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98th Co n g ress let',Session R eport SENATE N o . 9 8 -1 5 THE 1983 JOINT ECONOMIC REPORT REPORT OF TH E JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES O N TH E FEBRUARY 1983 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT T O G E TH E R W IT H ADDITIONAL VIEWS March 3 (legislative day, F ebruary 23), 1983.— Ordered to be printed Printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-336 O WASHINGTON : 1983 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE (Created pursuant to sec. 5(a) o f Public Law 304, 79th Cong.) SENATE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ROGER W. JEPSEN, Iowa, Chairman LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana, Vice Chairman GILLIS W. LONG, Louisiana WILLIAM V. ROTH, Jr., Delaware PARREN J. MITCHELL, Maryland JAMES ABDNOR, South Dakota STEVEN D. SYMMS, Idaho AUGUSTUS F. HAWKINS, California MACK MATTINGLY, Georgia DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin JAMES H. SCHEUER, New York ALPONSE M. D’AMATO, New York LLOYD BENTSEN, Texas CHALMERS P. WYLIE, Ohio MARJORIE S. HOLT, Maryland WILLIAM PROXMIRE, Wisconsin EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts DAN LUNGREN, California PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine B ruce R. B artlett, Executive Director J ames K. G albraith , Deputy Director (II) CONTENTS Page COLOt— Chairman’s Introduction......... Vice Chairman’s Introduction Republican View s........................ Democratic V iew s........................................................................................................................ Current Services Budget Estim ates...................................................................................... 49 101 SENATE 98th C o n g r e ss 1st Session R eport No. 98-15 REPORT ON THE FEBRUARY 1983 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT M arch 3 (legislative day, Mr. Jepsen , F ebruary 23), 1983.— Ordered to be printed from the Joint Economic Committee, submitted the following REPORT together with ADDITIONAL VIEWS [Pursuant to sec. 11(b)(3) of Public Law 304 (79th Cong.), as amended] This report is submitted in accordance with the requirem ent o f the Employment Act o f 1946 that the Joint Econom ic Committee file a report each year with the Senate and the House o f Repre sentatives containing its findings and recommendations with re spect to each o f the main recommendations made by the President in the Economic Report. This report is to serve as a guide to the several committees o f Congress dealing with legislation relating to econom ic issues. (l) C H A IR M A N 'S INTRODUCTION R o g e r W . J e p s e n , USS This Report o f the Joint Econom ic Committee is released in an atmosphere o f growing optimism about the economy. For the past two months, the econom ic statistics have pointed in one direction— recovery. More im portantly, the broad and strong advance o f eco nom ic indicators provides evidence that the recovery will be strong er than anticipated. In this Report, we look at Am erica's future and recommend poli cies that w ill provide a long and continuous recovery. Such a recov ery is the only way to perm anently attack our serious unemploy ment problem. Policies that are good for the short run but jeopard ize the recovery must be rejected. The “quick fix” is the w orst o f all possible solutions. Concerning unemployment, Congress w ill soon pass legislation providing assistance to the unemployed. How ever, no governm ent training and em ploym ent program w ill be suc cessful unless there is a recovery. Therefore, we must overcom e the barriers to a durable recovery. We must remember that the most powerful governm ent weapon is to reduce structural unem ploy ment, or unemployment caused by a lack o f labor skills. This Report recommends that the hard-core unemployed be provided em ploym ent and training in the private sector through governm ent incentives to business. First and forem ost, we must attact the large deficits that cloud *our future. This Report is adamant that the deficit must be at tacked prim arily on the spending side and lastly on the tax side. W e believe that entitlem ents programs and defense spending as w ell as all other areas o f the budget must be scrutinized or reduc tions in the rate o f expenditure increase. Tax increases must not be the scapegoat for deficit reduction. The last Adm inistration tried to balance the budget by increasing taxes—in fact, doubling taxes in only four years—and the result was the beginning o f the three years o f no real econom ic growth. Some tax increases may be necessary but only as a last resort; only when we have gotten control o f spending. Inronically, one o f the m ajor causes o f our current deficit has been the welcome, rapid decline in inflation. As inflation has de clined to only about a third o f what it was when Ronald Reagan took office, governm ent has been justly denied the revenues de rived from inflation pushing taxpayers into higher and higher tax brackets. This is not to argue that we should use inflation to bal ance our budget, as I fear some are quietly advocating. If we return again, have excessive m onetary growth, we w ill again have surging inflation. And it must be noted that this higher rate of inflation w ill not cause real econom ic growth to occur, but w ill in fact lead (3) 4 to another recession. Inflation in not our ally; it is our most debili tating enemy. _ The Federal Keserve in the past two years has, at crucial times, severely restricted the growth o f the money supply. I believe that this caused the recession in 1981, and prolonged it in 1982. I hope that the Federal Reserve w ill be m ore accom m odative in the early stages o f this recovery. But the Fed should be warned that efforts to “ print” our way out o f our econom ic problem s w ill not be tolerated. The econom ic slump o f the United States has been matched by econom ic slump around the world. It is unfortunate that many for eign governm ents have sought to protect their econom ies by creat ing barriers to imports which subsidizing their exports. The United States should assure all foreign countries that w ill not allow their barriers against ours and all other products to stand. The world econom y in 1982 was also marked by an international debt crisis. The Administration has moved forcefully to provide funds to the In ternational M onetary Fund to provide insurance that the crisis w ill not lead to worldwide econom ic disruption. I support the Adm inis tration’s IMF proposal. Finally, I represent a state that has a wide range o f agricultural interests. It is not unusual, therefore, that I should attempt to champion the cause of Am erica’s farm ers. But I suggest that anyone—whether they be Republican or Dem ocrat, conservative or liberal, rural or urban dweller—should be horrified at the eco nomic condition o f the Am erican farm er. The Am erican farm er, the most productive worker in the world, has been victim ized by his own success. His ability to cheaply produce mass quantities o f food, and his willingness to share his technical expertise with the less fortunate on this planet, have helped to drive down the prices o f his products and reduce his profits to Depression levels. The problems o f the Am erican farm er did not begin a year or two or five years ago. And, just as im portantly, the econom ic misery o f the Am erican farm er w ill not end with the beginning o f this recovery. But if must not be viewed as a final step. We must begin a wide-ranging debate on how to im prove the agricultural sector o f our econom y. Failure to do so w ill lead to econom ic and human suffering faster than any other failure. That debate must start and it must start now. These are the policy recom m endations that I believe w ill give us a better econom y and stronger society. The econom ic condition o f the econom y is growing stronger and the nation can once again look at the future with confidence. Let us all hope that this recov ery w ill have the chance to provide a better life for all Am ericans. I want to thank the Republican! Members o f this Committee for their hard work in writing this Report. W e Republicans have con ducted our negotiations with vigor but have always maintained our personal honor. I am proud to occupy the chair o f a com m ittee with these honorable men and women as Republican Members. VICE C H A IR M A N 'S INTRODUCTION L e e H. H a m il t o n , M .C. The Democrats' report on the state o f the econom y is notable for two reasons. It faces up to the m ajor issues before Congress, includ ing m onetary policy, jobs, taxes, defense, entitlem ents, and the In ternational M onetary Fund. Also, it is a unified report which, given the diversity o f Democrats on the com m ittee, reflects a grow ing consensus on econom ic policy among Democrats in Congress. W e must have strong and sustained econom ic growth. That is our basic message and our basic goal. For the shorter term, the Federal Reserve should set m onetary policy to achieve low real interest rates this year. W e are not per suaded that the Federal Reserve cannot control interest rates be cause we have seen that the easing o f money since last summer has brought about lower interest rates. Other steps need to be taken to get the econom y growing this year. Because the growth must be based on principles o f fairness, Congress should enact a significant jobs program , provide addition al support to low-incom e people, extend the federal unem ploym ent compensation program, give fiscal assistance to state and local gov ernments, and place a cap on this year's scheduled incom e tax cut. For the longer term, we propose a vigorous deficit-reduction pro gram whose fundamental aim is to keep the econom y growing. Per sonal income tax indexing should be repealed. Inefficient and re gressive tax expenditures should be elim inated. There should be no broad-based tax on consumption. To keep econom ic growth from being choked o ff by excessive spending, increases in the m ilitary budget should be slowed and en titlem ent programs must be reviewed for ways to reduce budget deficits. Both these categories o f federal spending m erit scrutiny. Economic growth can be sustained only if inflation is held in check, if productivity increases, and if the productive capacities o f people are used. R elief from inflation last year was principally due to the reces sion. Placing such a heavy burden on one segment o f the popula tion was unnecessary and unfair. A better way to hold down the wage-price spiral would be to forge a consensus anti-inflation policy based on the cooperation o f business, labor, and government. The federal governm ent should look to boost productivity and open up opportunities for productive work by strengthening job training programs, im proving education at all levels, providing m ore support for civilian research and developm ent, and m oderniz ing public infrastructure. Finally, the federal governm ent must fulfill its international re sponsibilities. This means ending the overvaluation o f the dollar (5 ) 16-336 0 - 8 3 - 2 6 and seeking proper enforcem ent o f trade laws while insisting on th© elim ination o f bsrriors to our exports. The requested increase in the lending authority o f the Interna tional M onetary Fund should be approved. That action should be accom panied by a tightening o f oversight o f foreign lending. W e must com e to understand that econom ic growth depends more than ever before on events taking place beyond our shores. In sum, the Dem ocrats on the com m ittee are united behind a program that is sensible, com prehensive, and workable. It empha sizes econom ic growth. W hat it envisions is realistic and what it asks is fair. REPUBLICAN VIEWS ON THE FEBRUARY 1983 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT (7) CONTENTS Page I. Review and outlook....................................................... >................................................. Recommendation: The present economic recovery will be stronger than the Administration currently forecasts. Economic policy in 1983 should focus on prolonging the recovery. II. Employment policy.......................................................................................................... Recommendation: For the long run, the Congress and the Adminis tration should direct their efforts to a job training program to reduce structural unemployment. These programs should empha size the training of the hard-core unemployed by broad use of the private sector. III. Fiscal policy.......................................................................................................................... Recommendation: Persistent Federal deficits must be reduced. Strict review of Federal expenditures is necessary. W e reject proposals to reduce deficits by raising taxes that could cut short the recovery. IV . Tax policy.............................................................................................................................. Recommendation: No major tax increases should be enacted. The third year of the tax cut and indexation should be preserved. V . Monetary policy................................................................................................................. Recommendation: W e recommend that the Federal Reserve gradually decrease money growth to a range that is consistent with normal long-term GNP growth and low inflation. W e warn against keeping money growth too fast, too long. That would produce another “ca lamity boom.” W ith a lag of about two years, inflation will surge once more, making another recession inevitable. VI. International....................................................................................................................... Recommendation: The United States should step up efforts to in crease exports to foreign markets and encourage action to lim it protectionism around the world. V II. Agriculture ....................................................................................................................... Recommendation: The Administration and the Congress should im mediately consider major changes in supply-control and demand enhancing farm policies and programs. Market discipline can be improved, thereby reducing the budgetary cost of farm private support programs, while at the same time improving the financial picture of American farmers. Additional views......................................................................................................................... (9) 11 14 18 23 28 31 35 39 I. R eview and O utlook Recommendation The present economic recovery will be stronger than the Adminis tration currently forecasts. Economic policy in 1983 should focus on prolonging the recovery. The econom ic recovery has begun. This is a welcome develop ment, but like all recoveries it is surrounded by many questions. Foremost is: W ill this recovery be strong enough to lift the econo my out o f the doldrums it has been in since 1979? There are no more telling statistics concerning our econom ic problems than that the country has had no real econom ic growth since the fourth quarter o f 1979 and that unem ploym ent has been rising for over three years. The greatest threat to this recovery would be to direct future econom ic policy at the past recession. Efforts by the Federal Gov ernment to “ spend” our way to recovery or efforts by the Federal Reserve to “ print” our way to econom ic health after this recovery has already begun w ill only sow the seeds o f our next recession. W e would be com m itting the same errors that have caused this decadelong decline in our econom ic fortunes. Instead o f looking back, eco nomic policy should focus on ways to sustain the present recovery. The present expansion seems to be developing along traditional lines, in that it is being led by recoveries o f the housing and the auto industries. Housing starts in January, 1983 o f 1.7 m illion units (annual rate) were almost double what they were in June 1982 and 36 percent above December. Housing perm its, which pro vide an indication o f future housing activity, increased to an annual level o f 1.5 m illion units in January which is 16 percent above December and almost double the annual rate o f last August. The autom obile industry began a strong surge in late 1982. The seasonally adjusted industrial production index for autos rose 25 percent from Novem ber 1982 to January 1983. Domestic auto sales have also turned around. From December through the first ten days o f February, they have averaged 6.1 m illion, seasonally adjust ed annual rate, com pared to 5.8 m illion for the year 1982 as a whole. Most im portantly, rising auto sales have resulted in “ call backs” o f laid-off workers at some auto plants. The housing and auto expansions are a direct result of falling in terest rates. The prim e interest rate which peaked at 21.5 percent in December 1980, and was as high as 16.5 percent last summer, is presently at 10.5 percent. M ore im portantly, market interest rates have fallen almost as dram atically. The 90-day Treasury bill rate was 13.65 percent a year ago, it is now 8.01 percent. Long-term in terest rates have also fallen. The rate on 30-year Treasury bonds has fallen from over 14 percent last February to under 11 percent this month. (11) 12 Other recent econom ic signs that the recession is over are the 4.5 percent increase in durable orders in January; the 0.9 percent in crease in industrial production in January, the second rise in a row follow ing declines in nine o f the ten previous months; and a 1.5 percent rise in the index o f leading indicators in December, the eighth rise in the last nine months. Perhaps the measures most often used by the public to determine the econom ic health o f the country are inflation and unemploy ment. In fact, President Carter even popularized a term known as the “ m isery index,” which consisted o f the inflation rate plus the unemployment rate. In the case o f inflation, the increase in the Consumer Price Index o f 3.9 percent for 1982 was the smallest in crease in the indicator since 1972. In fact, an actual reduction in the price level itself occurred in a recent month. Other measures o f inflation showed sim ilar rem arkable progress. The increase in the prices for finished goods o f producers was 3.5 percent in 1982, onehalf their rise in 1981 and less than a third o f their rise in 1980. The gross national product im plicit price deflator increased by 6 percent in 1982, compared with 9.4 .percent in 1981. The disastrous unemployment problem in this country shows some signs o f turning around. The civilian unem ploym ent rate in January fell to 10.4 percent from 10.8 percent in December. Though some o f this decline is the result o f an inaccurate seasonal adjustment process, the January figures do show significant im provement in the em ploym ent picture. Initial claim s for unem ploy ment insurance have declined by 200,000 from their peak in early September. The defusion index, w hich measures the percentage o f firms increasing employment, passed the critically significant 50 percent mark last month. The average workweek also increased, signaling that production has started to increase. Employment in creased in the sensitive construction and retail trade sectors and payroll employment increased by 340,000 in January, after season al adjustment. Our econom ic problems cannot be ignored because a recovery has begun. The absence o f econom ic growth over the past three years has significantly worsened unemployment. W hile Congress should enact short-term programs to help the unemployed, these programs should be viewed as tem porary assistance and not as substitutes for productive jobs. Only if this recovery is long and robust w ill a real solution to unemployment be found. For the present recovery, the Adm inistration forecasts real GNP growth in 1983 o f 3.1 percent (4th quarter over 4th quarter). Com pared to most private forecasters, this is a very pessimistic outlook. Blue Chip Indicators, which surveys 45 blue chip companies for their economic forecasts, puts the growth rate for 1983 at approxi m ately 4.5 percent. A ll but two o f the 45 econom ic forecasts have m ore optim istic estimates for growth in 1983 than the Adm inistra tion. More im portantly, as signs o f the recovery becom e increasing ly clear, most private forecasters have changed their estimates to show even faster real econom ic growth in 1983. The Adm inistration is not unmoved by such “ outside” advice. Martin Feldstein, the Chairman o f the Council o f Economic Advis ers, testified before the Joint Econom ic Committee that he would not be surprised if real econom ic growth in 1983 reached 5 percent. 13 The reason for the discrepancy between Dr. Feldstein’s “ official” forecast and his “ unofficial” forecast was that the official forecast was made early in January while his testim ony was given in Feb ruary. No one can be sure o f the precise date that recovery began. In early January it was not as clear as it is now that the bottom o f the business cycle was in December. The earlier the recovery begins, the more econom ic growth when com paring 1983 to 1982. Virtually all forecasters are projecting a recovery far stronger than anticipated just a few months ago. The Republican Members o f the Joint Econom ic Committee join those who believe that the econom y will perform better in 1983 and 1984 than the Adm inistration currently forecasts. We hope to focus attention on the need to make our econom ic perform ance better in 1985, 1986 and beyond. Consequently, we must not take any steps that w ill jeopardize the future o f this recovery. We advise against resorting to unnecessary tax increases in an effort to stim ulate eco nom ic growth. In this regard, we believe that the third year tax cut and indexation should be preserved. In setting forth our econom ic policy agenda, we should remember that our econom ic difficulties did not begin, and w ill not end, with the recent recession. We must set out sights on m aking the future better, rather than trying to correct the past. To meet our chal lenges we offer the following recommendations and report. 16-336 O 83 3 II. E mploym ent P olicy Recommendation For the long run, the Congress and the Administration should direct their efforts to designing a job training program to reduce structural unemployment These programs should emphasize the training o f the hard-core unemployed by broad use o f the private sector. Progress against inflation in recent years has had a harsh, and probably unavoidable im pact on the N ation’s working population. The unemployment rate rose persistently month by month over the past several years as the N ation’s econom y receded. By December o f 1982, the size o f the unemployed labor pool swelled to 12 m illion, or 10.8 percent o f the N ation’s labor force. The December unemployment rate was the highest level since the Great Depression o f the 1930’s, but it also signalled a turning point in the economy. The unemployment rate droped to 10.2 per cent by January 1983. The Republican Members believe that this drop although small, provides a strong signal that the econom y has turned the corner and is on the rebound. Though the unem ploy ment rate may move up slightly from the 10.2 percent in com ing months. Most experts believe that it w ill not again reach its De cem ber high. The sharp rise in January factory hours and the broad-based advance in the Bureau o f Labor Statistics diffusion index o f employment change are other im portant labor m arket in dicators that signal an upturn in labor markets. The drop in unem ploym ent benefit claims for newly unem ployed workers in Febru ary provides additional collaborating evidence. The impact o f unemployment varies unevenly among demo graphic groups. Blacks experienced a 19.0 percent unem ploym ent rate in January 1983 in comparison with a 9.1 percent for their white counterparts. The unemployment rate for women who main tain fam ilies was 13.2 percent. Age also makes a difference. Over 22 percent o f workers in the 16 to 19 age group were unemployed, in com parison with an unemployment rate o f 9.6 percent for men and 9.0 percent for women over age 20. The near doubling o f the unem ploym ent rate for men over age 20 since 1977 reflects im por tant structural changes in the N ation’s econom y. Unem ploym ent for the first tim e is reaching deeply into the ranks o f the blue collar workers in the basic goods industries such as autom obiles, steel and rubber. Regional variations in labor market impacts are also prevalent. States in the m anufacturing belt such as M ichigan, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, W isconsin, and Pennsylvania all had unemployment rates w ell above the national average. Sunbelt and W estern states such as South Carolina, Alabama, California, Mississippi, W ashington, Nevada, and Oregon, also had unemployment rates w ell above the (1 4 ) 15 national average. On the positive side, 31 states had unemployment rates below the national average in 1982. The states with the lowest unemployment rates included Texas, Connecticut, Kansas, Massachusetts, Verm ont, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Hawaii. We believe that the N ation's em ploym ent outlook is encouraging and w ill be reflected in a sizable reduction in the N ation's unem ployment rate as the recovery gains additional momentum. The de cline in the unemployment rate typically follows an upturn in GNP by two or three quarters (Table 1). Assuming the first quarter o f 1983 marks the turning point in the recovery, which we believe it does, it w ill be mid- to late 1983 before we see a significant de cline in the unemployment rate. Over the next few months, the un employment rate may edge up slightly as a result o f statistical aberations, but the trend should be clearly downward. TABLE ll.l.— THE LAG BETWEEN THE UPTURN IN THE BUSINESS CYCLE AND THE DECLINE IN UNEMPLOYMENT OVER THE LAST FOUR BUSINESS CYCLES Quarter of upturn in GNP 61-11... 70-111 75-11... 80—IV.. Quarter of downturn in unemployment 61—IV 72-1.. 76-1.. 81-111 Lag between GNP and unemployment movement 2 7 3 3 1 Beginning with second quarter 1970, GNP turned upward for two quarters, downward in fourth quarter 1970 and then steadily upward until first quarter 1974. If the cycle upturn is dated from first quarter 1971 the lag in the turn of the unemployment rate is four quarters, giving an average for the four cycles of three quarters. The rate o f decline in the unem ploym ent rate beyond 1983 w ill depend upon the speed o f the recovery. The modest recovery fore seen by the Reagan Adm inistration w ill result in a projected unem ployment rate o f 8.9 percent in 1985 and 6.5 percent in 1988. The more robust recovery that we foresee w ill create jobs at a much faster pace. A drop in the unem ploym ent rate to approxim ately 8 percent by 1985 is clearly possible. The Republican Members firm ly believe that econom ic recovery and an expansion in the N ation's productive capacity is the best jobs policy for the unemployed in the long run. As Richard Lesher, President o f the United States Chamber o f Commerce, recently put it, “ Last month alone, the econom ic recovery increased jobs by 339,000. How many billions of tax dollars would it take to legislate jobs at that rate? And at what cost to the economy? However, because o f the shifts in the structure o f the nation's economy, many workers find that their labor skills are no longer significantly demanded in the labor market. These structurally un employed workers w ill not find satisfactory employment in the near future, even if the recovery is strong. To aid their retraining and employment prospects, Congress and the Adm inistration should establish programs that hasten their return as a productive member o f the labor force. To understand why Federal efforts should aim at retraining, the causes o f unem ploym ent must be put into clear focus. Economists have identified three sources o f unemployment: cyclical, frictional and structural. Cyclical unemployment, which accounts for about one-third o f the current unemployment, occurs when the econom y 16 is in a slump and vanishes when the econom y rebounds. The best employment policy for workers affected by cyclical unemployment is an econom ic recovery. Frictional unemployment occurs as a result o f the approxim ately four m illion workers who change jobs or enter and leave the labor m arket each month. These workers are voluntarily unemployed in that they willingly forgo current employment to search for better paying, and/or m ore challenging jobs. Econom ic recovery cannot reduce frictional unemployment, and may even increase it as more workers attempt to use the mo bility route to upgrade their em ploym ent status. The third category, the structurally unemployed category, con sists o f individuals who are w illing to work at the prevailing wage but they lack the necessary skills and experience to find a job. Women, youth, and m inorities make up a disproportionately large share o f the structurally unemployed, but it also includes many blue collar workers who w ill not be reem ployed as the econom y re covers because their form er jobs have been perm anently elim inat ed. These displaced workers are entering the ranks o f the structur ally unemployed at a much higher rate than in the past. They are a “ fallout* from shifts in the N ation's industrial structure to a more service and high tech orientation. The best alternative for workers in the structurally unemployed class is to acquire the nec essary skills to compete for jobs in new industries. Unfortunately, these workers may not be able to acquire new skills easily on their own. It is in this regard that governm ent efforts can have their greatest employment impact. Some suggest that minimum wage laws provide a barrier for the structurally unemployed youth who would work at lower wages although the jobs are unavailable be cause employers w ill not hire youth at the minimum wage rate. For other workers, including the displaced workers, job training geared to the expanding service and high tech sectors provides a promising alternative to upgrade econom ic status and find alterna tive employment. Job creation efforts, both in the public and private sector, must take into account the special em ploym ent o f women. The different fam ily responsibilities and em ploym ent needs o f women should be recognized, and provisions for the developm ent o f alternative work schedules should be encouraged. Retraining programs should in clude an effort to prom ote em ploym ent o f women in non-traditional occupations. Strong efforts should be made to address wage and job discrim i nation toward women. The econom ic recovery cannot be expected to restore full em ploy ment without creating excessive inflationary pressures unless the Nation's productive capacity is expanded. The dynamics o f job cre ation explain why. During recovery, em ploym ent expands as idle capacity is diminished, and furloughed workers are reemployed. However, as stated, many form er employees in the basic goods in dustries and others w ill find their old jobs elim inated. New jobs must be created for the displaced workers, the new entrants into the labor m arket and those structurally unemployed workers who lower their reservation wage or upgrade their skills. The new jobs w ill occur in the private sector as the N ation's productive capacity expands, but for productive capacity to expand, real investment in 17 existing businesses and in new business starts must increase. The Republican Members maintain that higher rates o f real investment and business form ation are critical to a public policy to restore full employment in the labor market without rekindling inflationary pressures. Job training assistance to promote the upward m obility o f the semi-skilled and unskilled workers, the structurally unemployed, and the econom ically disadvantaged workers has much merit. The em ergence o f the inform ation economy offers a bright future for Am erica, but the transition is painful and filled with much uncer tainty and a sense o f hopelessness for m illions o f Am ericans. Indus tries like computers, research, semiconductors, telecom m unica tions, robotics, biotechnology, chemicals, and aerospace w ill create m illions o f new jobs over the com ing decades. Many o f the new jobs w ill be within the high tech-oriented sectors but a larger number w ill be in the traditional sectors o f the economy. Many businesses in the finance, insurance, m anufacturing, medical, services, whole sale and retail, and other industries are regaining a com petitive edge in the world marketplace by adopting the new advanced proc ess technologies. The new wave o f technologies is creating tem po rary labor market distortions but at the same tim e it is a major source o f new job growth for the economy. The labor market im plications o f the computer-based inform a tion age that we are just entering are not fully understood, but it is clear that the nature o f work and the workplace is changing. A public policy to retrain displaced workers and facilitate the upward m obility o f other workers caught in dead-end jobs can do much to facilitate labor market adjustments and m itigate the adverse im pacts associated with econom ic change. III. F iscal P olicy Recommendation Persistent Federal deficits must be reduced. Strict review o f Feder al expenditures is necessary. We reject proposals to reduce deficits by raising taxes that could cut short the recovery. Prospects o f $200 billion-plus Federal deficits, representing 5 to 6 percent o f GNP over the next few years, are taking the U.S. econo my into uncharted waters. Most financial analysts, the Congress, and the Adm inistration are frightened by the risks such unprec edented deficits pose—crowding out in private credit markets, in flation, and high interest rates. We share the public concern over huge deficits. We recognize the im portance o f deficit reduction, but we caution against making deficit reduction the sole aim o f eco nom ic policy. The first goal o f policy must be sustaining non-inflationary econom ic growth. We believe that such growth w ill, in large part, help deal with the deficit problem. In the first place, budget projections are, at best, tenuous, and m ajor policy decisions based on outyear projections must be made cautiously. Deficits are among the most difficult o f all econom ic measures to forecast. They are dependent on and are a com posite of, numerous econom ic and political variables: inflation, unemploy ment, interest rates, GNP, governm ent spending patterns and pro cedures, acts, o f nature and a host o f other things which them selves are hard to predict. Thus, outyear budget estimates should be recognized for their inherent weaknesses. The follow ing table shows the projected budget deficit (or sur plus) in the Budget Messages o f the Presidents for the years indi cated, and the actual deficit (or surplus) for those years: TABLE lll.l.