. SECTION 6. Form of Certificate or Obligation Taken from All Foreign Governments. C e r t if ic a t e of I n d e b t e d n e s s — S i x t h S e r ie s . The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, for value received, promises to pay to the United States of America, or assigns, the sum o f --------------------------------------------------------------------------- on demand, with in terest from the date hereof, at the rate of 5 per cent per annum. Such prin cipal sum and the interest thereon will be paid at the Subtreasury of the United States in New York, or, at the option of the holder, at the Treasury of the United States in Washington in gold coin of the United States of America of the present standard of weight and fineness, or, at the option of the holder, at the Bank of England, London, England, in pounds sterling at the fixed rate of $4.76t7s- to the pound sterling, and at any such place of payment without de duction for any British taxes, present or future. This certificate will be converted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, if requested by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States of America, at par, with an adjustment of accrued interest, into an equal par amount of five per cent convertible gold bonds o f the Gov ernment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland conforming to the provisions of acts of Congress of the United States known respectively as second Liberty bond act, third Liberty bond act, and Fourth Liberty bond act. I f bonds of the United States issued under authority of said acts shall be con verted into other bonds of the United States bearing a higher rate o f interest than four and one-half per cent per annum, a proportionate part o f the obli gations of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland o f this series acquired by the United States under authority of said acts shall, at the request of said Secretary o f the Treasury, be converted into obligations o f said Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland bear 22 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. ing interest at a rate exceeding that previously borne by tills obligation by the same amount as the interest rate of the bonds of the United States issued upon such conversion exceeds the interest rate of four and one-half per cent but not less than the highest rate of interest borne by such bonds of the United States. For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Dated t h is ------day o f ---------- , 1918. SECTION 7. Legal Right of the United States Treasury to Loan Money After Cessation of Hostilities Questioned—Great Britain Desired Loans Continued Until Their Export Trade Returned to Normal—Wanting the United States to Loan Them Money to Allow Them to Compete with the United States in Foreign Trade. D e c e m b e r 26, 1918. Memorandum. The British claims against Italy have been brought up to date; their account with France up to the end of October has also been sent to the French financial representatives in the United States. It shows a somewhat heavy deficit (over $60,000,000) against France at the end of October. Provided, however, that the weekly payment of $10,000,000 is continued up to, say, the end of April, 1919, this deficit may be largely liquidated, since cereal payments, which have been very heavy lately, will have practically come to an end. The chancellor of the exchequer accepts the understanding that the special credit of $250,000,000 will not be used to alter the present rate of sterling exchange. It is possible, however, that he may desire to fix a slightly wider margin between the paying and selling rates, but no change of the mean rate is contemplated in the near future. The India office is anxious to take delivery of the balance of the 200,000,000 ounces of silver and would like arrangements made for it to be shipped as fast as possible in instalments not exceeding 10.000,000 ounces. The British Gov ernment’s ability to agree to delivery being taken depends, however, on the amount of the further advance which the United States Treasury may agree to make to it. The chancellor of the exchequer is anxious to agree to the balance of silver being taken as he regards it as important, if not vital, to the stability of the Indian currency system, and he hopes that the Secretary of the Treasury will provide us with the necessary funds to take the silver. In putting the gen eral requirements of the British Treasury before the United States Treasury, however, the Chancellor o f the Exchequer thinks it convenient to separate silver for India under the Pitman Act from our general requirements as he feels that some undertaking from the United States Treasury as to its willingness to finance silver purchases is essential before he can finally commit himself ta take it. In estimating our future requirements, the chancellor of the exchequer feels great difficulty in looking ahead for more than three months, it being im practicable at present to make any estimate for a period later than that which is much better than a guess. In view of the expressed desire of the Secretary of the Treasury, the chancellor of the exchequer names a figure below and explains, so far as he can, the assumptions on which it is based, but he points out that it may be wide of the mark either in excess or in defect. I f the urgency of the United States Treasury to have a final estimate from him at the present time is based on questions as to its legal power to make the ad vances in the future, he trusts that they will open credits on a liberal scale trusting to the British Treasury not to draw any more than the* circumstances show to be its immediate minimum requirements. The two principal unknown factors in forming a judgment on the situation are first of all the date at which British export trade may be expected to revive to its normal dimensions. Even after industry is fully reestablished an interval must necessarily elapse before the recovery is reflected in our export returns. The assumption on which the chancellor of the exchequer proceeds below is FOREIGN LOANS A N D A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 23 artificial, viz, that up to June, 1919, British export trade will not have shown any important revival, although the prospective diminution in our purchases is fully allowed for, and that, after that date, it will have revived so com pletely as to render it unnecessary for him to ask further assistance from the United States Treasury. In point of fact, the revival will of course be gradual and some relief may be expected before June, 1919, but a normal state of affairs can hardly be reached before the end of the year. But for the purpose of a rough estimate the above assumption is likely to lead to as trustworthy a result as any other. The second great unknown factor is the extent to which the United Kingdom will be required to finance the Allies and to take a hand in providing, tem porarily at least, liquid resources for reconstruction in the rest of Europe. The magnitude of this task is in itself obscure, but even apart from this obscurity the share which is likely to fall upon the United Kingdom is largely dependent upon the policy which is pursued by the United States Treasury. Broadly speaking, the more ample the assistance which is afforded by the United States Treasury to France, Italy, Belgium, and other European countries the less will be the assistance which the British treasury will require from the United States Treasury. In particular, the burden that falls upon sterling exchange is determined mainly by the balance of indebtedness in favor o f the United States from the rest of the world as a whole. It is dependent only in a secondary degree upon the level of British purchases in the United States. It is impossible, therefore, until the future policy of the United States Treasury as regards loans to countries other than the United Kingdom is known, to make a useful guess as to the extent to which the United Kingdom will be able to support itself by purchase of dollars over the commercial exchange. Subject to the above observations and on the assumption that dollar reim bursements will be received from France and Italy for expenditure already incurred and for cereals, the chancellor of the exchequer suggests a figure of $500,000,000 for the further advance required by the British treasury to cover its outgoings in respect o f food, sugar, cereals, oil, leather, tobacco, silver (exclusive of tht Pittman Act silver), additional cotton, Canada interest other than interest payable to the United States Treasury, or, in other words, an advance of $500,000,000 plus the net amount required for Pittman Act silver and for interest payable to the United States Treasury up to the 30th o f June, 1919. The chancellor of the exchequer concludes, as he began, with the conjectural character of this figure and repeating that it may possibly prove wide o f the mark either in excess or in effect. SECTION 8. Treasury Department Admits That Loans Can Be Made Only to Prosecute the War—British Commitments on December 1, 1918, After the Armistice Were $154,000,000. D e c e m b e r 31, 1918. The memorandum o f December 26, 1918, which you handed me last Friday, has received the careful consideration of this depart ment. I regret that the United States Treasury is not in a position, even if the existing legislation permitted it, to advance to your Government $500,000,000 in addition to the balance of the $250,000,000 special credit which still remains available to your Government. Now that the war is virtually ended and the attention of our people is being more and more concentrated on private endeavor, the meeting of our own large war expenditures and the advances in the nature of relief which this Govern ment is being called upon to make to countries that are utterly unable to care for their necessary expenditures for this purpose imposes a burden upon the United States Treasury which can not be extended to meet the suggested additional advance to your Government. Even were such not the case, the existing legislation authorizing the loans to be made by the Secretary of the Treasury to foreign Governments does not contemplate advances for some of the purposes indicated by the memorandum. D ear S ir H a r d m a n : 24 FOREIGN’ LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. You will recall that the only loans which the Secretary of the Treasury may make to foreign Governments are for the purpose of our national security and defense and the prosecution of the war. In the judgment of this department a large part o f the outstanding obligations of your Government maturing February 1,1919, will be converted in accordance with the option given the holders thereof. It should be possible for your Government to float a loan on our market at this time on terms it could accept and sufficient in amount to provide for the payment of such of the obligations of your Government as mature on February 1, 1919, and are not converted and to leave a substantial balance to meet other requirements of your Government in the United States. It is probably possible to increase the amount of your treasury bills outstanding. You have already been informed of the view of the Treasury that it does not see its way in any event to make advances to your Government to meet these maturities, or to make advances to your Government for other purposes, which could be met by your Government if its maturities are refunded and not paid. You will recall that your estimate as of December 1, 1918, showed that, apart from maturities and commitments for food and cereals, the outstanding com mitments of your Government less estimated cancellations aggregated $154,000,000. During the month of December your Government has received: Loans from this Government___________________________________ $186,000,000 In reimbursement for sterling furnished this Government________ 45,029,000 Reimbursement in dollars from the Italian Government (exclusive of the $6,500,000 per week on account of cereal purchases)_____ 20,000,000 Total____________________________________________________ 251,029,000 Of the special $250,000,000 credit recently established in favor of your Gov ernment, there still remains available $193,981,000. In addition, your Government has received dollar reimbursement from France and has claims against other foreign Governments for dollar reimbursement aggregating many millions of dollars. It will also be in control o f dollar funds arising from sales of wool, ocean transportation of troops, sales of securi ties, sales of materials, and other proceeds of liquidation of war activities. It is the view of this department that many of the requirements of your Government in this country can be met through the private credits ordinarily extended by private interests in normal times and conditions. Since many of the purchases of your Government are, I understand, now made on the basis of immediate payment, the change to a commercial basis allowing a reasonable interval between purchase here and payment should afford marked relief in a situation which is essentially of a temporary character. I also wish to refer again to the American and neutral securities which are available for sale by your Government, or which it may make available for sale. Foreign currencies realized upon such sales could in many instances be ad vantageously exchanged into dollars at the present exchange rate, or they might be utilized in defraying the cost of raw material entering into commodities that your Government may desire to purchase in the United States. I sincerely hope, and I have no reason to doubt, that by effective use of the method suggested and others the financial requirements of your Government can be met without undue strain. The Treasury would have been glad if it could have seen its way by advances to make the task easier, but I am sure you will appreciate the heaviness of the burdens which the Treasury has to bear, and will realize both the legal and the practical difficulties which prevent its acceding to your request. I will write you later regarding the sale of silver to your Government under the authority of the Pittman Act, and also regarding the dollar payments which have for some time been made weekly by the French Government to the British treasury. Very truly, yours, A l be rt R a t h b o n e . Sir S. H a r d m a n L e v e r , c/o The Plaza Hotel, Neio York City. FOREIGN LOAN’S AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E . 25 SECTION 9. England’s Attempt at World Oil Monopoly—Royal Dutch Co. Purchase. (No. 6917. 600.4117/7.) A m e r ic a n C o n s u l a t e G e n e r a l , London, England, October 15, 1918. Subject: The British Government and the Royal Dutch Co. The honorable the S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , Washington. Si r : I have the honor to refer to the department’s No. 2774 o f September 5, 1918 (600.4117/6), on the subject of the acquisition by the British Government of debentures of the Royal Dutch Co. The department brings to my attention a memorandum prepared by the legal adviser of the Standard Oil Co. and also a memorandum from the Treasury Department of the United States. I beg leave tG report on the whole subject as follows: The view expressed by the Treasury Department that the legal staff o f the Standard Oil Co. are entirely in error in describing the disposition of securities deposited with the American Dollar Securities Committee is no doubt correct. I am unable to find that any of the securities taken over by the American Dollar Securities Committee in this country have been employed as collateral for advances from the United States Government. As the whole world knows, certain prewar loans of the British Government were secured by shares of this kind, and since the United States has come into the war American and other securities have been acquired by the British Government for the stabiliza tion of exchange in various countries. It is altogether likely that shares of some classes have been acquired by the British Government with ulterior objects in view, and there seems to be no reasonable doubt that this is the case as to the Royal Dutch concern. It is- a matter of common knowledge that the British community is very greatly interested at present in securing control of oil production in various parts of the world not only for domestic purposes but for the alimentation of the mercantile and military fleets. Expensive research work is being undertaken at this moment in the United Kingdom under the direction of Lord C'owdray and efforts are being made to obtain and hold financial control in the case of pro ducing properties in Persia, Mexico, Venezuela, the United States, Java, and very likely in other regions. It is not possible, of course, to know the precise de tails either as to existing or contemplated organizations. These comprehensive plans, to which I have alluded, constitute a very important link in the chain of defensive commercial measures undertaken with a view to making the United Kingdom completely independent of all other countries for the operation of its fleets, and the maintenance of its essential industries. To this end, as I have already reported (see my No. 6278 of June 7, 1918) a provision has been introduced in the defense of the realm regulations, which is specifically applica ble to any oil field, which sets out that “ A person shall not, without the con sent of the board of trade, transfer or agree to transfer to or for the benefit o f an alien or a foreign controlled company any interest in any property or undertaking to which this regulation applies.,, It follows from this that in so far as the Royal Dutch Co., or the Shell Transport and Trading Co. (Ltd.), to which it is allied control oil properties in California and Oklahoma or any where else it is forbidden, under severe penalties, that the ownership in those enterprises, or any portion thereof, shall be purchased or sold by an American citizen. No doubt the department will desire to inquire very closely into this legislation whereunder a British-owned company obtains possession o f oil fields in the United States under such circumstances that it is unlawful for an Ameri can citizen to acquire any interest therein. Now, with respect to the Royal Dutch Co., the situation appears to be that this concern is a very valuable portion of the total interests of the Shell com bination which seems to be the British rival of American oil interests. The Royal Dutch Co. is, indeed, domiciled legally in the Netherlands, and its share holders and directors are largely Dutch, but at the same time the control is intertwined with the Shell Transport & Trading Co. (Ltd.), and the ultimate control, without any reasonable doubt, is entirely British, if not vested in the British Government itself. The fusing of these interests is admitted without the slightest concealment. In an official circular of the company, which is now under my eyes, the following statements appear: 26 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. **The various properties of the Shell Co. and those of the Royal Dutch Co. were pooled as from the 1st January, 1907, being from that date vested in various subsidiary companies, in all of which the capital is held in the pro portion of 60 per cent, by the Royal Dutch Co. and 40 per cent by the Shell Co. “Apart, therefore, from the return received on private investments and loans, the whole of the yearly income of the Shell Co. is drawn from dividends de clared by the various subsidiary companies. “ Tfre amount of income so received and the dividends paid since the amalga mation are given below : Shell dividends Income from the subsidiary companies: free o f tax. 1907 £556,001 15 1908 632,952 20 1909 601, 408 22i 191 0 668, 690 22i 191 1 •_________________________________________ 591, 212 20 191 2 1, 038. 215 30 191 3 1, 506, 903 35 191 4 1, 553. 484 35 191 5 1, 647. 234 35 191 6 1, 613, 724 35 1917 (not yet published). “At the date of the amalgamation the interests of the Royal Dutch and Shell Cos., apart from tank steamers and distributing agencies, were mainly confined to oil producing properties in the Dutch East Indies, and even now practically the whole of the revenue is drawn from this source, it still being considered good policy to husband the bulk of the profits earned by subsidiary companies operating in other parts of the world. “ The subsidiary companies holding either direct or through further sub sidiaries the interests of the amalgamation in the Dutch East Indies and the fleet of tank steamers are the Bataafsche Petroleum Maatscliappij and the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. (Ltd.). The balance sheets of neither of these two companies for the year 1917 were available at the date of the Shell meetings, but during 1916 £750 000 had been allocated to insurance and war risk funds and no less than £2,500,000 allowed for depreciation before the declaration of the yearly dividend. Since 1907 a total sum of £11,000,000 has been allowed for depreciation alone by the Bataafsche and Anglo-Saxon Cos. The financial posi tion of the Bataafsche is enormously strong, cash in hand and sundry debtors amounting together, on the 31st of December. 1916, to no less than £7,300,000. The private holding of t'he Shell Co. in British Government securities amounted to £2,400,000, and, altogether, the Royal Dutcli-Shell combine, either direct or through their subsidiary companies, at the present time controls liquid assets of the value of at least £20,000.000. “ There is not space in a pamphlet of this description to give a full account of the combine’s subsidiary companies operating in ail parts of the world, but below are a few remarks on the better-known holdings.” The few remarks just referred to include descriptions of interests of the combination in Russia, Egypt, Mexico, Rumania, Venezuela, Trinidad, and the United States. As to the United States it is remarked: “ In the United States, through the Shell Co. of California and the Roxana Petroleum Co., the Royal Dutch Shell Combine has invested some £7,000,000 in the purchase of oil properties in California and Oklahoma and in the building o f refineries and pipe lines. On this investment no return has yet been received, though there is not the smallest doubt that the results of last year’s trading would have justified a very substantial dividend. From the properties in Cali fornia alone the production of the combine’s subsidiary was more than 4,800,000 barrels, or roughly 700,000 tons, while the price of oil has trebled since the acquisition of the properties. Now that the combine’s refining and distributing organization in the LTnited States is complete, a revenue of from £2,000,000 to £3,000,000 per annum seems very possible from the properties there.” I am in a position likewise to contribute the following notes respecting the activities of this combination: “ The Anglo Persian Co. owns a concession expiring in 1961 from the Persian Government, giving them the right to search for and deal with petroleum, natural gas, asphalt, and ozorerite throughout a large portion of the Persian Empire. FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 27 The company also owns a large majority of the shares of the First Exploitation Co. (Ltd.) and the Bakhtiari Oil Co. (Ltd.), the whole of the shares o f the Brit ish Tanker Co. (Ltd.), the British Petroleum Co. (Ltd.), the Homelight Oil Co. (L td.), and the Petroleum Steamship Co. (Ltd.). The company’s fleet as of the close o f 1917 numbered 22 vessels. “ In 1914 a contract was entered into to supply the British Government with oil fuel, and in May, 1914, the Government agreed to subscribe for 2,000,000 ordinary and 1,000 preference shares and for debenture stock up to a total of £199,000. The Government has the right to appoint two ex-officio directors (with out share qualification) to the board of the company and its subsidiary com panies, and the said directors can negative any resolutions of the board, subject, however, to the right of the board to appeal to the Government. “ The total capitalization o f the company consists of 3,000,000 ordinary and 2,000,000 participating preference shares of £1 each, fully paid. “ From this ownership of the British Government, it will be observed that the Government controls the company. “ Our opinion is obtained from stock-exchange houses and financiers in the city that the British Government has been buying shares of Royal Dutch in New York, the general opinion being that these purchases and further acquisi tion of oil company shares are made with the purpose of insuring a sufficient fuel supply to the vessels of His Majesty’s navy.” If the department desires to continue the investigation of this matter and will suggest the particular points in which it is interested, I shall be very glad to proceed with the inquiry. I have the honor to be, sir, Your obedient servant, R o b e r t P . S k in n e r , American Consul leneral. (711.3.) SECTION 10. Davis Advises Loans to Foreign Governments Until the High-Priced Goods in America Are Disposed of, Thus Keeping Up the Prices to the American Consumer. 2 r u e S t. F l o r e n t i n , Paris, 7 th January, 1919. D e a r R a t h b o n e : In telephone conversation with Keynes, primarily in ref erence to British purchases of pork in tlxe United States, he expressed con siderable concern over their present relations with the American Treasury. I could not understand quite clearly all he said, but, in substance, it was to the effect that Lever was having a lot of trouble with the Treasury and they were worried because of the $250,000,000 credit established in their favor, to be repaid in sterling, would not be sufficient to meet their requirements. I told him that such matters were now being handled entirely in Washington, but as nearly as I could gather, the American Treasury was adopting about the same policy as the British treasury had adopted with the Allies. He told me he thought they would not be able to use this money for the purchase o f pork in accordance with the January and February program, because this money would have to be used for more urgent requirements. I intimated to him that their worry was probably due to the fact that the British treasury has not kept in close touch with the American Treasury (as was recommended some time ago), because its representative in New York could not very well by an occasional visit to Washington or by letter keep fully conversant with the views and policy of the American Treasury, which must necessarily change with changing conditions and which made it more necessary for such matters to be handled now in Washington. I told him, however, that although it is now manifestly impossible for the American Treasury to continue advances as heretofore and that all purchases and financing should be restored to normal channels at the earliest possible moment, my personal opinion was that the American Treasury would be as reasonable and just as possible under the circumstances and would be inclined to make advances for a short time yet to cover approved purchases in the United States which could not be otherwise financed. It is more and more evident every day that if we ever expect to obtain a satisfactory peace settlement, it will be necessary for the various departments of our Government to coordinate their policies with those of the Peace Com 28 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. mission. The allied Governments, and especially England, appear to be greatly concerned lately about their future financial position, and aside from the fact that it is not good policy, at least at present, to increase their worry by with drawing financial assistance too rapidly and radically, it is, in my opinion, good business to make advances rather liberally until we can get rid of the large surplus stocks of higli-priced guaranteed food products. Otherwise, the price must drop with the consequent disturbance and a loss to the producers and to the country of probably more than would have to be loaned to tide over the situation during the next two or three months. Most confidentially, I am satisfied that to-day it would be difficult to negotiate a satisfactory peace. The British are considerably disturbed over the proposed purchase by our Gov ernment of the International Mercantile Marine. They have the impression from various statements that we are deliberately attempting to destroy their mercantile marine and they are all the more disturbed about this proposed pur chase, because they can not understand why we would want to pay such a ridiculous price for this stock unless there is something other than the actual acquisition of the property back of it, and until this matter is disposed of satis factorily, it will be a waste of time to sit down at the peace conference. The British have just made a contract with the Belgians to sell them (the Belgians) 5,00,000 tons of new ships at $110 a ton, and Hurley says that we will have to shut down at some of our shipyards because we will have no need for the ton nage, and it is therefore difficult to see why we should acquire the Mercantile Marine stock on the basis of about $200 a ton. I am inclined to think, however, that this deal will be dropped immediately. In my opinion, we should by no means give in to the British or anyone else on questions of vital importance where we are in the right, but we can make a more determined successful stand where we are right if we do not first get into difficulties over questions where we are in the wrong. Another thing which has disturbed the British has been the announcement that the increase in the Amercan Navy will not be a burden to America as it will be sustained by English taxation paid to use as interest on their debt. Some of the British are now saying that they have no intention of collecting their Italian and French loans because they can not afford to put themselves in the position now of taxing the peoples of those Governments to pay the British. If the British intend to cancel those loans, my own opinion is that it will be for some other reason, and that in their present state of mind they would take this high position in order to try to cause embarrassment to us. In spite of the fact that the President and the Secretary of the Treasury are of the opinion that the dis cussion of our obligations should not and will not come up at the Peace Confer ence, I myself can not see how it can be avoided unless we pursue a very careful policy in order to prevent it. it may even be advisable to agree to postpone the collection of the interest for a year or so until trade gets adjusted and they can meet same without the shipment of gold, which they can not do without weaken ing their positions considerably. I have had several talks with Col. House along the lines indicated in this letter and find that my opinions are substantially the same as his. I have also told Col. House that, in my opinion, it would be very advisable, at least a little later on, for either you or Leflingwell to come over here in order to see the situa tion from this viewpoint and discuss the general problems of finance in relation to the whole question at issue. I realize that it would be very difficult for either one of you to get away, but I think it will be necessary and that the Peace Com mission will so request. As you are probably aware, the President has, upon the recommendation of Col. House, designated Hoover, Hurley, McCormick, Baruch, Col. House, and myself as a council, to be presided over by the President, and in his absence by Col. House, with a view of coordinating the different activities and of determining policies to be pursued in the peace negotiotions. Under the plan proposed, you and Leflingwell would also sit on this council while here. I realize the advantages of your plan to force all financial discussions to Washing ton, but on the other hand, if you desire to settle up a lot of these questions amicably, you could do so more easily and effectively by a discussion here with the heads of the various treasuries than by dealing with their representatives In Washington. Col. House fully realizes the importance of official Treasury repre sentation at the Peace Conference, and the President will no doubt do likewise as the situation develops, and if you can get away from Washington some time in the near future and will so advise me, I will take the matter up with Col. House with a view o f having the President or the Peace Commission request it. Crosby’s experience and knowledge, of course, could be used to considerable ad vantage, but his determination to publish his book on the League of Nations may FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 29 prevent it. This, I understand, will be decided by the President to-day or to morrow. This peace proposition is going to be a tough one and will eventually get down to a question of negotiation just like that in the formation of a syndicate or any other business undertaking and can never be put over any other way. Very sincerely, yours, N o r m a n H. D a v is . Hon. A l b e r t R a t h b o n e , Assistant )SSecretary of the Treasury. SECTION 11. Secretary Glass Does Not Accept Davis’s Stand. (Charge to Treasury Department.) J a n u a r y 8, 1919. American Embassy, Paris: (For Davis from Glass, Treasury.) Embassy’s 6635, January 6, 10 p. m. Your 922. First. Our 689 to Crosby contained the following: “ Are unwilling to agree to extend further credits to British as an inducement to them to purchase pork they do not need. Even if legal power existed, we could not make loans for purposes which would tend to prevent artificially a reduction of price o f food to our domestic consumers. Believe if British negotiate loan on this market, increase amount o f their Treasury bills, sell American securities, and avail of ordinary channels for private credits, they will be able to finance their needs here until restoration of normal conditions. I f after resort to such means British find some of their requirements here are not provided for, we are pre pared to consider applications for further advances to British.” Second. In establishing $250,000,000 special credit for British, wThich in effect is an exchange of pounds for dollars and not a loan, it wTas understood British could use dollars as they pleased, provided they asked for no further loans from Treasury. Third. We had not understood that program of foreign Governments had binding effect, but that is for Food Administration to decide. It must be of great importance to us that some of our contracts abroad should be canceled. Further, think it important to bear in mind that the attitude of our govern mental departments in regard to cancellations of contracts and provisional orders of foreign Governments here is likely to have bearing on the attitude of foreign Governments regarding the cancellation o f our contracts abroad. Fourth. If pork is held at an artificial price the cost of living is maintained at an unnecessarily high level, with a reflex effect on all industry. Many cases have arisen in which maintenance of prices by artificial means has been urged, in order to avert losses or loss of profits to Government agencies or to industries whose production has been stimulated for war purposes. The Treasury has con sistently taken the position that a general readjustment of prices was inevitable and in the interests of the entire people desirable, and that it could not be a party to any plans designed or tending to retard the process artificially. It has held that any legal or moral commitments of our Government should be met by direct appropriation and ♦direct payment, and not by indirect protection of prices. That this position is sound is recognized by Food Administration in its joint communication to Congress regarding wheat guaranty. The Treasury can not now take any different attitude in regard to hog products. Fifth. I f Italy were purchasing here meats other than pork we should be prepared to urge that she take instead the meat of wiiich we have a surplus. We understand from Food Administration this is not the case, and we can not press purchases of pork upon Italy, though prepared for a time to make advances to cover supplies thereof Italy may require. Sixth. I f Italy is not willing to execute contract for definite purchase of its proportion of 100,000,000 bushels of wheat, Treasury prepared to refuse further advances for Italy’s current cereal purchases until its share o f 100,000,000 bushels so far as Italy has already paid therefor has been exhausted. See our 650. C a r t e r G la s s , Secretary of the Treasury, 30 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. SECTION 12. Great Britain Loans Belgium $45,000,000, This Loan to Have Preferential Payment Over All Other Loans. (Paraphrase of a cablegram from the American ambassador at London, England. Dated January 9, 1919, at 8 p. m. Received 4.20 a. m., January 10, 1919. No. 218. Routine.) The following is very confidential (from Crosby, No. S68, for the Secretary of the Treasury) : * 1. An agreement has been reached by the treasury of Great Britain to estab lish in favor of the Government of Belgium a credit of £9,000,000, and this is to include the credit of £4,000,000 against repayment from enemy indemnities reported in my No. 904. which is referred to at the present time as being on condition that the American and French Governments agree to the proposed course and agree to the provision of similar facilities, “ mutatis mutandis,” up to the same limit in each case. 2. The borrowings will be represented by treasury bills of Belgium of short date, renewable until the receipt of compensation from the enemy powers shall enable them to be discharged in accordance with the following conditions, namely, the first receipts which accrue to the Government of Belgium in re spect of compensation or indemnity from the enemy powers shall be applied to the liquidation of the treasury bills mentioned above Paris with the liquidation of any other similar advances received from any of the asso ciated Governments, always subject to such general principles as the peace conference may lay down with reference to the disposition to be made of the assets which the enemy powers make available. 3. It is stated that the object of this credit is the facilitation of the task of the Government of Belgium and of nationals of Belgium in placing orders for tlie manufactures and produce of the United Kingdom necessary for restor ing Belgium, pending the receipts of compensation from the enemy powers. The prime minister of Belgium has made voluntary representation as to quick action and has requested a larger credit than that granted by the International Exchange. 4. The British treasury advises me that the Government of France has opened in favor of the Belgian Government a 100,000.000-franc credit for purposes of reconstruction. Presumably similar conditions as to priorities with reference to enemy indemnities will be adopted by the Government of France as those appearing above in formal agreement with British. 5. It is further stated by the treasury of Great Britain “ that they are not willing to take any action in which claims upon the German indemnity would be involved without the full knowledge and consent of the American and French Governments ” and also “ that they however recognize the need for an in creased and immediate provision if Belgian industry is to be restored.” It is apparent that they consider that the condition recited above in paragraph No. 2 is enough safeguard with reference to the disposition to be made of the assets which the Central Powers may make available. 6. It is held by this British treasury that the indemnity funds which Belgium and France may collect should not be considered as available for the purpose of paying future or existing debts of the Government of Belgium contracted for purposes other than reconstruction, and that they will not urge that indemnities of this character if obtained shall constitute a part of the general assets of Belgium to wThich Great Britain will look to cover general advances. It appears that this position at least is tenable with reference to that portion of the indemnity which will actually be expended in reconstruction although if any greater amount should be obtained Belgium’s general creditors may properly hold that such excess should be available for the extinction of general indebt edness. 7. I f this point of view is adopted by you the only objection we could have to the procedure would be based upon the Belgian Government’s failure to ob serve the request made: that no arrangement of the character in question should be entered into without first permitting you to express your views thereon. I made this request known to them in an official letter, a copy of which was sent to the treasuries of Great Britain and France. 8. The arrangement of the treasury of Great Britain, it appears, has been published in Berlin, and that grave concern would be created by any suspension in the execution of it. FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 31 9. I shall, however, in view of the facts, referred to above, and of the further fact that you likely hold that no reconstruction loans can be made by us under the present statutes if altered, that we make no request for sus pension of the agreement just entered into by the British, request the finance minister of Belgium to observe in the future the request to which reference is made in the seventh paragraph above. 10. Some financial institutions of the United States contemplate negotiating with Belgian interests for credit for reconstruction work. I have ascertained that the establishment of credit by the British Government has had the natural effect of delaying private initiative. Belgium does not prohibit such inquiry, but the finance minister of Belgium holds, as British treasury officials report to me, that the Government of Belgium fears that exchange will be injuriously affected by the shortcomings on the part of Belgian nationals in the establishment of private credits, and therefore it is their desire to have a fund, through credits recently established by France and Great Britain and a similar one to be sought from America, covering urgent public needs as for railways and permitting money to be advanced by the Government to appli cants at practically gold parity of exchange. The parties obtaining such credit would be presumed to have an advantage through exchange rate in the final cost of reconstruction plans over others would hastily do their own financing, and the advantage referred to is supposed to have a deterrent effect upon un wise private initiative. Apparently this reasoning is not sound, as the re sult would be a general demand for governmental finance and has already led to the delays mentioned above. 11. However, wre are not seriously concerned with reference to this aspect of the matter, although it illustrates the possible embarrassment from a large resort to governmental credits for private purposes. 12. A Belgian finance official has inquired of me whether the United States would permit a Belgian Government loan from the American public through bankers? In view of the fact that I had no knowledge of your views on this subject, I would not express an opinion to him, but I wish to say that it is my opinion that this is probably the best way out o f the reconstruction problem in Belgium, if the Government of Belgium insists upon endeavoring to finance Belgian nationals and provided always that you would not consider that our own financial operations would be inconvenienced by such loan. It is thought probable, at least, that the matter will be promptly presented through Amer ican bankers, who may have been, or will be, approached by the Government of Belgium on this loan. 13. The agent of the Belgian Government here is not ready as yet to sub mit new" estimates for army but makes the statement that the Belgian Gov ernment contemplates increasing its army by approximately 100,000 men. The result will be the demobilization of approximately 100,000 men who have seen service at the front, but the taking on of approximately 200,000 young men of military age who have not seen service. While there are domestic reasons for the procedure outlined, it appears to me impossible to suppose that such an increase of military strength is necessary to prosecute the war against Germany. The treasury of Great Britain is disturbed by considerations of a similar character, but will, no doubt, pass the Belgian requisition for an in creased number of uniforms, supplying such uniforms from old stocks in Great Britain, of small value otherwise. 14. The independent determination of governments of Europe of demoneti zation (demobilization), and, generally, organized military organizations, must present very difficult questions in so far as the support of these organizations by American funds is concerned. I will report, in conformity with the views which were expressed in my No. 920, to our political representatives in Paris, as I now report to you in regard to the proposed increase in the strength of the Belgian army. At the present time my personal recommendation would be against the support of increased numbers, British here to express a final opin ion on the subject, since it is connected with considerations of a political character not in my hands. D a v is . L ondon, January 9, 1919. S ecre t a r y of S t a t e , Washington, D. C.: (195. Jan. 9. For Rathbone from Cook. Routine.) No. 864. Your 761. It is not expected that any large quantity of hog products will be sold to Swedish Government, nor am I advised at present what amount 32 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. they will require. At present British are attempting to sell about 12,000 tons to Holland; understand sale has not been consummated. Heretofore trades with neutrals have been at market rate of exchange. Will keep you advised if hog products purchased by British in America are sold to Sweden. D a v is . SECTION 13. Norman H. Davis on Continuation of Loans, January 16, 1919. P a r i s , January 16, 1919. or S t a t e , Washington, I). C. Important 6781. January 16, 6 p. m. For Glass from Davis No. 937. Your 694. First. I am in general agreement with your economic principles and think that at the earliest possible moment all governmental financial support or control of trade should be withdrawn and all sales and purchases placed in private hands as before the war. While I think it inadvisable to make loans or maintain restrictions now which would tend to prevent artificially a reduction of price of food to our domestic consumers I also think it inadvisable to cause an artificial reduction in the price of feeds which would happen unless control of purchases is likewise withdrawn. The pork producers and manufacturers have been working under governmental control with limited profits and the manufacturers have upon certain assurances pur chased and laid down pork for January shipments and part of February upon programs handed in on fifteenth of December which were in orders. Second. Hoover informs me that our exportable surplus of pork products for January and February is about equal to our domestic consumption, in which case the gain to the domestic consumer in any reaction in price would be a corresponding loss to the producer of hogs, the manufacturer of hog products, and to the country, and a corresponding gain to the foreign purchaser irrespec tive of the question of the objects involved. Hoover and I have been endeavor ing to get all control withdrawn but as normal fair prices can not be negatived by withdrawing artificial control or support on one side without the correspond ing withdrawal on the other, we have suggested to the Allies that they take only the surplus stocks held under assurance as to disposal and price for ship ment in January and part of February and that by the latter part of February all control over sales be withdrawn in the United States and that simultane ously the allied governments discontinue purchasing through the one allied purchasing agency and turn all purchases back into the hands of private mer chants and importers. Third. Understand British are willing to purchase such portion o f their January pork program as may be desirable provided we will advance the funds for same as was contemplated by them when program was prepared and submitted. Fourth. Keynes claims that the credit of $250,000,000 which has been estab lished in their favor to be repaid in sterling will not give them sufficient, funds to meet this purchase and take care of other more immediate requirements. Because while they will need the pork shortly, they can allow their stocks to run below normal and withdraw from the market temporarily. This of course would cause an artificial break in market and they could purchase much cheaper, which they feel justifiable if we withdraw our financial assistance. Keynes also contends that we should not remove control and finance on one side until the other is actually and effectively in a position to resume inde pendent private trade, and that during at least early part of peace negotiations war can not be over. Furthermore, that if we are satisfied our associates are doing their best to get independent as soon as possible, we should not press them further, making it clear, however, that while a continuation of assistance on previous basis is strictly temporary it is not to be brought to a sudden con clusion; also that general policy here during conference and complicated economical position o f Allies and the rest of Europe (? ) it quite unjust to pre serve a strict and unadulterated treasury policy with regard to other con siderations and the position as a whole. Keynes apparently agrees with your general principles that all trade and finance should be placed in private chan nels as possible, but contends that just at this particular moment it is embar S ecreta ry FOREIGN LOANS AN D A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E . 33 rassing to them from many standpoints to be forced so suddenly to negotiate largely private loans. I told Keynes that such questions must necessarily be handled in Washington, and merely transmit this for your information. Fifth. So far as I can ascertain from Hoover there is no commitment to any food producer except in respect to pork, which expires in March, but which can be canceled end of February, provided advances are continued normally for January and February, and also in respect to wheat, which can be consid ered several months hence. Sixth. In substance, while I am opposed in principle to high artificial prices I do not see how a normal and unartificial price can be obtained unless the markets are thrown open to the producer, and, as the producer has been under governmental control, I doubfc if control should be entirely withdrawn until there is a free market for the disposal of his products. B l is s . J a n u a r y 16, 1919. Memorandum for Mr. Rathbone. Referring to the attached cable No. 868, I do not see how we can submit to the segregation o f indemnities for the security of British loans to Belgium un less upon the understanding that we are to make no further loans to Belgium. R. C. L e f f i n g w e l l , Assistant Secretary o f the Treasury. SECTION 14. Reply to Belgium on British and French Loan—Our Advances for Food and Clothing After the Armistice Were to Be Treated as Though for Recon struction. J a n u a r y 18, 1919. Paris. For Davis from Rathbone. Treasury 716. Embassy’s 6780, January 16, 6 p. m. Your 936. First. Refer to Crosby’s 868 regarding Belgium. Second. Secretary has written Belgian minister as follow s: “ I have before me your letter of the 16th instant addressed to Mr. Rathbone in reply to his letter of January 3, and note that the negotiations in London referred to were not with banks but with the British Treasury, and that the draft of the under standing which was arrived at had been communicated to Mr. Crosby on Janu ary 7. “ The Treasury has just received cables from Europe, from which I under stand that the British Treasury has agreed to establish in favor of your Gov ernment a credit of £9,000,000 for the purchase of reconstruction supplies in Great Britain on condition that the first receipts which accrue to the Govern ment of Belgium in respect of compensation or indemnity from enemy powers shall be applied to the liquidation of the Treasury bills to be issued against such credits rari rassu with the liquidation of any other similar advances re ceived by your Government from any of the associated Governments, subject nevertheless to such general principles as the peace conference may lay down with reference to the disposition to be made o f the assets which the enemy powers make available. It is not entirely clear from these cables whether the arrangement mentioned is conditional upon the United States and French Gov ernments agreeing to the proposed course and to the provision of similar facilities. “ I am informed that your Government is negotiating for the establishment of a credit in its favor on simila? conditions by the French Government. “It is the vieto of the United States Treasury that advances made to your Government after the cessation of hostilities and the reoccupation of Belgian for food, clothing, and other relief purposes must be regarded as in the same category as advances for reconstruction of physical properties, distinguishing advances falling within this category from advances for military purposes. It follows therefore that the United States Treasury must take the position that the advances which it has made to your Government for food and relief S. Doc. 86, 67-2------ 3 A m e r ic a n M is s io n , 34 FOREIGN LOANS AND AU T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. purposes during tliis period must receive treatment as favorable as that ac corded to advances which may be made to your Government by the British or French Governments for reconstruction purposes, and I am unable to see my way to continue to make advances to your Government for food and relief purposes beyond the commitments which have already been entered into by the Food Administration unless this principle is accepted by your Government. “ I am sending a copy of this letter to the United States Food Administration so that it may be governed accordingly, and to the representatives of the British and French Treasuries for their information.” Third: Guaranty trust with Treasury approval consented to negotiate re garding placing Belgian loan on our markets. These negotiations were broken off by Belgium about time agreement with British Treasury was made. Have asked Belgian Minister to ascertain why negotiations were broken off in view of United States Treasury’s desire that allied Governments should so far as possible provide for their needs in United States from private sources. Fourth: It is important that Treasury’s position as indicated in paragraphs second and third be brought before our peace mission. It should be made clear to them that we have sought to avoid this issue, but our hand was forced by arrangements negotiated between British and Belgium Governments and it is deemed imperative that Treasury should immediately secure its position in order to adequately protect the advances we are making Belgium for food and relief purposes. The monthly advances for these purposes have been largely increased since the signing of the armistice. F ifth: Referring to paragraph 15 of Crosby’s 8(58 it is essential that in present circumstances our advances to allied Governments for military pur poses should be rapidly cut down and wholly cease at an early date. This applies to Belgium as well as other allied countries. Outside of commitments for food we are not approving Belgian applications for purchases for military purposes except in comparatively small amounts. A lb e r t R a th b on e, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. SECTION 15. Secretary Glass’s Reply to Norman H. Davis on British Loans. [N ot by wireless.] January 20, 1919. Paris. For Davis from Glass. Treasury 728. Your 937. First: I am glad to have your full statement of views as while I am clear regarding the essential principles to be followed I desire to give full weight to your recommendations and the views of other departments in applying such principles. Second: It is the settled policy of Treasury to discourage efforts to main tain high prices. Where legal or moral commitments exist to producers they should be met by direct appropriation by Congress and not by continuation of high prices through artificial means with resulting maintenance of high cost of living and other economic evils of utmost gravity. I am not willing to make loans to allied Governments in order to assist other departments of Government to continue artificial high prices in pursuance of a policy of which I emphatically disapprove. I am not willing to force upon Great Britain a loan for which she has not made application in order to enable Food Ad ministration to force upon her the purchase of pork which she is unwilling to buy at artificial prices. Treasury has never refused loan to British required to meet their purchases inUnited States. T hird: Treasury was not consulted in advance either by British or Food Ad ministration regarding financing of ultimate purchase of stocks laid down by packers or regarding assurances given to packers. Before negotiating special credit arrangement with British we asked Food Administration if there were any impending questions between it and British which it thought should be taken into account in these negotiations and were ad vised that there were not. Fourth. I am satisfied British underrate their financial resources apart from United States loans. No information furnished by British to indicate that A m e r ic a n M is s io n , FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 35 credit of $250,000,000 is inadequate to meet their needs if supplemented as it should be by other means, such as loans and employment of private credits. Reimbursements from other Governments will also aggregate a large sum. Fifth. Referring Keynes statement of British position which you transmit can not consider any further loans to British without evidence of their require ments in reasonable detail and statements as to what they are prepared to do to provide funds from other sources. Upon such a presentation should feel bound to give request for loan careful consideration notwithstanding the burdens of the Treasury. See our 689. Sixth. Hoover cable 24 to Richard creates impression that extraordinary efforts are being made to support market prices and that case is not one of market being artificially broken by failure of British to give expected order. Understand proposed British order only 23,500 tons, which would seem to be too small to break any market except one being artificially supported. Seventh. Consider British situation governed by entirely different considera tions from those relating to continental situation where question o f maintain ing order paramount. C a r te r G la s s , Secretary of Treasury. SECTION 16. Hoover’s Cable on Surplus Pork Supply. From: Ammisslon, Paris. T o: Opnav. Food 262. Food Administration as the result o f conversations we have to-day proposed following contract to British. We omit preamble which recites moral obligations involved and that it has not been presented to our Treasury pend ing views British food ministry. We anticipate ultimate entire sale 100,000 tons to Germany and northern neutrals and thus perhaps with temporary ad vances from our Treasury it would be carried through without substantial ex tension credits. “ It is agreed as follow s: One, the British Government will place orders for 100,000 tons of pork products (hereafter referred to as the February order) in the United States before January 25 for February delivery or payment. Two, the above February order or such quantities as may be sup plied in advance from the present current United Kingdom stocks shall be con sidered available for resale in Europe under the following conditions: (a) In case orders for February shipment betwreen this date and end of February from neutral countries shall be placed in the hands of the British authorities for purchase or shipment from the United States, portions of the February order shall be transferred by apec to the agents of such neutrals in the United States, who will pay directly therefor to the American producers; (b) in case advances have been or should be made from current stocks in the United Kingdom to neutral countries before the end of February, then the British Government shall arrange that an equal portion of the February order shall be paid for by neutral buying agencies in the United States directly to all American pro ducers; (c) in case of any orders from Germany for February shipment between this date and the end of February the cash provided by Germany therefor shall be transferred to the United States in payment for an equal portion of this February order; (d) in case advances are made from the United Kingdom from existing current stocks to Germany, the cash realized therefrom shall be trans ferred to the United States in payment of similar portion o f the above Febru ary order; (e) in case o f shipment to liberated countries by the British Govern ment from this February order (or advance shipments from existing United Kingdom stock to liberated countries) or such amounts as may be reserved out of the February order for the use of the United Kingdom, then the United States Treasury will advance the necessary amounts to pay therefor in the usual manner. Three, the British and United States Governments mutually agree to withdraw all import and export restrictions on pork products, beef, and condensed milk on Febuary 28, 1919. The British Government agrees to abandon all purchases of pork products through the Government and allied purchasing agencies after February 28 and the United States Government agrees to withdraw its requirements of governmental approval o f such purchases or support of American prices at the same date, to the intent that normal trade re lations are reestablished in these commodities. Four, if the British Government 36 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. shall have stocks of pork products February 28 which they dispose of abroad for receipts effective as exchange, they will refund in dollars to the United States Treasury the amounts realized from such sales, or with the consent of the United States Treasuhy use such funds for additional purchases of food in the United States. Five, the United States Food Administration has en route 20,000 tons of pork products to the northern ports of Europe. These 20,000 tons are held in reserve for Belgium use, or any excess thereof for sale to Germany or neutrals or relief purposes, and such excess as there may be over Belgian needs shall be dealt with pro rata with any amounts dealt with from the above February order of the United Kingdom. H oover . January 23, 1919. Op-19. Food Administration. Mr. Snyder responsible for answer. Copies sent to Richard, Gray, Whit marsh, Mitchell, Hallowell, Snyder. American Mission, Hoover Cables Incoming. A m e r ic a n M is s io n , P a r is , SECTION 17. Summary of Great Britain’s After-the-War Attitude on Trade and Finance. A m e r ic a n E m b a s s y , O f f ic e of t h e C o m m e r c ia l A t t a c h e , London, November 22, 1918. B r i t i s h T r ad e A t t it u d e T o w a r d t h e U n it e d S t a t e s . Memorandum for Mr. Irwin Laughlin, American C'harg^ d’Affaires: Follow ing your suggestion, I shall try to summarize briefly in the form of this memorandum information relating to the British trade attitude toward America, which I have in the past few days talked over with you. Mr. Edward Price Bell, who is in charge of the European service of the “ Chicago Daily News,” has told me that he had reason to fear that well informed American official opinion was likely to be unduly suspicions of British ambitions for sea power and trade domination. To counteract what he considered a mistaken attitude on the first point, he sent a long cable to his paper on November 6, in which he tried to show that Great Britain was entitled to her predominant naval power. His main argument was substantially that stated at a recent meeting of the American Lunch Club by Admiral Sims, who said that Great Britain’s lines of com munication are sea routes and that her position is, therefore, different from that of the United States or any other great power. Mr. Bell also tried to give assurance that Great Britain always had and always would use her naval power for ends in which the United States had a common interest. A qualifica tion which occurs to me is that America may soon possess merchant tonnage equivalent to that of Great Britain and have a foreign trade of greater rela tive importance to out national prosperity and of more serious competitive character as concerns Great Britain. We may, therefore, have greater interest in sea routes and may be brought into more severe competition with Great Britain, and our interests instead of being largely supplementary as formerly may be to an extent opposed to one another. Mr. Bell also wrote a memorandum intended to allay trade suspicion of Great Britain, which the visiting delegation of editors of the American daily press propose to present to the President and ask that permission be granted to give it wide publicity in America. Mr. Bell denies that there is any un friendly spirit in Great Britain toward America and tries to disabuse our people of any idea of this kind. He is, no doubt, correct in a general way. Any American who has been here recently has had plenty of personal evidence of the hospitality and genuine cordiality of the British people. Just how far this sentiment will make impossible conflicts of economic interests is another matter. Mr. Bell’s attitude is to get rid of suspicion and take as genuine the obvious good will toward America. Let us hold on to this good will by all means, but let us also examine for our own guidance just what sort of a trade attitude Great Britain would like to have America adopt. Whether or not British good will is dependent upon our falling in with her plans or not may be considered later. FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 37 FINANCE. Great Britain must furnish work for the demobilized soldiers. To do this an early revival of the export trade is essential. There is also the desire to make as much profit as possible in order to hold up exchange and relieve the present weakened financial position. It is hoped here that America will not enter the field as a financial competitor. The British financial position at present is not a very strong one, because they have a highly inflated currency and are faced with great burdens in the way of taxation. The demands of labor, which can hardly be avoided, will make it difficult for Great Britain to early put herself again in a sound financial position. If America, in a strong financial position, were to have the ambition to compete outright and try to take away the chance of profitable financing previously held by this country, it would not be an easy position to meet. If, on the other hand, American financiers are ready to go in with the British, who have had more experience, this would leave the machinery largely in the control of British banks and financial houses, but it might result in the greatest profit to both countries. During the war, American financiers have taken the position that they would not consider any financial expansion abroad of a commercial character until the war obligations were satisfied. During the past year I have had corre spondence with a number of leading American bankers who are in position to establish business overseas. As indicating at least one point of view, there is a letter which I have just received from Mr. Archibald Kains, president o f the American Foreign Banking Corporation, which has been organized by 16 or more large American banks in different cities. I had pointed out to Mr. Kains the advisability of establishing an American branch bank in Australia rather than making connections with existing banks. Mr. Kains replied that all the world was coming to America for financing and that we would have plenty to do without going out for business. He also said that for American banks to try and compete openly with British banks reminded him of the small boy who had tried to teach his grandmother to suck eggs. If this is typical of American banking opinion, we wTould not use our present financial strength to try and get hold of the world’s financial machinery. This would be very satisfactory to the British. If, however, American banks are ever going to compete outright with British banks in the financing of foreign commerce, the most favorable oppor tunity is now, when our trade adjustments are being made and when we have a relatively strong financial position. If our banks are content to finance our foreign trade through British banks our commerce will be under a certain handicap. With our normal high rate of wages we can not confidently suffer higher costs of doing foreign business. I am in favor of going ahead without delay in establishing branches of American banks abroad and stabilizing dollar exchange. It is a question of degree. Shall we make a substantial start or go slow and play safe? It is no time for over-extension certainly, but if we believe in the future of our foreign trade we should have the courage of our convictions. m erchant m a r in e . It would be shutting our eyes to the obvious if we were to try to believe that Great Britain has no apprehension of the potential competition of the new American merchant marine. I have recently talked quite frankly with the editor and publishers of the well-known British shipping journal “ Fair Play,” as well as with others who are informed as to the feeling of shipping interests here. British shipping has been self-supporting and a productive national asset. The principal points which are in the minds of British ship ping men in viewing the future American competition can be summarized, par tially, at least, as follow s: 1. Mr. Hurley made a statement regarding American railway rates, in which he inferred that export differentials could be utilized to develop the American merchant marine. They fear here that such export differentials may be made for American-owned ships and not for British ships. Presuming that American railways and American ships are both operated by the Government, it is feared that a through rate from an inland point to an oversea point might be made, which would give American ships an advantage over British ships in competing for cargoes. Seeing that Mr. Hurley’s statement was not in detail they read this interpretation into what he said. This interpretation is not un 38 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. natural, seeing tliat Germany and adjacent countries were accustomed, prior to the war, to give railway export differentials in favor of their own shipping. 2. During the war a large number of British ships have been diverted from normal trade routes to carry American troops and supplies to Europe. At the same time it is said that markets previously supplied from Great Britain had been supplied in increasing measure by direct shipments from America. We have, of course, made a special effort to increase our exports in markets where the exchange has been running against us, and our export figures to such markets as South America have greatly increased. At a time when British ships have been taken from some of these routes, there is a feeling that America has been fortunate in getting a foothold in British markets as a result of the war. 3. British shipyards have been working to a certain extent on repairs for warships, which has cut down the output of merchant tonnage and has made it impossible for Great Britain to keep up with the great increase in tonnage in America. It is felt that this fact should result in a certain amount of appreciation on the part of America when it conies to a question of keen competition in shipping. 4. There is considerable anxiety regarding the general statement that cer tain trade routes belong to America. It is feared that this is meant to imply that the South American market is one which the United States is especially entitled to. Seeing that the bulk of trade in this market has been British trade and that all trade has been carried largely by British ships, this position, if it was maintained, would meet with disagreement. British ships have pre viously run on all the trade routes of the world and they can not see why any particular route should be considered as the special province of America. 5. At least 250 British merchant marine officers have been loaned to America. Their salaries have been doubled. It can not be expected that they will freely return to the British merchant marine at this great salary disadvantage, and it is feared that this loan may work out in an embarrassing way to the British merchant marine. British officers and British seamen have helped in the development of the American merchant marine, where wages and con ditions of living have been better. It is feared that this competition may result injuriously to the British merchant marine. The British shipping people have been in the game a long time and are in terested in the return that they get on their investments. They are business people and are very anxious that they should not suffer as the result of changes made by the war. They probably would be very glad to go into pooling agree ments with American ships, which would result in a fair profit being obtained for both. A movement has been under way for some time toward a consolidation of British shipping interests. For example, the P. & O. Co. has purchased the Union Steamship Co. of New Zealand and the New Zealand Steamship Co., thereby gaining a firm hold on liner tonnage to Australia and New Zealand. Prominent officials of this consolidated company were influential in British shipping circles. When 1 left Australia in September, 1917, the prime minister, Mr. W. M. Hughes, told me confidentially that these officials in the Ministry of Shipping, who were primarily concerned with the development of the P. & O. communications to Australia and New Zealand direct from Great Britain, were adverse to an increase in shipping across the Pacific from Australasia to Ameri can ports. Other combinations have since been perfected in British shipping circles and probably there is the same desire to protect former lines of British shipping communications to other parts of the world. Carrying out this ten dency toward consolidation may be cited a United States Army Intelligence report which has just come to my attention, which is as follow s: “ Lieut. Col. H. D. Behrend. of Liverpool, a retired British Army officer, largely identified with the shipping industry in Liverpool, left for London November 19, 1918, to complete the purchase of five ships to be added to the Scandinavian service in which his firm are interested. “ The ships are new, just having been completed in British yards, average tonnage 4,500 and the price to be paid for them is about £145,000. “ Col. Behrend informs the writer that, in his belief, the day of the English tramp steamer is done, and that in the future the shipping industry of Eng land will be conducted by large companies formed from the consolidation of existing lines; in other words, he predicts an English shipping trust covering water transportation to and from the United Kingdom as conducted by British ships.” “ J. D. W h e l p l e y . ” FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E . 39 TRADE. The trade interests in this country, that is, the manufacturers and exporters, are desirous of securing as early return to favorable conditions for private business as possible. They desire, for instance, that British ships may be put back on normal routes as soon as possible. They also feel that protection for a certain period at least should be given to British industries during the period of reconstruction. As an example, American motor cars have ceased to come to this country for the retail trade, and in addition to the restrictions there is at present a duty. Great Britain munition firms, such as Vickers, are going to be able to change their plants over to the manufacture o f low-price motor cars. If they have a certain time they can possibly obtain a firm grip on the British market for low-price motor cars, so that it will be difficult, if not im possible, for American cars previously sold in this market to regain their posi tion. There are many industries which have enjoyed temporary protection during the war which desire sufficient protection during reconstruction and possibly afterwards. In some instances control has gone farther than this, as is the case of the nonferrous metals industry. The Overseas Trade Depart ment and commercial interests generally, I think, look upon an imperial prefer ence tariff as a matter of domestic policy. These instances which I have men tioned are illustrations of things in which the commercial interests in this country are interested, and on which probably they wish American opinion to look as just local British problems. The idea o f no economic barriers they feel has got to be whittled down to a point where this principle will not interfere with ambitions which particular interests have in mind. France, Belgium, and other countries which are going to be in particular need of essential materials for reconstruction, hope that arrangements will be made to give them these supplies under war conditions; that is, with priorities in shipping and manufacture and with credit for what they purchase. As an example of this, I can give you a confidential incident. The French Govern ment applied to representatives of the American War Industries Board in Paris for 70,000 tons of steel rails per month during 1919. They endeavored to get this order in under war conditions a few days before the armistice was signed. I talked with a committee of Belgian industrials in Paris who I know had the same idea; that is, that they should be taken care o f first. I f the United States is to pour out its resources in the way of providing materials for reconstruction in Europe for a year or two and at the same time is quite willing to suffer the cessation of normal exports o f finished goods, for which we have had an established trade good will, we will be pursuing a policy of generosity. Nothing, it seems to me, is more important than the fact that we should remain true to the motives which have been sincere. The last thing that we should do would be to try to take any commercial advantage of the war, which we could through out strong position. If, however, we are negligent of our financial machinery, our shipping machinery, and the normal organiza tion of our foreign trade, as operated by individual firms and on special and favorable lines, we will be giving our Allies a head start. It therefore is a policy to keep America quiescent, whereas our Allies, who have suffered more than we have, are eagerly trying to get their industries and trade in shape, there is no reason why we should not do this with our eyes open. This also, I should say, again is a matter of degree. I f American com merce is held back for generous motives when our Allies are forging ahead, the day may come when American commerce will reap great disadvantage. We can be generous where generosity is due and firm where our own com mercial interests are entitled to their due. I think that Allied friendship can stand this strain as it ought to. trade pro pagan da. The British Ministry of Information has been active in setting the British point of view before our people at home, and have, as well, entertained various delegations of editors in this country. What are their motives? Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, Bart., M. P., Parliamentary Secretary of the De partment of Overseas Trade, welcomed the American delegation of trade jour nalists on Nevember 12 at a luncheon given by the English-Speaking Union. He said quite frankly that he believed that every possible effort ought to be made to obtain better acquaintance and understanding between trade interests 40 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. in America and Great Britain. In the problems of peace now arising we would have to realize that human nature was not perfect and that there are many difficult, particular questions which would have to be settled. With sympathetic understanding between British and American trade interests we could feel more sure that our great objects would be obtained without permitting these practical adjustments to have a major influence. In making these remarks he saw me sitting not far away and took occasion to say, in a laughing way, that he had already talked these matters over with a friend who was sitting on his right In explanation I may say that some six or eight months ago I had a number of conversations with Sir Arthur about an exchange of visits be tween American and British commercial organizations. This was something which Dr. Page had asked me to attempt to bring about. At this time I be came quite well acquainted with Sir Arthur and with other men in the Overseas Trade Department and we talked rather frankly about the situation. I remember saying that at least in certain quarters in America British afterthe-war plans for trade were creating anxiety. Sir Arthur replied that in Great Britain they thought that we were going much farther than they had and he cited the American International Corporation as an example. He was very anxious that these visits should not be merely social affairs but that they should actually get ahead with certain definite things. He believed, for one thing, that it would be a good thing to have financial cooperation between the United States and Great Britain, and that in other instances we might get together and divide contracts in South America and in other places. The British Board of Trade and commercial organizations in this country have been very favorably attracted by the idea of combination since the war. There have been a great many combinations here in industry. They are occurring almost weekly. An export corporation is now being formed in Manchester which will have $1,000,000 a year to spend in promoting foreign trade. They have not our traditional dislike for combination as represented by political sentiment in America. They are favoring combination in Great Britain and they probably would be glad to have us work with them. Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland has recently told the American Chamber of Com merce in London that the British Government is anxious for close cooperation between Great Britain and the United States in all matters which must for some time remain subject to Government control. Their chief interest is in the control of raw materials after the war, and the earliest possible under standing between the two Governments is desired. Sir Arthur suggested that the American Chamber of Commerce in London ask the United States Govern ment, through the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, to indorse the early appointment of an allied international commission to deal with the distribution of raw materials after the war. It must be quite evident that Great Britain feels that America has been holding back during the war and that it is now essential for America to come out in favor of allied commercial control. There has probably been no direct attempt to influence America in this direction, but it has probably been con sidered all to the good if American public opinion has been put in a frame o f mind to approve this kind of close economic cooperation. My opinion is that there is every reason for allied economic control as long as it is necessary to have a lever to make Germany live up to the peace terms. It may also be necessary to safeguard the interests of our allies who have been invaded. I have reason to believe that British hopes go farther than this. They wish to have a head start in reconstruction as far as their own industries are "concerned, and to receive high prices for the raw materials they have to sell, which may restore the financial position o f the country. I am in favor of allied control of economic goods as long as it is necessary to coerce Germany and help our less fortunate allies. When this is accomplished I believe that an early return to free conditions of private buying and selling will obviate possible international misunderstandings and be the best all around for effective industry and commerce. American business will not stand being fettered any longer than patriotism requires. Then I am opposed to interna tional government trusts which will entirely alter our economic system and give advantage to the Government which can bargain most shrewdly. This is not a kind of international relation which can be faced with hope for future security and good will. FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 41 CONCLUSION. Can we bargain for our own interests and maintain the good will of Great Britain? They may say that we are letting Germany down too easy and that we have not suffered a long war. British labor, however, which is coming to be a most important factor, is for a liberal settlement. The British Government can not go too far in standing for the objects of special interests. If we are diplomatic and yet firm, I think that we can carry our liberal case a long way toward at tainment. We may have to make concessions for a period of transition, but we can narrow this period down to some reasonable limit. It will be necessary for us to have a solid understanding of our own case and to put it forward. When we make concessions it must be understood by our allies that they are concessions. We need to look at these great issues in proper proportion. It is not necessary to be suspicious because our allies are going to be rather de termined to get what they w.ant. It is certainly unwise to ignore these eco nomic issues and trust blindly to good will. We must be prepared for com mercial bargaining. If we are steady and true to our national interests, as well as to great principles of international policy, we will gain respect, which is the best basis for any permanent international good will. P h i l i p B. K e n n e d y , American Commercial Attachd. SECTION 18. United States Money for Food in Belgium to Be Treated the Same as Money for Rehabilitation. P a r is , February 6, 1919. S ecre t a r y of St a t e , Washington, D. 0..* 616, February 6, 11 a. m. D-23. For Rathbone. Referring to your dispatch of January 18 to Baron De Cartie, I transmit herewith copy of letter addressed by British Treasury to Compte de Grunnei, of Belgian commission. “ I beg to confirm our telephonic conversation of to-day with reference to the proposal of the United States Government that advances made by that Government for the Commission for Relief in Belgium on account of food and relief for the Belgian people should be considered as ranking with the ‘ similar credits’ which, under the agreement between His Majesty’s Treasury and the Belgian Government, are to rank pari passu, repayment out of the first installments of any payments for reparation or indemnity made by Germany to Belgium. “ His Majesty’s Treasury is prepared to regard American C. R. B. advances at present date as ‘ similar credits ’ in the above sense on condition that the British C. R. B. credits are also regarded and that the British Treasury shall receive the same proportion of the amount recovered out of the indemnity as the British gross contribution, whether made in cash or in bonds, to America bears to the total cost of the contribution of the leading powers for Belgium relief. In so far as recoveries are made in cash, the British Treasury would, of course, be prepared to apply the proper proportion of that cash toward redeeming the corresponding bonds given by them to the Government o f the United States.” In transmitting to Hoover a copy of above letter from British Treasury dated February 1, the Belgian delegate, Baron Hymen, states that he has in structed Belgian Minister in Washington to accept the proposals o f American Treasury. Am informing Baron Hymen that this matter must be dealt with you in Washington, but that, in my opinion, you will probably insist that the advances, which will rank pari passu between the American, French, and British Governments as a claim against German indemnities, must be those made for relief and reconstruction purposes on and after November 11 last, instead of February 1, as proposed by British. Davis. A m e r ic a n M is s io n . 42 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. SECTION 19. England Sold Pork Supplies, Purchased in This Country with United States Liberty Loan Money Loaned for the Purpose of Prosecution of the War, to Our Technical Enemy, Germany, with the Approval of the Treasury Department—The Gold Received Was Placed in the English Treasury and Not Credited on the English Debt Here—Thus the Money Raised from the American People to Prosecute the War Went to the Aid of the Enemy with the Treasury Department’s Sanction. [Paraphrase o f cablegram .] From : American Mission, Paris, France. Dated: February 21, 11 p. m. Received: February 22, 2 a. m. Number: 848. For Rathbone, No. D-71. A statement has been submitted by Hoover to the effect that the British have sold 30,000 tons of pork products to Germany and 12,000 tons to neutrals. In order to enable England to dispose of some old stocks, Hoover consented to this sale. Hoover could have made these sales himself, and intended to do so, but allowed British to make them in order that old stocks which might have become stale might be worked off. Hoover con sented to this sale upon condition that corresponding orders be placed by British in the United States or else return cash advanced by the Treasury to them for the original payment of stuff resold. As agreed, British have placed order for 12,000 tons replacement and Hoover has telegraphed his [willingness?] to remove control on pork market. That this information be kept confidential for a few days is earnestly desired by Hoover. If found pressing in the mean time, British to place order for balance of twenty [five?] thousand tons so that withdrawal may be announced by him of his staile ration of pork products without risk of a demoralized market, thus leading to an orderly return to un controlled market. Hoover has also requested that a ruling that unified buying in the United States is illegal be issued by the Attorney General. Claiming that no time limit was placed on this replacement order and seeking to attach condi tions making Hoover guarantee m a x im u m prices during the next six months, Hoover states that the British are delaying replacing order for 25,000 tons sold to Germany. Hoover contends that they should return cash or place this order at once in accordance with agreement, and requests that notification to this effect should be made to the British Government by the Treasury Department. He is anxious to have the matter settled by February 24 in order to make announcement. Taking the situation as it stands, the suggestion of Hoover may be the best way to secure a prompt and orderly return to natural market. Following is for your information: Arrangement was made whereby England is to receive from Germany in payment of above food 25,000,000 marks in neu tral currencies and 100,000,000 marks in gold. The neutral currencies in which payment is made are none of them currencies which are required by us at this time and they are not taken at the par of exchange. With reference to the gold, the conditions are outlined in your 758 (? ) acceptable to the French Gov ernment, they have waived any claim that the gold be turned over to them, for some reason not disclosed to us. The arrangement of Hoover with the British Government was made independently, producing no disadvantage in it to us. A m e r ic a n M i s s i o n . SECTION 20. Hoover Approves of the Sale of Pork to Germany. [Paraphrase o f a cablegram.] From the American Mission at Paris, France. Dated March 4, 1919, at 2 p. m. Received 8 :1 1 p. m. No. 1021. The following is for Rathbone, No. D-96, reference to his No. 834, filed March 1, 1919. 1. Your understanding is correct that our suggestion was not accepted by the French and that they waived claim to gold. FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 43 2. However, gold is not available to us on account of the fact that the British made sale of the food in question to Germany and the gold is to be received by them on the understanding that the British shall use the dollar equivalent for replacement order in the United States in accordance with agreement made icith Hoover without our approval being previously obtained, but it was not thought by Lamont, Strauss, and myself that it would be wise to make any objection because it was not our opinion that we were badly in need of gold but that if should take it, the opposition would only be increased which has been manifested here by the Allies, based on our readiness to transact business in comparison with Allied unreadiness. Negotiations to lift blockade and to make possible to Germany to pay for, are being hampered by this feeling. The sale o f Army assets in Spain to assist us in meeting our maturities has been suggested to Hollas. Lamont and Strauss are going to Spa this evening and will be gone until Friday. Davis. A m e r ic a n M is s io n . SECTION 21. Loans to Serbia to Be Secured by First Lien on German Indemnities to Serbia. M a r c h 8, 1919. The United States Treasury has received an ap plication from the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes for a credit of $40,000,000, or 200,000,000 francs, to enable the purchase by that Government o f certain commodities from the American Expeditionary Forces. In con nection with this application, the Government above mentioned has offered to secure the repayment o f advances made against such credit by that part of the war indemnity to be paid by Germany which will be allotted to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, with'the understanding that the reimbursement of the advance should be made out of the said indemnity. Before acting upon this offer, the United States Treasury would be glad to be informed whether the giving of this security would, in the judgment of your Government, in any way prejudice the interest which it has in the indemnity to be awarded the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes by reason of the fact that your Government has made advances to said Govern ment during the war. The United States Treasury does not desire to take, as against your Government or the other Governments which have made war advances to Serbia, any advantage through the acceptance of security for the advances it has made, or may make Serbia or the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. I shall be glad also for suggestions from your Government as to whether it might not be advisable for the United States Treasury to accept such security, in case the Treasury decides to establish such credit and make advances there from, with the distinct understanding with the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes that such security shall be held for the benefit o f such advances as have been made, or may be made to Serbia, or the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, by the Governments associated in the war, in such pro portion as shall be determined by such lending Governments, or as may be decided at the peace conference, or in accordance with principles thereat de termined. I am, my dear Mr. Blackett, Very truly, yours, M y D e a r M r. B l a c k e t t : A lb e r t R a t h b o n e . Mr. B a s i l B l a c k e t t , 23 Wall Street, New York City, N. Y. SECTION 22. United States and British Treasury Understanding on Serbian Loan. M arch 27, 1919. M r. B a s i l B l a c k e t t , 23 Wall Street, New York, N. Y. : I have received your letter of the 2;6th instant in reply to my letter of March 8 regarding an application received by the United States Treasury from the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes for a credit of $40,000,000, or 200,000,000 francs. D e a r M r. B l a c k e t t 44 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. I understand from your letter that it is the opinion of the- British Treasury that all advances made by the various Governments associated in the war to the Servian Government, or to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, from the date of the armistice until the signing of peace should rank equally as a first lien on the indemnity to be received by that country from the enemy. This view would not seem to be entirely in accord with the resolution w^hich I understand has been passed by the supreme economic council, to the effect that relief and reconstruction credits to Servia and certain other countries should be made a first charge against receipts 011 account of reparation and indemnity. Mr. Davis cables that such general principle has been approved by the allied governments in respect ol the particular countries mentioned. In the judgment of the United States Treasury, the question o f the liens for advances made to the various allied governments by the governments asso ciated in the war upon indemnities to be received from the enemy is one that had best be discussed in Paris. I am, therefore, communicating the views o f the British Treasury, as set forth in your letter, to Mr. Davis, asking him to discuss the matter in Paris with the representatives of your Government and the representatives of the other Governments concerned. In the meantime I take pleasure in informing you that the United States Treasury has advanced to the Czecho-Slovak Government $22,350,000, all of which was advanced after November 11, 1918. The Treasury has not, however, acted on the application for the $40,000,000 credit before mentioned. I am, my dear Mr. Blackett, Very truly, yours, A lbert R a t h b o n e . M arch 27, 1919. [N ot by wireless.] A m m is s io n , Paris. For Davis from Rathbone. Treasury 924. See our 921, paragraph 2. First. British in reply to our letter (see par. 11, our 862) state character of advances made or contemplated to be made by British Treasury to Servia since date of armistice, and states opinion of British Treasury that all of its ad vances between date of armistice and date of peace should rank equally for purposes of claims upon indemnity with any advances made by United States to Servia, and, further, that all advances by United States or British to Servia made before signature of peace should rank equally as a first lien on indemnity and take precedence of any advances made after signature o f peace. Second. Advising British (A ) its view apparently not in entire accord with resolution of supreme economic council (see your 151, par. 3) ; and (B ) that questions of liens on indemnities should be discussed in Paris (see our 780, par. 4). Third. French have informally stated no preference in respect of indemnities awarded Servia should be given to advances made by associated governments since armistice over French advances to Servia during war. Fourth, British position regarding lien of advances to Servia apparently not precisely same as its position regarding lien of advances to Belgium (see our 780, 774, and 716), nor lien of advances to Italy (see our 901, par. 1). A lb e r t R a th b on e, Assistant Secretary of Treasury. SECTION 23. The United States Paid Great Britain Over $90,000,000 for the Transportation of Our Troops March 27, 1919, when the Business-Like Thing to Have Done Would Have Been to Credit Great Britain on Her Debt or Interest with This Amount. T reasu ry D epartm en t, Washington, March 27,1919. Memorandum for Mr. Rathbone: I spoke to Gen. Hines to-day in regard to the amount due the British Gov ernment for transportation. He informed me that his latest figures show a total amount due o f about $90,000,000, on account of which $35,000,000, roughly, FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 45 has been paid, leaving $55,000,000 due for the transportation of troops. There will also be a payment on account of cargo, but he does not estimate this at more than $2,000,000 or $3,000,000. The final figures are now being compiled by months and as the amounts are determined payment is to be made to the British Government. I will make sure that we are currently kept informed in regard to these payments. G eorge O. M a y . H o tel de C r il l o n , March 29, 1919. --------- . 1. I have received advices to the effect that, at the request of the British, French, and Italian Governments, the United States Treasury Department is prepared to establish credits in favor of each of these Govern ments to the extent of $10,000,000 to each, for the payment of food purchased in the United States, and used by these respective Governments, up until September 1 next, for relief in Austria to prevent the further spread of anarchy. 2. In order to put this arrangement into effect and to secure payment from Austria to the allied governments for this food supplied to Austria, the allied governments are to make an agreement substantially along the following lines: (a) The Austrian Government will formally agree, and at once proceed to proceed to place at the disposal of Great Britain, France, and Italy, the state forests, salt mines, and certain other of its assets satisfactory to these countries. (&) Great Britain, France, and Italy will undertake to supply GermanAustria with food commodities not to exceed $30,000,000 in all, which is the estimated amount, at least, necessary to keep that country supplied until the next harvest. (c) Up to the amount of $30,000,000, these advances to Austria will be a first charge to be repaid before any reparation payments which the peace treaties may require Austria to make. 3. The above credits are established upon the understanding that the Gov ernments of Great Britain, France, and Italy will apply the proceeds of any funds received by them under this arrangement to the repayment of their obligations incurred to the United States for the purchase in the United States of foodstuffs supplied to Austria. 4. The funds so provided may be applied only for the payment of foodstuffs transported and distributed under the direction of the supreme economic council through the office of the director general of relief, and the allied com missions operating under his direction. Very sincerely, yours, D ear United States Commissioner of Finance. A true copy: H e n r y C. B r e c k , Secretary to Finance Commissioner of United States. SCHEME FOR THE REHABILITATION OF EUROPEAN CREDIT AND FOR FINANCING RELIES’ AND RECONSTRUCTION. A p r i l , 1919. 1. (i) German bonds to be issued to a present value of £1,000,000,000 and to a face value of £1,200,000,000 carrying interest at the rate of 4 per cent per annum and sinking fund at the rate of 1 per cent per annum as from January 1,1925, these payments to have priority over all other German obligations what ever, including additional claims for reparation not covered out o f the above, the difference between the face value and the present value representing the funding of interest from January 1, 1920, up to January 1, 1925. (ii) Austrian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian bonds to be issued to the present value of £125,000,000, £170,000,000 and £50,000,000, respectively, on similar con ditions. (N. B. Turkey to be dealt with separately.) (iii) Rumanian,1 Polish, Czecho-Slovakian Jugo-Slav,1 and Baltic States bonds to be issued to the present value of £15,000,000, £40,000,000, £20,000,000, £15,000.000, and £10,000,000, respectively, on similar conditions. 1 Rumania and Serbia also to receive a share o f reparation. 46 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 2. Interest on each of the issues of enemy bonds under 1 (i) and (ii) above to be guaranteed jointly and severally by the other enemy states, in the event of any one of them failing to provide the payments due. 3. In the event o f the failure of the above guaranties, interest at 4 per cent on all the above bonds to the aggregate present value of £1,500,000,000 (or £1,800,000,000 as from January 1, 1925), to be guaranteed by the principal allied and associated governments, by the three Scandinavian Governments, and by the Governments of Holland and Switzerland. 4. In the event of the guaranty under (3) becoming operative, the guarantee ing Governments to be responsible in proportions determined in advance, as set forth in the accompanying schedule A. 5. In the event of any of the guaranteeing Governments failing to meet their guaranty, the remaining guaranteeing Governments to make good this failure in the same proportions among themselves as under (4), but in no event shall any one of such guaranteeing Governments be liable for more than double its original proportionate share. 6. A failure of any Government to meet its guaranty under the above clauses to be considered by the financial section of the League of Nations, and if judged by them to have been avoidable shall be punished by such penalty of forfeiture of a financial, economic, or commercial character as the League o f Nations may determine. 7. The bonds to be free of all taxation in all the issuing or guaranteeing States. 8. Of the £1,000,000,000 bonds to be issued by the German Government £724,000,000 shall be paid to the allied and associated governments on account of sums due for reparations; £76,000.000 shall be utilized for the discharge of existing debts to the three Scandinavian countries, Holland, and Switzer land, and the remaining one-fiftli of the total, namely, £200,000,000 shall be left in the hands of the German Government to be made available for the purchase of food and raw materials. 9. Of the bonds amounting to £345,000,000 in all to be issued by the Austrian, Plungarian, and Bulgarian Governments, four-fifths in each case shall be paid over to the allied and associated governments on account o f sums due for repa ration, the remaining one-fifth being left in the hands of these Governments for the purchase of food and raw materials. 10. The bonds amounting in all to a present value of £1,000,000,000 to be received by the allied and associated governments on account of reparation to be divided between them in the proportions determined upon by them for the division of reparation receipts generally. 11. The bonds to be accepted at their par value plus accrued interest in payment of all indebtedness between any of the allied and associated govern ments. 12. The bonds to be acceptable as firs-class collateral for loans at the central banks of all the issuing or guaranteeing States, subject to such terms and limitations as may be in force with these institutions from time to time. Schedule A . Per cent. United Kingdom-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------United States___________________________________________________________ France---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Italy_____________________________________________________________________ J a p a n ___________________________________________________________________ Belgium-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Norway, Sweeden, Denmark, Holland, and Switzerland___________________ 20 20 20 10 10 5 15 A m e r ic a n C o m m i s s io n to N e g o t ia t e P e a c e , H o te l de C r il l o n , Paris, April 1, 1919. Mr. J. H . K e y n e s , Treasury Chambers, London, S. W. England. D e a r K e y n e s : With reference to your letter o f March 18 relative to the replacement order for pork, I do not see the necessity for your pursuing the matter further unless it is ascertained that the replacement order has not been FOREIGN LOANS AND AU T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E . 47 made in New York in accordance with the understanding. If this is not done I assume that I shall hear something further about it and if so shall advise you. Sincerely yours, N o rm an H . D a v is . SECTION 24. British Proposal to Have German Bonds Accepted at Par by All the Allies as Payment of AH Indebtedness— New Credit Established. A p r i l 2, 1919. Dear Mr. B l a c k e t t : I have received your letter of March 26, 1919, regarding further advances to your Government from the United States Treasury beyond the undrawn balance of the special credit established during December, 1918, in favor of your Government by the Secretary of the Treasury, now amounting to $24,323,824.75. I understand from our talks on the subject that the assurances as to further advances which your Government now desires to receive will in its judgment cover all the advances which it will require from the United States Treasury other than for United States purchases as British share of European relief, and it is on that understanding that I am replying to your letter and setting forth the following arrangement which the United States Treasury is prepared to make: (1) For all future advances to your Government from the United States Treasury, whether made from the undrawn balance of the special credit of last December or otherwise, your Government will give its demand obligations, payable in dollars, or at the option of the holder in sterling at the cable buying rate on the New York market at noon of the day o f demand [as fixed (deter mined) by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.] (2) Your Government will from time to time, at the request of the Secretary of the Treasury, and on such dates as he shall request, deposit sterling to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States, or to the credit of such other person as the Secretary of the Treasury shall indicate, with the Bank of Eng land or with such other depositary or depositaries as the Secretary of the Treasury may indicate up to £55,000,000 sterling. (3) For sterling so deposited at the request of the Secretary o f the Treasury your Government is to receive in payment thereof either, as the Secretary of the Treasury may elect: (a) Dollars credited to your Government at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York at the sterling cable buying rate on the New York market at noon of the day of deposit of such sterling as fixed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, or (&) The surrender of obligations of your Government then held by the United States to the representatives of your Government in Washington or New York, or appropriate notation thereon of payment on account o f the principal of any such obligations if not fully paid, such surrender or notation, as the case may be, being regarded as equivalent to due demand of payment of the principal of the obligation surrendered or of the part o f the principal set forth in any such notation as of the date of such deposit of sterling; the accrued interest on any such obligation so surrendered or upon the portion of the principal thereof set forth in any such notation to be paid in dollars simultaneously with the surrender thereof or the making of such notation thereon, as the case may be, by the deposit of the amount of such interest to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States with the Federal reserve bank of New York. (4) To represent the interest which shall become due during April and May, 1919, on obligations of your Government now or hereafter held by the United States, except interest on such of said obligations as shall be surrendered or upon which notation of partial payment shall be made, in payment for sterling deposited as above provided, the Secretary of the Treasury will ac cept demand obligations of your Government bearing 5 per cent interest and payable in dollars or at the option of the holder in sterling at the buying rate on the New York market at noon of the day of demand as fixed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. It would be intended by the Secretary of the Treasury to use these obligations after their receipt for the payment of sterling thereafter furnished at the request of the Secretary of the Treasury 48 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. with the view of having such obligations paid in full in this manner at the earliest practicable time. (5) The Secretary of the Treasury will from time to time establish credits in favor of your Government in the aggregate amount of $150,000,000, in ad dition to the unexpended balance of $24,323,824.75, to be availed of from time to time against obligations of your Government in a corresponding amount, to such extent and for such purposes as shall be approved by the Secretary of the Treasury. Said amount of $150,000,000, whether before or after its establishment in wrhole or in part as an additional credit, and said unex pended balance of the credit heretofore established, are to be reduced by the following amounts: (6) All dollars paid after March 26, 1919, for sterling deposited by your Government at the request of the Secretary of the Treasury; (&) All amounts paid after March 26, 1919, under the agreements mentioned in your letter of March 26, 1919, covering transportation of troops and cargo for the United States Government and for the sale of Australian wool, and. all other amounts paid after March 26, 1919, in dollars by the United States Government or any department or agency thereof to the British Gov ernment or to any department or agency thereof in the settlement or partial settlement of claim s; (c) The amounts at which all gold delivered after March 26, 1919, to the Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to the arrangement set forth in Lord Reading’s letter of May 28, 1918, shall be received by the Treasury; and ( d) The amount of all dollars paid in reimbursement after March 26, 1919, to the British Government by other Allied Governments, except to reimburse payments made after March 26, 1919, by the British Government for such other Governments with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury. (6) To the extent that any payments of the character mentioned in (a ), (&), (c) and (d) o f paragraph (5) shall be received by the British Govern ment after the credits hereinbefore mentioned shall be availed o f such amounts shall forthwith be paid by the British Government to the Secretary of the Treasury, to be by him applied toward the payment of the principal of obliga tions of the British Government held .by the United States. (7) At the election o f the Secretary of the Treasury the British Treasury will accept obligations of the British Government held by the United States, or appropriate notation thereon of payment on account of the principal thereof, at par in payment o f all claims of the British Government or any department or agency thereof against the Government of the United States or any depart ment or agency thereof. If payment of any such claim is to be made in sterling obligations of the British Government payable only in dollars, or notation thereon as aforesaid accepted in payment of such claims, will be accepted in Washington or New York as the equivalent of sterling at the cable buying rate on the New York market at noon of the day of surrender or notation, as the case may be, as fixed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The accrued interest on all obligations, or upon the portion of the principal thereof set forth in any such notation accepted in payment of any such claims, is to be paid in dollars simultaneously with the surrender thereof or the making of such notation, as the case may be, by the deposit o f the amount of such interest to the credit of the Treasurer o f the United States with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. I understand that the foregoing arrangement has been accepted by your Gov ernment, and shall be glad if you will accordingly confirm the same. SECTION 25. The United States Loaned England Money to Take Care of Her Share of European Relief. A p r il 2, 1919. (Not by wireless; charge to Treasury Department.) A m e r ic a n M is s io n , Paris. (For Davis from Glass. Treasury 943.) First. Unexpended balance of credit in favor o f Russian Provisional Govern ment in amount of $137,270,250 has been withdrawn with authority of President heretofore given. FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M AK IN G SAM E. 49 Second. British credits authorized by President but not yet established ap proximate two hundred million. Third. Unexpended balance of British credits heretofore established approxi mate twenty-four million. Fourth. British estimate cash requirements during April substantially one hundred twenty-five million, exclusive interest payment due United States that month, about fifty-six million. Fifth. Discussing with British establishment o f further credit of between one hundred and fifty million and two hundred million, and in addition to arrange method to take care of their interest payments to United States during April and May, approximating eighty million, by establishment of additional credit or otherwise. Proposing that new credits established are to be reduced by amounts of sterling furnished us, gold received under Pitman silver ar rangement, wTool payments, and charge for transportation of troops paid to British Government and possibly certain dollar reimbursement from allied governments. Sixth. Treasury obligated to establish additional credit in favor of British to care for its United States food purchases made to furnish British share of European relief. See paragraph 7 our 921. Seventh. Please obtain President’s approval to my establishment of further credits to British beyond amounts previously approved by him up to one hundred fifty million. Cable when such approval obtained and forward ap proval by mail. Eighth. Do not commit Treasury to above arrangement with British, as details affecting amounts, etc., are being worked out here with Blackett. Secretary of the Treasury. SECTION 26. New Agreement on British Credits. A p r il 14, 1919. D ear M r . B l a c k e t t : I have received your letter o f March 26, 1919, regarding further advances to your Government from the United States Treasury beyond the undrawn balance of the special credit established during December, 1918, in favor of your Government by the Secretary of the Treasury, which on the date o f your letter amounted to $24,323,824.75. ~ince the date of your letter substantially all of said credit balance has been advanced to your Government against its obligations payable in dollars or at the option of the United States in sterling at the cable-buying rate on the New York market at noon of the day of payment, as determined by the Federal Re serve Bank of New York. In addition, a further credit was established in favor of your Government on April 9, 1919, in the amount of $20,000,000, all of wiiieh has been advanced to your Government against its obligations in like form as those last mentioned. It was intended when this credit was established that it should form part of a larger arrangement which has now been perfected and made, for convenience as of March 26, 1919, and this $20,000,000 is to be considered as included in said larger arrangement. I have now received through you the estimate of the British Treasury that its requirements for dollars in the United States through the month of June next, exclusive of the amount of interest due on the obligations of the British Government held by the United States, will approximate $250,000,000. The arrangement herein set forth is designed to take the place of any exist ing commitments of the United States Treasury to establish credits in favor of your Government. The following is my understanding of the arrangement which has been made and I shall be obliged if you will be good enough to confirm it: First. For all future advances to your Government from the United States Treasury'your Government will give its demand obligations, payable in dollars, or, at the option of the holder, in sterling at the cable-buying rate on the New York market at noon of the day o f demand, as determined by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. S. Doc. 86, 67-2------ 4 50 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. Second. Your Government will from time to time, at the request of the Sec retary of the Treasury, and 011 such dates as he shall request, deposit sterling to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States, or to the credit of such other person as the Secretary of the Treasury shall indicate, with the Bank of England or with such other depositary 01* depositaries in the United Kingdom as the Secretary of the Treasury shall designate, up to £55,000,000 sterling. Third. For sterling so deposited at the request of the Secretary of the Treasury your Government is to receive in payment thereof either, as the Sec retary of the Treasury shall elect, (« ) dollars credited to your Government at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York at the cable-buying rate for sterling on the New York market at noon of the day of deposit of such sterling, as fixed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; or (b) obligations of your Govern ment then held by the United States at par of principal, either surrendered to representatives of your Government in Washington or New York, or indorsed with appropriate notation showing payment on account of principal if not fully paid; such surrender 01* notation, as the case may be, being regarded as the equivalent of due demand of the payment of the principal of the obligations surrendered or of a part of the principal set forth in any such notation, as o f the day of such deposit of sterling. Accrued interest up to the date of such deposit of sterling 011 any such obligations so surrendered or upon the portion of the principal thereof set forth in any such notation, to be paid by your Gov ernment in dollars simultaneously with the surrender of such obligations or the making of such notation thereon, as the case may be, by the deposit o f the amount of such interest to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Fourth. The Secretary of the Treasury will from time to time establish credits in favor of your Government in the aggregate amount of $200,000,000 (the $30,000,000 credit established in favor of your Government on April 9, 1919, to be deemed a part of said credit of $200,000,000) to be availed of from time to time against obligations of your Government in a corresponding amount, at such times as shall be approved by the Secretary of the Treasury. The aforesaid obligation of the Secretary of the Treasury to establish credits in favor of your Government is subject to reduction as hereinafter set forth. Fifth. Your Government has received dollars since March 26, 1919, and may in the future receive dollars from the following sources : (a) In payment for sterling deposited by your Government at the request of the Secretary of the Treasury; (b) Under the agreements mentioned in your letter of March 26, 1919, covering the transportation of troops and cargoes for the United States Govern ment, and for the sale of Australian wool, and through other payments by the United States Government or certain of its departments or agencies to the British Treasury, in settlement or partial settlement of claim s; (c) From the United States Treasury for gold delivered to the Secretary o f the Treasury pursuant to the arrangement set forth in Lord Reading’s letter o f May 28, 1918; (d) From certain allied Governments in settlement of claims of the British Government for dollar reimbursement. All dollars received by the British Government from any of such sources in excess of $50,000,000 and exclusive of (1) dollars received in reimbursement from other allied Governments for payments made after March 26, 1919, by the British Government for such other Governments, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury; and (2) dollars received by the British Treasury which are essentially reimbursements of sums spent by it prior to April 6, 1917; shall, if the Secretary of the Treasury shall so request, be forthwith paid by the British Government to the Secretary of the Treasury, to be by him applied and as he shall determine toward the payment of the principal of or interest upon obligations of the British Government held by the United States, or in case the Secretary of the Treasury shall so determine, from time to time such amounts may be retained by the British Government and the Secretary of the Treasury in such event may in his discretion reduce by a corresponding sum his commitment under this arrangement to establish credits in favor of the British Government. Sixth. The Secretary of the Treasury may, at his option, reduce his com mitment to establish credits in favor of your Government under this arrange ment by the sum of $43,750,000, or such portion thereof as the Secretary of the Treasury shall deem fair, in the event of the failure of the British Government to reach an agreement with the Grain Corporation regarding the delivery of and FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 51 payment for tlie 100,000,000 bushels of wheat purchased of the Grain Corpora tion by tlie Wheat Export Company for account of the British, French, and Italian Governments. Seventh. At the election of the Secretary of the Treasury the British Gov ernment will accept its obligations held by the United States, or appropriate notation thereon of payment on account of the principal thereof, at par in payment of all claims of the British Government or any department or agency thereof against the Government of the United States or any department or agency thereof. If payment of any such elaims is to be made in sterling, obligations o f the British Government payable only in dollars, or notation thereon, as aforesaid, accepted in payment of such claims, will be accepted in Washington or New York as the equivalent of sterling at the cable buying rate on the New York market at noon of the day of surrender or notation, as the case may be, as determined by the Federal Reserve Bank o f New York. The accrued interest on all obligations, or upon the portion of the principal thereof set forth in any such notation, accepted in payment of any such claims will be paid by the British Government in dollars simultaneously with the sur render of such obligations or the making of such notation thereon, as the case may be, by the deposit o f the amount of such accrued interest to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Eighth. The existing credit balance in favor of your Government in the amount of $323,824.75 is to be withdrawn. I appreciate that this arrangement does not fully assure your Government of the provision for all its estimated requirements for dollars through June, 1919. The Secretary of the Treasury does not, however, feel that so far in advance he could properly assure your Government of the establishment of credits in its favor to meet all of said requirements. However, under the arrangement as made the Secretary of the Treasury will have authority in the light of the circumstances as they may then exist to permit, if he shall then so determine, the use of dollars accruing to your Government from any of the sources mentioned to meet the dollar requirements of your Government in the United States. However, if after the credits assured your Government by the arrangement set forth have been availed of your Government desires to apply for a further extension of credit in its favor any such application will receive the careful consideration of the Treasury. I should, however, point out in this connection that such credits can not, except for the limited purposes set forth in the Victory Libery Loan Act, be established after the termination of the war, and further that the limitations of the appropriation provided by the Congress may make it impossible for the Secretary of the Treasury to estab lish either before or after the termination of the war credits in favor of your Government in addition to those provided for in the foregoing arrangement. I am, my dear Mr. Blackett, Very truly, yours, A lb e r t R a t h b o n e . Mr. B a s i l P. B l a c k e t t , 23 Wall Street, New York City, N. Y. SECTION 27. United States Loaned a Total of $16,000,000 Each to Great Britain in France and Italy for Foodstuffs to Be Sent to Austria. These Loans Were Made in This Way to Circumvent the Acts of Congress. Thus $48,000,000 of the American People’s Liberty Loan Money, Raised to Prosecute the War, Was Loaned for the Aid and Comfort of Our Enemy Austria. A p r il 23, 1919. S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , Washington, D. <7. (1755. April 23, 11 p. m.) D-241. For Rathbon. One. Reference your 963, paragraph one. I quote herewith reply received from Keynes to my letter of March 29 in regard to the $30,000,000 Austrian relief credit: “ I have submitted to Sir John Bradbury your letter of 29th March in which you state the conditions on which the United States Treasury Department is 52 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. prepared to establish credits in favor of tlie British, French, and the Italian Governments to tlie extent of $10,000,000 to each for the payment of food pur chased in the United States and used before September 1 next for relief in Austria. Sir John Bradbury authorized me to transmit to you the acceptance of these conditions by the British Treasury subject to the two observations: One, that as you are aware no formal agreement on the proposed lines has yet been made with the Austrian Government and that the olTer of the United States Treasury would not, according to our understanding, fall through if for any reason our best effoits fail to secure an agreement precisely in the form indicated; and, tw o : As regards paragraph 8 of your letter, that the funds received by us in repayment from Austria may not necessaarily be dollars or readily convertible into dollars and that, according to our understanding, we shall not be required to reply unless and until we ourselves receive payment in a form readily convertible into dollars. “ I take this opportunity to say with reference to ]\Ir. Hoover’s proposal that our loan of .