The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.
U N IT E D S T A T E S D E P A R T M E N T O F LA B O R Prances Perkins, Secretary BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS Isador Lubin, Commissioner (on leave) A. F. Hinrichs, Acting Commissioner Labor Unionism In American Agriculture Bulletin No. 836 U N IT E D STATES GOVERNM ENT P R IN T IN G O F F IC E , W A S H I N G T O N : IMS* For sale b y the Superintendent of Documents, U . S . Government Printing1 Office W ashington 25, D . C. - Price cents 70 Letter o f Transmittal U n ited S ta te s D e p a r tm e n t of L abor , B u r ea u of L abor S t a t is t ic s , Washington, June 15, 1945. T h e S ecretary of L abor : I have the honor to transmit herewith a report on the development of unionism in agriculture in the United States. The report, which is the result of exhaustive research, brings together hitherto scattered material much of which was previously not available. It traces the changing character of agriculture in this country and the conditions that have given rise to labor unrest. Altogether, it is a valuable and graphic study showing the origins, development, problems, and accomplishments of unionism among farm workers in various parts of the United States. The report was prepared by Stuart Jamieson, Lecturer in Economics at the University of British Columbia. A ny expressions of opinion are those of the author and are not necessarily shared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. A . F. H in r ic h s , Acting Commissioner. H o n . F rances P e r k in s . Secretary of Labor. Ill Contents Page Chapter I.— Introduction.. . ...................................... .................................................... 1 Chapter II.— The agricultural worker and labor unionism....................... ........... 4 The family farm and the farm hand................................................................... Deviations from the family farm ....................................... ................................. Labor unrest and large-scale farming................................................................. Changing labor relations in the twenties........................................................... 4 5 8 12 Chapter III.-— The farm-labor movement in the thirties....................; ................. 15 Farm labor and the depression....................... ....... ........................................... Course o f unionism and of strikes...................................................................... Spontaneous strikes and local unions................................................................... Agrarian program o f the Communist Party.................................................... Independent unions and federal labor unions o f the A.F. of L ....................... State-wide and national unionism, and inter-union conflict....................... United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and Allied Workers o f America 15 16 18 19 21 24 27 Chapter IV .— National perspective.............................................................................. 30 Concentration o f strikes by area and crop....................................................... Strike issues................................................................................................................ Violence in strikes.......................................................................... Strikebreaking and legal restriction..................................................................... Mediation and arbitration................................................................; ..................... 30 38 39 40 41 Chapter V.— Large-scale agriculture and early farm-labor unionism in Cali fornia ...................................................................................... 43 Industrialized agriculture............... The Chihese and race conflict in agriculture............................... ................... Labor organization among the Japanese............................................................. The A.F. o f L. and the casual white w ork er................................ ................. 43 46 50 55 Chapter V I.— The I.W .W . in California................................................................... 59 “ Educating” the casual w orker.................................................................. Prewar years.............................................................................................................. The “ free speech fights” ................................................................................ The Wheatland riot and other strikes........................................................ The I.W .W . during W orld W ar I ............................. ......................................... Toilers o f the W orld .............................................................................................. Postwar labor unrest............................................................................................. 59 60 60 60 63 65 67 Chapter V II.— California in the twenties................................................................... 70 Concentration in farm operations......................................................................... Grower-employer associations................................................................................ Mexican and Filipino immigration........................ Revival o f unionism among field workers................................. .................... . Revival o f unionism among shed workers......................................................... 70 71 72 75 78 Chapter V III.— Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union................ Revolutionary unionism in California agriculture........................... 80 80 V VI CONTENTS Chapter V III.— Continued. Page Origins of the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union........ 81 Cannery workers* strike, Santa Clara County, July 1931........................ 84 Pea strike at H alf-M oon Bay, May 1932................................................. 85 Orchard pruners’ strike, Solano County, November 1932...................... 85 State-wide unionism and general strikes in 1933............................................. 86 The spring campaign .............................................................................................. 88 Pea strike, Alameda and Santa Clara, April 1933.................................... 88 Cherry pickers* strike, Santa Clara, June 1933.......................................... 89 Berry strike at El Monte, June 1933......................................................... 90 Campaign of late summer and fall, 1933........................................................... 92 Pear strike in Santa Clara County, August 1933...................................... 93 Peach strike, August 1933............................................................................... 93 Sugar-beet strike at Oxnard, August 1933................................................ 96 Grape strike at Fresno and Lodi, September-October 1933.................. 97 The cotton pickers* strike o f San Joaquin Valley, October 1933........ 100 Collateral strikes................................. 105 The C.&A.W.I.U. in 1934...................................................................................... 105 Imperial Valley strikes, November 1933-March 1934.............................. 107 Miscellaneous strikes: February-April 1934......... 110 Apricot pickers* strike, Contra Costa County, June 1934...................... 112 Apricot strike o f Hayward, June 1934......................1............................... 113 Death o f the C.&A.W .I.U...................................................................................... 113 The C.&A.W.I.U. in perspective........................................................................ 114 Chapter IX .— Spontaneous strikes and independent unions................................... Spontaneous strikes.................................................................................................. Relief policy and farm-labor strikes........................................................... Sonoma apple pickers* strike, August 1935................................................. Spontaneous strikes and wage increases in 1936....................................... Unionism among Mexicans.......................................................................'............ Federation o f Agricultural Workers Unions o f Am erica...................... Celery strike, April 1936......................................................................... Citrus strike in Orange County, June-July 1936............................... Beginning o f State-wide unionism................................................................. Unionism among Filipinos............................................................................ 116 116 117 119 120 122 124 124 125 127 129 Chapter X .— The American Federation o f Labor................................. ................. The A.F. of L. and left-wing unionists................................................. .......... Packing-shed workers* unions in the A.F. o f L ............................................... Cooperation with organized Filipinos........................................................ Imperial Valley strike, 1935........................................................................... Miscellaneous strikes, 1935-36......................................................................... Salinas strikes o f 1936.............................................. Field workers* unions in the A.F. o f L ............................................................. State-wide federation o f agricultural workers................................................. 134 134 135 136 137 138 138 140 144 Chapter X I.— Inter-union conflict............................... The American Federation o f Labor, 1937-38................................................... The canning industry................................................................................ The dairy industry............................................................................................ Produce trucking.............................................................................................. Miscellaneous processing industries............................................................... 149 149 149 155 160 162 VII CONTENTS Chapter X I.— Continued. Page The U .C .A .P.A .W .A . drive during 1937-38................................... ................. 164 Processing industries........................................... ............. ...................... 164 Unionization o f field workers......................................... . . .......................... 165 Apricot strike in Y olo County.............................................................. 166 Vegetable workers’ strike in Santa Maria Valley............................ 167 Citrus workers.............................................................. ............................. 168 Farm-labor unionism in 1938................................................................................ 169 Pea pickers’ strike............................................................................................ 170 Cotton pickers* strike in Kern County........................................... ........... 171 Vegetable workers’ strike in Orange C ou n ty ................................. ....... 172 Miscellaneous strikes........................................................................................ 172 General results of organization activity in 1938....................................... 173 Farm-labor unionism in 1939................................................................................ 174 Activities o f the U .C .A .P .A .W .A ................................................................. 174 Spontaneous strikes.................................................................................. 174 Orchard strikes in Yuba County........................................................... 175 Cotton strike, San Joaquin.................................................................. 176 Filipino agricultural labor association......................................................... 179 Recent developments in agriculture and allied industries...................... 186 Activities o f U .C .A .P .A .W .A ................................................................. 186 Activities of A.F. o f L .............................................................. ............. 188 Chapter X II.— Unionism in Arizona.......................................................................... Seasonal labor and large-scale farms................................................................... Beginnings o f farm-labor unionism..................................................................... Federal labor unions of cotton pickers....................................................... Strike o f Puerto Ricans................................................................................ Trade Union Unity League in the thirties......................................................... Unionism among shed workers............................................................................. State-wide unionism and the U .C.A.P.A.W .A . . . . ......................................... Chapter X III.— Unionism in the Pacific Northwest............................................... Migratory labor and seasonal agriculture........................................................... Farm-labor strikes in O reg on ................................................................... Pea pickers’ strikes in Idaho........................................................................ Farm-labor conflict in the Yakima Valley o f Washington............................ Race conflict........................................................................................................ The I.W .W . in Yakima.......................................................... ....................... Federal labor unions o f the A.F. o f L ........................................................ Activities o f United Cannery, Agricultural and Packing Workers of America .......................................................................................................... Recession and decline....................................................................................... The hay balers union.....................’ ................................................................ Cannery and agricultural unions on the Coast................................................. Cannery workers and farm laborers union................................................. A.F. o f L. cannery unions.................................................................. . 193 193 195 195 196 196 197 199 203 203 204 207 210 211 212 213 214 216 217 218 218 220 Chapter X IV .— The Sheep Shearers Union o f North Am erica............................ 221 Sheep shearing in the Rocky Mountain region............ ................... ......... . . . . 221 Origin, structure, and tactics o f the sheep shearers’ union.............................. 222 Labor troubles in the thirties................................................................................ 224 Labor trouble in the thirties................................................................................... 224 Strikes and labor trouble in California and neighboring States............ 229 Present status............................................................................................................ 232 VIII CONTENTS Page Chapter X V .— Beet workers in the Mountain States.. . . . . . . i ............ ............... 233 Labor in the sugar-beet industry............................... ................................... .. ... Beginnings o f unionism.......................................................................................... The I.W .W . and Mexican radicals........ ......... ............... , ......................... The A.F. of L. and the beet w o rk e d association. . ............................... The United Front Committee o f Agricultural Workers Unions.......... Unemployed organizations in Colorado............................................... . Beet-labor unionism and the Jones-Costigan A ct o f 1934..................... State-wide unionism and the A.F. o f L ........................................................... United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and Allied Workers of Am erica.. Labor troubles o f 1938.................................................................................... Decline o f U .C .A .P .A .W .A ...................................................................... 233 236 236 237 239 241 243 244 248 249 253 Chapter X V I.—Unionism in the Southwest: Texas and Oklahoma.................... 256 Displacement and agrarian agitation..................................................................... Beginnings o f labor organization in Texas......................................................... The cowboy strike of 1883 ............................................................................. The Mexican Protective Association........................................................... Early farm-tenant and labor unions in Oklahoma........................................... Miscellaneous organizations, 1909-14........................................................... The working class union and the “ green corn rebell ion” ...................... Oklahoma in the thirties: Displacement, migration, and unionism.............. The Veterans o f Industry o f America....................................................... Workingmen^ Union of the W orld ............................................................. The Southern Tenant Farmers Union......................................................... Texas in the thirties: Labor unionism in agriculture and allied industries Catholic W orkers Union o f Crystal City................................................... Unionism in the Lower Rio Grande V alley............................................. Onion workers* union, Laredo............................................................... Federal labor unions in the A.F. o f L ................................................. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A .......................................... ....................................... Shed workers in the Lower Rio Grande V alley........... ............... ... Pecan shelters* unions in San Antonio....................................................... 256 257 257 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 268 270 271 272 273 275 277 277 278 Chapter X V II.—Unionism among southern plantation sharecroppers, tenants, and laborers.................................................................................................................. 282 Tenancy and displacement.......... ........................................................................... The plantation and large-scale fa r m in g .................................................. Sharecroppers and laborers............................................................................ Unrest, mobility, and conflict....................................... Displacement ........................................................................ Conditions during the depression............................. Mechanization o f agriculture............... Farmers* and sharecroppers* unions in Alabama............................................. Farm tenant and labor unionism in the nineteenth century................... Farmers Union o f Alabama in the 1930’s ................... Origin o f Sharecroppers* Union o f Alabama........................................... The Camp Hill Affair, 1931................................................................... The Reeltown affair, 1932....................................................................... 282 282 282 284 285 285 288 289 290 290 292 294 295 IX CONTENTS Chapter X V II.— Continued. Pa° e Farmers* and Sharecroppers’ Unions in Alabama— Continued Organization in the Black Belt..................................................................... 297 Relations with A.F. o f L. and C .I.0 ........................................................... 300 Southern Tenant Farmers Union of Arkansas................................................. 302 Plantations o f east Arkansas..................................... .................................. 302 The “ Elaine Massacre” .............................................................................. .. 303 Displacement in the thirties............................................................................. 305 Beginnings o f the Southern Tenant Farmers Union........... ............... .. 306 Strikes and v io le n c e ................................................... Expansion during 1936-37...................................................................... 313 Affiliation with U .C .A .P .A .W .A .................................................................... 316 Strike o f 1938.............................................................. The Missouri demonstration..................... ............. ............... ............... 319 S.T .F .U .-U .C .A .P.A .W .A . conflict..................... 320 Recent developments.......................................................................................... 322 United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and Allied Workers of America .................................................................................................. 322 Southern Tenant Farmers Union........................................................... 323 Southern Tenant Farmers Union in retrospect......................................... 325 Chapter X V III.— Farm-labor unionism in Florida........................... , ..................... Unionism in the citrus-fruit in d u str y ..* ........................................................... United Citrus Workers of F lorida........................................................... Federal labor unions o f the A.F. o f L ........................................................ The U .C .A .P .A .W .A .......................................................... Vegetable packing-house workers* organizations.......... ........... 327 328 330 333 336 340 Chapter X IX .— Farm-labor unionism in New Jersey............................................ 343 The Seabrook Farm strikes.......................................................... Agricultural Workers* unions and the A.F. of L ............................................. Cannery unions........................................................................................................ The U .C .A .P .A .W .A .................................................... 344 347 350 351 Chapter X X .— Farm-labor unionism in New England............................. ... . . . . 356 Cranberry strikes in Massachusetts.................................................... 356 Cranberry bogs o f the Cape Cod region.......... .......................................... 356 Strike of 1931............................................................... ........... . ............ 359 Strike o f 1933........ ..................... ............................................................ 359 Strike o f 1 9 3 4 . . . . . . . ........... 361 Tobacco strikes in Connecticut and Massachusetts..................... . 364 Tobacco plantations o f the Connecticut V a lle y ................................. ... 364 Strikes o f 1933......................................... 366 Miscellaneous strikes, 1934-35............................................................... 368 Strikes in 1936 and 1938........................................................................ 369 The U .C.A.P.A.W .A ., 1940..................................................................... 370 General status o f tobacco workers.......... ............................................ 371 Chapter X X I.— Farm-labor unionism in the Great Lakes region........................ 373 Onion workers o f Hardin County, O hio........................................................... The onion marshes.............................................................. Onion workers* strike...................................................................................... Decline o f unionism among onion w o r k e r s .............................................. 374 374 376 379 307 318 X CONTENTS Chapter X X I.— Continued. Sugar-beet workers o f Ohio and Michigan................................... ................. . Great Lakes sugar-beet industry.............................................. ................... Unionism and strikes, 1935-37......................................................................... Labor trouble in 1938........................................... .......................................... Strikes in miscellaneous crops........................................................... Unionism in processing industries......................................................................... Farmer-labor conflict in Wisconsin and M innesota.,...................................... Pa^e 380 380 382 385 387 388 391 Chapter X X II.— The I.W .W . in the Wheat B e l t . ............................................... 396 Seasonal workers in wheat harvesting................................ Beginnings o f organization.................................................................................... The I.W .W . in agriculture..................................................................................... Suppression o f the I.W .W ...................................................................................... Postwar decline ............................................................................ 396 398 398 401 Chapter X X III.— Unionism and strikes in American agriculture........................ 406 A ppendixes A . — B ibliography......................................................................................................... 413 B. — Agricultural, canning and packing unions affiliated to the American Fedation o f Labor, October 1935.................................................................................... 425 C. — Unions affiliated to National Committee of Agricultural, Cannery and Packinghouse Unions..................... 426 D. — Farm-labor strikes in California, 1933...... 427 E. — Agreement between Mexican workers and Japanese grow ers................. 428 F. — Organizing tactics o f the C.&A.W.I.U. ............... .. 429 G. — Strawberry agreement...................................... 430 H . — San Diego County agreements..................................................................... 430 I. — News notes and bulletins o f a threatened strike in Maricopa County, Ariz., M arch-April 1939.......................................................................................................... 432 J. — Race conflict in the Yakima Valley, Washington....................................... 435 K . — The “ Yakima Incident” in 1933.................................................. .................. 437 L. — Antilabor farmers' organizations in Washington.................. ..................... 439 M. — The “ green corn rebellion” in Oklahoma................................ .................. 442 N. — Unionism and strikes among citrus workers in F lo r id a ....................... 443 O. — New Jersey situation....................................................................................... 448 P. — The Seabrook Farm strike of July 1934.............. ...................................... 451 Q. — Employment conditions in tobacco fields...................................................... 454 R. — Michigan beet agreem ent................................................... 456 S. — The Associated Farmers o f Minnesota...................................... . ; ............... 456 Bulletin N o. 8 3 6 o f the United States Bureau o f Labor Statistics Labor Unionism In American Agriculture Chapter I.— Introduction A lengthy study of labor unionism in American agriculture might appear to be “ much ado about nothing/’ The very concept of organization among farm workers seems anachronistic to many persons. College text books on labor problems dismiss the subject in summary fashion, if they mention it at all. Farming customarily receives brief notice as a special type of economic enterprise which remains singularly free from unionism, strikes, class conflict, and other manifestations of the labor troubles that nonagricultural industries have been experiencing for many decades. A s a matter of fact, hired farm workers numbering in the hundreds o f thousands have participated in literally hundreds of strikes throughout the Nation in the past five or six decades. Almost every State in the Union has experienced at least one farm-labor strike at one time or another. By far the majority of such outbreaks occurred during the 1930’s. It is questionable whether these occurrences should be considered a “ labor movement,, in the full sense of the term. Labor unions and strikes in American agriculture for the most part have been small, sporadic, and scattered. They seem insignificant in comparison with the activities o f organized labor in other industries, and the more important urban tradeunions during most of their history have had little to do with farm workers. On the pther hand, at least three concerted attempts have been made at different times to unionize agricultural labor in the United States on a nation-wide scale. On each occasion there was sufficient continuity in philosophy, tactics, and organizing personnel to constitute a “ m ovem ent/, In any case, the fact that farm workers in many areas did organize, and strike, is itself significant, for it indicates a divergence of actual condi tions from the popular conceptions regarding the nature of farm work. This report endeavors both to record the history of farm labor unions and strikes in the United States, and to analyze them functionally in time and place. The matters that always remain uppermost are the combina tions of circumstances that gave rise to organized labor-employer conflicts in agriculture; the types of farming and the changes in farm structure and labor relations that tended to generate such conflict; the issues over which the labor disputes on farms occurred, and the tactics of group pres sure and combat employed by the contending parties; the reactions of nominally neutral or disinterested groups in rural communities to farm labor unions and strikes, and the degree to which their reactions were influenced or governed by economic interest, social status, cultural tradi tion, or politico-legal considerations. 1 2 LABOR U N IO N IS M IN A M E R IC A N AG R IC U L TU R E This report presents a general picture of the history of agricultural unionism in the United States, and a more detailed analysis of its evolution in certain States and regions. The first three chapters give a brief chrono logical sketch of farm-labor unions and strikes as they developed for brief periods of time in scattered areas, showing the attempts to organize agri cultural and allied workers into international unions affiliated with two main organized federations, the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and evaluating some of the m ajor conditioning factors common to the different agricultural areas of the United States that experienced labor agitation and strikes. In the remainder of the report farm-labor unionism is examined in more detail in its diverse regional contexts. Unions and strikes have been classified as far as possible according to the areas in which they occurred, in so far as regions and States can be differentiated by distinct crop indus tries or types of agricultural labor employed. A n attempt has been made in each case to analyze the relationships between farm-labor movements and the economic and social structures of the crop areas in which they occurred. The history and nature of the farm-labor movement in the United States have been difficult to trace because of the exceedingly complex nature of the subject matter, much of which has been inadequately documented. Statistical estimates regarding number and frequency of strikes, dates on which they occurred, numbers of workers participating, issues raised, and crops affected are likely to be far from accurate or conclusive, and must allow for a wide margin of error. Agricultural laborers as an occupa tional group in many areas were extremely migratory and casual in their employment relations, making it almost impossible to distinguish clearly between employed and unemployed. Unskilled agricultural work for the most part was accessible to almost anyone, labor recruiting and hiring were haphazard, and turn-over was high. The number employed for brief periods in any one seasonal crop area generally fluctuated widely from day to day. The personnel at the same time was changing continually, owing to simultaneous hiring and voluntary quitting. F or these reasons clear definitions, let alone accurate statistical esti mates, are difficult to achieve. W hen a succession of walk-outs involved several thousand workers in one crop harvest and encompassed several counties and many separate localities, did it constitute one strike or several ? Again, when a small strike began in one crop and in a short time spread to thousands of workers in several crops within one county or growing area, did this situation represent one strike or several? Definition would be immaterial if accurate estimates could be made of the total numbers involved. This, however, raises even more formidable difficulties. The demand for labor in any crop area during a brief harvest period might have been fairly definite in terms of total man-hours, but it could be extremely elastic in terms of the number of persons employed for various lengths of time. The potential supply also varied considerably. Such marginal labor groups as women, children and aged, unemployed, relief clients, and transients from other States, all supplemented the “ usual” seasonal farm workers employed in an area. In a strike situation, which of these and how many of them should be included among the unem ployed, and which among the strikers ? The problem is complicated further by the extreme mobility of agricul tural laborers. A number of those made temporarily jobless by a strike C H . I.---- INTRODUCTION 3 in one locality or crop could have migrated to nearby areas and found work in the same or other crops. N ot infrequently such persons participated in further strikes before the first one was settled, so that a summation of the number affected at any one time could lead to duplication and overestimates. Another formidable obstacle to thorough and accurate analysis lies in the extreme paucity of reliable sources regarding farm-labor organizations and their activities. The fact that relatively few people are even aware that unions in agriculture ever existed is a good indication that little has been known or written about them. A few spectacularly large and violent strikes in farm areas at one time or another have received wide publicity in metropolitan newspapers and have become the subject of much investi gation. Various tabulations of agricultural strikes and numbers of partici pants have been compiled by such agencies as the Bureau of Labor Statis tics of the U. S. Department of Labor, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics of the U. S. Department of Agriculture, and the California Bureau of Labor Statistics and other State labor departments. Their estimates and tabulations tend to vary widely because in compiling their data they have had to depend sometimes upon unreliable news accounts and differing reports from local authorities, participants, and spectators. Few agricultural-labor strikes have been investigated thoroughly at first hand by official fact-finding bodies or by careful observers. A n invaluable source of information for the present study has been the published hearings and reports of the Subcommittee of the U. S. Senate Committee on Education and Labor, studying ‘‘Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor” in California’s agriculture. These volumes contain many special studies and reports by government agencies, scholars, experts, and others regarding the agricultural background of farm-labor problems in that State. Official investigators and representative participants from the ranks of employers, employees, and officers of the law, describe in detail several of the more important labor organizations and strikes at hearings held by the subcommittee. T o obtain data regarding the farm-labor movement in States other than California, the writer has had to rely almost completely upon personal interviews with participants and observers— union organizers and mem bers, employers and their representatives, police, sheriffs and deputies, and local government officials and administrators. Data obtained from these sources were compared and contrasted, and supplemented with accounts from local newspapers as well as various labor and employer journals. These findings wrere checked with official reports by public fact-finding agencies where available. Because of the fragmentary nature of the data, the portrayal of farmlabor unions and strikes in following chapters is not so well balanced as would be desired. Some incidents are treated perhaps in greater detail than their relative importance would require, simply because the sources were unusually full. Other important developments have had to be treated much too briefly because adequate information was lacking. Numerous lengthy quotations from and references to newspaper accounts and verbal testimony have been included, not so much for their factual accuracy as for the expression of significant attitudes by various groups involved in labor disputes. In so far as attitudes express a propensity to act, such accounts shed an illuminating light on the causes of strikes and the various patterns of labor-employer conflict that emerged in different areas. Chapter II.— Agricultural Worker and Labor Unionism The Family Farm and the Farm Hand “ Q . * * * D o many agricultural laborers belong to organizations in which they undertake to regulate the hours of labor ?” “ A . N o, sir. O f course, farmers usually work for themselves; they go to the field, take hold and labor; they are on very good terms with their help. V ery many of these laborers are members of the farmers’ organizations.” 1 The above picture of labor relationships on the land is traditional. In popular social theory, farm workers have occupied a special position that differentiated them sharply from other occupational groups. W ith few exceptions, labor problems and “ class conflict” have not been per ceived to be part of the rural scene. This conception derives from the nature of farming itself. Traditionally a “ way of life” as well as an economic undertaking, the farm in theory has been operated upon principles quite different from those governing other industrial and commercial enterprises. The conviction has long been preva lent that the farm owner-operator, together with his family, is or should be the one who performs most of the labor involved. The traditional “ American dream” envisaged a pattern of land settlement in which the “ family farm” would be the basic unit of the Nation’s agriculture. In Congressional debate at the time the Homestead A ct was being passed, a Representative from Indiana declared: Instead o f baronial possessions, let us facilitate the increase o f independent home steads. Let us keep the plow in the hands o f the owner. Every new home that is established, an independent possessor o f which cultivates his own freehold, is estab lishing a new republic within the old, and adding a new and strong pillar to the edifice of the state.8 The use of hired laborers evolved as a common adjunct where family farms became less diversified, with the growing of crops for sale in urban markets as well as for use by the operator’s family. “ By the outbreak of the American Revolution,” according to Dr. Paul S. Taylor, “ the institu tion of the farm wage worker who lived with the family and was paid by the month had appeared, and by 1800 had become general.” The number grew as farms themselves multiplied in the process of western expansion. Farm wage workers did not, however, become a class. In their origins they were mainly sons of other farmers, and their social status differed little from that of unpaid family laborers and their employers. In the popular conception the “ farm worker” became scarcely distinguishable from the “ working farmer.” The latter rarely maintained more than one “ hired man.” Employer-employee relationships were close, personal, and stable. Industrial labor problems arising from exploitation and insecurity, class division, and conflict of group interests were inconceivable. Farmer and farm hand together performed similar jobs the year round, ate at the1 * 2 1Statement of Honorable Joseph H. Brigham, Assistant Secretary of the U. S. Department of Agriculture, before the U. S. Industrial Commission, 1901. 2Quoted from Paul S. Taylor: The Place of Agricultural Labor in Society. Paper at Twelfth Annual Meeting. Western Farm Economics Association, June 15, 1939. This chapter draws liberally upon that paper. Also, testimony by Dr. Taylor published in Hearings of the Subcom mittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, U. S. Senate, 76th Cong., 2d sess. (hereafter referred to as the “ La Follette Committee” ), Part 47 (p. 17280). 4 C H . I I.---- A G R IC U L TU R A L W O RKER A N D LABOR U N IO N IS M 5 same table, and had major interests in common. If the farm hand was “ exploited,” in terms of long hours and, low wages, so was his farmer employer. The security and material welfare of both rested almost equally on the continued and successful functioning of the farm as a “ going con cern,” and, in the final analysis, the farm laborer’s position was made as secure as the farm employer’s by his well-nigh equal social status in the community. This position is described by E. Chapman in his New England Village L ife: The self-respecting [hired man] was a recognized and respected member o f the neighborhood. His was the independence o f a free citizen as really as that o f his employer * * * . I f his wages were small, the scale o f living about him was a simple one * * * . The employer worked beside his man.8 Even more important than family origins and social status in preventing farm workers from becoming a class were their opportunities to rise by their own individual efforts. During most of the nineteenth century there was a constant outlet for hired men who could push west and acquire new farms for themselves. Owner-employers at the same time were con stantly retiring or shifting to other vocations, and their farms were made available for renting to tenants or for selling on time payments. Occupa tional climbing from wage earner to owner was facilitated by general indus trial expansion, which increased the markets for agricultural produce and opened opportunities to those who chose to leave their farms, as well as to those who bought them. In this way were built the steps of a process which came to be known as the “ agricultural ladder.” This was described by the U. S. Industrial Commission in 1911: Farm labor, in a large and true sense, is the work o f the farmer, the tenant, the crop sharer, and the laborer hired for wages. These forms o f effort are inextricably involved, the farm laborer o f one year being the farm owner o f another, and the sons o f farm owners laborers temporarily, tenants later, and ultimately proprietors. In this country land titles are not tied up by primogeniture nor agricultural classes held by caste to semi-serfdom o f social and industrial conditions. It is impossible to chain an American to a life service in any industrial class.8 Economic security and fluidity of class lines for all farm occupational groups— laborer, tenant, and owner— were maintained, finally, by general business expansion. The farmer appeared still less to be a member of a fixed class, as there was always, apparently, the alternative avenue of escape to the city if and when the agricultural ladder became no longer scaleable. A s a matter of historical fact, the majority took this road, as evidenced by the continuous migrations to the cities, which in time transformed the. United States from a predominantly agricultural to a primarily urban, industrial nation. Periodic complaints of farm-labor shortages and rural depopulation were met with the argument that the country, to retain its people, must raise its working and living standards to a level of advantage that could compete with the city. Deviations from the Family Farm The family farm with its hired man became the general pattern of land settlement throughout most of the United States and was widely accepted as the ideal relationship for American agriculture. For several decades, however, there have been numerous indications that in certain areas inde-3 3Paul S. Taylor: The Place of Agricultural Labor in Society. 6 LABOR U N IO N IS M IN AM E R IC A N A G R ICU LTU RE pendent proprietors of small diversified farms were losing ground literally and figuratively, and where family farming was replaced by other forms of agricultural enterprise, the hired labor was no longer of the farm-hand variety. Huge enterprises in some types of agriculture, as in many urban indus tries, proved more profitable than diversified farming in small units. Cer tain land areas were found particularly adaptable to “ industrialized” methods of production. Large-scale enterprises were able to produce some crops more cheaply than could small family farms, by subdividing produc tive processes and simplifying each job, by mechanizing operations, and hiring labor in groups rather than as individuals, in brief, by functioning on a “ mass production” basis. Farms operating on these principles became most numerous in the cultivation of intensive cash crops for sale in distant urban markets. The existence of such agricultural enterprises in America was widely recognized by the 1930’s. Their roots, however, reached back to the 1870’s and earlier in some regions, and the special labor problems they generated were beginning to make their appearance late in the n in e-. teenth century. The Old South was perhaps unique in the United States as one rural economy in which the “ agricultural ladder” had never been accepted as a workable social ideal. Concentration of land ownership in large plantation units depending upon masses of slave labor was an almost complete an tithesis of the family farm, and the conflict between these two standards of land settlement played no small role as an issue in the Civil W ar. Emancipation created one of America’s first serious farm-labor problems. Large numbers of free and propertyless workers had to be reabsorbed into a financially bankrupt plantation economy. A s tenants and share croppers they had a standard of living and an economic security substan tially below that of the farm hand and the industrial laborer. A n increase in numbers of agricultural workers paralleled a steadily growing rate of tenancy in the South. By 1900 this region had more than half of all farm laborers in the United States.4 Variants of the plantation, employing a type of farm labor which dif fered rather sharply from the hired-man ideal, developed in other regions during the latter part of the nineteenth century. W ith rapid expansion of trade and industry, growth in city populations, rise in land values, and improvements in transportation and communication, agriculture in some sections of the North Atlantic States grew away from diversified family farming. Landowners in increasing numbers specialized in intensively cultivated truck vegetables, orchard fruits, berries, tobacco, and other mis cellaneous farm products. Completion of a transcontinental railway system developed a similar type of agriculture concentrated in larger and more heavily capitalized farm units in California and the Northwest. Highly mechanized, large-scale “ bonanza” farms in North Dakota, eastern W ash ington, and Oregon during the late seventies and eighties represented a factory method of organization adapted to the production of wheat. Cattle ranching in the southwestern plains during this period also became a highly centralized system of large-scale production, characterized by huge land holdings controlled by absentee corporations.4 Large farming enterprises in each of these distinct crop regions experi enced labor problems of a type never faced by family farms. A n industrial ^La Wanda Cox: Agricultural Labor in the United States 1865*1900. Ph. D. Thesis in History, University of California, Berkeley, Calif., December 1941 (p. 12). C H . I I .-----A G R IC U L TU R A L W ORKER AND LABOR U N IO N IS M 7 structure of operations when adapted to agriculture tended to bring a correspondingly industrialized pattern of labor relations. The scale of operations alone, beyond the capacities of the farm owner supplemented by his family and hired man, widened the social distance and inequality of status between employer and employee. Farming of this type was a busi ness run for profit rather than a “ way of life,” and labor relationships became commercialized and impersonal. The gulf was widened even more where the land, as in cattle ranching and wheat farming, became absenteeow ed and management-operated. Agricultural laborers in such cases were often hired in gangs or crews to perform standardized or repetitive work under the supervision of foremen or bosses, as in a factory. The farm owner no longer worked at the side of his men. Contrasts rather than similarities in social background between farm operators and farm laborers became obvious where (as in sections of California, Texas, and the North Atlantic), newly arrived immigrant workers were recruited in large numbers. The farm laborer was no longer “ like one of the fam ily/’ nor did he eat at the same table as his em ployer; on the cattle ranch and the “ bonanza” wheat farm he was boarded and lodged as one among many of his kind in dormitories or “ bunk houses.” On large farms ih California and the Northwest he usually had to provide his own food from the wages he earned. The farm laborer’s security and the continuity of his relationship to his employer and to the land on which he worked were disrupted even more in certain crop areas characterized by extreme seasonality of employment and consequent high labor mobility. Specialized large-scale farming, unlike most urban industry, is not a continuous interrelated process of simultane ous input and output. Natural factors govern the periods of planting, cultivating, growing, and harvesting. On the other hand, the work is not staggered over a variety of crops maturing at different months, as it is on the diversified family farm. The large farm specializing in one or a few crops tends to become vitally dependent upon large numbers of seasonal laborers required for short periods of time each year for cultivating and particularly for harvesting. Small farms also in some cases specialized in certain produce, and their labor relations came to resemble those of the large farms. Because limited areas, concentrating in special crops which ripened at different periods, were scattered over wide regions, many sea sonal workers were forced to migrate continually in order to find work at a succession of short planting and harvesting jobs. Labor-employer conflict was always latent and often overt in the limited areas in which these relationships developed. The absentee owner and hired manager of a large agricultural enterprise tended to view the wages of labor primarily as a cost which should be kept to the minimum in order to attain maximum profitability from the land. This was the case particu larly when other farm costs— rent, machinery, interest on invested capital, fertilizer, and other necessities— were fixed by contract or by “ adminis tered prices,” so that wages constituted almost the sole variable cost. The attitudes of seasonal wage laborers to their employers on large farms were no longer like those of the farm hand. Their material welfare could not be considered inseparably linked to that of the owner in a situa tion in which it was impossible for most of them to know him personally, much less to work with him in the fields. W age levels and conditions of employment served as a focus for conflicts of group interests. The hired laborers, and in many cases the tenants, had lost as individuals the protec6541070 —46-2 8 LABOR U N IO N ISM IN A M E R IC A N A G R ICU LTU RE tion of an economic position and social status which a personal relationship with their employers or landlords once afforded. A t the same time the large scale of operations and the heavier capital investments required for successful farming of several crops impressed upon certain groups of hired laborers a consciousness of their inability to rise to a position of owner or operator. A s members of a more or less fixed class in some regions, they sought alternative means of self-protection through banding together in unions to carry on collective bargaining with landowners and employers. Labor Unrest and Large-Scale Farming Labor unionism and strikes among agricultural workers were a rela tively unimportant aspect of the broader labor movment in America until the 1930’s. Collective action among farm workers was limited almost sole ly to areas characterized by large-scale farms specializing in one or a few crops and hiring laborers in groups rather than as individual workers. Sporadic local movements of many different types developed in widely separated regions during the nineteenth century. Propertyless wage earn ers frequently joined small farm owners and tenants in the same organiza tions ; in other instances they were organized separately, often in opposing groups. Agrarian movements in the Southern Cotton Belt during the latter part of the nineteenth century reflected the viewpoints of the small farm operator rather than the laborer. Concentration in land ownership had been general in the Old South since the beginning of colonization. The plantation system with its rigid caste structure based upon clearly defined racial division of labor inhibited collective action for social betterment on the part of labor and tenant groups. Slave revolts in pre-Civil-W ar days had been few, small, sporadic, and short-lived. Agrarian movements in opposition to the status quo developed after the Civil W ar among those elements not under the immediate domination of large planters— i.e., small hill farmers in the mountain regions of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Tennessee.6 These movements began, moreover, in the States (T exas and Oklahoma) which had the highest rates of tenancy but which were at the same time relatively free from the plantation system. The m ajor rural problem in the South and Southwest had long been the steadily growing indebtedness of farmers, as their livelihood became tied more closely to the production of cotton. This trend, punctuated by frequent depressions and conditions of drought, blight, and soil erosion, gave rise to continuous displacement of small owners and tenants. Here the problem of the farm operator became inseparable from that of the propertyless farm laborer, and both groups sometimes organized together for mutual self-protection. Small fanner organizations endeavored to combat indebtedness, dis placement, and concentration partly through a broad program of coopera tive buying and selling. A t the same time, they attempted to mobilize the disadvantaged small-farm operators and laborers and their allies into mass political pressure groups which could better their condition by agitating for favorable legislation. This program was characteristic of such or ganizations as the Agricultural Wheel, Farmers Alliance, Farm Labor 6See Olive Stone: Agrarian Conflict in Alabama. Ph. D. thesis. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1939. C H . II.-----A G R IC U L TU R A L W ORKER AN D LABOR U N IO N ISM 9 Union, and Farmers’ Educational and Cooperative Union. In contrast to most institutions in the South, these bodies usually cooperated with established labor unions and in some instances even made serious efforts to transcend the color line.7 Indigenous “ tenant unions” developed in Oklahoma as an extension of the radical labor movement in prewar years. Many farm operators in newly settled regions of that State were well-nigh destitute homesteaders who lacked the capital necessary to become independent proprietors. The lines between owners, tenants, and laborers were exceedingly fluid, at a precariously low economic level. Agrarian organizations like the Okla homa Renters Union and the W orking Class Union of the W orld included elements from all three groups. In some instances, as in the “ Green Corn Rebellion” in eastern Oklahoma, they employed tactics of direct action which were characteristic of labor unions rather than farmers’ cooper atives.8 The small farm operator’s position in many sections of the South was analogous to that of the town handicraftsman and proprietor during the Industrial R evolution; both waged a losing battle against large-scale production and concentration in ownership and control. One of the first instances in agriculture of organized action in which hired laborers played the dominant role occurred in the livestock industry of the Southwest during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Cattle ranching was one of the first branches of agriculture to organize in largescale units employing a specialized type of labor in crews supervised by hired managers and foremen. Range land became concentrated in the hands of large absentee owners at the expense of the small operators’ and cow boy laborers’ independent status. Class lines and issues were far from clear, however. Cowboys and small herd owners in some instances united for self-protection. Large ranchers, on the other hand, frequently hired cow boys as vigilantes to protect their property against the forays of inde pendent operators. Latent labor unrest and class conflict were manifested by the prevalence of cattle rustling, gun-fighting, employer blacklists, and high labor turn-over. A dramatic climax was reached in the early eighties, when several hundred cowboys in the vicinity of Tascosa, in the Texas Panhandle, went on strike against seven large cattle-ranching corpora tions. The first stable union of agricultural workers was organized among sheep shearers in the large-scale ranching areas of the Pacific Coast and R ocky Mountain regions. The present-day Sheep Shearers Union of North America, with headquarters in Butte, Mont., was preceded by several local and short-lived bodies, the earliest of which goes back as far as the 1890’s.10 Certain singular features of their occupation provided sheep shearers a strategic bargaining position and, therefore, a rate of remuneration far above the ordinary level for agricultural workers. W ool is a perishable product, to shear which, without undue spoilage, requires considerable skill and accuracy gained from long training. The labor supply was for a long 7See Stone, op. cit. Also R. L. Hunt: History of Farm Organizations in the South West, College Station, Texas, 1925. 8See Labor History of Oklahoma, W P A Federal Writers’ Project, Oklahoma City, 1939; also, Chanter X V I: Early Farm Tenant and Labor Unions in Oklahoma (p. 261). 9See Chapter X V I: Beginnings of Labor Organization in Texas (p. 257). 10This information was obtained from interview with C. B. Renk, secretary-treasurer of the Sheep Shearers Union in Butte, and from newspaper clippings and old membership cards which the union has on file. (See Chapter X IV .) 10 LABOR U N IO N ISM IN A M E R IC A N AG RICU LTU RE time limited not only by these requirements but also by transportation difficulties. The major sheep-raising areas, where shearing operations were performed and thus where shearers had to learn their trade, were sparsely populated and fairly inaccessible to large numbers of workers. Sheep shearers, as a small select group of itinerant skilled tradesmen, de veloped a decentralized type of union structure similar to that organized among such labor types as printers and mechanics. The collective-bargain ing tactics of the Sheep Shearers Union rested upon manipulating the labor supply in limited areas during the shearing season, when sheep raisers were dependent upon incoming migratory shearers. Labor unions did not develop among casual and migratory workers in other large-scale farming regions during the late nineteenth century, and strikes among this element were small and few. Sporadic local outbreaks occurred from time to time among “ harvest stiffs” in the W heat Belt of the Middle West. Most of such incidents were spontaneous protests against the inadequate meals provided by some employers.1 The few 1 agricultural strikes in California, during this period were far overshadowed by anti-Oriental riots, which radiated out to rural areas from San Fran cisco and other urban centers during periods o f depression and unem ployment.1 * 12 1 Large-scale industrial agricultural enterprises specializing in one or a few crops increased rapidly in scope and importance during the twentieth century under the stimuli of continued urban expansion, more complex market relationships, and notable technological improvements in trans portation and in methods of production on the land. Intensive truck and fruit farming continued to expand in the North Atlantic and Pacific Coast States, and in the Carolinas, Florida, southern Texas, and the Great Lakes States. Rapid progress in irrigation opened up new tracts for growing intensive crops, as in the Imperial Valley of California, the Salt River Valley of Arizona, and the Yakima Valley in Washington. The growth of sugar-beet production in the Rocky Mountain and Great Lakes States and the westward movement of cotton to Oklahoma and the States along the Mexican border also brought new patterns of land operation. Seasonal labor supplies for these concentrated crop areas came to be composed of many more or less distinct groups, differentiated by the various demands imposed upon them by each type of farming, their degree of mobility, the distances they travelled to work, and the number and duration of their jobs. The migratory agricultural laborers, defined broad ly as those who have no residence and those who leave their residences for certain periods to follow seasonal farm jobs, did not generally con stitute a compact and cohesive group moving from one community to an other. Mercer G. Evans, Director of Personnel and Labor Relations for the Farm Security Administration, described this migratory group th u s: * * * In each area new recruits join the movement, and old ones drop out. Many workers mingle with the migratory stream only at one point, and then return to a home base. The influx o f migrants into an area, also, usually represents an addition to a backlog of resident labor that is continuously available, but which is only used seasonally in agriculture.1 8 11See Chapter X X II (p. 398). 12See Chapter IV. 1,?The Migration of Farm Labor. Paper presented by Mercer G. Evans before the Committee on Problems in Inter-State Migration at the National Conference of Social Work, Buffalo, N. Y., June 21, 1939 (p. 1). Resident labor employed only for short periods seasonally is defined by some as casual in distinction to migratory. C H . I I .-----A G R IC U L TU R A L W O RK ER A N D LABOR U N IO N IS M 11 Intermittent employment, small average annual earnings, and de pressed standards of living branded the casual and migratory workers with a social status far below that of the farm hand. By the turn of the century, seasonal workers were recognized officially as a distinct occu pational group which constituted a special problem in certain farm areas. T o quote a report by the U . S. Industrial Commission in 1901— ♦ * * the annual inundation o f grain fields in harvest time, hop fields in the picking season, fruit picking in districts o f extensive market orchards, and similar harvest seasons requiring large numbers o f hands for a short time, has a demor alizing effect on farm labor, reducing its efficiency in these lines. Such employ ments demand little skill, the requirements o f each are simply and easily satisfied. They constitute a low order o f farm labor, if worthy to be classed with it at all, and are excrescences upon its fair face.14 Obvious weaknesses in their bargaining position prevented such workers from unionizing effectively. Local organizations began to de velop during the prewar decade in California, where the system of largescale intensive agriculture was most thoroughly entrenched and the de mand for seasonal labor was growing rapidly. Racial minorities like the Japanese, who dominated numerous farm occupations, were for a short time successful in establishing an indigenous system of collective bargain ing. The attempt of the American Federation of Labor to unionize casual and migratory white farm workers was only slightly successful. The first concerted program to organize farm workers on a nation wide scale was undertaken by the Industrial W orkers of the W orld. In the beginning this union was most active among unskilled mass-produc tion workers in the industrial Northeast and Middle W est, but in later years it became more widely known for the vigorous campaign it carried out in agriculture. The I.W .W . professed a revolutionary doctrine of continuous direct action designed ultimately to overthrow the capitalist system. It condemned the exclusive and conciliatory policies followed by established craft unions and set out to organize unskilled labor in employ ments hitherto left almost untouched by the A .F . of L. The I.W .W . attained its greatest strength among agricultural workers in those farming regions which had been experiencing intermittent farmlabor conflict for several decades. Its large following did not necessarily indicate dangerous radical proclivities on the part of farm laborers. It was, rather, a reflection of the growing divisions in economic interest and social status between employers and employees on farms which had become commercialized and large in scale. Itinerant laborers employed on mechanized wheat farms of the Middle W est and on large fruit or vege table ranches in California and the Pacific Northwest did not have to be well-versed in abstract revolutionary theory to understand the doctrines of class struggle preached by “ wobbly” agitators. The members of the I.W .W . rural labor organizations for the most part were not farm workers as a distinct and separate category. Rather they were a heterogeneous group of casual and migratory workers re cruited during the harvest season from cities and towns. The majority were single men who were employed at a variety of seasonal jobs at different months of the year in mining, lumbering, railway maintenance, and agriculture.15 The union’s activities among this element on the Pacific Coast during the prewar years were mainly agitational or educational in nature. Pre14Report, U. S. Industrial Commission, 1901, Part I, Vol. X I (p. 79), quoted In Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 47 (p. 17285). 15See Chapter XXH . 12 LABOR U N IO N IS M IN A M E R IC A N AG RICU LTU RE liminary indoctrination of hitherto unorganized workers was considered a prerequisite for effective direct action. Only in a few scattered instances, as in the famous “ Wheatland R iot” of 1913, did the I.W .W . lead strikes in agriculture. A more ambitious organization campaign was carried out among seasonal harvest hands in the great Wheat Belt of the Middle W est during the war years. Here in 1915 was chartered the Agricultural W orkers Organization, “ The 400,” which was later reorganized as Agricultural W orkers Industrial Union No. 110. Members of these organizations were involved in many scattered strikes and violent conflicts with growers and law officers. The I.W .W . temporarily abandoned the earlier policy of street agitation and “ soap boxing” in cities. It functioned instead as a decentralized union with an army of voluntary organizers or “ camp dele gates” who were employed at seasonal farm work to agitate and lead “ job action” strikes. The union was subjected to violent suppression by the Federal Gov ernment after America’ s entrance into the war. Its organization of agri cultural workers in the Middle W est finally disintegrated during the immediate postwar years, when mechanization of grain-harvesting opera tions in the W heat Belt eliminated much of the heavy seasonal demand for migratory workers from other areas, as local farm hands could perform most of the work.16 Changing Labor Relations in the Twenties N o extensive attempt to organize agricultural workers was undertaken for more than a decade after the disappearance of the I.W .W . in agri culture. Some sporadic strikes and short-lived local unions developed in a few States during the immediate postwar years, most of them in indus tries allied to agriculture, such as canning, packing, and shipping of fruits and vegetables. The American Federation of Labor attempted in 1921 to organize skilled packing-shed workers on the Pacific Coast in the newly chartered Fruit and Vegetable W orkers Union, but the campaign was abandoned within 2 years.1 7 The decade of the twenties was a period of quiescence in agriculturallabor unionism. It reflected in large part the lack of militancy in the American labor movement in general. Unions declined in membership and strength in urban industry, and in agriculture they disappeared en tirely for several years. New labor supplies were made available to largescale farm enterprises in special crop areas. Vegetable, fruit, and cotton growers in Texas, Arizona, and California relied largely upon importing Mexicans, whose numbers were not restricted by immigration quotas. Sugar-beet growers and refiners in Colorado, W yom ing, and Montana also utilized this labor supply intensively and transported large numbers by rail from M exico and southern Texas. The Pacific Coast States sup plemented the Mexicans with several thousand Filipinos. Other highly commercialized farming areas, such as southern New Jersey, depended upon recruiting unskilled and substandard labor (including large numbers of women and children) from nearby cities during the harvest season.18 16See Chapter XXH. 17See Chapter VI. 18See Josiah C. Folsom: Truck Farm Labor in New Jersey. (U. S. Department of Agriculture Bulletin No. 1285.) Washington, 1925. C H . I I .---- A G R ICU LTU RAL W ORKER AN D LABOR U N IO N IS M 13 The advent of the automobile served to increase the mobility of marginal and casual workers. Improved transportation facilities during the twenties rendered labor more continuously available to grower-em ployers, even during a period of industrial prosperity and relative labor scarcity. Migrant groups were composed increasingly of families working as units, in contrast to the single male “ stiffs” or “ hobos” characteristic of the prewar period. Rising national income and an expanding export trade during the prosperous twenties increased in the demand for intensively grown crops like cotton, luxury vegetables, fruits, and nuts. A t the same time large and accessible labor supplies from foreign and domestic sources furnished the means for increasing the output of such products. Certain farming regions particularly on the southern Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, experienced a rapid expansion in acreage devoted to commercialized crops grown inten sively on large-scale farms. The scale of farming grew larger, seasonality in farming operations in these areas was on the whole accentuated, the mobility of farm labor was increased, and class divisions among rural occupational groups were widened. W hen two or more workers are employed on a farm, in the opinion of one writer, the labor-employer relationship approaches that characteristic of urban industry rather than of farming.19 In the United States, by the nineteen thirties, 56.1 percent of all farm workers were on farms in this category. The proportion of farm workers employed in groups rather than as individuals was particularly high in certain States: 66.1 percent in New Jersey, 78.6 percent in California, 80.1 percent in Florida, and 82.2 percent in Louisiana.20 A n even greater degree of concentration was indicated for farm workers employed in larger groups: In January (1935) approximately one-third o f hired laborers as reported to the Bureau of the Census were on farms with four or more laborers, and about onesixth were on farms with eight or more laborers. The areas o f largest concen tration of farms with groups o f hired workers, as distinguished from a single hired hand, were the Delta cotton (with 54.5 percent on farms o f four or more and 37.4 percent on farms of eight or more workers) and range areas (with 50.3 percent and 33.9 percent, respectively) and in the group of miscellaneous States Florida and California. In California 59.1 percent o f hired workers were on farms employing four or more, and 42.0 percent were on farms employing eight or mort Corresponding figures for Florida are 60.9 percent and 45.6 percent. In Arizona the concentration was even greater. In that State, 68.0 percent o f hired workers were employed on farms with eight or mofe.2 1 The growing numbers and the changing composition of agricultural wage labor in the industrialized farming areas temporarily reduced its militancy. Family laborers and newly arrived immigrants were more difficult to unionize than were single men of the type organized by the I.VV.W. The farm workers’ bargaining position was further weakened by the strong and comprehensive control which growers exerted over the labor market when they were organized into employer associations. “ Labor exchanges” or “ labor bureaus” were established in California and Arizona to eliminate competition among individual employers, by stand ardizing wage rates throughout entire crop areas22 and recruiting the 19Louise Howard: Labor in Agriculture, London, Oxford University Press, 1935 (p. 32). ^Quoted from Arthur M. Ross: Agricultural Labor and Social Legislation. Ph. D. Thesis in Economics, University of California, Berkeley, Calif., August 1941 (p. 43). 21 Witt Bowden: Three Decades of Farm Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics Serial No. R. 976, pp. 8-9), 1937. 22A precedent for this practice had been established during periods of labor scarcity in the World War years. Under the initiative of State and county agricultural agents, growers in many regions of the country sought to decrease wasteful labor turn-over on farms by standard izing, wage rates for competing units. 14 LABOR U N IO N IS M IN A M E R IC A N AG RICU LTU RE required labor supplies. County boards of agriculture took the initiative in stabilizing wage rates in some sections of New Jersey by setting a scale before the harvest season began and then influencing growers to adhere to it.23 Labor exchanges and employers' associations served to strengthen the position of the grower by releasing him from dependence upon any par ticular group of laborers. On the other hand, there is little doubt that such institutions tended further to depersonalize labor relations in agriculture and to widen the cleavage of interests and attitudes between farm employ ers and employees. H iring of labor by the industry rather than by the indi vidual grower lessened whatever element of personal loyalty still remained in the more commercialized and large-scale farms. W hen employers utilized farmers' cooperative associations in setting wages and recruiting workers, they ultimately drove their laborers in turn to organize into unions and act collectively for self-protection. 23Folsom, op. cit. (p. 28). Chapter III.-— Farm-Labor Movement in the Thirties Farm Labor and the Depression A succession of catastrophes in the nineteen thirties brought the farm-labor problem into new focus. Depression, Government-sponsored crop reduction and acreage control, drought, and rapid technological change all had the effect of displacing operators of small and mediumsized farms, particularly tenants, on a mass scale. They contributed large numbers to a chronic surplus agricultural-labor supply, already enlarged by sizable additions from the ranks of urban unemployed. The severe maladjustments wrought by these changes generated among farm laborers widespread unrest which culminated in a series of strikes of unpre cedented scope and intensity throughout the country. The underlying causes for the outbreaks lay beyond the more obvious factors of economic hardship and agitation. Migratory and casual wage earners in agriculture had long suffered— with little or no organized pro test— low wages, depressed working conditions, job insecurity, and low social status. Several areas in which farm labor’s lot was most benighted, particularly the intensive fruit and truck growing regions of Florida and other South Atlantic States, never witnessed unionism or strikes on farms. The most serious conflict was generated in regions where agricultural workers suffered a sudden and drastic deterioration in economic status. Farm wage rates were ground between the upper and nether millstones of low farm prices and increasingly severe competition for jobs. Farm em ployers suffered a heavier burden of fixed charges and sought to reduce their variable costs by cutting wages to the minimum. They could draw upon the masses of bankrupt farmers, as well as laborers who were dis placed from city trades and forced to return to rural areas in a state of destitution. Farms which hired large numbers of seasonal laborers and which were accessible to important urban centers thus served continually as a catch-all for the unemployed and displaced from other industries. Disparities in wages, hours, and general working conditions between agricultural and urban industrial jobs had long been a source of dis satisfaction, and in prosperous times a m ajor cause for the long-term rural-urban migration trend. This movement was reversed in depression years and farm wage rates were further decreased by the increased com petition for jobs. The still greater disparity between rural and urban labor standards1 accentuated the unrest, particularly among new recruits drawn from urban industries where they had been exposed to labor unionism.1 1From what measurable data are available for that period, it appears that the decline in wage rates paid for all types of farm labor was proportionately greater than the decrease in the cost of living in agricultural areas. (See Yearbook of Agriculture, 1935, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Washington. Also Sidney Sufrin: Labor Organization in Agricultural America, in American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XLIII, No. 4, January 1938, p. 525.) Even more severe hardships were suffered by agricultural workers, particularly the casual and migratory element, from the much greater irregularity and loss of man-hours in employ ment at these lower rates owing to the greater competition for jobs. Seasonal operations on large farms, unlike many industrial factories, do not have more or less fixed technical co-efficients with regard to the number of workers required. There is a #wide range in the numbers of workers that can be employed at any one time to perform a given amount of work. The main variation occurs in the duration of the job. Thus the hardships suffered by agricultural workers during a period of labor surplus are primarily those of underemployment and low earnings, (Continued on p. 16) 15 16 LABOR U N IO N ISM IN A M E R IC A N AG RICU LTU RE The agricultural ladder seemed to be working in reverse in main regions. Heavily indebted owners in large numbers became tenants, and tenants became dispossessed wage earners who were added to an already overburdened labor market. By 1930 almost 33 percent of those gainfully employed in agriculture were wage workers and sharecroppers and their numbers increased steadily in succeeding years. The Committee on Farm Tenancy appointed by President Roosevelt in 1937 noted “ an increasing tendency for the rungs of the ladder to become bars * * * forcing im prisonment in a fixed social status from which it is increasingly difficult to escape.” 2 Depression, in brief, sharpened class divisions which had already been widened greatly in agriculture during the twenties. Farm laborers in certain areas concluded that their status as a class was fixed for some years to come and that opportunities to rise had disappeared. Organiza tion of unions for the purpose of collective bargaining became almost the sole means by which agricultural workers could seek to protect their meager earning power. Course o f Unionism and of Strikes The modern period of labor unionism in agriculture began during 1927-28, with a few short-lived local organizations and small strikes among melon pickers and shed packers in California, beet workers in Colorado, and greenhouse and nursery workers in Illinois. In 1930 several large strikes suddenly broke out in protest against the drastic wage cuts which were being applied at the beginning of a period of depression and unemployment. T w o strikes were motivated by racial antagonism, sharp ened by greater competition for jobs. Rural and urban unions both declined in militancy and size o f mem bership during the recession years from 1930 to 1933. Unemployment was increasing rapidly and labor's bargaining power in general was weak ened. Labor agitation during those years tended to center on the problems of obtaining adequate relief rather than higher wages. The few local unions organized in agricultural industries all but disappeared, and the strikes that occurred were chiefly small spontaneous protests against con tinued wage cuts. A s indicated in table 1, approximately 8,600 workers had participated in 8 farm strikes during 1930, and the number declined to about 3,000 workers in 5 strikes during 1931 and less than 3,200 workers in 10 much smaller strikes during 1932. The situation changed dramatically in 1933, when labor unrest in American agriculture reached a peak of intensity. Approximately 56,800 workers participated in about 61 strikes in X7 different States throughout rather than long-continued unemployment. The available man-hours of employment are spread over more men. The severity of the farm labor surplus reached in the depression years is indicated in the Yearbook of Agriculture, 1935 (p. 189): “ From the postwar depression of 1921-22 until the winter of 1929, the demand for and the supply of farm labor was below normal, with supply usually above needs for the country as a whole. By April 1933, farmers were offering only three jobs where they normally offered five. Meantime, the farm labor supply increased. The excess was increased by the competition of men thrown out of other employment. There were five workers available in January 1933 for every two jobs available.” 2Farm Tenancy Report of the President’ s Committee (prepared under the auspices of the National Resources Committee), Washington, February 1937 (p. 5). 17 C H . I I I .-----F A R M -L A B O R M O VEM EN T IN T H E T H IR T IE S the Nation. These conflicts continued on a smaller scale of size and fre quency in the years immediately following.3 Table 2 .— Strikes in the United States, by Years9 1 9 3 0 -3 9 Year and State All States................................................................................. California......................................................................... Other............................................................................... California......................................................................... Other............................................................................... California......................................................................... Other............................................................................... 1932.............................................................................................. California....... ................................................................. Other................................................................................ 1933................................... ........................................................... California.......................................................... .............. Other................................................................................ California........................................................................ Other............................................................................... 1935............................................................................................... California......................................................................... Other............................................................................... 1936................................................................................................ California......................................................................... Other................................................................................ California......................................................................... Other............................................................................... California......................................................................... Other...................................... ......................................... 1939................................................................................................ California......................................................................... Other............................................................... ............. Number of Number of Number of strikes strikers States 275 140 135 177,788 127,176 50,612 28 — — 8 3 5 5 3 2 10 6 4 61 31 30 38 18 20 30 12 18 33 24 9 32 15 17 35 13 22 23 15 8 8,605 7,300 1,305 3,005 1,575 1,430 3,162 2,497 665 56,816 48.005 8,811 30,548 19,882 10,666 20,125 6,550 13,575 17,712 13,659 4,053 6,234 3,086 3,148 11,073 5,469 5,604 20,508 19,153 1,355 5 1 4 3 1 2 4 1 3 17 1 16 12 1 11 12 1 11 8 1 7 12 1 11 16 1 15 8 1 7 A n u m ber of in terrelated fa cto rs, all of which served to focus the at tention of agricultural laborers on their greatly disadvantaged position, lay behind this upheaval. Farm wages reached their nadir in mid-1933 and lagged behind a rise in the general price level later in the year. A t the same time, New Deal legislation like the National Industrial Recovery A ct and that establishing the agricultural adjustment program ( A A A ) gave wide publicity to the fact that special favors were being granted to certain occupational groups, particularly farm owners and operators, nonagricultural labor, and urban industry. Agricultural workers enjoyed no such benefits. Only in the sugar-beet industry did the Government at tempt to set minimum wages for field laborers. Farm-labor earnings and working conditions suffered by contrast with the widely heralded provi sions of the N IR A , which established maximum hours and minimum wages of $16 per week. Section 7a of the act gave tremendous impetus to urban unionism bv granting legal protection to industrial labor’s right to organize. Indirectly the N IR A encouraged the formation of unions among 3The strike statistics in table 1 above, and in tables 2, 3, and 4 in Chapter IV , have all been taken from several sources. Much of the data has been based upon Labor Disputes in A gri culture, 1927-38, compiled by J. C. Folsom, Associate Economist in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics of the U. S. Department of Agriculture, Washington. Strike statistics for agricul ture in California have been based largely upon reports by the State Bureau of Labor Statistics and Department of Industrial Relations. Several small strikes which were not reported in the above sources have been included in table 1 and following tables. Various compilations of strikes differ in their estimates, for reasons mentioned in Chapter I (pp. 2-3). 18 LABOR U N IO N IS M IN A M E R IC A N AG RICU LTU RE farm workers, despite their exclusion from its provisions.4 Dozens of new labor organizations, encompassing many different crops, occupational types, and sources of leadership, were established simultaneously in scat tered agricultural areas throughout the country. Spontaneous Strikes and Local Unions The rebirth of farm-labor unionism as a social movement of nation wide proportions in 1933 developed from many scattered origins. It tended to assume a different form in each distinct farming region in the United States. Local unions in many instances grew out of spontaneous strikes; indigenous, leaders and organizers rose from the ranks and usually were men more experienced in union affairs than the majority of strikers. Such was the history, for instance, of the Onion W orkers U nion of Hardin County, Ohio. Many spontaneous strikes, on the other hand, were so unorganized that no unions, or even an accepted leadership, developed to carry on collective bargaining with the employers. The series of spontaneous strikes in the hop fields of south central Oregon and in the tobacco plantations of Connecticut and Massachusetts was of this type. Several strong indigenous unions were organized among hitherto nonunionized workers, and they carried out planned strikes for definite objectives. The initiative again rested generally with leaders and or ganizers who had been active previously in other labor movements or political parties. Such were the Asociacion de Jornaleros, organized among Mexican onion pickers in W ebb County, Tex., the Beet W orkers Union of Blissfield, Mich., the United Citrus W orkers of Florida (whose membership late in 1933 reached a peak of approximately 30,000), the Southern Tenant Farmers Union of eastern Arkansas, and the Cape Cod Cranberry Pickers Union of Massachusetts, which later affiliated with the A .F . of L. through the International H od Carriers and Common Laborers Union. A few independent unions which had become inactive during the late twenties regained vigor, often under new leaders, in the revival o f the mid-1930,s. Mexican migratory and casual laborers in some areas had been organized in loose and unaggressive associations which tended to be under the domination of the Mexican consulates and their “ sociedades honorificas.,, The Beet W orkers Association of Colorado and the Confederacion de Uniones Obreras Mexicanos (C .U .O .M .) o f southern California were the most important of these. Under the double stimuli of N ew Deal publicity and revived urban-labor unionism, and on some oc casions under radical leadership, these workers became more militant in their collective-bargaining relations and used strikes to win economic objectives. Several inactive federal labor unions of the A .F . of L . also were revived during this period. Local affiliates of the Federation at first applied col lective bargaining and strikes almost exclusively to the more skilled 4The new wave of unionism was caused in part by ignorance among farm workers of the act’s provisions. Many farm laborers reportedly sent in proposed codes of fair competition to the National Recovery Administration, although such proposals did not fall within the jurisdic tion of this body. (See Sufrin, op. cit., p. 554.) Provisions of the NIRA, however, covered a number of the canning and packing industries allied to agriculture, and unions of workers in these processes often expanded “ vertically” to include related field workers. C H . I II.-----FA R M -L A B O R M O VEM EN T IN T H E T H IR T IE S 19 workers in trades allied to agriculture. Outstanding among these were the packing-shed workers in Monterey and Imperial Counties, Calif., the citrus packing-house workers in Polk and Highland Counties, Fla., the sheep shearers in the Mountain States region, and the greenhouse work ers in Cook and Logan Counties, 111., Middlesex County, Conn., Ashta bula, Ohio, and New Providence, N. J. Agrarian Program of the Communist Party Far overshadowing all other organizations in agriculture during the early thirties was the Communist Party's Trade Union Unity League (T .U .U .L .) a “ dual” revolutionary federation established on a nation wide scale in opposition to the A .F . of L. The T.U .U .L . soon absorbed or “ captured” many local indigenous unions. It was the first nation-wide labor union in agriculture to be established since the demise of the In dustrial W orkers of the W orld. Previously the Communist Party of the United States had followed a policy of “ boring from within” established trade-unions. This program was largely abandoned after the Sixth W orld Congress of the Third International in M oscow in 1928. A world-wide campaign against capi talism was to be launched by fomenting opposition to the status quo among the most exploited segments of the population in each country. The Party in the United States made a concerted effort to organize elements that had been left untouched by the conservative and “ craft conscious” American Federation of Labor. Most promising among these were laborers in certain branches of marginal industries such as textiles, mining, and agriculture. Communist unions in these fields were affiliated with the Trade U nion Unity League. The “ peasantry” of the United States came in for special attention in the Party program. Southern N egro and poor white sharecroppers, casual wage workers in highly capitalistic agricultural areas like California and Arizona, and debt-ridden small-farm owners and tenants in various re gions were all considered to be potentially revolutionary material. O r ganizing policy differed for each group. “ Self-determination of the Black Belt” was announced as the major objective of the Party in the South, and an ambitious program of agitation was carried out among southern Negroes. A “ cadre” of advanced urban Negroes was trained to organize the backward colored “ peasantry,” who were to be united with the poor white population in a common class struggle of sharecroppers against landlords on the cotton plantations.5 Supporting these were to be urban labor unions in such industries as coal and iron mining and steel fabrication in the Birmingham area, which employed large numbers of both Negroes and whites. The first fruits of this program in southern agriculture were gun battles between organized N egro sharecroppers and law-enforcement offi cers in eastern Alabama. Several Negroes were killed or wounded and many more were arrested and sentenced to prison when hundreds of armed white citizenry helped officers suppress the movement.6 5John Beecher: The Sharecroppers Union in Alabama, in Social Forces, Vol. XIII, No. 1, October 1934 (p. 124); Negro Problem, by Abram Harris and Sterling Spero in Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. * 6See Chapter X VII (pp. 294-296). 20 LABOR U N IO N IS M IN A M E R IC A N AG RICU LTU RE Am ong small-farm operators the Party centered its efforts on agitation throughout the Middle W est and other “ family farming” regions. A wave of evictions and foreclosures caused much unrest and conflict dur ing the early depression years. Communist influence was very limited among these farmers, how ever; small numbers were drawn into branches of the Party-organized United Farmers League in several States, but this body attained no importance comparable to “ reformist” organizations like the Farm Holiday Association and the Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union.7 The Party’s most sensational and temporarily most successful organ izing venture in agriculture was waged among casual and migratory sea sonal workers in large-scale farming areas. The Trade U nion Unity League first launched its agrarian campaign in California in 1930. Its representatives assumed control over a large spontaneous strike of several thousand field workers, and subsequently established a new farm labor organization, the Cannery and Agricultural W orkers Industrial Union (C .& A .W .I.U .) The T .U .U .L . remained comparatively inactive in agriculture for the next two years, although it led a few scattered and unsuccessful farm strikes in California and Colorado. The growing problem of unemploy ment was turning the attention of Communist organizers towards agitat ing for more adequate relief. Unemployed Councils were organized in cities and towns throughout dozens of States, to act as pressure groups. H unger marches and demonstrations were mobilized throughout the country and often ended in violent and bloody clashes with police. This program was related to the agrarian campaign. Agricultural workers constituted a disproportionate part of the unemployed population in many small towns. Unemployed Councils consequently were invaluable to the T .U .U .L . in facilitating organization in rural areas. They served also as a medium by which support for farm-labor unions could be en listed from organized urban workers and other sympathizers. The T .U .U .L . held the spotlight in a spectacular wave of 61 strikes of almost 57,000 farm workers that broke out during 1933. A s shown in table 1, more than half of all farm strikes that occurred in the United States in that year, and four-fifths of all strikers, were in California. Approximately three-quarters of the strikes, covering dozens of crops and four-fifths of the more than 48,000 workers who participated in that State, were led by the C .& A .W .I.U .8 Representatives of that organiza tion at the same time led or at least were active in strikes of several thou7Clarence Hathaway, in a report to a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the United States, May 25*27, 1935, was strongly critical of the Party’ s failure to organize small farmers. He condemned “ * * * the sectarian tendencies which have run all through our farm work.” The failure of Communist organizations to gain many adherents from among small farm operators was laid primarily to this cause. To quote Hathaway: “ * * * It is the tendency generally to narrow things down, to try to keep the movement within the narrow confines of our own circles. There has not been the effort to penetrate into the Farm Holiday Association and the Farmers Union and other farm organizations that have mass in fluence in rural districts. To the degree that we have established contact with these farmers, the tendency has been to draw them away from these bodies, and into the United Farmers League * * * Our policy has not been the broad mass policy of setting in motion great num bers of farmers, but rather one of satisfying ourselves with a relatively small circle of farmers who were ready to accept our leadership and our program unquestioningly.” (The Communist, New York, October 1935, p. 653.) 8Strike statistics^ for California, compiled by the California Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Agriculture Economics of the U. S. Department of Agriculture, differ in their estimates. The divergences rest largely on the fact that (1) the BAE considers a series of simultaneous strikes in one crop as. constituting one strike, whereas the California Bureau tabulates them separately, and (2) the BAE does not include processing workers (e.g., in lettuce-packing sheds) in its calculations. (See Chapter V .) C H . I I I .-----FA R M -L A B O R M O VEM EN T IN T H E T H IR T IE S 21 sand cotton pickers in Arizona and hop pickers in Oregon as well as in California. The Communist Party was by no means the only leader of organized discontent in agriculture during 1933. O f some 30 strikes which occurred in 16 States other than California, none appears to have been dominated and few even directly influenced by Communist organizers. The largest and most violent movements were led by affiliates of the A .F . of L. and by independently organized unions. Farm-labor strikes during 1934 were smaller in size and fewer in num ber, and Communist leadership was again limited for the most part to California. Eighteen of the 38 farm strikes in the United States and al most two-thirds of some 30,500 strikers were in that State alone, and about five-sixths of these strikes and an equal proportion of the participants were led by the C.&A/Vy\I.U. Its parent body, the T .U .U .L ., estab lished a few additional union affiliates in other regions, but on the whole the most important strikes in States other than California were led by independent organizations. Communist unions among agricultural workers began to decline during 1934. The novelty o f large spectacular strikes had worn off, and openly revolutionary doctrines bad been found unattractive to farm labor in the long run. The C .& A .W .I.U . in California was suppressed by organized grower-employers who succeeded in breaking several strikes and finally securing the arrest and imprisonment of the leading left-wing unionists. The union became defunct in the summer of 1934 and its parent body, the Trade Union Unity League, was formally dissolved late in 1935. The official “ Party line,, in the mid-thirties called for a new “ united front” program of cooperation with liberal and reformist organizations, in response partly to the rising dangers of anti-Communist and antiliberal fascism. Left-wing organizers in the United States abandoned “ dual unionism” and reverted to their former policy of “ boring from within.” T o maintain its position of labor leadership, the Communist Party was forced again to work through established non-Communist organizations which had contact with large numbers of workers.9 Independent Unions and Federal Labor Unions o f the A.F. o f L. Unions among seasonal agricultural wage laborers were usually un able to sustain themselves, for reasons which became apparent in the course of many strikes in California and other States. Seasonality, short duration of jobs, and high mobility, together with exceedingly low annual earnings as a result of low wage rates and a labor surplus, all raised obvious financial obstacles. A stable and self-supporting organization which had to rely upon a steady revenue in fees and dues was difficult to maintain on such a membership base. The per capita costs of organizing habitually mobile workers scattered over wide rural areas were far higher than for most urban trades, in which the labor force was more stable and concentrated residentially and occupationally. A union of farm laborers to be effective, then, had to be part of a larger federation encompassing regularly employed and better-paid work ers in related industries like canning and packing. Farm workers’ unions 9Jack Stachel: Some Problems in Our Trade Union W ork, The Communist (New York), Vol. XIII, No. 6, June 1934. 22 LABOR U N IO N ISM IN A M E R IC A N A G R ICU LTU RE required continuous subsidies in money and personnel from other more financially secure and politically potent occupational groups. Affiliation with A .F . of L. trade-unions organized in strategic urban industries was the most feasible policy. These unions could mobilize the resources of organized industrial labor to support the agricultural workers by sym pathetic strike action and other means of pressure. Left-wing unionists early in 1935 began a campaign to organize local unions of agricultural and allied workers and to affiliate them with the A .F . of L. Former organizers of the C.& A.W .I.U ., who had been the most bitter antagonists of the A .F . of L., now called for labor unity and urged all workers to use whatever means possible to join this organiza tion.10 Representatives and sympathizers of organizations previously affil iated with the T .U .U .L . attended a National Conference of Agricultural Lumber and Rural W orkers held in Washington, D. C., on January 9, 1935, at which a program was planned for organizing agricultural and rural workers on a nation-wide scale. A National Committee for Unity of Agricultural and Rural W orkers, with headquarters in Washington, D. C., was established to coordinate the activities of all existing agricul tural workers’ organizations, to obtain the cooperation of organized labor in industrial centers, and to win the support of organizations among small farmers and unemployed. It planned later to hold crop-wide,' State-wide, and regional conferences of farm workers in order to unify local bodies on a broader basis. The committee’s ultimate goal was a nation-wide organization of agricultural and allied workers which could be chartered as an “ international” union by the A .F . of L .1 1 The national committee’s immediate program centered upon organiz ing local unions, obtaining federal labor union charters from the A .F . of L., and affiliating them with central labor councils of nearby urban cen ters. Organizers and sympathizers within the existing independent unions promoted the same policy. Sympathizers in established urban unions sought to win active financial and moral support for rural organizations from State and local affiliates of the A .F . of L .12 The A .F . of L. hitherto had been inactive in agriculture, save for organizing a few short-lived local unions mentioned before. The more conservative leaders in the A .F . of L. felt that the costs of unionizing sea sonal farm laborers outweighed any potential advantages to be derived. Hence they had relinquished the field to left-wing organizations such as the C .& A .W .I.U . A .F . of L. unions during the first upsurge of activity in the early thirties had been restricted to the more-stable, skilled, and better-paid occupations connected with processing industries related to agriculture. Skilled migratory fruit and vegetable packing-shed workers in California and later in Arizona were organized into unions having “ floating char10Rural Worker (published by the National Committee to Aid Agricultural Workers, W ash ington, D. C.), Vol. I, No; 1, August 1935 (p. 3). ^Program and Organization adopted at the National Conference of Agricultural, Lumber and Rural Workers (mimeographed) Washington, D. C., January 9, 1935. 12Donald Henderson, president of the national committee and editor of its official organ, the Rural Worker, outlined the organizing program in the second issue of that paper in September 1935 (Vol. I, No. 2). The three main types of unions to be organized were as follows: “ 1. Crop unions, to be composed of all workers, organized or unorganized, employed or un employed, who were connected with particular crops in which certain areas specialized, such as citrus fruits in central Florida, mushrooms in southeastern Pennsylvania, truck vegetables in southern New Jersey, and sugar beets in the South Platte Valley of Colorado. “ 2. General farm workers* unions, designed for local casual workers in towns and villages who worked at many different farm jobs during various months of the year. In so far as such workers were unemployed jsl good part of each year, such unions should serve the double purpose of collective ^bargaining for better wages and working conditions during the working months, and of fighting for adequate relief during the off-season months of unemployment. (Continued on p. 23) CH . I II.---- FAR M -L A B O R M O VEM EN T IN T H E T H IR T IE S 23 ters,” which gave them State-wide jurisdiction. Other packing-house workers attached to particular crop areas were organized into locals hav ing limited jurisdiction. In other States the A .F . of L. organized and chartered a few scattered locals of skilled and specialized occupational groups such as sheep shearers, hay balers, tree surgeons, horticultural workers, and employees of nurseries and greenhouses. Unskilled and semiskilled workers in agricultural industries organized by the A .F . of L. usually belonged to heterogeneous federal labor unions which included labor in nonfarm trades. Twenty-three such organizations altogether had been chartered by the summer of 1935 in the States of California, Arizona, Florida, Washington, Montana, Missouri, Indiana, Illinois, and Michi gan.13 Only a few local unions at this time were organized specifically for agricultural workers.14 Most of these had developed from spontaneous strikes or from unions previously organized by the T .U .U .L . and in dependent bodies. Farm-labor strikes in California varied widely in size and number from those in other States during this period. Suppression of the C.&A. W .I.U . in California left agricultural workers temporarily without leaders. Most of the 12 comparatively small strikes that did occur during 1935 were either spontaneous in origin or led by unaffiliated local organizations. In 11 other States, by contrast, more than 13,500 farm workers partici pated in some 18 strikes. A s may be seen from table 1, this represented the largest number of strike participants outside California for any one year in the 1930’s. The upsurge was explained in part by the new sup port in money and personnel which urban labor organizations were fur nishing to agricultural workers for the first time in many areas. The National Committee for Unity of Agricultural W orkers was of paramount influence in this program. The large-scale organizing campaign by left-wing unionists during 1935 and 1936 brought a rapid increase in the number of local and federal labor unions in agriculture. The National Committee to A id Agricultural W orkers (renamed) claimed by the fall of 1936 a total of 72 local unions “ 3. Cannery and packing-house unions, to include workers in the processing stages of agricul ture, such as canneries, packing sheds, and dairy plants. Such plants were felt to have a close functional relationship to agricultural workers, since they often employed the wives and children of farmers and farm workers.” Organizers and delegates of farm workers were advised to seek the help of ^A.F. of L. unions in cities and towns in setting up rural unions and obtaining federal^ labor union charters. Once chartered, such farm workers unions were then instructed to affiliate with the nearest central labor union in order to secure the utmost support from organized urban labor. Coopera tion was also to be sought with small farmers whose position was precarious, and farm workers’ unions were instructed to support this element. To quote Mr. Henderson: “ W e must point out that their interests are threatened by the same rich farmers, cannery owners and big busi ness class who cheat us. W e should approach organizations of poor farmers and propose united action where our interests are in common.” Differences in status and group interests between farm operators and farm laborers were recognized, however. It was advised that “ the small farmers should not be organized in the same unions with farm workers, except where the farmer is also a farm worker or on relief. Even in such cases, as soon as the organization of these farmers has grown to any number, a separate organization of small farmers should be set up.” The third important element whose support was considered important^ was the lower middle class—the small shopkeepers and professionals—of small towns and villages in which farm workers were organized. Because the livelihood of such groups depended in part on the pur chasing power of farm workers, it was felt that a basis for cooperation existed. The most important union policy, it was emphasized, was to “ neutralize” this class in case of a strike so that it would not furnish strikebreakers and vigilantes. # # . 13See list in Appendix B : Agricultural, canning and packing unions affiliated to the Ameri can Federation of Labor, October 1935. 14These included the Citrus Workers Union No. 18234 of Winter Haven and the United Citrus Workers Union No. 19180 of Dundee, Fla.; the Citrus, Vegetable and Farm Workers Union No. 19274 of San Diego, Calif.; the Farm Laborers Union No. 19845 of Casa Grande, Ariz.; the United Evergreen Pickers No. 19068 of Centralia, W ash.; and the Agricultural Workers Unions No. 19994 of Blissfield, Mich., No. 19724 of McGuffey, Ohio, and No. 19996 of Bridgeton, N. J. 654107°—46—3 24 LABOR U N IO N ISM IN A M E R IC A N AG RICU LTU RE affiliated to the A .F . of L., including 40 among field laborers, 22 among canning and packing-house employees, and 10 among dairy workers. The official dues-paying membership was estimated to number 7,500, while the unofficial membership was claimed to run as high as 50,000.1 5 The most rapid organizational gains were won in processing industries related to agriculture. Union organizers tended to focus their activities on these plants primarily because these industrial workers, unlike farm laborers, received legal protection under the terms of the newly enacted National Labor Relations Act. Unions of agricultural and allied workers revived strongly during 1936 in California, where they were supported by the increasingly powerful transport workers’ organizations, the Inter national Longshoremen’ s and Warehousemen’ s Union and the Interna tional Brotherhood of Teamsters. Hence, the rapid increase in size and number of strikes in that State, as seen in table 1. State-wide and National Unionism, and Inter-Union Conflict Local unions of agricultural and allied workers began to federate on a regional and State-wide basis during 1936. Local unions of migratory packing-shed workers in California and Arizona had been granted State wide jurisdiction in their charters, and steps were taken to establish gen eral State federations for all workers in agriculture and related industries. Local unions of beet workers in Colorado were drawn together into the Federation of Agricultural and Beet W orkers Unions, which received a charter from the A .F . of L. Urban trade or industrial unions and central labor councils established agricultural organizing committees in several States, such as Florida, Texas, and New Jersey, where farm labor union ism was potentially strong but currently limited in scope.16 The National Committee to A id Agricultural W orkers meanwhile was making plans to federate local and State-wide organizations into one international union. A s authorized by the constitution of the American Federation of Labor,17 such a body would include occupational groups of all types in agriculture and allied industries— field workers, cannery and packing-house employees. Spokesmen of the national committee stressed the limitations imposed upon federal labor unions within the A .F . of L . : These local unions feel that the present lack of a national organization is a serious obstacle in their work. The membership and the local leaders know from bitter experience that the federal and local trade-union form is unsatisfactory. The present federal labor union charter forces them to depend upon inexperi enced advice and the overburdened national office o f the A.F. o f L. It forces them to pay an excessive per capita tax to the national office of the A.F. o f L. which in most cases cannot be called upon for financial help when it is needed. (Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 16, December 1935, p. 3.) 15Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 16, November 1936. Because of the high per capita tax pay ment to the national executive council of the A.F. of L., required under a federal labor union charter, the number of official members for whom dues were paid by each local was kept to a minimum. 16Rural Worker, Vol. II, No. 2, February 1936 (p. 6). 17Article IX , section 2, of the constitution states that— “ The executive council shall use every means to organize new national or international trade or labor unions, and to organize local trade-unions, and to connect them with the Federa tion until such time as there is a sufficient number to form a national or international union, when it shall be the duty of the president of the Federation to see that such organization is formed.” C H . I I I .-----FAR M -L A B O R M O VEM EN T IN T H E T H IR T IE S 25 Agricultural labor organizers and their sympathizers exerted increas ing pressure upon the A .F . of L. to charter an international union. T w o State federations of labor and several central labor councils throughout the country passed resolutions petitioning the executive council of the A .F . of L. to take this step. The issue came to the fore at the national convention of the American Federation of Labor in Tampa, Fla., during November 1936. Twelve delegates representing agricultural, cannery, and packing-house unions in the States of California, Colorado, Michigan, N ew Jersey, and Florida presented six resolutions calling for an inter national charter. The aggressiveness of this small nucleus in the convention was ex pressed also in 25 separate resolutions on agricultural labor which it in troduced. Resolutions on vigilantism, Tampa floggings, discrimination against beet laborers on relief, removal of residence requirements for migratory labor to obtain relief, establishment of adequate transient camps for migratory labor, and provision for adequate rural housing, were in troduced by this group, and passed by the convention. One of the greatest victories won by the agricultural delegates was the passage of a resolution putting the American Federation of Labor on record as favoring the inclusion of agricultural workers and their families in all Federal and State legislation dealing with social security. This activity, however, stirred up adverse reactions. The convention later passed a resolution to remove the right of federal and local unions to introduce resolutions in all future conventions. It provided that such locals must submit their proposals to the executive council at least 30 days beforehand. The executive council of the A .F . of L. finally conferred with the agricultural delegates and requested them to submit to President William Green a financial plan for organizing a national union of agricultural and allied workers. H e refused to charter a new international for agriculture, at least in the immediate future. A s a compromise measure the executive council of the A .F . of L. instructed him to call a nation-wide conference of all local agricultural and allied unions. These were to be united in a temporary National Agricultural W orkers Council, which would serve as a clearing house of information and service until a permanent interna tional union could be established.18 The A .F . of L. officialdom hesitated to finance the organization of a new international union of farm labor, for several reasons. The extreme uncertainty of agricultural employment— the high seasonality and mobility of the labor, and wide fluctuations in the number employed— made any such venture precarious. It was possible, also, that such an international, after the A .F . of L. had made large outlays of money for its establish ment might secede and join the Committee for Industrial Organization. P ro-C .I.O . sympathies had been expressed openly by many agricultural labor organizers, particularly those formerly connected with the Trade Union Unity League. John L. Lewis and other high C .I.O . officials on several occasions had been approached to support farm-labor unionism. Sentiment for organizing an international to be affiliated with the C.I.O. grew during the spring of 1937, particularly after a substantial invest ment of money by that body for a nation-wide organizing campaign was assured. Spokesmen of the again renamed National Committee of A gri18Rural Worker, Vol. II, No. 3, March 1937 (p. 1). 26 LABOR U N IO N ISM IN A M E R IC A N AG RICU LTU RE cultural, Cannery and Packinghouse Unions became increasingly dis satisfied with the status of farm laborers in the A .F . of L. They charged that their federal labor unions were paying $3,500 monthly in per capita dues to the national office of the A .F . of L., and were getting little or nothing in return. The A .F . of L. had hired no organizers specifically for farm laborers. Local unions felt that the money collected from dues should go to a national organization of agricultural workers to help defray the direct expenses of unionizing farm and cannery labor over a wide area. Agricultural workers suffered from political impotence in addition to weak economic bargaining power. This was manifested particularly in their exclusion from the benefits of social legislation passed by the Federal Government, and was attributed to their having no powerful nation-wide pressure group to act on their behalf. Donald Henderson, secretarytreasurer of the national committee, w rote: * * * w e need our own national and State offices, leadership, and organizers with the power and prestige of a national union in back o f them to help us with our local problems. With a national organization we will command more respect in our negotiations with our employers; we will be able to secure more effective support from the other international unions in the organized labor movement. (Rural Worker, Vol. II, No. 6, June 1937, p. 2.) Henderson argued that the industrial-union structure of the C.I.O . was better adapted than the A .F . of L. to meet the needs of agricultural w orkers: * * * In agriculture, we cannot organize along craft lines of separate unions for each type o f work. W e must clearly build a union including all workers in agri cultural and related fields such as canneries, packing houses, etc. The policy of the C.I.O. in successfully organizing in industry-wide unions and their policy o f aggressively assisting the organization o f the unorganized with advice, funds, and organizers makes it necessary for us to seriously consider affiliation to the C.I.O. (Rural Worker, Vol. II, No. 6, June 1937, p. 2.) The affiliation issue came to a head during the spring of 1937. Serious interunion conflict occurred in California, which had long been the center of the agricultural-labor movement. The State federation of labor was divided by a growing rift between two strongly opposed union groups, each of which had a direct interest in organizing field, cannery and pack ing-house workers. The pro-C.I.O . wing, led by the International Lon g shoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union and its allies (including the more active left-wing organizers among agricultural and cannery workers) favored an industrial union which would encompass all types of workers, skilled and unskilled, who were employed in farming and related indus tries. The officials of the State federation, supported by the powerful Brotherhood of Teamsters, favored separate organizations for the more skilled and occupationally stable canning and packing workers, as distinct from the unskilled migratory field laborers. Representatives of the group favoring the C.I.O . met in a State-wide conference in the spring of 1937 and formed the California Federation of Agricultural and Cannery Unions. The State federation executive council promptly ousted all local union officers suspected of being Communist or pro-C.I.O . in sympathy and revoked the charters of several organizations. The California Federation of Agricultural and Cannery Unions then came out in support of the National Committee of Agricultural, Cannery and Packinghouse Unions, which was attempting to form an international C H . I I I .-----FA R M -L A B O R M O VEM EN T IN T H E T H IR T IE S 27 chartered by the C .I.O . George W oolf, president of the former organiza tion, w rote: The time has come to take matters in our own hands, call a national conference, draw up our own constitution, and bylaws, elect our own officers, and form our national agricultural and cannery union. (Rural Worker, Vol. II, No. 6, June 1937, P. 3.) A national convention was held in Denver, during July 1937. It was attended by a hundred delegates from 24 States, representing 56 different independent and A .F . of L. federal labor unions19 claiming a total mem bership of about 100,000 workers. A n international union was established, and received a charter from the C.I.O. as the United Cannery, Agricul tural, Packing and Allied W orkers of America (U .C .A .P .A .W .A .). It included such diverse occupational and sectional groups as cannery work ers from Maryland, landscape and cannery workers from the Middle West, mushroom workers from New York, sharecroppers and cottonfield laborers from Arkansas and Alabama, beet workers from the Rocky Mountain States, citrus workers from Florida, and fruit, vegetable and fish cannery workers from the North Atlantic and Pacific Coasts.20 United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and Allied Workers of America Unionism in agriculture and related industries gained new vitality when the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . was organized and financed from the C.I.O. treasury. Within the first 2 months of its existence it chartered 76 local unions.21 By the end of 17 months its record appeared truly impressive. President Donald Henderson, at the second national convention in Decem ber 1938, stated that the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . was the seventh largest union in the entire Congress of Industrial Organizations, claiming a voting membership of 124,750 workers belonging to more than 300 local unions.22 Other industrial-union elements pledged their support to the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . at the constitutional convention of the C.I.O . at Pitts burgh. The union delegates passed resolutions favoring the extension of State and Federal labor legislation to include farm labor within its pro visions and to amend the A A A so as to require farm employers who received benefits to meet certain minimum wage and labor standards. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . claimed to have established itself in W ashing ton, D. C., as a recognized spokesman for agricultural workers before such Federal Government agencies as the National Labor Relations Board, the W age and H our Division, the Departments of Labor and Agriculture, the Farm Security Administration, the Social Security Board, the W orks Progress Administration, and various Congressional Committees. 19See Apoendix C (p. 426). 20Rural Worker, Vol. II, No. 7, July 1937 (p. 1). 21Idem, Vol. II, No. 8, August 1937 (p. 2). . . . 22This and all following material on U .C.A.P.A.W .A. (except where otherwise noted) is from U.C.A.P.A.W .A. Yearbook, Second Annual Convention, San Francisco, Calif., Vol. I, December 1938. 28 LABOR U N IO N ISM IN A M E R IC A N AG RICU LTU RE The union appeared also to occupy a key position for encouraging closer cooperation between organized labor and farmers. President D on ald Henderson of the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . and E. L. Oliver of Labor’ s N on partisan League met with the national board of the Farmers Union in St. Paul, Minn., during December 1937, and signed a “ pact of coopera tion” which aimed to secure legislation and carry on educational work of benefit to farm laborers and small-farm operators. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A ., moreover, was established on a much firmer base than any previous unions in the field. It claimed nearly 40,000 members who were covered by signed contracts providing wage increases, improved working conditions, and vacations with pay. A large per centage of these contracts also entailed closed-shop and check-off agree ments. A large and indefinite number of temporary verbal contracts were obtained for agricultural workers employed in harvesting various crops. Particularly large gains in membership were claimed among field workers in certain specialty farming regions: beet-raising areas of Colorado and W yom ing, cotton and vegetable growing areas of Arizona, the citrus belt of Florida, and the Southern Cotton Belt. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . won its most substantial gains in processing industries related to agriculture. (Som e of these were only distantly related.) The strongest affiliates, claiming 16,000 members covered by closed-shop contracts, were organized among fish-cannery and sea food workers in the Pacific Northwest and South Atlantic. Unions in fruit and vegetable canning and general food processing constituted the U .C .A .P .A .W .A .’s main foundation in the industrial Northeast and Middle W est. The international by the end of 1938 claimed 12,000 employees in this industry as members, of whom 5,000 were covered by signed contracts. In California, which had long been the stronghold o f unionism in agriculture and allied industries, the U .C .A .P .A .W .A .’s organizing drive was a conspicuous failure. It faced strong opposition from well-organ ized anti-union farm employers. Furthermore, it was “ frozen out” of the fruit and vegetable canning industry in that State by the A .F . of L. which had control over truck transportation vital to food-processing industries. A trend away from field laborers in agriculture was apparent in union policy during this period. From an international union designed primarily for farm workers, the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . had become a federa tion of labor organizations whose main source of strength lay among the employees of allied processing industries, many of which were not closely related to farming. The trend continued in subsequent years. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . extended its organization into other processing industries, like cotton ginning and compressing in California, Arizona, and Tennessee, cigar wrapping in New Y ork City, basket weaving in New Jersey, and cigarette manufacturing in Virginia and North Caro lina. Its field workers’ unions declined and finally disappeared com pletely. The reasons for this transition in structure were financial rather than ideological. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . had “ spread itself thin” dur ing the great organizing campaign of late 1937 and 1938, and the high cost of unionizing low-paid and underemployed agricultural workers C H . I I I .-----FAR M -L A B O R M O V E M E N T IN T H E T H IR T IE S 29 scattered over a wide area had taken a m ajor part of the funds con tributed by the C .I.O . and other allied or sympathetic organizations.2* Internecine strife further weakened its hold on the workers. Particularly embarrassing and costly to the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . was its leadership of many large and spontaneous strikes among field work ers. These were lost in many cases because of inadequate preparation and advance organization; nevertheless, they redounded to the discredit of the union besides involving it in considerable expense. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . consequently adopted a policy of refusing to support agricultural workers whose strikes were not previously authorized by district representatives. It came to rely more heavily upon the programs o f the Farm Security Administration and other sympathetic govern ment agencies to improve wages and working conditions for farm work ers. Direct collective bargaining and strikes were abandoned in large part. The convention report as early as 1938 stated flatly (p. 20) that “ U .C .A .P .A .W .A . does not consider strikes as the most effective weapon in this field. In many cases the international does not encourage strikes. T o the workers strike means a loss of several days when the season is already short.” M ost of the 35 strikes involving approxi mately 11,000 workers in 1938 and 23 involving about 20,500 in 1939 were spontaneous in origin or led by organizations other than U .C .A .P .A .W .A . The international finally divested itself of almost all field workers’ local unions, in the interests of economy and, indeed, of its own survival as a self-sustaining organization. The executive committee at the 1940 convention decided officially to abandon several districts, and to restrict the U .C .A .P .A .W .A .’s jurisdiction to compact areas in which agricul tural and allied workers would be accessible to district headquarters. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A .’s decline in agriculture was offset to some degree by the expansion of A .F . of L. unions. The California State Federation of Labor in 1937 had established a National Council of Cannery and Agricultural W orkers, which organized many new locals during the following 2 years among workers in various processing indus tries, and won the affiliation of several of the largest independent unions o f field laborers. M inor gains of a similar nature were achieved in other States. America’s unprecedented war production program diverted the attention of both C.I.O . and A .F . of L. from agriculture to key urban industries where more fruitful organizational gains were to be made. Several of the more able organizers who were formerly active among farm workers were put on the pay roll of urban industrial and tradeunions. Those remaining in the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . (C .I.O .) and the National Council of Cannery and Agricultural W orkers (A .F . of L .) restricted their efforts still more to the processing industries related to agriculture. 2*It was estimated that the union spent an additional $18,000 from December 1938 to Novem ber 30, 1940, in organizing field workers, while little more than $6,000 was collected from them in initiation fees and dues. The U .C.A.P.A.W .A. consequently fell heavily into debt. (See Pro ceedings, Third National Convention of the United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing, and Allied Workers of America, Chicago, 1940 (p. 22); also Harry Schwartz: Recent Developments among Farm Labor Unions, Journal* of Farm Economics, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, November 1941 (p. 483).) Chapter IY.— National Perspective Concentration of Strikes by Area and Crop The labor movement in American agriculture, with scattered roots reaching back into the nineteenth century, seemed suddenly to have attained nation-wide scope during the 1930’s. Labor trouble on the land appeared to cover a wide area. A s seen in table 2, almost 178,000 farm workers during the decade participated in some 275 strikes in 28 States and the District of Columbia. Farm strikes, however, showed a high degree of concentration by geographic area. They were notably absent in several distinct regions. Sparsely settled States in the Rocky Mountains, such as New M exico, Nevada, and Utah, remained singularly free of farm-labor trouble. Few or no strikes occurred in the more depressed States of the Southern Cotton Belt, such as South Carolina, Georgia, and Mississippi. Urban industries in this region were comparatively undeveloped, industrial labor unions were weak and ineffective, and the status of the N egro and poor white farm population was perhaps least secure. States character ized by small diversified family-farm economies also remained virtually untouched by agricultural labor unionism: Kentucky and Tennessee in the mountain region of the South; Maine, New Hampshire, and V er mont in New England; and most of the States in the Corn and W heat Belts of the Middle W est. Table 2 .— Agricultural Labor Strikes9 by States9 1 9 3 0 -3 9 State Number of strikes Number of strikers Number of large strikes (1,000 and over) Number of strikers Total, 28 States.................................................. 275 177,788 50 112.524 Alabama.............................................................. Arkansas......... ................................................... Arizona................................................................ California............................................................ Colorado............................................................. Connecticut.................................... .................. Florida................................................................. 3 6 6 140 5 7 9 4,500 8,162 5,100 127,176 820 1,012 2,660 2 3 2 34 4,000 7,500 4,500 82,724 i 1,600 Idaho................................................................... Illinois.................................................................. Indiana............... ................................................ Maryland............................................................ Massachusetts................................................... Michigan................ ............................................ Minnesota........................................................... 3 5 1 1 8 2 2 2,000 247 35 12 1,882 1,500 54 1 1,500 Missouri.............................................................. Montana.............................................................. New Jersey.................................. ...................... New York. . ....................................................... North Carolina................................................... Ohio.......................... ......................................... Oregon................................................................. 4 1 7 8 1 11 17 1,072 1,000 1,017 2,666 200 1,535 8,079 1 1 1,000 1,000 1 1,200 2 4,500 Pennsylvania...................................................... Texas................................................................... Vermont................................. ......................... ... Virginia................................................................ Washington........................................................ Wisconsin........................................................... W voming ............................................................. District of Columbia......................................... 6 6 1 1 9 2 2 1 535 4,057 70 25 1,575 250 520 27 2 3,000 30 C H . IV .— N A T IO N A L PERSPECTIVE 31 The dominant factor determining the size and frequency of strikes in each agricultural area appeared to be the prevalence of large-scale farms. California, as the previous chapter has noted, suffered organ ized labor-employer conflict out of all proportion to its numbers of agri cultural workers. M ore than half of all strikes occurred in this State alone, and they included more than two-thirds of all participants. H enry H . Fowler, chief counsel of the United States Senate Civil Liberties Committee, summarized his findings as follow s: Although California normally employs only 4.4 percent o f the Nation’s agri cultural field laborers, California has been the scene of from 34.3 to 100 percent o f the Nation’s strikes in this field each year. These California strikes have involved from 31.8 to 96.5 percent o f the yearly total o f workers involved in the Nation’s agricultural field operations’ strikes. Although California normally em ploys 25.9 percent o f the Nation’s canning and preserving and cane-sugar-refining workers, California has been subject to from 30.3 to 50 percent o f the Nation’s strikes in this field four out of six and a half years in the period under con sideration (i.e., from January 1, 1933, to July 1, 1939). These California strikes have involved from 30 to 74.5 percent o f the total o f workers in the Nation’s canning and preserving and cane-sugar-refining strikes. (Hearings, La Follette Committee, Part 47, p. 17210.) Only in this State could agricultural labor unionism be considered truly a 'Tabor movement,” in the sense that an institutional framework was maintained continuously for several years to carry on collective bargaining enforced by organized agitation and strikes. The structure of California's agricultural economy was particularly conducive to con flict. M ore than a third of the Nation’s large-scale farms were in this State; wage laborers constituted a disproportionately large segment of the rural population, and they were among the most mobile and seasonal in job tenure. The labor-trouble centers within California during 1930-39 are indi cated in table 3, in which counties are ranged according to size and frequency of strikes. A high degree of concentration is indicated. O f the 149 strikes, 76, or more than half, occurred in 9 of the 35 counties affected in California. These leading counties included two highly urban ized areas, namely, Los Angeles and Alameda (hinterland of metro politan Oakland and San Francisco), where agricultural workers em ployed in various crops were influenced by urban labor movements. Other leading strike counties were characterized by specialized largescale farming. Imperial County has long been a center of large and violent strikes. According to the United States Census of 1930 its average expenditure per farm for hired labor was nearly 10 times the average for employing farms in the United States as a whole.1 Average labor expenditures per farm were similarly high for Monterey, Kern, and San Joaquin Counties— 8, 6 and 5 times the national average. The correlation between labor trouble and large-scale agriculture is brought out also in the statistics for large “ general” strikes, chosen arbitrarily as those in which 1,000 or more workers participated. San Joaquin County again led with 5 such outbreaks, followed by Imperial and Monterey Counties with 4 each. Altogether, 43 large general strikes occurred in 20 counties in California. Labor troubles in other States were generally more limited in scope and duration. M ost of the strikes either were spontaneous in origin or were led by local organizations that rarely lasted for more than one 1See Chapter V II (p. 70). 32 LABOR U N IO N IS M IN A M E R IC A N AG RICU LTU RE Table 3 .— Agricultural Labor Strikes in California9 by Counties, 1 9 3 0 -3 9 County Number of strikes Number of large strikes (1,000 and over) Total, 34 counties1. .. 149 12 11 9 5 Number of large strikes (1,000 and over) 44 San Joaquin................ Alameda...................... Los Angeles................ Imperial...................... San Luis Obispo........ Santa Clara................ Sacramento................ Kern............................ Santa Cruz................. Monterey.................... Orange........................ M erced....................... San M ateo.................. Tulare......................... Fresno..................... ... Santa Barbara............ San Benito.................. 8 8 7 7 7 7 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 4 1 2 4 3 2 2 2 (2) 4 3 2 2 1 1 Number of strikes County 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 Y olo........................... K ing.......................... Madera..................... Ventura..................... Yuba.......................... Contra Costa............ Butte......................... Stanislaus.................. Sonoma..................... Marin........................ Glenn......................... Sutter........................ Solano........................ Tehama..................... San Bernardino........ Placer........................ E l Dorado................. 3 3 1 i l i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 *The statistics for this table are compiled from the same sources as tables 1, 2, and 4. Table 3, however, indicates a total of 149 strikes and 43 “ large” strikes (1,000 or more participants) for California, as compared to 140 and 34, respectively, in the other tables. This divergence was made necessary by the fact that several “ general” or crop-wide strikes each encompassed more than one county, so that a tabulation of strikes according to individual counties made duplica tion unavoidable. Due to continual intercounty migration on the part of strikers, it was found impossible to estimate adequately the total number of participants in each county. aPart of Alameda County’s. season. The participants in the majority of instances were casual and migratory day laborers hired for special jobs like chopping, weeding, thinning, and, above all, harvesting. The essential similarity in tactics and issues in most instances suggested a fundamental likeness in the problems faced by farm laborers. California’s structure of farm opera tions and pattern of labor relations seemed to represent an extreme stage Table 4 .— Strikes in the United States, b y Crops, 1 9 3 0 -3 9 Number of large strikes (1,000 and over) Number involved 50 34 16 112,524c 82,724 29,800 9 4 4 10,600 10,600 22,746 18,605 4,141 6 9 8 l 24,977 13,474 1,500 20 7 13 7,283 4,266 3,017 4 2 1 1 3,600 2,000 1,600 Greenhouse and nursery....... - ........ California.............................: Other.................................. 21 3 18 1,327 195 1,132 9 C otton.................................................. California...................................... Other............................................. ji 17 5 47,302 27,650 19,652 6 Crop or occupation, and State Number of strikes Number involved Number of States affected Total (number of crops affected, 3 9 ) .. California..................................... Other............................................. 275 140 135 177,788 127,176 50,612 1 Vegetables............................................ California..................................... Other............................................. 29 14 15 15,128 12,627 2,501 Peas...................................................... California..................................... Other............................................. 27 16 11 Citrus.................................................... California............................. Other.................................. 1 2 J 28 28 j \ ; 12 3 9 | 45,500 27,000 18,500 33 C H . IV.-----N A T IO N A L PERSPECTIVE Table 4 .— Strikes in the United States, b y Crops, 1 9 3 0 -3 9 — Con. Crop or occupation, and State Number of strikes Number involved Number of States affected Number of large strikes (1,000 and over) 3 3 Peaches................................................. 15 14 1 6,952 6.940 12 2 H ops..................................................... 13 2 11 8,023 1,025 6,998 3 Apples................................................... 13 2 11 3,466 2.250 1,216 Lettuce: California............. . ............. 7 Beets..................................................... 8 4 4 Number involved 3,000 3,000 2 4,500 2 4,500 6 1 1 2,000 2,000 15,322 1 4 7,900 3,905 1,755 2,150 1 1 1 1,200 1,200 2 2 2.500 2.500 Tobacco: Other................................... 8 1,047 2 Berries.................................................. 7 4 3 3,425 2,835 590 3 Dairy............................. ...................... California...................................... 7 6 1 1,194 1,094 100 2 Sheep.................................................... 7 1 6 3,030 650 2,380 5 1 1,000 1 1,000 Celery: California............................... 7 7,000 1 3 5,400 Grapes: California.............................. 7 8,403 1 1 1,000 Apricots: California........................... 6 3,959 1 Poultry................................................. California...................................... Other............................................. 4 3 1 1,405 205 1,200 2 1 1,200 Onions: Other.................................... 4 2,337 3 1 Brussels sprouts: California.............. 4 1,008 4 1,935 1 Tomatoes: California.......................... Cherries................................................ California...................................... Other............................................. 4 4 2 2 816 1,125 900 225 1,500 1 1,600 1 Pears: California................................ 1,200 1 1 3 Cranberries: Other............................. 3 1,405 1 Melons.................................................. California...................................... Other............................................. 3 2 1 2 1 1 2.500 2.500 Asparagus............................................. California...................................... Other............................................. 3 2 1 2,595 2,500 95 2,546 2,521 25 2 1 1 2.500 2.500 Beans.............................................. California.................. ................... Other....................... ..................... 3 2 1 550 550 C) 1 2 Potatoes: California........................... 3 500 1 Plums: California............................... 2 700 1 Spinach: California........ .................. 2 140 1 Mushrooms: California...................... 2 95 1 Garlic: California............................... 1 500 1 Artichokes: California....................... 1 150 1 Olives: California............................... 1 80 1 Florists and gardeners: Other........... 1 105 1 Corn: Other........................................ 1 100 1 Cauliflower: Other............................. 1 100 1 Tree surgeons: Other......................... 1 27 1 (Jnknown: Other................................ 4 57 3 lUnkncwr. 34 LABOR U N IO N ISM IN A M E R IC A N AG RICU LTU RE of development in a trend occurring spottily in other regions. Strikes in each State were limited mainly to areas in which farming was con centrated in large specialized enterprises, and where class divisions were pronounced. Outstanding among such areas were certain sections of the southern cotton-growing region, the citrus belt of Florida, onion-grow ing tracts in Ohio and Texas, tobacco-plantation areas in Connecticut and Massachusetts, cranberry bogs in Massachusetts, truck-farming sections of New Jersey and Washington, hop-growing areas of Oregon, sugar-beet fields in Ohio, Michigan, and Colorado, and sheep ranches in the R ocky Mountain and Pacific Coast States. Farm strikes showed a high degree of concentration by crops as well as by geographic areas, as shown in table 4. Ninety-three, or well over one-third of the total 275 farm strikes in the country, were confined to four crops— less than a ninth of those affected during the thirties. In California, as may be seen from table 4, 44 or almost one-third of the 140 strikes occurred in only three leading crops (less than a tenth of the 31 crops affected). Still greater concentration of labor trouble in farm crops is indicated by the number of workers involved. A bout 70,000 or almost two-fifths of approximately 178,000 strikers in A m eri can agriculture participated in two crops only— peas and cotton. If to these are added some 15,100 in vegetables and 15,300 in lettuce, then about 100,400, or well over half of all strikers in the 10-year period, 1930-39, were employed in only four crops, or one-eighth of all those affected.2 California agriculture shows a similar concentration. The crops which had the most strikes altogether also experienced, by and large, the most numerous “ general” strikes involving one thousand or more workers at a time.3 Fifty such strikes throughout the Nation affected 18 crops, and in California alone 34 occurred in 14 crops. The largest number of strikers in any one crop occurred in vegetables, where there were 29 throughout the country; only cotton and peas surpassed vegetables in the number of “ general” strikes. Vegetables also experi enced strikes in more States (9 ) than did any other single crop. Field peas came second only to vegetables in number of strikes and number of States affected, and led in number of general strikes. Special crops, like lettuce, celery, hops, peaches, and apples, followed closely. Cotton occupied a singular position; although it had fewer strikes than several other crops, it far surpassed them in the size of its strikes and the num ber of participants— more than 47,300 or well over a fourth of approxi mately 178,000 strikers in the country, and more than 27,500 or more than a fifth of some 127,000 strikers in California. The extreme concen tration of strikes in regard to both number and size suggests that some fields of agriculture were characterized by highly frictional relationships. Their structure of farming operations and their pattern of labor rela tions provoked an unusual degree of collective action. 2The statistics compiled in table 4, for reasons mentioned before, differ from those presented by Henry H. Fowler in his Introductory Statement in Hearings before the U. S. Senate Com mittee on Education and Labor on December 6, 1939. Fowler found that “ 156 out of the total of 180 strikes (between January 1, 1933, and July 1, 1939) have concerned the so-called field workers. Nineteen strikes have affected the canning and preserving phase of the industry, while 5 have affected sugar refining. Of the 156 strikes among field workers, 63 pertained to crops of fruits and nuts, 56 to vegetables, and 37 affected such miscellaneous crops and activities as cotton, hops, poultry, rice, wool, and dairying. Of the 63 strikes in fruit and nut crops, the citrus and peach industries were most often affected, with 15 and 11 strikes, respectively. In the vegetable classification with 56 strikes, there were 20 strikes ^among the pea pickers, with lettuce and celery ranking second and third with 9 and 6, respectively.” (Hearings, La Follette Committee, Part 47, pp. 17208-17209.) 3The statistics for “ general” strikes in California and other States are rough estimates, for reasons mentioned in Chapter I and in footnote 1 to table 3. CH. IV.---- N A T IO N A L PERSPECTIVE 35 Labor trouble in vegetable growing was due to highly intensive and mechanized cultivation for commercial uses and, as a corollary, to the heavy demand for seasonal labor which such farming imposed upon growers. In California, furthermore, vegetable workers were usually more stable residentially and more homogeneous racially than those engaged on other crops. Mexicans predominated for many years in vegetable-growing areas of the Imperial Valley, while Mexicans and Filipinos together constituted by far most of the labor force in truckvegetable areas of Santa Barbara, Orange, and Los Angeles Counties. Both groups had special incentives to organize and bargain collectively: they were concerned with protecting not only their occupational interests but also their rights as disadvantaged racial minorities. Vegetable crops in California and other States, furthermore, were generally grown in close proximity to large cities and towns. Truckfarm workers correspondingly were more accessible to the influence of urban trade or industrial unions than were other agricultural laborers. This was even more true of employees in urban semi-industrialized plants, such as nurseries and greenhouses. Strikes in these two occupations together came second in number of States affected and third in total number. By far the majority of strikes in highly urbanized and indus trialized States such as Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey occurred in vegetable farms, greenhouses, and nurseries. The total number of strike participants in these last two industries was less than the number in various crop strikes because the producing units were usually small. Several factors contributed to acute labor unrest in pea crops throughout the country. Many outbreaks were prompted by the abuses suffered tfnder the contractor system. Pea growers were often largescale speculators who raised the crop on tracts of land which they leased from individual owners. The intensively grown and highly perishable crop required large supplies of migratory labor for a few weeks’ har vesting each season. A s peas were often raised in areas somewhat removed from m ajor population centers, growers tended to rely upon agents or contractors to recruit the labor and supervise the picking operations. By this means growers were able to avoid some of the risks and burdens of management. A t the same time, they freed themselves from responsi bility for the welfare of their employees and often allowed exploitation to occur. The extreme susceptibility of peas to spoilage from unforeseen weather changes meant the constant risk of loss of income to labor, grower, and contractor alike; this tended to bring tension and group conflict. Pea pickers were one of the most specialized types of seasonal agricultural workers. Many of them worked only in this crop, follow ing a cycle of pea harvests over several States. They tended to have greater cohesiveness or group consciousness than did migratory laborers who worked in a wide variety of crops, and consequently were more inclined to organize and strike. Similar job uncertainty and friction prevailed in such crops as ber ries, apples, peaches, and hops, all of which suffered numerous strikes, large and small. They were generally grown in concentrated areas which required large importations of. migratory labor for harvesting. There were fewer strikes among the workers in these crops than in peas, per haps chiefly because labor contractors were less prevalent. Furthermore, such fruits and vegetables were usually grown on smaller farms. The 36 LABOR U N IO N ISM IN A M E R IC A N AG RICU LTU RE peach industry in California was an exception, being concentrated in large-scale orchards bordered by highways and crossroads, which ren dered them accessible or vulnerable to union agitation, picketing, and strikes. The citrus-fruit industry, which was among the leading crops in size and number of strikes, was perhaps a special case in farm-labor relations. A ll but one small strike among 20 in this crop occurred in California and Florida, where the structure of the industry was strikingly similar. O f all farm crops, citrus fruit was one of the most highly com mercialized and integrated. Private or cooperatively owned processing concerns usually hired most of the labor and performed for passive grove owners the major functions of production and sale— growing, cultivat ing, “ caretaking,” harvesting, packing, shipping, and marketing. Citrusfruit workers were usually employed more continuously throughout the year than were those in other crops, and the requirements in accuracy and speed placed them in the category of semiskilled and skilled labor. In California, moreover, they had been for many years almost all of one race— Mexican. F or a long time cotton production has presented the most serious labor problem in American agriculture. Though fourth in the number of farm strikes through the Nation during the thirties, this crop was first in the number of strikers participating, with a total of almost 48,000. Six large and violent walk-outs in California alone included almost 28,000 workers. The huge scope of the cotton strikes in that State was attributed to a number of related factors. The crop employed more seasonal and migratory workers than did any other in California. Cotton farms in that State, moreover, were extraordinarily large in scale and impersonal in their labor relations. A s Dr. Paul S. Taylor pointed out, California produced less than 2 percent of the Nation’s cotton crop in 1929, but contained 30 percent of the Nation’s large-scale cotton farms.4 The specific issue which provoked widespread dissatisfaction and unrest among workers in this crop (discussed in greater detail later) was the particularly one-sided bargaining relationship. Growers in California practised monopolistic wage setting through regional employers’ associa tions. Cotton laborers became acutely aware of their disadvantaged bar gaining position, particularly after years of repeated agitation and stress on the part of labor organizers. General discontent tended to flare, periodically, into overt strike action and conflict during periods of de pression and wage cutting. Strikes carried out after work had begun were the only means of improving wages and other conditions, after wage scales had been determined by collective agreement among the growers beforehand. In a highly organized industry of this type, local sporadic walk-outs were obviously out of the question. They could suc ceed only in poorly organized crops like peas, hops, berries, and apples, in which bargaining was more individualized and competitive. Strikes in cotton were relatively few but large. They did not develop until labor unrest was acute and prevalent over an entire growing area. Once they did break out, they tended rapidly to become crop-wide or “ general” in scope, involving thousands of laborers. Extreme specialization in cotton production in the South had created serious problems of land exhaustion, chronic poverty, and dependency, 4Hearing of LaFollette Committee, Part 47 (p. 17224). C H . IV .-----N A T IO N A L PERSPECTIVE 37 which in themselves discouraged farm-labor militancy. Rural unionism was further hindered by the strong racial divisions between N egro and white, and by the taboos of tradition and caste which were imposed on sharecroppers and day laborers under the plantation system. A few big strikes organized by sharecroppers' unions in the South occurred in areas where the old-style plantations were breaking down and adopting a structure similar to the large agricultural enterprises of California and Arizona. This process wrought widespread hardship and group friction in such areas as the Mississippi bottom lands of eastern Arkansas and the Black Belt of southern Alabama. Large plantations, in order to adopt mechanized production methods, uprooted their sharecroppers and tenants and hired casual day laborers for short periods o f cotton “ chop ping” and picking. Certain crops which were grown widely in several States experienced strikes only in California. These strikes, some of which were notably large and violent, tended to substantiate the hypothesis that the special structure and labor relations of California farming were particularly conducive to unrest. Lettuce, celery, asparagus, melons, grapes, apri cots, peaches, and pears were raised in many States as part of the varied produce of small diversified farms. In California, large specialized agri cultural enterprises dominated the production and sale of these crops. Lettuce, celery, and asparagus farms in that State had labor relations in some respects similar to those in the raising of vegetables and citrus fruits. The crops in certain areas were located close to urban centers— lettuce near Salinas, and celery near Stockton and Los Angeles— and the workers were subject to the stimulus of the urban labor movement. Moreover, they were more homogeneous racially than in most crops, being almost all Filipino or Mexican. Harvesting these crops, finally, required more experience than was needed for other fruits and vegetables. This served to set these workers apart as a group not easily replaceable, with a bargaining power stronger than most seasonal agricultural work ers could achieve. Cutting celery, asparagus, and lettuce was in the cate gory of semiskilled rather than unskilled labor, and the wage rates were usually higher than those paid for other seasonal harvest work. Process ing jobs of packing and shipping fruits and vegetables were skilled tasks earning high rates of pay. Field and shed workers in these crops both won collective-bargaining gains hitherto unattained in other agricultural work. Strong unionism and large strikes in fruit and vegetable industries developed as a by product of integration and horizontal combination in business relation ships. Large packing and shipping companies frequently owned or con trolled a m ajor part of the acreage and output in each special crop area. These enterprises in turn were prone to organize into producer or employer associations in order to control marketing policy and labor relations. Collective bargaining and strikes had to be industry-wide to be effective against the opposition of such highly organized employers. Packing-shed work and field labor in celery and asparagus, as in citrus fruits, were so closely related as to be almost inseparable as col lective-bargaining units. A sharper line was drawn between skilled, white, shed workers and semiskilled or unskilled, nonwhite, field labor in such crops as fresh fruits, melons and lettuce. W hite shed workers were the first to organize, and their unions were strong. They established a pattern of action which field workers attempted to follow. O n some 38 LABOR U N IO N IS M IN A M E R IC A N AG R IC U L TU R E occasions the two separately organized groups cooperated to carry out joint collective bargaining and sympathetic or “ general” strikes. Several crops in which strikes occurred ivere limited to relatively small and compact farming localities. Climatic or topographical condi tions, as well as large-scale operations and special labor requirements, were important determinants. Unionism and strikes among sugar-beet workers were restricted to certain highly concentrated factory districts on the Michigan-Ohio border, the irrigated valleys of the Arkansas and South Platte Rivers in Colorado, and the Oxnard area of Ventura County in California. Strikes in sheep raising occurred almost solely in limited areas of the R ocky Mountain and Pacific Coast States where the indus try was concentrated in large-scale ranches hiring itinerant skilled shear ers. Large strikes confined to limited crop areas occurred also in the cranberry bogs of the Cape Cod region in Massachusetts, the tobacco plantations of the Connecticut Valley in Connecticut and Massachusetts, and the hop fields of Polk County and nearby areas in Oregon. The conclusion is unavoidable that strikes were largest and most prevalent in crop areas where farming was specialized, intensive, and large-scale, and where growers depended upon large supplies of seasonal and often nonresident labor for short periods of harvesting. Labor unionism had the greatest appeal in farm industries in which groweremployers were themselves well organized to control the prices of labor and produce, and in which the labor supply was more than ordinarily homogeneous in racial composition and occupational skills. Strike Issues Material hardship following a severe depression was the paramount factor generating widespread labor unrest during the 1930’s. The ob jec tives of most strikes were primarily economic, as indicated by the preva lence of wage demands. Ham and Folsom estimated that wages were a source of controversy in five out of every six strikes, and were the sole issue in two out of three strikes. The influence of expanding unionism during the middle and late thirties was indicated by 37 strikes in which demands for recognition and job preference were primary. W orking hours were important issues in at least 17 strikes, and working condi tions in at least 14.5 The main issues that gave rise to California’s numerous strikes in the thirties have been compiled by several Government agencies. O f 113 strikes analyzed by the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 60 involving 42,317 workers concerned wages and hours as the major issues, while 34 involving 36,902 workers concerned recognition and discrimination in employment.6 These included a number of strikes in urbanized process ing industries. A more accurate picture of labor trouble in field agri culture is furnished in a sample of 96 farm strikes in California reported by the U . S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics during 1933-38. Issues regarding wages, hours, and working conditions caused 63 strikes or almost two-thirds of the total; wages, hours, and recognition caused 14; recognition alone caused 7 ; organizational issues caused 4 ; and miscel laneous or unknown issues caused 8.6 5Testimony of William T. Ham and Josiah C. Folsom, at Hearings of La Follette Committee, May 8, 1940. 6Hearings of LaFollette Committee, Part 47 (p. 17211). CH. IV.-----N A T IO N A L PERSPECTIVE 39 Organized workers tended t.o be preoccupied with basic economic demands in a field of employment in which labor’s bargaining power was weak and annual earnings were among the lowest of any occupation. Minimum-wage standards and other protective labor legislation passed by State and Federal Governments were almost completely lacking for this group. Unionism in most fields of agriculture was a new develop ment in the thirties, and labor organizations lasted for more than one season in only a few crop areas. Advanced union demands, such as closed shop, union hiring halls, seniority preference, maximum hours, and over time rates, became paramount strike issues chiefly in well-organized processing industries that employed skilled white labor. Violence in Strikes Agricultural workers who organized unions and participated in strikes were subjected frequently to legal and extra-legal intimidation and vio lence. Suppression of many kinds could be employed safely against an occupational group which was heterogeneous in composition, low in social status, weak in bargaining power, poorly paid, lacking in political influence, and denied the benefits of protective labor legislation. Many tenants, sharecroppers, and laborers in Southern States were prevented from voting, under State poll taxes and Jim Crow laws. Seasonal farm workers in California and other States were politically impotent because large numbers were disfranchised by their alien citizenship or their inability to maintain a stable residence which the right to vote required. Hence they could count on little protection from elected representatives of the law in communities where they worked for short periods of time. Local residents and law-enforcement agencies usually sided with groweremployers. They tended to be violently opposed to unionism and strikes because of the high perishability of farm crops, and the alleged irre sponsibility of casual and migratory laborers. Agricultural strikes, largest and most numerous in California, were most highly publicized and investigated there by newspapers, private research organizations, and government agencies. The record of farmlabor unrest on the whole was one of turmoil, violence, illegality, and infringement of civil liberties. In a summary presented before the U . S. Senate Committee on Edu cation and Labor, H enry H . Fowler reported a total of 65 strikes involv ing civil and criminal disturbances in agricultural and allied industries, affecting 30 counties in California from January 1, 1933, to July 1, 1939. Fourteen violent strikes (a number of them in processing industries) occurred during the peak year 1937. Strikes among field workers alone reached their peak in 1933. The manifestations o f turmoil in these strikes were numerous and varied: Arrests were made in 39 out o f 65 strikes. Riots, violence, and injuries occurred in 32 strikes. Use o f munitions marked 16 strikes. Ranking fourth in frequency are evictions and deportations, which took place in 15 instances. Other types o f disturbances include 11 strikes involving property damage, 10 involving intimidation, 8 involving vigilante action, and 5 involving death. Again it should be observed that these are only the instances in the press; undoubtedly the information is far from complete. (Hearings o f La Follette Committee, Part 47, p. 17212.) This picture of California’s agriculture should not obscure the seri ousness of the less-frequent outbreaks in other farm areas. In propor654107° — 46—4 40 LABOR U N IO N IS M IN A M E R IC A N AG RICU LTU RE tion to numbers involved, the tactics. of combat indicating frictional labor relations appear to have been employed even more intensely, although less widely, in other States. Various farm areas which adopted California’s methods of crop production also acquired its pattern of agricultural labor relations. Violent disturbances and legal suppression were employed most widely in industries and crops which experienced the largest, most numerous, and long-sustained strikes. These conflict situations tended to develop when grower-employers were well organized in both the pro duce and labor markets, so that militant unionism seemed to be the only effective means by which labor could win economic gains. The agricul tural strikes which brought the most violence and death in California and the Nation as a whole occurred among the cotton workers. The most long-sustained conflicts between highly organized employers and employees developed among those in lettuce and in fruit and vegetable canning. Violence and legal suppression often accompanied strikes occurring in very perishable crops, such as peas, peaches, hops, and apples, employ ing highly migratory labor groups. These laborers usually were too unstable and precarious in economic status to be strongly organized. Neither they nor their employers could afford long-continued strikes, and hence the issues usually were settled by quick victory or quick defeat. Strikebreaking and Legal Restriction Anti-unionism and strikebreaking were spontaneous in most areas. Short-lived protective associations, vigilante committees, and sometimes merely unplanned mob action tended to develop where farm strikes threatened to ruin crops and thus destroy part of a community’s income. Permanent, anti-union employers’ associations in agriculture were organ ized only in States on the Pacific Coast where farm-labor unionism was a long-sustained and continuous social movement. The seriousness of farm-labor unrest in California and neighboring States also brought forth special effort to control strikes through legislative means in that region. The violence reached in agricultural strikes aroused in many quar ters opposition to the wholesale suppression of civil liberties. The tra ditionally western institution known as “ vigilantism” had been designed originally as the respectable citizens’ method for maintaining order and protection of property when the established forces of the law had been found inadequate. It lost a good deal of its romantic aura when employed by powerful economic interests against laborers who lacked even the normal amount of security and legal status. A s was disclosed in the Senate hearings already mentioned, employ ers’ organizations like the Associated Farmers of California had been formed to break farm-labor unionism and suppress strikes by means of more or less “ direct action.” In time such organizations came to rely increasingly upon local forces of law and order. Branches o f the A sso ciated Farmers in many counties established themselves as groups from which county sheriffs could choose the required number of deputies in case of strikes. In this way force could be applied against the strikers, but in a more disciplined and strictly legal fashion. C H . IV .-----N A T IO N A L PERSPECTIVE 41 The Associated Farmers and allied organizations at the same time attempted to create a more favorable public opinion and pressed for legis lation that would curb labor unionism in agriculture. They were remark ably successful because the organized weight of resident property own ers tended to be paramount in county elections. By the late thirties no less than 31 of California’s 58 counties, covering a major portion of all agricultural areas in the State, had passed antipicketing ordinances. H enry H . Fowler summarized the main prohibitory clauses incorporated in these ordinances: * * * Obstruction o f any public passageway prohibited in 27 counties; use o f language, noise, or gestures in 9 counties; picketing for the purpose of inducing others to quit work or not to seek employment in 18 counties; picketing with the intent o f inducing persons to boycott a place o f business in 17 counties ; obstruction o f any public entrance or approach in 17 counties. A $500 maximum fine and/or 6 months imprisonment is the penalty in 26 counties. (Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 47, p. 17213.) The Associated Farmers of California was not so successful on a State-wide and regional scale. State Associated Farmers units were organized in Arizona, Oregon, and Washington, and joined forces in a “ Pacific Coast hook-up.” In cooperation with other anti-union employer associations and sympathizers the Associated Farmers in California, Oregon, and Washington sponsored a referendum for a popular vote to enact State antipicketing laws. The measure failed to pass in California and Washington, but was enacted as State law in Oregon. The Associated Farmers also acted nationally to influence Federal Government policy. It cooperated with other employer interests in lobbies and pressure groups to agitate for the exemption of labor in agri culture and allied industries from the provisions of such Federal labor legislation as the Social Security A ct, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the National Labor Relations Act. The last named, in particular, alarmed agricultural employers, as its jurisdiction had extended to several important processing industries and thus allowed unions to gain a foothold in these fields. Mediation and Arbitration Many attempts were made to lessen the intensity of labor-employer conflict in agriculture. Federal, State, and county government bodies as well as various private groups continually sought to settle strike issues by mediation and, in a few cases, arbitration. Their efforts were not marked with success in most - instances. Their main value in the long run, perhaps, was in bringing controversial issues to the attention of the public and thus indirectly lessening the intransigeance of the contending parties. Mediators faced formidable difficulties in agriculture because pro tective labor legislation was almost completely absent. They met with deep suspicion from both employers and employees. The growers in particular had a tendency to oppose outside intervention because media tion and arbitration of disputes implied a certain recognition of collective bargaining and unionism among laborers. Farm employer spokesmen in the early thirties justified their position mainly on the grounds that agricultural unions were Communist dominated. Later they opposed just as strongly any recognition or mediation of disputes with full-fledged organizations affiliated with the A .F . of L. and C .I.O ., on the ground 42 LABOR U N IO N ISM IN A M E R IC A N AG RICU LTU RE that labor unionism in itself was a menace to an industry producing com modities as perishable as farm crops. Mediation and arbitration, lacking compulsory sanction, could do little of real value in settling strikes satisfactorily. In most cases one of the contending parties was too weak to enforce upon the other the provisions accepted in a settlement. Outside intervention was most suc cessful (fo r short periods at least) in preventing or settling strikes in which the contending parties were both relatively well organized. The turbulence of farm-labor strikes in California aroused persons in many quarters to demand official intervention. Some experts favored the establishment of permanent arbitration boards to which employers and employees could submit their disputes at any time. Such arrangements would prevent losses from strikes and lock-outs'when agreements could not be reached voluntarily. Various points of view were represented in a symposium held by the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco on the question of “ A Farm Labor Disputes Board ?” Profs. Paul S. Taylor and R. L . Adams of the University of California favored establishment of such an institution, created in advance of and without reference to any particular disputes but ready to arbitrate any that developed. Their views found support from agricultural labor-union representatives and the majority of the club’s members.7 Representatives of organized grower-employers, however, were doubt ful or antagonistic in their attitude.8 John F. Pickett, editor of the Pacific Rural Press, expressed his views in no uncertain terms : * * * May I say bluntly so that posal to set up a permanent farm agriculture as an impertinence and else’s business and neglecting their p. 252.) it may be more emphatic, that I feel the pro labor disputes board would be considered by cowardly, as seeming to attend to somebody own. (The Commonwealth, December 1936, M ost grower-employers and labor-union representatives, as well as impartial observers, agreed that the prevailing methods of mediation were on the whole inadequate for settling the problem of agricultural strikes. Mediators were generally unfamiliar with specific labor condi tions and strike issues, and their problems were complicated by the strong feelings of contending groups. These were serious obstacles, particularly because of the brief duration of most agricultural strikes. A s pointed out by one prominent grower-employer, R oy M. Pike, man ager of El Solyo R anch: “ Perishable crops do not lend themselves to mediation because they must be handled in two or three days of their ripening and cannot await meetings and drawn-out decision.” 9 Public interest in the subject declined during the late thirties, as agricultural strikes decreased in number, scope, and violence. 7The Commonwealth (Official Journal of the Commonwealth Club of California), Vol. XII, No. 51, San Francisco. Calif., December 1936 (p. 234). 8Idem (pp. 252-254). 9Idem (p. 242). Chapter V.— Large-Scale Agriculture and Early Farm-Labor Unionism in California Industrialized Agriculture The preceding chapters have indicated that labor-employer conflict in agriculture, particularly during the turbulent thirties, was concen trated to a disproportionate degree in California. Many studies of farmlabor problems in this State have been made by scholars, research experts, government agencies, and others. M ost of their findings have been assem bled in Hearings and Reports of the Subcommittee of the U . S. Senate Committee on Education and Labor investigating Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor. Facts brought out in these studies sub stantiate the hypothesis formulated in the previous chapter, namely, that disturbed labor relations are a product of a type of farm structure that has reached its fullest development in California. The pattern of land ownership and operation which developed earliest and most extensively in California has been termed “ factory farming” or “ industrialized agriculture.” 1 Its most obvious attributes have been an extraordinarily large scale of operation, extreme specialization, and a high degree of mechanization. Agricultural enterprises of this type began early in California because its land, since the beginning of settlement by early Spanish and Mexican colonists, had been owned, controlled, and administered in huge units. Large-scale farming remained dominant during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries as new crops and methods of production were adopted to meet the demands of new and expanding markets. Crops were grown more intensively, heavy capital investments were required for additional farm equipment and land im provements, and more labor was required per acre. Certain topographical and climatic features favored concentration in specialized large-scale farm production in this State and contributed to the peculiar nature of its labor problems. The land suitable for farm ing lies in a long strip running north and south for several hundred miles, bounded by the Pacific Ocean on the west and high mountain ranges to the east. Valley land along such rivers as the Sacramento and the San Joaquin was particularly fertile, and new farm land was continuously being made available through irrigation. Climatic differences in California from the Mexican border north to Oregon encouraged the cultivation of a wide variety of crops maturing at different months of the year, and each area tended to concentrate on growing one or a few products. Intensive specialized farming, as stressed before, requires adequate supplies of mobile seasonal labor available at the periods o f peak demand. By the time rural California had become largely a series of special crop areas, almost the entire agricultural economy was dependent upon a variably sized body of casual and migratory laborers who,' in order to find continuous employment, had to dovetail brief jobs over a region encompassing many counties and sometimes several States. Differences * *Cf. Report of La Follette Committee, Part III: The Disadvantaged Status of Unorganized Labor in California’s Industrialized Agriculture. 43 44 LABOR U N IO N ISM IN A M E R IC A N AG RICU LTU RE in status and attitude between employer and employee were widened to an extreme degree by the unusual size of many farming enterprises, the high proportion of casual workers in the farm population, and the extreme mobility of these workers. On large farms they were generally employed as members of gangs or crews to perform standardized repetitive tasks. Mass production in the large-scale California agricultural enterprise, in the words of one expert, “ brought about what may be called the mechani zation of the human element in the industry/’ 2 In agriculture, wages, hours, conditions of work, living facilities, and, above all, job security, have long been far below the standards generally applying to other industries in California. Seasonality precluded the security to be gained through permanence of employment. Haphazard hiring methods and uncontrolled individual and group migrations made job security through seniority preference or other such arrangements almost impossible to achieve. Low income, intermittent employment, and high mobility imposed the discomforts of poverty— inadequate hous ing, deficiencies in food, lack of educational and medical facilities, and the like. The exceedingly low social status and standards o f living of casual and migratory workers served to set them off as a distinct caste. Legally, however, they continued to be looked upon as enjoying more than ordinary security and personal solicitude from their employers. Hence, more than any other occupational group, they were denied the benefits of social legislation and protection of their civil liberties. This seriously disadvantaged position drove agricultural workers in this State periodically to organize and strike against their employers. Hardship alone was not sufficient cause for their taking organized action. On the contrary, their extremely precarious economic position was apt to preclude the growth of strong unionism. Historically, labor unrest in California has not always been most widespread when farm wages and working conditions were worst. Also, though the most militant farm-labor movements developed in that State, the standards of wages and employment there have usually been above those of other intensive farm ing regions. The striking inequalities between farm employers and employees and the wide margin between rural and urban labor standards appear to have been the most important factors contributing to labor unrest in California’s agriculture. L ow wages became a source of widespread complaint and a stimulus to organized protest when they were enforced by the superior bargaining power of large and well-financed employers. This was particularly true when growers in certain crop areas cooperated among themselves in order to fix wages and recruit labor. The trade-union movement had become strongly established in several cities and towns of California during the latter part of the nineteenth century, and many urban trades were better paid in that State than elsewhere. Contact with industrial labor groups whose economic status had been raised through collective bargaining gave agricultural workers a strong and continuous incentive to unionize. Periodically they attempted to transplant to the rural scene the structure and tactics of established urban trade-unions. 2Wells A. Sherman, Chief Marketing Specialist of the U. S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics, quoted in testimony by Dr. Paul S. Taylor, Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 47 (p. 17228). C H . V.---- LARGE-SCALE AG RICU LTU RE IN C A L IFO R N IA 45 Farm-labor unions usually met with more than ordinary hostility and violence from grower-employers and their sympathizers in Califor nia, as was pointed out in Chapter IV . W ages are almost the only vari able cost which farm employers feel they can revise to meet fluctuating economic conditions; and they usually constitute a more significant pro portion of total costs for large, specialized agricultural enterprises than for small diversified farms. Absolute control over wage rates, free from intervention by outside agencies, the growers thus deem essential. Agricultural employers, moreover, constantly fear heavy losses because of the perishability of many crops. Labor unionism and strikes consti tute further risks in addition to wind and weather. In contrast to most urban industries, a crop loss represents not merely current output, but investments for an entire season or even a year. A spokesman of the California Fruit Growers and Farmers summed up the situation as fol lows : The problems o f farm labor are so different from those o f industry, that, while we farmers have no quarrel with the aims of the legitimate industrial labor unions, we would regard the unionization o f farm labor, under existing conditions, as absolutely ruinous to us as well as to the laborers themselves. The main differences, as almost all o f you know, are as follow s: 1. Owing to the perishable nature o f his crop, a farmer cannot afford to have his harvesting delayed, while negotiating with strikers. ( x ) A week's delay, or in some cases 2 days' delay, will destroy his whole year's income and the much larger amount he has spent in producing the crop. (y ) The labor agitators always plan to call their strikes at the most critical stages o f the harvesting.3 The causes of the acute labor problems which California’s agriculture faces lie far back in the history of the State. Large-scale farms growing intensive cash crops for distant markets had become numerous by the third quarter of the nineteenth century, and the low-paid migratory seasonal laborers who harvested the crops were already an important and identifiable occupational class in the population. Once established, this agricultural system tended to be self-perpetuating. Land values rose as more and more capital was invested in improvements, machinery, and other equipment required for intensive cultivation. H igh land values were derived from the capitalization of large net profits, actual and potential, which the land could earn. Profitability o f the land, in turn, depended in no small measure upon low labor costs. Large and continuous supplies of cheap mobile labor then became an outright neces sity if the established agricultural system was not to be disorganized or transformed drastically. Farms burdened with large fixed or overhead costs imposed by highly capitalized land values could continue to operate profitably only as long as adequate numbers o f low-paid seasonal work ers were available.4 F or several decades California growers have been preoccupied, peri odically, with the search for new sources of labor. Inferior wages and working conditions constantly impelled agricultural workers to seek employment in other industries when they had the opportunity, and their places had to be filled by new recruits. For the past 70 years or more these have been drawn from successive waves of low-paid racial and cul 3Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 47 (p. 17219). 4For a fuller discussion of this subject see Varden Fuller: The Supply of Agricultural Labor as a Factor in the Evolution of Farm Organization in California, published in Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 54 (p. 19802). 46 LABOR U N IO N IS M IN A M E R IC A N A G R IC U L TU R E tural groups.5 Chinese came first, followed more or less chronologically by Japanese, Hindustani, Mexicans, Filipinos, and a minority of other elements including the native white American “ hobo” of the type studied by Carlton Parker.6 Each racial group in time acquired some of the techniques and standards established by urban workers. In California, farm workers of almost every race have participated in strikes and attempted to organ ize unions at one time or another. Periodically, the farm-labor m ove ment took the form of organized race conflict. The Chinese and Race Conflict in Agriculture Labor unionism and organized conflict in a primitive form first ap peared on a significant scale in rural California when the Chinese became an important part of the agricultural labor supply. They were mobile, efficient, and available in large numbers at wages much below the ordinary urban standards, and were an important factor enabling large farms to convert from intensive grain crops and livestock to intensive fruit and vegetable growing.7 A s a racial minority excluded from other industries and subject to considerable intimidation from the white community, the Chinese in agriculture were not in a position to organize unions for collective bar gaining. In fact, their industriousness and lack of militancy made them the more desirable as employees. Like other immigrant groups in later years, however, the Chinese developed an indigenous form of labor organi zation which they transplanted to rural areas. Quite early, in San Fran cisco and other urban centers, they had formed native “ brotherhoods” or “ protective associations” known as tongs. The California Bureau of Labor Statistics in its Third Biennial Report for 1888 (p. 84) described these as a type of “ trade-unions” which “ are very rarely heard of, but nevertheless exist and are very powerful. In case of a strike or boycott they are fierce and determined in their action, making a bitter and prolonged fight.” Although some organized strikes took place among Chinese workers in urban trades during these early years, there is little to indicate that similar developments of any importance arose in rural areas.8 The tong became, instead of a labor union, a type of employment agency which facilitated the recruiting and hiring of Chinese for seasonal jobs requiring considerable mobility. It was a forerunner of the laborcontractor system which became more firmly established among other racial groups. This system, as first developed among the Chinese, in volved a division of the entrepreneurial functions of hiring and firing between the grower-employer and a representative o f the labor group. s See Paul S. Taylor and Tom Vasey: Historical Background of California Farm Labor, in Rural Sociology, Vol. I, No. 3, September 1936 (pp. 289-295). 6Carlton Parker: The Casual Laborer and Other Essays, New York, 1920. 7Fuller, op. cit., Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 54 (pp. 19802-19811). 8One strike of Chinese demanding higher wages was reported in 1884. It involved a “ large force” of hop pickers on the Haggin Grant in Kern County. In this case employers planned ^to replace the Chinese with Negroes, but the latter were found to be too inexperienced. (Pacific Rural Press, Aug. 30, 1884, p. 164.) A limited and short-lived union of Chinese agricultural workers was noted in 1890, but was regarded somewhat lightly. The California Fruit Grower in its August 23, 1890, issue made passing reference to <r * * * a Chinese labor union and its $1.50 per day demand for work in the orchards and vineyards.” C H . V.-----LARGE-SCALE AG RICULTURE IN CA L IFO R N IA 47 The latter, as contractor, customarily received a flat sum from the grower for the work of the laborers he represented. From this he paid each individual worker a wage agreed upon beforehand. A s the system devel oped later, the contractor was often allowed a certain amount by groweremployers for each laborer he recruited. Sometimes he made an addi tional profit by furnishing supplies or room and board to the crew. Many abuses developed from time to time under this system, because of the many opportunities open to the contractor to exploit his lesssophisticated labor force.9 A s first developed, however, it offered the most suitable means for the occupational adjustment of unassimilated groups, with tangible advantages to both parties in the wage bargain. Like the padrone system in the industrial Northeast, the labor-contrac tor arrangement prevailed when a language barrier existed between employer and employees. For workers who were unable to speak English adequately and were as yet unfamiliar with the labor market in which they dealt, there were obvious gains in leaving the necessary business arrangements of job finding to a more sophisticated and experienced member who could act as official spokesman. The system constituted a type of collective bargaining in a semi-union form of organization. There were tangible advantages in this labor relationship for groweremployers also. Their persistent preference for nonwhite labor was ex plained in large part by the fact that whites seldom worked under a contractor. W orkers were more readily available when the employer, to recruit the labor supply he needed for a certain job, had only to con tact the “ Chinese boss” or “ head man” and specify the number of men wanted, where they were needed, and when. The grower was. relieved of almost all administrative or supervisory duties of hiring, firing, or even paying the men individually, since all negotiations were carried on through one bargaining agent. It was not necessary to provide board for the working crew (as it generally was for whites) and the most meager housing was usually accepted. After the harvesting operations were over, the crew would leave for other seasonal jobs or return to the cities to subsist on their “ stakes.” 10 The first instances of organized labor-employer conflict or the “ labor movement” in California agriculture began in the form of race riots rather than of unions organized for carrying on collective bargaining. Anti-Oriental agitation gave the trade-union movement in urban centers a heightened cohesiveness and unity of purpose. In small towns and nearby rural areas it stimulated a degree of collective action which at that time was unusual among small farmers and agricultural laborers. Throughout the late 1880’s and 1890’s the Chinese were subjected to increasing violence and intimidation. Their emigration in large num bers to rural areas brought a pattern of race relations earlier established in such cities as San Francisco. 9The United States Industrial Commission in 1901 reported that— “ Hundreds of coolie laborers brought into this country by the vicious ‘high-binder* tongs were hired out as ‘gangs’ under the supervision of ‘bosses,’ who in turn collected the wage of the laborers and turned the greater part over to some company of the highbinder.** (Office of the United States Industrial Commission, Report to Congress, December 5, 1901.) However, the coolie system of recruiting labor was not prevalent in agriculture as it had been earlier in railroad construction. Most of the workers on farms had already paid their in debtedness to the various labor-recruiting companies and were thus free to seek work where they pleased. W ith increasing knowledge and experience of individual members, the opportu nity for exploitation decreased. (Final Report, Commission on Industrial Relations, Vol. S, pp. 4941. 4950.) 10Fu!ler, in Hearings o f La Follette Committee, Part 54 (p. 19811). 48 LABOR U N IO N ISM IN A M E R IC A N AG RICU LTU RE A s early as 1877 farmers were reported to have received anonymous notes warning them to cease employing Chinese.1 Isolated instances of 1 violence against Chinese in rural areas occurred throughout the period of anti-Oriental agitation in cities. N o organized opposition to their employment in agriculture appeared until several years later. General business depression and unemployment from 1883 to 1887 led to considerable labor ferment throughout the United States. The year 1885 witnessed a virtual epidemic of strikes in many States of the Union. Labor unrest spread to agricultural areas, particularly in Califor nia, where it was manifested chiefly in the form of anti-Oriental agita tion.12 Unemployment in urban industries drove many city laborers, white as well as Chinese, to seek work on farms, and there the competi tion for jobs and the resulting wage cuts fanned the flames of race con flict. Violence against Chinese became more frequent and widespread, and boycotts directed against growers employing them were organized in many districts. B y 1886 this anti-Oriental movement had become sufficiently serious to impel grower-employers to organize strong meas ures in self-defense. In such districts as Vacaville, Mendocino, Petaluma, Newcastle, Santa Cruz, Santa Clara, and Sacramento, hop growers, fruit growers, canners, and sympathetic local businessmen called special meetings and in a few cases established protective organizations.13 The Fruit Growers and Citizens Defense Association of Santa Clara County was organized in April 1886, for the purpose of resisting organized boycotts and preventing interference with the Chinese labor supply.1 4 A t a meeting of* hop and fruit growers in Grangers Hall in Sacramento in the same month, the boycott of Chinese was “ discussed and com demned.,, Rifles were suggested as a means for handling the boycotters, portrayed as “ unemployed who won’t work.” Said one spokesman: If you discharge your Chinamen and employ white men you cannot depend upon your help at all. They will not work in the berry patch, the hop yard, or the fruit orchard so long as they can drive the header or follow the thresher. (Pacific Rural Press, April 3, 1886, p. 332.) Anti-Chinese agitation abated temporarily toward the end of 1886, as industry began to revive and surplus white laborers were reemployed in cities and towns. Scattered instances of labor trouble and race conflict during the next few years dealt more directly with economic issues con nected with strikes.15 A strike of white grape pickers was reported as early as 1887.16 In 1888 a small group of white strikers on a sugar-beet ranch operated by the Spreckels Co. forced a minority of Chinese to cease working also. A s reported in the Pacific Rural Press of June 9, 1888, a crew of 25 white boys collectively demanded wage rates equal to those being paid a crew of 14 Chinese, viz, $1.15 to $1.25 per day. W hen the employer refused, the whites went on strike and stoned the Chinese, who fled the fields until the strikers left. The relatively peaceful conditions incidental to prosperity and full employment were temporary. Again, during the 1890’s, the tide of antiChinese sentiment swept through rural areas. Organized boycotts and 11Pacific Rural Press, Vol. XIII, June 30, 1877 (p. 408). 12Idem, March 7, 1885. 13See Pacific Rural Press, issues of February 27, 1886 (pp. 196, 197, 209), March 13, 1886 (p. 278), and April 3, 1886 (p. 332). 14Idem, April 24, 1886 (p. 412). 15David Lubin, in a letter published in the Pacific Rural Press of August 18, 1888, regard ing labor troubles on California ranches, blamed -them on the employment of “ coolies,” on “ gruffness” of employers, and on generally poor working conditions. 16Reports of Senate Committee on Immigration, 1911, Part 25, Vol. II (p. 229). C H . V.-----LAR G E -SCA LE AG RICU LTU RE IN CALIFO RN IA 49 violent mob action grew in intensity. One writer even claimed that “ a condition approximating civil war broke out in the great valleys of California.” 1* Basic to this conflict, as in the previous instance of 1886, was the chronic unemployment brought by Nation-wide industrial stagnation. The labor supply in agriculture was increased to the point of superabundance throughout , the nineties.1 Unemployed whites were placed in direct 18 7 competition with Chinese and, increasingly, with newly arrived Japanese who were forced to resort to wage cutting in order to obtain employment. Racial antipathies were sharpened. Drastic wage reductions were put into effect in many agricultural areas during 1893 and 1894, leading to a series of riots and race conflicts. Beginning in August 1893, in the vicinity of Fresno, some 300 Chi nese field laborers were driven from their work by white men. Rioting soon became general in the San Joaquin Valley, centering in the vicinities of Tulare, Visalia, and Fresno. A white laborers’ union in Napa Valley was organized as a result of a mass meeting held to protest the employment of Chinese in prune orchards. In the vicinity of Compton in southern California, “ hoodlums” joined by sailors and longshoremen from San Pedro were reported to have raided fields and driven out the Chinese. Night raiders in Redlands, heart of the citrus belt, broke into Chinese camps. Rioting became so acute, according to one writer, that the National Guard was summoned and 200 special deputy sheriffs were sworn in. The disturbances spread farther north and culminated in a m ajor outbreak at Ukiah.19 The turmoil continued on a smaller scale the following year. In Febru ary 1894, a gang of Chinese brought into Anaheim to pick oranges was driven out by organized mobs of whites. Subsequently another gang was brought in under police guard.20 In Vacaville a mob calling itself the “ Industrial A rm y” terrorized Japanese and Chinese. A ccording to the Sacramento R ecord Union of May 18, 1894, “ the county is aroused, and will assert its right to have its employees continue undisturbed in their ranch work.” A few days later citizens were reported to be arming them selves to protect their Oriental labor.21 In August a “ large crowd of white men” was reported to have driven a hundred Chinese from their work at a packing house in Santa Rosa.22 Again, in November 1894, the Pacific Rural Press reported that “ vandalism” had broken out in the Vaca Valley as “ marauding tramps, ISO in a bunch, organized in squads with captains and lieutenants,” raided orchards, cut down fruit trees, and drove out Chinese and Japanese laborers.23 Anti-Oriental agitation and conflict diminished later in the decade, as business conditions improved and the farm-labor surplus decreased through rapid reemployment in city industries. The position of the Chinese in agriculture improved considerably, as their numbers were limited by immigration restrictions and as opposition to their employment in other trades relaxed. According to the California Bureau of Labor Statistics in its Ninth Biennial Report for 1899-1900 (p. IS ) : 17Carey McWilliams: Factories in the Fields, New York, 1939 (p. 74). 18The Pacific Rural Press in April 1894, for example, reported that it was easier to get men at 50 to 75 cents per day than it formerly had been at $1. (Pacific Rural Press, Apr. 7, 1894, pp. 264, 265.) l9McWilliams, op. cit. (p. 75). 20Pacific Rural Press, March 3, 1894 (p. 174). 21Idem, May 24, 1894. 22Idem, August 18, 1894 (p. 100). 23Idem, November 17, 1894; December 1, 1894 (p. 338). so LABOR U N IO N IS M IN A M E R IC A N AG RICU LTU RE Relieved by the operation o f the Exclusion A ct in great measure from the pressing competition o f his fellow-countrymen, the Chinese worker was not slow to take advantage o f his circumstances and demand in exchange for his labor a higher price and, as time went on, even becoming Americanized to the extent o f enforcing such demands, in some cases, through the medium o f labor organization * * * hence * * * the question o f his competition with the other labor o f the State has lost much o f its importance. Labor Organization Among the Japanese Towards the turn of the century an acute labor scarcity existed in every fruit district in the State. Even with advances in wage rates of 25 percent, 50 percent, and sometimes 100 percent, labor was not always available to harvest fruit as well as grain, hops, hay, and dairy products.24 The deficiency was soon rectified by a large influx of Japanese, whose numbers had been growing steadily during the nineties. It is almost im possible to overestimate the crucial importance of this element in but tressing the large-scale farming economy of the State at that time. In the opinion of Fuller— Their labor enabled the perpetuation o f an organizational structure which had been founded with the Chinese. In the interval between plentiful Chinese and Japanese labor, the structure had been maintained by depression-opportunity whites. The Japanese came at a strategic moment o f prosperity-opportunity for the local whites and carried the system through until recurring depression again gave it security. (Hearings o f La Follette Committee, Part 54, p. 19840.) It was primarily in field, garden, and orchard work that Japanese first appeared. The demand for their services was heightened by the rapid expansion of such crops as sugar beets, rice, and strawberries. By 1898, according to the Industrial Commission on Immigration,25 the Japanese were doing most of the work in beets and were rapidly monopolizing the work in berry cultivation. By 1909 the U .S. Senate Committee on Immi gration26 found that Japanese farm workers constituted some 30,000, and were the most important labor group in almost all types of intensive culti vation. In the southern citrus areas they constituted half to three-fourths of all seasonally employed workers, and in sugar beets, about two-thirds. They were dominant to almost the same degree in melons, celery, hops, and other crops requiring considerable amounts of hand labor.26 A t first the Japanese, like the Chinese before them, were favored as employees because of their relative cheapness and docility. W hen first introduced into agricultural labor, they not only underbid white laborers, but at the outset they even worked for less than the Chinese and Hindu stani. During the late eighties they had been used on some occasions to break strikes by white workers.27 W hen jobs became scarce during the 1890’s, they took the initiative in reducing wage rates. According to the Pacific Rural Press, a gang of Japanese was working in Santa Clara County for 50 cents per day without board, where previously the rates for Chinese had been $1 per day and for whites $1.25 to $1.75.28 During 1896 the Japanese competed with Chinese in the sugar-beet fields of the Pajaro Valley, reducing the contract price from $1.20 to 75 cents per 24Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 54 (p. 19819). 25Reports, Industrial Commission, Vol. 15, 1901. 26Reports, Senate Committee on Immigration, 1911, Vol. 24 (pp. 20-23). 27Idem, Part 25, Vol. II (p. 229). 28Pacinc Rural Press, April 7, 1894 (p. 264). C H . V .---- LAR G E -SCA LE AG RICU LTU RE IN C A L IFO R N IA 51 ton.29 A ccording to Fuller, however, the relation of the Japanese to the Chinese was one of replacement rather than displacement. Japanese competed with other labor groups, particularly in the southern citrus area where Chinese had not penetrated. In consequence, there were periodic outbreaks of anti-Japanese sentiment from Mexicans and whites in this area.30* Like the Chinese before them, the Japanese became established in various crops by organizing themselves into gangs which dealt through one spokesman. This made their labor more available and convenient to grower-employers, for whom it facilitated the problem of recruiting and hiring an adequate labor supply for temporary jobs of harvesting. Like the Chinese also, the Japanese had the additional virtue of providing their own food and housing, thus avoiding intrusion on the family life of the employer. The advantages to the growers in this system were stressed by Clemens Horst, large-scale hop raiser, in testimony before the Commission on Industrial Relations in 1915: You deal with one Hindu, who will furnish you the whole crew. You go to the Japanese and they will furnish you with a hundred or two hundred, and you go to the one man and he will furnish the number o f men. You go to a Chinaman, and he will do the same thing, furnish any number you want.8 1 W hite workers, on the other hand, were more disorganized and unreli able, according to M r. H o rst: * * * you don’t know which lots o f whites are going to stay [through the season]. If there could be some method devised that they could be made to stay and you wouldn’t have to change around all the time, the employers’ position would be very much better.8 1 F or the laborers, job finding was facilitated when one of their number specialized in locating w ork ; this enabled them to dovetail a series of seasonal jobs through a greater part of the year. The origins of this system and its subsequent developments were portrayed by Yam oto Ichihashi in his book, Japanese in the United States.32 * * * In 1892 a Japanese, Kimura, along with a dozen Oriental laborers, arrived in Watsonville. The following year he organized what he termed a club for his followers, as well as for others now entering the district. * * * These were early organized among the Japanese in the nineties to provide cheap lodging and boarding facilities, and to effect easy and inexpensive migration for work and to “ hibernate” successfully. The organizations were sometimes simply groupings o f laborers under a “ boss” who carried on the business o f finding jobs, supervising the workers^ and providing cooking and living quarters, with a secre tary who arranged for jobs on a commission basis, for which dues were charged. “ Camps” organized and run by bosses for their own benefit were formed, func tioning much as did clubs. These organizations greatly simplified job finding, as farmers and laborers alike used these facilities. * * * In time this club became a general rendezvous for the Japanese in the district, and when employers needed extra hands they went to the club and secured the men they wanted. Advantages o f the club were soon recognized by other Japanese leaders. Thus another came into being in 1899. When the writer visited the town in 1908, there were four o f these clubs with a total membership o f 650 in this district, roughly embracing 100 square miles. Each club had a secretary whose function it was to find jobs and arrange them so that its members could work most advantageously. His compensation consisted o f a 5 cent commission collected from each man per day, but he had no fixed salary. When the demand for the 29Report of Senate Committee on Immigration, 1911, Vol. 24 (p. 27). 30Fuller, in Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 54 (p. 19830). 3JSenate Documents, Vol. 23, No. 6933 (64th Cong., 1st Sess.) 1915-16. dustrial Relations, Reports, Vol. 5 (p. 4922). 32London, Oxford Press, 1932 (pp. 172-174). Commission on In 52 LABOR U N IO N IS M IN A M E R IC A N AG RICU LTU RE men was more than the members could supply, he sought outsiders, who obtained jobs by paying him the same commission. These outsiders were not given the privileges o f the club, and remained at boarding houses run for profit. However, anyone could join the club by paying the $5 annual dues, and avail himself of its privileges. When the season o f the district began to slacken, the “ outsider” first withdrew, and some o f its members migrated whenever it was found advantageous to work elsewhere. T o assist these migratory members, the secretary studied the situation in the neighboring districts, if he did not know them already; in fact, he often arranged with employers o f such districts for the employment o f his members before [they] were allowed to move, and in this case he collected his 5 cent com mission. M ore often, however, in order to obtain accurate information from the latter, he communicated with the bosses o f such localities, who were more than glad to furnish the information because they had to secure a labor force fluctuating with the seasonal needs o f their respective districts. When the men secured their jobs through the bosses, they paid their 5 cent commission to them and not to the secretary. Thus the club members kept going from industry to industry and from place to place until there were no more jobs. Then they returned to their clubs to spend the winter, doing such casual jobs as they would pick up in their resi dential district. In time the relationship between bosses and workers became more casual. Often several bosses became associated as contractors, and they in turn employed and directed the general rank-and-file laborers. W ith the completion of any given unit of work, the labor gang would disband and scatter, and succeeding jobs would be performed under new con tractors and under different terms.33 B y 1910, according to the Pacific Rural Press in its issue of June 11— The Japanese control and domination o f labor in orchards, vineyards, gardens, and sugar-beet fields in California has been accomplished by the persistent operation and State expansion o f the boss system. The Japanese soon lost their docility once they had come to dominate the labor market in various crop areas. Their contractor system of organization was utilized as an instrument for militant collective bargain ing. Employed primarily for harvesting operations, they were prone to put pressure on the employer when he was most vulnerable and subject to maximum loss in case of a strike— just when the crop was ripe and in highly perishable condition. It was generally conceded, according to the California Bureau of Labor Statistics, that the Japanese were merci less once they had their employer at a disadvantage. They would work for cheap wages until competition was eliminated and then strike for higher wages. It was charged by growers that when Japanese found their employers in need of help, “ they will strike without any provocation, simply to get an increase, regardless of agreement.” 34 Proceedings of the 1907 convention of the California Fruit Growers (1907, p. 69) expressed the increasing dissatisfaction of grower-employers with Jap anese, and a strong nostalgia for the more tractable Chinese of earlier days: The Chinese when they were here were ideal. They were patient, plodding, and uncomplaining in the performance o f the most menial service. They submitted to anything, never violating a contract. The Japanese now coming in are a tricky and cunning lot, who break contracts and become quite independent. They are not organized into unions, but their clannishness seems to operate as a union would. One trick is to contract work at a certain price and then, in the rush o f the harvest, threaten to strike unless wages are raised. 33California Bureau of Labor Statistics, Ninth Biennial Report, 1900 (p. 23). 34Idem, Twelfth Biennial Report, Sacramento, 1905-6. C H . V.-----LAR GE-SCALE AG RICU LTU RE IN C A L IFO R N IA S3 The Japanese employed strike strategy as early as 1891,353but severe 6 unemployment and competition for jobs with other races during the nineties precluded collective bargaining. In the early 1900’s, when other labor groups migrated to nonagricultural employments, the dominence qf the Japanese in agriculture became more pronounced and their position was strengthened. A series of strikes and boycotts for wage increases was carried out, the effectiveness of which was noted by the Immigration Commission in its Report of 1911. Investigators reported that in several important areas of the State the Japanese “ * * * ]jy securing control of the situation * * * have reduced the workday from 12 hours to 11 hours, and by means of strikes have raised the wages of all races.,,S6 First of such strikes was among Japanese fruit dryers in Hayward (Alam eda C ounty), during August 1902, seeking a wage increase from 8 to 10 cents for cutting apricots. The strikfe was broken when they were replaced by white men.37 Another instance in which Japanese strikers were supplanted by whites occurred in Santa Barbara County in 1906. A s reported in the Pacific Rural Press for October 10, 1906, Japanese walnut pickers employed by the H . R. Owen ranch in Santa Barbara County struck for an increase in wages. Owen had previously contracted with them to pick walnuts from the ground at $13 per ton, and they now asked $15. The request was met with a flat refusal on Owen’s part, but he made an alternative offer of $1.75 per day. W hen they refused this, he replaced them with white men. A strike of Japanese farm workers in Sutter County, in August 1903, was more successful. This walk-out was perhaps typical of many The growers found themselves unable to recruit an alternative labor supply at the height of the harvest season and were forced to give in to the collective demand for a wage increase to $1.40 per day in place of the prevailing $1.25.38 Japanese gained a dominating position in the vineyards of Fresno and exerted organized pressure for wage increases.39 On occasion they utilized some rather unique varieties of “ job action” and “ slow-down” strikes later made famous by the I.W .W . Fuller describes some of these practices as follow s: * * * Once established by working very rapidly on a low time wage, their pace began soon to slow up. In order to get any quantity o f work done, employers had to put them on piece rates, whereupon their activity was said to have undergone an astonishing transformation. They would now work much more rapidly and in addition their gang bosses would undertake contracts for more work than they could perform, in both ways giving little satisfaction by way o f quality. A fter being put on piece rates, the next step frequently was for the Japanese to attempt to con tract with the grower to attend the whole detail o f harvesting his crop on a share basis. As a bargaining argument the Japanese were able to assure the producer that he would get none o f their countrymen to work for him the following season if he did not meet their demands. (Fuller, op cit., p. 19834.) The first important field workers’ strike to cross racial lines took place in March 1903. It involved approximately a thousand Japanese and Mexican sugar-beet workers in Oxnard (Ventura County). This inci 35California Fruit Grower, Vol. VD I, June 13, 1891 (p. 378). 36Reports of Senate Committee on Immigration, 1911, Vol. 24 (p. 229). 37Oakland Tribune, August 4, 1902. 38The Pacific Rural Press of August 15, 1903 (p. 103), in commenting on this incident, ob served that “ the Japs are becoming in a measure. schooled in the ways of Americans and on last Tuesday went on strike. They asked for a raise of 15 cents a day. They were being paid $1.25 per day and demanded $1.40. The fruit was ripening rapidly, and the little brown men had their employers in a corner, which they were not slow in realizing, and took the opportunity of making a raise. Their demands were promptly met by the growers, and everything was soon working smoothly in these orchards.” ^California Fruit Grower, Vol. XXV III, April 18, 1903 (p. 4). LABOR U N IO N ISM 54 IN A M E R IC A N AG RICU LTU RE dent caused reverberations throughout organized-labor circles in southern California, as it brought to the fore the question of including nonwhite casual agricultural laborers in the hitherto exclusively white trade-unions. The extremely low wages paid in the highly industrialized sugar-beet farms were felt to be demoralizing to the local white labor market. This strike was one of the first attempts to raise wages by eliminating the labor contractors who acted as middlemen. They were making money from their workers from the sale of provisions as well as from the commissions for jobs. Despite some violent opposition, the workers were successful in gaining the right to bargain directly with the employers.40 The position of the contractor on issues arising in agricultural strikes was not the same in all circumstances. H e tended to be a “ marginal man” in relation to the grower on one side and the labor force on the other. Sometimes he was primarily the employers' agent who received a certain amount for guaranteeing the completion of a job and was interested mainly in obtaining his labor force as cheaply as possible so as to increase his profit margin. Hence arose the Oxnard strike of 1903 and others like it, designed to eliminate such middlemen. On several occasions contractors failed to pay their workers, or even absconded with money provided by the employer to cover ail labor costs. Stricter licensing regulations under State law eliminated this evil almost entirely in later years. In other situations the contractor was more closely associated with his workers, acting as their negotiator in bargaining for the highest possi ble price in the performance of a given job. A m ong the Japanese, con tractors and the gangs they hired often had agreements covering wages and exclusive job areas. Sometimes these approximated closed shops. A special agent of the Immigration Commission reported in 1911 that at the time of his investigation in the Fresno area, “ the smaller gangs who pick small vineyards have the territory distributed among them, and one gang will not take a ‘job ' in a district belonging to another.” 41 In one instance a strike was conducted by one group of Japanese in Fresno County to prevent the employment of others of their countrymen from adjoining Kings County. Pickets were established on roads leading into the “ exclusive territory,” and were successful in preventing the “ out siders” from coming in to work.41 Strong antagonism to the Japanese developed among the rural white population in many areas of California, partly as a result of their collective bargaining tactics. M ore important, however, in stimulating strong racial antipathies, particularly among smaller growers, was the tendency for Japanese to abandon wage labor and operate farms as small tenants and owners. Before the immigration of Japanese was restricted, this occupa tional rise did not decrease the labor supply seriously. After the “ Gen tlemen's Agreement” with Japan in 1905, however, the number available as wage workers was reduced markedly. The Alien Land A ct of 1914 and its successors of later years, designed to set limits on land ownership or control by Orientals, did not serve to drive the Japanese back to farm labor. It had the effect, rather, of increasing their number in city trades and occupations. They were replaced by new nonwhite immigrant groups in many farm occupations. 400akland Tribune, April 1, 1903 (p. 1). 41Reports of Senate Committee on Immigration, 1911, Vol. 24 (p. 591). CH. V.---LARGE-SCALE AGRICULTURE IN CALIFORNIA 55 The A.F. o f L. and the Casual White Worker Sporadic efforts were made during the early 1900’s to organize casual and seasonal white laborers in . agriculture and allied industries. The unions of whites that were formed, however, do not appear to have been so effective for collective bargaining as the Japanese associations. W hite workers employed on California ranches were more disorganized and individualistic, and for the most part were single migratory males of the type commonly termed “ hobos” or “ bindle-stiffs.” Growers apparently preferred Oriental labor for harvesting operations. W hites were more difficult to recruit and to hold to the j o b ; complaints were legion regarding their intractability, their continual dissatisfaction with wages and work ing conditions, and their undependability.42 A n extraordinarily high rate of labor turn-over was indicated in one survey made at the time, showing that the average duration of jobs for individual workers in harvesting and orchard work was only 7 to 10 days.43 However, as was pointed out at the time, the rapid shifting by white laborers indicated a certain physical and psychological inability to work efficiently under the substandard conditions accepted by Orientals. A high rate of labor turn-over, commonly interpreted by employers and laymen as “ labor undependability,” was said actually to be an “ instinctive” or unconscious exercise of the “ strike in detail” — simply drifting off the job— as a protest against unsatisfactory working conditions.43* W hite workers tended to concentrate in the processing stages of agri culture. In industries such as canning and packing of fruits and vege tables the work was more skilled, regular, and better paid than in harvest ing. It was in these industries that white workers first began to organize unions for collective bargaining, in a period when farm production was expanding rapidly and the demand for labor was rising. A s early as 1895, it was reported that a group of 150 girls working in raisin-packing sheds in Fresno threatened to strike, but this did not materialize. They had been brought in from San Francisco because the plants were shorthanded, and they attempted to take advantage of a labor scarcity to de mand pay increases.44 A strike of draymen in the summer of 1901 attracted considerable attention from the public and hostile opposition from the growers. The Pacific Rural Press termed it “ abominable and exasperating,” as it pre vented the transportation of farm goods to and from canneries and wharves.45 It created such “ hateful conditions,” according to a later issue of the same journal, that farmers began to consider the possibilities of “ a general law prescribing a closed season for strikers during the gathering and movement of staple crops.” 46 In following years a series of strikes took place in various operations associated with agriculture. The Twelfth Biennial Report o f the California Bureau of Labor Statistics mentioned several during the years 1901-5, in addition to those carried out by Japanese field workers. A strike of hop pickers in Sacramento in August 1901, seemed to have been organized on a quasi-racketeering basis for sharing the gains between the leaders 42Testimony of Horst, Vol. 5 of Report of Commission on Industrial Relations, 1915-16. 43Carlton Parker op. cit. (p. 76). 44Pacific Rural Press, October 5, 1895 (p. 2). 45Idem, July 27, 1901 (p. 50). 46Idem, August 24, 1901. 654107°—46—5 56 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE and the strikers.47 M ore numerous were the spontaneous strikes and those organized by local unions— of the raisin pickers in Fresno in 1901 and again in 1902 (the latter after the organization of a local union), of the prune pickers in the Fresno area and. the sugar workers in San Francisco in 1902, and of the orange packers in the Redlands area in 1904.48 Save for its conclusion, the prune pickers’ strike in Fresno in 1902 was perhaps typical of the many small and primitive spontaneous strikes taking place in a period of acute labor shortage. A s reported in the Pacific Rural Press of September 27, 1902, “ a bunch of young fellows from town,” who had been employed for $1.50 per day, went on strike at the East Side Fruit Growers Union prune orchards near Fresno. They demanded $1.75 per day and were granted the increase because of the acute shortage of help. A few days later, when there was a “ tremendous rush of prunes,” the workers took advantage of the emergency to strike again for a further increase to $2 per day. This time, however, the daughters of the growers came to the rescue and worked all the following day for $1.75, thus pre venting the fruit from going to waste. The Fruit and Raisin Packing House Employees Union was organized in Fresno and affiliated with the A .F . of L .49 in 1901, following a suc cessful strike of 350 workers against a wage reduction. This organization concentrated on unionizing the more skilled processing workers in the packing sheds and ignored the unskilled migratory field labor. The hitherto anti-Oriental and exclusively white local organizations affiliated to the American Federation of Labor became interested in un ionizing seasonal workers in agricultural industries during the following year. The national convention of the American Federation of Labor, held in New; Orleans in 1902, and the convention of the California State Federation of Labor, held in Los Angeles in 1903, both voted to place an organizer among the agricultural workers of California.50 One major incident which prompted this change of attitude was the strike of about 1,000 Mexican and Japanese workers in the sugar-beet fields in the vicinity of Oxnard (Ventura County) in protest against what the Oak land Tribune called “ starvation and bad treatment.” 50 The Los Angeles Labor Council passed a resolution which was forwarded to the national executive of the A .F . of L., stating in part— * * * W e do declare our belief that the most effective method o f protecting the American workingman and his standard o f living is by universal organization of wage workers regardless of race or nationality.5 0 The comment of one official of the California Federation of Labor was highly optimistic: * * * This is one o f the most important resolutions ever brought to the atten tion o f the executive council * * * . It virtually breaks the ice on the question o f forming the Orientals into unions and so keeping them from scabbing on white people, in place o f not recognizing Asiatics as at present.5 0 47According to Constable Frank Millard, as quoted in the Sacramento Record Union of Sep tember 1, 1901, the promoter of the strike was a man named Schreiber, who wanted the pickers to strike for $l per hundredweight in place of the prevailing 80 cents, on the understanding that he was to receive half of the increase for engineering it. He was unable to organize the 200 white workers, however. Only a few went on strike, and Schreiber and his 16 “ lieutenants” reportedly “ ran out” on them. 48California Bureau of Labor Statistics, Twelfth Biennial Report, 1904-5 (p. 200). 49American Federationist, Vol. 8, No. 11, November 1901 (p. 485). 50Oakland Tribune, April 21, 1903. CH. V.---LARGE-SCALE AGRICULTURE IN CALIFORNIA 57 The little evidence available does not indicate, however, that the resolution was favorably acted upon by the executive council of the A .F . o f L. During the same year a Fruit W orkers’ Union was formed at San Jose. Several local branches were established throughout Santa Clara County and other counties, and these elected delegates to the Federated Trades Council. The Pacific Rural Press described the movement as follow s: During the last two years the organizing committee o f the Federated Trades [Council] has had pleading requests from the fruit workers, time and time again, to organize them. Just as the fruit workers o f this county have been organized during the last few months, so local unions are forming simultaneously in all parts o f the State, all o f which is not an accidental coincidence but a response to a general need. (Pacific Rural Press, March 28, 1903, p. 204.) The program of the new organization, chartered as Fruit W orkers Union N o. 10770, was quite modest. J. Ryan of San Jose, county pre sident of the organization, denied any intention of making exorbitant requests: N o demands o f any kind, shape, or form have yet been prepared by this union, nor is there in existence the demands or resolutions o f any other union that require $2 for an 8-hour day in fruit work. * * * I am at liberty to state that not a mem ber has ever ventured such a radical suggestion as an 8-hour day for every worker in the fruit industry.515 2 The union continued to function for several years; it failed to develop into an effective collective-bargaining organization, however, and in time died out. The only organized action reported among white farm workers for several years was a small walk-out in Fresno in 1906. Some 200 vine pickers went on strike for higher wages, manifesting what the Pacific Rural Press called “ a local phase of organized farm labor.” The strike was called to enforce a demand for a wage increase from the prevailing $1.25 per day to $1.50, with board, or from $1.75 to $2, without board. The strikers pointed out that the cost of living had increased consider ably, so that houses which formerly rented for $5 per month now cost $9, and firewood had risen from $6 to $8 to $9 per cord.62 About this time the casual labor problem again came to the attention of the American Federation of Labor affiliates. In July 1908, at the sug gestion of Andrew: Furuseth, well-known president of the International Seamen’s Union, the organizing committee of the Oakland Central Labor Council was instructed to consider ways and means for organizing migra tory unskilled workers. A resolution was passed, stressing the exploita tion of these laborers and the menace which this constituted to the security and high standards of organized urban trades.53 This view was repeated many times during the following year in further resolutions passed by the State federation and city central bodies of the A .F . of L. in California. Finally, in 1910, during the national convention of the A .F . of L. in St. Louis, the executive council was instructed to take steps necessary to bring casual and migratory workers into the province o f unionism.54 51Pacific Rural Press, May 16, 1903 (p. 306). Earlier a local of the union had been organ ized at Gilroy and demanded $1.50 per day with board, at hours from 7 a.m. to 12 noon, and from 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. Overtime was to be compensated at the rate of 20 cents per hour. (Idem, Apr. 13, 1903, p. 37.) 52Pacific Rural Press, December 22, 1906 (p. 386). 53Lewis Lorwin: The American Federation of Labor, Washington, 1933 (p. 110). 54History-Encyclopedia and Reference Book, A.F. of L., Washington, D.C., 1927, Vol. H (p. 237). 58 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE Subsequently, an organizer was put on the pay rolls of the State Federa tion of Labor and maintained from 1911 to 1916. Little was accomplished. .Federal labor unions were formed in cities where migratory workers, agricultural and otherwise, tended to concentrate in off-seasons. J. B. Dale, A .F . of L. organizer, stated in 1915 that these bodies, known col lectively as the United Laborers of America, were established in San Francisco, Oakland, Richmond, Fresno, Bakersfield, Sacramento, San Jose, and San Rafael. Each local was affiliated with the central labor council of its city and chartered directly by the A .F . of L. The total mem bership in the State was estimated to be 5,000, with 2,000 of these in San Francisco. Dale admitted that few of these were truly agricultural labor unions. None of the workers were organized on their ranch jobs, nor did they bargain collectively with their grower-employers through the agency of a union.55 The A .F . of L /s organizing drive, despite the sentiment expressed in the resolution by the Los Angeles Central Labor Council in earlier years, was designed to favor white workers at the expense o f Orientals. In 1911, two A .F . of L. organizers in Fresno attempted to recruit white workers for the announced purpose of displacing Japanese employed in harvesting grapes.56 The experiment proved unsuccessful. Though the A .F . of L. apparently was careful to maintain a mild and conciliatory attitude, farm-labor unionism was not welcomed by the grow ers. One C. W . Thomas, more self-critical than most, called the attention of his associates to the fact that “ the conditions which are forced on white migratory workers have a tendency to degenerate the men,” and warned that unionization would inevitably follow if conditions were not improved. “ Labor agitation is already in the hands of men inimical to the farmer * * * some effort should be made to protect unorganized farm labor against organized skilled labor.” 57 The organizing drive of the A .F . of L. came to little, and was finally abandoned during the war years. The migratory and casual workers were difficult to hold for any length of time in an organization that appealed primarily to a minority of skilled workers. Casual farm laborers, whose work was seasonal and poorly paid, could not afford to pay regular union dues even when set by the A .F . of L. at an especially low level; and the dues which could be collected from the workers were not sufficient to maintain the staff of organizers needed to keep a union functioning effec tively. 55Report of Commission on Industrial Relations, 1915, Vol. IV (pp. 4972, 4976). 56P. Sioris and T. C. Seaward, the organizers, were furnished Greek laborers to take the place of Japanese in harvesting grapes in the Fresno area. Their avowed intention was to eliminate contractors and employment agencies by substituting the union as middleman. Sioris went further, expressing the opinion that white laborers should be given a preference in em ployment since they “ eat American food and spend their money here.” (Fresno Morning Re publican, Sept. 9, 1911, p. 9.) Apparently, however, the Greeks, imported from San Francisco and Sacramento, were found unsatisfactory. The management of the Tarpey Vineyard, for in stance, claimed that Japanese could pick 60 to 65 boxes of grapes per day, whereas the Greeks could only pick 40. (Idem, Sept. 11, 1911.) 57Quoted from McWilliams, op. cit. (p. 101), Chapter VI.— The I.W .W. in California “ Educating” the Casual Worker The revolutionary Industrial W orkers of the W orld ( I .W .W .) , whose philosophy was sharply at variance with orthodox unionism, was more effective than the American Federation of Labor in organizing the single, transient, white laborers. In the prewar era, the major efforts of the I.W .W . in the larger cities of the Pacific Coast were expended on agita tion and propaganda designed to imbue casual laborers with “ class consciousness.,, Several years’ “ education” of casual and migratory seasonal laborers was considered necessary before effective unionism and direct action could be undertaken. Unlike the Orientals, white workers were not homogeneous and did not at that time specialize in agricultural labor. They accepted seasonal jobs in the fields only when other, better-paying industrial jobs were unavailable. According to George B. Speed, I.W .W . organizer, testifying before the U . S. Commission on Industrial Relations— * * * the average migratory worker has had no sense o f organization what ever. The Japs and Chinese have a far better sense o f organization than has the native American, and the result is when he eliminates the native out of a given locality he gets better conditions and wages than the native worker does. The native worker through the agitation that has been going on in the State during the last several years is commencing to wake up and realize the necessity o f some form of organization in order to keep in touch and develop. H e is commencing to realize that now.1 When asked about the result of some 6 to 8 years’ effort at organizing the migrants, M r. Speed replied: “ Nothing more than the sentiment and feeling that is manifest among that class of labor when we go among them.” 2 From the organization’s point of view this result was all-impor tant. In the revolutionary I.W .W . philosophy, the m ajor and final pur pose of organizing and carrying out strikes was not to achieve immediate gains in wages or improvements in working conditions, but rather, to promote class consciousness and a sentiment of solidarity among the workers, as a step to final revolution. “ Harvest stiffs” during nonharvest seasons worked in lumber camps, railroad construction, or intermittent urban employments. They usually tried to save a small “ stake” during the harvest and threshing season and go to the larger cities when the work ended. There, like the Orientals, they could “ hibernate,” rooming in cheap lodging houses and eating in cheap restaurants during the winter months. After completion of the grain harvest in the Middle W est, some would go to Canada, and from there to the Pacific Coast. Others went straight west from the Dakotas to Seattle or Portland, and from there to California, where the climate was warm and living relatively cheap. In California the I.W .W ., like the A .F . of L., limited its organizing campaign in the beginning to the cities and towns where seasonal workers “ holed up.” These places constituted the main concentration points or 1Hearings, Industrial Commission, Vol. 5 (1915), p. 4943. 2Idem (p. 4945). 59 60 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE labor markets for casual day labor. Temporary workers were recruited in large numbers for farm jobs in surrounding areas from such cities and towns as San Francisco, Oakland, Sacramento, Stockton, Fresno, Los Angeles, Bakersfield, and Brawley. The I.W .W . at one time claimed as many as 10,000 to 12,000 members scattered through these areas. The membership fluctuated widely, however, because of the seasonal nature of farm work and the mobility of the laborers.2 Prewar Years The “Free Speech Fights9 9 The first important struggles of the I.W .W . in California were not strikes or “ labor troubles on the job.” They were, rather, the fights for free speech and the right to carry on agitation and organization in the cities where casual laborers concentrated. Here the I.W .W . met strong and violent opposition from the more conservative elements. The free-speech fight most important to the I.W .W . occurred in Fresno which, situated in the heart of the San Joaquin Valley, had long been a nerve center or key concentration-point for agricultural labor in the State. The main issues of the fight involved the right of the I.W .W . to maintain a headquarters, to distribute literature, and to hold public meetings. During the 6-month struggle, strong measures of suppression were employed by the public authorities. The conflict finally won a cer tain degree of tolerance for the activities of the I.W .W . and gained for that organization a status and importance among agricultural laborers far beyond its numerical significance.3 The struggle in San Diego, beginning early in 1912, was more sen sational and violent. There the efforts of authorities to suppress “ wobbly” meetings culminated in an ordinance which outlawed free speech through out the city. The I.W .W . endeavored to combat this move by bringing outside members into the city to pack the jails. This attempt was coun tered by the formation of a vigilance committee the members of which assisted the authorities in posting armed guards on highways to turn back incoming transients and to round up all persons suspected of being connected with the I.W .W . Considerable violence was employed by the authorities and vigilantes, and several “ wobblies” were seriously injured. The hostility of the community was perhaps most clearly expressed in the San Diego Tribune in its issue of March 4, 1912: Hanging is none too good for them and they would be much better dead, for they are absolutely useless in the human economy. They are the waste material o f creation and should be drained off into the sewer o f oblivion, there to rot in cold obstruction like any other excrement.4 The Wheatland Riot and Other Strikes Following the free-speech fights, the I.W .W . turned its attention more directly to economic action. Its prestige was now considerably en hanced, and its locals expanded rapidly in key labor centers such as San 2Hearings, Industrial Commission, Vol. 5 (1915), p. 4945. 3Paul Brissenden: The I.W .W .—A Study of American Syndicalism (New York, Columbia Uni versity Studies in History and Economics, 1919, Vol. 83, p. 262). 4Idem (p. 264). CH. VI.---THE I.W.W. IN CALIFORNIA 61 Francisco, Oakland, Fresno, and Bakersfield. Delegates were sent from these cities into the fields to organize workers on the job and to carry out “ job action strikes.” W hat influence the union had in rural areas was attributable in large part to the fact that the main body of white migratory workers on farms was composed of unmarried “ bindle-stiffs” or “ boomers,” recruited from other industries. Many of them had worked in lumber camps, coal mines, and railroad construction gangs, where they had been already exposed to the agitation of “ wobbly” delegates. Many in turn became “ job delegates” or organizers among agricultural workers. I.W .W . tactics in agriculture followed much the same informal pattern that had been applied in other seasonal industries. M ost of the organizing was done not by “ outside” paid organizers but by “ job delegates” who were actually employed on the job.5 They would form a nucleus of the more militant or disaffected workers, organize and call a strike, and then use persuasion or intimidation to get the rest of the workers to join. Since most of the workers were single men, the restraint imposed by family obligations was usually absent, and the strikes were often violent and un controlled. Organizers imbued with revolutionary zeal were not inclined to seek settlement of a strike on an amicable basis. They were more con cerned with widening each strike to large proportions so as to widen the scope of class conflict. From 1913 onward intermittently through the war years, several spontaneous field w o r k e d strikes and labor troubles were reported to have been led by I.W .W . “ job delegates,” or at least to have involved representatives of that organization. During August 1913, newspapers reported three such strikes. A t the H . Lee Co. orchard in Vina (Tehama County), a small strike of peach pickers belonging to the I.W .W . resulted in a 20-percent increase in wages.6 In the vicinity of Perkins (Sacra mento C ounty), 125 pickers led by 6 I.W .W . members went on strike, but the results were not reported. The ranch foreman was said to have threatened that, if the strikers did not return to work, there would never be another white man or woman employed on the place.7 Far overshadowing these strikes was the much publicized “ Wheatland riot,” which, more than any other event at the time, brought to public attention the problems facing white migratory laborers. This incident was described by one observer as “ a purely spontaneous uprising * * * a psychological protest against factory conditions of hop picking * * * and the emotional result of the nervous impact of the exceedingly irritating and intolerable conditions under which those people worked at the time.” 8 Following a practice not unusual among large-scale growers, E. B. Durst, hop rancher, had advertised in newspapers throughout California and Nevada for some 2,700 workers. He subsequently admitted that he could provide employment for only about 1,500, and that living arrange ments were inadequate even for that number. W orkers of many racial stocks from many areas poured into the community by every conceivable means of transportation, and some walked from nearby towns. A great number had no bedding and slept on piles of straw thrown on floors, in 5Characteristically, a “ wobbly” would hear of a situation where conditions were creating dis satisfaction, would travel to the area, get a job if possible, and begin to organize a strike. During the course of the strike, meetings were usually devoted to an exposition of the revolu tionary philosophy as understood by the organizers, rather than to means of settling the issues. 6Sacramento Bee, August 7, 1913. 7Idem, August 20, 1913. ^Hearings, Industrial Commission, Vol. 5 (1915), p. 5000. 62 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE tents rented from Durst at 75 cents a w eek ; many slept in the fields. There were no facilities for sanitation or garbage disposal and only 9 outdoor toilets for 2,800 people; dysentery became prevalent to an alarm ing degree. The water wells were insufficient for the camp, and no means existed for bringing water to the fields. Durst’s cousin had a lemonade concession in the fields, selling the drink for 5 cents a glass. Local W heatland stores were forbidden to send delivery wagons to the camp, so that workers were forced to buy what supplies they could afford from a con cession store on the ranch. These conditions were aggravated by the wage system at the ranch. The “ going rate” for hop picking in California during 1913 was roughly $1 per hundredweight. Durst paid 90 cents, with a bonus of 10 cents if the picker stayed through the harvest. H e was able to pay this discriminatively low rate because of the surplus labor he had recruited. It was later charged that he purposely permitted the exceedingly uncomfort able and insanitary working conditions to exist so that some of the pickers would leave before the season was over and would thereby forfeit the 10cent bonus. The earnings of the pickers were further reduced by the requirement of extra “ clean” picking, and by the absence of sufficient “ high-pole men” to pull down the vines within reach of the pickers.9 The conditions were sufficiently bad to bring the 2,800 people, repre senting at least 27 different nationalities, together in a spontaneous demonstration. It was estimated that only about 100 of the men had previously been connected with the I.W .W . However, the most active “ agitator” among the hop pickers, one Blackie Ford, was an active I.W .W . delegate who had organized a “ camp local” of some 30 members. A mass meeting was addressed by Ford, followed by other speakers in various languages. Durst, who attended the meeting, asked for a com mittee to meet with him to settle the grievances. H e promised suitable toilet accommodations and water on the fields. These were not supplied, however, and meanwhile resentment against the wage system grew. The camp was picketed, and a second meeting was held by the pickers in a public place which they hired for their own use. The meeting, which the county sheriff later testified was entirely peaceable, was invaded by a band of armed deputies who came to arrest Ford. One of the deputies on the fringe of the crowd fired a shot to “ quiet the mob.” This precipi tated a riot, in the course of which the district attorney, a deputy sheriff, and two workers were killed and many more were injured. Hysteria apparently gripped the authorities after the outbreak. Mass arrests of “ wobblies” or sympathizers were carried out. Many of the arrested men were severely beaten or tortured, and many other were held incommunicado for weeks. Ford and Suhr, the two leading I.W .W . organizers in the camp, were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.10 Voluntary cooperation offered by Japanese to the organizers in W heatland was an interesting side light on the strike. They pointed out to the whites that if they as Japanese were to cooperate openly, the whites would lose what support they had from the A .F . of L. because of the antiOriental sentiment of that organization. The Japanese therefore moved out of the area in a body, and for several months thereafter published an advertisement in Japanese-language papers calling upon their fellow 9Carey McWilliams; Factories in the Fields (pp. 158-159). Carlton Parker: The Casual Laborer and Other Essays (pp. 171-199). 10Hearings, Industrial Commission, Vol. 5 (1915), p. 5000. CH. VI.---THE I.W.W. IN CALIFORNIA 63 countrymen to abstain from working in the hop industry until the grievances of the pickers were ended and until the arrested strike leaders were released.10* The prevalence of labor agitation and conflict during these immediate prewar, years was attributed by Carlton Parker, in a report to the Cali fornia Commission on Immigration and Housing, largely to bad living conditions and insecure and intermittent employment caused by the high seasonality of California's agriculture.1 Fuller, however, pointed out12 1 that these were substantially the same living and employment conditions that had faced California's casual labor for decades. In his opinion the unrest was to be explained rather by the fact that severe depression and industrial unemployment had driven into casual farm labor a class of people who were unaccustomed to the conditions which it imposed. The situation was aggravated further by migration of unemployed persons from other States, following the slogan “ Y ou cannot freeze to death in California." The economic environment was like that existing during the middle nineties, when anti-Oriental riots and boycotts in rural areas reached their height, and like that which was to exist again during the 1930's when radical labor organizations led farm strikes of unprecedented proportions. The Wheatland affair was one of the most significant incidents in the long history of labor troubles in California. It created an opportunity for effective investigation by the Commission on Immigration and H ous ing in California which (under the chairmanship of Simon J. Lubin) did much to improve living and housing conditions for migratory workers. Those beginnings toward social control of the problem were to a large degree nullified, however, by the temporary prosperity during the W orld W ar. The I.W.W. During W orld War I The growth of labor unionism in California agriculture was checked during W orld W ar I. A chronic shortage of workers led the growers to seek new sources of labor of a type that could not be organized easily. State agencies assisted in recruiting youths in large numbers from insti tutions and schools. Schools were closed early in order to release chil dren for temporary farm work. A campaign to recruit women was carried out through the W om an's Land Arm y of America, California Division. This organization involved some degree o f collective bargaining, since growers were required to sign contracts agreeing to employ a definite number of women for a fixed period of employment. In addition to recruiting local labor supplies, growers in the Imperial Valley imported several hundred families from Texas and Oklahoma. Finally, toward the close of the war, a large supply of cheap labor was made available through relaxing the immigration laws and importing Mexicans by thousands.13 10Hearings, Industrial Commission, Vol. 5 (1915), p. 5000. ^ T h e Casual Laborer and Other Essays (pp. 171-199). 12Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 54 (p. 19844). 13The IJ. S. Department of Labor in May 1917 issued an order suspending the head tax, literacy test, and provisions against contract labor. It expressly authorized farm operators to bring Mexicans into the United States, where they were to engage exclusively in agricultural labor on pain of facing arrest and deportation. (Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 54, p. 19848.) 64 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE The war years were marked by intermittent organizational efforts on the part of the I.W .W . In a period of labor shortage and rising prices this organization was partially successful in raising wages. Following the Wheatland affair, the union had become much more active in agriculture throughout the United States, and particularly in the W heat Belt of the Middle West. In 1915, local I.W .W . unions of agricultural workers were federated into a new nation-wide department, the Agricultural W orkers Organization, chartered as “ The 400.” The effectiveness of the I.W .W . organization in California was, how ever, to a large degree dissipated in jurisdictional disputes and internal wrangles. Owing to sectionalism of the membership and poor communi cations with the national headquarters in the Middle W est, The 400 failed to become established in the State. A proposal by the Agricultural W o rk ers Organization executive to open a branch office in California which would absorb existing agricultural workers’ local unions was rejected by the membership in this State. Instead, the existing locals called a special conference and applied for a separate charter. It was granted in February 1916, as the Agricultural W orkers Organization No. 440, known as the A .W .O . of California. This union lasted only a few months and died from “ localism and sectarianism.” 14 Local branches of the A .W .O . remained active for some time afterward, however. The year 1917 marked the last but most active appearance of the 1. W .W . in the fields of California. The Pacific Rural Press of November 2, 1917, pictured the disturbances in dramatic term s: Early in the year, the propaganda o f the I.W .W . organized and incited an uprising in Fresno County, which proceeded to the fields in all the surrounding country and compelled the men working there to leave their work by threats o f bodily injury and by the showing o f arms and deadly weapons. The strike began in a few Fresno vineyards with a walk-out of 50 German and Italian laborers demanding higher wages and shorter hours. A ccord ing to the Fresno Morning Republican of February 8, 1917, the strikers “ terrorized” a number of Japanese into joining them. W ithin 2 days the movement involved several hundred workers organized in various language branches of the I.W .W . Shortly afterwards D. P. Pagano, president of the Italian branch of the A .W .O ., announced that about 200 strikers would resume work on a large vineyard which had accepted the new scale set by the union— $2.50 for an 8-hour day.15 The following day, at a special meeting in Fresno, vineyardists acceded to the demands of the remaining strikers, estimated at the time at 2,000.16 The Japanese Association of Fresno, as spokesman for Japanese pruners who had joined the strike, announced that they would return to work at a rate of $2.50 for a 9-hour day. In response to criticism from other members of the A .W .O . still out on strike, the Japanese pointed out that their scale was the equivalent of that set by the union, because the Japanese for the most part camped on the work sites and worked an extra hour for the free rent they were allowed. The Japanese did not join the union nor did their association endorse the strike; they had not been consulted beforehand, but had been ignored until after the strike was called.17 14E. Workman: History of “ The 400,” One Big Union Club, Chicago, III., 1935 (p. 17). 15Fresno Morning Republican, February 10, 1917. 16Idem, February 12, 1917. 17Idem, February 12, 1917 (p. 3). CH. VI.---THE I.W.W. IN CALIFORNIA 65 Several packing houses in the vicinity of Riverside were closed in April 1917 by a strike of orange-picking gangs attempting to enforce higher wage scales. N ot a gang was picking in the district for several days, it was reported. Packing companies in Redlands soon broke the strike by obtaining injunctions which restrained strikers from interfering with pickers recruited to take their places.1 8 In June 1917, farm laborers went on strike in the vicinity o f T u r lock. A thousand carloads of cantaloupes were reported lost as a result. The strike ended when growers enlisted local townspeople to drive “ agi tators” from the community.19 Effective organizing and strike action by the I.W .W . ended early in September 1917, when the nation-wide campaign to suppress the union was launched. Over 500 persons were arrested and 160 were later con victed of criminal syndicalism in Wichita, Chicago, and Sacramento, where the Federal prosecutions were held. The most vigorous action against the I.W .W . in California was taken at first in the vicinity of Fresno, where its successful strike had been carried out earlier in the year. The organization was accused of sabotage in Fresno, and many members were arrested on this charge. On Septem ber 2, 1917, the Fresno M orning Republican carried a story describing the sabotage inflicted by the I.W .W . on local grow ers; haystacks had been burned and many trays of raisins were dumped on the ground and covered with dirt. A s a result of these and other incidents reported at the time, a great round-up of the members was launched. On September 6, 1917, the I.W .W . hall in Fresno was raided, over a hundred men were seized, and some 19 were arrested. Later, raids and arrests were made by Federal officers in Stockton, Hanford, and elsewhere in the State. The general round-up continued throughout the fall of 19I7.20 The U .S. D e partment of Justice opened an office in Fresno, with W illiam Freeman, special investigator, in charge. Farmers having labor trouble were directed to report to that office.21 Toilers of the World During the late war years the I.W .W . carried on a disguised par ticipation in a new organization named “ Toilers of the W orld.” This short-lived local union developed in the canning industry of San Jose (Santa Clara C ounty). It was unique in the annals of California labor history in respect to the ambitious program to which it was committed, and in its ability, despite violent opposition, to rally and hold together a body of hitherto unorganized workers. The Toilers of the W orld was a hybrid group, including in its ranks a number of dissident and active elements from both the A .F . of L. and the I.W .W . Some of the former were said to have joined the Toilers after severing their connections with the A .F . of L. because it was “ too conservative and unreliable.” 22 The influence of the I.W .W . was more apparent in the organization, both1 1California Cultivator, April 7, 1917 (p. 410). 19Carey McWilliams, op. cit. (p. 172). "I d e m (p. 170). 21Los Angeles Times, September 11, 1917. 22San Francisco Examiner, March 14, 1918. 66 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE in its name and in its objectives. A number of “ wobblies” joined, appar ently, to carry out a sort of “ boring-from-within” policy, hiding their affiliations with the I.W .W . because of its “ unpatriotic” stigma during the late war years. The union began in March 1917 as a more or less spontaneous move ment. A mass meeting of fruit workers was addressed by a clergyman “ representing^ the church labor movement,” by some “ famous Japanese labor organizers,” and by other speakers who addressed the audience in English and Italian.23 Out of this meeting the Toilers of the W orld was organized, and was later chartered as a federal labor union of the A .F . of L . It was designed to “ organize men and women fruit workers into one great union through which they would gain fair wages and hours of labor,24 and was declared “ open to all workers over 16, regardless of race or creed.” 25 The organizer, E. B. Mercadier, was a printer by trade who had been in the coal and hay business in San Jose for several years. H e was described as a “ moderate * * * student of labor problems.” 25 The union included a variety of racial elements and claimed the sup port of substantial liberal groups. In a meeting attended by about 1,000 people on May 6, 1917, at which Mercadier presided, the audience was composed mostly of Americans, Italians, and Japanese. The elected presi dent was an Italian named San Filippo. According to the San Jose M er cury Herald of May 7, 1917, the Reverend W . L. Stidger, pastor of the First Methodist Church, promised the support of his church to the union, and Father W illiam Culligan of St. Joseph Church commended the or ganization. By this time, the union had become the largest labor organiza tion in Santa Clara County, with 10 delegates in the Central Labor Council. The union’s main objective was to achieve a wage increase of 25 per cent and, ultimately, the unionization of the whole fruit, vegetable, and berry industry in Santa Clara County. It aimed to include Chinese wage earners, a number of whom had asked to be organized.26 Later in the year the Toilers of the W orld conducted a large cannery strike, as a result of which it won agreements, covering wages, hours, and union recog nition, from the larger canneries of San Jose. This was the first instance in the cannery industry of California in which the techniques of mass demonstration and mass picketing were employed to enforce the demands of strikers and to bring their working conditions to public attention. The picket lines of the union were apparently well maintained in spite of considerable violence from local authorities, as well as intimidation from a National Guard unit dispatched to the strike area. The Toilers’ position was weakened considerably, as America’s par ticipation in W orld W ar I generated strong anti-union sentiments in many quarters. Agreements reached by the union after the strike of 1917 were maintained throughout 1918. In the spring of 1919, how ever, the union was broken. During a period of rising prices and tempo rary labor shortage it attempted by strike action to win wage increases to a standard of $3.50 for a 6-hour day, time and a half for overtime, and double pay for Sundays and holidays.27 The strike was defeated and the union declined rapidly thereafter. 23Mercury Herald (San Jose), March 31, 1917. 24San Francisco Examiner, March 14, 1918. 25Mercury Herald (San Jose), May 4, 1917. 26Idem, May 13, 1917 (p. 18). 27San Francisco Examiner, April 21, 1919 (p. 5). CH. VI.---THE I.W.W. IN CALIFORNIA 67 Postwar Labor Unrest Labor unrest became widespread throughout the United States during the immediate postwar years, and California's agriculture and related industries were affected thereby. The I.W .W . continued to maintain an organization in the fields, while the A .F . of L. temporarily renewed its interest in seasonal agricultural and allied workers under the pressure of numerous spontaneous strikes. Eleven walk-outs occurred between August 1918 and August 1920, most of them in canneries and packing sheds. A few resulted in the organization of labor unions, some of which were later chartered by the A .F . of L. A series of strikes occurred in northern California in the rural dis trict near San Francisco and Oakland. It began with a walk-out, in August 1918, of some 350 women and 50 men in two canning plants of the California Packing Corp. in Oakland.28 Other strikes during the next 2 years involved employees of a pickle works in Hayward, a plant of the California Packing Corp. in San Francisco, and a Libby, M cNeill & Libby cannery in Sacramento.29 The I.W .W . maintained a State branch of the Agricultural W orkers Industrial Union No. 110 (successor to A .W .O ., “ The 4 0 0 ") in Cali fornia for a few years after the war, and its “ job delegates" were reported to be numerous. The Industrial W orker, organ of the I.W .W ., by October 1920, was claiming that “ we have several traveling delegates in this State [California] during the winter months; a successful campaign is now being launched which will put No. 110 on the map in this country."30 These delegates apparently played a leading role in a strike of citrus workers in the vicinities of San Gabriel, Azusa, and Charter Oak in Los Angeles County. The Charter Oak Strike Committee was formed to organize and direct the strikers, whom the California Cultivator de scribed as “ American, Mexican, Japanese, and Russian ‘BolshevikiV’31 A .W .I.U . N o. 110 claimed to have active locals in such towns as Marysville, Knights Landing, W illows, Porterville, Lindsay, and Exeter.32 Locals in the southern San Joaquin Valley attempted to or ganize and win a basic wage of $6 for an 8-hour day in the fruit industry; they were frustrated, one spokesman reported, because “ the valley-cats all gather there to jungle up by the river."33 Behind this brief and temporarily revived agitation was the migration to California of unemployed city or industrial workers and of midwestern harvest hands who had been displaced by the mechanization of wheat farming. Indeed the I.W .W ., through its organ the Industrial W orker, became an early “ booster" for California. It urged migratory workers to go to that State for the off-season winter months, in order to awaken agricultural workers to their “ class interests": There is urgent need in California o f workers who have been through the battles o f the A .W .I.U . The “ Old Reds,” the militants with their knowledge o f organizational methods, would do an immense amount of good work in the task 28 San Francisco Examiner, August 1 and 7, 1918. 29Idem, April 12, 1919; October 3, 1919; August 8, 1920. 30Industrial Worker (Everett, Wash.), October 30, 1920 (p. 2). 31California Cultivator, February IS, 1919 (p. 205). 32Industrial Worker, September 25, 1920; October 23, 1920. 33Idem, October 23, 1920. 68 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE o f lining up the California agricultural workers solidly for the One Big Union. What say you, fellow workers? Shall we go W est this winter and colonize the California agricultural industry? Shall we put a stalwart band o f Middle Western harvest stiffs on the job in the Golden ( ? ) West, and teach the bosses the same lesson that was so hard for them to learn in the wheat country? (Industrial W orker, December 11, 1920.) Apparently little came of this appeal. N o strikes or collective bargain ing were reported as carried out officially by representatives of the I.W .W . in California after 1920. Approximately 500 hop pickers in a number of yards near Santa Rosa (Sonoma County), and 200 grape pickers in the vineyards near Lodi (San Joaquin County), struck during September 1921. These outbreaks, however, appear to have been spontaneous pro tests against wage cuts during a period of recession.34 During the immediate postwar years union organizers became active in another distinct occupational group in industries allied to agriculture— fruit and vegetable packing-house workers. “ J°b delegates” of the I.W .W . were numerous among these workers, and they led several small strikes. These volunteer organizers laid the groundwork for an ambitious attempt by the A .F . of L. to organize an international union in this field. In 1920 the A .F . of L. granted a federal labor union charter to a group employed in the packing of cauliflower, cabbage, and lettuce in Los Angeles, the principal shipping point for eastern markets. Verbal or unwritten agreements were established in certain plants, covering wage scales, hours, and working conditions for various categories of labor. W age rates were set at $5 per 8-hour day for packers and $4 for trim mers, plus time and a fifth for overtime. Other crafts such as loaders, lidders, truckers, icers, and crate liners were paid in proportion. The union was broken during the winter of 1921-22 after losing a month long strike for additional wage increases to a $6 and $5 scale.35 The largest organization to be formed in the packing industry by the A .F . of L. during this period was the Fruit and Vegetable W orkers Union, which at one time claimed a membership of more than 5,000 in San Joaquin County alone.36 Its initial impetus was provided by local independent organizations formed previously in Fresno and Imperial Counties. A series of strikes involving several hundred fruit and vegetable processing workers had occurred during late 1919 and 1920 in numerous packing plants in Fresno, as well as in five towns in San Joaquin County. The organization leading this movement had been reported originally as the Green Fruit W orkers Union. It was later renamed the Fruit W ork ers Union of the San Joaquin Valley and, finally, the Central California Fruit W orkers Union.37 A branch of this union was also reported in August 1920 to have led a strike of more than 1,200 men and women employees in the canning industry of San Jose (Santa Clara C ounty), where the Toilers of the W orld had previously been active.38 From these beginnings the A .F . of L. attempted to organize the en tire fruit and vegetable industry of California on a State-wide basis. In addition to the Central California Fruit W orkers Union, it gained the affiliation o f an independent packing-shed workers’ . union called the 34 San Francisco Examiner, September 14 and 21, 1921. 35A. ( ‘‘Shorty” ) Alston: A Brief History of the Fruit and Vegetable Industry on the Pacific Coast (unpublished document), San Francisco, 1938 (pp. 1, 2). 36San Francisco Examiner, August 8 and 10, 1920. 3,7Idem, July 3, 1919; August 2, 1919; and October 3, 1919. 38Idem, August 8 and 10, 1920. CH. VI.---THE I.W.W. IN CALIFORNIA 69 American Fruit W orkers Association. This had been organized originally in Brawley (Imperial County), in 1918, and later had established branches in other localities. A minority of members who were adherents of the I.W .W . was reported as bitterly opposed to joining the A .F . of L .39 The new union was chartered by the A .F . of L. as the Fruit and Vegetable W orkers Union, with headquarters in Fresno. Local charters were issued to other packing centers in California, Washington, and Oregon. Few gains apparently accrued to the members, and they dropped out in growing numbers. The F .V .W .U . finally disbanded in 1923, and for the next 5 years the A .F . of L. had no representation whatever in agricultural or allied industries.40 The I.W .W . likewise remained largely inactive in these fields. 39Alston, op. cit. (p. 3). 40Idem (pp. 3-5). Chapter VII.— California in the Twenties Concentration in Farm Operations The postwar decade became one of relative quiescence in rural Cali fornia after the demise of A .F . of L. and I.W .W . organizations in agri cultural industries. Employment relations were modified somewhat by rapid expansion in acreage of certain crops, and by the growth o f new organizations among employers. The underlying structure of farm oper ations changed little, however, and the trend toward large-scale farming continued. California’s agriculture furnished a striking comparison with the rest of the Nation as regards concentration in ownership and control. Statistics confirm the view that the dominant type o f enterprise producing fruit, vegetable, cotton, and specialty crops from the soil in California is the industrialized farm specializing in one or two commercial crops and operated by an agricultural employer who hires and fires gangs o f laborers as needed.1 By 1930 more than a third of all large-scale farms in the United States— those producing a gross annual output of $30,000 or more— were in that State, and the average value of its farms was more than three times the national average. Although the large-scale farms numbered less than 3,000, or barely 2.1 percent of all farms in California, they produced 28.5 percent, by value, of all California agricultural products. Although Cali fornia produced less than 2 percent of the Nation’s cotton crop in 1939, it had 30 percent of the Nation’s large-scale cotton farms. It claimed 30 percent of the large-scale crop specialty farms, 40 percent of the largescale dairy farms, 44 percent of the large-scale general farms, 53 percent of the large-scale poultry farms, 60 percent of the large-scale truck farms, and 60 percent of the large-scale fruit farms of the United States.2 Large-scale enterprises in agriculture, as in other industries, tended increasingly to incorporate and to extend their control over productive facilities by a process of integration. A ccording to the Senate Committee on Education and Labor— It is estimated that there are as many as 2,500 corporations engaged in agri cultural production in California, and that they have been increasing in importance since the close o f W orld W ar I. They exceed individual and partnership operators in average size; many o f them operate lands in other States, have cable addresses, em ploy regional and district managers, conduct extensive financing, and have other appurtenances o f modern large-scale corporations. (Report o f La Follette Com mittee, p. 165.) Large farms played a more dominant role in the labor market in Cali fornia than in other regions. The average cash expenditure for labor per farm was nearly four times the national average; in San Joaquin, Kern, Monterey, and Imperial Counties the expenditures were roughly 5, 6, 8, and 10 times the national average, respectively. Only 0.5 percent of all farms in the United States employed five or more laborers, but in California five times this proportion of farms hired labor in such groups. Although constituting only 2.1 percent of all farms in the State, large1Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 47 (p. 17217). 2Idem (pp. 17224-17225). 70 CH. VII.---CALIFORNIA IN THE TWENTIES 71 scale enterprises spent 35 percent of all cash outlays for employment of agricultural laborers. Almost a quarter of such cash outlays, moreover, was contributed by absentee owned or controlled farms, which were dominant among large units.3 Grower-Employer Associations The growing dominance of large-scale farming in California’s agri culture during the twenties was paralleled by a transformation in the pattern of employer-employee relations. Rapid expansion in such inten sive crops as cotton, fruit, nuts, and vegetables (which more than doubled in acreage during the decade) served to increase California growers’ demands for seasonal labor. Additional workers were made available partly through a more intensive utilization of existing supplies and partly through drawing upon new sources. One of the most significant developments during the decade was the organization of employers’ associations and labor-recruiting agencies. They were preceded in many cases by “ area” or “ commodity” producers’ associations, which exerted various degrees of control over member grow ers with regard to output, volume of sales allowed on the market, and prices charged for products. “ Horizontal combinations” of agricultural producers could be organized more easily in California than elsewhere because of specialization of farms in distinct crop areas, together with a high degree of concentration in ownership and control. The larger and fewer the enterprises in each crop area, usually the easier it was for them to agree to restrict their competitive relations. Small growers who specialized in one or a few crops were often drawn into area or commodity organizations because these groups offered some of the advantages of large-scale production. A s California agriculture became more dependent upon large numbers of seasonal workers to harvest its crops, area and commodity organiza tions of producers became also employer associations. They concerned themselves with the labor policies as well as with marketing practices of their members; they became increasingly active in standardizing wage rates over wide crop areas to eliminate competitive bidding, in recruiting adequate supplies of labor as a common pool for their members, and in laying down rules governing collective bargaining. A m ong the more im portant of these bodies organized along crop or industrial lines were the W estern Growers Protective Association, composed mainly of vegetable and melon producers; the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association of Central California, with headquarters in Salinas, center of an important lettuce-growing district; the California Fruit Growers Exchange, a central organization of citrus cooperative exchanges and packing houses; the California Dried Fruit Association; and the Canners League of Cali fornia, an organization of canning companies.4 Growers in certain areas of the State solved their common labor prob lems through labor exchanges or labor bureaus designed to estimate and plan the labor requirements for a coming harvest, to fix a uniform wage 3Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 47 (p. 17226). 4Report of La Follette Committee, Part I, General Introduction (pp. 19, 20). 654107°—46—6 72 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE rate to be paid by member employers, and then to recruit workers from whatever sources were available.5 The Valley Fruit Growers of San Joaquin County, established in 1921, was the first of the cooperative employer institutions. It suc ceeded in establishing uniform wage scales on a local basis and later attempted to extend these to the whole Pacific Coast. Subsequently, other groups adopted similar practices; these were the State Farm Bureau Federation, State and local chambers of commerce, and various special growers’ associations. The Agricultural Labor Bureau of the San Joaquin Valley became the most highly developed labor-recruiting and wage-fixing agency. It was organized in 1925 under the sponsorship of six county farm bureaus, six county chambers of commerce, and the raisin, fresh fruit, and cotton industries of the San Joaquin Valley. Its main support came from large cotton-ginning companies.6 Similar agencies were established for almost every major crop and growing area in the State. One writer estimated that they reduced labor costs by 10 to 30 percent,7 partly through keeping wage rates low, and partly through the more efficient allocation of existing labor supplies. Machinery was established for rationalizing and directing labor migra tions. Together with improved automobile transportation during the twenties, the recruiting program enabled labor to be moved with less delay from one area to another as the different crops matured. This system also helped to prevent unionization among farm laborers during the twenties. It increased the bargaining power of the groweremployer and released him from dependence upon any particular group of laborers, since these could be easily replaced from other sources. On the other hand, undoubtedly this one-sided method of setting wages served in time to provoke a corresponding degree of collective action among the workers. Differences between employees and employers were sharp ened as workers came to be employed increasingly by the industry rather than by the individual growers on whose farms they worked. Under the system the individual employer tended to lose the sense of personal re sponsibility for his employees. Thus the structure of employment relations, perhaps more than any other single factor, was responsible for the unpre cedented wave of industry-wide or general strikes which occurred later. Mexican and Filipino Immigration Grower-employers in California, in addition to utilizing labor more effectively through cooperative agreement, obtained a growing supply of cheap labor through immigration of large numbers of Mexicans, supple mented by Filipinos and migratory whites who were now traveling by automobile. Mexican-born persons more than trebled in California, in creasing from 121,176 in 1920 to 368,013 in 1930. In addition, during the sThis practice was first used in a simpler form over many specialized agricultural areas in the country during the World War. In some western States employers and laborers met with State farm-labor agents or representatives of the Federal Government to fix uniform wage rates within limited areas. In the Midwestern Wheat Belt standard wage rates were set by State and county “ Councils of Defense,” often with the county agricultural agents as the prime movers. During a period of severe labor shortage, the purpose was to eliminate competitive bidding among grower-employers, which conduced to a high degree of wasteful labor turn-over. 6Report of La Follette Committee, Part I, op. cit.; Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 54 (p. 19861). 7Carey McWilliams: Factories in the Fields (p. 192). CH. VII.---CALIFORNIA IN THE TWENTIES 73 years 1923-29, some 30,000 Filipinos were admitted into the State,8 of whom some 16,000 still remained in agricultural employments by the end of the decade. The volume of this influx created a labor surplus9 and severe competition among workers who were predominantly new immi grants accustomed to low standards of living. For the time being it caused a low level of wages to continue and precluded the development o f agricultural-labor unionism. Farmer-employer organizations throughout most of the decade vigor ously opposed any attempts to restrict the immigration of M exicans.10 Growers preferred Mexicans to whites for field work for substantially the same reason that in earlier decades they had favored Orientals. The industriousness, docility, and tractability of Mexicans were considered among their chief virtues. Dr. G. P. Clements, manager of the agricul tural department of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, expressed the view that— N o labor that has ever come to the United States is more satisfactory under righteous treatment. H e is the result o f years o f servitude, has always looked upon his employer as his padron, and upon himself as part o f the establishment. (Cali fornia Citrograph, Vol. X V , November 1929, pp. 28-29.) W hite workers, by comparison, were often considered undependable; they were unable or unwilling to perform the necessary farm work at the prevailing wages and working conditions. A W hittier lemon grower related his experience with white and Mexican citrus workers thus: Crabbing, grumbling, ill-natured complaining o f conditions, loud-mouthed Bolshe vistic propaganda, and other unpleasant behavior seriously interfered with the [white] crew’s activities. Several men quit before night, and the next morning only 2 or 3 out of IS reported for duty. * * * Mexicans as a rule work quietly and uncomplainingly and are well satisfied with wages and conditions. When a trouble maker appears, he is discharged at once. (California Cultivator, September 5, 1931, p. 208.) Mexican agricultural workers in California and other States remained one of the most economically depressed immigrant groups during the twenties. In Los Angeles and other large cities, a disproportionately large percentage of persons supported by private and public welfare agencies were members of this race.1 They faced the usual handicaps 1 initially suffered by aliens— inability to speak English and ignorance regarding the customs and techniques for “ getting by” in the complex American economy. The Mexicans’ cultural background was an additional impediment to successful occupational climbing. Largely of Indian blood, with a history of bondage, illiteracy, poverty, and suppression going back for several centuries, they tended to be an easy prey to exploitation, not only from grower-employers but also from the more unscrupulous labor 8Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 54 (p. 19857); see also Part 47 (p. 17426). 9Domestic labor, according to Fuller, was much less scarce during most of the twenties than it had been during the decade 1880-90 or 1900-10. Even on the employers* own terms, the labor supply for most of the years 1920-30 was in excess of demand. (Idem, p 19873.) i°Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 54 (p. 19854). Among such groups were the Cali fornia State Grange, the State Farm Bureau Federation, the Farmers* Union, and numerous producers* associations acting through the Agricultural Legislative Committee, the California Development Association, and the State and local chambers of commerce.^ 11 Emory S. Bogardus: The Mexican Immigrant and the Quota, in Sociology and Social Re search, Vol. XH , August 1928 (pp. 372-374). 74 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE agents or contractors of their own race.12 During the 1920’s these agents had become a more parasitic institution among Mexicans in California than they had been among Chinese and Japanese in earlier years. M exi cans were more dependent upon employers in their labor relationships. They were usually less skilled and less able than Orientals to transfer to better-paid urban employments or to rise to the status of independent farm operators. Filipinos were recruited for agricultural labor in California when it appeared that Mexican immigration would be restricted during the twenties. They were regarded as the sole remaining substitute in the field of cheap labor, and because of the particular political relationship of the Philippine Islands to the United States, they could not be excluded as a definitely alien element.13 Filipino field laborers, like other racial groups, were recruited and em ployed largely by contractors. In some areas it appeared that they were introduced in order to add one more racial element to an already hetero geneous occupational group and thus further discourage possible unioniza tion. A report of the California Department of Industrial Relations e x plained this practice as follow s: A t times the growers prefer to have the contractor employ a mixture o f laborers o f various races, speaking diverse languages and not accustomed to mingling with each other. This practice is intended to avoid labor trouble which might result from having a homogeneous group o f laborers of the same race or nationality. Laborers speaking different languages and accustomed to diverse standards o f living and habits are not as likely to arrive at a mutual understanding which would lead to strikes or other labor troubles during harvesting seasons, when work inter ruptions would result in serious financial losses to the growers.1 4 Growers at first considered Filipinos to be highly desirable laborers, as they were even more docile, low-paid, and hard-working than the more Americanized Mexicans. The Department of Industrial Relations in its report of 1930 described one instance thus: The Filipino workers are preferred by this company because they are considered more careful workers and because they are not averse to having as many men employed per acre as the company deems necessary, even though the employment o f the additional workers reduces the average daily earnings per man employed. The Filipinos are also considered very desirable workers because they are willing to work under all sorts o f weather conditions, even when it is raining and the fields are wet.1 5 H owever, the frequent exploitation of Filipinos was an important cause for their later militancy in agricultural-labor unions and strikes; it was also partially responsible for their abandoning farm jobs in large numbers. A s a result of substandard working conditions in agriculture and the dis parity between urban and rural wage rates, Filipinos more rapidly than 12Mexicans In California, Report of Governor Young’ s Fact Finding Commission, 1931 (p. 131, etc.). Crop owners entered into an agreement with the contractor for harvesting the crop. The con tractor in turn hired the harvest laborers and paid their wages from money advanced by the owner, after deducting varying percentages for his own use. In some cases, it has been shown, workers were hired for possibly $3 per day, from which the contractor has been known to deduct for himself as high as $1 per day. In addition, it has been the custom for the owner to withhold 25 percent of the total wages due until the harvesting was completed, when this final lump sum was handed over to the contractor for distribution to the workers to whom it was due. In many instances, dishonest labor contractors faded from the scene with the entire amount, leav ing the workers destitute and without funds to carry them on to the next available job. # 13Transactions of the Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco, Vol. X X IV , No. 7: Filipino Immigration. *4State of California, Department of Industrial Relations, Special Bulletin No. 3: Facts About Filipino Immigration into California, San Francisco, 1930 (p. 12). 15Idem (p. 71). CH. VII.---CALIFORNIA IN THE TWENTIES 75 other races tended to drift into cities and displace whites in urban occu pations.16 They were relatively well-educated upon arrival and were am bitious to improve their position where possible. Few of those who found employment in city trades returned to agriculture.17 Those who remained in the fields tended to specialize almost exclusively in certain crops, such as asparagus, brussels sprouts, celery, and rice. Revival o f Unionism Among Field Workers Labor unionism among Mexicans and Filipinos in agriculture was prevented for many years by the obvious weaknesses in their bargaining position. Like the Chinese and Japanese in the prewar decades, they con stituted low-paid labor castes whose occupations and conditions of em ployment were substandard in the eyes of urban workers. Urban tradeunions felt that they were too migratory or casual to organize, and the A .F . of L. agitated instead for greater restrictions on immigration. Some observers argued that Mexicans in particular were not educated to the level that unionism required,18 though the rise of powerful labor move ments in M exico would have seemed to belie this. Filipinos as a small minority in competition with whites were subjected during the late twenties to mob violence reminiscent of the anti-Oriental riots during the 1880’s and 1890’s. The immediate cause for several riots, as in Exeter in 1929, was attributed to the Filipinos’ interest in white women. It was apparent, however, that the underlying factor was economic competition with whites. A s explained by the California Department of Industrial Relations— The question o f the displacement o f white labor by the Filipino was a vital factor in the antagonism that was aroused between the races. The fact that Fili pinos found it necessary to hire white female entertainers only added to the tension o f the situation, and afforded the spark which fanned the racial hostility into open warfare. (Special Bulletin No. 3, p. 76.) The discrimination which Mexicans and Filipinos periodically en countered as distinct alien minorities in the communities in which they worked ultimately had the effect of stimulating them to organize in self protection. Members of each race tended to withdraw within their own group, in associations whose ties were stronger than those o f occupational interest alone. Like other immigrants, they settled in separate colonies in which their own language, customs, and institutions were maintained. New institutions served to facilitate the adjustment of Mexicans and Filipinos to their new social environment. Their brotherhoods, mutualaid societies, and protective associations served a double purpose. They provided a fuller social life and at the same time sought to protect the immigrant’s legal and economic rights in his occupation. These institu tions were a preliminary groundwork for the development of a “ job conscious” labor-union movement among these two racial minorities. Mexicans, although numerically far superior, did not encounter the degree of hostility faced by Filipinos. Th e former were more native to 16This was especially true in hotel and restaurant occupations. According to Organized Labor (official organ of California Building Trades Council), May 12, 1928, the Filipinos in San Fran cisco were “ forcing their way into the building industry, many of them working as engineers, painters, electricians, carpenters, helpers, and laborers.” (California Department of Industrial Relations, Special Bulletin No. 3, p. 73.) 17Transactions of Commonwealth Club, Vol. X X IV , No. 7 (p. 313). 18E. Bogardus, in Journal of Applied Sociology, May 1927 (pp. 470-488). 76 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE California and were accepted as such. They did not enter nonagricultural trades in competition with whites in the same proportion as did Filipinos. M ost important, they had a definite status either as American citizens or as Mexican nationals represented by their consuls. Consular officials were perhaps their main source of protection in California. On numerous occasions in later years these officers meditated labor disputes, served as official representatives in collective-bargaining agreements, and even organized labor unions among their compatriots. The disadvantage of their economic position had prompted Mexican field laborers on a few occasions to organize. A s early as 1903, as pre viously noted, Mexican and Japanese workers in the Oxnard area of V en tura County had struck spontaneously to win increased wages and eliminate contractors from the beet fields.19 The I.W .W . subsequently had organized and led a few strikes in which Mexicans and other races participated. Some of the doctrines of this organization were later carried over into separate Mexican unions. There is some fragmentary evidence that attempts were made as early as 1922 to organize Mexican farm workers in California as a distinct group. A 3-day celebration in observance of Mexican independence was held in Fresno in September of that year, at which time it was reported that Mexicans were endeavoring to form a grape pickers’ union in the San Joaquin Valley.20 A small union was also organized by Mexicans in Brawley (Imperial County), during a few months of the cantaloup season in 1922. Sporadic unorganized strikes meanwhile had been breaking out among Mexican field workers for years, and continued throughout the twenties and thirties.21 The first stable organization including Mexican farm laborers was begun in 1927. In November of that year, a committee of the Federation of Mexican Societies met in Los Angeles. A resolution was adopted asking the numerous mutual-aid and benefit associations to lend their financial and moral support to the organizing of Mexican workers into labor unions.22 Following this meeting, local unions were organized in Los Angeles and other southern California centers. These in turn com bined to form the Confederation of Mexican Labor Unions, or C .U .O .M . (Confederation de Uniones Obreras M exicanas). A constitution for the new organization, adopted in March 1928, was modeled after that of the Regional Confederation of Labor in M exico (the C .R .O .M .). Its prin ciples reflected in part the influence of American leftist organizations, such as the I.W .W . and the Communist Party.23 The “ declaration of principles” called for restriction of Mexican immigration and abolition of employment agencies and commissaries. In addition, it endorsed the “ class struggle” and favored the “ integration into a single union of all labor in the world to combat international finance.” 24 19See Chapter V (pp. 53-54). 20San Francisco Examiner, September 16, 1922. 21Paul S. Taylor: Mexican Labor in the United States (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1928), Vol. 1 (p. 53). 22Mexicans in California, Report of Governor Young’ s Fact Finding Commission, 1931 (p. 123). 23E. S. Bogardus: The Mexican in the United States (University of Southern California Press, Los Angeles, 1934, p. 41). 24Constitucion de la Confederacion de Uniones Mexicanas, Los Angeles, March 23, 1928. Radical labor organizers appear to have been working within the Mexican mutual-aid societies during the late 1920’ s. Most of their organizing activity was sporadic and individualistic until the policy of revolutionary dual unionism was put into practice by the Communist Party in the early 1930’ s, when the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union of the Trade Union Unity League was formed. CH. VII.---CALIFORNIA IN THE TWENTIES 77 Membership in the newly formed organization fluctuated widely be cause of the migratory and casual nature of the Mexican farm workers’ employment. Total membership in May 1928 was estimated at 2,(XX) to 3,000 in some 20 locals in southern California communities: Los Angeles, El Modena, Garden Grove, Palo Verde, Orange, A twood, Stanton, Santa Ana, Talbert, San Fernando Anaheim, Gloryetta, Santa Monica, Placentia, Buena Park, M oor Park, La Jolla, Corona, Fullerton, San Bernardino, and Colton.25 By March 1929 the number had dwindled to only 200 to 300 members.26 One of the first Mexican locals formed as a unit of the Confederation was La Union de Trabajadores del Valle Imperial, organized in April 1928 largely through the efforts of Carlos Ariza, Mexican consul at Calexico. Later it changed its name and incorporated as the Mexican Mutual A id Society. Shortly afterward some 70 members of the union participated in a strike which aroused considerable interest among ob servers, as well as violence from local authorities. Early in 1928, the union, in attempting to improve the conditions of its members, petitioned the El Centro Chamber of Commerce to act as intermediary between workers and growers in revising wage rates. This the chamber refused to do. The union at the same time sent to each grower in the Imperial Valley a set of courteously worded written demands for wage increases and abolition of contractors. Growers were then preparing to sign up with labor contractors for the cantaloup harvesting season, and they refused these demands, feeling that some were exorbitant and that the union did not represent the majority of Mexican laborers in the valley. The union leaders had hoped to settle the issues through peaceful arbitration, but some members went on strike. Immediate and strenuous opposition to the union and its activities was evinced by growers and local authorities, and the strike was soon broken through wholesale arrest of participants. Nevertheless, some gains were won for Mexican laborers in the valley. Although the growers refused to deal with the union, most of them agreed to pay certain stand ard rates demanded. A lso while the major issues— abolition of labor con tractors, improved housing, and proper insurance under the workmen’s compensation act— remained unsettled, some improvements developed as an aftermath of the strike. A revised contract, prepared with the assistance of State officials, eliminated the more objectionable features of the laborcontractor system. The practice of withholding 25 percent o f the wages until the completion of the harvest season was abolished; weekly pay days were established; and the grower, instead of the contractor, was re quired in future to assume full responsibility for complete payment of wages.27 In addition to the Imperial Valley incident, tw o spontaneous or un organized strikes among Mexican and other workers in California were reported officially in 1928. One, in October, involved an undetermined number of pea pickers in Monterey County, and the other, in November, about 80 cotton pickers in M erced County. In neither of these were the results recorded. 8 25Adelante, El Unico Periodico, Viernese, May 4, 1928. 26See Porter Chaffee: Organization Efforts of Mexican Agricultural Workers, unpublished manuscript of W PA , Federal Writers Project, Oakland, Calif., 1938 (p. 15). 27For a fuller discussion of this incident see Paul S. Taylor: Mexican Labor in the United States, Vol. I (pp. 52*56). See also Mexicans in California, Report of Governor Young’ s Fact Finding Commission. 28Labor Disputes in Agriculture, 1927*38. (List compiled by Josiah C. FoTsom, associate economist of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Wash ington, D. C.) 78 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE The Mexican union remained quiescent in the Imperial Valley until 1930, when its members were involved in a spontaneous strike of much larger proportions. F or several years thereafter the unionization of Mexican field workers in California was under the domination of the Communist Party's Trade Union Unity League. Revival of Unionism Among Shed Workers Unionism began to revive among fruit and vegetable packing-shed workers at about the same time that Mexican field laborers were being organized. Collective action for several years had been informal, con sisting of mutual understandings among the workers who migrated regularly to packing sheds throughout California and Arizona. If a grower or packer “ chiseled” on the accepted wage scale, employees col lectively avoided the job from the beginning or carried out job action and “ quickie” strikes at the height of the season.29 Field workers of various racial groups had also used such practices to some degree, as had the Japanese before the war.30 Informal methods of collective bargaining began to be utilized by late 1927 and 1928, in response to a changing structure in various agricul tural industries. The fruit-and-vegetable-packing industry, for example, had become concentrated in larger units and more centralized in adminis tration as a result of adopting new and improved mechanized processes. Then in the fall of 1927 growers and packers of lettuce in the San Joaquin Valley formed an employer marketing organization known as the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association of Central California, with head quarters in Salinas. The association in April 1928 attempted to apply an average wage cut, reported to be about 30 percent, throughout the lettuce-packing in dustry. Packing-shed workers responded almost immediately with an industry-wide walk-out. Recognized leaders among the workers, some of whom had been through literally dozens of “ job-action” strikes during the past decade or more, called a mass meeting at the Labor Tem ple in Salinas to organize the strikers.31 The need for an established labor union with support from other groups was recognized in view of the strongly organized position of the employers. A fter considerable internal opposition from a minority, the strikers applied for and received a charter from the A .F . o f L. as the Fruit and Vegetable W orkers' Union Local 18016, Monterey County. The union was almost ruined by the strike, although the wage scales in the lettuce-packing industry were maintained. W hen the packing season closed, late in the fall, less than 200 paid-up members remained out of an original 800 or more.32 Members of F .V .W .U . No. 18016 participated in another strike the following year, after most of them had migrated to the Imperial Valley 29Thus the San Francisco Examiner for July 25, 1926, reported that a 2-day strike of pear packers ended with an agreement between workers and plant officials. Officials of the Santa Clara Pear Growers Association agreed to pay 6J cents per box, a raise of one-half cent per box. A 30Rajani Kanta Das: Hindustani Workers on the Pacific Coast, Leipzig, 1923 (pp. 29-32). 81A. Alston: A Brief History of the Fruit and Vegetable Industry of the Pacific Coast (un published), (pp. 4 and 5). 32Alston, op. cit. (p. 5). The charter of a Watsonville local union for Santa Cruz County having the same name but a different number was not obtained until late summer. This union died within a year. CH. VII.---CALIFORNIA IN THE TWENTIES 79 of southern California to pack winter fruits and vegetables. Unrest was prevalent in the valley during the winter season of 1929-30. Overproduc tion of winter vegetables had resulted from the large acreages under cul tivation and a heavy average yield per acre. In order to avoid “ spoiling the market,” organized shipper-growers used practices which had the effect of reducing the earnings of packing-house workers. Extra inspec tors were hired to enforce more careful packing and, incidentally, to slow down production so as to allow only a certain amount to reach the market on a sort of “ prorating” basis. W orkers complained that they Were forced to put up a “ world’s-fair pack” and in some instances had to repack and reload cars which already had been filled. Packers and loaders, paid by the piece rate, claimed that under this new policy they had to do almost twice the regular amount of work for the same pay.33 The union called a mass meeting and formulated a flexible schedule of wage demands— 5 cents per box or $1 per hour for packing and wrap ping, and other work to be paid in proportion. Committees were formed to represent shed workers in different packing centers of the valley— Brawley, El Centro, Holtville, Heber, and Calexico. A central com mittee, composed of one representative from each town, was elected to negotiate for the whole area. A strike was called, which lasted for 10 days. Trimmers, who were paid by the hour, walked out in sympathy with packers and loaders. The strike was only partially successful, and the central committee of the union succeeded in winning agreements from only 17 out of 40 shippers in the valley. The packing-shed workers had not been organized or instructed adequately beforehand, and a rumor that the committee was calling the men back to work in order to submit the issues to arbitration broke the united front of the strikers. The final outcome was maintenance of the old wage scales and a compromise gain for the union through dismissal of extra inspectors.33 F .V .W .U . No. 18016 declined soon after. A small group retained the charter for some time after the main body of members had withdrawn, but finally, in the fall of 1931, it was returned to A .F . of L . headquarters with only 12 paid-up members in the union and $75 in the treasury.33 Unionism did not develop again on a significant scale for several years. 33Alston, op. cit. (p. 5). Chapter VIII.— Cannery and Agricultural Workers; Industrial Union Revolutionary Unionism in California Agriculture During the thirties, California witnessed the largest strikes in the his tory of American agriculture. Labor-employer friction was generated in many farming regions throughout the United States as one aspect of the severe depression during this period. In California such friction in creased in a framework of extraordinarily large-scale farming with its extreme dependence upon casual and migratory seasonal laborers. Under left-wing leadership, wage disputes in agriculture were broadened to the proportions of widespread and intense class conflict. Labor trouble in the form of strikes and race riots began on a serious scale during the beginning of the depression in 1929 and 1930. The first shock of price declines on the produce market, combined with unemploy ment, increased job competition, and wage cuts in the labor market, pro voked spontaneous protest movements among agricultural workers. Such militancy, however, soon declined under the pressure of a deepening de pression. Unemployment increased steadily from 1929 to m id-1933, and facilities for organized relief were inadequate to meet the need. Some of the most intensive labor-using crops in California were grown in p rox imity to large urban centers; agriculture consequently tended to become a catch-all for the displaced from other industries and trades. A growing labor surplus led to cutthroat competition for jobs and to continuous wage cutting. In some of the most important growing areas, wage levels of 35 to 50 cents per hour in 1929 and 1930 declined to 15 to 16 cents by the spring of 1933. The collective-bargaining power of agricultural work ers was weakened and their efforts to organize in self-protection had little success. California and other States experienced a resurgence o f economic activity during mid-1933, under the stimulus of the N R A . Simultane ously farm-labor unionism revived. Public relief was established on a more adequate basis than before, and many unemployed were drawn back to urban trades, while the general level of prices and nonfarm wages rose. Although the labor provisions of the National Industrial Recovery A ct did not apply to farm workers, the latter did not regard themselves as an isolated segment of the working class. The unionizing crusade and strike psychology prevalent in urban centers soon permeated rural areas in which seasonal workers were employed in large numbers. Improvements in wages and hours lagged in agriculture, in California particularly, owing to a continually heavy migration of dispossessed from other States. The unfavorable contrast with rising standards in urban industries intensified the unrest among farm workers. Agricultural-labor unions grew rapidly in number and size of membership, and by late summer and fall a wave of general strikes was rising, in a series of crops, in many counties. Spearheading the revival and expansion of the labor movement in California agriculture was the Trade Union Unity League controlled by the Communist Party of the United States. The T .U .U .L ., as pointed 80 CH. VIII.* AND A. W. I. U. 81 out previously,1 had been established as a separate federation in opposi tion to the American Federation of Labor, and its organizing efforts were directed toward the unskilled laborers largely ignored by the A .F . of L. These it hoped to organize into militant unions which would function as part of a world revolutionary movement. The T .U .U .L . carried out its most ambitious organizing campaign in agriculture among seasonally employed casual and migratory workers of California. Farm enterprises in this State were among the most “ capi talistic,” class divisions were most pronounced, and class war was con sidered most likely. California’s farm laborers, furthermore, suffered numerous special disabilities because most of them were members of nonwhite racial minorities. A n article in the Daily W orker as early as 1929 had stressed the importance of .mobilizing “ this most exploited section of the working class.” A n aggressive campaign of organizing casual farm workers in openly revolutionary unions and conducting strikes of unprecedented proportions led to intense and violent conflict. Grower-employers, many of whom already belonged to marketing associations and labor exchanges, for pro tection of their common economic interests, now organized special anti union employer associations. New union tactics for striking and picketing were matched by new methods for breaking strikes and suppressing agita tion. Other groups, ordinarily having no direct or immediate interest in wage disputes on the land, were frequently drawn into organized laboremployer conflicts. Strikes jeopardized the incomes of people throughout an entire community or crop area and often faced violent opposition from such groups as well as from employers. On the other hand, the methods which extra-legal vigilantes and the forces of law and order used to break strikes were interpreted in many neutral quarters as a serious danger to the civil liberties of the public. Farm-labor strikes throughout the thirties, long after the T .U .U .L . had declined, continued to be larger and more numerous than in previous decades. A pattern o f org a n iz e d g ro u p co n flict and v io le n ce rem ained imbedded in California’s agricultural labor relations. Origins o f the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union The T .U .U .L . received its initial test in agriculture during January 1930, in a second outbreak among Mexican laborers in the Imperial V al ley. Starting on a local scale, a spontaneous strike developed to propor tions far surpassing the small walk-out of 1928.2 A t its peak it was re ported to have involved as many as 5,000 field workers of Mexican and other racial origins. The Communist Daily W orker of January 6, 1930, pictured it as— * * * the beginning o f mass rebellion by all the scores o f thousands o f bitterly exploited Mexican, Filipino, Hindu, Japanese, and Chinese agricultural laborers who slave for the big open-shop fruit growers and packers under conditions bordering closely on peonage. A t the outset the Mexicans were for the most part members of the conciliatory Mexican Mutual A id Association, which had been involved in the 1928 incident, but this organization soon lost control when the Trade 1See Chapter III (p. 19). 2See Chapter V II (p. 77). 82 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE Union Unity League entered the field. The T .U .U .L . dispatched organ izers to the valley to assume leadership and direction of the strike, to create a new organization, and recruit new members. The demands of the strikers were formulated and given wide publicity: A 25-percent increase in wages above the prevailing average of $1.25 to $1.50 per day, aban donment of piece rates, abolition of the contractor system, recognition of workers’ “ job committees,” and rehiring of strike participants and union members without discrimination.3 Other affiliates of the Communist Party, like the W orkers International Relief and the International Labor Defense, mobilized material and legal aid to support the T .U .U .L . or ganizers and their strike followers. The bold bid of the Trade Union Unity League for leadership was at first rejected by Mexican workers, who were the decisive element in the strike. The Mutual A id Association resented the Communist activity in the strike. A t one strike meeting in Brawley, association spokesmen denied the floor to representatives of the “ red” T .U .U .L . and condemned the literature it was circulating.4 Though the T .U .U .L . finally gained major control, it was not immediately successful, and the strike collapsed. There were additional reasons for the failure of the strike. The grow ers and local authorities used substantial violence to suppress the m ove ment.5 Strikers were inadequately prepared and poorly organized, lack ing cohesion in their ranks. The strike was the first in a series of un formulated protests by a group of substandard and economically insecure workers. It was too large in scope to be handled by the Mexican Mutual A id Association of the Imperial Valley, a conservative nationalistic labor organization with neither the will nor the experience necessary to carry on large-scale and sustained collective action. The T .U .U .L .’s efforts, on the other hand, merely brought confusion and collapse. Out o f the struggle, however, the latter organization did develop a new and distinct affiliate for farm workers, the Agricultural W orkers Industrial League.6 A second spontaneous strike broke out in the Imperial Valley during February 1930. This movement, involving several hundred shed workers, most of them native white lettuce packers and trimmers, began as a local walk-out in the southern end of the valley and spread rapidly to several major packing centers— Brawley, Holtville, Calexico, and El Centro. The main issues centered in the wage scale; the strikers demanded 5 cents per crate or $1 per hour as against the 3 cents per crate or 70 cents per hour voted by the organized shippers in a special wage conference.7 3Daily Worker, January 6 and 7, 1930. 4Brawley News, February 15, 1930. 5The Daily Worker in its issue of January 18. 1930, charged that the local Mexican consul i cooperated with immigration authorities in arrestirfg and deporting strikers who were Mexican citizens. 6Daily Worker, January 23, 1930. 7Brawley News, February 12, 1930 (p. 1). CH. VIII.—C. AND A. W. I. U. 83 Several enterprises acceded to the strikers’ demands after more than 2 weeks had passed, and on February 28 a compromise settlement in volving concessions from both sides was reached. The demand of strikers in the northern half of the valley, for an increase from 70 cents to $1 per hour, was settled at the compromise rate of 80 cents. In the southern section, where piecework rates were paid, employers granted a com pro mise increase from 3 to 4 cents per crate.8 Again the efforts of T .U .U .L . organizers to edge their way into a strike and to assume control were unsuccessful.9 The A .W .I.L . head quarters in the Imperial Valley meanwhile hummed with activity in prep aration for the coming spring cantaloup harvest. Numerous meetings were held to organize and formulate demands for increased wages and improved working conditions. The union was successful in winning mem bers away from the Mexican Mutual A id Association, and recruited workers from many other racial stocks. Its preparations, however, were thwarted by the local authorities. The Brawley News reported that in April a series of raids, carried out “ in anticipation of the coming opening of the cantaloup season/’ netted 103 arrests, including Americans, Fili pinos, Japanese, and Mexicans.10 Eight union leaders subsequently were convicted of criminal syndicalism. Elaborate precautions were taken against a strike; according to the News of April 17, 1930, “ it was offi cially stated that the county has purchased more tear-gas gun, shells, and bombs than ever before.” Other minor walk-outs occurred as immediate aftermaths o f the labor struggles in the Imperial Valley. Later in the year 300 unorganized let tuce workers went on strike in Santa Barbara County.11 N one o f these developments appeared to have been under direct union influence. W ide spread arrests o f the more active leaders and members seemed to have limited temporarily any effective action on the part of the union. Labor unionism underwent a general decline in membership and strength during the worst depression years— 1930-32. The A .W .I.L ., nevertheless, was developing a potent organization through various Communist channels connected with the Trade Union Unity League. The Communist Party focused its attention on organizing the growing numbers of unemployed in urban and rural centers. This program facilitated the later unionizing of agricultural workers, since they were a disproportionate part of the unemployed in many California towns.12 Unemployed councils constituted effective pressure groups agitating for more adequate relief. Hunger marches and demonstrations were organ ized in numerous counties, and plans were made for a concerted protest march to Sacramento, the State capital.13 The Communist Party strengthened its following among the agricul tural workers also, by upholding the rights of racial minorities. Filipinos in particular were being subjected to mob violence from whites in a series of race riots in California and other States. The Daily W orker, as spokesman for the Party, condemned the outbreaks. After a riot in the Salinas-Watsonville area early in January 1930, the paper announced 8Monthly Labor Review (U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Washington), April 1930 (p. 24). 9C. B. Moore, secretary of the Western Growers Protective Association, termed it an “ un called-for strike.” He stated that there was no organization with which the striking packers were affiliated unless it were the A .W .I.L. of the Trade Union Unity League. Brawley News, February 18, 1930.) 10Brawley News, April 15, 1930. 11Josiah C. Folsom: Labor Disputes in Agriculture, 1927-38. 12Paul S. Taylor and Tom Vasey: Contemporary Background of California Farm Labor (in Rural Sociology. Vol. I, No. 4, December 1936, pp. 401-419). I 3Western Worker (San Francisco), January 1, 1932; August 15, 1932; and December 5, 1932, 84 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE that the agricultural workers' section of the Trade Union Unity League would begin an organizing drive in the Pajaro Valley in order to combat race conflict. Representatives of the W orkers International Relief and International Labor Defense were sent to Watsonville to help Filipinos who had been arrested and beaten during the disturbances. Protest meet ings to agitate against race discrimination were organized in San Fran cisco, Los Angeles, and Oakland.14 Mexican and Filipino beet workers and asparagus cutters were reported attending organization meetings called by the Agricultural W orkers Industrial League in Sacramento County during the spring of 1930. Joint meetings of local unemployed councils and branches of the A .W .I.L . were also held in Stockton and other central California towns.15 Strikes in California agriculture remained at a low ebb during the depression years— 1930-32. Altogether, 10 occurred, of which only 3 in volved as many as a thousand workers. The A .W .I.L . led or actively participated in the largest strikes. A ll were short-lived and unsuccessful, partly for the reason that they were unplanned and spontaneous protests against the continued wage decreases and poorer working conditions16 made necessary by low farm prices. They did nevertheless furnish test ing grounds in which the T .U .U .L . was able to develop organizing tech niques and strike strategy, put to use later in larger struggles. , , Cannery Worker’s Strike Santa Clara County July 1931 The first agricultural strike in which the Trade Union Unity League again became active took place in Santa Clara County in July 1931. A few months earlier a number of Italian and Spanish workers had organ ized an independent local body known as the American Labor Union. It was short-lived and limited in scope, including at its peak not more than 1,100 workers. It took part in numerous small protest strikes throughout the Santa Clara Valley, but was involved in no major struggles until the summer of 1931. Then a 20-percent wage slash provoked a spontaneous strike in one of the plants of the California Packing Corp. on July 30, and the walk-out spread rapidly to other canneries throughout the county.17 The Trade Union Unity League succeeded in getting control of the strike shortly after it broke out and won over most of the membership of the American Labor Union. The Agricultural W orkers Industrial League meanwhile had changed its name to the Agricultural W orkers Industrial Union. W hile leading the Santa Clara strike it again changed its title, 14Daily Worker, January 29, 1930. 15Idem, April 5, 1930. 16Strikes in agriculture and allied industries during these years took place as follows (aster isks mark the strikes in which the A.W .I.L. was involved): Crop or County occupation Number 1930: January ......................Imperial .......................................... Field workers .................... *5,000 February .................... Imperial ..........................................Lettuce shed-workers . . . . *700 November ...................Santa Barbara ...............................Lettuce workers ................ 300 1931: September .................. San Luis Obispo ............................Vegetable workers ............. 75 July .......... ................. Santa Clara ....................................Cannery workers ............... *1,500 1932: A p r il............................ Santa Cruz ..................................... Lettuce workers ................ 47 May ............................ Tehama .......................................... Peach# thinners .................. 50 May-June .................. San Mateo ..................................... Pea pickers ........................ *1,500 October ....................... Santa Barbara ...............................Tomato pickers .................. 150 November .................. Solano .............................................. Fruit trimmers .................. *400 17San Jose Mercury Herald, July 31, 1931. CH. VIII.---C. AND A. W. I. U. 85 this time to the Cannery and Agricultural W orkers Industrial Union or C .& A .W J .U . as it was to be known for the next 2 years. Demands were formulated by the union leadership: 40 cents per hour instead of the pre vailing 30 cents; time and a half for overtime, free transportation, union recognition, and rehiring without discrimination against union members and strike participants.1 The strikers were faced with intimidation and suppression from local authorities, provoked in part by the aggressive tactics of the union. Open mass meetings and parades were broken up by police. •Large numbers of special deputies were reported sworn in, riots occurred, and numerous strikers were arrested.19 The strike was lost and none of the union demands were met by the employers. The rank and file was disillusioned with the C .& A.W .I.U ., and for the remainder of its career the union had little or no influence in the canning industry in California. The basic pattern of union demands and strike tactics which the C .& A .W .I.U . developed in the Santa Clara affair was repeated many times in subsequent strikes. Some modifications of the principle of union recognition were later m ade: Preferential hiring of union members through the union as intermediary; nonreemployment of strikebreakers; election of rank and file workers’ committees to negotiate with employers, etc.20 The C .& A.W .I.U . led no other important strikes for almost a year after the failure in Santa Clara County. The Trade Union Unity League and other Communist affiliates in California were too deeply preoccupied with organizing urban unemployed to agitate for improved relief provi sions. , Pea Strike at Half-Moon Bay May 1932 A brief and unsuccessful bid for strike leadership was made by the C.& A.W .I.U . in May 1932. A reduction in piece rates from 75 cents to 40-50 cents per sack provoked a spontaneous strike among the pea pickers in the vicinity of H alf-M oon Bay (San Mateo County), which soon in volved, according to the claims of union spokesmen, about 1,500 Filipino, Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Italian workers.21 C .& A.W .I.U . organizers gained control over the walk-out shortly after it developed. Union spokes men demanded restoration of the wage cut and other provisions, such as improved housing, free medical service, and abolition of the $4 rental charged to pea pickers for living quarters.21 The walk-out lasted only 24 hours; the C .& A .W .I.U . discontinued it in recognition of its inadequate organization and preparation and in the face of intimidation from many well-armed special deputies.22 , , Orchard Pruners9 Strike Solano County November 1932 The first strike deliberately organized beforehand by the C.& A.W .I.U . occurred in Vacaville (Solano County), in November 1932. From then until its conclusion in January 1933, the strike remained under the control 18Porter M. Chaffee: A History of the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union (unpublished manuscript), W P A Federal Writers Project, Oakland, Calif., 1938 (pp. 100*104). i»Idem (pp. 104*110). 20Idero (pp. 112-114). 21Western Worker, June 15, 1932. 22Chaffee, op. cit. (pp. 123-124). LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 86 of the union. The C .& A .W .I.U . had been organizing fruit workers in the district for several months previously. A walk-out, starting on the ranch of U. S. Congressman Frank Buck, rapidly spread to other farms to embrace some 400 Mexican, Filipino, and white workers.23 The union formulated demands that were to be repeated many times in subsequent strikes: Basic minimum wage of $2.50 for an 8-hour day; time and a half for overtime; free transportation and work implements; union rec ognition; cessation of evictions; and rehiring without discrimination on grounds of race, color, or union affiliation.23 Police and strikers clashed during a meeting shortly after the walk-out began, and numerous arrests were made. Special deputies were recruited, and additional armed deputies were sent into the locality from other areas. Open-air meetings ended in further clashes between strikers and the forces of law and order. “ Outraged citizens’ ’ formed a local vigilante organization and were reported to have kidnapped certain organizers, clipped their hair, and applied red paint to their persons.24 Outside aid for the strikers was mobilized by the W orkers International Relief, the International Labor Defense, and other Communist affiliates. In court room trials of arrested organizers, the defendants inserted propagandists speeches into their testimony for purposes of publicity. Late in January the rank and file voted to discontinue the strike, after the growers had steadfastly refused to negotiate with the union. The failure of this attempt was laid to faulty tim ing; the strike had been called during the pruning season, whereas it would have been more effective at harvest time, when the growers would have been most vulnerable to crop losses and most dependent upon their workers. State-wide Unionism and General Strikes in 1933 The C .& A.W .I.U . organizing campaign in California agriculture as sumed new and more ambitious proportions during 1933. Large numbers of unemployed were returning to work in urban areas, while relief was being established on a more adequate basis by the Federal Government. The Communist Party shifted its attention away from organizing unem ployed councils designed to carry out public protest meetings and hunger marches, and undertook a larger and more carefully planned program of mobilizing farm labor in a militant State-wide union organization. Unrest became widespread among the agricultural workers as their earnings lagged behind nonfarm wages and prices during a period of temporary business recovery. Grower-employers recognized somewhat belatedly that this situation contributed seriously to the violent turmoil in agricultural labor relations. The board of directors of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce at a meeting on September T4, 1933, expressed the view that— * * * some o f the labor disputes were brought about by the fact that in some agricultural sections ridiculously low prices were quoted for agricultural labor which resulted in these prices being brought up under the threat of strikes or actual strikes, which lent encouragement to similar operations in other sections. (Hearings o f La Follette Committee, Part 53, p. 19489.) 23Western Worker, November 28, 1932. 24San Francisco Examiner, December 5 and 6, 1932, CH. VIII.—C. AND A. W. I. U. 87 M ore critical in tone was a letter to the Associated Farmers from J. A . Dennis, manager of the Edison Land & W ater Co., written on July 3Q, 1934: A t the beginning o f the agricultural season o f 1933 one or two serious decisions were made by the labor department o f this organization that gave the nbcessary “ cause” for which the professional agitators always look. * * * Labor rates were determined at the 1932 level o f but 15 cents per hour in the early crop-picking work. It is unnecessary to comment upon this mistake except to stress the fact that we must o f necessity be on the alert to avoid giving any cause of creating inquiries in the labor-employer relationship. The 15-cent rate was not in the cards for 1933. Nor was it in the cards for 1932. Labor made many personal sacrifices in their standards o f living in accepting this rate in 1932, and it remained an indirect source o f dis satisfaction which grew as time passed until in 1933 it became no longer accepted. (Hearings o f La Follette Committee, Part 53, p. 19489.) Other officials seemed to feel that “ Red agitation” rather than low wages was primarily responsible for the labor troubles of 1933. Sheriff E. Cooper of San D iego County said: * * * I find that our troubles now * * * are not serious; they [Communist agitators] are just trying to create a little unrest, trying to work on the poor devil who is trying to make a living for his family. They go into a place, a field where men are working for 15 cents an hour, and try to get them to strike for 20 cents. When those demands are met they increase it to 25 cents, and so on. (Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 75, p. 27604.) The spring of 1933 ushered in a series of general or crop-wide walk outs (m ost of them under the Communist C .& A .W .I.U . leadership), which affected the more important harvests of California. They began in the spring pea harvest in the Santa Clara Valley and the berry crops of El Monte, east of L os Angeles. They continued during the summer in the sugar-beet, apricot, pear, peach, lettuce, and grape harvests, and reached a climax in the cotton harvest in several counties of the San Joaquin Valley.25 Strikes in California altogether involved some 47,575 agricultural laborers during 1933, according to one estimate. Twenty-five strikes, involving about 37,550 or almost four-fifths of the total, were under the leadership of the C.& A.W .I.U . O f these, 21 strikes, affecting about 32,800, resulted in partial increases in wages, while 4 strikes, af fecting 4,750,* were lost. Unions affiliated with the A .F . of L. led 2 strikes involving some 2,200; the larger strike of about 2,000 workers won partial gains, while a small walk-out of 200 was lost. Independent unions led 2 strikes, of which 1, affecting 600 workers, gained wage increases, and 1, involving 2,000 workers, failed. O f 3 spontaneous strikes, 2 were successful and the results of 1 were not recorded.26 Elaborate planning and an intricate organizational structure lay be hind this movement. A t conferences of the T.U .U .L . and C.& A.W .I.U . executive council, detailed reports were drawn up regarding wages and working conditions in various parts of the State. Union strategy for strike action and collective bargaining was formulated on the basis of this information. The C .& A .W .I.U . headquarters for the western district was maintained in San Jose, and its jurisdiction extended over California and Arizona. The district was divided into sections and subsections, and these in turn were divided into locals. The locals were made the basic units of the C .& .A .W .I.U . organization. 25Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 54 (p. 19948). 26Hearings before House Committee on Labor (74th, Cong., 1st sess.) on H R 6288 (p. 345). (See Appendix D: Farm-Labor Strikes in California, 1933, p. 427). 654107°—46-7 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 88 They were composed of “ farm committees” or “ camp committees” of representatives elected by workers at mass meetings called by union or ganizers in the local growing areas. Committees of this kind provided workers with a leadership drawn from their own ranks, and furnished organizers with the necessary connecting link between rank and file work ers and the central union executive. N o decisions of policy were valid without the majority approval of the membership. There were only two paid functionaries of the union— the district or ganizer who received $5 a week, and the district secretary who was elected at the district conventions. Section organizers were elected at section conventions, and local presidents and secretaries were elected di rectly by the membership of each local. The actual functioning of this organization has been colorfully por trayed by one observer: The T.U.U.L. organizers, who moved in and out o f the Union Hall on their way to and from the numerous conferences and organizational meetings that were held throughout the State, received little or no salary. Those sympathetic to the organization fed them and donations would be given to them for the purpose of supplying the other necessities o f life. T o reach the various agricultural regions o f the State, they traveled in dilapidated automobiles or on freight cars. Some o f them hitchhiked. When no strike situation prevailed, they visited the shacks and hovels o f the migratory workers who usually camped along creek banks or on the edges o f fields and orchards where crops were being cultivated or harvested. The organizers would also inquire about wages and working conditions and search out the grievances o f the workers, around which ine men o f the T.U.U.L. hoped to develop a struggle. For the organizers had a belief, a sanguine and yet mechanical faith in up surges o f the working class. They doggedly followed this rule: “ Build the organiza tion through struggle!” (Porter M. Chaffee: A History of the Cannery and A gri cultural Workers Industrial Union (unpublished), p. 119.) The Spring Campaign Pea Strike, Alameda and Santa Clara, April 1933 The first general strike (i.e., one involving thousands of*workers over a wide crop area) organized by the C .& A.W .I.U . was in the pea fields of Alameda and Santa Clara Counties during April 1933. One of the major grievances around which union organizers were able to gather wide support was the exploitation suffered by the pickers under the laborcontractor system. The Western W orker charged that two contractors in the counties where the strike developed had made a profit of $60,000 on the labor they had recruited during 1932.27 It was rumored that they had received 32 cents per hamper from growers and returned only 17 cents per hamper to the pickers— a highly improbable situation. (T h e 17 cent rate was 2 cents below the scale established during the previous season.28) Preparations for the strike had been made some time beforehand. Early in April at a meeting of C .& A.W .I.U . representatives, a tentative wage scale was established: 32 cents per hamper if the crop was in good condition, and higher if the crop was poor, with the alternative rate of 35 cents per hour if the work was performed on time rates rather than piece rates.29 Delegates at a second union conference voted unanimously 27Western Worker, April 8, 1933. 28Oakland Tribune, April 15, 16, and 17, 1933. 29Western Worker, April 8, 1933. CH. VIII.---C. AND A. W. I. U. 89 to strike on April 14 in order to enforce the revised wage demands’ for 30 cents per hamper or 1 cent per pound for piece rates, or 35 cents per hour for time rates. The union demanded further that all workers be hired through union committees in each town instead of through private contractors. The strike was carried out in highly coordinated fashion. Every migrant workers’ camp elected a strike committee of 15 members, and each of these local units sent a representative to the general strike com mittee for aid and advice. Locals were instructed not to settle with owners, contractors, police, or other officials unless a representative of the general strike committee was present. Altogether some 2,000 pickers (M exican, Filipino, Puerto Rican, and white) were reported to have been called out. Considerable violence and intimidation attended the strike before it was finally defeated by the local growers and authorities. Arrests and deportations were carried out by police, who were reported to have visited camps and either “ run out of the county” or arrested for vagrancy those unwilling to accept offers of employment.30 Local charity agencies were reported as making a special survey among their clients, with the intention of cutting off from county aid all “ able-bodied men who refused to work in the fields.” 31 Rumors of “ armed bands of R eds” among the strikers stirred up extra-legal opposition from other elements in the community. Guns, blackjacks, clubs, and tear gas were said to have been used in one riot in the community of Decoto on April 15.32 The C .& A.W .I.U . finally called off the strike on April 30 with few if any gains. A similar walk-out in the pea and beet crops of Santa Barbara County was concurrent with the pea pickers’ strike. Though the former was not led directly by the C .& A .W .I.U ., the influence of the union was un doubtedly felt. F or more than 2 weeks, during early April, approxi mately 1,000 field workers struck for a wage of 30 cents per hour in place of the prevailing 15-cent rate. The fact that certain labor contrac tors had failed to pay wages due their workers was reported to be a prime factor contributing to this spontaneous outbreak.33 , Cherry Pickers9 Strike Santa Clara9 June 1933 The C .& A .W .I.U .’s leadership of a cherry pickers’ strike in the vicinity of Mountain View (Santa Clara County), during June, was more successful than its previous efforts. Early in the month it had organized local unions in small towns adjacent to the cherry orchards. Dissatisfaction among pickers centered on the wage issue. Union spokes men charged that wage rates had been reduced generally to 20 cents per hour from the previous year’s level of 30 cents, despite the fact that the price of cherries had risen to $80 per ton from the previous year’s $60. Union demands were formulated in the usual w ay: A basic minimum wage of 30 cents per hour, an 8-hour day, and union recognition.34 T o soOakland Tribune, April 14, 1933. 31Idem, April IS and 16, 1933. 32Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 75 (p. 27602). 33Daily News (Santa Barbara), April 13, 1933. 34Western Worker, June 26, 1933. 90 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE enforce this schedule, approximately 500 pickers on June 14 walked out of 12 of the largest ranches in the Santa Clara Valley. The strike soon spread to 8 more orchards, and at its peak was reported to have included 800 to 900 workers. Local newspapers reported some violence and intimidation of the familiar pattern. Local authorities raided the C .& A .W .I.U . headquar ters in San Jose. One fight resulted in a few injuries and arrests when special deputies armed with ‘‘pick handles and tear gas” clashed with “ Reds * * * well armed with clubs, rocks, bolts, and nuts.” The county sheriff was quoted as threatening to call for the State militia, if necessary, to quell the strike.35 The strikers nevertheless won compromise gains, and the general strike committee of the C .& .A.W .I.U ., on June 24, decided to call off hostilities. Twelve of the larger orchards were reported to have agreed to meet the most important demand— wages of 30 cents per hour. Only a few continued to pay the 20-cent rate.36 In the union’s favor was the fact that very little migratory labor was involved. Cherry picking was performed for the most part by resident workers of Spanish extraction, a number of whom were respectable home owners enjoying a higher standard of living than that customarily possessed by California’s farm laborers. Community opposition was less united and violent, and the strikers’ ability to hold out was corres pondingly greater. Berry Strike at El Monte, June 1933 The next venture of the C.& A.W .I.U . resulted in dismal failure. It was reminiscent of the T .U .U .L .’s earlier policy in 1930 and 1931 of capturing strike leadership from independent or unaffiliated labor organi zations. The strike of several thousand workers in berries and other crops in the San Gabriel Valley of Los Angeles County in the summer of 1933 was one of the largest general or crop-wide strikes in which the C .& A.W .I.U . participated. It gave rise to correspondingly extensive and elaborate antistrike preparations on the part of growers throughout California. The conflict had international repercussions, as well, before it was settled. Approximately 80 percent of the 600 to 700 acres of “ bush” berries in Los Angeles County was in the hands of Japanese, organized in their own growers’ associations. Picking was paid on a piecework basis and, at the rates prevailing during the 1933 season, the berry workers, pre dominantly Mexican, could average 15 to 20 cents per hour. Leaders of a locally organized Mexican Farm Labor Union affiliated to the Confederacion de Uniones Obreras Mexicanos called a strike early in June to enforce a wage rate of 25 cents per hour in the berry harvest. Local representatives of the C.& A.W .I.U . cooperated with the Mexican organi zation. Only 500 workers responded, and they soon showed signs of weakening as growers were able to recruit adequate help from a current surplus labor supply. 35Mercury Herald (San Jose), June 17, 18, and 19, 1933. 36Chaffee, op. cit. (pp. 8 and 9). CH. VIII.---C. AND A. W. I. U. 91 Communist strike participants, however, were able to gain outside support through their affiliations with other groups. They won temporary control over the conduct of the strike and were able to extend it rapidly. Mass picketing and demonstra tions were resorted to. The strike spread to include Mexicans and a minority of Filipinos, numbering altogether some 7,000 workers in the onion and celery as well as in the berry crops of Los Angeles County.37 The Mexican Farm Labor Union grew rapidly in the course of the walk-out, and local branches were formed in each agricultural labor cen ter in the county. Members held a convention in Los Angeles on July 15 in order to federate the new local unions, and formed a permanent organization, the Confederacion de Uniones de Campesinos y Obreras Mexicanos del Estado de California, or C.tJ.C.O.M . The new union extended its membership rapidly during 1933; by early 1934 a member of the executive council estimated that it numbered some 50 local affili ates and 5,000 to 10,000 members.38 The rapidly growing scope of the movement in Los Angeles County soon resulted in outside intervention to attempt a settlement, and in the process left-wing organizers won indirect support for the strike from the Mexican Government.39 Later the Mexican consul took an active part as mediator and spokesman for the strikers. The Japanese consul did not take part in the struggle directly, but cautioned the growers (largely Japanese, as noted) to stay strictly within the bounds of the law. Finally Edward Fitzgerald, Conciliator of the U. S. Department of Labor, en tered the discussions. The El Monte strike was less violent than other large struggles in which the C .& A .W .I.U . participated. A few overt conflicts resulted in arrests, but in view of the duration of the strike and the numbers involved, these occurrences were remarkably few. In fact, according to Lawrence Ross, strategist of the C .& A .W .I.U ., the police made a special effort to avoid violence.40 Dr. G. P. Clements, manager of the agricultural department of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, attempted to obtain a signed agree ment from the Japanese grower-employers. Mexican strike leaders, through U. S. Labor Commissioner Marsh and U . S. Conciliator Fitz gerald, had demanded certain concessions as a prerequisite to any com promise agreement, and finally accepted a raise in wage rates for the pickers to 20 cents per hour and 45 cents per crate, instead of the pre vailing 15-cent and 35-cent levels. A conference was then held with strike leaders, representatives of local Mexican unions, and the Mexican Consulate. Undr the domination of the Communist “ fraction,” however, the labor spokesmen refused to accept the agreement.41 The strikers at first had demanded only an increase in pay for berry picking (this had been granted). N ow that they had the grower-employers “ on the run,” they 37Western Worker, July 17 and August 7, 1933; also Spaulding: The Mexican Strike at El Monte (in Sociology and Social Research, Vol. XVIII, 1933-34, p. 575). 38Spaulding, op. cit. (p. 578). 39Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 53 (p. 19693). 40Western Worker, August 7, 1933. 41It was the strategy of the leadership, according to Donald E. Marve, attorney for the Mexican Consulate, to bring about a general strike in the entire area by the time the Federal Conciliator arrived. By the end of June 7.000 were on strike in Los Angeles and Orange Counties. (Los Angeles Times, June 25, 1933; San Francisco Examiner, June 30, 1933.) 92 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE considered the time propitious for continuing the strike and broadening it so as to make comparable gains in other crops of Los Angeles County.42 This error in strategy soon became apparent, as the C .& .A .W .I.U . lost control of the situation and provoked greater opposition from the groweremployers.43 The strike was in effect broken when the growers recruited Japanese laborers and school children from Los Angeles to pick berries. W hite employers hired white American laborers and stood guard with guns to warn “ agitators” away.44 The Mexican consul captured control over the strikers from the C.& A.W .I.U . and won a signed agreement entailing compromise gains for the new “ liberal union,” the C .U .C .O .M .: a minimum wage rate of $1.50 per 9-hour day, and 20 cents per hour where the work was not steady; recognition of the Mexican union; preferential hiring for its members; and discharge of strikebreakers.45 The scale of the strike aroused widespread apprehension among grow ers in many counties, and they began to prepare for labor trouble in other crops throughout the State. Dr. G. P. Clements in a memorandum writ ten at the time stated: “ Unless something is done this local situation is dangerous in that it will spread throughout the State as a whole. In my opinion this is the most serious outbreak of the Mexican workers here.” 46 Campaign o f Late Summer and Fall, 1933 The C .& A .W .I.U . held its first district convention shortly after the El Monte strike. The union indulged in self-criticism in the course of “ streamlining” its organizational structure and planning a series of more ambitious ventures. T o cope with the migratory condition of most agri cultural workers, the leaders felt they should form a chain of locals in all important farm, orchard, and cannery centers. These would then render the union more accessible to workers who otherwise might lose contact. The convention also called upon C.& .A .W .I.U . members to apply the “ boring from within” policy more effectively— to penetrate opposing unions in order to form contacts with dissident elements and thereby win organizations over to the C .& A.W .I.U . In planning a wave of strikes for the forthcoming summer and fall harvest seasons of 1933, the union defined more clearly the relationships among the local, section, and district groups. The local was to be the 42Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 53 (p. 19693). 43C.&A.W.I.U. strategists themselves were highly critical of their representatives* handling of the El Monte strike. Lawrence Ross, writing in the Communist Party organ, the Western Worker, stressed the inadequate preparations. No preliminary study had been made of crop and employment conditions in the fields, and the union demands were simply copied from those of the Santa Clara pea strike.' After the walk-out had spread, Party members did not follow a rational policy, including the possibility of a compromise offer from the growers. As a result, their rejection of the growers* agreement to a substantial wage increase ruined the Party mem bers’ status among the strikers, and with it any possibility of building a strong foundation for the C.&A.W.I.U. through recruiting new members. Subsequently the strikers turned to the more moderate program of the consul-controlled C.U.C.O.M. (Western Worker, Aug. 7, 1933.) 44Spaulding, op. cit. (p. 579). 45See Appendix E : “ Agreement between the Confederacion de Campesinos Y Obreras Mexicanos (C.U.C.O.M.) and Japanese Vegetable Growers’ Associations” (p. 428). 46Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 53 (p. 19695). In other parts of the State I>r. Clements reported that “ Frank Palomares of the Agricultural Labor Bureau of the San Joaquin Valley, whom we brought down to assist us in this matter, is afraid that the strike will extend into his district, and left last night to take care of his own job. I am advising the Western Growers Protective Association to have their agents in the Imperial Valley keep an eye on the situation down there so they can nip any general strike in the bud. The other districts have the advantage over us in this respect because the Mexicans live in homes owned by the employers, so whenever they strike they can be evicted and new workers brought in.” (Hearings, p. 19695.) CH. VIII.---C. AND A. W. I. U. 93 basic unit of organization, and the latter two were to mobilize assistance for it when a struggle developed in any local area. Profiting from their mistakes in the El Monte incident, C .& A .W .I.U . organizers embarked on a series of more ambitious and successful general agricultural strikes, some of which embraced workers in several counties. These followed a markedly similar pattern, not only in the aggressive strategy employed by the union leadership, but also in the cleavage of interests exposed within each community, and in the techniques of sup pression employed by local growers and authorities. The C .& A .W .I.U .’s efforts during the 2 months immediately follow ing the El Monte berry strike met with varying success. The union obtained valuable experience in an abortive strike at Lodi and other grape-producing areas near Fresno and in a later strike of peach pickers on the famous Tagus Ranch in Tulare County. It recruited and trained many effective organizers of Mexican, Filipino, and white American stock, who later proved effective leaders in a series of large walk-outs, culminating in the great cotton strike of the San Joaquin Valley in the fall of 1933. , Pear Strike in Santa Clara County August 1933 The first general crop strike undertaken by the C.& .A .W .I.U . after its convention was highly successful. It involved approximately 1,000 pear pickers in the regions of Agnew and Milpitas (Santa Clara County), during August 1933. W orkers in that area had been thoroughly organ ized beforehand; at a conference held in San Jose on August 11, 3 days before the strike broke, workers in every orchard in the area had been represented by elected delegates, and a coordinated strike policy had been designed. The physical or structural aspect of the pear industry in this area was an important element in the success of the strike. The technique of mass picketing commonly employed by the C.& .A .W .I.U . was ideally suited to large square orchards situated on main highways and cross roads. W here pickets in large numbers could be controlled, the dangers of violence and intimidation from growers and law-enforcement authori ties were lessened. The strike was settled within 4 days. Substantial wage gains accrued to the strikers, who returned to work still organized under the C .& A .W .I.U . Though the union had demanded a wage scale of 30 cents per hour instead of the existing 20 cents, agreement was reached on the compromise offer of 25 to 27Yz cents per hour.47 The strike was notable also for the arbitration efforts of Louis Block of the California Bureau of Labor Statistics. It was the first time that the C.& A.W .I.U . had been given official Government recognition. Peach Strike, August 1933 The peach strike led by the C .& A .W .I.U . during August 1933, was a more extensive and sustained movement. Starting on a local scale, it developed into a series of both organized and spontaneous walk-outs which blanketed the peach-growing areas in 7 counties— Sutter, Yuba, 47Oak1and Tribune, August 18, 1933. 94 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE Butte, Stanislaus, Tulare, Fresno, and Merced. A s in the previous pear strike in Santa Clara County, its success was attributed to the large and compact structure of the peach orchards. The first signs of unrest appeared in Fresno County early in August, when 130 Mexican pickers, after striking for a wage increase of 2 cents per hour, struck again for a further raise of 5 cents per hour on 5 peach ranches in the vicinity of Parlier and Selma. They justified this action on the ground that the N R A codes had stipulated a minimum wage scale of 27 cents per hour for unskilled labor.48 The C.& A.W .I.U ., meanwhile, was active in other communities. Pat Chambers, district organizer, unionized some 700 workers on the Tagus Ranch in Tulare County. These men had become dissatisfied with wages reported to be 15 cents per hour, and now, as an organized local, they demanded 35 cents per hour and certain improvements in working conditions. They called a strike on August 14 and placed picket lines around the ranch.49 T w o thousand peach pickers also walked out of orchards owned or controlled by the California Packing Corp. in Merced County, in a demand for 30 cents per hour in place of the prevailing 15 to 17 y 2 cents. This strike was doubly effective; it not only prevented the harvesting of the peaches, but also rendered the company canneries idle, since these depended on the steady flow of fruit from the orchards.49 By the middle of August 4,000 pickers were estimated to be on strike. Growers and police offered stiff resistance. . Newspapers reported that deputies and ranch guards were armed with shotguns and rifles in preparation for serious trouble.50 Relatively little violence occurred, however, though raids on strike headquarters were carried out, strikers were evicted in large numbers, and a few strike leaders and pickets were arrested. The threat of a general strike throughout the peach crop tended to bring the growers to terms. Settlements were reached in several locali ties through the mediation efforts of the California Department of Indus trial Relations.51 First to reach a compromise among the grower-employers was the California Packing Corp. On August 16, 2 days after its employees began their walk-out, the company accepted the recommendations of Timothy Reardon, Commissioner of the State Department of Industrial Relations. The strikers were granted a wage increase from the prevail ing 17y 2 cents per hour to the 25-cent rate, and a 9-hour day. The mana ger of the Tagus Ranch held for 2 days longer to the 17 y -c e n t scale, which constituted a 2j4-cent increase over the scale announced at the beginning of the peach harvest, by the Agricultural Labor Bureau of the San Joaquin Valley.52 On August 18, the management finally gave in to pressure from the C .& A .W .I.U . and the State Department of Indus trial Relations for a scale of 25 cents per hour.53 Peach growers in the Reedly-Parlier district of Fresno County followed suit the next day. In the presence of Deputy Labor Commissioner Fred Huss, they signed a wage agreement with C.& A.W .I.U . representatives, establishing the 48San Francisco Examiner, August 3, 1933. 49Hanford Journal, August 15, 1933. 50Idem, August 15, 1933; also San Francisco Examiner, August 17, 1933. 51 Kern County Labor Journal, August 18, 1933. 52Hanford Journal, August 18, 1933. 53Kern County Labor Journal, August 18, 1933. CH. VIII.---C. AND A. W. I. U. 95 25-cent hourly rate and pledging reemployment of strikers without dis crimination.34 New conflicts flared in northern California counties less than a week after these strikes had been settled. After an intensive organizing drive had been made by the C.& A.W .I.U . in the vicinity of Gridley (Butte C ounty), 350 pickers struck for higher wages on August 22.55 Some violence was reported, including an assault on pickets by armed deputies. A settlement was reached within 2 days, through the mediation efforts of the State Department of Industrial Relations. T w o hundred strikers on two of the largest orchards in Butte County56 won an agreement stipulating a wage rate of 30 cents per hour— the highest rate in the State for fruit picking.57 The strike sentiment spread to the Marysville-Yuba City area of Yuba and Sutter Counties. Though there was no definite organization behind this upsurge, the influence of the C .& A .W .I.U . was felt. Spon taneous mass meetings were attended by several hundred local pickers, who voted for wage increases from the prevailing 25 cents per hour to 30 cents, or from 4 to 5 cents per b o x ; they threatened to strike if these demands were not met. Labor representatives carried on negotiations with growers, a number of whom agreed to pay the higher scale.58 Sub sequently Sutter County placed a ban upon unlicensed public gatherings.59 Several hundred pickers in Stanislaus County went on strike when a formal demand for the 30-cent hourly rate was rejected by the grow ers. Here the leadership of the strike, at least in the beginning, was in the hands of an independent organization known as the M odesto Farmers and W orkers N R A Union. It proposed to establish a union-controlled employment center or exchange, from which growers could hire work ers without the intervention of contractors.60 After a strike of more than a week's duration, the union settled with the growers for a compromise wage of 25 cents per hour 61 A t this point the independent union com e into conflict with an affili ated local of the United Farmers' League which called an open-air meeting under its own name in order to win workers away from the N R A Union. The U .F .L . bitterly denounced the strike settlement, on the ground that the participants, by holding out a little longer, could have won the 30-cent scale they had demanded.62 The substantial gains won by the strikers in this series of walk-outs were due partly to the particular vulnerability of the peach industry already noted. The crop was highly perishable and concentrated on a limited number of large-scale ranches, many of which were owned or operated by outside corporations such as the California Packing Corp. or the Bank of America. Instances of arrests, vigilantism, and violence were few, ow ing largely to the fact that strikers, by mass-picketing 54Fresno Bee, August 20, 1933. 550akland Tribune, August 22, 1933. 56I.e., the Steadman Ranch and the Butte County orchards of California Lands, Inc., affiliated with the Bank of America. 570akland Tribune, August 22, 1933; Sutter County Farmer, August 24, 1933. 58Idem, August 23, 1933. 59Idem, August 29, 1933. 60Modesto Bee, August 23, 1933. 61Idem, September 1, 1933. 62Western Worker, September 4 and 11, 1933. 96 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE methods, were able to concentrate their forces around the more import ant orchards. C .& A .W .I.U . organizers could reach the main body of pickers without having to cover large numbers of small ranches. Largescale operations in the industry served also to standardize wages and working conditions; workers' grievances and strike demands were not so diverse as they would have been in a crop grown on many scattered small ranches run by independent operators. The close financial integra tion between canneries and peach orchards, furthermore, made it doubly difficult for firms like the California Packing Corp. to withstand strikes. , Sugar-Beet Strike at Oxnard August 1933 The C .& A .W .I.U . led an unsuccessful strike in the sugar-beet area of Oxnard (Ventura County), at about the same time that the peach industry was in trouble. Union organizers had been active among M exi can and Filipino beet laborers for several weeks. A 17-percent increase in benefit payments to beet growers had been announced on July 29, 1935.63 A few days later the C.& A.W .I.U ., together with a local Filipino Protective Union, submitted a schedule of demands to the Beet G row ers Association calling for a minimum wage of 35 cents per hour, and a comparable 30- to 50-percent increase in piece rates; an 8-hour day; weekly pay days; free transportation to and from w ork ; union recogni tion; employment without discrimination for race or union affiliation; hiring through a union shop; and abolition of labor contractors.64 A strike was called on August 7, after the growers had refused to consider the union demands. (The local chamber of commerce had announced previously that there were many Mexican relief clients available if a strike occurred.65) The situation remained comparatively peaceful for about 2 weeks. The Oxnard Daily Courier of August 12, 1933, described it as “ one of the few strikes in the State that has not been accompanied by either bloodshed or rioting.,, The growers took certain conciliatory measures almost immediately after the walk-out was called. The Beet Growers Association granted compromise wage increases and agreed to eliminate the use of labor contractors where possible.66 The C .& A .W .I.U .’s position was apparently weakened by divisions in its ranks, and by the fact that surplus labor was available for break ing the strike. The Filipinos at first refused to join the Mexicans in the walk-out, and those who remained at work were protected by heavily armed guards.67 Mexicans employed at the American Beet Sugar Co. plant in Oxnard were replaced by white Americans when they walked out in sympathy with the field workers.68 Although no open conflict occurred for almost 2 weeks, local authorities intimidated the strikers by various means. The Oxnard Daily Courier of August 13, 1933, for instance, reported that “ Deputies broke up one possible incipient riot in the alley near the strike headquarters by driving their cars with the 630xnard Daily Courier, July 29, 1933. 64Western Worker, August 7, 1933. 65Oxnard Daily Courier, August 5, 1933. 66Idem, August 9, 1933. 67Idem, August 7 and 11, 1933. 68Idem, August 10, 1933; Western Worker, August 21, 1938. CH. VIII.---C. AND A. W. I. U. 97 sirens shrieking at great speed through the crowd of strikers.” The strikers also charged that two of their number were forced to go to work under the threat of arrest. The Mexican W orkers Alliance, an organization on the order of a company union, was formed to counteract the C .& A.W .I.U . The local newspaper announced that its purpose was “ to serve as a point of contact between the farmer desiring Mexican workers and the Mexican workers desiring to return to work. They have the full cooperation and support of the authorities, the chamber of commerce, and the farmers of the com munity.” (O xnard Daily Courier, August 15, 1933.) Estimates of the number on strike differed widely. Union spokesmen claimed 1,000 to 1,200 participants.69 The Oxnard Daily Courier, A u gust 15) charged that this was a gross exaggeration, and estimated that fewer than 300 were involved. Other participants were described as “ idlers, agitators, and others not identified with labor in beet fields.” The conflict became violent, finally, when a riot occurred between the strikers and deputies on August 18. Five strikers were arrested, and police and deputies were reported by the local newspaper to be patrolling the strike area with “ sawed-off shotguns and tear-gas bombs.” 70 The strike was ended officially by the C.& A.W .I.U ., 2 days later. Grape Strike at Fresno and Lodi9 September-October 1933 *1 The C .& A .W .I.U . made an abortive and unsuccessful bid for leader ship of a strike among seasonal workers in the grape harvest in and around Fresno and Lodi during the fall of 1933. This movement was one of the most violent that occurred in California agriculture during the thirties, particularly in the techniques for suppression employed by growers and local law-enforcement authorities. C .& A.W .I.U . organizers wrere active among the vineyard workers by mid-August. On August 21, State Labor Commissioner MacDonald announced publicly that a general strike of pickers was impending unless the growers agreed to pay at least 25 cents per hour, as contrasted with the prevailing 12^2 to 20 cents, or cents per tray. The vineyardists refused, offering instead a standard rate of 20 cents per hour. A strike followed in Fresno, during the course of which both growers and work ers resorted to direct action. The walk-outs around Fresno and Modesto, inadequately organized beforehand, were broken almost immediately by arrests and imprisonment of the more active leaders. The union meanwhile was organizing pickers in the Lodi area, and the growers were making counterpreparations. On September 7 some 600 vineyardists at a mass meeting agreed upon a standard wage scale of l /* cents per tray, as opposed to the pickers’ demands for 2 to 4 1 cents per tray,72 Several hundred workers at a mass meeting on Septem ber 13 collectively demanded a flat 50 cents per hour and other condi tions.73 69Western Worker, August 14, 1933. 70Oxnard Daily Courier, August 18, 1933. 71 Most of the material on this incident is taken from Hearings before the House Committee on Labor (74th Cong., 1st sess.) on HR 6288; and from an unpublished paper of L. Archibald: The Lodi Grape Pickers’ Strike of 1933 (Berkeley, University of California, Apr. 26, 1939). 72Hearings of House Committee on Labor (p. 360). 73Idem (p. 361). 98 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE After fruitless negotiation marked by considerable intransigeance on both sides, a strike began on September 27, involving more than 500 pickers employed on 150 ranches.74 Some compromises were apparently made by both growers and strikers, but they were not sufficient to settle the issues. Local newspapers reported that Lodi growers were now paying a standard 25 cents per hour, while union demands were scaled down to 40 cents per hour, an 8-hour day, time and a half for overtime, and abolition of the contractor system of hiring.73 Several vineyardists appeared at strike headquarters and offered to pay pickers 40 cents per hour, but refused to allow the strike committee to designate whom they were to employ. One rancher succeeded in recruiting at the union wage about 40 pickers from the ranks of the strikers, and escorted them to work with the aid of special deputies. Local authorities used drastic methods to end the trouble on the second day of the strike. The sheriff moved additional deputies into the Lodi area, and 70 special deputies from a loosely formed vigilance com mittee were later sworn into office by a local justice, with instructions to use “ disturbance of the peace charges whenever trouble appeared.” 75 T o combat the “ guerilla picketing” of the strikers, two deputies in cars were assigned to every carload of pickets, with orders to arrest them for “ disturbing the peace” wherever they attempted to interfere with harvesting of the crop. Col. Walter E. Garrison, who became prominent as a leader of the Associated Farmers of California, was selected to head this group of volunteer deputies. Arrests grew in number as the strike began to affect the picking operations. By the end of the second day, 8 pickets had been arrested. A vigilante raid on union headquarters in Lodi netted 6 strike leaders, who were held on charges of conspiracy to obstruct the law.76 By the end of the third day 28 had been jailed. The situation became more tense as the strikers’ ranks were swelled by the arrival of incoming transients seeking employment. The applica tion of a “ grape control plan” sponsored by the A A A , which resulted in the discharge of approximately 35 percent of the workers who had remained in the vineyards during the strike, further complicated the problem and gave rise to greater apprehension among local residents. The strikers held numerous mass meetings in town to formulate further demands.77 They threatened that all picking operations would be stopped “ even though it required taking pickers from the vineyards.” 78 Approximately 1,000 local townspeople and ranchers held a mass meet ing in response to this threat. A sharp division developed between those who desired direct action and those who held out for settlement of the strike by peaceful means. One Lodi businessman and prominent Legion naire was reported to have suggested that “ all they [the strikers] have got is mob rule. Let’s beat them to it.” 79 Colonel Garrison and Sheriff Odell led the “ peace faction,” cautioning against violence. 74San Francisco Chronicle, September 28, 1933. 75Stockton Record, September 28, 1933. 76Modesto Bee, September 29, 1933. 77Eight specific demands were drawn up at strikers* meetings: (1) An 8-hour day at 40 cents per hour, with time and a half for overtime; (2) immediate release of all strikers under arrest; (3) recognition of the union; (4) no discrimination against strikers in rehiring; (5) those em ployed before the walk-out must have first chance in reemployment; (6) all hiring must be done through the union; (7) all nonstrikers who have worked during the strike must be dis missed; and (8) the union is to be the arbitrator of all future labor disputes. (San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 4, 1933.) 78Stockton Record, October 3, 1933. 79San Francisco Examiner, October 4, 1933. CH. VIII.---C. AND A. W. I. U. 99 The following morning several hundred citizens assembled before the union’s strike headquarters in Lodi, from which pickets were regu larly dispatched. Led by a prominent shipper and vineyardist, who was reported to have shouted, “ W hat are we waiting for? T o hell with the peace talk! Let’s get them m oving!” , the vigilante mob charged the ranks of the strikers with guns, clubs and fists, and drove them out of town.80 Later attempts by strikers to meet and reorganize were reported to have been broken up by vigilantes with fire hose and tear-gas bombs.8 1 A s a violent aftermath, a striker shot and killed a ranch foreman and made good his escape. The strong feeling which the strike had aroused among some elements in the community were indicated in the remarks made by Justice Solkmore of the Municipal Court to strikers brought up before him for trial. These were reported by several newspapers and were published in the Hearings before the Committee on Labor of the U. S. House of Repre sentatives : Some o f you have listened to nit-wits, half-baked radicals. * * * Some o f you, I am afraid, are not intelligent enough to know what it is all about. I f you were in the right crowd, I would gamble that many of you would go to work at once. I am not attempting to threaten or coerce you. I am warning you, if you insist on jury trials, and if you should be found guilty, you cannot expect leniency from this court. (Hearings of House Committee on Labor, p. 364.) On October 6, during the preliminary hearings of one striker held for trespassing, the justice declared in a dispute with the defendant’s attorney that— “ * * * These men are nothing but a bunch o f rats, Russian anarchists, cutthroats, and sweepings o f creation. This defendant doesn’t know when he is well off if he wants a jury trial. In some places they would take him and his kind and' hang them from the town hall.” The attorney interrupted with the comment: “ But they wouldn’t dare to do that here.” “ Don’t you be too sure about that. This town may see a few hangings yet.” The attorney insisted: “ I want a jury trial.” “ Juries be damned,” replied the judge. “ Juries are reminiscent o f medievalism. They are a means o f escape for guilty men. If I were innocent, I would rather go before a judge. They usually get twelve boneheads to sit on a jury.” (Hearings o f House Committee on Labor, p. 1364.) A change of venue was finally granted the striker defendants, on the ground that they could not obtain a fair trial in the Lodi municipal court. The unsuccessful conclusion of the Lodi grape strike was not to be explained solely by the effectiveness of the growers and local authorities in suppressing it. Union leaders obviously had failed to organize the pickers adequately beforehand, as was evident from the fact that pick ing operations continued only slightly below normal throughout the strike. The extreme hostility of the growers was due in part to the exhorbitant demands of the strike leaders. In stipulating a wage rate of SO cents or even 40 cents per hour, the strikers were setting a figure far in excess of the rate currently paid in other crop areas, and there was evidence to show that the growers at the time were unable to grant such demands. That the strike leaders were likewise unwilling to enter into negotiations except on the basis of their own demands was attested by 80San Francisco Chronicle, October 4, 1933, and San Francisco Examiner, October 4, 1933. 81San Francisco Chronicle, October 5, 1933; San Francisco Examiner, October 5, 1933; Stockton Record, October 5, 1933. 100 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE their refusal even to meet with Deputy State Labor Commissioner W il liamson after the strike had begun. These were doubtful tactics particu larly during a period when the demand for labor in the crop was tempo rarily reduced through a marketing-control program sponsored by the AAA. , The Cotton Pickers9 Strike of San Joaquin Valley October 1933s 2 Largest, most sensational, and most ably organized of all strikes led by the C.& A.W .I.U . was that among cotton pickers of the San Joaquin Valley during October 1933. It was a dramatic climax to the series which had begun in late summer. The significance o f the event is far more than incidental. It exhibits in full detail the essential characteristics o f numerous lesser conflicts in California agri culture both before and since, in which ardent organizers agitate and lead, incensed “ vigilantes” organize and act, growers, officials, and laborers each overstep the law, and citizens finally cry to the State authorities for peace, if necessary at the hands o f troops. (Hearings, p. 19947.) The “ structure of controls” which prevailed in the cotton industry of California tended to generate an unusual degree of labor unrest. The Agricultural Labor Bureau of San Joaquin Valley continually endeavored to standardize wage rates for chopping and picking throughout the cot ton-growing area. Several hundred of the largest grower-employers met annually at conferences held in Fresno for this purpose. Large cotton growing and finance companies, like the Anderson Clayton Co., which ginned about 35 percent of the total production in Arizona and Califor nia, could exert disproportionate pressure on individual growers. Cot ton farmers could be “ kept in line” and made to conform to wage scales and working conditions agreed upon collectively, for their dependence upon production loans and other financial services, provided by banks and processing companies on the security of crop or chattel mortgages, left them little leeway for individual bargaining with their employees. Chronic unemployment and job competition during the depression years of the early thirties caused an extreme decline in cotton wages, 6ven while the acreage and demand for labor was increasing. W ages for cotton chopping, for instance, fell from $1.46 per acre in 1930 and $1.36 in 1931 to 66 cents in 1932 and 72 cents in 1933. Cotton-picking rates underwent comparable changes; from well over $1* per hundred weight in the late twenties, the scale for picking fell to 40 cents in 1932. Grower-members of the Agricultural Labor Bureau followed their cus tomary practice in 1933 and convened in Fresno late in September to agree upon a standard rate. In view of the decreased labor surplus and growing labor unrest, they set a rate of 60 cents per hundredweight, with the stipulation that they would make no further changes without holding another meeting. The pickers’ reactions to this announcement foretold serious labor trouble. C.