— PROJECTING THE DEFICIT [Administration budget messages for years indicated versus actual budget results; in billions of dollars] Projected deficit ( - ) or surplus (+ ) Year 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 -9 1 .5 -4 5 .0 - 1 5 .8 -2 9 .0 - 6 0 .6 -5 7 .7 - 4 3 .0 - 5 1 .9 -9 .4 - 1 2 .7 -3 8 .8 11.6 - + 1.3 + 5 .8 - (1 8 ) 8.0 Actual deficit ( - ) or surplus (+ ) — 1 207.7 - 110.6 - 5 7 .9 - 5 9 .6 - 2 7 .7 - 4 8 .8 - 4 4 .9 - 6 6 .4 -4 5 .2 -4 .7 - 1 4 .8 - 2 3 .4 - 2 3 .0 - 2.8 + 3 .2 19 TABLE lll.l.— PROJECTING THE DEFICIT— Continued [Administration budget messages for years indicated versus actual budget results; in billions of dollars] Year Projected deficit ( - ) or surplus 1968....................................................................................................... 1967....................................................................................................... 1966....................................................................................................... 1965....................................................................................................... 1964.................................................................................................................. (+) -2 .1 -1 .8 - 5 .3 -4 .9 - 1 1 .9 Actual deficit ( - ) or surplus (+) -2 5 .2 - 8 .7 -3 .8 - 1 .6 - 5 .9 1 1 Estimate. Source.- Congressional Quarterly and Office of Management and Budget. Recent deficit estimates have been far o ff the mark on the low side. We believe that current estimates o f future deficits may be as far o ff on the high side. Our basic message is that deficits should not drive econom ic policy, but econom ic policy should drive out the deficits. Reasoned econom ic policy aimed at solid long-run econom ic growth should be the aim, with deficit reduction an im portant object o f that policy, but not its only object. We are very concerned about the prospect o f mammoth deficits. We believe they should be reduced and ultim ately eliminated by persistent expenditure control and by policies to prom ote econom ic growth. We reject proposals for m ajor tax increases since, as in the past, this would accelerate growth in governm ent and reduce pri vate econom ic growth. The upward tilt in Federal deficits has been many years in the making, growing out o f demand-oriented econom ic policy, in which the government has been called on to solve one problem after an other by creating new programs or by providing new injections of funds into existing programs. Elim ination o f such deficits w ill take many years. To try to do it all at once could be a jolt to the eco nomic system. The im portant signal to the financial markets is that we are pointed in the right direction and the policies are in place or being adopted to reduce the deficits in 1984 and after wards. The actual direction is more im portant than the speed at which deficits are reduced. In approaching spending reductions we must discard the notion o f “ uncontrollable'' budget items. As generally defined, “ uncontrollables” include open-ended programs such as Social Security and railroad retirem ent, Federal employees retirem ent and insurance, unemployment assistance, medical care, assistance to students, food and nutrition assistance, and public assistance; net interest; gener al revenue sharing and farm price supports (CCC). These relatively uncontrollable items in the budget presently account for nearly 60 percent o f the Federal budget. If outlays from prior-year contracts and obligations are included, the ratio o f relatively uncontrollable outlays rises to over 75 percent. We believe the concept o f uncontrollable budget items should be abolished, except in the case o f interest on the debt. Even interest costs can be controlled to a modest degree by sound policies to reduce interest rates. The entire budget deserves continual Con gressional examination. 20 Since it would require a 100 percent elim ination o f the relatively controllable budget items (making up 25 percent o f the budget) to elim inate the budget deficits (e.g. $204 billion in “ controllable” na tional defense and civilian expenditures out o f total budget expend itures o f $848 billion in Fiscal Year 1984), it is clear we w ill have to turn to the big ticket items to accom plish the task—entitlements. The Social Security program is a pay-as-you-go program, which affects the overall Federal budget. To think o f Social Security as a trust fund operation, separate and apart from the overall Federal budget, really has no meaning. Every Social Security tax dollar is a Federal budget revenue dollar, and every Social Security benefit payment is a Federal budget outlay; it involves substantial sums o f revenues and outlays and is getting bigger all the tim e. Even if we still had a large Social Security Trust Fund surplus, which we do not, the m oney com ing in is not as great as the m oney going out and the im pact on the budget and on the econom y is very real and very direct. The rate o f rise in Social Security benefits should be reviewed. We suggest the review o f long-term payments and do not propose cuts in benefits. The National Commission on Social Security Reform (NCSSR) has reported out a package o f proposal to cope with the rising gap in Social Security outlays and revenues. The entire package deserves fair consideration by the Congress. Several of the Commission recommendations would have major impacts on the trust funds, although impacts on the Federal budget deficits would be considerably less than on the trust funds, because about one-third o f the $168 billion package represents either transfers from the general fund or amounts that would be offset by increases in spending for other Federal programs or by reduced tax revenues. The NCSSR proposed that OASDI benefits be reduced by enact ment o f a permanent six-month delay in the annual cost-of-living adjustment. Thus the annual (COLA) payable in June (received in July) would be paid in December instead (received in January). The Congressional Budget O ffice estimates this would reduce OASDI payments by $24.1 billion over fiscal years 1983-1988, although this would be offset by $4.2 billion in payments to Supplemental Secu rity Income recipients (welfare recipients) who would be allowed to retain $30 more in total benefits each month to offset the im pact o f the Social Security COLA delay. The National Commission also recommended that, beginning in 1988, COLA adjustments be based on the lower o f the CPI increase or the increase in wages, if the fund ratio (fund balance as a per centage o f the fund outgo) is less than 20 percent. No estimates o f the cost savings have been made, but suffice it to say the savings would be substantial. The shift to the low er o f wage indexing or the CPI indexing, ef fective in 1984, m ight be a good way to slow Social Security outlays without serious hardship to recipients. The reason why Social Secu rity outlays have grown faster than revenues in the recent past is that prices have risen faster than wages and salaries since 1979 and Social Security benefits are adjusted by the CPI, while payroll tax revenues increase with the growth o f the wage base. If benefit COLA’s were put on a wage base adjustment, recipients would still receive increased benefits, although at a lesser rate, but the overall 21 impact on the trust funds and the Federal budget would be very beneficial. W ith regard to defense spending, we must remember that the U.S. defense posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union has deteriorated over the past decade. No one seriously questions that. Also, nation al defense outlays as percent o f GNP declined from 8.1 percent o f GNP in 1970 to 5.3 percent in 1980. Not that any particular ratio is sacrosanct, but coupled with the continued Soviet build-up, these declining ratios mean that the U.S. m ilitary spending must rise rel ative to the GNP and relative to the total budget. However, the rise need not be as rapid as the Adm inistration originally proposed. There is room for a scale-back or stretch-out in military spending increases. From a total o f $215 billion in 1983, m ilitary spending w ill rise to $386 billion in 1988, and the ratio to total budget out lays w ill rise from 26.7 percent in 1983 to 34.2 percent in 1988. We make no specific recommendations regarding how or where to reduce defense spending, but candidates for curtailm ent would in clude lim iting growth in operations and maintenance accounts, lim iting growth in pay and benefits, imposing modest cuts in cur rent force structure or build-up plans, and scaling back real growth in procurem ent accounts, by cancelling programs experiencing de velopm ent problems or by redirecting prelim inary developm ent ef forts to emphasize less expensive longer-term systems. Lastly, we would like to reemphasize the point that econom ic growth is a potent reducer of deficits. Thus fiscal policy should be geared to private econom ic growth. This means tax incentives to promote savings and no tax increases. The reason Japan can live with deficit ratios o f 5 percent o f GNP is its very high savings ratio—20 percent personal savings ratio compared to our 6 percent. These high savings ratios enable Japan to finance private credit de mands and still fund its deficit without putting upward pressures on inflation and interest rates. The fram ework for the appropriate econom ic program to pro mote econom ic growth is in place. The Adm inistration is correct in pursuing policies o f reduced tax burdens, reduced spending, and re duced regulatory burdens. W hile the recession and high interest rates have been thorns impeding the short-run success o f that pro gram, its potential for long-run econom ic growth is sound. To illustrate the power o f econom ic growth in deficit reduction, the follow ing table illustrates the dollar im pact o f a 1 percentage point increase in the rate o f growth o f real GNP on Federal rev enues, outlays, and the deficit for Fiscal Years 1983 to 1987. TABLE 111.2.— EFFECT ON FEDERAL BUDGET PROJECTIONS OF CHANGES IN THE RATE OF GROWTH IN REAL GNP [By fiscal year; in billions of dollars] Effect of 1 percentage point increase in real GNP (Beginning January 1983) Change in revenues.................................................................................. Change in outlays.................................................................................... Change in deficit....................................................................................... Note.— Totals may not add due to rounding. Source: Congressional Budget Office. 16-336 0 - 8 3 - 4 1983 +9 -2 -1 0 1984 + 23 -5 -2 8 1985 + 35 -1 1 -4 6 1986 +45 -1 7 -6 2 1987 + 60 -2 4 -8 3 22 If real GNP could grow 1 percentage point faster than projected over the next five years, the 1987 deficit would be $83 billion less. Though the relationships are not exactly linear, a 2 percentage point increase in real GNP would result in roughly a $166 billion reduction in the 1987 deficit. IV. T a x Policy Recommendation No major tax increases should be enacted. The third year o f the tax cut and indexation should be preserved. By the beginning o f the 1980’s it becam e increasingly apparent that many years o f legislated and unlegislated tax increases had condemned the econom y to low growth, high unemployment, and declining standards o f living. Incentives for work, investment, and saving had been seriously eroded. Am erican industry, over-taxed and starved o f capital, was stagnating and losing its ability to com pete in the world marketplace. Between 1976 and 1981, Federal revenues leapt from $298 billion to $599 billion, an increase o f $300 billion or about 100 percent. As a percentage o f GNP, Federal tax revenues increased from 18.2 percent to 20.9 percent, the highest level since 1944. Marginal and average individual incom e tax rates had risen substantially. The weighted average o f marginal rates o f all tax returns jum ped from 27.8 percent in 1976 to 32.2 percent in 1981, mostly due to inflation-induced bracket creep. Fueled by the enormous growth o f Federal taxes, Federal spending expanded at an even faster rate. Popular resentment against runaway taxing and spending forced a major change in governm ent fiscal policy. The Reagan Adminis tration was given a mandate to reduce the heavy and growing tax burden in the United States. W ith the enactm ent o f the Economic Recovery Tax Act o f 1981 (ERTA), individual m arginal tax rates were cut 23 percent across the board, a reduction m ostly preserved by indexing o f the tax brackets starting in 1985. Corporate depreci ation schedules were liberalized to allow accelerated cost recovery for tax purposes. Though the reduction o f individual taxes is modest even when fully in place, due to bracket creep and higher Social Security taxes, ERTA does stem the rising tide o f revenue increases. Federal revenues as a percent o f GNP is projected to de cline to 18.3 percent by Fiscal Year 1988, still higher than they were in 1976. Furthermore, the indexing provision makes the tax reduction permanent and not m erely temporary. This preservation o f the tax cuts is one o f the m ajor reasons in dexing is im portant to the future econom ic growth o f this country. Consequently, current proposals to increase the tax burden o f the Am erican people by repealing indexing could not be more illconsidered. The central purpose o f tax indexing is to lim it excessive and disproportionate growth in tax receipts due to inflation. Be cause o f the progressive structure o f the tax code, a 10 percent rate o f price inflation is estimated to increase tax revenues by about 17 percent. Government profits from inflation through bracket creep, taxation o f phantom profits to inflation. Because o f the progressive structure o f the tax code, a 10 percent rate o f price inflation is esti- (2 3 ) 24 mated to increase tax revenues by about 17 percent. Government profits from inflation through bracket creep, taxation o f phantom profits and capital, gains, and decline o f the real value o f its debt. An unindexed tax code is undoubtedly one o f the most convenient financing mechanisms available to the Federal Government. The only problem is that it’s too convenient. Autom atic tax increases provide plently o f funds for desired spending expansion without the need for legislated tax increases. The Government can always find ways to spend all the revenue it collects, and then some. By lim it ing unlegislated tax hikes, indexing promotes fiscal responsibility and improves Congressional decision-making. M oreover, we believe, since m ajor spending programs have been indexed to the inflation rate for many years, it is an essential act o f fairness to treat those who pay for governm ent spending as well as we treat those who receive such spending. Indexing adjusts individual tax brackets, zero bracket amounts, and personal exem ption for infation starting in 1985. However, little-known by the public is that the repeal o f indexing would harm the poor and middle-income groups m ore than others. W ith out indexing, inflation would continue to push taxpayers into higher and higher brackets. This well-known phenomenon, “ brack et creep,” increases both the m arginal and average tax rates o f almost all taxpayers. But lower- and middle-income taxpayers are especially victim ized by “ taxflation.” The fixed zero bracket amount and personal exem ption come to a larger proportion o f their gross incom e, and the tax brackets at the lower and middle levels are much m ore closely spaced than those near the top. The repeal o f indexing would amount to an enormous regressive tax in crease, falling heaviest on the working poor and middle class. This effect o f inflation on tax liability can be shown by a few simple comparisons. A fam ily o f four earning $15,000 in 1982 with annual cost o f living adjustments would lose almost all o f the tax benefits provided by the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax A ct (ERTA) through bracket creep alone (using 1980 as a starting point). This fam ily would receive $248 in tax relief from the rate reductions in 1983, but $214, or 86 percent would be wiped out by inflationinduced bracket creep. This leaves a meagre $34 in net tax reduc tion. In 1984, $271 o f $334 tax cut, or 81 percent, would be con sumed by bracket creep, allowing the taxpayer only $63 o f his tax break under ERTA. Jum ping ahead to 1987, through bracket creep this fam ily would lose $489, or 86 percent o f $567 from ERTA. In the follow ing year, $566 (87 percent) o f his $647 tax cut would be erased by inflation. A repeal o f indexing would allow this process to continue un checked after 1985. This would amount to a sizable tax increase for this taxpayer. W ithout indexing in place in 1985, this fam ily would pay $295 m ore in Federal incom e taxes in 1988, an increase o f about 22 percent in their taxes. Another fam ily o f four, starting with $25,000 in 1982, does a little better. In 1983 they lose $423, or 69 percent, out o f their $609 tax cut to bracket creep, leaving them with the sum o f $186. In 1984, $543 (67 percent) out o f $808 slips away, leaving them with $265 o f their tax relief. By 1987, $944 o f their $1313, 76 percent, would be taken by inflation, leaving a balance o f $369. In 1988 25 bracket creep robs them o f $1167, 78 percent, of $1501 in tax bene fits. If indexing were repealed, in 1988 this taxpayer would pay about $624 more than he would under current law, a tax increase o f about 20 percent. A fam ily o f four earning $40,000 in 1982 is also pinched by brack et creep. In 1983, this taxpayer would lose $1008 (76 percent) o f his $1318 tax cut, in 1984, $1288 (74 percent) o f $1739, in 1987, $2415 (81 percent) o f $2961, and in 1988, $2848 (83 percent) of $6927. If indexing were repealed, in 1988 he would pay about $1560 more than under current law, a tax increase o f about 22.5 percent. Another way o f looking at indexing would take into account the distribution o f taxable income and the relative impact o f indexing on each incom e class. According to the Joint Committee on Tax ation, indexing would benefit the lower income taxpayers the most. The percentage o f tax relief accruing to the various income classes would be greatest at the lowest class, and decline steadily as income rises. According to a Joint Committee on Taxation study, 1981 expanded revenue contributions under the current inflation rate by the various income classes would, in percentage terms, be 16 times greater at the bottom than at the top.1 (See table IV. 1.) TABLE IV .l— TAX INCREASES FROM INFLATION: LESS 1 AGGREGATE TOTAL AND PERCENT OF INCOME TAX LIABILITY UNDER PRESENT LAW BY INCOME CLASS (1981 INCOME LEVEL) Expanded income (thousands) gregate total (millions) Percent of income tax liability Below $ 5 ..................................................................................................................................... $5 to $10.................................................................................................................................... $10 to $15................................................................................................................................. $15 to $20................................................................................................................................. $20 to $30 ................................................................................................................................. $40 to $50 .............................................................................................................................. $50 to $100 ............................................................................................................................ $100 to $ 2 0 0 .......................................................................................................................... $200 and over............................................................................................................................ $168 1,232 1,365 1,570 3,703 5,268 2,781 771 253 (2 ) 19.3 8.4 6.8 6.3 6.1 5.4 3.2 1.2 Total.............................................................................................................................. $17,110 6.0 1 Revenue gain from not adjusting personal exemption, earned income credit, zero bracket amount, and rate brackets by 9.14 percent. 2 Individual income tax liability is negative for this group because earned income credits exceed tax. In summary, an analysis o f the relative impact o f bracket creep on different incom e classes shows clearly that lower- and middleincome taxpayers would be hit very hard by repeal o f indexing. Bracket creep takes a larger bite out o f lower incomes than higher incomes. Furthermore, the very wealthy do not benefit much from indexing for the simple reason that additions to their incom e are already taxed at the top rate which is now fixed at 50 percent. These wealthy taxpayers are the only ones who do not gain greatly from indexing. Indexation is a reform which is em inently progres sive in every sense o f the word. W hether they realize it or not, ad vocates o f indexing repeal are prom oting a huge tax increase on ev eryone except the rich. 1 Background and Issues Relating to Individual Income Tax Reductions, Joint Committee on Taxation, April 1981, p. 12. 26 Support for the repeal o f indexing is largely m otivated by fears about large projected deficits. Although this is o f serious concern, in this respect the repeal o f indexing would be com pletely self-de feating. First o f all, average higher m arginal tax rates would impose an additional drag on saving, investment, econom ic growth, and employment. By shrinking the pool o f savings available, higher marginal tax rates (from bracket creep), via repeal o f indexing, would make financing the deficit m ore difficult, not less. In addi tion, m ore tax resources w ill stimulate an increased rate o f govern ment spending which, if past experience is any guide, might well exceed projected revenue growth and increase the combined onbudget and off-budget deficit. This is what happened at the end o f the last decade with the $300 billion revenue increase between 1976 and 1981. Another political danger o f an unindexed tax code is the encourgement o f inflationary biases in governm ent. The tem ptation to in flate our way out o f fiscal problems w ill likely becom e very strong in the years ahead. Tax indexation is a vital reform which lessens inflationary political pressures on the m onetary authorities. We fear that the prim ary objective o f repeal o f tax indexing is to provide a way to finance accelerated Federal spending. By repeal ing indexing, Congress could avoid m aking the hard choices neces sary to restrain runaway Federal spending. This political reality is why we oppose any tam pering with indexation, the third year o f the tax cut, or enactment o f any other m ajor incom e tax increases. Despite much discussion linking widening deficits with “ exces sive” revenue reductions, a quick look at the facts should dispel this myth. In Fiscal Year 1983, projected baseline revenues are $606 billion, and outlays $800 billion, leaving a deficit o f $194 bil lion. Revenues are projected to increase $47 billion between Fiscal Year 1983 and Fiscal Year 1984, and then rise at least $50 billion each fiscal year after that. Nonetheless, deficits are projected to widen to $267 billion by 1988. W ith tax revenues rising over $50 billion annually after Fiscal Year 1984, it is impossible that they be the source o f widening deficits—the answer must be that Federal spending is outpacing the rise in revenues through 1988. Table IV.2 shows that spending is increasing about $70 billion annually through Fiscal Year 1988. The cum ulative effect o f this rapid ex pansion o f outlays is creating the problem. TABLE IV.2.— BASELINE PROJECTIONS BY FISCAL YEAR pn bHfions of dollars] Projections 1983 base 1984 Baseline revenues................................... ................................ Baseline outlays...................................... ................................ Baseline deficit........................................ ................................ 