$10,000,000 to Austria should be increased to $15,000,000, and that the chancellor of the exchequer has signified his approval to this proposal (the additional $5,000,000 to be taken as was the case with the original $10,000,000, out of our apportionment of £12,500,000 for relief) subject to France and Italy, also agreeing to a similar increase and subject to the United States Treasury agreeing to apply the arrangement set forth in your letter now under reply to the increased figure of $15,000,000. “ I. M . K e y n e s .” 2. Hoover now estimates that it will require $15,000,000 additional to care for Austrian relief until next crop and I therefore recommend that an addi tional credit of $5,000,000 to each England, France, and Italy, a total of $15,000,000, be established on the same condition as the $30,000,000 credit. Please [advise] immediately about this. 3. Referring to Keyne’s letter, paragraph 2, subsection 2. I suggest that you authorized me to inform the British that their proposal is accepted with the understanding that our Treasury shall have the option of accepting repayment from the British either in dollars or at our option in whatever funds Austria may use to pay England, should the British consider it impossible to convert these readily into dollars. D a vts , American Mission. A p r il 23, 1919. D ear M r. B la c k e tt : Have you been able to obtain figures showing the advances of the British treasury to Italy for its purchases without the British Empire during the period from July 1 to December 31, 1918, both dates inclusive? I expect very shortly to receive from Mr. Alliata the final figures of Italian purchases in neutral countries chargeable against the credit for such purchases established by the United States Treasury in favor of the Italian Government during the year 1918. I f both sets of figures can be obtained it should be possible to dispose of the claims of the British treasury against Italy for dollar reim bursement on account of British advances for Italian neutral expenditures during the period mentioned. I should be glad to get this matter out of the way, and I assume that you would also. Very truly yours, A lbert R a t h b o n e . P. B l a c k e t t . 23 Wall Street, New York, N. Y. M r. B a s i l P a r is , May 2, 1919. S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , Washington. (D-269. For Rathbone. Reference your 1005.) President has approved establishment of additional credits of $5,000,000 to each of the governments of Great Britain, France, and Italy. These credits to be used for the purchase of food in the United States and supplied by them for the relief of Austria. Formal letter being forwarded to Secretary of Treasury. D a v is . American Mission. FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. [2 GOO. June 16, 8 p. m. D -346. For Rathbone. 53 One.] S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , Washington. According to estimates estimate now supposed to be final, tlie $45,000,000 already provided for Austrian relief by the establishment of credits of $15,000,000 to each England, France, and Italy, will fall short by approximately $3,000,000 of completing the Austrian relief program until harvest. I recom mend the establishment of an additional credit of $1,000,000 in favor of each England, France, and Italy, upon the same terms and conditions as the credits aggregating $45,000,000 already established for Austrian relief. This entire $48,000,000 credit will be used exclusively for dollar expenditures. Additional expenditures for supplies, freights, and expenses, which now represent dollar expenditures, will be met by England, France, and Italy from their own resources. Two. Relief administration is completing accounts as to expenditures so far incurred, and I shall furnish this to you within a few days. D a v is , American Mission. SECTION 28. All Advances for Relief and Reconstruction to Have Priority of Payment. [Paraphrase o f a cablegram from the American Mission at Paris, France, dated Apr. 30, 1919, at 8 p. m., received May 1 at 3 03 a. m „ No. 1878.] The following is for Rathbone, No. D -261: 1. Reference is made to the third paragraph o f my No. D-151 and the fourth paragraph of my No. D-199, and I have to report that on the 14th day of April this resolution was referred to the Supreme Economic Council for more definite interpretation and referred back to the finance section with full power to in terpret and act. The following is the act of the finance section of April 24: “ It was agreed: (1) That all advances made to those countries, namely, the advances detailed in the resolution of the Supreme Economic Council during that armistice for reconstruction and relief shall be entitled to such priority. (2) By relief must be understood all advances for raw materials, clothing, drugs and hospital supplies, and railway material; reconstruction includes the provision of such things as horses, lubricating oil, leather belting, vehicles, and other transportation means not required for military purposes, but reconstruc tion does not include miscellaneous articles of industry. Reference must be made to the finance section of all doubtful cases, as for example in certain cir cumstances the provision of machinery for purposes of agriculture before they can be included in the categories of reconstruction and relief. The right was reserved by Mr. Collier to bring up at a later date the matter o f extending the definition of relief.” 2. With reference to your Nos. 947 and 924, the first and fourth paragraphs thereof, and paragraphs two and three of my No. D-199, I have to state that the action stated above settles any doubt as to the position of Great Britain. Refer to my No. 212 and paragraph four of my No. 240 and note that Belgium is included in the list of countries whose payment for reparation and indemnity are subject to this lien. It should also be noted that the advances made be tween the date of tlie armistice and the 1st of February are included. The matter has again been mentioned to Keynes, who agrees to make it clear to the treasury of Great Britain. 3. With reference to the third paragraph of your No. 924 and the third para graph of my No. D-199, it is admitted by the French that this priority is now settled. The reservation made by them above might accompany report by more detailed definition of the terms o f relief and reconstruction. * 4. The minutes of the meetings at which this action was taken wTill confirm this cable. D a v is , American Mission. 54 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. SECTION 29. The Belgian Account for the Commission for Relief in Belgium. B r it is h W ar M is s io n , O f f ic e of t h e B r i t i s h T r e a s u r y R e p r e s e n t a t iv e , New York City, May 5, 1919. The Hon. A l b e r t R a t h b o n e , % of The Federal Reserve Bank, New York City. D e a r M r, R a t h b o n e : Referring to your letter of April 16 regarding the British Government’s claim for dollar reimbursement on account of Belgian relief expenditure, I have now received from the treasury, London, further information as requested in your letter, which will I hope enable the final disposition of these claims now to be made. (1) Wheat Commission claims for flour, beans, etc.—I am informed that of the total claims of $4,837,959.58 the amount which refers to the crop year 1917-18 is $1,278,475.01. As this amount is less than the figure of $l,68i.000 mentioned in your letter I assume that no further question will arise as re gards this claim. (2) Value of specified articles in 20,000,000 rations.— I have pleasure in con firming your assumption that the specified articles referred to represent American food products contained in the rations and computed at the f. o. b. values at American ports as specifically approved on behalf of the United States Treasury before the rations were issued. (3) Ministry of Shipping claims for expenditure in the United States of American port dues, etc.— A full schedule is being mailed to me showing the sums recoverable. As regards that part of the services which was rendered in 1917, if the claim had been promptly paid by the Commission for Relief in Belgium it would necessarily have been paid for out of the dollar funds of the Commission for Relief in Belgium as at that time the United States was financing all the expenditure of the Commission for Relief in Belgium. The fact that there has been delay in payment does not appear to modify the principle on which the claim is justified. (4) Boots, cotton, etc., items.—The item $476,500 for cotton material and hosiery, etc., subsequent to the German retreat was specifically agreed to on behalf of the United States Treasury before the goods were supplied. All the other cases of supply were approved on the specific condition that they should be paid for by dollar transfers by the Commission for Relief in Belgium and it appears to the British treasury that it is only just that the commission should now carry out its undertaking. For example, on February 12, 1918, in response to a most urgent application, the approval of the British treasury was given for an expenditure on boots in the following fo rm : “Approved on the condition that the Commission for Relief in Belgium trans fer dollars equivalent to £150,000 out of their United States funds to the British treasury account with Morgans in New York. At a time when we are import ing leather from the United States the above is clearly a proper claim on American funds.” (The actual expenditure on boots in this case appears eventually to have been somewhat less than originally approved.) (5) Ministry of Food services prior to 1918.—This claim for $176,251.51 rep resents supplies of fish made to the Commission for Relief in Belgium during 1917, which, if promptly paid for, would necessarily have been paid for in dollars as the United States was at that time financing all the expenditure of the Commission for Relief in Belgium. I am, dear Mr. Rathbone, Yours, sincerely, B a s il P . B la c k e t t , For the Financial Secretary to the Treasury. MEMORANDUM REGARDING BELGIUM RELIEF CLAIMS— MR. MAY 5, 1919. BLACKETT’ S LETTER OF Claim No. 1. Wheat commission claims for flour, beans, etc., appears to be in order. Claim No. 2. Value of specified articles in 20,000,000 rations also appears to be in order. FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 55 Claim No. 3. Ministry of shipping claims for expenditure in the United States of America port dues, etc., should await receipt of full schedule and information from the commission for relief in Belgium as to whether expenditures of American vessels in Europe are met from their dollar resources or from other resources. See our letter of April 10. Claim No. 4. Boots, cotton, etc., items: There does not appear to be any record of the approval of the item of cotton material and hosiery by the Treas ury in New York and Mr. Cook states that he is satisfied it was not approved in London. In this connection, Mr. Crosby cabled on December 31, stating that the request had been referred to him, and positively recommending that it be not allowed. As regards the other items, while the approval by the British Treasury may have been given on specific conditions, there is no evidence that such conditions were assented to by the United States Treasury and, therefore, these claims would also seem to fail. Mr. Cook suggests that we secure from Mr. Poland, through Mr. Rickard, some further information in regard to the claim for boots. Claim No. 5. Ministry of food services prior to 1918. There is nothing to indicate that this is a claim arising from the United States, and in view of this fact and of its age the claim should be disallowed. SECTION 30. Suggestion for Cancellation of Debts, July 25, 1919. L o n d o n , July 25, 1919. : Inclosed is confirmation of a cable which I sent you through Ambassador Davis, in the embassy code, and which may astonish you a b it; so I am writing you an explanation. After talking with the officers of the Bank of England and with a very able, intelligent, and thoroughly reliable newspaper man named Kiddey whom Nor man invited to his house for dinner for the purpose, and after talking yester day with the chancellor, I am convinced that the immediate task now ahead of us which will help conditions over here more than anything else is to get some sort of a definition of the terms of the debt of the allies to the United States, and particularly of the British debt. I shall not attempt to repeat conversations in detail, but there is undoubtedly in existence here a latent underlying feeling that the allies have made the great and most vital sacrifices in the war, both of men and finance and in material damage suffered; that our sacrifices have been slight and our profits immense, and that the existence of this great debt due on demand is a sword of Damocles hanging over their heads. The premium on dollars, now increasing so rapidly, gives them a feeling of great concern as to how they are to meet the interest payments, particularly this fall when they feel matters will more or less reach a crisis, without pay ing so heavy penalties as to be embarrassing and humilating, and to con template going into the market to raise $100,000,000 in exchange, at present rates and under present conditions, is really a cause of great anxiety. I saw the chancellor yesterday under the following circumstances: Tuesday night Gov. Cokayne had a meeting with him and told him I was here, and he sent word to me through Gov. Cokayne that he hoped I would be sure and see him before leaving for Paris and finally made an appointment for 4 o’clock yesterday (Thursday, the 24th). We had a chat of about an hour and a quarter, much of the time merely discussing matters of mutual interest, such as our program and theirs, taxes, reconstruction, etc. I have made no sug gestions nor have I in any way disclosed our views or feelings except to state that England and the United States must in some way preserve good relations and work together; that the means must be found to overcome the difficulties in the way of getting investment money from America to help proper recon struction work, and that now that the treaty with Germany is formulated it might be well for these discussions to take place at Washington with thor oughly responsible people there for the purpose. I did point out how important it was that Great Britain should be well represented at the Embassy in Wash ington when Reading’s place is filled, and how important it was that we should both be well represented on the Reparations Commission. As to the latter, he assured me that if the man to whom the position had been offered D ear L e ffin g w e ll 56 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. would accept it we would be thoroughly satisfied. He made no reference to a definition of the terms of their debt to us until about as I was leaving it came up in a response to my inquiry as to whether there were any pending tangles between the financial departments of the two Governments that were unadjusted and causing difficulty. This led him to remark that as to the debt he thought it would be improper for the debtor to approach the creditor with proposals. You may be sure of my discretion in discussing these matters with him, or with anyone else, but I can see the need of prompt treatment of this matter. Possibly you will consider that I have changed my views because I recall stat ing to you that I did not think it was our duty to approach the debtor. In that I believe I was wrong. I gather by implication that there is a feeling here that we should try and have some cancellation of debt all around. It was too indefinite for nre to suggest any particulars, and it is hard to say how such a cancellation could take place without an actual reduction in indebtedness due us, wiiich is not to be contemplated, in my opinion. I am sending this letter in the embassy pouch. It is quite informal and con fidential, but I thought you would like to have a line on how things are going. On arriving I found that the Bank of England expected me to make my office with them while in London, and my old friend Norman took me right to his house, where I have been staying since arrival. They have made me feel most at home, and there is the keenest possible desire that in every way relations between America and England should be strengthened. In a sense it is pa thetic. Englishmen have betrayed so little of that sort of thing in the past and it emphasizes their need at the moment. The whole German gold matter is held up until I see Hoover in Paris, and there is nothing to report on that. The coal strike at York of which you doubtless see much in the newspapers, has some quite serious aspects. The difference is over adjustment of piece work, in which the Government seenrs to have played a rather stupid part, but the younger mine workers have broken away from their older leaders and are making rather unreasonable demands. One serious development is the use of the strike for political purposes, the so-called “ Triple A lliance” of labor unions at a meeting now being held pro posing frankly that the strike be used to force the discontinuance of conscrip tion and the withdrawal of troops from Russia. The picture of the situation here, as I gather it from only a fewTdays’ visit, is really distressing alongside of our situation at home, and naturally one’s sympathies are aroused. I can not believe, and so far have received no evi dence to justify the belief, that any such condition exists as Vanderlip pictured on his return. There is not time now to write you as full an account of some of these mat ters as I would like to, but when I reach Paris there will be, and I will write you through the embassy at length. With warmest regards to all in the Treasury, and particularly your good self, Faithfully, yours, B en R . S tr o n g . Hon. R. C. L e f f i n g w e l l , Treasury Department, 'Washington, D. C. [N ot by wireless.] T r e a s u r y D e p a r t m e n t , July 31, 1919. For S t r o n g from Leffingwell (Treasury 1170), Admission, Paris. Your T 1 received. Treasury is ready to discuss funding demand loans whenever the British Government desires to take the matter up. This the British Government knows. It has had neither ambassador nor high commis sioner here “for months. There is nothing that the American Treasury can do about the matter. If British bankers are worried why don’t they get their Government to act. I do not understand that the British Government shares any fear that there will be difficulties on account of interest payments in autumn. R. C. L e f f i n g w e l l , Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E . 57 SECTION 31. The United States Loaned Money to England and France, and They Made Loans to Belgium for Rehabilitation on Condition That No Purchases Should Be Made Out of the Money So Loaned in the United States. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BRITISH, FRENCH, AND BELGIAN GOVERNMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN EXPENSES OF THE COMMISSION RAVITAILLEMENT BELGE. (1) The British and French Treasuries undertake to make a loan for the purposes of the relief commission up to an amount not exceeding £1,500,000 per month. Of the actual expenses of the commission one-third will be borne by the French Government as representing the expenses in Northern France and the remaining two-thirds will be advanced by the British and French Governments to the Belgian Government in equal portions to cover the cost of relief in Belgium. (2) The control of the expenditure out of this loan will be centralized in London through the C. I. R. and items of expenditure by the relief commission will only be chargeable against this loan if they have received the previous approval of the representatives of the British and French Treasuries. (3) Such approval will be given subject the following understandings: (a) No purchases of commodities obtainable from the United States or em ploying raw material obtainable from the United States will be paid for out of the loan furnished by the British and French Governments. (&) Permission to purchase in neutral countries with which there are ex change difficulties will not be guaranteed and must be subject to the financial situation from time to time. (c) The ration of food or clothing will be subject to revision from time to time by agreement between the French and British Governments, according to circumstances and to the advice given by the blockade ministries of the two Governments. ( d) Due*account will be taken of the question of the total supplies of any commodity available for the Allies as a whole and of the available tonnage. (4) The above arrangements will take effect from January, 1918. In the event of the above figure of £1,500,000 monthly proving insufficient, the question of the monthly amount will be immediately reopened. SECTION 32. British Proposed to Defer Payment of Interest. N e w Y o r k , August 29, 1919. The Hon. A l b e r t R a t h b o n e , Treasury Department, Washington, D. C. D e a r M r . R a t h b o n e : I have pleasure in placing informally before you the following general statement in regard to the commitments and liabilities of the British Treasury in the United States at the present time. The figures which I shall give are based on the following assumptions: 1. That by some means or other the British Treasury will be relieved o f the necessity of paying interest this year on its debt to the United States Treasury. 2. That it will be unnecessary for the British Treasury to make any appre ciable reduction in the volume of treasury bills outstanding. 3. That it will be possible to make arrangements to refund on the market publicly issued bonds maturing on November 1. I f any of these assumptions are falsified by events the difficulties of our position wrill be proportionately aggravated. The British Government is al ready committed or practically committed to a program involving the pur chase of wheat and hog products in the United States between now and the end of December to the value of approximately $250,000,000. In addition :‘ t has prospective purchases to make in Canada. For all these purchases it is at present finding the necessary dollars across exchange, and its policy is to continue this as long as practicable. It is, however, the general opinion that if the whole burden of these purchases is thrown on exchange, sterling may become unsaleable in New York, a contingency which has almost been realised within the last few days. In addition approximately $110,000,000 are re 58 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E . quired to meet tlie British Government’s direct war liabilities, including sugar, and it requires some $20,000,000 to meet interest on public issues during the remainder of 1919. This makes a total of $380,000,000 required between now and tlie end of December as a minimum. It does not appear to be safe to hope that more than $130,000,000 can be found over the exchange under present conditions. If it be assumed that as much as $130,000,000 can be found over the exchange there will remain at least $250,000,000 to be provided by some other means. Our present balance is something under $50,000,000,«so that at least $200,000,000 have to be looked for from some source other than our existing balances and purchases of ex change. I am, dear Mr. Rathbone, Yours, sincerely, B a s i l P. B l a c k e t t , British Treasury Representative. SECTION 33. British Claims for Relief in Belgium Allowed. Septem ber 4, 1919. The United States Treasury has, through its representa tive, Mr. May, been discussing in London the claims of the British Government for reimbursement in respect of Belgian relief. The following claims of the British Treasury for reimbursement appear to be w'ell founded, and, therefore, provided the C. R. B. regard these claims for reimbursement as valid, the United States Treasury, if requested so to do by the Belgian Government, is prepared to establish credits to the extent that may be necessary in favor of that Government, and at such time or times as may be arranged to make advances from credits so established to it for the purpose of enabling tlie payment of a corresponding amount to the C. R. 'B. so that it can make necessary reimbursement in dollars to the British Treasury not exceeding tlie net amount of $7,376,649.25 in settlement of the claims hereafter mentioned: Royal Commission, claim on wheat supplies____________________ $4, 256, 650. 62 Ministry of food, for bacon and lard____________________________ 1, 611, 545. 61 Claim 04809 for________________________________________________ 3, 204,107. 42 and for (as part of tlie authorization for 20,000,000 rations furnished by the British Army, said amounts representing the f. o. b. values of American goods included in such rations) ________________________________________________ 90,146. 36 Claim 03800 for biscuits, really part of the claim in connection with rations_________________________________________________ 381, 252. 04 D e a r M r. R i c k a r d : Tlie aggregate of these claims is_______________________ From wliich, however, there should be deducted the sum o f______ 9, 543, 702. 05 2,167,052. 80 Counterclaim of the C. R. B. for charter hire against the British Government, leaving a balance o f______________ 7, 376, 649. 25 There is a further claim for lard supplied by the Ministry of Food at the same time as the 20.000,000 odd rations, apparently under a misapprehension that it was covered by that authorization. Although this claim is based on a relief authorization, in a measure it covers supplies not handled by the C. R. B. and, therefore, the United States Treasury is dealing with the matter as a direct claim of the British Treasury against the Belgian Government for dollar reimbursement separate and apart from relief. The following claims for dollar reimbursement in connection with Belgian relief have also been presented by the British Treasury: Claim 4760, hosiery and woolens----------------------------------------------- $476, 500.00 Claim 8301, cotton materials__________________________________ 95,688.00 Claim 10137, linen and other materials__________________________ 494.00 Claim 2692, cotton materials____________________________________ 47. 88 Claim 1787, cotton thread______________________________________ 537.00 T o t a l____________________________________________________ 573,266.88 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 59 Two items for 1917 expenditures: Ministry of shipping______________________________________ $1, 724, 506. 75 Ministry of food__________________________________________ 169, 853.19 The first-mentioned claims aggregating $573,266.88, according to tlie informa tion given to Mr. May by Mr. Poland and Mr. Gay, as well as by the British Treasury, are for supplies furnished on assurances of the C. It. B., or Mr. Hoover, that dollar reimbursement would be arranged. The two claims for 1917 expenditures are made on the ground that the United States agreed to finance all relief expenditures after June 1, 1917, and that this arrangement continued till January 1, 1918. This is supported by a war cabinet minute by Sir Robert Cecil reporting a call by Mr. Hoover on April 16, 1917, to advise that the United States proposed to take over the cost of Belgian relief in full and that he was taking the matter up with the Belgian and French Governments accordingly. No assurance had ever been given or authorized by the United States Treas ury that it would make advances to enable the payment of these claims to be made, nor do the claims come within the general classes for which the Treasury is prepared to make advances for the purpose of dollar reimbursement. Whether or not these claims of the British Treasury should be paid by the C. R. B. depends on the arrangements made by Mr. Hoover or the C. R. B. with the British Government. The Treasury is not prepared to establish credits in favor of the Belgian Government to meet these claims, but if the commission for relief is of the opinion, in view of all the facts, that dollar payment should be made to the British Government of the amount of these claims, the Treasury will make no objection to the use of funds of the C. R. B., which I understand w^ill be available for the purpose and to that extent will not require that such funds be applied to the payment of obligations of the Belgian Government held by the United States and received by it in connection with payments made to the C. R, B. for relief purposes. A further cla:m has been presented by the British Treasury, amounting to $715,750, in respect of boots, but as it is claimed by Mr. Poland and admitted by the British Treasury that no assurances as to reimbursement have been given in regard to this item, either by the Treasury or the C. R. B., I presume the C. C. B. will not desire to make this reimbursement, and the Treasury is not prepared to make any advance to enable reimbursement to be made or to consent to funds which would otherwise be applicable to retire Belgian obligations held by the United States being applied in making reimbursement therefor. I am. dear Mr. Rickard, Very truly, yours, A lbert R a t h b o n e , Esq., American Relief Administration, 115 Broadway, New York, N. Y. E d ga r R ic k a r d , D ep a rtm en t o f S ta te , Washington, September 18, 1919. The honorable T h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e T r e a s u r y . S ir : I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a telegram dated Sep tember 15, 1919, from the American Ambassador at London, with reference to the British Government obligations held at the United States Treasury, upon which, under present arrangements, interest is payable every six months, the next payment being due on October 15. The obligations are at present payable on demand, and the communication refers to the informal discussions which recently took place in Paris and Washington regarding the postponement of the payment of interest and the conversion of the demand obligations into long term obligations, stating that it was clearly understood by Mr. Blackett, of the British Treasury, before leaving America that the United States Treasury was expecting the appointment of a British Treasury representative to proceed at an early date to Washington to discuss these matters, but that upon return ing to London he finds the British Treasury under the impression that the United States Treasury does not desire these matters to be taken up formally. The British Treasury, therefore, wishes to know definitely whether the United 60 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. States Treasury desires the British Treasury representative to proceed to Wash ington at an early date for this purpose. I shall appreciate your advice on this matter for the information o f the British Government. I have the honor to be, sir, Your obedient servant, A l v e y A . A d e e , Second Assistant Secretary. (For the Acting Secretary of State.) Inclosure: Copy of telegram No. 3037, dated September 13, from embassy, London. SECTION 34. J. P. Morgan & Co. Were Made the British Financial Agents in the United States and Took Over the British Account from the Federal Reserve Bank. F ede r a l R es erve B a n k of N e w Y o r k , November 8, 1919. Esq., Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Washington, D, C. D e a r S ir : For your information I wish to advise you that we have received a letter from the Secretary of the British Treasury informing us that the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty’s Treasury have appointed Messrs. J. P. Morgan & Co. as their agents in the United States for transactions between the British Treasury and the United States Treasury, and in accordance with the instruc tions of the Lords Commissioners we have closed the account on our books in the name of “ The Government of Great Britain and Ireland.” Very truly, yours, J. E. C r a n e , Manager, Foreign Department. R . C. L e f f i n g w e l l , SECTION 35. Proposal Handed to Mr. Blackett, British Financial Representative, for LongTime Obligations of Foreign Governments to Take the Place of Demand Obligations. Exclusive of the allied obligations to receive special treatment (such as obligations given in connection with food supply of Austria, etc.), it is pro posed to refund the allied obligations held by the United States into two prin cipal series of bonds, with subseries to deal with different interest payment dates, as follows: {a) One series to include obligations purchased from proceeds of the first Liberty loan under the act of April 24, 1917, to bear interest at 5 per cent; to be dated April 15, 1919, and to mature June 15, 1947, providing for semiannual payments of interest, which in one subseries of bonds will be specified to be made on April 15 and October 15, and on the date of maturity. (b) The other series to include obligations purchased from the proceeds of the second, third, and fourth Liberty loans under the act of September 24. 1917, and amendments, to bear interest at 5 per cent, to be dated April 15, 1919, and to mature October 15, 1938, providing for semiannual payments of interest, which in one subseries of bonds will be specified to be made on April 15 and October 15. It is recognized that certain of the allied governments will not be in a posi tion for the first one, two or three years to provide for the payment Ol the current interest on these obligations unless devoting to such interest payments resources which could be more advantageously applied to reconstruction pur poses in the general effort to obtain normal conditions and financial stability in Europe. In cases where there shall be a postponement of interest payments, it is proposed to deal with obligations, taking as an example a three years FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 61 postponement of interest payments and a subseries of bonds in which interest payment dates will be fixed as April 15 and October 15, something about as follow s: Both of said series of bonds shall provide that interest payments for the first three years shall be deferred: that is, there shall be no payment of interest on October 15 and April 15 during the period October 15, 1919, to April 15, 1922, both inclusive; the accumulated 15 per cent interest to be paid without com pound interest in semiannual installments (a) in the case o f the 1947 series, of i per cent on each of the interest payment dates, October 15, 1922, to April 15, 1924, both inclusive (at the rate of \ per cent per annum), o f \ per cent on each of the interest payment dates, October 15, 1924, to April 15, 1926, both inclusive (at the rate of 1 per cent per annum), and of f per cent on each of the interest payment dates, October 15, 1926, to April 15, 1934, both inclusive (at the rate of 1£ per cent per annum) ; and (&) in the case of the 1938 series, of i per cent on each of the interest payment dates, October 15, 1922, to April 15, 1924, both inclusive (at the rate of 1 per cent per annum) ; of £ per cent on each of the interest payment dates, October 15, 1924, to April 15, 1926, both in clusive (at the rate of 1 per cent per annum), and of % per cent on each of the interest payment dates, October 15, 1926, to April 15, 1934, both inclusive (at the rate of 1^ per cent per annum). The bonds of both series shall contain provision for a cumulative sinking fund to provide for a partial amortization of the principal thereof before ma turity. The amount of this sinking fund shall be measured by (a) a specified percentage of the original principal amount of the bond, to be paid semiannually on interest-payment dates, and (&) the part o f 2^ per cent semiannual interest payments computed on the original principal amount of the respective bonds which shall not be required to pay interest in view of the previous payment of a part of the principal amount of the bond. For the 1947 series bonds the sinking-fund payments under (a) above, on the interest-payment dates, October 15, 1928, to April 15, 1930, both inclusive, shall be of the original principal amount of the bond (at the rate of I per cent per annum) ; on the interest-payment dates, October 15, 1930, to April 15, 1934, both inclusive, shall be of the original principal amount of the bond (at the rate of 1 per cent per annum), and thereafter on the interestpayment dates until maturity shall be 1 per cent of the original principal amount of the bond ( at the rate of per cent per annum). For the 1938 series of bonds the sinking-found payments under (a) above on the interest-payment dates, October 15, 1928, to April 15, 1930, both inclusive, shall be \ per cent of the original principal amount of the bond (at the rate of %per cent per annum) ; on the interest-payment dates, October 15, 1930, to April 15, 1934, both inclusive, shall be i per cent of the original principal amount of the bond (at the rate of 1 per cent per annum), and thereafter on the interest payment dates until ma turity shall be 11 per cent of the original principal amount of the bond (at the rate of 2£ per cent per annum). The above provisions would result in semiannual payments for the services o f the loan, in accordance with the following tables of annual payments, all percentages being based on the original principal amount of the bonds of each series. Series dated Apr. 15, 1919, due June 15, 1947. Interest and sinking fund payment dates. Oct. Oct. Oct. Oct. Oct. Oct. Oct. 15,1919, to Apr. 15,1922, to Apr. 15, 1924, to Apr. 15,1926, to Apr. 15,1928, to Apr. 15, 1930, to Apr. 15, 1934, to Apr. 15, 1922, both inclusive............. 15,1924, both inclusive............. 15,1926, both inclusive............. 15,1928, both inclusive............. 15,1930, both inclusive............. 15, 1934, both inclusive............. 15, 1947, both inclusive............. Annual Annual interest Annual sinkingPeriod (excess Annual back to fund in covered. sinking total. interest. stalment. fund). Years. Per cent. Per cent. Per cent. Per cent. 3 2 5 5* 2 5 6 1* 2 5 6^ 1* 2 5 7 1* 4 1 5 1* 13 5 2h h n n 62 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U TH O RITY FOR M A K IN G SAM E. Scries dated Apr. 15, 1919, due Oct. 15, 1938. Interest and sinking fund payment dates. Oct. 15, 1919, to Apr. Oct. 15, 1922, to Apr. Oct. 24, 1924, to Apr. Oct. 15, 1926, to Apr. Oct. 15,1928, to Apr. Oct. 15, 1930, to Apr. Oct. 15, 1934, to Apr. 15, 1922, both inclusive............. 15, 1924, both inclusive............. 15, 1926, both inclusive............. 15, 1928, both inclusive............. 15, 1930, both inclusive............. 15,1934, both inclusive............. 15, 1938, both inclusive............. Annual Annual interest Annual sinkingPeriod (excess ! Annual back to covered. sinking fund in total. interest. stalment. fund). Years. Per cent, Per cent. Per cent. Per cent. 3 J 2 5 5* 2 1 5 6 2 5 1J h H 2 5 ¥ 1" 4 5 ll n 4 5 2h 7* N o v e m b e r 8, 1919. I have now had an opportunity of discussing with the Chancellor of Exchequer tlie question of the conversion of the demand obligations of the British and allied governments held by the United States Treasury into the form of long-term bonds. The Chancellor of Exchequer desires me to say that, on the understanding that such conversion will not in any way prejudice the general question of interallied indebtedness, to the ulti mate settlement of which along broad lines he attaches great Importance, he is of opinion that a satisfactory solution of the particular question of conversion of demand obligations can quickly be reached along the general lines tentatively proposed in the memorandum which you gave me on Saturday, November 1. As I stated to you in Paris the Chancellor of Exchequer is prepared to give analogous treatment to the obligations of allied governments held by the British Treasury. In this connection he desires me to express his entire concurrence in your view that their community of interests as the two chief creditors makos close cooperation between the British and American Treasuries of vital im portance in these matters. It is his strong hope that the two treasuries will work together with a view to finding the right solution for the important problems which have arisen and will arise in regard to questions of interallied indebtedness and German reparation. The only point in your memorandum on which the Chancellor of Exchequer desires to make any reservations at the moment is the sinking fund provision. He would prefer on the whole that specific provision should not be included for repayment of debt before the due dates. According to calculations which I have had worked out. the sinking-fund provision would operate to redeem before maturity 17.783 per cent of the bonds maturing in 1938. and 55.718 per cent of the bonds maturing in 1947. In any case the latter figure seems too high. The most important point outside your memorandum which was discussed between us (with the exception of the proposed exclusion from the general funding arrangements of particular classes of advances about which I am writing separately) was the question of the marketability of the bonds. I understand that the United States Treasury would be prepared to accept a fewTbonds for large amounts (such as $1,000,000,000) with some understanding that the obligor would, if called upon by the holder, i. e. by the United States Treasury, after the expiration of a period which you suggested might be five years from the date of the bond, exchange the large bond into smaller bonds of normal market denominations. The Chancellor of the Exchequer regards it as essential that, so long as there is a considerable amount of British Gov ernment indebtedness held by the public in the United States o f America, British credit should be protected against any possibility of an issue on the market by the United States Treasury either of British Government bonds held by them or of any United States Government or other security based on the British obligations. In his opinion, therefore, it should be an under standing, if possible, expressly stated in the bond and, if not, included in the settlement now to be reached that the United States Treasury will not without the consent of the obligor sell, hypothecate, or in any way deal with their interest in the British Government bonds held by them throughout the period of the bonds. It does not seem to the Chancellor of Exchequer that the D e a r M r. R a t h b o n e : FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 63 provision for not splitting the large bonds would be a sufficient protection, and in any case the period o f five years would be too short. The Chancellor of Exchequer understands that you may be able to come to London shortly to continue discussion of this subject. He asks me to say that he looks forward to welcoming you here at an early date, and that he is con vinced that your presence would be most valuable in securing early and rapid progress in the matter. I have the honor to be, dear Mr. Rathbone, Your, faithfully, B a s i l P. B l a c k e t t . SECTION 36. Rathbone’s Answer to Blackett on Funding of the Debt and Cancellation of the Loans. H otel de C r il l o n , Paris, November 18, 1919. D e a r B l a c k e t t : Your three letters of November 8 were received the early part of last week and I regret that until the end of last week I had been unable to give then consideration. At the outset, permit me to assure you that I appreciate the mutual ad vantages of my going to London at an early date and discussing with the Chancellor the many questions, some of which we touched upon in our recent talk, which must arise concerning the form of obligations to be given by the various debtor countries in exchange for the present obligations now held mainly by the British and American Governments. I am also deeply sensible of the courteous message of the Chancellor that he looks forward to wel coming me in London. However, the pressing demands made upon my time here in regard to financial questions daily arising under or in respect to the Peace Treaties that have been formulated make it impossible for me, as yet, to fix a time for my visit to London. I have explained to Sir John Bradbury more in detail than it is possible to do in a letter, the difficulties that stand in the way of my leaving Paris at present, and trust that he may soon have an opportunity to explain my situation in this respect to the Chancellor or to you. I note that the Chancellor attaches great importance to the ultimate settle ment along broad lines of the general question of interallied indebtedness. Ju st what is meant by that expression I do not know, but feel confident there is C ° such Question now under discussion or consideration. The United States Treax"ury has in no wise cllan^'e(1 the views it has expressed, or modified the position ^ at ** lias taken *n the past, and regards the several obligations of thp vnrin '1S Allied Governments held by the Government of the United States as renresen eac^ to the United States. Indeed, under the nrP<5Ant atafrn only congressional action would authorize the Treasury to tnkp n riiffprpnt Position. You will recall that I stated to you in our recent talk nnri t nnw pa the statement, that our Congress would have the same ’r onfhnnVA the Treasury to deal with obligations of Allied Governinpnt«i IipI^ hv thP Tin te(i States having a fixed date of maturity as it now has to authorize the T n > ™ 2 ' % £ . with the denmml oblisnti,ms of AUled GW h T ttS ■uidum which I handed yon in Paris dealt gene r S l v l f ? w it h T e q„“ ; c 'f ™ dates of <2 > ‘ "terest P ™ n t dates and (3) sinking fund navmt 'nts as aPPlied t0 obligations to be received in exchange by Greaf Britain the J Inited States f.rom France- Ital5'> I5e,« ium’ Servia, Rouniania, and Czechoslovakia ' 1S of tlie opinion that a solution can be K ‘ '"e s ° f such memo randum, and that he is prepared to give -^ish T r e a ^ r T I trust that The tions of Allied Governments held by the Bi statement to this effect in your letter is l*ebtor com m a s coM ern eT of arrangement by both our Treasuries with the v h the Unite(i cfite s the definitive obligations to be received on such Treasury is firmly convinced that such method of pi and delnv most harmonious results with the least possible friction I regret that the Chancellor desires at tho moment to mrpa„lirv fppl€J ’ garding the sinking fund provision. The Secretary of the uiy Iee b very 64 FOREIGN LO ANS AND AU T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E . strongly that such a provision should be included in the long-time obligations, and believes that the soundness of the sinking fund principle is universally recognized. Indeed, in providing for the gradual and orderly extinguishment of the debt, such a provision should, in his judgment, be welcomed by the debtor countries. It permits plans to be made sufficiently far in advance for the measures needed to make revenues meet this budget item. I am inclined to agree with you that the sinking fund tentatively suggested for the 1947 bonds would op rate to redeem before maturity too large a proportion of the principal o f the debt. I should be glad of your suggestion as to a rearrangement of the sinking fund payment as applied to this series of bonds. I quite understood the advantage from the point of view of the United States Treasury, as well as from that of the Chancellor, of protecting British credit and the most unfortunate consequences wThich would result if the obligations of the British Government now held by the United States were offered for sale di rectly or indirectly on the American market, wThile considerable amounts of British Government obligations were held by the American public and while sterling exchange was at an appreciable discount. Nevertheless the United States Treasury can not but insist that in all respects it has and, in its dis cretion, is entitled to exercise, all the attributes of ownership in respect of the demand obligations of the British Government held by the United States, and must have similar rights in respect to any obligations taken in exchange therefor. In my judgment, neither the Secretary o f the Treasury nor any other official of the United States Government has authority, either by provi sion in any obligations taken in exchange for those now held, or otherwise, to stipulate that the same shall not be disposed of by the United States Govern ment at its pleasure. It had been my idea that any long-time obligations re ceived in exchange by the United States might be in large denominations (iipt necessarily of $1,000,000,000), coupled with an agreement of the obligor, upon demand, to exchange the same for smaller denominations (which, as you point out would meet normal market requirements). It was in an endeavor to meet, so far as possible, the situation to which you called attention that I suggested the possibility of providing that the agreement of the obligor to convert bonds of large denomination into bonds of small denomination should become effective only after a period of substantially five years from the date of the obligations, and I then said that if such suggestion should prove accep table to the Chancellor I would submit it to the Secretary of the Treasury. It has been the view of the United States Treasury that the demand obliga tions of your Government representing certain special advances could not be included in any general arrangement for the conversion of demand obligations into obligations having a fixed date of maturity. This view of the Treasury I have communicated to you and to Sir Hardman Lever in Washington on a number of occasions many months ago, and I again referred to it in my recent talk with you. The special cases in question are those mentioned in your letter. I have not, however, the data before me to enable me to agree on the exact amount of the particular advances. As to the Austrian relief loan, I see no reason why the terms of long-time obligations given in exchange should not follow the terms of other long-time obligations received by the United States in exchange for British demand obligations, with additional provisions assuring to the United States the ad vantages accorded it under the arrangements pursuant to which the advances were made, which are fully set forth in previous correspondence between the Treasuries on the subject. This I believe substantially accords with the views expressed in your letter regarding this particular advance. I do not recall that I made any specific suggestions at our recent talk regard ing the exchange of British obligations representing the United States advances to your Government for the purpose of meeting its secured debt incurred in the United States before the entry of my Government into the wTar. The repre sentatives of the British Treasury in the United States have been fully cogni zant o f the views of the United States Treasury that this particular debt should be treated on what might be termed something of a commercial basis. The suggestion of a three-year postponement of interest on the obligations repre senting this debt and its payment in five years grew out, as I recall it, of our talk regarding advantages to the British Treasury, if arrangements could be made for the withdrawal, at an early date, of a large part of the securities in respect of which the United States has subrogation rights to secure the pay ment of these advances. I am by no means wedded to the idea of a threeyear postponement o f interest payments in respect to these advances, nor to FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y JFOR M A K IN G SAME. 65 the particular period o f five years for its repayment, but I do feel and know it is the view of the Secretary of the Treasury as it was of his predecessor, that these advances should receive special treatment. You will recall that, so far as it was possible, it was sought to put the United States in the position of the previous holders of the obligations, and in the letter recently prepared and agreed to, defining the terms upon which the securities were held in subro gation, express stipulations were made regarding the sale of the subrogated securities. The United States Treasury has never accepted the principle that a pay ment by Great Britain on account o f her indebtedness to the United States required the receipt by Great Britain of a similar account from the Allied Governments indebted to Great Britain. On the contrary, the United States Treasury has always taken the position that the question of the British debt to the United States was a question between these two Governments alone. The principle of common action which we discussed at our recent talk was, as I understand it, the principle of proportionate equality in the collection by Great Britain and the United States o f the obligations of a common debtor to both countries. I was under the impression, though not so distinct but that I may be entirely mistaken, that I had at one time discussed with you in Washington the views of the United States Treasury in regard to similar treatment of the various Allied countries, common debtors to Great Britain and the United States. It has always been my feeling that, while politically there was every reason for according equality of treatment to the respective debtors, such political equality of treatment did not necessarily mean similar terms and conditions. The financial and economic conditions of one debtor country as compared with an other are and will be so fundamentally different that similar treatment in re gard to the debts o f all countries would from the standpoint of financial and economic considerations, prove much more onerous upon one country than upon another. I should be glad to receive an indication of the views of the British Treasury as to whether the rough scheme as to date of maturity, in teres t-payment dates, and singink-fund provisions which I handed you the other day (modified as aforementioned) should apply to all the countries which are the common debtors of Great Britain and the United States or whether, in certain cases, a different position should be taken by the two Treasuries in the respects mentioned. The United States Treasury has not proposed to treat obligations given by France for advances made to retire its obligations that have matured on the American market differently than other French obligations held by the United States. You will recall the pressing demand made by Mr. Clemanceau during a very dark period of the war that America turn over to France a large amount of gold, so that French credit and the position of the Bank of France should be protected. When this demand was made it was at once communicated to Lord Reading by Mr. Crosby. The United States Treasury, to meet the emer gency which appeared to it to be grave, among other things, agreed to advance to France, or to permit France to use, dollars accruing to it as the countervalue of francs furnished by France to the American Army, in amount sufficient to defray the French maturities on the American market to which you have called attention. The unpaid balance of the sales of silver to the British Government under the Pittman Act is a small amount in comparison with the entire debt of Great Britain to the United States. Perhaps I may be pardoned for stating that the United States Treasury has felt particularly proud of what was ac complished in regard to that silver sale, and feels confident that when the circumstances are recalled to the Chancellor he will endeavor to meet in all respects the views of the American Treasury in regard to the balance of this advance. You are aware that the silver question has been a bitter political issue in the United States, and that widely divergent views on the subject are held by Members of the Congress, but, notwithstanding, in the emergency which was made known to tlie Treasury by representatives of your Government, a bill was prepared, introduced into Congress, and passed with the hearty sup port of all factions within the unprecedented period of about one week, as a result of which there wTas immediately placed at the disposal of your Govern1 ment substantially 200,000,000 ounces of fine silver out of our currency reserves, S. Doc. 86, 67-2------5 66 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. In addition the Treasury made from time to time as required other advances to your Government to enable it to procure on the open market additional quantities of silver for use in India. The amount of such advances were only limited by the amount of the silver that your representatives found it possible to purchase on our market. The silver market was put under control and the most urgent demands o f other countries for silver were curtailed or refused so as to enable the representatives of your Government to obtain the greatest possible amount of silver to meet the Indian situation. As a further aid to your Government’s purchase of silver, the Secretary of the Treasury waived, until notice from him to the contrary, the compliance by your Govern ment of the provision in the arrangement effected between the Treasury and Lord Reading as to the limit of price which your Government should pay for silver, purchased in the United States or elsewhere, until the United States silver reserve should be restored. The Secretary of the Treasury does not ask any special treatment of the advances made to your Government for the purchase of silver on the open market, but he does feel most strongly that the loan from our silver reserve purchased under the Pittman Act must be treated very differently from the general advances made to your Government during the war. He feels that the arrangement made for the repayment of this loan should in our common interest be such as to be beyond criticism from all pos sible points of view. Under the arrangement set forth in Lord Reading’s letter of May 28, 1918, to Mr. Leflingwell, your Government agreed to supply to the United States Government telegraphic rupee credits on India at the rate of 1 rupee equals 35.73 cents, and a possible reduction in that price was contem plated. The cooperation of your Government in endeavoring to restore the parity of exchange whenever the dollar is at a discount wTas pledged by Lord Reading’s letter, from which I venture to quote as follows : “ 3. The agreement appears to me to mark an important step in the joint policy of our two Governments of supporting the exchange value of the dollar and the sovereign, and of facilitating the transactions which are essential to Allied war trade. The Secretary of State for India, as I told you in my letter of April 29, has only reluctantly raised the rate of exchange above the previous parity of 16 pence per rupee for demand bills, and I understand it is still his policy to revert to the former standard whenever in his judgment the reverse step or steps can expediently be taken. Meanwhile, and I mention this because the point is one I understand on which you have felt some apprehension, you may feel assured of the sympathetic support of the Government of India in maintaining the credit of the dollar in India as far as this comes within their legitimate sphere o f action. “ 4. As I informed you, the British Government will be glad to cooperate with the Government of the United States in endeavoring to restore the parity of ex change wherever the dollar is at a discount.” Instead of the American dollar approaching a parity with the rupee, the con trary is the case, the rupee now selling in the United States at approximately 1 rupee=42.70 cents. The embargo on the import of gold into India except through the Indian Government, while preventing a drain of gold from the United States, operates to increase the cost to American importers of their Indian purchases and this increased cost inures to the benefit of the Indian Government. The silver reserve of the United States, which my Government might have authorized to be used to meet the cost of American Indian pur chases, is now represented by demand obligations of your Government. The United States Treasury has suggested: (a) The payment of $40,000,000 in gold provided for under Lord Reading’s letter in India instead of New York, thus enabling the United States to obtain rupees therefor at the rate of 15 rupees to the pound sterling. (b) The furnishing of rupee credits to the United States Government to the equivalent of $40,000,000 and at the rate mentioned above in lieu of the de livery of the corresponding amount of gold, or (c) The agreement of the British Government to now apply in payment o f these demand obligations both principal and interest an amount equal to the dollars heretofore paid for rupee credits supplied in the United States since your Government ceased the supply of rupee credits to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and thereafter to continue to sell, at an amount per month to be agreed upon, rupee credits in New York at parity of the London rate for telegraphic transfers on India, as determined by the rate for sterling ex change on the New York market, and to apply dollars as so obtained to the payment of the principal and interest of said advance. FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 67 In our recent conference we spoke of a further alternative, namely, to pro vide for the payment of this loan, principal and interest, at the end o f a threeyear period, if an examination of the figures of the rupee sold through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York w w ld indicate that under present condi tions the proceeds of rupee credits sold in the United States would pay the advances in question in substantially that length of time. Whether such plan would meet the views of the Secretary of Treasury, I can not say, but I feel quite clear that the arrangement you suggest applicable to but $40,000,000 of these advances, would not appeal to him as meeting the situation. In connection with these silver advances I feel I must refer to your state ment that in the original agreement there is no provision that the proceeds of the gold shipped by India should be applied by the British Treasury in reduction of the indebtedness of your Government to the United States. As that arrangement was made between the British Government and the United States Treasury, which held obligations of the British Government, payable on its demand, to many times the amount involved, a provision in the agree ment to pay when received the proceeds of the gold to the United States seemed surplusage. Moreover, if any such payment to the United States Treasury had been made during the period of active fighting, it would have meant corre spondingly additional advances by the Treasury to the British Government with an unnecessary diminution of the amount of the appropriation available for loans by the United States to foreign Governments. I quite appreciate the force of what you write regarding the agreement of June, 1917, in regard to British expenditures for France. I recall that Sir Hardman Lever recollected handing a copy of that agreement to Mr. Crosby just prior to the latter’s leaving the United States for Europe in November, 1917. Unfortunately the copy so supplied could not be found in the files of the Treasury, nor did Mr. Crosby recollect having received it. After you had supplied to me the portion of Lord Reading’s letter that had been so mutilated as to be illegible, the Treasury requested of Sir Hardman Lever a copy of this agreement, with which formal request somewhat later Sir Hardman Lever com plied. I remember also that Mr. Crosby was, at the outset, somewhat appre hensive because of the large proportion of the Treasury loans made to Great Britain, but during the early months of 1918 I explained to you that the Treas ury was not concerned in the proportion of loans made to any country provided the aggregate was fairly apportioned to meet the requirements of each country in the United States. You will recall that the reply of the Secretary o f the Treasury to the then chancellor’s communication, in which he referred to the British Treasury acting as a conduit pipe, was delivered to Lord Reading in the late spring or early summer of 1918. This reply reviewed the situation and definitely refused to make reimbursement to your Government for any of its expenditures for France within the British Empire or for all of its like expenditures for neutral purchases. This formal statement of the position of the United States Treas ury was in effect a restatement of the position that had been taken during the previous months, as to which the representatives in Washington of the British treasury had been fully informed. I shall not burden this letter with a re statement of the contents of that communication, nor with the contents of my letter to Lord Reading, written at about the time that the weekly dollar pay ments of France to the British treasury ceased, nor to the repeated statements made to the representatives o f the British treasury in Washington that the treasury’s failure to prevent the weekly dollar payments being made on the running account must be understood to be without prejudice and subject to the ultimate adjustment o f that account. It was regrettable that during the interval which elapsed between the two communications before referred to no agreement was reached between the treasuries in regard to the past and future financing of the neutral expenditures of France. I do not understand, however, that at any conference which followed the delivery of the reply of the Secretary of the Treasury any different position was taken by the United States Treasury than that set forth in such response. In an endeavor to settle this troublesome question of the claims o f the British treasury for dollar reimbursement against France, Italy, and Belgium (in cluding Belgian R elief), the United States Treasury has treated the matter as a whole and has endeavored to make all the concessions to the views of the British treasury found possible within the principles laid down in the communication from the Secretary o f the Treasury to the Chancellor o f the 68 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. Exchequer. In our recent talk I referred to some of these concessions affecting not only the dollar reimbursement claim against France, but also to the similar claims against Italy and Belgium. The Treasury appreciates the desirability of a speedy settlement of these questions, and it was to effect such a settle ment, and influenced by the various considerations touched upon in your letter, that it was prepared to make the concessions referred to. I am very reluctant to reopen the question of cereal allocation in respect of which a definite settlement was finally reached after exhaustive study. Nevertheless, I have cabled Washington your remarks upon the subject and await its advices. I do not understand the last sentence of your letter regarding dollar reim bursements. It is my understanding that any amounts that may be received from Italy on British treasury dollar reimbursement claims was dedicated by your letter of August last to payment of obligations of your Government held by the United States. At our recent talk I suggested as a part of the settle ment of the dollar reimbursement claims that the Treasury would be prepared, in order to facilitate the settlement proposed, to consent that the agreed amounts of these claims against Italy, Belgium, and Commission for Relief in Belgium, should be applied to the payment of obligations of France held by the United States, instead of as agreed by your letter of last August, and that the balance of any further amounts required to correct overpayments of France on the running account should be provided through a further credit from the Treasury to Great Britain. This suggestion was made so that the set tlement of the dollar reimbursement claims would not affect the cash position of your Government in the United States, which we had formerly discussed, and in the light of which your letter of last August was written. I note that the British treasury feels that if the position of the United States Treasury regarding dollar reimbursements remains unchanged it must ask France to fulfill its engagement under the agreement of June, 1917, and I take pleasure in assuring you that the United States Treasury will make no objection to your Government receiving from France its obligations payable in dollars for amounts payable by France in dollars under that agreement. I do not see that France, in view of its reconstruction requirements, can afford, at the present time, to pay in cash either the principal of or interest upon its war indebtedness to Great Britain or to the United States. It is in recognition of that fact that the United States Treasury is disposed for a time to defer the payment of interest on the obligations which it holds of the French Govern ment. Moreover, the United States Treasury would deprecate the taking of any position not in accord with the principle of equal proportionate treatment in the payment by allied governments of their war debts to the respective allied and associate powers. I trust you will pardon the undue length to which this letter has run. Its length is another illustration of the advantages of a face-to-face talk. I have, however, as far as possible, endeavored to write on the lines of our talks in Washington, which I shall always look back upon with so much pleasure; stating our exact views fully and without withholding anything for the purpose of future negotiation. If I have failed in diplomatic expression, I trust you will forgive me. I am, my dear Mr. Blackett, Very truly yours, A lbe rt R a t h b o n e . B. P. B l a c k e t t , Esq., Treasury, Whitehall, 8. IT'. 1, London. SECTION 37. Views of the Secretary o f the Treasury on the Loan Situation. Since the armistice the United States Treasury has advanced to the Govern ments of the Allies as of the close of business November 15, 1919, the sum of $2,329,257,138.55, and there remained on November 15, 1919, an unexpended balance of $593,628,111.45 from the total loans of $10,000,000,000 authorized under the Liberty loan acts. The Treasury sees no need of an additional ap propriation for Government loans, though it may later have occasion to ask the Congress to make some further modification of the terms under which the FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 69 existing appropriation is available. The Treasury asked and obtained power for the War Finance Corporation to make advances up to the amount o f $1,000,000,000 for nonwar purposes, and the War Finance Corporation is pre pared to make such advances. The Secretary of War is authorized to sell his surplus stores on credit. The power which at present exists in the Government or governmental agen cies to assist in meeting Europe’s financial needs is therefore considerable. This power must, of course, be exercised with extreme caution and with the most careful regard for the urgent needs of our own people for an ample sup ply of foodstuffs and other necessities of life at reasonable prices. The Treasury is prepared at the convenience of the Governments o f the Allies to take up with their representatives the funding of the demand obligations winch the United States holds into long-time obligations, and at the same time the funding during the reconstruction period or, say, for a period of two or three years, of the interest on the obligations of foreign Governments acquired by the United States under the Liberty loan acts. The Treasury believes that the need of Europe for financial assistance is very great and very real, though it has been very much exaggerated here and abroad. Our hearts have been so touched by the suffering which the war left in its train and our experience is so recent of the financial condition which existed during the war (when men were devoting themselves to the business of destruction) that we are prone to overlook the vast recuperative power inherent in any country which, though devastated, has not been depopulated and the people of which are not starved afterwards. We must all feel deep sympathy for the suffering in Europe to-day, but we must not permit our sympathy to warp our judgment and by exaggerating European financial needs make it more difficult to fill them. Men must go back to work in Europe; must con tribute to increase production. The industries of Europe, of course, can not be set to work without raw material, machinery, etc.. and to the extent that these are to be secured from the United States the problem of financing the restora tion of Europe belongs primarily to our exporters. Governmental financial as sistance in the past and talk of plans for future Government or banking aid to finance exporters has apparently led our industrial concerns to the erroneous expectation that their war profits, based so largely on exports, will continue indefinitely without effort or risk on their part. To them will fall the profits of the exports and upon them will fall the consequences of failure to make the exports. As soon as domestic stocks, which were very low at the time of the armistice, have been replenished, those industries which have been developed to meet a demand for great exports paid for out of Government war loans will be forced to close plants and forego dividends unless they maintain and develop an outlet abroad. The industries o f the country must be brought to a realiza tion of the gravity of this problem: must go out and seek markets abroad; must reduce prices at home and abroad to a reasonable level, and create or cooperate in creating the means of financing export business. Since armistice day the consistent policy of the Treasury has been, so far as possible, to restore private initiative and remove governmental controls and interferences. It has been the view of the Treasury that only thus can the prompt restoration of healthy economic life be gained. The embargoes on gold and silver and control of foreign exchange have been removed, as well as the voluntary and informal control of call money and tiie stock exchange loan account. The control exercised by the Capital Issues Committee over capital issues have been discontinued. Thus the financial markets of the United States have been opened to the whole world and all restrictions removed that might have hindered America’s capital and credit resources, as well as its great gold reserve, from being available in aid of the world’s commerce and Europe’s need. There are those who believe that the dollar should be kept at par, no more no less, in the market of foreign exchange. I f effective action were taken to carry out such a policy, it could only be done by drawing gold out of the United States when the dollar would otherwise be at a discount and by in flating credit when the dollar would otherwise be at a premium. The dollar is now at a premium almost everywhere in the world. Its arti ficial reduction and maintenance at the gold par of exchange in all currencies is quite unthinkable unless we propose to level all differences in the relative credit of nations and to substitute for our gold reserve a reserve consisting of the promises to pay o f any nation that chooses to become our debtor. In equalities of exchange reflect not only the trade and financial balance between 70 FOREIGN LOANS AND AU T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. two countries, but particularly after a great war such as that we have been through the inequalities of domestic finance. The United States has met a greater portion of the cost of the necessary war measures from taxes and bond issues than any other country. Largely as a consequence of this policy the buy ing power of the dollar at home has been better sustained than has the buying power at home of the currency of any European belligerent. For the United States to determine by governmental action to depress the dollar as measured in terms of foreign exchange, and to improve the position of other currencies as measured in terms of dollars would be to shift to the American people the tax and loan burdens of foreign countries. United States Government action at this time to prevent in respect to foreign exchange the ordinary operation of the law of supply and demand which automatically sets in action corrective causes, and to make an attempt to prevent the dollar from going to a premium when its natural tendency is to do so, would as a natural consequence stimu late our exports and through the competition o f export demand with domestic demand maintain or increase domestic prices. Had the allied Governments, after they had relaxed the war control of their imports, attempted to continue to hold the exchange value of their currencies in the United States at an arti ficial level by further borrowings, the effect would necessarily have been to stimulate their imports and to discourage their exports, thus aggravating their already unfavorable international balances. It is essential to discriminate between plans on the one hand to support exchange by direct action of the United States Government and plans on the other hand to facilitate the extension of private credit and the investment of private capital in Europe. To the former the Treasury is utterly opposed. Of the latter the Treasury heartily approves. Some progress has already been made in placing in the United States through private channels the loans of allied and neutral European countries and municipalities. The Treasury favors the making in our markets of such loans which contribute to relieve the exchanges. I am sure that American exporters and European importers will lay the basis of credit in sound business transactions and I know that American bankers will not fail to devise means of financing the needs of the situation, nor American investors to respond to Europe’s demand for capital on a sound investment basis. Meanwhile it is well to remember the silent factors which are always at work toward a solution of the problem. Immigrants’ remittances to Europe are and will continue to be a very large item in rectifying the exchanges. Foreign travel will be a further item. Another very important factor is the purchase of European securities and repurchase of foreign-held American se curities by American investors. But the principal factor in Europe’s favor is the inevitable curtailment of her imports and expansion of her exports. These processes, of course, are stimulated by the very position of the exchanges which they tend to correct. T reasu ry C h a m b e r s, W h i t e h a l l S. W ., December 8, 1919. Hon. A l b e r t R a t h b o n e . D e a r M r. R a t h b o n e : I am much obliged to you for your letter inclosing a statement of the views of the Secretary of the United States Treasury. I will write to you again as soon as I have had time to consider and examine them. Yours, sincerely, A u st e n C h a m b e r l a in . SECTION 38. Chamberlain’s Reply for England. T reasury C h am bers, W h i t e h a l l S. W ., December 11, 1919. I have now been able to consider carefully the state ment of the views of the Secretary of the United States Treasury which you were good enough to transmit to me under cover of your letter of the 2d instant. You are already aware that the British Government accepts as far as they are concerned the suggestions of the United States that the demand obligations D e a r M r. R a t h b o n e : FOREIGN LOANS AND AU T H O R IT Y EOR M A K IN G SAM E . 71 of the Allies should be funded into long-time obligations, and that for a period of two or three years, preferably three, the interest on the obligations of foreign Governments acquired by the United States should also be funded, and that we are ready to extend similar treatment to our allies in respect of their obliga tions to us. In like manner we find ourselves in complete accord with the desire of the American Treasury to restore as soon and as far as possible private initiative in matters of trade and credit and to withdraw governmental control and in terference. We have restricted our control of capital issues within such narrow limits that it may now be said to be almost nonexistent, and we have, as you are aware, for some time withdrawn the artificial support of the ex changes, which was a necessary, though regrettable, incident of war finance. The effect of the fall in the dollar exchange is seen in our trade returns with America. The comparative depreciation of sterling necessarily restricts that trade and makes it the interest of this country to secure wherever possible those articles which are necessary to it in countries where the exchange is less unfavorable. We recognize that only by increasing our exports to and dimin ishing our imports from those countries in which sterling is at a discount can we reestablish an equilibrium or reach healthy conditions. Even private credits increase our total foreign indebtedness, and though they may be necessary in some circumstances and as a temporary expedient, pro tanto increase the diffi culties of the future. In this connection I venture to observe that the request made to us for immediate repayments on account of United States advances to the United Kingdom would seem scarcely consistent w^ith the general policy laid down in the report of the Secretary of the Treasury. Such repayments must neces sarily add to our difficulties in dealing with the immediate problem of financing necessary imports from the United States while they make it more difficult for the United Kingdom to contribute assistance to the general restoration of Europe. As regards the general position of Europe, I entirely agree with the Secretary of the Treasury that it should not and must not be regarded merely from a humanitarian or charitable point o f view. The British Government have no wish that their own share in that situation should be regarded in this light, nor do they think that such a point of view would lead to a true appreciation of the problem with which the world is confronted. The trouble is in our opinion too deep-seated and too widespread to be capable of solution by appeal to sentiment. What, in our opinion, is needed is a comprehensive plan to restore and restart the broken machinery of modern civilization over a large part of Europe. The nations which are least broken by the five years of war, including the neutrals as well as the United States and England, ought to regard it not so much as a duty which they owe to the world but as a neces sary measure of self-protection to take a long view of their interests and to cooperate in such a recuperation of the shattered portions of the world as will enable international trade to resume its normal course to the common ad vantage of all concerned. In our view the requirements of the situation exceed the limits of private enterprise and private resources, and it would exceed the power of any single nation to deal adequately with it. Private enterprise can and should do much, but I can not help thinking that comprehensive international cooperation is necessary to pave the way to the resumption of conditions in which private enterprise can act with success. This does nc': mean that limitless sums are required by way of advances from the United States; comparatively small sums might suffice provided they were raised and made available in accordance with a reasoned and definite plan of international reconstruction. The British Government would be quite ready to join in the discussion and elaboration of proposals of this character, and, in spite of the immense sacrifices which the United Kingdom has made during the war and of the immense strain placed upon its resources by the assistance which it has already accorded to its allies and others, would do its best to forward the success o f any scheme which might be agreed upon. We do not pretend to be in a position at the present time to play the leading part in such a scheme, but we should do our best to con tribute our share to its success. Yours, sincerely, A u st e n C h a m b e r l a in . Hon. A l b e r t R a t h b o n e . 72 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E, SECTION 39. Blackett, the British Financial Representative, Proposed Parley on Question of Cancellation of the Loans, February, 1920. F e b r u a r y , 1920. In continuation of previous correspondence and dis cussions on the subject of interallied indebtedness, and with particular refer ence to our discussions in Paris during tlie last fortnight, I am desired by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to write to you as follows: It has been the view of the British Government that the existence of a vast mass of intergovernmental indebtedness not only involves very grave political dangers, but also forms at the present time a most serious obstacle to the recuperation of the world and particularly of continental Europe from the immense strain and suffering caused by the war. They have more than once suggested informally to representatives of the United States Treasury that steps should be taken by the two Governments in concert to find some large solution of this problem, and as yon are aware the Chancellor of the Exchequer expressed himself ready to take any steps toward relieving tlie Governments which are debtors to the Brit'sli Government of the burden of their debts which the United Slates Treasury might feel able to propose in regard to the obligations of the Governments which it holds. These suggestions have not hitherto been placed on formal record, and it is for the purpose of formal record that they are mentioned here. The formal discussions on these matters have been confined to the questions of postponement o f interest on intergovernmental obligations and the conversion of such obligations into long-term bonds. The urgent necessity for such action does not appear to the Chancellor of the Exchequer to require any lengthy demonstration. His only doubt is whether such action is sufficient in present circumstances to afford the requisite relief for the financial and economic disorders of the world. The British and United States Governments are in entire agreement with the policy which lias been publicly stated both by the British Chancellor of the Exchequer and by the Secretary of the United States Treasury that no further loans should be made by one Government to another (subject to exceptional cases of relief loans to such countries as Austria and Poland). For continental Europe generally, recourse to such intergovernmental loans being barred, the problem of finding the minimum amount of foreign exchange absolutely necessary to enable it to secure essential imports is an extraordinary difficult one, and in such circumstances it seems to the Chancellor of the Exchequer to be out of the question that the available foreign exchange should be subjected to a claim by tlie creditor Governments for payment of interest until a reasonable opportunity lias been allowed for recuperation. It is further most desirable that potential private lenders should be relieved of the fear, which tends at present to check the granting of commercial credits, that the creditor Governments might for some reason or another call for immediate repayment of the principal of the demand obligations of the debtor Govern ments held by them. The potential private lenders are to be found to some extent in the neutral countries, but mainly in the United States of America and the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom the supply of foreign exchanges, as the discount o f sterling in terms of the dollar shows, is at present far short of the demand, and that demand is conditioned, be it remembered, rather by the general Eu ropean demand for dollars and other extra-European currencies than by the requirements of the United Kingdom alone, and it is out of this supply that the relief loans required by Austria and Poland must be provided. In these circumstances the chancellor of the Exchequer desires to make the following proposals: (a ) That the United States Treasury and the British Treasury should agree in principle, if so requested by the various Governments concerned, to postpone for a period of three years—that is to say, from April and May, 3919, to April and May, 1922, the collection of interest upon obligations held by them repre senting advances to Governments of the European Allies in connection with the war, including, in the case of the United States Treasury, advances to the British Government. (b) That the two Treasuries should agree in principle, if so requested by the Governments concerned, to convert into long-term bonds containing substan D e a r M r. R a t h b o n e : FOREIGN LOANS AND AU T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 73 tially similar conditions regarding interest, sinking fund, and dates o f ma turity, the short-term obligations of the Governments of the European Allies held by them, including, in the case of the United States Treasury, obligations of the British Government. (It is not intended to exclude the possibility of minor exceptions being made to the proposed principles in special cases.) The chancellor of the exchequer is prepared to agree in principle, if thought necessary by the United States Treasury, to some provision being included for protecting the exchange of the creditor Governments if and when the currency of the debtor Governments reaches a point so near to par as to be within the prewar gold points. I have the honor to be, nry dear Mr. Rathbone, Yours, faithfully, B a s il P . B l a c k e t t . P. S.— On learning that these proposals are acceptable to the United States Treasury, a formal request for postponement of interest on British obligations will be addressed to you. SECTION 40. Cable from Wallace on Funding of Interest and Concellation. P a rts, February 10, 1920. S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , Washington: (For Leflingwell and Davis. R-305. Department’s 313, February 7, 8 p. m., your R-221.) (1st) I am clear that interest upon interest should not be charged, and under stand that this is Treasury’s considerations. View legislation merely permit ting us in effect to loan new sums carrying interest with which debtors will pay interest as it accrues worse than useless. (2nd) I quote letter just received from Blackett, as follows: “ In continuation of previous correspondence and discussions on the subject of inter-Allied indebtedness, and with particular reference to our discussions in Paris during the last fortnight, I am desired by the chancellor of the ex chequer to write to you as follow s: “ ‘ It has been the view of the British Government that the existence of a vast mass of intergovernmental indebtedness involves very grave political dan ger, but also formulates at the present time a most serious obstacle to the recuperation of the world, and particularly of continental Europe, from the im mense strain and suffering caused by the war to-day. More than once sug gested informally to representatives of the United States Treasury that steps should be taken by the two Governments in concert to find some large solution of this problem, and as you are aware, the chancellor of the exchequer expressed himself ready to take any steps toward relieving the Governments which are debtors to the British Government of the burden of their debts which the United States Treasury might feel able to propose in regard to the obligations of the Governments which it holds. These suggestions have not hitherto been placed on formal record, and it is for the purpose of formal record that they are mentioned here. “ ‘ The formal discussions on these matters have been confined to the questions of postponement of interest on intergovernmental obligations and the conver sion of such obligations into long-term bonds. The urgency of such action does not appear to the Chancellor of the Exchequer to require any lengthy demonstration. His only defect is whether such action is sufficient in present circumstances to afford the requisite relief for the financial and economic dis orders of the world. The British and United States Governments are in en tire agreement with the policy of taxing publicly stated both by the British Chancellor of the Exchequer and by the Secretary of the United States Treas ury, that no further loans should be placed by one government to another subject to exceptional cases of relief loans to such countries as Austria and Poland. For continental Europe generally recourse to such inter-governmental loans being barred, the problem of finding the minimum amount of foreign exchange absolutely necessary to enable it to secure essential imports is an extraordinarily difficult one, and in such circumstances it seems to the Chancellor of the Exchequer to be out of the question, that the available foreign exchange 74 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. should be subjected to a claim by the creditor governments for payment of interest until a reasonable opportunity has been allowed for recuperation. It is further most desirable that potential private lenders should be relieved of the fear which tends at present to check the granting of commercial credits, that the creditor governments might for some reason or other call for imme diate repayment of the principal of the demand obligations of the debtor gov ernments held by them. “ ‘ The potential private lenders are to be found to some extent in the neutral countries, but mainly in the United States of America and the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom the supply of foreign exchanges, as the discount of sterling in terms of the dollar shows, is at present far short of the demand and that demand is conditioned, be it remembered, rather by the general European demand for dollars and other extra European [fabricating?! currencies than by the requirements of the United Kingdom alone and it is out of this supply that the relief loans required by Austria and Poland must be provided. In these circumstances the chancellor of the exchequer desires to make the following proposals: (a) That the United States Treasury and the British Treasury should agree in principle, if so requested by the various governments referred to, to postpone for a period of three years—that is to say, from April and May, 1919, to April and May, 1922—the collection of interest upon obliga tions held by them representing advances to countries of the European Allies in connection with the war, including, in the case o f United States Treasury, advances to the British Government. “ ‘ (b) That the two Treasuries should agree in principle, if so requested by the Governments concerned, to convert into long-term bonds containing sub stantially similar conditions regarding interest, sinking fund, and dates o f maturity the short-term obligations of the Governments of the European Allies held by them, including, in case of the United States, treasury obligations of the British Government (it is not intended to exclude possibility of minor ex ceptions being made to the proposed principles in special cases). The chan cellor of the exchequer is prepared to agree in principle, if thought necessary by the United States Treasury, to some provision being included for protect ing exchange of the creditor Governments if and when the currency of the debtor Governments reaches a position so near to par as to be within the prewar gold points.’ “ P o s t s c r i p t . —On learning that these proposals are acceptable to the United States a formal request for postponement of interest on British obligations will be addressed to you.” (3rd) Foregoing letter shows what British are prepared to do in way post ponement interest during three-year period. Prior to that date I understand they have in effect added interest to principal just as we have. I do not understand British have forgiven interest unless possibly in case of Belgium, but am writing Blackett asking him information as to matters referred to your paragraph 6th and 7th and will cable on receipt of reply. (4th) Have not conferred with French as to what they will do regarding deferring interest on their comparatively small advances. However, have no doubt France, in order to obtain postponement of interest from America and British, will be prepared to postpone interest on advances made by France in the same manner as agreed between America and Great Britain. I have felt it was useless to enter into lengthy discussion with France in postponement of interest until we had agreed in principle with British. Bloch, when repre senting French Treasury, made no objection to this procedure. Writing French asking information as to points (a ), (e ), (d ), and (e) of your paragraph 6th and paragraph 7th, and will cable you result. (5th) You will understand that my talks with British have been confined to countries to which we have made loans other than Russia, Cuba, and Greece. It may be that there should be postposement of interest in case of Greece, but in view of terms of Paris agreement I have not yet attempted to deal with our loan to Greece. (6th) By private bankers. (7th) Should add that detailed information regarding extent to which interest has been referred would naturally have been taken up after agreement with lending governments had been reached and lending governments were prepared to indicate to their common debtors exactly what they were prepared to do regarding (a) exchange of demand obligations for long-time obligations and (b) postponement of interest payments. W allace. FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E . 75 SECTION 41. Treasury Department Memorandum for President Wilson Against Cancellation. Your recent message through the British embassy, in which among other matters you advocate a general cancellation of intergovernment war debts, has been received, and Rathbone has transmitted to me a copy of a communi cation received by him from Blackett in respect to the funding of the demand obligations of allied governments held by the United States and England, respectively, in which the same subject is also raised. 1. At the outset, I desire to express my concurrence that the financial and economic problems of the world are very closely connected, and Great Britain and the United States naturally look with concern upon the difficulties which confront continental Europe. The United States Treasury has been greatly interested in such information as was available concerning the position of Great Britain, and has viewed with great pleasure and satisfaction the progress which your Government has been making toward the return to a peace basis. The United States is in the fortunate position of having been able to make even greater progress in this respect. While we have in the United States many difficult problems at present with which to contend, and while there is a widespread feeling that taxes should be reduced and governmental loans discontinued, our financial conditions are so far the reverse of critical that I have no reason to suppose that in so far as concerns conditions in the United States credits from private sources will not be available for assistance to continental Europe on sound and adequate security upon terms which recognize the world-wide shortage of capital resulting from five years of warfare. 2. Funding of the short-term obligations into long-term obligations is a matter as to which no question has been raised by our Congress and there should be no difficulty in dealing with this phase of the proposed arrangements in the manner outlined by Mr, Rathbone. As you have no doubt heard from Mr. Rathbone, it may be impossible to reach without congressional approval a final settlement in respect to the interest accruing during the next two or three years. 3. I regret that conditions are such as to cause you concern in respect to the Anglo-French loan maturing this fall, and sincerely hope you will have no difficulty in making satisfactory arrangements to take care o f it. 4. As to the engagement of the British Government in respect to advances for the purchase of silver under the Pitman Act, this matter is being dealt with by Mr. Rathbone, who undoubtedly will give full consideration to any proposal that you have to make in that connection. It is unfortunate that the Indian Government has not seen fit to take Lteps to limit the importation of gold into India. Failure to do this is making heavy demands on our gold reserves. I f continued, this is likely, materially, to impair the ability of our financial markets to assist Europe. 5. Being in hearty accord with you as to the desirability o f maintaining in ternational good-will and understanding, I am in favor o f every reasonable effort directed to that end, and am opposed to any action which may have a contrary effect. For these reasons I regret exceedingly that any proposal for a general cancellation of all intergovernmental war debts should be made and encouraged. Any movement to this end would most naturally result in creating in the minds of those who would expect to be benefited thereby not only the hope that such a plan will be adopted, but would also probably tend to mislead them into believing in the justice, importance, and necessity of such a contribution, which if not granted by those who are expected to make it can only have a harmful result. Apparently in the hope that the inevitable consequences of the war could be avoided, various schemes including that for a general coneellation of inter governmental war debts were, as far back as January a year ago, launched in one way or another before it could possibly be foreseen whether or not any measures were necessary other than that o f the adoption of sound economic policies, including increased work and production and decreased consumption and expenditures on the part o f the debtors as well as the creditors o f the world. I had not heretofore understood that the British Treasury seriously favored any such plan, although in so far as concerns the British Government, a general cancellation o f debts as proposed would be of certain advantage and probably would not involve any sacrifice or contribution. As there are no 76 FOREIGN LOANS AND AU T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. obligations of tlie United States Government which would be canceled under such a plan the effect would be that in consideration of a cancellation by the United States Government of the obligations which it holds for advances made to the British Government and the other allied Governments, the British Gov ernment would cancel its debts against France, Italy, Russia, and her other allies. Furthermore, your proposal, as I understand, is not based on the eventual inability of the respective debtor governments to pay their external debts, but upon the assumption that such a cancellation would improve their credit, hasten the economic rehabilitation of continental Europe, and improve international good-will and understanding. In the interest of good-will and understanding you will, I am sure, desire that I shall present my views not less frankly than you have done. Such a proposal, in my judgment, lacks many essential elements of justice, necessity, expediency, and possibility. It does not involve any mutual sacrifices or contributions on the part of all the governments concerned, but would in volve a unique and almost solitary additional contribution from the United States. I am surprised that it should be renewed so insistently, especially when there is no evidence that the debts can not be paid or that the contribution involved would solve or, in any event, be more than a slight contribution toward a solution of the difficulties of continental Europe. It does not deal with the matters out of which the present financial and economic difficulties of Europe chiefly grow and acceptance of such a plan would not solve those difficulties. The United States is most earnestly desirous of the prompt financial and economic rehabilitation of Europe, and in furtherance of that desire has rendered considerable assistance. Since the armistice the United States Gov ernment has extended to foreign governments financial assistance of approxi mately $4,000,000,000. This is a very large proportion of the total financial assistance rendered by the United States Government to the allied governments before the armistice. Negotiations for funding the principal of the foreign obligations held by the United States Treasury and postponing or funding the interest accruing during the reconstruction period are in progress. What this Government could do for the immediate relief of the debtor countries has, there fore, been done. Their need now is for private credits. The steps making it possible to obtain these can be taken only by the debtor governments them selves. I do not think that at the present time the foreign obligations held by the Government of the United States constitute a practical obstacle to obtain ing credits here, nor do I think that the European countries wTould obtain a dollar additional credit as a result of the cancellation of those obligations. On the contrary, it* might have a bad effect because our investors would construe such cancellation as an indication of the inability of the debtor governments to pay. The indebtedness of the allied Governments to each other and to the United States is not a present burden upon the debtor governments, since they are not paying interest or even, so far as I am aware, providing in their budgets or taxes for the payment of either principal or interest. It is not possible •upon any basis of experience or of existing fact to conclude, if the arrangements are made which it is hoped to make for the funding of the short-time obliga tions into long-time obligations and for the postponement of funding of interest accruing during the next two or three years, that the respective governments will not thereafter be able to meet instalments of interest and principal as they mature. With the adoption of such measures as their respective Governments can and should take to assist in a general recovery, I have great confidence in the abil ity of the peoples of continental Europe to return to their natural pursuits of industry and to rehabilitate their trade and commerce sooner than might be expected after such a destructive war. Some of the debtor Governments have not levied taxes sufficient to enable them to balance their budgets, nor have they taken any measures to reduce their budgets to meet their income. There has been little disarmament. No appreciable progress has been made in de flating excessive issues of currency nor in stabilizing the currencies at their respective approximate present values. In my judgment it is most essential that there should be a prompt, practical, and definite settlement of the German reparation question, and the immediate adoption of policies which would set Germany and Austria free economically in order that they may make their necessary contribution to the economic rehabilitation o f Europe. Realizing that the present economic ills of Europe grow not out of interest which the debtor Governments are not now paying upon their debts to the United States nor out of principal which is to be funded, but that a release FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 77 from such difficulties, in so far as that can be obtained, is primarily within the control of the debtor Governments and the peoples themselves, the Ameri can people and the American Congress would not, I am satisfied, look with favor upon the proposal to them of a cancellation of the obligations held by the United States Government when it can not be shown that the necessity for such action is immediate, or that all reasonable measures have been taken by the debtor Governments to make it possible for them to meet their foreign obligations, or that the request is part of a necessary composition with all creditors, domestic and foreign, public and private. A proposal that the United States should cancel its debts against the allied Governments would, as you must realize, lack many of the essential elements above indicated. It would simply result, in effect, in the cancellation by one of the principal creditors of its claims in order that the claims of the other creditors might remain intact, and would transfer from the peoples o f the debtor Governments to the shoulders of the people of the United States the taxes necessary to liquidate the outstanding obligations of the United States Government representing the loans made by it to the allied Governments. The United States Government in little over two years raised for war purposes through taxes and loans approximately $37,000,000,000, out of which were made to the allied Governments the loans to assist them in winning the war. The United States Government has neither received nor sought substantial material benefits from the war or under the terms of the treaty of peace. On the other hand, the Allies, although having suffered greatly in loss of lives and prop erty, have under the terms o f the treaty of peace and otherwise acquired acces sions o f territories, properties, raw materials, and other advantages, including their claims against Germany for vast indemnities. It would seem that if full account were taken of these there would be no incentive, desire, or reason to call upon the United States for further contributions. SECTION 42. Letter to the President on Cancellation. F e b r u a r y 21, 1920. Memorandum for the President: As you are aware, efforts beginning with the peace negotiations were made to bring about a cancellation of our debts against the allied Governments, but the question was not presented in such a definite way as to require us to take any formal action. Much to the surprise of the Treasury, in connection with negotiations which have been under way with the British Treasury regarding the funding of short-time obligations of the allied Governments into long-time obligations and the extension of the interest accruing thereon during the next two or three years, the question has been formally raised by the British Treasury, both in a communication to Mr. Rathbone and also on a message from the chancellor of the exchequer sent through the British Embassy in which, among other questions, the chancellor in effect invites the American Treasury to a consideration of a general cancellation of all intergovernmental war debts. Before his departure for a three days’ absence Secretary Houston approved the inclosed reply, which he proposes to send to the chancellor if it meets with your approval. In order not to consume your time in reading the chancellor’s message, which deals with many questions between the two Treasuries, I am attaching an extract from that portion of his message dealing with this subject. For some reason of his own, the chancellor bases his proposal partly on the theory of an alleged probable financial stringency in this market, which would make it impossible to obtain private credits here. Just as the people of Europe were misled into believing German reparations would supply the deficit in budgets, they are being misled into believing a cancellation of their external governmental debts will later solve their other difficulties. While the Allies have never bluntly so stated, their policy seems to be to make Germany indemnify them for having started the war and to make us indemnify them for not having entered the war sooner. Will you kindly indicate your approval or such instructions as you care to give in respect to the proposed reply ? (Signed) N o r m a n H. D a v is . 