& A.W .I.U . agents had been carrying on preharvest agita tion, in the southern San Joaquin cotton area, among the pickers of whom more than three-fourths were Mexican. The Communists had 82Except as otherwise noted, the material describing this strike was obtained largely from the account by Paul S. Taylor and Clark Kerr: Documentary History of the Strike of Cotton Pickers in California, 1933, in Hearings of the La Follette Committee, Part 51 (pp. 18578-18599) and Part 54 (pp. 19947-20030). CH. VIII.* I. AND A. W. I. U. 101 won considerable prestige through their leadership of previous strikes in other crops, in which large numbers of cotton pickers had participated, and now the one-sided wage policy of organized growers drove many more pickers to support the C .& A.W .I.U . The union had recruited and trained a corps of Mexican, N egro, and white organizers from among those who had been involved in earlier strikes. They now formed a nucleus of subordinate leaders over a net work of some 19 newly organized local unions throughout the cotton area. A conference of delegates elected by these locals, had been held in the southern cotton district early in September, in preparation for the coming harvest operations. A t that time a standard schedule of demands had been formulated, calling for a picking rate of $1 per hun dredweight, as compared to the previous year’s rate of 40 cents, abolition of labor contractors, and union hiring without discrimination. B y late September, there were manifest preparations for a large strike in protest against the wage policy of the organized growers. Mass meetings were held on farms and vacant lots in towns, and strike litera ture and union membership cards were distributed widely. The C .& A.W .I.U . headquarters at Tulare, established at the time of the Tagus Ranch strike, became the organization base. Strikers who had participated in this previous walk-out now furnished the militant nucleus for organizing the cotton pickers. The union was favored by the late maturity of the cotton crop which was retarded by 2 weeks; thus the organizers had more time to consolidate the ranks of the pickers. Taylor and K err described the movement as follow s: * * * The excitement o f the parades, the fiery talks, the cheering, appealed to the Mexicans particularly, and race discrimination, poor housing, and low pay, especially the latter, were rallying cries which appealed to a class o f workers with adequate personal experience to vivify the charges hurled by Communist leaders and rendered exposition o f the theories o f Karl M arx superfluous. (Hearings, p. 19957.) The strike began in the southern San Joaquin Valley, centering in Kern, King, and Tulare Counties, where more than half the cotton acre age of the State was to be harvested. It grew to involve some 10,000 to 12,000 pickers for more than 3 weeks, and threatened to spread north to impede harvesting o f the State’s entire crop. In the course of the strike, the C .& A .W .I.U . encountered tactical problems which had not arisen in previous conflicts. Cotton, unlike the other crops, was not confined to a limited growing area. A successful strike required the interruption of operations on several thousand ranches covering a distance of more than a hundred miles over three counties. H ere the union utilized tactics that had been employed successfully a few weeks earlier in a similar strike of several thousand cotton pickers in Arizona. Mass picketing was relied upon to enlist the active partici pation of as many workers as possible, and in order to cover thoroughly the area affected, this was supplemented by guerilla picketing. Caravans of trucks and automobiles filled with striking families were organized at camps and union headquarters, and were dispatched every morning to districts where picking was reported to be going on. The very scale on which the campaign was organized inevitably brought violence. Several riots, in some cases ending in the death of one or more participants, resulted from the attempts of the growers and 102 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE local authorities to disrupt the picketing. The strikers on several occasions were accused of illegal trespass and intimidation.83 M ost of the instances of forceful suppression of strikers’ activities, however, took place at times when there was no evidence of property damage or violence on their part. The legality of picketing was subject to rather flexible interpretation by local law-enforcement authorities, particularly as regards the distinction between “ peaceful persuasion” and “ intimidation.” The response of growers and their sympathizers to the strike was immediate. Their first move proved to be a boomerang. A s the walk out spread from ranch to ranch, individual growers followed a policy of evicting all those who refused to work at the prevailing rate, hoping thus to eliminate “ agitators” and deter other pickers from striking. The result was to drive thousands of evacuees into large “ concentration, camps,” where they could be more easily mobilized and dominated by C .& A .W .I.U . organizers. Large emergency tent colonies, as in Corcoran, McFarland, Porterville, Tulare, and W asco, served as homes for strikers, centers for mass meetings, and bases for guerilla picketing, thus facilitating the conduct of a strike involving pickers from more than a thousand scat tered ranches. The growers next organized protective associations, some public in character and some semisecret in the vigilante tradition. Members were allowed to arm themselves in defense of their property. In several com munities prominent business organizations took the initiative. In Kern County, for instance, it was reported that— * * * As cotton picking throughout the county has been reported paralyzed to a great extent and there is no legal recourse for the growers o f the county, citizens are banding together today, with assistance solicited from the Kern County Chamber o f Commerce, the Bakersfield Chamber o f Commerce, and the farm Bureau. * * * These organizations have been solicited by landowners and producers to join in this movement o f a citizens’ committee to prevent outside radicals and Communists from dominating and ruining a great industry. * * * Within 24 hours we will have a county-wide organization for the pro tection o f growers and their families, as well as their property. These people have been threatened and are taking steps to protect themselves against potential hurt and damage. (Hearings, p. 19962.) The tactics of such groups were designed to combat and neutralize those used by the strikers. Public mass meetings and parades of growers were held to counteract union-sponsored demonstrations, and when they failed, more violent methods were employed. Many ranchers armed with guns stood guard over their property to ward off pickets, and in several instances, as at Arvin, riots involving armed ranchers ended in fatal shooting of strikers. Other direct means utilized to break the strike included attempts to arrest and jail the strike leaders and to destroy the strikers’ “ concentration camps” ; local authorities refused relief to strikers, hoping to starve them out, and intimidated them with threats of imprisonment in “ bull pens.” Still other means were efforts to deport aliens and to disrupt the strikers’ ranks and secure their repudiation of Communist leadership. Later it was reported that the growers planned to import thousands of cotton pickers from Texas to break the strike. 83Strikers were accused of having burned the cotton in some fields in Kern County (Bakers* field Californian, Oct. 4 and Oct. 7, 1933), of having attempted to burn some cotton at the Long in near Corcoran, of resisting officers trying to arrest a Mexican in the Corcoran camp (Times>elta, Oct. 19, 1933), of ‘ ‘night riding” (Times, Oct. 25, 1933), of overturning cotton wagons m fields of Kings County (Times-Delta, Oct. 23, 1933), and of firing shots into the home of a grower indicted for manslaughter in a riot in Pixley (San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 20, 1933). f CH. VIII.---C. AND A. W. I. U. 103 In several local communities, school children were recruited to work in the fields. A s a wedge between strike leaders and the rank and file, the growers endeavored to use the Mexican consul to persuade Mexican workers to organize into separate unions which could deal directly with growers rather than through C & A .W .I.U .-controlled organizers. Active support was sought from local, State, and Federal administrative and law-enforce ment officials as well as business and nonrural labor groups. Local newspapers were vitriolic in their condemnation of the strike, blaming it almost entirely on outside “ Reds” and “ agitators.” The Fresno Bee in an editorial of October 6 stated: Our people are getting exceedingly weary o f the activities o f the professional Communist leaders mostly from New York, who are motivated by no honest desire to improve working conditions, but rather propose to feather their own nests while promoting the cause o f social anarchy and red revolution. * * * They loaf between working seasons, and then descend on the scene like vultures who have smelled carrion from afar. The Tulare Advance-Register, in its issue o f October 16, declared: The “ strike” would vanish into thin air overnight if the outside agitators were rounded up en masse and escorted out o f the country as they should be. And in the future we should guard against allowing them to get a new foothold for sowing the red seeds o f radicalism among an otherwise happy and contented people. Local forces of law and order tended to side with the growers. The latter were a long-established and well-organized group of residents who paid taxes and voted regularly. They constituted the main economic base of each community and wielded considerably more influence and pressure than the newly organized transient and nonvoting laborers, whose economic position was at best marginal. One undersheriff declared in an interview: W e protect our farmers here in Kern County. They are our best people. They are always with us. They keep the country going. They put us in here and they can put us out again, so we serve them. But the Mexicans are trash. They have no standard o f living. W e herd them like pigs. (Hearings, p. 19992.) It was not surprising that the civil liberties of the strikers were vio lated on numerous occasions, as the Governor’s Fact Finding Commis sion later revealed. Arm ed suppression and arrest were applied continu ally ; the W estern W orker of November 20 and the Hanford Journal of October 28 both reported a total of 113 arrests in four counties. In some localities the State highway patrol was dispatched to police the strike, thus relieving pressure on local deputies and shifting the cost from county to State. In the closing days of the strike there were rumors that the National Guard would be called out. Strikers grew in number and remained cohesively organized under the C.& A.W .I.U . to the end, despite the extent and power of the oppo sition. Violence and the arrests of strike leaders only heightened the morale of the rank and file by convincing them of the essential sincerity of their “ labor martyr” organizers. Strikers were further sustained by private and public relief in considerable quantity. The C .& A .W .I.U . through its Communist affiliations, particularly the W orkers Inter national Relief, raised substantial sums from sympathizers in various metropolitan communities. M ore important was the precedent-breaking action of the California Emergency Relief Administration. Probably for the first time in labor history in the United States, a public agency under 654107°-— 46—8 104 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE Federal direction provided public relief to workers actively involved in a large-scale strike. Several efforts were made to settle the strike with the aid o f outside mediating and arbitrating agencies. The first offer of mediation, from the Labor Commissioner of the State Department of Industrial Relations, was flatly rejected by the growers’ representatives. Later attempts by Edward J. Fitzgerald, Conciliator of the U . S. Department of Labor, who had just completed the settlement of a similar cotton pickers’ strike in Arizona, met with more response. In order to circumvent the growers’ intransigeant opposition to the Communist leadership, the Conciliator, in company with Mexican Consul E. Bravo, selected representative cotton pickers from each camp in the strike area to present their case before a fact-finding board appointed by the Governor of California. The hearings made clear the contending groups’ views on the wage issue. Growers justified their 60-cent rate on the ground that it was the highest for any cotton-picking area in the United States, outside of Arizona, and constituted a substantial increase over the 40-cent rate for 1932 and the 50-cent rate for 1931. The C .& A .W .I.U ., claiming this to be inadequate compensation for the work, demanded a minimum scale of $1 per hundredweight and recognition o f the union as repre sentative of agricultural workers in California. The Governor’s Committee, under the chairmanship of Dr. Ira B. Cross of the University of California, recommended a compromise set tlement in its final report. It nevertheless implied a condemnation of the growers’ tactics during the strike: It is the judgment o f the committee that upon evidence growers presented, growers can pay for picking at the rate o f 75 cents per hundred pounds, and your committee begs leave therefore to advise that this rate of payment be established. Without question, civil rights o f strikers have been violated. W e appeal to con stituted authorities to see that strikers are protected in rights conferred upon them by laws o f the State and by Federal and State constitutions. (Hearings, p. 20002.) Acceptance of the committee’s recommended 75-cent rate was in effect made mandatory by various Federal and State agencies. The Fed eral Intermediate Credit Bank exerted pressure on growers to accept the terms.84 Grower-employers met in a valley-wide conference in Fresno at the office of the Agricultural Labor Bureau of the San Joaquin Valley. A fter some opposition they voted to accept the 75-cent scale “ in the interests of good American citizenship, law and order, and in order to forestall the spread of communism and radicalism and to protect the harvesting of other crops.” 8 The union was prevailed upon to accept 5 settlement on the same terms. Food relief was discontinued by the Cali fornia State Emergency Relief Administration, and growers threatened to import new workers from other areas. The Slate highway patrol was dispatched to the main strike areas and threatened further arrests of strike leaders. The aftereffects of the struggle were felt by both sides. Many active union members faced blacklists in local areas as a result of their activities, while in some localities growers who had violently opposed the strike had difficulty in recruiting pickers. Despite the prestige it gained in leading the strike, the C .& A .W .I.U . failed to hold its position. Locals in such centers as Bakersfield, Shatter, 84San Francisco Chronicle, October 25, 1933. 85Times-Delta, October 25, 1933. CH. VIII.---C. AND A. W. I. U. 105 W asco, Corcoran, Delano, McFarland, Pixley, Visalia, Dinuba, H an ford, Fresno, and Kingsbury declined in membership and influence soon after completion of the cotton harvest, when ex-strikers migrated to other sections of the State to work in various crops. By the end of the year only the Tulare headquarters of the union remained, and no more than a skeleton organization had survived. Collateral Strikes The strike wave organized by the C.& A.W .I.U . during 1933 and 1934 indirectly affected agricultural laborers in many nonunionized crop areas. T w o hundred unorganized celery workers in the vicinity of Los Angeles won partial gains after a 1-month strike during May and June of 1933. H op pickers in Sacramento County, variously estimated at 300 to 500, won wage increases after a 5-day strike during late August.86 Certain racial groups also carried out spontaneous strikes as well as participating in the C .& A .W .I.U . and their own independent “ ethnic” unions. In Santa Cruz 150 Filipino artichoke workers won a reduction in working hours at the same rates of pay after a 1-month walk-out during September and October of 1933.87 Unorganized Mexican workers participated in small strikes of walnut pickers in Los Angeles,88 and olive pickers in Tulare County.89 The C.&A.W .I.U. in 19349 0 Until its demise in the summer of 1934, the C .& A .W .I.U . became much more restricted in the scope and intensity of its organizing activities. The movements which it led during the months following settlement of the cotton strike were indicative of its decline; they were fewer, smaller, and less successful than its previous attempts. O f the 15 strikes in agri culture and allied industries in California during 1934, 10 were led or at least strongly influenced by the C .& A .W .I.U .; most of these were small and of short duration. N The success of the union’s campaign during 1933 had been due in large part to the advantage of novelty and surprise. F or the first time in the history of American agriculture a well-financed and closely knit labor union used tactics which it had planned carefully and executed efficiently in organizing huge strikes of farm workers. The campaign was perfectly tim ed; the C .& A .W .I.U . was able to ride on the general upsurge of labor unionism unleashed in part by the N R A , at the very moment when labor unrest in agriculture was most widespread. Depressed farm laborers caught in a pincers of lagging wages and rising costs of living were easily led to participate in the excitement of a large and spectacular mass move ment. The strikes led by the C.& A.W .I.U . caught growers unprepared at the height of the harvest season, when their position was most vulner able. The situation changed considerably during late 1933 and 1934. The growers recognized that inordinately low wage rates were a basic cause 860akland Tribune, August 22, 1933; Western Worker, September 4, 1933. The California Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1933 reported two strikes in the hop industry, involving a total of 1,025 workers. 870akland Tribune, September 9, 1933. 88San Francisco Examiner, September 27, 1933. 89Idem, November 24, 1933. 90Except as otherwise noted, data in this section are based mainly on Hearings of the La Follette Committee, Parts 53-55. 106 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE of labor unrest and agitation, and they announced substantial increases in order to forestall further trouble. From the lowest standard of 15 cents per hour, established early in 1933, wage rates were raised by the sum mer of 1934 to a level of 20 cents to 25 cents per hour throughout the San Joaquin Valley.91 These improvements dampened the militancy of agricultural workers, for whom the novelty and glamor of strikes had worn thin under the stress of severe hardships. Improved relief facilities developed by Federal and State agencies during late 1933 and 1934 served further to allay labor unrest. The C .& A .W .I.U ., at its second district convention early in 1934, made strenuous efforts to revive and improve its flagging organization. Plans were laid to broaden and strengthen the membership. The union addressed itself to all workers on ranches, packing sheds, and canneries in California. Organizers were particularly anxious to reach workers in agricultural industries who belonged to local A .F . of L. affiliates and in dependent unions of Mexicans and Filipinos. The Y oung Communist League and youth sections of the C .& A.W .I.U . were directed to organize cannery workers in order to bring them into support of agricultural laborers. T o combat vigilante opposition from farmers during strikes, the C .& A.W .I.U . laid greater stress on dividing the ranks of groweremployers; it hoped to make special agreements with small farmers to induce them to withdraw their support from larger growers.92 Particular stress was laid also upon proper organization and prelimi nary planning of strikes. The union laid its defeats to its assuming the leadership of spontaneous strikes which had broken out prematurely. A m ajor weakness of the C.& A.W .I.U . lay in the inadequate contact of the Communist Party leadership with large sections of the agricultural labor population. A report at the second convention stated: Probably the outstanding shortcoming o f the leadership o f the 1933 struggles was that too large a part o f the leadership consisted of comrades who were not native to the situation that existed, and did not know the territorial conditions o f the industry, or the relation o f the contending forces. (Hearings, Part 54, p. 20028.) T o rectify these shortcomings, the C.& A.W .I.U . executive council planned in the future to allow nonparty workers a larger share in the direction of union-organized strikes. A resolution at the convention stated that— In organizing our leading committees in such a situation, we must be extremely careful to bring the rank and file into the leadership, and especially to bring them into those posts which are decisive for making decisions as to the course o f their strike. (Hearings, Part 54, p. 20030.) Several other resolutions were passed to improve the effectiveness of union tactics in strike situations. Strike committees, for instance, were to be democratically elected and “ representative of every race and color, of every ranch, shed and cannery involved in the strike.” The union’s organizational efforts were in large part neutralized by the temporary apathy of agricultural workers and, more important, by organized grower-employers’ elaborate preparations to suppress any re currences of labor trouble. The San Joaquin Valley cotton-pickers’ strike had aroused apprehension among growers in other crop areas in Cali fornia. Protective associations were organized in many localities to com bat the “ Communist menace,” and early in 1934 these were federated into 91 Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 49 (p. 18148). 92See Appendix F, Organizing Tactics of the C.&A.W.I.U. (p. 429). CH. VIII.---C. AND A. W. I. U. 107 a powerful State-wide organization known as the Associated Farmers of California, Inc. It launched an aggressive campaign against farm-labor unionism and finally succeeded in having the more active left-wing or ganizers arrested and sentenced to several years’ imprisonment. Imperial Valley Strikes, November 1933-March 1934 The C .& A.W .I.U . suffered its first serious setback in several months when it attempted, early in 1934, to organize field workers in the Imperial Valley for a large strike in the spring melon harvest. In this area, which had long been a “ trouble spot” in California, labor-employer conflict had developed as a concomitant of the extraordinarily large-scale and com mercialized nature of the farm operations. A s portrayed in an official report by the Phillips Committee, representing the California State Chamber of Commerce and the State Board of Agriculture— * * * The major part o f the total vegetable production o f lettuce, canteloups, carrots, etc., is contributed by the large-scale corporate type of farming and but a minor part by operators who own or lease the holdings that they farm. The major portion o f the pea and tomato output, however, appears to be produced on the smaller farms. In general, the corporate type o f farming is o f greatest importance from the standpoint o f acreages farmed and value o f output. This difference in the prevailing types o f agriculture creates dissimilar problems. Operators o f relatively small farms do not appear to have problems that are identical with those of the so-called “ grower-shippers.” The latter group, because o f its influence, largely determines the course o f action pursued by the smaller growers. The problems, therefore, tend to be those incident to the concentration o f an industry in relatively few hands, working with the better class o f lands, operating on a relatively large scale, leasing much o f the land that is thus farmed, planned, and directed by nonresident managers, financed with considerable borrowed capital, conducted with paid resident farm managers, superintendents, and farm hands. The goal is one o f profit making, accompanied by a lack of permanency inherent in a combination o f leased lands and salaried positions. The growing o f vegetable crops, therefore, is largely of a speculative nature (in so far as marketing is concerned) and every effort is directed to producing crops as economically as possible and marketing them to the best o f the operators* abilities in order to produce as wide a margin o f profit as may be possible. (Hearings, Part 55, p. 20135.) The precarious economic situation in the valley also contributed to its explosive labor relations and the proclivity o f local residents for adopting extra-legal violence and vigilantism. This condition was portrayed in a report by Gen. Pelham Glassford, a special mediator appointed by the Federal Government early in 1934: It is a 1-industry community. Unless these valuable crops are harvested, rents are not paid, merchandising bills are not paid, professional services are not re munerated, taxes are not paid; in other words, the whole economy o f the popula tion depends upon the successful harvesting o f these valuable crops. It, therefore, can be quite well understood that all engaged in business are going to support the shippers and growers against militancy in labor and, furthermore, that they are going to control the politics o f the Imperial Valley and elect officials who will carry on their desires in matters that are essential for the economic welfare o f the valley. Particularly characteristic o f Imperial Valley is the fact that it is isolated, bounded on the east and west by large expanses o f sand; on the north by the Salton Sea, and on the south by M exico. (Hearings, Part 55, p. 20150.) Field workers’ strikes had first occurred in the valley in 1928 and again in 1930, the latter being the C .& A .W .I.U .’s baptism of fire. U n ionism in both instances had been crushed temporarily through arrests and suppression of civil liberties. Labor conditions had deteriorated con siderably during the following 3 years. Though the labor-contractor 108 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE problem was far less serious than it had been earlier, chronic unemploy ment and labor surpluses had led to a continuous decline in wages. By the spring of 1933 the wage level was 16% cents per hour for irrigators and 15 cents per hour for other field workers, as compared to levels of 35 to 50 cents per hour in 1929 and 1930.93 A n absence of standardization in wage levels and noticeable differences in wage rates paid by differ ent growers were a further source of irritation to the workers. The wave of farm strikes during late summer and fall prompted the growers in the Imperial Valley to adopt a more conciliatory attitude. In order to forestall an impending invasion of the valley by the C .& A .W .I.U ., they took steps to negotiate with their employees and grant certain con cessions. Early in October 1933, the Union of Mexican Field W orkers was revived in the valley under the encouragement of the Mexican consul, and on November 1 a committee of the union met with representatives of the growers. The latter agreed, among other things, to pay 2 2 cents per hour for harvesting lettuce and to provide a minimum of 5 hours’ work for any laborer taken to the field. Some 2 weeks later, alleging that the growers were not living up to their agreement, the Mexican union called a 1-day strike on November 17, 1933. W ith the Mexican consul at Calexico acting as intermediary, representatives of the two groups met again in December to consider the union charges. During the last few weeks of December, however, the C .& A .W .I.U . entered the valley and began to organize a local. The union recruited new members rapidly and was reported to have won control temporarily over the members of the Mexican union.94 Consequently, at the next meeting between worker and grower representatives labor spokesmen, under the domination of the C .& A .W .I.U ., demanded wages of 35 cents per hour. W hen the growers flatly rejected this demand the union called a strike. The provocative tactics of the union stimulated correspondingly violent suppression from growers and local authorities.95 A caravan of union members from Brawley, formed to attend a meeting in El Centro, was dispersed by police and citizen volunteers using tear gas. A union meeting in Brawley also was broken up when local police and State highway patrolmen, together with local armed citizens, entered the meeting hall and threw tear-gas bombs. Local vigilantes kidnapped and assaulted several labor attorneys and “ outside” spectators. In one 2-week period in the middle of January, 86 arrests were made. The Imperial Valley during 1934 became one of the most highly pub licized localities in the country for its suppression of civil liberties. General Glassford stated in a report to the Board of Supervisors of Imperial V alley: 93Wages paid on an hourly basis to field workers remained fairly constant throughout the valley during 1929, 1930, and the spring and summer months of 1931. but in August a downward trend began. A reduction in the prevailing scale of wages was again recorded in April, August, and November 1932, and in April 1933. The period from April to June 1933 registered the lowest scale (16 2/3 cents per hour for irrigators and 15 cents for other workers as contrasted with 35 cents and 50 cents in 1929 and 1930). Beginning in July 1933, the wage scale started to rise, with increases taking place in July and November 1933. (Hearings, Part 55, p. 19482.) 94The officers of the Mexican union, unsuccessful in obtaining satisfactory recognition for their organization, were reported to have turned it over to the C.&A.W I.U. (Hearings, Part 55, p. 20140; see also Report to National Labor Board by Lubin Committee.) 95General Glassford, Special Conciliator of the U. S. Department of Labor, claimed that representatives of the C.&A.W.I.U. attempted^ to make the Imperial Valley a “ laboratory” or proving ground for class struggle and revolutionary theories. (Hearings, Part 55, p. 20150.) CH. VIII.---C. AND A. W. I. U. 109 * * * A fter more than 2 months o f observation and investigation in Imperial Valley, it is my conviction that a group o f growers have exploited a “ communist” hysteria for the advancement o f their own interests; that they have welcomed labor agitation, which they could brand as “ Red,” as a means o f sustaining supremacy by mob rule, thereby preserving what is so essential to their profits, cheap labor; that they have succeeded in drawing into their conspiracy certain county officials who have become the principal tools o f their machine. (Hearings, Part 55, p. 20148.) A report to the National Labor Board by a special commission made up of J. L. Leonard, W . J. French, and Simon J. Lubin seemed to concur in this v ie w : * * * W e uncovered sufficient evidence to convince us that in more than one instance the law was trampled underfoot by representative citizens o f Imperial County and by public officials under oath to support the law. (Hearings, Part 55, p. 20142.) Their views, however, were severely criticized in a Report on The Imperial Valley Farm Labor Situation, by a special investigating com mittee composed of C. B. Hutchinson, Dean of the College of Agriculture, University of California, W . C. Jacobsen of the State Department of Agriculture, and John Phillips of the State Assembly, now a member of Congress. This group had been appointed at the request of the California State Board of Agriculture, the California Farm Bureau Federation, and the agricultural department of the California State Chamber of Com merce. Its report published on April 20, 1934, stressed the provocative nature of the Communist labor organizers* activities, and their potential danger to the harvesting of the specialized, highly perishable crops on which the residents of the valley depended. The committee asserted furthermore that “ technically there is no strike in the Imperial Valley, nor any imminent.,,9e It claimed that there were uninterrupted shipments of lettuce and that growers had a working agreement with a revived Mexican union having some 1,800 members. A s there was no strike, the committee decided, there could be no official mediation and no interven tion by the State or Federal authorities. The growers were successful in preventing the effective organization of field workers by the C .& A .W .I.U . and thus counteracted the attempted strike. The separate Mexican union was organized under the direction of Consul Joaquin Terraza, and was named the Asociacion Mexicana del Valle Imperial. It negotiated an agreement with the growers, and in time won enough workers from the C .& A .W .I.U . to render the latter’s strike ineffective. General Glassford considered the Asociacion a company union because it was encouraged by growers, who refused jobs to anyone but its members. The C .& A .W .I.U . persisted without success in its efforts to organize the field workers in the valley in preparation for a strike in the cantaloup harvest during the spring. It could claim only a few limited successes in small 1-ranch strikes. The only large strike led by the C.& A.W .I.U . in Imperial County was one in February involving some 3,500 to 4,000 pea pickers in the vicinity of Calipatria, at the northern end of the valley. A strike bulletin issued by the union at the time announced that “ 10,000 American, M exi can, Filipino, and Puerto Rican workers are on strike in the Calipatria pea field area, demanding 2 cents per pound, recognition of the C. & A .W .I.U ., clean water on the job, sanitary conditions, scales for every 96Report on The Imperial Valley Farm Labor Situation, by a Special Investigating Com mittee, San Francisco, April 20, 1934 (p. 24). 110 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 150 workers, release of all arrested strikers/’ The union claimed that considerable “ police and vigilante terror” had been employed against its members. Several strikers were reported as having been arrested on charges of carrying firearms. The Calipatria Herald, in its issue of February 10, 1934, had reported that the influx of a surplus of pickers had created a chronic problem of local relief, and Federal aid was sought. During the strike several camps were closed by county health au thorities because of outbreaks of “ pink eye,” measles, and typhoid. The strike was settled through the mediation of State government representatives. After a conference, the growers agreed to accept arbi tration through a committee composed of four growers and two repre sentatives each from the Mexican and white strikers. Thomas Barker, State Commissioner of Industrial Relations, acted as chairman.97 Miscellaneous Strikes: February-April 1934 W hile the Imperial Valley struggles were at their height, the C.& A .W .I.U ., in cooperation with independent unions, made scattered forays over numerous crop areas of California. Several hundred citrus-fruit pickers and packing-shed workers in Los Angeles County struck early in January for wage increases and union recognition. Members of the Confederacion de Uniones de Campesinos y Obreros Mexicanos (C .U .C .O .M .) voted a united-front policy of cooperation with the C.& A .W .I.U . Strike organizers reported that a small A .F . of L. local, though refusing to join forces with the first two unions, nevertheless refused to “ scab.” 98 Several hundred Filipino vegetable workers in the vicinity of Pescadero (San Mateo County) were organized by the C .& A .W .I.U . in January, and struck for. union recognition and a wage increase of 5 cents per hour, to a 25-cent scale. The growers imported Japanese strike breakers, and the sheriff warned strikers to leave the county or face arrest. Several hundred pickets remained, nevertheless, and a com pro mise settlement was reached.99 According to the Agricultural W orker of February 20, 1934, the strike raised wages from 20 cents to 2 2 cents per hour and won recognition for the C .& A .W .I.U . A union contract was signed with several growers. The C.& A.W .I.U . failed early in February to gain control of one small strike of agricultural workers belonging to a local Socialist-con trolled “ N R A Union.” Communist spokesmen charged that the strikers were “ sold out” through a premature settlement brought about with the help of Labor Commissioner Crook and Administrator George Creel.98 C .& A .W .I.U . organizers during March also failed to carry out a threatened strike of citrus workers in the Fresno area.1 A large spontaneous walk-out of potato cutters near A rvin (K ern County) was narrowly averted during February 1934. Halfway through 97 San Francisco Chronicle, February 19, 1934. " T h e Agricultural Worker (published by C.&A.W.I.U., San Jose, Calif.), February 20, 1934. " S a n Francisco Examiner, January 24 and 25, 1934; Los Angeles Times, January 25, 1934. iSan Francisco Examiner, March 7, 1934, CH. VIII.---C. AND A. W. I. U. I ll the harvest, the cutters won a pay increase of 1 cent per bag by threaten ing to strike. Several walked out a few days later to demand that the pay increase be made retroactive. The strike was soon broken by the im portation of new workers guarded by special deputies.2 Following the Imperial Valley debacle, the C.& A.W .I.U . shifted its activities farther north, in the Salinas and Sacramento Valleys. A few dozen Filipino asparagus cutters organized by the union on a ranch in Sacramento County won a small strike during March. The grower-em ployer in this instance was paying wages below standard for the area. Neighboring growers exerted pressure on him to pay the accepted rates, in order to settle the strike and forestall further agitation. The asparagus area was described as being “ on edge,” as C.& A.W .I.U . organizers were active among the 7,000 Filipino workers employed in the crop.3 A large strike under C.& A.W .I.U . leadership broke out in Sacra mento County during April. Early in the month some 500 to 800 Mexican and Filipino strawberry pickers in the Florin district refused to begin picking until rates were raised from 20 to 25 cents per hour. There was one instance of violence, when local authorities used tear gas against strikers who were reported to have attacked workers in the fields. One organizer was arrested on the charge of stabbing two ranchers.4 The strike ended with a partial victory for the union. Before the strike was a week old, several growers had signed the union agreement, granting 25 cents per hour, union recognition, and other conditions.5 A C& A .W .I.U . bulletin for April 17, 1934, claimed that 75 percent of the growers finally signed the agreement. Almost all the growers, most of whom were Japanese, were paying a rate of at least 22^2 cents per hour when the strike was settled. The C .& A .W .I.U .’s first attempt in several years to organize a processing industry was unsuccessful. In April 45 mushroom workers in the Golden State Mushroom Co.’s plant in Redwood City struck for a minimum scale of $15 per week, an 8-hour day, and abolition of dis criminatory hiring and firing. The walk-out was broken, union spokes men claimed, when the chamber of commerce and local welfare agencies sent in unemployed as “ scabs.” 6 The C.& A.W .I.U . made some gains in other scattered strikes. A walk-out of about a hundred pea pickers in Alameda County won a few limited concessions early in April. Later in the month a larger C.& A .W .I.U .-organized strike of 2,000 to 3,000 in Monterey County was settled with compromise gains to the workers.7 This walk-out was or ganized in the familiar pattern; before the strike about 100 camp dele gates, representing an estimated 3,000 pickers, convened and formulated demands for 35 cents per hour, union recognition, and abolition of con tractors.8 A strike of approximately 1,000 pickers in San Mateo County during M ay likewise won a compromise wage increase of 2 cents per hamper.9 2Los Angeles Times, February 8, 1934. 3San Francisco Examiner, March 15, 1934. 4Tdem, April 9 and 11, 1934. 5See Appendix G: Sample Agreement between Strawberry Growers and Pickers, Sacramento County, April 1934 (p. 430). 6C.&A.W.I.U. Bulletin (San Jose), April 17, 1934. 7Western Worker, April 23, April 30, 1934. A gricultural Worker, April 17, 1934. 9San Francisco Examiner, May 22, 1934. LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 112 , Apricot Pickers9 Strike, Contra Costa County June 1934 The end of the C .& A .W .I.U . as an effective labor union in Cali fornia agriculture was signified in June 1934, when it suffered a serious defeat in a strike of apricot pickers in Contra Costa County. Structurally the apricot crop in the Brentwood district seemed vulner able to strike action. It was highly centralized and dominated by three large grower-shipper enterprises, the Balfour-Guthrie Co., the H . P. Garin Co., and the D. D. W ilson Co. The rest of the district was occupied by individual growers operating ranches of 15 to 21 acres and larger. W hile the crops controlled by the three dominant companies were harvested largely by migratory Filipino and Mexican labor, this was not true of the smaller individual ranches. The latter frequently sold their fruit “ on the trees” to the large shipping company, which usually brought in its own crew of pickers and cutters at harvest time. The individual grower who harvested his own crop, however, employed mostly local labor. In the cutting sheds of the large companies as well as of the small farmers, the work was performed almost entirely by local women and girls. Local resident workers presented no particular housing problem, but the available facilities for handling the large seasonal influx of migratory workers were inadequate. A survey by a committee of ministers from churches in nearby towns expressed the opinion that “ the problem of migratory labor with an influx of three times as many workers as can find employment produced an acute situation.” 10 Unrest and discontent generated by the unsatisfactory living conditions of these surplus workers were fuel for agitators of the C .& A.W .I.U . Strike meetings were held by the C .& A.W .I.U . organizers, as migra tory pickers arrived in motor caravans. Demands were made for an hourly rate of 35 cents instead of the prevailing 20 cents, or piece rates of 15 cents per b ox for cutters instead of the prevailing 8 cents; an 8-hour day; and union recognition. By June 11 the union claimed that about 1,000 workers were on strike, and picket lines were established around the largest ranches.1 1 Local growers and businessmen at a meeting in Brentwood appealed to county sheriff R. R . Veale for protection against the activities of tran sients. The sheriff issued orders forbidding picketing ,in the Brentwood area, and about 75 persons were deputized specifically to carry out these instructions. Assisted by State highway patrolmen, they broke up one strike caravan. One hundred and fifty pickets were led to a corral in the railroad yards, where they were fed, and later were conducted to the San Joaquin County line. Thirteen ringleaders were arrested on charges of violating Section 416 of the Penal Code, which prohibited disturbances on public highways. The Oakland Tribune described this action of the authorities as a “ round-up and deportation of undesirable agitators.” 12 The San Francisco Labor Council, however, condemned the action as “ outrages by mobs of farmers aided and abetted by State highway police.” 13 10Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 49 (p. 18157). ^W estern Worker, June 11, 1934. 12Oakland Tribune, June 5, 1934. 13Labor Clarion (San Francisco), June 15, 1934. CH. VIII.---C. AND A. W. I. U. 113 A t this point a newly organized local of the A .F. of L. entered the strike in competition with the C .& A.W .I.U . This organization, Can nery W orkers Union No. 18893, finally gained control.14 A strike committee of 5 members from both unions was established, including Caroline Decker (district secretary of the C .& A .W .I.U .). W . H . Urmy, a deputy labor commissioner, presented its demands at a meet ing of large growers, which rejected them on the ground that the com mittee was composed of outsiders who did not represent the mass of pickers.1 5 The strike was finally ended by the last week in June. A few growers and contractors acceded to the union demands for increased wage rates and an 8-hour day, but the larger companies continued to pay the same wages under the same working conditions as before.16 , Apricot Strike at Hayward June 1934 The last strike led by the C .& A.W .I.U . was significant in terms of its implications rather than its accomplishments. It was one of the few instances in American labor history in which organized agricultural workers carried out a sympathetic strike to support an urban labor move ment. Four hundred apricot pickers near Hayward (Alameda County) struck for wage increases early in July 1934. They demanded also that troops be removed from the San Francisco waterfront, where the great maritime strike of 1934 currently was raging.1 7 Death o f the C.&A.W.I.U. The C .& A .W .I.U . became inactive soon after the Hayward strike, and finally died. Some “ labor trouble” was reported late in July 1934, in San Joaquin Valley vineyards, where C .& A .W .I.U . organizers were active among workers harvesting the grape crop. Growers organized in vigilante associations had made extensive preparations beforehand to combat the union, and the threatened strike failed to materialize.18 The Associated Farmers and allied urban commercial and industrial interests struck directly at the C.& A.W .I.U . to forestall further unionization. The highly publicized general strike of San Francisco dur ing the summer of 1934 had generated a strong antiradical reaction throughout California, and a round-up of the more active Communist organizers resulted. A cting partly under the pressure of agricultural in terests, police raided C .& A .W .I.U . headquarters in Sacramento and arrested 17 leaders on charges of criminal syndicalism. Several of these, including such leading district organizers as Pat Chambers and Caroline Decker, were sentenced in 1935 to several years’ imprisonment. 14In an unpublished report of May 28, 1935, J. B. Nathan, business agent of Local 18893, claimed that an almost unanimous vote endorsing the leadership of the A.F. of L. was polled at a meeting of about 2,000 workers. A strike committee was given authority to sign contracts in the name of the Cannery Workers Union with every grower or contractor willing to meet union conditions. Within half an hour, according to Nathan, agreements were signed with 6 growers employing over 300 workers. 15Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 49 (p. 18155); and Contra Costa Gazette, June 9, 1933. 16Qaims by spokesmen of the C.&.A.W.I.U. (as represented by the Western Worker in its issue of June 25, 1934), that control by the A.F. of L. local resulted in a decrease of wages from 20 cents per hour to 15 cents after the strike was lost, were not substantiated. 17Western Worker, July 15, 1934. 18Bakersfield Californian, July 16 and 17, 1934. 114 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE The formal termination of the C .& A.W .I.U . came on March 17, 1935, when its parent body, the Trade Union Unity League, and all affiliated organizations were dissolved in accordance with a general change in the party line. A t that time the Communist Party officially adopted a policy which it had in fact been following for several months: Com munist labor-union organizers and affiliated bodies were to merge with or enter independent labor organizations and unions in the A .F . of L .19 The C.&A.W.I.U. in Perspective The C .& A .W .I.U . during its brief span of less than 4 years, led dozens of strikes, large and small. Some were spectacular successes, others were dismal failures. Though in the end the union was crushed, its cam paign was not without lasting effects. W ages were raised in all m ajor growing areas of the State as a result of the upsurge in 1933, and they have never since then fallen to the low levels of late 1932. Perhaps more important, the C .& A .W .I.U .’s organized agitation served to attract sympathetic public attention to some of the more pressing problems of agri cultural labor in California. State and Federal Government agencies in time undertook various measures to ameliorate some of the worst hard ships suffered by farm workers in that State. A s a collective-bargaining organization, the C .& A .W .I.U . followed a policy that was in some respects self-defeating. It was a revolutionary or “ fighting” union, in contrast to the conciliatory “ business” unions which it opposed, and its tactics were aggressive and provocative. Its strike cam paigns aroused a latent mob spirit in many communities. Because its organizers injected revolutionary doctrines into wage disputes, the em ployers were able to enlist support from many groups on other grounds than those of mere economic interest. The announced objectives of most vigilante organizations formed to “ drive out the Reds” had much moral and patriotic appeal in conservative rural areas. W hen an anti-union m ove ment was mobilized and coordinated on a State-wide scale by a wellfinanced body such as the Associated Farmers of California, it proved to be more than a match for any organization of farm laborers. The C & A .W .I.U /s strength and effectiveness rested on wide rank and file support, won by low initiation fees and monthly dues, and by ap parently democratic participation in union affairs. This support it utilized to organize and direct general strikes designed to involve all workers em ployed in each intensive crop area. The union was sometimes disinclined to accept separate agreements with individual growers willing to meet its demands; on several occasions strikers refused to return to work until a ll grower-employers had accepted the union’s terms. Its bargaining policy proved to be a boomerang, as it solidified the anti union sentiments and interests of growers. The union sought to win its demands in toto by continuing and expanding strikes, rather than by sub mitting to mediation which would bring settlement through compromise. The growers, consequently, were likely to regard a strike situation as one of “ rule or ruin,” and often were intransigeant in their refusal to meet with representatives of strikers or to listen to their grievances. A s a result of the attitudes of the two contending groups, impasses frequently occurred. 19Labor Fact Book, Vol. Ill, p. 101 (New York, Labor Research Association, 1936). CH. VIII.---C. AND A. W. I. U. 115 The inner contradiction of Communist unionism was nowhere more apparent than in the struggles of the C .& A .W J .U . in rural California. Its ultimate revolutionary objectives were in many ways incompatible with the immediate need for seeking improvements in wages and working conditions in order to retain the support of its members. The San Joaquin Valley cotton strike of 1933 was the best organized and the most successful of any large-scale walk-outs led by the C .& A .W .I.U . or any other union in agri culture. Party members, however, were severely criticized in the official organ, the Western W orker, for not infusing more propaganda into union meetings, and for being too greatly concerned with the immediate problems of the strike. On the other hand, when political objectives were made para mount, the rank and file lost interest, and many joined the more oppor tunistic and conciliatory affiliates o f the American Federation o f Labor and independent racial unions. Overcentralization of union control and direction also proved a major weakness of the C .& A .W .I.U . Though minor officers and organizers were often drawn from the rank and file, the main leaders in each strike were usually the same— chiefly a few able organizers who were gifted as orators and thoroughly imbued with revolutionary spirit. This very continuity of leadership was fatal; it was seized upon by the Associated Farmers and others as in itself proof that agricultural strikes were all part o f a concerted attempt to overthrow the Government. W hen the leaders were arrested and convicted under the criminal syndicalism laws of the State, the union or ganization collapsed. Ch a p t e r IX.— Spontaneous Strikes and Independent Unions Labor-employer conflict in California farming decreased in scope and intensity after the death of the Cannery and Agricultural W orkers In dustrial Union. The Communist Party's State organization for agricultural workers was temporarily disrupted, and the most able and active leaders were imprisoned. F or some time after the summer of 1934 the m ajor efforts of left-wing unionists were drawn away from agriculture and focused on key urban centers. Industrial labor organizations, particularly the powerful maritime unions, had gained substantial momentum following the general strike in San Francisco. Meanwhile the agricultural labor movement in California was relatively dormant. Farm workers' unions were decentralized, and collective action * was intermittent and local. In the absence of an adequate State-wide union structure, Communist labor organizers followed a “ knight errant" policy somewhat reminiscent of the Industrial W orkers of the W orld. A gricul tural workers were reached primarily through unemployed councils and independently organized unions in a few rural areas. Itinerant party members organized scattered locals where the labor outlook was promising and sought to gain control of unions already established by the American Federation of Labor and other bodies. A m ong the most effective field workers' organizations that appeared, in the years before the California Federation of Labor began a State-wide campaign, were the separate unions of Mexicans and Filipinos. On several occasions these were torn by internal dissension between radical and conservative elements struggling for control. Labor organizers, both right and left wing, began to lay greater emphasis on establishing stable local unions in agriculture and allied industries than on agitating and leading strikes. N o m ajor farm walk-outs were called officially by Communist Party affiliates after those in the apri cot orchards of Contra Costa and Alameda Counties in July 1934. The most important strikes during late 1934 and 1935 were spontaneous or nonunionized outbreaks, although they were undoubtedly influenced and stimulated indirectly by the militant campaign which the C .& A .W .I.U . had carried out in previous years. Some spontaneous strikes later came under the control of Communist organizers, and others were taken over by members of the A.F. o f L. or independent unions. Spontaneous Strikes Historically, spontaneous strikes had preceded the formation of labor unions in agriculture. They usually indicated an amorphous dissatisfaction which unions periodically could focus on specific issues. However, the trend in extent and intensity of spontaneous strikes among farm workers reflected, by and large, the changing fortunes of farm-labor unionism. A t least four such outbreaks, ranging in size from a few dozen to a few hun dred workers, had occurred during the first years of depression, from 1930 through 1932. During 1933 and 1934, under the indirect stimulus of 116 CH. IX.---SPONTANEOUS STRIKES AND INDEPENDENT UNIONS 117 the C .& A .W .I.U .’s widespread and militant campaign,1 they had increased in number to eight, most of which involved several hundred participants. Spontaneous or nonunion strikes in California continued to grow in scope and frequency in succeeding years. They constituted a large pro portion of all farm-labor outbreaks in 1935, chiefly because the collapse of the C .& A .W .I.U . had left workers without a large organization to repre sent them for collective bargaining; hence, they had to rely mainly on un planned local action. A s has already been seen (table 3, chapter V ) , farm strikes in California decreased considerably in size and number during 1935, then more than doubled in both respects during 1936. Relief Policy and Farm-Labor Strikes The prevalence of spontaneous as well as union-organized farm-labor strikes during the mid-thirties and later was due in large part to a glutted labor market and to the problems which this raised for public relief agencies. Mexicans had constituted the main postwar labor supply for California’s agriculture. In off-season months they had regularly con tributed a disproportionate number of public welfare cases in large cities such as Los Angeles. Although many were deported or repatriated to M exico during the early depression years, those remaining, including the naturalized, were sufficient to meet the reduced needs of California farms. Growers began to complain of labor shortages during 1935, when the Federal Government was establishing systematic relief measures for the unemployed. Relief income gave agricultural workers an increased bargaining power, because some were no longer forced to work at sub standard wages. Spokesmen of the employers claimed that the labor shortage became acute when the W orks Progress Administration was established by the Federal Government in 1935. “ W ith hundreds of thousands of people on the relief rolls of California,” wrote Dr. G. P. Clements, manager of the agricultural department of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, “ California in 1935 has experienced the most dis astrous labor famine in her history.” 2 The alleged shortage was rapidly being filled through a large and growing influx of “ Dust Bowl refugees” from the Middle W est and Southwest, which reached flood proportions in 1937 and 1938. This huge migration had the effect of reducing average earnings for farm work, even at higher wage rates. The average duration of seasonal jobs was reduced, the mobility of those forced to rely on farm work was increased, and friction of a type leading to strikes became widespread. These fundamental changes in the labor supply for California’s agri culture caused much concern among grower-employers. Dr. Clements expressed their alarm as follow s: This year 90 percent o f the labor consisted o f migratory labor from the South, mid-South, and Southeast. This labor, mostly white, is supposed to supplant the former Mexican laborers who were what might be termed versatile labor, since when the 150 days o f agricultural labor were over they could turn their hands to the manual labor o f rough industry and public utility and tighten their belts and exist on the minimum o f subsistence. Another feature in their favor was that they 1See preceding chapter. 2Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 53 (p. 19674). 118 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE were adaptable labor in the agricultural field. They were impossible of unionizing; they were tractable labor. Can we expect these new white transient citizens to fill their place ? The white transients are not tractable labor. Being American citizens, they are going to demand the so-called American standards o f living. In our own estimation they are going to be the finest pabulum for unionization for either group— the A.F. o f L. or the subversive elements. They are not going to be satisfied with 160 working days. I f our government, whether county, State or Federal, takes care o f them, at the end o f the year they become California citizens and a part o f our economy or lack o f economy. (Hearings o f La Follette Committee, Part 53, p. 19467.) Agricultural workers who were residents of California came to rely in growing numbers upon W P A work relief and cash disbursements from the State Relief Administration. Many migrated less, as relief grants freed them from the ceaseless pursuit of brief jobs on farms. They could reside in one locality the year round, and need perform agricul tural labor only for a few weeks during the harvest season. W ork on Federal projects usually paid 50 cents or more per hour, and work or cash relief totaled sometimes $40 or $50 or more per month. F or many families it became as important a source of livelihood as farm work and was often more attractive. The effect on agricultural labor was twofold. Relief payments were often higher than earnings in agriculture, leading the farm laborers to agitate more strenuously for higher pay for farm work. They took steps at the same time to protect their status as relief clients, since relief checks were often more important than intermittent farm wages in providing a subsistence. Unions of relief clients and unemployed consequently grew in number and size during the mid-thirties. On some occasions they took the initiative in organizing field laborers and leading local strikes during 1935 and 1936. In rural areas, however, they were largely occupied with counteracting the efforts of organized growers who were endeavoring to close relief projects and displace the clients in order to increase the avail able farm-labor supply. Dr. G. P. Clements sounded a warning at the tim e: The Mexican on relief is being unionized and is being used to foment strikes among the few still loyal Mexican workers. The Mexican casual labor is lost to the California farmer unless immediate action is taken to get him off relief. (H ear ings o f La Follette Committee, Part 53, p. 19675.) The Associated Farmers and other agricultural employers’ associa tions, supported by certain prominent newspapers, exerted increasing pressure on relief administrators during 1935 and 1936 to release clients for farm work. The W estern Grower-Shipper stated categorically that “ all unskilled labor capable of working in agricultural districts must be released from W P A .” 3 The Associated Farmers condemned the granting of relief to strikers, on the ground that it forced the public to subsidize strikes and thus to finance Communist unions of agricultural and relief workers.3 Farm-union spokesmen charged that grower-shipper interests were “ using the relief administration as a club to beat down wages,” and that relief clients were being dropped from the rolls and forced to work at 20 cents per hour.4 Far from weakening unionism, the organized growers’ campaign stimulated the farm workers and unemployed to organize more strongly 3From Apathy to Action (organ of the Associated Farmers of California, San Francisco), No. 30, November 23, 1936 (p. 2). 4Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 14, September 1936 (p. 4). CH. IX.---SPONTANEOUS STRIKES AND INDEPENDENT UNIONS 119 for their own protection. A number of relief organizations had been established in the early thirties as “ unemployed councils.0 After 1934, as already noted, organizers from the C .& A .W .I.U . and other Communist affiliates reverted to the “ boring from within” policy and worked in col laboration with other groups to form numerous public-works and unem ployed unions. These and similar bodies in California and other States were next merged and federated on a national scale in the W orkers A lli ance of America. Left-wing elements acting through this organization were able to agitate effectively for closer unity among unemployed and seasonal ly employed field and processing workers to resist attempts to cut them off from relief. Affiliation with the A .F . of L . now had greater appeal, as it held out the prospect of support from well-organized and politically weighty State and county union affiliates of the State federation of labor. The W orkers Alliance, with its central headquarters in Washington, D.C., achieved a status recognized by the Federal Government. It attempted to dovetail its program for the unemployed with the organizing policies of the A .F . of L. and the Committee for Industrial Organization. In each agricultural area the Alliance drew up agreements for a regular inter change of workers with other unions. It was to release members when they were employed seasonally on farms and reinstate them when their work was finished. It was suspected that certain spontaneous walk-outs, as well as some led by local unions of unemployed and others during 1935, had been organized by form er C .& A .W .I.U . organizers hiding their Communist affiliations under the new united-front policy. Such were the strikes of milkers in Los Angeles County during April, of 50 farm workers in Butte County during May, of several hundred potato diggers belonging to a local vegetable workers’ union in Santa Barbara, during August, and of apple pickers in Sonoma County during the same month.5 N o Communist control, however, was imputed to a minor strike of grape pickers in Kern County during September, in the course of which several arrests were made,6 nor to a strike of cotton pickers in the San Joaquin Valley during September and October.7 , Sonoma Apple Pickers9 Strike August 1935 The most highly publicized strike of agricultural workers during 1935 involved some 2,000 apple pickers in the vicinity of Santa Rosa (Sonoma C ounty). It began as a spontaneous movement and later came under the domination of radical organizers who were active in the local public-works and unemployed union. Late in July some 1,200 workers in the apple crop held a preharvest mass meeting in Santa Rosa and voted unanimously to strike in order to raise wages to 25 cents per hour, as compared to the prevailing level of 20 cents.8 Since the season*was delayed, the growers were able to ignore the strike vote until 200 packing-house employees joined the field work ers. Definite steps were then taken to suppress the movement. Early in August, 250 growers and sympathizers made a vigilante raid and broke up a meeting addressed by alleged Communist Party members.8 Pressure 5Pacific Rural Press, September 12, 1936. ^Oakland Tribune, September 8, 1935. ’ Western Worker, December 28, 1935. ®Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 2, September 1935. 654107®—46—9 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 120 was exerted on relief authorities to release clients for farm work, as the crop was ripening and the labor shortage created by the strike was be coming critical. A vigilante group, including some prominent local busi nessmen and civic leaders, finally resorted to direct violence late in August. A mob of several hundred men was reported to have tarred and feathered, and severely beaten two alleged Communist organizers and to have driven them out of the county.9 This attack proved a boomerang to the growers. A premature migra tion of apple pickers from the county resulted, and the labor shortage in both the apple and hop orchards became even more acute. W age rates were raised, and relief clients were released from the rolls in an effort to recruit sufficient workers. The San Francisco Chronicle for September 7, 1935, reported that— ♦ * * the mob action o f the vigilantes has frightened away so many workers that the county is 20 percent under the number of pickers needed. Pay was increased % cent a pound, with payment o f transportation, to induce pickers to come here, but the increase has had little effect in this regard. Relief headquarters in San Francisco, in response to a hurried request, sent large numbers of workers to help with the harvest. W P A officials, according to the San Francisco News of August 18, 1935, loaded relief clients on trucks and dispatched them to the hop fields, where many o f the inexperienced earned as little as 50 to 75 cents per day. T h e San Francisco Chronicle of September 7, 1935, reported that the State Emergency Relief Administration (S E R A ) sent more than 150 men into the fields in 1 day. The Simon J. Lubin Society stated that John Small, S E R A Relief Director for San Francisco, took a total of 5,000 men o ff relief during the harvest season in order to force them to pick hops in Sonoma County.10 The entire incident aroused widespread and unfavorable public atten tion, even in some rather conservative circles. The American Civil Liberties Union offered a reward of $1,000 for information leading to the arrest and conviction, for felonious assault, of any of the 300 vigilantes who had taken part in the tarring and feathering episode.11 T w o prom i nent San Francisco newspapers, the News and the Chronicle, called upon State Attorney General W ebb to take action.12 M r. W ebb finally acted when Governor Merriam several months later made $20,000 available as a special investigating fund. Warrants were served on 23 alleged vigilantes on charges of kidnapping and assault with deadly weapons. The defendants, portrayed in a News editorial on August 18, 1935, as a “ pack of lawless bullies masquerading as patriots,” were indicted but later acquitted. Spontaneous Strikes and Wage Increases in 1936 Spontaneous strikes among agricultural workers became noticeably larger and more numerous in California during 1936. Th ey reflected a renewed militancy and strength among farm-labor unions organized both by the A .F . o f L, and by unaffiliated Mexicans and Filipinos. The 9San Francisco Chronicle, August 23, 1935. i°Report Submitted to the President’ s Committee on Farm Tenancy, by Simon J. Lubin Society, San Francisco, January 12, 1937 (p. 3). 11Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 2, September 1935. 12The News was reported to have interviewed him every day for 11 months, to ask what steps had been taken to apprehend the vigilantes. CH. IX.---SPONTANEOUS STRIKES AND INDEPENDENT UNIONS 121 largest spontaneous strike during 1936 included some 2,500 pea pickers employed on several large ranches in San Joaquin County during April. Violence was notably lacking, and 'the strikers won a rapid success in raising picking rates from the prevailing 20 to 30 cents per hamper. Organizers failed to form a union, however, because of the extreme mobility of the labor.13 Success also attended a spontaneous strike of several hundred potato pickers and packing-shed workers in Kern County during July. The movement began on a small and apparently unsuccessful scale. The Fresno Bee of May 30, 1936, reported that only 40 pickers in the Shatter area quit work, and that all of these were replaced by unemployed. The Rural W orker in its July 1936 issue, however, claimed that a later 4-day strike of several hundred potato workers was successful. Fifty cents per hour was demanded for general' field workers and 50 to 75 cents per hour for packing-shed workers, in place of the prevailing 30 cents per hour. Despite the growers' refusal to meet a committee elected by the strikers, and despite their alleged use of armed vigilantes, the strikers were reemployed at a compromise increase in wage rates to 40 cents per hour.14 Other spontaneous field workers' strikes during 1936 were all small and short-lived. None involved as many as 300 workers, and only 2 lasted more than several days. A ll of them did, however, win at least partial wage increases for those participating. Chronologically these strikes occurred as follow s: Sfarch— 75 poultry workers in Alameda County over the issue o f working condi tions. Results unknown. April—35 fruit workers in Los Angeles County. Issues and results unknown. June—250 pea pickers in Y olo County. Compromise wage gains. July— 52 vegetable workers in Merced County. Compromise wage gains. July—250 peach pickers in Merced County. Compromise wage gains. July— 85 grape packers in Merced County. Compromise wage gains. September— 175 brussels sprouts and artichoke workers in Santa Cruz. W age gains in full. September— 150 sugar-beet toppers in Santa Maria Valley, Santa Barbara. Com promise wage gains. The spontaneous strike of sugar-beet toppers in the strongly unionized Santa Maria Valley began on September 10, when workers demanded an additional 10-percent increase in wage rates after one 10-percent in crease had already been granted the previous week. The strike was settled after a week by a compromise 5-percent increase. Tom ato grow ers in the area, who had just settled a wage dispute with their shed workers, complained of a shortage of field laborers. They were forced to increase all pay by 5 cents per hour in order to recruit sufficient help to love their crop.15 That spontaneous strikes were successful during 1936 was attested by the fact that nearly all of them won at least compromise gains. The general level of farm wages for almost all important crop areas of California had been raised by the end of the year. Substantial wage rises were granted voluntarily by growers on several occasions. T w o hundred of the largest cotton raisers represented by the Agricultural Labor Bureau of the San Joaquin Valley, for instance, announced an increase in cotton picking rates to $1 per hundredweight— 25 cents higher than the 1935 18Stockton Record, April 13, 1936. 14Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 12, July 1936. 18Loe Angeles Times, September 11 and 12, 1936. 122 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE scale. The Bakersfield Californian applauded this move and stated opti mistically that-“ the workers and the farmer will thus benefit from the new rate, and a harmonious relationship will be maintained to the ad vantage of the farmer, the worker, and the community.” 16 The revitalized Associated Farmers of California, despite its unprec edented strength and success during 1936 in breaking some of the largest strikes, nevertheless applied many conciliatory measures to nullify the growing militancy of agricultural workers. A t a quarterly meeting of the board of directors during the summer of 1936, a resolution was passed requesting farmers not to ask for more workers than they actually needed, nor to ask workers to report until employers were ready to hir< them. T o do otherwise is to create dissatisfaction and provide the workers with jus cause for complaint; also it lessens the willingness o f the public employmen agencies to cooperate fully with farmers. (From Apathy to Action, No. 23, Augu 31, 1936.) The Associated Farmers later announced that its executive committe, had voted unanimously to refuse membership to “ any man who is no willing to pay a fair wage to his employees in accordance with the pre vailing wage in the community.” 17 Voluntary wage increases and other conciliatory gestures were de? signed to forestall agitation and counteract the accelerated organizing drive being carried out by left-wing elements in the A .F . of L . and inde pendent unions of Mexicans and Filipinos. The readiness of growers tc concede wage increases where unorganized spontaneous strikes broke ot^ may have been prompted by the fear that recalcitrance would lead strikers to seek more militant leadership from the outside. There were good grounds for these apprehensions. The majority of spontaneous strikes that broke out during the next few years soon came under the control of unions, some of which were independent and some affiliated to the A .F . of L . and C.I.O. Unionism Among Mexicans The most effective agricultural-labor unions during 1935 and 1936 were those organized among Mexicans. They had furnished most of the membership in the C .& A .W .I.U . during the turbulent strike years of 1933 and 1934. Conflict had at times attended Communist organizers efforts to “ capture” Mexican organizations. Mexican consuls on occasion had attempted to split the C .& A .W .I.U . by organizing their compatriots into independent racial unions which could bargain as separate groups with grower-employers. In the Imperial Valley this contest had resulted in the defeat of both organizations.18 A Mexican union which had undergone a similar conflict in Los! Angeles County survived, and soon became the most active farm workers organization in the State. This was the Confederacion de Uniones de Campesinos y Obreros Mexicanos del Estado de California, or C .U .C .O .M ., which had developed out of the general strike in strawberries, 16Bakersfield Californian, September 10, 1936. 17San Francisco News, August 19, 1937. 18See Chapter V III (pp.107-110). CH. IX.---SPONTANEOUS STRIKES AND INDEPENDENT UNIONS 123 celery, and other crops, during June 1933.19 By 1934 this organization claimed as many as 10,000 members. Its policy and leadership were again coordinated with the C .& A .W .I.U . and the two unions carried out at least one strike under a united-front agreement. Several nominally independent local Mexican unions in addition to the C.U .C .O .M . were organized following the collapse of the C .& A .W .I.U . Some of these, the growers charged, were fronts for Communist organ izers. Such were the Mexican Agricultural W orkers U nion in Santa Barbara, which led a strike in August 1934 of some 300 vegetable w orkers;20 and the American Mexican Union in San Joaquin County which, in June 1935, led a small strike of cherry pickers in the* vicinity of Lodi, to enforce a demand for 6 cents per box instead of the prevailing rate of 4 y2 cents. Deputy sheriffs armed with tear-gas bombs were re ported to have patrolled the area and made a few arrests.21 N o Communist affiliations, however, were imputed to the independent Mexican Labor Union of the Santa Maria Valley, in Santa Barbara County, which cooperated with a local union of Filipinos and a local union of white vegetable packing-house workers in joint strikes and col lective-bargaining agreements (see page 126). Left-wing farm-labor organizers placed their main support behind the C .U .C.O.M . and ultimately assumed control o f it. Six of the 18 strikes reported in field and processing industries in California during 1935 came under the leadership of this union. Orange and San Diego Counties in southern California, seat of the union’s strength, were the trouble centers. Though minor in comparison to the great mass movements of 1933, these strikes contributed notably to the techniques of collective bargain ing and labor arbitration in agriculture. Even without resorting to strikes, the C .U .C .O .M . was able to gain several signed contracts granting wage increases, improvements in working conditions, union recognition, and job preference for members. A series of strikes involved organized workers in Orange County during 1935. A 1-day walk-out in January won compromise wage gains for 200 celery workers belonging to the C .U .C .O .M .22 This was followed on February 15, 1935, by a short and unsuccessful strike of 150 C .U .C.O.M . members working in pea and squash crops near Santa Ana.23 A few days later a general strike developed under the leadership of the Mexican organization, supported by working members of the local inde pendent Filipino Labor Union and the white International Farm Labor Association, Branch N o. 3, Orange County (a short-lived body reportedly established by Communist organizers after dissolution o f the C.& A .W .I.U .). The strike, which lasted almost a month, covered a major part of the pea, celery, and lettuce crops of the county. A settlement was finally reached, partly through the efforts of the Orange County Arbitra tion Board. A signed agreement was drawn up between the organized strikers and various local and county Japanese growers’ associations, granting a minimum wage scale of $2.15 per 9-hour day for permanent labor, 25 cents per hour for temporary labor, and time and a half for overtime.24 19See Chapter V III (pp. S9-90). 20San Francisco Examiner, August 19, 1934; Pacific Rural Press, September 12, 1936. 21Los Angeles Times, June 4, 1935; Western Worker, June 6, 1935. 22Western Worker, January 14, 1935. 23Idem, February 18, 1935. 24Idem, February 28, 1934. LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 124 During October and November 1935, the C .U .C.O.M . again was sup ported by the independent Filipino Labor Union and the American In dustrial W orkers Union (successor to the International Farm Labor Association) in a strike of 400 citrus workers near Santa Ana.25 Previ ously, during May, a small strike of 85 orange pickers in San Diego County under the combined leadership of a local branch of the C .U .C .O .M . and the new Vegetable and Citrus Federal Labor Union of the A .F . of L . had won compromise adjustments in wage scales.26 The C .U .C .O .M . in July 1934 had negotiated an agreement with organized Japanese grow ers of the county, providing for standard wages, union recognition, and arbitration of disputes.27 This was renewed in August 1935. Some 3,000 workers were estimated to be covered. Federation of Agricultural Workers Unions of America Left-wing organizers during 1935 had plans under way to coordinate the policies of farm-labor unions along broader State and regional lines. The National Committee for Unity of Agricultural and Rural W orkers had been established for this purpose, and it rendered substantial aid to rural organizations of all types. The immediate program called for affiliating all such local unions to the A .F . of L . as federal labor unions. Ultimately it was planned to federate these into a separate A .F . of L. in ternational union of agricultural and allied workers. Independent Filipino and Mexican unions in southern California, com posed solely of low-paid and seasonally employed field workers, could not afford the high initiation fees and dues charged by the A .F . of L .28 On the other hand, the notable gains in collective bargaining won by the C .U .C .O .M ., and its successful cooperation with other racial groups in several strikes, made the prospect of establishing a State-wide organiza tion of agricultural and allied workers more hopeful. It was recognized that unified control and cooperation among organized racial groups would be necessary if collective bargaining and strike action were to be made effective over wide crop areas in which the growers were highly organized. A temporary Federation of Agricultural W orkers Unions of America was formed during January 1936, at a convention in Los Angeles of organized farm-labor representatives of southern California. It was com posed of several independent local organizations of Mexicans, Filipinos, and others, and a few months after its formation it was joined by the newly organized Japanese Farm W orkers Union. The key group in the Federation was the C .U .C.O.M ., which furnished the chief leaders and most of the rank and file membership. CELERY STRIKE, APRIL 1936 The Federation’s attempts to enforce a schedule of union demands in the celery crop of Los Angeles County precipitated a series of strikes 25Pacific Rural Press, September 12, 1936. 26Western Worker, June 6, 1935. 27See Appendix H : Agreements between Japanese Farmers and the Union of Laborers and Field Workers, San Diego County, 1934 (p. 430). 28Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 13, August 1936 (p. 5), CH. IX.---SPONTANEOUS STRIKES AND INDEPENDENT UNIONS 125 during the spring of 1936. The first was a small strike of Mexican and Filipino workers on the farms of the H . P. Garin Co. in San Diego County, who in February attempted unsuccessfully to enforce demands for union recognition, 60-percent union preference, and a minimum wage scale of 30 cents per hour. This was followed in April by a walk-out of 300 workers in the Venice area under the leadership of the C .U .C .O .M ., when that organization’s request for higher wages and union recognition was refused by the organized Japanese growers.29 Eleven unions affiliated to the Federation of Agricultural W orkers Unions of America then presented these blanket demands to the grow ers: That 90 percent of the laborers in the field should be members of the F .A .W .U .A .; that union men in the field when at work should be paid a minimum of 30 cents per hour, and celery workers a minimum of 40 cents per hour, for a 9-hour d a y ; and that overtime, including Sundays and holidays, should be paid at the rate of time and a half.30 W ithin a few weeks the walk-out had grown to include some 2,600 celery workers (in cluding a minority of Filipinos) in such localities as El Monte, Torrence, H arbor City, Lovita, Palos Verdes, Norwalk, Carmentia, and Bell flower.31 Authorities took strong measures to suppress the movement. Union spokesmen claimed that a force of approximately 1,500 armed men, in cluding deputy sheriffs, special guards, and Los Angeles city police led by Capt. W illiam ( “ R ed” ) Hynes, was mobilized to break up parades and picket lines. Several strikers were reported struck and burned by tear-gas bombs, and many were arrested.32 The Public W orks and U n employed Union of Santa Monica sent a message to the W hite H ouse protesting “ provocation and intimidation” of strikers and sympathizers by the Los Angeles “ Red Squad.” 33 The constituent unions of the F .A .W .U .A . showed signs of winning after more than 2 months on strike, despite the severity of the opposition. The long duration o f the walk-out was due to a deadlock which developed in negotiations between representatives of the Japanese Growers A sso ciation and its affiliates in Los Angeles County on the one hand, and those of the C.U .C .O .M ., the Filipino Farm Labor Union, and the Japanese Labor Union on the other. Growers claimed that the unions were Com munist-controlled. Chinichi Kato, secretary of the Southern California Farm Federation, stated flatly that his organization would not meet with the workers while a “ radical and Communist-dominated group, led by Lillian Monroe, was in control.” 83 The F .A .W .U .A . nevertheless claimed, by July 1936, that 385 growers had signed an agreement granting union demands.34 Mediation by the U .S. Department of Labor finally settled the strike on the basis of 60-percent union preference in employment and a minimum wage of 30 cents per hour for field labor.35 CITRUS STRIKE IN ORANGE COUNTY, JUNE-JULY 1936 The Los Angeles celery strike during the spring and summer of 1936 had repercussions in other crops and in adjoining counties. Late in May, 300 strawberry pickers struck for wage increases and union recognition. 29Los Angeles Examiner, April 22, 1936. 30Field notes. 31Western Worker, August 17, 1936. 32Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 11, p. 1; Carey McWilliams, Factories m the Fields (p. 244). 33Field notes. 34Western Worker, July 9, 1936. 35Idem, August 17, 1936; Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 13, August 1936. 126 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE In July, about 200 bean pickers belonging to the C U .C .O .M . went on strike in the vicinity of Palos Verdes to enforce similar demands; although they won a wage raise from 22 y2 to 30 cents per hour, they lost their de mand for union recognition. Union spokesmen claimed that “ vigilante terror” was on occasion employed against strikers.36 Violence in labor relations reached its climax in southern California during a strike of 2,500 to 3,000 citrus-fruit pickers and packers in Orange County. It occurred while the celery strike was still in progress, and was under much the same leadership. The C .U .C.O.M . called the strike on June 15 in order to enforce a series of union demands: W age increases from the prevailing 5 j4 cents per box (which averaged 22 cents per hour) to 2 7 cents per hour, free transportation instead of the prevailing charges of 10 to 20 cents for being taken to and from groves, union recognition, and other minor provisions.37 The methods of suppression corresponded closely to those used in the L os Angeles celery strike. Large numbers of strikers were evicted from their hom es; 400 special armed guards were recruited by growers to patrol fields and protect strikebreakers; highway police disrupted strikers’ parades and picket lines; some 200 people were arrested and jailed in a stockade; and numerous strikers were injured when growers (to quote the Los Angeles Examiner, July 11, 1936) commissioned “ bands o f armed men, armed with tear gas and shotguns,” to conduct “ open private warfare against citrus strikers.” The Los Angeles Times pictured one clash as follow s: H undreds J ailed as C itrus R ioters A ttack W orkers (Placentia, July 6 ). A miniature civil war broke out in Orange County this afternoon as hundreds o f citrus strikers in a concerted offensive swooped on groves in a wide area and attacked growers and workers with guns, chains, knives, and rocks. ^ : A prominent citrus-association official was beaten on the head with a chain, 1 agita tor was shot, dozens o f persons were hurt, and 75 strikers were seized in a pitched battle near Placentia. By late afternoon more than 200 agitators had been arrested and taken to the county jail at Santa Ana. A counterattack against the strikers a few days later was described no less colorfully, in the July 11, 1936, issue of the Tim es: V igilantes B attle C itrus Strikers in W ar A gainst R eds Tw o Meeting Places Smashed up; Roving Carloads o f Ex-W orkers Hunted by Authorities (Anaheim, July 10). Drawing first blood in the retaliation against Communist disorder in the Orange County citrus area, night riders struck again early today with clubs and sent one man to a hospital and nearly demolished a rendezvous. Tear-gas bombs and clubs flew and men went down like tenpins when a group o f 150 asserted strikers in a conclave in a public handball court in Placentia was attacked. W alter Cowan, vice-president of the State Federation of Labor, and J. W , Buzzell, secretary of the Los Angeles Central Labor Council, were arrested while investigating the strike. They declared in a special communication to Attorney General W ebb that all law had been suspended in Orange County in an effort to terrorize and starve strikers into sub mission.38 Organized growers represented by the Associated Farmers charged that the labor trouble was due entirely to the activities of Communist 36Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 14, September 1936. 37Idem, Vol. I, No. 12, July 1936; Vol. I, No. 13, August 1936. 38Hollywood Citizeft News, July 17, 1936. CH. IX.---SPONTANEOUS STRIKES AND INDEPENDENT UNIONS 127 labor leaders in the F .A .W .U .A ., most active of whom were Velarde and Avila (M ex ica n ), Mensalves (F ilipin o), and Deguchi (Japanese). Growers maintained further that the situation constituted a “ labor boy cott” rather than a strike. It was argued that as the laborers had refused beforehand to take the jobs, the growers were under no responsibility to deal with them.39 Gilermo Velarde, president of the Mexican C .U .C.O.M . conducting the strike, charged that representatives of the local Mexican consul’s office were trying to trick the strikers into signing an unfavorable agree ment with growers.40 The Associated Farmers, on the other hand, claimed that the consul and his aides were “ constantly active in fomenting trouble.” 41 It was evident by the end of July that the strike was lost, as pickers returned to work in steadily increasing numbers. The union, in the final settlement, won some minor gains in wages and working conditions, but failed to attain union recognition from the organized growers in the citrus industry.42 Beginning of State-wide Unionism The citrus strike marked a turning point in agricultural relations in California. One result was the revival of the powerful anti-union A sso ciated Farmers of California, which had been inactive since crushing the C .& A .W .I.U . in 1934.43 The series of outbreaks under radical leadership in southern Cali fornia, culminating in the large celery and citrus strikes, again aroused grower-employer interests throughout the State and impelled them to join protective organizations under the aegis of the Associated Farmers. A t the same time, the violence employed by law officers and vigilantes in several strikes caused widespread apprehension among organized labor circles. Urban affiliates of the State Federation of Labor foresaw an ultimate threat to their own security and thus sought to guard their “ back door” by encouraging strong labor organizations in rural areas. Inde pendent unions of Mexicans and Filipinos saw their weakness as separate organizations of field workers lacking the support of the more powerful urban labor bodies, and their interest in affiliation with the A .F . of L. and other unions grew accordingly. The C .U .C.O.M . and other farm-labor organizations, during 1936 and 1937, participated in several conferences held to form a State-wide federation of agricultural and allied workers to be chartered by the A .F . of L. Local unions at the same time cooperated more closely than before with organizations of unemployed in order to prevent relief authorities from releasing their clients for farm work. A s already noted, the C .U .C.O.M . and other agricultural-labor unions drew up an agreement 39From Apathy to Action (San Francisco), Bulletin No. 20, July 29, 1936. 40Hollywooa Citizen News, July 17, 1936. 41From Apathy to Action (San Francisco), Bulletin No. 20, July 29, 1936. 42Idem, Bulletin No. 20, July 29, 1936; New York Times, July 27, 1936. 43The association had almost ended because of a shortage of funds and a declining mem bership. After the major drive of the C.&A.W.I.U. had ended, and the threat to the main grower-employers was temporarily over, urban and agrarian interests were little inclined to make large financial outlays for maintaining it. (See Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 49, pp. 17931-33, 17938-47.) 128 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE with the W orkers Alliance in several towns to provide for transference of membership44 and prevention of strikebreaking by unemployed. A c cording to Alliance spokesmen, its aim was to “ secure relief for striking agricultural workers and support their strikes with pickets.” 44 Grower-labor relations on the whole were more stable and peaceful during 1937 than they had been for years. In Los Angeles County, which had witnessed the celery workers’ violent strike during the previous year, representatives of nearly 5,000 farm workers in April signed a new union contract with the Central Japanese Association of Southern California, representing growers in the Venice Palms area. The provisions of theagreement were as follow s: (1 ) Recognition o f the unions as agents for collective bargaining, including their right to have delegates in the field to make contacts with workers. (2 ) Growers to refrain from interfering with union activities o f the workers. (3 ) Abolition o f the contractor system in fields. (4 ) Minimum wage o f 35 cents per hour for all field workers. (5 ) Contract to last 1 year, with no strikes or lock-outs. (6 ) Grievance committee o f 3 (1 from growers, 1 from the unions, 1 neutral) to settle all disputes that may arise.4 5 The agreement was drawn up in negotiations between representatives of the Japanese growers, the Mexican consul (fo r the w orkers), and the State Labor Commissioner’s office. It was then ratified by the Mexican Agricultural W orkers Union, the Filipino Labor Federation, and the Japanese Farm W orkers Union. Mexicans organized in their own unions participated in a few strikes in southern California during 1937. Approximately 450 celery workers in San Diego County struck for 6 days during January under the leader ship of the C .U .C .O .M . They returned to work without achieving the wage increases and union recognition demanded. Three small walk-outs of unorganized Mexican workers took place in the citrus orchards of southern California. In Ventura County, in February and again in May, two 1-week strikes of 120 and 100 workers, respectively, as well as one small strike of 45 citrus workers in San Diego County during the latter month, were all settled with compromise wage gains.46 Most of the Mexican and other farm-labor organizations in California sent delegates to the Denver convention in July 1937, and joined the C .I.O .’s new United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing, and Allied W orkers of America (U .C .A .P .A .W .A .). A few “ race conscious” M exican unions continued to function separately. In some areas, as in the Santa Maria Valley, they cooperated effectively with other labor organizations in collective bargaining; in other areas, as in Orange County, they became involved in jurisdictional disputes with the A .F . of L. and C.I.O . 44Under the terms of the agreement, paid-up membership books of the Workers Alliance were accepted by the Agricultural Workers Union in place of its own initiation fee when an Alliance member went to work in the fields. A farm worker who belonged to the C.U.C.O.M. likewise could join the Workers Alliance without paying additional fees when unemployed. (Rural W orker, Vol. I, No. 16, December 1936.) 45The wage scale specified 35 cents per hour for specialty crops, chiefly celery and cauliflower, in Los Angeles County. The agreement did not, however, include workers in the Venice celery area, scene of the major strike in 1936, nor did it apply to berry pickers. (Los Angeles Illus trated News, Apr. 30, 1937; Commonwealth Times, Vol. I, No. 8, Apr. 23, 1937.) 46Los Angeles Times, May 7, 1937; Josiah Folsom: Labor Disputes in Agriculture, 1927-39. CH. IX.—SPONTANEOUS STRIKES AND INDEPENDENT UNIONS 129 Unionism Among Filipinos Filipinos as well as Mexicans had been an active element in strikes led by the C .& A .W .I.U . This union, from its beginning, had gained the affiliation of many Filipinos because it had been one of the few or ganizations to come to their defense when they were the victims of mob action in the race riots early in the depression.47 They were reported to have participated in large numbers in at least TO strikes led by the union during its 3 most active years. Chronologically these occurred as follow s: Strikes In W hich Filipinos Participated County Demands Wage increases, im proved housing, and medical services. Solano ..................... Wage increase and an 8hour day. Alameda and Santa Wage increases. Clara. Monterey (Salinas Wage increases. and Watsonville). Kern....................... Wage increases. Ventura (Oxnard).... Elimination of contrac tors, and union recogni tion. San Mateo .............. Wage increases. San Joaquin Wage increases. (Pescadero). Sacramento ............ Wage increases. Sacramento ............ Wage increases. May 1932 ................. Pea pickers ........... . San Mateo .............. November 1932 • • • • Orchard workers .... . ••• April 1933 .......... . August 1933 August 1933 ............ Pea pickers............ . Lettuce workers ..... • Grape pickers........ • Beet workers..........,• January 1934 .• • • • •••• February 1934 .••••••» March 1934 .............. April 1934 ................ Spinach cutters • • •. •• Brussels-sprouts workers. Asparagus cutters .. . Strawberry pickers .,. August 1933 ............ Independent farm labor unions grew rapidly among Filipinos, as among Mexicans, after the C .& A .W .I.U . became inactive.48 Some of their organizers had been active previously in the Communist organiza tion The strike of lettuce-field workers in the Salinas-Watsonville area, for instance, had involved the Filipino Labor Chamber, and the Filipino Protective Union had participated in the strike of beet laborers in the Oxnard area of Ventura C ounty48 Other organizers tended to be na tionalistic and anti-Communist in sentiment. Independent Filipino unions in a few notable instances acted jointly with the A .F . of L. in strikes and collective-bargaining agreements. One o f the most important field workers’ unions to be organized by this racial minority was the Filipino Labor Union Incorporated, chartered in the early summer of 1934. Shortly after its formation it joined a local A .F . of L. shed workers’ union in a general strike throughout the lettuce industry of Salinas. The Filipino union had been negotiating with organ ized grower-shippers for wage increases and improved working condi tions. Failing to win these demands, the members voted to strike on September 1. W hite shed workers organized in the Salinas Vegetable Packers Association N o. 18211, A .F . of L., also drafted a schedule of demands regarding wage scales and working conditions and voted to join 47See Chapter V III (pp. 83-84). 48Among the organizations developed at one time or another m California, according to vari ous observers, were the following: The Filipino Labor Association, the Filipino Labor Supply Association, and the Filipino Agricultural Labor Association, all of Stockton; the Philippine Labor Chamber of Salinas; the Filipino United Labor Economic Endeavor of Santa Maria Valley, Guadalupe; the Filipino United Labor Association of San Joaquin Valley, Delano; the Filipino Unity Labor Association of Dinuba; the Filipino Labor Association of Fresno; and the Filipino Labor Union Incorporated of Guadalupe, which by 1935 reported 7 branches with a total membership of 2,000. (See Carey McWilliams: Exit the Filipino, in The Nation, Sept. 4, 1935.) 130 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE the Filipinos in a joint collective-bargaining effort. Field workers' wages were to be raised from the prevailing 30 to 40 cents per h ou r; men and women trimmers being paid 40 to 50 cents per hour were to be advanced to a minimum of 60 cents; and a 48-hour week was to be established, with time and a half for overtime, Sundays, and holidays.49 Representa tives of the two unions signed an agreement stipulating that neither would return to work until the demands of both were satisfied. Outside mediators from State and county government agencies were reported to have appeared on the fourth day of the strike, addressed mass meetings of strikers in the Rodeo grounds, and appealed to them to return to work and disregard “ outside agitators." Shed workers' Local N o. 18211 at a separate meeting then voted to let the Monterey County Industrial Relations Board50 settle the issues. The Filipino field workers voted to continue to strike and maintain their picket lines; apparently they were misled by “ runners" who were supposed to keep them informed of developments. A number of white shed workers attempted to resume the strike but were forced to return to work when J. M . Casey, west coast representative of the A .F . of L., threatened to revoke their charter.51 Thus isolated, the Filipinos were subjected to violent attack. W hile the Industrial Relations Board was in session, vigilantes burned a large labor camp owned by the president of the Filipino Labor Union Incor porated and inhabited by most of the union members. Some 800 Filipinos were reported to have been driven from the county at rifle point.52 The Filipino Labor Union Incorporated subsequently transferred its headquarters to Guadalupe, in the Santa Maria Valley of Santa Barbara County.53 By September 1936, it claimed 10 branches, having a member ship of several thousand, and had built an $8,000 labor temple.54 The union worked in close cooperation with an independent Mexican labor union of field workers and a local branch of Vegetable Packets Association Local N o. 18211. Mexicans and Filipinos in the valley pre viously had gone on a strike together, under the leadership of the C.& A .W .I.U . in 1933. This effort had failed because of inadequate prelimi nary organization and the successful recruiting of strikebreakers by contractors and growers.55 M ore than 3,000 workers of all three racial groups (Filipino, Mexican, and white) participated in a strike of almost 3 weeks, during November 1934, and were successful in winning wage increases to 30 cents per hour and other concessions.55 F or several years afterward, Filipinos, Mexicans, and whites were organized in their own unions and continued to cooperate. Under joint arbitration agreements they maintained peaceful collective-bargaining relations with organized grower-shippers in the Santa Maria Valley. Organized Filipinos during 1935 and 1936 cooperated with other racial groups also in Orange, Los Angeles, and San Diego Counties. In Orange County they participated with the Mexican C .U .C .O .M . and a 49W es tern Worker, August 30, 1934; also A. Alston: A brief History of the Fruit and Vege table Industry of the Pacific Coast (unpublished) (p. 12). 5°This board had been formed in the spring of 1934, through the efforts of Local No. 18211 and other unions to find a satisfactory alternative to a projected antipicketing ordinance that the City Council of Salinas attempted to pass. 51Alston, op. cit. (pp. 12-14). 52San Francisco Chronicle, September 25, 1936. The final decision by the Industrial Relations Board was a slight raise for all classes of shed workers, time and a half for overtime, Sundays, and holidays, time and a third for all work after 10 p.m., union recognition, and other concessions. (Alston, op. cit., pp. 12-13.) 53Pacinc Weekly, Vol. TV, No. 17, April 27, 1936 (p. 228). 54Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 13, August 1936 (p. 5). 55Idem, Vol. I, No. 8, March 1936 (p. 5). CH. IX.---SPONTANEOUS STRIKES AND INDEPENDENT UNIONS 131 local union of whites, in a strike of vegetable workers during February and March 1935 and a strike of orange pickers in November. Early in 1936 a local of Filipinos joined other field workers’ organizations in the F .A .W .U .A . During the summer it participated in a minor capacity in the large celery and citrus strikes in Los Angeles and Orange Counties, and later in negotiations for signed union agreements with Japanese growers’ associations in southern California.56 In the Imperial Valley during this period, on the other hand, the grow ers claimed that the Filipinos created a labor problem. They were sup planting Mexican laborers in lettuce and other crops through underbidding wages. B y working for from $3.25 to $4.50 per acre at thinning lettuce, instead of the $5 rate usually demanded, Filipinos were displacing M exi cans, who in turn were going on relief so as to be available for dam-con struction jobs. Growers were having to depend increasingly on white migrants and Filipino laborers, and as the Brawley News observed, "since the latter in other years have brought labor disturbances in the valley, growers are not pleased.” The Filipino Labor Union Incorporated meanwhile was meeting with mixed success. It assumed control of a spontaneous strike of 100 pea pickers in the vicinity of San Luis Obispo during January 1935, and organized a new local. The strike failed. During September 1936, some 175 to 200 union members carried out a successful strike in the artichoke and brussels-sprouts crops of Santa Cruz County. The walk-out occurred during the peak harvest season, at the same time that the famous strike of lettuce-shed workers was in progress in Salinas. The Filipinos on the larger ranches were able to win wage increases, establishing a union scale of 35 cents per hour. "Harassed growers” were reported attempting to import nonunion white workers from other counties, because, at the time the strike broke out, there were not enough local whites to supplant the Filipinos.57 A dissident group in the Filipino Labor Union Incorporated organized a separate union and submitted the following schedule of demands to the Japanese Growers Association of San Luis Obispo County, early in 1937: (1 ) That the employers recognize the Filipino Labor Union, Pismo Beach branch, as the collective-bargaining agency on all matters regarding wages, hours, and work ing conditions in the San Luis Obispo County vegetable industry. (2 ) That an agreement be signed by the employers and the union which shall be in force and effect for the period o f 1 year. (3 ) That a minimum wage o f 35 cents per hour be paid field workers. (4 ) That no discrimination because o f union affiliation be applied in hiring workers. (5 ) That a 10-hour day be in force, with time and a half for overtime, Sundays, and holidays. (6 ) That wages be paid every 15 days.®8 A strike of about 200 fruit and vegetable workers was called on ranches in the vicinities of Oceana, Pismo Beach, and A rroyo Grande to enforce these demands, but only a few minor .gains were won. The strikers were checked by numerous arrests, after the county board of supervisors passed an antipicketing ordinance. Filipino agricultural labor unions lost other strikes in early 1937. A small walk-out of 40 spinach cutters in Milpitas was broken immediately through complete replacement by other workers.59 The largest field 56See pp. 127-128. 57Oakland Tribune, September 17, 1936. ssRural Worker, Vol. II, No. 2, February 1937 (p. 5). 59Farm Labor News (Modesto), April 9, 1937. 132 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE workers’ strike of the year, a spontaneous walk-out of more than 1,000 pea pickers in San Luis Obispo County, during April, was suppressed within 2 days by local law-enforcement authorities. They declared the strike was illegal because it was not called by a recognized organization, despite the fact that it was supported by the Filipino Labor Union and the county central labor council. The impotence of spontaneous strikes and independent local unions in the face of strong opposition from organized grower-employers was becoming steadily more apparent. Revival of the anti-union Associated Farmers of California and its county subdivisions generated widespread sentiment among Filipinos, as among Mexicans, in favor of affiliation with the A .F . of L. Unions of Filipinos had won their greatest gains when they had cooperated closely with organized Mexicans and whites, as in Los Angeles, San Diego, and Orange Counties, and in the Santa Maria Valley of Santa Barbara County. By themselves they had lost heavily in membership, as workers migrated seasonally to crops grown in other areas. Federation of these local unions’ on a State-wide basis, allowing for transference of members among locals as they changed location, was urged as the only means for keeping migratory workers unionized.61 Left-wing elements, in particular, in the Filipino unions, favored affiliation with the A .F . of L. in a general federation of agricul tural and allied workers in California. Their representatives attended the State-wide conferences held during late 1936 and 1937.62 Other Filipino groups opposed this move. Labor contractors organ ized in the Filipino Labor Supply Association of Stockton were racially exclusive in policy. They refused membership to non-Filipino contractors, and petitioned the Central California Grower-Shipper Association to grant preferential hiring of the laborers they recruited and to pay the contractors a minimum of 60 cents per hour for field supervision. Although primarily a type of employers’ organization, the association at times at tempted to utilize methods of collective bargaining common to labor unions. Left-wing organizers, however, considered this group a form of company union.63 Leaders of the Filipino Labor Union Incorporated also favored a policy of racial exclusiveness and opposed affiliation with other labor organizations. A split developed within the union during the Salinas shed packers’ strike of 1936. The left-wing element led by Secretary C. D. Mensalves attempted to organize a sympathetic walk-out of Filipino field workers in support of the A .F . of L. Fruit and Vegetable W orkers Union N o. 18211.64 W hen this move was opposed by other officials of 60San Francisco News, April 15, 1937; Commonwealth Times (Organ of the Filipino Labor Union, Guadalupe) April 23, 1937. 61 Commonwealth Times, Vol. I, No. 18, April 23, 1937. ®2See Chapter X (pp. 145-146). 63In an address to the association, President M. M. Insigne claimed that Filipino labor in Salinas, under the “ paternal and sane guidance of the labor contractors,” felt confidence in the “ spirit of fair play and mutual cooperation between Filipino laborers and their employers.” He opposed accepting non-Filipino contractors as members, and stated that “ even without having to organize the Filipino farm hands into a union, they are already enjoying the right of collective bargaining and preferential hiring through the labor contractors who rebargain for them with the employers.” (Philippines Mail, Salinas, Vol. VII, No. 19, Feb. 8, 1937, p. 1.) The more articulate elements in the Filipino community upheld the views of organized Filipino contractors. The Philippines Mail, in an editorial commending the election of “ humani tarian and progressive young community leaders” to the Filipino Labor Supply Association, felt that outside Salinas there were “ unjustified distrust and unfair rumors” leveled against the organization by union labor. The paper commented: “ W e found it not an easy task to justify the faith of our laborers in the fairness of our labor contractors.” (Philippines Mail, Salinas, Vol. VIII, No. 6, January 17, 1938, p. 2.) 64See Chapter X (p. 139). CH. IX.---SPONTANEOUS STRIKES AND INDEPENDENT UNIONS 133 the union, Mensalves and his supporters withdrew and formed the sep arate Filipino Labor Union (unincorporated). This organization attended the convention at Denver in July 1937, and was later absorbed into the C I .O .’s new international, the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . The original Filipino Labor Union Incorporated late in 1937 under went a second split. President Reyes of Branch No. 4 at Guadalupe formed a new organization, the Philippine Islands Labor Union Incorporated, and assumed control of the $8,000 labor temple. H e claimed that Branch N o. 4 of the Filipino Labor Union Incorporated had been dissolved, and that the Philippine Islands Labor Union Incorporated had been organized as a new corporation. Officers of the Filipino Labor Union Incorporated, on the other hand, contended that Branch N o. 4 could not be dissolved without authorization from the union’s executive council.65 The new Philippine Islands Labor Union Incorporated survived the ensuing litiga tion and continued to function effectively in the Santa Maria Valley in cooperation with the local Mexican Labor Union. It remained the most important independent union of Filipinos in California until the spring of 1939, when the powerful Filipino Agricultural Labor Association, or F .A .L .A ., was formed in Stockton. ®5Philippines Mail, December 6, 1937 (p. 1); Philippines Journal, August 26, 1939 (p. 2). Ch a p t e r X .— The American Federation of Labor The A.F. o f L. and Left-Wing Unionists Far overshadowing other farm-labor movements following the collapse of the Cannery and Agricultural W orkers Industrial Union was the expansion of the American Federation of Labor in agriculture and allied industries of California. This organization in time absorbed most of the independent unions that had been organized among racial minorities or developed from spontaneous strikes. In the late thirties it furnished the foundation for the extensive organizing campaign launched by the Com mittee for Industrial Organization in agriculture. The A .F . of L /s new interest in agricultural and allied workers began partly as a byproduct of the general revival in labor unionism under the indirect stimulus of the National Industrial Recovery A ct during 1933 and 1934. Unions in key transportation industries rapidly increased in power, particularly the Brotherhood of Teamsters in highway trucking, and the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen in ocean and inland water transportation. These constituted a strong spearhead for organizing field and processing workers in California agriculture. The A .F . of L .’s new campaign was stimulated also by the infiltration of left-wing organizers into its ranks. The C .& A .W .I.U . policy had been too aggressive and revolutionary to appeal to its rank and file mem bers for very long, and to survive as a movement having close contact with the masses of workers the Communist union was forced to align itself with other organizations. Independent racial unions and federal labor unions of the A .F . of L. were more conciliatory in policy and their ulti mate objectives were more limited and tangible, so that in the long run they were more acceptable than the C .& .A .W .I.U . to the agricultural workers. The Communist Party therefore abandoned during 1934 its policy of opposition and “ dual unionism,” and formally dissolved its Trade Union Unity League in 1935. It adopted again its former policy of boring from within and of enlisting the support of the A .F . of L. and other unions. The influence of liberal and left-wing labor leaders, supported by an enlarged representation of unskilled and semiskilled production work ers who had been unionized during 1933 and 1934, led the A .F . of L . to adopt a broader organizing program. The new campaign among agricultural and allied laborers began on a Nation-wide scale in early 1935, when the National Committee for Unity of Agricultural and Rural W orkers was formed in W ashington, D . C. This body was designed to enlist the aid of urban trade-unions and other sympathizers in organizing farm-labor unions. The latter were to be chartered as federal labor unions of the A .F . of L. and ultimately united in a new international federation of agricultural, packing-house, and cannery labor.1 The more active leaders of the formerly “ dual” and antagonistic C.& A .W .I.U . in California now became the strongest supporters of the A .F . of L. Pat Chambers and Caroline Decker, district organizers of the 1Program and Organization adopted at the National Conference of Agricultural, Lum ber and Rural Workers (mimeographed), 4 pp., Washington, D . C., January 9, 1935. 134 CH. X.---THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 135 C .& A .W .I.U . in the m ajor strikes of 1933 and 1934, had been convicted of criminal syndicalism in 1935. From prison they issued a “ call for unity” to all agricultural and cannery workers, urging them to join the A .F . of L. Instead o f allowing ourselves to be divided, we should all unite to fight for our common demands. I f we remain divided, the employers will continue to use one group against the other. Therefore, the District Committee o f the C.&A.W .I.U. urges all workers, organized and unorganized, to join the A.F. o f L. (Rural W orker, Vol. I, No. 1, August 1935, p. 3.) Donald Henderson, president of the renamed National Committee of Agricultural W orkers, later wrote a lengthy article in that organiza tion’s official paper, the Rural W orker, explaining more fully the failure of the C.& A.W .I.tJ. and the need for the shift in union p o licy : * * * It [the C.&A.W .I.U.] failed * * * to develop a stable organization. Three reasons should be recognized for this failure so as to prevent a repetition. First, it was an independent trade-union unaffiliated to the rest o f California’s trade-union movement. It received little or no support, and in many cases bitter and active opposition, from the official A.F. o f L. unions, central and State bodies. This was due as* much to the unwillingness o f the A.F. o f L. groups at that time to help organize the agricultural field workers as it was to the fact that the C.&A.W.I.U. was an independent union. Second, the C.&A.W.I.U. was based too exclusively on the migratory field workers. The union failed to concentrate sufficiently on the more regularly em ployed and higher-paid workers who would have supplied a more stable group for permanent organization. Third, the weakness o f the trade-union movement in the smaller cities and o f small farmer organizations in the rural regions made it difficult to stop terror and vigilantism against the union. Important aspects o f the situation in California give hope that a real beginning is being made in developing a stable trade-union movement on a State-wide scale. O f fundamental importance is the growth o f the A.F. of L. trade-unions generally throughout the State, and the increased unionization in the smaller cities. Accom panying this growth in trade-union membership, there has developed a more pro gressive and intelligent union and central labor-union leadership that recognizes the importance and necessity o f organizing workers in agriculture. A greater willingness to assist agricultural trade-unions get charters and help in solving their organizational problem is apparent in a large number of the central labor unions throughout the State. (Rural W orker, Vol. I, No. 15, Novem ber 1936, p. 2.) Packing-Shed Workers’ Unions in the A.F. o f L. Hitherto the A .F . of L., dominated by the skilled craft unions, had evinced little interest in organizing seasonal workers in agriculture and allied industries, and its officials had tended to ignore the low-paid casually employed laborers. A ccording to Paul Scharrenberg, former secretary of the California State Federation of Labor, “ Only fanatics are willing to live in shacks or tents and get their heads broken in the interests of migratory labor.” 2 Strong racial divisions, paralleling occupational lines, had impelled the federation to confine such organizing efforts as were made to the skilled and semiskilled white workers in packing sheds and canneries, and to exclude unskilled and predominantly nonwhite field or “ stoop” laborers on farms. The A .F . of L. began to broaden its campaign during the thirties, by organizing unions of skilled fruit and vegetable packers in Salinas and 2New York Times, January 20, 1935. 654107°—46—10 136 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE the Imperial Valley, which furnished the opening wedge for a later drive among other agricultural and allied workers. A n independent union, composed exclusively of melon packers in the Imperial Valley, had been formed and incorporated as the Fruit and Vegetable Packers' Association in 1931. It had grown rapidly after win ning a sit-down strike during the 1931 cantaloup season, and at its peak claimed well over 1,000 members, many of whom migrated seasonally from California to Arizona, Oregon, and Washington. It failed in a strike in the 1932 season, and the shippers were reported to have broken the union by importing large numbers of strikebreakers, most of whom were Japanese.3 The Salinas Fruit and Vegetable W orkers Union Local 180164 mean while had been reorganized and rechartered as the Vegetable Packers Association, or V .P .A ., Local N o. 18211. It was given State-wide juris diction over all vegetable-packing workers, in the first charter of its kind granted by the A .F . of L. Under a “ floating charter" arrangement its offices could be transferred to various centers, following the main body of union members in their seasonal migrations. The association maintained its headquarters in Salinas during 8 months of the year, and in El Centro in the Imperial Valley during the remaining 4 months of winter and early spring. Branches or sublocals were organized in several localities, as among fruit packers in San Jose and vegetable packers in the Santa Maria Valley. Local No. 18211 (the V .P .A .) conducted an 11-day strike in Salinas during the fall of 1933, while the C .& A .W .I.U . drive among the field workers of California was reaching its height. Continuous wage cutting had reduced earnings in the packing industry to the lowest levels reached for many years. The union struck for wage increases to 75 cents per hour for packers, equal pay for other men and women employees at a minimum scale of SO cents per hour, and certain improvements in working conditions. The strike was settled with compromise wage increases to 70 cents per hour for packers and minimum wages for other employees of 45 cents per hour for men and 40 cents for women. Joe Casey, W est Coast representative of the A .F . of L., together with George Creel, Con ciliation Commissioner of the U. S. Department of Labor, persuaded the strikers to return to work on the promise that 90 percent of them would be reemployed and that wages would be arbitrated by an impartial body.5 Cooperation with Organized Filipinos Th e A .F . of L .'s first experiments in cooperating with nonwhite organizations for collective bargaining in agriculture met with mixed success. The general strike of field and shed workers in the Salinas let tuce area during the fall of 19346 was in one sense a setback. By with drawing from the strike, the members of V .P .A . were awarded im proved working conditions, shorter hours, and higher wages: 75 cents per hour for packers, 50 cents per hour for men trimmers, and 45 cents 3Brawley News, April 21, 1932; May 20, 1932; May 26, 1932. See also A. ( “ Shorty” ) Alston: A Brief History of the Fruit and Vegetable Industry of the Pacific Coast (pp. 6*7), (unpublished manuscript, Simon J. Lubin Society, San Francisco, Calif., 1938). 4See Chapter V II (pp. 78-79). 5Alston, op cit. (p. 9). 6See Chapter IX (pp. 129-130). CH. X.---THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 137 for women.7 In leaving the Filipino union members unprotected and subject to attack from vigilantes, however, the organized white shed workers had lost the good will of nonwhite field workers and reduced the chances of winning sympathetic strike support from them in the future. Whether V .P .A .’s action was motivated by race prejudice or by expe diency is not recorded. Cooperative strike action between organized whites and nonwhites was more successful in another locality, later in the year. A branch of the Vegetable Packers Association in the Santa Maria Valley of Santa Barbara County participated with local unions of Mexicans and Filipinos in a joint strike of several thousand workers in the vegetable industry. The unions voted to allow arbitration of their demands, and all three groups won signed agreements granting union recognition and improve ments in wages and working conditions. For several years thereafter they continued this cooperation in their collective bargaining with local grower-shippers under arbitration agreements.8 , Imperial Valley Strike 1935 Vegetable Packers Association No. 18211, as a separate union o f processing workers, had won substantial gains for its members during 1934. Later, however, it lost several large and important strikes through its failure to win the organized support of the field workers. The first defeat was suffered early in 1935. W hen union officers and members migrated to the Imperial Valley to pack and ship vegetables in the “ fall deal,” they attempted through collective bargaining to establish the wage standards which they had won by arbitration award in Monterey County. Grower-shippers refused to negotiate with the union, despite the mediation efforts of U. S. Conciliation Commissioner Fitzgerald. Finally the union drafted a set of demands for union wage scales and working con ditions, and served an ultimatum on the employers. W ithin a week 8 grower-shippers signed an agreement meeting the demands, and the union declared a strike against the 52 who refused.® * The strike involved some 1,500-2,000 shed workers and was financed through a levy on union members in other areas. A fund of $7,000 was raised to provide soup kitchens for such packing centers as Brawley, El Centro, Holtville, and Calexico. Both sides allegedly used considerable violence and intimidation during the strike. Tw o union members were shot to death while picketing one plant. Joseph Casey, west coast rep resentative of the A .F . of L., blamed this incident on “ unrestrained deputizing and arming of strikebreakers.” 10 In his official report to W il liam Green, president of the American Federation of Labor, M r. Casey condemned State and local police in strong terms: * * * a crew o f irresponsible and unknown morons was prevailed upon to break tKe strike with the law-enforcing bodies arming them with pick handles, pistols, and deputies’ badges. This unnecessary and promiscuous deputizing of nonresident strike breakers finally resulted in the uncalled-for and cold-blooded murder o f two striking 7Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 55: California State Chamber of Commerce— Origin of the Associated Farmers of California, Inc. (p. 20195). 