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FINAL REPORT

| A PA N E S E E V AC U AT IO N
FROM THE WEST COAST

D 769 U57f1943

NLM D5D07312

3

NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE

ARMY MEDICAL LIBRARY
WASHINGTON
Pounded 1836

Number

oro

3—10543

Form 113c, W. D., S. G. O.
(Revised June 13, 1936)

DUE TWO WEEKS FROM LAST DATE

JUL * *

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FINAL REPORT

JAPANESE EVACUATION
FROM THE WEST COAST
1942

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1943

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D. C.

ict>
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\9V5

WAR DEPARTMENT

THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

19 July 1943

Dear Mr. Secretary:

There is transmitted herewith General DeWitt’s final report
on the evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from certain
areas on the West Coast.
Faithfully yours,

Chief of Staff.

Washington, D. C.
Honorable Henry

L.

The Secretary of War

Stimson

FOREWORD
This volume constitutes a comprehensive report on the
evacuation from West Coast areas of persons of Japanese
ancestry carried out by the Army in the interests of military
security during the spring of 1942. The considerations which
led to evacuation as well as the mechanics by which it was
achieved, are set forth in detail. Great credit, in my opinion,
is due General DeWitt and the Army for the humane yet effi¬
cient manner in which this difficult task was handled. It was
unfortunate that the exigencies of the military situation were
such as to require the same treatment for all persons of Japa¬
nese ancestry, regardless of their individual loyalty to the
United States. But in emergencies, where the safety of the
Nation is involved, consideration of the rights of individuals
must be subordinated to the common security. As General
DeWitt points out, great credit is due our Japanese population
for the manner in which they responded to and complied with
the orders of exclusion.

/
Secretary of War.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND
AND FOIIKTFT AKMY
OFFICE

OF

THE

COMMANDING

GENERAL

PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

June 5, 1943

SUBJECT: Final Report on the Evacuation of Japanese from Certain Military
Areas in Western Defense Command.
TO:

Chief of Staff, United States Army, War Department, Washing¬
ton, D. C.

1. I transmit herewith my final report on the evacuation of Japanese from
the Pacific Coast.
2. The evacuation was impelled by military necessity.

The security of the

Pacific Coast continues to require the exclusion of Japanese from the area now
prohibited to them and will so continue as long as that military necessity exists.
The surprise attack at Pearl Harbor by the enemy crippled a major portion
of the Pacific Fleet and exposed the West Coast to an attack which could not
have been substantially impeded

by defensive fleet operations.

More than

115,000 persons of Japanese ancestry resided along the coast and were signifi¬
cantly concentrated near many highly sensitive installations essential to the war
effort.

Intelligence services records reflected

the existence of

hundreds of

Japanese organizations in California, Washington, Oregon and Arizona which,
prior to December 7, 1941, were actively engaged in advancing Japanese war
aims.

These records also disclosed that thousands of American-born Japanese

had gone to Japan to receive their education and indoctrination there and had
become rabidly pro-Japanese and then had returned to the United States. Emperor
worshipping ceremonies were commonly held and millions of dollars had flowed
into the Japanese imperial war chest from the contributions freely made by Jap¬
anese here. The continued presence of a large, unassimilated, tightly knit racial
group, bound to an enemy nation by strong ties of race, culture, custom and religion
along a frontier vulnerable to attack constituted a menace which had to be dealt
with. Their loyalties were unknown and time was of the essence. The evident
aspirations of the enemy emboldened by his recent successes made it worse than
folly to have left any stone unturned in the building up of our defenses. It is better
to have had this protection and not to have needed it than to have needed it and
not to have had it—as we have learned to our sorrow.
3. On February 14, 1942, I recommended to the War Department that the
military security of the Pacific Coast required the establishment of broad civil
control, anti-sabotage and counter-espionage measures, including the evacuation
therefrom of all persons of Japanese ancestry.
vii

In recognition of this situa-

via

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

tion, the President issued Executive Order No. 9066 on February 19, 1942,
authorizing the accomplishment of these and any other necessary security meas¬
ures. By letter dated February 20, 1942, the Secretary of War authorized me
to effectuate my recommendations and to exercise all of the powers which the
Executive Order conferred upon him and upon any military commander desig¬
nated by him. A number of separate and distinct security measures have been
instituted
may

under

demand

the

broad

the initiation

authority
of

others.

thus

delegated,

Among

the

and

steps

future
taken

events

was

the

evacuation of Japanese from western Washington and Oregon, California, and
southern Arizona. Transmitted herewith is the final report of that evacuation.
4. The report comprises nine Parts and reference matter.
eight chapters are supplemented by a pictorial summary.

Its twenty-

In Part I, I have

traced the developments which led to the issuance by the President of Executive
Order No. 9066, establishing military control over the Pacific Coast. The mili¬
tary necessity for the specific action reported is outlined in Chapter II.

Part II,

Chapters IV to VI, inclusive, presents a resume of the evacuation method.

In

these chapters the means provided to protect the persons, the property and the
health of evacuees are described.

In succeeding Parts a more detailed account

of each phase of the operation is found. Part III describes the military organiza¬
tion established to accomplish the evacuation.
cover evacuation operations.

Part IV, Chapters VIII to XII

Part V comprises Chapters XIII to XIX.

These

offer a narrative of Assembly Center Operations—the selection, construction
and administration by the Army of the temporary residences provided evacuees
pending their transfer to Relocation Centers in the interior.
Chapters XX to XXII.

Part VI includes

This section reports the Army’s participation in pre¬

paring semi-permanent facilities for the relocation of evacuees and the methods
pursued in their transfer to these accommodations.

In Part VII is found Chap¬

ters XXIII to XXVI, in which collateral aspects of the program are discussed,
such as curfew and travel control, public relations, inspection and repatriation
activities. Part VIII, consisting of Chapter XXVII and XXVIII, presents a fiscal
and statistical summary.

Part IX concludes the report with a series of photo¬

graphs pictorializing the entire operation. Only those data essential to an under¬
standing of the subject are included in the appendices.
5. There was neither pattern nor precedent for an undertaking of this mag¬
nitude and character; and yet over a period of less than ninety operating
days,
Coast.

110,442 persons of Japanese ancestry were evacuated from the West
This compulsory organized mass migration was conducted under com¬

plete military supervision.

It was effected without major incident in a time

of extreme pressure and severe national stress, consummated at a time when
the energies of the military were directed primarily toward the organization
and training of an Army of sufficient size and equipment to fight a global
war.

The task was, nevertheless, completed without any appreciable diver¬

gence of military personnel.

Comparatively few were used, and there was no

interruption in a training program.
6. In the orderly accomplishment of the program, emphasis was placed upon

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

IX

the making of due provision against social and economic dislocation.
cultural production was not reduced by the evacuation.

Agri¬

Over ninety-nine

per cent of all agricultural acreage in the affected area owned or operated by
evacuees was successfully kept in production.

Purchasers, lessees, or substitute

operators were found who took over the acreage subject to relinquishment.
The Los Angeles Herald and Express and the San Diego Union, on February
23, 1943, and the Tacoma News-Tribune, on February 25,

1943, reported

increases not only in the value but also in the quantity of farm production
in their respective areas.
7. So far

as

could

be

foreseen,

everything

essential

minimize the impact of evacuation upon evacuees,
omy.

was

provided

to

as well as upon econ¬

Notwithstanding, exclusive of the costs of construction of facilities,

the purchase of evacuee motor vehicles, the aggregate of agricultural crop loans
made and the purchase of office equipment now in use for other government
purposes, the entire cost was $1.46 per evacuee day for the period of evacua¬
tion, Assembly Center residence and transfer operations.

This cost includes

financial assistance to evacuees who voluntarily migrated from the area before
the controlled evacuation phase of the program.

It also covers registration and

processing costs; storage of evacuee property and all other aspects of the
evacuee property protection program.

It includes hospitalization and medical

care of all evacuees from the date of evacuation; transportation of evacuees
and their personal effects from their homes to Assembly Centers; complete
care in Assembly Centers, including all subsistence, medical care and nominal
compensation for work performed. It also reflects the cost of family allowances
and clothing as well as transportation and meals during the transfer from
Assembly to Relocation Centers.
8. Accomplishment of the program in the manner selected would have
been impossible without the participation of the Federal civilian agencies so
ably assisting throughout. Under my continuous direction, the associated agen¬
cies of the Federal Security Agency, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Fran¬
cisco, the Farm Security Administration of the Department of Agriculture,
and the Work Projects Administration of the Federal Works Agency accepted
major responsibilities.

The War Relocation Authority; the Departments of

Treasury, Post Office, Justice, Commerce and Interior; the Division of Central
Administrative Services of the Office for Emergency Management performed
an important service from the beginning, and various state and local agen¬
cies effectively cooperated. The participating Army Agencies, particularly the
Division Engineers of the United States Engineer Corps who supervised the con¬
struction of Assembly and Relocation Centers, discharged their responsibilities in
a superior manner. The agencies of my command, military and civilian person¬
nel alike, responded to the difficult assignment devolving upon them with un¬
selfish devotion to duty. To the Japanese themselves great credit is due for the
manner in which they, under Army supervision and direction, responded to and
complied with the orders of exclusion.

X

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

9. A large quantity of primary source materials not found in the Appendix
has been selected and bound together.
triplicate.

These have been made available in

It is proposed that one set be retained at this Headquarters.

sets are forwarded with this report.

Two

It is requested that one set be retained in

the office of the Adjutant General, War Department, and the other forwarded
to the Library of Congress for future reference.

The great volume of secon¬

dary source materials will remain on file at this Headquarters. All of these data
will be available for research purposes whenever the Secretary of War so directs.

FINAL REPORT
JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM THE WEST

1942

COAST

i

Table of Contents
PAGE

Letter of Transmittal from the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to the Secretary
of War.
Foreword

.

Ill
V

Letter of Transmittal from Commanding General to the Chief of Staff. U. S.
Army, supra.

VII

Index to Figures.

XV

Index to Tables. XIX

Part I.

Evacuation—Its Military Necessity
(Pages 1-38)

CHAPTER

,

I.

PAGE

Action Under Alien Enemy Proclamations.

II. Need for Military Control and for Evacuation.
III.

Establishment of Military Control—Executive Order No. 9066 . .

Part II.

3
7
25

Evacuation—Its Development in Summary
(Pages 39-62)

IV.

The Emergence of Controlled Evacuation.

41

V.

Separation of Jurisdiction Over Evacuation and Relocation.

50

VI. The Evacuation Method.

53

Part III.

Evacuation—The Mechanics for its
Accomplishment
(Pages 63-74)

VII.

Organization and Function of Civil Affairs Division, General Staff,
and Wartime Civil Control Administration and Other Agencies

Part IV.

65

Evacuation—Its Operational Technique
(Pages 75-148)

VIII.

Development and Execution of the Evacuation Plan.

77

IX.

Voluntary Migration.

X.

Operation of Civil Control Stations—Protection of Evacuees and

XI.

Protection of Property of the Evacuees.

127

XII.

Deferments and Exemptions from Evacuation.

145

Their Families.

Part V.

101
114

Assembly Center Operations
(Pages 149-233)

XIII.

Assembly Center Location, Construction and Equipment.

151

XIV.

Housing, Feeding and Clothing.

186

xiii

xiv

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

CHAPTER

PAGE

XV.

Medical Care and Sanitation.

190

XVI.

Employment of Evacuees in Assembly Centers.

205

XVII. Education, Recreation, Religion and Assembly Center News¬
papers .

207

XVIII.

Assembly Center Security.

215

XIX.

Administration of Assembly Centers.

222

Part VI.

Relocation of Evacuees
(Pages 235-290)

XX.

War Relocation Authority.

237

XXI.

The Construction and Equipment of Relocation Centers.

248

XXII.

Transfer of Evacuees from Assembly to Relocation Centers.

278

Part VII.

Related Activities of Wartime Civil Control
Administration
(Pages 291-336)

XXIII.

Curfew and Travel Control.

293

XXIV.

Repatriation .

309

XXV.

Public Relations Summary.

328

XXVI.

Inspection of Wartime Civil Control Administration Operations. .

334

Part VIII.

Statistical and Fiscal Summary
(Pages 337-428)

XXVII.

Fiscal Summary .

339

XXVIII.

Statistical Summary.

352

Part IX.

Pictorial Summary

(Pages 429-509)
References
Glossary.

511

Appendix.

517

1.

Memoranda of March 20, 1942, from the Assistant Chief of Staff for

2.

Memorandum of April 23, 1942—"Japanese Evacuation Operations.” 522

3.

Delegation to Ninth Service Command and Letters of Transmittal—

4.

Standards and Details—Construction of Japanese Evacuee Reception
Centers (June 8, 1942).

584

5.

Procedure Memorandum issued on June 26, 1942.

592

Index .

601

Civil Affairs Giving Advance Warning of the First Evacuation. .

Reports of Survey—Status of Relocation Center Construction...

519

526

Index to Figures
FIGURE
NO.
1.

Part I
CHAPTER

PAGE

Map of Military Areas of the Western Defense
Command

.

II

16

IV

45

VII

68

VII

65

VIII

80

VIII

81

VIII

83

VIII

85

Part II
2.

Phases of the Evacuation Program.
Part III

3.

Organization Chart of Civil Affairs Division and
Wartime Civil Control Administration—Evac¬
uation Period .

4.

Organization Chart of Civil Affairs Division and
Wartime Civil Control Administration—PostEvacuation Period

.
Part IV

5 a.

Geographical Distribution, Japanese Population of

5b.

Geographical Distribution, Japanese Population of

of the United States: 1940.

the United States: 1940 (Color Projection) ....
6.

Japanese Population Western Defense Command
Area: 1940 .

7.

Age and Nativity of Japanese in Arizona, Califor¬

8.

Plan for Evacuating Japanese Population from Pa¬
cific Coast.

VIII

87

9.

Exclusion Areas, Japanese Evacuation Program.. .

VIII

88

10.

Evacuee Flow Chart.

VIII

96

11.

Net Voluntary Movement of Japanese: March 12
IX

108

nia, Oregon and Washington: 1940.

to June 5, 1942.
12.

Japanese Voluntary Migration by State of Destina¬
tion: March 12 to October 31, 1942.

IX

113

13.

Woodland Civil Control Station.

X

119

Part V
14a-141.

Detailed Location Maps of Assembly Centers (12)

15.

Assembly Center Map with Population and Occu¬

XIII 153-157
and 160-166

pancy Data.
xv

XIII 158, 159

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

xvi

CHAPTER

NO.
16a-16o.

Aerial Photographs of Assembly Centers.

17.

Evacuee Crime Rate—Offenses Per Thousand Japanese Per Year.

18.

Assembly Center Organization.

19a-19p.

PAGE

XIII 167-181

XVIII

221

XIX

223

Daily Evacuation Population Movement of Each
Assembly Center (15).

XIX 228-233

Part VI

20a-20j.

Location of War Relocation Centers (10).

XXI 251-255
and 258-262

21.
22.

Relocation Project Sites (Map).

XXI 256, 257

Typical Plot Plan—War Relocation Center.

XXI

266

23.

Typical Housing Block—War Relocation Center. .

XXI

267

24.

Typical Administration Group—War Relocation
XXI

268

25.

Typical Military Police Group—War Relocation
Center.

XXI

269

26.

Typical Hospital Group—War Relocation Center.

XXI

270

27.

Typical

Center.

XXI

271

28.

Transfers from Assembly to Relocation Centers. . .

XXII

281

Center.

Warehouse

Group—War

Exclusion Areas

Relocation

Map Insert

I.

.Following Page 290

Map Insert

II.

Assembly Center Destinations.Following Page 290

Map Insert III.

Relocation Center Destinations.Following Page 290
Part VII

29.

Age and

Sex and Nativity of

2,772

Japanese

Requesting Repatriation.
30.

Nisei, Kibei and Issei Japanese 18 to 39 Years of

31.

Wartime Civil Control Administration News

Age Requesting Repatriation.

XXIV

325

XXIV

327

XXV

329

XXV

329

XXV

330

XXV

332

Releases Concerning Evacuation and Alien Con¬
trol: March-November, 1942.
32.

Magazine Articles and Wartime Civil Control
Administration News Releases Concerning
Evacuation

and

November, 1942
33.

Magazine

Articles

Evacuation

and

Alien

Control:

February-

.
and

Circulation

Alien

Control:

Concerning
February -

November, 1942 .
34.

Organization Chart, Public Relations Division

. .

INDEX TO FIGURES

Xvii

Part VIII
FIGURE
NO.

CHAPTER

35.

Total Evacuation Population, March 21 to October

36.

Japanese Population, Assembly and Relocation

31, 1942 .

PAGB

XXVIII

358

XXVIII

361

XXVIII

385

XXVIII

386

XXVIII

387

XXVIII

388

XXVIII

390

XXVIII

391

XXVIII

392

XXVIII

393

XXVIII

395

XXVIII

397

Centers, Western Defense Command Area: June
7, 1942 .
37.

Growth of Japanese Population United States: 1870

3 8.

Distribution of Japanese Population, Arizona, Cali¬

to 1940 .

fornia, Oregon, Washington and Entire United
States: 1900 to 1940.
39.

Japanese Population in Certain Selected Cities, of
California, Oregon and Washington:
1940

40.

1900 to

.

Trends in Sex Composition of Japanese Population,
Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington:
1900 to 1940.

41.

Trends in Nativity of Japanese Population, Ari¬
zona, California, Oregon and Washington: 1900
to 1940 .

42.

Nativity Trends of Japanese, Arizona, California,

43.

Trends in Age Composition, Japanese Population

44.

Age and Sex Composition, Japanese Population,

Oregon and Washington: 1900 to 1940.

United States: 1900 to 1940.

Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington:
1940
45.

.

Industry of Employed Japanese 14 Years and Older,
by Sex and Nativity, California, Oregon and
Washington: 1940 .

46.

Japanese Employed Workers

14 Years Old and

Over in Agriculture and Wholesale and Retail
Trade, California, Oregon and Washington: 1940

Index to Tables
Part IV

TABLE
NO.

CHAPTER

1.

Japanese Population of the Western Defense Command

2.

Nativity of the Total Japanese Population and of the

Area, by States and Military Areas:

1940.

PAGE

VIII

79

VIII

84

VIII

84

VIII

86

IX

107

IX

110

IX

111

IX

112

XI

132

XI

133

XI

134

XI

136

Adult Japanese Population of Arizona, California,
Oregon and Washington:

1940.

3.

Age and Nativity of Japanese Population in Arizona,

4.

Major Industry Groups of Japanese Employed Workers

California, Oregon and Washington:

1940.

14 Years Old and Over in California, Oregon and
Washington:

1940 .

5.

Cumulative Net Voluntary Migration of Japanese from

6.

Japanese Migrants from Evacuated Areas, by State and

7.

Japanese Migrants from Evacuated Areas, by State of

Military Areas: March 12 to June 30, 1942.

County of Origin and by Sex.

Reported Destination and by Sex.
8.

Japanese Migrants from Evacuated Areas, by State of
Origin and by Sex and Nativity.

9.

Classification of Interviews by Types of Business as of

10.

Total Interviews and Total Individual Cases Handled by

May 22, 1942, Head Office Zone.

Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco in Connection
with the Evacuation Program.
11.

Property Received for Storage in Military Areas 1 and 2

12.

Motor Vehicles Received and Handled by the Federal

13.

Summary of Cases Served by the Farm Security Adminis¬
tration: Military Areas 1 and 2.

XI

143

14.

Farms and Acreage Subject to Relinquishment.

XI

144

XIV

187

XV

197

XV

197

XV

199

and Transferred to War Relocation Authority.

Reserve Bank of San Francisco.

Part V
15.

Average Daily Cost of Rations per Evacuee.

16.

Inpatient Movement During Reporting Period: August I
to August 28, 1942.

17.

Patient-Days in Hospitals During Reporting Period:

18.

Operations Performed During Reporting Period: August

August 1 to August 28, 1942.

1 to August 28, 1942.
xix

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

XX

TABLE
NO.

19.

CHAPTER

PAGE

Average Number of Inpatients per Week by Type of
Service During Reporting Period: August 1 to August
28, 1942

.

XV

199

XV

200

XV

200

XV

201

XV

201

XV

202

XV

203

XV

204

Assembly Centers, April 25 to October 25, 1942. . . .

XVIII

220

28.

Crime Offenses in Assembly Centers.

XVIII

220

29.

Average Population, Total Days Occupied by Evacuees,
XIX

227

XXI

273

XXI

276

XXII

279

20.

Total Outpatient Treatments by Type of Service During

21.

Total Treatments and Outpatients for the Reporting

22.

Center Hospital Medical Staff During Reporting Period:

23.

Average Number of Cases of Communicable Diseases

24.

Births, Deaths, and Stillbirths for Japanese Inducted Into

the Reporting Period: August 1 to August 28, 1942 . .

Period: August 1 to August 28, 1942.

August 1 to August 28, 1942.

Reported per Week from August 1 to August 28, 1942

Assembly Centers: March 21 to October 30, 1942 ....
25.

Japanese Deaths in California, Oregon and Washington
During First Ten Months of 1942, by Sex and Month
of Death .

26.

Deaths, Infant Deaths, and Stillbirths for Japanese in
California:

27.

1937-1941

.

Number of Offenses Charged—Total Japanese Popula¬
tion of the United States, Calendar Year 1941, and of

Dates of Occupancy and Maximum Population of
Assembly Centers .
Part VI
30.

Preliminary Estimate of the Cost of Relocation Centers

31.

Quartermaster Property Shipped to War Relocation

(December 1, 1942).

Authority Centers.
32.

Summary of Transfers of Evacuees from Custody of the
Army to Custody of the War Relocation Authority. .

33.

Transfers from Assembly to Relocation Centers.

XXII 282-284

Part VII
34.

Summary by Source and Disposition of Persons Who
Were Offered Repatriation in June, 1942.

35.

XXIV

319

XXIV

319

Address, Age, and Sex of 54 Repatriates Entrained by
Wartime Civil Control Administration on June 6,
1942

.

INDEX TO TABLES

XXI

TABLE
NO.

3 6.

CHAPTER

PAGE

Distribution of Names on July 31, 1942 State Depart¬
ment Preliminary Repatriation List Found in Wartime
Civil Control Administration Master Index File.

37.

XXIV

320

XXIV

320

XXIV

321

XXIV

321

XXIV

321

XXIV

322

XXIV

323

XXIV

324

XXIV

326

XXVIII

362

XXVIII

362

Distribution of Names on July 31, 1942 State Depart¬
ment Preliminary Repatriation List Not Found in
Wartime Civil Control Administration Master Index
File

3 8.

.

Distribution of Names Under Wartime Civil Control
Administration Responsibility on August 19,

1942

State Department List.
39.

Disposition of Names Under Wartime Civil Control Ad¬
ministration Responsibility on August 19, 1942 State
Department List .

40.

Type of Form Letter Sent to Residents of Assembly and

41.

Responses Received in Canvass of Persons on Photostat

42.

Lists of Japanese Requesting Repatriation Transmitted

43.

Age, Sex, Citizenship, and Place of Education of 2,772

Relocation Centers in October, 1942.

List and Supplement: October 19-December 31, 1942

by Wartime Civil Control Administration.

Japanese Requesting Repatriation as of October 19,
1942
44.

Number

.
and

Percentage

of

Nisei,

Kibei,

and

Issei

Requesting Repatriation in Five Age Groups.
Part VIII
45.

Summary of Persons Evacuated or Otherwise Coming
Under the Evacuation Program, March 2 to October
31, 1942

46.

Evacuees
47.

.

State of Origin by Center of Destination of Japanese
.

Total Persons Evacuated to Each Assembly and Reloca¬
tion Center by Civilian Exclusion Order Number and
Area.

48.

XXVIII 363-366

Japanese Evacuation and Voluntary Migration from
Evacuated Areas of Western Defense Command—•
Compared to Census Population of 1940.

49.

Hospitals: March 21 to October 30, 1942.
50.

XXVIII 367-368

Daily Population of All Assembly Centers Including
XXVIII 371-372

Evacuees Entering Assembly Centers by Center and by
Type of Induction or Transfer:

March 21, 1942 to

October 30, 1942.

XXVIII

373

Xxii

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

TABLE
NO.

CHAPTER

PAGE

XXVIII

373

52.

Evacuees Leaving Assembly Centers by Center and by
Type of Release or Transfer: March 21, 1942 to
October 30, 1942. XXVIII

374

53.

Net Total Persons Entering and Leaving Wartime Civil
Control Administration Assembly Centers: March 21
to October 30, 1942.

XXVIII

375

54.

Population of Assembly and Relocation Centers May 1
to November 3, 1942, by Months.

XXVIII

375

55.

Total Number of Evacuee-Days in Assembly Centers
and in Hospitals Outside of Assembly Centers, by
Center and Month: March 21, 1942 to October 30,
1942 .

XXVIII 376-377

51. Evacuees on Leave and Returning to Assembly Centers. .

56. Estimated Total Number of Evacuee Families and Aver¬
age Size of Such Families, by Center.
57.

Center of Origin and Destination of Evacuees Trans¬
ferred from Assembly to Relocation Centers.

XXVIII

378

XXVIII 3 81-382

58. Estimated State and Relocation Center Destination of
Japanese Evacuees, by State of Origin. XXVIII

3 83

59. Estimated Persons Received by War Relocation Authority
from Wartime Civil Control Administration and
Other Sources, to October 31, 1942. XXVIII

3 83

60.
61.

Population by Race, for the United States: 1940 and
1930 .

XXVIII

399

Geographical Distribution of the Japanese Population in
the United States: 1940. XXVIII

399

62. Nativity of Japanese in United States: 1890-1940.

XXVIII

400

63.

Growth of Japanese Population in Certain Selected Cities
of California, Oregon, and Washington: 1900-1940 . . XXVIII

400

64.

Sex Composition of the Japanese Population in Arizona,
California, Oregon and Washington: 1900-1940. . . . XXVIII

401

65. Nativity of the Japanese Population in Arizona, Califor¬
nia, Oregon and Washington: 1900-1940.
66.
67.

Age of Japanese by Sex and by Nativity for Arizona,
California, Oregon and Washington: 1940.

XXVIII

402

XXVIII 403-406

Employed Japanese Workers by Major Industry Groups
in California, Oregon and Washington: 1940. XXVIII

407

68. Japanese-Operated Farms Compared with All Farms in
California, Oregon and Washington, 1920-1940. XXVIII

408

69. Acreage of Commercial Truck Crops Grown by Japanese
in California . XXVIII

409

INDEX TO TABLES

TABLE
NO.

CHAPTER

70.

Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads

71.

Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads

72.

Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads

73.

Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads

74.

Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads

75.

Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads

in Arizona, by Counties: 1940.

in California, by Counties: 1940.

in Oregon, by Counties: 1940.

in Washington, by Counties: 1940.

in Idaho, by Counties: 1940.

in Montana, by Counties: 1940.
76.

XXVIII

409

XXVIII

410

XXVIII

411

XXVIII

412

XXVIII

413

XXVIII

414

XXVIII

415

XXVIII

415

Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads
in Utah, by Counties: 1940.

78.

PAGE

Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads
in Nevada, by Counties: 1940.

77.

XXU1

Japanese Employed Workers 14 Years Old and Over by
Sex, Nativity, and Major Occupation and Industry
Groups, for California, Oregon and Washington: 1940

79.

XXVIII 416-418

Japanese Employed Workers 14 Years Old and Over by
Sex, Nativity and Major Occupation and Industry
Groups for California: 1940.

80.

XXVIII 419-421

Japanese Employed Workers 14 Years Old and Over by
Sex, Nativity and Major Occupation and Industry
Groups for Oregon: 1940.

81.

XXVIII 422-424

Japanese Employed Workers 14 Years Old and Over by
Sex, Nativity and Major Occupation and Industry
Groups for Washington: 1940.

XXVIII 425-427

PART 1

EVACUATION—ITS MILITARY NECESSITY

CHAPTER I
Action Under Alien Enemy Proclamations
The ultimate decision to evacuate all persons of Japanese ancestry from the
Pacific Coast under Federal supervision was not made coincidentally with the
outbreak of war between Japan and the United States.

It was predicated upon

a series of intermediate decisions, each of which formed a part of the pro¬
gressive development of the final decision. At certain stages of this development,
various semi-official views were advanced proposing action less embracing than
that which finally followed.
On December 7th and 8th, 1941, the President issued proclamations declar¬
ing all nationals and subjects of the nations with which we were at war to be
enemy aliens. This followed the precedent of the last war, and was based upon
the same statutory enactment which supported the proclamations of President
Wilson in this regard. (See 50 U.S.C. 21.) By executive action, certain restric¬
tive measures were applied against all enemy aliens on an equal basis. In continen¬
tal United States, the Attorney General, through the Department of Justice, was
charged with the enforcement and administration of these proclamations. Where
necessary fully to implement his action, the Attorney General was assigned the
responsibility of issuing administrative regulations. He was also given the author¬
ity to declare prohibited zones, to which enemy aliens were to be denied admit¬
tance or from which they were to be excluded in any case where the national
security required. The possession of certain articles was declared by the procla¬
mations to be unlawful, and these articles are described as contraband. Authority
was granted for the internment of such enemy aliens as might be regarded by
the Attorney General as dangerous to the national security if permitted to
remain at large. In continental United States internment was left in any case to
the discretion of the Attorney General.
On the night of December 7th and the days that followed, certain enemy
aliens were apprehended and held in detention pending the determination whether
to intern. Essentially, the apprehensions thus effected were based on lists of suspects
previously compiled by the intelligence services, the Federal Bureau of Investiga¬
tion, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence Service.
During the initial stages of this action, some 2,000 persons were apprehended.
Japanese aliens were included in their number.

However, no steps were taken

to provide for the collection of contraband and no prohibited zones were pro¬
claimed.
The Commanding General, during the closing weeks of December, requested
the War Department to acquaint the Department of Justice with the need for
vigorous action along the Pacific Coast.

He sought steps looking toward the

enforcement of the contraband prohibitions contained in the proclamations and
toward the declaration of certain prohibited zones surrounding “vital installa¬
tions” along the coast. The Commanding General had become convinced that
the military security of the coast required these measures.
3

4

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

His conclusion was in part based upon the interception of unauthorized radio
communications which had been identified as emanating from certain areas along
the coast.

Of further concern to him was the fact that for a period of several

weeks following December 7th, substantially every ship leaving a West Coast
port was attacked by an enemy submarine.

This seemed conclusively to point

to the existence of hostile shore-to-ship (submarine) communication.
The Commanding General requested the War Department to send a repre¬
sentative, and to arrange with the Department of Justice for an officer of that
agency to meet with him at San Francisco, in order to consider the situation
"on the ground.” His objective was to crystallize a program of forthright action
to deal with subversive segments of the population. Preliminary to this a num¬
ber of discussions had been held between War and Justice Department represen¬
tatives in Washington, D. C. The Provost Marshal General, Major General Allen
W. Gullion, the Assistant Secretary of War, Honorable John J. McCloy, the
Chief of the Enemy Alien Control Unit, Department of Justice, Mr. Edward J.
Ennis, and the Chief of the Aliens Division, Office of the Provost Marshal
General, participated in these meetings.
These conferences between War and Justice Department representatives in
Washington were followed by conferences in San Francisco.

Mr. James Rowe,

Jr., Assistant to the Attorney General, represented the Department of Justice.
The Commanding General urged that the Justice Department provide for spot
raids in various areas to determine the presence and possession of contraband;
that it authorize the ready seizure of contraband, and adopt means for collect¬
ing and storing it.

He further requested that the Attorney General declare

prohibited zones surrounding certain coastal installations.

These conferences

continued over the period between January 2nd and 5th,

1942, and, as an

outgrowth of these meetings, the Department of Justice agreed to a program
of enforcement substantially as desired, with certain important exceptions. These
exceptions are described in an exchange of memoranda dated January 5, 1942,
between the Commanding General and Mr. Rowe

(Appendix to Chapter II

infra).
The salient feature of the intended program was an agreement arranging for
creation of prohibited zones. The Department of Justice agreed to declare pro¬
hibited zones surrounding vital installations and to provide for the exclusion
from these zones of enemy aliens. The extent and location of these zones was to
be determined on the basis of recommendations submitted by the Commanding
General. At the conclusion of these conferences, identical memoranda were ex¬
changed on January 6, 1942, between the Commanding General and the Assistant
Attorney General, Mr. James Rowe, Jr., crystallizing the intermediate under¬
standings which had been developed. These were:
"Following is a summary of the principles applicable and procedure to be followed
in the implementation of the proclamations of the President dated December 7th and
8th, 1941, and the instructions and regulations of the Attorney General, respecting
alien enemies in the Western Theater of Operations.

These principles and procedure

5

ACTION UNDER ALIEN ENEMY PROCLAMATIONS

were formulated in conferences during the past week between Lieutenant General J. L.
DeWitt, Commanding General of the Western Theater of Operations, Mr. James Rowe,
special representative of the Attorney General of the United States, Mr. N. J. L. Pieper,
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Major Karl R. Bendetsen, J.A.G.D., Office
of the Provost Marshal General.
“1.

Restricted Areas:

The Attorney General will designate restricted areas.

will entertain Army recommendations.

He

He will require the Army to determine the

exact description of each restricted area. What further requirements he will make will
depend in large measure upon the nature of the area involved and the extent of alien
enemy population in such area.

Indications are that, should Army recommendations

include areas in which there is resident a large number of alien enemies and evacuation
will thereby be rendered necessary, he will also require the submission of detailed plans
for evacuation and resettlement.

The Army has expressed disinclination to compliance

on its part with such a requirement for the reason that the Justice Department will
undertake an alien enemy registration and will have in its possession all the informa¬
tion essential for planning purposes once the proposed restricted areas have been made
known to that Department by the Army.
“2.

Alien Enemy Registration:

The Department of Justice is committed to an

alien enemy registration with the least practicable delay.

It is understood that regis¬

tration will include provision for finger printing, photographing, and other information
to be filed locally and probably with local police, as well as at a central office, such
information to be compiled alphabetically, by nationality and race as well as geo¬
graphical.
“3.

Apprehension:

United States Attorneys have been or will be instructed to

issue apprehension warrants upon application of the F.B.I. special agents in charge.
F.B.I. agents in charge will entertain Army requests for apprehensions submitted in
writing, or, if time does not permit, oral requests which shall be confirmed later in
writing. In any case where an alien enemy is found in violation of any of the provisions
of the proclamation or any part of the regulations of the Attorney General thereunder,
he is subject to summary apprehension with or without a warrant. Presumably at least
he is subject to summary apprehension by the Army as well as by the civil authorities.
Example:

A known alien enemy in possession of contraband is subject to summary

apprehension without a warrant.

Example: An alien enemy found within a restricted

area without authority is subject to apprehension.
"In an emergency apprehensions may be made without a warrant.
"4.

Searches and Seizures:

A warrant authorizing the search of the premises

of an alien enemy for the presence of contraband may be obtained merely on application
to the United States Attorney.

It is only necessary to support the issuance of such a

warrant that it be stated that the premises are those of an alien enemy.

In an emer¬

gency where the time is insufficient in which to procure a warrant, such premises may
be searched without a warrant.
"5.

Mixed Occupancy Dwellings:

The search of mixed occupancy premises or

dwellings may be by warrant only. In emergencies involving contraband such as radio
transmitters, it may be necessary to keep the premises under surveillance while a
search warrant is procured.

As previously noted, however, in such an emergency an

alien enemy’s premises may be searched for contraband without a warrant.
"6.

Multiple Searches:

Attorney General.

The term 'mass raid’ will not be employed by the

Instructions which have been or will be issued to United States

Attorneys and to F.B.I. Special Agents will permit 'spot raids.’ That is to say, if lists
of known alien enemies with the addresses of each are prepared by the F.B.I. and war¬
rants are requested to cover such lists, a search of all the premises involved may be
undertaken simultaneously.

Thus all of the alien enemy premises in a given area can

be searched at the same moment.
"7.

Much of the effective action will be facilitated by a complete registration.

is important that it go forward with dispatch.

It

However, there should be no cessation

6

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

in the vigorous implementation of the President’s proclamations regarding alien enemies.
It appears that considerable progress of a clarifying nature has been made. Only actual
application of the streamlined mechanics can establish whether there is need for further
change in the principles to be applied and the procedure to be followed.”

After a series of surveys made by the Commanding Generals of the several
Western Defense Command sectors, the Commanding General submitted a
number of recommendations calling for the establishment of 99 prohibited
zones in the State of California, and two restricted zones. These were to be fol¬
lowed by similar recommendations pertaining to Arizona, Oregon, and Washing¬
ton. Primarily, the prohibited zones in California surrounded various points along
the California Coast, installations in the San Francisco Bay area, particularly
along the waterfront, and in Los Angeles and San Diego. The recommendation
as to California was transmitted by the Commanding General by letter dated
January 21, 1942, was received from the Commanding General by the War
Department on January 25, 1942, and was forwarded by the Secretary of War
to the Attorney General on the same date.
In a series of press releases the Attorney General designated as prohibited
zones the 99 areas recommended by the Commanding General in California.1
Considerable evacuation thus was necessitated, but most of the enemy aliens
concerned were able to take up residence in or near places adjacent to the prohibited
zone. For example, a large prohibited zone embraced the San Francisco waterfront
area. Enemy aliens living in this section were required only to move elsewhere in
San Francisco. Of course, only aliens of enemy nationality were affected, and no
persons of Japanese ancestry born in the United States were required to move under
the program.
Although some problems were presented which required provision for in¬
dividual assistance, essentially there was little of this involved. By arrangement
with the Justice Department, the associated agencies of the Federal Security
Agency were asked to lend assistance in unusually needy cases.
Mr. Tom C. Clark, then the West Coast representative of the Anti-Trust
Division of the Justice Department, supervised this phase of enemy alien control
and coordinated all activities for the Justice Department. There was much con¬
jecture that this was the forerunner of a general enemy alien evacuation. Mr.
Clark and his Anti-Trust Division staff were deluged with inquiries and com¬
ments.

Public excitement in certain areas reached a high pitch, and much

confusion, the result of conflicting reports and rumors, characterized the picture.
However, in essence, there was no substantial dislocation or disruption socially
or economically of the affected groups.
^ee Inclosures to letter of transmittal # 7 and #11.

CHAPTER II
Need for Military Control and for Evacuation
The Commanding General, meantime, prepared and submitted recommenda¬
tions for the establishment of prohibited zones in Arizona, Oregon and Wash¬
ington, similar to those he had prepared for California.

Upon receipt of these

supplemental recommendations, forwarded by the Secretary of War, the Attor¬
ney General declined to act until further study.

In the case of Washington

State, the recommended prohibited zone included virtually all of the territory
lying west of the Cascades.

A general enemy alien evacuation from this area

would have been required. More than 9,500 persons would have been affected.
No agency was then prepared to supervise or conduct a mass movement, and the
Attorney General was not convinced of the necessity.
As early as January 5, in a memorandum of that date to Mr. Rowe, during the
initial conferences at San Francisco, the Commanding General pointed to the
need for careful advanced planning to provide against such economic and social
dislocations which might ensue from such mass evacuation.

The point was

also established that the Army had no wish to assume any aspects of civil
control if there were any means by which the necessary security measures could
be taken through normal civilian channels. In order to trace clearly the develop¬
ments which ultimately led to Executive Order No. 9066, and the establish¬
ment of military control, that memorandum is quoted in full at the end of this
chapter.
The Department of Justice had indicated informally that it did not consider
itself in a position to direct any enforced migrations. The Commanding General’s
recommendations for prohibited zones in Washington and Oregon were there¬
fore viewed with particular concern by the Department.

Not only did it feel

that such action should be predicated on convincing evidence of the military
necessity, it regarded the responsibility for collective evacuation as one not
within its functions.
The Attorney General, on February 9, 1942, formally advised the Secretary
of War, by letter, that he could not accept the recommendation of the Com¬
manding General for the establishment of a zone prohibited to enemy aliens
in the States of Washington and Oregon of the extent proposed by him.
stated in part:
"Your recommendation of prohibited areas for Oregon and Washington include the
cities of Portland, Seattle and Tacoma and therefore contemplate a mass evacuation
of many thousands * * *. No reasons were given for this mass evacuation * * *
I understood that * * * Lieutenant General DeWITT has been requested to supply

7

He

8

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

the War Department with further details and further material before any action is
taken on these recommendations. I shall, therefore, await your further advice.
"* * * The evacuation
of very great magnitude.

*

*

*

from this area would, of course, present a problem

The Department of Justice is not physically equipped to

carry out any mass evacuation. It would mean that only the War Department has the
equipment and personnel to manage the task.
“The proclamations directing the Department of Justice to apprehend, and where
necessary, evacuate alien enemies, do not, of course, include American citizens of the
Japanese race. If they have to be evacuated, I believe that this would have to be done
as a military necessity in these particular areas.

Such action, therefore, should in my

opinion, be taken by the War Department and not by the Department of Justice.”

The Commanding General thereafter submitted a resume of the military
considerations which prompted his recommendation for a prohibited zone in
Washington and Oregon embracing virtually the westerly half of those states.
The Department of Justice, however, concluded that it was not in a position to
undertake any mass evacuation, and declined in any event to administer such
general civil control measures.
Meanwhile, the uncertainties of the situation became further complicated.
The enforcement of contraband provisions was impeded by the fact that many
Japanese aliens resided in premises owned by American-born persons of Japanese
ancestry. The Department of Justice had agreed to authorize its special field
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to undertake spot raids without
warrant to determine the possession of arms, cameras and other contraband by
Japanese, but only in those premises occupied exclusively by enemy aliens. The
search of mixed occupancy premises or dwellings had not been authorized except
by warrant only. (See Memo 1/5/42 at end of this chapter.)
In the Monterey area in California a Federal Bureau of Investigation spot
raid made about February 12, 1942, found more than 60,000 rounds of am¬
munition and many rifles, shotguns and maps of all kinds. These raids had not
succeeded in arresting the continuance of illicit signaling. Most dwelling places
were in the mixed occupancy class and could not be searched promptly upon
receipt of reports. It became increasingly apparent that adequate security mea¬
sures could not be taken unless the Federal Government placed itself in a
position to deal with the whole problem.
The Pacific Coast had become exposed to attack by enemy successes in the
Pacific. The situation in the Pacific theatre had gravely deteriorated. There
were hundreds of reports nightly of signal lights visible from the coast, and of
intercepts of unidentified radio transmissions. Signaling was often observed at
premises which could not be entered without a warrant because of mixed occu¬
pancy. The problem required immediate solution. It called for the application
of measures not then in being.1
Further, the situation was fraught with danger to the Japanese population
itself. The combination of spot raids revealing hidden caches of contraband, the
attacks on coastwise shipping, the interception of illicit radio transmissions, the
nightly observation of visual signal lamps from constantly changing locations,
JIt

is

interesting

to

note

that

following

the

signals and shore-to-ship signal lights were virtually
coast ports appreciably reduced.

evacuation,
eliminated

interceptions

of

suspicious

and

on

outbound

attacks

or

unidentified

shipping

from

radio
west

9

NEED FOR MILITARY CONTROL AND FOR EVACUATION

and the success of the enemy offensive in the Pacific, had so aroused the public
along the West Coast against the Japanese that it was ready to take matters into
its own hands.

Press and periodical reports of the public attitudes along the

West Coast from December 7, 1941, to the initiation of controlled evacuation
clearly reflected the intensity of feeling. Numerous incidents of violence involv¬
ing Japanese and others occurred; many more were reported but were sub¬
sequently either unverified or were found to be cumulative.
The acceptance by the Attorney General of the Washington and Oregon rec¬
ommendations would not have provided the security which the military situ¬
ation then required.

More than two-thirds of the total Japanese population

on the West Coast were not subject to alien enemy regulations.
ultimately taken was based upon authority not then existing.

The action

It had become

essential to provide means which would remove the potential menace to which
the presence of this group under all the circumstances subjected the West Coast.
It is pertinent now to examine the situation with which the military authorities
were then confronted.
Because of the ties of race, the intense feeling of filial piety and the strong
bonds of common tradition, culture and customs, this population presented a
tightly-knit racial group.

It included in excess of 115,000 persons deployed

along the Pacific Coast.

Whether by design or accident, virtually always

their communities were adjacent to very vital shore installations, war plants,
etc. While it was believed that some were loyal, it was known that many
were not.

To complicate the situation no ready means existed for determining

the loyal and the disloyal with any degree of safety. It was necessary to face the
realities—a positive determination could not have been made.
It could not be established, of course, that the location of thousands of
Japanese adjacent to strategic points verified the existence of some vast con¬
spiracy to which all of them were parties. Some of them doubtless resided there
through mere coincidence.

It seemed equally beyond doubt, however, that the

presence of others was not mere coincidence.

It was difficult to explain the

situation in Santa Barbara County, for example, by coincidence alone.
Throughout the Santa Maria Valley in that County, including the cities of
Santa Maria and Guadalupe, every utility, air field, bridge, telephone and power
line or other facility of importance was flanked by Japanese.

They even sur¬

rounded the oil fields in this area. Only a few miles south, however, in the Santa
Ynez Valley, lay an area equally as productive agriculturally as the Santa Maria
Valley and with lands equally available for purchase and lease, but without any
strategic installations whatever. There were no Japanese in the Santa Ynez Valley.
Similarly, along the coastal plain of Santa Barbara County from Gaviota
south, the entire plain, though narrow, had been subject to intensive cultivation.
Yet, the only Japanese in this area were located immediately adjacent to such
widely separated points as the El Capitan Oil Field, Elwood Oil Field, Summerland Oil Field, Santa Barbara airport and Santa Barbara lighthouse and harbor
entrance. There were no Japanese on the equally attractive lands between these

10

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

points. In the north end of the county is a stretch of open beach ideally suited
for landing purposes, extending for 15 or 20 miles, on which almost the only
inhabitants were Japanese.
Such a distribution of the Japanese population appeared to manifest some¬
thing more than coincidence.

In any case, it was certainly evident that the

Japanese population of the Pacific Coast was, as a whole, ideally situated with
reference to points of strategic importance, to carry into execution a tremendous
program of sabotage on a mass scale should any considerable number of them
have been inclined to do so.
There were other very disturbing indications that the Commanding General
could not ignore. He was forced to consider the character of the Japanese colony
along the coast. While this is neither the place nor the time to record in detail
significant pro-Japanese activities in the United States, it is pertinent to note
some of these in passing.

Research has established that there were over 124

separate Japanese organizations along the Pacific Coast engaged, in varying
degrees, in common pro-Japanese purposes. This number does not include local
branches of parent organizations, of which there were more than 310.
Research and co-ordination of information had made possible the identifica¬
tion of more than 100 parent fascistic or militaristic organizations in Japan
which have had some relation, either direct or indirect, with Japanese organiza¬
tions or individuals in the United States. Many of the former were parent organ¬
izations of subsidiary or branch organizations in the United States and in that
capacity directed organizational and functional activities.

There was definite

information that the great majority of activities followed a line of control from
the Japanese government,

through key individuals and

associations

to the

Japanese residents in the United States.
That the Japanese associations, as organizations, aided the military campaigns
of the Japanese Government is beyond doubt. The contributions of these associa¬
tions towards the Japanese war effort had been freely published in Japanese
newspapers throughout California.2
The extent to which Emperor worshiping ceremonies were attended could
not have been overlooked. Many articles appearing in issues of Japanese language
newspapers gave evidence that these ceremonies had been directed toward the
stimulation of "burning patriotism” and "all-out support of the Japanese Asiatic
Co-Prosperity Program.”
Numerous Emperor worshiping ceremonies had been held.

Hundreds of

Japanese attended these ceremonies, and it was an objective of the sponsoring
organization to encourage one hundred per cent attendance.

For example, on

2Some of these newspaper items are as follows:
"March 13, 1941. Thirty-two bales of tinfoil were shipped to Japan through the Japanese Consulate
General and were contributed by Japanese Associations of Fresno County, Kern County, Delano and San
Bernardino.”
"July 6, 1941. Central California Japanese Association announces the collection and transmission to
the War Ministry of the sum of $3,542.05.”
The Japanese Veterans Association was similarly engaged:
’’March 20, 1941. It is announced that the War Veterans Associations in Japan, Germany and Italy, in
keeping with the spirit of the Axis Treaty have formed joint and advisory committees to aid and establish
the new world order. There are 3l/z million veterans and reservists headed by General Imei who have pledged
their cooperation to Axis aims.”
(All quotations in this note taken from the Extension of the Testimony of the Attorney General of
California given before the House of Representatives, Select Committee on National Defense Migration, pur¬
suant to House Resolution 113, 77th Congress, San Francisco Hearings, part 29. Italics supplied.)

NEED FOR MILITARY CONTROL AND FOR EVACUATION

11

February 11, 1940, at 7:00 P.M., the Japanese Association of Sacramento spon¬
sored an Emperor worshiping ceremony in commemoration of the 2,600th
anniversary of the founding of Japan.

Three thousand attended.

Another group of Japanese met on January 1, 1941, at Lindsay, California.
They honored the 2,601st Year of the Founding of the Japanese Empire and
participated in the annual reverence to the Emperor,* 1 2 3 and bowed their heads
toward Japan in order to indicate that they would be "* * * ready to respond to

the call of the mother country with one mind. Japan is fighting to carry out
our program of Greater Asiatic co-prosperity. Our fellow Japanese countrymen
must be of one spirit and should endeavor to unite our Japanese societies in this

country * *

*.”4

Evidence of the regular occurrence of Emperor worshiping ceremonies in
almost every Japanese populated community in the United States had been
discovered.
A few examples of the many Japanese associations extant along the Pacific
Coast are described in the following passages:
The Hokubei Butoku Kai.

The Hokubei Butoku Kai or Military Virtue

Society of North America was organized in 1931 with headquarters at Alvarado,
Alameda County, California, and a branch office in Tokyo.

One of the pur¬

poses of the organization was to instill the Japanese military code of Bushido
among the Japanese throughout North America.

This highly nationalistic and

militaristic organization was formed primarily to teach Japanese boys "military
virtues” through Kendo

(fencing), Judo

(Jiujitsu), and Sumo

(wrestling).

The manner in which this society became closely integrated with many other
Japanese organizations, both business and social, is well illustrated by the postal
address of some of these branches.5
3The program was as follows:
a. Singing of Japanese National Anthem;
b. Opening of the Emperor’s portrait;
c. Reading of the Emperor’s Rescript;
d. Reading of Message of Reverence;
e. Bowing heads toward Japan;
/. Shouting "Banzai” (Long live the Emperor).
*New World Sun, January 7, 1941: 5:6.
5For example, in Alvarado, Alameda County, Post Office Box 215 was the address of the following:
(1) Headquarters’ Military Virtue Society of North America
(2) Kinyai Kumia Finance Association
(J) Japanese-American News Correspondent
(4) New World Sun Correspondent
(5) Hochi Shimbun Correspondent
(6) Alvarado Japanese School
(7) Takichi Nakamura (President) Military Virtue Society of North America
In Sebastopol, Post Office Box 57 was the address of the following:
(1) Military Virtue Society of North America
(2) Japanese Sunday School
(3) Hiroshima Prefectural Society
(4) Sabura Baseball Team
In Suisun, Post Office Box 252 was the address of:
(1) Military Virtue Society of North America
(2) Mint Grill
(3) Suisun Fishing Club
In Auburn, Post Office Box 57 was the address of:
(1) Military Virtue Society of North America
(2) Japanese School
(3) Young Men’s Buddhist Association
(4) Young Women’s Buddhist Association
(5) Buddhist Church
In Lindsay, 157 Mount Vernon Avenue was the address of:
(1) Military Virtue Society of North America
(2) Japanese School
(3) Lindsay Women’s Association

12

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

The Heimusha Kai. The Heimusha Kai was organized for the sole purpose
of furthering the Japanese war effort.

The intelligences services (including the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Military Intelligence Service and the Office
of Naval Intelligence) had reached the conclusion that this organization was
engaged in espionage.

Its membership contained highly militaristic males eligible

for compulsory military service in Japan.

Its prime function was the collection

of war funds for the Japanese army and navy.

In more than 1,000 translated

articles in which Heimusha Kai was mentioned, there was no evidence of any
function save the collection of war relief funds.
A prospectus was issued to all Japanese in the United States by the Sponsor
Committee for Heimusha Kai in America. That prospectus is quoted as follows:
"The world should realize that our military action in China is based upon the sig¬
nificant fact that we are forced to fight under realistic circumstances. As a -matter of
historical fact, -whenever the Japanese government begins a military campaign, we, Jap¬
anese, must be united and everyone of us must do his part.
"As far as our patriotism is concerned, the world knows that we are superior to any
other nation. However, as long as we are staying on foreign soil, what can we do for
our mother country?

All our courageous fighters are fighting at the front today, for¬

getting their parents, wives and children in their homes!

It is beyond our imagination,

the manner in which our imperial soldiers are sacrificing their lives at the front line,
bomb after bomb, deaths after deaths!
can keep from crying in sympathy?

Whenever we read and hear this sad news, who
Therefore, we, the Japanese in the United States,

have been contributing a huge amount of money for war relief funds and numerous
comforting bags for our imperial soldiers.
“Today, we, Japanese in the United States, who are not able to sacrifice our lives
for our National cause are now firmly resolved to stand by to settle the present war as
early as possible.

'We are proud to say that our daily happy life in America is depen¬

dent upon the protective power of Great Japan.’
and we will take strong action as planned.

.”6

with us for our National cause

We are facing a critical emergency,

We do hope and beg you all to cooperate

(Italics supplied.)

The Heimusha Kai was organized on October 24, 1937, in San Francisco.
The meeting took place at the Golden Gate Hall, and there were more than 200
members present. The following resolution was passed:
"We, the members of the Japanese Reserve Army Corps in America are resolved to
do our best in support of the Japanese campaign in China and to set up an Army

.”7

Relief Department For Our Mother Country

According to reliable sources there were more than 10,000 members of
Heimusha Kai in 1940.
Additional illustrations of pro-Japanese societies are found in footnotes.8
One extremely important obstacle in the path of Americanization of the
second-generation Japanese was the widespread formation, and increasing impor6New World Sun, August 28, 1937: 4:6 10.
7Excerpt from Zaibei Nippon Zin Sbi, published in Japan, 1940.
8The Togo Kai. The Togo Kai was organized in 1905 in memory of Admiral Togo, the hero of the
Japanese Russian Naval Battle. (Ref. Japanese Directory of Political and Religious Organizations.) The
purposes of this organization were to promote a greater Imperial Japanese Navy, and to collect and transmit
funds for the Japanese Navy.
It was revealed that there were three Togo Kai branches in the United States: One in Sacramento, one
in Sonoma County, and one in San Francisco. All of these branches worked industriously to raise money for
the Japanese Navy War Relief Fund. The Togo Kai branches in America were controlled by the parent
Togo Kai headquarters in Japan. This fact is substantiated by reference to telegraphic bank transfers from
the various branches of the United States to headquarters in Japan.
The Kanjo Kai. "Due to the critical situation that has developed in the Orient,” the Zaigo Gunjin Dan
(Retired Army Men’s Corps) of Sacramento organized the Kanjo Kai (Society for Defending the Country by

13

NEED FOR MILITARY CONTROL AND FOR EVACUATION

tance, of the Japanese language schools in the United States. The purposes and
functions of these Japanese language schools are well known.

They employed

only those textbooks which had been edited by the Department of Education
of the Japanese Imperial Government.
In order to assist the Japanization of the second generation, the Zaibei Ikuei
Kai (Society for Education of the Second Generation in America) was organ¬
ized in Los Angeles in April, 1940. "With the grace of the Emperor, the ZAIBEI
IKUEI KAI is being organized in commemoration of the 2,600th Anniversary
of the Founding of the Japanese Empire to Japanize the second and third genera¬
tions in this country for the accomplishment of establishing a greater Asia in
the future * * *.”9
In California alone there were over 248 schools with an aggregate faculty of
454 and a student body of 17,800.
The number of American-born Japanese who had been sent to Japan for
education and who were now in the United States could not be overlooked. For
more than twenty-five years American-born progeny of alien Japanese had been
Swords, or the Sword Society) in July, 1937. (Ref. New World Sun, July 18, 1937: 3:1.) It was the first
militant Japanese organization

that was established in the United States

by Japanese ex-service men

to

support military action taken by the Japanese government in the Orient.
The following telegram from the Japanese Army Department was received by the Kanjo Kai just after
the organization of that Society, and was read at the first executive board meeting:
"During this emergency, you officials are doing your utmost for the Country and the Army
Department is very grateful. For the establishment of peace in the Orient, it is necessary for us
to adopt positive steps in China.” (Ref. New World Sun, July 18, 1937: 3:1.)
In September, 1940, the Kanjo Kai, together with other organizations in Sacramento, gave a farewell
banquet for three representatives who were sent to the Empire Jubilee Conference

in Tokyo.

(Ref.

New

World Sun, September 19, 1940: 5:1.)
Members of the Kanjo Kai made monthly contributions of $1.00 or more to Imperial Japanese Army
War Relief Fund. This proposal was initiated by Consul-General Shiosaki during his visit to Sacramento
in 1938.

The Nipponjin Kai.

The Japanese Association of America (Nipponjin Kai) was the principal controlling

organization in the United States. It operated in close cooperation with the consulate and carried out the
directives of that office. Article 3 of its by-laws provides:
"Article 3. This association is organized by the local Japanese association

diction of the Japanese Consulate General of San Francisco.”

under the juris¬

(Italics supplied.)

The Japanese Association acted as intermediary between the Japanese people in the United States and
the Japanese government. It aided the collection of war relief funds and poll taxes, sponsored organization
of corps of visitors from the United States to Japan, founded Japanese language schools, disseminated propa¬
ganda, welcomed dignitaries and visiting military and naval officers, encouraged emperor worship, stimu¬
lated the establishment of subsidiaries and other organizations, and participated in a multitude of other
pro-Japanese activities. Branches of the Japanese Association were established in every community where
the Japanese population was such as to warrant such an organization.
Other outstanding Japanese organizations were known to exist in the United States. Some of the more
prominent ones are listed below. The translation of the names of these organizations is indicative of their
objects.
Kaigun Kyokai (Navy Association) ;
Aikoku Fujin Kai (Patriotic Women’s Society);
Jugo Sekisei Kai (Behind the Gun Society or Red Heart Society) j
Hokoku Kai (Society for Service to the Country);
Aikokuki Kenno Kisei Domei (Patriotic League for Contribution to the Airplane Fund);
Jugo Kai (Behind the Gun Society) ;
Ko-A-Sokushin Kai (Society for the Promotion of Asiatic Co-Prosperity);
Kokuryu Kai (Black Dragon Society);
Kibei Shimin Kai (Kibei Society);
Hokyoku Kai (Rising Sun Society);
Zaibei Nipponjin Kai (Japanese Association of America) ;
Zaibei Nipponjin Kai Renraku Nikkai Kanji Kai
(United Councilor’s Convention for Japanese Associations in North America);
Nanka Teikoku Gunjin Dan (Japanese Imperial Army Men’s Corps of Southern California) ;
Jugo Haibutsu Riyodan (Behind the Gun Waste Utilization Society);
Josho Kai

(Ever-Victorious or Invincible Society);

Hinode Kai (Imperial Japanese Reservists);
Hokubei Zaigo Shokuin Dan (North American Reserve Officers’ Association) ;
Sokoku Kai (Fatherland Society) ;
Suiko Kai (Los Angeles Reserve Officers’ Association);
Zaibei Ikuei Kai (Society of Educating the Second Generation in America).

9Neu/ World Sun,

April 13, 1940: 4:1.

14

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

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sent to Japan by their parents for education and indoctrination.

There they

remained for extended periods, following which they ordinarily returned to the
United States.

The extent of their influence upon other Nisei Japanese could

not be accurately calculated. But it could not be disregarded.
The Kibei Shimin movement was sponsored by the Japanese Association of
America.

Its objective for many years had been to encourage the return to

America from Japan of American-born Japanese. When the movement started
it was ascertained that there were about 20,000 American-born Japanese in
Japan.

The Japanese Association of America sent representatives to Japan to

confer with Prefectural officials on the problems of financing and transportation.
The Association also arranged with steamship companies for special rates for
groups of ten or more so returning, and requested all Japanese associations to
secure employment for returning American-born Japanese.
During 1941 alone more than 1,573 American-born Japanese entered West
Coast ports from Japan.

Over 1,147 Issei, or alien Japanese, re-entered the

United States from Japan during that year.
The 557 male Japanese less than twenty-five years of age who entered West
Coast ports from Japan during 1941 had an average age of 18.2 years and had
spent an average of 5.2 years in Japan. Of these, 239 had spent more than three
years there. This latter group had spent an average of 10.2 years in Japan.
Of the 239 males who spent three years or more abroad, 180 were in the age
group 15 to 19 (with an assumed average age of 17.5 years) and had spent 10.7
years abroad. In other words, these 180 Kibei lived, on the average, 6.8 years at
the beginning of their life in the United States and the next 10.7 years in Japan.
Forty of the 239 who had spent three or more years abroad were in the age group
20 to 24, with an assumed average age 22.5. These were returning to the United
States after having lived here, on the average, for their first 13 years and having
spent the last 9.5 years in Japan, including one or more years when they were
of compulsory (Japanese) military age.
The table below indicates the nearest relative in Japan for the age groups
15 to 19, and 20 to 24 years of age.
It will be noted that 42.3 per cent of those in the 15 to 19 year group lived
with a father or mother in Japan, and that 13.2 lived with a grandparent. In
AGE GROUP
Nearest Relative in Japan

15 to 19 years
Number

Percent

20 to 24 years
Number

Percent

All.

272

100.0

163

100.0

Father or mother...

115
67
48

42.3
24.6
17.7

66
46
20

40.5
28.2
12.3

36
95
16
10
4
6

13.2
34.9
5.9
3.7
1.5
2.2

18
42
30
7
7

11.0
25.8
18.4
4.3
4.3

Mother.
Grandparent.
Uncle or aunt.
Other relative.
No relative indicated.
Non-relative.

NEED FOR MILITARY CONTROL AND FOR EVACUATION

15

other words, more than 50 per cent of this group of Kibei had a parent or grand¬
parent in Japan, and it is reasonable to assume that in most instances these Kibei
lived with this nearest relative.
Combining this information with that from the preceding table, it is seen
that in a group with an average age of 17.5 years who were returning to the
United States after having spent an average of 7.4 years abroad continuously
(in other words, from the time they were ten years of age) one-half had lived
with their parent or grandparent in Japan.

Yet, this group consists entirely of

American citizens.
Of the Kibei in Hawaii, Andrew W. Lind, Professor of Sociology, University
of Hawaii, says: "Finally, there is the rather large Kibei group of the second
generation who, although citizens of the United States by virtue of birth within
the Territory, are frequently more fanatically Japanese in their disposition than
their own parents.

Many of these individuals have returned from Japan so

recently as to be unable to speak the English language and some are unquestion¬
ably disappointed by the lack of appreciation manifested for their Japanese edu¬
cation.”

(American Council Paper No. 5, page 187, American Council, Insti¬

tute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52nd Street, New York.)
It was, perforce, a combination of factors and circumstances with which the
Commanding General had to deal. Here was a relatively homogenous, unassimi¬
lated element bearing a close relationship through ties of race, religion, language,
custom, and indoctrination to the enemy.
The mission of the Commanding General was to defend the West Coast from
enemy attack, both from within and without. The Japanese were concentrated
along the coastal strip.

The nature of this area and its relation to the national

war effort had to be carefully considered.
The areas ultimately evacuated of all persons of Japanese ancestry embraced
the coastal area of the Pacific slope.

In the States of Washington and Oregon

to the north, Military Area No. 1 contains all that portion lying westerly of
the eastern bases of the Cascade Mountains. In other words, the coastal plain,
the forests, and the mountain barrier.

In California the evacuation program

encompassed the entire State—that is to say, not only Military Area No. 1
but also Military Area No. 2. Military Area No. 2 in California was evacuated
because (1) geographically and strategically the eastern boundary of the State of
California approximates the easterly limit of Military Area No. 1 in Washington
and Oregon (Figure 1 shows the boundaries of these two Military Areas), and
because (2) the natural forests and mountain barriers, from which it was deter¬
mined to exclude all Japanese, lie in Military Area No. 2 in California, although
these lie in Military Area No. 1 of Washington and Oregon. A brief reference to
the relationship of the coastal states to the national war effort is here pertinent.
That part of the States of Washington, Oregon, and California which lies
west of the Cascade and Sierra Nevada Ranges, is dominated by many water¬
ways, forests, and vital industrial installations.

Throughout the Puget Sound

area there are many military and naval establishments as well as shipyards, air¬
plane factories and other industries essential to total war.

In the vicinity of

16

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

Figure 1

THE

WEST

COAST

NEED FOR MILITARY CONTROL AND FOR EVACUATION

17

Whidby Island, Island County, Washington, at the north end of the island, is
the important Deception Pass bridge.

This bridge provides the only means of

transit by land from important naval installations, facilities and properties in
the vicinity of Whidby Island.

This island afforded an ideal rendezvous from

which enemy agents might communicate with enemy submarines in the Strait
of Juan de Fuca or with other agents on the Olympic Peninsula. From Whidby
and Camano Islands, comprising Island County, the passages through Admiralty
Inlet, Skagit Bay and Saratoga Passage from Juan de Fuca Strait to the vital
areas of the Bremerton Navy Yard and Bainbridge Island can be watched. The
important city of Seattle with its airplane plants, airports, waterfront facilities,
Army and Navy transport establishments and supply terminals required that an
unassimilated group of doubtful loyalty be removed a safe distance from these
critical areas.

A reference to the spot map (published in Chapter VIII), Fig¬

ure 6, showing the distribution of Japanese population along the frontier, dis¬
closes a high concentration of persons of Japanese ancestry in the Puget Sound
area.

Seattle is the principal port in the Northwest; it is the port from which

troops in Alaska are supplied; its inland water route to Alaska passes the north
coast of Washington into the Straits of Georgia on its way to Alaska.
The lumber industry is of vital importance to the war effort. The State of
Washington, with Oregon and California close seconds, produces the bulk of
sawed lumber in the United States.

The large area devoted to this industry

afforded saboteurs unlimited freedom of action.

The danger from forest fires

involved not only the destruction of valuable timber but also threatened cities,
towns and other installations in the affected area.

The entire coastal strip from

Cape Flattery south to Lower California is particularly important from a pro¬
tective viewpoint.

There are numerous naval installations with such facilities

constantly under augmentation.

The coast line is particularly vulnerable.

Dis¬

tances between inhabited areas are great and enemy activities might be carried
on without interference.
The petroleum industry of California and its great centers of production for
aircraft and shipbuilding, are a vital part of the life blood of a nation at war.
The crippling of any part of this would seriously impede the war effort. Through
the ports of Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego, flow
the sinews of war—the men, equipment and supplies for carrying the battle
A further reference to the spot map, Figure 6,

against the enemy in the Pacific.

in Chapter VIII, reveals the high concentration of this segment of the population
surrounding nearly all these key installations.
In his estimate of the situation, then, the Commanding General found a
tightly-knit, unassimilated racial group, substantial numbers of whom were
engaged in pro-Japanese activities.

He found them concentrated in great num¬

bers along the Pacific Coast, an area of the utmost importance to the national
war effort. These considerations were weighed against the progress of the
Emperor’s Imperial Japanese forces in the Pacific.

This chapter would be

incomplete without a brief reference to the gravity of the external situation
obtaining in the Pacific theater.
war in the Pacific to show this.

It is necessary only to state the chronology of

18

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

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COAST

At 8:05 A.M., the 7th of December, the Japanese attacked the United States
naval base at Pearl Harbor without warning. Simultaneously they struck against
Malaysia, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Wake and Midway Islands.
On the day following, the Japanese Army invaded Thailand. Two days later
the British battleships "H.M.S. Wales” and "H.M.S. Repulse” were sunk off the
Malay Peninsula.

The enemy’s successes continued without interruption.

On

the 13 th of December, Guam was captured and on successive days the Japanese
captured Wake Island and occupied Hong Kong, December 24th and 25 th,
respectively.

On January 2nd Manila fell and on the 27th of February the battle

of the Java Sea resulted in a crushing naval defeat to the United Nations. Thir¬
teen United Nations’ warships were sunk and one damaged.

Japanese losses were

limited to two warships sunk and five damaged.
On the 9th of March the Japanese Imperial forces established full control of
the Netherlands East Indies; Rangoon and Burma were occupied.

Continuing

during the course of evacuation, on the 9th of April, Bataan was occupied by the
Japanese and on May 6th Corregidor surrendered.
On June 3rd, Dutch Harbor, Alaska, was attacked by Japanese carrier-based
aircraft and, with the occupation by the Japanese on June 7th of Attu and Kiska
Islands, United States territory in continental Northern America had been invaded.
As already stated, there were many evidences of the successful communica¬
tion of information to the enemy, information regarding positive knowledge on
his part of our installations.

The most striking illustrations of this are found

in three of the several incidents of enemy attacks on West Coast points.
On February 23, 1942, a hostile submarine shelled Goleta, near Santa Bar¬
bara, California, in an attempt to destroy vital oil installations there.

On the

preceding day the shore battery in position at this point had been withdrawn to
be replaced by another. On the succeeding day, when the shelling occurred, it was
the only point along the coast where an enemy submarine could have successfully
surfaced and fired on a vital installation without coming within the range of
coast defense guns.
In the vicinity of Brookings (Mt. Emily), Oregon, an enemy submarinebased plane dropped incendiary bombs in an effort to start forest fires.

At that

time it was the only section of the Pacific Coast which could have been approached
by enemy aircraft without interception by aircraft warning devices.
Similarly, a precise knowledge of the range of coast defense guns at Astoria,
Oregon, was in the possession of the enemy.

A hostile submarine surfaced and

shelled shore batteries there from the only position at which a surfaced sub¬
marine could have approached the coast line close enough to shell a part of its
coast defenses without being within range of the coastal batteries.
In summary, the Commanding General was confronted with the Pearl Har¬
bor experience, which involved a positive enemy knowledge of our patrols, our
naval dispositions, etc., on the morning of December 7th; with the fact that
ships leaving West Coast ports were being intercepted regularly by enemy sub¬
marines; and with the fact that an enemy element was in a position to do great
damage and substantially to aid the enemy nation.

Time was of the essence.

The Commanding General, charged as he was with the mission of providing

19

NEED FOR MILITARY CONTROL AND FOR EVACUATION

for the defense of the West Coast, had to take into account these and other
military considerations. He had no alternative but to conclude that the Japanese
constituted a potentially dangerous element from the viewpoint of military
security—that military necessity required their immediate evacuation to the
interior.

The impelling military necessity had become such that any measures

other than those pursued along the Pacific Coast might have been "too little
and too late”.
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II

Memorandum from the Commanding General, Western
Defense Command, to the Assistant Attorney General,
Mr. James Rowe, Jr.
"January 5, 1942
"Memorandum for: Assistant Attorney General Rowe.
Subject:
"1.

Alien Enemy Control Requirements.

Reference is made to the summary of report of the Assistant Attorney
General Rowe to General DeWitt on Sunday, January 4, 1942, at 6:30
P.M. (TAB. 'A.’)

"2.

It should be stated at the outset that the Army has no wish to undertake
the conduct and control of alien enemies anywhere within continental
United States.

Impressions to the contrary notwithstanding, the Army

would accept transfer of such responsibility and authority with the great¬
est reluctance. Its desire is only that the Department of Justice act with
expedition and effectiveness in the discharge of its responsibilities under
the Presidential Proclamations of December 7th and 8 th.

The develop¬

ments which have resulted in the current conferences between the Attor¬
ney General’s representative, and General DeWitt and his staff, have been
occasioned by the almost complete absence of action on the part of the
Department of Justice over a period of nearly four weeks since promul¬
gation of the mentioned proclamations, toward implementing sections
5 and 9.
"3.

To the extent that an estimate can now be made, in the absence of actual
demonstration, the courses of action proposed to be taken by the Depart¬
ment of Justice, as set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Tab. 'A*,
appear to constitute a great step forward.

"4.

While some amendment, clarification and implementation may be neces¬
sary, it appears that section 5 of the proclamation relative to prohibited
articles will have been fully implemented when the measures detailed in
Tab. 'A’ have been taken.

The means of determining whether all alien

enemies are complying with the proscriptions of the Proclamations, as
repeated in the contraband regulations promulgated by the Attorney Gen¬
eral, may have to be further clarified. This phase of the problem, how¬
ever, is closely associated with warrant issuance aspect of the alien enemy
program.

20

"5.

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

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COAST

As agreed in the conference referred to in paragraph 1 hereof, the Com¬
manding General of the Western Defense Command has initiated action
within the California, Oregon and Washington portions of his command
(as augmented by the inclusion of the Air Corps installations throughout
his command), to furnish U. S. Attorneys not later than January 9, 1942,
a list of the areas which are regarded by Army authorities as falling within
section 9 of the regulations relative to restricted areas.

This report will

include definite descriptions of such areas and will divide them into two
categories as follows:
"Category A:

Those areas within, or through which no alien enemy

may be permitted, under any circumstances.
"Category B:

Those areas through, or within which alien enemies

may be permitted on pass or permit.
"In this connection attention is invited to the concluding paragraph of
Section 9 of the regulations which provides in substance that any alien
enemy found within any restricted area contrary to the regulations shall
be subject to summary apprehension.

The military authorities desire to

be advised whether, in the opinion of the Attorney General, apprehension
of alien enemies under such circumstances may be without warrant and,
if so, whether the military authorities are empowered to enforce.

"In order to avoid absolute confusion in the matter, Army authorities
strongly urge that the Department of Justice undertake to establish im¬
mediate liaison and coordination xvith all appropriate relief agencies pre¬
pared to alleviate hardship resulting from compulsory change of residence
on the part of alien enemies residing in Category A, restricted areas. As
the Department of Justice has requested permission to announce that the
establishment of restricted areas has been made by the Attorney General
only because the Commanding General of this theatre has so requested,
military authorities desire it to be unequivocally clear that they desire that
everything possible be done to eliminate unnecessary hardship and the need
for planning and coordination along this line is strongly emphasized.
"Depending upon the manner in which compulsory eviction from Cate¬
gory A restricted areas is handled and upon how the pass and permit
system respecting Category B restricted areas is developed, the action pro¬
posed in paragraph 2 of Tab. 'A’ appears presently to provide for full
implementation of Section 9.
"6.

Comments relative to paragraph 3 of Tab 'A’ entitled 'Search Warrants’
will be deferred for inclusion in the portion of this memorandum relative
to particular problems.

“7.

As already noted, neither the War Department nor the Army desire to
undertake responsibility for the alien enemy program in Continental
United States.

In view of this, the comment in paragraph 4 of Tab. 'A’

to the effect that the Department of Justice is of the view that it is better
qualified to conduct an alien enemy registration than is the Army, and
in view of the expressed intention of that Department to act without

NEED FOR MILITARY CONTROL AND FOR EVACUATION

21

delay, it would appear that the action proposed in paragraph 4, Tab. 'A',
if speedily accomplished will satisfy the need for immediate registration of
alien enemies.
"8.

Reference is made to paragraph 5 of Tab. 'A’ relative to 'spot raids’ and
'mass raids.’ The military authorities in this theatre are of the view that
counter espionage measures require that the Department of Justice take
whatever steps are necessary, effectively to provide for simultaneous 'mass
raids’ without warning to determine the presence of prohibited articles
which may be in possession or under the control of alien enemies, or to
which such persons may have access. By this type of raid is meant 'coordi¬
nated action’ in several areas at the same moment and on successive occa¬
sions providing for the search of a given number of alien enemy premises
in each area. Under such circumstances the premises to be searched dur¬
ing any such 'mass raid’ would be only those in which it is known that an
alien enemy may be found or in which there is cause to believe that an
alien enemy may be found. It does not mean the 'willy-nilly’ raiding of
all premises within a prescribed area.

The number of premises to be

searched during any given 'mass raid’ will depend upon the circumstances
and the means at hand. This type of sampling or cross-sectional raiding is
regarded as vitally important.

While such raids may not be successful

from the viewpoint of rounding up great quantities of contraband, they
will have the important effect of driving contraband more deeply under¬
ground with the result that its illicit use becomes increasingly difficult.
"The military authorities request that they be advised by the Depart¬
ment of Justice of its position in this matter. If it is inclined to provide
for this type of search, advice is requested as to the steps proposed by this
Department.
"9.

The courses of action proposed in Tab. 'A’, when accomplished, will not
solve a number of pressing problems. It is neither possible nor practicable
to undertake or attempt to illustrate all of the problems which may arise
in connection with the alien enemy program. As limited in the foregoing
sentence, some of the problems and some of the questions remaining un¬
solved are:
"(a).

A fix is established on a radio transmitter.

Transmission of un¬

lawful radio signals is established but the location is determined
only within a defined area such as a city block.

Manifestly an

accurate description of the premises, the operator’s name and a
description of equipment can not be furnished.

The operation

of such a transmitter is equally unlawful on the part of a citizen,
alien or an alien enemy.

Unless a 'John Doe’ search warrant

can be obtained and obtained immediately, the consequences may
be grave and the transmitter may be moved without trace. What
action can be taken?
"(b).

The facts are sufficient to support the issuance of an alien enemy
warrant or a contraband search warrant, but the responsible law

JAPANESE

22

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

enforcement officer on the ground is unable to communicate
with the issuing authority due to the lack of means or because
of the time element.
"(c).

What action can he take?

A known alien enemy is observed, in transit, in the possession of
contraband or in the possession of articles believed, for good
cause, to be contraband.

If a warrant is procured under present

as well as proposed machinery, the quarry will be lost.

What

action can be taken?
"(d).

The unlawful transmission of radio signals has been established
through interception.

A series of fixes determines the location

of the transmitter within a general area, such as Monterey County.
Further, there is convincing evidence of shore to enemy subma¬
rine communication.

What action can be taken to isolate the

area and conduct an effective search to locate the mobile unit?
"(e).

An alien enemy is resident with a citizen, perhaps a relative such
as a wife.

While it cannot be proven that he owns or actually

controls contraband it can be proven that he has unlimited access
to such.

The situation is as potentially dangerous as if it could

be proven that he owned or actually controlled the contraband.
What action can be taken?
"(f).

Question arises whether access of the character description in (e)
above is unlawful under the Proclamations.

Assuming that it is

unlawful, to what extent may the search, under a contraband
search warrant, of a mixed occupancy dwelling or other premises
be carried to determine access to contraband?
"(g).

The dual citizen problem is perplexing.

Self-serving declarations

of an election are of little meaning, particularly where conduct
is incompatible with the so-called election.

What methods exist

or what steps are in contemplation looking toward the control of
1. Dual citizens.
2. Disloyal, subversive citizens (where there has been no overt
act detected).
"(h).

In the opinion of the Attorney General, to what extent may the
responsible Military Commander in a theatre of operations, con¬
travene normal processes to take necessary action in an emergency
in order to provide for the internal as well as the external security
of his theatre—to what extent is the Department of Justice able
to take similar measures?

"(i).

Military authorities are convinced of the desirability of close
cooperation and collaboration between the War Department and
the Department of Justice in connection with the instant sub¬
ject.

However, it is considered desirable to request advice as to

the extent to which the Department of Justice is prepared to
assume and to discharge the responsibility of taking whatever steps
are necessary for the prevention of sabotage, espionage, and other
fifth column activities from enemy alien courses, and the extent to

NEED FOR MILITARY CONTROL AND FOR EVACUATION

23

which the Department of Justice will expect the military authori¬
ties to continue the outline of the necessary steps for progressive
implementation of the enemy alien program.
“10. The foregoing represents the consensus of those concerned as under¬
stood by the undersigned. It does not necessarily reflect the official
opinions of anyone concerned. It is intended primarily as exploratory
of the problem.
Inch 1.

j L DeWITT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army.”
TAB "A”

Summary of Communication—January 4, 1942

“This is the summary by Assistant Attorney General Rowe to the Command¬
ing General of a conversation with the Attorney General of the United States, and
Mr. Rowe’s understanding of what the Department of Justice is prepared to
do on questions of Alien Enemy Control referred to him by the Commanding
General and his staff.
"1.

PROHIBITED ARTICLES.

Besides cameras, radios and firearms, the articles prohibited by the Presi¬
dent’s proclamation are to be deposited by all alien enemies with local police
authorities by Monday night, January 5, 1942, at 11 p. m. Because sufficient
publicity was not given to the requirement that all prohibited articles be so
deposited, the Department of Justice will, by release for Tuesday morning,
allow all alien enemies at least two more days, say, 11 p. m., January 7, to dis¬
pose of the articles. An effort will be made to obtain sufficient publicity by
radio and in the press.
"2. RESTRICTED AREAS.

The Department of Justice tonight will by wire direct the United States
Attorneys in the Western Theatre of Operations, with particular emphasis on
Washington, Oregon, and California, to telephone Major General Benedict for
recommendations as to what areas should be regarded as restricted. The United
States Attorney will automatically accept the General’s recommendations, and
these areas will immediately become restricted areas pending confirmation by the
Attorney General. As soon as possible, a press release ordering all enemy aliens
to evacuate restricted areas by a certain date and hour will be issued. Any
release by the Department of Justice will specifically state that the Attorney
General has designated these restricted areas at the specific and urgent request
of the Commanding General. The Army will request the Navy to submit its rec¬
ommendations through the Commanding General. It is believed several days will
elapse before the Army will be ready to submit its recommendations.
"3. SEARCH WARRANTS.

New forms for search and seizure of prohibited articles in homes con¬
trolled by, or inhabited by, alien enemies, are to be received tomorrow morning
by Federal Bureau of Investigation teletype. The question of probable cause will
be met only by the statement that an alien enemy is resident in such premises. It is

24

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

Mr. Rowe’s understanding that the local United States Attorney’s interpretation
that more information is necessary to show probable cause is incorrect. The United
States Attorney will issue a search warrant upon a statement by a Federal Bureau
of Investigation agent that an alien enemy is resident at certain premises. It is not
necessary that the Department in Washington be consulted.
"4.

ALIEN ENEMY REGISTRATION.
The Department feels it can conduct an alien enemy registration in the

Western Theatre of Operations within a week or ten days.

Tomorrow morning

by Federal Bureau of Investigation teletype a statement will be sent from Wash¬
ington outlining a procedure of what the Department is prepared to do. The De¬
partment feels it can conduct such a registration, through the local police author¬
ities, much faster than the Army itself.

The Department also feels that the

existing list from the previous alien registration, now in Washington, is in better
shape than is the impression in San Francisco, and every effort will be made to
have such lists available in the Western Theatre of Operations.
“5.

The Department is willing to make spot-raids on alien enemies tomor¬

row or at any time after the registration, anywhere within the Western Theatre
of Operations.