78 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. F e b r u a r y 23, 1920. : With reference to my memorandum of February 21, inclosing a proposed reply to the chancellor of the exchequer regarding the cancellation o f intergovernmental war loans, I desire to submit for your further information the following consideration: Without any specific proof, I have for some time suspected that the loans made by England to France and Italy have not the same standing as our loans to the Allies. I recall that Mr. Lloyd George told me England could not afford to force those countries to pay her. Article X I o f the pact o f London states that: “ Italy shall receive a military contribution corresponding to her strength and sacrifices.” I do not know what this means. It may mean corresponding financial assist ance to Italy during the war or after the war or both. In either case it most probably has a direct relation to the obligations of the Italian Government now held by the British Government, and it may well be that the British desire a general cancellation of intergovernmental war debts as a means of discharg ing secret treaty provisions. If such is the case, the British might thus in great part at our expense discharge their treaty obligations. Article X IY of the pact of London provides that “ Great Britain undertakes to facilitate for Italy without delay and on favorable conditions the conclusion of a loan in the London market amounting to not less than 50,000,000 pounds.” The reference herein to immediate financial assistance may well indicate that Article X I referred to general financial assistance on a larger scale. Cordially and faithfully, yours, (Signed) N o r m a n H . D a v id . M y D e a r M r. P r e s i d e n t T h e P r e s id e n t , The White House. F e b r u a r y 26, 1920. The document attached hereto, entitled “A proposed message from the Secretary of the Treasury to the British Chancellor of the Exchequer,” has been under consideration by Mr. Norman Davis and me for more than a week. It is in response to a message which came to the Treasury through the British Embassy from the chancellor about 10 days or 2 weeks ago. It bears principally on a suggestion contained in his message bearing oil the general cancellation of interallied debts. The question with me is whether you would approve my sending such a reply. Mr. Davis and I are of the opinion that a reply should be sent and that this will cover the ground. Perhaps you may prefer that no reply whatever be sent. I should be glad to know your views and to have your instructions. I am returning Mr. Davis’s memorandum of February 21, which he sent to you at my request, and also his letter to you of February 23, giving further information bearing on the matter, particularly parts of articles of the pact of London. Faithfully, yours, D. F. H o u s t o n . D e a r M b. P r e s i d e n t : T h e P r e s id e n t . The White House. SECTION 43. Message from the Secretary of the Treasury to England on Cancellation. m essage fro m the secretar y OF t h e t r e a s u r y to t h e c h a n c e l l o r of t h e exchequer. Your recent message through the British Embassy, in which among other things you suggest a general cancellation of intergovernmental war debts, has been received, and Hathbone has transmitted a copy of the communication sent him by Blackett dealing with the funding of the demand obligations of the allied Governments held by the United States and England, respectively, in which the same subject is raised. I concur with your view that the financial and economic problems of all the world are closely connected and that Great Britain and the United States naturally look with concern upon the difficulties which confront continental FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 79 Europe. Tlie United States Treasury has been greatly interested in information reaching it concerning the situation of Great Britain and has viewed with pleasure and satisfaction the progress which your Government has been making toward a return to a peace basis. While we are at present confronted with difficult problems, our financial situation is not at all critical. On the contrary, it is such that I have reason to think that credits from private sources may be made available to continental Europe on sound and adequate security and on terms which recognize the world-wide shortage of capital resulting from five years o f warfare. Funding of the short-term obligations into long-term obligations is a matter as to which no question has been raised by our Congress and there should be no difficulty in dealing with this phase of the proposed arrangements in the manner outlined by Mr. Rathbone. As you have no doubt heard from Mr. Rathbone, it may be impossible to reach without congressional approval a final settlement in respect to the interest accruing during the next two or three years. I regret that conditions are such as to cause you concern in respect to the Anglo-French loan maturing this fall, and sincerely hope you will have no difficulty in making satisfactory arrangements to take care o f it. As to the engagement o f the British Government in respect to advances for the purchase of silver under the Pittman Act, this matter is being dealt with by Mr. Rathbone, who undoubtedly will give full consideration to any proposal that you have to make in that connection. It is unfortunate that the Indian Government has not seen fit to take steps to limit the importation of gold into India. Failure to do this is making heavy demands on our gold reserves. I f continued, this is likely materially to impair the ability of our financial markets to assist Europe. As to the general cancellation o f intergovernmental war debts suggested by you, you will, I am sure, desire that I present my views no less frankly than you have presented yours. Any proposal or movement of such character would, I am confident, serve no useful purpose. On the contrary, it would, I fear, mislead the people of the debtor countries as to the justice and efficacy of such a plan, and arouse hopes, the disappointment o f which could only have a harmful effect. I feel certain that neither the American people nor our Congress, whose action on such a question would be required, is prepared to look with favor upon such a proposal. Apparently there are those who have been laboring for some time under the delusion that the inevitable consequences of war can be avoided. As far back as January a year ago, before it could possibly be foreseen whether any measures were necessary other than the adoption o f sound economic policies, various schemes, including that o f a cancellation o f intergovernmental war debts, were launched. Of course, I recognize that a general cancellation of such debts would be of advantage to Great Britain, and that it probably would not in volve any losses on her part. As there are no obligations of the United States Government which would be canceled under such a plan, the effect would be that in consideration o f a cancellation by the United States Government of the obligations which it holds for advances made to the British Government and the other allied Governments the British Government would cancel its debts against France, Italy, Russia, and her other allies. Such a proposal does not involve mutual sacrifice on the part of the nations concerned. It simply involves a contribution mainly by the United States. The United States has shown its desire to assist Europe. Negotiations for funding the principal of the foreign obligations held by the United States Treasury and for postponing or funding the interest accruing during the reconstruction period are in prog ress. Since the armistice this Government has extended to foreign Govern ments financial assistance to the extent of approximately $4,000,000,000. What this Government could do for the immediate relief of the debtor countries has been done. Their need now is for private credits. The indebtedness o f the allied Governments to each other and to the United States is not a present burden upon the debtor Governments, since they are not paying interest, or even, as far as I am aware, providing in their budgets or taxes for the payment of either principal or interest. At the present time the foreign obligations held by the Government of the United States do not constitute a practical obstacle to obtaining credits here, and I do not think that the European coun tries would obtain a dollar additional credit as a result o f the cancellation o f those obligations. The proposal does not touch matters out of which the pres ent financial and economic difficulties of Europe chiefly grow. The relief from 80 FOREIGN LOANS AND AU T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E . present ills, in so far as it can be obtained, is primarily within the control of the debtor Governments and peoples themselves. Most of the debtor Govern ments have not levied taxes sufficient to enable them to balance their budgets, nor have they taken any energetic and adequate measures to reduce their expenditures to meet their income. Too little progress has been made in dis armament. No appreciable progress lias been made in deflating excessive issues of currency or in stabilizing the currencies at new levels, but in continental Europe there has been a constant increase in note issues. Private initiative has not been restored. Unnecessary and unwise economic barriers still exist. Instead of setting trade and commerce free by appropriate steps, there appear to be concerted efforts to obtain from the most needy discriminatory advantages and exclusive concessions. There is not yet apparent any disposition on the part of Europe to make a prompt and reasonable definite settlement of the reparation claims against Germany or to adopt policies which will set Germany and Aus tria free to make their necessary contribution to the economic rehabilitation of Europe. After taking all the measures within their power, one or more of the debtor Governments may ultimately consider it necessary or advantageous to make some general settlement of llieir indebtedness. In such a case, they would, I presume, propose to all creditors, domestic and foreign, a general composition which would take into account advantages obtained by such debtor country under the treaty of peace. How the American people or the American Con gress would view participation in such a composition, I can not say. It is very clear to me. however, that a general cancellation of intergovernmental war debts, irrespective of the positions of the separate debtor Governments, is of no present advantage or necessity. A general cancellation as suggested would, while retaining the domestic obligations intact, throw upon the people of this country the exclusive burden of meeting the interest and of ultimately extin guishing the principal of our loans to the allied Governments. This Nation has neither sought nor received substantial benefits from the war. On the other hand, the Allies, although having suffered greatly in loss of lives and property, have, under the terms of the treaty of peace and otherwise, acquired very con siderable accessions of territories, populations, economic, and other advantages. It would, therefore, seem that if a full account were taken of these and of the whole situation, there would be no desire nor reason to call upon the Govern ment of this country for further contributions. SECTION 44. Cancellation and Interest-Funding Negotiations. P a r i s , May 25, 1920. Washington: Most urgent. 1198. May 25, 7 p. m. R-530. Secretary of the Treasury, Leftingwell and Davis from Rathbone. Supplementing my R-529. First. In writing chancellor before I left London I stated as follow s: “ I have explained to Mr. Blackett quite fully the legal situation which exists regarding the demand obligations which the United States Treasury holds of the British Government and the firm necessity of our asking for payment of the interest? which has accrued on these demand obligations if we are unable to postpone such collection in accordance with the terms of long-time obligations in such form as it may be agreed upon and which your Government will agree to deliver in exchange for such demand obligations upon the request of the Secretary of the Treasury.” Second. Under date of May 19 I received following letter from chancellor: “ I am very sorry that I did not see you again before I left, but, as Blackett explained, my time was fully occupied by deputations with whom I had already made appointment. I have reported to the cabinet the general tenor of the discussions which have passed between us and of the arrangements which we were seeking to effect for the settlement of outstanding points, but amidst the pressure of other urgent business they have not hitherto been able to give to these questions the full consideration which they deserve. I avail myself, there fore, of your kind offer to come and see me again before you sail for America. If you could fix your visit for Tuesday, the 1st, or Wednesday, the 2d June, I think I could promise to be in a position to express our considered opinion to you.” S e c r e ta r y o f S ta te , FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E . 81 Third. Before replying to that letter I received telephone message from Brit ish Embassy quoting telegram stating that chancellor had written me further letter which would render it unnecessary for me to go to London. Fourth. Have just received the following letter from chancellor: “ The cabi net has this morning given prolonged and careful consideration to the proposals which have been discussed between us for the treatment of British indebtedness to the American Government and the parallel treatment by both the United States and Great Britain of the debts due to them by France, Italy, and other allied Governments. Since I had my last meeting with you the discussion be tween the prime ministers of France and Great Britain at Lympne have, on the initiative of the French, resulted in an agreement that in order to provide a solution for the economic difficulties which are gravely weighing upon the gen eral situation of the world and in order to mark a definite beginning of the era of peace the settlement of the debts between them and the other European allies should proceed on parallel lines with such of the reparation debts of the Central Empire. “ The question of European indebtedness to America was not discussed at this conference at which no American representative was present, but before proceeding further with the consideration of detailed proposals for the treat ment of the British debt to the United States Government, which, as explained by you, were intended to form the basis for similar arrangements between the Unied States and Great Britain on the one hand and the allied nations indebted to both of them on the other, we feel that their applicability to the general situation must be further explored and that it raises questions of great ini' portance unsuited for departmental treatment between our ttco treasuries. Discussions on the subject took place at an earlier (?) between President Wilson and the prime minister and the prime minister proposes now to resume these discussions and will send a communication on this subject for the Presi dent’s consideration. It was with great reluctance that I made my request that you should return here, for I fear that it would have involved considerable inconvenience to you and I am glad that such a decision removes the necessity for interfering with your plans. My only regret is that it also deprives me of the pleasure of seeing you again and personally offering you my good wishes in an emergency.” Fifth. Am writing chancellor to-day as follow s: “ I was about to sign a letter to you advising that I would be in London on 1st in accordance with the suggestion in your letter o f the 19th instant when I received your *message that you had written me another letter which would render my visit to London unnecessary. I have now the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of May 21 which reached me this morning. In view of the communication which the prime minister is about to send to the President, I have referred your letter to the Secretary o f the Treasury and shall not now attempt to discuss the matter you refer to beyond restating the views of the United States Treasury that the questions relating to the debt of the British Government to the United States Government must be settled by those two Governments only and that the indebtedness of other Governments to the American Government or to the British Government and the payment by Germany of reparations are in no way related to the postponement of interest on our behalf and funding of the obligations of the British Government held by the United States Treasury nor to the other matters which were discussed during my month’s* stay in England for that purpose. Permit me to express my regret that the termination of my pleasant negotiations with the British Treasury, which when I left Mr. Blackett on the 18th instant had resulted in substantial agreement on nearly all points and gave fair promise that agreement would be speedily reached on the few matters that remained to be settled. You will recall that the ar rangement under discussion was one which it was clearly understood that neither the American nor the British Treasury intended to adopt in dealing with the obligations of other Governments held by them, respectively. Regretting that I shall not have the pleasure of seeing you again before leaving for America, I am, my dear Mr. Chancellor.” Sixth. In view of practical refusal of British Government to further negotiate on these points, there is nothing more that can be done here so far as questions with British are involved, and in view of sudden turn taken by these negotiations I believe it would be inadvisable for me to attempt negotiations here with other countries. May 25,11 a. m. W allace. S. Doc. 86,67-2------ 6 82 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. SECTION 45. British Call Off Negotiations for Funding Debt. I. The Secretary of the Treasury has received the letter addressed to As sistant Secretary Rathbone by the chancellor of the exchequer under date of May 22, 1920, and has consulted with the President in regard to the same. II. It has been at all times the view of the United States Treasury that ques tions regarding the indebtedness of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to the United States Government and the funding of such indebtedness had no relation either to questions arising concerning the war loans of the United States and of the United Kingdom to other Governments or to questions regarding the reparation payments of the Central Empires of Europe. These views were expressed to the representatives of the British Treasury constantly during the period when the United States Government was making loans to the Government of the United Kingdom and since that time in Washington, in Paris, and in London. The views of the President on the sub ject were stated at length to the prime minister in a letter dated May 5, 1919. III. While at the outset of Mr. Ratlibone’s d ;scussions with Mr. Blackett of the British Treasury during the latter part of the year 1919 and the beginning of the year 1920 in Paris and in London it was thought that the arrangements being discussed for the funding of the obligations of the United Kingdom held by the United States might form the basis of arrangements thereafter to be made with other debtor Governments by t*he United States and British Treasu ries, respectively, later Mr. Blackett made it plain that the British Treasury proposed to make other and different arrangements as to the obligations it held of allied Governments and thereafter the discussions in London between Mr. Blackett and Mr. Rathbone proceeded on that basis. IV. While the Secretary of the Treasury has felt some surprise that Mr. Rathbone’s negotiations in London, undertaken there at the suggestion of the British Treasury, have been interrupted, he desires to express his regret that the chancellor of the exchequer does not himself feel able to continue the same. Congress has. however, delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury the sole au thority to deal with these matters and the Secretary suggests that such repre sentative of the Government of the United Kingdom as has the necessary au thority to negotiate with him the fulfillment of the obligation o f the Govern ment of the Un'ted Kingdom to convert their demand obligations held by the United States Treasury into long-term obligations proceed to Washington for that purpose. V. In his letter of May IS, 1920. to the chancellor. Mr. Rathbone advised that he had theretofore explained to Mr. Blackett the legal situation which made it necessary that payment of accrued interest on demand obligations of the British Government held by the United States Treasury should be asked unless postponed in accordance with the terms of long-time obligations in such form as might be agreed upon and which the Government of the United King dom would agree to deliver in exchange for such demand obligations upon the request of the Secretary of the Treasury. Accordingly the Secretary of the Treasury expresses his hope that the interrupted negotiations for the funding of the demand obligations of the Govenment of the United Kingdom be resumed at the earliest possible date. VI. In Mr. Blackett’s letter of .Tune 1, 1920, to Mr. Rathbone he suggested the immediate settlement of the various questions discussed in London, with which the British Treasury is competent to deal, thus leaving a clear field for further discussion of long-term bonds. The Secretary of the Treasury does not feel able to release the Government of the United Kingdom from its obligations in respect to the so-called subrogated securities except in connection with an agreement regarding the long-term bonds; otherwise he is prepared to meet the suggestion made by the British Treasury and to agree with it regarding the Pittman silver advances and dollar reimbursement questions in accordance with the text of the memoranda on these subjects which Mr. Rathbone handed Mr. Blackett in London as a result of their discussion. I f these matters are thus arranged the Secertary of the Treasury is likewise prepared in order to comply with the suggestion made by the British Treasury to enter into the following agreement regarding the United States advances to the United Kingdom for Austrian relief, viz: “ Of the demand obligations of the Government of the United Kingdom held by the United States Government, obligations aggregating $10,000,000, principal FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 83 amount represent advances to the United Kingdom for its purchases of food stuffs in the United States subsequently sold by the United Kingdom to Austria, all in pursuance of arrangements for the relief of Austria made by or on behalf of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and other gov ernments. It is understood that the British Treasury will pay forthwith the principal of said demand obligations held by the United States Government in the amount of $16,000,000, together with interest accrucd thereon at the rate of 5 per cent to the date of payment as to $8,000,000 thereof from zipril 15, 1919, and as to the remaining $8,000,000 from May 15, 1919; but such payments shall in no manner release the Government of the United Kingdom from its under taking to sell to Austria foodstuffs purchased in the United States to the value of $16,000,000 as provided in the arrangements for the relief of Austria herein before referred to.” SECTION 46. Message from the British Prime Minister to the President on Cancellation. EXTRACT FROM BRITISH PRIME MINISTER’ S LETTER OF AUGUST 5, PRESIDENT. 1920, TO THE I come now to the other question I wish to write to you about, and that is the knotty problem of interallied indebtedness. Indeed; I promised Mr. Rathbone long ago that I would write to you about it, but I have had to put it off for one reason and another till now. The British and the French Governments have been discussing during the last four months the question of giving fixity and definiteness to Germany’s reparation obligations. The British Government has stood steadily by the view that it was vital that Germany’s liabilities should be fixed at a figure which it was within the reasonable capacity of G e r many to pay, and that this figure should be fixed without delay, because the reconstruction of Central Europe could not begin nor could the Aliies themselves raise money on the strength of Germany’s obligation to pay them reparation until her liabilities had been exactly defined. After great difficulties with his own people, M. Millerand found himself able to accept this view—but he pointed out that it was impossible for France to agree to accept nothing less than it was entitled to under the treaty, unless its debts to its allies and associates in the war were treated in the same way. This declaration appeared to the British Government eminently fair. But after careful consideration they came to the conclusion that it was imposible to remit any part of what was owed to them by France except as part an ] par cel of all around settlement of interallied indebtedness. I need not go into the reasons which led to this conclusion which must be clear to you. But the prin cipal reason was that British public opinion would never support a one-sided arrangement at its sole expense, and that if such a one-sided arrangement were made it could not fail to estrange and eventually embitter the relations between the American and British people, with calamitous results to the future of the world. You will remember that Great Britain borrowed from the United States about half as much as its total loans to the Allies, and that after America’s entry into the war it lent to the Allies almost exactly the same amount as it borrowed from the United States of America. Accordingly, the British Government has informed the French Government that it will agree to any equitable arrangement for the reduction or cancellation of interallied in debtedness, but that such an arrangement must be one which applies all around. As you know, the representatives of the Allies and of Germany are meeting at Geneva in a week or two to commence discussion on the subject of reparation. I recognize that in the midst of a presidential election and with Congress not in session it is impossible for the United States to deal with this question in a practical manner, but the question is one of such importance to the future of Europe, and indeed to the relations between the allied and associated powers, that I should very much welcome any advice which you might feel yourself able to give me as to the best method of securing that the whole problem could be considered and settled by the Uuited States Government in concert with its associates at the earliest possible moment that the political situation in America makes it possible. There is one other point which I should like to add. When the British Gov ernment decided that it could not deal with the question of the debts owed to 84 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. it by its allies except as part and parcel of an all-around arrangement of inter allied debts, the chancellor of the exchequer told Mr. Rathbone that he could not proceed any further with the negotiations which they had been conducting together with regard to the postponement of the payment of interest on the finding of Great Britain’s debts to America. I should like to make it plain that this is due to no reluctance on the part of Great Britain to fund its debt, but solely to the fact that it can not bind itself by any arrangement which would prejudice the working of any interallied arrangement which may be reached in the future. If some method can be found for funding the British debt which does not prejudice the larger question, the British Government would be glad to fall in with it. SECTION 47. Letters Showing United States' Treasury Refused to Consider Cancellation. DRAFT. It should be pointed out at the outset that the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized by United States law to arrange for the conversion of the demand obligations of the British Government into its obligations having a fixed date of maturity, in accordance with the agreement of the British Government to make such exchange on demand contained in its existing obligations. In con nection with such exchange, the Secretary of the Treasury has authority to arrange for the postponement of interest payments. No authority has been given by the Congress to any one to exchange, remit, or cancel any part of the indebtedness of the allied governments to the United States represented by their respective demand obligations. It would require congressional authority to authorize any such dealing with the demand obligations and, as stated in the letter of November 18, 1919, from then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Rathbone to Mr. Blackett, of the British Treasury, the Congress has the same authority to authorize any disposition of obligations of the British Government held by the United States, whether represented by demand obligations or by obligations having a fixed date of maturity. Frankness, however, compels the statement that it is improbable that either the Congress or popular opinion in this country will ever permit a cancellation of any part of the debt of the British Government to the United States in order to induce the British Govern ment to remit, in whole or in part, the debt to Great Britain of France or of any other of the allied governments, or that it would consent to a cancellation or reduction in the debts of any of the allied governments as an inducement toward a practical settlement of the reparation claims. As a matter of fact, such a settlement, in our judgment, would in itself increase the ultimate financial strength o f the Allies. Suggestions looking to the cancellation or exchange of the indebtedness of Great Britain to the United States were made when the President was in Paris. Like suggestions were again made by the chancellor of the exchequer in the early part of the present year. The United States Government by its duly authorized representatives has promptly and clearly stated its unwilling ness to accept such suggestions each time they have been made and has pointed out in detail the considerations which caused its decision. The views of the United States Government have not changed, and it is not prepared to consent to the remission of any part of the debt of Great Britain to the United States. Any arrangements the British Government may make with regard to the debt owed to it by France or by the other allied governments should be made in the light of the position now and heretofore taken by the United States, and the United States, in making any arrangements with other allied governments regarding their indebtedness to the United States (and none are now contemplated beyond the funding of indebtedness and the postponement of payment of interest) will do so with the confident expectation of the payment in due coruse of the debt owed the United States by Great Britain. It is felt that the funding of these demand obligations of the British Government will do more to strengthen the friendly relations between America and Great Britain than would any other course of dealing with the same. The United States Government entirely agrees with the British Government that the fixing of Germany’s reparation obligation is a cardinal necessity for the renewal of the economic life of Europe and would prove to be most helpful FOREIGN LOANS AND AU T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E . 85 in the interests of peace throughout the world; however, it fails to perceive the logic in the suggestion in effect either that the United States shall pay part of Germany’s reparation obligation or that it shall make a gratuity to the allied governments to induce them to fix such obligation at an amount within Germany’s capacity to pay. This Government has endeavored hereto fore in a most friendly spirit to make it clear that it can not consent to connect the reparation question with that of intergovernmental indebtedness. It would seem wise, therefore, that our position should be clearly understood in order to avoid any further delay in a constructive settlement of reparations with the hope that the debts to this Government can form a part of such settlement. The long delay which has occurred regarding the funding of the demand obligations is already embarrassing the Treasury, which will find itself com pelled to begin to collect back and current interest if progress is not made with the funding. Unless arrangements are completed for funding such loans, and in that connection for the deferring of interest, in the present state of opinion here they are apt to become a dangerous source of misunderstanding and bitterness with our people. It is highly important that a British representative, with proper authority, proceed to Washington without delay to arrange to carry out the obligation of the British Government to convert its demand obligations held by our Treas ury into long-time obligations. The United States Government recognizes the importance, in the interests of peace and prosperity, of securing the restoration o f financial and industrial stability throughout Europe. The war debts of the allied governments, the treaty obligations of Germany under the reparation clauses of the treaty o f Versailles, and the annexes thereto, and of other enemy and exenemy countries under the treaties nogotiated with them, the administration of countries under the mandates provided for by such treaties, and the existing arrangements between the Governments of various countries have or may have an important bearing in making plans to accomplish such restoration. It is the view o f the United States Government that in accrediting a representative to Washington for the purpose mentioned it might prove expedient that the British Govern ment should authorize him to enter into discussions of all of these matters with the proper representatives of the United States Government. O ctober 11, 1920. Personal and private. Hon. N o r m a n D a v is , Assistant Secretary of State. M y D e a r D a v i s : I inclose herewith a draft of a letter for the President’s consideration, covering the financial part of the prime minister’s letter to the President. I believe you have gone over the substance of this very carefully with Mr. Kelly. I think we ought immediately to connect what the State De partment has to say with this and send a complete letter to the President. Faithfully, yours, D. F . H o u s to n . (Copy was sent Mr. Davis in the Secretary’s letter of Oct. 11, 1920.) I turn now to the problem of interallied indebtedness which you raise. I must deal with this matter with great frankness, as I am sure you wish me to do. It is desirable that our position be clearly understood in order to avoid any further delay in a constructive settlement of reparations, which may arise from the hope that the debts to this Government can form a part of such settlement. It will be helpful if, first o f all, I indicate our legal situation. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized by United States law to arrange for the conversion of the demand obligations of the British Government into its obligations having a fixed date of maturity, in accordance with the agree ment of the British Government to make such exchange on demand contained in its existing obligations. In connection with such exchange, the Secretary of the Treasury has authority to arrange for the postponement of interest pay ments. No power has been given by the Congress to any one to exchange, remit, or cancel any part o f the indebtedness of the allied governments to the United States represented by their respective demand obligations. It would require congressional authority to authorize any such dealing with the demand 86 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. obligations, and. as slated in tlie letter of November 18, 1919, from Mr. Rath bone to Mr. Blackeit, of the British Treasury, the Congress has the same au thority to authorize any disposition of obligations of the British Government held by the United States, whether represented by demand obligations or by obligations having a fixed date of maturity. It is highly improbable that either the Congress or popular opinion in this country will ever permit a cancellation of any part of the debt of the British Government to the United States in order to induce the British Government to remit, in whole or in part, the debt to Great Britain of France or any other of the allied governments or that it would consent to a cancellation or reduction in the debts of any o f the allied governments as an inducement toward a practical settlement of the reparation claims. As a matter of fact such a settlement, in our judgment, would in itself increase the ultimate financial strength of the Allies. You will recall that suggestions looking to the cancellation or exchange of the indebtedness of Great Britain to the United States were made to me when I was in Paris. Like suggestions were again made by the chancellor of the ex chequer in the early part of the present year. The United States Government by its duly authorized representatives has promptly and clearly stated its unwillingness to accept such suggestions each time they have been made, and has pointed out in detail the considerations which caused its decision. The views of the United States Government have not changed, and it is not pre pared to consent to the remission of any part of the debt of Great Britain to the United States. Any arrangements the British Government may make with regard to the debt owed to it by France or by the other allied governments should be made in the light of the position now and heretofore taken by the United States, and the United States, in making any arrangements with other allied governments re garding their indebtedness to the United States (and none are now contem plated beyond the funding of indebtedness and the postponement of payment of interest) will do so with the confident expectation of the payment in due course of the debt owed the United States by Great Britain. It is felt that the funding of these demand obligations of the British Government will do more to strengthen the friendly relations between America and Great Britain than would any other course of dealing with the same. The United States Government entirely agrees with the British Government that the fixing of Germany's reparation obligation is a cardinal necessity for the renewal of the economic life of Europe and would prove to be most helpful in the interests of peace throughout the w orld; however, it fails to perceive the logic in a suggestion in effect either that the Untied States shall pay part of Germany's reparation obligation or that it shall make a gratuity to the allied governments to induce them to fix such obligation at an amount within Ger many’s capacity to pay. This Government has endeavored heretofore in a most friendly spirit to make it clear that it can not consent to connect the reparation question with that of intergovernmental indebtedness. The long delay which has occurred in the funding o f the demand obligations is already embarrassing the Treasury, which will find itself compelled to begin to collect back and current interest if speedy progress is not made with the funding. Unless arrangements are completed for funding such loans and in that connection for the deferring of interest, in the present state of opinion here, there is likely to develop a dangerous misunderstanding. I believe it to be highly important that a British representative with proper authority proceed to Washington without delay to arrange to carry out the obligation of the British Government to convert its demand obligations held by our Treasury into long time obligations. The United States Government recognizes the importance, in the interests of peace and prosperity, of securing the restoration of financial and industrial sta bility throughout Europe. The war debts of the allied governments, the treaty obligations of Germany under the reparation clauses of the treaty of Versailles and the annexes thereto, and of other enemy and ex-enemy countries under the treaties negotiated with them, the administration of countries under the man dates provided for by such treaties, and the existing arrangements between the Governments of various countries have or may have an important bearing in making plans to accomplish such restoration. It is the view of the United States Government that in accrediting a representative to Washington for the purpose mentioned it might prove expedient that the British Government should authorize him to enter into discussions of all of these matters with the proper representatives of the United States Government. RUSSIA 87 SECTION 48. Russia. Memorandum, prepared for the Senate Committee on the Judici ary, from the correspondence of the Treasury Department covering the loans to Russia. In order that this data may be properly un derstood a brief word of explanation is necessary. The Milyukoff government succeeded the Czar’s government in Russia during March, 1917. This government was afterwards known as the Kerensky Provisional Government. Boris Bakhmeteff was sent on a special mission to the United States by the Kerensky Pro visional Government late in the spring of 1917, the mission having much the same duties as the Root Mission from the United States to Russia. After Bakhmeteff arrived here he was appointed as the ambassador from the Kerensky Provisional Government. Under the four Liberty bond acts the Government of the United States was authorized to loan money to foreign Governments then engaged in war with enemies of the United States for the prosecu tion of the war. Pursuant to these acts the Treasury Department established credits for the Kerensky Provisional Government of Rus sia in the aggregate of $450,000,000. On this credit $187,729,750 was advanced to Russia. The date of the advances and the amounts so advanced are as fol lows: June 6,1917, $35,000,000; June 13, 1917, $10,000,000; August 1, 1917, $2,500,000; August 22, 1917, $2,500,000; August 24, 1917, $37,500,000; August 30, 1917, $10,000,000; September 25. 1917, $15,000,000; October 2, 1917, $22,200,000; October 11, 1917, $20,000,000; October 24, 1917, $5,000,000 ; November 1, 1917, $31,700,000; Novem ber 15,1917, $1,329,750. The advancement made on October 24 was for a specific purpose to be used through Rumania. This advance was afterwards with drawn. The advance on November 15 was an advance made to pay interest due the United States. In addition to the $187,000,000 loan, above referred to, there is now due, as shown by the Treasury report of the date of November 15,1920, $14,092,609 30, which is the interest due on the Russian loan. We also hold obligations of the so-called provisional Russian Gov ernment for war material sold by the War Department to various branches of that Government, dated August 8, 1919, $406,092. We also hold the obligations of the provisional government for food stuffs sent through the American Relief Administration the sum of $4,465,465.07. This obligation is dated July 1,1919. This money was taken from the President’s fund of $150,000,000. In addition to these sums there wrere a number of private loans floated in this country through J. P. Morgan, The Guaranty Trust Co., The National City Bank, and other large banking institutions prior to our entrance into the war. These private loans to Russia aggregate over $96,000,000. Summing up all of these obligations we find that we are now holding Russian obligations aggregating over $302,000,000. in addition to these loans to the provisional Government of Russia direct we hold the obligations of various subdivisions of what was 89 90 FOREIGN LOANS AND AU TH O RITY FOR M A K IN G SAM E. formerly the Government of Russia in the aggregate of over $30,000,000. These obligations are from the Government of Esthonia, Finland. Latvia, and Lithuania. I f these Governments remain as sepa rate Governments, then, of course, these obligations will eventually be paid by them if paid at all. But if Russia when it finally emerges from its present chaotic condition insists on recognition of its original boundaries, these Governments will be a part of Russia. Immediately after the fall of the Kerensky government on Novem ber 1, 1917, the Treasury Department canceled all of the credits over and above the $187,000,000 referred to. The first act of the new bolshevik government of Russia was to de clare that all foreign loans were from that date null and void. When the United States Government first started making advances to the Kerensky provisional government that government then had to its credit in the National City Bank of New York City approxi mately $11,000,000. In addition to the advances made by the United States Government it sold property belonging to the Russian Govern ment in this country and realized therefrom approximately $13,000,000. This made the total of its available balances approximately $211,000,000. During the summer of 1917 the provisional government entered into large contracts with American contractors for various war supplies. When the provisional government fell these contracts were in various stages of completion. Our Government, instead of declaring the pro visional Government of Russia a bankrupt and stepping in and taking complete charge of the assets and administering the estate, continued to recognize the provisional government’s ambassador, Mr. Bakhme teff, and allowed him to carry on the functions of his office to the end that he settle up the affairs of the Kerensky government under the United States Treasury supervision of his bank balance. During his term of office here as a de facto ambassador of the Russian people, Mr. Bakhmeteff has represented first the Milyukoff Kerenski government, second the Kolchak government of Russia, third the Wrangel government of Russia, and at the present time there is no faction in Russia strong enough to set up a de facto government which he could possibly represent. Some interesting facts about the unbusinesslike manner in which the Russian affairs were administered by this government are shown by the fact that the War Department of the United States Govern ment purchased from the provisional Russian government after its fall war munitions which had been contracted for by that govern ment to the extent of $11,000,000. Instead of paying that $11,000,000 into the United States Treasury and crediting that sum as a payment on the Russian loan the $11,000,000 was paid into the National City Bank to the credit of Mr. Bakhmeteff. The Shipping Board chartered some vessels belonging to the pro visional Russian Government. It paid Mr. Bakhmeteff over $1,400,000 for these vessels. This money was paid direct to the National City Bank to Mr. Bakhmeteff’s credit, but none of it was paid to the United States Government for credit on the loan or on the interest due from Russia. About $300,000 remains due the Russian Govern ment from the Shipping Board on these stocks. The Navy Depart ment of the United States Government was indebted to the Russian Government for certain vessels it used. It also made payments direct FOREIGN LO ANS AND AU T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 91 to Mr. Bakhmeteff instead of paying this money into the United States Treasury, where it could be credited on the Russian loan. There was a fund of $1,000,000 in gold deposited in the Mint at San Francisco, Calif., by the provisional government of Russia, as a forfeiture on certain war supplies which were to be purchased from the War Department of the United States. When the Kolchak gov ernment fell this contract could not be carried out. According to the contract the $1,000,000 in gold was put up as a forfeiture. The War Department of the United States settled with the Russian Am bassador, charging him only $585,000 on the contract. The remaining $415,000 which this Government then had in its possession was im mediately turned over to Mr. Bakhmeteff, instead of being credited on the Russian loan or interest. At the time of the fall of the Kerensky government there was ap proximately $56,000,000 in the National City Bank to the credit of that government. According to Mr. Bakhmeteff’s report, over $50,000,000 munitions and supplies have been sent from this country to Russia. Practically all of these supplies could have been sold in this country and the money credited on the Russian loan if the matter had been handled in a businesslike manner. In the data which I append hereto I desire to call especial atten tion to the enormous expenditures which were made by Mr. Bakh meteff out of this fund. You will note in one of his salary reports that he used approximately $2,500,000 for this fund. With this fund he was keeping up the embassy here, two or three consulates in this country, and several offices in Russia. I want also to call the attention of the committee to the $100,000 item of expense for sending the Russian provisional government ministers and agents to the peace conference. It is also interesting to note that we paid $1,239,000 as a printing bill for printing Russian paper money in this country, and you will find in the attached correspondence letters in which the defaeto Rus sian ambassador requests that we keep up the embassies of the de facto government in South America. I want to also call your attention to a cablegram from Ambassador Francis in which he states that Boris Bakhmeteff, the ambassador for the provisional government, was the financial agent of the Czar of Russia. He also cabled that the former Czar of Russia Avas the owner of approximately $100,000,000 of stocks and bonds in various business concerns and railroads in this country. It would seem that these stocks and bonds having been purchased with the money of the Russian people would be subject to attachment by the Government of the United States and in that way this Government could get back some of the millions it has put up for Russia. I will attach hereto the letter and documents w7hich go to substan tiate the statement made above. In order that the committee may have the views of both the Treas ury Department and Mr. Bakhmeteff about these loans, I have at tached a synopsis giving the attiude of the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and Mr. Bakhmeteff. To make the Russian expenditures and loans complete, there should be added the amount spent out of the presidential fund not already referred to. 92 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. Acording to a partial report by President Wilson of the expendi tures made by him under the $150,000,000 appropriation given him for the purpose of prosecuting the war it appears that he spent $15,815,523.67 for investigation, propaganda, relief work, and the operation of the railroads in Russia in 1917 and 1918. This report is filed with the Secretary of the Senate. The report includes the $5,000,000 given to the Archangel district for relief purposes already referred to. It also includes an additional $5,000,000 for relief wTork and $4,500,000 for operation of the Siberian Railroad and an addi tional item of $1,000,000 for military supplies in Russia. Also $25,000 for a publicity campaign in Russia during 1917; $50,000 for the Root Mission; and $50,000 for the Railroad Mission. All of these expenditures were made direct and we hold no obliga tions from the Russian Government or promises from them to repay this fund. In addition to the funds above referred to a letter from Newton D. Baker, former Secretary of War, dated February 1, 1921, copy of which is attached to this report, shows that the cost of our military forces in the Archangel district from August 1, 1918, to March 31, 1920, amounted in all to $1,149,428.88. This letter also shows that the expenditures by the War Department for the United States mili tary forces in Siberia from August 1, 1918, to August 24, 1920, amounted in all to $8,049,068.31. These items of course were expendi tures by the Government of the United States and we hold no promis sory note from Russia to cover them. T reasury D epartm en t, Washington, June 28, 1919. Memorandum for Mr. Leffingwell: The Russian situation must be dealt w’ith as a whole. The payment of interest on Russian securities held by private persons in the United States is only one element of the Russian financial situation which has produced one of the most difficult problems arising- out of the war, and one in which the results obtained by the work of the State Department and the Treasury Department are a source of much satisfaction to those departments. Before the entry of the United States into the war the Russian Government had made large purchases in this country. These were financed in part by the British Government, which through J. P. Morgan & Co., who were then acting as the purchasing agents for the British Government, made a certain number of contracts for the Russian Government. In addition to their British credits, the Russian Government also obtained credits amounting to .$86,000,000 from bankers in the United States. A table of these private banking credits follow s: Details of Russian loans. ! Title. 1 Term. Rate. Amount. Russian Treasury i Years. Pet. notes 1................. 1 5 2 $11,000,000 Russian credit4__ 3 G§ 5 50,000,000 Russian Treasury notes................... 5 5* a 25,000,000 When made. April, June Dec. 1916 1916 1,1916 When payable. April, June, Dec. 1917 1919 Interest payable. Collateral and secured. Rubles. Nov. l,Mayl 3145.000.000 7150.000.000 (6) 1,1921 1 Renewed to May, 1918; again May, 1919. When this matured in May, 191S. holders urged to extend to May, 1919, upon an irrevocable allocation of funds being made to meet interest maturing during year. Interest rate seems to have changed at May 1, 1918. to 6 per cent. 2 With National City Bank of New York. 1Russian internal bonds. ‘‘The rate of per cent paid to syndicate by Russian ministry of finance on rubles and a commission of 1 per cent payable every 3 months. These charges, calculated in rubles, to be paid in dollars, at thf rate of 1 ruble, or 33£ cents. 5 With syndicate of American bankers, headed by National City Bank of New York. 1Every 6 months. ^Credit at State Bank. Petrograd. FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 93 When the United States entered the war and began raising great loans from its own people, it ceased to be proper to allow the foreign Governments to come into the money market in competition with the Liberty loans. The United States undertook to finance the requirements of the foreign Governments in the United States. A part of these requirements in the case of the Russian Government, as in the case of the British Government and the French Government, which had raised loans from private bankers, was the interest on such loans from private sources. When the United States undertook to finance the requirements of the Allies, the first step was to obtain from the various countries estimates of the financial help which they would need. In accordance with the statute authoriz ing the making of loans to foreign Governments, the Secretary of the Treasury from time to time established credits in favor of the respective governments. This establishment of credits did not thereupon give the respective governments a right to draw against the United States for the amount of the credit, but was in the nature of an apportionment to any government of a share in the funds which the Treasury was from time to time in a position to advance. The establishment o f the credit usually stated that the credit was to be availed of against the obligations of the Government from time to time in sucli amounts and for such purposes as should be agreed upon with the Treasury. In order to keep the various governments from bidding up prices against each other, and against the United States, each Government was required to enter into a separate contract with the Secretary of the Treasury whereby three commis sioners were appointed in connection with their purchases. The commissioners appointed in the contract made by the different countries were all the same and constituted the so-called allied purchasing commission, to which all the Governments proposing to make purchases in the United States were required to submit the contracts which they proposed to make. The first credit in favor of the Russian Government was for $100,000,000 on May 16, 1917. The first advance of cash against this credit, however, was not made until July 6, when $35,000,000 wTas advanced. At the date of this advance the Russian Govern ment still had with the National City Bank deposits of between $21,000,000 and $22,000,000, being the proceeds either of British credits or of the abovementioned loans made from private bankers. Later in July, Mr B. Bakmeteff, the ambassador representing the so-called Provisional Government of Russia, or Kerensky government, submitted a general summary statement of the require ments of his Government in the United States, showing the necessity for $733,900,000. In this summary statement were contained items of interest up to the 1st of January, 1918, on the above-mentioned indebtedness of the Imperial Gov ernment to private banking interests in the United States. This was in accord ance with the declaration made by the Kerensky Government of its assumption of the debts of the Imperial Government. The Provisional Government, as rep resented by Mr. Bakmeteff, proceeded to make contracts with the approval of the purchasing commission and the War Industries Board for the purchase of supplies in the United States, and the Treasury continued to establish credits and to make advances in accordance with the statement presented to you by Mr. Polk. As of the 1st of November, 1917, the total established credits were $450,000,000 and cash advances had been made to the extent of $186,400,000. On November 7 the Kerensky government was overthrown. On the 15th the first payment of interest on obligations held by the United States was due and the Treasury advanced against an obligation signed by Mr. Bakmeteff the sum of $1,329,750, which were at once repaid to the Treasury as interest on advances which had been made by it to Russia. This brought the total of the cash advances made by the Treasury of the United States to $187,729,750. No further cash advances have been made to the Russian Government by the United States and the excess of credits established in favor of Russia above the amount of these advances has been withdrawn. It is to be remembered that at the time of the overthrow of the Kerensky Government it was not in this country considered certain that the bolsheviks were in fact successful and, if so, that they would be able to maintain their power, as the news at that time was far from clear. By the 1st of December, however, the success of the bolsheviks appeared to be certain. Thereupon there was presented the extraordinarily difficult question of dealing with the Russian financial situation in the United States. x\s of the 1st o f December, the unpaid balances on contracts made by the Russian Government 94 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. with our people was something over $102,000,000. The contracts were in all stages of performance. The funds on hand of the Russian Government in the United States amounted to about $56,000,000. These funds consisted of cash, and it is impossible to say how far they consisted of the $21,000,000 which the Russians had before the United States began making advances to it, and how far they consisted of the proceeds of advances by our Treasury. Two important considerations were involved in liquidating the Russian situa tion : The first was, in so far as possible, to prevent actual losses to American contractors; the second was to save for Russia as much as possible of the sup plies which had been contracted for. The great danger was that, if the Russian financial situation in the United States was to he treated as a case of insolvency on a large scale, there would be a so-called race of diligence by the contractors who had contracts, and by the banking interests who had advanced money, to grab everything in sight for the purpose of securing their claims. This would undoubtedly have resulted in very great losses, particularly to the contractors, and nothing would have been saved for Russia. To prevent this situation, the State Department and the Treasury cooperated to direct a liquidation which would prevent such a calamity. At the end of December. 1917, as a result of the payment, cancellation, or reduction of contracts, the unpaid balance of con tracts, which a month before, amounted to over $100,000,000, was less than $50,000,000. On the 1st of May, 1919 the estimated position of the Russian Government, allowing for amounts expected to be received and payments expected to be made, showed a balance of $800,000, aside from the liquidation of the socalled Remington contract, which is now in arbitration and which may result in a debit of about $3,000,000. This situation does not take into account prop erty of the cost of probably between $25,000,000 and $50,000,000, which has been conserved for the Russian Governmnet, and most of which has been shipped to Russia during recent months. In order to protect the material which was being conserved for the Russian Government, it was quite as necessary to prevent the occurrence of a default on obligations due to bankers in this country, as it was to liquidate the claims of the contractors. For this reason it was necessary that an extension be arranged of the $11,000,000 of notes, the principal of which fell due in April, 1917, and to pay the interest which became due from time to time on the bonds held by private interests in this country. Accordingly, the United States Government did not object to the payment out of the funds at the disposal of the Russian Government of interest upon the external obligations of the Russian Government held by private interests as it became due. Part of the funds at the disposal of the Russian Government consisted of the proceeds of rails and other merchandise which had been sold at advantageous prices as a part of the liquidation. These funds, together with the proceeds of the chartering of certain ships be longing to the Rilssian Government, amounted to in the neighborhood of $13,000,000. The rails owned by the Russian Government in this country had been bought in part out of United States credits and in part out o f other re sources of the Russian Government, in the proportion roughly of 40 per cent out of United States credits and 60 per cent out of other resources. The total expenditures reported by the Russian Government to have been made since December 1, 1917, amount to about $66,000,000, or about $10,000,000 more than the cash on hand December 1, 1917. Considering this fact and consid ering that some part of the cash on hand December 1, 1917, may properly be attributed to the balance of $21,000,000 on hand before any United States advances were made, it can be argued with considerable plausibility that the interest, amounting to about $9,000,000, paid by the Russian Government to the private holders of bonds in this country was not paid out of United States advances or the proceeds thereof. On the other hand, it is clear that even assuming such interest to have been paid out of American advances for the purpose of keeping the Russian financial situation in this country together, with the result that our contractors have lost nothing and a large salvage has been obtained for the Russian Government and large payments of freight have been made in sending much of this salvaged material to Russia, where it is so greatly needed, such payments have been a small price for an aston ishingly great and creditable result. FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAME, 95 SECTION 48-A. BakhmetefTs Resume of Russian Loans. M a rch 12, 1920. M r. W ad e H . E l l i s , Southern Building, Washington, D. C. Si r : In response to your request on behalf of the subcommittee of the Com mittee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, which is investigating Russian propaganda in this country, I furnish you herewith a copy of a letter addressed to me under date of March 4, 1920, by the Russian Ambassador at Washington, together with a copy of its inclosure, relating to the liquidation of the financial business of the Russian Government in this country. I am, sir, Your obedient servant, F r a n k L. P o l k , Acting Secretary of State. (Inclosure: Letter from Russian Ambassador; copy of inclosure.) A ide M e m o ir e s , I. PERIOD PREVIOUS TO THE BOLSHEVIKI REVOLUTION. 1. In accordance with the acts of April 24 and September 24, 1917, credits were established at different periods by the United States Treasury in favor of the provisional government of Russia, the amount of such credits totaling $450,000,000. A special appropriation was decided upon besides for the pur chase of additional railway material, but this allocation, on account of events, did not become effective. Advances amounting in the aggregate to $191,400,000 were made against these credits during a period beginning July 6, 1917, and ending November 1, 1917. A further advance of $1,329,750 was effected on November 21, 1917, for the specific purpose of paying interest due to the United States Government on moneys theretofore advanced. The $1,329,750 was immediately paid back to the United States Treasury. The total advances of $192,729,750 included $5,000,000 allocated for a spe cial operation with Rumania. As this transaction did not materialize, the $5,000,000 was returned December 3 to the United States Treasury. Deducting such $5,000,000 from the total leaves $.187,729,750 as the actual advances made by the United States to the provisional government of Russia. 2. For such advances the United States received obligations of the provi sional government of Russia. The funds were advanced at a time when the provisional government was functioning as the legally recognized Government of Russia. The embassy was acting as an agency of such Government and the authorities in Petrograd were entirely responsible for the disposition of funds during this period. 3. Besides money received from the United States the Russian Government possessed in this country certain funds remaining from proceeds o f previous financial transactions. The balance of such funds on July 6, 1917, the date of receipt of the first advance from the United States Treasury, represented $22,643,891.75. About $6,500,000, derived from different sources other than United States loans, was further credited to the accounts of the Russian Gov ernment within the period between July 6 and December 1, 1917, and wras used in common with moneys received from the United States Treasury. II. PERIOD AFTER THE BOLSHEVIKI REVOLUTION. 1. On November 8, 1917, the provisional government of Russia fell and the power in Petrograd was seized by the bolsheviki. As a result the United States Government suspended further advances of cash and the balance of credits, established in favor of the Russian Government, became ineffective. The embassy was faced thus with a situation where it was compelled to handle rather extensive liabilities incurred by the Russian Government in the United States, relying solely on funds on hand on different governmental accounts. 96 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. It was, however, the firm decision of the embassy to use its best endeavor to meet as fully and for as long as possible the obligations of the Russian Gov ernment in this country. Such course was considered an act of justice toward the American contractors and bondholders who in best faith had entered into transactions with Russia. It was believed, moreover, that it would well serve the future relations of Russia with this country if forced disruption of business relations could be avoided and Russia’s liabilities liquidated by amiable compromise and settlement. It was generally felt besides that the period of no legal government in Rus sia would be of shorter duration, and was judged desirable, therefore, to con tinue more or less a normal course of relations so that, with a legal government restored, business activities could be resumed without interruption. 2. The funds at hand being inadequate to meet the liabilities as they stood, it was imperative to proceed at once with a systematic revision of all con tracts for the purpose of arriving, by agreement, at proper cancellations or reductions. The policy of the embassy, however, was to effectuate such reduc tions only as far as was required .by financial exigencies. The aim of the embassy was to conserve as much as possible the supplies, those on hand as well as those due on incompleted contracts, with the view to shipping them as soon as practicable to Russia. 3. After consultation with the United States Government and the banking institutions it was decided to amalgamate the different funds available on Russian governmental accounts, irrespective of their previous destination, into a special segregated set of accounts with the National City Bank of New York. The funds credited to these “ liquidation accounts ” were to be con sidered as placed in trust for the following purposes: Payments on contracts, as well as expenses for transportation, insurance, and inspection; payment of obligations arising from loans; upkeep of Russian institutions in the United States, and other administration exuenses. Although no formal agreement was entered between the United States Gov ernment and the ambassador, still there was an understanding with the De partment of State and the Treasury, as a result of which the distribution of the funds was effected with the knowledge and subject to the control of the Treasury. A list of proposed payments was presented to the Treasury from week to week and only disbursements to which it took no exception were made. In addition, a monthly statement was presented to the Treasury in the regular established form. 4. Such procedure was decided upon in the latter part of November, 1917, and the “ liquidation accounts ” were thereupon established with a balance of $47,010,203.94. Due to previous segregations or particular conditions, it was necessary to leave $9,166,517.9S on accounts “ set aside for specific purposes.” It was understood, however, that in so far as these specific liabilities might later be reduced, moneys set free would be used for general liquidation require ments. In fact, the account set aside for specific purposes were subsequently reduced to $6,047,272.87 and the balance of $3,119,245.11 added to the liquida tion fund. Such balance of $47,010,203.94 and $9,166,517.98 included the total of funds, derived from Russian governmental accounts, which came under the control of the ambassador. The aggregate of $56,176,721.92 ($47,010,203.94 and $9,166,517.98) was subse quently increased by funds derived from the disposition of certain supplies, receipts from charter of Russian steamers, proceeds of certain adjustments, etc. From such miscellaneous sources the ambassador secured $22,507,626.01, which added to the initial $56,176,721.92 made the sum of $78,684,347.93, this being the grand total of funds under control of the ambassador from December 1, 1917, until January 1, 1920. It is apparent that a considerable portion of this fund was not derived from United States Treasury loans. In fact the major part of funds added after December 1, 1917, had no connection whatever with United States Government advances. Within the total of $78,648,347.93 at least $26 400.000 can distinctly be traced as not being United States Treasury money. The definite figure of non-American moneys in the balance of $52,284,347.93 can not be established with precision, at; most accounts in the past were credited with both American and non-American funds. FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 97 III. RESULTS OF LIQUIDATION. 1. The most important and intricate part of the liquidation procedures referred to contracts for different kinds of supplies, the amount of liabilities on which, in the end of November, 1917, was about $103,000,000. The reduction and cancellation procedure was accomplished in closest collaboration with the United States Government, which was especially concerned about the success ful performance of the undertaking. The general line established was that while strictly military contracts were canceled in the greatest possible measure, arrangements affecting supplies for civil purposes, were reduced only in measure, as was imperatively necessitated by the shortage of funds. In most cases the revision of Russian contracts served as a basis for a diversion of production for supplies needed by the United States or by the other Governments at war with Germany. The position of business on January 1, 1920, leaves no outstanding liabilities whatever with reference to contracts placed in the United States by the Rus sian Supply Committee prior to the Bolsheviki revolution. The liquidation of Russia's obligations in this line has been completed without any defaults in payments and has been consummated entirely to mutual satisfaction on lines of amiable agreement. 2. As to the financial liabilities arising from loans previously made by the Russian Government through private financial concerns, the embassy, being in no position to meet the maturing principal, has continued, as long as possi ble, current payment of interest. As a matter of fact interest was paid in full approximately for 18 months, that is, until June, 1919, when the exhaus tion of funds compelled the discontinuance of the established practice. The circumstances accompanying such suspension were explained, together with the assurance of payment of defaults by the future recognized legal Russian Gov ernment, in communications addressed to the banks and made public through their respective circulars together with a statement issued by the Acting Sec retary of State. 3. Shipments of supplies to Russia were resumed in the latter part of 1918 and continued in 1919. On January 1, 1920, practically the whole of the stocks, of which the greater part consisted of railway material, shoes, leather, and agricultural implements, had been shipped to Siberia, to the south and into the northern regions of Russia. As to the disposition of materials by sale, the purpose of the embassy has been to conserve all possible supplies. In fact, no leather, shoes, agricultural implements or material needed by the civil population were sold. The major part of the sales consisted of rails, required by the United States and other cobelligerent Governments for military purposes. The sale, under such cir cumstances was a transfer of supplies to an allied army. This fact was in conformity with the general policy of the embassy, which together with loyal Russia, not having recognized the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, considered itself at war with the Central Powers and endeavored to be of any possible assistance to the common cause. The only sale of any importance outside of rails was a stock of barbed wire, needed at the Italian front at a most critical moment. 4. The total disbursements from December 1, 1917, to January 1, 1920, amount to $77,302,935.99, leaving a balance of $1,381,411.94. Of this figure $461,313.44 is the remainder of the “ liquidation accounts,” while $920,098.50 is the balance of the accounts “ set aside for specific purposes.” This balance represents a special reserve, secured to guarantee the claim of such Russians who in time had arranged for transfer of their savings through the Russian consulates to their relative in Russia. The reserve is maintained in order to refund transfers which could not be delivered due to disturbed conditions on the other side and exactly corresponds to the remaining total of unrefunded transfers. This is emphasized because of misrepresentations which have ap peared as to the use of funds entrusted to the consulates. 5. In the total amount expended at least one-third is money derived from sources other than American credits. Thus not only all expenses concerning the upkeep of Russian institutions but the total of interest paid to American bondholders is amply covered by funds which the Russian Government pos sessed or which have been received by the embassy independently of the ad vances made by the Department of the Treaury. March 1, 1920. S. Doc. 86,67-2------ 7 98 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAME. SECTION 49. National City Bank Deposit. N o v e m b e r 22, 1917. Mr. S e c r e t a r y : Mr. Gardin, a vice president of tlie National City Bank, informs me that his bank has on deposit between $60,000,000 and $70,000,000 in various accounts for the Russian Government, and inquires whether, in view of the existing situation in Russia, he should continue to honor drafts upon these accounts drawn by those representatives of the Provisional Russian Government who wrere accredited to him by it before the recent disturbances. These amounts on deposit doubtless represent sums advanced by the United States before the recent disturbances in Russia and for which the United States holds the certificates of indebtedness of the Provisional Russian Government. Mr. Gardin’s question seems to me to be one which can only be answered prop erly by you. As checks for large amounts may be presented any day, it seems to me to be a matter of first importance that the views of the State Department should be indicated promptly—to-day if possible. Mr. Gardin came here in person and is hoping to take back with him instructions upon the point. What he would like to know is whether he should honor checks drawn in the manner indicated, and may continue to do so until otherwise notified by you. Cordially, yours, D ear W m . G. M c A doo , Secretary. The honorable the S e c r e t a r y or S t a t e . SECTION 50. Treasury Department Memo on Russian Loan. T r e a s u r y D e p a rtm e n t, Washington, November 26, 1911. The Russian Government has received in cash up to date $192,729,750. From the information so far obtainable, it would appear that approximately $48,400,000 represents payments on account of old contracts for purchases in this country, and approximately $25,000,000 payments from cash received on ac count of new contract* (for which allocations were made) ; $1,829,750 represents interest payments, and $50,000,000 was account of Finland, which leaves a bal ance of approximately $68,000,000, which was practically a free credit turned over to the Minister of Finance. This $68,000,000 plus the $50,000,000 for Fin land, makes a total of $118,000,000, which did not represent purchases in this country and no definite information has been given as to how this was employed. N. H. D. SECTION 51. Bolshevik Government Cancels All Loans. S to c k h o lm , December 7, 1917. 1137, 7th. S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , Washington D. C.: Stockholm’s Dagblad to-day publishes following from Petrograd, via Svenska Telegram Bureau: The Maximalist, Laurie, has published article in Pravda, stating that it will be necessary to annul all war loans taken up or guaranteed by Russian Government. Pravda is chief organ of Bolsheviks, and Laurie lived here in Stockholm until outbreak of revolution, known as student o f economic questions. M o r r is . FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 99 SECTION 52. Resume of Russian Financial Loan— Situation by Basil Miles, of State De partment, Showing Need of Money for Relief, Propaganda, and $2,500,000 for Officers’ Salaries. D e c e m b e r 10, 1917. Memorandum for the Secretary. Referring to the attached long memorandum, handed me by M iles: It seemed to me that we should adhere to our program, namely, to insist upon slowing down on all Russian contracts for rifles, munitions, etc., and to oversee the expenditure of the money now on hand with a view to the protection of Ameri can manufacturers, who have made contracts with the Russians. However, I think that the present situation calls for large expenditures and organization for propaganda, and for relief, and that food and military supplies should be sent forward to Russia, that so far as the money is on hand, here available, for the purpose it should be used and that so far as it is wanting the President’s discretionary fund should be used. I question very much the advisability of sending forward railroad equipment until there is some definite assurance that it can be effectively used for Russian relief and not for German military pur poses. It is also important that the United States should decide promptly whether it will give aid to Kalendin and the southern Russians. It seems to me that this matter is one of the most vital matters in the war at the present moment. I hope very much that you and Secretary Lansing will be able to have a con ference concerning it, if possible, with the President. R. C. L e f f i n g w e l l . The S e c r e t a r y o f t h e T r e a s u r y . RUSSIA. D e c e m b e r 11, 1917. Credits have been established in favor of Russia to the amount of $450,000,000, including one of $125,000,000* established immediately before the collapse of Russia and to which were attached conditions making its availability, to say the least, extremely doubtful. Excluding that credit, the amount of credits was $325,000,000 and the amount o f actual advances to Russia is $187,729,750. The establishment of a credit meant that the United States had set aside out of the total authorized by Congress to be loaned to foreign Governments a specific amount which would be loaned to Russia upon receipt of her bonds or cer tificates of indebtedness. In certain instances American manufacturers made inquiry and were informed of the establishment of these credits and that the Russian ambassador had requested that a specific amount be set aside against their contracts to be paid out to the duly accredited representative o f the Rus sian Government with the understanding that such sum would be used by him only in payment of the liability of the Russian Government under the contracts. This arrangement was, of course, ineffective to protect the American manufac turer in case there were no Russian Government or no accredited representative of the Russian Government, or if the Russian Government and its accredited representative failed to avail themselves o f the credit for the purpose indicated, or, perhaps, if Russia ceased to be in the war. This was understood by those American manufacturers who gave the matter any consideration, and it is safe to guess that they all realized that the United States was prepared to lend money to the then existing Russian Government and was not guaranteeing the con fined existence o f the Russian Government or its continuance in the war. Some of the contracts were approved by the Purchases Commission, consisting of Messrs. Baruch, Lovett, and Brookings. The arrangement under which the Purchases Commission was formed provides as follow s: “ Nothing herein contained, expressed or implied, nor anything done or omitted by the commission, shall impose any obligation or liability upon the United States whether to advance moneys, to establish credits, or otherwise.” When the Russian affairs became acute the National City Bank had $60,000,000 or $70,000,000 on deposit in various accounts subject to the order o f various representatives of the Russian Government, and they asked the Secretary of the 100 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. Treasury whether the City Bank was protected in paying upon their checks. The Secretary of the Treasury consulted the Secretary of State and, at the suggestion of the Secretary of State, Mr. Polk and Mr. Leffingwell saw the Rus sian ambassador who agreed to take the initiative in limiting the liabilities of the Russian Government under exstng contracts as far as that could be done in cooperation with the Purchases Commission, and to render so much as possible of the funds on deposit with the City Bank available for the inevitable payments to American manufacturers. The Bolsheviki Government has disavowed the ambassador and the other representatives here and the City Bank has received cable instructions from Petrograd not to honor their orders. 1. In the existing situation of Russian affairs it is submitted that to allow the situation to drift and to encourage the City Bank to permit Ughet with Bakhmeteff’s acquiescence to dissipate the great fund which is in the City Bank involves more risk than to deal firmly with the situation. 2. That the City Bank should be told to permit such payments only as are approved by the representatives of the Purchases Commission, consisting of Messrs. Baruch, Lovett, and Brookings. 3. That American manufacturers should be told by the Purchases Commission to adjust their contracts on the basis of terminating work at once with a mini mum of loss, and that they should be paid out of the funds in the City Bank. 4. That ay\ exception should be made in the case of such materials and sup plies as are needed for relief, and that no further work should be done under contracts for arms or munitions, and that contracts for railroad equipment should be stopped or work on them postponed until some definite assurance can be given that the equipment can be effectively used by skilled crews adequately protected. Generally speaking, it is believed that the United States should, through the Red Cross, and perhaps with the aid of the President’s discretionary fund, en gage immediately actively, but unofficially, with works of relief and propaganda in Russia; that it should not sanction the dissipation of the fund in the City Bank by the Russian supply committee for purposes which may well be regarded as inimical by the Russian people, but should sanction the use of that fund in so far as it may be necessary to cover contracts entered into before the latest revolution with the American manufacturers. With respect to the specific question of silver, it is a grave responsibility to direct the City Bank to pay $500,000 for silver to be sent through the British to Kaledin. That involves a question of State. The situation has drifted for two weeks during which the ambassador has gone through the motions of trying to do what was indicated to him by Mr. Polk and Mr. Leffingwell and has done precisely the opposite. His whole policy is to carry on as though nothing had happened and hope that before the funds are exhausted the situation will have been reversed and his party be in power. Although the City Bank have said from time to time that there were $60,000,000 or $70,000,000 in the City Bank, the Russian ambassador now states that there in only $52,000,000, of which upward of $9,000,000 is in special accounts and can not be touched. $20,000,000 he proposes to set aside for American contracts. $6,000,000 he proposes to use for payment of interest on the old Russian debt to and including July 1 next, etc., and $10,000,000 for certain special contracts, etc., of which $3,000,000 is for transportation, and $2,500,000 for the office expenses and salaries of the supply committee up to next July. 101 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. SECTION 52-A. Table Showing Russian Loan Expenditures to December 12, 1917. Distribution of cash advances to Russia to December 12, 1917. Purchases in United States. Total. Date of payment. 1917. July 6..................................... July 13................................... Aug. 1 ................................... Aug. 22................................. Aug. 24................................. Aug. 30................................. Sept. 25................................. Oct. 2 ................................... Oct. 11................................... Do................................... Nov. 1................................... Nov. 20.......... ...................... $35,000,000 10,000,000 2.500.000 2.500.000 37; 500,000 10,000,000 15.000.000 22,200,000 5,000,000 15.000.000 31,700,000 1,329,750 Total........................... 187,729,750 Not ap Approved proved by by Pur Purchases chases Com Commis mission. sion. Finland payments. Silver. Total. $26,300,000 $26,300,000 $8,000,000 7,900.000 15,900.000 3,900,000 3,300,000 7,200,000 13,600,000 1.000,000 14,600,000 25,500,000 38,500,000 64,000,000 $2,500,000 2,500,000 $10,000,000 i | 10.000,000 I 15,000,000 5,000,000 i ...................................... 10,000,000 50,000,000 15,000,000 Other purposes. Date of payment. Current expenses of Russian Credit Trans sian Min operations. portation. istry of Finance. Expenses of Rus Interest on Swedish sian mis United payments. sion in States United loans. States. Total. i 1917. | ■Tlllv fi____________ :___ .. Aug. 24................... $15,000,000 Oct. 2...................... 15.000.000 Nov. 1 .................... 15.000.000 Nov. 2 0 ................... Total.............. 45,000,000 $7,000,000 $1,500,000 1. (500.000 %h. 000.000 • 800,000 7,800,000 1,300,000 1 $1,329,750 $8,700,000 21,600,000 15,000,000 17,100,000 1,329,750 1,329,750 63,729,750 $200,000 ! ........................... __________________ ! ________________i ___________________ i 4,400,000 ; 5,000,000 200,000 Note.— The sum of $5,000,000 was advanced on October 24 on account of Rumania, but was refunded December 7. D e c e m b e r 12, 1917. Mr. H. U g h e t , Russian Financial Attach6, Flatiron Building, New York City. D e a r S i r : We beg to refer to a copy of a letter which you have left with us dated November 28, 1917, addressed to The National City Bank of New York by His Excellency the Ambassador of the Provisional Government of Russia, in respect to the disposition of all moneys now standing at his disposal and all money which he may hereafter deposit. There are no moneys deposited with this company standing at the disposal of His Excellency. Of course, any money which His Excellency may hereafter de posit with us will be subject to his instructions or those of his duly constituted successor. We have, however, an account in which there is a balance of $4,976,722.78 standing to the credit of the Ministry of Finance, Section Etrangere. This was opened in July, 1916, and moneys in this account may be paid out only upon the signature of two of certain designated officials of the Ministry of Finance. 102 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. It has been customary for us to honor cable instructions directing payments out of this account, which cable instructions have in each case been confirmed by proper written orders. Under present conditions we do not see how we can honor such cable instructions, nor do we see how we could honor written orders signed by the persons previously designated to draw 011 this account without the as surance of our Government that such persons still have authority to act. Nor have we any authority for the transfer of these funds. We must, therefore, for the present continue to hold these funds to the credit of such account. Very truly, yours, President. SECTION 52-B. Czar Nicholas’s Holdings of Millions in American Companies—Bakhmeteff, the Czar’s Financial Agent. Cable message from American Ambassador at Petrograd to the Secretary of State. No. 2105, December 15, 6 p. m. In answer to inquiry concerning money of people under Czar, the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda states to-day that investments in the United States are held by Nicholas as follow s: In Pennsylvania Railroad, $50,000,000; in New York Metropolitan, $16,000,000; in New York Central, $5,000,000; and in Baltimore & Ohio, $5,000,000. The Pravda adds that Mr. BaJchmetcff, Russian Ambassador in Washington and professor of Petrograd Polytechnic Institute, teas Nicholas's financial agent. I f the department approves, this is also for the information of the Russian Am bassador. SECTION 53. Russian Contract Situation December IT, 1917. T r e a s u r y D e p a rtm e n t, Washington, December 11, 1911. D e a r M r. P o l k : I beg to acknowledge the receipt of the communication of December 7 from the Department of State, inclosing a paraphrase of a tele gram from the American ambassador at Petrograd, dated December 1, 1917, making certain inquiries as to the status of credits for purchases of the Rus sian Government. All of the final details of Russian expenditures on contracts from November 1 to date have not been received, and the Purchases Commission has not as yet been able to furnish us with definite information as to the value of clearances and the amount of orders now ready to be shipped. I beg to submit, however, the approximate estimates obtained on the above items and the other information requested by the ambassador at Petrograd for your guidance in replying to the cable received from him : Total credits established in favor of Russia, $450,000,000, of which $75,000,000 was for the account of Finland. Total cash advanced, $187,729,750, of which approximately $74,000,000 was for payment on account of purchases here, $50,000,000 for account of Finland, and $63,729,750 for other purposes, leaving an unconsumed credit o f $252,270,250. According to latest reports received, the balance due by Russian Government on uncompleted contracts on November 1 was $108,295,590 payable from United States credits, and $22,431,900 payable from other credits. As nearly as we can ascertain the approximate value of clearances amounts to $12,000,000, and purchases ready for shipment, $25,000,000. This does not include clearances and stock on hand on old contracts made under British or other credits. Very truly, yours, Hon. F r a n k L. P o l k , Counselor for the State Department. FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 103 SECTION 54. Ambassador Francis Says "Russia Is No Longer in the War.” [Paraphrase o f a telegram from the American ambassador at Petrograd, dated Dec. 17, received Dec. 20, 1917.] 2113, December 17, 11 p. m. The conclusion of the armistice is for a period of 28 days. This may be terminated on a notice of seven days, but in the event that no such notice shall be given, the extension of the armistice is automatic. According to what I have heard it is Trotsky’s opinion that a success has been achieved, but another success of the same character is worse for him than defeat. In my opinion its significance is that Russia is no longer in the war. On Saturday Trotsky made a speech in which he threatened the use of the guillotine, and it was said by Lenine that the government of the soviet was above the government of the con stituent assembly, and he argued in favor of the justice of the treatment of the cadets. I received a visit from two Poles who alleged that they wTould be able to raise an army of Poles to fight Germany amounting to 800,000 men, and that in the Austrian Army—400,000 men of Polish nationality— would fight against the Central Empire. So many of these rumors appear to have no foundation, but I will make an investigation and report. I do not regard the statement as of much importance. The report goes that it is being arranged that the commissioners of Germany shall come to Petrograd with a view to peace ne gotiations, and that German soldiers should protect them in Petrograd. Within the vicinity of the embassy there have been fewer depredations, but in other sections they continue, and the nerves of the people are so badly shaken that they would be glad to have a monarchy, or even German rule, if there could be thereby restoration of order. This afternoon there was a meeting of the diplomatic corps for consideration of the note respecting couriers. (Reference is made to my No. 2107.) There was an adjournment of the meeting until the 20th, after provision had been made for the appointment of the committee o f one employee of the neutrals and two of the allied powers who should receive instructions to make an unoffi cial visit to the Smolny Institute, and advise them of the impossibility of the plan proposed, and to furnish them with a suggestion as to another. The em ployees selected were the Danish, French, and British, as it is stated that those Governments require the employment of couriers. Provided there is no prohibition of telegrams I will not need a courier for a month. My colleagues express fear that this prohibition of telegraphing will be enforced. The propo sition to accept the plan of Trotsky with the condition attached that no propa ganda work should be done by couriers was opposed by me, and I put the ques tion to the meeting: “ Is there a diplomatic mission o f the soviet government in any capital?” A statement was made in reply by the Dutch minister, “ In Sweden,” but the minister of that power was not present at the meeting. I learned that the French and British embassies have been asked to vis§ the passports of the soviet couriers, but that they refused to do so, stating that there has been no recognition of the soviet government. I have received no application to vise the passport of a courier to the United States. SECTION 54-A. Russian Bank Accounts. D e c e m b e r 26, 1917. : The sums which the Russian Ambassador regards as avail able for payments upon American contracts are insufficient to cover those con tracts. You are familiar with the difficulty of handling the situation other wise than through funds already at the disposal of the Russian representatives. There is a fund of $9,000,000 or thereabouts which is in the City Bank and which the ambassador regards as not available because not subject generally to his instructions. There is a fund of $4,000,000 or thereabouts in the hands of the Guaranty Trust Co. as appears from their letter to you of which you sent me a copy with your letter of December 15. A fund amounting to £3,000,000 in all was transferred in amounts of £1,000,000 each on October 9, October D e a r M r. P o l k 104 FOREIGN LO ANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 31, and November 12 for account of the Russian Government to the London City and Midland Bank. Limited, in London, as appears by Mr. Gardin’s letter of November 23, of which a copy is inclosed herewith. The question whether and to what extent and in what manner these sums could be made available for payment to American manufacturers is one upon which the State Department can, T think, be of very great assistance, and, if you should be willing to take these matters up with the ambassador, I should be glad if you would have him come to see you and let me be present with a view to discussing these things. Very truly, yours, R . C. L e f f in g w e l l . Hon. F r a n k L. P o l k , Counselor for the Department of State, Washington. P. S.—I learn just now that Prof. Lomonosoff has funds which are subject to his own disposition, wThich make him apparently more or less independent of the ambassador. It would be interesting to find out what is the amount of these funds and what are the conditions with respect to them. D iv i s i o n of O p e r a t io n s , U n it e d S t a t e s S h i p p i n g B oard E m e r g e n c y F le e t C o r p o r a t io n , Washington, January 4, 1918. Mr. N o r m a n H. D a v is , Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. Washington, D. C. D e a r S i r : I beg to acknowledge the receipt of two statements of Russian materials, which you were kind enough to return to me by your letter of January 2. Very truly, yours, Additional payments to be made by the Provisional Government of Russia from funds in the National City Bank. Secretarial department: P. A. Morosoff, traveling expense___________________________ Various employees, financial department—Extra compensationP. A. Morosoff, office expense______________________________ Mur man Railw ay: Jacob Dreyfus & Sons, clothing_____________________________ New England Steamship Co., freight_______________________ Naval department: Melchoir, Armstrong & Dessau, spare parts_________________ Melchoir, Armstrong & Dessau, motors____________________ C. D. Durkee & Co., ships’ telegraphs______________________ P. Hansen, cartage________________________________________ Commissariat department: United States Horse Shoe Co., horse shoes________________________________________________________ Russian financial attach^: French technical bureau___________________________________ American Bank Note Co____________________________________ C. J. Medzikhovsky_________________________________________ V. P. Ananieff_______________________________________________ Eng. Goodkoff_______________________________________________ Machinery department: Barber Colman Co., machinery______________________________ National City Bank, account General Electric Co., machinery. B. F. Sturtevant Co., freight_______________________________ Central war industrial committee: McElwain, Morse & Rogers, shoes___________________________ Endicott, Johnson & Co., shoes--------------------------------------------- $260. 72 883.16 2, 000. 00 6, 328. 38 6. 78 354. 00 28, 880. 00 887. 50 9. 27 18, 841. 55 67, 300.00 59.000. 00 806. 33 168. 80 350. 00 137.17 3, 677. 00 228. 62 65, 302. 80 112,346. 20 FOREIGN LOANS AN D A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 105 Transportation department: Emergency Fleet Corporation (de ferred payment not included in total)________________________ $535,801.35 Railway department: Greenlee Brothers Co., machinery__________ 1,674. 00 All Russian Zemsky Union, account Pekosnarm: Sutten-Vaughn Equipment Co., saws_________________________________________ 3, 780. 00 Additional items: National City Bank, interest on 6£ per cent credit operations, due Jan. 10_____________________________________________ 1, 625,000. 00 One-fourth per cent commission to National City Bank_______ 125, 000. 00 K. Falion, representative of the ministry of supplies_________ 10, 000. 00 Peoria Cordage Co., for 500 tons binder twTine_______________ 212,914.00 International Harvester Co., freight________________________ 233, 719. 86 Bishop Alexander (clergy, etc., in America)________________ 24,000.00 Total____________________________________________________ 2,590,856.14 SECTION 55. McAdoo’s Letter Stating That United States Should Recognize No Govern ment in Russia Which Did Not Validate All Russian Loans— Lansing’s Reply. J a n u a r y 17, 1918. Hon. R o b e r t L a n s i n g , Secretary of State. D e a r M r. S e c r e t a r y : I need not, of course, remind you o f the difficulties which have arisen in connection with the Russian revolution nor of the steps which have been taken to meet them. As to these, you have been, directly and through the Counselor of the Department of State, kept fully informed. Credits have been established to the amount of $325,000,000 against which advances, evidenced by demand obligations signed by Mr. Bakhmeteff as ambassador of the Provisional Russian Government, have been made to the aggregate amount of $187,729,750. A further credit of $125,000,000 was established on November 1, 1917, but to it were attached conditions which, in view of the existing situa tion, are regarded as making it unavailable and concerning which credit, there fore, no public announcement has been made in this country. Heavy commitments had been assumed by the Russian representatives here, as to many of which the Treasury Department had been notified and as to some of which the Treasury Department had been in direct communication with the American contractors. In close consultation with the Department of State and the Treasury Department the Russian representatives here have made adjustments in respect to these commitments and payments to these contractors out of funds which were on deposit in the National City Bank subject to their draft before the change in the Russian situation early in November. With reference to all of these matters, I have to suggest that if and whenever there shall be presented to you the question of recognizing any government in Russia other than the Provisional Russian Government, with which we have been dealing since the entrance of the United States into the war, the United States should make a condition of its recognition of any such government the ratification of the indebtedness incurred by the Provisional Russian Government to the United States and of all the terms and conditions thereof, and the ratifi cation of the transactions of the representatives here of the Provisional Russian Government which have been had under the supervision or in consultation with the United States as represented by the Department of State and the Treasury Department. I f and when the question of any such recognition of another gov ernment in Russia should arise, I should be glad if you would consult me in order that I may make more specific suggestions with reference to such ratifi cation as I shall be able to do on account of my familiarity with the details of these loans and transactions. I am, my dear Mr. Secretary, Cordially, yours, Wm. G. M c A d o o , Secretary. 106 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. T h e S e c r e ta r y o f S ta te , Washington, January 17, 1918. Hon. W i l i a m G ib b s M cA d o o , Secretary of the Treasury, Washington. M y D e a r M r. S e c r e t a r y : I acknowledge the receipt of your letter o f even date with reference to credits established by this Government in favor of the provisional Russian Government. I thank you for the information contained in this letter, and I can assure you that before any other government in Russia is recognized, I shall confer with you fully as to the best method of providing for the recognition by such govern ment of the indebtedness incurred by the provisional Russian Government to the United States. I am, my dear Mr. Secretary, Sincerely yours, R obert L a n s i n g . SECTION 56. Bolshevik Decree Canceling All Loans. D e p a rtm e n t o f S ta te , Washington, February 11, 1918. The Secretary o f State presents his compliments to the honorable the Secre tary of the Treasury, and has the honor to give herewith, for his information, a paraphrase of a telegram No. 2348. February 8, 10 p. m., received from the American ambassador at Petrograd, as follows: “ A decree of the council of commissaries has just been approved by the cen tral executive committee of the soviet, and it cancels all state loans and all guarantees undertaken by previous regimes and states ‘ all foreign loans are annulled wholly and without exception.* “ This action, to the extent which this Government has the power, repudiates all foreign loans.” SECTION 57. Resolution of Interallied Financial Council Not to Recognize Russia Till Promise of Loan Payments. L ondon, February 14, 1918. S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , Washington: No. 68. For McAdoo from Crosby. At meeting of finance section o f interally council on Friday, Bonar Law and Klotz both being present, Klotz proposed following resolution, which was adopted: “ The finance section of the interally council on war purchases and finance, referring to the statement put forward by the diplomatic conference of London on February 18. 1831, regarding Belgian affairs: “ It is a principle of commanding nature that treaties do not lose their value, whatever be the changes that intervene in the interior organization of peoples.” Recommends for the consideration of the Governments represented the following statement: “ Whereas the Imperial Russian Government, when it contracted liabilities, undoubtedly represented Russia and definitely obligated i t ; “ Whereas this obligation can not be repudiated by any authority whatever governing, or which should eventually govern, in Russia without shaking the very foundations of the law of nations; “ Whereas there would be in that case no more security in the relations States and it wTould be impossible to enter into a contract over any long period of time on account of the risk of such a contract being eventually ignored; “ Whereas such a policy would mean the destruction o f the credits of States as much from a political as from a financial viewpoint; “ Whereas a State could not borrow money under normal conditions if the lender’s only guaranty was the maintenance of the constitution under which the borrowing government as representing the country puts out a call for credit; FOREIGN LOANS AN D A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. 107 “ Whereas no principle is more clearly settled than the one according to which a nation bears the responsibility o f the acts o f its government and the liabilities incurred are not affected by any change in authority; “ Whereas the obligations o f Russia bind and wTill bind the new State or the group of new States that represent or will represent Russia n ow : “ Therefore, the allied powers will take into consideration the principles above mentioned in every negotiation relating to the recognition of the flew State or new States that are eventually to be constituted in Russia.” In voting for the resolution, chancellor of the exchequer and myself were moved by consideration that, being only a recommendation of the general prin ciple of our respective governments, we were not in any way compromising their action, and at the same time, according to Klotz representations, might, if the governments accept the recommendation, aid him in some of his great difficulties. Due to the vast amount of Russian obligations held in France, my own opinion is that the paragraphs defining the general principle of re sponsibility of succeeding governments for debts of predecessors has been already so often stated that repetition scarcely necessary. Most important part has to do with suggestion that no recognition o f new States, carved out of original Russian territory, should be made without provision for adoption of part o f general debt. P age. SECTION 57-A. Payments on Russian Contracts. F e b r u a r y 21, 1918. While I understand that M r. Davis has kept you advised and has consulted with you from time to time regarding the payments and set tlements which have been made on the Russian contracts, I am sending here with for your records additional data and statements, showing the payments made against the contracts up to February 1, 1918, and the arrangements made in relation to the cancellation and postponement of certain of said contracts. As you will notice from the inclosed statements, the unpaid balances on Russian contracts on December 1,1917, amounted to $102,604,496.62, and on February 1, 1918, to $13,731,410.35. This considerable reduction, made during December and January, in the current balance due was obtained as follow s: Paid in cash__________________________________________________$19,977,649.11 Canceled_____________________________________________________ 24,185, 872. 02 Postponed------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 44, 836,162.14 The amounts “ postponed” are deducted from the original amount due be cause, I understand, there is no definite obligation on the part of Russia to pay the amounts composing this item, except in July and October, next, to receive from the Remington Co. 245,000 rifles at approximately $30.00 apiece. However, there will no doubt be a credit against this from the sale of a certain part of the machinery, etc., belonging to Russia, as contemplated under the settlement agreement between the Remington Co., the War Department, and the Russian Government. As you will notice, however, from this agreement, the Remington Co. does not expect this Government to furnish any further funds for this pur pose. According to the inclosed statement furnished to us, the Russian ambassador had, on January 31, 1918, from the funds which had been set aside by him for payment on account of contracts, a balance in the National City Bank of $11,950,631.54 available for payments under class 1, and $3,983,063.23 for payments under classes 2, 3, and 4, making a total of $15,933,694.77. Class 1 comprises the items payable on purchase contracts, and while it appears that the balance due on contracts as of February 1, 1918, amounts to about $1,781,000 more than the balance of funds set aside for class 1 payments, Mr. Ughet expects to have sufficient funds to make these payments, with the exception of the Reming ton rifle contract, by making further considerable reductions in the contracts and also possibly by transferring additional funds from other accounts for pay ments under class 1. Mr. Ughet thinks there will be sufficient funds from the sale of rails or other materials to meet the payments on Remington rifles if the Russian Government should not otherwise be in a position to do so. Very sincerely, yours, D e a r M r. P o l k : K . C . L e f f in g w e l l . Hon. F r a n k L. P o l k , Counselor for the Department of State* 108 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. SECTION 58. State Department Assisting in Sending Supplies to Russia. D e p a rtm e n t o f S ta te , Washington, February 25, 1918. Mr. R. C. L e f f i n g w e l l , Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Washington, D. C. M y D e a r M r, L e f f i n g w e l l : The department has received your letter of February 21, with inclosures, asking whether the Russian Purchasing Commis sion in this country should be furnished with the facilities of the Allies’ Pur chasing Commission. This department believes that at the present time it would be extremely unfortunate for the Russian people to receive the impression that they are being abandoned by the Allies or by the United States. Consequently, the department has been assisting the Russian authorities in this country in forwarding non warlike stores, including railway material, agricultural machinery, binder twine, army and civilian shoes and leather, together with miscellaneous Red Cross supplies. We have been of the opinion that the limited tonnage available to Russia makes it impracticable to deliver supplies in large enough quantity— even in the case of railway material—to become by any possibility a military factor. The department accordingly believes that the Russian commission might well have the advantage of the facilities afforded by the Allies’ Purchasing Com mission. In view of the present German advance, however, the department would be glad to have brought to its attention all shipments which may be made, as it has obviously become necessary to take additional precautionary measures to safeguard the supplies from falling into German hands. This is especially true in regard to shipments destined for Petrograd or Moscow. I am, my dear Mr. Leffingwell, Very sincerely, yours, R obert L a n s i n g . SECTION 58-A. Treasury Department Memo on Russian Finance and Contracts, March 1,1918. [Written on margin:] Mr. Davis: Please prepare letter on these lines to Polk. R. L. T r e a s u r y D e p a rtm e n t, Washington, March 1, 1918. re.