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Labor-Management Cooperation: Recent Efforts and Results R eadings fro m th e M o n th ly L a b o r R eview U.S. D e p a rtm e n t of L a b o r L a b o r-M a n a g e m e n t S e rvic e s A d m in is tra tio n and B u reau of L a b o r S ta tistics D e c e m b e r 1982 LM S A P u b lica tio n 6 BLS B ulletin 2 1 5 3 gpip a m The D iv is io n o f C o o p e ra tiv e LaborM a n a g e m e n t P ro g ra m s w a s c re a te d by th e D e p a rtm e n t o f L ab o r in 1982 to e n c o u ra g e a nd a s s is t e m p lo y e rs and u n io n s to u n d e rta k e jo in t e ffo rts to im p ro v e p ro d u c tiv ity and e n h a n c e th e q u a lity o f w o rk in g life . C e n tra l to th e D iv is io n ’s p u rp o s e is th e c o n v ic tio n th a t c o o p e ra tiv e re la tio n s b e tw e e n th e p a rtie s , p a rtic u la rly th o s e c re a tin g n ew o p p o rtu n itie s fo r w o rk e r p a rtic ip a tio n in d e c is io n m a k in g , c a n c o n trib u te s u b s ta n tia lly to th e fu rth e ra n c e of th e ir m u tu a l in te re s ts . In itia l a tte n tio n is b e in g d ire c te d to m e e tin g a lre a d y id e n tifie d n ee d s fo r te c h n ic a l a s s is ta n c e and in fo rm a tio n th ro u g h o u t th e p riv a te s e c to r. A c h ie f a im w ill be to w o rk c lo s e ly w ith tra d e a s s o c ia tio n s , in te rn a tio n a l u n io n s, a re a lab o rm a n a g e m e n t c o m m itte e s , and n atio n al, S ta te , a n d re g io n a l p ro d u c tiv ity / q u a lity of w o rk in g life c e n te rs . In a d d itio n , the D iv is io n w ill re g u la rly c o m p ile a nd d is s e m in a te in fo rm a tio n on c u rre n t is su e s and p ra c tic e s th ro u g h p u b li c a tio n s , c o n fe re n c e s , and w o rk s h o p s . This v o lu m e , p u b lis h e d jo in tly w ith the B u re a u o f L a b o r S ta tis tic s , is one in a s e rie s o f p la n n e d p u b lic a tio n s . F or fu rth e r in fo rm a tio n , c o n ta c t: C h ief, D iv is io n o f C o o p e ra tiv e L a b o r-M a n a g e m e n t P ro g ra m s L a b o r-M a n a g e m e n t S e rv ic e s A d m in is tra tio n U.S. D e p a rtm e n t o f L a b o r W a s h in g to n , D.C. 2 0 2 1 0 / Labor-Management Cooperation: Recant Efforts and Results < 3 / c 2 /5 ^ R eadings from the M onthly Labor Review U.S. D epartm ent of Labor Raym ond J. Donovan, S ecretary Labor-M anagem ent S ervices A d m in is tra tio n . D onald L. Dotson, A ssistant S ecretary Bureau of Labor Statistics Janet L. Norwood, C om m issioner D e cem ber 1982 LM SA Publication 6 BLS Bulletin 2153 p For sale by the Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Government P rinting Office W ashington, D.C. 20402— Price $6.00 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data M ain e n t r y u n d e r t i t l e : L a b o r-m an ag em en t c o o p e r a t i o n . ; 6) (BLS b u l l e t i n ; 2153) "D ecem ber 1 9 8 2 ," S u p t , o f D ocs, n o . : I 2 8 .1 5 6 : 1 . I n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s - —U n ite d S t a t e s ■ —A d d r e s s e s , e s s a y s , l e c t u r e s . 2. Q u a lity o f w ork l i f e — U n ite d S t a t e s — A d d r e s s e s , e s s a y s , le c tu re s . 3 . L ab o r-m an ag em en t c o m m itte e s — U n ite d S t a t e s — A d d r e s s e s , e s s a y s , l e c t u r e s . I n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s —A d d r e s s e s , e s s a y s , le c tu re s , 5* Q u a lity o f work l i f e —A d d re s s e s , e s s a y s , l e c t u r e s . I . U n ite d S t a t e s . Labor-M anagem ent S e r v ic e s A d m in is tr a tio n . I I . U n ite d S t a t e s . B u re a u o f L a b o r S t a t i s t i c s . I I I . M o n th ly l a b o r re v ie w . IV . S e r i e s . V. S e r i e s : B u l l e t i n ( U n ite d S t a t e s . B u re a u o f L a b o r S t a t i s t i c s ) ; 2153. HD80T2.5.L3 1982 3 3 1 0 1 '1 2 82-60037^ (LMSA p u b l i c a t i o n Foreword Although there is a long history of labor-management cooperation in American industrial relations, a new chapter was begun in the 1970’s. Labor and manage ment in several key industries set about to reexamine their traditional relationship and to discover anew their interdependence. As in World War II, cooperation developed in response to a national challenge. Unlike the past, however, the impetus came, not from a threat to the country’s security, but from a challenge to the resiliency and adaptability of its economic and social in stitutions. Once the leader in the world economy, the United States found itself in intense competition with other in dustrial nations. As U.S. industry’s share of world markets began to shrink, traditional approaches no longer could protect, let alone enhance, the U.S. com petitive position. Exceptional measures were called for, including the forging of new alliances between labor and management to spur the growth of productivity and preserve the economic health of their enterprises. Work ing within the context of collective bargaining, the par ties in such vital sectors as steel, autos, and communica tions devised cooperative arrangements to enlist more fully the talents and energies of both groups to improve the effectiveness of their organizations. A second and closely related development, most com monly referred to under the rubric “ quality of worklife,” also took form in the past decade. Managers and union leaders alike found themselves confronted by a labor force whose members expected and demanded more of their jobs and work lives. But today’s definition of the “ more” goes well beyond historical pressures for higher wages and better fringe benefits, or even safer and more healthful working conditions. Workers seek more opportunity to develop and apply their capabilities, more flexibility in the patterning of work and family life, and, perhaps above all, more say in how work is organized and managed. iii Although the voices heard have not always been in unison, the underlying theme has been unmistakable: there has been growing interest in recasting work and work organizations in ways that take account of the needs, abilities, interests, and aspirations of those who “ turn out the production.” Because these innovative ideas could lead to a labor force that is more satisfied, more committed, and more productive, the economic needs of the Nation and the personal needs of its work ing people have become inextricably intertwined. The Monthly Labor Review has closely followed developments in this new area of labor-management cooperation, both in the United States and abroad. The Review has published numerous articles by researchers and practitioners describing the kinds of problems employers and unions face and illustrating some of the cooperative strategies they have invented in seeking solutions. Twenty-eight of these articles are reprinted in this volume, along with pertinent extracts from impor tant contracts, statements, articles, and laws. The ex perience recorded in this volume should encourage and assist further innovation in this area of increasing na tional concern. This publication was planned and assembled by Edgar Weinberg, formerly economic adviser in the Of fice of the Assistant Secretary for Policy, with the assistance of Thomas H. Roadley and William L. Batt, Jr., of the Division of Cooperative Labor-Management Programs in the Labor-Management Services Ad ministration. The staff of the bls Office of Publications was responsible for editing and production. John R. Stepp , Director Office of Labor-Management Relations Services Labor-Management Services Administration Contents Page P A R T I. PROBLEMS OF THE W ORKPLACE.................................................................................. 1 American workers evaluate the quality of their jo b s........................................................................ Graham L. Staines and Robert P. Quinn 2 Worker dissatisfaction: a look at the c a u se s.................................................................................... George Strauss 12 Worker dissatisfaction: a look at the economic effects .................................................................. Peter Henle 14 Work, stress, and individual well-being............................................................................................ Robert L. Kahn 16 How American workers view labor unions .................................................................................... Thomas A . Kochan 19 PART II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LABOR-MANAGEMENT C O O PE R A T IO N ........ 29 Labor-management cooperation: a report on recent initiatives...................................................... Edgar Weinberg 30 Helping labor and management see and solve problems ................................................................ John R. Stepp, Robert P. Baker, and Jerome T. Barrett 40 How quality-of-worklife projects work for General M otors.......................................................... Stephen H. Fuller 46 How quality-of-worklife projects work for the United Auto W orkers.......................................... Irving Bluestone 49 The quality-of-worklife project at Bolivar: an assessment.............................................................. Barry A . Macy 51 Altering the social structure in coal mining: a case stu d y ................................................................ Ted Mills 54 Labor-management panels: three case studies.................................................................................. James W. Driscoll 62 Dynamics of establishing cooperative quality-of-worklife p ro je c ts.............................................. Edward E. Lawler III and John A. Drexler, Jr. 66 The process of work restructuring and its impact on collective bargaining.................................. Leonard A . Schlesinger and Richard E. Walton 72 v Contents—Continued Page PART I I —CONTINUED Flexible schedules: problems and issues............................................................................................ Janice Neipert Hedges 76 Drug company workers like new schedules...................................................................................... Robert T. Golembiewski and Richard J. Hilles 80 The problem of job obsolescence: working it out at River W orks.................................................. Robert Zager 84 Union-management committees in the Federal s e c to r.................................................................... James E. Martin 89 Labor-management panel seeks to help laid-off State w orkers...................................................... Todd Jick 92 The perceptions of participants in a joint productivity program .................................................... Anna C. G oldoff 95 Employee-owned companies: is the difference m easurable?.......................................................... Michael Conte and Arnold S. Tannenbaum 97 PART I I I . IMPROVING WORKLIFE ABROAD............................................................................ 103 Improving working life—the role of European unions.................................................................... 104 Joseph Mire White-collar unions and the work humanization m ovem ent.......................................................... 113 Everett M. Kassalow Workers’ morale in J a p a n ................................................................................................................. Joseph Mire 119 Worker participation in West German in d u stry .............................................................................. 124 David T. Fisher Industrial democracy in the N etherlands.......................................................................................... 129 Arthur S. Weinberg Six American workers assess job redesign at Saab-Scania.............................................................. 132 Arthur S. Weinberg U.S. longshoremen evaluate work conditions in R otterdam .......................................................... 134 Herbert A . Perry vi 'Part I. Problems of the Workplace Workplace problems and various efforts to measure their dimensions are the principal concerns of articles in this section. Graham L. Staines and Robert P. Quinn report on the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey, the third and last in a series conducted over an 8-year period by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center for the U.S. Department of Labor. A provocative finding is a decline in selected indicators of worker well being, including overall job satisfaction, desire to stay with present employer, and contentment with life in general. At the same time, work-related problems such as availability of fringe benefits and severity of ac cidents showed improvement. Two articles deal with worker dissatisfaction: George Strauss looks at causes and concludes that economic conditions are primary, but intrinsic factors such as jobs without challenge can not be ignored, even if less important. Peter Henle ex amines data on economic effects such as trends in quit rates, strikes, labor force participation, and absenteeism and finds little evidence of significant adverse change traceable to disaffection with work. Robert L. Kahn reviews research findings on the adverse physiological and behavioral effects of various stresses and points out that laboratory situations are suggestive of conditions imposed by many jobs. A list of guidelines is presented for designing less stressful jobs and organizations. Thomas A. Kochan analyzes data from the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey regarding the perceptions of union members about the performance of unions. While they expected their union to give the highest priority to internal administration and traditional bread and butter issues, a majority also wanted their unions to expand union activity to quality-of-worklife issues. American workers evaluate the quality of their jobs They called work-related problems less serious in 1977, but reported declines in overall jo b satisfaction, desire to stay with present employer, and contentment with life in general G raham L. Staines and R obert P. Q uinn These results confirm important connections between life on and off the job. Changes in employment patterns are inducing major shifts in family life, leisure, and other activities away from work. For example, the rise in the proportion of working wives has installed the dual-earner house hold as the modal family type. This shift from housewife to working wife has a multitude of potential implications for life off the job: fewer volunteers available for charity work, greater demand for after work and weekend shopping and business hours, steadily rising purchases of fast foods and easily prepared foods as well as the increasing tendency for families to eat out, and, finally, more socializing with people from work and less with other families in the neighborhood. Clearly, the investigation of the interplay between work and leisure-time activities has only begun. A new survey designed to measure the quality of employment in America shows that U.S. workers have experienced declines both in job satisfaction and in the desire to stay with their present employers. The survey, the third conducted by the Survey Research Center, provides an overview of conditions of employment in the United States in 1977, as reported by workers. Data are compared with results of surveys conducted in 1969 and 1973, thus providing trends over an 8-year period.1 (See appendix.) The 1977 survey, for the first time, asked questions about the relationships between worklife and certain domains of life away from the job, particularly the relationships between employment and family life and between employment and leisure activities. A third of the married workers reported that their jobs interfered with family life “somewhat” or “a lot.” Much of the conflict involved time—the amount of time spent at work, inconvenient work schedules, or uncertainty about work schedules. Available energy for family life was also a factor, especially for working wives with children. Most married workers (80 percent) reported spending at least half of their free time with their spouses. A third of all workers said their work interfered with leisure activities “somewhat” or “a lot.” Indicators off worker well-being Following are indicators of the well-being of workers that are known to be associated with employment conditions. Job satisfaction. In all three surveys, job satisfac tion was measured in two ways: first, with a set of general questions phrased so the worker could invoke any considerations of his or her choice; second, with a series of questions about specific aspects of the worker’s job and employment Graham L. Staines is study director and Robert P. Quinn is senior study director at the Survey Research Center, The University of Michigan. From the Review of January 1979 2 conditions (pay or hours, for example). Responses to the general questions were averaged to form a “general satisfaction” index. The specific responses were indexed by topic and statistical similarity, and were averaged to form a “specific satisfac tions” index. The topics included: com fort, chal lenge, financial rewards, relations with coworkers, resource adequacy, an d prom otions. The overall index com bines the “general satisfaction” and “specific satisfactions” indexes.2 (See table 1.) There was no change in overall jo b satisfaction between 1969 and 1973; in contrast, there was an appreciable drop betw een 1973 and 1977. The full story on jo b satisfaction, however, requires sepa rate consideration o f the various com ponents o f the overall jo b satisfaction index and also o f the various dem ographic subgroups o f workers. Over the 8-year period from 1969 to 1977, particularly between 1973 and 1977, the specific satisfactions index exhibited a m arked and significant decline, whereas the general satisfaction index declined slightly but significantly. The decrease was about equally distributed am ong five areas—com fort, challenge, financial rew ards, resource adequacy, and prom otions—b u t was absent for the sixth, relations with coworkers. Analysis o f the decline in the general satisfaction index requires a review o f analogous d ata from other years and other surveys. A 1974 report concluded that there was no evidence o f significant changes in jo b satisfaction over the 15-year period, 1958-73.3 This conclusion was based on d ata from 15 com parable national surveys, conducted by four different agencies. All surveys included a sim ilar question which asked, “How satisfied would you say you are w ith your jo b ? ” This question was asked in the three surveys discussed in this article. Job satisfaction, as m easured by this question, did not decline significantly betw een 1969 and 1977. T a b te H. This finding indicates the lim itations o f a singlequestion m easure o f jo b satisfaction. Despite the considerable face validity o f this general jo b satisfaction question, it fails to show m uch change over periods w hen other m ore elaborate m easures detect a substantial decline in satisfaction. This insensitivity to change m ay be attributable, in part, to the gross generality o f the question (because such m easures reveal less decline than their m ore specifically stated counterparts) and, in part, to its distinctive w ording (because other general ques tions do show the decrem ent in jo b satisfaction over time). In contrast, the indicators shown in table 1 have a high degree o f consistency in their representation o f change. T he decline in jo b satisfaction has been perva sive, affecting virtually all dem ographic a n d occupational classes tested. (See table 2.) Still, there are some differences a n d similarities w orth noting. M en, for example, reported greater de clines in satisfaction betw een 1969 an d 1977 than did women. Satisfaction o f workers under age 21 was unchanged, whereas that o f older workers changed. The decline was virtually identical for white an d black workers, although black workers continued to rem ain less satisfied than did whites. Satisfaction dropped in all educational achieve m ent categories, but the drop was larger am ong workers w ith a college degree. The self-employed had a relatively slight decrem ent in satisfaction, com pared with wage and salary employees. W ork ers in the higher skilled occupations (professional, technical, an d m anagerial jobs) exhibited a smaller decline than did those in lower skilled occupations (operatives and laborers). Intention to change jobs. In each survey, wage and salary workers were asked: “Taking everything into account, how likely is it that you will m ake a genuine effort to find a new jo b with another em ployer w ithin the next year?” The answers reveal a slight shift tow ards greater willingness to seek a different employer. In 1969, 70 percent of wage and salary workers said th at it was “not a t all likely” that they w ould try to find a new jo b ; in 1973, the figure was 72 percent; but by 1977, it h ad fallen significantly to 66 percent. Therefore, as a behavior-oriented indicator o f increasing worker discontent, willingness to change employers dis closes a shift betw een 1973 a n d 1977 that is not incom patible with the decline in jo b satisfaction suggested by other m easures. The m agnitude o f the shift is not great, bu t it should be rem em bered that betw een 1973 an d 1977 the availability o f alterna tive em ploym ent declined significantly, an d jo b change becam e an increasingly im practical m edi um for expressing discontent. ©atfistesfciT) SiradllesiSsr©, 1 S i i, 1©?3, arsd 11877 [M ean overall job satisfaction in 1 9 6 9 = 0 ] to n 5r$5££$8? Overall job satisfaction index1 ............................. General satisfaction values ............................. Specific satisfactions values .......................... C o m fo rt........................ .................................... Challenge ........................ ............................... Financial rewards ........................ ................. Relations with cow orkers............................. Resource adequacy ..................................... Promotions ....................................................... 188® 1873 1977 0 3.75 3.24 3.14 3.26 3.08 3.41 3.45 -2 3.79 3.20 ’ 3.03 3.21 3.10 3.34 3.44 2.63 ’3.66 ’3.05 ’2.87 ’3.08 ’ 2.89 ’3.40 ’3.28 ’ 2.46 ... 2.24 'The overall job satisfaction index is an equally weighted combination of the general and specific satisfaction values, transformed arbitrarily to a mean of zero in 1969. ’Statistically significant changes from 1973 to 1977 and, in the case of comfort, from 1969 to 1973. ’The derivation of the relations with coworkers index is somewhat different for 1977 than for the prior years, and its comparability has not yet been ascertained. However, versions of this index were constructed for comparing 1969 and 1973 and for comparing 1973 and 1977. Neither difference was statistically significant. 3 with the response “very happy” declining from 38 p ercen t in 1973 to 27 percent in 1977 a n d “com pletely satisfying” from 23 percent to 15 percent. T he d a ta on the second com ponent (specific m oods an d affects) are available only for 1973 and 1977; they evidence an unm istakable and significant decline betw een these 2 years, w ith responses in the m ost positive category dropping by an average o f 8 percentage points. Tabs® 2. Overall Job saffefeefflta index by demographic and ®Q©MpafiB®5iiaB grcmp®, 1@i®8 1973, and 1 i77' 1169 Characteristic* Sex: Men ............ Women, sole wage earners Women with other wage earners in household Age: Under 21 . 21-29 . . . 30-44 . . . . 45-54 . . . 55-64 . . 65 or o ld e r___ Race: White . . Black . . . Education: 8 years or less Some high school . High school diploma Some college College degree .............. Graduate education . Employment status: Self-em ployed.............. Wage and salary Occupation: Professional and technical Managers, administrators, and proprietors . . . . Salesworkers . . Clerical workers Craftworkers Operatives . . Laborers, nonfarm ........... Farmers and farm managers Farm laborers and supervisors . . . Service workers N u tte r of 1973 1977 dent* te n fob satisfa c ta 993 176 7 -16 1,291 182 0 -1 1,359 235 -26 -21 362 -8 616 -5 691 -21 97 333 489 340 210 55 -40 -21 5 12 19 23 173 568 634 422 248 41 -42 -26 11 11 17 63 203 594 759 389 271 45 -41 -49 -20 -4 -2 11 1,354 157 5 -34 1,853 166 3 -32 2,019 167 -21 -59 240 269 554 253 111 102 0 -7 -1 -2 14 23 234 294 805 436 162 153 -1 -10 -6 -8 18 35 173 315 863 515 193 201 -17 -39 -26 -24 -28 2 205 1,326 25 -3 184 1,270 39 -7 287 1,998 15 -30 225 20 311 26 365 0 208 80 244 224 294 45 43 22 146 27 4 -6 9 -11 -25 28 -55 -35 315 105 344 277 361 73 44 8 241 18 10 -10 7 -38 -36 31 1 -6 317 112 370 309 389 79 41 11 292 -6 -3 -19 -14 -67 -58 18 0 -27 Number Keen of lab respon s a f e dents2 t e c t a Numbsr of te n |ob respon- OSfiEdwrte2 te e ta W ork-related problems All workers were asked about aspects o f their em ploym ent they considered to be problem s; those who m entioned a specific problem were asked to judge its severity. Table 3 shows the percent reporting one problem or m ore in each o f 12 problem areas com m only m entioned. Problem severity is represented by the proportion reporting the problem as “ sizable” or “great.” F rom 1969 to 1977, problem frequency varied by direction an d degree o f change, bu t problem severity declined consistently by small am ounts. In ad eq u ate fam ily incom e as a problem was m entioned significantly less frequently in 1973 an d 1977 than in 1969 (although no change since 1973); however, in 1977, it m aintained the highest rated severity. Problem s relatin g to the desire for additional fringe benefits were frequently m en tioned and were rated relatively high in severity. T he pro p o rtio n reporting problem s related to occupational, handicaps rem ained constant over the 8-year period, b u t the severity o f such p ro b lems in 1977 rem ained nonsignificantly below that reported in 1969. The results on trends in the desire for additional fringe benefits and trends in safety and health were anom alous because o f survey m ethod changes in 1977. T he frequency o f w ork-related problem s can be considered in m ore detail if account is taken o f certain data th at are available for 1977 b u t not necessarily from the prior surveys. (See table 4.) T he problem s related to earnings, incom e, an d fringe benefits generally h a d higher rates o f occurrence than other problem areas. The relative ly frequent m ention o f problem s concerning work content, specifically w orkers reporting they h ad skills they w ould like to use but could not and those “overeducated” for their jo b s suggests a prevalent concern about misfit betw een jo b re quirem ents an d self-appraised capabilities. U n steady em ploym ent an d layoff or jo b loss were relatively uncom m on problem s, although only em ployed people were interviewed. In four areas for which such questions were asked, lack o f control over conditions very often was seen as a problem , n o t the co n d itio n s them selves. F o r example, lack o f control over days worked (77 'The overall job satisfaction index is an equally weighted combination of the general satisfaction and the specific satisfactions values transformed to a mean of zero and standard deviation of 87 in 1969. Negative figures indicate deviations below the 1969 mean. Because significance indicators are not provided, the reader should note that some subpopulations are very small and have unstable means. !Number of respondents in 1973 and 1977 was weighted to provide comparability with 1969 data. Life satisfaction. The index o f overall life satisfac tion contains two equally weighted com ponents. The first, general life satisfaction, is m easured by two questions: (1) “T aking all things together, how would you say things are these days? W ould you say you’re very happy, pretty happy, or no t too happy these days?” an d (2) “ In general, how satisfying do you find the ways you’re spending your life these days? W ould you call it com pletely satisfying, pretty satisfying, or not very satisfying?” In the second com ponent, satisfaction is assessed through eight scales representing specific m oods or affective states th at can characterize a person’s life (for example, interesting versus boring, full versus em pty, and hopeful versus discouraging). Life satisfaction declined betw een 1969 and 1977, although the change occurred betw een 1973 and 1977. The data from the first com ponent (general life satisfaction) display this p attern significantly, 4 percent to 67 percent, and medical contingency insurance rose from 72 percent to 78 percent. The gain was especially noticeable for two benefits offered to women only—maternity leave with full reemployment rights, and maternity leave with pay. The proportion receiving these benefits increased a significant 15 percentage points be tween 1969 and 1977. These findings regarding economic benefits available to wage and salary workers reveal two different trends between 1969 and 1977. There was Tafel© 3. Frequency asud s@y®rlfiy of selected work-related probSems, 19S9, 1973, and 1977 Problem Inadequacy of family income for meeting monthly expenses .................. Percent reposting p r o to n Percent re p u tin g the p r o to n as “e to b ts ” or “great” 1989 1973 1977 1969 1973 1977 26 21 21 63 55 57 Desire for additional fringe benefits, all workers........................................ Wage and salary workers receiving at least one benefit2 .................................. 39 40 '46 43 39 '40 45 45 '55 43 39 '40 Exposure to one or more safety and health hazards............................. 38 42 ' 78 46 40 '32 Work-related illness or injury during last 3 years ........................................ 13 14 15 56 48 44 Occupational h an d ic a p ^ )............................... 9 9 10 39 30 29 Inconvenient or excessive h o u rs.................. 30 39 34 38 34 36 Age discrimination ............................................ 5 4 6 >35 >35 >34 Sex discrimination, all workers .................... Women only2 ................................................. 3 8 5 14 5 12 >44 >44 >37 >37 >33 >33 Race or national origin discrimination, all workers............................. Blacks only2..................................................... 3 17 3 15 6 16 >53 >62 >52 >68 >51 >37 Unsteady employment...................................... 11 9 9 36 26 27 Transportation problem s................................. 35 40 34 40 37 33 Unpleasant work environment......................... 33 40 37 38 36 37 Table 4. Frequency ©! work-related pf©fel©m@ fin 1§7? Probtan Earnings, income, and fringe benefits: Desire for improvement of present fringe benefits (including wage and salary workers receiving at least one benefit) ............................. Desire for additional fringe benefits (includes wage and salaried workers receiving at least one benefit) ............................. Earns less than deserved compared to others doing similar work ............ Inadequacy of family income for meeting monthly expenses ............................. Safety and health hazards: Exposed to one or more safety and health h a z a rd ........................................ Not informed about dangerous or unhealthy conditions (includes wage and salary workers only) ............................................................. Work-reiated illness or injury during last 3 years ............................................................... Occupational h a n d icap ^ ).......................................... Work schedule: Difficult to get work days changed ...................... Difficult to get work hours changed .................... Inconvenient or excessive ho u rs............................. Difficult to take time off for personal matters ........................................................................ Hours do not suit ....................................................... Employer determines overtime and worker cannot refuse (includes wags and salary workers who work some overtime) .................... Days do not suit ......................................................... Work content: Difficult to get duties changed ............................... Feeling that time drags at w o r k ............................. Skills underutilized in present j o b ........................... "Overeducated” for j o b ............................................ Conscience violated by required job d u tie s ___ Substandard quality of product or service provided ............................................................... .. Low value of present job skills 5 years hence ........................................................... Job mobility and security: Shortage of jobs in worker's line of work (including only those not reporting a shortage of workers with their s k ills )................................... Stake in present job too great to change jobs .............................................................................. Difficult to find another job with similar pay ......................................................... Likely to lose job in next year ............................... Unsteady employment................................................ Laid off in last year ................................................... Other problems: Inadk?uat6 time for leisure a c M is s .................... Transportation problem s............................................ Unpleasant work environment ................................. Interference between work and family/ life (includes only workers with spouse or children 17 years or younger in household) ................................................................. Interference between work and leisure ................ Child care cost problems (includes only workers who used a child care arrangement . Problems with work schedules caused by child care arrangements (includes only workers who used a child care arrangem ent)..................................................... 'The 1969 and 1973 data are not comparable to those from 1977. 'The percentage Is based on all workers in this subsample. !N < 100 in 1969 or weighted N < 1 4 0 in 1973 or 1977. percent) was a problem more frequently than was working on days that did not suit the worker (12 percent), and lack of control over own job assignment (54 percent) was a more frequent problem than not being able to use one’s skills in present job assignment (36 percent). Also, 42 percent said it would be difficult to find a job similar to the one they have, but only 15 percent said they were likely to lose their job in the next year. Earnings, income, and fringe benefits. The three surveys reveal only limited changes in levels and adequacy of income. Adjusted for inflation, levels of family income increased somewhat between 1969 and 1973 and then decreased between 1973 and 1977. Similarly adjusted figures for job earnings showed little change between 1969 and 1973, but declined between 1973 and 1977. As judged by workers, inadequacy of family income for meeting monthly expenses declined sig nificantly between 1969 and 1973, with no change thereafter. Inadequacy of family income for living comfortably remained virtually constant over the 8-year span. Between 1969 and 1977, there was a modest but significant gain in the proportion of wage and salary workers reporting the availability of various fringe benefits. For example, between 1969 and 1977 the proportion with paid vacations rose from 74 percent to 81 percent, those with a retirement program other than social security rose from 61 Number el ro sp m to ife' Percent reporting p r o to n 1,829 58.1 1,943 54.5 2,199 39.0 2,261 20.8 2,289 78.0 1,947 15.7 2,289 2,291 15.6 10.0 2,284 2,251 2,258 76.6 71.5 33.6 2,251 2,287 26.0 19.3 1,508 2,261 15.9 12.0 2,274 2,290 2,290 2,236 2,215 54.0 39.6 35.6 32.2 28.2 2,179 12.8 2,288 11.8 1,405 54.1 2,241 47.8 2,254 2,219 2,276 2,288 41.9 14.6 9.4 5.1 2,259 2,284 1,686 55.2 37.7 37.1 1,622 2,258 34.7 32.8 215 20.0 276 14.5 'Number of respondents weighted to provide comparability with earlier surveys. (See appendix.) 5 3 years, they had experienced any illnesses or injuries that they thought had been caused or made more severe by any job held during that period. The frequency of such reported illnesses or injuries changed little from 1969 to 1977; nonethe less, workers in 1977 rated such illnesses or injuries as somewhat less severe and were less likely to report missing more than 2 weeks of work as a consequence. Although a casual examination of the data seems to indicate dramatic changes in the frequen cy of various safety and health hazards, these changes, in part, represent only a change in measurement methods. In both 1969 and 1973, workers were asked an open-end question about safety and health hazards: “Does your job at any time expose you to what you feel are physical dangers or unhealthy conditions?” The 1977 survey, however, asked the worker to report exposure to each of 13 specific hazards (plus a residual category for any other hazards). The open-end and close-end procedures produce sub stantially different estimates of the prevalence of safety hazards, with the close-end approach sug gesting a much higher rate of occurrence. The 1977 survey collected specific information on frequency and severity of 13 presumably hazardous conditions on the job. The four hazards most frequently reported were air pollution (cited by 40 percent of the workers), fire or shock (30 percent), noise (30 percent)', and dangerous chemi cals (29 percent). However, these hazards are not all regarded as particularly severe by the workers exposed to them. Noise was among the highest ranked hazards (40 percent of the workers exposed described it as a “sizable” or “great” problem), and air pollution ranked in the middle (32 percent); fire or shock and dangerous chemicals were regarded as less severe (21 percent and 18 percent, respectively). The 1977 survey also generated an additional finding that underscores the salience to workers of issues involving safety and health. The 1977 interview schedule included questions concerning how much say workers should have about workrelated decisions, such as safety equipment and practices, how the work is done, the wages and salaries paid, the particular days and hours of work, and hiring or layoffs. The respondents singled out safety equipment and practices as the area in which workers should have the greatest say. In fact, 76 percent of respondents believed that workers should have “complete say” or “a lot of say” regarding safety decisions. No other category of decision produced a figure over 41 percent. no gain over time in direct monetary returns, but fairly steady gains in fringe benefits. Such findings indicate that workers may have been exchanging additional pay for more fringe benefits. The 1977 interview schedule included a question about the tradeoff between pay and other job returns. Workers were asked whether they would prefer a 10-percent pay raise or some other improvement in their conditions of employment (such as more interesting work, more comfortable working conditions, better fringe benefits, a shorter workweek, or greater job security). About one-half of the respondents indicated they favored more fringe benefits over additional earnings. Wage and salary workers were frequently willing to trade increments in pay for three economic benefits: better retirement benefits (54 percent preferred an improvement in such benefits over a pay increase), more paid vacation days (48 percent), and better medical insurance benefits (47 percent). It is likely that increases in the total economic package over the last 8 years have been in the form of more fringe benefits rather than additional earnings. The 1977 survey permits a detailed examination of how workers evaluate 18 fringe benefits. Table 5 presents five items of information on each benefit: the percent of workers to whom it is available, the percent receiving the benefit who describe it as most important, the percent who describe it as least important, and the percent saying they would like to see the benefit improved. The fifth item concerns fringe benefits that workers do not receive but would like to; for each such benefit, the column records the percent of all mentions (not of all persons) that refer to this benefit. The data reveal considerable concern by work ers over their current fringe benefits. More than half of the workers wanted improvement in some of their fringe benefits. Of these, large percentages desired improvements in widely available benefits: 51 percent in the case of medical contingency insurance, 42 percent for retirement programs, and 28 percent for paid vacation. More than a third of those with dental benefits wished them to be improved, and 22 percent of all mentions of desired additional benefits referred to a dental program. Additional data indicate that workers expressed less satisfaction with fringe benefits than with numerous other features of their conditions of employment. Also, fringe benefits were the only workplace improvements, among several suggest ed, for which large numbers of workers were willing to sacrifice a pay increase. Prevalence o f safety and health hazards. In all three surveys, workers were asked if, within the previous 6 Talbi® i. Wag© arsdl salary wasters’ ©vatafifoira off fftrllirag® lb@ro©ffilt® AwaSlEfellHy Gf benefit Benefit Kisst im p c r M benefits Number S ta te r2 Least InipssfenS te n s S o Percent S ta te r2 Percent Want benefits tap jB K d Munster2 Percent Went to resstaa benefit' PereenS Paid vacation ............................. 1,956 80.8 1,550 47.0 1,534 6.6 899 28.1 3.1 Medical, surgical, or hospital insurance that covers any illness or injury that might occur to you while off the job . . 1,962 78.1 1,506 83.9 1,504 2.3 921 51.4 9.7 Maternity leave with full re employment rights3 A retirement program 707 74.5 513 12.7 509 33.4 266 3.8 ‘ 1.7 1,949 67.4 1,288 50.3 1,286 7.9 764 42.3 8.1 Life insurance that would cover a death occuring for reasons not connected with your job .................... 1,942 64.1 1,218 41.2 1,220 9.4 730 14.1 4.3 Sick leave with full pay 1,940 62.8 1,193 59.1 1,190 5.1 665 18.6 7.9 A training program that you can take to improve your skills .............. 1,963 49.0 941 18.3 936 13.8 526 10.3 2.0 Thrift or savings plan ............................. 1,913 39.8 757 13.1 761 19.1 450 3.6 1.5 Free or discounted merchandise 1,992 34.3 669 10.5 660 33.3 382 5.8 0.0 Dental benefits.......................................... 1,934 29.4 569 35.5 568 12.1 353 36.3 22.3 691 29.4 197 10.7 197 47.2 78 6.4 (4) Eyeglass or eye care benefits 1,911 21.8 416 25.5 415 21.0 264 15.9 12.2 3.9 Maternity leave with pay3 Profit s h a rin g .................... 1,939 19.8 378 33.1 377 13.3 220 16.8 Stock o p tio n s ............................... 1,912 17.6 333 16.2 332 27.4 181 4.4 1.8 Work clothing allowance . 1,889 16.8 330 18.5 322 33.2 169 15.4 3.4 .. Free or discounted meals ........................................ 1,982 16.3 313 14.7 308 40.3 157 9.6 1.6 Legal aid service . . . 1,885 10.3 193 13.5 191 18.3 104 6.7 2.0, Child care arrangements for working parents.................... 1,943 2.2 42 9.5 42 38.1 18 0.0 1.6 'The base number for this column (N = 2278) is the (total) number of benefits mentioned by all workers in response to the question: "Are there any fringe benefits you are not getting that you'd like to be getting?” Percentages add to less than 100 percent because some benefits mentioned by workers do not appear on this list. D ecision Safety equipment and practices __ How work is done .......................... Wages and salaries .......................... Days and hours of work ................ Hiring or layoffs .......... .................. 1 Includes only workers who report the benefit as available and, in the case of desired improvement of fringe benefits, only those who want at least one benefit improved, !Only women were asked about this benefit, ‘The category for this item is nonspecific maternity leave. P ercent responding “com plete s a y ” or “lot o f s a y ” A nother im portant dim ension o f working hours concerns the extent to which workers have control over their work schedules. In all three surveys, workers were asked how m uch control they felt they h a d over w hether or n o t they w orked overtime. Between 1969 an d 1977, there was a sm all b u t significant increase in the percent reporting control o f their overtim e hours. M ore workers in the third survey were in the top two categories o f overtim e control (m ostly up to the worker, and b oth w orker an d em ployer have a say bu t worker can refuse w ithout penalty), up sig nificantly from 36 percent in 1969 to 52 percent in 1977. The pro p o rtio n reporting that it was up to their em ployers a n d th at they could not refuse overtim e w ithout penalty rem ained constant be tween 1969 an d 1977 at about 16 percent. The percent reporting some kind o f problem concerning “ . . . the hours you work, your work schedule, or overtim e” rose slightly betw een 1969 and 1977 (nonsignificantly from 30 to 34 percent), but the nature o f these problem s changed. O f the total num ber o f problem s m entioned, inadequate control by workers over hours (excluding the issue o f overtime) rose from 4 percent o f the problem s in 1969 to 16 percent in 1977. Such evidence points to 76 41 30 19 16 Working hours. The 40-hour week persisted as the prevalent workweek. However, the surveys reveal a distinct and significant decline betw een 1969 an d 1977 in the proportion working exactly 40 hours per week on their m ain jo b (from 39 to 30 percent) an d an increase in the proportion w orking m ore than 40 hours (from 39 to 42 percent) or less than 40 hours (from 22 to 28 percent). U sing a b ro ad er range o f hours, for example, 35 to 44 hours as a “norm al” workweek, there is still a significant decline in the proportion working such a “norm al” workweek (from 57 to 51 percent). These changes do not reflect sex differences in w ork-hour prefer ences or in labor force com position. T he same pattern o f changes applied to both m en an d w om en—declines in the p ro p o rtio n s w orking exactly 40 hours per week with com pensating changes o f sim ilar m agnitude and directions. 7 valuable will your present job skills be 5 years from now?” In 1973, 68 percent reported their skills would be “very useful and valuable;” the propor tion dropped to 62 percent in 1977. The decline relating to use of available skills on the worker’s present job was even more substan tial. In 1969, 27 percent of those interviewed claimed that they had some skills from their experience and training that they would like to use but could not on their present jobs. By 1977, this measure of underutilization of skills had risen significantly to 36 percent, with all of the change occurring between 1973 and 1977. One plausible source of underutilization of skills is “overeduca tion.” Workers who feel that their levels of formal education exceed those required by their jobs seem likely to possess skills that cannot be used on their present jobs. “Overeducation” (or underutilization of education) might, thus, be expected to increase in tandem with underutilization of skills. This prediction, however, is not confirmed by the 1969 and 1977 data. Data from these 2 years show no increase whatsoever in the proportion of workers with more education than their jobs required. Consequently, the increase in perceived underutili zation of skills may have originated outside of formal education. Such findings should not be taken to mean that workers felt that their jobs made few demands on their skills. Some of the 1977 data indicate that most workers reported that their jobs utilized a fair measure of their skills. For example, 69 percent of all workers “strongly agree” or “agree” that their jobs required “a high level of skill” and 78 percent said they were using their “skills and abilities.” Moreover, most workers reported that their jobs helped them acquire new skills. Thus, 62 percent of all workers “strongly agree” or “agree” that their jobs required them to be “creative” and 83 percent said their jobs required them to “keep learning new things.” Nevertheless, the trend data on skill utilization do suggest that these percentages may be on the decline. a sizable constituency of workers who would be receptive to flexitime and other experiments in which workers could help determine their own work schedules. Beyond the issue of trends, the 1977 data indicate that workers took off very little time for personal activities during a regular workday. Among full-time workers, 60 percent spent no more than 30 minutes a day on meal breaks. Nor did workers take off much time during an average workday on regular coffee breaks or scheduled rest breaks. Almost 40 percent of the full-time workers received no such time off, and more than 70 percent received less than half an hour. Workers also were asked how much additional time they spent on activities such as talking to friends, doing personal business, or just relaxing. Among full time workers, 45 percent reported no time off at all, and two-thirds reported less than half an hour. By comparison, among part-time workers (those who worked 20 to 34 hours a week) the use of time during an average workday for personal activities was even more restricted: almost a third of all parttime workers (compared with 8 percent of all full time workers) reported no time off for meal breaks; and almost half (compared with 39 percent of all full-time workers) reported no time off for coffee or rest breaks. By their own accounts, parttime workers spent virtually all of their time at work on the tasks for which they are paid. Discrimination. The data on different types of job discrimination are as interesting for the trends they do not show as for those they do. All workers in the three surveys were asked whether they felt discriminated against on their jobs because of age. There was no significant change in overall age discrimination. Young workers reported nonsignificantl decreases during the period (from 24 to 15 percent for those under age 21). Workers age 55 and over reported no change in age discrimination between 1969 and 1973 but reported a significant increase between 1973 and 1977 (from 4 to 10 percent). The proportion of women reporting sex discrimination at work increased significantly from 8 to 14 percent between 1969 and 1973, but in 1977, the figure dropped to 12 percent. Among black workers, reports of job discrimination based on race or national origin held relatively constant at 15 to 17 percent between 1969 and 1977. Job mobility and security. The 1977 survey investi gated job security in greater detail than did the earlier surveys. In 1977, job insecurity appeared among the less frequent and less serious problems. Nine percent of all workers reported their employ ment as irregular or unsteady; and among those, 27 percent described the problem as “sizable” or “great.” Five percent had experienced a layoff in the preceding year, and among those, 31 percent characterized the problem as “sizable” or “great.” Moreover, 15 percent reported that they were Utilization o f skills. Evidence from the surveys suggests a decline in the extent to which jobs provide the opportunity for full use of skills. This decline applies to future as well as current opportunities. With respect to the future, the interviewed workers were asked, “How useful and 8 unions’ handling of nontraditional issues such as helping to make jobs more interesting, getting workers a say in how their employers run the business or organizations, and getting workers a say in how they do their own jobs. However, members also expressed the view that their unions should put greater effort into the traditional than into the less traditional union functions. Overall, union members expressed satisfaction with their unions—77 percent of the white-collar workers and 71 percent of the blue-collar workers reported that they were “somewhat” or “very” satisfied. Workers not belonging to a union nor covered by a union contract were asked how they would vote if there were an election for representation by a union or an employee association; 29 percent of the white-collar workers and 39 percent of the blue-collar workers reported that they would vote in favor of such representation. likely to lose their present jobs during the next couple of years. The 1977 survey included two measures of locking-in that appeared also in at least one of the earlier surveys. (Locking-in is the extent to which workers feel constrained in seeking alternative employment.) In all three surveys, wage and salary workers were asked: “About how easy would it be for you to find another job with another employer with approximately the same income and fringe benefits you now have?” In 1969, 40 percent thought it would be very easy to find a similar job. In 1973, the proportion dropped significantly to 27 percent, and by 1977, had dropped significantly again to 20 percent. In 1973 and 1977, workers were asked: “Is there a shortage of workers in this (geographical) area who have your experience, training, and skills?” Almost half (48 percent) perceived a shortage in 1973, but only 37 percent did so in 1977. Also, in 1977, of those not reporting a worker shortage, 54 percent reported a shortage of available jobs for people with their experience, training, and skills. These data demonstrate that between 1969 and 1977 workers became increas ingly locked-in to their jobs, a change that undoubtedly reflects the economic climate and unemployment rates. Some interpretations of trends The survey results show that American workers experienced declines between 1969 and 1977 in job satisfaction, intentions to stay on with their present jobs and employers, and overall life satisfaction. The changes were greater during the 1973-77 period than during the 1969-73 period. There are three possible explanations for the declining job satisfaction: (1) perhaps the composi tion of the labor force is changing in ways that give added weight to those segments that are character istically low in job satisfaction; (2) perhaps the objective qualities of jobs and conditions of employment are deteriorating; or (3) perhaps workers are raising their expectations regarding their jobs. The segments of the labor force that are increasing include women with other wage earners in the household, workers with educational attain ments beyond high school, workers who live in the South, workers who are not members of unions, workers under age 30, and workers in service occupations. If these also are demographic classes with characteristically low job satisfaction, the composition argument has some support, but that is not clearly the case. The first four groups characteristically have job satisfaction levels at or above the national means. The last two groups are characteristically below the national means in job satisfaction measures, but the period of their greatest increase in numbers in our surveys, 1969 to 1973, does not match the period of greatest decline in job satisfaction, 1973 to 1977. Further, table 5 shows that the decline in job satisfaction involved virtually all groups. Attitudes toward labor unions Trend data on union issues a’re not available because the questions asked in 1977 differed from those in the previous surveys. Workers in the 1977 sample expressed fairly positive attitudes toward labor unions. On the subject of union goals, workers were asked what things they thought unions in this country were trying to do. Among union members, 66 percent mentioned only posi tive things (such as improving wages or benefits, improving job security) and 15 percent mentioned only negative things (such as self-aggrandizement). Among the nonmembers, the corresponding pro portions were 45 percent and 28 percent. Union members gave their unions higher marks for handling traditional functions than for less traditional functions. A majority reported that their unions did a “somewhat” or “very” good job in securing better working conditions, such as better wages (76 percent for white-collar workers, 75 percent for blue-collar workers), better fringe benefits (69 percent and 71 percent), improved safety and health on the job (74 and 71 percent), and improved job security (76 and 74 percent). Members also rated their unions high on handling grievances and on other indicators of responsive ness. Members were less positive about their 9 nately, the survey interviews included few meas ures o f w orkers’ expectations, so this argum ent cannot be sufficiently tested. N onetheless, d a ta on three indicators o f the discrepancy betw een w ork ers’ expectations an d the realities o f their w ork experiences (nam ely, level o f educational a tta in m ent, degree to which w orker is “overeducated” for present jo b , and underutilization o f skills) give essentially negative results. N either o f the m eas ures involving education exhibits the expected p a tte rn o f stability betw een 1969 and 1973, followed by an increase in unm et expectations betw een 1973 an d 1977. The m easure o f underutili zation does m eet this first test, yet fails when used as a control variable: the decline in jo b satisfaction betw een 1973 an d 1977 persists even w ithin levels o f underutilization. T he rising expectations argu m ent m ay gain greater em pirical support in the future, when tested using m ore a n d ' better m eas ures. In any case, the search for single, simple, an d universally relevant explanations for changes in jo b satisfaction, a n d other m easures o f w orker well-being is likely to be fruitless. The explanatory factors m ay be complex, an d m ay well be quite different for the various subpopulations that m ake up the A m erican labor force. Given the lim ited available m easures, the argu m ent relating to objective deterioration o f jo b s and em ploym ent conditions gains little support from the data. Such changes in objective factors that did occur betw een 1969 and 1977 were not great, and in any case, indicate m ore gains than losses in the objective qualities o f jo b s an d em ploym ent conditions: increased availability o f fringe benefits; dim inished severity of w ork-related illnesses and injuries; m ore control by the worker over overtim e hours. Between 1973 and 1977, the slight decline in earnings m ay have contributed to the-decrease in satisfaction” with financial rew ards over that period, b u t it does not address the .decrement in satisfaction w ith other dom ains. M oreover, over the same period, the slight decline in family incom e was no t m atched by a corre sponding decline in the adequacy o f fam ily income. The decrease in availability o f alternative em ploym ent opportunities, or locking-in, could have accounted for som e reduction in jo b satisfac tion, but did not; locking-in increased considera bly m ore betw een 1969 a n d 1973 than betw een 1973 and 1977. There rem ains, by the process o f elim ination, the argum ent concerning rising expectations. U n fo rtu -FOOTNOTES1 Data from the 1969 and 1973 surveys appear in Neal Q. Herrick and Robert P. Quinn, “The working conditions survey as a source of social indicators,” Monthly Labor Review, April 1971, pp. 15-24, and Robert P. Quinn, Thomas W. Mangione, Martha S. Baldi de Mandilovitch, “Evaluating worldng conditions in America,” Monthly 2 The theoretical and empirical bases for development o f the measures o f job satisfaction, along with their statistical significance appear in Robert P. Quinn and Linda I. Shepard, The 1972-73 Quality o f Employment Survey (Ann Arbor, Mich., Survey Research Center, 1974), pp. 50-69. 3 Job Satisfaction: Is There a Trend? Manpower Research Monograph 30 (U.S. Department o f Labor, 1974). Labor Review, November 1973, pp. 32-40. APPENDIX^ Hire© surveys on work m America of work-related problems, with special emphasis on those that were or might become matters of public policy; (2) to indicate which major demographic or occupational groups were most affected by these problems; (3) to develop efficient measures of job satisfaction suitable for use with samples of workers in heterogeneous occupations under a variety of condi tions of census and research; (4) to assess the associa tions between working conditions and various indica tors of workers’ well-being; (5) to establish base line statistics that might permit subsequent national surveys to reveal any trends in the content areas originally investigated; and (6) to establish normative statistics that might permit other investigators to compare their data from more limited subsamples of workers with national norms. The second survey, the 1973 Quality of Employment Survey, was conducted in early 1973 using a national household sample of 1,455 employed persons. The 1973 survey retained the core content and purposes of the preceding one, but differed in three aspects: first, In 1968-69, the U.S. Department of Labor and the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan instituted a program to assess some of the conditions of employment experienced by American workers. It was hoped that data based' on personal interviews with representative workers would aid policymakers in evaluating the needs and problems of workers. The investigators defined “working conditions” broadly to include not only immediate job and work environment (for example, job content, hours of work), but also the surrounding conditions (for example, supervision, fringe benefits) and selected aspects of the off-job but work-related conditions (such as transporta tion to work and child care). “Workers” include all adults substantially engaged in remunerative employ ment. The 1969 Survey of Working Conditions, with interviews during late 1969, used a national probability household sample of 1,533 employed persons 16 years or older who worked for pay 20 hours a week or more. Its goals were: (1) to assess the frequency and severity 10 underrepresentation of workers in multiple-worker families. The statistical tables relating to the 1977 survey, unless otherwise specified, show the weighted numbers of respondents, not the actual number. While all of the percentages and mean scores shown are based upon weighted data, all tests of significance are based on unweighted data. Differences and changes described as significant in the text are significant at the 95 percent probability level or better, using conservative assumptions. Statistical information and methodological details appear in Robert P. Quinn and Graham L. Staines, The 1977 Quality o f Employment Survey: descriptive statistics, with comparison data from the 1969-70 Survey of Working Conditions and the 1972-73 Quality o f Employment Survey, available from Publications Sales, Institute for Social Research, Box 1248, Ann Arbor Mich. 48106. Persons interested in analyzing data from these surveys can obtain data tapes and documentation from the Inter-university Consortium for Political Social Re search, Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48106. certain methodological development was no longer needed and therefore, was omitted; second, issues relating to job stress, physical health, and mental health were expanded; third, the sampling procedure was modified to take account of population shifts revealed by the 1970 census, and only one worker was inter viewed in households with more than one eligible respondent. The third survey, the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey, was conducted in late 1977. Again, the core content material from the earlier surveys was retained, but new material was added. The principal added or expanded topics of coverage concerned labor unions, participation in workplace decisions, worker mobility, work hours, and certain off-job matters such as political participation, family accommodation to the worker’s job, and leisure activities. The 1969 survey included all eligible respondents in each of the sample households, and is therefore self weighting. To make the three samples comparable, data for 1973 and 1977 were weighted to compensate for the W orker participation The idea of participation as a principle of organization is not a new one. It has its roots, after all, in the ageless democratic ideal. It is ex pressed in our cultural emphasis on the dignity of the individual and on the value of freely stated opinions before a decision is reached. In the management of our industrial enterprises, also, workers have long been and are now consulted intermittently on immediate production problems. But the rise and the strength of the American labor move ment give testimony that the emphasis in industry has usually been the other way around; on the unquestioned authority and ability of management to make correct and acceptable decisions. As this philosophy was once stated, “ All that a man wants, is to be told what to do and to be paid for doing it.” The idea of worker participation on production problems, of democracy in industry is, basically, then, an old one, yet one that challenges a traditional management philosophy. Thus, the fu n damental premise of the participation idea, just the opposite of that quoted above, might be stated in this way: The average worker is able to make and, given the right kind of circumstances, wants to make im portant contributions to the solution of production problems. If you cannot accept this premise, you need consider this question no fur ther. ----- George P. Shultz “ Worker Participation on Productivity Problems,” in Frederick G. Lesieur, ed., The Scanlon Plan: A Frontier in Labor-Management Cooperation (Cambridge, mit Press, 1958), p. 51 11 Worker dissatisfaction: a look at the causes George Strauss A ll during the 1940’s and 1950’s, workers placed steady work as the most important thing they wanted from their jobs. By sharp contrast, a 1969 survey listed interesting work first, with job security coming seventh; six of the eight top-ranking work aspects related to job content. These data may be but a statistical artifact, but if confirmed by other evidence they suggest a substan tial shift in the value-ordering of American workers: with low level needs largely fulfilled, workers may be in a position to demand satisfaction for their egoistic and self-actualization needs. If so, such workers are less likely to settle for apathy or even for a job which offers high income and a rich social life but no intrinsic satisfaction. Possibly for such workers, money alone may no longer motivate— or as economists put it, it may have declining marginal utility. Possibly. But today’s luxuries become tomor row’s necessities. Wants grow at least as fast as paychecks, and I doubt if economic motivation will atrophy as fast as some psychologists suggest. Re gardless, most employees today claim that they are satisfied and apparently have reached some sort of adjustment to their environment (in the sense that what they expect and obtain from the job are in fair balance). Dissatisfaction may have increased re cently, but probably not by much. It seems reasonably clear that not everyone feels oppressed by his organization. Dissatisfaction with work seems to be a function of technology. The most dissatisfaction is reported on jobs with short job cycles or relatively little challenge— and also in in dustries in which such characteristics are common, such as the automotive industry. There are a variety of forms of adjustment work ers may make to “objectively” challengeless work (that is. work which most observers— and especially college professors— report as challengeless). Some workers are able to develop rich social lives on the job or are active in their union. Others obtain a large part of the challenges they seek off the job, through recreation or family activities (though the evidence suggests that for many this recreation may THE 43D AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, meeting at Arden House, Harriman, N .Y ., examined “ The Changing World o f Work” at a 4-day conference last November. This and the excerpt on pp. 14-15, drawn from background papers prepared for the conference and copyrighted by The American Assembly, are published with permission. A final report on the conference is planned for publication later this year under the title The Worker and the Job: Coping with Change, and may be ordered from the publisher, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N .J. 07632. George Strauss is a professor at the School o f Business Ad ministration and also acting director of the Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Berkeley. This excerpt is adapted from his paper, “ Workers: Attitudes and Adjustments.” From the Review of February 1974 12 be rather passive in nature). A worker may “ad just” by dreaming of better work, whether for him self or his children. Alternatively, he may “enlarge” his job through sabotage or output restriction, or he may lower his aspirations and delude himself that he is truly happy— and thus become resigned and apathetic. Finally, he may become a chronic griper and even express his feelings by striking, being ab sent from work, or quitting his job. But dissatisfaction can be caused as much by low incomes, job insecurity, inadequate fringe benefits, or tyrannical supervision. Indeed to me the evidence suggests that for workers at all levels— even man agers and professionals— lack of challenge is much less oppressive than lack of income. People as a whole are willing to tolerate large doses of boredom if they are paid enough. In so doing they are perhaps selling their soul for a mess of pottage. By my elitist standards this may be a raw deal, especially since it may have an adverse impact on personality and mental health. But why should my standards govern? Life without adequate income can also be pretty grim. I tend to agree with those union leaders who argue that economic conditions are a greater cause of dis satisfaction than any intrinsic sterility on the job. But this is no reason for ignoring intrinsic factors— any more than we should ignore arthritis just be cause cancer kills more people annually. The fact that over 10 percent of our work force (almost 10 million people) are dissatisfied is itself significant. And it is also clear that challengeless work has led to countless further millions leading narrower, less creative, and less happy lives. R obert Owem9§ Sessom The need to give machines the care and conditions required for them to work best—to service, clean, and maintain them and keep them in the right temperatures and humidity—is seen as obvious; yet doing the same for human beings is often regarded as an ex travagance. It is an old, old lesson of which Robert Owen provided initial proof at his New Lanark Mill in Scotland between the years 1800 and 1820. He built schools, developed adult education, restricted child labour, provided clean and safe working conditions. His workers were the so-called “ unemployables” imported from the slums of Glasgow and others were crofters driven from their land by the big landlords: 500 of his 1700 workforce were pauper ap prentices. They were a bitter, warring, improvident, and hard drinking community with no cause to trust their employer and little social homogeneity. Yet he built a society in New Lanark which, remarkably, made more profit than his competitors were able to achieve with their “ buy them cheap and sell them dear policy.’’ We began to learn Owen’s lesson and apply it when more than a century had passed since his work at New Lanark. Quality of work life is simply an extension of Owen’s thesis. It rests on the assumption that workers, unions, and employers all have a shared interest in the continuation and profitability of the enterprise. But in order that workers should make their contribution, they need the right en vironment. Job structures will need to be changed, work reorgan ised, and arrangements made for people to participate in the deci sions which affect them. ----- Peter D. Carr, Labour Counsellor, British Embassy From “ The British Approach to Quality of Work Life,” a paper presented at the Quality of Work Life Institute, George Meany Center for Labor Studies, Silver Spring, Md., February 10, 1981 13 Worker dissatisfaction: a look at the economic effects P eter Henle Some evidence provides modest support to the proposition that there is increasing disenchantment with work, including, for example, the decline in labor force participation by middle-aged and older men, the increase in the rate of unscheduled ab sences over the past 5 years, and the increasing pro portion of strikes over working conditions. The in crease in petitions filed with the National Labor Re lations Board by individuals in bargaining units ask ing that their union.be decertified (its right of repre sentation ended) may suggest that workers are in creasingly dissatisfied with the collective bargaining system. On the other hand, each of these points has to be qualified. The decline in labor force participation by middle-aged and older men is more than offset numerically by the sharp growth in the rate at which women have been entering the labor force and the absence of any decline among younger people. The significance of the increased rate of unscheduled absences is not clear; to some extent, it may simply reflect individuals taking advantage of newly won paid-leave privileges. The increasing proportion of strikes over working conditions covers such a wide variety of issues that its implications in terms of at titudes toward work are uncertain. Finally, the in crease in decertification petitions must be put in proper perspective; the number of workers voting to oust their union representatives is but 5 to 10 percent of the total voting to install union representation. In addition, other indicators give little or no sup port to any decline in the work ethic: the absence of any long-term trend in the quit rate, the rebound in the rate of productivity improvement, and the rela tive stability of labor relations activity, even in such an active collective bargaining year as 1973. In summary, Americans may be more unhappy at work, but there is very little evidence that this has affected their economic performance. Furthermore, the absence of any clear-cut economic data pointing to disaffection with work raises the possibility that people may be more satisfied with their jobs than many writers have suggested. The avalanche of news stories and surveys point ing up job dissatisfaction has tended to obscure a number of longer range developments operating to create a more favorable working environment. Con sider, for example, the following: 1. Changes in the occupational structure have em phasized the rise of professional, technical, and other white-collar jobs at the expense of the blue-collar occupations. Many routine, low-paying jobs remain, especially in manufacturing and service industries, but the effect of technological change has been to eliminate many burdensome backbreaking laboring jobs. 2. There have been major improvements in the work environment. For one thing, most jobs are no Peter H enle is senior specialist (labor) in the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. From the Review of February 1974 14 longer jammed into the middle of the urban centers, as small manufacturing plants outside the metropoli tan centers have tended to replace the older, ugly, sprawling plants in the cities. In addition, improved lighting, ventilation, temperature, noise control, sani tation, and other amenities have been built into the newer industrial facilities. Perhaps the ideal factory has not been achieved, but working conditions have certainly improved. 3. A longer preparatory period of education be fore commencing a working career, a revolution in paid leisure time during the work career, and a longer period of income-supported retirement afterwards have given a new look to the role of work in American life and opened up a wider range of opportunities aw ay from work for creating a full and satisfying life. 4. Important changes have been taking place in the schedules for working hours. Most significant is-the growth in part-time jobs—over 50 percept in the last 10 years—which have particular appeal to women and young people. 