Mr. Rowe emphasized that such raids must be confined to

premises controlled by enemy aliens, or where enemy aliens are resident.

In

other words, the Department cannot raid a specific locality, covering every
house in that locality, irrespective of whether such houses are inhabited by
enemy aliens or citizens.

The Attorney General requested Mr. Rowe to make

clear to the Commanding General that under no circumstances will the Depart¬
ment of Justice conduct mass raids on alien enemies. It is understood that the term
“mass raids” means, eventually a raid on every alien enemy within the Western
Theatre of Operations.

The Attorney General will oppose such raids and, if

overruled by the President, will request the Army to supersede the Department
of Justice in the Western Theatre of Operations.
"6.

It was agreed by the Commanding General and his staff and Mr. Rowe

that certain questions pertaining to raids on localities and the issuance of search
warrants, particularly referring to raids on localities in which radio transmitters
are probably to be found, will be transmitted to the Department, also for an
indication as to how far the Department would proceed, as a matter of law
and policy.”

CHAPTER III
Establishment of Military Control—Executive
Order No. 9066
After a series of conferences between War and Justice Department repre¬
sentatives, in Washington, D. C., the Secretary of War ordered a representative
of the Department personally to survey the situation along the Pacific Coast.
The War Department representative carried back to the Secretary the recom¬
mendation of the Commanding General that some method be developed empow¬
ering the Federal Government to provide for the evacuation from sensitive
areas of all persons of Japanese ancestry, and any other persons individually
or collectively regarded as potentially dangerous.

The Commanding General’s

proposal was reduced to writing in a memorandum for the Secretary of War,
dated February 14, 1942.

It is reproduced in full at the end of this chapter.

This recommendation was presented to the Secretary of War on or about Feb¬
ruary 16th.

After consultation between War and Justice Department repre¬

sentatives, it was determined that a Presidential executive order should be
sought authorizing the Secretary of War to institute civil control measures.
A proposed order was drafted in the War Department.

With the concurrence

of the Department of Justice it was presented to the President.
Executive Order No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, was the direct result
of these steps.

On the day following its signature by the President, the Sec¬

retary of War designated the Commanding General, Western Defense Com¬
mand, as a Military Commander within the meaning of the Executive Order.
This meant that the power and authority granted by the Order had been dele¬
gated to the Commanding General.

The letter of authority, enclosing a copy

of the Order, from the Secretary of War was as follows:
“February 20, 1942
"Commanding General,
Western Defense Command and Fourth Army,
Presidio of San Francicso, California.
"Dear General DeWitt:
“By Executive Order, dated February 19, 1942, copy inclosed, the President author¬
ized and directed me, through the Military Commander whom I designate, to prescribe
military areas for the protection of vital installations against sabotage and espionage.
The cited Executive Order also authorized and directed the administering authority
to impose such restrictions upon the right to enter, remain in, or leave any such areas
as may be appropriate to the requirements in each instance.

Accordingly, I designate

you as the Military Commander to carry out the duties and responsibilities imposed
by said Executive Order for that portion of the United States embraced in the West¬
ern Defense Command, including such changes in the prohibited and restricted areas
heretofore designated by the Attorney General as you deem proper to prescribe.
"In carrying out your duties under this delegation, I desire, so far as military
requirements permit, that you do not disturb, for the time being at least, Italian
aliens and persons of Italian lineage except where they are, in your judgment, unde¬
sirable or constitute a definite danger to the performance of your mission to defend
25

26

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

the West Coast.

I ask that you take this action in respect to Italians for the reason

that I consider such persons to be potentially less dangerous, as a whole, than those
of other enemy nationalities.

Because of the size of the Italian population and the

number of troops and facilities which would have to be employed to deal with them,
their inclusion in the general plan would greatly overtax our strength.

In this con¬

nection it may be necessary for you to relieve Italian aliens from the necessity for
compliance with the Attorney General’s order respecting the California prohibited
areas 1 to 88

(Category A).

This may appropriately be done by designating, suffi¬

ciently in advance of February 24, the said areas as military areas and by excepting
Italian aliens from the classes excluded.
"With due regard to your other missions you may use the troops you can now
make available from your general command, but for this purpose the 27th Division
and the 3rd Division reinforced are not to be considered as part of your general
command as such troops are assigned to your command only for specific training.
"Your attention is invited to those provisions of the Executive Order under which
you are authorized to call for assistance, supplies, and services from all Government
agencies. It is desired that you take full advantage of that authority.
"Removal of individuals from areas in which they are domiciled should be accom¬
plished gradually so as to avoid, so far as it is consistent with national safety and the
performance of your mission, unnecessary hardship and dislocation of business and
industry. In order to permit the War Department to make plans for the proper dis¬
position of individuals whom you contemplate moving outside of your jurisdiction,
it is desired that you make known to me your detailed plans for evacuation. Indi¬
viduals will not be entrained until such plans are furnished and you are informed that
accommodations have been prepared at the point of detraining.
“So far as practicable, fullest advantage should be taken of voluntary exodus of
individuals and of the facilities afforded by other Government and private agencies
in assisting evacuees to resettle.

Where evacuees are unable to effect resettlement of

their own volition, or with the assistance of other agencies, proper provision for
housing, feeding, transportation and medical care must be provided.
"I desire that from time to time you make report direct to me of important
actions and events, particularly with respect to the extent and location of military
areas, and the restrictions applicable thereto.
"Sincerely yours,
"/s/

Henry

L.

Stimson,

“Secretary of War.
“Inch
Executive Order.
Executive Order No. 9066
AUTHORIZING THE SECRETARY OF WAR TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY AREAS
"Whereas,

The successful prosecution of the war requires every possible pro¬

tection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material, nationaldefense premises and national-defense utilities as defined in Section 4, Act

of April

20, 1918, 40 Stat. 533, as amended by the Act of November 30, 1940, 54 Stat. 1220,
and the Act of August 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 655 (U.S.C., Title 50, Sec. 104):
"Now

therefore,

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United

States, and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct
the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time
designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such action necessary or
desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the
appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may
be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or
leave shall be subject to whatever restriction the Secretary of War or the appropriate
Military Commander may impose in his discretion. The Secretary of War is hereby

27

ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY CONTROL

authorized to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such
transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the
judgment of the Secretary of War or the said Military Commander, and until other
arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order. The designation of mili¬
tary areas in any region or locality shall supersede designations of prohibited and restricted
areas by the Attorney General under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, and
shall supersede the responsibility and authority of the Attorney General under the said
Proclamations in respect of such prohibited and restricted areas.
"I hereby further authorize and direct the Secretary of War and the said Military
Commanders to take such other steps as he or the appropriate Military Commander may
deem advisable to enforce compliance with the restrictions applicable to each Military
area hereinabove authorized to be designated, including the use of Federal troops and
other Federal Agencies, with authority to accept assistance of state and local agencies.
"I hereby further authorize and direct all Executive Departments, independent estab¬
lishments and other Federal Agencies, to assist the Secretary of War or the said Military
Commanders in carrying out this Executive Order, including the furnishing of medical
aid, hospitalization, food, clothing, transportation, use of land, shelter, and other supplies,
equipment, utilities, facilities, and services.
"This order shall not be construed as modifying or limiting in any way the authority
heretofore granted under Executive Order No. 8972, dated December 12, 1941, nor shall
it be construed as limiting or modifying the duty and responsibility of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, with respect to the investigations of alleged acts of sabotage or the
duty and responsibility of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice under
the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, prescribing regulations for the conduct
and control of alien enemies, except as such duty and responsibility is superseded by
the designation of military areas hereunder.”
Franklin
The White House,

D.

Roosevelt

February 19, 1942.

On the same date, the Assistant Secretary of War forwarded a memo¬
randum to the Commanding General which contained an outline of a suggested
method of procedure which might be followed in carrying out an evacuation
program.

This memorandum had been developed by the War Department

representative at the West Coast conferences, and was based upon his survey
of the situation there obtained.

He drafted the Executive Order on his return.

It is pertinent to quote portions of the memorandum here.

“February 20, 1942
"My dear General DeWitt:
“In accordance with my telephone conversation with you today I am enclosing a
memorandum which was prepared in the War Department relating to the effect of the
new Executive Order. It represents, as I said, some of our thinking on the subject and I
think it may be helpful to you as a guide in the determination of the steps that you will
want to take under the authority of the Directive which the Secretary of War has sent
you today,
"Very truly yours,
"(Signed)

John

"John

J.

J.

McCloy

McCloy,

"Assistant Secretary of War.”
"Lt.

Gen.

J. L.

DeWitt

Commanding General
Western Defense Command and Fourth Army
Presidio of San Francisco, California.”

28

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

OUTLINE MEMORANDUM

COAST

"February 20, 1942

"... For the purpose of these instructions, persons resident in the Western Defense
Command will be classified as follows:
"Class 1

Japanese Aliens

“Class 2

American citizens of Japanese Lineage

"Class 3

German Aliens

"Class 4

Italian Aliens

"Class 5

Any persons, whether citizens or aliens, who are suspected for any reason
by you or your responsible subordinates, of being actually or potentially
dangerous either as saboteurs, espionage agents, fifth-columnists or sub¬
versive persons.

"Class 6

All other persons who are, or who may be within the Western Defense
Command.”

"I suggest the advisability of the following course of action:
"7. The progressive designation by you of military areas throughout the Western
Defense Command of such extent and in such places as you deem necessary to pro¬
vide the maximum protection from sabotage and espionage of installations vital to
the war effort consistent with the means available for evacuation and the military
responsibilities attendant upon evacuation of large numbers of persons.
“8. Where necessary, in your judgment, the designation of protective zones within
the military areas referred to in 7 above, in which you will provide (a) for the ex¬
clusion of all persons in Classes 1, 2 and 5, and where in your judgment it is essential,
and (b) for the exclusion of persons in Class 3, so as to afford the maximum protec¬
tion from espionage and sabotage to installations vital to the war effort, consistent
with the military responsibilities attendant upon such an evacuation, viz., the number
of troops which will be diverted from training for combat and from other missions,
the fulfillment of which is your responsibility.
"9. The promulgation of appropriate restrictive regulations governing the exercise
by any person of the right to enter, remain in or leave such military areas and any zones
within such military areas. In connection with the initiation, development and accomp¬
lishment of the program outlined above, you will initiate and carry to completion, with¬
out delay, the preparation of detailed plans for the evacuation of those classes of persons
and individuals who will be excluded from military areas prescribed by you. In so doing
it is desired that you take full advantage of the provisions of the Executive Order whereby
you are authorized to call upon the other executive departments and federal agencies for
assistance, not only in the furnishing of services, but also of supplies, equipment and
land. It is the intention that the heads of the several executive departments, independent
establishments, and other federal agencies will be required and will have full authority
to respond to such requests as you may make upon them in carrying out the provisions
of the executive order.
"10. In this connection so far as consistent with safety the development of your
program should be by stages. In the most critical areas you may consider it necessary to
bring about an almost immediate evacuation of certain classes, particularly classes 1 and 2.
However, in order to take full advantage of voluntary exodus and of re-settlement
facilities arranged by other agencies, both public and private, the timing of your program
should be most carefully conceived and coordinated. Representatives of the Departments
of Justice and Agriculture advise that in those instances where it is consistent with the
safety to afford evacuees reasonable advance notice that they will be able greatly to de¬
crease the numbers of evacuees to be cared for by the Army, and thereby greatly decrease
the drain on our military resources; thus avoiding the diversion of troops from their
primary mission, the defense of the West Coast.
"11. In providing for the exclusion of classes of persons and individuals from military
areas prescribed by you, you will make appropriate exception in favor of the aged, infirm,
and the sick. Persons above the age of 70 years should not be disturbed unless for sufficient
reason, you consider them suspect. Unless you find that the national safety will not so
permit, bona fide refugees in Class 3 should be afforded special consideration, either

29

ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY CONTROL

through the development of suitable means to acquire permits to return to prohibited
zones or to remain therein.
“12. I desire that you make known to me your detailed plans for evacuation as soon
as practicable in order to enable the War Department to coordinate with the Corps Area
Commanders concerned any movement you propose to undertake of evacuees outside
of your command to places of temporary shelter. You will not entrain any evacuees for
transportation beyond your command until you have been informed by the War Depart¬
ment that accommodations are prepared to receive them at the places of destination.
“13. Yours will be the military responsibility for processing, evacuation, supplying,
rationing and transportation to the points of shelter. This, of course, applies only to those
evacuees who are unable to re-settle themselves on their own resources or for whom public
and private agencies have been unable to arrange re-settlement. For persons in this class,
the Army will provide shelter, food and other accommodations, including medical aid
and hospitalization in selected places in the interior until civil authorities can make
other arrangements.
“14.

It will, of course, be necessary that your plans include provision for protection

of the property, particularly the physical property, of evacuees. All reasonable measures
should be taken through publicity and other means, to encourage evacuees to take steps
to protect their own property. Where evacuees are unable to do this prior to the time
when it is necessary for them to comply with the exclusion orders, there is always danger
that unscrupulous persons will take undue advantage or that physical property unavoid¬
ably left behind will be pillaged by lawless elements. The protection of physical property
from theft or other harm is primarily the responsibility of state and local law-enforce¬
ment agencies, and you will doubtless call upon them for the maximum assistance in
this connection. Where they are unable to protect physical property left behind in mili¬
tary areas, the responsibility will be yours, to provide reasonable protection, either
through the use of troops or through other appropriate measures. The appointment by
you of a property custodian and the creation by him of an organization to deal with
such property in military areas may become necessary.

The provisions of the Exec¬

utive Order and the necessity in each given instance are such that you have authority
to take such action, either directly or through another federal agency. In the develop¬
ment of your program, it is desired that you accomplish it with the minimum of
individual hardship and dislocation of business and industries consistent with safety.
Report to me from time to time by telephone, with confirmation in writing, of impor¬
tant action and events, indicating particularly the location and extent of military
areas prescribed by you and the character of the restrictions promulgated.”

,

Immediately upon the promulgation of Executive Order No. 9066 the War
Department, with the approval of the President, requested the Congress to enact
legislation to provide sanctions for the enforcement of directives issued under the
authority of the Executive Order. A draft of proposed legislation for this purpose
was transmitted by the Secretary of War simultaneously to the Chairman of the
Senate Military Affairs Committee, and to the Speaker of the House of Represen¬
tatives. The concurrence of the Department of Justice as to the form and sub¬
stance of the bill had been obtained.
The body of each letter of transmittal from the Secretary of War to the
Congress read as follows:
“There is enclosed herewith draft of a bill entitled 'A bill to provide a penalty for
violation of restrictions or orders with respect to persons entering, remaining in, or
leaving military areas or zones,’ which the War Department recommends to be enacted
into law.

30

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

“The purpose of the proposed legislation is to provide for enforcement in the Federal
criminal courts of orders issued under the authority of Executive order of the President
No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942. This Executive order authorizes the Secretary of
War to prescribe military areas from which any and all persons may be excluded for pur¬
poses of national defense.
“It is impossible to estimate the probable cost to the Government consequent upon
the enactment of such legislation.
“The Bureau of the Budget has advised that there is no objection to the submission
of this proposed legislation for the consideration of the Congress, as the enactment thereof
would not be in conflict with the program of the President.”

While the legislation was under consideration, the Secretary of War, on
March

14,

1942, transmitted another letter to the Congress suggesting an

amendment and urging immediate enactment.

The letter of March 14th is as

follows:
"Hon. Andrew

J.

May,

Chairman, Committee on Military Affairs,
House of Representatives.
“Dear Mr. May:
"By telephone on Thursday, March 12, 1942, Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, commanding
the Western Defense Command, requested that action be taken to expedite passage of
S. 2352 and H. R. 6758, bills to provide penalties for violation of restrictions or orders
with respect to persons entering, remaining in, or leaving military areas or zones.
"General DeWitt is strongly of the opinion that the bill, when enacted, should be
broad enough to enable the Secretary of War or the appropriate military commander to
enforce curfews and other restrictions within military areas and zones. To that end, it is
suggested that in line 3, page 1, of H. R. 6758 the word 'or’ be stricken and that after
the word 'leave’ there be inserted the words, 'or commit any act in.’
"General DeWitt indicated that he was prepared to enforce certain restrictions at
once for the purpose of protecting certain vital national defense interests but did not
desire to proceed until enforcement machinery had been set up.
"The War Department recommends immediate passage of the proposed law.
“Sincerely yours,
“Henry

L.

Stimson,

"Secretary of War.”

This bill became the vehicle for enactment of Public Law No. 503, 77th
Congress, approved March 21, 1942. The Department of Justice was consulted
in the drafting of this litigation as well as in the drafting, processing and pres¬
entation of Executive Order 9066.
Public Law No. 503 follows:
"To provide a penalty for violation of restrictions or orders with respect to persons
entering, remaining in, leaving, or committing any act in military areas or zones.
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit
any act in any military area or military zone prescribed, under the authority of an
Executive order of the President, by the Secretary of War, or by any military commander
designated by the Secretary of War, contrary to the restrictions applicable to any such
area or zone or contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any such military com¬
mander, shall, if it appears that he knew or should have known of the existence and

31

ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY CONTROL

extent of the restrictions or order and that his act was in violation thereof, be guilty of
misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be liable to a fine of not to exceed $5,000 or to
imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, for each offense.”

Previous to that time, on February 14, 1942, the Commanding General
had forwarded his recommendations to the Chief of Staff, United States Army,
as to the necessary measures to be taken.

(See Appendix to this chapter,

Memorandum for The Secretary of War from the Commanding General, Feb¬
ruary 14, 1942.)

Included in these proposals were provisions for property pro¬

tection and the rendering of necessary social service.

It will be noted that the

military authorities contemplated appropriate provision against undue economic
and social dislocation from the beginning.

This did not emerge as an underly¬

ing policy after the program had been initiated but, on the contrary, consti¬
tuted an essential feature during all of the pre-evacuation discussions.
On February 23, the Secretary of War again dispatched a War Depart¬
ment representative to San Francisco to act as liaison officer between the
Department and the Commanding General and to be of any possible assis¬
tance.

Acting upon recommendations of the Western Defense Command, the

Assistant Secretary of War called upon certain federal agencies to designate per¬
sonnel to participate in developing the evacuation program.

Prompt responses

followed, and by February 27th the first of these representatives arrived in San
Francisco.

Dr. C. L. Dedrick of the Census Bureau, Department of Commerce,

reported at San Francisco.

Fie was shortly followed by represtantives of the

Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve System, the Department of Agri¬
culture, the Federal Security Agency, the Department of Justice, the Alien
Property Custodian, and the Office of Price Administration.
In a subsequent communication dated March 2,

1942, the Secretary of

War broadened the authority of the Commanding General which had been
granted him under the previous delegation of February 20, 1942
chapter III, supra).

(see p. 2,

Full freedom of action was granted to obligate funds, to

enter into contracts and to acquire the services of any persons, firms or cor¬
porations in accomplishing the evacuation.

The letter was as follows:
“March 2, 1942

“Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt,

Commander, Western Defense Command,
San Francisco, California.
“Dear General DeWitt:
“By letter dated February 20, 1942, I designated you as one of the appropriate Military
Commanders to exercise the powers vested in me under Executive Order No. 9066,
February 19, 1942, and I delegated to you such powers as are necessary to carry out the
purposes of that Executive Order. Incident to the exercise of those powers, you are au¬
thorized to employ without regard to Civil Service or Classification laws or regulations,
all persons or agencies necessary to carry out your duties. You are also authorized to
employ the service of any association, firm, company, or corporation in furtherance of
your mission. You will fix the rates of compensation so as to correspond as nearly as
possible to the rate prevailing for similar service in the community in which the services
are to be rendered.
“Under the terms of Executive Order No. 9001, dated December 27, 1941, and
subject to the limitations thereof and of the Act of December 18, 1941

(First War

32

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Powers Act, 1941, Public Law 354—77th Congress), I am expressly authorized to dele¬
gate further the powers therein delegated to me. Pursuant thereto, I delegate to you,
within the limits of the amounts appropriated by the Congress, the power to enter into
contracts and into amendments or modifications of contracts heretofore or hereafter
made, and to make advance, progress, and other payments thereon, without regard to
the provisions of law relating to the making, performance, amendment, or modification
of contracts.
"In order to remove any doubt as to your authority to obligate funds, I specifically
authorize you to obligate funds in such amounts as you deem necessary to effectuate the
purposes of the Executive Order, and of your instructions, from any funds in an alloted
status available to you, or to incur obligations in excess of such funds, reporting deficien¬
cies to the appropriate chief of supply arm or service.
"Sincerely yours,
"Henry

L. Stimson,

"Secretary of War.”

On March 2nd, the Commanding General issued Public Proclamation No. 1,
establishing the westerly half of Washington, Oregon, and California and the
southerly half of Arizona as Military Area No.

1.

Certain prohibited and

restricted zones were also established within Military Area No. 1. The boundary
of Military Area No. 1 had been selected on the basis of previous study and
the recommendations made by subordinate commanders.

Highways were used

to designate the boundaries in order that they would be plainly denoted on the
ground and that all concerned could be placed on proper notice.
The boundaries of Military Areas Nos.

1

and 2, established by Public

Proclamation No. 1, were also designated on the ground by the erection of
appropriate signs.
was marked.

Similarly, each prohibited zone created by the Proclamation

Later, when additional military areas in the zones were estab¬

lished by Public Proclamation No. 2 on March 14, 1942, the same action was
taken.

In order to insure proper public notice of the location and extent of

each area, zone signs were posted at every entrance to each of them.

The

Commanding General, Ninth Service Command (then the Ninth Corps Area),
and the Commanding Generals of the Northwest, Northern California, Southern
California and Southern Land Frontier Sectors, Western Defense Command, were
directed by the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, to erect suit¬
able signs.

The Commanding General, Ninth Service Command, posted the east

boundary of Military Area No. 1 and all of the other zone and area boundaries
lying to the east.

The Commanding Generals of the Sectors posted the prohibited

zones within Military Area No. 1.

The task, particularly that required of

the Ninth Service Command, was one of unusual magnitude.

ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY CONTROL

33

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III

Final Recommendation of the Commanding General,
Western Defense Command and Fourth Army,
Submitted to The Secretary of War.
(see page 1 of this Chapter III)

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND
FOURTH ARMY
Presidio of San Francisco, California
Office of the Commanding General
February 14, 1942
014.31

(DCS)

Memorandum

For:

The Secretary
(Thru:

of

War,

The Commanding General,

Field Forces, Washington, D. C.)
Evacuation of Japanese and other Subversive Persons from the

Subject:

Pacific Coast.
1.

In presenting a recommendation for the evacuation of Japanese and

other subversive persons from the Pacific Coast, the following facts have been
considered:
a. Mission of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army.
(1)

Defense of the Pacific Coast of the Western Defense Command, as

extended, against attacks by sea, land or air;
(2)

Local protection of establishments and communications vital to the

National Defense for which adequate defense cannot be provided by local civilian
authorities.
b. Brief Estimate of the Situation.
(1)

Any estimate of the situation indicates that the following are pos¬

sible and probable enemy activities:
(a)

Naval attack on shipping in coastal waters;

(b)

Naval attack on coastal cities and vital installations;

(c)

Air raids on vital installations, particularly within two hundred

miles of the coast;
(d)

Sabotage of vital installations throughout the Western Defense

Command.
Hostile Naval and air raids will be assisted by enemy agents signaling
from the coastline and the vicinity thereof; and by supplying and other¬
wise assisting enemy vessels and by sabotage.
Sabotage, (for example, of airplane factories), may be effected not only by
destruction within plants and establishments, but by destroying power, light,
water, sewer and other utility and other facilities in the immediate vicinity
thereof or at a distance.

Serious damage or destruction in congested areas may

readily be caused by incendiarism.

34

JAPANESE

(2)

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

The area lying to the west of the Cascade and Sierra Nevada Moun¬

tains in Washington, Oregon and California, is highly critical not only because
the lines of communication and supply to the Pacific theater pass through it,
but also because of the vital industrial production therein, particularly air¬
craft.

In the war in which we are now engaged racial affinities are not severed

by migration.

The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second

and third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United
States citizenship, have become "Americanized”, the racial strains are undi¬
luted.

To conclude otherwise is to expect that children born of white parents

on Japanese soil sever all racial affinity and become loyal Japanese subjects,
ready to fight and, if necessary, to die for Japan in a war against the nation of
their parents.

That Japan is allied with Germany and Italy in this struggle

is no ground for assuming that any Japanese, barred from assimilation by con¬
vention as he is, though born and raised in the United States, will not turn
against this nation when the final test of loyalty comes.

It, therefore, fol¬

lows that along the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential enemies, of
Japanese extraction, are at large today.

There are indications that these are

organized and ready for concerted action at a favorable opportunity.

The very

fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming
indication that such action will be taken.
c. Disposition of the Japanese.
(1)

'Washington.

As

the

term

is

used

herein,

the

word

"Japanese”

includes alien Japanese and American citizens of Japanese ancestry.

In the

State of Washington the Japanese population, aggregating over 14,500, is dis¬
posed largely in the area lying west of the Cascade Mountains and south of
an east-west line passing through Bellingham, Washington, about 70 miles
north of Seattle and some 15 miles south of the Canadian border.

The largest

concentration of Japanese is in the area, the axis of which is along the line
Seattle, Tacoma, Olympia, Willapa Bay and the mouth of the Columbia River,
with the heaviest concentration in the agricultural valleys between Seattle and
Tacoma, viz., the Green River and the Puyallup Valleys.
factory is in the Green River Valley.

The Boeing Aircraft

The lines of communication and supply

including power and water which feed this vital industrial installation, radiate
from this plant for many miles through areas heavily populated by Japanese.
Large numbers of Japanese also operate vegetable markets along the Seattle
and Tacoma water fronts, in Bremerton, near the Bremerton Navy Yard, and
inhabit islands in Puget Sound opposite vital naval ship building installations.
Still others are engaged in fishing along the southwest Washington Pacific Coast
and along the Columbia River.

Many of these Japanese are within easy reach

of the forests of Washington State, the stock piles of seasoning lumber and
the many sawmills of southwest Washington.
forests, mills and stock piles are easily fired.
(2)

Oregon.

During the dry season these

(See inclosed map.)

There are approximately 4,000 Japanese in the State of

Oregon, of which the substantial majority reside in the area in the vicinity of
Portland along the south bank of the Columbia River, following the general

35

ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY CONTROL

line Bonneville, Oregon City, Astoria, Tillamook.

Many of these are in the

northern reaches of the Willamette Valley and are engaged in agricultural and
fishing pursuits.

Others operate vegetable markets in the Portland metropoli¬

tan area and still others reside along the northern Oregon sea coast.

Their

disposition is in intimate relationship with the northwest Oregon sawmills andlumber industry, near and around the vital electric power development at
Bonneville and the pulp and paper installations at Camas (on the Washington
State side of the Columbia River) and Oregon City, directly south of Port¬
land).
(3)

(See inclosed map.)
California.

The Japanese population in California aggregates approx¬

imately 93,500 people.

Its disposition is so widespread and so well known that

little would be gained by setting it forth in detail here.

They live in great

numbers along the coastal strip, in and around San Francisco and the Bay Area,
the Salinas Valley, Los Angeles and San Diego.

Their truck farms are con¬

tiguous to the vital aircraft industry concentration in and around Los Angeles.
They live in large numbers in and about San Francisco, now a vast staging
area for the war in the Pacific, a point at which the nation’s lines of communi¬
cation and supply converge.

Inland they are disposed in the Sacramento, San

Joaquin and Imperial Valleys. They are engaged in the production of approxi¬
mately 3 8 % of the vegetable produce of California.

Many of them are engaged

in the distribution of such produce in and along the water fronts at San Fran¬
cisco and Los Angeles.

Of the 93,500 in California, about

25,000 reside

inland in the mentioned valleys where they are largely engaged in vegetable
production cited above, and 54,600 reside along the coastal strip, that is to
say, a strip of coast line varying from eight miles in the north to twenty miles
in width in and around the San Francisco bay area, including San Francisco,
in Los Angeles and its environs, and in San Diego.

Approximately 13,900

are dispersed throughout the remaining portion of the state.

In Los Angeles

City the disposition of vital aircraft industrial plants covers the entire city.
Large numbers of Japanese live and operate markets and truck farms adjacent
to or near these installations.

(See inclosed map.)

d. Disposition of Other Subversive Persons.
Disposed within the vital coastal strip already mentioned are large numbers
of Italians and Germans, foreign and native born, among whom are many
individuals who constitute an actual or potential menace to the safety of the
nation.
2.
a.

Action recommended.
Recommendations for the designation of prohibited areas, described as

"Category A” areas in California, Oregon and Washington, from which are to
be excluded by order of the Attorney General all alien enemies, have gone
forward from this headquarters to the Attorney General through the Provost
Marshal General and the Secretary of War.

These recommendations were made

in order to aid the Attorney General in the implementation of the Presiden¬
tial Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, imposing responsibility on him

36

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

for the control of alien enemies as such.

THE

WEST

COAST

These recommendations were for the

exclusion of all alien enemies from Category "A.”

The Attorney General has

adopted these recommendations in part, and has the balance under considera¬
tion.

Similarly, recommendations were made by this headquarters, and adopted

by the Attorney General, for the designation of certain areas as Category "B”
areas, within which alien enemies may be permitted on pass or permit.
b.

I now recommend the following:

(1)

That the Secretary of War procure from the President direction and

authority to designate military areas in the combat zone of the Western The¬
ater of Operations,

(if necessary to include the entire combat zone), from

which, in his discretion, he may exclude all Japanese, all alien enemies, and all
other persons suspected for any reason by the administering military authori¬
ties of being actual or potential saboteurs, espionage agents, or fifth column¬
ists.

Such executive order should empower the Secretary of War to requisition

the services of any and all other agencies of the Federal Government, with
express direction to such agencies to respond to such requisition, and further
empowering the Secretary of War to use any and all federal facilities and
equipment, including Civilian Conservation Corps Camps, and to accept the use
of State facilities for the purpose of providing shelter and equipment for evacuees.
Such executive order to provide further for the administration of military areas
for the purposes of this plan by appropriate military authorities acting with the
requisitioned assistance of the other federal agencies and the cooperation of
State and local agencies.

The executive order should further provide that by

reason of military necessity the right of all persons, whether citizens or aliens,
to reside, enter, cross or be within any military areas shall be subject to revo¬
cation and shall exist on a pass and permit basis at the discretion of the Sec¬
retary of War and implemented by the necessary legislation imposing penalties
for violation.
(2)

That, pursuant to such executive order, there be designated as mili¬

tary areas all areas in Washington, Oregon and California, recommended by
me to date for designation by the Attorney General as Category "A” areas
and such additional areas as it may be found necessary to designate hereafter.
(3)

That the Secretary of War provide for the exclusion from such mili¬

tary areas, in his discretion, of the following classes of persons, viz:
(a)

Japanese aliens.

(b)

Japanese-American citizens.

(r)

Alien enemies other than Japanese aliens.

(d)

Any and all other persons who are suspected for any reason by

the administering military authorities to be actual or potential saboteurs,
espionage agents, fifth columnists, or subversive persons.
(4)

That the evacuation of classes (a), (b), and (c)

from such mili¬

tary areas be initiated on a designated evacuation day and carried to comple¬
tion as rapidly as practicable.
That prior to evacuation day all plans be complete for the establishment
of initial concentration points, reception centers, registration, rationing, guard-

37

ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY CONTROL

ing, transportation to internment points, and the selection and establishment
of internment facilities in the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Corps Areas.
That persons in class (a) and (c) above be evacuated and interned at such
selected places of internment, under guard.
That persons in class (b) above, at the time of evacuation, be offered an
opportunity to accept voluntary internment, under guard, at the place of
internment above mentioned.
That persons in class (b) who decline to accept voluntary internment, be
excluded from all military areas, and left to their own resources, or, in the
alternative, be encouraged to accept resettlement outside of such military areas
with such assistance as the State governments concerned or the Federal Security
Agency may be by that time prepared to offer.
That the evacuation of persons in class (d) be progressive and continuing,
and that upon their evacuation persons in class (d) be excluded from all mili¬
tary areas and left in their own resources outside of such military areas, or, in
the alternative, be offered voluntary internment or encouraged to accept vol¬
untary resettlement as above outlined, unless the facts in a particular case shall
warrant other action.
(5)

The Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth

Army, to be responsible for the evacuation, administration, supply and guard,
to the place of internment; the Commanding Generals of the Corps Areas con¬
cerned to be responsible for guard, supply and administration at the places of
internment.
(6)

That

direct

communication

between

the

Commanding

General,

Western Defense Command and Fourth Army and the Corps Area Com¬
manders

concerned

for

the

purpose

of

making necessary arrangements

be

authorized.
(7)

That the Provost Marshal General coordinate all phases of the plan

between the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth
Army, on the one hand, and the Corps Area Commanders on the other hand.
(8)

That all arrangements be accomplished with the utmost secrecy.

(9)

That adult males (above the age of 14 years) be interned separately

from all women and children until the establishment of family units can be
accomplished.
(10)
3.

No change is contemplated in Category "B” areas.

Although so far as the Army is concerned, such action is not an essen¬

tial feature of the plan, but merely incidental thereto, I, nevertheless, recom¬
mend that mass internment be considered as largely a temporary expedient
pending selective resettlement, to be accomplished by the various Security
Agencies of the Federal and State Governments.
4.

The number of persons involved in the recommended evacuation will

be approximately 133,000.

(This total represents all enemy aliens and Japa¬

nese-American citizens in Category "A” areas recommended to date.)
5.

If these recommendations are approved detailed plans will be made

by this headquarters for the proposed evacuation.

The number evacuated to

be apportioned by the Provost Marshal General among the Corps Area Com-

38

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

manders concerned as the basis for formulating their respective plans.

It is

possible that the State of California, and perhaps the State of Washington, will
be able to offer resettlement facilities for a given number of evacuees who may
be willing to accept resettlement.
6.

Pending further and detailed study of the problem, it is further recom¬

mended:

(1)

That the Commanding General, Western Defense Command

and Fourth Army, coordinate with the local and State authorities, in order
to facilitate the temporary physical protection by them of the property of
evacuees not taken with them; (2) That the Commanding General, Western
Defense Command and Fourth Army, determine the quantity and character
of property which the adult males, referred to in paragraph 2b (9), may be
permitted to take with them; and (3) That the Treasury Department or other
proper Federal agency be responsible for the conservation, liquidation, and
proper disposition of the property of evacuees if it cannot be cared for through
the usual and normal channels.
J. L. DeWITT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
1 Inch

Map (indup.).

PART II
EVACUATION—ITS DEVELOPMENT IN
SUMMARY

FOREWORD
Part II (Chapters IV, V and VI) contains a summary of
the evacuation program. The detailed chronology and
analysis of the operations appear in the succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER IV
The Emergence of Controlled Evacuation
The voluntary migration phase of evacuation was initiated by the pro¬
mulgation of Public Proclamation No.

1, designating Military Area No.

1

as the zone from which persons of Japanese ancestry were to be required to
leave during the first phase of evacuation.

Between March 2 and March 10,

1942, the discussions as to evacuation procedures were general in nature and
specific planning had not emerged.

The voluntary movement did not gain

momentum because means had not been provided on the ground for aiding
evacuees in the solution of personal

problems incident to their voluntary

exodus.
Prior to March 10 the General Staff of the Western Defense Command and
Fourth Army had not engaged in any extensive planning or preparation for
the program.

The tactical duties imposed upon it were such that it was

unable to do so and at the same time meet the responsibilities imposed on the
Headquarters by the essentially military aspects of its mission.

Accordingly,

on March 10, by General Order No. 34, the Commanding General established
the Civil Affairs Division as an addition to his general staff.

On the day fol¬

lowing by General Order No. 3 5 he created the Wartime Civil Control Admin¬
istration as an operating agency of his Command to carry out assigned mis¬
sions involving civil control.
With the creation of these agencies specific plans for the evacuation of
all persons of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 1, and the California
portion of Military Area No. 2 were immediately initiated.

The War Depart¬

ment liaison representative was designated as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil
Affairs, General Staff, and also as the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administra¬
tion.

The offices of Civil Affairs Division, General Staff, and of the Wartime

Civil Control Administration were established in the Whitcomb Hotel, San Fran¬
cisco.

The Wartime Civil Control Administration initiated its operations with

a brief, but none the less all-inclusive, directive from the Commanding General:
"To provide for the evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from Military
Area No. 1 and the California portion of Military Area No. 2 of the Pacific Coast with
a minimum of economic and social dislocation, a minimum use of military personnel and
maximum speed; and initially to employ all appropriate means to encourage voluntary
migration.”

To facilitate the organization of the Wartime Civil Control Administration,
and to streamline the procurement of personnel, office equipment, personal ser¬
vices and supplies, the Division of Central Administrative Services of the Office
for Emergency Management responded to a. request to extend its services to the
Wartime Civil Control Administration.

Almost overnight the Office for Emer¬

gency Management acquired office space in the Whitcomb Hotel, supplied and
equipped these offices, and engaged qualified personnel to meet the requirements of
the Director.

Mr. Ralph B. Thompson, Regional Director of the Division of

Central Administrative Services, personally supervised these activities.
41

Funds

42

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

were transferred to the Office for Emergency Management from appropriations
available to the military establishment.

This arrangement, which continued

throughout the program with highly satisfactory results, was confirmed by let¬
ters of the Commanding General dated March 12, 1942.

One of these letters

was addressed to Mr. Dallas Dort, Director of that agency, and the other to
Mr. Thompson, the Regional Director. These letters follow:
(File No. 323.3 WCCA)
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of the Commanding General
Presidio of San Francisco, California
March 12, 1942

"Mr. Dallas Dort

Director, Central Administrative Services
Office for Emergency Management
101 Indiana Avenue, Washington, D. C.
"Please arrange to provide the disbursing account assigned to Mr. Ralph B. Thomp¬
son, Director of Administrative Services, Merchandise Mart, San Francisco, with funds
necessary to service the Wartime Civilian Control Administration under my command.
"His account will be reimbursed currently from funds under my direct control.
"Funds to protect obligations up to sixty days should be provided. It is estimated
that $500,000.00 will be sufficient for the time being.

/*/

J. L. DeWitt
J. L. DeWitt,

Lieutenant General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.”
(File No. 323.3 WCCA)
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of the Commanding General
Presidio of San Francisco, California
12 March 1942
"Mr. Ralph B. Thompson, Regional Director
Division of Central Administrative Services
1355 Market Street, San Francisco, California
"Dear Mr. Thompson:
"You are hereby authorized to commence immediately to render the administrative
services, as outlined in your letter of March 11, 1942, to the Wartime Civilian Control
Administration (under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs,
Western Defense Command and Fourth Army) under my command.
"Such services are to be rendered only upon order of Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen or
his designated representative.
"You may utilize the procedure and necessary forms now used by you in servicing
other emergency agencies.
"You will be reimbursed from appropriations available to the military establishment
upon receipt of Standard Government Form 1080, “Voucher Adjustment” between
appropriations and/or funds, properly supported by requisitions and vouchers.
"You will receive your orders and requests for service from only one source in each
city or location serviced, that source to be designated in writing by Colonel Bendetsen
or his successor.
"In performing this service you will not be subjected to jurisdiction or clearance
with any department of the Army except upon my specific order.
“You are not authorized or expected to pay any obligations incurred by officers or
civilian officials of the Wartime Civilian Control Administration which have not been
ordered through your office under your regular procedures.
"By authority of the Secretary of War, acting under Executive Order No. 9066, dated
February 19, 1942, I advise that you are authorized to contract for printing and binding

EMERGENCE OF

43

CONTROLLED EVACUATION

ordered by the designated officer of the Wartime Civilian Control Administration without
prior approval of the Government printing office.
“All special services rendered to date, namely the establishment of executive offices
and the teletype services in the Whitcomb Hotel Building at the request of Colonel W.
Fulton Magill are hereby approved.
Sincerely yours,
/s/

J. L. DeWitt
J. L. DeWitt,

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
JLD/tgb

Commanding.”

As an initial step in the facilitation of voluntary emigration, 48 Wartime
Civil Control Administration offices were established, one in each important
center of Japanese population in the affected area.

These offices were staffed

by representatives of the cooperating Federal agencies which had agreed to
undertake certain specific responsiblities in the program.

The Federal Reserve

Bank and the Farm Security Administration had undertaken to provide prop¬
erty protection, under the direction of the Wartime Civil Control Administra¬
tion—the former, primarily as to business and personal property; the latter
primarily

respecting

agricultural

property.

The

Federal

Security

Agency,

through its various associated agencies, had agreed to provide necessary social
services.

The 48 Wartime Civil Control Administration offices (which became

known as "Wartime Civil Control Administration Service Centers”) were staffed
by a team with one or more representatives from each of these agencies.
Through every available public information channel prospective evacuees
were urged to prepare for evacuation, and to go to these offices for assistance
in the solution of their personal problems*

It was stated that they would

receive aid in their actual migration to the interior.

These offices were empow¬

ered—among other things—to pay the cost of transportation of evacuees to
points in the interior.

They undertook to locate specific employment oppor¬

tunities for prospective evacuees.
This program met with measurable success in that approximately 9,000
persons of Japanese ancestry voluntarily emigrated from Military Area No. 1
to interior points.

However, the attitude of the interior states was hostile.

This group considered too dangerous to remain on the West Coast, was similarly
regarded by State and local authorities, and by the population of the interior.
The evacuees were not welcome.

Incidents developed with increasing

in¬

tensity, with the result that the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs, on
March 21, recommended to the Commanding General that evacuation be placed
on the basis of complete Federal supervision and control.

By Proclamation No. 4,

dated March 27, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry were required to remain
within Military Area No. 1 and were not permitted to change their places of
residence.
Essentially, military necessity required only that the Japanese population
be removed from the coastal area and dispersed in the interior, where the
danger of action in concert during any attempted enemy raids along the coast,
or in advance thereof as preparation for a full scale attack, would be eliminated.
That the evacuation program necessarily and ultimately developed into one of

44

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

complete Federal supervision, was due primarily to the fact that the interior
states would not accept an uncontrolled Japanese migration. Although the initial
recommendation of February 14, 1942 (appendix to chapter 3, page 33, supra)
contemplated the internment of alien Japanese, this was abandoned as a method
of operation.

Once authority had been granted to set the program in motion,

the Commanding General encouraged and facilitated a voluntary exodus with
free choice of destination in the interior of persons of Japanese ancestry.
Voluntary evacuation was Phase I of the program.

Through the Federal

Security Agency initially and, after March 12, 1942, when the Wartime Civil
Control Administration was established, in cooperation with the other partici¬
pating Federal agencies, the means were provided for assisting Japanese in
undertaking a free exodus from the West Coast.

The accompanying functional

chart, Figure 2, is illustrative of the phases through which the evacuation process
progressed.

Chapter IX of this report presents in greater detail the history of

the first phase.
During the period between March 12, the establishment of the Civil Affairs
Division, General Staff, and the Wartime Civil Control Administration, and the
announcement of Proclamation No. 4 on March 27, 1942, plans were going for¬
ward for the specific kind of evacuation that Proclamation No. 4 contemplated.
Prior to March 12, when it was hoped that the evacuation would be char¬
acterized primarily by a

voluntary exodus,

the Commanding

General had

directed the acquisition and establishment of two "Reception Centers.” These
two Centers were to be developed at Manzanar and Parker.

The "Reception

Center” at Manzanar, California, is located in Owens Valley, Inyo County,
at the easterly base of the Sierra.

The Parker "Reception Center,” now known

as the Colorado River War Relocation Center, is located in Arizona on the
Colorado River Indian Reservation along the Arizona-California boundary,
south of Parker Dam.

Originally, it was intended that each would have a

capacity of 10,000 persons and that they would be used to provide temporary
housing for those who were either unable to undertake their own evacuation,
or who declined to leave until forced so to do.
As soon as specific evacuation plans had been initiated, it was foreseen
that relocation facilities would have to be developed for virtually all evacuees.
Accordingly, within a few days following March 12, site-selection parties were
formed and dispatched to the interior states in the Western Defense Command
to seek sites for the development of Relocation Centers.

The Director, Wartime

Civil Control Administration, called a meeting of representatives of the Bureau
of Reclamation, Department of Interior, the National Resources Planning Board,
the Soil Conservation Service, the Farm Security Administration of the Depart¬
ment of Agriculture, the Work Projects Administration, and the Corps of Engi¬
neers, South Pacific Division.

The object of this conference was to sift available

data as to the location of potential Relocation Center sites and to organize siteselection parties.
transport aircraft.

Two such parties were formed and each was assigned a military
One party was dispatched to cover the area lying north of the

California-Oregon boundary and west of the Rocky Mountains. This party was
joined by a representative of the North Pacific Division of the United States

PHASE AND

FUNCTIONAL

DISTRIBUTION

CHART

EMERGENCE OF CONTROLLED EVACUATION

t

45

(N

Figure

46

JAPANESE

Engineer Corps.

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

A second party was assigned to reconnoiter the area lying south

of the Oregon-California boundary and west of the Rocky Mountains.

These

groups initiated their survey on March 16, 1942.
Following its establishment, the Director, Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬
tration, on March 12, 1942, requested that Mr. R. L. Nicholson, then Regional
Director of the Work Projects Administration for the eleven Western States,
come to San Francisco for a conference.

He had participated in several informal

pre-evacuation conferences at the request of Mr. Tom C. Clark, then the West
Coast representative of the Anti-Trust Division of the Department of Justice.
The Director requested him to join the staff df Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬
tration as Chief of the Assembly Center Branch of the Temporary Settlement
Operations Division.

In the course of the discussion, Mr. Nicholson stated that

substantial numbers of Work Projects Administration field staff personnel would
be available to Wartime Civil Control Administration as that agency’s operations
were rapidly diminishing in scope.

The Director, Wartime Civil Control Ad¬

ministration asked that such personnel be recruited from Work Projects Admin¬
istration offices to provide Wartime Civil Control Administration administrative
staffs for assembly centers and for any reception centers that might be estab¬
lished.

The understanding was that all such personnel would join the Wartime

Civil Control Administration to be administratively responsible to the Director.
It was further understood that, in accordance with the policy of the Commanding
General to limit the use of military personnel, all center staff operations would
be supervised by civilians.

It was agreed that any personnel not available from

among Work Projects Administration staff offices would be recruited indepen¬
dently.

As internal security and police functions were not to be under the control

of the Assembly Center Managers, the recruitment of police staffs, to be admin¬
istratively responsible to the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration,
was not included in the arrangement.
Later, Mr. Nicholson advised that Work Projects Administration person¬
nel, including himself, desired to retain their status with that agency without
prejudice and that the Federal Works Agency (Work Projects Administration)
would give its consent to an arrangement whereby such personnel would remain on
the rolls of Work Projects Administration at Army expense subject, however, to
the complete direction and administrative control of the Army. Accordingly, in
order to preserve the status of such personnel, a letter of request from the Com¬
manding General to Mr. Nicholson, dated March 28, 1942, was drafted in such
manner as to call upon the Work Projects Administration, as an agency, to provide
Assembly and Reception Center managerial personnel. The actual arrangement
remained as initially agreed, however, viz., that the Commanding General, through
Wartime Civil Control Administration as an agency would retain complete respon¬
sibility for the establishment, administration, and operation of Assembly Centers.
All such personnel were administratively responsible to the Director, Wartime Civil
Control Administration, and became a part of that organization.

It is neces¬

sary, therefore, to bear the foregoing in mind in order fully to understand the
letter of March 28, 1942, which, on its face, does not fully reflect the actuality.
All plans, policies, and directives were developed by Wartime Civil Control Ad-

47

EMERGENCE OF CONTROLLED EVACUATION

ministration, and the manual of Assembly Center operations was issued by the
Director.

The letter of March 28, 1942, reads as follows:
March 28, 1942

"Mr. Rex

L. Nicholson, Regional WPA Supervisor

W. C. C. A.
Whitcomb Hotel, San Francisco, California
"My dear Mr. Nicholson:
"Under authority granted to me by executive order of the President No. 9066 dated
February 19, 1942, it is requested that the Work Projects Administration assume the
responsibility for the direction and management of such assembly points and reception
centers as may be assigned in connection with the program of evacuation of German,
Italian and Japanese enemy aliens and persons of Japanese ancestry from restricted zones
within the military areas established by my Military Proclamation No. 1 dated March
2, 1942, and by my Military Proclamation No. 2 dated March 16, 1942.
"Subject to general direction from my Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division,
and in accordance with policies approved by him as the officer responsible for the execution
of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, your agency is authorized to incur obliga¬
tions and make expenditures from any funds available to it or made available to it by the
War Department, in carrying out the duties and functions assigned. In this connection
it is desired that you submit to the Asst. Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, for
approval, at the earliest possible date, a Budget Estimate of your fiscal requirements up
to May 1, 1942 broken down in such detail as is immediately practicable. Reimbursement
to the Work Projects Administration for expenditures made from any funds appropriated
to the WPA will be from available funds subject to my control and allocation, appro¬
priate orders having been issued in respect thereto.
"General plans and policies for the operation of Reception Centers and Assembly
points will be worked out by you with my Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division,
and subject to his final approval. The actual administration and management of the
Assembly Points and Reception Centers will be the responsibility of your agency.
"After general plans and policies have been agreed upon, your general operation will
be subject to inspection by my Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, and his
Deputy for Temporary Settlement Operations to insure conformance with the general
plans and policies described.
“In the event that the operation of the Reception Centers or Assembly Points does
not appear to be satisfactory, upon inspection, it is understood that determinations will
be made as to necessary adjustments and revisions of policy and that such changes
will be communicated to you by my Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division.
“Yours very truly,
/s/

J. L. DeWitt
J. L. DeWitt,

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.”

Mr. Nicholson was succeeded as Chief

of

the

Assembly

Center Branch,

Wartime Civil Control Administration, on June 30, 1942, by Mr. Emil Sandquist, who remained as Chief of that branch until completion of the program.
Meanwhile, the construction of the Manzanar and Parker Projects was
being pushed.

Forty-eight Wartime Civil Control Administration Service Cen¬

ters were in operation for the encouragement of voluntary migration and, at the
same time, site-selection parties were in the interior seeking sites for Relocation
Centers.
The initiation of detailed evacuation planning established the impracti¬
cability of undertaking evacuation and relocation in the same operation.

It

became evident that the establishment of intermediate assembly facilities would

48

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

be a prime essential to the accomplishment of a rapid, compulsory evacuation.
The separation of these phases is best illustrated by a reference to the Wartime
Civil Control Administration Functional Distribution Chart. (Figure 2, supra.)
Accordingly, the selection of sites within the zone to be evacuated, near each
evacuee community, for the establishment of Assembly Centers (initially called
“Induction Centers”) was undertaken at the same time when these other activi¬
ties mentioned above were under way, viz., interior relocation site selection, the
encouragement of voluntary migration and the operation of the Wartime Civil
Control Administration Service Centers. The detailed plan called for the
acquisition of Assembly Center sites where existing installations and facilities
could be used to the maximum. Fairgrounds and race tracks were the primary
source of such locations.
The Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, instituted a survey of
all available Assembly Center locations with a view to the selection of places
near to each center of evacuee population and susceptible of rapid adaptation to
the purpose. The Commanding Generals of the Northwest Sector, the Northern
and Southern California Sectors, and the Southern Land Frontier Sector, were
also directed by the Commanding General to make recommendations as to suit¬
able sites for this purpose. Seventeen such sites were selected, fifteen of which
were ultimately used for evacuee housing, in addition to Manzanar and Parker.
Twelve of these Centers, exclusive of Manzanar, were developed in California,
one in Washington, one in Oregon, and one in Arizona, exclusive of Parker. The
names and locations of these Centers are detailed in Chapter XIII.
The North and South Pacific Divisions of the United States Engineer Corps
were requested to provide for the construction of suitable facilities at each
of these sites, making maximum use of existing strucures. The contemplated
aggregate capacity (exclusive of Manzanar and Parker) was set at 100,000.
The housing was to be suitable for family units, and central messing facili¬
ties were to be provided. A maximum of four weeks was allotted for com¬
pletion of the projects. Thirteen of the fifteen Assembly Centers established
were within the South Pacific Division of the United States Engineer Corps and,
notwithstanding this unprecedented assignment, the schedule was substantially
met. The Division Engineers received their requests for action on March 20,
1942, and the deadline was established for April 21. Specifications were pro¬
vided by Wartime Civil Control Administration only in essential outline. One
requirement was that construction be planned so that the reception of evacuees
could be initiated in advance of completion of the entire Center.
While Assembly Center site selection was under way, and before construc¬
tion was started, the pressure for the initiation of a definite evacuation move¬
ment reached the point where there was grave danger of serious incidents.
On March 21, 1942, the Wartime Civil Control Administration organized a
voluntary evacuation of some 2,100 persons from Los Angeles, California, to
Manzanar which was then, of course, still undergoing construction at a rapid
rate. The Commanding General, Southern California Sector, Western Defense
Command, provided escort for the convoy of cars and a collateral train move¬
ment. The Quartermaster, Western Defense Command, obtained the necessary

49

EMERGENCE OF CONTROLLED EVACUATION

transportation and subsistence, and the United States Public Health Service pro¬
vided medical care.

An advance party of voluntary evacuees had preceded the

main party to assist the Manzanar Administrative Staff in preparing for the
reception of the main party of 2,100.
ticularly the Maryknoll Mission.

Local Los Angeles agencies aided, par¬

(See Chapters VII and VIII for division of

responsibilities.)
On March 29, 1942, the first compulsory evacuation of persons of Japanese
ancestry from Bainbridge Island in Puget Sound, Washington, to Manzanar
was executed pursuant to Exclusion Order No. 1, dated March 24, 1942.
When Proclamation No. 4 was announced, the construction of Assembly
Centers on sites already selected was under way.

The Work Projects Admin¬

istration had provided a staff at Manzanar and was assembling personnel to
administer other Assembly Centers as they were developed. Detailed plans were
being formulated by Wartime Civil Control Administration to solve a variety
of problems such as those of determining the supply and equipment requirements
for each Assembly Center, for transportation of evacuees, for health, sanitation
and education, and for all other Assembly Center operation requirements.

Also,

advanced planning for the designation of Exclusion Areas, for their orderly evacua¬
tion, for the designation of each evacuee group, for the maintenance of family
units and of community balance within Centers had to be considered.

As War¬

time Civil Control Administration was being organized and a new staff recruited
and trained, it was necessary to consider and solve these problems and at the same
time place the program in execution.
With the initiation of the Assembly Center construction, initial supply
requirements for Manzanar had been determined by the Wartime Civil Control
Administration and requisitioned.

These supplies were rapidly started toward

destination by the Quartermaster, Western Defense Command.

Plans had to be

developed for internal security—the policing of Assembly Centers.

The ques¬

tion of evacuee employment, of their compensation, of the establishment of
many social services such as barber shops, beauty shops, shoe repair facilities,
clothing stores, hospital, optical and dental services, the warehousing of evacuee
goods and chattels, all had to be considered and met.

For none was there either

precedent or pattern.
Complex as these operational aspects were, the problem was further com¬
pounded by the public relations aspect of the program.

Rumors were ram¬

pant, public feeling ran high, the affected groups were in a state of confusion,
and unscrupulous interests were seeking to take advantage of misfortune. There
was, therefore, an impelling necessity for the formulation of a definitive public
information and public relations program.

This was immediately undertaken.

A more detailed account of all these aspects of the program will appear in
ensuing chapters.

G

O 0 l

vW.
^gton

FES 2 »44
0. c

CHAPTER V
Separation of Jurisdiction Over Evacuation and
Relocation
When it became finally evident toward the end of February that a com¬
plete evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 1,
and ultimately from the California portion of Military Area No. 2, would be
ordered, discussions were initiated in Washington as to whether a separate
agency should be

created to undertake evacuee supervision

after the Army had attained its objective.

and relocation

The primary basis for these discus¬

sions was that Army resources should not be expended in any direction not
essential to the military aspects of the successful prosecution of the war.

The

Attorney General and other representatives of the Justice Department were
also concerned with several post-evacuation considerations, particularly those
revolving around the civil rights of American-born Japanese.

Justice Depart¬

ment officials therefore urged the establishment of a separate civilian agency
to undertake the post-evacuation phases of relocation.

The Assistant Secretary

of War, the Director of the Bureau of Budget and the Attorney General all
participated in the consideration of this problem.
The desirability of establishing such an operating agency was generally
agreed to when the Assistant Secretary of War came to the West Coast for
a survey of the situation.

He arrived at San Francisco on March 7, 1942,

and brought with him representatives of the Treasury Department and of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

The Treasury Depart¬

ment had accepted the responsibility of providing means for evacuee property
protection under the direction of the Commanding General and had selected
the Federal Reserve System, long its fiscal agent, as the instrumentality through
which it would discharge this mission.

The Assistant Secretary of War’s party

included Messrs. John Pehle, John Lawlor, and Ansel F. Luxford of the Treasury
Department, and Governor M. S. Szymczak and Mr. W. B. Pollard of the
Federal Reserve System.

Mr. Milton S. Eisenhower, then Assistant to the Sec¬

retary of Agriculture, joined the party as he had participated in the Washing¬
ton discussions concerning the proposed relocation agency.

Mr. Eisenhower

returned to Washington after having engaged in discussions with the Com¬
manding General, the Assistant Secretary of War and other officials about
March

11,

1942.

Following his return, Executive Order of the President

No. 9102 was published on March 18th.

Under its terms, War Relocation

Authority was established in the Office for Emergency Management in the
Executive Office of the President.
Director.

Mr. Eisenhower was named as its first

Broad powers were accorded.

became responsible for "the relocation

Primarily, however, the new agency
(of evacuees)

in appropriate places,

providing for their needs in such manner as may be appropriate, and super¬
vising their activities.”

Its power, authority and responsibility are clearly

expressed in the order.3
'See Inclosure to letter of transmittal

# 7.

50

51

SEPARATION OF JURISDICTION

Liaison was established between the Director, War Relocation Authority,
and

the

Commanding

General.

Mr.

Eisenhower

returned

to

the

Pacific

Coast about the end of March and established temporary offices on the third
floor of the Whitcomb Hotel building, San Francisco, adjacent to the office
of the Wartime Civil Control Administration.

Because of the primary interest

of War Relocation Authority in the relocation aspects of evacuation, it was
agreed that the selection of Relocation Center sites by the Army would be sus¬
pended, and that all data collected would be made available to War Relocation
Authority for its use.
The Director of War Relocation Authority determined that the characteristics
for each site should be such that all lands included were to be a part of the public
domain; that each site have an optimum potential for the employment of all em¬
ployables among evacuees there resident; and that there be sufficient water and
suitable soil for agricultural development.

It was further agreed that War Re¬

location Authority would make the selections subject to the approval of military
authorities as to military security features.

Also, it was agreed that the acquisition

of sites would be through military channels, and that the Commanding General,
Western Defense Command, would notify the Governor of each State concerned,
prior to acquisition, of the military necessity for the construction of a Relo¬
cation Center on the chosen area.

Some time later a formal agreement was

executed between the War Department and War Relocation Authority, reflecting
this understanding and providing for the construction of Centers on behalf of
War Relocation Authority by the Army.

This agreement, executed April 17,

1942, is found in Chapter XX.
The Western Defense Command, therefore, abandoned Relocation Center
site selection and concentrated its efforts on controlled evacuation.

Emphasis

was placed by Wartime Civil Control Administration on evacuee property pro¬
tection, provision for necessary social services, establishment of Assembly Centers,
the evacuation of Japanese to Assembly Centers, operation of Assembly Centers,
the construction and equipment of Relocation Centers and the transfer of evacuees
from Assembly to Relocation Centers.
which met the standards prescribed.

It was difficult to locate suitable sites
This, in combination with construction

delays due to the scarcity of building materials, delayed the ultimate transfer
from Assembly Centers to completed Relocation Centers for approximately four
months.
Assembly Centers were originally conceived and established as a transitory
facility and their adaptation to longer evacuee residence became essential. Bear¬
ing in mind the seriousness of the results which might ensue from over-long
residence in facilities intended only to provide temporary shelter, the Director,
Wartime Civil Control Administration, on April 22 ,1942, emphasized these con¬
siderations to the Director, War Relocation Authority, in a memorandum to the
following effect:
"1. The tempo of evacuation is under acceleration. Its accomplishment will place
approximately 85,000 evacuees in assembly centers in the next six weeks. Assembly

52

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

centers are not designed to provide suitable semi-permanent housing and other facilities.
They are temporary in nature. Their facilities are transitory only. They are made neces¬
sary because of the time required to select relocation sites. Their objective is to meet
the demand of military necessity and to avoid any retarding effect caused by relocation
site selection.
"2. Assembly centers are not and cannot, without the expenditure of tremendous
sums of money for space and facilities in duplication of those which will be provided
on relocation sites, be designed to permit the development and maintenance of a vocational,
educational, recreational and social program. Long residence in an assembly center is
bound to have a demoralizing effect.
“3. The grave responsibility for the most rapid selection of relocation sites and
the compilation of all necessary data to permit speedy acquisition and construction of
relocation centers thereon cannot be overemphasized in view of the essential character¬
istics of assembly centers.
"4. In this connection, it is suggested that a representative of the office of the ap¬
propriate United States Army Division Engineer be included in War Relocation Au¬
thority site selection parties. This will produce a two-fold effect. (1) It will facilitate
acquisition once a site is selected and the data compiled because the real estate section
of the Division Engineer’s Office will have been accorded the maximum advance notice.
(2) It will facilitate the initiation of construction for manifest reasons in that advance
information on the characteristics of a site will have been insured.
"5. From the long range point of view and the self-evident desirability of maintaining
sound public relations, the suggestion is made that all personnel of both WCCA and
WRA, and the associated cooperating federal agencies, bear in mind the necessity for and
objective of assembly centers. Thus, their essential characteristics will be more readily
understood. The attainment of any social ideal therein is beyond possibility for manifest
reasons and the responsibility is grave to avoid misinterpretations. Failure to avoid it may
initiate a chain of circumstances resulting in reprisals against our nationals in enemy
hands.”

CHAPTER VI
The Evacuation Method
With the formal organization of an Army agency charged with the gen¬
eral supervision of all evacuation activities, rather definite property protection
and social service policies and practices emerged with a specific evacuation
technique.

The central theory of evacuation, upon which the method and

technique was developed, was essentially the block system.
was ultimately subdivided into 108 exclusion areas.

The coastal strip

Comprehensive statistical

studies of the size and composition of the Japanese population in each of the
areas were made.

As a particular exclusion area became readied for evacua¬

tion, an Exclusion Order with specific Exclusion Instructions was promulgated.
A Civil Control Station was established immediately in the exclusion area
concerned.

This Control Station was staffed with a team of experts.

On

definite dates following the posting of an Exclusion Order in an "exclusion
area”, the heads of families, and each individual living alone, were required
to report to the Civil Control Station in that area for instructions and regis¬
tration.

Representatives of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, of

the Farm Security Administration, and the associated agencies of the Federal
Security Agency, comprised the Control Station staff.

The Commanding Gen¬

eral of each Sector provided a military officer with several military police to
act as a security group.

Applications for exemption from evacuation were re¬

ferred to Control Station Provosts.

Normally, a representative of the United

States Employment Service acted as the Station Manager for administrative pur¬
poses.
As many as 43 Civil Control Stations operated simultaneously at the peak
of evacuation.

At this time an average of 3,750 evacuees per day were being

moved from their homes to Assembly Centers, or, in some cases, direct to Manzanar or Colorado River Relocation Centers.
The Department of Agriculture had designated the Farm Security Admin¬
istration as its representative to undertake the responsibility for agricultural
property protection.

Mr. Laurence I. Hewes, the Pacific Coast Regional Direc¬

tor of the Farm Security Administration, supervised these activities.

At con¬

ferences between the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, and Mr.
Flewes, the details of the arrangements between the Farm Security Administra¬
tion and Wartime Civil Control Administration were developed.

These under¬

standings were confirmed by correspondence dated March 15, 1942, and March
27, 1942, addressed to the Pacific Coast Regional Director of the Farm Security
Administration.

(Appendix (1) to Chapter VI, infra.)

In respect to a telegram dated March 14, 1942 (Appendix (2) to Chapter VI)
from the Commanding General, the sum of $1,000,000 was made available from
War Department appropriations for the purpose of making loans against evacuee
crops and farm implements. The Farm Security Administration representatives,
forming a part of Wartime Civil Control Administration, were entrusted with
53

54

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

authority for making loans from this sum. The objective was to facilitate the
procurement of substitute farm operators who would take over evacuated farms
and other agricultural property, particularly where the financial condition of a
given evacuee, or of a specific agricultural property, was such that sufficient
moneys to continue operations could not be obtained through commercial sources.
Later this was augmented by an additional $4,000,000, obtained from funds
available to the President.

Both the evacuees and their communities of resi¬

dence derived much benefit from these loans because many properties other¬
wise would have remained idle, and growing crops left unharvested.

The Farm

Security Administration organized for the task with great facility and soon
developed a complete inventory of evacuee agricultural interests.

Ultimately

satisfactory arrangements were made for over 99 per cent of all this property.
Arrangements were successfully accomplished to keep these properties in produc¬
tion without shrinkage in aggregate crop output.
Measures for evacuee property protection were rapidly developed following
the arrival of the Assistant Secretary of War and of the representatives of the
Treasury Department and Federal Reserve System who accompanied him. When
the Wartime Civil Control Administration was organized the Director called
upon the cooperating agencies to organize 48 Service Center teams.
plied rapidly.

They com¬

Under the immediate direction of Mr. William H. Hale, Vice-

President of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, the bank’s phase of
evacuee property protection activities was rapidly developed.

The arrangement

between Western Defense Command and the Federal Reserve Bank of San Fran¬
cisco was formally confirmed in letters from the Commanding General to the
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, dated March 11th and April 5, 1942.
(Appendix (3) to Chapter VI.)
Service center offices were established in downtown San Francisco, Los Ange¬
les, Portland, and Seattle.

These were staffed by personnel specially selected to

aid evacuees with their problems.
At the request of the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, the
Federal Reserve Bank also undertook responsibility for the storage of evacuee
household goods.

This included the acquisition of suitable warehouses, the em¬

ployment of guards, and the installation of suitable means and methods to en¬
sure a control and inventory of the stored property.

As will be outlined in greater

detail later in this report, the Wartime Civil Control Administration formulated
definite policies, implemented with detailed instructions and forms, in the matter
of household goods storage.

Any type of personal property was accepted for

storage, including business property and automobiles.

Farm implements were

warehoused, through the Farm Security Administration’s organization.

As for

automobiles and trucks, the Army offered to purchase any automobile or truck
at Blue Book value, through the Federal Reserve Bank, if an evacuee desired to
sell. Evacuee response to the property protection services was most gratifying, and
clearly indicated their effectiveness.
As already noted, the associated agencies of the Federal Security Agency
accepted responsibility for providing all necessary social and public health services.

THE

EVACUATION

55

METHOD

These allied agencies included the United States Employment Service, the Bureau
of Public Assistance, Social Security Board, and the United States Public Health
Service.

The scope and magnitude of the functions performed by these allied

agencies will be described in detail in subsequent chapters. Mr. Richard M. Neustadt, Regional Director of the Federal Security Agency, agreed to place all of
the facilities of the organizations under his direction at the disposal of the Wartime
Civil Control Administration.

The closest liaison was constantly mantained. A

letter in confirmation of the arrangement made between the Director, Wartime
Civil Control Administration, and Mr. Neustadt was forwarded by the Com¬
manding General on March 31, 1942. (Appendix (4) to Chapter VI.)
Among the manifold services provided by these agencies, the United States
Public Health Service undertook to examine each evacuee for contagious diseases
prior to his entry into an Assembly Center. It also undertook the acquisition of
infirmary and hospital equipment, and medical supplies for Assembly Centers,
and to make suitable auxiliary arrangements for hospitalization of evacuees in
private and public hospitals adjacent to Assembly Centers.

Further, it super¬

vised the entire medical program within the Centers.
The United States Employment Service provided the Manager for each Civil
Control Station and Wartime Civil Control Administration Service Center. The
Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Board, in collaboration with the
United States Employment Service, undertook the initial interview of each
evacuee to determine his individual problems and the social and property protec¬
tion services he would require.

These two agencies also undertook the recruit¬

ment of advanced parties of evacuee workers for each Assembly Center.

These

parties were recruited, organized and transported to each Assembly Center well
in advance of the induction of the first groups of evacuees.

Thus the Assembly

Center staffs were able to organize a skeleton force for the reception of the new
Center residents.
At the request of the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, the
Office of Price Administration sent a liaison representative to be available for con¬
sultation, advice, and the initiation of any necessary action.

He established a

liaison section at Wartime Civil Control Administration, and remained during the
initial phases of evacuation. This relationship was established because it was fore¬
seen that some control might have to be applied to arrest widespread deflation of
values.

This in turn might have adversely affected the economic structure of the

West Coast. This did not prove to be the case. No price control measures were
applied.
The Post Office Department effectively cooperated throughout the entire
operation. When it became essential to devise means for maintaining an account
of the progress of voluntary migration, postmasters throughout the Western
Defense Command administered the change of address reporting system. Later,
during Assembly Center operations, branch post offices were promptly established
in each Center. The Inspectors in charge of the San Francisco and Seattle Divisions
promptly responded to all Wartime Civil Control Administration requirements.

56

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

By arrangement with the Attorney General, the Department of Justice,
through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the United States Attorneys,
acted as the enforcing agency for all of the Proclamations and Exclusion Orders
of the Commanding General, promulgated under Executive Order No. 9066.
Although prosecutions in connection with the Japanese evacuation were few,
the number of cases of violation of the Commanding General’s Curfew and
Travel restrictions, applicable to alien enemies, were many.

Through the agency

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, State and local law-enforcement agen¬
cies cooperated and assisted in enforcement of the evacuation program pri¬
marily by reporting promptly any and all cases of failure to comply with
Exclusion Orders.

To insure the closest working relationship between Western

Defense Command and the enforcement agencies of the Department of Jus¬
tice, preliminary understandings for collaboration were embodied in a memo¬
randum from the Commanding General to the Assistant Secretary of War
dated April 20, 1942.

(Appendix (5) to Chapter VI.)

The cooperation of the participating Federal agencies, and the high devo¬
tion to duty displayed by all of their personnel was outstanding.

The will¬

ingness of all concerned to apply themselves to the task without regard to
personal convenience, or to the hours of duty, cannot be left unmentioned.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VI
Appendix 1
"Mr.

Laurence

I.

Hewes,

Jr.,

Regional Director

15 March 1942

Farm Security Administration
30 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, California
"Dear Mr. Flewes:
"By virtue of and pursuant to the authority vested in me as Commanding General,
Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, and in order to effectuate the removal
of any enemy aliens and other persons designated by me, engaged in farming operations
who evacuate from restricted and prohibited areas lying within my command, you are
hereby ordered and authorized as follows:
“1. To institute and administer a program which will insure continuation of
the proper use of agricultural lands voluntarily vacated by enemy aliens and
other persons designated by me, and which will insure fair and equitable ar¬
rangements between the evacuees and the operators of their property.
"2. To incur the necessary administrative expenses, including the payment of
personnel and necessary traveling expenses to be reimbursed by me upon pres¬
entation of reimbursement vouchers.
"3. From funds made available or to be made available by me, to make, ser¬
vice and collect loans, including the provision of necessary farm management
advice and guidance.
"4. To redelegate to such officers and employees of the Farm Security Ad¬
ministration as you may designate, any part of the authority herein contained.
"Sincerely yours,
/s/

J. L. DeWitt
J.

L.

DeWitt,

Lieutennant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.”

THE

EVACUATION

57

METHOD

March 27, 1942
MEMORANDUM For

Mr. Larry

I.

Hewes,

Farm Security Administration

Subject: Exercise of freezing power of agricultural property.
1. I have been directed by the Commanding General to advise you as follows:
2. After extended consideration of your mission and the problems attendant upon its
accomplishment, it has been concluded that there is necessity for a revision in the
method and circumstances wherein the freezing power is now exercised.
3. In your relationship with the Commanding General, Western Defense Command
and Fourth Army, you are regarded as a representative of the Department of Agriculture,
and I understand from my conversations with you that, in the accomplishment of the
mission assigned the Department, you, as its representative, are employing all of the
available departmental agencies. In this connection, I further understand that the Ag¬
ricultural War Boards established in each county by order of the Secretary of Agriculture,
have a membership comprising a repesentative of evey agency of the Department of
Agriculture.
4. The primary mission imposed upon the Commanding General is accomplishment of
the evacuation in satisfaction of military necessity. In the accomplishment of his mission,
he has prescribed that it shall be carried out (a) with a minimum loss in agricultural
production consistent with prompt execution, and (b) with a maximum of fair dealing
to all concerned. In the latter case, protection of the property interests of evacuees and
avoidance, so far as practicable, of economic dislocation are major phases of the pre¬
scribed method.
5. In responding to the request of the Commanding General to the Secretary of War,
the Agriculture Department has therefore accepted the mission of performing the
following:
(a) To do everything reasonably necessary to prevent any crop loss subse¬
quent upon evacuation and to reduce to a minimum the spoilage or loss of
growing crops;
(b) To assist the evacuee in providing a substitute tenant or operator and
at the same time to preserve the evacuee’s equity to the fullest practicable extent
consistent with the circumstances in each case;
(c) If necessary to take over and operate property where, in the absence
of such action, growing crops would be neglected or abandoned or where the
evacuee’s equity, though of reasonable substance, would otherwise deteriorate.

.

6

In order to accomplish these objectives it is essential that the power to "freeze”

agricultural property, crops, farm implements and agricultural equipment, lease-hold
interests, be readily available for application in cases of necessity.
7. As the Agricultural War Boards have been organized in each county, it must
follow that such Boards are familiar with local problems and conditions. They also have
the personnel available to make prompt investigation and recommendation upon the rec¬
ommendation of the Farm Security field agent. I therefore propose that the "freezing”
powers necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives stated be applied only upon
the recommendation of the appropriate county War Board; that such boards be the
final arbiter as to whether or not the power to freeze be exercised in any given case.
8. In this way, the action taken to "freeze” in any instance will represent the
considered judgment of all agricultural agencies. It is immaterial to me whether the
agency empowered to “freeze” on such recommendation is the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco, one of its member banks or agencies, or whether it is the field agent of
the Farm Security Administration.
9. I am furnishing a copy of this memorandum to Mr. William H. Hale, Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco; Mr. Milton Eisenhower, War Relocation Authority; Mr. Ed Dodd,
Director, Western Division, Department of Agriculture; and Mr. Dave Davidson, chair¬
man, California War Board. Concurrently I am recommending to the Commanding
General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, that he approve the program

58

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

outlined and that in furtherance of your mission, where property is "frozen” and op¬
erated by your Agency, funds be made available for such operation, as for the hiring of
operators and for the purchase of feed and seed, etc.
Karl R. Bendetsen, Colonel, G. S. C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs, Directing, WCCA.

Copies to:
Mr. Wm. H. Hale
Mr. Milton Eisenhower
Mr. Ed Dodd
Mr. Dave Davidson

Appendix 2
"14 MARCH 1942
"CHIEF OF STAFF
"WAR DEPARTMENT
"WASHINGTON, D. C.
"ORDERLY ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MISSION ASSIGNED ME UNDER
EXECUTIVE ORDER NINE NAUGHT SIX SIX DATED FEBRUARY NINE¬
TEEN COMMA NINETEEN FORTY TWO BY LETTER OF THE SECRETARY
OF WAR DATED FEBRUARY TWENTY COMMA NINETEEN FORTY TWO
RENDERS IMPERATIVE THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR THE MAK¬
ING OF CROP LOANS IN ORDER TO AVOID THE LOSS OF GROWING
CROPS PLANTED BY JAPANESE FARMS WHO WILL BE EXCLUDED FROM
THE PACIFIC COASTAL FRONTIER STOP SUCH FUNDS ARE NEEDED
FOR SPRAYING AND FOR FINANCING OPERATIONS BY PERSONS PRO¬
CURED TO SUBSTITUTE AS FARM OPERATORS IN THE PLACE OF EVAC¬
UEES STOP THE STIMULUS OF VOLUNTARY EVACUATION ON THE PART
OF AFFECTED GROUPS WILL BE GREATLY ENHANCED IF AN ALLOT¬
MENT OF FUNDS FROM THE CHIEF OF STAFFS CONTINGENT FUND OR
THE PRESIDENTS EMERGENCY FUND IS MADE FOR THIS PURPOSE STOP
OFFICERS OF THE FARM CREDIT AND FARM SECURITY ADMINISTRA¬
TION COMMA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE COMMA WORKING IN
COLLABORATION WITH THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ARE UNDER¬
TAKING TO MAKE LOANS IN PROPER CASES AND TO ESTABLISH A
MEANS FOR SECURITY AND REPAYMENT ON A SUITABLE BASIS STOP
THIS MATTER HAS ALREADY BEEN REFERRED INFORMALLY TO GEN¬
ERAL BROWN COMMA BUDGET OFFICER FOR THE WAR DEPARTMENT
STOP PRIORITY ACTION IS URGENTLY REQUESTED.
"DeWITT
"COMDG WDC AND FOURTH ARMY”

Appendix 3
"March 11, 1942
"Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
"San Francisco, California.
"Sirs:
"By virtue of orders issued by the War Department on December 11, 1941, the
entire Pacific Coast of the United States was established as the Western Defense
Command and designated as a theatre of operations under my command.
"By Executive Order No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, the President of the
United States authorized and directed the Secretary of War and the military com¬
manders whom he may from time to time designate to prescribe military areas in
such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate military commander may
determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to

THE

EVACUATION

59

METHOD

which the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave, shall be subject to what¬
ever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate military commander may
impose in his discretion.
"The Secretary of War, on February 20, 1942, designated the undersigned as
the military commander to carry out the duties and responsibilities imposed by said
Executive Order for that portion of the United States embraced in the Western
Defense Command.
"On March 2, 1942, pursuant to authority vested in me, I issued Public Proclama¬
tion No.
zones.

1, under which I designated and established certain military areas and

It is my intention, by subsequent proclamations, to exclude certain persons

and classes of persons from all of Military Area No. 1, and also from such of those
zones described in said Public Proclamation No. 1 as Zones A-2 to A-99 inclusive
as are within Military Area No. 2.

The evacuees will include Japanese, German

and Italian aliens and persons of Japanese ancestry now resident in Military Area
No. 1.

I am familiar with the contemplated program dealing with the problem of

evacuees and I find that the prompt execution of such a program is essential to the
successful prosecution of the war and the performance of my duty under Executive
Order No. 9066.

Accordingly, I hereby authorize and direct you to take all steps

which in your judgment are necessary or desirable in order to carry out the objective
of the program.
"You are authorized and requested to employ such personnel and set up such offices
within the Western Defense Command as you may consider advisable, necessary or
expedient for the purpose of carrying out the program of dealing with the property
interests of said evacuees. You are further authorized to employ such personnel and
appoint such sub-agents as you may see fit in connection therewith.
"You will be reimbursed for all necessary and proper expenses incurred in con¬
nection with the carrying out of this program.

Furthermore, you are directed to

perform any and all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of this pro¬
gram, and as such you are, of course, entitled to be reimbursed for all necessary and
proper expenses and obligations arising out of such agency, for which under law such
an agent would be entitled to reimbursement.
"It is understood that in executing the foregoing no warranty of my authority
is included nor is any personal liability imposed upon or assumed by the undersigned.
"Very truly yours,
“J. L.

DeWitt,

"Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.”
"April 5, 1942
"Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
"San Francisco, California.
"Sirs:

,

"Reference is made to my letter dated March 11

1942, addressed to you, in

which I authorize and direct you to take all steps which in your judgment are nec¬
essary or desirable in order to carry out the objective of the program dealing with
the problem of evacuees from Military Area No. 1, as designated and established in
my Public Proclamation No. 1, dated March 2, 1942.
"Last week the Congress of the United States enacted and on March 21, 1942, the
President of the United States approved Public Law, No. 503, 77th Congress, under
the terms of which whomsoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in
any military area or any military zone prescribed, under the authority of an execu¬
tive order of the President, by the Secretary of War, or by any military commander
designated by the Secretary of War, contrary to the restrictions applicable to any such
area or zone or contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any such military
commander, shall, if it appears that he knew or should have known of the existence
and extent of the restrictions or order and that this act was in violation thereof,

60

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be subject to certain penalties
stated therein.
"Accordingly, by virtue of the additional authority vested in me by said Public
Law, No. 503, 77th Congress, approved by the President of the United States on
March 21, 1942, as well as by virtue of all other authority vested in me by Execu¬
tive Order No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, the orders and designation issued
by the Secretary of War on February 20, 1942, designating the undersigned as a
Military Commander to carry out the duties and responsibilities embodied by said
Executive Order No. 9066 for that portion of the United States embraced within
the Western Defense Command, and pursuant to all other authority vested in me,
I hereby authorize and direct you to continue to take all steps which in your judg¬
ment are necessary or desirable in order to carry out the objectives of the program
dealing with the problem of evacuees from the Western Defense Command and par¬
ticularly Military Area No. 1, embraced therein.
"Very truly yours,
"J. L. DeWitt,

“Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.”

Appendix 4
"March 31, 1942
“Federal Security Agency,
"785 Market Street,
"San Francisco, California.
“Attention:

Mr. Richard M. Neustadt:

“Dear Mr. Neustadt:
"Under authority of the Executive Order of the President, No. 9066, dated
February 19, 1942, your Agency has been assigned certain functions and duties by
me, to be performed in aid of the program for evacuation of German, Italian and
Japanese enemy aliens and persons of Japanese ancestry, from strategic zones within
the military areas established by my Public Proclamation No.

1, dated March 2,

1942, and Public Proclamation No. 2, dated March 16, 1942.
"Subject to my directions and instructions and in accordance with approved poli¬
cies, your Agency is authorized and directed to incur obligations and make expenditures
from any funds available to it in carrying out the duties and functions assigned.

In

this connection it is desired that you submit, for approval, without delay, a budget
estimate of your funds requirements to May 1, 1942, broken down in such detail as
is practicable at the present time.
"Payment for obligations incurred or funds expended under the approved budget esti¬
mate will be made from funds subject to my control and allocation.
“Yours very truly,
"J. L. DeWitt,

"Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.”

Appendix 5
"At a conference in my office during the afternoon of April 20, 1942, attended
by Mr. Tom C. Clark, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, Mr. Nat L. Pieper,
Special Agent in Charge, San Francisco office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Brig¬
adier-General J. L. Bradley, Chief of Staff, Colonel Joel F. Watson, Judge Advocate,
Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen, Assistant Chief of Staff, the following procedure, predi¬
cated upon correspondence exchanged between your office and the Assistant to the
Attorney General, governing procedure and liaison between the War Department, the
Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, and the Depart¬
ment of Justice, was agreed upon:

THE

"1.