—Disposal of Russian materials and funds: Mr. Ughet informs me that, substantially, all Russian purchases made here prior to our entry into the war with funds advanced by the British Government were made through J. P. Morgan & Co., and that practically all o f the other direct purchases were made with funds obtained through loans placed with American banks. Russia placed in this country $11,000,000 in 5 per cent oneyear notes, which have been renewed twice and which mature May 1; also, $25,000,000 of Russian 5$ per cent bonds were sold to a syndicate of bankers; and $50,000,000 was obtained through a syndicate of banks, headed by the National City Bank, and per cent certificates were issued against the un used rouble balance. In addition, some interior Russian bonds were sold here. Mr. Ughet further states that the rails and approximately 9,000 tons of barbed wire, which are stored by Russia in this c untry, were purchased some time prior to our entry into the war and paid for in most part from the pro ceeds o f loans obtained through American banks. One contract for 35,000 tons o f barbed wire, which is. now being delivered, was placed through Morgans on behalf of the British Government, and the British Government has already dis posed of approximately 10,000 tons of this barbed wire to our War Department, and is applying the proceeds in reduction o f Russian obligations held by Great Britain. Mr. Ughet also informs me that the British Government, with the consent of the Anglo-Russian subcommittee, is disposing of all of the materials which were purchased through Morgans with British funds and applying the proceeds in reduction of Russian obligations held by Great Britain. It would seem, thereM em oran du m 109 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. fore, that the British Government is looking after its interests very well in this respect, and that they could have no claim whatever in respect to the rails and Mr. Ughet understands that the British lay no claim whatever to any interest in the rails. The above-mentioned 9,000 tons of barbed wire are being sold to the Italian Government and Mr. Ughet is of the opinion that the proceeds from this sale should be applied in providing interest for an additional year on the $11,000,000 note issue maturing May 1, and that any other surplus funds obtained from the sale of materials purchased and paid for from the proceeds of the above-men tioned American loans should be used, as far as practicable, to paying the in terest on the other above-mentioned credits. Mr. Ughet’s personal opinion is that there are sufficient funds on hand to meet the actual current obligations for contracts, with the exception o f the Remington rifle contract. It now appears that the Russian ambassador has ample funds in the Na tional City Bank to meet the balance due on all contracts here (with the ex ception of the Remington rifles to be delivered in July and October) for pur chases, freight, expenses, and interest to May 1 on all Russian loans placed through American banks. It should be determined, therefore, what application shall be made o f the sur plus funds derived from the sale of the rails and other materials purchased with funds advanced to Russia by American banks and by the United States Gov ernment, and whether or not entire preference should be given to the Reming ton rifle contract, or to the payment of interest on the Russian credits and obligations placed through American banks and the obligations held by this Government. Liabilities as per list of March 1, 1918. Statement No. 1_______________________________________________$5, 754,932. 76 Statement No. 2________________________________________________ 4,895, 330.14 For salaries, etc-----------------------------------------------------------------------551,444.84 Total liability_______________________________________ ____ 11, 201, 707. 74 Bank balances, March 1. National City Bank (account A ) -----------------------------------------------$9, 304, 860.84 National City Bank (account B ) parts (amounts concerning transactions of Russian financial attache are excluded)______ 14, 252.72 National City Bank (account C )----------------------------------------------- 3, 420, 074.14 T ota l----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12, 739,187. 70 Statement of payments made during February. From account A, total paid-------------------------------------------------------- $2,812, 546. 72 From account B, total paid-------------------------------------------------------170,642.17 From account C, direct payment------- ---------------------------------------461. 74 T ota l___________________________________________________ 2,983,650. 63 Artillery Department: No. 146, class 1-----------------------------------------------------------------Freight and expenses on guns, class 2__ ____________________ No. 322, class 2___________________________________________ 520.00 1,000. 00 26,097. 29 27,617. 29 Technical Department: No. 300, class 1___________________________________________ 11,461.88 All-Russian Zeusky Union A /C Pekosnarm: No. 127, class 2------------------------------------------------------------------No. 124, class 1------------------------------------------------------------------ 1,168.00 210. 00 , 1 378.00 110 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOR M A K IN G SAM E. Commissariat Departments: No. 131, class 1____________________________________________ No. 133, class 1_____________________________________________ No. 135, class 1_____________________________________________ No. 138, class 1_____________________________________________ No. 136, class 1____________________________________________ $132,165. 26 241,630. 06 262, 797. 08 284, 800. 74 1,078,605. 54 1,999,998. 68 Ministry of Supplies: No. I l l , class 1____________________________________________ ____ 65,226. 00 No. 100, class 1_________________________________________________ 56, 230. 90 No. 113, class 1_________________________________________________ 88,888. 80 No. 108, class 1____________________________________________ ____ 23, 762. 60 No. 107, class 1____________________________________________ ____ 99,433. 80 333, 542.10 Railway department: No. 208, class 2___________________________________________ No. 197, class 1___________________________________________ No. 41, class 1_____________________________________________ 93, 904. 80 6,663. 60 2,007. 22 102, 575. 62 Military attach^: Protection account, class 4_____________ __________________ 100.00 Naval department: No. 226, class 1___________________________________________ No. 218, class 1___________________________________________ No. 213, class 1___________________________________________ No. 214, class 1___________________________________________ No. 58, class 1____________________________________________ 2,307. 50 6,600. 00 3,306.18 548. 35 25,106. 25 40,068. 28 Machinery department: No. 290, class 2___________________________________________ No. 82, class 1_____________________________________________ No. 279, class 1____________________________________________ No. 260, class 1-----------------------------------------------------------------No. 280, class 1___________________________________________ No. 80, class 1------------------------------------------------------------------- 377. 31 435.10 250. 00 1, 721. 50 1, 551. 20 1,040.00 5,375.11 Agricultural department: No. 180, class 1___________________________________________ No. 181, class 1___________________________________________ 27, 766.00 44,452. 80 72,218. 80 Secretarial department: Various expenses, class 4_________________________________ Nondepartmental payments: Various salaries, class 4__________________________________ Murman port: No. 10, class 1_____________________________________________ No. 10, class 2--------------------------------------------------------------------Transportation—special: Various payments, class 2-------------------------------------------------Transportation—general: Various payments, class 2-------------------------------------------------Account “ C ” : Class 4 ________________________________________________ 35,997. 19 6,223.81 10. 567. 34 129.50 10, 696.84 25, 020. 88 140, 272. 24 461.74 Ill FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. Account “ B ” : ( See special statement____________________________________ $170,642.17 Summary: Artillery department______________________________________ Technical department_____________________________________ All-Russian Zemsky Union, account Pokosnarm____________ Commissariat department_________________________________ Ministry of supplies______________________________________ Railway department______________________________________ Military attache__________________________________________ Naval department_________________________________________ Machinery department____________________________________ Agricultural department__________________________________ Secretarial department____________________________________ Nondepartmental payments________________________________ Transportation— Special___________________________________ Transportation—General---------------------------------------------------Murman port--------------------------------------------------------------------Russian financial attache__________________________________ Direct payment from compte cheque_______________________ 27,617.29 11,461. 88 1, 378. 00 1,999,998. 68 333, 542.10 102, 575. 62 100. 00 40, 068. 28 5,375.11 72, 218.80 35,997.19 6, 223.81 25, 020. 88 140, 272. 24 10,696.84 170, 642.17 461. 74 Total____________________________________________________ Total payments for February: Class 1 ___________________________________________________ Class 2________________________ ______________ $287, 970.02 Class 3_______________________________________ 129,200.00 Class 4_______________________________________ 46,585.22 ------------------Grand total____________________________________________ 2,983,650. 63 2,519, 895.39 463, 755. 24 2,983,650.63 Russian financial attache account “ B ” payments for February. 1918. Feb. 6. 6. 6. 6. 6. 7. 13. 13. 13. 19. 19. 23. 23. 26. To C. J. Medzikhovsky, class 4____________________________ To V. P. Ananieff, class 4_________________________________ To J. Goodkoff, class 4__________________ _________________ To Western Union Teegraph Co., class 4__________________ To Western Union Telegraph Co., class 4_________________ To National City Bank, account General Electric Co., class H------------------------------------------------------------------------To American Bank Note Co., class 3______________________ To American Bank Note Co., class 3______________________ To Purchasing Commission, class 3_______________________ To Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., class 1______________________ To G. Klodnitzky, class 4_________________________________ To American Bank Note Co., class 3______________________ To American Bank Note Co., class 3______________________ To Western Union Telegraph Co., class 4__________________ $677. 80 168. 80 350. 00 98. 50 7.25 4, 928. 40 58, 500. 00 500. 00 11, 200. 00 22, 711. 29 2, 349. 00 58, 500.00 500. 00 151.15 170,642.17 M a r c h 5, 1918. : I beg to submit for your consideration the following infor mation in regard to the disposal of Russian materials and funds: Mr. Ughet informs me that, substantially, all Russian purchases made here prior to our entry into the war with funds advanced by the British Govern ment were made through J. P. Morgan & Co., and that practically all of the other direct purchases were made with funds obtained through loans placed with American banks. Russia placed in this country $11,000,000 in 5 per cent one-year notes, which have been renewed twice and which mature May 1 ; also, $25,000,000 of Russian 5$ per cent bonds were sold to a syndicate of bankers; and $50,000,000 was obtained through a syndicate of banks, headed by The D e a r M r. P o l k 112 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. National City Bank, and 6^ per cent certificates were issued against the unused rouble balance. In addition, some interior Russian bonds were sold here. Mr. Ughet further states that the rails and approximately 9,000 tons o f barbed wire, which are stored by Russia in this country, were purchased some time prior to our entry into the war and paid for in most part from the proceeds of loans obtained through American banks. One contract for 35,000 tons of barbed wire, which is now being delivered, was placed through Morgans on behalf of the British Government, and the British Government has already dis posed of approximately 10,000 tons of this barbed wire to our War Department, and is applying the proceeds in reduction of Russian obligations held by Great Britain. Mr. Ughet also informs me that the British Government, with the consent of the Anglo-Russian subcommittee, is disposing of all of the materials which were purchased through Morgans with British funds and applying the proceeds in reduction of Russian obligations held by Great Britain. It would seem, there fore, that the British Government is looking after its interests very well in this respect, and that they could have no claim whatever in respect to the rails, and Mr. Ughet understands that the British lay no claim whatever to any interest in the rails. The above-mentioned 9,000 tons of barbed wire are being sold to the Italian Government and Mr. Ughet is of the opinion that the proceeds from this sale should be applied in providing interest for an additional year on the $11,000,000 note issue maturing May 1, and that any other surplus fuuds obtained from the sale of materials purchased and paid for from the proceeds of the above-men tioned American loans should be used, as far as practicable, to paying the interest on the other above-mentioned credits. Mr. Ughet’s personal opinion is that there are sufficient funds on hand to meet the actual current obligations for contracts, with the exception of the Remingon rifle contract. It now appears that the Russian Ambassador has ample funds in The Na tional City Bank to meet the balance due on all contracts here (with the ex ception of the Remington rifles to be delivered in July and October) for pur chases, freight, expenses, and interest to May 1 on all Russian loans placed through American banks. It should be determined, therefore, what application should be made of the surplus funds derived from the sale of the rails and other materials purchased with funds advanced to Russia by American banks and by the United States Government, and whether or not entire preference should be given to the Rem ington rifle contract, or to the payment of interest on the Russian credits and obligations placed through American banks and the obligations held by this Government. Referring to our conversation on the above subject, my understanding is that you are of the opinion that such surplus funds, if any, should be applied by the Russian Ambassador to payment of interest on Russian credits and obligations up to and including July 1, and to any other current obligations as they become due, rather than setting aside a specific amount for payment in July and Octo ber on the Remington rifle contracts. Very sincerely, yours, R. C. L e f f i n g w e l l . Hon. F r a n k L . P o l k , Counselor for the Department of State. [Mr. Polk replied March 7, and we again wrote Mr. Polk March 12.] SECTION 59. Russian Decree on Annullment of Loans. D e p a r t m e n t of C o m m e r c e , B u r e a u of F oreig n a n d D o m e s t ic C o m m e r c e , Washington, March 23, 1918. The D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e T r e a s u r y , Washington, D. C. D e a r S i r : I take pleasure in referring to you the attached copy of a com munication received by this bureau from one of its foreign representatives, as FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 113 indicated below. The bureau is interested in any special comment you may have to offer, but no formal acknowledgment of this reference is necessary. Very truly, yours, C. D. S n o w , Assistant Chief of Bureau. Submitted b y : Commercial Attachg W. C. Huntington. Place: Petrograd, Russia. Dated: Received here March 21,1918. Subject: Copy of decree adopted by the council of the commissaries of the people on January 1 regarding the annulment of State loans. ANNULMENT OF LOANS. The following decrees have been adopted by the council of the commissaries of the people of January 1 regarding the annulment of State loans: 1. All State loans concluded by the Government of the Russian landowners and Russian bourgeoisie, which are enumerated in the inclosed statement, are being annulled (canceled) from December 1, 1917. The December coupons are not subject to payment. 2. In the same way all guaranties are being annulled, which have been given by the above-mentioned Governments on the loans of various concerns and insti tutions. 3. Absolutely and without any exception, all foreign loans are being an nulled. 4. Short time obligations and series of the State chancelery are remaining in force. Interest on them is not paid, but their obligations have the same validity as the credit notes. 5. Citizens of limited means possessing the securities of the interior loan, which are annulled for a sum not exceeding 10,000 roubles (at normal value), receive a lifelong yearly annuity from the State amounting to the sum equiva lent to the interest derived from the securities which belong to them. 6. Citizens possessing the annulled securities for a sum exceeding 10,000 roubles do not receive any indemnification for the annulled papers which belong to them. 7. The deposits in the State savings banks and interest on them are inviolable. All the obligations of the loans to be annulled belonging to the savings banks are being replaced by a book debt of the Russian Peasants’ and Workers’ Re public. 8. The cooperative stores, local self-government, and other universally bene ficial or democratic institutions possessing obligations of tlio loans to be an nulled will be satisfied on the basis of the rules which are being worked out by the chief council of national economy together with the representatives of these institutions if it can be proved that these obligations have been purchased prior to the publication of the present decree. R e m a r k . —The local organs of the Chief Council of National Economy have the right to determine which institutions come under the head of universally bene ficial or democratic. 9. The general management o f the liquidation of the State loans is intrusted to the chief council of national economy. 10. The whole matter of liquidating the loans is intrusted to the State bank, whose duty it is to immediately commence the registration of all the obliga tions of the State loans in the hands of the various proprietors, as well as the other intrest-bearing papers; both of those subject and not subject to annul ment. 11. The councils of the workers’, soldiers’, and peasants’ deputies form, in connection with the local councils of national economy, commissions for the determination of which of the citizens come under the head of having limited means. These commissions have the right to annul in their entirety savings obtained not by means of labor, even if these savings do not exceed the sum of 5,000 roubles. This decree is to be discussed by the Central Executive Committee. N. G o r b u n o f f , Secretary of the Council of National Commissaries. V y e k , January S/16, 1918. S. Doc. 86,67-2------8 114 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. SECTION 60. Interest Table. Payments of interest and other current liabilities on credit operations of the Russian Government due between June 1, 1918, and January 1, 1919. 1. Twenty-five million 5^ per cent bonds. $687,500.00 (a) Interest due from June 1, 191.8________________________ Commission N. C. B. of New York § per cent of the value of the coupons__________________________________________________ 859 38 Do_____________________________________________________ 687, 500. 00 Dec. 1, 1918________________________________________________ 859.38 2. Eleven million 5 per cent Treasury notes, (b) Interest due Nov. 1, 1918____________________________________ __________ _ 275,000.00 3. Fifty million credit: (a) Interest 6? per cent due July 10. 1918__________________ 1,625,000.00 Commission N. C. B. of the New York j per cent of the value of the operation July 10, 191S____________________________ 125, 000. 00 Oct. 10, 1918_______________________________________________ 125,000.00 Total until Jan. 1, 1918__________________________________ _ 3, 526, 718. 76 4. Jan. 10, 1919. Payment of the $50,000,000 credit: Interest________________________________ ___________________ 1, 625,000. 00 Commission_________________________________________________ 125, 000. 00 Total_____________________________________________________ 5,276, 718. 76 SECTION 59-A. Memo on Disposal o f Russian Supplies. RUSSIAN SUPPLIES. Memorandum of plan for disposing of Russian supplies which, when ap proved by the British and French Governments, is to be submitted by cable to the Secretary of the Treasury at Washington. Supplies originally intended for Russia are now distributed as follows: (a) In the United States; (7j) in Great Britain, or in British ships which will eventually land their cargoes in Great Britain; (e) in France; {d) in Italy; (e) at Archangel and Murmansk; ( f ) at Vladivostock and other ports in the Far East, chiefly Japanese ports. Payment for these supplies has been made in the main, if not entirely, by some of the following methods: {a) By funds advanced by Great Britain; (b) by funds advanced by France; (c) by funds advanced by the United States. (Russian funds in the United States, Great Britain, and France, not “ ear marked ” as having been provided by any particular Government, will be treated herein as if advanced by the country in which the funds were deposited.) Inasmuch as many of these supplies are likely to deteriorate, and many of them are required for the allied armies or for the United States Army, it is de sirable that existing oragnizations be coordinated for disposing of them (in so far as possession of them can be had), to the best possible advantage for all concerned. To this end the following plan is proposed: (1) Russian supplies now in Great Britain, or which may be returned in the future, to continue to be disposed of under the direction of the existing Treasury Committee formed for this purpose, to which has been attached a United States representative to control the disposal of stores unloaded in the United Kingdom purchased in the first instance in the United States, either out of Russian funds or out of funds advanced by the United States Govern ment. Should in the future goods be returned to the United Kingdom purchased in the first instance out of funds advanced by the French Government or Rus sian credits in France, a French representative shall be attached to the above committee for the control of such goods. FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 115 (2) Russian supplies now in America, or wThich may be returned in the future, to be disposed of under the direction of an American committee to which shall be attached representatives of the British and French Governments for the control of goods purchased out of funds advanced by the British or French Governments. (3) Russian supplies in France to be disposed of under the direction of the French Government, the disposal of any Russian goods in France purchased out of British or United States credits being controlled by representatives of the British 01* United States Governments. In disposing of Russian supplies, wherever they may be, the following prin ciples shall govern: (a) The French Government shall have preference in the purchase of sup plies paid for out of advances made by the French Government, or out of Russian funds in France. (b) The British Government shall have preference in the purchase of sup plies paid for out of advances made by the British Government, or out of Russian funds in Great Britain. (c) The American Government to have preference in the purchase o f sup plies paid for by advances made by the American Government, or out of Rus sian funds in the United States. After the above preferences have been recognized the remaining goods shall be disposed of in sueli manner as to realize the best possible results. The proceeds of the liquidation of goods, after deducting any expenses in curred in effecting their sale, shall be disposed of as follow s: (a) The proceeds of goods paid for out of advances by Great Britain shall be turned over to the British treasury, to be dealt with as it shall deem proper. ( b) The proceeds of goods purchased from advances made by the French Government shall be turned over to the French treasury, to be dealt with as it shall deem best. (c) The proceeds of goods purchased by advances made by the United States Government shall be turned over to the American Treasury, to be dealt with as it shall deem best. So far as supplies purchased from advances made by the United States, or from Russian funds in the United States are concerned, none shall be sold without tlie consent of the representative of United States Government, whose approval shall also be necessary before possession is taken of any such sup plies still in the hands of the Russians. If the Supreme War Council shall so direct, a military committee shall be established at Versailles, to be consulted, in case of need, regarding the dis posal of the Russian military supplies herein dealt with, in so far as they are not purchased by the respective Governments under the preferences established as above provided. Sunderland House, Curzon Street, London, W. 1, March 19, 1918. SECTION 61. Payment of Interest on Private Loans Before Government Interest Payments Are Met. A p r i l 19, 1938. : As you will recall, $11,000,000 of Russian notes placed in this country and now outstanding mature on May 1, next. I understand that about $2,500,000 of these notes are owned by the National City Bank or the National City Co., and that the Russian ambassador has proposed to pay one year’s interest on those notes if the holders agree to extend the same, but his proposal has not as yet been accepted. In case the ambassador’s proposal is not accepted before May 1, I should like to know if the State Department would permit the National City Bank to apply, without the consent of the Rus sian ambassador, any part of the Russian deposits held by the bank to the payment of the principal or interest of any o f said notes after their maturity, or to refuse payment of checks drawn against said deposits because the bank or anyone else held some of these notes then past due. Very sincerely, yours, R. C. L e f f i n g w e l l , Hon. F r a n k L. P o l k , Counselor for the Department of State. M y D e a r M r. P o l k 116 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. A pun. 24. 1018. My Dear Mr. Polk : I am inclosing herewith copy of a letter which I wrote on April 13 to Mr. Ughet, Russian financial attache, and copy of a letter to me, dated April 22, from the National City Bank, in reference to the adjustment of Russian Government accounts in accordance with letters of instruction from the Russian ambassador and from the Russian financial attach# on November 28 and December 1, 1917. As you will recall, this was in pursuance of our con versations with the Russian ambassador. I had assumed that the accounts had been arranged in accordance with the* instructions given in those letters, but apparently the bank has postponed completing the arrangement pending the definite approval of this department. As an approval of tlie arrangement as set forth in the above-mentioned letters involves the approval of the Russian ambassador’s power or action, it is not a question which the Treasury Depart ment can answer. The National City Bank has informed the Treasury Depart ment from time to time in respect to payments which the Russian financial attach^ wished to make, and, so far as I know, the National City Bank has only made payments to which this deprtment offered no objections. It seems to me that the course which has been pursued by the National City Bank up to the present time has been one which has relieved the Government of the United States of grave embarrassment and that if it is prepared to con tinue to pursue a like course it would be desirable that that bank should have the definite approval of the Department of State, if that department can con sistently give such approval. As you know, a substantial sum of money remains on deposit with the City Bank, a part of which at least is the proceeds of loans made by the United States. The $11,000,000 of Russian notes which were placed in this country about three years ago mature on May 1, next. Mr. Ughet, Russian financial attach^, states that he has just had a meeting with officials of the National City Bank representing that bank and other note holders, and that they have positively refused to accept the payment of one year’s interest and extend the notes. In my opinion, it would be unfortunate if at present the Russian financial situauation here should be brought to a crisis, and it would be advisable to have a meeting with the National City Bank and any other substantial note holders. If you are of the same opinion I suggest that you arrange an early conference with the note holders. I understand that the Russian Government has in the United States various military and civilian supplies, purchased in part from United States advances, which probably could be disposed of for from $25,000,000 to $40 000,000; that the cash in the National City Bank is probably sufficient to pay In full all unsettled claims of contractors, at least for commodities heretofore delivered; and that there is a deposit of about $5,000,000 in the Guaranty Trust Co., of New York. Six months’ interest will, on May 15, 191S, be unpaid on the de mand and past-due obligations of the Russian Government held by the United States. I understand that Mr. Davis, of this department, is to confer with you about all these subjects to-morrow morning. Very sin c e r e ly , y o u r s . R . C. L e f f t n g w e l l . Hon. F r a n k L. P o l k , Counselor for the Department of State . A p r i l 29, 1918. : If it meets with your approval, I will be obliged if you will have the following message, which I have prepared in pursuance of our con versation, cabled to Assistant Secretary Crosby at London: “ From Secretary of Treasury for Crosby. No. 164. Russian one-year notes, to amount of $11,000,000. placed through National City Bank three years ago, and which have been renewed twice, mature May 1. Russian Ambassador has funds available for paying interest for six months or one year in case notes are extended, but can not, of course, pay principal. It is very desirable that these notes be extended without protest or attempt on part of note holders to attach any Russian property here, which would create a crisis and might force this Government to take over all Russian assets and apply proceeds to credit of Russian obligations. It seems advisable from note holders’ stand point to grant extension and not create a situation whereby this Government would be compelled to take an antagonistic position to protect its own in terests, leaving little or nothing for note holders. Notes are held by National M y D e a r M r. P o l k FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 117 City Bank and few other large interests, all or substantially all assenting to extension, with exception of $2,500,000, which were purchased by the Russian Corporation in England, of which Holden is president, through proceeds loan from City Bank. City Bank has asked consent of Russian Corporation to grant extension, blit has demanded payment of its loan or additional collateral. Russian corporation replied that it could give no additional security, but has indicated its willingness to extend notes, provided City Bank would extend loan without additional securities. Am advised that Russian corporation has other assets, and as City Bank has been cooperating satisfactorily in this and other Russian matters, have -agreed to use good offices to get additional se curity, if available, from Russian corporation. This, of course, is a delicate matter, but British representative suggests advisability of our suggesting that you take matter up unofficially with British Treasury, explaining that ap parently nothing would be gained by refusing to extend notes and that City Bank is entitled to additional security. Very truly, yours, R . C. L e f f i n g w e l l . H on . F r a n k L. P olk, Counselor for the Department of State. [On margin: Mr. Crosby replied by his No. 175, May 2. to Polk, May 6.] _ _ See also our letter M a y 4, 1918. Inclosed herewith you will please find a table pre pared by the Treasurer of the United States showing the amount of interest which become due on May 15, 1918, on the obligations of the Russian Govern ment held by the United States at the close of April 27, 1918. It is my under standing that your Government will pay on May 15 the interest to that date on all obligations of your Government then held by the United States. Please make check payable to the order of “ Assistant Treasurer of United States, New York, for credit general account Treasurer o f United States,” and deliver the same to the Assistant Treasurer of the United States at the subtreasury in New York. A word of explanation in regard to the inclosed table may not be out of place. On November 15, 1917, the United States held obligations of your Government aggregating in amount $187,729,750, of which $97,500,000 in amount were then hearing interest at the rate of 331 per cent per annum, and $90,229,750 at the rate of 4| per cent. Interest on such 44 per cent obligations has been computed for the period November 15, 1917, to May 15, 1918, at the rate of 4£ per cent. Under date of November 15, 1917, I wrote you reminding you that it would be necessary to increase the interest rate upon all or part of the 3£ per cent obli gations of the Russian Government held by the United States. The aggregate amount of the loans made to the Governments of the Allies under the act approved April 24, 1917, was $2,114,000,000. The amount of 81 per cent bonds of the United States not yet converted into 4 per cent bonds is something under $1,480,000,000. The difference between these two amounts, or $684,000,000, is nearely one-third of the total of such loans. Accordingly, for convenience, interest is being charged on $32,500,000 or one-third of such obli gations of your Government at the rate of 4 per cent and on the balance of $65,000,000 of such obligations of your Government at the rate of 3 i per cent. The privilege of the holders to convert 3£ per cent bonds of the United States into 4 per cent bonds does not expire until May 15, 1918, and the privilege of the holders to convert 3£ per cent bonds and 4 per cent bonds of the United States into 4i per cent bonds commences as of May 9, 1918, so that the amount of interest to May 15, 1918, on the obligations of your Government held by the United States is necessarily figured approximately, and further adjustment of interest may be required after final figures are available. It is hoped that the rate to be borne after May 15, 1918, by all the shorttime obligations of your Government held by the United States will shortly be determined, and, in that connection, the conversion privileges in respect of both the 3i per cent and the 4 per cent United States Liberty bonds must be borne in mind. I am, my dear Mr. Ambassador, Very truly, yours, R. C. L e f f i n g w e l l . His Excellency B . B a k h m e t e f f , Ambassador Extraordinary of the Provisional Government of Russia, The Embassy, Washington, D. C. D e a r M r. A m b a s s a d o r : 118 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. Interest on obligations of the Provisional Government of Russia held by the United States Apr. 27, 1918. as demand obligations. Date of obligation. Principal. Interest Interest from rate at Nov. 15,1917, which or date, to computed. May 15,1918. Per cent. July 6 .. . July 13.. July 13.. Aug. 1... Aug. 22.. Aug. 24.. Aug. 30.. Aug. 30.. Sept. 25.. Sept. 25.. Sept. 25.. Oct. 2 ... Oct. 11.. Oct. 11.. Oct. 11.. Oct. 11.. Nov. 1... Nov. 15.. $35,000, 000.00 5.000, 000.00 5.000, 000.00 2.500, 000.00 2.500, 000.00 137, 500, 000.00 5.000, 000.00 5.000, 000.00 5.000, 000.00 5.000, 000.00 5.000, 000.00 22, 200, 000.00 5.000, 000.00 5.000, 000.00 5.000, 000.00 5.000, 000.00 31,700, 000.00 1,329, 750.00 Total. 187,729, 750.00 3h 3i 31 3i n 3m 4 4 4i 41 4i 41 41 41 4i 4141- . $607, 465. 75 86 780. 82 86, 780. 82 43, 390.41 43, 390.41 708, 643.84 99, 178.08 99, 17S. 08 105, 376.71 105, 376.71 105, 376.71 467, 872.60 105b376.71 105, 376.71 105, 376. 71 105, 376.71 668, 088. 36 28, 024.94 3,674,431.08 JOn $15,000,000 interest computed at 3.J per cent; on $22,500,000 interest computed at 4 per cent. SECTION 62. Memo on Deferring the Payment of Russian Interest to the United States. T re a s u r y D e p a rtm e n t, Washington May 10, 1918. Memorandum for Mr. L e f f i n g w e l l : Mr. Polk, of the State Department, told me by telephone this afternoon that Mr. Phillips had communicated to him the substance of his talk with you this morning relative to the collection of interest accruing on May 15 on the Russian obligations. In substance, the views of Mr. Polk, as expressed to me, are that it would be inadvisable just now to use up all the Russian funds now available for payment of interest. I explained to him that alter paying the balance due on the Russian contracts, amounting to approximately $4,000,GOO, there would be a balance in bank of approximately $8,200,000 and that our interest would amount to approximately $3,700,000, and that to pay interest on other Russian obligations up to and including July 10, an additional $3,000,000 would be re quired, but that enough rails could be sold to cover all of this. Mr. Polk then stated that in view of the fact that it might be most desirable a little later on to ship all of the material^ required to Russia, and even go to Congress and ask for an appropriation for assisting Russia further, it seemed inadvisable just now to jeopardize the collection of our principal by forcing collection of interest at this moment. He further stated, however, that we would not be running any risk in postponing the collection of interest, at least temporarily, because we could at any time collect the interest by taking over the Russian assets in this country. I explained to him that in view of the fact that we had just permitted the payment of interest on the $11,000,000 note issue, the Treasury Department could not very well justify allowing everyone else being paid to date and only to stop the payment of interest at the time that our interest becomes clue, and that it would be still more difficult to justify our action if we permit the interest to be paid on the other obligations on June 1 and July 10. He agreed that if we should not collect our interest, it would be inadvisable to allow interest to be paid on the other obligations on June 1 and July 10, but as he has been sick for some time and is leaving in the morn ing for Atlantic City to recuperate, he expressed the hope that you would post pone action until his return and we could discuss further the entire Russian FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 119 situation. I asked him if the Secretary o f State would write us a letter along this line and he replied that as he was more conversant with the matter himself, he would prefer that I talk to Mr. Miles and request him to draft a letter to be sent to him for signature and stated that he thought, under the circumstances, the Treasury Department would be entitled to a letter from the State Department. I told him that I would endeavor to talk with you and then communicate with him further to-night, and he suggested that if you wished to talk with him yourself, he would be glad to have you call him at his home. N . H. D a v is . N e w Y o r k , July 2, 1918. My D e a r Mr. L e f f i n g w e l l : Referring to your letter of May 4 and subsequent conference which we have had at the State and Treasury Departments regard ing the payment of interest due May 15,1918, on the loans granted by the United States to Russia, and ultimately taking into consideration the letter which Mr. Polk addressed to me on June 22, I beg to state that I am prepared to have this interest paid at the earliest possible convenience. However, at the present moment the free balance of our accounts is approxi mately of $5,000,000, out of which on the 10th of July we have to pay the interest and the commission on our banking operation of $50,000,000, being $1,750,000; besides this a certain amount is needed for different emergency expenses as for transportation, expenditures in connection with the personnel and for different claims of American manufacturers, but on the other hand considerable payments are due to my accounts from the United States Shipping Board and from the office of the Director of Military Railroads. In view of the above, I would propose the following procedure of payment of interest: (1) Out of the cash balance now at my disposal, I am willing to pay at once $1,000,000, check for which amount, drawn in favor of the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, please find inclosed herewith. (2) On June 26 I addressed a note to the Secretary of State informing him that I was absolutely agreeable that the proceeds of the merchandise purchased on account of American and Russian credits and sold in England be applied in partial cover of above said interest. Information reached me to the effect that the Treasury Department had been advised by the Equitable Trust Co., of New York, of the receipt by their London office of two amounts of £370,650.10 and £8,731.0 in connection with the Russian liquidation in England. These funds would have to be transferred to the disposal of the Secretary ot the Treasury on account of interest due on Russian obliga tions held by this Government; after that this transaction will have gone through the books of Mr. S. Ughet, Russian financial attache, and the funds have been deposited with the National City Bank of New York to the credit of my account. The amounts in question will represent approximately $1,800,000. (3) The balance of payment, approximately $800,000, will be paid at the earliest possible convenience, as soon as sufficient funds for this purpose shall have accumulated at my disposal out of proceeds for the merchandise sold in this country or in England and acquired on account of American or Russian credits, or from the amounts payable to me by the United States Government for chartering of the ships. Hoping that this proposal will meet with your approval, I am, my dear Mr. Leffingwell, Very truly, yours, B, B a k h m e te ff, Ambassador of Russia. Hon. R. C. L e f f i n g w e l l , Assistant Secretary o f the Treasury of the United States, Washington, D. C. D e p a rtm e n t o f S ta te , Washington, July 10, 1918. My D e a r M r. L e f f i n g w e l l : Your communication dated July 8 inclosing copy of a letter dated July 2, addressed to you by His Excellency B. Bakhmeteff, ambassador extraordinary of the provisional government of Russia, suggesting a method for the payment of the interest which became due on May 15 on 120 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. obligations of tlie Russian Government held by the Government of the United States, and your reply thereto dated July 8, have been received. The Department of State sees no objection to the plan of arrangement re garding the settlement of these obligations, and, therefore, has transmitted your communication to Ambassador Bakhmeteff in accordance with your request. I am, my dear Mr. Leffingwell, Very truly, yours, W il l ia m P h il l ip s . Hon. R. C. L effingwell , Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Department, Washington, D. C. SECTION 63. United States Shipping Board Payments to Russian Ambassador. FINANCIAL ATTACH^ TO THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY. N e w Y o r k , July 6, 1918. Esq., Care Office of Assistant Secretary to the Treasury, Washington, D. C. D e a r Si r : Please find inclosed herewith three statements showing the amounts due to us from the United States Government for charter money on the five steamers of the Russian volunteer fleet, the first statement, amounting to $1,108,755.75, being the gross amount receivable, from which has to be de ducted, as per list No. 2, the amount of $702,121.51 covering expenses in con nection with chartering of steamers, as well as amounts due the United States Government in connection with same. List No. 3 is a recapitulation of said two lists and shows that the net balance due to us is $493,271.74. Believe me, dear sir, Yours, very truly, A lb e r t R a th b on e, S h ip le y , Russian Financial AttacM. J . D . J o l c o w s k i, Secretary. Due from United States Government charter money for five steamers of the Russian volunteer fleet, in accordance icith respective charter parties, dated in Washington, D. C,, March SO, 1918, as per Mils presented to division of operations, Emergency Fleet Corporation, United States Shipping Board, Washington, D. C. Per steamship Omsk, 11,950 tons dead-weight: 1, for first month, Apr. 4r-May 4________ $49, 592. 50 6, for second month, May 4 -June 4______ 49, 592. 50 11, for third month, June 4-July 4______ 49, 592. 50 16, for fourth month, July 4-Aug. 4____ 49, 592. 50 ----------------Per steamship Irtysh, 7,100 tons dead-weight: Bill No. 5, for coal______________________________ 581. 25 Bill No —, for first month, Apr. 20-May 20______ 29,465. 00 Bill No. 10, for second month, May 20-June 20____ 29, 465. 00 Bill No. 15, for third month, June 20-July 20_____ 29,465.00 ----------------Per steamship Nijni No vgorod, 4,380 tons dead-weight: Bill No. 3, for first month, Apr. 11-May 11 _______ 18,177. 00 Bill No. 8, for second month, May 11-June 11____ 18,177.00 Bill No. 13, for third month, June 11-July 11_____ 18,177.00 ----------------Bill Bill Bill Bill No. No. No. No. $198,370.00 88,976. 25 54,531.00 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 121 Per steamship Toula, 3,120 tons dead-weiglit: Bill No. 4, for first month, Apr. 12-May 12______$12, 948. 00 Bill No. 9, for second month, May 12-June 12____ 12, 948. 00 Bill No. 14, for third month, June 12-July 12------- 12,948. 00 ----------------- $38, 844. 00 Per steamship Kishenev, 3,120 tons dead-weight: Bill No. 2, for first month, Apr. 9- May 9-------------- 12, 948. 00 Bill No. 7, for second month, May 9-Jnne 9______ 12, 948.00 Bill No. 12, for third month, June 9 -July 9_______ 12,948. 00 ----------------38, 844.00 Total on bills already presented__________________________ Up to Dec. 31,1918, will still be due: Per Omsk__ For fifth month, Aug. 4-Sept. 4__ $49, 592. 50 For sixth month, Sept. 4-Oct. 4__ 49, 592. 50 For seventh month, Oct. 4-Nov. 4_ 49, 592. 50 For eighth month, Nov. 4-Dec. 4_ 49, 592. 50 For ninth month, Dec. 4 -Jan. 4__ 49, 592. 50 ----------------- 247, 962. 50 Per Irtysh— For fourth month, July 20-Aug. 20_ 29, 465. 00 For fifth month, Aug. 20-Sept. 20_ 29,465. 00 For sixth month, Sept. 20-Gct. 20_ 29, 465. 00 For seventh month, Oct. 20-Nov. 20_ 29, 465, 00 For eighth month, Nov. 20-Dec. 20_ 29,465. 00 For ninth month, Dec. 20-Jan. 20- 29, 465. 00 ----------------- 176, 790.00 Per Nijni Novgorod— For fourth month, July 11-Aug. 11_ 18,177. 00 For fifth month, Aug. 11-Sept. 11_ 18,177. 00 For sixth month, Sept. 11-Oct. 11_ 18,177.00 For seventh month, Oct. ll-N o v .ll_ 18,177. 00 For eighth month, Nov. 11-Dec. 11_ 18,177. 00 For ninth month, Dec. 11-Jan. 11_ 18,177.00 ----------------- 109,062.00 Per Toula— For fourth month, July 12-Aug. 12- 12, 948. 00 For fifth month, Aug. 12-Sept. 12_ 12,948. 00 For sixth month, Sept. 12-Oct. 12_ 12, 948. 00 For seventh month, Oct. 12-Nov. 12_ 12,948. 00 For eighth month, Nov. 12-Dec. 12_ 12, 948. 00 For ninth month, Dec. 12-Jan. 12_ 12,948.00 ----------------- 77,688.00 Per Kishenev— For fourth .month, July 9-Aug. 9_ 12, 948. 00 For fifth month, Aug. 9-Sept. 9— 12,948. 00 For sixth month, Sept. 9-Oct. 9__ 12, 948. 00 For seventh month, Oct. 9-Nov. 9_ 12,948. 00 For eighth month, Nov. 9-Dec. 9__ 12, 948. 00 For ninth month, Dec. 9-Jan. 9___ 12,948.00 ----------------- 77,688.00 ----------------- 419,565.25 689,190. 50 1,108, 755. 75 Statement of expenses in connection icith statement of chartering steamers of the Russian volunteer fleet to the United States Government and amounts due the United States Government in connection with charter of “ Omsk” and “ Irtysh ” Paid to United States Government insurance premium for Omsk for voyage from Norfolk to Liverpool___________________________$86,637.50 Paid to United States Government insurance premium for steamship Omsk for voyage from Liverpool for New York (money to be re funded)________________________________________________________ 86,637.50 122 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. Advanced to Mr. I. V. Shestaeovsky, to pay off Russian crew ex steamship Irtysh _______________________________________________$46, 019. 90 Advanced to Canadian Pacific Railroad for dispatch and paying off crew ex Nijni Novgorod, Toula, and Kishenev___________________ 132, 000. 00 Remark No. 1: Captains and officers of Russian volunteer fleet steamers which are now in New York and which are considered dismissed claim their bonuses and reserve funds, in all due to them ___________________________________________________________ 90, 000. 00 Remark No. 2: Mr. Poliakoff, formerly captain of steamship Kamenetz Podolsk, has already presented, through an attorney, claim for $15,000. Due to United States Government charter money for steamship Omsk voyage Norfolk-Liverpool from Apr. 3-May 22, 1918______________ 110, 826. 61 Due to United States Government for repairs of steamship Irtysh, approximately_________________________________ $130,000 Due to United States Government for repairs steamship Nijni Novgorod, approximately_______________________ 20, 000 -------------- 150, 000. 00 Total_______________________________________________________ 702,121. 51 Statement of account with United States Government for charter money, etc., on steamers “ Omsk” “ Irtysh ” “ Nijni Novgorod” “ Toula” “ K ishenev” up to Dec. 81, 1918, and expenses in connection therewith. DEBIT. CREDIT. Charter money due per Dee. 31, 191.S, as per list No. 1___________ $1,108, 755. 75 To be refunded, insur ance premium on home trip of steam ship Omsk from Liverpool to New York, money was paid prior to United States Government taking the steamer over at Liverpool-----86, 637. 50 Total as per statement No. 2 attached______ Balance d u e f r o m United States Gov ernment per Dec. 31, 1918________________ 1,195, 393. 25 $702,121. 51 493, 271. 74 1,195, 393. 25 SECTION 64. Statement of Condition of Russian Account August, 1918—'This Also Shows the Enormous Salaries of the Russian Embassy and Officials Allowed by the United States Out of This Liquidation Fund. FINANCIAL ATTACHE TO THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY. F l a t ir o n B u il d i n g , Neto York, August 20, 1918. Mr. A lbert R a t h b o n e , Care Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Department. D e a r M e. R a t h b o n e : In accordance with your request, I beg leave to tender you some data concerning the disbursements up to August 1, 1918, and the estimated expenditures from said date up to January, 1919. Inclosed please find a copy of a letter addressed on December 27, 1917, to Hon. R. C. Leffingwell by the Russian ambassador with two accompanying statements, which we have to consider as the starting point of our figures. Said documents show the cash available at that time subdivided into different clashes of expenditures. I further inclose several statements showing the disbursements made up to August 1, 1918, the estimates of future expenses up to January, 1919, as well the cash statement as of August 1, 1918. FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 123 These estimated expenses show a total of $6,359,594.0S. A further amount of about $750,000 should be taken into account for obligations on various orders placed from Petrograd. This brings the total to $7,i09<594.08. The cash on hand on August 1, 1918, shows $4,975,490.70. This amount must be reduced by $865,925.08, representing interest paid to the United States Gov ernment and not included in the inclosed statements of disbursements. On the other hand, an amount of about $400,000 must be added, this amount being the estimated net income from charter of Russian steamers to the United States Government. The total means available would thus reach the amount of $4,509,565.62. The balance of $2,600,028.46, to cover the estimated payments in case of necessity, could be provided for from the proceeds of sale of various goods standing at our disposal. I hope that the above information will meet your request, and I hold myself at your entire disposal for any additional data which you might find necessary. Believe me, dear Mr. Rathbone, Very sincerely, yours, Russian Financial AttacM. T r e a s u r y D ep a rtm en t, Washington, August 27, 1918. Memorandum for Mr. Rathbone: The principal conclusion I draw from the attached figures is that there are a number of items as to which our information is not very full or clear. In the month of June the only very large item is salary and office expenses, $71,307, apparently covering salaries and expenses of the embassy and con sulates. There is a corresponding amount in May of $59,517. In April the amount shown under this heading is $223,958.58, which probably covers more than one month, as there are no exactly corresponding items shown in the earlier months. The payments for expenses of railway men in Russia amount to a substantial sum, a large proportion of the total being paid through Prof. Lomonossoff. In December there are some very large items for salaries and expenses,-as follow s: Artillery department____________________________________________ $422, 822. 88 Secretarial department---------------------------------------------------------------- 244, 876.00 Prof. Lomonossoff________________________________________________ 300, 000. 00 L. TiajolofC______________________________________________________ 57, 054. 86 There is an artillery department item of $86,604.55 in January, but no similar items thereafter. In March there is an item of expenses of consulates at Chicago and Pittsburgh, $50,000. SECTION 65. Large Salaries. Russian expenditures, class 4* DECEMBER, 1917. Artillery department, Col. V. Oranovsky (N. Y .), salaries and ex' penses_______________________________________________________ Technical department, M. Yassukovitch, salaries and expenses__ Secretarial department: C. J. Madjikhovsky and Ananieff, salaries and expenses____________________________________ $244, 876,00 S. Ughet, salaries and expenses________________ 10,000. 00 V. P. Ananeiff, salary and expenses____________ 128.66 Prof. Lomonossoff, salary and expenses---------- 300,000. 00 W. P. Anderson— Salaries and office expenses---------$7,249. 71 Salary and expenses____________ 2, 840. 00 Subsidy on account of services— 308.46 Christmas gratuities to employees766.10 ---------------11,164.27 $422,822. 88 20,000.00 124 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. Secretarial department— Continued. L. Tiajoloff— Salaries and office expenses___ $57,054. 36 Salaries and Xmas gratuities__ 3, 970. 83 --------------P. A. Morosoff (New York), salaries and office expenses------------------------------------------------------A. A. Vinoff (commissary department), salaries_ Y. Petropavlosky, salaries and expenses________ Various employees— Extra compensation for Novem ber __________________________ $826.37 Salaries for December__________ 3,080. 00 Christmas gratuities____________ 1, 783. 75 ---------------A. N. Sakhnovsky (New York), legal services and expenses________________________________ Lieut. Karpoff, traveling expenses_____________ P. A. Morosoff, traveling expenses______________ S. Ughet, traveling expenses___________________ Lieut. Iampolsky (Canada)___________________ R. V. Poliosky, traveling expenses______________ C. J. Medzikhovsky— Traveling expenses_____________ $50.18 Salaries for employees__________ 1, 825. 36 ---------------Col. Donnovlsky, traveling expenses—:__________ Lieut. Platonoff, expenses London to New York_ Miscellaneous— Rent for New York office, Decem ber __________________________$1,650. 75 New York office expenses, Decem ber ___________________________ 552.45 Western Union Telegraph Co (Gen. * K h robroff)________________________ 4, 910. 52 --------------- $61, 025.19 906. 93 40, 815. 00 5,900.00 5, 690.12 15,946.97 23. 00 455.00 631. 62 346.51 125.91 1, 875. 54 75. 30 957. 50 7,113. 72 $708,057. 24 Nondepartmental payments: W. P. Anderson— Daily money for two months______________ Advance for Mr. Ignative________________ L. Tiojoloff— Return expenses to Russia of various officersAdditional salary for various officers______ Salary for Col. Abbott____________________ Lieut. Maletsky, return expenses to Russia______ Lieut. Dmetneff, return expenses to Russia______ Capt. Grinoff, salary due in Russia______ :_____ Zimdin & Co. (telegraphic)------------------------------- 1, 644. 46 500.00 6, 878. 39 1,208. 74 1,000. 00 641. 46 641. 46 2, 345. 27 .92 14,860.70 Salaries: J. Goodkoff, salary for November_____________ C. J. Medzikhovsky, salary for November______ Y. P. Ananeiff, salary for November__________ 350.00 806. 33 168. 80 1, 325.13 Miscellaneous: Coudert Bros., New York, legal services________ Western Union Telegraph Co., bills for November 639. 67 1,114. 66 1,754.33 ., 168,820.28 JANUARY 1918. Artillery Department, Col. Y. Oranovsky, expenses for January _« $86, 604.55 125 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. Nondepartmental: Representative money for Anderson and Kachetkoff_______________________________________ Col. Abbott, salary for December______________ B. L. Brazol (New York), supplementary money Lieut. Konshin (New York), salary due in Russia- C7, 561. 30 1,000.00 510.97 423. 60 $9,495. 87 Secretarial: Various employes— Extra compensation for December. $883.18 Salaries for January------------------ 3,115. 00 3, 998. .18 P. A. Morosoff— Office expenses__________________ 2,817.34 Traveling expenses______________ 260. 72 C. J. Medzikhovsky, traveling expenses__________ Gen. A. Ziegler, traveling expenses_____________ J. D. Jolkovsky, office expenses________________ R. Poliokoff— Office expenses for December and January______________________ $2,822. 95 Supplementary money____________ 2,022. 72 Traveling expenses______________ 260. 00 3,078. 06 115. 36 54. 85 50. 00 5,105. 67 12, 402.12 Salaries: Goodkoff_____________________________________ Medzikhovsky_________________________________ Anoneiff _____________________________________ 350. 00 806. 33 168. 80 K. F. Fabian, salaries and expenses____________________ ________ Bishop Alexander, upkeep of North American Orthodox Mission_ V. Novitsky (Washington), office expenses______________________ S. Ughet (financial attach^)), salary and expenses_____________ Account C, direct payment (Compte cheque)____________________ Miscellaneous, telegraphic_____________________________________ Total. •1, 325.13 12, 600. 00 24, 000. 00 6, 000 00 5, 832. 92 1,652. 30 .92 159, 913. 81 FEBRUARY, 1918. Secretarial department: A. N. Avinoff (commissary departmentt) office expenses for four months____________________ $26, 788. 73 C. D. Medzikrovsky— Supplementary money_____________________ 2,200. 00 Various employees’ salaries for January and F eb ru a ry _______________________________ 3, 627. 42 P. A. Morosoff, office expenses-------------------------906. 04 S. Ughet, traveling expenses___________________ 390. 90 R. Poliakoff, traveling expenses------------------------55. 55 Miscellaneous— Rent for February, New York office__________________________$1,650.75 Expenses, New York office--------377.80 --------------2,028. 55 $35,997.19 Nondepartmental payments: L. D. Tiajoloff— Salaries for various officers------------------------Return to Russia of Col. Bek______________ 5, 582.35 641. 46 6,223.81 Salaries: Goodkoff______________________________________ ______350. 00 Medzikhovsky__________________________________ _____ 677. 80 Ananieff---------------------------------------------------------------------168. 80 , 1 196.60 126 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. G. Klodnitsky, salaries and expenses-----------------------------------------Account C. direct payment (Compte cheque)___________________ Miscellaneous: J. J. Connor, salary__________________________ $100.00 Western Union Telegraph Co. (Ughet for De cember and January)_______________________ 256.88 -------------------Total_____________________________________________________ $2, 349. 00 4G1. 74 356.88 46, 585.22 MARCH, 1918. Nondepartmental payments: L. D. Tiajoloff— Advance for salaries____________________ Salary of Col. Abbott______________________ Salary of Mr. Chicoff______________________ Lieut. Alexeew, return expenses to Russia______ $11, 009. 20 2, 000. 00 1, 881.00 494. 77 $15, 384.97 Salaries: 350. 00 Goodkoff______________________________________ Medzikhovsky_________________________________ 1, 355. 60 Ananieff_______________________________________ 377. 60 -------------------K. F. Fabian, sala ries and expenses_______________ 8, 500.00 V. Petropavlosky, salaries and expenses____________ 8, 000. 00 1,503.80 Col. Nikolaieff (Washington), expenses____________ M. Oustinoff (New York), expenses of consulates at Chicago and Pittsburgh_______________________ 50,000. 00 10,000.00 W. Baslikiroff (New York), expenses______________ W. P. Anderson: Expenses of two engineers__________$1, 800.00 Assistance to f gricultural instructors. 1, 500. 00 --------------3,300.00 Col. Gadsevitch, expenses___________________________ 263. 37 N ovitsky (W a s h in g to n ), expenses __________________ 9,000.00 Miscellaneous: J. J. Connor, salary_______________ $100. 00 Expenses of advertising bonds, N. C. B_ 150. 23 --------------250.23 Railway department: Count Shulenburg, expenses of raihvaymen in R ussia______________________________________ 95, 560. 23 Prof. Lomonossoff, expenses of railwaymen in Russia______________________________________ 500. 00 2,043 20 8, 500. 00 8, 000. 00 1,503.80 50,000. 00 10,000.00 3,300.00 263. 37 9,000.00 250.23 96,060. 23 Secretarial department: M. Yassukovitch, salaries and office expenses___ W. P. Anderson, office expenses________________ Coudert Bros., legal services to Dec. 31, 1917___ Capt. Visotsky, expenses of reorganization of archives_____________________________________ S. Koshkin, traveling expenses-------------------------M. Schumantoff— Salary and expenses__________$5,154. 00 Traveling expenses_____________ 150, 54 ---------------L. D. Tiajoloff— Office expenses__________________ 495. 54 Salaries for March_____________ 2,215.00 --------------A. Vinoff, salary_______________________________ C. J. Medzikhovsky, traveling expenses_________ P. A. Morosoff, traveling expenses______________ A. Polouboyarenoff, traveling expenses_________ J. D. Jolovaky, petty cash for office____________ R. Poliakoff, traveling expenses________________ S. Ughet, traveling expenses--------------------------- 10,000.00 2, 960. 69 25,117. 00 1, 600.00 23. 67 5,304. 54 2, 710. 54 1, 314. 53 100. 36 150. 54 23. 58 50. 00 70. 00 260.72 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOE MAKING SAME. 127 Secretarial department—Continued. Various employees— Extra compensation for February. $582.03 Salaries for March______________ 2,935.00 Miscellaneous— Office expense, New York_________ 305. 82 Rent for February, New York____ 1, 650. 75 Western Union Telegraph Co. ( Gen. Khrabroff)____________________ 1,725.22 $3, 517.03 3, 681. 79 $56,884. 79 T ota l____________________________________________ 261,190. 79 APRIL, 1918. Railway department: Prof. Lomonossoff— Expenses of railwaymen in Russia________ Purchase of technical books_______________ Upkeep of Railway Mission for May_______ Nondepartmental payments: Salary for Col. Abbott for March and April____ Medzikhovsky, return trip to Russia of GudkoflL Tiajoloff, salaries for April____________________ $69,608. 79 1,000.00 15, 000. 00 $85, 608. 79 2, 000. 00 962. 00 6,471. 38 Transportation department, Medzikhovsky, rent for temporary storage _______________________________________________________ Salaries: Medzikhovsky, salary for April________________ $677. 80 168.80 Ananieff, salary for April______:________________ Provisional ambassador, expenses and salaries of embassy and consulates____________________________________________________ Col. Nikolaieff, subsidy to officers_______________________________ Account C______________________________________________________ Provisional ambassador transfer to Riggs Bank for salaries and expenses of embassy and consulates___________________________ Miscellaneous: Rent for storage places_______________________ $510. 60 Military attache_______________________________ 32. 28 9, 433. 38 1,950. 00 846. 60 10, 000. 00 5, 000. 00 283. 76 223, 958. 58 542. 88 Secretarial department: Tiajoloff— Office expenses__________________ $565.97 Liquidating bonuses to employees- 8, 736, 65 Liquidation of Remington plant_ 5, 000. 00 Pushkiroff, salary for March_________________ Jolosky, petty cash -----------------------------------------Various employees: Extra compensation for March____ $535. 49 Extra compensation for April_____ 485. 64 Salaries for April________________ 2,935. 00 14, 302,. 62 300. 00 50.00 3,956.13 A. Vinoff: Office expenses____________________ Liquidating bonuses________________ 10, 720. 62 21, 955.48 32,676. 30 Gen. Khrabroff, advance for office ex penses ________________________________ ___________ Wissotsky: Advance salary of Stasenko for April------------------------ $175.00 Salaries of employees to May 1 __________________ 160.00 2,000.00 835.00 128 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. M. Yussukovitcli, advance for storage____________ W. P. Anderson: Representative money from Jan. 1 to May 1____________________________ $2, 000. 00 Office expenses and salaries________ 1, 752. 29 Traveling expenses-------------------------250.90 ----------------Gen. Ziegler, traveling expenses___________________ S. Ughet, traveling expenses_______________________ R. Poliakoff, traveling expenses____________________ C. J. Medzikhovsky: Traveling expenses_________________ $140. 36 Liquidating bonuses________________ 4,054. 26 ----------------A. N. Sakhnovsky, extra salary from Jan. 1 to Nov. 1_________________________________ Miscellaneous: Rent for April (New Y ork )_________ $1, 650. 75 Western Union Telegraph Co.— Bills for March________________ 464.44 New York Telegraph Co., bills for A p ril____________________ 38. 75 Remington Arms (supplies)____ 664.82 Office expenses and supplies____ 615.98 ----------------- $1,000.00 4,003.19 4, 003.19 73.95 521. 44 81.10 4,194. 62 1, 753. 04 3,434.274 $68, 682.13 Total_____________________________________________________ 406,306.12 MAY, 1918. Railway department: Count Shulenburg— Expense of railway men in Russia_________ Prof. Loirronossoff— Expense ot railway men in Russia__________ Upkeep of Railway Mission for June_______ $75, 000. 00 45, 575. 49 15,000. 00 Salaries, Medzikhoosky, salary for May__________________________ K. F. Fabian, representative Moscow district supply committee_ Anderson, W P., and E. Berry, agricultural instructors___________ Nelse Johnson, trip to Russia__________________________________ Gen. A. Dobraj insky (salaries)__________________________________ Y. Petropavloosky, revision of operations of Russian institutionsS. MacTaggert, expense in ChristianiaAccount C__________________________________________ Miscellaneous, Western Union Telegraph Co_________ Chancery and archives, E. W itssotsky: Advance for May, salaries__________ $59, 517. 00 Office expenses_____________________ 1,000. 00 Claims against Russian Supply Co_ 5,000. 00 Expense for detective work________ 500. 00 Advance for immediate expenses____ 4,000. 00 Advance for treatment of Strutzinsky____________________________ 120. 00 Telephone service---------------------------150.00 Traveling expenses_________________ 2, 000. 00 Advance for overtime______________ 1,000.00 Advance for rent___________________ 2,074.17 $75,361.17 S. Ughet, expenses of Washington office_____________ 500.00 C. J. Medzikhovskv, advance for Brooklyn rent_____ 250.00 Petropavlosky, salaries and (expenses of representative of Russian State control_________________________ 15,000.00 Condert Bros., legal services and expenses_________ 4,003. 26 G. Y. Shestocovsky, advances for telephone, etc______ 150. 00 $135, 575. 49 1, 065. 55 4,150. 00 450. 00 2, 080. 45 6,169. 66 6, 000. 00 215. 89 748. 76 46.06 129 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. Capt. Smirnoff, reimbursement for rent o f May--------Mrs. O. Leichter (N. Y .), reimbursement funeral ' expenses of S. Leichter----------------------------------------- $73. 33 500.00 ------------------- $95, 837. 76 Total____________________________________________________ 252, 339. 62 JUNE, 1918. Railway department: L. Lipets— Expenses of railwaymen in Russia_________ Traveling expenses_________________________ $12,000.00 5,000.00 ------------------Medzikhovsky, salary for June-------------------------------------------------Fabian, expenses for June______________________________________ Novitsky, office expenses________________________________________ Petropavlosky, salaries and expenses________________________ Engineer Paykine, salary due from Russia______________________ Miscellaneous, Barrow, Wade & Gutherie, accounting____________ Chancery and archives: Adrianoff, salary from Aug. 1,1915 to Apr. 17-182, 737. 34 Rent for May (N. Y .)_________________ $128.00 Rent for June (N. Y .)________________ 147.50 -----------275.50 Wissotsky, reimbursement for storage__________ 255.30 ------------------Advances: E. Wissotsky, salaries and office expenses for June_______________________________________ 71, 307. 00 C. J. Medzikovsky, funds advanced for trans portation section_____________________________ 15, 000.00 ------------------Total_____________________________________________________ $17,000.00 1,052. 55 1, 340. 00 9, 000. 00 1, 200.00 1, 546. 43 5,000.00 3,318.14 66, 307.00 125,764.12 SECTION 66. United States Nayy Department Payments to the De Facto Russian Ambassador. 28-905-1176 N a v y D e p a rtm e n t, Washington, September 24, 1918. The honorable the S e c r e t a r y o f t h e T r e a s u r y . Subject: Payment of charter rate for steamers Foam, Ripple, and Spray. Reference: {a) Secretary of State, letter dated May 2, 1918, to the honorable the Secretary of the Navy; (b) Third District Naval Force, requisition No. 139, Bureau S. O., dated July 20, 1918; (c) Third Naval District Reserve Force, requisition No. 140, Bureau S. O., dated July 20, 1918; ((Z) Third District Naval Force, requisition No. 141, Bureau S. O., dated July 20, 1918; ( e ) Third District Naval Force, requisition No. 186, Bureau S. O., dated August 3,1918; ( f ) Third District Reserve Force, requisition No. 196, Bureau S. O., dated August 2, 1918; (g) Third District Naval Force, requisition No. 500-S. O., dated September 9, 1918; ( h) Third Naval District, requisition No. 492, Bureau S. O., dated September 9, 1918; (i) Third District Naval Force, requisition No. 502, Bureau S. O., dated September 9, 1918. Inclosure: Copy of reference ( « ) , (&), (c), (d ), (e ), ( f ), ( g ), (ft), and (i). The above requisitions cover the payment of charter rates on the steamers Foam, Ripple, and Spray, which have been chartered from the Provisional Government of Russia. The Secretary of State suggested, in reference( a ), “ that the approval of the Treasury Department be obtained for the payment of the charter hire to the individual named in the charter party.” The Secretary of State evidently S. Doc. 86,67-2------9 130 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. deemed it necessary to have a competent authority to decide whether or not the individual named in tlie charter party was the proper and competent person to receive payment on behalf of the Provisional Russian Government. It would be appreciated, therefore, if the Secretary of the Treasury would express an opinion as to whether the party referred to in the attached requisi tion, namely “ S. Ughet, Russian financial attache, Flatiron Building, New York City,” is the proper party to receive the payments called for in the above requisitions. Refund of pairers is requested. J o se ph u s D a n ie l s . SECTION 67. Treasury Department O. K.’s Payment of Private Loan Interest from this Fund. O c t o b e r 21, 1918. J. T. C o s b y , Esq., Vice President National City Bank of New York, 55 Wall Street, New York City. D ear S ir : With reference to your letter of October 10, the Treasury Depart ment raises no objections to the payment amounting to some $20,000 for the coupons maturing this month on the Russian internal per cent bonds. Yours, very truly, A lb e r t R a t h b o n e . GOM. JF. SECTION 68. Money Sent from this Fund to Pay Upkeep of Embassies o f De Facto Russian Government in Belgium and Norway. N o v e m b e r 2, 1918. Esq., Care of Department of State, local. D e a r M r. M ii.e s : In accordance with my telephone conversation with you, we have advised M r. Ughet, Russian financial attache, that there is no objec tion to the transfer of $17,000 and $8,000, respectively, to the Russian legations in Norway and Belgium. These funds are to be taken from accounts over which we have exercised no direct jurisdiction. Very truly, yours, B a s il M ile s , N o rm an H . D a v is . SECTION 69. November 1,1918, Account. Estimated situation of accounts of the Russian Government in the United States of America. ASSETS AS OF NOVEMBER 1, 1918. 1. Cash: Account A------------------------------------------------------------------Account B------------------------------------------------------------------Account B (confirmed credit for payments for interest on $11,000,000—5 per cent bonds, May 1,1919,included). Account C------------------------------------------------------------------Account D____________________________________________ Account H ------------------------------------------------------------------Account M------------------------------------------------------------------Total________________________________________________ 2. Amounts receivable on invoiced sales: a. Rails, up to Dec. 1, 1918_____________________________ b. Various, up to Jan. 1, 1919---------------------------------------- $1,281. 944. 60 215, 377. 49 330,000.00 767, 410. 05 21, 623. 02 4, 993, 338. 72 26, 725. 00 7, 636, 418. 88 141,033.34 199, 935.93 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 3. Estimated receipts for rails sold but not invoiced up to Apr. 1, 1919_____________________________________________ 4. Estimate of gross income up to Jan. 1, 1919, for charter of volunteer fleet steamers (net income $419,950.74 up to Feb. 1, 1919)__________________________________________________ 5. Estimate of receipts for charter of trawlers (up to Jan. 1, 1919)____________________________________________________ 6. Estimated interest on various accounts in the National City Bank (2 per cent on $6,000,000 for two months, from Nov. 1, 1918, to Jan. 1, 1919)__________________________________ 7. Estimate of receipts for sale of Remington’s equipment, up to Feb. 1, 1919__________________________________________ 8. Credit balance as of Nov. 1, 1918, of the a /c of the liquidation of the Remington rifle contract_________________________ Total________________________________________________ 131 $G, 977, 551. 37 1,152,072.25 49,112.87 20, 000. 00 3, 697, 649. 19 391, 638. 26 20, 265, 412. 09 LIABILITIES AS OF NOVEMBER 1, 1918. 1. Payments on statements of liabilities No, and 1 and No. 2____ 2. Payments on orders of the chancery of credit: a. Moscow Machine Tool Works________________________ b. Canning machinery__________________________________ c. Reserve for unsettled payments---------------------------------3. Estimated operative expenses of transportation section, up to Jan. 1, 1919__________________________________________ 4. Estimated expenses in connection with charter of Hussion volunteer fleet steamers up to Jan. 1, 1919________________ 5. Estimated freight expenses of Railway Mission up to Jan. 1, 1919, $490,725.24, less amount included in statement No. 1, $108,725.24________________________________________ 6. Estimate of operative expenses of information and report sec tion for storage and insurance___________________________ 7. Payments for air brakes for closed cars (the sum is approxi mation ) _________________________________________________ 8. Payments on spare parts for closed cars---------------------------9. Payments for bank notes___________________________________ 10. Estimated expenses on the order foi 50-copek treasury bills_ 11. Estimate for expenditures on personnel up to Jan. 1. 1919___ 12. Interest up to Jan. 1, 1919, on $25,000,000, 5| per cent bonds_ Commission________________________________________________ 13. Interest on $11,000,000, 5 per cent bonds up to May 1, 1919 (confirmed credit)---------------------------------------------------------14. Interest up to Jan. 10, 1919, on $50,000,000, 6J per cent bondsCommission-----------------------------------------------------------------------15. Estimated payments on coupons of Russion internal war loans up to Jan. 1, 1919-----------------------------------------------------------16. Payment to Remington A. U. M. C. Co. for rifles___________ 17. Estimated expenses of the Remington trustees______________ 1, 201, 733. 51 82, 748. 50 165, 000. 00 150,000. 00 892,000.00 732,121. 51 3S2, 000. 00 14, 000. 00 350, 000.00 300, 000. 00 214, 800. 00 225, 000. 00 150, 000. 00 687, 500. 00 859. 38 330,000.00 1, 625,000. 00 125, 000. 00 35,000.00 6, 808, 350. 00 42,087. 45 Total____________________________________________________ 14, 513, 200. 35 Credit balance------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5, 752,211. 74 Grand total--------------------------------------------------------------------- 20,265,412.09 SECTION 70. Bakhmeteff Gives His I. O. U. for Almost $5,000,000 of Interest Due the United States. R u s s ia n E m b assy, Washington, November lJf, 1918. The honorable the S e c r e t a r y o f t h e T r e a s u r y . M y D e a r M r. S e c r e t a r y : Referring to your letter of October 31 in regard to the interest due on the 15th of this month on the obligations of my Govern ment held by the United States, I desire to inform you that at the moment I 132 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. have not the cash available which will enable me to pay the interest in the amount of $4,728,997.60 due on that date. I have executed and hand you herewith a certificate o f indebtedness for $4,728,997.60, payable on demand, and ask that you receive the same in lieu of a cash payment of the interest referred to, due on the 15th of this month. You will observe that this certificate of indebtedness is payable on demand, so that if we are unable 1:0 agree upon arrangements relating to the postponement of any cash payments from my Government, you are in a position to demand pay ment of this certificate. Very truly, yours, B. B akh m eteff, The Extraordinary Russian Ambassador. SECTION 71. President Wilson Transfers $5,000,000 from His Special War Fund Given Him to Prosecute the War for Winter Supplies to Russians in Archangel Dis trict, November 20, 1918, Nine Days After the War Was Over. N o v e m b e r 20, 1918. H. H. P i e r c e , Esq., War Trade Board, Washington, D. C. D e a r M r. P i e r c e : In accordance with your request over the telephone, I inclose copies of the letters in connection with the allotment by the President of $5,000,000 from the appropriation of $50,000,000 for national security and defense for the purpose of providing for winter supplies for the civilian population of the Archangel district of Russia. Very truly, yours, N. K elley. SECTION 72. Kolchak to Pay All Foreign Loans if Successful—He Was Therefore Given Aid by United States. P e k in g , November 27t 1918. S ecretary of S t a t e , Washington: Following from Omsk. 207. Twenty-seventh. All-Russian Provincial Govern ment has issued following statement: “ Considering ourselves proper and lawful successors to all lawful Russian Governments which existed up to the end of October, 1917. The Government were such, Admiral Kolchak at its head takes the stand of absolutely executing according to the reestablishment of whole Russia all financial obligations which the Government has taken upon itse lf; for instance, the payment of interest, the settlement of interior and foreign loans, payments per contracts, the supporting of employees, pensions and all sorts of other payments payable legally from the treasury. The Government has declared that all financial acts which were established by the soviet conference are unlawful and are not to be executed, being acts established by rebels. Signed, Admiral Kolchak and the members of the Government.” Minister of Finance Michaeloff confirmed this statement to me yesterday. He further stated that it took 500,000,000 rubles monthly to meet the expenditures of the new Govern ment—350,000,000 were necessary for army and 100,000,000 for Siberian Rail road, leaving only 50,000,000 for miscellaneous expenses. Harris. R e in s c h . SECTION 73. One Hundred Thousand Dollars from Liquidation Fund for Expenses of De Facto Russian Government to the Peace Conference. D e c e m b e r 5, 1918. : In the current statement of proposed disbursements of the Russian Government in the United States is an item of $100,000, to be placed at the disposal of the ambassador for expenses at the peace conference. D e a r M r. P o l k FOREIGN" LOAN'S AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 133 I im informed by Mr. Ughet that you have approved in principle such an .allo cation, and I should be glad to be advised whether you think it desirable, upon political grounds, that the allocation should be allowed to be made without any objection being interposed by the Treasury. Statements submitted by Mr. Ughet show assets exceeding liabilities on con tracts and other current liabilities, exclusive of interest due to the United States of about $2,800,000. Yours, very truly, A lbe rt R a t h b o n e . Hon. F r a n k L. P o l k , Acting Secretary of State, Washington. D e p a rtm e n t o f S ta te , Washington, December 7, 1918. M y D e a r M r. R a t h b o n e : I have your letter of December 5, in which you in form me that in the current statement of proposed disbursements of the Russian Government in the United States is an item of $100,000 to be placed at the disposal of the Russian ambassador for expenses at the peace conference. If the Treasury Department concurs, I would offer no objection to this sum being placed at the disposal of the ambassador, and so informed the ambassador in view of the representations he made concerning his proposal to be in Paris during the time of the peace conference. I am, my dear Mr. Rathbone, Very sincerely, yours, F r a n k L. P o l k . The Hon. A l b e r t R a t h b o n e , Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. D e p a rtm e n t o f S ta te , Washington, December SI, 1918. M y D e a r M r . R a t h b o n e : I have your letter of December 12, 1918, with refer ence to the sum of $100,000 to be placed at the disposal of the Russian am bassador for expenses at the peace conference. I talked with the Russian ambassador about placing this sum at his disposal, and from what he told me I do not believe it is excessive, and consequently see no objection to placing the entire amount at his disposal. I am, my dear Mr. Rathbone, Very truly, yours, F r a n k L. P o l k , Acting Secretary of State. Hon A l b e r t R a t h b o n e , Assistant Treasurer. SECTION 74. Lansing Postpones Collection of Money Due United States in Order to Keep Up Russian Embassy. D e p a rtm e n t o f S ta te , Washington, November 29, 1918. M y D e a r M r. P r e s i d e n t : The Russian ambassador, from Russian funds available to him, has been paying interest on the following Russian obligations held in this country: 1. Russian obligations held by the Treasury____________________ $187, 729, 750 2. Russian Government credit advanced by National City Bank in 1916 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------50,000,000 3. Russian bonds bought by a syndicate of banks, including National City Bank, and partly sold to the public___________ 25,000,000 4. Russian notes held by group of banks------------------------------------11, 000,000 The Treasury Department advises me that while adequate funds may be available later, for example, from the sale of certain Russian supplies in this 134 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. country, the Russian ambassador lias not now sufficient funds on hand to meet the interest on these obligations as they fall due. I f the interest is collected, the embassy and the Russian consultes still maintained as usual in the United States, will be forced to close; Russia will be without representa tion. The Treasury takes tlie position that unless political considerations, known to the Department of State, urge the contrary, the Government’s interest must be protected before that of the private banks; in other words, that interest on obligations held by the Treasury must be collected before in terest can be paid on private holdings. I believe that political considerations justify the Government in postponing collection of the interest due it, and, if another arrangement can not be reached, allowing the Russian ambassador to pay the interest on obligations held by the banks and by the public, and to defer payment 011 obligations held by the Treasury. I have favored maintaining Russian representation in the United States as long as may be practicable. Moreover, the Government has announced its settled purpose to assist Russia; the public has assumed no such commitment. I think it but a matter of just policy to defer for the time or postpone until the establishment of orderly government the collection of interest due the United States on and after November 15, 1918. I shall be glad to know if you concur, as an interest payment on $25,000,000, noted above, is payable Monday, December 2: the ambassador will require authority to pay. Faithfully, yours, R obert L a n s i n g . The P r e s i d e n t , The White House. D epartm ent of State. Washington, January 7, 1918. M y D e a r M r. S e c r e t a r y : Referring to our conference yesterday regarding Russian bonds and obligations in this country, I believe the situation is such that it would be unfortunate if we offered any objection at this time to the payment of interest 011 the $50,000,000 of Russian bonds due January 10, 1919. I believe political considerations should prompt us to acquiesce in the payment of this interest and shall be glad to know that you concur. It strikes me as especially important that 110 action should be taken which might affect Rus sian interests unfavorably until the general question of the relation of our selves and the other associated Governments toward Russia is more clearly defined. I am, my dear Mr. Glass, Very sincerely, yours, F r a n k L. P o lk. The Hon. C a r t e r H. G l a s s , Secretary of the Treasury. N e w Y o r k , January 14, 1919. Sir : Referring to the interest due the 10th of January on our “ report ” operation of $50,000,000, with a syndicate of American banks headed by The National City Bank of New York, I beg to state that while this matter was taken up with the Hon. A. Rathbone, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Rathbone informed me that the United States Government would see 110 objection that this payment on the 10th of January be made by me, provided, however, that the Russian embassy pays to the Treasury Department, in cash, the sum of $300 000, to apply on account of interest due on November 15, 1918, to the United States Government on the advances made to the Russian Government. In pursuance of this specific request I beg to inclose herewith my check for $300,000 to your order, representing a part of the cash payment of the interest due to the United States Government on November 15, 1918. I would be very much obliged if you would kindly cause the usual receipt to be made and forwarded to me. Very truly, yours, Serge U g h et, The S e c r e t a r y o f t h e T r e a s u r y , Washington, D. C. Russian Financial A ttache FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 135 SECTION 74-A. State Department’s Resume of Russian Situation. D e p a rtm e n t o f S ta te , Washington, December 13, 1918. D e a r M r. S e c r e t a r y : Referring to Department’s letter of May 14, 1917, in closing a telegram from the American ambassador at Petrograd, dated May 11, 1917, stating that the Russian charg£ d’affaires here had been authorized to act for Russia until the arrival of Mr. Bakhmeteff about June 15, 1917, and referring to the letter of Mr. C. Onou, the Russian charge d’affaires, to Mr. Oscar T. Crosby, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, dated May 16, 1917, in closing copies of two telegrams of the Russian minister of foreign affaires and stating that they authorize him in the name of the Russian Provisional Govern ment to incur obligations in its behalf under the act of Congress approved April 24, 1917, to sign the bonds of his Government to be purchased by the United States and to agree to terms and conditions in connection with the same, which will be an essential part of the transaction, and referring also to department’s letter of May 17, 1917, inclosing a telegram from the American ambassador at Petrograd, dated May 15,1917, stating that he had been formally advised by the Russian foreign office of the designation by the Russian Govern ment of its charg6 d’affaires here, Mr. Onou, in the name of his Government to sign obligations and to make declarations in connection with loans until the arrival o f Mr. Bakhmeteff, and referring further to department’s letter of June 22, 1917, inclosing the powers of Mr. Bakhmeteff, Russian ambassador to the United States on special mission, authorizing him to enter into financial agree ments between the two Governments and to sign the obligations of Russia thereunder, and referring finally to department’s letter of October 25, 1917, inclosing a mail dispatch from the American ambassador at Petrograd, dated September 11, 1917, transmitting a note of August 14/27, 1917, of the Russian foreign minister, stating that the Russian ambasador at Washington was authorized to sign in the name of the Russian Provisional Government shorttime obligations for advances made by the United States Treasury, I have the honor to confirm your informal advices that demand obligations o f the Pro visional Government of Russia payable to the United States of America have been executed and issued by Mr. B. Bakhmeteff, in the name of the Provisional Government of Russia from time to time, and delivered to you in the total face amount of $187,729,750, of which obligations in the face amount o f $186,> 400,000 were so delivered between July 6,1917, and November 1,1917, both dates inclusive, against the contemporaneous payment to Mr. Bakhmeteff for his Gov ernment of cash to the full face amount of the respective obligations, and a further obligation in the amount of $1,329,750 was executed by Mr. Bakhmeteff in the name of his Government under date of November 15, 1917, and delivered to you on November 20, 1917, against a cash advance in like amount made to Mr. Bakhmeteff to enable his Government to pay the interest which became due on November 15, 1917, on its obligations then held by the United States. In view of the circumstances above set out, the above-mentioned obligations issued and executed by Mr. Bakhmeteff in the name of and under full powers of the Provisional Government of Russia are regarded by this department as valid and binding internationally and have its sanction. I am, dear Mr. Secretary, Very sincerely, yours, The F ran k L. P olk. S ecreta ry o f t h e T rea su ry . SECTION 75. Interest Memorandum. MEMORANDUM RE GENERAL RUSSIAN POSITION AND INTEREST DUE BY RUSSIA. At the time the Kerensky government was overthrown by the Bolsheviks, and advances to Russia by the Treasury were discontinued (that is, about November 1, 1917), the Russian Government had outstanding large contracts which it expected to meet out o f United States credits. Its cash 136 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. resources were far from adequate to meet is obligations, but after much ne gotiation and effort cancellation and sales were effected which put tlie Russian Government in tlie possession of sufficient funds to meet its liabilities on tliese contracts as reduced and to leave a certain balance. The principal commodity available for sale was a supply of 243,000 tons of rails, of which 220,000 tons were on the eastern seaboard. The sale of these rails seemed especially desirable; first, because they were needed for military railways in France; second, because they were causing congestion at ports; and, third, bcause the proceeds would greatly alleviate the financial situation of the Russian Government. It appeared that these rails were not purchased from either British of United States Government advances, but from the proceeds o f securities sold by Russia in the United States, comprising $11,000,000 of one-year notes, wliicli have been three times renewed, now maturing May 1, 1919; $50,000,000 6i per cent credit negotiated through syndi cate bankers and maturing in June, 1919; $25,000,000 Russian 5£ per cent bonds, and some interior Russian bonds. The interest on these borrowings has been paid as it matured up to the present time. When the $11,000,000 of notes matured on May 1 last, the Treasury opposed all suggestion as to payment on account of the principal, and eventually the holders agreed to extend them until May, 1919, upon an irrevocable allocation of funds being made to meet the interest maturing during the year. On May 15, 1918, interest became due to the United States Treasury to the amount of $3,674,431.08. Payments amounting to $1,865,925.08 were made in cash on July 3 and August 17, 1918, and the remainder is expected to be met out of the proceeds of the sale of certain cargoes realized in England upon the diversion of the steamers from Russian ports by reason of the unfriendly developments in Russia. These cargoes consisted largely of goods purchased out of United States credits, and the proceeds of the cargoes are being deposited with the Treasurer of the United States, the amount at present being $1,903,806. The Russian ambassa dor has undertaken to defray, out of his general funds, the amount due to certain private owners of cargo; these payments are estimated at $85,000, of which approximately $65,000 have been paid. Upon November 15, 1918, interest became due to the United States to the amount of $4,728,997.60. No cash has been paid, but the ambassador has given a demand note to represent the amount of this interest. With the approval of the State Department, the Treasury interposed no objection to the payment of interest, which became due on December 1, on the $25,000,000 bonds held by the American public. After conference between the President and the Secretary, the Treasury on December 11 expressed the view that the interest which becomes due on January 10 on the $5,000,000 6| per cent credit should not be paid, so long as interest due the United States re mained unpaid. Mr. McAdoo, however, advised that the President had given no directions in regard to the matter and the Treasury was free to adopt such policy in regard to the matter as it should deem wise. Mr. Ughet, the Russian charge d’affairs, is extremely anxious that this in terest, which amounts to $1,625,000 plus a commission to the bankers of $125,000, should be paid. He argues forcibly that Russia having avoided default in the United States until now it is undesirable that default should occur just when the peace conference which is bound to concern itself with the future policy toward Russia is about to meet, and just after the Omsk Gov ernment, which is regarded by him as the nucleus of a future Russian Govment, has announced its policy of recognizing and meeting Russia’s external obligations. He also urges that the loan of $11,000,000, maturing May 1, is secured by Russian internal bonds of a face value of 145,000,000 rubles, and that any default now would greatly depreciate the value o f these ruble bonds which the holders of the $11,000,000 notes may naturally be expected to realize if the note is not paid. Statements submitted by Mr. Ughet indicate that the Russian Government will be unable to meet its maturing obligations and provide for its outstanding contracts very much longer. His estimate made as of January 1 shows that after collecting all accounts due and meeting maturing interest, current ex penditures, and payments on contracts there will be a deficit on May 1 of $1,660,000 without allowing for any interest due to the United States Govern ment. Examination of this statement which was furnished yesterday raises some questions as to the correctness of the basis upon which it is prepared, but it. is doubtless sufficiently accurate to form the basis for determination of a general policy. One very uncertain item in the statement is the provision of FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 137 $2,761,000 for net amount payable under a contract with the Remington Arms Union Metallic Cartridge Co. The amounts payable under this contract are now the subject of arbitration and there is a wide difference between the claims of the two parties, so that the amount payable may be substantially increased or reduced. On the other hand, it does not now seem probable that any determination on this question will be reached before May 1. Attached is the statement received and also a condensed summary thereof. It will be observed that the principal expenditures for the five months are for freights, transportation expenses, and expenditures in connection with the Russian railways, all of which seem vitally important to the relief and economic reconstruction of Russia. The principal assets are the cash and accounts receivable arising from the sale of rails. The considerations in favor of the payment of interest have already been brought forward. From the purely Treasury standpoint the question resolves itself into one as to the relative priority of its claim for interest and other claims against Russia, and from a broader standpoint it may be regarded as a question of priority between (1) interest due to the United States Government, (2) interest due to other parties, (3) existing contract obligations, and (4) ex penditures for transportation of supplies now owned by Russia in the United States to Russian points. On November 16, 1918, being the last for which a statement is available, the tonnage of materials belonging to the Russian Government on hand at various United States ports amounted to 81,839 tons, the principal item being 73,440 of railroad equipment—locomotives, cars, and car parts. The following further considerations are put forward for whatever weight, if any, they may have: During the period since November 1, 1917, approximately $7,000,000 have been paid in interest, etc., on the bonds held by private holders in the United States. Approximately $12,000,000 has been realized or is due for property sold which was originally acquired from the proceeds of these bonds. As between the United States and Great Britain the principle has been followed that control of property realized should be with the Government which financed the original purchase. At November 1, 1917, the debt to the public represented about 32 per cent; that to the United States about 68 per cent of the borrowings of Russia in the United States. If the property then on hand had been distributed to creditors pro rata the private creditors would have received a sum substantially in excess of the amount which they have received up to now. Of course, the United States has received less in proportion to its debt than the private creditors, but it may be urged that it has been a party to the dis position of the assets in other ways and has an important political interest at stake while the private creditors had no such voice or interest. Attached is a memorandum of Russian bonds which could be pledged to secure the interest now due the United States, if deemed advisable to receive the same. It is possible that the Russian Government might be induced to pay, say, $300,000 on account of this intrest in cash. A. R. J a n u a r y 3, 1919. Summary of Russian financial statement as at Jan. 1, 1919, toith estimated expenditures to May 1, 1919. A Q oatc• Cash______________________________________________________ $5, 415, 071. 09 Accounts receivable________________________________________ 5, 8S4,175.13 Together________________________________________________ 11,299, 246. 22 Liabilities and reserves for expenditures: Balances of contracts for materials, etc------------------------------Freight (ocean and rail) and storage charges Jan. 1. to May 1,1919___________________________________________________ Due to Shipping Board for requisitioned steamers Jan. 1, to May 1,1919______________________________________________ Payments on account of bank notes and 50-kopeck bills--------Interest and commission— Due Jan. 10, 1919______________________ $1, 750, 000. 00 Due February to May, 1919--------------------175,000. 00 --------------------- 1, 781, 778. 64 5, 337, 000.00 600, 000. 00 350,300.00 1,925,000.00 138 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. Expenses of Russian representatives, Jan. 1 to May 1, 1919_ $175, 000. 00 Expense* of Russian representatives, Jan. 1 to May 1, 1919— 175, 000. 00 Miscellaneous______________________________________________ • 30, 888. 43 Estimated balance due on Remington contract______________ 2. 761, 058. 00 Total____________________________________________________ 12,961,025.07 Estimated deficit on May 1, 1919___________________________ 1,661,778.85 SECTION 76. Treasury Department O. K.’s Shipping Board Payment to De Facto Russian Ambassador Without Making Attempt to Collect This Money for the United States and Crediting Russia’s Loan or Interest Account. D ear M r. J a n u a r y 20, 1919. P o l k : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant inclosing a copy of a letter from Mr. Medziklovsky dated the 16th day of December, addressed to Mr. Miles. I understand that it is the view of the Department of State that the amouns due should be paid by the Shipping Board to the Russian embassy because of political considerations the importance of which is appreciated by the Treasury, and which led to the Treasury’s making no objection to the payment of interest on the Russian bonds which became due on the 10th instant. Such being the case, the Treasury makes no objection to the contemplated payment of the Shipping Board to the Russian embassy which is now in question. I am, my dear Mr. Polk, Very truly, yours, A lbert R athbone. Hon. F r a n k L. P o l k , Counselor State Department, Washington, D. C. SECTION 77. De Facto Ambassador Asks for Money from Fund to Pay for Upkeep of De Facto Embassies in South America, but is Refused. R ussian E mbassy, Washington, January 15, 1919. S i r : Referring to your note of January 7, No. 69, with which you kindly forwarded to me copy of a dispatch from the American legation, at Monte video, dated November 15, 1918, together with copy of a memorandum, dated October 3, 1918, submitted by Mr. Alexandre Sclierbatskoy, the Russian minis ter at Montevideo, I have the honor to inform you that I consider it of great importance to enable the Russian minister to Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay to continue his functions, and think it desirable to open to the Rus sian legation at Montevideo the necessary small credit. Such credit could be opened by me out of general Russian Government funds in this country. Pre vious to any action in this matter, I would, however, appreciate your views on this question. Accept, sir, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration. S. U g h e t , Charge d’Affaires ad interim. Hon. F r a n k L. P o l k , Acting Secretary of State, Department of State. L egation of t h e U nited St a t e s of A merica, Montevideo, Uruguay, October 3, 1918. (Memorandum.) The Russian legation in Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay, which is one single legation, has found itself deprived of resources since November, 1917. It is likewise lacking such kind of emergency financial support as has been afforded to Russian institutions in some countries, or created for them by circumstances. The legation has, up to the present, been maintained upon the personal means of the minister, now exhausted. FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 139 Would the Government of the United States deem it possible to open to the said Russian legation a small credit which would allow the continuance of such limited functions as it actually performs in Brazil and Uruguay, pending the constitution of a government in Russia? Submitted by: A lexandre Sc h e r b a t s k o y , Envoy & Extraordinaire et Ministre Plenipotentiare de Russie. L egation of t h e U nited States of A merica, Montevideo, Uruguay, November 15, 1918. The honorable the S e c r e t a r y of St a t e , Washington, D. G. Si r : I have the honor to inclose herewith the original memorandum with copies thereof, handed me by the Russian minister, who was accredited to Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay by the Provisional Russian Government and who is at present residing with his family in this capital, where he expects to remain until such time of the reestablishment of a stable government for Russia will enable him to take up the diplomatic representation o f his govern ment in the countries referred to. The minister will find it impossible to maintain Russian representation in South America any longer and as all means of communication are cut off to his former sources of financial support he has very modestly suggested to me that if some provision could be made for his temporary support by the United States Government, that upon the reestablishment of his Government he could continue as a diplomatic representative thereof. The minister has been informed by the National City Bank of New York that credit can not by it be extended to him without special authorization of the United States Government. I am authorized to say thnt he is personally well known to the Secretary of State, having been connected with the Russian Embassey in Washington as counsellor prior to his appointment as minister to South America. The minister will appreciate a telegraphic reply to this communication. I have the honor to be, sir, Your obedient servant, R obert E mmett Je f f e r y , Minister. (Inclosures: Russian minister’s memorandum and copies; Russian minister’s card.) D e p a r t m e n t of St a t e , Washington, January 20, 1919. The honorable The S e c r e t a r y o f t h e T r e a s u r y . S ir : I have the honor to transmit herewith inclosed for your information and recommendation copy of a dispatch number 408, dated November 15 last, from the American Legation at Montevideo, Uruguay; also copy of an original mem orandum therewith handed to the American minister there by the Russian min ister, who was accredited to Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay by the Pro visional Russian Government and who is at present residing with his family in Montevideo. It will be noted from the memorandum that the minister. Mr. Alexandre Scherbatskoy, desires to know if it would be possible for the Government of the United States to open to the Russian Legation at Montevideo a small credit which would allow the continuance of such limited functions as it actually per forms in Brazil and Uruguay, pending the organization o f a government in Russia. A copy of these communications was referred to the Russian Embassy on January 7 last, and a reply thereto, dated the 15th instant, has been re ceived, copy also of which is herewith inclosed. I have the honor to be, sir, Your obedient servant, P r a n k L. P o l k , Acting Secretary of State. (Inclosures: Copy o f dispatch number 408, dated November 15 last, from American Legation at Montevideo, Uruguay; also copy of an original memo randum therewith handed to American minister there by Russian minister, and reply from the Russian Embassy dated January 15, 1919.) 140 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. JANUARY 22, 1919. Sir.: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20tli instant addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury, accompanied by the com munications therein referred to. all in relation to the desire of the Russian minister accredited to Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay by the provi sional Russian Government to obtain a credt in order to allow the continuance of limited functions by the Russian legation in Brazil and Uruguay pending the organization of a government in Russia. Under the terms and provisions of the bond acts the Secretary of the Treas ury in present circumstances would not have authority to open a new credit to be place! at the disposal of the Russian minister accredited to the South American Governments above mentioned. In Minister Jeffery's communication of November 15, 1918, addressed to the Secretary of State, reference is made to the possibility of an establishment of a credit in favor of the Russian minister above referred to by the National City Bank of New York. This department would have no objection to the National City Bank of New York establishing from its own resources a moder ate credit in favor of the Russian minister above mentioned. In Mr. Ughet’s letter to you of the 15th instant he suggests that the Rus sian ambassador to this country, from the funds at present at his disposal, open n small credit in favor of the Russian minister to Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay. From the Treasury standpoint, the available funds at the disposal of the Russian ambassador to this country should be primarily devoted to payment of the overdue interest upon the obligations of the Russian Govern ment held by the United States. The department realizes there may be politi cal considerations involved, but it is without information as to whether such is the case or as to the importance attached by the Department of State to any such considerations as may exist. Respectfully, yours, A The honorable the xlcting S e c r e t a r y of lbert R athbone. St a t e . SECTION 78. February 1,1919, Account. Memorandum for Mr. Ughet. Compte Cheques (Account C). Balance July 1, 1917 (previous to first American credit)------------ $5, 018, 262. 32 Added to Compte Cheques from advances by American Govern ment between July 1, 1917, and Nov. 13, 1917----------------------From the above total the following sums were used for special purposes and disbursed by direction of S. Ughet, Russian financial attache: 1. Payment to Guaranty Trust Co., re: Russo-Asia tic Bank m atter____________ $5,000, 000.00 2. Payment to Russian Supply Committee. (S. Ughet, Russian financial attache) to reimburse amount paid for interest and con)mission of National City Bank on $50,000,000 report operation July 10, 1917__________________________________ 1, 750,000. 00 3. Sum of $5,000,0001 re: Rumanian matter which was repaid to American Govern ment after Nov. 13, 1917--------------------- 5, 000,000. 00 ---------------------- 11,750,000.00 Net sum added to Compte Cheques from July 1, 1917, to Nov. 13, 1917, to increase the general balance___________________ Balance Nov. 13, 1917, Compte Cheques1______________________ 56, 050 000. 00 32, 820,632. 70 67,800,000.00 1 Actual balance was $37,820,032.70. The sum o f $5,000,000 is deducted to allow for the return o f it to American Government on Dec. 3, 1917. 141 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. Amount added to Compte Cheques from sums received for sale of merchandise (account H ) from May 1, 1918, to Feb. 1, 1919_______________________________________________________ $3, 214,147. 40 Amount added to Compte Cheques from account A and B, being “ unneeded balances” and accumulated interest, etc., from Nov. 13, 1917, to Feb. 1, 19192______________________________ 11,950, 598. 08 Amount added to Compte Cheques from accounts previously car ried at the National City Bank, as follows: “ Buying account— kroners ” (American credit)_________________________________ — $1.100,000. 00 923,304.55 “ Account No. 2 ” (other sources)--------------“ Account No. 3 ” (other sources)__________ 1,381,090.08 ---------------------3, 404, 394. 63 Balance, Feb. 1, 1919_________________________________________ 317,039. 59 Interest and commission on loans. $50,000,000 report operation: Interest due Jan. 10, 1918, July 10, 1918, and Jan. 10, 1919_ Commission due Jan. 10, 1918, April 10, 1918, July 10, 1918, Oct. 10, 1918, and Jan. 10, 1919_________________________ $4, 875,000. 00 T otal__________ 1______________________________________ $25,000,000, 5£ per cent loan: Interest due Dec. 1, 1917, June 1,1918, and Dec. 1, 1918____ Commission due June 1, 1917, Dec. 1, 1917, June 1, 1918, and Dec. 1, 1918_______________________________________ 625, 000. 00 5, 500, 000. 00 2,062, 500.00 3,437. 52 T ota l__________________________________________________ 2, 065,937. 52 $11,000,000, loan: Interest due May 1, 1918-------------------------------------------------Special segregation for interest due Nov. 1, 1918, and May 1, 1919___________________________________________ 275,000. 00 T ota l__________________________________________________ 935, 000. 00 Coupons on war loans: Total payments, Jan. 1, 1918, to Feb. 1, 1919----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 183, 587. 97 Grand total------------------------------------------------------------------ 8, 684, 525. 49 Interest on advances by American Government: Interest due Nov. 15, 1917________________________________ On account interest due May 15, 1918 (balance, viz, $1,808,506 covered by sale of cargoes, steamships Oconee, Pawnee, and D ora)------------------------------------------------------On account interest due Nov. 15, 1918___________________ T ota l--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 660.000.00 1, 329, 761. 64 1,865.925.08 300,000. 00 3,495,6S6. 72 SECTION 79. Russia Wants $20,000,000 Gold in the Form of New Loan, but is Refused. [Telegram sent.] D e p a r t m e n t of St a t e , Washington, March 19, 1919. C o n s u l , VladivostoJc. (For Stevens.) Your March 15, through Gen. Graves, No. 210. 1. Question of advancing twenty millions gold will be taken up by Govern ments concerned upon receiving formal recommendations from interallied com mittee. A merican * American credit included in this total, $3,563,731.89. 142 FOREIGN LOAN'S AND AUTHORITY FOIl MAKING SAME. 2. Salaries and maintenance of technical board and experts staff should be taken into consideration by interallied committee in recommendations for gen eral plan of financing. 3. Spare parts for locomotives and cars will be forwarded as soon as possible. Conditions liere regarding locomotives and cars may demand early shipment in order to avoid complications. If this proves to be the case, can they be taken care of on reaching Vladivostok? Please forward copy to Smith for his information. P o l k , Acting. [Paraphrase of a cable.] (Referred for attention to Mr. Stanert.) T o k i o , March 2Jh 1919. Referring to your telegram of March 39, S p. in., the interallied committee at Vladivostok clearly understood that after their recommendation had been made the Governments concerned would discuss and determine the question of finance. Smith’s telegram confirmed the fact that the interallied committee has recom mended as preliminary to a detailed and final plan that $20,000,000 should be made available so that the necessary improvements and purchases will not be delayed until agreement can be reached on all the details. I presume that this amount could be advanced as a credit by the interested powers to the inter allied committee in a manner similar to that of the million-dollar credit granted temporarily to Stevens. The committee, I believe, feels that it will take several months of examinations by experts before full official notes can be submitted, and the railway needs are in the meantime imperative. In regard to military control my understanding was that the allied com manders would determine the matter of troop distribution. I think, strictly speaking, that the interallied committee is without jurisdiction over that ques tion provided the protection is adequate. Accordingly I agree with Matsu Daira, and that is why I have suggested to Gen. Graves that he first discuss the subject with the Japanese command and then with the others. M orris. SECTION 80. Cable from Basil Miles Requesting President Wilson’s Attitude on Russian Finance and Giving Resume of Situation to Date March 21, 1919. M A merican M arch 21, 1919. i s s i o n , Paris (For Mr. Lansing and McCormick). Owing to his more pressing engagements I had no opportunity to discuss with the President the question of the status of the Russian Embassy and the funds and accumulated materials which the embassy controls. The situation which is pressing, is as follows, figures being given in round numbers: Cash standing to ambassador’s cliredit in City Bank______________ $3,400,000 Owed ambassador by Shipping Board for charter of Russian steamers of the volunteer fleet_________________________________ 1,400,000 Owed ambassador by War Department for rails purchased________ 3,000,000 Together with lesser items the aggregate approximates (cash)___________________________________________________ 8,000,000 Materials constitute additional assets, as follows: Military supplies, as follows: B oots________________________________________________________ $8,500,000 Sole leather__________________________________________________ 3, 500, 000 Horseshoes----------------------------------------------------------------------------200,000 Total---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12,200,000 Railway supplies, including 137 locomotives and 4,400 cars_________ 11,000,000 Miscellaneous_____________________________________________________ 2,000,000 25, 200, 000. Aggregate assets of cash and materials_______________________ 33, 200, 00 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 143 Against these assets of $8,000,000 cash and $25,200,000 materials, there are the following major liabilities: First. Interest on Government loans. Interest on demand obligations of Rus sia, held by the United States, as follow s: Unpaid and past d u e____________________________________________ $4, 400, 000 Due May 15, 1919_______________________________________________ 4, TOO, 000 Total___________________________________ ____________________ Second. Obligations of Russian Government from private sources, Russian treasury notes, maturing May 1, 1919, held by National City and other banks__________________________________________ Interest thereon, secured by confirmed credit, due May 1, 1919______ 6J per cent credit, advanced to Russia by City Bank in 1910, pay able June 18, 1919______________________________________________ Interest thereon, due June 18, 1919___________ .----- ------------------- ----Commission, due April 10, 1919___________________________________ Commission, due June 18, 1919___________________________________ Five-year note, payable, 1921-------------------------------------------------------Interest on these notes, due June 1, 1919--------------------------------------- 9,100, 000 as follow s: 11,000,000 830,000 50, 000, 000 1,625, 000 1.25, 000 125,000 25, 000, 000 687,000 Total_______________________________________________________ 97, 992, 000 It is obvious that if the United States, or the private creditors, principally the City Bank, collect their indebtedness when due the embassy will be bank rupt in May or June; furthermore, the supplies of boots, leather, and railway materials, so urgently needed for economic relief or Russia, may be attached and possibly sold. The situation seems to me to require decision as to certain principles before we can decide what measures it may be necessary to take, as follow s: 1. Does the President desire Russian assets of cash and railway supplies, boots, etc., to be protected and used for the purpose for which they were origi nally obtained by the Russian Government, namely, for assistance to Russia? 