606 800 194 653 850 197 1985 715 929 214 1986 768 999 231 1987 822 1,072 250 1988 878 1,145 267 In conclusion, we feel com pelled to restate the fact that we cannot tax ourselves into prosperity. Im posing heavier tax burdens on our people w ill not help them or our econom y. It’s tim e to hold 27 the line on major tax initiatives. The Congress should not repeal the third year of the tax cut and indexation. V. M onetary Policy Recommendation We recommend that the Federal Reserve gradually decrease money growth to a range that is both consistant with normal long term real GNP growth and low inflation. We warn against keeping money growth too fast, too long. That would produce another “ca lamity boom.99 With a lag o f about two years, inflation will surge once more, making another recession inevitable. From 1954 to 1964, measuring year over year, annual money growth (M l) averaged 1.9 percent. In the same period, real GNP growth averaged 3.6 percent a year, inflation (using the GNP defla tor) averaged 2.0 percent a year, unemployment averaged 5.4 per cent, and the Treasury bill rate averaged 2.8 percent and never ex ceeded 5.0 percent. In the next decade, increased Federal Govern ment spending to finance the Vietnam War and a proliferation o f so-called anti-poverty programs here at home placed continuing upward pressure on interest rates. The Federal Reserve, prompted first by President Johnson and later by President Nixon, tried to keep interest rates down by perm itting the growth o f M l to accel erate to 5.6 percent a year in the 1965 to 1974 period. As a result, despite “jaw boning” by President Johnson and controls under President Nixon, inflation increased and interest rates also rose. Inflation averaged 4.8 percent a year and the Treasury bill rate av eraged 5.5 percent in the 1965 to 1974 period. One o f the lessons o f the 1965 to 1974 period is that, if the Feder al Reserve promotes rapid money growth, neither tax increases nor balancing the budget w ill keep inflation in check and interest rates down. That lesson was brought into clear view by the results o f President Johnson’s ill-conceived plan to “ tighten” fiscal policy and “ loosen” monetary policy in 1968. Acting on his proposal, in June 1968, Congress imposed surtaxes on personal and corporate incom e taxes, effective in January and April 1968, respectively, and the Federal Reserve perm itted fast M l growth by targetting interest rates, M l increased by 7.0 percent in 1968. Consequently, inflation jumped, interest rates soared, our international trade balance dete riorated, and by the fall o f 1969 the econom y was in a recession. Beginning in mid-1974 and continuing to the end o f 1976, M l growth was greatly moderated. The initial effect o f slowing money growth was to exacerbate the 1974 to 1975 recession. But, in time, our econom ic perform ance greatly improved. Measured year over year, inflation dropped to 5.2 percent in 1976, from 8.7 percent in 1974 and 9.2 percent in 1975. The Treasury bill rate fell to 4.4 per cent in December 1976 from the August 1974 high o f 8.7 percent. Real GNP growth turned up strongly in the year over year, infla tion dropped to 5.2 percent in 1976, from 8.7 percent in 1974 and 9.2 percent in 1975. The Treasury bill rate fell to 4.4 percent in De- (2 8 ) 29 cember 1976 from the August 1974 high o f 8.7 percent. Real GNP growth turned up strongly in the second half o f 1975. It was 5.4 percent in 1976 versus 1975 as a whole, and unemployment fell from 8.9 percent in May 1975 to 7.4 percent in January 1977. Unfortunately, beginning in 1977, the Federal Reserve again per mitted rapid M l growth. It averagd 7.5 percent a year in the 1977 to 1980 period. In association, inflation and interest rates rose again. Inflation averaged 7.7 percent a year in the 1977 to 1980 period and reached 9.0 percent in 1980. The Treasury bill rate in creased from 4.4 percent in December 1976, to 6.1 percent in De cember 1977, to 9.2 percent in Decmber 1978, to 12.1 percent in De cember 1979, and to 15.7 percent in December 1980. No real sector gains resulted from stepping up M l growth either in the 1977 to 1980 period or in the 1965 to 1974 period. In the 1965 to 1974 period, year-over-year real GNP growth was 2.9 percent versus 3.6 percent in the 1954 to 1964 period, and unemployment averaged 7.0 percent, versus 5.4 percent in the 1954 to 1964 period. In the 1977 to 1980 period, real GNP growth averaged 3.0 percent a year and unemployment averaged 6.5 percent. Moreover, in 1980, real growth actually declined 0.4 percent and unemployment aver aged 7.2 percent. The lesson is clear. W e cannot inflate our way, that is paper or print our way, to real prosperity and full employment. The record warns against money growth which is too fast, too long. President Reagan inherited a m onetary policy problem when he came into office in January 1981. M l growth had soared to over 13 percent per year in the second half o f 1980, the Treasury bill rate averaged 15.7 percent in December 1980. The unhappy choice that had to be made was between gradual reduction o f M l growth or a sharp deceleration. Slowing money growth slowly from the 13 per cent per year level meant reducing inflation only slowly but keep ing the economy from receding sharply. Decreasing M l growth rap idly meant courting a m ajor recession but breaking inflation quick- ly- The Adm inistration urged that the growth o f the monetary base (and thereby M l growth) be reduced slowly, 0.6 to 1.0 percentage point a year. For reasons that are not clear, the Federal Reserve allowed M l growth to drop very sharply beginning in A pril 1981 and continuing through July 1982. In that period, annualized M l growth was only 3.3 percent, significantly lower then the 7.5 per cent per year average o f the 1977 to 1980 period. The sharp decel eration o f M l growth helped send the econom y into a recession be ginning in the second h alf o f 1981. However, it also helped to slash the inflation rate in half, and interest rates, albeit with a lag, have been follow ing the inflation rate downward. Since last August, M l growth has again been accelerating sharp ly. It increased at an annual rate o f 12.7 percent from August 1982 to January 1983. The rapid runup in money growth since last August has increased the quantity o f the M l measure o f money to a level slightly above where it now would have been if the Federal Reserve had followed the Reagan Adm inistration’s original plan o f decreasing M l growth steadily by 0.6 to 1.0 percentage point a year. W ith a strong recovery underway, it is time to again rein-in the growth o f M l, but this time it must be done gradually. If the 16-336 0 - 8 3 - 5 30 Adm inistration's original track for M l growth had been followed, M l growth would have been 6 to 6.5 percent in 1982. Since the level o f M l is now about where it would have been if that track had been followed, the sensible policy to pursue now is to follow the original track in 1983 and subsequent years. Accordingly, we recommend that M l growth be constrained to 5.0 to 6.0 percent in 1983 and reduced by 0.6 to 1.0 percentage point a year in the 1984 to 1986 period. This policy w ill promote sustained recovery and a gradual return to full employment without reigniting inflation and sending interest rates to much higher levels once again. VI. International Recommendation The United States should step up efforts to increase exports to for eign markets and strongly resist protectionist measures at home. International econom ic forces have taken on increasing impor tance in the United States over the past decade. Four out o f five new manufacturing jobs have been created by international com merce. One out o f every three acres is planted for export, and trade in general accounts for an ever-increasing share o f our Gross Na tional Product. Given the role o f trade in providing jobs and domes tic and international sales opportunities, we should adopt those policies that w ill ensure expanded export markets and should avoid increased protectionism. Since W orld War II, the liberalizing influence o f successive rounds of m ultilateral trade negotiations under the 89-country General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) fostered substan tial growth in world trade, i.e., at a 7.1 percent annual rate from the mid-1940’s to the early 1970’s. The oil price shocks and com peti tion from developing countries slowed this growth substantially, however, and the value o f world trade actually declined one per cent in 1981; 1982’s trade volum e rem ained stagnant, with the United States particularly hard hit by im port pressure. In 1982, the United States suffered a $44 billion balance o f trade deficit. This shortfall is estimated to rise to $75 or $80 billion in 1983, particularly as a result o f the overvalued dollar’s upward price pressure on U.S. goods and services. This deficit is directly subtracted from GNP and in large part accounts for 1982’s slow growth and high unemployment. In this difficult international econom ic clim ate, the members o f GATT met in Geneva in November 1982 to renew their commit ment to expanded world trade. The Contracting Parties committed to “ refrain from taking or m aintaining any measures inconsistent with the GATT” and to “ resist protectionist pressures.” However, the European Community, in particular, refused to discuss a nearterm extension o f GATT rules to deal effectively with agricultural trade problems. Thus, EC export subsidies for products such as wheat flour, poultry and pasta rem ain, despite U.S. complaints that such subsidies deprive us o f an equitable share o f the world market. Japanese im port quotas on citrus fruits and juices, beef and other farm products remain outside o f GATT scrutiny, as well. During the GATT M inisterial, the United States made some progress in establishing a GATT study o f the im pact o f internation al trade in services, such as banking, insurance, communications, and data processing, and o f the barriers to such trade. However, we could not persuade other countries to undertake a sim ilar examina- (3 1 ) 32 tion o f trade in high technology products, such as computers, elec tronic components and aircraft. Notwithstanding the impact o f the current trading environm ent here at home and the unwillingness o f our foreign partners to open markets immediately, we should resist the use o f protectionist measures. Government intervention in one sector o f the econom y can distort trade and investment flows in that sector and else where. Protection, in the form o f higher tariffs, im port quotas or “ Buy Am erican” provisions, should therefore be provided only under the most serious circumstances. At the same tim e we reject protectionism at home, however, the United States should increase its efforts to combat unfair practices on the part o f our trading partners. Predatory trade measures, e.g., industry targeting, insidious domestic subsidies, export aids and cartel arrangements, deny U.S. producers an equitable share o f the world market and should be removed. The United States must, however, develop careful and measured responses designed to re store our legitim ate com petitive opportunities rather than imple menting actions that w ill prom ote a beggar-thy-neighbor trade war. Such a trade war could have a devastating impact on the debtridden developing countries who rely on exports to the industrial ized world for much o f their survival. In addition to outright protectionism , this rising world debt prob lem also constitutes a threat to world trade. Over the last year, de veloping country debt has risen to an incredible $700 billion, with a major share held by Latin Am erican nations. Since 1978, high in terest rates have boosted the cost o f servicing such debt, forcing countries to reschedule nearly $11 billion in repayments in 1982. W hile the sharp fall in U.S. rates beginning at the end o f last year eased the debt cost for major borrowers, a severe crisis continues. Mexico, for example, has had to agree to numerous austerity meas ures in order to obtain a three-year $4 billion loan agreement with the International M onetary Fund. Brazil was forced to devalue its currency by 30 percent and to conclude a $4 9 billion credit agree ment with the Fund in order to meet its financing needs for 1983. This agreement is conditioned upon the willingness o f Brazil's com mercial creditors to increase their lending, as well. Argentina's agreement was for a $1.6 billion IMF loan based on a rescheduling o f existing debt as well as the securing o f an additional $2 billion in new com m ercial loans. W hile, through a com bination o f Fund credit and increased com m ercial bank commitments, the developing countries should be able to avoid default this year, the present debt crisis points to the need to take a closer look at how we reached the present state o f commercial bank overexposure and vulnerability. Congress should undertake to determ ine the inter-relationship between governm ent actions and com m ercial bank lending. Useful areas o f inquiry would be, for example, the extent to which banks have lent on the basis o f governm ental foreign policy goals rather than on sound fi nancial considerations. In addition, we should consider what role the Federal Government should reasonably play in supporting U.S. com m ercial banks when these institutions face major loan defaults. High interest rates, which have exacerbated world debt prob lems, have also affected the United States by raising the value o f 33 the dollar. Over the course o f 1982, the dollar rose as much as 40 percent against many m ajor foreign currencies. As a result, U.S. goods and services have becom e relatively m ore expensive than com parable foreign products in the international m arketplace. The largest single factor in the d ollars surge has been the high real in terest rates, which have increased the attractiveness o f the U.S. market to foreign suppliers o f credit. In addition, currencies, such as the Japanese yen, have been abnorm ally depressed, further widen ing the gap and placing Am erican traders at a com petitive disad vantage vis-a-vis their Japanese counterparts. Since late October, the yen has risen by approxim ately 11 percent against the dollar and 7 to 8 percent against the German mark. Despite a $7 to $8 billion infusion to bolster the yen in 1982, it has depreciated 15 per cent in real terms over the past two years. Recognizing the adverse im pact the overvalued dollar has had on the U.S. balance o f trade, the United States should nevertheless avoid foreign exchange m arket interventions except under condi tions o f severe distortion. Over the long term , the elim ination o f in flationary expectations and a concom m itant reduction in interest rates w ill have the most positive im pact on exchange rates and cur rency misalignment. Another factor currently influencing the international econom y is the dissolution o f OPEC. In sharp contrast to 1974 and 1978, the world econom y is facing not a massive increase in the price o f oil but a massive glut o f one o f our most valuable natural resources. The com bination o f worldwide econom ic downturn, increased con servation efforts, and greater use o f alternative energy sources has reduced the demand for oil and led to dwindling production by the countries that com prise the OPEC cartel. According to OPEC’s Research Group o f Petroleum Exporters’ Policies, OPEC lost 12 m illion barrels per day in production be tween 1979 and 1982. M oreover, as a result o f the glut, we have seen as much as a 25 percent decline in the real price o f oil since March 1981. At present, the OPEC benchm ark price is $34 per barrel, with the average effective effective price closer to $32. W hile we should welcom e these declining prices, since they herald a freeing-up o f scarce capital for other consumption and in vestment opportunities, there may be problem s associated with a sudden price drop in oil. Developing countries like Mexico, Venezu ela, and Nigeria, for example, would see their oil-related incom e decline, further weakening already fragile economies. However, this should be more than offset by im provem ents in the balance o f trade for such oil im porting countries as Brazil. Nevertheless, on balance, a reduction in oil prices should be hailed as a positive development. The Adm inistration has asked that we go along with the propos al by the Board o f Governors o f the International M onetary Fund (IMF) to increase its quotas by $32 billion and expand the General Agreem ent to Borrow (GAB) by $12 billion. The cost to the United States would be $8.4 billion. The proposal is prompted by the cur rent international debt crisis. The new moneys w ill not be paid into the IMF until late 1983 or even early 1984. New econom ic trends, including lower loan rates and the U.S. recovery, together with actions taken in conjunction with the IMF by Argentina, 34 Brazil, Mexico, and other debtor nations to im prove their trade and current account balances, and by creditor-banks to roll-over matur ing loans and extend new credits, will help to solve the debt crisis. A rather positive view along these lines was set forth by the W orld Bank in issuing its annual “ W orld Debt Tables.” However, the pro posal o f the Adm inistration would be a type o f “ insurance” for solving the long-term debt crisis. VII. A griculture Recommendation The Administration and the Congress should immediately consid er major changes in supply-control and demand-enhancing farm policies and programs. Market discipline can be improved, thereby reducing the budgetary cost o f farm private support programs, while at the same time improving the financial picture o f American farm ers. Since the 1930's, U.S. farm policy has had the dual objective o f encouraging the production o f adequate supplies o f food and fiber so as to maintain reasonable prices for consumers, and, at the same tim e, assuring farmers a fair return on their investment and ef forts. Four measures are com m only em ployed by the Federal Gov ernment to balance these conflicting consum er and form er inter ests: direct payments to farmers, nonrecourse loans, acreage reduc tion programs, and export prom otion activities. Most agricultural price support and related activities are carried out by the Commod ity Credit Corporation (CCC) o f the United States Department o f Agriculture. Including the projection o f the Congressional Budget O ffice for Fiscal Year 1983, CCC realized losses on commodity price and farm incom e support program s for the last four years w ill exceed $35 billion. From the consum er perspective, traditional farm policy has been exceptionally effective. Food and fiber supplies are not only ade quate but border on the extravagant. Never has a society been pro vided with more abundant supplies and a wider variety o f nutri tious food. The consumer price index for food and beverages during the last four years has advanced 21.8 percent compared to a 33.0 percent increase in the prices o f all consum er goods and services. Am ericans now spend a sm aller proportion o f their income on food than any other people on earth. Farmers, however, have not fared as well. According to the United States Department o f Agriculture, 1983 w ill likely mark the fourth consecutive year o f declining and record low net farm incom e. In 1982, real net farm incom e was one-fourth the level achieved by farm ers 10 years ago and roughly equivalent to that realized in 1933. A fter three consecutive years o f im plem enting in creasingly costly acreage reduction programs, surplus carryover stocks for virtually all grains and cotton approach record levels. Government-owned stocks o f dairy products, acquired under the dairy program , are at record levels. In constant dollars, the net incom e-to-equity ratio for U.S. agriculture has trended down from 10.0 percent in 1973 to 2.2 percent in 1982. (35) 36 TABLE V ll.l.— NET INCOME-TO-EQUITY RATIO FOR U.S. AGRICULTURE (1972 to 1982) Year 1972.......................................................................................................................... 1973....................................................................... ................................................... 1974....................................................................... ................................................... 1975....................................................................... ................................................... 1976....................................................................... ................................................... 1977....................................................................... ................................................... 1978....................................................................... ................................................... 1979....................................................................... ................................................... 1980....................................................................... ................................................... 1981....................................................................... ................................................... 1982....................................................................... .................................................. Net income ■ 15.1 25.1 17.6 15.6 11.0 10.2 13.6 14.9 8.2 9.2 6.7 Equity ■ 233.5 247.9 274.4 260.6 285.2 310.6 312.5 336.9 342.3 333.2 305.8 rS T p S 6.5 10.0 6.4 7.9 3.9 3.3 4.4 4.4 2.4 2.8 2.2 1 Billions of 1967 dollars. Farm com m odity programs, specifically their price support provi sions, have proven to be counterproductive in achieving fair re turns to investment in agriculture. An increasingly larger share of U.S. argriculture's output is being “ sold” at the loan rate for long term storage in governm ent warehouses rather than being com peti tively priced and purchased in the marketplace and consumed. In 1982, the governm ent incurred a storage expense o f close to $500 m illion just for the grain reserve. U.S. loan rates are considered by our foreign com petitors as price ceilings. The United States Gov ernment, not the international marketplace, therefore, must ac commodate U.S. farm er-produced supplies as long as world prices remain below loan rates. Loan rates, in effect, protect w orld farm ers and their governments from feeling the full clout o f the U.S. farm ers' competitiveness. The United Sates is losing export sales as a result, and the role o f nonrecourse loans in future farm policy needs to be carefully considered in that light. Target prices have gained the reputation as constituting the clos est the Am erican society gets to providing a sector o f its populace with a guaranteed income. But U.S. farm policy has, in fact, had the effect o f guaranteeing farm ers a loss. For exam ple, wheat farm ers in 1983, who reduce their planted acreage 20 percent and satis fy all other program requirem ents, are entitled to a minimum price o f $4.30 per bushel for the amount o f wheat they do produce. Target prices are legislatively determ ined and are generally be lieved to be below the cost o f production and above m arket-clearing price levels. Relative to the target price o f $4.30 per bushel, wheat is presently selling for $3.90 per bushel in Kansas City and, accord ing to Chase Econometrics, the cost o f growing a bushel o f wheat in Kansas is $5.22 per bushel. The U.S. farm er is apparently becom ing more and more remote from his m arketplace and, as a result, his production decisions are more a consequence and reflection o f political activity in W ashington than o f supply and demand forces in Kansas City. Im portantly, it is m arket forces w hich prom ote effi ciency, and greater econom ic efficiency is one means to both increase farm incom e and reduce food and Treasury costs. Yet, the public most definitely has a vested interest in the con tinuance o f food supplies in adequate quantities, quality and vari ety provided at reasonably stable prices. It is estim ated that 20 per 37 cent o f the U.S. gross national product and as many as 20 m illion jobs are directly or indiretly related to the production o f food and fiber. In addition, agricultural export sales have become a major means o f earning foreign exchange and helping maintain a strong dollar, thereby lowering the cost o f imported goods and services. The United States Government also extensively uses the products o f Am erican farmers to achieve public welfare and foreign policy objectives, through the food stamp and Food for Peace programs. Therefore, there is ample justification for the public to assume some degree o f the risk associated with farm ing through the provi sion o f a necessary level o f incom e maintenance support. However, target prices should be made adm inistratively more flexible and set closer to market-clearing levels so that farm ers w ill be given more appropriate market signals. Effective production restraint by farm ers w ill result in higher market-clearing prices and therefore higher income support levels. Conversely, overproduction w ill drive prices down and lower prices w ill help more quickly to elim inate surpluses. Public support o f the farm sector should emphasize the promo tion o f export sales—meeting international market challenges and pursuing international market opportunities—as a means o f in creasing demand and, therefore, market clearing prices. The United States Government should assume the obligation o f aggres sively representing in the international m arketplace the most effi cient food producers in the world when and where necessary. Agri culture is a U.S. international advantage well worth defending. Substantial evidence exists to support the need to challenge the current effectiveness and question the future appropriateness o f traditional farm policy in satisfying its prim ary client, the farmer. The debate will be intense and controversial; but the debate must proceed. 16-336 0 - 8 3 - 6 ADDITIONAL VIEW S (39) ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE MARJORIE S. HOLT The Republican Members o f the Joint Econom ic Committee are correct in their assumption that a strong econom ic recovery is al ready underway and we must avoid reinflating the econom y with a burst o f stimulus spending and/or excessive monetary growth. The greatest danger confronting the econom y in the next few years is deficit spending on so large a scale that it would crowd out the private sector by raising interest rates and force inflationary increases in money supply to accommodate governm ent borrowing. A strong rate o f econom ic growth w ill reduce annual budget defi cits by increasing revenues and reducing outlays associated with unemployment, but this alone will probably not reduce the deficits to acceptable levels. I agree with my Republican colleagues that some savings are pos sible in the defense budget, but a realistic appraisal o f defense needs leads me to assume that the savings w ill not be as large as my colleagues would hope for. To those who suggest that we cut operations and maintenance accounts in the defense budget, I ask whether they are w illing to sacrifice readiness. To those who would freeze pay and benefits, I ask how we will recruit and retain m ilitary personnel o f good qual ity. To those who would spread procurem ent costs over additional years, I say this w ill surely increase unit prices and increase the total cost o f those weapons systems and equipment in the final analysis. Defense claimed 40 percent o f the Federal budget in 1970, but only 23 percent o f the budget in 1980. This year defense has almost 27 percent o f the budget and next year might go to 29 percent, or 7 percent o f GNP. Critics are com plaining that we cannot afford to spend 29 per cent o f the Federal budget on the forem ost responsibility o f the na tional government. They are upset that defense w ill have 34 per cent o f the Federal budget in fiscal 1988 if President Reagan’s pro gram is fully implemented. Savings are possible, but there is a consensus in Congress that the defense budget must continue to show substantial real growth in the 1980’s after the cuts that were imposed in the 1970’s. There is a consensus that we must not allow Soviet advantages in m ili tary capability to grow to overwhelming advantages that would place the freedom and life o f every citizen o f the Free W orld at risk. Obviously, we must pay for effective and credible m ilitary strength, one way or another, and at the same tim e that we con front the imperative o f reducing budget deficits. Faced with this dilemma, I would be w illing to consider the repeal o f tax indexing scheduled to begin in fiscal 1985. (4 1) 42 Perhaps it is unpopular to say this, but I believe Congress made a big mistake in 1981 by promising that the individual tax burden would be adjusted for inflation on a permanent basis beginning in 1985. That was not part o f President Reagan's original tax reduc tion package, but was among the ornaments Congress hung on the tree. I have never taken an expansive view o f the responsibilities o f government, but I recognize that we must have sufficient revenues to fulfill the responsibilities it must perform. On the one hand, we are required to continue our defense re building effort to deter the perceived threat to our national secu rity. On the other hand, the future health o f our econom y depends on reducing annual budget deficits o f enormous size. Under the circumstances, allowing tax indexing to take effect in 1985 and proceed through the ensuing years would probably be unwise. ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE OLYMPIA J. SNOWE I want to lend my strong support to the Republican Views o f the Joint Economic Committee and to praise Chairman Jepsen for his leadership and dedication in producing a useful document. Through this report, it is my hope the Congress w ill benefit from the view points presented by the Joint Economic Committee and the recom mendations that are contained in the body o f this report. Curing the ills o f our econom y w ill not be easy. The high federal deficits the pervasive nature o f unemployment, the prospects o f re newed inflation, the growing foreign debt problem, and the many pressing human needs are problems that cannot be solved in a short period o f time. Our recommendations are intended to produce a strong economy, but recongnize that short-term, quick-fix solu tions often produce long-term problems o f an ever greater magni tude. W hatever created our current problems in not my prim ary con cern. Congress should not dwell on the mistakes that we and others have made in the past, but rather we should carefully scrutinize our actions to determine their effects in the future. Too often our actions are reflective o f short-term pressures, and pay little atten tion to the future im plications. This leads to stop and start policies, personal and business uncertainty, and an uneven economy. More attention should be paid to the long-range effect o f the actions we take, and our goal should be a healthy and stable economy. I would agree with the recent econom ic report that our econom y is beginning to recover. I remain guarded in my optimism regard ing the recovery, however, particularly in view of the many pitfalls pointed out to the Committee by several prom inent economists. A great deal o f doubt remains about the strength and length o f the recovery. The actions we take in Congress, as well as those taken by the Reagan Adm inistration and the Federal Reserve Board, should recognize the fragility of the recovery, and the need for policies that build on the progress that has been made at this time. The Reagan Adm inistration has taken many positive steps toward producing a better economy. The reduced rate o f inflation and the lower interest rates are praiseworthy. W hile the Adminis tration has been much criticized for the areas and amounts o f their budget reductions, I applaude them for the honesty with which they have addressed the Federal budget crisis. I have many differ ences with the specific budget levels recommended by the Adm inis tration, but I feel they have accurately captured the public mood, as well as the econom ic necessity, to reduce Federal spending. Much debate will focus in the coming months on efforts to delay or repeal indexing o f the incom e tax rates. W hile this might result in a significant reduction in the future deficit, it would also be an indirect method o f increasing taxes. Such a tax increase would fall (43) 44 most heavily on the lower incom e classes and as such I do not think it would be the most preferable course o f action. The everincreasing budget deficits must be reduced, however, and all meth ods o f deficit reduction should be reviewed by Congress. Delay of indexing would not be my first choice to reduce the deficit, but it should not be eliminated from the options to consider. The level o f defense spending should receive considerable review. Our m ilitary capability should not be harmed by any adjustments in defense expenditures, but I believe the military budget should receive the same scrutiny for possible savings as the rest o f the budget has already received. The health o f the overall economy will improve if the budget deficits can be decreased. As the overall economy improves, our defense expenditures can again play a posi tive role in our economy. O f particular concern to me are proposed spending reductions in programs designed to protect against, or relieve human suffering. Extremely important to my region is adequate funding for lowincome energy assistance and home weatherization. Funding for health care should be maintained at a level necessary to assure that proper attention is given to those in need. Our government cannot turn its back on those that are suffering, and Americans living in poverty must be given as much assistance as possible to help them improve their quality o f life. The basic social safety net that consists o f Federal, State, and local programs must not be weakened. The Federal responsibility to provide assistance to the needy is clear, and additional burdens should not be transferred to the States, to local governments, or to the private sector. One area where much im provem ent needs to be made is unem ployment. The overall rate is far too high, and unemployment among certain subgroups is at tragic levels. I recognize the human suffering caused by unemployment and strongly endorse the recom mendations o f the Joint Econom ic Committee report designed to reduce unemployment. Special attention should be made to the problems o f women in the work force, a subject I w ill deal with in greater depth later in these views. The strong employment record o f small business should be recog nized, and efforts should be made to prom ote the activities o f all sectors o f our small business community. Employment programs should address the role o f regional industries in the econom y o f our country and steps should be taken to insure the health o f our many regional industries. Above all, unemployment should not be dealt with as a statistical problem, but we should be ever mindful o f the personal effects o f unemployment, underemployment, or the fear o f unemployment, on every member o f our society. As a member o f the Foreign Affairs Committee, I am well aware o f the special trade problems o f our country. We are dependent on other nations to an ever greater degree, and the world econom y is closely tied to the econom y o f the United States. Both our export policy and our im port policy are im portant to me, and I am outlin ing my views in greater detail in a later section o f these views. 