(a)

EVACUATION

61

METHOD

All orders and proclamations issued by me pursuant to the provisions

of Executive Order of the President, No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, as the Mili¬
tary Commander designated by the Secretary of War by letter dated March 20, 1942,
to carry out the provisions of the cited Executive Order, involving enforcement of
the penalties provided by Public Law No. 503, 77th Congress, approved March 20,
1942, will be transmitted to the Assistant Secretary of War by telephone or tele¬
graph for clearance with the Assistant to the Attorney General, Mr. James Rowe, Jr.
The Department of Justice has indicated that it will respond with all practicable
dispatch and that upon clearance of such orders and proclamations it will undertake
enforcement of the penalties provided by the cited law.

Thereafter, in the case of

any such approved proclamation or order, direct communication between the local
Department of Justice representative, viz., Mr. Tom C. Clark (or whomever may be
so designated by the Justice Department)
Attorneys, will be authorized.
"(b)

for

the several

United

States District

The present form of general exclusion order and general supporting instruc¬

tions employed in effectuating the evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry having
been approved will not be so submitted. Any necessary enforcement of the penalties
provided by the cited Statute in connection with evacuation of persons of Japanese
ancestry under such exclusion orders and supporting instructions will be undertaken
by the Department of Justice.

For local operational purposes, Sector Commanders

are authorized to communicate directly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Special Agent in Charge, for the District in which evacuation projects are entrained.
Similar direct communication with the appropriate District Attorney is also author¬
ized.

Warning notices of impending exclusion orders and copies of the exclusion

order will, in each case, be transmitted to Mr. Nat L. Pieper, Special Agent in
Charge, San Francisco office, for communication to other Federal Bureau of Investi¬
gation Special Agents in Charge and to local police.

Similar material will be fur¬

nished Mr. Tom C. Clark for transmission by his office to the appropriate District
Attorneys and the United States Marshals.

Mr. Clark will also continue to under¬

take to keep the Department of Justice fully informed as to progress of evacuation
as reflected by the copies of warning memoranda and exclusion orders furnished him.
"(c)

The form of individual exclusion order is currently being submitted to

your office for transmission to Mr. Rose in accordance with the arrangement.

Upon

approval of the form and substance of the individual exclusion order, it is the under¬
standing that the Department of Justice will undertake any necessary enforcement
of the penalties provided by Public Law No. 503, supra.

Once the form and substance

of the individual exclusion order has been approved it is understood that no further
clearance with the Department of Justice will be necessary, and that

individual

exclusion orders may be issued without further reference to the Department of Jus¬
tice.

Communication to arrange the necessary enforcement of such individual exclu¬

sion orders, as presently understood, will be through Mr. Nat L. Pieper, Special Agent
in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, but should any Court proceedings develop,
local liaison will be through Mr. Tom C. Clark, Special Assistant to the Attorney
General.

"2. On the basis of current understandings the procedure outlined above will be
followed. It is requested, however, that confirmation of the Department of Justice
be obtained as soon as practicable.
"/s/ J. L. DeWitt,
"J. L. DeWitt,

"Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.”

PART III
EVACUATION—THE MECHANICS FOR ITS
ACCOMPLISHMENT

CHAPTER YII
Organization and Functions of Civil Affairs Division,
General Staff, and Wartime Civil Control
Administration and Other Agencies
During the period up to and including March 2, 1942, the date on which
Public Proclamation No. 1 was announced, there was no single section of the
general or special staff of Headquarters Western Defense Command charged with
the formulation of policies, plans, and directives pertaining to civil control. Dur¬
ing most of this time the Commanding General gave extensive personal attention
to all aspects of internal security in addition to the manifold tactical responsibili¬
ties imposed upon him.
In the preparation of the bases for Proclamations Nos. 1 and 2, the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2 of the General Staff in collaboration with the Staff Judge
Advocate carried the primary burden. The Commanding General had called for
the recommendations of the Sector Commanders and of the Commanding Generals
of the Air Forces and Ninth Service Command (then Ninth Corps Area) con¬
cerning those areas and installations which they regarded as particularly sensi¬
tive. Much material was submitted in connection with these recommendations.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 analyzed, evaluated, and organized these recom¬
mendations.

The direct result of this endeavor laid the basis for the designation

by the Commanding General of Military Areas No. 1 and No. 2 and the pro¬
hibited zones therein.
In the field of alien control, that is to say, the custody and processing
of male internees, the Provost Marshal was the special staff officer whose duties
embraced these functions. However, as the special adviser to the Commanding
General regarding military police activities throughout Western Defense Com¬
mand, and as the officer responsible for the conduct of the countless investi¬
gations required to clear civilian personnel for duty with the military estab¬
lishment, his duties were pressing and confining.
The tactical responsibilities which then confronted the four sections of the
General Staff in executing the Commanding General’s directives regarding the
training, tactical dispositions, and supply of the substantial military forces
within Western Defense Command and Alaska Defense Command were ex¬
tensive.

These, together with the problems involved in the development of

plans for the joint defense of the West Coast, initially between the Canadian
forces and later the Mexican forces and our own, as well as between the United
States land and naval forces, were such that their energies were wholly consumed.
The requirements, ramifications, and the complex inter-dependent aspects
of the program demanded the centralization in one staff agency, under the
Commanding General, of full responsibility for the conduct and supervision
of the Commanding General’s directives in the civil control field.

As military

necessity required drastic action, so was it essential to make unusual pro¬
vision.

This, added to the fact that the Army was suddenly confronted with
65

JAPANESE

66

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

full responsibility for immediate action in fields normally occupied by civilian
agencies, and in new and unprecedented fields, made necessary the creation of
a fifth section of the general staff.
Although it is contemplated that the creation of a staff section charged with
responsibility for civil affairs would be done only where military forces are in
actual occupation of enemy territory or in other cases involving full military
government, a novel and unexpected situation here confronted the Commanding
General. Accordingly, on March 10, 1942, by General Order No. 34, "The Civil
Affairs Division of the General Staff of Western Defense Command and Fourth
Army” was created.

In addition to any other responsibilities and duties which

might be assigned him and "within the directives and general policies of the
Commanding General,” the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs was made
fully responsible for the "formulation of policies, plans and directives” pertaining
to "control and exclusion of civilians.”
Notwithstanding the multiple responsibilities devolving upon

the entire

staff, augmented especially by the creation of a new staff agency, the necessity
for a smoothly functioning headquarters became increasingly important.

The

Chief of Staff coordinated the varying staff functions to the end that the Com¬
manding General’s directives were executed.
In order to provide adequately for facile execution of the program, a new
agency of Headquarters Western Defense Command was created, and desig¬
nated as the Civil Affairs Division.

It was given broad responsibilities and

placed under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs. Being
a General Staff Division, the Civil Affairs Division was a planning agency.

To

execute the directives and to administer the plans of the Civil Affairs Division,
the Commanding General upon March 11, 1942, by General Order No. 3 5 estab¬
lished the Wartime Civil Control Administration.

By its terms the Assistant

Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs was made responsible for, “the organization, estab¬
lishment and direction of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, Western
Defense Command and Fourth Army.” Except as otherwise discharged by direc¬
tive of the Commanding General, the Wartime Civil Control Administration was
in turn made responsible for, "the execution of the duties and responsibilities im¬
posed upon the Commanding General, Western Defense Command by the Secre¬
tary of War in designating him, on February 20, 1942, as the Military Com¬
mander to carry out the duties and responsibilities imposed by Executive Order
No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, for that portion of the United States em¬
braced in Western Defense Command.”
Thus the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs performed a dual function.
As a General Staff officer and agent of the Commanding General for Civil Affairs,
he was empowered to issue appropriate directives pertaining to the control and
exclusion of civilians in the name of the Commanding General. As Director of the
Wartime Civil Control Administration, he was authorized to carry such directives
into execution.
During the pre-evacuation period and particularly during that phase which
involved the exclusion of enemy aliens from the 99 prohibited zones estab-

ORGANIZATION

AND

FUNCTIONS

OF

67

AGENCIES

lished in California by the Attorney General, Mr. Tom C. Clark, a special
assistant

to

the

Attorney

General

in

charge of

the Anti-Trust

Division

on the Pacific Coast, had coordinated the Justice Department’s program in
this regard.

As the evacuation program was to involve the active participa¬

tion of many Federal civilian agencies, by arrangement between the Depart¬
ment of Justice and the Commanding General, Mr. Clark’s services were
retained as the coordinator of these agencies under the direction of the War¬
time Civil Control Administration.

He functioned in this capacity until

some time in May when duties in Washington required his withdrawal from
this activity.
A permanent allotment of four officers was accorded the Civil Affairs
Division, General Staff. The operating staff of the Wartime Civil Control Admin¬
istration was drawn from among officers available to the Western Defense Com¬
mand and assigned to Wartime Civil Control Administration on a temporary
duty status.

As the Commanding General’s directive was to reduce to a mini¬

mum the use of military personnel, the major portion of the Wartime Civil Con¬
trol Administration staff was civilian.

A maximum of 45 officers and 12 enlisted

men comprised the military personnel.

The Commanding General directed that

Sector Commanders order officers assigned to them to report to Headquarters
Western Defense Command for duty with Wartime Civil Control Administra¬
tion.

Acting under pressure, the G-l section of the General Staff obtained suit¬

ably qualified officers for this duty in a minimum time.

Within the day follow¬

ing the request officers began to report for this duty.
At the peak of evacuation and Assembly Center operations the civilian
personnel of the Wartime Civil Control Administration totaled 269 at head¬
quarters and 1,660 in the field, an aggregate of 1,929.
on the administrative staff of the

Of these 762 served

15 Assembly Centers and the Manzanar

Reception Center, and 319 were engaged as interior security police within
Assembly Centers.

The remainder of the personnel comprised the teams which

operated the 48 Wartime Civil Control Administration Service Centers and the
many Civil Control Stations.
The Wartime Civil Control Administration was organized into divisions
and branches embracing every aspect of planning, administration, and opera¬
tions.

The Inspection

Property, Security,

and

Fiscal,

and Regulations

Administrative,

Evacuation

and Temporary Settlement

Divisions were headed by military officers.

Operations,
Operations

The Statistical and Public Rela¬

tions Divisions were headed by civilian experts except for that period between
March 11 and September 14, 1942, when the Public Relations Division was
headed by a military officer.
Figure 3 represents the organization of the Civil Affairs Division, General
Staff, and the Wartime Civil Control Administration during the evacuation
period.

When all persons of Japanese ancestry had been evacuated, the organ¬

ization was revised to reflect the cessation of this phase of activities.

The

Evacuation Operations Division was eliminated, and responsibility for developing
and supervising the logistics of transfer of evacuees, their impedimenta, supplies,
and equipment from Assembly to Relocation Centers became essentially the re-

ORGANIZATION CHART OF CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION AND WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION

68

EVACUATION PERIOD

JAPANESE
EVACUATION
FROM
THE
WEST
COAST

Figure 3

ORGANIZATION CHART OF CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION AND WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
POST-EVACUATION PERIOD

ORGANIZATION
AND
FUNCTIONS
OF
AGENCIES

69

Figure 4

70

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

ponsibility of the Temporary Settlement Operations Division, renamed the "Op¬
erations Division.” Figure 4 is the organization chart of Civil Affairs Division
and Wartime Civil Control Administration during the post-evacuation period.
The principal functions of the Wartime Civil Control Administration were:
(1)

Determination of all necessary requirements for the orderly accom¬

(2)

The determination of all evacuation logistics.

(3)

The general supervision of all

plishment of evacuation and Assembly Center operations.
aspects of evacuation operations,

evacuee property protection, social service and medical and hospital
care.
(4)

The preparation of directives required for the accomplishment of
all aspects of the program.

Where such directives were for issu¬

ance by the Commanding General, i. e. where their execution was
to be accomplished by an Army agency, they were prepared and
issued in the name of the Commanding General by the Assistant Chief
of Staff for Civil Affairs.

Where such directives were for execution

by the Wartime Civil Control Administration or by one of the par¬
ticipating Federal agencies, they were issued and published by author¬
ity of the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration.
(5)

Public information and relations inclusive of the preparation, print¬
ing, and distribution of all public proclamations, civilian exclusion
orders, and instructions.

(6)

The administration and operation of Assembly Centers including
internal security.

(7)

The supervision of Assembly and Relocation Center construction

(8)

The determination of all logistics relating to the transfer of evac¬

through the agency of the United States Engineer Corps.
uees from Assembly to Relocation Centers.
(9)

The general supervision of all such transfer operations.

(10) The administration of evacuation exemptions and deferments.
During evacuation operations, the Commanding Generals of the several sectors
of Western Defense Command were responsible to the Commanding General,
Western Defense Command, for the following:
(1)

The execution of his directives for escort of each movement of
evacuees from the Civil Control Stations in each exclusion area to
the prescribed Assembly Center destination.

(2)

Establishment of security measures at each Civil Control Station
and the issuance of any necessary evacuee travel permits and defer¬
ments from evacuation—including security measures during move¬
ment.

(3)

External security of each Assembly Center.

(4)

Posting of notices of exclusion and instruction placards in each
exclusion area.

(5)

The escort of each prescribed evacuee transfer unit from Assembly
to indicated Relocation Center destination.

ORGANIZATION

In order to facilitate

AND

FUNCTIONS

OF

71

AGENCIES

the evacuation operations by

keeping

constantly

informed of the location, extent, and evacuee population in each exclusion
area, each sector had a liaison officer at Wartime Civil Control Administration.
By this arrangement Sector Commanders were fully and currently advised of the
situation and of the prescribed sequence of evacuation.
Similarly, each participating Federal agency had a liaison section at Wartime
Civil Control Administration.

This assured close coordination, and served as

the administrative channel from the Director, Wartime Civil Control Admin¬
istration, to each such agency.
It is pertinent to note in passing that representatives from the War Depart¬
ment

as

well

as

from

observed the operation.

Eastern

and

Southern

Defense

Commands

closely

The Assistant Secretary of War was in daily tele¬

phonic liaison and personally inspected the activities on the ground.

The

Bureau of Public Relations, War Department, sent a liaison officer to study
the execution of the program and to inform the War Department of its
aspects.

The Inspector General of the Army and The Provost Marshal Gen¬

eral each personally viewed the operation.

In addition, the Quartermaster

General sent subsistence specialists to each Assembly Center to report on the
adequacy of messing with special emphasis on dietetics.

At the request of

the Secretary of War, the American Red Cross instituted a comprehensive
study of all aspects.

By arrangement with the War Department, the State

Department sent representatives in company with members of the Spanish
Embassy (the latter represented Japanese Government interests in the United
States) to visit each Assembly Center.
The evacuation tempo depended largely upon the availability of troops
to act as convoy escorts and to provide Assembly Center external security.
The demand for troops during this period of sudden Army expansion was par¬
ticularly heavy.

Close coordination was maintained between the Assistant

Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

Notwith¬

standing these heavy demands, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 was able to
provide the necessary escort troops and guard companies to insure maintenance
of the prescribed schedule without a single interruption.
The Quartermaster, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, under the
supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4,
Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, was responsible for obtaining the
supplies and equipment (other than medical and hospital, and other than Assem¬
bly and Relocation Center fixtures) for Assembly Centers.

The requirements

were determined and prescribed by Wartime Civil Control Administration. After
these requirements had been determined by the Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬
tration, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs approved them for the Com¬
manding General and transmitted them to the Quartermaster for necessary action
through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

Thousands of utensils, dishes, cots,

and blankets were procured with dispatch and were started rolling from the
supply depots to the prescribed Centers.

Later, when evacuees were trans¬

ferred from Assembly to Relocation Centers, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4
supervised

the

organization

by

the Quartermaster of

supply

teams

which

72

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

crated, packed, and shipped messing and barrack equipment from each evacu¬
ated Assembly Center to the Relocation Center or Centers next to receive trans¬
fer increments, in accordance with the Wartime Civil Control Administration
logistical plan.
In addition, the Quartermaster supervised, through Army central market¬
ing, procurement of subsistence.

The stores and perishables acquired were

in accordance with the prescribed quantities and diets developed by Wartime
Civil Control Administration to meet the peculiar needs of the populations in¬
volved.

The Quartermaster was also responsible for obtaining all necessary rail

and bus transportation for evacuee movements prescribed, not only to Assembly
Centers but from Assembly to Relocation Centers.
To recapitulate then, the supply agencies of Western

Defense

Command

functioned in this manner: The Wartime Civil Control Administration deter¬
mined all supply requirements and logistics. These were transmitted to the Assis¬
tant Chief of Staff, G-4. Under the direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff, the
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army,
was responsible through the Quartermaster, Western Defense Command and
Fourth Army, as the operating supply agency for the following:
(1)

The procurement of

subsistence for Assembly Centers,

including

the procuring of stores and perishables, in accordance with the pre¬
scribed quantities and diets developed by Wartime Civil Control Admin¬
istration to meet the peculiar needs of the populations involved.
(2)

Transfer of surplus subsistence supplies from Assembly Centers and
providing an initial 10-day non-perishable subsistence for War Reloca¬
tion Authority projects.

(3)

The procurement of Quartermaster supplies and equipment requisi¬
tioned by Wartime Civil Control Administration such as utensils,
dishes, cots and blankets for Assembly Centers (other than medical
and hospital and other than Assembly and Relocation Center fixtures).

(4)

Procurement of initial motor transportation required in the opera¬
tion of Assembly Centers and additions as requested, together with
their maintenance.

(5)

Arrangements for burial contracts for each Assembly Center, in¬
cluding provisions for undertaking and interment facilities.

(6)

The handling of army salvage operations through appropriate sup¬
ply depots.

(7)

The organization of supply teams to handle crating, packing and
shipping of all Quartermaster property, such as messing and bar¬
racks equipment, from Assembly Centers to Relocation Centers.

(8)

Obtaining
movements

the

rail

and

prescribed,

bus
not

transportation necessary for evacuee
only

Assembly to Relocation Centers.

to

Assembly

Centers

but

from

ORGANIZATION

(9)

AND

FUNCTIONS

OF AGENCIES

73

In addition, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 and the Quartermaster,
Western Defense Command, inspected each Assembly Center at the
commencement of operations to determine whether the Quartermaster
supplies and equipment procured had been received in good order.

In many instances, the pressure of evacuation required emergency pro¬
curement of supplies, equipment and materials, particularly for Assembly
Center maintenance, through other than Army channels. Close working liai¬
son was established between this Headquarters and the branch office of the
Army-Navy Munitions Board in San Francisco. The War Department rep¬
resentative in charge of the San Francisco office promptly met Wartime Civil
Control Administration emergency requirements in this regard by according the
necessary priority ratings.
The Provost Marshal, Western Defense Command, made continuing inspec¬
tions of the Military Police escort guard companies at each Assembly Center to
determine whether the Commanding General’s directives were being properly
executed with regard to external security. The relationship between Military
Police and the evacuees under their guard was particularly delicate. Military Police
personnel unsuited to duty of this trying character were replaced by others.
Appropriate directives to the commanding officers of military police escort guard
companies were developed to insure that there was no misunderstanding with
regard to the responsibility imposed on guard companies for the maintenance
of external security.
In order to make a photographic record of the evacuation, through an
arrangement with the Chief Signal Officer, two Signal Corps moving picture
photographic teams were assigned from the Signal Corps laboratory at Mon¬
mouth, New Jersey, to Headquarters Western Defense Command for duty with
the Wartime Civil Control Administration. A complete photographic record
was obtained of every phase of evacuation operations.
A communications net tied Wartime Civil Control Administration by TWX
(teletype) and telephone with each Assembly Center. Each Center had its own
switching central trained and trusted to handle confidential, as well as routine
messages. This system was in operation, as was Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬
tration, twenty-four hours per day, continuously during the entire program. Even
minor incidents occurring at any Center were immediately relayed to Wartime
Civil Control Administration. The Signal Officer, Western Defense Command
and Fourth Army, procured and supervised the installation of this signal system.
Hospital and infirmary medical supplies and equipment were procured in
part by the Surgeon, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. In all
matters relating to the health and medical care of evacuees, the Surgeon col¬
laborated with the United States Public Health Service. Under general supervi¬
sion of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, the latter agency had the pri¬
mary responsibility in all these matters. But the counsel and guidance of the
Surgeon were freely sought and given. In the main, however, the procurement of

74

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

medical supplies and services was the function of the United States Public Health
Service.
In furnishing the administrative staffs for Assembly Center operations, the
Work Projects Administration also made its procurement and fiscal facilities
available to Wartime Civil Control Administration. By direct transfer of funds
appropriated for the military establishment to the accounts of Work Projects
Administration, the procurement of stocks for Center canteens and stores, and of
materials for Assembly Center maintenance and repair was arranged.

United

States Treasury procurement entered this arrangement and by this method neces¬
sary Assembly Center motor transportation, office equipment and supplies, and
all emergency purchases were procured.
As previously noted, Wartime Civil Control Administration procured its
headquarters office space, personnel, equipment, and services through the Division
of Central Administration Services of the Office for Emergency Management.
The pressure of events was such that emergency methods were essential to suc¬
cessful operations. For instance, the acquisition of printing without delay was a
major requirement, particularly during evacuation operations.
Evacuee property protection, business, personal, residential, and agricul¬
tural, was the mission of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and the
Farm Security Administration.

Provision for necessary social and medical

services was the operating responsibility of the associated Federal Security
Agencies.

The application of sanctions for violations of the exclusion orders

of the Commanding General was the duty of the Department of Justice
through enforcement of the provisions of Public Law 503, 77th Congress,
and through the making of necessary investigations.
Thus, the Wartime Civil Control Administration performed its functions
in a two-fold manner:

First, indirectly, through other operating agencies on

the basis of requirements determined by it and, second, directly, through its
own staff at headquarters and in the field.

Again, the reader’s attention is

drawn to Figures 3 and 4, supra, showing the organization of Wartime Civil
Control Administration and its relationship to other agencies.

PART IV
EVACUATION—ITS OPERATIONAL
TECHNIQUE

CHAPTER VIII
Development and Execution of the Evacuation Plan
The general plan for the evacuation and relocation of Japanese from the
West Coast developed rapidly after the authority was granted for the decision
that an evacuation of the Japanese population from coastal areas was a military
necessity. The mission was clear cut: To devise and operate an evacuation and
temporary settlement plan which would remove substantial numbers of people
from strategic areas rapidly and safely, and with as little disturbance and loss
as practicable to the evacuees and the coastal communities.
No precedents existed in American life.
factory for many reasons.

European precedents were unsatis¬

Therefore, the Army was faced with the problem

of designing a new type of civilian evacuation which would accomplish the
mission in a truly American way. The present chapter outlines the evacuation
and temporary settlement plan designed to meet this problem.

Later chapters

of this report recount its actual operation in detail.
Several very fundamental decisions were made at the outset of the program
which were to guide the evacuation along quite different lines than had been
followed in the military evacuation of areas in European countries:
First, it was determined that the areas to be evacuated would be handled
so far as possible in the order of their relative military importance.
Exclusion Order No.
Bremerton Navy Yard.

1

covered Bainbridge Island, in the channel

Thus,
to

the

Orders No. 2 and No. 3 removed Japanese from San

Pedro, Long Beach and other areas in Los Angeles County. (The Japanese had
been evacuated from Terminal Island prior to the initiation of the program.)
Order No. 4 covered the City and most of the County of San Diego.

Order

No. 5 removed the Japanese from most dock areas and the water front of San
Francisco.
Second, it was determined that the evacuation would not split family units or
communities where this could be avoided. In certain foreign countries the evacua¬
tion of a civilian population had proceeded as follows: First, dangerous adult males
and females—those suspected of subversive activities—were removed to intern¬
ment camps; and second, all other males of military age were sent to special
labor camps.
of the family.

Women and children were often separated from the remainder
This method removes the normal economic support of the family

and forces it to dissipate its resources.

This in turn creates a community prob¬

lem of dependency, and disrupts the entire organization of the family.
Of only slightly less significance than the decision to evacuate entire family
units, was the decision to move communities together so far as this was possi¬
ble under the pressure of the program.

Thus, the Japanese of Seattle were all

sent to the Puyallup Assembly Center and later to the Minidoka Relocation
Center; those from the San Francisco-Oakland Area were temporarily placed
in Tanforan and later moved to Central Utah, etc.

The basic principle of

maintaining communities was adopted to maintain a natural community and
77

78

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

economic balance and to preserve desirable institutions by moving each family
with its relatives and friends.
Third, it was determined that the program should entail a minimum of
financial loss to the evacuees; that all possible advice and assistance be available
to (but not forced upon) evacuees.

The property protection activities of the

Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and the Farm Security Administration
under the direction of the Commanding General, are reported in detail in
Chapter XI.
Fourth, it was desired that a minimum of active military units and other
military personnel be used in the program; that, instead, the evacuation should be
accomplished as far as practicable by civilian personnel, making full use of Federal
and State civilian agency facilities. As indicated above, the Wartime Civil Control
Administration was created to plan, direct and finance the evacuation program.
At no time was its staff sufficiently large to perform all of the operating func¬
tions involved in the evacuation.

Troops were used only for security purposes

in Civil Control Stations, as escorts for bus and train movements, and for
external security at Assembly Centers.
Fifth, it was desired that the evacuated population not only be removed
to areas outside of the critical military area as rapidly as practicable, but also
to locations where the evacuees could be relatively self-supporting for the
duration.

Steps were immediately taken to find suitable Reception Centers,

such as Manzanar. With the establishment of the War Relocation Authority to
handle the relocation of evacuees, the Army made its facilities fully available
to this agency. (See Chapters XX to XXII.)
Sixth, it was concluded that evacuation and relocation could not be accom¬
plished simultaneously.
for a transitory phase.

This was the heart of the plan.

It entailed provision

It called for the establishment of Assembly Centers at

or near each center of evacuee population.

These Centers were to be designed

to provide shelter and messing facilities and the minimum essentials for the
maintenance of health and morale.
all.

This was the most significant decision of

Without this, accomplishment of the assigned mission and attainment of

the incidental objective stated above would have been impossible.
It is pertinent to allude briefly to the reason for the use of Assembly Centers.
This was because the program would have been seriously delayed if all evacua¬
tion had been forced to await the development of Relocation Centers. The initial
movement of evacuees to an Assembly Center as close as possible to the area of
origin also aided the program (a) by reducing the initial travel; (b) by keeping
evacuees close to their places of former residence for a brief period while prop¬
erty matters and family arrangements which had not been completed prior to
evacuation could be settled; and (c) by acclimating the evacuees to the group
life of a Center in their own climatic region.
Evacuation planning was conditioned by statistical data as to the number
of Japanese, their location and characteristics.

In this regard the Bureau of the

Census was very helpful, supplying considerable statistical data, and technicians
to interpret it.

(Only those statistics which had an immediate, over-all influence

on the procedure are presented in this chapter. More detailed data are given in

79

DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF EVACUATION PLAN

Chapter XXVIII.)

Of prime importance in shaping the evacuation procedure

were the following facts derived principally from the 1940 Census of Population.

a.

Of the 126,947 persons of Japanese ancestry in the United States in
April, 1940, 117,364, or 92.5 percent, lived in the eight states com¬
prising the Western Defense Command. California had 93,717 Japanese;
Washington 14,565 ; and Oregon, 4,071.

Together, these three states

contained 112,353, or 88.5 percent, of all Japanese in continental United
States.

b.

(See Figures 5a and 5b.)

Within the Western Defense Command the distribution of the Japanese
population by specific Military Areas and States, as shown in Figure 1,
Chapter II, is given in Table 1.
important Military Area No.

It will be noted that the strategically
1

had a total Japanese population of

107,704, which was 84.6 percent of the total Japanese population of the
United States.
TABLE 1.—Japanese Population of the Western Defense Command Area
by States and Military Areas:
1940

State

Total, WDC Area.

Source:

Military
Area
1

Military
Area
2

Military
Areas
3-6

117,364

107,704

5,281

4,379

632
93,717
4,071
14,565
1,191
508
470
2,210

362
89,483
3,843
14,016

270
4,234
228
549

All
Areas

1,191
508
470
2,210

Bureau of the Census

c. Within Military Area No. 1 there were particularly heavy concentrations
in or at the edge of almost all the important cities, particularly the port
cities.

This is clearly shown in Figure 6. In Los Angeles County alone

there were 3 6,866 Japanese.

In the immediate San Francisco Bay Area

(San Francisco, Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Mateo, Solano,
and Sonoma Counties) there were 14,362 Japanese, and in the ring of
near-by counties to the northeast, east, and south (Sacramento, Santa
Clara, Santa Cruz, San Joaquin, and Yolo Counties) lived an additional
17,685 Japanese. San Diego city and county had 2,076; King and Pierce
Counties, Washington (Seattle and Tacoma), 11,913; and Multnomah
County, Oregon (Portland), 2,390.

Thus, even within Military Area

No. 1, 67,607 of the 107,704 total Japanese population lived in or near
the five principal cities and ports of embarkation.

80

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION
JAPANESE

POPULATION

UNITED STATES: 1940
FIGURES

SUMMARY: PROPORTION
PACIFIC COAST

IN

THOUSANDS

OF JAPANESE

STATES AND IN

DEFENSE COMMAND

PACIFIC COAST

STATES (WASHINGTON, OREGON

POPULATION

IN

ENTIRE WESTERN
AREA.

AND CALIFORNI

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AREA
(WASH, ORE., CALIF., ARIZ., IDAHO, NEV., MONT. AND UTAH,

WESTERN OCrCNSC COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION

SOURCE' US. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS

Figure 5 a

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION JAPANESE POPULATION

DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF EVACUATION PLAN

Figure

6

83

84

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

d.

Of the 112,985 Japanese in the States of Arizona, California, Oregon,
and Washington, 71,896, or 64 percent, were native-born, and 41,089,
or 36 percent, were foreign-born.

Because of the large proportion of

children, who were almost entirely native-born, the adult Japanese popu¬
lation (21 years of age and older) was comprised of 64 percent foreignborn and 36 percent native-born.

(See Table 2.)

The age, sex, and

nativity distribution of the Japanese population in these states is shown
in Table 3, and the distribution of the total Japanese population by age
groups is presented in Figure 7.

TABLE 2.—Nativity of the Total Japanese Population and of the Adult
Japanese Population of Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington:
TOTAL
POPULATION

Sex and Nativity

1940

ADULT
POPULATION*

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

BOTH SEXES
All.

112,985

100

62,899

100

Native-born.
Foreign-born.

71,896
41,089

64
36

22,375
40,524

36
64

MALES
All.

63,208

100

37,438

100

Native-born.
Foreign-born.

38,094
25,114

60
40

12,628
24,810

34
66

FEMALES
All.

49,777

100

25,461

100

Foreign-born.

33,802
15,975

68
32

9,747
15,714

38
62

♦Persons 21 years of age or older.

TABLE 3.—Age and Nativity of Japanese Population in Arizona, California,
Oregon and Washington:
Age
(Years)

TOTAL

1940

NATIVE-BORN

FOREIGN-BORN

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

All ages.

112,985

100.0

71,896

100.0

41,089

100.0

Under 5.
5 to 9.
10 to 14.
15 to 19.

7,189
8,357
12,861
18,138

6.4
7.4
11 .4
16.1

7,134
8,281
12,743
17,893

9.9
11.5
17.7
24.9

55
76
118
245

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.6

20
25
30
35

to
to
to
to

24.
29.
34.
39.

14,636
7,667
4,470
6,381

13.0
6.8
4.0
5.6

14,193
7,075
2,699
1,120

19.7
9.8
3.8
1.6

443
592
1,771
5,261

L.l
1 .4
4.3
12.8

40
45
50
55

to
to
to
to

44.
49.
54.
59.

7,068
5,854
7,412
5,917

6.3
5.2
6.6
5.2

394
195
83
37

0.5
0.3
0.1
0.1

6,674
5,659
7,329
5,880

16.2
13.8
17.8
14.3

70 to 74.

4,450
1,799
566
220

3.9
1.6
0.5
0.2

18
7
10
14

4,432
1,792
556
206

10.8
4.4
1.4
0 5

21 and older.

62,899

55.7

22,375

40,524

98.6

Source:

Bureau of the Census.

31.1

DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF EVACUATION PLAN

85

AGE AND NATIVITY OF JAPANESE IN
ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, OREGON, AND

WASHINGTON: 1940

e. The typical Japanese family, therefore, consisted of Japanese-born par¬
ents who were enemy aliens, and their American-born children. Because
of the Japanese custom of sending substantial numbers of their children,
particularly the older children, to Japan to live with their grandparents
or other relatives and to be educated as Japanese, there were in the "citi¬
zen” group an undetermined number of Kibei. Many of these were even
more Japanese in customs and loyalty than their alien parents.

(See dis¬

cussion of Kibei who returned to the United States in 1941, Chapter

II, pp. 14-15.)
/.

Occupationally, nearly half (45.2 percent) of the West Coast Japanese
were engaged in agriculture.

In the four states comprising Military

Areas Nos. 1 and 2 there were 6,170 Japanese operated farms, of which
1,583 were fully or partly owned by Japanese, 262 were operated by
Japanese as managers, and 4,325 as tenants. Many of these farms were in
the suburbs of the largest cities, astride the principal lines of com¬
munication, transportation, and public utilities.

Numerous other farms

were located on the coast or immediately adjacent to important military
and naval installations.

g.

It was impracticable to determine statistically the number of business
establishments owned or operated by Japanese. It is known that, of the
Japanese employed workers 14 years old and over in 1940, 23.6 percent
were engaged in wholesale and retail trade,

17.1 percent in personal

services (including commercial service, such as hotels, laundries, etc.),

JAPANESE

86

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

4.1 percent were in manufacturing establishments, and only 10 percent
in all other industry groups.

The evacuation plan, therefore, had to

provide for the protection of substantial amounts of property, both in
the form of farms and of properties in non-farm areas.

(See Table 4.)

Many additional data were available and analyzed in the preparation of the
general evacuation plan, but the foregoing summarizes certain of the more im¬
portant facts which were taken into consideration. The census data were modified
by estimates as to the immigration and emigration of Japanese from this area.
Allowance was made for under-enumeration by the census, and data from Change
of Residence Report Cards (voluntary migration from this area to the interior)
were applied as corrective factors.
TABLE 4.—Major Industry Groups of Japanese Employed Workers, 14 Years
Old and Over; California, Oregon, and Washington: 1940
Industry

Oregon

Total

California

Washington

All industries.

48,691

40,374

1,771

6,546

Agriculture.
Manufacturing.
Wholesale and retail trade.
Personal service.
All other.

22,027
1,978
11,472
8,336
4,878

19,289
1,131
9,336
6,896
3,722

759
160
404
271
177

1,979
687
1,732
1,169
979

All industries.

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Agriculture.
M anuf acturing.
Wholesale and retail trade.
Personal service.
All other.

45.2
4.1
23.6
17.1
10.0

47.8
2.8
23.1
17.1
9.2

42.9
9.0
22.8
15.3
10.0

30.2
10.5
26.5
17.9
15.0

PERCENTAGE

Source:

Bureau of the Census.

For planning purposes the West Coast was divided into 22 basic units
shown on Figure 8, "Plan for Evacuating Japanese Population from Pacific
Coast.” Estimates were made of the Japanese population in each of these areas
and a tentative Assembly Center destination was given. Each of these generalplan areas was considered as comprising a community of Japanese, all of whom
were to be moved to the same Assembly Center and eventually to the same
Relocation Center, if the capacity of the Centers and the logistics of movement
permitted.
The basic population data for the program were provided from a special
tabulation by the Bureau of the Census of Japanese cards of the 1940 Popu¬
lation Census.

The total number of Japanese individuals and families in each

county, township and incorporated place, and for each census tract in the
larger cities, was plotted on maps.

These census data, though two years old,

were found satisfactory for planning purposes when corrected for emigration,
under-enumeration and voluntary migration.
From these data and a study of the structure and characteristics of each basic
area, it was possible to define and map Exclusion Areas, 108 in all, which were used
for operational purposes. Each Exclusion Area was a geographic unit bounded by

DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF EVACUATION PLAN

Figure 8

87

88

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

EXCLUSION AREAS
JAPANESE EVACUATION PROGRAM
WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND

Figure

AND

9

FOURTH

ARMY

89

DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF EVACUATION PLAN

recognized physical or legal lines and having a Japanese population of approxi¬
mately 1,000 persons (250 families), the number that could be most efficiently
handled in a single operation.

In those sections of the West Coast where the

Japanese were sparsely settled and where several counties were grouped together
for evacuation purposes, space, rather than population, became the controlling
factor.

(See Figure 9; also Map Insert I following page 290.)

In establishing the boundaries of the Exclusion Areas every effort was
made to adhere to the established policy of keeping family units unbroken,
and to move communities with similar social and economic backgrounds to
the same Assembly Center.
lished policy.

There was virtually no deviation from this estab¬

However, in a few instances, particularly in the later stages

of evacuation of Military Area No.

1, the availability of space in certain

Assembly Centers made it necessary to separate communities.

Where this

occurred, every effort was made to reunite the community in the process of
transfer to Relocation Centers.
In each Exclusion Area was placed a Civil Control Station.

These stations

were usually located in a public hall, school gymnasium, or auditorium, in order
to provide adequate space in which to handle all persons of Japanese ancestry
in the area. Whenever possible, the Control Station was located near the center
of the Japanese population of the area.

In all cases it was located within the

boundaries of the area to be evacuated.
As already noted, cooperating Federal agencies had agreed to staff the Civil
Control Stations with a team, which, in concert with an Army representative,
registered and processed the Japanese population within the area. The functions
of the Army and of each agency can be briefly stated:

a.

The Federal Security Agency, through the United States Employment
Service, located, established, organized and operated the Civil Control
Stations. This agency provided suitable space and equipment for all agen¬
cies which operated in the Station.

The Manager of the Civil Control

Station was named by the Federal Security Agency and was usually a rep¬
resentative of the United States Employment Service. He was responsible
for the organization, supply and administration of his Control Station and
for the distribution of instructions received by him to the civilian staff.

b. The Federal Security Agency through the Bureau of Public Assistance
of the Social Security Board registered all evacuees, and social workers
arranged to aid potential evacuees in the solution of family problems,
and in some instances gave financial assistance to those who wished to
leave the area and who submitted approved plans for relocation.

c. The Federal Security Agency through the United States Public Health
Service provided for the medical examination of all evacuees either dur¬
ing processing at the Civil Control Station or upon arrival at an Assembly
Center.

d. The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, by authority of the Treasury
Department and Alien Property Custodian, arranged for the storage of

90

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

household goods, acted in the settlement of creditor-debtor disputes and
assumed a protective function for all real and personal property of
evacuees, except farm property. This agency also provided for the stor¬
age and for the sale to the United States Government of privately owned
automobiles not otherwise disposed of by the evacuees.

e. The Farm Security Administration as the designee of the United States
Department of Agriculture, assumed responsibility for the agricultural
aspects of the program such as the securing of substitute operators for
Japanese farms to assure continued production of food and to protect
the Japanese operators against loss.
/.

The Sector Commander provided such military personnel as he deemed
necessary at the Civil Control Station. He also was responsible for post¬
ing Civilian Exclusion Orders and instructions throughout the specific
area, for the escort of evacuees to Assembly Centers and, in some in¬
stances, for the transportation of evacuees.

g. All major transportation requirements determined by Wartime Civil
Control Administration were procured by the Western Defense Command
Rail Transportation Officer under the Quartermaster through the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-4, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army.
These arrangements provided virtually for direct liaison between the trans¬
portation officer, Wartime Civil Control Administration, and the Rail
Transportation Officer, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army.
The Sector Rail Transportation Officer concerned was kept informed of
the transportation schedules and acted as the field transportation opera¬
tions officer for each movement.

h. The Sector Commander, through his Provost Marshal, issued all permits
to enter or leave designated areas, passed on requests for deferment from
evacuation, and provided internal and external security for Civil Con¬
trol Stations.
Though modified by the experience gained in the early evacuation oper¬
ations, this original assignment of civilian agency functions and statement of
operating principles (as of March 20)
the entire program.

remained substantially unchanged for

The basic directive entitled "Japanese Evacuation Oper¬

ations,” dated April 23, 1942, was but a modification of the individual direc¬
tives given to each agency for operations prior to that date.

It is repro¬

duced in full in Appendix 2.
Details concerning the actual protective service ordered at Civil Control
Stations are developed in full in Chapters X and XI.
As pointed out in Chapter VII the work of the various agencies, both Army
and civilian, was directed by Wartime Civil Control Administration.

War¬

time Civil Control Administration drafted appropriate orders governing the
posting of Exclusion Areas, the establishment and operation of Civil Control
Stations, and the transportation of evacuees to Assembly Centers. It gave maxi-

91

DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF EVACUATION PLAN

mum notice of planned exclusion operations to the cooperating civilian agencies
and to the Sector Commanders through liaison representatives stationed at its
central office. It printed and distributed Exclusion Orders and instruction posters
for each area to the Sector Commanders.
In addition to the Service Centers, all United States Employment Service
offices in Military Area No. 1 were authorized to issue travel permits and to act
as consultants to potential evacuees.
’'limited service offices.”

These offices might be thought of as

Cases which required the attention of the Federal

Reserve Bank, the Farm Security Administration or the Bureau of Public Assist¬
ance were referred to the nearest Service Center, or to the nearest representative
of the agency concerned.1
Both the Service Centers and the Employment Service offices were agents
of the 'Wartime Civil Control Administration in the issuance of travel permits
required by Proclamation 3, and Change of Residence Reports required by
Proclamation 1.

Ordinarily all cases involving exemption from curfew were

referred to the nearest representative of the Provost Marshal or directly to
Wartime Civil Control Administration.
When voluntary migration ceased, and controlled evacuation commenced,
the Service Center teams, with the exception of those persons engaged in the
enforcement of curfew and travel regulations, were transferred to Civil Control
Stations, to continue their efforts on the evacuees’ behalf.
The evacuation process commenced with the issuance of a Civilian Exclusion
Order, a document which defined the Exclusion Area and provided the imme¬
diate sanction for its evacuation.

This Order specified the exclusion date, the

registration date or dates and the location of the Civil Control Stations.

The

Order was accompanied by specific Instructions to Evacuees concerning their
responsibilities in the evacuation program.

(See Specimen Civilian Exclusion

Order, at end of chapter.)
The various Exclusion Orders were issued in a sequence based upon several
considerations.

Military security

requirements

tions but others were involved as well.

were

the

primary

considera¬

The ability of Assembly Centers to

receive evacuees, the availability of civilian personnel in the various agencies
which participated in the operation of Control Stations, the distance evacuees
were to be moved, and the availability of rail or motor transportation were
other important factors considered in determining the order in which Exclu¬
sion Areas were evacuated.

Areas were evacuated in the order indicated by

the Civilian Exclusion Order number with but a few exceptions.
A preliminary plan for the evacuation of each Exclusion Area was drafted
about two weeks prior to the first day of registration proposed for that area.
This was referred (1) to the liaison representative of the United States Employ-

1On March
advise all local
contraband from
such contraband.
in Military Area

28 the Federal Security Agency was requested by Wartime Civil Control Administration to
United States Employment Service offices in California, Oregon and Washington to accept
Japanese until midnight, March 31.
Each office was instructed concerning the handling of
This was a purely temporary service to facilitate the collection of contraband from Japanese
No. 1.

92

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

ment Service to ascertain if a Control Station Manager could be made available,
and if space for the operation of the Control Station could be obtained; (2)
to the Rail Transportation Officer of the Fourth Army to ascertain the avail¬
ability of necessary rail or bus transportation on the dates specified;

(3)

to

the liaison officer in the Federal Security Agency to ascertain if personnel for
the operation of the Control Station would be available on the proposed dates;
and

(4)

to the liaison officer from the Sector in which the unit area was

located to ascertain whether military personnel necessary for the escort of
the evacuee movement would be available.

The United States Employment Ser¬

vice appointed a Control Station Manager and leased space for the Control Sta¬
tion on receipt of this advice.
"When concurrence in the proposed plan was received from the Sector
Commander and from the civilian agencies concerned, the planning for the
evacuation of the selected unit area went into the final stage.

There was

then issued a letter directed to all the civilian agencies of the Wartime Civil
Control Administration which stated that it was proposed to evacuate all
persons of Japanese ancestry from a prescribed area.

This letter set forth

all pertinent data regarding this evacuation operation, including the number
of the Civilian Exclusion Order to be issued, the location of the Control Station,
the date and hour for posting, registration, processing and movement of the
evacuees, and the effective date and hour after which all persons of Japanese
ancestry would be excluded from the area.

This letter also specified whether

movement by private automobile was to be authorized, and the type and place of
medical inspection.
These letters outlining proposed evacuation areas were "restricted” so that
the information would not reach any affected person within the area.

No

publicity was permitted concerning the evacuation of any specific unit area
prior to the posting of the Civilian Exclusion Order within the unit area affected.
The

evacuation operations

within a normal Exclusion Area

covered

a

period of seven days, as follows:

a. Posting of the Exclusion Order throughout the area: From 12:00 noon
the first day to 5:00 A. M. the second day.

b. Registration of all persons of Japanese ancestry within the area: From
8:00 A. M. to 5:00 P. M. on the second and third days.

c. Processing, or the preparing of evacuees for evacuation:

From 8:00

A. M. to 5:00 P. M. on the fourth and fifth days.

d. Movement of evacuees in increments of approximately 500:

On the

sixth and seventh days.
In practice it was found that registration of from two-thirds to threefourths of the families and single individuals was accomplished on the first
day of registration and it was therefore found practical to both process and
register on the third day.

Some processing continued on the sixth and even

the seventh day where necessary.

The schedule of operations for Control Sta¬

tions, given above, was the minimum time allowed for those stations which
handled one thousand or more evacuees.

Where the number of evacuees to

93

DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF EVACUATION PLAN

be registered, processed, and moved was known to exceed 1,500, one to three
additional days were allowed in order that each person would have adequate
time to prepare fully for the movement to the Assembly Center.

Additional

days were also allowed where large areas with small populations were evacu¬
ated and in other cases where unusual conditions existed.
In the normal operation of Control Stations, those persons who were first
registered were given the first appointments for medical inspection and were
scheduled for departure on the first day of departure.

Conversely, those last

to register were last to be given physical examinations and to depart.

When¬

ever it was found that it was impractical to settle the business or personal
property affairs of an evacuee, or an evacuee family, the individual or family
was not transferred until the departure date of the last movement from that
area.

In a few instances where the affairs of the evacuee could not be set¬

tled, or satisfactory arrangements for the settling could not be made, prior
to the last date of movement, temporary deferments from evacuation were
granted by the Acting Provost Marshal.
Less than two weeks after the Wartime Civil Control Administration was
established, there was issued the first Civilian Exclusion Order requiring the evac¬
uation of all Japanese living on Bainbridge Island, Kitsap County, Washing¬
ton.

Posters containing the Order and presenting instructions to the evacuees

were posted throughout the area on March 24,

1942.

On March 20, an

advance warning of this evacuation was given to the agencies concerned and
their functions were defined by memoranda from the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Civil Affairs.

(See Appendix 1.)

The task of establishing Civil Control Stations to register, process and assist
evacuees was not the major operating problem of the Army.

The Army’s real

job was that of providing temporary housing for the evacuees. Assembly Centers
had to be constructed and operated pending the transfer of the evacuees to
Relocation Centers.
camps.

Assembly Centers were not internment or concentration

They were temporary shelters where evacuees could be assembled and

protected.

War Relocation Authority, as was stated in Chapter V, had been

created to assume responsibility for the relocation of evacuees, and hence Wartime
Civil Control Administration’s operation of Reception Centers stopped with
Manzanar.

However, Manzanar was used by Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬

tration until May 31, 1942, when it was formally transferred to War Relocation
Authority.
Wartime Civil Control Administration moved to construct the many other
temporary centers necessary to carry through the evacuation program.

Race

tracks, fairgrounds, and other facilities which permitted of quick conversion
to use for temporary housing were acquired.

The tempo of the Army’s action

can be gauged by the fact that an advance crew of evacuee workers entered
Manzanar on March 21, 1942, eleven days after the establishment of the War¬
time Civil Control Administration, and by the fact that Santa Anita Assembly
Center was ready for its first movement on March 27, 1942. The details con¬
cerning Assembly Center construction and operation are found in later chapters.

94

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

As was stated in the first part of this chapter, “It was determined that the
evacuation would not split family units or communities, where this could be
avoided.”

This principle was observed throughout the entire program so far

as sound logistics of evacuee population movement permitted.

Persons were

ordinarily moved to the Assembly Center nearest their residence and successive
evacuation orders from a given city were destined normally to the same Assembly
Center.

The ultimate objective of this was to accomplish the relocation of entire

communities at their destination in Relocation Centers with a minimum of cross
movement.
Before the evacuation to Assembly Centers had been completed there was
already in preparation a plan for the eventual transfer from Assembly to Reloca¬
tion Centers.

Among the principle objectives of this plan were:

(1)

The

evacuation of entire communities as units in relocation; (2) the combination
of communities so as to obtain a working balance between urban and rural
population groups in each Relocation Center—where possible rural and urban
groups from the same general area; (3) the attainment of minimum change in
climatic conditions consistent with available relocation sites; and (4) the move¬
ment of each population group a minimum of distance, i. e., to the nearest
available relocation site.
These objectives were attained to a great extent, although various practical
considerations interfered with the perfect realization of these relocation objec¬
tives.

Principal among the modifying factors may be mentioned:

(1) The need

for the early evacuation of certain Assembly Centers, particularly those which had
pit latrines and those which presented an abnormal fire hazard; (2) the date
of availability of various Relocation Centers;

(3)

the difficulty of moving

small groups (less than train load units for long distances) ; and (4) the operat¬
ing requirement that an entire Assembly Center be evacuated in a continuous
movement and, if possible, to the same Relocation Center.
In summary, the general plan for controlled movement and relocation pro¬
vided for three main steps:

(1)
(2)

The “registering and servicing” of evacuees at Civil Control Stations.
The provision of temporary residence quarters and a minimum of
normal community services at Assembly Centers.

(3)

The ultimate tranfer of evacuees to Relocation Centers under the
administration of the War Relocation Authority.

The flow of evacuees from Civil Control Stations to each of the later steps
in the program is shown graphically in Figure 10.
In the operation of the program Civil Control Stations sent the bulk of
evacuees direct to Assembly Centers.

A few were deferred, and those who

needed hospitalization were placed in hospitals. Direct evacuation to Relocation
Centers was possible toward the end of the evacuation of Military Area 1; and

DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF EVACUATION PLAN

95

all evacuees from control sjations in Military Area 2 were sent directly to
Relocation Centers or to work furlough under War Relocation Authority super¬
vision.
In the Assembly Center phase of the program there were received in Cen¬
ters, in addition to persons coming directly from control stations, those who
entered after the regular movement because of deferment and also parolees,
voluntary evacuees, and others who came to an Assembly Center without first
passing through a Control Station.

The use of outside hospitals to supplement

the Center hospitals resulted in a continual exchange of persons between Assem¬
bly Centers and hospitals and other institutions.
The movement out of Assembly Centers was principally to Relocation
Centers, though provision was made for the following types of release as well:

a.

To War Relocation Authority for work furlough by that agency.

b. To direct release from evacuation (principally mixed-marriage cases).
c. To hospitals and various agencies for detention or arrest (such as the Fed¬
eral Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Naturalization Service and
Police), and institutions.
Detail as to the procedure of movement of evacuees through these various
phases of the program are presented in succeeding chapters of this report.

A

statistical summary of the number of persons entering and leaving each of these
phases of the program is presented in Chapter XXVIII.

96

FLOW OF EVACUEES

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF EVACUATION PLAN

97

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII
Specimen Civilian Exclusion Order*

Headquarters
Western Defense Command
and Fourth Army
Presidio of San Francisco, California
April 30, 1942

Civilian Exclusion Order No. 27
1.

Pursuant to the provisions of Public Proclamations Nos. 1 and 2, this

Headquarters, dated March 2, 1942, and March 16, 1942, respectively, it is
hereby ordered that from and after 12 o’clock noon, P.W.T., of Thursday, May
7, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien, be excluded
from that portion of Military Area No. 1 described as follows:
All of that portion of the County of Alameda, State of California, within
that boundary beginning at the point at which the southerly limits of the
City of Berkeley meet San Francisco Bay; thence easterly and following
the southerly limits of said city to College Avenue; thence southerly on
College Avenue to Broadway; thence southerly on Broadway to the south¬
erly limits of the City of Oakland; thence following the limits of said city
westerly and northerly, and following the shoreline of San Francisco Bay
to the point of beginning.
2.

A responsible member of each family, and each individual living alone,

in the above described area will report between the hours of

8:00 A. M. and

5:00 P. M., Friday, May 1, 1942, or during the same hours on Saturday, May
2, 1942, to the Civil Control Station located at:
530 Eighteenth Street
Oakland, California.
3.

Any person subject to this order who fails to comply with any of its

provisions or with the provisions of published instructions pertaining hereto
or who is found in the above area after 12 o’clock noon, P.W.T., of Thursday,
May 7, 1942, will be liable to the criminal penalties provided by Public Law
No. 503, 77th Congress, approved March 21, 1942 entitled "An Act to Provide
a Penalty for Violation of Restrictions or Orders with Respect to Persons
Entering, Remaining in, Leaving, or Committing any Act in Military Areas
or Zones,” and alien Japanese will be subject to immediate apprehension and in¬
ternment.
4.

All persons within the bounds of an established Assembly Center pur¬

suant to instructions from this Headquarters are excepted from the provisions
of this order while those persons are in such Assembly Center.
J. L. DeWitt

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding
‘Reproduction of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 27. Each Order prepared in both poster and pamphlet size.

98

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

PROHIBITED AREA
EXCLUSION ORDER NO. 27
Western Defense Command and Fourth Army

C. E. Order 27

This Map is prepared for the convenience of the public; see the
Civilian Exclusion Order for the full and correct description.

DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF EVACUATION PLAN

99

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
Presidio of San Francisco, California

INSTRUCTIONS
TO ALL PERSONS OF

JAPANESE
ANCESTRY
LIVING IN THE FOLLOWING AREA:
All of that portion of the County of Alameda, State of California, within
that boundary beginning at the point at which the southerly limits of
the City of Berkeley meet San Francisco Bay; thence easterly and following
the southerly limits of said city to College Avenue; thence southerly on
College Avenue to Broadway; thence southerly on Broadway to the south¬
erly limits of the City of Oakland; thence following the limits of said
city westerly and northerly, and following the shoreline of San Francisco
Bay to the point of beginning.
Pursuant to the provisions of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 27, this Head¬
quarters, dated April 30, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and
non-alien, will be evacuated from the above area by 12 o’clock noon, P.W.T.,
Thursday May 7, 1942.
No Japanese person living in the above area will be permitted to change
residence after 12 o’clock noon, P.W.T., Thursday, April 30, 1942, without
obtaining special permission from the representative of the Commanding Gen¬
eral, Northern California Sector, at the Civil Control Station located at:
530 Eighteenth Street,
Oakland, California.
Such permits will only be granted for the purpose of uniting members of a
family, or in cases of grave emergency.
The Civil Control Station is equipped to assist the Japanese population
affected by this evacuation in the following ways:
1.

Give advice and instructions on the evacuation.

2.

Provide services with respect to the management, leasing, sale, storage

or other disposition of most kinds of property, such as real estate, business and
professional equipment, household goods, boats, automobiles and livestock.
3.

Provide temporary residence elsewhere for all Japanese in family groups.

4.

Transport persons and a limited amount of clothing and equipment to

their new residence.

100

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS MUST BE OBSERVED:
1.

A responsible member of each family, preferably the head of the family,

or the person in whose name most of the property is held, and each individual
living alone, will report to the Civil Control Station to receive further in¬
structions. This must be done between 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M. on Friday,
May 1, 1942, or between 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M. on Saturday, May 2, 1942.
2.

Evacuees must carry with them on departure for the Assembly Center,

the following property:
(a) Bedding and linens (no mattress) for each member of the family;
(b) Toilet articles for each member of the family;
(c)
(d)

Extra clothing for each member of the family;
Sufficient knives, forks, spoons, plates, bowls and cups for each mem¬
ber of the family;

(e) Essential personal effects for each member of the family.
All items carried will be securely packaged, tied and plainly marked with
the name of the owner and numbered in accordance with instructions obtained
at the Civil Control Station. The size and number of packages is limited to
that which can be carried by the individual or family group.
3.

No pets of any kind will be permitted.

4.

No personal items and no household goods will be shipped to the As¬

sembly Center.
5.

The United States Government through its agencies will provide for

the storage at the sole risk of the owner of the more substantial household
items, such as iceboxes, washing machines, pianos and other heavy furniture.
Cooking utensils and other small items will be accepted for storage if crated,
packed and plainly marked with the name and address of the owner. Only one
name and address will be used by a given family.

.

6

Each family, and individual living alone will be furnished transportation

to the Assembly Center or will be authorized to travel by private automobile
in a supervised group. All instructions pertaining to the movement will be ob¬
tained at the Civil Control Station.

Go to the Civil Control Station between the hours of 8:00 A. M. and
5:00 P. M., Friday, May 1, 1942, or between the hours of
8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M., Saturday, May 2, 1942, to receive
further instructions.
J. L. DeWitt
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding
April 30, 1942
See Civilian Exclusion Order No. 27.

CHAPTER IX
Voluntary Migration
A voluntary migration of Japanese from West Coast areas began with the
first public announcement that they would be evacuated from strategic mili¬
tary areas of the West Coast. Even before Public Proclamation No. 1 was issued,
some migration had begun, particularly to the eastern San Joaquin and Sacra¬
mento Valley areas of California and to mountain areas with Japanese colonies.
These early movements were not very large. It was deemed advisable to assist
this voluntary migration movement as much as possible as an initial phase of the
evacuation program. However, a realization of the many problems which would
be encountered by those Japanese who moved to new areas clearly indicated
that voluntary migration would be but one phase of the over-all program—
never a complete and satisfactory solution.
As early as February, 1942, some public resistance to the inland movement
of large numbers of Pacific Coast Japanese was evident. On the other hand,
it was felt that the prospective evacuees should be given every opportunity
to determine the areas to which they would go and to utilize such employment
opportunities as might be available to them through friends living in inland
areas. Thus, while voluntary migration was never considered to be a complete
and satisfactory solution to the problem of evacuation, it was encouraged and
assisted by the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army until such time
as it became clearly evident that this voluntary migration was creating major
social and economic problems in the areas to which the Japanese were moving.
The following quotation from the statement to the Tolan Committee by the
Emergency

Defense

Council,

Seattle

Chapter,

Japanese-American

Citizens

League, Seattle, Washington indicates some of the problems of insecurity which
faced those Japanese who migrated to inland areas:
"A large number of people have remarked that they will go where the Govern¬
ment orders them to go, willingly, if it will help the national defense effort.

But the

biggest problem in their minds is where to go. The first unofficial evacuation announce¬
ment pointed out that the Government did not concern itself with where evacuees
went, just so they left prohibited areas. Obviously, this was no solution to the question,
for immediately, from Yakima, Idaho, Montana, Colorado and elsewhere authoritative
voices shouted: 'No Japs wanted Here!’
“The Japanese feared with reason that, forced to vacate their homes, unable to find
a place to stay, they would be kicked from town to town in the interior like the
'Okies’ of John Steinbeck’s novel.

Others went further, and envisioned the day when

inhabitants of inland States, aroused by the steady influx of Japanese, would refuse
to sell gasoline and food to them. They saw, too, the possibility of mob action against
them as exhausted, impoverished and unable to travel further, they stopped in some
town or village where they were not wanted.”

(National Defense Migration, Hearings,

Part 30, p. 11465)

The following steps were taken in the supervision, control and assistance
of voluntary migration:
(a) To record the amount and type of movement, a change of residence
reporting system was instituted by Public Proclamation No. 1, March 2, 1942.

101

102

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

(b) To provide the migrants with documentary evidence of compliance
with military orders and of military approval of travel, a "Certificate—Change
of Residence” was issued. After Public Proclamation No. 3, this was revised to
serve as an official "Travel Permit.”
(c) To provide assistance to those persons with satisfactory resettlement
plans, to disseminate information about employment, living facilities, etc., to
those interested in moving out of military areas, and to serve as general evacua¬
tion field offices, Wartime Civil Control Administration Service Centers were
established in 48 cities.
Definite control over voluntary migration was established in the same proc¬
lamations which laid the ground work for the controlled evacuation of Military
Area No. 1. Proclamation No. 1 warned that "Such persons, or classes of
persons, as the situation may require will by subsequent Proclamation be ex¬
cluded from all of Military Area No. 1. ...” It also required the reporting of
changes of residence by those who left the area. Public Proclamation No. 3
prescribed curfew hours, limited movement to places within five miles of the
place of residence and defined certain items as contraband. However it made
the travel limitations inapplicable to cases where persons were "visiting the
nearest United States Post Office, United States Employment Service Office,
or office operated or maintained by the Wartime Civil Control Administration,
for the purpose of transacting any business or the making of any arrangements
reasonably necessary to accomplish evacuation.

The Proclamation also pro¬

vided that, "Travel performed in change of residence to a place outside the
prohibited and restricted areas may be performed without regard to curfew
hours.”
From March 2 to March 29, therefore, under the provisions of Proclama¬
tion No. 1 nearly anyone who was affected by the proposed evacuation program
was not only permitted to leave Military Area 1, he was encouraged and assisted
to leave. Each German or Italian alien or person of Japanese ancestry residing
in the States of Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington was required
only to execute a Change of Residence Notice which was obtainable at any
post office. This Change of Residence Notice was merely a notification mailed
to the Provost Marshal of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army
that the person intended to change his place of residence. It was required
whether the destination was outside of Military Area No.

1 or within it.

Proclamation No. 2 extended this residence change reporting system to Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, and Utah.
The change of residence reporting system accomplished several purposes:
(a) It provided the Headquarters with a file of the names and destinations
of persons who left the area prior to evacuation.
(b)

It trained the evacuee population in the shift of authority which had

occurred when the primary responsibility for the control of enemy aliens in
this area was assumed by the Army.
(c) It provided statistical data as to the direction and extent of voluntary

VOLUNTARY

103

MIGRATION

migration and perforce gave information as to the numbers remaining in each
area. The latter purpose was the primary reason for its adoption.
Without definite information as to the number of persons who migrated
from each county of Military Area No. 1 to Military Area No. 2 and to other sec¬
tions of the Western Defense Command and elsewhere, it would not have been
possible to plan the controlled evacuation program without considerable error.
These data, when used in conjunction with detailed figures of the 1940 decen¬
nial census of population, proved quite reliable for planning purposes, and are
summarized in a later part of this chapter.
The following information was secured on the "Change of Residence Report
Card:” (1) Name, (2) last address, (3) new address, or destination, (4) sex,
(5) age,

(6)

race, (7) country of citizenship, and (8) alien registration num¬

ber. Each person 14 years of age or older was required to sign his own card
and parents returned the cards for children under 14.
By arrangement with the Post Office Department supplies of the "Change
of Residence Report Card” forms were made available at all post offices in the
Western Defense Command Area. The Postmaster was instructed to issue these
cards on application without questioning the applicant. When a properly exe¬
cuted form was returned to him, the postmaster issued a "Certificate—Change
of Residence Notice” with the name and new address of the applicant. This
Certificate stated only that:
"The above named person had executed an official change of residence report card
declaring his intention to reside at the above address, which Report Card has been
forwarded to the Provost Marshal, Western Defense Command, San Francisco, Cali¬
fornia.”

After the issuance of Public Proclamation No. 3, the "Certificate—Change
of Residence Notice” was revised to also serve as a Travel Permit. At this time
the issuance of such permits at post offices in Military Area No. 1 was dis¬
continued and the permits were issued only at Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬
tration Team Offices or at approved United States Employment Service offices.
By agreement with the United States Attorneys in Military Area No. 1 the
Travel Permits issued after Proclamation No. 3 carried the following statement:
“The travel of the above-named person from the place of issue of this permit to
the address given above has been approved by the Western Defense Command and
Fourth Army, Wartime Civil Control Administration

(and, if an alien, has been

approved in the name of the United States Attorney in the district from which he
has moved). It is requested that all authorities permit this person to travel to the above
address by direct route without molestation or hindrance.”

The back of the Travel Permit form contained the following instructions
to the migrant:
"Upon arrival at the destination indicated on this form the bearer, if an alien,
is required to report his change of address to the Alien Registration Division, Immi¬
gration and Naturalization Service, and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Forms
for this purpose may be obtained from the Post Office at the place of destination.

A

new travel permit is required for travel from the destination indicated on this form
if this destination is within the above-named States. Travel from the place of issue of this
permit to the destination indicated must be by direct route and completed within a rea¬
sonable time after the date of issue.”

104

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

As revised the Travel Permit was used principally for travel within Mili¬
tary Area 1, though some permits to leave the area were approved by the
Wartime Civil Control Administration even after March 29 when Public Procla¬
mation No. 4 ended the free migration of Japanese from this area.
The Wartime Civil Control Administration through its Service Center Teams
provided advice and assistance for volunteer evacuees up to the time that the area
in which they resided was posted for evacuation. Many of those who left the area
before evacuation used the services of these offices. However, only a relatively
few families availed themselves of the full facilities provided by the Army to assist
them in attaining an approved relocation plan.
The formulation of an approved relocation plan involved the discussion and
consideration of the proposed movement with members of the family. It also
involved direct correspondence by Wartime Civil Control Administration with
out-of-state agencies concerning the presence of a responsible relative, friend, or
employer in the community to which the proposed move would be made. In
every case an official expression as to the attitude of that community toward
Japanese was required. Unless local law enforcement officers would give a clear¬
ance and indicate that the probability of "incidents” was low, no relocation plan
would be approved by the Wartime Civil Control Administration.
To facilitate the relocation of families, financial assistance was given at Team
Offices for travel expenses, maintenance enroute, transportation of personal
effects, and other identifiable expenses incident to moving. To insure the well¬
being of the family and the fact, so far as it could be determined, that de¬
pendency in another state would not be created, financial assistance in relocat¬
ing was contingent upon the capacity of the family to establish itself economi¬
cally at the point of relocation. Attention was also given to the availability at
the point of destination of community resources such as medical facilities and
adequate housing.
The investigation of all such cases was a responsibility of the Bureau of
Public Assistance, and the Employment Service, of the Federal Security Agency,
staff in the Team Office. The staff representatives of the Federal Reserve Bank
and the Farm Security Administration also assisted voluntary evacuees with
the settlement of property matters.
Only a small proportion of all the individuals who left Military Area No. 1
prior to controlled evacuation applied for any assistance or advice. Many of
the migrants were persons with some financial independence or with relatives
and friends in the area of destination. To June 5, 1942, the Bureau of Public
Assistance reported that a total of 125 relocation plans had been approved_
92 during the voluntary evacuation period—and that approximately $10,200
had been expended in assistance on such plans.
As the evacuation program progressed, it became increasingly difficult for
evacuees to secure the necessary clearance for voluntary relocation. This was

VOLUNTARY

105

MIGRATION

because of the widespread hostility which developed in almost every state
and every community. It was literally unsafe for Japanese migrants.
Free voluntary migration out of Military Area No. 1 was stopped by Procla¬
mation No. 4 dated March 27, 1942. After March 29, permission to leave the area
was granted only after a relatively thorough investigation of each case.

The

principal basis for permission was to allow reuniting of families. A considerable
number of families had become separated during the voluntary migration phase.
For example the head of a family often went on ahead to accept employment
and prepare the way for his family to follow. Frequently cases arose where
Proclamation No. 4 intervened before the family had rejoined the head. Wartime
Civil Control Administration always permitted such families to reunite. However,
some movement was permitted in other classes of cases throughout the entire
period of evacuation—but in all cases, only by military permission. When an area
was in process of evacuation, i. e., after the area had been posted and before the
exclusion date, it was still possible for the evacuees to secure permission from the
military representative at the Control Station, the Provost Marshal, to leave the
area.

After a person had been evacuated to an Assembly Center, it then became

necessary for him to secure the approval of the Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬
tration before being released.
Japanese who resided in the California portion of Military Area No. 2,
including, of course, many who migrated to this area from Military Area No. 1
without definite employment opportunities, were permitted free movement from
the area until June 2, 1942. Public Proclamation No. 6 on that date prohibited
the further migration out of or into that area in preparation for controlled
evacuation.
It is pertinent here to record briefly some of the factors which induced the
action ending voluntary migration as an evacuation method. Some reference
has already been made to this in preceding chapters. Public Proclamation No.
4, dated March 27, 1942, was the vehicle for that decision. Essentially, the
objective was twofold. First, it was to alleviate tension and prevent incidents
involving violence between Japanese migrants and others. Second, it was to
insure an orderly, supervised, and thoroughly controlled evacuation with ade¬
quate provision for the protection of the persons of evacuees as well as their
property. Some exodus began early in February when there was much public
discussion about it. A reference to the hearings before the Select Committee
Investigating National Defense Migration of the House of Representatives,
Seventy-Seventh Congress, Second Session, will serve to illustrate the extent
to which vigilante activities were developing. Particularly in Part 29, the
hearings at San Francisco between February 21 and 23, 1942, will the reader
find illustrative material.

For example, the Sheriff of Merced County in a

letter to the Attorney General of California, presented at the hearings, stated
in part:
"To avoid disaster, I believe that action must be taken to protect both the State
and enemy aliens, as there are already 'rumblings’ of vigilante activity which has been
caused in the main, by the influx of Japanese from the evacuated areas.”

(Page

10998)

106

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

In a letter to the Regional Director of the Social Security Board, the Director
of the State Department for Social Welfare said, on February 11th, in part:
“Any uncontrolled evacuation of Japanese to this county would be a serious and
grave mistake at this time as it would only tend to aggravate the present tense
situation.”

(Page 11044)

In his testimony before the Committee Mr. Richard Neustadt, Regional
Director of the Social Security Board and Regional Director of the Office of
Defense, Health, and Welfare Services, made many references to the state of
public feeling. He said in part:
"I have seen resolutions of the Governors, the chambers of commerce, and all the
hospitality centers west of the Rocky Mountain States. They don’t want them either.
“May I say that all they are talking about is Japanese.
from all the towns in California protesting.”

We have had telegrams

(Page 11054)

Spokesmen from among the Japanese themselves made the same point. The
National Secretary of the Japanese-American Citizens League urged:
“That, in view of the alarming developments in Tulare County (California) and
other communities against incoming Japanese evacuees all plans for voluntary evacua¬
tion be discouraged; * * *.” (Page 11137)

He said further:
"Just as I pointed out, the tension is increasing all around and immediate action
would be very helpful, I think, to all concerned to protect us from mob violence,
* * *.

But I do not think it should be voluntary evacuation for the simple reason

that I am afraid of what is happening * * *.”

(Page 11156)

Early in the program an aged Issei couple and their family had migrated
to Santa Fe, New Mexico. The racial prejudice against the Hayakawas was
so severe that the family petitioned Wartime Civil Control Administration re¬
questing that they be permitted to join the evacuees assembled at Tanforan.
The Hayakawa case is cited as but one example from among many.

It is il¬

lustrative of the intensity of public feeling. Multiply this by several thousand
and it will become apparent why it was necessary for the Army to abandon
voluntary migration.

The necessity was

to provide

suitable

and

adequate

protection for the evacuees themselves and to insure an orderly scheduled
exodus.

Statistics on Voluntary Migration
Until the end of the evacuation program from Military Area No. 1, daily
tabulations were prepared on the Change of Residence Report Cards received
by the Wartime Civil Control Administration.

These tabulations were cumula¬

tive by counties so as to show the net migration into or out of each area. Although
Public Proclamation No. 1 became immediately effective on March 2, the actual
tabulation of Change of Residence Report Cards was not started until March 12
after the establishment of the Wartime Civil Control Administration and after

VOLUNTARY

107

MIGRATION

sufficient time had elapsed for the distribution of blank forms to all post offices
in the affected areas.
Of the 4,070 Change of Residence Report Cards received by Wartime Civil
Control Administration on or before March 25, only 1,235 reported an intended
move to an area outside of Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2, 770 to places in Military
Area No. 2, 1,289 to addresses within Military Area No. 1, and 776 to other loca¬
tions within the same county. Thus, nearly a month after the original announce¬
ment of the intended evacuation of Military Area No. 1, and three weeks after
Proclamation No. 1, only 2,005 Japanese had moved out of the area and had re¬
ported this fact. With approximately 107,500 Japanese residing in Military
Area No. 1, it was quite apparent that voluntary migration was completely in¬
effective as an evacuation device. Now apparent, it was creative of social and
economic problems in the areas to which the Japanese were going.
Public Proclamation No. 4 was issued on March 27, 1942, and became
effective midnight, March 29. As soon as this Proclamation was announced, a
very heavy rush of Change of Residence Report Cards was received. After
this final rush to leave the area before the "freeze” imposed by Proclamation
No. 4, the number of Change of Residence Cards received by the Wartime Civil
Control Administration from Japanese moving out of military areas increased only
approximately 2,500 for the remainder of the program.
The following table shows the total reported voluntary movement of Jap¬
anese from March 12 to June 30, 1942:
TABLE 5.—Cumulative Net Voluntary Migration of Japanese From Military
Areas—Western Defense Command, March 12 to June 30, 1942

Dates

March 12 to 18.
March 19 to 25.
March 26 to April 1.
April 2 to 8.
April 9 to 15.
April 16 to 22.
April 23 to 29.
April 30 to May 6.
May 7 to 13.
May 14 to 20.
May 21 to 27.
May 28 to June 7.
June 17 to 30.

Total
outside
Military
Area 1
528
1,555
7,774
8,254
8,529
8,670
8,879
9,057
9,141
10,241
10,255
10,286
10,290
10,312

Military
Area 2

90
285
3,087
3,368
3,484
3,556
3,673
3,785
3,776
4,792
4,778
4,793
4,794
4,791

Military
Areas
3 to 6
171
517
2,093
2,284
2,425
2,449
2,471
2,490
2,537
2,589
2,614
2,630
2,630
2,633

Outside
W D C
Area

267
753
2,594
2,602
2.620
2,665
2,735
2,782
2,828
2,860
2,863
2,863
2,866
2,888

A total of 10,312 persons reported their intention to move out of Military
Area No. 1 during this period. Of these, 9,536 were in the California portion of
Area No. 1. A total of 4,791 Japanese stated that they were moving into Area
No. 2, and of these, 4,310 to the California portion of Area No. 2. Other areas of
the Western Defense Command and other states of the United States were desig¬
nated as intended residences by 5,521 Japanese from Military Area No. 1. Prospec¬
tive moves to Colorado were reported by 2,292; to Utah, 2,13 8; to Idaho, 3 84;
to Montana, 121; and to all other states combined 586.
On June 5, 1942, Military Area No. 1 had been completely evacuated, except

108

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Figure 11

VOLUNTARY

109

MIGRATION

for persons in Assembly Centers, those in institutions and a few who had been
granted deferments from evacuation because of illness.

Figure 11 shows the

effect of voluntary movement of Japanese in the Western Defense Command
Area from March 12 to June 5 by counties.

It will be noted that those counties

split by, or immediately adjacent to, the boundary of Military Area No. 1 in
California received large numbers of voluntary migrants, particularly: Fresno,
2,499; Tulare, 932; and Placer, 495.
In the interpretation of the above table and charts showing the reported
voluntary movement of Japanese from military areas, the nature of these data
should be kept in mind.

Proclamation No. 1 required that the Report Card

be made out not more than five, or less than one day prior to any intended
change of residence.

Although no enforcement procedure was set up for this

aspect of the program, there is clear evidence that most persons complied with
the provisions of the Proclamation by mailing their cards in advance of their
intended departure.

No requirement was made that a cancellation card or

other notice be given if the move was not made.

While some Japanese wrote

the Wartime Civil Control Administration indicating that they had changed
their minds and would not make the originally intended move, most persons who
changed their minds did not bother to report this fact.
It was not until the end of the evacuation program, therefore, that it was
possible to arrive at substantially complete and accurate net migration figures.
This was done by an actual card match of Change of Residence Report Cards
with the Master File cards for those who had been evacuated to Assembly and
Relocation Centers.

The Change of Residence Report figures presented in

Table 5 and in Figure 11 are, therefore, inflated to an unknown extent by re¬
ported intended changes of residence which were not made. It is also increased by
data for persons who returned to their original residences (without reporting
this fact) or who joined other members of their family in Assembly and Reloca¬
tion Centers.
The final results of the voluntary evacuation program are shown in Tables
6 to 8.

These data are net totals, i. e., persons who migrated out of the area

but did not return to the area to be evacuated with their families, or did not other¬
wise join their families in Assembly Centers or Relocation Projects prior to Octo¬
ber 31, 1942.
A net total of 4,889 Japanese left the evacuated area and returned Change
of Residence cards to the Wartime Civil Control Administration.

By far the

largest number of these, 4,203, migrated from the State of California.
ington lost 499 through migration, Oregon 129 and Arizona 58.

Wash¬

The counties

from which these persons moved are shown in Table 6.
Table 7 shows the indicated state of destination of the voluntary migrants.
Of the 4,889 net total, Colorado received 1,963, Utah, 1,519, Idaho, 305,
eastern Washington, 208, eastern Oregon, 115, and all other states lesser move¬
ments. These data are illustrated in Figure 12.

110

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

TABLE 6.—Japanese Migrants From Evacuated Areas by State and County
of Origin and by Sex
Total

Male

Female

Four-State total.

4,889

2,602

2,287

Arizona.

58

34

Maricopa.

58

34

24

California.

4,203

2,269

1,934

Alameda.
Butte.
Contra Costa.
Fresno.
Imperial.
Kern.
Kings.
Los Angeles.
Marin.
Merced.
Monterey.
Orange.
Placer.
Riverside.
Sacramento.
San Benito.
San Bernardino.
San Diego.
San Francisco.
San Joaquin.
San Luis Obispo.
San Mateo.
Santa Barbara.
Santa Clara.
Santa Cruz.
Sonoma.
Stanislaus.
Tulare.
Tuolumne.
Ventura.
Yolo.

263
7
18
153
82
7
3
1,969
8
6
234
88
2
10
24
6
13
61
207
21
11
139
205
443
82
17
8
64
20
29
2
1

142
5
8
75
35
5
1
1,080
4
2
143
54
1
4
10
4
9
31
95
10
5
67
116
231
44
9
4
44
15
14
2

121
2
10
78
47
2
2
889
4
4
91
34
1
6
14
2
4
30
112
11
6
72
89
212
38
8
4
20
5
15

Oregon.

129

70

59

Hood River.
Lane.
Multnomah.
Polk.
Washington.
Yamhill.

1
13
4
54
5
50
2

1
9
2
24
2
32

Washington.

499

229

270

Chelan.
Clark.
King.
Kitsap.
Lewis.

2
5
403
6
6
3
5
56
6
7

1
3
183
4
1
3
2
26
2
4

1
2
220
2
5

State and County

Pacific.
Pierce.
Thurston.
Yakima.

24

1

Source—Change of Residence Cards: Evacuated to Non-Evacuated Area.

4
2
30
3
18
2

3
30
4
3

VOLUNTARY

TABLE

111

MIGRATION

7.—Japanese Migrants From Evacuated Areas by State of Reporter
Destination and by Sex
State

Total

Male

Female

Total.

4,889

2,602

2,287

Arizona.
Arkansas.
Colorado.
District of Columbia.
Idaho.
Illinois.

105
1
1,963
5
305
72
4
4
6
1
3
24
42
26
85
69
38
4
39
27
7
9
12
39
115
14
51
1,519
3
208
16
72
1

64

41
1
904
4
131
44
2
2
5
1
2
11
23
14
37
28
20
3
21
15
5
5
4
21
54
9
32
697
2
103
7
38
1

Iowa.
Kansas.
Kentucky..
Massachusetts.
Michigan.
Minnesota.
Missouri.
Montana.
Nebraska.
Nevada.
New Jersey.
New Mexico.
New York.
North Carolina.
North Dakota.
Ohio.
Oklahoma.
Oregon.
Pennsylvania.
Texas.
Utah.
Virginia.
Washington.
Wisconsin.
Wyoming.
Canada.

1,059
1
174
28
2
2
1
1
13
19
12
48
41
18
1
18
12
2
4
8
18
61
5
19
822
1
105
9
34

In addition to this recorded net migration, there was, of course, some move¬
ment of Japanese from the West Coast areas to inland points prior to the
beginning of the Change of Residence reporting as required by Proclamation
No. 1. There is also some evidence that some Japanese slipped across the mili¬
tary area boundaries both before and after the issuance of Proclamation No. 4 and
Proclamation No. 6. However, this group is believed not to have been very large.
The net total of 4,889 migrants probably accounts for 90 percent of the total
number of Japanese now in the United States who voluntarily left the West
Coast area for inland points.
The distribution by sex, and nativity of those who migrated does not
differ markedly from that of the Japanese population of the West Coast.
(See Table 8.)

Of the 4,889, 3,377, or 69 percent, were native-born; 1,512

were foreign-born.

The number of male migrants exceeded the number of

female in both the native-born and the foreign-born group in the population
as a whole. No attempt has been made to analyze these data by families. Though
it is known that the movement occurred largely in family groups, frequently
a father or older son would either be accompanied by, or followed by, the
mother and other children.

Relatively few family groups as such returned for

evacuation to Assembly Centers. Such persons as did return were predominantly
children who had migrated inland and then later returned to join their family
in a Center.

112

JAPANESE

TABLE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

8.—Japanese Migrants From Evacuated Areas by State of Origin and
by Sex and Nativity
STATE OF ORIGIN

Nativity and Sex

Total
Arizona

California

Oregon

Washington

ALL MIGRANTS
Total.

4,889

58

4,203

129

499

Male.
Female.

2,602
2,287

34
24

2,269
1,934

70
59

229
270

Total.

3,377

38

2,888

84

367

Male.
Female.

1,763
1,614

23
15

1,531
1,357

47
37

162
205

Total.

1,512

20

1,315

45

132

Male.
Female.