2. Does the President desire Russian diplomatic and consular officials to con tinue to function in this country? 3. I f so, does he desire department to lend its good offices to assist the Rus sian ambassador in safeguarding Russian cash assets adequate for that purpose, say, until July 1, 1920, in case such assistance proves requisite? 4. Does the President desire to postpone collection of interest on Russian obli gations held by Treasury Department? This will be necessary if he approves 1 and 2 above. I am ascertaining just how we can effect the above if the President approves. As a last resort, I believe the following procedure would be justified : 1. Have the War Department requisition all military and railway supplies not shipped to Russia and arranged with the War Trade Board, Russian Bureau (Inc.), for their shipment to Russia and disposal for the best advantage of Russia. 2. That the cash assets of the Russian ambassador be disposed of as follow s: Part deposited with the United States Shipping Board, as advance payments of sea freights for Russian supplies, remaining in this country and available for shipment to Russia; a second part deposited with the Railway Administration o f the United States as advance payment for railway freight charges for above supplies; and a third part to be deposited with the War Trade Board, Russian Bureau (Inc.), or such other agency as the President may designate, for contingencies and to defray charges and expenses designated by the Russian ambassador and approved by the Department of State, including maintenance and upkeep of Russian officials in this country. The foregoing procedure is suggested as a last resort. I am hopeful that other arrangements may prove possible. In the meanwhile, however, I can take no effective action until the President approves the general question of principle which I have outlined. -------------------- - Acting. 144 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. SECTION 81. Treasury Department Will Not Establish New Credit for Russia. D ear M r. U g h e t A pri l 3, 1919. : I have received your letter of April 2, 1919, in regard to the withdrawal of the unexpended balance of the credits established in favor of the provisional Government of Russia in the sum of $137,270,250, which has not been available since November, 1917. I am sorry that you should have obtained the impression that credits opened by the United States Government in favor of the Governments associated with the United States in the war would be formally stopped and the unexpended balances withdrawn as soon as the formal peace treaty should be signed. The authority conferred upon the Secretary of the Treasury by the Congress authorizes the establishment of credits until the term!naton of the war (under the provisions of the Victory Liberty loan act for certain restricted purposes until 18 months after the termination of the war), and does not require the Secretary of the Treasury to withdraw upon the termination of the war the balance of credits previously established then remaining unavailed of. The action of the Secretary of the Treasury regarding the withdrawal of credits must depend upon the consideration governing each case. Heretofore the unavailed of parts of credits previously established in favor o f certain of the allied Governments have been withdrawn, and similarly the unexpended balance of credits previously established in favor of the provisional Govern ment of Russia has been withdrawn, as the same has not been available sinr’e November, 1917. If by reason of changes in existing conditions the Secretary of the Treasury should be authorized by law to make advances to Russia, any application made for the establishment of new’ credits in its favor and for advances therefrom would, of course, receive his consideration. With regard to the establishment of a credit of $125,000,000, referred to in Mr. McAdoo’s letter of November 1, 1917, to the Russian ambassador, devel opments in Russia immediately after the date of the letter were such as would have rendered it unavailable in view of the conditions set out in said letter, and the credit has never been regarded by the Treasury as effective. I had assumed that the representatives of the Russian Government had been so informed. I am, my dear Mr. Ughet, Very truly, yours, A lbert R athbone. S. U gi-iet , Esq., Flatiron Building, New York City. N. F. SECTION 82. April 19, 1919: Polk Refuses to Recognize Martens as Ambassador From Russia, and States That Bakhmeteff Has Been Recognized as Such Am bassador Since July 5, 1917. D epartment of St a t e , Washington, April 19, 1919. Mr. J. H. C a r t e r , Vice President National City Bank of New York, New York City. Si r : The department has received your letter of April 15, 1919, in respect of the demand of Mr. L. A. Martens on the Russian ambassador to the United States for all property in the United States under his control belonging to the Russian Government. In reply I have to state that Mr. Boris Bakhmeteff pre sented his letters of credence to the President of the United States, and was officially received by the President as ambassador extraordinary and pleni potentiary of Russia July 5, 1917, and that Ambassador Bakhmeteff has, accord ingly, since that date, been recognized by this Government as the ambassador of Russia to this country. In a recent telegram from the Secretary of State, in Paris, he states that the only Russian representative recognized by the FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 145 United States is Mr. Bakhmeteff, and adds in effect that the claims to a repre sentative capacity put forth by Martens are not to be given credence. I may add that the Government of the United States has not received or recognized Mr. Martens in any representative capacity in the United States on behalf of the Government of Russia, or of any other government, and, moreover, that the department has received no authentic evidence that Mr. Martens is even the representative in the United States of the so-called “ Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.” As you are no doubt also aware this Government has never recognized the bolshevik regime as a Government, either de facto 01* de jure. I am, sir, Your obedient servant, F r a n k L. P o l k , Acting Secretary of State. SECTION 83. Ughet, Russian De Facto Charge d’Affaires, Gives His I. O. U. to United States for Interest $1,314,847.23. R ussian E mbassy, Washington, May 1, 1919. M y D e a r M r . R a t h b o n e : I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of April 25, with the inclosed statement setting forth the dates and principal amounts of obligations of the Russian Government dated later than October 2, 1917, held by the United States at the close of business on April 24, 1919, and showing inter est thereon due May 15,1919, in the amount of $1,314,847.23. Further on you request payment of this interest to be made by check payable to the order of the assistant treasurer of the United States, New York, for credit general account of the Treasurer of the United States, to be delivered to the assistant treasurer of the United States at the subtreasury in New York on May 15, 1919. Referring to this request, I desire to inform you that at the moment I have not the cash available which will enable me to pay the interest in the amount of $1,314,847.23, due 011 the 15th of this month. However, I formally undertake 011 behalf of the Provisional Government of Russia that the said Government promises to pay, for value received, to the United States of America, or assigns, the sum of $1,314,847.23, on demand, made at the Russian embassy in Washington, with interest from the date hereof at the rate of 5 per cent per annum. Such principal sum and the interest thereon will be paid without deduction for any Russian taxes, present or future, in gold coin of the United States Government of the present standard, weight, and fineness, at the subtreasury of the United States in New York or at the option of the holder at the Treasury of the United States in Washington. I am, my dear Mr. Rathbone, Very truly, yours, S. U g h e t , Charge d'Affaires ad interim of Russia. SECTION 84. May 12, 1919: No Russian Government Recognized by the United States at That Time. M y D ear M r. R aymond M a y 12, 1919. : The Secretary has requested me to reply to your interesting letter of the 7th instant making suggestions as to the payment of the per cent $50,000,000 loan and the 5i per cent $26,000,000 loan raised in this country by the Russian Government before the United States entered the war. The authority of the Secretary o f the Treasury to make loans to foreign Governments is limited to Governments at war with enemies o f the United States, and the purposes for which such loans are authorized to be made are the prosecution of the war and also the sale o f property owned by the Government o f the United States and not needed by it or the sale o f wheat owned by the S. Doc. 86,67-2------10 146 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. United States or the price of which has been guaranteed by the United States. At the present time there is in Russia no government which has been recog nized by the United States. Under these circumstances, there does not seem to be any way for the Treasury to make advances for the purpose of meeting the Russian maturities, even though it were considered desirable to do so. The credits guaranteed the provisional government of Russia in 1917 were not available to the Russians except to the extent to which advances under them were made by the Treasury, and no such advances have been made since Novem ber 15, 1917. Inasmuch as under existing circumstances the Treasury was not in a position to make advances under those credits, the unexpended balances were withdrawn some time ago in order that there might be removed any confusion on the part of the public as to the possibility of making further advances to Russia. Yours, very truly, A lbert R athbone. W. L. R a y m o n d , Esq., 85 Congress Street, Boston, Mass. SECTION 85. Costs of Keeping Up Embassy. May 22, 1919. Memorandum for files: On the list of deferred payments, May 20, 1919, submitted to me by Mr. Ughet on May 21, appears an item “ Russian Embassy, additional amount for upkeep of embassy and connected institutions, $90,275.” Mr. Ughet stated that this was to cover for the period of four months, from May 1 to September 1, the cost of the commercial attach^ and the cost of consulates. Mr. Ughet said that these had by error been left out of the previous similar items. To-day I called up Mr. Miles at the State Department about this item and asked him whether to pass it. Mr. Miles said that until the question of the June 1 interest charge was decided, items for the upkeep o f embassy and consulates should be passed as heretofore. I thereupon told him that I would pass this item and he ap proved my doing so. SECTION 86. President Wilson O. K's Deferrment of Collection of United States Interest so that Russian Embassy Can Be Kept Up. Paraphrase of a telegram from the American mission at Paris, dated May 26, 1919, No. 2270, signed by Mr. Lansing and Mr. McCormick. Utilization of Russian Embassy assets in the United States in order to meet interest on maturing obligations and the postponement of the collection of interest by the Treasury Department has been approved by the President. Furthermore, the possibility of recognizing the Omsk government has so much increase:! that in our opinion it appears more important than ever to continue this policy and avoid any collapse of Russian finance in America at the present time. In our opinion the administration will not be subjected to any special criticism by adopting this policy, inasmuch as it will probably be necessary to take a very similar position in respect of even the principal allied Governments, where it will probably be necessary to provide some plan to defer, for the present, collection of interest on their obligations by the Treasury, while at the same time allowing these Governments to meet obligations held by the public. SECTION 87. Kolchak Government Supported by Allies. A ssistant Se c r e t a r y of t h e T reasury, June 19, 1919. Memorandum for Mr. Rathbone: Mr. Ughet came in to see me and, referring to what has appeared in the newspapers and his own advices concerning the agreement of the Allies to support the Kolchak government, asked if we were in a position, under exist FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 147 ing legislation, to establish credits for that government. He said he realized that we should have to have advices from the State Department and that at his request the State Department had cabled Paris for instructions. He said that the Kolchak government was at war with Germany, since it had never made peace. I referred him to you. R. O. L. SECTION 88. United States Navy Department Pays for Ship Hire to Russian Ambassador When Payment Should Have Been Made to the United States Treasury and Credited on Russian Loan and Interest. N D avy epartment, Washington, June 23, 1919. T o : The honorable the Secretary of the Treasury. Subject: Final payment for charter hire of steamers Spray (ID 2491) and Foam (ID 2496). References: (a) F. S. B., S. O. Reqn. No. 16 (1919. (b) F. S. B., S. O. Reqn. No. 17 (1919). (c) Treasury Dept, letter October 15, 1918, to Secretary of the Navy, (cl) Treasury Dept, letter May 29, 1919, to Secretary of the Navy. Inclosures: Copies o f references (a), (b), (c ), and (d). For the purpose of effecting final settlement for charter hire o f steamer Spray (ID 2491) and steamer Foam (ID 2496) for the period January 29, 1919, to February 28, 1919, inclusive, which vessels were taken over from the pro visional government of Russia, represented by Capt. G. T. Smirnoff, Flatiron Building, New York City, under voluntary charter Form 4-C, and referred to in Treasury Department communication referenced (c) above, information is re quested as to the proper official to whom this payment should be made. In this connection attention is invited to a communication referenced (d) above, covering final payment for charter of steamer Ripple, also referred to in Treasury Department letter of October 16, 1918. It will be noted that payment in this case to S. Ughet was authorized, provided the Department of State de sires such payment to be so made. A prompt reply to this communication will be appreciated. F r a n k l i n D. R oosevelt, Acting Secretary of the Navy. Treasury D epartment, Washington, October 15, 1918. S ir: Referring to your letter of September 24, 1918, in relation to the charter hire for the steamers, Foam, Ripple, and Spray, chartered from the provisional government of Russia, as stated in my reply of October 5, 1918, I forwarded to the Department of State a copy of your letter and of said reply. I am now in receipt of a letter from the Secretary of State under date of October 10, 1918, in which he asks me to inform you that he knows o f no modi fication of our general relations with the Russian ambassador and sees no objection whatever to payments due in this country to the Russian Government being made to the Russian ambassador or to his duly constituted representa tive. Respectfully, yours, A The honorable the S e c r e t a r y of t h e N lbert R athbone. avy. SECTION 89. Russian Financial Position June 1,1919. Memorandum as to Russian financial position as of June 1, 1919. Advances from United States Treasury---------------------------------- $187, 729, 750.00 Proceeds sale of rails and other merchandise-------------------------13,000,000.00 , , 200 729 750.00 148 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. Tlie reports of Russian expenditure show itemized expenditures to Dec. 31, 1917, amounting t o ------------------------------------------ $104, 600, 751. 46 For the 12 months of 1918__________________ 34, 603,197. 20 For 5 months of the year 1919, to June 1_____ 8, 396, 648. 30 ------------------------- $147, 600, 596. 96 Deduct cash balance as at June 1_____________________________ 53,129,153. 04 1,694,129.11 This leaves unaccounted for a balance o f (together with such items as the Russian Government received by way of interest on its bank balances and charter hire for s h ip s )__________________________________________ 51,435, 023. 93 Of the American credits certain advances were made as follow s: For expenditure in Finland______________________________ For the purchase of Swedish exchange__________________ For the support of the Russian ministry of finance_______ 50,000,000. 00 5,000,000.00 45, 000,000. 00 T o t a l_________________________________________________ 100,000,000. 00 If this $100,000,000 had all been spent outside of the United States the re sult would be that the difference between the remaining $100,729,750 made up of the balance of United States advances and of the sale of merchandise and the $147,600,596.96 accounted for must have been provided by the Russians from other sources. It appears from Russian reports that the Russians had a balance of about $21,000,000 on July 1, 1917, before American advances began and that $1,100,000 of the American advance for the purchase of Swedish kroner were not used for that purpose, but were applied by the Russians in their general account. How much of the Russian free credits, amounting to $45,000,000, and how much o f the $50,000,000 advance for the purchase of Finnish marks were applied to the general balance of the Russians in this country has not been ascertained from the Russian reports. The Russian charge d’affaires insists that of their expenditures $32,001,108.33 were made out of their general funds in anticipation of United States advances and that a con siderable part of these payments were made w^ith funds derived from British credits or the sale of Russian bonds. The total sum paid by the Russians for rails in 1917-18 amounted to about $25,000,000, of which slightly over $11,000,000 were paid out of American credits. Of the expenditures reported by the Rus sians $9,130,000 were for interest on Russian bonds privately held and slightly over $750,000 were for commissions of the payment of interest. The amount paid by the Russian Government to the United States for interest or deposited with the Treasury to cover the payment of interest aggregates $5,637,717.72. The amount of interest due the United States Treasury and unpaid and un secured by any deposit with the Treasury amounted, as of May 15, 1919, to $8,196,580.10. For this, the Treasury holds undertakings by the Russian repre sentative that his Government will pay the amount with interest at 5 per cent. Provisional Government o f Russia. Accrued interest on Russian obligations held by United States Treasury: Nov. 15, 1917______________________________$1 329,761.64 May 15, 1918______________________________ 3, 674,431.08 Nov. 15,1918_______________________________ 4, 728,997. 60 Apr. 15, 1918______________________________ 2,786,260.27 May 15, 1919______________________________ 1,314,847. 23 $13,834,297.82 Payments of interest on Russian obligations: Nov. 15, 1917_______________________________ July 3, 1918_______________________________ Aug. 17, 1918______________________________ Jan. 15, 1919______________________________ 1,329,761. 64 1, 000, 000. 00 865,925.08 300,000.00 ---------------------- 3,495,686. 72 , , 10 338 611.10 149 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. Proceeds from sale of Russian cargoes carried in Treasurer’s special account No. 11 to be used to liquidate accrued interest on Russian obligations_____________________________________ $2,142,031.00 Balance unpaid________________________________________ 8,196,580.10 Interest paid by Russians on private obligations, $9,130,000; commissions, $750,000. PAYMENT OF INTEREST AND COMMISSIONS ON RUSSIAN BONDS AS REPORTED BY MR. UGHET. $11,000,000 5 per cent Russian internal bonds: Apr. 29, 1918______________________________ Apr. 30, 1918 (Nov. 1, 1918, and May 1, .1919)___________________________________ May 3, 1918 (increase from 5 per cent to 6 per cent_________________________________ $275,000.00 550,000.00 110,000. 00 ---------------------- 935,000.00 687,500.00 687,500.00 687, 500. 00 687,500. 00 ---------------------- 2, 750,000. 00 2,578.14 859.38 859.38 ----------- ---------- 4,296,90 1,625,000.00 1,625,000.00 1, 625,000.00 ---------------------- 4,875,000.00 125, 000. 00 125,000.00 125,000. 00 125, 000. 00 125, 000. 00 125. 000. 00 125, 000. 00 ---------------------- 875, 000. 00 T o t a l__________________________________________________ 9, 439, 296. 90 $25,000,000 5-year 5| per cent bonds: Dec. 1, 1917_______________________________ May 31,1918_______________________________ Nov. 30, 1918_______________________________ May 31,1919_______________________________ Commission on above: June 21, 1918______________________________ Nov. 30, 1918______________________________ May 31, 1919______________________________ $50,000,000 3-year 6£ per cent bonds: Jan. 7, 1918________________________________ July 8,1918________________________________ Jan. 7, 1919________________________________ Commission on above: Oct. 10, 1917_______________________________ Jan. 7, 1918_______________________________ Apr. 10,1918_______________________________ July 8, 1918_______________________________ Oct. 11, 1918_______________________________ Jan. 10, 1919_______________________________ Apr. 14, 1919_______________________________ SUMMARY OF PAYMENTS REPORTED BY MR. UGHET. Up to Oct. 1, 1917___________ _________________ $33,858, 668.13 October, 1917________________________________ 19,949,782.07 November, 1917______________________________ 27,360, 774. 74 December, 1917______________________________ 23,431,526. 52 ----------------------- 104,600,751.46 January, 1918_______________________________ 7,904,781.64 February, 1918_______________________________ 2, 983, 650. 63 March, 1918__________________________________ 3,842, 736. 90 April, 1918___________________________________ 3,812,363.21 May, 1918____________________________________ 2,475,425.98 June, 1918___________________________________ 1,406, 622. 63 July, 1918___________________________________ 3,538,396.59 August, 1918_________________________________ 1,510,112.18 September, 1918______________________________ 2,961,499. 78 October, 1918________________________________ 1,645,713.07 November, 1918______________________________ 1, 574,402. 20 December, 1918_______________________________ 947,492.39 34 603 197.20 , , 150 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. January, 1919. February, 1919. March, 1919---April, 1919____ May, 1919____ 2, 475, 551. 64 1, 275, 496. 64 1, 543, 392. 58 1, 243, 928. 21 1, 858, 279. 23 ----------------- Total c r e d it s e s t a b l is h e d , $8, 896,648. 80 147, 600, 596. 96 cr e d its w it h d r a w n , p r o v is io n a l and advances made in fa v o r of GOVERNMENT OF RUSSIA. Credits established: May 16, 1917_________________________________ $100,000,000 July 17, 1917_________________________________ 75,000,000 Aug. 23, 1917_________________________________ 100,000,000 Oct. 12, 1917__________________________________ 50,000,000 _____________ $325,000,000 Credits withdrawn, Mar. 31, 1919_______________________________ 137,270,250 187, 729, 750 Advances: July 6, 1917__________________________________ July 13, 1917_________________________________ Aug. 1, 1917__________________________________ Aug. 22, 1917_________________________________ Aug. 24, 1917_________________________________ Aug. 30, 1917_________________________________ Sept. 25, 1917_________________________________ Oct. 2, 1917___________________________________ Oct. 11, 1917__________________________________ Nov. 1, 1917__________________________________ Nov. 15, 1917_________________________________ 85,000,000 10,000,000 2, 500,000 2,500,000 37, 500, 000 10,000,000 15,000,000 22, 200,000 20,000, 000 31,700,000 1,329,750 187, 729. 750 A conditional credit of $125,000,000 was established in favor of Russia on November 1, 1917, but in view of the conditions to which the credit was sub ject and of subsequent developments in Russia the credit has never been regarded by the Treasury as effective, and back entries showing its withdrawal were made on December 28, 1917. N o t e .— PAYMENTS OF INTEREST AND COMMISSIONS ON RUSSIAN BONDS AS REPORTED BY MR. UGHET. $11,000,000 5 per cent Russian internal bonds: Apr. 29,1918__________________________________ Apr. 30, 1918 (Nov. 1, 1918, and May 1, 1919)__ May 3, 1918 (increase from 5 to 6 per cent)___ $25,000,000 5-year 51 per cent bonds: Dec. 1, 1917__________________________________ May 31, 1918_________________________________ Nov. 30, 1918_________________________________ Mav 31, 1919_________________________________ Commission on above: June 21. 1918_________________________________ Nov. 30, 1918_________________________________ May 31, 1919_________________________________ $275, 000. 00 550,000. 00 110, 000. 00 -------------------- $935,000.00 687,500.00 687, 500. 00 687,500.00 687, 500. 00 -------------------- 2, 750,000.00 2, 578.14 859. 38 859.38 -------------------- 4,296.90 $50,000,000 5-year 6i per cent bonds: Jan. 7, 1918__________________________________ 1,625,000.00 July 8, 1918__________________________________ 1,625,000.00 Jan. 7, 1919__________________________________ 1,625,000.00 -------------------- 4,875,000.00 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. Commission on above: Oct. 10, 1917________________ _________________ Jan. 7, 1918________________________________— Apr. 10, 1918_________________________________ July 9, 1918__________________________________ Oct. 11, 1918__________________________________ Jan. 10, 1919_________________________________ Apr. 14, 1919_________________________________ 151 $125,000. 00 125,000.00 125,000.00 125,000.00 125,000. 00 125,000.00 125,000.00 $875,000.00 T ota l________________________________________________ 9, 439, 296.90 SECTION 90. Great Britain Plans to Capture Russian Trade (This Should Probably Be Kept Confidential). D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , F oreign T rade A d v is e r ’ s O f f ic e , E c o n o m ic I n t e l l ig e n c e S e c t io n . [Confidential.] B r i t i s h P l a n s for R u s s ia n T rade , w a r n in g . (By direction of the Second Assistant Secretary of State.) This monograph has been prepared as a study, and has not been submitted foi; the consideration or approval of the Secretary of State. It is not in any sense official. E. M. K ayden. J u ly 29, 1919. 1. INTEREST i n RUSSIAN TRADE. During the last two months of May and June the British press was unusually interested in the question of Russia’s importance in the export trade of the United Kingdom. It was felt that it is in Russia that defeated Germany will seek an outlet for her industrial and commercial activities, and that here was the danger of the recrudescence of the spirit of German economic aggressiveness. “ No time is to be lost if British trade is to secure the benefit arising from the fact that the Englishman is in business better liked and respected by the Rus sian than the German,” declared a leading article of the Times Trade Supplement of May 17, 1919. Notwithstanding the difficulties in the way of normal trade relations with Russia, such as the matter of ruble exchange, disorganization of transport, absence of any assurance that if goods are misappropriated their rightful owner will be able to make good his claim for their value, and also the practical disappearance of credit on which modern commerce depends, trade with Russia is not felt to be beyond the pale of possibility. The newspapers assert that, unlike in any other country, the cooperative organizations of Russia, with their network of producers’, consumers’, and mutual credit societies, are at present the best agencies for the resumption of trade, and that what is wanted is “ some machinery by which the risks attendant on trade ventures could be shared between those embarking upon them.” In other words, there is need for international cooperative effort in the field of foreign trade. The Times closes its article of May 17 with this statement: “ We are convinced that if something could be done on these lines (trade-risk insurance) the benefit to British trade in the future would be incalculably great * * *. We understand that the Government are fully alive to the importance of Russia as a future field for British enterprise and that they are at the present time discussing with the principal interests concerned the possible lines of action that might be taken to revive and expand our trade with Russia.” 152 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 2. PROPOSAL OF THK DEPARTMENT OF OVERSEAS TRADE. In the issue of May 24 the Times Trade Supplement outlined in brief the scheme prepared by the department o f overseas trade for the promotion and early resumption of trade with non-Bolshevist Russia. It was proposed that arrangements be made, in cooperation with the war-risks office, to take up at a reasonable rate any marine and war-risks insurance which the open market can not absorb on goods passing to and from Britain and Russia, and also to insure (cr) British goods from the time of discharge from the steamer and whilst they are lying in a warehouse or store, wherever situated within the area covered by the insurance policy, until the time of sale to the purchaser, and (&) Russian export goods from the time of purchase until goods are loaded on board ship at a Russian port. One of the main objects of the proposed insurance is to enable banks to give advances in the ordinary way of business to traders in respects of shipments between the two countries, and in order to facilitate these advances it is suggested that British banks might perhaps cooperate by opening branches in various parts of Russia. The Times states that such a scheme will, of course, require legislative sanc tion, inasmuch as a substantial sum will be required to finance it, but that its ultimate cost to the Government will be nil. The scheme has the advantage of elasticity in that it could be put in operation at once and extended or contracted as various parts of Russia are being opened up for commercial intercourse. The matter was discussed at the third annual meeting of the Russo-British Chamber of Commerce (the Times trade supplement, May 31), and the presi dent, Sir George Buchanan, and Sir Francis Barker cordially approved of the project. In the same issue of the Times a letter, signed “ Traveler,” said in p a rt: “ The Government of the United States have, with typical sagacity, already voted something like £200,000,000 to financing their export trade. I f only the same were done at once by our legislators, and suitable cargoes embarked for the different Russian ports, north as well as south and west, bolshevism and all the consequences it entails would collapse like some hideous nightmare. “ Goods of the value of several million pounds could, I am assured on the best o f authorities (the statements of the merchants themselves), be shipped to Russia in the course of a few weeks. What is required o f the Government is a generous guaranty and maritime protection, the instant raising of the block ade and more speedy release of personnel and tonnage for the great venture for trade and civilization.” At the request of Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, parliamentary secretary for the department of overseas trade, a meeting of the leading trade organizations was called together in London for the purpose of discussion of ways and means for the resumption of trade writh Russia. It was commonly held that one of the most urgent needs was adequate insurance facilities not covered in the ordinary insurance market, and that Government cooperation was essential. Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland has been selected to pilot the bill through the House of Com mons. The b ill1 provided that merchants shall be furnished with commercial information regarding R ussia; that regular sailings shall be arranged; that goods shall be insured and that banks shall be enabled to make ordinary ad vances to traders. Banks could also issue warrants against collateral security o f insured goods and the warrants would be valid only for purchase of British goods; they would have a fixed value in British money. The bill prepared for early submission to Parliament asked that a fund of £25,000,000 be set aside to finance the insurance on the transportation of British goods to Russia. Sponsors of the scheme pointed out that the Government prob ably would make a profit, as was the case with the war risks insurance scheme which netted a profit of £17.000,000.2 The advantages claimed for the plan are that it calls for no allied consulta tion, raising no controversy as to allied political relationship with soviet Russia, because it would only apply to territories freed from bolshevik rule; that it could be instantly extended to any part of Russia that might be open to commercial intercourse It was also claimed that the scheme could be put in operation within two weeks, and so render possible the dispatch to Russia of large quantities of British goods within a month of the date o f the approval of the scheme. 1 Tribune, July 6, 1919. *T he D aily Express, London, May 23, 1919. FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 153 ARRANGEMENTS BY BOARD OF TRADE. The Times Trade Supplement of June 21 announced that arrangements have now been employed whereby the board of trade war-risk insurance office, 53 Cornhill, E. C., will be able to give facilities for the insurance o f the inland risks upon British goods imported into Russia and goods bought by British firms for export from Russia. The insurance will cover the goods against loss or damage arising from war risks, riots, civil commotions, and other risks usually feicluded in an ordinary Lloyd’s policy. Policies will, in the first place, only be issued for the area in southeastern Russia and the northern Caucasus, including the ports of Tagan rog, Rostov-on-Don, Novorossisk, and Tuapse. Facilities for marine insurance will also be given in cases where this can not be obtained through the ordinary channels. The Admiralty has issued in structions whereby vessels carrying cargo for the ports of Taganrog and Rostov-on-Don will now be allowed to pass through the Ivertch Straits into the Sea of Azov. It was hoped that this new scheme of trade-risks insurance would lead to cooperation by the banks in way of advances to traders in respect of shipments from the United Kingdom to Russia and in respect of goods available for export from Russia. Among the leading banks giving special consideration to Russian trade development are the British Trade Corporation, Lloyds Bank, the London Country and Westminster and Parrs’ Bank (Ltd.), and the National Provincial and Union Bank of England (Ltd.), which have already intimated that they are now prepared to consider applications for advances against goods sent to Russia, and insured under this measure. The banks are also considering the opening up of business in different parts of Russia. It is appreciated that it is important that traders should be able to rely on regular and adequate opportunities for shipment of their goods, and the fol lowing shipping companies have undertaken to provide sailings at least fort nightly and tonnage for all the cargo which may be forthcoming: The Cunard Steamship Co. (Ltd.), the Ellerman Lines, James Moss & Co. (L td.), the Westcott & Laurance Line. The fortnightly service will be maintained, but this can be extended to weekly or even more frequent sailings as soon as the need arises. C. G. Jerram, of the salaried consular service, has recently proceeded to Novorossisk to act as consul at that port. An economic mission under Lieut. Col. Mac Alpine has already left this country to visit Ekaterinodar, and will also visit other centers in the insurance area. W. S. Walton has been ap pointed as British vice consul at Rostov-on-Don, and will leave this country immediately for that port. The question o f making other appointments is also under consideration. SECTION 91. Complete Account Showing Over $1,400,000 Paid the De Facto Russian Am bassador by United States for Hire of Ships—Balance Due, $339,000. D i v i s i o n o f O p e r a t io n s , U n it e d S t a t e s S h i p p i n g B oard E m e r g e n c y F le e t C o r p o r a t io n , Washington, August 14, 1919. F rom : John J. Nevin, comptroller, Hooe-Iron Building, Washington, D. C. T o: Mr. S. R. Cate, war loan staff, room 253, Treasury Department, Wash ington, D. C. RUSSIAN CHARTER HIRE. D e a r S i b : Referring to conversation held with you in my office yesterday morning, I now beg to submit to you statement showing the status o f our accounts with the Russian Government down to August 4, 1919, midnight. You will note that the Russian Government, as represented by Mr. Bahkmeteff, representing the Kerensky regime, through Mr. S. Ughet, financial attach^, have made payment to us in the sum o f $794,796.61, leaving balance due us of $187,820.01, while the Shipping Board has paid to Mr. Ughet $1,406,788.98, leav ing balance due the Russians $339,219.09; net balance in favor of the Russian Government being $151,399.08, as per recapitulation on statement. 154 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. It is well for me to say also that while the inclosed statement is an actual transcript of our financial relations with the Russian provisional government at the pi’esent time, there will be certain changes, due to the fact that the British Government, during the winter 1917-18, seized certain of our ships chartered to the Russians, as well as cargoes aboard them which belonged to the Russians, upon their entrance into British ports, thus necessitating forced redeliveries by the Russians, dates of which have not yet been determined, but which will in all probability when determined result in our becoming debtors to the Russian Government for some two hundred thousand odd dollars more than is shown on the present statement. Our payments to the Russian provisional government were made on instruc tions from Mr. Frank L. Polk, Acting Secretary of State, in order that certain funds might be available to the representatives of stability and order in Russia. We understand that all disbursements made from these funds by the embassy of the Russian provisional government in Washington have been made under the supervision of the Treasury Department. I trust that this statement, together with the facts here presented, will be of service to you before the congressional committee. I beg also to attach hereto your written memorandum showing statement of our Russian accounts as contained in your file, which you were good enough to leave with me. I beg to advise that I have taken the liberty of making a typewritten copy of same. Very truly, yours, John J. Nevin, Comptroller. Russian statement, May 1, 1919. Estimated gross income, as per bills already delivered, for charter of Russian volunteer fleet steamers___________________________$1, 544,548.90 Estimated expense in connection with charter of Russian volun teer fleet steamers---------------------------------------------------------------290,826.61 Net amount due Russia as at May 1, 1919________________ 1, 253,722.29 The Russian Government in account with United States Shipping Board Emer gency Fleet Corporation for charter hire, etc., to August 4 , 1919, midnight. Balance. Balance Payments ! due by Russian ; United Govern States ment. Shipping Board. j Steamship Dora. Charter hire June 21,1917 to Mar. 17, 1918............... *756,111.11 1,040.00 Coal on delivery June 21,1917.................................. 757,156.11 Coal on delivery to Publishers Paper Co., Nov. 22, 1917........................................ $4,455.00 Off-hire credits........................................ 76,907.65 Coal consumed during off-hire ............ 1,375.00 Advance to captain, etc.......................... 1,624.31 Cash paid................................................. 484,132.82 568,494.78 $188,661.33 $188,661.33 Steamship Ida. Charter hire June 20,1917, to June 15, 1918............. Coal on delivery............................... ....................... Water on delivery..................................................... 379,559.05 1,034.00 45.00 380,638.05 Coal on redelivery, etc............................ $4,620.00 Cash paid................................................. 296, &36.20 Off-hire credits........................................ 15,330.39 Advance to master.................................. 376.50 316,363.15 64,275.80 i 64,275.80 ................... FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 155 The Russian Government in account with United States Shipping Board Ewergency Fleet Corporation for charter hire, etc.—Continued. Balance. Payments by Russian Govern ment. Balance due United States Shipping Board. Steamship Isonomia. Charter hire May 26, 1917, to Jan. 23, 1918............... Coal on delivery........................................................ 382,331.49 2,607.00 384,938.49 Coal on redelivery, etc............................ S3,608.00 Off-hire credits........................................ 41,346.44 Cash paid................................................. 301,490.94 346,445.58 Steamship Oconee. Charter hire July 7, 1917, to Mar. 9, 1918................. Coal on delivery................................................ ........ $38,493.11 $38,359.11 71,255.21 71,255.21 107,963.59 107,963.59 273,940.89 273,940.89 20,902.16 50,340.68 $134.00 259,756.04 1,386.00 261,142.04 Off-hire credits........................................ $17,303.17 Coal on redelivery and off-hire............... 2,563.00 Cash paid................................................. 168,839.10 Advance to master.................................. 1,181.56 189,886.83 Steamship Omsk. Charter hire Apr. 4,1918, to May 22,1918.................. Steamship Pawnee. Charter hire July 28,1917, to May 28,1918............... Coal on board on delivery......................................... Off-hire credits........................................ $71,193.63 Coal on redelivery and off-hire............... 1,996.50 Cash paid................................................. 246,948.87 Survey fees, etc........................................ 53.33 592,494.22 1,639.00 594,133.22 320,192.33 Steamship Yucca. Charter hire May 7, 1917, to Feb. 7,1918................. 365,982.68 Off-hire credits........................................ $89,405.13 Coal on redelivery................................... 594.00 Cash paid................................................. 253,037.66 Advance to captain................................. 2,043.73 345,080.52 Due Russian Government for repairs, as follows: Steamship Nijni Novgorod............................... D o................................................................. Steamship Kishinev........................................... Steamship Toula................................................ Steamship KishinevTime lost on charter and repairs to tank... Loss of value in cargo.................................. Bill rendered by Quartermaster Depart ment for extra trucking............................ Steamship Nijni Novgorod, refund to be de ducted irom hire............................................. Steamship Omsk, repairs per cable from Sims, London............................................................ Steamship Irtysh— Repairs......................................................... Additional charges for watchman, etc........ Total.................................................................. i Credit Russian Government. 129.438.52 2,345.51 25,541.98 2,729.88 2,504.98 3,765.76 7,925.21 144.60 13,289.76 6,768.43 151,836.22 272.20 217.124.53 217,124.53 982,616.62 794,796.61 187,820.00 156 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. The Russian Government in account with United States Shipping Board Emer g en cy Fleet Corporation for charter hire, etc.— Continued. Balance. Payments by United States Ship ping Board. Balance due Rus sian Gov ernment. Due the Russian Government by United States Shipping Board as follows: j Charter hire, steamship Omsk, Apr. 4,1918, to | Aug. 4, 1919, midnight.....................................$793,480.00 '. $595,110.00 $198,370.00 Charter hire, steamship Nijni Novgorod, Apr. j 11, 1918, to Mar. 28, 1919 .................................. 210,086.05 !. 177,262.39 32,823.66 Charter hire, steamship Kishinev, Apr. 9, 1918, I to Mar. 7,1919, noon........................................ 141,541.68 . 126,204.47 15,337.21 Charter hire, steamship Irtysh, Apr. 20,1918, to I May 7.1919, 2 p. m .......................................... 369,867.60 :. 294,650.00 75,217.60 Charter nire, steamship Toula, Apr. 12,1918, to j Mar. 24, 1919, 5 p. m ........................................ 147,561.95 1. 20,637.33 126,924.62 Steamship Irtysh, coal on delivery................... 581.25 I. 581.25 Supplies sold out of steamship Kishinev.......... 194.44 194.44 86,637.50 Refund insurance, steamship Omsk................. 86,637.50 Pavment of our bill for supplies on steamship \yucca............................................................... 6,262.12 6,262.12 Payment of our bill in error, steamship Isonoliiia................................................................... 134.00 134.00 -.$1,756,346.59 Less half hire, steamship Kishinev, Feb. 21, 1919, 8 a. m., to Mar. 7, 1919, noon................. 3,275.53 ! Less half hire, steamship Toula, Mar. 12, 11.20 I a. m., to Mar. 24, 5 p. m ................................. 2,555.38 ' Less half hire, steamship Nijni Novgorod, Mar. j 13, 8 a. m., to Mar. 28, 5 p. m ......................... 4,507. 61 f 10,338.52 |...................... 2 10,338.52 Total...................................................................................... 1,746,008.07 1,406,788.98 339,219.09 * Credit account off-hire. RECAPITULATION. Due Russian Government by United States Shipping Board..................................................... $339,219.09 Due United States Shipping Board by Russian Government..................................................... 187,820.01 Balanco in favor Russian Government................................................................................ 151,399.08 SECTION 92. Cost of United States Forces in Archangel, Russia, and Siberia, Russia. W a r D e p a rtm e n t, Washington, February 1, 1921. Hon. J a m e s A. R e e d , United States Senate. M y D e a r S e n a t o r : I desire to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of Janu ary 7, 1921, wherein you request a statement of the total cost to the United States of the maintenance of our troops in Russia and Siberia during their tours of duty in those countries. In reply thereto, I beg to inform you as follow s: a r c h a n g e l fo r c e s . The actual expenditures made by United States Army disbursing officers at Archangel, August 1, 1918, to March 31, 1920, are as follow s: Pay _______________________________________________1__________ $1,051,496.23M ileage_______________________________________________________ 1,215.11 General appropriations, Quartermaster Corps__________________ 86,323.19 Medical and hospital---------------------------------------------------------------2,031. 52 Signal Corps of the Army_____________________________________ 23.97 Army deposit fund____________________________________________ 816.10 Engineer operations in the field________________________________ 69. 84 Horses for Cavalry____________________________________________ 589.81 Construction and repair of hospitals___________________________ 6,683.77 179.34 Barracks and quarters________________________________________ T o t a l___________________________________________________ 1,149,428. 88 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 157 All supplies furnished in kind for this expeditionary force were obtained by agreement from the British supply service in Russia. The claim submitted by the British Government for furnishing these supplies amounted to £700,417 9s. 2d. Under the “ British-American final settlement, Burr-Niemeyer agree ment,” dated November 23, 1920, final settlement of this claim was made on December 31, 1920, by paying the British Government the sum of £560,000. The rate of exchange employed being $3.50f per pound sterling, the amount thus paid equals $1,963,500, or a total cost of maintaining our troops in Archangel during their tour in that country of $3,112,928.88. SIBERIA FORCES. Actual expenditures made by United States disbursing officer in Siberia in connection with this expeditionary force, August 1, 1918, to August 24, 1920, are as follows: Pay __________________________________________________________ $5,519,493.62 M ileage_______________________________________________________ 3,223. 73 General appropriations, Quartermaster Corps---------------------------- 2,321,435.68 Medical and hospital---------------------------------------------------------------(*) (*) Signal Corps of the Army----- --------------------------------------------------Army deposit funds----------------------------------------------------------------(*) Engineer operations in the field----------------------------------------------(*) Horses for Cavalry___________________________________________ (M Construction and repair of hospitals---------------------------------------6,683. 77 Barracks and quarters-----------------------------------------------------------198,231. 51 T o t a l___________________________________________________ 8,049,068. 31 Supplies in kind furnished these troops were shipped from Manila and from the United States, while some were procured in China. On the other hand, large quantities thereof were brought back to the United States and to the Philippine Islands, where they were continued in service, consumed, or salvaged. There has not, however, been sufficient time available for the chiefs of the va rious supply branches to complete their office records with reference thereto, and I regret that it is therefore impossible at this time to furnish you with detailed information in this connection. Cordially, yours, N e w t o n D. B a k e r , Secretary of War. SECTION 93. Allies Recognition of Kolchak Provisional Government of Russia. [Christian Science Monitor, Saturday, June 14, 1919. By the Associated Press.] ALLIES RECOGNIZE ADMIRAL KOLCHAK. P a r is , F ran ce. The reply sent by the council of four to-day to the note of Admiral Kolchak extends to him and his associates in the All-Russian Government at Omsk the support set forth in the original letter of the council to Admiral Kolchak. This is interpreted here as meaning virtual recognition of the Omsk Government. The text of the reply follows: “ The allied and associated powers wish to acknowledge the receipt of Admiral Kolchak’s reply to their note of May 26. They welcome the terms of that reply which seem to them to be in substantial agreement with the propositions they had made and to contain satisfactory assurances for the freedom, self-govern ment, and peace of the Russian people and their neighbors. “ They are therefore willing to extend to Admiral Kolchak and his associates the support set forth in their original letter. “ “ “ “ L lo y d G eorge . W il s o n . C lem en c eau . M a k i n o .” It is understood that the support referred to involves the furnishing of munitions and supplies for Admiral Kolchak’s campaign. 1 Nothing. 158 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. TEXT OF ORIGINAL DISPATCH. Following is the text of the dispatch originally sent to Admiral Kolchak: “ P a r i s , May 26, 1919. “ The allied and associated powers feel that the time has come when it is necessary for them once more to make clear the policy they propose to pursue in regard to Russia. “ It has always been a cardinal axiom of the allied and associated powers to avoid interference in the internal affairs of Russia. Their original intention was made for the sole purpose of assisting those elements in Russia which wanted to continue the struggle against German autocracy and to free their country from German rule and in order to rescue the Czecho-Slovaks from the danger of annihilation at the hands of the bolslievist forces. Since the signature of the armistice on November 11,1918, they have kept forces in various parts of Russia. Munitions and supplies have been sent to assist those associated with them at a very considerable cost. No sooner, however, did the peace conference assemble than they endeavored to bring peace and order to Russia by inviting representatives of all these warring governments within Russia to meet them in the hope that they might be able to arrange a permanent solution of the Russian problem. “ This proposal and a later effort to relieve the distress among the suffering millions of Russia broke down through the refusal of the soviet government to accept the fundamental conditions of suspending hostilities while negotiations for the work of relief were proceeding. “ Some of the allied and associated governments are now being pressed to withdraw their troops and to incur no further expense in Russia, on the ground that continued intervention shows no prospect of producing an early settlement. They are prepared, however, to continue their assistance on the lines laid down below, provided they are satisfied that it will really help the Russian people to liberty, self-government, and peace. “ The allied and associated governments now wish to declare formally that the object of their policy is to restore peace within Russia by enabling the Russian people to resume control of their own affairs through the instrumen tality of a freely elected constituent assembly and to restore peace along its frontiers by arranging for the settlement of disputes in regard to the boundaries of the Russian State and its relations with its neighbors through the peaceful arbitration of the League of Nations. “ They are convinced by their experiences of the last 12 months that it is not possible to attain these ends by dealings with the soviet government o f Moscow. They are therefore disposed to assist the government of Admiral Koltchak and his associates with munitions, supplies, and food to establish themselves as the government of all Russia, provided they receive from them definite guaranties that their policy has the same object in view as that of the allied and associated powers. “ With this object they would ask Admiral Koltchak and his associates whether they will agree to the following as the conditions upon which they would accept continued assistance from the allied and associated powers: “ In the first place, that as soon as they reach Moscow they will summon a constituent assembly elected by a free, secret, and democratic franchise as the supreme legislature for Russia to which the Government of Russia must be responsible, or, if at that time order is not sufficient restored, they will summon the constituent assembly elected in 1917 to sit until such time as new elections are possible. “ Secondly, that throughout the areas which they at present control they will permit free elections in the normal course £or all local and legally constituted assemblies, such as municipalities, zemstvos, etc. “ Thirdly, they will countenance no attempt to revive the special privilege of any class or order in Russia. “ The allied and associated powers have noted with satisfaction the solemn declaration made by Admiral Koltchak and his associates that they have no intention of restoring the former land system. They feel that the principles to be followed in the solution of this and other internal questions must be left to the free decision of the Russian constituent assembly; but they wish to be assured that those whom they are prepared to assist stand for the civil and religious liberty of all Russian citizens and will make no attempt to reintroduce the regime which the revolution destroyed. FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 159 Fourthly, that the independence of Finland and Poland be recognized, and that in the event of frontiers and other relations between Russia and these countries not being settled by agreement, they will be referred to the arbitration of the League of Nations. “ Fifthly, that if a solution of the relations between Eathonia, Letvia, Lithu ania, and the Caucasian and transcaspian territories and Russia is not speedily reached by agreement, the settlement will be made in consultation and coopera tion with the League of Nations, and that until such settlement is made the Government of Russia agrees to recognize these territories as autonomous and to confirm the relations which may exist between their de facto governments and the allied and associated governments. “ Sixthly, that the right o f the peace conference to determine the future of the Rumanian part of Bessarabia be recognized. “ Seventhly, that as soon as a government for Russia has been constituted on a democratic basis. Russia should join the League of Nations and cooperate with the other members in the limitation o f armaments and of military organi zations throughout the world. “ Finally, that they abide by the declaration made by Admiral Koltchak on November 27,1918, in regard to Russia’s national debt. “ The allied and associated powers will be glad to learn as soon as possible whether the government of Admiral Koltchak and his associates are prepared to accept these conditions, and also whether in the event o f acceptance they will undertake to form a single government and army command as soon as the military situation makes it possible. “ G. C le m e n c e a t j . “ L l o y d -G eorge . “ Orlando. ‘ ‘ W oodrow W i l s o n . “ SAIONJI.’ * a d m ir a l k o l t c h a k ’ s r e p l y . P a r is , F r a n c e . Admiral Koltchak, the head of the All-Russian Government, at Omsk, in his reply to the first letter from the allied and associated powers, which re sulted in a second letter, promising him allied support, declared that he did not purpose to retain power longer than required by the interest o f the country. He reaffirmed his intention to call elections for the constituent assembly as soon as the bolsheviki have been crushed. The text o f the ad miral’s reply was made public to-night. The allied letted was handed to Admiral Koltchak at Titmon by Mr. de Martel, the French charge d’affaires at Omsk. The admiral’s reply was received in Paris on June 5. It reads: “ The Government, over which I preside, has been happy to learn that the policy of the allied and associated powers in regard to Russia is in perfect accordance with the task which the Russian Government itself has undertaken. That Government being anxious, above all things, to reestablish peace in the country and to assure to the Russian people the right to decide their own destiny in freedom by means of a constituent assembly. I appreciate highly the interest shown by the powers as regards the national movement, and con sider their wish to make certain that the political conditions with which we are inspired are legitimate. I am, therefore, ready to confirm once more my previous declarations, which I have always regarded as irrevocable. “ 1. On November 18, 1918, I assumed power, and I shall not retain that power one day longer than required by the interest of the country. My first though at the moment when the bolsheviki are definitely crushed will be to fix the date for the election of the constituent assembly. A commission is now at work on direct preparation for them on the basis of universal suffrage. Considering myself as responsible for that constituent assembly, I shall hand over to it all my powers in order that it may freely determine the system of government; I have, moreover, taken the oath to do this before the supreme Russian tribunal, the guardian of legality. “ All my efforts are aimed at concluding the civil war as soon as possible by crushing bolshevism in order to put the Russian people in a position to express its free will. Any prolongation o f this struggle would only postpone that moment; the Government, however, does not consider itself authorized to substitute for the inalienable right of free and legal elections the mere reestablishment of the assembly of 1917, which was elected under the regime 160 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. of bolshevist violence, and a majority o f whose members are now in the ranks of the soviet. i t is through the legally elected constituent assembly alone, which my Government will do its utmost to convoke properly, that there will belong the the sovereign rights of deciding the problems of the Russian State, both in the internal and external affairs of the country. “ 2. We gladly consent to discuss at once with the powers all international questions, and doing so shall aim at the free and peaceful development of the peoples, the limitation o f armaments and the measures calculated to prevent new wars, of which the League of Nations is the highest expression. “ The Russian Government thinks, however, that it could recall the fact that the final sanction of the decisions, wiiich may be taken in the name, Russia will belong to the constituent assembly. Russia can not now and can not in the future ever be anything but a democratic State where all questions in volving modifications o f the territorial frontiers and of external relations must be ratified by a representative body which is the national expression o f the people’s sovereignty. “ 3. Considering the creation of a unified Polish State to be one o f the chief of the normal and just consequences of the World War, the Government thinks itself justified in confirming the independence of Poland, proclaimed by the provisional Russian Government of 1917, all of the pledges and decrees of which we have accepted. The final solution of the question of delimiting the frontiers between Russia and Poland must, however, in conformity with the principles set forth above, be postponed till the meeting of the constituent assembly. We are disposed at once to recognize the de facto government of Finland, but the final solution of the Finnish institution must belong to the constituent assembly. “ 4. We are fully disposed at once to prepare for the solution of the question concerning the fate of the national groups in Esthonia, Letvia, Lithuania, and of the Caucasian and trans-Caspian countries, and we have every reason to believe that a prompt settlement will be made, seeing that the Government is assuring as from the present time autonomy of the various nationalities. It goes without saying that the limits and conditions of these autonomous institu tions will be settled separately as regards each. “ Even in the case difficulties should arise in. regard to the solution of these various institutions, the Government is ready to have recourse to the collabora tion and good offices of the League of Nations with a view to arriving at a satisfactory settlement. “ 5. The above principle, implying the satisfaction of the agreements by the constituent assembly, should obviously be applied to the question of Bessarabia. “ 6. The Russian Government once more repeats its declaration of November 27, 1918. by which it accepted the burden of the national debt of Russia. “ 7. As regards the question of internal politics, which can only interest the powers in so far as they reflect the political tendencies of the Russian Govern ment, I make a point of repeating that there can not be a return to the regime which existed in Russia before February, 1917. The provisional solution which my Government has adopted in regard to the agrarian question aims at satisfy ing the interests of the great mass of the population, and is inspired by the conditions that Russia can only be flourishing and strong when the millions of Russian peasants receive all guaranties for the possession of the land. “ Similarly, as regards the regime to be applied to the liberated territories, the Government, far from placing obstacles in the way of the free election of local assemblies, municipalities, and zemstvos, regards the activities of these bodies and also the development of the people in self-government as the neces sary conditions for the reconstruction of the country, and is already actually giving them its support by all the means at its disposal. “ 8. Having set ourselves the task of reestablishing order and justice and of insuring individual security to the population, which is tired of trials and execu tions, the Government affirms the equality before the law of all citizens without any special privilege. All shall receive, without distinction of origin or religion, the protection of the State and o f the law. “ The Government whose head I am is concentrating all the forces and all the resources at its disposal in order to accomplish the task which it has set itself; at this decisive hour I speak in the name of all National Russia. I am confident that, bolshevism once crushed, satisfactory solutions will be found for all questions which equally concern all those populations whose existence is bound up with that of Russia. “ K o l t c h a k .” 161 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. SECTION 94. United States War Department Made Contract to Sell War Supplies to De Facto Russian Government, Which Government Put Up $1,000,000 in Gold as Forfeiture in San Francisco Mint—Contract Was Broken by Russians and the War Department Turned Back to Them Over $400,000 of This Money, Which Should Have Gone to the United States Treasury. W a r D e p a rtm e n t, Washington, November 5, 1919. The honorable the S e c r e t a r y o f t h e T r e a s u r y . S ir: Having received information that $1,000,000 worth of gold has just arrived at San Francisco, Calif., from Vladivostok on the United States Army transport Great Northern, I have the honor to request that you issue the neces sary instructions to the Subtreasury at San Francisco to accept this gold to be held in safekeeping at the risk of and subject to final disposition by orders from the Secretary of War. This gold is in the nature of a security to guarantee payment by the Russian Government under a contract dated July 31, 1919, whereby there was sold by the WTar Department to the Russian Government Russian rifles and ammunition for the same. Under the terms of the contract payment was to be made of 40 per cent on January 15, 1920, and payment of 60 per cent on July 15, 1920. In the event that payments, as stated, are made by the Russian Government, this gold is to be returned in kind to the Russian representatives. For your information I am transmitting herewith a mimeographed copy of the contract under which this gold is being received. Very truly, yours, N ew ton D . B a k e r , Secretary of War. D e p a rtm e n t o f S ta te , Washington, August 6, 1920. The Hon. N i c h o l a s K e l l e y , Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. My D e a r M r. K e l l e y : Pursuant to the conference between Mr. Ughet, your self, and myself this morning, I wish to confirm our understanding of the notification to Mr. Ughet that neither the State Department nor the Treasury would approve the payment of the funds held by the War Department as security for payments on the shipments of arms to Admiral Kolchak, under the terms of the contract entered into between the W^ar Department and Mr. Ughet on behalf of the Russian Government, unless the proceeds were deposited by Mr. Ughet in the Russian liquidation account. The decision of the Departments o f State and the Treasury has been communicated by telephone to Maj. Pierson, of the War Department. I beg to suggest that the Treasury confirm by official letter to the War Department the decision of the Departments of State and the Treasury in this matter, and suggest such practical arrangements as you may believe are necessary for carrying out this decision. Cordially, yours, V a n S. M e rl e -S m i t h . Gold received by Assistant Treasurer at San Francisco for account of Russian Government. Face value. Cash value. Current gold......................................................................................................... Uncurrent gold..................................... .............................................................. $991,535.00 8,455.00 $991,535.00 8,410.42 $10 short in count.......................................................................................... To be paid to War Department......................................................................... 999,990.00 999,945.42 584,294.58 To be paid to National City Bank of New York for Russian Government__ S. Doc. 86, 67-2------11 415,650.84 162 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. SECTION 94-A. Treasury Department Allowed the Payment of $1,239,000 Out of Liquidation Fund for Printing of Paper Money for the Various De Facto Russian Governments. D e p a rtm e n t o f S ta te . Washington, November 7, 1919. The Hon. C a r t e r G l a s s , Secretary of the Treasury. M y D e a r M r. S e c r e t a r y : In accordance with an agreement made between the Russian ambassador and myself with regard to release of certain rouble bank notes printed by the American Bank Note Co. for the Russian Government, I wish to inform you that the Russian Embassy has informed me of the trans fers to account “ C ” of the Russian Government at the National City Bank, New York, of sums totaling $1,239,000, equaling the original cost of print ing these notes paid from credits originally established by the United States Government, the reason for the transfers referred to herein being to reimburse the accounts from which originally paid. I am, my dear Mr. Glass, Very sincerely, yours, R obert L a n s i n g . SECTION 95. December, 1919—Itemized Statement of Russian Account. F i n a n c i a l A t t a c h e : to t h e R u s s i a n E m b a s s y , New York, December 3, 1919. N. K e l l e y , E s q ., Treasury Department, Washington, D. C. M y D e a r M r. K e l l e y : In accordance with your verbal request of some time ago, I beg to send you inclosed herewith statement showing the amounts re ceived by the Russian Government from the United States Government for a total amount of $187,729,750 ($192,729,750—$5,000,000), as well as summary of payments on account of contracts approved by the War Industries Board and Council of National Defense, and summary of payments, for which no special credits have been granted by the Treasury Department, but being payments for the old contracts placed before the first American credit became operative, the necessary amounts have been granted, in accordance with the monthly statements presented by the Russian Embassy from July up to November, 1917. I am, my dear Mr. Kelley, Yours, very truly, S h y h i, Russian Financial Attache. Amounts received from the United States Government. Supply committee. July 6, 1917—135,000,000 on account of the first $100,000,000 credit opened May 16,1917: Contracts and payments of supply committee.............................. Russian Government credit operations......................................... Free credit at disposal of Russian ministry of finance.................. Contracts placed outside of supply committee ($4,500,000)— a. Payments made by supply committee............................... b. Payments made outside of supply committee.................... Upkeep of extraordinary mission................................................... July 13,1917—$10,000,000 (on account of the $75,000,000 credit opened July 17,1917) for Finland................................................................... Aug. 1, 1917—$2,500,000 (on account of the first $100,000,000 credit onened Mav 16,1917) for silver........................................................... Aug. 22,1917—$2,500,000 (on account of the first $100,000,000 credit opened May 16,1917) for silver.......................................................... Ministry of finance. $18,300,000.00 $7,000,000.00 5,000,000.00 3,225,723.23 1,274,276.77 200,000.00 10,000,000.00 2.500.000.00 2.500.000.00 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 163 Amounts received from the United States Government—Continued. Supply committee. Aug. 24,1917—$37,500,000 on account of the second $100,000,000 credit opened Aug. 23,1917: Contracts and payments of supply committee For payment to Remington Arms Co. for rifle Free credit at disposal of Russian ministry of For navmfints in Sweden___ ___ . . . . For transportation _. ___ r. __________________ _____________ Aug. 30,1917—$10,000,000 (on account of the $75,000,000 credit opened July 17,1917) for Finland................................................................... Sept. 25,1917—$15,000,000 (on account of the $75,000,000 credit opened .lnlv 17.1917^ for Finland..................................... ............................ Oct. 2,1917—$22,200,000, $2,413,750 on account of thLefirst $100,000,000 credit and $19,786;250 on account of the second 3>100,000,000 credit: Free credit at disposal of Russian ministry o f:finance.................. Contracts and payments of supply committee Oct. 11, 1917—$5,000,000 (on account of the first i5100,000,000 credit o-nenerl Mav 1fi. 1917'! for silver_______________ Oct. 11,1917—$15,000,000 (on account of the $75,000,000 credit opened .Tnltr 17. 1917^ for Finland_______________________ ______ _______ Oct. 25,1917—$5,000,000 for operations with Ruma] Nov. 1.1917—$31,700,000, $9,900,000 on account of thie first $100,000,000, credit, $3,700,000 on account of the second $100,'000,000 credit and $18,100,000 on account of the $50,000,000 credit: Contracts and payments of supply committee For payment to Remington Arms Co. for rifle; For Tiflvment, t.o Westinchouse Co. for rifles 5..... : : : : : : : : : : : : Free credit at disposal of Russian ministry of finance.................. ! Russian Government credit operations......................................... i Nov. 15,1917—$1,329,750 for payment of interest to the United States Government........................................................................................ Total............................................................................................. Ministry of finance. 7.900.000.00 8.000.000.00 15,000,000.00 5,000,000.00 1,600,000.00 10,000,000.00 15.000.000.00 15.000.000.00 17,200,000.00 2 5,000,000.00 215,000,000.00 *5,000,000.00 12,600,000.00 2.300.000.00 1.000.000.00 15,000,000.00 800,000.00 1,329,750.00 262,125,723.23 | 130,604,026.77 Grand total................................................................................... *$5,000,000 received on Oct. 11,1917, for operations with Rumania were refunded to the United States Treasury Department on Dec. 23,1917 .............................................................................................. 192,729,750.00 Total............................................................................................. 187,729,750.00 Originally received. 1................................................................................ 2................................................................................ 3................................................................................ $5,000,000.00 15,000,000.00 62,125,723.23 5,000,000.00 Paid for direct purposes. $4,246,126.06 14,295,000.00 *59,298,873.07 Balance applied to general liqui dation purposes. $753,873.94 705,000.00 2,826,850.16 1 Out of this amount $1,000,000 was for payment to Westinghouse Co. for rifles. 2 These amounts were not used in their entirety for objects indicated, and were applied for general liqui dation purposes in accordance with the approval of the United States Treasury Department of the weekly lists of deferred payments. * Details of expenditures on account of this amount are shown in two explanatory statements. Value. 250.000 pairs shoes.. 125.000 pairs shoes.. 750.000 pairs shoes.. $1,222,500.00 | 611,250.00 3,629,850.00 375,000 pairs shoes... 1,000,000 pairs shoes. 1,814,925.00 4,829,800.0 500.000 pairs shoes... 1,000,000 horseshoes.. 400.000 pairs shoes... 000,000 pairs shoes... 2.414.900.00 113.750.00 1.983.000.00 3.224.820.00 1.084.940.00 1.533.000.00 3.606.075.00 824.850.00 2.199.600.00 1.642.650.00 10,530,000.00 13.932.500.00 5.670.000.00 13.932.500.00 Amount canceled. Payments from other sourccs Payments from American outside of American credit. credit. Aug. 1,1917 Aug. 22,1917 Aug. 1,1917 131 132 RZ-21A RZ-21 Aug. 22,1917 Aug. 1,1917 133 134 135 136 RZ-21 Gr.5 RZ-27 RZ-28 Aug. July Oct. Oct. 137 138 139 140 141 142 12 13 14 RZ-29 RZ-30 RZ-23 RZ-24 RZ-25 RZ-26 350-C 347-C 346-C 349-C ----- d o ........... . .... d o ........... Oct. 19,1917 ___ d o ........... ___ d o ........... ------d o ........... July 11,1917 July 5,1917 July 25,1917 July 9,1917 15 360-C Aug. 14,1917 947,187.38 947,187.38 16 17 18 359-C 369-C 372-C . . . . d o ........... Baldwin Locomotive Works. Sept. 11,1917 Andrew M. Feuss.................. Sept. 17,1917 Ingersoll Rand Co.................. 623,636.50 6.265.00 39,270.60 2622,691.89 6,265.00 39,270.60 19 371-C 437-C Sept. 12,1917 Dec. 6,1917 646.000.00 525.000.00 645,741.60 420,000.00 258.40 105.000.00 32,792.06 160.00 34.400.00 928.13 160.00 34,400.00 31,863.93 2.400.00 63.248.00 2,400.00 11 24 25 395-C Oct. 18,1917 396-C ----- d o ........... 399-C Oct. 20,1917 27 400-C 402-C Oct. 22,1917 Oct. 25,1917 200.000 pairs shoes............... 300.000 pairs shoes............... 336.000 leather sides............ 75,000! eather sides.............. 200.000 leather sides............ 160.000 leather sides............ 6.500 closed cars.................. 250 locomotive “ Decapode” 3.500 closed cars.................. 250locomotive “ Decapode*’ Spare parts for locomotives 'Decapode.” .......do.............................................. 1 generator and board.................... Spare parts for Vladivostok repair shops. Air brakes for 10,000 cars............... Westinghouse Air Brake Co.. ___ d o ..................................... 500 sets for locomotive air-brake equipment. American Steel Export Co........... Galvanized pipes and rails............ Ingersoll Rand Co........................ Carbon............................................ F. C. Austin Drainage Excavator 4 ditchers and spares...................... Co. Zin-Ho Manufacturing Co........... 2 pumping units.............. Ingersoll Rand Co........................ 500 hammers and spares . $828,536.26 $800,000.00 1,557,016.61 3,757,083.79 130,674.60 660,716.65 2,714,657.95 3,809,325.40 660,998.33 1,080,846.81 1,322,001.67 2,143,973.19 361,648.49 511,000.00 915,945.92 384,298.97 523,550.82 691,327.52 8.371.350.00 10.896.000.00 4.507.650.00 10.896.000.00 723,291.51 1, 022, 000.00 2,690,129.08 440,551.03 1,676,049.18 951,322.48 1,053,650.00 250.000.00 453,600.00 250.000.00 63,248.00 U13,181.27 1,105,000.00 2,78-*,500.00 708,750.00 2,786,500.00 SAME. 20 22,1917 31,1917 19,1917 24,1917 $205,213.74 AND RZ-22 RZ-22 RZ-21A LOANS 128 129 130 MAKING W. H. McElwain Co.................... Option on preceding contract...... E. E. Taylor Co., L. Q. White Shoe Co., Jos. M. Herman Shoe Co. Option on preceding contract----E. E. Taylor Co., L. Q. White Shoe Co., Jos. M. Herman Shoe Co. Option on orecedingcontract....... U. S. Horse Shoe Co..................... F. M. Hoyt Shoe Co..................... E. E. Taylor Co., Jos. M. Herman Shoe Co., B. A. Corbin & Son. ----- d o............................................ W. H. McElwain Co.................... U. S. Leather Co......................... Armour Leather Co...................... Howes Brothers Co...................... Proctor Ellison Co........................ American Car & Foundry Co...... Baldwin Locomotive Works-...... Standard Steel Car Co.................. American Locomotive Sales Cor poration. ___ d o ............................................ Object. FOK Name of firm. AUTHOKITY Date of contract. FOREIGN Ameri can Gov Contract num ernment ber. number. 164 Summary of payments on account of contracts confirmed by the War Industries Board and Council of National Defense, placed in America by the Russian Government Supply Committee. 1,674.00 904.50 330.50 2,007.22 174,710.89 1,272.73 9.375.00 1.975.00 1,500,000.00 367,920.00 111, 132.00 49.500.00 49.500.00 5,992,318.86 10,300,000.00 4.000.000.00 2 000 000.00 8,680.00 , , 4,650.00 <3,696.00 "14*475*00 SAME. 1.750.000.00 MAKING , , 2,830.57 FOB .. .. 446.93 4,540.02 231.40 30,870.00 1,700.00 715.00 1,729.71 AUTHORITY 16,500.00 4$204 were rebated. 165 Cornell & Underhill.......... Erie Foundry Co............... The Howe Scale Co........... E. A. Woods Machine Co. Ingersoll Rand Co............. Taylor & Fenn.................. Andrew W. Fouss............. AND 126 26,1917 15,1917 26,1917 11,1917 13,1917 11,1917 10,1917 LOANS 122 123 124 125 3.46 P ipes,etc........................................ 450.39 89.98 Steam forging hammer.................. 4.630.00 4 scales............................................. 231.40 1.00 31.500.00 Planners......................................... Pneumatic riveting machine......... 1.700.00 715.00 2 grinding machines....................... 1,784.50 70 barrels oil and 2,900 pounds 54.79 metal. 381-C .do. 1.330.00 1,330.00 Niles Bement Pond Co................ 1 steam hammer............................. 380-C .do. Westingh ouse Electric Manufac 42 rheostat motor pannels.............. 2,830.57 turing Co. 379-C ....... d o ........... Greenlee Bros. Co........................ Drill machines................................ 1.674.00 406-C Oct. 30,1917 Landis Machine Co....................... Lathes and accessories................... 904.50 407-C ....... d o ........... Jas. M. Mathews Co..................... 667 stamps...................................... 10.00 340.50 409-C Nov. 1,1917 Monarch Engine Co..................... Tilting furnace............................... .01 2,007.23 413-C Nov. 2,1917 Orton & Steinbrenner.................. 4 cranes and spare parts................ 48,630.92 48,630.92 414-C ....... d o........... Baldwin Locomotive Works....... Construction of plant for erection 1,555,459.11 1,730,170.00 of locomotives at Vladivostok. 25.97 415-C Nov. 9,1917 Graton & Knight Co.................... Belts................................................ 1,298.70 21,310.00 416-C ....... d o ........... Worthington Pump & Machine 32 pumps*......................................... 21.310.00 Co. 114,000.00 420-C Nov. 13,1917 Vernon Bridge Co......................... 20 deck turntables.......................... 114,000.00 3,125.00 421-C Nov. 14,1917 Draper Manufacturing Co............ 20 pneumatic locomotive turn 12.500.00 table motors. gCaj0S ». « 386-C Oct. 13,1917 Howe Scale Co. 1.975.00 1.302.00 387-C d o............ Niles Bement Pond Co. 1.302.00 Lathes, Pratt & W hitney............. 9.100.00 425-C Nov. 16,1917 Ingersoll Rand Co. _____ 9.100.00 8__________________ pneumatic machines.................. Special credit granted for sending American railway men to Russia, to apply on this credit the follow ing contract: 1.500.000.00 430-C .....................Nov. 6,1917 Western Electric Co. Various telephone equipment ($136,676.19). 63 Aug. 16,1917 American Smelting & Refining 1,500 tons lead................................ 367.920.00 Co. 1-625-69 Oct. 5,1917 The Wah Chung Mining & Smelt 405 tons antimony.. 111, 132.00 ing Co. 2-4413-70 Oct 2,1917 L. Vogelstein & Co....................... 300 tons lead....................... 49.500.00 297,000.00 3-10-1048-71 ....... d o .......... . American Smelting & Refining 2,100 tons lead................... 346.500.00 Co. 8,707,681.14 Gr.2, No. 11 Sept. 10,1917 Remington Arms Union Metallic I,000,000 rifles.................... 25.000.000.00 Cartridge Co. 12 000 000.00 6 000 000.00 Option contract between J. P. Option contract for 400,000 Morgan and Westinghouse. 4,250,000.00 6 000 000.00 .......d o............................................ Option contract for 200,000 rifles.. 4.650.00 1 Gr. 556 July 16,1917 E. Landress & Co........................ 3.000 dozen files............................. 6,600.00 10.500.00 4 Gr. 555 July 20,1917 .......d o ........................................... 7.000 crosscut saws........................ 27,570.00 36.250.00 3 Gr. 555 Aug. 3,1917 Sutton Vaughn Equipment Co.. 25.000 crosscut saws...................... 15,000.00 525.00 2 Gr. 555 Aug. 7,1917 Jos. Ohlen «& Sons Saw Manu 10.000 crosscut saws...................... facturing Co. 1 Gr. 555 July 10,1917 Simonds Manufacturing Co......... II,000.crosscut saws...................... 16.500.00 8 Additional for overplus 323 pounds of lead. 1$568.73 were rebated. 2Balance, $944.61, is not paid yet. Oct. Oct. Oct. Oct. Oct. Oct. Oct. FOREIGN 403-C 390-0 405-C 384-C 385-C 383-C 382-C 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 T-91 T-85 T-92 T-91 120-PRM-165 121-PRM-165 123-PRM-422 125-PRM-165 127-PRM-165 Sept. 15,1917 ....... do............ Sept. 11,1917 Sept. 15,1917 Sept. 4,1917 ....... d o............ Sept. 27,1917 ....... d o............ ....... do............ Bausch & Lom b........................... B. D. Said..................................... Austin Manufacturing Co............ Herbert & Huesgen...................... E. Landress& Co......................... ___ do............................................. Tinius Olsen Testing Machine Co. Fairbanks Morse Co...................... E. Landress & Co......................... 12.600 pairs shoes........................... 18,576 pairs shoes........................... 3,960 pairs shoes............................ 1,032 pairs shoes............................ 4,212 pairs shoes............................ 12,662 pairs shoes........................... 40,200 pairs shoes........................... 8,220 pairs shoes............................ 30,912 pairs shoes........................... 8,180 pairs shoes............................ 92,450 pairs shoes........................... 10,701 pairs shoes........................... 21,664 pairs shoes........................... 4,303 pairs shoes............................ 127,786 pairs shoes......................... 9,682 pairs shoes............................ 2,859 pairs shoes............................ 10,021 pairs shoes........................... 22,088 pairs shoes........................... 3,362 pairs shoes............................ 3,535 pairs shoes............................. 3,517 pairs shoes............................. 63.600 pairs shoes........................... Spare parts for 5-ton and 3-ton White trucks. 300leases........................................ 200 pairs driving chains................. 25 rollers........................................ Photo supplies.............................. 600 rules and tapes......................... 6,500 files........................................ 3 testing presses............................. 5electromotors.............................. 8.000 drift pins................................ 60.00 35.049.00 22.70 56,253.60 11.664.00 720.00 3.457.20 ! 80. 10 12,720.96 38,551.25 95.970.00 49.95 25,322.30 103,806.40 1, OiO. 20 23.774.00 11.40 249.620.00 1,007.50 25.018.80 54.40 65,446.05 220.05 12,536.20 342,347.64 29,020.55 8,636.65 ..............1,34*65* 24,304.50 l 57.382.80 9,960.05 30.95 6,830.50 8.640.20 180,232.80 138.90 48,82-4.70 49.600.00 6.642.00 82.646.81 616,355. 24 404.58 3, 443.14 825.00 2.339.00 800.00 i : i : ! 45,337.50 i 733. 86 ! ; i 34.989.00 56,230.90 10.944.00 3,376.80 5,162.10 5 38,569.37 95,920.05 &100.00 248,612.50 24,964.40 65,226.00 6 12,585.65 6 343,310.3o 29,020.55 8,502.00 6 24,782.40 6 57,694.80 9,929.10 6,830.50 8,640.20 180,093.90 $7,558.8b 25,322.30 102,760.20 23,762.60 ! ! J i i 1 1 1 48,824. 70 4,252.50 162.00 6.642.00 82,646.81 16,455.24 404.58 2,709.28 825.00 2.339.00 500.00 SAME. 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 T-90 100 101 102 $854,080.00 $1,810.00 MAKING 1,810.00 9,1917 FOR $854,080.00 1.000 dozen files............................. July 26,1917 AUTHORITY 68 locomotives............................... Nov. 13,1917 ....... d o............ ....... d o ............ ....... d o ............ ....... d o ............ Nov. 9,1917 Nov. 13,1917 ....... d o ............ ....... d o ............ ....... d o ............ ....... d o............ ....... d o ............ ....... d o ............ Nov. 9,1917 ....... d o . ! ........ Nov. 15,1917 Nov. 16,1917 ....... d o............ ....... d o............ ....... do............ ....... d o............ ....... d o ............ ....... d o ............ Sept. 27,1917 American Locomotive Sales Cor poration. United States Machinery Export Co. Brown Shoe Co............................. International Shoe Co.................. Beals & Torrey Shoe Co............... Luedke, Shaper & Butler Co...... Milwakee Shoe Co........................ McElwain, Morse & Rogers........ Selz, Shwab & Co......................... Weinberg Shoe Co........................ Harsh & Edmond Shoe Co........ . A. H. Weinbrenner...................... Hamilton Brown Shoe Co.......... . C. M. Brett Co.............................. Nunn & Bush Shoe Co................. Nathaniel Fisher Co.................... Endicott Johnson Co.................... Franklin Shoe Co......................... Winsh Bros. Co............................ W. H. Walker Co......................... Interstate Shoe Co........................ Parker Holmes Co........................ M. Fincovitch (Inc.).................... Graddock, Terry Shoe Co............ McElwain Barton Shoe Co.......... B. D. Said..................................... July 2 Gr. 556 Payments from Payments from other sources American outside of credit. American credit. AND Object. 3 Gr. 552 Amount canceled. Value. Name of firm. LOANS 127 Date of contract. FOREIGN Ameri can Gov Contract num ber. ernment number. 166 Summary of 'payments on account of contracts, confirmed by the War Industries Board and Council of National Defense, placed in America by the Russian Government Supply Committee—Continued. 64 65 66 67 80 85 79 87 164-PRM-355 130-PRM-355 150-PRM-165 No. 1 Gr. 401 170-PRM-165 Nov. Oct. Nov. Sept. Nov. 14,1917 22,1917 8,1917 5,1917 9,1917 E. Landress & Co........................ Simonds Manufacturing Co....... . Strong Kennard & Nut Co......... Remington Typewriter Co......... E. Landress & Co....................... 876.00 3.400.00 7.329.00 4.000 dozen files................... . 7 recording pressure gauges. 6.200.00 199.00 6.200.00 199.00 2 air valves........................... 2.000 Stoco safety goggles... 5,400 crosscut saws.............. 83.00 1,125.00 5,575.50 3 NUo velocity meters............... 4 hydrometers............................ 72 blacksmith's tools................. Drill and 20 grinding wheels__ 2 cutting machines.................... 11 gross file handles................... Anemometer.............................. 10 hydrants................................ 12 sets blacksmith’s tools, 200 dozen axes. 1.000 dozen files.......................... 35.000 crosscut saws................... 300 adjustable goggles................ /105 typewriters........................... \580 ribbons................................. ' 2,900 carbon twist drills and 36 carbon-steel bridge reamers. 1,200 dozen files......................... 312 dozen files............................ 20 locomotive jacks.................... 6.000.tons annealed wire............ 500 long tons binder twine........ 100 long tons wire...................... 567.00 20.40 2,168. 94 350.00 1,040.00 32. 34 26.60 441. 50 248.00 1.25 60.68 6.40 1,550.00 52,500.00 5,250.00 208.25 10,468.00 } ............... 241.00 2,433.44 147.07 7,425.00 1,989. 85 671.00 62(5,976.00 216,720.00 11.424.00 626.976.00 216.720.00 118.42 567. 00 20. 40 2,108. 26 350.00 1,010.00 32. 34 28. 60 435.10 248.00 47,250.00 208.25 1,550.00 10,709.00 2,286.37 7,425.00 1,989.85 671.00 11,305.58 17,136.10 335,554.84 558,370.26 23.542.47 60', 500. (X) 157,500.00 28,538.10 16,269.93 SAME. 167 17,136.10 63,000.00 63,000.00 944,032.32 608,477.48 65,851.02 65,851.02 1,100,000.00 518,087.27 11 automobiles, “ Pierce Arrow” . . 60.500.00 12,088.06 12,088.06 Spare parts for above................ 50 automobiles, “ Federal” ....... 157,500.00 2,961.90 31,500.00 Spare parts for above................ 55.80 Spare parts for 8 motor launches.. 16,325.73 « Paid above this amount $262. 150 long tons wire................. . 150 long tons binder twine.... 2,200 long tons binder twine.. 155 long tons binder twine.... 81.75 1,125.00 5,575. 50 MAKING &Additional payments. 876.00 3.400.00 7.329.00 FOR 171-PRM-459 .......do............ .do.. .do.. 172-PRM-459 Nov. 10,1917 288 ; 153-PRM-165 .......do............ Duff Manufacturing Co.............. No. 1 Gr. 702 Sept. 6,1917 ! United States Steel Products Co. 4 No. 1 Gr. 703 Oct. 20,1917 | Peoria Cordage Co...................... 5 No. 2 Gr. 702 ...... do............ 1 Gr. W einberg & Al. Posner Eng. 6 I Co. do. No. 3 Gr. 702 Nov. 1,1917 No. 3 Gr. 703 ___ do.......... . I Hooven Allison Co..................... . No. 2 Gr. 703 ___ do............ J. A. Rosen (Gruindyke)........... . No. 4 Gr. 902 Nov. 9,1917 Columbian Rope Co..................... | Supplies for the Murman ports... 10 50 207-6A j Oct. 8,1917 j Pluym & Ochs Co........................ 51 207-6B i .......do.......... . ;.......do............................................ 52 207-4A | Sept. 15,1917 I.......do............................................ 207-4B .......do.......... . !.......do............... ............................ 53 54 213-25 I Sept. 13,1917 ] Duesenberg Motor Corp............... 3 electromotors....... 1 riveting machine. 7,200 crosscut saws. AUTHORITY 81 84 82 83 8,294.72 7,507.50 AND 75 76 77 78 231.00 8,294.72 7,507. 50 LOANS 72 73 74 231.00 Balances, thermometers, etc. 10 electromotors..................... 7,800 crosscut saws................. FOREIGN 70 71 128-PRM-165 ___ do............ Eimer & Amend Co...................... 126-PRM-165 ----- do............ C. &C. Electric Manufacturing Co. 129-PRM-355 Oct. 13,1917 United Hardware & Tool Manu facturing Co. of America. 124-PRM-165 Sept. 27,1917 Crocker Wheeler Co..................... 134-PRM-317 Oct. 26,1917 Acme Machinery Co..................... 139-PRM-355 Oct. 29,1917 United Hardware & Tool Manu facturing Co. 131-PRM-355 Oct. 23,1917 E . Landress & Co......................... 142-PRM-165 Nov. 1,1917 Schaeffer & Budenberg Manufac turing Co. 143-PRM-165 .......do............ Simplex Valve & Motor Co.......... 148-PRM-165 Nov. 7,1917 Standard Optical Co.................... 154-PRM-355 Nov. 13,1917 United Hardware & Tool Manu facturing Co. 155-PRM-165 ___ d o.......... . Union Water Meter Co................ 157-PRM-165 .......d o.......... . Taylor Instrument Co.................. 149-PRM-165 Nov. 8,1917 Columbia Hardware Co............... 151-PRM-165 .......do.......... . W ilmarth & M orman Co............. 133-PRM-165 Oct. 26,1917 Hess Machinery Works................ 144-PRM-165 Nov. 1,1917 E . Landress &‘Co......................... 152-PRM-165 Nov. 10,1917 Kaeffel & Esser Co....................... 156-PRM-165 Nov. 13,1917 Millard F. Smith Co..................... 159-PRM-165 Nov. 14,1917 E . Landress & Co......................... Summary of payments on account of contracts, confirmed by the War Industries Board and Council of National Defense, placed in America by the Russian Government Supply Committee—Continued. 168 Payments from Payments from other sources American outside of credit. American credit. FOREIGN Ameri can Gov Contract num-1 ernment ber. | number. Date of contract. 211-16 Nov. 13,1917 207-5A Nov. 14,1917 Value. Object. i Total........... $82.86 $6,354.17 6,600.00 126,375.00 101,178.75 25,196.25 131,251,801.07 66,644,162.39 38,961,692.48 $6,437.03 6,600.00 2,211.60 2,211.60 25,646,437.69 American Govern ment No. Contract No. . 284 Apr. 25,1917 May 9,1917 Apr. 30,1917 . . . . . d o . . . ....... .do........ .do........ .do........ do........... May 17,1917 May 2,1917 May 21 1917 do.......... Value. Payments fro American credit. j-Erection of stores for shells............................ Lathes..................................... 1 Norton lathe................................................. 4 lathes............................................................. 10 various lathes.............................................. 4 lathes............................................................. 3 lathes............................................................. 14 lathes........................................................... 10 electromotors.............................................. 3 saws............................................................... 5 spinders........................................................ 2 lathes............................................................. ....... do............................................................... 1 lathe.............................................................. Spare parts for contract 57-PRM-202............ $400,000.00 $400,000.00 1,860.00 48,140.00 1.951.25 1,800.00 7.540.00 9.395.00 945.00 4.805.00 1,195.40 1.770.00 120.00 8.525.00 2.200.00 891.90 1,450.00 1.103.25 1,860.00 48,140.00 1.951.25 1,800.00 7.540.00 9.395.00 945.00 4.805.00 1,195.40 1.770.00 120.00 8.525.00 2 200.00 891.90 1,450.00 1.103.25 . SAME. 273 ... 53-PRM-206.__ 69-P R M -3........ fi7-PRM-2D2____ 58-PRM-202.......... M-PRM-202___ 60-PRM-202...... 61-PRM-202A 62-P RM-202B 73-PRM-207........ 63-PRM-140...... 75-PRM-30...... 76-PRM-202A 78-PRM-204...... 85-PRM-202.......... Bethlehem Steel Co..................................................... General Electric Co...................................................... American Can Co......................................................... Iznoskolf Co ............................................................ Carbondale Machine Co............................................... Iznoskoff & Co............................................................. Davis Machine Tool Co................................................ Defiance Machine Works............................................. ....... do............................................................................ ____ do............................................................................ ....... do............................................................................ ....... do............................................................................ ....... do............................................................................ Pratt & Whitney Co................................................... Walter H. Foster Co.................................................... American Machinery Syndicate................................. American Wood W orking Machine Co....................... Baker Bros................................................................... Defiance Machine Works............................................. Object. MAKING 971 _ Name of firms. FOR i ! Date of contract. AUTHORITY Summary of payments not covered by special credits allocated by the United States Government. AND C. & C. Sales Corp...................... . ___ do.................. Greenport Basin & Construction 3 wireless outfits. Co. Herz & Co..................................... 3,000 Herz plugs and 200 spare in sulators. 50 Sterling trucks, Army bodies, Sterling Motor Co. and headlight for same. Amount canceled. LOANS 213-29 Oct. 18,1917 211-15 Oct. 19,1917 Name of firm. 180.. 181.. 188 ., 1,020.27 727.20 43.80 1 220.00 7,421.54 1.556.00 1,623.30 619.30 2.489.00 1 010.0 0 , 169 2 saws and 1 lathe............................................ 16 electromotors.............................................. 5 electromotors................................................ 2 machines and spare parts............................. 2 saws and spare parts................................... 8 electromotors................................................ 1,020.27 727.20 43.80 1,220.00 7.573.00 1.556.00 1,623.30 619.30 2,489.00 . , SAME. Spare parts................................................ Rails and accessories...................................... Technical books for the Russian Railway Mission. 49 belts............................................................. ! 2 saws.............................................. . ... MAKING Chas. Shieren Co.............................. American Saw Mill Machinery Co.. Fairbanks Morse Co......................... Fay & Egan Co............................... C. & C. Electric Manufacturing Co. J. G. White Engineering Co............ S. A. Woods Machinery Co............. ...... do.......................... .................... J. G. White Engineering Co............ Switches............... .«........................ Steamfeeding pipe connections...................... Spare parts...................................................... .......do............................................... FOR Mav 11,1917 May 14,1917 Mav 17,1917 May 22,1917 Apr. 27,1917 .......do............ May 9,1917 May 5,1917 May 7,1917 53 locomotives................................................. 978 trucks and spare parts.............................. Spare parts....................................................... Crane............................................................... 12 jacks............................................................ Files................................................................. Instruments..................................................... Rails and accessories....................................... 686.55 259.72 30.00 750.00 1,021.25 250.00 4,100.05 541.74 7, 12.818.15 771,886.27 137.584.00 315,000.00 643,387.50 483.00 102.40 1,237,700.00 1.992.00 13.751.15 122,440.84 13,413.60 2.497.00 13.500.00 20,822.50 3.080.00 34.300.00 278.530.00 144,997.64 6,415.17 10.500.00 202.56 663.18 861.60 3,537,532.10 2,495,879.81 610.245.00 696.89 520.58 12.988.00 1 200.00 124.99 5,115,761.96 AUTHORITY 70-PRM-16 5 71-PRM-165... 72-PRM-165... 36-PRM-165__ 55-PRM-165... 56-PRM-16 5 68-PRM-165.. . 66-PRM-165__ 65-PRM-165__ ....... do............................................................... Scythe blades.................................................. Agricultural machinery.................................. 200 pairs driving chains.................................. 2 lathes............................................................. 80 guns and 400,000 shells................................ Various instruments....................................... Spare parts...................................................... 10 cranes and spare parts................................ Air pumps....................................................... Condenser........................................................ Engine............................ . . Spare parts...................................................... Bandages for 10 cranes.................................... 686.55 259.72 30.00 750.00 1,021.25 250.00 4,108.30 541.74 7,892,818.15 771,886.27 137,584.00 315,000.00 643,387.50 483.00 102.40 1,334,000.00 1.992.00 90.625.00 125,000.00 22.500.00 2.497.00 13.500.00 20,822.50 3.080.00 34.300.00 1,522,955.00 144,99-7.64 6,415.17 10.500.00 202.56 944.94 922.98 9,733,849.52 5,181,241.62 639,000.00 696.89 677.25 125,421.98 24,700.00 1,269.80 10,217,015.03 1,000.00 AND 190.. 197.. 198.. 199.. 202.. 53-PRM-4 No. 6 Gr. 24___ 291- C 168-C................. 238-C................ 323-C................ 364-C................ 362-C................ 328-C................ 270- C 271- C 182 231- C 174-C................ 20i* 202-C................ 392-C................ *i94 294-C................ 320 292- C 191 285-C................ 183 157- C 184 158- C 207-C................ 281-C................ 193’ 199-C................ 187 167-C................ 200 201-C................ 189 232-...................C 185 159- C Spare parts for contract 60-PRM-202A......... Spare parts for contract 62-PRM-202B......... 6 drills.............................................................. 192 various instruments.................................. 2 machines....................................................... 2 electromotors................................................ 2 lathes............................................................. 32J dozen chisels.............................................. Agricultural machinery ......... ........................ LOANS T oc 143.. June 11,1917 .......do............................................ .......do........... .......do............................................ June 23,1917 .......do............................................ June 25,1917 Walter H. Foster Co.................... June 28,1917 Greenlee Bros. Co......................... July 30,1917 Fairbanks Morse Co..................... June 2,1917 Keller Mechanical Engraving Co. Aug. 20,1917 E. Landress & Co......................... Aug. 18,1916 International Harvester Co.......... Massey Harris Co.......................... Noxon Co...................................... In Petrograd. American Steel Export Co............ Adriance Platt Co......................... Oct. 15,1917 B. D. Said.................................... Mar. 27,1917 Cincinnati Electrical Tool Co....... July 20,1917 Pool Engineering & Mach. Co. . . . June 5,1917 Ingersoll Rand Co......................... Nov. 11,1916 American Locomotive Works___ Mar. 28,1917 Orton & Steinbrenner Co............. July 19,1917 Zin-Ho Manufacturing Co............ Aug. 21,1917 Andrew W. Feuss........................ .......do........... .......do............................................ July 26,1917 Flannery Bolt Co......................... May 22,1917 American Car & Foundry Co....... May 23,1917 American Steel Export Co........... Apr. 5,1917 Baldwin Locomotive Works....... Dec. 22,1916 Pressed Steel Car C o.................... Mar. 2(>,1917 Baldwin Locomo tive Works___ Oct. 17,1917 Andrew W. Feuss........................ June 14,1917 Norton & Co................................. Young Corley & Diilon................ ___ do............................................ July 22.1916 Allie l Contracting Co.................. July 25.1916 American Steel Expert Co........... M.ay 8,1917 Allied Contracting Co.................. June 11.1917 Andrew W. Feuss........................ Mar. 25.1917 Ingersoll Rand Co......................... Nov. 11.1916 Baldwin Locomotive Works....... May 28.1917 ...... do............................................ Apr. 27.1917 Ingersoll Rand Co........................ June 23,1916 United States Steel Products Co.. FOREIGN 279. 86-PRM-202A.. 87-P RM-202B.. 88-P RM-202A.. 90-PRM-140.......... 97-P RM-202A.. 112-PRM-202A___ 81-PRM-205.......... 122-P RM-202A___ No. 2 Gr. 701... No. 1 Gr. 701... No. 3 Gr. 701......... No. 11 Gr. 701.. No. 4 Gr. 701... Summary of payments not covered by special credits allocated by the United States Government—Continued. Contract No. Osgood Co. Weston Electrical Instrument Co. do. Sterling Engine Co...................... Melchoir Armstrong & Dessau.. ___ d o .......................................... ___ d o.......................................... ___ d o.......................................... ___ d o .......................................... Duessenberg Motor Corporation. ___ d o.......................................... Goodrich Transit Co................... Manitowoc Shipbuilding Co....... ___ d o.......................................... SAME. 4,1917 £236.38 8,006.00 6,808.00 1.289.94 1.149.00 706.00 1.896.20 101.25 3,934.50 834.00 3,792.40 1.117.00 438.00 1.507.00 1.687.25 752.00 176.40 2.747.00 49.50 750.00 740.00 376.00 851.58 399.86 1.551.20 227,500.00 869,567.83 900.00 8.075.00 7.500.00 7.912.95 2,149.29 22,141.69 37,828.80 9.371.25 54,719.30 8.280.00 62.624.00 89.100.00 8,490.24 455,000.00 4.900.00 7.328.00 MAKING Apr. 13,1917 Feb. 16,1917 Mar. 26,1917 Feb. 21,1917 Feb. 20,1917 .......d o .......... Feb. 21,1917 .......d o .......... Mar. 10,1917 June 6,1917 Feb. 8,1917 Apr. 3,1917 Apr. 25,1917 $236.38 8,006.00 6,808.00 1.289.94 1.149.00 706.00 1.896.20 101.25 3,934.50 834.00 3,792.40 1.117.00 438.00 1.507.00 1,687.25 752.00 176.40 2.747.00 49.50 1.025.00 740.00 376.00 851.58 408.02 1.551.20 227.500.00 869,567.83 900.00 8.075.00 7.500.00 7.912.95 2,149.29 32,521.55 45.923.00 11.436.50 73.338.50 165.600.00 156.560.00 89.100.00 18,562.70 725,000.00 4.900.00 7.328.00 Payment sfrom American credit. FOR *22i June 49-PRM-210. 41-PRM-35.. 213-16............ 213-11............ 213-19............ 213-18............ 213-7.............. 213-9.............. 213-15............ 213-15A ......... 212-7.............. 217-7A........... 212-7A........... 1-ton galvanized iron..................................... 2 lathes........................................................... 2 fans.............................................................. Various spare parts....................................... 1 saw................................................................ 2 saws............................................................. 1 lathe............................................................ . .......do............................................................... .......do............................................................... 1 saw................................................................ 2 lathes............................................................ Spare parts...................................................... 3 electromotors................................................ 1 lathe.............................................................. .......do............................................................... 2 electromotors................................................ 1 saw................................................................ 2 exhausters, etc............................................. 18 grinders....................................................... 4 electromotors................................................ 2 saws............................................................... 1 motor............................................................ 33 various belts................................................ 134 grinders..................................................... 3 electromotors................................................ 2,000,000 horseshoes........................................ Supplies for Murman Railway...................... Additional payment for 600 saws................. . Steam shovel................................................... Expenses of sending workingmen to Russia. Instruments.................................................... .......d o .............................................................. Spare parts for 54 motors, Sterling................ Spare parts for 76 motors, Buffalo................. Spare parts for 20 motors, Buffalo................. Spare parts for 94 motors, Van Blerk............ 30 motors, Van Blerk..................................... 76 motors, Buffalo.......................................... 18 motors, Duessenberg.................................. Spare parts for above..................................... Icebreaker, Nevada........................................ 4 engines for above......................................... Hose................................................................. Value. AUTHORITY 213 214 215 216 217 No. 1-555... 82-PRM-25. American Rolling Mill Co............. P. B. Yates Machine Co................ B. F. Sturtevant Co....................... P. B. Yates Machine Co................ American Saw Mill Machinery Co. Woods Machine Co......................... Greenlee Bros. Co.......................... Smith Machine Co......................... Woods Machine Co......................... American Saw Mill Machinery Co. Greenlee Bros. Co.......................... Woods Machine Co......................... Washburn Shops of Worcester___ American Tool Works................... Matt Co........................................... Fairbanks Morse Co....................... . Machinery Co. of America............. B. F. Sturtevant Co....................... Washburn Shops of Worcester___ White Engineering Corporation — Greenlee Bros. Co.......................... Fairbanks Morse Co....................... Chas. E. Shieren Co....................... . Carborundum Co........................... C. C. Electric Manufacturing Co— Phonex Horse Shoe Co.................. Object. AND 212 July 16,1917 Apr. 27,1917 June 26,1917 ___ do........... June 27,1917 ...... d o .......... June 28,1917 .......do.......... . June 30,1917 June 29,1917 .......do........... June 30,1917 July 10,1917 July 14,1917 July 18,1917 July 25,1917 July 26,1917 July 27,1917 July 30,1917 Aug. 2,1917 June 25,1917 Aug. 2,1917 July 9,1917 Aug. 20,1917 Aug. 2,1917 Aug. 27,1917 Name of firms. LOANS 107-PRM-165. 93-PRM-165.. 92-PRM-165.. 94-PRM-165.. 95-PRM-165.. 96-PRM-165.. 98-PRM-165... 99-PRM-165.. 100-PRM-165. 101-PRM-165. 102-PRM-165. 103-PRM-165. 105-PRM-165. 106-PRM-165. 282 108-PRM-165. 109-PRM-165. 110-PRM-165. 111-PRM-165. 113-PRM-165. 283 114-PRM-165. 89-PRM-165.. 115-PRM-165. 104r-PRM-165. 270 119-PRM-165. 280 116-PRM-165. Gr. 4............... 261 Date of contract. FOREIGN American Govern ment No. 220 223 '226 218 227 ----- do........................................ ___ do........................................ Melchoir Armstrong & Dessau. do. American Chain Co........................... C. D. Durkee Co................................ New London Ship & Engine Co....... Electric Boat Co................................ Greenport Basin & Construction Co. 213-14. 208-5.. Oct. 16,1916 Apr. 21,1916 Melchoir, Armstrong & Dessau . Moscow Machine Tool Works. .. 74-PRM-254. 80-PRM -41.. 16-PRM-41.. May 18,1917 May 31,1917 Mar. 21,1918 Defiance Machine Tool Co...... Blanchard Machine Co............ American Tool Works Co....... Gaston Williams & Wigmore.. Nankiwell, Dawson & Co....... Total.................... 1.500.00 216.00 5.920.00 13.200.00 27,275.13 33,192.50 7.250.00 185.625.00 158.400.00 988,430.70 150.000.00 4,834.95 141,516.29 12.623.00 171.00 7.367.00 233.600.00 237.341.00 88, 000.00 106.09 141,516.29 12.623.00 168.60 2.307.00 233.600.00 237.341.00 315.331.00 38,000.00 274.161.00 315.331.00 38,000.00 274.161.00 43.146.00 4,958,861.85 43.146.00 4,958,851.85 53,650,154.16 33,652,435.38 AUTHORITY ..do. Freight, inspection, etc. 1.500.00 216.00 14.800.00 13.200.00 62.720.00 37.630.00 14.500.00 3,712,500.00 352.000.00 988,430.70 AND FOR MAKING SAME, .do. .do. .do. Spare parts...................................................... Sose connections............................................ 8 motors, Buffalo............................................ 10 starters........................................................ Chains............................................................. Ship telegraphs............................................... Air tanks......................................................... 5 submarines................................................... 8 launches....................................................... Surplus expenses for repairs and supplies for yachts and trawlers. 10 motors, Mietz............................................. Instruments.................................................... Supplies for Murman port.............................. Machinery....................................................... 10 grinders....................................................... Lathe............................................................... 50 trucks, Packard.......................................... 20 automobiles, Pathfinder; 25 automobiles, Chandler. 84 Glen trailers; 80 automobiles, Chandler... Automobile machine shops............................ 10 automobiles, Locomobile; 87 automobiles, Chandler. 14 Glen trailers; 4 trucks, Lombard............. . LOANS Apr. 3,1917 Aug. 25,1917 Feb. 20,1917 In Petrograd. Feb. 20,1917 Apr. 17,1917 Jan. 14,1916 Aug. 31,1917 Mar. 21,1917 FOREIGN *232 233 234 212-7B. 212-7C . 213-20.. 213-22.. 218-4... 211-13.. 215-2... 204-1... 211-14.. 