5. Finally, what about the increase in levels of pay? Working on a General Motors assembly line may provide little satisfaction for the inner man, but the pay of $4.60 an hour (plus health insurance, pen sions, paid vacations, holidays, and other fringe benefits) with $9,000 annual earnings (plus overtime) may cover up most of the pain. These points do not erase any cause for job dis satisfaction, but they may have the effect of making work more tolerable economically than it may have been in the past. Up to now, there is only limited evidence that dis affection with work has interfered with the perform ance of the national economy. In the future this may change, as the bond that ties individuals to their work tends to loosen in a world of higher incomes, greater leisure, and more competitors for an indi vidual’s time. In such a world, if work is to retain its traditional attraction, management and labor may have to change some attitudes and techniques, per haps even their basic approach to the work environ ment. However, the demonstrated adaptability of the Nation’s labor relations institutions provides some confidence that any such changes can be adopted successfully. Labor looEss at quality-of-worklife programs Quality-of-worklife programs, under whatever name, can be of tremendous help in facilitating the dealing with the larger issues of collective bargaining, including wages and working conditions, and, at the same time, can deal with the less visible but even more basic issues that affect the individual at the workplace. Labor has no intention of allowing management to co-opt these basic issues. But dealing with qwl programs will present our unions with immense problems of education of members; training and re training of shop stewards and business agents; of giving attention to the overall coordination of qwl programs plant by plant, employer by employer, and individual by individual; and of developing at national staff levels the technical expertise to assist in the negotiation of qwl programs and in their development and maintenance, and in the resolution of the problems of sharing the benefits—what necessary agreements and conditions before entering into the program, and so forth. Every union needs to continue in every way possible to assert its rights and the rights of its members to acceptance as legitimate equals in a partnership with management, with collective bargaining as the essential foundation for labor-management cooperation. — - T homas R. D onahue , Secretary-Treasurer, afl-cio From an address at the Labor Relations Research Center of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, January 7, 1982 15 Work, stress, and individual well-being Robert L. Kahn Research and theory about organizational life have been dominated by the criterion of organizational effective ness. Productivity and profit, absence and turnover, strikes and grievances, and other such measures are the outcomes that such research attempts to predict or ex plain. In combination they indicate the effectiveness or well-being of the organization as a living system. But the individual is also a living system, with crite ria of well-being quite separate from those of the organization. Agreement on those criteria is far from perfect, but there is some convergence around the abili ty to work, love, and play; to regard oneself and one’s life with positive feelings; to perceive people and events without major distortion; and to be free from distressing physical symptoms. These and other mea sures of individual health, physical and mental, we re gard as complex outcomes determined in part by properties of the organizations within which people work and the roles they perform in those organizations. The enactment of an organizational role by an indi vidual can thus be thought of as an intersection and partial overlap of two ongoing systems, the person and the organization. The overlap consists of certain cycles of behavior that are identical for both; these behaviors are part of the ongoing life of both the individual and the organization. We are accustomed to examining the extent to which these overlapping cycles contribute to efficiency, productivity, and other measures of organiza tional effectiveness. It is equally appropriate, however, to ask the complementary questions: Does the enact ment of the organizational role enhance or reduce the well-being of the individual? Does it enlarge or diminish the person’s valued skills and abilities? Does it increase or restrict the individual’s opportunity and capacity to perform other valued social roles?1 Stress and health Research on the full triad of work, stress, and health is still relatively uncommon. More research has been done on the latter elements, stress and health, or more specifically, on the physiological and behavioral effects of certain stressors (stimuli) on laboratory animals and on human beings. As a result, much has been learned about the psychobiology of stress, about the effects of stress on the central nervous system, on neuroregulators in the brain, and on the immune system. Something is known also about the relationship of stress to physical and psychiatric illness. Without pretending even to summarize these large bodies of work, I want to suggest in each of these areas the kinds of findings that are ac cumulating, especially those in which the experimental This excerpt is drawn from a paper presented at the Thirty-Third Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association, September 1980, in Denver, Colo. Papers prepared for the meetings o f the IRRA are excerpted by special permission and may not be reproduced without the express permission o f the IRRA, which holds the copyright. Robert L. Kahn is Program Director at the Institute for Social Research, The University o f Michigan. The title o f his full IRRA paper is “ Work, Stress, and H ealth.” From the Review of May 1981 16 stressor is strongly suggestive of conditions imposed by many jobs. psychosocial stress in reducing resistance, increasing susceptibility, and lengthening the process of recovery. Psychobiology of stress. The earliest research on biologi cal aspects of stress concentrated on the adrenocortico tropic hormone (acth) and the pituitary-adrenal system. In more recent years, other hormones have been identified as stress-responsive. Many stressors evoke these hormonal responses, but the common element ap pears to be emotional arousal to threatening and un pleasant aspects of life situations. Moreover, some of these hormonal changes occur not only in response to classical aversive stimuli like pain or noise, but also in response to unfavorable changes in environmental contingencies and expectations. For ex ample, when animals trained to work for food by press ing a lever were presented with a condition in which pressing the lever did not produce food, they showed el evations in plasma corticoids as high as those evoked by noxious stimuli. Other research also emphasizes the importance of predictability in facilitating coping and in minimizing hormonal stress responses. For example, an imals subjected to unpredictable shocks showed greater somatic change (corticosterone elevation, stomach ulcer ation, and weight loss) than animals that received shocks of the same magnitude on a predictable basis. Experiments with escapable and inescapable shock show similar results. Animals exposed to inescapable shock showed more fear than those exposed to escapable shock. Moreover, animals so exposed learned the lesson of helplessness and showed a severely reduced ability to escape in subsequent situations in which escape was possible. One researcher summarizes these and other laboratory studies by stating that there are two basic stimulus patterns that elevate hormonal responses for significant lengths of time: instability, which creates an unpredictable and “ununderstandable” environment, and uncontrollability, which makes coping efforts futile. Stress and physical illness. A current review by one re searcher summarized research on stress as a casual fac tor in a wide array of physical illness. Examples with apparent relevance to conditions encountered by men and women at work include gastric ulcer, cancer, and cardiovascular diseases. The treatment now considered most useful for peptic ulcer (cimetidine) acts by block ing the release of hydrochloric acid in response to emo tional stimuh and other stressors. There is some evidence for the involvement of stress factors—includ ing recent significant loss, job instability, and lack of plans for the future—in the precipitation of cancer. The effects of stress in illness have perhaps been demonstrat ed most clearly with respect to cardiovascular disease. Laboratory studies of stressful stimuli produce changes in stroke volume, heart rate, and blood pressure. Con sistent with these is the clinical identification of emo tional disturbance as a major cause of anginal pain, and as a cause of heart failure in persons with heart disease otherwise under control. Stress and psychiatric illness. Recent research implicates stress as a factor in depression, anxiety states, alcohol ism, drug abuse, and sleep disorders. For example, de pressed men and women experienced many more stressful life events just prior to their depression than did comparable groups in the general population. Anxiety as a temporary feeling associated with some actual or threatened event is an experience that every one has had. It seems to arise when we feel that the de mands made on us (or soon to be made) exceed our abilities or resources to meet them successfully. When such feelings of anxiety are chronic, disabling, or seem ingly unrelated to external realities, they are classified as signs of psychiatric disorder. Since the work role is for the majority of adults one of the most important sources of recurring demands for performance within specified limits of time, quality, and resources, we can expect it also to be a common source of anxiety. Alcoholism and drug abuse almost certainly have many causes that do not lie in the immediate environ ment of the person. Environmental stressors seem to be implicated in both disorders, nevertheless. For example, the use of alcohol was found to increase during the first year after the death of a spouse and the use of opiates and marijuana was higher among Americans in Viet nam than would have been predicted from comparison groups in the United States. The intuitive opinion that acute life stresses cause sleep disturbances has been well documented. Further more, chronic insomniacs, as compared to controls, re ported more stressful life events during the year in which their insomnia began. There is some evidence Stress and immunity. A recent review of research on the immune system found that certain psychosocial process es affect the central nervous system, thereby bringing about changes in the immune function, which in turn alter the risk of onset and subsequent course of many diseases. Frightening and distressing stimuli, over crowding, exposure to loud noise and bright light have all been found to have effects of this kind in animals. For example, the stress of avoidance learning (perfor mance to avoid punishment) and confinement in mice produced adrenal hypertrophy and susceptibility to vi ral infection. Stress effects on the immune systems have also been noted in studies with human beings. For ex ample, in 1977, one researcher reported decreased im mune responses among bereaved spouses after a period of seven to 10 weeks. Studies of infectious diseases, both with animals and human beings, bear out the effects of 17 that chronic lack of sleep is more than unpleasant. Even short periods of sleep during periods of prolonged phys ical stress reversed stress-related changes in growth hor mone, prolactin, and testosterone. And in a long prospective study, a group of researchers found that otherwise healthy individuals who initially reported ab normal sleep patterns (substantially less or more than the average) were more likely than members of the con trol group to have died by the time of the 6-year fol low-up. cede more severe somatic and behavioral reactions to stress. The reader is likely to say, “Well everybody knows that.” Perhaps everybody knows it, but almost nobody does much about it. There is some innovation; some drift toward job enlargement and employee involvement in decisions, perhaps; some experimentation in related matters. But the spread is slow and the successful ex periments are not copied, even in the companies where they were done. Compared with the adoption rate of flared trousers and color television, not to mention computers, stress-reducing improvements in the quality of work life are adopted slowly. Why should this be so? Many reasons come to mind, and many have been offered. Let me conclude by pro posing a reason that is not so often given for the slow spread of stress-reducing, work-enhancing organization al changes — their special demands on organizational leadership. Buying a new technology is, a decision usual ly made by people at the top of an organization that creates change-demands on others. But redesigning an organization to increase autonomy and control of each person and group creates change-demands that begin with the leaders themselves, in labor unions and govern ment as well as industry. This task, its admitted dif ficulty, and its apparent implications for the reduction of managerial power and privilege, account for the slow, resistant, over-skeptical response of management to the findings of stress research— a response that has been slower in the United States than in some other techni cally advanced countries. The scientific understanding of stress has greatly en larged and continues to grow. The use of that under standing to reduce stress has only begun. Im plications for jobs and organizations Now let us bring work back into the discussion of stress and health, by proposing a few implications of stress research for the improvement of work life. With both the field and the laboratory findings in mind, let us go beyond research and propose a few decision rules for the design of less stressful jobs and organizations: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Minimize unpredictability and ambiguity at work. Make the work situation as predictable as possible, in terms of job stability and certainty about the fu ture. (Change can be predictable, too.) Minimize uncontrollable events at the individual lev el. That is, maximize the decisions that can be made autonomously by the individual, then the de cisions that can be made directly by the primary group in which the individual works, and only then those decisions in which control must be by more distant representative arrangements. (Take into ac count differences in individual preference.) Eliminate avoidance learning, that is, performanceor-punishment. Instead, recognize and reward suc cessful performance, both at the group and the in dividual level. Minimize physical stressors—excessive noise, ex tremes of temperature and light intensity, spatial and postural confinement, crowding and isolation. Avoid recurring (daily) stresses; they are more dam aging than the occasional peaks of demand. Watch for negative affect (emotional response). Feelings of boredom and apathy, anger and hostili ty, and other kinds of emotional distress often pre --------- FOOTNOTE---------1 The introductory paragraphs of this article are adapted from Chapter 17 of Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Social Psychology o f Organizations (New York, Wiley, 1978). The discus sion of stress and health owes much to the work of the Committee on Stress Research, Institute o f Medicine, National Academy o f Sciences. 18 How American workers view labor unions Although most workers surveyed are critical o f union leaders, most also consider them effective in promoting member job interests, a third o f nonmembers would vote to unionize, and, in general, union members are satisfied T homas A. K ochan Results of the survey show that w orkers general ly viewed unions as large, powerful bodies, which are highly effective. O f the nonunion workers, alm ost one-third said they w ould vote to unionize; and, although union m em bers were m ostly sat isfied, they placed highest priorities on im proving their unions’ internal adm inistration, while also emphasizing the im portance o f traditional collec tive bargaining issues, such as wages an d fringe benefits. The A m erican trade union m ovem ent has been characterized by theorists, social critics, and union practitioners alike as following a “business union ism ” philosophy. T hat is, A m erican unions are seen as very pragm atic organizations that seek to improve the econom ic and social conditions of their m em bers, focusing on im proving the condi tions o f em ploym ent in the short run, prim arily through collective bargaining. However, until recently, surprisingly little work has probed system atically the views of A m erican workers tow ard trade unions.1 Even less em pirical evidence was available for m easuring union m em bers’ assessments of the perform ance o f their own unions. T he 1977 Q uality o f E m ploym ent Survey, conducted for the U.S. D epartm ent o f Labor by the Survey Research C enter at the U niversity o f M ichigan, provides a first step tow ard changing this state of affairs.2 A ttitudes and experiences o f a representative sample o f the labor force were surveyed on a variety o f questions related to the respondents’ working lives.3 Three sets o f ques tions pertaining to unions were included in the survey. First, all respondents were asked about their beliefs ab o u t trade unions in general. Second, the nonunion respondents were asked about their voting preference if a union representation election were held where they work. Third, the union m em bers in the survey were asked to report their satisfaction with their unions, priorities for w hat their unions ought to be doing, and views of w hat their unions actually were doing a n d to indicate the extent o f their participation in their unions. Perceiving unions In the questions on w hat workers believe trade unions are doing, respondents were asked to rate on a five-point scale the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the statem ents listed in table 1. “Big-labor” image. T he first six questions in the table are clustered in som ething that m ight be labeled a “big-labor-im age” dim ension.4 These questions m easure the extent to which respondents agree or disagree with statem ents th at the labor m ovem ent exerts a pow erful influence over others in society. F o r example, those who generally agreed w ith these statem en ts saw unions as exerting considerable influence over (1) who gets elected to public office, (2) w hat laws are passed, (3) how the country is run, (4) employers, and (5) union m em bers. A final question in this cluster asked the extent to which the respondents saw union leaders as out to do w hat is best for themselves rather th an w hat is best for their m em bers. Between 70 an d 80 percent o f the respondents agreed with the statem ents that unions exert influence over who gets elected to public office, w hat laws are passed, how the country is Thomas A. Kochan is an associate professor at the New York State School o f Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University. From the Review of April 1979 19 High ratings for effectiveness. The remaining four questions are clustered in a separate factor in the bottom half of table 1. These questions appear to measure the extent to which respondents viewed unions as “instrumental” in improving the working lives of their members. Those who agreed with these questions saw unions as (1) protecting their members against unfair practices of employers, (2) improving members’ job security, (3) improving the wages of their members, and (4) giving their members their money’s (dues) worth. More than 80 percent of the respondents agreed that unions improve the wages and job security of their members and represent their members against unfair labor practices of employers. The respond ents were almost equally divided over the question of whether the unions provide members their money’s worth. Again these data are consistent with previous polls that show, despite the negative images of the political and economic power of unions, between 60 and 70 percent of Americans approve of unions in general and of the rights of workers to join unions. Bok and Dunlop interpre ted these ratings (in conjunction with the negative public image of the power of unions) as support for the collective bargaining functions of unions.6 When a regression analysis was performed on the average responses to this “instrumental” dimension, it was found that those who were most likely to agree with these statements were members of trade unions, higher educated, and living in the South. White-collar workers, especially managerial employees, workers in the North-Central region of the country, and those in the manufacturing, transportation, and utility industries were less likely to agree with these statements. Although nonwhites and older workers also scored higher on this dimension than their white and younger counterparts, the relationships here were not statistically significant. Those who scored high on the big-labor-image dimension were somewhat less likely to score high in the instrumental dimension (the correlation between the scores on these two dimensions is -.19). However, these are by no means mutually exclusive images. Instead, the majority of the workers surveyed apparently were somewhat skep tical of the political roles that unions play and of their power in society and also held positive views of union performance in collective bargaining. TsbSe 1. Amgriean workers’ beliefs about trade unions' [In percent] Beliefs Big-labor-image beliefs: Influence wtio gets elected to public o ffic e ....................................... Influence laws pass ed ............................ Are more powerful than employers ................................................ Influence how the country is run ........................................................ Require members to go along with decisions......................................... Have leaders who do what's best for them selves............................... Instrumental beliefs: Protect workers against unfair practice ....................................... Improve job security ............................... Improve wages ......................................... Give members their money (dues) worth ........................................... Strongly agree 37.5 24.0 Agree 46.0 56.6 Neither Strongly agree Disagree disagree nor disagree 1.8 3.8 12.7 14.4 1.1 1.2 2.0 24.8 41.6 6.2 25.4 18.1 53.4 4.8 21.7 1.9 18.5 56.0 3.9 20.1 1.6 22.8 44.7 6.4 24.0 2.1 20.5 19.2 18.9 63.0 61.0 67.6 3.4 2.8 3.2 11.2 14.5 8.7 2.0 2.5 1.7 6.9 38.5 6.3 36.9 11.3 'In the survey, 1,515 workers were polled. run, and union members. Approximately twothirds of the respondents agreed that unions are more powerful than employers and that leaders are more interested in what benefits themselves than in what benefits union members. Thus, a strong majority of workers saw unions as big, powerful institutions in society. These results are consistent with earlier opinion poll data summarized by Derek C. Bok and John T. Dunlop. A 1941 survey found 75 percent of the public believed union leaders had accumulated “too much power;” 62 percent agreed with this same question in 1950. Questions about union leaders asked in four polls between 1962 and 1965 consistently showed that the public held union leaders in very low esteem relative to business leaders, religious leaders, government officials, and college professors.5 However, because the wording and specificity of the questions in the 1977 survey differ from these earlier polls, it is not possible to make exact comparisons. A regression analysis in which the dependent variable was an index composed of the average responses to these big-labor-image questions showed that those who were most likely to agree with these statements were older and white-collar workers, while those most likely to disagree with these statements were union members, Southern ers, women, nonwhites, and workers employed in public sector occupations. Overall, however, only a very small proportion of the variations in these responses (R2= .07) was explained by the regres sion equation, indicating that this big-labor image was generally shared by a majority of the workers in all the demographic, industrial, regional, and occupational categories examined. Workers divided on union function. In addition to responding to multiple-choice questions, the re spondents were asked in an open-ended question to describe what they believe labor unions in this country are trying to do. The responses to this 20 question then were coded into a set of positive or negative categories depending on the nature of the responses. Overall, 51 percent of those responding mentioned only positive things that unions are doing. Twenty-four percent described only nega tive functions. Fourteen percent mentioned both positive and negative things, and the remaining 11 percent of the responses were not amenable to classification. The most common positive function mentioned was improving the wages and benefits of union members. Twenty-nine percent of those giving a reason listed this as their primary view of what unions do. An additional 18 percent de scribed unions as improving the working condi tions of their members. Although the remaining responses on the positive side were scattered across a wide variety of categories, none of the reasons given were listed by more than 5 percent of the respondents. Those describing unions as doing negative things had a more difficult time specifying exactly what they meant. Of the primary reasons given, the most frequent was the view that unions were out more for their own self-protection than for the good of society in general. Six percent of those responding gave this view of unions. The remain ing negative views were, again, scattered across a wide array of categories. None of the reasons were given by more than 3 percent of the sample. Thus, the negative image workers have of unions appears to reflect a generalized stereotype, rather than a specific identifiable or easily expressed criticism. individual workers approach the decision to jo in or not jo in a union: The worker reacts favorably to union membership in proportion to the strength of his belief that this step will reduce his frustrations and anxieties and will further his opportunities relevant to the achievement of his standards of successful living. He reacts unfavorably in proportion to the strength of his belief that this step will increase his frustrations and anxieties and will reduce his opportunities relevant to the achievement of such standards:7 In short, if we are to distinguish betw een individu als who w ould support unionization in 1977 versus those w ho w ould not, we m ust first identify the current job -related concerns o f workers, their evaluation of their current conditions, an d their views o f the instrum entality o f unionization as a strategy for im proving their well-being versus the perceived costs or negative consequences o f union ization.8 The findings o f several recent em pirical studies suggest that dissatisfaction over the econom ic or traditional bread an d butter issues o f wages, fringe benefits, and w orking conditions is m ore strongly related to the desire to jo in a union than is dissatisfaction with other aspects o f a jo b , such as relations with supervisors an d the content o f the jo b itself.9 Thus, the initial proposition tested with these d a ta was that those w orkers who are m ore dissatisfied with the econom ic or traditional bread and b utter aspects o f their jo b or those who report m ore problem s with such aspects are m ore likely to be union supporters than those who are m ore satisfied or experience fewer problem s with these aspects o f their job. The correlations an d regression equations relat ing characteristics o f the respondents, their jobs, and their attitu d es tow ard their jo b s to the propensity to jo in a union are presented in table 2. For the overall sample, bread an d b utter aspects o f the re s p o n d e n ts ’ jo b s w ere co n sisten tly sig nificantly related to willingness to jo in unions, both before an d after controlling for all o f the other variables. Likewise, those respondents who reported m ore problem s with inadequate income, fringe benefits, and problem s with health an d safety hazards on the jo b were also m ore likely to support unionization on their jobs than were w orkers not experiencing these problem s (or experiencing them in lesser m agnitudes). E xam ina tion o f the distribution o f these responses betw een union an d nonunion supporters further indicated that only when the problem s becam e m ost Severe or the highest level or dissatisfaction was reported did a m ajority o f repondents indicate a willingness Voting on unionization One of the key questions asked of the nonunion respondents in the survey was whether they would vote for union representation if an election were held in their workplace. Of the 983 that responded, 295, or 30 percent, indicated they would vote for unionization. When managers and the self-em ployed were excluded from the sample, the rate of support for unionization rose to 33 percent. Further breakdowns show that 39 percent of the blue-collar workers would support unionization, compared to 28 percent of the white-collar work ers, excluding the self-employed and managers. Perhaps the most striking finding was that 67 percent of all black and other minority workers would vote to unionize. Also, 40 percent of all women and 35 percent of workers in the South would support unionization. Dissatisfaction a factor. The following statement by E. Wight Bakke is still perhaps one of the best propositions for guiding an analysis of how 21 Tabs© 2 . R o g ir e s s io r ts od w o r k e r ® ’ p r o p e n s i t y u n io n s , b y o c c u p a tio n s ! jo in g ro u p Blue-collar workers'1 White-collar workers5 Standardized regression coefficients Standardized regression coefficients Standardized regression coefficients Run 12 Run 12 Run 12 Overall sample1 Independent v a r ia t e Correlation coefficients Job satisfaction4 Bread and butter .............. Supervision.......................... Nature of work _ ’-.297 ’-.206 ’-.299 ’-.135 -.033 ‘-.112 Desired on-the-job influence Difficulty exerting influence . Job insecurity10 . . . Severity of job dangers10. . . Travel to work difficulties10 . ’ .160 ’ .150 .056 ’ .164 .041 ... --... --... Desirability of working conditions10............................. Inadequate income10 Inadequate fringes10 .............. Pay equity perceptions10 . . Age ............................................ ’ .103 ’ .209 ’ .211 ’-.210 ’ -.090 ... -.014 Education ............................... Sex: Female ............................. Race: Nonwhite ...................... Big-labor-image b e lie fs ......... Instrumentality beliefs ........... -.029 ‘ .118 ’ .244 ’ -.167 ’ .329 -.018 .004 ’ .143 ‘ -.076 ’ .262 Region: North C e n tra l...................... S o u th ..................................... West .................. ’ -.077 .043 -.020 Size of establishment: 1 to 10 employees .. . 11 to 499 employees ___ Over 2000 employees___ Industry: Secondary .......................... Government ........................ Occupation: " Professional/technical . . . Managerial/administrative . Clerical ................................. Craftsman ............................. Service ................................. to Run 2* -.061 . . . ’-.111 . . . -9095 ’ .104 ’ .057 .007 M 41 .020 ‘-.127 ... .004 . . . ‘-.160 .069 ‘ .112 -.015 ’ .156 .038 ... ... Run 23 ... ... ’ .150 .022 -.012 ’ .081 .019 .012 ’ .150 ’ .092 -.047 -.053 -.044 .030 .002 ‘ .097 ’-.158 -.016 -.001 -.008 .035 -.011 ’ .148 ’ .176 ’ -.091 ’ -.116 .273 ’ .301 .022 .001 ’ .180 ’ -.120 ’ .301 .026 .064 ‘ .117 ’ -.060 ’ .230 .025 .094 ’ .130 ’ -.079 ’ .261 ‘ -.108 -.061 -.038 ‘ -.103 ’ -.126 ‘ -.073 -.043 -.047 -.040 ’ -.126 -.058 -.038 ‘ -.132 ‘ -.117 -.046 ‘ -.116 ’ -.105 -.057 ’ -.095 .057 -.021 ’ -.090 -.004 -.016 -.112 -.121 -.011 ’ .136 -.002 -.065 ‘ -.215 .058 -.059 -.091 -.044 .003 -.968 -.038 .016 .048 .015 .016 -.031 .021 -.035 .035 .065 .017 ‘ -.105 .079 .022 .082 .031 -.020 ‘ -.116 .031 ’ -.091 .018 -.023 -.002 -.042 -.047 *.110 --- .006 ’ .067 ‘ .087 ’-.126 -.026 ... ... Run 23 ... ... -.044 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... Measures of regression accuracy F R2 TP . . . __ ’ 12.14 .271 .249 ’ 10.61 .261 .237 ‘ 7.35 .300 .265 ‘ 6.81 .313 .267 ‘ 8.05 .262 .229 ‘ 5.97 .226 .188 'N =804. ’ These regressions include indexes of job satisfaction. ’These regressions include measures of workers' perceptions of problems with different aspects of their jobs. <N = 335. 5N = 469. ‘ Not included in Run 2. ’ Significant at .01. ‘ Significant at .05. ’ Significant at .10. ,0Not included in Run 1. 11Not included in blue-collar and white-collar regressions. to support unionization. Thus, it would appear that, while dissatisfaction with wages, fringes, and working conditions provides the initial stim ulus to unionization, concern for this m ust be quite severe before a m ajority will support unionization as an option for im proving these conditions.10 For white-collar workers, dissatisfaction with the content of their jobs exerted a som ew hat greater effect on propensity to unionize than did dissatis faction with the bread and butter aspects o f the job. Still, however, dissatisfaction with bread and butter aspects o f the jo b was significant in the white-collar equation. This implies that the m otiva tion to unionize for both white-collar and bluecollar workers is influenced by their econom ic conditions, but that w hite-collar workers are also m ore m otivated to support unionization when dissatisfied with the content, scope, and organiza tion o f their jobs. D is s a tisfa c tio n w ith w ages a n d eco n o m ic benefits can arise both because their absolute levels are perceived to be below some acceptable stan d ard or because of inequities that are perceived in one’s wages or in the way in which working conditions are adm inistered. W orkers norm ally have som e com parison in m ind when evaluating their ow n conditions. How ever, we can also directly assess the effects o f perceptions o f inequi table wages, as workers were asked the extent to which they perceived their wages to be equitable relative to others doing the same type o f work. A significant negative correlation was found betw een perceptions o f equity and propensity to unionize for the overall sam ple and for white-collar workers. Thus, it is not only the level o f wages and other terms and conditions o f em ploym ent that influence w orkers’ willingness to unionize but also, in at least the case o f white-collar workers, the extent to which w orkers’ wages are perceived to be inequita ble relative to others doing sim ilar work. Desire fo r influence. W hile dissatisfaction with jo b conditions m ay provide the initial stim ulus for unionization, not all workers are likely to turn im m ediately to unions as a way o f coping with these problem s. W orkers have alternatives for influencing unsatisfactory working conditions. N ot all workers believe it is their right or desire to have greater participation on their jobs. Furtherm ore, am ong those who believe it is their right or are interested in having greater influence, only those who are unable to influence their work environ m ent through other, m ore inform al, individualistic, or em ployer-initiated participation program s are likely to turn to unions as an alternative. The correlations betw een the variables m easur ing the desire for participation and the difficulty o f introducing changes on the jo b provide support for these propositions, though the correlations be tween these characteristics and the propensity to unionize are som ew hat lower than the correlation on jo b dissatisfaction. However, the correlations do indicate that workers interested in unionization see it as both a m eans o f introducing greater participation on the jo b and for overcom ing em ployer resistance to change or to dealing with In this study, the coefficients on the instrumen tality index tended to be approximately three times as large as those on the big-labor-image index, reinforcing the view that American workers ap proach the decision to unionize in very pragmatic terms. They are apparently less influenced by their general image of labor in society or by their general views of the labor movement than they are by their judgments about what unions actually do for their members. job-related problems. In fact, a majority of the respondents who both desired greater participation and reported experiencing difficulty in getting employers to make changes on their jobs support ed unionization.11 Again, differences between white-collar and blue-collar workers were found with these two measures. For the white-collar workers, a belief about the rights of workers to participate exerted stronger effects on their propensity to unionize than did the difficulty they experienced in making changes on their jobs. For blue-collar workers, the opposite was true; difficulty of change outweighed beliefs about participation. Demographic determinants. A common theme running through much of the popular speculation about the future of the labor movement is that unions will have a difficult time organizing because of the changing demographic, industrial, occupa tional, and regional characteristics of the labor force. Consequently, the relationship between each of these characteristics and the propensity to join unions was examined again both before and after controlling the psychological or attitudinal charac teristics summarized in the previous section. In general, findings concerning the demographic characteristics suggest there are no specific sub groups in the population that are consistently unwilling to join a union if their job conditions warrant unionization. At the same time, there were no specific subgroups, with the exception of nonwhite workers, that appeared to be willing to join unions as a matter of course. That is, holding job conditions constant, younger workers were as willing (or unwilling) to join unions as older workers, women at least as willing as men, and Benefits versus costs. Workers who are dissatisfied with their present conditions and seek greater participation and influence still must decide whether the benefits of unionization in their particular situation outweigh the costs associated with it. Here is where the general beliefs workers hold about unions enter into the process of deciding whether to vote for unionization. Workers who are more ideologically predisposed toward unions or have more favorable images of unions could be expected to support unionization in their particular situations. The recent empirical studies of representation elections cited earlier in this article have found very strong relationships be tween general images of unions and workers’ voting behavior. Most vote, few mm for office nificantly more active in their unions than their counterparts. Members with college educations were significantly more likely to run for union office, with the highest propensity among those in or approach ing their prime working years. There were no significant differences between men and women in the propensity to vote or to run for office. However, blacks and other minorities were only half as likely to run for office (8 percent compared with 15 percent) and were significantly less likely to vote in union elections (53 percent versus 69 percent). Professional and managerial unionists were most likely to run for office (25 percent and 20 percent, respectively) while clerical union members were least likely (3 percent). Although the regional variations were not significant, there was a lower rate of voting and candidacy among union members in the Northeast relative to the rest of the country. Similarly, again, although the overall distribution was not significantly different, union members in the largest establishments (2,000 employees or more) were least likely (3.3 percent) to run for union office. One set of questions in the survey dealt with the level of participation of members in their trade unions. The respondents were asked whether in the last 2 years they had (1) voted in a union election, (2) attended a union meeting, (3) run for a union office, and/or (4) filed a grievance. The responses indicated that (1) 68 percent had voted in a union election, (2) 67 percent had attended at least one union meeting, (3) 13 percent had run for office, and (4) 19 percent had filed a grievance. From these data, an overall index of union participation was calculated (by weighting each form of participation equally) and regressed on the demographic characteristics discussed in earlier sections of this article. The objective was not to test a formal model of union participation but rather to identify whether union activists were underrepresent ed or overrepresented by any of the demographic, occupational, regional, or industry categories. Results show that older members, members with more education, and members who scored higher on the desire for participation on the job were sig 23 Benefits the main factor. W hen nonunion respond ents were asked why they would vote for or against unionization, the m ost frequently cited reason for supporting unionization was that unions would improve wages and fringe benefits. Twelve percent of the union supporters cited this as the m ajor reason for preferring unionization. The second m ost im portant reason, cited by 6 percent o f the union supporters, was that unions w ould represent the w orkers’ interests in dealing with their em ploy er. O ther reasons cited include unions’ ability to improve working conditions, provide jo b security, ensure fair treatm ent, im prove working hours, im prove safety and health, an d handle w orkers’ grievances. Clearly, these verbal responses rein force the concerns workers have for the econom ic and other traditional aspects o f their jobs. The m ajor reason w orkers gave for voting against unionization was th at a union was not needed on their jo b —the jo b was satisfactory as it now was. Tw enty percent o f those opposed to unionization gave this response. The second m ost com m on reason cited for opposing unions was that the w orker preferred to handle problem s individu ally with the em ployer. T en percent o f the union opponents gave this response. The next m ost com m on response reflects a negative image o f labor unions; the respondent d idn’t approve o f unions (8 percent). Finally, only 1 percent o f the workers indicated th at the prim ary reason for opposing unionization was a fear o f em ployer retaliation or closure o f the plant resulting from unionization. white-collar workers apparently as willing as bluecollar workers. Pro-union white-collar workers were (1) more concerned with pay inequities and fringe benefits problem s than with the absolute levels of their wages, (2) m ore interested in participation in decision m aking, (3) m ore likely to support unionization when dissatisfied with the content o f their jobs, and (4) less likely to avoid unionization because they hold a negative image of the labor m ovem ent. Fem ale w hite-collar w orkers were more likely to support unionization than were their male counterparts. Blue-collar workers, however, were m ost likely to turn to unions when dissatisfied with wages, benefits, and health and safety hazards on their jobs. Y ounger blue-collar workers were som ew hat m ore willing to jo in unions than were older blue-collar workers. Including regional variables in the analysis also provided som ew hat surprising results. Although it has often been argued th at Southern workers are less interested in joining unions than their N o rth ern counterparts, the negative coefficient on the Southern variable was significant only for whitecollar workers. Southern blue-collar workers were, therefore, ju st as willing to jo in unions when their jo b conditions w arranted unionization as were workers in the N ortheast. However, there appeared to be a m ore negative nonunion effect found am ong both blue- and white-collar workers in the N orth C entral region of the country. W orkers in the W est appeared insignificantly different from the workers in the N ortheast in their willingness to join trade unions. The N orth C entral effect rem ained significant, even when the sample was broken down into white-collar and blue-collar subgroups. Evaluating union performance W hat do A m erican union m em bers expect their trade unions to be doing? H ow well are unions fulfilling these expectations? These are perhaps two o f the m ost critical questions for evaluating the responsiveness o f trade unions to their m em bers. Inform ation on w orkers’ views can be useful for tracing trends or changes in the responsiveness o f the A m erican trade union m ovem ent over time and for identifying the directions union m em bers would like to see their organizations m ove in the future. The last variable exam ined was the size of the establishm ent in which the worker was employed. Size was m easured by a series o f categorical variables, because initial ex am in atio n o f the distribution o f responses showed th at the workers in the smallest (fewer than 10 workers) and the largest (1,000 workers or m ore) establishm ents were least willing to jo in trade unions. Those in the in term ed iate categories w ere som ew hat m ore prone to unionization. Relative to the smallest establishm ents, workers in the interm ediate size organizations were m ost likely to be willing to support unionization. These results m ay reflect the close interpersonal relationship betw een workers and employers in the very small organizations and the effectiveness o f the very large nonunion employers in reducing the incentives to jo in unions by paying higher wages and benefits and by using sophisticated personnel techniques and policies.12 Greater expectations. W orkers were asked two sets of questions concerning their expectations from their unions a n d th eir evaluations o f un io n perform ance. T he first set o f questions asked m em bers to rate on a four-point scale how m uch effort they felt unions should be putting into various areas. T he second question asked how well their unions actually were doing in the same areas. 24 (r = .70) rank order correlation betw een the ratings o f union priorities and union perform ance.13 This indicates that unions were perceived to be per form ing best on the issues o f highest priority to their m em bers. Second, the data further confirm the centrality o f the traditional econom ic issues to union m em bers. Third, the results indicate that m em bers’ expectations for their unions exceeded current union perform ance. On average, there was approxim ately a 0.5- to 0.7-point difference or gap (on a four-point scale) betw een the expectations m em bers had for their unions and their percep tions o f union perform ance. W hen the gap betw een expectations and perfor m ance on each issue was exam ined (by subtracting from the percentage o f the respondents who indicated they w ould like to see their unions exerting a lot o f effort on a dim ension the percentage o f respondents who indicated their union was actually doing very well on th at dim ension), the im portance o f im proving the internal adm inistrative aspects o f trade unions again was observed. These differences are shown in the following tabulation: The list o f issues included in these questions can be grouped into three categories: First, the traditional bread and butter issues of wages, fringe benefits, jo b security, and safety and health; second, the quality of work; third, the internal adm inistration o f the union. The responses of the union m em bers to these questions are presented in tables 3 and 4. The greatest concern of the union m em bers was for increasing the responsiveness o f the u nion’s inter nal adm inistration. The highest priority rating was given to the concern for im proving the handling o f m em ber grievances. The second highest was given to increasing the am ount o f feedback the union provides its m em bers. In addition, the need to increase the influence th at m em bers have in running the union was rated as the fourth m ost im portant priority. Thus, three o f the top four concerns of the union m em bers reflected their interest in im proving the governance o f their union. The second m ajor area o f concern was in the traditional issues—wages, fringe benefits, jo b security, and working conditions. The concern for fringe benefits, in fact, was the third m ost im por tant issue, while wages, jo b security, and safety and health issues ranked fifth through seventh, respec tively. Issues concerning the quality o f work were given the three lowest priorities. Handling members’ grievances ........................ Providing more say in union ...................... Providing more feedback from union ...................................................... Getting better fringe benefits ........................... Improving job security ................................ Improving safety and health ........................... Make jobs more interesting ................... Getting better wages ........................................ More say in how to do their jobs ............. More say in how business is run ............... The data pose som ew hat o f a dilem m a for unions, however, for betw een 60 and 75 percent of all respondents w anted their unions to exert some or a lot o f effort in im proving the quality o f work aspects of their jobs. Thus, while workers expected their union to give the highest priority to the internal adm inistration and traditional issues, a m ajority also w anted their unions to exert an effort to improve the quality o f work. Consequently, w hile w o rk ers still view ed th e ir u n io n s as representatives o f their econom ic interests, they also were looking for an expansion o f the dom ain of union activity into these m ore uncharted areas. The central determ inant o f w orkers’ ratings of their unions’ perform ance is their degree o f jo b dissatisfaction with bread and b utter issues or the existence o f problem s with these issues. U nion perform ance was rated higher and m em bers were more satisfied with union perform ance when these problem s had been effectively addressed and when workers were satisfied with these aspects o f their jobs. Older m em bers and m em bers in the South rated their unions significantly higher than did younger and non-Southern respondents. Three m ajor findings emerge from a com parison o f the data on w hat union m em bers expect their unions to do with the data on how well unions are actually doing. First, there is a strong positive S ize o f differences Issue 43.8 42.3 40.1 35.2 30.8 26.3 25.2 24.0 21.9 18.9 In general, however, regression analysis showed few significant differences in the priorities o f the individual respondents or in the extent to which Tabs® 3. Umtast memteir priori^®® for union S©®u©s' [In percent] losuas Wages Frinaes Job security Safety /health Say on job . Interesting jobs Say in union Say in business Feedback from union Handling grievances A lot Of effort Msso* 34.7 30.9 34.4 34.9 45.1 30.3 31.8 39.7 56.9 63.8 54.4 47.6 30.5 30.1 60.0 25.2 3.46 3.57 3.39 2.87 3.01 2.76 3.49 2.73 No effort a im b effort Somo 2.4 1.1 3.4 4.3 5.2 14.7 3.2 17.1 6.0 4.2 7.8 13.1 19.0 24.7 4.9 18.1 effort 2.0 5.9 22.1 69.7 3.60 1.5 2.3 17.1 78.5 3.74 'Union.members were asked how much effort they thought their unions should be putting into various issues. ! Degrees of effort were valued from 1 to 4 points, with “ little effort" equaling 1 and "a lot of effort," 4. The mean is the average value of response. 25 negative view o f trade unions or to the prospects of joining a union. Y ounger workers, wom en, and higher educated workers are no less willing to jo in a union when their jo b conditions w arrant it than their older, male, or less educated counterparts. Even the com m on stereotype o f the anti-union Southern worker does not show up in these data. Therefore, the changing regional and dem ographic com position o f the labor force should pose no new barriers to organizing. On the negative side, the m ajority o f workers apparently only turn to a union when (1) greatly dissatisfied with their jo b an d econom ic condi tions, (2) they desire m ore influence over their jo b conditions, and (3) other form s o f influence do not work. U nions are seen by a large num ber o f workers as a strategy o f last resort rather than as a n atu ral or preferred m eans o f im proving jo b conditions. W hite-collar workers are especially concerned with the threats unionization m ight pose to their individual autonom y and independ ence. This suggests that potential m em bers will have to be convinced that a union can respond to their specific sources o f dissatisfaction and provide channels for effective participation and organiza tional change. A lthough the survey data do not provide specific detailed suggestions for w hat unions need to do to im prove their adm inistration, they clearly show that this concern outweighs even m em bers’ con cerns for substantive im provem ents in their condi tions o f em ploym ent. The data docum ent that union m em bers expect their unions to m aintain their historical focus on seeking better wages, fringe benefits, jo b s security, and working condi tions. It is clear, therefore, that no shift in the focus o f union priorities would be tolerated by the m ajority o f union m em bers. A ny efforts m ade to im prove the quality o f work m ust be a supplem ent to, not a replacem ent for, efforts in the traditional areas o f union concern. Tab!® 4. Evaluation of union performance1 [In percent] Issues Not good at all Not too good Somewhat good Very good Kean2 W a g e s ......................................... Fringes . Job security ............................... Safety/health ............................. Say on job ................................. Interesting job .......................... Say in union............................... Say in business ...................... Feedback from union .............. Handling grievances................ 4.7 7.7 7.6 6.5 15.2 22.5 16.2 25.8 10.5 8.7 19.8 21.8 18.0 21.5 34.3 43.1 27.9 37.7 23.3 15.7 42.5 41.9 50.8 50.7 41.9 29.5 37.3 30.1 36.5 40.9 32.9 28.6 23.6 21.3 8.6 4.9 18.7 6.3 29.6 4.7 3.04 2.91 2.90 2.87 2.44 2.17 2.58 2.16 2.85 3.02 1Union members were asked how good a job their unions were doing in addressing various issues. 2 Ratings were valued on a 4-point scale, with "Not good at all” worth 1 point and "Very good" worth 4. The mean is the average value of response. they perceived their union as effectively respond ing to their needs. C onsequently, while these data are useful for giving us an overall view o f the priorities o f union m em bers in general and their views o f the perform ance o f their unions, they do not provide m uch insight into the conditions under w hich u n io n s are re sp o n d in g m ore or less effectively to their m em bers’ interests. General satisfaction prevails. The final question asked o f the respondents was “ H ow satisfied are you with your trade union?” The responses showed a trade union m em bership that was relatively well satisfied with its unions. Twenty-five percent o f the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied with their union, 48 percent indicated they were satisfied, 17 percent indicated they were dissat isfied, and 10 percent indicated they were very dissatisfied. Thus, ju st under three-fourths o f all of the union m em bers surveyed indicated a general degree of satisfaction with their union. Subsequent regression analysis again confirm ed that the only significant correlate o f union satisfaction was satisfaction with the traditional econom ic or bread and butter aspects o f w orkers’ jobs. Beyond this, there were no consistent significant dem ographic, regions, or occupational groups that differed significantly on this satisfaction score. The next step Implications for organized labor A m ore intensive analysis o f the priorities o f union m em bers is needed (the analysis would be equally relevant for those interested in the n o n u n ion sample). The research presented in this article deals only with the general m easures o f w hat the overall sam ple o f union m em bers expected their unions to be doing. M ore extensive inform ation is also provided in the survey on the tradeoffs workers w ould m ake across a broad array o f wage, benefit, and working conditions options. Analysis o f these data by sex, race, occupation, an d age groups could provide a better picture o f the relative priorities o f workers. These data suggest both positive and negative predictions for the ability o f unions to attract new m em bers. On the positive side, extrapolating these sam ple results to the entire labor force indicates that if all workers who prefer to unionize (oneth ird o f the unorganized work force14) were organized, the size o f the labor m ovem ent would nearly double. The greatest source of potential grow th appears to be am ong non whites; a twothirds m ajority o f nonw hite workers prefers to unionize. In addition, none of the growing seg m ents o f the labor force exhibits an inherently 26 perceptions o f trade unions in society an d union m em bers’ perceptions o f the responsiveness o f their ow n unions. The availability o f these d a ta on a continuous basis should m ake a m ajor contribu tion to stim ulating needed research on the role o f trade unions in A m erican society. Perhaps, the m ost im portant next step in this research is to replicate the survey periodically in future years. Longitudinal d a ta collected from the same panel o f respondents would enable causeand-effect relations to be identified m ore readily. The data sum m arized in this article provide an initial baseline for m easuring trends in w orkers’ FOOTNOTES10 A satisfaction squared term was entered into the regression equation to test whether it outperformed or added to the explanatory power o f the additive specification o f this variable. The results did not significantly differ when the squared term was used as a substitute for the additive term. Including both terms in the equation did not significantly increase the explanatory power o f the model. 1 For a discussion o f opinion polls covering selected views o f trade unions between 1940 and 1966, see Derek C. Bok and John T. Dunlop, Labor and the American Community (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1970), pp. 11-19. 2 This article is condensed from a report submitted to the Assistant Secretary o f Labor for Policy, Evaluation, and Research under contract No. B -9-e-8-2899. For a general discussion o f the survey results, see Graham L. Staines and Robert P. Quinn, “American workers evaluate the quality of their jobs,” Monthly Labor Review, January 1979, pp. 3-12. 11 An interaction term measuring the combined effects o f a high desire for participation and a high perceived difficulty o f achieving changes on the job was tested in several regression runs. The explanatory power o f this interaction term was approximately equal to the combined effects o f desire for influence and difficulty o f change when entered in their additive form. The interaction term did not add significant explanatory power when included with the additive form o f these two variables. 3 Information on the sample drawn for this survey is contained in Robert P. Quinn and Graham L. Staines, The 1977 Quality o f Employment Survey (University o f Michigan, Survey Research Center, 1978), Section Two. 12 A discriminant analysis also was performed on these data as a supplement to, and a check on, the regression results. The same profile o f coefficients was obtained in both procedures. The discriminant model was able to accurately classify 73 percent o f the “no” voters and 72 percent of the “yes” voters. 4 The clusters reported here and in table 3 were derived from factor analyses that are available from the author upon request. 5 Bok and Dunlop, Labor, pp. 13-18. 6 Bok and Dunlop, Labor, p. 13. 7 E. Wight Bakke, “Why Workers Join Unions,” Personnel, July 1945, p. 2. 8 Note that the question being asked o f the workers in this sample is whether they would vote for union representation, not whether they would join a union. Thus, the argument that union benefits are public goods that can be obtained without actually becoming a member and paying union dues need not be addressed here. For a discussion o f this problem, see Mancur Olsen, The Logic o f Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971). 13 This correlation is almost identical to the one reported in a similar study o f the relationship between the importance o f alternative dimensions o f union activists jobs and the effectiveness o f collective bargaining on these job dimensions. In the earlier study, the rank order correlation was .71. Thomas A. Kochan, David B. Lipsky, and Lee Dyer, “Collective Bargaining and the Quality o f Work: The Views o f Local Union Activists,” Proceedings o f the 27th Annual Meeting o f the Industrial Relations Research Association (Madison, Wis., IRRA, 1975), p. 159. 9 See for example Julius Getman, Stephen Goldberg, and Jeanne Herman, Union Representation Elections: Law and Reality (New York, Russel Sage, 1977); Chester A. Schreisheim, “Job Satisfaction, Attitude Toward Unions, and Voting in a Union Representation Election,” Journal o f Applied Psychology —1978. 14 Approximately 79 million employees are in the nonagricultural labor force, o f which approximately 22 million are already members o f labor organizations. Thirty-three percent o f the remaining 57 million unorganized workers provide an estimated 19 million potential union members. 27 Assistance to labor management committees Sec . 6. (a) This section may be cited as the “ Labor Management Cooperation Act of 1978.” (b) It is the purpose of this section— (1) to improve communication between representatives of labor and management; (2) to provide workers and employers with opportunities to study and explore new and innovative joint approaches to achieving organizational effectiveness; (3) to assist workers and employers in solving problems of mutual concern not susceptible to resolution within the col lective bargaining process; (4) to study and explore ways of eliminating potential problems which reduce the competitiveness and inhibit the economic development of the plant, area, or industry; (5) to enhance the involvement of workers in making deci sions that affect their working lives; (6) to expand and improve working relationships between workers and managers; and (7) to encourage free collective bargaining by establishing continuing mechanisms for comm unication between employers and their employees through Federal assistance to the formation and operation of labor management commit tees. * * * (2) Title II of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, is amended by adding after section 205 the following new section: “ Sec . 205A. (a)(1) The [Federal Mediation and Conciliation] Service is authorized and directed to provide assistance in the establishment and operation of plant, area, and industrywide labor management committees which— “ (A) have been organized jointly by employers and labor organizations representing employees in that plant, area, or industry; and “ (B) are established for the purpose of improving labor management relationships, job security, organizational ef fectiveness, enhancing economic development or involving workers in decisions affecting their jobs including improving communication with respect to subjects of mutual interest and concern. “ (2) The Service is authorized and directed to enter into contracts and to make grants, where necessary or appropriate, to fulfill its responsibilities under this section. ----- Excerpts from Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1978 28 ‘P art II. Recent Developments in Labor-Management Cooperation forces supporting and opposing change at 10 joint pro jects. Leonard A. Schlesinger and Richard E. Walton analyze the reactions of union and management par ticipants at eight firms. The increasingly popular flexitime systems which allow employees to adjust their work schedules to fit personal needs and preferences are discussed in two ar ticles. One, by Janice Neipert Hedges, analyzes pro blems and issues of flexible schedules; the other, by Robert T. Golembiewski and Richard J. Hilles, reports favorably on initial experiences at a major phar maceutical company. Robert Zager reports on formal and informal ar rangements developed by unions and management at a General Electric plant to deal with workforce ad justments among technical employees resulting from the introduction of computerized drafting techniques. This section includes articles primarily concerned with joint programs to deal with workplace matters usually considered outside the scope of the collective bargaining process. Experiments in the private and public sectors are covered. Edgar Weinberg reviews past experiences with labormanagement committees and describes recent initiatives at three different levels—plant, community, and in dustry. The process of helping labor and management perceive and solve joint problems is examined by three mediators, John R. Stepp, Robert P. Baker, and Jerome T. Barrett. Three possible remedies for troubled labor-management relationships are described: Rela tionships by Objectives programs; labor-management committees; and joint training programs. The benefits and problems of the pioneering qualityof-worklife projects at the General Motors Corp. are presented in two articles: one by a gm vice president, Stephen H. Fuller; the other by a United Auto Workers vice president, Irving Bluestone. The objectives and results of another uaw cooperative project, the qualityof-worklife program at Harman International In dustries, Inc., in Bolivar, Tennessee, are assessed by Barry A. Macy. Another case study, by Ted Mills, deals with a union-management experiment with autonomous work groups at a small Pennsylvania coal mine. Three cooperative programs, including a joint committee in the retail food industry, a labor-management committee at a small industrial plant, and a quality-of-worklife project at a hospital, are evaluated by James W. Driscoll. Two articles draw conclusions about the process of establishing work restructuring programs from the ex perience of a number of union-management projects. Edward E. Lawler III and John A. Drexler examine Three articles deal with cooperative programs in the public sector. James E. Martin describes the operation of joint union-management committees in six Federal agencies in a large Midwestern city. The role of re searchers in the work of the New York State Continuity of Employment Committee, a joint arrangement set up in 1976 to handle worker displacement problems, is discussed by Todd lick. Anna C. Goldoff reports on the views of union and management representatives in volved in the economy program of the Joint LaborManagement Productivity Committee of the New York City civil service. The last article in part II, by Michael Conte and Ar nold S. Tannenbaum, analyzes several aspects of per formance of employee-owned companies, including profitability, productivity, and job attitudes, and finds tentatively some evidence of positive effects. 29 Labor-management cooperation: a report on recent initiatives Labor and management in several enterprises have suspended traditional fears to deal jointly with productivity and related problems, areas not generally covered by collective bargaining contracts E d g a r W e in b e r g In recent years, there has been increased interest in cooperative approaches, involving both labor and management, to productivity improvement. One of the most important factors has been mutual con cern about job security and survival in older plants and industries facing inflationary cost pressures and international competition. Moreover, many observers believe that with a highly educated work force, it would be beneficial to give employees a chance for more participation and greater insight into decision making, which in the long run could enhance em ployee motivation for productivity improvement. In addition, some favor joint labor-management ap proaches as the means to introduce changes in the quality of working life. Joint committees— a direct outgrowth of these perceived needs— are formal advisory bodies through which proposals for improving production processes or working conditions which affect productivity can be discussed. Created through collective bargaining, they do not deal with negotiable issues of wages and fringe benefits, working conditions, or grievances, but are limited to issues of mutual interest not usually covered by written agreements. Labor-management cooperation through joint committees to work out methods of improving the quantity and quality of production has been disEdgar W einberg is assistant director, N ational Center for Productivity and the Quality o f W orking Life. cussed since the 1920’s, but until recently there have been relatively few cases in peacetime where this type of relationship has been adopted. The sparsity of cases is related to deep-seated beliefs in the United States about the roles of unions, employees, and managers. Sumner Slichter, Robert Livernash, and James Healy cited three reasons why management does not favor cooperative activities: managers underestimate workers’ potential contribution; they fear loss of prestige and authority; and they are con cerned that giving workers a voice would strengthen the union’s position.1 Unions and employees, on their part, often equate productivity with loss of jobs or greater worker effort, or fear that cooperation might weaken their ability to bargain for their primary objectives. Nonetheless, such committees have been set up in several enterprises. This article describes recent initiatives in labor-management cooperation at three different levels— plant, community, and industry— and discusses factors affecting its wider adoption. A common thread of recent joint efforts is the tradi tional concern with issues of job preservation or improvement and company or industry survival. In contrast to European developments, the labor-man agement committees discussed in this article have been established voluntarily in efforts to solve specific problems, rather than as responses to wellarticulated demands for “industrial democracy,” co-determination, or other forms of power sharing. From the Review of April 1976 30 Early approval Fifty years ago it was hoped that cooperation would become the norm in the “mature” stage of collective bargaining when unions no longer would have to fight for the right to exist. William Green, the president of the American Federation of Labor, saw advantages for both unions and management in co operative relationships which utilized the ideas and judgment of those “who handle tools and mate rials.” 