45 W omen an d E mployment The tragically high rate o f unemployment in this country, as well as the near certainty that Congress w ill proceed with legisla tive measures to provide some relief to those who are out o f work, demands that we focus renewed attention on the problems o f women in the work force, and how they can be best addressed by em ploym ent initiatives in the 98th Congress. I include these addi tional comments because I do not believe the plight o f women in the work force has been adequately addressed any where in recent discussions o f this country's employment picture. In January 1983, nearly 48 m illion women, 16 years and over, were in the labor force. Forty-three percent o f the Am erican labor force is comprised o f women. This number has doubled in the last 20 years, and by 1990, women are expected to comprise more than half o f all our nation's workers. W hile women’s participation in the labor force has increased, their pay has actually decreased. In 1955, women earned only $.64 for every $1 earned by a man. Incredibly, this has decreased to $.59 to every $1 earned by men today. In 1981, women workers with four or more years o f college education earned approxim ately the same incom e as men who had only one to three years o f high school, while women high school graduates earned less than men who had not completed their elem entary school. One of the primary reasons for this gross disparity in pay contin ues to be the concentration o f women in traditional, low-paying, dead-end jobs. In 1981, women were 80 percent o f all clerical work ers, 63 percent o f all retail sales workers, and 89 percent o f all health service workers. At the same time, they were only 4 percent o f all engineers, 14 percent o f all doctors and laywers, 7 percent o f workers in heavy construction, and 1 percent o f all truck drivers. Women work for the same reason man do—econom ic necessity. Two-thirds o f all working women are single, widowed, divorced, or separated, or have husbands who earn less then $15,000 a year. Ad ditionally, a growing proportion o f Am erican fam ilies are headed by women. Tragically, almost one in three female-headed fam ilies lives in poverty today, as contrasted to one in 18 headed by a man. Three-fourths o f the poor are women, a phenomenon that has re cently been described as “ the fem inization o f poverty.” The most vulnerable women are elderly and single fem ale heads o f house hold. The costs o f unemployment to these women, their fam ilies, and society are enormous. In January 1983, 10.0 percent of women 16 and over were unem ployed, and certain groups o f women have been much harder hit. Women who maintain fam ilies, for example, suffer from an unem ploym ent rate o f 13.2 percent, while the figure approaches 50 per cent for young, black women. Women make a vital contribution to the labor force o f this coun try and share the same devastating results o f unemployment. Public policy discussions must go beyond the traditional, but total ly inaccurate concept that unemployment is not really a wom an's problem because women don't really need to work. This sim ply is not true, and steps must be taken to insure that any legislative 16-336 0 - 8 3 - 7 46 program adopted by the Congress w ill provide relief to all o f this nation’s unemployed—not just to one group. I, therefore, recommend that any legislative program meet the following specific objectives: (1) that women be assured o f this gov ernment’s commitment to elim inate discrim ination in employment, (2) that employment stim ulation be balanced over a wide range o f job types, (3) that the specific employment needs working mothers face in m eeting the demands o f their dual career be addressed, and (4) that women’s long-term employment and econom ic security be strengthened through job retraining programs that specifically seek to overcom e sex-stereotyping in employment. I would like to elaborate briefly on each o f these objectives. Women continue to suffer from pervasive discrim ination in wages and hiring, despite the passage o f m ajor legislation designed to address these programs. The Equal Pay A ct o f 1963, Title VII o f the Civil Rights A ct o f 1964, and Executive Order 11246 can be ef fective tools, if rigorously enforced. But women have been forced to confront a governm ent that has not measured up to its responsibil ity for eradicating employment discrim ination. Therefore, it is vi tally im portant that antidiscrim ination provisions consistent with existing law be included in the language o f any jobs legislation, and that they be rigorously enforced. A com m itm ent to pay equity must be affirm ed as well. I also believe that we must balance employment stim ulation over a wide range o f job types from public works to public services. The recent debate on the various jobs bills proposed in the 97th Con gress to repair highways, bridges, and mass transit, and the even tual passage o f a gas tax to fund these jobs, exem plified the deeply held assumption that unemployment is not really a woman’s prob lem. In fact, 98.3 percent o f construction workers in this country are male, and when efforts are made to fund jobs to repair high ways, bridges and mass transit, the assistance goes prim arily to employ men. Any jobs legislation passed by Congress must insure that the jobs created w ill offer realistic em ploym ent opportunities to women. This country has great needs for the rebuilding o f its infrastructure, and those have received an abundance o f attention recently. However, two years o f greatly reduced domestic spending have created a considerable need for increased services to the el derly, poor, and children. Jobs created in the public service area w ill both help to meet those needs and provide jobs that are m ore consistent with the skills and employment interests traditionally held by women. Any serious consideration o f women’s em ploym ent problems would be grossly deficient without efforts to address the specific employment needs working mothers face in m eeting the demands o f their dual role as workers and caregivers. Funding for day care has been greatly reduced over the past few years. Adequate fund ing for child care resources must be an essential part o f any em ployment initiative that seeks to address wom en’s employment needs. Additionally, provisions encouraging the developm ent o f al ternative work schedules should be included to realistically en hance women em ploym ent opportunities. Finally, and very im portantly, it is vitally im portant that efforts be made to move beyond the placement o f women into traditional 47 low-paying jobs, and strong steps be taken to encourage the en trance o f greater numbers o f women into nontraditional fields. Pro visions for occupational development, upward mobility, develop ment o f new careers for women, and overcom ing sex sterotyping should be included as we enact new job training and job creation programs. In particular, the rapid movement o f our econom y toward a com plex, highly technical job structure, presents a critical opportunity for women to prepare to enter and advance in parity with their male counterparts into this new field. Tragically, women are in a state o f double jeopardy at present. They suffer from persistent and totally intolerable wage and hiring discrim ination on the one hand. On the other hand, they face the same critical problems that confront all unemployed workers in the country today. It is essential that the 98th Congress recognize this serious problem and take strong steps to address the specific prob lems confronting women as they fight for econom ic security. T rade No one can doubt the im portance o f trade to the U.S. econom y. We rely on other countries for certain goods, and our exports are critical to the econom y o f our country. But there must also be the realization that parts o f our econom y may be hurt by foreign trade. The actions o f other countries must be carefully monitored and ac tions should be taken if harm is done to our domestic economy. The United States may currently be a victim , not a beneficiary of its open market policies. Our econom y is directly disturbed when our foreign trade partners help themselves to larger and larger portions o f our consumer markets while denying access to their do mestic markets. It is time to put our foreign competitors on notice that the slogan “ free trade must be fair trade” is not just simple rhetoric. I do not advocate passing protectionist legislation, but I submit that it must be clearly understood that all bilateral trade relations with the United States w ill be equitable out o f necessity. A case in point from my home state o f Maine involves the shoe industry. Maine is the leading footwear producing state in the nation, em ploying 17,000 people. Yet, significantly as that figure appears, it is less by 7,000 jobs since the late 1960’s. Those job de creases can be directly attributed to the flood o f foreign, low-cost shoes that have been dumped on U.S. markets. Foreign m aterial costs and wage differentials are certainty a major factor account able for the decline, but the problem goes beyond that. In many in stances, the shoe exporters have gone one step further and are denying m arket access to U.S. shoe exporters. For all intents and purpose, the foreign shoe m anufacturers are having their cake and eating it too by monopolizing their domestic markets, m aintaining full production and exporting, at the expense o f U.S. shoe m anufac turers m illions o f pairs o f shoes. I do not think that anyone would characterize this trade situation as fair or equitable. Restricting market access is only one method by which the U.S. global trade position suffers. Another serious roadblock to free and fair trade is heavy subsidization by com peting governments. Canada is a prime example o f a governm ent which subsidizes cer tain industries, often with great harm to our domestic markets. 48 Canadian lum ber exports to the United States has reached almost $2 billion annually. Certainly, that level o f exports does not come about as a result o f lack o f supply in the U.S. side o f the border. It is a documented fact that the Canadian governm ent is heavily interventionist in their industries, and offers the lumber business a vast quantity o f loans, grants, rail rate discounts, wage assistance, and inventory financing, while selling public tim ber well below m arket value. Consequently, the Canadians are able to severely undercut the products o f the U.S. lum ber industry and that proof is dram atically illustrated by the fact that the Canadian share o f the U.S. lum ber m arket has grown steadily over the last 20 years from 13 percent to over 30 percent. One other effect has been increased unemployment in the U.S. lum ber industry. In some segments, idleness has reached a disastrous level o f 50 per cent o f the work force. A good portion can be attributed to the sub sidized exports o f the United States. Clearly, this is another exam ple o f an unfair trade practice which aids the exporter while in flicting damage on our domestic market. Similar claims can be made about the Canadian fishing industry. The Canadian Fishing Vessel Construction Program provides up to $50,000 for the purchase o f new fishing gear or can be put to use for refurbishing an older fishing vessel. Canada also provides tax exemptions for boat fuel and fishing gear. Unemployment insur ance is provided for Canadian fisherm en even though they are selfemployed. It is no wonder that over 50 percent o f the fisheries products used in the United States are imported. O f those imports, Canada supplies nearly one-half a billion dollars worth, which is equal to 90 percent o f all o f Canada’s fish landings. It would appear that Canada is supplying these subsidies because o f a conscious de cision to support the M aritim e fisheries as a less costly alternative to widespread w elfare and the social losses that would result from the decline o f the fishing industry. The United States must follow an even course on trade policy. I agree that considerable attention should center on efforts to in crease our exports, but attention should also be paid to our import policy. We should not look only to markets in other countries for our goods, but we should make every effort to encourage a healthy domestic market for our products. DEMOCRATIC VIEW S ON THE FEBRUARY 1983 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT (4 9 ) CONTENTS Page I. To restore grow th....................................................................................................... 55 R ecom m endation N o. 1: Congress, the Administration, and the Federal Reserve should act to achieve a high rate of economic growth in 1983 and 1984. The following mix of policies is required: Monetary policy should accommodate sufficient economic growth to reduce unemployment in 1983 and 1984. Fiscal policy in 1983 should support economic recovery. Immediate steps to provide relief to low-income people and to improve tax fairness will promote this objective. Fiscal policy decisions this year for Fiscal Years 1984-1986 and beyond should sustain recovery. Much lower deficits, achieved through a reduction in the proposed m ilitary budget and other spending and through a more fair tax system, will promote this objective by encour aging lower long-term interest rates. Humphrey-Hawkins and the President’s Economic Report........................ 57 Monetary Policy in 1983— Recovery................................... ................................ 57 R ecom m endation N o. 2: The Federal Reserve should ease money and credit to achieve low real interest rates early in 1983, and should sustain such rates through 1984. R ecom m endation N o. 3: Better coordination of monetary and fiscal poli cies should be achieved through the budget process. The Federal Open Market Committee’s official projections for growth, inflation, and employ ment should be made consistent with the economic assumptions of the budget resolution. Fiscal Policy in 1983— R elief and Reform.......................................................... 60 R ecom m endation N o. 4 : Congress should authorize and fund a significant jobs program. R ecom m endation N o. 5: Congress should provide additional support this year for food, fuel, housing, and health care to low-income people. R ecom m endation N o. 6: The Federal Supplemental Compensation program should be ex tended to provide 10 additional weeks of coverage to those who have exhausted benefits, and to provide the current level of coverage for workers who become newly eligible over the next nine months. Propos als to cut eligibility for FSC by increasing the number of weeks worked in the base period should be rejected. Consideration should be given to the use of a national unemployment rate trigger as steps to reduce the Federal deficit take effect. Congress should suspend changes in the Ex tended Benefit program that restrict availability of the program in cer tain states, and extend the two-year grace period on repayment of Fed eral loans to state unemployment insurance programs. R ecom m endation N o. 7: Congress should provide fiscal assistance to state and local governments this year to avert sharp cuts in public services and regressive tax increases. Such assistance should be phased out as the econo my recovers. No counterproductive cuts in programs benefitting state and local governments should be made this year. R ecom m endation N o. 8: The July 1, 1983, 10 percent personal income tax reduction should be capped at a maximum benefit of $700 per taxpayer, preserving the full benefit of the cut for all taxpayers earning less than $46,500. Fiscal Policy in 1984-1986— Reconstruction (51) 67 52 Recommendation No. 9: Congress should put in place in 1983 a fair and effective deficit reduction program for Fiscal Years 1984-1986. Recommendation No. 10: Personal income tax indexing should be repealed. The base o f both the personal income tax and of the corporate income tax should be broadened, with special emphasis on the elimina tion of tax expenditures which are obsolete, inefficient, or particulary regressive, and on reform o f depreciation schedules to improve the neu trality of the tax code with respect o f different classes of investment. W e oppose proposals for broad-based, regressive consumption taxes. Recommendation No. 11: M ilitary spending increases should be slowed for the immediate future by more prudent decisions with respect to weapons systems and to procurement, rather than through cuts which will affect the recruitment and retention o f qualified m ilitary personnel or their combat readiness. Recommendation No. 12: Entitlem ents programs should not be exempt from review as part o f the broader effort to reduce budget deficits in future years. International Economic Policy................................................................................ 71 Recommendation No. 13: The overvaluation of the U.S. dollar must be ended. Recommendation No. H : The United States Government must seek to assure the proper enforcement o f existing trade laws, and seek elimination o f foreign trade barriers which lim it our exports. Recommendation No. 15: Congress should support the requested increase in the lending authority o f the IM F. Recommendation No. 16: A ny increase in the IM F quota should be accom panied by actions to tighten oversight o f foreign lending. II. To sustain growth........................................................................................................ 76 Recommendation No. 17: Cooperative policies to fight inflation must be developed as the economy recovers. Training and Job Services........................................................................................ 77 Recommendation No. 18: The newly enacted job training and dislocated worker assistance program needs increased funding. Recommendation No. 19: State unemployment insurance laws should be modified to encourage training and education, while avoiding measures which have a punitive effect on those unable to work. Recommendation No. 20: The functions o f the Employment Service should be enlarged, with greater efforts to expand use o f the Service by applicants and employers. Additional resources and staff should also be provided to of fices administering unemployment insurance. Recommendation No. 21: Equal employment opportunity laws should be enforced vigorously, with adequate funding for enforcement activity. Education and Science............................................................................................... 79 Recommendation No. 22: Education at all levels must be improved. Feder al funds should be provided to raise the technical level o f primary, second ary, and higher education, and to assure more equal educational opportuni ty across all regions, and for the disadvantaged. Recommendation No. 23: Federal support for nondefense research and de velopment, especially in universities, should be increased. Industry and Infrastructure.................................................................................... 82 Recommendation No. 24: Programs to support industry should be de signed to take advantage o f new opportunities while retaining our old, pro ductive strengths. The key ingredients include: An efficient, up-to-date, w ell maintained public infrastructure. Necessary Federal support to workers for adjustment to new indus try. A griculture.................................................................................................................... 84 Recommendation No. 25: Congress and the U SD A must take steps to ensure that efforts to reduce excess U .S. production, such as the PaymentIn-Kind program, are successful. 53 Recom m endation N o. 26 : Congress and the Administration must increase efforts to expand farm exports. E nergy............................................................................................................................ 86 necommendahun No. 27: Incentives to conserve energy, to promote pro duction of cost-efficient fossil fuels in the United States, to further reduce unreliable energy imports, and for research in renewable energy should remain high national priorities. Statistics for Economic A nalysis........................................................................... 87 Recom m endation N o. 28: The budget for economic statistics should restore adequate funding for crucial economic data. A full review o f Fiscal Year 1984 funding for GNP source data should be undertaken. Cooperation and a Common Purpose.................................................................... 88 Recom m endation N o. 29 : Greater cooperation should be fostered among the institutions of government, business, and labor toward the common ob jective of higher productivity, international competitiveness, and a higher domestic standard of living. Additional V iew s........................................................................................................ 91 I. T o R e sto r e G r o w t h Recommendation No. 1 Congress, the Administration, and the Federal Reserve should act to achieve a high rate o f economic growth in 1983 and 1984. The follow ing mix o f policies is required: Monetary policy should accommodate sufficient economic growth to reduce unemployment in 1983 and 1984. Fiscal policy in 1983 should support economic recovery. Im m e diate steps to provide relief to low-income people and to improve tax fairness will promote this objective. fisca l policy decisions this year for Fiscal Years 1984-1986 and beyond should sustain recovery. M uch lower deficits, achieved through a reduction in the proposed m ilitary budget and other spending and through a more fa ir tax system, w ill prom ote this objective by encouraging lower long-term interest rates.1 The Administration has presented a frank view o f the most likely course o f the economy for 1983 and subsequent years. How ever, this course is not acceptable. W e believe that the policies rec ommended in this Report w ill yield m ore rapid econom ic growth and a faster reduction in unemployment them under the Adminis tration forecast, without leading to an acceleration o f inflation. W hile inflation remains a danger, in the current phase o f the busi ness cycle, renewed inflation is not the m ajor risk. Indeed, stronger recovery over the next couple o f year could in some ways further reduce the inflation rate. We favor a more rapid growth rate o f output because that means a more rapid reduction in unemployment after the peak unemploy ment rate is reached. The unemployment rate w ill fall only if output grows faster than the total o f the rates o f increase in pro ductivity and the labor force. I f productivity were to grow by 2.5 percent and the labor force by 1.5 percent, modest in comparison with past recoveries, output would have to rise by at least 4 per cent simply to maintain the unem ploym ent rate at the current level. For this reason, we regard growth more rapid than 4 percent in the year ahead as essential. The achievement o f 5.5 to 6 percent real annual growth in the first full year o f recovery is a realistic goal. Following six previous recessions since W orld W ar n , econom ic growth in the first year o f recovery was at or above this range five out o f six times, as shown 1 Representative Hawkins states: “ While deficit reduction is important and necessary, too much attention is being placed on reducing the deficit as the means for sustaining economic growth. Deficit reduction is a desired end result. The most effective way to promote this objec tive is by increasing employment and production with proper attention to the priority needs of the American people ana the economy. The achievement o f full employment with price stability after an initial increase in properly targeted budget outlays w ill produce growth that will pro vide the addition of revenues needed to lower the deficit and eventually balance the budget.” (55) 56 in Table I. W ith the exception o f the excessively rapid recovery during the Korean War, stronger upturns have not led to higher inflation. In the most recent sustained upturn, follow ing the 19731975 recession, real GNP rose at a 5.7 percent annual rate over a two and a half year period, leading to a reduction in the unemploy ment rate from 9 percent to less than 6.5 percent, without acceler ating inflation. TABLE I.— REAL GNP GROWTH AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, POSTWAR RECOVERIES [In percent] Real GNP through quarter 1949:1V........................................................ ........................................... 1954:11.. ........................................... 1958:1... ......... ........................................... 1960:1V. ........................................... 1970:1V......................................................... ........................................... 1975:1........................................................... ........................................... Average2....................................................... ........................................... 1982:1V3 ....................................................... Real GNP growth over follm,l" 8 4 quarters 8 quarters1 13.3 7.4 6.9 6.4 4.7 6.7 7.6 9.6 5.0 5.5 5.1 5.8 5.4 6.1 Unemployment rate ( . M u g through- Througi 4 quarters 7.0 5.8 6.3 6.3 5.8 8.3 6.6 1 0 .7 ..... 4.2 4.4 5.8 6.2 5.9 7.7 5.7 8 quarters 3.4 4.2 5.1 5.5 5.4 7.5 5.2 1 Average annual rate of growth. 2 Excludes the abbreviated 1980 recovery, when real GNP rose for only 3 quarters (1980:111-1981:1). 3 Real GNP growth and unemployment rate based on administration forecast. Faster growth at this time, with so much slack in the economy, would actually restrain inflation in the short run through higher productivity growth, which lowers the rate o f increase in labor cost per unit o f output, the major component of the cost o f production. At the same time, lower interest rates would reduce costs directly, and contribute to a more rapid recovery of investment, which would mean more productivity as the recovery matures. Lower in flation resulting from productivity improvement would build on itself—a sustained improvement o f 1 percent in our productivity growth rates would, over time, reduce the inflation rate by more than 1 percent.2 To achieve a higher growth rate this year and to sustain it through 1984 w ill require prompt action to change the course o f both monetary and fiscal policy, both o f which are pursuing a dan gerous policy o f “ going slow” in the recovery’s early phases. M onetary policy should act to achieve low real interest rates early in 1983. The Federal Reserve has now rightly abandoned the monetary targets it tentatively had set for 1983, in the im plicit rec ognition that those targets were incompatible with econom ic recov ery. But the thrust o f monetary policy remains that o f inching in terest rates down, in the hope that adequate recovery w ill take hold. M onetary policy should instead set about to create the condi tions for more rapid econom ic growth in 1983 and 1984. Fiscal policy should provide short-term stimulus in two highly ef ficient ways: by meeting the needs o f low-income people and the unemployed, and by supporting the provision o f a significant number o f useful jobs as rapidly as possible. Over the longer term, 2 “ Productivity and Inflation,” a study prepared for the use of the Joint Economic Committee, April 24, 1980. 57 fiscal policy should have two objectives: to cut the deficits and so help restore the long-term capital markets, and to assume the rule o f fairness which should be the hallm ark o f the Am erican system o f taxation. H U M P H R E Y - H A W K IN S A N D T H E P R E S ID E N T ’ S E C O N O M IC R E P O R T The Full Employment and Balanded Growth A ct o f 1978 (Humphrey-Hawkins Act) established national goals o f full employment and price stability, and set out guidelines for the development o f econom ic policy in pursuit o f these goals. Under the Act, the Presi dent is directed to establish short-term goals each year, whose at tainment is consistent with progress toward full employment and price stability. The goals should then serve as anchors for the design o f short-term economic policy, and as beacons to warn when econom ic policy is not m eeting its objectives and should be changed. Since the enactment o f Humphrey-Hawkins in 1978, two Adm in istrations have misconstrued the provisions relating to short-term econom ic goals, in particular by specifying “ forecasts,” for the at tainment of which the Adm inistration does not assume responsi bility, instead o f the “goals” required by law. This procedure needs to be changed, as the experience o f the present Adm inistration in 1982 demonstrates. In last year’s Economic Report, the Adm inistration made the fol lowing forecast: “ The com bination o f growth-oriented fiscal policy and anti-inflationary monetary policy should mean substantial progress toward the econom ic goals embodied in the Full Employ ment and Balanced Growth A ct o f 1978.” Specifically, unemploy ment was forecast to fall from an average level o f 8.9 percent in 1982 to 7.9 percent in 1983. Obviously, this has not happened. Unem ploym ent is now expect ed to average 10.7 percent in 1983, and other indicators o f econom ic perform ance except for inflation, w ill also fall far short o f the levels forecast for them a year ago. Such a divergence o f perform ance from objectives should be followed by changes in policy ade quate to restore progress toward the original objective. The Administration forecasts for econom ic growth in 1983 are far below the economy’s noninflationary potential. Different policies are clearly available which would bring about a higher rate o f growth without renewed inflation. U nder these circumstances, the Full Employment and Balanced Growth A ct o f 1978 requires that policy be changed to bring about more rapid growth and a more rapid reduction in unemployment. M O N E T A R Y P O L IC Y I N 1983— RECO VERY From October 1979 through July 1982, with a brief exception in the summer and fall o f 1980, m onetary policy was conducted to fight inflation. No other objective influenced the course o f mone tary policy during this period. Two recessions have resulted, one in early 1980, and another which began in July o f 1981 and continues to this day. It was Federal Reserve policy through the first h a lf o f 1982 to continue strong monetary restraint despite the recession. As late as 58 May 18, 1982, the Federal Open Market Committee “ renewed the short-run objectives (from expansion o f M l) established in late M arch,” which objectives had been intended at the tim e to “ permit only modest growth o f M l.” In July 1982, the Federal Reserve changed policy. The growth o f M l resumed at a rapid rate, and interest rates, which had been de clining irregularly since the fall o f 1981, began a rapid decline be ginning in July o f 1982. By its meeting o f October 5, 1982, the FOMC had abandoned efforts to target narrow money. The FOMC's endorsement o f more rapid money and credit expansion was re peated in November and in December. In February o f 1983, the Federal Reserve presented m onetary targets for 1983 to Congress as required by the Humphrey-Hawkins Act. These targets reaffirm the Federal Reserve's retreat from monetarism in 1983. The target for M l has been widened, and its upper lim it, 8 per cent, is 2.5 points higher than the tentative lim it for M l in 1983 o f 5.5 percent which was advanced last July. Moreover, the base from which the new M l lim it has been calculated—the level o f M l in the fourth quarter o f 1982—was far higher than foreseen last July. Combining the higher range and the higher base, it is possible for M l growth in 1983 to be considerably higher than would have been possible under the tentative targets set six months ago. The Federal Reserve has also eased its targets for the growth o f M2. The base for M2 growth in 1983, to which the 1983 target range o f 7-10 percent applies, has been shifted forward to the level o f M2 which w ill be achieved in February and March o f this year. The Federal Reserve has thus given itself leeway to accommodate the full liquidity requirements o f the economy in the first quarter o f 1983, including all o f the demand for Super NOW accounts cur rently flooding into M2. This flexibility means an effective target for M2 in 1983 o f up to 15 percent growth above the fourth quarter o f 1982, or more if M2 growth continues to be rapid in the next month. The Federal Reserve's abandonment o f monetarism is a welcome recognition o f the error in the monetary policy prescription o f the Reagan Adm inistration, set forth in the Economic Recovery Pro gram o f February 18, 1981, which called for steady deceleration in money growth over a period o f years, irrespective o f econom ic con ditions. This Committee warned at the time, in our 1981 Report, that a too rigid approach to monetary targeting would not work. The Federal Reserve has now acknowledged, by its actions since July o f 1982, that our position was correct. Simply put, the Federal Reserve miscalculated the costs o f rigid monetarism in 1981 and 1982. In its report to Congress under the Humphrey-Hawkins Act in July 1981, this m iscalculation is spelled out: the individual members o f the Federal Open Market Commit tee estimated that unemployment in 1982 would average 7% per cent, with the most pessimistic estimate being 8V2 percent. As late as July 1982, the Federal Open Market Committee predicted that “ an upturn in econom ic activity was highly likely in the second half o f 1982.” No one on the FOMC foresaw that, in fact, a sharp drop in real GNP would occur during that period. 