172 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. SECTION 96. Interesting Epitome of Conference Between Ughet, of the Russian Embassy, and Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State in Charge of Foreign Loans, on Russian Finances and Conditions. I first asked him for information regarding results of his trip abroad. He stated that the Russian representatives had met and decided to continue aid to Wrangel. In regard to the currency situation, Wrangel’s minister of finance desired to know whether bank notes printed in America would be available for Wrangel and had explained the plan of issuance of Wrangel treasury certificates and at some later time retirement of these certificates and other currencies, in cluding bolshevik and foreign, all at some stated rate of exchange, and the issuance of new bank notes. He said that the notes would not be issued except in connection with this process of retirement. I told him I wished to discuss frankly with him the general situation in regard to Russian funds. I spoke somewhat as follow s: Our understanding o f the fiction of the Russian Embassy was that it repre sented the “ Russian people ” at present submerged under a despotic minority. WTe had the deepest sympathy, regard for, and future faith in this Russian people; that our steadfast feeling, without selfish political ends, I believed was stronger than on the part of the Allies and was as strong to-day as ever. On the basis of this feeling we had felt convinced of the wisdom of aiding the continued existence and functioning of the embassy; that the way Bakmetief and Ughet had acted in a difficult capacity had justified our reliance on them to carry out this purpose and had given us material aid in the carrying out o f the policy of preventing the dismemberment of the Russian heritage. We felt that faith in Ughet and his square dealings justified perfect frankness on our part, although with others we might fear that such funds might be absconded with 01* dissipated in ways inconsistent with the policy of this Government. The Kerensky regime, in which the Russian people had an opportunity for expression, had been engulfed in the wave of bolshevism, and there had then succeeded various phases—Denekin, Yudenich, Kolchak—through each of which in turn it was hoped the Russian people would again find expression. Whether a better result could have been obtained if these enterprises had been handled differently from within or without is now academic. The facts show failure. In the case of Kolchak the United States Government had approved the em bassy aiding him, hoping that his faction would gather to itself the Russian people and the real Russia could be recognized through him. Now, perhaps the situation has changed. As a matter of personal opinion I felt that the possibility of factions entering from outside Russia, gathering to themselves the nucleus of the Russian people, had become far remote, if not entirely out of the realm of possibility. Aid from the Allies, coupled perhaps with an impression that such aid was given for selfish purposes, plus the Polish attack, had apparently raised a spirit of nationalism which very likely would damn from the beginning the chances of any outside intervention being received other than with mistrust. As a matter of personal opinion I believed the hope and expression o f Russia must now come from the inside— a result not at all impossible— perhaps by an overthrow of bolshevism through the military organization. With this possibility in the future the eventual accounting of the embassy to such result ing government, if it had the Russian people behind it, must be seriously con sidered by the embassy, and in this connection the department’s views as to the functions of the embassy, i. e., a real representative of the Russian people, must be regarded. Therefore it should be seriously considered whether— for the accomplishment of the purpose to which I believed Ughet had sincerely committed himself and carried out, and for his own eventual protection and the ratification of his acts— it was not advisable for him to bring the Kolchak funds, which I believed were based in the main on old Russian gold reserves, property of the Russian people, under the supervision of our Government in a manner perhaps somewhat similar to the present liquidation account. I told him that the matter was under consideration merely by the department, but I requested him to take the matter up with the ambassador and reach a decision for the purpose of further discussion with Mr. Davis. This he agreed to do without objection. I should judge that he had in his mind the possibility of our taking such a position and that it was very possible that they would be willing to take such a step. FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 173 Mr. Ughet pointed out that before the dissolution of the Kolchak government he had been authorized by that government to dispose of funds for purposes helpful to Denekin or Wrangel in south Russia. I explained to him that we doubted whether such authorization would protect him now that his former principal, the Kolchak government, had dissolved. I brought up the question of the million dollars held as security by the War Department. I notified him that we considered that (1) these wrere funds brought officially to the notice of the Government on account of their having been held by the Government, that (2) the contract was made in behalf of the Russian Government, and (3) the situation had now changed and liis for merly existing principal, the Kolchak government, which we had approved, had now dissolved. For these reasons we felt that the sum should be either held by the War Department or deposited in the liquidation account. This was accepted without any protest on his part. With regard to the Shipping Board fund, I explained to him that this was again a case where the funds were held by the Government and came within our official notice. In addition, the volunteer fleet was a separate entity, and we felt doubtful about the ability of the embassy to give a valid receipt to the Shipping Board for the funds. And, therefore, it had been decided that: the funds held by the Shipping Board should be retained until such time as the Russian volunteer fleet should again come into official existence or some other solution could be reached. The question of the bank notes was discussed and it was pointed out that after consideration o f the subject it w^as felt that the Government could not avoid a certain measure of responsibility in regard to their issuance, and that, therefore, it did not feel itself able to become a party to the issuance of the notes unless surcharged with a statement that they were to be issued by Wrangel’s government in order to avoid what might on their face appear a fraud in that they purported to be obligations of the Russian State Bank. He argued this point, stating that these bank notes were products o f addi tional contracts made entirely with Kolchak and paid with his funds, and that the notes could be distinguished by the issue-letter designations, and that they would be only issued for the purpose of redemption of present coinage. I stated that was not sufficient reason to cause us to change our opinions and we were convinced of the necessity of requiring a surcharge before per mitting exportation. He pointed out that as a practical matter, on account of the cost and time required to surcharge, it might very probably make im practical the issue o f the notes. I told him that was to be regretted, but that we would have to protect ourselves in view of our indirect responsibility. The question of liquidation of railway rails in Yokohama and ports in China was brought up. He stated that in view of the fact that there had been certain delays in their shipment, perhaps involving claims against the British and Japanese Governments, and that only about one-third of the rails had been bought with United States credits, he was not inclined to take the responsi bility o f selling the rails at this time, which might involve impairing future Russian claims against the British and Japanese Governments. He desired us to sell the rails. Mr. Kelley told him the Treasury did not like to take such responsibility. I left the matter with Mr. Kelley for further arrangements. The War Department was notified by telephone of our views on the payment of the million-dollar security fund to Ughet. V an S. M.-S. SECTION 97. Agreement Between the United States Treasury and Russian Embassy on Russian Finance. SUMMARY OF MEMORANDUM ON AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY THE TREASURY DEPART MENT AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WITH BAHKEMETEFF FOR CONTROL OF RUS SIAN EMBASSY FINANCES. 1. The Treasury Department and the Department o f State undertook to direct the liquidation of the claims of American manufacturers against the Russian Government growing out of the war contracts. 2. The Treasury Department undertook to exercise a negative control over the expenditures from funds in the National City Bank, i. e., it did not direct or supervise these expenditures, but all checks drawn upon these funds were sub mitted to the Treasury for vise, and the checks were not honored unless the Treasury approved. 174 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 3. The purpose of the arrangement was, first, to insure the payment of the just claims of American manufacturers against the Russian Government, and, second, to prevent the payment of mony from the fund in the National City Bank for purposes of which the Treasury did not approve. 4. It was evidently the intention not to create the impression that a forcible receivership had been established, and care was taken, apparently, to avoid the charge that, by interferring to too great an extent in the liquidation, this Govern ment had invalidated the claims against the Russian Government. SECTION 98. Answers to Senate Resolution, Page 6, Showing a Total of $11,047,346.20 Paid by United States War Department to De Facto Russian Ambassador for Materials Purchased by United States War Department; This Also Shows $1,921,597.48 Paid the De Facto Russian Government by the United States Shipping Board for Ship Hire. F e b r u a r y 25, 1921. Sir : Pursuant to Senate resolution 417,1 have the honor to furnish the foliow^ ing information: Question 1. Are funds of'the United States being used either directly or in directly to support or maintain an embassy in the city of Washington, D. C., representing the so-called Kerensky government of Russia, and if so, how much money has been thus expended and what authority is there for such expenditure? Answer. No funds of the United States have been so used. The funds of the United States were used solely for the purchase of obligations of the Russ.an Government in accordance with the Liberty loan acts. The funds paid by the United States to the Russian Government to purchase its obligations became the funds of the Russian Government. Among the expenditures of the Russian Gov ernment from its funds, as shown by the below-mentioned reports, are disburse ments to support or maintain the Russian Embassy in Washington. Question 2. Was money advanced from the Treasury of the United States to establish a credit on behalf of the Kerensky government, and if so, in what amount, and for what purpose was it used? Answer. As set forth in the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for the fiscal year 1920, in pursuance of the authority o f the Liberty loan acts, the Secretary of the Treasury did from time to time, with the approval of the President, establish credits in favor of the provisional government of Russia, but no such credits were established subsequent to the fall of the so-called K er ensky government in November, 1917. Advances were made to the said Russian Government on the following dates and in the following amounts: 1917— October 2 _________$22, 200, 000 1917—July 6 ____________ $35, 000, 000 July 1 3 ___________ 10, 000, 000 October 1 1 ________ 20,000,000 November 1 _______ 31, 700,000 2, 500, 000 August 1__________ November 1 5 ______ 1,329, 750 August 22_________ 2, 500, 000 August 24_________ 37, 500, 000 August 30_________ 10,000, 000 Total_______ 187,729,750 15,000,000 September 25--------- The proceeds of the advance of $1,329,750 made on November 15, 1917, were simultaneously applied by the Russians to the payment of interest to the Gov ernment of the United States. No advances were made after November 15,1917. As shown in Exhibits 26 and 28, on pages 338 and 342 of the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for the fiscal year 1920, respectively, the expenditures reported by the Russian Government for the period April 6 , 1917, to December 31, 1917, were as follow s: Expenditures. Munitions, including remounts------------------------------------------------ $58, 698,646. 58 Exchange and cotton purchases----------------------------------------------- 53,186,352. 70 Other foods___________________________________________________ 1> 706,909. 48 Other supplies-----------------------------------------------------------------------49,338,982.34 Transportation________________________________________________ 2,155,769. 40 Shipping-------------------------------------------------------------------------------1,324,678. 54 Interest---------------------------------------------------------------------------------4,129,761.64 Maturities------------------------------------------------------------------------------5,000,000.00 Miscellaneous_________________________________________________ 3, 041, 568.89 T ota l__________________________________________________ 178, 582, < 9.57 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 175 Subsequent to January 1, 1918, further expenditures for similar items were reported to the amount of $50,058,684.89. The total expenditures reported for the entire period from April 6 , 1917, to December 15, 1920, were, therefore, $228,641,354.46. The Russian representatives have reported receipts since De cember 31, 1917, of $25,466,962.83. Certain of these are doubtless refunds of payments included among the expenditures, and others may be the proceeds of goods purchased by means of the expenditures. There is reason to believe, however, that a large portion of the receipts are the proceeds of materials pur chased by the Russians out of resources other than United States advances. Question S. What amount of money, if any, does the Kerensky government owe to the Government o f the United States, how is it secured, what rate of interest does it bear, and when does it mature? Ansiver. For its advances to Russia, as stated on page 55 of the Annual Re port of the Secretary of the Treasury for the fiscal year 1920, the Secretary holds obligations of the Russian Government corresponding in amount and bearing the respective dates set forth in the foregoing table of advances. Said obliga tions are in the form of certificat3s of indebtedness payable to the United States, without deduction as to prii cipal and interest, for taxes of the debtor Government in gold coin of the United States of the present standard of weight and fineness, at the Subtreasury of the United States in New York or at the Treasury of the United States in Washington. They are signed in the name of the provisional Government of Russia by a representative of that Government designated to the Treasury by the Department of State as being uathorized to sign them in the name and on behalf of that Government. Certain of the cer tificates were payable at fixed dates of maturity, all of which are now past, so that they are now held as demand obligations. The remainder were expressed to be payable on demand. Certain of them were expressed to bear interest at the rate of 3£ per cent per annum and the others at the rate o f 4£ per cent per annum, being the same rates borne by the obligations issued at that time by the United States Government. By arrange ment similar to that made with other Governments, interest has been charged on all Russian obligations since May 15, 1918, at a rate equivalent to 5 per cent per annum on the total amount thereof. As stated on page 57 of my annual report, the amount of interest heretofore paid on the above-mentioned Russian obligations is $4,595,564.15, being the interest up to November 15, 1917, in full, together with a partial payment of $1,865,925.08 on account of the interest which became due May 15, 1918, and partial payments of $1,399,877.43 on account of the interest which became due November 15, 1918. As stated on page 58 of the annual report, the Secretary holds a special fund of $1,808,506, which is equal to the unpaid balance of the interest matured on Russian obligations on May 15, 1918, and which, it is believed, ultimately can be applied in discharge of that balance, and a similar fund of $335,095.07 which it is believed will be applicable upon the unpaid balance of interest which became due November 15, 1918. As shown at the same page o f the report, the interest accrued and remaining unpaid on the above-mentioned Russian obligations for the half years ending November 15, 1918, April 15, 1919, and May 15, 1919, October 15, 1919, and November 15, 1919, April 15, 1920, and May 15, 1920, and October 15, 1920, and November 15, 1920, amounts in all, after deduction of the special funds above mentioned, to $21,187,741.90. For the interest which became due November 15, 1918, the Treasury holds an obligation of that date executed in the name o f the provisional government of Russia, payable on demand with interest at the rate of 5 per cent per annum, and for the interest which became due subsequently, the Treasury holds formal undertakings executed by the Russian representatives on behalf o f the provisional government o f Russia that said government promises to pay the respective amounts so becoming due on demand, with interest at the rate of 5 per cent per annum. As shown on pages 65, 66 , and 67 of the report, the Treasury has received as custodian from the Secretary of War on account o f sales o f surplus war supplies a Russian obligation dated August 8 , 1919, for $406,082.30, payable June 30, 1922, with interest at 5 per cent, on which the sum of $10,179.87 has been re ceived on account of interest accrued for the period from June 30, 1919, to December 30, 1919, and has also received from the American Relief Administra tion, on account of relief, pursuant to act approved February 25, 1919, Russian obligations dated July 1, 1919, for $4,465,465.07, payable on June 30, 1921, with interest. No interest has been paid on these obligations. Question If. After the downfall of the Kerensky government, did the Govern ment of the United States purchase war material or other supplies from the 176 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. officials of the Kerensky government with funds of the United States and, if so, what was the nature of the supplies, how much money was paid for the same, and was the purchase made at a time when the Kerensky government was indebted to the United States, and, if so, in what amount? Answer. It is my understanding that subsequent to November 15, 1917, the Government of the United States purchased through its various departments and agencies certain materials from the Russian representatives. The corre spondence in my office indicates purchases as follow s: Rails and accessories_________________________________________ $9,188,318. 92 Machine guns-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 , 572, 021.00 Motor trucks and parts_______________________________________ 214,500.00 Lenses________________________________________________________ 4,270. 00 Ammunition --------------------------------------------------------------------------68,236. 28 T o t a l___________________________________________________ 11, 047, 346. 20 I believe there were also other purchases, the total amount of which was only a small fraction of the foregoing. This Government also paid the Russian rep resentatives $1,921,597.48 charter hire for ships. These items include, as I understand it, substantially all the payments made by departments of this Government. Exact figures can be obtained only by reference to the depart ments and agencies concerned. Such payments would appear in the Treasury records only in the accounts presented to the auditor by the various disbursing officers who made them and could be ascertained only by a physical examina tion of the accounts and vouchers. This would require months of work by many people, is impracticable, and was not, as I understand it, contemplated by the resolution. The funds mentioned above in this answer w^ere placed in the liquidation account. The cargo of certain Russian ships diverted from Murmansk and Archangel to England was sold in England and purchased in part by and for the use of the American Expeditionary Forces. The special funds referred to above as being held to cover interest payments are composed of proceeds of these cargoes. Question 5. Has the Government of the United States taken any steps to re imburse itself for money advanced or loaned to the Kerensky government? Answer. Except to the extent above stated, I am not aware tliat the Govern ment of the United States has taken any steps to reimburse itself for money advanced or loaned to the Russian Government. As of December 1, 1917, the unpaid balance on contracts made by the Russian Government with our people was something over $102,000,000. The contracts were in all stages of performance. The funds on hand of the Russian Govern ment in the United States amounted to about $56,000,000. At the end of De cember, 1917, as a result of the payment, cancellation, or reduction of con tracts, the unpaid balance on contracts in America was reduced to less than $50,000,000. The liquidation has since been completed, liability under said con tracts discharged, and a substantial amount of property shipped to Russians in territory not under the control of the bolsheviks. These matters were dealt with at length by Mr. Polk, then Undersecretary of State, and Mr. Leffingwell, then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, in hear ings before the Committee on Expenditures in the State Department of the House of Representatives in the summer and autumn of 1919, and were also con sidered in the hearings on Russian propaganda before a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate in the winter and spring of 1920. For the information of the Senate, copies of the statements by Mr. Polk and Mr. Leffingwell are attached. Respectfully, D. F. H ouston. The P b e s id e n t o f t h e S e n a t e . GREECE S. Doc. 86 , 67-2------ 12 177 SECTION 99. Greece. Under the various Liberty loan acts which provided that the Sec retary of the Treasury could, with the approval of the President, make loans to foreign Governments then engaged in Avar with ene mies of the United States for the purpose of prosecution of the war, there was a credit established for Greece of $48,236,629.05. Of this credit there was advanced to Greece up to November 15, 1920, a total of $15,000,000. There now remains on the books of the Treasury Department a credit in favor of Greece for $33,236,629.05. No money whatsoever was advanced to Greece during the actual progress of the war. The first advance was made to Greece December 15, 1919. The next advance was January 16,1920, of $5,000,000. The third advance was September 17,1920, of $5,000,000. Loans were made to Greece under an entirely different plan and system from those made to any of the other allies. In February, 1918, fingland, France, and the TJnited States made an agreement with Greece whereby these three countries agreed to underwrite a Greek loan for 750,000,000 drachmas which have the same value as francs. Each of the three countries agreed to make its share of one-third of the loan. This 750,000,000 franc loan was the outside limit of the loan to be made. That is, it was the maximum amount for the 1918 expenditures. In pursuance to this loan Greece agreed to keep a certain number of men in the field and make other military and naval operations. This loan was to be paid to Greece upon certain conditions. Those conditions were, first, the money was to be paid if at any time during the war the credit of the National Bank of Greece fell below 100,000,000 francs. Second, if the money was not paid during the war, then it was all to be due and payable six months after the con clusion of peace. A further condition was added that in no case were the three countries referred to to pay more than one-third of the expendi tures for 1918 as shown by vouchers from the Greek Treasury, which vouchers were to be passed upon by the financial commission ap pointed for this purpose. On the strength of this promised loan, the Greek Government issued a bond issue which it sold to its own people. The correspondence shows that this agreement was couched in such vague terms that there was considerable dispute as to its actual meaning. The correspondence shows that though the United States has up to date advanced $15,000,000 on this credit so established, neither of the other countries have advanced any of their share. All that they have done was to establish book credits. 179 180 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. The correspondence also shows that when our advances were finally made, they were made not to take care of war purposes but to rehabilitate Greece. In fact, all of the proposals for advances mentioned the fact that the advances are to be used for rehabilita tion and relief purposes. The Treasury Department only agreed to these advances when they were assured that they were to be made for expenditure in the United States. There is nothing in the correspondence on Greece showing any itemized statement as to how this money was spent other than a statement in French, giving merely the names of the parties who received the money, no statement being given of what the money was spent for. It must also be borne in mind with reference to the Greek loan that this loan was made to the Venizelos government, which govern ment has since collapsed, and the former King Constantine, who had been ousted from the throne by Great Britain and France because of his pro-German leaning, has been returned to the throne by a popular plebiscite of Greece. At the time of the political disturbances in Greece, just prior to the return of Constantine, a fourth advance of $5,000,000 was asked, but this request has never been granted by the Treasury Department. The correspondence with the committee only runs to January 14, 1921, and it does not show a direct refusal on the part of the Treas ury Department of the United States of this request. For a complete understanding of the political bearing on these cash advances see the last subdivision of letters in the Greek file, attached hereto. Because of the United States Treasury’s refusal to release all or a large part of the credit established for Greece, Greece adopted retaliatory measures in the form of a high tariff on certain American goods sold in Greece. It increased the tariff on oleomargarine 300 per cent. The Treasury’s report shows that up to November 15, 1920, the interest on the Greek advances were paid. We hold no obligations of Greece for military supplies sold or foodstuffs supplied by the American Belief Commission. SECTION 99-A. File Begins with the Three-Party Agreement Entered into at Paris Between the Representatives of England, France, the United States, and Greece. This Agreement Became the Basis for All Credits Established by the Above-Named Countries with Greece and is Always Referred to in Sub sequent Correspondence Attached as the February 10, 1918, Agreement, Although it is Headed as Entered into December 1, 1917. This Agreement is Appended in the Original French as Well as in an English Rough Trans lation Made for the Treasury Department. To These Documents is Added a Translation of Ratification of the Agreement by the Royal Greek Gov ernment. S u n d e r la n d H ou se, London, February 20. D e a r M r. S e c r e t a r y : In accordance with my telegram No. 77 of February 16 I am sending herewith the original and copy of translation of the agreement executed between the Government of France, Great Britain, and the United States on the one hand and the Greek Government on the other. FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 181 Copies of my letter to the Greek minister in London in regard to a modifica tion of article 3 in so far as the Governments of France and Great Britain are concerned, and of my supplement letter of instructions to the American consul general at Athens, are also inclosed. The cable instructions given by me to the consul general were repeated to you in my No. 77. Sincerely, yours,* O scar T. C rosby . H on. W il l ia m G. M cAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, Washington. D. C., U. 8. A. The financial delegates of the United States of America, Great Britain, and France, as a consequence of the decision of the Supreme War Council, dated December 1, 1917, the American delegates, ad referendum, have approved the following agreement with the Greek Government: ARTICLE 1. The Governments of the United States of America, France, and Great Britain agree to make advances to the Greek Government by equal shares during the year 1918 in order to allow them to get in their own country the credits necessary to provide: 1. For the settlement of arrears. 2. For expenses during 1918 of the Greek Army and Navy, the strength of which having been increased as delineated in the military arrangements. The latter expenses, including navy expenses, to be made in Greece, apply to the following items: (a) Pay and indemnities of the army. (&) Separation allowances. (c) Utilization of local resources. (d ) Requisition of the animals and carts of the country. (e ) Transports by sea and rail. The advances mentioned in this article will be liable to come up to the amount of francs 750,000,000, including the 50,000,000 about which the arrangement of November 30, 1917, was made. ARTICLE 2. These advances will be dealt out to the Greek Government according to their needs from time to time upon their asking and subject to the agreement of an interallied financial commission, which will be created in Athens. This com mission will include delegates of the United States, France, Great Britain, and Greece. The employment of these credits will be controlled by the aforesaid commis sion as far as the arrears are concerned and by a similarly composed interallied military commission, also meeting in Athens, which commission, previous to the grant of advances meant for the organization and keeping of the army and navy, will have given its advice to the financial commission. ARTICLE 3. These advances, granted in dollars, francs, and sterling, intended to be security for issues of the National Bank of Greece to the same amount, will be available during the war within the scope of needs by means of drafts on one or the other of the lending countries in case the foreign balances of the Greek treasury and the national bank should fall below 10 0 ,000,000 francs. Six months after the conclusion of peace the balance of these advances will be available without the restrictions of the first paragraph. ARTICLE 4. The advances will be represented by obligations of the Greek Government. For each draft, and from the day on which it will have been made, these obli gations will yield interest at a rate determined with each of the Governments concerned, and, save the right reserved by the Greek Government of beginning the amortization in advance, will be redeemable by the end of the fifteenth year following the cessation of hostilities. # Until the redemption of the aforesaid obligations, no new security may be used for an exterior loan without the assent o f the Governments o f the United States of America, France, and Great Britain. 182 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. ARTICLE 5. In consideration of the advances granted to them, the Greek Government pledge themselves to take immediately the necessary steps to prevent in future the granting in Greece of remittances upon foreign countries, unless it be for legitimate needs, and upon production of documentary evidence. Done in Paris, 1918, in four copies. A . B onar L a w . Lu et approuve: L l . K lotz . Approved ad referendum: O scar T . C rosby . GENNADIUS. The above contract has been approved by the Government of the United States of America with the following reservation: The obligations given to the Government of the United States of America may be redeemed within a lapse of time which will not exceed the maximum limit allowed by the laws of the United States, but will never be longer than 15 years from the date of the cessation of hostilities. O scar T . C rosby . F ebruary 13, 1918. Les del£gues financiers des Etats-Unis, de la Grande-Bretagne et de la France ont, en consequence de la decision du Comity supSrieur de guerre en date du le r d§cembre 1917, donne leur approbation-les representants des Etats-Unis ad referendum-^ l’aceord ci-dessous avec le Gouvernement hellenique: article i . Les Gouvernements des Etats-Unis, de la France et de la Grande Bretagne sont d’accord pour consentir, par parts egales, au cours de l’annee 1918, au Gouverne ment hellenique, des avances destinees a permettre a celui-ci de se procurer les ressources interieures nScessaires l°-k la liquidation de l’arriere, 2 °-aux d6 penses, pendant ladite annee 1918, de l’armee et de la marine hell£niques portSs aux effectifs prevus dans les arrangements militaires. Ces derni£res dSpenses, y compris celles de la marine a effectuer en Gr§ee, s’appliquent aux objets suivants: (a) Solde et ind£nmit6 de la troupe. (Z>) Allocations aux families des nobilises. (e) Exploitation des ressources locales. ( cl) Requisition des animaux et voitures du pays. (e) Transports par voie ferree et de mer. Les avances visees au present article seront susceptibles d’atteindre 750 mil lions de francs, y compris les cinquante millions qui ont fait l’objet de l’arrangement du 30 Novembre 1917. ARTICLE 2. Ces avances seront mises & la disposition du Gouvernement hellenique, au fur et it mesure de ses besoins, sur sa demande et sur l’avis conforme d’une Commission financiSre interalliee qui sera institute &Ath£nes. Cette Commission comprendra des representants des Etats-Unis, de la France, de la GrandeBretagne et de la Gr£ce. L’emploi de ces ressources sera suivi tant par ladite Commission en ce qui concerne le paiement de l’arriere que par une Commission militaire interalliee d’une composition semblable sie.cceant egalement k Ath^nes et qui, prealablement ^ Toctroi des avances ayant pour objet l’organisation et l’entretien d*e 1’arm^e et de la marine, aura fourni son avis a la Commission financi6 re. ARTICLE 3. Ces avances, accordees en dollars, francs et livres sterling, destinies a gager des Emissions de la Banque Nationale de Gr^ce pour des montants §gaux pourront, pendant la duree de la guerre, §tre u tilises dans la limite des besoins par des tirages sur l’un ou l’autre des Etats pr^teurs dans le cas oft Tavoir disponible 183 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. k PEtranger du TrSsor hell6nique et de la Banque Nationale tomberait audessous de 10 0 millions de francs. Six mois apr§s la conclusion de la paix, le solde de ces avances pourra §tre utilisS sans les restrictions de l’alin^a premier. ARTICLE 4. Les avances seront representees par des obligations du Gouvernement hellSnique. Pour chaque tirage et k dater du jour oft il aura eu lieu, ces obligations, pour un montant 6 gal k celui du dit tirage deviendront productives d’inter£t k un taux fixS respectivement avec les parties, et seront, sauf le droit que se reserve le Gouvernement hell£nique de les amortir par anticipation, remboursables & la fin d la quinzi£me annee qui suivra la cessation des hostility. Jusqu’au remboursement des dites obligations aucun gage nouveau ne pourra §tre affecte k un emprunt extSrieur sans l’assentiment des Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, de France et de Grande Bretagne. ARTICLE 5. En consideration des avances qui lui sont accordSes, le Gouvernement hellgnique s’engage k prendre imm§diatement les mesures nScessaires pour qu’il ne soit plus & l’avenir d61ivr6 en Gr£ce de remises sur l’etranger que pour des besoins legitimes et sur production de documents justificatifs./. Fait k Paris, le en quatre exemplaires. A. B onar La scar T. C r o s b y . w . Approuve ad referendum. O GENNADIUS. Le contrat ci-dessus a 6 t6 approuv§ par le Gouvernement des Etats la reserve suivante: les obligations qui seront remises au Gouvernement des Etats Unis ront un d61ai de remboursement qui ne pourra excSder le delai autorisg par la legislation des Etats Unis, mais ne sera en aucun cas k quince ans, k compter de la cessation des hostility. O scar Unis sous comportemaximum superieur T. C r o s b y . F e b r u a r y 13, 1918. Ratification o f the financial agreements signed January 28/February 10, 1918, between the Governments of France, England, and the United States on the one hand and the Greek Government on the other. Also addition o f article 8 A to law GCMB of March 6/19, 1910. L aw 1235. We, Alexander, King of the Hellenes, in unanimity with the House of Parlia ment, have resolved and do decree: ARTICLE 1. The financial agreements signed January 28/February 10, 1918, between the Governments of France, England, and the United States on the one hand and the Greek Government on the other, including the supplements to such agree ments, are hereby ratified. The original and the translation of said agreements read as follow s: French. Greek. ARTICLE 2. The minister of finance is empowered to sign or to intrust to his deputy to sign the bonds (of article 4 of above agreement) for the payment of the 750,000,000 francs in advance. 184 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. ARTICLE 3. Article 8 A is added to the law GCMB of March 6/19, 1910, concerning loan, maximum 240,000,000, in gold drachmas, for abolishing compulsory circulation and modifying the terms o f the regulation, ratified by law BFIT, of February 26, 1898, on international control, re redeemable and consolidated loans in gold therein discussed. Article 8A runs as follow s: “ ARTICLE 8 A. “ The National Bank of Greece is authorized to issue bank notes according to the provisions of the preceding article against credits made over by the Greek treasury to the order of the bank at the exchequers of England, France, and the United States of America, or against credits opened in favor of the bank by the said exchequers at the banks of the said countries. “ In case the foreign exchange is depreciated as regards the Greek drachma, this exchange and the credits of the preceding paragraph are entered as assets of the national bank at par, the difference between these credits and the bank notes issued being entered as liabilities of the national bank under the title ‘ Exchange difference in independent account according to article 8 A of law GCMB.’ ” Possible gain or loss by reason of the exchange difference in the cases pro vided for by the first paragraph of this article are to be reckoned to the debit or eredit of the Greek treasury. The gain or the loss is determined at the moment of the realization o f the credits by the national bank through sale of the corresponding bill of exchange abroad. The minister of finance can assure to the National Bank of Greece for the expenditures of manufacture, transportation, substitution, etc., incident upon management of the bank notes issued according to the present article, one-eighth per cent annually on said bank notes. This percentage will cease being paid by the treasury according to what amount and for as long a time as the above credits of the Allies are interest bearing. ARTICLE 4. The minister of finance is authorized to proceed without auction to leasing buildings for the installation of the Interallied Financial and Military Commis sion, as also offices for the general accountant. ARTICLE 5. The Interallied Finance Commission and the Interallied Military Commission are allowed expenditures for personnel and all other expenses by money orders at the demand and in the name of the Interallied Finance Commission or agent appointed by the same without further ceremony. Five hundred drachmas monthly for expenses attendant upon representation are granted to the Greek representative in the Interallied Finance Commission, and 250 drachmas monthly for the same purpose to the Greek representative in the Interallied Military Commission, said sums being paid to both at the begin ning of each month. For payment of above expenditures an annual credit of 300,000 drachmas is entered in the budget of expenditures of the ministry of finance. The present law goes into force on December 1, 1917. Let the present law, enacted by Parliament and confirmed by us to-day, be published in the Government Gazette and be executed as a law of the State. A lexan de r . M il t ia d e s N e g r o p o n t is , Minister of Finance. VisSed and the great seal of the State impressed. I. A th e n s, April 4, 1918. D. T s i r im o k o s , Minister of Justice. FOREIGN LCANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 185 D e c e m b e r 8 , 1917. I have received, through the State Department, a cable from Assistant Secretary Crosby containing the following passage with ref erence to Greece: Referring to Greece Supreme War Council at Versailles. Meeting concluded. House voting affirmatively that it is of prime military importance that Venizelos should return to Greece. Satisfied with support Allies and asked finance section of interallied conference to prepare plan for such support. After pro longed conference, following plan satisfactory to Venizelos and his finance min ister, Diomides, is unanimously recommended to Governments of United States, France, and Great Britain military requirements o f Greece for coming year, based on report of France finance and military missions, involving promptly increasing active army from present three divisions to at least nine divisions, will require about 600,000,000 francs for munitions and supplies for army and navy herein called munition and supplies fund, and 750,000,000 francs for payment of soldiers and sailors and other local military expenditures, including certain arrears herein called military funds. France and Great Britain have agreed to provide munition and supply fund, reserving for determination until after conclusion of peace extent and manner of their reimbursement by Greece in light of various considerations, including results of terms of peace to Greece. I have declined to recommend participation by the United States in this advance because of extent to which European political questions which do not concern us may be involved in ultimate settlement. Representatives of Great Britain and France recognize fairness of this position, but may later urge that we share this burden. Conditioned upon this fund being supplied by France, Great Britain recommends that United States join with France and Great Britain in supplying military fund o f 750,000,000 francs upon following terms: Advances to be provided as required under supervision of military and financial commissions sitting at Athens, including representatives of United States, France, and Great Britain, and Greece. I believe our present minister and military attach^, if there is one, will be sufficient representation for us in commissions above mentioned. Advances to take form of credits in dollars, francs, and sterling, which will serve as basis for Greek bank notes, Greece to have right actually to draw against these credits during the war only in case balances abroad o f Greek treasury and National Bank should fall below 100,000,000 francs. Six months after conclusion of peace, credit can be drawn upon without restriction. The three powers joining in advances are to receive Greek 5 per cent obligations, loan 15 years after cessation o f hostilities, Greece agreeing that no pledges shall be created in favor of any subsequent exterior loan without consent o f three leading Governments. So long as and to extent that Greece does not draw against credits interest on obligations will be remitted. Obligations to be received by United States to contain special provisions meeting the requirements of our September law. Agreement con tains other details for protection of lenders. Col. House and Gen. Bliss join in recommending our joining in support of Greece in view of urgent military necessity and upon principle that we should join with Great Britain and France in supporting military programs of weaker nations whose military cooperation is important to aid in accomplishing desired victory, even though involving ad vance for expenditures outside our country. If plan approved will agree upon precise amount, dollar credit to represent our third in the aggregate advance herein for convenience expressed as 750,000,000 francs. Greek minister at Washington will be authorized to sign obligations. I am disposed to feel that, in view o f the joint recommendation o f Col. House, Gen. Bliss, and Mr. Crosby, that this be done. We should join with Great Britain and France and advance one-third o f the 750,000,000 francs to Greece, although this does involve expenditures outside o f our country. If you approve, may I ask that you indicate your approval upon this letter, carry ing as it will the establishment o f a credit for Greece of 250,000,000 francs, or approximately $43,859,649.12 at the current rate of exchange. Cordially, yours, W . G. M c A d o o , Secretary. The P r e s i d e n t , The White House. D e a r M r. P r e s i d e n t : T h e W h it e H ou se , Approved: December, 1917. W oodrow W il s o n . 186 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. SECTION 100. Approval of Credits. Operating under the general approval of credits to the amount of approximately $44,000,000 by President Wilson, Secretary Lansing (letter of June 17, 1918, to Secretary of Treasury) approved and Assistant Secretary Leffingwell established a credit of $15,790,000, which amount was the one-third share to be borne by the United States of book credits to be opened by England, France, and the United States of 150,000,000 francs and 120,000,000 francs by arrange ments of December 1,1918, and April 18, 1918, entered into by agents of the four countries acting in pursuance to the three-party agree ment. On June 20, 1918, the Treasury Department advised the Greek minister at Washington by letter that the credit had been established. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Leffingwell, in a letter dated July 12, 1918, notified the Treasurer of the United States that on June 21,1918, the credit ot$15,790,0001 had been established in favor of the Royal Greek Government; that the obligation would bear interest at rate of 5 per cent only upon such sums as were actually advanced; and that the Treasurer should hold the credit available to meet drafts drawn upon the Treasury by the National Bank of Greece and presented by the Greek minister at Washington. Upon investigation it was found that the British Government had established credits with Greece on the gold-parity rate between pounds sterling and francs, and the two American negotiators (Mr. Crosby and Mr. Cravath) of the three-party agreement advised the Treasury Department that it was the intention that credits estab lished in accordance therewith should be established at the goldparity rate. Consequently, on November 25, 1918, Acting Secretary of State, Mr. L. S. Eowe, addressed the President asking his approval of an additional credit of $4,236,630. This was necessary to add to the $44,000,000 already approved in order that the whole credit would equal 250,000,000 francs at gold-parity rate, or the full share of the United States under the three-party agreement. N o v e m b e r 25, 1918. Under date of December 10, 1917, you approved the establishment in favor of the Greek Government of a credit of 250,000,000 francs, which in the request for your approval of the credit was stated to be at the then rate of exchange equivalent to approximately $44,000,000, and the credit which you approved has been since carried on the books of this department at $44,000,000. Your approval of the establishment of this credit in favor of the Greek Government was asked to enable this department to carry out its part of the financial arrangement entered into about a year ago between the British, French, and American Treasuries and the Greek Government which provided for certain credits to be established against which bank notes of the Greek National Bank were to be issued for the purpose of providing for certain of the expenditures required to be made by the Government of Greece in the prosecution of the war. The Government of Greece has insisted that it was the purpose and intent of the agreement referred to that the credits to be established thereunder should be established at the gold-parity rate between francs and dollars. Upon inquiry D e a r M r. P r e s i d e n t : 1 This credit o f $15,790,000 represented the equivalent o f 90,000,000 francs at the then current rate o f exchange. FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 187 it is found that the British Government has established under the said agree ment credits at the gold-parity rate between pounds and francs, and Mr. Crosby and Mr. Cravath, who negotiated the agreement, advise that it was the intenttion that credits established in accordance therewith should be established at the gold-parity rate. Accordingly, your approval is now asked to the establishment in favor o f the Greek Government of an additional credit in the amount of $4,236,630, which, with the $44,000,000 credit you have already approved, will be the equivalent at gold parity of 250,000,000 francs, the limit of the credit to be established by the United States in favor of the Greek Government under the agreement afore said. I f the establishment of this further credit meets with your approval, will you be good enough to so indicate at the foot of this letter? Cordially, yours, L . S. R o w e , Acting Secretary. The P r e s i d e n t , The White House. T h e W h ite H ou se, November 27, 1918. Approved. (Signed) W oodrow t W ils o n . SECTION 101. No Cash Advances Made to Greece Prior to Armistice. [See note to follow ing statement.] N o v e m b e r 30, 1918. Complete statement of expenditures in the purchase of obligations o f foreign Governments under acts September 24, 1917, April 4, 1918, and July 9, 1918. Great B ritain____________________________________________ $2,641,000,000.00 France ___________________________________________________ 1,360,000,000.00 Italy _____________________________________________________ 916,000, 000. 00 Belgium __________________________________________________ 150,495,000.00 R ussia____________________________________________________ 90,229,750.00 C u b a _____________________________________________________ 10,000,000.00 S erb ia ____________________________________________________ 9, C14, 697. 70 Czecho-Slovak National Council____________________________ 5,000,000.00 T o t a l______________________________________________ 5,182,039,447.70 credit in favor of the Greek Government o f $15,790,000 has been formally established to meet drafts to be drawn on the Treasurer o f the United States, but not yet presented, under arrangements heretofore entered into with the Greek Government. There have been drawn upon the Treasurer o f the United States, but not yet presented, drafts in the amount o f $5,000,000, the status of which is not determined, in favor of the Rumanian Government. N o t e . —A SECTION 102. Correspondence Establishing a Second Book Credit of $23,764,036 or an Equivalent at Gold Parity of 115,000,000 Francs— Credit Established De cember 3, 1918. D e c e m b e r 3, 1918. : 1 have the honor to inform you that as contemplated by the financial agreement entered into in Paris by the representative of your Government and the financial representatives of the Governments of France, Great Britain, and the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury has estab lished a credit in favor o f the Royal Greek Government in the amount o f $23,764,036. This credit is in addition to the credit o f $15,790,000 heretofore established in favor of your Government by the Secretary of the Treasury. D e a r M r. M i n i s t e r 188 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. The sum of the two credits thus established in favor of your Government is $39,554,036, the equivalent at gold parity of 205,000,000 francs. In establish ing the above credit of $23,764,036 in favor of your Government it is done on the understanding that the British and French Governments have each estab lished credits in favor of your Government in pursuance of the financial agree ment before mentioned up to the equivalent at gold parity of 205,000,000 francs, or that said Governments are each about to establish additional credits in favor of your Government under said agreement which with the amounts pre viously established thereunder in favor of your Government by said Govern ments, respectively, will bring the total amounts of the credits established by each of said Governments in favor of your Government under said agreement up to the equivalent at gold parity of said amount of 205,000,000 francs. The credit o f $23,764,036 will be made available against the duly executed obligations of your Government in a corresponding amount and in a manner to be arranged, to comply with the provisions and limitations of the Paris agree ment above mentioned. I am, my dear Mr. Minister, Yours, very truly, A lb e r t R a t h b o n e . Mr. G e o r g e R o u s s o s , Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, The Royal Greek Legation, Washington, D. C. L e g a tio n R o y a le de G r e c e , Washington, December 3, 1918. D e a r Mr. S e c r e t a r y : I acknowledge the receipt of the letter of Mr. Rath bone of even date advising of the establishment by the Secretary of the Treasury of a credit in favor of the Royal Greek Government in the amount of $23,764,036, which with the $15,790,000 credit previously established by you in favor o f my Government is the equivalent of 205,000,000 francs at gold parity. I hand you herewith the obligation of my Government in the aggregate amount of $23,764,036, which I have executed in the name of my Government pursuant to the authority which it has conferred upon me, and pursuant to like authority I am authorized to receive from you the advance to my Government in a corresponding amount for the purpose of making it available for the use contemplated by the financial agreement entered into in Paris by the repre sentative of my Government and the financial representatives of the Govern ments of France, Great Britain, and the United States. I shall be obliged, however, if you will cause the above amount to be held by the Treasurer of the United States to be paid by him only when and to the extent from time to time that there shall be presented to him drafts drawn upon him by the National Bank of Greece. I shall arrange to furnish you with the necessary authorization from the National Bank of Greece and to its officers authorized from time to time to execute these drafts in its behalf, and as well specimens of their signatures, and shall also arrange that all such drafts presented to the Treasurer of the United States shall bear a notation signed by the Greek minister of finance in substantially the following w ords: “ The draft upon which this notation is made is drawn under and in ac cordance with the provisions of the Paris financial agreement, dated Feb ruary 10, 1918.” The authority hereby conferred upon the Treasurer of the United States to pay drafts drawn by the National Bank of Greece is irrevocable. I understand that the interest on the obligation of my Government handed to you herewith will be remitted until payments are made against drafts of the National Bank of Greece, each amount so paid to carry interest from the date o f its payment by the Treasurer of the United States. I am, my dear Mr. Secretary, Yours, very truly. G. Roussos. The honorable the S e c r e t a r y o f t h e T r e a s u r y , Washington, D. C. FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 189 D e c e m b e r 3, 1918. : I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of even date and, in accordance with your request, take pleasure in informing you that the amount of the obligation of your Government handed me therewith, namely, $23,764,036, will be held by the Treasurer of the United States and paid by him, from time to time, only when and to the extent that there shall be pre sented to him drafts drawn upon him by the National Bank of Greece. I note that you will furnish the Secretary of the Treasury the necessary authori zation from the National Bank of Greece as to the officers who may, from time to time, execute such drafts and as well specimens of their signatures. I also note that you will arrange that drafts drawn by the National Bank of Greece when presented to the Treasurer o f the United States for payment will bear notation as set forth in your letter of even date. While I understand that the authority which you have given by your letter to niake payments of such drafts so presented is irrevocable, the Secretary of the Treasury reserves all rights conferred on the United States by the financial agreement of Paris referred to in your letter above mentioned, and the arrangement made between us is not intended as an extension o f the undertakings of the United States Government, as set forth in such agreement, nor to commit the Secretary of the Treasury or the Treasurer of the United States to make payment of drafts except in the circumstances provided in the Paris financial agreement above referred to. I take pleasure in confirming the understanding reached in Paris that, although the obligation of the Royal Greek Government above referred to by its terms bears interest from its date, the interest thereon will be re mitted to the extent necessary to the end that interest shall be collected on such obligation only upon amounts which the Treasurer of the United States shall actually pay upon drafts of the National Bank o f Greece and only from the respective dates when such payments are made. I am, my dear Mr. Minister, Yours, very truly, D e a r M r. M i n i s t e r A lbe rt R a t h b o n e . M r. G eorge R otjssos , Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, The Royal Greek Legation, Washington, D. C. D e c e m b e r 3, 1918. Sir : Referring to my letter of July 12 last, on June 21, 1918, a credit of $15,790,000 was established in favor o f the Royal Greek Government and an obligation of that Government payable to the Government of the United States in a like amount was transmitted to you to be placed in the vaults of your office under your custody. To-day a further credit o f $23,764,036 was established in favor of the Greek Government, making the total credits estab lished in favor of that Government $39,554,036, and a similar obligation, dated to-day, in the sum of $23,764,036 was likewise transmitted to you to be placed in the vaults of your office under your custody. These obligations by their terms are stated to bear interest from their respective dates at the rate of 5 per cent per annum, but by an understanding entered into in Paris the interest on the obligations will be remitted to the extent necessary to the end that interest shall be collected on such obligations only upon amounts which shall actually be paid by you upon drafts of the National Bank o f Greece and only from the respective dates when such payments are made. Pursuant to the establishment of the credits referred to and in accordance with the understanding between the Secretary o f the Treasury and the Royal Greek Government it is expected that there will be drawn against the credits from time to time drafts upon you by the National Bank o f Greece. The Greek minister at this capital will furnish the necessary authorization from the National Bank of Greece as to the officers authorized from time to time to execute these drafts on its behalf and will provide specimens of their signa tures and will also arrange that all such drafts presented to you shall bear a notation signed by the Greek Minister o f Finance in substantially the fol lowing words: “ The draft upon which this notation is made is drawn under and in ac cordance with the provisions of the Paris financial agreement dated February 10 , 1918.” 190 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. Please cause to be made upon your books the necessary entries opening said credit in the amount of $39,554,036 in favor of the National Bank of Greece to be availed of only as aforesaid. Before making any advances under said credit or against the obligations, above mentioned or honoring any draft drawn under or against the same please consult this office. By direction of the secretary. Respectfully, A lbe rt R a t h b o n e . The honorable the T r e a s u r e r o f t h e U n it e d S t a t e s . SECTION 103. Correspondence Relating to Establishing Third Book Credit of $3,858,930, or an Equivalent of 20,000,000 Francs at Gold Parity— Credit Established March 25, 1919. L e g a t io n R o y a l e de G r e c e , Washington, January 13, 1919. Mr. A l b e r t R a t h b o n e , Assistant Secretary to the Treasurer, Treasury Department. Washington, D. C. Dear S ir: With reference to our telephone conversation of even date, I have the honor to inform you that my Government has telegraphed inquiring about the further portion of 20 .000,000 francs which was to complete the amount of 225,000,000, which, according to a financial agreement of February 10, 1918, the United States had agreed to loan to Greece. The Governments of France, England, and the United States, having agreed to advance 225,000,000 each, it seems that the British Government has already put to the credit of the National Bank of Greece the 20,000,000 francs repre senting the last portion of their part of 225,000,000. I would appreciate very much your informing us how this matter stands with the United States Government. Very sincerely, yours, S. X. CONSTANTINIDI, First Secretary, Greek Legation. J a n u a r y 15, 1919. I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 13th instant inquiring as to the establishing by the United States of a credit in dollars equivalent to 20,000,000 francs in favor of the Greek Government, thus bringing the total credit established by the United States in favor oj. your Government to the dollar equivalent of 235,000,000 francs. In this connection I am to-day cabling Mr. Norman H. Davis, the representa tive in Paris of the United States Treasury, for information as to whether the French Government has established or agreed to establish an additional credit in the amount of 20 ,000,000 francs, thus bringing the total credit estab lished by the French Government in favor of your Government up to the amount of 225,000,000 francs, and also for information as to whether a report has been received from Mr. Weddell in Athens upon certain inquiries previously addressed to him concerning the establishment of the credit in question. This department had previously cabled to Paris for information on the two points above mentioned, and has for some time been expecting a reply. Very truly, yours, D ear S ir : A lbert R a t h b o n e . Mr. S. X. C o n s t a n t i n i d i , First Secretary Greek Legation, Washington, D. C. L e g a tio n R o y a le de G rece, Washington, January 30, 1919. Mr. A l b e r t R a t h b o n e , Assistant Secretary to the Treasury Department, Washington, D. C. D e a r S ir : Referring to your letter of January 15, 1919, the contents of which I had brought to the knowledge o f the Royal Greek Government, I have the honor to inform you that the minister of finance, by a new cablegram, requests FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 191 me to proceed with the necessary steps in order that the amount of 20 ,000,000 francs should be placed to the credit of the National Bank of Greece. This sum constitutes the part of the United States in the last credit of 69,000,000 francs made to Greece by the Allies, completing thus the amount of 225,000,000 which, according to the financial agreement of February 10, 1918, the United States agreed to loan to Greece. I would appreciate very much your informing us how this matter stands now with the United States Government Yours, very truly, M. T sam ad os, Charge d’Affaires of Greece. J a n u a r y 31, 1919. Si r : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th instant and take pleasure in advising you that before establishing an additional credit in favor of your Government in an amount equivalent to 20 ,000,000 francs this department is awaiting advices from the representative of this Government at Athens as to whether the difference between the total military and naval expenses for November and December, estimated by your Government at 90,000,000 drachmas, and the credits to be established to the equivalent of 60,000,000 francs by the Governments of Great Britain, France, and the United States under the 3-party agreement, is amply sufficient to permit of the restitution of the amount of certain emergency purchases of wheat and tin during the year 1918 which were improperly charged to the agreement above mentioned. In order to make a credit so established effective in favor of the National Bank o f Greece, as contemplated by the tri-party agreement above mentioned, it is necessary that this department receive the duly executed obligation of your Government in a corresponding amount. This department has received advices from our Department of State as to the authority of the Greek minister to execute in the name and on behalf o f your Government such obligations. I was informed some days ago that the Greek minister was about to leave for Europe, and I then addressed an inquiry to our Department of State asking whether in his absence anyone else was authorized and empowered to execute the necessary obligations in connection with the credit above mentioned in the name and on behalf of your Government. I am, my dear Mr. Tsamados, Very truly, yours, (Signed) A lb e r t R a th b o n e . Mr. M. T s a m a d o s , Charge d’Affaires of Greece, the Greek Legation, 1715 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D. C. D ear L e g a tio n R o y a l D e G rece, Washington, March 20, 1919. Mr. A l b e r t R a t h b o n e , Assistant Secretary, Treasury Department, Washington, D. C. D e a r S i r : Referring to your letter of January 31, 1919, I beg to state that the Royal Government of Greece requests me to give them any information con cerning the additional credit o f the equivalent of 20 ,000,000 francs in favor of Greece. The Greek Treasury Department’s cablegram states that the French and British Governments have already credited the National Bank o f Greece with their quota, and that the French Mission (I presume the French Military Mis sion), has assumed the task of furnishing the information for which the United States is asking. Would you kindly let me know how matters now stand? Yours, very truly, M. T s a m a d o s , Charg4 d'Affaires of Greece. M a r c h 24, 1919. I have received your letter of March 20, stating that your Government requests information concerning the additional credit of the equivalent of 20,000,000 francs in favor of Greece. On my return to Washing M y D ear S ir : 192 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. ton this morning I am in receipt of a cable from a representative of the United States Treasury in Europe, giving the information needed by this de partment before establishing a further credit in favor of your Government. I now take pleasure in informing you that, as contemplated by the financial agreement entered into in Paris by the representative of your Government and the financial representatives of the Governments of France, Great Britain, and the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury has established a credit in favor of the Royal Greek Government in the amount o f $3,858,930, equivalent at gold parity to 20,000,000 francs. This credit will be made available against the duly executed obligation of your Government in a corresponding amount, and in a manner to be arranged to comply with the provisions and limitations of the Paris agreement above mentioned. I addressed a letter some time ago to our Department of State, asking whether, in the absence of the Greek minister, any other representative of the Royal Greek Government is authorized to execute obligations in its name and on its behalf in favor of the Government of the United States. The Treasury must receive advices from the Department of State as to the authority to sign such obligations on behalf of the representatives of foreign Governments. I understand that the Department of State has conferred with you in regard to the matter of obtaining the authority needcl. When the Treasury Department has been advised by the State Department regarding such authority 1 should be pleased to arrange with the representa tives of your Government as to making available the credits above mentioned in its favor, as contemplated by the Paris agreement. I am, my dear Mr. Tsamados, Very truly, yours, A lbe rt R a t h b o n e . Mr. M. T s a m a d o s , Charge d’Affaires of Greece, The Greek Legation, Washington, D. C. M a y 24, 1919. Sir : Referring to Mr. Leffingall’s letter of July 12 and my letter of December 6 , 1918, on March 24, 1919, a further credit of $3,858,820 was established in favor of the Royal Greek Government, making the total credits established in favor of that Government $45,412,966. On May 26, 1919, an obligation dated May 24, 1919, of the Royal Greek Government, payable to the Government of the United States, in the amount of $2,858,930 was transmitted to you to be placed in the vaults of your office under your custody. This obligation by its terms is stated to bear interest from its date at the rate of 5 per cent per annum, but in accordance with the understanding entered into in Paris tlie in terest will be remitted to the extent necessary to the end that interest shall be collected thereon only upon so much of the amount thereof as shall actually be paid by you upon drafts of the National Bank of Greece, and only from the respective dates when such payments are made. Pursuant to the establishment of the credit referred to and in accordance with the understanding between the Secretary of the Treasury and the Royal Greek Government, it is expected that there will be drawn against this credit, from time to time, drafts upon you by the National Bank o f Greece. The Greek Legation at this Capital will furnish the necessary authorization from the National Bank of Greece as to the officers authorized from time to time to execute these drafts on its behalf, and will provide specimens of their signa tures, and will also arrange that all such drafts presented to you shall bear a notation signed by the Greek Minister of Finance in substantially the follow ing words: “ The draft upon which this notation is made is drawn under and in accord ance with the provisions of the Paris financial agreement dated February 10, 1918.” Please cause to be made upon your books the necessary entries opening said credit in the amount of $3,858,930 in favor of the National Bank of Greece, to be availed of only as aforesaid. This credit, together with those as to which you have already received instructions, will bring the total credits opened on your books in favor of the National Bank of Greece to the amount of $43,412,- FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 193 966. Before making any advances under said credits or against the obligations which have been delivered to you or honoring any draft drawn under or against the same please consult this office. By direction of the Secretary. Respectfully, A lbert R a t h b o n e . The T r e a s u r e r o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . SECTION 104. Correspondence Relating to Greek Politics and Attitude of Certain American Officials Toward Establishing New Credits. B r i t i s h D e l e g a t io n , Paris, March 2, 1919. A conference took place this morning, which you were unable to attend, between M. Sergent and myself on the question of financial assist ance to Greece in 1919. I present to M. Sergent the statement set forth in the inclosed paper It appeared that there was even more uncertainty than I supposed as regards the exact amount of the surplus available from 1918, but apart from this the paper was accepted as fairly representing the situation, and the proposals therein received the concurrence of the French Treasury. As regards the American position, I gave it to the conference as my personal opinion that the evident reluctance of the American Government to share in the advances was due to a belief on their part that the issues involved were more political than financial, and that considerations were present to which it would be difficult for them to be a party. This suspicion on the part of the American administration was based on various projects and proposals which had been in the air from time to time, and which had actually materialized in one case, namely, in the dispatch of Greek troops to Odessa. I added that my Govern ment also was unwilling to afford financial assistance in this connection, and that I had explicit instructions from the war cabinet that the British Govern ment could not make itself responsible for expenditure arising out of the ex pedition to Odessa. This point of view was accepted by the French treasury. I continued that the British treasury recognized no liability except for expendi tures consequential on the operations of 1918 and involved in the question of demobilization. I ventured to say further that I did not believe the United States Treasury would adhere to their present attitude as soon as they were perfectly satisfied that the expenditure proposed arose out of the operation of 1918, and was not connected with any new enterprises. I hope after perusing the inclosed document that you may be able to present the matter to your Government in this light. Unless some new element is in troduced, surely as great a moral obligation lies upon the United States Treas ury as upon the British or French Treasury to finance to a conclusion expenses which were undertaken with their direct approval. Gen. Bonnier, who was present, undertook to convey my propositions to M. Venizelos, and to suggest to M. Venizelos that it was for him to take up with Mr. Lansing the question of American assistance. I asked, however, that this proposed communication to M. Venizelos should be postponed until I had had an opportunity of writing this letter to you, to put you au courant with the proceedings. Sincerely, yours, J. M. K e y n e s . N o r m a n H. D a v is , Esq., American Peace Commission, Hotel CriUon, Paris. D e a r D a v is : DRAFT CABLE TO TREASURY. J u n e 11, 1919. My 285. Your 1043. Greek credit. 1. Weddell advises that by June 30 vouchers covering proper expenditures for 1918 will be aproved sufficient to bring total up to 750,000,000 drachmae, excluding payments for foodstuffs, remittances abroad, and other doubtful items referred to my D 285. S. Doc. 86,67-2------ 13 194 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 2. Weddell also states that interallied financial mission at Athens has never proceeded upon the assumption that obligation to make advances ceased Decem ber 31, 1918, but has felt that the agreement covered all expenditures within its scope made during 1918 up to 750,000,000 drachmae although not vouchered until after December 31, 1918. 3. British and French have each established credit for 250,000,000 drachmae. I hare always opposed extending agreement to cotter expenditures after 1918, but think it would be very unfortunate for us without very strong grounds to give this agreement a construction different from that of the French and B r't;sh after they have established credit for full amount to cover 1918 expenditures. Weddell lias very strong feelings on this matter, and I myself think that if you are unwilling to establish credit at present time you should at least reserve 25,000,000 drachmae for establishment later on when vouchers have been ap proved as stated your 1043, paragraph 4. D a v is , American Mission. T reasury D epartm en t, Washington, June 13, 1919. Memorandum for Mr. Kelley. While I feel very reluctant to advance anything further to Greece under the old Paris agreement, in view of Davis’s cable, 344, and the fact that the British and French have construed that agreement to cover up to the total amount of the credit therein stipulated for 1918 expenditures, whether or not made during 1919, I feel inclined to establish the further credit equivalent to 25,000,000 francs at gold parity as before. If Mr. Leffingwell agrees as to this, will you draft the papers the same as those used before and cable in reply to Davis's 344? A. R. J u n e 26, 1919. Paris. For Davis from Rathbone. Treasury, 1125. Mission’s 2511, June 11, 7 p. in. Your D-344. As British and French have construed Paris agreement to cover up to the total amount of the credit therein stipulated for 1918 expenditures, whether or not made during 1919, and in view of your recommendation, Treasury prepared to establish Greek credit of $4,823,663.05, equivalent at gold parity to 25,000,000 francs, upon receipt from Greek representative here of request for same. A m e r ic a n M is s io n , A lb e r t R a th b o n e , Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. SECTION 105. Correspondence Relating to Establishment of Additional Credit of $4,823,863.05, or Equivalent at Gold Parity of 25,000,000 Francs— Credit Estab lished July 31, 1919. No. 1667. L e g a t i o n R o y a i.e d e G r e c e , A Washington, July 25, 1919. : Complying with a telegraphic order of the Royal Gov ernment of Greece, I have the honor to request the honorable Treasury Depart ment to open in favor of the Greek treasury a credit in the amount of the equivalent of 25,000,000 francs, at gold parity, this being the balance o f the participation of the United States in the 150,000,000 francs loan to Greece. I am ready to sign, as in the previous case, the necessary obligations in the name of the Royal Government of Greece. I am, my dear Mr. Secretary, Yours, very truly, D e a r M r. S e c r e t a r y M. T sam ados, Charge d*Affaires of Greece. The S e c r e t a r y o f t h e T r e a s u r y , Washington, D. C. FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 195 J u l y 31, 1919. : I acknowledge receipt of your letter of even date, addressed to the Secretary, and, in accordance with your request, take pleasure in informing you that a sum of money equal to the amount of the obligation of your Government handed me therewith, namely, $4,823,663.05, will be held by the Treasurer of the United States and paid by him from time to time only when and to the extent that there shall be presented to him drafts drawn upon him by the National Bank of Greece. I note that you will furnish the Secre tary of the Treasury the necessary authorization from the National Bank of Greece as to the officers who may from time to time execute such drafts, and as well specimens of their signatures. I also note that you wTill arrange that drafts drawn by the National Bank of Greece when presented to the Treasurer of the United States for payment will bear notation as set forth in your letter of even date. While I understand that the authority which you have given by your letter to make payments of such drafts so presented is irrevocable, the Secretary of the Treasury reserves all rights conferred on the United States by the financial agreement of Paris, referred to in your letter above mentioned, and the arrangement made between us is not intended as an extension of the undertakings of the United States Government, as set forth in such agreement, nor to commit the Secretary of the Treasury or the Treasurer of the United States to make payment of drafts except in the circumstances provided in the Paris financial agreement above referred to. It is to be understood that the foregoing amount will not be available to meet drafts of the National Bank of Greece until vouchers for expenditures prior to 1919 shall have been submitted to and approved by Mr. Weddell, the American delegate to the interallied financial commission, up to 750,000,000 francs. I take pleasure in confirming the understanding reached in Paris that, although the obligation of the Royal Greek Government above referred to by its terms bears interest from its date, the interest thereon will be remitted to the extent necessary to the end that interest shall be collected on such obligation only upon amounts which the Treasurer of the United States shall actually pay upon drafts of the National Bank of Greece and only from the respective dates when such payments are made. I am, my dear Mr. Tsamados, Yours, very truly. M y D e a r M r. T s a m a d o s A lb e r t R a t h b o n e . Mr. M. T s a m a d o s , Charge d'Affaires, Greek Legation, 1715 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, I). C. W a s h i n g t o n , D . C ., July S I , 1919. Mr. S e c r e t a r y : I acknowledge the receipt of the letter of Mr. Rathbone of even date advising of the establishment by the Secretary of the Treas ury of a credit in favor of the Royal Greek Government in the amount of $4,823,663.05, which, with the $43,412,966 credit previously established by you in favor of my Government, is the equivalent of 250,000,000 francs at gold parity. I hand you herewith the obligation of my Government in the amount of $4,823,663.05, which I have executed in the name of my Government pursuant to the au thority which it has conferred upon me, and pursuant to like authority I am authorized to receive from you the advance to my Government in a corresponding amount for the purpose of making it available for the use contemplated by the financial agreement entered into in Paris by the representative of my GoVernment and the financial representatives of the Governments of France, Great Britain, and the United States. I shall be obliged, however, if you will cause the above amount to be held by the Treasurer of the United States to be paid by him only when and to the extent that there shall be presented to him f,rom time to time drafts drawn upon him by the National Bank of Greece. I shall arrange to furnish you with the necessary authorization from the National Bank of Greece as to its officers authorized from time to time to execute these drafts in its behalf, and as well specimens of their signatures, and shall also arrange that all such drafts presented to thg Treasurer of the United States shall bear a notation signed by the Greek minister of finance in substantially the follow ing words: D ear 196 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. “ The draft upon which this notation is made is drawn under and in accord ance with the provisions of the Paris financial agreement dated February 10, 1918.” The authority hereby conferred upon the Treasurer of the United States to pay drafts drawn by the National Bank of Greece is irrevocable. I understand that the interest on the obligation of my Government, handed to you herewith, will be remitted until payments are made against the drafts of the National Bank of Greece, each amount so paid to carry interest from the date of its pay ment by the Treasurer of the United States. I am, my dear Mr. Secretary, Yours, very truly, M. T s a m a d o s . T h e Secretary o r t h e T r e a su r y. J u l y 31, 1919. : I take pleasure in informing you that, as contem plated by the financial agreement entered into in Paris by the representative of your Government and the financial representatives of the Governments of France, Great Britain, and the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury has established a credit in favor of the Royal Greek Government in the amount of $4,823,663.05, the equivalent at gold parity of 25,000,000 frances. This credit will be made available against the duly executed obligation of your Govern ment in a corresponding amount and in a manner to be arranged to comply W’ith the provisions and limitations of the Paris agreement above mentioned, and on the same terms as the previous credits, totaling $43,412,966, advanced to your Government. I am, my dear Mr. Tsamados, Yours, very truly, M y D e a r M r. T s a m a d o s A lb e r t R a t h b o n e . Mr. M. T s a m a d o s , Charge d’Affair&s Greek Legation, Washington D. C. J u l y 31,1919. Si r : Referring to Mr. Leffingwell’s letter of July 12 and my letters of December 3, 1918, and May 24, 1919, on July 31, 1919, a further credit ot $4,823,663.05 was established in favor of the Royal Greek Government, making the total credits established in favor of that Government $48,236,629.05. On July 31, 1919, an obligation dated July 31, 1919, of the Royal Greek Govern ment, payable to the Government of the United States, in the amount of $4,823,663.05, was transmitted to you to be placed in the vaults of your office under your custody. This obligation by its terms is stated to bear interest from its date at the rate of 5 per cent per annum, but in accordance with the understanding entered into in Paris the interest will be remitted to the extent necessary to the end that interest shall be collected thereon only upon so much of the amount thereof as shall actually be paid by you upon drafts of the National Bank of Greece and only from the respective dates when such payments are made. Pursuant to the establishment of the credit referred to and in accordance with the understanding between the Secretary of the Treasury and the Royal Greek Government, it is expected that there will be drawn against this credit from time to time drafts upon you by the National Bank o f Greece. The Greek Legation at the capital will furnish the necessary authorization from the National Bank of Greece as to the officers authorized from time to time to execute these drafts on its behalf, and will provide specimens o f their signa tures and will also arrange that all such drafts presented to you shall bear a notation signed by the Greek minister of finance in substantially the following w ords: “ The draft upon which this notation is made is drawn under and in ac cordance with the provisions of the Paris financial agreement dated February 10, 1918.” Please cause to be made upon your books the necessary entries opening said credit in the amount of $4,823,663.05 in favor of the National Bank of Greece, to be availed of only as aforesaid. This credit, together with those as to which you have already received instructions, will bring the total credits opened on FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 197 your books in favor of the National Bank of Greece to the amount of $48,236,629.05. Before making any advances under said credits or against the obliga tions or honoring any drafts drawn under or against the same, please consult this office. By direction of the Secretary. Respectfully, A lb e r t R a t h b o n e . T h e T r e a s u r e r o r t h e U n it e d S t a t e s . SECTION 106. Annual United States Consular Report for 1918 of Greece, Showing (1) High Public Debt $93.80 per Capita; (2) Inadequate Receipts and Revenues. The Treasury Department as well as the State Department was in possession of these and other facts and reliable information concern ing the situation of Greek fiscal and financial affairs before any cash advances had been made. Excerpt: Annual report on commerce and industries for 1918 for the Kingdom of Greece. F rom : Alexander W. Weddell, consul general. Place: Athens, Greece. Date: June 16, 1919. Greece of to-day is a country of approximately 5,000,000 souls, in a territory of about 44,700 square miles. The public debt on December 31, 1918, was Drs. 2,431,925,845, or some Drs. 486—$93.80 per capita. In addition to this heavy debt, there must sooner or later be added the outstanding Turkish debt on the territories acquired as a result of the Balkan wars o f 1912-1913. The above figures of public debt of 1918 represent a gain of 100 per cent over that of 1913. To meet present and future financial needs of the country the Government has enacted within the 1 2 months a number of laws imposing fresh taxes or increasing the scales of those already in force. Among these may be cited: (a) Increase of tithes. Taxes on import permits. Taxes on revenues of mines. (b) Taxes on exportation o f tobacco. Taxes on tobacco production. Taxes on wine-consumption, and consumption of spirits. (c) Taxes on stock-exchange transactions. Stamp taxes on legal documents. Taxes on consumption of electric current. Taxes on forest products. Taxes on incomes from war-profits. (Taxes on incomes (augmenting). It is anticipated that from these imposts the Government will receive for 1918 some 57.170,000 drachmas ($11,036 810) and for 1919, 69,795,000 drachmas ($13,470,435), with a natural tendency to a decline in the following years as taxable war profits diminish following the dawn of peace. Returning to the question of the public debt of Greece it is interesting to recall that this is in large measure under the control of the International Finan cial Commission, created in 1898, following Greece’s disastrous war with Turkey. This commission has under its control as monopolies of the Govern ment the sale of salt, kerosene, matches, playing cards, cigarette paper, emery; various stamp taxes; the revenue of certain customhouses, and certain sur taxes on tobacco. The year just closed was one of the most profitable in the history of the commission, despite the existence o f war. The total receipts of the commission amounted to 90.138,297.75 drachmas against 66,342,115 drachmas in 1917, and 55,021,654 drachmas in 1913. Of the various monopolies only those of salt, playing cards, tobacco, and stamped paper showed gains. The heavy advance record d was due in large measure to receipts from the Piraeus customhouse, these amounting in 1918 to 31,185,798 drachmas, against 14,262,000 drachmas for the preceding 12 months, which, however, were marked by a blockade for half the period of this and other important Greek ports. 198 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. SECTION 107. First Demand by Greece for a Cash Advance— Cash Advance Made December 15, 1919. (N o t e .— The Greek minister in the following letter does not base his request on the three-party agreement, but rests his case “ on the equities ” and he specifically states that the money so advanced would be used “ to feed her [Greece’s] population, run her factories, and provide for the needs of her economic life.” He says nothing about money to be used to cover Greece’s 1918 expenditures or “ for the prosecution of the war.” ) R o y a l L e g a t io n of G r eece , Washington, September 3, 1919. Si r : The financial agreement, concluded in Paris on February 10, 1918, pro vided for a loan of 750,000,000 francs to be granted to Greece by the three signatory powers of the agreement to w it: the United States of America, France, and England. The second paragraph of article 3 of this agreement stipulates that Greece could not have recourse to these credits granted to her until six months after the signature of peace. However, the United States being the country having suffered least from the ravages of the war as icell as the country producing everything required by the allied nations, it is to her, very naturally, that Greece turns to procure all that she needs to feed her population, to run her factories, and to provide for the needs of her economic life (foodstuffs, agricultural implements, coal, etc., etc.). In order to make the payment of all her orders without running the risk of seeing her monetary unity depreciated, Greece has need of credits in the United States. It is for this reason, and by order of my Government, that I have the honor to request the Government of the United States to take under consideration the ct'itical situation of my country at the present time, and kindly agree that the Greek Government may have recourse immediately to the credits arranged for in the financial agreement of Paris, in order to be in the position to meet the payment of debts incurred through large orders made and to be made in the United States of America. The Greek Government, I am sure, will appre ciate very much this favor, relying on the friendly feelings that unite the two countries. The necessary obligations, in the amount of $48,286,629, constituting the share of the United States, were signed at different periods by Mr. George Roussos and myself. Trusting that the request of the Royal Greek Government will be favorably considered, I beg to remain, Yours, very truly, M. Ts am a d o s, Charge d’Affaires of Greece. Hon. R o b e r t L a n s i n g , Secretary of State. S e p te m b e r 10, 1919. : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of September 8 to the Secretary of the Treasury inclosing copy of a note from the Greek charge d’affaires ad interim requesting that the Greek Government may have recourse immediately to the credit established by the United States Government in favor of Greece under the financial agreement concluded in Paris on February 10, 1918, providing for a joint loan o f 750,000,000 francs by the three signatory powers—the United States, France, and England. While there are considerable limitations to the use of funds under this credit until six months after the conclusion of peace, the Treasury will be glad to discuss the matter with the Greek representative. . If, however, we should con sider it advisable to permit funds to be used before the expiration of the six months’ period provided to cover such purchases and expenditures as may be D e a r M r. P h i l l i p s FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 199 previously approved by the Treasury Department, we would not feel justified in doing so without previous consultation with the French and British treas uries, who were parties to the agreement. The Treasury will be glad to discuss the matter with the Greek representative and to take it up with the British and French treasuries. Very truly, yours, (Signed) A lb e r t R a th b o n e . Hon. W i l l i a m P h i l l i p s , Acting Secretary of State. L e g a tio n R o y a le de G re e ce , Washington, October 29, 1919, or T r e a s u r y , Washington, D. C. (Attention of Mr. Davis.) D e a r S i r : Referring to our conversation of some time ago concerning the use of the credits granted to Greece by the United States, in accordance with the provisions of the financial agreement of Paris, I beg to inform you that in a cablegram sent to me the treasury department of Greece states that the Greek Government would greatly appreciate if credits in the amount of $10,000,000 would be placed at its disposition at the present time. It thinks, fur thermore, that $5,000,000 a month would be required to meet the needs in the future. These monthly installments wrould not begin before the complete use of the first $10 ,000 ,000 , and each o f the subsequent monthly installments is not to be available until the precedent is entirely spent. This fact would be brought to the knowledge of the United States Government by its representa tive at the interallied commission. The treasury department in his above-mentioned cablegram adds that it is not in the possibility to fix beforehand the goods that will be paid with the credits, as this depends essentially of the needs of the country, but I think it will be always possible to make a subsequent statement as to the use that has been made of each of the precedent monthly installments. I would be very glad to know your consideration on the above suggestions. Yours, very truly, M. T s a m a d o s , Charg6 d’Affaires of Greece. D e p a rtm e n t N ovember 3, 1919. My Dear Mr. Tsamados : Your letter of October 29, addressed to Mr. Davis, who is out of town, has been handed to me. I have pleasure in advising you that the United States Treasury is prepared, to the extent necessary to cover purchases which shall previously have been agreed upon by your Government with the Treasury, to make available against drafts of the National Bank of Greece, drawn as arranged in the previous correspondence, part of the credit heretofore established in favor of your Government. I trust that your Govern ment, to the extent that it desires that this credit shall be availed of at this time, may find itself able to determine the purchases which it desires to make from the advances from the United States Treasury. The Treasury is not prepared to make the credit available at this time, except to the extent necessary to cover purchases which shall previously have been so agreed upon. It is, of course, to be understood that, except in so far as the Secretary of the Treasury shall consent to make advances at this time for purposes to be agreed upon, as above set out, the Secretary of the Treasury reserves all rights conferred upon the United States by the financial agreement entered into in fi?aris by the representative of the Greek Government and the financial representatives of the Governments of France, Great Britain, and the United States. In no event can the total amount advanced by the United States Treasury be in excess of one-third of the aggregate amount of the vouchers submitted and approved for expenditures prior to 1919, in accordance with the above-mentioned agreement of Paris. To the extent that the aggregate amount of such vouchers is less than 750,000,000 francs and the share of the United States Government is diminished accordingly, a corresponding amount 200 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. of the credit heretofore established in favor of your Government will be withdrawn. I am, my dear Mr. Tsamados, Very truly, yours, R . O. L e f f in g w e l l . Mr. M . T s a m a d o s , Charge d’Affaires, the Greek Legation, 1715 Massachusetts Avenue NW. L e g a t io n R o y a l e D e G r ece , Washington, November Uf, 1919. T reasu ry D epartm en t, Washington, D. C. Attention of Mr. Davis. D e a r S i r s : Referring to the letter of the Treasury Department, signed by Mr. N. Leffingwell, dated November 5 (filed; should be Nov. 3 ), in which it is stated that “ The Treasury is not prepared to make the credit available at this time except to the extent necessary to cover purchases which shall previously have been so agreed upon,” I beg your leave to explain at some length how difficult it is for the Royal Greek Government to comply with this request, cer tainly not on account o f any lack of good will but merely on account of the nature of the commercial transactions and the way they are affected nowadays. The purchases which are to be paid with the credits in question are not pur chases of the Government, or at least not only of the Government. Purchases made by a Government are, as a rule, very simple, and refer to a very small number of articles, which are purchased in large quantities; it is, therefore, always easy to know in advance what articles are to be purchased and what are the credits required for that purpose. In the present case conditions are quite different. All the foreign exchange— in this case the exchanges on the United States—for all payments to be made in this country are to be pro vided by the National Bank of Greece (it has been necessary to adopt this measure in order to prevent speculations on the fluctuations of the exchange) ; all the merchants in Greece are, therefore, obliged to apply to that bank in order to get the necessary exchange on the United States to be able to make their transactions concerning all kinds of articles. It is already a well-known fact that the most important articles, particularly coal, raw materials, manufac tured articles, agricultural implements, etc., etc., have to be imported to Greece from the United States, and that, at least in Greece, a characteristic feature of to-day’s transactions is a cash payment upon the opening of the necessary credits in this country. On the other hand, the quantity of articles purchased varies very much, causing a variation in the credits and the exchanges asked by the merchants in Greece. Transactions can not be completed unless their value can be paid immediately. This is why it is simply impossible to state before hand what articles will be purchased, in what quantities, and at what price. I understand from the Treasury Department’s letter that the United States Government is anxious to see that the requested credits will be used only for the purpose of paying purchases made in the United States. To this I can say that the Royal Government of Greece is ready to promise that the credits accorded will be used only to pay goods purchased in the United States and destined to be consumed in Greece. Furthermore, the National Bank of Greece will forward through this legation to the United States Government monthly itemized statements showing how the credits have been used. In order to prevent goods purchased with credits of the National Bank of Greece from going to foreign countries, particularly to those with depreciated currency, the Royal Government of Greece has already directed that merchants or other persons asking for exchange in order to buy goods in the United States (and other European countries) that it will be necessary for them to make a deposit amounting to 10 per cent of the value of the goods as a guaranty that these goods would be used for consumption in Greece. Let me hope that after the above explanation the Treasury, taking into consideration the particular circumstances under which the foreign trade of Greece is being handled, will find the proper way to authorize the use o f the credits granted to Greece according to the stipulations of the financial agree ment of Paris, and under the above-stated conditions. Yours, very truly, G e o r g e Roussos, Minister o f Greece. FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. L e g a t io n R o y a l e de 201 G rece, Washington, November 22, 1919. (Attention Mr. Norman Davis.) T reasury D epartm ent, Washington, D. C. : The National Bank of Greece has cabled to me a letter addressed to the Treasury Department of the United States, with a request to communicate it to you. 1 take pleasure to enclose this letter, written in French, together with an English translation. Yours, very truly, M. T s a m a d o s . 2 Enclosures. D e a r S ir L e g a t io n R o y a l e de G rece, Washington, November 22, 1919. [Translation o f cable.] M i s t e r S e c r e t a r y : The available credits of the Hellenic Treasury and of the National Bank of Greece, in foreign countries, has fallen below the sum of 100,000,000 francs; I beg therefore to request in accordance with article 3 of the financial agreement made in Paris in February, 1918, between the United States, France, and Great Britain on one hand, and the Government of Greece on the other, that credits in the amount of $48,236,629 should be made available to the National Bank of Greece through the National City Bank of New York and the National Bank of Commerce, New York. This amount according to the provision of the above said agreement is to be used by the National Bank of Greece by way of draft to pay debts contracted in the United States. Yours, very truly, ( S i g .) D io m e d e s. N ovem ber 25, 1919. Your letter of the 22d instant has been received together with copies in French and in English, as therein stated, of a letter from the National Bank of Greece stating that the available credits of the Hellenic Treasury and of the National Bank of Greece in foreign countries have fallen below the sum of 10 0 ,000,000 francs, and requesting that credits in the amount of $48,236,629 should be made available to the National Bank of Greece through the National City Bank of New York and the National Bank of Commerce, New York. I assume that the arrangements referred to in the minister’s letter of the 14th instant and my reply of to-day will meet the wishes expressed by the Bank of Greece. Article 3 of the Paris agreement does not appear in any event to contemplate that, upon the mere falling below the sum of 100,000,000 francs of the foreign balances of the Greek Treasury and the national bank, the entire credit established by the United States should im mediately become available. The letter of the bank does not indicate either the amount by which the foreign balances have fallen below 10 0 ,000,000 francs or the extent to which it is proposed that the credits established by the British and French Governments under the Paris agreement are to be availed of. I assume therefore that the letter of the bank is merely a formal notice of the fact that the foreign balances have fallen below 10 0 ,000,000 francs. I am, my dear Mr. Tsamados, Yours, very truly, N o r m a n H. D a v i s , Mr. M. T s a m a d o s , Charg6 d*Affaires, Greek Legation, 1838 Connecticut Ave., Washington, D. C. M y D e a r M r. T sa m a d o s: N o v e m b e r 2 5 , 1919. Your letter of the 14th instant has been received. I have pleasure in advising you that, in accordance with the request made by M r . Tsamados, the Treasury is prepared against the credits heretofore estab lished in favor of your Government to make available forthwith to the National M y D ea r M r. M in is t e r : 202 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. Bank of Greece lip to the sum of .$5,000,000 upon the understandings herein after set out. Upon receipt of a cable request from the National Bank of Greece, transmitted through the legation at Washington and accompanied by a cable representation similarly transmitted from the Greek minister of finance, that the transfer so requested is under and in accordance with the provisions of the Paris financial agreement, dated February 10, 1918, the Treasury will deposit the sum so requested up to $5,000,000 with such bank in New York as shall be designated by the National Bank of Greece. The National Bank of Greece and the Greek minister of finance, respectively, will by letters trans mitted to the Treasury through the legation in Washington confirm the request and representation made by cable as above mentioned. It is understood that the amount transferred by the United States Treasury to the credit o f the Na tional Bank of Greece, in accordance with this procedure, is to be used either by the National Bank of Greece itself or by the parlies to whom the National Bank of Greece may transfer such funds only for purchases in the United States of goods to be consumed in Greece. It is further understood that itemized semimonthly statements showing the purposes for which such funds were used and the amounts will be furnished promptly through the legation to the Treasury. I shall be glad if you will confirm the foregoing understandings. I am, my dear Mr. Minister, Yours, very truly, N o r m a n H. D a v is . M r. G eorges R o u s s o s , Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, the Greek Legation, 1838 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D. C. D ecem ber 13, 1919. (Attention Mr. Davis.) T reasury D epa rtm en t, Washington, 1) C. : I beg to inclose herewith certified copy of a cablegram concern ing the transfer of $5,000,000 to the National Bank of Commerce, New York City, for the use of the National Bank of Greece, according to the financial agreement concluded at Paris in February, 1918. Yours, very truly, M. T s a m a d o s . G e n tle m e n L e g a t io n R o y a l e de G rece , Washington, December 13, 1919. [Copy o f cablegram.] We transmit hereunder telegram national bank to you be communicated to American Treasury Department. Please inform American Government that transfer five millions from American Treasury to National Bank of Commerce is effected, conformably financial agreement Paris. Hereunder text telegram national bank as follows: “ Tsamados, minister Greek legation, for United States Treasury. New York, kindly place our credit with National Bank Com merce, New York. $5,000,000. according Paris agreement 10th February, 1918, account Greek Government, National Bank Greece.” Please cable, urgently, results of your steps. P o l it is . I, Michael Tsamados, ministre resident of Greece, do hereby certify that the above is a true and correct copy of the cablegram received by this legation from the ministry of finance in Athens, Greece. [ s e a l .] W a s h in g to n , D. M . T sam ados. C., December 13, 1919. D e c e m b e r 15, 1919. : Your letter of the 13th instant, file No. 2659, has been received, inclosing a copy of a cablegram from the minister of finance in Athens transmitting a message from the Greek National Bank requesting the M y D e a r M r. T s a m a d o s FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 203 Treasury to place to their credit with the National Bank of Commerce, New York, $5,000,000. The minister of finance states that the transfer is conformable with the Paris financial agreement. I have pleasure in advising you that, in accordance with the request contained in said cable and upon the understand ings set out in my letter of November 25, 1919, to the Greek minister, the Treas ury has to-day deposited with the National Bank of Commerce in New York, for credit of the National Bank of Greece, the sum of $5,000,000. The abovementioned deposit of $5,000,000 is made against the obligation dated June 21, 1918, of your Government for $15,790,000 held by the United States Treasury, and to the extent of $5,000,000 is in lieu of the arrangement referred to in Mr. Crosby’s letter of June 21, 1918, for the presentation to the Treasury o f the United States of drafts drawn by the National Bank of Greece on the Treasury of the United States, and bearing the notation of the Greek minister of finance in the form mentioned in said letter. In accordance with Mr. Crosby’s letter interest will be charged, beginning to-day, upon $5,000,000 of said obligation of your Government for $15,790,000. I am, my dear Mr. Tsamados, Very truly, yours, Mr. M. T s a m a d o s , Charge d*Affaires, the Greek Legation, 1838 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D. C. L e g a t io n R o y a l e de G r e c e , Washington, December 16, 1919. T reasu ry D epartm en t, Washington, D. C. (Attention of Mr. Davis.) D e a r S i r s : A cablegram received from the Greek ministry of finance on De cember 5, 1919, states that the National Bank of Commerce, New York City, has been appointed as the bank to which the transfer of $5,000,000 was to be made by the United States Treasury Department and on which the National Bank of Greece will issue its drafts. For each draft the national bank will cable to this legation through the Greek treasury department, which will give the ap proval of the Greek Government to the purchases paid these drafts. Sincerely, yours, M. T s a m a d o s , Charge d'Affaires of Greece. SECTION 108. Retaliation by 300 Per Cent Increase on Tariff on Oleo by Greek Government for Refusal of Treasury Department to Release All or a Considerable Part of the Full $50,000,000 Credit. [E xcerpts from paraphrase.! D e c e m b e r 30, 1919. From: Athens. Dated: December 16, 1919. Received: 17th, 6.20 p. m. The import rate upon oleo oil w^as suddenly increased a few weeks ago by the Greek Government through reclassifying this commodity. It was formerly classed as fats and rated at 58 centimes to the oke of 2.82 pounds; it is now classed as margarin and rated at 2.32 drachmas to the oke. Heavy stocks of oleo oil were in transit from America, or had just arrived, when the re classification was made operative. The original classification had been in force for more than 20 years. Confidential.— (It is thought probable that this measure was taken as re taliation for the refusal of the Treasury Department to release all or a con siderable part of the $50,000,000 credit to Greece until six months after the ratification of the peace treaty.) A m e r ic a n L e g a t io n . 204 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. A th e n s, S ecretary of December 16, 1919. State, Washington: December 16, 9 p. m. My 8 tli and my November 5, 8 p. m. I am having much trouble with the Greek Government with regard to a sudden classification of oleo oil affecting large stocks just arrived or afloat. Customs duty has been increased by reclassification, without notice, from 58 centimes per oke to 2 drachams 32 centimes, though old classification was in operation over 20 years, involving heavy losses to shippers. I am convinced there should be merely retaliation for the delay in the $50,000,000 credit to be accorded Greece if the Greek Government insists on this exorbitant rate. Is there any pressure, retaliatory or otherwise, which the department can bring to bear as (corrective) ? In the year 1909 the chamber of deputies proposed an increase of duty, but a threat of tariff retaliation by our consul stopped it. D r o pper s. A th e n s, S ecretary of November 5, 1919. State, Washington: 853, November 5, 8 p. m. Greek Government has agreed to suddenly classify oleo oil as margarin, thereafter increasing duty 300 per cent. Hitherto classified at fat. As large stocks are on the way, this change means heavy loss to American importers. Would like to have opinion on this point of Treasury Department experts. D ro pper s. D ecem ber A m e r ic a n 26, 1919. L e g a t io n , Athens: 977. Your December 16, 9 p. m. Department assumes you are urging arguments of American friendship, Greek consumers’ interests, and discouragement to Greek margarine industry. Also argument that since oleo forms only one-third or less of margarine its classifica tion as margarine is unreasonable. Detailed technical data are being forwarded by mail. As hint, not threat, refer to the fact that thus far it has been deemed ex pedient by United States despite repeated protests of California raisin interests to classify Zante currants as raw product paying 25 per cent less than other raisins because much cleaning and packing necessary before Greek product is salable. Invite Americans injured by reclassification furnish department full informa tion through their American offices as to extend their loss on oleo in transit when measure became operative. Cable quantities oleo Greece imported from other countries and keep department informed by cable. P o l k , Acting. SECTION 109. Second Cash Advance of $5,000,000—Advance Made January 16, 1920. J a n u a r y 3 , 1920. Attention Mr. Merle-Smith. S i r : The National Bank of Greece, to which the Greek Government has ceded the credit which was established by the Treasury in favor of the Greek Gov ernment, has asked that the entire amount of this credit be advanced now. As you are aware, we did advance $5,000,000 on account of the credit on December 15, 1919, with the understanding that this advance would be employed for the purchase of commodities in the United States for shipment to and consumption in Greece. After the establishment of this credit, we received from the State De partment copy of a note from the American Minister to Greece, relating the in ability of Americans in Greece to purchase dollar drafts for remittance to cover FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 205 shipments from the United States to Greece. The representative of the National Bank of Greece informs me that the bank refused to sell such drafts because it had exhausted all its dollar balances. The Treasury is considering the advance of an additional $5,000,000 to Greece, but before doing so I should be pleased to know whether the National Bank of Greece, which now has dollar funds from the advance already made by the United States, is supplying dollar drafts to American applicants, and if not whether you would care to have the Treasury stipulate any conditions in con nection with this additional advance, with a view to meeting the difficulty which has been reported by our minister in Greece. I am, my dear Mr. Secretary, Very sincerely, yours, N o rm an H . D a v is . The S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , Washington, D. (7. D e p a rtm e n t o f S ta te , Washington, January 9, 1920. Confidential. The S e c r e t a r y o f t h e T r e a s u r y . Attention of Assistant Secretary Davis. Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the letter from your de partment dated January 3 and signed by Assistant Secretary Davis, which states that the Treasury now considers making an advance of $5,000,000 to Greece in addition to the like sum advanced to that Government on December 15, 1919, and which inquires (1) whether the National Bank of Greece is still refusing to sell dollar drafts to American applicants, and (2) whether this de partment would care to have the Treasury stipulate any conditions in connec tion with the additional advance now contemplated. In reply thereto I have the honor to inform you that the American minister cabled on December 12 that New York exchange had then been obtainable for several days at approximately 6.60. As no further communication has been re ceived from the minister upon this matter, it is assumed that the situation of which he complained has been remedied, for the time at least, by the action of your department. There is, however, one difference between our Government and the Hellenic Government which might be adjusted to the benefit of American interests by appealing to Greek reciprocity when your department takes up the question of releasing additional funds to that Government. For more than 20 years oleo oil was classified by the Greek Government as fat, but about November 1, 1919, that Government suddenly classified oleo oil as margarine. The duty upon this item of American exports was thereby increased from 58 centimes to 2.32 drachmas an oke. There are transmitted herewith copies o f two cablegrams from the American Legation at Athens, dated November 5 and December 16, also statistical material compiled in the foreign trade adviser’s office, all per taining to this matter. It will be noted therefrom that our exports of oleo oil to Greece in 1918 totaled $228,809, and that the increase of duty upon the amount, estimated at $100,000, would probably raise a prohibitive barrier. More over, the suddenness with which the reclassification became operative made the enactment almost confiscatory as regards the stocks of American oleo oil in Greek Government warehouses and occasioned large losses upon the stocks then in transit. It is requested that effort be made by your department in con junction with this department to effect a repeal of this classification, which appears indefensible alike upon technical and economic grounds, and possibly to obtain compensation to Americans who suffered from the suddenness of the enactment. I should like further to bring to your attention that, in the opinion o f the American minister at Athens, the reclassification of oleo oil and the refusal to sell dollar drafts were conceived by the Greek Government as retaliation against our Government on account of its interpretation of the Paris loan agreement. In this connection I should like to inquire whether there are important fiscal reasons against assuring the release of a specified amount to Greece at regular intervals, say $5,000 000 every other month, until six months after the conclusion o f peace. It is suggested that such a plan would create a stream o f dollar ex change, would facilitate importation from the United States into Greece, and by 206 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. relieving the anxiety o f the Greek Government, would remove the apparent de sire on its part to devise means of discriminating against us. It is of importance to note the remarkable increase in our sales to Greece since the war and the correspondingly increased need of Greece for large bal ances in this country to draw against. In 1914 our exports to Greece were $1,123,511 and our imports were $3,860,594: during the first 10 months of 1919 our exports to that country were $31,712,425 and our imports were $24,665,578. About 21 per cent of our exports to Greece consist of sugar, wheat, leather, and kerosene—commodities which are at present purchased from our country chiefly perhaps as a result of reconstruction conditions and which, therefore, will not be regularly purchased from America in the future. Nevertheless, by far the greater part of our exports to Greece consist of miscellaneous commodities which can be regularly sold by our exporters and transported on our merchant marine for years to come, particularly if now, during these crucial months, we employ every legitimate means to enable our exporters to consolidate the new position which they have won in the Greek market. It is suggested, on the other hand, that if little or no more funds be advanced to Greece to be deposited here for the financing of the imports of that country, American business with Greece will suffer a serious check during the immediate future, a vital period. Moreover, six months after tlie conclusion of peace, Greece would draw its balance of approximately $43,000 000, perhaps distribut ing the major part of it among the financial centers o f other foreign countries, thus encouraging the purchase of goods by Greece from the foreign trade rivals of American merchants. I have the honor to be, sir, Your obedient servant, R obert L a n s i n g . L e g a tio n R o y a le de G r e c e , Washington, January 15, 1920. Mr. N o r m a n D a v is , Treasury Department, Washington, D. C. D e a r M r. D a v i s : I beg to inclose copy of cablegram received from the Na tional Bank of Greece stating that the credit of $5,000,000 is exhausted and requesting me to ask for a second credit of $5,000,000. The itemized statement o f the use made of the first $5,000,000 is to be forwarded to this legation in the immediate future. Yours, very truly, M. T s a m a d o s . L e g a tio n R o y a le de G r £ c e , Washington, January 15, 1920. Credit cinq millions dollars aupres Banque National Commerce epuise priens intervenir Tresor Etats-Unis mettre notre disposition deuxieme credit cinq millions dollars aupr&s m§me. B a n q u e N a t io n a l e G r ece . J a n u a r y 16, 1920. : Two letters from Mr. Tsamados of the 15th instant (your file No. 2) have been received, enclosing copies (in part in translation) of a cablegram from the Greek Treasury, transmitting a message from the Greek National Bank requesting the United States Treasury to place to their credit with the National Bank of Commerce, New York, $5,000,000. The Greek Treasury states that these $5,000,000 are the second instalment in accordance with the Financial Agreement of Paris. I have pleasure in advising you that in accordance with the request contained in said cable and upon the under standings set out in my letter to you of November 25. 