2 Later, Philip Murray, president of the Con gress of Industrial Organizations, believed that once employers fully and sincerely accepted unions, orga nized labor had some responsibility in achieving efficient plant operations. The general idea that unions were willing to co operate with management on productivity was put forth to counter employers’ anti-union charges dur ing the 1920’s that trade unions reduced efficiency, raised costs, and opposed technological progress. This was a time when the movement to eliminate waste through scientific management was attracting wide support. B & O Plan. One of the best known cases of unionmanagement cooperation was the Baltimore and Ohio (B & O) Railroad Plan. Introduced in 1923, a few years after railway unions had proposed the Plumb Plan for nationalization of the failing rail road system, it was cited as proof that unionmanagement cooperation was workable and mutually beneficial. It established an important model that has, in many respects, been followed in other in dustries. Otto Beyer, a B & O management engineer, and W. H. Johnston, president of the Machinists Union, conceived the idea of forming committees of union and management representatives to consider matters outside the scope of usual collective bargaining over wages and hours and grievances. Johnston, a Social ist, believed that union-management cooperation was a prime necessity for their mutual survival and prosperity.3 Joint committees in the B & O repair shops met regularly to deal with worker suggestions for elimi nating waste, increasing efficiency, improving working conditions, stabilizing employment, main taining the volume of work, and acquiring new business. Almost 31,000 suggestions were made in the first 15 years of the B & O Plan, and they made an important contribution to productivity. The em ployees benefited in better working conditions, somewhat higher wages, fewer grievances, improved apprentice training and, prior to the depression, stable employment.4 The depression of the 1930’s dried up workers’ interest in cost-saving suggestions, and the Plan disintegrated. As unemployment mounted, unions gave little attention to plans for improving pro ductivity. World War II experience. The most extensive experi ment with labor-management production commit tees took place in World War II, when industry was trying to increase military output in the face of shortages of labor, materials, and energy. Early in 1942, the War Production Board, with the backing of the AFL, CIO, National Association of Manu facturers, and the Chamber of Commerce, appealed to employers and unions to organize joint labormanagement productivity committees on a voluntary basis. A small unit was created in the Board to pro vide guidelines and monitor progress, but the devel opment of activities was left to the parties themselves. Between 1942 and 1945, there were about 5,000 committees functioning, most of them conducting bond drives, blood banks, carpools, and similar activities to boost morale. Most of the committees were in unionized plants, with heavy concentrations in steel, ordnance, and shipbuilding. About 1,000 dealt with improving productive efficiency, focusing on activities to reduce waste of energy and materials, improve quality, cut machine downtime, and improve tool and product design and equipment maintenance. In a definitive assessment of the World War II experience, one observer concluded that in the opinion of many employers and union officials, these committees had helped to increase productivity and had enhanced mutual understanding of each other’s problem.5 No precise productivity measurement, however, is available. When the war emergency ended, most of the com mittees closed down, and the War Production Board unit ceased to function. In Canada, the government decided to continue its support of joint labormanagement committees and established a unit in the Labor Department for the purpose of continuing assistance to committees. There are about 2,700 committees currently in operation there.6 Postwar committees. Since the end of World War II, there has been a continuing but limited interest in formal labor-management cooperation for produc tivity. Unions have concentrated on trying to obtain, through collective bargaining, their share of rising productivity in the form of higher wages and fringe benefits and greater job security, leaving to manage ment the responsibility of improving efficiency. By pressing for “more and more,” unions believe they stimulate productivity-enhancing innovation and pro 31 vide the basis of the mass consumption needed for mass production. Joint committees for increasing productivity, therefore, have been formed only in exceptional situations. One of these— the Union-Management Coopera tive Committee system of the Tennessee Valley Authority— has operated since the 1940’s with strong support from both sides. Joint committees covering construction, plant, and office workers con sider suggestions for improvement and solicit solu tions to specific problems. No cash awards are made for ideas accepted, yet participation has been rela tively high. There has been general agreement that the TV A program has contributed to efficiency and has helped to sustain high employee morale, but few other government agencies have adopted such plans.7 Another significant postwar development in unionmanagement cooperation was the Scanlon Plan, named after the Steelworker Union official, Joe Scanlon, who conceived it. Scanlon’s aim ip helping establish the plan was to assist firms in danger of going out of business. One of the most important elements of the plan is a system of joint production committees to encourage and evaluate suggestions for work improvement. Other unique features are a plant-wide incentive scheme based on measuring plant-wide productivity change and a formula for distributing productivity savings in the form of monthly bonuses. Although proponents of the Scanlon Plan believe that it is applicable to firms of all sizes, relatively few companies— 300-500 ac cording to some estimates— are using the plan.8 to develop general guidelines that local unions and employers might adapt to their specific situation. Basic steel. The most extensive on-going program of labor-management cooperation was begun in •1971, when the United Steelworkers and the 10 basic steel companies agreed to establish joint com mittees on productivity at each plant. Concern over the steel industry’s lagging productivity in the 1960’s and the potential loss of jobs because of foreign imports provided the immediate impetus behind organizing a formal system of labor-management cooperation in this industry. Both parties agreed that The statistical record; B3LS studies of joint committees Aside from the examples cited here, only a few co l lective bargaining contracts have included provisions for labor-management productivity committees. A survey b y the Bureau o f Labor Statistics o f 1,773 major agreements in effect in 1963-64 found 44 agreements with provisions for joint com m ittees deal ing with production problems. In 1973, 64 out o f 1,311 major agreements contained such provisions; in 1974, the number increased to 97 out o f 1,550, with m ost o f the com m ittees in the steel industry. These figures exclude joint production committees set up under the Scanlon Plan. In addition, there are labor-management com mittees that deal with safety, training, and industrial relations issues. A special BLS study for the N ational Com m ission on Productivity found joint com m ittees fragile insti tutions, but viable under certain circumstances. Of the 44 contracts with com mittees in the above survey, half had dropped such provisions in a 1972 resurvey. The BLS investigation o f six cases found that where a measure o f success was found, the com m ittee was a means o f discussing matters not covered by the contract that were bothering em ployees, and a means o f getting quick decisions from management, bypass ing lower echelons. In som e cases, the industrial rela tions benefits probably exceeded productivity gains. The BLS study highlighted som e conditions o f success: the crucial role o f key managers and union officials in sustaining interest; the usefulness o f good com munications with rank-and-file workers to allay fears o f displacement; and the usefulness o f good labor-management relations at the start so a com mittee may survive the early period o f adjustment. A ll but one o f the com mittees studied by the BLS functioned in areas not subject to collective bargaining. The findings are contained in Harry D outy, L aborM anagem ent P roductivity C o m m ittees in A m erican Industry (W ashington, N ational C om m ission on Pro ductivity and Work Quality, M ay 1 9 75), and Charac teristics o f M ajor C ollective Bargaining A greem ents, Bureau o f Labor Statistics Bulletin 1888, July 1, 1974. Mecemt efforts at cooperation Since 1971, there have been several significant developments in labor-management cooperation and joint consultation. Some have been organized at the plant level, some at the industry level, and some at the community level, each addressed to an appro priate set of problems. The joint production com mittees at the plant level, as in the steel and auto mobile industry, directly involve management and employees in problem-solving to improve the orga nization’s performance. Joint committees at the com munity level, as in Jamestown, N.Y., set up at the initiative of community leaders, involve labor and business leaders in efforts to improve the industrial labor climate, with the ultimate goal of retaining jobs in existing plants through modernization, in creased productivity, and competitiveness. Coopera tion is also taking place at the industry level, as in the retail food and railroad industries. In such joint committees, labor and management leaders discuss broad issues affecting their mutual interests and try 32 there were critical issues of mutual survival war ranting cooperative efforts. Considered from a longer perspective, the 1971 agreement can be seen as the outcome of an evolu tionary process of accommodation. The Steelworkers and the steel companies had been engaged, over many years, in joint activities which had built up a sense of mutual trust between the parties.9 Among their joint accomplishments was a complex job classi fication system for the industry; a highly developed arbitration system for grievance settlement; and pen sion and health benefits. The Joint Basic Education Program, with Federal financial assistance, provided opportunities for steelworkers to improve their basic educational skills. Worker acceptance of produc tivity improvements in basic steel is encouraged by collective bargaining contracts which provide for supplementary unemployment benefits, early retire ment, a 13-week vacation for seniority, and other measures to cushion the impact of change. The primary purpose of the program begun in 1971 was to organize joint committees with union representatives to advise plant management on ways of improving productivity and promoting the use of domestic steel. An agreement made in 1974 renewed the provisions for joint committees, and changed the name to “Employment Security and Plant Pro ductivity Committees.” The 1971 and 1974 agreements provided Joint Advisory Committees at each plant, with an industry wide committee to coordinate activities and advise plant committees. It limited the scope of the com mittee’s operation so that it would not affect “the existing rights of either party under any other pro vision of the collective bargaining agreement.” Subjects that plant committees have considered in clude the following: avoidance of quality defects, improved identification of warehoused steel, more efficient handling of scrap, energy conservation, more efficient phasing out of old equipment and better care of new equipment.10 Although about 230 individual joint plant produc tivity committees were in operation by the end of 1975, there is little detailed information about their experience so far. Unlike the Human Relations Com mittees of the 1960’s, the Employment Security and Plant Productivity Committees involve union officers and members at steel plants rather than being limited to union and management technicians. In the first year, unemployment among steel workers reportedly delayed the organization of com mittees; dissension arose when some union leaders charged that some supervisors attempted to reduce manning in a manner contrary to the agreement, and management accused some unions of trying to use the committees to take up grievances that could not be processed through normal procedures.11 The guidelines for joint committees provided the procedure for resolving such differences about the local committee’s authority. When either party ques tions whether an item falls within a joint committee’s purview, it is referred to the industry committee for resolution. Following an initial period of uncer tainty, the parties have generally come to an under standing about limitations on the scope of committee deliberations. One management official of a steel company, in an account of his experience with introducing the committee system, stressed the importance of a pre paratory period and of establishing a network of subcommittees in all departments within a plant. In the beginning, separate classes for management officials and foremen and union officers and shop stewards were held to explain the principles of the agreement. “From the classroom sessions, it became evident that there were local areas in which people would like to participate with management in cor recting problems they thought existed. This resulted in the development of what we call circle team efforts, made up of both supervisors and hourly personnel in specific areas. It made an attempt to work out bottlenecks they thought existed within a department. Some were very successful; others were not.” 12 Leaders of the Steelworkers Union have said that the value of Employment Security and Plant Pro ductivity Committees, to a great extent, lies in its contribution to the general acceptance of the Experi mental Negotiating Agreement, signed on March 29, 1973.13 This procedure for voluntary arbitration of any unresolved bargaining issues has largely elimi nated the uncertainty at each negotiating period that encouraged inventory buildups and increased steel imports, followed by higher unemployment and low productivity after contract settlements. The ENA was used to the satisfaction of both parties in the 1974 negotiations and then was accepted as a pro cedure for bargaining until 1980. (It should be noted, however, that there have been no steel strikes since 1959.) Automobile industry. Productivity improvement has long been recognized by management and labor leaders in the automobile industry as a “sound and mutually beneficial objective.” The provision for the annual improvement factor, first introduced in the 1948 agreement between the United Auto Workers and major automobile companies, and con tinued in subsequent agreements, states that this wage gain “depends upon technological progress, 33 better tools, methods, processes and equipment, and a cooperative attitude on the part of all parties in such progress.” The acceptance of the annual im provement factor, however, has not diminished prob lems in the setting of work standards on the job. Such issues affecting job conditions of assembly line workers have long been a source of dispute and negotiation at the plant level. In the past few years, there has also been increas ing concern about absenteeism and turnover which adversely affect productivity and work quality, espe cially on production lines involving sequential opera tions. Some automobile companies started experi ments in the early 1970’s to deal with problems affecting working conditions without the participa tion of the UAW. In 1973, after union protest, a joint national committee was established in each automobile company to work on a year-round basis . on efforts to improve the quality of working life. The 1973 memorandum of agreement between the union and General Motors notes “the desirability of mutual effort to improve the quality of work life for the employees.” It states that projects have been undertaken by management with the union’s partici pation involving organizational development in order “to improve the quality of work life.” The agreement notes that such efforts would benefit the worker “by making work a more satisfying experience . . ., the Corporation by leading to a reduction in employee absenteeism and turnover . . ., and the consumer through improvement in the quality of the products manufactured.” 14 The National GM-UAW Committee to Improve the Quality of Work Life was established in 1973 to review and evaluate corporate programs to im prove the work environment of employees repre sented by the union, to develop experiments and projects in that area, to maintain records of its meetings, deliberations, and all experiments and evaluations it conducts, to report to the company and the union on the results of its activities, and to arrange for any outside counsel which it feels is necessary or desirable, the expenses of which to be shared equally by both parties. Under the com mittee’s sponsorship, a number of joint quality of work projects are underway. At the plant level, a key feature of these projects is a joint labor-manage ment committee which is empowered to plan and supervise the progress of experiments, including the hiring of consultants. While productivity improve ment is not an explicit goal, quality-of-work projects often address work problems that affect the plant’s production performance. One example of quality-of-work projects with UAW participation is the joint experiment with the Rockwell Standard Division of Rockwell Interna tional. An agreement was signed in August 1974 to conduct a joint project at a new plant to be opened in Battle Creek, Mich., with 400 expected to be employed by 1977. The company and the union agree in advance to use several innovative concepts, including training of employees for widened respon sibilities to maximize job interchangeability and manpower mobility, establishment of “work team” concepts within departments, or specified work areas, or both, employee participation in establishing pro duction standards with due regard to competitive factors and job security for employees involved, em ployee participation in the determination of policies covering overtime, work-break periods, layoffs, and leaves of absence which would take individual needs into consideration, and emphasis on foremanemployee relationships designed to resolve work problems at the lowest possible level.15 While the recession has delayed full application, the agreement is still in force. Another joint experiment is the Bolivar, Ten nessee, Work Improvement Program established in 1973 between the UAW and the Harmon Inter national Company, a producer of automobile mirrors with a work force of 8,700. With foundation grants and Federal financial support, and at a later stage, company funds, a social scientist, selected with union approval, has assisted the union and manage ment in designing experiments to eliminate sources of discontent. Following an employee attitude survey to identify major problems, a labor-management committee was formed to review the results and organize work improvement experiments. Small groups of workers and supervisors jointly decide on ways of changing work methods with the objective of improving both productivity and job satisfaction. One of the projects involved a new reward system giving workers exceeding production standards in less than 8 hours the option of earning more money or taking off time. The result was an increase in productivity and a request for in-plant training classes.16 The railroad industry. Following almost a decade of dispute over manning, the Railroad Labor-Manage ment Committee, composed of the presidents of 11 railroads, the industry association, and 6 union organizations, was set up in January 1968, to study jointly matters of mutual interest, such as safety, research, education, and legislation, in a setting re moved from the pressures of the bargaining table. It stemmed from a growing awareness that solutions to many of the industry’s underlying financial and 34 economic difficulties are matters of concern to both parties. The committee’s progress has been slow. Study projects on specific problem areas have been under taken, with funding by the industry, labor, and in some cases, the Federal Railroad Administration. A 14-man Task Force on Terminals made up of 6 union, 6 railroad, and 2 government officials, was established in 1973 to develop and test innovative experiments in terminal operations. The objective was to increase the reliability, speed, and efficiency of car movements through terminals, which have been a bottleneck in the industry. A case study of a specific terminal—the St. Louis terminal of the Missouri Pacific Railroad— was decided. A joint labor-management team was assigned to “identify barriers to efficiency, propose changes in management and labor practices and government policies and regulations, and conduct on-line experiments designed to test the effectiveness of the proposed solutions.” The Task Force, in its 1974 progress report, described 18 specific experiments in terminal opera tions designed to meet five objectives: improved service reliability, reduced car detention time, crea tion of new business, better management techniques for planning and evaluation, and greater job security and safety.17 Labor’s representative, as associate director of the project, helped to plan the experiments, many of which showed possibilities of significant cost savings from reduced congestion, faster and more car movements, and other operational changes. The Task Force recommended that changes proven effec tive by the experiment be put into regular practice at the St. Louis terminal. In May 1975, the Labor-Management Committee broadened the scope of the Task Force on Terminals, designating it The Task Force on Railroad Trans portation, with the understanding that it would con tinue its activities on other functions in cooperation with the Federal Railroad Administration. The retail food industry. Organized at the end of the wage and price controls program in March 1974, the Joint Labor-Management Committee of the Retail Food Industry provides a forum for the joint communication and cooperation on long-term in dustry problems, such as management .and union work practices, technological change and produc tivity, and the structure of bargaining, and possible solutions.18 The Committee is composed of officers of the three major unions—the Teamsters, the Re tail Clerks, and the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butchers— and officials of eight leading food chains. A leading arbitrator serves as the neutral chairman, working with a small staff funded by the industry members and the unions. The Committee’s activities are closely coordinated with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. Although collective bargaining is conducted on a local basis in this highly fragmented industry, union and industry leaders agreed that consideration at a national forum of issues in which both sides had a mutual interest could help to improve local negotia tions, reduce the incidence of work stoppages, and promote long-range stability. In its first 18 months, the joint committee, meet ing monthly in different cities, dealt with a variety of industry issues, of mutual interest. In October 1974, it formulated a set of voluntary guidelines for collective bargaining based on procedures charac teristic of successful negotiations.19 Among the 10 procedures were such practices as exchange of pro posals well in advance of contract expiration, use of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, and other steps to achieve peaceful settlements. When consumer and union groups in early 1975 threatened to obstruct the introduction of automa tion through legislation, an eight-man joint subcom mittee was established to collect “accurate and re liable” information about the impact of the electronic checkout and the elimination of price marking. The subcommittee agreed on a set of principles for collective bargainers which recognizes that man agement’s interest in using the new technology to improve productivity must be balanced with labor’s “concern about the impact on the size of the work force and the nature of the changed job assignments.” Collective bargainers are asked to consider measures to minimize any adverse impact, keeping in mind the uncertainty about pace of change, costs, savings, and manpower impact that surrounds employers’ decisions on electronic scanning. The subcommittee agreed to focus on provisions for advance notice of changes affecting employees, methods for sharing information and consultation before changes are introduced, and collective bargaining solutions for problems that may arise.20 The recommendations were expressed in general terms, recognizing that they must be refined for each particular situation. The joint committee has also commissioned Har vard University’s School of Public Health to study the health aspects of the use of polyvinyl chloride film in retail meat markets. This study is intended to provide a factual basis for establishing safe work practices. 35 Other recent cooperative efforts FMCS program. The Federal Mediation and Con ciliation Service (FMCS) has long encouraged and assisted the establishment of labor-management committees in various plants and localities in order to lessen the impact of industrial disputes. By fos tering industrial peace, these committees are also expected to contribute to productivity improvement. This preventive mediation approach was made an integral part of the FMCS’ statutory responsibili ties (sec. 203 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947), and has been endorsed by several labor relations study groups. The National LaborManagement Panel in 1964, and the National Commission on Industrial Peace in 1974, recom mended expansion of labor-management committee activities.21 FMCS mediators, acting as neutral chairmen, at the request of the parties, help lead joint com mittee meetings to identify problems of mutual interest, concentrating on workplace issues that are not usually matters of negotiation or grievance. A new FMCS mediation procedure, Relations by Objective, is being introduced to improve com munications between bargaining periods and enhance mutual trust by the application of behaviorial science problem-solving techniques. The essence of this system is the step-by-step establishment of mutual objectives, starting with each side determining what the other side should do to improve labor-manage ment relations, and then what each side could do itself. The lists of objectives become the agenda for separate discussions and, finally, the joint committee discussions on specific action steps. Mediators trained in these procedures helped to organize joint com mittees at a pulp and paper mill in Maine, after a 3-week strike, and succeeded in reducing grievances and markedly improving relations between manage ment and five unions. A FMCS-assisted labor-man agement committee at a particleboard plant in Wisconsin reported a sharp reduction in grievances and waste.22 While these committees are not directly concerned with production, mediators report that they fre quently contribute to better morale and improved plant performance. For example, a committee may take up a problem of discipline which had roots in lack of proper supervision, resulting in poor employee productivity. The Federal Mediation and Concilia tion Service takes the approach that, in the long run, better communication and mutual respect help lessen grievances and strikes and can create a climate re ceptive to productivity improvements. Community effort: Jamestown, N .Y. A highly inter esting example of community self-renewal through labor-management cooperation is the joint activi ties taking place in Jamestown, N.Y., a factory town of 40,000 people in the western part of the state. Faced with loss of plants and jobs because of a “bad labor relations climate,” the mayor, on the advice of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, called together the town’s leading manufac turers and union leaders in 1972, to discuss ways of halting the community’s decline. Industrial develop ment efforts had failed to attract new business. After several meetings, the group decided to es tablish the Jamestown Area Labor-Management Committee. The 30 business members include in ternational corporations as well as local firms. Unions involved include the Machinists, Auto Workers, Steelworkers, and Furniture Workers. Following an intensive investigation of areas of common interest, the committee established four goals: productivity gains in existing industries, im provement of labor relations, manpower develop ment, and assistance to industrial development pro grams. Productivity was singled out as the most important objective of the committee at the earliest discussions. In its 1975 report, Three Productive Years, the committee states that such a goal could only be enunciated once labor leaders were assured that no jobs would be eliminated in any plant as a result of achieving productivity gains because “unions had come to regard the word productivity as equated with ‘speed-up’ time-and-motion approaches which were so distasteful to their members.” The report describes this process: Upon analysis, the labor leaders came to a difficult conclusion that in the long term, productivity must be a primary goal. The only way to improve the business conditions for existing companies was to make them more competitive. Continual complaints from manu facturers about high New York State taxes and other costs of doing business in this area had to be offset by higher levels of productivity. Furthermore, the best way to attract new industry and to deal with the new thrust of increasing foreign competition was to prove that Jamestown was a productive place to do business because of a good labor relations atmosphere.23 With Federal funds from the Economic Develop ment Administration of the Department of Commerce and the National Commission on Productivity, and technical advice from Cornell University labor ex perts, the committee hired a full-time coordinator and a noted consultant to carry out a program of demonstration projects and educational activities. 36 Establishing plant labor-management committees was a key feature of the program. The objective was to create a channel of communication for the expression of employee opinion rather than imposing a predesigned plan. About 10 plants have initiated joint productivity improvement projects, including experiments in redesign of work at a glass processing plant, a program for training key skilled workers for woodworking plants, and a gain-sharing program to increase material utilization at a glass-tempering plant. In addition, training programs in management skills and labor relations have been developed with the assistance of the local community college. As the plant committees take over the function of initiating projects, the community-wide labormanagement committee has become a clearinghouse, serving as a facilitator and sponsor of joint confer ences and other educational activities. The objective is to foster an atmosphere receptive to new concepts about productivity, the quality of work, and labor relations, both at the plant and community level. One of the key factors in the continued existence of labor-management plant committees has been maintenance of close communications among all the participants. The committee’s report stresses that poor communication as to the real objective and impact of such committees has sometimes threatened the break-up of a particular committee. According to the report, “The understanding of the rank and file as to the need for collaboration is the heart of the process. To the extent that any labor leader who is involved in such a committee has difficulty with rank-and-file resistance, the entire program is jeopardized.” In the 3 years of the committee’s existence, despite nationwide recession in 1974-75, there has been a remarkable turnaround in the com munity’s economic prospects. Strikes and grievances have been reduced. Several plants were saved from liquidation, in some cases with the cooperation of the employees and their unions. Employment has increased significantly. Many workers have received training to upgrade their skills. Largely because of the favorable labor-management climate, a major engine company, with potential employment of 1,500, has decided to locate a plant in Jamestown. The project has inspired a countywide effort, involv ing smaller industrial communities. In nearby Buffalo, a city of 1.5 million and declining employment, union and business leaders have formed a joint com mittee patterned after Jamestown’s. Outlook One of the most striking features of these ex amples is that cooperation is taking place in several major industries— steel, automobiles, railroads, and retail food—facing serious competitive pressures or industrial relations problems. Union and manage ment in these situations have voluntarily put aside, to a degree, traditional mistrust to deal through joint committees with problems affecting productivity, di rectly or indirectly. While the impact on productivity in most cases may be impossible to measure, there is general agreement that these initiatives could help to create an industrial relations climate favorable to productivity improvement. Labor-management committees at the plant or industry level appear to be fragile organizations, having their own problems of leadership, commit ment communication, and participation. Debates over management rights and job security may be stilled but not wholly eliminated. To be effective, mutual trust is critical. At the start, joint plant com mittees may need a period of preparation and orien tation and, in some cases, outside, neutral, technical assistance. It is essential that employees be kept informed of committee activities, and that fears of displacement or reduced status be allayed. Without some mechanism for sharing productivity gains other than collective bargaining, the committee ap proach may not arouse interest among rank-and-file members. Although introduction of joint productivity com mittees on a wide scale may be doubtful, given deepseated mistrust between labor and management and the persistence of high unemployment, the prospect for greater experimentation seems more favorable than it has been since World War II. One reason is that there exists among management and labor policy makers some agreement about the nature and im portance of productivity improvement. A 1974 sur vey of union and management officials found that most believe that increasing productivity is an im portant goal, although union officials as a group espouse this view less strongly than do managers.24 There is also a strong consensus about the possibility for unions and management to cooperate on pro ductivity programs. However, there is also evidence of fairly widespread mutual mistrust between the two groups, with management believing unions are ob stacles to change and unions believing management is not concerned about workers. The ’rvey con cludes that such mistrust would need to suspended before cooperative programs could be undertaken, but the agreement on the importance of efforts to increase productivity and quality of work life points to a “potential springboard for joint action.” Considerable potential for cooperation is likely to be found in communities with old plants, a tradition 37 of unionism, and competition from modern non union firms, domestic or foreign. In such places, community pressure for industrial peace and a co operative labor-management reputation can result in persuading corporate planners that modernization of their local plants would be more profitable than relocation. Thus, the Jamestown, N.Y., experience is proving to be an attractive model for similar in dustrial communities with high unemployment, such as Cumberland, Md., Muskegon, Mich., Evansville, Ind:, and Lockhaven, Pa., which have recently or ganized joint committees. In October 1975, the New York Governor’s Labor-Management Conference on Jobs recommended that joint committees modeled after Jamestown’s be organized in other cities in the State. Interest in union-management cooperation may also be heightened by recognition of the role of pro ductivity improvement in offsetting inflationary cost pressures. In addition, with the high cost of capital, some businesses may find labor-management co operation an attractive alternative to investment in automation. In the construction industry, the com petition of nonunion contractors is encouraging co operation between unions and management to im prove productivity. There is likely to be pressure for labor-manage ment cooperation in the public sector, where limited revenues, union wage pressures, and public demands for services have combined to make improved productivity a vital necessity. A 1970 BLS survey of municipal agreements found that about 1 out of 5 provided for joint committees to discuss problems of common interest. About half of Federal agree ments in 1971 had such provision. Although not always specifically mentioned, productivity issues could be taken up by such committees.25 A third and final factor in the future spread of labor-management committees is the encouragement being given by Federal and State Governments and specialized nonprofit institutions. The National Center for Productivity and the Quality of Working Life, an independent agency of the Federal Govern ment, with a board of directors composed of labor, business, government, and public leaders, has as one of its functions the fostering of joint coopera tion. Productivity commissions or centers are being considered by State governments in Maryland, Michi gan, Washington, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Important sources of information, technical assist ance, and demonstration are being organized on a continuing basis by nonprofit institutions with labor and business leaders represented on boards of direc tors.26 The diffusion of knowledge about specific benefits and problems of labor-management coopera tion for productivity and quality of working life could help both parties adapt the idea to their in dividual circumstances. ---------- F O O T N O T E S---------1 Sumner Slichter, E. R. Livernash, J. J. H ealy, The Im pact o f C ollective Bargaining on M anagem ent (W ashington, Brookings Institution, 1 9 60), p. 842. Differences between conventional bargaining and union-management cooperation are discussed by N . W. Chamberlain and J. W. Kuhn, C ollective Bargaining (N ew York, M cG raw-Hill B ook Co., 1 9 65), pp. 4 2 4 -3 5 . See also R. E. W alton and R. B. McKersie, A Behaviorial Theory o f L abor N egotiations (N ew York, M cG raw-Hill Book Co., 1965). 2 Harry A. M illis and R oyal M ontgomery, O rganized L abor (N e w York, M cG raw -H ill Book C o., 1 9 45), pt». 4 6 5-66. 3 Philip Taft, O rganized L abor in A m erican H istory (N ew York, Harper and Row , 1 9 64), p. 381. 4 Harry D outy, Labor-M anagem ent P roductivity C om m ittees in A m erican Industry (W ashington, N ational C om m ission on Productivity and W ork Quality, M ay 1975), p. 8. 5 D orothea de Schweinitz, L abor and M anagem ent in a C om m on E nterprise (Cambridge, M ass., Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 155. 6 Inform ation from the Branch, Ottawa, Canada. U nion M anagement ° Brian E. M oore and Paul S. G oodm an, A Plant-W ide P roductivity Plan in A ction: Three Y ears o f Experience with the Scanlon Plan (W ashington, N ational Com m ission on Productivity and Work Quality, 1975). 9 A lawyer who participated on the union side in many negotiations pointed out in 1968 that despite bitter disputes in the 1950’s, culminating in the 1959 strike, “There was a continuing, mature and sophisticated relationship based on mutual acceptance by each party o f the other party’s status and need and a relatively objective search for solutions to joint problem s.” D avid E. Feller, “The Steel Experience: Myth and Reality,” Proceedings of the Tw enty-F irst Annual W inter M eeting, D ecem ber 1968 (M adison, W is., Industrial Relations Research A ssociation, 1969) p. 153. 10 R ecent In itiatives in Labor-M anagem ent C ooperation (W ashington, N ational Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life, 1 9 76), p. 13. u Industry W eek, D ec. 6, 1971. 12 R ecent Initiatives, p. 15. Services 7 Harry D outy, L abor-M anagem ent C om m ittees, pp. 1 5 17. See also Arnold Tannenbaum, “Systems o f Form al Participation,” O rganizational Behavior: Research and Issues (M adison, W is., Industrial Relations Research A sso ciation, 1974) p. 96. 131. W . A bel, E m ploym en t Security and P lant P roductivity C om m ittees: Ten Coordinating Steel C om panies (W ashing ton, N ational C om m ission on Productivity and Work Quality, 1974), pp. 7 -8 . See also Bruce Thrasher, “Joint 38 Labor-M anagement A pproach to Productivity— The Steel Industry,” Proceedings o f the Conference on P roductivity: Its Im pact on C ollective Bargaining and E m ployee R ela tions (N ashville, University o f Tennessee, Institute for Pub lic Service, 1973), pp. 9-2 0 . 14 Testim ony o f D onald F. Ephlin, Administrative A ssis tant to the President, International Union, U nited A uto Workers, before U.S. Senate Committee on Governm ent Operations, Mar. 20, 1975, on S.765, N ational Center for Productivity and Quality o f W ork Life Act. Letter from G eorge B. Morris, Jr., vice president, General M otors Corp., to Irving Bluestone, vice president, International U nion, United A uto Workers, Oct. 17, 1973. 15 “Try N ovel Plan at R ockw ell,” Solidarity, September 1974. 16 “H ow Workers Can G et Eight-Hour Pay for F ive,” Business W eek, M ay 19, 1975, p. 52. See also The N ew Y ork Tim es, Apr. 9, 1975, p. 24, and The Q uality o f W ork: The First Eighteen M on th s (W ashington, N ational Quality o f Work Center and Institute o f Social Research, 1975), pp. 43—47. 17 A Program o f E xperim ents In volvin g Changes in T er m inal Operations: 1974 Progress R e p o rt (W ashington, Task Force on Terminals o f the Labor-M anagement Com m ittee, 1975). 18 “Retail F ood Industry Labor-M anagement C om m ittee,” Cost o f Living Council N ew s Release, Apr. 12, 1974. 10 C ollective Bargaining P rocedures fo r the R etail F ood Industry, W ashington, Joint Labor M anagement Com m ittee o f the Retail Food Industry, Mar. 6, 1975. 20 Statem ent o f P rinciples on U niform P roduct C ode and R elated-Technology, W ashington, Joint Labor M anagement Com m ittee o f the Retail F ood Industry, M ay 23, 1975. 21 Charles L. Bowen, “Preventive M ediation,” P roceed ings o f the T w enty-F ir st A nn ual W inter M eeting (M adison, W is., Industrial Relations Research A ssociation, 1 9 6 9 ), p. 160. A lso, R ep o rt and R ecom m en dations, The N ational C om m ission for Industrial Peace (W ashington, Executive Office o f the President, 1 9 74), pp. 6 -7 . 22 R ecent Initiatives, pp. 2 5 -30. 23 Three P roductive Y ears (Jamestown, N .Y ., Labor M an agement Com m ittee o f the Jamestown Area, 1 9 75), p. 4. 24 Raymond A . Katzell and D aniel Y ankelovich, and others, W ork P roductivity and Job Satisfaction: A n E valua tion o f P olicy R elated Research, Part 2, Research Findings, Report for the N ational Science Foundation (N e w York, N ew York University, 1 9 75), pp. 9 9 -102. 26 C ollective Bargaining A greem ents in Large Cities, Bul letin 1759 (Bureau o f Labor Statistics, 1972). C ollective Bargaining A greem en ts in the F ederal Service, L ate 1971, Bulletin 1789 (Bureau o f Labor Statistics, 1973). The ex periences o f 8 com m ittees are described by Sam Zagoria and others in L abor M anagem ent C om m ittees in the Public Sector (W ashington, N ational C om m ission on Productivity and Work Quality, 1975). 28 Som e are affiliated with State university schools or insti tutes, such as the Center for the Quality o f W orking Life o f the University o f California at Los A ngeles and the N ational Quality o f W ork Center o f the U niversity o f M ichigan. Others include the W ork in Am erica Institute and the M assachusetts Q uality o f W ork Life Center. Tine erykng meed In effect, I am recommending that we really take a look at this adversarial relationship. It must be dramatically changed toward a cooperative, collaborative relationship. We do not get needed support in our schools. Our schools do not teach labor-management coopera tion; they teach management-labor conflict—how to resolve conflict, how to mediate, how to arbitrate, how to negotiate, how to fight. They do not teach labor and management how to work together toward mutually satisfying goals. That is a crying need in our country today. -------S t a n L u n d i n e , Member of Congress Hearings, “ The Human Factor in Innovation and Productivity,” Science, Research, and Technology Subcommittee of the House Committee on Science and Technology, September 15, 1981, p. 370 39 Helping labor and management see and solve problems A mediator can help improve an unhealthy labor-management relationship by recognizing the symptoms , m aking an accurate diagnosis, and carefully prescribing appropriate remedies John R. Stepp, Robert P. Baker , and Jerome T. Barrett The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service has rec ognized that the effective promotion of labor-manage ment peace requires more than just an “eleventh-hour” appearance at the bargaining table by its mediators. Like most other professional organizations that respond to human emergencies, the service has learned that by blending prevention with treatment its resources are used more efficiently. The preventive mediation function requires the medi ator to be alert to symptoms of untoward labor-man agement relationships, to diagnose the problems accurately, and to prescribe effective remedies.' The na ture and severity of the symptoms must be recognized and traced to their source; the remedy must be suited to the location of the symptoms in the labor or manage ment hierarchy, or both; and the parties must be per suaded that the cure is preferable to the disease and'is clearly in their own self-interests. This article extracts from accumulated experience those principles on which a prescriptive model for im proving labor-management relationships can be built.2 John R. Stepp is Director, Office of Labor-Management Relations Services, U.S. Department of Labor; Robert P. Baker is District Di rector. Western Region, San Francisco, Federal Mediation and Con ciliation Service; and Jerome T. Barrett is Director and Associate Professor of Industrial and Labor Relations, Northern Kentucky Uni versity, Highland Heights. From the Review of September 1982 40 This empirical model is erected on the perceptions and experiences of the authors, all of whom are or have been Federal mediators.3 Recognizing the symptoms Mediators are uniquely positioned to detect the dan ger signals emanating from a poor labor-mangement re lationship. When involved at the collective bargaining table in dispute mediation, the mediator can make a reasoned judgment as to the nature of the relationship behind the conflict. This is done by examining the is sues, assessing each side’s internal relationships, and testing and verifying these impressions through indepth private discussions with both parties. Numerous issues, especially noneconomic or language items, are often symptomatic of underlying problems which are being addressed in a circuitous manner. When this is the case, a contractual agreement may be no more than a bandage on a festering wound. The un derlying problems have neither been identified nor ad dressed and certainly have not been resolved. Every mediator, at one time or another, has entered a negotiation shortly before a strike deadline, only to be confronted with many unresolved issues. In private dis cussions with the moving party, usually the union com mittee, the mediator learns that these issues are an attempt to send the other party “a message.” The mes relationship may be viewed along a simple continuum consisting of three benchmarks: conflict, detente, and ac commodation.4 An employer at the conflict end of the continuum never really accepts the union: “ . . . he does not yield to the union even a narrow, restricted scope until he lit erally has to; and he looks for the first opportunity to get rid of the intruder. His acceptance of joint dealings is an ‘imposed acceptance,’ imposed by law and by union power.”5 Under detente, the midpoint of the continuum, each side accepts the other’s institutional legitimacy but exer cises its relative strength to obtain the best deal. Each adopts a “win some, lose some” approach. They fight, but the conflict is held within accepted limits; there is a conscious effort to avoid pain and serious injury to one another. Parties at the accommodation end of this scale strive to reduce the level of contention. When differ ences do occur, they are processed with minimum emo tion through agreed-upon procedures with equity being a realistic and desired goal for both. “They have proved themselves willing to compromise whenever possible, to conciliate whenever necessary, and to tolerate at all times.”6 The three benchmarks can be used by the mediator to determine the severity and types of problems the parties have. Relationships characterized by conflict will have the most serious problems, reflecting distrust, hos tility, and suspicion; those characterized by accommoda tion will have the least severe problems, arising from human failures in communications, consistency, and concern for the points of view of others. The next segment of the model directs the mediator’s diagnosis to a determination of the location of the prob lem within the respective organization. One inhibitor to accurate diagnosis is the diffusion of authority in com plex, multilayered, and interdependent labor-manage ment organizational structures. A systematic exam ination of the various intraorganizational dimensions and their interrelationships is needed to locate and ad dress the source of the problem. Because the structures of most labor organizations are reactive to and thus closely parallel the management structure to which they relate, more attention will be given to the structure of management in labor relations matters. Management can generally be regarded as conducting labor relations on three levels. (On occasion these levels may be extended or compressed.) The top level is one of decisionmaking, usually personified by either a vice president of labor relations or a labor relations director. This level formulates, delivers, and implements corpo rate policy on its own initiative or as an operating arm of higher-level management policymakers. The union counterpart of this level is usually an international rep resentative. The mid-level can be characterized as one of imple sage is that there is enormous dissatisfaction with “busi ness as usual” on the shop floor and that problems are not getting resolved. Resentment is bubbling over onto the bargaining table in the form of contract issues. The bargaining table is an ill-equipped forum for the effec tive resolution of these underlying problems. During crisis negotiations it is very difficult to negotiate an im provement in attitudes or a better labor-management re lationship. Faced with a rapidly approaching deadline, the best the mediator can hope for is that some issues can be re solved through catharsis and others quietly dropped be cause they are not strike-related. If a tentative agreement is reached, the mediator’s relief may be brief because the membership’s frustrations may surface again in their refusing to ratify the agreement. Even with ratification, there remains a strong suspicion that all is not well and that the administration of this con tract and the negotiation of the next are likely to be fraught with difficulty. This perception is often shared by negotiators, too. The mediator may also become aware of a deteriorat ing labor-management relationship through ways other than his or her personal involvement in contract negoti ations. Through such professional and community orga nizations as the Industrial Relations Research Association, the mediator can learn of problems. Also, in monitoring dispute cases, he or she has daily contact with representatives of labor and management; through casual conversation, there is much opportunity to learn of labor relations problems in a particular plant or loca tion. Similarly, relationships plagued by frequent, long, or bitter strikes; wildcat strikes; high grievance levels; nu merous arbitrations; or other obvious signs such as job losses in a declining business enterprise, are symptoms which will catch the mediator’s attention. Once alerted, he or she can seek confirmation from the labor and management representatives at the site. Another means of mediator awareness is through communiques from the affected parties. Because the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service is annually involved in more than 1,000 technical assistance en deavors, the awareness of the availability of this service among labor-management practitioners assures numer ous requests. When contacted, the mediator will begin exploratory meetings with the parties to determine the nature, location in the organization, and extent of the problems. Diagnosing the problem Having detected danger signals, the mediator must guide both parties through a joint analysis of the prob lems in order to determine their seriousness and exact location. Until this diagnosis is completed, no remedy can be prescribed. The character of a labor-management 41 projects have been completed in some of the most diffi cult labor relations situations in American industry. Currently, the program is being used almost exclu sively in situations following protracted strikes or where there are volatile labor-management histories. The crite ria established by the FMCS as a prerequisite for con ducting such programs are that both parties must be sufficiently concerned about their divisive relationship and committed at all levels to do something about it. In return, the FMCS commits itself to assist the parties in rebuilding their relationship and thus to reduce the prospects of strikes in subsequent negotiations. (A Rela tionships by Objectives program may result in the parties identifying a need for a labor-management com mittee or for training.) mentation for labor relations decisions and policies. Within management, this level would generally be staffed by either a plant manager or a department head who formulates very little policy but has, instead, the important responsibility of supervising and coordinating the implementation of policies established at the top level. Business agent or local president are usually the titles of union officials at this level. The lowest management level is populated by firstline supervisors. They face the difficult task of confront ing the real world armed only with the policies supplied and precedents established. Here are discovered both the flaws and strengths of overall policy. The union counterpart at this level is the steward. A thorough examination of the parties’ relationship requires a look at the relationships between levels with in each structure, as well as across the table, which symbolizes the classic area of contention. Given three existing levels of labor-management interaction within a bargaining unit, each level having 1 of 3 possible char acters, a diagnosis may theoretically yield 27 possibili ties.7 In this article, we will not attempt to deal with 27 different variations, several of which have only a theo retical existence and are not plausible outcomes. For ex ample, this would be true when accommodation existed at the supervisor/steward level, but at all higher levels the parties were locked in conflict. Accommodation could not realistically exist between foreman and stew ard, except momentarily, if conflict were the prevalent mode between plant manager and business agent. Two corporals in opposing armies cannot wage peace while their generals are waging war, lest they risk dismissal for treasonous behavior.8 More importantly, to examine all 27 possibilities would emphasize detail over the more generic and fundamental concepts. Labor-management committees. In recent years, more than 300 labor-management committees have been formed annually by employers and unions with the as sistance of FMCS mediators. The structure and goals of labor-management committees vary greatly, but most share the essential need for representatives of labor and management to join together and talk about mutual problems. These committees complement the traditional collective bargaining relationship. They are an implicit recognition that the parties have much in common and that their relationship need not be totally adversarial. Through effective committees, joint problem-solving can take place which strengthens mutual credibility and tends to improve relationships. Joint training programs. Successful labor-management relations are less a function of the quality of negotia tions than of the day-to-day implementation and admin istration of the labor agreement. The majority of this work is done by the first-line supervisor and the union steward. If their performance is below standard, rela tions suffer. Consequently, most of FMCS’ preventive ac tivities have been directed toward this group. Supervisor-steward training does have considerable value in the development of a work atmosphere which is conducive to labor peace and the quick and effective resolution of labor-related problems. Training sessions, which use a variety of instructional techniques and fo cus on subjects such as communications, leadership, and grievance handling, are a vehicle whereby adversar ies can set aside their stereotyped images and view one another in a nonthreatening light, thus seeing, perhaps for the first time, their commonalities. The FMCS con ducts 400 to 500 such joint training programs annually. These training programs are tailored to the perceived needs of the supervisor-steward audience, and are struc tured to encourage class participation. Using a combi nation of lecture, audio-visual materials, and workbooks for the participants, the mediator leads discussions into such areas as: Prescribing a remedy Having diagnosed the relationship and the possible location of the problem, the model’s remaining segment concerns the prescribing of remedies. Labor-manage ment relations improvement remedies are few— there are presently three primary items: Relationships by Ob jectives programs, labor-management committees, and joint training programs. Variations exist of each, espe cially the latter two. Relationship by objectives. In the Relationships by Ob jectives program, mediators provide the expertise for guiding labor and management toward basic changes in their relationship.9 Both are brought together by media tors to analyze their problems, to decide what their common objectives should be, and to reach agreement on goal implementation. Since the program was intro duced by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Serv ice ( f m c s ) in 1975, 100 Relationships by Objectives 42 ® ® ® ® understanding the supervisor-steward relationship; making the supervisor-steward relationship work; providing effective leadership; and handling problem situations. If the remaining problem is simply a technical inabili ty to meet labor relations responsibilities, the most ef fective antidote is training. Through joint training of supervisors and stewards, the groundwork may be laid for a better relationship. Effective joint training usually emphasizes the building of problem-solving and inter personal skills, and better understanding of respective roles and the benefits of working together. Equipped with an improved understanding of their roles and the prerequisite skills for doing their jobs, and encouraged by support from the top and middle levels, discord and discontentment at the lower level can be converted to a c c o m m o d a t i o n . These programs are not intended to provide instant solutions to complex problems. They are designed to enable the participant, working with others in the group and under the guidance of a mediator, to come up with his/her own insights which, it is hoped, will be wisely applied over time to improve their relations. Setting priorities In selecting a remedy, order is important. One must focus first at the highest level in need of attention. Higher-order problems must be resolved or neutralized before those of a lower level are addressed. If the labor-management problems are severe, and are located in the top or middle levels of the respective or ganizations, then the Relationships by Objective pro gram should be considered as a possible remedy. Through the program, the parties have an opportunity to recast their relationship or to start anew, provided there is mutual acknowledgment of serious problems impairing the relationship, and genuine commitment to change. Once the program has been successfully applied, d e te n te , and rarely, a c c o m m o d a t i o n , would be expected in lieu of c o n f lic t. Assuming the most likely, d e te n t e , the parties are now in a position to build together a better relationship. To assure further positive momentum and continued improvement, a labor-management committee is usually needed. If nurtured and sustained, labor-management commit tees have demonstrated their capability for improving labor relations. The most visible level of improvement is likely to be between the top plant management and the business agent or local union president. If the commit tee is really working, it will also affect the plant floor. Consequently, through effective applications of such committees, all mid-level outcomes have the potential of being elevated to the a c c o m m o d a t i o n mode. In many cases involving labor-management commit tees, a problem that is often identified as an impediment to a good relationship is the inability of stewards or su pervisors, or both, to dispose of grievances successfully. This can generally be attributed to some combination of three factors: (1) an unwillingness to reach an agree ment—a preference for sustaining the conflict, (2) the absence of perceived authority to settle the problem, or (3) the lack of knowledge or technical ability to handle grievances. Each of these causes can be successfully tackled by the labor-management committee. The first two can be addressed through separate consultations within each party, so that agents at the lower level real ize their superiors are expecting most problems to be re solved at that level. Third party audits The model that we have evolved consists of: three or ganizational levels within labor and management; three characterizations of the relationship which determine the type and severity of the problem; and three remedial approaches. However, it has not been suggested in any detail how to analyze a labor-management problem when applying the model; rather we have spoken of the mediator recognizing danger signals and observing is sues and relationships, all of which implies an intuitive, ill-defined, and artistic process. This method usually provides a sufficiently accurate diagnosis in cases in which the mediator knows the parties well, or the prob lems are relatively obvious, or both; but in other situa tions a more rigorous approach is needed to apply the model. For this purpose, we will describe a diagnostic process used in organizational development and human resources development (training needs assessment).10 Discussion will center on joint training at the supervisor/steward level, but with minor modifications, the process could be used at other levels or when other remedies are proposed. The diagnostic procedure, developed by Geary Rummler, focuses on a “human performance” audit.11 For him, human performance is composed of: (1) the job situation or occasion to perform; (2) the performer; (3) the behavior (action or decisions) that is to occur; and (4) the consequences of that behavior to the per former.12The advantage of using a performance audit is that it forces the specific source of the undesirable be havior to be identified. A second feature of Rummler’s audit is the determi nation of the economic consequence of poor performance. In other words, having determined by the audit model that undesirable performance is a result of a lack of feedback to a supervisor about his or her work, for example, the question is asked: does it r e a l l y make any difference or enough difference to require change? The result of this questioning will be to consid er first those performance problems which are most eco nomically important to the organization. A very sophisticated or extremely simple audit can be 43 used, depending upon the amount of time available, the complexity of the organization, and the functions being audited. This audit of performance can be used on all three levels of labor relations concurrently, but we will apply it only to the lower level. The basic components of the Rummler approach can be retained in a streamlined audit by using this series of questions to identify sources of the problems and to an alyze them: ° Under II, questions 1, 2, and 3 could lead one to discover I. © Under V, question 1 could divulge that the first-line super that the union policy is unclear on whether a steward is expected to anticipate and solve problem s before they be com e formal grievances. © Under III, question 5 could disclose that first-line supervi sors in only 2 departm ents in 20 have performance problems. ® Under IV, questions 2 and 3 could reveal that m otivation and interest are the source of the performance problem, not know ledge or skill. General lead-in questions 1. How do you know you have a problem? 2. How will you know when the problem is solved? 3. How long has this been a problem? 4. How general is the problem? visor is aware of only one-third of the tasks expected of him or her. © Under VI, question 1 m ight reveal that the steward gets no positive feedback on his or her performance. II. Questions on the job 1. What is the desired performance? 2. What are the job standards? 3. Who says that these are the standards? 4. Does everybody agree on these standards? ® Under VII, question 1 m ight show that the failure to prop erly investigate a grievance, prior to com m itting it to writ ing, doubled the length of tim e required to process it through the first tw o steps of the grievance procedure. III. Questions on the performer 1. What are the specific differences between actual and expected performance? 2. Has anyone ever performed as expected? 3. Who? 4. When? 5. How many individuals are now performing below standard? When the audit is completed, the mediator will have a complete list of the performance problems in the area under study, which will include an identification of the sources of the problems, and economic priorities based on the cost of the problem to the organization. Following an analysis of this list, the mediator could act as an adviser to labor and management in determin ing the appropriate remedy. Some problems are more susceptible to a training solution, others to a labormanagement committee or a Relationships by Objec tives program, and some will require structural and pol icy changes. In each instance, the mediator will work with the parties to resolve the performance problem and improve their relationship. IV. Questions on behavior 1. Did the steward or first-line supervisor ever perform properly?. 2. Could they perform properly if their lives depended upon it? 3. If they could perform properly, would they? V. Questions on the consequences of performance 1. Does the steward or first-line supervisor whose perfor mance is below standard know: a. What is expected of him or her? b. What he or she is not performing correctly and exactly how far he or she is from expected per formance? c. How to perform correctly? d. When to perform? Conclusions VI. Questions on feedback 1. What positive or negative consequences, or both, of performing correctly or incorrectly can the first-line supervisor or steward expect from: a. Higher ranking officials within the company or or ganization? b. Subordinates? c. Associates at the same level?V I. VII. Questions on economic costs and priorities 1. What does it cost the employer or union not to reme dy the performance problem? 2. What is the priority on remedying any performance problem? A few examples will illustrate how these questions produce relevant information on performance and eco nomic priorities: 44 Before any labor-management relationship can be im proved, the parties to that relationship must both be dissatisfied with the status quo and have before them some blueprint which, if followed, has a reasonable chance of succeeding.13 14 In many cases, labor-manage ment relationships are operating at a suboptimal level. This can happen for many reasons; for example, one or both sides prefer it that way, they are not prepared to incur the political or economic costs they attach to im provement, they do not know how to gain the necessary credibility to move jointly forward, or they simply do not know what to do. O fte n a tr u ste d th ir d p a r ty can d ip lo m a tic a lly a llo w th e p a r ties to fo c u s o n s h o r tc o m in g s in a r e la tio n sh ip , b y m in im iz in g p o litic a l a n d e c o n o m ic c o s ts o f c h a n g e , p r o m o tin g sid e s in tr u st a n d d e v e lo p fn g c o o p e r a tio n , a roadm ap and a s s is tin g w h ic h , if b o th fo llo w e d , s h o u ld le a d to a p o s itiv e , c o n s tr u c tiv e r e la tio n sh ip . FOOTNOTES Fuller, Problems in Labor Relations (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1950), p. 7. 1Section 203 (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act states: “It shall be the duty of the Service, in order to prevent or minimize interruptions, of the free flow of commerce growing out of labor disputes, to assist parties to labor disputes in industries affecting commerce to settle such disputes through conciliation and mediation.” During the discussion on the floor of the Senate of Bill S. 1126 (sub sequently compromised to become the Taft-Hartley Law), Senator Ir ving Ives of New York made the statement: "A great lack at the present moment in the field of mediation is measures by which we may prevent industrial strife as well as cure it after it has begun. That, of course, is contemplated under the new title.” (Congressional Report, p. 4,590, 5-6-47.) ; It is interesting to note that the Federal Mediation and Concilia tion Service Preventive Mediation function started during the same period (late 1940's) as the early applications of contemporary behav ioral science to organization and management. But there is little evi dence that the service benefited in any systematic way from developments within behavioral science until the 1970’s. The introduc tion of the Relationships by Objectives program in 1975 (see discus sion on p. 17 of this article) was influenced by the work of Blake and Mouton, particularly Robert R. Blake, Herbert A. Shepard, and Jane S. Mouton, Managing Intergroup Conflict in Industry (Houston, Gulf Publishing Co., 1964), p. 210; and Robert R. Blake, Jane S. Mouton, and Richard L. Sloma, “The Union-Management Intergroup Labora tory: Strategy for Resolving Intergroup Conflict,” 'in Warner Burk and Harvey A. Hornatein, eds., The Social Technology of Organization Development (Fairfax, Va., NTL Learning Resources Corporation, 1972), pp. 101-26. This lack of behavioral science influence on preventive mediation during these 30 years is understandable because Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service mediators are pragmatic individuals caught up in practicing their art; they are not inclined to seek help or guid ance from theorists and academics. Moreover, even the behavioral sci entist makes limited claims for the application of his work to the practitioner. See George Strauss and others, eds., Organizational Be havior: Research and Issues (Madison, Wis., Industrial Relations Re search Association Series, 1974), p. 2, which quotes with approval Harold L. Wilensky, writing on the same subject in 1957: “Not every thing done by the social scientist can or should help the practitioner . . . . the social scientist’s job is basically different from the executive’s job . . . . much of what he comes up with is of limited use to the practi tioner.” Writing 5 years later on the question, “Can Social Psychology Con tribute to Industrial Relations?” Strauss said, “From 1960 on, psychological contributions to industrial relations were almost nonexistent . . . ” See Geoffrey M. Stephenson and Christopher J. Brotherton, eds., Industrial Relations: A Social Psychological Approach (Chicheston, England, John Wiley & Sons, 1979), p. 371. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Mediation and Conciliaton Service. 4A similar continuum of labor-management relations consisting of armed truce, working harmony, and union-management cooperation was proposed in Frederick H. Harbison and John R. Coleman, Goals and Strategy in Collective Bargaining (New York, Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1951), p. 19. Another more complex model for analyzing labor-management rela tions is described in Leon Meggison and C. Ray Gullett. “A Predic tive Model of Union-Management Conflict,” Personnel Journal, June 1970, pp. 495-503. See Benjamin M. Selekman. Sylvia K. Selekman, and Stephen H. " “Problems,” p. 8. D = Lg where D is the number of diagnostic outcomes, L is the number of levels in the organization (3). and G is the number of pos sible characterizations of the relationship between the parties (3). Hence, D = 3~'or 27. s However, it should be noted that a very bad relationship (conflict) may exist at a lower level even though there is a very good one at the next higher level (accommodation). Two generals can be pursuing peace while the battle rages. ' For more background on Relationships by Objectives program, see John J. Popular, “Labor-Management Relations: U.S. Mediators Try to Build Common Objectives,” World of Work Report I, Septem ber 1976, pp. 1-3; Thomas A. Kochan, Collective Bargaining and In dustrial Relations (Homewood, 111., Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1980); and Anthony V. Sinicropi, David A. Gray, and Paula Ann Hughes, Eval uation of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service's Technical As sistance Program in Labor-Management Relationships by Objectives (RBO), unpublished, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, 1978. In the field or in organizational developments there are a number of diagnostic processes for searching out and assessing organizational problems. See for example: Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton, Corporate Excellence Diagnosis: The Phase 6 Instrument (Austin, Tex., Scientific Methods, 1968); J. Richard Hackman and Greg R. Oldhan, “Development of the Job Diagnosis Survey,” Journal of Applied Psy chology, 1975, vol. 60, pp. 159-70; Ralph H. Kilmann and Kenneth W. Thomas, “Four Perspectives on Conflict Management: An Attributional Framework for Organizing Descriptive and Normative Theo ry,” Academy of Management Review, 1978; vol. 3, pp. 59-68; John P. Kotter, Organization Dynamics: Diagnosis and Intervention (Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1978); Paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, Developing Organizations: Diagnosis and Action (Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1969); Harry Levinson, Organizational Diagnosis (Cam bridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1972); and Rensis Likert, The Human Organization: Its Management and Value (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967). " Geary A. Rummler, “The Performance Audit,” in Robert L. Craig, ed., Training and Development Handbook (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1976, 2d ed.). Rummler, “The Performance Audit.” ” Dissatisfaction with the status quo is found in organizational de velopment efforts: “The fundamental reason some crisis or pressure seems to be so important in setting the stage for change is that it cre ates a state of readiness and motivation to change. Kurt Lewin called this the ‘unfreezing stage’ at which old beliefs, values, and behaviors lose strength in the face of data that disconfirm the manager’s (union ist’s) view of his (their) organization’s effectiveness.” Michael Beer, Organization Change and Development: A Systems View (Santa Monica, Calif., Goodyear Publishing Co., 1980), p. 48. 14The need for a plan in order to facilitate change is also found in the Organizational Development literature: “Successful change efforts require new models for looking at organizational problems and/or new ideas for structuring or managing the organization. New models may come in the form of a new organizational design, accounting sys tem, planning systems, or personnel policy.” (See Beer. “Organiza tional Change,” p. 50.) 45 How quality=of=worklife projects work for General Motors St e p h e n H. F uller Quality of worklife is not a happiness program, al though happy employees may certainly be a byproduct. It is not a personnel department program, although quality of worklife has important implications for per sonnel management. It is not a subtle employee incentive program, although employees motivated to achieving the goals of the organization certainly ought to be one of the outcomes. And, it is not another pro ductivity program, although better productivity is cer tainly one of the important results. Quality of worklife is all of these things and more: °A continuing process, not something that can be turned on today and turned off tomorrow. ° Using all resources, especially human resources, bet ter today than yesterday . . . and even better tomorrow. ©Developing among all members of an organization an awareness and understanding of the concerns and needs of others, and a willingness to be more responsive to those concerns and needs. ©Improving the way things get done to assure the long-term effectiveness and success of organizations. General Motors is making a concerted effort to im prove the quality of worklife for its employees. Projects are underway in most North American operations and in many overseas operations as well. The approach was not developed overnight. It evolved from a philosophy of management, shaped by events and experiences oc curring over a considerable period of time. A key component of our quality-of-worklife process is union participation. Quality of worklife became a joint effort of General Motors and the United Auto Workers in 1973, when a National Committee to Im prove the Quality of Work Life was established. Repre senting the UAW on the committee are two officials of the international union. The corporation is represented by two personnel officers. The committee meets periodi cally to discuss activities underway in the corporation. One of its chief functions is to educate executives of the union and the corporation in order to encourage coop erative quality-of-worklife ventures at the local level. The committee adopted minimum standards to assure that every GM plant has the basics of a quality-ofworklife effort. Each operation is expected to have: ® A g r o u p to o v e r s e e th e q u a lity o f w o r k life p r o c e s s. °A statement of long-term objectives incorporating quality of worklife along with other desirable business targets. ° Regular measurement of quality of worklife. ° Seminars and other activities to make the organiza tion more knowledgeable about quality-of-worklife con cepts and techniques. ©Adequate internal resources and skills to assure the developmental process is moving ahead and accomplish ing its objectives. Approaches vary A quality-of-worklife improvement program is man datory at g m ; however, specific approaches are optional. Following are some examples of approaches being applied at existing and new plants. A decade ago, one of our assembly plants could have been characterized as a problem plant. There was an air of hostility between management and the union. Costs Stephen H. Fuller is a vice president of General Motors Corp. From the Review of July 1980 46 reflecting the local management’s beliefs about people and work and the relationship between those beliefs and the plant’s objectives.) A team concept is a major feature of many new GM plants. Job rotation within the team is encouraged. Em ployees thus acquire broader skills which, in turn, al lows for greater flexibility in performing all of the tasks within the team. This concept tends to promote em ployee involvement and satisfaction, and to minimize the disruptive effects of occasional absenteeism and turnover. Employees are encouraged to move from one team to another once they have learned all of the jobs in the team. This further adds to the fulfillment of em ployee interests and to the expansion of experiences and achievements. The team concept encourages employee responsibility and involvement. For example, employees may have re sponsibility for training team members; assessing indi vidual team members’ progress in satisfactorily per forming job assignments; forecasting efficiency, scrap, and manpower requirements in their operating areas; recommending corrective action for improper conduct of team members; contributing to the selection of new employees; selecting team leaders; and maintaining op eration of tools and equipment within process stand ards. were high. Performance was poor. Something had to be done. Fortunately, the local management and union were willing to undertake some initiatives. As both sides explored and discussed their mutual problems and concerns, an atmosphere of understanding and mutual respect began to emerge. In 1972, the plant faced a ma jor rearrangement which provided an opportunity for management to involve employees in planning the change, something that had not been done before. The rearrangement went well, due, in part, to the employees’ suggestions. Then, following the lead set by the GM-UAW National Quality of Work Life Committee, plant management and the union established their own committee. In 1977, management and the union initiated a 3-day training program providing employees at the plant training in team problem-solving. Although the pro gram was voluntary, nearly all of the 3,600 employees participated. Today, employee morale at that plant is high, grievances are only a fraction of what they were a decade ago, and the plant has become one of the best performing assembly plants at General Motors. Another GM plant abandoned the traditional organi zational structure a few years ago. Today, the plant is organized into six business teams, each consisting of the necessary production activities and support elements: engineering, scheduling, material handling, quality con trol, maintenance, and accounting. The system has made support employees an integral part of the plant’s business operations. The quality-control circle concept, which has flourished in Japan and is being introduced by a growing number of firms in this country, has been incorporated into the business-team structure. The circle concept gives employees the opportunity to meet regu larly to discuss problems affecting their work environ ment and the plant’s performance. These are only two of many approaches underway in established GM plants. New plants provide a unique op portunity to design an organization from a blank sheet of paper. Free from the constraints of past practice and stereotyped roles, each plant is an opportunity to intro duce new approaches. There are three important considerations underlying quality-of-worklife initiatives in new plants: (1) there is no best system or organizational design, (2) there is an ongoing interaction among the parts of the system—a change in one part of the system can have a significant impact on the entire system, and (3) each part of the system must reinforce consistency of operations and fa cilitate employee involvement. To achieve an organizational system in which each part is congruent with the rest, careful consideration is given to the basic values, principles, and objectives held by local management. The development of a philosophy and goals is viewed as a necessary first step in the plan ning process. (The philosophy and goals are statements Employee-management communications essential. In our plants, emphasis is placed on effective communication, particularly face-to-face communication. It begins with the orientation, which includes, in addition to tradition al topics, a thorough review of the plant’s philosophy and goals. Periodic plant meetings and team meetings are used to discuss aspects of the business— for exam ple, quality, schedules, scrap and rework, housekeeping, safety, employee facilities, production facilities, and cus tomer orders. There also is ample opportunity for em ployees to discuss their concerns with management. The role of the personnel department at General Motors is to facilitate the development of the qualityof-worklife process by consulting with management, with employees, and with their elected representatives. Well-conceived and effectively administered personnel programs are absolutely essential for a strong qualityof-worklife effort. One such program is a system of redress for thos< employees not represented by a union. A formal “opei door policy” is one approach, but it must have the sup port of all levels of management. An effective appraisa system for all employees, including managers and exec utives, also is essential. The appraisal also should evalu ate managers’ support and implementation of quality of-worklife principles. Training for all employees is an absolute necessity. 