59 In early 1982, a bipartisan coalition introduced language into the First Budget Resolution, on this Committee’s recommendation, which urged the Federal Reserve to reevaluate its monetary tar gets. In the Continuing Resolution enacted in December, Congress directed that the Federal Reserve “ continue to take such actions as are necessary to achieve and m aintain a level o f interest rates low enough to generate significant econom ic growth and thereby reduce the current intolerable level o f unemployment.” These measures undoubtedly had a positive effect on the conduct o f mone tary policy in 1982 and 1983. We support the decisions o f the Federal Reserve in July 1982 and February o f 1983 to relax its m onetary targets and to support eco nom ic recovery.8 Monetary policy in 1983 should move to assure that strong econom ic recovery does occur, and monetary policy in 1984 should sustain that recovery at a rapid rate o f growth. Recommendation No. 2 The Federal Reserve should ease m oney and credit to achieve low real interest rates early in 1983, and should sustain such rates through 1984. Interest rates have fallen sharply since the peak levels o f 1981. The prime rate averaged over 20 percent in the summer and fall o f 1981, it now stands at 11.0 percent. This is a welcom e reduction, and accounts for the revival o f housing and autom obile sales in 1982. Real interest rates, however, have fallen less than nom inal inter est rates, and remain much too high. W hen the prim e rate stood at 20.5 percent, the inflation rate was approxim ately 10.5 percent, and the real rate o f interest stood at the historic level o f 10 percent. Now the prime rate has declined to 10.5 percent, and inflation to about 4 percent from levels a year ago. This represents a decline in real interest rates to about 7 percent. It m ay be that expectations o f inflation have not fallen as much as inflation, and this is delay ing the downward adjustment o f nom inal rates. However, a sub stantial further reduction in interest rates is called for at the pres ent time. Recommendation No. 34 Better coordination o f monetary and fiscal policies should be achieved through the budget process. The Federal Open M arket Com m ittee’s official projections for growth, inflation, and employ ment should be made consistent with the economic assumptions o f the budget resolution. A major weakness o f budget and econom ic policy planning in recent years has been failure to integrate monetary policy into the budget process. If the m onetary and fiscal authorities are operating on the basis o f economic assumptions and goals which conflict with those of Congress, then congressional forecasts o f the budget deficit are likely to be in error and the budget process itself is impaired.3 3 Representative Hawkins states: “ While I support the shift away from rigid monetarism which the Federal Reserve has maintained since 1979, and which greatly contributed to two re cessions, it is not entirely clear to me that they have indeed stated a change in position nor have they wholeheartedly endorsed a different monetary policy conducive to real economic growth.” 60 Coordination o f monetary and fiscal policies has been made diffi cult by the failure o f the Federal Reserve to provide Congress with a forecast o f real econom ic growth, inflation, and employment which it believes to be consistent with the monetary and credit tar gets established under the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act o f 1978. Instead, the Federal Reserve provided Congress with a wide “ range o f view s" o f the individual members o f the Federal Open Market Committee, which provided no basis for relating the Federal Reserve’s monetary targets to the final econom ic objec tives. As a result o f discussions with this Committee, the Federal Re serve has now changed its practice. The February 1983 Report to Congress under the Humphrev-Hawkins Act provides, for the first time, the “ central tendency’* of the Open Market Committee’s members’ views on growth, inflation, and unemployment. This “ central tendency’’ is tantamount to an official Federal Reserve forecast o f the expected consequences o f monetary policy. A sum mary of the forecast is given in Table II. TABLE II.— FEDERAL RESERVE OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE ECONOMIC FORECAST FOR 1983 [Midpoints of Ranges] FOMC Changes, 4th quarter to 4th quarter, percent: Nominal GNP........................................................................................................................ Real GNP............................................................................................................................. GNP deflator........................................................................................................................ Average level in the 4th quarter, percent: Unemployment ra te ....................................... Administration 8.5 4.0 4.5 10.15 8.8 3.1 5.6 10.4 CBO 8.9 4.0 4.7 f1) 1 Not available. Source: Federal Reserve Board. Now that the Federal Reserve has agreed to supply to Congress the econom ic forecast on which monetary policy is based, it is pos sible to proceed to the next step: integration o f the econom ic as sumptions underlying monetary policy with those underlying the Budget. The logical way to do this is through the First Concurrent Budget Resolution, as Congress recognized in 1982 when it includ ed language on m onetary policy in that Resolution. In preparing the First Concurrent Budget Resolution for 1983, the Budget Committees should seek common ground on econom ic forecasts with the Federal Reserve, in consultation with this Com mittee and with the Banking Committees of the House and Senate. Once such common ground has been achieved, language can be in cluded in the Budget Resolution which makes achievement of the econom ic goals assumed therein the policy o f the Federal Reserve. FISCAL POLICY IN 1 9 8 3 — RELIEF AND REFORM Recommendation No. 4 Congress should authorize and fund a significant jobs program. O f the 11.4 m illion people who were unemployed in January o f 1983, 23.4 percent, or nearly 3 m illion people, had been out o f work for over 27 weeks. That is a record proportion, and can be com- 61 pared with 10.7 percent o f a far sm aller number o f total unem ployed in the 1980 recession. Many o f the long-term unemployed have lost jobs that w ill never return. Many live in regions which have fallen into a long-standing state o f depression. These workers can expect, at best, only slow re absorption into the private sector as the econom y recovers. And the number o f long-term unemployed w ill rise as total un employment remains high. Under the Adm inistration’s forecast, total unemployment w ill remain above 10 percent on an annual average basis until 1985. W hile the policies we advocate in this Report would bring unemployment down more rapidly, they would still leave hunderds o f thousands o f the long-term unemployed without job offers in the private econom y until late in business cycle upturn. Under these circumstances, governm ent should act to provide jobs to the long-term unemployed. The program should be targeted on areas o f high unemployment, and it should provide useful work in m aintaining, repairing, and rehabilitating public facilities and essential public services. H iring should be nondiscriminatory, with priority to the long-term unem ployed, for a period of one year’s em ploym ent, and at an average cost per job below $15,000. The program should be designed to re spond quickly to changing conditions in the labor market. The design of a jobs program is necessarily a compromise be tween the need to hire people quickly, and the desire to em ploy them in their most productive uses. However, in a deep recession, there is no shortage o f useful work to be done, the priority should be to design programs which provide a range o f jobs which require relatively little capital equipment, and which provide opportunities at relatively modest wages to workers with varying skills. Repair o f public facilities and improved delivery o f public services should both be permitted work categories under this progam. Examples o f labor-entensive, relatively sm all-scale projects in clude rehabilitation o f public buildings; bridge painting and repair; maintenance o f roads, mass transit, and traffic control systems; maintenance o f water and sanitation systems; and improved drain age in flood-prone areas. Useful service em ploym ent can be created in the areas o f public health, safety, education, and child care. As studies o f programs operated during the 1970’s have shown, jobholders in such programs do benefit from the work experience. Especially for low-income participants, the programs resulted in future gains in employment and earnings. Equally im portant, the country benefits from the work that these men and women can do, in a time when the private econom y would not be able to offer them productive private-sector jobs. In order that jobs may be created quickly, state and local govern ments should be responsible for identifying areas where w ork is needed and programs can be organized prom ptly. Cost-sharing re quirements between Federal, state, and local governments should be encouraged as needed and appropriate to keep the Federal budget cost o f this program within desirable limits. 62 Recommendation No, 5 Congress should provide additional support this year for food , fuel, housing, and health care to low-income people. The Federal Government has a responsibility to see that emer gency needs for food, shelter, fuel, and health care are met. Addi tional resources should be provided to states and local communi ties, and to expand the capacity o f private charitable organizations to respond to the rising demand for their services. There are four specific areas in which Federal assistance can be directed prom ptly to those most in need. Distribution o f surplus food. The tem porary provision of surplus housing, for example on m ilitary bases. Authorization o f emergency home foreclosure relief, in the form o f assistance to the long-term unemployed in imminent danger o f mortgage foreclosure or, in the case o f renters, evic tion. Measures to extend health insurance coverage to unem ployed persons who have lost their own coverage. This is par ticularly urgent with respect to maternity and infant care. Prompt action on such measures does not remove the need to strengthen the m ajor incom e security programs. Many Am ericans now in need o f aid were never eligible for unemployment insur ance, public assistance, or other support programs that could nor m ally have helped them through hard times. Others would have been eligible under the law in effect before 1981, but became ineli gible just at the time they became needy. Congress should assure that eligibility for food stamps, AFDC, and Medicaid for low-incom e working people and the unemployed are not unduly restrictive. Many o f the cuts in means-tested programs in 1981 and 1982 have affected low-income working people who had previously relied on public assistance programs to supplement their incomes, their diets, and to provide health care which otherwise they could not afford. For example, in 1981, all fam ilies with incomes above $12,000 were excluded from the food stamp program, irrespective o f fam ily size. AFDC benefit reduction rates have been altered, so as to increase the benefit penalty associated with each dollar o f out side earnings. Changes in the “ income disregard” associated with work-related expenses (clothes, travel, tools, equipment, child care, etc.) have disqualified for AFDC needy families with heavy expend itures in these areas. In many o f these cases, disqualification for AFDC has also meant a loss o f Medicaid benefits. The standard o f living o f low-income people has been eroded by these changes, as has the ability o f the system o f public assistance to respond to the additional needs generated by the recession. In 1981, the proportion o f persons living in poverty increased by the largest amount since 1967, from 13.2 to 14.0 percent. That repre sents an increase o f 2.2 m illion persons, for a total o f 31.8 m illion.4 No doubt in 1982 the rate o f poverty rose even further. For many programs, expectations that lost Federal revenues would be replaced by state, local, and/or nonprofit organizations' Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, Series P-60 Number 134. 63 revenues have not materialized. Most state and local governments have not replaced lost Federal aid, partly because the iisca l effects o f the recession have impaired their ability to do so. .Because non profit organizations are so dependent on public support, reductions in Federal aid are forcing them to curtail activities also. Even if the recession ends in the next few months, its effects, and the effects o f program cuts, on low-incom e people w ill continue to be felt. There is thus a com pelling case for additional support o f food, fuel, housing, and health care to low-incom e people in 1983. Part should take the form o f funding for relief that can be dis pensed rapidly under existing law. But there is also no substitute for a truly effective safety net. There is no case for further reduc tions in means-tested benefit programs at this time. Recommendation No. 6 The Federal Supplemental Compensation program should be ex tended to provide 10 additional weeks o f coverage to those who have exhausted benefits, and to provide the current level o f coverage for workers who become newly eligible over the next nine months. Pro posals to cut eligibility for FSC by increasing the number o f weeks worked in the base period should be rejected. Consideration should be given to the use o f a national unemployment rate trigger as steps to reduce the Federal deficit take effect. Congress should suspend changes in the Extended Benefit pro gram that restrict availability o f the program in certain states and extend the two-year grace period on repayment o f Federal loans to state unemployment insurance programs.* Six and one-half m illion persons—about h alf o f the unem ployed—are currently drawing unem ploym ent insurance benefits. This compares to 70 percent o f the jobless at the height o f the 1974-1975 recession and to an average o f 60 percent for all seven previous postwar recessions. Until passage o f the Federal Supple mental Compensation program in September 1982, only about 40 percent o f those unemployed during this recession qualified for any jobless benefits. Since 1981, most states have responded to cost pressures by re stricting eligibility for the regular 26-week program. Federal law changes have also limited the ability o f states to qualify for the Ex tended Benefits program, which provides an additional 13 weeks o f benefits. Moreover, the rapid sequence o f the 1980 and 1981 reces sions prevented many o f the jobless from working long enough to establish or reestablish their eligibility for unemployment insur ance. And the numbers o f jobless persons exhausting their benefits keeps growing as weak labor markets persist. The Federal Supplemental Compensation program now provides a third tier o f benefits, adding either 8, 10, 12, 14, or 16 weeks to whatever regular and extended benefits are available. Since the length o f supplemental benefits depends upon a state’s unemploy m ent rate, most states can offer a total o f 40 weeks o f benefits. In several states with high unemployment, the com bination o f regu-5 5 Senator Bentsen agrees that Congress could consider the suspension of changes in the Ex tended Benefit program, and extending the two-year grace period on repayment o f Federal loans to state unemployment insurance programs, as the budget deficit is brought under control. 64 lar, extended, and supplemental benefits permits 55 weeks o f cover age. Federal supplemental benefits should be extended. An addi tional 10 weeks o f benefits should be provided to those who have exhausted their unemployment benefits, with current levels o f cov erage available to newly eligible workers. Consideration should be given to eventual use o f a national unemployment rate trigger. To reduce costs, the Adm inistration’s Fiscal 1984 budget would make it harder to qualify for the FSC program by requiring recipi ents to have worked 30 rather than 20 weeks in the base period used to determine eligibility. This change would deny benefits to an estimated 300,000 long-term unemployed persons and should be rejected. Meanwhile, because o f restrictions enacted in 1981, the second tier o f the system—the Extended Benefits program—is irrelevant for many states. Currently, 24 states and Puerto Rico qualify for extended benefits. Four states with double-digit unemployment rates are not eligible. The principal reasons are higher state trigger levels, which took effect in September 1982, and a change in the method o f calculating these rates. Because persons receiving ex tended benefits are now excluded in the computation o f the trigger rates, several states with severe unemployment—such as Michigan and Maryland—lost eligibility for extended benefits at times last year. If these changes were suspended, a total of 34 states would be able to offer extended benefits. If the former national trigger for the program still applied, extended benefits would be available in all states. Even with lower eligibility rates, the cost of unemployment in surance claims in this recession has risen. Double-digit unemploy ment brought expenditures on unemployment insurance close to $22 billion in 1982, up from $18 billion in 1981 and $16.5 billion in 1980. The states’ share, which finances the regular 26-week pro gram and one-half o f the cost of Extended Benefits, rose from $13.5 billion in 1980 to $20.3 billion in 1982. Many o f the hardest hit states, reluctant to raise payroll taxes on employers or cut benefits to the jobless any further, have borrowed heavily from the Federal Government to meet their program obli gations. As of January 31, 1983, 23 states plus District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands had accumulated debts o f more than $11.7 billion. At least 35 states are expected to have outstand ing loans in 1983. The 1981 budget reconcilation legislation changed the rules on borrowing by states whose revenues for unemployment insurance have run short. Interest charges—currently 10 percent—have been applied to states taking out loans after April 1982. After a two-year grace period, states with outstanding loans will see em ployer pay roll taxes go up unless their programs meet certain new standards for solvency. These requirements are ill timed in the context o f the current re cession. States with high levels of unemployment—those most likely to incur the debts— are least able to afford the penalty of higher payroll taxes. Nationwide, employers alreadv face an in crease in unemployment insurance payroll taxes o f $1.4 billion in 1983. Extending the two-year grace period would spare states with 65 high unemployment from the choice o f cutting program costs to deter the tax penalty or risking new losses o f industry and jobs. Recommendation No. 7 Congress should provide fiscal assistance to state and local gov ernments this year to avert sharp cuts in public services and regres sive tax increases. Such assistance should be phased out as the econ om y recovers. N o counterproductive cuts in programs benefiting state and local governments should be made this year. For the state and local sectors, 1981 and 1982 were years o f tran sition. New federalism took a major leap forward and the growth in Federal aid was reversed. A t the same tim e, the national econo m y was mired in a recession and interest rates were high. Taken together, these factors had far-reaching im plications for state and local governments. In October 1982, the Committee released its annual survey on the fiscal condition o f cities. Our 1981 survey had shown that the number o f cities running operating deficits was large. According to our latest report, five more cities were added to the list, bringing the proportion o f cities with operating deficits to 40 percent. Cities were projecting virtually no growth in revenues in 1982. For cities o f all sizes, revenues were expected to increase by 1.3 percent, a re duction o f approximately 6 percent in real terms. Expenditures were projected to increase by an average o f 7.8 percent. As a result, as many as 60 percent o f the respondents may have incurred a cur rent deficit in 1982 unless expenditures were reduced or revenues raised. The survey also found that the buffer generally provided by carryover balances has continued to decrease, thereby reducing the margin for fiscal error. Finally, our respondents indicated that city work forces have once again declined and were expected to decline further in 1982. According to a survey o f 41 states conducted by the National Governors Association (NGA) and the National Association o f State Budget Officers (NASBO), these states expected to end FY 1982 with a combine surplus o f $1.6 billon, and FY 1983 with a $2.0 bil lion deficit. This compares to a surplus o f $11.8 billion as recently as 1980. Nine states—California, Colorado, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Verm ont, Virginia, and W iscon sin—are currently projecting budget deficits for the end o f the fiscal year. Only six months ago, FY 1983 revenues were expected to be $8 billion higher than current projections and expenditures were pro jected to exceed current estimates by $5 billion. NGA concludes, “ the Report quantifies the devastating im pact the recession has had on state revenues. As bleak as these totals are, the fiscal situa tion in the states is probably worse than portrayed here.” 6 Because all states except Verm ont are prohibited from running deficits, discretionary actions to reduce expenditures and increase revenues have been implemented. The results are tax rate hikes, program reductions, and employment layoffs. State tax increases in 1982 were the largest in more than a decade. Four states raised their incom e taxes; five increased their sales taxes; and nearly half 6National Governors Association News Release, January 7,1983. 66 of the states have increased other taxes or fees. In addition, budg etary pressures have forced 26 states to cut back their 1982 and 1983 budgets after those budgets had already been proposed or en acted; 32 states imposed either across-the-board or selective spend ing cuts—or both—for fiscal year 1982 or 1983; 33 imposed hiring lim itations; 18 laid o ff employees; and eight initiated furloughs. High interest rates and the severity o f the national recession have exacerbated state and local fiscal problems. According to the Bond Buyer Index, interest rates on municipal bonds in 1982 aver age 11.6 percent. Although recently interest rates have been declin ing, at 9.5 percent they still outpace the Bond Buyer Index for the 1970’s, which average only 6.95 percent. Thus, for $75 billion in long-term borrowing in 1982, state and local governments are com mitted to paying over $3 billion more in interest costs over the course o f the loans than they would have if the same level o f bor rowing occurred in the 1970’s. What is more, unemployment has reduced state and local rev enues, while increasing the need for additional social services. In particular, cyclically sensitive taxes, such as those on sales and income which are buoyed during inflationary periods tend to de cline the most during recessions. Due to the seriousness o f the re cession, property tax revenues, which have grown rapidly in recent years, are also tapering off. The Community Development Block Grant program provides one means that additional funds could be provided to state and local governments to relieve distress and at the same tim e lessen fiscal pressure. At least $1 billion in additional CDBG funds could be made available and used effectively this year. The State and Local Fiscal Assistance A ct (general revenue sharing could also be made into a vehicle for a tem porary increase in general fiscal assistance to local governments. Recommendation No. 8 The July 1, 1983, 10 percent personal income tax reduction should be capped at a maximum benefit o f $700 per taxpayer, preserving the fu ll benefit o f the cut for all taxpayers earning less than $46,500. Steps are needed this year to establish that Congress is prepared and determined to cut the budget deficit in future years. One step, which would have no adverse effect on recovery this year, would be to place a $700 cap on the benefit received from the July 1, 1983, 10 percent personal incom e tax reduction. A cap on the July 1, 1983, tax reduction would raise $1 billion in fiscal year 1983, $5 billion in fiscal year 1984, $7 billion in fiscal year 1985, and progressively larger sums thereafter. Over a threeto five-year period, it would more than com pletely pay back the cost o f a significant jobs program. Alternatively, such a cap would more than offset the additional cost o f needed relief programs in 1983 and 1984. A cap would only affect those taxpayers currently earning over $46,500 per year, who have received m ore benefit from the tax reductions already put into effect in 1981 and 1982. A ll other taxpayers would receive the full 10 percent reduction in their taxes on July 1. 67 Such a cap, finally, would be good for the economy. In the cur rent state o f the economy, the urgent priority is for additional spending power to set the recovery moving; a cap on the third year o f Kemp-Roth would promote this objective, by helping to lower in terest rates, reverse expectations o f high future deficits, and pro vide resources that are needed to bring about an end to the reces sion this year. F IS C A L P O L IC Y I N 1 9 8 4 - 8 6 — R E C O N S T R U C T IO N Recommendation No. 9: Congress should put in place in 1983 a fa ir and effective deficit reduction program for Fiscal Years 1984-1986. To sustain the recovery beyond this year, the budget deficits from Fiscal 1984 through 1988 must be reduced well below the levels currently projected. The growth in spending projected through 1988 must be reduced as part o f this effort, but no ade quate cut can be made in projected deficits unless we also consider revenues. The current situation is unprecedented. D eficits projected for 1984 and beyond actually increase, even if the econom y recovers from the recession. The Federal deficit would rise to almost $300 billion by Fiscal 1988, even under optim istic assumptions about the performance o f the economy between now and then. In the past, Federal deficits have fallen, not risen, during recov ery periods. During a recovery, the deficit should decline, Tax receipts nor m ally rise as people go back to work, businesses become profitable, and incomes grow, while safety net expenditures norm ally decline. A gradual reduction in the deficit during recovery also serves to keep the economy from expanding too quickly and thus reduces in flationary pressures. Deficits o f the size projected for 1984 through 1988 would tend to induce another cycle o f inflation and recession if the econom y re covers as projected. Greater long-term stimulus is likely to bring about a more rapid return o f inflation. Should this actually be our fiscal policy, the Federal Reserve could com e under pressure to tighten money and create another recession before the econom y has fully recovered from this one. Recommendation No. 10: Personal income tax indexing should be repealed. 7 The base o f both " ’ ? tax and o f the corporate special emphasis on the income tax should elimination o f tax expenditures which are obsolete, inefficient, or particularly regressive, and on reform o f depreciation schedules to improve the neutrality o f the tax code with respect to different classes o f investment. We oppose proposals for broad-based regressive consumption taxes. Personal income tax indexing should be repealed. W ith inflation for 1984 and 1985 projected at 4 to 5 percent, the purpose o f index 7 Senator Bentsen feels that, in light of the large budget deficit, personal income tax indexing should be deferred. 