1919, the Treasury has to-day deposited with the National Bank of Commerce in New York for credit of the National Bank of Greece the sum of $5,000,000. The above-mentioned deposit of $5,000,000 is made against the obligation dated June 21, 1918, of your Government for $15,790,000 held by the United States Treasury and to the extent of $5,000,000 is in lieu of the arrangement referred to in Mr. Crosby’s letter of June 21, 1918, for the presentation to the Treasury of the United States o f drafts drawn by the National Bank of Greece on the Treasury o f the United M y D e a r M r. M i n i s t e r FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 207 States and bearing the notation o f the Greek Minister of Finance in the form mentioned in said letter. In accordance with Mr. Crosby’s letter, interest will be charged beginning to-day, January 16, 1920, upon $5,000,000 o f said obliga tion of your Government for $15,790,000 in addition to the instalment of $5,000,000 referred to in my letter to Mr. Tsamados of December 15, 1919. This advance, together with the advance mentioned in my letter to Mr. Tsama dos of December 15, 1919, brings the total advances to your Government under the above-mentioned arrangements to the sum of $1 0 ,000 ,000 . I trust that the itemized statement of the use made of the first $5,000,000 will be forwarded to us at once. I am, my dear Mr. Minister, Very truly yours, N orman H. D avis . Mr. G eorges R oussos, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, The Greek Legation, 1838 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D. C. L egation R oyale de G r&ce, Washington, January 17, 1920. Mr. N orman D avis , Treasury Department, Washington, D. C. D ear Mr . D avis : Referring to our conversation of yesterday, I beg to request that the second installment of $5,000,000 should be placed at the disposal o f the National Bank of Greece with the National Bank of Commerce, New York. Yours, very truly, M. T samados. SECTION 110. Correspondence Relating to Payment of Interest on the Cash Advances of $10,000,000—Interest Due April 15, 1920—Interest Paid September 21, 1920. A pril 6 , 1920. M y D ear M inister : Referring to Mr. Davis’s letters of December 15, 1919, to Mr. Tsamados and of January 16, 1920, to you in connection with the advances of $5 ,000,000 each made on those respective dates against the obligation dated June 21, 1918, of your Government for $15,790,000 held by the United States Treasury, I inclose herewith a statement prepared under the direction of the Treasurer of the United States, showing that interest in the amount of $144,808.74 will be due on April .15, 1920, on said obligation, computed to said date, as to $5,000,000 from December 15, 1919, and as to $5,000,000 additional from January 16, 1920. Please make payment of the interest due on April 15 by check payable to the order o f “ Assistant Treasurer of the United States for credit general account of Treasurer of the United States ” and deliver the same to the Assistant Treasurer of the United States at the Subtreasury in New York on April 15. I am, my dear Mr. Minister, Very truly, yours, R. C. L effingwell. Mr. G eorges R oussos, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, The Greek Legation, 1838 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D. C. Interest on obligations of the Royal Greek Government, Oct. 15, 1919, to Apr. 15,1920, at 5 per cent, 366 days to the year. I Amount. 1$5,000,000.00 June 21,1918 (face amount, $15,790,000)............... J \ 15,000,000.00 Total............................................................ Interest on $10,000,000 from date of ad vances to Apr. 15, 1920, at 5 per cent per annum...................................................... i Part. Interest from- Number of days. Dec. 15,1919 Jan. 16,1920 122 90 Interest. $83,333.33 61,475.41 10,000,000.00 144,808.74 208 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. No. 857. L e g a tio n R o y a le de G re ce , Washington, May 4 , 1920. T reasury D epa rtm en t, Washington, D. C. (Attention Mr. Norman Davis.) D e a r S ir: In reply to your commun.cation o f tlie 6 th of April, relative to the payment of the interest on the two amounts of $5,000,000 each, advanced re spectively to the Royal Government on December 15, 1919, and January 16, 1920, I have the honor to inform your excellency that my Government has requested me to solicit from the Government of the United States the same treatment as accorded to similar advances made to the other allied Govern ments; that is, to defer the payment of the interest for two years. I sincerely trust that your excellency will give consideration to the request of my Government. I pray your excellency to kindly accept the assurances of my very high consideration. G. Roussos, Minister. M a y 11, 1920. : I have pleasure in acknowledging the receipt of your letter No. 857 of the 4th instant concerning the payment of interest on the two amounts of $5,000,000 each advanced by the Treasury to your Government on December 15, 1919, and January 16. 1920, respectively. Since further advances yet to be made against credits established in favor of your Government are several times larger than the principal of the advances heretofore made, and will make available for Greece an amount of dollars compared with which the interest due upon the obligations of your Government held by the United States is relatively insignificant, the Treasury has considered that your Government is in a position with regard to dollar exchange such as clearly to distinguish it from that of other Governments to which you doubtless refer. By reason of the special circumstances in which the advances were made to your Govern ment, the Treasury is of the opinion that the considerations which may lead to the postponement of the collection of interest upon the obligations of certain of the Governments to which the United States has made advances do not apply in the case of the Greek Government, I am, my dear Mr. Minister, Yours, very truly, M y D e a r M r. M i n i s t e r N orm an H . D a v is . Hon. G e o r g e s Roussos, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, The Greek Legation, 1838 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D. C. No. 912. L e g a tio n R o y a le de G r£ ce , Washington, May 19, 1920. T reasury D epartm en t, Washington, D. C. (Attention Mr. Norman Davis.) D e a r Si r : In reply to your communication of May 11, 1920, in which you informed me of the decision taken by your department in regard to the request of the Greek Government concerning the granting of the same consideration accorded to the other Allies—that is, to defer the payment of interests for two years—I presume that there must be a misunderstanding existing. You state that taking into consideration the amounts of the credits placed at the disposal of the Royal Government would be larger than the interests due on the amount already used, so that the payment of these interests would not necessitate a payment, but is simply a question of balance. But the Royal Government does not dispose of any amount o f the credits opened by the Government of the United States as a result of the convention of 1917. In reality the integral amount of these credits was transferred to the National Bank of Greece, who, in accordance with the laws governing it, issued bank notes and credited the Greek treasury with the amount of bank notes issued. Thanks to these amounts, the Royal Greek Government could meet its military expenses in 1917, 1918, so that it has not at its disposal any part of these advances. FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 209 To pay the interests on the amounts already transferred to the credit o f the National Bank of Greece deposited to its correspondents in America, the Greek Government must then proceed to send funds to America, buying ex change, and paying nearly 9 drachmas for $1 . The favor accorded to the allied States who have already benefited of the United States Government’s friendly measure was justified by the desire not to affect their exchange which was already unfavorable. It is to be remarked that the allied States having benefited from this measure are not mobilized and have resumed their peaceful occupations. Greece finds herself not only facing an unfavorable exchange but also still mobilized. The treaty of peace with Turkey, which concerns her particularly, is not yet signed, and she is obliged to maintain a large military contingent, and is deprived of her pro ductive strength. Consequently, she is justified, in every point of view, to be treated with the same consideration as were the other allies who are in a better condition. I trust that if the above statements are taken into consideration, you shall kindly reconsider your decision. Yours, very truly, G. Roussos, Minister. M a y 21, 1920. : I have pleasure in acknowledging the receipt of your letter, No. 912, of the 19th instant. I ought to point out that the Treasury has not as yet agreed with any Government to defer the interest payable by it on obligations held by the United States Treasury, but that this matter is still the subject of discussion. Assistant Secretary Rathbone, who has been in Europe on behalf of the Treasury Department in connection with other matters, has had this matter also in charge. Mr. Rathbone expects very shortly to sail for the United States. I am, however, cabling him in regard to your letter, and shall communicate with you further. I am, my dear Mr. Minister, Very truly, yours, N o r m a n H. D a v is . M r. G e o r g e s Roussos, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, the Greek Legation, 1838 Connecticut Avenue. Washington, D. C. M y D e a r M r. M i n i s t e r No. 1650. L e g a tio n R o y a le D e G rece, Washington, September 15, 1920. T reasu py D epartm en t, Washington, I). C. {Attention of Mr. Kelley.) D e^r Si r : I take pleasure in informing you that, according to a cablegram from our minister of finance, orders have been given so that the amount of $144,808.74 be deposited with the National Bank of Greece. This amount is equal to the interest due by the Greek Government to the United States Treasury for the advance of $10,000,000. Yours, very truly, M. T s a m a d o s . S e p te m b e r 16, 1920. I have pleasure in acknowledging receipt o f your letter of the 15th instant, No. 1650, and note that orders have been given by your Government for the deposit with the National Bank of Greece of the sum of $144,808.74, being the amount of the interest due by your Government to April 15, 1920, on the obligations of your Government held by the Treasury. I am, my dear Mr. Tsamados, Yours, very truly, N. K e l l e y . Mr. M. T s a m a d o s , Charg6 d1Affaires Greek Government, .1838 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D. C. M y D e a r M r. T s a m a d o s : S. Doc. 86,67-2------ 14 210 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOE MAKING SAME. T r e a s u r y D ep a rtm en t, Washington, September 21, 1920. The Hon. N . S. K e l l e y , Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Washington, D. C. S i r : Please be advised that the Riggs National Bank, by direction of the National City Bank of New York, has this day deposited $144,808.74 on account of interest to April 15 on $10,000,000 loaned to the Greek Government, as evi denced by certificate of deposit No. 3S338. Respectfully, John B urke. Treasurer. SECTION 111. Correspondence Relating to Third Cash Advance of $5,000,000 Made to Greece on September 24, 1920. No. 1516. L e g a tio n R o y a l e de G re ce , T reasury D epa rtm en t, Washington, August 18, 1920. Washington, D. C. Attention of Mr. Kelley. M y D e a r M r. K e l l e y : I beg to inclose herewith copy of cablegram to this legation, transmitting a message to the United States Treasury Department from the National Bank of Greece and signed by the minister of finance who is thus approving its contents. The National Bank of Greece asks that a third install ment of $5,000,000 should be placed to her credit with the National Bank o f Commerce, New York, in accordance with the Paris financial agreement of February, 191S, and for the account of the Greek Government. Yours, very truly, M. Saw Mr. Collas regarding this August 20, 1920. and about reports. T sam ados. Asked him about interest N. K. [Athens. No. 102190. Legation Grece, W ashington.] No. 1516. L e g a t i o n R o y a l e d e G r e c e , Washington. Transmettons telegramme suivant national bank votre adresse approuve gouvernement hellenique. His excellency Tsamados minister Greek Legation for United States Treasury, Washington. Kindly place our credit with National Bank Commerce New York $5,000,000 third payment on Paris agreement Feb ruary 10, 1918, account Greek Government. National bank. N e g re p o n te , Minister Finances. The above is a true and correct copy of cablegrams received by this legation from Minister of Finances Negreponte. W a s h i n g t o n , D. C., August 18, 1920. S e p te m b e r 24, 1920. D ear Mr. T samados : Referring to our conversation of to-day and to your letter (No. 1516) of the 18th ultimo, inclosing a copy of a cablegram from the Greek minister of finance transmitting a message from the Greek National Bank requesting the United States Treasury to place to their credit with the National Bank of Commerce, in New York, $5,000,000, and stating that these $5,000,000 are a third installment in accordance with the financial agreement in Paris, I have pleasure in advising you that in accordnce with the request contained in said cable and upon the understandings set out in Mr. Davis’s letter to the minister of November 25, 1919, the Treasury has to-day deposited with the National Bank of Commerce, in New York, for credit o f the National Bank of Greece, the sum of $5,000,000 The above-mentioned deposit of $5,000 000 is made against the obligation, dated June 21, 1918, of your Government for $15,790,000, held by the United States Treasury and to the extent of $5,000,000, My FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 211 is in lieu of the arrangement referred to in Mr. Crosby’s letter of June 21, 1918, for the presentation to the Treasury of the United States of drafts drawn by the National Bank of Greece on the Treasury of the United States and bearing the notation of the Greek minister of finance in the form mentioned in said letter. In accordance with Mr. Crosby’s letter interest will be charged beginning to-day, September 24, 1920, upon $5,000,000 of said obligation of your Government for $15,790,000, in addition to the two installments of $5,000,000, each referred to in Mr. Davis’s letters of December 15, 1919, and January 16, 1920. This ad vance, together with the advances mentioned in Mr. Davis’s letters of December 15, 1919, and January 16, 1920, brings the total advances to your Government, under the above-mentioned arrangements, to the sum of $15,000,000. I am, my dear Mr. Tsamados, Yours, very truly, Mr. M. T s a m a d o s , Charg6 6?Affaires, the Greek Legation, 1838 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D. C. T r e a s u r y D ep a rtm en t, Washington, September 24, 1920. Memorandum for files: Mr. Tsamados stated to-day that he would obtain by mail from the Greek minister of finance a more specific statement that the third installment of $5,000,000 requested in the message o f the Greek National Bank transmitted by cable No. 102190 of the Greek minister of finance, copy of which was in closed in Mr. Tsamados’s letter of August 18, 1920, was requested under the financial agreement of Paris. Mr. Tsamados stated also that he will arrange with his Government so that future requests by the Greek National Bank will be accompanied by more explicit statements from the Greek minister o f finance, in accordance with the terms of Mr. Davis’s letter of November 25, 1919, to the Greek minister. N. K. No. 1902. L e g a tio n R o y a le de G rece, Washington, October 26, 1920. T reasury D epartm en t, Washington, D. C. (Attention of Mr. Kelley.) M y D e a r M r. K e l l e y : Referring to my letter of August 18, 1920, No. 1516, concerning a third advance of $5,000,000 against the $750,000,000 loan granted to Greece according to the Paris financial agreement of 1918, I beg to inclose copy of a cablegram received to-day from our minister of finance. Yours, very sincerely, M. T s a m a d o s . No. 1902. A t h e n s , October 26. Yotre 1,725 onze septembre. Credit cinq millions? dollars mis disposition National Bank const!tue troisieme remise participation Amerique emprunt conformement agrement Paris, 1919. N ig r o p o n t is . SECTION 112. Correspondence Relating to Payment of Interest on the Three Cash Advances of $5,000,000 Each—Interest Due October 15, 1920—Interest Paid October 25, 1920. S e p te m b e r 28, 1920. Referring to M r. Davis’s letters o f December 15, 1919, and January 16,1920, and to my letter of September 24,1920, in connection with the advances o f $5,000,000 each made on those respective dates against the obligation dated June 2 1 , 1918, of your Government for $15,790,000 held by the United States Treasury, I inclose herewith a statement prepared under the M y D e a r M r. T s a m a d o s : 212 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. direction of the Treasurer of the United States, showing that interest in the amount of $264,344.26 will be due on October 15, 1920, on said obligation com puted to said date from April 15, 3920, on the sum of $10,000,000, being the amount of the advances made on December 15. 1919, and January 16, 1920, and from September 24, 1920, on the sum of $5,000,000 advanced on that day. Please make payment of the interest due on October 15 by check payable to the order o f the “Assistant Treasurer of the United States for credit General Account of Treasury of the United States ” and deliver the same to the Assistant Treasurer of the United States at the subtreasury in New York on October 15. I am, my dear Mr. Tsamados, Very truly, yours, N. K e l l e y . Mr. M. T s a m a d o s , Charge d’Affaires, the Greek Legation, Washington, D. C. Interest on obligations of the Royal Greek Government, Apr. 15, 1920, to Oct. 15,1920, at 5 per cent per annum, semiannual period of 18S days. Date. Date advanced. Amount advanced. Dec. 15, 1919.......................... $5,000,000.00 Jan. 16,1920.......................... 5.000.000.00 Sept. 24, 1920......................... 5.000.000.00 June 21,1918 (face amount, $15,790,000). 15,000,000.00 Total. Interest on $10,000,000 from Apr. 15, 1920, to Oct. 15,1920, at . 5 per cent per annum, amounts to. Interest on $5,000,000 from Sept. 24, 1920, to Oct. 15,1920, at j. 5 per cent, amounts to. j 250,000.00 Total................................................................................ .. 264,344.26 14,344.26 L e g a tio n R o y a le de G re ce , Washington, October 20, 1920. Attention of Mr. Kelley. T reasury D epa rtm en t, Washington, D.C. Referring to your letter of September 28, 1920, in which was inclosed a statement showing that interest in the amount o f $264,344.26 for $15,000,000 advanced to the Greek Government by the United States against the obligation dated June 21, 1918, would be due on October 15, I beg to inform you that according to a cablegram received to-day from our department of finance, instructions had been given to place that amount at the disposal of our national bank in order that it may effect the payment of the interest. Believe me, dear Mr. Kelley, Yours, very truly, M y D e a r M r. K e l l e y : M. T sam ados. No. 40184. Treasury Department, Office of the Treasurer of the United States. Duplicate. $264,344.60. D. C., October 26, 1920. I certify that the Greek Government has this day deposited to the credit of the United States two hundred sixty-four thousand three hundred forty-four 60/100 dollars, on account of interest on obligations of the Greek Government, to October 15, for which I have signed duplicate receipts. W a s h in g to n , J. G. W a l l a c e , Acting Assistant Treasurer United States. To be retained by the depositor. FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 213 SECTION 113. Correspondence Relating to Request of Greek Government for Fourth Cash Advance of $5,000,000—This Cash Advance Was not Made—No Reply From Treasury Department to Letter of Greek Minister of December 22, 1920—File Runs to February 15, 1921. (For reasons why this loan was not made see sec. 115, containing letters relating to Greek political situation.) L e g a tio n R o y a le de G re ce , Washington, December 22,1920. Attention Mr. Kelley. T reasury D epartm en t, Washington, D. C. : Referring to the conversation which I had the pleasure of having with you yesterday, I beg to inclose herewith a copy of the cablegram to this legation transmitting a message to the United States Treasury Depart ment from the National Bank of Greece and signed by the new minister of finance, M r. N. Calogeropoulos, thus approving its contents. The National Bank of Greece asks that a fourth installment of $5,000,000 should be placed to its credit with the National Bank of Commerce, New York, in accordance with the Paris financial agreement of February, 1918, and for the account of the Greek Government. In this same cablegram, it is said that the statements of the third installment are sent through the ministry of finance. Yours, very truly, G. O. A r a c o p o u l o . M y D e a r M r. K e l l e y A th e n s , G reece, December 19, 1920. L e g a t io n H e l l e n iq u e A W a s h i n g t o n . Credit cinq millions dollars auprSs National Bank of Commerce SpuisS, nous prions Tr£sor Etats Unis mettre notre disposition 4§me credit cinq millions dollars m£me Banque. Etat disposition 3§me credit sera adressS par l’interm§diaire Minist£re Finances. National Bank “ Calogeropoulos” D ep a rtm e n t o f S ta te , Washington, December 31, 1920. M y D e a r M r . K e l l e y : I beg to* acknowledge the receipt of your letter o f December 27, referring to a request from the National Bank of Greece for a fourth installment of $5,000,000 against the credit heretofore established in favor of the Greek Government. You inquire whether there is any objection from the point of view of the Department of State to the Treasury proceeding to make the advance requested ; and if there is no objection, wThether Mr. Dracopoulo is the authorized person in charge of the legation with whom the Treasury may properly deal concerning the same. The President was informed by letter, dated December 25, of the inquiry made by the Treasury. He has expressed his concurrence in the recommenda tion made by this department that the credit obligation negotiated with the Venizelos government (referring to the credit of $38,000,000) should be consid ered as still binding on this Government, and that the Greek charge d’affaires, on proper application, should be recognized as representing the Government of King Constantine. Under the above authorization there would seem no objection to the continuance o f informal negotiations with the Greek charge d’affaires in Washington with regard to this matter. The Department of State, however, can not officially inform you that Mr. Dracopoulo is the authorized person in charge of the legation with whom the Treasury may officially deal, until he or some other is accredited to this Government by the Constantine regime. Very truly, yours, V a n S. M e r l e -S m i t h . The Hon. N i c h o l a s K e l l e y , Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. 214 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. J a n u a r y 13, 1921. My Dear Mr. Davis : Referring to my letter of the 27th ultimo to Mr. MerleSmith, advising him that the Treasury had received from Mr. G. O. Dracopoulo, of the Greek legation, an informal request for a fourth installment o f $5,000,000 against the credit heretofore established in favor of the Greek Gov ernment, I understand from Mr. Merle-Smith’s reply o f the 31st ultimo that the President has expressed his concurrence in the recommendation made by the Department of State that the financial arrangements made with the Greek Government early in 1918 should be considered as still binding on this Gov ernment and that the Greek charge d’affaires on proper application should be recognized as representing the Government of King Constantine. Mr. MerleSmith added that under the above-mentioned authorization there would seem to be no objection to the continuance of informal negotiations with the Greek charge d’affaires in regard to the advance which has been requested. Until the Department of State officially informs the Treasury that the present charge d’affaires of the Greek legation is the authorized person in charge of the legation with whom the Treasury may officially deal, as having been accredited to this Government by the Constantine regime, the Treasury is not in a posi tion finally to complete arrangements for the advance. The Treasury has. however, conferred informally with the charge d’affaires in order that pending the receipt by the Treasury of advices from the Department o f State that he has been duly accredited, he may inform the present Greek Government of the steps necessary to be taken by it in order to meet, in connection with the proposed advance [as might be made under the credit formally established in favor of Greece] ,1 the requirements imposed by the arrangement between the Treasury and the Greek Government made in November, 1919, pursuant to which the three previous installments were advanced. Very truly, yours, N. K elley. Hon. N o r m a n H. D a v is , Acting Secretary of State, Department of State. W a s h i n g t o n , January 14, 1921. In acknowledging receipt of your letter of the 13th instant I may say that I see no objection whatever to your continuing informal negotiations with the Greek charge d’affaires in regard to the advances which have been requested, in order that the Greek Government, when recognized, may be conversant with the requirements of the Treasury. As soon as there are any more definite developments I shall be glad to inform you. You are correct in your understanding of the President’s views in respect to the finan cial arrangement made with the Greek Government early in 1918. Very sincerely, yours, N o r m a n H. D a v is . The Hon. N i c h o l a s K e l l e y , Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. M y D e a r M r. K e l l e y : J a n u a r y 15, 1921. : Referring to previous correspondence concerning advances by the Treasury to the Greek Government under the credits established pur suant to the agreement of February 10, 1918, made in Paris by this Government and the British and French Governments on one hand, and the Greek Govern ment on the other, for the making of loans to Greece by the three Governments in equal amounts, not exceeding in the aggregate for the three Governments, however, the equivalent of 750,000,000 francs, the Treasury will be glad to learn whether it is correct in its understanding that up to date neither the British nor French Government has made any advance to the Greek Govern ment under the arrangement. Sincerely yours, D e a r M r. D a v is N . K elley. Hon. N o r m a n H. D a v is , Acting Secretary of State, Department of State. 1 Change suggested by Mr. Davis fo r the statement to be given to the press. Mr. Kelley, Jan. 14, 1921. O. K.d by FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME, 215 SECTION 114. Statement From Greek Minister o f Finance, in French, o f Disposal o f the First Two Cash Advances Made by the United States o f $5,000,000 Each. (N o t e .— In accounting for these moneys onfy the names of the recipients— individuals and banks— are given. The purpose of the disbursements is not shown.) L e g a tio n R o y a le de G re ce , Washington, September 21, 1920. Attention of Mr. Kelly. T reasu ry D e pa rtm en t, Washington D. C. Referring to my letter of September 15, 1920, No. 1650, I take pleasure in informing you that a cablegram received to-day from Athens advises that the statements concerning the disposal of the first two installments of $5,000,000 each have been mailed to this legation and that the National Bank of Greece has been ordered to pay the interest due for that amount. I am, my dear Mr. Kelly, Yours, very truly, D e a r M r. K e l l y : M. T sam ados. L e g a tio n R o y a le de G re ce , Washington, October 29, 1920. Attention o f Mr. Kelley. T reasury D epartm en t, Washington D. C. Referring to my letter of September 21, 1920, No. 1691, I beg to inclose herewith the statements sent to this legation by the ministry of finance concerning the use of the first $10 ,000,000 on the allied loan of 750,000,000 francs to Greece in conformity with the financial agreement of Paris of the year 1918. Yours, very truly, M y D e a r M r. K e l l e y : M . T sam ad o s. Relev6 de disposition des $10,000,000 avanc£s par le Tvtisor des Etats-Unis & valoir sur les credits consentis par les Gouvemements Allies de Frs. 750,000,000. 1919: Novem. 3-16. Decouvert au 10-23 Novembre------------------------------$225,876.00 Novem. 12-25. Cofits de Billets de Banque-----------------------------------200, 000.00 Novem. 13-26. Fournitures du Gouvernement___________________ 1,049,380.00 Decem. 17-20: Succursale de Sparte----------------------------------------------------------600.00 Succursale du PirSe------------------------------------------------------------1,251.00 Succursale du Pir 6 e------------------------------------------------------------2, 298. 00 Succursale du Piree------------------------------------------------ -----------20,000.00 Succursale du Corfou----------------------------------------------------------4, 000. 00 Ch. Yerikios-----------------------------------------------------------------------20,000. 00 Caissier Central------------------------------------------------------------------81.00 Decem. 18-1: Effets encaisses------------------------------------------------------------------22,622.00 Caissier Central-----------------------------------------------------------------821.00 Decem. 19-22. Effets encaisses__________________________________ 4,254.00 Decem. 20-3: K. Bastatzoglou------------------------------------------------------------------225,000.00 Succursale de Cefalonie------------------------------------------------------3,200.00 Succursale du PirSe------------------------------------------------------------7,664.00 Succursale de la Canee-------------------------------------------------------9,000.00 Effets encaisses------------------ ------------------------------------------------8,051.00 Effets encaisses------------------------------------------------------------------4 3 3 .00 E. Yichos___________________________________________________ 2, 400.00 Al. Griescon________________________________________________ 2,080.00 H. Ifoanos_________________________________________________ 483.00 A. Ifoanos__________________________________________________ 1 ,000.00 216 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. Decem. 21-4: Succursale du Piree________________________ ______________ Do_____________________________________________________ Effets encaisses____________________________________________ Fournitures du Gouvernement--------------------------------------------Credits Documentaires_____________________________________ Bourne & Cie______________________________________________ Effets encaisses------------------------------------------------------------------Decem. 23-5: A. Viclios___________________________________________________ Succursale de Candie----------------------------------------------------------Succursale du Piree------------------------------------------------------------Credits Documentaires_____________________________________ Decem. 24-6: Ministere de la Marine_____________________________________ Effets encaisses____________________________________________ Do_____________________________________________________ Caissier Central___________________________________________ Effets encaisses____________________________________________ D appiti $505.00 3, 539 .00 26, 369.00 12,405.00 6,195.00 20,000.00 1,763.00 30, 000. 00 7, 500.00 314.00 30,000.00 300,000.00 16,165.00 3, 743. 00 1,941.00 821.00 97_ Q• Succursale du Piree______ ’_________________________________ Jacharias & Cie------------------------------------------------------------------Effets encaisses____________________________________________ Decem. 28/10. Effets encaisses--------------------------------------------------Decem. 30/12: Suc/le du Piree____________________________________________ Retour de cheque-----------------------------------------------------------------Caissier Central___________________________________________ B. Ipivelis__________________________________________________ Decem. 31/13: . Succursale du Piree------------------------------------------------------------Do_____________________________________________________ Do_____________________________________________________ Caissier Central___________________________________________ 1920: Janv. 2-15: H. Oeconomopoulos________________________________________ E. Isampourtjis______________________________ ______________ Banque d’Ath§nes__________________________________________ Janv. 3-16 : P. Skiadaressis------------------------------------------------------------------Caissier Central___________________________________________ Banque de l’lndustrie______________________________________ D. Michailidis _____________________________________________ Banque de l’lndustrie______________________________________ Banque Olivier____________________________________________ Suc/le du Piree____________________________________________ Janv. 4-17: Effets encaisses____________________________________________ Do-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Caissier Central___________________________________________ Banque du Piree___________________________________________ Effets encaisses____________________________________________ Do_____________________________________________________ Succursale de Yanina----------------------------------------------------------Succursale du Piree________________________________________ Do-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Janv. 7-20: Succursale de Patras_______________________________________ Effets encaisses____________________________________________ Banque Populaire_________________________________________ Banque de l’lndustrie___________________ __________________ Banque du Piree___________________________________________ Janv. 8-21: Ecole Charocopos__________________________________________ Bourne & Cie----------------------------------------------------------------------Banque de l’lndustrie______________________________________ 5, 731.00 1,250.00 1 , 539. 00 1, 881.00 37,477.00 100.00 2,224. 00 150.00 5,460.00 35, 775. 00 21, 687. 00 2,490.00 150. 00 140. 00 199.00 434.00 10,000. 00 6 , 200.00 15.00 40. 796. 00 50. 00 6,008.00 4,624.00 14,487.00 192.00 31,020. 00 420.00 9,927.00 10,300. 00 10,951.00 41,947.00 5, 000.00 2,350.00 432. 00 5, 738.00 9,476.00 381. 00 20,000.00 15,875.00 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. Janv. 9-22: Suc/le du Piree___________________________________________ Suc/le de Salonique________________________________________ Suc/le de Patras----------------------------------------------------------------Caissier Central___________________________________________ I. Skinis________________________________ - _________________ Banque Populaire----------------------------------- --------------------------Banque du Piree___________________________________________ Banque d’Athenes__________________________________________ E. Dravantinos____________________________________________ Effets encaissSs____________________________________________ Janv. 10-23: Banque Populaire---------------------------------------------------------------Do_____________________________________________________ Banque de l’lndustrie______________________________________ Banque Populaire__________________________________________ Banque de l’Economie Nationale-------------------------------------------Banque d’Athenes__________________________________________ Banque Populaire__________________________________________ Sucfle du Pir 6 e____________________________________________ Do______________________________________ - _____________ Banque Populaire---------------------------------------------------------------Banque du Piree-----------------------------------------------------------------Banque d’Athenes--------------- -----------------------------------------------Banque de l’lndustrie---------------------------------------------------------Do_____________________________________________________ Sucfle de Salonique------------------------------------------------------------Sucfle de Pyrgos__________________________________________ Y. Polamarkakis___________________________________________ Effets encaissets___________________________________________ Sucfle de Candie___________________________________________ Janv. 11-24: Sucfle de Patras___________________________________________ Sucfle de Salonique________________________________________ Do_____________________________________________________ Banque de l’Eeonomie Nationale____________________________ Banque du Pir 6 e__________________________________________ Banque de l’lndustrie---------------------------------------------------------Banque Populaire---------------------------------------------------------------Sucfle du Pir 6 e------------------------------------------------------------------Caissier Central___________________________________________ Do___________________________________ _________________ Do_____________________________________________________ A. Slimann-------------------------------------------------------------------------Effets encaissets___________________________________________ Janv. 13-26: Banque Lonienne---------------------------------------------------------------Banque de l’Economie Nationale____________________________ Banque Populaire__________________________________________ Banque de l’lndustrie__________ ^___________________________ Banque Lonienne__________________________________________ Do-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Do-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Do-------------------------- _— ---------------------------------------------Sucfle de Salonique---------------- ‘-------------------------------------------Sucfle de Patras-----------------------------------------------------------------Effets encaissets-----------------------------------------------------------------Do------------------------------------- :-----------------------------------------Sucfle de Patras___________________________________________ Janv. 14-27: Sucfle du PirSe------------------------------------------------------------------Banque de l’lndustrie______________________________________ Banque Populaire---------------- ;--------------------------------------------Do-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Do-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Banque de l’Economie Nationale____________________________ 217 $8,764.00 26,800. 00 33,000. 00 726.00 250. 00 8 , 041. 00 10,170.00 475.00 436.00 13,258.00 1,600. 00 120.00 47,500.00 8,135.00 50, 000.00 6,469.00 13,000. 00 526, 751.00 450. 00 35,502.00 31,625.00 19, 004.00 1,249.00 77, 500.00 91,000. 00 58.00 268.00 24,900. 00 15,790.00 16,000.00 60, 000. 00 3,807.00 89,851.00 46, 516.00 95,140. 00 45, 545. 00 17, 606. 00 306.00 600. 00 26. 00 140.00 8,905. 00 641.00 2,677.00 46, 804. 00 39,150. 00 200. 00 2, 870.00 7, 060. 00 8 ,000. 00 45,963.00 43,500.00 3,493.00 11,294.00 280. 00 30,403.00 22, 500. 00 10,651.00 48,821.00 4, 500. 00 9,082.00 218 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. Janv. 14-27—Continued. Banque du Piree-----------------------------------------------------------------Do_____________________________________________________ S. Aggelatos-----------------------------------------------------------------------Janv. 15-28: Banque de l’lndustrie---------------------------------------------------------Banque d’Athenes__________________________________________ Banque du Piree-----------------------------------------------------------------Banque Populaire__________________________________________ Banque Lonienne------------------------------------------------ ,--------------Do_____________________________________________________ K. Macheras________________________________________________ Sucfle de Yolos____________________________________________ Effets encaissets___________________________________________ Do_____________________________________________________ Banque d’Ath£nes__________________________________________ Janv. 16-29: Banque Panagiotopoulos------------------------------------------------------Banque d’AthSnes---------------------------------------------------------------Do_____________________________________________________ Sucfle de Patras___________________________________________ Do_____________________________________________________ Sucfle de Salonique________________________________________ Do___________________________________________________— Caissier Central___________________________________________ Sucfle du Piree____________________________________________ Sucfle de Pyrgos___________________________________________ Janv. 17-20: Banque Populaire---------------------------------------------------------------Do_____________________________________________________ Banque d’Athenes__________________________________________ Banque de l’lndustrie______________________________________ Do_____________________________________________________ Banque Gen£rale__________________________________________ 1919: Novem. 12-25. Coupons du Gouvernment------------------------------------Decem. 5-18. Coupons du Gouvernment--------------------------------------1920: Janv. 16-29. Sucfle du Piree------------------------------------------------------Nov. 3: Banque Generale----------------------------------------------------------17-30: Sucfle de Salonique________________________________ Janv. 16/20: Effets encaissets-----------------------------------------------------------------K. Georges-------------------------------------------------------------------------Effets encaissets-----------------------------------------------------------------Janv. 18-31: Sucfle du Piree------------------------------------------------------------------Do_____________________________________________________ Janv. 20-3: Effets encaissets----------------------------------------------------Janv. 24-5: Sucfle du Salonique------------------------------------------------------------Sucfle du Pir£e------------------------------------------------------------------Do-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Caissier Central-----------------------------------------------------------------Effets encaissets-----------------------------------------------------------------Janv. 22-4: Sucfle du Pir§e-------------------------------------------------------------------Effels encaissSes----------------------------------------------------------------Janv. 23-5: Sucfle du Piree-------------------------------------------------------------------Caissier Central-----------------------------------------------------------------Janv. 28-10: Banque Populaire_________________________________________ Banque d’Athfcnes_________________________________________ Banque de 1’Industrie______________________________________ Banque lonienne____________________________________________ $23,943.00 1,700.00 72.00 9,933.00 9,095.00 25,000.00 3,000. 00 562.00 600.00 458. 00 50, 000. 00 17,240. 00 19, 875. 00 369.00 1,527.00 187.00 2, 345. 00 3, 500.00 38,000.00 30,000.00 34, 255. 00 4,780. 00 53,205. 00 500.00 11,877.00 23, 961.00 4,819.00 48,943.00 39, 356. 00 130,596.00 47,376.00 213,429. 00 29,512. 00 9,404.00 18,000 .00 10,933.00 208.00 9,636.00 60,637.00 34,955. 00 5,696.00 18,400.00 6,975.00 28,250. 00 440. 00 2,795.00 61,924.00 3,284.00 41, 753. 00 420.00 4,685.00 24,166.00 49,930.00 4,526.00 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. Janv. 28-10— Continued. Banque Populaire__________________________________________ Banque d’Athenes-------------------------------------------------------------Banque d’Orient___________________________________________ Banque de l’Economie Nationale---------------------------------------Banque Populaire-------------------------------------------------------------Banque d’Atlienes-------------------------------------------------------------Banque de 1’Industrie---------------------------------------------------------Banque de l’Economie Nationale---------------------------------------Banque Commerciale---------------------------------------------------------Do_____________________________________________________ Banque de l’lndustrie-------------------------------------------------------Banque Populaire-------------------------------------------------------------Banque de l’Economie Nationale---------------------------------------Banque du Piree__________________________________________ Banque d’Athenes_________________________________________ Banque de l’lndustrie______________________________________ Banque d’Athenes_________________________________________ Banque du Piree___________________________________________ Banque Populaire_________________________________________ Do_____________________________________________________ Banque de l’lndustrie_____________________________________ Banque d’Orient___________________________________________ Banque d’Athenes_________________________________________ Banque d’Orient___________________________________________ Banque de l’lndustrie_____________________________________ Banque du Piree___________________________________________ Banque Populaire_________________________________________ Banque Ionienne__________________________________________ Janv. 29-11: Banque du Piree__________________________________________ Banque de l’Economie Nationale___________________________ Fevr. 1-14: Suefle de Salonique________________________________________ Do-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Do-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Do-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Do-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Banque de Navigation_____________________________________ Sucfle de Salonique----------------------------------------------------------Do-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Janv. 28/10: Suc/le de la Canee__________________________________________ Effets eneaisses_____________________________________________ Janv. 29/11. Do________________________________________________ Janv. 30/12. Do------------------------------------------------------------------------Janv. 31/13: Suc/le du Piree_____________________________________________ Effets eneaisses______________________ ______________________ M. Evlampios--------------------------------------------------------------------D o ------------------------------------------------------------------------------Fevr. 1-14: Suc/le du Piree_____________________________________________ D o ------------------------------------------------------------------------------Caissier Central___________________________________________ Fevr. 3-16: Suc/le du Piree_____________________________________________ D o ------------------------------------------------------------------------------Fevr. 4-17: Caissier Central-----------------------------------------------------------------M. Evlampios______________________________________________ Fevr. 5-18: G. Aravomtinos____________________________________________ Effets eneaisses_____________________________________________ Fevr. 6-19. Suc/le du Piree-------------------------------------------------------Fevr. 7-20. Prise Korgialenios--------------------------------------------------- 219 $23,780.00 11> 877.00 6 , 600. 00 13,040. 00 10,741.00 4,974.00 37, 520.00 45,636.00 353. 00 1,956.00 50,414.00 6,260.00 7,659.00 10,200. 00 920.00 37,634.00 27, 624.00 33,400.00 210,358. 00 43,147.00 88,155.00 5,000.00 907.00 1,650.00 2,947.00 19,651. 00 15,000.00 61.00 800.00 11,500.00 33,150.00 23,018.00 1 1 2 ,200.00 110,451.00 37,964.00 4,300.00 5,600.00 1 0 , 500.00 60,000.00 7 , 1 3 3 .00 400.00 3,999.00 10,311.00 1,461.00 650. 00 1 ,000.00 7,500.00 00 6,718.00 4 ,260. 15,837.00 3, 500.00 9,137.00 1 ,100.00 363.00 5,445.00 16,230.00 114.00 220 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. Fevr. 8-21: Effets encaisses____________________________________________ D o ____________________________________________________ Fevr. 12-25. Suc/le du Piree____________________________________ Fevr. 13-26. Suc/le du Piree____________________________________ Fevr. 24-6. Credits Continues___________________________________ Fevr. 29/13. Effets encaisses____________________________________ Mars 2-15. Suc/le du Piree______________________ _______________ Fevr. 5-18: Banque Ionienne___________________________________________ D o ____________________________________________________ D o ____________________________________________________ Fevr. 18/1. Banque de l’lndustrie_______________________________ Fevr. 19/2. Banque Ionienne____________________________________ Mars 2-15. Effets encaisses_____________________________________ Mars 4-17: Suc/le de Pyrgos___________________________________________ Suc/le de Larissa__________________________ :_______________ Mars 5-18: Dimaras Freres____________________________________________ Banque d’Athenes_________________________________________ Mars 10-23. Coupons du Gouvernement_________________________ Mars 18-30. Dimaras Freres____________________________________ Mars 21-3. Effets encaisses_____________________________________ Avril 2-15. Banque Commereiale_______________________________ Avril 13-26. Suc/le de Chios_____________________________________ Avril 15-28: Banque Commereiale______________________________________ Effets encaisses_____________________________________________ Avril 16-29: Frais de fabrication de Billets de Banque___________________ A. Launis__________________________________________________ Effets encaisses_____________________________________________ Mars 20-3: Minist&re des Finances_____________________________________ Fournitures du Gouvernement______________________________ Mai 6-19. Banque Ionienne_____________________________________ Mai 27-9. Fournitures du Gouvernement________________________ Juin 25-7. Fournitures du Gouvernement-----------------------------------Juillet 14-27. Coupons du Gouvernement-----------------------------------Juillet 15-28. Fournitures du Gouvernement_____________________ Juillet 18-31. Coupons du Gouvernement_______________________ Juillet 23-6. Fournitures du Gouvernement--------------------------------Aout 11-24. Fournitures du Gouvernement_____________________ Aotit 28-10: Ministere des Finances____________________________________ Ministere des Finances____________________________________ Ministere des Finances_____________________________________ Ministere des Finances____________________________________ $431.00 1 , 951. 00 2, 886 .00 2,302.00 3,967.00 5,977.00 675.00 1 0 , 731.00 621.00 00 1,406.00 4,835.00 9,000.00 8 , 350. 1, 040. 00 100. 00 60,000.00 50. 00 81, 782. 00 40,000.00 314,000. 00 200. 00 3,148.00 10. 00 509,858.00 263,624. 00 117.00 59.00 1, 255. 00 1,255. 00 10,000. 00 1,500.00 360,000.00 61,175.00 7,000.00 14,849.00 178,618.00 261.55 963, 200. 00 14,200.00 750. 00 144,808. 74 9, 995. 432. 29 Avance au 3/16 Decembre 1919________________________________ $5,000,000.00 Avance au 4/17 Janvier 1920---------------------------------------------------- 5,000,000.00 T otal___________________________________________________ 10,000,000.00 Pour copie conforme, Ath^nes, le 29/11 Sept., 1920, le chef de section. C. W o l s k r s . 27, 1920. : Referring to our recent conversations, I inclose for your information a copy of a letter dated the 23d instant, No. 2242, which I have received from Mr. G. O. Dracopoulo, of the Greek Legation, and of the copy therewith inclosed of a cable from Mr. Calogoropoulos, whom I understand to be the Greek minister of finance, to the Greek Legation in Washington trans mitting a request from the National Bank o f Greece for a fourth installment D ecem ber M y D e a r M e rle -S m ith 221 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. o f $5,000,000 against the credit heretofore established in favor o f the Greek Government. The arrangement pursuant to which the three previous advances were made requires that the request from the National Bank of Greece trans mitted through the legation at Washington shall be accompanied by a cable representation similarly transmitted from the Greek minister of finance that the transfer so requested is under and in accordance with the provisions o f the Paris financial agreement dated February 10, 1918. You will observe that the cable from the Greek minister of finance does not contain such a repre sentation. Under the arrangement the Greek Government undertook to supply the Treasury with reports showing the purposes for which expenditures out of the advances are used. The Treasury has not as yet received an itemized report of the expenditure of the third installment. The reports covering the first and second installments appear to show the persons to whom the dollars were transferred, but not the purposes for which they were used. Before it takes thesee matters up with Mr. Dracopoulo the Treasury will be glad to learn whether, by reason of recent events in Greece, there is any objection from the point of view of the Department of State to the Treasury’s proceeding to make the advances now requested, and if not whether Mr. Dracopoulo is the authorized person in charge of the legation with whom the Treasury may properly deal concerning the same. Very truly, yours, M . K elley. Hon. V a n S. M e r l e - S m i t h , Third Assistant Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. SECTION 115. Correspondence Relating to Greek Politics at the Close of 1919 and the Consequent Financial Policy of the Allies Toward Greece. [Paraphrase o f telegram received.] From: American Legation, Athens. Dated: December 12, 1920, 8 p. m. Received: December 13, 9.55 a. m. No. 265. Fo$ your confidential information: Great Britain iand France have notified the Greek Government that they will not honor any further drafts upon the unused balances of the tripartite loan to Greece still held in London and Paris. In discussing this withholding of economic support from Greece in case of the return of King Constantine the Government-controlled press speak with much confidence of the support ex pected from America, evidently meaning the American balance of the loan in question. From a conference which I had with the British minister yesterday I believe that England hopes that the present reactionary movement in Greece will be very short lived if she can prove to Greece that she can not fulfill her r61e in the Near East without the good will and support of the associated powers. Bankruptcy is impending and the strongest argument possible at this time would be a financial one. Should the United States make any advances at this time I believe they would be considered as a condemnation o f Venizelos and that much publicity would be given them as supporting the incoming administration. If the United States does not consider making such advances, I think it would be very desirable to clearly indicate this to the Greek Govern ment. The French and British ministers are expecting to receive notifications that they are recalled. Have you any instructions for me in the premises? Capps. U n it e d S t a t e s S e n a t e , C o m m i t t e e o n t h e U n iv e r s it y o f t h e U n it e d S t a t e s , January 13, 1921. Hon. D a v id F. H o u s t o n , Secretary of the Treasury, Washington, D. C. M y D e a r M r . H o u s t o n : I inclose you a copy of a letter that I wrote to the State Department some time ago, and I also inclose the reply of the State De 222 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. partment. I call your attention to the last part of the letter, and would like to have such information and enlightenment as you can furnish me with. I am, with every expression of regard, Very truly, yours, Jo h n Sh arp W il l ia m s . W a s h i n g t o n , D. C., January 5 , 1921. Hon. N o r m a n H. D a v is , Acting Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. M y D e a r M r . D a v i s ; I see in the paper some information, or quasi informa tion—I don’t know which—to tlie effect that the State Department first con strued its agreement with regard to the credit extended by the Allies of $38,000,000 for Greece as contingent upon the ratification of the treaty of Versailles, but that later the State Department construed the agreement to permit them to advance $5,000,000, supposedly our share, regardless of the ratification. If this be true, I think the department made a mistake in its second ruling, and that now a splendid opportunity is presented to retire from it and to avoid the criticism which necessarily will arise by refusing to ad vance the money to King Constantine. This refusal can well be based upon the fact that wre were helping a friend, or a friendly government and people, and that when an enemy has been substituted for the friend, we do not con sider ourselves compelled to extend any gratuity. It is a gratuity, although the gratuity is expected to be paid back. I am, with every expression of regard, Very truly, yours, Jo h n Sh arp W il l ia m s . P. S.—I write this to you in Mr. Colby’s absence, but, of course, would like to have him read the letter when he returns. I don’t think that we ought to interfere with the internal affairs of Greece. I f the people want King Con stantine back, that is their business and not ours; but helping him after he gets back is another thing. Right now’ we need to economize, and we might just as well put that.$5,000,000 to the credit side of the ledger and take it oft* the debit side. T he U nder Se cretary of State, Washington, January 10, 1M0. M y D e a r S e n a t o r W i l l i a m s : In acknowledging receipt of your letter of January 5 relative to the credit extended to Greece, I may say that the Treasury is more conversant with the details of that credit than I am, but the credit extended by this Government to Greece was not contingent upon the ratifica tion of the treaty of Versailles. The credit extended to Greece, as I recall, about two years ago was, upon the condition that it would be made available upon the conclusion of peace, or whenever the foreign balances of the National Bank of Greece should fall below 100,000,000 marks. I understand that the Greek Government contended that both of those contingencies have arisen, and that the Treasury finally agreed to let them have advances from time to time for purchases of American commodities for consumption in Greece. I f and when this Government extends recognition to King Constantine, or continues relations with the Greek Government, I do not see how the Treasury can legally or morally cancel its obligation to complete the advance to Greece under the terms stipulated. As the Treasury, however, is more conversant with this than I am, I suggest that you might communicate with the Secretary o f the Treasury. Sincerely, yours, N o r m a n H. D a v is . J a n u a r y 19, 1921. Your letter o f the 13th instant has been received, transmitting a copy of your letter o f the 5th to the Undersecretary o f State, and a copy of his reply o f the 10th, concerning loans by the Treasury to the Greek Government. Mr. Davis’s understanding of the situation regard ing loans to Greece, as stated in his letter, is substantially in accord with mine. The question involved is the obligation of the Treasury under the arrangement made as long ago as February, 1918. The Treasury, of course, does not desire My D ear S en ator W illia m s : FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 223 to pay out funds except to the extent necessary, and, in any case, is not in a position to make advances to the Greek Government pending receipt from the Department of State of advices as to the existence of relations between this Government and the Greek Government. I return Mr. Davis’s letter. Sincerely, yours, D. F. H o u s t o n . Hon. J o h n S h a r p W i l l i a m s , United States Senate, Washington, D. G. T h e S e c r e t a r y of t h e T r e a s u r y , Washington, January 19, 1921. Your letter of the 13th instant has been re ceived, transmitting a copy of your letter of the 5th to the Undersecretary o f State and a copy of his reply of the 10th, concerning loans by the Treasury to the Greek Government. In February, 1918, a special agreement was made in Paris under which the United States, France, and Great Britain undertook to lend to the Greek Government in equal shares in their respective currencies up to the equivalent of 250,000,000 francs each. The loan was to be pledged by the Greek Government to the National Bank of Greece against the issue of bank notes to be used by the Greek Government in Greece for certain purposes specified in the agreement. Credits and advances under the arrangement were to be put at the disposal of the Greek Government as recommended and ap proved by an interallied financial commission to be established at Athens, and the use of the resources was to be supervised by an interallied military com mission similarly established. During the war the loan could be availed of in case the foreign balances of the Greek treasury and the Greek National Bank fell below 100,000,000 francs, and it was provided that six months after the conclusion of peace the balance of the loan could be availed of without restric tion. Pursuant to these arrangements, the Treasury established credits in dollars up to the equivalent of 250,000,000 francs, upon the understanding, how ever, that this amount would not be available except to the extent o f one-third of such amount of vouchers for expenditures by the Greek Government prior to 1919 for the purposes specified in the Paris agreement as should have been submitted to and approved by the American delegate to the interallied financial commission. It is the understanding of the Treasury that on the basis of the vouchers approved by the commission the total amount of this Government’s share o f the loan will probably not exceed $43,900,000. The obligation of the Treasury under the Paris agreement to make advances does not appear to be contingent upon anything except proof by the Greek Government to the satisfaction o f the interallied commission o f expenditures by the Greek Government for the pur poses mentioned in the agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, however, the time when the advances are to be made is contingent upon the lapse of six months after the termination of the war and prior to such termination upon the foreign balances of the Greek treasury and of the Greek National Bank falling below 100,000,000 francs. In November, 1919, the Greek Government advised the Treasury that the balances had fallen below that figure, but did not inform the Treasury by how much or give it information which led the Treasury to believe the advices more than a formal notice, as distinguished from a request for an advance. The Greek Government had, in September, 1919, however, made urgent request for leave to be permitted to anticipate the six months’ period after the termination o f the war and to use part or all of the dollars which would be available to it under the Paris agreement. Late in November, 1919, the Treasury reached an agreement with the Greek representatives where by it agreed to make available against the credits established in favor of the Greek Government the sum of $5,000,000, upon the understanding that said sum was to be used either by the National Bank of Greece itself or by the parties to whom that bank might transfer such funds only for the purchase in the United States of goods to be consumed in Greece, and upon the further under standing that itemized statements showing the purposes for which such funds were used would be furnished by the Treasury through the Greek Legation here. Subsequently the further installments of $5,000,000 each were advanced. As suming that the Government of King Constantine is recognized by the political departments of this Government as the same Government with which the Paris agreement was made, or as the proper successor to that Government, I do not M y D ea r S e n a to r W illia m s : 224 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. see how the Treasury can in honor refuse to perform its obligations under the Paris agreement. Although it is doubtless open to the Treasury to stand upon the terms of that agreement and to decline to make further advances until after the lapse of six months after the termination by this Government of the state of war, I do not see any advantage, in case the Government o f King Constantine shall be recognized, in refusing to make advances in such install ments as Greece may require for the purposes for which the previous install ments were advanced. Yours, very truly, D . F . H o u ston . Hon. J o h n S h a r p W i l l i a m s , United States Senate. D e p a rtm e n t o f S ta te , Washington, February 3, 1921. M y D e a r M r. K e l l e y : Referring to my letter of January 24, inclosing a copy of a telegram from the American ambassador at London in regard to advance ments by the British Government to Greece under the Paris agreement of February 10, 1918, I inclose herewith a copy of the confidential dispatch referred to in the telegram mentioned. Very truly, yours, V a n S. M e rl e -S m i t h . Hon. N i c h o l a s K e l l e y , Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Washington, D. C. No. 4108. L o n d o n , January 21, 1921. The S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , Washington. Sir : I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 69, under date of to-day, in reply to the department’s telegraphic instructions No. 52, of January 20, 7 p. m., relative to the advances made by the British Government to the Greek Government pursuant to the agreement of February 10, 1918, signed in Paris. I was informed to-day by an official of the foreign office dealing with near eastern affairs that in accordance with the agreement above mentioned the British Government undertook to place to the favor of the Greek Government a credit of £10,000,000 (the nominal equivalent of 250,000,000 francs), against which sum the Greek Government might make purchases of merchandise in the United Kingdom. I was further informed that up to the present date the British Government had advanced approximately £6,500,000. Owing to the decision reached a short time ago, that no further financial assistance was to be given for the time being by the British Government to the Greek Government because of King Constantine’s accession, the credit of the remaining £3,500,000 is temporarily suspended. I learn confidentially from the same source that when the Greek Government approached the French Government with a view to obtaining an advance on the credit allotted to Greece under the agreement of February 10, 1918, the French Government stated that the Greek Government had obtained an errone ous impression with regard to the matter; that the agreement did not provide for advances being made to Greece by France, but that the 250,000,000 francs was to act as collateral against which the Greek Government might issue notes. I was informed in this connection, in the strictest confidence, that the British Government did not hold this view. In this connection and with reference to my telegram No. 71 of January 21, 6 p. m., it appears that the British Government is forced to temporarily oppose the recognition of King Constantine at the present time because of English public opinion and the strong attitude of the French Government in this respect. For the same reason that the British Government opposes the revision of the treaty of Sevres, recognition of Constantine will be eventually given. It is the belief of the Government that British interests in the Near East can best be furnished by a strong Greece, and that one of the best means to better the Greek situation is to tender moral and political support. Obviously this can not be accomplished by continuing to refuse recognition of the Greek King. It is probable that recognition will be requested and accorded soon after the forthcoming Paris conference. I have the honor to be, sir, Your obedient servant, J o h n W . D a v is . FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 225 D e p a rtm e n t o f S ta te , Washington, January 24, 1921. M y D e a r M r . K e l l e y : I am inclosing herewith a copy of a telegram dated January 21, 1921, from the American ambassador at London, England, in regard to an advancement by the British Government of approximately £6,500,000 to the Greek Government to be used against purchases o f commodities by Greece in England. The substance of this telegram was communicated to your office by telephone this morning. Very sincerely, yours, V a n S. M e rl e - S m i t h . Hon. N i c h o l a s K e l l e y , Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Washington, D. C. L ondon, January 21, 1921. S ec r e t a r y of S t a t e , Washington D. C.: Your 52, January 20, 7 p. m. Informed that British Government have ad vanced approximately £6,500,000 to the Greek Government to be used against purchases of commodities by Greece in England. Credit of remaining £3,500,000 has been suspended temporarily on account of accession to the throne, Con stantine. Dispatch follows. Repeated at Paris. D a v is . D e p a rtm e n t o f S ta te , Washington, January 26, 1921. D e a r M r. K e l l e y : With reference to your letter of January 15, 1921, there is inclosed herewith a copy of a telegram dated January 25, 1921, from the American ambassador at Paris, France, in regard to a book credit for 250,000,000 francs, opened by the French Treasury in favor of Greece. I sent you under date of January 24 a copy of the reply o f the American ambassador at London to the department’s telegram of the 20th in this regard. Very sincerely, yours, V an S. M e r l e -S m i t h . P a r is , January 25, 1921. Hon. N i c h o l a s K e l l e y , Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , Washington, D. C.: Referring to the department’s telegram of January 20, 7 p. in., to London, transmitted to me mutatis mutandis. Foreign office states that a book credit for 250,000,000 francs was opened by the Treasury in favor o f Greece and that for various reasons Greece has not yet had an opportunity to draw upon this credit, which has remained intact. W allace. D ep a rtm e n t o f S ta te , Washington, February 26, 1921. The S e c r e t a r y o f ti-ie T r e a s u r y . (Attention of Mr. Nicholas Kelley, Assistant Secretary.) Sir : I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of dispatch No. 2085, dated January 26, 1921, from the American ambassador at Paris, and copies of the in closures thereto which contain information relative to the advances made by France under the Franco-Anglo-American agreement with Greece, dated Febru ary 10, 1918. I have the honor to be, sir, Your obedient servant, N o r m a n H. D a v is , Undersecretary. (For the Secretary of State.) S. Doc. 86, 87-2------15 226 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. No. 20S5. P a r i s , January 26, 1921. Tlie S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e . Washington. S i r : In confirmation of my telegram No. 67, January 25, 5 p. m., transmitting in substance the reply given by tlie foreign office in regard to the advances made to date by the French Government pursuant to the agreement of February 10, 1918, I have the honor to inclose herewith copy and translation of the letter received from Mr. A. Kammerer, director of political and commercial affairs at the foreign office, in reply to tlie embassy’s informal inquiry, and on which my above telegram was based. I have the honor to be, sir, Your obedient servant, H u g h C. W a l l a c e . D ir e c t r ox des A f f a ir e s A f f a ir e s E n t r a n g e r e s , P o l it iq u e s et C o m m e r c ia l e s , 25 Janvier, 1921. de Peretti me dit que vous avez demand^ des chi fires precis en ce qui concerne les credits mis par la France a la disposition de la Grece en vertu de l’accord franco-anglo-americain avec la Grece du 10 fevrier 1921 (sic). Je remarque d’abord que le credit total de £30,000 (sic) etait nn credit en ecriture. Le Gouverenment franeais a ouvert pour sa part ce credit dans les Ecritures de la Caisse Centrale du Tresor pour 250,000,000 Frs. Mais pour diverses raisons tres compliqu6es, la Grece n’avait pas encore eu l’opportunitG de tirer sur ces credits si bien qu’ils sont jusqu’ici restes intacts. Yotre bien de vouG, M on g h e r C o lle g u e : M. A. K am m erer. Monsieur H a r r i s o n , Conseiller de VAmbassadc des Etats-Unis, Paris. F ore lg n A f f a ir e s , D e p a r t m e n t of P o l it ic a l a n d C o m m e r c ia l A f f a i r s , January 25, 1921. My D e a r C o l l e g u e : Mr. de Peretti tells me that you have asked him to give you exact figures as regards the credits placed by France at the disposal o f Greece under the Franco-Anglo-American agreement with Greece, dated Feb ruary 10, 1921 (sic). I observe first o f all that the total credit of £30,000 (sic) was a hook credit. For its part the French Government has operated this credit in the books of the central paying office of the treasury for 250,000,000 francs. However, owing to various very complicated reasons, Greece has not yet had the opportunity of drawing upon these credits, so that to this date they have remained intact. Faithfully, yours, A . K a m m erer. Mr. H a r r i s o n , Counselor of the American Embassy, Paris. CZECHOSLOVAKIA 227 SECTION 116. Czechoslovak] a. Under the Liberty loan acts which authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President, to make loans to for* eign Governments then engaged in war Avith enemies of the United States for the purpose of prosecuting the war, the Treasury Depart ment made loans to Czechoslovakia in a total amount of $61,256,206.74. It established credits for Czechoslovakia in a total of $67,329,041.10. There now remains to the credit of Czechoslovakia in the United States Treasury a sum of $6,072,834.36. There was no credit established nor were there any cash advances made to Czecho slovakia prior to the termination of the war by the armistice of November 11, 1918, although this money was to be loaned for war purposes under the law. The first credit was established for Czecho slovakia on November 15,1918, four days after hostilities had ceased, and it amounted to $7,000,000. The last credit was December 31, 1919, of $12,000,000. The first cash advance made to Czechoslovakia was November 15, 1918, of $5,000,000. The last cash advance was September 17, 1920, of $732,165.64. In addition to these loans made under the Libert}^ loan acts, the United States War Department sold to Czechoslovakia surplus war material amounting to a total of $20,621,994.54. For this sum we now hold the obligations of Czechoslovakia. The American Relief Commission also sold to Czechoslovakia food stuffs, amounting in all to $6,348,653.56. We hold the obligations of Czechoslovakia for this amount also. This makes a total of over $88,225,000 that we have supplied to Czechoslovakia and for which we have their demand paper. In order to properly understand the letters which follow a brief resume of the history of Czechoslovakia is necessary. Czechoslovakia was a part of Austria-Hungary which contained a large number of Slavic people. There were over 600,000 Czecho slovaks in the Austro-Hungarian Army. Shortly after the war be gan numerous efforts were made to get that portion of Austria-Hun gary to revolt and set up a government of its own. When Russia finally quit the fight in November, 1917, there were about 300,000 Czecho-Slovaks who had been taken as willing pris oners in Russia. Fighting contingents were made up of a number of them and they aided the Allies to a certain extent. France recognized Czechoslovakia as a nation on June 30, 1918. Great Britain recognized her on August 13, 1918. The United States recognized the Czechoslovakia National Council as a “ de facto 'belligerent government clothed with the proper au thority to direct political and military affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks ” on September 2, 1918. 229 230 FORETGX LOAXS AXD AUTHORITY FOR MAKTXG SAME. The nation was not finally set up as a nation with definite boun daries and a parliamentary form of government until it was so cre ated and set up by the peace treaty, articles 80 to 86, concluded June 28, 1919, and finally ratified bv the various countries January 10, 1 9 2 °* The attention of the committee is called to the fact that the Liberty loan acts provide that the loans can be made to countries then engaged in war with enemies of the United States for the purpose of prose cuting the war; that Czechoslovakia was not a country in the com mon sense of the word until it was established by the peace treaty on June 28, 1919, and the money loaned Czechoslovakia could not have been loaned them for the purpose of the prosecution of the war, as the war had ceased, all hostilities W'ere over, and Germany had com pletely capitulated four days before the first credit was established for Czechoslovakia. Attention is also called to the fact that throughout the Czecho slovakian correspondence attached hereto both the Treasury De partment and the Czechoslovakian representatives were aware of the fact that loans could only be made for war purposes to countries then engaged in w7ar with enemies of the United States, and repeated reference is made to this fact and effort made to circumvent the law by making the statement that the loans are made to prevent the spread of anarchy. SECTION 116-A. Recognition of Czechoslovakia National Council as a De Facto Belligerent Government by United States State Department September 3, 1918. [N ot to be used before 12 noon September 3, 1918.]. D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e . For the press: The Secretary of State makes the following announcement: The Czecho-Slovak peoples having taken up arms against the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and having placed organized armies in the field, which are waging war against those Empires under officers of their own na tionality and in accordance with the rules and practices of civilized nations; and The Czecho-Slovaks having, in prosecution o f their independent purposes in the present war, confided supreme political authority to the Czechoslovak National Council, The Government of the United States recognizes that a state o f belligerency exists between the Cziecho-Slovaks thus organized and the German and AustroHungarian Empires. It also recognizes the Czechoslovak National Council as a de facto belligerent government clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political aifairs of the Czecho-Slovaks. The Government o f the United States further declares that it is prepared to enter formally into relations with the de facto government thus recognized for the purpose of prosecuting the war against the common enemy, the Empires of Germany and Austria-Hungary. O ctober 2, 1918. M y D e a r Mr. P r e s i d e n t : Mr. McCormick, Mr. Hurley, and I have been in vestigating further the problems involved in supplying the Czecho-Slovaks, and after careful consideration we now have the following recommendations to sub mit to you. 1. The cost of purchasing those supplies which are admittedly required by 75,000 Czecho-Slovaks, and the purchase of which is approved by the War Department, will very materially exceed $1,500,000, the sum which we pre FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 231 viously mentioned to you. Our present estimate is $4,(MX),000, and an itemized statement showing how this is reached is inclosed herewith. In addition to the actual purchase price additional sums must be added for such items as freight, insurance, etc., which will bring the total to about $5,000,0001 Our experience of the past two weeks leads us to believe that further purchases will develop as necessary or very desirable. We accordingly recommend in order to avoid the necessity of troubling you personally whenever a new item of expense may arise that the Treasury Department be authorized from time to time to make advances to the Czechoslovak Government, represented by Prof. Massaryk, of sums aggregating $7,000,000 each, such loan to be first approved by Mr. McCormick, Mr. Hurley, and me, and the moneys to be spent for the purchase and shipment of supplies for the Czechoslovak forces. Very truly, yours, B . M. B a r u c h . The P r e s i d e n t , The White House, Washington, D. C. O. K'd, W. W. SECTION 117. Seven-Million-Dollar Loan Approved October 4, 1918. O c t o b e r 4, 1918. I understand that the Department of State has recog nized the Czechoslovak Government as a de facto belligerent Government at war with Germany. As I have under consideration making advances to said Gov ernment under the authority of the second Liberty bond act and the acts amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto, I shall be obliged if you will advise me if my understanding as above stated is correct, and also whether the Department of State can affirmatively advise me that, in its opinion, the necessary formalities have been complied with, so that the obligations of the Czechoslovak Government, when executed in conformity with the documents furnished to you and by such person as you shall designate to the Treasury Department, would be regarded by the Department of State as valid and bind ing internationally, and would have its sanction. Cordially, yours, W m . G. M c A d o o . The S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e . D e a r M r. S e c r e t a r y : O c t o b e r 4, 1918. I understand that the Department of State has recog nized the Czecho-Slovak Government as a de facto belligerent government at wrar with Germany, and that said Government is urgently in need of funds to make purchases in the United States for the purpose of prosecuting the war. In order to enable me to make loans to the Czecho-Slovak Government for such purpose I ask your authority for the establishment of a credit in its favor in the amount of $7,000,000. Cordially, yours, W m . G. M c A d o o . D e a r M r. P r e s i d e n t : T h e P r e s id e n t , The White House. T h e W h ite H ou se, October, 1918. Approved. O c t o b e r 8, 1918. The President has authorized the establishment of a credit of $7,000,000 in favor of the Czecho-Slovak Government, and I understand that you desire that the advances from that credit be made only after advices from you, Mr. McCormick, and Mr. Hurley, so that you will have an oppor tunity to pass upon the proposed expenditures. I understand that the following method of procedure, which we discussed the other day, meets with your approval. After the Department o f State has furnished the Treasury Department the advices necessary to enable the Treas ury to make the advances against the obligations of Czecho Slovak Government, D e a r M r. B a r u c h : 232 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. as that Government desires round amounts of* cash advanced against Its obliga tions, you, Mr. MrOormiek, and Mr. Hurley, will advise tlu* Secretary of the Treasury of your approval of su<*h request on the part of the Czeeho Slovak Government. The amounts advanced by the Secretary of the Treasury are to be deposited by the Czeclio-Slovak Government with the banking institution which you have designated, namely, the Central Union Trust Co. of New York, to be held and paid out by it on the check of the Czeeho-Slovak Government or its representa tive, but only when bearing such countersignature or countersignatures as you and your colleagues shall designate. A purchasing agreement is being prepared for execution by the Czocho-Slovak Government. I f there are any other points which it is desired should be covered in the understanding between the Treasury and the Czeclio-Slovak Government, will you kindly advise me. and I will appreciate it if you will inform me in due course of the individual or individuals who are to countersign checks of the Czeclio-Slovak Government drawn 011 the Central Union Trust Co. of New York. Very truly, yours, A lbe rt R a t h b o n e . Mr. B e r n a r d H. B a r u c h , Chairman War Industries Board, Council of National Defense Building, Washington, D. C. D e p a rtm e n t o f S ta te , Washington, November l ’i, 1918. My D e a r Mr. S e c r e t a r y : In response to your letter of October 4, I take pleasure in advising you that the United States Government on September 3, 1918, accorded recognition to the Czechoslovak National Council as a de facto belligerent Government clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks. The Czechoslovak National Council is, in the opinion of this department, a foreign Government engaged in war with the enemies of the United States. I am of the opinion that obligations executed at this time by President Massaryk in the name and on behalf of the Czechoslovak National Council, purchased at par by the Secretary of the Treasury under the authority of the Liberty bond acts, will be valid and binding internationally, and such obligations will have the sanction of this department. I am, my dear Mr. Secretary, Very sincerely, yours, R obert L a n s i n g . T h e S e c r e t a r y of t h e T r e a s u r y . SECTION 118. Treasury Department Doubted Its Legal Authority to Make Czechoslovakian Loan, so Fixed Matter Up with President Wilson and State Department. D e p a rtm e n t o f S ta te , Washington, November 2, 1918. M y D e a r M r. S e c r e t a r y : I have received your letter of October 4, asking to be advised if your understanding is correct that the Czechoslovak National Council has been recognized as a de facto belligerent Government in the present war, and whether the Department of State can affirmatively express its opinion that the necessary formalities have been complied with so that the obligations of the Czechoslovak Government when issued for advances made to that Gov ernment under the authority of tlie second Liberty bond act and acts amenda tory thereof and supplementary thereto would be regarded by this department as valid and binding internationally, and would have its sanction. In reply I have to advise you that 011 account of the delay which would inevitably be consequent upon obtaining the necessary documents from Paris in order to be in a position to make tlie statement which you desire, inquiry was made of the President as to whether, pending the delay, he desired to direct that preliminary advances be made as a matter of policy, pending the clearing up of the legal situation. From his approval of your letter I understood that FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 233 tlie President preferred that the legal formalities he complied with before advances were made, and I have Ihere fore delayed answering your letter until the necessary information could be obtained from Paris. From the information at hand I am in a position to make the following statement : The Czechoslovak National Council, with headquarters at Paris, has been recognized by France, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States. The recog nition by the United States was accorded 011 September 3, 1918, in a public announcement issued by the Secretary of State (copy inclosed), in which it was stated that the United States “ recognizes the Czechoslovak National Coun cil as a de facto belligerent Government, clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czechoslovaks.” From the information at hand it appears that the Czechoslovak Army in Siberia and in Europe recognize the authority of the Czechoslovak National Council as hav ing complete control over their organization and movements. The recognition of the national council, the number and functions of its officers, and the au thority of President Massaryk to enter into loan obligations are set forth in the inclosed telegrams of October 22 and 28 from Paris. While the docu ments set forth in these telegrams show that President Massaryk has the au thority to enter into loan engagements with foreign countries, yet it is neces sary to take into consideration the fact that the Czechoslovak National Coun cil, as it has been recognized, is merely a provisional government, and that the Czechoslovak Nation has not as yet attained complete independence. Dur ing the present transitional stage of its existence, therefore, I am not in a position to state more than that, in my opinion, the obligations entered into by President Massaryk for the advances made by the Treasury Department under the Liberty bond acts will in honor bind the present de facto belligerent Czechoslovak Government to recognize these obligations as valid and binding internationally, and to confirm recognition o f them by appropriate legal meas ures should the independence of the nation be hereafter established. On this understanding the advances have the sanction of this department. I am, my dear Mr. Secretary, Very sincerely, yours, R obert L a n s i n g . The S e c r e t a r y o f t h e T r e a s u r y . Memorandum re obligations of the Czecho-Slovak Government: The Secretary of State the early part of September, 1918, on behalf o f the United States Government, recognized that a state of belligerency existed be tween the Czecho-Slovaks, organized in such manner that supreme political authority was confided in the Czecho-Slovak National Council and the German arAl Austro-Hungarian Empires, and that the Czecho-Slovak National Council was a de facto belligerent government clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks. Apparently the Czecho-Slovak National Council, by action taken September 26, 1918, established itself or attempted to establish itself as the provisional government of the Czecho-Slovak countries. The American ambassador in Paris has received and forwarded to the Department of State all the docu ments and laws, including the constitution, pertaining to the subject of the authority of the Czecho-Slovaks to contract foreign loans. Apparently Prof. Masaryk was president of the council, and by decree of February 10, 1916, as such was authorized to contract loans, to sign in the name of the council all financial agreements and obligations, to receive all funds and advances, and dispose of them in accordance with the decisions already adopted. When the Czecho-Slovak provisional government was estab lished on September 26, 1918, Prof. Masaryk was made the president and minister of finance, the special functions which previously belonged to the president of the council, were vested in Prof. Masaryk as president and minister of finance. The national council having been merged into the provisional government, it would seem that any advance made by the United States should be made to the provisional government and not to the national council. Whether a loan can be made depends 011 whether the Department o f State can say it is of the opinion— 1. The Czecho-Slovak provisional government is a foreign government en gaged in war with the enemies of the United States. 2. That the obligations of that government wiien signed by the person designated are valid and binding internationally and have the sanction of the Department of State. FOKKIGX LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. It would s(vin Unit, these questions are political and involve a determination by the Department of State as to whether it is prepared to recognize the in dependence of the Ozecho-Slovak nation—irrespective of its boundaries—and the provisional government. If so, in view of the telegrams received from the American ambassador on the subject, there can be little doubt that the authority to execute demand notes for money received is vested in Prof. Masaryk. On the other hand, if the State Department is not prepared to give the requisite recognition to the Czecho-Slovaks it would seem that the Treas ury is without power to purchase the obligations under the terms of the bond act. N o v e m b e r 14, 1918. Memorandum for Mr. Rathbone: The Secretary wants at once to send a letter to the President inclosing a copy of the letter received from the Secretary of State concerning the OzechoSlovak Government, together with a brief statement of our minimum require ment. Will you please prepare such a letter for his signature? R. C. L e f f i n g w e t x . N o v e m b e r 14, 1918. : I spoke to you yesterday about the character of letter to be addressed by the State Department to the Treasury Department as a basis for the proposed loans to the Czecho-Slovak National Council. I inclose the desired form, marked “ Exhibit A.” I also inclose as “ Exhibit B ” a letter addressed to me by the Secretary of State on November 2 (you need read only the first, second, and last page), which is not, I regret to say, an opinion upon which I would feel justified under the existing law in making advances to the Czecho-Slovak National Council. If you will be good enough to ask the Secretary of State to send me an opinion along the lines of “ Exhibit A,” we can proceed, I think, with safety. Cordially, yours, D e a r M r. P r e s i d e n t The P r e s i d e n t , The White House. N o v e m b e r 14, 1918. Draft of letter of Trcasuiy Department needs jn order to make advances to Czechoslovak Provisional Government. M y D e a r M r. S e c r e t a r y : In response to your letter of October 4 1 take pleasure in advising you that the United States Government on September 3, 1918, accorded recognition to the Czechoslovak National Council as a de facto belligerent government clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czechoslovaks. The Czechoslovak National Council is, in the opinion of this department, a foreign Government engaged in war with the enemies of the United States. I am of the opinion that obligations executed at this time by President Mazaryk in the name and on behalf of the Czechoslovak National Council, purchased at par by the Secretary of the Treasury under the authority of the Liberty bond acts, will be valid and binding internationally, and such obligations will have the sanction of this department. Secretary of State. D e p a rtm e n t o f S ta te , Washington, November 14, 1918. M y D e a r Mr. S e c r e t a r y : In response to your letter of October 4, I take pleasure in advising you that the United States Government on September 3, 1918, accorded recognition to the Czechoslovak National Council as a de facto belligerent government clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czechoslovaks. The Czechoslovak National Council is, in the opinion of this department, a foreign Government engaged in war with the enemies of the United States. I am of the opinion that obligations executed at this time by President Mazaryk in the name and on behalf o f the Czecho- FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 235 National Council, purchaser! at par by the ►Secretary of the Treasury under the authority of the Liberty bond acts, will be valid and binding inter nationally, and such obligations will have the sanction of this department. I am, my dear Mr. Secretary, Very sincerely, yours, S lov ak R obert L a n s i n g . The honorable the S e c r e t a r y o f t h e T r e a s u r y . SECTION 119. Treasury Department States Loan Can Only Be Made for War Purposes. N o v e m b e r 1 5, 1 9 1 8 . letter dated November 1 5, addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury and signed by Mr. Baruch and Mr. McCormick, has been duly received. The advance of $ 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 to Czechoslovak National Council has been made. I desire, however, to call to your attention in this connection that under the Liberty bond acts giving the Secretary of the Treasury authority to make this advance the amounts advanced must be expended only for the purpose of prosecuting the war. This department has made it plain in writing to Prof. Mazaryk that the advance is to be spent only for the war purposes of the Czechoslovak National Council, and I will be obliged if, so far as commitments are made by Czechoslovak National Council under the direction of yourself, Mr. McCormick, and Mr. Baruch, and so far as Czechoslovak National Council checks are countersigned by the persons from time to time designated by your self, Mr. McCormick, and Mr. Baruch, you will see that no commitments to be paid for out of this advance and no payments from said advance are made for other than war purposes. The Secretary o f the Treasury has no authority to make advances for reconstruction purposes, and no part of the sum advanced can be used for such purpose. For your information, I inclose herewith a copy of my letter of even date to Prof. Mazaryk. I am writing a similar letter to Mr. McCormick and to Mr. Baruch. Very truly, yours, D e ar M r. H urley: A A lb e r t R a t h b o n e . Mr. E d w a r d N . H u r l e y , Chairman Shipping Board, 1319 S Street NW., Washington, D. C. SECTION 120. Great Britain, a Heavy Debtor to the United States, Endeavors to Negotiate a Loan to Czechoslovakia and Receive Certain Customs Concessions as Security. D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , Washington, May 19, 1919. The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to the honorable the Secretary of the Treasury and has the honor to transmit herewith a para phrased copy of a telegram from the American Mission at Paris, dated May 1 5 , embodying a message from the American consul at Prague regarding negotia tions for a loan to Czechoslovakia. Inclosure: Paraphrase of telegram May 15, 1 9 1 9 , from American Mission at Paris. CABLE MESSAGE FROM THE AMERICAN MISSION AT PARIS NO. 2122, MAY 15, 191!), 6 P. M. (PARAPHRASE.) The telegram embodies a confidential message from the American consul at Prague. Consul Young has learned that a representative of British banks is endeavoring to negotiate a loan of £ 1 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 with the present Government. He demanded, in addition to excellent securities, certain customs concessions, but the latter proposition was refused. While the Government has not yet 23G FORETC.X LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. reached an agreement with him, it is his impression dial the Government is waiting in the hope of receiving monetary terms from other sources. This representative advised Consul Young's informant, an American Army officer, that it was the desire of the Government to obtain £25,000,000, but that tlie representative's principles he! eve that an advance of 1on millions will be enough. In the event that the Government of the United States is interested, Consul Young desires to be informed in order that he may approach the minister of finance. SECTION 121. Seven Million Dollars Credit Established and $5,000,000 Advance Made No vember 15, 1918. ( ’o x sftl National T ciiecoslovaque, Washington, D. C., November 15, 1918. The Secretary of the T reasury , Washington, D. C. M y D ear M r. Secretary : I have the honor to request that a credit of $7,000,000 be established in favor of my Government, and that against such credit an advance in the amount of $5,000 000 be made on November 15, 1918, to my Government, in order to enable it to make cash payments immediately re quired for the purchase and transport of supplies purchased in the United States, by arrangements made with Messrs. Vance C. McCormick, Bernard M. Baruch, and Edward N. Hurley, for the Czecho-Slovak forces now in Siberia. Inclosed is a statement of the expenditures necessary forthwith to be made out of said advance. My Government is at the present time without dollar funds sufficient to meet any part of said expenditures. I have the honor to request that said advance be deposited to the credit of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, with Central Union Trust Co., of New York, to be withdrawn only by checks bearing the counter-signature of the person or persons from time to tim-e designated to said trust company by Messrs. McCormick, Baruch, and Hurley, or any two of them, with whom arrangements have been made to make such designation. I am, my clear Mr. Secretary, Very truly yours, T. G. M asaryk . N ovem ber 15, 1918. D ear M r . M cCormick : Your letter of November 15 addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury and signed by Mr. Barucli and yourself has been duly received. The advance of $5,000,000 to Czecho-Slovak National Council has been made. I desire, however, to call to your attention in this connection that under the Lib erty bond acts giving the Secretary of the Treasury authority to make this ad vance, the amounts advanced must be expended only for the purpose of prosecut ing the tear. This department has made it plain in writing to Prof. Masaryk that the advance is to be spent only for the war purposes o f the Czecho-Slovak National Council, and I will be obliged if so far as commitments are made by Czecho-Slovak National Council under the direction of yourself, Mr. Baruch, and Mr. Hurley, and so far as Czecho-Slovak National Council checks are coun tersigned by the persons from time to time designated by yourself, Mr. Baruch, and Mr. Hurley, you will see that no commitments to be paid for out of this advance and no payments from said advance are made for other than war pur poses. The Secretary of the Treasury has no authority to make advances for reconstruction purposes, and no part of the sum advanced can be used for such purpose. For your information I inclose herewith a copy of my letter o f even date to Prof. Masaryk. I am writing a similar letter to Mr. Baruch and to Mr. Hurley. Very truly, yours. A lbe rt R a t h b o n e . M r. V a n c e C. M c C o r m i c k , War Trade Board. Washington, D. C. FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 237 SECTION 122. Ten Million Dollar Loan Asked, November 15, 1918. Conseil N ational T checoslovaque, Washington, D. G., November 15, 1918. The Secretary of the T reasury, Washington, D. G. M y D ear M r. Secretary : I have tlie honor to request that a credit of $10,000,000 be established in favor of my Government, in order to enable it to have funds at its disposal for general war purposes, this to be in addition to the $7,000,000 loan being requested by me eontemparaneonsly. These funds supplied and made immediately available for the new political entity will be of the greatest value to my Government in meeting its many and complex problems. My Government is at the present time without dollar funds sufficient to meet any part o f such expenditures. I am, my dear Mr. Secretary, Yours, very truly, T. G. M asaryk . SECTION 122-A. Commission to Make Purchases Could Not Obligate the United States to Make Advances or Establish Credits. Memorandum of an arrangement entered into this loth day of November, 1918, by the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President of the United States, and Thomas G. Masaryk acting for and on behalf of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, hereinafter called the Czecho-Slovak Gov ernment. The following arrangement is entered into as one o f the arrangements neces sary or desirable for establishing such credits in the United States for the Czecho-Slovak Government as may from time to time be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President, under the authority of the act of Congress approved April 24, 1917, and subsequent similar acts: 1. Bernard M. Baruch and Robert S. Brookings are hereby designated a commission through whom or with whose approval or consent all purchases in the United States of materials and supplies by or on behalf of the Czecho slovak Government shall be made. 2. The Czecho-Slovak Government, from time to time, shall communicate its requirements for materials and supplies to the commission, through such person or persons as shall be from time to time designated to the commission as em powered by the Czecho-Slovak Government to make purchases on its behalf. 3. It shall be the duty of the commission to use their best efforts to obtain offers of the materials and supplies, as shown to be required, at the best obtainable prices and terms, of delivery and otherwise, and to submit the same to the said person or persons representing the Czecho-Slovak Government, but it shall be no part of the duty of the commission to prepare and sign contracts, or to supervise their execution, or to determine technical details, or to carry out the inspection of materials, all of which matters shall be the concern of the Czecho-Slovak Government. Said Government shall be under no obligation to make purchases of materials and supplies at the prices and upon the terms so submitted by the commission, but it is agreed that it shall not during the continuance of this arrangement make purchases in the United States otherwise than through or with the approval or consent of the com mission. Such approval of the commission may be given from time to time, according to the circumstances of each case, with reference to purchases o f a specified general character, or specifically with reference to stated transactions; and the commission may, according to the circumstances o f each case, deter mine from time to time to give its consent, with reference to purchases of a specified general character or specifically with reference to stated transactions, that the same be made without the intervention of the commission. 238 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 4. The commission shall determine tlieir own organization and rules and methods of procedure, and may employ counsel and clerical assistance, all sub ject to the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury. The commission shall be under no liability except in good faith to use tlieir best efforts as aforesaid. The expenses of the commission and their compensation, which together shall not exceed $150,000 per annum, shall be borne by the Czecho-Slovak Govern ment. It is understood that such expenses and compensations shall be borne by the foreign Governments which have entered or may enter into similar arrangements in proportion to tlieir respective purchases through the com mission. 5. Any or all members of the commission may be removed by the President of the United States, who may from time to time fill vacancies and designate an additional member or members of the commission or reduce the number of members of the commission. 6. This arrangement shall continue until the expiration o f 90 days after written notice shall have been given by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Czecho-Slovak Government, or by the Czecho-Slovak Government to the Sec retary of the Treasury, of his or its desire to terminate the same; but in no case shall this arrangement continue beyond the termination of the war between the United States and its enemies. 7. Any notice hereunder to the Secretary of the Treasury shall be deemed sufficiently given if delivered at the State Department in Washington for trans mission to the Secretary of the Treasury. Any notice hereunder to the Czecho slovak Government shall be deemed sufficiently given if delivered, addressed to said Czecho-Slovak Government or to its agent designated as herein pro vided. 8. Nothing herein contained, expressed or implied, nor anything done or omit ted by the commission, shall impose any obligation or liability upon the United States, ichether to advance moneys, to establish credits, or otherwise. W. G. M cA doo. T. G. M asa r yk . P aris , December 19, 1918. The S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , Washington. Important 6870, December 19, 12 a. m. Your 6546, December 16, 6 p. m. Am in receipt of a note from the ministry of foreign affairs of the Czecho-Slovak Republic transmitting a copy of the powers given to Mr. Charles Pergler, a close translation of which follow s: “ Decisions of the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic o f December 11, 1918. The Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic confers to Mr. Charles Pergler the full powers to negotiate and conclude loans, to sign obligations, and to receive the sums which may be advanced to him. “ T. G. M a saryk , “ President of the Republic. “ D octor E dward B enes, “ Minister of Foreign A ffairs” Dispatch follows. S harp . SECTION 123. Ten Million Dollars Credit to Be Used for Civilian Foodstuffs and Not to Prosecute the War. Office Czecho-S lovak N ational C ouncil , C ommissioner in the U nited States , of Washington, D. C., January 13, 1919. The S ecretary of the T reasury , Washington, D. G. M y D ear Mr. Secretary : Referring to the $10,000,000 credit, the establish ment of which Prof. Masaryk requested in his letter addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury dated November 15, 1918, I desire to ask that an immediate advance be made from the United States Treasury of $4,800,000, and shall be FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 239 obliged if it is deposited in the Central Union Trust Co. of New York to the credit of Czecho-Slovak Republic. The money is to be used entirely to meet purchases and expenditures in the United States. Arrangements are being made with the United States Food Administration to ship to Czechoslovakia, for use in that country, pork and pork products at an estimated cost of $3,878,000; condensed milk at a cost of approximately $280,000. It is estimated that the freight and ocean charges on the above, payable in dollars, will be $560,000. Insurance on the proposed shipments is estimated at a cost of $47,000. I estimate that the expenses connected with maintaining the legation in Washington and administration charges for the period of three months next ensuing will amount to approximately $50,000. The pork, pork products, and milk that I have mentioned are urgently needed for use in my country to prevent starvation or shortage of food which might have serious consequences, and 1 trust that you will feel as a military measure that this advance is essential to my Government, which has no other funds available to defray the cost of same. In addition to the expenditures above mentioned the representatives of my Government in Europe are in negotiation with the American Expeditionary Forces for the purchase of 20,000 military overcoats at a cost of approximately $400,000. These overcoats are needed for the Czecho-Slovak Italian Army, and as soon as the negotiations are concluded I am planning to request a further advance from the Treasury in an amount sufficient to pay for the same. This payment will be made in dollars to the proper representatives o f the War Department. I should be glad if you could indicate to me whether the Treasury is prepared to make an advance for this purpose. I am, my dear Mr. Secretary, Very truly, yours, C hari .es P ergler. J anuary 13, 1919. M y D ear M r. P ergler : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of even date addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury, and take pleas ure in advising you that the Secretary of the Treasury has established in favor of the Czecho-Slovak Republic a credit in the amount of $10,000,000, to be made available to your Government against its duly executed obligations in a corresponding amount, to such extent, at such times and for such purposes as may be hereafter agreed. In accordance with the request contained in your letter above mentioned, the Treasury will to-day advance to your Government, against its duly executed obligation in a corresponding amount, the sum o f $4,800,000, on the understand ing that this amount will be expended wholly within the United States and for the purposes set forth in your letter above referred to. In regard to the negotiations now proceeding for the purchase o f 20,000 over coats from the American Expeditionary Forces for the use of the Czecho slovak Italian Army, the Treasury will be prepared out of the $10,000,000 credit established in favor of your Government and against the duly executed obliga tion of your Government, to advance substantially the sum of $400,000 if and when needed to make payment for the overcoats above mentioned, to be used as indicated in your letter. This assurance is given you for your personal use and for the use only of the representatives of your Government negotiating the arrangement aforesaid, and the Treasury will not feel obligated to make an advance for the purpose indicated unless required within the next 30 days. In case it becomes apparent that the negotiations will not be concluded within that time, I suggest that you bring the matter again to the Treasury’s attention in order to ascertain whether in the light o f the circumstances as they then exist the Treasury will be prepared to advance at a later date to your Government the amount mentioned for the purpose aforesaid. I am, my dear Mr. Pergler, Very truly, yours, A lbert R athbone . C harles P ergler, Esq., Commissioner, Czechoslovak Republic, Washington, I). C. 240 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. SECTION 124. Four Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars Used for Pork and Milk for Civilians; $50,000 to Be Used for Office Expenses in United States. Office of T he Czecho-S lovak R epublic, C ommissioner in the United S tates , Washington, D. C., February 17, 1919. Mr. A lbert R athbone , Assistant Secretary, Treasury Department, Washington, D. J. M y D ear M r. R athbone : I have just been informed by the Food Administra tion that they have received the following cablegram : “ Czecho-Slovak Governments have purchased additional 10,000 tons flour, 3,500 tons pork products, 400 tons milk. Have asked them cable their repre sentative turn over to you additional $4,500,000.” Owing to the fact that I am leaving to-night with Mr. Capek. my other secretary, for Richmond, and will be back in the evening of the 19th, I am having my secretary, Miss Kazamek, submit this to you at once, so as to advise you of the situation. It was my original intention to write you a letter along the lines of the one dated January 13. 1919. But it occurred to me that perhaps you would desire a special wording, and for that reason I am not writing it at the present time, and am leaving the matter for the morning of the 20th, be cause the preparation of the letter of itself is a mere formality. On the morning of the 20th, assuming you will find it possible to grant me an appointment. I shall submit-to you also a statement of the present condition of our account, which I am turning over also to Mr. May. As usual in such cases where there is not sufficient experience to base estimates upon, my esti mates have been fairly low, and I trust the Treasury will find it possible to grant me another $50,000 for administration purposes in this country. With your assent, I would include this request in the present transaction, so as to avoid the necessity of asking specially for $50,000 later on. This cablegram caught me just before leaving for Richmond, and that ac counts for the crudity of the letter, which I trust you will pardon. Will you kindly have your secretary notify my office, the phone being Colum bia 2264, whether I can see j'ou on the morning of the 20th, and of the time? Thanking you in advance, I am, Very truly, yours, C harles P ergler, Commissioner. SECTION 124-A. Loan Requested Not to Prosecute the War But to Prevent Anarchy Locally. O ffice of T he Czecho-Slovak R epublic, C ommissioner in the U nited States , February 20, 1919. D ear Mr. R athbone : Supplementing my letter to you of the 17th instant, I am submitting to you herewith a statement of the account of my Government dealing with the advance made to my Government by the Secretary of the Treasury on January 13, 1919. in the amount of $4,800,000. As you will per ceive. there remains an unexpended balance of this fund of $296,178.40. My Government will be required to make at once payment to the United States Food Administration to cover the cost of 10,000 tons of flour, 3,500 tons of pork products, 400 tons of milk, and insurance, freight, and other charges in connection therewith of $4,500,000. In order to meet the requirements above mentioned I request the United States Treasury on February 21, 1919, to advance to my Government the sum of $4,300,000 out of the unexpended balance of the $10,000,000 credit pre viously established in favor of my Government. Upon receipt of the amount o f such advance I will a( once turn over to the Food Administration Grain Corporation $4,500,000 in order to obtain the delivery of the flour, pork prducts, and milk hereinbefore mentioned. These commodities are urgently needed for use in my country as a military necessity in order to prevent anarchy. FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 241 My Government is without resources to meet its requirements above men tioned other than by means of the advance requested of the United States Treasury. Please accept my assurance that this advance, if made, as well as the ad vances heretofore made my Government by the United States Treasury, will be used only to pay for expenditures in the United States which have been previously approved by the United States Treasury, and if it should transpire that the advances made are more than sufficient in amount to provide for such approved requirements of my Government in the United States my Gov ernment will, upon the request of the Secretary o f the Treasury, make payment to him of any balance remaining of such advances to be applied as a partial payment on account of any of the obligations of my Government held by the United States Government. There remains an unexpended balance of the $5,000,000 advanced to my Government by the United States Treasury on November 15, 1981. This balance is held for the use of the military forces of my Government now in Russia or Siberia. This fund can only be disbursed with the consent o f the representative of Messrs. Baruch, Hoover, and McCormick. Very truly, yours, C harles P ergler. Hon. A lbert R athbone , Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Washington, D. C. F ebruary 20, 1919. D ear M r. P ergler : I take pleasure in acknowledging receipt of your letters of the 17th and 19th instant asking for a further advance to your Government from the unexpended balance of the credit established in its favor by the Sec retary of the Treasury in the amount of $10,000,000 on the 21st instant the sum of $4,800,000. The Treasury will be prepared to advance to your Government said amount on the date above mentioned against its duly executed obligation in a corre sponding amount for the purposes and on the understandings set forth in your letter of February 19 above referred to. I am, my dear Mr. Pergler, Very truly, yours, A lbert R athbone . Mr. C harles P ergler, Commissioner Czech o-Slo va k Repu blic, Washington, D. 0. SECTION 125. United States State Department Admits That Authority to Make Foreign Loans Only Extends to National Defense and Prosecution of the War. PARAPHRASE OF CABLEGRAM NO. 777, FROM AMERICAN MISSION AT PARIS, FRANCE, DATED FEBRUARY 16 AT 5 P. M. The following is from Lansing: A communication dated 11th of February has been received from Benes, Czecho slovak minister of foreign affairs, in which lie requests a loan of $100,000,000 from the Government o f the United States. In his note of three and a half pages, the minister outlines the reasons for this request, as follow s: 1. On account of the exhaustion of the previous loan of $20,000,000 from the United States. 