8Field and shed workers as well as truck drivers again united in a small strike on a potato ranch. The strikers demanded 45 cents per hour for field labor and 50 cents per hour for shed workers, but apparently failed to win these gains. (Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 2, September 1935, p. 1.) 9Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 55 (p. 20195). 10Idem (p. 20198). 138 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE pickets. Next we find the State o f California shamefully aiding and abetting this land o f terroristic vigilantism and fascism by sending in police from the State High way Patrol. The attitude o f these “ cossacks” was so bitterly biased that union strikers were hunted from the public streets like dogs. (Hearings o f La Follette Committee, Part 55, p. 20199.) Shed owners and local law-enforcement authorities, on the other hand, alleged that violent methods were necessary in the face of intimi dation and threatened violence from the strikers. A grand jury con cluded that the shooting of the two strikers had occurred in self-defense, and refused to return indictments.11 The strike ended within a few weeks with heavy losses to the union. It won none of its demands, and less than a third of the strikers were rehired.12 , Miscellaneous Strikes 1935-36 The Salinas shed packers' organization, renamed the Fruit and V ege table W orkers Union N o. 18211, won several union gains and extended its influence throughout California during 1935-36. The contracts which had been won by organized shed workers after the strikes of 1934 in the Salinas-Watsonville and Santa Maria districts, were renewed for another year. Delegates from the Imperial Valley, Salinas-Watsonville, and Santa Maria districts attended the union's second annual conference early in 1936, where they made plans to win signed union contracts in other crops besides lettuce, and to organize other workers besides those in the packing industry.13 The F .V .W .U . met with some success in organizing scattered groups of workers employed at packing such crops as pears, peaches, and small fruits throughout California. Some 12 small strikes were called by union members during 1935 and 1936. M ost of these occurred in newly organ ized districts and only a few were reported in the newspapers. A 2-day strike of 165 members employed at packing pears in Santa Clara County won wage increases. Union spokesmen claimed that fiery crosses were burned at night in the vicinity of San Jose in order to intimidate the strikers.14 Compromise wage gains were won during August by 100 fruit packers striking for a 10 to 33 percent wage increase at the Fruit Growers Association sheds at Placerville,15 and by 140 fruit packers in a 10-day strike in another town in El Dorado County.16 Salinas Strikes of 1936 The Fruit and Vegetable W orkers Union suffered its severest defeat in the famous Salinas lettuce strike during the fall of 1936. The organiza tion never fully recovered after the loss of this large and prolonged struggle, one of the most violent in the history of agricultural labor in California. Trouble in the Salinas area began with a small strike carried out by F .V .W .U . N o. 18211 in M ay 1936. Union members in one plant walked out in protest against the employment of four “ Imperial Valley scabs" on the crew. W hen the management sent the lettuce to another company 11Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 55 (p. 20199). 12A. ( “ Shorty” ) Alston: A Brief History of the Fruit and Vegetable Industry of the Pacific Coast, p. 14. 13Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 7, March 1936 (p. 1). 14Idem, Vol. I, No. 14, September 1936, (p. 4). 15Sacramento Union, August 16, 1936. ,6Josiah C. Folsom: Labor Disputes in Agriculture, 1927 to 1928 (unpublished). CH. X.---THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 139 to be packed, the crew in the second plant also struck, refusing to handle the “ hot lettuce.” The strike grew in this manner until operations at four plants were at a standstill for 10 days. It was settled by an arbitration board which included among its members a conciliator from the U .S. Department of Labor, and 12 “ scabs” altogether were dismissed.17 The Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association, together with the re vitalized Associated Farmers of California, made elaborate preparations to break the Fruit and Vegetable W orkers Union when its industry-wide contract came up for renewal in September. The two organizations engaged a public relations counsel, primarily to organize a “ citizen’s association,” and hired private detectives and investigators to supplement the functions of local and State police.18 A strike developed when negotiations over the union contract failed to bring agreement. Representatives of the union and organized growershippers came to a deadlock over clause 39, which guaranteed preferential hiring of union members. T o the employers this was “ an effort of the union and a radical minority to set up a closed shop” 19 and was therefore unacceptable. The Associated Farmers gave its full support to the grower-shippers in Salinas. This organization had been revived in full force earlier in the year, in southern California, to combat renewed unionism and strike activity among Mexican field laborers. The threat of a State-wide A .F . of L. organizing campaign stimulated its reorganization on a larger and stronger basis, and brought considerable financial and moral support from important urban business interests. Organized agricultural em ployers saw a strong identity of interest between farmers and packingshed owners, and for this reason supported the grower-shippers in Salinas. The Associated Farmers’ official journal, From Apathy to Action, warned its subscribers in its October 6, 1936, issue that— * * * should the strikers win and succeed in “ unionizing” farm labor in the Salinas Valley, it would be but a step towards the same efforts in other areas o f Cali fornia * * * grapes, cotton, peaches, peas, grain, hay and all crops included. * * * Although they pay the highest prices in the world for agricultural labor, California farmers would be told definitely whom they could hire and whom not— and whether they could harvest their crops at all or not. The embattled employers and their allies displayed an extremely strong and well-organized opposition that finally defeated the Fruit and Vegetable W orkers Union. Individual members of the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association were held strictly in line; one company which attempted to make a separate agreement with the union was boycotted and was unable to obtain ice, paper, boxes, and other equipment necessary for packing and shipping lettuce. Organized labor throughout the State supported the strike and placed bans on “ hot lettuce.” 20 Left-wing organizers in the Filipino Labor Union Incorporated made unsuccessful attempts to bring the lettuce-field workers in the Salinas area out on a sympathetic strike, but most of these workers were Filipinos and only a few were organized. The more nationalistic union members opposed these efforts, and the organizers faced an unfenthusiastic group of workers who had been somewhat disillusioned by 17National Labor Relations Board, Report of Cases 178-178ee, Washington, July 14, 1939; Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 11, Tune 1936. 18National Labor Relations Board, Report of Cases 178-178ee, Washington, July 14, 1939 (p. 1-20). 19From Apathy to Action, Bulletin 26, October 6, 1936 (p. 1). 20Rural Worker, Vol. 1, No. 14, October 1936. 140 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE their experiences in the strike of 1934. A split ensued within the Filipino organization, and the left-wing faction withdrew to form the separate Filipino Labor Union. Representatives of the latter organization by late September claimed to have brought 500 field workers out on strike in sympathy with the white shed workers, but the number was insufficient to affect the outcome of the struggle. Further agitation was checked when Rufus Conate, president, and Chris Mensalves, secretary, of the Filipino Labor Union were arrested for “ vagrancy.” 21 The strike at times approached the scale of a local civil war, with some 4,000 organized lettuce packers, teamsters, and their sympathizers facing armed State and city police, vigilantes, and imported strikebreakers. Violence and intimidation to an unusual degree were directed against strikers. The official report by the National Labor Relations Board stated that “ the impression of these events obtained from the record is one of inexcusable police brutality, in many instances bordering on sadism.” 22 The strike was finally terminated, after 6 weeks, by a vote of 613 to 342 among the strikers. Edward Vandeleur, secretary of the California State Federation of Labor, together with officers of the Fruit and V ege table W orkers Union N o. 18211, negotiated the terms of settlement with representatives of the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association. Field Workers’ Unions in the A.F. o f L. The serious defeats suffered by the Fruit and Vegetable W orkers Union N o. 1&211 in the Imperial Valley strike of 1935 and the Salinas strike of 1936 demonstrated the weaknesses of an organization restricted to white workers employed in processing industries only. The union had encountered an extraordinarily well-organized and violent opposition, but this was not the major reason for losing the strikes. It was to be found, rather, in the union’s failure to organize the unskilled and semi skilled nonwhite field laborers employed in harvesting crops owned or controlled by grower-shippers. In the last analysis both strikes had been broken by the almost uninterrupted flow of produce from field to shed, where it was packed by imported strikebreakers protected by hundreds of heavily armed deputies and police. Complete “ vertical” unions were necessary if workers of all occupa tions in agriculture were to wield a degree of bargaining power equal to that of employers. Large agricultural industries had become highly integrated, technologically and financially. Unions had to be organized on an industry-wide or State-wide scale to cope with business enterprises and employers’ associations whose operations covered a broad territory. The California Federation of Labor and its affiliates organized in food processing industries consequently were impelled to make an effort to unionize seasonal and migratory agricultural workers in the State. A n interest in affiliation with the A .F . of L. was growing among organized field workers. Left-wing unionists and representatives of the National Committee to A id Agricultural W orkers were taking steps to unite local farm-labor unions and to bring them into close working relationships with the organized employees of allied processing industries. 21San Francisco Examiner, September 24 and 28, 1936; Voice of Federation (California State Federation of Labor, San Francisco), September 24, 1936. 22National Labor Relations Board, Report of Cases, 178-178ee, Washington, July 14, 1939 (p. 20). CH. X.---THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 141 Donald Henderson, president of the National Committee, stressed the importance of processing workers as a core of relatively well-paid and regularly employed labor within agricultural unions; they would provide greater stability of membership and income and serve as an important contact with urban trade-unions. The Salinas Fruit and Vegetable W ork ers Union N o. 18211 he considered to be of strategic importance: Its membership is largely composed o f American workers nearly half o f whom are former “ Dust Bowl” farmers from Oklahoma and Texas. While many o f the wives o f these workers are employed in the industry, large numbers o f the women also work in the restaurants and other shops in lettuce and fruit centers. Wherever they are, they unionize their shop. Equally important in realizing the key position which this union holds is the fact that their jobs are semiskilled, fairly regular the year round, and wages are a great deal higher in the sheds than in the fields. These factors are o f importance to the building o f a stable, financially capable and permanent trade-union. (Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 15, October 1936, p. 2.) Farm workers in California during 1936 were in a temporarily stra tegic position to improve their economic status by collective bargaining. A comparative labor shortage existed in many crop areas, as various groups were withdrawn from agricultural work. Mexicans had been deported or repatriated in large numbers, and many resident workers were being reemployed in better-paid nonagricultural occupations during a period of general business recovery. The less successful could obtain relief from the W orks Progress Administration and the California State Relief Administration. “ Dust B ow l” refugees from the rural Middle W est and Southwest had not yet arrived in such numbers as to compen sate for all withdrawals from agricultural work. W age rates throughout California’s agriculture consequently tended to rise during 1936. Efforts to increase the labor supply by cutting relief rolls merely stimulated farm workers and unemployed to unionize and cooperate more closely among themselves. Affiliation with the A .F . of L. now carried still greater appeal, as it held out the prospect of support from well-organized and politically powerful State and county union affiliates of the State Federation of Labor. The A .F . of L .’ s earlier efforts to organize field workers in competi tion with the C .& .A .W .I.U . in 1934 had been unsuccessful. Attempts to win Mexican citrus workers in Redlands to a branch of the V .P .A ., and later to local Federal Labor Union No. 19060,23 had soon failed. Can nery W orkers Union No. 18893, which had wrested control from the C. & A .W .I.U . in the strike of apricot workers in Contra Costa County, suffered a defeat.24 A .F . of L. unions of agricultural workers grew rapidly after the C .& .A .W .I.U . had been abolished and left-wing organizers had aban doned their former policy of opposition. The National Committee for Unity of Agricultural W orkers enlisted the support of organized labor and other sympathetic bodies to build local farm-labor unions; where possible these were chartered by the A .F . of L. and affiliated to central labor councils of nearby towns and counties. Federal labor unions, organ ized in many cases from local spontaneous strikes, grew side by side with independent racial unions of Mexicans and Filipinos. By September 1935, there were 16 such A .F . of L. local organizations of field, cannery, and packing-house workers in California.25 O f this number, 4 were field workers* unions chartered in Portersville, Delano, •Visalia, and 23Daily Press (Riverside), March 1, 1934. 24See Chapter V III (p. 112). „ „ „ f AJ . . A . w , A 25Unpublished List prepared by U. S. Resettlement Administration, Washington, April 24. 1935. 142 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE Tulare, and charters were pending for local unions organized in the towns of Arvin, Fresno, San Jose, and San Diego.26 Unions occupying key positions in the transportation industries of California furnished additional momentum to the A .F . of L .’s organizing campaign in agriculture. Labor organizations composing the Maritime Federation of the Pacific pushed unionism almost literally to the very doors of growers and shippers. Following the San Francisco general strike, unions were organized among bargemen and warehousemen on inland-waterway towns as well as in coastal ports. Both these groups handled crops harvested by field workers and later processed by canning and packing workers. Often the same companies employed both agri cultural and transportation workers. The Maritime Federation’s “ march inland” thus provided an ever-widening base for the A .F . of L .’s program of organizing the canning and packing industries. A t the same time such unionization was necessary if the Maritime Federation was to main tain and consolidate its gains.27 The “ march inland” stimulated the Brotherhood of Teamsters, main stay o f A .F . of L. strength e n the Pacific Coast, to launch a counterdrive to “ organize everything on wheels.” T o maintain its own proportional strength within the State Federation and constituent central labor coun cils, the Brotherhood was forced to extend its jurisdiction to agricultural processing industries such as a creameries and dairies, vegetable-packing sheds, canneries, and fruit- and nut-packing plants. Unions in these industries, to be fully effective, required, in turn, a supporting base of organized field laborers. The competing aims of these two transport unions caused increasingly bitter jurisdictional disputes and internecine friction within the California State Federation of Labor. There were unprecedented organizational gains, nevertheless, for labor in agriculture and allied industries. The most stable and militant local unions o i field and processing workers were organized in the vicinities of key transportation centers for agricultural products. In such cities as Oakland, Stockton, Sacra mento, San Jose, and Bakersfield, pressure from the teamsters and long shoremen forced the central labor councils to support agricultural work ers’ organizations. From these centers, organizers formed additional locals and branches in other sections of their counties. The Central Labor Council of Santa Clara County in October 1935 passed a resolution to organize a Committee for Agricultural Organiza tion, which would enlist unified support for local farm-labor unions. The committee was finally formed early in February 1937, shortly after Can nery W orkers Union N o. 20325 of San Jose had received its charter from the A .F . of L .28 Since the majority of agricultural workers in this area were migratory, the organizing campaign was designed primarily to establish a union that could raise and standardize wage scales over the entire county. Such an organization was felt to be particularly necessary in. view of the steadily increasing job competition from newly arrived “ Dust B ow l” refugees from the Southwest.20 The Santa Clara Central Labor Council and the San Jose Cannery Union cooperated with the newly organized Agricultural W orkers Union 26Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 1, August 1935 (p. 3). 27Idem, Vol. I, No. 15, October 1936 (p. 2). 28Sacramento Valley Union Labor Bulletin (Northern California Agricultural and Cannery Conference, Sacramento), February 2, 1937. 29See footnote, p. 143. CH. X.---THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 143 N o. 20221 of Stockton in unionizing field workers involved in numerous spontaneous strikes. The unions negotiated wage increases of from 2 2 /2 to 30 cents per hour for Mexican grape trimmers in the vicinity l of Los Gatos, for spinach cutters in Milpitas, and for cherry pickers in Mount V iew .29 A local farm-labor union was organized and chartered in M ay 1937, as Field W orkers Union N o. 20686, which succeeded in signing unusually favorable agreements with growers in field and orchard crops. The union asserted it had won closed shops on some farms, and union representatives were entitled to inspect companies’ books to see that all employees were union members. A schedule of wages was reported established at a minimum of 50 cents per hour for an 8-hour day and 60 cents per hour for overtime, 60 and 70 cents per hour for tractor-drivers and irrigators, and 75 cents to $1 for sprayers.30 Agricultural W orkers Union No. 20289 of Kern County began on a modest scale in Bakersfield early in 1936. By November it claimed only 85 members, though 1,000 Filipinos promised to join as soon as 100 white workers were enlisted. It expanded rapidly during the early part of 1937, establishing branches in such communities as Delano, W asco, Shatter, McFarland, and Arvin, and by April it claimed a membership o f several hundred whites and more than 1,000 resident Filipinos. It planned to require the seasonal influx of 4,000 to 5,000 additional Filipino workers to present union cards from other organizations or to join the county organization, before permitting them to work.31 Agricultural W orkers Union No. 20221 was organized among Filipino field laborers in the Stockton area late in 1936. Its first strike was a failure. In concert with Agricultural W orkers Union N o. 20241 of Sacramento, it organized the Filipino celery workers and announced as its objectives a general 10-cent increase in hourly wage rates, union recog nition, and a hiring hall for local farm workers.32 A strike was called on November 25, after grower-shippers had refused to negotiate. Though union spokesmen maintained that some 3,500 celery workers responded, the movement soon collapsed and the union won none of its demands.33 Spokesmen for the grower-shippers charged that the union was a “ racket” for collecting membership fees as high as $25 from Filipinos, and could not be an effective collective-bargaining unit.34 W ill Hutchin son, spokesman of the newly organized Celery Growers and Shippers Association, asserted that no white men except the business agent had joined the organization and that no effort was being made to enlist other than Filipino members.35 Union spokesmen, on the other hand, blamed the failure of the strike on the “ excessively close” cooperation of State and county police officers with the grower-shipper interests. County Sheriff Odell, it was charged, barricaded the public highway against pickets 6 miles from the main packing sheds, and provided heavily armed convoys for trucks loaded with “ hot celery” and strikebreakers. W hen peaceful pickets attempted to call out workers in sheds near Isleton, 11 were reported arrested for “ trespassing on cultivated ground.” 36 29Farmer-Labor News (Central Labor Council of San Joaquin County, Modesto), May 7, 1937. 30Idem, May 28, 1937. 31Idem, April 23, 1937. Previously the union had complained that several strikes undertaken in late 1936 were rendered ineffective by the continuous influx of migratory workers from other counties. (Letter to the Simon J. Lubin Society, San Francisco, Nov. 22, 1936.) 32W estem Worker, November 23, 1936. 33San Francisco Examiner, November 24, 1936. 34Pacific Rural Press, November 26, 1936. 35Idem, November 25, 1936. 3®Rural Worker, Vol. II, No. 1, January 1937 (p. 2). 144 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE Agricultural W orkers Union No. 20241 of Sacramento County was first organized and chartered in May 1936 among a group of laborers in Knights Landing. Later it transferred its headquarters to the city of Sacramento and joined the Federated Trades Council.37 W ith the assistance of organizers from the Stockton Local N o. 20221 and the Sacramento local of the International Longshoremen and W arehouse men's Union, it established branches in Hollister, Brentwood, Riverbank, and Chowchilla. The Chowchilla branch in May 1937 was chartered separately as Federal Labor Union N o. 20675 of agricultural workers.38 Later it won a written agreement with organized asparagus growers in the Walnut Grove area.39 Another local organization of agricultural workers in Yuba and Sutter Counties was chartered as a federal labor union during May 1937. The union's executive board sought to negotiate with growers for a standard wage of 35 cents per hour throughout the peach-growing area during the summer harvest season.40 Filipino and Mexican farm workers' unions in several crop areas be came affiliated to the A .F . of L. early in 1937. American, Mexican, and Filipino agricultural workers in Santa Maria Valley, who had cooperated remarkably well for several years in separate organizations, received an A .F . of L. charter in February 1937, as Field W orkers Union Local N o. 20326. Local union representatives insisted that workers of all races be accepted without discrimination.41 The transition was not always this smooth. In the spring of 1937 a majority of the members in a local branch of the Confederation de U niones de Campesinas y Obreras Mexicanas in Orange County withdrew to join a new A .F . of L. Farm Laborers Union No. 20688. The C .U .C .O .M . local continued, however, retaining enough of its membership to create considerable jurisdictional trouble the following year.42 The question of affiliation with the A .F . of L. also was one cause of the split that occurred in the Filipino Labor Union Incorporated, and led to the establishment of the separate unincorporated Filipino Labor Union already noted.43 Early in 1937 the Lom poc, Salinas, and San Luis Obispo County branches of the latter organization voted to affiliate with the A .F . of L. and seek federal labor union charters.44 State-wide Federation o f Agricultural Workers W hile local unions were being established throughout California, labor organizers were attempting to federate local organizations of all types into one State-wide union covering agriculture and allied industries. The support of the organized teamsters and longshoremen was vital in this campaign. Nevertheless it brought to a head the growing conflict between these two groups within the California State Federation of Labor and re sulted finally in the secession of the Maritime Federation of the Pacific. 37Farmer-Labor News, June 4, 1937. 38Idem, May 21, 1937. 39Sacramento Valley Union Labor Bulletin (Sacramento), February 3, 1937. 40Sacramento Bee, May 24, 1937. 41 Rural Worker, Vol. II, No. 2, February 1937. 42Field notes. 43See Chapter IX (p. 131). 44Rural Worker, Vol. H, No. 3, March 1937 (p. 5). CH. X.---THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 145 The Federation of Agricultural W orkers Unions formed in Los Angeles in January 193645 was the beginning of a State-wide union in agricultural industries. The Coordinating Council of Agricultural and Packing W orkers of California was established shortly afterward to enlist the support of the more strategically located central labor councils in the State. This body published a semiweekly farmer-labor newspaper as a means of promoting “ trade-union education” and providing workers with information regarding crops, prices, and wage and hour conditions. The Coordinating Council depended upon the general organizer of the A .F . of L. for support in obtaining federal labor union charters when opposition was encountered from officials of local central labor councils.46 A n unofficial California Conference of Agricultural W orkers, attended by representatives from A .F . of L. affiliates and independent Mexican and Filipino unions, was held in Stockton during June 6 and 7, 1936. Delegates passed resolutions endorsing the establishment of a State Fed eration of Agricultural, Cannery and Packing W orkers, and calling for a standard $3 per 8-hour day with overtime pay for seasonal farm workers, and $65 per month with board for year-round employees.47 The conference was not officially recognized by the California State Federation of Labor. However, a few months later the strike of Salinas lettuce-shed workers in the fall of 1936 focused attention on the desir ability of organizing field laborers to cooperate with unions of processing workers. The State federation at its annual convention in November 1936 passed a resolution endorsing the demands of the Stockton confer ence for a State-wide charter for labor in agriculture and allied industries. A 1-cent monthly per capita tax was levied on all State federation mem bers to finance an organizing campaign.48 The text of the resolution read as follow s: Whereas, agriculture, the largest industry in the State, is still unorganized, and its peculiar make-up necessitates special consideration on the part o f the State Federation to organize, and Whereas, agriculture is State-wide in scope, and is seasonal and ^localized by crops, and compels the bulk of its workers to migrate, covering the entire State and sometimes adjacent States, during a season o f 8 or 9 months, and Whereas, the workers engaged in agriculture and its numerous branches require little or no skill, Therefore be it Resolved, That the State Federation o f Labor assembled in convention at Sacra mento, September 1936, petition the American Federation of Labor to grant an international charter for agriculture covering all workers in the production of farm products and the processes o f manufacturing o f a consumable product; and further be it Resolved, That pending the establishment o f an international union a State-wide federal charter be asked for California to cover all field workers engaged in agriculture.4 8 The State Federation of Labor in February 1937 officially endorsed and sponsored a State-wide conference of agricultural workers in San Francisco. Accredited delegates represented 14 local or federal labor unions chartered by the A .F . of L., 15 locals of the Mexican C.U .C.O.M ., 4 branches of the Filipino Labor Union, and the newly organized Japanese Agricultural W orkers Association of Southern California.49 45See Chapter IX (p. 124). 46Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 14, September 1936 (p. 4). 47Idem, Vol. I, No. 12, July 1936 (p. 1). 48Idem, Vol. I, No. 16 (p. 1). 4®Official Roster of Delegates, State Conference of Agricultural Unions, February 27, 1937 (Minutes of California State Federation of Labor, Feb. 27). San Francisco, 146 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE The State federation in a special bulletin expressed its concern over the growing strength of the Associated Farmers and other anti-union forces in the State and indicated the main objective: Because o f many serious and acute problems and the strong organized opposition that confronts the agricultural workers o f this State in their attempts to organize and better their low economic and social conditions, it is imperative that there be established one State-wide organization with a uniform program with no conflict in jurisdiction between local unions. (Call for Conference of Agricultural W orkers, California State Federation o f Labor, San Francisco, February 1937.) The delegates approved a proposal for chartering a State-wide organ ization that would absorb all existing field and cannery workers’ unions. U nder the proposed plan, all existing federal labor union charters were to be surrendered, and the new organization was to issue cards to workers for general use in agriculture and allied industries in the State. A ll can nery and field labor unions, whether A .F . of L. or independent, would be affiliated to the new federation, a branch of which would be established in each central labor union territory. By referendum vote, workers in each county would elect one representative to a State executive committee, which would be the responsible governing body for the State organization. Each local branch would elect a suborganizer.50 Meanwhile a temporary Agricultural and Cannery W orkers Union was formed, and George W oolf, president of the Alaska Cannery W orkers Union N o. 20195, and part-time organizer of the International Longshoremen and W arehouse men’s Union under H arry Bridges, was elected president. It was further proposed at the conference that the State federation provide a fund of $20,000 for the new union, to finance its projected or ganizational campaign. Another resolution was passed requesting that half of the money raised by the 1-cent monthly per capita tax, levied on all members of the State federation by the convention in September, be allotted to the new organization.51 A committee was appointed to present these resolutions to the executive council of the California State Federation of Labor. A t the meeting held at Sacramento in March 1937, the executive coun cil refused these requests on the ground that, if it had to provide the funds to finance an organizing campaign in agriculture, it should have direct control over any new State-wide union. It ruled further that field and processing workers should be organized in separate State-wide unions rather than in one integrated organization, because the existing federal labor unions of the A .F . of L. already were under contract to their em ployers.51 W alter Cowan, vice president of the California State Federa tion of Labor, was appointed temporary secretary of the proposed union and was given the power to appoint organizers and control the allocation of funds. George W oolf and other representatives elected at the San Francisco conference denounced the State federation’s stand. They were supported by H arry Bridges, president of the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen, W alter Mahaffey, president of the Central Labor Council of Stockton, and other important urban union officials.52 Bridges charged that the State federation officialdom was trying to “ build up its own polit ical set-up” so as to allow no control in the hands of the local unions 50Rural Worker, Vol. II, No. 2, February 1937 (p. 5). 51Official Report of Proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board, Cases No. XX-C0362 to 377, Bercut Richards and California Processors and Growers v. U.C.A.P.A.W.A., Oak land, Tune 1938 (pp. 10744-10746); Rural Worker, Vol. II, No. 5, May 1937. 52See footnote, p. 147. CH. X.---THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 147 themselves.52 W oolf and his supporters threatened indirectly to secede from the federation : * * * the more than 200,000 workers in field, shed and canneries in California should be organized into one union which would elect its officers and control its affairs democratically. The time is ripe for such an organization, and something will be done whether we operate under C.I.O. or form an independent group. (Rural W orker, Vol. II, No. 4, April 1937, p. 4.) The insurgents called another convention of agricultural field and processing workers in April. Delegates from 18 federal labor unions and independent organizations, claiming to represent a total membership of 15,000, met in Bakersfield and established the California Federation of Agricultural and Cannery Unions. The executive board elected to direct this organization represented the left-wing element in the agricultural labor movement including George W o o lf; Dudley Sargent, secretary of Agricultural W orkers Union N o. 20221 of Stockton; Marcella Ryan, or ganizer of Cannery W orkers Union 20099 of Oakland; C. W . John son, organizer of Agricultural W orkers Union N o. 20289 of Bakersfield; C. D. Mensalves, secretary, Filipino Labor U n io n ; and Bernard Lucero, secretary, M exican Confederation of Agricultural W orkers.53 Organized grower-shippers found the State Federation of Labor's proposed organizing campaign in agriculture highly disturbing. The A s sociated Farmers of California had regarded with suspicion the Confer ence of Agricultural W orkers held in Stockton in June 1936 and claimed that it was dominated by radicals and had received little support from rec ognized labor unions.54 A few months later, however, this farm organiza tion had fought the strike called by the recognized A .F . of L. shed work ers' union in Salinas. The appointment of W alter Cowan and Fred W est as A .F . of L. organizers for farm labor brought the comment from the Associated Farmers' bulletin that— * * * assuredly they constitute a good pair, fully qualified because o f their experi ence with restaurant workers and window cleaners to tell the farmers of Cali fornia how they should conduct their business. (From Apathy to Action, Bulletin No. 33, January 5, 1937.) The split between right- and left-wing elements within the California State Federation of Labor caused even more consternation among organ ized grower-employers. A s between the conservatives led by Edward Vandeleur (secretary of the State federation) and the Brotherhood of Teamsters on one side, and the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen led by H arry Bridges on the other, agricultural in terests favored the former. They charged Bridges with being “ dom inated by C.I.O. leanings and support of the Communists."55 The Asso ciated Farmers were particularly hostile to the I.L .W .U ., as this union had been aggressive in pushing the campaign to organize agricultural field and processing workers. From Apathy to Action alleged that longshoremen had been sent to act as pickets in several agriculturallabor disputes, including the milk strike in Alameda, the lettuce strike in Salinas, and the celery strike in San Joaquin. “ W hat lawful right these 52W oolf and Bridges were supported by tbe officers of Agricultural Workers Union No. 20241 of Sacramento and No. 23228 of San Jose; Dried Fruit and Nut Workers No. 20020 of Alameda; the Employees Security Association of Fresno; the Filipino Labor Association of Knights Land ing; Agricultural Workers Union No. 20221 of Stockton; the Cannery Workers Union of Pitts burg; the Mexican Agricultural Workers Union of Los Alamitos; and the Central ^ Labor Councils of Alameda, Contra Costa, Stanislas, and Santa Clara Counties and the cities of Vallejo and Bakersfield. (SaH Francisco Chronicle, Mar. 24, 1937.) 53Farmer-Labor News, April 20, 1937; San Francisco Chronicle, April 26, 1937; Rural Worker, Vol. II, No. 5, May 1937 (p. 3). 54From Apathy to Action, Bulletin No. 39, April 3, 1937. 5«Idem, Bulletin No. 41, May 4, 1937, 148 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE waterfront workers have to interfere with the harvesting of farm crops,” the official organ of the Associated Farmers commented, "goes beyond human understanding.” 56 A s regards the Bakersfield conference in April, farm employers observed that— * * * the apparent intention was to create a situation under which agricultural workers would be affiliated with the Longshoremen’s union and be under the domina tion o f the dictatorial alien, Harry Bridges. (From Apathy to Action, Bulletin No. 41, April 20, 1933.) The Associated Farmers of California nevertheless was unwilling to accept organization of farm laborers at the hands of conservatives in the State Federation of Labor. Secretary Vandeleur, at a legislative com mittee hearing at Sacramento, expressed the view that farmers had either to consent to having their workers organized by the orthodox A .F . of L., or they would be unionized by the C.I.O . with the backing of Communists. The Associated Farmers dismissed this argument with the reply that "the A .F . of L. has not been able to keep Communists out of its older unions, and so it cannot guarantee that they would be barred from any farm-labor union.” 57 The rift between unions within the State Federation of Labor was widening. The National Committee to A id Agricultural W orkers (fo r merly the National Committee for Unity of Agricultural W ork ers), backed by the executive of the C.I.O., was making preparations to hold a nation wide conference of local unions in order to establish a separate interna tional organization of agricultural field and processing workers. The conflict within the California State Federation o f Labor helped to speed events. George W oolf, president of the temporary Cannery and A gricul tural Federation of California established at the Bakersfield conference, came out flatly in favor of an international chartered by the C .I.O . H e claimed the complete backing of the maritime unions of the Pacific Coast, which at that time were voting to affiliate with the C .I.O .58 Labor unionism in agriculture and allied industries of California seemed by late 1936 to hold promise of achieving a degree of strength and stability it had not hitherto attained. It had survived several serious strike defeats during 1936, and labor organizers were taking steps to unify all local unions on an integrated State-wide scale. Unlike the C.& A .W .I.U . during the early thirties, the A .F . of L. was organizing the bet ter-paid and more regularly employed processing workers as well as field laborers. These groups, moreover, enjoyed the support of far more pow erful urban labor unions than had the C .& .A .W .I.U . This support, however, had its negative aspects, from the point of view of farm-labor unionism. Leading urban industrial labor organizations drew agricultural workers into their jurisdictional disputes. Farm-labor unionism in California was disrupted within a few years when it became part of the general conflict between the American Federation of Labor and the Committee for Industrial Organization. 56From Apathy to Action, Bulletin No. 33, January S, 1937. 57Idem, Bulletin No. 40, April 13, 1937. 58Rural Worker, Vol. II, No. 6, July 1937 (p. 3). Ch apter X I.— Inter-Union Conflict Conflict between the two most powerful groups within the California State Federation of Labor came to a head in m id-1937. Unions in the Maritime Federation of the Pacific under Harry Bridges competed with affiliates of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters for control over industrial establishments that were dependent upon transportation by highway or waterway— warehouses, packing plants and canneries par ticularly. The executive council of the American Federation of Labor attempted to settle the dispute by handing jurisdiction over inland ware houses (which were presumed to be more immediately dependent upon highway transportation) to the teamsters.1 The Maritime Federation seceded from the American Federation of Labor to join the Committee for Industrial Organization in 1937. Jurisdictional disputes between the two m ajor transport unions then increased to major proportions. The conflict became general in the field of agriculture and allied industries, when the C.I.O . chartered a new international, the United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and Allied W orkers of America (U .C .A .P .A .W .A .). The organizing campaign among field laborers during 1937 was inci dental to that carried out in processing industries related to agriculture. Unions won m ajor gains in the wineries, dairies and creameries, vege table-, fruit-, and nut-packing plants, and canneries of California. A gri cultural employers considered these new unionizing drives as a prelude to an extensive union campaign among seasonal field laborers on farms. E. P. Loescher, leader of the State-wide agricultural committee of the California State Chamber of Commerce, summarized his views as follow s: As I see it, the big question in 1938 faced by farmers regarding organization o f field workers is not what will take place in the field, but rather what degree o f pressure will be brought from the unions in related industries. There is every indication that the new C.I.O. leaders are going to attempt to extend their contracts to include all growers o f vegetables and if possible the growers o f citrus and walnuts and other crops. (Stockton Record, November 4, 1937.) The American Federation o f Labor, 1937-38 The Canning Industry Inter-union conflict in agriculture and allied industries o f California was concentrated in fruit and vegetable canning during 1937 and 1938. The largest and most violent strike of the year and, subsequently, the most important organization gains for unions, were experienced in this industry. A m ajor weakness of the campaign o f the Cannery and Agricultural W orkers Industrial Union (C .& A .W .I.U .) during 1933 and 1934 had been its failure to organize the cannery workers. Communist labor organizers and their supporters began to pay more attention to this occupational group in 1935 and 1936, after the policy of dual unionism had been abandoned in favor of cooperation with the A .F . of L. In several of the larger northern and central California towns locals were 1Report, NLRB Case No. XX-C-362-377 (pp. 72-86). 149 150 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE organized and given charters from the A .F . of L. as federal labor unions and were then affiliated to nearby central labor councils. The first cannery workers’ locals were organized in metropolitan San Francisco and Oakland, where the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen’s Union was expanding rapidly and growing in power following the general strike of 1934. In July 1935, 150 cannery employees at plants of the Santa Cruz Packing Co. and the California Packing Corp. joined in a sympathy strike with organized warehousemen who had been locked out.2 A t about the same time some 350 workers belonging to the newly organized Dried Fruit and Nut Packers Federal Labor Union No. 20020 were involved in a 3-week strike in Oakland. Cannery W orkers Union No. 20099 was formed in Alameda County during the fall of 1935 by Marcella Ryan, who had credentials from the Machinists Union, and was able to enlist the financial support of the Alameda Central Labor Coun- ciL3 Union activity among canneries in the Bay area gained greater momentum during the fall of 1936, as the State Federation of Labor began to take a more direct interest in the industry. A joint organizing campaign was conducted during November by Local N o. 20099 and the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen’s U nion among em ployees of the Filice & Perelli Co. in Richmond. A 3-week walk-out began when several union members were discharged, and lasted until the company agreed to rehire them. The union later charged the com pany with failing to live up to its agreement and attempting to promote a company union among its employees.4 A more serious strike over the issue of union recognition for Local N o. 20099 occurred in the Heinz Co. plant at Emeryville (Alam eda County) during January, February, and March, 1937. W ith the cooperation of the Alameda Central Labor Council and local unions of teamsters and warehousemen, the Cannery W orkers Union was success ful in forcing the company to negotiate. The Central Labor Council of Alameda put the company on the “ W e D on’t Patronize” list, and its two warehouses were closed by sympathetic-strike action on the part of team sters and warehousemen. The strike was continued and the cannery closed for almost 2 months while negotiations remained at a stalemate. Both sides sought allies in order to improve their position for collective bargaining. The Heinz Co. empowered the Canners’ League, an organization composed of all can ning companies in the district, to handle its labor relations. Cannery W orkers Union N o. 20099 and Warehousemen’s Union Local N o. 3844 meanwhile established a joint organizing committee to conduct a union izing drive among workers in all East Bay canneries. The Warehouse men’s Union cooperated with the Cannery W orkers U nion in preparing contracts to be submitted to the management in negotiations.6 The California Conserving Co. of Hayward (Alam eda County) was the first cannery to be organized in the new drive. This company used 2Report, NLRB Case No. XX-C-362-367 (p. 2686). Subsequently, the National Labor Relations Board ordered the Santa Cruz Co. of Oakland to cease discouraging its employees from joining unions, and to reinstate with pay some 31 work ers who were discharged for joining Local 3844 of the International Longshoremen and W are housemen’ s Union. (Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 10, May 1936, p. 4.) ^Report NLRB Case No. XX-C-362-377 (p. 2690). 4Idem (pp. 293 and 3786). ®Idem (p. 2704); Rural Worker, Vol. II, No. 3, March 1937. CReport, NLRB Case No. XX-C-362-377 (p. 2709); Rural Worker, Vol. II, No. 4, April 1937. CH. XI.---INTER-UNION CONFLICT 151 anti-union tactics similar to those used by Filice & Perelli and the Heinz Co.— discriminatory discharge, adverse publicity, and fostering of com pany unions. In retaliation, picket lines were placed around four plants and the company was put on the “ W e D on’t Patronize” list of the A .F . of L .7 A committee of union members met with the attorney for the Califor nia Processors and Growers, a newly established organization of can nery operators, to negotiate the terms of settlement, and the strikes were finally ended with an agreement stating that all strikers would be rein stated without discrimination. The most notable conflict during 1937 involved cannery workers in Stockton during April. In the course of an 8-day strike more than 60 participants were injured in battles in which tear gas, axe handles, shot guns, and rocks were used.8 Conflict between the left-wing farm and cannery labor organizers and the executive board of the California State Federation of Labor came to a head during the settlement of the strike. Agricultural W orkers Union No. 20221 in March 1937 had been granted financial aid and personnel from the San Joaquin County Cen tral Labor Council to organize cannery workers in Stockton.9 The Stockton local International longshoremen and warehousemen’s union gave sympathetic strike support by refusing to move “ hot cans.” 1 0 The strike began in one plant over the familiar issue of discriminatory dis charge of union members. It spread rapidly and soon included several hundred employees of the four major canning companies in the city: Stockton Food Products, Packwell, M or Pack, and Richmond-Chase. Agricultural W orkers Union N o. 20221 formulated the following sched ule of demands, which included substantial wage increases and recog nition as sole bargaining agency: (1 ) 62Y* cents per hour for men, and 50 cents per hour for women; (2 ) 70 cents per hour for skilled workers; (3 ) 8-hour day and 6-day week; (4 ) Tim e and a h a lf fo r Sunday and holiday w o rk ; (5 ) Agricultural W orkers Union No. 20221 as sole bargaining agency. W hen some 1,200 special deputies recruited by and from the ranks of the Associated Farmers attacked the picket lines with gunfire, the union threatened to call out the field workers on a sympathetic strike.10 The State Federation of Labor helped to finance a joint strategy com mittee which the Central Labor Council of San Joaquin County and the Federated Trades Council of Sacramento together had established to carry on negotiations for settling the strike. The canning companies refused to accept Agricultural W orkers Union No. 20221 as bargaining agent, on the ground that it did not represent the cannery workers. The joint strategy committee consequently ordered the strikers to return to work pending negotiations. A new cannery workers union which ex cluded field laborers was organized at a mass meeting of strikers on ^Report, NLRB Case No. XX-C-362-377 (pp. 2704, 2716-2718, 3212). 8Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 50 (pp. 18242-18319). ©it had applied for jurisdiction over the cannery workers, and proceeded to organize them with the understanding that when the State Federation program for State-wide organization of cannery workers was under way, Local No. 20221 would have to surrender them. (Report, NLRB Case No. XX-C-362-377, p. 237.) . , , t t 0 . . . Previously, instructions had been issued to central labor councils by the State federation that no more charters were to be issued to agricultural or cannery workers* unions until the plan for a State-wide organization had been completed. Thus when Local No. 20221 applied to the San Joaquin Central Labor Council for a cannery workers* charter, it was refused. How ever, a resolution asking for authorization to organize cannery workers under the .existing local charter was approved. (Idem, pp. 330-332.) lOReport, NLRB Case No. XX-C-362-377 (pp. 336-337). 54107 ®— 46—11 152 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE April 25, and its newly issued charter as Federal Labor Union Local N o. 20676 granted it jurisdiction over canneries in San Joaquin County.1 1 A settlement was reached at a conference called by Governor Merriam on the following day, April 2 6 ; Cannery W orkers Union Local No. 20676 was recognized as bargaining agent, and all details regarding wages, hours, and working conditions were deferred for later negotia tions.12 Secretary Vandeleur proposed a “ master contract” to the em ployers’ representatives, on the basis of which the State Federation of Labor would represent cannery workers in collective-bargaining rela tions.13 H e justified the State federation’s assumption of powers on the ground that the strike had involved illegal and unrecognized action on the part of Agricultural W orkers Union Local N o. 2022L Vandeleur asserted that the trouble had begun when the Central Labor Council granted unwarranted control over the organizing of cannery workers to the Stockton farm workers’ local. He charged that the subsequent actions of those workers did not constitute a legally recognized strike, because “ outside Delta agricultural workers” had placed a picket line around a cannery and closed it in order to force its employees into the union. H e concluded that the State federation was justified in repre senting the cannery workers in collective-bargaining negotiations until such time as a new and separate union had been organized and chartered for them.13 The Stockton cannery strike served as a test case, a turning point in the California State federation’s entire organization program in agri culture and allied industries. The victory of the conservative executive, under Vandeleur, over the left-wing faction supported by the Inter national Longshoremen and Warehousemen’s Union started a whole sale purge of all cannery unions and central labor councils suspected of being pro-C .LO . or radical in sympathy. W illiam Green, president of the A .F . of L., granted Edward Vandeleur the direct power to oust any established local leadership, to revoke existing cannery-union charters, and to issue new charters in their stead.14 Oakland Local N o. 20099 came to an end in June 1937. Its charter was revoked on the grounds that it was not paying its dues, that its leadership was communistic, and that it was planning to join the C .I.O .15 In its place were chartered Cannery W orkers Unions N o. 20843 for South Alameda and N o. 20905 for North Alameda. Cannery W orkers Union No. 20324 of Sacramento was similarly reorganized during the early summer of 1937. Like the other locals, it had been organized originally with the assistance of the Longshoremen and Warehousemen’s Union. In June 1937, it conducted a strike against the California Packing Corp., a move which the Federated Trades Coun cil had refused to sanction. The State federation executive under Secre tary Vandeleur forced the union officers to resign on the charge of being 11Report, NLRB Case No. XX-C-362-377 (pp. 7279, 7301, 8852). 12Farmer-Labor News, Vol. 14, No. 60, April 30, 1937. 13Report, NLRB Case No. XX-C-362-377 (pp. 8846-8860, 11034). 14Idem (pp. 10749-10814). 15In more detail, Mr. Vandeleur charged that Local No. 20099 refused to comply with the laws of the Alameda County Central Labor Council and the State federation, that it was not paying its dues to these bodies, and that it was preparing to join the C.I.O. He alleged that the officers controlling the union were not themselves cannery workers, but were “ radicals” under the domination of Harry Bridges, president of the Maritime Federation of the Pacific, and George Woolf, allegedly Communist organizer of the Alaska Fish Cannery Workers Union. (Report, NLRB Case No. XX-C-362-377, pp. 10749-10814.) CH. XI.---INTER-UNION CONFLICT 153 ^communistic,” and threatened to revoke the union’s charter if they irefused. The union elected new officers, and Federated Trades Coun cil officials appointed by the State federation negotiated a settlement of the strike with the cannery employers. The agreement they reached was (Submitted to the cannery-union membership, which voted to ratify it.16 Another important cannery workers’ union, Local N o. 20325 of Santa Clara County, underwent a change in control during this period. T h e Central Labor Council protested to A .F . of L. President W illiam Green that the executive of the State federation had arbitrarily issued a new charter, N o. 20852, without previous notice and without preferring charges against the officers of the existing organization.17 The members o f Local No. 20325 were later transferred to the Dried Fruit and Nut [Packers Union Local No. 20184, and voted to affiliate with the newly organized U .C .A .P .A .W .A . (C .I.O .). The organizing board of the Central Labor Council filed charges with the regional office of the Na tional Labor Relations Board against several cannery employers of the county on the ground that they were forcing workers into Local No. 20852, newly chartered by the State federation. This latter, the council claimed, “ functions more in the nature of a dues-collecting agency than as a trade-union.” 18 The State federation soon extended its control over the entire can ning industry of northern California. The unionizing drive was accel erated in A p r il; 18 organizers were placed in the field and they brought an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 cannery workers into the A .F . of L. within a few months. The Teamsters Union supported the drive by Organizing several thousand truck drivers handling fruit going from fields to canneries and from canneries to ships and railways.19 The negotiations begun in settling the Stockton strike were broad ened. The State federation executive bargained on an industry-wide basis with the California Processors and Growers, representing a score o f the larger canneries. Finally, in July 1937, a blanket agreement was drawn up in contract form and signed by both parties. It granted closed shops and recognition as sole bargaining agency to 10 cannery unions, most of them newly organized and chartered, having jurisdiction over several counties: N o. No. N o. N o. N o. 20905 20794 20852 20676 21104 of of of of of North Alameda Contra Costa Santa Clara San Joaquin Yuba-Sutter No. 20843 o f South Alameda No. 20889 o f Fresno and Kingsburg No. 20592 o f Stanislaus No. 20324 o f Sacramento No. 20823 o f Rio Vista T h e number of cannery unions included under the master agreement had increased to 21 within a year and covered an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 workers.20 A State Council of Agricultural and Cannery W orkers, with Charles Real of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters as president, was established during the annual convention of the State Federation of Labor at L ong Beach in September 1937. The State council at a meeting in Los Angeles on December 13, 1937, then instituted a tentative Na tional Council of Agricultural and Cannery W orkers as a counterbalance leReport, NLRB Case No. XX-C-362-377 (pp. 5738, 5759-5764, 5780). 17Rural Worker, Vol. II, No. 7, July 1937. 18Progress Report, Subcommittee of the organizing board, Central Labor Council of Santa Clara County, San Jose, September 20, 1937 (p. 1). 154 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE to the C .I.O .’s new United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and Allied W orkers of America, or U .C .A .P .A .W .A .2 1 The methods by which the State federation extended its control in order to exclude the C.I.O . had raised criticism in many quarters, includ ing affiliates of the A .F . of L. itself. Cannery employers, as represented by the California Processors and Growers and other organizations, had indicated a decided preference for dealing with the conservative union bloc led by Vandeleur and the teamsters. This preference became more pronounced when the left-wing group, led by organized longshoremen and warehousemen under Harry Bridges, seceded from the federation to join the C.I.O. and at the same time organized the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . Accusations of “ selling out” and “ promoting company unions” were directed against the State federation from many sides. The FarmerLabor News, organ of the Central Labor Council of San Joaquin County, had suggested that there were “ irregularities” in the settlement of the Stockton strike.22 A n editorial entitled “ Company Unions— 1937 Style,” voiced these charges: The employers have taken full advantage of the A.F. o f L .-C .I.O . rivalry that exists in the labor movement They have appealed to the A.F. o f L. leaders who, frightened by the spread o f C.I.O. influence, became panic-stricken and have aided and abetted the extension o f employer domination in A.F. o f L. unions. Charters o f unions organized by central labor bodies have been revoked and given over to unions that are obviously controlled by employers. (Farmer-Labor News, Vol. X V , No. 10, July 2, 1937, p. 3.) Similar sentiments were expressed by bodies such as the Alameda Industrial Union Council (which represented unions suspended from the Central Labor Council by the State federation) and the Central Labor Council of Santa Clara County which had protested to W illiam Green against the issuance of a new cannery-union charter without prior consultation.23 The members of the new Santa Clara cannery union later refused to approve the uniform wage and hour provisions established in the State federation’s blanket agreement with the California Proces sors and Growers.24 The president of Sacramento Local N o. 20324 filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board, claiming that cannery operators were using coercion and interfering with elections.25 In Alameda County, special resentment was aroused during a series of strikes in the summer of 1937, when the Teamsters Union refused to recognize picket lines established by a C.I.O . cannery workers union around the Filice & Perelli plant at Richmond. Rowland W atson, an A .F . of L. organizer at the time, later testified before the N L R B that the State federation took over and chartered several company unions (in the form of employee associations) in plants of Filice & Perelli and other companies. A former member of Local N o. 20099 employed in the Heinz plant at Emeryville asserted that the company had helped organize the newly chartered A .F . of L. Union N o. 20905 and had circulated a petition among the employees urging them to withdraw from the old union and join the new one.26 The new C.I.O. organization, U .C .A .P .A .W A ., finally filed formal charges with the National Labor Relations Board against canneries rep21 Report, NLRB Case No. XX-C-362-377 (pp. 2404-2408). 22Farmer-Labor News, Vol. X V , No. 8, June 18, 1937 (p. 8). 23Idem, No. 11, July 9, 1937 (p. 3). 24Rural Worker, Vol. II, No. 7, July 1937 (p. 1). 25Farmer-Labor News, Vol. X V , No. 9, June 25, 1937 (p. 5). 26Report, NLRB Case No, XX-C-362-377 (pp. 2966, 9949), CH. XI.---INTER-UNION CONFLICT 155 resented by the California Processors and Growers. The chief allega tion was that the organized cannery employers’ master agreement with the State Federation of Labor and the methods by which the agreement was enforced constituted “ company unionism” in violation of the W ag ner Act. After more than a year of investigation and testimony at official hearings of the N L R B , the record was set aside and no judgment was rendered. This in itself would seem to justify the State federation’s assertion that its cannery workers’ organizations were bona-fide labor unions.27 The State federation’s National Council of Agricultural and Can nery W orkers meanwhile was negotiating with the California Proces sors and Growers for a new contract to cover the more than 60,000 northern and central California fruit and vegetable cannery employees. The union announced early in February 1938 that it would seek a 20percent wage increase and an 8-hour day, with time and a half for over time up to 10 hours and double time thereafter.28 N o such gains were won, however, and the contract of the previous year was renewed. Secre tary Vandeleur claimed that “ harassing tactics” by the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . and the National Labor Relations Board, which began its investigations in April, had weakened the bargaining power of the cannery unions.29 The Dairy Industry N ext to fruit and vegetable canning, the most impressive organiza tion gains by the A .F . of L. in the field of agriculture and allied indus tries were made among dairies and creameries. The Brotherhood of Teamsters played a crucial role, becoming involved again in a threesided conflict with the C.I.O. and the Associated Farmers of California. The union campaign centered in the rural areas near San Francisco and Los Angeles, when the dairy industry was concentrated to a degree not found in other sections of the United States. Dairying, more than any other type of farming, had highly urbanized business relations. Because its product was very perishable, the various stages of produc ing, transporting, distributing, processing, and retailing were intimately related, and the industry was extremely dependent upon truck trans portation. Dairy farms in the San Francisco and Los Angeles areas, moreover, had become specialized, large-scale, and industrialized,30 with a factory pattern of labor relations that left them peculiarly vulnerable to 27Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 60 (p. 22059). 28The existing agreement, drawn up in 1937, provided for a base pay rate of 52$4 cents per hour for men, 42J4 cents per hour for women, and an 8-hour day. (San Jose Mercury Herald, Feb. 3, 1938.) 29Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 60 (p. 22059). 3°Idem, Part 58 (pp. 21336-21338). Arthur W . Stuart, economist on the La Follette Committee, stated: #„ “ The production of milk for the Los Angeles County market shows a degree of specialization, intensity of operation, and large-scale operation found in no other area in the United States. * * * Very little feed is raised on dairy farms in Los Angeles County. Hay and concentrated feeds are purchased by dairy farmers and fed to mature stock which are raised in other counties and States and shipped into Los Angeles after they have reached maturity. * * * Milk Products Industries, Inc., a distributors* organization, has cited census data to indicate that Los Angeles County had the highest volume of milk production of any county in the United States in 1934. * * * Dairy farms in Los Angeles County are larger, in terms of income received, than is the rule in other sections of the country. In 1929, according to the Census, 504 dairy farms, or three-fifths of dairy, farms in the county, received incomes of $10,000 or over. * * * The average size of commercial dairy herds in Los Angeles County is larger than in other milksheds of which I have knowledge, with the exception of San Francisco. In San Francisco, less than 200 farms supply all of the city’s fluid-milk requirements. * * * However, Los Angeles displays a con siderably higher degree of concentration of cows on large dairies than is the case in San Fran cisco.” 156 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE unionization. Also, in contrast to most types of farming for cash pro duce, employment was relatively stable and nonseasonal. Extensive organization among dairy farm workers in the two major California milksheds is recent, dating only from early 1934. Labor relations in the industry had become more casual during the period of severe unemployment in the early 1930’s. Dairy hands were recruited largely through private employment agencies in the “ skid row ” sections of Los Angeles. W orkers suffered from job insecurity and the employ ers’ power of arbitrary dismissal; they ordinarily worked 11 hours a day, with no days off. Dairy workers organized primarily in order to win holidays, and union hiring halls in place of private fee-charging agencies.31 The first dairy workers’ local was established in the Los Angeles milkshed area early in 1934 by organizers of the Trade Union Unity League. Several small strikes for union recognition and wage and hour improvements were called by this organization. Dairy-farm proprietors complained about the spread of labor agitation from field crops to dairies. The California Cultivator of January 20, 1934, stated that “ investigation has proved that behind the movement, which is supposed to be for recog nition of an unknown union not recognized by the A .F . of L., is a group of well-known Communists and red agitators * * * some of whom were said to have been mixed up in the San Joaquin Valley cotton strike last fall.” It also stated that many of the larger dairies were reported to be operating with nonunion milkers under armed guard, while smaller ones were compelled to submit to the terms of the strikers. The center of union activity during the next few years shifted to counties in the San Francisco milkshed where the Brotherhood of Teamsters was most strongly organized. Unionization of dairy workers in this area was more thorough. By the end of 1939 more than fourfifths of the workers in the dairy farms supplying San Francisco were reported to be members of a local of the Brotherhood of Teamsters, which included milk-wagon drivers and milk-plant employees as well as dairy-farm workers in its membership.32 A series of strikes occurred during 1936 mainly over the issue of union recognition. A 2-month walk-out from April to June won sub stantial gains for 40 members of the dairy workers’ branch of the Brother hood of Teamsters in Marin County. A comprehensive agreement be tween the Dairy and Creamery Employees Union and the larger milk companies in June granted a minimum wage of $65 per month with board and 2 holidays per month. It provided also for an “ adjustment board” composed of two union members and two employers’ representa tives empowered to settle all differences.33 Later disputes involving some 950 dairy workers in Alameda and 22 in Contra Costa Counties won for the union compromise gains in wage increases and recognition.34 The Marin County milkshed, supplying San Francisco and the East Bay area, by early 1937 had become well organized in the Milkers Union of the A .F . of L. The union won agreements from dairymen entailing provision for preferential hiring. The Teamsters Union, which included milk-wagon drivers and creamery employees, used the tactic of the secondary boycott and made rapid organization gains among dairy-farm 31 Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 58 (pp. 21457-21459). 32Idem (p. 21339). 33Rural W orker, Vol. I, No. 2, July 1936 (p. 4) 34Josiah C. Folsom: Labor Disputes in Agriculture, 1927-38. CH. XI.---INTER-UNION CONFLICT 157 hands. In some instances the Teamsters declared milk from certain dairies "h ot,” in order to force their employees into the union. Injunc tion proceedings were undertaken by some milk producers; farm em ployers hoped thus to establish important principles relating to restraint of trade which, if successful, could be applied to other agricultural indus tries as well.35 The "h ot cargo” issue was given considerable publicity in a small strike in Santa Clara County during 1938. By that year some 700 mem bers of the Milkers' Union, affiliated to the A .F . of L. Teamsters, had formulated proposed agreements with employers establishing a wage of $90 per month plus room and board, 2 days off per month, and a union shop. These agreements were to cover dairies in the counties serv ing metropolitan San Francisco and Oakland— i.e., Santa Clara, San Joaquin, San Mateo, Marin, Alameda, San Francisco, and Sonoma.36 Three dairy-farm proprietors in Santa Clara County refused to meet the union conditions or even to discuss the matter with union rep resentatives. Eleven union milkers on the three farms were then called out on strike. Milk from the dairies was declared "h ot” by the Team sters and other A .F . of L. affiliates, and San Francisco distributors refused to handle it. In response to this move, the employers diverted the "hot milk” from the fresh-milk market to a cheese factory to sell it at half price.37 The union followed the "hot milk” to the cheese company and threatened a union boycott of that firm and any others that accepted the milk.38 Both disputants enlisted immediate support from their respective organized groups. E. Moorehead, president of the Santa Clara Central Labor Council, endorsed the stand of the union, while the executive committee of the Associated Farmers met in San Francisco and voted resolutions pledging full backing to their Santa Clara dairy-farmer members.39 L. Edwards, president of the Santa Clara County unit of the Associated Farmers, upheld the employers' assertion that the Teamsters Union did not have the right to act as spokesman for the milkers. H e expressed particular opposition to a closed shop on dairy farms or other agricultural enterprises. Indeed, he threatened to call the attention of the Humane Society of Santa Clara to the fact that cows were going unmilked because of the strike.40 The milkers’ representatives in the Dairy and Creamery Employees Union, on the other hand, denied that they were seeking a closed shop or union hiring hall. They were requiring merely a provision that any one hired apply to the union for membership within 2 weeks. The union justified its demands on the ground that it was merely asking the struck dairy owners to grant the same wages, hours, and working conditions provided by other dairies in the Bay region, since all were in direct com petition for the metropolitan milk markets.40 Labor-employer conflict in the dairy industry became more widely publicized and vitriolic when the Teamsters Union extended its organiz ing campaign to the Los Angeles milkshed. The union had not organ ized the transportation industry in this area to the same degree as in San Francisco. Throughout its campaign of 1937 and 1938, in Los 3SStockton Record, November 4, 1937. 36San Francisco News, May 28, 1938. 37San Francisco Examiner, March 26, 1938. 38San Jose Mercury Herald, March 26, 1938. 39San Francisco Examiner, March 26, 1938. 40San Jose Mercury Herald, March 25, 1938. 158 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE Angeles, it faced the organized hostility of the Associated Farmers of California, allied with powerful open-shop associations. A second obsta cle was encountered in jurisdictional disputes with a local C .I.O . union of dairy workers. Left-wing unionists organized an independent Milkers Recreation Club in 1936, after the Trade Union Unity League was dissolved. Later, under the name of the Dairy W orkers Union, it won several signed union-shop agreements with dairy farms in Los Angeles County.4 1 A s a separate farm workers’ organization, it faced obvious limitations in collective bargaining, in an industry in which the relationships among producing, processing, and selling were very close and very de pendent upon truck transportation. Consequently, the union turned to the C.I.O . early in 1937, before the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . was formed, and became affiliated as Local No. 49, having about 1,000 members. The C .I.O . meanwhile had been active in organizing milkers, dairy drivers, and creamery operators.42 Local N o. 49, though still in existence by 1940, had lost consider able ground when the A .F . of L. Teamsters Union launched its new organizational campaign. Occasionally minor conflict broke out between the two organizations. Early in November 1937 the regional director of the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . (C .I.O .) met with organizers of the dairy workers to plan an increase in the number of union contracts signed with Los Angeles milkshed dairies. He threatened a “ milk holiday” in protest against “ A .F . of L. goon-squad tactics used against us in the dairy industry.” 43 The Teamsters Union had an advantage in organizing dairy-farm workers, as it was able to exert pressure through the distributing and processing stages of the industry, in which the truck drivers were highly organized. Through this control it could force contracts upon dairyfarm producers by declaring their milk “ hot” and thus cutting off access to urban markets.44 The larger producers in the milk industry adopted a protective anti union position as a result of a vigorous campaign by the open-shop Merchant and Manufacturers Association. Dairy Industries Limited was organized by dairy employers in October 1936, for the purpose of handling labor relations collectively. In its constitution was a clause prohibiting a member from entering into any oral or written agreement with any labor organization without prior notice to the corporation.45 Milk producers belonging to Dairy Industries Limited became more conciliatory toward the A .F . of L. Teamsters after the C.I.O . dairy workers’ local called a series of strikes in the Hynes area. Contracts were signed in August 1937 with Teamsters Local No. 93 of the Milk 41 Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 58 (p. 21460). 42Idem (p. 21457). 43Los Angeles Examiner, November 2, 1937. 44Joe Casey, western representative of the A.F. of L., justified this organizational drive, on the grounds of precedent, as follows: “ There is one particular industry in which we always went inside of the factory, and that was in the dairy industry—the milk industry. When we organized the drivers years ago, the milk driver was everything. He was generally a small farmer who maintained a few cows, milked those cows, and took the milk then and distributed it himself. The whole operation was handled more or less by a handful of people around a small dairy farm. At that time we organ ized those people and we also had jurisdiction reaching right into the actual milker.^ Of course the dairy end of it has become highly specialized now, but we have never lost our jurisdiction. W e have always maintained and always attempted to organize everything connected with the milk industry inside the plant as far as pasteurization, bottling and cleaning up things—as far as things of that sort are concerned—right down to the milking of the cows.” (Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 58, p. 21363.) 45Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 58 (p. 21342). CH. XI.---INTER-UNION CONFLICT 159 Drivers Union. By the end of the year about 45 percent of the milk production and at least 75 percent of the distribution in Los Angeles County were unionized.46 Attempts to sign up independent distributors and producers caused some conflict. Milk-wagon drivers went on strike against 14 major dairy employers in Ventura County who refused to deal with "a union and picket line which does not represent our employees.,, Though many organized milkers failed to participate in sympathy with the drivers, the walk-out spread to Los Angeles and Santa Barbara Counties before it was settled. The contractual arrangement between dairy union and employers’ association was unstable and temporary at best. Dairy Industries Limited was disbanded shortly after the agreements were signed. A new organization, Milk Products Industries Incorporated, was established to cooperate more closely with urban anti-union organizations. A report of the Associated Farmers of Los Angeles County, dated December 1, 1937, summarized the labor situation as follow s: These contracts expire on February 1, 1938, and indications point to serious troubles if closed shop is demanded. This struggle will center in a battle between the C.I.O. and the milkers’ division of the Teamsters Union for control o f pro duction during 1938, with the dairies o f nearly every southern California county involved. Steps are being taken for coordinated action against all unionization of milk production. (Hearings o f La Follette Committee, Part 58, p. 21365.) Branches of the Associated Farmers in the five southern counties in the Los Angeles milkshed— Ventura, Orange, Los Angeles, San Bernardino, and San Diego— held a series of meetings, and a “ dairy committee” was established for the entire area. Its official position was that the dairy farmer came before the distributing group, and it would not approve any contract which would stop “ hot” milk at the distribu tors’ platforms.48 The Associated Farmers upheld the opposition of the Milk Products Industries Incorporated to the closed-shop clause proposed by the union in February 1938. A letter from the secretary of the Associated Farmers to the Milk Products Industries Incorporated, on February 22, 1938, expressed these sentiments: The Associated Farmers o f Orange County through their dairy division wish to commend your attitude in taking a definite stand against the closed-shop practice in the milk industry. W e are asking you to continue on this basis, and want to assure you that you will have our complete support in your program as long as you insist upon keeping control o f your own business. (Hearings o f La Follette Committee, Part 58, p. 21395.) Other open-shop organizations of Los Angeles, such as the Neutral Thousands and the W om en of the Pacific, stiffened the dairy employers’ opposition to union demands. Mrs: Bessie Ochs of the former organi zation discussed the issues in a special radio broadcast: 46Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 58 (p. 21365). 47 Los Angeles Examiner, October 19, 1937. 48Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 58 (p. 21366). A. E. Clark, field secretary for the Associated Farmers of Los Angeles County, explained the opposition to unions as owing primarily to the current C.I.O.-A.F.L. conflict. In his own words, “ there was a serious prospect of jurisdictional dispute between the C.I.O. and the A.F; of L. during the organization of the milk business here, and as soon as the teamsters’ organization entered into the contracts with the distributors in town, those distributors who had those contracts were fearful that^ on their farms, if the C.I.O. should get a foothold, they would be subjected to very serious situations, and rather welcomed the opportunity of having the same union involved in both cases.” (Idem, p. 21379.) 160 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE Not men seizing an opportunity to rob and kill, but men sitting in comfortable city offices who calmly and deliberately plan to control the roads that are the prop erty o f the community. Any rogues who believe the roads are the vital link between dairy farm and home and as such plot to stop all milk trucks unless both producer and consumer pay them tribute are the greatest rogues o f all. Several times in the past 6 months these men have seemed ready to carry their plans into effect and then, frightened by the vigilance o f organizations such as the Neutral Thousands that are working for industrial peace, have decided to wait a little longer. But I tell you that, because the milk trucks roll unmolested between the orange groves and the fields o f lupin today, it is not because the plot has been abandoned. No, these plotters have only made strategic retreat. The instant they believe we have relaxed our vigilance, they will strike swiftly and suddenly. So we must not relax our watch for a second. For the sake o f our babies and children, we must keep eternal sentry duty, so that the milk trucks shall never cease rolling, so that the wild flowers growing along our highways shall not be desecrated by over turned trucks or splashed with spilled milk— or, perhaps, with blood o f the drivers. (Hearings o f La Follette Committee, Part 58, p. 21393.) Negotiations ended in a stalemate during 1938 as a result o f the organized opposition to union demands. A new contract granting an increase in wages was not reached until October, after the Teamsters Union had threatened the milk industry with a general strike. Milk Drivers Union No. 93, Brotherhood of Teamsters, and the Milk Prod ucts Industry Incorporated, finally signed an agreement in November 1939, granting a compromise union shop to 2,000 to 3,500 organized workers.49 M inor labor troubles continued as the Teamsters Union extended its organizing efforts to dairy employees in more outlying areas. Twenty organized milkers struck in June 1939 on the 1,000-acre Panorama Ranch dairy farm near Van Nuys (L os Angeles County), to enforce union demands for the standard $90 per month and board for milkers, as against the prevailing $75 to $80. Authorities feared that the Team sters Union might attempt a road blockade to prevent pick-up of the ranch’s milk. However, the strike was quickly settled.50 Produce Trucking The Teamsters’ success in unionizing dairy workers aroused a great deal of apprehension among farm employers. They felt that this was the entering wedge for an A .F . of L. campaign to organize agricultural workers in other fields. Joe Casey, western representative of the A .F . of L., denied, however, that the Teamsters intended to go beyond their usual jurisdiction, which he claimed to include by precedent milkers and helpers on dairy farms as well as truck drivers. A unionizing.campaign in the produce-trucking business provoked organized opposition from farmers. The Teamsters’ representatives denied allegations that they were attempting to force union conditions upon farmers, members of farmers’ families, or their farm hands who were hauling their own produce to and from markets. The union was con cerned only with farmers who entered the transportation business, hauling other people’s produce for a fee, in competition with trucking companies which had contracts with the union.52 It came into conflict 49Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 58 (p. 21415). 50Los Angeles Examiner, June 24, 1939. In mid-January, 1940, another strike at this ranch, involving the same 20 milkers, was settled in less than a week by the Teamsters* representative, Paul Jones. (Los Angeles Evening News, Jan. 20, 1940.) 51 Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 58 (p. 21362). 52Idem (p. 21362). CH. XI.---INTER-UNION CONFLICT 161 with the Associated Farmers despite the latter's preference for the A .F . o f L. Teamsters rather than the C .I.O . Longshoremen. In a press release dated October 19, 1937, the Associated Farmers explained its position to the Teamsters’ representatives: W e are informed o f the record o f the Teamsters Union and have knowledge of the fact that for more than 37 years you have endeavored to follow a conservative and constructive policy. W e are fully aware o f the magnitude o f your present fight against the C.I.O. and the notorious alien, Harry Bridges, and in that fight we are with you. However, we cannot admit that the Teamsters Union, or any other organization or individual, has a legal right to prevent the free movement o f transportation along our public highways or the delivery o f our goods to market. Y ou may enter into a contractual arrangement governing or controlling such transportation and delivery and the contract should be adhered to, but it must always be considered as an extralegal contract. * * * It would be economically impossible for the farmer in question to employ a union teamster all the year round and pay him union wages to operate a truck perhaps once a week on a casual trip to town for supplies. It would likewise be impractical to hire union teamsters to operate the other farmer-owned trucks during the brief season when the harvest is being reaped, and where the hauling would take only 2 or 3 hours during the day. In neither instance is the farmer interfering with the contractual arrangements that teamsters have been striving for years to complete with the ordinary industrial concerns. (Hearings o f La Follette Committee, Part 58, p. 21360.) A s opposition to the Teamsters’ drive strengthened, the Associated Farmers began to support nonfarm business firms which were wiling to fight the union. This was disclosed in the course o f a small but highly publicized strike against an independent firm, the Knudsen Truck & W arehouse Co. The Knudsen Co., as a member of the Orange Belt Draymen’s Association, had had contractual relations with the Teamsters for several years. The union drew up a new contract in 1938, calling for a wage increase from the prevailing 75 cents per hour to 87j^ cents. U pon the company’s refusal to sign, it was suspended from the Draymen’s A sso ciation and its union drivers were called out on strike.53 Knudsen, whose company hauled farm produce chiefly, was a mem ber of the Associated Farmers of San Bernardino County. This group came to his aid, obtaining business for his lines and giving him protec tion where he felt it was needed. Hugh Osborne, secretary-manager of the Associated Farmers of Imperial Valley, announced that his organi zation intended to make an issue of Knudsen’s case, and that ranchers in five southern counties had formed a committee to prevent a “ unionharassed farm-commodities truck operator” from being put out of busi ness. In Osborne’s words, “ Knudsen now is a symbol with us. W e find we have a government within our government. There is a great American principle at stake. W e are going to help him stay in busi ness.” 54 Knudsen continued to operate with nonunion drivers. A ccording to his own testimony, he was subjected to intimidation from the union and faced considerable losses. In one instance 30 growers accompanied a truckload of oranges, driven by nonunion men, to San P e d ro ; the convoy encountered difficulty when longshoremen of the I.L .W .U . (C .I.O .) refused to handle cargo brought onto the docks by strikebreakers.55 53Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 58 (p. 21478). 54Idem (p. 21484). Mldern (pp. 21481-21483, 21490). t62 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE Teamsters Local No. 898 was balked in its efforts to organize hay loaders, grocery drivers, and warehousemen in the Imperial Valley dur ing 1938 and 1939. In these attempts also the union faced organized opposition from the Associated Farmers, explained by Hugh Osborne thus: W e know this to be a fact, that the first move on the part o f the union is to unionize the wholesale groceries. Then they can say to the retail groceries, “ Come in line,” because they get their supplies from the wholesale grocers. * * * W e don’t propose to allow the closed shop to get in here, and increase the cost o f living in our community 10, 15, or 20 percent, and stand idly by to see that done.5 6 Miscellaneous Processing Industries The A .F . of L . made substantial gains in 1937 and the following years in many small processing industries related more or less distantly to agriculture. Federal labor union affiliates conducted a few small strikes in nurseries and greenhouses. Twenty-two members of an A .F . of L. local in Alameda County participated in an unsuccessful 10-day strike late in January 1937, over the issue of discriminatory discharge. One hundred union members in June carried out a 1-day strike that won partial union recognition and wage increases.57 Seventy-five mem bers of Federal Labor Union No. 20218 of Niles (Alameda County) struck in March 1937 against the California Flower Nurseries. Violence flared on March 12, 1937, when 75 pickets were reported to have been surrounded by deputies and highway patrol officers, attacked with clubs, and chased 2 miles.58 The most substantial union gains in this field were won in San Francisco. A n industry-wide collective-bargaining agree ment was negotiated and signed in June 1938 between six major whole sale flower-growing companies, represented by the Industrial Associa tion of San Francisco, and the Gardeners and Nursery W orkers Union of the A .F . of L. The contract, renewable in a year, provided for preferen tial hiring of union members, minimum wages ranging from 47 cents per hour for general laborers to 72 cents per hour for foremen, $25.50 to $39 by the week or $110.50 to $169.50 by the month, a 9-hour day, and 6-day week.59 Union jurisdiction over the wine industry of California was divided between affiliates of the A .F . of L. and C.I.O . The workers in almost all wineries in the San Francisco Bay region and two in the San Joaquin Valley, according to a survey by the California State Chamber of Com merce, were organized by the C.I.O. International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union. Most of those at Fresno and several in the Lodi district were organized by the newly established W inery W orkers Union of the A .F . of L .60 These unions were loosely organized and provided little security for their members in collective bargaining. Fed eral Labor Union No. 20574 of Lodi, for instance, in a verbal agreement with the companies, conceded that in event of rush work the winery could employ nonunion men freely. The growers were also protected against sympathetic action in event of strikes of field workers during 56Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 58 (pp. 21497-21509). 57Josiah C. Folsom: Labor Disputes in Agriculture, 1927-38. 58Los Angeles Evening News, March 13, 1937. 59San Francisco News, June 3, 1938. 60Stockton Record, November 4, 1937. CH. XI.—INTER-UNION CONFLICT 163 the harvest season; winery workers could walk out only if a general strike were called from the Washington headquarters of the A .F . of L .61 M inor conflict between the A .F . of L. and the C.I.O. unions occurred in other processing industries. Rival unions attempting to organize labor in almond-shelling plants were unable for some time to agree upon de mands. In the poultry industry, the unions made little or no progress among farms; but substantial organization gains, about equally divided between A .F . of L. and C.I.O., were achieved in northern California among feed handlers, chicken and turkey pickers, candlers, warehouse men, and teamsters. The only strikes reported in this industry were small, though long in duration. During November a strike of 50 turkey pickers in Stanislaus County resulted, after a month, in compromise wage increases. In Sacramento County during the same period, a strike by 80 members of the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . for jurisdictional control and recognition was won after almost a month.62 The greatest single vic tory in this industry came late in the year when Local No. 17 of the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . won a contract with the Runnymede enterprise in the vicinity of Resida (L os Angeles County), reported to be the world's largest poultry farm. The terms included recognition of the union as sole bargaining agent; wage increases of $1 per day for all employees; senority rights; a week of 40 hours for women and 48 hours for m e n ; time and a half for overtim e; and 1 week's vacation with pay.63 The most confusing jurisdictional overlapping and interunion con flict between A .F of L. and C.I.O. developed during 1937 in the lettuce packing industry of Salinas, which at that time was under investigation by the National Labor Relations Board for anti-union activities. Local No. 18211 of the A .F . of L. had lost heavily in membership because of its defeat in 1936 and, following this, an effective blacklist imposed by the employers.64 A new independent and unaffiliated Fruit and Vegetable W orkers Association was organized during the spring of 1937 to supplant Local No. 18211. Its spokesmen claimed that it represented “ 1,300 of the more conservative lettuce workers." A. J. Doss, president of Local N o. 18211, was critical of the new organization: “ They say they are just the conservative workers, but it's a company union. W e ’ve had re ports that Imperial Valley strikebreakers are helping to organize the new bun ch ."65 A union contract was drawn up in June, after more than a month's negotiations, between the new independent union and representatives of the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association. Included in the terms were wage scales of 65 cents per hour, time and a half for Sundays and holi days for truck drivers, a wage increase of 5 cents per hour for carrot packers, washers, and crate dumpers, and overtime pay after 8 p.m. an d /or 10 hours per day. The Berkeley Gazette in its issue of June 18, 1937, observed optimistically that “ the agreement ends a controversy which reached its height in the strike last year." The issues were far from settled, however. By November 1937, a survey by the agricultural committee of the State Chamber of Commerce reported four factions working at cross purposes: The new union, which 61Sacramento Bee, May 7, 1937. 62Josiah C. Folsom: Labor Disputes in Agriculture, 1927-38. 63Commonwealth Times (Santa Maria), Vol. II, No. 23, November 22, 1937; Stockton Record, November 4. 1937. 64Rura* Worker, Vol. II, No. 1, January 1937 (p. 5); NLRB Report of Cases 178 to 178ee. 65San Jose Mercury-Herald, May 17, 1937; San Francisco Chronicle, May 11, 1937. 164 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE had an agreement with the industry; a newly organized local of the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . (C .I.O .) ; a small group which wished to revive the old A .F . of L. Fruit and Vegetable W orkers Union No. 18211; and a large number of workers who wanted no affiliation with any union.66 Subsequently, the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . obtained local jurisdiction by win ning an election supervised by the National Labor Relations Board. The U.C.A.P.A.W.A. Drive During 1937-38 Processing Industries The newly organized C.I.O. international, the United Cannery, A gri cultural, Packing and Allied W orkers of America, or U .C .A .P .A .W .A ., won few major organizing gains in the processing industries of Cali fornia. Its efforts were frustrated by the A .F . of L .’s control over truck transportation and particularly by its closed-shop contract cover ing the important fruit and vegetable canning industry of northern Cali fornia. The C.I.O. organization’s main victories were won in fish can ning, where it had the strategic support of the allied International Lon g shoremen and Warehousemen’s Union. Early in November, despite alleged company support for the A .F . of L., the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . won jurisdiction over 600 fish-cannery workers in San Diego in a N L R B supervised election.67 There were more important achievements in the Alaska salmon-canning industry; a union contract was signed with the employers, granting wage increases, union recognition, and other con cessions for w o r k e r s h i r e d from San Francisco and Seattle. U .C .A .P .A .W .A . Locals Nos. 5 and 7 in these two cities became the “ anchors” for the international union on the Pacific Coast. Later other locals were organized in cotton compresses and gins in Bakersfield, Madera, and other San Joaquin Valley towns. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . met reverses in other minor processing indus tries. Mushroom workers in one of its locals struck unsuccessfully against the Golden State Mushroom Co., in Redwood City, during December 1937. The strike was lost because of inadequate organization and in ternal discipline, which led to disorder and costly court action. Three strikers were arrested and subsequently convicted by the San Mateo Superior Court on charges of rioting; they had boarded a truck loaded with “ hot” mushrooms and dumped them over the side.68 The U .C .A .P .A .W .A .’s efforts to unionize the walnut industry of southern California led to one of the numerous test cases before the National Labor Relations Board. Six workers at the plant of the Cali fornia Walnut Growers Association in the fall of 1937 lodged a com plaint with the N L R B that they had been locked out for refusing to join a company-sponsored union. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . previously had filed a charge with the Board to the effect that the Walnut Growers’ Employees Association was a company union in violation of the W agner A ct.69 The Walnut Growers Association, claiming to be an “ agricul tural” enterprise, unsuccessfully challenged the N L R B ’s jurisdiction over its employees.70 66Stockton Record, November 4, 1937. « 7CIO News, Vol. I, No. 48, November 5, 1938. 68San Francisco Examiner, April 21, 1938. 69Los Angeles Illustrated News, October 14, 1937. 70Los Angeles Examiner, November 25, 1937. CH. XI.---INTER-UNION CONFLICT 165 Unionization of Field Workers The A .F . of L .’s organization achievements and jurisdictional dis putes with the C.I.O. in the processing industries during 1937 and early 1938 overshadowed the union campaign among field workers. Unionizing field workers by themselves had long been considered a losing proposition. A self-sustaining union of agricultural laborers re quired in advance a strong base membership of more-skilled and betterpaid workers in allied processing industries, whose dues could subsidize a long organizing campaign in rural areas. The C.I.O. program for agricultural labor was checked when it lost control of the more important processing industries, particularly fruit and vegetable canning, to the A .F . of L. Financed by substantial advances of money from the central executive of the C.I.O ., as well as by donations from various sympathizers, the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . in Cali fornia and other States was able for a time to organize unskilled field laborers hitherto neglected by the more conservative A .F . of L . It maintained a skeleton staff of organizers in rural areas to direct strikes and enroll the workers in local unions. Particularly costly were the numerous unorganized spontaneous strikes which periodically broke out, and which the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . felt morally obligated to direct when appealed to for aid. A n adequate finan cial and membership base to support this program was lacking, and ulti mately the union had to abandon its organization of field workers. In California it turned over its locals to the A .F . of L., whose National Council of Agricultural and Cannery W orkers supported by the Team sters Union, was better able to carry on. California’s farm laborers were relatively quiescent during 1937 and 1938, as measured by the number, size, and violence o f the strikes in which they participated. A s compared to the 24 strikes involving more than 13,600 workers during 1936, only 15 small strikes totaling less than 4,000 workers in 1937, and 13 strikes of less than 5,500 work ers in 1938 occurred. The decline in the militancy of farm labor was explained in part by the preoccupation of both A .F . of L. and C .I.O . with organizing allied processing industries. A more important reason was the chronic surplus of farm laborers and consequent weakening of their bargaining power. Influx of “ drought refugees” from the Middle W est and Southwest was reaching a peak in numbers during 1937 and 1938. These newcomers, individualistic small-farm operators for the most part, had had little experience with labor unions. In the dependent and pov erty-stricken condition in which many of them arrived in California, they were little inclined to jeopardize by strike action what brief jobs they could get. Minor jurisdictional disputes between the A .F . of L . and C.I.O., nevertheless, did extend into agriculture. Most field workers’ organi zations of California by early 1937 had become affiliated to the A .F . of L. as federal labor unions. These, together with several cannery work ers’ unions and independent Filipino and Mexican organizations, sent official delegations to the first convention of the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . at Denver in July. Subsequently, they became part of the new organiza 166 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE tion.71 Jurisdictional problems arose when the A .F . of L. attempted to maintain its local union charters and refused to recognize new U .C .A .P .A .W .A . locals. In some localities it chartered new federal labor unions to parallel and compete with established C.I.O. organizations. The problem became even more confused in areas where independent Filipino or Mexican unions remained more or less apart from both C.I.O . and A .F . of L .72 APRICOT STRIKE IN YOLO COUNTY73 Conflict between the A .F . of L. and C.I.O. in agriculture first ap peared in one of the only two general or crop-wide strikes in California during 1937; this was a walk-out involving some 500 apricot workers in Y olo and Solano Counties during June. This incident was of special interest in illustrating the reactions and conflicts of various interest groups in a rural community. Early in May 1937, the “ intelligence service,, of the Associated Farmers of California had reported that “ the International Longshore men and Warehousemen have now organized a Union of Farm and Field W orkers at Knights Landing, Y olo County, close to the city of W oodland, and have now applied to the national for a charter.” The union, chartered as Agricultural W orkers Union Local N o. 20241 of Sacramento, took in members throughout the Sacramento Valley and established branches in Winters, Marysville, Knights Land ing, Walnut Grove, Isleton, and Woodland. Organizers were active in Yolo, Solano, Yuba, and Sacramento Counties, creating local “ workers’ committees*’ in various communities.74 The union was estimated to have about 500 paid-up members in good standing by June 1937, and an additional 1,000 workers had paid admission fees and applied for membership. A strike of apricot workers began in the vicinity of W inters (Solano County) in the middle of June, after organized growers had refused union demands for 40 cents per hour and union recognition and had agreed upon a flat wage of 35 cents per hour. The labor surplus ren dered the strike ineffective. The W inters Express in its June 25, 1937, issue claimed that “ it was not a workers’ strike— it was an attempt of the unemployed to stop the work of the employed.” The first step was a series of open meetings addressed by union organizers, who planned to call a strike after the growers had refused ^Official Proceedings of First National Convention of U .C.A.P.A.W .A., Denver, Colo., July 9*12, 1937. The official list of delegates included representatives from the following unions in California: Agricultural Workers Union—No. 20221 of Stockton, No. 20241 of Sacramento, No. 20539 of Marysville, and No. 20289 of Bakersfield; Fruit Workers Union No. 18211 of W at sonville; Field Workers Union No. 20326 of Guadalupe; Citrus Workers Union No. 20539 of Santa Ana; Cannery Workers Union No. 20325 of San Jose and No. 20099 of Oakland and Richmond; Cannery and Preserve Workers No. 20686 of Santa Clara; Dairy Workers Union (C.I.O.) of Los Angeles; Filipino Labor Union of Los Angeles: Confederacion do Campesinos y Obreras Mexicanos (C.U.C.O.M.), Los Angeles; Union de Obreras y Campesinos, San Diego; and Japanese Farm Workers Union of California, Los Angeles. Some of these organizations, such as Agricultural Workers Union No. 20211 of Stockton, Cannery Workers Unions No. 20325 of San Jose, No. 20099 of Oakland, and No. 20686 of Santa Clara, were “ paper organizations/’ since their leadership previously had been ousted and new unions chartered in their place by the State federation. 72Some of these formerly independent unions, working in collaboration with or directly affili ated to the U .C.A.P.A.W .A.. charged the A.F. of L. with creating “ dummy unions” in the form of competing “ paper” organizations sanctioned by federal labor union charters. (See Rural Worker, July 1937, p. 1; Commonwealth Times, December 24, 1937.) 73Except as otherwise noted, data in this seel ion are from Hearings of La Follette Commit tee, Part 49 (pp. 17949-17955, 17965-17987, 18124, 18213). 74Sacramento Union, June 2, 1937. CH. XI.---INTER-UNION CONFLICT 167 the union demands. Complications arose when the organizers suddenly announced a change of affiliation from the A .F . of L. to the C .I.O . They explained to the rank and file that the A .F . of L. had “ sold out” the workers, and that the International Longshoremen’s Association was soon to change to the C.I.O. (apparently on the widely held rumor that John L. Lewis had appropriated $50,000 to organize agricultural laborers on the Pacific Coast, and that Harry Bridges was to direct the campaign). This sudden change stiffened the opposition of growers and brought jurisdictional conflict with representatives of the A .F . of L. A group from the Teamsters Union addressed meetings of strikers, cautioning them against joining the C.I.O ., “ an organization of Communists,” and warning them that a strike would have no official standing with the A .F . o f L. Growers faced the prospect of crop losses if the Teamsters Union declared the apricots picked by the C.I.O. to be “ hot,” and refused to transport them. The local Associated Farmers organized the groweremployers and their supporters to cooperate with local law-enforcement authorities in combating the strike A t an annual meeting of the A sso ciated Farmers in December 1936, B. A . Schwartz, president of the Y olo County unit, described his organization in the following w ords: I have found that the Associated Farmers is an organization carrying the fight for the industrialists. W e must work together and realize that there is an inter dependence. The sheriff, the district attorney and supervisor practically form the Associated Farmers in Y olo County. (Hearings, p. 17952.) The pickers organized a system of “ flying squads” to make contact with nonstriking farm workers. W hen they attempted to stop cannery trucks from gathering up fruit, county ordinances were passed prohibit ing picketing and camping on highways. The strike was in effect broken through the arrest of almost two dozen pickets. W orkers will ing to take jobs were placed on ranches, while those not willing were given “ floating orders” out of the community. The Winters Express, in its June 25, 1937, issue, summarized the strike situation dramatically: The week of June 21 will go down in the history o f Winters as one o f the most eventful periods in the life o f this unusually peaceful and quiet community. With the sheriffs o f both Y olo and Solano Counties, and squads from the State highw ay patrol, plus specially appointed deputies, the citizens o f the district succeeded in breaking up a labor disturbance which has been brewing for the past 3 weeks, and reached its climax Tuesday. VEGETABLE WORKERS’ STRIKE IN-SANTA MARIA VALLEY Mexicans and Filipinos, organized in their own independent unions in the Santa Maria Valley, participated in the only other field workers’ strike of importance in 1937. This area had been free of strikes for several years, as local Mexican, Filipino, and white workers’ unions had carried on peaceful bargaining relations with the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association. A ll disputes and controversial issues between organized labor and employers had been submitted for settlement to an arbitration board under the chairmanship of Prof. R. L. Adams of the University of California. The board was finally dissolved in January 1937, when it was felt that labor relations had become so stabilized that arbitration was no longer necessary. 654107 ° — 4 6 -1 2 168 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE The contract between the union and the association expired in Decem ber 1937. The field workers demanded wage increases in a new agree ment for the coming year, and when these were refused by the organized growers, the Filipino and Mexican unions called a strike. Approximately 3,000 workers were involved directly and an additional 1,000 indirectly. The walk-out ended within S days, when the unions withdrew their de mands. Union spokesmen explained that adverse economic conditions and low market quotations for vegetables, in a period of general economic recession, did not warrant the wage increases demanded. The 1937 con tract was renewed.75 Spokesmen for Filipinos organized in U .C .A .P .A .W .A . locals N o. 69 of Guadalupe, N o. 71 of Lom poc, and N o. 72 of Pism o Beach claimed that the settlement was a defeat for the independent Philippine Islands Labor Union Incorporated. They blamed the defeat on that union’s refusal to cooperate with the C.I.O. Prior to the strike, Filipino field workers in the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . (C .I.O .) had formulated a schedule of demands to be submitted to the growers and had invited the president of the Philippine Islands Labor Union Incorporated to cooperate in enforcing them.76 That organization had opposed the U .C .A .P .A .W .A .’s efforts, and on one occasion had ejected C.I.O . members from its meet ing.77 CITRUS WORKERS The C.I.O. and A .F . of L. both made progress in unionizing field and packing-shed workers in the citrus industry during 1937 and 1938. Organizational advances for several years were somewhat nullified by interunion rivalries. However, the unions did win one notable legal victory; citrus exchanges and employers’ associations, ordinarily con sidered to be “ agricultural,” were brought under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. Local unions among Mexican citrus workers of Orange, Los Angeles, and Ventura Counties had had a relatively long and involved history of internecine strife, and the A .F . of L.-C .I.O . split in agriculture and allied industries led to further confusion. In Orange County, for instance, a local Mexican union had been in existence since 1933, and had taken part in several strikes. Early in 1937 many of its members withdrew to join the newly chartered A .F . of L. Farm Laborers Union Local No. 20699, though enough remained to maintain the original organization. A few months later most of the members of Local N o. 20699 left it, in turn, to join a local of the new C.I.O. international, the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . Twenty members remained with the A .F . of L. organization, which was rechartered as Citrus W orkers Union Local No. 20688. Thus, three dis tinct unions were claiming jurisdiction simultaneously. This situation seriously impeded the settlement of strikes in the area.78 The A .F . of L. renewed its organizing drive in July 1937, shortly after the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . was formed. It immediately faced strong opposition from employers, who made anti-union threats, circulated notices vilifying “ outside agitators,” and discharged union members. The union lodged complaints with the N L R B ,79 which in January 1939 ^Philippines Mail (Salinas), Vol. 7, No. 26, November 28, 1937, and Vol. 8, No. 3, December 20, 1937. 76Western Worker, November 25, 1937. 77Commonwealth Times, Vol. II, No. 24, December 21, 1937. 78Field notes. 79Hollywood Citizen News, August 21, 1937. CH. XI.---INTER-UNION CONFLICT 169 finally issued “ cease and desist*' orders against the North Whittier Heights Citrus Association of Puente, a cooperative packing plant owned by 200 citrus growers. It was ordered to reinstate with back pay 27 packing-house workers, to end “ interference with their self-organization’* as members of an A .F . of L. local, and to refrain from spying on union meetings.80 The A .F . of L. by the fall of 1938 claimed to have organized and chartered six local unions of citrus-fruit packing and byproducts work ers in Corona, Ontario, Pasadena, Puente, and Upland.81 The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . during 1939, however, superseded it in this field, and it did not regain its dominant position until early in 1941. W hen it was ruled that citrus associations were nonagricultural, this A .F . of L. victory brought to a head the opposition of the organized employers to Federal legislation. The National Labor Relations Board had rendered several decisions that were unfavorable to employers in processing industries allied to agriculture, including citrus fruits, wal nut packing, and lettuce packing and shipping. California farm interests, acting through the Agricultural Producers Labor Committee, launched a drive to persuade Congress to curb the extension of Federal legisla tion over agriculture. They wished particularly to check the National Labor Relations Board's decisions, to limit what they regarded as en croachment of the new W age and H our Administration onto the farm, and to procure exemptions for agricultural and allied workers from the jurisdiction of the Social Security Board. A committee of three, includ ing C. B. M oore of the W estern Growers Protective Association, went to Washington to formulate and direct the program.82 Farm-Labor Unionism in 1938 The agricultural labor front in California was even quieter during 1938 than it had been in 1937. The farm-labor surplus had become chronic and was continuously fed by an influx of southwestern refugees. The labor movement in general, and particularly the C.I.O ., had suffered a temporary decline in membership and financial strength because of the serious recession of late 1937 and 1938. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . organizing drive in rural areas consequently lost a good deal of momentum. Twelve strikes, the same number as in 1937, were reported among field laborers during 1938, and the total number of workers involved also remained roughly the same as the year before. Most of the walk-outs were small, localized, and spontaneous. Three large crop-wide or general strikes temporarily captured public attention. These included approxi mately 650 sheep shearers in Kern County and surrounding areas during April, 2,000 pea pickers in Sacramento County during May, and 5,000 cotton pickers in Kern County during August and September. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . was more active than the A .F . of L. among field work ers; the only affiliate of the latter to lead an agricultural strike was the Sheep Shearers Union of North America. This incident, the longest and most bitterly fought labor conflict in farming during 1938, is described 8°New York Times, January 21, 1939. 81Proceedings, 1938, of California State Federation of Labor (San Francisco), (pp. 41-45). 82Los Angeles Times, January 4, 1939. 170 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE in more detail in Chapter X I V (pages 229-230). It constituted a serious defeat for rural unionism. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . restricted its activities considerably because of financial stringency. Its activities in strikes were confined almost en tirely to assuming leadership and control of movements which had de veloped spontaneously. The District No. 2 office reported that in a dozen instances workers in unorganized spontaneous strikes came to the union for aid.83 Pea Pickers* Strike The first union-supported strike in 1938 occurred among some 2,000 pea pickers in Sacramento County during May. It began with a spon taneous walk-out of a few hundred pickers, demanding restoration of a previously announced rate of 25 cents per hamper, as against the prevail ing 21-cent rate being paid by labor contractors. The strikers enlisted the aid of organizers from the local U .C .A .P . A .W .A . headquarters in Sacramento. W age demands were raised to a rate of 1 cent per pound or 30 cents per hamper, and pickets were sent to other centers, such as Valdez, Central Souza, and W illow Point, to extend the strike throughout the pea-growing area.84 Within a few days approximately 2,000 pickers were reported to be taking part.85 The strike was remarkably peaceful, considering the numbers in volved, and no arrests were made. After a few days the strikers won their wage demand of 30 cents per hamper; this rate benefited some 5,000 pickers employed throughout the crop area.85 This easy victory was explained in part by the sympathetic attitude of employer groups themselves. The Sacramento Valley Council of the State Chamber of Commerce, representing 10 northern California counties, flatly charged “ chiselling” labor contractors with responsibility for the outbreak. It exonerated the pea growers and laid the trouble to the 21-cent rate paid by contractors who previously had promised the pickers 25 cents. The council further advised laborers to “ locate the source of false representation of farm labor needs” and to demand prose cution as a means for averting such disturbances later in the season.86 According to U .C .A .P .A .W .A . spokesmen, “ so hard boiled were shippers and labor contractors in their wage slashes that even the Clarksburg branch of the Associated Farmers refused to support them.” 87 Further labor trouble was not averted in this area, however. A few days after this strike, the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . placed pickets in front of the State Employment Service office to protest the hiring of beet-field workers at 35 cents per hour. The union asserted that the minimum Government rate was 40 cents per hour for labor employed by growers receiving A A A benefits.88 Another strike of several hundred pea pickers occurred in San Benito County during September 1938. These workers, who according to some reports had been averaging TO to 15 cents per hour at a rate of 21 830fficial Report (mimeographed) U .C.A.P.A.W .A. District No. 2. San Francisco. Decern* ber 1938 (pp. 1, 2). 84Sacramento Bee, May 12, 1938. 85Labor Herald (Sacramento), May 19. 1938. 86San Francisco Examiner, May 14, 1938. 87Labor Herald, Sacramento, May 19, 1938. 88Sacramento Union, May 19. 1938. CH. XI.---INTKR-UNION CONFLICT 171 cents per hamper, struck spontaneously for a 30-cent rate. Again the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . was appealed to for aid. In this instance, according to union spokesmen, some 200 members of the Associated Farmers co operated with the State highway patrol to drive labor organizers out of the county and to carry on a policy of “ forceful eviction” against the strikers.89 Cotton Pickers9 Strike in Kern County The most serious labor troubles during 1938 were centered in Kern County. A small strike of some 68 grape pickers broke out spontaneously during January, in protest against wage decreases. A restoration of previous wage rates was won with the help of C.I.O. organizers. Again in August the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . helped 150 peach pickers win a sponta neous strike for wage increases.90 These minor outbreaks culminated in a spontaneous walk-out of ap proximately 3,000 cotton pickers in the Shatter area of Kern County during September. The strike was in protest against the organized growers’ offer of 75 cents per hundredweight instead of the 90-cent scale of the previous year. Strikers demanded an increase in rates to $1 per hundredweight.91 The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . declared itself taken com pletely by surprise. A n organizer who was rushed from its San Francisco headquarters found the strikers without leadership and uncertain of their course of action.92 New demands were formulated, under union direction, calling for the testing of weighing machines, jo b stewards for each field, payment of wages in full each Saturday, drinking water near the cotton wagon, and rehiring of strikers without discrimination 92 Both strike and strikebreaking tactics reminiscent of 1933 were re vived. Caravans of strikers and organizers drove from field to field endeavoring to extend the walk-out in scope and effectiveness. The Associated Farmers of Kern County sought to prevent this by tabulating the strikers’ auto licenses as a means for applying a blacklist.93 The union claimed that many independent growers who were willing to agree to the strikers’ terms were prevented by the Associated Farmers from doing so, by the threat that money to finance the next year’s crop would not be forthcoming from banks and cotton-ginning companies.94 The San Fran cisco Chronicle of October 28, 1938, reported that several growers who raised picking rates to 85 or 90 cents per hundredweight under the threat of the strike, were “ urged” by other growers to return to the prevailing 75-cent scale and did so. The Associated Farmers refused to negotiate with strike representatives and ignored mediation offers from a Con ciliator of the U .S. Department of Labor. Grower-employers maintained that no strike existed, since full picking crews were available.95 The strike collapsed before strong and unified opposition from groweremployers and local government officials. Roger W elch, district attorney, announced that he would enforce Kern County’s antipicketing ordinance and that officers would be instructed to “ stop strikes before they got 89CI0 News, Vol. 1, No. 43, October 1, 1938. 90Josiah C. Folsom: Labor Disputes in Agriculture, 1927-38. 91 San Francisco Chronicle, October 26, 1938. " C I O News, Vol. 1, No. 47, October 29, 1938 (p. 8). "H earin g s of La Follette Committee, Part 51 (p. 18623). " C I O News, Vol. 1, No. 47, October 29, 1938 (p. 1), " F ie ld notes. 172 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE started.” 90 Numerous arrests subsequently were made. On one occasion more than 100 pickets in a caravan of 30 automobiles were arrested near A rvin on a charge of “ conspiracy to break and enter with intent to incite a riot.” The sheriff charged that the strikers assaulted pickers on one ranch with stones and clubs.97 H . Pom eroy, director of the State Relief Administration, was also reported to have used his office to help break the strike, by refusing relief to those able to work as strikebreakers in the fields at the rate set by growers.98 Protests were expressed by the W orkers Alliance and several C.I.O. affiliates, including Dairy W orkers Local No. 49 of Los Angeles, the United Fishermen, and the State, County and Municipal W orkers of America.99 The strike ended after several weeks. Vegetable Workers9 Strike in Orange County The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . was more successful in a strike involving some 750 vegetable workers in the vicinity of Santa Ana (Orange County). This dispute, also, began as a spontaneous protest against wage cuts. Its settlement was delayed for several weeks by jurisdictional disputes among three unions: A local of the Mexican C .U .C.O.M ., which had been in the county for almost 6 years, the A .F . of L. Citrus W orkers Union Local N o. 20688, and a local of the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . Grower-employers, represented jointly by the Orange County Farm Federation, the Japanese Vegetable Growers Association, and the Associated Farmers of Orange County, refused to recognize the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . or to accede to strike demands for wage increases.1 Pat Callahan, district U .C .A .P .A .W .A . organizer, charged that the Associated Farmers was exerting pressure on Japanese growers to refuse agreements with the union, promising them full compensation for any losses incurred in holding out. The strikebreaking campaign was being financed, he asserted, through levies imposed upon citrus growers in the county. The State Relief Administration again was charged with sending relief clients from Santa Ana to take the places of strikers in the fields.2 The U .C .A .P .A .W .A ., nevertheless, claimed to have cleared the fields of strikebreakers within a month and to have defeated an “ underhanded campaign” seeking to prevent the C .U .C.O.M . and A .F . of L. locals from affiliating with the C .I.O .2 W ith the aid of the U .S. Conciliation Service the union was successful in winning one closed-shop contract covering 50 workers and three working agreements covering another 150 workers.® Miscellaneous Strikes The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . took part in other field workers’ strikes of smaller size. A short spontaneous walk-out of 25 lettuce workers, oppos ing a wage decrease, ended with no gain to the workers. Strikes of a " S a n Francisco Chronicle, October 20, 1938. 97Idem, October 26, 1938. 98Idem, October 12, 1938. " S a n Francisco News, October 25, 1938. Two months previously the U .C.A.P.A.W .A. had passed resolutions praising the W P A for requiring that current relief subsistence wages be paid to agricultural workers before it re leased them from work relief. At the same time it condemned the State Relief Administration for “ separating from its rolls workers for agriculture on a wage offer as low as 20 cents an hour.” (San Francisco News, June 3, 1938.) 1Field notes. 