1 employees are to be involved in the decisionmaking prc cess, if they are to grow and develop, they must ha\ 47 major factor contributing to our economic ills. The problem has not come about overnight. Between 1947 and 1967, output per hour of work in the United States nearly doubled. Since 1967, output per hour worked has risen only about one-fifth. And in 1978, the U.S. pro ductivity growth rate was an alarming one-half of 1 per cent, a dismal performance compared to the rate of growth of other major industrial nations, particularly Japan. In the past, America has been able to compete with cheap overseas labor because of our capital investment. In 1978, however, capital investment per worker in this country amounted to less than $3,700, compared with nearly $5,000 per Japanese worker. There are many fac tors in addition to capital investment which contribute to Japan’s envious productivity growth rate. Among them are government policies and programs that active ly support economic expansion, technological innova tion, harmonious union-management relations, and a totally dedicated work force. Group goals are far more important than individual successes in the Japanese structure. I do not think we can ignore the traits present in the Japanese system. In this country, we have been overly loyal to organizational tradition. But, today, we cannot afford not to take new risks. The joint efforts of busi ness, government, and labor are essential if we are to respond to the needs of a changing workforce and re solve our economic problems. the opportunity to acquire the necessary knowledge and skills. Finally, it is necessary to have a statement of philoso phy that spells out the general role workers have in the organization and how they are to be treated. A state ment of philosophy that represents the consensus of se nior management provides a basis for encouraging managerial behavior consistent across plants and func tions. The philosophy also lets employees know how they can expect to be treated. All efforts at General Motors require a firm commit ment at the top levels of the corporation. Such support, combined with a variety of successful projects has led to the creation of a quality-of-worklife program in near ly all plants. This does not mean that GM has all the answers or that quality of worklife is fully developed in General Motors. There is much to be done, but the cor poration is on the right track and making progress. Future of the projects An important shift in union-management relations began in the decade of the 1970’s. Unions and manage ment showed a willingness to explore new alternatives and, in some instances, levels of cooperation once thought impossible produced dramatic results. What about the decade of the 1980’s? What is the future of quality of worklife in America? Two critical forces will have a significant impact on the future of quality-of-worklife projects. One is the changing values of workers. Increased sense of entitle ment, disregard for authority, and a general low esteem of our institutions have been major factors in the devel opmental years of quality of worklife. Today’s workers place less emphasis on material achievement and more on personal fulfillment. The value shift of Americans will significantly impact the future of quality of worklife. The second force is economic. While business is being challenged to respond to dramatically changing values, our country is facing economic problems. The fact is, the United States is locked in a fiercely competitive eco nomic struggle which could have either a positive or negative impact on quality of worklife— positive if it leads to innovative solutions and negative if it results in simply greater emphasis on traditional approaches. Our Nation’s poor productivity improvement rate is a Stumbling blocks. As we push forward the frontiers of quality of worklife there are some formidable obstacles to overcome. One is the issue of control. Should control be viewed as external to the individual, as provided for through a supervisor and shop rules? Or should it lie within the individual’s self-regulating ability and value system and based upon mutual influence and interest that leads to “win-win” rather than “win-lose” relation ships? Moving from external to self-regulating sources of control would seem to be consistent with the qualityof-worklife viewpoint. How much training and how much information is management willing to provide if employees are to be self-regulating? Many organizations in the past have been cautious about sharing informa tion, particularly financial information, for fear employ ees will use this knowledge to make “unfair” claims on the enterprise. 48 How quality-of-worklife projects work for the United Auto Workers Irving Bluestone In 1973, in bargaining with General Motors Corp. for a new national agreement, the United Auto Workers (uaw) proposed the establishment of a National Joint Committee to Improve the Quality of Worklife. The parties agreed to a document which set forth their gen eral understanding on the subject and pledged to urge their respective local managements and local unions to cooperate “in (quality-of-worklife) experiments and projects.” How, where, and when to go about the task were left open for the parties to consider. Over time, certain gen eralized concepts have become accepted. However, the approach varies in each situation because the program is not imposed from the top down, but must be cooper atively and voluntarily developed and implemented from the bottom up—at the local union-management level. Today, there are approximately 50 quality-of-worklife programs in UAW-GM bargaining units. Most are still in the early stages— an indication that such programs are not “instant utopias” but rather follow a slow, cau tious, deliberate pace. How did the UAW and GM go about setting up a quality-of-worklife program? What were the “nuts and bolts” steps taken and how were they implemented? While no two projects are identical, the following de scribes in concrete terms what happened. The fact that the National Joint Committee to Im prove the Quality of Worklife exists and urges the local parties to consider undertaking a project supplies the initiative to create interest in the subject. A local man agement may contact the local union shop committee (or vice versa) suggesting the local parties discuss the possibility of initiating a quality-of-worklife project. The local union as a rule will contact the international union and ask for a thorough explanation of the concept, how it works, what it entails, and its advantages and disad vantages. An international union representative will meet with the local union official and describe in detail the mean ing and purpose of the concept and what has been done elsewhere and why. The representative will set forth cer tain guiding principles which are usually agreed upon as a basis for proceeding: ©There must be no increase in production standards as a result of the quality-of-worklife program—an as surance against speed-up. (Naturally, increased produc tion due to technological change is another matter.) ©There must be no loss of jobs as a result of the program—an assurance of job security. (Obviously, layoffs due to business cycles are another matter.) ®The provisions of the national agreement and of the local agreements and practices remain inviolable. ©The program will be voluntary. No worker will be compelled to participate. ©The union representatives will be involved in all as pects of the program—sharing with management equal Irving Bluestone recently retired as a vice president of the United Auto Workers and director of the union’s General Motors depart ment. From the Review of July 1980 49 ly in the development and implementation of the pro gram. ©Either party may cancel the program at any time— an assurance against either being tied to a project in which it has lost faith. The overriding consideration is that all decisions are by mutual desire and consent at the local level. Neither the corporation nor the international union instructs the local parties; each is merely a catalyst (to advise and consult) when called upon. The local, after full discussion, will decide whether to proceed. It is advised to “go slow,” to experiment with a pilot project at first and approach the program on a “cut and try” basis. The local understands that normal collective bargaining continues, that a quality-of-worklife program will not solve all the plant problems. In the U A W -G M approach, no separate quality-ofworklife committee is formed. The local union shop committee— the elected representatives of the workers for purposes of handling grievances and bargaining—is the union counterpart in the program. This avoids any conflict in determining which subjects fall within the purview of adversarial collective bargaining and which are subject to the cooperative effort of quality of worklife. A quality-of-worklife program cannot succeed unless the local parties develop a collective bargaining climate of mutual respect, a climate in which solving problems supersedes beating the other party down. Therefore, the first phase, before the parties can move significantly to ward worker participation programs, entails fostering a mutually respectful relationship as the groundwork for a program which will involve the workers directly. This is no overnight task. It may take months of get ting together and talking things through. Essentially the problem is altitudinal, and breaking down distrust and cynicism on both sides is a slow but extremely reward ing process. Once phase one is well underway, the road is paved for the local parties to embark on pilot projects in which workers on a volunteer basis become involved in problem solving and participate in making decisions re garding the workplace which, heretofore, have been de nied them. By now, the parties have learned to work together more cooperatively. Without pervasive rancor and suspicion beclouding their efforts, they can join mutually in analyzing the problems which trouble the workers and create the opportunity for workers to help resolve them. There is ample evidence that the introduction of a quality-of-worklife program has a salubrious effect upon the adversarial collective bargaining system. For exam ple, simultaneously with national negotiations between the u a w and GM, the local parties negotiate on local is sues, including seniority, transfer, shift preference, equalization of overtime agreements, and other propos als to improve working conditions and health and safe ty, grievances, and other issues. Of the first 90 local set tlements in 1979, all of which were accomplished without a strike threat, 44 were engaged in some stage of a quality-of-worklife program. Considering there are about 50 programs at GM, this represents a noteworthy achievement. Studies at locations where a quality-of-worklife pro gram has existed long enough to be meaningful indicate a more constructive collective bargaining relationship; a more satisfied workforce; improved product quality; a reduction in grievance handling, absenteeism, labor turnover, and disciplinary layoffs and discharges. These are all mutually desirable objectives; they rep resent benefits for the workers and advantages for both the union and the management. But above all, from the workers’ point of view, they add up to one of the most fundamental objectives of unionism: the enhancement of human dignity and self-fulfillment at work. For decades, we have heard corporation executives exclaim: “Our workers are our most valuable resource.” Quality-of-worklife programs are designed to make that slogan a reality. How? By altering the autocratic cli mate of the workplace and providing workers, through their union, with the opportunity to participate mean ingfully in the decisionmaking process at the workplace; by focusing management’s orientation toward concern for the needs and aspiration of the workers; and by cre ating an atmosphere of cooperative effort between union and management to achieve the above noted objec tive. 50 The quality-of-worklife project at Bolivar: an assessment Barry A. Macy The quality-of-worklife project1at Harman International Industries, Inc., in Bolivar, Tennessee, is a cooperative change effort between the company and the United Au tomobile Workers of America (uaw). The project is structured so that both parties can jointly determine and implement organizational change according to mu tually agreed-upon principles. The objectives of the project are to improve employees, quality of worklife and enhance organizational effectiveness. The explicit internal goals were identified as job secu rity, job equity, worker humanization, and worker de mocracy. These were ambitious undertakings in 1973 — ahead of their times in many respects— particularly be cause they were shared and agreed to by both labor and management. However, some of the objectives of the project have been reached and surpassed, while others have yet to be reached. Other outcomes and critical process events are discussed in an assessment study by Macy and others.2 According to the five intervention phases of the Boli var experiment, each composed of 11 months beginning with the baseline phase through plant-wide experimen tation to coincide with the change program, the follow ing changes were measured: Job security. More jobs were created, as the hourly employment level rose 55 percent to 839. Once the pro- Barry A. Macy is director of The Texas Center for Productivity and Quality of Work Life and associate professor of Organizational Be havior at the College of Business Administration, Texas Tech Univer sity. Health and working conditions. Accident rates, as de fined by the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis tration, declined 60 percent, while minor accidents de creased 20 percent even with the presence of many new and inexperienced employees. Rates of short-term ab sences due to sickness declined 16 percent. However, not all of the changes were favorable, as the rate of mi nor illnesses rose 71 percent and the rate of medical leaves increased 19 percent. (Perceptions of Bolivar em ployees’ health appear later in this report.) Financial security. The average hourly rate remained constant and the wage rates relative to area standards did not change (during this time, the wage rates for the whole country did not increase relative to real wages). The fringe benefit package increased by a small amount. Proposals for the introduction of a gain-sharing com pensation plan (a negotiable issue) were discussed but none was adopted. Job security based on organizational performance. Daily output per hourly-paid employee, adjusted for inflation, From the Review of July 1980 gram was underway, the cooperative union-management climate stimulated an effort to develop a joint bid on a particular product, and the company and the uaw established joint efficiency rates with the goals of in creasing employees’ quality of worklife and improving job security. Ultimately, this venture saved 70 jobs. Voluntary turnover rates declined by 72 percent, while involuntary turnover (discharges, retirements, and so forth) rates decreased by 95 percent. 51 mixed results. Thirteen indicators of the quality of worklife and 24 measures of job and work environment characteristics known to be associated with higher qual ity of worklife are assessed in table 1. (The data refer only to UAW members; however, these indicators repre sent fairly well the different types of employees sur veyed at the Bolivar plant.) Some of the gains have been offset by losses or no change. It must be remem bered, however, that over the extended period studied, there were some unmeasured changes in the employees’ level of aspirations and expectations. These changes in expectations and aspirations were enhanced by the quality-of-worklife program and the later conditions were probably judged more critically than the earlier condi tions. When asked a series of questions pertaining to the goals and outcomes of the quality-of-worklife pro gram, the employees responded generally with positive opinions about the impact, the desirability of the pro gram, the effectiveness of the union-management rela tionships, and the ability of the UAW to represent membership concerns. For example, 60 percent found the program to be desirable; a majority found the joint rose 23 percent. Two other measures of productivity— efficiency and standard performance— verify this posi tive change in plant performance. On the product side of the financial ledger, net product reject cost rates de clined 39 percent, while the rate of customer returns de creased by 47 percent. Once again, not all was positive as the rate of manufacturing supplies used rose 22 per cent and the rate of machine downtime increased slight ly. What is so striking about productivity and product quality at the Harman International plant is the fact that both of these performance measures increased. Moreover, these measures have held positive and signifi cant trends for approximately 3 years. Some of the gains are attributable to technological and capital in puts; however, many can be attributed to the coopera tive labor-management change. Cost-benefit. The cost-benefit calculations for the project reflect the program costs and benefits per hourly-paid employee per phase, summed over 55 months. The re sults show a net discounted benefit per hourly-paid em ployee to the company of more than $3,000. There are, multiple reasons for this net savings, but nevertheless, the plant improved its performance through a combina tion of forces, including the cooperative quality-ofworklife program. In summary, the evidence shows that because of the quality-of-worklife program, jobs objectively became more secure; productivity and product quality rose; ac cidents decreased at a faster rate than their industry av erage; minor accidents declined while minor illnesses rose; short-term absences due to sickness declined; man ufacturing supplies and machine downtime increased; and employee earnings held steady. Also, grievances de creased 51 percent and absences due to lack of work de creased 94 percent. These positive behavioral and organizational per formance gains seem to have had some practical implications for both the company and the union in their contractual process. The company’s 1976 contract with the UAW was signed earlier than ever before and benefited both the company and the union membership by reducing the need for higher product inventories while maintaining the same employment level. These bargaining sessions, as contrasted to previous ones, were accomplished and concluded in a mutual atmo sphere of cordiality, creativity, and trust. Absent was the win-lose philosophy and counterthreats that often accompany traditional labor-management bargaining. This is not to indicate that the adversary relationship between the UAW and Harman International Industries has vanished. It has not! The union still grieves con tract issues; however, the spirit or climate in which grievances are handled has improved. Generally, the behavioral and performance findings were positive, while the attitudinal indicators showed Table 1. Assessment of quality-of-worklife indicators and work environment characteristics Gains No change Losses QUALITY OF W ORKLIFE Less alienation Job satisfaction More reports of physical stress symptoms Treated in a more personal way Job offers opportunity for personal growth More reports of psycho logical stress symptoms Job involved more use of, or higher level, skills Working conditions Less satisfaction with pay level Work equity Job is more secure Fringe benefits Less satisfaction with pay equity W ORK EN VIR O N M EN T Supervisors more participative Role conflict Supervisors are less workfacilitating, supportive, and respectful Job variety More work-group participation Supervisory closeness, favoritism, and feedback More employee influence over task-related decisions Work-group feedback Less satisfaction with work group More adequate work resources Employee influence over work-schedule decisions Less association between work performance and reward received (3 indicators) More work improvement ideas provided by employees Association between job security and intrinsic motivation with work performance Less job feedback General organizational climate Work improvement suggestions NOTE: 52 Assessment based on 85 matched UAW members. on whether or not the union should be kept at Harman International Industries, how would you vote?” These results and other outcomes not reported here4 seem to indicate that the union members perfer to use joint union-management programs to deal with quality of worklife and other important domains of their life at work. Recently, many other reports and studies5 have indicated similar trends and like results with other union members. One trend seems very clear. The time is ripe for the U.S. industrial relations system to seriously consider cooperative union-management programs along with their traditional contractual and collective bar gaining structures and processes. union-management committee responsible for designing and implementing the program to be effective without domination from either party; and 67 percent indicated that the program strengthened the local union. In addi tion, 90 percent of the UAW membership were satisfied with the local union in 1976, compared with 78 percent in 1973. This is substantially higher than the satisfac tion level of a national sample of blue-collar union members with their union during this period.3 More over, union membership at the Bolivar plant has in creased from 65 percent to more than 90 percent, and 100 percent of the union membership responded affir matively when asked: “If there were an election today FOOTNOTES 'The project was independently assessed during 1972-79. The be havioral and performance outcomes were evaluated for 55 consecutive months during 1972-76. Support for this article was provided by the Ford Foundation and the Economic Development Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. States (Geneva, Switzerland, International Labor Organization, 1977); J. Drexler and E. E. Lawler III, “A Union-Management Cooperative Project to Improve the Quality of Work Life,” The Journal o f Applied Behavioral Science (July-August-September, 1977), pp. 351-86; I. Bluestone, “The Quality of Work Life Project Between UAW and Hannan International Industries,” paper presented at the Thirty-Sev enth Annual Meeting, The Academy of Management, Aug. 14-18, 1977; E. E. Lawler III and L. Ozley, “Winning Union-Management Cooperation,” Management Review (March 1979), pp. 19-24; E. E. Lawler III, and J. Drexler, “The dynamics of establishing cooperative quality-of-worklife projects,” Monthly Labor Review, March 1978, pp. 23-28; D. Nadler, “Hospitals, Organized Labor and Quality of Work: An Intervention Case Study,” The Journal o f Applied Behavior al Science (September 1978), pp. 366-81; J. Perry and others, The Impact o f Labor-Management Relations on Productivity and Efficiency in Urban Mass Transit (Institute of Transportation Studies and Grad uate School of Administration, University of California at Irvine, 1979); B. A. Macy and M. Peterson, “Evaluating Attitudinal Change in a Longitudinal Quality of Work Life Intervention,” in S. Seashore, E. Lawler III, and others, eds., Observing and Measuring Organization al Change: A Guide to Field Practice (New York, Wiley-Interscience, forthcoming); P. S. Goodman, Assessing Organizational Change: The Rushton Quality o f Work Experiment (New York, Wiley-Interscience, 1979); B. A. Macy and A. Nurick, Assessing Organkational Change and Participation: The TV A Quality of Work Experiment (New York, Wiley-Interscience, forthcoming); and M. Duckies, R. Duckies, and M. Maccoby “The Process of Change at Bolivar,” The Journal of Ap plied Behavioral Science (July-August-September, 1977), pp. 387-99. 2B. A. Macy, G. E. Ledford, Jr., and E. E. Lawler III, An Assessment o f the Bolivar Quality of Work Life Experiment: 1972-1979 (New York, Wiley-Interscience, forthcoming). 3 R. P. Quinn and G. L. Staines, The 1977 Quality o f Employment Survey (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, Survey Research Center, 1978). A general discussion of the survey results is described in an ar ticle by G. L. Staines and R. P. Quinn, “American workers evaluate the quality of their jobs,” Monthly Labor Review, January 1979, pp. 3-1 2 . For a more in-depth discussion of union attitudes, see T. A. Kochan, “How American workers view labor unions,” Monthly Labor Review, April 1979, pp. 23-31. 4 See Macy et al, An Assessment. 5 For example, see T. A. Kochan, D. Lipsky, and L. Dyer, “Collec tive Bargaining and the Quality of Work — the Views of Local Union Activists,” Proceedings o f the Twenty-Seventh Annual Meeting (Madi son, Wis., Industrial Relations Research Association, 1975), pp. ISO62; A. Ponak and C. Fraser, “Union Activists’ Support for Joint Pro grams,” Industrial Relations, Spring 1979, pp. 197-209; B. A. Macy, “A Progress Report on the Bolivar Quality of Work Life Project,” Personnel, August 1979, pp. 527-30 and 557-59; P. S. Goodman and E. E. Lawler III, New Forms o f Work Organization in the United 53 Altering the social structure in coal mining: a case study An underground experiment using autonomous work groups showed increased production, motivation, and safety, hut created discontent among other workers at the mine T e d M il l s In the past 5 years, all over the Western world, there has been a substantial growth of interest—re flected in increased experimentation and activity— in the human contribution to work performance. With major organizations such as the United Auto mobile Workers and General Motors in the van guard, American labor and management in both the public and private sectors are beginning to pay significantly more attention to the growing body of expertise in a field increasingly called “the quality of working life,” which focuses on the overall devel opment of the human resource in enterprise. indicate that the industry’s productivity has de clined precipitously during the past decade. Unoffi cial productivity figures for the entire industry, in cluding the highly productive strip mining operations, are bad enough; the figures for under ground mining alone are far worse. For example, Consolidation Coal’s big underground Ireland mine in the Ohio River area showed a decrease in daily production per miner from 25 tons in 1966 to 10.6 in 1974, with the rate continuing to fall in 1975 de spite investments of millions of dollars in ultra modern technology to try to stem the decline. Whenever productivity declines, of course, the overriding question for management and unions alike is, why? In the coal mining case, some managers suggest that when stringent new State mining safety laws and the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 took effect, with inspectors crawling around the mines to enforce them, productivity plummeted. But, curiously, the productivity de crease after the new laws were passed was not sig nificantly greater than in the years before the Fed eral act took effect; productivity just continued its downward march. Another possible explanation for the productivity decrease is that miners, like other Americans, had become increasingly better educated, with higher Coal miming productivity In order to develop and explore the quality of working life concept, the National Quality of Work Center has conducted a number of diverse experi ments in various industries. None of these indus tries is more fascinating for such exploration than underground coal mining, the subject of this case study. For one thing, coal mining is hard, hazard ous, health-jeopardizing work, as everyone—partic ularly miners and their union—is aware. More sig nificantly, available data, though very crude, Ted Mills is director of the National Quality of Work Center, a private, nonprofit organization located in Washington, D.C. From the Review of October 1976 54 expectations from their work, with consequently increasing resistance to the dismal conditions and work organization of most underground mines. For these reasons, underground coal mining seemed, in 1973, an intriguing place to implement some of the emerging quality of working life no tions. These notions postulate, among other things, that joint union and management efforts to involve employees in the decisions that affect their lives on the job can and will have measurable impacts on their attitudes toward work, employer, union, and even themselves as human beings. According to the quality of working life approach, when you change the quality of the individual’s experience at work, you will find employees in turn changing both the quantity and quality of the work they are asked to do. When the quality of working life is high, in other words, improved productivity may be one of the important consequences. This notion is some times stated as “change the work, change the worker.” Most mining managements have traditionally as sumed that there are essentially only two ways to remedy falling productivity underground: Sweeten ing the paycheck, or increasing capital investment in mining machinery. Until the experiment launched by the National Quality of Work Center, few mine managers or union leaders had considered that restructuring work systems underground, pro viding miners with new insights about their (and their machines’) performance of work, might have a measurable positive impact on productivity in min ing. rald Sussman, a research psychologist from the Pennsylvania State University, and Grant Brown, a Penn State mining engineer, formed the rest of the Trist team. In mid-1973, the mine president, the United Mine Workers president, and the consultant team met for the first time, in the UMW building in Washington. Hinks and Miller signed an experi ment-launching agreement which stipulated, among other things, that either party could end the experi ment by just a phone call, that no miner would lose a job because of the experiment, and, most impor tant of all, that the experiment would be “jointly owned” by the management and the union during its 18-month lifetime. In all of the National Quality of Work Center’s many, diverse projects across the country, all of them in unionized workplaces, this “joint owner ship” is of major significance to the potential suc cess of each project. To the participants it means that neither management nor union is running the project, but rather both at once, cooperatively. To the consultants, it means their “client” is both the management and the union members who make up the labor-management committees formed in every project. In all Center projects, there are two or more such labor-management committees, situated at various levels from the top of the organization to the bot tom. The top tier committee usually comprises two or three senior executive officers of the entire orga nization (often including the chief executive officer) and two or three senior officers of the international union (often including the president). The focus of this committee is organizationwide; the joint objec tive at this level is eventually to spread the first ex perimental efforts (if they prove beneficial) through out the organization. This top committee—which may be called a “core committee” or a “steering committee” or whatever—identifies a divisional, second-tier area of the organization where the union and manage ment feel the first active shopfloor experiment should be inaugurated. In large operations (two Center projects involve organizations with more than 50,000 employees and unions of more than 500,000 members), such second-tier areas are usu ally operating divisions or regions. The Center en courages these divisions or regions to form secondtier divisional or regional labor-management com mittees of 6 to 10 management and union officers from that level. They in turn identify one or more plants or work organizations for experimental activ ity, where plant-level committees (usually with 12 to 14 members, evenly divided between managers The agreement In 1973, I was able to persuade the National Commission of Productivity to support a qualityof-working-life experiment in a coal mine (the ex periment later shifted, along with the rest of our Quality of Work Program, to the National Quality of Work Center when that organization was founded in 1974). We found a mine president (War ren Hinks of the Rushton Mining Co.) who was in trigued by the notion of working with his people as well as his machines. And we found that the newly elected president of the United Mine Workers of America (Arnold R. Miller, himself a victim of black-lung disease) was intrigued by the potential of the quality-of-working-life effort to improve the health and safety of underground mineworkers. We found that Professor Eric Trist, a social scientist from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania who had done classic work on sociotechnical work restructure in British mines more than two decades before, would be available and interested in participating in the project. Dr. Ge 55 and union members) are established. As this case history shows, there are good rea sons for urging such a multi-tier approach to quality-of-working-life projects in organizations of any size. One reason is sanction: participants at the plant level where the first experimental efforts occur are reassured that both their union and their man agement, all the way up to the top, jointly approve of, and are even part of, the experiment. (More than once, Rushton coalminers were heard to justify their commitment to the experiment by saying, “Arnold Miller’s for it.”) Another reason is visibil ity: what happens in a plant far from organizational or divisional headquarters is known, monitored, and evaluated at each level; the danger of “encapsu lation”—achieving something impressive that no one beyond the local workplace knows or cares about—is significantly lessened. But perhaps the most important reason for the multi-tier structure is the built-in impetus and potential it provides for eventually spreading or diffusing a. successful exper iment from the first workplace to others, first within the division by the division-level committee and then from one division to another by the toplevel committee. Sanction from the top adds pres tige, encouragement, and a sense of importance to work-change activities at the workplace level; or ganizationwide visibility creates higher level aware ness of what is achieved; the potential for diffusion makes experimental efforts far more significant, jus tifiable, and cost-effective, for if they provide the hoped-for benefits to the management and union sponsors, the built-in structure can spread those benefits throughout the organization. committee members began to learn how to examine all work-related aspects of underground mining, one by one, and to devise notions for improving them. After 4 months of weekly steering committee meetings, a carefully prepared 15-page report which they called “the document” was finally drawn and jointly approved. It covered many points and rec ommended many major changes, most of them or ganizational. But, unfortunately, it concerned itself almost exclusively with the establishment of a new experimental underground section operating under brand new principles (for the United States) of hu man organization in mining. The major points of the “document” were: 1. An experimental section would be estab lished in the mine, comprising 27 volunteers, 9 to a shift. 2. Every worker in the experimental section would be on top pay. This meant the experimental section would cost at most $324 more each week than other sections, not a prohibitive cost factor to the mine’s management. 3. All members of each crew would be, or would be trained by the company to be, capable of performing any job in the section, from continuous miner operation to roof bolting. The entire crew would also be given special training in State and Federal mine safety laws, so each miner would know what constitutes a violation. Each crew of the experimental section, therefore, would be an auton omous work team. 4. Each of the three crew foremen in the section would henceforth have responsibility and authority primarily for the safety of the crew. The responsi bility to management for the day-to-day production of coal by the crew was transferred to the entire work team of nine men now without a boss. 5. Grievances by any member of the section would be dealt with primarily by the crew involved, in what is sometimes called “peer discipline.” If the crew couldn’t cope with a grievance itself, it would then be processed through the local union’s formal grievance machinery. Implementation The Rushton mine was a small, independently owned 235-worker mine in central Pennsylvania, not part of a larger organization as are most other Center projects. (It subsequently became an owned subsidiary of Pittsburgh Power and Light Co.) Nevertheless, it had two tiers of committees. The 12-member top-tier steering committee, which in cluded the mine president and superintendent and the president of the UMW local, would eventually authorize the formation, in each affected under ground section of the mine, of section committees, comprising one supervisor and one union member in each of the section’s three shifts, for a total of six members per section. It took the mine’s steering committee a while to realize that its joint diagnosis of mine work struc tures and work performance was quite different from the traditional adversary and money matters usually discussed in labor-management meetings. But slowly, under the guidance of the Trist team, A meeting of the full membership of the union was called to approve the “document.” The vote of those attending was strongly in favor. By that membership approval, production at the mine had legally become—although experimentally only—a joint worker-management responsibility. An important factor in the deliberations of the steering committee, in the final membership vote ratifying the document experimentally, and in the entire mine’s initial acceptance of the experiment 56 cause of what he knows, and not ju st because he was boss. He liked that. W arren Hinks, the mine president, spoke last. He said that the im pact of the experiment underground was reaching upw ard into Ms m anagem ent and the m anagement style of the mine as a whole; it was changing much of his own and his subordinates’ notions about mine m anagement, aboveground as well as under. In February 1975, a few weeks after the confer ence, the three full crews of the 2 South experimen tal section gathered, as scheduled, for one of the all day critique and training sessions th at occurred about every 6 weeks. But this session turned out to be special. For the first time since they had joined together, the 27 miner members and 3 foremen of 2 South were shown actual m anagement figures for their performance. The figures were for only 1 m onth, January 1975, but it was the first feedback to the crews of their effectiveness as a section com pared with the nonexperimental sections of the mine. The miners were astonished. As a section, they had mined 25 percent more coal than the poorest section of the mine. This achievement was even m ore impressive because a roof cave-in had ren dered their mine inoperative for 5 of the 21 working days that m onth, or alm ost 25 percent of the work ing days. A nd their section’s operating cost (cover ing materials, timbers, bolts, m aintenance, and so forth) was alm ost 40 percent under that of the poorest section. As a result, the cost of clean coal produced by the experimental section in January 1975 was $1.16 a ton, $0.71 under the mine average of $1.87 and $1.58 under the poorest section, whose clean coal that m onth cost $2.74 a ton. To members of the local and international unions, however, the experimental section’s safety record for the first year of operation was even m ore impressive. In 1974, one of the m ine’s nonexperi mental sections had amassed 37 Federal safety vio lations, and the other had 17; the experimental sec tion had incurred only 7. The other two sections reported 25 accidents in 1974, 5 of them involving lost time. The experimental 2 South section re ported only seven, and ju st one lost-time accident (which the crews insisted was an unavoidable fluke). The 2 South section that racked up these impres sive performance and safety records for about its first year of operation differed from the other two sections only in its social or organizational struc ture. The technology used by all three sections was the same m ost of the time. Mine services were the same. W hat was different was 2 South’s autonom y was an explicit search for ways to improve the safety of the miners. This emphasis on safety under lay M iller’s initial interest and official UM W en dorsem ent of the project. It underlay the decision to entrust foremen with prim ary concern for crew safety, instead of production. Safety improvement, in m any ways, was the m otivation for the entire ini tial effort. Once the docum ent was ratified, the next step was to call for volunteers for the new experimental section, called “ 2 South.” The list was quickly sub scribed. Then came training for the three crews of the all-volunteer section. The miners worked at the jobs they had originally bid for, but they were en couraged to begin learning every job in the crew and to familiarize themselves with State and Fed eral safety laws. On February 24, 1974, each of the three new crews of 2 South elected one miner to be a mem ber of the section committee, m anagement appointed five members, and the “official” imple m entation of the experiment underground was under way. The first year’s results Some 10 m onths later, in January 1975, at a la bor-m anagem ent conference in Buffalo sponsored by the N ational Commission on Productivity and W ork Quality, miners, foremen, and m anagers from R ushton told of their experiences to date. From what they said to the large audience, it was obvious that they felt that the new social system of the ex perim ental section and the new role of foremen in th at section were working. The change was evident, they said, not only in what they did but also in how they felt. A 25-year-old miner, since prom oted to foreman, put his feelings this way: Suddenly, we felt we mattered to somebody. Some body trusted us. . . . The funny thing is, in the new system, the crew, we don’t really get tired any more. We probably work twice as hard as we did before, but we don’t get tired. . . . It’s like you feel you’re some body, like you feel you’re a professional, like you got a profession you’re proud of . . . all 27 guys in all three shifts. A section foreman, also since prom oted and now assistant director of training, spoke candidly about the radically changed foreman function. He told the audience that it took a lot of personal adjustm ent not to be (or act like) a “boss” any more, but that once he learned the new system, he found that he had more time to study safety problems coming up, time that the old system had never allowed him. His relations with his crew were first-rate, he said, but he pointed out that now they respected him be 57 as a work unit. (The performance data cited are m anagem ent’s figures for 1 m onth only, however, and during that particular m onth, conditions in 2 South’s section of the mine were generally better than those encountered by the poorest section, though that advantage may have been roughly can celed out by 2 South’s 5 down days from the roof cave-in.) Both the miners in the experimental section and m anagement were delighted by these figures. It seemed clear that in every way—in th e changed self-estimate of the crews, in their productivity, and in their safety record— the experimental section was working m ore impressively than anyone had hoped. On that snowy day in 1975, with the experiment a year old, it would have been understandable to de scribe the new system as enormously successful, with m ajor ramifications for improved safety and productivity in the m ining industry. But any eupho ria th at may have been experienced th at day was soon to be dispelled. went, were to have no such sharing. Additionally, dissident union members not in the two experimen tal sections, and particularly those in aboveground work, began to say that they too wanted top mine pay. Why should “yellow hats” get it when workers with years and decades of seniority did not? A t a local union meeting in M arch 1975, one of the dissident miners proposed that the top-pay pro visions of the experimental sections be extended to the entire union membership, or the union would exercise its right to term inate the project. The pro posal was accepted by the members present. Now faced with a legal union m andate to devise a form ula for diffusing the experiment to the M l mine population if it was to be continued at all, the em battled steering comm ittee sought to find some form ula which would be acceptable to the m ine’s management, to the local union leadership, to the rank and file, and to the United Mine W orkers In ternational. Moreover, the form ula would have to be acceptable to all concerned as a perm anent solu tion which could continue beyond the soon-toexpire 18-month experimental period. For the union, the formula had to apply equitably through out the entire mine operation and not violate na tional agreements between the UM W and the Bitu minous Coal Operators of .America (BCOA). And. for management, it had to be a formula that would not price the m ine’s labor force out of competitive range. Nevertheless, by June 1975, a formula (“docu m ent no. 2”) had been devised which was accept able to the steering committee, the United Mine W orkers contract officials in W ashington, the mine management, and all officers of the local. T hrough out July, members of the research team and the steering committee endeavored to explain the de tails of the complex new “docum ent” to the entire work force, meeting in groups of 8 to 10 miners at a time. In essence, the new docum ent offered each underground miner in all sections of the mine the option of accepting or refusing the “experimental” autonom ous principles of job-rotation at top pay. It offered every worker 90 workdays at top pay while training for the new type of work system. A t the end of 90 days, workers would take a proficiency test. If they passed, they would be perm anently as signed to an autonom ous section at the new rate of pay. It didn’t work. Perhaps the form ula was just too complex. Perhaps its provisions were wrongly con ceived or inadequately explained. Perhaps the m in ers in the more productive experimental sections had developed—as some others charged— a holierthan-thou smugness about their way of life that an T ie rising storm In late 1974, with the new push on for coal as an energy source, the m anagem ent unilaterally decided to start a fourth section in the mine. A decision was m ade— unfortunately w ithout consulting the un ion— that the fourth section (to be called 5 Butt) would operate under the new system, which every one, miners and m anagement and consultants, now referred to as “autonom ous.” The joint steering comm ittee was presented this decision as a fait ac compli, which rankled many union members, par ticularly the representative of the U M W interna tional. This new section was also to be composed only of volunteers. But this time, the volunteers for 5 Butt were mostly “yellow hats,” or apprentice new miners. Older miners, m ost of whom seemed to pre fer to stay with the crews they’d worked with for years, did not rash to this section as the committee had anticipated. So an appreciable num ber of the members of the new 27-m an section were green horns, brand new to mining, who were to earn top mine pay from the start, a factor that helped set off the coming storm. A nother factor was ignorance, or inadequate comm unications throughout the mine, or both. Be ginning in late 1974 and m ounting in the spring, the rumor-mill began to operate full blast among the m ine’s rank and file. One highly persistent— and untrue-—rum or was that the “autonom ous” sections, and they alone, had made a deal with m anagem ent by which any productivity increases would be shared; the other sections, the rum or 58 gered their peers. Perhaps it was political factional ism within the local. Perhaps too m any of the older miners were too tradition-bound or too close to re tirem ent to welcome m ajor changes in their ways of working. Perhaps the persistent false rum or of a lo cal-union sellout to m anagem ent had sunk in. W hatever the reasons, the local union rejected the new docum ent in m id-August 1975, by a razorthin m argin of 79 against, 75 for, with 16 absent. The vote rocked the consultants, the local union leadership, and the mine management, who had jointly devised the form ula and had been convinced it would easily pass. It rocked the U nited Mine W orker officials in W ashington and in the U M W ’s regional district, v/fao had given it their endorse ment. Legally, the vote was merely a rejection of the new formula. But the stunned local union leader ship interpreted it as m ore—as rank-and-file rejec tion of the whole experiment, ending the coopera tive joint union-m anagem ent decisionmaking phase. The union leaders, aware that alm ost half the mem bership of the local (and perhaps m ore than half, had the absent members been present) wanted to continue and expand the experimental conditions, asked m anagement to continue the new work sys tems in the autonom ous sections, so cherished by the miners in them, exactly as they were, but as a unilateral m anagement decision. Also at the union’s request, the name of the steering committee was changed to the training and development com m it tee (under a clause in the national BCOA-UM W contract perm itting union-m anagem ent cooperation in those areas). But unlike the steering committee, the new training and development comm ittee was no longer— officially— a decisionmaking body. It was to recom mend to management, which would m ake all decisions unilaterally. In the fall of 1975, several things happened. A l m ost immediately after the vote against the new formula, there was a perceptible fall-off in produc tivity and an accompanying rise in safety violations throughout the mine, particularly in the formerly “yellow-hat” second autonom ous “ 5 B utt” section. The former steering comm ittee continued to meet regularly under its new name, with exactly the same faces around the table as for the previous 2 years, with continuing counsel from the research team. In October, it began deliberating a new formula. W ar ren Hinks, the mine president, noted with a smile th at by the time that form ula was set into place in the mine in October 1975, the newly nam ed train ing and development committee had reassumed all of the steering com m ittee’s old labor-management decisionmaking functions, as if the A ugust vote had never happened. The mine still contained a large percentage of workers unconvinced th at the autonom ous m ode of the experimental volunteer sections was a good way to mine coal. The com m ittee’s new form ula gave such miners an option. M anagem ent announced th at for a period of 1 year, all workers except new “yellow-hat” entrants in the entire mine— above ground and below— would be paid the top rate for their area of the mine, and all would be given train ing in all the jobs performed in their areas. Those who showed no interest or willingness to. learn jobs other than their own would revert to the contract rate for their job, which usually would be less pay. Because this was a m anagement decision recom m ended by the committee, there was no formal de bate among the miners. In August 1976, the Rushton project entered its fourth year. The initial experimental phase was dead; the research team felt it expired long before the August 1975 brouhaha, when the focus at the mine began— through peer pressures, prim arily— to turn its focus from two sections underground to the new focus on the entire mine. Even the term s used around the mine have changed: “autonom ous” has largely dropped out of currency; no one now refers to “the program ” or “the experiment” as they used to. According to President Hinks, today miners and managers, in referring to the new participative so cial system, simply talk about “our way of w ork ing.” Since October 1975, the focus of “our way of working” has been increasingly on m anagers and foremen, on the sound assum ption th at mine per sonnel at those levels often require m ore under standing and reassurance about participative m an agement than do the underground miners on whom the initial phase focused exclusively. In July 1976, a leadership effectiveness course for m anagers was inaugurated. The old section conferences of the ex perimental period are still full-day meetings to ex amine social and interpersonal work problems, but they now occur half as often as in the old days of 1974. M iner training has been shifted underground, where workers train with the m ine’s machines, and a new m achine-m aintenance consultant has been retained. In late 1975, the third of the mine’s four sec tions— 1 East— voluntarily adopted “our way of working” as an autonom ous unbossed work team, with no formal fanfare and no new “docum ent” to set it up. Its safety record has changed dram atically since then, from five lost-time accidents with one fatality under the traditional system in 1974 to one lost-time accident in 1975 under the new system, and one thus far through 1976. (The first experi m ental section, 2 South, improved its splendid one 59 ished R ushton story is not whether the new partici pative social system works in underground face mining in the United States. Its feasibility as a more hum an, m ore effective, m easurably safer way of mining coal has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as every R ushton miner who has worked in it will vouchsafe. W hat remains to be seen, how ever, with implications for every underground mine operation in the U nited States, is if the new workrestructuring approaches can be successfully ap plied to a total mining organization, at every level of that organization, aboveground as well as under ground, and particularly with mine managements. The dissidence, suspicion, and hard-core resis tance that developed at R ushton and culm inated in the negative vote of August 1975 suggest an im por tant lesson: although initiating socio-technical change activities through a single “shopfloor” workplace unit may be a useful or even m andatory “entry” device into an organization and the best or only way to get an organizational change program going, it m ust quickly be expanded throughout the workplace, or peer-pressure troubles are certain to arise. A study of the negative August 1975 vote re veals that all those who had personally experienced the new social system in action voted for continu ance and expansion; alm ost uniformly, those who voted against had not been touched by the experi m ental activity. A nd because those untouched m in ers had no personal, experiential understanding of the new social system in action, they perceived, quite understandably, the key issues involved to be traditional issues such as equity in pay, which they did understand. A nother hindsight judgm ent w orth noting is that once 5 Butt, the second experimental section, got underway, the steering committee, perhaps consid ering its experimental task accomplished, ceased to meet regularly. M any involved suggest th at had it continued to meet regularly, it m ight have been able to both perceive and take remedial action against the rising suspicions, dissidence, and minewide thrust. The perm anent function of laborm anagem ent bodies at every level m ay be as m uch to observe, diagnose, and take regularly scheduled soundings as it is to make implementive decisions. Perhaps the m ost useful lesson to be learned by the R ushton story to date is a lesson in scale. A t the inception of the effort, it was a small, onesection “shopfloor” experiment in the effectiveness of autonom ous work teams in mining coal under ground. That was the totality of the original “ex perim ent” inaugurated by Miller and Hinks, a small, joint search for innovative mining techniques which m ight bring greater safety and perhaps pro ductivity to coal production. But it could not stay lost-tim e 1974 record to none in 1975 and none thus far in 1976.) N or is it coincidence, perhaps, th at of five prom otions in the mine since m id-1975, all have come from the 2 South section: four miners prom oted to foreman and managerial positions, and one foreman prom oted to assistant training direc tor. Further, perceiving the value of the extra train ing the experimental crews had received, the mine m anagement brought in a new training consultant to expand such training throughout the mine. A nd the renamed steering committee, now operating as before but under its new alias, has been wrestling with a soon-to-be-proposed gain-sharing plan (re quested in the original “document no. 1”), report edly to resemble a modified “ Scanlon plan” for profit sharing. Clearly, there were spinoffs from the original experiment, not specifically bottom -line productivity improvements, which had significantly increased the effectiveness of the entire mine and the utilization of its hum an resources. “Our way of working” is still very much in place at Rushton, operating under different names, and with its new, mine-wide focus. Yet it has not en tirely won. Pockets of hard-nose resistance in m an agement and among the workers remain unbudged, although Hinks says m any of those are slowly and suspiciously “coming around.” The fourth section, 2 N orth, will as yet have none of “our way of work ing” (and has had four lost-time accidents thus far in 1976). There have been several wildcat strikes, at Eastertim e a big one (about bidding for a single tem porary job). Problems, lots of them, remain. Lessons and questions W hen questioned in August 1976 about his prog nosis for the future of “the way we work” at Rushton, the mine president— still as com m itted to its principles as in 1973— identified his feelings as “positive.” He paused, then added, “but not eu phoric.” He said, looking backward, that a lot of good things have happened, and, although there’s no way to know for sure, a lot of bad things have probably been avoided. Generally, m ost officers of the local union share H inks5 cautious optimism for the future; they agree that labor-managem ent dia logue and joint consultation are probably perm a nently imbedded in the organization. An unpub lished 1976 report by UM W officials, however, is critical of what R ushton has actually achieved in term s of m ajor safety advances. The report does not treat the 3-year lost-time and accident perform ance of 2 South, and more recently 1 East, as sig nificant. W ith the benefit of hindsight, however, alm ost all who have been involved with the project concur th at what is m ost significant about the still unfin 60 whether in a delayed “Hawthorne effect,” it will subside down to status quo ante or worse. Still an other question is the impact that the labormanagement cooperation and joint decisionmaking will have on collective bargaining, both locally at Rushton and perhaps nationally on BCOA-UMW national agreements. small. By early 1975, it was evident (looking backward) that peer pressures were already transform ing that first experiment into a totally different ef fort: the mandatory diffusion of the same participative notions to the entire organization. The latter had, and still has, a scale of hugely different proportion and complexity. For what might be called the second, evolutionary stage focusing on the whole mine, involved not just one kind of work, workers, and technology (digging coal under ground) but many. It involved electricians, mainte nance workers, bulldozer operators, clerks, supervi sors, managers, and trainers. It involved an entire organization to be introduced slowly and effectively to “our way or work.” The basic lesson is that tactical “entry at the bot tom,” however initially effective, always has in it the larvae of the obligatory second stage which, if not accommodated by carefully preplanned strate gies for growth, will grow hungrily and finally burst out of their chrysalis. The Trist research team had conceived the total organization as the experimental locus from the outset. The two experimental sections—2 South and 5 Butt—had been conceived and structured as but initial efforts within a broader, mine-wide plan of project growth. But the tactics of entry had ob scured from the mine population this larger multi tier vision: the visible focus to the participants re mained too long underground and too long on just two sections. Had management, local and interna tional union, miners, and the consultant team worked from the outset to eventually bring work restructure and new participative systems to all, the Rushton story might have been quite a different story, avoiding the traumas of 1975 and 1976. True, M l sanction from top to bottom was present from the start. To most of the mine organization, how ever, strong, organizationwide visibility and precon ceived commitment to diffusion were missing. Many still-unanswered questions remain for time, the mine’s union and management, and present and future consultants to answer. The key question, of course, is whether, in the ad hoc, ex-post-ffacto manner in which the mine-wide focus arrived, 2 years after the experiment began, “our way of working” can and will spread effectively to the rest of the mine, as President Hinks hopes. Another sig nificant question is whether the crews working un der the new system will sustain their performance permanently, both in safety and productivity, or What could happen at Rushton if Arnold Miller is replaced as UMW president and a new Mine Workers regime appears, or if Warren Hinks retires as mine president? Is enough built into the system to survive such change? What will happen as one by one the original leaders of the experimental effort are replaced by younger, newer figures? How deeply fixed, in other words, are the notions of co operation and autonomy? How much are they merely the temporary objectives of a currently con vinced group that will disappear in time? Underlying these questions are deeper ones. As suming that the new system will effectively spread mine-wide, what will be the long-run effect on pro ductivity in mining? On mine safety? On new tech nology? On the union and the management? Some union pessimists still claim that in the long ran, success of the new system will undermine the union’s strength and weaken the union irreparably through gradual disappearance of the adversary at titudes. Some managers still claim, in almost equal pessimism, that success of the new system will per manently undermine “management’s right to man age” and hand the power of mine management over to the approval of the men and their union. Each of these questions reaches beyond events in a small coal mine in central Pennsylvania. Each opens up other long-range questions about mine safety and human productivity in American under ground mining in the energy-hungry future. A year from now, in m id -1977, a Ford Foundation-funded study of Rushton from 1973 to 1976, prepared by Dr. Paul Goodman for the Institute of Social Re search at the University of Michigan, will reveal not-yet-available documented details and data of the impact of the initial experiment and its mine wide evolution on miner attitudes, mine effective ness in dollar terms, union relations, and the like. But like this article, that report will not have an end. The end will be written, as a continuing learn ing process, by a harndM of coal miners and their bosses straggling to learn whether they can work better together, and how to-do it. 61 o James W. D riscoll Cooperative departures from traditional collective bar gaining behavior have begun to interest scholars and practitioners.1 Former Secretary of Labor John Dunlop has chaired the meetings of an informal Labor-Manage ment Group at the national level to make recommenda tions on macroeconomic policy. Numerous local com munities now support area-wide labor-management committees. And numerous cooperative programs have appeared in local plants, including quality-of-worklife programs at General Motors and in-plant committees in the steel industry, under the auspices of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, and in the Scanlon Plan. Despite the recent chill in U.S. union-management re lations, cooperative programs have arisen because the two adversaries increasingly face common problems.2 Challenges to both parties are presented by demograph ic and attitudinal shifts in the work force, new govern mental regulation, technological change, and foreign competition. All new programs in collective bargaining aiming to answer these challenges share a common behavioral de nominator: they encourage joint problem-solving rather than traditional bargaining. Richard Walton and Rob ert B. McKersie popularized the distinction between these two techniques of conflict resolution.3 Bargaining conceals information in order to extract concessions from an opponent; problem-solving relies on sharing in formation in open discussions. Rather than the ex change of proposals, problem-solving includes careful identification of joint concerns, generation of a range of possible alternatives, and the selection of an alternative to maximize joint benefits. Research on these recent problem-solving efforts has largely consisted of broad overviews and testimonials by their proponents. Our own recent study takes a look at three cooperative innovations, running the gamut from success to failure. Our purpose was to learn whether co operative problem-solving between adversaries in collec tive bargaining works, and what factors facilitate its success. Study of cooperative efforts Case I describes an attempt to improve the negotia tion of contracts through an industry committee. Case II focuses on efforts to improve the administration of the grievance procedure in one plant of a large compa ny. Case III deals with issues outside the scope of tradi tional collective bargaining in a quality-of-worklife project at a hospital. In each case, we primarily gathered data by inter viewing as many of the regular participants, past and present, as possible. We interviewed 83 participants (about half of those involved), including some third-par ty participants and about equal numbers of union and management representatives.4 Joint meetings were also observed in our study. James W. Driscoll is an assistant professor at the Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts. From the Review of June 1980 62 More recently, the committee has sponsored studies of potential industry health hazards growing out of con cerns about “meatcutters asthma” and the use of poly vinyl chloride wrapping paper, and of the cost of health benefits under collectively bargained benefit plans. The health proposals could help reduce benefit costs, while maintaining or increasing benefit levels for workers. The committee’s specific accomplishments stem in large part from the effort of its permanent third parties and especially the original chairman. He held it together in its early days and mediated some key contract dis putes. Later, when the steering committee became bogged down (in part from antagonisms generated dur ing contract negotiations) the chairman reactivated the executive committee to provide policy direction from a group that was not engaged in continuous negotiations. The retail food committee Collective bargaining in the ‘retail food industry is ex tremely decentralized, with contracts signed in individu al cities. Unions have been able to play one local employer against another in highly unionized areas of this competitive product market. Along with a skilled work force, this has led to higher wage levels than those of workers in other retail trades. The industry also has a high profile. Labor and man agement felt that unless they agreed to address common problems in collective bargaining, the industry would be subject to continued wage-price controls (in early 1974). To reduce this possibility, the three major unions in the industry— the Retail Clerks, the Meatcutters, and the Teamsters—met with the major supermarket chains and employer association representatives in April 1974 to form the Joint Labor-Management Committee of the Retail Food Industry. Wayne Horvitz, former chairman of the industry’s Tripartite Wage Stabilization Committee during the pe riod of controls, was chosen as permanent chairman of the Joint. Committee. Committee members included the presidents of the international unions and the chief executives of the ma jor supermarket chains. A steering committee was also established, consisting of the labor-relations vice presi dents of the companies and staff officials from the unions. The steering committee met monthly, while the original top-level executives convened quarterly to set policy. Mixed reviews. In summary, the steering committee has taken action on a number of fundamental industry problems. For this reason, most of the labor members praised the committee. Company representatives were dissatisfied, however, because they wanted the commit tee to help reduce the upward pressure on wages from collective bargaining. However, the companies also applauded the committee’s work, when specific accom plishments were considered. The disappointment of company members does high light a major shortcoming. Although it is involved in settling local disputes, the committee has not enabled the parties to achieve a structural breakthrough in mar ket-area bargaining. Negotiating contracts for larger geographical areas facing similar market conditions might allow greater stability and lower pressure on wages than current fragmented bargaining patterns. As a consequence, the frequency of local disputes might de cline. Despite progress in some local areas and the merger of two participating unions— the Clerks and the Meatcutters, the structural problems of collective bargaining in the industry remain. An early start tackling issues. The committee examined collective bargaining and general industry problems. It published some general principles to guide contract ne gotiations in the industry. However, the national recommendations have not be come standard practice in local negotiations,' although the committee has targeted key negotiations for national attention. It has convened local conferences to help identify problems before contract negotiations begin, thereby reducing the possibility of work stoppages. In addition to institutionalizing pre-negotiation con ferences, the (neutral) chairman and other committee members worked closely with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service in mediating a number of deadlocked negotiations, avoiding several unnecessary work stoppages and shortening others. The steering committee has also initiated action on other problems. In 1976 it undertook a union-manage ment study of personal protective equipment for meatcutters, because both parties were dissatisfied with a regulation proposed by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). As a result, the com mittee came up with a more workable clarification of the standard providing greater protection to workers and acceptable to OSHA. A small plant’s alternative Pressure from external events forced union and man agement representatives in a local plant of a large mul tinational manufacturer to consider an alternative to traditional collective bargaining. Shortly after the founding of this small plant in 1969, demand for its product slackened. As a local policy, workers were not laid off, but were used as janitors. Union-management antagonisms developed, which finally led the corporate industrial relations staff to recommend that no new work be assigned to the plant. By 1972, the plant’s employment had dropped to 35 in the bargaining unit. A consultant from the corporate organizational development staff, which is separate from the industrial relations staff, began to work with the plant management to improve its effectiveness. The con 63 sultant quickly became aware of the labor-management hostility and offered his help, which was accepted by the plant manager. From early-1973 to mid-1974, the consultant initiat ed, designed, and implemented a series of multiple-day meetings at which union and management representa tives discussed their differences in a carefully orchestrat ed format. All local union officers and members of the bargaining committee met first with the plant manager and his staff and later with the production supervisors in the plant. In the initial meetings, each group openly vented its dissatisfaction with the other side. Most members par ticipated in the discussion, and both sides acknowl edged some of their own problems. They subsequently agreed on areas where joint action was needed by top leadership. Health care union approached The quality-of-worklife project at the hospital did not arise from external pressures, as in the cases previously discussed. Rather, in 1975, a small independent agency that had been founded to stimulate joint quality-ofworklife projects approached a major union in the health care field. The union suggested the 1,200-bed pri vate, teaching hospital in a major northeastern city as a site for the project. Relevant parties involved with the' hospital agreed to support a proposal by the quality-ofworklife agency for Federal funding. The purpose of the externally funded project was to improve patient care and the quality of worklife in the hospital. During the initial discussion of the project, the union was represented by a vice president; the residents5 com mittee (which then had a collective bargaining agree ment with the hospital) sent its leader for the metropolitan area; and the State nurses association was represented by its statewide director of collective bargaining. The hospital was represented by its director, the director of nursing, and the vice Dissident for labor relations. It was the first and only time that top leaders from the various parties met during the project. A steering committee consisting of representatives of these top leaders was formed to identify a demonstra tion unit within the hospital, and to establish a control group so the effect of the project could be determined. The steering committee then hired a consulting team, as called for by the proposal, to initiate the project. im p r o v e . These meetings dramatically im proved the collective bargaining climate, as both sides unanimously reported. Relations among the participants of the meetings improved immediately, and most said that they could now trust opposing members to tell the truth more often. R e la tio n s More importantly, the plant personnel manager and the local union president agreed on two supplements to the contract: one to revise the assignment of overtime, the other to specify job ladders within the plant. Both issues had previously caused many grievance problems; now grievances decreased immediately. C h a n g e in c o n s u l ti n g te a m . Following a slow start, the first consulting team was dismissed and a second team was hired, 16 months after the first, top leadership meeting. The latter consultants initially worked with rank-and-file workers on the target ward to identify problem areas for improvement. Later, the consultants extended their efforts to include higher-level supervisors and a major department that provides diagnostic serv ices for the entire hospital. At the time of the interviews for this report (Fall 1977), the consultant had been working in the hospital for 15 months and had undertaken a number of pro grams. Workers on the target ward, aided by the con sultants, prepared an orientation program for new residents to ensure continuity in day-to-day work prac tices, a major problem in teaching hospitals. The con sultants conducted training sessions on interpersonal skills for workers on the ward, and they began a survey of attitudes and perceptions of performance for the di agnostic department. It is difficult to assess the impact of these programs on patient care and worklife because the interviews for this report focused only on members of the steering committee. A major evaluation effort is underway to measure both the delivery of service and the attitude of The two men also began to meet regularly for openended discussions of plant problems. Indeed,^5when a department that housed new products developed serious labor problems, the two held a 3-day meeting with de partment representatives. Finally, the monthly union-management meeting was expanded from a management briefing to include both safety issues and specific concerns raised by the union. In this improved atmosphere, the plant manager was able to support the introduction of new products. It is always difficult to untangle the effects of such development programs from simultaneous external in fluences. In this case, new products were brought on line after the first meeting, so employment had returned to 200 following the last meeting. A new personnel manager also came to the plant just before the first meeting; he was the first to hold that position on a full time basis. Finally, a new union president was elected after the second meeting. He had participated in and had been impressed by the meetings and continued to work closely with management, dominating the local union for several years. Each of these factors undoubt edly helped resolve some of the problems. 