839
673

11
9

738
577

23
22

67
65

NATIVE-BORN

FOREIGN-BORN

113

VOLUNTARY MIGRATION

JAPANESE VOLUNTARY MIGRATION
BY STATE OF DESTINATION
MARCH 12 TO OCTOBER 31.1942

wcyrcflN ocrcN$e command and fourth armt
FAHTlMt CIVIC CONTAOC ADMINISTRATION

Figure 12

CHAPTER X
Operation of Civil Control Stations
Protection of Evacuees and Their Families
That phase of evacuation involving complete Federal supervision was in¬
itiated late in March, following the publication of Public Proclamation No. 2,
March 16, 1942. It is sometimes referred to as the "controlled phase.” The first
exclusion area selected for evacuation was Bainbridge Island in Puget Sound,
State of Washington. This area was selected for first evacuation because of its
importance to the security of the Pacific Coast. It is located in the channel
leading to the Bremerton Navy Yard. This was in accordance with the ap¬
proved policy that the areas most vital to security would be the first to be
evacuated.
On March 24, 1942, there was issued Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1 which
proclaimed that all persons of Japanese ancestry would be excluded from the
area of Bainbridge Island, effective 12:00 noon, March 31, 1942. The Command¬
ing General, Northwest Sector, Western Defense Command, and the Federal
agencies which had been selected and designated to assist in the evacuation pro¬
gram had been informed of the proposed evacuation by memoranda dated March
20, 1942.

(See Appendix 1.)

The specific procedures for preparing persons of Japanese ancestry for re¬
moval from that area, and for their actual physical movement, had been devel¬
oped by the Wartime Civil Control Administration prior to this time. The
memoranda mentioned above prescribed the methods and designated the re¬
sponsibilities and functions of the Sector Commander and each of the partici¬
pating Federal civilian agencies.

(See Chapter VII.)

The location of the Control Station for each exclusion area was determined
prior to the issuance of the Civilian Exclusion Order. Each Order gave the
address of the Control Station, and required that a responsible member of each
family, and each individual living alone report to that Station on the date
specified therein, for the purpose of registration.
The Commanding General of each Sector within the Western Defense Com¬
mand was responsible for the establishment of Control Station security measures
and for the escort of all evacuees from each exclusion area to prescribed des¬
tination. He also was responsible for procuring the necessary transportation, and
meals enroute to Assembly and Relocation Centers. In addition, he issued any
necessary local travel permits (once an area was posted for evacuation, evacuees
could not leave without permission), and deferments. To each Control Station
the Sector Commander assigned one officer as his representative and as an
Acting Provost Marshal. An appropriate number of military guards were as¬
signed to each Control Station to protect the evacuees, to supervise the move¬
ment of individuals, and to guard the official records.
The civilian staff at each Control Station was made up of sections repre¬
senting the United States Employment Service, the United States Public Health
114

OPERATION

OF

CIVIL

115

CONTROL STATIONS

Service, the Farm Security Administation and the Federal Reserve Bank. The
operation of each Control Station was under the direction of a Control Station
Manager selected by the United States Employment Service. Each civilianagency section within the Control Station was headed by a Supervisor who was
responsible for the activities of that section.
Control Stations performed three basic functions: (1) To register all per¬
sons of Japanese ancestry; (2) To provide all services and assistance necessary
to prepare them for movement from the area; and (3) To direct the actual
movement from the area. The Army, and each of the participating civilian
agencies, was assigned specific responsibilities and duties within the Control
Station to insure the complete accomplishment of the three functions and to
avoid duplication of effort.
Army orders and instructions regarding the responsibilities of the Sector
Commander at each Station were sent through normal Army channels to the
Acting Provost Marshal. Prior to, as well as during, the activation of each Sta¬
tion, the Wartime Civil Control Administration gave its orders directly to the
civilian agencies through their full-time liaison personnel in the Wartime Civil
Control Administration.
Responsibilities of the Army at each Control Station.

The Sector

Commander, in whose Sector the Control Station was located, designated an
officer as the Acting Provost Marshal for that Control Station. The duties and
responsibilities of the Acting Provost Marshals were:
1.

To receive and pass on requests for deferments

made

by

individual

evacuees, and recommendations for deferments made by the Control
Station Manager, or by the participating civilian agencies. In routine
cases, such as recommendations for deferments for health reasons made by
the United States Public Health Service, temporary deferments were is¬
sued by the Acting Provost Marshal. All unusual requests and recom¬
mendations for deferment were referred by the Acting Provost Marshal
to the Provost Marshal of the Sector, or to the Wartime Civil Control
Administration for decision;
2.

To issue travel permits to evacuees when the request for such travel

3.

To provide for the safety of all evacuees during the period of regis¬

came within the prescribed regulations.
tration, processing, and movement, and to provide for the safety of
all government records;
4.

To keep the Sector Commander, the Commanding General and the War¬
time Civil Control Administration informed by periodic reports of the
registration, processing, and movement of evacuees;

5.

To provide necessary military escort, and to supervise entrainment of
evacuees.

The responsibility for posting the Civilian Exclusion Orders and Instruc¬
tions to evacuees throughout each area to be evacuated was vested in the ap¬
propriate Sector Commander. Generally an officer designated as a Posting Officer,
was responsible for posting these orders in all public places within the area—

116

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

at crossroads and other prominent locations. In a few instances the Acting
Provost Marshal assigned to a Control Station was made responsible for the post¬
ing of the area.
One of the principal duties of the Acting Provost Marshal in each Control
Station was the interpretation to individual evacuees of the terms of the evacu¬
ation order. Practically all individual problems not specifically covered by reg¬
ulations, and not falling within the functions of one of the participating civil¬
ian agencies, were referred to the Acting Provost Marshal for decision. Those
included such matters as mixed-marriage, and mixed-blood cases, travel permits
for the purpose of reuniting families, shipment of freight to Assembly Centers,
departure dates for individual evacuees and convoys, and other problems created
by the evacuation order.
Responsibilities of the Federal Security Agency
The Federal Security Agency was charged with the duty to provide several
general services at Control Stations and in turn delegated to component organ¬
izations within that agency the following responsibilities:
1.

To the United States Employment Service, the location, establishment,

2.

To the Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Board, the regis¬

3.

To the United States Public Health Service, the medical inspection of

organization and management of Control Stations;
tration of all evacuees and the provision of social welfare service;

all evacuees, the providing of medical aid during the registration and
processing period and while enroute to Assembly Centers, and the con¬
tinued medical care and hospitalization of persons who could not be
evacuated for medical reasons.
Responsibilities of the United States Employment Service
The United States Employment Service of the Federal Security Agency was
responsible for the location, establishment, and management of all Civil Control
Stations. Specifically, this responsibility included:
1.

The selection of a Station Manager for each Control Station;

2.

The securing of space for each Station, and of all supplies and equip¬
ment necessary for its operation, except for that equipment which was
furnished by other participating agencies;

3.

The furnishing of all civilian employees essential for the operation of
the Control Station, except those employees furnished by the other par¬
ticipating agencies;

4.

The supervising and coordinating of the activities of all civilian agency
staff sections within each Control Station to insure its successful oper¬
ation so far as these agencies were concerned;

5.

The transmitting of all orders and instructions pertaining to evacuation
received from the Wartime Civil Control Administration to the super¬
visors of the various sections within the Control Station;

OPERATION OF CIVIL CONTROL STATIONS

117

6. The maintaining of necessary records and files, and the submission of
required reports.
Responsibilities of the Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social
Security Board.

The Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security

Board was responsible for the registration of all persons of Japanese ancestry
and for providing all necessary social welfare service for the individuals affect¬
ed by the Exclusion Orders. Specifically, the responsibilities were:
1.

To provide a staff of trained social welfare workers to function as inter¬
viewers and welfare supervisors in the Control Station;

2.

To give an initial interpretation to all evacuees of Exclusion Orders and
instructions pertaining to evacuation;

3.

To register all persons of Japanese ancestry affected by the Exclusion
Orders, and to complete all necessary social data records pertaining to
these individuals;

4.

To interview a responsible member of each family, and all individuals
living alone, to ascertain what assistance they might require to enable
them to comply with the Exclusion Orders;

5.

To refer individuals and heads of families to the representatives of the
appropriate participating agencies to secure the assistance necessary in
settling personal and real property affairs, in securing travel permits, etc;

6.

To provide necessary financial assistance and other social welfare aids
to individuals and families who required interim subsistence and those
items essential to maintain a minimum standard of living at the Assem¬
bly Center;

7.

To instruct evacuees in all matters pertaining to baggage and personal
effects to be taken to the Assembly Centers; date and hour for medical
examination; date and hour of departure for Assembly Center; and all
other matters pertaining to the evacuation;

8.

To provide all types of social welfare service required by the evacuees
under the unusual circumstances created by evacuation.

The Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security Board was respon¬
sible for the overall supervision of such work in Civil Control Stations. It also
maintained liaison with other Federal agencies and with Wartime Civil Control
Administration.

By agreement, the various State Public Welfare Agencies as¬

sumed the responsibility for the direct operating phase of this work. The State
Agencies furnished for each Control Station a staff member who functioned as the
Public Assistant Supervisor. Additional members of the social service staff in each
Control Station were recruited from the County Welfare Departments and from
private welfare agencies.
Responsibilities of the United States Public Health Service.

The United

States Public Health Service of the Federal Security Agency was responsible for
all matters pertaining to the physical health and well-being of evacuees throughout
the entire program.

The first phase of the Public Health Service’s activities

was from the time evacuees reported to a Control Station for registration until

118

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

they were inducted in the Assembly Center of destination. Specifically these
responsibilities were as follows:
1.

To provide medical service in each Control Station during the entire
period of registration and processing of evacuees;

2.

To physically inspect all evacuees prior to induction into an Assembly

3.

To remove from the evacuee group all persons with detectable commu¬

4.

To detect and remove from the evacuee group all persons whose physical

Center;
nicable diseases in the infectious stage prior to evacuation or induction;
condition indicated that evacuation at the scheduled time might be det¬
rimental to their physical well-being, or to the physical well-being of
other evacuees;
5.

To provide for necessary medical attention, hospitalization or home care
for all evacuees requiring such attention at any time during the regis¬
tration and processing period, or subsequent thereto;

6. To provide for adequate medical attention and care for all evacuees
while enroute from Civil Control Stations to Assembly Centers.
Organization of the Control Station. Usually, only one Control Station
was established within an exclusion area. This was the case in ninety-seven of
the one-hundred and eight areas. However, in the other eleven areas, because
of the expanse of the area and the great distances involved, two or more Control
Stations were established. The establishment of multiple Control Stations re¬
duced the inconvenience to the evacuees to a minimum and made it possible
to provide all necessary services to the evacuees on the ground. The staffs of
these multiple Control Stations were reduced to fit the anticipated number to
be handled, but all participating civilian agencies were represented at each
Control Station. Where the distance that an evacuee was required to travel in
order to reach a Control Station was more than thirty miles, transportation at
government expense was furnished, on application. The instructions to persons
of Japanese ancestry in those cases informed the evacuees of this, and authorized
them to communicate with the Control Stations at government expense.
All personnel assigned to a Control Station normally reported to that Station
on the afternoon prior to the first day of registration for a staff meeting, under
the direction of the Control Station Manager. The Acting Provost Marshal, as
the representative of the Sector Commander, and an appropriate number of
military personnel to act as guards, also reported at that time, so that all per¬
sonnel of military and of the civilian agencies might be properly instructed and
their activities coordinated.
The Control Station was usually so arranged that there was only one en¬
trance and one exit. Evacuees proceeded through the station in single line to
avoid cross-traffic and confusion.
Registration of Evacuees. When the evacuees arrived at a Control Station
to register, they were met by a floorman who directed them to a receptionist.
The receptionist first obtained the name and home address of each evacuee, and

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checked on the map of the unit area to determine that the individual lived
within the described area, and was therefore subject to registration. The name
and address of the individual, citizenship, number in family, and sex, was then
noted on a "Routing and Control Slip.” This was attached to the outside of a
large manila envelope which contained all the material necessary for the regis¬
tration of the evacuee and his family. This envelope and control slip carried a
case number, known as the “family number,” which was permanently assigned
to the individual and his family. All records pertaining to that evacuee family
carried the family number. This number was also used to mark all baggage and
freight belonging to the evacuee and his family, which was to be stored or
shipped to an Assembly Center.
Control of assignment of family numbers was maintained by the Federal
Security Agency, as directed by the Wartime Civil Control Administration, to
prevent the assigning of the same number to more than one family. Blocks of
numbers were assigned to Control Stations and all numbers used were reported
and recorded.
There was also attached to the registration envelope a form for recording
the family history of the evacuee and his family, known as the Social Data
Registration Form. The receptionist made the original entries upon this form
after having rechecked the address of the evacuee to be certain that the family
lived within the areas designated for evacuation. The data recorded on this form
were basic in formation regarding all persons who were evacuated, and partic¬
ular care was exercised in making the entries to insure accuracy. Typed copies
of the completed registration form were sent immediately to (a) the Wartime
Civil Control Administration, (b) the Assembly Center to which the evacuee

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was to be moved, and (c) one copy was given to the officer in charge of a
convoyed movement for delivery to the Assembly Center Manager.
The registration envelope also contained four copies of the Personal Property
Form for use by evacuees in listing personal property for storage, forms for
automobile storage and for sales of automobiles, and one triplicate Personal and
Baggage Tag. This tag carried the family number assigned to the evacuee—
that which appeared on the Social Data Registration Form and the Routing and
Control Slip. The first portion of this tag was to be worn by the head of the
family at the time of the movement to the Assembly Center; the second portion
to be attached to the baggage of the evacuee, and the third part to be taken
by the examining physician at the time medical examination was made. Similar
triplicate tags were furnished for each additional member of the family, and the
assigned family number and the name of the head of the family was written
on them at the time of issue. Additional blank tags were furnished the head
of the family for use in marking baggage and personal property which was to
be stored or shipped.
In the normal Control Station there were a minimum of two doormen
whose duties were to regulate the flow of traffic to the receptionist, and from
the receptionist to the social workers; to prevent crowds from gathering before
the reception desk; and to answer questions of arriving evacuees. These doormen
worked directly under the supervision of the Station Manager. In most Control
Stations one or more bi-lingual Japanese doormen were used to direct evacuees
who were unfamiliar with the English language.
The average Control Station used five receptionists during the two days of
registration, and three receptionists during the processing period. Every effort
was made to secure personnel with experience and training which fitted them
for this type of work. Considerable use was made of evacuees who spoke both
English and Japanese. Many evacuees had little or no knowledge of the English
language and could be questioned intelligently only in Japanese to obtain a
complete and accurate family history for the registration form. It was necessary
to speak in Japanese in order that regulations and instructions regarding evacu¬
ation could be properly explained; so that the personal problems presented by
each family could be properly ascertained, and directions given for the evacuee
to obtain the necessary assistance in settling these problems. In some few cases
Japanese serving in the Control Stations were paid employees, but in many in¬
stances this work was done by evacuees without pay.
After completing the preliminary registration entries, the evacuee was then
sent to a social worker by the receptionist. Early experience indicated that the
average length of the interview by the social worker was 25 minutes, and the
assignments were made on this basis. The social workers did not attempt to
adhere to a fixed time schedule, but gave each evacuee all the time necessary
to complete the registration, explain the evacuation, and to ascertain and arrange
for assistance necessary in settling all problems of the evacuee and his family.
Bi-lingual evacuees assisted the social workers in questioning those who spoke
no English.

OPERATION

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When an evacuee came to a social worker’s desk, she first obtained all
necessary data for completing the registration of the evacuee and his family.
Evacuation instructions, particularly as to the probable time of movement and
the baggage and personal items which each family were required to take to
Assembly Centers, were then explained in detail. Any special instructions af¬
fecting the individual evacuee also were explained, and written instructions
were frequently given as to medical inspection.
Each evacuee was then carefully questioned as to his business, property,
personal and family affairs, to ascertain the problems created by evacuation,
and to establish the existing needs for assistance in settling these problems. The
services offered by the Farm Security Administration in settling farming and
agricultural problems, and those offered by the Federal Reserve Bank in settling
personal affairs and for the storage of automobiles and furniture were explained
fully. Every effort was made to ascertain if the particular evacuee was in need
of these services. The evacuee was further questioned as to his personal and
family needs for clothing, food, and shelter in the interim prior to the date of
movement, and as to any needs for items required in the Assembly Centers
which he might not have, or might be unable, to purchase.
Evacuees were not required to accept any of the services offered at the Con¬
trol Stations for settling business and personal affairs prior to evacuation. Free¬
dom of personal initiative was not infringed. However, each evacuee was fully
informed of the type and scope of assistance available.
The social worker, after completing the registration interview of the evac¬
uee, noted in appropriate spaces on the Routing and Control Slip, the services,
if any, required by the evacuee from the Farm Security Administration and the
Federal Reserve Bank. The evacuee was then referred to those sections and in¬
structed to return to the social worker after completing his business with
those services.
When the evacuee returned to the social worker, the Routing and Control
Slip was checked to see if there were any return appointments. He was informed
of the date and hour of his appointment for a medical examination, and was
instructed that he and his entire family must report at the time specified. The
date and hour for his medical examination was written on the medical exam¬
iner’s portion of the triplicate tag which then was given to the evacuee.
If the original interview had disclosed a need for social welfare service, the
social worker then prepared a recommendation for the issuance of a disbursal
voucher or took such other action as was necessary to provide the required
welfare service. At this time the evacuee was also issued one triplicate tag for
every member of his family, and its use explained.
In making appointments for medical examinations, those who were regis¬
tered first generally were given appointments on the first day of medical exam¬
ination, normally the third day of station operation. However, each case was
considered individually and appointments arranged so as to best fit the individ¬
ual family. Such factors as the size of the family, distance to be traveled, busi¬
ness and personal affairs to be settled, and the physical condition of the evacuee

JAPANESE

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and the members of his family were all carefully considered in scheduling ap¬
pointments.
Financial Assistance to Evacuees. Financial assistance was recommended
on the basis of individual and family needs, and was generally given for the
purchase of articles which evacuees were required to take with them to As¬
sembly Centers. It was also given to pay for crating of personal property to be
stored at Government expense, and to provide food and lodging to the date of
exclusion when the individual or family was without adequate financial means.
Items purchased for personal use in Assembly Centers were those which
each evacuee was required to take to the Center and included: bedding and
linen (mattresses together with blankets and pillows were issued at all Assembly
Centers to each evacuee), toilet articles, clothing, and essential personal effects.
It was not practicable for the Public Assistance Staff to make an accurate
or verified determination of need for financial assistance due to the short period
of time and large number of individuals who were served with a limited staff.
It was therefore necessary to make such determinations on the basis of infor¬
mation obtained during the first interview and to arrive at a judgment at that
time. It was necessary to give financial assistance to only a small percentage of
the individuals and families, but the possibility of need for such assistance was
considered at all times during the registration by the social workers.
The social worker, after completing the registration and interviewing of
the evacuee referred him to the Assistant Supervisor of Public Assistance. Here
all the records of the individual were reviewed to insure that all essential ar¬
rangements had been made and all necessary services had been given, or return
appointments scheduled, in order to complete settlement of the affairs of the
evacuee. If financial assistance had been recommended, the disbursing order was
completed and its use explained to the evacuee. When this work was accom¬
plished and all records in order, the evacuee was referred to the Control Desk.
The Control Desk was supervised by an assistant to the Station Manager.
At this point the evacuee surrendered the registration envelope but retained the
triplicate tags and any necessary property and motor vehicle forms and baggage
tags. The Control Desk inspected the records to determine that each essential
service had been performed and that necessary action had been taken by the
several staff sections to make final disposition of the case.
Medical Inspection and Service.

At all times during the operation of

each Control Station, from the hour the station first opened for registration
until the last evacuee had been placed on the train or bus, medical attention
was provided at the Control Station or was immediately available. A doctor and
at least one registered nurse were provided at each Control Station by the United
States Public Health Service.

A nurse was on duty at all hours that the Control

Station was open and the assigned physician was either present at the Station
or immediately available.
Specific appointments were scheduled for medical examination of each fam¬
ily unit. These appointments were carefully scheduled so as to distribute the
work evenly throughout the days designated for examination,

which were

OPERATION

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usually the three and four days devoted to "processing.” In areas where evacuees
were required to travel considerable distances to Control Stations, medical
inspections were conducted at the time of registration or prior to departure, in
order to avoid inconvenience and duplication of travel.
The inspections were made or supervised by officers of the United States Public
Health Service experienced in maritime quarantine inspection. When the num¬
ber of inspections was more than could be undertaken by United States Public
Health Service officers, the assistance of State, County and City health officers and,
in a few instances, of private physicians from the county medical societies was
enlisted.
Medical inspection included the observation of general appearance of the
individual, the eyes and conjunctival sacs, mouth and throat, hands and such
areas of the skin as could be seen without actually disrobing. When a person
was suspected of disease, he was taken to a room (or screened area) affording
greater privacy, the necessary clothing was removed, and a more thorough
examination was made. All examinations of female cases were made in the pres¬
ence of a nurse or other female attendant.
In practically all instances, evacuees who were ambulatory appeared at the
Control Station at scheduled hours for medical inspection. Those unable to
appear were visited in their homes by the inspecting physicians. In the case of
those individuals ill in hospitals on the inspection day, certification of the at¬
tendant physician or hospital as to the patient’s condition was often accepted
as proof of illness.
Medical inspections were made at the Control Station prior to embarkation
for a Reception or Assembly Center in 89 of the unit areas evacuated. In the
remaining 19 unit areas where the movement from the Control Station to the
Assembly Center was short, the inspection was made on arrival at the Center
and prior to induction. Every person found suffering from a condition which
made evacuation actually or potentially dangerous was recommended for ex¬
emption from evacuation until such time as his condition had so improved
that transportation to, or residence in, an Assembly Center would not constitute
a hazard to his life, or to the health or life of others.
Medical care of the type and quantity required by the patient was supplied
to each evacuee found ill at the time of inspection. The quality of the care
supplied varied somewhat from one community to another but in every case
Japanese patients received medical attention at least equal to that available to
the other residents of the same community.
Where medical inspections were conducted at Control Stations, the evacuees
were routed first to the receptionist, who checked the family number on the
triplicate tag in the possession of the head of the family, and then took from
the file the registration envelope containing the records of that family. The
Routing and Control Slip was checked to see if there were appointments sched¬
uled with any other staff sections and the evacuee family was then sent to the
medical section.
The medical section receptionist removed the third, or medical examiner’s

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portion of the triplicate tags for each member of the family, and directed the
members of the family to the examining physician. If any member of the family
was not present due to illness, necessary data regarding the absentee were obtain¬
ed in order that the examining physician could make a home call.
All unusual physical conditions were noted on the Social Data Registration
form. In those cases where physical conditions made evacuation at that time
inadvisable, the examining physician recommended temporary deferment until
such time as their condition would permit evacuation with safety. Cases of
illness detected on arrival at an Assembly Center, where the inspection was con¬
ducted prior to induction, were handled in the same manner as those detected
at the Control Station.
Hospitalization and Deferment of Special Cases.

Persons with con¬

tagious and infectious diseases were transferred, if their physical condition per¬
mitted, to the most easily available public hospital where they were kept at
government expense until the period of communicability was past and the pa¬
tient able to travel. In some instances where hospital facilities were not avail¬
able, or where it was impractical to move the patient, temporary exemption
was granted to the patient and to members of the patient’s family so as to
provide necessary home care. However, wherever possible the patient was hos¬
pitalized at government expense and the patient’s family was evacuated with
the regular movement.
Maternity cases in hospitals were allowed to remain in these institutions, for
the duration of confinement. In most cases financial arrangements between the
patient and hospital had been completed before the evacuation orders were
posted. Cases of pregnancy of eight months or more were not normally allowed
to go to an Assembly Center. Such cases were recommended for exemption from
evacuation until the mother and baby were declared able to travel.

While it

would have been less expensive to have allowed the women to remain in their
homes until time for delivery, there was no provision for the general exemption
from exclusion of members of families to care for such cases. However, in a
few instances, where hospital facilities were not available, it was necessary to
provide for temporary exemption for the pregnant woman and an adult mem¬
ber of her immediate family to care for her at home.
Many persons suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis and already in public
or private sanitoriums were found. These cases were deferred from evacuation
and were transferred, if their physical condition permitted, to the most easily
available and best public tuberculosis sanitorium in the community, where they
were hospitalized at government expense.

Mental patients in sanitoria were

exempted from evacuation so that they might remain under psychiatric super¬
vision. Short-term illnesses already hospitalized, when a unit area was evacuated,
were usually allowed to remain in hospitals at their own expense. Long-term ill¬
nesses and illnesses occurring during the registration and processing period were
placed in public hospitals at Federal expense. If hospitalization was available,
every case unable to be evacuated for any medical reason was admitted to a
hospital.

Persons who of necessity were confined in private homes, remained

OPERATION

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under the supervision of the United States Public Health Service until physically
fit to be evacuated.
All persons deferred from evacuation for medical reasons remained under the
direct supervision of physicians of the United States Public Health Service dur¬
ing the period of deferrment. Cases of temporary illness, contagious infections,
diseases, childbirth and pregnancies, were moved to Assembly Centers when re¬
covery was complete or when the physical condition, for which deferment had
been granted, so improved as to permit evacuation with complete safety to the
individual. Cases of long term illnesses and those requiring special medical care,
such as pulmonary tuberculosis and insanity, were allowed to remain in insti¬
tutions.
No evacuee, deferred for medical reasons, was later transferred to an Assem¬
bly Center until such transfer was recommended by the supervising United
States Public Health Service physician. The basis of this recommendation in
all cases was the improved physical condition of the individual evacuee and the
medical facilities available in the Centers to provide any required additional
medical care.
At the time of the physical inspection the examining physician noted all
cases which would require special accommodations for travel, such as the aged,
infirm, babes in arms, and pregnant women. These individuals were recom¬
mended to the Station Manager for Pullman berth accommodations, ambulance
service or other special facilities as required. Where the travel to the Assembly
Centers was an over-night journey, Pullman berths were provided for all such
persons and for all others recommended by the United States Public Health
Service representative for that type of accommodation.
Transportation from Control Stations to Centers. After the medical
examination was completed, the evacuees were directed to the social worker
who checked all records to make certain that all necessary services had been
furnished to prepare the family for evacuation. The evacuees were then inform¬
ed of the scheduled date and hour for their departure to the Assembly Center,
and they were assigned to a specific numbered bus or coach in the convoy. The
data as to the date and place of departure and coach or bus number were written
on the individual identification tag.

In the evacuation of fifty-two of the Exclusion Areas, evacuees were allowed
to drive their personal cars in supervised convoys to the Assembly Centers for
storage, if the distance to be travelled was not over 100 miles. In those cases
where private cars were permitted, the convoys were escorted by military police,
and a nurse or doctor, and were accompanied by an Army towcar.
Most evacuees were moved in special bus convoys or trains. On busses and
train coaches three persons were assigned for each four seats. This gave space
for the comfort of the evacuees and for hand luggage.
Five hundred evacuees were normally moved in one unit. For such move¬
ments, two baggage cars were provided for baggage which was not taken on
the coaches with the evacuees. The baggage cars were loaded and sealed prior

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to departure. For the bus convoys, trucks were provided to transport the surplus
baggage.
All baggage was marked and tagged with the name of the head of the family
and the family number in accordance with instructions given at the Control
Station. It was also required that all baggage be in substantial containers or
securely wrapped and tied in bundles so as to avoid any possibility of loss.
On each special train there was assigned one doctor and a minimum of one
registered nurse. Each train was equipped with necessary medical supplies and
with any special foods and paraphernalia for the preparation of formulas for
infant feeding. The type and quantity of foods and equipment so provided, were
varied according to the length of the trip. Provisions were also made for meals
enroute as required. In those cases individual box lunches and cold drinks were
provided. These were generally arranged for in advance, and were picked up
enroute on or about the hour they were to be esrved. Where it was necessary to
prepare the lunches prior to the start of the journey, iceboxes were provided
in order to properly preserve foodstuffs.
A doctor and a nurse were similarly assigned for bus convoys carrying up
to 500 evacuees and comparable facilities for the health and comfort of the
evacuees were provided. All necessary stops enroute for exercise and personal
comfort were made. Any evacuees on the bus convoys who appeared in need of
medical care during the movement were placed together in one bus and were
accompanied by a registered nurse. Medical personnel in charge of convoys were
authorized and instructed to provide hospitalization in the nearest available
hospital in all emergency medical cases occurring enroute.

CHAPTER XI
Protection of Property of the Evacuees
While the decision was pending, and even after it had been determined
to evacuate all persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast, no single
aspect of evacuation procedure stimulated more discussion than that which
related to evacuee property protection.

During the month of February The

Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration for the House
of Representatives, 77th Congress

(The Tolan Committee), held exhaustive

hearings along the Pacific Coast.

Persons from all walks of life appeared

before this committee including many persons of Japanese ancestry.

Virtually

every witness expressed interest or concern in the economic and sociological
considerations.

In substantially every instance, suggestions were made pro¬

posing various methods of affording protection.

It would unduly extend this

report to refer in any detail to these many suggestions.

Many were made not

only to the Tolan Committee but also to the Army and other Federal agen¬
cies.

It is sufficient to say that the problem was widely recognized and that

many proposals were advanced for

its solution.

During the course of its

hearings, the Committee made specific recommendations in this regard to the
interested Executive Departments of the government

and urged the early

appointment of an alien property custodian.
It has been noted in Chapter III and IV that consideration was given to this
subject from the beginning—as early as January 5 th during discussions between
the assistant to the Attorney General, Mr. James Rowe, Jr. and the Commanding
General at San Francisco. In a memorandum to Mr. Rowe, quoted at the end of
Chapter II, supra, the Commanding General pointed to the need for careful plan¬
ning to avoid undue hardship.

It was then still contemplated that the Depart¬

ment of Justice might direct, coordinate and supervise certain alien enemy migra¬
tions from critical areas. Again on February 14th when the Department of Justice
had withdrawn from any program involving collective evacuation (see letter of the
Attorney General to the Secretary of War dated February 9, 1942, quoted on page
7), the Commanding General in recommending mass total evacuation of Japanese
from the Pacific Coast, proposed that authority be granted to make for adequate
provision for conservation of property.

He recommended that specific means

be established for arresting economic loss either through the designation of a
trustee in conservation or through affording free facilities for the equitable dis¬
position or liquidation of properties.

Once authority had been accorded the

Commanding General to take action under Executive Order No. 9066, coincident
with the publication of Proclamation No. I on March 2nd, he announced:
“The appropriate agencies of the Federal Government are engaged in far reaching
preparations to deal with the problem * * * regarding the protection of property, the
resettlement and relocation of those who are affected.
127

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“The property section of my staff will deal with the perplexing problem of pro¬
viding a property custodian, of minimizing economic dislocation, and of evading so
far as possible forced sale by persons affected.”

If the evacuation had been undertaken in the same way as compulsory
migrations in other countries, it would not have been an underlying consid¬
eration that the evacuation program should entail a minimum of economic
loss and social dislocation.

In order to implement that controlling principle

very specific steps were taken.
for present purposes

To describe those steps it is deemed sufficient

to present a resume of

the activities of the Federal

Reserve Bank, San Francisco, and the Farm Security Administration in the
field of property protection.
The property protection program can be analyzed in two parts.

First,

that which related to Japanese owned or operated farms, including crops,
livestock and farm equipment.

Second, that relating to all other classes of

evacuee property both real and personal including such categories as house¬
hold

goods,

business

motor vehicles.

establishments,

accounts

receivable

and

payable,

and

These two phases of property protection were administered

by the Farm Security Administration as the designee of the United States De¬
partment of Agriculture and by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
as fiscal agent for the United States.

These instrumentalities functioned under

the direction of the Wartime Civil Control Administration.
a narrative account of the services rendered by them.

This chapter is

Each of them has pre¬

pared its own detailed reports, copies of which are to be on file with Head¬
quarters, Western Defense Command, the War Department, and the Library
of Congress.

These reports present in much greater detail such subjects as

the authorizations given them, the exact administrative procedures, personal
functions, expenditures and services rendered.

The purpose of this chapter is

to compress the record of their activities into summary form.
That phase of the program undertaken by the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco is presented first.

It is followed by a summary of the activities

of the Farm Security Administration.
The formulation of an evacuation plan necessarily entailed consideration
of the disposition of the real and personal property of those who would be
subject to removal from designated areas.

It was anticipated that creditors

would be disinclined to afford any protection for the interests of their debtors
and that unscrupulous dealers and investors would be prone to take advan¬
tage of the unfavorable bargaining position of those involved.

Therefore,

means of reducing financial and material losses to a minimum were studied.
It was resolved that the enlistment of the services of an agency widely expe¬
rienced in handling a large quantity and variety of property transactions was
desirable.

Responsive to a request for assistance, the Secretary of the Treasury

designated the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, a fiscal agent of the
United States, as the agency thus experienced.
Authorization and Powers.

The Federal Reserve Bank was first advised

of its new assignment in a telegram dated March 5, 1942, from the Treasury
Department which outlined certain phases of the program then still in the

PROTECTION OF PROPERTY

129

formative stage. On March 7, 1942, all powers reposing in the Secretary of
the Treasury which were incident to the execution of the new duties were
delegated to the Federal Reserve Bank, including those under Section V(b)
of the Trading With the Enemy Act as amended by Title III of the First
War Powers Act of 1941. These powers were re-delegated by the Secretary
of the Treasury after the creation of the office of the Enemy Alien Property
Custodian on March 11, 1942, because it was believed that a jurisdictional
hiatus may have arisen by reason of the creation of that office. On March
11, 1942, the bank was authorized and directed to take all steps necessary to carry
out the objectives of the program, as prescribed by his representative, the
Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration. The letters of authority from
the Commanding General to the Federal Reserve Bank are quoted in Chapter
IV hereof. A delegation of power by the War Relocation Authority was made
on March 25, 1942, to avoid any jurisdictional conflict which may have come
into being by reason of the existence of that agency. These directives, author¬
izations and powers emanated from the President’s Executive Order No. 9066,
dated February 19, 1942.
Administration of the Property Plan
Preliminary Action. A series of conferences between the Federal Reserve
Bank, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Treasury
Department and the Military Authorities was held and a plan of procedure
was agreed upon for the protection of property of evacuees under the direc¬
tion and supervision of the Wartime Civil Control Administration.
The cooperation of all banks in Military Area No. 1, and later in Mili¬
tary Area No. 2, was solicited, and such institutions were advised of the
desired methods and principles to be followed, and the objectives to be
attained. The facilities of other governmental agencies, federal, state and
local, were utilized.
Publicity. The Information Division of the Wartime Civil Control Admin¬
istration secured the support of the press and radio in advising evacuees, cred¬
itors, prospective purchasers, lessees, operators, and the public, of the services, aims
and policies of the government and the Military Establishment in the evacuee prop¬
erty program. The response of the press and radio was wholehearted and effective.
Advantage of every opportunity favorably to influence future dealings was
exercised. Organizations of all kinds, including banking groups, trade, credit
and other associations, business organizations and Japanese societies, were
periodically addressed for the purpose of inspiring voluntary fair treatment
in all transactions involving such organizations, or their clients, and the
Japanese.
Bank Departments and Offices. An Evacuee Property Department was
organized within the Federal Reserve Bank structure which was placed under
the direct supervision of a vice-president and an assistant cashier of that insti¬
tution. A Federal Reserve liaison section was established at Wartime Civil Control
Administration and the administrative channel from the Director, Wartime Civil

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Control Administration, was through this liaison section to the vice-president to
the field forces. Directive operations were carried on from the head office but the
administrative branch of the new department was decentralized and housed at 500
California Street, San Francisco, California. Other branches were established at
addresses independent of bank offices in Los Angeles, California, Portland, Oregon,
and Seattle, Washington, between March 9 and March 13 of 1942.
Civil Control Station Representation.

In addition to the establishment

of the four principal offices, arrangements were made to place representatives
in certain of the offices of the United States Employment Service throughout
Military Area No. 1 and in Service Centers and Civil Control Stations in accord¬
ance with the "team” service plan initiated by Wartime Civil Concrol Admin¬
istration.

Federal Reserve Bank representatives frequently visited the territory

surrounding Civil Control Stations in order to implement office representation
and facilitate problem solution. Bank agents were so stationed for the purpose of
administering such of the evacuee property program problems which remained
unsolved at the time of actual evacuation.

Few such cases were uncompleted

at that time in view of the groundwork previously laid.
Operations at Assembly Centers. As it was necessary for evacuees to use
some household equipment until the day of evacuation, it became necessary
for bank agents to remain in contact with evacuees in order to finally settle
any pending affairs and to dispose of and store the last of their effects, and
for those purposes Bank representatives were maintained at Assembly Centers.
In some instances the representatives were permanently assigned to the Centers
and in others contact was maintained through periodical visits.
As the ultimate responsibility for the care and protection of the property of
evacuees rests in the War Relocation Authority, no representatives of the
Bank were assigned to War Relocation Centers. All pertinent records in connec¬
tion with evacuee property interests were made available to War Relocation
Authority.
Personnel. Personnel was generally recruited from the existing Federal Re¬
serve Bank force, and those having particular experience and ability in various
fields of endeavor were selected.
At the peak of operations, 184 persons were engaged in the Bank’s per¬
formance of the property protection plan. Bank operatives were admonished to
hold the information imparted to them in strict confidence and to respect the
trust which had been placed in them. They were required to prepare and submit
reports of their activities and progress in the field, and their acts and decisions
were reviewed by supervisional district officers to determine whether supplemental
action was necessary or advisable.
The need for flexible "freezing power” in the conduct of evacuee property
protection, particularly with regard to personal property, was apparent.
of the objectives of the plan was to restrain unconscionable creditors.

One

Accord-

131

PROTECTION OF PROPERTY

ingly, the Bank issued Special Regulation No. 1.

It provided that the exercise

of any right, power or privilege with respect to "special blocked property” was
prohibited except when authorized by the Bank.

The term "special blocked

property” was defined to be "property in which an evacuee national has an
interest and which has been designated as special blocked property.”

"Evacuee

national” was defined to include all persons of Japanese ancestry subject to
exclusion.

The regulation was confirmed by the Secretary of the Treasury and

was published in the Federal Register March 21, 1942.

The authority for the

regulation rested upon Section V (b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act and
upon the authority vested in the Commanding General under Executive Ordei
No. 9066.
All Wartime Civil Control Administration teams were advised of the exis¬
tence of the power.

The Bank’s representatives were instructed to exercise the

power wherever an evacuee property problem proved to be beyond compromise.
It developed, however, that the mere existence of the authority had the desired
effect.

A similar power accorded Farm Security Administration was exercised

but once.

The Bank’s responsibility did not exercise it in any instance during

administration of the program.
Optional Service and Private Dealings. The evacuee property protection
plan was predicated on the principle that this service was to be available to
those who chose to call upon it on a purely voluntary basis. There was a total
absence of compulsion, although

every

appropriate

means

was

pursued

to

encourage its use. The Japanese were urged to call for the services, present their
problems for consideration and solution.

A continuous effort was put forth

to anticipate and forestall future difficulties.
Subject to the limitations of the Foreign Funds Control Operations of the
Treasury Department, persons of Japanese ancestry were at liberty to dispose
of their properties by sale, lease or any other arrangement desired by them.
The Foreign Funds Control limitations imposed little or no burden upon
evacuees as all essential licensing transactions were completed with all necessary
dispatch.
Cases in which powers of attorney were exercised by the institution were
largely limited to transactions under the Army motor vehicle purchase program,
and only in one case was a power of attorney otherwise used.
Operating Procedure and Accomplishment. Problems were classified and
assigned to those representatives best qualified in the particular field.

Agents

were instructed to explore fully the facts and circumstances of each case, to
render considered advice. In all instances, when relationships with other persons
were involved, they were directed to approach such persons in the interest of
the evacuee and achieve a satisfactory solution through negotiation and com¬
promise.
Where evacuees elected to avail themselves of assistance and had once pre¬
sented themselves for consultation, and did not reappear, they were queried
to ascertain whether their problems were fully and satisfactorily concluded.

132

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

Personal interviews and a follow-up system were also pursued with creditors.
Complex legal problems were presented and every effort was made to seek
their settlement. Contract and conditional sale obligations of all types, realty
purchase agreements, tenancy commitments and evaluation of equities of all
types, were handled and disposed of. Many accounts payable to evacuees were
collected for them.
Remittances of refunds, such as those due upon public utility use termina¬
tions were arranged.

Business inventories were liquidated, leasehold interests

were protected, and management for properties and businesses of all types,
including flats, apartments, hotels and other income properties, bakeries, beauty
parlors, canneries, church properties, cleaning and dyeing establishments, dry
goods concerns, florists, garages, laundries, markets, newspapers, novelty stores,
nurseries, packing houses, and restaurants was provided.

The service of man¬

agement organizations and other firms specializing in business operation were
secured where advisable or where substitute private operators were unobtainable.
The following table illustrates the nature and number of business activities
handled by the Bank during the program at its peak:

TABLE 9.—Classification of Interviews by Types of Businesses as of May 22,
1942, Head Office Zone
Number of Cases._.
Ntimber of Persons Interviewed.
Number of Persons Represented
Residences.
Flats and Apartments.
Business._.
Equipment and Merchandise...
Furniture and Fixtures.
Farms and Orchards.

3,562
6,515
41,483
712
120
1,325
2,111
942
1,002

Major Business Classification
Bakeries....
Beauticians.
Canneries...
Churches...
Cleaners....
Dry Goods..
Fertilizers...
Florists.
Garages
Hotels..
Laundries...
Liquors.
Markets
Newspapers.
Novelties. ..
Nurseries. ..
Packers.
Professions..
Restaurants.
Sport Goods.
All Others...

7
38
1

34
205
32
5
21

16
158
75
14
102

6
19
230
9
19
56
2

276

Interviews Conducted. Representatives conducted 26,954 interviews rela¬
tive to general property problems. Many of this number involved the concerns
of several members of a family or of associates or organizations, and that figure
should be considered in the light of such augmentation.
sented 10,600 individual cases.

The interviews repre¬

133

PROTECTION OF PROPERTY

TABLE 10.—Total Interviews and Total Individual Cases Handled by Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco in Connection With the
Evacuation Program

Office

Number
of
interviews

Number
of
cases

Total (all offices).

26,954

10,600

San Francisco (Head Office).
Los Angeles Branch.
Portland Branch.
Seattle Branch.

7.895
9,109
3,741
6,209

4,630
4,059
207
1,704

Agriculture.

The Bank’s inability in some cases, to divorce general prop-

lems from those of an agricultural character, necessitated the involvement of
the Bank in situations concerning evacuees engaged in farming, although, as
the general program progressed, the responsibility for settlement of the majority
of all agricultural problems was assumed and administered by the Farm Security
Administration.
Storage of Personal Property
General Considerations. By Proclamation No. 4, dated March 27, 1942,
the Commanding General ordered the cessation of further voluntary migration
effective March 29th. This was primarily to insure an orderly plan of supervised
evacuation.

It was stimulated essentially by reason of the need for protecting

the evacuees themselves (See Chapter VI).
In anticipation of Proclamation No. 4, the Commanding General authorized
the Wartime Civil Control Administration to arrange for the storage of all
evacuee personal property which they did not desire to dispose of otherwise. A
number of possibilities were considered including the construction of facilities
at Assembly Centers. While this was favorably regarded it would have imposed
a considerable strain on transportation facilities already over-taxed and would
have entailed additional construction which the alternative finally adopted
eliminated. Accordingly, the Federal Reserve Bank was instructed to anticipate
storage needs, locate warehouses and other buildings suitable for storage, and
secure them by lease. Forms and procedures were developed for the purpose by
Wartime Civil Control Administration and Wartime Civil Control Administra¬
tion Service Center and Civil Control Station teams were instructed fully to
inform evacuees of the availability of this service.
Whenever possible, a building not previously used for storage purposes was
acquired on a monthly basis as economically as circumstances permitted and,
where practical, the use of public storage concerns was avoided in an effort to
prevent unnecessary warehouse congestion.

In those instances where public

warehouses only were available, they were used, and sometimes storage space
was utilized at Assembly Centers. Guarding service was provided on a twentyfour hour basis for storage premises to prevent damage or destruction through
vandalism or theft.
All personal property, including stocks of merchandise, other than perish-

134

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

able goods, were accepted for storage, as was machinery and equipment. Inven¬
tory

forms

were

provided

and

identification

tags

issued.

Evacuees

were

instructed to crate all belongings and avoid collections of small units or bundles.
They were directed to make inventories of everything to be stored.

The goods

were checked upon delivery to draymen and warehousemen and receipts were
issued to the owners.

Discrepancies between the property declared and that

actually received were adjusted with the evacuee.
Drayage facilities were provided in urban communities and the goods were
collected at the evacuee’s residence, place of business or other location wherever
possible.

Shortages of drayage facilities were sometimes encountered in rural

communities or districts and under such circumstances evacuees were urged
to move as many of their belongings as possible to designated property assembly
locations for removal to storage buildings.

Where available, local hauling and

drayage concerns were employed for the movement of all such property.
Scope of the Operation.

Those evacuees in both Military Areas Nos. 1

and 2, who elected to use the government storage plan were in the minority,
a major portion of them having made private provision for the care of their
property.

Evacuees from Military Area No. 2 were transferred direct to War

Relocation Centers upon evacuation, rather than to Assembly Centers, and in
many instances their household effects were forwarded directly to them at the
Centers. In addition to the properties stored from Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2,
goods were accepted from evacuees and internees from the Territory of Alaska,
and stored in Seattle, Washington, the port of their debarkation.

These latter

properties were subsequently released from storage upon the instructions of the
proper authorities.
Termination of Wartime Civil Control Administration Jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the goods became vested in the War Relocation Authority after
the evacuation was completed, and control over 2,983 family units of property
was assumed by that agency.

(See Chapter XX, Agreement between War De¬

partment and War Relocation Authority of April 17, 1942.)

Some specific

items of belongings were forwarded to evacuees at Relocation Projects by the
bank on the direction of the War Relocation Authority during the period of resul¬
tant readjustment. A schedule of property stored follows:

TABLE 11.—Property

Received for Storage in Military Areas
Transferred to War Relocation Authority
Office

Number of
family units

1

and

2

and

Number of
individual units

Total (all offices).

2,983

38,693

San Francisco (Head Office).
Los Angeles Branch.
Portland Branch.
Seattle Branch.

1,375
1,190
153
265

17,930
15,168
2,966
2,629

Handling and Storage. In the disposition of motor vehicles, evacuees were
afforded the following avenues of disposition:

(a) private sale, lease or storage

through private arrangements; (b) sale or other disposition through the facilities

135

PROTECTION OF PROPERTY

provided by Wartime Civil Control Administration;

(c)

sale to the Army;

(d) storage in facilities made available by Wartime Civil Control Administration.
In connection with the latter course open to them, evacuees were permitted
to drive their cars from a given exclusion area control station to the pre¬
described Assembly Center under convoy.

As the emphasis was to encourage

and induce evacuees to make their vehicles available for continued use in the
war effort, every appropriate means were applied to stimulate private sale or
sale to the Army. By far the major portion of evacuees chose to dispose of their
vehicles through private channels.

The substantial majority of them stored

them in private places and these vehicles never came into the custody, con¬
structive or otherwise, of any governmental agency.

The minority who did

choose to store their cars at public expense drove them to guarded parking
lots.

In order to arrest the deterioration ensuing from open storage, cars thus

stored were immediately appraised by two disinterested appraisers with a view
to ultimate purchase or, if owners refused to sell or make some appropriate
disposition for beneficial use, their requisition.
Sales.

Sales to the Army were consummated soon after the appraisal was

completed where such procedure was agreed upon by the evacuee. It became ap¬
parent that the storage of vehicles would serve little purpose and would result
in deterioration and waste, whereupon renewed offers of Army purchase were
submitted to those evacuees who had not availed themselves in the first instance
of the Army purchase plan where the vehicles were qualified for Army acquisi¬
tion.

Many car storage cases were converted to sales through this approach.

The evacuees were permitted, however, to dispose of their vehicles at private
sale at any time.
Payment.

Where no third party claim existed, a check was issued by the

Bank to the registered owner in the amount of the appraised value of the vehicle.
The vehicle was then delivered to a designated representative of the Army
Quartermaster’s Corps against receipt.

Many third party claims were encoun¬

tered where vehicles had been purchased under installment contracts.

Under

those circumstances the legal and registered owners were consulted, balances
established and agreements for the transfer consummated. Under such circum¬
stances the interest of the legal owner was cleared through the issuance of a
Bank check in the amount required to discharge the unpaid obligation.

The

difference between the appraised value and such sum was forwarded to the
evacuee in satisfaction of his equity.

Wartime Civil Control Administration

reimbursed the Bank for all sums so advanced upon presentation of proper
vouchers.
Vehicle Requisition.

Vehicles relinquished to the custody of the Bank

numbered 1,905, of which 1,469 originally were voluntarily sold to the Army
and 319 were released in accordance with the instructions of the evacuees.
The 117 vehicles remaining in storage under the control of the Bank were sub¬
sequently subjected to requisition by the Army.

Pending completion of the

requisition proceedings, voluntary sales to the Army continued.

Only those

136

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

vehicles which the evacuee owners refused to sell and which were in open
public storage were requisitioned.
Farm Vehicles.

The motor vehicle purchase program contemplated the

acquisition of all vehicles other than farm equipment, the latter falling within
the jurisdiction of the Farm Security Administration.

At first some difficulty

was experienced in arriving at a clear definition of "farm equipment”. Wartime
Civil Control Administration subsequently determined that farm equipment
should be defined as that type of equipment ordinarily handled by dealers in farm
implements. The only motor vehicles actually handled by the Bank were auto¬
mobiles, trucks and a few trailers.

There follows a schedule of motor vehicles

handled under the program:
TABLE 12.—Motor Vehicles Received and Handled by the Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco

Total

Office

Sold to army

Released to depositors
for private dis¬
position*

Submitted for
requisitioning

1,905

1,469

319

117

152
1,682
13
58

120
1,312
7
30

28
259
5
27

4
**111
1
1

*On Form EPM 8.
**While 111 vehicles in Los Angeles Branch zone were submitted to the Military authorities under pro¬
posals for requisitioning, voluntary sales of the vehicles to the Army continued, pending comp¬
letion of requisitioning details.

Conclusion
The following objectives of the Evacuee

Property Program

have been

achieved:
1.

Real properties and business enterprises of evacuees have been disposed
of at fair prices or are being operated through substitute management;

2.

Personal property, other than motor vehicles, which was not sold or
otherwise disposed of by the Japanese, has been placed in protective
storage;

3.

Many motor vehicles which were not sold at private sale have been pur¬
chased or requisitioned by the United States Army.

4.

Business transactions of all kinds have been adjusted and settled, so far
as can be determined, to the satisfaction of the parties concerned.

5.

Responsibility for evacuee property protection was relinquished to the
War Relocation Authority only after the completion of the evacuation
process.
Agricultural Property Protection

At the time the evacuation program was conceived the Commanding Gen¬
eral was confronted with the problem of the evacuation of the Japanese farmer.
This

class

comprised 45.3

per cent

of

the

employed Japanese

population

of Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington. An estimated 6,000 farms,

137

PROTECTION OF PROPERTY

aggregating some 260,000 acres valued at $73,000,000.00 became the immedi¬
ate concern of the Wartime Civil Control Administration.
Japanese farming interests were analyzed with a view to the accomplishment
of the intended evacuation with a maximum of expedition and a minimum of
crop loss.

Protection of many of

the

growing crops was

of concern to

Wartime Civil Control Administration in view of the demands of war. The
Secretary of Agriculture had established

1942 production goals for certain

farm products considered vital in the prosecution of the war. Japanese farms
in California had been expected to contribute an appreciable proportion of
many of these commodities. Contribution to such effort, in lesser degree, was
expected of the Japanese in Oregon, Washington and Arizona.
Numerous complicating factors in the successful preservation of the crops
and in the minimization of financial loss to the evacuees immediately evinced
themselves. The Japanese people were the most important racial minority group
engaged in agriculture in the Pacific Coast region.

Their systems of farming,

types of crops, and conditions of land tenure were such that their replacement
by other farmers would be extremely difficult; yet replacement was considered
necessary to the successful completion of the plan in order to preserve expected
and important production. Since Japanese production was predicated upon the
intensification of farming methods, frugality and economy of operation, mini¬
mization of ‘water consumption, family labor, and special and peculiar skill,
substituted operation on a practical basis at first seemed a difficult if not an
insurmountable obstacle from a production preservation standpoint.
A very complex system of land tenure in California resulted from the pro¬
hibitions against Japanese land ownership contained in the Alien Land Law of
May 19, 1913, and it further complicated the farm evacuation program. Seventy
per cent of the Pacific Coast Japanese farmers were classified as tenants and
the remainder owned their land through minors or third parties who appeared
to be disinterested parties.
Of a total of 48,926 Japanese workers over fourteen years of age, in the
four mentioned states, 7,000 were farm operators or managers, and 13,000
were farm laborers, making a total of 20,000 deriving their livelihood from
agricultural pursuits.
Not only the desire to assure to the Japanese farmer a fair and equitable dis¬
position of his real and personal property was involved, but the necessity for the
protection of the American farmer, landlord, creditor, merchant and consumer,
as well.

Land, rental, crop, and equipment values required stabilization, and the

substitution of purchasers, operators, tenants, share croppers, and labor in the
places of the evacuees was an immediate and pressing necessity.
At the request of the Commanding General transmitted to the Department
of Agriculture by the Assistant Secretary of War, the Farm Security Adminis¬
tration was named as the designee of the Department of Agriculture in its
evacuation operations participation.
Accordingly, on March 15 th, the Farm Security Administration, through

138

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

its Coast Regional Director, was authorized and
administer

an

appropriate

program.

The

directed to institute and

program

outlined

was

one

de¬

signed to secure the continued operation of Japanese agricultural lands and
assure a fair and equitable disposition of Japanese farming interests.

Such

authority included an authorization to make, service, and collect loans and
provide necessary farm management and advice. The letters of authorization
from the Commanding General as supplemented by the Director, Wartime Civil
Control Administration, are quoted in Chapter III, supra. The original letter of
authority from the Commanding General was in confirmation of arrangements
previously made on an informal basis between Mr. Laurence I. Hewes, Jr., Regional
Director and the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration.
After a brief period of operation by Farm Security Administration, it became
apparent that the authority vested in it by the Commanding General’s order and
authorization of March 15 th would require supplementation. Instances were soon
encountered where the interests of landlords, creditors and potential purchasers
of crops and farm assets came into conflict, not only with the interests of
Japanese farmers, but also with those of each other. Landlords, because of the
presence of non-assignability clauses in leases, sought to deprive Japanese farm
operators of their crops and leasehold interests. Conditional contract sellers
were ready to exercise forfeitures based upon breaches which would be necessi¬
tated by the enforced evacuation.

Landlords, creditors, and prospective pur¬

chasers were ready to take advantage in other ways of the adverse bargaining
position of Japanese evacuees, even at the cost of serious loss of agricultural
production. There was a further possibility that Japanese operators would
abandon farm land, would discontinue normal agricultural operations, would
refuse to consummate transfers of their agricultural properties, or would per¬
haps commit sabotage of crops and machinery. None of this could be coun¬
tenanced.
On March 7, 1942, evacuees were warned against the destruction of grow¬
ing crops, as follows:
"Foodstuffs are vital in prosecution of the war, and for Japanese ranchers professing
loyalty to the United States there is no better way of showing sincerity than by continu¬
ing to raise crops. On the other hand, wilful destruction of crops demonstrates disloy¬
alty and unwillingness to cooperate.”

On March 9, 1942, it was announced that Japanese farmers, aliens or cit¬
izens, who plowed under growing crops would be arrested and prosecuted as
saboteurs.

The statement said, "Destruction of growing foodstuffs is outright

sabotage and will be dealt with accordingly.”

However, action was taken to

insure the continued cultivation of farm properties and to protect the interests
of evacuee operators.
Accordingly, it was requested that authority be delegated to the Secre¬
tary of Agriculture, and, in turn, to the Farm Security Administration and
its Regional Director, to exercise "freezing powers.”

These powers emanated

from Section 5 (b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act as amended by Title
III of the First War Powers Act of 1941.
cised by the Bank.

The power was similar to that exer¬

139

PROTECTION OF PROPERTY

Funds were made available from the Chief of Staff’s Contingent Fund and
later from the President’s Emergency Fund to Farm Security Administration for
the formation of the California Evacuated Farms Association, a corporate entity
capable of undertaking the operation of farms and the acceptance of powers of
attorney if such should become necessary through the exercise of the “freezing
power.”
Administrative Agencies and Services
Regional Director.

Throughout the evacuation program the Farm Se¬

curity Regional Director was personally responsible to the Commanding Gen¬
eral for the agricultural phases of the evacuation.

Fie was the authorized rep¬

resentative of the Department of Agriculture and directed the activities of Farm
Security Administration under the supervision of the Wartime Civil Control
Administration. A Farm Security Administration liaison section was estab¬
lished at Wartime Civil Control Administration. This served as the administra¬
tive channel from the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, to the
Director, Farm Security Administration, and the field forces.
Public Information Activities. Meetings between Wartime Civil Control
Administration and representatives of Farm Security Administration, State Agri¬
cultural War Board, United States Agricultural Extension Service, Bureau of Ag¬
ricultural

Economics,

Agricultural

Adjustment

Administration

and

Farm

Credit Administration were called and the farm evacuation plan was explained
and discussed with a view toward effecting unity and cooperation throughout
the state and the nation. Farm Security Administration looked to the War
Boards for advice and recommendations concerning local conditions of which
they were particularly cognizant, and state and local Chambers of Commerce
and Japanese-American organizations were called upon for cooperation in the
execution of the program. An Information Division, created March 16, 1942,
and disbanded June 10, 1942, publicized the movement for the purpose of
edifying the evacuee and the farming and general public alike in the agricul¬
tural aspects of evacuation.
Reports.

Wartime Civil Control Administration’s complete surveillance

of the program was materially aided by the submission of daily field progress
reports and weekly statistical surveys throughout the operating period by Farm
Security Administration.
Personnel.

Wartime Civil Control Administration agricultural aspects

of evacuation operations required the employment of a total of 521 persons, of
whom 148 were detailed from the permanent force of the Farm Security Admin¬
istration, 367 were newly employed and 6 were specialists borrowed from the
Farm Credit Administration. These figures apply to total numbers of personnel
employed, as the maximum number on duty at the peak of operations was 375.
Initiation of Activities.

On March 13, 1942, Farm Security Administra¬

tion’s Regional Director initiated proceedings for the development of an opera¬
tional field organization. Three days later basic procedure had been formulated
and the administrative plan was decided upon. On March 16, 1942, 48 Farm
Security Administration Rural Rehabilitation supervisors in Arizona, California,

140

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

Oregon, and Washington received orders to report for duty as field agents at 48
Service Centers, which had been established in United States Employment Service
offices, throughout Military Area No. 1, and instructions concerning the work
they would immediately undertake upon arrival at their destinations were
dispatched on the following day. Thirty-nine of these offices were in California,
five in Washington, two in Oregon, and one in Arizona. Special information
offices were opened in principal metropolitan centers. Eight additional offices
were subsequently placed in operation in Military Area No. 1. By June 5, 1942,
five offices were staffed in Military Area No. 2, and four additional offices were
subsequently opened in that Area.
Registration of Japanese Farms.

Contact was first established with

Japanese farmers through Field Agents. Registration of all Japanese farms and
recordation of the location and description of every farm subject to evacuation
followed. By March 27, 1942, 6,307 Japanese farms had been listed in Military
Area No. 1, of which 5,436, totalling 151,063 acres had been inspected. In
Military Area No. 2 over 850 farms were registered. The process of registering
Japanese farms by Farm Security Administration in Areas 1 and 2 continued
throughout the program with the assistance of Japanese-American Societies, the
United States Department of Agriculture County War Boards, local organiza¬
tions, and agricultural commissions, although 80 per cent of the task was ac¬
complished within the first week in both Areas.
Registration of Prospective Operators.

Aggressive tactics in the loca¬

tion and registration of prospective substitute farm operators and managers
and prospective purchasers of crops, machinery and other farm assets were
employed after the voluntary phase of the evacuation program ended on March
31, 1942. During the first ten days of field operation in Military Area No. 1,
1,487 prospective operators were registered.

One week later this number had

doubled, (3,151). By May 15, it had doubled again (6,455). Registration was
accomplished with like dispatch in Military Area No. 2.
Progress in Completing the Disposal of Farm Properties.

During the

first ten days of field operation, when voluntary evacuation was still possible,
734 deals were closed and 28,042 acres,

(10 per cent), transferred to new

operators. One week later, April 3, 1942, 1,776 transactions had been completed,
embracing 59,653 acres. By May 31, 1942, over 6,000 deals had been consumated, involving 230,248 acres and 6,596 farms. For all practical purposes
the transfer of Japanese farms in Military Area No. 1 had been completely
accomplished, and the crops and land were in the hands of the most qualified
substitute operators who could be selected under the circumstances. The pro¬
gram was carried out with equal facility in Military Area No. 2.
Providing Credit to Substitute Operators.

Short term agricultural

credit was indispensable to many substitute operators desiring to take over
evacuated

properties.

However,

while

6,596

transfers

were

involved

in

the entire evacuation of Military Area No. 1, but 722 loans were required.
The mere availability of such credit had a stabilizing and stimulating effect
on the dealings between prospective operators and established credit agencies

PROTECTION OF PROPERTY

and between such operators and the Japanese.

141

The use of credit agencies such

as the Farm Credit Administration, the Rural Rehabilitation Offices and private
banks, was advocated wherever practical, but Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬
tration productions loans were granted where the substitute operators appeared
qualified to assume the operation of evacuated property in all respects except that
of eligibility for private credit.
Wartime Civil Control Administration loans were authorized “for the pur¬
pose of meeting any expense or charge in connection with land use, feed and
fertilizer, livestock, farm machinery, equipment and tools, or supplies and/or
services.” They were not authorized for land acquisition or for the construction
of real estate improvements. Loans were to be made for a period of one year or
less with the definite expectation that renewals of notes at maturity would be
permitted where the purchase of durable goods, such as livestock or machinery,
was involved.

The interest rate was five per cent per annum.

All loans were

secured by first liens upon crops and chattels purchased with loan proceeds, and
in some instances by liens upon additional property possessed by borrowers. Each
loan application included a concise farm operating plan which specified the types
of farm enterprises to be continued or established by the substitute operator, and
the estimated expenses and incomes involved in the individual farm program.
Progress in Making Loans. The first two Wartime Civil Control Admin¬
istration loans were submitted from the field on March 23, 1942. By the end of
March, 3 5 loans had been received totaling $23 5,312. At the end of the first week
in April, 155 loans had been submitted and 33 approved. During the entire period

,

to June 1 789 loans were submitted totaling $4,450,140. Of these loans 722 were
approved, totaling $3,120,243. Forty-two of the loans provided for an advance
of funds at future dates. The amount involved in such advances was $320,411.
The average size of all loans approved was $4,321.67; 77 per cent were for
amounts under $5,000, 22 per cent for amounts under $50,000, and less than 1
per cent for sums exceeding $50,000.

The distribution and average size of loans

was influenced by certain large corporation loans which were made and which
involved the assumption of the operation of several farms by a single borrowing
agent.
The loan policy was modified during the evacuation of Military Area No. 2
to deny loans to corporations, organizations or associations unless their mem¬
bers, directors, or stockholders assumed payment responsibility. This change met
with considerable opposition from prospective operators, but credit was arranged
through other channels and no Wartime Civil Control Administration loans
whatever were granted in that Area.
Special Negotiations Unit
Frequently the prevailing size and highly specialized character of Japanese
farm enterprises made successful operation by individual substitute operators
impractical and uneconomical, and consequently some consolidation of the
operation of these small farms was found to be necessary. Local leaders and
established agricultural

cooperative

groups

and

associations

and real estate

companies, being best qualified, were interested in the movement and opera-

142

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

tional agreements were consummated with many of them. A Special Negotia¬
tions Unit was established to review, and, in an appropriate degree, supervise
these larger scale transactions. In some instances corporations were organized
by such groups for this purpose. Each such organization undertook to operate
a number of farms and if financing proved necessary it was provided. They
supplied competent supervision, management and labor for 124 evacuated farms
totaling 4,023 acres and $617,987.17, was loaned by Wartime Civil Control Ad¬
ministration for this purpose.
Freezing Power and Fair Dealing
When it became evident that hard bargains were to be imposed on the
Japanese by creditors, purchasers, and operators, the power of "freezing” any
inequitable transaction was delegated to Farm Security Administration, and
the formation of an entity through which business could be conducted in
consequence of the exercise of the power was undertaken.

The vesting of

such power and the provision for means to exercise it had the desired effect of
stabilization, and, as a result, it became necessary in only one instance in the
entire evacuation process to assert the "freezing power.” One power of attorney
and management contract was accepted by the California Evacuated Farms
Association, the entity so established for the purpose, and thirteen powers of
attorney which had been accepted by a Farm Security Administration field
agent during the initial phase of the evacuation from Bainbridge Island in Puget
Sound were transferred to the Association. Occasionally powers of attorney were
given by the Japanese to private individuals who agreed to represent them in the
disposition of their properties, but a relatively small number of such situations
developed, as nearly all transactions were concluded prior to evacuation.
Farm Machinery.

The preservation, distribution, and transfer of farm

machinery presented such difficulties that the adoption of a firm policy was
necessary to prevent waste, destruction, or sale for scrap. Many substitute
operators owned or had access to sufficient equipment to farm the added acre¬
age. Dealers in scrap metal attempted to buy from the Japanese at sacrificial
prices. Implement dealers were reluctant to purchase, and there was some
indication that some equipment may have been intentionally destroyed. There¬
fore Wartime Civil Control Administration directed the institution of a cam¬
paign to assure (1) the retention of farm machinery by the substitute operators
upon the land where it had been formerly used if they so desired, (2) the con¬
tinued utilization in the locality of former use if needed by others, and (3) the
discouragement of storage or sale for scrap of any such equipment. An agreement
was reached with implement dealers’ associations whereby dealers consented to
act as attorneys in fact for the Japanese in the sale of farm machinery which was
placed with them on a consignment basis. As a result, by May 8, 1942, undisposed
of equipment remained on but thirteen farms in Military Area No. 1 and was of an
approximate value of $11,655.00, and available farm machinery and equipment
had been distributed in a manner consonant with a maximum agricultural war
effort.

143

PROTECTION OF PROPERTY

Fiscal Summary
The Finance Division of the Farm Security Administration provided the
necessary services in handling the accounts for the agricultural aspects of the
evacuation program, and the creation of a new section of finance in the Wartime
Civil Control Administration for this purpose was thus avoided.
On March 18, 1942, $1,000,000 was allocated from the contingent fund of
the Army Chief of Staff to Farm Security Administration for use in making
Wartime Civil Control Administration loans. By the middle of April, this sum
had been exhausted, loans aggregating over $900,000 having been made.

On

April 24, 1942, an additional $5,000,000 was transferred from the President’s
Emergency Fund for the continuation of operations.

A total of $3,584,025.42

had been expended for loans and administrative costs by the end of May.

Of

this sum, $3,434,008.08 was for loans and $150,017.34 for administrative costs.
Conclusion
The first Civil Control Station opened on March 24, 1942 at Winslow,
Washington.

Between that date and June 6, 1942, over 100,000 persons of

Japanese ancestry were processed in 112 Civil Control Stations, and evacuated
from Military Area No. 1. On May 27, 1942 the Farm Security Administration
was advised by Wartime Civil Control Administration that the California por¬
tion of Military Area No. 2 would be evacuated, and on June 5, 1942, Farm
Security Administration agents opened offices in the Sacramento and San Joaquin
valleys. Between July 4 and August 11, 1942, over 9,000 persons were evacuated
from Military Area No. 2 in California.

By August 8, 1942, the Farm Security

Administration had completed its phase of the property protection program.
Table 13 summarizes the accomplishments of that program.
TABLE 13.—Summary of Cases Served by the Farm Security Administration:
Military Areas 1 and 2
Military Area
No. 1

Military Area
No. 2

Total Civil Control Stations.

112

9

Farm cases registered.

5,349

867

5:266

866

Cases with property arrangements
Completed when Stations closed.
Farm cases with property arrangements
Incomplete when Stations closed.
Acreage operated by registered evacuees.
Acreage with property transactions
Completed.
Acreage with property transactions
Incomplete.

83

1

210,179

34,536

207,942

34,511

2,237

25

After evacuation of the Japanese was accomplished in any area, attention was
concentrated upon all incomplete cases and acreages.
Of the evacuee Agricultural Property Protection Program, it may be con¬
cluded:
1.

That substitute management and operation has been achieved for 99
percent of Japanese farms.

144

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

2.

That farm equipment has been utilized, consistent with fair dealing and
protection of evacuee interests, to the greatest advantage of the war effort.

3.

That the use of land, the nature of crops, and the quantity of production
underwent a minimum of change as the result of the evacuation of
Japanese owners, operators, and labor, although some deviation was ex¬
perienced in highly subdivided suburban districts or in localities in which
poor soil and inadequate water supply were found.
the land reverted to pasture.

In a few instances,

Some reduction in production will have

been experienced by reason of the loss of the peculiar skill and experience
of the Japanese, his capacity for labor, and his employment of intensive
farming methods, but the production of crops vital to the war effort has
been maintained and in some instances augmented.
Table 14 shows the number of evacuee farms (viz., farms subject to re¬
linquishment) and the number successfully transferred or for which substitute
operators were found. The data in this table are for operations in both Military
Area 1 and Area 2.
TABLE 14.—Farms and Acreage Subject to Relinquishment
FARMS SUBJECT TO
RELINQUISHMENT
Office

All
farms

Transferred
N umber

ACREAGE SUBJECT TO
RELINQUISHMENT
Total
acreage

Percent

Transferred
Number

Percent

All offices.

7,311

7,243

99.1

256,741

254,830

99.3

Arizona.
Phoenix.

31
31

31
31

100.0
100.0

1,438
1,438

1,438
1,438

100.0
100.0

California.
Military Area 1.
Bakersfield.
El Centro.
Fresno.
Hayward.
Los Angeles.
Pasadena.
Sacramento.
San Diego.
San Jose.
Santa Ana.
Santa Maria.
Santa Rosa.
Stockton.
Torrance.
Watsonville.
Military Area 2.
Chico.
Lincoln.
Marysville.
Reedley.
Visalia.
Oregon.
Portland.
Washington.
Auburn.
Yakima.

6,084
5,437
120
254
469
254
548
352
754
190
604
544
155
81
303
414
395
647
24
52
17
373
181
366
366
830
715
115

6,062
5,415
120
254
469
254
548
351
734
190
604
544
154
81
303
414
395
647
24
52
17
373
181
366
366
784
669
115

99.6
99.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100,0
99.7
97.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
99.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
94.5
93.6
100.0

223,257
198,675
6,118
12,729
27,784
6,758
7,941
7,319
36,878
6,070
13,841
15,926
16,776
1,209
15,827
8,462
15,037
24,582
643
2,876
573
13,985
6,505
13,974
13,974
18,072
10,635
7,437

221,744
197,162
6,118
12,729
27,784
6,758
7,941
7,309
35,627
6,070
13,841
15,926
16,524
1,209
15,827
8,462
15,037
24,582
643
2,876
573
13,985
6,505
13,974
13,974
17,674
10,237
7,437

99.3
99.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
99.9
96.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
98.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
97.8
96.3
100.0

CHAPTER XII
Deferments and Exemptions From Evacuation
The Public Proclamations and Restrictive Orders provided for the immediate
evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry.
were made in the interest of justice.
to be moved without danger to life.

However, certain exceptions

There were Japanese in hospitals too ill

There were Japanese children in orphanages,

for whom proper facilities were not available in the Assembly Centers.

There

were Japanese in institutions who required special attention, which the Assembly
Centers were not equipped to provide, and those who were imprisoned. Defer¬
ment from evacuation was granted these persons until their physical condition
permitted movement or until they were released.
Early in the evacuation program another problem requiring special con¬
sideration was presented.

Included among the evacuees were persons who were

only part Japanese, some with as little as one-sixteenth Japanese blood; others
who, prior to evacuation, were unaware of their Japanese ancestry; and many
who had married Caucasians, Chinese, Filipinos, Negroes, Hawaiians, or Eskimos.
Most of these people were American-born, had been through American
schools, had not developed Oriental thought patterns or been subjected to socalled Japanese culture.

Because of their Americanization and their awkward

social position, life in the Japanese Centers proved a trying and often humiliating
experience.

The adults were ostracized and the half-caste children ridiculed.

Their presence in the Assembly Centers was the source of constant irritation to
the Japanese, provoked bad feeling and added to the difficulties of administra¬
tion.

Although non-Japanese spouses were eligible to reside in the Centers,

many of them found life in a totally Japanese community unbearable, and left,
thus breaking up the family group.
A policy was initiated which provided exemption from evacuation for
certain mixed-marriage families and mixed-blood individuals whose background
made it reasonably clear that their sympathies were and would remain American.
Those eligible for exemption from evacuation or eligible to return to the evac¬
uated zone were:
1.

Families consisting of a Japanese wife, a non-Japanese husband, citizen
of the United States or of a friendly nation, and their mixed-blood un¬
emancipated children.

2.

Families consisting of a Caucasian mother, citizen of the United States
or of a friendly nation, and her mixed-blood children by a Japanese father
(either dead or separated from the family).

3.

Mixed-blood

(one-half Japanese or less)

individuals, citizens of the

United States or of friendly nations, whose backgrounds have been
Caucasian.
4.

Japanese unemancipated children who are being reared by Caucasian
foster-parents.
145

146

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

5.

Japanese wives of non-Japanese spouses serving in the armed forces of
the United States.1

As a condition to release, each applicant’s name was submitted to the several
intelligence services, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of
Naval Intelligence, and the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 and to the
police chief of the local community where the applicant intended to establish
residence. If the applicant had a clean record and his residence in the community
was not objected to by the local authorities on the ground that it would provoke
incidents, exemption from evacuation was authorized.
In addition to residents of the Assembly Centers, applications for exemption
from evacuation and for permission to reside in the evacuated area were re¬
ceived from:
1.

Persons who for one reason or another had not been evacuated and were
still resident in the evacuated areas.

2.

Persons in War Relocation Authority Centers.

3.

Persons who had voluntarily left their families in the evacuated areas,
and had established residence elsewhere.

The applications of such individuals for permission to reside in the evacuated
area were considered, and where it was deemed necessary, the applicant’s back¬
ground was investigated through the Public Assistance Division of the Federal
Social Security Board.

If the applicants were found to be eligible under the

mixed-marriage policy, permits were issued after the necessary intelligence and
police clearances had been secured.
Each person granted an exemption from evacuation was furnished a com¬
bination photograph permit showing his authority for residence in the evacuated
area with his family.

Each is required to furnish a monthly report reflecting

births, deaths, marriages, divorces, change of address or any incident bearing
upon community acceptance.

This information has been recorded in Wartime

Civil Control Administration files. All residence addresses of exemptees are imme¬
diately forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The purposes of these

safeguards are:
1.

To keep informed of the whereabouts of persons of Japanese ancestry
in the event future developments require a different solution of the
mixed-marriage problem or require the apprehension of an individual.

2.

To keep advised of the community attitude with respect to the residence
of Japanese in the evacuated area, since community attitude is a factor
bearing on the ultimate success or failure of the mixed-marriage program.

During the execution of the mixed-marriage program, 465 persons of Japa¬
nese ancestry were released for residence in the evacuated area.

Of these, 290

were mixed-blood children, 34 were mixed-blood parents, 72 were Japanese
mothers, and 68 were mixed-blood adults with no children.

Only one full-

1Otlier mixed-marriage families and mixed-blood individuals were made eligible for release from the
Assembly Centers upon the condition that they leave the Western Defense Command area. This feature of
the program was incidental since persons eligible were transferred to War Relocation Centers and out of
the jurisdiction of the Army before many relocations could be arranged.
Many of these were released by
War Relocation Authority with Army consent to take up residence within the Western Defense Command
area but outside the evacuated zone. Only ten families left the Assembly Centers for residence outside the
Western Defense Command area.

DEFERMENTS AND EXEMPTIONS FROM EVACUATION

147

blooded Japanese male, a citizen of the United States, was authorized to reside
in the evacuated area.

A special exception was made in his case because of long

and honorable service in the United States Navy.

Of the total group, 375 per¬

sons of Japanese ancestry elected to reside in California, 14 in Oregon, 53 in
Washington, and 23 in Arizona.

(Fourteen persons subsequently moved out of

the evacuated area.)
The execution of the mixed-marriage program has not adversely affected
military security, and it has achieved certain benefits:
1.

Mixed-blood children are being reared in an American environment.

2.

Families have been reunited.

3.

Mixed-blood adults predominantly American in appearance and thought
have been restored to their families, to their communities, and to their
jobs.

PART V
ASSEMBLY CENTER OPERATIONS

CHAPTER XIII
Assembly Center Location, Construction
and Equipment
The considerations which induced the decision to establish Assembly Centers
as transitory evacuation facilities have already been presented in preceding chap¬
ters. The dominant factor was that evacuation could not await the preparation
of semi-permanent Relocation Centers. Once their use had been decided upon,
evacuation planning and execution moved forward simultaneously.
Assembly Center site selection was a task of relative simplicity. As time
was of the essence, it will be apparent that the choice was limited by four rather
fundamental requirements which virtually pointed out the selections ultimately
made. First, it was necessary to find places with some adaptable pre-existing
facilities suitable for the establishment of shelter, and the many needed com¬
munity services. Second, power, light, and water had to be within immediate
availability as there was no time for a long pre-development period. Third,
the distance from the Center of the main elements of evacuee population served
had to be short, the connecting road and rail net good, and the potential
capacity sufficient to accept the adjacent evacuee group. Finally, it was essen¬
tial that there be some area within the enclosure for recreation and allied activ¬
ities as the necessary confinement would otherwise have been completely demor¬
alizing. The sudden expansion of our military and naval establishments further
limited the choice.
After an intensive survey the selections were made. Except at Portland,
Oregon, Pinedale and Sacramento, California, and Mayer, Arizona, large fair¬
grounds or racetracks were selected. As the Arizona requirements were small,
an abandoned Civilian Conservation Corps camp at Mayer was employed. In
Portland the Pacific International Live Stock Exposition facilities were adapted to
the purpose. At Pinedale the place chosen made use of the facilities remaining on a
former mill site where mill employees had previously resided. At Sacramento an
area was employed where a migrant camp had once operated and advantage was
taken of nearby utilities. However, construction was substantially all new there.
It will be remembered that Manzanar Reception Center, located at Owens
Valley, Inyo County, California, and the Colorado River War Relocation Center
in Arizona were intended essentially for use as Reception Centers. They were to
be operated by the Army during the initial phases of evacuation. Manzanar was
under Army operation until June 1st, 1942, when it was transferred to War Relo¬
cation Authority for use as a Relocation Center. The Colorado River Center was
operated by War Relocation Authority from the beginning. Direct evacuation to
both of these Projects was substantial. Nine thousand eight hundred thirty
evacuees were moved directly to Manzanar. Eleven thousand seven hundred eleven
were evacuated from their former residences to Colorado River. These Centers
therefore eliminated the need for additional Assembly Center capacity. In this
chapter, however, comments are confined to Assembly Centers. The Manzanar
and Colorado River projects are discussed in Chapter XXI.
151

152

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

Very largely it was possible to adhere to the objective that Center residents
originate exclusively in the areas adjacent to each Center. Some variation in this
became essential, however.

The Centers at Puyallup, Washington, and Port¬

land, Oregon, lacked sufficient capacity in the aggregate to house all the evacuees
from those States.

It was not economically feasible to establish a third Center

in the Northwest in view of the existence of sufficient excess capacity elsewhere.
Toppenish, in eastern Washington, proved to be wholly unsuitable from a health
and sanitation viewpoint and although partially readied for use as an Assembly
Center it was never so employed.

Hence, some movement of Washington and

Oregon evacuees to California Centers was unavoidable, although shuttling
was kept to a minimum.

The largest movement from the States of Washington

and Oregon was to the Center at Pinedale. This Center had an excess capacity
above the requirements of the area serviced.
evacuees were moved directly to Pinedale.

4,048 Washington and Oregon

These were later transferred to the

Relocation Center at Tule Lake, California, to rejoin other evacuees from the
area of their former residence at the earliest opportunity.
A second Assembly Center in Arizona was partially readied for use.

At

Cave Creek a former Civilian Conservation Corps camp was made available for
this purpose but, due to considerable voluntary migration into the northern half of
the State, the need for the Cave Creek camp did not materialize. The Cave Creek
facility was later utilized, however, by an infantry regiment as a Recreation Center.
The selections proved to be reasonably adequate for the purpose.

It will

be recalled that the intention was to house evacuees in Assembly Centers for a
much shorter period than that which proved to be the case.

For extended

occupancy by men, women and children whose movements were necessarily
restricted, the use of facilities of this character is not highly desirable.
was, however, no alternative.

There

Modifications and additions effected during the

course of operations tended largely to overcome

the

natural

disadvantages

inherent in the confinement of a large community within a limited area.
Assembly Center construction generally followed those specifications estab¬
lished for Army cantonments. Of course, numerous refinements were included
adequately to provide for the housing of family units.

Considerable augmen¬

tation was essential because of the necessity for providing separate utilities for
men and for women and children.
A map of the West Coast States and Arizona with the general location of
each Assembly Center is presented as Figure 15, the center spread in the follow¬
ing series of maps. This figure also shows the maximum population of the Center
and the period of evacuee occupancy.
The exact location of each Assembly Center is shown on Figures 14-a to
14-1 inclusive. These figures are in geographical order from north to south and
are self-explanatory.
The general features of each Assembly Center are illustrated in the series of
aerial photographs (Figures 16-a to 16-o) following the maps.

153

ASSEMBLY CENTER LOCATION, CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT

LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER

LEGEND
30 Miles

PAVED ROADS

mimmtw

RAILROADS

GRAVEL ROADS

FEDERAL HIGHWAYS

DIRT ROADS

STATE HIGHWAYS

PRINCIPAL CITIES

ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES

THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MILES APART.
THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES.

Figure 14-a

JAPANESE

154

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER

PORTLAND
Deer Island^
Watemew\
Columbia Oil

Cormlcl
.Ridgetield

Scappoose]
IHockinsort

C rcharc

Wfa
Rains

'I

PORTLAND

Scholl:

.Estacada

L 464

in A MS

LEGEND

10

PAVED ROADS

III Hll HUtH

RAILROADS

GRAVEL ROADS

FEDERAL HIGHWAYS

DIRT ROADS

STATE HIGHWAYS

PRINCIPAL CITIES

ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES

THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MILES APART.
THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES.

Figure

14-b

ASSEMBLY

CENTER

LOCATION,

CONSTRUCTION

AND

155

EQUIPMENT

LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER

LEGEND
10

PAVED ROADS

20

I I I I t II I IHH4

30 Miles

m

RAILROADS

GRAVEL ROADS

FEDERAL HIGHWAYS

DIRT ROADS

STATE HIGHWAYS

PRINCIPAL CITIES

ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES

THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MILES APART.
THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES.