68 ing—to protect taxpayers from bracket creep—is no longer com pel ling. But the projected deficits for 1985 and beyond are a com pel ling argument in favor o f the repeal o f indexing. From 1985 through 1988, the Administration projects a cumulative deficit o f $601 billion. Repeal o f indexing would reduce the deficit by $90 bil lion without imposing a new tax on anyone. Indexing o f income taxes would be bad economic policy even under a better current outlook for the deficit. In periods o f infla tion, indexing would inject economic stimulus by cutting tax rates, at just the time when good economic policy would call for restraint. Under such circum stances—accelerating inflation, rising deficits— interest rates would be certain to rise. Thus, indexing would active ly promote the vicious sequence o f inflation and recession which econom ic policy ought to be devoted to defeating. Broadening the tax base by eliminating loopholes Wtft help reduce the deficit while improving the fairness o f the tax code. The base o f the personal incom e tax code has become riddled with ex emptions and deductions. W hile some serve a useful purpose, chan neling private spending into activities that would otherwise be un derfunded, all com plicate the tax statutes, serve to erode the tax base, and in their aggregate contribute to a lack o f public confi dence in the tax system. A recent study prepared for the Joint Economic Committee by the Treasury Department found that the top 4.4 percent o f taxpay ers in 1981—those making $50,000 or more—received a more that proportionate share o f the benefits o f 13 out o f 33 tax expenditures examined.8 The study found some major tax expenditures to be highly regressive, such as the exclusion o f interest on state and local bonds, with 94.1 percent o f the benefits going to the most af fluent taxpayers, and the capital gains exclusion, 63.5 percent o f which goes to the wealthiest taxpayers. Selective loophole closing will improve the progressivity o f effec tive tax rates, and make possible further m odification o f the mar ginal rate structure. In its purest form, with no deductions o f ex emptions, a flat rate tax would entail a massive shift o f the tax burden from upper-income to middle-income taxpayers. But a lower marginal rate structure that incorporated some o f the more pro gressive deductions and exemptions can be designed to expand the tax base, and still make the overall tax system more progressive and more equitable. At present, virtually all o f the measures under consideration to reduce the deficits for 1984 and beyond would increase the tax burden on individuals. Corporations should pay their fair share o f new revenues. Such measures should aim to improve the neutrality o f the tax system with respect to types o f business investment. The Acceler ated Cost Recovery System, enacted in 1981 to reduce taxes on new investment, has acted to subsidize short-lived assets, such as auto mobiles and m achinery, at the expense o f long-lived assets, such as factories and structures. This non-neutrality o f the business tax 8 Letter and tables transmitted to Chairman Henry S. Reuse on September 28, 1982, by John E. Chapoton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy. 69 system cuts efficiency and wastes resources. This provision o f the corporate income fay needs to be revised as the econom y recovers. Finally, we oppose proposafs for regressive tax increases on con sumption, such as a value-added tax or a national sales tax. Such a tax would fall unfairly on moderate and lower incom e households who devote a larger percentage o f their incom es to consumption, at a time when such households are already suffering a considerable increase in the proportion o f the total tax burden which they bear. A VAT or national sales tax would also be inflationary, since it would be added directly to the price o f goods sold at retail. And such a tax would greatly increase the burden o f paperwork, espe cially on small businesses who would have to absorb the additional costs out o f their already recession-diminished profits. Recommendation No. 11: M ilitary spending increases should be slow ed for the immediate future by more prudent decisions with respect to weapons system s and to procurement, rather than through cuts which w ill affect the recruitment and retention o f qualified m ilitary personnel or their combat readiness. The defense budget is at the core o f governm ents commitment to protect the Nation in a perilous world. However, there can be no serious effort to hold down governm ent spending if the defense budget is not addressed. The large increases planned for defense are disturbing from an econom ic perspective because our experi ence has been that too rapid m ilitary buildups lead to waste and inefficiency. There are additional problems. Under present circumstances, the rapid planned m ilitary buildup is contributing significantly to the budget deficits. Further, the higher level o f defense spending w ill probably result in some crowding out o f private investment. The present m ilitary buildup is a consequence o f spending in creases proposed by the Adm inistrations o f form er President Carter and President Reagan and is the largest buildup in our peacetime history. The defense budget, not including the m ilitary com ponent of the space program and other defense-related activi ties, is scheduled to grow in terms o f budget authority from $214 billion in fiscal year 1982 to $445 billion in fiscal year 1988. M urray Weidenbaum, form er Chairman o f the Council o f Eco nom ic Advisers, testified before this Committee on December 15, 1982, that, toward the middle o f the decade, when significant eco nom ic growth may coincide with the peak o f the m ilitary buildup, three results o f the buildup can be anticipated: the substantial transfer o f resources in the durable goods sector to defense produc tion may increase relative prices for the Defense Department and private purchasers; increased demand may produce delays in the delivery o f military goods; and some crowding out o f private invest ment may occur. Prim arily, the proposed defense increases are for procurem ent of weapons and equipment. When calculated as a percentage o f the overall manufacturing base o f the national economy, these in creases represent an upward surge. There is reason for concern about the capacity o f the defense industries to make deliveries on schedule and about the ability o f the Defense Department to 70 manage its procurem ent programs. If deliveries cannot be made on time, bottleneck problems and cost increases will ensue, with possi ble inflationary effects on the general economy. There is presently so much excess capacity in Am erican industry that capacity problems are unlikely for the next year or two. How ever, the persistence o f cost problems in defense production has been widely noted. The latest defense deflator statistics show a slowdown o f inflation in the defense sector which is less than has occurred in the rest o f the economy. The findings o f recent studies o f the management o f defense pro curement are equally disturbing. A study issued by the Committee last year noted that, unless the trend o f cost overruns is reversed, the cycle o f higher unit costs leading to increased budgets and in creased budgets contributing to higher unit costs w ill be perpetuat ed.9 Two studies perform ed in the Defense Department, portions o f which were made available to the press, conclude that cost esti mates o f m ajor weapons programs continue to be unrealistically op timistic: “ actual procurem ent costs usually exceed the planning es timates.” 101Studies by the Heritage Foundation and others demon strate the relative ineffectiveness so far o f efforts to control cost growth in defense procurem ent.11 Defense spending could crowd our private investment whether or not there are capacity problems if, as seems likely, monetary policy does not accommodate the increased defense spending or the poten tially induced increase in nominal and real GNP. In his testim ony before this Committee, Otto Eckstein stated that, under this condi tion, defense spending crowds out private spending even in a period o f general slack unless taxes are increased. Dr. Eckstein said, “ In the current circum stance, it must be recognized that we have chosen the path o f a massive increase in defense spending without asking the public to pay for it.” The defense buildup, he continued, combined with the tax cuts constitute “ the origin o f the enormous deficit problem and forces us to consider the question to what extent the growth o f aggregate supply, i.e., the long-run growth o f the econom ic potential o f the country, will be damaged by a de fense boom that is not paid for.” To avoid this consequence, m ajor tax increases would be necessary to adequately finance the defense buildup. A slowdown in the rate o f defense increases can produce signifi cant budgetary savings. The defense spending increases proposed by the Adm inistration w ill average about 7 percent real annual growth over the next five years. If annual growth o f defense budget authority is trimmed to, say, 5 percent, the five-year savings would be approxim ately $129 billion, or about $26 billion per year. W ith a 3 percent growth rate, the savings in budgetary authority would be about $228 billion for the five years, or $46 billion annually. 9 “ The Defense Buildup and the Economy,” p. 29, a staff study prepared for the Subcommittee on Economic Goals and Intergovernmental Policy. 10 Quoted in the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 7, 1982. 11 “Agenda ’83,” edited by Richard Holwill (Heritage Foundation, 1983). 71 Recommendation No. 12: Entitlements programs should not he exempt from review as part o f the broader effort to reduce budget deficits in future years. Entitlements are at the core o f governm ent’s commitment to the well-being o f the elderly, the sick, and the handicapped and dis abled. There will always be a significant need for the services that entitlement programs provide and for the rights that they convey: the right to reasonable nutrition, health care, a retirem ent incom e, and to basic income support for those who cannot support them selves. In the present recession, entitlem ent programs are hard pressed. The demand for their services has risen, and at the same time many currently ineligible people are in need o f assistance. Now is a time when basic entitlement programs should be protected, not de molished. The first priority in reducing the budget deficit should be re duced growth in m ilitary spending and improved revenues. A t the same time, no serious effort to reduce the budget deficit in future years can ignore certain aspects o f the entitlem ent programs. There remains room for streamlined operation o f these programs which will not undermine the well-being o f those who are necessar ily dependent on them. Entitlement programs have been plagued in the past by faulty adjustments for rises in the cost o f living, which have either over stated or understated the actual effect o f inflation on the recipient group. It is probably impossible to predict in advance just how any particular indexing mechanism m ight distort cost-of-living adjust ments. Congress should therefore retain the flexibility to adjust future cost-of-living payments to compensate for unintended under payments or overpayments on a case-by-case basis, if they occur. Second, health care costs continue to rise at double-digit rates de spite the recession. It is quite apparent that only a m ajor reform in the finance, delivery, and pricing o f health care is likely to bring this aspect o f the entitlement sector under control. Congress should be prepared to implement health care cost containm ent well before the projected financial difficulties o f the M edicare trust fund are upon us. IN T E R N A T IO N A L E C O N O M IC P O L IC Y The problems o f our domestic econom y—unemployment, stagna tion, high real interest rates—are now m ore closely linked to the fate o f the world economy than ever before. Today, alm ost every nation is trying to lim it its imports and boost its exports—while at the same time continuing with domestic austerity to fight inflation or, in the case o f LDC’s, to conserve scarce foreign exchange. This is a form ula for worldwide depression. Economic recovery abroad depends on an early and strong eco nom ic recovery in the United States. A t the same tim e, sustained econom ic recovery in the United States w ill require a revival in the rest o f the world. U.S. policy must therefore be designed to foster both domestic and international recovery as close to each other in tim e as possible. 72 Recommendation No. 13 The overvaluation o f the U.S. dollar must be ended. The principal means for correcting the overvaluation o f the dollar is through lower U.S. interest rates. The overvalued dollar has cost the U.S. econom y over one m illion jobs. It has contributed significantly to the rise in protectionist pressures in this country. During all previous postwar recessions, the U.S. trade balance improved, because demand for imports slackened along with demand for dom estic goods. The reason for the deterioration this time is the overvalued dollar, which has made U.S. goods less com petitive. Estimates o f the relative loss o f com petitiveness in 1982 alone range from 20 to 30 percent. The high dollar also has worsened the debt crisis and inflation for the oil-dependent developing countries. Global oil prices are de nominated in dollars. The currencies o f developing countries have depreciated against the dollar so much that the price o f im ported oil is almost twice as high for them as it is for the United States. Thus, their balance-of-payments positions, already strained by high interest payments on their debt and slackened demand for their ex ports, have been further eroded. When, in 1981, the dollar began appreciating strongly against the other m ajor currencies, the principal reason was the sizable in terest rate differential between the United States and Germany and Japan. Interest rates here began dropping during the late spring, thus narrowing the interest rate differential. In November, the dollar began to fall relative to the Japanese yen and the German mark. The decline against the yen has been striking. This trend is most welcome, and will, we hope, continue. Further prog ress in the realignm ent o f our currency depends on further prog ress in getting interest rates down. Recommendation No. H The United States Government must seek to assure the proper en forcement o f existing trade laws and seek elimination o f foreign trade barriers which lim it our exports. As the fourth year o f the world recession begins, trading part ners are eyeing each other with increased hostility. The GATT M inisterial M eeting failed to alter the drift towards protection. The present recession poses the severest test o f open trade since the Great Depression. W ith exports comprising a substantial share o f each nation’s production, more and more jobs depend upon them, and the use o f direct or indirect government export subsidies abroad has grown sharply. This Nation should take the lead in re building a m ultilateral trade system free o f such subsidies. As part o f that process, we must be w illing to counter export subsidies on a case-by-case basis, as we did in the recent sale o f one m illion m etric tons o f wheat flour to Egypt. And, Congress should m eet the Ad m inistration’s request for $2.67 billion in standby funds to enforce the 22-nation agreem ent signed last year lim iting such governm ent export subsidies. Since the world has profited so much from open trade, we should continually remind and demonstrate to our trad ing partners that any short-term gains for particular sectors 73 through protection may be offset by long-term disadvantages to other sectors, and to their economies as a whole. The traditional merits o f open trade—enhanced competition at home, benefits for consumers in variety, price, and quality, and im provements in the general welfare from international specializa tion—are still theoretically valid. In today’s competitive arena, we must be prepared to act firm ly against imports which are subsi dized or dumped, providing only that there has been injury to do mestic producers. We should use the “ escape clause” in the trade law which provides for im port restraints—usually temporary and phased out over a period o f years—where domestic industry has been injured, even if the imports in question are neither subsidized nor dumped. When other countries follow a similar policy, we should insist on our right to compensation. U.S. traders have recently sought protection under Section 301 o f the 1974 Trade Act as amended by the Trade Agreements A ct o f 1979. This reflects a concern that the GATT dispute settlement mechanisms are inadequate to protect U.S. rights. Section 301 pro vides the President with authority to impose restrictions against individual countries in retaliation against “ unjustifiable” or “ un reasonable” foreign trade practices. We cannot tolerate the cre ation o f any disingenuous ways o f excluding Am erican exports. Ours is still the largest market, and we should be prepared to close down some o f it in response to unfair trade practices. The enlargement and fairness o f trade remain our primary inter ests. We must avoid enacting laws which would force us to require bilateral, sectoral, or product-by-product reciprocity, but we should be prepared to pursue such policies when they serve the national interest. The relief we do provide—for those industries which quali fy as most affected by import competition—should be structured to build a viable multilateral trade system. Recommendation No. 15 Congress should support the requested increase in the lending au thority o f the IM F. Global economic interdependence is illustrated nowhere so well as in the LDC foreign debt problem. As more countries find it diffi cult to repay their debts, the possibility o f one or more defaults, the failure of several major banks, and an international financial collapse must be considered. Short o f such an eventuality, it is likely that some o f the debt may never be repaid. The problems ex perienced by the developing nations have already caused them to reduce their purchases from the United States and the West. The developing nations purchase 40 percent o f the goods and services exported by the OECD countries and about the same percentage o f U.S. exports. Any contraction o f credit from the West to the LDC’s w ill cause a greater reduction o f Western exports and is bound to aggravate unemployment. The total foreign debt of the LDC’s reached about $640 billion in 1982, an increase o f 200 percent since 1978. The heavy burden o f this debt is evidenced by the fact that the interest payments alone represented between 30-45 percent o f LDC exports. Commercial banks account for approximately $375 billion o f the total debt. 74 The debt problem is due largely to circumstances beyond the con trol o f the debtor countries. These circumstances are the rise in oil prices, higher interest rates, and the global recession. Since the oil shocks o f the 1970’s the costs of oil imports for the oil im porting developing nations have risen from 6 percent o f total im port costs in 1973 to 20 percent today. The rise in interest rates caused the average interest rate on outstanding long-term debt to rise from 4.5 percent in 1973-1977 to 8.5 percent in 1981-1982. At the same time, the global recession has depressed commodity prices and made export markets in the West and elsewhere less profitable. So far, the nations who borrowed the most are the ones having problems. Not all foreign debtors face debt payment interruptions. The largest o f those who have problems made serious econom ic mistakes. Poland and Brazil followed a high-growth strategy which required huge foreign loans and involved high risks. M exico was unable to adjust to the decline o f demand for oil, on which it had based its development strategy, and kept incurring large deficits. Argentina and Chile allowed their currency exchange rates to be overvalued and there, as elsewhere, debt got out o f hand. The United States and other industrial nations undoubtedly made policy mistakes that led to recession, or at least failed to make the adjustments to such changes as the oil shocks that would have avoided recession. The commercial banks and the governm ent regu latory authorities also made their share o f mistakes. The difficult problem is allocating the costs o f solving the problems. The international banks and most economists agree that the IMF replenishment is intended only as a partial solution, to provide much needed immediate credit and to encourage the com m ercial banks, which provide most o f the loans to the LDC’s, to continue flows o f new financing. Secretary Regan has warned the commer cial banks that enabled LDC borrowers to run up dept— “ some o f it nonproductive and nonforeign exchange earning” —o f the dangers should they attempt to reduce exposure during the adjustment process that is underway. Whether the IMF replenishment is viewed as a stop-gap effort or part of an overall strategy, it will have no lasting effect unless there is a sustained recovery from the global recession. To restore business and consumer confidence worldwide, Secretary Regan has said, there must be “ a set of economic policies in the m ajor indus trialized countries that will produce economic growth and a counter to the risks of inward-looking protectionism .” The consen sus is that a recovery must be led by the United Stated. The Ad ministration should take the opportunity of the W illiam sburg summit to assure our allies o f our commitment to pursue strong economic growth in the United States, and to secure their coopera tion in a coordinated program o f global economic expansion. An important question for Congress is whether the Adm inistra tion’s IMF request is made in the context of a broader econom ic strategy likely to bring about a strong, sustained econom ic recov ery. If there is no recovery or only a weak one, replenishing the IMF and other recent emergency actions could prove to be first-aid measures that were too little, too late. It is possible for further debt troubles to arise this year, even if recovery gets underway, and 75 some economists are predicting that an additional IMF replenish ment might be needed in the near future. Recommendation No. 16 A n y increase in the IM F quota should he accompanied by actions to tighten oversight o f foreign lending. In recent years, an increasing share o f the debt has been under taken on market-related terms, from com m ercial banks, and at short maturity. These trends cause special concern. For one thing, short-term loans have been increasingly relied upon to finance long-term development projects. This posed no problem while hanks were willing to rollover previous loans. Since the onset o f the debt troubles, banks have becom e reluctant to provide roll overs. The U.S. bank regulatory agencies should increased their ability to m onitor foreign lending by U.S. banks. Inform ation about short term loans is inadequate, causing borrowers and lenders to under estim ate potential problems. They are also difficult for govern ments and private organizations to monitor. The previously undis closed large amount o f com m ercial short-term loans caused many governm ent officials and private specialists to be surprised by the total indebtedness o f some o f the countries whose problems were made public in 1982. In an effort to develop better data, the Interagency Country Ex posure Review Committee o f the three U.S. bank regulatory agen cies has met three times a year since the spring o f 1979 to review the findings o f its examiners. Countries that interrupted or were about to interrupt debt servicing were designated “ classified,” and others designated as “ weak,” “ m oderately strong,” and “ strong.” The designations are, in effect, a system o f credit ratings. However, there is no indication that he system has had any effect on foreign lending so far. It is possible to correct the deficiencies in the system without cre ating a new government agency. First, the authority o f the inter agency committee can be enlarged and its m onitoring o f foreign lending practices increased. Second, the functions o f the inter agency committee can be enlarged to provide an im portant step to wards an international clearinghouse o f inform ation about foreign lending. As a first stage, the interagency com m ittee can collect in form ation about foreign lending by U.S. banks and make it availa ble to government officials in the Executive Branch and Congress, as w ell as to the financial community. A ll that would remain is for other governments to provide sim ilar inform ation about the foreign lending o f their banks and to exchange such inform ation with the United States and other countries. II. To Sustain G rowth Recommendation No. 17 Cooperative policies to fight inflation must be developed as the economy recovers. Inflation is in remission. The Consumer Price Index rose by only 3.9 percent for the 12-month period ending in December 1982, which is less than one-half o f the inflation rate in 1981, and less than one-third o f the inflation rate in 1980. Food prices, housing, and energy prices all rose much less than in previous years, and interest costs fell. Only medical costs failed to moderate during 1982, rising 11.1 percent. For the immediate future, the inflation outlook is good. Falling oil prices in recent days w ill probably mean a substantial further slowdown in the CPI in the months ahead. There continue to be large agricultural stocks overhanging the market, assuring rela tively stable food prices. Wage settlements will continue to be very moderate, given the depressed condition o f the labor market. Rapid productivity growth in the early phases o f the recovery, a standard cyclical phenomenon, w ill further ease pressure on prices o f manu factured goods. Only the prospect o f a falling dollar—otherwise de sirable—might im ply some increase in prices in the year ahead. But the relief from inflation during 1982 was due almost entirely to the recession. Inflation followed a pattern which is entirely char acteristic o f the postwar business cycle. During the 1974-1975 re cession, for example, as the unemployment rate rose from 5 to 9 percent, the inflation rate fell from 12.2 percent (in 1974) to 4.8 per cent (in 1976), which is roughly comparable to the experience o f the past three years. Unhappily, recovery periods have almost always brought re newed inflation after a few years. Indeed, the experience since the early 1960’s has been o f progressively worse inflation in each suc ceeding business cycle. There is no guarantee that today’s low rate o f inflation, an artifact o f recession, will persist once econom ic growth is restored. The best historical evidence suggests the re verse: inflation will return a few years after growth returns, unless strong and effective policies are implemented to stop it. By far the best and most durable way to combat inflation is to raise the rate o f productivity growth. Each additional point o f pro ductivity permits an equivalent increase in real incom es without putting any pressure on prices. The recommendations which follow in this section outline a broad program which would meet the chal lenge o f increasing productivity, and so sustaining growth while keeping inflation at bay. In addition, measures w ill be needed to prevent chronic sources o f inflation in our econom y from getting out o f control. This can only be done effectively on a permanent basis if the principal play (7 6) 77 ers—business, labor, and governm ent—are brought together at all levels, with a common purpose, and with the tools necessary to forge and implement a consensus policy against inflation. Compul sory, short-term policies implemented against the will o f major eco nomic sectors cannot, on past experience, be sustained. The Admin istration and Congress should take advantage o f the time available while inflation remains in remission to consider and choose a strat egy to prevent inflation from returning. No one should be lulled into the complacent assumption that inflation has disappeared in definitely from our national life. TR A IN IN G A N D JOB SERVICES Recommendation No. 18 The newly enacted job training and dislocated worker assistance program needs increased funding. Many workers need to equip themselves with new skills to com pete for jobs when the economy does improve. Am ong other groups, youth and other new entrants to the labor market, the econom ical ly disadvantaged, and workers displaced from long-term jobs in contracting industries could benefit from the opportunity to im prove their training or educational background. Such investments w ill also benefit the Nation through higher levels o f productivity, employment, and output o f goods and services. Beginning in Fiscal 1984, a new job training law w ill take effect, replacing programs operated under the Comprehensive Employ ment and Training Act (CETA). State and local areas w ill receive funding for such services as job counseling classroom training and education, and on-the-job training. Ninety percent o f program par ticipants must be econom ically disadvantaged: 40 percent o f the funds—excluding those reserved for summer programs—must be used for youth. The Administration requested $1.9 billion for job training under the new Act in its FY 1984 budget. Even with the stricter focus on low-income groups, state and local programs could effectively uti lize substantially higher amounts. The new law is structured to strengthen the involvement o f private em ployers in the design and operation of training programs. This effort deserves stronger fund ing. Also, the Administration has recommended $240 m illion for a new dislocated worker assistance program. This level should be ap proved to enable job search assistance, retraining, relocation assist ance and supportive services for workers whose plants closed, and for other long-term unemployed. The experience with seven Feder al demonstration projects and other prom ising state initiatives should serve to guide the design o f these programs. Recommendation No. 19 State unemployment insurance laws should be m odified to encour age training and education, while avoiding measures which have a punitive effect on those unable to work. The unemployment insurance system is currently structured to provide short-term income replacement. W ithout undercutting this vital function, certain revisions in unemployment insurance pro 78 grams would enable workers to develop their skills and move into jobs more quickly. Such program should be designed so as to make this option available to those for whom it would be useful, while not punishing or denying unemployment insurance eligibility to those for whom retraining is not a sensible option. Three states have amended their unemployment insurance laws to encourage sharing o f available work during a downturn. Under such arrangements, workers who would otherwise be laid o ff but remain on the payroll for shorter hours could receive a prorated unemployment insurance benefit. Firms are induced to retain these workers because they w ill save on rehiring and retraining costs once business picks up. Sometimes, the worker's downtime is profit ably used for retraining. In California, which enacted the first work sharing legislation four years ago, 4,485 employers and 174,000 employees have made use o f the provision. Another approach might be to establish a separate training ac count, financed jointly by contributions from workers and employ ers. Resembling an individual retirement account (IRA) in concept, these training accounts would accumulate contributions and inter est while the worker is on the job, until a sufficient threshold, per haps $6,000 per worker, is reached. A displaced worker could then use the funds from this account like a voucher, to pay for educa tion, retraining, relocation, or related expenses. W hile self-financ ing, the account could be linked to the unemployment insurance system, by requiring workers to draw on the funds after collecting unemployment insurance for some period o f time. The Committee urges through examination o f these ideas and their econom ic im plications. W hile struck by the imaginativeness of the training account proposal, the Committee notes that the method o f financing is equivalent to a new payroll tax on workers and employers. In view o f the weak economy and already high pay roll tax levels, such a tax is not advisable at this time. Recommendation No. 20 The functions o f the Employment Service should be enlarged, with greater efforts to expand use o f the Service by applicants and employers. Additional resources and sta ff should also be provided to offices administering unemployment insurance. The U.S. Employment Service (ES) serves as a labor-exchange for individuals seeking work and for employers with job openings. Its activities include counseling, testing, vocational guidance, and job referrals. By producing better matches between workers and jobs, an efficient system o f job information and placement assistance will result in higher productivity. It can save the Nation billions o f dollars by helping to shorten spells o f unemployment and reduce periods o f dependence on transfer payments from the government. The new job training act includes the most significant revisions o f the Employment Service Act since its passage 50 years ago. The law relieves the Enployment Service o f functions like m igrant and seasonal farm -workers' housing inspections, alien labor certifica tions, and unemployment insurance work test verifications, thereby providing a greater proportion o f ES funding for its labor-exchange function. Also, the funding formula is altered to concentrate great- 79 er resources upon the training and counseling needs o f hard-topiace applicants. Computerized innovations have substantially improved the effec tiveness o f ES in making tim ely and accurate job matches. Howev er, advanced technology must be accompanied by capable personnel service, including efforts to improve relations with employers. Double-digit unemployment has naturally increased demand on unemployment insurance offices and branches o f the Employment Service. Unemployment insurance offices have endured sharp re ductions in permanent staff while the job service was recently denied a much-needed increase in personnel. As the long lines o f people demonstrate, service to the public has deteriorated. Proper staffing for unemployment insurance and Employment Service of fices w ill help to ensure better inform ation to job seekers and speed the process o f reemployment. Recommendation No. 21 Equal employment opportunity laws should be enforced vig orously, with adequate funding for enforcement activity. Blacks, Hispanics, and women continue to experience significant labor market disadvantages by com parison with whites and males, and it should continue to be a vigorous Federal policy to root out discrim inatory sources o f those problems. According to a November 1982 study by the U.S. Civil Rights Commission,1 Blacks, Hispanics, and women are m ore heavily rep resented in all categories o f em ployment hardship than they are in the general population. These measures include unemployment, in term ittent employment, involuntary part-time employment, mar ginal jobs, workers in poverty households, overqualification for the job held, and low pay. These disparities are present in all phases o f the business cycle, and across the spectrum o f industries and re gions. Not all o f the disadvantaged position o f these and other m inority groups is due to discrimination that can be reached effectively under current statutes. But some is. M oreover, it is longstanding Federal policy to reduce such discrim ination. The need for the Fed eral Government to run efficient, adequately staffed, and effective anti-discrimination enforcem ent efforts is clear. The Justice De partment, Office o f Federal Contract Compliance, and Equal Em ploym ent Opportunity Commission should reaffirm a strong com mitment to Title VII o f the Civil Rights A ct o f 1964 and other job anti-discrimination measures. EDUCATION AN D SCIENCE Recommendation No. 22 Education at all levels must be improved. Federal funds should be provided to raise the technical level o f primary, secondary, and higher education, and to assure more equal educational opportunity across all regions, and for the disadvantaged. 