2CIO News, Vol. 1, No. 38, August 27, 1938 (p. 2). 193^0fficial Report <mimeographed), U .C.A.P.A.W .A. District No. 2, San Francisco, December CH. XI.—INTER-UNION CONFLICT 173 dozen apricot workers in San Benito County and 150 pear pickers in Y olo County during July were similarly unsuccessful/ Slight wage increases were won during November in a walk-out of 200 brussels-sprout workers in the vicinity of San Mateo (Santa Cruz County). The U .C .A .P .A .W .A won compromise wage gains in the citrus in dustry of. Los Angeles County. Its Citrus W orkers Union had begun a strike against the San Fernando Heights Lemon Association, which countered by closing down its packing houses and locking out 150 em ployees, justifying this action as a move for “ quieting of an agitated situation” among Mexican citrus-fruit pickers and packers in the valley. The National Labor Relations Board was called in to investigate and arrange a settlement.5 General Results of Organization Activity in 1938 The activities of U .C .A .P .A .W .A . (C .I.O .) in rural California during 1938 apparently resulted in a net loss, despite numerous partial victories. The various strikes it led probably prevented wage cutting and tempo rarily increased its membership in many crop areas. A ccording to its dis trict representative, however, these strikes did not bring organization gains proportional to the effort and cost expended. The district executive board consequently ruled at a meeting in November 1938 that thereafter no spontaneous strike would be supported until it had been thoroughly in vestigated by a district representative.6 Impressive achievements throughout the United States were recorded by the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . at its second annual national convention held in San Francisco during December 1938. It claimed to have grown from a nucleus of scattered A .F . of L. federal labor unions to 408 locals with some 125,000 members throughout the Nation, and to have won over 200 contracts covering 40,000 members.7 The organization had little to show for its efforts in California, how ever. By December 1938 it could claim only 15 local unions in the State, and some of these were hardly more than paper organizations. Cannery W orkers Unions N o. I f of San Jose, No. 14 of San Francisco, and No. 15 of Oakland were chartered from the former Federal Labor Unions Nos. 20325, 20989, and 20099, respectively, and had little importance, in view of the fact that the A .F . of L. had already won exclusive recognition from the major canneries in these communities. U .C .A .P .A .W .A . locals No. 12 of Marysville, N o. 20 of Stockton, and N o. 33 of Sacramento, which had been chartered from the former Agricultural W orkers Federal Labor Unions Nos. 20539, 20221, and 20241, respectively, were tempo rarily inactive. They were revived later, in strikes during the summer and fall of 1939. Agricultural W orkers Federal Labor Unions No. 20284 of Bakersfield, No. 10912 of Watsonville, No. 20886 of Santa Clara, and N o. 20326 of Guadalupe, all of which had been represented at the first national convention in Denver during July 1937, were no longer in existence. U .C .A .P .A .W .A . Locals No. 69 of Santa Maria, No. 71 of Lom poc, and N o. 72 of Pismo Beach, chartered from branches of the Filipino Labor Union, likewise had disappeared or become inactive. 4Josiah C. Folsom: Labor Disputes in Agriculture, 1927-38. 5Los Angeles Times, August 27, 1938. 60fficial Report (mimeographed), U.C.A.P.A.W .A. District No. 2, San Francisco, December 1938 (p. 46). ^CIO News, Vol. 1, No. 53, December 12, 1938 (p. 3). 174 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE Of the older established locals, only No. 3 of Dairy W orkers in Los Angeles, No. 5 of Alaska Cannery W orkers in San Francisco, N o. 18 of Shed W orkers in Salinas, and No. 29 of Citrus W orkers in Santa Ana (chartered from the former A .F . of L. N o. 20539 and local Mexican C .U .C .O .M .) appeared to be active. No. 58 of Modesto, No. 233 of Brentwood, No. 23 of Camarillo, No. 24 of Chowchilla, and N o. 203 of Lodi were newly chartered locals which developed from spontaneous strikes described above.8 The A .F . of L., by comparison, had reached unprecedented strength in agriculture and allied industries. The proceedings of the California State Federation for 1938 listed the following affiliates, claiming a total membership of 65,000 to 75,000: Cannery W orkers: 16 local unions with an estimated 50-60,000 members in the localities o f Antioch, Benicia, Hayward, Kingsburg, Marysville, Modesto, Oakland, Oroville, Richmond, Rio Vista, Sacramento, Salinas, San Francisco, San Jose, Stockton, and Suisun. Citrus Fruit-Packing and Byproducts W orkers: 6 local unions in Corona, On tario. Pasadena, Puente, and Upland. Fruit and Vegetable Packing and Preserve W orkers: 5 local unions in Oakland, Salinas, San Francisco, San Jose, and Santa Maria. Dairy and Creamery Employees: 3 local unions in Fresno, Lemoore, and San Francisco. Winery and Distillery W orkers: 3 local unions in Fresno, Lodi, and Morgan Hill.9 Farm-Labor Unionism in 1939 Agricultural laborers' strikes during 1939 were fewer in number but larger in scope than they had been for some years. A few even approached the extent and violence reached in the campaign of the Cannery and A gri cultural W orkers Industrial Union in 1933. This revival of unionism was only temporary, however. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A ., the main field workers' organization in California, continued to decline. A newly estab lished independent union of Filipino workers in central California won the most important organization gains in the State during 1939. The A .F . of L. meanwhile remained inactive among field laborers. Activities of the U.C.A.P.A.W.A. SPONTANEOUS STRIKES The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . attempted to restrict its strike activities and to concentrate on building a stable organization based on the processing industries. Though on several occasions it felt forced to give support to spontaneous strikes, on the whole it exerted a moderating influence on labor relations in the fields. Several Avalk-outs it ignored completely. The first strike in which the union was active occurred early in April among several hundred pea pickers in the vicinity of Modesto (Stanislaus C ounty). T w o hundred workers meeting in a Federal labor camp near W estley elected a committee of 5 to negotiate with growers for an in creased picking rate of 30 cents per hamper in place of the prevailing 25 8Labor Herald, Sacramento, December 29, 1938. P roceedings of California State Federation of Labor, 1938 (pp. 41-45). CH. XI.---INTER-UNION CONFLICT 175 cents. They threatened to strike if the demands were not met*10 Fifteen or twenty members of the U .C .A .P .A .W .A ., however, opposed calling a strike until a majority of the workers had been organized into the union. Overriding this opposition, some 240 nonunion workers under a '“ gentle men’s agreement,, refrained from picking and sent delegates to several labor camps in the pea-growing area in an effort to extend the walk-out.1 1 Several hundred pickers, representing about a third of the total employed in the area, finally joined the movement. The strike soon collapsed be cause of inadequate preparation.12 Another spontaneous movement developed among the pea workers late in September, when about 200 migratory pea pickers in a dozen ranches in the lower Santa Clara Valley near Gilroy struck unsuccess fully for a wage increase to 25 cents per hamper from the prevailing 21 cents.13 Small and unsuccessful strikes occurred in other crop areas during the year. Walk-outs of a few hundred fruit pickers in the vicinities of Patterson (M adera County), and Pittsburg (Contra Costa County) during June and July were broken by importation of strikebreakers. T w o alleged agitators in one strike were arrested and held on $500 bail on charges of violating the county antipicketing ordinance.14 A n unsuc cessful small strike of plum pickers in one orchard near Fresno was conducted under the leadership of a local independent union known as the Farm W orkers Association. Its secretary-treasurer was Lillian Monroe, formerly an active left-wing organizer of the C .& A .W .LU . during the San Joaquin Valley cotton strike of 1933. T w o college students acting as pickets were jailed on charges of being “ labor agitators * * * attempt ing to incite orchard workers to join the strike.” 1® ORCHARD STRIKES IN YUBA COUNTY The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . endeavored to build county-wide agricultural workers’ unions which could work in close cooperation with other labor groups, particularly those of unemployed and relief clients in rural areas. The most important of these bodies was the W orkers Alliance of America, which claimed 12,000 members in California in 1939. The joint organizing efforts of the two unions in Yuba County led to serious labor-employer conflict in the peach orchards near Marysville. Early in May about 650 fruit workers (including spray men, peach thinners, irrigators, pear blight-control men, and general ranch laborers) carried out a brief strike. It began as a spontaneous walk-out on the Dantoni and New England orchards of the Earl Fruit Co., in protest against the resignation of a foreman who had refused to hire Filipinos to replace whites.16 W hen the unions took control, they enlarged the strike and made additional demands. Organizers extended the walk-out to three other large orchards in the area in an unsuccessful effort to raise wage levels from 25 to 30 cents per hour for general labor, and from 30 to 3 8 % 0 cents per hour for skilled work.17 The dispute was settled when the company agreed to rehire strikers without discrimination. 10Sacramento Union, April 14, 1939. 11Stockton Record, April 14, 1939. 12San Francisco Chronicle, April 15, 1939. 13San Rafael Independent, September 28, 1939. 14Stockton Record, June 30, 1939; San Francisco Examiner, July 29. 1939. 15San Francisco Examiner, May 9, 1939. 16Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 48 (p. 17556); Sacramento Bee. May 6, 1939. 17Idem, Part 48 (pp. 17539, 17545-17546). 176 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE Conflict broke out anew 2 months later, when the Earl Fruit Co. was alleged to have applied a lock-out against union members. The revived Marysville local of the U .C .A .P .A .W .A (the reorganized local W orkers Alliance) established picket lines in protest against the replacement of union members by white and oriental strikebreakers employed to harvest pears and nectarines. The strike was easily broken by the county sheriff. Twenty-two pickets, including the more active union organizers, were arrested for violating the county antipicketing ordinance. The management of the Earl Fruit Co. refused Governor Olson’s offer to mediate the dispute, choosing instead to hire enough strikebreakers to harvest the crop.18 COTTON STRIKE, SAN JOAQUIN The W orkers Alliance had been active also among agricultural work ers in southern and central California. Local government officials in Santa Barbara County complained that Alliance organizers were inter fering with the county agricultural commissioner’s program to ban itinerant labor and harvest the pea crop with resident pickers taken from S R A rolls. On one occasion, it was reported, the county S R A coordinator recruited a truck load of pickers but W orkers Alliance “ agitators” per suaded them to leave the truck.19 The combined organizing efforts of the W orkers Alliance and the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . in the cotton fields of the San Joaquin Valley resulted in the most violent agricultural labor conflict of 1939. W ages and employ ment conditions in this crop still tended to generate more than ordinary labor unrest. W age rates set by organized growers under the auspices of the A gri cultural Labor Bureau of the San Joaquin Valley had varied considerably from year to year in the cotton-growing industry. They had been raised immediately after the militant campaign of the Cannery and Agricultural W orkers Industrial Union in the early thirties. Cotton choppers had been paid $1.15 per acre in 1934 as compared with 72 cents in 1933. The collapse of the C .& A .W .I.U ., the disorganization of farm laborers, and reported discriminatory relief policies which favored the growers’ interests all served to reduce wages in following years. By 1936 the rate for cotton chopping had fallen to 75 cents per acre or 20 cents per hour. During 1937, a peak prosperity year, the rates were raised again, this time to $1 per acre or 25 cents per hour.20 This situation, however, did not last beyond that year. Cotton culti vation had been increasing steadily— from 130,000 acres in 1924 to 670,000 acres in 1937. This was reduced Irastically to 340,000 acres during the following 2 years, under the restrictive program o f the A A A . De mand for labor was thus being reduced at the same time that its supply was increasing rapidly. The influx of drought refugees to California was reaching unprecedented proportions, and they were supplemented by unemployed who were being displaced from urban industries in a period of general business recession. A doubly burdensome problem of under employment and declining wage rates faced cotton choppers and pickers in the State. Chopping rates declined to 75 cents per acre or 20 cents per 18Sacramento Union, July 18, 1939; Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 48 (pp. 17594* 17614, 17638-17641). 19Los Angeles Times, March 18, 1939. 20Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 51 (pp. 18578-18584). CH. XI.---INTER-UNION CONFLICT 177 hour in 1938. In the fall of that year, as described before, an abortive strike of pickers had broken out in Kern County. The W orkers Alliance had been organizing seasonal workers in cotton and other crops in the San Joaquin Valley for several years. Since relief was the chief livelihood of many seasonal agricultural workers during the off-season months, some such organization as the Alliance represented almost their sole hope for attaining any degree of security and self-protection. W hen the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . established locals in the valley, Alliance members were transferred to them during the chopping and harvesting seasons. The two labor unions became influential among agricultural workers in the San Joaquin Valley from 1937 to 1939, as relief authorities co operated closely with growers belonging to the Agricultural Labor Bureau. Labor spokesmen complained almost continually that clients were being cut off from relief and thereby forced to work at “ starvation” wages.21 A s already noted the S R A , through cutting clients off relief during the harvest season, had helped to break the spontaneous strike of several thousand cotton pickers in 1938. In spite of this evidence of labor unrest, or perhaps because of the relative ease with which the strike had been broken, grower-employers at their annual conference in Fresno, in April 1939, again adopted the 1938 wage scales for cotton chopping. Labor dissatisfaction with the wage situation became widespread. The W orkers Alliance requested the right to be represented at the wage setting convention. W hen this was ignored, the union held a mass meet ing in Madera to agitate for a wage increase to 30 cents per hour or $1.25 per acre. Though it did not declare a formal strike, the Alliance tried to discourage relief clients from chopping cotton at the current rates. Growers meanwhile exerted pressure on relief officials to drop clients from the rolls so that they would be available to work at the 20 cents per hour scale. Governor Olson finally appointed a committee of State officials to in vestigate the cotton-wage situation. Chairman Carey Me W illiams’ report on May 12, 1939, condemned the rate of 20 cents per hour or 75 cents per acre for chopping, as not representing “ even a subsistence wage.” A minimum scale of 2 7 cents per hour or $1.25 per acre was recom mended.22 The Associated Farmers of California strongly criticized the indirect intervention of the State government. The executive committee stated on May 26, 1939: Farmers want to pay the highest wages conditions will permit, but an arbitrary wage fixed by some governmental agency would be disastrous because prices received for crops cannot be controlled by the farmers. The State is also powerless to con trol the numerous conditions inside and outside California which determine prices received for agricultural products. Attempts by the State to fix agricultural wages will place farmers at a further disadvantage in selling in eastern markets in competition with other producing areas paying less than half the present level in California, and having a much shorter haul to the major markets, and will put more California farmers out o f business and add further to unemployment. (Hearings o f La Follette Committee, Part 51, p. 18897.) 21Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 51 (pp. 18603-18605). 22Idem (pp. 18633 and 18969). 178 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE M ore serious labor trouble developed during the cotton-picking season in the fall of 1939. Late in August the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . was re ported as entering the San Joaquin Valley to cooperate with the W ork ers Alliance. The unions jointly held mass meetings and launched an organization campaign to draft and enforce wage increases in the forth coming cotton harvests.23 W age demands were set at $1.25 and $1.50 per hundredweight for first and second pickings, as against the prevailing 65 to 75 cents. W hen growers refused to meet union negotiating committees, the demands were printed and distributed widely among pickers. A local strike, authorized at a relatively small union meeting, began in the vicinity of Madera. It rapidly developed into a series of spon taneous strikes involving several thousand cotton pickers over a wide area, on a scale approaching the strike of 1933. The movement became too large for the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . to control and coordinate effectively. Both grower and labor representatives estimated that by mid-October almost 90 percent of the pickers in Madera County were affected.24 A field agent of the Associated Farmers reported that— The present situation constitutes the worst agricultural strike in the State since 1933, although to date we have played it down for obvious reasons. However, we plan to break loose on it now as we cannot hurt the situation by giving it the works in certain areas. (Hearings, Part 51, pp. 18653-18654.) The strikers faced strong violence and intimidation from growers and local authorities. There was wholesale eviction of strikers from their cabins and armed vigilantes attacked pickets.25 In Madera County 142 pickers were arrested on “ John D oe” warrants, for violating the anti caravan ordinance which prohibited automobile caravans without a county permit, but they were later released when the district attorney explained that they had not engaged in violence and intimidation, and that “ the offense of which they appear guilty is trivial.” 26 Judge Campbell Beaumont issued a temporary injunction in November to restrain authorities in Madera County from enforcing the antipicketing ordinance.27 Tactics employed by both groups were patterned closely after those of 1933. Strikers endeavored to extend the walk-out by forming flying squadrons of pickets who traveled by auto caravan from ranch to ranch. Farmers organized a growers’ emergency committee, which planned similar caravans which could converge on any picketed ranch to counter act the efforts of the strikers.28 There were occasional violent outbreaks between organized growers and strikers. Fights between flying squadrons from both sides occurred at picketed ranches and cotton gins, in the course of which clubs were used and guns displayed by growers. Several strikers reported to the county hospital for treatment of wounds and bruises.29 One fight between cotton growers and pickets in the Dairyland district sent nine strikers to the hospital with minor injuries. The growers claimed that the fight began when a group of pickets went into a field to intimidate 30 non striking pickers.30 The most serious riot occurred in the Madera County 23Fresno Bee, August 26, 1939. 24Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 51 (pp. 18633-18634. 18654). 25Oakland Post Enquirer, October 24, 1939. 26Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 51 (pp. 18640-18643, 18694). 27Daily Worker, November 12, 1939. 28Hearings of La Follette Committee. Part 51 (p. 18664). 29Idem (pp. 18667-18669, 18922). 3°San Francisco Examiner, October 20, 1939, CH. XI.---INTER-UNION CONFLICT 179 Park. Several dozen strikers and spectators were injured, 12 seriously enough to require hospital treatment, when 300 vigilantes broke up a mass meeting of strikers.31 Governor Olson, previous to the outbreak, had incurred the resent ment of growers by appointing a Cotton W age Hearing Board to air the issues under dispute and to seek terms for settlement of the strike. The State highway patrol meanwhile was dispatched to the Madera trouble center to “ escort” and protect caravans of pickets.32 Growers held a mass meeting of protest in Madera on October 25, 1939. Speakers served Colonel Henderson, representing Governor Olson, with an ulti matum to the effect that if the strike leaders were not imprisoned and picketing prevented, the growers would take the law into their own hands. A s one representative expressed it, “ W e will be the law !” They planned to break up by force a forthcoming strike meeting in Madera County Park.33 Some 300 growers armed with clubs and rubber hoses invaded the park the following day and forcefully disrupted the gathering. The State highway patrol fired tear-gas bombs into the crowd to quiet the melee.34 The strike subsided, after several weeks, into a series of local actions. The publicity attending the Cotton W age Hearing Board rendered both groups more willing to compromise. U .C .A .P .A .W .A . spokesmen re ported that cotton pickers in Madera. County were returning to work by groups, as one grower after another broke away from the standards of the Associated Farmers and the Agricultural Labor Bureau and accepted the union compromise wage offer of $1 per hundredweight. In many places, however, strike and picketing activities continued for months. Filipino Agricultural Labor Association One of the most notable labor developments during 1939 and 1940 was the revival of independent, race-conscious unionism among the Filipinos in central California, particularly in the asparagus- and celery growing areas of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys. The divisions of opinion regarding labor unionism and other questions within Filipino communities of California had become deeper and more complex as C .I.O .-A .F . of L. conflict was intensified from late 1937 onward. The majority of unionized Filipinos tended to be partial to the C.I.Q . because of its “ sincerity in internationalism,” to quote one observer. Several Filipinos had been elected to fill executive posts in C.I.O . unions and to act as delegates at national conventions. The A .F . of L., on the other hand, had, it was reported, consistently opposed the immigration of Filipinos and tried to exclude them from organized trades.35 The more articulate elements in Filipino communities favored a separate racial labor movement which would remain unaffiliated with either the A .F . of L. or C.I.O . The Philippines Mail of Salinas, one of the important language papers of this group, stated the separatist view in an editorial in its issue of December 6, 1937: 31Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 51 (p. 18922). 32San Francisco Examiner, October 23, 1939. 33Hearings of La Follette Committee, Part 51 (pp. 18678-18680). 34Idem (pp. 18748. 18755-18756, 18922). ^Philippines Maii, Vol. 8, No. 19, May 13, 1938, 180 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE The Mail is convinced that the A.F. o f L. has for its basic purpose the elimina tion o f Filipino labor in the American scene; it is likewise convinced that the C.LO. is only a temporary emotional flare-up and that its leadership may soon revert back to the A.F. o f L. * * * Should it be necessary to organize U. S. Filipinos into a union, the Mail is sympathetic to the suggestion o f an independent Filipino union. The Mail believes and maintains that the Filipino workman in the United States is a distinct factor as a labor unit. It offers no unfair competition with any of the existing American organized labor. It keeps its own standard o f efficiency and productiveness acceptable to its employer and, because o f that, it can place its own values based on that efficiency and productiveness. * * * Filipino labor can sell on its own merits without involving itself in partisan quarrels between the A .F. o f L. and C.I.O. The successful organization of Filipinos in the independent P.I. Labor Union Incorporated in the Santa Maria Valley of Santa Barbara County appeared to justify the Mail's assertions. In cooperation with the local independent Mexican Labor Union, this organization in February 1939 again negotiated an agreement providing union recognition, preferential hiring, a minimum wage of 35 cents per hour for field labor, overtime rates, special working conditions, and a representative grievance board to settle disputes.36 Independent racial unionism among Filipinos won added support when the Philippine Islands gained a more independent status from the United States Government. Late in 1936 President Quezon appointed the H on. Francisco Varona, member of the National Economic Council, as Resident Commissioner of the United States. His main function was “ to uphold the dignity of the new nation and to take care of nationals abroad."37 M r. Varona expressed the view that Filipino workers should not join either the A .F . of L. or C.I.O., but should form independent unions closely bound to the Philippines Government through the Resident Labor Com missioner's office.38 The Filipino community was receptive to the views of the new Resi dent Commissioner, who offered a means for unifying conflicting tribal and occupational groups. Filipino businessmen and contractors stood to gain by organizing stronger associations not only among themselves, but among the workers also, since the economic interests of the two groups were interdependent. If both could be unified in one organization, the bargaining position of each would be strengthened for dealing with grower-employers. A writer in the Philippines Mail of March 15, 1940, stated the main issues as follow s: Conflicting group interests surround the social and economic life o f the Filipino community. * * * Certain elements * * * have assumed the power to represent Fili pino labor without giving the workers a voice in determining the terms and condi tions under which they work and live * * *. No one questions the sincerity and honesty o f every contractor as a labor leader to help the workers advance themselves beyond a mere primitive stage o f existence. But his relation with the company or employer, and his constant fear o f cutthroat labor competition, which is so widely practised among his fellow contractors, make 36Field notes. 37Philippines Mail, Vol. 7, No. 20, April 12, 1937. 38C. D. Mensalves, Filipino president of the C.I.O. Industrial Union Council of Guadalupe, was highly critical of this view. He pointed out that Filipinos had made their greatest gams in C.I.O. unions, particularly those organized among Alaska cannery workers. (Commonwealth Times, Vol. 1, No. 24, Dec. 21, 1937.) CH. XI.---INTER-UNION CONFLICT 181 it impossible for him to defend the rights o f the workers in time o f labor dis putes or grievances.8 8 The Resident Labor Commissioner proved to be a very effective agent for the welding diverse elements of the Filipino community together and organizing wage earners and labor contractors for the purpose of col lective bargaining. Early in March 1938 he called a conference of repre sentatives from all Filipino organizations on the Pacific Coast40 to es tablish an independent union of Filipinos. The delegates favored a bi lateral association that would include both occupational groups in the un organized Salinas and Sacramento Valley districts. A s a result the Filipino Agricultural W orkers Association of San Joaquin and Sacramento Valleys was established; it included 6,000 Filipino laborers and contractors engaged chiefly in asparagus work. The executive council was made up of prominent civic leaders o f the Filipino communities of Stockton and Sacramento who were considered to have the status required for bargaining effectively with employers. It was designed to include the best features of the Philippine Islands Labor Union Incorporated of Guadalupe and the Filipino Labor Supply Asso ciation of Stockton.41 The new organization first turned its attention to improving the Filipino workers’ position in the asparagus industry, where labor re lations were most chaotic and unsatisfactory. A ccording to a reporter in the Philippines Mail of A pril 7, 1939— The F.A .W .A . was formed under the pressure o f deplorable conditions existing in the asparagus area, where wages for cutting asparagus were lowered from the 1938 scale; where contracts entered into between asparagus employers and the Filipino labor contractors were found to be one-sided in favor o f employers, and in almost all cases in violation o f the labor laws that apply; and where camp housing, in almost 99 cases out o f 100, are in violation o f the labor code. The F .A .W .A .’s two principal demands w ere: (1 ) Restoration of the 1938 wage scale retroactively as of March 1, 1939, or from the commence ment of the 1939 harvest season, and ( 2 ) a revised, uniform, and model contract mutually drawn and agreed upon by employers and employees, bargaining collectively through their own representatives. A strike was to be declared against those employer-growers who refused to accede to the union’s demands.42 The F .A .W .A .’s initial difficulty lay in the fact that the 250-odd asparagus growers themselves were not sufficiently well organized to carry on collective bargaining. The contractor system of recruiting and paying labor had led to competitive individual bargaining agreements among contractors and growers. This had caused a conspicuous lack of uniformity in wage rates and labor conditions throughout the growing area. N o two contracts were alike and, according to labor spokesmen, almost ®9A brief submitted to a conference of Filipino organizations stressed further points of weak ness in the labor contractor’ s position: “ The common practice is employment of farm-hand contractors who act as conciliators be tween laborers and employers. This practice has been most effective, especially in the Salinas Valley where labor enjoys a paternalistic relationship with farm-hand contractors. These con tractors on the other hand represent the best interests of their laborers to their employers. “ The only objectionable feature of the system is that the labor-contractor system is not recog nized by law and consequently has no legal standing before the courts in case of disputes. The term ‘labor contractor’ is a trade name which applies to labor agents recruiting laborers for employers and operating under the ‘Employment Agency L a w / The labor contractors do not enjoy the full protection of the law, while the laborers they recruit for the employers do.” (Philippines Mail, Vol. 8, No. 14, Apr. 4, 1938.) 40Philippines Mail, Vol. 8, No. 12, March 14, 1938. 41Idem, Vol. 9, No. 1, August 30, 1939. 42Idem, Vol. 8, No. 35, April 7, 1939. 182 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE all of them violated the law. Variations in crop conditions likewise militated against standardization of wage rates and conditions and favored individual work contracts.43 The unorganized and competitive position of asparagus growers left them ill-equipped to resist the labor organization. The union, now re named the Filipino Agricultural Labor Association, or F .A .L .A ., won a resounding victory in its first strike in April 1939. A s this was the first time in the history of this crop area that Filipino laborers had been or ganized on an inclusive scale, the strike caught the grower-employers by surprise. The walk-out extended throughout the Delta region of San Joaquin, Sacramento, Contra Costa, and Y olo Counties. It affected about half the total asparagus crop, separate union contracts having been signed pre viously with the six largest growers in the region.44 It was called just when the asparagus crop was reaching peak production. In the words of the Stockton Record of April 7, 1939, the strike— * * * virtually paralyzed more than one-half o f one o f the richest agricultural industries o f California, leaving at least 40,000 acres o f rapidly growing '“ grass” uncut and rotting in the fields. * * * * * * Grower representatives, openly at a loss because of the surprising show o f strength and unity by their workers, were considering immediate capitulation as the only alternative to suffering losses running into hundreds o f thousands o f dollars and possible ruin for the remainder of the crop-year. The strike ended within T day with an almost complete victory for the F .A .L .A . O f the 258 growers employing a total of 4,000 to 5,000 work ers, all but 2, hiring some 200 cutters, had acceded to union demands,45 and these capitulated shortly afterward. The complete absence of picketing or violence was unusual for a strike involving such large numbers. The Filipinos had a monopoly of the labor supply in asparagus because they were the only group sufficient ly skilled and adapted to perform the gruelling and specialized work re quired. W hen almost all the asparagus workers were organized into the F .A .L .A ., they had merely to refrain from going to work to make the strike completely effective. Efforts to import whites, Negroes, and M exi cans to replace the Filipinos failed 45 Unusual also was the sympathetic, or at least neutral and unbiased, attitude of the newspapers of the Stockton and San Francisco Bay areas. Said Dr. Macario Bautista, president of the F .A .L .A .: I am very happy to report that the attitude o f the American public was one o f friendliness to and sympathy with our cause. The press, too, was friendly to u s ; in fact, the attitude o f the Stockton Record on this particular occasion was unprece dented in American journalism in so far as the Filipinos are concerned. (Philip pines Mail, Vol. 8, No. 36, April 22, 1939.) A Filipino Labor Association was organized in Sacramento County, patterned after the F .A .L .A . in Stockton, following the initial strike suc cess.46 Filipino labor agents and contractors agreed to delegate to the 43As one union official pointed out, the disparity of conditions tended to create confusion in union demands. An increase of 5 cents per hour over the 1938 wage scales could not be made a blanket increase to cover every age and condition of the “ grass” because of the peculiarity of the crop. Many factors, such as soil conditions, productivity of beds, etc., had to be consid ered. Thus a price of $1 per 100 pounds for 5-year old “ grass” in one bed might be too low for the same age of grass in a bed in which there were too many “ spots,” or ground in which there was no “ grass,” or a bed in which the soil was too hard. For these reasons asparagus wages almost necessarily had to be determined individually for each camp. 44 San Francisco Examiner, April 8, 1939. 45Stockton Independent, April 8, 1939. 46Philippines Mail, Vol. 9, No. 1, August 30, 1939. CH. XI.---INTER-UNION CONFLICT 183 association authority to represent them and the laborers under their jurisdiction, in negotiations with grower-employers.47 The Sacramento union late in September won a favorable collective-bargaining contract with the Japanese Tom ato Growers Association, providing for a raise in minimum wages to a scale of 35 cents per hour from the previous level of 25 to 27j 2 cents paid to some 1,500 Filipino field laborers.48 / The F .A .L .A . of Stockton meanwhile was extending its organization to other crop areas in which Filipinos were employed. Late in September approximately 250 members of the association in the Concord area of Contra Costa County struck for an increase of 5 cents per hour, to a 35cent minimum to be paid by Japanese pea and tomato farmers.49 Filipinos in Santa Clara County were reported to be organized into a union for the first time, in a local of the F .A .L .A .50 The association temporarily planned to organize the grape industry of central California, concentrated in the vicinities of Fresno, Porterville, Delano, and Bakersfield. There some 7,000 Filipinos were employed, earning a pay roll o f about $90,000 weekly.51 The F .A .L .A . attained only partial success in its next strike. This began late in October 1939, with a spontaneous walk-out of 363 Filipino and 20 Mexican brussels-sprouts pickers in the vicinity of Pescadero (San Mateo County). They demanded a wage'increase of 5 cents per hour to the 35-cent level won in other crop areas. The F .A .L .A . enrolled the strikers in a local which already had a number of members employed in the area. The rank and file elected their own local union officers.51 A deadlock developed in negotiations between union representatives and growers. The F .A .L .A . office in Stockton notified Commissioner Varona, who requested the U .S. Department of Labor to send a conciliator. The latter, meeting with F .A .L .A . president Bautista and a committee of growers' and workers' representatives, suggested temporary arbitration and investigation of the feasibility of a 35-cent scale. This the growers refused on the ground that they could not afford to pay such a wage. They offered, as a counterproposal, to sign a contract recognizing the F .A .L .A . and agreeing to pay the 35-cent wage if and when the price of brussels sprouts reached 5 cents per pound. This in turn was refused by the strikers. A week after the dispute began, the workers returned to their jobs on 27 brussels-sprouts ranches at the original wage scale. The strike was reported to have been broken through the importation of about 150 M ex icans and a few whites and Negroes from Stockton's “ skid-row."51 The strike broke out anew and on a larger scale in mid-December, when 500 workers organized in the F .A .L .A . and supported by Local No. 20 of the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . in Stockton struck for the same wage demands as before. Some violence occurred, including the shooting of two Filipino pickets and the stoning of several Mexican strike-breakers.52 A compromise wage increase of 3 cents per hour plus free housing for the workers ended the wralk-out after 1 week. The growers agreed further to reemploy all strikers without discrimination for union affili ations.53 Details of the settlement were worked out at a joint conference called by W alter Mathewson, Federal Conciliator.54 ^Philippines Mail, Vol. 9, No. 3, September 30, 1939. 48Commonwealth Times, September 30, 1939. 49Stockton Record, September 22, 1939. sophilippines Mail, Vol. I, No. 4, October 16, 1939. 51 Philippines Journal, Stockton, Vol. 1, No. 8, November 11, 1939 (p. 1). 52Idem; also San Francisco Examiner, December 17, 1939. 53San Francisco Examiner, December 21, 1939. 54Idem; also Philippines Mail, Vol. 9, No. 9, December 22, 1939. 654107®—46—13 184 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE The F .A .L .A . won a more important victory in the celery-growing areas around Pescadero (San Mateo County), Terminous, H olt, O rw ood, and other Delta centers. Here also the F .A .L .A . cooperated with U .C .A .P .A .W .A . Local No. 20 of Stockton in seeking to establish union recognition and a general wage increase to the minimum scale of 35 cents per hour. Large numbers of Filipinos employed during the winter months in this crop area were also members of U .C .A .P .A .W .A . fish-cannery unions of Seattle, Portland, and San Francisco. Nonunion Filipinos signed pledges authorizing the F .A .L .A . to represent them in collective bargaining relations with grower-employers.55 Filipino celery workers in the area were almost all organized by late fall. The two organizations, F .A .L .A . and U .C .A .P .A .W .A ., jointly re quested that grower-shippers meet with union representatives to nego tiate a schedule of union demands. W hen this was ignored, Dr. Bautista, Stockton president of the F .A .L .A ., called a strike. The resulting walk out of 2,700 workers stopped operations completely in dozens of celery fields and packing sheds in the Delta area. The strike involved remarkably little violence considering the num bers involved and the well-organized resistance of the grower-shippers. The Daily W orker claimed that “ the antilabor Associated Farmers through so-called ‘ emergency committees’ is trying sporadically to run small numbers of Japanese into the area for strikebreaking.” 56 The Oak land Tribune reported that large numbers of strikers were being evicted from their cabins and that the growers were inviting white migrants and local Japanese to take their places.57 U .C .A .P .A .W .A . Local No. 221 of Stockton was forced to sever its official connection with the F .A .L .A . during the strike, when a spokesman ot the A .F . of L. threatened the grower-shippers with a “ hot cargo” boy cott of agricultural products if they signed an agreement with a C.I.O . union. The A .F . of L. earlier had moved to support the celery workers in order to “ forestall the C.I.O . courtship of the independent Filipino A gri cultural Laborers Association.” 58 The strike ended in less than a week with an almost complete victory for the union. It won an agreement incorporating most of its original demands: (1 ) Recognition o f the F.A.L.A. as bargaining agent; (2 ) 5-cent hourly wage increase over the prevailing scale o f 25 cents to 30 cents per hour for field and packing-shed workers; (3 ) 10-hour day and time and a half for overtime; (4 ) Reinstatement o f all strikers without discrimination; (5 ) Seniority rights for workers, providing job preference next year for those now employed; (6 ) Improved housing conditions, with no charge for rent, fuel and light.5 9 Less than a week after the settlement of this strike, another walk-out included about 500 Filipinos employed at garlic planting in the vicinity of Hollister. Organized in a separate Filipino Agricultural W orkers Union, they sought to enforce the standard union demand of a 5-cent hourly increase to the 35-cent scale. They were unsuccessful, however, as the walk-out was defeated by wholesale importation of Mexican strike breakers.60 ^Philippines Mail, Vo!. 9, No. 5, November 11, 1939. 56I>aily Worker, November 30, 1939. 57Oakland Tribune, December 1, 1939. 58Idem, December 1, 1939; Philippines Mail, Vol. 9, No. 9, December 22, 1939. 59San Francisco News, December 4, 1939; Philippines Journal, Vol. 1, No. 8, November 11, 1939. " S a n Francisco News, December 29, 1939. CS. XI.---INTER-UNION CONFLICT 185 The F .A .L .A . was unable during 1940 to maintain in full the gains that it had won through strike action in the celery and asparagus crops of the Sacramento Delta region. Like other Filipino organizations the union to some degree was disrupted by intertribal jealousies.61 It met more serious reverses from grower-shippers, who were better organized and prepared now that the union had lost the initial advantage of surprise. The Philippines Journal, official organ of the F .A .L .A ., charged that growers were attempting to destroy the association by refusing to hire its mem bers in asparagus and celery cutting. Union spokesmen inveighed against “ Japanese activities in meddling with Pinoy labor.” 62 Grocerymen and merchants, many of whom were Japanese, were reported as obtaining concessions in asparagus camps, placing their own nonunion men in jobs, and requiring the men to buy their provisions exclusively from them. Japanese interests were also charged with turning growers against the F .A .L .A ., and urging them to hire their Filipino workers from the anti union Filipino Federation of America, whose members were pledged not to strike.62 Similar unsatisfactory labor conditions in the Delta celery-growing area around Terminous finally resulted in a general or crop wide walk-out called by the F .A .L .A . in 1940. This was the only agricultural field workers’ strike of importance in the United States during that year. The growers under the leadership of the Associated Farmers of California were much better organized to combat Filipino farm-labor unions than they had been the previous year. Harvesting and packing were continued by Japanese and Filipino strikebreakers recruited through two main sources, the Filipino Federation of America and an employ ment agency operated by Mrs. R. S. Morimoto, local Japanese golf star.63 T w o weeks after calling the strike, the F .A .L .A ., claiming to repre sent some 7,000 field workers in the Stockton area and almost 30,000 throughout the State, voted to affiliate with the A .F . of L. The union hoped in this way to enlist sympathetic strike support from strategically placed A .F . of L. organizations, particularly those in the transportation and canning industries. A n A .F . of L. charter as a federal labor union was granted the F .A .L .A ., permitting it to enroll all agricultural work ers regardless of race or nationality. The union meanwhile filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board against the organized growershippers.64 Negotiations reached a stalemate when the F .A .L .A . rejected a con tract proposed by the grower-shippers. The union, however, compro mised in its demands for an outright closed sh op; it was willing to accept 61Filipinos in the United States are represented by three main tribal groups—the Visayans, the Tagalogs, and the Ilicanos. While the latter groups constitute the numerical majority, the more prominent leaders in the community usually belong to the minority represented by the first group, and this situation sometimes leads to friction. It was reported, for instance, that an aspirant for the office of president of the F.A.L.A. stated at a meeting that “ the majority of Filipinos here are Ilicanos, and we Ilicanos should have a fearless Ilicano in the F.A.L.A. office to look after Ilicano interests.” The Philippines Journal in a critical editorial replied in a more nationalistic vein: “ You can no longer appeal to the Pinoys [Filipinos] from the sectional stand point. The F.A.L.A. is not an organization for Visayans, Ilicanos, or Tagalogs. It is an organ ization for Filipinos only!” (Philippines Journal Vol. 2, No. 3, Feb. 15, 1940.) 62Philippines Journal, Vol. 2, No, 3, February 15, 1940, p. 2. 63Stockton Record, November 11, 1940. 64San Francisco Examiner, November 12, 1940. 186 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE a preferential hiring agreement providing that all Filipinos employed during the 1939 season be reinstated. The strike became more critical when A .F . of L. representatives took over negotiations for the strikers. The Teamsters Union moved to declare the struck celery “ hot.” A meeting was held between repre sentatives of organized growers and A .F . of L. unions, including the special A .F . of L. organizer of cannery and agricultural wprkers in California, the president of the San Joaquin County General Labor Council, and an official of the Teamsters Union. Final application of the “ hot cargo” policy was postponed pending negotiations between I. B. Padway, attorney for the A .F . of L., and the legal counsel for organ ized grower-shippers. W hen these negotiations failed, the A .F . of L. reinforced the picket lines around celery fields and packing sheds in the Terminous area and definitely declared San Joaquin County celery to be “ hot.” 65 After several weeks the strike was finally settled on a compromise basis. Recent Developments in Agriculture and Allied Industries Activities of U.C.A.P.A.W.A. The revived militancy and broadened range of the farm-labor movement during 1939 did not last long. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . (C .I .O .), a union devoted to the organizing of field agriculture’s “ forgotten mil lions,” had carried out a costly and extensive organizing campaign in scattered rural areas during 1937-39, and had taken over the leadership of numerous ill-planned spontaneous strikes. A drastically reduced budget forced the national organization to restrict its activities throughout the country to those processing industries that were accessible to union headquarters in metropolitan centers. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . had faced the initial disadvantage in Califor nia of loss of control over those industries, particularly fruit and vege table canning, to the A .F. of L. and its affiliated National Council of Agricultural and Cannery W orkers. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . lost further ground during 1940 as the A .F . of L. extended its activities to rural areas and the organizing of field workers. Besides a few small spon taneous walk-outs that passed unnoticed in newspapers, two important field workers’ strikes occurred in the State during 1940 and 1941'; these were both led by affiliates of the A .F . of L. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . early in 1940 had publicly announced an ambitious organizing campaign for California’s agricultural workers, following its partial successes in the San Joaquin Valley cotton pickers’ strike. A writer in the San Francisco News reported that the union was “ growing faster than at any time in the history of agricultural organization in this State.” Its growth was attributed in part to the large number of active organizers, including Spanish-speaking and M exi can officers in southern California. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . claimed in a news letter to have “ 11 locals in the San Joaquin Valley with more than 1,500 members * * * each local * * * reporting a steady increase of about 4 members a w eek /’ For the first time in its history, the union 65$tockton Record, issues of December 3, 4, and 6, 1940. CH. XI.---INTER-UNION CONFLICT 187 stated, it was able to maintain an active membership during the off season months from November to March.66 Union locals in the past had usually dissolved at the end of each harvest season when workers had to move to other areas to find work. Under the U .C .A .P .A .W .A .’s new organizing policy, the State was divided into eight agricultural districts, each having a large town as a center in which was located a key local with a permanent experienced leadership. The union’s activities could then be carried on continuously in spite of the seasonal shifts of migratory workers. The strongest key local was organized in Madera, center of the 1939 cotton pickers’ strike. Another intensive organizing campaign was launched throughout the citrus belt of Tulare, Ventura, Orange, and Riverside Counties. The largest union membership in 1940 was reported in Orange County. The organization was active also in the celery and asparagus fields of the upper San Joaquin and lower Sacramento V al leys, where independently organized Filipino workers were entrenched. Here the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . optimistically claimed to have control of the Filipino Agricultural Laborers Association.67 Renewed efforts resulted in an almost continuous series of defeats. A major setback occurred when the powerful independent Filipino Agricultural Laborers Association of Stockton— the largest field workers’ union in California— joined the A .F . of L .’s National Council of A gri cultural and Cannery W orkers. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . previously had cooperated closely with the F .A .L .A . in several strikes and had counted ultimately upon winning its affiliation. Strategic control of vital truck transportation as well as fruit and vegetable canning, however, made the A .F . of L. a more useful partner for the organized Filipinos. A U .C .A .P .A .W .A . affiliate won a temporary victory, followed by eventual defeat, in packing sheds of the Imperial Valley early in 1940. The C .I.O .’s Fresh Fruit and Vegetable W orkers Union No. 18 had supplanted the A .F . of L .’s Fruit and Vegetable W orkers Union No. 18211 in Salinas. W hen it extended its activities to the Imperial Valley early in 1939 it aroused the fears of local grower-shippers. The A sso ciated Farmers of Imperial Valley began to prepare for a widespread lettuce strike, which was expected to develop as an outgrowth of the re cent cotton strike in the San Joaquin Valley. Hugh Osborne, manager of the Associated Farmers of Imperial County, claimed that strike leaders at Madera had threatened to move the strike organization to the Imperial Valley.67 The U .C .A .P .A .W .A .’s Fresh Fruit and Vegetable W orkers Union, without calling a strike, won jurisdiction over the employees of four Imperial Valley packing companies in elections ordered by the regional National Labor Relations Board.68 Later in the year the union began to lose ground to the A .F . of L. in this industry. Representatives of the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable W orkers’ Union in January 1941 demanded a closed-shop contract with grower-shippers of the Imperial Valley, in order to safeguard the U .C .A .P .A .W .A .’s position. The union called a strike on January 25, 1941, after the employers refused its demands. Pickets were placed around numerous packing sheds. 66San Francisco News, July 22, 1940. 67Bakersfield Californian, October 25, 1939. 68Los Angeles Examiner, February 14, 1940. The four packing companies were the Farley Fruit Co. of Calexico; Frank Morito Co. of Holtville; Bruce Church Co. of El Centro; and Smith Thornburg Co. of Holtville. 188 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . apparently failed to organize a sufficiently large proportion of the packing-shed workers to make the strike effec tive. It faced strong opposition from the powerful A .F . of L. Teamsters Union as well as from organized grower-shipper interests. The strike was reported to have been repudiated by employees who voted by secret ballot at numerous packing sheds. Unorganized employees as well as members of the A .F . of L. Fruit and Vegetable W orkers Union in some plants won temporary restraining orders against U .C .A .P .A .W .A . picket lines. Pickets on at least two occasions were arrested for violating these court injunctions.69 By mid-February 1941, it was evident that the strike had failed. Picketing had ceased almost entirely. Virtually all packing sheds in the valley were reported functioning normally, while the N L R B investi gated the conflicting jurisdictional claims of the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . (C .I.O .) and the A .F . of L. Charles Copperman, head of the local Team sters Union, claimed that 1,000 shed workers had signed with the A .F . of L. union.70 The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . finally abandoned the field early in 1941. It transferred as a “ gift” to the A .F . of L. its one active organization of farm workers, a union of citrus-fruit pickers and packers in Ventura and adjoining counties. . Activities of A.F of L. The A .F . of L., through its Teamster-controlled National Council of Agricultural and Cannery W orkers in California, as already noted, was improving its position in agriculture and allied industries at the expense of the C .I.O .-U .C .A .P .A .W .A . Said the weekly news letter of the A .F . of L. in January 14, 1939: The progress we have made in this particular field is little short o f remarkable. W e have established 64 local unions o f agricultural, cannery, and citrus workers. They number more than 21,305 workers.71 The California State Federation of Labor experienced local insur gent movements but they came to little. The first of these occurred in San Jose during April 1939. O f the normal force of 650 to 670 yearround workers in the Dried Fruit and Nut Packers Union, 465 voted 69The Los Angeles Times of February 2, 1941, reported that packers from several plants affected by U .C.A.P.A.W .A. picketing gathered in a mass meeting sponsored by pastors of local churches and cast a secret ballot. Out of 812 balloting, 667 voted against the strike, 108 voted for it, and 37 votes were cast out for irregularities. Shed workers at three plants in Brawley and one in El Centro were also reported to have voted overwhelmingly against the strike in a secret ballot. After a vote of 37 to 4, the shed workers of the Western Fruit Grow ers Inc. raised funds to obtain a temporary restraining order against pickets. At the A. Arena & Co. shed in Brawley, also, the A.F. of L. Vegetable Workers Union filed a restraining injuncton against the U.C.A.P.A.W .A. and demanded $1,587.60 damages for wages lost to mem bers as a result of the picket lines. (Los Angeles Times, Feb. 1, 1941.) Two pickets were arrested for violating these temporary restraining orders, and as a result U.C.A.P.A.W .A. dis trict president, T. R. Rasmussen, requested a writ of prohibition from the State supreme court to cancel injunctions issued by Judge V. N. Thompson of Imperial County. (Los Angeles Ex aminer, Feb. 7, 1941.) 70San Diego Sun, February 12, 1941. One incidental result of the strike, according to the San Diego Union, was a hastening of the adoption of new labor-saving handling and shipping methods, including dry packing and use of precooled cars. (San Diego Union, Feb. 7, 1941.) 71The disparity in membership figures between this statement and the previously estimated 50,000 to 60,000 in the northern California cannery unions alone, is to be explained by the high seasonality of employment in the industry. The 21,305 claimed in the news letter for 64 unions over the entire United States represent the stable year-round employees at work during the slack winter months. During the peak harvest and canning season of summer and fall the number employed, many of them under A.F. of L. jurisdiction, is multiplied several times. CH. XI.---INTER-UNION CONFLICT 189 three to one to disband as an A .F . of L. organization and to affiliate with the Warehousemen’s Local Nos. 1-6 of the C.I.O. The union closed its A .F . of L. office and opened a new C.I.O. local union head quarters. In response to these moves, State federation secretary Vandeleur suspended the union officers and announced that the A .F . of L. local union headquarters was reopened under a new temporary set of officers.72 A ll the important local cannery unions in northern California by early April 1939 had ratified the master agreement drawn up and signed by the State federation and the California Processors and Growers Association. The recalcitrance of Local No. 20325 of Santa Clara County ended when 500 members in a mass meeting ratified the master agreement.73 Later in the year a contract granting a compromise wage increase was negotiated between the Stockton Cannery W orkers Union Local N o. 20676 and the Pacific Grape Products, which had experienced a strike the previous year.74 The majority of A .F . of L. cannery unions in central and north ern California in May 1940 voted to accept proposals submitted by the California Processors and Growers Association, representing 20 major plants employing about 50,000 workers. The agreement granted most of the unions’ new demands, including vacations with pay and the estab lishment of occupational and pay classifications above the minimumwage base.75 It did not, however, meet the union demands for a 5-cent hourly wage increase and elimination of a 5-cent hourly differential in wage scales between urban and rural canneries.76 A n industry-wide strike was called over this issue during the 1941 season. Meyer Lewis, west coast representative of the A .F . of L., announced in 1940 that the Federation would launch a unionizing campaign in canneries, dried fruit and nut packing industries, green fruits, cotton seed, vegetable oils, citrus, and citrus byproducts plants in southern California.77 The A .F . of L. met considerable resistance in its attempts to apply the wage standards of northern California to the processing industries in southern counties. The union was unable to win its demands for a closed-shop contract and higher wages in citrus-fruit canneries in the Hemet Valley (Riverside County). Cannery operators refused to accept the union standards on the ground that the greater cost involved in packing smaller and lower-quality fruit, together with the higher trans portation costs in serving more-isolated rural communities, rendered the companies unable to afford the wage scales paid by canneries in northern California.78 The A .F . of L. expanded rapidly in membership among field workers in California during 1940 and 1941. Its m ajor success lay in winning the affiliation of the Filipino Agricultural Laborers Association. Early in 1941 the A .F . of L. took part in the largest, most prolonged, and 72San Jose Mercury Herald, April 23, 1939. 73Idem, April 7, 1939. Critics of the A.F. of L. pointed out, however, that this vote rep resented only a fraction of the total membership, since it did not include the thousands sea sonally employed during the summer months, who also came under the union’s jurisdiction. 74The union had asked an increase from 40 cents per hour for men and 35 cents for women to a level of 5254 and 44 cents, respectively. Under the compromise agreement wage scales were established at 4754 and 3854 cents, respectively, and all strikers and discriminatorily dis charged workers were rehired. (Stockton Record, July 3, 1939.) 75San Francisco News, May 1, 1940. 76San Francisco Examiner, April 27, 1940. 77San Francisco News, May 1, 1940. 78Los Angeles Times, September 1. 1939. 190 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE highly publicized field workers’ strike to occur in California for several years. The walk-out of several thousand citrus-fruit workers in V en tura County ultimately had repercussions throughout the State. The entrance of the Teamsters Union into the conflict again brought the “ hot cargo” issue to the fore. The strike, according to some reports, followed a “ behind-thescenes deal” between the A .F . of L. and the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . (C .I.O .). The U .C .A .P .A .W .A ., faced with inadequate funds and a declining membership, was unable to continue its organizing drive in the citrus industry, where it had been competing for several years with the A .F . of L. Consequently it turned over its membership to the A .F . of L. Agricultural and Citrus W orkers Union. “ Pedro Pete” Peterson, for mer official of the International Longshoremen’s Association, was ap pointed special organizer of the new union. The strike apparently was called prematurely. One theory was that “ Pedro Pete” feared that the C.I.O. intended to recapture the union after the A .F . of L. had spent much time and money in organizing the citrus workers. Also, the A .F . of L. organizers had intended to call a strike on only a few large ranches, the employees of which were well organized. The union hoped to win its demands for recognition, a 10cent hourly increase in wages, and adjustment of “ stand-by time” dur ing inclement weather. Union members constituted a small fraction of all citrus-fruit work ers in the county. The strike in late January, nevertheless, “ spread like wildfire,” according to the Ventura Star Free Press of January 31, 1941. Many unorganized workers joined in a series of spontaneous walk-outs. Within a few days the movement involved approximately 1,500 pickers and packing-shed workers employed by cooperative grow ing and packing associations in the vicinities of Camarillo, Moorpark, Oxnard, Port Hueneme, and Saticoy. By the second week of Febru ary about 4,000 workers were affected.79 The strike assumed particular significance when officers of the A gri cultural and Citrus W orkers Union demanded active support from other A .F . of L. affiliates, particularly the Brotherhood of Teamsters. E. Vandeleur, secretary, and C. J. Haggerty, president of the California State Federation of Labor, promised fullest support of the lemon pickers’ collective-bargaining demands. A secondary boycott was announced, and teamsters were instructed not to handle lemons grown in Ventura County.80 A byproducts plant in Corona whose employees were organ ized in the A .F . of L. also refused to handle Ventura County fruit.81 U nion circles scouted the possibilities of applying the secondary boycott throughout the State and even to eastern markets. Grower-employers and their supporters mobilized their forces to com bat the threatened union progress. The Los Angeles Times of March 7, 1941, reported that “ an alarm and rallying call was broadcast through out California * * * for the support of agriculture against the A .F . of L. campaign to unionize farms and ranches.” Representatives of the Associated Farmers and the Farm Bureau notified city government officials throughout the State that farmers collectively would refuse to buy from cities which did not keep farm-to-con sumer routes open and free from “ union molestation.” 81 Almon E. Roth, president of the San 79Los Angeles Times, February 7, 1941. 80Ventura Star Free Press, February 20, 1941. 81 Los Angeles Times, February 23, 1941. CH. XI.---INTER-UNION CONFLICT 191 Francisco Employers Council, sent a wire to the organized citrus growers protesting the union's secondary boycott and promising to “ do everything we possibly can to aid you [growers] in the distribution of your lemons in this area.” 82 Alfred J. Lundberg, president o f the Cali fornia State Chamber of Commerce, stated officially that— * * * the Board o f Directors went on record in favor o f legislation to outlaw the secondary boycott and hot cargo. W e are now in the process o f throwing the full strength of our State-wide organization and our regional councils behind this proposed legislation. (Ventura Star Free Press, March 7, 1941.) The strike itself meanwhile continued to grow. It became general in the Corona area early in March as pickers, packers, and truckers walked out of orchards and packing sheds of the Orange Heights and Corona Citrus Associations. Late in February a mass meeting of 1,000 growers in 28 citrus associations of Ventura County affiliated to the California Fruit Growers Exchange pledged a “ fight to the finish” and made plans to recruit labor from all possible sources to replace strikers.83 The State Relief Administration and the Federal Farm Security Administration opened offices in the county, the latter furnishing relief to strikers who were ineligible for State relief because of legal residence requirements.84 Organized growers and their sympathizers strongly opposed this policy. They threatened that a legislative relief committee would conduct a “ thorough investigation” of charges that several hundred strikers had been certified for relief since the strike began.85 A grower in Saticoy was the first to accede to union demands by signing a temporary contract to pay pickers 15 cents per box, a sub stantial increase in rates over the prevailing scale.86 The growers’ ranks were far from broken, however. Union finances were strained through maintaining soup kitchens and living quarters for several hun dred evicted strikers. Numerous pickets were arrested on charges of disturbing the peace by “ heckling” nonunion pickers employed in har vesting lemons. The strike dragged on for several months, not ending until May. Rumors of a “ sell-out” were current. “ Pedro Pete” Peterson was accused of settling with the growers for a compromise agreement which covered only the small fraction of workers who had been organized beforehand by the A .F . of L., leaving the unorganized majority stranded. Some union leaders and Mexican workers claimed that the strike was broken by an influx of “ Okies and Arkies” who had read of the strike in eastern papers. 82Los Angeles Examiner, March 8, 1941. 83Los Angeles Times, February 22, 1941. The State Labor Commissioner later conducted hearings on union charges that officials of the Seabord Lemon Association violated the labor code by misrepresenting conditions in Ventura County to laborers of other areas. He also reviewed testimony to the effect that Ventura Col lege had violated the code by asking students to apply for lemon-picking jobs. (Ventura Star Free Press, Feb. 21, 1941.) 84Los Angeles Examiner, March 8, 1941. . 88The Relief Supervisor pointed out that there were some 1,200 applications for relief, of which S33 cases were pending, while rejections were running about 60 percent. (Los Angeles Examiner, Mar. 15, 1941.) In subsequent testimony at the hearings it was brought out that strikers were granted relief after the local State Employment Service office had certified that there was no work available because of strike conditions in the Ventura County lemon groves. (Los Angeles Times, Mar. 18, 1941.) 86Los Angeles Times, March 7, 1941. 87Idem, March 10, 1941. 192 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE The temper of industrial urban and agrarian interests in California was unmistakably hostile to the new A .F . of L. organizing drive. It was one of the few disputes in which “ Communist agitation” was not the main issue. Anti-unionism had broadened; employers in agriculture like their prototypes in other industries, tended to identify their par ticular interests with those of the Nation. The Los Angeles Times of February 17, 1941, expressed this view strongly in a long editorial: California is at this moment face to face with a harvest labor situation that is truly alarming. Both C.I.O. and A.F. of L. trouble makers are bearing down with strikes, secondary boycotts, picketing, and “ hot cargo” pressure on growers trying to provide food and vital raw materials needed as never before. The condition exists in almost every major producing area in the State and in practically every instance is resulting in bottlenecks in harvesting, packing, processing, and transportation. Most o f the trouble arises from union squabblings over so-called “ collective bargaining rights” which actually means merely the inside track on membership and dues collections; few o f the controversies involve disputes over wages and working conditions. People are primarily concerned these days about the efficacy o f defense activities and the Associated Farmers can count on ample support if they decide, as they have intimated they may, to seek new legislation for the protection of agriculture’s endeavors to that end. Ch apter XII.— Unionism in Arizona Seasonal Labor and Large-Scale Farms Arizona probably has diverged from the family-farm ideal more sharply than any other important agricultural State. The land available for cultivation is limited primarily to areas accessible to the water sup plies necessary for irrigation. Ownership and control of such lands is even more concentrated in Arizona than in California. Units of 500 acres and over composed 2.4 percent of all irrigated farms ahd 20 per cent of the acreage of such farms, while farms of 100 to 499 acres accounted for 25 percent of all irrigated farms and 49 percent of their acreage in 1935.1 Statistics on the employment of farm labor illustrate this concentration. Large agricultural enterprises hiring laborers as groups, rather than as individual farm hands, are relatively most preva lent in A rizona; no other State in the country has reported so high a proportion of such farms. The proportion of farms which hired 10 or more laborers each in 1935 was 0.2 percent for the United States as a whole; 1.3 percent for California, and 2.4 percent for Arizona.1 In 2 the country at large, approximately a sixth of all hired farm laborers were employed on farms having 8 or more workers; in California, 42 percent of all farm laborers were employed on such farms, and in A ri zona, 68 percent.3 Large farms hiring laborers in groups have tended to displace family farms. Irrigated land was used increasingly for the production of a few intensively grown commercial crops for sale in distant markets. Cotton has long been most important among these products. From 1929 to 1931, for instance, it contributed approximately 40 percent of the total crop income for Arizona, and in the late thirties it assumed increasing importance.4 Citrus fruits, lettuce, and melons have come next in amount of irrigated land and the number of laborers employed. Arizona farming became more dependent upon hired laborers, as contrasted with family workers, as the acreage in cotton, citrus fruit, lettuce, and truck crops continued to expand during the twenties and thirties.5 B y 1935 hired labor comprised 63 percent of all labor on farms in the counties containing Arizona’s principal irrigated areas.6 The heavy capital investments required for adequate use of irriga tion facilities and farm machinery in producing special cash crops fa vored the large farm unit as against the small. In the opinion of Dr. E. D. Tetreau, Professor of Rural Sociology at the University of A ri zona— 1E. D. Tetreau: Social Organization in Arizona’s Irrigated Farms, in Rural Sociology, Vol. V, No. 2, 1940 (p. 200). 2Idem <p. 203). 3W itt Bowden: Three Decades of Farm Labor. U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Serial No. R-796 (pp. 8-9), 1937. 4Present-Day Agriculture in Arizona, Bulletin No. 141, Agricultural Experiment Station, College of Agriculture, University of Arizona, Tucson, 1932 (p. 10). 5E. D. Tetreau: Hired Labor Requirements on Arizona Irrigated Farms. Bulletin No. 160, Synopsis, Agricultural Experiment Station, College of Agriculture, University of Arizona, Tuc son, May 1938. 6Idem (p. 200). 193 194 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE Markets and machines definitely threaten the family-size farm in Arizona’s irri gated areas. Commercialized and mechanized farming experts and operators exploit land and water resources, using cheap money and cheap labor to the exhaustion of soil fertility and often to the detriment o f local institutions.8 Seasonality of employment for hired farm laborers became relatively more extreme in Arizona than in any other State. As irrigated areas specialized increasingly in a few crops requiring large numbers of laborers, the period of harvesting became shorter. A smaller proportion of regular farm labor was used. The demand for seasonal labor grew in terms of numbers but was concentrated in shorter periods throughout the year. Man-days of labor required during the peak of the season in November, as compared with the nadir in March, was roughly 6 to 1 by the late thirties. F or all irrigated areas in Arizona, more than twothirds of the labor-hours, throughout the year were performed by seasonal day labor, the remaining third being done by farm hands paid by the month or the year.8 The irrigated areas varied widely in their require ments of seasonal labor. The Salt River Valley, largest and most diversi fied in crops, was most regular in its labor demands; the Casa Grande Valley, specializing in cotton, was most seasonal. O f each l',000 mandays of hired labor, 356 were those of regular labor and 644 were those of seasonal labor in the Salt River V alley; in the Casa Grande Valley the corresponding numbers were 147 and 853. The Upper Gila, Yum aGila and Santa Cruz Valleys came between these extremes.8 Arizona's large farms have been in a strategic geographical position. The State lies between California and the Dust Bowl regions o f the Southwest, and the more important highways traverse the irrigated farming regions. Hence, large farms specializing in intensively grown cash crops have been able to utilize the continuous stream of displaced farm families migrating to California. A substantial minority of its seasonal workers migrate regularly to Arizona from Texas, New Mexico, and particularly California, following the harvests. Because of the continuous migration and communication between Arizona and California, agricultural workers in the former State have been influenced by labor movements in the latter. Many have worked for large-scale employers with branch plants and landholdings in both States. Therefore, collective bargaining, to be effective, has had to be interstate in scope. The more important instances of collective action among Arizona farm laborers were a sort of “ backwash” from Califor nia. During the late thirties the more prominent agricultural labor unions in Arizona were usually under the jurisdiction of parent organi zations in California. The structure of Arizona's agriculture, dominated as it was by largescale farms whose demand for labor was highly seasonal, tended to generate labor-employer conflict. A continual labor surplus and severe job competition from transient laborers from M exico and the South west at the same time weakened farm laborers' bargaining power. For the majority, the duration of employment and length of residence in Arizona was short. Hence they were considerably more difficult to unionize than migratory workers in California. 8E. D. Tetreau: Hired Labor Requirements on Arizona Irrigated Farms. Bulletin No. 160, Synopsis, Agricultural Experiment Station, College of Agriculture, University of Arizona, Tuc son. May 1938. CH. XII.---UNIONISM IN ARIZONA 195 Beginnings of Farm-Labor Unionism Sporadic collective action among Arizona’s agricultural workers began during the First W orld W ar years. A t that time white American farm laborers, who were usually the more skilled or supervisory ranch hands, had a tradition of individual action and loyalty to the owner or “ old man.” Mexican laborers in both mining and agriculture, how ever, were influenced by the activities of the Industrial W orkers of the W orld and other unions.9 Several strikes occurred during the war years among Mexican miners in Arizona who had belonged to unions affiliated to the Western Federation of Miners, the I.W .W ., and the American Federation of Labor. Many agricultural laborers had also worked in mines at various times and thus had had some experience with labor unionism. Federal Labor Unions of Cotton Pickers The Arizona State Federation of Labor became interested in agri cultural workers in the early 1920’s. During the postwar slump which closed down many mines in northern M exico and Arizona, large num bers of unemployed miners were recruited to pick cotton. Lester Doane, State representative of the A .F . of L., together with C. N. Idar, A .F. of L. ace Mexican organizer, conducted a temporarily successful union izing campaign among these workers. During 1921 these two organized 14 federal labor unions of cotton pickers, averaging 300 to 400 mem bers each, in the largest towns of Maricopa County.101 The success of the campaign was due partly to the fact that Doane had been a foreman in a copper mine in Callandria, M exico, just across the border from Bisbee, Ariz. W hen the mine was closed during the postwar, depression, many unemployed Mexicans were recruited for cotton picking. During his organizing campaign, according to his state ments, he met men in almost every camp who had worked under him in Callandria. On several occasions these men protected the organizers from threatened violence and arrest at the hands of growers and local authorities.1 1 Doane called a wage conference at the beginning of the cotton-picking season, after a network of locals had been established. Representatives of organized growers and pickers, together with the county sheriff and an official of the Mexican Government, met to discuss wage rates and working conditions. The Mexican official supported the organized pickers by threatening to have them repatriated and to close the border to further immigration to Arizona, unless conditions were improved. A ccording to Doane, he even threatened to have the growers’ labor recruiting agents arrested in Mexico. Through such organized pressure the pickers were able to win a substantial increase in rates— from the prevailing 2 % cents per pound up to 4 cents.1 1 The federal labor unions lasted only one season, however. Large numbers of cotton pickers returned to M exico, and most of the others in time migrated to other areas or were absorbed into other industries. 9Arizona, A State Guide, (W P A American Guide Series, New York, 1940) p. 97. 10Coldwater, Buckeye, Glendale, Cashion, Avondale, Tolleson, Alhambra, Peoria, Scottsdale, Tempe. Mesa, Gilbert, Chandler, and Higley. 11 Field notes. 196 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE Strike of Puerto Ricans The first highly publicized strike among cotton pickers in Arizona occurred during the late twenties as a result of labor-recruiting activities by organized growers. A s greater limitations on the immigration of Mexicans were being imposed by the U. S. Department of Labor, the growers searched for alternative labor supplies. In 1926 several hun dred Puerto Ricans, who were not subject to the immigration restric tions applied to Mexicans, were brought into Arizona. Labor troubles soon developed. A spontaneous strike broke out, and the Arizona State Federation of Labor, among other sympathizers, supported the m ove ment. Many Puerto Rican strikers were brought to Phoenix, where they were fed and lodged, first in the Labor Temple and later in exhibi tion buildings at the State Fair Grounds. In time they returned to work on the cotton ranches and were later absorbed into other employments.12 A n attempt was made at the same time by the A .F . of L. to organize the migratory fruit and vegetable packing-shed workers but, as in Cali fornia during this period, a few short-lived local unions were the only result. The “ fruit tramps” relied rather upon informal “ job action” tactics to enforce their immediate collective demands.13 Trade Union Unity League in the Thirties The effects of the campaign of the Cannery and Agricultural W o rk ers Industrial Union in California agriculture were felt in Arizona dur ing the depression years of the early 1930’s. The Trade Union Unity League became active in 1933, organizing unemployed in the cities and seasonal workers in the rural areas during the harvest season. In A ri zona these two classes of workers were largely interchangeable. The agitation by Communist organizers culminated in two large strikes, involving several thousand cotton pickers. The tactics were similar to those employed in California, though the opposition from growers and law-enforcement officers was not so violent. A few organizers of the C .& A .W .I.U . maintained State head quarters in Phoenix. They regularly visited the camps o f migratory workers in several counties, to address mass meetings and establish local unions. Strike and negotiating committees were elected in each community, to organize and bargain collectively with local employers. These groups in turn met regularly with the State executive of the C .& A .W .I.U . in Phoenix, to coordinate union activities over a wide area. Outside support was furnished through the W orkers Interna tional Relief and the International Labor Defense. The first strike involved approximately 2,500 cotton pickers in Yuma County for several days during September 1933 and succeeded in win ning a general wage increase.14 The union claimed that agreements covering wages and working conditions were signed with individual growers. The extreme transiency of the pickers, however, made unions 12M. C. Brown and O. Cassmore: Migratory Cotton Pickers in Arizona. Washington, Works Progress Administration, 1939 (p. 67). 13Idem (p. 100). 14Josiah Folsom: Labor Disputes in Agriculture, 1927-38 (unpublished). CH. XII.---UNIONISM IN ARIZONA 197 impossible to maintain, and the C .& A .W .I.U . locals did not last beyond the 1933 harvest season. T.U .U .L . organizers established a local union of cotton pickers in Coolidge (Pinal County) during the winter picking season of 1933. Its chief purpose was to combat the current policy of discharging relief clients in order to have them available for farm work at low wages. In the spring of 1934, when it was apparent that the C .& A .W .I.U . was rapidly losing ground on the Pacific Coast, the local asked for and received a charter from the A .F . of L. as Federal Labor Union No. 19542. Coolidge was the only agricultural-labor center organized at the time. It furnished the focal point for directing a second strike of cotton pickers, which spread throughout the Salt River Valley of Maricopa County during September 1934. The most active organizers behind this movement were the T.U .U .L . members within the local union. They employed tactics roughly similar to those of the previous strike. Camp meetings were held in unorganized centers such as Chandler, Mesa, and Buckeye, strike and negotiation committees were elected, and “ guerilla pickets” were used to spread the strike to fields in which picking opera tions continued. Little violence was reported, compared with the cotton strike in California during 1933, though Clay Naff, former Communist organizer in Arizona, stated later that on one occasion he narrowly escaped being lynched by irate growers.15 Ultimately, the strike included several thousand pickers in Maricopa County. This strike resulted in State intervention and arbitration, for the first time in Arizona agriculture. Under orders from Governor Moeur, one representative from the growers and one from the pickers (chosen from the federal labor union in Coolidge) met with a member from the Labor Department of the State Industrial Commission to decide the terms of settlement.16 The final decision of the arbitration board awarded an increase of 15 cents per hundredweight to the pickers, raising the scale from 60 to 75 cents. Several local unions were established during the following year in such centers as Casa Grande, Chandler, and Phoenix. Following the collapse of the C.& A.W .I.U . on the Pacific Coast in 1934 and the dis solution of the Trade Union Unity League in 1935, left-wing organizers transferred their affiliations to the A .F . of L. Meanwhile Lester Doane, State organizer and president of the Arizona State Federation of Labor, again became active in unionizing miners, construction workers, and agricultural laborers. During the period 1934-36, 18 federal labor unions of agricultural and industrial workers were chartered in various communities, but none of them attempted direct collective bargaining in agriculture. Unionism Among Shed Workers Trade-unionism among the fruit and vegetable packing-shed work ers of Arizona began in 1933. The rapid growth of the Vegetable Packers Association of Salinas, Calif, (later chartered as the Fruit and 15Los Angeles Examiner, April 22 and 23, 1936. Articles by Clay Naff, former organizer of the Trade Union Unity League. 16Phoenix Gazette, September 14, 1934 (p. 4). 198 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE Vegetable W orkers Union Local No. 18211) was reflected in southern California and Arizona. Many of the same “ fruit tramps” (as the packing-shed workers were called) worked in both regions during certain months each year in the course of their seasonal migrations. Considerable unrest resulted from the low. wage levels in the industry; the prevailing minimum rate had fallen from 70 cents per hour in 1929 to 25 cents per hour in 1933. A n organizing campaign backed by the Phoenix Central Labor Council and the Arizona State Federation o fs Labor began during the fall and winter of 1933. For the first time in many Arizona plants, packing-shed workers carried on collective bargaining with growershippers. A number of scattered strikes broke out in Phoenix and Yuma during the season, before the workers had been sufficiently well-organized to plan beforehand an adequate program of collective action. Even so, in most of these the strikers won their demands. In one instance a delegation persuaded Governor Moeur to bring pressure upon a ship ping company, to reinstate several discharged strikers. Under the threat of revocation of its license to operate, the company complied with the demand. In December 1933, the A .F . of L. chartered the Fruit and Vegetable W orkers Union Local 19115 of Phoenix. For the first 2 years it had difficulty functioning effectively, because its purely local jurisdiction was unsuitable for workers who migrated to several States each year. It attempted to overcome this drawback by establishing a sublocal in Yuma, the other main center for packing and shipping fruits and vege tables in Arizona. A jurisdictional dispute developed between the California and A ri zona unions when the president of Salinas Local No. 18211 claimed control over dues paid by those of its members who worked seasonally in Yuma. This was settled when the west coast representative of the A .F . of L. met with officials of the Arizona and California State Fed erations and with representatives of the two shed workers’ unions. It was ruled that each was to have State-wide jurisdiction in the fruit and vegetable packing industry. Union officials estimated that some 3,000 fruit and vegetable packing house workers possessed membership cards in Local No. 19115 by April 1936.17 The sub-local in Yuma, however, subsequently became better organized and more closely knit than the parent body in Phoenix. During 1935 and 1936 the former obtained signed agreements with shipping companies (which the Phoenix local never was able to d o ), establishing standard union wages and working conditions, closed shop, and union label on all products packed and shipped.18 In Phoenix the shed workers, although in closer contact with established urban A .F . of L. unions, were more widely scattered in their living quarters and places of employment. In the opinion of union organizers, they were too accessible to influences opposed to unionism. The Phoenix local maintained union standards by verbal agreement, backed by the rank and file’s readiness to apply “ job action/’ In April 1936, for instance, a sit-down strike in the Hawes shed in Chandler forced the management to rehire a discharged union employee and pay him the established union wage.19 In January 1937, a half-day sit-down strike in the P. J. 17Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 10, May 1936 (p. 1). 18Idem, Vol. I, No. 13, August 1936 (p. 1). 19Idem, Vol. I, No. 10, May 1936 (p. 1). CH. XII.---UNIONISM IN ARIZONA 199 Linde shed near Phoenix forced the company to rehire a discharged union packer and to fire six former nonunion strikebreakers.20 Early in 1937 the Fruit and Vegetable W orkers Union began nego tiations with the Farmers Union of Arizona, which had been organized late in 1936. This latter organization directed its main appeals to small farmers who felt that they suffered disadvantages in bargaining with the larger grower-shipper interests. A program of united action was planned for the common interests of workers and small farmers. The possibility of using both a labor union and farmers' union label on produce grown and packed by members of these organizations was discussed by the Central Labor Council of Phoenix, but little or nothing came of it. State-Wide Unionism and the U.C.A.P.A.W.A. There was little direct cooperation between organized packing-shed workers and field laborers during the first few years of unionism. Their organizations developed independently of each other. The shed workers resisted any attempts, whether in unions or elsewhere, to classify them as agricultural workers. These skilled and semiskilled laborers feared that they would be subjected to the discrimination, low social status, and lack of legal protection suffered by field workers. Furthermore, the two groups were divided by racial as well as occupational differences. White shed workers, while sympathetic to the unionizing of field laborers, generally refused to work beside members of a nonwhite race or even to allow them to work inside a packing shed. This attitude had devel oped, as shed workers were quick to explain, from the tendency of nonwhite workers (as members of a minority) to stick together and help one another obtain jobs. T o allow one or a few to work in a shed, the whites felt, would be a “ thin edge of the wedge." The nonwhites in time would become available to the employer in such numbers that the whites would be displaced, wage rates would be depressed, and any organization of whites for their own protection would be rendered ineffective. Several incidents in California had exposed the bargaining weak nesses of unionism and strike action carried on exclusively by white shed workers against highly integrated grower-shipper enterprises. The Fruit and Vegetable W orkers Union, consequently, began to cooperate with other affiliates of the State Federation of Labor in promoting the organization of field workers in federal labor unions. Organized shed workers in Yuma held open meetings for field laborers in the lettuce and cantaloup crops, to “ educate" them as a preliminary step to union izing them later. A n Arizona Agricultural W orkers Organizing Com mittee was established in March 1937, by the F .V .W .U . of Yuma and Phoenix.21 The National Committee to A id Agricultural W orkers sought with some success to bring about a closer cooperation between fruit and vege table shed workers' unions. By late 1936 these groups were beginning to favor the organization of a separate international union for all work ers in agriculture and related industries. The fruit and vegetable pack ers’ unions of Arizona and California accordingly sent delegates to the 2°Rural Worker, Vol. II, No. 5, May 1937 (p. 4). 21Idem, Vol. II, No. 4, April 1937 (p. 1). 654107°—46—14 200 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE national c o n v e n t i o n i n Denver during July 1937, when the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . was formed. The Yuma packing-shed local voted to affiliate with the new C .I.O . International, and the Phoenix local soon followed. A n international representative of the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . was ap pointed late in 1937 to expand and coordinate the activities of local organizations among field and shed workers of Arizona. During the winter of 1937 a new union of field workers was organized in Yuma and chartered as U .C .A .P .A .W .A . Local No. 130. In March 1938. in protest against a 15-percent wage cut at the H . P. Garin Co., it conducted a strike of cutters, loaders, and teamsters, as well as field laborers. The union demanded recognition, reinstatement with back pay for discharged members, wages of 35 cents per hour for field packers. 40 cents for cutters, and 50 cents for loaders, as well as double pay for holiday work.22 In the course of the walk-out, according to union spokesmen, Indian and Filipino workers brought in as “ scabs” joined the picket lines.23 On the fifth day of the strike, a union newspaper reported, “ hired thugs and vigilantes under the leadership of a former judge launched a mass assault on the picket line.” 23 The strike was finally broken and wage rates remained the same as before. Another local was chartered by the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . in Nogales, on the Mexican border. Previously the independent Santa Cruz Industrial Union had been formed and later chartered as a federal labor union of the A .F . of L. This organization was composed mainly of nonagricultural labor in general construction work, but an attempt was made to enlist small cattle ranchers of the vicinity. It was too far removed from the center of union activity in the Phoenix area, however, to be a permanent or effective local. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A .’s most successful venture in Arizona was its leadership of the much-publicized Commodity March in the spring of 1938. During the cotton-picking season of late 1937-38 the Farm Labor Service (recruiting agency for the cotton growers) had overextended its activities. It had enticed cotton pickers to the State in such large numbers that the resulting decrease in employment and earnings left destitute several thousand families in the Salt River Valley at the end of the season. They were without the means either to move on to other jobs or to return to their home States.24 The international representative of the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . organized parades and demonstrations of cotton pickers and established workers’ committees to confer with the Governor.25 Newspapers gave wide pub licity to the county health officer’s reports of sickness and starvation.26 Pressure was brought to bear on the State and Federal Governments to provide adequate emergency relief. The agitation finally brought improvement in conditions for cotton pickers, as well as greater prestige for the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . The Farm Security Administration immediately made available, for relief, $50,000 from its regional office and the State Department of Health dispatched 22CIO News, March 12, 1938. 23People’s World (San Francisco), December 30, 1938. 24M. C. Brown and O. Cassmore: Migratory Cotton Pickers in Arizona. Washington, W PA Social Research Division, 1913. 25Phoenix Gazette, March 21, 1938 (p. 1); CIO News, March 19, 1938 (p. 2). 26Phoenix Gazette, March 23, 1938: Disease and Poverty Rampant in Cotton Camps. CH. XII.---UNIONISM IN ARIZONA 201 nurses and case workers to various cotton camps in the Valley. H ous ing for the laborers was improved through the establishment of F S A migratory housing units.27 Restrictions were imposed on activities of the growers’ Farm Labor Service, and a more adequate and rational plan for labor recruiting was developed through cooperation of State and Federal relief and employment agencies. The chief gain to the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . was its recognition by vari ous State and Federal Government officials as the spokesman for em ployed and unemployed cotton pickers.28 After this success the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . made rapid increases in membership among hitherto unorganized field laborers, and among N egro workers in cotton com presses and cotton-oil mills near Phoenix. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . was active also in a strike of approximately 250 strawberry pickers, chiefly Mexicans and native whites, near Phoenix during April 1938,29 a number of whom had been involved in the Com modity March the previous month. The April walk-out, spontaneous and loosely organized, was in protest against a decrease in wage rates by 5 cents a crate from the previous season’s scale of 25 cents.29 Before the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . organizers assumed control, internal dissension, reported to be racial in origin, had begun to split the ranks of the strikers. The strike soon ended when it met with violence and intimi dation from civil authorities, supported by the Associated. Farmers of Arizona.30 The effects of these spontaneous movements during early 1938, supplemented by money and organizing personnel provided by the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . national executive, brought a rapid increase in union membership in Arizona. The international representative organized Local N o. 191 as one large comprehensive union, centered in Phoenix. It was composed of four main classes of workers: Field laborers, shed workers, cotton-oil mill, and cotton-compress employees. Packing-shed workers, previously organized in A .F . of L. Local No. 19115, were transferrred to the new organization, to which they now paid their dues. The organization proved to be too unwieldy to function effectively. Its executive board was composed of working delegates from sub locals in various sections of the Salt River Valley, and it was difficult for them to convene for board meetings. A second difficulty arose from the fact that delegates from sublocals in varied occupations each had distinct policies to propose; this made it hard for them to meet on com mon ground. There was strong sentiment among the packers, for instance, to remain organized in a separate union which would be affiliated to, but not absorbed in, a central executive body. Following much friction and frequent changes in international rep resentatives for the State, the Phoenix union was finally reorganized. Packing-shed workers were chartered separately as Local N o. 78, with headquarters in Phoenix; organized cotton-oil mill and cotton-compress workers were chartered as Local No. 306 of Phoenix; and five separate field workers’ locals, varying in size from 50 to 300 members, were established in Phoenix, Chandler, Mesa, Glendale, and Buckeye. Cen tral union headquarters were later transferred to Los Angeles, under the direct jurisdiction of the District No. 2 U.C.A.P.A.W.A. execu tive. 27Phoenix Gazette, September 17, 1938 (p. 1). «8CIO News, Vol. I, No. 17, March 24. 1938 (p. 2). 29Phoenix Gazette, April 9, 1938 (p. 1). 30Field notes. 202 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE The processing workers made some notable gains during 1938 and 1939. N egro members of the Cotton Oil Mill and Compress W orkers Union won a suit filed with the National Labor Relations Board against the Anderson Clayton Co. The company was forced to reinstate with back pay 16 members discharged for union activity. In the fall of 1938 and again in the spring of 1939 the local obtained signed collective agree ments with the company, bringing substantial increases in basic wage scales, union recognition, and overtime rates. However, a strike of a months’ duration in October 1939, resulted in only compromise gains, and though a new agreement was signed, the position of the union became precarious. Shed workers in late 1938 succeeded, with a vote of 760 to 252 in a N L R B election, in establishing the jurisdiction of Local No. 78 over 26 sheds in the Salt River Valley area near Phpenix. The ship pers joined with the Western Growers Protective Association in an unsuccessful appeal against the Labor Board’s decision, on the grounds that shed workers should be classed as agricultural and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the N L R B .31 The union won signed collective agree ments granting union wages and working conditions in the m ajor pack ing sheds of Yuma. Field workers’ locals chartered near Phoenix meanwhile tried early in 1939 to win improvements for their members in the lettuce harvest. Representatives of the locals met regularly in a Field W orkers Coun cil in Phoenix. This body was designed to coordinate the activities and standardize the demands of the unions. Farm employers and county officials as well as union members and sympathizers were invited to open hearings held by the union organizers to air the grievances of workers. W orkers’ committees were formed to negotiate with repre sentatives of the growers and shippers. The unions demanded recognition, free transportation to and from the fields, a minimum wage of 45 cents per hour and guaranty of 4 hours’ work when called to the fields, time and a half for overtime after 8 hours and for Sundays and holidays, employment without dis crimination against unionists, and wages in cash or by check.32 The unions were not sufficiently well organized to enforce their demands. The Associated Farmers of Arizona mobilized its forces to support local authorities against the menace of a field workers’ strike, and open threats of violence forestalled any attempts by the workers. Sheriff Lon Jordon of Maricopa County was reported to have said that he was “ watching the situation closely, and * * * prepared at a moment’s notice to dispatch a large force of men to any sector of the Valley to quell any uprising and throw the ringleaders in jail.” 33 This was the last activity of the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . in Arizona. The State organization was abandoned and the local unions disappeared when the international was forced, because of financial stringency, to restrict its organizing activities and reduce its personnel. Only the local N egro Cotton Oil Mill and Compress W orkers Union remained. 31CIO News, January 2, 1939 (p. 1). 32See Appendix I (p. 432). 33Phoenix Gazette, March 30, 1939 (p. 6). N. H. Powers, who headed a negotiation committee, said that a prominent contractor told him: “ W e just want you to call a strike—we are ready—you all will be shot down like dogs.” (Peo ple's World, San Francisco, Apr. 3, 1939, p. 2.) Chapter XIII.— Unionism in the Pacific Northwest Migratory Labor and Seasonal Agriculture The structure of farm operations in the Northwest has not been favorable to the organization of rural labor. N o stable or effective union movement developed among farm workers in this region during the thirties, despite support from powerful urban labor organizations. Farming in most of the Pacific Northwest has remained small, and the majority of farm operators belong in the category of “ working” or “ fam ily” farmers. Farm laborers have been mainly “ hired men,” scattered in location and employed individually. Collective bargaining and strikes have rarely occurred among this group. Certain limited areas stand out in contrast to this usual pattern, and it was in these that sporadic labor trouble broke out from time to time. Large and small farms growing intensive cash crops and employing large gangs of seasonal workers developed in scattered “ pockets” — sections of valley country along the H ood and Willamette Rivers in Oregon, the W hite River in western Washington, the Yakima and Wenatchee Rivers in central Washington, and the Snake River in Idaho. Before the First W orld W ar, moreover, large-scale wheat farms in east ern Washington and Oregon hired crews of seasonal harvest hands who migrated regularly from the Middle W est. Industrialized farming in these areas gave rise to unrest and a pro pensity to collective action among seasonal workers. Their bargaining position was consistently weak, however, and this precluded their organizing effective unions. Each valley area specialized in one or a few crops requiring large numbers of workers— berries and truck vege tables in the W hite River Valley, hops in Willamette, apples in W enat chee, hops and apples in H ood and Yakima, and peas in the Snake River Valley. Seasonality of work was extreme in such areas, and the labor recruited temporarily for harvesting was exceedingly heterogeneous. During the depression years of the 1930’s, competition for jobs became even more severe than in California, and the labor market was corres pondingly disorganized. California’s migratory workers, some of whom had regularly followed the crop harvests northward into Oregon, W ash ington, and Idaho, came in increasing numbers during the thirties. T o these were added a growing number of urban unemployed from such cities as Seattle and Portland, and an increasing stream of displaced farm families migrating from the Middle W est and Southwest in search of employment. W ages and working conditions on farms employing labor declined to substandard levels. Friction along racial and sectional lines developed among seasonal workers early in the thirties. Toward the middle of the decade the militant unionism of California’s agricul tural workers spread in milder form to scattered areas of the North west, giving rise to many sporadic protest strikes. Organized efforts of farmer-employers to combat labor trouble were like the attempts in California, though usually more spontaneous and local. In the late thirties branches of the Associated Farmers were established in Oregon and Washington, which later were affiliated into a west coast anti-union organization in agriculture. 203 204 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE Farm-Labor Strikes in Oregon The industrial and commercial structure of Oregon's economy has never fostered a labor movement of comparable importance to that in California and Washington, nor has its agricultural system; farms were usually smaller, less specialized and seasonal in crops, and less dependent upon nonresident labor. The long-established hop industry in the H ood and Willamette River Valleys and the recently developed pea-growing areas in the eastern section of the State were notable exceptions, resembling the pattern in California. Highly specialized farming enterprises were operated on a large scale, often by absentee owners, many of whom were outside corporations; and large numbers of local seasonal workers were em ployed, as.well as migrants from California. Oregon, because of its proximity to California and Washington, felt the influence of their labor unrest. A t least two farm-labor strikes in the years before the First W orld W ar, both in the vicinity of North Yamhill, were reported to have been led by the Industrial W orkers of the W orld. A walk-out in 1910 protested the discriminatory discharge of union members. Another in 1912 was led by “ wobblies” who demanded wages of 30 cents per hour and “ decent quarters.” 1 Small sporadic outbreaks occurred infrequently in fruit and vegetable packing sheds.1 The anti-Filipino riots which developed along the Pacific Coast 2 during 1929 and 1930 occurred in milder form in local communities in Oregon. They were generated in large part by unemployment and greater competition for jobs during the first years of depression. In the W hite River Valley of Columbia County, Oreg., several hundred native white workers went on strike in order to force vegetable farmers to cease employing Filipinos.3 In the Scapoose Delta lands of Colum bia County, near the town of Yankton, labor organizations backed by the local Grange strongly opposed the importation of Filipinos. The California Conserving Co., with the support of local business interests, had planned to hire Filipino laborers to harvest cucumber crops grown for a local pickle factory.4 The only large strikes in Oregon's agriculture occurred during 1933 and 1934 in the hop industry of Polk, Benton, and Marion Counties. Seasonal laborers employed in this crop undoubtedly were influenced by the current wave of farm strikes led by the Cannery and Agricultural W orkers Industrial Union in California. It is not unlikely that many of them had taken part in strikes in California earlier in the season. The union may even have sent organizers from California to follow itinerant agricultural laborers in their seasonal migration north to the Oregon hop fields. A t any rate a small number could rapidly promote a strike to protest the depressed labor conditions then prevalent in the hop-growing area. N o union of hop pickers developed among the 1Paul Brissenden: The I.W .W .—A Study of American Syndicalism, Vol. 83, Columbia Uni versity Studies in History and Economics, New York, 1919 (p. 306). 2The Medford Mail Tribune, of September 10, 1936, for instance, reported a “ slight misunder standing” in a local packing plant when the management allegedly fired, for union activity, six members of the Salinas Fruit and Vegetable Workers Union Local 18211. ^ The difficulty was soon resolved in a conference between the operator, his attorney, a conciliator of the U. S. Department of Labor, and a member of the Northwest Regional Labor Board. 3Sidney Sufrin: Labor Organization in Agricultural America in American Journal of So ciology, January 1938). 4St. Helen’s Mist, June 6, 13, and 20, 1930. CH. XIII.---UNIONISM IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 205 strikers, however, as their period of employment in the crop was too brief. The strikes were characteristically sudden and brief. One of the chief causes of labor unrest in the hop yards during 1933 was the low wage rate of $1 per hundredweight. It had been adopted as a standard agreement among growers at a preharvest meeting held at Salem. Subsequently they failed to adhere to the standard rate, and some growers offered a bonus as high as 20 cents per hundredweight in order to have their hops picked more rapidly. This aggravated the dissatisfaction with the standard rate.3 Labor unrest finally flared into overt action, according to the Sheriff of Polk County, when the growers demanded exceedingly “ clean” picking.3 They were able to impose such requirements in 1933 because widespread unemployment and a surplus labor supply had increased their bargaining power. A series of small disturbances broke out first in Marion County during early September 1933. Four alleged agitators were arrested and released on bail. On September 13, 1,000 to 1,200 pickers made a spontaneous walk-out at the McLaughlin yard near Independence (Polk County). This was one of the largest hop farms in the area, comprising several hundred acres. The m ajor demand of the strikers was a 100percent increase in wage rates, to 2 cents per pound in place of the pre vailing 1 cent.6 Additional demands were formulated later at a mass meeting, including improved sanitary conditions, reemployment of strikers without discrimination, and recognition of a newly elected strike committee.7 The strike was reported as carried out in an “ orderly fashion.” During the first day there was no picketing, and no arrests were made.8 , Hop-yard operators blamed the strike on “ Communist agitators” who had been active in Marion County the week b efore; they announced that they “ would not yield in any degree to the demands of the strikers.” 8 This attitude changed abruptly, however, and the strikers’ position was strengthened, when rains kept pickers from the yards and allowed addi tional time for organization. Within 2 days the owner of the M cLaugh lin yard announced a compromise wage increase to $1.50 per hundred weight, which was accepted unanimously by the pickers.9 Strikes in other large hop yards of Marion and Polk Counties fol lowed this victory. Growers at first agreed among themselves to oust all strikers who refused to pick at the $1 per hundredweight scale. W hen this plan failed, they held another meeting to try to reach a standard agreement on $1.20 per hundredweight.9 This effort likewise failed. Several large growers were faced with walk-outs of hundreds of their pickers, while operations had to be suspended because of recur rent rains. They soon followed the McLaughlin yard’s lead in reaching a settlement at the $1.50 rate. B y September 17 the strikes, many of them lasting only a few hours, had been settled. A general raise in wages approaching the $1.50 scale was granted throughout the hop growing area in order to forestall further labor trouble.10 Efforts to suppress the strikes by legal action failed in most cases. The Oregon Statesman in its issue of September 16, 1933, reported the following instance: 5Oregon Statesman (Salem), September 15, 1933. «St. Helen’s Mist, September 14, 1933. ^Oregon Statesman (Salem), September 15, 1933. 8Idem, September 14, 1933. 9Idem, September 15, 1933. 10Idem, September 16 and 17, 1933. 206 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE In the Tankella yard near Independence, controlled by T. A. Livesay & Co., more than 300 pickers walked out on September 15 in demanding $1.50 for the remainder of the season. Allen Tankella, manager o f the yard and a deputy sheriff in Polk County, immediately took A. G. Sewell, who had suggested the $1.50 price, into custody in Independence on the grounds that he had “ talked too much.” Officials at Independence, however, refused to hold him, claiming there was no charge against him. Tankella drove back to the yard and after a conference, told the strikers they could go back to work at $1.50 per hundredweight. Strikers refused until Sewell was reinstated. Tankella gave in and permitted Sewell to work. Labor conflict again developed in hop-growing sections of Polk and Marion Counties during the 1934 season. Growers by mutual agree ment had established a standard wage rate of $1.20 per hundredweight before harvesting began, but many were reported to have granted bonuses in order to avert strikes.1 In anticipation of conflict the county 1 sheriff obtained a supply of tear gas and “ John Doe warrants.” 1 A 12 strike began on a small ranch near Independence on September 5, when 15 out of a crew of 50 pickers ceased work in order to enforce a demand for the previous year’s rate of $1.50.12 The following day more than 2,000 workers walked out of the largest ranch in Polk County, belong ing to the Horst interests of California. Several hundred more pickers struck in other large yards of the area.13 Growers again placed responsibility for the strikes on “ an influx of outside agitators following the Pacific coast fruit and agricultural harvests.” N o violence occurred, and no arrests were made. The general strike lasted for only a day, ending when the larger growers agreed to meet the strikers’ demands for $1.50 per hundredweight.1 3 The final strike of the season took place 4 days later and involved 500 out of 750 pickers on one large ranch. The employer had continued to pay the $1.20 scale after neighboring yards had raised their rates to $1.50. The strikers returned to work next day without winning their demands.14 N o further strikes were reported in Oregon hop fields until 1936, when another series of small ones occurred. Prices paid for picking by this time had risen generally to a scale of $1.50 per hundredweight. A few yards paid $1.75 and some even $2. However, a relative scarcity of hops in the fields, together with growers’ demands for unusually “ clean” picking, tended to lower the seasonal earnings of workers and provoked widespread unrest.15 The first small strike occurred on August 31. It ended quickly when the sheriff’s deputies removed “ agitators” from among the pickers. Ten days later a group of 100 out of 1,000 pickers employed on a large hop yard owned by a London company walked out in a demand for $2 per hundredweight. Eight hundred more pickers in the yard soon followed.16 The strike was settled within 24 hours when the manage ment raised the rates to $1.75. Fifty strikers who refused the com promise scale were ordered off the ranch.16 A similar strike of a few hundred pickers broke out at the McLaughlin ranch, the scene of one of the 1933 incidents. It ended within a few hours when the pickers returned to work without winning their demands for a wage increase.17 11Oregon Statesman (Salem), September 6 and 7, 1934. 12Idem, September 6, 1934 (p. 1). 13Idem, September 7, 1934 (p. 1). 14Idem, September 11, 1934 (p. 5). 15Idem, September 9, 1936. 16Idem, September 10, 1936 (p. 1). 17Idem, September 11, 1936 (p. 1). CH. XIII.--- UNIONISM IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 207 Strikes in the hop-growing areas of the Willamette Valley were illus trative of labor relations in a crop in which neither workers nor employers were strongly organized. Unlike growers in the San Joaquin Valley of California, for instance, each operator was relatively free to determine the wages he paid. W age levels varied widely among ranches, depending upon the estimated bargaining power which their crews could exert. The issue in each strike was decided in a very short time, as the crop was highly perishable. The pickers obviously could not be organized for longsustained collective bargaining, as they were for the most part highly transient and poorly paid workers employed in each area for a few weeks at the most. The only concerted attempt to establish a stable labor organization in Oregon agriculture occurred in the spring and summer of 1937. The business agent of the Cannery W orkers and Farm Laborers Union of Seattle,18 with the help of the local Longshoremen and Warehousemen’s Union, established a sublocal in Portland. A t its first meeting some 150 orchard and fruit-packing employees drew up a schedule of wage demands ranging from 37 cents per hour for common labor to 60 cents per hour for skilled work in agriculture and allied industries.19 Subsequent attempts to control the hiring of labor for harvests in nearby areas brought strong resistance from grower-employers. M ore than 400 organized farmers of H ood River County voted unanimously to “ refuse to consider any union demand for closed-shop conditions.” 20 A t a convention in Salem early in 1938 the Associated Farmers of • Oregon was formed to establish a “ Pacific coast hook-up” with its counter parts in Washington and California. In Oregon the main concern of this body was not with fighting the brief and weak organizations among agricultural laborers, but rather with combating the control exerted by urban unions over the transporting and marketing of farm products. The organized teamsters and longshoremen were the growers’ special aversion. A spokesman of the Associated Farmers of Oregon at a meeting in April 1938 declared: “ The time has come when farmers must organize to pre vent violence and racketeering at the expense of the farmer, the laborers, and the public, and to put a stop to illegal interference with harvesting and marketing of farm products.” 21 Several restrictions proposed at the meeting were later incorporated as law in an initiative measure introduced during a general election— prohibition of picketing, boycotting, or inter ference by labor organizations with employers who were not actually en gaged in labor disputes.22 Pea Pickers’ Strike in Idaho Farm-labor conflict in Idaho was concentrated in the pea-growing areas of the Snake River Valley. Labor relations in this crop were par ticularly unstable, for a number of reasons. Peas were grown by large 18See p. 218. 19Oregonian (Portland), April 6, 1937. 20Spokesmen of the farm organizations declared that farmers would not “ tolerate labor in terference with businessmen, truck operators, or themselves in handling the crops.” (Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 31, 1937.) 21Oregonian (Portland), April 7, 1938. 22Earlier the State Grange had taken the initiative in creating a new farm-labor relations committee consisting of three members appointed by the Grange and three by the Oregon State Federation of Labor. It was announced that “ the primary purpose of the committee is to pre vent misunderstanding between farmers and industrial workers by keeping both groups in formed. In case of disagreement, the committee will attempt to find grounds for settlement which will be acceptable to both groups.” (Oregonian, Portland, July 15, 1937.) 208 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE speculative companies, many of which leased the land from private owners. The crop was extremely perishable; thus the growers ran the double risk of its ruin because of adverse weather conditions or its loss in case of strikes called at the height of the season. Another reason lay in the highly seasonal demand for labor. Since the harvesting period was brief, lasting only a few weeks each season, and the resident population in the growing areas was sparse, many pickers had to be recruited from other, often distant, regions. Large numbers migrated each year from California, A ri zona, Oregon, and Washington, as well as from States to the east. Pea pickers employed in somewhat isolated growing areas became more “ professionalized” than most seasonal farm laborers. Many of them worked exclusively in this crop, following successive harvests from State to State as well as working in some areas which had several harvests each year. This continuous seasonal work in the same crop created in the migrants a feeling of group solidarity; and this, together with the knowledge that the growers were unusually dependent on them, gave the pickers strong incentives to organize and act collectively for wage in creases in such areas as the Snake River Valley. Labor exploitation in many cases furnished additional stimulus to strike. The growers’ dependence upon labor from other areas forced them to deal with professional labor-recruiting agents or contractors. These agents customarily agreed to harvest a crop for a fixed sum, from which they paid the wages of the pickers. They usually tried to reduce their wage costs to the minimum in order to increase their net profit, and this frequently led to labor unrest and strikes. The first serious outbreak among pea pickers in Idaho arose during the summer of 1935. In June an acute labor shortage had been reported in the Parma area, with many acres of peas going to waste for want of pickers. The Idaho Emergency Relief Administration attempted to ease the situation by temporarily closing local work-relief projects, but this failed to provide sufficient labor. Instead, it created unrest among the relief workers because, as the Adminstrator pointed out, many who had been on relief for the past year or more had exhausted their resources and did not have the money to follow the pea harvest.23 Trouble developed on several ranches which refused to hire relief workers, in violation of previous agreements with the IE R A . There was further conflict when a number of white migrant and resident workers invaded several camps to “ persuade” imported Filipino workers to leave the area.24 Other scattered outbreaks culminated in a strike of pea pickers working in the summer crop of 1935. Early in August a group organized and demanded an increase in rates from the current 70 cents per hundred weight to $1 per hundredweight. W hen the growers refused these de mands, approximately 1,500 pickers struck. S. H . Atchley, attorney for Teton County, sent a hurried letter to Governor C. B. Ross of Idaho, stating that growers faced certain ruin if the crops were not harvested, and that “ local authorities were powerless to make the workers work.” Atchley asserted also that 90 percent of the pickers were willing to work, but were being stopped by 10 percent who were “ agitators.” In response to this message, Governor Ross declared a state of mar tial law and sent a detachment of the National Guard to the strike area. 23Boise Statesman, June 23, 1935. 24Idem, June 18, 1935. CH. XIII.---UNIONISM IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 209 Picking was resumed upon arrival of the Guardsmen. Governor Ross stated in a press interview: “ Deportation of about one hundred strike agitators has resulted in a return of the workers to their jobs, and law and order prevail again.” 