Figure

14-c

156

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER

LEGEND
10

mum ph-f h-

PAVED ROADS

RAILROADS

GRAVEL ROADS

FEDERAL HIGHWAYS

DIRT ROADS

STATE HIGHWAYS

PRINCIPAL CITIES

ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES

THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MILES APART.
THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES.

Figure

14-d

ASSEMBLY

CENTER

LOCATION,

CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT

LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER
\V

SALINAS
imadaro

mUir.

;j^,982N*l

Sargent]

Mo** tanning

■ViMtlHa •'Ion

ialinas
£29
Pt Pino*

Pacrtie

AiiiomW^fPY*

/

jKCigling
aWorkfield
>Seaside\

Buena Visti
Carmel

Ipnzalea
Pinyon PeaJaJj

Jamasburg

soeo

LEGEND
10

10

PAVED ROADS

IMI III I H-H-H-

GRAVEL ROADS

RAILROADS
FEDERAL HIGHWAYS

DIRT ROADS

STATE HIGHWAYS

PRINCIPAL CITIES

ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES

THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MILES APART.
THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES.

Figure

14-e

157

MAXIMUM JAPANESE POPULATION
■LL/NGHAM

OROVILLE

OF OCCUPATION

AND DATES

OF ASSEMBLY

CENTERS

COlviclV

MOUNT

'$^J(°«anozah

POST>
IMCtLES

EVERETT

''y^XEWSTCH

ASSEMBLY
CENTER

Ty.ac>»tBATA~
wb^ATj;^
SOOTH|

HITZVILLE^
X

MAXIMUM
POPULATION
NUMBER

l COLZA*

OCCUPIED
FROM

DATE

TO

VAKIMA
sunnysioc

^«uS?noview
■jrQjtLjo
T^Q5>'alama

River

TILL AMO<

WALLA walla

imooho

IPUYALLUP

7,390

MAY 2 5 APRIL 28 SEPT 12

1 PORTLAND

3,6 76

JUNE 6

MAY 2

SEPT 10

|MARYSVILLE

2,451

JUNE 2

MAY 8

JUNE 29

.SACRAMENTO

4,739

MAY 30

MAY 6

JUNE 26

j TAN FOR AN

7,816

JULY

STOCKTON

4,271

MAY

TURLOCK

3,661

JUNE 2

L'a GRAND!

fOALLj

;sh*ni

SALEM

ifOSSIL

'ALBANY

EL - -I
\jrE"
,<s° ^^inoSLj< \ f*V~

"jUNCTtON (Jj

''^RINEVILLE

ELOAENCI

BEND]

'cahyon

i city

•CAN

25 APRIL 28

OCT

13

SORT ROCK

'NARROW!

RATER l

MAY 10

OCT 17

APRIL 30

AUG 12

21

VATlMRt

lakevicw

SALINAS

3,5 8 6 JUNE 23 APRIL 27

JULY 4

.MERCED

4,508

JUNE 3

MAY 6

SEPT 15

.PINEDALE

4,792

JUNE 29

MAY 7

JULY 23

..rnrfttsio

C#l 5* 9

.TULARE

4,978

AUG II

APRIL 20 SEPT 4

[SANTA ANITA

18,719

AUG 23

MARCH 27

OCT 27

[POMONA

5,434

JULY 20

MAY 7

AUG 24

MAY 7

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JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

160

LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER
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LEGEND
10

PAVED ROADS

III IIIIIHW

GRAVEL ROADS

RAILROADS
FEDERAL HIGHWAYS

DIRT ROADS

STATE HIGHWAYS

PRINCIPAL CITIES

ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES

THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MILES APART.
THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES.

Figure

14-f

ASSEMBLY

CENTER

LOCATION,

CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT

161

LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER

LEGEND
10

I I I I I I I I HUM

PAVED ROADS
GRAVEL ROADS

RAILROADS
FEDERAL HIGHWAYS

DIRT ROADS

STATE HIGHWAYS

PRINCIPAL CITIES

ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES

THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MILES APART.
THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES.

Figure

14-g

162

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER

TURLOCK AND MERCED
Grange / 63!
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610

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698

Ballicot
idendale'

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Agatha'

LEGEND
10

PAVED ROADS

H H 111 H-H4B-

GRAVEL ROADS

20

30 Miles

RAILROADS
FEDERAL HIGHWAYS

DIRT ROADS

STATE HIGHWAYS

PRINCIPAL CITIES

ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES

THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MILES APART.
THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES.

Figure

14-h

ASSEMBLY

CENTER

LOCATION,

CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT

163

LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER

LEGEND
10

30 Miles

HIIUlHUm

PAVED ROADS

RAILROADS

GRAVEL ROADS

FEDERAL HIGHWAYS

DIRT ROADS

STATE HIGHWAYS

PRINCIPAL CITIES

ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES

THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MlfcES APART.
THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES.

Figure

14-i

164

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER

I H II I I H

PAVED ROADS
GRAVEL ROADS

H-

RAILROADS
FEDERAL HIGHWAYS

DIRT ROADS

STATE HIGHWAYS

PRINCIPAL CITIES

ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES

THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MlfcES APART.
THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES.

Figure

14-j

ASSEMBLY CENTER LOCATION, CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT

165

LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER

SANTA ANITA AND POMONA

LEGEND
10

PAVED ROADS

20

I i III H f H-H-H-

GRAVEL ROADS

30 Miles

RAILROADS
FEDERAL HIGHWAYS

DIRT ROADS

STATE HIGHWAYS

PRINCIPAL CITIES

ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES

THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MILES APART.
THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES.

Figure

14-k

166

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER

10

20

PAVED ROADS

111 III I H+H4+

30 Miles

RAILROADS

GRAVEL ROADS

FEDERAL HIGHWAYS

DIRT ROADS

STATE HIGHWAYS

PRINCIPAL CITIES

ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES

THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MILES APART.
THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES.

Figure

14-1

ASSEMBLY

CENTER

LOCATION,

CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT

167

Figure 16-a—Fresno Assembly Center

168
JAPANESE
EVACUATION
FROM
THE
WEST
COAST

Figure 16-b—Marysville Assembly Center

ASSEMBLY

CENTER

LOCATION,

CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT
169

Figure 16-c—Manzanar Assembly Center

170
JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Figure 16-d—Merced Assembly Center

ASSEMBLY

CENTER

LOCATION,

CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT

171

Figure 16-e—Pinedale Assembly Center

172
JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Figure 16-f—Pomona Assembly Center

ASSEMBLY

CENTER

LOCATION,

CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT

173

174

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Figure 16-h—Puyallup Assembly Center

ASSEMBLY

CENTER

LOCATION,

CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT

175

Figure 16-i—Sacramento Assembly Center

176

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Figure 16-j—Salinas Assembly Center

ASSEMBLY

CENTER

LOCATION
CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT

177

178

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Assembly Center

16-1—Stockton
Figure

ASSEMBLY

CENTER

LOCATION,

CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT

179

180

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Figure 16-n—Tulare Assembly Center

ASSEMBLY

CENTER

LOCATION,

CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT

181

Assembly Center

16-o—Turlock
Figure

ASSEMBLY

CENTER

LOCATION,

CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT

183

In most instances, the adaptation of existing structures was limited in scope.
These were used, in the main, to provide warehouse facilities, offices, infirmaries
or large mess halls.

In some cases these buildings were ideal for use in connec¬

tion with evacuee work projects, schools, repair shops and recreational activities.
With appropriate modification and renovation, existing buildings were some¬
times suitable for use as apartments.
In large measure, apartment space was provided through new construction.
The

type of buildings erected for this

purpose was substantially uniform.

Theater of Operations type barracks with suitable floors, ceilings and partitions
were built at most Centers.Where the site selected would so permit, apartments
were grouped in blocks.
ties were erected.

Within each block, showers, lavatories and toilet facili¬

The capacity of each block varied, but the norm was between

six to eight hundred.

Wherever practicable, a kitchen and mess hall were pro¬

vided for each block.

In some Centers, however, notably Santa Anita, Tan-

foran and Portland, existing facilities were adapted for use as mess halls and in
these instances larger groups of evacuees were messed at a single facility.
In all Centers climatic conditions were taken into account in design and
construction.

This also influenced location.

Provision was made against cold,

rain and extreme heat.
As noted, the design and lay-out of construction varied between Centers.
At Portland, for example, substantially all of the evacuees were housed under one
roof in the Pacific International Livestock Exposition Pavilion. This pavilion cov¬
ered eleven acres of ground, and apartments were provided within it to house
3,800 people.

At Santa Anita the stable area was renovated and modified

to provide suitable apartments.

The apartments in this area were considered to

be the most desirable of all by Santa Anita residents.

As a matter of fact there

was adequate apartment space elsewhere in Santa Anita to house evacuees but
residents in the remodeled stable area preferred to remain there.
Where existing structures were inadequate to provide housing for commu¬
nity services, buildings were added for this purpose.

Infirmaries were established

at every Center and, in the larger installations, hospitals were built.

Laundries,

canteens, post offices, dental clinics, barber shops, warehouses, administration
buildings and places for the reception of visitors had to be built or created by
adaptation of existing accommodations.
Housing for Military Police at each Center was provided in an area separate
from the Assembly Center inclosure.
to those used by evacuees.

Ordinarily, these facilities were similar

Where existing accommodations could not be

adapted for this purpose, barracks were constructed as were auxiliary installa¬
tions.
Following transfer of evacuees to Relocation Centers, Assembly Center
facilities were occupied by various Army agencies without exception.

Most

of them were employed as service schools for the various Army branches,
such

as

ordnance,

signal

corps,

quartermaster

and

transportation

corps.

184

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Physically, all Assembly Centers are more ideally suited for troop use than they
were for the housing of families.
The dates of transfer from Wartime Civil Control Administration as an
agency of Western Defense Command to the new Army using agency and the
name of the transferee or new user in each case is set forth in the following table.
Center

Date of Transfer

New Using Agency

Fresno

November 9, 1942

Fourth Air Force Technical Training Command

Marysville

June 16, 1942

VII Army Corps

Mayer

June 27, 1942

Forestry Service

Merced

September 30, 1942

Fourth Air Service Area Command

Pinedale

August 6, 1942

Fourth Air Force

Pomona

September 4, 1942

Ordnance Motor Transport

Portland

September 30, 1942

Portland Port of Embarkation

Sacramento

July 30, 1942

Signal Corps

Puyallup

September 30, 1942

Ninth Service Command

Salinas

July 24, 1942

VII Army Corps

Santa Anita

November 30, 1942

Ordnance

Stockton

October 30, 1942

Fourth Air Service Area Command

Tanforan

October 27, 1942

Northern California Sector, WDC

Tulare

September 15, 1942

VII Army Corps

Turlock

August 24, 1942

Ninth Service Command

It is inappropriate to record in detail the character of the equipment installed
and the supplies furnished each Assembly Center.
fully outfitted kitchens and mess halls.

Standard equipment included

Showers, lavatories and flush toilets

were located and spaced to insure privacy and sanitation.

Even where pit type

latrines were erected flushing devices were installed.
All kitchens, mess halls and barracks were screened and weatherized.
Where feasible, central refrigeration was installed; otherwise, each kitchen
was furnished its own refrigerator.
trical outlets.

Evacuee apartments were wired with elec¬

Standard Army steel cots, mattresses, blankets (a minimum of

three per person)

and pillows were issued.

Where evacuees did not have or

could not afford linens, these were purchased by arrangement with the Federal
Security Agency out of funds made available by the Army.
Laundries were equipped with stationary wash tubs and ironing boards.

As

there was no established precedent, the demand for hot water was inaccurately
gauged at some Centers.

The initial installations had to be augmented.

Ample

hot water for use in laundries and showers, as well as the kitchen for scalding
utensils and dishes, was thus made available.
In the smaller Centers, infirmaries were established.

All of these had a

sufficient complement of beds and facilities to provide for the less aggravated
and less serious in-patient cases.

All of these were equipped with sufficient

means to include clinical services and to meet the needs of out-patient require¬
ments.

A laboratory, surgical room, and kitchen were included in each.

The

necessary medicines, bandages, dressings, and instruments were also furnished.
Some difficulty was experienced in obtaining dental equipment but this was
ultimately provided.

In the larger Centers, complete hospitals were established

ASSEMBLY

CENTER

LOCATION,

CONSTRUCTION

AND EQUIPMENT

185

with ample equipment and supplies. A detailed description of the medical care
provided evacuees is found in Chapter XV.
Play fields, recreational halls, and fire stations were equipped with the neces¬
sary items. Fire protection equipment was distributed throughout each Center.
Woodworking, gardening, and general maintenance tools were acquired.
Necessary motor transportation to maintain Center supply and to provide for
garbage disposal was uniformly made available. In short, the equipment and
supplies were those to be found in any well ordered community in sufficient
quantity to maintain health, sanitation and reasonable comfort.

CHAPTER XIV
Housing, Feeding and Clothing
Apartments were assigned evacuees at Assembly Centers on the basis of
family composition. The space assigned to a couple was 10' x 20'. Larger family
units received space allotments accordingly. Where necessary, standard apart¬
ments were remodeled to fit specific needs.
Housekeeping within each apartment was limited to living and sleeping
needs, as all other community services, including meals, were provided centrally
at mess halls and elsewhere. Showers, latrines and wash basins were located in
the center of each block of apartments. Each apartment was furnished with
the necessary Army steel cots, and mattresses, blankets and pillows.

Evacuees

were encouraged to bring their own additional furnishings

and

these

transported by the Wartime Civil Control Administration.

Center carpenter

were

shops constructed many tables, chairs and other utilities for use in these apart¬
ments.
Needed warehouses, administrative buildings, mess halls, kitchens, laundries,
latrines, showers, hospital infirmaries and recreational halls were added to normal
facilities by the Engineer Corps.
Housing problems were relatively simple. In the organization of community
life at each Center the Wartime Civil Control Administration Operations Manual
required the appointment of evacuee block monitors who were assigned the duty
of frequent inspections to see that proper care was taken of each apartment.
Bedding was aired twice a week and each barrack was inspected frequently by the
Assembly Center housing supervisor.
Evacuees were fed in central mess halls. Due to the variation between As¬
sembly Centers and the character of the existing facilities employed, it was not
possible for every Center to operate under the same plan.
There was a supervisor of housing and feeding at each Assembly Center
and, under him, a chief steward, a supervising chef for each five mess halls, and
a chief of food warehousing.

Where inadequacy in messing facilities, cooking

services, dishwashing facilities was discovered, these were augmented.
All Assembly Centers were operated within the ration allowance prescribed
by the Army for its soldiers, i. e., 50 cents per person per day.

Early menus

developed an average ration cost of 3 3 cents. There was some tendency to be
too conservative at first and, after a period of adjustment, the average cost
was revised to approximately 39 cents per person per day.

This gave ample

allowance for special menus adapted to the feeding of infants, ulcer cases and
other chronic sufferers.
Of course, food buying opportunities varied in the general area surrounding
each Assembly Center. The actual average daily ration cost per person for all
Centers from March to October was 3 8.19 cents. Complete data on these costs
are shown on the following table:
186

HOUSING,

FEEDING

AND

187

CLOTHING

TABLE 15.—Average Daily Cost of Rations Per Evacuee
Center

March

April

May

June

July

Marysville.
Sacramento.
Stockton.
Turlock.
Merced.

$0.39
.34
.27
.36
.44

$0.33
.34
.43
.41
.37

$0.48
.50
.41

$0.46
.50
.42

$0.38

Fresno.
Pinedale.
Tulare.
Pomona.
Tanforan.

.36
.30
.28
.37
.30

.36
.37
.46
.37
.33

.38
.44
.42
.47
.38

.41

.38

.39
.48
.39

.39

Salinas.
Portland.
Puyallup.
Manzanar.
Santa Anita.

.32
.34
.32
.36
.30

.40
.31
.36

.40
.35
.49

.39
.41

.24
.39

.41

.42

.45

.41

$0.36

$0.36
.22

August

Sept.

October

$0.43

.42
.39

.39

Daily
average
$0.36
.34
.41
.44
.41

.42

.38
.37
.39
.42
.37

.42

.38
.33
.39
.36
.38

Average daily ration cost for all Centers, $0.38.

The general diet was subject to constant revision to suit the taste of evacu¬
ees. Menus were developed only after extended consultation with evacuee dieti¬
tians. A table of quantities was determined for each 100 persons. The standard
table of allowances per meal in basic items of diet was as follows.
QUANTITY PER MEAL PER 100 PERSONS
(Basic items only)
Rice .

30 pounds

Beef in quarters (including bones)

.

45

Fish frozen with heads off .

40

"

Fish fillets frozen

20

"

.

“

Beans

dry—kidney

.

15

“

Beets

.

25

"
*'

Cabbage

.

23

Potatoes

.

40

"

Spinach

.

30

"

Squash

.

28

"

.

24

"

Tomatoes

The system of serving food was a combined cafeteria and family service
style. Thus even where the number of persons assigned to a single mess hall
exceeded its seating capacity, a continuous serving process, cafeteria style, elim¬
inated delay and waiting. In the larger Centers each evacuee’s meal period was
identified by a special ticket which designated the mess hall in which he was
served and the hours for each meal. Hot dishes and entrees were served at cafe¬
teria counters.

Beverages, bread and butter, salads and desserts were served

family fashion on the tables.
Specific rules and regulations were promulgated and strictly enforced gov¬
erning the handling and preparation of food. Instructions issued covered such
subjects as prevention of food spoilage; control of bacteria; effects of heat, cold,
and light; control of insects and other pests; care of fish and meats; and care
of fresh fruits and vegetables.

These instructions also detailed the methods for

the maintenance of sanitation in kitchens, mess halls, pantries, vegetable rooms,
cupboards, ice boxes, food storage and garbage containers.

Garbage

disposal

188

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

"WEST

COAST

received careful attention, and in most instances garbage racks were screened
and placed above ground level.
Perishable foods were stored in separate warehouses and, in large Centers
where facilities permitted, central refrigeration was installed.

In the smaller

Centers, ice boxes were used in each mess hall. Where necessary, refrigeration
space was contracted for in nearby communities.
An interesting development, not followed by the Army, but practiced in all
Wartime Civil Control Administration Centers as an experiment was the central
cutting of meats. A central butcher shop was installed at each Center. Initially
it was realized that inexperienced cutting would result in waste. It was, therefore,
necessary to establish a school for butchers. The establishment of central meat
cutting resulted in substantial savings. Actually, the saving amounted to 8 cents
per pound in the cost of meat used. In the case of hamburger and sausage, made
in the Assembly Center butcher shops, the saving was more than 10 cents per
pound over the normal quantity market price.
While full facilities for baking were not installed at all Centers, central
bakeries were established in Portland, Puyallup, and Tanforan, as these three
locations had ample gas facilities. In other Centers baking was only undertaken
in the kitchens. This was limited in scope.
Special care and attention was accorded the preparation of food for infants
and small children. Formulas and menus prepared by the United States Public
Health Service and the Wartime Civil Control Administration Division of Hous¬
ing and Feeding, were provided for all infants. Feeding periods for formula
babies were on a four-hour schedule.

War milk formula ingredients, scalding

water for sterilization of bottles, nipples and all other necessary items were made
available in special diet kitchens and were delivered to mothers by evacuee at¬
tendants at regular intervals throughout the day and night. A detail of trained
evacuee girl attendants was assigned in each Center to see that mothers requiring
special baby formulas were supplied at the proper intervals.
In addition to the special formulas for babies, the United States Public
Health Service supervised special diets for children in the lower age groups as
well as for diabetics, ulcer patients, outpatients, and the very aged.
Where necessary, clothing was made available upon application. It was not
an item of regular issue. Where the need was urgent, a controlled clothing issue
was granted with a money value allowance per month not to exceed the
following:
Cost per
Month
Adult,

male

. . $3.82
Male, 6-18 years . .
2.15

Children, 1-5 years

. .
..

Cost per
Year
$30.50
25.00

2.60

27.57

4.61
Female, 6-18 years . .
2.85
Total cost per family of 5 .. 16.03

42.19

Adult, female

Infant to one year ..

2.25

26.81
162.07
27.09

Due to the delay encountered in the selection of sites for Relocation Centers,
Assembly Center Residence was extended beyond the period originally contem-

HOUSING,

FEEDING

AND

CLOTHING

plated by Wartime Civil Control Administration.

189

Therefore, the need for a

planned distribution of clothing arose after Assembly Center operations were
well under way. Had Assembly Center residence been limited to a shorter period,
no extensive purchases would have been necessary.
Contracts were executed for deliveries of clothing within the permissible
allowance to all of the Centers in California, other than Marysville, Sacramento,
Salinas, and Turlock. Evacuees in these four Centers were transferred to Re¬
location Centers at an early date, hence no extensive need developed there. Once
evacuees were tranferred to the custody of War Relocation Authority, Army
jurisdiction and responsibility ceased. This followed because of the specific pro¬
visions of Executive Order No. 9102 of the President dated March 18, 1942
under which War Relocation Authority was established.
The total amount of clothing purchased under contract amounted to ap¬
proximately $586,900. Direct purchase aggregated $44,260.

CHAPTER XV
Medical Care and Sanitation
Frequent references have been
planning

and

execution

of a

made in

medical

care

the preceding

chapters

to

the

program

evacuees

in

the

for

Civil Control Stations and during the movement of evacuees from the area
of their residence to Assembly Centers. The present chapter summarizes the
steps taken by the Wartime Civil Control Administration to provide medical
care and sanitation in Assembly Centers. In later chapters attention will be
given to the construction and equipment of hospital facilities in Relocation
Centers and to the medical care of evacuees during their transfer from Assembly
Centers to Relocation Centers.
The supervision of medical services throughout the entire program was the
responsibility of the United States Public Health Service under the direction
of the Commanding General. No medical division was established within the
Wartime Civil Control Administration; instead, the Office of the Surgeon, West¬
ern Defense Command and Fourth Army, served as a consultant agency during
the entire program. The overall planning and coordination for this phase of the
program, as well as all others, was the responsibility of the Assistant Chief of
Staff for Civil Affairs.

The Public Health Service was provided with a general

directive, grant of authority and funds.

An objective was prescribed.

In per¬

forming its mission, the Public Health Service utilized the facilities of several
other agencies, particularly county and city health officers, the state and county
medical associations, the State Department of Public Health, and public and
private hospitals.
The medical care and sanitation program for Assembly Centers was initiated
with the advance recruitment of Japanese doctors and nurses and the assign¬
ment of such personnel to the Centers. An essential section of the advance party
recruited and assembled for each Center consisted of Japanese

doctors

and

nurses. These staffed the infirmaries and outpatient departments of each Center
before the arrival of the first group of evacuees. The total number of Japanese
doctors and nurses in the entire evacuee population was low. It was therefore
necessary to allocate such personnel among the Centers rather than to allow
them to follow the normal course of evacuation.

In the advance recruitment of

medical personnel the Public Health Service was assisted by state and county
medical associations, the Japanese doctors themselves, and the staff of the United
States Employment Service.

The latter agency actively engaged in recruiting

the remaining elements of each advance party opening each Center.
Under the supervision and frequent visitation of experts from the Public
Health Service, the physician in charge, in all cases a Japanese doctor, was in
complete charge of the Center hospital outpatient department, dental clinic,
and other direct medical functions within the Assembly Center. Administra¬
tively the Chief Medical Officer was responsible to the Center Manager on all
matters relating to general policy, space, personnel and non-medical supplies,
190

MEDICAL

CARE

AND

191

SANITATION

and to the Public Health Service on all matters of medical policy, medical
supplies and equipment. Daily reports were prepared by the Chief Medical
Officer for both the Center Manager and the Public Health Service. The Office
of the Surgeon, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, conducted occa¬
sional inspections of medical care and sanitation in the Assembly Centers.
Written regulations and procedures governing the more important phases
of the operation of Center hospitals, medical programs, etc., were issued by
the Public Health Service.
Hospital buildings. There were added to the permanent buildings in each
Center (buildings constructed before the Army took over the installation)

a

sufficient number of barrack type buildings to provide ample space for all med¬
ical services. These new buildings differed from other barracks in that they were
built from one to three feet off the ground, ceiled overhead and on the sidewalls,
and on partition walls inside. They were partitioned into rooms and wards. In
many instances the sidewalls and ceilings were painted. These buildings were all
completely screened and, where the summer heat was high, a sprinkler system
was placed on the roof to lower the temperature. At Santa Anita, the largest
of the Assembly Centers, especially constructed buildings were extensively
remodeled and made available for hospital uses.
The original conception assigned to Center hospitals the role of functioning
as infirmaries. All "serious” and operative cases were to be transferred to estab¬
lished public or private county hospitals. As previously noted, residence in
the Assembly Centers was intended to be brief and all Centers were on sites
adjacent to communities having excellent hospital facilities. Delay in the trans¬
fer of evacuees to Relocation Centers due to the retardation of site selection
consequent upon the transfer of this function to War Relocation Authority,
required the expansion of medical services in Assembly Centers to include minor
surgery, obstetrics, dental, and optical care. Alterations and additions to the
infirmary buildings were recommended by the United States Public Health
Service. The changes thus recommended were made.
Medical Staff. Regular officers of the United States Public Health Service
visited the Centers as often as necessary to supervise the program. County health
officers close to the Assembly Centers were designated to act as representatives
of the Health Service in case of emergencies and in routine requirements. The
assistance of the State Department of Health was enlisted. Close relationships
were maintained with county hospitals, neighboring

sanatoria,

and

county

health departments.
A basic principle established by the Public Health Service with Wartime Civil
Control Administration approval was that a selected Japanese physician should be
in direct charge in each Center of the infirmary and medical care as Chief Medical
Officer. His authority embraced professional and administrative supervision over
other physicians, dentists, opticians, nurses, and hospital personnel. He was re¬
sponsible to the Public Health Service for the proper administration of health and
medical services. The Center Manager, through his Service Division, had general
supervision and provided non-medical personnel and supplies.

The arrangement

192

JAPANESE

proved to be ideal.

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Specialists were utilized when needed and special clinics

were established particularly in the field of pediatrics.
Outpatient clinical services were available at stated hours for the care of
ambulatory patients with minor complaints.

A schedule was worked out with

physicians so that one member of the staff was on call each night. Special clin¬
ical services were provided as often as needed.
In the initial stages of Center administration many of the Centers were
short of graduate nurses. In some instances Caucasian public health nurses were
procured and assigned to the Centers. To offset this deficiency and to relieve
graduate and student nurses a study was made of personnel among the evacuees
who might be trained as aids in medical nursing, dental and dietetic duties, and
a program of training established. Lectures and instructions in nurse’s-aid pro¬
cedures included bed-making, care of bedding, sponge baths, indication of sick¬
ness, discussion of nursing ethics, personal health and hygiene, sickroom appli¬
ances (their care and use), nutrition and diets, medication (place of drugs in
therapy), counterirritants, enemas, hot and cold applications, communicable
diseases, infant and maternity care, hospital supplies (how made, preparation for
sterilization), procedure for steam inhalations, procedure for preparing hypo¬
dermics, routine regulations and duties of the day, etc. As the program prog¬
ressed, lectures and instruction in work procedure in formula laboratory were
given. Thus was built up a corps of nurse’s aides to assist the professionals.
In general each infirmary was organized to provide bed care for minor med¬
ical, surgical, uncomplicated obstetrical, and contagious cases. One registered
nurse or doctor was on duty at all times. Each infirmary patient was seen a
minimum of twice a day by the resident physician; once at morning rounds
and again at evening bed check. Necessary clerical and maintenance staff was
assigned to the infirmary by the Center Manager.
Use of outside hospitals. Complicated obstetrical and major surgical and
medical cases were referred, and often physically transferred, to a local hospital
for treatment. In several of the Centers facilities were adequate to care for
all but the most serious surgical cases.
Outside hospitalization was arranged at standard rates not exceeding $3.75
per patient day. These expenses were paid out of Army funds allotted to the
Health Service. Evacuees who, at the time of evacuation, were in private hos¬
pitals at their own expense and those who, following evacuation, were in private
hospitals at Federal government expense, were transferred to county hospitals
as the condition of each permitted moving without harmful effect.
Fees were neither charged nor accepted from evacuees for medical, surgical
or dental treatment, or for drugs and supplies. This service, and housing, food,
personal allowance for necessities, was furnished to all on an equal basis by
the Army.
Necessary prescriptions ordered by the physician in charge which could not
be compounded in the Assembly Center infirmary, were, with the approval of
the Center Manager, filled outside.

MEDICAL

Prenatal care.

CARE

AND

SANITATION

193

In all Centers the registration at prenatal clinics was

almost 100 per cent of the known pregnancies. Conferences which large groups
of women attended were a part of the prenatal program. Well-baby examina¬
tions were held in specialty clinics or pediatric clinics in all Assembly Centers.
In many of the Centers, where Caucasian public health nurses included home
visiting in their activities, children were seen in evacuee apartments and pre¬
natal home visits were routine. Postnatal problems also were subjects of in¬
struction and care. Several Centers had well attended lectures on premarital
education.
Special diets. All formulas for babies were prepared under supervision by
central kitchens in one of the hospital buildings in each Center. Lectures and
instructions in work procedure were given to train Japanese formula girls in
the type of clothes to be worn, the washing of hands, tables and layout cloths,
preparation of sterile field and the layout of formula equipment, sterilization of
food containers and equipment, and the preparation of diets. For babies from
birth to one year special formulas were arranged, and pureed vegetables, fruits,
meats and cereals, etc., were provided; children from one year to three years
received chopped foods, unseasoned meats and vegetables, and extra quantities
of desserts, fresh fruits, and fresh vegetables. Special diets were also prepared for
invalids, both ambulatory and bedridden, where such were required because of
hypertensives, diabetes, gastric ulcers, nephritis, and senility.
For children up to ten years some Centers inaugurated a between-meal
snack of milk and fruit or cookies to supplement their food needs.
Per capita consumption of milk by the entire population was higher than
before evacuation. It was also higher than that of the American population as
a whole.
Immunization. Virtually all Japanese in Assembly Centers were vaccinated
against smallpox and typhoid. The immunization program was thorough both
as to the percentage immunized and the potency of the vaccines used. The
small percentage of persons not immunized belonged to the following groups:
Those individuals refusing absolutely; individuals debilitated because of sickness
or age; cases of recent authenticated immunization.
All children from six months to five years of age not previously immunized
against diphtheria were given three doses of plain toxoid at intervals of four
weeks and without a prior Schick test. All children from five to twelve years,
and younger children previously immunized, were Schick tested and the susceptibles immunized.
All children between the ages of six months and three years were offered
immunization against pertussis. Doses advised by the Public Health Service
were 5,000 M, 10,000 M, and 15,000 M at weekly intervals.
Dental care. Emergency dental treatment including extractions, fillings,
and other services was provided as part of the general health services. A Chief
of Dental Section was selected by the Public Health Service, or its local repre¬
sentative after consultation with the Japanese physician in charge in each As¬
sembly Center. The dentists in all Centers were kept extremely busy.
Optical Service. The multiple phases of the health program included the

194

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

operation of an optometry clinic in most Centers. Eyes were examined by a
registered optician under the direction of the physician in charge; glasses were
fitted and purchased if needed; and necessary repairs were made.

When re¬

quired, an optician in a nearby community might be visited. All such services
were without expense to the evacuee. Not initiated in all Centers at the be¬
ginning of operations, these clinics increased the scope of their service as time
went on. At Tanforan, for example, the optometry clinic, before closing, issued
1,000 prescriptions. The usual services were adjustments, replacements, and
repairs. Of the average of 30 persons who daily visited the clinic, 3 or 4 came
with broken glasses. At Portland three registered optometrists aided all those
complaining of defects of vision.

Clinic hours were advertised in the Center

newspapers.
Records. A complete system was set up to keep a record for each patient
receiving medical care. Unfortunately because of the pressure of work during
the early phases of the program, the medical records left much to be desired
but before July the inadequacies had been remedied. The individual medical
records of evacuees were sent to the Relocation Center to which each was trans¬
ferred. A daily summary report on hospital cases, outpatients, and Center resi¬
dents in outside hospitals, and a more detailed weekly hospital census report were
submitted to the Center Manager, the Wartime Civil Control Administration, and
the Public Health Service. The physician in charge maintained appropriate records
covering the dispensing of narcotic drugs under regulations of the Public Health
Service.
Equipment and supplies. Initially an effort was made to purchase equip¬
ment locally, and the Public Health Service was charged with the responsibility
for procuring supplies. Several Centers were so supplied in part. However, the
Public Health Service found that it did not have adequate facilities for pro¬
curement and was unable to secure the required priorities for such large quan¬
tities of drugs and other supplies and it became necessary for the Army to
purchase the initial medical equipment. Estimates of the equipment required
were furnished by

the Public

Health

Service.

Requisitions

were

prepared

by the Office of the Surgeon, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army;
and were forwarded to the Medical Section, San Francisco General Depot.

In

order to expedite medical equipment and supplies, all items were purchased by
the Depot for delivery direct to Centers by the various dealers. As the evacua¬
tion program progressed a steady improvement was made in the equipment and
medical supplies in Centers.
Assembly Centers were equipped initially to operate a dispensary and to
provide temporary hospitalization for twenty patients. Shortly after they were
occupied the equipment was supplemented by the issuance of beds and other
items sufficient for hospitalization of from sixty to one hundred and twenty
patients in each Center. Dental equipment also was requisitioned for each Center
but could not always be made immediately available. The San Francisco General
Depot purchased equipment for a total of 1,370 hospital beds from funds allotted
by Headquarters, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. Total cost of

MEDICAL

CARE

AND

SANITATION

195

supplies was $147,961.82. Maintenance supplies for the Assembly Centers were
purchased locally under direction of the Public Health Service. One regular officer
of the Service was assigned to handle the purchase of narcotics.
Sanitation
Supervision of sanitation was part of the responsibility of the Public Health
Service and, of course, the medical departments of the Assembly Centers.

In

discharging this responsibility, the Public Health Service enlisted the assistance
of the State Department of Health and the County Health Department of the
counties in which the Assembly Centers were located.
A survey of each Center and Center site was made by a commissioned sani¬
tary engineer of the Public Health Service before occupation by the evacuees.
The physician in charge at each Center acted as Chief of Sanitation. He
was often assisted by a Sanitary Board of evacuees. General administrative super¬
vision was exercised by the Center Manager who provided necessary supplies,
equipment, and personnel. Regular, in some cases daily, inspections were made
by the County Health Department for the Public Health Service.
Reports were submitted to the Center Manager in writing, with appropriate
recommendations for any condition not found in order, and a copy was forward¬
ed to the District Director of the Public Health Service.
Multiple daily inspections of toilets, baths, laundries, kitchens, dining rooms,
and grounds, were made, under the direction of the physician in charge who
reported deficiencies to the Center Manager through the Service Division. All
reports were required to be forwarded to Wartime Civil Control Administration.
If serious deficiencies were noted in these reports the Director, Wartime Civil
Control Administration, took immediate measures to correct them.
Detailed instructions, together with general recommendations for the proper
sanitation of mess halls, food warehouses, and pantries, for living quarters and
such facilities as laundries, latrines, showers, and washrooms were issued to all
Center Managers by the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, under
date of May 2, 1942, on recommendation of the Public Health Service.

The

specific instructions conformed in substance, and as far as applicable, to regula¬
tions of the United States Army for its establishments.
The Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, called upon the United
States Army Engineers Corps to modify or alter construction of toilet, lavatory,
and shower facilities to insure a higher standard of sanitation and privacy to meet
the needs of women and children.
Training of personnel was undertaken by the Public Health Service, through
the County Medical Officer and the physician in charge. This personnel was
selected from evacuees who had had some technical training, such as under¬
graduate medical students, laboratory technicians, and undergraduate engineer¬
ing students. Lectures and demonstrations were given to prepare them for the
assignment. Labor squads were also drilled in various sanitation functions. In
several Centers the evacuees formed a Sanitary Board to assist the Physician in
Charge and the Manager.
An important phase of public health activities in Assembly Centers was
the regular examination of food handlers conducted under supervision of the

196

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Public Health Service. Food handlers were examined by physicians before be¬
ginning duty in the mess and at periodical intervals thereafter, to detect cases
or carriers of communicable diseases. All kitchen and mess personnel were kept
under daily observation for evidences of communicable diseases, particularly
of colds or other respiratory diseases, diarrhea or other intestinal diseases. Such
cases were promptly relieved from duty. Clean clothing, and clean hands and
nails for mess personnel were required.
All food received at the mess was inspected for freshness and quality. Canned
goods were likewise examined.

Refrigeration was provided for all perishable

foods, and all places where food was handled were screened and ventilated.
It was a recognized rule that thorough cooking and immediate service after
cooking are the best safeguards against the transmission of communicable dis¬
eases by food, provided care is taken not to contaminate the food after cooking.
All eating and cooking utensils were sterilized immediately after use by proper
washing and rinsing.
Evacuees were expected to keep their living quarters clean at all times.
Barrack monitors were appointed to supervise the housekeeping. Sanitation days
were observed when mattresses and bedding were removed for airing and sun¬
ning.
From the beginning of the program the daily telegraphic report made to the
Wartime Civil Control Administration by the Center Manager included a state¬
ment concerning the number of persons in hospitals and the presence of com¬
municable diseases. A uniform system of reports for hospital and medical services
was instituted in all Assembly Centers in June by the United States Public Health
Service at the request, and with the assistance of the Wartime Civil Control
Administration. Much earlier in the program, however, a uniform system of med¬
ical records for all inpatient and outpatient cases had been started.
For purposes of the present report, the "reporting period” from August 1
to August 28, 1942, is used in the presentation of medical statistics. This four
weeks’ period can be accepted as a typical period in the operations of Assembly
Centers. It was neither subject to the limitations of the early, induction phase
of Center life or of the improvements in facilities and services which occurred
toward the end of Center operation.
Table 16 presents data on inpatient movement, both in Center and in out¬
side hospitals, from August 1 to August 28,

1942,

for

the

nine

Assembly

Centers then in operation. At the beginning of the period these nine Centers
had 483 inpatients; at the end of the period, 446. During these four weeks,
1,318 patients were admitted to Center and/or outside hospitals, and 1,421
were discharged. With an average population of 58,229 for the nine Centers,
this represented an admission rate of 5.6 persons per thousand per week. Prob¬
ably a better measure of hospitalization of evacuees is provided in Table 17,
which shows the total patient-days in Center and outside hospitals, and the
number of patient-days per thousand total evacuee-days of residence. For the
nine Centers combined, there were 8.3 patient-days per 1,000 total evacueedays.

CARE
AND
SANITATION

‘Reporting period from August 8 to August 28, 1942.
Reporting period from August 1 to August 21, 1942.

TABLE 16.—Inpatient Movement During Reporting Period
From August 1 to August 28, 1942

MEDICAL

197

198

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

The total number of operations performed for evacuees resident in the nine
Centers between August 1 and August 28, was 271, of which 36 were major,
and 23 5 were minor. The detail by type of operation, and whether performed
in the Center or in outside hospital, is given in Table 18.

Only 5 of the 36

major operations were performed in Center hospitals, and these

in

the

well

equipped facilities at Santa Anita and Puyallup. The average number of in¬
patients per week by type of medical service required is shown in Table 19.
The total outpatient treatments for each type of service required (during
the reporting period) is presented in detail by Table 20.

In the analysis of the

data in this table, it should be recalled that many minor ailments such as cuts,
bruises, headaches, and stomachaches, which in a normal community would
receive only home treatment, were taken to the Outpatient Clinic of the As¬
sembly Center for free treatment. Thus, any comparison between the number
of treatments in an Assembly Center and in a normal community should be
made with extreme caution.

This table is valuable, however, in showing the

ratio between the different types of cases presented to the Outpatient Clinics
of Assembly Centers.

Four of the nine Centers made separate counts on total

treatments and total outpatient cases, thus providing a ratio of average treat¬
ments per outpatient.

This is presented for these Centers in Table 21.

As has been indicated above, the Center medical staff was composed of pro¬
fessionally trained evacuees assisted by other evacuees who were given special
courses for the performance of their duties.

Table 22 gives the detail as to

Center hospital and medical staff during the reporting period by Centers and
by classification of function or skill.

The nine Centers, with an average popu¬

lation of 58,229 evacuees, were served by 45 physicians, 43 dentists, 149 nurses,
of whom 37 were graduates, and 893 other staff members such as dieticians,
aides, administrative assistants, and unskilled help.

This table does not show,

of course, the number of physicians and other medical personnel serving those
Center residents who were placed in outside hospitals.
Vital Statistics. The very process of evacuation made the compilation
and analysis of vital statistics for the evacuee population alone extremely diffi¬
cult.

Those persons who were ill at home (or in hospitals) were placed (or

left) in hospitals at government expense immediately after they were registered
at a Civil Control Station by some member of their family. No one was removed
from a hospital until the Public Health Service certified that the patient might
be sent to an Assembly Center without danger to himself or other evacuees.
Also, all Japanese, except those who were ill or who were expectant mothers in
the eighth month of pregnancy or later, were removed first to an Assembly
Center close to their place of residence and later to a Relocation Center, in some
instances far removed from their former residence, during the brief span of six
months.

No strictly comparable basis exists, therefore, for the calculation of

birth rates and death rates as in the general population.
The total number of births and deaths occurring in the evacuated popula¬
tion, i. e., those who were inducted into Assembly Centers, are shown by Cen¬
ters in Table 24.

On the basis of 9,485,202 evacuee-days in Assembly Centers,

|

Outside
hospital
67

04

fO •<* •
^ •

rt« • • •
CO • • •

>

<
>

Venereal
diseases

Tuber¬
culosis

MEDICAL CARE AND SANITATION

•

• On VO
•

r* • •
•

04 04

^
£

fOOHHO
C'-OOt^^*

CO^HVOCO

• •

^ 04 04 04 IO

CO 04

67
04 • **H •

•'t 04 04 04 O
04

o

TH Ov • •

O'COO^CO
04

. . T*

ro IO lO
rf co 04 CO

38

OM04»OH

'OWN'OfO
CO
CO rf<

lOO"tN

199

♦Average based on 3 week period.

60

o io ^
04 04 CO

in
04

lOO'tN'O
IO04*HT*\O

Santa Anita.
Stockton.
Tanforan.
Tulare*.

242

04

267

CO CO

476

Other

04

Total.
Fresno.
Merced*.
Pomona*.
Portland.
Puyallup.

Obstetrical

Outpatient

as
w
CO

Communi¬
cable

rf« •
• •

!*

Surgical
Total

04

00 • •
lO • •
>*
n
w
us

►SJ <2

£ tf)
H
H
Z
u o

<<
z o

fa *-h

H

>—I H

°

(4 ^

S O

a £

£

(4

(4

O
C
«

>
<J

Total
patients

CO •
•

04

OfO^H
>0 ^

^ • • •

v© co 04 04

'O'O'OfO
VO «0
PQ

w

MEDICAL
Center

|[

63

04

O

vO vH 04 vO

*-< ■<* ■

OO'O^H'O'O
CO

»0

• * • **H

\OhhtJih

168
l>»

235

Inpatient
SOI

Total

c

Outside
hospital

H

36

'tNMON
00
^

Santa Anita.
Stockton.
Tanforan.
Tulare2.

Center
hospital

CO

271

Fresno.
Merced1.
Pomona2.
Portland.
Puyallup.

MINOR OPERATIONS
Center Hospital

Total

IT)

Total.

K

Total
operations

14

MAJOR OPERATIONS
Center

Pi

o
z

TABLE 18.—Operations Performed During Reporti
August 1 to August 28, 1942, Inclusive

200

TABLE 20.—Total

Outpatient Treatments by Type of Service

Reporting Period August

1

28, 1942

to August

O'
TO
•

00 t* i© i©
<N
00
*0 r*

• •© •
• Tt< •

•

hhOO

.

CO © 1^ 00
CO 00 04 ©
l© CN c©

FROM

<D

> >o

3 g
oo bo

§ §>

o o

’C ’C

o,

</>££
2 S.

•h « 4)

rt 4-> +J
■p MM

*,5,2

ft G G

*>•£*5

WOP

EVACUATION

•'©OOOO
CN *-< CQ

NHO^O

© *"»
*-< <N C©

JAPANESE

l© T* tH CO

•

.

»© 00 <© "* O'
© CN
CO

CSH

lO
CN CN

236

rH

3,856

•

175

CN

1,642
83
567
1

394

© i© ^ 00

4,107
422
1,669
391

150

HHH

10,495
2,552
5,765
1,614

Physio¬
therapy

1,761

• 1© •
• CN •

Santa Anita.
Stockton.
Tanforan.
Tulare3.

Inocula¬
tions and
vaccina¬
tions

88

CO

197
51

Arsenicals

692

CO

483
797
1,031

10,008

Veneral
diseases1

• CN C© (N c©
•
*-< tH

1,357
258

Tubercu¬
losis

OOCNt*^
O CN CN l©
CN
»H

4,156

396

Eye, ear,
nose and
throat

COCOOOCO^
U- i© y-J l© 00

9,296

3,361
1,142
1,430
2,193
2,260

Post¬
natal

©CO00©
© Tf r© 1©
-HCSTj^O
CO TH y-T y-<

30,812

Pre¬
natal

'tCNOO'N
Tf O' O © 1©
t^COt^ONC©

Total.
Fresno.
Merced2.
Pomona3.
Portland.
Puyallup.

General
medical

^ ••<*

Surgical

• 1© ©
• tH

Dental

O'

Total
treat¬
ments

i-t

OBSTETRICAL
Center

THE
WEST
COAST

1For the reporting period August 1 to August 21, 1942.

TABLE 22.—Center

Hospital Medical Staff During Reporting Period

1

August

to August

28, 1942

'
NURSES
Admin.
assistants

Other
employees

III

(NNO'OO'
lO CO *0 *-< CN

HHftjH .

CN C"- 0"0 CO
i-i 00

(SOOOO
<N *-« ■<*

'O'O^CS
IO CS to to

C^fO'O'O

O'

474

AND

3 3

<JC

3 3

o o

'd’d

*C'C

aa

tt,
o o

CARE

CN *lO
•

t^fOO'CO

44

MEDICAL

O'

^

rO fO

Dieticians,
aids, etc.

375

O'

O'OO'O'
CO
^

Santa Anita.
Stockton.
Tanforan.
Tulare*.

37

Total

<0

Fresno.
Merced1.
Pomona*.
Portland.
Puyallup.

149

O'O'»0
CS
to

43

CN

45

Other

Hf^oCM

1,130

Graduate

CO CN CO CO 00

Dentists

cot'*—«t^co
OOCCOM
vH

Physicians

00'CO't

Total.

Total
medical
staff

fO CO ^ fO

Center

SANITATION
201

•Information not available for Tulare; for Pomona, only for the period August 1 to August 21.

202

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

the realized birth rate was 19.5 births per thousand persons per year of Center
residence; and the death rate was 4.9 per thousand.
That no sharp increase occurred in the number of deaths in the evacuated
area as a result of the evacuation program is shown by Table 25, which gives
the number of Japanese deaths in California, Oregon, and Washington during
the first ten months of 1942 by sex, and by month of death.

For comparative

purposes, and by special permission of the California Bureau of Vital Statistics,
there is presented in Table 26 the number of deaths, infant deaths, and still¬
births among Japanese in California from 1937 to 1941, by cause of death.

TABLE 24.—Deaths,

Births, and Stillbirths for Japanese Inducted
Into an Assembly Center :

March 21 to October 30, 1942
Center

Deaths

Births

Stillbirths

Total.

128

504

6

Fresno.
Manzanar (To June 1, 1942).
Marysville.
Mayer.

12
4
1

32
11
4

Merced.
Pinedale.
Pomona.
Portland.

10
5
3
4

21
6
31
23

1

Puyallup.
Sacramento.
Salinas.
Santa Anita.

11
1
2
37

37
15
13
194

1
1

Stockton.
Tanforan.
Tulare.
Turlock.

7
22
5
4

25
64
18
10

3

203

MEDICAL CARE AND SANITATION

TABLE 25.—Japanese Deaths in California, Oregon, and Washington
First 10 Months of 1942, By Sex and Month of Death*
Sex and Month

Total

California

Oregon

During

Washington

BOTH SEXES

Total (10 months)

539

457

12

70

82
45
59
55
68
64
54
46
33
33

66
38
45
44
57
57
45
42
31
32

2
2
3
1
1
1
1

14
5
11
10
10
6
8
4
2

Total (10 months).

396

340

6

49

January.
February.
March.
April.
May.
June.
July.
August.
September.
October.

67
35
40
39
42
49
41
35
23
24

55
30
33
31
37
44
34
31
21
24

2
2

10
3
7
8
5
4
6
4
2

Total (10 months)..

144

117

6

21

January.
February.
March.
April.
May.

15
10
19
16
26
15
13
11
10
9

11
8
12
13
20
13
11
11
10
8

3
1
1

4
2
4
2
5
2
2

January.
February.
March.
April.
May.
June.

July.
August.
September.
October.

i

MALE

i
1

FEMALE

fc::::::::::::::::
August.
September.
October.

*Source: Bureau of Vital Statistics of California, Oregon and Washington.
deaths and none of the Oregon deaths occurred in Military Area 2.

i
Four of the Washington

204

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

TABLE 26.—Deaths,

Infant Deaths, and Stillbirths for Japanese

in California:

Cause of Death

1937-1941*

Total
1937-41

1941

1940

1939

1938

1937

causes.

3,043

617

638

562

606

620

Typhoid and paratyphoid fever.
Measles.
Scarlet fever.
Whooping cough.
Diphtheria.
Influenza.
Dysentery.
Poliomyelitis, acute.
Encephalitis, lethargic.
Meningococcus, meningitis.
Tuberculosis, lungs.
Tuberculosis, other.
Venereal diseases.
Other general diseases (epidemic).
Cancer.
Other general diseases.
Diseases of nervous system.
Diseases of circulatory system.
Pneumonia.
Other diseases—respiratory system.
Diarrhea and enteritis (-2).
Diarrhea and enteritis (2 plus).
Other diseases digestive system.
Nephritis.
Other non-venereal genito-urinary.
Puerperal state.
Diseases skin—cellular tissue.
Diseases bone, organs of locomotion.
Congenital malformations.
Diseases peculiar to early infancy.
Suicide.
Other external causes.
Ill defined or unknown.

10
4
3
6
3
15
6
1
5
1
434
64
58
13
424
117
239
378
153
35
10
12
179
145
18
17
3
6
44
134
141
361
4

4

2

1
2
2

2
1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1

1

1

91
13
16
3
89
20
67
70
22
5
2
3
31
21
4
2
1
1
8
24
32
81
1

93
12
13
1
105
28
48
90
23
12
1
1
28
27
3
4

64
13
5
2
88
20
42
76
35
6
4
2
42
29
4
1
1
2
5
24
26
60
1

Infant deaths.

270

50

58

46

58

58

Stillbirths.

135

24

31

30

25

25

All

♦Source: California Bureau of Vital Statistics.

3
2

i
5
1

1
7
33
29
68
1

1
3

2
1
88
16
7
4
79
23
43
74
29
5
2
5
32
36
3
6
1
14
28
27
74

2
1
6
2
1

98
10
17
3
63
26
39
68
44
7
1
1
46
32
4
4
1
1
10
25
27
78
1

CHAPTER XVI
Employment of Evacuees in Assembly Centers
Some indication of the extent of evacuee employment within Assembly
Centers has already been given. It should be recalled that a basic Wartime Civil
Control Administration policy required that operations be carried out by evacuees
so far as practicable.

The means, supplies and equipment, and the supervision

were provided. The extent to which evacuees elected to make use of these means
was to be largely up to them. It can be generally stated that the response to this
policy was excellent.
The rates of compensation are detailed in Chapter XIX infra. The unskilled
occupation group, compensated at the rate of

$8.00

per month, included

laborers, dishwashers, mess hall attendants, junior clerks, assistant playground
directors, cook’s helpers and similar occupations.

The skilled classification, paid

at the rate of $12.00 per month, included accountants, senior clerks, playground
directors, nurses, motion picture machine operators and cooks. The professional
and technical group, whose compensation was

$16.00

per month, included

physicians, surgeons, dentists, engineers, chemists and teachers.
It must be understood that no evacuee was required to work, but, once he
accepted a job, he was expected to carry it out except in case of illness.

To

sever his employment an evacuee was required to give a 48-hour notice of
intent in writing.
The success of the evacuee employment policies of Wartime Civil Control
Administration is measured in part by the fact that more than 27,000 evacuees
representing over 3 0 per cent of the total population were employed in necessary
and productive Assembly Center tasks.

The average man-hours per month of

those employed equaled 47.7 hours per person of the aggregate evacuee popula¬
tion, non-workers included.
During the Army’s operation of the Manzanar Reception Center a guayule
rubber project was established for the purpose of devising practicable methods
for the rooting of guayule cuttings.

This was instituted with the assistance

and guidance of Dr. Robert Emerson of the California Institute of Technology,
Pasadena.

Evacuee chemists and nursery specialists planted more than 23 0,000

guayule seedlings.
ment.

The project thus initiated was made a permanent establish¬

Following the transfer of Manzanar to the jurisdiction of War Reloca¬

tion Authority, that agency supervised the guayule project.
Another project of interest was the camouflage net project.
direction

of the

United

States

Engineer

Corps,

the

necessary

for the conduct of this project were established at Santa Anita.

Under the
installations
Employment

in the camouflaging net project was limited to American-born evacuees.

This

project garnished and delivered more than 22,000 completed nets, varying in
size from 22' x 22' to 36' x 60'. An aggregate of 2,718 man-months of labor
was used in garnishing and packing the nets.
205

The net saving accruing to the

206

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

government more than offset the aggregate cost of food served to the evacuee
population at Santa Anita.
Evacuees were employed in the administrative offices and in every depart¬
ment of Center operations—in maintenance and repairs, construction, sanitation,
gardening, recreation, education, cobbler shops, beauty shops, barber shops, and
repair shops. Under Staff supervision all kitchens and mess-halls were manned by
evacuees. A complete list of the multiple services in which evacuees were engaged
would cover every known community service.
An example of the scope of work accomplished is evidenced by the record
at Santa Anita. There, over 454,252 evacuee man-hours were expended in the
maintenance unit of the Work and Maintenance Section alone.

This unit in¬

cluded repairs by the carpenter shop, plumbing, electrical, mechanical shop
work, cleaning services, trash collection, landscape and nursery maintenance,
streets, buildings, sidewalks and sewer repairs.

CHAPTER XVII
Education, Recreation, Religion and Assembly
Center Newspapers
In preceding chapters, attention has been directed to measures taken to
provide for housing, feeding and clothing the evacuees, for their medical care
and employment, and for Center sanitation. This chapter summarizes steps
taken to provide for education, recreation, freedom of religious worship and
the publication of Assembly Center newspapers.
Under the guidance and stimulation of the administration, a program was
early set in motion to encourage all groups—child, adolescent and adult of
both sexes, alien and American-born—to employ their stay in the Assembly
Centers in useful and interesting activities.
The educational program especially was conditioned by the time of the
evacuation and the temporary character of the Centers. The evacuation of
most areas occurred toward the end of the school term with summer vacations
near at hand. Hardly had some of the Assembly Centers been established when
transfers were begun to Relocation Centers at Colorado River and Tule Lake.
Still, it was borne in mind that without a daily routine of activities, both
youths and adults would have more leisure than that to which many of them
had been accustomed. Parents desired that their children have an opportunity
to complete school terms, where evacuation had interrupted them, and to enjoy
the wholesome activities offered by school.
The evacuation plan developed by the Wartime Civil Control Administration
did not contemplate overlong Center residence. The reason for the extension of
this period has already been discussed in Chapter XIII. Because the program moved
forward with such rapidity, evacuation was well under way before it became
known that the satisfaction of the War Relocation Authority’s objectives in site
selection would materially extend the period of Assembly Center residence. Hence
no formal system of education or recreation was initially provided. When it be¬
came evident that there would be a delay in transfers to the interior, it became a
matter of deep concern to Wartime Civil Control Administration to meet the
morale problem.
It was brought about that, though no formal system of education or recrea¬
tion had been contemplated in the original planning, and no initial budget
provision made, an effective program was developed under the direction of
the Wartime Civil Control Administration with the active cooperation of the
evacuees, using their various training, skills and experiences.
In general the program had for its aim the maintenance of the mental and
physical health and morale of the evacuees at the highest level possible. It was
realized that the program might not be followed in its entirety in any Center
but necessarily would be adapted to the needs and facilities and conditions
prevailing in each.
Supervision of the program was placed with the Director of the Commu207

208

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

nity Service Division and administered in each Assembly Center by his staff
members, the Director of Education and the Director of Recreation.
There were in all Centers, buildings available for school purposes—unoccu¬
pied barracks, recreation halls, grandstands and other permanent structures—
and these were converted to class uses.
doors.

In some cases, classes were held out of

Workmen among the evacuees helped with their skills in fashioning

additional benches, chairs, tables and blackboards.

Textbooks were supplied

by State and County school boards and from cities from which the school
children had come.

In many cases the parents of the children aided.

Paper,

pencils, pens and crayons arrived from "outside”, the gifts of interested groups
and individuals.

Libraries were established.

All teachers were Japanese chosen from the evacuees.
were created by the administration for instructors.

Job classifications

Most of these teachers

were college graduates. A number were certificated. Many, particularly among
the younger set, worked part-time in the classes.
At Tanforan, for instance, four of the evacuees had teachers’ certificates
and four were majoring in education at the time of leaving college. At Merced,
of its twenty full-time teachers, more than half were university graduates and
not a single teacher had less than two years of university study.

At Tulare, the

teaching staff consisted of 37 Japanese teachers of whom four had State teaching
certificates and all others either college or junior college training.
Girl Scouts and Boy Scouts were trained in leadership.

Particularly in the

nursery schools, Girl Scouts became valuable assistants.
Specialists in the arts and crafts were many among the Japanese and their
classes were well attended.

Isamu Noguchi, internationally known sculptor,

was a resident of Santa Anita; Professor Chiura Obata, whose paintings were
exhibited at Mills College, lived and taught at Tanforan.

Many excellent

musicians contributed their talents to the class-room. From these classes there
emerged orchestras of symphonic size for rendition of the classics and ensem¬
bles to delight with dance and informal musical programs.
Scarcely had the first bus wheeled out of a Center before classes began.
Tanforan opened its library in three days, its educational program in two
weeks; Stockton, in ten days.

These achievements were matched in other

Centers.
The informal plan had laid out programs for nursery schools for children
from 2 to 5, and schools for children from 6 to 11, for children from 12 to 18,
for youths from 19 to 30, for adult women 20 and older and for adult men 20
and older. Suitable programs for these divisions were arranged and the pattern
generally followed.
The curriculum varied. That at Merced gives an idea of the field covered.
Subjects taught consisted of (first to sixth grade) arithmetic, reading, spelling,
group singing, dancing, story telling, drawing and crafts.
senior

high

schools,

English,

algebra,

geometry,

In junior and

trigonometry,

shorthand,

bookkeeping, business training, elementary economics, commercial art, decora-

EDUCATION, RECREATION, RELIGION AND ASSEMBLY CENTER NEWSPAPERS

tive art, weaving, costume designing, dance

209

(folk and interpretive), music,

handicrafts (paper, wood, needle), child care, hygiene, etiquette, drama, gar¬
dening and physical education.

For adults, English for men and women; and

for women, knitting and sewing.

American history was stressed.

Tanfbran, for the three and a half months of its existence, reported an
increased enrollment of 276 percent in adult education, 108 percent in ele¬
mentary classes, 281 percent in music and 108 percent in art.
and junior high showed lesser percentage increases.
ples:

High school

To cite but a few exam¬

Out of a population of 7,800 evacuees, there were 3,650 students and

100 teachers.

Merced had 110 students from 25 to 65 years of age.

Three

hundred children were in daily attendance at nursery, kindergarten and pri¬
mary schools at Tulare.
To encourage the students, reports of their progress were made and exam¬
ples of their handiwork exhibited at community gatherings in the Center
bowls or in the large recreation halls.

Hobby shows were popular.

forums discussed the problems of Center living.
cussed at study panels.

Public

Current questions were dis¬

Quiz programs abounded.

Promotions were obtained for students in the schools they attended prior
to evacuation.

Commencement exercises were occasions of community-wide

interest and conducted with collegiate formality with an address by a distin¬
guished educator.

At Fresno, for instance, 3,000 parents and friends crowded

the amphitheater to applaud the graduates.
In those Centers where the evacuees remained as fall approached, study
was resumed from nursery to high school and adult classes.
Linked with education was a recreation program that embraced in its wide¬
spread activities the nursery tot in the sandbox to the aged wood-carver and
needle worker.
of education.

Especially in nursery and kindergarten, recreation was a part
They learned as they played.

As in education, the recreational program was a cooperative effort between
administration and evacuee.

Supervision was under a Caucasian director. Com¬

petent Japanese were placed on the Wartime Civil Control Administration pay¬
roll. Part-time workers and volunteers supplied other directing personnel.
The spontaneity of play and the enthusiasm of players offset whatever
handicaps existed in the early days because of lack of equipment and budget
outlay—a condition progressively remedied by donations from interested organ¬
izations and individuals and from the evacuees themselves.

Soon unoccupied

barrack rooms and warehouse space were readied for indoor games and gym¬
nasiums.

Adequate halls were furnished for dancing and musical programs.

Minstrel shows and amateur theatricals had appropriate stages.
provided for motion picture presentation.

Housing was

Galleries were established for exhibi¬

tions of the fine arts and handicraft.
Equipment varied among the Centers as did the facilities.

The type of

recreation was conditioned by the physical resources and terrain of the Centers.
In some of the Centers the evacuees constructed pitch-and-putt golf courses.
Others boasted miniature lakes for swimming and model yachting.

But an

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

210

overall inventory of recreational facilities and equipment would include such
items as sandboxes, swings, slides and other playground equipment for chil¬
dren; baseballs, bats and gloves, soft balls, volley balls, basket balls, wrestling
mats, tennis and badminton and ping-pong equipment, punching bags and
dumbbells, golf sticks, fencing foils and masks, croquet mallets, chess, checkers
and marbles, mites and model plans, model yachts and miniature boats, horse¬
shoes, flycasting rods and lines, gym suits and baseball uniforms and swim¬
ming togs.
Pianos, bass viols, cellos and cymbals, violins and piccolos moved magically
into the Centers, with
saxaphones.

snare drums,

accordions, harmonicas,

clarinets

and

Phonographs and records added to the inventory, and only the

shortwave radio was prohibited.

Much of this equipment was the property of

the evacuees and, when not too bulky, was carried by them into the Centers.
The Wartime Civil Control Administration supplied trucks to gather up whatever
other equipment would contribute to the program.
Many tournaments were started.
League lines.
official

scorers appointed;

tabulated.
one league:

Baseball leagues were organized on Big

Contesting teams were uniformed; a panel of umpires, elected;
pitching,

fielding and

batting

averages

carefully

The familiar nick-names of Big League teams were adopted—in
The Modesto Browns, the Turlock Senators, the Marin Athletics,

the Yuba City Red Sox, the Courtland Yankees, the Yolo White Sox, the
Sebastopol Indians and the Cortez Tigers. In the basketball league the Wolves,
Bears, Pirates, Bulldogs, Wildcats and Panthers vied for honors.
sters bore the titles Midgets, Kittens, Pups and Pappooses.

The young¬

Girls were nick¬

named the Bloomer Babes, Wolfers, Skoits, Cabbages, Brussel Sprouts, Hens
and Zombies.

The whole nomenclature gives an idea both of the seriousness

of the play and its sportive spirit.

American slang described the play.

Those who did not participate in the games were ranged in bleachers or
crowded the side-lines.

Issei and Nisei and Sansei mingled in play in the same

field or in the same hall.

Events and games of which a large number of

Japanese had no knowledge or in which they had never participated were
popular.
Sumo squads were divided into East and West, as in old Japanese custom.
The referee appeared in gala costume to add to the ceremonial atmosphere.
Shogi and Go, a type of chess, was a diversion for adults.

It was a familiar

scene, in warm weather, to see an aged couple under a palm or fig tree engaged
at this native pastime while children romped in ring-a-rosie or knuckled down
to marbles.
Calisthenics attracted the women folks.
Stockton was built up to 3 50.

A class of 3 5

Issei started at

The value of calisthenics in reducing weight

was a popular topic among the ladies.
Dancing was popular, from formal, dressy, date affairs to hops in dungarees.
Motion picture shows were crowded.

The spirit of Wild West was exemplified

both in dress and in the young men’s attempts to grow whiskers.
Queen contests abounded and the most popular girls were crowned with

EDUCATION, RECREATION, RELIGION AND ASSEMBLY CENTER NEWSPAPERS

appropriate ceremony.

211

As in the development of the educational program,

hobby shows and handicraft exhibitions were planned to develop a spirit of
emulation.

Talent shows and field days were held to reward the accomplished

and crown the victor.
Carnival days were celebrated in gay holiday mood.
community-wide.

The celebrations were

At Santa Anita on Independence Day, the Fourth of July,

the Anita Funita Festival ran for three days.

Throughout the afternoon Boy

Scout corps paraded through the Center in gayly decorated trucks and wagons
advertising the coming of the evening performance.
crowd of

15,000 responded to the summons.

jitterbug contests.

A swarming laughing

Three thousand entered the

There was a baby parade with 93 babies entered divided

into the arms division and toddler class.
position and individuality.

Babies were judged on health, dis¬

Prize winners received ribbons of excellence.

Tanforan held a Mardi Gras over the Labor Day holidays.
in all branches of sport enlivened the athletic program.

Tournaments

Folk dancing, garden

and greenhouse displays, exhibitions of needle craft and handicraft, painting,
drawing and modeling filled three eventful days.

The festival was topped

with a coronation costume ball when the queen chosen by the evacuees re¬
ceived the acclaim of beauty and personality.
As early as April 7, 1942, the Director, Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬
tration, was in touch with religious activities within the Centers.

Recognized

were three general groups: The Christians, with their two general classifica¬
tions of Protestant and Catholic, and the Buddhists.
It was estimated that about 10 percent of the Japanese aliens and 50 per¬
cent of the Japanese-American citizens belonged to the Protestant constitu¬
ency.

Catholic Japanese church organizations were fewer in comparison with

the Protestant.

The majority of the older generation Japanese and some of the

younger generation belonged to the Buddhist faith.
As a result of conferences with religious workers and the Administration’s
own studies, a policy was determined and finally approved by the Commanding
General.
The main features of this policy, with its overriding principle of religious
freedom, can be summarized as follows:

Japanese evacuees were permitted to

promote religious services within the various Centers and to request such
Caucasian assistance for coordinating religious activities as might be necessary.
The Center Manager arranged with each religious group for such service,
provided such facilities as were available for the conduct of services, and in¬
sured that the services were conducted properly and were not used as a vehicle
to propagandize or incite the members of the Center.
Due to the unusual situation of temporary settlement and military sig-

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

212

nificance of the religious practices of certain Japanese groups, particularly the
Shintoists, certain limitations were necessary.
Permission was not granted Caucasian religious workers to reside within
the confines of the various Centers.

Only those Caucasian workers who had a

constituency among the evacuees in a Center were permitted to minister
within the Center and then only at the request of the Japanese.

Japanese

religious workers conducted all services and activities wherever possible.

In

those instances where there was not a Japanese qualified in this field, the Jap¬
anese group concerned might request assistance of Caucasian workers in con¬
ducting religious services.
Permission was not granted for transfer of Japanese religious workers from
one Assembly Center to another for the purpose of carrying on religious ac¬
tivities, except where there was
without a director or leader.

a

religious

constituency within a Center

This request for transfer had to be made in

writing to Wartime Civil Control Administration headquarters.
Any material

intended

for release in

religious

publications

other

than

routine matters was cleared by the Press Relations Representative of each
Center involved.

These routine matters included notices of church services,

prayer meetings and activities of a similar nature.
Japanese was not spoken in connection with religious services except where
the use of English prevented the congregation from comprehending the service.
The use of Japanese in this respect had to have the sanction of the Center
Manager.
No recognition was given any church federation, committee or group as to
the authorized representation of its purported members until that representa¬
tion was authorized in writing by the members concerned.

Inasmuch as edu¬

cational and recreational programs were coordinated in all Assembly Centers,
no educational program was to be included within the scope of religious
activities.
Among the evacuees were a number of ministers of Christian and Buddhist
faiths.

Resident in the Centers, they were able to begin immediately the

organization and promotion of religious services and to carry on in related
fields of social service.
In collaboration with Center Managers, religious workers set themselves
to the task of providing places of worship and prayer.

Grandstands of fair

grounds and race courses afforded ample space for large assemblages. Barracks
were available for other group activities. Altars and benches and chairs were
donated or constructed by the resident faithful, or fellow religionists in the
neighboring communities. Denominational conventions drew upon their central
treasuries to assist.
were helpful.

Gifts of Bibles and hymnals and Sunday school material

Musical instruments were provided for the choirs.

Services followed the pattern familiar to the evacuees in their prior urban
or village residence—Sunday morning services with preacher and choir and
prayer, Sunday school classes, with mid-week prayer meetings, hours of medita-

EDUCATION, RECREATION, RELIGION AND ASSEMBLY CENTER NEWSPAPERS

tion and panel discussions.

213

Special prayer meetings were arranged for the

Issei. Problems of immediate concern to young people were discussed by Youth
Fellowship.

Visiting preachers addressed large bodies.

Catholic priests ministered to their flocks, celebrated Mass and administered
Holy Communion.
Like the Christian bodies, the Buddhists organized immediately after arrival
at the Centers. Their religious program was designed for all ages—community
gatherings for the general faithful, mid-week discussions for young Buddhists
and Sunday school for the youngsters.
excellent choirs.

Flowers used at

Many of the Buddhist groups trained

religious service were distributed among

the sick.
Most colorful of the Buddhist festivals was the O-bon Odori, a traditional
festival for the resurrection of the soul.

Participants were asked to wear their

Ukatas (light kimonos) at the festival. The music was ceremonial and familiar
to the masses.
The organization and development of programs of education, recreation
and religion were greatly facilitated by the Center papers.

Daily newspapers

from metropolitan centers and of the "old home town” were placed on sale at
the Centers or the evacuees might subscribe for them. So also were the popular
national weekly and monthly magazines.

On file in Center libraries were

standard publications of wit and humor, and picture periodicals.
But these reading sources did not satisfy all the needs of the Centers.
the mimeographed home-product newspaper emerged.

So,

On April 11 the first

copy of the Manzanar Free Press was issued; on April 18 the Santa Anita
Pacemaker appeared.

Sacramento had its own mimeographed paper by May 3,

and Stockton by May 11.
for editing

and

Authority to publish, with instructions providing

distribution,

was

contained

in

a

directive

issued

by the

Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration.
Fifteen of these papers were established.
evacuees.

They drew their Staffs from the

Some of them had had experience in the offices of Japanese dailies

or weeklies before their suppression in the military areas evacuated.
them had majored in English.

Many of

Several excellent draftsmen and cartoonists ap¬

peared among them.
Facilities for publication were made available by the Center Managers.
Editorial comment, news from other Centers, bulletins and news releases from
administration headquarters, vital statistics, fashion notes, religious notes and
doings in the field of sports filled their pages.

Cartoons enlivened

Poetry and literary tid-bits flowed from the esthetes.
life, indeed, was mirrored in the Center paper.

them.

The whole community

The management found them

useful in making instructions known.
The text was in English, and the young editors had the assistance and
guidance of the Public Relations Representative who saw that news items
were confined to those of actual interest to the evacuees.
with the Center Manager.

Final control rested

Circulation was free to all residents of the Center

of publication, libraries, universities and a list of approved individuals.

214

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

Said the late John D. Barry, columnist of the San Francisco News: "Some day
they will be material for history records of a curious interval, sought by col¬
lectors, preserved in libraries.”
The Editor of the Pacemaker (title of the Santa Anita Assembly Center
paper) wrote in his column:

"We’ve had requests from the Library of Con¬

gress, New York Public Library, Pasadena Public Library, Los Angeles County
Library, Palo Alto Public Library and California State Library. Colleges which
receive our paper include the University of California (Los Angeles Branch),
University of Southern California, University of Chicago, Smith and Harvard
Universities.

Harvard uses our paper in its political science department.”

As source material for future reference, complete sets of the Center news¬
papers will be available at Headquarters, Western Defense Command, the War
Department, and the Library of Congress.

CHAPTER XVIII
Assembly Center Security
External Security.

The Commanding Generals of each Sector of the

Western Defense Command were responsible to the Commanding General,
Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, for the external security at
each of the Assembly Centers located in their respective Sectors.

One or more

military police companies were assigned to each Assembly Center as required
by the area and evacuee population involved.
The Sector Provost Marshal was responsible for the actual supervision of
the military police at all Assembly Centers in his Sector. The Provost Marshal,
Western Defense Command, advised the Commanding General, Western De¬
fense Command, in all matters pertaining to external security at Assembly
Centers, and prepared the policies and orders of the Commanding General
for transmittal to the Commanding Generals of the various Sectors.

The

Provost Marshal, Western Defense Command, as well as other officers from
this headquarters, periodically inspected the manner in which announced func¬
tions and policies were carried out by the military police companies at each
of the Assembly Centers.
The basic function of the military police at the Assembly Centers was to
prevent ingress and egress of unauthorized persons.

The Assembly Center

Manager, operating within the specific regulations published by the Wartime
Civil Control Administration in this regard, was authorized to control the
entrance and exit of evacuees and other persons.
permission granted.
pass.

He issued passes to reflect

No entrance or exit was permitted without a specific

The military police honored the passes thus issued, and refused entrance

and exit to those persons not in possession of such authority.
The military police also had a contingent responsibility.

In the event of a

fire, riot, or disorder which passed beyond the control of the Center Manage¬
ment or interior police, the Center Manager or the superior officer of the
interior police then on duty was authorized to call upon the commanding
officer of the military police for assistance.

When the military police were

called into an Assembly Center on such an occasion, the commanding officer
assumed full charge of the entire Center until the emergency was ended.
The policies

governing the functioning of military police at Assembly

Centers were announced in the following order of the Commanding General:
*'370.093

"SUBJECT: Functions of Military Police Units at centers for Japanese evacuees.
"To
: Commanding Generals,
Northwestern Sector, WDC.
Northern California Sector, WDC.
Southern California Sector, WDC.
Southern Land Frontier Sector, WDC.
Ninth Corps Area.
"1. Prior instructions on the subject of functions of military police units at the
Assembly Centers and Relocation Centers for Japanese evacuees are rescinded and the
following instructions are substituted therefor:
215

216

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

“a. Purpose of the Evacuation Center. The Evacuation Center has been established
for the purpose of caring for Japanese who have been moved from certain military
areas. They have been moved from their homes and placed in camps under guard as
a matter of military necessity. The camps are not "concentration camps” and the use
of this term is considered objectionable. Evacuation Centers are not internment camps.
Internment camps are established for another purpose and are not related to the evacu¬
ation program.
"b. Operation of the Evacuation Center. The Center is operated by civilian man¬
agement under the Wartime Civilian Control Administration, Headquarters Western
Defense Command and Fourth Army. A civilian director is in charge of each Center.
Civilian police available will be on duty to maintain order within the camp. The
civilian police are responsible for the search of individual evacuees and their possessions
for contraband. The civilian police are responsible for the escort of visitors and evacu¬
ees throughout the camp. The camp director is responsible for all means of communi¬
cation within the camp.
"c. (1) Functions of Military Police at Evacuation Centers. The military police
are assigned to the Center for the purpose of preventing ingress or egress of unauthor¬
ized persons and preventing evacuees from leaving the Center without proper authority.
The Assembly Centers in the combat area are generally located in grounds surrounded
by fences clearly defining the limits for the evacuees. In such places the perimeter of
the camp will be guarded to prevent unauthorized departure of evacuees. The Re¬
location Centers are generally large areas of which the evacuee quarters form only a
part of the Center. These Centers may have no fences and the boundaries may only be
marked by signs. At such Centers the military police will control the roads leading
into the Center and may have sentry towers placed to observe the evacuee barracks.
The balance of the area may be covered by motor patrols. The camp director will
determine those persons authorized to enter the area and will transmit his instructions
to the commanding officer of the military police. The camp director is authorized to
issue permits to such evacuees as may be allowed to leave the Center.
"(2) In case of disorder, such as fire or riot, the camp director or interior police
are authorized to call upon the military police for assistance within the camp. When
the military police are called into the camp area on such occasions the commander of
the military police will assume full charge until the emergency ends. The question of
the disposition of unmanageable evacuees is not a responsibility of the military police.
"(3) The commanding officer of the military police is responsible for the black-out
of the Evacuation Center.

A switch will be so located to permit the prompt cut-off

by the military police of all electric current in the camp. He will notify the camp
director of his instructions relative to black-outs.
“(4) The commanding officer of the military police is responsible for the protection
of merchandise at the post exchanges furnished for the use of the military personnel.
"(5)

Enlisted men will be permitted within the areas occupied by the evacuees

only when in the performance of prescribed duties.
"(6)

All military personnel will be impressed with the importance of the duties to

which their unit has been assigned, the performance of which demands the highest
standards of duty, deportment and military appearance.
"(7)

A firm but courteous attitude will be maintained toward the evacuees.

There will be no fraternizing.

Should an evacuee attempt to leave camp without per¬

mission he will be halted, arrested and delivered to the camp police.
"(8)

Commanding officers of military police units will be furnished copies of

operating instructions issued to the camp director. They are required to maintain such
close personal contacts with the camp director and his assistants as will assure the
efficient and orderly conduct of the camp, and the proper performance of the duties
of each.”

Interior Security.

The original plans for interior security contemplated

a civilian law enforcement body consisting of an experienced Caucasian peace

217

ASSEMBLY CENTER SECURITY

officer as chief of police and one other Caucasian assistant, with such number
of evacuees as necessary to maintain the peace and to enforce the laws and
Center regulations.

The chief of police under this plan, was responsible to the

Center Manager. Early in the operation of the first Centers it became evident
that this would not provide the desired security within the Centers and it was
abandoned.

To insure that disaffection among the evacuees would not become

rampant, an organization was created with a separate line of authority to the
Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration. This line was parallel to that
of the Center Management staff.
The Interior Security Branch was created within the Property, Security,
and Regulatory Division of Wartime Civil Control Administration, and an army
officer with previous experience as a student of municipal affairs and as a metro¬
politan police chief was assigned as chief of that Branch.

Civilians with con¬

siderable municipal police experience were employed as assistant chiefs of the
Branch, inspectors, and planning assistants. A capable police records technician
was employed for one month to organize the interior security records and install
them in each Center.
An

experienced

interior security

municipal

police

in

each

police

officer

Center.

interior security police consisted of a

In

was

employed

each

Center

as

chief

thenceforth

chief, assistant chief,

of
the

two or more

sergeants, and such number of patrolmen as the evacuee population and area
of the Center demanded.

Basically there were approximately four interior

security police per thousand evacuee population.

While this proportion of

police per thousand population is greater than the average municipality of
similar size, there were many duties to be performed not ordinarily required of
police in small communities.

Examples of these extra duties were:

inspection

of all incoming and outgoing parcels, except letter mail, for contraband;
inspection of all vehicles passing through entrances and exits; supervision of
visiting; patrol of mess halls; and escorting all evacuees who were authorized
by the Center Manager to leave the Center.

The personnel of the Interior

Security Branch reached its maximum in the month of July, 1942, with a
total of 334 employees—319 in the Assembly Centers and 15 at the Wartime
Civil Control Administration headquarters.
To assist in the keeping of the peace and the regulation of foot and mo¬
torized traffic, the chiefs of interior security in each Center were authorized
to, and did, recruit staffs of auxiliary police from among evacuees.
number of reasons this proved wholly unsuccessful.
privileges to influential evacuees

For a

They extended special

(so far as they were able), they demanded

extra compensation and extra privileges and in a number of instances "pro¬
tected” gambling rings.

After more than fair trial, the evacuee auxiliaries

were disbanded.
It was so rare as to be exceptional when an evacuee, auxiliary or otherwise,
reported a violation to the interior security police, made a worthwhile investi¬
gation, or even produced any information of value regarding a violator or
impending disturbances.

On the contrary, when the one disturbance

mentioned in greater detail later)

(to be

of any moment occurred, many of the

218

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

former auxiliary police were observed in the forefront of the demonstration.
Direct liaison was established between the interior security police in each
Center and the local law enforcement agencies, police, sheriffs, county attor¬
neys, and the local courts.

All of the interior security police at each Center

received deputizations from the county sheriff except in those cases where the
Center was entirely within a municipality and then special police commissions
were issued by the local police chief.
were

tried in

the local

Violations of ordinances and state laws

courts with

the local

prosecutors conducting

the

prosecution.
Subversive activities and violations of Federal laws were investigated by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and prosecuted in the Federal Courts.

In

conformance with the delimitation agreement between Federal investigative
agencies, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was ordinarily responsible for
investigations of these types in the Centers.

Because the Centers had many

of the aspects of military reservations, the usual practice was for the interior
security police to conduct preliminary investigations, report those that ap¬
peared to be Federal violations to the Federal Bureau of Investigation office having
jurisdiction, and then cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents in
such manner as desired in further investigation or in the apprehension of the
violators. Several cases of conspiracy to violate Public Law No. 503 (involving
liquor transactions and gambling) and theft of government property were com¬
pleted in this manner.
Only one disturbance of serious proportions occurred in any of the Assem¬
bly Centers.

At Santa Anita on August 4, 1942, a routine search for various

articles of contraband was started immediately after the morning meal.

A few

of the interior security police became over-zealous in their search and some¬
what overbearing in their manner of approach to evacuees in two of the
Center’s seven districts.

Added to this was an order from the Center Manager

to pick up, without advance notice, electric hot plates which had previously
been allowed on written individual authorization of the Center Management
staff to families who needed them for the preparation of infant formulas and
food for the sick.

Electric devices, such as hot plates, were strictly controlled

to prevent fire.
Poor liaison, or rather the complete lack of liaison in this incident, between
the Center Management and the heads of the interior security police resulted
in the failure of reports of complaints to reach the chief of interior security
police until mid-afternoon.

Those complaints, based to a certain extent on

solid ground grew in the intervening four or five hours to rumors of all kinds
of violations on the part of the police.

When finally the complaints reached

the chief of interior police, the search was promptly postponed just as the
crowds were beginning to gather.
Two mobs and one crowd of women evacuees formed.