64 workers. Nonetheless, labor and management represen tatives felt that the stated goals had not been achieved, and that there had been little impact on the larger col lective bargaining system, where most had also hoped to see some improvement. Two dynamics are worthy of note in understanding the quality-of-worklife project. First, the director of the hospital who endorsed the project was replaced shortly afterward by a successor whose mandate was to cut costs. Second, the consulting team worked primarily with employees in the target ward, members of the di agnostic department that was being surveyed, and with a few steering committee members. The consultants did not develop the steering committee to be a problem solving group. Guidelines offered Cooperative projects emerged from these cases not as panaceas, nor as surefire successes. Rather, practitioners must exercise caution in the face of optimistic claims for joint programs and care in their execution. Based on the three cases studied, it is possible to offer the follow ing guidelines for cooperation: ® Do not expect certain success. ® Examine the initial situation to predict the success of the program; specifically, the felt need for change, the mutual legitimacy of the parties, and support from top-level management. ® Expect more interpersonal changes and indirect ef fects than specific accomplishments. ® Attempt problem-solving at any hierarchical level. ° Engage a third party with labor-relations experience and behavioral-science skills. ® Despite the increased risk of failure, identify com mon objectives early. Q Involve “line” officials of both union and manage ment. ° Develop a cohesive group of labor and management representatives. ° Avoid challenges to union or management authori ty. ® Attempt change in an entire, largely self-contained social system. The three cases not only identify a probable pattern of factors facilitating cooperative problem-solving, but also suggest a tentative strategy to implement such a change. These guidelines stress the need for participants in a joint effort to monitor the process of the change ef fort as well as specific substantive issues. FOOTNOTES A c k n o w l e d g m e n t : Marvin Israelow and Paul McKinnon assisted in all phases of the project. The research reported here was supported by the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Evaluation, and Research (Contract J-9-D-7-0047). The contents of the report are our responsibility and not that of the Department of Labor. Additional funding was provided by the Industrial Relations Section of the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of David A. Nadler of Columbia University, who is assessing the impact of. the quality-ofworklife project at the hospital beyond our current focus on the col lective bargaining system. The project activities at the hospital were conducted under contract HRA 230-75-0179 with the National Cen 65 ter for Health Services Research, U.S. Department of Health, Educa tion, and Welfare. Helpful comments were provided by Richard Shore and Edgar Weinberg of the Department of Labor. ' William Batt and Edgar Weinberg, “Labor-Management Coopera tion Today,” Harvard Business Review, January-February, 1978. 2J. W. Driscoll, “A Behavorial-Science View of the Future of Col lective Bargaining in the United States,” Labor Law Journal, July 1979, pp. 433-38. 1Richard Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavorial Theory of Labor Negotiations, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1965, pp. 4 -5 . 4 The interviews lasted from 20 minutes to 8 hours, with a median length of 1 hour. Dynamics of establishing cooperative quality-of-worklife projects An analysis o f the start-up and operation o f union-management projects concerned with restructuring work; forces supporting and opposing their creation are examined E d w a r d E. L a w ler III and John A. B rexler , ior patterns usually exist. In the case of union-m an agement relationships, the persistence of noncooper ative behavior is explained by an equilibrium of forces in which the balance favors noncooperation. Cooperation will occur only if the forces are altered to shift th at balance. The relative strength of positive and negative forces can be changed by increasing the forces favorable to the new behavior, or decreasing those opposed. Two other of Lewin’s ideas are relevant to our discussion: (1) behavior patterns are m ore effectively changed when negative forces are reduced than when positive forces are increased, and (2) behavior p at terns are m ore effectively changed when effort is ta r geted at the groups involved, rather than at individu als. The rationale for the first idea is that increasing the positive forces has the undesirable side effect of producing psychological tension among the partici pants and, thus, tendencies toward emotionality, fa tigue, aggression, and w ithdraw al.4 The rationale for the second is the potency of group norms, and the reluctance of people to change their social role be havior “on their own” w ithout group support and concerted action.5 First, we will examine the forces encouraging and discouraging joint union-m anagem ent projects that were present in the 10 locations prior to start-up, then, we will discuss how the existing forces were altered to produce project start-up. For years, cooperative projects have been proposed as a way to improve union-m anagem ent problem solving, reduce conflict, increase organizational effectiveness, and create a better quality of worklife for employees. Prior to 1970, relatively few coopera tive projects were started in the United States.1 This trend has changed, however; recently a num ber of cooperative union-m anagem ent quality-of-work proj ects have been voluntarily started as an adjunct to the collective bargaining process. In some cases, proj ect start-up has been facilitated by a neutral third party, in others it has not. This article concerns the dynamics of establishing 10 cooperative union-m an agement quality-of-worklife projects that were facili tated by a third party, and presents the initial results from these projects.2 Theoretical analysis of start-ups K u rt Lewin, an early psychological theorist, de veloped a model th at explains the causes of individ ual and group behavior in social settings.3 Basic to his m odel is the notion that multiple forces, both encouraging and discouraging to specific behaviors, operate on individuals and groups. Because these forces are relatively constant over time, stable behavEdward E. Lawler III is program director and professor of psychology at the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, and ■>.visit ing scientist at the Battelle Human Affairs Research Centers, Seattle, Wash. John A. Drexler, Jr., is a research scientist at Battelle. From the R e v ie w of March 1978 66 and although it was not the m ost im portant force toward joint projects, it was significant. Forces favoring joint projects Complementary goals. Most job and organization redesign projects in the United States have been initi ated and directed by management. In the sites we studied, both m anagem ent and labor recognized that such efforts m ight be m ore effective in unionized workplaces if they were cooperatively directed. W ithout formal union involvement and cooperation, significant employee involvement is impossible. Em ployees often have useful information about how jobs and organizations should be designed. Production workers, for example, often have the expertise to identify problem areas and to suggest practical solu tions that can make the organization more effective. Further, participation itself is a factor in improving the quality of worklife. It can lead to a more satisfied work force and encourage individual dignity, growth, and developm ent.6 Thus, employee partici pation in the redesign process can help both m anage ment and labor accomplish their goals, and as such, represents a force tow ard cooperation for both groups. Avoidance o f legislation. Voluntarily established joint projects have advantages for union and m an agement members who wish to avoid imposed legis lation. In many European countries, legislation has been enacted to require union-m anagem ent collabo ration. The unions and managements in this study were aware of a potential for similar legislation in the United States and saw it as something to be avoided.9 Some stated that voluntary cooperation may prevent coercive legislation and has the advantage of being more adaptable to local conditions, as well as more in tune with Am erican labor relations traditions. Achieving noneconomic benefits fo r employees. The union representatives felt they had to discuss noneco nomic m atters, but that such issues are not easily or best accom m odated in the established adversarial bargaining and grieving process, and thus, an alter native approach should be tried. F or them, the coop erative approach promised a better response to m em bers’ noneconomic needs, and they were positively inclined tow ard it. Reduction o f resistance to change. For management, another reason for involving unions in a change process is that such involvement may increase indi vidual and group readiness to accept change.7 People are often reluctant to accept changes if they are not included in the planning; thus, projects that are uni laterally initiated by m anagement are frequently re sisted by employees.8 The resistance can be active or passive, and can take the form of planned noncom pliance or spontaneous noncooperation. Such resist ance is often sufficient to make the changes ineffec tive or to delay their implementation. The advantages of participation in aiding im plem entation was a strong force acting on m anagement in the sites we studied. Several had tried to produce change uni laterally and were aware of the potential advantages of joint change efforts. More efficient decisionmaking. In most sites, union and m anagement officials had spent long periods in adversarial relations and were dissatisfied with the rigidities and rituals associated with these relation ships. Strikes and prolonged negotiations had taken their toll on both sides, and the belief was expressed that “there m ust be a better way.’’ Thus, out of fa tigue— and perhaps boredom —both unions and managements were attracted tow ard an approach that promised limited relief from adversarial cere mony, while still serving their respective interests. Forces opposing joint projects Goal differences. The strongest negative force in most sites was the broadly shared belief th at unions and m anagements have different and potentially con flicting goals. Union leaders talk of employment se curity, higher wages, improved benefits, and job rights. M anagers talk of m aintaining profitability, productivity, and achieving greater organizational effectiveness. Thus, at least on the surface, the im por tant goals of unions and m anagements are different and there seems to be little comm on ground to serve as a basis for cooperative projects. Permanence o f changes. A nother advantage of joint changes is that they may be more sustainable and perm anent than those unilaterally imposed. There are two reasons for this. First, the m aintenance of joint changes does not depend on a few key people but, instead, is a public com m itm ent of two groups. Second, when both sides agree to a change, as long as either one rem ains comm itted, it is difficult for the other to withdraw. The force here is not one of a specific contract, but one of m utual com m itm ent to honor the cooperative relationship. Thus, for both union leaders and m anagers who want to see changes institutionalized, joint projects offer a promise of continuity. This was recognized by some of the union and m anagem ent representatives in the sites studied, Lack o f a model. There are few models of how to structure union-m anagem ent projects. The E uro pean models were largely rejected by both the unions and m anagements as fitting different cultures with different union structures and different political envi ronm ents.10 This attitude was illustrated by Thom as 67 about joint projects taking away some of their tradi tional prerogatives in the areas of staffing, work de sign, and the evaluation of performance. The power of union leaders often rests upon sup port from the rank-and-file membership. A m anager may be removed from office by superiors; but union officers can be voted out of office by the membership. Unions can also be decertified by a vote of the m em bers. There is evidence that because of this, union leaders generally feel less secure in their jobs than do managers, and more often perceive change as th reat ening.11 Furtherm ore, m any union officers have ob tained office and power on the basis of their skill in handling adversary relationships. In entering into a joint project, they undertake to change something that, at least in one respect, has been good to them: an adversary relationship that focuses on a contract and bread-and-butter issues. In the projects we stud ied, some union officers did fear that a cooperative project would threaten their power; in some cases the local officers were concerned about support from their peers or from regional and international offi cers. Consistent with this are the results of a recent study which found that a group of union leaders rate quality-of-worklife issues as the most threatening that they confront.12 D onahue of the A FL -C IO in a discussion of union m em bership on corporate boards of directors, a trend in Europe. D onahue stated that such moves “offer little to Am erican unions . . . we do not want to blur in any way the distinctions between the re spective roles of m anagem ent and labor in the plan.” If unions were to become a “partner in m anage m ent,” he suggested, they would likely be “the junior partner in successes and the senior partner in fail ure.” Thus, a problem in starting projects in the United States is that an institutionalized Am erican approach has not yet been developed, and as a result, both the unions and m anagements in the sites studied were hesitant to undertake a cooperative project. L ack o f knowledge and experience. Most of the union and m anagem ent leaders were competent in their traditional roles, but were not knowledgeable about organizational development, job redesign, and or ganizational psychology. The union leaders, particu larly, had limited exposure to the basic principles involved, and, therefore, to the risks and potential benefits arising from a quality-of-worklife project. Only one union had a staff person with professionallevel training in the design of work and social sys tems. For the union leaders particularly, but also for some managers, this m eant that they would have to be m ore dependent than usual upon the judgm ents of others purporting to be experts. For most, this was a significant force against com m itm ent to a joint project. Im pact on contract roles. Labor-m anagem ent quality-of-worklife projects necessarily raise questions about contractual protections. W hich m atters are to be handled within and outside of the contract? Will there be proposals to limit or suspend contractual term s in order to allow the trial of some alternative course of action? Both m anagem ent and union lead ers expressed concern that protection achieved by hard bargaining might be difficult to regain or sup plant if once yielded. A few union leaders thought that the erosion of contractual agreements m ight be come progressive, particularly if the joint program was successful, leaving workers without those pro tections and perhaps w ithout the conviction th at a strong union is necessary. Such concerns were ex pressed m ost often by those individuals, both union and m anagement, whose responsibilities included negotiating contracts. Past adversary relationships. The union-management relationships were all long-term adversary relation ships. In most cases, the past experiences of bargain ing and grievance were more of a hindrance than a help because they represented behaviors that had to be put aside. G roup norm s existed that discouraged any nonadversary interactions between sides. Lewin pointed out that such situations make change partic ularly difficult to produce and, indeed, in the sites studied, it was a strong force against joint projects. Loss o f power. The m anagers and union leaders felt that cooperative projects could be a threat to their power to control events and to ensure meeting their responsibilities. For managers, power is usually cen tered at the top of the hierarchy and decreases through succeeding levels. M iddle and lower level m anagers often are hesitant to engage in new activi ties unless they are clearly supported by their superi ors. This means that starting a project requires get ting support all the way up and down the m anagem ent hierarchy. This kind of broad support for a joint project can be difficult to obtain because of a fear of losing power. For example, m anagers at all levels in the sites we studied were concerned Time involved. Cooperative projects often take time to get started and to show results. For example, in the projects studied, 12 to 18 m onths were typically required to take a project from conception to actual initiation. Once started, the projects required further time to become fully functional. The fear of slow progress, or no progress, acted as a force against project start-up on both the unions and m anage ments. 68 Am biguity o f goals and outcomes. Differing or am biguous expectations represented another blocking force in most of the projects. It is hard to attract people to a potentially risky cooperative project without there being some explicit understanding about focal issues and directions of change. At the same time, the agreement about focal issues and spe cific directions of change must arise out of the proc ess itself if it is truly to be a joint effort. In one case, some individuals thought the project would aim at convenience matters, such as improved parking and payroll functions; others saw supervisory behavior as the target for change; still others believed that spe cific jobs would be redesigned to be less boring and tedious; finally, one top manager thought that lower level joint committees would identify and define pol icy issues to be brought to him and the local union president for solution. At this site, as in others, gen eral agreement to go ahead was difficult to obtain because of these differing initial goal expectations. Qualified consultants. The final negative force was the difficulty of finding qualified consultants who have the experience, credibility, and skills necessary to deal with cooperative projects. In all of the cases we studied, questions were raised by both manage ments and unions about the neutrality of proposed consultants, most of whom had prior experience only as consultants to management. tary rather than conflicting. Most managers will agree that an improved quality of worklife is a ration al goal because organizations cannot perform well when the workers have a poor quality of worklife. Most union representatives will concede that organi zational effectiveness is in their interest because un ions cannot continue to advance the security and wages important to their members in ineffective or ganizations. The third parties also pointed out that there are some goals that are shared by managements and unions (such as, safety in a mine, patient care in a hospital). Providing a model. The negative force of lack of a model was reduced in all of the cases by establishing joint labor-management committees with equal rep resentation from union and management. These committees were established with an understanding that they were an adjunct to, rather than replace ment for, collective bargaining. In most cases, the idea for the committee was provided by a third party, but in one case it was suggested by the union. Often committees were established at several organiza tional levels in a multi-tier arrangement. For exam ple, in two cases, joint committees were established at the international union and corporate headquar ters level, at the regional level, and at the local level. The creation of these committees was an inportant event in all sites, not only because the committees served as a mechanism for moving the project ahead, but also because they were seen as a joint body that could not be dominated by either side. In many proj ects, this was a key factor in reducing the fears of both sides, and the formation of such committees was seen as a clear first step the project could take. Creating conducive conditions The existing negative forces in a workplace are usually stronger than the forces that favor joint proj ects. As such, while a desire for change may be pre sent, the opposing forces are typically so strong that project start-up is precluded until some change in the forces occurs. This was true in all the projects we studied. Our analysis of these joint projects indicates that successful start-ups occurred because of some key interventions that reduced the forces acting against joint projects. Without these interventions by third parties, it is doubtful that project start-up would have occurred. Adversary history. In all cases, some insulation from Role o f third parties . The third parties in the projects introduced new ideas, served as a communications link, and helped break down false stereotypes. As stated earlier, Lewin believed that reducing opposing forces is more likely to result in positive change than is increasing favoring forces. The third parties real ized this, for they worked to reduce the forces operat ing against joint projects. For example, in dealing with the blocking force of conflicting union and man agement goals, the third parties showed both sides that their goals, while different, may be complemen Providing information. A number of approaches were used to educate potential participants about joint projects. Key individuals attended seminars and other conferences, and many union and manage ment leaders visited ongoing projects before they agreed to go ahead with their own. Union representa tives from other projects were brought to sites where efforts were being made to initiate new projects. This was effective in reducing resistance because union members seemed to understand and trust their coun terparts’ descriptions of their experiences. past adversary relationships was obtained by bring ing into the new committees individuals who had not previously been associated in adversary roles. In some instances, people in such roles were explicitly excluded, in part to protect their roles and in part to symbolize the nonadversarial nature of the commit tees. 69 One reason the projects continue is that the com mittee structures used in the projects lead to changes that are jointly created and “owned.” In the projects studied, it took only a few meetings of the joint com mittees before the rhetoric changed from “you need to do som ething” to “we need to do som ething.” Changes in seating arrangem ents also reflected the spirit of cooperation that develops. In early com m it tee meetings, the union and m anagem ent representa tives tended to sit across the table from each other in confrontation style; later they mixed up their seat ing arrangem ents. Com m ittee members also seem to accept quickly the fact that a joint process is viable, and that changes can be m ade which will help both the employees and the organization. In all cases, union and m anagem ent representa tives have discovered th at m uch work is involved if meaningful organizational change is to be accom plished, in part, because the committees operate on a consensus basis, and will not implem ent a decision unless there is widespread support for it. However, it also reflects the complexity of the issues with which the committees deal and the ambiguity of what is supposed to happen in the joint committees. The committees typically begin with a wide open charter to improve the quality of worklife and with no specific problems to solve. In one sense, their biggest problem is not having any concrete problems with which to start. The result typically is a long period of education, frustration, and, finally, prob lem identification and problem solving. In addition, the right of committees to discuss contractual issues is not clear in m ost projects. They have been dis cussed, but often with a lack of clarity concerning the com m ittee’s ability to affect them. M ost committees have started by dealing with local housekeeping issues (for example, issues con cerning parking and cafeteria facilities), then they deal with issues concerning work and organization redesign. Some have started with the need for more training and employee development. This is a logical area for action, because it influences both organiza tional effectiveness and the quality of worklife for individuals. A nother frequently discussed issue is pay systems— most of the projects have searched for and tried to implem ent pay plans in which workers share in the benefits of increased performance. Job redesign is a third area in which most of the projects have m ade changes. In some cases, they have pro vided for individual job enrichm ent, while in others, they have used team approaches to job design. None of the projects shows evidence of the worst fears of either unions or m anagements being realized. No unions have been decertified, no union leaders have lost power or elections, and no m anagers have been fired. There have been some problems, however. Potential loss o f power. Two main approaches were taken to m oderate forces arising from fear of power loss or loss of control. One was an agreement to work together on a basis of consensus decisions within the committees; no action could be taken if even one m em ber was strongly opposed. While this led to the decisionmaking becoming laborious and tim e-con suming after start-up, especially in the early stages of the work, it was necessary to allay fears that one side or the other may be coerced into undesirable actions. F urther, in m ost of the sites studied, there was a form al written agreem ent designed to protect the parties and various groups that might be affected by actions taken. These agreements varied in content, but typically included the provision that either union or m anagem ent could, on short notice, unilaterally discontinue the effort, and that employees would be guaranteed against job loss or pay loss from actions arising from the cooperative effort. Finding consultants. Several mechanisms were used to deal with the problem of finding acceptable con sultants. A third party that specializes in starting joint projects screened the resumes of potential con sultants and then arranged for interviews of several consultants by the joint committees. This helped as sure that the consultants would be acceptable to both the union and m anagement; in addition, it com m unicated to the consultant the joint character of the projects. To increase the pool of experienced consult ants, intern program s have been established at sev eral sites to train younger people interested in this work. Overview: reducing negative forces. The approaches used either partially or completely reduced m ost of the forces acting against the establishment of cooper ative joint projects. It is im portant to note, however, that two negative forces— the time required and the im pact on the contract— were not dealt with in m ost situations. Still, the approaches used achieved enough of a net reduction of the forces against coop eration to allow a start-up. Initial results All of the labor-m anagem ent quality-of-worklife projects are still alive, although the survival of two is in question. Several have existed for more than 3 years. Their duration is particularly interesting be cause the agreements th at started the projects allow the parties to w ithdraw easily and quickly. A ppar ently, the approaches used to shift the balance to favor joint projects perm anently changed the situa tion. This is consistent with Lewin’s predictions about the effects of participation and of public group comm itm ents. 70 In three cases, the existence of a cooperative project has caused internal problems on the union side; ten sion has increased and opposition groups have devel oped. In two cases, it has worsened the relationship between the international and the local taking part in the project. On the m anagem ent side, there have also been problems. The expected gains in performance have not yet been realized in some cases, and this, combined with the slow progress, has led to some disagreement about the w orth of the projects. studied. The forces against progress were quite strong and probably are typical of those in most workplaces. Overall, the conditions which led to the projects do not seem to be unique. Joint projects in other workplaces are certainly feasible, particularly if these early projects are successful and third party efforts to stim ulate interest in projects continue. However, it is im portant to note that two of the forces against joint projects— the time they require and their possible impact on contracts— have not yet been dealt with. In two sites, the contract problem was handled by a clause in the contract specifying the existence of a committee, but these sites are the exception rather than the rule. U ntil an approach is developed to deal with both of these forces, joint projects will probably be limited to those situations in which the conditions are relatively favorable, and strong forces favoring cooperation are present. h e e v i d e n c e s t r o n g l y indicates that the initia tion of joint quality-of-worklife projects can be aided by reducing the forces against cooperation. The ap proaches that were identified are widely applicable, and their use could lead to the initiation of m ore joint projects. The forces identified as favoring joint proj ects probably exist in most workplaces, although per haps not to the degree they are present in the sites T -FOOTNOTES1See Edward Weinberg, “Labor-management cooperation: a report on recent initiatives,” Monthly Labor Review, April 1976, pp. 13-22. Also see descriptions of current projects provided in the National Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life Directory o f Labor Manage ment Committees, 1976. 5 Ibid., p. 34. 6 Rensis Likert, The Human Organization (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1967). 7 Kenneth D. Benne and Max Bimbaum, “Principles of changing,” in Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and Robert Chin, eds., The Planning o f Change (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), pp. 328-35. 2 Most of the projects discussed in this paper were started as part of the Quality of Work Program of the Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the University of Michigan and the American Center for the Quality of Work Life (ACQWL) of Washington, D.C. The role of ACQWL is to initiate broad ranging joint quality-of-worklife improvement projects by soliciting the support and interest of individual managements and unions. ACQWL establishes a structure of joint labor-management com mittees at participating sites and serves as a third party during project start-up and initial planning stages; an independent consultant is usually chosen jointly by unions and management as a third party once the change project begins. The primary role of ISR is to document individual projects and to evaluate and assess their impact on organizational effec tiveness and individual worker outcomes, such as satisfaction and safety. Funding for the overall effort is provided through grants from the Ford Foundation and the Economic Development Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce. 8 Lester Coch and John R. P. French, Jr., “Overcoming resistance to change,” in Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander eds., Group Dynamics (New York, Harper and Row, 1968, 3d. ed.), pp. 336-50. 9 Edward E. Lawler, “Should the quality of work life be legislated?” The Personnel Administrator, January 1976, pp. 17-21. 10 Nancy Foy and Herman Gadon, “Worker participation: Contrasts in three countries,” Harvard Business Review, May-June 1976, pp. 7183. 11 Edwin A. Miller, “The study of job attitudes of national union officers,” unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1964. 12 Thomas A. Kochan, David V. Lipsky, and Lee Dyer, “Collective bargaining and the quality of work: The views of local union activists,” Proceedings o f the Twenty-Seventh Annual Winter Meeting, IRRA, Dec. 28-29, 1974, pp. 150-62. 3 Kurt Lewin, “Frontiers in group dynamics,” Human Relations, 1947, pp. 5-41. 4 Kurt Lewin, “Frontiers in group dynamics,” p. 26. 71 The process of work restructuring and its impact on collective bargaining L e o n a r d A. Schlesing er R ic h a r d E. W alton and projects? How do they deal with these perceived risks? How does the handling of these projects af fect the nature of collective bargaining relationships and processes? W ith respect to the third question, we take as a reference the theory set forth in a book one of us coauthored in 1965, which proposed four subprocesses as comprehensive of the m ajor dy namics of labor-m anagem ent negotiations.1 To date, work restructuring in America has taken place m ostly within nonunion organizations. The U.S. labor movement has generally viewed job re design, quality of worklife, and related activities with suspicion. In recent years, however, a num ber of unions have become interested in these issues and have joined with m anagement groups to effect basic changes in the structure of the workplace. Our study is based on work restructuring projects in eight U.S. firms. The vehicle used for dealing with work restructuring issues in each situa tion was a joint labor-managem ent committee sepa rate and distinct from the bargaining committees. These committees had an equal num ber of m anage m ent and union representatives. M anagem ent mem bers were chosen by top management, and union members either were appointed by the leadership or elected by the membership. We have reviewed these joint efforts with three questions in mind. How do the various participants perceive the risks of their involvement in these The network of participants O ur current conception of the netw ork of partici pants in a joint work restructuring effort includes not only the local union and local m anagement, but also first line supervisors, union stewards, corporate m anagement, the international union, and the workers themselves. Each group perceived unique risks associated with its participation. In each case, the strategies of involvement included factors in tended to minimize these perceived risks. Local management. Plant managers saw m ajor risks with respect to three groups. First, they were wary that their corporate superiors would be less sup portive of plant level work restructuring efforts in actual practice than corporate rhetoric would promise. Thus, plant m anagers took into account certain career risks. Second, they were concerned th at work restructuring activities would somehow worsen rather than enhance worker-m anagem ent Leonard A. Schlesinger is a doctoral candidate in organizational behavior at Harvard University. Richard E. Walton, also at Harvard, is a professor in the Graduate School o f Business Administration. This excerpt is drawn from “ Work Restructuring in Unionized Organizations: Risks, Opportunities, and Impact on Collective Bargaining,” a paper presented at the 29th annual meeting of the In dustrial Relations Research Association, September 1976. From the Review of April 1977 72 relations; or would enhance worker m orale without economic benefit and at a significant cost of m ana gerial time and effort; or would have short-term hu m an and economic benefits but serve to further raise employee expectations, laying the ground for future disappointm ent. We found that these first two concerns, which exist in both nominionized and unionized plants, were amplified for plant m an agements in a unionized situation. Such amplifica tion relates to the third group with which plant m anagem ent perceives substantial risks; namely, the local union. Local plant m anagers’ greatest fears derive from experiences in their adversarial relations with the local union—fears th at the union would exploit the cooperative venture to achieve their own adversarial ends; or would disrupt the venture if it appeared to gain acceptance among workers. chinery was replaced by the joint committee. Where there was a “sign-off” from sections of the collec tive bargaining agreement, it was agreed that the “sign-off” was voluntary and could be revoked by either party. Supervision. In several projects a common com plaint from both union and m anagem ent groups went as follows: “We were really working nicely and making real progress and then the foremen went and screwed everything up.” M any of the first-level supervisors interviewed displayed distrust tow ard both their m anagement superiors and the union. They often feared that m anagement was attem pting to eliminate their jobs, or the union was attem pting to strip them of their decisionmaking or supervisory authority, or both. Indeed, it is often assumed by the planners that work restructuring will ultimately eliminate or de crease the num ber of first-line supervisors as work team s are better able to coordinate their work and handle more of their own hum an problems, In any event, the supervisors’ role is expected to change so significantly that some supervisors rightly have feared they will not be able to perform effectively in the redefined role. Thus, there is a realistic basis to the fears of the first-line supervisor. However, not surprisingly, supervisors are better prepared to play a constructive role in implementing a restructuring effort if they are involved in the design process. Local unions. Full participation in a joint effort raises the trust issue for local union officials, ju st as it does for managers. M any union officials ex pressed the suspicion that work restructuring, work reform and quality of worklife were just new terms for “speed up” and therefore entered into the proc ess quite wary of m anagem ent’s intentions. Some substantive features which characterize m any work restructuring efforts are of im portant concern. Often the num ber of job classifications have been reduced in order to allow for greater op erational flexibility and m ore meaningful tasks. Union officials who have viewed this change in iso lation w ithout respect to other changes were suspi cious of giving up some boundaries w ithout know ing how the flexibility m ight be used and perhaps abused. Even m ore concern has surrounded the re structuring that incorporates m any m aintenance functions into operating teams, thereby reducing the size of a separate m aintenance group. This pro p o sal and one which involved the cross-training of m aintenance specialists threaten jurisdictions care fully developed and preserved over m any decades. Certainly, at the outset, it has not been obvious to union officials how the larger patterns of restruc tured work could justify giving up the benefits which these jurisdictional boundaries have pro vided. N ot that such changes would be appropriate or proposed as a part of any particular joint effort, but they have been a part of some projects and may be viewed with alarm by a union official assessing the risks of participating in a joint project. In brief, union officials do not want to overturn the gains generated via collective bargaining. To cope with this concern, at m ost of the sites it was agreed to preserve the sanctity of the union agree m ent, although in a few instances the grievance m a Union representatives,/stewards. Union representa tives, not unlike supervisors, often fear that work restructuring will diminish their role. As employees have been encouraged to speak for themselves in various forms ranging from work-team meetings to plantwide task forces, the steward has been less exclusively relied upon as a channel of com m unica tion including “grievances.” M uch the same in volvement pattern that is called for in the case of remedying some of the problems surrounding su pervisors applies to union representatives as well. As a contrast to the risks associated with exclu sion from projects, in a few instances in which stewards have developed a high sense of ownership about the innovative work structures, their enthusi asm created risks for them personally and for. the work restructuring program. In one of the sites studied, the steward of the experimental depart m ent took it upon himself to handle all of the pol icy and procedure questions that needed to be re solved with the com pany without consulting the union hierarchy. When confronted at a union meet ing about his actions, he stated, “W hat happens in departm ent X is none of your business.” This stance created significant antagonism on the part of 73 both the union leadership and the rank and file out side tiie experimental unit. reason for the involvement of the international union is that it serves as a source of reassurance To local union leaders and the rank and file that they are not being “hoodw inked” by m anagem ent and m anagem ent consultants. Workers. W orkers, not unlike the supervisors we have discussed, are often in the position of m istrust ing both m anagement and the union leadership. W ith m anagement they may have played the con ventional games of reciprocal m anipulation regard ing work standards, overtime scheduling, and the like. W ith the union, they may have regarded its leadership as too politically m otivated and its pro grams as unresponsive to some of their im portant concerns. Some of the employee distrust derived from mis perceptions of what work restructuring actually meant. Like m anagement, they initially assumed the project would take the same form in their orga nization that it has taken in some other project that has received wide publicity for job rotation or workteam formation. Therefore, some of the efforts to familiarize workers with work restructuring raise m ore concerns than they allay and unnecessarily so. M uch of the early effort at the sites studied was devoted to allaying other m ore realistic fears which employees expressed, through vehicles such as: (1) a guarantee of sanctity for the union agreement; (2) a guarantee that layoffs or cutbacks would occur only through attrition; (3) a guarantee th at individ uals would lose no wages as a result of changes; (4) in cases where productivity was an expressed pur pose of changes, a guarantee that workers would share in the economic benefits; and (5) an opportu nity to end participation in a joint effort on short notice. Im pact oia the bargaining proce ss W ork restructuring by joint committees appears to follow a precedent in labor relations for isolating problem solving and bargaining activities. The use of joint committees at the site level followed by bargaining committees at the top level is not an in frequent combination. Such a procedure provides the opportunity to involve m ore people in an open and spontaneous exploration of issues w ithout pre venting the parties from addressing the issues in a controlled and channeled decisionmaking process at a later point in time. But such separation is not always readily achieved in practice. Union officials interviewed said that managing the different relationships exist ing in the joint comm ittee and collective bargaining frameworks posed the m ost formidable problem. Basically, the W alton and M cKersie theory indi cates th at labor negotiations are comprised of four subprocesses — bargaining, problem solving, altitu dinal structuring, and internal 'consensus seeking. The theory acknowledges that each of these proc esses has its own internal logic — each complex in its own right — and th at the m ost interesting and challenging aspects of negotiations occur as a result of the interaction between pairs of these sub processes. O ur research to date leads us to make several ob servations pertinent to the theory. First, the work restructuring activity increases somewhat, and m aybe even dram atically, the ratio of problem solv ing to bargaining activity com pared with th at nor mally observed in U.S. collective bargaining. This in turn places a higher premium on structuring atti tudes r f m utual trust and respect. A lthough partici pants currently differentiate between “work restruc turing” activities and “collective bargaining” in order not to allow their problem solving and bar gaining to interfere with each other, over time the parties can become m ore integrated in their think ing and actions. Second, work restructuring activity presents some novel problem s for union leaders in seeking rank-and-file consensus for agreements they enter into with management. N either of the above, however, requires any revi sion of W alton-M cK ersie’s four subprocess theory. But our next observation is not comprehended within the framework of that theory. Corporate management/international union. A t m any of the sites studied, the involvement of either corporate level m anagem ent or the international union leadership, or both, was critical to the joint effort. However, the nature of involvement varied considerably. In one instance corporate m anage m ent offered to be a consulting resource; it was able to do little more because of the divisionalized na ture of the firm. Similarly, when contacted for assist ance by management, the national leader of a divi sionalized union informed m anagement that all work restructuring issues were handled at the re gional level. In contrast, corporate leaders in another firm com m itted themselves to a worklife improvement program and actively sought out and enlisted key m anagers in the effort. Similarly, one union studied insisted that no m atter how small a joint effort was to be, effective coordination and supervision should be provided by the international leadership. One 74 Third, work restructuring is a reflection of and, in turn, will prom ote a trend in the United States tow ard “participatory democracy” in the work place. Collective bargaining and the W altonM cKersie theory, which attem pted to capture the essence of the institution as then practiced in the U nited States, contem plated a form of “representa tive dem ocracy,” where workers’ influence was ex ercised through union representatives in a twoparty (union-management) forum. W ork restructuring involves workers directly in determining conditions affecting their work. This, in turn, reinforces their expectations that they will be afforded an opportunity for direct participation in the future. In the extreme case, workers develop a belief that “decisions affecting me are only legiti m ate if I participate in them directly.” Direct involvement is more feasible if units, small enough so that individuals can see themselves as a “significant part of the whole,” are given some au tonom y to determine what is best for them. This autonom y, in turn, increases the diversity among units within the same larger facility, underm ining the concept that equity can only be achieved through uniformity (a principle of traditional unionism and a natural corollary to representative democracy). The tendency tow ard diversity asso ciated with work restructuring extends to the level of the individual. W hereas, historically, work has tended to be progressively deskilled to accom mo date some engineering conception of the “lowest common denom inator” of hum an skills and m otiva tion, the trend is being reversed in many cases in favor of providing challenge to employees to de velop and then utilize their capacities. Obviously, the new trend will require that we take m ore ac count of individual differences in the workplace. All of these interrelated trends tow ard direct par ticipation—smaller units with greater autonom y, diversity within units traditionally m anaged by principles of uniformity, more accom odation of in dividual differences in preferences and capacities— will require some revision of both the practices and theory of collective bargaining, with their tradi tional emphasis on representational influence sys tems and two-party decisionmaking. --------- FOOTNOTE--------1 Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations: An Analysis of a Social Interaction System (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1965). M oving quality-of-w orklife program s into the w orkplace The core of this approach is to encourage employees to participate in the key decisions that affect and determine day-to-day work pat terns. It recognizes that the person who does a job is the person who knows that job best. And it seeks to draw upon the expertise and creativity of a better-educated work force to help redesign and reorganize work in ways that meet the needs and demands of working people today and encourage them to maximize their contributions to the productivity of the organizations that employ them . . . . Quality of worklife is an adventure in cooperation and consultation among people who must function together in work situations. There are no set formulas for success—except that success is unlikely unless free and easy interchange is encouraged at all levels. Management, particularly, must be genuinely willing to consult with employees, to consider their ideas and opinions, and to communicate frankly before implementing decisions. Obviously, the cooperation of unions, too, is essential in moving quality-of-worklife programs out of the concep tual stages and into thousands of individual workplaces. ----- William M. Batten, Chairman of the New York Stock Exchange From an address in the Dean’s Lecture Series at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, November 1979 75 Flexible schedules: problems and issues Ja nic e N eipert H edges period commonly is 4 to 6 hours in length and spans the middle of the former schedule. A “flexible band” of up to several hours during which a worker can elect to begin work at any time replaces a spe cific starting time. Similarly, a specific quitting time is replaced by a band of several hours following core time. In systems where the contractual hours m ust be worked each day, quitting time for a worker on any day is determined by that worker’s starting time the same day. In more flexible systems, those in which credit and debit hours can be carried over to other days, a worker can elect to stop work any time after core hours. Following three decades of stability in full-time work schedules, alternatives to the standard 5-day 40-hour week began to appear in the early 1970’s. The initiative came prim arily from management, seeking improvements in worker morale and output per unit of labor and capital investment. A lthough labor leaders continued to espouse a shorter work week, many workers seemed willing to settle for a rearrangem ent of their hours. Schedules that compressed a full 40-hour work week into 4, or even 3, days dom inated the early innovations.1 But before the mid-1970’s, a different type of schedule— flexitime— gained prominence. Like the compressed workweek, flexitime involves no change in total hours of work. But it is unique in that it transfers some control over the timing of work from supervisors to individual workers, based on a philosophy that workers should have the right, insofar as their work permits, to adjust their begin ning and ending hours to meet their personal needs and preferences. The basic mechanics of flexitime are simple. The fixed daily schedule, during which everyone is ex pected to work, is designated as “core tim e.” This Just how flexible a flexitime system is varies from one installation to another. There are differences in the length of core time (which can range from half to three-quarters of the former workday), in the width of the flexible bands (which in some cases are as narrow as 30 minutes), and in the length of the period in which total hours worked m ust be bal anced with total hours required (which can be a day, a week, or even longer). The degree of flexibil ity in a particular system depends on the am ount of control m anagement is willing to transfer to work ers, the relative isolation or interdependence in which a worker functions, the constraints imposed by the laws and collective bargaining agreements that cover specific groups of employers and their employees, and the interaction of those laws and agreements with scheduled hours of work. Janice Neipert Hedges is an economist in the Office of Current Em ployment Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics. This overview is based in part on her participation as the United States representative to an international meeting of experts on the allocation of work and leisure, sponsored by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel opment (OECD) in Paris in 1974. From the Review of February 1977 76 creases; overtime hours frequently are reduced; util ization of plant and equipm ent improve; service to clients increases; and employees assume more re sponsibility for their own work and that of their unit. Flexitime systems in Europe, where overtime pay provisions are less restrictive, generally are much more flexible than in this country. M any of the in stallations in Germany, Switzerland, and G reat Britain, for example, provide for credit and debit hours to be carried over from 1 week to another, and in limited amounts, even from 1 m onth to an other. Experience with varying degrees of flexibility indicates that the greater the flexibility, the greater the benefits. For example, the likelihood of a drop in absence and of a rise in productivity tends to in crease with greater flexibility. Problem s related to flexitime But the record is not all positive. The three re ports reveal typical scheduling problem s encoun tered under flexitime that need to be resolved if the system is to succeed and, even m ore so, if it is to produce maximum benefits. Problems, such as lack of support for flexitime or its possible abuse, either by workers or by management, are less likely to oc cur if workers and unions are involved in the pro cess of planning, introducing, and modifying the system. The degree of flexibility elected by workers under such scheduling options also varies. Studies show that some workers use flexible working hours daily; others, only occasionally; and still others adhere to their former schedules. Differences among workers in their use of flexitime are determined by factors such as responsibilities and interests outside of work, place of residence, and m ethod of com m ut ing. Decisions are also affected by schedules of schools, churches, government agencies, and those of m erchants from whom they purchase goods and services. The three summary reports that follow are from among the first detailed accounts by m anagers in the United States of their experience with flexitime. They relate to a variety of work environments as found in a drag company, a com puter firm, and a government office, and include research and devel opment, production, office, marketing, and cus tom er service operations. Each report draws from company records and attitudinal surveys and cov ers roughly the same ground: the terms of the flex itime system, its origin and objectives, the basic problems encountered, and the results for m anage m ent and workers. A lthough the reports of these establishments pro vide some insights into the workings of flexitime, general conclusions m ust await more rigorous stud ies based on more extensive experience. N ot every environm ent offers the same prospect off success; in fact, a few establishments have abandoned flexitime as unworkable. Moreover, evaluations by labor offi cials in these same establishments m ight provide additional perspective. F or example, where m anage m ent sees a reduction in overtime, labor officials may see a decrease in earnings and an increase in the intensity of w ork .2 Nonetheless, the generally positive results re ported for these three establishments seem to be fairly typical of the wider experience with flexitime.3 A ttendance tends to improve as tardiness is virtu ally eliminated and absence is reduced; productivity increases are reported far more often than de Scheduling. Since the total work force is available only during core time, problems of scheduling are inherent in flexitime and can affect communication, supervision and workflow. Placing limits on flexi bility is usually the solution. If necessary, flexible bands can be made very narrow and core time, sub stantial. W orkers may be required to select a sched ule for a specified period of time or to coordinate their schedule with others, and clear any deviations with supervisors or co-workers. Beginning and end ing hours may be a m atter of group rather than in dividual decision, and, as a last resort, some work ers may be excluded altogether from participation. Adequate comm unication within the work unit and with suppliers and clients m ust be m aintained. Some adjustm ents can be m ade to accom modate flexitime. Staff meetings, for example, usually are scheduled for core time. But wherever necessary, flexitime makes the accom m odation, generally of a type described above. Certain establishments, in cluding one reporting here, have turned a potential problem into an advantage. For example, keeping comm unication to a minimum during the flexible periods (quiet hours) seems to have good results. In some cases, establishments that operate in more than one time zone use flexitime to extend hours of comm unication with branch offices. Sufficient supervision during the flexible bands can be assured by limiting flexibility. In some in stances supervisors coordinate their schedules with other supervisors. Some have found it possible to give advance instructions during core time or to delegate more responsibility. Employees on flexible hours, for their part, seem to be willing to assume m ore responsibility for their own work and that of their group. In practice, supervision usually pre sents a less serious problem than anticipated. 77 U ninterrupted workflow as a problem varies with the extent to which a worker functions independently and also with the num ber of workers who perform or are able to perform the same duties. The constraints on flexitime for an employee performing independent research are obviously less than for one who provides services or for a worker on an as sembly line. If the num ber of workers is large, ran dom variations in schedule preferences will mitigate problems of workflow. Job enlargement or job ro tation often has proven the most straight-forward and successful m ethod of broadening the applicabil ity of flexitime.4 Scheduling problems generally are responsible for excluding security, cafeteria, and elevator personnel from participation in flexitime systems. M any pro duction jobs cannot be successfully scheduled un der flexitime, particularly those in operations in volving continuous processing, multiple shifts, or assembly lines. Modified flexitime systems have proven successful, however, in some shift situations and even on assembly lines where the components are small enough that sufficient stockpiles of parts and m aterials can be established between work sta tions. Costs. Since flexitime keeps a building open longer hours to accom modate those who wish to start work earlier or finish later, some increased costs for heating, cooling, lighting, and for cafeteria, eleva tor, and other services m ight be expected. Increased costs also may be incurred in connection with re cording the hours of work accumulated. However, actual increases usually are small (consistent with the experience of the government agency reporting here) and generally m ore than offset by gains such as lower overtime costs and improved utilization of building and equipment. A lthough the effect of flexitime on national en ergy usage is a consideration, any increase in usage in the establishment may be offset by economies in com m uter transportation. Wage and hour laws. The finding that the m ost flex ible systems yield the best results leads supporters of flexitime to view laws and collective bargaining agreements that curtail the possibility of working longer and shorter days and weeks as an obstacle. Initiatives to amend Federal legislation on over time hours and premium pay in order to enlarge the degree of freedom feasible under flexitime began in 1975. An A dm inistration-sponsored bill was intro duced in the 94th Congress to test a limited num ber of new flexitime models in the Federal Govern m ent.5 This bill would have modified overtime pro visions of the Federal Pay Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act to permit flexitime employees to work more than 8 hours a day or 40 hours a week as a m atter of personal preference, without the gov ernm ent incurring a liability for payment of a pre mium wage. The bill passed the House, but failed to get Senate action. Its sponsors plan to resubm it it in the 95th Congress. The General Accounting Office, in a report to Congress,6 recommended that in connection with legislative proposals to amend the C ontract W ork H ours and Safety Standards Act and the WalshHealey Act, consideration be given to perm itting flexitime employees to exceed 8 hours work per day and 40 hours per week for their own convenience, without obligating their employer to pay overtime premiums. The report also recommended that the Fair Labor Standards Act be amended to perm it flexitime employees of Federal contractors (and in the longrun, all flexitime employees) to work m ore than 40 hours a week of their own choice, w ithout receiving premium pay. No congressional action was taken on these recommendations. Labor officials generally opposed proposals to amend present laws on premium pay and overtime, prim arily on the grounds that workers would be deprived of protection against excessive hours of work and loss of premium pay.7 Issues off flexitime Flexitime raises some fundam ental and rather complicated issues. A critical issue, reflected in the attitude of m ost labor officials, is whether the rights of workers in regard to overtime and shift differen tials can be protected under flexitime. Can m anage m ent-ordered overtime be clearly distinguished from the longer hours that an employee works for personal convenience? Or will employees be di rected, or pressured, to “volunteer” for a longer day or week so that peak loads can be handled at regular wage rates? The arrival and departure of workers at various times within the flexible bands itself makes enforce m ent of wage and hour laws more difficult. It will be even more difficult if current laws are amended to permit longer and shorter days or weeks. On the other hand, the potential benefits seem sufficient to encourage legislative efforts to make greater flexi bility feasible as long as such efforts continue to protect the basic interests of workers. A second issue is whether flexitime will add to the oversupply of labor, either by enabling more persons to enter the labor force or by increasing the likelihood that persons now employed will use flexi ble hours to take a second job. Flexible work 78 schedules are considered a critical step toward equal employment opportunity for women and oth ers who find it difficult to work rigid schedules. At the same time, studies of multiple jobholding indi cate that workers on non-standard work schedules are more likely than others to hold more than one jo b .8 M ultiple job holding is of particular concern in periods of persistent unemployment. An issue that may arise if anticipated gains for employers materialize is whether such gains (for ex ample, a reduction in overtime payments) should be shared with workers so that they can obtain a m on etary benefit for improved attendance and higher productivity. A division of any productivity gains could be im portant in gaining the acceptance of flexitime by organized labor. There are still other issues. One arises from the greater ease in applying flexitime to office as op posed to production jobs. Will flexitime, while nar rowing the distinction between managerial and pro fessional workers (who already have some control over their hours of work) on the one hand, and cler ical workers on the other, widen the gap between the white-collar and the blue-collar group? A nother issue pertains to responsibility for scheduling work. Scheduling, once considered m an agem ent’s sole prerogative, has become an area for collective bargaining. Flexitime takes it one step further, giving individual workers a voice in deter mining their hours of work. Concern has been ex pressed by m anagement that flexible hours are a further encroachment on their prerogatives. H ow ever, it should be noted in this context, first, that only limited options are offered to workers and, second, that the concept of a m anager’s function is changing, with increasing emphasis on delegation and worker participation. Exceptions to “fixed” schedules abound in many places of work. A compelling issue is whether they should be acknowledged and systematized. In summary, flexitime has proven advantages. It also presents problems that m ust be worked out if its potential gains are to be realized, and issues that m ust be resolved if rights are to be protected. FOOTNOTES 1See Janice N. Hedges, “New patterns for working time,” Monthly Labor Review, February 1973, pp. 3-8 and “How many days make a workweek?”, Monthly Labor Review, April 1975, pp. 29-36. 6 See report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States, Contractors’ Use o f Altered Work Schedules for their Em ployees—How is it Working?April 7, 1976. 2 See John D. Owen, “Flexitime: Some problems and solutions,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, January 1977, pp. 152-60. 7 Alternate Work Schedules and Part-time Career Opportunities in the Federal Government, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Civil Service of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session on H.R. 6350, H.R. 9043, H.R. 3925, and S. 792. Sept. 29-30, Oct. 7, 1975; Changing Patterns o f Work in America, 1975, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Employment, Poverty, and Migratory Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, Nine ty-Fourth Congress, Second Session on Examination of Alternative Working Hours and Arrangements, April 7 and 8, 1976; and Contrac tor’s Use of Altered Work Schedules. 3 See, for example, Virginia Eider Martin, Hours o f Work When Workers can Choose (Research Project of the Business and Professional Women’s Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1975), p. 12; Alvar O. Elbing, Herman Gadon, and John R. M. Gordon, “Flexible Working Hours: It’s about Time,” Harvard Business Review, January-February 1974, pp. 1-6; and J. Carroll Swart, “What Time Shall I go to Work Today?” Business Horizons, October 1974, pp. 19-26. 4 John D. Owen, “Flexitime.” 5 See H.R. 9043, Federal Employees’ Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act of 1975. (Another bill, H.R. 6350, had similar provi sions.) 