25 A second series of disputes followed during the summer of 1937. A small strike had occurred near Huston and Caldwell during May. The State W orkers Alliance called a walk-out of onion weeders in protest against a wage cut from 25 to 20 cents per hour, and demanded that dis crimination against employment of Alliance members cease. The strike ended in a compromise agreement.26 A dispute began in the Cascade area during July among approximately 3,000 pea pickers, many of whom were from California and other States. Protest meetings and scattered strikes were blamed by local authorities on a “ group of agitators” demanding wage increases above the prevailing 27 cents per hamper. Newspapers reported that the sheriff requested State aid to help control the situation.27 N o general strike developed, however. Agricultural-labor troubles in Idaho during 1938 began in the beet fields of Bingham County with a threatened strike which did not materi alize. A strike vote for a price of $26 per acre for cultivating and harvest ing beets had been taken in the unionized areas of Colorado and Nebraska, after the Department of Agriculture had set a minimum rate of $22.80. W orkers in the Snake River Valley, though not highly organized, all par ticipated in the vote.28 Later the Denver district headquarters of the United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and Allied W orkers of America officially called off the threatened strike. Strife in the pea fields broke out again during June 1938, when some 350 pickers struck in the San Diego Co. fields near Melba (Canyon County). This group had taken part before in a successful strike under U .C .A .P .A .W .A . leadership in Sacramento County, Calif. The walk-out in Idaho developed when the pickers charged the labor contractors with paying them less than they had been promised. The attempt failed within a week, after the county sheriff arrested strike leaders and members of the negotiating committee. Several hundred strikebreakers were success fully recruited to replace the strikers.29 The sheriff said: The growers o f this county have put forth lots o f effort in growing these peas, and they are going to have the full protection o f the law in getting them harvested and marketed. (Boise Statesman, June 13, 1938.) Strike leaders claimed that a field boss for the San Diego Co. ap pealed over the radio for 500 school children to pick peas. Spontaneous collective action of another type took place near Driggs, Idaho, in September. Approximately 300 Mexican pea pickers quit their jobs and demanded to be paid off, in protest against what they claimed were top wages of $1 per day for “ third pickings.” In doing so, they forfeited a bonus of 25 cents per hundredweight which, if they remained throughout the season, was paid in addition to the prevailing rate of 75 cents.30 25Salt Lake Tribune, August 18, 1935 (p. 1). . 26Idem, May 10, 1937. Growers offered a straight 20 cents per hour and, if they were able to sell the onions for 75 cents per hundredweight bulk, 25 cents per hour. If the prices went up to $1 per hundredweight, they were willing to pay 30 to 35 cents per hour, and offered to sign a contract to that effect. 27Salt Lake Tribune, July 31, 1937. 28Idem, April 14, 1938. "Com m onwealth News, Seattle, June 11, 1938. " P o s t Register (Idaho Falls), September 12, 1938. LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 210 The largest strike in the pea crop during 1939 took place in W ashing ton. Approximately 1,000 pea pickers in the vicinity of Sequim struck spontaneously for a rate of 30 cents per hamper in place of the prevailing 20 cents. They returned to work within a few hours at a compromise rate of 25 cents.31 Farm-Labor Conflict in the Yakima Valley of Washington Washington’s most critical agricultural-labor problems were concen trated in the Yakima Valley in the central section of the State. Here one of the most intensive farming counties in the United States was devoted primarily to the cultivation of hop and apple crops, both with large labor requirements. This specialization led to extreme seasonality in labor demands. In winter months only 500 to 1,000 agricultural workers were needed in the Yakima Valley, yet 25,000 to 35,000 were required during the hop harvest in September and 5,000 to 6,000 during the apple harvest in October.32 W age rates fell and conditions of employment became worse during the thirties. Housing and other facilities were notably inadequate and unsanitary. Various surveys estimated that annual incomes of sear sonal farm-labor families averaged from $254 to $466. The majority rer quired relief subsidies to raise their wages to a minimum subsistence level.33 Few large strikes occurred, and stable labor organizations did not take root in the Yakima Valley. Unstable conditions of employment mili tated against the organization of farm workers for collective bargaining. Increasing numbers of urban unemployed and displaced farm families created a chronic labor surplus in agriculture. T o many of these, perhaps to the majority, hop and apple picking offered a few weeks of employment with free shelter and some earnings when no other work was available. Migratory and casual laborers in these crops were an exceedingly hetero geneous group made up of Negroes, Filipinos, Indians, and whites. The whites, by far the numerical majority, included such diverse elements as “ professional” migratory families, single migrants, or “ bindle tramps,” college and high-school students on holidays, urban unemployed, and ‘Dust B ow l” refugees from the Middle W est.34 Some new elements contributed a greater militancy in the Yakima /a lley during the 1930’s. A survey in 1937 revealed that almost threefourths of all heads of hop-picking families ordinarily had found most of their employment in nonagricultural industries. Nearly a sixth of the hop pickers had been union members in their former occupations, having be longed to unions of longshoremen, waiters, miners, and forestry and wood workers, as well as other groups affiliated to the A .F . of L. and the C .I .O .3 5 31 Seattle Star, August 5, 1939. 32Paul H, Landis: Seasonal Agricultural Labor in the Yakima Valley (in Monthly Labor Review, August 1937). 33Carl F. Reuss: Professional Migratory Farm Labor Households, Bulletin of the Farm Security Administration (Portland, Oreg.), June 1940 (p. 2); Carl F. Reuss, Paul H. Landis, and Richard Wakefield: Migratory Farm Labor and the Hop Industry of the Pacific Coast. Bulletin No. 363, Agricultural Experiment Station, State College of Washington (Pullman, W ash.), August 1938 (p. 49); Landis, op. cit. (p. 2). 34Reuss, Landis, and Wakefield, op. cit. (pp. 38-45, 62). 35Idem (pp. 43, 48). CH. XIII.---UNIONISM IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 211 Race Conflict Labor trouble often took the form of race conflict in the Yakima and Wenatchee Valleys because of unemployment among workers of different racial backgrounds. Indeed, the first serious anti-Filipino outbreak on the Pacific Coast occurred in the Wenatchee Valley of Washington in 1928. The usual explanation for the incident stressed the Filipinos’ re lations with white women. The underlying cause, however, was the increased competition for jobs when Filipinos were brought in by truck from Seattle to work in the apple harvest.36 For substantially the same reasons, a mob of whites in at least one instance in the early 1930’s forcibly drove Filipinos out of the Yakima Valley town of Toppenish. In later years Filipino strikers were run out of the county on several occasions. The most recent cases of widespread anti-Filipino activities were reported in 1937 by Filipino farm tenants in central Washington, who claimed that they were being evicted in large numbers and threatened with mob action.37 The Cosmopolitan W eekly of Seattle on May 22, 1937, quoted from a Yakima newspaper as follow s: Hard-fisted, weather-beaten white ranchers from the lower Yakima Valley swore solemnly before Senator Lewis B. Schwellenbach that there soon will be bloody race riots that forever will be a blot on this State if the Federal Government does not move against Filipinos and Japanese, who unlawfully are crowding out the whites. Race conflict later involved other groups, particularly Negroes and Mexicans, as Filipinos in the Yakima Valley decreased in number.38 Since racial minorities usually were imported by large growers and processors in search of cheap labor, resentment motivated by class con sciousness might be expected from disadvantaged residents white workers. However, in a rural community where the temper of the population was predominantly conservative and the rights of the property holder were held sacred, resentment was directed against the alien as such. In some respects it was merely a special manifestation of the local residents’ fear and suspicion of the outsider. Race conflict in the Yakima Valley sprang from much the same motivation as did the periodic raids carried out against hobos and transients. The structure of farm operations militated strongly against the de velopment of labor unionism among agricultural workers in the valley. Its agriculture, unlike that of other intensive growing areas, was not characterized by large-scale farming. Laborers, less concentrated than they would have been if employed on industrialized farms, were much harder to reach and organize. Employers in the valley were predominant ly working farmers whose position was becoming increasingly precarious as the profitability of cash-crop farming in this area declined. Opposition to labor unionism was unanimous and. strong, particularly as there were no extreme inequalities in wealth or size of operations to divide the ranks of farm employers. One observer described this rural community thus: The whole culture o f the valley is traditionally the area. A large number o f the farmers have cleared the sagebrush o f the land they now farm. who have done this. Because o f this background based on the agricultural life o f dug the irrigation ditches and Others are the sons o f farmers some o f the pioneer spirit still 36Interview with Trinidad Rojo. President of Cannery Workers and Farm Labors Union, Seattle, 1940. (See Appendix J. p. 435). 37Philippine-American Tribune (Seattle), Vol. VI, No. 2, January 27, 1937 (p. 1). 38See Appendix J (p. 435). 212 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE prevails among the farmers. They believe in private initiative and the principle o f individual contract. The local townsmen are also on the whole opposed to labor organizations. The police and the city and county officials are definitely on the side of the businessmen, and even the conservative A.F. of L. has not been able to gain a strong hold on local industry. The unions have practically no political power, and their social status is not high in the community. (R. R. Wakefield: A Study o f Seasonal Farm Labor in Yakima County, Washington, M .A. Thesis, 1937, State College (Pullman, W ash.), (p. 32.) Unrest for the most part was passive, taking the form of a high rate of labor turn-over (less than 45 percent of the pickers interviewed in a survey of the 1937 harvest had worked in the valley before). Collective action was expressed at the most in small spontaneous strikes and race riots and, in a few cases, in the formation of short-lived local labor unions. The I.W.W. in Yakima The Industrial W orkers of the W orld extended its activities to the Yakima Valley and other sections of Washington during W orld W orld I, but at least one strike of farm laborers in that State even in prewar years was reported as led by “ wobblies.” 40 Large numbers of casual mi gratory workers who were employed at different seasons of the year in lumbering, mining, and agriculture throughout the Middle W est and Northwest regularly wintered in Seattle. That city became a center for labor agitation which culminated in the general strike of 1919. The State of Washington became noted for the virulence of its labor troubles (blamed largely on the “ wobblies” ) and the extreme violence with which they were resisted in many centers. The I.W .W . Agricultural W orkers Industrial Union No. 110, former ly known as “ The 400,” became particularly active in the Yakima Valley and other intensive growing areas of the State in 1917. Rumors and re ports of strikes and sabotage in agriculture became frequent. Newspapers throughout the country reported, for instance, that fruit trees in several orchard districts were killed by the simple expedient of driving copper nails into them.41 Such alleged activities gave rise to stern legal measures, and a special council of defense was formed. On July 12 Federal troops arrested some 16 I.W .W . organizers in Ellensburg, Wash., on the charge of “ interfering with crop harvesting and logging in violation of Federal statutes.” 42 A general strike was reported to have been called by Local No. 110 for all agricultural, construction, and lumber workers in W ash ington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana, as a protest against what were con sidered illegal arrests, but this evidently failed to materialize.43 In the Yakima Valley a vigilante organization, or “ pick-handle bri gade,” composed of farmers and businessmen was reported to have rounded up 40 to 50 alleged I.W .W . members and to have jailed them on charges of “ agitation.” It was said that the prisoners received nothing to eat while they were in jail, and that this led to a small riot which was quieted only when the fire department was called, to use fire hose. The prisoners were next herded into a boxcar to be taken out of the county, but the train crew refused to carry them. They were then returned to jail, 40Brissenden, op. cit. (p. 366). 41Morning Republican (Mitchell, S. Dak.), July 13, 1917. 42Idem, July 12, 1917. 43Idem, August 18, 1917; August 21, 1917. CH. XIII.---UNIONISM IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 213 but were later released and warned to leave the area. Several charges of beatings were voiced against the vigilantes.44 The I.W .W . in the Northwest was disrupted by the mass arrests of its leaders and violent suppression of rank and file activities. Volunteer walking delegates, nevertheless, remained active in numerous spontaneous or “ job action” strikes among field and packing-shed workers in the Pa cific Coast States throughout the twenties and early thirties. I.W .W . agitation was partly responsible for the spectacular “ Yakima incident” of 1933. Large numbers of unemployed transient laborers from other areas had congregated in Yakima for some time before apple and hop harvesting was to begin in the fall. A cut in local relief rolls aroused their resentment, and this was fanned by radical organizers. Public meet ings were held in Yakima City Park, there were scattered disturbances and outbreaks of violence, and “ strike talk” was in the air. The growers, alarmed at the situation, organized themselves into vigilante bands armed with pick handles. The situation came to a head on August 24, when some 250 armed farmers clashed with a group of about 100 strikers picketing a large or chard near Yakima. The pickets were rounded up and jailed for several months in an improvised “ bull pen” in the city. Most of them were in time released, 12 finally being convicted of vagrancy in December. Mean while all public meetings of workers were banned, transient camps and hobo jungles were broken up, and all surplus transient workers were kept out of the valley.45 The severity with which labor agitation was thus suppressed impeded unionism in the valley for some time thereafter. Remnants of the I.W .W . continued to make gestures toward unionizing agricultural labor but they failed to develop any effective organization. A s late as the fall of 1935 a meeting of farmers, threshers, and combine men was reported held in W averley, Wash., under the auspices of Agricultural W orkers Industrial Union N o. 110. The group attempted to enforce a scale of wages ranging from $1.50 per day for “ hay hands, straw bucks, and roustabouts” to $4.50 per day for steam engineers, separator tenders, and “ herd punchers.” 46 Federal Labor Unions of the A.F. of L. Several federal labor unions were chartered by the American Federation of Labor in the Yakima Valley and other scattered agricultural areas of central Washington during 1934 and early 1935. Locals were established in such towns as Toppenish, Sunnyside, Grandview, Prosser, Dayton, and Kennewick. A district council of federal labor unions was created to coordinate the policies of these locals throughout the fruit belt, but the movement was not sustained. It never got beyond the stage of an educational campaign, and no direct action was taken. M ost of the local unions lasted only a short time. The only ones which survived more than one season were Local No. 19399 of farm laborers in Grandview, and Local No. 19066, the United Evergreen Pickers of Centralia, com posed of migratory workers who cut evergreens for decorations during the Christmas season. 44Field notes from interviews. 45For fuller discussion of this incident see Appendix K : The Yakima Incident of 1933 (p. 437). See also issues of the Yakima Morning Herald for July 17, August 29 and 30, September 1 and 7, 1933. 46Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 3, October 1935 (p. 4). 214 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE Several unsuccessful attempts were made to unionize packing-shed workers of “ produce row ” in the city of Yakima. Finally in the summer of 193S a federal labor union, the Fruit and Vegetable W orkers Union Local No. 20315, was organized and chartered, with headquarters in the Yakima Labor Temple. It was the best-organized and most-stable local union of this period. O f the 150 members in good standing (a large pro portion of whom were wom en), many continued to pay dues during the off-season winter months in order to build a fund to finance an organizing drive during the forthcoming packing season of 1936. Unlike its un successful predecessors, Local No. 20315 planned to include other workers besides skilled packers, such as pickers and employees of packing sheds, storage houses, processing plants, and canneries. The organization was disrupted in the summer of 1936 by a jurisdic tional dispute with the Brotherhood of Teamsters, which claimed control over truckers in packing sheds and warehouses. Local No. 20315 argued that it could organize effectively only as a vertical industrial union which would include all workers within each plant— truckers who operated primarily within the packing houses, as well as packers, loaders, graders, peelers, and other groups. The two groups reached a settlement only after much strife and corre spondence with the central executive council of the A .F . of L. in W ash ington, D.C. A t a joint meeting jn the Yakima Labor Temple the F .V .W .U . was persuaded to surrender its charter to the Brotherhood of Teamsters. In return, the latter promised to use its ample resources and strategic position to “ organize everything on wheels,” i.e., all labor in storage plants and warehouses, packing sheds and canneries. The campaign was abandoned after a 3-month organization drive. The packing-shed workers’ union lost a good part of its membership. Sup porters of the Teamsters Union explained its failure by the strong and persistent opposition of growers and company executives. The workers, furthermore, had displayed increasing apathy and lack of interest. Com petition from “ Dust Bowl” refugees from the Middle W est, who were be ginning to arrive in large numbers, further disorganized the local union bodies. Critics of the Brotherhood on the other hand explained its failure in the Yakima Valley by excessive timidity. One writer claimed that the Teamsters Union and the Yakima Central Labor Union on several occa sions went out of their way to oust radical organizers, who were the most persistent in efforts at unionizing. The Brotherhood hesitated to include agricultural workers in its organization because of their alleged com munistic tendencies. In a community in which even the conservative urban unions faced, at best, an unsympathetic public opinion, inclusion of radical elements, it was feared, would make the organized labor move ment even less acceptable.47 , Activities of United Cannery Agricultural and Packing Workers of America The original organizers of the Fruit and Vegetable W orkers Union, some of whom were radicals expelled by the Teamsters Union, then 47Reuss, Landis, and Wakefield: Migratory Farm Labor and the Hop Industry of the Pacific Coast (pp. 35, 36). CH. XIII.---UNIONISM IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 215 established a new independent local. Under the name of the American Industrial Union it obtained a charter from the State of Washington dur ing the summer of 1936. This organization was composed of about 600 workers, evenly divided between urban and rural employments, and in cluding unemployed as well. It purposely broadened its appeals so as to attract a wide class of casual laborers in the community.48 Left-wing or ganizers aimed to have a union in existence which could be chartered by the C.I.O. when the fruit season opened. The American Industrial Union consequently was fought bitterly by the Teamsters and the Central Labor Union, as well as by local employer groups. The American Industrial Union was dissolved early in 1937, and its membership was absorbed into newly organized locals of the International Mine, Mill, and Smelter W orkers Union and the W orkers Alliance of America. The business agent of the Aqueduct and Tunnel W orkers Union of the I.M .M . & S.W .U . was put in charge of all local C .I.O . organiza tions in the district, with power to grant charters. H e planned to build up an industrial union to include farm laborers, warehouse and cannery workers.49 District 1 of the newly organized United Cannery, Agricultural, Pack ing and Allied W orkers of America (C .I.O .) assumed jurisdiction over agricultural and allied labor in the Northwest after July 1937. Later in the year it made an arrangement with the W orkers Alliance, whereby the latter was to maintain local unions of unemployed which could absorb U .C .A .P .A .W .A . members during off-season months and release them when they were reemployed during the harvest season.50 The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . expended a good deal of money and effort in a campaign to organize field and packing-shed workers in the Yakima Valley, but the results were not commensurate with the costs. A com mittee of 13 organizers campaigned throughout the area, addressing meet ings of the W orkers Alliance in valley towns and soliciting workers in homes and tourist camps.51 Nevertheless, by late September 1937, the presi dent of District 1 reported that the Yakima Valley was represented only by Local N o. 1 at Yakima, and sublocals Nos. 1-1 and 1-2 of Naches and Selah, respectively, having a total membership of 160. The charter of Local No. 70 of W alla W alla was canceled. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A .’s efforts were neutralized in part by opposition from the A .F . of L. The Brotherhood of Teamsters adopted a policy of conciliation toward farm groups in order to win their favor. T o forestall the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . in Yakima it organized and chartered in August 1937 a new local, the Cannery and Warehouse Employees Union Local N o. 83.52 The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . faced even stronger opposition from a newly formed anti-union organization of farmer-employers. F or the purpose of 48At a mass meeting held under the auspices of the American Industrial Union on July 14, 1936, for instance, a resolution was adopted demanding a minimum wage of 50 cents per hour for all labor in the Yakima Valley, and a uniform minimum wage of $65 per month for W PA labor throughout the State of Washington. (Yakima Valley Farmer, July 16, 1936, p. 1.) 49Jtteuss, Landis, and Wakefield: Migratory Farm Labor and the Hop Industry of the Pacific Coast (p. 36). 50Wake field, op. cit.; also Yakima Morning Herald, September 10, 1937 (p. 10). 81 Rural Worker, Vol. II, No. 8, August 1937 (p. 3); Yakima Morning Herald, August 24, 1937. 82Yakima Morning Herald, August 19, 1937 (p. 1). About the same time, at the Walla Walla convention of the State Grange (which was esti mated to have 3,000 members in the Yakima Valley), the executive committee was instructed to bargain with “ legitimate” labor organizations, with a view to protecting the interests of farmers. Dave Beck, district president of the Brotherhood of Teamsters, explained tc the executive committee that it had become necessary for his union to organize the warehouse and cannery workers in self-defense, or see them organized by a competing union. He promised that farmers’ crops would “ not be tied up five minutes” by his organization. (Yakima Valley Farmer, August 19, 1937, p. 4.) 654107°—46—5 216 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE resisting local unionization of field and processing workers, the Farmers Protective Association was formed in August 1936, at a meeting held ir. the Chamber of Commerce headquarters in Yakima. In November 1937. it was reorganized as the Associated Farmers of Washington and affili ated in the “ coast-wise hook-up” already mentioned.53 Its effective anti union tactics disrupted the organizing campaign of the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . The association was aided by the huge influx of out-of-State migrants, which was increasingly demoralizing to organized labor. The U .C .A .P . A .W .A . won minor victories against the Ross Packing Co. and W ash ington Dehydrated Food Co. when the National Labor Relations Board forced' these to cea.se and desist from their anti-union practices and to rehire discharged union members. Its locals, nevertheless; failed to sur vive. The only important field workers’ strike in which the union be came involved in this district was the spontaneous walk-out, mentioned before, of 350 migrant pea pickers in the vicinity of Nampa, Idaho. Recession and Decline Late in the summer of 1938 a new and short-lived organization de veloped, with the name Washington Agricultural W orkers Association. By August 20 its organizer, Frederick Brown, claimed that 500 members had been enrolled in the Yakima Valley. This body adopted a conciliatory attitude to farmer-employers. Its main appeal was based upon sectional hostility to the rapidly increasing numbers of drought refugees from the Middle W est and Southwest, in search of work. Brown described his union as follow s: Our organization is not fighting for wages, because we realize that under present conditions the farmers cannot pay high wages. Our object is mainly to get the farmers to employ Washington workers and not transient workers from out o f State. The farmers can get Washington workers if they call at the employment bureau in Yakima. (Spokesman Review (Spokane), August 20, 1938, p. 2.) Growing unemployment combined with an unprecedented influx of out-of-State transients disrupted almost all labor organizations except those of unemployed during the recession year of 1938. Local newspapers reported that, for the first time in several years, hop growers in the Yakima Valley had a surplus of pickers on hand before the harvest be gan.54 B y the first week in September the State Employment Office in Yakima estimated that 33,000 hop pickers were in valley yards.55 The chronic labor surplus forced the union organizers to direct their efforts primarily toward obtaining adequate relief for underemployed seasonal workers. The only organization that gained in membership among field and processing workers in the Yakima Valley during 1938 was the W orkers Alliance. By the end of the year this union of relief clients and unem ployed claimed some 700 members in Yakima, 250 in Selah, 170 in Naches, and about 60 each in the towns of Toppenish, Wapato, and Harrah. Group interest conflicted over relief policy in the Yakima Valley. During the middle thirties the County Commissioners of Yakima, who 53Official Report of Proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board, Case No. X IX C-298. Washington, February 28, 1938 (p. 343); see also Appendix L (p. 439). 54Spokesman Review (Spokane), August 31, 1938 (p. 10). 55Idem, September 4, 1938 (p. 12). CH. XIII.---UNIONISM IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 217 had administrative control over local work-relief projects, were for the most part substantial growers and employers. They made a practice of closing relief projects before the harvest season each year in order to re lease workers for farm jobs.56 L. O. Bird, president of the Associated Farmers of Washington, publicly claimed the complete support of the county commissioners, who pledged that relief workers would be sepa rated from W P A to work on farms “ when conditions necessitated it.,,S7 Critics charged the commissioners with following a policy of self-interest or class interest, to the detriment of farm workers’ and relief clients’ in terests. Clyde Galloway, C.I.O. organizer, protested against this policy on the ground that it led to “ flooding the vallley with cheap labor.” 58 Opposition to current relief policy became stronger in 1938, when the labor surplus was critical. A committee of the W orkers Alliance pro tested to Frank Boisselle, county commissioner and large-scale hop grower, against the seasonal closing of W P A projects.59 After numerous conferences with W P A officials in Yakima, an agreement was reached that workers would be reemployed on the projects whenever investigations in local hop yards revealed average wages of less than $1 per day.60 The Hay Balers Union The only labor union in agriculture and allied industries in the Yaki ma Valley which survived after 1938 was the Hay Balers Union. This organization had been chartered in August 1934 as Federal Labor Union Local No. 19799, but became an independent body, severing its affiliation with the A .F . of L., late in 1937. Though its headquarters was in the Yakima Valley town of Toppenish, its jurisdiction extended to several eastern Washington counties to which its members migrated seasonally to work. The union included some 350 workers, with closed-shop agree ments covering 65 to 75 percent of the acreage of commercially baled hay in eastern Washington. The stability of the union rested on high pay and continuous employ ment for its members. The hay balers were a skilled migratory labor group working in crews with machinery. Contractors owned baling equipment, made contracts with farm owners, and hired the workers in crews which traveled from farm to farm baling crops at a set price per ton. The men were employed continuously for almost half the year, as several hay and alfalfa crops were grown in rotation. Hay baling could be staggered. Often the farm owner harvested his hay and alfalfa and kept it in stack, and not until he made a sale at a price suitable to himself would he have the crop baled and made ready for shipment. The Hay Balers Union carried out two strikes, each of about a week’s duration, during 1938 and 1939. They were provoked by competition from nonunion crews employed by hay and grain dealers from Seattle. Farmers who had their hay baled by union crews had to raise their price to the dealers in order to cover the increased labor costs. Several buyers hired their own crews who were nonunion and worked for less than the union scale. The local office of the State Labor Commissioner helped to settle both strikes through compromise agreement, 56Spokesman Review (Spokane), September 17, 1937 (p. 1). 57Report, NLRB Case XIX-C-298, Washington, February 28, 1938 (p. 468). 58Spokesman Review (Spokane), September 16, 1937 (p. 1). 59Idem, September 21, 1938 (p. 2). 60Idem, September 11, 1938 (p. 17). 218 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE Cannery and Agricultural Unions on the Coast The strongest unions of agricultural and allied workers in the North west were organized in the fruit, vegetable, and fish canneries on the Coast. A good measure of their strength lay in the support they received from urban trade-unions, particularly the Seattle locals of the A .F . of L. Brotherhood of Teamsters and the C.I.O. Maritime Federation of the Pacific. Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union The oldest and most powerful of these organizations was the Cannery W orkers and Farm Laborers Union, or C .W .F.L.U ., of Seattle. It was organized by Filipinos in 1932. In June 1933, it received its charter from the A .F . of L. as Federal Labor Union No. 18257. This was the first charter of its kind ever issued by the A .F . of L., granting jurisdiction over both cannery and field workers.61 The C .W .F.L.U . in the beginning was an exclusively Filipino union of Alaska salmon-cannery workers, but in time it broadened its member ship to include workers of many races. By 1940 it was estimated to in clude some 2,000 Filipinos, 600 Japanese, 100 Chinese, and 250 whites, Negroes, Hawaiians, and Indians.62 The C .W .F .L .U . was organized primarily to improve conditions in Alaska fish canning, and its major gains were won in that industry. Its most notable achievements were the elimination of the contractor system and the gaining of a closed-shop agreement providing also for a union hiring hall. Most of the strikes in which members of the C .W .F .L .U . took part, however, were in agriculture. A s the canning season in Alaska lasted only for 8 to 10 weeks, the Filipino union members had to depend on other industries for their chief employment and livelihood. M ore than three-fourths of them were employed seasonally in agriculture; about half of these lived in California during the winter months, and many belonged to U .C .A .P .A .W .A . and independent Filipino agricultural-labor unions in that State. “ Job action” strikes in protest against long hours and low pay in volved about TOO Filipino workers in truck-farming areas near Seattle, in the vicinities of Kent, Auburn, and Puyallup, during the spring of 1934. In spite of alleged vigilante action by local law-enforcement officers, the strikers were successful in raising wage rates from 15 to 25 cents per hour in the area. They were helped materially by Charles Doyle, secre tary of the Seattle Trades and Labor Council, who negotiated with grower-employers on their behalf.63 Communist labor organizations were temporarily active among agri cultural and allied workers on the Coast. The Daily W orker on July 10, 1934, reported that the Agricultural and Cannery W orkers Union led a strike of more than 500 workers on a large lettuce farm near Everett. 61Yearbook of the Cannery Workers and Farm Labor Union, 1937-38 (Seattle, W ash.), Vol. II, No. 2 (p. 22). 62Interview, Trinidad Rojo, president of C.W .F.L.U., Seattle, Wash., August 21, 1940. 63Yearbook of C.W.F.L.U. (p. 21). CH. XIII.- • UNIONISM IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST — 219 Union spokesmen complained of wages of 10 cents per hour and 16hour workdays, and charged that terrorism was used to quell the strike.64 Local units of other organizations affiliated with the Communist Party remained active. Unemployed councils and branches of the United Farm ers League were reported as carrying on agitation in the Puyallup area during 1934 and 1935.65 The Trade Union Unity League organized a Fishermen and Cannery W orkers Industrial Union to rival the C .W .F. L.U . It was dissolved less than a year later and the members were ab sorbed into the A .F . of L , local.66 The C .W .F.L.U . expanded its jurisdiction over a wide area during the mid-thirties and became known as the “ Little International.,, By late 1936 it claimed some 6,500 members in sublocals in the vicinities of Portland, Oreg., Anacortes, Everett, and Seattle, Wash., and Ketchikan, Alaska. These represented three main industrial groups— agriculture, fish canning, and fruit and vegetable canning.67 Early in 1937 the locals began to prepare for a nation-wide convention :o form a separate international union for workers in agriculture and allied industries. A s a first step the Northwest Council of Cannery, Pack inghouse and Agricultural W orkers was formed, to coordinate the policies of nine local organizations claiming a total membership of 12,000. Most of these belonged to the C .W .F .L .U . and its branches. The council was dissolved when the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . (C .I.O ) was formed in July 1937, and the C .W .F .L .U . gave up direct jurisdiction over its branch locals. A t present it is composed of U .C .A .P .A .W .A . Local 7 of Alaska fish-cannery workers and Sub-Local 7-2 of vegetable-canning workers in Seattle.68 The C .W .F .L .U was not very successful in applying collective bar gaining in intensive agricultural areas of Washington. Truck farms in the rural areas near Seattle wrere generally small, hiring men in groups of six or less, so that both growers and employees were too scattered to be organized effectively. The Yakima Valley was too far from Seattle for the union to give adequate support to its Filipino members there, who con stitu ted an in sign ifican t fr a c tio n of the total la b or supply recru ited fo r the hop and apple harvests. A strike by 50 C .W .F .L .U . members picking hops in the Yakima Valley during September 1937 brought swift reprisals from local authori ties. The Filipinos started a sit-down strike in one hop yard in an effort to raise picking rates to $2 per hundredweight in place of the prevailing $1.75. Deputy sheriffs and State highway patrol officers promptly escorted them to the Kittitas County line and told them to “ keep moving.,,e9 Union spokesmen claimed that “ the Associated Farmers, with the aid of the State patrol, carted away a handful of the hop pickers to the county line, with the threat of a ‘necktie party’ if they attempted to return.” 70 Vigilante tactics were also employed against Filipino members of the C .W .F .L .U . in the Puyallup Valley, a few miles south of Seattle, in the 64Daily Worker, July 10, 1934. «5RU ral Worker, Vol. I, No. 3, October, 1935 (p. 5). 66Yearbook of C.W .F.L.U. (p. 21). 67Tdem (p. 22). 68The U.C.A.P.A.W .A. won temporary gains in the fish-canning industry during 1938. In the spring two contracts were signed with 10 companies in the clam-digging and packing industry to cover 1,200 workers; clauses included wage increases to a base rate o f 55 cents per hour, sole collective-bargaining rights, and preferential shop. Unions included were U.C.A.P.A.W .A. Locals Nos. 62 and 239 of Aberdeen. (CIO News, Vol. I, No. 15, March 19, 1937, p. 1.) Again, in November 1938, more than 2,500 fish-cannery workers in the Grays Harbor area won a closed-shop contract with wage increases of 2J^ to 15 cents per hour, through Locals NV. 238 and 239. (Idem, Nov. 28, 1938, p. 5.) 69Spokesman Review, September 10, 1937; Yakima Morning Herald, September 10 and 12, 1937. 70Yearbook of C.W.F.L.U. (p. 22). 220 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE spring of 1937. The union business agent attempted to open negotiations to set a standard wage scale of 35 cents per hour, an 8-hour day, and 40 cents per hour for overtime, instead of prevailing wages of 25 cents per hour or less. A strike was called by union members when negotiations failed, and picketing began early in April.71 A week later a vigilante band composed of local growers and businessmen, reported to have been led by Mayor W oodin of Kent, drove the pickets from the valley. Strong pressure from urban trade-unions and sympathizers sub sequently forced the growers to resume negotiations and come to a com promise agreement with the union.71 The C .W .F .L .U . acted primarily as an employment agency for its members working in agriculture. Union representatives made contacts with individual growers and came to verbal agreements regarding wages, housing, working conditions, numbers of hands required, etc. Only one written contract was ever signed between the C .W .F .L .U . and or ganized growers. This covered strawberry pickers on Bainbridge Island, Wash., where the growers were predominantly Japanese.72 A.F. of L. Cannery Unions One other strike of importance occurred in industries allied to agri culture. This involved fruit and vegetable cannery workers organized by the A .F . of L. During 1937 and 1938, that organization had formed five federal labor unions of local cannery workers in the vicinities of Friday Harbor, Mount Vernon, Bellingham, Puyallup, and Olympia, having a total membership of about 5,000. Prior to the opening of the canning season in May 1938, a wage dispute developed between 22 canneries in western Washington and the five A .F . of L. unions, when operators cut wages 5 cents per hour below the minimum wage scale of 52J4 cents for men and 4254 cents for women, established in the previous year’s agree ment. The union called a “ hold o ff” strike when negotiations ended in a stalemate, and refused to begin work until the wage cut was restored. The canners contended that much of the previous year’s crop was still un sold in the warehouses and that any wage increases would have to be borne by the farmers, since the public would not buy so much of the product at a higher price.73 The Associated Farmers exerted pressure on the Associated Producers and Packers Incorporated to consider the interests of growers in wage negotiations, but the cannery workers’ unions refused the latter’s offers of mediation.74 The dispute finally was settled by compromise agreement when the international representative of the A .F . of L. negotiated for the cannery workers. Collective bargaining between cannery unions and employers in later years was carried out on a more localized basis, because of differ ences between areas in products and market conditions. The unions in general were able to win better wage and hour provisions than those applying in competing nonunionized areas of eastern Washington and Oregon.75 71 Philippine-American Tribune (Seattle), Vol. VI, No. 8, May 4, 1937 (p. 1). 72Idem, April 24, 1937. 73Seattle Post Intelligencer, May 3 and 5, 1938. 74Idem, May 5, 1938. 75 Puyallup Tribune, May 10, 1940. Ch a p t e r XIV.— The Sheep Shearers Union of North America Sheep Shearing in the Rocky Mountain Region The first stable trade-union among agricultural and allied workers developed in the sparsely settled livestock-raising areas of the Rocky Mountain region. Sheep raising in the W estern States, although a type of extensive pastoral farming, was nevertheless an intensive industry using a great deal of labor. Many sheep ranches became large, specialized enterprises raising a commercial product for sale in ‘ distant markets. They hired gangs of migratory laborers for a few weeks during the shear ing season each year. The contacts between employers and employees became increasingly casual, distant, and impersonal as the scale of opera tions grew. The sheep shearers developed as a distinct occupational grou p‘ when specialized sheep ranching became concentrated in the Mountain and Pacific Coast States. Improvements in railroad and steamship trans portation, particularly after completion of the Panama Canal, opened up eastern wool markets and encouraged the raising of sheep instead of cattle— a source of considerable conflict and violence between stock raisers. A s sheep raising became a commercialized industry instead of a mere adjunct to the farm, proprietors came to depend upon an itinerant group of skilled sheep shearers. The more migratory workers in follow ing the shearing season sometimes traveled from the Mexican to the Canadian border in a period of a few months. Established routes of interstate migration lay through a region encompassing New M exico, Arizona, California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, W yom ing, Montana, Idaho, and Washington. Numerous more localized migrations developed within each State. Sheep shearers, because of the nature of their occupation, had stronger bargaining power than other migratory agricultural workers. Shearing is a skilled occupation requiring care and accuracy if the wool is not to be ruined. Unshorn wool is a highly perishable product; a delay in shear ing during warm summer weather lessens its value considerably, because of the accumulation of dust, grease, and vermin on the sheep. The supply of sheep shearers available for ranchers is limited by many factors. Besides requiring considerable training, the work is highly seasonal and lasts only some three months even with continuous travel over an area covering several States. During the major part of the year almost all shearers depend primarily on other employments for their livelihood. Large numbers are themselves sheep raisers, particularly in the southern Mountain States of New M exico, Colorado, and Arizona. After they have sheared their own sheep and helped their neighbors, they follow the shearing to northern States, where the season comes later in the summer. Localities in which shearing operations take place, and where potential shearers usually have to learn the trade, are relatively inaccessible to any large body of workers. This is particularly true of the sparsely settled ranching areas of W yoming, Montana, and Idaho, where the union became established most strongly. 221 222 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE Origin, Structure, and Tactics of the Sheep Shearers Union Very little is known about the origins of the Sheep Shearers Union of North America (A .F . of L .), because it developed in a highly seasonal and migratory labor group in an area where transportation and com munication facilities were poor. It was preceded by several short-lived local unions, the earliest of which was organized in 1895 under the name of United Sheep Shearers. The present organization was chartered as a local union in Rawlins, W yo., in 1912. After it had grown considerably in membership, it moved its headquarters to Butte, Mont. Their technical skill and limited numbers enabled sheep shearers in the Mountain States to develop a small but prosperous and well-organized union which has managed to maintain a high level of wages. The extreme mobility of the membership over a wide and sparsely populated region required a decentralized union structure. The Sheep Shearers Union, having a local charter in Butte, claims jurisdiction “ over North A m erica.” Union members, while at work during the shearing season, elect delegates by secret ballot to the union convention which takes place every 4 years. There the delegates in turn nominate and elect officers to the executive board. This body, among its other functions, on or before February 1 of each year sets the union scale for shearing sheep. Any member shearing at less than this scale is liable to suspension.1 The application of union standards to the job is left to the more or less spontaneous local action of itinerant shearing crews. Union shearers are instructed to hold a meeting and elect a chairman before going to work on any job. The chairman then appoints a business committee of three members, whose duty is to negotiate an agreement with the sheep raiser (subject to the approval of a majority of the crew ), stipulating the union price for shearing and an adjustment of grievances at the corrals. Crews have the right to strike without prior authorization from the executive board.2 Collective bargaining by the Sheep Shearers Union has led to few large and spectacular strikes of the kind common to other migratorylabor organizations. The union’s effectiveness has rested on manipulating the labor supply in each local area during the shearing season. W here the members constitute a significant proportion of the total labor supply, closed-shop contracts and written agreements have rarely been necessary in order to maintain union standards. The mere threat of a “ stay-away strike” or labor boycott, by subjecting sheep raisers to the danger of losing their wool crop, in many cases has been sufficient to bring them to terms. W age rates have been standardized at the union level for mem ber and nonmember shearers alike over wide areas. The Sheep Shearers Union has not been a typical agricultural labor organization. Through most of its career it has been, rather, a wellfinanced and cohesive craft union of highly skilled workers, characteris tic of A .F . of L. affiliates in certain urban trades. The S.S.U. early Constitution and Bylaws, as amended at Second Quadrennial Convention, Butte, Mont., Julv 1939. (pp. 4, 7, 21). 2Idem (p. 4). The strike must be supported by vote from three-quarters of all union members in the locality affected. Bylaws state that union members must elect a strike committee of seven. From these the chairman appoints three members Jto a finance committee to handle strike funds. A complete record of all expenditures pertaining to a strike must be forwarded to the executive board before members are eligible for disbursements from the union’s strike emergency fund. (Idem, pp. 21-22.) CH. XIV.---SHEEP SHEARERS UNION OF NORTH AMERICA 223 established an 8-hour day in many localities and has maintained piece rates ranging from 1 2 to 15 cents per head of sheep.3 (T h e output per man ranges from 100 to 200 or more sheep sheared per day.) The dues are high for a union in the general field of agriculture; initiation and reinstatement fees are set at $33 per member, and annual dues at $27. W ith this money the union maintains important services for its members.4 Machine techniques have replaced hand shearing. Unlike many craft labor organizations, however, the Sheep Shearers Union does not seem to have been weakened by these developments. Displacement has not been great, for power shearing has not proved to be very much faster than hand shearing.5 The sheep industry, in response to a steadily rising demand for wool, has expanded more rapidly than has the productivity of labor from the use of new techniques, so that the total employment of shearers has grown considerably since the union was first organized. The union was unique among labor oganizations in the way in which it controlled technological change, for the union itself went into the manu facture and sale of new labor-saving machinery. E. Bartlett, a former president of the union, developed and patented one of the best and most widely accepted power shears. The S.S.U. acquired the patent, and as a corporation it sold shares to its members in order to raise sufficient capital to manufacture the equipment. The patent expired several years ago, and companies such as Stewart W arner and the Chicago Flexible Appliance Co. now market power shears and other equipment in competi tion with the union. The S.S.U. meanwhile has broadened its marketing activities. The union-owned Sheep Shearers Merchandise & Commerce Co. does a wholesale and retail business in shearers’ equipment and accessories of al kinds, including power shears. This company sells its goods to both union and nonunion shearing crews, who customarily must furnish their own equipment. Members are allowed a 20-percent discount from the regular prices, as a means of encouraging affiliation to the union. The introduction of power shearing has changed labor relations within the occupation. Individual migratory hand shearers have for the most part disappeared. Shearing by power-driven machines requires the cooperative efforts of numbers of men working together in gangs. These move from one area to another throughout the sheep-raising region, taking with them their camping outfit, power plant, and movable cor rals.6 The method of recruiting shearers is similar to that among other migratory agricultural workers. The direct employer of the shearers is a contractor, plant man, or captain similar to the Mexican contractor for cotton pickers in Texas. H e solicits the work, furnishes the shearing machinery and accessory equipment, hires and pays the shearers, and 3This rate does not include board provided by the employer in kind or cash at the rate of $1.50 per day or 2 cents per sheep sheared. 4$5 from each of these charges per member is contributed to the total-disability, old-agepension, and burial fund. This provides a pension of $25 per month to members of 10 years’ consecutive standing who are totally disabled through old age or accident, and disburses burial expenses to the families of members. The cash disbursement varies according to the members’ years of affiliation to the union. Members who have been in good standing for only 1 year receive up to $40; members of 2 years’ consecutive standing receive $75; for 3 consecutive years, $100; for 4 consecutive years, $125; for 5 consecutive years, $150; and for 6 consecutive years, $175. This is the maximum paid. (Constitution and Bylaws, p. 17.) 3The most common estimate seems to be that a man who formerly could shear 130 sheep per day by hand shears can now do about 175 by power shears. 6The typical unit is a motor carried on a truck which supplies^ power through flexible attaching-rods to some 12 or 16 power shears or clippers handled by individual shearers. 224 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE frequently provides their board, lodging, and transportation. In highwage States like California or Montana the contractor has usually received 3^4 cents per sheep and the shearers 12J4 cents, in addition to board and lodging. The union is strongest among itinerant crews, who are usually, the most skilled in the trade. Contractors are included in the union and are subject to numerous regulations governing the hiring of union crews, use of equipment, and wage rates paid for various jobs.7 The bargaining power of the union has tended to be weakened by improvements in transportation and communication, rather than by tech nological change within the sheep-shearing trade. In the old days em ployers had to rely upon itinerant shearers who traveled by horseback or by train; they frequently had to meet their shearers at the nearest station and transport them to the ranches in buckboards. Often individual shearers worked for the same rancher year after year. Automobile transportation has made the occupation more casual. Shearers now travel in their own cars or in trucks provided by contrac tors for their crews. Many pick up jobs where they can find them, just as do cotton pickers and other migratory agricultural workers. Shear ing crews consequently have lost much of their group cohesiveness. The Sheep Shearers Union as a type of cooperative agency also has had to relinquish a great deal of its control over the allocation of workers and their jobs. W ool growers are no longer so dependent as formerly upon the union to recruit adequate crews. Correspondingly, the S.S.U. has had increasing difficulty in attempting to force growers to adhere to the terms of verbal agreements.8 The main competition facing union members has come from the South western region, including Texas, Colorado, New M exico, Arizona, and southern California, where large labor supplies are available in rural areas. The union’s strength centers in the sheep-raising areas of central and northern California, Utah, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and M on tana, where labor is relatively scarce and shearing rates are high. Labor Trouble in the Thirties Competition of labor from the Southwest became particularly severe for the Sheep Shearers Union during the 1930’s. W age rates were 7Article I of the constitution provides, among other things, the following regulations: Section 20.—Any member booking a nonunion shearer in preference to a union shearer shall be subject to suspension from this union. Section 21.—No member shall be refused work if he so desires, so long as there are no idle pens equipped for shearing at that plant. Members violating this rule shall be subject to suspension. Section 22.—Members making up crews are requested to include one member of 60 years or over, where available. All members are urged to see that members are not discriminated against on account of their age. Section 23.—Any member running a machine plant or doing grinding for himself or crew without adequate compensation for such work shall be subject to suspension. Section 24.—Any member running a machine plant or doing grinding for an unfair crew shall be subject to suspension. Section 25.—Where members of this union have established a fair margin for grinding, con tracting, or furnishing machines in any district, no member shall enter the same field at a lower rate for similar work. This would be a serious offense and violators are liable to ex pulsion. 8The union receives many complaints against ranchers who request that shearers be sent out to a job. When they arrive at ranches they may find that their places have already been taken, and that they have paid the expenses of transportation for nothing. In such strongly unionized States as California or Montana the S.S.U. can apoeal to the State Labor com missioner, who may force ranchers to hire the men or at least pay them for transportation and time lost. CH. XIV.---SHEEP SHEARERS UNION OF NORTH AMERICA 225 affected by both a decline in wool prices and an increasing labor supply arising from unemployment in other industries and trades. From 1930 to 1933 the union declined to its lowest membership in decades. The union revived strongly after the National Industrial Recovery A ct was passed in 1933. During 1934 and 1935 it began a unionizing drive in the hitherto unorganized States of Texas and Arizona, which had been a m ajor source for nonunion migratory shearers. Later it attempted such restrictive measures as the union label and the closed shop in order to protect the position of its members. The union campaign led to several large strikes. About 1,000 shearers in Missoula County, Mont., struck for 6 days during May 1933 against a reduction in wages. A month later some 500 shearers in Matrona and Loraine Counties, W yo., were involved for 2 weeks in a strike over the same issue.9 Sheep Shearers9 Strike in Western Texas, 1934 The S.S.U. suffered a serious defeat when it attempted to unionize the shearers in western Texas in 1934. Employment conditions in that area were radically different from those in the northern Mountain States, and the union found it virtually impossible to establish stable collective bargaining relations. It encountered bitter and violent opposition from organized sheep and goat raisers and finally had to abandon its cam paign. The sheep shearers of Texas, unlike those of the Mountain States, have never constituted a well-unionized labor aristocracy. They had been one of the first occupational groups to migrate in large numbers from M exico to Texas. During the middle and late nineteenth century, when the livestock industry was expanding rapidly, most of the yearround laborers tending cattle and sheep on South Texas ranches were Mexican “ vaqueros” and “ pastores.” Gangs of sheep shearers later began coming across the border twice a year, for periods of about 2 months each, to supply the seasonal demands of the ranches.10 A s the cattle and sheep industry moved farther north and west in Texas, the Mexican shearers tended to become permanent residents employed most of the year at unskilled ranch jobs. A number of them also migrated seasonally to other sections of Texas to find intermittent employment in cotton and other crops. For the most part, however, the shearers in Texas, unlike those in the Mountain and Pacific Coast States, remained casual ranch hands who rarely migrated far from their resi dences. Their bargaining power was weak. The supply of Mexican labor remained large, while strong traditional racial and class divisions kept them in a status beneath white men. W age rates for sheep shear ing in Texas were considerably lower and working conditions were poorer than in other States. Shearers in Texas during the early and middle thirties were generally paid 5 to 6 cents per sheep, as compared with 12 to 15 cents in W yom ing, Montana, or California. They averaged $2.50 to $3.25 per day during the season, making an average yearly income of $400 to $700. General ranch laborers (including most of the 9Josiah C. Folsom; Labor Disputes in Agriculture, 1927-38. 10Origins and Problems of Texas Migratory Farm Labor, prepared by the Farm Placement Service Division of the Texas State Employment Service (Austin), 1940 (p. 10). 226 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE shearers in the off-season months) customarily received $1.00 to $1.50 per day or $20 to $25 per month for steady employment.1 1 Sheep ranching, like cattle ranching, became large-scale, highly cen tralized, and owned or controlled by absentees. The land in western sheep and goat raising counties is characteristically sparsely settled and owned in large tracts of several thousand acres each.1 The ranches 2 are often in the hands of hired white managers who supervise the M exi can ranch laborers while the owners, living in adjacent small towns or cities, are concerned chiefly with commercial and financial arrangements with banks, Joan companies, wool buyers or brokers, wool and mohair warehouse companies, and the like. These enterprises, acting through such organizations as the Texas Sheep and Goat Raisers Association and the Texas W ool and Mohair Warehouse Association, exert 'considerable influence on the ranchers' business affairs and labor relations. The first attempts at organization and collective bargaining were carried out not by hired shearers but by “ capitans.'' Their prime motive was to regulate competition for labor as well as to establish standard shearing rates with sheep ranchers. A union of capitans was formed in the winter of 1925; the representatives met with officials of the Sheep and Goat Raisers Association, and a shearing price of 10 cents for sheep and 6 cents for goats was agreed upon. The union soon disbanded, however, because individual capitans failed to live up to their agree ments to restrict the cash advances to their shearers.13 Capitans, sheep shearers, and general ranch* labor jointly participated in the next attempt to organize a union. This occurred in 1933, under the double stimulus of rising prices for wool and other commodities and Federal Government's encouragement to unionism. The official Sheep and Goat Raisers Magazine announced for 1933 the “ sharpest recovery ever staged in the history of the wool industry. * * * Prices of both raw and finished products soared spectacularly during the year.” The N R A was gaining in effectiveness, and its labor provisions were highly publicized. Mexican ranch laborers in the vicinity of San Angelo, T ex., met and formulated demands for $2.80 per 8-hour day or $40 to $50 per month for steady employment, in place of the pre vailing $1.00 to $1.50 per day or $20 to $25 per month with no restric tions on hours.14 Ranchmen had difficulty in convincing the workers that they were not covered by the N R A . According to the September 1933 issue of the magazine— A committee o f Mexican ranch workers called on J. C. Deal, San Angelo Board o f City Development manager, and was not convinced until Deal communicated with Washington, D. C., and received confirmation o f earlier instructions. Open conflict and strikes did not develop until shearers in several sheep-raising counties were organized by the Sheep Shearers Union of 11Sheep and Goat Raisers Magazine (San Angelo, Tex.), Vol. 14, No. 2, September 1933 (p. 23); Vol. 14, No. 6, January 1934 (p. 101). 12Sutton County, for instance, has a total population of about 3,000. Seven or eight families are estimated to own 75 to 90 percent of the land in ranches, some of which are more than 25,000 acres in size. The large landowners are descended from old southern families who settled in the area following the Civil War. They spend most of their time in the town of Sonora and visit their ranches only once or twice a week. The ranches are managed by# hired white superintendents, who supervise the Mexican ranch labor. The only other whites in the county are a few in white-collar jobs and proprietary and skilled trades in Sonora, the county seat, and a few scattered towns. (Field notes.) 13Sheep and Goat Raisers Magazine (San Angelo, Tex.), Vol. 14, No. 6, January 1934 (p. 101). The capitan, like the labor contractor in some crop areas, often advanced credit to his sea sonal laborers during off-season months in order to maintain them and to be sure of an ade quate labor supply. During a period of relative prosperity and alternative job opportunities, however, he had no guaranty that he could hold his workers, and thus risked losing his credit outlays. 14Idem. Vol. 14. No. 2. September 1933 (p. 23). and No. 7, February 1934 (p. 126). CH. XIV.---SHEEP SHEARERS UNION OF NORTH AMERICA 227 North America. By the beginning of 1934 the S.S.U. claimed to have 750 members in the area. Representatives and members formulated demands in accordance with union standards: Union recognition and shearing rates of 12 cents per head for sheep and 8 cents for goats, as compared to the prevailing rates of 8 cents and 5 cents, respectively.1 5 Organized landowners and warehousemen tried immediately to coun teract the S.S.U. Representatives of wool and mohair warehouse com panies and ranchmen of 25 western counties held a conference on Janu ary 4th at the First National Bank of Sonora (Sutton County) under the chairmanship of T. A . Kincaid, president of the Sheep and Goat Raisers Association, and J. M . O'Daniel, president of the Texas W ool and Mohair Warehousemen's Association. They voted to refuse recognition to the Sheep Shearers Union and to maintain maximum shearing rates at 8 cents for sheep and 5 cents for goats.1 5 The discussion at the conference indicated strong anti-union sentiment and distrust of labor. H . W . Ruck declared bluntly that the union was a “ racket.” Chairman T. A . Kincaid opposed higher wage rates on the ground that “ 90 percent of the shearers gamble away their earnings each night around the camp.” 15 H e expressed the opinion that “ Mexicans are being urged along like a bunch of sheep led by a lead goat into a car.” Their actions showed, he claimed, that they were ungrateful for the facts that— * * * Mexican children are being educated, that the Mexicans pay little if any taxes, that they have equality o f opportunity on public works, that they are getting more from C W A than anybody else in the ranch country.1 6 The close relationship between sheep raising and urban business and financial interests was indicated in motions and amendments of several rancher delegates to allow banks, loan companies, and warehouses to determine the shearing rates.15 Several hundred sheep shearers in the spring and fall shearing seasons of 1934 struck in scattered local “ stay-aways,” or labor boy cotts, on ranches which refused to pay union rates. The movement continued for several months and brought sporadic incidents of violence from both sides. It was ineffective where general unemployment made large supplies of labor available, and where Mexican shearers, lacking political influence, had little legal protection. Many part-time ranch hands were dependent upon public relief, and this rendered the Sheep Shearers Union vulnerable to strikebreaking. Late in February 50 west Texas ranchmen went to Austin to persuade Government officials to discontinue relief to shearers who refused em ployment at prevailing wages. C. B. Braun, Assistant Administrator of State Relief in Austin, subsequently announced that Mexicans who refused shearing or other ranch jobs would be made ineligible for relief. R. E. Taylor, Relief Administrator for Sutton County, announced further that all shearers were to be dropped from relief rolls, even if they had not done any shearing for years. Ranchmen were encouraged to give the names of clients refusing jobs to their county relief boards so that they could then be declared ineligible. T. A . Kincaid said: W e are a pretty poor bunch of white men if we are going to sit here and let a bunch of Mexicans tell us what to do. They have organized a bunch o f foreigners that this country has taken care o f.16 15Sheep and Goat Raisers Magazine (San Angelo. Tex.), Vol. 14, No. 6, January 1934 (p. 101). 16Idem, Vol. 14, No. 7. February 1934 (o. 126). 228 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE The Sheep and Goat Raisers Association in February discussed obtaining the services of Texas rangers to patrol the sheep and goat belt, in anticipation of trouble during the coming peak of the shearing season. The only untoward incidents up to that time had been an alleged incendiary firing of two shearing machines belonging to Del R io capitans who had made contracts with nonunion shearers, and the arrest of two unionists in Del R io for “ intimidation” of nonunion men.16 A s a further means of breaking the strike such companies as the Del R io W ool & Mohair Co. and the Producers W o o l & Mohair Co. bought shearing machines and hired crews directly. Thus they were directly competing with established capitans, some of whom had joined the strike or had been unable to recruit full crews. Several white crews were put into the field to replace organized Mexicans on strike. Spokes men of the ranchers claimed that the whites did better work.16 The official organizer of the Sheep Shearers U nion for Texas com plained of “ forceful opposition” from the Sheep and Goat Raisers A sso ciation, supported by the local press and law-enforcement agencies. Some 42 union members altogether were reported arrested and jailed, and a union organizer charged that extralegal vigilante methods were employed by ranchers against strikers on several occasions.1 7 By March 1934 the Sheep and Goat Raisers Association claimed to have broken the strike. Its magazine announced that shearing had been completed for more than three-fourths of the goats, and that the same number of sheep were already being shorn, while many thousand additional sheep were covered by contracts for shearing at rates fixed by the association.18 Spokesmen of the organized ranchers, nevertheless, seemed to be undecided about the merits of collective bargaining. In an editorial entitled “ The Shearing Situation,” the official magazine complimented the association on the “ wonderful job ” it had performed in bringing together the representatives of ranchers from 25 counties to fix maximum rates for shearing. Then followed the observation that— * * * the shearing situation in Texas today is in better shape than it has ever been before. * * * Competition is the life of all trades. The white crews in competition with the Mexican crews put a different phase on the shearing situation.1 8 Later in the year Joseph S. Meyers, Conciliator from the U. S. Depart ment of Labor, sought to bring the Sheep and Goat Raisers Association into agreement with the Sheep Shearers Union. The association refused the conciliator’s request to call a meeting for discussion of shearing rates on the ground that it had no authority to make contracts with shearers 16Sheep and Goat Raisers Magazine (San Angelo, Tex.), Vol. 14, No. 7, February 1934 (p. 126). 17Letter to Harry Acreman, executive secretary of the Texas State Federation of Labor, Austin, ’March 10, 1938, from the Sheep Shearers Union organizer in San Angelo, Tex. One example was a local incident in Sutton County during the fall shearing season, described by a rancher participant thus:% “ In October 1934, Ramon Bill, a Mexican capitan of a shearing crew, tried to organize all Mexican crews in Sutton County into one shearing union. The purpose of this was to get higher pay for the work. At the time, ranchers were paying to 9 cents for sheep. Bill wanted all crews to strike for 10 cents. “ On October 23, 1934, Bill sent word to a crew working on the Arthur Simmons ranch that unless they struck, he and his crew would come out to the ranch and stop them from working. “ Several ranchers got word o> the threat and Bill and his men were stopped as they left f Sonora and arrested for disturbing the peace. Confidentially they were told that they would be shot if they ever mentioned union a^ain. “ As far as we know this is the only time there was ever any union activity of any type in Sutton County.” (Field notes.) 18The capitans were reported as having been “ a little backward” about making contracts, but were now “ falling into line.” Dozens of nonunion crews were listed as having made con tracts. (Sheep and Goat Raisers Magazine, Vol. 14, No. 8, Mar. 1934, p. 141.) CH. XIV.---SHEEP SHEARERS UNION OF NORTH AMERICA 229 nor to buy or sell anything for its members. Ranchers informed Meyers that the shearing question was “ individual, between ranchmen and shear ers.” 10 Strikes and Labor Trouble in California and Neighboring States The Sheep Shearers Union suffered worse defeats in organizing campaigns in California and adjoining States during the middle and late thirties. It had won a few union agreements with State wool growers’ associations, but these had not been renewed. After 1933, the S.S.U. continuously attempted to reach an agreement with the National W ool Growers’ Association or its various State subdivisions. These bodies, being primarily marketing agencies, consistently refused the union de mand, asserting that they had no power to bind their members to any fixed standard of wages, working conditions, or terms of hiring and firing. A unionizing campaign in California during 1934 resulted in property damage and arrest. Four union members were tried and sentenced to several years’ imprisonment on charges of arson. Local law officers pictured the incident as a “ widespread plot to terrorize sheepmen of Solano and Y olo Counties into paying wages demanded by the Sheep Shearers Union.” 20 Officers of the union disclaimed official responsibility for the acts, and commended the local law authorities and the court for “ fair and impartial instructions to the jury.” 21 The S.S.U .’s worst defeat came during the spring season of 1938, when it attempted to enforce signed collective-bargaining agreements upon wool growers throughout the western sheep-raising region. Early in the year the union announced that it would apply the closed shop, uniform union wage scales, and the union label to the wool industry. It enlisted the aid of key unions in transportation, the A .F . of L. Brother hood of Teamsters and the C.I.O. International Longshoremen and W are housemen’s Union, both of which were in a strategic position to support the shearers* demands.22 H arry Bridges, president of the Martime Union, informed representatives of the western wool growers’ associations by letter that his organization would support the S .S .U .: The Sheep Shearers Union o f North America has notified us that as o f January 1, 1938, they are placing a union label on all products handled by their members. This label has been sanctioned by all labor unions affiliated to the Committee for Industrial Organization and the American Federation o f Labor. W e, therefore, feel it is advisable to notify you that the Committee for Industrial Organization recognizes the Sheep Shearers Union label, and that we are cooperating with them in their organizing program. (Quoted from Arizona Republic, February 21,1938.) Organized wool growers in seven Western States moved to nullify the threatened union action. Shipment of wool by water from Pacific Coast ports was vulnerable to sympathetic strikes and “ hot-cargo” boy cotts on trucking lines and water fronts. The wool growers planned to 19Sheep and Goat Raisers Magazine, Vol. 14, No. 10, May 1934 (p. 184). 20California W ool Grower, March 5, 1935 (p. 4); Vallejo Times-Herald, December 28, 1934. 21 Corning Observer, February 19, 1935. 22The western wool industry has what it calls a “ break line” running from Montana to Arizona. West of this line—in the States of California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Utah, Nevada, and Arizona—the growers find it economical to truck wool to the Pacific Coast ports for shipment by ocean transport to Boston or Philadelphia. 230 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE utilize railroads as an alternative means for sending wool to eastern markets. W . P. W ing, secretary of the California W ool Growers' Association, suggested the slogan: “ Ship your wool by rail and avoid bottlenecks and Bridges.” 23 The transport unions, however, failed to give the promised support to the Sheep Shearers Union. According to spokesmen of the W ater front Employers’ Association, Harry Bridges in February assured a committee of San Francisco employers that all wool delivered to Pacific Coast ports would be handled by longshoremen irrespective of whether it bore a union label.24 Organized teamsters in Sacramento, according to spokesmen of the S.S.U., refused to recognize picket lines established by striking shearers around the docks. In Washington and Oregon the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher W orkmen of North America (A .F . of L .) gave limited sympathetic strike support to the union. Lacking unified support from other labor organizations, the union’s organizing campaign in 1938 came to little. Conflict occurred in Arizona during February, when union agents attempted to organize several non union shearing plants and later called a strike to raise wage rates to the union standard. In one minor clash 47 members, including the union president, A . A . Evans, were arrested on charges of “ rioting” and “ raid ing” a plant in which a strike was called. The union countered with complaints laid before the National Labor Relations Board, stating that nonunion shearing-plant operators had violated the W agner A ct by intimidating union members and refusing to bargain collectively.25 A strike of several hundred union shearers occurred in California during late March and April over the closed-shop and union-label issues. The California W ool Growers Association, claiming to represent 60 percent of the State’s sheep raisers, had refused to negotiate with the Sheep Shearers Union.26 S. P. Arbois, director of the association, claimed that it had no power to negotiate labor agreements with unions. H e described it as “ merely a service organization. All labor agreements have to be carried out by members acting individually.” 27 The strike began in Kern County and spread north through other central and eastern California counties. John Crawford, president of the newly established California branch of the S.S.U., claimed by April 1 that only 40 nonunion shearers were at work in the vicinities of W o o d land, Davis, and Bakersfield, where normally some 700 workers were employed.28 The strike was officially extended on April 10 to cover the entire Pacific Coast and Mountain sheep-raising region, including the States of California, Nevada, Montana, Utah, Idaho, Oregon, and W ash ington. Most shearing operations had not yet begun, however, in States other than California because their seasons came later. The union encountered opposition from growers in California, who in the end were able to break the strike. They were strongly organized 23Corning Observer, February 8, 1938 (p. 7). 24In one instance, union butchers employed in a meat-packing plant in Tacoma, Wash., re fused to kill “ hot sheep’ * bought from a ranch which was involved at the time in difficulties with the Sheep Shearers Union. This action was overruled by Patrick Gorman, national presi dent of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, on the grounds that it unnecessarily penalized the packing company involved, putting it in a position of disad vantage with its competitors. Furthermore, it was felt that without the support of key labor groups like the teamsters and freight handlers, sympathetic strike action to help the Sheep Shearers Union placed unreasonable burdens and responsibility upon the Amalgamated. (Cali fornia W ool Grower, Feb. 22, 1938.) 25Arizona Republic, March 1, 1938 (p. 3). 26San Francisco Examiner, April 2, 1938 (p. 3). 27Idem, April 3, 1938 (p. 10). 28Idem, April 2, 1938 (p. 8). CH. XIV.---SHEEP SHEARERS UNION OF NORTH AMERICA 231 in county associations, which in turn backed the State W ool Growers Association. Levies were raised from individual members, and the power ful Associated Farmers supported a drive to recruit nonunion shearers. This organization opposed the union demands for a closed shop and union label on wool, fearing that the principle would be extended to other crops. (T h e C.I.O. union, U .C .A .P .A .W .A ., was at that time dominant among field workers and was preparing to undertake a State wide organizing drive.) The San Joaquin County W ool Growers Association announced for mation of the Associated Sheep Shearers of California, a type of company union. Spokesmen announced that shearers would be selected from the new organization regardless of union affiliation and would be paid the union scale of 12y2 cents per head. Crawford, president of the Califor nia Sheep Shearers Union, repudiated the new organization as “ undoubt edly sponsored by the Associated Farmers of California as well as the W ool Growers Association, who favor an open shop in the wool indus try.” 29 T w o hundred wool growers from San Joaquin, Stanislaus, and Contra Costa Counties at a mass meeting voted to assess themselves 1 cent per sheep for a “ war chest” with which to fight the closed-shop strike.30 They also announced publicly that they would employ and assure full protection to any sheep shearers, regardless of union affiliation, who would work under strike conditions. They were followed several days later by 300 wool growers of Napa, Marin, and Sonoma Counties, who in a meeting in Santa Rosa on April 12 likewise resolved to operate a joint hiring hall and raise an anti-union fund.31 The Associated Farmers sent agents to other States to recruit shearers who would take the places of the strikers. By mid-April nonunion shearers from Texas and other States were reported to be flocking into the sheep-raising areas of California.32 Law-enforcement officers in several counties cooperated closely with organized wool growers and the Associated Farmers. Sheriff Ben Heard of Glenn County described his method as follow s: I called the sheep men together * * * I put the cards before them * * * and con tacted different members throughout the State. W e organized throughout our county a group o f farms. W e had to carry out the work o f patrolling and moving these several [sheep-shearing] plants, o f which we had 12 at one time, then 10, sometimes 8, 4, and 2. On these we put as high as 8 guards, 6 at night and 2 in the daytime. * * * The Associated Farmers coordinated them * * * we moved most o f the sheep shearers into a larger plant and they tried to prorate the sheep. They [Associated Farmers] fed the men and sheared the sheep and paid the guards. (Hearings o f La Follette Committee, Part 75, pp. 27631-27632.) Under such combined pressure the strike collapsed after a month. The defeat cost the Sheep Shearers Union several thousands of dollars and weakened it for some time to come. Its membership, which early in 1936 was estimated by one official as including some 1,100 out of approximately 3,000 professional shearers in the United States, had declined by July 1938 to about 700, or less than 25 percent of the number employed in the industry. " S a n Francisco Examiner, April 2, 1938 (p. 7). "Id e m , April 8, 1938 (p. 8). 31Idem, April 13, 1938 (p. 9). 32Idem, April 22, 1938 (p. 10). 654107°—46-16 232 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE Present Status Both public and private groups have begun to compete with the union for control o f the sheep-shearing trade. A union official termed such competition “ a conscious effort by particular groups who want to make a ‘good thing’ out of a high-paid trade.” One private employment agency, the Inter-Mountain Circuit, has some 200 nonunion shearers on its rolls. The agent locates jobs by making contacts with plant and ranch operators and recruiting sheep shearers by telegram. The Circuit, in return, collects yearly fees or dues from the shearers.33 The S.S.U. has been concerned about the practices of such institu tions as the Utah State College of Agriculture at Logan, which has intro duced a course in sheep shearing for its students. Union officials con sider the course a threat to their organization, since it is a potential means for developing a larger local labor supply in the State. Growers in the future will be likely to hire fewer migratory shearers, among whom the union is most strongly organized. On the other hand, a m ajor part of the shearing in Utah, at least of smaller flocks, has always been performed by local workers. Many of the migratory workers who shear flocks in several States of the Inter-Mountain area come from small communities in Sanpete County, Utah. In recent years a few Mexicans have been employed seasonally at shearing in eastern Utah, and some shearers from California and Arizona have been entering Utah to work after the season is finished in their States. Increasing competition from many sources has weakened the bargain ing position of the Sheep Shearers Union and impelled it to seek the support of other organizations. After its defeats in 1938, the S.S.U. affiliated with the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher W orkm en of America, so as to insure sympathetic action from this more powerful organization. W ool growers fear that this alliance will lead to a more ambitious attempt than in 1938 to extend union control, in the form of the closed shop and union label, throughout the sheep industry. They envisage “ hot cargo” boycotts applied by union butchers in packing houses which buy sheep from wool growers. The bargaining power of the Sheep Shearers Union of North America is likely to be greatly strengthened by present conditions. Increased de mand and higher prices for wool have stimulated expansion in the sheep industry. A t the same time, the number of nonunion sheep shearers has been decreasing, because of the Arm y draft and the huge expansion of employment in war industries. The union members’ position is made more secure by the fact that most of them are middle-aged men. 83Shearers affiliated both to the Circuit and to the union periodically complain of “ chiseling” agencies and “ schools” which operate in Texas and New Mexico. One such, advertising by radio, offered to teach sheep shearing for a price and to guarantee jobs for its “ graduates.” Such agencies place their men, it is charged, by cutting the wages and getting a substantial “ rake-off.” They have been rumored to accept shearing rates^ of 10 cents per head (where the union and the Circuit have a standard 12 cents), and from this they collect a fee of 4 cents to 5 cents a head from the men they place. (Field notes and interviews.) Ch a pter XV .— Beet Workers in the Mountain States Labor in the Sugar-Beet Industry A special agricultural labor problem developed in the Rocky Moun tain States during the twentieth century as sugar-beet production became concentrated in that region. It was a distinctly submarginal or sweat shop industry that depended upon public protection and financial sub sidy in various forms. A s an intensively cultivated crop grown in sparsely settled areas it relied also upon cheap seasonal labor imported from other areas. Commercially grown beets were first introduced into Colorado about 40 years ago, and during the two decades following W orld W ar I the State averaged almost one-third of the total acreage and output for the United States.1 W eld, Morgan, Larimer, Logan, Adams, and Boulder Counties, lying immediately north of Denver, became in the order named the heaviest beet-producing areas in the country. The Great Western Sugar Co., operating mainly in this district, was estimated to be pro ducing by 1930 more than 80 percent of all beet sugar in Colorado and almost 45 percent of all produced in the United States.2 Sugar-refining companies, as monopolistic buyers, gained an increas ing domination over beet growers. Sugar beets, unlike other types of agricultural produce, were not sold competitively in central markets. Their bulkiness and perishability required that they be grown in the immediate vicinity of the refining plant, which was the sole market for each grower’s crop. The processors’ control often extended even beyond this market relationship. Frequently a refining company financed the growers’ production outlays, maintained a staff of agricultural superin tendents and field men to supervise farm operations, and recruited the labor hired by growers to cultivate and harvest their crop.3 The terms of purchase, sale, and supervision over production were stipulated in detail in contracts made between processors and producers prior to the planting season. Refining companies found such contracts necessary to insure an adequate supply of beets, and growers considered them desira ble as assurance of a certain market at predetermined prices. The low earnings, high seasonality and disagreeable nature of the work made beet-field labor unattractive to resident workers of the R ocky Mountain States. Labor supplies from other regions consequently had to be tapped. The Great W estern Sugar Co. and other refiners recruited thousands of Mexican families from southern Texas and M exico for the beet fields of Colorado and neighboring States. Company agents sent out circulars and newspaper advertisements, held public meetings, and provided transportation for the workers. A peculiar pattern of labor relations developed. Refining companies endeavored to standardize labor costs as well as prices of sugar beets by means of seasonal labor contracts between growers and workers in 1Sugar Beets: Changes in Technology and Labor Requirements in Crop Production. WPA National Research Project, Washington, 1937 (pp. 6-13). 2Paul S. Taylor: Mexican Labor in the Valley of the South Platte, Colorado, University of California. Publications in Economics, 1928: Thomas F. Mahoney: Industrial Relations in the Beet Fields of Colorado, address at the Third Catholic Conference on Industrial Problems, Denver, April 21, 1931 (p. 1). 3 Paul S . T aylor, M exican Labor in the V alley of the South P latte, Colorado (p. 114). 233 234 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE each factory district. These contracts specified the acreage allotted to each laborer, the manner in which the work was to be performed, wage rates and time or manner of payment, terms of hiring and firing, and settlement of disputes. Company field men were usually stipulated as arbitrators in case of disagreement between growers and laborers. The interests of the grower-employers and the processing companies tended to diverge over the labor question. In the last analysis the refiners determined wages and working conditions by the contract price they paid for beets. At the same time they could shift the burden of responsi bility for the workers’ welfare upon the immediate employers, the grow ers. While beet acreage was expanding, the companies were eager to attract and maintain a large resident labor supply in order to cut down the costs of recruiting and transporting workers from distant areas. Hence they favored higher wages than the growers were willing to pay. In earlier years the companies also had provided free housing and other facilities for the workers and had attempted to smooth the process of social and occupational adjustment for the Mexican and Spanish-Ameri can laborers. The refining companies, in brief, were concerned with keeping labor satisfied with its position, even though at a low standard of living. Every effort was made to prevent any feeling of injustice or exploitation among beet workers. Growers were urged to be diplomatic in their treatment of Mexican laborers and to be as liberal as possible in meeting their needs. Companies endeavored to educate farmers in every aspect of personnel work or labor relations.4 Mexican beet workers were recognized, nevertheless, as constituting a chronic labor problem in Colorado even in the most prosperous years of the twenties. The Colorado State Council of the Knights of Columbus, for instance, had formed a special Mexican welfare committee as early as 1923, to carry on social work and charity among beet laborers. In its fifth annual report for 1928 it stated: “ W e * * * believe that by indifference to social justice, Colorado is— unwittingly— but nevertheless actively, cooperating with the forces of radicalism and disorder.” 5 The most obvious problems facing the beet laborer were poverty and squalor imposed by low wr ages, seasonal employment, and absence of alternative opportunities for earning a livelihood in the sparsely set tled Rocky Mountain region. Family earnings even in the best of times averaged only $600 to $650 per year.6 By the mid-thirties annual family earnings had declined to averages estimated as low as $220 for beet work and $72 for other employment. The proportion of beet laborers on relief ranged from 37 to 97 percent in different areas. Poverty was accom panied by distinctly substandard housing, child labor, pauperism, and deficiencies in education and health.7 A more serious problem in the long run was the Mexican beet labor ers’ distinct status as a lower caste, which they held because of their poverty, color, and cultural attributes. Their position in Colorado in 4Taylor, op. cit. (pp. 142, 157-160). 5Fifth Annual Report, Mexican welfare committee of Colorado State Council, Knights of Columbus (Pueblo, Colo.), May 28, 1928 (p. 1). 6Paul S. Taylor: Mexican Labor in the Valley of the South Platte, Colorado; also, Thomas F. Mahoney: Problems of the Mexican Wage Earner, address at the Catholic Conference o* Industrial Problems, Denver, May 12, 1930 (p. 2). 7Wages, Employment Conditions, and Welfare of Sugar Beet Laborers, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Serial No. R. 703, Washington, 1938 (pp. 4-5, 14-16); R. W . Rosskelly: Beet • Labor Problems in Colorado, paper presented at the thirteenth annual meeting of the Western Farm Economics Association (Pullman, Wash.), July 10-12, 1940 (pp. 4, 5). CH. XV.---BEET WORKERS IN THE MOUNTAIN STATES 235 many ways came to parallel that of Negroes in the Southern States. “ W hite trade only” signs appeared in business establishments in some towns, segregation in seating arrangements was imposed in movingpicture houses, residential restrictions were applied to real estate, and a sentiment for segregation in schools became widespread.8 Mexicans and Spanish-Americans also faced discrimination before the law. The M exi can welfare committee of the Knights of Columbus in its annual report for 1928 stated: Protest is becoming more general against the abuse, injustice, and grossly unfair treatment o f the Spanish-speaking people by certain Colorado constables, lawenforcement officers, and justices o f the peace * * * . As things now stand, for a Mexican to be arrested and accused, is to be convicted. And to be arrested and accused in many instances it is only necessary to have money to pay the fines and costs which the judge may assess. Racial divisions were reflected in labor relations in the beet fields. Beet growers were for the most part family farmers who hired yearround farm hands of the old-fashioned kind, who ate at the same table as their employers. These personal relationships did not extend to the Mexican beet laborer. The regular field work— plowing, planting, irri gating, and cultivating in spring and summer, and beet lifting and haul ing by machinery in the fall— was commonly performed by white A m er ican farmers and hired men. The tasks of weeding, hoeing, thinning, and topping, which were not considered “ white men’s work,” were left to seasonally employed Mexicans.9 Beet work was characterized by a high rate of turn-over. In one survey it was found that beet laborers on the average had worked 2.35 years for their present employers, and 51.7 percent of those interviewed were working for their present employers for the first time.101 In many places the Mexicans lived in company-owned houses rather than on the farms on which they were employed. Sometimes, it was said, a farmer used farm dwellings as a bargaining device to make the beet workers adhere to his personal whims.10 A situation of near-peonage developed where beet workers depended upon their employers for credit (deducted from future earnings) for subsistence during off seasons.1 1 Widespread dissatisfaction became evident among Mexican beet work ers in Colorado by the late twenties. Second-generation immigrants in particular tended to resent the incompatibility of their disadvantaged status with the democratic American principles which they learned in public school. T o quote Dr. R . W . Rosskelly of Colorado State A gri cultural College: Logic suggests the impossibility o f scoffing at the Mexican culture patterns, of indoctrinating them with those o f the Nordics and still expecting them to perform a type o f labor and live under conditions which Nordic standards taboo. Neither can it be expected that they will willingly relegate themselves to the status o f secondclass citizens in a country where equal opportunity, regardless o f race, is the symbol of freedom. (Beet Labor Problems in Colorado, p. 10.) 8Paul S. Taylor: Mexican Labor in the Valley of the South Platte, Colorado (pp. 216-223); R. W. Rosskelly, op. cit. (pp. 8, 9). 9Paul S. Taylor: Mexican Labor in the Valley of the South Platte, Colorado (p. 102)* 10R. W . Rosskelly: Beet Labor Problems in Colorado (pp. 5 and 6). 11Thomas F. Mahoney: Problems of the Mexican Wage Earner (p. 6). “ The system of giving credit for food and supplies during the winter to be paid out of the next season’ s work is also to be condemned as being a menace to the economic liberty of the Mexican and Spanish workers in the sugar-beet industry. Under this plan he will start to work in the spring handicapped by a debt to the sugar company which will reduce the amount coming to him in the fall. Every winter this burden of debt may be increased until in a comparatively short time many of these Mexican workers will find their freedom of contract so limited that they will be compelled to labor under whatever terms or conditions may be imposed upon them.” 236 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE Beginnings of Unionism The disadvantaged social and economic position of Mexican laborers stimulated unionism in the sugar-beet fields. Poverty and low social status became unacceptable when imposed by collective bargaining be tween sugar companies and beet growers' associations. The laborers were impelled to organize in self-defense, seeking to improve wage rates and working conditions by bargaining collectively with producers and processors in an evenly balanced triangular relationship. The beet workers' unions were concentrated in northeastern Colorado, in counties adjacent to Denver. Only a few brief local organizations ever developed in the beet-growing districts of southern Colorado, Kan sas, Nebraska, W yom ing, or Montana. Field workers near the metro politan area could enlist the support of strongly established urban tradeunions. Denver has long served as a focal point for transportation and communication in the Mountain States. It has been the headquarters for major industrial, financial, and governmental agencies serving the region, and the nerve center for Colorado's militant labor movement. Certain distinctive features of labor relations in the sugar-beet indus try, on the other hand, impeded effective labor unionism and collective bargaining. Beet workers lived and worked individually or in small scattered groups on small farms, in contrast with the gangs or crews employed on large agricultural enterprises. W orking conditions varied widely among individual farms. Hence it was difficult to bring laborers together in agreement over issues which would find general acceptance. The system of individual contracting between growers and workers was an additional deterrent, despite the fact that it served to standardize wage rates and terms of employment. A s the price for beets was deter mined by contract before cultivation began, organized workers had little or no opportunity to change the wage scale by threatening to strike at the strategic harvest period. The I.W.W. and Mexican Radicals The first attempt to organize beet workers in the Mountain States was made during the twenties by the Industrial W orkers of the W orld. The Agricultural W orkers Industrial Union No. 110 as early as 1920 reported having official organizers in Colorado and Nebraska to cam paign among workers in the sugar-beet crop,12 but there is no evidence to show that this organization gained any influence in these areas. Early in 1927 the I.W .W . was active in a strike among coal miners in southern Colorado, a large proportion of whom were Mexicans and Spanish-Americans. There was much occupational mobility between mining and farming in some localities. The I.W .W ., however, was unable to organize unions among farm laborers as it had done among miners.13 Nevertheless, spontaneous organization and agitation among Mexicans in northern Colorado beet districts created a widespread though groundless fear that beet workers were being organized by the I.W .W . to strike for higher wages. Attempts were made for a while to prevent 12The Industrial Worker (Everett, Wash., official stated: “ Members of the A.W .I.U . No. 110 have started a of Colorado and Nebraska. A traveling delegate is There are bumper crops around Sterling, Brush, and 13Paul S. Taylor: Mexican Labor in the Valley of organ of the I.W .W .), October 30, 1920, drive this year throughout the beet fields at present going through these States. Greeley/’ the South Platte, Colorado (p. 159). CH. XV.—BEET WORKERS IN THE MOUNTAIN STATES ‘- 237 field laborers from holding meetings of any kind, and there were even some demands that soldiers be sent into the beet fields to “ intimidate” the Mexicans.14 Directors of the Beet Growers’ Association subsequently met with Mexican beet workers’ committees in amicable conferences. Spokesmen for the laborers presented petitions for improved housing, clean drinking water, sanitary facilities, and guaranties that they would be paid for their work. The president of the Beet Growers’ Association stated that the workers’ demands were reasonable and promised to grant them as soon as possible.15 A greater source of worry in certain quarters was what the Mexican welfare committee of the Knights of Columbus termed the “ Red Socialist menace.” A ccording to that body, propaganda and “ educational” work were being carried on among Mexican beet workers by representatives of certain radical organizations of M exico. The agitation had begun in Colorado in 1926 as a nationalistic movement in support of the Calles regime in M exico,15 but later became associated with the Mexican C.R .O .M . labor movement. Apparently no strike action was under taken by its leadership.16 . The A.F of L. and the Beet Workers9 Association Collective bargaining along union lines was first attempted during the late twenties. Officials of the Colorado State Federation of Labor from time to time met with local committees of beet workers who had grievances they wished to present to their employers, and endeavored to help such groups organize and formulate their demands. The federation late in 1927 became more active in forming local groups or committees of Mexican beet workers in communities where they were concentrated in off-season months— Denver, Longmont, Loveland, Fort Collins, Greeley, Fort Lupton, Rocky Ford, and Pueblo, among others. Loosely organized associations were formed in which the local community leader — the accepted spokesman for the laborers in each locality— was chosen to act as secretary, to call meetings, and to give each group some con tinuity. There was no regular system of union d ues; informal collections at meetings and money raised at social activities provided the main sources of revenue. The State federation in 1928 persuaded the executive council of the American Federation of Labor at Washington, D. C., to provide an experienced organizer for the Mexican beet workers. The State body planned to enlist them in federal labor unions which in time would be federated into an international union for the industry. A well-educated 14Fifth Annual Report, Mexican Welfare Committee of the Colorado State Council, Knights of Columbus, 1928 (p. 6). 15Fourth Annual Report, Mexican Welfare Committee of the Colorado State Council, Knights of Columbus, Denver, 1927 (p. 2). 16Fifth Annual Report, Mexican Welfare Committee, 1928 (p. 6). “ These radicals at present seem to be mostly doing educational work among the Spanish speaking people * * * “ They have frequent closed meetings in Denver and in and near the smaller towns in the sugar-beet districts. These meetings are really schools for the teaching of Communist and other radical doctrines. Their propaganda is directed along anti-Catholic, anti-religious, anti organized government, and on Mexican-political lines. It is to some extent in this country a sort of# ‘Help Calles, movement. “ This work has been carried on quietly but persistently for several years in Colorado #and other parts of the Southwest. Their leaders, while using the existing bad conditions effectively to attract and make converts, do not seem to want labor troubles. They seem for the present to have some other purpose in view * * V * 238 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE and able Spanish-American printer and member of the Typographical Union, C. N. Idar, came to Colorado for this purpose. A s he had been a successful organizer for the A .F . of L. among the Mexican cotton pickers in Arizona during 1920-21,17 and later among the Mexican laborers in various industries along the lower R io Grande Valley in Texas, he was considered well fitted to unionize beet workers of the same race in the Mountain States. Idar was active in this region throughout 1928 and 1929, attempting to organize federal labor unions in every colony of beet workers in Colo rado, Nebraska, and W yoming. Charters were issued to local unions, and these were encouraged to keep a nucleus of 10 or 12 members pay ing regular monthly dues the year round in order to maintain the organi zation in good standing. A special concession also was granted to these unions, in that their members, a large proportion of whom were unem ployed or nonresident during part of each year, were required to pay dues only during the months they were employed. Usually just enough was collected from each local to pay the minimum per capita dues required by the constitution of the A .F . of L. In exchange for this con cession, restrictions were imposed on the locals’ right to the strike bene fits from the A .F . of L. These local unions of beet workers at one time had a total member ship in the Mountain States of more than 10,000 members, most o f them in Colorado, according to a former official of the Colorado State Federa tion of Labor. In 1929 they were brought together into a loosely formed organization known as the Beet W orkers’ Association. The member ship included several elements whose philosophies differed rather widely. Representatives of the I.W .W ., who during early 1927 had led strikes of Mexican and other foreign-born coal miners in Colorado, had some influence among the beet workers. Communists, who hoped to recruit beet workers to the newly organized Trade U nion Unity League, were numerically insignificant at that time. Many local representatives in the association were strongly nationalist in sentiment, for the status and prestige of a community leader among Mexicans rested upon his uphold ing, at least vocally, their rights.as a national minority.18 Some repre sentatives favored the formation of a separate union, exclusively M exi can and unaffiliated with other organizations. Others sought to obtain a charter from the State federation for an all-Mexican or Spanish-speak ing organization whose members would be allowed to work in other unionized industries. The federation refused this request on the ground that it would segregate workers by race or religion rather than by trade or industry. Prevailing sentiment apparently favored affiliation with the A .F . of L. This was expressed in a convention of some 200 delegates of the Beet W orkers’ Association at Fort Lupton in August 1929, which was attended by the president and secretary-treasurer of the Colorado State Federation of Labor.19 The A .F . of L. executive refused to grant an international charter to the association until it proved able to maintain itself as a permanent, self-sufficient organization. A t the thirty-fifth annual convention of the Colorado State Federation of Labor at Fort Lupton in June 1930, Frank Corpio, president of the Beet W orkers’ 17See Chapter X II (p. 195). ^Representatives of the Mexican Government at that time were charged by radical and conservative groups alike with propagandizing Mexican-born workers in this country. CH. XV.---BEET WORKERS IN THE MOUNTAIN STATES 239 Association, stated that his organization would be able to affiliate for mally with the A .F . of L. within a year.19 The association disintegrated soon after this convention. C. N . Idar was forced because of illness to discontinue his activities as an A .F . of L. organizer. H e was not replaced, as the A .F . of L. at the time was faced with declining revenue and the need to retrench. Surplus labor displaced from other industries flooded the beet fields in the ensuing period of depression and unemployment. Native white Americans, who had tra ditionally shunned this occupation, now competed writh Mexicans. Most of the union locals passed out of existence; the few remaining existed in name only. The United Front Committee of Agricultural Workers Unions Discontent among beet workers became widespread during the early depression years, because of increasingly severe unemployment and a rapid decline in wage rates. W ages were cut 25 percent in the northern Colorado district from 1930 to 1931, from $23 per acre and a bonus o f 50 cents per ton for harvesting on yields over 12 tons, to $18 per acre and a bonus for yields over 14 tons.20 By 1932 wages had been reduced to a record low of $12 to $14 per acre. The customary standard ization of contract rates and working conditions was disrupted by cut throat competition among growers selling beets and among surplus laborers seeking jobs. The Mountain States Beet Growers’ Association claimed to have had no voice whatever in determining either the beetproduction contracts or the labor contracts with sugar-refining com panies.21 A report by the Colorado State Industrial Commission described conditions in the beet fields as “ industrial slavery.” W age rates were at such low levels that beet workers, in order to exist, required charity even while at work.22 Growers at the same time were having financial troubles. The Great Western Sugar Co. and other sugar-refining firms were losing money for the first time in many years,23 and consequently set lower prices for beets they bought from farmers. Prices for other crops fell even more, so that growers had no choice but to accept. A n official of the Mountain States Beet Growers’ Association stated publicly: Returns to farmers under their individual contracts with the Great Western Sugar Co. are so uncertain and indefinite that the growers have been virtually forced to get their labor at starvation wages. (R ocky Mountain News, May 20, 1932, p. 10.) Left-wing elements gained influence among beet workers at the ex pense of the more orthodox or “ reformist” adherents of the A .F . of L. and the former Beet W orkers’ Association. The Agricultural W orkers Industrial League was formed as the Colorado counterpart of California’s Cannery and Agricultural W orkers Industrial Union, both subsidiaries of the Communist-controlled Trade Union Unity League. The League 1 1Proceedings, Thirty-fifth Annual Convention, Colorado State Federation of Labor, Denver, June 1930 (pp. 3 and 30). 20Thomas F. Manoney: Industrial Relations in the Beet Fields of Colorado, address at the third Catholic conference on industrial problems, Denver. April 21, 1931 (p. 3). 21Rocky Mountain News (Denver), May 20, 1932 (p. 10). -2Idem, May 16, 1932 (p. 1). „ ^ - 3The Financial History of the Great Western Sugar Company, an outline compiled by J. F. Rasmussen, consulting engineer for the Colorado Farmers Union, Denver, 1939. 240 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE took the initiative in organizing new local unions of beet workers, and in some communities it revived inactive locals of the Beet W orkers’ A sso ciation. T h e A .W .I.L . had new branches in Greeley, Fort Lupton, Fort Collins, and Denver, while in other centers it enlisted the support of various non-Communist organizations. The leading organizers were reported to be Anglo-Americans who had been active in various Com munist groups in Denver.24 A number of Spanish-speaking organizers campaigned locally among Mexicans and Spanish-Americans. A conference of representatives from both the orthodox and left-wing factions among the beet workers was held in Denver in February 1932, and the United Front Committee of Agricultural W orkers Unions was formed. Delegates formulated demands for a basic contract price of $23 per acre and recognition of the United Front Committee, and decided to form local committees in each factory district and beet workers’ colony in Colorado, Nebraska, and W yom ing. A central committee was elected to represent organized workers from these scattered growing areas. Delegates of the United Front attempted several times to negotiate with representatives of beet growers and sugar companies but were un successful. A strike finally was called on May 16, 1932, after a series of mass meetings had been held in Fort Lupton, Fort Morgan, Brighton, Fort Collins, and other beet centers of Colorado. It began about one week before the thinning season reached a peak. One leading organizer announced that he expected 20,000 workers to respond,25 but any accu rate estimate of the number who actually participated is impossible. The labor situation was unfavorable for collective action, and the movement collapsed within a few weeks. It could not be coordinated effectively over so wide an area, ranging from the Arkansas Valley in southern Colorado to Greeley and Fort Morgan in the northeastern counties. The United Front Committee was a loosely organized mass movement containing divergent groups which did not work well together. Left-wing elements accused some of the more conservative or “ reformist” local organizations, such as the Spanish-American Citizens’ Association of Fort Collins, of helping to break the strike through refusing to co operate with other labor groups. Some were charged with replacing strikers in the beet fields, spreading unfavorable rumors, and meeting openly with officials of the Great Western Sugar Co. and other employers. The strike was not timed strategically. Sugar beets were not perish able at the weeding and thinning stage, and these operations could be delayed for some time to the increasing discomfort of the strikers. The latters’ position was made extremely, precarious by the chronic surplus of labor in a year of severe depression and unemployment. Officials of of the Great Western Sugar Co. stated to the Associated Press that there were two or three men available for every job vacated.25 Falling prices and substantial monetary losses stiffened the resistance of growers and company officials to union demands. Public agencies and law authorities were generally hostile to the strikers. County commissioners in W eld and other beet-growing counties stated publicly that relief would be denied to workers who refused jobs in the beet fields.26 Newspapers announced that R ed Cross flour dona tions to the needy would not be available for those who declined to 24Rocky Mountain News, May 16, 1932 (p. 1). 25Idem, May 16. 1932 (p. 1). 26Idem, May 17, 1932 (p. 5). CH. XV.---BEET WORKERS IN THE MOUNTAIN STATES 241 work.28 Material aid provided by the W orkers International Relief of New Y ork City was an inadequate substitute, as was legal aid supplied by the International Labor Defense for strikers arrested en masse. Police and sheriffs in several counties in north and south Colorado within 2 weeks arrested dozens of pickets on charges of “ vagrancy,” “ intimida t i o n , o r simply “ attempting to persuade workers to leave their jobs in the beet fields.,, 29 Deportation of a number of the more militant M exi can members of the United Front contributed to the final collapse of the movement.80 The strike was relatively free from extralegal violence and vigilantism. Nevertheless, there were sufficient individual cases to represent “ terrorism” and “ intimidation” to the union representatives.30 Opposi tion threatened to become violent after a company-employed “ ditch-rider” was injured by an explosion, which newspapers attributed to a bomb set by “ beet labor agitators.” 31 In one locality violent armed conflict on a large scale was narrowly averted. The R ocky Mountain News in its May 27, 1932, issue reported that— Squads o f heavily armed deputy sheriffs and volunteers surrounded and arrested 33 alleged strike agitators in the sugar-beet fields near Avondale yesterday. Farmers o f the district, armed and organized, were prepared to use their guns against the asserted agitators when the officers reached the scene, averting violence. None o f the demonstrators were armed * * * . The United Front Committee disappeared after the failure of this strike. Groups of the more militant organizers continued their unionizing campaign on a local basis. Some worked through organizations which survived the strike, and others organized new groups where previous unions had disappeared. The Spanish-Speaking W orkers’ League, for instance, was organized among the more radical beet workers living in Denver during off-season months. It was a means for holding them together after the 1932 strike collapsed. F or the next few years the beet workers’ organizations strove primarily to obtain adequate relief rather than to raise wage rates in the beet fields. Unemployed Organizations in Colorado Under-employment, poverty, and dependency had created a serious labor problem in beet-growing areas of Colorado and other Mountain States for many years. H igh seasonality and low wage rates in sugarbeet work, together with lack of alternative job opportunities for M exi can field laborers, had been causes for grave concern even in the most prosperous years of the late twenties. Labor organizers in many agricultural areas during the thirties were anxious to unionize farm workers in order to protect their position as relief clients rather than as wage earners. Relief was a club which could be used to support or destroy the bargaining power and security of laborers on their jobs. Competition for jobs in the fields decreased and wage rates were kept from going lower when part of the labor sup ply could be maintained on relief. 28Longmont Times Call, June 17, 1932 (p. 1). 29Rocky Mountain News, May 18, 1932 (p. 3); May M ay 21, 1932 (p. 12); May 27, 1932 (p. 3). 3°Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 3, October 1935 (p. 2). ~ ' ___________ , . ... y ~ 81Rocky Mountain News, May 23, 1932 (p. 32). 19, 1932 (p. 2); May 20, 1932 (p. 242 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE The incentives which impelled beet workers to organize and press for adequate relief prqvisions were doubly strong in Colorado. Public assistance was of crucial importance as a supplementary source of live lihood 32 and appeared to be administered in an unusually discriminatory manner by public authorities. Testimony from both labor representatives and government officials * indicated that earnings from cash and work relief were almost as high as, if not higher than, wages from beet-field work. Beet laborers con sequently sought to stay on relief where possible.33 Local and State relief administrators at the same time were often under the domination of the most influential groups in the community and acted in the inter ests of growers and sugar-company officials. The influence of employers was particularly strong in these areas, because the labor belonged to a depressed racial minority. Beet workers throughout the early and middle thirties complained that they were being cut off relief rolls arbitrarily. Sometimes they were discharged w’ell before the growing season began; this created a surplus of labor which depressed wages.34 Little or no attempt was made in the earlier years to guarantee that workers could find jobs when cut off relief. They had to compete with out-of-State migrants, many of whom were recruited by the sugar-beet companies.35 Spokesmen for Roman Catholic welfare organizations, among others, complained that the burden of charity was being shifted increasingly to private or semipublic agencies in Denver and other cities.36 Discrimination was made still more apparent after 1933, when beet growers began receiving crop benefit payments from the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. W hile wages and prices in other industries were rising during 1933 and 1934, beet workers’ wages remained but slightly above the record low of 1932. According to a survey by the Agricultural Experiment Station of the Colorado State College of A gri culture, average contract-labor rates in the northern beet-growing sec tion were $13.42 per acre in 1933 and $13.19 in 1934, as compared with $12.09 in 1932, $18.09 in 1931, and $24.68 in 1930.37 Meanwhile the incomes of the five major sugar companies during the 4 years 1933 to 1936, inclusive, as the survey pointed out, were ‘Very favorable.” 38 Particularly irritating to Mexican and Spanish-American workers was the discrimination against them as a racial or cultural minority. State W P A Administrator Paul Schriver later admitted with regard to relief policy— W e are not particularly proud o f the way in which it was handled. Men were laid off on the assumption that they were beet laborers because o f their names— 32In various surveys the proportion of beet workers* families on relief varied in time and place from 37 to 97 percent—the latter in the Arkansas Valley of southern Colorado during 1935. A study of 192 beet workers* families on relief in Weld County during 1936 revealed an average income from relief nearly as large as that from beet work—$172 and $222, respectively, for the year. The average amount of public assistance received was 39 percent of the total average annual income from all sources. (U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Serial No. R. 703, pp. 16-17; Olaf Larsen: Beet Workers on Relief, Research Bulletin No. 4, Colorado State Agricultural Experiment Station, Fort Collins, May 1937.) 33Regional Sugar Beet Labor Conference, Denver, March 19-20, 1937. Works Progress A d ministration (pp. 1, 38, 50). 34Longmont Times Call, June 27, 1934, September 18, 1934, June 21, 1935, March 5, 1937; Colorado Labor Advocate (Denver), April 5, 1935; Denver Post, June 22, 1934, April 27, 1936; Rocky Mountain News, May 5, 1937. 35Regional Sugar Beet Labor Conference, Denver, March 19-20, 1937. Works Progress A d ministration (pp. 15, 25, 33, 34). 36Catholic Register, March 30, 1936, January 21, 1940. 37R. T. Burdick: Economics of Sugar Beet Production. Experiment Station, Colorado State College, Fort Collins, Bulletin 453, June 1939 (p. 36). 38Idem (p. 41); see also J. F. Rasmussen, op. cit. CH. XV.---BEET WORKERS IN THE MOUNTAIN STATES Spanish bungled was in 1937, p. 243 or Mexican. W e were faced with the necessity for making reductions, the thing through and got rid o f the men whose traditional employment the beet fields. (Regional Sugar Beet Labor Conference, March 19-20, 1.) Another administrator said: The W P A , in my estimation, is consequently being represented by the Spanish speaking people as showing class prejudice in referring to the beet work only Spanish-speaking people. (Regional Sugar Beet Labor Conference, March 19-20, 1937, p. 39.) The Trade U nion Unity League, following the collapse of its beetlabor strike for wage increases, sought to organize “ unemployed councils” of beet workers to agitate for more adequate relief. This pro gram merged with that of the Colorado State Federation of Labor, which took a more active interest in the unemployed than did its counterparts in other States. The executive board of the State federation from 1933 through 1935 carried on a campaign to organize local unemployed councils in various communities and to unite these in the State-wide Colorado Federation of W orkers. Free charters were issued to local councils and their rep resentatives were allowed to have a voice in the annual convention o f the State federation. They had no vote since they paid no regular dues. Membership cards issued to those who joined the councils were forfeited when members obtained stable jobs which took them out of the category of unemployed. According to a former secretary-treasurer of the State federation, 25,000 membership cards were issued altogether.39 State federation officials made some attempt to handle grievances presented by these organized groups, and to help them formulate and negotiate demands. A few o f these councils, as in Greeley and Fort Collins, engaged in strikes for improved conditions on F E R A workrelief projects but were unable to win substantial concessions. Some, like the Crowley County Federation of W orkers, became local agricul tural-labor organizations which later acquired charters from the A .F . o f L. as federal labor unions.40 Members of some councils in the Arkansas Valley were reported to have participated in a series of small sporadic strikes in the cauliflower, pea, and potato crops during 1934 and 1935. A race riot nearly occurred in one instance in 1935 when a growershipper imported a gang of Filipinos to work in field crops.41 Beet-Labor Unionism and the Jones-Costigan Act of 1934 Federal Government legislation applying to the sugar-beet industry provided a renewed stimulus to the unionization of beet workers. The Jones-Costigan A ct of 1934 granted special monetary benefits to beet growers and, uniquely for American agriculture, some measure of protec tion for field labor. It provided for the establishment of sugar quotas and marketing allotments, for a processing tax on sugar, and for benefit payments to growers making production-adjustment contracts with the 39See Proceedings, Annual Convention of the Colorado State Federation of Labor, June 1934, Official Report (p. 20). 40Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 9, April 1936 (p. 2). 41 Field notes taken in interviews. 244 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE Government. These benefits were made contingent upon clauses pro hibiting employment of child labor and fixing minimum wages. F or the year 1934, before the labor provisions were applied, growers received bene fit payments estimated to average $17.15 per acre; a survey by the Chil dren’s Bureau of the U. S. Department of Labor showed average family wage earnings of $16.40 per acre.42 Another survey by the Agricultural State Experiment Station in Colorado indicated wage rates averaging $13.19 per acre-43 T o w;in substantial concessions for beet workers under the terms of this legislation, labor sympathizers felt that it was necessary to exert organized pressure and to be represented by spokesmen at hearings and investigations sponsored by the Department of Agriculture. Labor unionists, particularly in the left-wing group, accordingly campaigned actively during 1934 and 1935 to organize beet workers in sugar-factory districts throughout the Mountain States. Loosely organized committees of beet workers were hastily created in a number of centers such as Denver, Noviot, Longmont, Fort Collins, and Fort Lupton, Colo., Bill ings, Mont., and Lovell, W yo. Federations were formed in Boulder and Larimer Counties, Colo., to coordinate the local committees. Locals of the old Beet W orkers’ Association were revived in such communities as Fort Lupton, Platteville, Rollmer, and Longmont, though by this time the radical or progressive elements had gained dominance. Other organizations supplemented the beet workers’ unions. The Independent League, organized in Fort Collins and Loveland, was a heterogeneous body of unskilled workers in diverse industries. The Joint Labor Committee of Larimer County, centered in Fort Collins, was composed mainly of middle-class sympathizers— merchants, ministers, and other professional men interested in the labor problems of the sugarbeet industry. Members of this group later helped to raise money to charter a local organization of beet workers as a federal labor union of the A .F . of L .44 The Spanish-American Protective League of Las Animas was primarily a type of mutual-aid society common to racial or cultural minorities. Groups such as the Arkansas Valley Cooperative Labor A s sociation and the Rocky Mountain Beet Laborers’ Association in Brush, Colo., were alleged by left-wing organizers to be company unions. They were organized, it was charged, to be the “ labor mouth-pieces” o f beet growers and sugar companies at Government hearings. A new class-conscious or at least job-conscious labor unionism among sugar-beet workers grew from these scattered local groups. It became State-wide and regional, claiming a membership of several thousands, under radical leadership within the A .F . o f L ., and later the C .I.O . State-wide Unionism and the A.F. o f L. The old Beet W orkers’ Association was revived in February 1935, when a small militant group in the vicinity of Fort Lupton, Colo., called a convention of local beet-labor representatives in the R ocky Mountain region. Meeting in Denver, delegates claiming to represent some 35,000 42U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Serial No. R. 703 (p. 2). 