1 “ Unemployment and Underemployment Among Blacks, Hispanics and Women," U.S. Civil Rights Commission, November 1982. 80 The growth and competitiveness of the United States economy over the long run w ill depend in large part on the quality and level o f education o f the Am erican work force. The present system o f education in the United States has not produced the necessary numbers o f workers with high levels o f skills in math, science, and analytical ability. But that problem can be solved only in conjunc tion with a general program o f improvement in our system o f edu cation. The Federal Government has an important role to play in educa tion. It is Federal resources which make possible a narrowing in what would otherwise be vast differentials in educational resources per pupil across States, and in different communities within States. It is Federal resources which provide opportunities for the educa tionally disadvantaged to participate more fully in econom ic life. By providing for a more even distribution o f educational opportuni ty, the Federal Government has made possible the creation o f a much more broadly based skilled labor force than would otherwise be the case. There is evidence, moreover, that Federal assistance to education is effective. For example, the basic test scores o f students in large urban school districts receiving substantial Federal assistance have risen. So have the cognitive skills o f socially and econom ically dis advantaged children who participate in Title I programs. So, clear ly, have the handicapped and otherwise educationally disabled, whose participation in a normal curriculum has been made possi ble by Federal funds. Under the Reagan Adm inistration, funds to meet all o f the objec tives of national education policy, particularly with respect to the disadvantaged, the handicapped, and to general educational re sources in lower incom e states and communities, have been cut. The fiscal year 1983 budget for elementary and secondary educa tion, for example, was $4.4 billion, which was $2 billion less than would have been required to maintain programs at their fiscal year 1982 levels. These sharp cuts reflect a reduced level o f investment in the next generations o f Americans, which could mean eventual productivity and competitiveness lower than can be achieved through strong and effective education. One area o f special concern is the declining quality o f technical education in the United States today. The Nation's potential for scientific and technological advance ment depends directly on the quality o f the scientific and technical education received by its students and on the numbers o f students who enter these fields. In the area o f mathematics, science, foreign languages, and technology education, we are currently witnessing a decline in student achievement, a drop in the number o f students studying advanced science and mathematics subjects, a shortage o f teachers in these areas, and deficiences in the number o f skilled technicians and high-level scientific personnel. This situation, if not addressed, threatens to compromise Am erica's stature in the international marketplace, weaken our industrial base, and under mine our national defense. There currently exists a shortage o f qualified science and math teachers and o f individuals willing to enter teaching careers in these subjects. Furthermore, a growing number o f qualified math 81 and science teachers are leaving their profession to pursue other careers. The principal reasons the large salary differential which exists between the teaching profession and others which demand the same mathematical or scientific education and skills. For new graduates in science and math, the average salary in teaching is between $9,000 and $10,000, whereas scientific and technical jobs in industry pay $18,000 to $30,000. In addition to salary differences, some may consider teaching o f lower professional status than work in reserch organizations or industry. Various means o f educational assessment show that the Nation has experienced a 20-year erosion o f math and science com petence at the precollege level. To reverse the trend, rewards to teaching technical fields must be increased. Special undergraduate scholar ship, graduate fellowship, and low-interest loan programs should be available to prospective teachers in math, science, and other fields with inadequate supplies o f teachers. Loans and other form s o f fi nancial assistance could be forgiven if students pursue a career in teaching for a designated number o f years. In the area o f foreign languages, the proportion o f secondary stu dents enrolling in courses dropped from one-fourth in the mid1960’s to 15 percent in the 1970’s. Our educational system has not placed sufficient emphasis on the study o f foreign languages, as re flected by steadily diminishing educational requirements in this field. We should encourage student exposure to the languages and cultures o f other countries and expand opportunities for exchange programs and study abroad. These trends suggest that the current generation o f students w ill be ill-prepared to meet the challenges o f an increasingly techno logically oriented and com petitive job market. The National Sci ence Foundation notes that there is a manpower shortage at nearly every degree level and specialty in engineering and the com puter sciences, as well as in certain physical and biological science fields. Furthermore, the Bureau o f Labor Statistics estimates that be tween 1980 and 1990 the demand for com puter-related occupations is expected to grow by as much as 75 percent—and increase o f 600,000 jobs. If the United States intends to succeed in the interna tional markets for high technology products, we must address these deficiencies in our national educational system. A student’s early exposure to, and fam iliarity with, computers and other technical equipment can serve to spark his interest in the fields o f science and technology. A t present, according to the National Center for Education Statistics, slightly over one-third o f the Nation’s public schools have at least one com puter available for classroom use. But as part o f any effort to broaden the use o f com puters in classrooms, schools must also have trained personnel to explain its processes and sufficient software to operate the pro grams. In addition to proficiency in these technical subjects, deficiences in the basic skills o f the disadvantaged must be remedied. Educa tional institutions must equip students with adequte literacy and num erical skills as well as some facility with computers, to assure that opportunities for skilled jobs w ill be open to all. W hile it is only a small part o f total spending on education, Fed eral funding is critical to the skill development o f m illions who w ill 82 otherwise be left behind. Funding for programs serving the disad vantaged, the handicapped, and other special educational needs must be made cost effective and must be maintained. Recommendation No. 23 Federal support for nondefense reserach and development, espe cially in universities, should be increased. In constant dollars, nondefense research and develpment (R&D) spending in fiscal year 1983 will be 6 percent lower than in fiscal year 1982 and 20 percent lower than in fiscal year 1981. The larg est relative cuts in R&D outlays for fiscal year 1983 occurred in the environm ental protection area, the National Bureau o f Standards, the Commerce Department, and the Bureau o f Mines. The President’s budget provides an increase in overall funding for R&D. However, when m ilitary and civilian activities are sepa rated, the budget shows a substantial increase for m ilitary R&D and a reduction for civilian R&D, in real terms. This is the same pattern that has prevailed since 1981. Among the agencies whose R&D funds have been reduced are the Department o f Energy (except for m ilitary research), NASA, the Department o f Agricul ture, the Department o f the Interior, the Department o f Commerce, and the Environmental Protection Agency. The Federal Government’s role in the national R&D effort con tinues to diminish. Federal R&D in fiscal year 1983 w ill comprise about 45 percent o f the total projected U.S. spending on R&D, down from some 55 percent during the previous decade. This sm all er Federal commitment to nondefense R&D runs counter to trends abroad. And, by holding back the rate o f industrial innovation, it will hurt productivity growth. The trend is disturbing because of the im plication for productiv ity and econom ic growth. W hile the linkages between R&D, produc tivity, and econom ic growth cannot be precisely described, few doubt that they are interrelated. Many economists believe that the Nation’s technological progress has been slowed and our industrial competitiveness has suffered in part because o f the Federal Gov ernm ent’s inadequate support for industrial research. Future productivity gains depend in part on the ability to devel op less costly ways o f producing goods and services. Small firm s have been the most innovative—and the heaviest investors in R&D. Accelerating the improvement of technology will require expansion o f basic and applied research, as well as better dissemination o f the results. Centers that bring university and industry researchers to gether for joint projects are a valuable means o f strengthening this process. IN D U STRY AND INFRASTRUCTURE Recommendation No. 24 Programs to support industry should be designed to take advan tage o f new opportunities while retaining our old, productive strengths. The key ingredients include: A n efficient, up-to-date, well maintained public infrastruc ture. 83 Necessary Federal support to workers for adjustm ent to new industry. The United States is and w ill remain and industrial nation. The challenge will be to create the conditions for a revival and sus tained growth o f American industry that is com petitive in world markets, and so makes possible a continued high standard o f living for Am erican workers. Private sector industrial investment requires and adequate and well-maintained infrastructure. The condition or our infrastruc ture— our roads, bridges, water systems, ports, utilities, rails, and other physical support systems—is not adequate. And although the need for maintenance, repair, and rebuilding o f these systems grows every year, real capital expenditures by State and local gov ernments continue to decline. W ith the passage o f the Surface Transportation Assistance A ct o f 1982, Congress is attempting to reverse the decline in expenditure on one aspect o f the national infrastructure: our highways. In so doing, Congress has acknowledged that such investment is a vital ingredient o f future national productivity growth. Such recognition should lead to careful planning for any other programs o f Federal support for infrastructure that may be developed. This Committee is contributing to this effort by coordinating studies conducted by the various States o f their public investm ent requirem ents and fi nancing capacity. Such studies w ill be published as they becom e available throughout 1983. Adjustment assistance represents another im portant elem ent o f econom ic development and the transition to m ore modern, produc tive, and technology-intensive processes. Both the workers who are currently (or were recently) employed in contracting industries and the communities which are home to those industries should be con sidered as national assets. They can either be reem ployed, or they can be neglected. Clearly, national econom ic developm ent w ill be greater and our standard o f living higher if the form er course is chosen. For workers, every effort should be made to provide a range o f opportunities in an industrial transition. These should include training and relocation assistance. For communities affected by plant closings, Congress should con sider providing transitional assistance to m aintain public services should a dramatic erosion o f the tax base occur. Such assistance could make it possible for a community to rem ain an attractive site for new investment, which derelict com m unities are not and so pre serve the underlying physical com m unity—streets, homes, schools, utilities, services, and trades. Finally, consideration should be given to the problem o f assuring that adequate capital is available to the most im portant o f our basic industries to make possible modernization, rationalization, and redevelopment on an internationally com petitive basis. Any program to facilitate acquistion o f capital for such purposes must also assure that the basic public objectives—jobs and com petitive industry—are met. The problems o f the rapidly growing em erging industries should also be considered, recognizing that one o f the strongest markets for robots, semiconductors, and the services o f 84 computer-aided design and manufacture are in traditional manu facturing enterprise. AGRICULTURE Recommendation No. 25 Congress and the USDA must take steps to ensure that efforts to reduce excess U.S. production, such as the Paymen t-In-Kind pro gram, are successful. In sharp contrast to the tremendous growth and accom plish ments o f U.S. agriculture during the 1970’s, net farm incom e for the last three years has been at record low levels. In real dollar terms, 1982 net farm incom e was Vi the level of 10 years ago, and roughly equivalent o f that realized by farmers in 1933. Only the livestock sector has escaped, as incomes were bolstered by low feed prices. Nationwide the value o f farmland has plummeted. Agricul tural exports have dropped. Farm bankruptcies are up. And the farm er’s problems have rippled over into their communities and re lated industries. Perhaps the only bright news for farm ers has been the virtual halt o f farm production cost increases, which had risen more than 60 percent between 1975 and 1981. Nonetheless, there is strong evidence that the agricultural bubble, inflated during the 1970’s, has burst. Perhaps the most worrisome problem plaguing the agriculture sector today is the growing surplus o f U.S. crops—wheat, soybeans, and especially corn. Currently, the United States has m ore than 150 MMT o f stocks exceeding projected demand—almost 2 xfa times the ending stocks just two years ago, and enough to meet our do mestic needs for almost an entire year. It is our greatest surplus in more than 20 years, and it has resulted from three straight years o f bumper crops at a time when export sales have lagged. The mas sive surplus has led to the lowest grain prices in years, and a sharp increase in governm ent support payments to farmers. The public cost o f farm programs in 1982 will likely exceed $12 billion, com pared to $5 billion 10 years ago. The immediate farm policy chal lenge is to rapidly reduce price-depressing surplus grain stocks. The quickest way to accomplish this goal is to produce less and sell more in 1983. A sim ilar situation applies to the beleaguered dairy industry. The USDA has indicated that under current policy declines in the huge dairy surpluses in 1983 are likely to be very small at best. Other methods to reduce these surpluses should be explored. The general consensus is that the traditional supply-control measures to reduce surpluses, such as the voluntary land set-aside program, have not been totally successful. This fact, coupled with record high governm ent farm program costs and a growing budget deficit, prompted the Administration to implement the PaymentIn-Kind (PIK) program. Under this program, farmers can retire up to an additional 30 percent o f their land (50 percent when com bined with the initial land set-aside program) and, in lieu o f plant ing, receive commodities from government-owned or controlled stocks. Farmers can also bid their entire land base out o f produc tion. By lim iting production and shrinking the supply o f reserves overhanging markets, PIK may yield firmer prices in 1984 and 85 beyond. The PIK program could be m ore successful at reducing 1983 grain and cotton output than many believe, because the net returns associated with the program could be very attractive to farmers. Congress and the USDA must do what is necessary to ensure that efforts to trim excess U.S. production, such as through the PIK program, are successful. We must also closely m onitor produc tion by other countries. Sharp reductions in U.S. production could be seen by our competitors as an opportunity to boost their produc tion to gain a greater share o f the export market. Expanded pro duction by non-U.S. grain suppliers, it must be cautioned, could easily offset U.S. production control efforts, contributing to yet fur ther declines in world agricultural prices. Recommendation No. 26 Congress and the Adm inistration m ust increase efforts to expand farm exports. Agricultural exports, once readily siphoning o ff excess U.S. pro duction, have dropped due to the worldwide recession, the strength ened U.S. dollar, aggressive m arket expansion o f other countries, and reduced U.S. purchases by the Soviet Union. A fter several straight record years, the dollar value o f agricultural experts has dropped for the first time since the last global recession o f 1975. We must recognize the recent internationalization o f the U.S. farm sector. Twenty years ago, we produced alm ost entirely for the domestic market, isolated from external changes. Today one out o f every three bushels o f U.S. grain is produced for export, and our farm sector is highly sensitive to supply and demand fluctuations in other countries, variations in currency exchange rates, and changes in foreign trade and agricultural policies. W e must recog nize this reality and meet the present challenge head on by devel oping an aggressive farm program o f export prom otion: expanding and im proving our export credit and m arket development, meeting our com petitors’ export subsidies with price subsidies o f our own, negotating reductions in protectionist barriers to our products, de veloping future markets through an expanded food aid program, negotiating long-term supply-purchase agreements, revising aspects of our farm programs that price our goods out o f the world market, and guaranteeing that contracts to buy U.S. agricultural goods w ill not be cancelled for political reasons. Recent promising Adm inistration actions have been expanding the USDA “blended” credit program and negotiating the recent wheat-flour sale to Egypt. An additional $250 m illion in direct in terest-free export credit w ill be blended with at least $1 billion in export credit guarantees to produce interest rates below commer cial levels. The earlier blended credit program resulted in $500 m il lion in additional U.S. export sales for an outlay o f governm ent funds o f $100 million. The 1 MMT wheat-flour sale to Egypt negoti ated by the USDA was made in direct response to European Eco nom ic Community export trade subsidies. Ending the financial crisis in agriculture w ill require aggressive efforts to boost farm prices to profitable levels. Surplus stocks must be reduced and export sales increased. W hile this process occurs, farm credit programs must remain flexible enough to see farmers 86 through this period o f extrem ely low incomes and negative cash flows. Farm lending agencies, such as the Farmers Home Adminis tration and the Farm Credit Administration, must be w illing to defer loan payments on a case-by-case basis until farm incomes im prove. Indications are that 1983 will be neither the best o f times nor the worst of times for U.S. farmers. Nominal total farm net income will likely be up only m arginally in 1983. Recent dramatic and historic declines in farm operator equity, in combination with three, and likely four, consecutive years o f poor income returns foretell m ajor adjustments for the agricultural sector. In 1982, the asset base o f U.S. agriculture was approximately $1 trillion. This investment yielded but $20 billion o f net income, for a rate o f return o f only 2 percent. The modest econom ic recovery predicted by the Adm inis tration, followed perhaps years later by a modest world econom ic recovery, while necessary, w ill not be sufficient to restore prosper ity to U.S. farmers. Clearly, the real economic challenge to U.S. ag riculture lies ahead. ENERGY Recommendation No. 27 Incentives to conserve energy, to promote production o f cost-effi cient fossil fuels in the United States, to further reduce unreliable energy imports, and for research in renewable energy should remain high national priorities. Energy use in 1982 fell for the third year in a row. Domestic energy consumption from all sources of energy, including petro leum, natural gas, coal, and electricity, declined at a prelim inary rate of 3.4 percent compared to 1981. Energy use in 1982 was off almost 10 percent from the peak of 78.9 quadrillion BTU’s (quads) consumed in 1979. The decline occured most heavily in natural gas with demand off 6 percent nationally, over double the rate o f de cline experienced for coal. This decline was concentrated heavily in the industrial sector where gas usage declined a very sharp 35 per cent through September. With only lim ited natural gas storage capacity, the decline in consumption was matched by a 7.4 percent decline in production through September. Modest increases in domestic petroleum pro duction and a 6.4 percent rise in coal output offset declining gas output and yielded a slight 0.6 percent rise in overall domestic energy production last year through September compared to 1981. Two notable trends emerged in 1981. First, production o f hydro electric power reversed its three-year decline and rose by close to 17 percent in 1982, compared to the first nine months o f 1981. This reflected the boom in small-scale hydro projects intended to serve a broad cross-section o f manufacturing facilities. Second, imports plunged in 1982 to 5 m illion barrels daily through September from 6 m illion barrels daily during 1981, and almost 7 m illion barrels per day in 1980. Altogether, petroleum imports over the first nine months o f 1982 fell 16.6 percent below 1981 and were o ff a sharp 43 percent from the peak attained in 1977. The decline in oil imports coupled with world oil price stability cut the U.S. foreign oil bill some 20 percent below the 1981 total o f 87 $81.3 billion. That price stability should continue throughout 1983 in light o f continued softness in world oil m arkets and present dif ficulties OPEC is having with its pricing policies. Barring further armed conflicts in the Middle East or elsewhere, foreign petroleum supplies will be abundant in 1983 with im porters able to bargain effectively for stable or even lower prices. But, while the oil glut may be with us for another year, it is not likely to be a permanent phenomenon. The recent weak market, particularly for oil and natural gas, has sent exploration activities tumbling. This m ay expose the United States to needless supply vulnerability in the future. The number o f crews engaged in seismic exploration plunged more than 13 per cent in 1982, largely at on-shore sites. Because o f its longer lead time, off-shore exploration activities did not begin to decline last year until July. Exploration rigs were stacked all across the South west, West, and Mountain states in 1982 as the number o f rotary rigs in operation fell by 30 percent com pared to 1981. The Administration has reduced Federal outlays for energy con servation activities in the past two years. A focus on conservation has been maintained, however, in Federal tax policy and through incentives offered by a large number o f states for building insula tion, hydroelectric, and unconventional energy production. The Nation continues to improve the efficiency with which it utilizes energy. Efforts to improve conservation and alternate energy sources should be resume even though the energy crisis remains in remission. S T A T IS T IC S F O R E C O N O M IC A N A L Y S IS Recommendation No. 28 The budget for economic statistics should restore adequate fund ing for crucial economic data. A fu ll review o f Fiscal Year 1984 funding for G N P source data should be undertaken. High quality Federal statistical programs are crucial to sound econom ic analysis and decision-making. The United States, with its strong reputation for expertise in statistical matters, had tradition ally made maintaining these inform ation sources a top priority. Re cently, however, budget cuts at statistical agencies, coupled with the weakening o f the interagency program coordination mecha nism, have led to doubts about the governm ent’s continued capabil ity to produce economic data m eeting its traditional high standards o f accuracy, timeliness, and completeness. Budget cuts during the past few years have had a widespread effect on statistical programs. A staff study released by the Joint Econom ic Committee last year identified several high-priority sta tistical areas for which restoration o f funds was desirable.2 U nfortunately many areas o f the statistical program continue to suffer from ill-advised budget cuts. The em ploym ent and wage data programs at the Bureau of Labor Statistics, for example, have been cut so m uch that valuable, long-standing data series have had to be 2 “ Statistics for Economic Analysis: 1983 Budget Requirements/’ a study prepared for the use o f the Joint Economic Committee, July 19,1982. 