79 8 Kopp Michelotti, “Multiple jobholding in May 1972 and 1973,” Monthly Labor Review, May 1974, pp. 65-69. Drug company workers like new schedules R o b e r t T . G o l e m b ie w s k i and R i c h a r d J. H i l l e s ployees (those covered by the Federal WalshHealey Act) may work as few as 5 hours a day, but they can work no m ore than 8 hours unless they receive supervisory approval for overtime pay. Ex em pt employees (those not covered by the W alshHealey Act) may work as few as 5 or as m any as 11 hours a day. Can flexitime work in a large, diversified corpora tion? This is a report on a m ajor pharm aceutical com pany’s first 6 m onths of experience with a flexi ble work hours program . The company, SmithKline Corp., has an extensive product line and is involved in the full range of activities from research and de velopment through m arketing. The flexible work hours policy perm itted many variations on the elemental theme that employees exercise control over when they begin and stop work each day. Top m anagement defines a maxi mum condition which various operating units may exploit fully or not at all, depending upon their choice and the demands of work. Basically, an em ployee may start work any time between 7 and 9:15 a.m., and can stop work between 3 and 6 p.m. of a 5-day workweek. These are the flexible work hours. The mimimum that an employee may work is 5 hours in any 1 day. All employees are required to be present for the 5 hours between 9:15 a.m. to 3 p.m. (excluding 45 minutes for lunch), called the “core” hours. Norm al hours of work in the firm vary from 35 to 40 hours per week, depending on the policy of specific units. Two classes of employees—nonexempt and ex em pt— participate in the program. Nonexem pt em- Four approaches Such factors, when combined with the different lengths of normal workweeks, create substantial differences in the way various groups of employees can use flexitime. Four program s— ranging from least flexible to m ost—illustrate the different flexi bility possible for various groups of exempt and nonexem pt employees: o In the mailroom, all nonexempt employees work a regular 40-hour week. Consequently, their start ing time determines their quitting time. © M anufacturing office employees are, in the main, nonexempt and work 7-3/4 hours per day. Therefore, they can work only an additional 15 m inutes per day before getting into overtime. Em ployees can determine when they will begin work in the interval 7 to 9:15 a.m., but they can bank only 15 m inutes per day to shorten one or m ore of the workdays in the same week. q Nonexem pt employees in the custom er service unit work a 7-hour day, and can bank up to an hour a day to shorten other workdays in the same Robert T. Golembiewski is Research Professor at the University of Georgia. Richard J. Hilles is Compensation Manager, SmithKline Corp. From the Review of February 1977 80 programs and those employees not covered (secu rity, field sales, and manufacturing-production). Altitudinal data were collected from a sample of 183 supervisors and 274 employees in 16 of the 23 work areas. A fifth of the employees under flexible work hour programs were surveyed. The seven work areas not surveyed had about 12 percent of the workers. The questionnaire survey was voluntary, and seven of the area representatives declined to participate. Area representatives who did not participate averaged 35 employees each, with a low of 10 and a high of 100; they claimed to know the attitudes of those employees toward flexi ble work hours, and felt a survey was redundant and a waste of time. On the other hand, the 16 par ticipating area representatives were responsible for an average of 120 employees each and, therefore, felt less confident in assessing reactions to the pro gram. Area representatives did not follow any single pattern in polling nonsupervisory workers; they were urged to generate approximately a 10-percent sample of nonsupervisory workers, but several had areas with large differences in skills and wage rates, and therefore, sampled more extensively. Random methods of selecting individual respondents were recommended, but in some cases job demands and availability of specific individuals made random se lection impossible. Area representatives were urged to get as many responses as possible from supervisory employees, because the expectation was that supervisors would be especially sensitive to problems with the flexible work hour programs. About 30 percent of all su pervisors were surveyed. week. All employees must provide supervisors with advance notice of their arrival and departure times so that customer coverage can continue without in terruption. © Employees in other areas of the firm—research and development, marketing (excluding field sales), corporate personnel, and so on—work a 7-hour day. Exempt employees can bank as many as 4 hours a day; and noeexempt employees can bank 1 hour per day. Employees must use their banked hours in the week they are accumulated. All em ployees can determine when they will begin and fin ish work on specific days as long as they respect the “core” hours, although supervisors can require ex ceptions as needed. The flexible work hours program involves 2,150 employees; however, nearly 40 percent are covered by Federal wage-and-hour laws and cannot take maximum advantage of the flexible work hours. One unit (manufacturing-production) with 650 em ployees was offered the opportunity to develop a suitable flexible work hours program, but decided against it. Two other groups of employees—the field sales force and security—did not participate in flexible work hours. The former already had sub stantial control over their hours of work; and the latter had to keep to rigidly fixed schedules due to the nature of the work. The introduction of flexible work hours in the firm was broadly experimental and participative. Managers assisted the personnel representative in developing a pilot application. Prior to the start of the experiment, managers also approved the way success or failure was to be measured.1 Following the successful pilot study, top manage ment authorized—but did not require—subordinate managers to develop some flexitime variant suitable to their own organization units and employees, with the help of corporate personnel. Appropriate man agers appointed 23 work-hour area representatives to work with personnel in developing individual programs and evaluating their success or failure. Six months after the local variants were begun, re sults were assessed and reported in the aggregate to top management. Each of the 23 area representa tives received data concerning his or her own sub workforce for futher dissemination to involved managers and employees. Nonsupervisory workers9evaluation. The reactions of nonsupervisors were strongly positive. Their favor able reaction is especially noteworthy because the 1,400 nonsupervisory employees in the 16 work ar eas participating in this study included 875 nonex empt employees who were limited in their ability to use flexible work hours. When asked to describe their reaction if the firm was to return to the previ ous fixed hours policy, 83 percent opposed a return to fixed hours, while only 6 percent were in favor of doing so. There was a variety of reasons for the strong preference to retain flexible work hours. (See table 1.) Generally, the benefits to most employees were seen as considerable, as in reduced traffic conges tion and ability to attend to personal business. The costs were not seen as great. About 11 percent of the respondents saw others as less available when needed; and the same proportion -also saw the avail ability of support services as Gaving been adversely Evaluation! Evaluation was based on the attitudes of both supervisors and employees about their work and the worksite, as well as on data about absenteeism and overtime. No control or comparison group was used because there were major perceived differences between the population under flexible work hour 81 are determined by m any diverse factors. Two stratified, random samples of 50 exempt and 50 nonexempt employees were draw n to test for ab senteeism effects, com paring a 5-month period in the year before flexitime with the same period in the year following its im plem entation. The samples were stratified to reflect proportions of the several job classes of involved employees, with random choices of individuals filling each share of the 100 cases. Only paid sick days of exempt and hourlypaid employees were considered. D uring the 1974 period, 191 total sick days, of which 78 were single day absences, were recorded. D uring the 1975 pe riod, the employees’ total sick days increased to 235 days but only 67 were single-day absences. This im plies that the flexible work hour program s had the intended effect. The expected decrease in single-day sick absences did occur, a decrease that is particu larly notable since total sick days increased sub stantially. affected by flexible work hours. Only a few employ ees reported a negative effect on their productivity or job performance. In fact, on a separate question naire item, 43 percent of the respondents indicated that flexible work hours improve their productivity, while only 2 percent perceived a reduction. Supervisory workers' evaluation. The 183 supervisors responding provided reactions as individual em ployees and as supervisors. The latter are consid ered an im portant indicator because flexible work hours m ight so complicate the task of supervisors th at advantages experienced by employees would be offset by disadvantages for the supervisors. Supervisors as employees were about as positive about flexible work hours as nonsupervisory wor kers— 81 percent opposed a return to fixed hours, while 9 percent favored it, for example. Their atti tudes were as favorable as those of nonsupervisory workers shown in table 1. Supervisors in their managerial role also re sponded favorably to flexible work hours, but less uniformly in some respects. Twelve percent saw their flexibilty in scheduling as having been reduced somewhat; 17 percent saw some reduced employee coverage of work situations; and 18 percent re ported having to spend more effort accounting for employee’s time. These indications do not appear to be problems: they seem overbalanced by positive effects. Thus, 85 percent of the supervisors reported that flexible work hours improve employee morale; 45 percent saw an improvement in overall perform ance; and 32 percent attributed enhanced produc tivity to the innovation. The few negative comments focused on specific work areas where the program s were not seen as applicable. Trends in overtime. Flexible work hours also m ight affect overtime. Some observers have worried that such flexibility for salaried personnel would only result in burgeoning overtime costs for hourly workers. For example, a research scientist might use flexible hours to finish a long experiment and sleep late the next day; but his flexible hours m ight require overtime for lab helpers who are paid by the hour. It seems safe to conclude that flexible work hours program s in this firm did not increase over time. In fact, comparing the first 5 m onths in 1975 with the same period in 1974, overtime costs were down m ore than 21 percent. This drop cannot be credited to the flexible hours program alone; in deed, the company was m aking a concerted effort to minimize overtime. But these program s clearly did not frustrate m anagem ent efforts to reduce overtime; and they m ay have encouraged employees to m ake more efficient use of their m ost productive work periods. Trends in absenteeism. One m ajor expected conse quence of flexitime is that it will decrease single-day absenteeism resulting from the need to attend to personal business or m inor physical complaints. R ather than come to work late under a fixed-hour program and risk a reprim and, the employee might simply call in sick. F le x itim e shnniH have no obvi ous im pact on m ulti-day or total absences, which Conclusions These results encourage the use of flexible work hours. A t very little cost, m ajor and favorable atti- Table 1. B@sp©ns@§ of nomiupervisory ©mp!oy@@$ on eff©ct of flsxibi© workhours Rem evaluated Very favorablo it a & s r Productivity.................................................... Job performance........................................... Ability to attend personal business............... Availability of others when needed.................... Availability of support services....................................... Communication with others regarding w o rk ..................................... Traffic to and from work.................................................... 176 97 136 31 28 51 112 Sm s Favorable Percent 64 35 50 12 10 19 42 Number Percent 80 93 87 90 93 73 90 82 29 34 32 33 35 27 33 Percent 13 83 44 120 117 135 63 Very unfavorable U n faver^fe 7 30 16 44 44 50 23 Number 1 2 28 30 11 3 Number 1 1 10 11 4 1 Mo rcsponso Percent Number 4 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 4 6 4 4 Psrecmf 2 ments in the program were made on the basis of this 6-months evaluation-flexitim e continues as before, creating somewhat more freedom at work for little or no additional cost in dollars or effort. tadin&l shifts occur among both employees and su pervisors. For this firm it is clear that flexible work hours did not increase costs of absenteeism or over times and probably decreased them. No adjust --------- f o o t n o t e --------1For results of the pilot application, see Robert T. Golembiewsld, Richard J. Hilles, and Munro Kagmo, “A Longitudinal Study of Some Flexi-Time Effects,” Journal o f Applied Behaviarml Science, Vol. 10 (December 1974), pp. 503-32. C ooperation between unions and m anagem ent The basis for cooperation is laid in the collective agreement negotiated by unions and management. Such an agreement establishes standards of equitable work relations and begets confidence that makes possible continuous cooperation in dealing with other problems arising out of the day’s work. The union is essentially an agency for cooperation for service to the union members and to the industry in which its members are employed. * * * Partnership implies joint responsibility and decision of matters involved—in the case of industry, for problems of production. The workers’ group, to function in such a partnership, must have organized channels for developing decisions and carrying out under takings. The organization must be a voluntary one. As soon as an agreement is reached between workers and management, the workers must assume definite responsibility not only for the terms of the contract, but for maintaining the spirit of partnership or cooperation. It is fundamental for efficiency in pro duction that the spirit and method of teamwork be followed. In this as well as in developing agreements, there should be joint par ticipation through representative groups. The committee that is responsible for working out production problems should be a dif ferent agency from that concerned with grievances. -----Report o f Proceedings o f the 46th Annual Convention o f the American Federation o f Labor (held in Detroit, Michigan, October 4-14, 1926), pp. 51-52 83 The problem of job obsolescence: working it out at River Works R obert Z ager current level of 292. M ost m em bers of the two locals have had technical education beyond high school, some to the bachelor o f science level. M any have come through G E ’s apprentice program with substantial experience in the shop. M anagem ent regards them as a prim e source o f candidates for entry-level m anagem ent positions. Since 1960, 73 drafters have been prom oted from the aircraft engine drafting unit to m anagem ent positions, and betw een 1967 an d 1972 some 91 planners were prom oted. Because o f the high degree o f responsibility, independent thought, and creativity dem anded by the work, very few o f these white-collar employees had im agined th at technological change m ight transform , or even partially elim inate, their jobs. The rapid evolution o f the com puter, m ainly in the form o f tim e-sharing facilities and m inicom puters, has suddenly m ade the unthinkable real. Starting with the drudging, routine tasks such as h a n d printed notes, tube draw ings, tracing, repetitive cross, sections and views, an d the tiresom e calcula tions and m inutiae that engineering entails, the new technology has show n th at a surprising proportion o f the w ork could be profitably m echa nized. Are workers naturally resistant to technological change? M ore specifically, are white-collar w ork ers resistant? A recent experim ent at an engine plant o f the G eneral Electric Co. does not provide final answers but it does suggest workers accom m odate themselves to change that appears to benefit them. G eneral Electric’s River W orks at Lynn and Everett, Mass., is one o f the com pany’s oldest m anufacturing plants, bu t it produces some o f the m ost advanced engines in the world. The num ber o f employees fluctuates as m ajor contracts start and stop. In m id -1977, m ore than 12,000 people were em ployed there. M ost o f the hourly paid employees were represented by the International U nion o f Electrical W orkers, but the weekly paid drafters and planners opted in 1951 to be repre sented by the International F ederation o f Profes sional and Technical Engineers (IF P T E ) which form ed locals 142 (drafters) and 149 (planners). The drafters, com prising designers, design drafters, trainees, tracers, technical illustrators, an d illustra tors, are concentrated in the Engineering Services section. Planners, whose work ranges from m eth ods, tools, processes, procedures, and m achine loading to time and wage standards, are dispersed through the shops. M em bership o f local 142 has averaged about 425, its current level. M em bership o f local 149 has varied betw een a high o f 411, in 1969, and a Technological changes The beachhead o f the invasion o f change was the arrival in 1970 o f a special reproducing Robert Zager is a vice president o f the Work in America Institute, Inc. From the Review of July 1978 84 he sees where parts might interfere and how op eratin g tem p eratu res m ight alter sizes and shapes. In seconds, the tube shows him the length o f a chain of, say, 150 lines and arcs, or the area of a complex shape to the nearest .001 square inch. W ith a light pen and the term inal keys, he adds an elem ent (for example, a rivet or screw), or changes curves, lines, or distances. Then he brings the entire object back to scale for appraisal, and, when satisfied, captures the C R T image on paper either electrostatically or by m eans o f the com puterdriven plotter. In addition, the com puter data, o f which the image is the visual expression, are transm itted on m agnetic tape to an interactive graphics system for use in tooling, m achining, and process design. A lthough fewer technological changes have come into planning than drafting, m ore planners are doing work that involves m ajor technological change, and the effect on individual jo b s is greater. The key innovations are in the field o f num erical control o f m achine tools (NC). The N C m achines have becom e indispensible for fast, low-cost, repetitive production o f difficult parts. The essence o f N C is that electronic control replaces direct hum an control o f the m achine tool. But each advance creates a new problem . In o rd er to induce the co m p u ter to w rite N C instructions, the parts planner m ust be able to com m unicate w ith it. T he language for this purpose was called “A P T .” T he hitch was th at it took a year to learn how to program a whole jo b by m eans o f APT. M anagem ent set up a voluntary, but grueling, 22-week form al course, with 4 hours o f classwork an d 8 hours o f hom ew ork per week, and a tough final exam ination. All training was after work and unpaid; the trainee carried on his regular jo b during the day. Perhaps 75 percent o f the m em bers o f the planners local are doing work th at has been touched by technological change. Some jobs have undergone m ajor changes. A planner now m ay spend less than h a lf his time on one of the new jobs, and the rest o f his time on other work. m achine, which elim inated the jo b s of several tracers. T he least skilled classification am ong drafters, tracers have the task o f going over the lines o f finished draw ings an d bringing them to a uniform density, so that they rem ain sharp and clear under m icrofilm ing. W ith the reproducing m achine a slow, labor-intensive process is per form ed instantly, error-free, and with a m inim um o f labor. In 1971, m anagem ent introduced a flat-bed p lo tter, a huge m achine guided by tape or m agnetic card, capable o f draw ing lines five times as precisely as a drafter and at a rate o f up to 500 inches per m inute, and o f lettering at the rate o f 60 three-eighth inch letters per m inute. The plotter was used to take over the tedious but essential work o f preparing engineering m aster draw ings and layouts. In addition, it can scale draw ings up or down, change their axes, and can be applied to other functions such as engineering, m an u factu r ing, and quality control. A ircraft turbine engines contain m any airfoils, whose contours are sm oothly curved. A t G E, the shapes are generated by com puter program s. As engine perform ance standards rise, shapes grow m ore complex and occasionally a com puter p ro gram produces an airfoil with some areas lacking the requisite sm oothness. A drafter can sm ooth these portions by hand but doing so negates the stored com puter data. M anagem ent, therefore, introduced an autom atic digitizer, which works by reversing the process. The com puter has ingested a m athem atical form ula and uses it to plot the points o f a partly nonsm ooth curve. The digitizer now sights points on the m anually sm oothed portion o f the curve, notes their coordinates, and translates them back into the com puter m em ory, which in turn instructs the plotter. T hereafter the curve can be reproduced at will, rotated, and so forth. N ext cam e a drum -type plotter, less precise but faster than the flat-bed, draw ing at a rate up to 1,400 inches per m inute and at 144 letters per m inute. M ost recently, the com pany has introduced interactive graphics, a technique widely publicized and used in the electronics field but not yet widely used in m echanical fields, particularly in three dim ensions. In this system, a cathode ray tube (C R T ) a n d a com puter term inal replace the drafting board. The designer either creates or sum m ons to the tube face an image o f the engine p art that concerns him; he enlarges, reduces, repositions, or rotates one or more features at will; The structure of cooperation The invasion o f change into fields that once epitom ized jo b security m ight easily have led to turm oil and resistance. T h at it has not done so is a tribute to the foresight and flexibility o f both G E and IFPT E . All these potentially unsettling inno vations were introduced swiftly and sm oothly, with full cooperation—even encouragem ent—from the locals an d th eir m em bers. M anagem ent h a d 85 practically a free h an d in researching and develop ing ways to increase productivity through techno logical change. Em ployees were able to share in the excitem ent o f each new developm ent, because m anagem ent and the unions have w orked out an arrangem ent that takes the worry out o f change. In this m utually advantageous arrangem ent, the com pany provided: over the drudgery, lessened chances for error, enabled employees to see the results o f their work sooner, and, by opening up new ranges o f concepts and m anipulations, im parted a sense o f adventure. Those who have w orked with the new m ethods have no hankering to return to the old, though they keep the old ones polished for use. The gains do not obscure the possibility that, as technological change becom es m ore pervasive or com petition intensifies, displacem ents m ay some day occur; b u t a web o f m an a g e m e n t/la b o r a rra n g e m e n ts holds the d an g er dow n to an acceptable level. U nion security is threatened less by ju risd ictio n al intrusions than by River W orks’ long-term decline o f business an d em ploym ent (down by 1,000 in a decade). Individual security is closely tied to union security. Planners look to their local to defend them against jo b encroachm ent, m onitor the introduction o f technological changes, and police the em ploym ent adjustm ent sections o f the co n tract, as well as fight for econom ic im provem ents. The inform ality o f the modus vivendi m akes it all the m ore n ecessary for the local to rem ain vigorous. Early, full com m unication o f proposed chang es. o C onsultation on the possible effects of changes upon working conditions. o Reliance on attrition to protect the incum bents of jo b s m ade red u n d an t by technological change. o A variety of m anpow er adjustm ent program s in the event that attrition should ever be im practical in such a phase out. o In return, the unions assisted by: o C om m unicating to m em bers a constructive attitude tow ard technological change in gener al. o C om m unicating with m em bers about p articu lar changes, to avert needless anxiety and grievances. o Suggesting to m anagem ent ways o f increasing the utility and acceptability o f particular changes. Communication and consultation In the contracts o f the two locals, sim ilar letters o f agreem ent state: Some provisions appear in the body o f the contract, some in letters o f agreem ent, some in inform al w ritings, an d som e in custom and practice. M utual trust holds the arrangem ent together. “. . . the Company will notify the Union prior to the introduction of technological changes which will have an effect on the work normally performed by the employees in the bargaining unit. Thereafter, at the request of the Union, the Company is prepared to hold discussions with the Union relating to such changes insofar as they may have any effect on the wages, hours, or working conditions in the bargaining unit.” Improvements in job security D rafters and planners perceive technological change as having actually increased their jo b security in a num ber o f ways. T he capabilities o f these technological changes have attracted new kinds o f work to the plant. It has helped to keep River W orks busier than it otherwise would have been, and it has opened opportunities for prom o tion within the bargaining units and also into m anagem ent. M any IF P T E m em bers saw the additional training these new m ethods necessitated to be a m eans o f m aking their future em ploym ent more secure. As elsewhere, younger employees were eager to learn new skills, while some older employees, especially those nearing retirem ent, saw no point in discarding old skills for new ones they would have little time to exercise. M oreover, technological changes have taken T he letters represent a m inim al concession to a 1973 union dem and for contract language specifi cally providing em ploym ent adjustm ents in the event o f technological displacem ents. They con firm ed w hat had long been the practice at River W orks. As early as 1968, m anagem ent has taken pains to let the union know as soon as there were definite plans to introduce a technological change, and to give the union a close look at equipm ent as soon as it cam e on the premises. F rom tim e to time, m anagem ent also m eets inform ally with the union to survey the latest technical developm ents in the field. H ere the locals are able to ask an d get dependable answ ers to any pertinent question 86 about change. T heir criticisms and suggestions receive serious consideration, although m anage m ent reserves the right to m ake decisions. The unions use the inform ation culled from these meetings to anticipate and defuse potential causes o f grievance and tell m em bers w hat lies ahead. They expound the inevitability and the benefits of technological change m ore effectively than m anagem ent ever could do. M em bers tend to listen to the local leaders because they have been consistently accurate and farsighted about techno logical change. The leaders can talk frankly about benefits o f change because they have a record o f pointing out the dangers too, while there is still time to deal with them . Besides inform ing m em bers about particular changes,. Local 149 aims to present a balanced view o f technological change in general, using such m edia as its m onthly news bulletin, newsletters, and m ajor reports. All the writings reflect m uch field investigation, study, and thought. T heir message runs along the following lines: o o o o o o o o o o Attrition C om puter-aided drafting and planning are here to stay and their im pact on workers will grow. Technology is developing so fast that IF P T E m ust start thinking at once about the conse quences. O lder w orkers will feel the im pact m ost. A lthough they have the strongest hold on em ploym ent, they are least am enable to change and have the least hope of finding traditional jo b s elsewhere. To m anagem ent, they represent an unattractive investm ent for retraining. IF P T E m em bers’ greatest dangers lie in thier own com placency and unwillingness to face facts. D rafters and planners m ust learn to think of new technology as new tools for doing the job. A djustm ent to technological change is as vital as econom ic issues. There is little point in negotiating wage-benefit increases for jo b s that are about to go out of existence. The true question before drafters and planners is not, Will we be affected? but. W ho will get the new jobs? A key problem for drafters and planners (though not at River W orks) is that they do not see new equipm ent until it is already in operation and beginning to cause displace ments. Even w ithout filing a grievance, they have a statutory right to know how m anage m ent plans to use new equipm ent that may affect them. Since new techniques cannot be stopped, “ . . . our most appropriate course of action should be to take a positive stance and encourage its im plem entation in return for guarantees that will help stabilize our bargaining units and protect our m em bers.” All IF P T E locals should coordinate efforts and press for em ploym ent adjustm ent provi sions in contracts. 87 How have technological changes affected the num ber of drafting and planning jo b s at River W orks? Favorably, on the whole. They have been instrum ental in bringing new business but they have m ade a few jo b s redundant. U p to now, the objective o f the changes has been faster, better, more accurate work. R eductions in em ploym ent have been a byproduct, touching certain drafting jo b s but not the overall num ber o f drafters employed. However, as the com puter data-base becomes more com plete, redundancies m ay occur faster than n ew jo b s open up. All jobs elim inated by technological change have been phased o u t w ithout harm to the incum bents. For exam ple, the reproducing m a chine m ade half a dozen tracers’ jobs redundant, but the tracers were kept at work until they could fill vacancies at the next higher level—drafters. Those prom oted were not replaced. M anagem ent has pursued this policy voluntarily. T here is no com m itm ent, w ritten or oral, to use attritio n as a rem edy for all technological change redundancies, although clearly the policy allays anxiety and fosters cooperation. Resort to attrition has been eased by the age distribution and other characteristics o f the two bargaining units. Local 149 reported in a 1972 news bulletin that 103 o f 299 m em bers would reach m an d a to ry retirem en t age 65, and an additional 78 would reach optional retirem ent age 60, before the end o f 1982. “T aking into consider ation quits an d deaths, the figure ju m p s to approxim ately 7 out o f every 10 planners” who would leave by attrition betw een 1972 and 1982. And even this calculation om its planners leaving River W orks by prom otion or transfer to other G E plants. Such hard facts leave room for attrition not only in technological change redundancies b u t also in economic reductions in force. Effective tripartition Since 1970, G E ’s River W orks has introduced one m ajor technological advance after another into the work o f drafters and planners, with active dem onstrates that em ployees are as rational as employers, and not m erely accept bu t actively encourage the introduction o f technological ch an g es when they believe the changes will benefit them . So much for the hobgoblin o f “innate resistance to change.” cooperation from unions and employees. This accom plishm ent rests on a structure of relations by which m anagem ent has virtually a free hand in the field o f technological change, the unions have a respectable role to play, and the employees feel secure against displacem ent. The case clearly Tine G overnm ent’s role In June of this year, at a nearby residential conference center, we assembled more than 40 of the country’s foremost authorities on in dustrial relations to review the current and future status of labormanagement cooperation. . . . We examined together many of the impediments to the wider adoption of cooperative practices and we received some excellent suggestions as to the kinds of strategies that might best cope with them. Particularly instructive to us were the recommendations that were advanced regarding the appropriate role for the Federal Government, and especially the Department of Labor, to play in facilitating pro gress in this area. Among them were widely agreed upon proposals that we undertake the following actions: o Create an information exchange that makes readily available to all who request it data on current and emerging industrial relations isssues, collective bargaining developments, recent experiences with various kinds of cooperative programs, and sources of technical assistance throughout the country; q Conduct and support research designed to fill the many knowledge gaps that already have been identified in this fastdeveloping area of labor-management cooperation; 0 Organize and sponsor, alone and in conjunction with other organizations, national and regional conferences to promote the widest possible dissemination of information about new concepts and programs among practitioners, third-party consultants and re searchers, and government officials; Develop and lend support to the development of training pro grams and materials which can enhance the capability of union and management officials to design and administer their own cooperative programs; Undertake to become a model employer and demonstrate to management and labor alike what can be achieved by expanding op portunities for employee participation in workplace decisions. ----- Raymond J. D onovan , Secretary of Labor From remarks at the National Labor-Management Conference, Washington, D.C., September 9, 1982 88 Union-management committees in the Federal sector J a m e s E. M a r t in ings discussed herein are not limited to productivity committees. The operation off joint union-m anagem ent meet ings and committees in six Federal organizations was examined as part of an exploratory multiplecase study. All six organizations were located in a large M idwestern city and consisted of three Veter ans A dm inistration facilities and three from the De partm ent of Defense. Below are some characteris tics of the organizations studied: D ata from the m ost recent surveys of the Bureau of Labor Statistics show that the greatest use of joint union-m anagem ent committees appears in the Federal sector, where they are provided for in 44 per cent of a representative sample of negotiated agreem ents.1 In contrast, in the municipal sector, joint committees are provided for in 19 percent of the negotiated agreements in cities with a popula tion of 250,000 or m ore,2 and in the private sector, less than 5 percent of the negotiated agreements covering 1,000 workers or more called for their use.3 Despite the greater prevalence off joint com m it tees in the Federal sector, H arry Douty, in a report on labor-m anagem ent productivity committees for the N ational Commission on Productivity and the Quality of W orking Life, concluded, “ Little appears to be known as yet about the performance of these joint labor-m anagem ent committees in the Federal service. . . .”4 This paper discusses the functioning off joint un ion-m anagem ent committees in the Federal Gov ernm ent. It should be noted that the scope off the committees in this study differs from m ost previous work on joint labor-managem ent committees, in cluding studies off the Bureau of Labor Statistics which focus on productivity committees. The meet- Characteristic Number of employees .. Average grade level ...... Percent blue-collar workers .................. Percent male ...... ....... Percent black .............. A 75 3.5 B 200 5.7 1 10 85 65 60 45 Organization C D E 575 1,200 2,500 5.5 5 8 F 700 5.5 2 58 14 35 60 65 32 55 75 2 45 40 In each organization the union-m anagem ent agree m ent, the minutes off the joint meetings, and the general labor relations files were analyzed. In addi tion, 63 interviews focusing on the unionm anagement interactions, activities, and sentiments were held with union and m anagement personnel m ost responsible for the functioning off the relation ship. Operation m egiei organization A t Organization A, there was little inform ation exchange or problem solving in the joint unionm anagem ent meeting. The meetings were reported James E. Martin is assistant professor of Management and Organiza tion Sciences, Wayne State University, Detroit, Mich. From the Review of October 1976 ________ 89 to have become rather heated occasionally, and broke up prem aturely at least twice. However, both union and m anagement stated that the joint meet ings served to keep the lines of communication open between the parties by forcing them to come together to try to understand each other’s prob lems. A t Organization B, there was a little more infor m ation exchange and problem solving than at O r ganization A. In the beginning, both parties felt the meetings were turbulent, but after changes in union and m anagement leaderships, meetings were gener ally calm and rational. Both union and manage m ent felt that the meetings kept the lines of com m unication open. Organizations C and F (veterans’ hospitals) used the meetings for inform ation exchange and problem solving. In 1971, the administrative units of the hospitals were combined and the meetings were also combined. The problem solving did not take place in the meetings but rather as a result of them. Both parties felt the meetings were useful and served as an im portant vehicle for communication. Occasionally, at Organization F (where manage m ent was headquartered) meetings dealing with specific problems were held with division managers. A t these four organizations, labor relations con cerns and organizational concerns were generally equally discussed in the meetings. Labor relations concerns were such items as planning for contract negotiations, updating the steward lists, and griev ance handling procedures. Organizational concerns discussed included suggestions for improving pro duction and saving work hours and general work ing conditions at the organizations. A t Organization D, there were two separate joint meetings, one with the comm anding officer and one without. Both meetings resulted in considerable ex change of information and some problem solving. Union and m anagement agreed that the items dis cussed in these meetings were instrum ental in help ing the union-m anagem ent relationship achieve its objectives. These meetings appeared to be more heavily weighted by organizational concerns than labor relations concerns. Organization E, the largest organization, did not have a regularly scheduled m onthly unionm anagem ent meeting. Such meetings had been re placed by ad hoc meetings in 1971, and the parties felt that because they m et so frequently in ad hoc meetings, there was no need for a regularly sched uled meeting. M any different topics consisting al m ost entirely of organizational concerns were dis cussed. Overall, the parties felt that the ad hoc meetings helped keep the lines of communication open and reduced the level of problems in the un ion-management relationship. Regular m onthly joint meetings dealing solely with divisional con cerns were held in some of the divisions, and were felt to be effective. Organization E had a joint committee, negotiated into the first agreement effective June 1969, with specific authority to seek solutions. The agreement stated the committee was to meet at least once ev ery 3 months. However, little was accomplished un til m ajor leadership changes in union and m anage m ent in July 1971, after which the committee began to meet m ore frequently and deal m ore completely with its assignments. A t the time of the research the committee was meeting biweekly. Respondents felt that both employees and m anagement had a very great respect for the reports and recommendations of the joint committee. The topics were exclusively organizational concerns. All unions sent their president, and at least one and sometimes up to three other officers, occasion ally on a rotating basis, to the joint meetings. Rep resenting management, the labor-m anagem ent rela tions officer or the highest ranking personnel officer attended meetings at every organization, except one; three organizations included the commanding officer or the director of the facility at their m eet ings. Depending on the particular subjects to be discussed, national union representatives, additional personnel staff, or line m anagers attended the m eet ings. General findings Joint union-m anagem ent meetings varied directly with the size of the organization— the larger the or ganization (in terms of the num ber of employees), the more the meetings were used for information exchange or problem solving, or both. The more the joint meetings were used for inform ation ex change and problem solving, the lower was the fre quency of union-m anagem ent problems. Greater use of the personnel and labor relations staff in handling relations with the union and more good faith in the carrying out of consultations were also related to greater use of the joint meetings. A l though these exploratory findings are tentative, they do suggest that the use of joint meetings was related to problem resolution and to the way the union and m anagement interacted, as exemplified by their use of consultation and labor relations staff. A joint committee, having as its m ajor goal over all organizational objectives, functioned at all six sites. However, only five of the labor agreements established a general purpose joint meeting. The 90 found to suggest that any of the joint committees were established because of a crisis. Where the Bureau study found some success in industrial relations m atters, the joint committees it studied dealt with m atters similar to those in the current study and did not deal exclusively with pro ductivity m atters. A second im portant observation of the Bureau was the crucial role of the union and m anagement leadership support in determining the usefulness of the meetings. In the current study, leadership changes were able to increase the effectiveness of the joint meetings in individual organizations. Am ong the six organizations, differences in the be havior of the leadership and their attitudes toward the joint meetings varied and appeared related to their effectiveness. The Bureau also found that good laborm anagement relations were im portant in determ in ing the function and scope of the committee when the committee is initiated. Some support for that finding also came from the current study. A t the two smallest organizations, the parties felt there was a lack of good union-m anagem ent relations and that the joint meetings were limited to keeping the lines of comm unication from closing and pre venting labor relations from getting worse. Where relations were better or where they had improved, the meetings performed more tasks and were more effective. O ur findings indicate th at at all six organizations the meetings contributed benefits. These benefits varied considerably among organizations, from helping to keep the channels of comm unication from closing accompanied with a little information exchange and alm ost no problem solving, to being a m ajor problem-solving and information-exchange vehicle of the union-m anagem ent relationship. In the more effective instances, the joint meetings served as an aid in reducing the areas of conflict be tween the parties. Specific productivity concerns were not discussed, even though benefits from the meetings, such as decreased time spent on labor re lations m atters and an improved labor relations cli mate, indirectly helped productivity. oldest joint meeting had been established prior to the union's having been granted exclusive recogni tion. Three joint meetings started when the union received recognition. The two newest meetings were only begun when the first labor agreement was im plemented. Thus, in four out of the six instances, joint meetings had functioned or were functioning without having been incorporated into the labor agreement. In this research, an effective meeting in terms of producing results was one which led to information exchange and problem solving on m atters of m utual concern. Where the meetings served partially as a starting point in information exchange and problem solving, as at the four largest organizations, they were m ore effective. Concerns raised at those m eet ings and not resolved were examined and often an swered by the parties before the next meetings. Leadership attitudes concerning the joint meetings also appeared im portant in determining effective ness. W here union and m anagement leaders viewed the joint meetings m ore favorably, they were used m ore effectively. W here the joint meetings utilized specific solu tion-seeking authority, increased effectiveness was apparent. In addition, the organizations whose meetings dealt prim arily with organizational con cerns, as opposed to labor relations concern’s, had m ore effective meetings than those organizations where labor relations and organizational concerns appeared equally. In no organization did the joint meetings deal directly with productivity concerns. However, at the four largest organizations, in creases in productivity resulted from the time saved in the resolution of problems and by resolving some problem s before they became m ajor issues. Comparisons with private sector It is useful to com pare the findings of the current study to the general observations of a Bureau of La bor Statistics report on six cases of joint com m it tees in the private sector. 5 All of the functioning committees in that report arose out of a crisis situa tion, whereas in the current study, no evidence was FOOTNOTESCommittee on Productivity and Work Quality, May 1975), pp. 50-52. (It should be noted that the Center assumed its new name at the end of 1975.) Douty notes that because the BLS study omitted agreements from the railroad and airline industries, units with less than 1,000 workers, plants with a Scanlon-type plan, and nonunion plants, the percentage of private sector joint committees may be somewhat greater than found in the BLS survey. 4 Douty, Labor-Management Productivity Committees, p. 19. 5 Report on Joint Productivity Committees. 1 Collective Bargaining Agreements in the Federal Service, Late 1971, Bulletin 1789 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1973), p. 62. 2 Municipal Collective Bargaining Agreements in Large Cities, Bulletin 1759 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1972), p. 14. 3 Report on Joint Productivity Committees to the National Commission on Productivity and Work Quality (Bureau of Labor Statistics, unpub lished, Feb. 20, 1974), cited in Harry Douty, Labor-Management Pro ductivity Committees in American Industry (Washington, The National 91 Labor-management panel seeks to help laid-off State workers T o dd Jic k The last few years have been a period of declining resources in many parts of the public sector. Budget and program cutbacks in New York State have been particularly severe. As a result, problems of re trenchm ent have emerged in a sector characterized typically by its secure jobs. Turm oil has replaced stability and the loss of w orkers’ jobs has been one of the key outcomes. Between April 1971 and D e cember 1976, approxim ately 10,000 individuals were laid off by New York State. Approxim ately 3,000 workers rem ain laid off today, with almost another 1,000 having been rehired at lower grades. The New York State Continuity of Em ploym ent (COE) Com m ittee was established to tackle the deli cate issues of public sector worker displacement. Created in April 1976, the Com m ittee emerged out of a collective bargaining agreement between the State of New York and the New York State Civil Service Employees Association. Its membership con sists of an equal num ber of union and m anagement officials, and it is chaired by a neutral party. The C om m ittee’s mission is to study worker displace m ent problems arising from economic or program cutbacks in State agencies and to facilitate program s and m ake recom m endations which would minimize layoffs, or at least minimize the negative effects of layoffs. W hat follows is a brief discussion of the proce dures used to research the displacem ent problem and the specific program s and policies recom mended thus far. The role of researchers Once constituted as a form al committee, the m em bers were faced with a dilem m a of how to meet their m andate. They needed to agree on the scope and nature of the problem, to generate alternative strate gies for dealing with it, and to reach consensus on the choice of appropriate program s. They sought an swers to a variety of research questions relating to the whereabouts and condition of laid-off State em ployees. Thus, the Com m ittee decided to solicit the assistance of academic researchers to contribute sup portive services. Behavioral science researchers were brought into the project to collect and analyze the required information. The research serves a variety of functions. First, it provides objective evidence to support or refute hy potheses and questions generated by the Committee. F or example, the Com m ittee wanted to know w hether low staff m orale caused by job insecurity affected patient care in State hospitals. A literature review and research design were prepared by the researchers to help the Com m ittee decide how to pursue the question. D ata collection would follow if deemed necessary. This is typical of how the Com m ittee sought to dem onstrate a “hunch” and how the researchers provided the tools to test it out. Todd Jick is a research specialist at New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University. The title of his full IRRA paper is “Coping with Job Loss: An Integration of Research, Applica tion, and Policy Development.” From the Review of July 1978 92 resentative to determ ine m anpow er needs in various State agencies, identification of suitable trainees from the list of laid-off individuals, assistance in recruit m ent where necessary, and the design, coordination, and evaluation of the program . Specific program s have included special recruitm ent of correctional officers and accompanying training, retraining for system analysts positions, and helping individuals find m ore suitable opportunities in the private sector. The overall direction is that of “employability en hancem ent,” th at is, locating available job m arkets and easing entry through retraining or simple advo cacy. A second purpose of the support staff is to prevent problems in the future by m inimizing the barriers to continuity of employment for State employees. This essentially represents effective work force planning characterized by coordination, m atching, and prob lem solving. The goal is to develop a tighter m atch between staffing needs and staffing resources, to im prove the m anpow er planning function so that, for example, agencies “scaling up ” can easily acquire employees from agencies who are cutting back. Thus, it has already been recom m ended th at com pre hensive work force planning be developed in the form of an adm inistrative “hom e” or center for state wide planning. The Com m ittee is currently consider ing a pilot program to set up a parallel center within a State departm ent which will be subject to work force fluctuations. Accordingly, the action staff has been developing a num ber of program s and proposals: a skills inven tory of laid-off employees, relocation and job search grants, special grants, civil service announcem ents, and tests. Together with the retraining, counseling, and private sector outplacem ent program s, these represent the tools for a readjustm ent program . Pilot projects in these areas are currently underw ay and have begun to be evaluated. Perhaps m ost im portantly, research has re sponded to the interests of the Com m ittee to investi gate the im pact of layoffs from a variety of perspec tives. W hereas layoffs have traditionally been considered as an economic phenom enon alone, the current emphasis has also explored the social and psychological consequences. The general thrust of the research has been to examine how layoffs affect the employee’s physical health, psychological well being, and family life, as well as economic stability. Furtherm ore, the Com m ittee wanted to understand how to ensure both efficiency and high m orale of those employees who continued to work in a system under conditions of perceived job insecurity and a high degree of personnel movement. Research thus reflected the dual concern of hum ane and effective use of the State’s work force. (N ot surprisingly, this also stru ck 1a balance between the union’s interest to be a vocal fighter for job security and the State’s interest to manage efficiently.) Prelim inary evidence indicates that under the per ceived threat of layoff, m any good workers have cho sen to voluntarily quit (which results in costly re training and a loss in organizational effectiveness). M oreover, absenteeism associated with low m orale and perceived insecurities creates significant ineffi ciencies in services. The Com m ittee may therefore be led to conclude that the overall “costs” of layoffs become higher than the initial savings through per sonnel cuts. W hile this is evidently true for the indi vidual, various data indicate that this applies to the imm ediate agency as well. The CO E Com m ittee is currently in the process of evaluating some of this cost-benefit research, a kind of balance sheet, in order to form ulate action-policy recom mendations. Mole off action program staff Action program s have been designed to deliver direct benefits to displaced employees. Reem ploy m ent has been the m ajor objective, facilitated through a variety of techniques including retraining opportunities, relocation services, counseling, and placement program s. There is a full-time coordina tor-facilitator of the action program s who works in close cooperation with the affected agencies, the Civil Service D epartm ent, the State’s Office of Em ployee Relations, and the Civil Service Employees Association. The action program staff serves two purposes. First, staff members engage in advocacy for the dis placed employee. They seek out individuals, deter mine- their needs, and provide them with assistance. Com m ittee members help to develop leads to agen cies which may have hiring plans. The typical pilot program involves liaison work by a Com m ittee rep Policy recommendations Prelim inary findings from the research and the action program s led the Com m ittee to a num ber of policy recom mendations. F o r example, there was considerable evidence th at the agencies themselves could not do m uch to m itigate discontinuities in em ployment. Thus, some strategies being evaluated by the Com m ittee include: (1) use of a project task force of affected agency representatives to do “h an d s-o n ” person-by-person planning to find solutions for all individuals in a target situation (as long as there is lead time, com m itm ent, and backing from higher State levels); (2) substantial advance notice of layoff to provide the lead time necessary to gear up for hum ane solutions; (3) incentives to agencies which conduct good planning; (4) improved data m anage 93 ment so that each agency maintains timely data for good human resource planning; and (5) improved official communication on job security matters to reduce much unnecessary anxiety fueled by rumors and inaccuracies. All the policy recommendations are a result of the research and direct assistance action programs. It must be noted, however, that reaching a consensus on policy proposals is frequently a time-consuming and controversial process. Frequently, the mixedmotive problem-solving spirit reverts to adversarial parties’ political concerns. There are also obstacles which are less a function of internal process but rather external constraints. For example, the 1-year State budget cycle inhibits long-range planning by agencies. Conflicting political interests and stakes between (State) agencies can deter efforts directed toward sharing resources and information. These are chronic problems which impede Committee programs and which influence Committee decisions. The COE committee represents a specific strategy relevant to a New York State problem, but it is an en couraging model for all who are trying to find better solutions to critical industrial relations problems. positioning. Moreover, the researchers are also subject to political pressures and they must be sensitive to the Am experiment!: Labor-mamagememt participation teams In the past, job-related problems for which the contract provides no answer have been tackled every three years, in a crisis at mosphere, as part of negotiations; and once an overall agreement is reached, these kinds of “ on-the-job” problems receive no mean ingful treatment for another three years. That system leaves something to be desired from the Union’s standpoint, and also from management’s standpoint. The right to strike over local issues, of course, is a vitally important component of the Experimental National Agreement, and the Union would not consider any solution which affected that right in any way. Never theless, the ability to also tackle job-related issues on a meaningful basis during the life of the agreement could be a valuable additional procedure. Both sides have an interest in developing a system for meaningful consideration of job-related issues throughout the life of the agree ment. The Union’s interests are in establishing an effective means of improving the on-the-job conditions most directly affecting our members. The Companies’ interest is finding a means to improve output. In an attempt to provide a method by which both sides can work out effective solutions, and at the same time minimize the risks of a new approach, the settlement agreement proposes an ex perimental program which would authorize the local parties at the department level to “ discuss, consider and decide upon proposed means to improve department or unit performance, employee morale and dignity, and conditions of the work site.” The pro posal, described below, is a radical departure from past ef forts—primarily because it allows the local parties to explore a full range of solutions to their problems. ----- Excerpt from summary of United Steelworkers of America— U.S. Steel Corp. national agreement, April 1980 94 The perceptions of participants in a joint productivity program A nna C. G oldoff New Y ork C ity’s financial crisis is largely responsi ble for its present labor-m anagem ent program . The program originated in a m em orandum o f interim understanding signed by the m unicipal unions and by the city on June 30, 1976. T hat agreem ent reflected guidelines set by the State Em ergency Financial C ontrol B oard and the conditions set by then Secretary o f the T reasury W illiam Simon for Federal seasonal loans. These conditions specified that no m unicipal w orkers would get cost-of-living adjustm ents unless m atched by productivity sav ings, which could not be achieved through service reductions or contract items. Hence, the citywide Joint L abor-M anagem ent Productivity C om m it tee, com posed equally o f representatives from the City o f N ew Y ork and the M unicipal Labor Com m ittee, was created in July 1976. Its function was to guide and approve the work o f the 26 agency subcom m ittees, insuring that individual agency productivity proposals com plied w ith the spirit and letter o f the interim agreem ent. These subcom m ittees are cochaired by union and m an agem ent and have an equal num ber o f representa tives from both sides. Following is the result o f personal interviews with 15 agency representatives and 21 union representatives participating on the subcom m ittees.1 M ost (72 percent) o f the participants reported m oderate to strong com m itm ent to the productivi ty effort. The m ajority (56 percent) also stated that they achieved their goals in the initial phase o f the program . Seventy-eight percent said their goals were m aking cash savings for cost-of-living adjust m ents and 22 percent m entioned other productivi ty issues, such as im proving jo b satisfaction or m anagerial effectiveness. O nly 8 percent felt they could achieve future productivity goals through the current program . Are the benefits o f the program distributed equitably to b oth sides? Forty-tw o percent said yes, 44 percent disagreed. O nly 27 percent o f union respondents felt their role was instrum ental. In contrast, 67 percent o f the m anagem ent partici pants saw their side as having the prim ary role. A ccording to our respondents, neither side felt that the program threatened the traditional rights and privileges o f m anagem ent. Sixty percent o f the m anagers were satisfied with their rights under the program , 33 percent were not. M ost o f the union respondents also felt the program did nothing to alter m anagem ent’s prerogatives, b u t 75 percent believed th at the program infringed on collective bargaining issues. T hirty-three percent o f the m anagem ent respondents also thought this was true, but m ost (53 percent) did not. A m ajority o f Anna C. GoldofF is an assistant professor of government and public administration at the City University o f New York. David C. Tatge, a staff associate in public management at the university, assisted in the preparation of this report. From the Review of July 1978 95 the respondents felt that the productivity program used the same tactics and m aneuvers as the form al bargaining process. D o union m em bers feel that the union leader ship is co-opted into m anagem ent as a result o f this program ? M ore than one-half (57 percent) did not feel this was true, but 38 percent did. However, the union leaders denied “ switching sides.” R ather, they felt forced to take on m anagerial roles because of asserted m anagerial incom petence in city governm ent. D id the rank and file believe the union leaders could aggressively pursue wage increases while being a part o f the productivity program ? Fifty-seven percent o f union respond ents believed that union leaders are ham pered in pursuing wage increases but a clear m ajority blam ed the fiscal crisis, n o t the productivity program . M ost o f the participants (56 percent) felt that the initial stim ulus for the program has changed—that is, the im proved econom ic and political environm ent has dim inished the crisis atm osphere that produced the Com m ittee. Fortytwo percent disagreed. This research suggests th at the participants in New Y ork’s productivity program are com m itted only to a short-term cash savings program to pay em ployee cost-of-living ad ju stm en ts. N egative perceptions o f future goal achievem ent, a dim in ishing environm ental stim ulus, an d jurisdictional am biguity betw een productivity and collective bargaining issues indicate that a long-term p ro d u c tivity program w ould not succeed. One obstacle is strong union dissatisfaction. Tw o-thirds o f union respondents believed that the current program will disband after the agreem ent expires. In fact, 73 percent o f the labor cochairm en interview ed agreed th at the program will be unnecessary when norm al collective bargaining is resum ed. Because these cochairm en are local union leaders, their dissatisfaction and lack o f com m itm ent are definite weaknesses in the current program . Their negative perceptions will affect other labor participants in the program , as well as the union’s rank and file. -------------- f o o t n o t e -------------1 The sample included 12 o f the 26 participating agencies: Housing and Development Administration, Human Resources, Personnel, Environmental Protection, Law, Economic Development, Model Cities, Parks, Police, Sanitation, Fire, and Corrections. Interviews with city and union staff experts suggested that these included an even mix of the most and least effective agency subcommittees. 96 Employee-owned companies: is the difference measurable? Employee ownership may be associated with better attitudes toward the jo b and higher productivity and profits , according to a recent 98-firm survey M ichael C onte and A rnold S. T annenbaum Em ployee ownership can be found throughout the history o f the U nited States, although com panies th at are wholly ow ned by employees (including w orkers) have alw ays been rare. One survey reported that 389 com panies, in which a large proportion o f the stock was directly ow ned by employees, were established in the U nited States betw een 1791 and 1940.' The num ber o f com pa nies with at least som e degree o f em ployee ownership was pro bably m uch larger, an d there is evidence that this num ber has grown in recent years.2 Several aspects o f perform ance in a variety o f em ployee-ow ned com panies are analyzed in this article. The data em ployed include: the size and sales volum e o f em ployee-ow ned com panies; the percent o f em ployees w ho p articip ate in the ow nership plan; the percent o f equity ow ned by nonm anagerial as well as m anagerial persons; and aspects o f control o f the com pany by employees. Also analyzed are the attitu d es o f m anagers tow ard the ow nership plan and their judgm ent about the effect o f the plan on productivity and profit. A ctual profit data were available for a subset o f com panies, and the relationship betw een Michael Conte is assistant study director and Arnold S. Tannenbaum is program director, Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, The University o f Michigan. From the Review of July 1978 97 profit and other characteristics o f these com panies was studied. Em ployee ow nership can take two form s: direct, where employees own shares in the com pany as w ould o rd in ary shareholders in a jo in t-sto ck com pany; or “beneficial,” where em ployees ow n shares through a trust, as illustrated by the Em ployee Stock O w nership T rust (ESQ T).4 The Em ployee R etirem ent and Incom e Security A ct o f 1975 stipulates th at the holdings o f an O w nership T rust m ust be invested “prim arily” in the stock o f its com pany—unlike the holdings o f the usual profit-sharing trust, which m ay be diversified, or o f a pension trust, w hich m ust be diversified. C ontributions to the T rust are governed by an Em ployee Stock O w nership P lan (ESOP). D epend ing on the plan, contributions m ay be m ade on the basis o f a profit-sharing principle (whereby some fixed percentage o f com pany profits is annually transferred to the Trust), a cost principle (w hereby a fixed percentage o f labor costs is annually transferred to the Trust), a fixed contribution principle (w hereby a fixed dollar am o u n t is transferred to the Trust), or by other m ethods determ ined entirely at the discretion o f a single party or parties. T he central requirem ents, how ever, are that the O w nership T rust invest “prim ari ly” in em ployer securities an d that disbursem ents from the T rust be m ade in em ployer securities. D ividends th at m ay be declared are not usually distributed im m ediately to employees but, rather, are held in trust. N onetheless, the financial well being o f the “beneficiaries” o f stock in the T rust is tied to the success o f the com pany. Table 2. Percent of total equity owned by workers only, In S3 companies ________________________________ Percent of companies Equity owned by workers Finding who owns what A list of 148 com panies in the U nited States and C anada, thought to have some degree o f em ployee ownership, was com piled.5 A fter conducting tele phone interviews, usually with the financial officer, 98 of these com panies actually were found to have some com ponent o f w orker ownership; 68 firms had Stock O w nership Plans, and 30 had direct ownership. Their m edian size was approxim ately 350 employees; 17 percent had fewer than 100 employees and 25 percent had 1,000 or more. D uring the previous year, alm ost h a lf o f the com panies had sales o f at least $25 million. As shown in table 1, employees in about threequarters o f the com panies owned at least h a lf o f the equity; ow nership o f the entire equity by employees was m ore likely to occur in stock-plan than directly owned com panies. This table refers to the percent o f equity held by all employees, including m anagers. T able 2, on the other hand, refers to the percent o f equity owned by the workers alone, which, o f course, is less than that owned by all employees. The m easure o f equity owned by workers in stock-plan com panies was obtained by m ultiplying the percent of the com pany’s equity ow ned by the T rust times the percent o f the T rust’s equity owned by the workers. Because o f the way records are kept in most o f the stock-plan com panies, we found it necessary to rely on the distinction between salaried and other personnel as the basis for distinguishing rank-and-file w orkers from m anagers in these com panies. Furtherm ore, al though most of the directly owned com panies could report the allocation o f ownership betw een m anagerial and other personnel, only about h alf o f the stock-plan com panies could report the precise allocation o f stock w ithin the Ownership Trust. In Less than 10 percent Between 10 and 49.9 percent Between 50 and 99.9 percent 100 percent 4 18 28 50 4 18 59 19 4 18 38 40 8 8 20 64 27 13 36 24 Employee-owners have: Stock-voting rights .. Representatives on Board of Directors _ Union representation Influence on important decisions other than through a union. ... Percent of Percent of directly Percent of stock-plan owned all companies companies compar 27 97 50 36 32 77 33 49 32 51 77 56 In general, the data indicate substantial differ ences betw een stock-plan an d directly ow ned com panies in these m easures o f employee influ ence over com pany decisions. For example, only 36 percent o f the respondents in com panies with Stock Ownership Plans report that worker repre sentatives sit on the board o f directors; 77 percent o f the com panies with direct ownership report the presence o f w orkers on the board. Similarly, 51 percent o f the respondents in com panies with ow nership plans, com pared to 77 percent in com panies with direct ownership, indicate that employees influence “im p o rtan t” decisions in the NOTE Eleven companies did not provide sufficient percent of equity owned Internally, data to determine the percent of equity owned internally. 34 16 43 7 these com panies, 54 percent o f the O w nership Trust stock, on average, is owned by nonsalaried employees. This average, then, was used to define the am ount o f w orker-ow ned stock within the T rust in each o f the rem aining cases.6 As estim ated, therefore, w orker-ow ned equity in the rem aining cases is directly proportional to (that is, 54 percent times) the percent o f the com pany’s equity in the T rust itself. Em ployee owners in the T rust are entitled to dispose o f their stock at m arket value once it has been distributed to them . Unlike employees in directly owned com panies, however, owners in a T rust generally do not vote their stock. The following tabulation shows the percent o f com pa nies where voting rights an d other em ployee control m echanism s are reported to be available: Percent of companies All companies (N = 87) All companies (N = 83) NOTE: Fifteen companies did not provide data relevant to the percent of equity owned by workers. Equity owned by employees Direct ownership (N = 27) Direct ownership (N = 25) Less than 3 percent Between 3 and 9.9 percent Between 10 and 49.9 percent Between 50 and 100 percent Table 1. Percent of total equity owned by employees, Including managers, in 87 companies Stock ownership plan (N = 60) Stock ownership plan (N = 58) 98 com pany. In some o f the com panies, this influence reportedly extends to such decisions as w hether or not to m ake m ajor capital acquisitions. The two types o f com panies do not, however, appear to differ with respect to w hether or not employees are unionized. A lthough not specifically m easured, indications are that directly owned com panies have significantly fewer unionized em ployees than do com parable ow nership-plan com panies. Tab5@ 3. RegressSon coefficients for the predictors of “ adjusted” and “ unadjusted” profitability Adjusted Unadjusted ESOT ( = 0) vs. direct ownership ( = 1) ................ ............................... Percent employees participating in plan Percent equity owned internally ................................................... Percent equity owned by workers ........... ......... W orker representativeness on board of directors .............................................. Employee stockholders vote Multiple r ........................................................................... -2 2 -.30 -.31 '1.02 -.18 -.05 .72 -.34 -.31 -.19 .78 -.18 -.24 47 ’ p < .02. NOTE: The data necessary to calculate the adjusted profitability ratio are unavailable in five companies of the subset and five companies did not provide information concerning all of the predictors in this regression. The number of cases in the adjusted and unadjusted cells are therefore 20 and 25 respectively. Employee ownership and profitability Profit data were supplied by 30 com panies. The ratio o f pretax profits to sales was used as a basis for gauging profitability. Each com pany’s ratio was then divided by its industry’s 1976 ratio.7 This weighted ratio was the prim ary m easure o f a com pany’s pretax profitability. F or five com pa nies, how ever, an a d d itio n a l adjustm ent was necessary. Because these com panies are directly and wholly ow ned by employees, they distributed a part o f their “profit” to employees in the form o f wages. This allocation o f funds has the effect o f depressing the co n v en tio n al profit statem ent, although it has the corresponding advantage o f reducing taxes. These m oneys, however, should be considered as p art o f the com pany’s profit for purposes o f com parison with other com panies in our set. To calculate the am ount o f m oney diverted from profits to wages in the five com panies, the average wage differential betw een the worker owners and nonow ner w orkers was used.8 This differential in each com pany was added to its form ally stated profit figure, and this final value was used for com puting the profitability o f these five com panies. A lthough this adjustm ent seems appropriate as a way o f m aintaining com parability am ong com panies that em ploy different acco u n t ing procedures, the unadjusted profit statem ents also were com pared. This unadjusted value is, m ost likely, overly conservative; but there m ay be som e utility in exam ining b oth m easures o f profitability. The average adjusted profit ratio for the 30 com panies was 1.7; the unadjusted ratio was 1.5. In both cases, these values, which are greater than 1, indicate greater profitability am ong employeeowned com panies than com parable sized com pa nies in their respective industries. However, be cause the variance in profitability am ong the 30 com panies is relatively large and the num ber o f cases is sm all, statistical significance is n o t achieved. It is also possible that the “ sam ple” o f com panies m ay be select with respect to profitabil ity. T he results are suggestive, however, that Predictor em ployee ownership, in one form or another, m ay be associated with the profitability o f a com pany.9 In table 3, the two indexes o f profitability (adjusted a n d unadjusted) are predicted using several aspects o f em ployee ow nership in a regression analysis. The predictors include: (1) the form o f em ployee ownership, w hether direct or through a T rust (O w nership Trust is scored “0” ; direct ownership is scored “ 1” ); (2) the percent of employees who participate in the plan; (3) the percent o f com pany equity owned by employees (by m anagers and workers); (4) the percent o f com pany equity ow ned by the workers themselves; (5) w hether em ployees have representatives on the board of directors; and (6) w hether em ployee stockholders have voting rights. These predictors jointly explain a substantial am ount of the variance in “adjusted” profitability, but only one o f the predictors, the am ount o f equity owned by the w orkers themselves, proves statistically significant (p less than .02); the m ore equity the w orkers own, the m ore profitable the com oanv. other things being equal (beta = 1.02V T he second variable o f im portance In this analysis, the am ount o f equity owned internally, has, if anything, a negative relationship with profitability (beta = -.31); but the statistical significance o f this variable is m arginal, at b est—a coefficient o f this size occurring about one out of four times by chance. V ariation in “internal ow nership” in this context is really variation in ownership by m anagerial personnel, because ow n ership by the workers them selves is controlled in the analysis. T he possible im plication, therefore, is that increases in the am ount o f equity owned by m anagers m ay have a negative effect if this increase is not accom panied by an increase in the equity owned by the workers. This result is not strong statistically, but it m ay be w orth consider ing as a hypothesis. The im pact o f the rem aining variables can easily be attributed to chance, but it is interesting to see that they, too, imply, if anything, negative relation 99 ships in the regression. Direct ownership (rather than through a Trust), the percent o f employees who participate in the plan, the existence o f worker representatives on the board, and the existence of voting rights show a negative relationship (if anything) to profitability when the percent o f equity owned by the workers themselves is con trolled. Prediction o f the unadjusted profitability index is not as good as the prediction o f the adjusted index, the m ultiple correlation being only 0.47, and none of the predictors m eets the usual criterion o f significance. The pattern o f results, however, is sim ilar to that for the analysis o f the adjusted profitability index; the one predictor that ap proaches a m arginal level o f statistical significance is the precent of equity ow ned by the workers. The negative signs associated with several o f the variables in table 3 do not imply (or they would not imply, even if they were statistically signifi cant) that these characteristics are associated with low profitability; they imply (or would imply) such a negative association only under the conditions o f the regression analysis where, for exam ple, the am o u n t o f equity ow ned by the w orkers is controlled statistically. In fact, because com panies where workers hold a high percent o f the equity are likely also to be directly ow ned, direct ownership, like the am ount o f worker ownership itself, is positively associated with profitability. Table 4 helps to illustrate these associations. This table shows the simple, zero-order correla tions am ong the variables presented in the regres sion analysis. C orrelations that are significant at the .05 level or better are indicated. We see in this table not only how the predictors may be associ ated with profitability, but also how the predictors relate to one another. For example, com panies in which workers hold a high proportion of the equity tend to be directly owned (r = .68), to have worker representatives on the board (r = .36), and to provide voting rights to employee owners (r = .68). On the other hand, the correlation betw een Table 4. Subjectively supported by maeagers In a previous study, substantial sentim ent in favor o f employee ow nership was found am ong both m anagers and w orkers in a com pany th at had recently adopted an ow nership p lan .11 Em ployee Correlations among aspects of employee ownership and profitability Characteristics ESOT ( = 0) vs. Direct ownership ( = 1) Percent employees participating Percent of equity owned internally Percent of equity owned by workers Workers on board Employee stockholders vote 1p < the percent o f equity ow ned by the workers and that owned internally (by workers and m anagers) is not as high as one m ight expect, in view o f the fact that internal ownership includes ownership by workers (r = .34). T he proportion o f equity ow ned by m anagers in m any o f these com panies is relatively large and “internal ow nership,” there fore, reflects m anagerial ownership m ore than worker ownership. D irect ownership in this table is significantly and positively related to adjusted profitability (r = .48)—unlike the relationship indicated in the regression analysis—because direct ownership is associated with the percent o f equity ow ned by workers, which appears from the regression analy sis to be m ore closely associated with profitability. Voting rights is also associated with the percent of equity ow ned by workers and it, too, shows a positive relationship with adjusted profitability (unlike the relationship in the regression analysis), although the m agnitude o f the correlation does not m eet the criterion o f statistical significance, given the small num ber o f cases. The percent o f employees who participate in the ow nership plan, however, does not show the relationship to profitability th at one might expect from the hypothesis that employee ownership has a positive effect on profitability (r = .33). The explanation m ay hinge on the association, or rather lack of association, betw een the percent o f employees who participate and the percent o f equity owned by w orkers (r = .14). A pparently, m any com panies that have relatively w idespread em ployee ownership, in fact, involve only a small p ro portion o f the com panies’ equity in such ownership. M any m em bers, in other words, own very little. Profit (adjusted) (N = 20) Profit (unad|usted) (N = 25) 1.48 -3 3 -.02 '.60 .24 30 .27 -.29 -.06 .31 .08 .18 '-.23 -.10 1 68 '.3 6 '.68 05 Stock plan vs. direct ownership (N = 75) 100 Percent employees participating (N = 75) '.25 .14 .08 -.11 Percent of equity owned internally (N = 75) Percent of equity owned by workers (N = 75) Workers on board (N = 75) '.34 .04 -.11 '.43 '.47 '.22 ownership, they felt, contributed substantially to the satisfaction o f all emplovees, to the m otivation o f workers, and. ultim ately, to the productivity and profitability o f the com pany. Records of the com pany also indicated that grievances and waste (in the form o f expendable tools) declined and that productivity and profitability increased during the period im m ediately following the introduction of the plan (although profitability was higher during one period a num ber o f years earlier). In the present analysis, a m anagem ent represen tative in each com pany was asked questions about the effect o f employee ownership on productivity and profit. “ Do you think that employee ow ner ship affects profits? Does it increase profits, decrease them, or have no effect?” Similar questions were asked concerning productivity. On average, the responses to these questions indicated substan tial support for em ployee ownership. The analyses presented in the previous section, suggesting that em ployee-owned com panies are associated with above average profitability within their respective industries, lend some credence to the claims of these m anagers. H ow ever, the m anagers who credited em ployee ownership for high levels o f profit did not necessarily work for the m ore profitable com panies. M anagers in com panies that were substantially worker-ow ned were no m ore likely to ascribe positive effects to employee ownership than m an agers in less intensively worker-owned com panies even though the proportion o f equity ow ned by workers appears to be related to profitability. On the other hand, em ployee ownership is m ore likely to be reported to have positive effects on profit w here such ow nership is direct, rath er than through a T rust; m anagers also respond m ore favorably where workers are not represented on the board. Each m anager respondent was asked w hether em ployee ow nership affected the attitudes o f workers toward their job. The average response was 0.84 on a scale from 0 to 1, where “ 1” m eans that work attitudes are better and “0” that they are worse as a result o f the ownership plan. Their response, therefore, implies that these m anagers, on average, perceive em ployee-ownership plans as having a su b stan tially positive effect on the a ttitu d e s o f em ployees. But, acco rd in g to a regression analysis, this judgm ent by m anagers may be less positive where workers have represen tatives on the b o ard o f directors. In general, m anagers were m ore satisfied with the plan where 101 ownership is direct rather than through a T rust and where the percent o f employees who partici pate in the plan is relatively large. It seems reasonable that m anagers should think well o f the plan where participation is widespread. On the other hand, we have seen that widespread ow ner ship, per se, is not associated with profitability; such ownership m ay very well m ean that m any employees own only a very small fraction o f the equity—and it is the am ount o f equity owned by workers that appears to be m ost often associated with profitability. Taking stock Em ployee ow nership in the U nited States has taken a num ber of forms, although examples where workers own a substantial p art o f a com pany’s equity are rare. These data, although only prelim i nary, offer a glimpse o f the possible im pact of employee ow nership on the econom ic perform ance of com panies an d employee attitudes. On the basis o f this brief analysis, some tentative conclusions may be suggested: The industrial relations clim ate in em ployee-ow ned com panies appears to be good, in the judgm ent of m anagerial respondents; m an a gerial respondents in these com panies see em ploy ee ow nership as having a positive effect on p ro ductivity a n d p rofit; the em ployee-ow ned com panies that have been studied appear to be profitable—perhaps m ore profitable than com pa rable, conventionally ow ned com panies; the ow n ership variable m ost closely associated with profit ability is the percent o f equity owned by the workers themselves; although w orkers’ influence in the com pany, as ju d g ed by m anagers, is a function o f worker-ow ned equity, m anagers’ evaluation of the ownership plan is not affected in a positive way by either the am ount of equity held by the workers or the am ount o f influence exercised by the workers; m anagers appear m ore favorably dis posed tow ard plans with w idespread participation am ong employees, even though this m ay involve only a small fraction o f the com pany’s equity. These conclusions are tentative. The com panies that provided profit data m ay be select, and the analyses are based on correlations that illustrate association am ong variables—they do not prove causation. The results, however, are sufficiently encouraging to justify a detailed, longitudinal study o f a num ber o f com panies over a period of years. Such a study should include m easures o f the attitudes and m otivations o f all employees within the com panies as well as m easures o f com pany perform ance. If em ployee ow nership does have an effect on the economic performance of a company, as the data of this study tentatively suggest, the explanation may be found, at least partly, in the effect of ownership on the employees themselves. FOOTNOTES Democracy and the Worker-Owned Firm (New York, Praeger Publish ers, 1972); Katrina Berman, Worker-Owned Plywood Companies: An Economic Analysis. (Pullman, Wash., Washington State University Press, 1967); “Comparative productivity in worker-managed coopera tive plywood plants and conventionally run plants,” unpublished, 1976; Paul Bernstein, “Democratization or organization: theory, practice and further possibilities,” Ph. D dissertation, Stanford University, 1972. See also Seymour Melman, “Managerial versus cooperative decision making in Israel,” Studies in Comparative International Development, 1970-71, who compares the performance of kibbutz firms with conventional firms in Israel. For an analysis of companies that have substantial profit-sharing programs, some of which entail a degree o f employee ownership, see Bert L. Metzger, Profit Sharing in 38 Large Companies (Evanston, 111., Profit Sharing Foundation, 1975). 