43R. T. Burdick: Economics of Sugar Beet Production (p. 36). 44Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 11, June 1936 (p. 2). CH. XV.---B£ET WORKERS IN THE MOUNTAIN STATES 245 beet workers in Colorado, W yoming, Nebraska, and Montana sought various gains under the terms of the Jones-Costigan A ct. A minimum wage of $23 an acre based on a yield of 12 tons and a bonus of 50 cents for every ton above this was demanded, together with enforcement of child-labor provisions and settlement of unpaid wage claims for the 1934 season. T o exert pressure for those demands, an executive committee of seven members was elected, district committees were established in all factory districts, and organizers were dispatched to unionize field workers.45 W orkers presented their demands and grievances at hearings held by the U. S. Department of Agriculture during March in Pueblo and Denver, Colo., Scottsbluff, Nebr., and Billings, Mont. The result to the organized laborers was disappointing. A mimimum contract wage of $19.50 per acre was set for northern Colorado, and $17.50 for southern Colorado. This represented, nevertheless, a substantial gain over the previous year’s rates of $13 to $14. Beet laborers won additional pro tection when the A A A opened an office in Denver to adjudicate wage disputes for 1934 between workers and growers. Under the Jones-Costigan A ct the Secretary of Agriculture could require that all bona-fide wage claims be paid before final benefit payments were made.46 The Colorado State Federation of Labor in 1935 again took an active part in organizing the beet workers. It contributed toward the expenses o f Mexican and Spanish-American organizers in the new Beet W orkers’ Association. A ccording to some officials of the State federation, two vice presidents on its pay roll during 1935 and 1936 devoted most of their working hours to the task of organizing beet workers, helping them formulate their demands, and negotiating on their behalf with repre sentatives of sugar companies and growers. The executive committee of the Beet W orkers’ Association held another convention in Denver in January 1936, for the purpose of uniting the local unions into one national organization. It was attended by 50 delegates representing 39 local organizations in 5 States (Colorado, Nebraska, W yoming, Montana, and South Dakota). They resolved unanimously to organize federal labor unions in every sugar-beet fac tory district in the Mountain States. These were to be federated in an international beet workers’ union affiliated to the A .F . of L .47 The Na tional Committee to A id Agricultural W orkers, represented by John Donovan in this region, also worked in the general campaign. Discrimination against beet workers on relief also received attention at the convention. A resolution addressed to Harry Hopkins, Federal Administrator of the W orks Progress Administration, stated that— * * * it is common knowledge that relief officials are tied with the beet growers and their associations, and that last summer it was common practice to shut down relief agencies at the request o f local farmers, to force workers into the fields at even less than relief rates. (Rural Worker, Vol. 1, No. 7, February 1936, p. 1.) The organized beet workers’ demands were further clarified in a con ference called by the Colorado State Federation of Labor in Greeley dur ing 1936. Seventy-five delegates attended, representing unaffiliated bodies and federal labor unions recently chartered by the A .F . of L. in such 45Rocky Mountain News, January 27, 1935; Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 3, November 1935 (p. 3). 46Denver Post, March 27, 1935. 47Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 6, January 193$ (p. 1); Vol. I, No. 7, February 1936 (p. 1). 246 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE centers as Longmont, Johnston, Crowley, Fort Lupton, Fort Morgan, Fort Collins, Greeley, Eaton, Rocky Ford, and Gilcrest. A model con tract for the 1936 season called for a flat minimum rate of $23 an acre and a bonus of 75 cents for each ton above 12 per acre. A ll disputes between growers and laborers were to be settled by collective bargain ing and no workers were to suffer discrimination because of union mem bership.48 The conference voted to request W illiam Green, president of the A .F . of L., to authorize a permanent organization to be known as the Colorado Conference of Beet Field and Agricultural W orkers’ Unions. Pending this authorization, a negotiating committee, which included the vice presi dent of the State Federation of Labor, was created to meet with the M oun tain States Beet Growers’ Association. John Gross, secretary of the State federation, acted as chairman of the conference as a temporary body, and James Graham, vice president of the State federation, served as secretary. The central executive of the A .F . of L. authorized the formation of a State organization, and the Colorado Federation of Agricultural W orkers Unions was established at a conference of organized beet workers in Greeley during August. The constitution of the new organization provided for the establishment of an executive board and committees for each local to negotiate and administer union policy on a State-wide basis. Local unions m the new federation represented diverse origins and varying degrees of bargaining power. Some were temporarily very effec tive. In Fort Lupton, for instance, numerous conflicting local bodies were brought together into the Agricultural W orkers Union Local N o. 20172. This organization won for bean pickers a closed-field agreement and a 35-percent wage increase from the Kuner and Fort Collins Canning Cos. Union closed-field agreements were also claimed for a time in 95 percent of the sugar-beet fields in the Fort Lupton district.49 Local No. 20179 of Crowley began as a group of unemployed who organized to protest discriminatory relief policies. It received a charter from the State federation in 1934 as a local of the Crowley County Fed eration of W orkers and became a full-fledged federal labor union in 1936.50 Organizers of Local N o. 20169 in Fort Collins raised money for its federal labor union charter by making collections among local merchants and professional men, a number of whom had belonged to the Joint Labor Committee of Larimer County.50 This union was active in mobilizing mass protest meetings of beet workers and W P A workers. Its officers claimed to have forced the county welfare committee and the State board of public welfare to abolish soup kitchens and adopt direct relief in this area.51 Newly organized locals such as No. 20215 in Torrington, W yo., situ ated in outlying areas where beet workers had had little previous experi ence in unions, were weak and short-lived.52 Other organizations composing the State Federation of Agricultural W orkers were not trade-unions in the strict sense of the term. The Comision Honorarias Mexicanos was a protective association sponsored by the Mexican consulate. The W orkers Alliance organized relief clients 48Rural Worker, Vol. 1, No. 9, April 1936 (p. 2); Rocky Mountain News, March 11, 1936 (p. 8). 49See V. Vigil, in Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 13, August 1936 (p. 6). 50Rural Worker, Vol. 1, No. 9, April 1936 (p. 2). 51Idejn, Vol. II, No. 2, February 1937 (p. 2). 52Idem, Vol. I, No. 11, June 1936 (p. 2). CH. AV.—BEET WORKERS IN THE MOUNTAIN STATES 247 and unemployed only, but cooperated with the State federation in union izing beet workers, and acted as spokesman for local communities which had no chartered locals,64 A conference was called in February 1937, to prepare demands for the forthcoming season. It was attended by 50 delegates representing 20 agricultural and beet workers’ organizations in Colorado, W yom ing, and Nebraska. O f these, 14 were federal labor unions, 3 were locals of the Mexican H onorary Commission, and 3 were unaffiliated local organiza tions.55 The conference drew up a model union contract demanding a basic wage scale of $25 an acre, with a $1 bonus for each ton over 12 per acre. It provided further that extra labor be hired and paid for by the grower, and that the sugar companies be responsible for full payment of wages to the workers.56 A negotiating committee was elected to meet with the sugar companies and the growers’ association. It consisted of the executive board of the Colorado Conference of Beet Field and A gri cultural W orkers Unions and representatives from each of the factory districts.57 The problem of discrimination against Spanish-speaking beet workers on relief was stressed again at the conference and some progress toward eliminating the practice was reported. A resolution condemning discrimi natory relief policy was introduced by beet workers’ union delegates who had attended the annual convention of the American Federation of Labor in Tampa, Fla., in the fall of 1936. The resolution recommended to Harry Hopkins that “ the system of administering work relief be revised to pro vide for representation of labor unions locally organized on all boards for determining eligibility for public relief.” 58 The bargaining position of beet workers’ unions in Colorado was weakened in 1936 when the Supreme Court invalidated the Jones-Costigan A ct. Child workers in large numbers again competed with adults when the labor provisions of the act were no longer enforced.59 The labor supply was augmented further by the large number of workers discharged from W P A rolls during 1936. According to the R ocky Mountain News of March 10, 1936, these totaled 5,200 for the State, including 1,400 in Denver, 1,200 in Greeley, 1,000 in Colorado Springs, 1,000 in Pueblo, 250 in Grand Junction, and several hundred in other centers. The district W P A director was reported to have furnished lists of relief clients to the sugar companies as a source for recruiting workers. Company officials threatened to import laborers in large numbers from New M exico and Arizona on the ground that there was an in adequate supply in northern Colorado 60 The problem o f incoming transients in Colorado, aggravated by the sugar companies’ recruiting activities, reached its climax in the spring of 1936. Governor E. C. Johnson on April 18 proclaimed martial law along 54Rural Worker, Vol. II, No. 4, April 1937 (p. 4). 55Idem, Vol. n , No. 3, March 1937 (p. 2); Proceedings of Conference of Beet Field and Agri cultural Workers Unions of Colorado and Neighboring States, Denver, February 6, 1937 (pp. 4-6). 56Proceedings of Conference, February 6, 1937 (p. 3); Rural Worker, VoL n , N a 3, March 1937 (p. 2). 87Rural Worker, Vol. IL No. 3, March 1937 (p. 2). 58Idem, Vol. 11, No. 1, January 1937 (p. 5); Proceedings, op. cit. The agricultural delegates next traveled to Washington and interviewed Assistant Ad ministrator Aubrey Williams, to demand action to stop intimidation of beet workers. Calling the State administrator in Colorado by long-distance telephone, Mr. Williams reportedly insisted that there be no discrimination against beet workers, and threatened to take authority out of the hands of local county boards if it continued. (Rural Worker, op. cit.) 59U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Serial No. R. 703 (p. 8). 60Rocky Mountain News, March 13, 1936. 654107°—46—17 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 248 the Colorado-New M exico border in order to block the entry of transients in search of employment. H e charged that— * * * certain classes o f individuals within the State o f Colorado are acting in con junction with large numbers o f persons outside o f said State who are aliens and indigent persons to effect an invasion o f said State. (Denver Post, Apr. 19, 1936, p. 1.) The officer in command of the National Guard even sent airplanes over the Oklahoma panhandle and northern New M exico to detect any m ove ment of migrants toward Colorado. The Denver Post reported that— W ord came to General Kimball that labor agents, who are alleged to have con tracted to supply cheap alien and other labor for the Northern Colorado beet fields, had gathered a great force o f aliens to the south of Baca County. (A pril 21, 1936, P. 1 .) Simultaneous emigrations of Colorado beet workers to fields in other States raised further complications. Growers claimed that the Governor’s blockade was creating a definite labor shortage in the Arkansas Valley and other sugar-beet areas of Colorado. O. E. Griffiths, secretary of the Southern Colorado Beet Growers’ Association, was of the opinion that “ what we need is the National Guard along the northeastern Colorado border to prevent our beet labor from going to Nebraska.” (R ock y M oun tain News, April 26, 1936, p. 2.) A surplus of beet-field workers developed nevertheless. In this period of general prosperity, expanding employment, and rising prices, wage rates in northern Colorado remained at the 1935 level of $19.50 per acre, while in the Arkansas Valley they fell from $17.50 per acre to $16.25.61 The negotiating committee of the Colorado Federation of Agricultural W orkers Unions met several times with representatives of the Mountain States Beet Growers’ Association (representing growers in Colorado, W yoming, Montana, and Nebraska) to discuss contract demands for sugar-beet labor. N o collective agreements were reached. The growers proposed a minimum scale of $19.50 an acre with a bonus of 65 cents a ton above the basic 12 tons per acre. Additional payments were to be made in event of increases in the price of sugar under the proposed Federal legislation for acreage reduction and benefit payments. The federation persisted in its proposal for a $25 flat rate. The union pressed its demands meanwhile at joint conferences at tended by government officials and representatives of beet workers, grow ers, and refining companies. Organized labor spokesmen won an agree ment from the W P A stipulating that beet workers in the future would not be laid off relief work until definite contracts had been drawn up be tween growers’ and workers’ representatives beforehand.62 Cooperation from the Mexican consulate and important Catholic laymen and clergy in Colorado was enlisted to help restrict the seasonal inflow of Mexican and Spanish-American workers from other States.63 United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and Allied Workers o f America Beet workers’ unions during late 1936 and early 1937 became in creasingly interested in affiliation to the C.I.O. Their representatives at 61U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Serial No. R. 703 (p. 13). 62Rura! Worker, Vol. II, No. 5, M a y 1937 (p. 5); Proceedings, Regional Sugar B eet L abor Conference, Works Progress Administration, Denver, March 19 and 20, 1937. 63Rural Worker, Vol. U, No. 3, March 1937. CH. XV.---- BJ5.ET WORKERS IN TH E MOUNTAIN STATES 249 the annual convention of the A .F . of L. at Tampa, Fla., in the fall of 1936 had united with other agricultural labor spokesmen in a bloc which demanded an international charter for farm and allied workers. This they failed to achieve. Farm-labor unionists later charged the A .F . of L. executive with refusing to provide sufficient financial aid and personnel for an adequate organization campaign. The more active farm-labor unionists leaned toward the C.I.O., which promised greater support. Fourteen active federal labor unions of beet workers, including 13 in Colorado and 1 in W yoming, surrendered their A .F . of L. charters and joined the new C.I.O. international, the U .C .A .P .A .W .A ., when that organization was established at the convention in Denver during July 1937. These locals formed the initial framework of U .C .A .P .A .W .A ., District III, having jurisdiction over the States of Colorado, W yoming, Kansas, Nebraska, and Montana. By the end of the f l o w i n g year the district organization claimed 37 chartered locals, including 1 of mushroom workers in Denver and 1 of sheep shearers in Montrose, southwestern Colorado, having a total membership of 10,000 workers.64 Unionism among beet workers was stimulated in late 1937 by re newed Federal legislation granting benefits to growers and protection to labor in the sugar-beet industry. The Sugar A ct of that year provided for a quota, a processing tax on sugar, and benefits averaging $19.42 per acre plus crop insurance for growers. These provisions were made con ditional upon growers’ acceptance of certain standards for child labor and minimum wages. W age rates were to be set in each beet-growing area at a level “ determined by the Secretary [of Agriculture] to be fair and reasonable after investigation and due notice and opportunity for public hearing.” 65 Expanding unionism among beet workers, first under the A .F . of L. and later under the U .C .A .P .A .W .A ., had had some effect on wages. After remaining at $19.50 per acre during 1935 and 1936, contract-labor rates in northern Colorado were raised to $20.50 in 1937. The Depart ment of Agriculture set a $22.80 minimum for 1938 after holding public hearings in various beet centers.66 Labor Troubles of 1938 J. A . Beasley, president of the newly organized District No. I l l , U .C .A .P .A .W .A ., in the beginning favored a conciliatory policy for his union. In a long press interview he expressed satisfaction with the labor provisions of the new Sugar A ct and favored farmer-labor cooperation: What we hope to do is to convince the growers that their interests and those o f labor are naturally allied. W e stand ready to take any measures in behalf o f the growers which will aid them to free the industry from the domination o f the proces sors and their bankers * * * . Our only quarrel wT some o f the present growers’ organizations has been that ith some men who have guided them have been more interested in the welfare o f the processing companies than of the growers, and in some cases have been sugarcompany stockholders * * * . 64President’s Report, Proceedings, Second Annual Convention, Denver, January 21, 22, 1939 (p. 2). 6SV. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Serial No. R. 703 (pp. 2, 3). 66Idem (p. 13); Denver Post, August 14, 1937 (p. 10), April 13, 1938 (p. 3). 250 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE I think the present rates for beet-field labor are about as high as possible under present conditions * * * W e regard the 1938 Department o f Agriculture wage allo cations as fair, and all that could reasonably have been expected. (R ocky Mountain News, November 27, 1937, pp. 1-2.) Dissatisfaction nevertheless became widespread among the rank and file union membership of the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . in the Mountain States during 1938. A decreased beet acreage created a temporary labor surplus, which was increased by continued importation of transient workers from other States. Growers discriminated against resident union members. Labor conditions in the beet fields failed to improve despite minimum standards set by the Federal Government. Seventy-five delegates to the District No. I l l conference o f U .C .A . P .A .W .A . early in 1938 delivered an ultimatum to the Beet Growers’ Association. They demanded union control of hiring, substantial pay in creases to $26 per acre in place of the prevailing minimum of $22.80, and guaranties of better housing for beet workers during the com ing w ork season.67 District N o. I l l by this time claimed 47 locals having 9,000 paid-up members and an equal number of “ pledges” in Colorado, W y o ming, Montana, Utah, Nebraska, and Idaho.67 In early spring, while the growers’ association was negotiating contracts with the sugar companies, the union sent ballots to some 20,000 beet workers in six Mountain States to vote on the question of empowering the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . office to call a strike for union demands.68 The strike was deferred, because the time was far from strategic. Organized growers themselves were disputing with the sugar companies while negotiating contracts. Members of several growers’ associations voted to refuse to plant beets until the companies granted certain price concessions. In at least one growing area the contract advanced by the company was accepted only under protest. The local beet growers’ asso ciation released its members from any obligation to live up to the contract, and informed them that they were free to follow their individual interests as they saw fit.69 Beet acreage in Colorado in 1938 was the smallest in decades— 120,000 acres, as compared to an average over 10 years of 162,000. Various reasons were advanced, such as inadequate prices from the companies, higher wages set under the Sugar Control Act, and uncertain weather conditions.70 The State employment service reported that many farmers had decreased their plantings to the point where they and their families could perform the necessary work without hired labor. U .C .A .P .A .W .A . District President Beasley abandoned the union’s demands on the ground that wage rates were “ satisfactory.” W e regard the 1938 wage allocations as fair and all that could reasonably be expected. Growers, in prices for the 1938 crop, did not get relatively as much. Processors will get the best end of it. (C IO News, Vol. 1, No. 36, August 1938, p. 1.) The union took direct action during this period only in pea fields in the vicinity of Greeley (W eld County). Early in August, U .C .A .P . A .W .A . Local N o. 158 organized the pickers, most o f whom were local Mexican beet workers. It formulated demands for. union recognition and a wage rate of $1.25 per hundredweight, in place o f the prevailing 20 cents per 30-pound hamper and 5 cents bonus at the end of the 67CIO News, Vol. I, No. 8, January 1938 (p. 3); Rocky Mountain News, February 11, 1938 (p. 8). 68Denver Post, April 13, 1938 (p. 1). 69Delta Daily Independent, April IS, 1938 (p. 1). 70Rocky Mountain News, May 21, 1938. CH. XV.---BEET WORKERS IN THE MOUNTAIN STATES 251 harvest.71 A large employer refused to negotiate with a committee of union members and fired two of them for organizing activity. About 400 pickers promptly struck on July 8, demanding reinstatement and back pay, union recognition, and wage increases.72 Packet lines were established around two large farms, to prevent labor contractors from recruiting newr crews. Shortly afterward, Sheriff Gus Anderson arrested 17 strikers on charges of “ unlawful assembly, violating State antipicketing law, and obstructing the highways."73 The strike was settled within a few days through the intervention of the regional National Labor Relations Board. That agency assisted semi officially on the ground that a labor contractor from Idaho had brought in pea pickers from other States. The union won a written agreement grant ing recognition, back pay, and the union scale for picking. There were threats of strikes again during the beet harvest in October. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . by this time had dropped its demands for wage increases, and sought greater recognition and control over the hiring of beet workers. Specifically the union demanded agreements granting closed fields and a check-off system of collecting dues, job preference for local and State resident workers, and union responsibility for providing grow ers‘with the labor they required.74 A State-wide general strike of beet workers threatened when the Mountain States Beet Growers' Association suddenly canceled a con ference which had been scheduled with U .C .A .P .A .W .A . Officials of the association claimed that they had no authority to enter into labor agree ments for its members.75 Governor Ammons of Colorado and repre sentatives of the U . S. Department of Labor met with indignant response from the growers when they attempted to mediate the dispute. H . L. Brooks, leading member of the W indsor local of the association, sent a telegram to the Governor stating: The farmers o f the Windsor sugar factory district vigorously protest your inter ference in injecting your office into the beet-labor controversy in northern Colorado. I grow 50 acres o f beets and if I am to be dominated by outside influences in my farming operations I will quit the crop. Interference in labor problems o f us farmers will not be tolerated. (Greeley Tribune, October 7, 1938, p. 1.) Ralph Clar, former director of the association protested union de mands for the reason that other types of farming would also be domi nated ; beet workers would not be allowed to do any other type of work, such as potato picking and hay harvesting, except with the permission of the C.I.O. and on terms dictated by it. “ It would be turning northern Colorado agriculture over to the C .I.O .," he said.76 J. A . Beasley announced that the association's refusal to negotiate had left the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . with “ no other recourse but to order a strike."77 The W orkers Alliance of Colorado pledged full support by seeking relief for strikers and preventing unemployed workers from taking jobs on struck beet fields. The State W P A administrator took a neutral position, announcing that clients would not be laid o ff in order to take the places vacated by strikers.77 County officials, more closely associated 71 Rocky Mountain News, July 13, 1938. 72CI0 News, Vol. I, No. 32, July 16, 1938 (p. 1). 73Rocky Mountain News, July 11 and 13, 1938. Greeley Tribune, October 4, 1938 (p. 1). 75Idem, October 6, 1938 (p. 1). 76Idem, October 11, 1938 (p. 2). 77Idem, October 7, 1938. ......................... “ The W P A is not permitted to interfere with established union relationships and as a matter of policy will not lay off or cause to be laid off workers now employed by the W P A in order that such workers may take the jobs previously held by men on strike.” 252 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE with growers, were less impartial. Charles O. Plumb, W eld County Commissioner, expressed the opinion that the union “ would be taking unfair advantage of the growers, and should not be given relief while on strike.” 78 The position of the union was hopelessly weak. Publicity attending the threatened strike, and the fact that topping was the most highly paid operation in beet work, attracted large numbers of laborers from other areas. Migration of white “ Dust B ow l” refugees from the Middle W est and Southwest was reaching its peak. The Greeley Tribune reported “ hundreds of farmers and farm workers flocking into northern Colorado from Kansas, Missouri, and W yom ing, applying for any jobs left open if the C.I.O. calls a strike.” 79 Hundreds of local beet laborers were al ready available because of the reduced beet acreage. One prominent grower warned union organizers that— They don’t control enough o f the beet labor to make a ripple in the harvesting of the crop, and those going on strike and breaking their contract will have a mighty hard time getting a contract to break hereafter. (Greeley Tribune, October 7, 1938.) The union position became desperate and a complete debacle was only narrowly averted. U .C .A .P .A .W .A . President Donald Henderson and V ice President Leif Dahl rushed out to Colorado to improve the union organization in District III in case a strike became unavoidable. High C.I.O. officials meanwhile put pressure on the U. S. Department of Agriculture and other agencies in Washington, D. C., to seek a com promise from the growers.80 Beet workers were requested to defer strike action for several days. Governor Ammons, at the request of the Con ciliator from the U. S. Department of Labor, appointed a mediation com mittee of five members, to seek adjustment of the issues.81 A settlement of sorts was finally reached which included a “ statement of policy” rather than a bona-fide union-employer agreement for the beet industry. The District U .C .A .P .A .W .A . called off the strike at the re quest of James Patton, member of the Governor's committee and presi dent of the Colorado Farmers Union. The Farmers Union in return agreed to organize beet growers into a group separate from the M oun tain States Beet Growers' Association. This new dual organization was to cooperate with the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . in securing adequate beet prices for growers and in collective bargaining over wages and working con ditions.82 Organized beet growers and local newspapers denounced this move as an act in “ collusion” with the C.I.O., to furnish a way out for the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . and “ save its face.” 83 Patton, on the other hand, claimed that the beet growers were being betrayed by their own marketing asso ciations in dealing with both the sugar companies and beet workers' unions. H e said: The fundamental difficulty in the beet-growing areas is not the controversy between the beet growers and the beet-field workers. The real problem is that beet growers have themselves been betrayed and their interests neglected by their organ ization. (Greeley Tribune, October 14, 1938, p. 1.) 78Greeley, Tribune, October 14, 1938 (p. 1). '79Idem, October 14, 1938. 80CIO News, Vol. I, No. 5, October 15, 1938 (p. 1). 81 Greeley Tribune, October 11, 1938. 82CIO News, Vol. T, No. 46, October 22, 1938 (p. 7). 83Greeley Tribune, October 14, 1938 (p. 6). CH. XV.—BEET WORKERS IN THE MOUNTAIN STATES Decline of U.C.A.P.A.W.A 253 * Beet farmers and field workers gained little from the agreement with the Farmers Union, as the latter did not represent a significant propor tion of the grower-employers in Colorado. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . declined rapidly in membership in the Mountain States as the feeling spread that the settlement had been a “ sell-out.” This suspicion became stronger when the incumbent district president, J. A . Beasley, was removed from office on charges of betrayal and bribery, leaving the union heavily in debt. Retrenchment by the national U .C .A .P .A .W .A . organization also weakened District No. III. The more isolated or outlying locals were allowed to lapse because of the high cost of maintaining them, and the organization was restricted to locals within easy access to district head quarters. The only ones remaining by 1940 were two in Fort Morgan and one each in Denver, Fort Lupton, La Salle, and Longmont. These were in the most intensive beet-raising area in the country, a region suf ficiently compact to maintain for a time the contacts and services from headquarters. Early in 1941 District No. I l l was abandoned entirely by the national U .C .A .P .A .W .A . executive, and the international’s repre sentative, Clyde Johnson, was transferred to San Antonio, T ex. The union modified its policy after 1938. It regulated strikes more strictly by requiring their authorization from the district office before hand. U .C .A .P .A .W .A . Local No. 6 of Fort Lupton, without resorting to strikes, won an agreement with bean-picking contractors granting union recognition, job preference, and a' substantial increase in wage rates.84 The agricultural strikes that did occur after 1938 were spontaneous or unauthorized. T w o hundred migrant pea pickers in the vicinity of La Jara and Bountiful, south-central Colorado, participated in an unsuccess ful spontaneous walk-out for 2 days during late August 1939. The current picking rate in the area was 20 cents per 30-pound hamper. A labor con tractor imported the 200 pickers and their families from Idaho to harvest 1,100 acres of peas at 15 cents per hamper. W hen the migrants struck for the 20-cent rate, their places were taken by local workers whom they had previously displaced. U .C .A .P .A .W .A . District No. I l l in the Mountain States had to assume increasingly the character of a semipolitical pressure group, as. the only effective protection for beet labor rested with government agencies. The union acted as spokesman for beet workers at wage hear ings held by the Department of Agriculture, as well as at conferences called by State and Federal relief agencies and employment services. U .C .A .P .A .W .A . locals took on the functions of the W orkers Alliance in many localities in seeking to protect the rights of beet workers on relief. Beet-labor unions acted in concert with their allies to seek the elec tion of county commissioners, sheriffs, and other law-enforcement officials who would be sympathetic to organized workers. In the last analysis the chief reason for the ineffectiveness of unions in collective bargaining was the large and growing influx of transient labor from other States. This reached its greatest proportions during the threatened strike of 1938, and caused alarm in government as well as labor circles. Faced with growing competition from unorganized workers of other States, the unions were helpless to improve their position through 84U.C.A.P.A.W .A. News, Vol. I, No. 9, July-August 1940 (p. 14). 254 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE direct action. They had to rely on legislative action to gain any measure of security for their members. The problem of seasonal migration into Colorado had become even more critical after Governor Johnson’s attempted blockade in 1936. Hear ings of the Colorado Industrial Commission during 1937 had unearthed much evidence regarding employment of child labor, depressed living conditions, and continued recruitment of workers from other States. The Rocky Mountain News for May 8, 1937, stated: Although the beet growers and the laborers both agreed that there was ample labor available, it was admitted by representatives o f the Great Western Sugar Co. that labor was being recruited from out of the State and that transportation was being furnished. Governor Ammons called a special conference of sugar-company of ficials, relief administrators, and State employment officers to deal with the problem. The attorney general meanwhile investigated labor-recruit ing handbills carrying the name of the Great W estern Sugar Co., alleged to be distributed along the W est Coast and throughout New M exico.8® After a conference of representatives of State relief and employment service agencies, labor unions, and employers, State officials announced a drive to restrict employment of out-of-State labor in the Colorado beet fields during 1938.86 It was reported, nevertheless, that 2,000 beet laborers entered Colorado during a single 2-week period and that their trans portation had been paid by the sugar-refining companies. Employment on emergency relief projects at the same time was reported to be at the highest spring level in 3 years.87 The beet companies continued to justify their policy on the ground that there was a labor shortage in Colorado because resident relief clients would not or could not do beet work.88 The Governor finally called a conference early in April 1939 for repre sentatives of labor, growers, sugar companies, and government officials. Growers and sugar-company officials promised to hire local workers re leased from W P A , when these were found willing and able, and agreed not to advertise or recruit labor from other States. The president of the Southern Colorado Beet Growers Association, however, warned the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . that— I f it should happen that labor cannot see fit to accept the wages fixed [by the Department o f Agriculture] we shall have to go outside o f Colorado and get labor. (Denver Post, April 5, 1939, p. 4.) U .C .A .P .A .W .A . spokesmen for the beet workers agreed to abide by the prevailing wage and accept employment at that figure. Labor condi tions in the beet fields did not grow materially better during 1939 despite these promises for improvement. The union’s declining influence was re flected in an average decrease of 4 percent in beet wages below the 1938 level. Contract-labor rates for 1939 approximately equaled those of 1937.89 In its Statement to the Sugar Beet W age Hearings in Denver, January 19,1940 (pp. 1 ,4 -5 ), U .C .A .P .A .W .A . District N o. I l l announced that— 85Rocky Mountain News, April 30, 1937; May 14, 1938. 86Idem, May 14, 1938. 87Idem, May 21, 1938. 88The Colorado (Denver), April 8, 1939. 89Denver Post, March 31, 1939 (p. 26). CH. XV.---BEET WORKERS IN THE MOUNTAIN STATES 255 The 1939 season was a very unpleasant one for sugar-beet workers. Grower-labor contracts were violated at will * * * violations o f the law and discrimination against workers indicate very serious labor conditions that point to laxity in administering the law and the need for closer examination o f conditions by the Department o f Agriculture. The union charged that many members, because of their C .I.O . affili ations, were refused contracts in the factory districts in which they re sided. They were forced consequently to migrate to other States for beet work. Sugar companies, in spite of their pledges to Governor Carr the previous year, were reported as having continued to import more than 1,000 workers to replace resident beet labor* Many beet workers had had hoeing and topping jobs taken away from them in spite of written or verbal contracts and thus in violation of the law. Extra labor was hired for topping in order to shorten the harvest period, and the income of workers under contract was correspondingly reduced. Many beet laborers were forced to work on share contracts which, unlike those applying to tenants, did not allow the worker to share in benefit payments to the grower. Finally, it was charged, labor continued to receive inadequate protection from county committees, the only enforcement agencies to which they could appeal, because these were composed almost entirely of grower-employers.90 90Statement to the Sugar Beet Wage Hearings, Denver, January 10, 1940 (pp. 1-5). Ch a pter XVI.— Unionism in the Southwest: Texas and Oklahoma Displacement and Agrarian Agitation It is perhaps inaccurate to call rural unionism a farm labor movement in an area as large and diversified as Texas and Oklahoma. The organized agitation that developed periodically among tenants and laborers in these two States during the past 6 decades or more was usually local, infrequent, and scattered. It tended to express the aspirations of farm operators rather than of wage laborers, since in most areas of the Southwest the former constituted the majority of the rural population. The interests of farm workers were not thought to be different from those of the operators, since it was the accepted belief that the workers' future lay in rising to the position of proprietor. Cotton and other cash crop areas of the region usually were characterized by having more white farm operators, a smaller proportion of sharecroppers and day laborers, larger family acreage allot ments, and higher standards of living than were true of plantation areas of the older South. The conditions which gave rise to agrarian movements in the South west, however, were not fundamentally different from those which stimu lated unionism and unrest among casual workers in California or among plantation sharecroppers and day laborers in eastern Arkansas and Ala bama. The California pattern of large specialized farms which hire large groups of seasonal laborers for intermittent employment has been spread ing to many family farming areas of Texas and Oklahoma, as well as to the plantation lands of the Old South. A growing burden of indebtedness and a rising rate of tenancy have been characteristic among farm operators in the Southwest. These trends were climaxed in many sections by mass displacement through mechanization and catastrophic climatic factors such as drought. In many areas the total number of farm operators de clined. Individual holdings were consolidated into larger tracts cultivated by power-farming methods, and hiring a greater proportion of seasonal workers than before. The capital investment required for successful farming increased. Displaced small operators either remained, to exist upon casual employment supplemented by public relief, or migrated to other areas in search of other jobs or other farms to rent. Agrarian agitation in the Southwest was a byproduct largely of the farm operators' decline. A s indebtedness, tenancy, and displacement in creased among them, their economic and social position came to parallel that of casual laborers and sharecroppers in other regions. The line be tween owner, tenant, and laborer in many cases became extremely fluid at a depressed income level. On a few occasions all three groups partici pated jointly in movements to protect common interests and to promote common objectives. Several such organizations expressed a radical philosophy and adopted tactics and policies ordinarily associated with labor unions. For these reasons, some associations of tenants and laborers in Texas and Oklahoma, as well as in States of the Old South, may be considered as much a part of farm-labor unionism as were the organiza tions composed exclusively of wage workers. 256 CH. XVI —UNIONISM IN TEXAS AND OKLAHOMA 257 The most important radical agrarian movements in the Southern States began among the relatively independent cotton farmers of the Southwest, who were free from the frustrations of strong racial divisions and caste relationships which the plantation system imposed. In other Southern States agrarian organizations drew their largest following among small hill farmers of the Piedmont sections, who were motivated by latent opposition to large planters and their allied business interests. The earlier movements were primarily associations of farm proprietors rather than laborers. Outstanding among these were the Farmers Alliance, the Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union, and the Farm Labor Union, all of which originated in Texas.1 The Farm Labor Union was the most radical and, more than the others, represented the attitudes of the poorer tenants and laborers. The preamble to its constitution stressed the unity of interest between farmers and workers who “ have been slaves for years of the manufacturers, the gamblers, and the speculators of every type."2 Agrarian organizations among the poorer class of tenants, sharecrop pers and laborers in eastern Oklahoma during the early twentieth century, as will be described later, more nearly approached the status of true farmlabor unions. Class-conscious unionism among agricultural wage workers as a sepa- • rate occupational group did not develop in the South west until the thirties. It was confined largely to Texas, where casual and migratory seasonal labor had become a vital and distinct element in the agricultural economy. In Oklahoma and other Southern States agricultural wage workers con tinued to be organized with poorer tenants and sharecroopers, because these groups were not sufficiently different in status and economic interest to make separate unions feasible. Beginnings o f Labor Organization in Texas The Cowboy Strike of 1883s One of the first agricultural industries of the United States to be dominated by large-scale operators was cattle ranching in the Southwest. The cattle baron developed at the expense of the small ranch proprietor and depended largely upon hired labor to perform the essential ranch work. The increasing concentration in ownership and control was ac companied by*much friction. The first large strike of hired laborers in the general field of agriculture occurred among some 325 cowboys in western Texas during the early eighties, when fencing the range was rapidly driving small cattlemen out of business. The labor condition which provoked this outbreak was a precursor of similar situations in other 1R. L. Hunt: A History of Farmer Movements in the Southwest. Texas A & M College (College Station, Tex.), 1925. 2Quoted from R. E. Anderson: History of the Farm Labor Union of Texas, M. A. Thesis, University of Texas (Austin), 1938. 3The discussion of this incident is based upon Dr. Ruth Allen’ s Chapters in the History of Organized Labor in Texas, Bureau of Research in the Social Sciences, University of Texas (Austin. University of Texas Publications, No. 4141, Nov. 15, 1941, pp. 33-41). 258 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE fields of agriculture in the Southwest which were to create unrest in later years. The cowboy in American folklore has long been a romantic, almost legendary, figure who typified the individualism and opportunity of the frontier. H e was considered a special variant of the year-round hired man. H e felt a personal loyalty to “ the Old Man” and had before him constantly the goal of becoming an independent cattle raiser. Reality, of course, differed sharply from this idealized picture. O f all forms of agri culture during the latter part of the nineteenth century, cattle ranching probably exhibited least the attributes of the “ agricultural ladder,” much less of family farming. Labor relations on the cattle ranch resembled those of an industrial enterprise rather than a farm lan d the group attitudes which developed were likewise similar. Most cattle ranches employed cowboys in gangs or crews under the supervision of ranch foremen or riding bosses. They were laborers hired to do special seasonal jobs during the round-up and odd ranch jobs during other months of the year. Dr. Ruth Allen of the University of Texas points out that— Whatever else the cowboy may or may not have been, he was a hired hand, a laborer who worked for wages. He was a casual laborer with all that term implies— no settled habitation, no family, no security o f status or income. It has not been . fully appreciated that the most dramatic, the most direct action in the American labor movement took place in the mines and on the railroads of the W est among workers who had ridden the range and followed the cattle trails. The rapid increase in population and growth of cities in the United States during the latter part of the nineteenth century furnished a steadily increasing demand for meat. A t the same time, expanding railroad facili ties, and new, improved methods for packing, preserving, and shipping placed distant markets within reach of stock raisers. The price of range cattle rose considerably during the seventies and eighties. H igh profits attracted large investments and stimulated a rapid expansion of cattle ranching in the relatively unpopulated western sections of the Southwest and Middle W est, and the prevalence of absentee ownership increased. The heavy capital requirements and complex financial dealings involved in raising livestock for distant markets, as in growing and shipping fruits and vegetables in later years, tended to eliminate the small owner. M ost of the expansion was undertaken by large financial interests— railroad companies which had acquired the land as a State subsidy, and foreign or domestic corporations having shares listed in eastern financial markets. The New Y ork & Texas Land Co. Limited and the Franklin Land & Cattle Co., for instance, each owned millions of acres of grazing land. A growing volume of bonds and debentures of cattle companies was sold in England and Scotland as well as in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia. By the early eighties the Texas Panhandle was almost entirely owned or controlled by large Scotch and English cattle corporations. The strike of 1883 occurred mainly on ranches owned by enterprises of this type. Concentration of ownership and control of cattle ranching in the hands of large absentee corporations created friction. The long struggle of smallherd owners against the encroachments of cattle barons and large land companies is a saga of the Old W est. The land companies’ policy of fencing off large ranges as private property destroyed the independence of many cattle ranchers, created class divisions, and fostered an antagonism CH. XVI.---UNIONISM IN TEXAS AND OKLAHOMA 259 which often flared into open conflict. Many small-herd owners could sur vive only if they were hired seasonally as cowboys on the larger ranches, could graze their cattle there, and join in the annual spring round-up. The interests of cowboys as hired wage laborers were, then, not dis tinctly differentiated from those of small-herd owners, and both partici pated in the strike of 1883. Tom Harris, the recognized strike leader, was reported at the time to have “ enough cattle of his own that he doesn’t have to work for wages.” The interests of the small owners were ex pressed in a demand during the strike that they “ be allowed to own and run our range cattle on the premises.” (Allen, p. 38.) The specific demands of the cowboys who were hired as straight wage laborers covered wage rates and living conditions. Poor food in particular was a cause for complaint. The strike began in the spring of 1883 when cowboys in the Canadian River country near the town of Tascosa met and prepared an ultimatum to present to their employers, stating that they had agreed among themselves not to work for less than $50 per month for “ hands” and $75 per month for those running an outfit, and requiring in addition that cooks be paid the same wage as cowboys. The movement spread rapidly and soon involved some 325 cowboys employed on 7 ranches, including the L S, the L X , the Altaz, the T-A nchor, the X IT , and the Lit outfits. The effectiveness of the strike was due partly to the fact that the cow boys had been saving their money for some time and could live on the “ stake.” Moreover, they quit work just before the spring round-up, when the vulnerability of the employers gave the laborers a great bargaining advantage. Apparently not all of the demands were met, however, as some trouble continued between the contending groups. The strike ended, finally when the strikers had spent their money and were forced to return to work. The end was hastened by the death of Tom Harris, the leader, and by the decisive action of the employers in calling upon the Texas Rangers to protect their interests. W ages were raised from $1.18 to $1.68 per day, the strikers were paid for lost time, and the number of workers was not changed by the strike. Hours of work, which were not included in the demands, remained un changed at 105 per week. The employers’ loss was estimated at $3,835. This cowboy strike was in essence a group protest against conditions of a kind which later gave rise to labor troubles in other fields of agricul ture. It was not low wages or intolerable working conditions per se which provoked unrest. Rather it was the growing division of interest and the impersonal relationships which developed between employers and em ployees as the scale of operations in cattle ranching became larger.4 Dr. Ruth Allen concludes: They [cowboys] rather than the miners whose struggles have filled pages o f labor history, were the legitimate precursors o f the western labor movement. The cowboy, due to the nature o f his work, became more completely cognizant o f the 4The statement of Sheriff East of Oldham County as to the cause of the strike was illuminat ing; “ You see, the cow business is not what it used to be. You take such as John Chisum or Charley Goodnight, they were real people. They got right out with the boys on the trail, did just as much work as the boys, ate the same kind of food. Their cowboys would have died m the saddle rather than have complained. See what we have now; a bunch of organized companies. Some of them are foreign and have costly managers and bookkeepers who live on and drink the best stuff money can buy and call their help cow servants. And they expect them to work for $30 per month and expect them to work as much as from 12 to 18 hours a day on common rations.” (Allen, pp. 37-38.) 260 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE growing disparity in attitudes and wealth between his employer and himself. If the cowboy’s day had not already ended, because his industry was passing away beneath him, it would probably have been the hired cattle hands rather than the miners and the lumberjacks whose resentment echoed menacingly through the history o f the West. (Allen, p. 41.) The Mexican Protective Association A s farms throughout large sections of Texas during the twentieth century specialized increasingly in cash crops, landowners came to depend upon a growing supply of cheap seasonal labor. Cotton especially re quired large numbers of workers during the brief periods of chopping and picking. These were recruited chiefly from Texas-born Mexicans, supple mented by a huge volume of immigrants coming from M exico into Texas on a scale far surpassing that in Arizona and California. Landowners in some sections of northeastern and south-central Texas followed the plan tation system of maintaining a year-round supply of seasonal labor by means of sharecropping and share-renting agreements with Mexicans, Negroes, and whites. A n increasing number, however, hired migratory and casual day laborers. Native and foreign-born Mexican migrants as early as the nineties were following the cotton harvest on foot into eastern Texas for 5 months of the year. They journeyed sometimes as far as the Sabine River before returning to their homes in M exico or south Texas.5 By 1910 they were traveling as family groups by train and horse-drawn vehicle and were covering a much larger cotton-growing area in their seasonal migrations. The circumstances under which most Mexicans immigrated to Texas made them particularly subject to exploitation by labor contractors and recruiting agents. According to the farm placement division of the Texas State Employment Service, there were more illegal than legal entries up to the 1920’s. These proved a “ lever of advantage” to the agents, who “ could and often did keep the fact of illegality * * * dangling over the heads of the frightened peon workers, paying them meager wages and treating them almost as slaves.” 6 Mexicans on the land had a social and economic status similar to that of Negroes in other sections of the South. They were a large, lowly paid racial minority, and most of them were disfranchised by the State poll tax. A s laborers or tenants their bargaining position was much weaker than that of the landlords or employers. Numerous complaints were voiced at hearings held by the U . S. Commission on Industrial Relations in 1915. Contracts between landlords and tenants or sharecroppers were said to be unenforceable in practice or before the law. M exican as well as white and Negro tenants were burdened with heavy indebtedness, high rates of interest on credit, and high prices for the necessaries they pur chased. Not infrequently, it was charged, situations of peonage developed 5Paul S. Taylor: An American-Mexican Frontier. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1934 (p. 102). 6J. H. Bond: Employment Problems of Migratory Farm Workers, in Hearings before the Select Committee to Investigate the Interstate Migration of Destitute Citizens, House of Repre sentatives, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (hereafter called the Tolan Committee), Part 5, Oklahoma City Hearings, pp. 1799-1832; also, Origins and Problems of Texas Migratory Farm Labor, Brief prepared by the Farm Placement Service Division of the Texas State Employment Service, Austin, 1940 (p. 17). A special type oi labor agent developed—a “ curbstone operator” or “ man-catcher” whose practice was to gather groups of workers—Mexican, white, and Negro—for “ selling” and “ re selling” to farmers. (Brief, p. 18.) CH. XVI.---UNIONISM IN TEXAS AND OKLAHOMA 261 in which debtors were forced under armed guard to work out their obli gations.7 Under conditions like these, any collective action by laborers or ten ants was checked almost as completely as on plantations in the Old South. Protest against unsatisfactory working conditions was individual and passive; the rate of labor turn-over was high. Strikes were few, sporadic, and local. The superintendent of a farm enterprise owned by a corporation described one small walk-out of Mexican farm workers thus: Last fall a bunch o f Mexicans, 15 or 20 receiving 60 cents a hundred for picking cotton, asked for 75 cents; said if we didn’t pay them they would go where they could get it, and my man told them to go, ancj they went. (Final Report and Testi mony, Commission on Industrial Relations, p. 9258.) The first union to be organized among low-income Mexicans in agri culture was the Mexican Protective Association, established in southern Texas during 1911. It was an amorphous organization made up of smallfarm owners, tenants, and day laborers. Like the precursors of Mexican labor unions in California and Colorado, it was primarily an immigrant brotherhood or mutual-aid society designed, in the words of its secretary, to “ come out for the members in case of abuse— murders, lynchings, loss of crops, or violations of law.” 8 It also provided sick and death benefits and assisted in providing relief to distressed Mexicans, both members and nonmembers.8 The association’s membership fluctuated widely between 1911 and 1914 because of large influxes of Mexicans from across the border. It was weakened in 1914 by depressed conditions in the cotton market and consequently low earnings of tenants and laborers. It was disrupted also by internecine strife between the moderate or conservative group in con trol and a left-wing faction which was influenced, directly or indirectly, by the Industrial W orkers of the W orld.9 E a rly Farm -Tenant and L a b or U nions in O klahom a Though the largest radical agrarian movements among small-farm operators began in Texas, they reached their fullest development in Okla homa. A s the last frontier where free land was available, this State attracted large numbers of disaffected rural and industrial laborers who leaned towards radical political philosophies and collective action for economic objectives. The extreme mobility of Oklahoma’s population also contributed to the growth of the movement. The proportion of its resi dents who had come from other States was the largest in the Nation, and the turn-over of its tenants and laborers was particularly high.10 The rural as well as the urban population was less bound by concepts of tradition and status which hindered the growth of organized opposition 7Final Report and Testimony. Commission on Industrial Relations, established by the act of August 23, 1912, Washington, D. C., 1915, Vol. X (pp. 9201-9204). «Idem (p. 9200). 9Idem (p. 9201). 10The U. S. Census of Agriculture figures for 1935 indicated a relatively high rate of mobility of farm tenants in Oklahoma: 42.9 percent of Oklahoma’s tenants had lived for less than 1 year on the farms they were occupying, as compared with a national average of 34.2 percent and an average for the southern Cotton Belt of 40.2 percent. In Oklahoma 21.9 per cent of the tenants had lived 5 years or longer on their present farms, compared with 28.6 percent for the country at large and 24.2 percent for the Cotton Belt. (0 . D. Duncan: Theory and Conse quences of Mobility of Farm Population, Oklahoma A & M College, Stillwater, Circular No. 88, May 1940, pp. 12-13.) 262 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE movements among poorer farm groups in other sections of the South. Moreover, Oklahoma, of all States in the South, was least torn by racial divisions.1 Farmer and labor movements in Oklahoma were unimpeded 1 by the N egro problem of States farther east, and were not disrupted by racial divisions between whites and Mexicans as in Texas. Agrarian movements in Oklahoma resembled labor unions rather than associations of independent farmers. Prevalent tenancy and displace ment put a large part of the rural population in an extremely precarious marginal position between farm operator and propertyless casual laborer. Organizations such as the Farmers Alliance, the Farmers Union, and the Farm Labor Union appealed to the more substantial small farmers, i.e., those who owned or could borrow the money required to finance coopera tive ventures. They could do little for small owners of submarginal land, sharecroppers, property less tenants, and laborers, whose need for organized bargaining strength was perhaps greatest. Miscellaneous Organizations, 1909-14 Several local and short-lived but nevertheless militant organizations developed among the poorer farm tenants and laborers in Oklahoma during the immediate prewar decade. Some professed the class-conscious philosophy of a full-fledged industrial labor movement. The Renters Union of Oklahoma, organized in McLain County during September 1909, expressed a strong Socialist sentiment in the preamble to its con stitution : The financial emancipation of the working class can only be accomplished when the means o f life have passed into the hands o f the workers. This great good can be accomplished only through a united class-conscious organization o f workers.13 The union in actual policy was concerned primarily with the interests of tenant proprietors. It sought particularly to win improved landlordtenant contracts and to establish “ agricultural arbitration courts’’ which could protect tenants having weak bargaining power.13 A similar organiza tion was started in W aco, Tex., in 1911; in November 1913, the two merged and assumed the name of the Land League.14 A somewhat similar organization, the Farmers Protective Association, was organized in Oklahoma during the immediate prewar years. By 1914 it claimed some 9,000 members, 95 percent of whom were reported to be tenants. It stated that its purpose was to resist usurious charges by banks in particular, and to improve farm conditions in general.15 Various Social ist organizations were also active among tenants, small farmers, and laborers during 1911 and 1912.16 The Socialist Party had gained an appre ciable following in the eastern section of Oklahoma where cotton was the chief crop and the problem of an impoverished tenantry most serious. In HO. D. Duncan: Population Trends in Oklahoma, Oklahoma A & M College, Stillwater, Bulletin No. 224, March 1935 (p. 10). The population in the 1939 census was 98.6 percent American and 87.5 percent native white. 12Labor History of Oklahoma, W P A Federal Writers Project, Oklahoma City, 1939 (p. 39). 13Final Report and Testimony, Commission on Industrial Relations, Vol. IX (p. 9064). 14Idem (p. 9130). 15Idem (p. 9095). 16I d e m (p p . 9102-9119). CH. XVI.---UNIONISM IN TEXAS AND OKLAHOMA 263 1911 it was reported to have won one-third of the votes in Seminole, Pontotoc, Pottawatomie, Hughes, and Pittsburg Counties.1 7 M ost unions of farm tenants and laborers of Oklahoma had disappeared entirely or become inactive by 1915. Some minor acts of violence were reported to have been committed by members on the property of landlords and employers, but there is little or no evidence to show that such acts were the result of deliberate or official union policies.1 7 The Working Class Union and the “ Green Corn Rebellion” 1 * The most sensational of all early farm tenant and labor demonstrations in the Southwest was the brief armed revolt of some 2,000 tenants, small farmers and laborers in eastern Oklahoma in the incident known as the “ Green Corn Rebellion.,, The influence of radical labor unionism and the philosophy of direct action, as exemplified in the I.W .W ., was apparent in this outbreak. The idealistic doctrines of the Socialist Party and the ineffective pro gram of the Renters Union and its prototypes had failed to improve con ditions appreciably among the impoverished tenants and laborers of eastern Oklahoma. A few I.W .W . organizers meanwhile had been active around the lumber camps and mines of western Arkansas and south eastern Oklahoma. During the early years of W orld W ar I their doc trine of direct action had taken hold among some of the poorer workers in the rural population. This doctrine found expression by late 1914 in a militant secret organization known as the W orking Class Union. Though first organized among industrial workers in the vicinities of Fort Smith and Van Buren, Ark., its main following was recruited from farm laborers and tenants in eastern Oklahoma. The W .C .U ., according to its or ganizers, at one time had close to 25,000 adherents in this region. The union advocated a program of revolutionary action to attain such ends as abolition of rent, interest, and profit taking; Government owner ship of public utilities; and free schools and textbooks. It was reported that the W .C .U . led what was probably the first union-organized strike of agricultural laborers in the Southwest. It was reported in one sou rce: (Fort Smith, May 2, 1916.) Farm hands employed at Moffatt, Okla., and vicinity, opposite Fort Smith, Ark., went on strike Monday because their employers refused to increase their wages from $1 to $1.25 a day. The number o f strikers cannot be learned, but it is understood that the movement has affected many. Several farmers and planters from the Moffatt region who were in Fort Smith Monday declared that their employees were not in sympathy with the strike, but refused to work for fear o f being dealt with violently. Some planters assert that the W orking Class Union, which has a large following among the farm laborers in many parts o f Oklahoma, particularly in Sequoia County, is behind the strike. (Quoted from E. L. Nourse: Agricultural Economics, University o f Chicago Press, Chicago, 1916, p. 860.) The W orking Class Union lost many members in eastern Oklahoma as the war progressed and prosperity brought improvement in conditions for farm tenants and laborers. The promulgation of the National Draft A ct in 1917, however, caused renewed unrest and indirectly revived the union. The draft was unpopular among poorer farm groups in the section. 17Labor History of Oklahoma (p. 40). *®Most of the material in this section is based upon the Labor History of Oklahoma by the Federal Writers Project, cited in previous pages. For fuller discussion see Appendix M (p. 442). 654107°—46—18 264 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE who were just emerging from years of poverty. It provided the W .C .U . with an opportunity for successful agitation under the militant leadership of an I.W .W . organizer from Chicago. Violence followed the arrest of several men for resisting the draft during June 1917. Arms and dynamite were obtained by the union, and waterworks and bridges were blown up. Further arrests of union members brought organized armed resistance from an “ army” of some 2,000 farm ers, including Negroes and Seminole Indians. The “ rebellion” was suppressed by August, after county sheriffs had formed large posses of citizens to crush the demonstrations. M ore than 450 participants were arrested, of whom 193 were charged with draft resistance and 8 leaders with seditious conspiracy; the rest were freed or paroled. Eighty-six were finally convicted by the Federal Courts. Oklahoma in the Thirties: Displacement, Migration, and Unionism Unionism among farm operators as well as industrial laborers ex panded rapidly in Oklahoma during the comparatively prosperous decade of the twenties. The Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union was revived and reorganized, multiplying several times in membership and establishing many cooperative projects throughout the State. Tenancy among farm operators meanwhile continued to increase. The problem of displacement and migration in Oklahoma was more widely publicized than that of any other State in the union during the 1930’s. Hitherto the most persistent rural question in the Southwest had been the growing indebtedness and tenancy among farm operators, and this trend had furnished the chief “ protest motive” for numerous agrarian movements. The chief problem in the thirties became that of propertyless rural migrants whose numbers were swelled by displacement arising mainly from adverse climatic factors and accelerated technological change. Mass displacement in the Southwest did not give rise to militant labor and tenant unionism or widespread strikes as it had in other regions. Farm tenants and sharecroppers in the western Cotton Belt, in contrast to plan tation areas in States to the east, were independent individuals with social standing nearly equal to neighboring owners or landlords, rather than closely supervised dependent gangs who were sharply differentiated in race and status from their landlord-managers. Their reactions when they were displaced were correspondingly individualistic; separate families migrated to cities or other farm areas, individuals competed for jobs or for farms to rent, and their personal relations with landlords grew strained. Strikes and organized roadside demonstrations of the kind staged by the Southern Tenant Farmers Union and the United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and Allied W orkers of America among sharecroppers in Arkansas and southeastern Missouri19 would be difficult to conceive in Texas and Oklahoma. Agrarian organization in the two States differed sharply in character during the thirties. In Texas, as will be described later in this chapter, there were scattered local unions of habitual migratory workers, most of whom were Mexican. In Oklahoma low-income farm laborers and 19S ee C h a p ter X V J L CH. XVI.---UNIONISM IN TEXAS AND OKLAHOMA 265 tenants became well organized throughout the State in associations which were political pressure groups as well as economic bargaining units. They were able to press for legislative measures which would improve the position of low-income farm groups, or would at least prevent it from be coming more serious. The Veterans of Industry of America The unprecedented rate of displacement of farm families gave rise to organizations whose purpose was to protect the dispossessed. In the early years of depression, agrarian workers, including farm owners and tenants, swelled the ranks of urban unemployed who had drifted into Oklahoma in search of jobs in the oil industry, which was experiencing a temporary boom. By 1933 the number of unemployed had risen to 301,310 or 42 per cent of all workers in the State.20 Organizations of unemployed whose primary objective was to secure adequate relief from State and Federal Government agencies were the only labor unions that gained in membership for several years. Unem ployed councils organized by the Communist Party among both urban and rural workers by 1933 numbered about 80 locals and 30,000 members in the State, with 23 locals and 7,000 members in Oklahoma City alone.20 These were soon disrupted by the arrest and conviction of their most active leaders, after violent demonstrations and clashes with police. The rank and file aligned itself with other groups. The most important organization was the Veterans of Industry of America or V .I.A ., established in 1932 by Ira Finley, a former president of the Oklahoma State Federation of Labor. Its aims for adequate relief were much the same as those of the unemployed councils, but it rapidly branched out to other fields. Local committees of the V .I.A . multiplied while the N R A was in effect, as they were an excellent means for helping to en force the labor and industry codes. In 1935 the V .I.A . initiated an old-age pension plan which, its sponsors claimed, was defeated in the State Su preme Court, largely through the efforts of the Chamber of Commerce. As an organization whose membership was chiefly rural, it cooperated with the Farmers Union of Oklahoma in seeking enactment of such measures as the Graduated Land Tax and the Homestead Exemption Law. The V .I.A . remained an effective pressure group for the propertyless. B y the end of the thirties it claimed 317 locals (about half of which were active) having approximately 40,000 paid-up members and 200,000 signed membership pledges. Several thousand Negroes were organized in separate locals.21 About half of all the members were unemployed, and the rest were tenants and nonunion casual workers in agriculture and industry. In the western cotton and wheat counties they were mostly urban or small-town laborers, while in the eastern section the majority were casual laborers and small part-time farm owners or tenants, many of whom de pended upon W P A jobs and intermittent farm work. The V .I.A . cooperated closely with other farm organizations and labor unions. It organized boycotts and provided pickets to prevent the unem ployed and unorganized from breaking strikes of A .F . of L. and C.I.O. unions of oil workers, packing-house and cannery employees, and the like. 20Labor History of Oklahoma, W PA Federal Writers Project (p. 66). 21On January 22, 1938, the Black Dispatch, Negro newspaper published in Oklahoma City, estimated that some 20,000 Negroes belonged to the V.I.A. 266 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE V .I.A . unions of farm wage workers were limited for the most part to small areas of eastern Oklahoma where many seasonal laborers were em ployed. The biggest membership was in such counties as Le Flore, Se quoia, and Seminole, where large numbers were hired for seasonal jobs such as cotton chopping and picking during fall and winter, turkey picking in early December, and spinach cutting in spring and fall. A few large plantations growing cotton, spinach, beans, and other commercial vege tables are concentrated along the Arkansas border. Negroes constituted 90 to 95 percent of the laborers recruited from Muskogee and other large cities and towns for seasonal bean picking, spinach cutting and thinning. O f the local casual laborers recruited from relief clients, unemployed, and part-time farm owners or tenants, about half were white and half colored. A number of plantations relied for their regular labor supply upon N egro sharecroppers and casual day laborers who lived on the plantation the year round. These were supplemented during the peak harvest season by white and colored casual workers from adjacent areas.22 The V .I.A . at tempted to improve the labor situation in eastern Oklahoma by means of organized labor boycotts, i.e., by persuading workers to avoid agricultural jobs at substandard wages or working conditions. It also exerted pressure upon State relief and W P A authorities to refrain from closing down projects to force clients into agricultural work at low wages. The V .I.A . for a time faced competition from the W orkers Alliance. The major objectives of both organizations were almost identical; both wanted larger expenditures for wT ork relief and union mediation of griev ances between workers and work-relief authorities. The W orkers Alliance failed to become effective in Oklahoma. By 1939 its officers claimed only 25 locals with an aggregate membership of approximately 2,000. The organization soon disappeared from the State.23 Workingmen9 Union of the World s A short-lived organization named the Workingmen’s Union of the W orld, having much the same function as the V .I.A ., sprang up among farm tenants, workers, and unemployed of western Arkansas and eastern Oklahoma during the middle thirties. The leading organizers were former members of miners’ and small farmers’ unions in the Fort Smith industrial area and the adjacent rural region. The name of the organization was reminiscent of the old W orking Class Union, which had developed in the same locale, and its philosophy represented an admixture of hill-country religion and the doctrines of the I.W .W . Its constitution stated: 22Data obtained from the district office of the Oklahoma State Employment Service, Musko gee, Okla. 23Labor History of Oklahoma (p. 68). Ira Finley, president of the V.I.A., charged the Workers Alliance in Oklahoma with being a Communist-front organization formed for the purpose of disrupting and destroying his union. (Labor’ s Voice, Official Organ of the V.I.A., Oklahoma City, Vol. VI, No. 6, June 18, 1940.) Twenty paid organizers were sent into Oklahoma by the national executive of the Workers Alliance, he claimed, and these centered their activities in the counties where the V.I.A . had its chief membership. The Alliance in Oklahoma was destroyed subsequently. Several alleged Communist leaders were arrested and sentenced to long prison terms on charges of violating the State Criminal Syndicalism Act. CH. XVI.---UNIONISM IN TEXAS AND OKLAHOMA 267 Labor, being the foundation o f world progress, knows no State, National or International lines. W e have no religion, creed or dogma, save that o f the Carpenter o f Nazareth, as expressed in the New Commandment, “ That ye love one another.” W e make no distinction as to race, color or nationality. W e welcome within our organization all unorganized workers, skilled or unskilled, both wage earners and farmers. (The Toiler, Official Organ o f Workingmen’s Union of the W orld, Fort Smith, Ark., Vol. I, No. 1, February 2, 1934, p. 4.) The union originated during the N R A period of 1933 and 1934 among unemployed workers on C W A projects in the vicinity of Fort Smith. It spread to other industries whose workers were unorganized by the A .F . of L., or whose unions had become inactive. It claimed at its peak about 116 locals and 30,000 paid-up members in counties adjacent to Fort Smith in both Oklahoma and Arkansas. More than half were agricultural workers and tenants employed in the cotton and spinach plantations of eastern Oklahoma.24 Negro and white plantation workers were reported 100 percent unionized in the northern section of Le Flore County, mostly in the potato-growing area around Spiro, W ebber Falls, and Fort Gibson, and well organized in the cotton-growing sections be tween Fort Smith and Spiro, in the corn and cotton fields from Spiro west to Muskogee, and in the spinach-raising area of Sequoia County on the north side of the Arkansas River. Some of the locals were exclusively Negro, some exclusively white, and some had both whites and Negroes, depending upon the wishes of the membership. N o strikes were undertaken by the W .U .W . directly. The complete ness of unionization among workers in the areas indicated was sufficient to raise their wages appreciably. Organized laborers in several localities were reported to have won $1.25 per day and perquisites in place of a previous flat rate of 60 to 75 cents per day in potato digging and spinach cutting, and $1 to $1.25 per hundredweight instead of the prevailing 75 cents for cotton picking.25 The only agricultural strike in which the W .U .W . was involved even indirectly was a small dispute on a few plantations in Logan County, Ark. A n independently organized local union of tenants and share croppers clashed with planters over the sharing of A A A benefit pay ments. Though the local union did not affiliate with the W .U .W ., the latter supported the strikers with material aid and helped them reach a compromise settlement.26 The W .U .W . soon declined in eastern Oklahoma, and its membership and local organizations were absorbed by the Veterans of Industry of America. The W .U .W . in Arkansas was made up largely of miners and other industrial workers. It later affiliated with the United Mine Workers, and furnished the base for establishing the State C.I.O. Industrial Union Council. In the absence of the W orkers Alliance or V .I.A . in western 24By October 1934, the union listed one or more locals in the following communities: In Arkansas—Fort Smith, Van Buren, Jenny Lind, Greenwood, Bonanza, Clarksville, Witcherville, Midland, Hartford, Pine Grove, Mansfield, Tyro, Huntington, Shilow Pine Log. In Oklahoma— Spiro, Race Track, Fort Coffee, Lone Star, Murrys Spur, Stoney Point, Poteau, Heavener, Howe, Pocola, Victor, Hodgens, Independence, Cherry Grove, Kennedy, Wister, Royal Oak, Richards, New Bokoshe, Old Bokoshe, Rock Island, Red Oak, Salona, Pine Valley, Lone Pine, Calhoun, Bengal, Norris, Lodi, Cedars, Boggy, Latham, Jaw Creek, Shady Point, Cartersville, Arkola. (The Toiler, October 1934.) 25Interview, J. W . Eakin, former president of W .U .W ., Fort Smith, Ark., December 7, 1940. 26Idem. Several W .U .W . organizers claimed that when they were organizing the union, they found literally dozens of small independent local unions of tenants and casual workers in scattered communities throughout western Arkansas and eastern Oklahoma. Most of these merged with the W .U .W ., but a few, like the one of white plantation tenants in Logan County, Ark;, re mained independent. 268 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE Arkansas, the C l.O .. continued the policy of organizing W P A and other relief workers. Intermittently it organized plantation workers along the Arkansas River, who, in contrast to those in eastern Oklahoma, were predominantly white. One strike of white casual workers took place in river-bottom planta tions about 10 miles north of Paris, Ark., a local center of U .M .W . strength. A n amorphous local union named the Industrial W orkers of America had developed as an offshoot of the W .U .W . and had later affiliated to the C.I.O. Jim Kindrick of Fort Smith, State I.W .A . or ganizer and later president of the State Industrial Union Council (C .I.O .) organized about 240 casual laborers into I.W .A . Local No. 16 of Paris. Organizers made overtures to river-bottom cotton planters to negotiate for wage increases to $1.50 per day for cotton chopping in place of the prevailing $1. A strike was called on May 9 when the farmers refused to meet with union representatives.27 The strike continued for 10 days, during which time local newspapers reported that it was being “ conducted in a quiet, orderly manner.” N o picket lines were formed. The only incident of violence or near violence was the arrest of Orlando H ixson, prominent local planter, on a charge of “ assault with intent to kill.” Cyrus Grady and Dewey Mosley, mem bers of the union strike committee, claimed that H ixson had shot at them with a pistol and Winchester, and one shot was alleged to have passed through Grady's cap bill.27 The charges apparently were later dropped. The Southern Tenant Farmers Union The Southern Tenant Farmers Union, which began among share croppers in the Arkansas Delta, made littlfc headway in western Arkansas, Oklahoma, dr Texas because the disadvantages of the plantation system were not a major issue in the Southwest. The structure of farm opera tions in this region, as pointed out in previous pages, did not generally emphasize sharp class lines or provoke organized group conflict. Share croppers, tenants, and farm laborers of Oklahoma were already well or ganized in the Farmers Union and V .I.A ., which enjoyed a good measure of public recognition and brought substantial benefits to lower-income farm groups. They could win some measure of security through effective use of their voting rights because they were not disfranchised by a State poll tax, as in Arkansas and other Southern States. Tenants and share croppers functioning through the Farmers Union and the V .I.A . could influence or even control local elections and thus insure adequate protec tion for themselves from law-enforcement officers and Government agri cultural agencies. There were few if any inequalities between landlords and tenants or sharecroppers in the distribution of A A A benefit pay ments. Tenants could always appeal to local committees of their organiza tion, which could take their case to the county agent without fear of violent opposition from organized planters or hostile sheriffs and deputies. The Southern Tenant Farmers Union consequently was led to focus its m ajor attention upon wage laborers rather than tenants or sharecroppers. The first local in Oklahoma was organized at Muskogee in September 1935, with about a dozen charter members. The State organization claimed 50 locals having 1,000 members by January 1936, when it held 27Paris Express, May 11, 1939 (p. 1). CH. XVI.—UNIONISM IN TEXAS AND OKLAHOMA 269 its first convention.28 It formulated demands patterned closely after those expressed by the parent organization in Arkansas, regarding Government rental and parity payments, written contracts with landlords, protection against eviction, and rehabilitation.29 The S .T .F .U .'s limited size in Oklahoma made it ineffective for col lective bargaining. A strike of cotton choppers in eastern Arkansas during the spring of 1935 was not extended to Oklahoma. The union campaigned to popularize the demand for a $1 minimum wage per 10-hour day in the cotton-growing section of the eastern counties and was reported to have won these demands in a few areas without resorting to strikes.30 The State branch of the S.T.F.U . made greater efforts to organize spinach workers in several eastern counties. A n agricultural laborers' local union was chartered in Muskogee in January 1936, for the spring season. It aimed primarily to raise wage rates above the prevailing level, which the State organizer charged was an average of $1.25 for 12 hours' work for a family of five.31 The S.T .F .U . temporarily organized only a few hundred out of several thousand workers in the spinach crop. The sole concrete union gain was a closed-field agreement signed with a small grower having 35 acres who paid piece rates of 10 cents per 25-pound basket and provided free trans portation to and from work. N o progress was reported in negotiations with larger growers controlling most of the remaining 2,200 acres.32 The union made renewed efforts in the spring of 1937 to organize the 5,000 field, shed, and cannery workers in the spinach and onion strip extending from Muskogee to the Arkansas border. A special field work ers' organizing committee of seven members was appointed to conduct the drive, and several open mass meetings were held. This attempt also did not last long, and only a few hundred new members were gained temporarily.33 The only strike in which the S.T.F.U . participated even indirectly in Oklahoma was conducted by another union. About 135 spinach-cannery workers in Muskogee were organized and chartered as Federal Labor Union No. 20046 in July 1935. They called a strike in August against the Griffen Manufacturing Co. cannery to demand reestablishment of N R A wage scales and rehiring of several discharged union members.34 The Central Labor Council of Muskogee endorsed the strike and promised full support, while the S.T .F.U . supplied pickets and instructed its mem bers in the county not to harvest produce or bring it to the cannery.85 The strike lasted more than a month, during which time numerous scuffles occurred between strikers and strikebreakers recruited from Muskogee County farmers on O E R A relief rolls.36 Delay in settlement was caused by the employer's insistence upon retaining a company-union clause in the agreement.37 Perhaps the most important accomplishment of the V .I.A ., the W .U .W ., the S.T .F.U ., and other organizations of tenants, wage workers, 28At a State-wide rally held later at Tallahassee, Okla., in August 1936, the State organizer claimed an attendance of 2,000, though it is doubtful whether all of these were members. (Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 13, September 1936, p. 4.) 29Labor History of Oklahoma, W P A Federal Workers Project (p. 78). 30Idem (p. 79). SiRural Worker, Vol. I, No. 7, February 1936 (p. 2). 32Idem, Vol. I, No. 11, June 1936 (p. 3). 33Idem, Vol. II, No. 3, March 1937 (p. 2), and No. 4, April 1937 (p. 2). 34Daily Phoenix, Muskogee, August 7, 1935 (p. 1). SSRural Worker, Vol. I, No. 2, September, 1935 (p. 1). 36Daily .Phoenix, August 14, 1935 (p. 1); August 19 (p. 1); August 22 (p. 1). 37“ It is agreed and understood that the employees* organization to be formed for the purpose of making this agreement shall be open to membership of any and all employees residing in Muskogee and without payment of dues of any kind or character. The company agrees to furnish a suitable hall or other satisfactory meeting place and to pay a reasonable sum for secretarial fees.” (Daily Phoenix, September 6, 1935, p. 2.) 270 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE and unemployed in Oklahoma lay in bringing organized public pressure to bear upon government authorities to deal with the related problems of tenancy, displacement, and labor surpluses in agriculture. The Gov ernor in 1936 appointed a commission to study the question and to make recommendations to the State legislature. In response to the findings, the Oklahoma Legislature in 1937 passed the first Landlord-Tenant R e lations A ct in the Nation. It provided for equitable rental contracts, an educational campaign among both parties to encourage long-term con tracts, regular meetings among landlords and tenants to promote better understanding, and the adoption of means for arbitrating their differ ences.38 The more serious problems of unemployment, displacement, and labor surplus were mitigated to some degree in the Southwest and other regions during the late thirties by more adequate Federal relief for rural areas. Texas in the Thirties: Labor Unionism in Agriculture and Allied Industries Labor relations in Texas agriculture by the 1930’s in many ways bore a striking resemblance to those in California, and the similarity grew stronger during this decade. Farms were being mechanized rapidly, small operators were being displaced in great numbers, and land was being consolidated into larger holdings. New cash crops intensively grown for sale in distant markets had been introduced in many areas. A widespread system of factory farming had developed, and it was fully as dependent as that of California upon large and mobile supplies o f cheap labor. “ W ith out itinerant labor in great quantities/’ wrote Robert M . M cKinley, State farm placement supervisor of the Texas State Employment Service, “ our present agricultural system cannot ex ist/’39 In 1937 he estimated that there were about 600,000 of these itinerant workers in Texas, about half of whom were migratory (i.e., traveling extensively in order to find con tinuous employment) and the remaining half casual (i.e., traveling only short distances from home to work for varying lengths of tim e). These latter for the most part either were on relief or were engaged in nonagricultural jobs in private industry, were self-employed, or worked on Government projects.39 Although it surpassed most other States in the number of its agricul tural laborers, Texas remained relatively free of unionism and strikes in agriculture and allied industries. It was virtually untouched by the wave of farm-labor outbreaks during 1933. Organized action on the whole continued to be local and infrequent throughout the decade. The bargaining power of agricultural laborers remained weak arid their earnings low for reasons mentioned before. Immigration of M exi cans continued in huge volume during the war and postwar years. The use of private automobiles and trucks increased the mobility of seasonal laborers and made large numbers of them available to growers. B y the thirties there was a chronic farm-labor surplus. Mexicans were estimated to constitute 85 percent of the total labor supply; of the remaining 15 percent, two-thirds were white and one-third Negro.40 Even after the 38Labor History of Oklahoma (p. 79). "R o b e r t M. McKinley: Migratory Labor, Austin, Tex., October 1940. Report of Farm Place ment Division, Texas State Employment Service (pp. 1, 3). " I d e m (p. 5). CH. XVI.---UNIONISM IN TEXAS AND OKLAHOMA 271 worst abuses of the contractor system had been eliminated and the volume of Mexican immigration reduced, the bargaining position of casual farm workers was too weak to prevent their exploitation. They were political ly impotent under the poll-tax law (and “ white men’s primaries” in some counties), they had little or no labor legislation to protect them, and they faced constantly increasing competition from thousands of displaced farm families. The decentralized structure of the Texas economy was a further obstacle to unionism. A s the study of other States has clearly shown, the successful union organization of agricultural workers depends to a large degree upon urban centers which have been unionized previously, par ticularly where these serve as labor markets or distributing points through which itinerant workers pass in the course of their migrations. Denver (C olo.) and Phoenix (A r iz .), for instance, are State capitals as well as trade centers situated close to agricultural areas requiring great numbers of laborers. Unions with district headquarters in these cities are easily accessible to small towns in commercial-crop areas. In California, San Francisco is within easy access to such m ajor “ concentration points” for agricultural labor as Stockton, Salinas, and Sacramento. The concentration point for the main body of itinerant agricultural workers in Texas, however, is the Lower R io Grande Valley. This area, rather far from the chief urban centers, is composed of small towns or shipping points which depend upon intensive citrus-fruit and vegetable growing and packing industries. Migratory labor each year spreads out from the valley, following the successive cotton harvests north, east, and west from June to November, and returns south in December. There is no one metropolitan area which could serve as a main center or hub, easily accessible to any large proportion of all agricultural workers. Furthermore, labor unions among nonagricultural trades and industries in the larger cities of the State are themselves relatively weak and un developed. The labor movement in Texas agriculture has therefore been a series of sporadic, independent local developments. The one attempt to coordi nate a unionizing campaign over a wide area of the State failed, largely because of the difficulty of maintaining sufficient contact between different areas and of providing adequate services for the local unions. Catholic Workers Union of Crystal City The first union of agricultural workers in Texas during the thirties was the short-lived but temporarily successful Catholic W orkers Union, formed in November 1930 in Crystal City, center of an important spinach growing area in the State. It was also one of a very few labor unions in the United States to be organized directly by an official representative o f the Roman Catholic Church. On November 7, 1930, some 450 Mexican workers attended a meeting called by Rev. Charles Taylor, O. M. I., Pastor of the Sacred Heart Church in Crystal City, to discuss methods for dealing with certain labor conditions which were causing widespread hardship and unrest. A t the meeting a schedule of demands was drawn up for submission to local growers and processors: That no outside laborers be brought in to work, except under very special circumstances, because of the serious local labor 272 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE surplus; that no children under 12 years of age be employed; that hourly or piece rates be established at levels to provide a minimum living wage of $2 a day, $11 a week, or $45 a m onth; that the wage rates to be paid be announced publicly at each place of employment, and that the wages be paid directly by the employer, so as to eliminate deception and exploitation by contractors; and that any work done be accepted or rejected in the fields rather than at the railroad station, as the latter practice caused considerable loss to the workers. Out of the meeting the Catholic W orkers Union, with the Reverend Taylor as president, was formed to “ help the laborers in their difficulty according to their rights and obligations, as taught by the Catholic Church.” (Circular letter by Rev. Charles T a y lo r: “ T o the Growers and Farmers,” Crystal City, Tex., November 10, 1930.) Within a week 25 of the more prominent growers and processing companies in and around Crystal City had signed an agreement incor porating the main demands, though not the minimum living wages stipu lated, as above. (U nion Bulletin: “ Respueta a Los Trabajadores de Crystal City, T ex.,” November 14, 1930.) “ A s a general result,” Reverend Taylor wrote about 2 months later, “ there have been comparatively few laborers brought in from outside, though many have come in of their own accord. W ages have been maintained here higher than elsewhere in the district. The Mexican schools here report, for the first time in history, an increased instead of diminished attendance since the spinach harvest commenced. And, in general, there has been more than the usual good feeling and cooperation among all classes in the community.” (Letter from Rev. Charles Taylor, Crystal City, Tex., February 3, 1931.) Unionism in the Lower Rio Grande Valley The first important campaign to organize casual farm workers in Texas on a larger than local scale was an unsuccessful attempt among sheep shearers in several western counties early in 1934, as described in chapter X IV . Union activity among other groups then shifted to the south and east. A n official report to the Communist Party by an officer in June 1934, stated: Our District Organizer in Texas has informed me that near the Mexican border we have an Agricultural Workers Union with 450 members. This Union is directly under the leadership o f our Party. (Communist, June 1934, Vol. X III, No. 6, p. 571.) A sustained effort was made, from 1934 on, to organize field laborers and packing-shed workers in the Lower R io Grande Valley. A n y cam paign which hoped to unionize farm labor in Texas necessarily centered in this area since it was the main source for migratory labor. It had been found useless to organize casual labor in any one crop area without organizing the migratory workers beforehand, because the seasonal influx CH. XVI.---UNIONISM IN TEXAS AND OKLAHOMA 273 of this group rendered the bargaining power of the casual workers in effective. Migrants were a strategic group in each locality because their labor was necessary to harvest the crop, and the wage rate had to be set, at the very least, at a level which would attract sufficient numbers from other areas. A union theoretically could affect wage rates in any crop area by restricting the movement or supply of migrants. It was found almost impossible in practice to keep a union of migratory workers intact when regularly each year they scattered over wide regions which some times encompassed several States. Effective organization of seasonal farm labor in Texas, then, necessi tated maintaining stable unions in the valley the year round, to which the migrants would return each winter. Such unions required a basic mem bership of continuously employed resident field labor, as well as the betterpaid shed workers whose dues could provide an adequate revenue. Union organizers found labor in this area, whether in fields or packing sheds, exceedingly difficult to organize or keep organized. Field and shed workers were divided to some degree not only by race but also by occu pational interest. The various fruit and vegetable crops in the valley em ployed only a fraction of all available Mexican workers, so that the ma jority had to migrate elsewhere for work. Hence few had any direct economic incentive to organize locally. The farm proprietors in the Lower R io Grande Valley, furthermore, were primarily small owners, in contrast to many other areas growing cash crops intensively for distant markets. Shipping companies owned or controlled only a small proportion of the irrigated acreage. The farms were relatively small and diversified, and Mexican laborers employed more or less continuously maintained a rather personal “ farm hand” relationship with their employers. They usually lived in cabins provided by the owner and often had a plot of ground and some livestock for their families. Growers in the Lower R io Grande Valley, finally, were in a weak bar gaining position as sellers. The prices of their produce were determined on national markets in competition with large-scale grower-shippers from other cash-crop areas. Since farm earnings were low, field workers could scarcely expect to raise their wages by means of collective bargaining. O N IO N W ORKERS’ U N IO N , LAREDO A heterogeneous group of Mexican laborers in Laredo (W eb b Coun ty ) in 1933 organized an independent labor union named the Asociacion de Jornaleros. Like many new unions at the time, it began as a spon taneous response to the N R A and gave workers the means for enforcing the labor and industrial codes announced by the Washington administra tion. The Asociacion included among its members Mexicans in several occupations— hat makers, painters, carpenters, general construction work ers, miners, and agricultural laborers. The union declined rapidly in membership during 1934 because, according to the organizers, local em ployers hired agents provocateurs to disrupt it. The Asociacion revived temporarily in the spring of 1935, when it assumed control over a strike of some 1,200 onion workers. Certain urban business interests at the time were raising onions as a side line. The crop was grown intensively in a limited area of irrigated farm land near 274 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE Laredo, and surplus cheap labor from the city was available for seasonal short jobs. The strike was a spontaneous protest against wages of 60 to 75 cents per 10-hour day, or 6 to 7 j4 cents per hour. Laborers com plained that the work was extremely uncertain. They often drove out to the fields at their own expense only to find that there was but 2 or 3 hours’ work for them. The strike was lost, according to the organizers, because of inexperi ence among the workers and intimidation from authorities. Strike tactics were similar to those employed in California during the early thirties— mass demonstrations in the city and mass picketing along highways lead ing to the fields.41 Union demands were not formulated clearly and at tempted to cover too much at once. The demands, printed in strike cir culars, were as follow s: (1 ) That all work that involved extraction and cleaning o f onions, broccoli, car rots, and beets be paid for at the rate of $1.25 for 10 hours’ labor, with overtime at the rate o f 20 cents per hour. (2 ) That bunching together be paid at the rate of 2 cents per bunch. (3 ) That carrots be paid a rate of 12 cents for 48 bunches not containing more than 10 pieces. (4 ) That broccoli be paid at a rate o f 8 cents for 12 bunches in fields and 5 cents in warehouses. (5 ) That onion harvesting be paid at rate o f 5 cents per bushel for first class and those spotted or too small at 8 cents, not to contain more than 22 pounds per bushel. (6 ) That beets be paid a rate o f 40 bunches for 10 cents when containing not more than 10 pieces. (7 ) That a rate o f 6 cents per crate be paid for Bermuda onions, with crates to be furnished at the place o f work. (8 ) That onion grading be paid at 5 cents a sack, complete work, and growers to furnish transportation. (9) Drinking water to be furnished near place of work. (10) Farmers pay transportation charges of workers to and from jobs. (11) Payment of wages by 1 o’clock Saturday, and labor to be immediately brought home in order to be able to purchase their necessities. (12) Good treatment o f laborers by farm owners and foremen. (13) When a group o f men are taken out to work on farms and are not satisfied with the conditions or terms, they are to be brought back to town. (14) Accidents suffered by the workers are to be paid for by farmers. (15) That in all instances where an agreement cannot be reached as to contract wages that the farmers will pay, the laborer is to receive $1.25 per day.4 2 Control of union officers over the rank and file was not sufficiently strong to prevent ill-judged actions which subjected the strikers to legal intimidation and suppression. Although there was little violence, 56 ar rests nevertheless were made by Texas Rangers sent in at the request of the district judge, who charged that the highways were being blocked by strikers.43 The Laredo strikers refused to sign contracts with individual em ployers, and held out instead for a uniform agreement covering the entire growing area.44 The similarity to some tactics in strikes conducted by Communist unions in other areas led several people, including the district attorney and a resident A .F. of L. organizer, to charge publicly that the movement was controlled by “ a few radicals.” 45 41Laredo Light, April 12 (p. 1) and April 14 (p. 1), 1935; Rural Worker, Vol. 1, No. 1, August 1935 (p. 1). 42Laredo Times, April 12, 1935 (p. 12). 43Idem, April 15, 1935. 44H. G. Samuels, a large onion grower employing 100 to 125 workers, early agreed to the wage scales and working conditions demanded by the union. While the strike leaders were willing to accept this offer and sign a contract, the rank and file voted against it for fear of jeopardizing the solidarity of the strike as a whole. (Laredo Light, April 14 and April 15, 1935.) 45Laredo Light, April 16, 1935. CH. XVI.---UNIONISM IN TEXAS AND OKLAHOMA 275 John R. Steelman, conciliator from the U. S. Department of Labor, came to Laredo at the request of the Chamber of Commerce. H e per suaded some 500 strikers to return to work for two large growers who were willing to pay the union scale of $1.25 per day. The strike was dis continued after 5 days when an agreement was drawn up at a mass meet ing of 600 strikers addressed by Steelman. It amounted to little more than a “ statement of policy,” since only the two growers mentioned actually signed it.46 Steelman expressed the view that “ the growers missed a good opportunity to make another strike this season impossible, had they come in and mutually signed the agreement. They left it wide open for another strike.” H e was strongly critical of the employers and found them “ hopelessly at variance among themselves * * * some who say that $1.25 a day is a fair wage, and others who say that 60 cents a day is too much.” 46 A s the agreement was at best only a compromise, the strikers held another mass meeting for the purpose of taking action against employers paying less than the $1.25 per day promised. The growers repudiated the agreement and, according to leaders of the strike, reverted to the scale of 60 to 75 cents per day as soon as the conciliator left. N o further trouble developed, however, and the union lost a large part of its mem bership because of the unsatisfactory conclusion of the strike. F E D E R A L L A B O R U N I O N S O F T H E A .F . O F L . A revival of the Asociacion de Jornaleros was attempted in the spring o f 1936, with aid and encouragement from the National Committee of Agricultural W orkers. Mass meetings were held to consider affiliating with the A .F . of L. as a federal labor union, in the hope of winning more outside support. According to a report which union officers sub mitted to the Civil Liberties Committee, U . S. Senate Committee on Edu cation and Labor, organizers faced a great deal of intimidation. The Asociacion de Jornaleros, Laredo, had carried on “ exchanges of dele gates” with the Farm W orkers Union of M exico and had cooperated with the Communist-controlled unemployed council of San Antonio over the current “ relief o r work” issue.47 Hence the authorities viewed the union with suspicion, as being alien and Communist-dominated. A t one union meeting it was reported that the district attorney, the chief of the local immigration department, Texas Rangers, and U . S. Arm y officers were in attendance. A few days later it was reported that a grand jury had been formed to investigate alleged insults to the American flag at union meetings.48 Apparently little came of this investigation. The Asociacion obtained a charter from the A .F . of L. as Agricultural W orkers (Federal) Labor Union No. 20212 and immediately initiated a drive to organize similar unions in other agricultural areas of Texas. A State-wide conference held in Corpus Christi during January 1937, was endorsed by the Texas State Federation o f Labor and attended by dele gates from the Central Trades and Labor Council of Corpus Christi, the W orkers Alliance of San Antonio, and locals of the Oil W orkers Union, the Brotherhood of Carpenters, and the International Longshoremen’s Association. A Texas Agricultural W orkers Organizing Committee was 46Laredo Light, April 17, 1935. 47Rural Worker, Vol. I, No. 1, August 1935 (p. 1); No. 3, October 1935 (p. 1). 48Jdem, Vol. I, No. 11, June 1936 (p. 3). 276 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE formed to develop new agricultural labor unions in Corpus Christi, Brownsville, and San Antonio, which were to be affiliated with the A .F . of L. The committee agreed to cooperate with the W orkers Alliance in seeking W P A employment at union wages for all unemployed farm workers.49 The State organizing committee, with some financial support from local unions of carpenters, plumbers and oil workers, chartered a new local of Mexican tenant farmers as well as farm laborers in the Corpus Christi area.49 Organizers were sent to Brownsville, Raymondsville, Robstown, Ingleside, Chapman, Crystal City, and other towns in the Low er R io Grande area.50 Representatives of local organizations of pickers throughout the valley called a meeting prior to the opening of the 1937 cotton-picking season in late June. They agreed to demand a standard rate for picking of $1 per hundredweight as long as cotton was priced at 12 cents per pound.51 The Tri-County Vegetable Producers Association met shortly afterward in order to neutralize the union d rive; it wanted also to prevent local increases in wage rates which would arise if farmers competed for workers in case of labor scarcity.52 The organized growers agreed to set standard rates of 50 cents per hundredweight for first picking, 60 cents for second, and 75 cents for third picking.53 A series of local strikes ensued during late June and early July throughout the cotton-growing area of the Low er R io Grande Valley, extending from M cAllen to Brownsville. The farm workers’ unions used the strategy of concerted “ stay-aways” or labor boycotts in local areas; pickers avoided the fields which paid less than the union wage rates. The strike was successful in winning wage increases to $1 per hundred weight in a few areas, according to union organizers. Some 1,500 cotton pickers and truckers meeting in the town of Mercedes on July 7 agreed to a compromise rate of 85 cents per hundredweight for picking and 20 cents for trucking. Delegates were appointed to negotiate with officials of the Tri-County Vegetable Growers Association for these wage in creases.54 Local newspapers in most sections, on the other hand, reported that cotton growers were managing to have their cotton harvested at rates as low as 60 cents per hundredweight. Strikebreakers apparently were available in large numbers. In the town of W eslaco, for instance, violence was narrowly averted between local Mexicans and N egro pickers imported from distant W aco. A Mexican labor leader was alleged to have told the Negroes that “ a strike was on and they would be shot if they picked cotton.” Police dispersed a crowd of strikers.55 49Rural Worker, Vol. II, No. 2, February 1937 (p. 2), and Vol. II, No. 3, March 1937 (p. 2). 50Harlingen Star, May 8, 1937. 51Idem, June 25, 1937. 52On June 17, 1937, for instance, the Harlingen Star reported that farmers in the area were complaining of labor contractor “ parasites” and were requesting action to stop alleged “ chisel* ling” by a number of them. According to growers, many contractors got laborers to agree to allow them to contract with farmers for cotton, with the customary provision that the contractors were to receive a percentage of the wages. The contractors often violated the verbal agreements to provide so many pickers at a certain price when other farmers, with or without knowledge of previous agreements, offered higher prices. 53Harlingen Star, June 10 and 25, 1937. 54Brownsville Herald, July 6, 1937; Houston Press, July 8, 1937. 55Harlingen Star, July 10, 1937. CH. XVI.---UNIONISM IN TEXAS AND OKLAHOMA 277 T H E U .C .A .P .A .W .A . The Texas Agricultural W orkers Organizing Committee and its locals were absorbed into the C .I.O .’s United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and Allied W orkers of America in the summer of 1937. The new union conducted an extensive organizing drive in the Lower R io Grande Valley and other special crop areas in Texas. The locals in Laredo and Corpus Christi were rechartered as branches of the U .C .A .P .A .W .A ., and new locals were chartered in several towns in the Lower R io Grande Valley, such as Weslaco, La Feria, Mercedes, Harlingen, San Benito, and Donna. In M cAllen and other towns U .C .A .P .A .W .A . locals enlisted the support of Mexican social clubs and brotherhoods. According to union spokesmen there were altogether some 5,000 paid-up members who, together with their working wives and children, made a significant part of the seasonal labor supply in the valley. Local unions won a few minor strikes during late summer and fall. A small group of citrus-fruit pickers belonging to a local in Mercedes won a wage increase from 2J4 cents to 4 cents per crate when they called a short sit-down strike early in October.56 The local unions composed mainly of migratory workers became in active and disappeared during the last months of 1937. The labor drifted north and scattered in seasonal migrations following the harvests in cotton and other crops. The field laborers’ unions were further weakened by the fact that many of the leading organizers and union members were either Mexican citizens57 or known Communists. Hence they constantly feared legal suppression and deportation, though such actions were taken against few if any U .C .A .P .A .W .A , members. The union nevertheless faced the deeply imbedded antagonism of Anglo-Saxon groups to alien and radical activities. SH ED W ORKERS IN T H E LOW ER RIO GRANDE VALLEY Sporadic efforts were made to organize the more skilled and better paid packing-shed workers, both whites and Mexicans, in the Lower Rio Grande Valley. The Fruit and Vegetable W orkers Union Local No. 20363 was organized and chartered by the A .F . of L. in January 1937, and was active for over a year throughout the vegetable-producing areas. A t its peak it claimed from 500 to 600 members in good standing, representing all types of shed workers— Mexican and white, migratory and transient. The union did not participate officially in any strike (though scattered “ wildcat” walk-outs did take place in some sheds) or win signed contracts with any employers. It did, however, negotiate successfully for a stand ardization of wages in several sheds employing a large part of the union membership.58 The union in February 1938, arranged a 50-car caravan which paraded the length of the Low er R io Grande Valley in protest against anti-union activity and the prorating of produce shipped to other areas. The latter 56Brownsville Herald, October 14, 1937. 57Texan-born Mexicans, in the opinion of several unionists, were more difficult to organize than the Mexican-born. The former were brought up in a situation of greater dependency and less freedom of expression, because of their political impotence (imposed by the State poll tax) and their inferior social status. 58Brownsville Herald, November 2, 1937. 278 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE policy, according to union spokesmen, left 8,000 workers unemployed and threatened to displace 5,000 to 6,000 more.59 Local 20363 faced growing competition from surplus nonunion labor, and its membership was found to be too heterogeneous to combine successfully in one union. It became inactive 14 months after it was organized. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . in 1937 also attempted to organize shed work ers. About 300 skilled crate makers employed by the Jolly Co. in San Benito took steps to affiliate with the C.I.O. Late in August 1937, they went on strike for union recognition, a signed union contract, and certain wage and hour conditions. The company announced its willingness to accede to union demands if they were imposed also upon competing com panies in nearby W eslaco and adjoining towns. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . took appropriate steps to this end. Crate Makers Union Local No. 110, Low er R io Grande Valley, was chartered in the early fall. Representatives from such towns as Mission, Elsa, Pharr, W eslaco, Mercedes, and San Benito held a meeting in the Brownsville City Hall. They formulated standard crate-making rates for competing firms throughout the valley and planned to negotiate union contracts with shippers.60 The union campaign failed, however. The strike in San Benito was lost and Local N o. 110 rapidly declined. Local unions of agricultural and allied workers in the Low er R io Grande Valley and other rural areas of Texas, in sum, were virtually impossible to maintain. All had disappeared by the close of 1938. P ro cessing workers in a large urban center constituted the only occupational group related to agriculture which remained with the U .C .A .P .A .W .A * and continued to carry on collective bargaining effectively. Pecan Shelters9 Unions in San Antonio6 1 The most dramatic labor upheaval in industries allied to agriculture in Texas occurred among pecan shellers. San Antonio, a city fairly ac cessible to the Mexican border and to intensive agricultural areas employ ing large numbers of seasonal workers, became during the thirties a concentration point for sweatshops which relied upon large supplies of Mexican labor. Pecan shelling became one of the lowest-paid jobs in the country during this period. The average annual family income was esti mated in a survey in 1938 to be $251 for a family of 4.6 persons, and only 2 percent of the families had incomes of $900 or more. The average weekly income reported by individuals in pecan work was $2.73, which was even lower than the $3.50 per week average income for agricultural labor. A l most a fourth of the pecan shelters’ families supplemented their earnings in San Antonio with farm work in Texas and other States during part of each year. M ost of these families picked cotton in Texas, and some traveled north to the Michigan beet fields. From all jobs reported by pecan shellers’ families in 1938, the average income per worker was $3.01 for an average week of 51 hours. A large proportion of the shellers de pended upon public assistance for part of their livelihood, even when the plants were operating at full speed. 59 San Angelo Times, February 10, 1938. 60Brownsville Herald, October 14, 1937. 61The material in this section has been drawn mainly from S. C. Mennefee and O. C. Cassmore: The Pecan Shellers of San Antonio. WPA-Division of Social Research, Washington, D. C. (pp. 16-18). It has been supplemented by newspaper reports and interviews. CH. XVI.---UNIONISM IN TEXAS AND OKLAHOMA 279 A militant union was organized among Mexican pecan shellers of San Antonio during the worst years of depression, unemployment, and wage cutting. The Pecan Shelling W orkers Union of San Antonio was formed under the close personal domination of Magdaleno Rodriguez early in 1933 and grew rapidly when the N R A came into effect later in the year. Contrary to the usual experience, however, this union of pecan workers subsequently opposed the Federal labor codes. Julius Seligman, largest pecan-shelling operator in the city, later stated that he had provided financial support to Rodriguez in order to promote unionism in competing plants and thus prevent them from cutting piece rates. Rodriguez’s union at first campaigned for the N R A wage scale of 10 to 12 cents per pound for shelling. Later it accepted a compromise rate of 5 cents and helped the employer oppose the wage provisions of the N R A . Even this compromise represented a substantial improvement over the 3- to 4-cent rate of early 1933, and the union grew rapidly in membership and status. Rodriguez by late 1934 claimed 10,000 to 12,000 members, though probably less than half of these paid regular dues. The union was soon disrupted by factionalism and sporadic strikes against repeated wage cuts. Union members opposed to Rodriguez organized a second union and sought to have the labor provisions of the N R A applied to the pecan-shelling industry. This group called itself the Mondolares de Nuez el Nogal (the Tree) and claimed some 2,500 members by late 1934. It was later absorbed into the C.I.O . Pecan Shellers’ Union. Another short-lived group known as the Cooperative Nueceros was organized in 1936 and later, with 250 members, received a charter from the A .F . of L. It failed to survive, partly because the poorly paid membership could not afford, or at least was unwilling to pay, the high union dues required. The original Pecan Shelling W orkers Union meanwhile was becom ing more militant. Rodriguez called a strike, in July 1934, in several plants which attempted to maintain the previous season’s rate of 2 and 3 cents per pound. The 5- and 6-cent scale was generally adopted under the combined pressure of the union and N R A standards.62 The union called another strike, in March 1935, in one shellery which had cut wages from the 5- and 6-cent rates to 4 and 5 cents.63 Strikes spread the follow ing month to several plants which had applied similar wage cuts. Riot ing occurred on one occasion early in April, as a result of which R odri guez and several pickets were arrested and jailed for “ unlawful assem blage.” 64 Still another strike developed in June over wage disputes at the Howell-Hutches factory 65 These walk-outs failed to prevent a substantial decline in wage stand ards and union membership during the fall of 1935. Rodriguez’s per sonal instability and dictatorial policies in ruling the union led in time to his imprisonment and finally to confinement in a mental hospital. The remnants of his union were later revived as the Texas Pecan Shelling W orkers Union, which increased rapidly in membership during 1937. Seligman raised the wages of his shellers from 5 to 6 cents per pound in August. The union in October threatened to call a general strike of 5,000 pecan workers in San Antonio unless wage rates were raised to 7 and 8 cents per pound for shelling and 60 cents per hundredweight 62San Antonio Express, July 18, 1934. 63Sart Antonio News, March 18, 1935. 64San Antonio Light, April 8, 1935. ®5Idem, June 10, 1935. 654107°—46—19 280 LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE for cracking. W hen those plants hitherto paying the 5- and 6-cent rate granted a compromise increase to 6 and 7 cents per pound, the threatened walk-out was averted.66 Donald Henderson, president of the U .C .A .P .A .W .A ., visited San Antonio in November 1937, to enlist the pecan shelters in his organiza tion. A temporary charter as Local 172 was issued to the Texas Pecan Shelling W orkers Union, with the understanding that it was to absorb the former A .F . of L. group, El Nogale, and a new left-wing faction which had risen to prominence through its activities in the W orkers Alliance.67 This organization rapidly assumed a leading role in the out breaks which ensued early the following year. The Southern Pecan Shelling Co.’s contractors on January 31, 1938, announced a 15-percent wage decrease from the 6- and 7-cent rates established in late 1937 to the previous 5 and 6 cents. This provoked a spontaneous strike which conservative union leaders sought to prevent. Left-wing organizers, however, rapidly extended it to a number of other plants, and the chief of police called out squads for riot duty. The U .C .A .P .A .W .A . executive then sanctioned the walk-out, making it a recognized strike of an international union. The scope of the movement and the drastic measures by which lawenforcement officers suppressed it made this strike one of the most highly publicized in the Nation during 1938. A ccording to Mennefee and Cassmore— On February 7 the police routed 300 pickets from the shelling plants. Over 1,000 pickets were arrested during the strike on charges o f “ blocking the sidewalks,” “ disturbing the peace,” and “ congregating in unlawful assemblies.” Tear gas was used on six or eight occasions during the first 2 weeks o f the strike, according to the testimony o f Chief o f Police Owen Kilday at the hearings o f the Texas Indus trial Commission on February 14; 52 policemen and 125 firemen were used on “ riot duty” in the strike. Both Mayor C. K. Quin and Kilday maintained that there was no strike, since they said that only a minority o f workers had left the plants. (M en nefee and Cassmore, Pecan Shelters of San Antonio, p. 5.) Chief of Police Kilday consistently justified attempts to suppress the strike on the ground that it was organized and led by Communists. H e said in later testimony: " I did not interfere with a strike! I interfered with a revolution.” Donald Henderson arrived in San Antonio on February 6 to take charge of the strike, and immediately removed local Communists from their position of leadership in the union. This did not mollify the oppo sition, however, because church and business groups as well as city police charged Henderson himself with being a Communist. Chief Kilday said: H e [Henderson] is an intruder down here that hasn’t 600 or 700 followers in the pecan industry. Y ou call it a strike; I call it a disturbance out of Washington, D. C. (Mennefee and Cassmore, p. 7.) In one press interview Kilday expressed the fear that— 66San Antonio Light, October 17, 1937. 67The Workers Alliance represented the most militant labor movement in San Antonio. Begun in 1934 by Emma Tennayucca, local Communist leader, it soon had a dues-paying mem bership of some 3,800. Under the leadership of the Alliance, sit-down strikes were staged at W P A headquarters and in the City Hall to enforce demands for relief and project work, and numerous demonstrations and parades were organized throughout the business area of the city. In July 1937, city police raided the Workers Alliance hall, destroyed records, and jailed several Alliance leaders. The influence won by Alliance leaders among Mexican unemployed and relief clients rapidly placed them in temporary control of the pecan sh elled strike early in 1938. (See San Antonio— The Cradle of Texas Liberty and Its Coffin, Texas Civil Liberties Union, Austin, 1938, p. 5.) <CH. XVI.---UNIONISM IN TEXAS AND OKLAHOMA 281 I f he [Henderson] organized these plants with the closed-shop provisions he insists upon, it would place about 18,000 workers under the domination o f the Communists * * * . These workers and their families total in excess o f 25,000 people, and would be forced into the local Communist Party before being permitted to work. (San Antonio Light, February 11, 1938.) Despite the powerful opposition, the number of strikers soon increased to about 6,000, or more than half of the total employed. M ore than 6,000 applied for membership in the union and about 3,000 of these paid dues during the strike, according to George Lambert, representative of the U .C .A .P .A .W .A . in San Antonio during 1938. The methods of resisting the strikers provoked widespread protest, and Governor Alldred finally ordered the Industrial Commission of Texas to investigate the situation. In addition to presenting data on living and working condi tions in the industry and on the marketing problems it faced, the final report of the commissioners expres