One evacuee who

had long been suspected by the disorderly elements among the population of
giving information to the police was set upon and severely beaten though not
seriously injured.
injured.

The interior security police were harassed but none were

ASSEMBLY CENTER SECURITY

219

This is the single instance, mentioned earlier, in which the military police
were called into the Center and took complete charge upon entry. No further
disturbance occurred after the military police entered.

The crowds dispersed,

and no further threats of violence were circulated and no actual attempts at
violence occurred.

This disturbance was spontaneous and not the result of

subversive planning.
Corrective action was immediately taken to insure against provocation of
similar disturbances in the future.

Center Management and Interior Security

staff officials responsible for the lack of liaison which had allowed the all too
evident signs of brewing trouble to reach the boiling point without action
were removed from the Center.

A survey by military police officers established

the two districts in which some of the police were so over-zealous as to cause
the rumors and actually identified the responsible individual police employees
who were promptly replaced.
It is difficult to establish a basis for comparing the incidence of crime in
the Assembly Centers with the incidence of crime in municipalities with
approximately the same population, or with the incidence of crime committed
by persons of Japanese ancestry prior to evacuation.

Too many of the charac¬

teristics which are presumed to be crime deterrents in the normal community
of similar population were necessarily absent in Assembly Centers.

On the

other hand, many new factors appeared in the Assembly Centers that are not
usually found in communities of a like population.

The fact that a great

majority of the evacuees had much more unoccupied time than they were
accustomed to, is not an insignificant consideration.
During the year 1941 a total of 570 persons of Japanese ancestry were

arrested for Part I and Part II offenses (see uniform crime reports, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, for list of offenses).

The crime records in Assembly

Centers cover a period of six months during which 534 Part I and Part II

offenses were reported to the Interior Security Police.
evacuee population during these six months was 58,004.

The average monthly
The total population

of persons of Japanese ancestry in the United States in 1941 was 126,500.
The annual crime rate per 1,000 Japanese for 1941 is 4.5, while the same rate
projected from the six months of record in the Assembly Centers was 20.6. For
the record it must be stated that many of the more serious crimes disappeared en¬
tirely or showed great proportionate decrease in the Assembly Centers.

The

approximately 450 percent increase is due almost entirely to the multiplicity of
assaults, petty thefts, disorderly conduct, and other offenses of similar minor
nature which always occur when large populations are concentrated into small
areas under abnormal conditions. Because of all the complicating factors, no at¬
tempt is made at actual comparison with cities of approximately the same popu¬
lation. Tables 27 and 28 present an analysis of the crime incidence in Assembly
Centers. A graphic presentation of the Evacuee Crime Rate is given as Figure 17.

220

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

TABLE 27.—Number of Offenses Charged—Total Japanese Population of
the United States, Calendar Year, 1941, and of Assembly Centers,
April 25 to October 25, 1942.
Pre-Evacuation1
(12 Mos.)

Offense Charged

Post-Evacuation
(6 Mos.)

570

534

5
5
16
10
10
2
9

1
36
11
123
1
1

1

10
2
24
9
10
9
1
3
30
4

Disorderly Conduct...

2
10

1
7
13

8
4
89
24
192
69
3
22

2
72
7
55
117
9
65

figures are based on “Uniform Crime Reports”, Volume XII, fourth quarterly bulletin, 1941, issued
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice.

TABLE 28.—Crime Offenses in Assembly Centers

Center

Average
population
(Thousands)

Days
of
operation

Total
Japanese
man days
(Thousands)

Number
of
offenses

Offense
rate per
1,000 persons
per year

Pre-Evacuation1.

126.5

365

46,172.5

570

4.5

All Assembly Centers.

42.2

224

9,462.2

534

20.6

Fresno.
Manzanar.
Marysville.
Mayer.
Merced.
Pinedale.
Pomona.
Portland.
Puyallup.
Sacramento.
Salinas.
Santa Anita.
Stockton.
Tanforan.
Tulare.
Turlock.

4.4
5.2
1.8
0.2
3.8
3.7
4.8
3.0
5.7
3.2
3.0
12.9
3.7
6.5
4.1
2.9

178
72
53
27
133
78
110
132
137
52
69
215
161
169
138
105

783.7
373.4
93.3
5.8
500.4
287.9
523.0
391.8
781.4
165.9
209.2
2,777.6
599.7
1,098.7
567.4
303.2

34
40
1

15.8
39.1
3.9

4
9
11
19
32
8
20
226
16
59
36
19

2.9
11.4
7.7
17.7
14.9
17.6
34.9
29.7
9.7
19.6
23.2
22.9

■Figures are based on “Uniform Crime Reports”, Volume XII, fourth quarterly bulletin, 1941, issued
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of justice.

ASSEMBLY CENTER SECURITY

EVACUEE CRIME RATE
OFFENSES PER THOUSAND JAPANESE PER YEAR
*llt Utl_Y CENTER ANO
NUMBER OF OFFENSES

MAN Z ANAR

40

SALINAS

20

SANTA ANITA

226

TULARE

36

TURLOCK

i«

ALL CENTERS 534

TANFORAN

39

PORTLAND

19

SACRAMENTO

8

FRESNO

34

PUYALLUP

32

PINEDALE

9

STOCKTON

16

POMONA

ll

MARYSVILLE

i

MERCED

4

MAYER

0 0

Figure 17

221

CHAPTER XIX
Administration of Assembly Centers
As indicated in Chapter IV, supra, the Assembly Centers were largely staffed
by personnel "borrowed” from the Work Projects Administration.

The Chief

of the Assembly Center Branch of the Wartime Civil Control Administration
was Rex L. Nicholson, who absented himself temporarily from his position as
a Regional Director of the Work Projects Administration, to aid in the evacua¬
tion program.

Although Work Projects Administration personnel contributed

their valuable experience in Federal fiscal, procurement and administrative mat¬
ters, the responsibility for Assembly Center operations remained exclusively that
of the Commanding General, and his administrative directions were carried into
effect through the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration.
Every effort was made to employ evacuees in Assembly Center operations to
the fullest extent practicable on assignments they proved to be capable of per¬
forming. The basic plan, therefore, contemplated that all actual operations were
to be carried out by evacuees. This was followed almost without exception.
The accompanying chart is illustrative of Assembly Center administrative
organization

(Figure 18).

It enables the reader to visualize for himself the

wide range of problems encountered and the division of responsibilities at the
Center level.

It will be noted that every aspect of community life is included

in one of the regularly established administrative divisions.
no end to the services that had to be provided.

There was literally

Of course, housing, feeding,

sanitation, public health, maintenance and recreation were the principal con¬
siderations, but provision for these activities did not necessarily meet the neces¬
sity for barbershops, beauty shops, shoe repair shops, clothing stores, canteens
and post offices.
The problem of compensation for those evacuees accepting employment
required solution. Also a proper table of allowances per person and per family
had to be computed in order to assure the availability of the necessities for
normal maintenance.

Provision for maternity wards, for the care of the new¬

born, for the ailing, aged and the chronics was not alone enough, means had
to be established for the burial of the deceased.
In developing the rates of compensation for evacuees, the Wartime Civil
Control Administration took a number of factors into account.

First, it was

concluded that the net cash wage paid to any evacuee should not exceed the
net cash allowance then available to any enlisted man in the United States
Army.

At this time enlisted men received $21.00 per month for their first

four months of service.

Further, as the War Relocation Authority was to be¬

come responsible for the continuing problem once evacuees had been removed
to the interior by the Army, it was felt that War Relocation Authority should
be consulted. In addition, there was the problem of morale. Some compensation
was essential and there had to be a division between the various skills. It would
not have worked successfully had no recognition been afforded the various dif222

CENTER ORGANIZATION
ASSEMBLY

ADMINISTRATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTERS

223

Figure 18

224

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

ferences between the unskilled and the professional groups. A pay schedule was
developed, and submitted to War Relocation Authority for comment. The
Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, and the Director, War Reloca¬
tion Authority, concurred. It was then submitted by Wartime Civil Control
Administration to the Commanding General who, following his approval of the
schedule, submitted it to the War Department. When finally placed in opera¬
tion as a schedule of compensation, it had the approval of the Director, Bureau
of the Budget, the Secretary of War and the Commanding General, Western
Defense Command and Fourth Army, as well as the Director, War Relocation
Authority.
Although four classifications were initially adopted, over the major period
of operations, there were but three general classes and three applicable rates.
They were as indicated in Chapter XVI.
Unskilled. $ 8.00 per month
Skilled .

12.00

"

Professional

16.00

”

.

“

These rates were based upon a forty-hour week. Only those who accepted
employment on a regular basis of forty hours per week were eligible to receive
compensation at the stated rate.
All evacuees were given a monthly allowance in script or coupons. The
objective was to place them all on the same basis irrespective of economic
position. In the execution of this objective, evacuees were furnished housing,
food, clothing, where necessary, the normal community services and an elastic
means based on a fixed allowance for the acquisition of necessities. The
monthly coupon allowance was as follows:
Evacuees under 16 years of age. $1.00
Evacuees over 16 years of age.

2.50

Married couples.

4.50 per couple (maximum)

Families

7.50 per family (maximum)

.

The available community services such as shoe repair shops, barber and
beauty shop services were obtainable in exchange for coupons only. Cash as a
medium for the purchase of these services was not permitted. Any evacuee
who so desired was allowed to purchase extra coupon books. These coupons
were acceptable at canteens as well.
A competent system of timekeeping and recording was established at each
Center to account for the work performed by evacuees. It was also necessary
to maintain a family ledger as every item of clothing, each coupon book and
every time check issued an evacuee was accurately recorded. Ultimately, this
was reported to the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration.
A fully equipped fire department was installed at each Assembly Center
and fire discipline was strictly enforced. A Fire Chief, under the direction of
the Center Manager, organized a group to train evacuee firemen. Semi-weekly
fire drill were held and daily fire inspection was the rule. In all cases specific
arrangements were made by the Wartime Civil Control Administration for the
assistance of nearby public fire departments in case of serious emergency. The

ADMINISTRATION

OF

ASSEMBLY

225

CENTERS

use of hot plates and other electrical devices was strictly limited in order to main¬
tain fire hazard at a minimum. But few fires developed during the course of
Assembly Center administration and all of these were relatively minor.
As was noted in Chapter XVIII, Assembly Center security was not the
responsibility of the Center Manager and his staff.

Internal security was the

responsibility of the Chief of Internal Security at each Center.

He, in turn,

was directly responsible to Wartime Civil Control Administration, under a
separate line of administration. External security was the function of Army
Military Police. Close liaison was maintained between the Military Police Com¬
mander, the Center Manager, and the Chief of Internal Security.
Shortly after the establishment of the first Assembly Center, the Wartime
Civil Control Administration, issued an Assembly Center Operations Manual as
well as an Interior Security Manual. The former covered all aspects of operations,
and prescribed the rules to be observed by evacuees in the interests of public health,
morals and order.

Regulations were posted for the information and guidance

of those affected.

It would over-extend this report to reprint the Assembly

Center Operations

and the Interior Security Manuals here.

Bound copies,

however, are to be on file at Headquarters, Western Defense Command, at the
War Department, and at the Library of Congress.
Some additional construction was always in progress at each Center.

The

Works and Maintenance Section was responsible not only for maintenance
and repair but also for the construction of additions and improvements.

In

passing, it is to be noted that this Section was responsible for fire control.
Under the direction of the Service Section at each Center, various commu¬
nity needs were satisfied.

Education, recreation, welfare, intra-center mail dis¬

tribution and the complaint department were under its aegis. At each Center
specific opportunity was afforded every evacuee to make suggestions, complaints
and requests in writing or through his Block Leader.
complaint was given consideration.

Each suggestion and

If it had merit, action was taken to

remedy the difficulty at the Center level. If the Center Manager lacked author¬
ity, he communicated immediately with the Director, Wartime Civil Control
Administration, San Francisco.

The entire emphasis in the Center Administra¬

tion was to provide for the comfort and convenience of evacuees in order to
reduce hardship.
The Service Section was also responsible for the establishment of a Center
newspaper.

Each Center had its own paper, prepared, published and edited

exclusively by evacuees.

A complete file of these publications will be available

at Headquarters, Western Defense Command, at the War Department, and at
the Library of Congress.
The education program of the Service Section was under the technical
direction of the United States Office of Education.

The educational super¬

visor was a member of the Center Administrative staff.
by evacuee supervisors and teachers.

He was assisted

Existing or specially constructed build¬

ings were converted to school room use.

Blackboards, desks, tables, and other

school furniture were either constructed with evacuee labor or improvised.
Books, classroom and special materials were provided primarily through dona-

226

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

tions. A limited amount of supplies was purchased with Army funds. Instruc¬
tion courses included classes for pre-school, kindergarten, elementary, junior
and senior high school, and adult groups. Special classes were held in first aid,
safety, fire prevention and nursing.
Recreation was an important department in the Service Section; both out¬
door and indoor activities were organized for the benefit of all age groups.
Certain existing organizations such as Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts were en¬
couraged to continue unit activities. Special classes were established for
dancing, art work and other allied recreational interests. Libraries were estab¬
lished with books and magazines normally donated. Moving pictures were
shown periodically, ordinarily with donated equipment.
The United States postal service facilities in Assembly Centers were operated
by regular, bonded postal employees assigned by postal authorities. They were
authorized to sell stamps, postal money orders and handle parcel post packages.
They also had authority to sell War Bonds and Stamps and carry on normal
post office business.
The work of sorting and delivering incoming and outgoing mail was ordi¬
narily accomplished by evacuees. There was no censorship of incoming or out¬
going mail. Parcel post, however, was inspected for contraband in the presence
of the addressee.
Banking facilities were found to be essential in all Centers, although bank¬
ing by mail was encouraged through the assistance of the Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco. The necessary services were made available.
There were many visitors at each Assembly Center, some for social calls
and others who had business with evacuees. Visiting houses were established
near each Assembly Center gate. Visitors were not allowed to enter the Center
proper or to meet evacuees in their living quarters except in cases of serious
illness or other emergency. There were, of course, no restrictions whatever
against evacuees residing within the Center visiting each other. Visitor passes
were issued on application as a matter of course. A record was kept of all
visitations. Passes could be obtained through mail application or at the Center
gate from an attendant. When a visitor arrived, word was sent to the evacuee
who met the visitor in the building provided therefor.
Public health and sanitation received the most careful attention. Inspections
of latrines, and showers were required to be made a minimum of twice daily.
Food handlers underwent careful physical examinations and kitchens were in¬
spected daily. Sanitary requirements had to be met. To encourage this, com¬
petitions were held between Center kitchens. At each center the most sanitary,
orderly kitchen was awarded a pennant weekly. Evacuees themselves were the
dishwashers and the food handlers, and with but few exceptions Center chefs
were evacuees. It is interesting to note that in one or two Centers the Japanese
community did not contain any individuals who were qualified as cooks. At
these Centers Caucasian cooks were hired and a school was immediately estab¬
lished. Within a short time evacuees took over the task.
Although the United States Public Health Service was responsible for the

ADMINISTRATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTERS

227

immediate direction of Center infirmaries, hospitals and outpatient service, the
Center Manager was responsible for the extension of community services to
the infirmaries and hospitals. The success of the operation can be measured in
part by the absence of any significant epidemic.
A summary showing each of the following facts for each Assembly Center
is presented in Table 29: The average population, total days occupied by
evacuees, the inclusive dates of occupancy, and the maximum population. The
entire Assembly Center operations program from the opening of the Manzanar
Reception Center on March 21 to the closing of Fresno, October 30, extended
through a period of 224 days. Exclusive of Manzanar, which was transferred
to War Relocation Authority, the Santa Anita Center had the longest period of
occupancy: 215 days, with an average population of 12,919 for this entire period.
During most of the period, the population of Santa Anita was more than 18,000.
Next in order of length of evacuee occupancy, were Fresno, with 178 days; Tanforan, 169 days; and Stockton, 161 days. On the other hand, the Center at
Mayer, Arizona, was closed after 27 days, Sacramento after 52 days, Marys¬
ville after 53, Salinas after 69, and Pinedale after 78.
TABLE 29.—Average Population, Total Days Occupied by Evacuees, Dates of
Occupancy and Maximum Population of Assembly Centers

(Population in outside hospitals not included)

Center

Average
population

Total
days
occupied

DATES OF
OCCUPANCY
From

To

MAXIMUM
POPULATION
Number

Date

Fresno.
Manzanar1.
Marysville.
Mayer.

4,403
5,186
1,760
214

178
72
53
27

5-6
3-21
5-8
5-7

10-30
5-31
6-29
6-2

5,120
9,666
2,451
245

9-4
5-31
6-2
5-25

Merced.
Pinedale.
Pomona.
Portland.

3,762
3,690
4,755
2,969

133
78
110
132

5-6
5-7
5-7
5-2

9-15
7-23
8-24
9-10

4,508
4,792
5,434
3,676

6-3
6-29
7-20
6-6

Puyallup.
Sacramento.
Salinas.
Santa Anita.

5,704
3,190
3,032
12,919

137
52
69
215

4-28
5-6
4-27
3-27

9-12
6-26
7-4
10-27

7,390
4,739
3,594
18,719

5-25
5-30
6-23
8-23

Stockton.
Tanforan.
Tulare.
Turlock.

3,725
6,501
4,112
2,888

161
169
138
105

5-10
4-28
4-20
4-30

10-17
10-13
9-4
8-12

4,271
7,816
4,978
3,662

5-21
7-25
8-11
6-2

lManzanar was transferred to WRA on June 1, 1942.

The following Figures (19-a to 19-p inclusive) graphically present the indi¬
vidual Center data on occupancy.

228

JAPANESE

Figure 19-a:

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Evacuee Population of Fresno Assembly Center

Daily population movement shown above. Average population 4,403 for 178 days.
Occupied from May 6 to October 30. Maximum population 5,120 on September 4.
Received evacuees from: Central San Joaquin Valley. Major transfer movements to:
Jerome and Gila River.

3000
2000
1000
MARCH

APRIL
Figure 19-b:

Evacuee Population of Marysville Assembly Center

Daily population movement shown above. Average population 1,760 for 53 days.
Occupied from May 8 to June 29. Maximum population 2,451 on June 2. Received
evacuees from: Placer-Sacramento Area. Major transfer movements to: Tule Lake.

Figure 19-c:

Evacuee Population of Manzanar Assembly Center

Daily population movement shown above. Average population 5,186 for 72 days.
Occupied from March 21 to May 31. Maximum population 9,666 on May 31.
Received evacuees from: Los Angeles County, Bainbridge Island, Sacramento-Amador
Area. Major transfer movements to: Manzanar.

ADMINISTRATION

OF

ASSEMBLY

000 jMARCH

APRIL
Figure

flmuuupga
MAY
19-d:

229

CENTERS

1
JUNE

Evacuee

JULY

Population

of

AUGUST
Mayer

SEPTEMBER1 OCTOBER

Assembly

Center

Daily population movement shown above. Average population 214 for 27 days. Occu¬
pied from May 7 to June 2. Maximum population 245 on May 25. Received evacuees
from: Arizona Military Area I. Major transfer movements to: Colorado River.

5000
4 000
3 000

2000
1000
MARCH
Figure

19-e:

Evacuee

Population

of

Merced

Assembly

Center

Daily population movement shown above. Average population 3,762 for 133 days.
Occupied from May 6 to September 15. Maximum population 4,508 on June 3.
Received evacuees from: North San Francisco Bay Area—North San Joaquin Valley.
Major transfer movements to: Granada.

Figure

19-f:

Evacuee Population

of

Portland

Assembly Center

Daily population movement shown above. Average population 2,969 for 132 days.
Occupied from May 2 to September 10. Maximum population 3,676 on June 6.
Received evacuees from: Multnomah and Western Counties, Oregon, Central Counties,
Washington. Major transfer movements to: Minidoka, Heart Mountain, Tule Lake.

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

230

8000

™

7000

'

L

1

M

6000
5000
4000

3000

2000
1000
RCH

APRIL

1

MAY

1

JUNE

1

JULY

'

AUGUST

'sEPTEMBEf! OCTOBER

Figure 19-g: Evacuee Population of Puyallup Assembly Center
Daily population movement shown above. Average population 5,704 for 137 days.
Occupied from April 28 to September 12. Maximum population 7,390 on May 25.
Received evacuees from: Seattle-Tacoma Areas, Alaska. Major transfer movements
to: Tule Lake, Minidoka.

Figure

19-h:

Evacuee

Population

of

Pinedale

Assembly

Center

Daily population movement shown above. Average population 3,690 for 78 days.
Occupied from May 7 to July 23. Maximum population 4,792 on June 29. Re¬
ceived evacuees from: Pierce, King Counties, Hood River County, Oregon. Major
transfer movements to: Tule Lake, Colorado River.

ADMINISTRATION

Figure 19-i:

OF

ASSEMBLY

CENTERS

231

Evacuee Population of Pomona Assembly Center

Daily population movement shown above. Average population 4,755 for 110 days.
Occupied from May 7 to August 24. Maximum population 5,434 on July 20 and
August 2. Received evacuees from: Los Angeles, San Francisco, Santa Clara. Major
transfer movements to: Heart Mountain.

Figure 19-j:

Evacuee Population of Sacramento Assembly Center

Daily population movement shown above. Average population 3,190 for 52 days.
Occupied from May 6 to June 26
Maximum population 4,739 on May 30. Received
evacuees from: San Joaquin and Sacramento Counties, California. Major transfer
movements to: Tule Lake.

.

3 000
2000
1 000
MA =*CH

APRIL

MAY

Figure 19-k:

1

JUNE

1

JULY

1 AUGUST

September OCTOBER

Evacuee Population of Salinas Assembly Center

Daily population movement shown above. Average population 3,032 for 69 days.
Occupied from April 27 to July 4. Maximum population 3,594 on June 23. Received
evacuees from: Monterey, Santa Cruz, and San Benito Counties, California. Major
transfer movements to: Colorado River.

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

232

I 9000

I

I 8000
I 7000
I 6000
I 5000

—

_

I 4000
I 3000
I 2000
I 1000
10000
9000
8000

BhI

7000
6000

..

5000
4000

r

3000
2000
1000

u
Figure

19-1:

Evacuee

Population

of

Santa

Anita

Assembly

Center

Daily population movement shown above. Average population 12,919 for 215 days.
Occupied from March 27 to October 27. Maximum population 18,719 on August 23.
Received evacuees from: Los Angeles, San Diego, and Santa Clara Counties, California.
Major transfer movements to: Colorado River, Gila River, Heart Mountain, Granada,
Rohwer, Central Utah, Jerome.

Figure

19-m:

Evacuee

Population

of

Stockton

Assembly

Center

Daily population movement shown above. Average population 3,725 for 161 days.
Occupied from May 10 to October 17. Maximum population 4,271 on May 21.
Received evacuees from: San Joaquin County, California. Major transfer movements
to: Rohwer, Gila River.

ADMINISTRATION

Figure

19-n:

Evacuee

OF

ASSEMBLY

Population

of

233

CENTERS

Tanforan

Assembly

Center

Daily population movement shown above. Average population 6,501 for 169 days.
Occupied from April 28 to October 13. Maximum population 7,816 on July 25.
Received evacuees from: San Francisco Bay Area. Major transfer movements to:
Central Utah.

Figure

19-o:

Evacuee

Population

of

Tulare

Assembly

Center

Daily population movement shown above. Average population 4,112 for 138 days.
Occupied from April 20 to September 4. Maximum population 4,978 on August
11-14. Received evacuees from: Ventura, Santa Barbara, San Luis Obispo, Los
Angeles, and Sacramento Counties. Major transfer movements to: Gila River.

Figure

19-p:

Evacuee

Population

of

Turlock

Assembly

Center

Daily population movement shown above. Average population 2,888 for 105 days.
Occupied from April 30 to August 12. Maximum population 3,661 on June 2.
Received evacuees from: Solano, Alameda, Los Angeles, and Sacramento Counties.
Major transfer movements to: Gila River.

PART VI
RELOCATION OF EVACUEES

CHAPTER XX
War Relocation Authority
Chapter V hereof alludes to the preliminary considerations which ultimately
lead to the establishment of the War Relocation Authority by Executive Order
No. 9102 issued by the President of the United States on March 18, 1942.
As it was then contemplated that there might be collective evacuations of
more than one category from the Atlantic seaboard as well as from the Pacific
Coast, the Executive Order (9102) carried broad powers.

In essential particu¬

lar, the Director of War Relocation Authority was authorized to formulate and
execute a relocation program—to provide shelter, subsistence, clothing, medical
attention, educational and recreational facilities, and to provide for private and
public employment for evacuees.
To effectuate this program the Director of War Relocation Authority was
authorized to:

Accomplish all necessary evacuation not undertaken by the

Secretary of War or Military Commanders, and to relocate, supervise and pro¬
vide for the needs of such persons; to provide for employment of such persons
with due regard to the safeguarding of the public interests; to secure coopera¬
tion and assistance of any governmental agency; to consult with the Secretary
of War relative to regulations issued by him in order to coordinate evacuation
and relocation activities; to delegate authority; to employ personnel, make
expenditures including loans, grants, and the purchase of real property.

The

Order also directed consultation with the United States Employment Service
and cooperation with the Alien Property Custodian.

A War Relocation Work

Corps was created to be made up by voluntary enlistment of persons removed
under the Order.

Finally, in order to avoid duplication of evacuation activities

under the Order, and also under Executive Order No. 9066, it was provided
that the Director shall not undertake any evacuation activities within Military
Areas designated under Executive Order No. 9066 without the approval of the
Secretary of War and an appropriate Military Commander.
Obviously the evacuation would lead to the creation of long-range social and
economic problems. These problems were essentially non-military in nature and
it was considered unwise to require the military establishment to exert its
energies in that direction but rather to conserve them for those aspects of the
war effort intensely related to the defeat of the enemy. Such a program called
for further movement of evacuees, with due regard to military necessity, to
Relocation Centers, actual communities where a more normal life could be
provided and the energies of the evacuees appropriately directed.

The control

and administration of these communities, made ready by the Army, became
the War Relocation Authority burden.
The tenor of the Executive Order establishing War Relocation Authority
indicated that it would fully assume the burden of formulating and placing in
execution a complete relocation program.

However, to expedite the removal

of evacuees from the temporary Assembly Centers to the Relocation Centers, the
237

238

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Army assumed certain responsibilities imposed on the "War Relocation Authority
by the Executive Order, namely, the construction and equipment of the Reloca¬
tion Centers and the transfer of the evacuees thereto.
As noted in Chapter I, the Wartime Civil Control Administration halted the
relocation site selection aspects of its program following the creation of War Re¬
location Authority.

Otherwise,

War Relocation Authority accepted almost

without change the program already formulated by Wartime Civil Control
Administration in the first fortnight of Wartime Civil Control Administration
existence. In essence the program called for the evacuation first to Assembly Cen¬
ters and thence to Relocation Centers in the interior. Accordingly, but for site
selection (and ample time was afforded for this because, with evacuees resident
in Assembly Centers, the pressure was off), War Relocation Authority was
free to concentrate solely on the rehabilitation aspects of relocation. It was
able to consider problems incident to the operation of Relocation Centers,
for release therefrom, for providing employment in the interior, and the post
war aspects.

It was not required to devote any of its energies or functions to

the logistics of transfers from Assembly to Relocation Centers, to the preserva¬
tion of community patterns in evacuation, to the furnishing of social, medical
and property protection services during evacuation, or during the Assembly
Center phases, to the construction, equipment and supply of Relocation Cen¬
ters. However, conferences between Wartime Civil Control Administration and
War Relocation Authority representatives were held at frequent intervals on all
Wartime Civil Control Administration actions which would affect in any way the
War Relocation Authority policy and program.

Indeed, the War Relocation

Authority was free for virtually six months after its creation to develop a specific
and thoroughly conceived program of Relocation Center operations. Therefore,
the distinction between evacuation and the initial aspects of relocation presump¬
tively established by the terms of the Executive Order creating War Relocation
Authority was never fully operative.
As previously indicated in Chapter V, the closest coordination was estab¬
lished between headquarters of Wartime Civil Control Administration and War
Relocation Authority. As soon as Director Eisenhower arrived in San Francisco
following his appointment, he opened offices adjacent to those of the Wartime
Civil Control Administration in the Whitcomb Hotel. Although the head¬
quarters of War Relocation Authority were to be established in Washington,
until well into the summer of 1942 the principal office was in the San Francisco
Regional Office.

Major Mark H. Astrup (then Captain) was directed by War

Department orders to report for duty to Mr. Eisenhower who assigned him as
Liaison Officer from War Relocation Authority to Wartime Civil Control Ad¬
ministration. Consultation between Mr. Eisenhower and the Director, Wartime
Civil Control Administration, was a multiple daily occurrence.
The formal understanding of April 17, 1942, between the War Department
and War Relocation Authority had been informally agreed to in essential part
before the end of March.
detail here.

As the agreement speaks for itself, it is set forth in

WAR

RELOCATION

239

AUTHORITY

"WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
Washington, D. C.
April 17, 1942.
"MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE WAR DEPARTMENT AND
WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY.
"Preamble: The War Relocation Authority is an independent establishment created
by Executive Order of the President, No. 9102 dated March 18, 1942, with a primary
objective of relieving the military establishment of the burden of providing for the re¬
location of persons excluded from military areas by order of the Secretary of War or any
designated military commander acting pursuant to Executive Order of the President,
No. 9066 dated February 19, 1942. The emphasis in all War Relocation Authority activ¬
ities will be increasingly to alleviate the drain on military resources with regard to all
phases of evacuation and relocation. The War Relocation Authority has agreed to prepare
itself as rapidly as practicable to assume those burdens now imposed on the War Depart¬
ment respecting such activities and particularly in connection with the Pacific Coast
evacuation now in progress. Accordingly the following understanding is executed between
the War Department and the War Relocation Authority to meet the present situation.
“1. The evacuation of combat zones is a military necessity and when determined upon
must not be retarded by resettlement and relocation. In other words, the timing of evac¬
uation is a military function which War Relocation Authority will do all in its power
to accommodate.
"2. Assembly Centers are staging areas and necessary because of the time required to
select relocation sites and to construct Relocation Centers (Reception Centers). Assembly
Centers are constructed and will be supplied and operated by the War Department.
"3. Relocation sites, upon which Relocation Centers (Reception Centers) are built,
are to be selected by the War Relocation Authority, subject to War Department approval.
"4. The acquisition, as distinguished from selection, of sites for Relocation Centers
(Reception Centers) is a War Department function. Such acquisition will be made by
the War Department upon the request of the War Relocation Authority. The War Re¬
location Authority will reimburse the War Department for the acquisition cost of re¬
location sites, or pay the cost in the first instance.
"a. As a part of the acquisition procedure, respecting both private and public lands,
the War Department, through an appropriate military commander, will advise the Chief
Executive of the State concerned of the military necessity for the location of a relocation
project within that State.
"b. The War Relocation Authority has full responsibility for compilation of the
necessary data and descriptions in connection with 3 and 4 above.
"5. Construction of initial facilities at Relocation Centers (Reception Centers) will
be accomplished by the War Department. This initial construction will include all facil¬
ities necessary to provide the minimum essentials of living, viz., shelter, hospital, mess,
sanitary facilities, administration building, housing for relocation staff, post office, store
houses, essential refrigeration equipment, and military police housing. (War Department
construction will not include refinements such as schools, churches and other community
planning adjuncts.) The placement and construction of military police housing will be
subject to the approval of the appropriate military commander.
"6. The War Department will procure and supply the initial equipment for Relocation
Centers (Reception Centers), viz., kitchen equipment, minimum mess and barrack equip¬
ment, hospital equipment and ten days’ supply of non-perishable subsistence based on the
Relocation Center (Reception Center) evacuee capacity. From the date of opening, or the
date on which the War Relocation Authority initiates the operation of any Relocation
Center (Reception Center), as the case may be, the War Department will transfer ac¬
countability for all such equipment and property to the War Relocation Authority. The
War Relocation Authority agrees to assume such accountability. Thereafter, the War
Relocation Authority will maintain and replace all such equipment and property, inclu¬
ding subsistence, and will procure whatever additional supplies, subsistence and equipment

JAPANESE

240

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

it may require. The War Department agrees that the War Relocation Authority may
effect its procurement through War Department agencies.
"a. As to all routine procurement effected by the War Relocation Authority through
War Department Agencies, said Authority agrees that it will transmit to the War De¬
partment a forecast of its requirements semi-annually in advance and that it will confirm
in writing to the appropriate War Department Agency its actual requirements from time
to time as the need for such procurement develops. The War Relocation Authority will
take all possible and practicable steps to inform the War Department well in advance of
its requirements.
"7. After pending arrangements for existing Reception Centers are completed, the
War Relocation Authority will operate Relocation Centers (Reception Centers) from the
date of opening. This will include staffing, administration, project planning and complete
operation and maintenance. In undertaking such operations the War Relocation Authority
will not retard completion of the evacuation process but will accommodate military re¬
quirements. It will be prepared to accept successive increments of evacuees as construction
is completed and supplies and equipment are delivered. In each case the War Relocation
Authority will provide a project manager who will be available to the War Department
local construction representative for consultation as soon as a given project is approved
for construction.
"8. The War Department will provide for the transportation of evacuees to Assembly
Centers and from Assembly Centers to Relocation Centers (Reception Centers) under
appropriate military escort. The War Department through the Western Defense Com¬
mand, has arranged for the storage of household effects of evacuees through the Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco. At War Department expense, the Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco has acquired warehouse space, provided civilian guards, and has ar¬
ranged for inventories of goods stored by each evacuee. When evacuee goods are stored
and the Federal Reserve Bank delivers inventory receipts to the War Relocation Authority,
said Authority will accept such receipts from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
and, upon such acceptance, said Authority assumes the responsibility now borne by the
War Department for the warehousing program, including the assumption from the date
of delivery of receipts, of payment of all costs. Thereafter, the disposition of such
household effects and the transportation thereof to Relocation Centers, or elsewhere,
will be the sole responsibility of the War Relocation Authority.
"9. In the interest of the security of the evacuees relocation sites will be designated
by the appropriate Military Commander or by the Secretary of War, as the case may be,
as prohibited zones and military areas, and appropriate restrictions with respect to the
rights of evacuees and others to enter, remain in, or leave such areas will be promulgated
so that ingress and egress of all persons, including evacuees, will be subject to the control
of the responsible Military Commander. Each relocation site will be under Military Police
patrol and protection as determined by the War Department. Relocation Centers (Recep¬
tion Centers) will have a minimum capacity of 5,000 evacuees (until otherwise agreed
to) in order that the number of Military Police required for patrol and protection will
be kept at a minimum.
"10. It is understood that all commitments herein as relate to the use of War De¬
partment and/or War Relocation funds are subject to the approval of the Bureau of the
Budget.
WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
by

/s/ M. S.

Eisenhower

Director
WAR DEPARTMENT
by

/s/ John J. McCloy
Assistant Secretary of War.”

In other chapters of this report a narrative account outlines the action
taken to comply with the Agreement of April 17, by the War Department
through Western Defense Command.

In addition to Relocation Project site

WAR

RELOCATION

241

AUTHORITY

acquisition, Center construction, equipment and supply, transfer of evacuees
and their impedimenta from Assembly Centers to Relocation Centers, transfer
of personal property and warehousing, as contemplated by the agreement, cer¬
tain other steps were taken. They are briefly described in the following passages.
Each Assembly and Relocation Center within Western Defense Command
was ultimately made the basis for a Civilian Restrictive Order.1 All are not of
the same character.

One group described the boundaries and extent of each

Center, and the other group was issued in connection with the group agricultural
labor program of War Relocation Authority.
Civilian Restrictive Orders Nos. 1, 18, 19, 20, 23, and 24 described the
boundaries of the various Centers.
within these physical boundaries.

Center residents were required to remain

Each Center resident was enjoined to obtain

express written authority before undertaking to leave

the designated area.

During the Assembly Center phase, such permits were issued only by the
Wartime Civil Control Administration.

Once transfer to Relocation Centers

was initiated, a delegation of authority was executed by the Commanding Gen¬
eral to the Director of the War Relocation Authority.

As ''X^r Relocation Au¬

thority was charged with full responsibility for Relocation Center operations
and for all other aspects of relocation, the Army did not undertake to determine
who might enter and who might depart from a Relocation Center.

Violation

of the terms of these Restrictive Orders subjected the violator to the penalties
and liabilities provided by law. The Regulatory Branch of Wartime Civil Con¬
trol Administration was charged with the issuance of the authorizations above
referred to, and issued appropriate permits, after investigation if that was deemed
necessary, in telegraphic or written form, depending on the circumstances sur¬
rounding the particular application.
Public Proclamation No. 8 was promulgated by the Commanding General,
further to assure the security of Relocation Centers and adjacent communities.2
Under its terms all Center residents were required to obtain a permit before
leaving the designated Project boundaries.

The Proclamation also specifically

controlled ingress and egress of persons other than Center residents. Violations
were made subject to the penalties provided under Public Law 503, 77th Con¬
gress. In the delegation of authority to control ingress and egress (described in
further detail later in this chapter), War Relocation Authority was given full
freedom of action in determining who might enter and who might leave. The
military police stationed around the perimeter of the several Projects did not
participate in this determination. Their mission was merely to prevent unauthor¬
ized entry and unauthorized departure—as determined solely by War Relocation
Authority.
Four of the ten War Relocation Centers were established outside of the
Western Defense Command and hence outside of the jurisdiction of the Com¬
manding General, Western Defense Command. To secure uniformity of control
the War Department published Public Proclamation WD:1 on August 13, 1942.
It designated the Heart Mountain Relocation Project in Wyoming, the Granada
*See Inclosure to letter of transmittal

# 7.

2See Inclosure to letter of transmittal

#

7.

JAPANESE

242

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Relocation Project in Colorado, the Jerome Relocation Project and the Rohwer
Relocation Project in Arkansas, as military areas and as War Relocation Project
areas.

In addition, Public Proclamation WD:1 contained provisions similar to

those of Public Proclamation No. 8 issued by the Commanding General relative
to the ingress to and egress from War Relocation Project areas.3
The Commanding General recognized fully that one of the principal responsi¬
bilities of War Relocation Authority was properly to control ingress and egress
at Relocation Centers. The exercise of such control by Army authorities would
have been tantamount to administering the Centers themselves. While the Com¬
manding General retained exclusive control to regulate and prohibit the entry or
movement of any Japanese in the evacuated areas, he delegated fully the authority
and responsibility to determine entry to and departure from the Center proper.
The authority to control ingress and egress was delegated to the Director
of War Relocation Authority and to such persons as the Director might desig¬
nate in writing.

Each permit issued under this authorization was required to

set forth the effective period thereof and the terms and conditions upon and the
purpose for whiclj it was granted.

A complete record of all such permits was

required to be kept by the Director.

However, the Commanding General

retained exclusive jurisdiction over:
"(a)

Release of persons of Japanese ancestry from any Relocation Center or Project

Area for the purpose of private employment within, resettlement within, or permanent
or semi-permanent residence within Military Area No. 1 or the California portion of
Military Area No. 2.”

The delegation was accomplished on August 11, 1942.

The Director, War

Relocation Authority, in turn further delegated the authority and responsibility
to his respective Center Directors. The net result of this arrangement was that
in Centers located outside the evacuated zone, the military authorities exercised
no control whatever over ingress and egress. That is, none beyond that involved
in the military police function of preventing those entries and departures not au¬
thorized by the Center Director.

As to the four Centers situated within the

evacuated zone (Tule Lake, Manzanar, Colorado River and Gila River)4 the
control reserved by the Commanding General was limited to regulating the
conditions of travel and movement through the area.

Where, for example,

the Center Director at Manzanar determined to transfer an evacuee to another
Center, or to release him for private employment or to enter a college in the
interior, a travel permit for that portion of the travel performed within the
evacuated zone was required.

In issuing a permit

(as a matter of course, a

permit is issued on War Relocation Authority request) the Commanding Gen¬
eral merely prescribes the condition of travel—viz., on a stated route under escort.
The War Relocation Authority endeavored to use evacuee labor as much
as possible in the operation of its Relocation Centers.

The railheads serving

the Colorado River, Tule Lake, Gila River, and Manzanar Centers were outside
SA copy of this Proclamation will also be found in Inclosure to letter of transmittal # 7.
4By Proclamation No. 16, Headquarters, Western Defense Command, dated March 2, 1943, the Colorado
and Gila River War Relocation Centers were removed from the evacuated zone in Arizona when the boundary
was moved southward an average of 60 miles.

WAR

RELOCATION

AUTHORITY

243

the respective Project areas. In order to facilitate the War Relocation Authortiy
policy in this regard, notwithstanding the location of the Centers within the
evacuated zone, the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and
Fourth Army, on September 21, 1942, authorized emergency employment of
Japanese evacuees outside of the four War Relocation Authority Centers located
within the evacuated areas.

The authority granted required:
“(a) That the work to be done is essential to the operation of the projects and in¬
volves meeting a current emergency.
"(b) That payment therefor is not to be received from private individuals or private
firms, that it is not private employment.
"(c) That military guards are to be furnished to prevent the unauthorized absence
of evacuees from the area in which the work is to be performed. This is not to be con¬
strued as indicating that the military personnel is to act as guards in connection with the
works party. Military personnel is to be provided solely for the purpose of controlling
exits from the particular area involved in order that unauthorized departure of evacuee
labor may be prevented.
"(d) In the event an evacuee laborer does escape or does effect an unauthorized
absence from the area, the military personnel assigned to secure the area are not to take
action for the apprehension of the individual. The Military Commander is, however, to
immediately notify local County and State civilian law enforcement officials and the
nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In addition thereto, an immediate
report of the occurrence is to be made to this headquarters.”

Almost coincidentally with the initiation of evacuation, requests were sub¬
mitted for evacuee labor in the interior from various private sources. The most
substantial volume emanated from sugar beet interests.

As noted elsewhere in

this report, particularly in Chapter IX, voluntary migration was halted pri¬
marily because of the attitude of the interior population. The governors of the
interior states, with but one exception, reflected this attitude most forcibly.
Their public statements

augmented

a

growing public

hostility

toward

all

evacuees. Some few incidents occurred and it became apparent that evacuation
would necessarily have to be accomplished under complete Federal supervision.
Requests for evacuee labor coming from some sources were accompanied by
the suggestion that Federal troops be used to provide for the security of the
evacuees and the adjoining communities, but the requests were denied as no
troops were available for such assignments.

It was announced that if evacuee

labor was to be used at all, suitable arrangements would have to be made by the
State and County officials concerned, the growers, and the War Relocation
Authority.

It was also announced that in any event no evacuee labor would be

available for employment within the evacuated zone.

Flowever, it was agreed

that if appropriate arrangements were made betwen those interested, there would
be no objection to private employment in the interior of Western Defense Com¬
mand under War Relocation Authority jurisdiction and responsibility.
On April 7, 1942, Mr. Eisenhower called a conference of Governors of
western states at Salt Lake City.

The Director, Wartime Civil Control Admin¬

istration, represented the Commanding General. Fie described the Army’s position
to the Governors of several states, outlined in detail the evacuation program

244

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

already under way, and stated that as far as the Army was concerned any group
agricultural labor recruitment from among evacuees would have to be the result of
suitable arrangements between the interested parties, viz., State and local officials,
sugar beet growers, sugar refiners, and the War Relocation Authority. A large
group of sugar beet growers and sugar refiners were present at the conference, and
shortly thereafter a crystallized program emerged. Although most of the Govern¬
ors present at the conference indicated that they would permit no evacuee labor to
enter their respective states, a complete change of heart soon became evident in
that suitable agreements were executed in writing covering the use of group
evacuee labor parties in the sugar beet fields.

The War Relocation Authority

policies in this regard were announced in a printed pamphlet, an excerpt from
which is quoted here.
"A. Assurance from the Governor of the state and from the principal law enforcement
officials in the locality that law and order will be maintained in the event that
Japanese evacuees move into a specified area. (Such assurances will be released to the
newspapers by the War Relocation Authority.)
"B. Assurance from the employer that transportation by bus or rail will be provided
by the employer from the assembly center to the place of work and return, or, if the
assembly center has been evacuated in the meantime, assurance that the employer
■will compensate the Military authority in an amount equivalent to the cost of re¬
turning the evacuees to the assembly centers. In connection with transportation it
is to be understood that, in the event the return of the evacuees is deemed necessary
by the Director of the War Relocation Authority at any time, the employer will
provide for such return as agreed to in this paragraph.
"C. Assurance by the employer that not less than the wages prevailing in the locality
will be paid the evacuees, and that any legal minimum wage requirement will be ob¬
served. The employer will agree that, in the event the family of the evacuee should
be moved from an assembly to a relocation center during the period of private em¬
ployment, a portion of the evacuee’s wages as determined by the War Relocation
Authority to be necessary for the support of the family will be paid to the Authority
by the employer. The employer will also agree that at each pay period a record of the
wages paid to each evacuee is to be submitted to the War Relocation Authority.
"D. Assurance by the employer that adequate provision has been made as to housing
and sanitary facilities for the evacues without cost to them.
"E. Assurance by the employer that adequate provision has been made as to cooking
facilities for the evacuees, or assurance that board will be furnished by the employer
at cost.
*'F. Assurance by the employer that adequate provision has been made as to medical atten¬
tion for the evacuees or assurance that medical attention is readily available to them
at rates commensurate with wages.
*'G. Assurance by the United States Employment Service, or assurance received by the
Employment Service from responsible public officials, that the provisions made by the
employer for housing, sanitary conditions, and medical service, are satisfactory.
"H. Assurance by the United States Employment Service that labor in the locality will
not be displaced by the evacuees, that a genuine labor shortage exists in the local¬
ity, and that the wages offered by the employer are not less than prevailing wages in
the locality and not less than minimum wages required by law.
"I.

Assurance by the United States Employment Service that it will make a weekly

WAR

RELOCATION

245

AUTHORITY

telegraphic report to the War Relocation Authority on general conditions in the
area of employment.
"When the War Relocation Authority has received the assurances outlined above, it
recommends to the Military authority that the recruiting of the desired labor in the
assembly centers be permitted. All recruiting is done by the United States Employment
Service and all recruiting is done on a strictly voluntary basis.”

The program having thus become crystallized, the Commanding General
authorized the release of evacuees from Assembly Centers to the custody of War
Relocation Authority for "evacuation” by that Authority from Assembly Centers
to the appropriate sugar beet fields. The term "evacuation” is used as signifying
action by War Relocation Authority under paragraph 3 (a) of Executive Order
No. 9102. As the custody and responsibility of the persons involved moved from
the Army to War Relocation Authority at the Assembly Center gates—within the
prohibited zone—it was distinguished from a mere "transfer” from one point to
another. The essential features of the program were that (a) State and local officials
executed a signed commitment to maintain order, (b) employers agreed to pay
prevailing wages, certified that there was no other available labor, and agreed to
maintain certain minimum standards of housing and provision for medical and
social care.
In aid of this arrangement, the Commanding General issued Civilian Restric¬
tive Orders Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,

16, 17, 22, and 25.

These orders authorized the release of stated numbers of evacuees to the custody of
War Relocation Authority for evacuation by it to prescribed areas in the interior
for private employment in agricultural pursuits. Japanese thus transferred were
enjoined to abide by the instructions and orders of War Relocation Authority and
to return to Centers designated by that Authority whenever so directed. Violations
were subject to the penalties prescribed by Public Law No. 503, 77th Congress.
Approximately 1,740 evacuees were released from Assembly Centers under
Army jurisdiction into the custody of War Relocation Authority in advance of the
time when they would otherwise have been transferred to Relocation Centers. Of
these 3 32 returned to an Assembly Center to join their families in regular transfers.
The program met with measurable success and it was followed later by a more
widely organized recruitment.
In furtherance of the War Department-War Relocation Authority agreement
as to procurement by War Relocation Authority through War Department agen¬
cies, certain preliminary arrangements were made. War Relocation Authority was
authorized to procure materials and supplies through various Army depots on
requisition. As to requisitions for items kept in stock, they were filled as a credit
sale under the provisions of certain Army Regulations.5 As to items not in stock,
the Army was to issue a purchase order charging Relocation Authority appropria¬
tions for each item. This purchase order was to direct that certified invoices for
the purchase should be mailed to War Relocation Authority for payment and the
goods shipped direct.

General depots, Engineer depots, Quartermaster depots, and

Medical depots were available in this connection.
On November 22, 1942, the Commanding General, Ninth Service Command,
was delegated the responsibility for liaison with War Relocation Authority, and
5Army Regulations 35-880.

246

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

for the control of military police escort guard companies stationed at the six Relo¬
cation Centers within Western Defense Command. Four of the six Centers, viz.,
Tule Lake, Manzanar, Colorado River and Gila River, were considered to be in a
special category. The delegation made special mention of the Commanding Gen¬
eral’s concern regarding these four Centers because of their location within the
evacuated zone.

In accomplishing this delegation and rendering the report of

survey on the status of Relocation Center construction and supply, the Com¬
manding General, Western Defense Command, announced his conclusion that
the evacuation program initiated by him the preceding March was completed,
so far as his headquarters might be concerned.

The reservation as to the four

named Centers contained in the delegation was predicated only upon his general
responsibility for the defense of the Command.

The delegation was based on

the premise that Western Defense Command had no further direct interest in
evacuee affairs.
This delegation was of rather deep significance.

The metamorphosis was

complete. The initial problem was one of security—the security of the Pacific
Coast.

The problem was met by evacuation to Assembly Centers followed by

a transfer to Relocation Centers.

The latter phase — construction, supply,

equipment of Relocation Centers and the transfer of evacuees from Assem¬
bly

to Relocation

Centers had

been accomplished by

the Army.

(While

the Commanding General was made responsible for this latter phase of the
program, in so doing, he was accomplishing a mission of the War Relocation
Authority rather than strictly an Army mission.)

The second problem—national

in scope—essentially a social-economic problem, was primarily for solution by
the War Relocation Authority, an agency expressly created for that purpose.
Had it not been for the responsibility accepted by the War Department, dis¬
charged through Western Defense Command, for executing the second phase
of evacuation—a War Relocation Authority responsibility under the terms of
the Executive Order—the transmission would have been accomplished sooner.
In any event it would not have been later than the time when the last evacuee
had been transferred from an Assembly Center.
The delegation to Ninth Service Command, and the letters of transmittal
of the reports of survey as to the status of Relocation Center construction are
presented in Appendix 3.
Transfer of Manzanar Reception Center
On June 1, the Manzanar Reception Center, which had been operated by
the Wartime Civil Control Administration since March 21, was formally trans¬
ferred to the War Relocation Authority.

The Transfer agreement was as follows:

"TRANSFER AGREEMENT BETWEEN WAR DEPARTMENT AND WAR RELO¬
CATION AUTHORITY PERTAINING TO MANZANAR RELOCATION AREA
June 1, 1942.
"1. Under and in accordance with the terms of the agreement of April 17, 1942, by
the War Department and the War Relocation Authority, the Manzanar Relocation Area,
including a Reception Center for approximately 10,000 Japanese evacuees, with all lands,
water, buildings and installations, and fixtures and equipment, thereto, is transferred from

WAR

RELOCATION

247

AUTHORITY

the War Department to the War Relocation Authority, effective at 12:01 A. M., June
1, 1942.
"2. Accountability for Buildings, Fixtures and Utilities, or, in general, Installations
and Equipment provided by the U. S. Engineer District constructing the Center, will be
transferred by letter from the appropriate District Engineer to the War Relocation
Authority Representative (Project Director). Such transfer to be based on a joint inven¬
tory and inspection by the War Relocation Authority Representative (Project Director),
a representative of the Civil Affairs Division, Headquarters Western Defense Command
and Fourth Army, and the appropriate U. S. Engineer District. The facilities and equip¬
ment transferred to be described in detail on the reverse of the letter of transfer, or by
attachment thereto.
"3. Accountability for items of equipment and property, other than included under
the provisions of Paragraph 2, above, which have been provided by the War Department
will be transferred on shipping tickets issued by the War Department Shipping Agency
and signed by the War Relocation Authority representative (Project Director) as and
when equipment and property is received or taken over by him.
“4. All responsibility for administration and all expense incident to operation and
maintenance occurring after the date of transfer will be assumed by the War Relocation
Authority.
For the War Department

/s/ J. L. DeWitt
J. L.

Date: 6/2/42

DeWitt

Lieutenant General U. S. Army
Commanding Western Defense Command
and Fourth Army

For the War Relocation Authority:

/s/ E. R. Fryer
E. R. Fryer

Date: 5/31/42

Regional Director
War Relocation Authority”

The Manzanar Reception Center was originally selected and constructed
by the Army for relocation occupancy as distinct from the temporary custodial
occupancy for which the Assembly Centers were constructed. In various tables
throughout this report the Manzanar Reception Center is included in the pres¬
entation of data for Assembly Centers until May 31, 1942.

It should not be

overlooked, however, that Manzanar was never intended to be only an Assembly
Center.

Although the initial steps for the acquisition and construction of the

Colorado River Center had been taken by the Army, before the War Relocation
Authority was established, this Center was taken over by the War Relocation
Authority (in an agreement with the Indian Service) soon after the establishment
of the Authority and was never operated by the Wartime Civil Control Admin¬
istration.

CHAPTER XXI
The Construction and Equipment of
Relocation Centers
Introduction.

General

plans for the establishment,

construction

and

equipping of Relocation Centers were developed before the War Relocation
Authority was created.

The Relocation Centers—at that time spoken of as

Reception Centers—were intended to provide

the evacuees

not

only with

housing, but also with employment, education, recreation and all other neces¬
sary functions and services of community life.

As indicated above (in Chap¬

ters IV and V) the general plan for evacuation and the relocation of evacuees
was formulated in advance of the first controlled movement.
Soon after the establishment of the War Relocation Authority this agency
assumed responsibility for the selection of Relocation Project sites, subject to
War Department approval as noted in Chapter I. Such approval was necessary
in order that large numbers of evacuees might not be located immediately
adjacent to present or proposed military installations or in strategically impor¬
tant areas.

The acquisition of Relocation Project sites, as distinct from their

selection, remained a War Department function.

Such acquisition was made

by the War Department upon the request of the Authority and with the
understanding that the Authority would undertake to reimburse the Depart¬
ment for the acquisition costs or provide funds to pay the cost in the first
instance. This depended on whether appropriations would ultimately be made
available by Congress.
The initial facilities at Relocation Centers were constructed by the War
Department.

This included all facilities necessary to provide the minimum

essentials of living, viz., shelter, hospitals (all medical facilities), mess, sanitary
facilities, administration buildings, housing for the non-evacuee staff of the
Center, post office, store and warehouses, essential refrigeration equipment, and
military police housing.

It was agreed between the Authority and the War

Department that the Department would not include in its construction pro¬
gram such utilities as schools, churches, and other community service buildings,
except those listed above.

This Agreement was reflected in a memorandum dated

April 17, 1942, set forth in full in Chapter XX, of this report. The memorandum
reflected a previous oral understanding reached between Director Eisenhower,
shortly after his appointment, and the Director, Wartime Civil Control Admin¬
istration, acting for the Commanding General.

It was planned to utilize evacuee

labor in the construction of such facilities and in the interim to use any vacant
evacuee housing for these purposes.
The War Department also procured and supplied the initial equipment for
Relocation Centers,

viz.,

kitchen

equipment,

minimum

mess

and

barrack

equipment, hospital equipment, and ten days’ supply of non-perishable sub¬
sistence, in accordance with the evacuee capacity of the Center.

From the

date of opening a Center (or other initiation of operation) by the War Relocation
248

CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT

OF

RELOCATION

CENTERS

249

Authority, the accountability for all such equipment and property was trans¬
ferred to the Authority.
The present chapter summarizes the action taken by the Wartime Civil
Control Administration and other Army agencies and services in the acquisi¬
tion, construction and equipping of Relocation Centers.
Project Site Selection. In conformance with the provisions of Par. 3
of the Memorandum of Agreement between the War Department and the War
Relocation Authority, sites for the Relocation Projects were selected by the War
Relocation Authority. When a decision had been reached that a location was
considered suitable for a Relocation Project, the Commanding General, Western
Defense Command and Fourth Army, was so informed by the Director of the
War Relocation Authority.
Steps were then taken to "clear” the area from a military standpoint by
ascertaining if the appropriate Defense or Corps Area Commander had any
objections to the use of the land for evacuee relocation. Where the Navy
Department might be interested, clearance was secured from the Commandant
of the Naval District concerned.
The Manzanar Relocation Center in the Owens Valley, California, was an
exception to this procedure. Manzanar was originally selected and acquired
by the Army as a Reception Center. It was turned over to the War Relocation
Authority on June 1, 1942. Colorado River Relocation Center was also an
exception. The Army acquired this site from the Secretary of Interior for a
reception center—for use by the Army for such purpose for the duration. The
Wartime Civil Control Administration never operated it, however, as Director
Eisenhower agreed with the Wartime Civil Control Administration Director, to
staff and operate it from the beginning. Because of difficulties in assembling such
a staff, Director Eisenhower turned over operations to the Indian Service.
Project Site Acquisition. The acquisition of the property comprising
Relocation Project sites was a War Department function and was done by the
United States Engineer Corps on the request of the Commanding General. When
military clearance had been obtained, the Commanding General issued a directive
to the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, who acted for the Chief of
Engineers, requesting that he direct the Division Engineer concerned to proceed
with the acquisition of the necessary land. At the same time the Commanding
General notified the Governor of the State concerned that, because of military
necessity, a Relocation Center for Japanese evacuees was to be located in his
State. Ten sites were acquired and their locations are shown on Figure 21, the
center spread in the series of individual Relocation Center location maps follow¬
ing page 250.
Description of Relocation Project Sites.
Following are brief de¬
scriptions of the ten Relocation Project sites on which Centers have been con¬
structed and to which the Japanese evacuees have been sent.
(1)
Central Utah. Located at Abraham, Utah, in Millard County,
this Project site comprises approximately 19,000 acres. Several thousand
acres were in crop but the greatest portion was covered with greasewood

250

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

brush. The land is generally quite level. Fourteen hundred acres were pub¬
lic domain, 8,840 were owned by Millard County and the balance was pri¬
vately owned.
The average rainfall here is about 8 inches, with the greater portion
coming during the winter months. This area requires considerable irrigation
to mature crops, normally between two and three acre-feet of water per
acre. To provide for the water needs in connection with the farming planned
for this project, the Division Engineer, Mountain Division, has purchased
20,000 shares of water stock in the Abraham and Deseret Water Company.
(2)

Colorado River.

The Colorado River Relocation Center is sit¬

uated on the lands of the United States Indian Service, being part of the
Colorado River Indian Reservation at Poston, Arizona. It is seventeen miles
south of the town of Parker, the railhead for the Center. The tract consists
of 71,600 acres of land. Several types of soil are found in this area. Some is
first class soil and highly suited to irrigation while some is fourth class and so
highly impregnated with salts and alkali that cultivation would be difficult.
Several irrigation canals traverse the area bringing water from the Colo¬
rado River which bounds it for a distance of about twenty-two miles on
the west.
(3)

Gila River.

This Center is located in Pinal County, Arizona,

near Sacaton on the Gila River Indian Reservation.

There are approxi¬

mately 16,100 acres of the reservation set aside for the use of the War
Relocation Authority.

The soil has an average depth of two feet of fine

silt, over adobe and/or caliche.

Irrigation produces bountiful crops of

long staple cotton, alfalfa, vegetables, melons, etc.

Water for irrigation is

obtained from canals, originally developed by the Indian Service, and comes
from the Gila River Reservoir.
(4)

Granada.

The Granada Relocation Project site is one and one-

half miles west of Granada, Colorado, and fourteen miles east of Lamar.

It

comprises approximately 10,500 acres of land and extends into the State
of Kansas.

Most of the area was formerly known as the X-Y Ranch.

Water stock in the amount of 15,000 shares of the Lamar Canal and Irri¬
gation Company and 127 shares of the X-Y Irrigation Ditch Company
were purchased to provide water needs for the agricultural program. Several
thousand acres of this area were formerly owned by the American Sugar
Beet Co.
(5)

Heart Mountain.

This Project site is located in Park County,

northwestern Wyoming, and is in the Heart Mountain Irrigation Division
of the Shoshone Project of the Bureau of Reclamation. It consists of some
46,000 acres most of which is irrigable land. The land was public domain
and was secured from the Department of the Interior. The soils vary from
light sandy to heavy clay.

The principal crops are alfalfa, beans, sugar

beets, seed peas, potatoes, soy beans and small grains.

Conditions are gen¬

erally favorable for dairying and poultry raising.
Temperatures in this area range from a maximum of 101 degrees above

CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT

OF

RELOCATION

251

CENTERS

LOCATION OF WAR RELOCATION CENTER
CITY

•^CENTRA

UTAH
JACINO

*a«kc»

fnpAJ

LEGCNO

W.RA. PROJECT SITES

PRINCIPAL

CITIES
•RMGHURST
VCLINTOKk

SMALL CITIES AND TOWNS

PAVED ROAOS

OTHER ROADS

RAILROADS

9

FEDERAL HIGHWAY

©

STATE

HIGHWAY

TOOELI
JUAB

THE LOCATION

OF

THE PROJECT CENTER SITE
(RESIDENTIAL) IS MARKED BY
CIRCLES FIVE

MILES APART

TOTAL LAND AREA OF

VEAICHO

THE

PROJECT IS NOT SHOWN.
THE AREA COVERED BY THIS
MAP IS APPROXIMATELY

63

PARLEY

BY 102 MILES.

IILLARD

UTAH
HINCKlI

SCALE IN MILES
10

0

10

20

Figure 20-a

30

40

252

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

LOCATION OF WAR RELOCATION

COAST

CENTER

COLORADO RIVER
LEGEND

^

IBb

o

W.RA. PROJECT SITES

principal

cities

SMALL CITIES AND TOWNS

—-

PAVED ROADS

=

OTHER ROADS

*.*1

Sack
RAILROADS

^

FEOERAL HIGHWAY

<g)

STATE

HIGHWAY

THE LOCATION

OF

THE PROJECT CENTER SITE
(RESIDENTIAL) IS MARKED BY
CIRCLES FIVE

MILES APART

TOTAL LAND AREA OF

THE

PROJECT IS NOT SHOWN.

sX$l6h/

THE AREA COVERED BY THIS
MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 63
BY 102 MILES.

Lff>;v•./,f
m\

J COLORADO^

A

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7

Wt

SCALE IN MILES
10

0

10

20

Figure 20-b

30

40

CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT

OF

RELOCATION

LOCATION OF WAR RELOCATION

CENTERS

253

CENTER

LEGEND

W.RA. PROJECT SITES

PRINCIPAL

o

CITIES

SMALL CITIES AND TOWNS

PAVED ROADS

OTHER ROADS

RAILROAOS

FEDERAL HIGHWAY

©

STATE

HIGHWAY

THE LOCATION

OF

THE PROJECT CENTER SITS
(RESIDENTIAL^ IS MARKED BY
CIRCLES FIVE

MILES APART

TOTAL LAND AREA OF

THE

PROJECT IS NOT SHOWN.
THE AREA COWERED BY THIS
MAP IS APPROXIMATELY

63

BY 102 MILES.

SCALE IN MILES
10

0

10

20

Figure 20-c

30

40

254

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

LOCATION OF WAR RELOCATION

COAST

CENTER

LEGEND

■a

W.RA. PROJECT SITES

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PRINCIPAL

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OTHER ROADS

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FEDERAL HIGHWAY

(Q)

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HIGHWAY

THE LOCATION

OF

THE PROJECT CENTER SITE
(residential^ is marked by
CIRCLES FIVE

MILES APART.

TOTAL LAND AREA OF

THE

PROJECT IS NOT SHOWN.
THE AREA COVERED BY THIS
MAP IS APPROXIMATELY

B3

BY 102 MILES.

10

0

10

20

Figure 20-d

30

40

CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT

OF

RELOCATION

LOCATION OF WAR RELOCATION

255

CENTERS

CENTER

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W.RA. PROJECT SITES

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SMALL CITIES AND TOWNS

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RAILROADS

9

FEOERAL HIGHWAY

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THE LOCATION

OF

THE PROJECT CENTER SITE
(RESIDENTIAL IS MARKED BY
CIRCLES FIVE

MILES APART

TOTAL LAND AREA OF

THE

PROJECT IS NOT SHOWN.
THE AREA COVERED BY THIS

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MAP IS APPROXIMATELY S3
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SCALE IN MILES
10

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20

Figure 20-e

30

40

RELOCATION PROJECT SITES

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WAR

RELOCATION

PROJECT

SITES

258

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

LOCATION OF WAR RELOCATION

COAST

CENTER

JEROME
LEGEND

W.RA. PROJECT SITES
JhaleyN
L0E.SHM

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THE LOCATION

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THE PROJECT CENTER SITE
(RESIDENTIAL) IS MARKED BY
CIRCLES FIVE

MILES APART

TOTAL LAND AREA OF

THE

PROJECT IS NOT SHOWN.
THE AREA COVERED BY THIS
MAP IS APPROXIMATELY

tANJYLVAMl,

63
VSAT IA

BY 102 MILES.

IISON

■ayvillT
iTallul.

CHAPLltYILLf1

SCALE IN MILES
10_O_

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Figure

20

20-f

30

40

CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT

OF

RELOCATION

LOCATION OF WAR RELOCATION

CENTERS

259

CENTER

MANZANAR
LEGEND

.LOWE PINE

W.RA. PROJECT SITES

PRINCIPAL

CITIES

SMALL CITIES AND TOWNS

PAVED ROADS

OTHER ROADS

RAILROADS

$

FEDERAL HIGHWAY

©

STATE

HIGHWAY

THE LOCATION

OF

THE PROJECT CENTER SITE
(RESIDENTIAL,) IS MARKED BY
CIRCLES FIVE

W>TSPRJNCJ£.

MILES APART

TOTAL LAND AREA OF

THE

PROJECT IS NOT SHOWN.
THE AREA COVERED BY THIS
[EBNVIH.I

MAP IS APPROXIMATELY

83

BY 102 MILES.

rm
W

Wk

note:

<«; i.

». HIGH WAV gT§ P BOM
1"^ . 'pAXC BSFIELO INTERSECTS U S.
i^'^'JlICHWAr^TO MANZANAR NORTH
0 r MOJAVE, CALIFORNIA WHICH

“"■*» tA*T

•»
or
FIELD ANO 12ft MILES SOUTH OF
--'-/MANX ANAR- RAILROADS FOLLOW
APPROX IMATELT THE SAME ROUTE.

SCALE IN MILES
10

0

10

20

Figure 20-g

30

40

260

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

LOCATION OF WAR RELOCATION

COAST

CENTER

SCALE IN MILES
■0_O_

10

20

Figure 20-h

30

40

CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT

OF

RELOCATION

LOCATION OF WAR RELOCATION

CENTER

LEGEND

W.RA. PROJECT SITES

PRINCIPAL

o

CITIES

SMALL CITIES AND TOWNS

PAVED ROADS

OTHER ROADS

RAILROADS

FEDERAL HIGHWAY

@

STATE

HIGHWAY

THE LOCATION

OF

THE PROJECT CENTER SITE
(RESIDENTIAL^ IS MARKED BY
CIRCLES FIVE

MILES A PARI

TOTAL LAND AREA OF

THE

PROJECT IS NOT SHOWN.
THE AREA COVERED BY THIS
MAP IS APPROXIMATELY

CENTERS

63

BY 102 MILES.

Figure 20-i

261

262

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

LOCATION OF WAR RELOCATION

COAST

CENTER

TULE LAKE
LEGEND
[aIc6mV
WRA

BMm

o

PROJECT SITES

principal

cities

SMALL CITIES AND TOWNS

—.

PAVED ROADS

=

OTHER ROADS

h**++

RAILROADS

JMstukei

Kdv-a

FEDERAL HIGHWAY

@

STATE

HIGHWAY

/mav

V

•HOLD

MM -

J SO ME Rsty,

fMACDoJ<<^

JEROME
THE LOCATION

OF

THE PROJECT CENTER SITE
(RESIDENTIAL) IS MARKED BY
CIRCLES FIVE

MILES APART

TOTAL LAND AREA OF

THE

PROJECT IS NOT SHOWN.
THE AREA COVERED BY THIS
FSCARFACj

MAP IS APPROXIMATELY
BY 102 MILES.

63
.ACK'

|f ANTAR>
IDOSA

m
rfK

iDAHA^

’q&mr J

SCALE IN MILES

10

20

Figure 20-j

30

40

CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT

OF

RELOCATION

zero to a minimum of 30 degrees below zero.

263

CENTERS

The frost-free season extends

from the end of May to the middle of September. Rainfall averages 5

l/z

inches

per year.
(6)

Jerome.

This Project site is adjacent to the town of Jerome,

Arkansas, and comprises 10,054 acres, most of which is in Chicot County,
Arkansas.

The land was obtained from the Farm Security Administration.

It is in the Mississippi River Delta and is particularly suited to cotton and
vegetables.
(7)

Manzanar.

Manzanar differs from the other Centers in that it

was originally selected by the Western Defense Command as a Reception
Center.
Japanese

The initial movement from the West Coast consisted of those
who

went

from

ginning March 21, 1942.

their

homes

directly

to

Manzanar

be¬

It was operated by the Wartime Civil Control

Administration until May 31, 1942, when it was transferred to the War
Relocation Authority.
The Project site is situated in the Owens Valley, Inyo County, California,
and consists of approximately 60,000 acres of land leased from the City of
Los Angeles. This land was acquired by the city when it built the Owens
Valley Aqueduct, the most important part of the Los Angeles city water
system.

Formerly ranches and farms occupied this valley but during the

thirty years of city ownership the land reverted to desert conditions.
Under irrigation it is capable of producing heavy crops and the Japanese
have been very successful in raising vegetables here.
(8)

Minidoka.

The Minidoka Relocation Project site is located in

Jerome County, Idaho, about six miles north of the town of Eden. There
are 33,500 acres in the tract.

The land was obtained from the Bureau

of Reclamation, United States Department of the Interior. The terrain here is
rolling and the soil is particularly good for the growing of potatoes, sugar
beets, beans and peas.

Underlying most of the area there is a rock strata

known as malapai.
Surplus water from the American Falls Dam is sufficient for the irri¬
gation of about 17,000 acres of this land.
(9)

Rohwer.

This Project site is adjacent to and west of the town of

Rohwer in Desha County, Arkansas.

Of the 10,161 acres, 9,560 were

secured from the Farm Security Administration.
vately owned.

The balance was pri¬

This section is also in the Mississippi River Delta country

and the nearby farmers are cotton growers.

Most of the center land is

heavily wooded and some is quite swampy.
(10)

Tule Lake.

The Bureau of Reclamation formerly controlled

the land which now constitutes the Tule Lake Relocation Project site. Situ¬
ated in Modoc County, California, approximately forty miles south of Klam¬
ath Falls, Oregon, the site was formerly the bed of the lake from which the
Center derives its name.

There are approximately 7,400

acres in the

264

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

tract. The soil is a sandy loam interspersed with a layer of shells of fresh
water spiral mollusks.

It is extremely fertile and raises bumper crops of

garden vegetables and barley.

Nearby is Tule Lake and the Game Refuge

where wild life abounds.
Design of Relocation Centers.

The design of temporary buildings to

house the evacuees at the Relocation Centers presented a problem since no
precedents for this type of housing existed.
not desired.

Permanent type buildings were

It was essential to be as economical as possible and to avoid

the excessive use of critical materials.

Speed of construction was also a vital

factor because it was desired to move the Japanese out of the Assembly Cen¬
ters as quickly as possible.
There were available drawings of cantonment type of buildings which
might be classed as semi-permanent, and of theater of operations type buildings
which were purely temporary, the latter being intended primarily for rapid
construction to house troops in the rear of combat zones.
Theater of operations type buildings answered most of the requirements
for troop shelter but were too crude for the housing of women, children and
elderly persons.

Normally this type of housing has no floors: toilet facilities

are meager (usually pit latrines), and heating units are omitted in all except
extremely cold climates.

It was decided that a modified theater of operations

camp could be developed which would adequately house all evacuees, young
and old, male and female, and still meet fairly well the desire for speed, low
cost, and restricted use of critical materials.
A set of standards and details for the construction of Relocation Centers
were developed by the Wartime Civil Control Administration and these were
adopted in a conference between the Commanding General, and a representative
of the Office of the Chief of Engineers. This was issued on June 8, 1942, under
the title—"Standards and Details, Construction of Japanese Evacuee Reception
Centers”.

Later it was necessary to issue two supplements, No. 1, dated June

18th, listed the hospital equipment to be provided; No. 2, dated June 29th, cov¬
ered the fire fighting equipment.
These standards provided uniformity of construction at the Centers con¬
structed after this date.

Prior to their issuance several Centers—Manzanar,

Tule Lake, Colorado River and Unit No. 1 at Gila River—were under construc¬
tion. The Wartime Civil Control Administration staff had some difficulty in estab¬
lishing uniformity in what facilities were to be provided because more than one
Engineer Division was involved and each placed its own interpretation on War¬
time Civil Control Administration requests.

The standards provided a basis on

which all of the contractors and engineers could work towards the common goal.
A copy of these standards and their supplements is shown in Appendix 4 to this
report.
Lay-out of a Typical Center.

The buildings in each Center are grouped

CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT OF

as to use.

RELOCATION

265

CENTERS

The evacuee housing group is the largest and consists of the blocks

in which the evacuees have their homes.
reserved for future schools, churches,

Several blocks in this grouping are

and recreational centers.

The

other

principal groups in each Center are an administration group, a warehouse
group, a military police camp, and a hospital.

(See Figure 22.)

In a typical Center designed for 10,000 evacuees there are 36 housing
blocks.

Each block holds 12 barrack buildings, a recreation building, a mess

hall, and a combination H-shaped building which has toilet and bath facilities
for both men and women and a laundry room and a heater room.

(See Fig¬

ure 23.)
The administration group comprises the buildings devoted to the use of
the Center Management.

Included are four dormitories for non-evacuee em¬

ployees, two office buildings, a post office, store, fire house, warehouse, shop
building, garage, mess hall for the non-evacuee staff, and a recreation building.
(See Figure 24.)
The Military Police camp is usually separated from the Center proper. This
aids in preventing fraternization between the guards and the evacuees.
buildings comprise:

The

Four enlisted men’s barracks, a bachelor officers’ quarters,

a headquarters and supply building, a guard house, a recreation and post ex¬
change building, a dispensary, latrine and bathhouse, mess hall, and a garage.
(See Figure 25.)

These facilities are found adequate for one company of mili¬

tary police.
The hospital is an outstanding feature at each of the Relocation Centers.
The hospital buildings provide space for the principal medical activities carried
on in any metropolitan community.

Such facilities as modern surgeries, ob¬

stetrical and isolation wards, X-ray rooms, a morgue, and a fully equipped
laundry are included.

All these buildings are steam heated.

The hospital group

is composed of an administration building, doctors’ quarters, nurses’ quarters,
three general wards, an outpatient building, obstetrical ward, surgery building,
pediatric ward, mess hall, isolation ward, morgue, laundry, two storehouses for
supplies and equipment, and a boiler house which supplies steam for heat and
sterilization.

(See Figure 26.)

The large quantities of food, supplies, and equipment needed daily by the
Centers made it necessary to have ample storage space available. It was decided
to erect a group of warehouses some of which would be refrigerated for the
preservation of perishable foods and the balance for housing staple foods and
for supplies and equipment.

Originally two 20' x 100' refrigerated warehouses

were provided for a 10,000 population center, but it was found to be more
efficient to erect one, a 40' x 100' building, divided into compartments for the
different types of perishable food.

Space is provided for fruits and vegetables,

meats, and dairy products. Twenty 40' x 100' warehouses for dry storage, i.e.,
not only food but all general warehouse requirements, are standard for 10,000
people.

These buildings are unpartitioned and unheated.

(See Figure 27.)

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

266

TYPICAL PLOT PLAN
WAR RELOCATION CENTER
10,000 POPULATION

V

u

1

S

•

N

0

H

G
Future Schools
and
Community
Activities
Play
Area

PlayArea

A

A

R

E

—x

-*

■L.

;
Military j :
Police ) ;
Area
5;

r
Hospital
Area

idministratioi
Area

»i

Figure 22

Warehouse
Area

CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT

OF

RELOCATION

CENTERS

TYPICAL HOUSING BLOCK
WAR RELOCATION CENTER

1.
2.
3.
4.

Barracks 20x120
Mess Hall 40x120
Women's Latrine
lien's Latrine

5.
6.
7.
Figure 23

Laundry Room
Heater Room
Recreation Hall

267

268

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

TYPICAL ADMINISTRATION GROUP
WAR RELOCATION CENTER

1.
2.
3.
4*
5,

Administration Headquarters
Post Office
Warehouse
Fire Station
Dormitory
Figure 24

6.

7.
6,
9.
10*

Garage

Store
Mess
Recreation
Shop

CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT

OF

RELOCATION

CENTERS

269

TYPICAL MILITARY POLICE GROUP
WAR RELOCATION CENTER

Guard House
Barracks
Latrine
Dispensary
Mess
Headquarters
Officers* Quarters
P.X. and
Recreation
Garage
Figure 25

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

TYPICAL HOSPITAL GROUP
WAR RELOCATION CENTER

mr~i

.

1.
2

11
l

H=~l

3.
4.
5.

.

6

.
10.
11.
.

7.

8

11

9.

HI—I

12

13.

14

Figure 26

Heating Plant
Laundry
Administration
Doctors' Quarters
Nurses' Quarters
Out Patients
Obstetrics
Surgery
Children
Mess
Adults
Warehouse
Morgue and
Disinfecting
Isolation

CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT

OF

RELOCATION

CENTERS

TYPICAL WAREHOUSE GROUP
WAR RELOCATION CENTER

Figure

27

1.
Z.

'Warehouse
Refrigerated Warehouse

271

272

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

In planning the Centers the following utilities were included:
Adequate water for culinary, sanitary and fire-protection pur¬

(1)
poses.

The water supply systems were designed to provide 100 gallons

per capita per day with ample storage capacity.

In most instances the

water was secured from wells which produced potable water that needed
no treatment, in some other Centers partial or complete treatment was
required.
(2)

Water-borne sewage disposal conforming to minimum health

requirements.

Sewer capacity is based on 75 gallons per capita per day.

The treatment ranges from large septic tanks with no chlorination of
effluent to modern disposal plants that include digester, chlorinators, sludge
beds, and effluent ponds.

In all cases the requirements of the appropriate

State Health Departments were met and the plants were approved by
the State Inspectors.
(3)

Electric power and lighting was designed on the basis of

2,000 KVA per 10,000 population.
the load for all needs.

This was considered ample to handle

In the earlier Centers, street lighting was used.

Centers built after the Standards were issued have, in lieu of street light¬
ing, one light at each end of all main buildings.
(4)

The telephone facilities provided usually consist of not more

than four trunk lines to a 40 line board with 60 handset stations for ad¬
ministration and operation and 15 handsets for the Military Police unit.
One separate outside line with handset station is provided for the Com¬
manding Officer of the Military Police unit.

The Signal Corps of each

Service Command installed, or supervised the installation of the telephone
communication system at Relocation Centers in their area.
Construction.

Plans and specifications for the construction of the build¬

ings at the Centers were prepared at the District Engineer’s office in the dis¬
trict in which the Centers were located.

These plans were then submitted for

approval to the Civil Affairs Division, General Staff (thence to Wartime Civil
Control Administration) of the Western Defense Command.

When approved,

contracts were awarded by the District Engineers to private builders.
Considerable difficulty was encountered in obtaining building materials and
mechanical equipment.

Deliveries were slow and it was necessary to have

expediters working constantly to speed shipments. At times a contractor would
have no two-by-four lumber on hand but would have plenty of one-by-six or
two-by-eight planks.

Nails, pipe, and plumbing fixtures were particularly

hard to secure on schedule, as were the pumps for the water supply and sewage
systems.
Skilled building-trades craftsmen were scarce in certain localities and had
to be imported.

To keep them on the job the contractors had to establish

commissaries and dormitories.

CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT

OF

RELOCATION

273

CENTERS

Table 30 gives the capacity, date construction started, and costs of the
various Centers. These costs are estimated, not final.

In most cases re-negotia¬

tion of contracts is now taking place; in several instances credits have not
been posted for excess materials shipped from the Centers to other construc¬
tion projects in a district.
TABLE 30.—Preliminary Estimate of the Cost of Relocation Centers
(December 1, 1942)

Capacity

Center

Work
started

120,000
10,000
20,000
15,000
8,000
11,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
16,000

Description of Evacuee Housing.

7/10/42
3/27/42
5/1/42
6/12/42
6/15/42
7/15/42
3/10/42
6/5/42
7/1/42
4/23/42

ESTIMATED COST
Total

Per capita

$56,482,000

$471

3,929,000
9,365,000
7,560,000
4,200,000
5,095,000
5,003,000
3,764,000
5,837,000
4,804,000
6,925,000

393
468
504
525
463
500
376
584
480
433

Originally barracks were 20' x 100'

divided into five 20' x 20' rooms or “apartments.” To accommodate differences
in family sizes the design was changed to provide for 120' buildings with two
16' x 20', two 20' x 20', and two 24' x 20' apartments. A family was assigned
to each apartment.

No toilet or bath facilities were provided as these were

common for each block.

A heating unit, either cannon type stove or cabinet

oil heater, depending on the fuel used, was placed in each room. In the colder
climates wall board was given the War Relocation Authority so that the
evacuees might line and ceil the interiors.

The exterior walls and roofs were

generally of shiplap or other sheathing covered with tarpaper.

In Granada

weatherized wallboard was used for the side walls, eliminating the paper and
saving labor. One drop light per room was furnished. Floors of the apartments
at all Centers were of wood, except at Granada, where they were of brick.
Single floors were tried but found unsatisfactory because of the drying of green
lumber.

Over these floors the War Relocation Authority applied a patented

flooring called Mastipave which gave a smooth, washable surface. This flooring
was procured by the Army for War Relocation Authority use in the Tule Lake,
Manzanar, Gila River, and Colorado River Centers.
Fly screening was given to the evacuees to make screens for their homes.
In the earlier Centers bachelors were housed in barracks which were not par¬
titioned off into rooms.

Usually there were two of these buildings to a block,

but it was proven to be more efficient to divide all barracks into rooms. Bach¬
elors could then be assigned wherever desired and all buildings were available
for the housing of families.
Mess halls are 40' x 100' of which approximately one-third is devoted to
kitchen, store room, and scullery.

Windows and doors are screened against

flies, heat is provided by cannon stoves or cabinet heaters.