'Derek Jones, “The economics and industrial relations o f producer cooperatives in the United States, 1790-1940,” mimeo. 2“Employee Ownership,” Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University o f Michigan, Sept. 23, 1977. Matthew J. Bonaccorso and others, “Survey o f Employee Stock Ownership Plans,” unpublished masters thesis, University o f California, Los Angeles, Graduate School o f Management, December 1977. 3The study reported here was done under a grant from the Economic Development Administration, U.S. Department o f Com merce. The views expressed are those o f the authors. 4Louis Kelso and Patricia Hetter, Two Factor Theory: The Economics o f Reality (New York, Random House, 1968). 5The list was culled from articles in newspapers, magazines and professional journals, conversations with colleagues, and references given by persons in employee-owned companies whom we contacted. l0“Beta” refers to a standardized regression coefficient. 6The definition o f “worker” implicit in the stated procedure differs somewhat in the two types o f companies. “Workers” may include foremen and salaried clerical workers in some directly owned companies, but not in stock-plan companies. Table 2, therefore, may overstate the difference in worker ownership between stock-plan and directly owned companies, although we do not believe that the definitional inconsistency accounts for the entire difference shown in the table. 11An employee owned firm, Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, The University o f Michigan, Jan. 17, 1977. For a study o f the reaction o f both managers and workers in Israeli kibbutz, Yugoslav, American, Austrian, and Italian factories that differ in their system o f ownership, see Arnold S. Tannenbaum and others, Hierarchy in Organizations (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1974). See also Ana Gutierrez Johnson and William Foote Whyte, “The Mon Dragon System o f Worker Production Cooperatives,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, October 1977, pp. 18-30; and Richard J. Long, “The Effects o f Employee Ownership on Organization, Employee Job Attitudes, and Organization Performance: A Tentative Framework and Empirical Findings,” Human Relations, January 1978, pp. 29-48. 7Robert Morris Associates, Annual Statement Studies (Philadel phia, Credit Division, 1976). “These nonowner-workers performed essentially the same jobs as the worker owners and received the union wage rate. 9For studies in which performance o f worker-owned plywood firms is compared to that o f conventional firms, see Carl J. Bellas, Industrial L earning from foreign m anagem ent First, foreign managers increasingly demand responsibility from their employees, all the way down to the lowliest blue-collar worker on the factory floor. They are putting to work the tremendous improve ment in the education and skill of the labor force that has been ac complished in this century. The Japanese are famous for their “ quali ty circles” and their “ continuous learning.” Employees at all levels come together regularly, sometimes once a week, more often twice a month, to address the question: “ What can we do to improve what we already are doing?” In Germany, a highly skilled senior worker known as the “ Meister” acts as teacher, assistant, and standardsetter, rather than as “ supervisor” and “ boss.” ------- P e t e r F. D r u c k e r Clarke Professor of Social Sciences, Claremont Graduate School, in The Wall Street Journal, June 4, 1980 102 Part III. Improving Workllfe Abroad The seven articles in this section focus on efforts in Western Europe and Japan to enlist the participation of workers and their unions in programs to improve the work environment, including the nature of work itself. Because of their often impressive accomplishments, the many experiments in work and workplace design con ducted in these countries during the 1970’s attracted widespread attention and undoubtedly encouraged counterpart efforts in the United States. The role of trade unions in work improvement ex periments conducted during the early part of the last decade in Sweden, Great Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany is discussed by Joseph Mire. With the growth of service industries, white-collar as well as bluecollar unions became increasingly involved in these ef forts, a development reviewed by Everett Kassalow. Other articles deal in greater detail with some of the pro grams undertaken in specific countries. A second con tribution by Mire discusses joint labor-management ef forts to deal with worker discontent within the framework of the Japanese industrial relations system (although in a period predating the zenith of the qualitycircle movement). David T. Fisher, an American manager in a West German company, explains that country’s system of codetermination as established by the Act of 1976 and other legislation. And Arthur S. Weinberg describes work council-trade union relations in the Netherlands, as well as experiments there to reduce the repetitive character of assembly line work. The reactions of American workers to working condi tions and workplace innovations abroad were examined through two adventuresome projects sponsored by the Ford Foundation. In one article, by Arthur S. Weinberg, six auto workers from the United States were reported to be rather critical of the group assembly methods and other employment conditions prevailing in Swedish auto plants. A second article, by Herbert A. Perry, describes the experiences of six longshoremen who worked at the port of Rotterdam, focusing on fac tors contributing to job satisfaction and dissatisfaction. In reading these articles, it is important to bear in mind that observations and interpretations reported necessarily reflect the conditions prevailing during a particular stage in the evolution of the work humaniza tion movement. The early to mid-1970’s were years of trial-and-error experimentation in Europe, with a predictable mixture of successes and failures. Most im portant, however, it was a time during which a founda tion was laid, particularly in Scandinavia, for more sweeping reforms brought about through legislation enacted in the second half of the decade. Noteworthy in this regard, according to a recent ilo study, is the fact that each year since 1974 has seen some European coun try enact additional legislation to establish or extend worker participation in decisionmaking. This preference for legislative remedies stands in marked contrast to the much greater reliance placed on collective bargaining strategies in the United States. 103 Improving working life— the role of European unions A report on effo rts in fiv e countries to restructure and reorganize jo b s and on the participation o f trade unions in jo b im provem ent experiments Joseph Mire nations and focuses on the role unions have played in these efforts. There are reasons for the newly awakened interest in job satisfaction. There is an increasing uneasiness and uncertainty about the stability of the industrial relations system. Western European unions, using economic and political muscle, and aided by incredible progress in technology, have with few exceptions been highly successful in improving standards of living of workers and in securing pro tection against the various hazards to a worker’s employment, including unemployment and advanc ing age. “For the first time in the history of man kind,” as Arnold Toynbee pointed out, “the good life has come within reach of the masses of the people.” Yet, good pay, improved working conditions, and social and welfare legislation do not seem to assure a happy and satisfied labor force: Labor strife and unrest continue; rank and file workers seem more prone now than before to reject collective agree ments negotiated by union leadership; wildcat strikes are numerous and often center on non economic concerns,2 and rates of absenteeism and turnover in industry are spiraling. E f f o r t s t o h u m a n i z e w o r k are part of the broad worldwide concern for a better quality of life. On the shop floor and at the bargaining table, these efforts cover safety and health, improved systems of remuneration, job security, and better welfare provisions. Proposals to humanize work run the gamut of employer-employee relations from the early demand for “industrial democracy” first coined by Beatrice and Sydney Webb to the demand for worker representation on companies’ boards of directors and for workers’ control or self-manage ment. More recently they have ranged to a demand for restructuring and reorganizing work to relieve the worker from the deadening impact of monoto nous, repetitive, and boring work and pressures on the assembly line. A previous Monthly Labor Review article de scribed efforts to make work more meaningful through worker participation in management deci sions.1 This report describes attempts to restructure and reorganize work in several Western European Joseph Mire is an econom ist formerly on the staff o f the American Federation o f State, County and M unicipal Em ployees. He has also served as adjunct professor at the School o f International Services o f The Am erican University, W ashington, D.C. This article stems from a field study undertaken with the assistance o f a grant from the Ford Foundation. The plant—an authoritarian institution? Increasingly, unions charge that the economic and social progress achieved by workers often has From the Review of September 1974 104 changed very little the basically oppressive and authoritarian character of the workplace. Some workers feel they are still mere appendages of the machine and are treated as tools, hands, or a com modity in production. Many jobs are monotonous and depersonalized, allowing the individual human being no room for independent judgment or initia tive in the performance of their duties and eroding the need for skills. Workplaces, machines, and tools continue to be designed by technical engineers, keeping in mind efficiency and productivity with little regard for social and human concerns. Consequently, work for too many people is as dis satisfying as it ever was. Unions (and management) also perceive that as standards of living advance and education levels and aspirations of workers rise, there is a corre sponding disinclination to do boring and unsatisfy ing work. Employers in many nations find they must turn to foreign workers, often to do the less desirable jobs. Western Europe today employs about 8V2 million foreign workers who are doing most of the undesirable jobs. The Ford Co. in Cologne, Germany, employs 14,000 foreign workers out of a labor force of 35,000. Eighty percent of workers employed in a Renault automobile plant near Paris are foreigners. One Swedish company recently was unable to recruit a single Swede below the age of 30 for its assembly line operation.3 In Italy too, in spite of its pockets of unemployment, companies such as Olivetti and FIAT complain of their diffi culties in recruiting native labor for their plants.4 Both management and unions are concerned lest manual labor may become a synonym for a bad job suitable only for foreigners. On a more positive side, many union leaders and government officials see the demand for a more rewarding work experience and satisfaction not merely as a response to workers’ discontent but also as a logical next step in a dynamic social policy, and part of the quest for a smooth functioning of the social and economic system. It is a demand appropriate for socially and technologically advanced industrial societies which have already met most of the early goals of the labor movement. Thus, the Swedish Prime Ministei Olaf Palme sees new hori zons for reform, not through further massive wel fare programs, but “. . . in making work less boring by allowing workers to exercise initiative on the factory floor.” 5 Similarly the Austrian Minister of Finance, at a meeting of economic experts of the Socialist Party called for a qualitative full employ ment policy to replace the present quantitative full employment policy. “It is not enough,” he said, “that everybody has a job but that he has the kind of job which is best suited to his interests and ability.”6 Many trade union leaders have spoken in the same vein. Arne Geijer, former President of the Swedish Trade Union Federation, called for the integration of the production processes with decision making and control functions “. . . in order to in crease personal responsibilities and with it job satis faction within the enterprise.”7 The Austrian Presi dent of the Union Federation, Anton Benya, in an address to the union’s conventions,8 stated: “Next to achieving material benefits for workers, we must also search for ways to improve the quality of life.” These considerations have combined to prompt many companies and unions to focus on the nature and organization of work as the main hope for relieving workers from boring, repetitive, and gen erally unsatisfying work. A whole roster of pro grams and approaches has been developed, which includes job enrichment and enlargement; job rota tion; team work; small production islands to replace the assembly line; elimination of time clocks; short ening of working hours or extension of rest periods for monotonous work or both; flexible working hours; equalizing of working conditions between blue- and white-collar workers; alternate employment of workers on administrative and manual jobs; election of spokesmen from even the smallest units in the plants; and finally also efforts to secure representa tion for workers on the supervisory boards of man agement. The following is a brief description of specific efforts to reorganize and restructure jobs and of union attitudes towards these efforts in selected Western European countries— Sweden, Great Bri tain, France, Italy, and West Germany. Varying means and goals No consensus exists as yet as to which of these measures— or combination of measures— is most effective. What works in one place or one country may not work somewhere else and transferability of experiences from one plant to another has proven very difficult. There are presumably some jobs which are beyond redemption and the only solution may lie in further technology. Some jobs can be made more attractive, if not more enobling, by raising the pay. Again others can be made more acceptable if workers are given some discretion on how, when, and at what pace to perform their duties. Nor should it be assumed that unions in Western Europe have arrived at a unified policy to deal with job satisfaction. In Scandinavia, unions have actually taken the initiative in proposing to management joint experimental programs to deal with job monot 105 ony and assembly line work. At the other end of the spectrum, some unions flatly refuse to become involved in programs having to do with production problems or job satisfaction either on the ground that this is a management responsibility and/or that “they would not want workers to become too happy or the private enterprise system too successful.”9 In between, most of the unions are taking an atti tude of “interested concern” or “wait and see,” going all out neither for nor against programs deal ing with job satisfaction. If the results are beneficial to the workers, the unions will usually go along. The caution shown by the trade unions must be viewed in the light of their experiences with previous schemes to “humanize” the working place and also in the light of their own institutional interests. Many unions fear that programs to improve job satisfaction are either disguises to speed up production, or worse, merely anti-union devices, even if there should be a financial spin off for the workers.10 Promises for more job variety and autonomy are seen as attempts to divert workers’ attention from more pertinent— and more costly—union objectives. Also, for trade union leaders, especially those who have lived through several depressions, there is the fear that improved job satisfaction may result in higher productivity and' thus, at least in the short rue, reduce the number of available jobs. Still other unions fear the impact job restructuring may have on established institutional arrangements for skill requirements, wage differentials, transfers, and pro motions, all of which are often drastically altered by the introduction of a new work organization such as teamwork or the breakup of the assembly line and its replacement by production islands. Last, but not least, unions are prone to point out that there has been no rank-and-file articulation of the demand for union action on job improvement programs ( although such failure may tell more about the worker’s estimate of what a union can and can not do rather than whether or not workers are satis fied with their jobs). In the absence of any definite policy on work restructuring and job satisfaction among most unions, the degree of participation in management programs is largely left to workers and union representatives in the plant. That is where a good deal of sharing in the decisionmaking is going on on a more or less informal basis. Significant joint effort in Sweden A recognized pioneer of social and economic reforms, Sweden has now also become one of the world’s foremost laboratories for the humanization of the workplace. Unions and companies in Sweden are currently engaged on a substantial scale in joint programs to redesign tools, machines, plants, and the organization of work to allow workers more variety on their jobs, more discretion on how to do their jobs, more opportunities for individual growth and participation in problem-solving situations, and, consequently, more job satisfaction. These results are to be achieved in conjunction with rising pro ductivity since, realistically, it is felt that increased job satisfaction at the expense of productivity— and therefore also at the expense of income of the workers— is an untenable proposition. On the management side, interest in job satis faction of workers has been prompted by high rates of turnover' and absenteeism, serious difficulties in recruiting labor, especially for assembly line opera tions, and increasing friction between workers and supervisory personnel resulting in an alarming re currence of unplanned work stoppages. On the union side the case for job improvement was suc cinctly formulated in its program for “industrial democracy” adopted at the 1971 Congress of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (L O ). Taking note of the “glaring difference which exists between conditions at work and those outside the factory gates, where social reform had transformed the whole character of life,” the federation considers it inevitable that the individual workers’ interests should “turn to other aspects of his working life than wages and working conditions in the narrow sense. The workers increasingly look for more job satis faction and a better environment. . . .”1X The result of these mutual concerns, given the highly centralized labor market policy of Sweden, and its very mature level of employer-employee relationships, has been a very significant joint labormanagement effort to come to grips with workers’ dissatisfaction and to engage in programs of experi mentation with a view to adjusting work to the workers rather than, as in the past, having the worker adjust to the job. Although job redesign experiments have not been limited to the automobile industry, outstanding examples are provided by two Swedish automotive companies, Saab and Volvo. Saab began its experimentation with job im provement programs at Scania in 1969. The plant manufactures trucks and Saab engines, and employs about 5,000 people. After exploratory talks with the Metal Workers Union, it was decided to form a joint “Reference Group” to guide and assist in the development of the program. For its initial trial run, this group selected two operations in the chassis department, engine finishing and small bore piping. In each section a production and a develop ment group was formed; the former to propose 106 changes in the work organization and the latter to suggest improvements in the everyday cooperation between workers and supervisory personnel and the various specialists. Forty people in two produc tion and two development groups initially took part. By early 1973 their numbers had grown to over 1,500 workers in 130 production and more than 60 development groups. Ultimately all employees are expected to be active participants in the program.12 Both management and workers seem well-satisfied with the results to date, although the road to success has not always been smooth. Production goals have been met, quality improved, and turnover and un planned work stoppages significantly reduced.13 Many valuable ideas have come, spontaneously, out of the group. As byproducts, the company and union also point to better relations between workers and work study personnel and less opposition— or criticism— to the introduction of new tools and methods, since those matters are now being discussed at length at the periodic meetings of the development groups. Also, company and workers’ representatives no longer talk of “experiments” and all are agreed that it would be very difficult to go back to the old assemblv line. Many of the experiences gained at Scania have since been incorporated into a new engine factory built in 1972. There the assembly line has been replaced by a “group assembly” and the principle of using production and development groups have be come generally accepted. In fact, some of its features are now being applied to office employees. Also on the drawing board are plans to involve the development groups in the preparation of the annual budget of the company and to train workers and supervisory personnel in such fields as “working in a group,” knowing the product, industrial eco nomics and engineering, and work simplification. Volvo, like Saab, started its program in the late 1960’s with the full encouragement, endorsement, and cooperation of the Metal Workers Union. As a first step, the union negotiated with management an agreement providing for the establishment of specific minimum standards for the physical environment in the plants, applicable to all Volvo factories and offices. Their aim, of course, was to reduce risks to health and safety. Next, in line with a recommenda tion of a committee composed of union and manage ment representatives, a number of project groups and factory committees were formed to consider proposals for the improvement of job satisfaction. At Volvo Torslanda, some 1,000 workers partici pate in a job rotation program. Workers change jobs every day, or in some departments, every 4 hours. For example, one group will assemble fuel pipes on Monday; fit side windows on Tuesday; fit car interiors on Wednesday; assemble rear parts on Thursday; and fit fuel pipes again on Friday. The system requires that workers learn to do four jobs instead of only one and, to make this possible, the company has introduced an elaborate training pro gram. At Volvo-Lundbywerken, which produces trucks and buses, teamwork was introduced. Groups of up to nine workers are given a work assignment and they decide for themselves who does what. The teams elect their own foreman—on a rotating basis— and they do their own training, with the cost of the training borne by the company. Production problems are discussed with management at monthly meetings. A new production technology was installed in a new engine factory built by Volvo at Skovde. Here the assembly line has been completely replaced by small “work groups.” Built-in “puffer zones” give workers and/or the work groups a chance to determine their own workpace as well as rest periods. The work groups are fully responsible for quality control, processing of raw materials, and tool inventories. Each work group takes care of the transport of motors from one workshop to the other. The company employs 600 workers and pro duces 25,000 engines annually. The most advanced Volvo plant has just been constructed at Calmar. It incorporates at this new assembly works all the positive elements of the experience gained in other Volvo plants, after earnest and detailed discussions with all concerned, including the union, the factory central committee, and, most important, the workers themselves. Work groups of up to 20 workers were established for each operation, such as electric system, instruments, brakes, and wheels. Within the groups the workers themselves decide on who does what, what the pattern of the opera tion should be, and the beginning and ending of the work shift. Electric trucks are used to transport car bodies between the departments. The layout of the plant maintains a small shop atmosphere because a great number of dividing walls separate adjoining workrooms, and each room has its own entrance, restroom, and puffer zone. The plant will employ 600 workers and is expected to produce 30,000 engines annually. Efforts in Great Britain Because of our common heritage, the British system of industrial relations is closest to the Ameri can system. But there are some important differ ences. The trade union structure, while democratic, is also very untidy. Craft, industrial, and general unions function side by side, often competing and bargaining for the same skill. No union has exclu 107 be accommodated. No less than 16 unions are in volved, with the major union being brought in at every stage of the planning. The teams do their own training, administration, maintenance, and stock control. Productivity moved up moderately and so did pay. More important, absenteeism declined and quality improved. All employees are encouraged to learn at least two or three tasks. A new technology is about to be introduced in a 5-year-old plant pro ducing washing machines. A “working party” com posed of engineers, efficiency experts, and shop stewards has studied its likely impact on workers and has come up with pertinent recommendations on teamwork. Teamwork has also been introduced at several plants of the Imperial Chemical Co. It has been supported fully by the General and Municipal Workers Union which termed the program an out standing success, inasmuch as it raised productivity and pay and reduced turnover and the number of disputes. Key to the success, according to the union, has been the involvement of the workers who as sisted, at weekly staff meetings, in identifying jobs workers do and those they can do. Those doing routine jobs were given additional responsibilities, including testing, cleaning, and repairing. The Transport and General Workers Union main tains a position of neutrality on job improvement programs, neither encouraging nor discouraging their local branches from participation in companyinitiated programs, except for those dealing with such narrowly defined issues as health and safety, which are being pressed hard by the union. Also, the union has made special efforts to raise the pay for low-skilled workers. The union position is that pay hikes are the real reason there has been no serious problems of worker turnover or absenteeism in companies under its jurisdiction and no rankand-file demand for improved job satisfaction. The union is interested in experiments in other com panies abroad and top officials plan to visit the Volvo plant in Sweden. By contrast, the Amalgamated Union of Engi neering Workers seems very definitely cool to any suggestion that it should cooperate with manage ment on production problems. Work satisfaction under capitalism is held to be an elusive goal which the union has no desire to achieve anyway. The union has been invited by the TUC to serve on the Tripartite Committee on Job Satisfaction but has declined. Yet the union is asking for a vast exten sion of the scope of collective bargaining. The union is interested in new technology, shorter hours of work, and higher pay rather than restructuring jobs sive jurisdiction. Consequently, there is no industry with only one union, but some with as many as 20 unions. There is an emphasis on national agreements —with varying degrees of supplementary bargain ing left to the local plant organization— and a heavy reliance on unwritten and uncodified understandings and practices. Shop stewards, functioning across jurisdictional lines, take part in plant negotiations and guide union policies. They are, unfortunately, also responsible for a good portion of unauthorized strikes. Disputes about rights, arising out of a collec tive bargaining agreement, are settled by internal joint machinery rather than outside arbitrators as is so common in the United States. In June of 1973, the Trade Union Congress (TU C), the British counterpart of the AFL-CIO, took the first important step in the field of job satis faction when it joined with the Confederation of British Industry and the Government in the estab lishment of a Tripartite Committee on Job Satisfac tion. The committee has nine members— three each from government, business, and labor— and is chaired by the Minister of State, the second highest official in the Foreign Service. The committee does research and offers advice and assistance to com panies which wish to engage in experimental job satisfaction programs. The TUC has agreed to serve on the committee though it has not yet adopted an official position on the issue. Job satisfaction is viewed by the TUC only as a part of its larger demand for “industrial democracy” or, more specifically right now, as part of its demand for worker representation on the supervisory boards of management.14 The TUC posi tion, according to responsible spokesmen, is that before workers should be asked to join in job re structuring programs, they should be given a larger share in the economic decisions of the company. This position notwithstanding, the TUC has encour aged participatory arrangements at the floor level. Examples of trade union participation in pro grams to restructure jobs can be found in the petro leum and tobacco industries, electronics, and bank ing, all of which have much routine work and therefore serious problems of turnover and/or absenteeism. The Phillips Electronic Co. has been heavily engaged for many years in a variety of approaches to improve work satisfaction. It oper ates some 20 plants in Great Britain, with about 65,000 employees, and employs three behavioral scientists to assist in experimental programs. The company has introduced teamwork in several plants. Although workers were invited but not forced to participate, more workers volunteered than could 108 as the solution to boring work. In the British steel industry, cooperation on pro duction problems has long been practiced. The Iron and Steel Workers Federation is brought in at every stage of new designs for tools, machines, or plants. This type of full cooperation has continued un interruptedly through private and public ownership, and concern for productivity and the competitiveness of the industry has always ranked very high with the union. It recently gave its approval to an indus try plan which will reduce employment in the steel industry within the next 10 years by some 50,000 to 60,000 workers. In banking, the Union of Bank Employees takes a strong interest in job satisfaction. Menial jobs abound in banking, and turnover rates vary from 15 to 20 percent per annum. This worries the union even more than management because the training cost of new employees is minimal. Therefore, the union is cooperating fully in endeavors to create more meaningful work in banking. An Interbank Research Organization has just been established to research problems of job satisfaction. It is trying to estimate the technology which will govern banking in the coming decade and determine the kind of adjustments which can and should be made now. Management initiative in France Trade unions in France are split along ideological lines into three major federations: The Communist General Federation of Labor; the Democratic Feder ation of Labor (formerly the Christian Federation of Labor); and the Socialist Force Ouvriere. Total membership is less than 20 percent of all workers, the lowest of any Western European country. Union dues are low, payment irregular, and, consequently, the financial structure weak. The Government plays a large role in setting economic and social policies, including wages, in public as well as private employ ment. A polarization of interests dominates labormanagement relations, the former committed to the class struggle, the latter often still inclined towards paternalistic attitudes, viewing the plant as an exten sion of the family. In November 1973, the French National Assembly passed a law creating an independent Agency for the Improvement of Working Conditions. Its major purpose is to focus on problems of job satisfaction. The agency will collect information about significant achievements by companies, organize training semi nars, and offer assistance to companies or unions wishing to promote experimental programs. A tri partite Board has been established composed of five representatives each from labor and management, three representatives from Government, and two academics. All major unions have promised to coop erate, though some with the declared intention to direct the efforts of the agency towards matters of health and safety rather than job restructuring or other production problems. About 30 large companies as well as some nationalized industries, including the Postal Service, are engaged in action-research programs dealing with work reorganization to improve job satisfac tion, though precise information is hard to come by. Unions are being informed and consulted, but as a rule not asked to officially endorse the program, which they would be most reluctant to do. However, companies generally have managed to get worker and union support at the plant level. Of the three major union federations, the Force Ouvriere is most receptive to job satisfaction pro grams. It wants to get away from the assembly line and is concerned about the resistance of young people to do any kind of manual labor. The federa tion has large membership in the public service and in banks and insurance companies, where mechani zation is now being pushed in earnest and boredom is widespread. Several local union branches of the federation are involved in experimental programs, and their reports have been quite favorable. The Democratic Federation of Labor is interested in job satisfaction because of its strong theoretical commitment to a system of self-management. It wants to eliminate all piecework as well as shift work, the latter because it interferes with family life, and it is trying to reduce the spread in income be tween various skills of workers. In actual practice, perhaps for reasons of competitiveness, the union is shying away from openly cooperating with manage ment on production problems. The Communist Gen eral Federation of Labor is pragmatic. It opposes cooperation on production problems as a matter of principle, but will go along, and— if past experience is a guide— share the credit, if the experimental programs should be successful. Given the general reluctance of all three federa tions to openly cooperate with management on pro duction problems, companies are pretty much left free to reorganize work, conceded by the unions to be a management prerogative. Also, French unions seldom have the strength at the plant level to oppose such programs even if they wished to do so. Nor do they attach a high priority to job satisfaction because of other more pressing problems. All three federa tions have been pushing very hard for a harmoniza tion of pay and other working conditions between blue- and white-collar workers. Much of the dif ferentiation in sickness benefits, vacations, and holi days, for example, already has been eliminated. 109 Monthly pay has been negotiated by all three federa tions in an agreement signed July 1970, which became effective in two steps January 1972 and July 1973 respectively. The Renault Automobile plant, a nationalized enterprise, has been a leading pioneer in job restruc turing. It tried most of the known approaches with as many plants and workers as possible to find optimum solutions. First, the company concentrated on improving the physical conditions to correct what unions called the “inhumanity of industry.” Then, job enrichment and rotation, teamwork, and other changes in the assembly line followed. For example, workers producing a new type of radiator were given additional responsibility for quality control. In a new plant at Donde, the general assembly of cars was broken down and reorganized so that workers could stop work without stopping the whole assembly line. Thus the pressure on each group has been lessened. At Le Mans, the assembly line was changed in two steps. First, workers were instructed to learn two or three operations which allowed them to move with the piece instead of doing only one operation always standing in the same place. Later, the assembly line was completely eliminated and replaced by “production islands.” Four workers now work at a table surrounded by containers. The unions, according to a company spokesman, re mained aloof initially but could not object when the workers liked it. Job redesign in Italy Many of the features described earlier for France also apply to the trade union scene in Italy, that is, unions are split along political or religious lines, dues are low, the financial structure of unions is relatively weak, there is heavy reliance on political as against economic action, employers are often paternalistic, attitudes are polarized, and there is a strong syndicalist and anarchist tradition. A problem peculiar to Italy is the existence of a “black market” for jobs. Small, unorganized shops operate in viola tion of most of the protective labor legislation, in cluding social insurance, and pay little, if any, taxes. These enterprises defy Government and union at tempts to eliminate them because the workers em ployed in these “sweat shops” support and defend the system. It is estimated that some 10 percent of the Italian labor force may be employed in such jobs. The three major union federations are: The com munist Italian General Federation of Labor; the Demo-Christian Confederation of Labor; and the socialist Italian Union of Labor. Of these, the Italian General Federation of Labor is the strongest. All three federations are on record as favoring the humanization of the workplace and the improvement of the quality of life. Their interests are directed primarily at measures to improve health and safety, to equalize working conditions for blue- and whitecollar workers, and to reduce the gap in wages of workers with different skills. Unions view job enrich ment programs, teamwork, and elimination of the assembly line in a larger context: They would like to see workers given more say not only on how to perform but also on what to produce. For example, the Agricultural Workers Union recently demanded of management changes in production goals to intro duce more labor-intensive crops as well as crops oriented towards a “social purpose,” such as wheat in the place of artichokes. Not unexpectedly, the demands were rejected by management but the demand for “social control” continues to play a powerful part in the propaganda arsenal of all three union federations. On the local level, companies experimenting with job restructuring have found it, generally speaking, not difficult to get cooperation from the respective unions. Two examples are pro vided by Olivetti and FIAT. At Olivetti, job enlargement has been going on for a long time as a continuing process of improving production methods. More recently the principle of “production islands” has been introduced in the manufacture of electronic calculators. Under this system groups are comprised of four workers in stead of 100 or more as previously on the assembly line. The workers now do a complete subassembly and also their own repairing and testing and, as a result, have all been put into higher classifications. A much higher proportion than previously is now being carried on the payroll as skilled workers, usu ally after undergoing short training programs. Job redesign, the company feels, has been very instru mental in improving work discipline and in reducing an abnormally high rate of absenteeism. Besides, it has injected a new image into the industry. After some initial reluctance, unions have been cooperating fully in the program. The FIAT Automobile Co. started looking into job satisfaction in 1969 when it was expanding so rapidly it had to import labor from southern Italy. These workers found conditions in industry “shock ingly inhuman.” They missed working at their own pace, lacked work discipline, and disliked the as sembly line. FIAT began by applying job enrichment to workers not on the assembly line. Workers were given additional responsibiliites such as quality con trol, minor repairs, and preparing machines for operation. Then job enlargement was applied to the assembly line, first to the production of auto bodies. The speed of the assembly line belt was slowed from 110 1 minute to 4, and workers instructed to do several operations. Finally, at a new plant established at Termoli in 1972, the assembly line is used only to move motors and the actual work is done by teams off the assembly line on production islands. Accord ing to interviews with both union and company offi cials, the programs have been quite successful in reducing absenteeism and in moving a larger pro portion of workers into higher skilled jobs and therefore enabling them to earn more pay. Turnover has not been a serious problem, since Italian workers traditionally have not been very mobile. Research efforts in Germany Although democratization of work has been dis cussed widely and thoroughly for a number of years in Germany, the interest thus far has been largely theoretical. Only a few companies are ac tively engaged in experimental programs specifically addressed to the promotion of job satisfaction.15 Several German automobile executives have traveled to Sweden to observe the programs at Volvo but have not yet changed their technology. The Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Sci ence and Technology have joined in creating a spe cial commission whose task is to formulate a re search program aimed at the development of alter native— and more humane— work organizations. The commission also will make recommendations for the support of experimental programs to hu manize work. It will start its work this fall. The trade unions have initially thought mostly in terms of a “democratization” rather than restructur ing of the workplace. They have tried to seek an increase in the decisionmaking power of workers, partly through an amendment of the German works council law, providing for the election of “Gruppen sprecher” (group spokesmen) to give smaller units in plants an opportunity to share in the decision making, and partly through an extension of the law on codetermination giving workers in all industries equal representation on the supervisory boards of management.16 Subsequently, enthusiasm and sup port for the election of “Gruppen sprecher” cooled considerably and the demand has been dropped, focusing union efforts now almost exclusively on the extension of codetermination. Intensive research, however, continues at the Central Trade Union Federation, (DGB) under the auspices of the Institute for Economic and Social Research, an independent arm of the Union Federa tion. An interdisciplinary team project, with repre sentation from the fields of economics, political sci ence, sociology, and engineering, is trying to deter mine the nature and content of a “labor-oriented technology.” The emphasis is on empirical, socio economic research studies on how best to protect workers interest in such a new technology. The inter ests of workers are defined as requiring for every job some ability, some decisionmaking, some oppor tunity to advance, and some social contact. It is hoped that the sum total of their research will pro vide the elements of a systematic labor-oriented theory on job improvement. E a c h c o u n t r y , industry, and company has to find its own solution to the problems of work dissatis faction. It seems likely that unions will be increas ingly pressed by management initiatives, on the one hand, and their own desire to enhance the dignity of workers and improve their quality of life, on the other, to explore alternatives to the present work organization. In view of the union’s role as spokes man for the human factor in industry, and as a vital instrumentality for effecting social and eco nomic change, it is difficult to see how the goals of job improvement could be achieved without the fullest and wholehearted cooperation of the trade union movement. -FOOTNOTES'Josep h Mire, “European workers’ participation in m an agem ent,” M on th ly L abor R eview , February 1973, pp. 9 -1 5 . 2 Even West G erm any, with its tradition o f union disci pline and tight union structure, had no fewer than 370 wild cat strikes in the m etal industry in the first 10 months o f 1973. (A rb e it und W irtschaft, Austrian Federation of Trade Unions, Vienna, D ecem ber 1973). 3 Basil W hiting, Program Officer, Ford Foundation, state ment before the Senate Com m ittee on Em ploym ent, M an power and Poverty, July 26, 1972. * Personal interviews, October 1973. 7 Industrial D em ocracy in the Seventies, Swedish Federa tion o f Trade U nions, Stockholm , 1971. 8 V ienna, 1971. 9 Personal interview with a research director o f a large trade union in Great Britain, N ovem ber 1974. This position is, admittedly, equivocal, since this union, like all others, is bargaining with managem ent on a number o f issues, all o f which aim at improvement o f working conditions and thus aid in the survival o f the “system .” 10 See also D onald F. Ephlin, “The U n ion s’ Role in Job Enrichment Programs,” in proceedings o f the winter 1973 5 Q uoted in R eaders D igest, April 1, 1974, p. 174. 6 D ie Zukunft, V ienna, M ay 1973. 111 meeting o f the Industrial Relations Research A ssociation. 11 Industrial D em ocracy, Swedish Trade U nion Confedera tion, Stockholm , 1972. 12 The Saab-Scania Report, Swedish Employers Confedera tion, Stockholm , 1973. 13 Pehr G. G yllenhammar, President o f V olvo, in a speech at the Swedish-American Chamber o f Commerce in N ew York City on Mar. 26, 1974, estimated that a reduction of only 1 percent in turnover an d /or absenteeism justifies an investment o f $30 m illion, for a com pany em ploying 10,000 people. 14 U ntil quite recently, the T U C had been opposed to any involvem ent in any aspects o f m anagement, outside of collective bargaining. The switch in its present attitude to wards representation on the supervisory boards o f m anage m ent may have been influenced by the fact that a proposal providing for such representation has been included re cently in a draft docum ent o f the Com m on M arket Organization. 15 For som e participation.” exam ples, see Mire, “European workers’ 18 Such representation at present is limited to coal and steel industries. N ot ju st a passing vogue This growing interest in workers’ participation is all the more remarkable if one considers the larger environment in which it has recently developed. In many countries it was originally conceived in a period of growth and expansion, when the main issues related to the redistribution of wealth. As recession, unemployment, and in flation set in, both managements and trade unions were faced with tougher questions, namely job security and even the survival of enterprises themselves. At a time when managements were suppos ed to expedite decisionmaking in order to facilitate the quick adop tion of contingency measures, certain forms of workers’ participa tion loomed, in the eyes of some employers, as an additional challenge, if not as a handicap, to business operations. For the trade unions, workers’ participation in times of recession entailed a shift of emphasis from the traditional concern with bargaining, wage rates, and the securing of better conditions of employment to the attainment of a bigger role in the running of enterprises. This was not an easy change, particularly for those unions which had reservations as to their involvement in management or were hesitant to promote workers’ participation bodies likely to compete with them. The fact that workers’ participation has continued to develop in lean years shows that it is not just a passing vogue but a lasting and deeply rooted movement. To be sure, there have been some set backs, particularly as regards workers’ representation on company boards, as well as feelings of frustration at the limited success of ef forts to expand shop-floor-level experiments. By and large, however, it is safe to say that there has been a continuous move towards more extensive forms of workers’ participation in general. International Labour Office, in “ Workers’ Participation in Decisions Within Enterprises: Recent Trends and Problems,” International Labour Review, Vol. 121, No. 2, March-April 1982 -------E . C o r d o v a , 112 White-collar unions and the work humanization movement In both developed and developing countries, service industries and white-collar occupations have expanded; increasing white-collar unionization in economically advanced nations points to a new concern with shaping satisfying jobs E v e r e t t M. K assalow W orldwide economic development since W orld W ar II has transform ed the labor force distribution among industries and occupations in both devel oped and developing countries, with service indus tries and white-collar occupations showing the greatest growth. This shift has spurred white-collar unionization, just as it has altered the concerns of blue-collar unions in many countries. Reflecting these changes in labor force distribution, many unions are turning m ore and more tow ard issues of “work hum anization,” tow ard an increased concern with participation in the organization of job tasks and with development of jobs that are intrinsically satisfying. Shift in distributions The advances in personal income registered by m ost countries in the postw ar period have been ac companied by a large increase in the dem and for services. As family income has risen, some in creased spending has gone for automobiles, appli ances, and other hard goods, but—especially in the Everett M. Kassalow is a professor of economics at the University of Wisconsin. This article is based in part on a larger report on “Full Em ployment, Income Security, Non-Manual Labor Force Trends, and Work Humanization” prepared for the 18th World Congress of the International Federation of Commercial, Clerical, and Technical Em ployees held in Helsinki, Finland, on August 22-27, 1976. From the Review of May 1977 113 past decade— a greater proportion of the rising in come has been spent for services such as education, medical case, insurance, travel, and recreation. N a t urally, the labor force has reflected these expendi ture trends, and the service sector of the economy has led the way in labor force growth. A recent International Labor Office survey shows the service sector of the work force leading the way in practically all the developed countries.1 F or ex ample, in Belgium, the service or tertiary sector (in cluding commerce, finance, insurance, and com m u nity, social, and personal services) grew from 38.9 percent of employment in 1947 to 52.5 percent in 1970; in Canada, from 45.3 percent in 1951 to 61.3 percent in 1971; in France, from 34.3 percent in 1946 to 47.8 percent in 1970; in Germ any, from 32.3 percent in 1946 to 41.9 percent in 1970; in the U nited Kingdom , from 45.8 percent in 1951 to 50.3 percent in 1966; and in the United States, from 53.6 percent in 1950 to 62.1 percent in 1970. There is every reason to believe that those trends will con tinue— and spread to other countries as well— in the years ahead, as concern for education, health, and the environm ent grows. A lthough fewer data are available, the service or tertiary sector has also been expanding rapidly in m ost developing countries. For example, in Brazil, this sector grew from 26.4 percent of employment in 1950 to 38.0 percent in 1970; in Mexico, from 21.9 percent in 1940 to 26.9 percent in 1960; and in Egypt, from 19.3 percent in 1937 to 29.8 percent in 1960. The reasons for this flow to the service sector in developing countries are not as clear as those for developed countries, but they do seem to relate to m igration from rural to urban areas. A nd in the u r ban areas, many new plants are so highly mechanized that they offer relatively few industrial jobs. There is also a strong, rising demand for services in developing countries. Moreover, as a study of the service sector in Mexico suggests, the lower rate of productivity in services than in the industrial sector adds to the relatively higher demand for service la bor.2 These labor force shifts among industrial sectors have naturally entailed dram atic changes in occupa tional distributions as well. More employment in schools, hospitals, and insurance companies gener ally means that professional, technical, and clerical jobs expand more rapidly than those for farmers, laborers, assemblers, or other blue-collar workers. The growth of white-collar jobs has been in progress in many developed countries for m ost of this century; only in the last decade or two, how ever, have white-collar workers come to outnum ber blue-collar workers in the m ost highly developed economies. (See table 1.) M ost labor force experts TabS® 1. in developed countries expect the growth of whitecollar employment to continue. A recent govern ment report in Japan found white-collar employees constituting 38.7 percent of the labor force in 1973 and projected expansion to about 46 percent by 1985.3 For the United States, where white-collar workers were 48.6 percent of the work force in 1974, the proportion is expected to rise to 51.5 per cent by 1985.4 In most of the developing countries for which longitudinal data on occupational distributions are available, white-collar employment seems to be in creasing rapidly, also. For example, white-collar workers expanded from 15.6 percent of the Mexi can labor force in 1950 to 23.1 percent in 1970. D uring this period, overall employment rose by 55 percent, while the num ber of employed white-collar workers grew by 129 percent. In Chile, white-collar workers rose from 20.4 percent of the work force in 1952 to 26.8 percent of a much larger work force in 1970. In Turkey, they rose from 4.7 percent of the work force in 1950 to 8.7 percent in 1965. A lthough it is custom ary to emphasize long-run dem and factors in explaining the growth of the ter tiary sector, Yves Sabolo called attention to changes on the labor supply side. He found that in come prospects, for equal qualifications, “seem bet ter in much of the tertiary sector than in industry. . Occupational distributions of employed workers, selected countries, 1947-71 [Percent] Country Australia 1947 ....................................................................................................... 1 9 7 1 ....................................................................................................... Canada 1950 ....................................................................................................... 1 9 7 1 ....................................................................................................... Finland 1950 ....................................................................................................... 1970 ....................................................................................................... Japan 1950 ....................................................................................................... 1970 ....................................................................................................... New Zealand 1 9 5 1 ....................................................................................................... 1 9 7 1 ....................................................................................................... Sweden 1950 ....................................................................................................... 1 970 ....................................................................................................... United Kingdom 1 9 5 1 ....................................................................................................... 1 9 7 1 ....................................................................................................... United States 1 950 ....................................................................................................... 1 970 ....................................................................................................... White colar Tots! 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Agriodturs!, ftehing,snd forestry H us e e ls ’ Other (not etesifteti) 32.4 41.4 7.3 7.4 42.3 38.8 14.8 7.7 33.7 46.3 7.8 12.3 38.1 31.7 18.9 7.7 16.0 30.0 7.4 10.5 30.0 38.7 46.0 20.0 2.0 .6 .8 23.5 36.4 4.0 7.7 24.4 36.5 47.8 19.2 .2 32.0 41.9 7.1 7.1 41.6 38.3 18.8 11.7 1.0 27.2 41.3 9.2 9.6 43.0 40.8 20.3 .3 14.6 42.4 40.1 5.6 2.9 29.3 42.6 36.0 48.1 NOTE: Figures from United Nations Demographic Yearbook, various years, for economically active populations, have been rounded in some cases. (Canadian figures for 1971 taken directly from 1971 Canadian Census.) Occupational categories may vary slightly between countries, and, for example, for the most recent year some countries used the International Standard Classification of Occupation for 1958 instead of 1968. Moreover, within countries the shift from 1958 to 1968 makes very close comparisons doubtful; but generally, btue-collar workers include those in production or related jobs, miners, construction workers, truck drivers, 11.8 11.0 11.4 39.0 35.8 8.0 12.0 3.1 3.2 4.7 1.5 .3 .5 .2 8.1 2.5 2.0 1.6 lodging, food service, and similar personnel; white-collar workers include professional and technical, managerial, clerical, and sales personnel. “Other” usually includes those not elsewhere classified, or those whose occupations were not known. Those in the armed forces have been subtracted from the totals. Unemployed workers are in a few cases included in their occupa tional categories; in 1 or 2 cases, certain aboriginal groups are excluded. During these years, occupational definitions have been modified slightly in some countries—for these and similar reasons small changes within countries and between countries are not significant laborers, factory operatives, skilled craftworkers, and the like; service workers include protective Service 114 . . Secondly, as a result of the content of education and increasing labor force participation by women, there is an increasingly pronounced preference for employment in the tertiary sector rather than in the secondary sector.” This trend in personal tastes in the developed countries “has led the machines to be preferred to the plough and now for the pen to the m achine,” he added. “This trend has also m ade a sudden emergence in the developing countries.” 5 members by 1955, but it is also significant that the white-collar federation went from about one-fourth the size of the blue-collar LO in 1955 to half the size (951,000 members) in 1975. In G reat Britain, Professors R obert Price and George Bain estimate th at white-collar union membership grew from 1.9 to 3.6 million from 1948 to 1974, an increase of 83 percent.7 Blue-collar unionization in Britain was practically stable during the same period. A lthough it is difficult to find com parable data for m ost other countries, a few additional figures may be of interest. As a whole, the predom inantly blue-collar Danish Federation of Trade Unions (LO) increased 47 percent from 1955 to 1975; the LO ’s large white-collar affiliate, Commercial and Clerical State Employees, expanded by 184 percent. While the entire Germ an Federation of Trade Unions (DGB) increased membership by 20 percent from 1955 to 1975, the num ber of unionized whitecollar employees in the federation (excluding civil servants) grew 104 percent—and hundreds of thou sands of other white-collar workers belong to a sep arate group, the G erm an Salaried Employees’ Union. The Austrian Federation of Trade Unions (OGB) increased 35 percent from 1955 to 1975; the private white-collar employees union expanded 67 percent, becoming the O G B ’s largest affiliate. White-collar unionization The continuing growth of white-collar employ m ent suggests that unionizing these workers m ust be increasingly im portant to organized labor, par ticularly in developed countries. Traditionally, most union movements (especially those before W orld W ar II) have been based upon blue-collar workers. In addition to representing their members at the workplace, these unions have generally supported political causes such as social welfare legislation, tax reform, and economic planning. As the propor tion of white-collar workers expands, the political influence of organized labor may decline unless the degree of white-collar unionization increases as well. W hat are the trends in white-collar unionization? Briefly, there appears to be a general relationship between the levels of blue- and white-collar union ization in m ost developed countries, as blue-collar organizing has typically led the way for white-collar movements. An A ustralian scholar, D. W. Rawson, recently summarized blue- and white-collar union ization rates for developed countries around 1971 and noted that Sweden had the highest rates of unionization for both blue- and white-collar work ers.6 The following tabulation gives Raw son’s fig ures for the percentages of blue- and white-collar workers who belong to unions in six developed economies: United States.............. Germany................... Britain ....................... Australia ................... Norway..................... Sweden....................... B lu e c o lla r W h ite co lla r 56 42 53 64 65 80 13 24 38 41 58 70 Work humanization The growth in white-collar unionization has coin cided with an increased interest in the work hum an ization movement, which seeks to develop intrinsi cally satisfying jobs. W hite-collar union members, who are likely to be better educated and m ore re ceptive to changes in job design, seem to accept work hum anization efforts more readily than many blue-collar workers. To date, m ost work hum anization activities have centered in the developed countries, though some aspects (such as the campaign for improved safety from dangerous machinery and chemicals) have been more universal. (The drive for worker partici pation in top m anagement, which has at times gone hand in hand with the work hum anization emphasis on job redesign, has also been concentrated in de veloped countries.) But in a very real sense, the movement for m ore satisfying jobs is a natural out growth of the traditional concerns of unions every where, concerns that led to historic struggles against inhum anly long hours of work and atro cious working conditions. The work hum anization m ovem ent’s special con tribution is its suggestion that work should satisfy the workers, that jobs should be m ore than ju st a way of earning money. Previously, work has gener A lthough white-collar unionization still trails blue-collar in each country, white-collar organizing has been gaining ground rapidly in m any countries. In Sweden, for example, the leading white-collar federation increased its membership 172 percent be tween 1955 and 1975, while the blue-collar federa tion advanced 39 percent. Adm ittedly the bluecollar LO (Swedish Federation of Trade Unions) had already organized a m ajority of its potential ic ally been viewed as a necessary evil— perhaps more evil for an underground miner or autom obile as sembly worker, less evil for a teacher or bank em ployee, but still something to be endured in order to obtain satisfaction elsewhere. To put it m ore ele gantly, work was looked on as something instru m ental to consumption; the essence of the work hu m anization movement is that work should also be intrinsically satisfying. Of course, there have always been some w ork ers— many professionals such as doctors or teach ers, for example— who view their work as a pleas ure in itself; these same people may have a great degree of control over their own work. Indeed, m ost white-collar workers have generally enjoyed m ore pleasant working conditions than blue-collar workers (though the large-scale introduction of the com puter has transform ed many white-collar jobs to such a degree that it is posing many of the same problems of routine tasks, poor prom otion oppor tunities, and shift work that have long troubled m any blue-collar workers). The work hum anization movement goes beyond pleasant working condi tions, however, to the dual concerns of satisfying work and the scope of w orkers’ responsibility over their own activities. W hy is this new emphasis on work hum anization developing? Once again, the great economic gains of the post-W orld-W ar-II period are im portant. As m ore and more employees reached at least a decent standard of living, new needs arose. W orkers be came more inclined to self-expression, which often took the form of higher job turnover, greater absen teeism, and refusal to perform some types of un pleasant work. In some countries— Sweden and N orway were conspicuous in this respect—employ ers began to perceive a need to redesign work as part of seeking new m otivations for their employ ees. It is no accident that tight labor m arkets pre vailed in these same two countries for m ost of the postw ar period. The hard fact is that employer con cern with relieving work m onotony and boredom is often a response to such pressures. Rising levels of education, with m ore and more employees entering the labor m arket with 2, 3, or 4 years more of schooling than their prewar counter parts, added to the pressure. The aspirations of postw ar employees often exceeded those of their prewar parents. In many countries, the strengthening of democ racy and individualism— related both to greater economic security and to the greater strength of w orkers’ political movements after W orld W ar II— also added to the work hum anization movement. M ore and m ore people became aware of the inher ent contradiction between participating a; a full cit izen in political life and being treated as a highly subordinate underling in the typically authoritarian structures of m odem economic life. The impulse grew to question rules and regulations imposed from the top of the office or workshop. Unions and the movement Of course, trade unionism dealt with many of these problems. In Canada, G reat Britain, and the United States, the power of the union at the work place has been greater than in some European countries, let alone those in the developing world. But even where workplace unionization was strong, it was essentially reactive, rarely questioning the nature and organization of work itself. Rather, unions reacted to the excesses of employers’ m an agement of work. The idea that workers should help shape their own work, arrange or rearrange it to allow them greater personal responsibility and expression, was largely beyond the scope of unions and their members. In view of this histone reactive role of unions, it is not surprising that where im portant work changes have been undertaken, where m ost work hum anization projects have been implemented, the employer has typically taken the initiative. The role of the union as an agent for workers reacting to em ployers’ actions has m ade it difficult for many unions even to collaborate fully in this w ork.8 In m any experiments, the employer has undertaken to redesign jobs, rotate assignments, or establish semiautonom ous work groups in collaboration with em ployees but with little or no participation by the union. Unions in Norway, Denm ark, and Sweden have been more actively associated with these ex periments, but even there they have not always had a strong, direct role at the worksite level. In these countries, work redesigned experiments generally proceed under an um brella agreement between toplevel union federations and employers’ associations. In the United States, m any experiments have been conducted in nonunionized plants, and many unions have become convinced that the movement is ju st another device to prevent unions from gain ing a foothold.9 Indeed, some anti-union consul tants in the United States sell so-called work hu m anization experiments as a device to help keep unions out. Even here, however, some unions are expressing interest in joint union-em ployer pro gram s.10 By their nature, these experiments may set off forces that run somewhat counter to traditional union needs and bonds. W ork reorganization de vices such as flexible hours, job enrichm ent, or job 116 storm or whim of m anagement. W ork hum aniza tion practitioners who ignore basic power relations and the need for strong unions are deceiving either themselves or the workers. It is easily overlooked that one reason these experiments have had special success in Norway and Sweden is th at the unions are fully established there, and m ost employers in those countries would scarcely be tem pted to use work reorganization as a device to get around the unions. Indeed, the very strength and pervasiveness of unionization in Sweden and Norw ay reduces open labor-m anagem ent conflict and helps create a working consensus in labor relations that is a neces sary background to successful collaboration in work hum anization. Even those Scandinavian unions that have been m ost identified with work reorganization have been careful to make it but one part of their total plans for industrial democracy. They are also concerned with worker participation on com pany m anagement boards, improved legislation for worker safety, greater collective bargaining rights at the worksite, and better sharing of wealth. These m ore tradi tional, power-based dem ands illustrate the continu ing need for adversarial relations in some fields even while union-m anagem ent cooperation in work hum anization develops. The hum anization movement will probably not make significant progress in m ost m ajor industries in the United States until unions are m ore genu inely accepted by employers, especially in the pri vate sector. The kind of consensus atm osphere in which work hum anization efforts flourish is often lacking in this country. A t present, continued ex periments in individual companies and in the public sector are more realistic goals. W ork hum anization, in any case, should not be viewed as a cure-all. M any groups of employees prefer their old work routines, which they find com fortable; these groups should be accom m odated in proposed reorganization plans. But for millions of other employees, the drive for greater responsibil ity, meaning, and significance in their work presents an exciting challenge to workers and their unions. enlargem ent may establish ties between individual workers and the company that may differ from the broader collective appeals on which unions are based. Unions tend to concentrate on establishing uniform, collective rules and protections. Clearly, these new hum anization plans will call for more flexibility in job titles, work hours, and probably pay scales and rules. Indeed, one of the unions’ tasks will be to negotiate the workers’ share of the increased productivity that often flows from work reorganization. Unions m ust find ways to meet these challenges. If the economic, educational, indi vidualistic, and democratic trends that led to inter est in work hum anization are likely to continue, then unions as well as employers m ust adapt to re spond to the new interests of m odern workers. W hite-collar unions are in a special strategic po sition to meet the challenges of the work hum aniza tion issue. Their members are likely to be better ed ucated, more conceptually minded, and more readily interested in these programs. They also, in m any instances, work in smaller groups than many blue-collar workers, which also facilitates work hu m anization experiments. Case reports by social scientists of work hum an ization experiments show that white-collar employ ees accept such projects more quickly and show greater initiative in shaping work redesign. In one branch bank in Norway where new com puter oper ations were being installed, for example, a work hu m anization specialist found that the bank’s employ ees needed little help in developing systems for wider participation. Several other cases like this have been reported among white-collar employees.11 W ork redesign should be a participatory process, not one dom inated by outside experts, and it should provide a learning process that can lead to career advancement. These goals accord with the upw ard aspirations of many white-collar workers. Pow er relations As work hum anization efforts continue, unions will have to ensure that they do not become sham program s that may blow away at the first economic FOOTNOTES 'Yves Sabolo, The Service Industries (Geneva, International Labor Office, 1975). 