88 elim inated and research abandoned. The revision o f the Consumer Price Index has also fallen behind schedule. W hile the im portance o f accurate GNP accounts is widely recog nized, general budget stringency and organizational disarray in the statistical program have led to erosion in the com pleteness and timeliness o f the source data for the GNP. Improving the quality o f the GNP accounts demands priority attention. The Adm inistration should provide Congress with an analysis of proposed budget changes having consequences for the GNP accounts and also with a multi-year plan for investing in the improvement o f these accounts. This analysis should be made available to Congress in time to be useful in final decision-making on the 1984 budget. COOPERATION AN D A COM M ON PURPOSE Recommendation No. 29 Greater cooperation should be fostered among the institutions o f government, business, and labor toward the common objective o f higher productivity, international competitiveness, and a higher do mestic standard o f living. The achievement o f sustained noninflationary growth requires institutional changes which foster consensus in decision-making, cooperation on the job, and a sense o f shared purpose among gov ernment, business, and labor. The relationships among these groups at present are unnecessarily adversarial. There is too much focus on short-term objectives, and there is inadequate consultation and coordination. Institutional rigidities, distrust, and the lack o f cooperative spirit impede econom ic performance, both in current production and in the design and development o f new products and processes. A general com mitment to greater cooperation and to the develop ment o f a common purpose has many aspects. Labor-management relations must be improved. W hile there is no single blueprint for these activities, models exist: prom ising joint initiatives have occurred in plants, industries, and local com munities around the country. At the plant level, labor and management have participated in quality o f work life programs, quality circles, and other in novative approaches to problem-solving and workplace deci sion-making. Joint committees have tackled problem s like ab senteeism and turnover, bottlenecks in the production process, and changes in technology and skill requirements. They have brought about higher productivity, greater job satisfaction, and better labor-management relations. Cooperative labor-management efforts have helped the retail food, railroad, and airline industries cope with regulatory prob lems and improve competitiveness. In the telecom m unications industry, there are join t committees which focus on broadening worker participation in decision-making and addressing prob lems that have tended to jlebramatlize work. Local communities have Tormed committees o f m ajor employ ers and unions, often to reduce strike activity and prom ote eco nomic development. A leading example is Jamestown, New York, which has had a successful communitywide com m ittee 89 for nearly 10 years. Plagued with massive unemployment and a reputation for hostile labor-management relations, James town organized a network o f cooperative activities in local plants, special skill development programs, and other efforts to attract new firms and expand existing ones. Since the mid-1970’s, a labor-management com m ittee in Ev ansville, Indiana, has sim ilarly worked to foster the growth o f local industry. A relatively new com m ittee in Philadelphia is focusing on the problems o f displaced workers. There are cur rently initiatives in about 30 communities, h alf a dozen indus tries, and hundreds o f individual plants—including small busi ness and giant corporations. W ith proper encouragement, there could be many more. In the Labor-Management Cooperation A ct o f 1978, Congress au thorized the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) to provide modest grants and technical assistance to labor-manage ment committees established voluntarily on a plant, community, or industry-wide basis. Help from a neutral source like this agency can be critical in the initial stages o f labor-management activity, and many o f the existing efforts could never have started without Federal support. Funding for the program has never been close to the $10 m illion authorized. The current level is $500,000 a year, enough for six grants. Government-business-labor relations need fundamental reform . The government should encourage active consultation among all three parties. In recent years, we have gained valuable experience in forgoing partnerships among business, labor, and government. This experi ence suggests that, through sustained effort and a broad commit ment to cooperative endeavor, problems can be solved. For exam ple, state and local governments, the United Autom obile W orkers, the Federal Government, and leading financial institutions came together with the leadership o f the Chysler Corporation and struck a bargain which has permitted that corporation to survive despite bleak conditions in the automobile market. Sim ilarly, the Steel Tri partite Advisory Committee, initiated by the AFL-CIO, the Carter Adm inistration, and our leading steel companies, offered promise until the effort was abandoned in 1981. The advisory panel would provide a general-purpose institutional setting within which such efforts can be renewed. Government, finally, must im prove its own process of decision making and intragovemment consensus-building. One key example is the current lack o f coordination between the development o f fiscal policy in the Executive branch and decision-making on mone tary policy at the Federal Reserve. We find it difficult to have con fidence in the com patibility o f monetary and fiscal policies when cooperation is lacking. The President and the Federal Reserve Chairman should meet regularly and coordinate their activities closely. Ultimately, as discussed earlier in this Report, Congress must ensure that monetary and fiscal policies are coordinated and working toward a common objective. A D D ITIO N AL V IE W S (9 1 ) ADDITIONAL VIEW S OF SENATOR ED W A R D M. K E N N E D Y V ice Chairman Hamilton, our Committee colleagues, and the staff deserve and have my admiration and appreciation for their hard and important work in fashioning this Report which makes a com pelling argument against the continuation o f our current eco nom ic path; and, even more important, charts a responsible and achievable alternative. The econom ic agenda set forth in this docu ment is one rooted in the twin visions o f econom ic growth and eco nom ic equity. It underscores the fundam ental im portance o f full employment and balanced growth, while recognizing that our longrun econom ic health depends upon a restoration o f fiscal responsi bility and stable prices. It does not shrink from the tough decisions we must make about spending priorities, and it emphasizes that we must act forthrightly to ensure that the victim s o f today’s devastat ing recession have our help now. I am proud to join with my col leagues in forwarding our recommendations to the House and Senate. Our Report correctly emphasizes that a restoration o f steady sig nificant growth is our most important priority. However, I believe we must also acknowledge that growth alone w ill not be sufficient. Our econom y also faces massive and fundam ental structural prob lems which must be squarely addressed. The international economic environm ent has changed markedly during the past decade. Rapid development and impressive produc tivity growth by our trading partners have created a new com peti tive environm ent which we cannot ignore. The steady shift from m anufacturing to services has left m illions o f workers and hundreds o f communities with crucial adjustment problems which cannot be wished away. Rapid, often dazzling, technological change poses difficult new problems for both goods-producing and service industries. And the confluence o f these changes has created an awareness o f the central role that new forms o f cooperation among business, labor, and government must play if we are to meet the challenges which lie ahead. I believe that these problems require that we look beyond the macro policy tools which we must em ploy to restore growth, and consider what additional steps must be taken to sustain it. At a minimum, these new tools—often now referred to as indus trial policy—must include: A capacity to ensure coordination among the numerous— tax, trade, education and training, and infrastructure develop ment—policies now utilized by government at all levels. A capacity to build and sustain cooperative relationships among all of the participants in the econom ic equation. (9 3 ) 94 A capacity to target investment on those strategic—both basic and developing—industries that are fundamental to our future. A capacity to develop long-range economic strategies which ensure (1) continued international competitiveness, and (2) that the fruits o f econom ic strength will redound to the benefit o f all Americans. During the com ing year, we must address these fundam ental needs or run the very serious risk o f seeing the benefits o f the growth policy we have suggested dissipated. I look forward to join ing with V ice Chairman Hamilton and our colleagues in that effort. ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE AUGUSTUS F. HAWKINS The February 1983 Economic Report o f the President violates the statutory mandates o f the Employment A ct o f 1946, as amended by the Full Employment and Balanced Growth A ct o f 1978. The President is required to set goals and recommend policies de signed to reduce unemployment to 4 percent and inflation to 3 per cent by the end o f 1987. The Full Employment and Balanced Growth A ct specifically obligated the President to substitute mean ingful programs and policies to achieve these defined objectives, in place o f “ forecasts,” i.e., saying what is likely to happen if current policies continue. The Report o f the President forecasts a 7.3 percent unemploy ment rate for 1987, a 4.5 percent inflation rate, and makes no alter native recommendations as to how to achieve the statutory require ment o f 4 percent unemployment and 3 percent inflation. The President’s Report unlawfully supports the trade-off theory o f keeping unemployment unnecessarily high so that inflation can be reduced. This is in direct violation o f Section 104 o f the Full Em ploym ent and Balanced Growth A ct which states, “ . . . policies and programs for reducing the rate o f inflation shall be designated so as not to impede achievement o f the goals and tim etables . . . for the reduction o f unemployment. ’ ’ In addition, it is in direct viola tion o f Section 105, which states, “ In choosing means to achieve the goal for the reduction o f unemployment and choosing means to achieve the goal o f reasonable price stability, those means which are m utually reinforcing shall be used . . .” Distinguishing the difference between current policies as de scribed in the President’s Report and those we should be follow ing as alternatives is the first responsibility o f the Joint Economic Committee in its Report on the President’s Economic Report. The second responsibility is to offer a workable alternative to set us back on the right track. W hile I commend the Vice Chairman, and I am in general agree ment with the alternative program recommended in this Report, I believe the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act embodies a more aggressive and comprehensive plan o f remedies and appropri ate alternatives which should be followed because it w ill more quickly increase employment and production, and attain the goals o f full employment and price stability within the statutory tim e table. First, we should set econom ic goals on both an annual basis, as well as on a five-year basis, and then specify the policies and pro grams we must implement in order to reach those goals. As we go along, year by year, we w ill be able to measure our progress in achieving the reduction o f unemployment, and if we are not suc ceeding in reducing joblessness fast enough to meet the mandatory (9 5 ) 96 goals, then we can make mid-course corrections so that the goals can be reached. The Full Employment and Balanced Growth A ct requires mone tary and fiscal policy form ulation to support full employment and full production. Current econom ic policy decision-making, as evi denced by the grossly inadequate Report o f the President, is made on an ad-hoc basis, and w ill again result in wasteful, duplicitous, and mismanaged governm ent policy. M onetary policy is overly restrictive, stunting econom ic growth and creating excessive levels o f interest rates. Congress has the au thority to direct the Federal Reserve Board to com ply with the cur rent requirements o f law, and the President, through the Economic Report, can also tell the Federal Reserve Board to coordinate its policies, as other governm ental entities are required to do. Additional alternatives to the Federal Reserve Board’s policies can be achieved through a tightening o f its reporting provisions in the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act, congressional action mandating lower interest rates to levels that are consistent with a GNP rate that w ill effectively begin to reduce unemploy ment, and amending the Federal Reserve Act to make the board more accountable to the President, the Congress, and thus the Am erican people. Fiscal policies are currently misdirected, suppressing ultim ate demand and regressively redistributing income. As I stated in my footnote to Recommendation No. 1, too much attention is being put on reducing deficits as a means for sustaining econom ic growth, as opposed to being an end result o f alternative programs and policies. Alternatives to this policy lie in changing the structure o f our tax system, and in selectively increasing and targeting Federal budget outlays to achieve employment creation and a more balanced at tention to national priorities in order to achieve sustained econom ic growth. Tax indexing should be abandoned. While the idea may sound good on its face, the net effect o f it in practice would be very re gressive. Tax law should be revised to reduce or elim inate tax pref erences that serve as incentives for speculation or other unproduc tive investment. Tax credit programs should focus on providing in centives for employment and self-sufficiency. For the outyears, loopholes should be closed. Federal Budget spending programs should be viewed as tools for achieving sustained growth and as investments which w ill end up paying for themselves as economic recovery and overall growth take hold. Increased Federal spending, targeted to the labor force groups, sectors o f the economy, and regions experiencing econom ic difficulties, is the most powerful tool we have in stim ulating the econom y and balancing priorities. In addition, it can be the most effective anti-inflation program we have. Stable, balanced growth is a key to price stability. Full employment and production prevents shortages, which result in higher prices. The Full Employment and Balanced Growth A ct recognizes that monetary and fiscal policies alone cannot achieve the quantitative goals mandated by law. Structural programs must be used to sup plement m acroeconom ic policy. While policies to prom ote aggregate demand for goods and services provide overall stimulus necessary 97 to reduce unemployment and increase production, it only goes so far, and disparities and inequities rem ain among certain labor force groups, industrial sectors, and geographic areas. Structural programs are necessary to close the gap among these groups and sectors, so that all those able, w illing, and seeking work have the opportunity for employment at fair rates o f compensation. Targeting structured programs w ill also enable achievem ent o f full em ploym ent simultaneously with price stability. Thus, the Full Employment and Balanced Growth A ct should be properly implemented. The preem inent goal guiding econom ic policy should be full employment: the full utilization o f our materi al and human resources. When balanced in its approach, a full em ploym ent and full production alternative would do more than any thing else to improve productivity and reduce inflationary pres sures. W hen joined with structural programs which provide jobs skills, education and opportunities, and targeted investment and job creation in the sectors o f the econom y and geographic areas which are underutilized or where shortages exist, the attainm ent o f full employment with price stability w ill be a reality. CURRENT SERVICES BUDGET ESTIMATES (99) Current Services Budget E stim ates 1 The Congressional Budget Act o f 1974 (Section 605) requires that the President submit a current services budget to Congress. This budget notes the level o f outlays and budget authority “ for the en suing fiscal year if all programs and activities were carried on during such ensuing fiscal year at the same level as the fiscal year in progress and without policy changes in such programs and activ ities.” Such benchmark estimates and the corresponding current services receipts estimates are to be accom panied by “ the econom ic and programmatic assumptions underlying the estimated outlays and proposed budget authority, such as the rate o f inflation, the rate o f real economic growth, the unem ploym ent rate, program case loads, and pay increases.” The current services budget plays a vital role in expediting efforts o f congressional com m ittees and the Adm inistration to develop and evaluate tim ely and credible policy alternatives. Current services outlays by function and receipts by source for 1984 are compared with the corresponding 1982, estimat ed 1983, and proposed 1984 amounts in Table III. The deficit, offbudget outlays, and total budget authority are also shown. TABLE ill.— RECEIPTS BY SOURCE AND OUTLAYS BY FUNCTION, FISCAL YEAR 1982, ADMINISTRATION'S CURRENT SERVICES BASIS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1982-83, AND PROPOSAL FOR FISCAL YEAR 1984 [In billions of dollars] 1984 1982 actual 1983 current services Current services Administra tion proposal Difference from current services Individual income taxes.............................................. .............. Corporation income taxes........................................... .............. Social insurance taxes and contributions.................................. Excise taxes............................................................... .............. Other......................................................................................... $297.7 49.2 201.5 36.3 33.0 $285.2 35.3 210.3 37.3 29.4 $295.8 51.9 231.7 40.4 29.0 $295.6 51.8 242.9 40.4 29.1 -$ 0 .2 -0 .1 11.2 0.0 0.1 Total receipts......................................................... ........... 617.8 597.5 648.8 659.7 10.9 Outlays: National defense1 ............................................. ....... .............. International affairs.................................................... .............. General science, space, and technology.................................... Energy........................................................................ .............. Natural resources and environment............................. .............. Agriculture................................................................. .............. Commerce and housing credit.................................... .............. Transportation............................................................ .............. Community and regional development....................................... 187.4 10.0 7.1 4.7 12.9 14.9 3.9 20.6 7.2 214.6 11.7 7.8 4.6 12.0 21.7 2.0 21.9 7.4 253.7 12.8 8.1 4.1 11.2 15.3 2.1 26.1 7.2 245.3 13.2 8.2 3.3 9.8 12.1 0.4 25.1 7.0 - 8 .4 0.4 0.2 -0 .7 -1 .4 -3 .2 -1 .6 -0 .9 -0 .2 1 A ll years referred to are fiscal years. (101) 102 TABLE III.— RECEIPTS BY SOURCE AND OUTLAYS BY FUNCTION, FISCAL YEAR 1982, ADMINISTRATION'S CURRENT SERVICES BASIS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1982-83, AND PROPOSAL FOR FISCAL YEAR 1984— Continued [In billions of dollars] 1984 1982 actual 26.3 74.0 248.3 24.0 4.7 4.7 6.4 84.7 0.0 - 13.2 Education, training, employment, and social services........... Health....................................................................................... Income security........................................................................ ..... Veterans benefits and services................................................ Administration of justice......................................................... General Government................................................................. General purpose fiscal assistance........................................... Net interest............................................................................... Allowances................................................................................ Undistributed offsetting receipts............................................. ..... Total outlays........................................................................ ..... Deficit ( - ) ...................................................................................... ..... Off-Budget Outlays............................................................................. Deficit ( - ) Including Off-Budget Outlays..................................... ..... Budget Authority................................................................................ ..... 1983 current services - 728.4 110.6 17.3 127.9 779.9 Current services 27.1 92.9 289.7 26.1 5.5 5.9 7.2 105.2 1.9 - 21.6 26.8 82.3 282.8 24.5 5.3 5.9 6.4 89.0 0.0 - 20.4 - 806.1 208.5 16.9 225.4 828.4 Administra tion proposal - 880.3 231.5 17.1 248.5 954.8 Difference from current services 25.3 90.6 282.4 25.7 5.5 6.0 7.0 103.2 0.9 - 22.8 - 848.5 188.8 14.0 202.8 900.1 - - 1.8 2.3 7.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 2.0 1.0 1.1 31.8 42.7 - 3.0 45.7 - 54.7 - 1 See Table IV and discussion of estimated current services outlays for national defense in the text. Sources: Office of Management and Budget, "Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1984,” p. 9 -4 , and "Special Analysis A (Current Services Estimates),” pp. A-4, A-6, A-7, A—11. Since the 1981 budget, the economic assumptions utilized in the current services estimates and other components o f the President’s budget have been identical. This practice was continued in prepara tion o f the 1984 budget documents as well. This uniform ity resulted from repeated recommendations by this Committee that econom ic assumptions for each program be consistent. In 1981 and 1982, the Committee recommended modification of Section 605 o f the Con gressional Budget Act to require submission by the President o f a current services budget by January 31 o f each year, with the Joint Economic Committee evaluation to follow by M arch 1. This change would make the law consistent with the present satisfactory prac tice. That Act now requires submission by the President o f current services budget estimates on or before November 10 o f each year, and the Committee’s evaluation of such budget estimates must be submitted to both Budget Committees by December 31. Compliance with these deadlines has typically not occurred because it would reduce the usefulness o f the evaluation which would be based on assumptions not necessarily adopted for the ensuing budget. Each year, it has been necessary to extend the deadlines on a one-year basis because the proposed modification in the Budget Act has not been made, and the Committee again urges that this step be taken. In previous years, this Committee has called for more detailed current services estimates for a five-year period, to facilitate longer run policy form ulation. Last year the Adm inistration provided pro jections o f outlays on a “ current services baseline with adequate defense” basis for five fiscal years. This presentation combined two very im portant but very different concepts—current services and an “ adequate defense.” The basic rationale for current services 103 budget is that it is intended to provide objective estimates o f spend ing in the absence o f policy changes. By com bining it with the much more subjective (though im portant) concept o f an “ adequate defense,” the estimates lose their meaning and, in fact, they create confusion. Also, last year no details were provided for the outyears on budget categories other than defense. A major improvement has been made in the current services budget this year in that five-year budget estimates have been made o f total budget authority, receipts, outlays, deficits, and off-budget outlays. Also differences between current services and proposed outlays by function have been presented for 1984-1988. These func tional estimates would be somewhat more useful if the level o f cur rent services outlays by function were shown as well as the differ ences between current services outlays and the Adm inistration’s proposals. In this year’s budget, current services outlays by func tion must be calculated by adding these differences to the proposed outlays. The major shortcoming o f the 1984 current services budget is its treatm ent o f budget authority and outlays for defense. In an ac knowledged “ major exception” to norm al practice, the Adm inistra tion indicates that the estimated m ilitary budget authority for 1984 and outlays for 1984-1987 are not intended to represent costs “ if all programs and activities were carried on . . . at the same level as the fiscal year in progress and without policy changes in such pro grams and activities,” the definition o f current services in the Budget Act. Rather, the 1984-1987 estimates are “ those presented by the Administration and used by Congress in last year’s budget deliberations,” and the 1988 estimates “ were developed consistent with this baseline.” This baseline is “ believed to be the most useful one for measuring the effects o f policy changes in the defense area.” 2 It is not specified in the Special Analysis whether the Ad ministration or the Congress finds this baseline “ the most useful one,” nor, if the latter, how such a determ ination was made. And there is no indication why sim ilar baselines m ight not be “ the most useful” as in other areas as well. The basis for current services defense estimates has major im pli cations. As shown in Table IV, over the 1983-1988 period, the Ad m inistration’s proposed outlays for defense ($1,808.3 billion) repre sent a $46.9 billion reduction from the Adm inistration’s current services estimates, but increases ranging from $74.0 billion to $353.3 billion in comparison with the other four baselines listed.3 These differences between proposed outlays and various current services measures vary by more than $400 billion over this period. Sim ilarly, as shown in Table V, over the 1983-1988 period, the Ad m inistration’s proposed budget authority for defense ($2,050.5 bil lion) represents a $54.4 billion reduction from the Adm inistration’s current services estimates, but increases ranging from $84.9 billion to $389.4 billion in comparison with the other four baselines listed. 2 Office of Management and Budget, “ Special Analyses, Budget o f the United States Govern ment, Fiscal Year 1984,” p. A-3. 3 These comparisons do not take into account any differences between the economic forecasts o f the Administration and the Congressional Budget Office. Such differences appear to be rela tively small in com panion with the magnitudes involved. 104 TABLE IV— OUTLAYS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE: ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS AND VARIOUS BASELINES FISCAL YEARS 1983-88 [In billions of dollars] Baseline Fiscal year Aftminic T rS ( 1) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) 214.8 222.4 236.0 248.1 260.4 273.3 213.5 234.0 251.0 267.0 285.0 303.0 213.5 236.8 259.6 280.5 300.0 320.7 213.5 242.1 277.7 310.0 333.0 358.0 214.6 253.7 293.4 332.2 364.7 396.6 214.8 245.3 285.3 323.0 354.3 385.6 Total.............. ...... 1,455.0 1,553.5 1,611.1 1,734.3 1,855.2 1,808.3 1983 ........................... ...... 1984 ........................... ...... 1985 ........................... ...... 1986 ........................... ...... 1987 ........................... ...... 1988 ........................... ...... proposal Difference between administration proposal and baseline (5 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) 22.9 49.3 74.9 93.9 112.3 1.3 11.3 34.3 56.0 69.3 82.6 1.3 8.5 25.7 42.5 54.3 64.9 1.3 3.2 7.6 13.0 21.3 27.6 0.2 8.4 - 8.1 - 9.2 - 10.4 - 11.0 353.3 254.8 197.2 74.0 - ( 1) 0.0 - 46.9 Sources: (1) No real growth, as derived from OMB data contained in Congressional Budget Office "An Analysis of the President's Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 1984.” Feb. 1983, p. 54 (2) CBO's "no real growth" path, from CBO’s "Baseline Budget Projections for Fiscal Year 1984-88,” Feb. 3, 1983, p. 45. (3) CBO’s "programmatic component of baseline," same source as (2 ), p. 100. (4) CBO's baseline, same source as (2 ), p. 100. (5) Administration's current services budget, from Office of Management and Budget, “Special Analyses, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1984," pp. A-7, A-16. Administration Proposal: Office of Management and Budget, "Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1984," p. 9-5. Note: Adjustments have not been made in ( 2 ) - ( 4 ) for any differences between the CBO and Administration economic forecasts, which do not have major impacts on estimated defense outlays. TABLE V.— BUDGET AUTHORITY FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE: ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS AND VARIOUS BASELINES, FISCAL YEARS 1983-88 [In billions of dollars]*5 1SS Baseline AHminic Fiscal year ( 1) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) 245.5 254.5 269.3 283.0 297.0 311.8 243.9 258.0 273.0 288.0 304.0 322.0 243.9 267.5 286.7 304.1 322.0 352.7 243.9 278.3 322.4 350.0 373.0 398.0 244.5 291.8 339.4 375.4 408.7 445.1 Total.............. ...... 1,661.1 1,688.9 1,776.9 1,965.6 1983 ........................... ...... 1984 ........................... ...... 1985 ........................... ...... 1986 ........................... ...... 1987 ........................... ...... 1988 ........................... ...... proposal Difference between administration proposal and baseline ^ ( 1) 0.0 (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) 1.0 245.5 280.5 330.0 364.8 397.0 432.7 26.0 60.7 81.8 100.0 120.9 1.6 22.5 57.0 76.8 93.0 110.7 1.6 13.0 43.3 60.7 75.0 80.0 1.6 2.2 7.6 14.8 24.0 34.7 11.3 - 9.4 - 10.6 - 11.7 - 12.4 2 , 104.9 2 ,050.5 389.4 361.6 273.6 84.9 - - 54.4 Sources: ( l ) - ( 4 ) As in Table IV. (5) As for (1). p. 80, Administration Proposal: As for (1). Note: Adjustments have not been made in ( 2 ) - ( 4 ) for any differences between the CBO and Administration economic forecasts, which do not have major impacts in estimated defense budget authority. These difference between proposed budget authority and various current services measures of budget authority vary by more than $400 billion over this period. Percentage increases in defense out lays and budget authority using the various measures are com pared in Table VI for 1983-1988. 105 TABLE VI.— AVERAGE ANNUAL INCREASES IN VARIOUS MEASURES OF DEFENSE SPENDING, FISCAL YEARS 1983-88 [In percent] Average annual percentage increase, fiscal years 1983Measure Outlays Estimates in current dollars: Baseline ( ! ) .................. Baseline (2 ).................. Baseline (3 ).................. Baseline (4 ).................. Baseline (5 ).................. Administration proposal... Estimates in constant dollars:1 Baseline (1 ).................. Baseline (2 ).................. Baseline (3 ).................. Baseline (4 )................... Baseline (5 )................... Administration proposal.... 4.9 7.3 8.5 10.9 13.1 12.4 Budget authority 4.9 5.7 7.7 10.3 12.7 12.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.8 3.4 5.7 7.8 7.1 2.6 5.1 7.5 6.8 1 In comparison with baseline (1). Sources: Calculated from data in Tables III and IV. The Congressional Budget Office rejected its “ no real growth” es timates as its baseline. The CBO “ no real growth” path over the 1984-1988 period implies increases in defense outlays averaging 7.3 percent per year and increases in defense budget authority averag ing 5.7 percent per year, well above OMB's im plicit estimates, but CBO felt that funding at such levels “ could require cancelation o f some investment programs, rescheduling o f others, and some force structure deactivation.” 45 CBO’s “ no real growth” path probably does understate a realistic level o f current services defense spend ing. But it is also clear that the Administration's current services de fense budget significantly overstates the level o f expenditures con sistent with the definition o f current services contained in the Budget Act. The most realistic benchmark appears to be baseline (3), CBO’s “ programmatic component o f baseline.” In discussing the differences between the estimated current serv ices and proposed budgets, the Adm inistration cites savings in the defense area “ due to lower inflation, the 1984 pay freeze, and var ious program economies.” 5 The proposed pay freeze and program economies represent legitimate savings from current services spending. Lower inflation will help restrain defense outlays by an estimated $35 billion over the 1984-1988 period according to Ad m inistration estimates, but by definition these savings do not rep resent savings from current services, properly defined. The current services budget, as well as the proposed budget, should be reduced to take account o f lower inflation, leaving the difference between the two unchanged. 4 Congressional Budget Office, “ Baseline Budget Projections for Fiscal Years 1984-88,” p. 46. 5 Office of Management and Budget, “ Special Analyses, Budget of the United States Govern ment, Fiscal Year 1984,” p. A-12. 106 In summary, in m any areas, the current services budget has been im proved by providing more detailed estim ates o f outlays by function and receipts by source over a five-year period. A five-year analysis o f current services budget authority by function w ould also be useful. In the defense area, the Adm inistration has inexpli cably departed from the basic definitions o f current services in the Budget Act. Current services defense estimates based on last year’s budget proposals by the Adm inistration are confusing and m islead ing. In the future, the analysis o f the defense program should be based on a legitim ate current services concept, not on the previous year’s budget proposals. O