Sufficient mess

274

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

tables, with benches, to seat 300 persons are standard. Each kitchen is equipped
with three ranges, 60 cubic feet of electric refrigeration, scullery sinks, hot
water heater and tank, cooks’ tables, and a meat block. Shelving is built into
the store room, and serving counters are provided. Concrete floors were stand¬
ard after the first four camps where wooden ones were built.
One recreation building was constructed for each evacuee housing block.
This is a 20'x 100' structure without partitions and has no equipment other
than heaters.
A combination latrine and laundry building, built in a "H” shape, was
located between the two rows of barracks in each block. One side of this
building contains the block laundry, the other, the men’s toilet and shower
rooms and women’s toilet and bath rooms. In the space forming the cross
bar of the "H” is housed the water heater and storage tank. Floors throughout
are concrete.
The laundry room is fitted out with 18 double compartment laundry trays
and 18 ironing boards with an electric outlet at each board. Plumbing fixtures
in each unit or block facility are hung on the basis of eight showerheads, four
bathtubs, fourteen lavatories, fourteen toilets, and one slop sink for the women;
and twelve showerheads, twelve lavatories, ten toilets, four urinals and one
slop sink for men.
Supplies and Equipment. As stated in the introduction to this chapter,
initial supplies and equipment were furnished to the War Relocation Authority
by the War Department. This included not only major items that became a
part of the buildings in which they were placed, but also the items which are
used in the preparation and serving of food, the treatment of patients in the
hospitals, and beds, mattresses and blankets for the homes of the evacuees.
Hospital Equipment and Medical Supplies. In the buildings compris¬
ing the hospital, special equipment was installed to make them modern in every
respect. Each ward has a diet kitchen with an electric range, an eight cubic
foot electric refrigerator, shelving, and a sink. Flush rim sinks and bedpan
sterilizers are located in the wards. The isolation ward kitchen has in addition
a mechanical dishwasher.
Each outpatient building has a 100-200 MA X-Ray Machine as well as a
portable 15-50 MA X-Ray. Ventilating fans are provided for the X-Ray devel¬
oping room, the dental and the general laboratory. In the outpatient building
there is a dental clinic with modern chairs and equipment.
Each surgery building has special lighting in its two operating rooms. Op¬
erating tables are provided and wash-up sinks, knee-operated, are available for
the doctors’ use. Four-piece sterilizer batteries handle the sterilizing of the
instruments. The morgue has a four-body electric refrigerator, autopsy table,
and a bulk-pressure sterilizer and disinfector.
The most recent types of heavy duty kitchen appliances are to be found in
the hospital mess hall. Included are a steam table, electric bake oven, mechan-

CONSTRUCTION

AND

EQUIPMENT

OF

RELOCATION

CENTERS

275

ical dishwasher, steam pressure cooker, electric mixer, and deep fat fryer as
well as the usual ranges and coffee urn battery.

The laundry is fully equipped

to handle all hospital work with washers drying tumblers, extractors, a flatwork ironer, starch cooker, and electric hand irons.
Each hospital was provided with an initial allowance of drugs and medical
supplies on requisition, prepared by the Office of the Surgeon, Western De¬
fense Command. These requisitions were forwarded as far in advance as pos¬
sible to the Surgeon General for approval and designation of a medical depot to
issue. In addition to a large and varied stock of drugs and medicines, bandages,
sutures, syringes and numerous other articles were furnished.

Among these

were forceps, knives, needles, ophthalmoscopes, retractors, scissors, gloves, and
catheters.

There was also a complete issue of the supplies used in the wards

such as sheets, pillow cases, rubber sheeting, basins, bedpans and hot water
bags.

With this equipment and supply the medical staff was prepared to prop¬

erly treat and hospitalize any and all patients who came to them.
Quartermaster Property.

The supply of items of Quartermaster prop¬

erty and subsistence to the Relocation Centers was the mission of the Quarter¬
master, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army.

This was accomplished

by transferring property from evacuated Assembly Centers and by shipment of
additional items from Quartermaster Depots.

As proper packing, crating, and

shipping from the Assembly Centers was of vital importance, an army supply
team composed of three officers and one hundred enlisted men was organized
to perform this duty. A follow-up system to check the status of shipment was
put into effect. Each Center Director was required to report by teletype daily
what items of property he received.

One officer and two enlisted men were

sent to each Center to assist in setting up a property record account and to
spot check daily receipts.
Each Center was provided with an initial supply of ten days’ requirements
of Type B rations, i.e., non-perishible foods such as canned goods, smoked
meats, and staples such as beans, rice, flour, sugar, etc.
Table 31 shows the total amount of Quartermaster property shipped to
the War Relocation Authority.
Transfer of

supplies

from Assembly to

Relocation

Center.

The

logistics of transfer of evacuees from Assembly to Relocation Centers were
developed by Wartime Civil Control Administration in such a manner as to result
in the use of a minimum of supplies and equipment.
graphically illustrates the logistics of transfer.)

(Figure 28, Chapter XXII,

By providing those Relocation

Centers which received the first movements of evacuees with sufficient supplies and
equipment to handle transfers for a three or four week period, and by scheduling
the movement of supplies and equipment out of evacuated Assembly Centers to
Relocation Centers in the order in which evacuees would be transferred to
them, it was possible to utilize again the supplies and equipment originally
purchased for the Japanese in Assembly Centers.

Transfer movements of

evacuees were timed to provide a two weeks period in which beds, mattresses,

276

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

TABLE 31.—Quartermaster
Item

FROM

THE

Property Shipped to

Amount

Cots, Steel.
Blankets, W. O. D. or Comforters.
Covers, Mattresses or Bed Sacks. .
Axes, S. B.
Buckets, G. I.
Cans, G. I., 10 Gallon.
Cans, G. I., 32 Gallons.
Boats, Gravy.
Bowls, Soup.
Bowls, Sugar.
Cups, Coffee.
Dishes, Pickle.
Dishes, Vegetable.
Porks.
Knives.
Pitchers, Syrup.
Pitchers, Water.
Plates, Dinner.
Platters, Meat.
Pots, Mustard.
Saucers, Coffee.
Shakers, Pepper.
Shakers, Salt.
Spoons...
Cleavers, Butcher.
Dippers.
Forks, Meat.
Graters.

WEST

117,393
275,141
118,626
2,635
9,478
4,159
5,555
19,915
123,583
21,002
122,797
10,125
39,195
117,620
121,114
19,390
19,774
125,627
10,149
19,879
123,345
17,600
20,444
117,821
604
5,166
2,434
1,224

COAST

WRA

Centers*

Item

Amount

Griddles.
Knives, Butcher.
Knives, Paring.
Ladles, Soup.
Machines, Grinder.
Mashers, Potato.
Measures, Quart.
Openers, Can.
Pans, Bake, Large.
Pans, Cake or Pie.
Pans, Dish.
Pans, Frying.
Picks, Ice.
Pins, Rolling.
Pots, Stock, 10 Gallon.
Pots, Stock, 15 Gallon.
Pots, Stock, 20 Gallon.
Saws, Butcher.
Scrapers, Dough.
Sieves, Flour.
Skimmers, Large.
Spoons, Basting.
Steels, Butcher.
Tongs, Ice.
Turners, Cake.
Whips, Wire.
Ranges, Army No. 5, complete....

1,240
1,805
3,518
4,022
659
1,207
594
1,179
2,894
18,116
5,228
618
590
592
1,292
1,340
466
625
586
594
1,521
1,348
560
639
2,507
1,213
1,236

♦Most of this equipment was transferred from Assembly to Relocation Centers.

cooking and eating utensils, and all other supplies and equipment which were
to be moved from Assembly to Relocation Centers, could be inventoried, reno¬
vated, and shipped to a new Center.
Fire Protection.

The fire hazard that is always present in a settlement

composed of closely grouped wooden structures made it necessary to provide
adequate equipment for protection against fire.
matic sprinkler systems were installed.

In hospital buildings, auto¬

Fire hydrants were located throughout

the entire area of each Center. Two fire trucks were provided for each Center
of 10,000 capacity or less; for the larger ones, one truck for each 5,000 ca¬
pacity.

These trucks are equipped with a minimum of 600 feet of 2/2 inch

hose, wrenches, hand operated chemical extinguishers and two ladders 12 feet
long, and pumper engines with a capacity of 600 GPM.

In addition to that

carried on fire trucks, enough 2 l/z inch hose was furnished to make a minimum
of 2,000 feet. Two hand extinguishers were furnished for each building. These
were 2 /z gallon size and were foamite and pump types.
Inspections.

During the course of construction of the Relocation Cen¬

ters, inspections were made by the members of the Construction Branch as
well as by the Inspection and Fiscal Division of the Wartime Civil Control
Administration, Western Defense Command.
Before the initiation of the first movement of evacuees to a Center, an
inspection was made to verify that the Center was ready for beneficial oc¬
cupancy.

This inspection was conducted far enough in advance—usually one

week—so that, if necessary, movement schedules could be altered without
confusion.

CONSTRUCTION

AND EQUIPMENT

OF

RELOCATION

CENTERS

277

During the period from November 10th to 29th, 1942, inclusive, a Board of
Officers appointed by the Commanding General, Western Defense Command,
made a tour of all the Centers making a final inspection of each. This Board was
composed of a representative from the Provost Marshal’s Office, the Surgeon’s
Office,

the Signal Office,

the Quartermaster’s Office and the Construction

Branch of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, all from the Western De¬
fense Command and Fourth Army. The Board reported to the Commanding Gen¬
eral that, with certain exceptions, the agreement of the War Department to pro¬
vide the War Relocation Authority with the minimum essentials of living had been
fulfilled. The exceptions noted were minor ones and were, in most instances, items
that were not completed on the date of inspection, but which were shortly sched¬
uled for completion.

The reports of survey at each Relocation Center are set

forth in Appendix 3, to this Report.

CHAPTER XXII
Transfer of Evacuees From Assembly to
Relocation Centers
In accord with the agreement between the War Department and the War Relo¬
cation Authority, evacuees were transferred from the custody of the Army to
the War Relocation Authority as rapidly as Relocation Centers were completed
for beneficial occupancy. Evacuees passed from the custody of the Army to the
War Relocation Authority in the following ways:
(1)

By the regular transfer movement from an Assembly to a Relocation
Center.

(2)
(3)

By direct transfer of the Manzanar Reception Center on June 1, 1942.
By direct evacuation from an Exclusion Area to the Relocation Cen¬
ters at Colorado River, Gila River, and Tule Lake.

(4)
(5)

By release to War Relocation Authority on work furlough.
By the transfer to War Relocation Authority Centers of individual
evacuees and special groups. There were also transferred to War Relo¬
cation Authority during September and October the responsibilities
for all institutional cases remaining in hospitals, homes, prisons, jails,
etc., physically located within the evacuated area.

These various transfers accounted for all of the persons who came directly
under the evacuation program, except, (1) those persons who had been released
from Assembly Centers in accordance with regulations governing the release
of mixed-marriage cases, (2) a few persons who were deferred from evacuation
and later released, and (3) a few persons who were permitted to leave the As¬
sembly Centers for interior points to join their families which had previously
established themselves there.
The total number of evacuees transferred by the Wartime Civil Control Ad¬
ministration to the War Relocation Authority by the several methods indicated
above is summarized in Table 32.
These data are presented to provide an overall picture of the number of
persons transferred by the Wartime Civil Control Administration to War Reloca¬
tion Authority.

It is the purpose of this chapter, however, to give a detailed

account only of the regular movement of evacuees from Assembly to Relocation
Centers in accordance with the standard procedure developed for this purpose.
The other types of transfers indicated above are discussed elsewhere in the present
report.
Authority for Transfer of Evacuees.

The memorandum of agreement

between the War Department and the War Relocation Authority dated April 17,
1942, (See Chapter XX) provided in part:
“The War Department will provide for the transportation of evacuees to AssemblyCenters and from Assembly Centers to Relocation Centers (Reception Centers) under
appropriate military escort . . .”
278

279

TRANSFER OF EVACUEES

TABLE 32.—Summary of Transfers of Evacuees From Custody of The Army to
Custody of War Relocation Authority
Total

Transfer
order

Direct
evacuation

Other
movement

WRA Custody.

111,155*

89,698

18,249

2,414

To all Relocation Centers.

108,503

89,698

18,026

779

8,255
17,740
10,972
7,674
13,234
7,567
10,049
9,484
8,232
15,296

8,223
5,919
10,954
7,674
10,202
7,554
9,731
9,467
8,232
11,742

11,711

32
110
18

Place of Custody

Colorado River.

Gila River.
Manzanar2.

Tule Lake.

To other than Relocation
Centers.

2,946
165

86
13
153
17

3,204

350

2,652*

223

1,635

1,630
1,022*

223

1,407
228

♦Including 794 persons remaining in institutions in evacuated area, and who were never evacuated.
including 894 persons enroute from Fresno on October 31.
s9,666 evacuees transferred by inter-agency agreement, June 1, 1942.

The Commanding General authorized and directed the Assistant Chief of
Staff for Civil Affairs, to make all necessary arrangements for the transfer of
evacuees and their impedimenta. This directive, dated May 23, 1942, also granted
authority to call on the Sector Commanders in the name of the Commanding
General for necessary military assistance in the accomplishment of this trans¬
fer.

The directives given to civilian agencies cooperating in the Wartime Civil

Control Administration program were sufficiently broad to cover their functions
in the transfer operations.

The latter instructions were issued by the Director,

Wartime Civil Control Administration.
General Transfer Plan.

It has been indicated in Chapter VIII that the

transfer of evacuees from Assembly to Relocation Centers was an integral
part of the overall plan for evacuation and relocation. In scheduling the transfer
movements the dominant objectives of the program as a whole were not over¬
looked.
A schedule of movement was prepared as the first step in the detailed plan
for the transfer of evacuees from Assembly to Relocation Centers. This schedule
indicated:
(1)

The destination to which each Assembly Center or a defined group
of evacuees would be transferred.

(2)

The date or dates on which movements would be made.

(3)

The estimated number of persons.

In the preparation of this schedule the following factors were considered:
a.

The date when each of the Relocation Centers would be available for
beneficial occupancy. This was determined primarily by the progress of

280

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

construction but it also involved a consideration of the availability of
supplies, including the transfer of supplies from Assembly to Relocation
Centers.
b.

(See Chapter XXI.)

The urgency of the early evacuation of certain Assembly Centers having
pit latrines or which presented an abnormal fire hazard.

c. The desirability, for efficient operation, of transferring the evacuees in
an entire Assembly Center in a continuous movement and, if possible,
to the same Relocation Center destination.
d.

The need to balance the urban and rural population in each Relocation
Center; and the desirability of relocating together the rural and urban
groups which were from the same general area.

e. The attainment of a minimum climatic change consistent with the place¬
ment in available Centers.
/. The transfer of evacuees to a Relocation Center as close to their com¬
munity of former residence as possible.
g.

The availability of sufficient train equipment to transport the evacuees
without interrupting the prearranged schedules of major troop move¬
ments.

A preliminary transfer schedule was prepared early in June.

In addition to

all proposed transfers, it made allowance for the direct evacuation of Japanese
from the California portion of Military Area No. 2 to Relocation Centers. Because
of the delay in construction of certain Relocation Centers and the availability of
certain types of supplies, this preliminary schedule was revised

slightly

in

August. The initial schedule had called for the evacuation of all Assembly
Centers by October 12, while the revised schedule had set October 30—the
realized goal—as the date of the final movement. The logistics of transfer as
prescribed by Wartime Civil Control

Administration is represented in the

accompanying Chart and Table (Figure 28 and Table 33).
Transfer Orders and General Operating Procedure.

Specific trans¬

fer orders were issued covering all of the regular transfer movements of evac¬
uees from Assembly to Relocation Centers. These transfer orders were prepared
by Civil Affairs Division, General Staff, and issued by Headquarters, Western
Defense Command, and were addressed to the Commanding General of the Sector
in which the movement originated and to all Wartime Civil Control Administra¬
tion agencies concerned with transfer operations.1
Before each transfer order was issued a determination was made by Wartime
Civil Control Administration on each of the following points:

a. That adequate accommodations were ready for beneficial occupancy at
the Center of destination.
b. That sufficient supplies were available or would be available in advance
of the arrival of the evacuees.
transfer orders Nos. 1 to 5, inclusive, and No. 7 were issued by the Director, Wartime Civil Control Admin¬
istration, pursuant to the authority contained in the letter from the Commanding General, Western Defense
Command, dated May 23, 1942, which stated, “You are directed ... to make all necessary arrangements for the
transfer of evacuees. . . .” Such orders were usually issued 12 to 19 days prior to the departure of the first train
of evacuees to be moved under the order.

LjJ

if)

tr
U

to

TRANSFER OF EVACUEES

281

OCTOBER
1
SEPTEMBER
1

H
Z
O
Z

o

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H

UJ
CE

O
0

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tr

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to

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UJ
o
tr
o
a.

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u

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H

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Figure 28

AUGUST
1
JULY
1
JUNE
*
MAY

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

282

TABLE 33—Transfers From Asssembly to Relocation
(Regular movements by Transfer Order)

Assembly Center
origin

Portland
Puyallup

Relocation Center
destination

Transfer
order
number

Centers

DATE OF
Departure

Persons
transferred

Arrival

Tule Lake
Tule Lake

1

5-26
5-26

5-26
5-26

250
196

Mayer

Colorado River

2

6-2

6-2

246

Sacramento
Sacramento
Sacramento
Sacramento
Sacramento
Sacramento
Sacramento
Sacramento
Sacramento
Sacramento

Tule
Tule
Tule
Tule
Tule
Tule
Tule
Tule
Tule
Tule

Lake
Lake
Lake
Lake
Lake
Lake
Lake
Lake
Lake
Lake

3

6-15
6-16
6-17
6-18
6-19
6-20
6-21
6-22
6-23
6-26

6-16
6-17
6-18
6-19
6-20
6-21
6-22
6-23
6-24
6-26

498
504
512
494
497
499
509
512
545
85

Marysville
Marysville
Marysville
Marysville
Marysville

Tule
Tule
Tule
Tule
Tule

Lake
Lake
Lake
Lake
Lake

4

6-24
6-25
6-26
6-27
6-28

6-25
6-26
6-27
6-28
6-29

520
499
488
490
397

Salinas
Salinas
Salinas
Salinas

River
River
River
River
River
River
River

5

Salinas
Salinas

Colorado
Colorado
Colorado
Colorado
Colorado
Colorado
Colorado

6-28
6-29
6-30
7-1
7-2
7-3
7-4

6-29
6-30
7-1
7-2
7-3
7-4
7-5

483
482
499
451
451
517
592

Pined ale
Pinedale
Pined ale
Pinedale
Pinedale
Pinedale
Pinedale
Pinedale
Pinedale
Pinedale

Tule Lake
Tule Lake
Tule Lake
Tule Lake
Tule Lake
Tule Lake
Tule Lake
Tule Lake
Colorado River
Colorado River

6

7-15
7-16
7-17
7-18
7-19
7-20
7-22
7-23
7-21
7-21

7-16
7-17
7-18
7-19
7-20
7-21
7-23
7-24
7-22
7-22

501
503
508
515
513
515
510
446
345
350

Salinas

Tule Lake

7

7-3

7-4

105

Turlock
Turlock
Turlock
Turlock
Turlock
Turlock
Turlock

Gila
Gila
Gila
Gila
Gila
Gila
Gila

8

7-18
7-25
7-26
7-27
8-10
8-11
8-12

7-20
7-27
7-28
7-29
8-12
8-13
8-14

520
510
513
519
507
502
502

Pinedale

Gila River

9

7-22

7-23

40

Puyallup
Puyallup
Puyallup
Puyallup
Puyallup
Puyallup
Puyallup
Puyallup
Puyallup
Puyallup
Puyallup
Puyallup
Puyallup
Puyallup
Puyallup
Puyallup

Minidoka
Minidoka
Minidoka
Minidoka
Minidoka
Minidoka
Minidoka
Minidoka
Minidoka
Minidoka
Minidoka
Minidoka
Minidoka
Minidoka
Minidoka
Minidoka

10

8-9
8-15
8-16
8-17
8-18
8-19
8-20
8-21
8-29
8-30
8-31
9-1
9-2
9-3
9-4
9-12

8-10
8-16
8-17
8-18
8-19
8-20
8-21
8-22
8-30
8-31
9-1
9-2
9-3
9-4
9-5
9-13

213
493
516
508
524
511
525
516
517
512
503
505
505
412
297
92

Pomona
Pomona
Pomona
Pomona

Heart
Heart
Heart
Heart

11

8-9
8-15
8-16
8-17

8-12
8-18
8-19
8-20

292
529
519
530

River
River
River
River
River
River
River

Mountain
Mountain
Mountain
Mountain

TRANSFER OF EVACUEES

283

TABLE 33—Transfers From Assembly to Relocation Centers
(Regular movements by Transfer Order)—Continued

Assembly Center
origin

Relocation Center
destination

DATE OF

Persons
transferred

Departure

Arrival

11

8-18
8-19
8-20
8-21
8-22
8-23
8-24

8-21
8-22
8-23
8-24
8-25
8-26
8-27

545
507
499
542
492
392
413

12

8-20
8-21
8-25
8-26
8-30
8-31
9-1
9-2
9-3
9-4

8-21
8-22
8-26
8-27
8-31
9-1
9-2
9-3
9-4
9-5

506
529
514
485
523
516
501
521
447
400

Pomona
Pomona
Pomona
Pomona
Pomona
Pomona
Pomona

Heart
Heart
Heart
Heart
Heart
Heart
Heart

Tulare
Tulare
Tulare
Tulare
Tulare
Tulare
Tulare
Tulare
Tulare
Tulare

Gila
Gila
Gila
Gila
Gila
Gila
Gila
Gila
Gila
Gila

Portland
Portland
Portland
Portland
Portland
Portland
Portland

Heart Mountain
Heart Mountain
Minidoka
Minidoka
Minidoka
Minidoka
Minidoka

13

8-29
8-30
9-6
9-7
9-8
9-9
9-10

8-31
9-1
9-7
9-8
9-9
9-10
9-11

498
440
500
494
501
506
317

Santa
Santa
Santa
Santa
Santa
Santa
Santa
Santa
Santa
Santa
Santa

Colorado River
Colorado River
Colorado River
Heart Mountain
Heart Mountain
Heart Mountain
Heart Mountain
Heart Mountain
Heart Mountain
Heart Mountain
Heart Mountain

14

8-26
8-26
8-27
8-30
9-1
9-3
9-5
9-7
9-9
9-1L
9-13

8-27
8-27
8-28
9-2
9-4
9-6
9-8
9-10
9-12
9-13
9-17

639
231
540
608
597
595
583
586
561
541
532

Puyallup

Tule Lake

15

8-25

8-26

53

Merced
Merced
Merced
Merced
Merced
Merced
Merced
Merced
Merced

Granada
Granada
Granada
Granada
Granada
Granada
Granada
Granada
Granada

16

8-25
9-1
9-2
9-3
9-5
9-7
9-13
9-14
9-15

8-27
9-3
9-5
9-5
9-7
9-9
9-16
9-16
9-17

212
557
550
556
553
527
529
527
481

Portland

Tule Lake

17

9-3

9-3

Tanforan
Tanforan
Tanforan
Tanforan
Tanforan
Tanforan
Tanforan
Tanforan
Tanforan
Tanforan
Tanforan
Tanforan
Tanforan
Tanforan
Tanforan
Tanforan

Central
Central
Central
Central
Central
Central
Central
Central
Central
Central
Central
Central
Central
Central
Central
Central

18

9-9
9-15
9-16
9-17
9-18
9-19
9-20
9-21
9-22
9-26
9-27
9-28
9-29
9-30
10-1
10-13

9-11
9-17
9-18
9-19
9-20
9-21
9-22
9-23
9-24
9-28
9-29
9-30
9-31
10-2
10-3
10-15

214
502
482
511
498
505
520
500
516
525
514
516
513
522
527
308

Santa
Santa
Santa
Santa
Santa
Santa

Granada
Granada
Granada
Granada
Granada
Granada

19

9-17
9-19
9-21
9-23
9-25
9-27

9-19
9-21
9-24
9-25
9-27
9-29

495
524
514
500
452
457

Anita
Anita
Anita
Anita
Anita
Anita
Anita
Anita
Anita
Anita
Anita

Anita
Anita
Anita
Anita
Anita
Anita

Mountain
Mountain
Mountain
Mountain
Mountain
Mountain
Mountain

Transfer
order
number

River
River
River
River
River
River
River
River
River
River

Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

78

284

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

TABLE 33—Transfers From Assembly to Relocation Centers
(Regular movements by Transfer Order)—Concluded
Assembly Center
origin

Transfer
order
number

DATE OF
Departure

Persons
transferred

Arrival

Portland

Heart Mountain

20

9-9

9-11

Santa
Santa
Santa
Santa
Santa
Santa
Santa
Santa
Santa

Rohwer
Rohwer
Rohwer
Rohwer
Rohwer
Rohwer
Rohwer
Rohwer
Rohwer

21

9-20
9-22
9-24
9-26
9-28
9-30
10-2
10-4
10-6

9-24
9-26
9-27
9-30
10-1
10-3
10-6
10-7
10-10

503
522
496
494
492
453
480
417
389

Rohwer
Rohwer
Rohwer
Rohwer
Rohwer
Rohwer
Rohwer
Rohwer
Rohwer

22

9-14
10-3
10-5
10-7
10-9
10-11
10-13
10-15
10-17

9-18
10-7
10-9
10-11
10-13
10-15
10-17
10-19
10-21

249
512
515
426
423
417
432
414
425

Santa Anita

Central Utah

23

10-7

10-9

550

Santa
Santa
Santa
Santa
Santa
Santa

Jerome
Jerome
Jerome
Jerome
Jerome
Jerome

24

10-8
10-10
10-12
10-14
10-16
10-19

10-11
10-13
10-16
10-18
10-19
10-22

510
457
476
472
355
386

Fresno
Fresno
Fresno
Fresno
Fresno
Fresno
Fresno
Fresno
Fresno
Fresno
Fresno

Jerome
Jerome
Jerome
Jerome
Jerome
Jerome
Jerome
Jerome
Jerome
Jerome
Jerome

25

10-2
10-12
10-14
10-16
10-18
10-20
10-22
10-24
10-26
10-28
10-30

10-6
10-16
10-18
10-20
10-22
10-24
10-26
10-28
10-30
11-1
11-3

202
463
472
466
468
459
437
438
462
479
415

Santa Anita
Santa Anita

Gila River
Gila River

26

10-17
10-18

10-18
10-19

533
514

Stockton
Fresno

Gila River
Gila River

27

10-16
10-16

10-17
10-17

220
156

Santa
Santa
Santa
Santa

Heart Mountain
Granada
Jerome
Rohwer

28

10-27
10-27
10-27
10-27

10-30
10-29
10-30
10-31

105
120
257
173

Gila River
Colorado River
Manzanar

29

10-26
10-26
10-26

10-27
10-26
10-27

224
93
65

Anita
Anita
Anita
Anita
Anita
Anita
Anita
Anita
Anita

Stockton
Stockton
Stockton
Stockton
Stockton
Stockton
Stockton
Stockton
Stockton

.

Relocation Center
destination

Anita
Anita
Anita
Anita
Anita
Anita

Anita
Anita
Anita
Anita

Santa Anita
Santa Anita
Santa Anita

48

TRANSFER OF EVACUEES

c.

285

That rail transportation facilities for the proposed movement would be
available.

d.

That the War Relocation Authority would be prepared to receive this
movement.

Each transfer order directed that the agencies concerned make the neces¬
sary arrangements for the transfer of the evacuees as indicated. In the order
were given the approximate number of persons, the Assembly Center of origin,
the Relocation destination, the dates of movement and, where necessary, a
specific description by family numbers or civilian exclusion order of the exact
group of evacuees who were to be moved. It also directed that a suitable mili¬
tary escort be provided and that the necessary transportation and meals be
furnished to the evacuees, the Caucasian medical attendants, and the military
escort.
There grew out of the Instructional Bulletins which accompanied the var¬
ious transfer orders, beginning with Evacuation Bulletin No. 1 dated May 25,
1942, a formal operating procedure which was presented in detail in a Procedure
Memorandum issued on June 26, 1942. The procedure as outlined on this date
worked satisfactorily for the remainder of the transfer program with but two
minor provisions which are not of consequence at this point.

A copy of this

memorandum with its amendments is presented in Appendix 5.
Process of Evacuation of an Assembly Center.

A representative of

the Operations Division, Wartime Civil Control Administration, proceeded to
the Assembly Center to assist the Manager and his staff in preparing for the coming
transfer. In a conference with the Center staff a preliminary plan for the evacua¬
tion of the Center was drafted. This covered the logistics of movement within the
Center, and set a definite schedule for each step in the operation. Quite important
in this plan was the exact location of and time of loading of the train or bus. This
determined whether a shuttle-bus service was necessary to transport the evacuees
from the Assembly Center to the train. Recommendations as to transportation
were teletyped to the Wartime Civil Control Administration and, if approved, were
relayed to the Rail Transportation Officer, Western Defense Command. The As¬
sembly Center evacuation plan also covered such items as the listing of individuals
who were to go on each movement, their notification, the advance inspection and
loading of the baggage (other than hand baggage), and the organization of the
transfer group into specific car units, for each of which a Monitor was appointed.
Rosters of the persons who were scheduled to depart in each train unit were
prepared by the Center Manager in quadruplicate, and each individual was iden¬
tified thereon by name and by the family number assigned at the Civil Control
Station at the time of registration. In the preparation of these rosters an effort
was made to maintain as transfer units all those evacuees who were from the
same locality prior to evacuation.

So far as practicable, the evacuation of an

Assembly Center was accomplished by blocks or other administrative areas
within the Center.

This permitted the closing off of unused portions of the

286

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

Center for cleaning up by the remaining evacuees and for the removal and
inventory of government property.
The roster was submitted to the Medical Department of the Center to de¬
termine the number and names of persons who, because of their age, health, or
other condition, required special sleeper accommodations, medicines, diets, or
personal attention enroute.

Expectant mothers and those mothers with babes-

in-arms or infants were also given Pullman sleeping accommodations.
In preparing for the transfer, certain teletyped information was required
from the Manager of the Assembly Center. Five days prior to each scheduled
train departure date, the Wartime Civil Control Administration was advised by
teletype:

a.

The number of full fares, half fares, and infants for whom transportation
would be required.

b. The number of full fares, half fares, and infants who, because of their
age, state of health, physical condition, or other reason, required sleeper
accommodations.

c. A statement as to whether all personal baggage (other than hand bag¬
gage) to be taken on the train by the evacuees could be transported in
the two baggage cars provided.
In addition to the above teletyped information, the Center Manager was
required to furnish by teletype at least five days prior to the initial movement
under a transfer order (excluding the advance detachment), a statement of
the amount of freight to be transported on each day of the movement.

This

did not include personal baggage transportable in the baggage cars.
An organization by cars was then made up for each train unit and an
evacuee Monitor was assigned to each car. It then became his duty to assist the
Center staff in all further steps of the transfer. He notified the evacuees con¬
cerning any change in plans, notified the Center Manager if there was any
change in the health status of any individual, assisted the evacuees in the prep¬
aration of their freight and baggage for shipment, and on the day of departure
assisted the Center Registrars in checking out his group.
A carefully prepared and verified train list accompanied each movement.
On this list appeared the name and family number (and sometimes the age and
sex) of each individual, in family group order.

This list was signed by the

Center Manager and counter-signed by the Train Commander in charge of the
escort part of the military escort. Extra copies of the list were carried by the
Train Commander and delivered to the Director at the Relocation Center. The
original signed copy was again counter-signed by the Train Commander and
receipted by the Relocation Center Director upon delivery of the evacuees at the
Relocation Center.
In addition to the train list the following records were turned over to the
Train Commander for delivery to the Director of the Relocation Center: The
Social Data Registration forms for each family, all medical and hospital records,
and copies of pertinent correspondence relating to each family and individual.

TRANSFER OF EVACUEES

287

In each of the larger Centers a cleanup crew of evacuees was retained for
a short period after the main body had moved. These workers performed such
services as were necessary to prepare the Center for any later reoccupancy and
to assist the Center staff in the completion of certain fiscal and property records
and the storage of government property. As each Center was evacuated, the
residents of the evacuated area were required to do all the necessary policing of
the barracks, the latrines and grounds immediately surrounding the barracks.
All shelving, wiring and other facilities that were installed in their living quar¬
ters by the evacuees were removed.
Change of Address cards were furnished to the evacuees in each movement
so that postal authorities could be advised as to a change of residence of evacuees.
Upon the receipt of the certified train list, the Wartime Civil Control Administra¬
tion staff posted the change of residence and the date of movement on the Indi¬
vidual Record card which was maintained for each evacuee in the Wartime Civil
Control Administration Master File.
Advance Group of Evacuees to Open a Relocation Center. If the trans¬
fer was to a Relocation Center which had not yet received any evacuees, a small
advance detachment of about 200 persons was sent at least six days in advance
of the main movement. This advance detachment consisted of the key evacuee
personnel necessary to receive, feed, house and provide medical service for the
evacuees of the main body as they arrived.
Personnel for an advance detachment was selected by the United States Em¬
ployment Service and the United States Public Health Service at the request of
the Wartime Civil Control Administration.

The requests to these two Federal

Services, were usually prepared at least 15 days prior to the departure of the first
increment of the main body, and prior to the issuance of the order directing the
transfer.
Each request asked that the advance detachment be selected, so far as prac¬
ticable, from the Assembly Center scheduled for immediate evacuation to the
designated Relocation Center.

If necessary personnel for the advance detach¬

ment were not available at that Assembly Center, the Wartime Civil Control Ad¬
ministration would authorize recruiting at additional named Assembly Centers.
All persons doing recruiting were instructed not to divulge the name of the Center
to which the advance detachment was to go. Evacuees interviewed for possible
selection were informed only whether the destination of the advance detachment
was the same as that scheduled for the other evacuees of that Assembly Center.
Evacuees selected were urged to have their families travel to the Relocation Center
with the first increment of the main body to minimize the size of the advance
party. This request was generally observed. It was not compulsory because the an¬
nounced policy was against family separation.
The United States Employment Service representatives, subject to the approval
of the Center Manager concerned, selected all persons in the advance detachment,

288

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

except certain professional and technical medical personnel.

Members of its

advance detachment usually consisted of the following:
Hospital Attendants

. . .

.

.

Hospital Maids .
Hospital Secretary

10

Recreation

15

Social Workers .

. . . . .

1

. . . .

2
10

Cooks’ Helpers . . . . .
Dishwashers . . . . .

4

.

1
2

.
.

1
1

Steno-Typists

.

.

10

10

Clerks .
Guides (preferably high

.

5

. . .
. . .

10
10

. .... 20
.
1
Butchers .
1
Store Managers . . . . .
Bakers

Carpenters

.

10

Waiters

. . . . .

2

. . . . .

2

Retail Clerks

Leaders

school or college men)
Truck Drivers
Laborers

. . . 70
—

Total. . .198

The United States Public Health Service representatives, with the assistance of
the Regional Medical Director of War Relocation Authority, and the approval of
the Center Manager, selected the doctors, nurses, and dentists required for the ad¬
vance detachment. There was also selected a dietitian, a pharmacist, a laboratory
technician, and an X-ray technician. No person was accepted as a member of the
advance detachment if the removal of that evacuee would unduly interfere with
the satisfactory continued operation of the Assembly Center. For this reason several
of the advance detachments did not have an evacuee doctor, though every
detachment had at least one evacuee registered nurse.
Train Accommodations.

Once the evacuation of an Assembly Center

started it was usually continuous until the Center was empty. Evacuees were
normally moved by special train in increments of approximately 500 persons.
Movements occurred daily or on alternate days until the ordered transfer was
complete.

The unit of 500 persons was used because it approximated an opti¬

mum train load, and was near the maximum number that could be efficiently
handled in departing from an Assembly Center, and quickly cared for on arrival
at a Relocation Center.

Of the evacuees transferred, only 710 were moved by

bus—these for relatively short distances.

All other transfers were accomplished

by train—171 special trains being required.
The coordination for transportation necessary to move evacuees, baggage,
and freight under provisions of each transfer order was the responsibility of the
Rail Transportation Officer, Office of the Quartermaster, Western Defense Com¬
mand. This office was authorized to deal directly with the Rail Transportation
Officers in the different Western Defense Command Sectors concerned.

After

transportation requirements were ascertained, the Sector Transportation Officer
assured in advance that adequate rail or bus equipment would be on hand at the
time of each projected movement.
Necessary ambulances, when required, were provided by the United States
Public Health Service. In no case was an evacuee permitted to drive from an
Assembly Center to a Relocation Center in his privately owned conveyance.
In each movement the evacuees were permitted to take on the same train only
such personal effects and bedding as required by the evacuee immediately upon
arrival at the War Relocation Center. Two baggage cars were provided for each

289

TRANSFER OF EVACUEES

train of 500 evacuees, and the amount of personal effects were limited to that
which could be transported in these two baggage cars. Excess baggage was sent to
the Relocation Center by freight. Care was taken in preparation of personal effects
of evacuees. Such personal effects were required to be securely bundled and tagged.
When two or more meals were required enroute between the Assembly and
the Relocation Center, dining cars were included in the train equipment by the
Rail Transportation Officer.

For movements involving only one or two meals,

lunches were provided by the Manager of the Assembly Center concerned.
In connection with the movements of evacuees, the Sector Commander fur¬
nished the necessary military personnel, including

a

Sector

Transportation

Officer, a Train Commander, and sufficient military personnel to assure the
safe conduct of the evacuees.

(The Train Commanders took delivery of, and

accepted responsibility for, the evacuees at the exit gate of the Assembly Center.)
The War Relocation Authority was responsible for the movement of house¬
hold and personal effects of evacuees not transferred by the regular movements
from the Assembly to the Relocation Centers.

The War Relocation Authority

selected warehouses wherein such household and personal effects of evacuees could
be stored. The evacuees were requested to furnish the War Relocation Authority
information as to the volume of household and personal effects which were to be
shipped from privately owned storage to central receiving warehouses designated
by the War Relocation Authority.
Medical Care.

The United States Public Health Service provided the

necessary medical care by employing one physician and one or two registered
nurses to accompany the longer transfers. Such physicians and nurses were se¬
cured through many channels. They were authorized to render any type of
treatment which their judgment seemed to dictate, and they were further
authorized to hospitalize in the nearest adequate hospital, any person who be¬
came too ill enroute to continue. These medical attendants were required to
submit a trip report to the Director of the United States Public Health Service
relating details of medical care and supervision exercised on the trip.
That Service also determined the number of tourist sleepers required for the
transfer of infants, invalids, and others who, due to their physical condition,
required such accommodation. There were cases where it was necessary that
certain hospitalized evacuees be left behind when Assembly Centers were evac¬
uated. In such instances it was necessary to make arrangements locally for the
care of these people in the movement of evacuees from Assembly to Relocation
Centers.

The United States Public Health Service in such instances recom¬

mended deferment of cases only on medical grounds.
Certain medical supplies were required for all transfer movements. Medical
kits containing drugs and medical supplies considered necessary by the train
physician to have on hand to meet any immediate development while enroute,
were provided through the Center Manager. Evacuee girls were trained by the
Center physician and Public Health representative in methods of infants’ feeding
preparation. These formula girls handled such work under the supervision of the
nurses accompanying the train movements. All utensils and materials for formula
preparations were placed on the trains from supplies in the Center hospital.

The three colored map inserts which follow
have been arranged to depict: (a) the areas of
the West Coast from which Japanese were
evacuated under each of the 108 Civilian Ex¬
clusion Orders;

(b)

the Assembly Center

destinations of the evacuees by area of origin;
and (c) the Relocation Center destinations
by area of origin.

MAP INSERT I
EXCLUSION AREAS

JAPANESE EVACUATION PROGRAM
WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND

AND FOURTH

ARMY

SEATTLE AND VICINITY

WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
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THIS IS NUMBER I OF A SERIES OF THREE MAPS.

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IT SHOWS THE AREAS FROM WHICH ALL PERSONS OF

AREAS, EACH CONTAINING AN EVACUEE POPULATION

MARCH 24 AND JUNE 6 NEARLY 100,000

JAPANESE ANCESTRY WERE EVACUATED BY THE ARMY

UNIT OF APPROXIMATELY 1,000 PERSONS.

WERE EVACUATED FROM MILITARY AREA I.

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SITY

movement: character of population:

CREATED BY TOTAL WAR WITH JAPAN.

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THE BASIS

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preserva-

THAN

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PERSONS
MORE

9,000 WERE EVACUATED FROM MILITARY AREA

2 OF CALIFORNIA FROM JULY 4 TO AUGUST II, 1942.

MAP INSERT II
ASSEMBLY CENTER DESTINATIONS

JAPANESE EVACUATION PROGRAM
WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND

AND

FOURTH

ARMY

SEATTLE AND VICINITY

WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
MILITARY
SEE INSET
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STATISTICAL DIVISION

EXP

LANATORY

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DIRECTLY MOVED. THOSE WHO WERE TAKEN TO RELO¬

TION BY THE ARMY. THE COLOR SCHEME OF THIS MAP

IT SHOWS THE LOCATIONS OF 15 TEMPORARY ASSEMBLY

CATION CENTERS REMAINED THERE.

IS DESIGNED TO SHOW THE CENTER DESTINATION OF

CENTERS AND OF 4 OF THE PERMANENT RELOCATION

SHELTERED IN ASSEMBLY CENTERS PENDING TRANSFER

CENTERS. INTO THE CENTERS SHOWN EVACUEES WERE

TO INTERIOR RELOCATION CENTERS UNDER CONSTRUC-

THIS IS NUMBER II OF A SERIES OF THREE MAPS.

THE OTHERS WERE

THE PERSONS EVACUATED FROM EACH EXCLUSION AREA.

MAP INSERT III
RELOCATION CENTER DESTINATIONS

JAPANESE EVACUATION PROGRAM
WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND

AND

FOURTH

ARMY

SEATTLE AND VICINITY

WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
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SEE INSET FOR
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WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
STATISTICAL DIVISION

EXP

THIS IS NUMBER III OF A SERIES OF THREE MAPS.

LANATORY

NOT

E ~ III

DESTINATION OF EACH EVACUEE POPULATION GROUP

MITTED, THE CONTROLLING CONSIDERATIONS IN THE

10 PERMANENT RELOCATION CENTERS WERE CONSTRUC¬

MOVED FROM THE EXCLUSION AREAS OUTLINED ABOVE.

DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF THE PLAN OF MOVE¬

TED BY THE ARMY IN 7 STATES.

EACH RELOCATION CENTER HAS BEEN ASSIGNED A

MENT TO ULTIMATE DESTINATION WERE: CHARACTER

DISTINCTIVE COLOR. SO FAR AS SOUND LOGISTICS PER-

OF POPULATION; COMMUNITY BALANCE', PRESERVATION

THE COLOR SCHEME IS

DESIGNED TO SHOW THE ULTIMATE RELOCATION CENTER

OF COMMUNITY AND FAMILY UNITS.

PART VII

RELATED ACTIVITIES OF WARTIME CIVIL
CONTROL ADMINISTRATION

CHAPTER XXIII
Curfew and Travel Control
INTRODUCTION
To have suggested that the enemy would not exploit the fifth column
technique to its fullest extent in the development of its expansive program
would have been naive. To have ignored the potential dangers arising out of
the presence of nearly 200,000 enemy aliens on the West Coast would have
been indifference tantamount to military indiscretion. National security de¬
manded that precautions be taken immediately.
In the year following Pearl Harbor regulations were imposed governing
the conduct of enemy aliens which are without parallel in the history of the
United States. While the full story of alien control embraces the evacuation
of all persons of Japanese ancestry from strategic areas on the West Coast,
it is with the curfew and travel regulations only that this chapter is concerned.
These regulations applied to alien enemies and to all Japanese.
To fully appreciate the chronological development and ultimate revision
of these regulations, it must be understood at the outset that they were
interim measures designed as safeguards against espionage, sabotage, and fifth
column activities pending evacuation.
With the evacuation of the Japanese accomplished, the interim measures
were thereafter continued as military precautions until their withdrawal could
be effected without jeopardizing the national security.
Alien Control By Presidential Proclamation
The President in Proclamations issued on December 7 and 8, 1941, pre¬
scribed the conduct to be observed by all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects
of Japan, Germany, and Italy. These Proclamations were numbered 2526 and
2527 respectively. All such persons of the ages of 14 years or over who were
within the United States or within any territories in any way subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States and not actually naturalized were termed for the
purpose of the said Proclamations “alien enemies”. These Proclamations by their
terms enjoined all such persons to preserve the peace toward the United States.
More specifically, alien enemies were directed to refrain from acts against public
safety and from violating the laws of the United States and of the states and terri¬
tories thereof. They were enjoined against actual hostility or giving information,
aid, or comfort to the enemies of the United States or interfering by word or deed
with the defense of the United States or the political processes and public opinions
thereof. They were required to comply strictly with the regulations which
were thereby, or thereafter, promulgated by the President.
The Attorney General was charged with the duty of executing the regula¬
tions prescribed by the Proclamation regarding the conduct of alien enemies
within the continental United States and Alaska. The Secretary of War had
the duty of executing such regulations in the Canal Zone, Hawaiian Islands,
293

294

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

and the Philippine Islands. Each, within his own sphere, was directed to cause
the apprehension of such enemy aliens as in their judgment were subject to
arrest or deportation under the regulations prescribed by the said Proclamation.
The authority and duty of the Attorney General to execute the regulations
applicable to alien enemies in Alaska were transferred to the Secretary of War
by Presidential Proclamation 2533, issued on December 29, 1941.
a.

Certificate of Identification Program.

Security measures required

that enemy aliens at all times might be identified as such.

In a Proclamation

issued on January 14, 1942, the President directed all such persons within the
continental United States to apply for and acquire Certificates of Identifica¬
tion.

The Attorney General was thereby authorized and directed to provide

for the receipt of such applications and for the issuance of appropriate Identi¬
fication Certificates. Upon the issuance of Identification Certificates, all enemy
aliens were directed to have such certificates on their persons at all times.
Pursuant to the directive contained in the said Proclamation, the Attorney
General designated the United States Postal Department as the governmental
agency to administer the Certificate of Identification Program.

He declared

the week commencing on February 2, 1942, as the period during which all
alien enemies were required to register at the times and places designated by
the Postal Authorities in their communities.
Regulations of Attorney General
The Attorney General on February 4, 1942, pursuant to the Proclama¬
tions of December 7 and 8, 1941, and January 14, 1942, published regulations
controlling travel and other activities of aliens of enemy nationalities, which
in substance provided as follows:
1.

Travel By Enemy Aliens Without Special Permission.

a.

Travel from place to place within the community of residence or place

of business to the extent necessary to engage in the activities usual to the
community.
b.

Commuting to regular place of business, usual place of religious wor¬

ship, school, college, or institution of learning regularly attended, and any
Federal, state, or local governmental agency for the purpose of transacting
business.
2.

Occasional Travel or Trips By Alien Enemies.

a.

Travel, trips, or moving from one locality to another permissible upon

approval of United States Attorney.

In connection with such travel, alien

enemies were required to file applications in writing 7 days prior to intended
departure, setting forth in full the circumstances surrounding the said travel.
All such applications were submitted by the Attorney General to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for clearance.
3.

Frequent Travel or Regular Business Travel of Alien Enemies.

a.

Alien enemies whose occupations required frequent or regular business

travel could apply in writing to the United States Attorney for permission
to accomplish the said travel, setting forth the purpose of the travel and the

295

CURFEW AND TRAVEL CONTROL

complete itinerary.

All such applications were submitted by the Attorney

General to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for clearance.
4.

Air Travel By Alien Enemies Prohibited.

5.

Travel Incident to Permanent Change of Residence.

a.

At least 7 days prior to changing their place of abode, alien enemies

were required to file with the United States Attorney a statement in writing
containing the full particulars of such change and to give written notice
thereof immediately to:
a.

The Alien Registration Division of the Immigration and Naturaliza¬

tion Service.
b.

Federal Bureau of Investigation at the office shown on the holder’s

Certificate of Identification.
To facilitate the fulfillment of the requirements regarding written notice
to the various agencies, Form AR-11

(Revised) was prepared and distributed

by the United States Post Offices for execution by alien enemies.
a.

Attorney General’s Curfew.

The Attorney General in a press re¬

lease on February 4, 1942, announced the establishment of a “restricted area”
for all alien enemies along the West Coast.

The announced area followed the

coastline of California from the Oregon Border south to a point approximately
50 miles north of Los Angeles and extended for distances varying from 30 to
150 miles inland.

In connection with the establishment of the restricted area,

a new regulation in the form of a curfew was imposed upon all Japanese,
German, and Italian aliens living therein.

It required them to be within the

place of residence indicated on their Certificates of Identification between the
hours of 9 P. M. and 6 A. M. At all other times during the day they were to
be found only at the place of residence or employment indicated on their
Certificates of Identification, or going between those two places.

They were

permitted to travel within a radius of not more than five miles from the place
of residence.

The United States Attorneys were authorized to grant exceptions

to these restrictions only in cases where a compelling reason existed and after
completion of a suitable investigation.
Executive Order No. 9066
The President in Executive Order No. 9066 dated February 19,

1942,

authorized and directed the Secretary of War and the military commanders
whom he might from time to time designate, to prescribe Military areas in
such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate military commanders
may determine.

It authorized a designated Military Commander to exclude

any and all persons from such areas.

Further, it empowered such a com¬

mander to issue regulations governing the right of any person to enter, remain
in, or leave a military area.
Executive Order No.

9066 thus afforded means to exert any necessary

control over persons within a designated military area.

In short, to the extent

that military security required, the defense commander was empowered to act.
In order to establish the security of the Pacific Coast the Command-

296

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

ing General exercised the powers granted him in two ways.

First, the author¬

ity to exclude was applied to persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and
non-alien.

This also applied in specific cases to persons who were found,

after hearing, to be dangerous or potentially dangerous to the military security
of the Pacific Coast.
No.

Second, to those remaining within the Military Area

1, classified as alien enemies by the President, were applied restrictive

measures.

That is to say, the right of persons within this group to remain in

Military Area No. 1, was subjected to stated restrictions limiting their travel
and imposing a curfew.

As noted in Chapters IV, V, and VII, Parts II and III

of this report, the enforcement of sanctions for failure to comply with the
announced restrictions was accomplished through the Department of Justice
agencies.
The Seventy-Seventh Congress in enacting Public Law 503 had made noncompliance a misdemeanor.

Persons found guilty were subject to a fine not

exceeding $5,000 and to imprisonment not exceeding one year. While violators
were subject to immediate exclusion from the Pacific Coast, all alien ene¬
mies were also subject to internment as well as to prosecution under the Con¬
gressional statute.

Accordingly, the Commanding General did not exercise

his exclusion powers in those cases where subject failed to observe curfew and
travel restrictions.

His policy was against the extension of military control

over civilians except where absolute necessity required. As the normal processes
of law had been made available, enforcement was left to the regularly con¬
stituted Federal civilian enforcement agency.

The understanding between the

Commanding General and the Department of Justice in this regard was ulti¬
mately reflected in a memorandum dated June 2, 1942.

That memorandum

is quoted here:
''Memorandum between War and Justice Departments on
Enforcement of Contraband, Curfew and Travel Regulations
in the Western Defense Command.
“On June 2, 1942, Lieutenant General DeWitt, Colonel Bendetsen and Mr. Ennis
of the Department of Justice conferred on the enforcement of the contraband, resi¬
dence, curfew and travel regulations in force in the Western Defense Command and
on enforcement of exclusion orders and certain other related subjects. General DeWitt
stated that during the present military situation, which he explained to Mr. Ennis, he
wished a strict enforcement of the regulations. Mr. Ennis explained that at the orders
of the President after consultation with General Marshall, the United States Attorneys
were, since May 27, operating under instructions which prohibited them from releasing
any person apprehended for violation of the instructions even though the circumstances
involving the apprehension of several persons since these instructions went into effect
were such that the United States Attorney, if he had discretion,

would

direct the

release of the person detained as a case involving no violation or an excusable violation.
General DeWitt agreed that even strict enforcement permitted the exercise of some
discretion and requested,

however, that for the present, release in the discretion of

the United States Attorney should be after consultation with

the War Department

officials. Thereupon the following was agreed:
“During the present

military situation,

and

until

termination

after

consultation

between representatives of the War and Justice Departments, all U. S. Attorneys in
the

Western

Defense

Command

will

order

the

apprehension

and

detention

of

all

persons violating contraband, residence, curfew, travel, prohibited zones and exclusion

29?

CURFEW AND TRAVEL CONTROL

regulations, or of any other person, citizen or alien, whose activities are deemed by
the War Department to be dangerous to the security of the nation, and will consult
duly designated representatives of the War Department before releasing any such persons.
"By use of the term War Department herein, is meant the War Department
through Commanding General, Western Defense Command.
"Dated at San Francisco, California, this 2nd day of June, 1942.
For the Department of Justice
/s/ Edward J. Ennis
Director,

Alien

Enemy

Control,

Department of Justice
For the War Department, through
the Commanding General, Western
Defense Command
/s/ Karl R. Bendetsen
Assistant Chief of Staff.”

Control By Military Proclamation
The Secretary of War on February 20, 1942, designated the Commanding
General as the military commander to carry out the

duties

and responsi¬

bilities imposed by Executive Order No. 9066 for that portion of the United
States embraced within the Western Defense Command.

Pursuant to that

authority, based on a determination of military necessity he issued Public
Proclamation No. 1 on March 2, 1942.

This established Military Areas Nos. 1

and 2 and various prohibited and restricted zones therein. Military Area No. 1
roughly comprised the western half of the States of Washington, Oregon,
California, and the southern half of the state of Arizona.

The remaining

portions of the said states comprised Military Area No. 2.
This proclamation imposed the first military regulation upon alien enemies
and all persons of Japanese ancestry residing in Military Area No. 1.

It re¬

quired them to obtain and execute a “Change of Residence Notice”

(Form

PM-2)

not more than five, nor less than one day prior to any change of

habitual

residence.

These

notices

were

distributed

by

the

Wartime

Civil

Control Administration through the United States Post Offices situated within
the geographical limits of Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2.

As a condition to the

procurement of Form PM-2, the execution of a “Change of Residence Report
Card”

(Form PM-1)

was required.

This latter form required informational

data surrounding the change of residence, including the old and new address,
as well as personal identifying data.
Public Proclamation No. 2
The requirements of Public Proclamation No.

1

with reference to the

execution of Change of Residence Notices were extended to enemy aliens and
persons of Japanese ancestry residing within the geographical limits of the
Western Defense Command by Public Proclamation No. 2 issued by the Com¬
manding General on March 16, 1942.
Public Proclamation No. 3
The Commanding General
mation No. 3.

on

March

24,

1942,

issued

Public

Procla¬

This required all Japanese, German, and Italian aliens, and all

298

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

other persons of Japanese ancestry residing or being within the geographical
limits of Military Area No. 1 or within any of the zones established within
Military Areas Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 to be within their places of residence
between the hours of 8 P. M. and 6 A. M.
"hours of curfew”.

This period was designated as the

At all other times such persons were required to be at

their places of residence or employment.

They were permitted to travel be¬

tween those places and also to any point within a distance of not more than
5 miles from the place of residence.
This proclamation intensified rather than superseded the prevailing regula¬
tions of the Attorney General governing the conduct of alien enemies within
Military Area No. 1.

That this was so, can be fully understood and appre¬

ciated only when considered in connection with the situation preceding its
promulgation.

The regulations of the Attorney General in effect throughout

Military Area No. 1 were, for the most part, acceptable to the military authori¬
ties as far as they went.

They were, however, national in scope and designed

as overall safeguards without due regard for local conditions.
The invasion of the Aleutians, the deterioration of the position of the
United States in the Pacific Theatre, the frequency of submarine attack on coast¬
wise shipping, and the shelling of the California and Oregon coasts and the bomb¬
ing by submarine based aircraft of the Oregon forest area were incidents of war
that kept the Commanding General ever conscious of the proximity of the Pacific
battlefront and furnished full justification for the designation of the Western
Defense Command as a theater of operations.

In the considered judgment of the

military authorities, this situation required treatment special and apart from that
routinely accorded to the rest of the nation.
In a sense, then, the military views in connection with the control of alien
enemies on the West Coast were expressed in the terms of Public Proclamation
No. 3.

It was designed to augment rather than supersede the prevailing regula¬

tions of the Attorney General.
Recognizing that regulation of enemy aliens was essentially a civilian prob¬
lem, the military was content that the Attorney General should continue the ad¬
ministration of his regulations as augmented by the terms of this new military
proclamation. Having contemplated the continued existence of the Attorney
General’s regulations, no provision was made in Public Proclamation No. 3 for
the relaxation of the restrictions therein contained.
If, in the first instance, it had been the intent of the military to supersede
the Attorney General as the monitor of enemy aliens on the West Coast, the
acceptable features of the prevailing regulations would have been embodied
within the terms of this latest Proclamation.

It was not therefore the inten¬

tion that Public Proclamation No. 3 would in effect be an obituary for the
Attorney General’s regulations insofar as the same applied to Military Area
No. 1.

Such was the case, however, as the Attorney General interpreted the

provisions of this new military proclamation as superseding his duties and
responsibilities with respect to the conduct and control of alien enemies within
Military Area No. 1.

The effect of this interpretation was to catapult Public

CURFEW AND TRAVEL CONTROL

299

Proclamation No. 3 into the position of controlling prominence in the alien
enemy regulation field.
This made the administration of such regulations a military problem by reason
of the action of the Justice Department in withdrawing from the administration
of alien control. The military immediately set about to administer Public Procla¬
mation No. 3.

There were two requirements—a field organization to service

the needs of nearly 200,000 alien enemies widely distributed throughout Mili¬
tary Area No. 1, and workable regulations. The enforcement of Public Procla¬
mation No. 3 to the letter would have seriously disrupted normal community
life, which at no time was the intent of this proclamation.

Elastic regulations

were, therefore, requested.
Ably assisting the Wartime Civil Control Administration in the evacuation
of the Japanese at the time Public Proclamation No. 3 came into being was
the United States Employment Service.

This agency, a unit of the Federal

Security Agency, had 138 field offices situated throughout Military Areas Nos.
1 and 2.

This organization was adequately staffed and was designated as the

field organization to act under the direction of the Wartime Civil Control Admin¬
istration in administering the travel and curfew restrictions announced in Public
Proclamation No. 3.
Those charged with the administration of Public Proclamation No. 3 were
instructed that some relaxation thereof was essential to the preservation of
normal community life. Accordingly, Form PM-2 was converted from a simple
Change of Residence Certificate to a Change of Residence Certificate and
Travel Permit.

This new form (PM-2 Revised) was used exclusively by the

United States Employment Service in the field.

The Wartime Civil Control

Administration from its headquarters in San Francisco reviewed all unusual
applications and in many instances issued special permits. These always recited
the basis upon which the relaxation was granted and specified the limitations.
In practice, the Wartime Civil Control Administration ultimately resorted to
extensive use of the special permit.
Literally thousands of travel permits and temporary curfew exemptions
were issued by the Wartime Civil Control Administration and the United States
Employment Service between the period commencing on March 27, 1942, and
terminating on August 27, 1942.

The travel and curfew regulations as ad¬

ministered by, and through direction of, the Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬
tration differed in no material respect from the regulations of the Attorney
General.
The Wartime Civil Control Administration was able to so regulate travel and
curfew within Military Area No. 1 as to assure substantial compliance with Public
Proclamation No. 3 and at the same time avoid undue hardship in any emergencies.
The military was fully cognizant of the existence of such situations and endeav¬
ored whenever possible to alleviate them through relaxation of the provisions of
Public Proclamation No. 3.

The facilities of the office of the Assistant Chief of

Staff, G-2 were at all times available to the Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬
tration.

Prior to relaxation in a given case, a clearance from the Military In-

300

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

telligence was invariably obtained.

(A clearance indicated that the files of the

investigative services did not reflect criminal or subversive activities on the part
of the subject.)

Cases of doubt were consistently resolved against the alien to

the end that military security should not be compromised.
Upon the creation of the War Manpower Commission, there was imposed
upon the United States Employment Service heavily increased responsibilities.
In the early part of July, 1942, this organization requested that it be relieved
of its duties in connection with the issuance of travel permits and curfew
exemptions to enemy aliens.
Loss of the United States Employment Service as a field agency involved
more than the physical substitution of one government agency for another.
The United States Employment Service had been identified with the Wartime
Civil Control Administration since the latter agency’s inception. It had a valuable
field of background information. Its necessary withdrawal from further participa¬
tion was therefore keenly felt.
However, the Ninth Regional Office of Civilian Defense signified its willing¬
ness to assume the responsibilities. By letter dated August 19, 1942, the Com¬
manding General, requested and authorized the Regional Director, Ninth Civilian
Defense Region, United States Office of Civilian Defense, to act. The arrangement
contemplated that the several city and county Civilian Defense Councils would
provide for the issuance of permits authorizing certain temporary exemptions from
the travel limitations and hours of curfew provisions of Proclamation No. 3. In
exercising this authority and discharging its responsibilities thereunder, the said
agency operated under the supervision and as part of the Wartime Civil Control
Administration. The exchange of correspondence reflecting the new connection
follows:
"August 19, 1942

"Mr. James C. Sheppard
Regional Director, Ninth Civilian Defense Region
United States Office of Civilian Defense
1355 Market Street,

San Francisco, California.
"Dear Mr. Sheppard:
"I am pleased to transmit herewith a letter dated August 19, 1942, from the
Commanding General, Western Defense Command. As previously understood and in¬
formally agreed upon between your office and the office of the Commanding General,
the United States Office of Civilian Defense, through its several County Defense
Councils, has agreed to undertake the administration of certain phases of Proclamation
No. 3, headquarters, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, dated March 24,
1942, within Military Area No. 1, operating as such as a part of the Wartime Civil
Control Administration. The enclosed letter from the Commanding General authorizes
your organization so to function.

"In accordance with the authorization and designation enclosed, the Wartime Civil
Control Administration, which operates under the command of the undersigned, has
prepared operating rules and regulations applicable to the administration to be under¬
taken. Reprints of the enclosed set of rules and regulations, together with necessary
forms, are being distributed to the city and county defense councils designated by you,
for their use. In addition, an appropriate public statement will be released by head¬
quarters, Western Defense Command, of the assumption of your new duties formerly
discharged by the United States Employment Service. In this connection, you will

301

CURFEW AND TRAVEL CONTROL

note that the regulations approved by the Commanding General require that all
publicity and press releases with reference to this subject have the approval of the
Assistant

Chief

of Staff,

Civil Affairs

Division, or

his

designated

representative.

I hereby designate The Chief, Public Relations Branch, Wartime Civil Control Ad¬
ministration, Major Norman Beasley, A. U. S., as authorized to pass on such questions.
"It is understood that you will instruct your field agencies to refer all emergency
matters not covered by these regulations and questions of an unusual nature to the
San Francisco office of the Wartime Civil Control Administration for action or de¬
cision as the case may be. You are assured that every effort will be made to accord
prompt response to inquiries. This office maintains 24-hour service, seven days a week.
"It will be appreciated if you will acknowledge this letter and its enclosures, and
at the same time confirm the understanding expressed herein and in the accompanying
letter from the Commanding General, Western Defense Command.
“Your cooperation in this matter is much appreciated.
"Sincerely yours,
Karl

R. Bendetsen

"Colonel, General Staff Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff
Civil Affairs Division
"Directing, Wartime Civil Control Administration.
"Enclosures—2
1— Itr from Commanding General
2— rules and regulations”

"August 19, 1942
"Mr. James

C. Sheppard

Regional Director, Ninth Civilian Defense Region
Office of Civilian Defense
1355 Market Street
San Francisco, California
"Dear Sir:
"By virtue of the authority vested in me as a Military Commander designated by
the Secretary of War to carry out the duties and responsibilities imposed by Executive
Order of the President, No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, with respect to that
portion of the United

States embraced in Western Defense Command, I hereby

authorize the Regional Director, Ninth Civilian Defense Region, United States Office
of Civilian Defense, through the agency of the several county or city civilian defense
councils, to provide for the issuance of permits authorizing certain temporary exemp¬
tions from the travel limitations and hours of curfew provisions of Public Procla¬
mation No. 3, this headquarters, dated March 24, 1942. Under this authorization the
Ninth Civilian Defense Regional Office and the several city or county defense councils
will exercise authority and discharge its responsibilities hereunder as a part of the
Wartime Civil Control Administration. The issuance of such permits will be in con¬
formity with such rules and regulations as shall be published by or pursuant to my
authority by the Assistant Chief of Staff Civil Affairs Division, his headquarters,
through the agency of the Wartime Civil Control Administration.
"The Wartime Civil Control Administration, an agency of my command, is
under the immediate direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division.
The Wartime Civil Control Administration is authorized and directed to furnish to
your office for distribution to your agency defense councils, for their guidance, a
statement of the rules and regulations governing the issuance of permits as indicated
above. Any question concerning the interpretation of Proclamation No. 3, of the
published rules and regulations governing the issuance of permits and concerning
the promulgation of any necessary new or amended rules or regulations should be

302

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

referred by your office to the Wartime Civil Control Administration, this headquarters,
for appropriate action.
“The enforcement of the provisions of Proclamation No. 3 continues to be vested
in the Department of Justice through the agency of the Federal Bureau of Investi¬
gation and the several United States District Attorneys.
"It is requested that the United States Office of Civilian Defense, (Ninth Civilian
Defense Region), designate a member of its staff to act as liaison officer between your
office and the office of the Wartime Civil Control Administration at the Whitcomb
Hotel, San Francisco, California.
“Very truly yours,
J.

L. DeWitt

"Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding.”

“OFFICE OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE
Ninth Civilian Defense Region
1355 Market Street
San Francisco, California
"August 19, 1942
"Colonel Karl

R. Bendetsen, G. S. C.

Wartime Civil Control Administration
1231 Market Street,
San Francisco, California
"Dear Colonel Bendetsen:
"This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 19, 1942, in duplicate, having
attached thereto a letter signed by Lieutenant General DeWitt, dated August 19, 1942,
and addressed to me together with proof sheets entitled respectively,
"Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Permits.
"Tab A consisting of a proof sheet of the Change of Residence Report Card.
"Tab B containing a Certificate Change of Residence Notice.
"Tab C consisting of a proof sheet of a Round Trip Travel Permit.
"Tab D containing instructions for applicants for exemption.
"Tab E consisting of a form for Exemption from Curfew Hours.
"Tab F consisting of mimeographed form RB-3, Travel and Curfew Report.
“As Regional Director of the Ninth Civilian Defense region, the authorization con¬
tained in Lieutenant General DeWitt’s letter of August 19 is accepted as well as the under¬
standing contained in your letter to me, dated August 19, 1942, with one clarification.
That is, the concluding two sentences in the second paragraph of your letter with regard
to publicity and press releases. There is no objection to that understanding insofar as the
Regional Office is concerned. However, it would be exceedingly difficult for us to require
the several city and county defense councils to submit all publicity and press releases to
the Chief, Public Relations Branch, Wartime Civil Control Administration. I am acting
upon the assumption that this was not intended, and I would appreciate your acquiescence
in this interpretation.
“I also observe that the first paragraph of your letter utilizes the phrase, 'through its
several county defense councils,’ while the second paragraph of your letter refers to
'city and county defense councils designated by you.’ I am assuming that in accordance
with our telephone conversation that we may interpret the first paragraph as meaning city
and county defense councils in the same sense in which it is used in the second paragraph.
"Yours sincerely,
(s)

James C. Sheppard
James C. Sheppard
Regional Director.”

303

CURFEW AND TRAVEL CONTROL

"August 20, 1942
"Mr. James

C. Sheppard

Regional Director
Ninth Civilian Defense Region
Office of Civilian Defense
1355 Market Street
San Francisco, California
"Dear Mr. Sheppard:
“I am pleased to acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 19, 1942, in which you
accept and confirm the arrangements communicated to you by letters dated August 19,
1942, from the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army,
and the undersigned, respectively, regarding the functioning of your office and of your
agency city and county civilian defense councils as a part of the Wartime Civil Control
Administration for the purpose of administering certain phases of Proclamation No. 3,
this headquarters, dated March 24, 1942. In your letter you also accept and acknowledge
receipt of certain rules and regulations governing the issuance of permits in connection
with the functions to be undertaken by your organization, together with certain exhibits
A to F, inclusive, supporting the mentioned rules and regulations.
"In the closing paragraph of your letter you refer to the use of the phrase in my
letter 'through its several county defense councils’ in its second paragraph. In all cases
where either phrase appears it is intended that both the city and county civilian defense
councils operating under your supervision in Military Area No. 1 of the Western Defense
Command are included.
"You have alluded to the requirement that all public statements and publicity re¬
leases in connection with the program be approved by the San Francisco office of the
Wartime Civil Control Administration prior to issuance. I am sure you will agree that
there is the utmost desirability in achieving and preserving uniformity, particularly in
connection with a program affecting substantial sections of the civilian components of
the Pacific Coast population. With this objective in view the Commanding General,
Western Defense Command, has taken great pains to do everything practicable throughout
the civilian control program to attain this standard. I appreciate the difficulties inherent
in exercising control of this nature over widely scattered cooperating agencies. If it were
not a matter of the utmost importance, the Commanding General would not consider the
imposition of such a burden upon you. It is with the solid conviction that real benefit will
accrue to all concerned that I advise you of the applicability of the requirement to your
agency councils. However, the requirement does not contemplate the several participating
city and county defense councils are precluded from releasing factual statements designed
solely to give information as to the location, hours of service and names of the officials
who will administer the program in each locality.
“I trust the foregoing will fully clarify the subjects of your inquiry. May I again
express the real appreciation of the Commanding General, to which I add my own, of
your valued cooperation and service in this important work.
"Sincerely yours,
Karl

R. Bendetsen

Colonel, G. S. C.
Assistant Chief of Staff
Civil Affairs Division.”
“August 27, 1942
"Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt

Commanding General
Western Defense Command and Fourth Army
Presidio of San Francisco
California
"Dear Sir:
“I have been delayed in replying to your letter of August 19 due to the fact that I
have been compelled to be away from San Francisco.

304

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

"Please be advised that pursuant to the authorization contained in your letter of
August 19 provision has been made for the issuance of permits authorizing certain tem¬
porary exemptions from the travel limitations and hours of curfew provisions of Public
Proclamation No. 3 of your Command, dated March 24, 1942.
“All such local defense councils have received the necessary instructions and forms,
and will be prepared to be fully operating as of the effective date, August 28, 1942.
“I think, General DeWitt, you will be interested to know that the some three hundred
defense councils who were asked to undertake this work did so willingly and with enthu¬
siasm. There was not one single objection raised. Having contacted many of them, I think
I can state that they are willing to undertake any assignment which is given them with
the same enthusiasm.
“A copy of the communication sent by this office to such defense councils, together
with the attachments, is enclosed herewith for your information.
"Pursuant to the request contained in the concluding paragraph of your letter, the
deputy director, George L. Levison, is designated as the liaison officer between this office
and the office of the Wartime Civil Control Administration at the Hotel Whitcomb,
San Francisco, California.
"Very truly yours,
James

C. Sheppard

Director
Ninth Civilian Defense Region.
"enc—9 (WCCA Rules and Reg. of Aug. 19, 1942
Pub. Proc. 1. 2, 3 and 5
Memo to Local Defense Council 8-24-42
Regional Regulations No. 4, 8-24-42
Form—Nom. of Alien Permit Officer
Form—Oath of Office”

Entitled "Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Travel Permits,
Authorizing Temporary Exemptions from Travel and Curfew Provisions of
Public Proclamation No.

3, Headquarters, Western Defense Command and

Fourth Army, dated March 24, 1942”, a manual was issued on August 19,
1942, by the Director of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. To insure
the proper indoctrination of this new field agency, in the early part of Septem¬
ber, 1942, representatives of the Wartime Civil Control Administration in com¬
pany with the regional alien permit officer of the Office of Civilian Defense toured
Military Area No. 1. They lectured before groups of alien permit officers in all of
the principal cities thereof respecting their duties and obligations in administering
the policies of the Wartime Civil Control Administration in connection with the
control of enemy aliens.
The Wartime Civil Control Administration published appropriate forms for
use in connection with the rules and regulations.

Form RB-1 was created for

the purpose of providing an adequate permit form for round-trip travel. Form
RB-2 was devised for the purpose of providing an adequate form for curfew
exemptions.
In the discharge of its newly acquired duties, the Office of Civilian Defense
appointed 336 permit officers who served without compensation within Military
Area No. 1 from August 28, 1942, to December 24, 1942.

All were provided

with Interview Records (Form RB-4) which were executed in triplicate.

On

these forms were recorded the identity of the aliens requesting travel permits or
curfew exemptions, together with the date and nature of said request and the

305

CURFEW AND TRAVEL CONTROL

disposition made in connection therewith.

At the conclusion of each week the

various alien permit officers throughout Military Area No. 1 forwarded a copy
of the Interview Record to the office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at
San Francisco.

This was done so that the Bureau might be apprized of the

number and identity of outstanding permits.

A copy of the said Interview

Record was likewise forwarded to the Headquarters of the Office of Civilian
Defense in San Francisco for review.

This enabled the San Francisco office to

determine whether the issuance of travel permits and curfew exemptions by
the various field agencies had been in accordance with the rules and regulations
governing their issuance.
On the 9th and 25 th day of every month a recapitulation of the number
of travel permits and curfew exemptions issued to enemy aliens was prepared
by the alien permit officers in the field.

This was recorded on Form RB-3,

which was forwarded to the Headquarters of the Office of Civilian Defense in
San Francisco. The San Francisco office prepared a recapitulation for the entire
area for the information of the Commanding General, Western Defense Com¬
mand and Fourth Army.
Public Proclamation No. 5
During the evacuation period there was some indication that further enemy
alien migrations might be ordered in the interest of national security.

It was

intended that some sensitive areas, in addition to those announced by the Attor¬
ney General in California, would have to be established.

Upon their creation,

alien enemies resident therein were to become subject to exclusion.

In antici¬

pation of this possibility, provision was made for the extension of exemptions
from exclusion to certain categories of enemy aliens.

Accordingly, on March

30, 1942, Public Proclamation No. 5 was announced.

Its primary purpose was

to afford a basis for exempting the classes named from the necessity for observing
curfew and travel regulations.

The categories eligible for exemption from com¬

pliance with travel and curfew regulations were:
"1.

German and Italian aliens 70 or more years of age.

"2.

In the case of German and Italian aliens, the parent, wife, husband, child of (or
other person who resides in the household and whose support is wholly dependent
upon) an officer, enlisted man, or commissioned nurse on active duty in the Army
of the United States (or any component thereof). United States Navy, United States
Marine Corps, or United States Coast Guard.

"3.

In the case of German and Italian aliens, the parent, wife, husband, child of (or other
person who resides in the household and whose support is wholly dependent upon)
an officer, enlisted man, or commissioned nurse, who on or since December 7, 1941,
died in line of duty with the armed forces of the United States indicated in the pre¬
ceding paragraph.

“4.

German and Italian aliens awaiting naturalization who had filed petition for nat¬
uralization and who had paid the filing fee therefore in a court of competent juris¬
diction on or before December 7, 1941.

"5.

Patients in hospitals or confined elsewhere and too ill or incapacitated to be removed
therefrom without endangering their lives.

"6.

Inmates of orphanages and the totally deaf, dumb, or blind.”

In May it was recommended to the War Department that further categories
be relieved from compliance.

It was proposed that this be accomplished on a

306

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

national scale if at all.

It was suggested that the War Department forward

the recommendations to the Department of Justice with a view to the amend¬
ment of the Attorney General’s recommendations
throughout continental United States.

governing

alien enemies

If the recommendations were favorably

regarded by the Department of Justice, it was proposed to amend Public Proc¬
lamation No. 3 accordingly.

The additional categories submitted in this pro¬

posal were:
“1.

Any German or Italian person expatriated by decree of the present German Gov¬
ernment or Italian Government, and who has or who shall have within 60 days
from the issuance of an appropriate proclamation declared his intention of becoming
a citizen of the United States.

"2.

Any German or Italian persons who having been residents in the United States since
June 1, 1924, who have failed to become United States citizens or who were denied
admission to citizenship by reason of lack of educational or mental qualifications.

“3.

Any person who has ever served in the Armed Forces of the United States on active
duty (land or naval forces) and whose separation from the service was not under
conditions other than honorable.

“4.

The parents, spouse, or minor children of any person who is now serving or who
has ever served with the forces of the United Nations since September 8, 1939, and
whose separation from such services was not under conditions other than honorable.

"5.

The parents, spouse, or minor children of any person who served with the Allies
during the period April 6, 1917 to November 11, 1918, and whose separation from
the service was not under conditions other than honorable.

“6.

All those classes of persons now accorded exemption under Proclamation No. 5
(curfew exemptions) issued by Headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth
Army.”

However, the suggestion was not favorably considered by the Attorney
General and no action was taken at that time.

As already noted, finally on

December 24, 1942, all curfew and travel regulations were rescinded.
Under the provisions of Proclamation No. 5, eligibles were required to make
application for exemption.

Forms (Application Form WDC-PM 5) were dis¬

tributed by the offices of the United States Post Office, the United States Employ¬
ment Service, the United States Immigration Service, and the Office of Civilian
Defense.

The Commanding Generals of the Sectors of Western Defense Com¬

mand were the primary agencies administering the granting of exemptions under
Proclamation No. 5.

The provost marshals in each sector were responsible for

the immediate supervision of this activity.

For the convenience of eligibles,

the procedure directed an applicant to submit his proofs to the local draft board
nearest his residence. These boards, upon receipt of an application, inspected it
for completeness and forwarded it to the Commanding General of the sector
concerned with a recommendation. The Sector Commander made a final decision
unless the case fell into an unusual category. All special cases, known as "hard¬
ship” cases, were normally forwarded to Headquarters, Western Defense Com¬
mand, for determination.
If an application was approved, the applicant was issued a certificate of
exemption from exclusion and curfew

(Form WDC-PM 6).

relieved from compliance with curfew and travel restrictions.

He was then
A clearance by

the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 was a condition precedent in all cases to the

307

CURFEW AND TRAVEL CONTROL

issuance of an exemption.

A recapitulation of exemptions granted under this

procedure follows:
Cumulative total of Western Defense Command-PM 6 Exemptions granted
to December 24, 1942:
Northwestern Sector.

1,295

Northern California Sector.
Southern California Sector.

7,483
2,118

Southern Land Frontier Sector.

10

Ninth Service Command .
Provost Marshal, Western Defense Command.
Wartime Civil Control Administration.

43
13
126
11,088

It is estimated that approximately 40,000 persons made application, of
which roughly 10,000 were referred to the Wartime Civil Control Administra¬
tion as special cases not falling within any established regulation or policy.
Public Proclamation No. 13
The regulations of the Attorney General governing the conduct of aliens
of enemy nationalities specifically designated certain classes of persons who were
not required to comply with the provisions of the said regulations.

For the

purposes of the regulations these were not considered enemy aliens. On October
12, 1942, the Attorney General announced that effective October 19, 1942, the
President had relieved all citizens or subjects of Italy (and all aliens who at
that time were stateless, but who at the time at which they became stateless
were citizens or subjects of Italy) from compliance with the provisions of the
general enemy regulations.

For these purposes the President no longer required

their classification as enemy aliens.
In order to establish uniformity, on October 19, 1942, Public Proclamation
No. 13 was issued.

By its terms, all such persons were specifically exempted

from the provisions of curfew and travel regulations established under the proc¬
lamations theretofore issued.
Public Proclamation No. 15
In the year following Pearl Harbor much was accomplished in the field of
civil control to reduce the dangers existing on the West Coast.

The Japanese,

aliens and citizens alike, had been excluded from Military Area No. 1 and that
portion of Military Area No. 2 lying within the State of California. The Attor¬
ney General, under the authority conferred upon him in the Presidential Procla¬
mations of December 7 and 8, 1941, had apprehended, detained, and interned
enemy aliens deemed dangerous to the national security. In addition, the Com¬
manding

General

established

a

procedure for

the

exclusion

of

potentially

dangerous persons from the West Coast—persons whose presence endangered
the military security of the Coast.

With these safeguards in operation, the

military necessity upon which the continuance of the military curfew and
travel regulations was predicated had been substantially satisfied. Accordingly,
on December 24, 1942, Public Proclamation No. 15, rescinding the travel and

308

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

curfew provisions of Public Proclamation No. 3 was issued.

This, in effect,

brought to an end the military regulation of enemy aliens on the West Coast.
It revived the Attorney General’s alien regulations.

Citizens and aliens alike

continued to be subject to exclusion from Military Area No. 1 in all cases where
their presence on the West Coast endangered its military security.

In announc¬

ing the change, it was stated in part:
. . the need for the curfew no longer exists as other security measures have now been
provided. Among these measures is the Individual Exclusion Procedure under which
persons who are found, after hearing, to be dangerous or potentially dangerous to the
military security of the West Coast are excluded. I desire to make it plain, however, that
there will be no retardation of the program to rid the West Coast of such persons.”

Calendar of Enemy Alien Regulations
December 7, 1941

Presidential Proclamation No. 2525

December 8, 1941

Presidential Proclamation No. 2526

(Conduct to be observed by German

December 8, 1941

Presidential Proclamation No. 2527

aliens prescribed)
(Conduct to be observed by Italian

December 29, 1941

Presidential Proclamation No. 2533

January 14, 1942

Presidential Proclamation No. 2537

(Conduct to be observed
Japanese prescribed)

by

alien

aliens prescribed)
(Secretary of War substituted for
Attorney General as monitor of
enemy aliens in Alaska)
(Certificate of Identification

pro¬

gram announced)
February 2-9, 1942

Certificate of Identification Program

February 5, 1942

Regulations controlling travel and

(Enemy aliens required to register)

other conduct of aliens of enemy
nationality announced by Attor¬
ney General.
February 24, 1942

Attorney General announces curfew

March 2, 1942

Public Proclamation No. 1

(Enemy aliens in northwestern por¬
tion of California placed under cur¬
few)
(Aliens within Military Area No. 1
required to execute Change of Resi¬
dence Notices)

March 16, 1942

Public Proclamation No. 2

(Alien enemies within Western De¬
fense Command required to execute
Change of Residence Notices.)

March 24, 1942

Public Proclamation No. 3

(Military curfew and travel regula¬
tions imposed on enemy aliens)

March 30, 1942

Public Proclamation No. 5

October 12, 1942

Italian aliens relieved from the

(Exemptions from curfew and exclu¬
sion announced)

provisions of the Attorney
General’s regulations.
October 19, 1942

Public Proclamation No. 13

(Italian aliens relieved from the pro¬
visions of Public Proclamations Nos.
1, 2, and 3.)