2 Earl L. McFarland, Jr., “Employment Growth in Services: Mexico, 1950-1969” (Ph. D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1974). 3 Japan Labor Bulletin, Jan. 1, 1976, p. 8. 4 Employment and Training Report of the President, 1976 (Washing ton, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), table E-9, p. 336. 5 Sabolo, The Service Industries, p. 121. 6 D. W. Rawson, “A Note on Manual and Non-Manual Union Membership in Australia,” The Journal of Industrial Relations, Decem ber 1974, pp. 394-97. 7 Robert Price and George S. Bain, “Union Growth Revisited: 1948-1974, in Perspective,” June, 1976, reprinted in British Journal oj Industrial Relations, November 1976. 8 See generally R. Tchobanian, “Trade Unions and the Humaniza tion of Work,” International Labor Review, March 1975, pp. 199-217; and Ursula Engelen-Kefer, “Humanization of Work in the Federal Republic of Germany: A Labor Oriented Approach,” International Labor Review, March-April 1976, pp. 221-AX. 117 of the Rockwell International Corporation, see Rockwell-Standard Division, Rockwell International press release, R5-85, Aug. 12, 1974, “Rockwell-UAW Announce Innovative Commitment at Battle Creek Plant.” 11 For the Norway case, see Max Elden, “Bank Employees Begin to Participate in Studying and Changing their Organization,” paper pre sented to Third International Conference Self-Management, Washing ton, D.C., June 10-13, 1976. At this conference, several other groups made oral reports on union-management humanization of work projects in offices. 9 For a U.S. union view of this, see William W. Winpisinger, “Job Satisfaction: A Union Response,” The American Federationist, Febru ary 1973, pp. 8-10. 10 See Ted Mills, “Altering the social structure in coal mining: a case study,” Monthly Labor Review, October 1976, pp. 3-10. A description of the quality of work demonstration project involving a Cleveland, Ohio, plant of the Eaton Corporation and the United Auto Workers is contained in Recent Initiatives in Labor-Management Cooperation (Washington, National Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life, 1976), pp. 37-42. For an announcement and description of an other important UAW quality of work program, this one with a plant UAW-FotcEemployee involvement A work force concept for mow amd the future W hat it is . . . Employee Involvement (E l) is the sum of many parts. o It’s a process in which local Unions and local Managements work together to jointly create a work climate where employees can achieve work satisfaction by directing their ingenuity, im agination, and creativity toward improving their work and the overall work environment. o It’s a means of providing employees the opportunity to actively identify and resolve problems related to their work. o It’s part sound management, part Union-Management cooperation, part human relations, part employee awareness, part communications . . . and basically good business. o It’s a Management and Union style that promotes all of this. o And in a very real sense, Employee Involvement is a three-way partnership—a recognition by employees, the Union, and Management that their common interests can be served best when there is common effort. ----- From A Handbook on the UAW-Ford Process fo r Local Unions and Management issued by the UAW-Ford National Joint Committee on Employee Involvement, 1980 118 Workers morale in Japan 2 Joseph Mire In December 1971, the Public Employment Se curity Office undertook an “employees life con sciousness survey,” covering some 2,800 workers in 2,200 establishments, each with at least 30 employ ees. The sample covered nine major industries: mining, construction, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, finance and insurance, real estate, trans port and communication, electricity and gas, and water services. The workers were asked to state their views on the contents of their jobs, human relations, work environment, and what aspects of-their life they considered most worth living for.- The methods used were personal interviews of workers at the plant site. On job content, 8.9 percent of the workers were considerably satisfied, 45.8 percent slightly satisfied, 28.8 percent slightly dissatisfied, and 7.1 percent greatly dissatisfied.3 The following tabulation shows the divergence of views between younger and older workers— the 20—24 and 45—54 age groups: D uring 1968, 1969, and 1970, the Bureau of Labor Standards of the Ministry of Labor in Japan con ducted, by means of a questionnaire, six studies on job adaptation of young workers. About 2,000 workers were asked whether they considered their job worthwhile. Only a little over half responded in the affirmative, and the remainder replied either in the negative or by saying they “did not know.” The following tabulation shows the changes recorded by the six studies1: Job is worthwhile . . Job is not w o r th w h ile .......... D o not k n o w .......... 1st 2d 3d 4 th 5 th 6 th 512 51.7 52.7 54.5 55.2 59.9 10.4 32.4 13.9 34.4 15.6 31.7 15.0 30.5 14.2 30.7 11.4 28.7 Disturbing as these figures were, the Ministry of Labor was even more alarmed by the fact that 38 percent of those included in the survey at the begin ning had to be eliminated from the tabulation be cause they had left their place of employment during the project period. The proportion of those chang ing jobs rose from 14.7 percent of the total in the first year to 32 percent in the second, and to no less than 49.2 percent in the third. This turnover hardly signified workers’ contentment with their jobs. W ork environm ent A ge 2 0 -2 4 4 5 -5 4 Considerably satisfied . Slightly satisfied . Slightly dissatisfied Greatly dissatisfied Joseph Mire is an econom ist formerly on the staff o f the American Federation of State, County, and M unicipal E m ployees. He has also served as adjunct professor at the School o f International Services o f the American University, W ashington, D.C. This article stems from a field study under taken with the assistance o f a grant from the Ford Founda tion. Job content A ge 2 0 -2 4 4 5 -5 4 .. 4.3 10.6 6.2 11.9 4.8 19.3 .. 27.8 38.8 43.9 54.7 38.2 53.1 . 33.8 30.9 30.0 20.7 35.9 18.3 . 28.0 14.0 10.6 6.1 10.3 4.1 Concerning the “spheres of life worth living for,” the answers of those in the 20-24 and 45-54 age From the Review of June 1975 H um an relations A ge 2 0 -2 4 4 5 -5 4 119 groups were as follows (in percent of the groups’ totals): Work and/or recognition by others— 37.6 and 45.2; family— 7.1 and 33.4; leisure— 39.8 and 9.0; civic service— 3.5 and 5.3; others— 13.0 and 3.7; none— 7.0 and 2.6. Spurred by the very disquieting results of this survey— which clearly reinforced the findings of the previous, the 3-year study— the Ministry of Labor sponsored, in October 1972, a roundtable confer ence on “new visions of working life.” The confer ence concluded that improvements in the living environment of workers had not kept pace with the advance of the gross national product and income, and called for prompt efforts to reorganize work so as to eliminate monotony and the resultant mental strain. Shortly thereafter, the Ministry of Labor sent a questionnaire to some 700 business and union leaders, as well as other persons versed in labor problems, asking them, among other things, to list the priority of labor issues today and as they ex pected them to be in the 1980’s. There was over whelming agreement among these leaders that, in that decade, wages and other working conditions would decline in importance and job satisfaction would come to the forefront. The Ministry viewed this agreement as a hopeful sign that proposals to come to grips with job monotony, psychological stress, and increased job simplification will be forth coming in due time and favorably received.4 A spe cial agency, The National Institute of Vocational Re search, is now collecting pertinent information on job satisfaction, trying to develop a framework for an ideal relationship between the worker and his job. To that end the Institute is looking into job restructuring, attempting to forecast the structure of the future labor force and trying to “identify the relations between personal life on the one hand and organizations, value systems, level of education, and the financial situation peculiar to a specific occupa tional group on the other.” 5 The old system under stress Growing job dissatisfaction is a serious factor in the current changes in Japan’s industrial relations system based on a unique employer-employee rela tionship. It both reflects and contributes to those changes. And it puts into question some of the cher ished traditions of that system, traditions that could be described in practical terms as lifetime employ ment, promotion from within, enterprise unions, and a wage system based on age seniority. The tradition of lifetime employment is part of a management philosophy which views the plant as an extension of the family. It makes the employer responsible not only for providing employment but for the “whole employee,” that is, his social and economic needs within the plant and without. Fear of unemployment and other insecurities are thus supposed to be substantially reduced. Hiring policies of companies are directed toward the recruitment of graduates from junior and senior high schools, with the understanding that everybody would start at the workshop level and work his way up, and that no hiring would be done from the outside. Thus, pro motional opportunities are greatly enhanced, and workers doing monotonous, dull, and generally unin spiring jobs may well consider their work assignments to be only the initial, passing stage in their career and, consequently, less onerous and dissatisfying. Many industry spokesmen claim that it would be un likely for workers above the age of 30 to be still working on the assembly line since by then they would, normally, have moved into some supervisory position. Workers also derive a sense of importance from the efforts of management to solicit their views on a wide range of problems concerning production and their jobs.6 A concomitant of the Japanese manpower policy is the investment of large amounts of time and money in (a) identifying individual capabilities of all employees, manual and white-collar; and (b) introducing constant on-the-job training and learning programs. The latter allow a more flexible use of the labor force to meet irregular peak periods, and if, as expected, employees stay in the same enterprise for their whole working life, both the workers and the company will be able to reap the benefit of such training and learning. The upward adjustment of wages according to age seniority is based on the rationale that with age and length of service come greater skill and experience. Such a policy, it is held, reduces changes of favorit ism, inevitable under a merit system, which has to depend largely on individual judgements by super visors. Its most conspicuous disadvantage is the tendency to overpay older workers at the expense of younger, adding to the relatively greater dissatis faction of the latter group in the labor force. Indirectly related to wage payments by age seni ority is another tradition— compulsory retirement at age 55. This goes back to a time when average life expectancy was close to that age, but the practice is now being continued because keeping workers be yond age 55 would entail further wage increases at a time when the workers productivity is thought to be on the decline. The extent to which these and other features of the Japanese industrial relations system are still op erative today is a matter of much debate. Most peo ple knowledgeable on the subject agree that the sys120 tem is experiencing severe strains. The shift from a labor surplus economy to labor shortages during the last two decades has weakened the attraction of life time employment and increased the mobility of labor, especially among younger workers. Paralleling the trend in other industrialized countries, young people of Japan today have better education and, therefore, higher aspirations. They are no longer satisfied just to have a job but want opportunities for growth, chal lenge, and satisfaction. Also, some industries, such as electronic computers and electrical machinery, have been forced to resort to outside hiring since the needed labor could not be recruited through tradi tional channels. This, in turn, has reduced promo tional opportunities for those starting, as usual, at the work shop level. Still other industries had to raise their hiring standards because of technological changes, with more jobs going to university gradu ates, whose ratio in the labor force has gone up 50 percent between 1959 and 1968.7 Finally, the role and importance of the enterprise unions, compared with the national federations, is changing, with the latter now playing a rather dominant part in wage bargaining through the annual “spring offensive.” For the first time the union federations are also ask ing for the establishment of national, uniform mini mum wage standards.8 In sum, the peculiar characteristics of the Japa nese industrial relations system have been shaken, but not eliminated. Its traditions will continue in some weakened form at least for the foreseeable future. But job discontent will undoubtedly produce profound modifications in the system. Umioms’ search for remedy Both management and unions seem acutely aware of the need to come to grips with the growing dislike and disrepute in which work in the manufacturing industries has fallen, particularly among young peo ple, and the communal environment which prevails in many enterprises seems well suited for cooperative arrangements to restructure the work organization. Company spokesmen generally acknowledge the sup port received from enterprise unions. In a few in stances, the unions have, in fact, taken the initiative and proposed to management measures to improve the working environment. Some of their suggestions are: To eliminate all distinctions in work standards and benefits between blue- and white-collar workers9; to decentralize authority; and to give the enterprise union more say on promotions and training pro grams. Unions7 approaches to the problem vary consider ably. Sohyo, closely allied with the Japan Socialist Party and committed to nationalization of industry, is opposed to any form of workers’ participation in industry, viewing it as a management tool. Its tradi tional responses to work monotony and the pressures of the assembly line are higher pay, shorter working hours, and more and longer rest periods. Its program aims essentially at political objectives.10 Domei, close to the more moderate Japan Social Democratic Party, deplores the lack of adequate information on job restructuring but seems willing to join in management efforts to find solutions through job improvement programs. At its 1973 convention, Domei issued a call to its affiliates to focus their efforts on workplace activities and to cooperate— and where necessary, to initiate— work improvement projects. The noticeable drift of young workers into the service industries has convinced the union’s lead ership that more pay and shorter hours alone would not solve the problem, and that something would have to be done to meet the psychological needs of the young generation. The Automobile Workers’ Union recently adopted an action program which puts the demand for a bet ter quality of life in second place, right next to the fight against inflation. This was done in response to polls taken by the union. Its staff has been trying to formulate details of specific union goals on job dis satisfaction, but the task proved too big to handle. Job satisfaction, the union has come to believe, is a matter which must be attacked individually, not in stitutionally. No single measure will meet all situa tions, and the workers themselves should be involved in finding appropriate solutions. The union did de termine, on a tentative basis, that each job should have at least three components: a long range goal; a system of rewards and promotions; and an oppor tunity for social contacts. The Federation of Electrical Machine Workers Unions favors participation in management on the floor level but is skeptical about workers’ serving on boards of management. The union strongly supports joint labor-management consultation committees and has recommended participation in them to its affili ates, The International Metal Workers FederationJapan Council, which represents some 2,000 unions with a total of about 1,402,000 members and cuts across jurisdictional lines of all major federations, has'set up a special study committee on industrial democracy and is planning to hold a nationwide con ference on job improvement programs in the summer of 1975. Employers9 efforts On the company side, interest— and experimenta tion— in job restructuring is apparently on a sub stantial scale, though no one at this- time seems to be 121 able to provide a complete accounting of what is actually being done. Some examples can be cited here. The Iron and Steel Federation, a membership organization of 54 steel companies and 2 associa tions of iron and steel producers, has pioneered in the establishment of voluntary autonomous work groups— so-called J-K committees—within its affili ates. Their purposes are to improve work quality, lower production costs, and generally improve work ers’ morale. J-K activities are carried out by small groups of workers, who elect leaders from among themselves and set their own goals. Workers share in the gains of productivity, and the programs are considered to be effective antidotes to job monot ony.11 The Iron and Steel Federation serves as a catalyst and recorder of experiences on job improve ment programs. Its basic labor policy calls for the elimination of the conveyor belt system, improve ment of communication between workers and super visory personnel, and work restructuring based on a careful analysis of each worker’s ability in relation to his job assignment.12 Mitsubishi, a diversified producer of a wide range of electrical machinery, was forced by circumstances to grapple with job monotony and problems on the assembly line. The company, employing some 57,000 people in 21 plants, has expanded rapidly and has had severe difficulties in recruiting and keeping labor. Union and management agreed that something had to be done to make work more attractive. Job en largement was tried first. The time allotted for certain operations on the assembly line was changed from 3 minutes to 10, and workers were given additional responsibilities. Absenteeism dropped immediately, but not for long. After the novelty of the experiment had passed, absenteeism was back to its former level, apparently because the added work assignments were equally monotonous. The company then shifted to antonomous work groups, composed of 10 workers each. They were given weekly or monthly production goals but otherwise were fully in charge of plans and efforts to achieve them. Hence, their discretion cov ered planning, execution, and checking— the plando-see responsibility. This approach proved very effective, raising production and quality. Job dissatis faction, the company feels, is more serious among female than male workers, because the latter move up rather quickly to more demanding jobs for which female workers lack either skill or interest. On sug gestion of the union, the company is currently making a feasibility study of flexi-time. Sony Electric Corp., a worldwide multinational concern, prides itself on its role as a pathfinder in the use of new technology, in developing new markets, as well as in its labor relation policy. A statement of the company’s chairman, Masura Ibuka, “Nothing makes a man happier than doing the work he enjoys,” is displayed conspicuously in all plants and is impressed again and again upon all supervisory employees. There is constant effort to put the right man in the right job and to bring out the best in each employee. The company has tried the whole roster of job im provement instrumentalities in its farflung empire, but has not yet come to any definitive conclusions about their respective merits and is, therefore, reluc tant to disclose details. Each of the new techniques has worked in some places but not in others, and the company is still trying to find out why. The very speed with which the company is applying new tech nology has also made some of the work restructuring programs obsolete. 1 For a detailed report on the studies, see R osei Jiho (Labor Adm inistration R eview ), April 1974. (The journal is published by the Labor Law Association o f Japan.) 5 Som e F acts and Figures, June 1973. (Published by the Japan N ational Institute of Vocational Research.) 2 Other questions of the survey pertained to general life, clothing, housing, food, welfare facilities, earnings, recrea tion and leisure, hours of work, culture, and savings. 3 Remaining percentages were either those who answered “hard to say” or did not answer. 4 Shin-ichi Takezaw'a, “The Quality o f Working L ife,” a paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Council for the Quality o f Working Life, at Tokyo, Aug. 6 -9 , 1974. The union and management responses mentioned here are indicative, but not necessarily representative, of current efforts in Japan to deal with workers’ morale. It stands to reason that a country which has few natural resources would particularly treasure and husband its human resources. The results are great efforts to consider workers’ values and aspira tions; to avoid underutilization; to involve workers in production problems; and to create for workers a satisfactory work environment. 6 In turn, managem ent expects from its em ployees, loyalty, good performance, and full cooperation; a free hand to modernize the plant and to introduce new equip ment; and a high degree o f identification of workers’ in terests with those o f the enterprise. Professor Shin-ichi Takezawa o f Rikkyo U niversity in Tokyo credits tradi tional Japanese em ploym ent policies with creating an excep tionally human bond in industry which makes it difficult for functional and class divisions to be perpetuated. See his “The Quality of Working Life” (cited ab ove); see also 122 means o f coordinating wage demands and strategies in order to minimize disagreements among unions and m axi mize results. Robert E. Cole, The Japanese Blue C ollar (Berkeley, U n i versity o f California Press, 1971), p. 230. On the unique Japanese em ployer-em ployee relationship, see Robert Evans, Jr., “Japan’s labor econom y— prospect for the future,” M on th ly L abor R eview , October 1972, pp. 3—8. 7 Shun-Ichiro U m etani, Japan L abor Bulletin, Oct. 1, 1974. 9 Some of these distinctions pertained not only to work standards but to what clothes and ties workers were al lowed to wear on their jobs, as well as in their hem es. 10 Japan L abor Bulletin, Oct. 1, 1974. 8 L abor N ew s, Jan. 9, 1975, published by International M etal Workers Federation, Japan Council. The “spring offensive” is the concentration o f wage nego tiations into the 3 spring months. First proposed by Sohyo in 1955, it is now follow ed by all major federations as a*123 n Takazawa, op. cit. M easures taken by the Japanese steel industry to im prove the m orale of the w orkers (The Japan Iron and Steel Federation, T o k y o ), M ay 1974. Corporate goals in Japan 1. A corporation exists for the people who work for it. 2. A corporation exists for serving customers who buy its products and services. 3. A corporation serves its shareholders. The goals are similar to ones for American corporations except for the reversal of priorities. Because a corporation serves its own people, discharging or laying off employees due to a declining economy is out of the question. In a recession, the first consideration is shortening of work hours, diver sification to downstream product lines. In return, employees develop a sense of sharing the destiny of the corporation with management. This sentiment of the employees can be shown by the number of sug gestions a company receives from its employees. The average is 20 and the acceptance ratio by management is 85 percent, which favorably compares with the American average of 5 and acceptance of 10 per cent. ----- J oji A rai , Manager, U.S. Office, Japan Productivity Center From an address, “ Productivity Management: Comparison of U .S./Japan Approach: Overview,” at the State University of New York, Buffalo, July 23, 1982 123 Worker participation in West German industry D a v id T. F ish er Council into the laws of the Federal Republic. The position and function of the Councils were redefined by the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1972, which enumerates the rights of the individual worker and authorizes the freely elected Works Council to guard these rights. These rights include the rights of the worker to be informed about matters concerning his job, to make suggestions concerning his work, to see all files that are kept about him, and to appeal management decisions that he considers unfair. The Works Council also has important prerogatives con cerning the hiring and firing of employees. Although Works Councils are an irritation to management in the conduct of daily business, their usefulness as an instrument of conflict resolution cannot be denied even by the most conservative busi nessmen. The Works Council serves very effectively as a pressure valve for employee discontent and often brings critical matters to the attention of manage ment before they have a chance to get out of hand. In addition, the Works Council tends to have a vested interest in the well-being of the plant and thus often acts more responsibly than some managers might. For these reasons, the Works Council is gen erally accepted, despite occasional partisan grum blings about its many responsibilities. Industrial relations in West Germany have been dis tinguished by cooperation and compromise, partly because of the tradition of employee participation in management. The Codetermination Act of 1976 is the latest in a series of laws which extends the influ ence of labor in industrial decisionmaking. German industrialists have angered union leaders by chal lenging the constitutionality of this law; the case has not yet been decided by the courts. To illustrate the significance of these events, this report traces the growth of codetermination in Germany during the last 30 years. Much of the history of labor-management rela tions in West Germany involves the extension and development of codetermination, or the institutional ized participation of workers in management. Codetermination has evolved on both the plant level and the enterprise level. Codetermination on the plant level is realized through the Works Council and is generally oriented toward the increased participation of the individual worker in his immediate labor environment. This type of codetermination was first sanctioned by law in 1920.1 After being suppressed during the Nazi period, Works Councils reappeared during the Al lied occupation with a strengthened and expanded role. The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1952 (sometimes literally translated as the Works Consti tution Act) incorporated the institution of the Works Beginnings Codetermination on the enterprise level does not enjoy such widespread acceptance. This form of codetermination seeks to expand the voice of labor in the governing boards of large corporations. These David T. Fisher is the manager of the computer department at Lummus GmbH in Wiesbaden, West Germany. From the Review of May 1978 124 companies have a peculiar structure—two boards run the company. A Supervisory Board, elected by the stockholders, in turn appoints a Board of Execu tive Directors. No one may serve on both at one time. The Board of Executive Directors runs the daily business of the company, while the Supervisory Board concerns itself with general strategic ques tions. The goal of the second type of codetermination is to increase the number of Supervisory Board mem bers who are either elected by the employees or ap pointed by the labor union. Opponents of this concept fear that an increase in labor representatives beyond a certain point would reorient decisionmaking: labor approval would be necessary to appoint any executive directors, making it difficult, if not impossible, for management to champion the owners’ interests. According to propo nents of the scheme, the interests of employees and management should not often represent a zero-sum game and in those cases where they do, the interests of labor should tend to be controlling. Moreover, the proponents contend that large enterprises, by virtue of their amassed capital resources, have such an im pact on societal well-being that it is unwise and irre sponsible to allow them to be subjected to the will of a handful of major stockholders, often large banks.2 Prior to World War II, enterprise codetermination was unknown in Germany. During the Allied occu pation, however, the labor movement was able to effect a codetermination policy in the coal and steel companies in the Ruhr District. Aided by the Allied forces, who depended on the unions as a source of “denazified” German leaders, the labor movement succeeded in implementing the following structure in the Supervisory Boards of the industries:3 Shareholders’ meeting Union and Works Council 7 members 7 members Stalem ate Between 1952 and 1967, labor was unable to make any further progress in the expansion of codetermi nation. In 1967, the Christian Democratic Union was obliged to form the “Grand Coalition” with the Social Democratic Party, marking the first time that the Socialists had a say in the operation of the Bonn government. To achieve some basis for consensus between the two rather unlikely partners, it was agreed to postpone discussion of codetermination in the German parliament for the duration of that legis lative period (until 1969). Instead, a commission of nine university professors headed by Professor Kurt Biedenkopf (later elected Secretary-General of the Christian Democratic Union) was appointed to study the issue. In addition to the nine professors representing several political persuasions, the gov ernment appointed three business and three union advisers to assist the commission. I-------- -|---------- 1 1 neutral member Supervisory Board (15 members) I Board of Executive Directors Labor and owners each nominate seven members; they then must agree on a neutral 15th member. It is impossible for a simple majority of shareholders to nominate any member of the Board of Executive Directors. This represents the highwater mark of enterprise codetermination, all subsequent efforts by labor have been to extend this arrangement to the rest of German industry. When Konrad Adenauer’s Christian Democratic Union took over the administration of West Ger many at the end of the occupation, it displayed no intention of transforming this arrangement into law. A very credible threat of a general strike, however, caused the government to retreat and enact a special law in 1951 giving legal effect to this scheme, but only in the coal and steel industries. A desire to maintain the solidarity achieved by Adenauer is probably the reason that conservatives have never challenged the legality of this statute.4 To show that enterprise codetermination would not become a general principle, the Adenauer gov ernment passed the Enterprise Organization Law of 1952, which regulated the structure of Supervisory Boards outside of the coal and steel industries. Ac cording to this law, shareholders retained a twothirds majority in the 15-member Supervisory Board. Unlike the 1951 law, this legislation does not provide the union or the Works Council with a direct voice in the nomination of the five labor representa tives. The owners’ wishes clearly prevail in the deci sionmaking of the enterprise. Most industrialists re gard this arrangement as the optimal solution to the problem of labor participation. They feel that the predominance of stockholders in the Supervisory Board is a fair and equal balance to the predomi nance of labor outside the Supervisory Board (in the operations of the Works Council). The history of codetermination since 1952 has been a sort of dialectical struggle. Unions battle for general acceptance of the coal and steel model, while industrialists seek to widen the scope of the 1952 law. 125 The Biedenkopf Commission presented its report in January 1970 to the newly elected Social D em o cratic Party Chancellor Willy Brandt. The Bieden kopf R eport held that both existing models were unsatisfactory. The coal and steel model was viewed as biased in favor of labor, while the 1952 law gave stockholders too m uch influence. The Commission recom mended a Supervisory Board of 12 members, half of which would be elected by the stockholders and four by the employees. The remaining two would have to be agreed upon by the other members of the Board. The Commission assumed that the final breakdown would be seven stockholder representa tives and five employee representatives. A lthough stockholders would have a slight edge, provisions were included to induce unanim ity to decisionmak ing. (For example, under certain circumstances the overruled labor representatives would have the op tion to disclose the conflict to the com pany’s em ployees or to the public.) By increasing the num ber of labor representatives, the Commission hoped to generate a larger com m itm ent by labor to the well being of the enterprise. By m aintaining a stockholder majority, however, the principles of consumer sove reignty and profitability would be preserved. The recom mendations of the Biedenkopf R eport were never adopted by any of the three m ajor politi cal parties. In fact, all now advocate some form of parity between labor and capital. The im portance of the Biedenkopf Report is that the unanim ity of the members of the Commission lent great credence to the objectivity of its recommendations. The Com m is sion’s guidelines, therefore, remain a yardstick against which alternative proposals are frequently compared. W hen the Social Dem ocratic Party took over the governm ent in 1969 in coalition with the Free D em o cratic Party, one of its top priorities was the expan sion of codeterm ination. The Social D em ocrats chose to ignore the recom mendations of the Bieden kopf Commission. In a party congress in Saarbrucken in 1971, they came out clearly on the side of the unions in advocating the extension of the coal and steel model to all sections of the economy. The Young Socialist faction was prepared to go consider ably further, along the lines of the Yugoslavian model of w orkers’ self-administration. The Social D em ocratic Party, however, was (and is) dependent upon the support of the Free D em o crats for the success of its legislative program. In its party congress in Freiburg in the fall of 1971, the Free D em ocrats considered the issue of codeterm ina tion. M ost representatives tended toward some type of parity model. A fter heated debate, the following scheme was adopted in a very close vote:5 Shareholders’ meeting High-level employees Low-level employees 6 members 2 members 4 members ^----------- Supervisory Board------------^ (12 members) Board of Executive Directors This model makes the distinction for the first time between high- and low-level employees. The idea is that high-level employees will often vote with the stockholders on key issues, thus m aintaining the owners’ control but at the same time providing for equal representation of labor and capital. However, the problem of accurately and unambiguously defin ing th e group of high-level workers has caused skep ticism am ong labor and capital about the practical effects of this plan. 126 Compromise The coalition of the Social D em ocrats and the Free D em ocrats was renewed after the elections of 1972. The new governm ent resolved to work out a comprom ise model and implem ent it in the 1972-76 legislative period. After a year of secret negotiations, the coalition parties announced their comm on pro gram in January 1974. The compromise package worked out by the coali tion was the m ost complicated model that had been suggested. A n overview is presented in the following diagram :6 Shareholders’ meeting Employees 10 members Group of electors l 10 members including one high-level employee ----Supervisory Board---(20 members) Board of Executive Directors Ten of the 20 members of the Supervisory Board would be directly elected at the shareholders’ m eet ing. The labor representatives would be indirectly elected by groups of electors nom inated by the em ployees. The labor representatives m ust include three union representatives and one high-level employee. A chairm an and deputy chairm an would be elected from among the members. The model provides for the following mechanism when a majority decision cannot be reached:7 to the number of employees in the enterprise. The possible configurations are illustrated below:9 __________ Number of employees_________ 2,000-10,000 10,000-20,000 Over 20,000 1. If no majority can be achieved to elect the chair man and deputy chairman of the Supervisory Board, each group of representatives nominates one candi date. The two candidates alternate for 2 years each as chairman and deputy chairman. The question of who serves the first 2-year term is decided, if necessary, by lot. 2. If the Supervisory Board fails several times to muster a majority to appoint members of the Execu tive Board, the chairman or the deputy chairman makes a proposal to the shareholders’ meeting, whose decision then becomes binding. 3. Other problems for which a decision of the Su pervisory Board is required but cannot be achieved can be decided by a tie-breaking vote of the chairman, but only if the Supervisory Board expressly grants this right to the chairman. If it does not, there is no mechanism to break the deadlock. R epresentatives of: Capital .............. W hite- and blue- collar em p lo y ees.... Senior e x e c u tiv e s.... U n ion ................ This model pleased no one except its political crea tors. The unions were against it, because of the neces sity of including one high-level employee in the labor group and because the stockholders’ meeting would have the final say in the appointment of executive directors. Industry representatives also opposed it, seeing a predominance of labor representation that would make it impossible to function according to market imperatives. They.feared that the compli cated processes would paralyze the decisionmaking capabilities of the Supervisory Board.8 Because of this opposition from strong and vocal interest groups, the coalition of Social Democrats and Free Democrats was unable to introduce its model—de spite its majority in the parliament. Current situation After more than 2 additional years of rigorous debate, the Codetermination Act of 1976 was adopted by the German parliament in the spring of 1976 and was formally put into effect on July 1, 1976. The general outlines of the coalition model re mained, but they were augmented by a number of provisions designed to dampen the opposition of the various interest groups. The act covers all limited liability companies outside of the coal and steel in dustries which have more than 2,000 employees; smaller companies continue to be covered by the one-third rule of the 1952 law. The basic goal of parity in the Supervisory Board remains, but the labor side is now classified into three different groups: workers, salaried employees, and senior executives. The size of the Supervisory Board varies according 127 6 8 10 3 5 6 1 2 1 2 1 3 In each case, the members of the Board are elected either directly by the employees or by electors which have been elected by the employees. The law suggests direct election in enterprises with less than 8,000 employees and indirect election through electors in enterprises with more than 8,000 employees. The employees of an enterprise can determine which method they prefer, however, through a direct vote. Union leaders tend to favor the indirect procedure while conservatives prefer the direct method.10 The chairman and vice chairman of the Supervi sory Board are elected by a two-thirds majority of the Board. If this majority is not obtained, the share holders elect the chairman and labor elects the vice chairman. The chairman may cast deciding votes in all issues before the Supervisory Board that cannot be resolved in the first round of voting. As in the other plans, the Supervisory Board ap points the Executive Board; appointment requires a two-thirds majority. If this is not achieved, a media tion committee with parity composition proposes candidates, who can be chosen by a simple majority of the Supervisory Board. Only if this fails can the chairman exercise his tie-breaking right. The Execu tive Board must include a “labor director” who is responsible for personnel and social affairs. Al though the law states that this individual must have the confidence of labor, he is selected by the same procedures as all other Executive Board members. Companies were given 2 years from July 1, 1976, to adjust to the new law. German law also provides for the possibility of contesting any new law before . the Supreme Court in Karlsruhe within 1 year of its passage. This is exactly what the Confederation of German Employers’ Associations did in June 1977, just weeks before the deadline expired.11 To ascertain what options are available for Ger many, it is worth examining the proposal of the op position Christian Democratic Union, first suggested at its party congress in Hamburg in November 1973. The Christian Democrats also called for equal repre sentation of labor and capital. The main elements of their program are as follows: 1. Shareholders and labor each nominate half of the members of the Supervisory Board. 2. The chairman of the Supervisory Board is elected by a two-thirds majority of the Board. If this cannot be achieved, the chairman is elected by the stockholders. 3. In case of deadlocks, the chairman of the Super visory Board casts the deciding vote. Time will tell which—if either—of these models for worker participation will ultimately prevail in West Qermany. -FOOTNOTES1 Dr. Wolfgang Heintzeler, The Codetermination Problem in Western Germany (London, Aims of Industry Publications, 1974), p. 2. 8 For the typical view of German industrialists, see an interview with the late Hanns Martin Schleyer in “Die Spielraeume werden enger,” Der Spiegel, No. 24, June 6, 1977, p. 40. 2 Unlike in the United States, German banks are allowed to hold stock directly, and therefore exercise a degree of control and influence over industrial enterprises which might seem excessive to one reared in the American tradition of economic liberalism. 9 “Mit dem Fuss in der Tuer,” Wirtschaftswoche, No. 3, Jan. 6 1978, p. 18. 10 For typical views on this issue see “Gefaehrliche Tauschgeschaefte,” an interview with Philipp von Bismarck in Wirtschaftswoche, No. 3, Jan. 13 1978, p. 19, for the conservative view and “Lueckenhaft und ungereimt” by Karl Hauenschild in the same issue, p. 23, for the union view. 3 Heintzeler, Codetermination, p.6. 4 It must be stressed that the conservatives never pretended to be in favor of this arrangement. They saw it as the price that had to be paid at the time for an anti-Communist consensus. '1 For the impact of this event on German industrial relations see the following articles in Die Zeit, No. 29, July 8, 1977: “So verhaelt sich kein Partner,” p. 17; “Zankapfel Mitbestimmung,” p. 17; “Das dicke Ende kommt noch,” p. 18; and “In letzter Minute,” p. 18. 5 Heintzeler, Codetermination, p. 15. 6 Heintzeler, Codetermination, p. 16. 7 Heintzeler, Codetermination, p. 17. Where does participation start? Beginning at the bottom end of the spectrum, we ask: Is a suggestion box or occasional inquiry by a manager enough to be considered employee participation? On balance, the answer seems negative for the following reasons. Systems which work via a suggestion box or other bureaucratic channel not allowing for adult, faceto-face discussion of the proposal between employee and manager tend to preserve the identification of em ployee as someone soley managed and ruled. Em ployees do not become co-managers; there is no regular weekly or monthly consultation between them (or their chosen representatives) and higher level managers who are making decisions. Employees are not even present when the decisions about their proposals are made and so have no way of knowing why it was rejected, altered, or accepted. The motivational effects of such irregular, impersonal, and individual consultations are not condu cive to fostering further group self-govement... .Taken together, these reasons make it necessary to exclude such forms. They lie, apparently, below the threshold where regular participation can be a self-sustaining sys tem, which was our first criterion. . . . A second problem occurs at what we have identified as the threshold of democratic participation. Below that line employees and managers do consult on certain decisions, but it is usually the manager who determines which issues are discussed in the first place, and ulti mately the decisions are determined by the managers’ preferences. Above this threshold, by contrast, many topics are initiated by the workers themselves and more of the decisions made together by workers and manag ers tend to go in the direction workers prefer. --------P a u l B e r n s t e i n W o rk p la c e D e m o c ra tiza tio n : I ts I n te r n a l D y n a m ic s (Kent, Ohio, Kent State University, 1976), pp. 48-49. 128 Industrial democracy in the Netherlands A rthur S. W e i n b e r g The question of whether or not workers should par ticipate in m anagem ent is not debated in the N eth erlands; rather, the debate is over what will be the form and shape of th at participation. Legally, workers, through the W orks Council A ct of 1970, are guaranteed control of the workplace through elected representatives, while the Law on the Right of Inquiry affords the W orks Council, and also the trade unions, the right to challenge managerial m ethods. Works councils and trade unions The distinction between the function of the unions and that of the W orks Council is heatedly debated between these two. The 1970 law gives the Council a dom inant position in the determ ination of working conditions. Unions have been left with the residual: wage bargaining. In the N etherlands, it is assumed that m anagers possess the expertise to decide the means, but th at the right to define broad objectives belongs to the W orks Council; the W orks Council establishes goals and objectives which m anagem ent is legally obligated to imple- Arthur S. Weinberg is coordinator of the Worker Exchange Program at the Metropolitan Office of the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University. This report stems from a field study undertaken with the assistance of a grant from the Ford Founda tion. Credit for research assistance and commentary on this report should be afforded to Dr. Maarten van Gils, Deputy Director, Nether lands Institute for Preventive Medicine in Leiden. From the Review of July 1976 129 ment. If a problem arises, a Federal judge deter mines whether m anagem ent has adequately imple m ented the policies form ulated by the Council; although this practice is rare, the decision is bind ing on m anagerial personnel. In many companies, workers committees ( werkoverleg) have been established to discuss jobrelated problems. In some companies, the com m it tees are in direct contact with m embers of the W orks Council, who themselves are elected by all employees of the company. The stockholders, Board of Commissars (an appointed public interest group), and the trade union all have an equal right to place names in nom ination for Council positions. Unions represent about 40 percent of the labor force and the percentage is relatively stable. The union is attem pting to m aintain its strength and its influence through their bedrijvenwerk (trade union committees and officials within the enterprise); it is an effort to make the union presence felt on the shop floor. Trade union officials claim that the workers’ committees are not adequate to deal with daily problems. It should be obvious that there is a conflict im plied in the situation; the policies of the trade union will often conflict with the policies of the W orks Council. Com pounding this problem is the fact that many of the members of the W orks Council are also union officials or members. The resolution of this conflict of dual loyalties is one of the most pressing in the D utch labor movement. Job design experiments On the m anagem ent side, many companies have attem pted to alter the traditional assembly line and eliminate repetitive work tasks. The reasons are threefold: To increase productivity, to improve job satisfaction, and to m itigate the problems of re cruitm ent and turnover. Gains have been m ade in the alteration of traditional approaches to work by International Business Machines (IBM) in type writer assembly, Philips in electronics assembly, Bamshoeve in textiles, and by Centraal Beheer, an insurance company. IBM . In what is term ed a “ simple business unit,” IBM allows 16 to 20 workers to rotate tasks and also to move from complex to simple work tasks. The product m anager explains that this allows a desirable variation of workload; workers need to relieve the strain imposed by a complex task and, at times, enjoy a simple and routine task. The IBM concept has been implemented through the use of a “mini, midi, and m axi” assembly line in the pro duction process. The size of the line varies with the needs and abilities of each worker. The author of this study concluded that an over whelming m ajority of workers did not wish to re turn to the assembly line. “They have learned to see the assembly process as a whole, to learn from their mistakes, and to work together with others and the group. They have become more aware of their own situation.” 1 In 1969, an experiment was m ade in the m anufac ture of light bulbs, where the traditional assembly line was replaced by a “miniline” of 12-14 workers assembling the product at three worktables. This “miniline” did not include any mechanical con veyor, but did fix a repetitive work task and con fined operatives to one work station. According to com pany reports, these initial efforts resulted in a substantial reduction in quality and led to dishar mony in work attitudes at the factory. In view of the failure of the “miniline,” Philips moved tow ard small “autonom ous” groups with responsibility for quality, job-task distribution, and, in theory, unlim ited freedom for job rotation. Early results, according to m anagement officials, have shown quality improvements and a reduction of absenteeism and turnover. Bamshoeve Textile. This small spinning-mill in En schede has implemented workers committees and a W orks Council which exceed the average D utch program; consultations with workers have led to new personnel policies and a complete organiza tional change within m anagerial ranks. D epart ments have been reorganized according to the prin ciple of establishing “natural boundaries” within a departm ent which will facilitate better work rela tionships and more extensive communication. One change in job design has recently been im plemented. Two self-selected partners operate ap proximately 10 machines and rotate tasks at will; each two-man team coordinates efforts with similar teams in order to complete a final product. The di rector of the experiment comm ented that the most im portant result of this experiment has been more cooperative attitudes in the factory. Philips. A nother effort to redesign alm ost all areas of m anufacture has been made by the Philips orga nization. The m ost successful and m ost prom inent changes have been accomplished in the production of television sets, in lam p assembly, and in defense industries. In the m anufacture of television, efforts have been directed at determining the optim al size of au tonom ous groups to be engaged in the assembly process. The current effort has as many as 20 peo ple working together and as few as one skilled worker completing the entire assembly operation. Philips has studied all of its approaches by keeping in close contact with experimental groups. The fol lowing distribution of answers was obtained from two autonom ous groups of workers, and from workers on a long assembly line, when asked about their feelings tow ard work: Tradi tional line (percent) Question A nsw er A utono m ous groups (percent) D o you get bored at work? ... . . Can you use your talents and capacities in the work you are doing? ......... .. D o you feel nervous and hurried at w ork?....... ........... D o you like your work?....... .. A re people helping each other in your group? ......... .. No 92 73 Y es 68 48 Seldom Y es 53 77 31 54 Yes 86 56 Centraal Beheer. This large insurance com pany in A peldoorn is found in an office building created by the famous architect, Professor Ir H. Hertzberger. The interior of the building is a mosaic of “is lands,” each a separate and distinct part of the building. The “office sculpture” consists of many floor levels with each level existing in an open-area atm osphere in an effort to prom ote a feeling of so cial integration. The office landscaping, what the D utch call Kantoorin, contains an autonom ous work group in each 130 “island.” The work groups have been established, but the integration of work tasks (job enlargement) is just beginning. At this time, the working environ ment is unique, but the job tasks and organiza tional structure are still traditional. The project at Centraal Beheer (subsidized by the D utch Govern ment) is to develop integrated work tasks and initi ate organizational changes to accommodate autono mous groups. Job design experiments and refinements in indus trial democracy are continuing throughout the Netherlands. At the time of this writing, the social ist trade union, the largest in the country, and the Catholic trade union were expected to call for an end to new work experiments. This has been viewed as an effort by the unions to gain control of existing work experiments. W ith the works councils rem ain ing academically critical of this experimentation, this move by the trade unions may alter the future of the Dutch effort at job redesign. --------- f o o t n o t e --------'Friso J. den Hertog, Work Structuring, Philips’ Gloeilampenfabrieken, Industrial Psychology Department, unpublished manu script, e.d. Miitum! growth forums U a w members employed at the Ford Motor Co. will get new input into the management decisionmaking process through a framework of joint union-management bodies called Mutual Growth Forums, which will operate at both the local and national levels. Scope The Mutual Growth Forums will be empowered to undertake “ ad vance discussion of certain business developments that are of material interest and significance to the union, the employees, and the company.” National level An equal number of union and company representatives will comprise the national Forum which will be empowered, among other things, to discuss the company’s general operations and cer tain business developments, examine government relations matters, and take other actions. The Director of the u a w National Ford Dept, may address the company’s board of directors twice yearly. Local level At the plant level, it is suggested that the Forums meet at least quarterly to discuss such things as “ the plant’s general operation and certain business developments.” The local Forums will get periodic financial and business presentations from management and the union. -Excerpt from summary of United Auto Workers— Ford Motor Co. national agreement, 1982 131 Six American workers assess job redesign at Saab-Scania A rthur S. Weinberg A r e t h e r e l e s s o n s for Detroit carmakers in the way work is organized in a Swedish factory? Six American workers recently participated in the ex periment at the Saab-Scania plant in Sodertalje. Their reactions serve as a basis for a case study on job satisfaction. In the experiment, three-member groups assemble the combustion engine for the Saab Model 99. Each worker in the group completes part or all of the engine as determined by the decisions of the threemember assembly team. The Americans worked in these autonomous groups and also in engine pre assembly.1 Their 1-month tour of duty was spon sored by the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University with the cooperation of the Ford Foundation. In engine preassembly, the traditional assembly line method is used and job tasks are rotated on a weekly basis. Skilled mechanics, foundry workers, and white-collar workers have work assignments that are little different from that of an American firm. The Americans also participated in works coun cils and consultation groups, which were created in an effort to increase worker participation in man- Arthur S. W einberg is Coordinator o f the Worker Exchange Program at N ew Y ork State School o f Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University. agerial decisions. The works councils represent man agement, white-collar employees, foremen, and pro duction workers and meet on a monthly basis to resolve plantwide issues. Consultation groups (pro duction and development groups) are composed of technicians, foremen, and production workers. Smaller groups of these workers meet on a monthly or biweekly basis to solve grievances and shop floor problems. Decisions of the production and develop ment groups are not binding on company manage ment; however, information obtained from these meetings is used by management in implementing corporate decisions. The goal of the experimental job redesign, initi ated in 1969, was to optimize the potential for human satisfaction in every aspect of the job envi ronment by (1) increasing the possibilities for em ployees to influence their own work task; (2) ren dering production tasks more meaningful and stimulating; and (3) increasing productive efficiency by improving flexibility and minimizing the possibil ity ol disruption. The Detroit auto workers were selected based on their ability to articulate their work experiences and how their work related to their lives. Efforts were made to choose individuals who were representative in terms of age, race, and sex. Conceptually, it was felt that the only person who could evaluate the work environment was the individual actually per forming the task. From the Review of September 1975 132 The six were involved in a 3-day orientation pro gram at Cornell University in New York City to acquaint them with the concepts of job design; job enrichment and enlargement; industrial democracy; Swedish life and culture; and to prepare them for what they might expect at Saab-Scania. This was fol lowed by a 2-day orientation program by Scania in Sweden. They worked first in engine preassembly and then in the assembly of the Model 99 engine. Reactions off American workers There was general agreement by the American participants that physical environment, noise levels, lighting, and the quality of the air in the plant was better at Saab-Scania than in their plant at home. Each commented favorably on the leisurely pace of the preassembly line and expressed favorable re sponses to the idea of rotating tasks on the line. The only general question posed was how the company could function economically at this slow pace, par ticularly when coupled with what seemed to be fre quent production breakdowns. They felt that this frequency of work stoppages would not be tolerated in Detroit. In the area of engine group assembly, the Ameri can reactions were negative. The majority felt that the rapid pace and complexity of the work task on group assembly imposed psychological pressures which outweighed benefits of variety in work tasks. Only one worker felt that the Saab approach was superior to Detroit. Two workers had mixed reac tions to group assembly: they liked the complex work task, but questioned how interesting it would be in the longrun. They felt the assembly line method allowed more freedom of thought and action, in that it required less concentration. The remaining three workers had more serious reservations about group assembly, citing pressures of stress and concentra tion to maintain the pace of the group, a continuing isolation, and lack of social contact. The American reaction was indifferent or negative to the worker participation schemes. They observed that the work council meeting seemed more like a mixture of a shareholders and general sales meeting, and that the members of the works council did not seem to be a representative sample of workers throughout the plant. The production and develop ment group meetings seemed an adjunct of the works council meeting. There were discussions of problems with little attention directed at possible solutions. In general, all six workers viewed the production and development groups as inadequate in handling dis putes at the workplace. Reactions of indigenous workers The consensus of the indigenous workers inter viewed was that group engine assembly was an undesirable job; they felt the only advantage was the flexible 4-day workweek allowed under this system. Almost all workers interviewed preferred the casual working pace of the assembly line in contrast to group engine assembly. They felt no identification with the production and development groups and none expressed any feeling of participation in union activities or in the works councils. Scania workers and the Americans worked both day and night shifts alternating on a weekly basis. Both groups reacted negatively to mandatory shift changing. This procedure is a tradition in Swedish industry. Scania workers had frequently expressed dissatisfaction over this issue. There have been no attitudinal studies at SaabScania to determine if the group assembly approach is more satisfactory than an assembly line method. There is no evidence to indicate that employees feel an increase in their influence over work tasks or that their job is more meaningful and stimulating. How ever, the production flexibility intended by utilizing group assembly methods seems to have been success ful. ■FOOTNOTEshafts, connecting rods, and pistons are machined assembled together. 1 Preassembly consists o f a square production line on which the main com ponents o f the engine such as crank 133 and UoSo longshoremen evaluate work conditions in Rotterdam H e r b e r t A. P e r r y Six members of the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union spent a month work ing on the piers in Rotterdam (Holland) in the spring of 1975. This work study experience, spon sored by the Labor Center of the Institute of Indus trial Relations, University of California at Berkeley, in cooperation with the Ford Foundation, was de signed to obtain reactions of American workers to working conditions in other countries, particularly in terms of job satisfaction issues. Before leaving for Rotterdam, the participants received approximately 25 hours of orientation. In addition, the Port of Rotterdam Transport College, which educates and trains port workers, conducted a 4-day orientation for the group which included lectures on the history of the port, its facilities and the work force. The longshoremen were assigned in pairs to work for three cooperating employers. Despite cultural and language differences, the workplace and organiza tion of work were familiar, and the Americans adapted to their new assignments with little trou ble. Eight factors which contribute to job satisfac tion were evaluated. with the strong sense of community among Rotter dam dockworkers, was an important factor in pro viding job satisfaction. They felt the Dutch system provides greater job security than the American. Wages and benefits. Weekly wages for dockworkers in Rotterdam were generally lower than longshore men wages in San Francisco. A higher proportion of the Dutch workers’ pay is deducted for social se curity and income taxes. However, provision of cer tain amenities (such as subsidized cafeterias, medi cal clinics, and sports and other recreational facilities) by both the State and employers tends to narrow the gap between San Francisco and Rotter dam earnings patterns. In addition, most fringe benefits (that is, health insurance plans, family al lowances, pensions, and paid vacations) are pro vided for all workers by the State. The U.S. long shoremen felt that wages for the Dutch longshoremen were adequate, and given their sense of job security and social security protection, sav ings did not seem necessary to Dutch dockworkers. Participation in day-to-day decisions o f the work place. The American workers found little difference Job security. Longshoremen in Rotterdam have job security and earnings guarantees provided by state regulation of private firms’ layoff and termination actions. The American workers felt that this, along in this area although the union played a greater role in San Francisco than in Rotterdam. Arrangements whereby as soon as a particular job is finished workers are allowed to go home and still get a full shift’s pay are found in both ports but are probably more widespread in Rotterdam. This arrangement, Herbert A. Perry is professor of economics at California State Univer sity, Sacramento. From the Review of August 1976 134 which requires a more intensive work pace in turn for a short workday, is favored by young workers and opposed by older workers, management, and union officials. Project participants felt that regard less of the faster work pace, those involved get con siderable satisfaction out of negotiating a shorter workday. and regulations. D utch dockworkers seemed to take a perverse pride in risks. This was particularly true under the arrangements whereby they were allowed to go home as soon as a particular job was finished. They overloaded slings, swung loads directly over groups of workers, operated lift trucks at high speeds, and cluttered up the docks with loaded pal lets. Union officials, employers, and Transport Col lege staff all agreed safety regulations were often ignored but inferred that the workers were at fault. Variety o f work and promotion opportunities. The San Francisco group found less variety and choice in jobs and work schedules in Rotterdam because the m ajority of dockworkers are hired directly by the employer. They felt the union-controlled hiring hall in San Francisco gave them greater choice in jobs and work schedules— a very im portant source of job satisfaction for 95 percent of the 30 long shoremen interviewed by the project selection com mittee. As for training and promotion opportuni ties, they noted that the D utch have more options because of their Transport College, which offers courses in improving longshore skills and training in managerial and administrative skills with oppor tunity to move up in the industry. While the group expressed some concern about employer influence in the Transport College and their role in selecting workers for upgrading, they felt it was a desirable arrangem ent and contributed to job satisfaction. Role o f unions, employers, and Government. Expo sure to this area was mainly through formal contact with union officials, m anagement representatives, and Transport College staff. M embers of the group were impressed by the social consciousness imposed on employers by the Government and were aware of the role the national union and federation had in negotiating the extensive social security system. However, the Americans expressed reservations about the unions’ open shop policy and lack of in terest in direct job control and contract enforce ment on the piers. Belonging to a strong union seemed to be a source of job satisfaction for all of the American participants; union m embership did not seem as im portant to the D utch longshoremen. Status o f longshoremen in society. As the San F ran cisco longshoremen saw it, the R otterdam dockworker enjoys considerable status, better wages, and a greater variety of work than factory workers and a sense of being m ore essential to the well being of the economy than m ost other workers. Dockworkers are the m ost im portant segment of R otterdam ’s work force and they take pride in their occupation and derive m ore status from this than do longshoremen in the San Francisco Bay area. Generally, the longshoreman in R otterdam feels his job is a good one with a relatively high level of satisfaction. G reater job security and overall eco nomic security combined with a strong sense of community with the whole of D utch society seems to be im portant. However, the San Francisco long shoreman also feels he has a good job, greater free dom of choice in his work than m ost jobs provide, and considerable job security and independence from the employer because of a strong union. A l though the Americans felt that the D utch dockworkers were well satisfied with their working con ditions, they felt that the same working conditions on the San Francisco w aterfront would not give them [Americans] as m uch satisfaction. Supervision and grievance handling. On the R otter dam docks where the Americans worked, supervi sors seemed to be generally well qualified, in close comm unication with the workers, unobtrusive, and more respectful tow ards employees than is the case in the San Francisco area. On the other hand, D utch dockworkers seem to accept authority more readily and are able to communicate fairly high up the m anagem ent ladder. M ost of the participants indicated they had never met m anagement people in a cooperative relationship in the m anner they ob served in Holland. As for grievance handling, they felt th at the union did not have a strong presence on the piers in R otterdam and that their union did a much better job. Grievances in R otterdam were handled informally with m anagement by bondskontaktm en appointed by the national union, paid from a special employer fund, and not answerable to the local membership. Few D utch workers and union officials who discussed this m atter with the group were happy with the system. Safety regulations and enforcement. The American longshoremen were appalled at the dangerous work practices and lack of enforcement of safety rules 135 Other Publications on Labor ^Management Cooperation By the D ivision of Cooperative Labor-Management P rograms Labor-Management Services A dministration Plant Closings: What Can Be Learned From Best Prac tice. A report on a January 1981 conference sponsored by the U.S. Department of Labor summarizing discussion and describing six exemplary programs of adjustment assistance in the United States and Canada. 58 pp. 1982. #029-011-00007-9. $4.50. Listed below are other publications issued by the Division of Cooperative Labor-Management Programs of the Labor-Management Services Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. The first three may be pur chased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. The last two may be requested directly from the Divi sion of Cooperative Labor-Management Programs, Room N5677, 200 C onstitution Ave., N .W ., Washington, D.C. 20210. (Phone: (202) 523-6098.) Report on the Secretary o f Labor’s Symposium on Cooperative Labor-Management Programs. A report on a June 1982 symposium convened by the Secretary of Labor summarizing the views of more than 40 representatives of business, labor, government, and the third-party community on the current and future status of cooperative labor-management programs. 51 pp. 1982. Resource Guide to Labor-Management Cooperation. Describes 181 in-plant programs and lists industry and area labor-management committees as well as pro ductivity and quality-of-worklife centers. Entries are in dexed to permit identification of programs by region, industry, and union. 198 pp. #029-000-00414-5. $7. The Operation o f Area Labor-Management Commit tees. A comprehensive assessment of areawide commit tees—why they have been formed, how they are struc tured and how they function, and what criteria might be used to evaluate their effectiveness. 288 pp. 1982. Starting Labor-Management Quality o f Work Life Pro grams. Experiences of the Northeast Labor Management Center (Massachusetts) in starting up and assisting a number of quality-of-worklife programs. 21 pp. 1982. #029-000-00415-3. $3.25. The Operation of Area Ubor-Management Committees Report on the Secretary of Labor's Symposium on Cooperative LaborManagement Programs Resource Guide to la b o r Management Cooperation Plant Closings: What Can Be Learned from Best Practice Starting LaborManagement Quality of Work Life Programs ☆ 136 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE :1982 0 -3 8 1 -6 0 8 (4208) MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics Every month, 12 times a year A rticle s and 40 pages reports on o f c u rre n t em p lo ym e n t, la b o r sta tistics prices, wages, p ro d u c tiv ity , jo b safety, and e co n o m ic g ro w th M ail to: S u p e rinte n d e n t o f D ocum ents U.S. G overnm en t P rin tin g O ffice W ashington, D.C. 20402 Developments in industrial relations Please e n te r m y s u b s c rip tio n to the Monthly Labor Review fo r 1 year at $26.00. (F oreign su b scrib e rs add $6.50.) □ R em ittance is enclosed. 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