2. It is impossible to obtain without a loan the necessary food and raw mate rial for 13,000,000 people. 3. England and France are unable to make a loan to the Czecho-Slovak State, as both of these countries are themselves demanding money from the Govern ment of the United States. 4. The 15,000,000.000 Austrian crowns in circulation at the present time in Czecho-Sla via have to a large extent lost their value and will be wholly worth S. Doc. 86, 07-2----- 10 242 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. less if an attempt is made by the State to use them as security for foreign purchases. 5. The State will fall into a financial and economic crisis if it does not receive foreign credit, and it loUl not be possible for it to escape from this crisis. Mr. Benes is being advised that his request is being submitted to the State Department for its consideration. It is my desire that the matter in question be taken up through the regularity of the State Department and the Treasury Department. However, the repre sentatives of the Treasury Department in Paris at the present time are being furnished with a copy of this note and it is being sent to you by courier. A dmission . F ebruary 20, 1919. Si b : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt from the Department of State of a paraphrase of a cable (No. 777), dated February 16, from Secretary Lansing regarding a communication received from Mr. Benes, Checho-Slovak minister of foreign affairs, in which a loan o f $100,000,000 is requested from the Government of the United States. Mr. Pergler, the representative here of the Czeclio-Slovak Government, spoke to me this morning in regard to such a loan. I explained to Mr. Pergler that the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized, only to make loans for the purpose of the national security and defense and the prosecution of the tear, and suggested to him the advisability of ascer taining from his Government its immediate requirements in this country which could properly come within that limitation. I also endeavored to impress on Mr. Pergler the necessity of his Government making commercial arrangements to care for such credits as his Government required in the United States to deal with purchases required for the economic reconstruction o f his country. I desire to call attention to item 3 in the cable above mentioned, reading as follow s: “ England and France are unable to make a loan to the Czeclio-Slovak State, as both of these countries are themselves demanding money from the Government of the United States.” You will appreciate that because England and France require credits to enable them to make purchases in the United States does not in any way prevent these countries from making advances to the Czeclio-Slovak Government to cover such purchases as that Government may desire to make within the British Empire or in France. In view of the demands which are being made upon the United States Treas ury and the large amounts which this Government is obliged to raise by taxation and the issue of its bonds or other obligations, the Treasury has taken the position that the foreign Governments should not ask advances from the United States for purposes other than the expenditure thereof within the United States and for products of the United States. Respectfully, yours, A lbert R athbone . T he A cting Secretary of State . SECTION 126. Eighteen Million Dollars Asked for Feeding the Civilian Population—This O. K’d by Hoover. O ffice of T he C zecho-S lovak R epublic, Commissioner in the U nited States , March 3, 1919. My D ear Mr. Secretary : The minister of foreign affairs of the Czecho slovak Republic informs me that he has agreed icith Mr. Herbert Hoover, director general of the American Relief Administration, upon a plan of food supplies and payments therefor, and it is believed that the sum of $18,000,000 will prove sufficient to meet the needs of the population of the Republic for the months of March and April of this year. This information is contained in a cablegram dated February 28, 1919, addressed to me, and prior to that I had another cablegram from the minister of foreign affairs to the effect that without this aid the Czecho-Slovak Republic would be in extreme difficulties, in view of the necessity for immediate payments for food supplies which are needed as a military necessity in order to prevent: anarchy. FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 243 I have, therefore, the honor respectfully to ask that a credit of $18,000,000 be established in favor o f my Government in order to enable it to have funds at its disposal for the purpose of purchasing food supplies necessary to provide for the needs of the Czecho-Slovak Republic as above indicated. My Government is without resources to meet its requirements above mentioned, other than by means of a credit as requested. I am, my dear Mr. Secretary, Your obedient servant, C h a r l e s P e r g l e r , Commissioner. The S e c r e t a r y o r t h e T r e a s u r y , Washington, D. C. M arch 3, 1919. Mr. P e r g l e r : I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 3d instant asking the establishment of a further credit in favor of your Government by the Secretary o f the Treasury in the amount of $18,000,000. I note that this amount is estimated to be sufficient to meet the needs of the population of your country for food for the months of March and April of this year, and that this food is needed as a military measure in order to prevent anarchy. I take pleasure in informing you that the Secretary of the Treasury has established a credit in favor of your Government in the sum of $18,000,000, to be advanced from time to time against the duly executed obligations of your Government in such amounts and to such extent as the Secretary of the Treasury shall determine. I am, my dear Mr. Pergler, Very truly, yours, D ear A lbe r t R a t h b o n e . Mr. C h a r l e s P e r g l e r , Commissioner Czecho-Slovak Republic, Washington, D. C. M a r c h 8, 1919. Mr. P e r g l e r : I have just received a cable from Europe which indicates that in the opinion of Mr. McCormick and Mr. Baruch there is no reason why the unexpended balance remaining in your account with the Central Union Trust Co. should not be used for the purpose of providing for the food supplies which, with the approval of this department, may be purchased o f the Food Administration for use in your country. Messrs. McCormick and Baruch take the same view as to the $2,000,000 of the $7,000,000 credit which has not yet been advanced to your Government. In view of this information, when arrangements are made for the supply o f additional food to your Government, I think it would be advisable that your Government should use the unexpended balance of the account above men tioned before resorting to the new credit recently established in favor of your Government and designed to meet its food requirements for March and April, 1919. I f the course thus suggested is followed there should remain at the end of the 2-months’ period credits in favor of your Government which have not been availed of. This department will then be prepared to discuss with you whether to withdraw these credits or to make them available to cover required food purchases in the United States for a further period. I am, my dear Mr. Pergler, very truly, yours, D ear A lb e r t R a t h b o n e . Mr. C h a r l e s P e r g l e r , Commissioner Czecho-Slovak Republic. m e m o r a n d u m r e g a r d in g c r e d its a n d a d v a n c e s to c z e c h o - s l o v a k s . T reasury D epartm en t, Washington, March 18, 1919. Credits have been established in favor of the Czeeho-Slovaks in the amount o f $35,000,000. Twenty-eight million dollars of such credits were established for the purpose of providing for food to be funri <hed in Czechoslovakia through the 244 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. month of April, 1919. Of that $28,000,000 of credits there has been advanced $9,100,000. The remaining credit established in favor of the Czecho-Slovaks, $7,000,000, was established for the purpose of caring for their military expedi tion in Siberia. Of this amount $5,000,000 has been advanced. Of the amounts advanced the Czecho-Slovaks for their Siberian purposes, the Treasury is informed that there has been actually spent and that commitments have been made up to something under $4,000,000, leaving $1,000,000 unex pended, and as to which no obligations have been made. It is expected there will be no further need for this cash or this additional credit, except the matter of transporting certain invalid soldiers now in Siberia to Trieste has just come up as an emergency matter. The War Trade Board advises that the probabili ties are that this can be done without resorting to the cash heretofore advanced the Czecho-Slovaks for use in Siberia, or the balance of the credit established for Siberian purposes, but that there is a possibility that there may be some cost involved in this transaction. At the outside, in the judgment of the War Trade Board, this cost will not amount to more than $1,000,000, and the War Trade Board will be able, in the course o f a short time, to give more definite figures as to this possible outside cost. So far as the credits established for Siberian uses and the cash advanced for that purpose is not required for this purpose, or for commitments already made in regard to expenses in Siberia, it is designed to use the same for food purposes during the period up to May 1; the credit heretofore established for food purchases being reduced by a corresponding amount; that is. it is not intended by the use of these unexpended funds or credits established for the Siberian purpose to increase the amount of food to be purchased for Czecho slovakia up to May 1. In order to deal with the situation the Treasury pro poses, in case the War Trade Bgard intends to undertake the movement of invalid soldiers to Trieste, to leave a credit on its books of $1,000,000 to be later reduced to such figure as the War Trade Board may show as the outside ex penses in connection with moving the soldiers above mentioned, so that the Czecho-Slovaks will be able to obtain out of such credit any amount that may be necessary to pay for the transportation of the soldiers. The remainder of the Siberian credit and substantially all the cash available out of the amounts heretofore advanced to Czechoslovakia for use in Siberia is to be devoted to the purchase of food for use in Bohemia. A. R. Office of T he C zecho-S lovak R epublic* Commissioner in the U nited States , March 19,1919. My Dear Mr. Rathbone : My Government is required to make at once pay ment to the American Relief Administration to cover the cost of 25,000 tons of wheat flour. 15,000 tons of rye flour, 1,000 tons of pork products and 500 tons of milk, all of which have now been delivered or are in process of being delivered to my Government, together with insurance, freight, and other charges in con nection therewith of $9,350,000. In order to meet this payment, I request the United States Treasury to advance to my Government on March 19 the sum of $8,250,000 out of the unexpended balance of credit previously established in favor of my Government. Upon receipt of the amount of such advance I shall at once turn over to the American Relief Administration said sum together with the sum of $1,100,000 out of the balance of the advance made to my Government on November 15 last against the credit of $7,000,000 established on that day, making a total payment of $9,350,000. The commodities above set out are urgently needed for use in my country as a military necessity in order to prevent anarchy. My Government is without resources to meet the requirements above men tioned other than by means of the advance requested of the United States Treasury. Please accept my assurance that this advance, if made, as well as the advances heretofore made my Government by the United States Treasury will be used only to pay for expenditures in the United States previously ap proved by the United States Treasury, and if it should transpire that the advances made are more than sufficient in amount (o provide for such approved requirements of my Government in the United States, my Government will upon the request of the Secretary of the Treasury make payment to him of any FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 245 balance remaining of sncli advances to be applied as a partial payment 011 account of any of the obligations of my Government held by the United States Government. Yours, very truly, C harles P ergler. Hon. A lbebt R athbone , Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Washington, D. C. SECTION 127. Food Supplies Sent Civilian Population. A m e r ic a n R e l ie f A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , New York City, April //, 1919, M r. A lb e r t R a t h b o n e , Treasury Department, Washington, D. C. : The following is a summary of the Czechoslovakia food deliveries as of March 27, 1919, based on a cable received by us, and of which you have a cop y: Delivered f. o. b. outgoing vehicles, Trieste: 26,263 tons wheat Hour____________________ $5, 789, 678. 35 2,935 tons rye_____________________________ 3,726,270.45 1,045 tons milk____________________________ 519, 270. 95 ---------------------- $10, 035,219. 75 In passage to Trieste 011 c. i. f. basis: 22,900 tons wheat flour____________________ 4, 609,344. 87 3,302 tons rye_____________________________ 493,097.66 400 tons pork__ ___________________________ 296, 516. 00 300 tons milk______________________________ 144, 939.00 100 tons cocoa_____________________________ 46, 021. 00 ---------------------5, 589,918. 53 In passage to Hamburg, thence by Kibe River to Czechoslovakia: 16,726 tons wheat flour___________________ 3,134, 285.14 10,927 tons rye------------------------------------------ 1,390,897.83 3,921 tons pork____________________________ 2, 809,357. 29 2,519 tons wheat flour_____________________ 522,415. 41 63 tons pork----------------------------------------------47, 594. 61 ---------------------7, 904, 550. 28 Assigned to Czechoslovakia from cargoes now loading: 5.000 tons wheat flour_____________________ 936,950. 00 18.000 tons rye____________________________ 2, 467, 540.00 1,500 tons milk-----------------------------------------595, 829. 00 ---------------------4, 000,319.00 D e a r M r. R a t h b o n e 27, 530, 007. 56 We are to-day writing to the Czechoslovakia Government commissioner ask ing that he kindly arrange with you for disbursement to us next Tuesday of $8,650,000, which amount represents the undrawn balance of $27,000,000 al located to Czechoslovakia for the months of February, March; and April. We are also asking him if he can kindly arrange with you for a $9,000,000 allocation for the month of May. This request is based on the cable advice that foodstuffs have already been allocated to Czechoslovakia in excess of the pres ent funds available. After the establishing of this credit, additional quantities will be put in transit for Czechoslovakia. Very truly, yours, A merican R elief A dministration , By R oger S herman , Assistant to Joint Director. 246 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. SECTION 128. Money Used for Civilian Feeding— $25,000 to $35,000 to be Used for Ex penses of New York City Consulate. Office of T he Czecho-S lovak R epublic, C ommissioner in the U nited States , April 8, 1919. Si r : I have been advised by the American Relief Administration that there has been delivered to the Czecho-Slovak Republic or in transit assigned to my Government foodstuffs for which there is payable by my Government the sum of $27,830,007.56. Of this sum I have already paid the American Relief Ad ministration out of advances from the United States Treasury the sum of $18,350,000. I request that you advance to my Government on April 8, 1919, the further sum of $8,650,000 to enable me to make payment of a corresponding amount to the American Relief Administration. When this sum has been ad vanced it will complete the advances which will then have been made to my Government by the United States Treasury at the rate of $9,000,000 per month for the months of February, March, and April, 1919, to provide food and food products required as a military measure to prevent the spread o f anarchy. I also desire to ask for the establishment of a further credit in behalf o f my Government. Food and food products are still urgently needed in Czecho slovakia as a military measure to prevent the spread of anarchy, and I trust that you will feel it possible to continue for the month o f May an extension of credit in the same amount, $9,000,000, as was extended for the months of February, March, and April, respectively, to provide for this purpose. From information I have received, I do not think it is possible to accomplish the end desired by any diminution in the amount of food and food products to be furnished my Government during the month of May from that furnished over the previous months. During the month of April my Government will require $195,186.99 to pay the interest then due on the obligations of my Government held by the United States, as set forth in your letter to me o f April 1. On May 15 a further payment o f interest will become due from my Government on its obligations held by the United States, which I estimate in the amount of about $108,000. My Government is in c u rrin g certain expenses through the establish ment of consulates of my Government in New York and Chicago and probably elsewhere in the United States, and I estimate the aggregate of these amounts up to June 1 from $25,000 to $35,000, and it is necessary that I make arrange ments to assure the provision of this sum before these consulates are established. My Government has no dollar fund available at this time to take care of these expenses, or any of them, except a balance in Central Union Trust Co. to cover commitments heretofore made by my Government with the approval of Messrs. Baruch, McCormick, and Hurley, or their representatives. Of the credits heretofore established in favor of nry Government by the Secretary of the Treasury there remain unadvanced $12,650,000. The advance of $8,650,000 I am asking on April 8 should be charged against this credit, leaving a balance of $4,000,000. Of this credit balance $1,000,000 should be reserved to care for any expenses that may be incurred, with the approval of Messrs. Baruch, McCormick, and Hurley or their representatives in transporting in valid Czecho-Slovak troops from Siberia to Trieste, but the balance of $3,000,000 o f such credits is available, with tlie consent of the Secretary o f the Treasury, for use for the purposes mentioned in this letter. I therefore ask for the establishment of further credits in favor of my Government in the aomunt of $6,330,000 in order to make the total credits remaining in favor of my Govern ment after the aforesaid advance o f $8,350,000, $10,330,000. No part o f such credit will be needed by my Government as an advance before May 1, 1919, except (a) to meet any expenses necessary before that date for the transporta tion o f the invalid troops before mentioned and (6) to provide for April in terest and consulate expenses not to exceed $220,000. It may be possible to temporarily provide all or some part of such expenses from the account of my Government with Central Union Trust Co., before mentioned. I am, sir, your obedient servant, C harles P ergler, Commissioner. The Secretary of the T reasury, Washington, D. C. FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 247 A p r i l 8, 1910. The Treasury will be pre pared to advance to your Government on April 8, 1919, against its duly executed obligation in a corresponding amount the sum of $8,650,000, on the understand ing that this sum will be turned over to American Relief Administration to cover purchases of food and food products for your Government in the United States up to May 1, 1919. I take pleasure in informing you that the Secretary of the Treasury has established a further credit in favor of your Government in the sum o f $6,330,000, which credit, together with the unexpended balances of credits pre viously established by the Secretary of the Treasury in favor of your Govern ment, are to be availed of against duly executed obligations of your Government to such extent, for such purposes, and upon such conditions as the Secretary of the Treasury shall from time to time determine. The unexpended credit balance remaining in favor of your Government after the establishment of such additional credit and making the advance to your Government already mentioned will amount to $10,330,000. <5ne million dollars of this remaining credit is to be set aside for use to the extent determined necessary with the prior approval of the Secretary of the Treasury only for the transportation of invalid soldiers from Siberia to Trieste. Nine million dollars of this remaining credit is to be set aside for use after April 30, 1919, to the extent determined necessary, with the prior approval of the Secretary of tlie Treasury, only for the purchase in the United States of food and food products through American Relief Administration and in accordance with its May program. In regard to any advances that may be necessary from the remaining por tion of such credits during the month of April I await further information from you as to the exact amount required, the purposes thereof, the amount of the bank balances of your Government in the United States, the outstanding commitments to be paid therefrom, and the dates when payment for such commitments is expected to be made. Very truly, yours, D ear S ir : I have received your letter of April 7. A lbert R athbone . Mr. C harles P ergler, Commissioner Czecho-Slovak Republic, Washington, D. C. SECTION 129. United States Loans Money to Pay the Interest on Obligations Due It. T he Czecho-S lovak R epublic, C ommissioner in the U nited States, April 14, 1919. The Secretary of the T reasury , Washington, D. C. S ir: On the loans heretofore extended to my Government, for war purposes and to prevent disorder and anarchy, there will be due on April 15,1919, interest in the amount of $195,136.99, upon the payment of which my Government has available at the present time, in my hands, the sum of $5,136.99, my Govern ment being at the present time without any funds to meet the sum o f $190,000. I therefore have the honor to ask that the United States Treasury advance the sum o f $190,000 against the duly executed obligations o f my Government to meet such interest. I am, sir, Your obedient servant, C harles P ergler, Commissioner. 248 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. T h e C z e c h o s l o v a k H eim iil ic , C o m m i s s io n e r in t h e U n it e d S t a t e s , April 21, 1019. The Secretary of the T reasury , Washington, J). C. Si r : I have been advised by the American Relief Administration that in order to complete the foodstuff program for the Czecho-Slovak Republic, as arranged by the American Relief Administration, a credit of $9,000,000 in addition to the money already advanced and credits established will be needed. I therefore respectfully ask for the establishment of a further credit of $9,000,000 in behalf of my Government. Food and food products are still urgently needed in Czechoslovakia, as a 'military measure to prevent the spread of anarchy, and 1 trust that you will feel it possible to continue for the month of June an extension of credit in the same amount, $9,000,000, as was extended for the months of February, March, April, and May, respectively, to provide for this purpose. It is my understanding that the establishment of this credit is necessary to provide for the food necessities of the Czecho-Slovak Republic for the month of June, 1919. From information I have received I do not think it is possible to accomplish the end desired by any diminution in the amount of food and food products to be furnished my Government dui ing the month of June from that furnished over the previous months. I am, sir, Your obedient servant, C harles P ergler, Commissioner. A pril 21, 1919. D ear M r . P ergler : I have received your letter of the 21st instant asking for an additional credit in favor of the Czecho-Slovak Government in the amount of $9,000,000 to provide for food purchases in the United States through the American Relief Administration for the month o f June, 1919. This application will receive the careful and sympathetic consideration of tlie Secretary of the Treasury. I am, m y dear M r. Pergler, Very truly, yours, A lbert R athbone . Mr. C harles P ergler, Commissioner Czecho-Slovak Republic, Washington, D. C. M ay 14, 1919. D ear M r. P ergler: Referring to your letter of April 8, 1919, and my reply of the same date, $110,000 of the credit referred to in my letter as having been established in favor of your Government was for the purpose of enabling your Government to pay the interest due May 15, 1919, on the obligations of your Government held by the United States. If such interest payment is made by your Government to-morrow by check drawn against the account of your Government with the Central Union Trust Co., of New York, subject to the countersignature of the representative of the committee composed of Mr. McCormick, Mr. Hurley, and Mr. Baruch, the Treasury is prepared to advance to your Government against its duly executed obligation in a corresponding amount at such time as the above-mentioned account with the Central Union Trust Co. shall require replenishment an amount equal to this interest payment on the understanding that such advance shall be deposited with the Central Union Trust Co. in the above-mentioned account and subject to countersignature in accordance with the arrangements heretofore made. I am, dear Mr. Pergler, Yours, very truly, A lbert R athbone . M r. C harles P ergler, Commissioner Czecho-Slovak Republic, Washington, D. C. FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 249 SECTION 130. Foodstuffs Program. A merican R elief A dministration , New York City, May 15, 1919. Mr. A lbert R athbone , Treasury Department, Washington, D. C. D ear M r. R athbone : The following is a summary of the Czechoslovakia food deliveries to date, based on cable received by us from Mr. Hoover : Deliveries to Apr. 1: 34,870 tons of wheat flour_______________________ $7, 322, 700 5,088 tons pork__________________________________ 3, 358, 080 730 tons milk____________________________________ 341, 640 ----------------- $11,022,420 Deliveries in A pril: 35,523 tons wheat flour__________________________ 7,026, 622 27,662 tons rye___________________________________ 3,483,400 4,003 tons pork__________________________________ 2,641,980 3,921 pounds lard substitute--------------------------------- 2,423,178 987 tons milk____________________________________ 458, 774 100 tons cocoa___________________________________ 42,000 2,337 tons wheat________________________________ 315,495 ----------------- 16,391,449 Total deliveries to May 1__________________________________ Deliveries reported in May : 1,500 tons wheat flour____________________________ 300,000 1,042 tons corn flour_____________________________ 187, 560 6,666 tons wheat_________________________________ 899,910 ----------------- 27,413, 869 Deliveries to May 9_______________________________________ A float: 2,204 tons wheat flour____________________________ 407, 740 998 tons corn flour_______________________________ 164,835 30,610 tons rye--------------------------------------------------- 3,673,200 1,899 tons bacon________________________________ 1,300,815 5,996 tons wheat_________________________________ 809,460 ----------------- 28,801, 339 Delivered and afloat______________________________________ Assigned afloat: 13,923 tons wheat flour___________________________ 2,575, 755 21,414 tons rye___ ^______________________________ 2,569,680 ----------------- 35,157,389 T ota l_____________________________________________________ Received from Treasury-------------------------------------------------------------- 40, 302,824 27,000,000 1,387,470 6, 356, 050 5,145,435 Total_____________________________________________________ 13,302,824 We are to-day sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Pergler, asking that he kindly arrange with you for the deposit of $13,302,824 to our account with the Chase National Bank, New York City. Yours, very truly, T he A merican R elief A dministration , By R oger S herman , Assistant to Joint Manager. M a y 19,-1919. D ear Mr. R ickard : Referring to the inquiry contained in your letter of the 19th instant, regarding an additional credit of $5,000,000 for the Czecho-Slovaks, the demands upon the talance of the appropriation for foreign loans are now very great. The Treasury has not been able to establish credits to meet the food program for any country beyond June. The Treasury has established, or 250 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. will establish when requested, the credits necessary to complete the food pro gram for the Czeclio-Slovaks in accordance with the estimates of the American Relief Administration that the needs of this country would be covered by five instalments of $9,000,000 each, the last being for the month of June. At the present time the Treasury is not in a position to undertake to establish a further credit to cover purchases of food for the Czecho-Slovaks. Very truly, yours, A lbert R athbone . E egar R ickard , Esq., American Relief Administration, New York City. M a y 19, 1919. D ear Mr. S herman : Your letters of the 15th and 17th instant have been been received, setting forth a summary of the deliveries of food to the Czecho slovaks to date, based on a cable received from Mr. Hoover. I note that you are asking Mr. Pergler to deposit $13,372,824 with the Chase National Bank of New York for the American Relief Administration. I am to-day in receipt of a letter from Mr. Rickard, stating that it will not be necessary to establish the fourth and fifth credits for Serbia to cover purchases for food for the months of May and June. Upon the understanding that such credits are not to be established and upon the further understanding that the food for which you are requesting payment from Mr. Pergler has been loaded and as signed to the Czecho-Slovak Republic and completes the program for May and part of the program for June, the Treasury is prepared to entertain a request from Mr. Pergler that it establish a credit of $9,000,000 to cover purchases of food for June, and that it advance his Government $13,350,000, of which $9,000,000 are to be charged against the credit heretofore established for May, and $4,350,000 are to be charged against the credit requested to be established for June. If in accordance with a request which shall be received from Mr. Pergler, the above-mentioned credit is established for June and the abovementioned advance is made, the balance of the June credit against which ad vances for the remainder of the June food program can be made will amount to but $4,650,000. It may be that the Czecho-Slovak Government has available for temporary use certain dollar funds. In that case the above-mentioned advance from the Treasury will be reduced by an amount equal to such pay ment as may be made to the American Relief Administration from such other funds, and the credits of the Czecho-Slovak Government with the Treasury to a corresponding amount will be held available only for the replenishment o f such other moneys so used. In view of the overpurchase for Belgian account of pork products, I presume that if any further purchases of pork products are contemplated by the Ameri can Relief Administration for the account of the Czecho-Slovak Government or for other Governments, the surplus now held for Belgian account will be taken over. The Treasury must urge most strongly that such course be fol lowed if practicable, and I shall be glad to be advised whether further pur chases of pork products are contemplated by the American Relief Association, and if so, whether the Belgian oversupply will be availed of. Yours, very truly, A lbert R athbone . Mr. R oger S herm an , Assistant to Joint Manager, the American Relief Administration, New York City. T he Czecho-S lovak R epublic C ommissioner in the U nited States , Washington, D. C., May 22, 1919. My D ear Mr. Secretary : Referring to my communication to you of April 21, 1919, I respectfully renew my request of that date for the establishment of a further credit o f $9,000,000 in behalf of my Government. As stated in the letter above referred to, this amount is required in order to complete the food stuff program for the Czecho-Slovak Republic as arranged by the American Relief Administration. FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 251 Food and food products are still urgently needed in Czechoslovakia as a military measure to prevent the spread of anarchy, and I take the liberty again to express the hope that you will feel it possible to continue for the month o f June an extension of credit in the same amount, $9,000,000, as was extended for the months of February, March, April, and May, respectively, to provide for this purpose. It is my understanding that the establishment of this credit is necessary to provide for the food necessities of the Czecho slovak Republic for the month of June, 1919. From the information now available I take the liberty to say again that I do not think it is possible to accomplish the end desired by any diminution o f the amount of food and food products to be furnished my Government during the month of June from that furnished over the previous months. I have been advised by the American Relief Administration that there have been delivered to the Czecho-Slovak Republic, or are in transit assigned to my Government, foodstuffs for which there is payable by my Government the sum of $40,302,824. Of this sum I have already paid the American Relief Administration, out o f advances from the United States Treasury, the sum of $27,000,000. I shall draw a check for $1,500,000 upon the Central Union Trust Co. of New York, upon the funds on deposit there, with the understanding that when it is necessary to replenish this deposit the United States Treasury will advance to my Government a corresponding amount from the credits es tablished for food purposes, such advance to be deposited in said account, subject to countersignature as heretofore arranged. I respectfully ask that you advance to my Government on May 22 the further sum of $11,850,000 to be applied by my Government on the balance due to the American Relief Ad ministration for food delivered, or in transit, as above mentioned. I am, sir, your obedient servant, C harles P ergler, Commissioner. The Secretary of the T reasury, Washington, D. C. M a y 22, 1919. D ear M r . P ergler : I take pleasure in advising you that in accordance with your request the Secretary of the Treasury has established a further credit in favor o f your Government in the amount of $9,000,000. This credit is to be made available to your Government against its duly executed obligations in a corresponding amount, to such extent and at such times as the Secretary of the Treasury may determine, in order to meet food purchases of your Govern ment in the United States through the American Relief Administration. I understand from you that this food is urgently needed in your country in order to maintain order and to prevent the spread of anarchy, and that your Govern ment has no dollar resources from which to defray the cost of the same other than advances which may be made to it by the Secretary o f the Treasury. I am, dear Mr. Pergler, Very truly, yours, A lbert R athbone . Mr. C harles P ergler, Commissioner Czecho-Slovak Republic, Washington, D. C. M a y 22, 1919. D ear M r. P ergler : Your letter of the 22d instant has been received in which you request that the United States Treasury advance to your Government the sum of $11,850,000, in order to enable your Government to pay said amount to the American Relief Administration for food and food products delivered to your Government or loaded for such delivery. I have pleasure in advising you that the United States Treasury has this day advanced to your Government said sum of $11,850,000 against the duly executed obligation o f your Government in a corresponding amount, upon the understanding that said sum is to be paid to the American Relief Administration for food and food products heretofore delivered to your Government or loaded for such delivery as above mentioned. Nine million dollars of such advance has been charged against the credit hereto fore established in favor of your Government, to cover the purchase of food through the American Relief Administration during the month of May, and 252 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. $2,850,000 has been charged against the credit of $9,000,000 established to cover such purchases for the month of June, thus reducing the balance o f said credit available for further advances to the slim of $6,150,000. I am, dear Mr. Pergler, Yours, very truly, A lbert R athbone . C harles P ergler, Esq., Commissioner Czecho-Slova k Republic, Washington, D. C. M ay 22, 1919. D ear Mr. P ergler : Supplementing my letter of to-day and in further reply to your letter of to-day, I have pleasure in advising you that if your Government on the 24th instant makes a payment to the American Relief Administration of $1,500,000 by check drawn against the account of your Government with the Central Union Trust Co. of New York, subject to the counter-signature of the representatives of the committee composed of Mr. McCormick, Mr. Hurley, and Mr. Baruch, the Treasury is prepared to advance to your Government against its duly executed obligation in a corresponding amount at such time as the above-mentioned account with the Central Union Trust Co. shall require replenishment an amount equal to such payment, on the understanding that such advance shall be charged against the credit of $9,000,000 to-day established in favor of your Government for the purpose of covering purchases of food through the American Relief Administration for the month of June, and shall be deposited with the Central Union Trust Co. in the above-mentioned amount and subject to countersignature in accordance with the arrangement hereto fore made. I am, dear Mr. Pergler, Yours, very truly, A lbert R athbone. C harles P ergler, Esq., Commissioner Czechoslovak Republic, Washington. D. C. A merican R elief A dministration , Netv York City, May 29, 1919. Mr. A lbert R athbone , Treasury Department, Washington, D. C. D ear M r. R athbone : We are advised by cable that the following allocations of food have been made to Czechoslovakia: 27,587 tons ry e ___________________________________________________ $3, 310,440 715,950 3,870 tons wheat flour------------------------------------------------------------------4,026,390 In our letter of May, 15 we asked for------------------------------------------- 13,372,824 Total___________________________________ I __________________ 17,399,214 May 22 received from United States Treasury---------- $11,850,000 May 28 received from Mr. Pergler------------------------------1, 500,000 ------------------- 13,350,000 Total_______________________________________________________ 4,049,214 We are sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Pergler, asking that he kindly arrange with you for the deposit of $4,049,214 to our account with the Chase National Bank, New York City. Yours, very truly, T he A merican R elief A dministration . By R oger S h erm an , Assistant to Joint Director. FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 253 SECTION 131. Twenty-five Thousand Dollars for Cost of Keeping Up New York City Con sulate Approved by United States Treasury June 4, 1919. J une 4, 1919. D ear M r. P ergler : I have pleasure in advising you that to the extent not exceding $25,000 that your Government meets the expenses up to June 30, 1919, of maintaining its consulate at New York by checks drawn against the account of your Government with the Central Union Trust Co. o f New l rork, subject to the countersignature of the representative of the committee composed of Mr. Mc Cormick, Mr. Hurley, and Mr. Baruch, the Treasury is prepared to advance to your Government, against its duly executed obligation in a corresponding amount, at such a time as the above-mentioned account with the Central Union Trust Co. shall require replenishment, an amount equal to such payments, not exceeding $25,000, on the understanding that such advance shall be charged against the credit referred to in my letter to you of April 8 as having been established by the Secretary of the Treasury in favor of your Government in the amount of $6,330,000, and shall be deposited with the Central Union Trust Co. in the amount above mentioned and subject to the countersignature, in accordance with the arrangement heretofore made. I am, dear Mr. Pergler, Yours, very truly, A lbert R athbone . C harles P ergler, Esq., Commissioner Czecho-Slovak Republic, Washington, D. C. SECTION 132. Credit to Return Troops from Siberia. D epartment of State . Washington, D. C., September 19, 1919. My D ear M r. Secretary : I am inclosing a copy of a telegram I have received from Mr. Polk which bears on the very urgent problem which this department has been trying to solve for several months, namely, the repatriation o f the Czecho-Slovak forces now in Siberia. I regard the matter of such importance that I hope it will be possible for you to grant to the Czecho-Slovak Republic an additional credit up to $12,000,000 to defray the expenses of moving these troops. I am requesting the President to direct the Shipping Board to supply the necessary tonnage, pro vided he approves your granting the credit. If a favorable decision is reached in regard to the matter of the loan and also the necessary tonnage, I shall cable Mr. Polk the result, but shall urge him to insist that the British and French Governments shall each contribute one-fourth of the expenses involved and shall suggest that Mr. Polk point out not only the very great part which has been played by the United States in general relief measures but also the definite interest which both Great Britain and France have in stabilizing conditions in Czechoslovakia. In order that you may be fully informed of all the measures which are being taken I am inclosing herewith a copy of the telegram which I am sending to the President to-day at San Diego, Calif. I am, my dear Mr. Glass, Very sincerely, yours, W illiam P h illips . Hon. C arter G lass , Secretary of the Treasury. PARAPHRASE OF CABLE FROM MR. POLK AT PARTS, DATED SEPTEMBER 17. Mr. Polk refers to previous correspondence in which both he and the depart ment were agreed upon tlie great urgency of getting the Czecho-Slovak forces home from Siberia. Mr. Polk says: “ Benes, Czecho-Slovak foreign minister, has made urgent representations to the American mission on the subject of Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia, 254 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. stating that the situation has now become exceedingly grave from two points of view: First, the condition of these 60,000 troops is pitiful as to morale as they look with despair upon another possible winter in Siberia. Their reten tion might be an actual source of danger rather than protection. Second, the return of these troops has become a burning political question. Benes states that if he can not give any hope to the hundreds of thousands of persons inter ested at home in the return of these troops, an overthrow of the Government is possible if not probable. The powers have every interest in preventing this. “ Benes points out that the important matter is that the movement should begin at once so that he can inform his people that it is proceeding under a definite promise from the powders. “ The American mission is strongly of the opinion that all possible effort should be made on our part to provide transportation and such financial as sistance as may be practicable, which Benes agrees to reimburse in due time. “ Please reply at earliest possible moment, stating definitely what can be done on these two points. On receiving department’s reply the matter will be at once brought up again before the supreme council.” N ote.—The Department of State feels that the United States has a definite moral obligation in regard to the repatriation of these forces and has been in correspondence on this subject, without result, for several months. It is de sired to recommend to the President that he authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to make additional advances to Czechoslovakia, up to $12,000,000, to start the movement to get these men home, and also have the President direct the Shipping Board to provide the necessary tonnage. In the mean while the department will proceed with negotiations with the other powers to ascertain whether some division of the expenses can not be reached. The department considers it vital, however, that the movement get started and that details in dispute be left to subsequent adjustment. September 19, 1919. The P resident, San Diego, Calif.: I have received a cable from Mr. Polk emphasizing the very urgent necessity for immediate measures to repatriate the Czecho-Slovak forces now in Siberia. First, because they look with despair upon the possibility of another winter in Siberia, and in these circumstances their retention might prove a source of danger rather than a protection. Second, because their return has become a burning political question in Czechoslovakia, upon which the overthrow of the Government is possible if not probable. The department has for some months been in correspondence upon this subject, because it has considered that, beginning with our sending of troops to Siberia, we have had a definite moral obligation to the Czecho-Slovak armies of Siberia. Accordingly I have to-day written the Secretary of the Treasury, urging him to advance additional credits to the Czecho-Slovak Government up to $12,000,000, which is the estimated cost of repatriating 50,000 men. I have informed Mr. Glass that if such a credit is granted, I will, if you so desire, urge Mr. Polk to insist that Great Britain and France each bear one-fourth of such a loan in view of the burden assumed by the United Europe, and also because o f the special interest which Great Britain and France have in main taining stable conditions in Czechoslovakia. I f the additional credit, to which I refer is approved, I would also urgently request your authorization to have the Shipping Board set aside the tonnage necessary for this movement, it being understood that economy of tonnage will have every consideration. In conclusion allow me to add that the im portance of repatriating the Czecho-Slovak forces has been brought to the attention of the department from various sources and has been particularly emphasized by Ambassador Morris in his reports from Siberia. I believe considerations of very great weight urge our starting this movement and hope you will see your way clear to authorizing the necessary credits and tonnage. Allow me to add in regard to the question of tonnage that, while there is urgent command on commercial routes for the vessels which have been en gaged in returning our troops from France, I believe the political and moral considerations in this particular instance are paramount. W i txtam P hitj/i ps, .4eting. FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 255 September 19, 1919. Si r : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt o f Mr. Phillips’s letter of the 19th instant, addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a paraphrase of a telegram from Mr. Polk relative to the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak forces now in Siberia, and requesting the Secretary o f the Treasury to establish, in favor o f the Czecho-Slovak Republic, an additional credit up to $12,000,000 to defray the expenses of moving these troops. Mr. Phillips also transmitted a copy of his telegram sent to the President at San Diego on this subject. In accordance with the request of your department, and in order to expedite the matter in so far as possible, in view of the state ment of your department as to its military and political importance, the Secre tary of the Treasury has sent to the President a telegram requesting his ap proval of the establishment of a credit in favor of the Czecho-Slovak Republic up to $12,000,000 for the purpose mentioned in Mr. Phillips’s letter. Before establishing any part of such credit as the President may authorize, the Sec retary of the Treasury would wish to discuss with the Treasuries of Great Britain and France the extent to which they are prepared to make to the Czecho-Slovak Republic advances for this purpose. Respectfully, A lbert R athbone . The Secretary of State . T reasury D epartment T elegram, Washington, D. C., September 25, 1919. The P resident, Pueblo, Colo.: Czecho-Slovak Republic has applied through American mission and Depart ment of State for additional loan from United States of $12,000,000 to re patriate Czecho-Slovak troops now in Siberia. Department of State urges military and political importance of return o f these troops. Your approval is therefore requested of establishment of credit for this purpose in favor of Czecho-Slovak Republic up to $12,000,000. If you approve establishment of credit Treasury will discuss with treasuries of Great Britain and France the proportions to be borne by them of the necessary advances. To extent of such participation by them advances made by our Treasury will be reduced below amount for which your approval is requested. C arter G lass . [Telegram .] L a J unta , Colo., September 25, 1919—10.58 p. m. Hon. Carter Glass , Secretary of the Treasury, Washington, D. C.: Entirely approve loan to Czecho-Slovak Republic under conditions named ia your telegram of to-day. W oodrow W ilson . SECTION 133. Owing to the Length of Time Since the Armistice the Treasury Department Refuses to Establish New Credit to Pay for Automobiles, March, 1920. T he C zecho-S lovak L egation , February Jh 1920. Mr. D ewitt P oole, Per Russian Division, Department of State, Washington, 1). C. M y D ear M r. P oole : In June, 1918, we were compelled to disarm the Vladi vostok Soviet, and to get bold of Vladivostok our army was in sore need of transportation facilities. By order o f our army commander in Vladivostok then* were requisitioned some automobles from the Vladivostok port, which had been shipped there by different American firms in 1916 and which were lying there without use. Particularly there were requisitioned 65 Pathfinder automobiles, 256 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. belonging to the linn of John McGregor Grant, of New York, with 14 cases of spare parts belonging to these cars; also 14 Pathfinder automobiles and 14 cases of spare parts belonging to Mr. Claude M. Nankivel, of New York. These last 14 were in Vladivostok under the care of the firm o f Jourovette. Notwithstanding that this requisition has been carried out not quite regularly and the greater part of these automobiles were not assigned to our army but dis tributed among the Russians, French, and Chinese contingents, our army com mander and our authorities in Siberia—after numerous conferences, in which the American consul general in Vladivostok participated—recognized the respon sibility for this requisition and assumed the obligation of payment. On account of the near impossibility to pay in foreign money this obligaton, the whole transacton has been referred by our Siberian authorities to me for payment out of the sum which was loaned for supplies for our Siberian army. In taking up this matter with the firms referred to, I declared that I am willing to pay for these automobiles if the United States authorities recognize this item as being for supplies for our army in Siberia. But I made objection to the amount asked for by these firms and which—by not being well informed about conditions— our authorities in Vladivostok accepted. Both firms claimed the price of one car $3,649.54, in which amount is included 6 per cent interest from January 10, 1917, 5 per cent commission, and other different expenses. To this sum they claim should be added 6 per cent interest from January 10, 1919, to January 10, 1920. In the conference which I had yesterday with the representative of John McGregor Grant, Mr. Andrew Ivalpaschnikoff, and Mr. Claude M. Nankivel, I succeeded in cutting dowrn the price by 26 per cent, viz, the 10 per cent interest, the 5 per cent commisson, and 8 per cent for depreciation of value of the cars while lying two years in Vladivostok. The original claim of Mr. Nankivel was $71,000.12 and of McGregor Grant $257,126 (to which has not been added the 6 per cent for the last year). The reductions amount o f $14,200.02 from the Nankivel claim and $51,425.33 (20 per cent, since the last 6 per cent was not included in the claims), making the sums which I agreed upon $56,800.10 for the claim of Mr. Nankivel and $205,701.33 for the firm of McGregor Grant. Before issuing the necessary checks in payment I beg you to take the neces sary steps to ascertain that the firm of John McGregor Grant and Mr. Claude M. Nankivel are the legal proprietors of said material, as I have been informed that this matter has been referred to the Department of State by the consul general at Vladivostok, also by these firms themselves, that this formal ques tion can be settled easily. It would be also very useful to have a confirmation from the American consul general at Vladivostok that in the meantime other arrangements for payment have not been made. Concerning the amounts available for this purpose, I should like to call your attention to the fact that in figuring out our needs wTe did not count upon this expense, and part of the funds were used for food supplies, which the Treasury was supposed to reimburse, but did not because there appeared to be sufficient funds without this sum. But it would now seem that in order to meet the obli gation for these automobiles we shall require a reimbursement from the Treas ury for part of this amount. I am inclosing a statement showing funds avail able for military supplies and outstanding obligations, exclusive of these auto mobiles, which you will note shows a margin of $131,000 with which to meet the payment of $262,500 for the automobiles. As I mentioned before, out of these 79 automobiles there are in our posses sion only 34. The rest have been transferred mostly to the Russians, who re ceived 39 cars; the French 4 ; and the Rumanians 2. We have receipts from the Russian authorities for part of the cars, but not for all; for instance, Seminoff, who took over 7 automobiles, has not given receipts for them, although requested to do so. Also, Gen. Chorvat failed to give receipts. The reason I am mentioning these facts is that perhaps it wrould be possible to secure some reference from the Russians here in America as to whether any funds are under control of the United States Government. I should be obliged if you would inform me about this, as to what can be done in this line, because it is most unjust that we have to pay for material transferred by good will to the Rus sians, for which they did not pay on account of chaotic conditions. Very truly, yours. Col. V. S. H crban, Military Attache. L a f a y e t t e H o t e l , Washington. FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 257 M arch 22,1920. Sir : Referring to your letter of the 4th instant and tlie copy therein incloseu of a letter from Col. V. S. Hurban, dated the 4th ultimo, concerning 79 auto mobiles requisitioned by the Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia in June, 1918, and said to have been the property of parties in New York, the Treasury sees no objection to the use for the payment for such automobiles of funds heretofore advanced against the credit of $5,000,000 established in favor of the Czecho slovak National Council on November 15, 1918, provided the Department of State approves and the Czecho-Slovak Government has available any of the such funds against which no other commitments have been made. The pur poses for which the Treasury was authorized to establish credits and make advances were the national security and defense and the prosecution of the war. In view of the time which has elapsed since the cessation of hostilities and the even longer time since the automobiles in question were requisitioned, and in view of the fact that no commitment was incurred by this Government to make advances to pay for these automobiles, the Treasury is not able to establish a new credit or to make new advances for that purpose. Very truly, yours, N orman H. D avis . Hon. F rank L. P olk , Undersecretary of State. D e p a rtm e n t o f S ta te , Washington, D. C., April 3, 1020. T h e S e c r e t a r y of t h e T r e a s u r y . S ir : Referring to your letter of March 22, 1920, in which you state that the Treasury sees no objection to the use for the payment for automobiles, requisi tioned at Vladivostok by the Czecho-Slovak authorities, of funds heretofore advanced against the credit o f $5,000,000 established in favor o f the Czecho slovak National Council on November 15, 1918, provided that the Department of State approves and the Czecho-Slovak Government has available any o f such funds against which no other commitments have been made, I have the honor to call your attention to the statement submitted by Col. Hurban, of the Czecho slovak Government, a copy o f which was inclosed in my letter o f March 4, 1920. It will be seen from this statement that the $5,000,000 advance to which you refer is listed, and that an additional advance o f $1,000,000 is also listed. From this $6,000,000 the disbursements are indicated, leaving a balance, but it can not be determined from the statement whether the balance is a remainder of the $5 000,000 advance or o f the $1,000,000 advance, or both. Under such circumstances I would be pleased to receive a letter from you stating whether the Treasury Department sees any objection to the use for the payment for such automobiles of funds heretofore advanced against any credits established in favor of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, provided the Czecho slovak Government has available any of such funds against which no other commitments have been made. I have the honor to be, sir, for the Secretary of State, Your obedient servant, F ran k L. P olk , Undersecretary. A pril 7, 1920. S ir : Your letter of the 3d instant has been received, in which you again refer to the statement submitted by Col. Hurban, o f the Czecho-Slovak Government, with his letter to you of February 4, 1920, copy of which was inclosed in your letter of March 4, 1920. The Treasury does not, however, understand Col. Hurban’s reference to the advance o f $1,000,000, which he indicates as having been made in addition to the previous advance of $5,000,000 against the credit o f $7,000,000 established in favor o f the Czecho-Slovaks for the purpose of caring for their military expedition in Siberia. All advances made by the Treasury against such credit beyond the first advance of $5,000,000 were, by arrange ment with the Czecho-Slovak Government, made for the purchase in the United States of food, and were used for that purpose. No part o f them, therefore, is now available for the purpose mentioned in your letter. The Treasury sees no S. Doc. 86, 67-2------17 258 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. objection to the use for the payment for the automobiles mentioned in your letter of funds heretofore advanced by the Treasury against any credits estab lished in favor o f the Czecho-Slovak National Council or the Czecho-Slovak Government other than the credit of $12,000,000 established for the purpose of the repatriation of troops from Siberia, provided the Czecho-Slovak Government has available any of such funds against which no other commitments have been made. Respectfully, N o r m a n H. D a v is . The S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e . FRANCE SECTION 134. France. Under the four Liberty loan acts which authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to make loans to foreign Governments then engaged in war ivith enemies of the United States for the 'purpose of prose cuting the ivar, the Treasury Department established credits for France to the extent of $3,047,974,777.24. The Treasury Department made advances on these credits so established of $2,997,477,800, leav ing a balance now existing under established credit in favor of France of $50,496,977.24. On November 15, 1920, France was in debted to the United States for interest on the above loan to the extent of $211,524,703.02. Credit to the extent of $435,000,000 was established for France after the date of the armistice on November 11,1918. According to Andre Tarclieu, former French high commissioner to the United States, this sum of approximately 15,000,000,000 francs which wTe loaned to France actually amounted to about 45,000,000,000 francs according to the actual exchange rate at the time. The War Department sold to France surplus war materials in a total sum of $400,000,000. Summing up these two items it appears that France is still indebted to the United States to the extent of approximately $3,500,000,000. Prior to our entrance into the war a number of private loans were floated in this country for France. It appears from the data attached hereto that France paid off some of the private loans made in this country with the money loaned her for the prosecution of the war. The correspondence attached hereto shows that Secretary McAdoo was aware of the fact that under the Liberty loan act he had no authority to continue granting of credit to France for reconstruc tion purposes after hostilities had ceased. The correspondence shows no proposal by the French Govern ment for cancellation of the loans. There is, however, attached the correspondence relating to the funding of the debt the attitude of France to treat the debt as an international question instead of a question between the United States and France, and the possible attitude of France toward the cancellation of debt owed to it by Italy, Rumania, and other countries, which would lead to the infer ence that if these debts due France were canceled, then the United States should cancel the debts due from France. Attached hereto will be found the correspondence relative to the loan of $16,000,000 to France for the purpose of reloaning it to Aus tria for relief purposes. This roundabout method was pursued in order to evade the law, which provided that the loans should be made to countries then engaged in Avar with enemies of the United 261 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 262 States for the purpose of tlie prosecution of the war. Under such an act, of course, no money could be loaned to Austria, one of our enemies. SECTION 134. [Translated from a series o f articles by Andre Tardieu in the Illustration, The Problem o f Reparations. Oct. 20, 1920.] Financial Solidarity. Besides guaranties levied directly against Germany, others were conceived in reason and conscience, founded on the solidarity of the Allies. Union in war— union in peace. Could not the sacrifices supported in common include the expenses of the settlement— after the great losses of life and treasure— the richer aiding the less rich to carry his part of the burden? A grand and noble idea of which the French people, less because of their enormous obligations than from their passion for justice, had appreciated the harmony. To properly set out the problem, which has often been confusedly presented, it should be stated the financial regulation of the war was accompanied by certain burden and possible risk to the conquerors—a certain burden in that the treaty did not impose on the conquered the reimbursement for the price of victory (700,000,000,000 francs) ; a possible risk in the event of nonpayment by Germany of all or part o f the reparation debt (about 350,000,000,000 francs), which she was bound to acquit. It is to these two kinds of responsibilities, the one ineluctable, the other eventual, that the principle of solidarity (on a basis to be later determined) could have been applied. * * * * * * * Nothing simpler, it seemed, and nothing more just. And without considering the men of partisan motives, whose criticism does not count, impartial minds were astounded that this solution did not prevail. Thus Prof. Charles Gide wrote in an article on the League of Nations: “ The favorable moment has been let pass * * * the solution probably would have been easy if the powers had given it a thought during the war. When they resolved in May, 1918, to have only one army and one commander in chief it would not have been difficult to persuade them that they should have but one bank.” If M. Gide had been in charge of the tremendous difficulties of either, he would certainly not have written the above. Unity o f command? Forty-five months of war and tlie menace of disaster had to occur before that was even theoretically accepted. And once accepted, it was only by laborious steps that it became a fact. If M. Cleinenceau did not mention financial unity in the debates on military unity, it was only because he knew how well it would irrevocably compromise the military issue upon w hich the war depended. He knew that, particularists in matter of command, the Allies were still more so in finance, and that to the end of hostilities the treasuries of each country would remain the impregnable fortress of national individualism. I do not wish to retrace the financial history of the war, but I do wish to explain my proposition by certain facts. Consider France and the LTnited States. I have often reminded my fellow citizens as a striking example of American solidarity o f the 15,000,000,000 francs (45,000,000,000 according to the actual exchange) which the United States Treasury loaned us. l"et how many difficulties had to be overcome by daily practice to gain this generous cooperation? Remember that at no time did America consent to any general commitment, either to France or to any of our allies. An advance of $100,000,000 had been accorded to M. Viviani during the last of April, 1917, without promise of renewal. This, on my arrival in Washington the 15th of May following, was my first care. Then from month to month— often from fortnight to fortnight— my allied colleagues and I obtained the indispensable credits. Each time the negotiations of these credits demanded long explanations. As to France, one part of them were used to pay for Government purchases m America, and there was no objection on that score. But we were obliged to retrocede another part to England for payments in dollars which she effected for us outside America, and to turn a third part over to the order of the Bank FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 263 of France to be changed for private purchases. To the end of the war tlies© provoked the inquietude and protestations of the Treasury Department. In January, 1918, the fact that our moneys on hand revealed an excess over our disbursements let us in for severe reproaches. A little later I encountered the most serious obstacles to repaying, thanks to American dollars, certain of our borrowings of 1915 and 1916, the renewal of which would have been, however, pure folly. On all these occasions the Treasury Department, frightened by the immensity of its task, careful not to exceed the limits of the authorizations provided by Congress, hesitated sometimes for weeks to allow allied operations which conformed to the general interest. We worked from day to day, nearly always getting results, but without being able to embrace this unsystematic and cordial collaboration in the outlines of a general system. There was another question— that of “ cessions.” America had bought war material of us. Moreover, her troops were becoming more and more numerous in France, gave rise to a need for French francs (more than 800,000,000 in May, 1918), which the French treasury supplied against payment furnished in dollars and not without a heavy burden on circulation. Our minister of finance considered that the dollars were our property and that the United States Treasury should continue to advance us credits for our purchases in the United States, as they did to the other allies, without deducting from that amount dollars supplied by the cessions either of materials or of francs. The American Secretary of the Treasury, on the contrary, insisted that, in view of the crushing burdens put on him, the dollars, wherever they came from, should be applied without distinction of origin where they were necessary. He did not admit that France was able on the one hand to build up a reserve and on the other to draw advances from the Treasury. It was his understanding that the said advances were strictly limited to the difference between the amount of our purchases in the United States and the disposed moneys resulting from the cessions for mate rials, francs, etc. This disagreement was the beginning of an epic controversy. As always with the Americans, we arrived at a transaction in fact, but without succeeding to agree in principles. We obtained in July, 1918, a supplementary credit of $200,000,000 and in the following November a setting out of a draft for proposed legislation authorizing advances for our purchases for reconstruction. But on principle— “ compensation ” or “ no compensation ”—the two treasuries remained invariably unable to agree, both standing on their respective doc trines of financial autonomy. They did their most to aid the war, but they abandoned not a whit of their opposed theses. All this to demonstrate how eagerly the United States Treasury, in spite of the splendid cooperation it gave associates in the war, desired to do nothing upon which could be placed the construction of a general engagement either for peace or war. Freed from the mask of words and translated into figures, the idea of financial solidarity among the Allies to liquidate the war debts, had only one meaning—an appeal to the American Treasury in the event of an acceptance by it of an addi tional burden. The facts which I have just stated prove that such appeal would have had no chance to be heard before the armistice. It had still less chance after that date. The war had cost America, who demanded nothing for reparations, nearly $35,000,000,000. Congress found that it was dear at that price and was not dis posed to go further. Since the November elections in 1918 the policy of non intervention in the affairs of Europe answered at the same time the spontaneous tendency of a part of public opinion and also the deliberate will to checkmate the President. Moreover, the laws of arithmetic would have obliged the United States, if she were to fulfill this solidarity, to pay not only for France but for Great Britain as well. The Americans were not so disposed. In brief, if the thesis of financial unity was just or logical and if it is regretted that financial unity did not triumph, I dare state without fear of being contra dicted by anyone who, like myself, was a member of the Government during the war, that only to present such a theory would have been enough to have sustained a reverse whose consequences would have been disastrous. Both by members of the peace conference from the beginning and others out side, this question of solidarity has been studied under diverse forms. 264 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. I can not outer into a detailed examination here of these different projects which, as we shall see. a common fate awaited. One o f the interesting schemes, elaborated by a French banker, M. BouillouxLafont, proposed the creation of a general financial office of the nations. This international financial office could utter bank notes, 3 per cent debentures re deemable in six months, and 4A per cent redeemable bonds. The Allies were to receive for the indemnities due them (which were estimated by the author of this scheme at 300.000,000,000 francs), an equal amount—half in notes and half in bonds. An annuity charged to Germany, Austria, etc., was to cover tlie inter est on the bonds as well as the retirement o f them and the bank notes. To take care of the war expenses (700,000,000,000 francs), tlie belligerents were to re ceive as a set off an income o f 4-h per cent, which interest would be assured by world-wide taxes on transportation, customs, production of raw materials, etc. These taxes were to be quintupled for the Central Powers * * *. Other such theories have been suggested. The first twTo fundamental objections to these theories upon application are that, first, certain countries, including France, by this system or any other simi lar one, wTould thus place a part of their own burdens on the shoulders of other allies and neutrals whose consent would have to be obtained; second, since these notes, debentures, and bonds must bear the collective signatures of all the participants, two alternatives are presented, either signature does not signify that the parties are severally liable, and in that event it is senseless, or it im plies several liabilitity and in that event what minister of finance would put his signature to an issue of bonds of a thousand billion francs? ❖ * * ❖ * * ❖ Other solutions have been prepared which by other paths tend to the same end. For example, we studied a plan to lump the costs, whatever they might be, of the war in one sum, basing responsibility on the population and national wealth of each country. This scheme would have reduced France’s war debt from 30.2 per cent to 11.4. per cent; that of Great Britain. 31.1 per cent to 20.2 per cent; that of Belgium*, from 5.4 per cent to 1.7 per cen t; that of Serbia from 4.6 per cent to 0.8 per cent. On the contrary, it wTould have increased the United States obligations 29 per cent, that of Japan 6 per cent, that of Italy 6 per cent, that of Canada 1 per cent, that of the Union of Souh Africa 1.4 per cent, etc. This percentage increase represented in round numbers 250,000,000,000 francs for the United States, 65.000.000,000 for Japan, 9,000,000,000 for Canada, 12,000,000,000 for the Union of South Africa. The simple statement of these fig ures provoked absolute protest from those countries whose debts were to be so increased. The same fate attended another scheme, which was equally officially sub mitted to the allied delegations and which used as a basis for the share in the war debts the war dead of the several countries, as compared with the total population of the Allies. This assumed that these dead were the most irrep arable injuries that the countries sustained. The adoption of this calculation would have reduced the debt of France by about 30,000,000,000 francs. But many others would have suffered; Belgium, for instance, by reason of the small number of her dead would have scarcely reduced her indebtedness at all. In every case, no matter what was the method applied to the solution of financial unity, those who w’ere called upon to pay for the others or to pledge themselves for others affirmed the doctrine of financial autonomy so jealously safeguarded during the war. To each of these schemes the same invariable principle remained. We shall see this affirmed with emphasis: Toward the beginning of March, 1919, a rumor was spread around Washington that tlie apportionment of the reparations had been effected at Paris, and on the 8th of March I received from M. Edouard de Billy, who had succeeded me as French high commissioner, a cable giving me a part o f a letter received by him the same day from Mr. Rathbone, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. This letter, after recalling that in one of the commission’s meetings M. Kiotz had supported the proposition of apportioning among the Allies the total amount of the war debts, concluded: “ I wish to clearly inform you that the Treasury Department of the United States, which, as you know, has absolute authority, conferred by Congress, in the matter of loans allowed by it to foreign governments, will not consent to any discussion, at the peace conference or elsewhere, of a plan or project having FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 2G5 for object the liberation, the consolidation, or new division of the obligations of foreign governments held by the United States. “ You will appreciate also that the Treasury Department will be unable to continue advances to any allied government that favors any plan which would result in reducing the certainty of payment on maturity of the advances allowed by the United States Treasury. “ I will highly appreciate it if you will communicate the decision of the Treasury Department to your Government. I shall impatiently await your reply.” The allied governments, who all most urgently required the continuance of American advances and none of whom were ready to repay their anterior cred tors, could not go beyond the terms of this letter. In a very precise reply I claimed again the right of the French Government to have and to defend whatever opinion it deemed proper, after its enormous sacrifices. Mr. Rathbone remained in accord with that and the incident was closed. I have cited the above only to show in what degree, after the armistice as well as before, the touchiness of the treasuries remained watchful when they feared that an international agreement would operate to increase the already heavy burdens which their parliaments had authorized. It was under these conditions that the plan of the financial section of the League of Nations, usefully presented by M. Klotz, was sent to the executive council for examination, still in a vague form which the recent conference at Brussels has not succeeded in concretizing. (It should be stated that many of the powers, attributed to the Klotz plan, have been effectively conferred by the treaty to the Commission on Reparations.) The hour for solidarity had not sounded. Any pressure to hasten it would have precipitated conflict where union was desired. Long and prudent preparation was necessary, especially in America, where, as I have demonstrated, success depended. To organize this preparation Presi dent Wilson and his colleagues, struck by our anxieties and our desires, largely consecrated their last days in Paris. SECTION 134. Correspondence Relating to Settlements, Cancellations, Repayment, and Fund ing of Interest of French Debt. [Correspondence covers a period from Oct. 25, 1018, to Jan. 27, 1921.] P a r is , October 25, 1918. S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , Washington, D. C.: Urgent. 5574, October 25, 6 p. m. For McAdoo from Crosby, 625. Tardieu will probably show you letter from me concerning supply of francs for our purposes after the war. This letter resulted from numerous informal conversations begun when peace looked much further off than now, and also before full appreciation of the importance of obtaining assurance of francs after the war. Though the controlling conditions which led to the suggestions may now be somewhat modified, they still, in my opinion, warrant my recommendations. Following explanations will aid in interpreting letter: One. The principal objective is to secure francs after the war. Two. Another objective is to aid in giving needed support to the Bank of France during the war and during the trying period of three after the war in the purchase of foodstuffs and raw materials, particularly, those required for rebuilding the devastated provinces. Four. Theoretically it might be held that all francs after the war should be purchased by cancellation of existing French obligation. Practically I do not believe you can rely on this to a great extent. The Technical on demand maturity of obligations held by us will not secure their payment. No court exists to enforce payment and the French Finance Minister continually holds that even with respect to obligations signed after the twenty-fourth September, 1917, we can not justly claim that they are actually payable on demand and that they could not make such payment save in small part, which in any case they 266 FOREIGN LOANS AND A U T H O R IT Y FOE M A K IN G SAM E. will make from time to time when judged possible. Should the French insist upon this point of view, the absolute necessity of our depositing francs during the period of the withdrawal of troops might result in a gold demand upon us and the arrangement contemplated is simply a substitution of other materials through a friendly understanding between the two Governments instead of leaving the matter as a subject of possible unfriendly controversy at the time when our needs would be so imperious that we should be at a disadvantage. The special credit suggested is in fact the purchase price of francs required by us after the tear. Fifth. In suggesting the proportion sixty forty and seventy-five twenty-five. I was moved by consideration of the fact that some proportion seemed desirable to be provisionally adopted in view of immediate excesses of our expenditures in France over the French expenditures in the United States, and further, because the particular ratio sixty-the had been strongly urged by Klotz and it wTas represented by Tardieu that if were adopted even temporarily as a recom mendation by me it would result in the immediate undertaking of negotiations between the French and British treasuries for after the war credits to France. The letter plainly shows, however, that this ratio is not considered important by me as a part of my recommendation and that it is presumed to be subject to change at any time 011 the motion of either finance minister concerned. While it is true that the French Treasury, according to my views, should have under taken the British negotiations earlier and without waiting for my recommenda tions, yet, inasmuch as considerable feeling had been developed 011 this point, I deem it worth while to expose myself to the embarrassment of having my recom mendations entirely renounced rather than to continue indefinitely a stale mate situation in the negotiations between Paris and London which are now under way. Incidentally it appears that for the next few months it is probable that 40 per cent of the dollar value of francs furnished to the American Government represent the excess over French expenditures in the United States. Six. The undertaking of the French Government to supply us with francs may go far beyond the figure of a billion and a half dollars, as the arrangement proposes that all United States expenditures in France growing out of the war are thus to be covered. While the rapid progress in military events may dimin ish our expenditures in France as compared with first estimates, it remains that in the opinion o f Stettinius a 'billion and a half dollars seems a conservative rather than unconservative estimate of our expenditures here after the tear. Seven. In paragraph II of the letter it is provided that the French Government can not use the materials purchased in the United States for manufacture and resale to third parties, it is clear that to express such a thing in precise terms would be difficult without putting in the hands of the American Government the power of parcelling French export trade. It will [not] serve, however, when properly drafted as a protection for our industries. Eight. No specific mention is made in the letter of furnishing francs for American nationals, but their interests are protected by the provision that funds made available to the French can not be used if the dollar is at less than gold parity. It does not seem that we can legitimately ask for anything more than (? ) of exchange after the war, since if we exclude the theory of obtaining a billion and a half dollars' worth of francs by cancellation of existing obligations the franc might at normal times go to a premium over the dollar. The burden of maintaining the dollar at a gold parity is substantially thrown upon the French if they are to enjoy the funds 111 question. Nine. While I had myself at first urged that some formula relating to the con dition of the Bank of France should determine credits to be established in favor of the French Government, I am convinced that any such formula will include doubtful elements, which, however, lead to vexatious discussion between the Governments, and perhaps eventually to a refusal on the part of the French Gov ernment after the war to accept our views. Ten. Moreover, no consideration of the condition of the Bank of France alone will include the satisfaction of our mutual requirements during the past war. This overestimating of need is the basis of the arrangement suggested. The limiting figure suggested is less by six billion francs than the amount submitted by Tardieu as that which his Government would require for all purposes in the United States during three years. Eleven. If an indemnity should be obtained from Germany applicable to recon struction in France, the proportion of francs paid for by goods would be auto matically diminished and applied to cancellation of French debt. French minis ters assure me they expect to obtain indemnity from Germany for all damages FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 267 suffered by them. Estimate of this damage is being prepared and will be fur nished me in about 10 days. It will be much larger than the total credit men tioned in my letter. Twelve. The value of French exports to the United States during the first three years after the war will probably be less than the sum of the interest charges on the debt of France to the United States, plus the debt to our citizens maturing during the same period. In so far as any deficiency in respect to these two items may be made up out of the limiting amount named in the letter, the amount for raw materials will be correspondingly diminished, and therefore probably not amount to more than $^00,000,000 a year. This is less than onelialf the amount that France has been drawing annually from the United States since our entrance into the war. elemental advises me that prewar exports from France to America may be largely increased, but only on condition that our policy through importation of wines and our import duties on other luxuries must be radically modified. Thirteen. Munitions contracts usually provide that in case of peace the mate rials involved may be changed in character so as to be useful for other purposes than those originally intended. As our loans for war purposes must cease with the conclusion of peace, the values involved must be in some way provided for now unless the Government placing the orders can find means independently to pay for the material or make an absolute cancellation, which would probably work a hardship upon our manufacturers. The arrangement proposed would cover this case, and the amount involved at any one time on orders outstanding would probably amount to more than $100,000,000. Fourteen. Although, through oversight, no mention is made in the letter of the condition that if the lijniting amount mentioned therein shall not be spent during the three years the balance shall be applied to the canceling of French debt, yet this understanding was perfectly distinct by the last conversation with Mr. Tardieu and will not be questioned by him. Fifteen. While it is uncertain that an arrangement of the kind indicated in the letter to Mr. (Letcher t ) between the French and the British, yet it is not improbable that, having now some basis of discussion, an arrangement may be effected by which France will be able to obtain coal and other British supplies of which she wTill stand in great need for a considerable period after the war. I am informed by Tardieu, and it is a matter of public statement now in France, that the principal mining fields in French territory will not be available inside of two years and will not be completely eight or ten years. Sixteen. It seems not improbable that French governmental finances will be more embarrassed at the end of the war than during the war unless they con tinue to borrow from their public at extraordinary high rates. The disappear ance of war motive inspiring the purchase of national obligations will doubtless make it extremely difficult, even if it were otherwise desirable, to obtain neces sary funds by borrowing. On the other hand their expenditures, including interest on public debt, will amount approximately to 18,000,000,000 francs per annum. This is more by nearly 10,000,000,000 francs than the present amount obtained by taxation. No plan has been evolved to meet the situation, and the rapid movement of the war does not give time for the evolution of a satisfactory plan. Thoughtful men here believe that serious troubles are ahead of France in this respect. Our continued demand for francs, while benefiting individuals, will increase difficulties of the Treasury. Their situation will, of course, be eased by the resale of materials purchased as francs advanced to us, but even with this relief their future is extremely grave. It is not improbable that even the most cold-blooded consideration by us as a creditor of France would lead to a helpful attitude on our part, somewhat along the lines of the suggested arrangement, which, however, must constantly be contemplated as directed toward the ac quirement by us of francs for removing our Army from France and the settle ment of unknown claims against us. While our interest in obtaining francs is the dominant one involved in the suggestions made, it is also true that such American sentiment as may favor the aiding of France ( N o t e . —Balance of letter not furnished committee.) O c t o b e r 16, 1918. I shall endeavor in the following pages to make the slight modifications which we discussed in our last interview of the arrange ment shown in some earlier letters from me to you, to indicate one or two points that have occurred to me since then, and in this letter to place in your M y D e a r M r. T a r d i e u : 268 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. hands a substitute for all of the papers which have passed between us on the subject, under discussion. After due consideration it does not seem to me very important as to whether the proportion of the dollar equivalent of francs advanced by your Government to the United States should be divided for the purposes we have had in view" on the basis of 60-40 or on the basis of 75-25. If the Secretary of the Treasury is willing at all 1o make an arrangement along the lines we have discussed, I should personally be quite content to see the matter left in this shape, namely, that, beginning now with 60-40, the arrangement should be permitted to run on that basis until either party desires to make a change, with the understanding that it could then be brought to some new7 ratio, say 75-25, until the limiting amount should be reached. I make this comment in connection with the matter, and ask that the ratio 60-40 appearing below’ should be interpreted, so far as my view- is concerned, in the light of wrhat has just been said. As to limiting the amount of the special credit in view, I have written in $1,500,000,000. This sum has been reached from my consideration of the mat ter by assuming that it is somewhat larger than (40 per cent of) the amount that will be expended by the United States in France for war purposes after the close of hostilities. If the dollar equivalent of advances made by your Govern ment to meet such expenditures on our part were entirely given over to meet your needs in the United States during that period, and, say, some extension of it up to three years, we would have substantially a state of affairs that the subjoined plan would give, with this modification involved in the said plan, namely, that a portion of the credit in question would be established for the purpose of strengthening the Bank of France at an earlier date than the cessation of hostilities. Correspondingly, a portion of the dollars advanced for francs after the cessation of hostilities would go directly to the prepayment of your existing obligations. I need scarcely repeat here wiiat is so wrell understood between us, namely, that in all these transactions it is supposed that some arrangement similar to the one that might eventually be made between the United States Treasury and the French Treasury will be made between the French and British Treasuries. As I have explained to you, a reference to the condition of the Bank of France may be quite necessary from a technical as wTell as a practical point of view, if the Secretary of the Treasury should enter into an arrangement of the kind contemplated by us. This arrangement, in fact, contemplates the es tablishment of credits which could not be immediately useful to you, nor needed by you, save for the purposes of the Bank of France, and I believe it must be considered from that point of view. What I now hold as compared with my earlier position is this— that it will be simpler to leave this whole matter of determining the needs of the Bank of France to your Treasury rather than set up a formula concerning which there might be some difference of view in an endeavor to apply it to future situations. It must be presumed that if, before the end of the war, the French Treasury does not hold that it is important to strengthen the Bank of France by fresh credits, then notice would be given to that effect to the Secretary of the Treasury, and there wrould be a suspension of these special credits from funds advanced before the end of the war. This w’ould not defeat the ultimate obtainment of whatever is accepted to be the limiting amount available for your pur chasers in the United States after the war. Finally, I should add that, with respect to the cardinal points involved in the arrangement outlined between us, it may be that the Secretary of the Treasury will have entirely different views from mine. I have already wrritten him to such effect that the expression of my own views, if found to be different from his, will be in no way whatever an embarrassment in the determination for which he alone is finally responsible. The direct and simple treatment of the case arising benveen the two Gov ernments would normally suppose that your existing obligations would be diminished as far as possible for them to be diminished and would not take account wiiat shall be the debt in franc advances immediately to be made to the United States—that is, whether before the war or after the war. Nor mally, I repeat, that any franc advances which your Government could make to that of the United States, and in excess of its owrn present needs for carrying on the war, would be applied to the reduction of the existing indebtedness of your Government to that of the United States. In agreeing with you that a FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 269 modification of this strict rule might be found wise, I have done so after weighing a great many different considerations affecting the problem. It is not easy to explain in writing. Some days ago, however, I w’rote at some length to the Secretary of the Treasury on this subject, and shall further endeavor to set forth the reasons that have led my own judgment to a conclusion which might seem at first glance to depart from that which is usually sound and prudent in the conduct of money matters. With these statements I add now a general outline of arrangements which have been discussed between us. (1) Mutual undertaking on the part o f the French and American Treasuries to supply each to the other the franc and dollar funds, respectively, required for their war expenditures, including expenditures incident to the removal of the American troops and their equipment from France after the war and other expenditures of the American Government in France due to and growing out of the war. (2) Until peace shall have been established between either the United States 01* France and the German Empire there shall be an agreement that 60 per cent, or as much thereof as may be necessary, of the dollar equivalent o f francs advanced to the United States according to the provisions of paragraph (1) shall be applicable to your current expenditures in the United States. (3) During the period defined in paragraph (2) it should be agreed that 40 per cent of the said dollar equivalent, plus any portion of the said 60 per cent not needed for your current expenditures in the United States, shall be represented by a special credit in the United States Treasury, available to the French treasury during the period of from one to three years after the war, to cover purchases of materials in the United States other, than gold, all substantially in accordance with the conditions relating to the recently established special credit of $200,000,000, and set forth in the letter of the Secretary of the Treasury dated August 16, 1918; the amount of the special credit herein men tioned, including the $200,000,000 special credit already established, shall be limited to $1,500,000,000. (4) When the United States shall have made peace with the German Empire, and during the removal of its troops and their equipment from France, then the total dollar equivalent of franc advances made to the United States during such period shall be available to the French Government for purchases in the United States and for the establishment of special credits as mentioned in paragraph (3) until the sum of such special credits plus the sum o f the ex penditures made from dollar equivalents herein considered shall have equaled $1,500,000,000. Thereafter the dollar equivalent of francs advanced to the United States for the purposes herein mentioned shall be applied to the can cellation of your existing debt. (5) I f before the making of peace between the United States and the German Empire the sum of $1,500,000,000 shall have been reached by the establishment o f special credits as provided for in paragraph (3), then thereafter the dollar equivalent of the francs advanced to the United States by the French treasury shall be applied to the cancellation of the existing debt to the United States. (6) If subsequently agreed upon, instead of canceling the debt, a portion of the amount that might be absolutely canceled may be represented by obligations of one to the other, equal in amount, maturity, rate of interest, etc., so that there would be an automatic cancellation of the maturity of these obligations instead of at ftie moment when the funds would otherwise be available for such purposes. (7) That any such obligations given by one Government to the other shall carry the provision that they are payable in the corresponding obligations of the other party. (8) That any sum remaining due from one Government to the other at the end of the transactions herein referred to shall be represented by long-term obligations. (9) The rate of expenditure o f the special credit of $1,500,000,000 should be fixed at some average monthly rate convenient to both parties, and, further, it should be conditioned that it should not be used if at any time the dollar is at a discount below its gold parity in the Newr York-Paris exchange quotations. (10) It would also be necessary to assume that the dollar equivalent of franc advances shall be established at rates o f exchange agreed upon from time to time between the two treasuries. (11) It is understood that the funds to be advanced to the United States by France as at present and as contemplated by this memorandum are for the pur 270 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. pose of meeting the expenditures of the United States Government in its war against Germany, as indicated in paragraph (1 ), and that the dollar equiva lent of francs thus advanced and made available to the Government o f France in the form of special credits, are to be expended for necessary purchases of foodstuffs for the French population, material for her manufacturers, and ma terial for reconstructing the devastated provinces, and not for purchase and resale to third parties either in raw or manufactured state. (12) In case a war indemnity be collected from Germany for purposes of reconstruction o f French territory, the amount o f such indemnity thus col lected, when made available during the first three years after the end o f the war, shall be deducted from the amount of the special credits herein presumed, and the amount thus deducted shall be applied to the cancellation of your debt. This form of undertaking leaves very much less fa* future determination and interpretation than any other form which we have thus far discussed. It approaches very nearly the arrangement which I think Mr. Klotz had in view from the beginning. In closing, I trust, my dear Tardieu, that you may have a very pleasant and safe voyage to America. Cordially, yours, Cro sby, Special United States Commissioner of Finance in Europe. His Excellency M. A ndre T a r d ie u , French High Commissioner. P. S.—Time has been lacking to give proper turn to loose phrases and to clear up some doubts. Before you have occasion to show this in Washington I shall have cabled explanations. M a r c h 8 , 1910. : I learn that at a meeting of the financial drafting committee appointed by the executive council o f 10 at the peace conference one of the allied Governments having proposed as one of the financial questions affecting peace the reapportionment and consolidation o f wrar debts, this pro posal was strongly supported by the representatives o f your Government, Mr. Klotz taking the position that this question must be discussed while the dele gates of all the powers are in Paris. While I understand that the drafting committee did not report this question as one to be dealt with in the peace treaty, I understand that it did report to the executive council as a question which had been raised, “ interallied agreements as to the consolidation, reapportionment. and reassumption of war debts.” I need not dwell on my surprise at the position taken by Mr. Klotz on behalf of your Government, particularly in view of your letters of December 27, 1918, and February 5, 1919, as to which I testified before the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives of the Congress at the reeent hearing on the Victory Liberty bond bill. I have, however, to state most emphatically that the Treasury, which, as you are awrare, is clothed by the Congress with full authority to deal with foreign loans which it has made, will not assent to any discussion at the peace con ference, or elsewhere, of any plan or arrangement for the release, consolidation, or reapportionment of the obligations of foreign governments held by the United States. You will appreciate also that the Treasury can not contemplate continuance of advances to any allied Government which is lending its support to any plan winch would create uncertainty as to its due repayment o f advances made to it by the United States Treasury. I should be obliged if you would communicate to your Government the views o f the Treasury as expressed above, and I shall be anxious to receive its reply. I am, my dear Mr. de Billy, Very truly, your, M y D e a r M r. de B il l y A lbert R a t h b o n e . M r . E douard de B il l y , French Deputy High Commissioner, Fifteenth and M Streets NW., Washington, D. C. 271 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. F rench H ig h C o m m is s io n in the U n it e d S t a t e s , Washington, D. C., March 18, 1919. Hon. A l b e r t R a t h b o n e , Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Washington, D. C. My D e a r Mr. R a t h b o n e : By your letter of March 8 you informed me that at a meeting of the financial drafting committee in Paris one of the allied Gov ernments having proposed, as one o f the questions affecting peace, the reappor tionment and consolidation of war debts, this proposal was strongly supported by the representatives of the French Government. You expressed your surprise at the position taken by Mr. Klotz, and you requested me to communicate to my Government the views of the Treasury con cerning this question. I have just received an answer from Mr. Klotz by cable, the gist of which I give you below: The proposition referred to was presented to the commission encharged by the executive committee with the study of the financial questions, at a time when the rOle of this commission was reduced to the establishment of a list of the questions to be submitted to the executive committee, which had subsequently to decide which questions should be retained and, in such case, to whom their examination should be confided. The Italian delegation of the said commission having proposed that the question of the division among the Allies of the total of the war expenses be inscribed on this list and a discussion having begun on this point, the French delegate asked that the Italian proposition be not dis carded a priori. The purpose of the commission was purely and simply to make a list of the questions which the representatives of the powers now assembled in Paris might find it expedient to consider either in the general meetings or in meetings limited to the Governments directly interested; the inscription of the Italian proposition on this list would not in any way preclude the decision o f the executive committee. Furthermore, Mr. Klotz points out that with reference to the attitude of the French officials toward the principle involved in this question, the French Government never made any declaration favoring either the Italian proposi tion or any other similar proposition reproduced in the press or in the French Chambers. I am, my dear Mr. Rathbone, Very truly, yours, B il l y . M a y 25, 1920. I see in the papers that the Franco-British con ference at Hythe has provoked in the United States rather unfavorable com ments. Permit me to give you in a friendly and personal way certain infor mation which I hope will permit you to better appreciate the facts. We regret very much that circumstances will not allow us at this time a direct collabora tion with you, so as not to have the great anxiety of avoiding false interpre tation and misunderstanding. You know how the question of Germany’s reparation debt was officially raised at San Remo. They considered the difficulty of reviving international credit if the amount of this debt must remain indefinite until the month of May, 1921. They decided to offer the Germans an opportunity, in a conference at Spa, to make the proposals for fixing it provided for in the protocol attached to the treaty. And finally they realized through simple conversations the opportunity of according to Germany the means of liberating herself by a certain number of annuities. Of all that nothing was formal except the call to Spa. The British Govern ment was anxious not to approach this conference without having defined a little further the intentions of the Allies, so as not to be taken unaware by possible offers o f the parties at the conference, but, on the contrary, to have prepared roughly in advance a common program by which to judge tliese offers. Such was the object of the economic and financial interview at Hythe. It could hardly be a question of determining figures there, but simply bring ing up general ideas. First. In going deeper into the subject, everybody agreed that it was neces sary to determine the manner of settling the German debt, so as to obtain as promptly as possible actual resources for reparations. This will tend to put D e a r M r, N o r m a n D a v i s : 272 FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. Germany as soon as possible in a position to negotiate loans intended to free her from her reparation debt and the political and other restrictions con nected therewith much quicker than would be the case by simple annuities. Whatever the outside difficulties may be for the moment, the success of the first German loan, even of moderate amount, appears as one of the most prac tical things for reestablishing international credit. It is self-evident that such a loan should be intended to provide in a certain measure for the revitualing of Germany and the payment of her other debts, and at the same time to begin the payment of her debt of reparation. Second. In the second place, it has been shown by the conversations at Hythe that in regard to the general improvement of the financial condition of Europe it w’as not sufficient to take into consideration only the debt of reparation of Germany. The international charges left by the war are represented on one side by this debt of reparation and 011 the other side by the war debts of the Allies. The one and the other weigh equally on the future and are a cause of apprehension for financiers. The British and French premiers expressed their opinion that there was occasion to size up the situation as a whole and to seek a parallel method of settlement. They have ordered the experts of both treasuries to continue their studies on those general bases. No figure has been fixed upon. No definite procedure, such as the assign ment of claims against Germany in payment of the war debts, has been adopted. All that the papers have printed in this respect is without foun dation. I am of the impression that as a matter of fact the British and French Governments have taken the trouble to meet together before the conference in Brussels to clear up the financial situation as far as they are able so that the adjustments following the war may operate without hindrance to the very necessary recovery of commerce (trade). For that purpose it will necessarily follow that Germany be given, without losing sight of the princ'ples of the treaty, a settlement which will not discourage her from working and which, similarly, Great Britain will accord to her debtors (among whom we are), just as V e will allow our debtors (Italy, Rumania, Serbia, etc.) delays and conditions of interest—perhaps even annulment of debts such as will enable them to pull through. The only manner in which to arrange all that with desirable promptness and other than by acts of charity which are very unfavor able to the credit of those who accept them is to make a regulation in common where each will put a little bit of his own. As this does not only concern France and Great Britain, they will try to bring to the same points of view the other allied Governments. I understand very wyell the difficulties which at present America experiences in taking part in such agreements. Is it not possible in some manner? At any rate, I will be happy if you will not disapprove efforts which are made in "a spirit of moderation and good faith to put our affairs in shape, and you would infinitely oblige me if you could in an entirely personal manner let me know wiiat you think of it. You know how much I appreciate the support of your friendship and your counsel. Receive, dear Mr. Norman Davis, the expression of my profound sentiments and devotions. C e l ie r . J uly 28, 1020. Monsieur C e l ie r , Care of the Ministry of Finance, Paris, France. M y D e a r M o n s i e u r C e l i e r : Although my delay in replying to your letters of May 25 and June 24 would not so indicate, I was delighted to hear from you. Up to the present my new’ duties have left no time for anything except most urgent matters. You, of course, realize that articles in the newspapers 011 various questions do not as a rule represent the official position or view’s of this Government. It is true there were many articles in the papers relating to the alleged decisions of the tvvo premiers at: Hythe. As a matter of fact, none of the accounts of what took place there was sufficiently clear and definite to necessitate or justify form ing an opinion. I am glad to note, however, that the necessity of a constructive settlement of German reparations is now more fully realized. I may say, howrever, that the vague reports to the effect that it had been decided that the various intergovernmental debts and the settlement thereof FOREIGN LOANS AND AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. 273 would be made to depend directly upon the settlement of collection from German reparation appeared to have a rather adverse reaction here. It is felt here that the obligation on the part of debtor countries to liquidate war debts is a matter entirely independent o f the reparation problem. The moneys were loaned before the question of reparations from Germany could be considered. It is, of course, realized that the ability to pay these war debts in full will in some cases depend upon the economic recovery of the debtor country, and that the amount received by way of reparation will be one of the elements in such recovery. It is hard for the people o f this country, however, to see the justification for any plan of assignment of German reparation obligations in payment of war debts, or the using of reparation payments as a controlling index of payments to be required on war loans, when these loans and reparation obligations have no connection and receipts from reparations have at best only an indirect and partial relation to the ability o f the debtor nations to pay. It would be impossible for me to express a personal opinion on any contemplated settlement of the reparations problem without more specific information than it contained in your letter. If the Secretary of the Treasury were inclined to tie up the reparation question with intergovernmental indebtedness, which I believe is not the case, it would be impossible for him to do so without congres sional approval, which, in my judgment, is out of the question. Under existing circumstances I fear that any agitation along this line will simply be mis leading and make it more difficult eventually for this country to participate and cooperate with other countries in the adjustment of existing economic problems. As to the distinct problem of reparations, I may frankly say that my own personal view is that if the German indemnity is reduced and fixed at an amount which Germany may reasonably be expected to pay, and which the investors of the world will think that Germany can pay, the results to France will be greater and her ability to recuperate and liquidate all o f her obligations increased, much more surely than would be the case if the question is left in an indefinite state in an endeavor to collect from Germany the full amount of her debt. With regard to the liquidation of the United States loan to France, I am no longer at the Treasury and can not speak for the Sercetary of the Treasury. As you are aware, he expressed a willingness to negotiate with the allied Gov ernments for the funding of their demand obligations held by this Government into long-time obligations, and as a part of and in connection with such funding arrangements to provide for the postponement of interest accruing during three years. The Secretary of the Treasury, however, is empowered to make this concession as to postponement of interest only as part of a comprehensive and final funding agreement, which must be consummated if the Allies desire to take advantage of such a concession. In case such an arrangement is arrived at, the allied powers would have about two more years before interest payments would begin, during which time at least their indebtedness to the United States would not be any burden on them. I do not believe that the United States ivill ever be an harassing creditor, but in substance I may say it appears to me that the ultimate American opinion will be that in time the Allies will be able to pay what they owe to the United States and for the sake of their financial credit will desire fully to fulfill their obligations; but that if they do not recuperate as expected and it is later found necessary to make some adjustment, then will be the time to consider such a question solely on its merits upon the basis of the general economic and financial situation. I have more fully explained my personal views in a conversation to Ambas sador Jusserand, who has just gone to France, and have suggested to him that he have a talk with you. I regret that I can not have an opportunity myself to see you and renew our cordial and satisfactory conversations. With very best wishes and regards, I am, as ever, Cordnilly, yours, N o r m a n H. D a v i s . T reasury D epartm en t, Washington, December 15, 1920. Memorandum for files: Pursuant to a request which I made of Mr. Casenave over the telephone about 10 days ago, Mr. de Sieyes came to see me to-day. It is my understanding that Mr. Casenave is in Canada temporarily. S. Doc. SO, 67-2------38 274 FOREIGN LOANS ANI) AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SAME. FRENCH SETTLEMENT. As to this Mr. de Sieyes said that Mr. Dietrich had been working for some time on the figures which are now ready. I do not understand just what figures these are, as substantially all the figures had been agreed upon by the liquidation commission. He stated that prior to the payment of the AngloFrench loan the French Government had been most anxious to complete the set tlement in the hope that there would result funds available for use upon the loan. Mr. de Sieyes and Mr. Casenave, however, came to the conclusion that no available funds would result from the settlement and impressed this upon their Government. Consequently the French Government, although desirous of disposing of the matter, has lost the incentive for haste. Apparently delay has also resulted from the reluctance of Mr. Casenave to take the responsibility for the settlement wiiich he thinks may in any case arouse criticism in France. He believes that in making the settlement he would be assuming re sponsibility not only for what he has done since he has been in charge, but for whatever was done in the past by the French representatives, including Tardieu, both in Paris and here. I told Mr. de Sieyes that it is highly desirable that the settlement be made during the present administration, in view of the practical certainty that after its close there will not be anybody in the Treasury familiar with the matter. I pointed out also that anybody who is not familiar with it would, in all probability, as a matter of self protection, consider him self bound to deal with the French Government at arm’s length and would be unable to accept a result as advantageous to France as might be agreed upon by somebody who had been familiar with the financial arrangements between the two Governments during the past two and one-half years. I stated, further, that the great fall in French exchange since the end of November, 1919, when Mr. Rathbone discussed the settlement with Mr. Bloch, has greatly altered the situation. The fact that exchange for many months has been worse than 14 francs to the dollar, and that there is no prospect of any great appreciation o f francs for some time to come, has entirely changed the plane upon which figures can be discussed in arriving at the rate or rates of exchange to be applied in the settlement, and has imposed a heavy responsibility on the representative of our Treasury who undertakes to apply a rate other than the new current rate. Mr. de Sieves replied that he apprecia