December 24, 1942

Public Proclamation No. 15

(Curfew and

travel

provisions of

Public Proclamation No. 3 rescinded)

CHAPTER XXIV
Repatriation of Japanese
On June 6, 1942, the Wartime Civil Control Administration entrained 54
Japanese for New York where they were scheduled to sail on the S. S. Gripsholm
for Lourenco Marques, Portuguese East Africa, on June 11. Although these 54
persons are, in fact, the only Japanese under Wartime Civil Control Administra¬
tion jurisdiction ever to have been repatriated, this fact alone gives no indication
whatever of the total repatriation activities which were carried out by this agency.
The purpose of this Chapter is to present these activities as briefly as possible.
When any person under Wartime Civil Control Administration jurisdiction
either (a) of his accord requested repatriation, or (b) was listed by the State
Department as being considered for repatriation, it became necessary to carry out
certain very definite functions.

In outlining these functions, and the results

thereof, the Chapter is divided into three parts:

(1)

Scope of responsibility in

repatriation matters, (2) State Department Lists of persons being considered for
repatriation, and (3) the Request for Repatriation Procedure.
It would unduly extend this portion of the report to recount in detail here
the steps taken by Wartime Civil Control Administration in preparing evacuees
for repatriation, determining identity and derivative eligibility, transporting them
to New York City, arranging their fiscal affairs, property disposition, and insuring
against attempts on the part of repatriates to carry contraband or excessive monies
with them.

In point of fact, there were two groups of repatriates handled by

Wartime Civil Control Administration. The second group originated in Hawaii.
Custody of the second group was accepted by the Wartime Civil Control Admin¬
istration in San Francisco and the same elaborate steps were taken to transport
this party to North Carolina (there to await repatrition) with some minor omis¬
sions, as those which were taken to organize the first party of fifty-four who left
from Assembly and Relocation Centers bound for New York.
When the first repatriation exchange agreement ultimately developed, the
responsibility was imposed on Wartime Civil Control Administration to organize
the movement within less than seven days. Few ground rules had been pre-determined which specified what kinds of property could be taken, how much money,
how financial transfers were to be arranged, whether there would be baggage
inspection, customs inspection, and internal revenue examinations. Neither had
rules been announced to govern the eligibility of persons whose names did not
appear on any list to accept repatriation by derivation from a member of the
immediate family. Accordingly, it fell to the lot of Wartime Civil Control Ad¬
ministration to develop a set of rules, a series of questions and answers, and a
number of policies for guidance. This was done under considerable handicap be¬
cause all of the solutions to these problems proposed by Wartime Civil Control
Administration had to be transmitted by telephone through the War Depart¬
ment to the State Department for clearance. There was insufficient time with
which to resort even to the use of teletype messages.
The train parties, once organized, were placed under the command of a
309

310

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

commissioned officer and in each car, trained civilian personnel, including guards
and nurses, were provided.

All baggage had to be searched and questionable

items were taken up, receipts given, and those items in turn shipped to the
State Department for disposition.

Although only fifty-four persons were ulti¬

mately to comprise the first repatriation party, it took the full time and energies
of seven officers and over thirty civilians at Wartime Civil Control Administra¬
tion offices to conclude the necessary arrangements.

In addition, the Director of

Wartime Civil Control Administration held a number of telephone conference
calls with the managers of all Assembly and Relocation Centers to give them
specific instructions as to how to proceed.

All international requirements were

observed, because it was keenly felt by the Wartime Civil Control Administra¬
tion staff that any omission, no matter how slight, might result in reprisals
against our nationals in the hands of the enemy, or perhaps even in the break¬
down of the repatriation agreement which would have denied to many of our
nationals the opportunity to return home.

The many problems which arose,

their solution, the human interest aspects, if narrated in detail would occupy
a volume of considerable extent itself.
I.

Scope of responsibility in repatriation matters.

When, on June 1, it first became possible to repatriate Japanese in America
in exchange for Americans held in Japan, those Japanese who had been evacu¬
ated from the West Coast were housed in 18 Centers, of which three, Colorado
River (Parker), Manzanar, and Tule Lake, were Relocation Centers operated
by the War Relocation Authority, and 15 were Assembly Centers under Wartime
Civil Control Administration operation. In order to expedite the June repatriation
of west coast Japanese under unified direction, the War Relocation Authority at
that time gave Wartime Civil Control Administration jurisdiction in all matters
affecting the repatriation of evacuees in Relocation as well as Assembly Centers.
On July 17-18 a canvass of Assembly and Relocation Centers was institu¬
ted in order to determine the names of evacuees who wished to be repatriated.
This canvass was begun as a joint undertaking of both Wartime Civil Control
Administration and War Relocation Authority, and an explanation of the proce¬
dure and results constitutes Part III of this Chapter.

Again, however, it was

apparent that the canvass, and subsequent actual repatriation, could be much more
efficiently handled under unified rather than joint jurisdiction. Accordingly, on
July 25, with 63 per cent of the evacuees remaining under Wartime Civil Control
Administration control in Assembly Centers, a Wartime Civil Control Admin¬
istration memorandum entitled: "Interim Report and Recommendation—Re¬
patriation,” was prepared for discussion with War Relocation Authority repre¬
sentatives and made certain specific proposals for handling the problem.

Of

pertinence here is the following excerpt from this memorandum: "(Repatria¬
tion)

operations of War Relocation Authority and Wartime Civil Control

Administration should be consolidated at this time. One office should be charged
with the responsibility of preparing all lists for transmittal to the War and State
Departments, maintaining all records, and providing for release of repatriates.
Since this is largely a War Department program, it is recommended that War-

REPATRIATION

OF

311

JAPANESE

time Civil Control Administration be charged with this responsibility.

It is

further recommended that an official of War Relocation Authority should work
closely with Wartime Civil Control Administration persons in charge of this
project and be present at all meetings and conferences relating to this project.”
On July 26 this recommendation was discussed by Wartime Civil Control
Administration representatives with Mr. E. R. Fryer, San Francisco Regional
Director of War Relocation Authority, and it was agreed that Wartime Civil
Control Administration should bear the responsibility for processing potential
repatriates in Relocation as well as Assembly Centers.
Inasmuch as all Japanese evacuees were to be transferred to War Relocation
Authority by November 1, a request was made in October by Wartime Civil
Control Administration that War Relocation Authority be prepared to take
over all responsibility concerning repatriation of Center residents as early in
November as possible.

In compliance with this request, on October 20 War

Relocation Authority placed two statistical clerks with the Repatriation Sec¬
tion for training in the handling of repatriation matters.

It was agreed, how¬

ever, that Wartime Civil Control Administration would continue to receive,
tabulate, and transmit the documented decisions of persons being canvassed
because of their listing on the State Department so-called Photostat List (see
section on List 4 in Part II of this chapter).

For any repatriation up to Novem¬

ber 15, 1942, Wartime Civil Control Administration was to retain full responsi¬
bility.

Continuing with this responsibility concerning repatriation, Wartime

Civil Control Administration on November 15, transferred its index file of persons
who had received, or were receiving, repatriation consideration to War Relocation
Authority, and that agency, having established a Repatriation unit, assumed
all further functions having to do with the repatriation of Japanese evacuees
under its jurisdiction.
II. State Department Lists of persons being considered for repatriation.
List No.

1.

On June 1, 1942, Wartime Civil Control Administration

received a list of names of 539 Japanese from the State Department.
was entitled: "Japanese Nationals Sailing First Voyage S. S. Gripsholm.

This list
Group

II (A) : Non-Officials From the United States.” In addition to names, the list
in most cases provided some indication of last known occupation and city of
residence of each person.

All persons who were shown to have lived within

the evacuated portion of the Western Defense Command, and who were not
interned as dangerous enemy aliens, were considered to constitute that portion
of the list for which Wartime Civil Control Administration was responsible.
A search of the list showed 142 of the 539 persons to have lived within
the evacuated area of the Western Defense Command, and thus presumed to
be under Wartime Civil Control Administration jurisdiction.

To these

142

were later added 34 dependents of listed persons who were eligible for repatria¬
tion because of such dependency, thus making a total of 176 persons to be
located and questioned for a decision.
Because of prior international agreements concerning this first wartime
exchange of repatriates between the United States and Japan, it was necessary
for the exchange vessel, the S. S. Gripsholm, to sail from New York City on

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

312
June 11.

To meet this sailing date it was necessary that repatriates from the

West Coast be entrained before June 7.

Operating under considerable pressure

because of this imposed time limit, and carrying on all correspondence with
Centers and other points by teletype, telegram, and telephone, 101 of the 176
persons were located and their decision obtained.

Of these 101 persons, 41

declined repatriation, six were found to be ineligible, and 54 accepted and were
subsequently repatriated.1
Although those who wished to accept repatriation could do so simply by
notifying Wartime Civil Control Administration of their decision, those who
wished to decline repatriation were asked to sign five copies of a declaration to
that effect. Four copies of these declarations were trasmitted by airmail to the
War Department on June 8.
Of the 54 persons who were repatriated, two were from Pasco, Washing¬
ton, one was from the Arequipa Sanatorium in Marin County, California, and
the remaining 51 were from nine Assembly Centers and one Relocation Cen¬
ter.

Thirty-six of the repatriates were adults eighteen years of age and older,

and eighteen were children under the age of eighteen.2
List No. 2.

On August 5, a mimeographed list was received which con¬

sisted of 2,803 Japanese names, most of which were listed at some type of
address.

This list was entitled:

"Preliminary List of Japanese Nationals Who

Are Being Considered for the Second Sailing of the Exchange Vessel 'Gripsholm’:

Revised July 31, 1942.”

The State Department did not ask that any

of these persons be questioned regarding repatriation, but, instead, it was stated
in a letter from S. K. Lafoon to Col. Ralph H. Tate, Executive Officer, Office
of the Assistant Secretary of War, that, "It would be greatly appreciated if
you would provide the Department with any corrections of the addresses given
or supply any missing addresses that may be available in your files.”

The

Repatriation Section had individual blue Address Tracer cards typed for each
name and address listed.

These names were then searched in the Wartime Civil

Control Administration master index file, and 778 names were found at current
addresses.

This information was teletyped to the War Department by August

13, for transmission to the State Department.8
List No. 3.

The next repatriation list consisted of 1,366 Japanese names

dated August 19, 1942, and entitled:

"Tentative Office List of Japanese Na¬

tionals Eligible for Repatriation on Next 'Gripsholm’ ”,
Wartime Civil Control Administration was requested to canvass those persons
within its area of responsibility, together with those who were found in three
west coast internment enclosures, viz., Sharp’s Park, Angel Island, and United
States Immigration Service, Los Angeles, and to notify the State Department
concerning the names and addresses of those persons wishing to accept repatria¬
tion, as well as those wishing to decline.

list.

*Table 34 shows the disposition made by Wartime Civil Control Administration of persons on the June
See Chapter Appendix for Tables and Figures.
*Table 35 shows the address, age, and sex distribution of the repatriates.

'Table 36 shows the distribution of these 778 persons by address. Table 37 shows the distribution of the
remaining 2,025 names which were not found indexed in the master file.

REPATRIATION

OF

313

JAPANESE

After adding the names of 20 persons later made eligible by the State De¬
partment, and deducting duplicated names and names of deceased persons, it
became apparent from an examination of the addresses, that the Wartime Civil
Control Administration was

responsible

for obtaining the decision of

3 52

persons.4
Because Japanese evacuees were being continuously transferred from As¬
sembly to Relocation Centers, it was necessary to re-check all names against
the master index file before communicating with the potential repatriates.
After this search was complete, and addresses verified or revised, lists were made
up for each Center and Internment Enclosure concerned, and transmitted to the
administrator of each such place.

Each administrator was instructed to advise

the persons on his list that they had been made eligible for repatriation to
Japan on the forthcoming second sailing of the exchange vessel Gripsholm, and
were to be permitted to accept formally or decline the offer.

It was further

directed that persons wishing to accept should fill out and sign Requests for
Repatriation in triplicate, and that persons 18 years of age and older who
wished to decline repatriation should sign five copies of a Declaration of
Declination.

It was specifically stated that persons under the age of 18 who

were being considered for repatriation must abide by the decision of their
parents or guardians.
After the completion of the canvass it was determined that 199 persons
wished to accept repatriation.

One copy of each of the Individual Request for

Repatriation and Family Summary Sheets for these people was sent to the War
Department, as well as three copies of each Declaration of Declination received
from persons 18 years of age and older declining the repatriation offer. A re¬
port, in list form, was made up and transmitted to the War Department on
September
for

whom

10,

which

Wartime

provided
Civil

the

Control

following

information for each

Administration

was

responsible:

person
State

Department list number, name and address as listed by the State Department.
In addition, for each person with whom Wartime Civil Control Administration
had actually communicated, the list provided this information:

repatriation

decision, Wartime Civil Control Administration family number, correct spelling
of name, correct address, age, and sex.5
List No. 4. On August 28, three photostatic copies of a list of 986 Japanese
names were received from the War Department.

This list differed radically

from previous lists of possible repatriates in that only the name of the family
head was given, and the Repatriation Section was asked to ascertain name and
current location of all family members wherever possible.

The request from

the State Department to the War Department in turn transmitted to Wartime
Civil Control Administration read as follows: "1.

In the attached list you will

note that the names of some individuals have been crossed off.

This indicates

that the Department has already located these individuals. 2. Where a red circle
is placed around the number preceding the name, it indicates that the individual
4The distribution of these persons appear in Table 38.
sThe disposition of the 352 cases for which Wartime Civil Control Administration was responsible appears
in Table 39.

314

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

has been located in the records of the Provost Marshal General but that no
record of the family groups is available. In all cases where a red circle precedes

the name, please endeavor to locate the families only. 3. It is desired that all
other names on the list be checked with reference to the location of the indi¬
vidual as well as the family.”6
As a matter of fact, it was decided to search all names against Wartime
Civil Control Administration files because of the continuing transfer of persons
from Assembly to Relocation Centers, and because of the continuing parole of
interned persons to these Centers.

Fortunately, the list provided a last known

private address as well as a former occupation for the persons listed. With this
information in hand, the names were first searched through the file of Social
Data Registration forms which had been filled out for each Japanese family
group evacuated from the West Coast.

By this expedient, the names of family

members of 657 of the 986 listed individuals were found.
After transferring the available data on both listed individuals and their
family members to Address Tracer Cards, the names were searched against the
master index file in an attempt to determine the present address of each person.
At this time, although the State Department had advised that, "It is possible
that some of these persons may have to be considered for repatriation in the
very near future,”' no request was made to attempt communication with them.
But, in accordance with the expressed request for current locations of these
people, Wartime Civil Control Administration transmitted between September 4
and September 12, eight partial lists providing the following information for the
657 families found to be indexed in the master file:

name, sex, Wartime Civil

Control Administration family number, and current residence.
On September 27 the War Department notified Wartime Civil Control
Administration by telephone that the State Department desired to know the
names of family members of listed persons who would accept repatriation to
Japan, if offered, and names of those who would not be willing to be repatriated.
In other words, a canvass of the 657 families was desired, although no assurance
could be made that those expressing a desire for repatriation would actually be
permitted to sail.
Before commencing a canvass of listed persons and their families, it was
necessary to re-search the master index file in the case of all names previously
located in Assembly Centers. This was necessary because of the unabated con¬
tinuing transfer of Japanese evacuees from Assembly to Relocation Centers. On
September 12 when the final list of names and addresses of listed persons and
their family members was transmitted by Wartime Civil Control Administra¬
tion, there was a total of 31,417 evacuees residing in the five extant Assembly
Centers.

By October 13, when this repatriation canvass actually commenced,

only three Assembly Centers remained in operation and all but 8,806 evacuees
had been transferred to Relocation Centers or otherwise relocated.

After this

search was completed, the names of the persons to be canvassed were listed
according to the Center of residence. Three different form letters were printed,
eExccrpt from memorandum to Colonel Ralph H. Tate from S. K. Lafoon dated August 26, 1942.
7Ibid.

REPATRIATION

OF

JAPANESE

315

based on three broad categories of families to be canvassed. On the evening of
October 12 lists were transmitted to the three Assembly Centers remaining in
operation8 and the ten Relocation Centers, together with covering letters to the
Managers and Directors explaining the purposes of the canvass. At the same
time, the form letters to persons being canvassed were inserted, with a franked
pre-addressed return envelope, in envelopes addressed to the oldest resident
family member concerned; these envelopes were bundled by Center of residence
and transmitted to the Managers and directors for distribution. Later, on
October 21, 54 more names were added as a supplement. These latter names
resulted from a list, since entitled War Relocation Authority List-I, which had
been given War Relocation Authority by the State Department. Form letters
were then mailed out to these additional persons.9
Persons wishing to accept repatriation, if later offered, were directed to file
formal Request for Repatriation forms if this had previously not been done,
and those wishing to decline such an offer were directed to sign five copies of
the Declaration of Declination form. The form letters were provided with a per¬
forated stub on which the recipients were asked to indicate their wish to accept
or decline by signing their names under the appropriate decision. It was re¬
quested that these stubs then be separated from the form letter and returned
immediately to the attention of the Repatriation Section in the pre-addressed
franked envelope which had been provided.
Replies were allowed to accumulate until October 19, at which time the
first partial list of decisions (involving 184 persons) was forwarded to the War
Department. Periodically thereafter when a sufficient number of replies had been
received, further partial lists were transmitted. These lists provided information
as to the State Department number under which the family had originally been
listed, name, age, sex, Wartime Civil Control Administration Family number,
and decision concerning repatriation.
By December 31, the decisions of 2,229 of the 2,744 persons, to whom form
letters had been mailed on October 12, had been received, tabulated, and trans¬
mitted.10 It is interesting to note that only 6.4 per cent, or 142, of these
respondents indicated that they would be willing to accept an offer of repatria¬
tion to Japan. This amounts to only 30 more persons than those who had filed
a Request for Repatriation prior to the commencement of the canvass. It
is conjectural why so few expressed a willingness to be repatriated. Although
this is not the place to detail the factors which may have been operating to
greatly reduce the numbers of potential acceptances, it should be emphasized
that no actual offer of repatriation was made to these people, and no scheduled
sailing of an exchange vessel had been announced. Instead, the form letters
simply stated that: "Certain Japanese persons are currently being considered for
repatriation to Japan. You, and those members of your family listed above, are
®A fourth Assembly Center, Tanforan, actually transferred the last of its residents on October 13. The
Manager of this Center forwarded the form letter to the desination of the addressees.
•Table 40 shows the total number of persons who were canvassed, and the type of printed form letters
which they received.
10Table 41 shows the number of persons whose decisions were transmitted from October 19 through
December 31.

316

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

being so considered,” and further on, "If repatriation would be accepted, three
copies of a Request for Repatriation should be filled out and signed by each
person 18 years of age and older.”
By way of comparison, in June when "Wartime Civil Control Administration
sought the decision of 95 persons who had actually received assurance that they
had been declared eligible for repatriation by the State Department, 57 per cent
accepted and were repatriated. Again, when 344 persons who had been listed by
the State Department on August 19 (List No. 3) were located and (errone¬
ously)

informed that they were eligible for repatriation, a total of 60 per

cent accepted.
III.

The Request for Repatriation Procedure.

The State Department had originally planned that the S. S. Grips holm
would sail from New York on or about August 10 with a second group of
Japanese repatriates.11 It was desirable that advance knowledge be secured con¬
cerning those Japanese who, if offered an opportunity to be sent to Japan, would
accept repatriation. Accordingly, on July 11 the State Department requested a
canvass of the Centers for persons in the following categories who would like
to be repatriated: 1) Treaty merchants, 2) professors, 3)

temporary visitors,

4) students, and 5) clergymen.
There was no facile way by which only those evacuees in these five limited
categories could be questioned. It was decided that the request of the State
Department made it necessary to immediately undertake a canvass of all Jap¬
anese Center residents. It was fortunate that this was so, because later, on July
16, the State Department broadened its request to include information concern¬
ing any and all Japanese who might wish to be repatriated. Necessary forms and
instructions for the use of evacuees wishing to request repatriation were devised
and printed, and on July 17 supplies of these, together with a memorandum
from the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, explaining procedure
to be followed,

were sent

to

the Managers of the ten Assembly Centers

remaining in operation.12 And on July 18, the San Francisco regional office of the
War Relocation Authority sent a supply of identical forms and instructions
to the Directors of the existing Relocation Centers.

Later, on July 26, the

agreement mentioned in Part I of this chapter, was made that all completed
forms being returned to War Relocation Authority from its Centers were to be
turned over to Wartime Civil Control Administration for tabulation, listing, and
transmission to the War Department.
The following forms were used in this program to obtain a formal request
from each evacuee who wished to be repatriated:
1.

Wartime Civil Control Administration Form R-100.

"Individual

Request for Repatriation.” This form was filled out in triplicate by each person
18 years of age and older. One copy was forwarded to the attention of the State
Department, one copy was provided the War Relocation Authority, and the
“This plan as well as later plans based on other tentative dates all had to be abandoned.
sailed in June were the only ones actually repatriated during the year 1942.
“Not including Pinedale from which all evacuees were transferred by July 23.

The Japanese who

REPATRIATION

OF

317

JAPANESE

remaining copy was retained by Wartime Civil Control Administration.
was provided on the form for the following information:

Space

Name; sex; age and

date of birth; height; weight; marital status; place of birth; citizenship; port,
date; vessel and entry status at time of last entry into the United States; informa¬
tion covering residence outside the United States (dates of departure and return,
foreign country of residence, and occupation or activity while there); educa¬
tional history; employment history; residence addresses for previous five years;
name, relationship, sex, age, and present address of all first degree relatives;
signature of applicant and of witness; and date of filing. In addition, space was
provided for the following information to be filled in by the Repatriation Section:
Center; Wartime Civil Control Administration Family number; and place from
which applicant was evacuated.
2.

Wartime Civil Control Administration Form R-l01.

Repatriation—Family Summary.”

"Request for

This form was provided in order that mem¬

bers of family groups who wished to be repatriated together would not be
considered individually, and perhaps be repatriated separately.
in triplicate for each such family.

It was filled out

These were distributed with the attached

R-l00 forms to the State Department, War Relocation Authority, and Wartime
Civil Control Administration. Space was provided on this form for the following
information for each family member for whom repatriation was requested:
Name; relationship; sex; age; place of birth; and affirmation or negation of fact
that form R-l00 for the named person was attached. This form was signed by
the acting head of the family, witnessed, dated, and the name of the Center
entered. This was the form from which information concerning children under
the age of 18 and interned family members was secured.
3.

Wartime Civil Control Administration Form R-103. "Notice and

General Instructions to Japanese Seeking Repatriation.” This form consisted of
eleven paragraphs explaining the request for repatriation procedure and the
rights and duties of persons wishing to apply for repatriation.
4.

Japanese Translation of Form R-103.

This was prepared by the

Army Language School, Camp Savage, Minnesota.
5.

Wartime Civil Control Administration Form R-104. "Instructions

for the Individual Request for Repatriation.”

This form contained specific

instructions for filling out each item of Form R-l00.
6.

Wartime Civil Control Administration Form R-105.

Japanese Requesting Repatriation.”

"List of

This form was used to summarize the

information for all persons who themselves requested repatriation, or for whom
repatriation was requested, i. e., minors under 18, and interned persons.

When

each list was completed, two copies were sent to the War Department for
transmittal to the State Department, two copies were sent to G-2, and one
copy was provided War Relocation Authority.
lowing information in columnar form:

This list provided the fol¬

Wartime Civil Control Administration

Family number; name; relationship to (family) head; sex; age; citizenship; last
entry date; entry status; occupation; previous address; and name of the Center
from which the Request for Repatriation was received.
A total of 2,640 names of Japanese evacuees wishing to be repatriated had

318

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

been listed and forwarded to the War Department by August 13. One copy of
each Individual Request for Repatriation and each Family Summary covering
the persons listed, was also transmitted for the State Department. Later, on
September 12, and October 21, a total of 132 more names, together with com¬
pleted forms, were transmitted in two additional lists, thus making a grand
total of 2,772 names.13
The names of only 151, or 5.5 per cent, of the 2,772 persons who sub¬
mitted Requests for Repatriation under this voluntary program appeared on
the State Department lists of persons being considered for repatriation which
have been mentioned in this chapter.
Certain salient facts about that portion of the Japanese who prefer re¬
patriation to continuing residence in the United States can be gained by an
analysis of the age, sex, citizenship, and place of education of the 2,772 persons
filing Requests for Repatriation.14
1.

Sex.

The preponderance of males is immediately apparent, particu¬

larly in the older ages.15 It is particularly interesting to note that of all appli¬
cants 18 years of age and older 70.9 per cent are males.

In other words, there

are 2.4 adult males for every adult female.
2.

Citizenship.

Of the 2,772 applicants 1,171, or 42.2 per cent, were

born in the United States and can, therefore,

claim

American

citizenship.

Nevertheless, of the 525 U. S. born Japanese eighteen years of age and older,
363, or 69.1 per cent, claimed on their Individual Request for Repatriation to be
registered with Japan as dual citizens.
3.

Place of education of U. S. born.

Further analysis of the Individ¬

ual Requests for Repatriation filed by the 525 U. S. born Japanese 18 years
of age and older reveals that 375, or 71.4 per cent, claimed to have been partially
or wholly educated in Japan. It can thus be asserted that 71.4 per cent of these
U. S. born Japanese are Kibei and only 28.6 per cent are Nisei.

As would be

expected, a high degree of correlation is evident between those U. S. born
Japanese who claim dual citizenship and those who claim to have received
school training in Japan. Focusing more particularly on certain age groups, it
can be shown that of the 23 5 persons in the 20-24 age group, 164, or 69.8
per cent are Kibei. Also of all persons in the 25-29 age group, 70.9 per cent are
Kibei.16
13Table 42 shows the dates on which the various lists were transmitted and
involved.

the number of applicants

14In presenting these data in Table 43, a division is made between those under and over the age of 18
inasmuch as certain information is lacking on the under 18 group. Because these minors were not required to
fill out an Individual Request for Repatriation, there is no data on their dual citizenship status or education
in Japan, if any.
15This is shown graphically in the population pyramid presented as Figure 29.
leTable 44 shows a detailed analysis of the percentage of male and female Nisei, Kibei, and Issei for each
of five age groups, and Figure 30 presents these same data in graphic form.

REPATRIATION

OF

319

JAPANESE

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV
TABLE 34.—Summary by Source and Disposition of Persons Who
Were Offered Repatriation in June, 1942
Number of
persons

Source and Disposition

Total searched by WCCA.

573

SOURCE
539

34
DISPOSITION
Listed persons found to be interned or at addresses outside WCCA jurisdiction. .. .
Listed persons and unlisted dependents with whom WCCA communicated.

397

101
54
41
6

Listed persons whose last known address was within evacuated portion of WDC
but who were not located by "WCCA.

75

TABLE 35.—Address, Age, and Sex of 54 Repatriates Entrained
by WCCA on June 6, 1942
MINORS
UNDER AGE OF 18

ADULTS
Center, or Other Address

Total
persons
Male

Female

Male

Total persons.

54

18

18

Marysville.
Pomona.
Portland.
Puyallup.
Sacramento.

3
2
3
3

1

1
1
1

4

2

1

i
1

10

5

2

1

2
2

1

4

Santa Anita.
Stockton.
Tanforan.
Turlock.
Colorado River.
Arequipa Sanatorium.
Pasco, Washington.

3
15

4
4
1
2

2

4
4
2

1
6

5

Female

1
1
2

i
l
i

13

i
i

320

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

TABLE 36.—Distribution

FROM

THE

of Names on July

WEST

31, 1942

COAST

State Department

Preliminary Repatriation List Found in WCCA Master Index File

Number of
persons

Distribution of Names Found

Total names teletyped to War Department, together with current
778
Residents of Assembly Centers.

407
11
12
29
35
25
202
7
50
36

Residents of Relocation Centers.

291
90
27
120
54

At private addresses in unevacuated portions of WDC.

40

At private addresses outside WDC.

40

TABLE

37.—Distribution

of

Names

on July

31, 1942

State

Department

Preliminary Repatriation List not Found in WCCA Master Index File

Distribution of Names not Found

Number of
persons

2,025
52
399
487
993
39
23
32

REPATRIATION

OF

321

JAPANESE

TABLE 38.—Distribution of Names Under WCCA Responsibility
on August 19, 1942 State Department List
Distribution

Number of
persons

Total persons from whom WCCA was responsible for obtaining a
decision.

352

Residents of Assembly and Relocation Centers.
Originally listed at Centers.
Added by special permission of State Department.
Originally listed at internment enclosures but found paroled to Centers ...
Internees at Angel Island, Sharp’s Park, and U. S. I. S., Los Angeles.
Listed at former private addresses within evacuated portion of WDC but not
found indexed in WCCA Master File.

299
275

20
4
22
31

TABLE 39.—Disposition of Names Under WCCA Responsibility
August 19, 1942 State Department List

on

Number of
persons

Disposition

Total persons from whom WCCA was responsible for obtaining a
352
334
199
135
2
16

TABLE 40.—Type of Form Letter Sent to Residents of Assembly
and Relocation Centers in October, 1942
PERSONS
Form Letter

Total persons.
WCCA Form R-106.
Sent to persons who had formerly submitted Individual Requests for Repatriation. .
WCCA Form R-107. Sent to immediate family of
listed persons.
WCCA Form R-108. Sent to other family group
members who had registered for evacuation with
immediate family (i. e., non-dependent children,
aunts, uncles, in-laws, cousins, etc.).
♦From WRA List-I received October 21, 1942.

Total

Photostat list

Supplement*

2,744

2,690

54

112

87

25

1,994

1,973

21

638

630

8

322

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

REPATRIATION

TABLE

List
No.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

OF

323

JAPANESE

42.—Lists of Japanese Requesting Repatriation Transmitted by
Wartime Civil Control Administration
Date
transmitted
1942

7-31
7-31
7-31
7-31
8-2
8-2
8-2
8-2
8-5
8-5
8-5
8-5
8-6
8-6
8-6
8-6
8-6
8-6
8-13
8-13
8-13
9-12
10-21

Total
individuals

Total
signed
requests*

Total.

2,772

2,086

Fresno.
Merced.
Pomona.
Portland.
Stockton.
Tanforan.
Tulare.
Pomona.
Tanforan.
Tule Lake.
Turlock.
Puyallup.
Manzanar.
Gila River.
Colorado River.
Santa Anita.
Manzanar.
Miscellaneous.
Miscellaneous.
Gila River.
Colorado River.
Miscellaneous.
Miscellaneous.

43
79
77
71
130
61
170
117
128
110
182
309
237
24
170
299
97
15
198
44
79
105
27

36
69
65
55
85
50
119
79
102
98
126
244
189
14
119
220
85
10
152
35
54
67
13

Center

♦Exclusive of persons under age of 18 and interned family members whose names appeared only on
Family Summary Sheets.

M
o

<

PQ

H

149
171
203
123

2,126

0-4.
5-9.
10-14.
15-17.

Total 18 and over.
54

1,601

363

162

lO'OOONiOTfO"t^,NO

1,507

149
171
203
123

co
CO
00

70
93
101
62

54

1,601

320

C*■<
sO

808
646

939

aoONH
OO
*H

326

Japan

Dual

CN On rt< 00 GO
lO CO th

Female

U. S.

XT) 00 v© *h 00 •<*
lOvOOvCO

Male

96

Female

127

Female

127

]

tr)

248

248

Male

FROM

cc
V©
CO
•

THE
WEST

OHCOPOHf^HH . . .
fOH»ONH
...

(NtNONvH(N.
rO •<*
tH
.

(SHOOHHH.
cs cs
.

vH cs (N (N (N VH T-t

. . . .
....

• • tH . . .
.

MO'»OOCS'O»O^00lOH
lOcooOTfTHt^r^rHrot^co
TH

j£ s

co.Jj

p‘o

ONCO-^COCCOCCNVOI^CNIO

S'*

**U. S. born Japanese with no education in Japan are here termed "Nisei”, and those partially or entirely educated in Japan are termed “Kibei”.
data available on place of education of those under 18 years of age.

f

Nisei

EDUCATION, IF U. S. BORN**

EVACUATION

18-19.
20-24.
25-29.
30-34.
35-39.
40-44.
45-49.
50-54.
55-59.
60-64.
65 and over.

646

W

2,772

Both sexes

<

Total all ages.

CO
CITIZENSHIP*

*c3
s

Total under 18.

K
w

TOTAL BY SEX

U

Age Group

JAPANESE

96

19, 1942

w
£
O'
H
P4
pqix

Repatriation as of October

324
COAST

I
l/> T* CN.
.

o

REPATRIATION

OF

325

JAPANESE

AGE, BY SEX AND NATIVITY, OF
2,772 JAPANESE REQUESTING REPATRIATION
(SOURCE : TABLE 43)
AGE

I

1

I

1

I

1

I

1

240 220 200 180

I '

I

160 140

120 100 80

60

U S.BORN

40

20

0

20

40

60

JAPANESE BORN
Figure 29

80

100

326

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

REPATRIATION

OF

327

JAPANESE

NISEI, KIBEI AND ISSEI JAPANESE 18 TO 39
YEARS OF AGE REQUESTING REPATRIATION
PERCENTAGE BY CLASS AND SEX OF TOTAL IN EACH AGE GROUP
TABLE 44-)

PERCENTAGE

OF EACH AGE

GROUP

(^SOURCE

M
18

-

F

M

19

20

NISEI

F
-

M

24

25

I

-

F

M

29

30

KIBEI

Figure 30

F

M

34

35

u
EES

ISSEI

-

CHAPTER XXV
Public Relations Summary

Few public relations problems materialized during the course of the pro¬
gram. This was the case because such problems were kept to a minimum. Early
recognition of the causes from which difficulties of this character might arise
led to the establishment of a Public Relations Division in Wartime Civil Control
Administration as one of its first Divisions.

All public relations activities con¬

cerning civil control functions were governed by Wartime Civil Control Admin¬
istration.
There were two basic policies which governed activities in this field through¬
out the program. The first was the policy of complete frankness. This required
that all news releases be confined to factual statements only.

The second was a

policy of cooperation with press and radio. This required simply that (a) rep¬
resentatives of press and radio be kept fully advised of the background of the
program in advance of publication, and (b) that they be asked to publish only
that factual information which was necessary to the successful accomplishment
of the program. To state it another way, it meant that press and radio should
not be called upon to fill their columns and broadcasts with unimportant or
"manufactured” information. It also involved permitting duly accredited mem¬
bers of the press and radio free access to all phases of evacuation operations.
Appreciating the important position of press and radio in dissemination of
accurate information about the evacuation, the Commanding General, as early
as March 27, 1942, spoke to a large gathering of news men at the San Francisco
Press Club. He explained, "off the record,” the military necessity for the evacu¬
ation, and the program to be followed.
During the week of March 15, 1942, the Director, Wartime Civil Control
Administration, spoke "off the record” to gatherings of newspaper publishers,
editorial executives, and representatives of radio and wire services. Meetings of
this character were arranged at Los Angeles,

San

Francisco,

Portland,

and

Seattle.
The first of these "off the record” appearances occurred at Los Angeles. The
comment of the Chairman, Committee on Public Information, California State
Council of Defense, in a communication to that organization of April 15, 1942.
is quoted here because it is illustrative of how the basic policies worked.
"Through the Wartime Civil Control Administration, * * * the Chairman of your
Committee on Public Information arranged * * * meetings with the press for the un¬
folding of the entire plan of Japanese evacuation as background material for the
handling of the news as it broke,

*

* *.

Rumors were promptly stifled with facts;

a mutuality of confidence and trust between the military and the press worked beau¬
tifully and that relationship—so important to civilian spirit—seems well on its way to
continue through this history-making migration.”
328

PUBLIC

RELATIONS

329

SUMMARY

WCCA NEWS RELEASES CONCERNING
EVACUATION AND ALIEN CONTROL: MARCH-NOVEMBER. 1942

MARCH

APRIL

MAT

JUNE

JULY

AUGUST

SCPTCMKR

OCTOBER

NCVtUWtR

Figure 31
MAGAZINE ARTICLES AND WCCA NEWS RELEASES CONCERNING
EVACUATION AND ALIEN CONTROL: FEBRUARY-NOVEMBER, 1942
30

43

40

35

30

30

IS

WESTERN DEFENSE COWMANO *N0 FOORTN MM
WARTIME OWL «NT*OL AOMWfcTAAUCW

Figure 32

330

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

MAGAZINE ARTICLES AND CIRCULATION CONCERNING
EVACUATION AND ALIEN CONTROL: FEBRUARY-NOVEMBER. 1942

FEBRUARY

MARCH

APRIL

MAY

JUNE

JULY

AUGUST

SEPTEMBER

OCTOBER

NOVEMBER

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND ANO FOURTH ARMY
WARTIME Cm. COWTROl ADMINISTRATOR

Figure 33

PUBLIC

RELATIONS

331

SUMMARY

The basic policy outlined above controlled the continuous relationship with
the press. Confident that the Commanding General was fully appreciative of the
position of the public, the press, wire services, and radio went to unusual lengths
in cooperating.

This relationship resulted in an unusual presentation of facts

to the public. Figures 31, 32 and 33 are illustrative of the ratio between public
information releases and the publication of factual accounts concerning evacu¬
ation. In Figure 3 3 some idea of the circulation is given.
Two distinct types of information were presented. The first was that to the
wire services, the newspapers and the radio. These releases were entirely factual.
Recognizing that the public knowledge of events as they transpired was dependent
upon the radio and press, great care was exercised in the preparation of these
releases.

No attempt was made to control news as it was recognized that a

truthful presentation of events was the most honest control. With this in mind,
each statement issued was edited to the point of stark clarity. Quotations were
carefully considered and were solely informative.
As the result of the printing of factual news by the newspapers of the
country, there developed a sustained interest in the historical and featured phases
of the evacuation. For this, a second type of news service was developed. Maga¬
zines of a wide variety of interest and circulation were serviced upon request
with factual and statistical data as well as features.
As public interest diminished, news releases were shortened to terse state¬
ments reflecting the actual news value of the event recorded.

This diminishing

news interest, by newspapers, resulted in a partial control of the sustained pub¬
lic interest exhibited by the magazines. A study of the above-mentioned Figures
will show that this method of handling news releases shortened public discussion
on the evacuation.
There was never an attempt to develop news, but only to present actual
happenings at their news value. The charts reflect this practice by showing the
relationship between sustained public interest and news releases.
During the actual evacuation operations magazines of large circulation
which have "spot news” interest in outstanding events carried featured articles
relating to the evacuation. The result was that public discussion of the event
reached a circulation of more than nine million magazine readers during the
month of March. As the "spot news” value diminished, magazines with smaller
specialized circulation picked up the feature angles of the evacuation for pre¬
sentation to their readers. In consequence of this trend the number of national
articles increased while the circulation diminished.
Prime interest shown by the magazines in the evacuation was in the first
stage—that of actual evacuation to Assembly Centers, though naturally because
of the interim between observation and publication, a large number of magazine
and periodical articles continued to be issued months after the actual evacuation
was completed. During the second stage of transfer to War Relocation Author¬
ity Centers both news stories and magazine circulation diminished. By that time
public knowledge of the event had destroyed much of the novelty.

332

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

PUBLIC RELATIONS DIVISION
ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

Figure 34

PUBLIC

RELATIONS

SUMMARY

333

However, there is a continuing interest in the evacuation evidenced by cer¬
tain groups that have reported their intention of further studying the historical,
sociological and economic phases of the evacuation.
The organization chart of the Public Relations Division of Wartime Civil
Control Administration best illustrates the method employed in dealing with the
requirements in the field.

(See figure 34).

Most important to the operation was the establishment of a press relations
representative at each assembly center.

In this manner, all accredited press and

radio representatives, as well as writers, were accorded an opportunity for personal
service. Whenever a visiting writer or reporter called at a Center he was re¬
ferred at once to the press relations representative for that Center.

He was

furnished with whatever information he required and arrangements were made
for escorting him through the entire facility.
The press relations representative at each Assembly Center was normally an
active or former editorial executive or newspaper publisher. As a professional news
executive he was thus thoroughly familiar with all aspects of his assignment.
The basic policy which governed his relations was the “no censorship” rule.
Recognized representatives of publications and of the radio could visit any
Assembly Center, interview evacuees, take photographs, and ask for any in¬
formation desired. A full explanation of the background of evacuation and the
military necessity therefor was given each visitor by the press relations representa¬
tive. Stressed by him always was the necessity for a completely factual report by
every writer. The point was made that any other action on the part of a writer
might have serious effect upon the treatment of our own nationals in the hands
of the enemy. With but a few exceptions there was no misinterpretation re¬
ported in any newspaper, periodical, or domestic broadcast.
It must be here recorded that the cooperation, assistance, and sympathetic
understanding of press and radio was outstanding. Without it, the evacuation
problem would have been more complex, for the operation was dependent in
no small degree upon the immediate and complete dissemination of factual data
and instructions to all those affected.

CHAPTER XXVI
Inspection of Wartime Civil Control
Administration Operations
One of the important considerations in providing for adequate direction of
the evacuation program was the establishment of a means to insure that the
Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration was currently and accurately
advised on all aspects.

Accordingly, plans were developed and executed for

a constant and reliable field inspection service.
The Inspection Branch of the Wartime Civil Control Administration was
organized March 29, 1942. Its mission was to keep the Director informed of
the progress of all operations of the Wartime Civil Control Administration to
determine whether these operations conformed to established policies and direc¬
tives. The Chief of the Branch reported to the Director and was responsible to
him. Three officers of field grade were selected to perform these functions. One
was assigned as Chief of the Branch and two as field inspectors.

Careful con¬

sideration was given to their backgrounds and experience in the establishment,
operation

and

supply of Army

Field

Training

and

Civilian

Conservation

Corps camps.
On April 1, 1942, after receipt of instructions on the evacuation plan, the
field inspectors were dispatched to observe evacuation activities already in
process. Close liaison was maintained by telephone with Wartime Civil Control
Administration

as

they

visited

information

centers.

Control

Stations, and

Assembly and Reception Centers. The information reported was evaluated and
transmitted to the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, and by him
to the interested division heads with appropriate instructions for institution of
any necessary corrective action.

These reports, where applicable to functions

of the several Sectors of Western Defense Command were also furnished to the
liaison officers from each Sector. Where departures from the prescribed operating
procedures were noted, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs issued
appropriate directives in the name of the Commanding General for corrective
action on the part of the Sectors concerned. Where pertinent, the Director also
furnished copies of inspection reports with requests for remedial action to the
liaison section of the participating Federal Civilian Agencies.
Inspection forms and check lists were developed as guides to insure that all
phases of the program were fully inspected. Field inspectors were encouraged to
maintain a continuous vigilance for trends that might indicate a source of
future trouble. They were instructed to make free use of telephone, teletype,
telegraph and airmail facilities in reporting conditions so that any required
corrective action could be taken immediately.
The establishment of a thorough inspection service proved to be of in334

INSPECTION

OF

335

OPERATIONS

estimable value. It insured uniformity, prevented abuses of discretion and tended
to check the circulation of unfounded rumors.
It has been noted that Wartime Civil Control Administration Service Centers
were established in 48 communities along the West Coast to assist evacuees in
accomplishing a voluntary relocation plan.

Each Service Center was the chief

source of information available to the evacuee in the community it served.

An

important function was involved. Accordingly, field inspection was immediately
extended to these Centers.
At each of these Service Centers information was gathered on all aspects
of its operations. Of course the demeanor, attitude, efficiency and attendance
of the staff was carefully observed. Uniformly reported as well were the location
of the Service Center in relation to Control Stations; its accessibility to the
people affected; the means employed to make known its location; the hours and
days of the week each Service Center remained open; the presence of an inter¬
preter; the status of liaison with Sector representatives, including the Sector
Provost Marshal.
At each Civil Control Station an inspection was made of the following:
Its location, its adequacy to service the area being evacuated, the number of
persons being processed, and the density of traffic within the area. Also care¬
fully observed were the efficiency of Control Station personnel and equipment;
internal coordination and dissemination of information; liaison between the
Sector Transportation Officer and Control Station Manager regarding time of
departure of trains and buses; the adequacy of the period allotted for assignment
of evacuees to transportation; sufficiency of time for processing; efficiency of
loading; liaison with the Manager of Assembly Center at point of destination,
and the appropriateness of time of arrival at Assembly Center.
While at Control Stations, the field inspectors investigated the adequacy of
medical aid and social welfare services during processing and while en route.
They also reported on the adequacy of the arrangements being made for trans¬
porting evacuees from each assembly point to point of entrainment. Uniformly
observed also were: the disposition of private automobiles used by evacuees
to reach the assembly point, the adequacy of Control Station records, the precau¬
tions taken to insure that family groups remained intact, the provisions made
for transportation and storage of personal property of evacuees, and the arrange¬
ments for medical and hospital service for those persons too ill to travel and
whose evacuation was therefore deferred.
Assembly Center inspection was constant and thorough.

Inspectors were

accorded full freedom of action and were directed to spare no effort in devel¬
oping an adequate report. The attitude, efficiency and demeanor of administra¬
tive and interior security personnel was the subject of careful observation.
Evacuees were freely interviewed and their complaints investigated. Any de¬
partures in operative and administrative practices from those prescribed by the
Wartime Civil Control Administration manual were noted,

and corrective

measures followed.

They inspected the warehouses for efficiency, security, fire

protection, records.

Quantities of stock on hand were reported. Special atten¬

tion was given to the promptness with which supplies and rations were being

336

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

received and distributed at each Center.
each mess hall and kitchen.

THE

WEST

COAST

A detailed inspection was made of

The prescribed inspection guide required the

answering of eighty-five separate questions covering management, operation,
the quality, variety, and sufficiency of food, sanitation, cost, waste, and special
foods for the infants, ill and aged.

A similar inspection was made of each

infirmary. At infirmaries and hospitals, 107 special questions were posed. These
covered'organization, personnel, records, ward rules, the treatment of patients,
the method of handling alcohol, narcotics and poisons, and the ability and
helpfulness of doctors, dentists, nurses, dietitians and cooperating Public Health
representatives.

Particular attention was directed to special diets for the sick,

and fire protection. Any complaints made by patients were investigated.
The general condition of each Assembly Center was thoroughly studied.
Questions uniformly answered by inspectors in their reports were on the sub¬
jects of health and sanitation, water supply, sewerage, baths, latrines, laundries,
lighting, heating and ventilation, condition of quarters, clothing and bedding.
Welfare conditions were investigated, including facilities for recreation, educaton and religious worship, postal facilities and camp stores. Inspectors mingled
freely with evacuees and transmitted to proper authorities any complaint against
the civilian staff or the interior or exterior police.
When Relocation Centers were ready for occupancy, field inspectors ac¬
companied movements of evacuees from the Assembly Centers of origin to the
Relocation Centers of destination. They were present to observe the adequacy
of entrainment arrangements and to see that facilities were adequate for health
and welfare. They also reported on the propriety of arrangements for each
movement, including the question whether dining car and rail service were
satisfactory.
Numerous special investigations were made on complaints received at Head¬
quarters, Western Defense Command, and the War Department as well as by
the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration. Most of these complaints
were from interested citizens and observers.

In a majority of instances they

were presented in utmost good faith but were based on misinformation and
rumor.

The inspection service made a valuable contribution in this regard for

these inquiries were fully and satisfactorily answered.

PART VIII
STATISTICAL AND FISCAL SUMMARY

CHAPTER XXVII
Fiscal Summary
Introduction.

The scope of the West Coast evacuation, its urgency as a

military necessity, the number of agencies involved, and the geographical size
of the area in which simultaneous operations were being carried out, presented
an unusual problem in finance.
Executive Order of the President No. 9066 authorized and directed that
all Executive Departments, independent establishments and other federal agen¬
cies, were to assist the Secretary of War, or the Military Commander, in carry¬
ing out this Executive Order, "including the furnishing of medical aid, hospital¬
ization, food, clothing, transportation, use of land, shelter, and other supplies,
equipment, utilities, facilities, and services.”

As it was the decision of the Com¬

manding General to utilize to the fullest extent various federal agencies in
accomplishing evacuation, it was necessary to devise some flexible method of
promptly financing the various agencies in order that their operations might
not be impaired.
On March 10, 1942, the division of Central Administrative Services, Office
for Emergency Management, offered to perform specific services in office man¬
agement, personnel management, and fiscal processes for the Wartime Civil
Control Administration, and this offer was accepted on March 12, 1942.

In

the initial plan for the organization of the Wartime Civil Control Administra¬
tion, it was contemplated that all fiscal affairs would be handled by the Office
for Emergency Management, under the direction of the Wartime Civil Control
Administration.

It soon became apparent, however, that this plan was imprac¬

ticable because of differences in the fiscal procedures of the various agencies,
and the military problems of supply and finance.

This led to the establishment

of a Fiscal Branch in the Wartime Civil Control Administration, charged with
the duties of providing fiscal procedures and liaison between the Army and the
various co-operating civilian agencies.
In order for the newly established Fiscal Branch to operate efficiently contin¬
uing liaison between the Finance Officer, Western

Defense

Command

and

Fourth Army, as a member of the Commanding General’s special staff, and the
Wartime Civil Control Administration, was needed.

This resulted in a request

upon the Finance. Officer, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, to
detail an officer of the Finance Department to effect the necessary liaison.

An

experienced Finance Officer of field grade was accordingly detailed by the
Finance Officer to fulfill the fiscal requisites of Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬
tration.

Civilian personnel were hired and trained to carry out the functions

of the Fiscal Branch, and a set of fiscal records supplementary and comple¬
mentary to those of the Finance Officer, Western Defense Command and
Fourth Army, was devised.

Vouchers originating from Army sources and sent

to the Wartime Civil Control Administration for action were processed and
passed for payment by the Fiscal Branch.
339

Copies of paid vouchers emanating

340

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

from the several co-operating civilian agencies were received and recorded for
purposes of fiscal control and record. A manual, titled "Fiscal Guide,” was
prepared and distributed to those concerned, setting forth the financial pro¬
cedure to be followed by agencies performing services for the Wartime Civil
Control Administration.
Fiscal Operations by Army Agencies.

A study of the proposed finan¬

cial plan revealed that no funds had been distinctly set aside to cover evacuation
costs. Broad power existed to use and, if necessary, to over-obligate any funds
held in an allotted status by the Commanding General. It was ascertained that
the only allotted status funds available were, in general, limited to use for tacti¬
cal field operations and therefore were obviously unsuited for the evacuation
program. This situation was brought to the attention of the War Department
and the recommendation made that allotments be issued to cover general pur¬
poses which could be forseen in the tremendous task of evacuating over 115,000
people.
Expenses were anticipated to fall in the general classification of (1) travel,
(2) subsistence, (3) clothing, (4) communications, (5) shelter and utilities,
(6) transportation, (7) pay of civilian employees, (8) pay for work done by
evacuees, (9) contingencies, (10) incidental expenses, (11) medical and hos¬
pital expenses, (12) regular supplies, (13) cemeterial expenses, (14) equipment,
and (15) printing and binding. As the projected evacuation operations had
no precedent, no definite financial requirements could be associated with any of
the general purposes. It was hoped that token allotments would be made in
order to establish procurement authority and appropriation identification, and
that such token allotments would be replenished as obligations were incurred.
The foregoing recommendations met favorable reception in the War Depart¬
ment shortly after the passage by Congress of the Fifth Supplemental National
Defense Appropriation Act, 1942. This Act permitted consolidation of several
Quartermaster Corps appropriations into one general appropriation known as
Quartermaster Service Army. This consolidation resulted in reducing the
number of separate general fund purposes set forth above by half. Subsequent
combination of Quartermaster Service, Army, and Supplies and Transportation,
Army, tended to further simplify use of Army funds.
Upon passage of the Military Appropriation Act of 1943 the transfer to
open allotments of travel, transportation, commutation of subsistence and ceme¬
terial expenses was authorized. This not only facilitated use of those funds but
provided more flexibility and less restrictions on funds in an allotted status.
Likewise, a definite contribution toward simplification of fiscal accounting was
provided when

the War

Department

allotted

the

Commanding

General

$1,500,000, under the general authority FDGA-13, to be used for all purposes
of civil control, in lieu of the five different allotments previously utilized. The
schedule of funds allotted to November 30, 1942, by the War Department to

FISCAL

341

SUMMARY

the Commanding General, for direct obligation or sub-allotment and disburse¬
ment through Army channels is shown below:
COMMANDING GENERAL’S ACCOUNT
As of November 30, 1942

Total
Obligated

Total
Available
for Obligation
or Return

Supplies and Transp., Army QM D-l. . $4,411,199.81
Finance Service, Army FDGA-13.... 1,251,308.73
Signal Service, Army SC 6121.
105,058.59
148,140.82
Med. and Hosp. Dept., Army MD 1612
Engineer Service, Army Eng. 30109...
41,297.03

$4,479,350.69
436,145.61
105,058.59
148,140.82
41,297.03

$ 68,150.88
815,163.12
.00
.00
.00

$5,957,004.98

$5,209,992.74

$747,012.24

Amount
Allotted

Finance

Officer,

Western

Defense

Command

and

Fourth

Army.

Funds allotted by the War Department for use by the Commanding General
in the evacuation program were disbursed through or suballotted by the Finance
Office, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army.

Reimbursements made

to Federal Agencies as detailed later in this report were:
Federal Reserve Bank—All operating expenses and services.$310,215.90
Federal Reserve Bank—Automobile Purchases . 258,842.35
Farm Security Administration—All operating expenses and services. 226,857-53
$795,915.78
Other disbursements through Army channels were:
FINANCE OFFICER
WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
As of November 30, 1942
C. G. 9th Corps Area (9th S. C.).$ 111,522.26
C. G. So. Calif. Sector .
22,921.62
C. G. No. Calif. Sector .
112,396.63
C. G. Northwest Sector .
11,506.64
C. G. Alaska Defense Command .
119.05
C. G. So. Land Frontier .
3,126.77
C. O. Calif. QM. Depot, Oakland . 3,198,261.33
C. O. QM. Depot, Seattle .
356,806.72
C. O. QM. Depot, Kansas City .
11,470.94
C. O. QM. Depot, Memphis .
55,833.46
QM. W. D. C. and 4A ..
248,127.34
Med. Supply Off., S. F. Gen. Depot.
147,961.82
Sig. Off. Forward Ech. 9 th S. C.
19,155.11
Sig. Off. 9th Serv. Com.
1,212.48
S. F. Signal Procurement District .
91,104.28
Engineer Service, Army .
35,858.99
$4,427,3 85.44

342

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

The obligated funds reported in the Commanding General’s Account above,
viz., $5,209,992.74, was the source from which these accounts were paid.

The

difference, viz., $13,308.48, was from open allotment accounts.
Fiscal Operations of Civilian Agencies.

Throughout the course of the

program of civil control and evacuation, several civilian government agencies
performed assigned functions in cooperation with the Western Defense Com¬
mand and Fourth Army.

Not all of these agencies required financing of their

respective functions in the program.
In the preliminary days of the program, the cooperating civilian agencies
(referred to simply as agencies hereafter) used their own funds, and looked to
the Commanding General, for reimbursement.

The reimbursement procedure

was in accordance with provisions of Army Regulations 35-880 and General
Accounting Office Regulations No. 78-Revised.

Each reimbursement voucher

submitted required detail of an exacting nature, virtually a verbatim reproduc¬
tion of the data carried on the original disbursing voucher of the agency.

Such

detail was necessary in order that the purpose of the expenditure could be
reconciled with the serial, purpose, and appropriation numbers used in Army
accounting.

These constitute the necessary allotment number that must be

determined and stated on reimbursement vouchers prior to settlement by the
designated Army disbursing officer.

Alphabetical and numerical indices were

evolved to enable inexperienced personnel to reconcile the supplies and services
stated on the reimbursement voucher with the applicable allotment number in
the Army Accounting system.

Upon completion of the classification into

Army accounting terms, the reimbursement vouchers were ready for recording
and payment from funds available to Commanding General.

The recording of

these vouchers required a more detailed system of accounting than was necessary
in Army fiscal accounting. It was necessary for Wartime Civil Control Admin¬
istration to establish fund control ledgers for each allotment number available
to the Commanding General.

Ledgers were also required for each agency.

It developed, during the course of the evacuation, that the "1080” process1
of reimbursing agencies as outlined in Army Regulations 35-880 was cumber¬
some and not entirely suitable. To remedy this, the system of making advance
or anticipatory transfers of Army funds in Washington, D. C., to the partici¬
pating agencies was put into effect.

The agencies were required to submit a

quarterly estimate of their needs to Wartime Civil Control Administration.
Upon approval, a request for funds based on these estimates was teletyped to
Commanding General, Service of Supply, Washington, D. C.

This procedure

was used to finance all agencies except the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
and the Farm Security Administration.
Advance transfers of Army funds in Washington, D. C., to agencies, and
their respective obligations, expenditures and unobligated balances on November
30, 1942, were as follows:
^ee Glossary (W. D. Form

1080).

FISCAL

343

SUMMARY

WASHINGTON TRANSFERS
As of November 30, 1942
Total

Total

Total

Unobligated

Allotted

Obligated

Expended

Balance

OEM (WCCA—All Administrative Costs) .. $1,746,436.00

$

986,162.26

$

830,584.52

$

760,273.74

617,232.00

532,714.93

436,226.85

84,517.07

5,398,582.00

3,788,231.04

3,054,925.46

1,610,350.96

826,603.30

684,578.08

516,320.89

142,025.22

$8,588,853.30

$5,991,686.31

$4,838,057.72

$2,597,166.99

Federal Security Agency
Federal Works Agency—
WPA Working Fund.
Revolving Fund:
Allotted

$250,000.00

Collections

576,603.30

Agencies financed by "1034”2 and "1080” processes from funds allotted by
the War Department to the Commanding General, and included in the Com¬
manding General’s Account, were the Federal Reserve Bank, and the operating
expenses of the Farm Security Administration. The details of these accounts are
shown under the respective agencies.
Central
ment.

Administrative

Services—Office

for Emergency Manage¬

The Office for Emergency Management was originally charged solely

with the duty of servicing the operating needs of Wartime Civil Control Ad¬
ministration.

This involved the hire and pay of personnel, procurement and

payment of supplies and services, travel of individuals, and many other services.
It was found that because of the speed with which Office for Emergency
Management acted and the flexibility of its organization, it was advantageous
to utilize this agency for performing various emergency projects.
In the early stages of evacuation, no funds were readily available to finance
the activities required of Office for Emergency Management.

As an emergency

measure there was advanced to this agency, by Washington transfer, the lump
sum of $3 50,000.00 from the Appropriation Pay of the Army, 1942.

This

amount was later augmented from Army funds in an allotted status by transfers
in amounts of $371,436.00, $75,000.00 and $950,000.00 for a total of $1,746,436.00.
Control of funds at the outset of the program was maintained through a
monthly reporting method.

The Office for Emergency Management furnished

the Wartime Civil Control Administration a copy of its monthly allotment
ledger.
Control

This was reconciled with the control ledger kept by Wartime Civil
Administration.

When

the

substantial

sum

of

$950,000.00

was

advanced, a system requiring the Office for Emergency Management to submit
all prospective purchases of supplies and services for approval prior to obligation
and payment was put into effect. Under this system a budget control showing
all obligations and expenditures was kept by Wartime Civil Control Ad¬
ministration.
2See Glossary (W. D. Form 1034).

344

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

The record of expenditures by this agency on November 30, 1942, was as
follows:
OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT
EXPENDITURES
As of November 30, 1942
Payrolls

.$548,736.86

Supplies and Equipment . 102,921.15
Printing

.

78,212.26

Transportation of Things .
All Other (Contractual)
Travel

3,393.40

.

23,858.44

.

Communications

17,908.99

.

26,114.41

Rents, Utilities, etc.

29,439.01
$830,584.52

Federal Security Agency.

This agency, through its component agencies,

United States Public Health Service, Social Security Board, Defense Health and
Welfare Service and United States Employment Service, was, by a confirming
letter from the Commanding General under date of March 31, 1942, assigned
*

the task of: Providing services of civilian physicians and nurses; hospitalization
and ambulance service; aid and miscellaneous assistance expenditures at Control
Stations, Reception Centers and in the field; social service involving direct aid;
and operation of Control Stations.
Total funds advanced to finance operations of Federal Security Agency were
$617,232.00. Control of these funds was maintained by Wartime Civil Control
Administration by means of review of copies of paid vouchers submitted for
that purpose. A set of control books was kept by Wartime Civil Control Admin¬
istration as a further check.
The record of expenditures by this agency on November 3 0, 1942, was
as follows:
FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY ACCOUNT
EXPENDITURES
As of November 30, 1942
Payrolls

.$148,921.63

Supplies and Equipment. 227,170.52
Clothing

.

Transportation of Things

3,021.40

.

17775.75

.

24,227.91

All Others
Travel

7,750.96

.

Communications

.

6,072.92

Rents, Utilities, etc.

1,285.76
$436,226.85

Federal Works

Agency — Work Projects

Administration.

This

agency was requested, by a confirming letter from the Commanding General,
dated March 30, 1942, to assume responsibility for providing personnel to man¬
age and operate Assembly and Reception Centers established within the Western
Defense Command area.

It was also requested to make its fiscal and procure¬

ment facilities available.
Due to the absence of suitable fiscal arrangements at the outset of the evacu-

FISCAL

345

SUMMARY

ation it was necessary to have Work Projects Administration pay expenses in¬
curred from its own funds and to be reimbursed later by use of Standard Form
1080, providing for inter-agency adjustments.

Upon presentation of its first

budget, covering anticipated expenses of early months of operation, and after
proper approval, a request was made upon the War Department to transfer
the necessary funds to Federal Works Agency-Work Projects Administration for
obligation and disbursement through its normal channels.

Subsequent advances

of funds were handled in the same manner.
Funds advanced to Federal Works Agency-Work Projects Administration
for management and operation of Reception and Assembly Centers totaled
$5,398,582.00, of which, on November 30, 1942, there was an unobligated
balance of $1,367,711.31. The balance remaining after all outstanding accounts
are processed and paid will be somewhat less.

Control and supervision of funds advanced to this agency were maintained
by the requirement that it supply Wartime Civil Control Administration with
copies of all paid vouchers immediately upon payment thereof. These copies of
vouchers were reviewed and, if payments evidenced thereby were questionable or
irrelevant to the purpose for which funds were advanced, were either (1) referred
back to the agency for clarification, or (2) if necessary, a request was submitted
for reimbursement of War Department funds.
There was advanced the further sum of $250,000.00 to operate Center
stores.

The Center store funds were put into a revolving fund with provisions

that, upon closing of Centers, the funds advanced would be deposited back to
the appropriation from which advanced, and, that the operating profit would
be deposited to Miscellaneous Receipts, Treasury of the United States.

On

November 30, 1942, the records in the office of Wartime Civil Control Admin¬
istration disclosed the following:
WORK PROJECTS ADMINISTRATION CENTER STORE REVOLVING FUND
Total funds advanced .$250,000.00
Received from sales . 576,603.30

Total funds .$826,603.30
Less Obligations. 684,578.08
Book profits .$142,025.22

Expenditures from the working fund account by objective classification
e:

WORK PROJECTS ADMINISTRATION ACCOUNT
EXPENDITURES
As of November 30, 1942
Payrolls

.$1,735,211.32

Supplies and Equipment
Clothing

.

354,762.06

.

156,158.21

Transportation of Things .
All Others

Travel

.

.

Communications

40,506.99
314,263.82
72,961.04

.

6,989.00

Rents, Construction, etc.

374,073.02
$3,054,925.46

346

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Expenditures from the working fund account, by individual Assembly Cen¬
ters were:
WORK PROJECTS ADMINISTRATION ACCOUNT
EXPENDITURES BY ASSEMBLY CENTER
As of November 30, 1942
Office
No.

Location

50

Central Office .$

257,583.26

1

Marysville

.

2

Sacramento

37,119.27

3

Stockton

4

Turlock

.

98,171.87

5

Merced

.

188,862.77

.

.

56,660.93
152,524.30

6

Pinedale

.

98,135.68

7

Fresno

.

221,268.70

8

Tulare

.

9

Tanforan

10

Salinas

16

Santa

.

144,671.80
260,466.48

.
Anita

50,276.17

.

663,592.00

.

225,990.26

.

187,144.17

17

Pomona

18

Manzanar

21

Mayer (Arizona)

22

Cave Creek

26

Puyallup

27

Toppenish (Washington)

31

Portland

.

(Arizona)

6,948.42

.

4,022.05

.

210,993.61

(Oregon)

.

6,111.20

.

184,382.52
$3,054,925.46

Federal Reserve Bank, as Fiscal Agent of the United States.

To the

Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco was delegated the task of evacuee prop¬
erty protection.

By letters of the Commanding General dated March 11 and

April 5, 1942, and telegrams from the Secretary of the Treasury of March 7
and 11 1942, prior informal arrangements were confirmed.

These delegations

of authority provided that the Bank would be reimbursed for all necessary
and proper expenses incurred in carrying out its assigned duties.
In all instances the Bank paid all expenses from its own funds.

Upon sub¬

mission of receipted copies of bills or other satisfactory evidences of disburse¬
ment, reimbursement from Army funds followed. The use of Standard Form
1034, public voucher for purchases and services other than personal, was the
method employed.
There were 1,512 cars purchased by the Bank on behalf of the Government
at a total cost (purchase price of vehicles only) of $258,842.35.
penses incurred for all other purposes aggregated $310,215.90.

Total ex¬

FISCAL

347

SUMMARY

The record of expenditures by this agency on November 30, 1942, was as
follows:
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK ACCOUNT
EXPENDITURES
As of November 30, 1942
Payrolls

.$208,156.37

Supplies and Equipment .
Transportation of Things .
All Others
Travel

3,953.29
22,631.44

.

9,913.26

.

15,928.55

Communications

.

7,659.57

Rents, Utilities, etc.

41,973.42

Total Administrative Expenditures .$310,215.90
Expenditures to purchasing of Evacuees’ Automobiles.. 258,842.35
$569,058.25

Department

of Agriculture—Farm Security

letter of March 14, 1942, the

Commanding

Administration.

General

authorized

the

By
Farm

Security Administration to institute and administer a program to insure that
growing crops on farm lands evacuated by Japanese were cared for and har¬
vested, and to assist evacuees in arriving at fair and equitable arrangements
with the operators of their properties.
To provide funds for loan to substitute operators of evacuated lands and
advance transfer, in Washington, D. C., of $1,000,000.00 was made to the
Farm Security Administration from Contingent Fund, Chief of Staff, Army,
1942.

Later, when this amount was exhausted, an advance transfer of $5,000,-

000.00 was made from the President’s Emergency Fund.

The $5,000,000.00

fund was later reduced to $3,984,525.00 by decrease effected in Washington,
D. C., thereby leaving a total advanced from both sources of $4,984,525.00.
Total loans made under this crop loan program amount to $4,146,036.31. The
status of this account on November 30, 1942, was as follows:
FARM SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
CROP LOAN FUNDS
(From Washington Transfers)
As of November 30, 1942
Total
Allotted

Total

Total

Unobligated

Wash. Trans.

Obligated

Expended

Balance

Department of Agri¬
culture, Farm Security
Agency FD 4127. .

$1,000,000.00

$

992,597.40

$

992,597.40

$

7,402.60

President’s
Fund

. .

3,984,525.00

3,153,438.91

3,153,438.91

831,086.09

$4,984,525.00

$4,146,036.31

$4,146,036.31

$838,488.69

Credited repayments on loans to January 31, 1943, were $1,724,075.21,
or 41.6 percent of the total loaned.
Up to September 30, 1942, administrative expenses incident to this program,
totaling $226,857.53, were paid by use of Standard Form 1034 and by reim-

348

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST COAST

bursement on Form 1080 from funds allotted to the Commanding General,
as follows:
FARM SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES
(From Commanding General’s Account)
As of November 30, 1942
Payrolls .$145,630.51
Supplies and Equipment .

3,634.66

Transportation of Things .

369.61

All Others .

984.45

Travel .

68,491.46

Communications.

7,683.84

Rents, Utilities, etc.

63.00
$226,857.53

Since September 30, 1942, administrative costs have been charged to the
funds advanced from President’s Emergency Fund.
Wartime Civil Control Administration Consolidated Account.

The

consolidated statement of administrative and operational expenditures (exclud¬
ing construction, travel and subsistence)

made

by

Wartime

Civil

Control

Administration up to November 30, 1942, is as follows:
WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
CONSOLIDATED ACCOUNT
As of November 30, 1942

Army

Total

Total

T otal

Allotted

Obligated

Expended

.$5,957,004.98

$5,209,992.74

U nobligated
Balance

$5,209,992.74 $

747,012.24

(Including Federal
Reserve Bank, Farm
Security Administration
Cleared through Army
Disbursing Office)
OEM (WCCA Adminis¬
trative Cost)

. 1,746,436.00

986,162.26

830,584.52

760,273.74

617,232.00

532,714.93

436,226.85

84,517.07

Working Fund . 5,398,582.00

3,788,231.04

3,054,925.46

1,610,350.96

684,578.08

516,320.89

142,025.22

4,146,036.31*

838,488.69

Federal Security Agency.
Federal W orks Agency—WP A

Revolving Fund:
Allotted

$250,000.00

Collections 576,603.30

826,603.30

Department of Agriculture—FSA (Crop Loans)
FD 4127 $1,000,000.00
President’s
Fund

3,984,525.00

4,984,525.00

4,146,036.31*

$19,530,383.28 $ 15,347,71 5.36 $ 14,221,086.77 $4,182,667.92
$4,144,034.31

loam made, 41.4% had

been

repaid by January 31,

1943.

FISCAL

Additional Costs.

349

SUMMARY

In addition to the expenditures recorded in the books

maintained by the Wartime Civil Control Administration, other costs in con¬
nection with the evacuation have been reported as follows:
QUARTERMASTER EXPENDITURES
QM Property—War Relocation Projects .$2,993,714.84

Transportation—Depots to WCCA Centers

.

43,428.49

Tansportation—Centers and Depots to WRA Projects.

153,473.48

Transferring QM Property from Centers to other points.

5,773.88

Transportation—Rations—Depots to Centers .

7,736.23

Transportation—Rations—Depots to Projects .

26,551.31

Rail Transportation—Evacuees to Assembly and Relocation
Centers with escort .
Freight Shipments

(Baggage)

2,281,976.14

.

104,549.94

Evacuee Subsistence enroute .

517,213.73
$6,134,418.04

UNITED STATES ENGINEERS CONSTRUCTION COSTS
As of November 30, 1942
ASSEMBLY CENTERS
Posted Costs
Cave Creek

.$

Mayer

.

Fresno

.

Marysville
Merced

9,974.87

Estimated Cost
$

9,974.87

12,030.13

12,030.13

611,546.00

613,029.00

.

364,889.00

364,889.00

.

583,926.00

601,359.00

Pinedale

.

696,341.00

708,498.00

Pomona

.

963,744.00

978,514.00

Portland

.

235,308.00

350,000.00

514,183.00

514,183.00

Sacramento .

821,682.00

822,966.00

Salinas

.

585,967.00

589,967.00

Santa Anita .

2,335,505.00

2,452,154.00

Puyallup

.

Stockton .
Tanforan

.

Toppenish
Tulare
Turlock

475,314.00

476,815.00

1,147,216.00

1,147,260.00

.

47,018.00

47,018.00

.

541,690.00

543,160.00

.

468,349.00

469,819.00

$10,414,683.00

$10,701,636.00

Although the cost of constructing Assembly Centers has been included in
the cost of evacuation, consideration should be given to the fact that, upon
vacancy, each Center was taken over by other Army agencies for use in con¬
nection with troop training and housing.
and as service schools.

These are now in use for billeting

350

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

RELOCATION PROJECTS
Posted Costs
Central Utah (Abraham)

. . . _$ 3,512,877.00

Estimated Cost
$ 3,928,917.00

. _

8,016,575.00

9,365,203.00

. _

4,723,089.00

7,559,702.00

. _

Colorado

River

Gila River

4,091,373.24

4,200,235.81

. _

5,059,854.00

5,094,700.00

. _

4,703,347.00

5,003,014.00

Manzanar

. _

3,507,018.00

3,763,646.00

Minidoka

. _

5,199,577.00

5,837,379.00

Granada
Heart

Mountain

Jerome

Rohwer

.

Tule Lake

4,804,121.00

. _

6,908,236.00

6,925,721.00

$50,522,504.24

$56,482,638.81

No attempt has been made to compile payments made from open allotments
covering salaries and travel expenses of military personnel performing duty in
connection with the evacuation.
Attention is directed to the fact that at the date of this report, all bills
had not yet been processed and paid.

For that reason all accounts reported

herein are subject to additional entries before final fiscal accounting is made.
For present purposes, however, the total amount expended by the Army
for activities relating to the evacuation program can be summarized as follows:

TOTAL COSTS
As of November 30, 1942
Federal Reserve Bank—(All evacuee services)

.$

310,215.90

Federal Reserve Bank—Automobile Purchases .

258,842.35

Farm Security Administration—(All evacuee services)

226,857.53

Farm Security Administration—Crop Loan Account

.
.

Office For Emergency Management .
Federal Security Agency .
Federal Works Agency—Working Fund

.

4,146,036.31*
986,162.26
532,714.93
3,788,231.04

Federal Works Agency—Revolving Fund .

684,578.08

Finance Officer, WDC and 4A.

4,427,385.44

Quartermaster

6,134,418.04

.

U. S. Engineers—Assembly Centers

. 10,701,636.00

U. S. Engineers—Relocation Projects

. 56,482,638.81

$88,679,716.69
’Thu lum will be returned in substantial part. 41.6% was repaid by January 31, 1943.

FISCAL

351

SUMMARY

It is noted that, after deducting from the above total the estimated salvage
values, expected refunds and construction costs, viz.,
Automobile Salvage 50% .$
Crop Loans

80%

.

129,421.17
3,316,829.05

Estimated Interest on Crop Loans .

10,000.00

Equipment from OEM Purchases

.

15,000.00

Federal Works Agency—Revolving Fund .

684,578.08

Estimated Profits—FWA Revolving Fund .

142,025.22

QM Property—War Relocation Projects .

2,993,714.84

U. S. Engineers—Assembly Centers . 10,701,63 6.00
U. S. Engineers—Relocation Projects . 56,482,638.81
$74,475,843.17

there remains a net cost of $14,203,873.52.
This sum includes the following major phases of the program:

General

operations costs for the entire period; cost incurred by Wartime Civil Control
Administration Service Center offices during the entire period; financial assistance
to evacuees who voluntarily migrated from the area before the controlled evacua¬
tion phase of the program; registration and processing costs at Civil Control
Stations; storage of evacuee property, and all other aspects of the property pro¬
tection program; hospitalization and medical care of all evacuees from the date of
their evacuation; transportation of evacuees and their personal effects from their
homes to Assembly Centers; complete care in Assembly Centers, including all
food and medical care, nominal payment for work performed, family allowances,
and clothes, where necessary; and transportation and meals during the transfer
from Assembly to Relocation Centers.
The evacuees spent a total of 9,485,202 evacuee-days of residence in Assembly
Centers.

In addition, it is estimated that 294,000 evacuee-days were spent on

trains or other means of transportation from their homes to Assembly Centers
and from Assembly to Relocation Centers. The overall net cost of the program
as described in the preceding paragraph per evacuee-day in Assembly Centers,
en route thereto and therefrom was $1.46.

CHAPTER XXVIII
Statistical Summary
Statistical information, primarily that relating to the Japanese population,
was important in every phase of the evacuation program.

Various statistics

have been presented in earlier chapters of this report. The present chapter sum¬
marizes the evacuee and general population data of the program. It is organized
in the following general sections:
1.

Data on evacuation movements from Civil Control Stations and other

origins to Assembly Centers.
2.

Data on population movements during the operation of Assembly

Centers.
3.

Transfer movements from Assembly to Relocation Centers.

4.

General population data from both Census and evacuation program

sources.
No attempt is made in this report to give a general statistical analysis of
the Japanese population of the United States, or to summarize the many spe¬
cial analyses which were made by the Wartime Civil Control Administration in
preparing for, and conducting, the evacuation program.
The most important single source of information prior to the evacuation
was the 1940 Census of Population. Fortunately, the Bureau of the Census had
reproduced a duplicate set of punched cards for all Japanese in the United States
shortly after the outbreak of war and had prepared certain general tabulations
for the use of war agencies.

By arrangement with the Bureau of the Census,

through the Office of the Provost Marshal General in Washington, the War¬
time Civil Control Administration had the Bureau prepare several special tab¬
ulations of these Japanese census cards.

These special tabulations, when ana¬

lyzed, became the basis for the general evacuation and relocation plan.
Though nearly two years old at the beginning of the evacuation program,
the Census data were found to be sufficiently representative of the situation as
of March, 1942, to be used for general planning purposes. The aggregate total
Japanese population of states, the larger cities and groups of counties were
used for this purpose.

Where more accurate estimates were necessary, for

example, in planning the movement under a specific Civilian Exclusion Order, the
Census data were often modified by data from other sources, including recent
partial surveys by Military Intelligence, Western Defense Command.
Immediately on the establishment of the Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬
tration, steps were taken to insure that adequate reports would come to the
Wartime Civil Control Administration, from each step in the evacuation opera¬
tions.
as

However, great care was exercised to make operating reports as simple

practicable,

in order not

to impose

too heavy a

on the staffs of the military and civilian agencies.
352

clerical responsibility

The collection and compi-

STATISTICAL

353

SUMMARY

lation of information was centrally supervised.

The Wartime Civil Control

Administration exercised a control review function on all statistical forms and
procedures.
Among the various types of data which came to the Wartime Civil Control
Administration, from its own Divisions and from co-operating agencies, the fol¬
lowing are particularly important:
1. From each Civil Control Station came daily reports during its entire
operating period, and two registration progress reports daily during regis¬
tration days.

The Control Station Manager reported to the liaison officer

of the Federal Security Agency at the Wartime Civil Control Administra¬
tion, and the representative of the Sector Commander reported to Wartime
Civil Control Administration through the Sector Commander’s liaison officer
who also was at the Wartime Civil Control Administration.

Transporta¬

tion requirements were re-estimated daily during the registration period at
the Civil Control Station and were reported to the Transportation Officer
of each Sector, and to the Wartime Civil Control Administration Transpor¬
tation Section.
2. Assembly Centers sent daily reports to Wartime Civil Control Ad¬
ministration, by teletype, showing such factors as the total population, total
inductions, total releases, cases of contagious disease, etc.

In addition, a

daily population summary was mailed to Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬
tration by each Center Manager, beginning in June and continuing to the
end of the program.
3. The United States Public Health Service and Wartime Civil Control
Administration received daily and weekly reports showing, by appropriate
medical classifications, the movement of inpatients and outpatients in Center
hospitals, and of evacuees (from Centers)

who were in outside hospitals.

A daily census was taken in each Assembly Center as a routine procedure.
On June 30, a complete Center census list was made of all evacuees giving
their name, family number, age, sex, and Center address.
4. Transfer movements from

Assembly to Relocation

Centers were

controlled by carefully prepared lists of names from which exact transporta¬
tion requirements could be determined. Signed copies of these lists certified
the movement of each individual who was transferred.
5. Special data were collected and lists prepared when necessary, for
example, those containing the names of persons in special categories, such
as parolees released to Assembly Centers, persons listed for repatriation,
and persons residing in institutions in the evacuated area at the end of
the program.
Social Data Registration Forms executed by social workers at the Civil
Control Stations provided the basic registration record of the program.

These

forms were numbered in accordance with the pre-numbered tag which was
given to the head of each family. On the Social Data Registration form appeared
the following facts relating to the family as a whole: Residence address at the time

354

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

of evacuation; the number of persons in the family who were moving together
and were, therefore, registering together.

The following facts were secured for

each individual: Name; relationship to registering head of family; sex; age; place
of birth; education; occupation (and industry) ; alien registration number (if
an alien) ; and physical condition. Space was provided on the form for notation
of the date of departure, the appointment for medical inspection, and for indi¬
cating the completion of necessary property arrangements at the Civil Control
Station.

A

special

box

was

provided

for

Assembly Center notations

on

each family.
Three typed copies were prepared from the longhand original of this form.
The distribution of these copies was as follows: One was sent in advance of
the evacuee to the Assembly Center to which he was being moved; one was
given to the escort officer in charge of the movement (from the Civil Control
Station to the Assembly Center) to be delivered to the Center Manager; and
one was sent to Wartime Civil Control Administration.

When evacuees were

transferred from an Assembly to a Relocation Center, one copy of the Social
Data Registration accompanied them to become a basic record for the War Relo¬
cation Authority.
Both the type and the amount of information secured on the Social Data
Registration Form was the minimum necessary for Civil Control Station and
Assembly Center operation purposes.

Prior to the establishment of the War

Relocation Authority, Wartime Civil Control Administration, had prepared an
individual registration form which was intended for use in securing complete
information for Relocation purposes.

This form, together with its instructions,

was given to the War Relocation Authority for its use in Relocation Centers.
All of the names on Social Data Registration Forms

(and received by

Wartime Civil Control Administration from various other sources)
tered on cards by Wartime Civil Control Administration.

were en¬

This Master Index

File was initially compiled at the Tanforan Assembly Center, from June to
September, 1942, by trained evacuee clerks.

This evacuee staff copied, on a

4x6 inch index card, all of the pertinent information from the Social Data
Registration form.

These cards were then arranged by Assembly Centers and

verified against the information given on the Assembly Center census record as
of June 30.

The Relocation destination of each evacuee was posted on his card

later from the train list certifying his movement. Births were recorded on new
cards and the names of infants were entered on the Social Data Registration Form
of the mother.

Deaths, transfers and releases were also posted.

At the conclu¬

sion of the program, therefore, it was possible to reproduce the essential identifica¬
tion data for each individual, and to trace him through each step of controlled
movement.

Subsequently, there were added to the Master Index, cards for all

Japanese persons who had been interned or detained by various authorities, and
who resided in the evacuated area at the time of apprehension.

Parolees and

others released from internment or detention were registered at Assembly and
Relocation Centers and were added to the Index.

Master Index cards were also

made for all persons who migrated from the evacuated area and reported this fact

STATISTICAL

355

SUMMARY

to Wartime Civil Control Administration.

Subsequent changes of address were

posted as well as the original move. Since many evacuees had moved immediately
prior to registration at a Civil Control Station and the Social Data Registration
Form gave their address at the time of evacuation, all intra-evacuated-area address
cards were posted to their corresponding Index cards to provide additional pre¬
evacuation residence addresses.
Consideration was given by the Wartime Civil Control Administration to
the possibility of conducting a general compulsory registration of all enemy
aliens and of native-born persons of Japanese ancestry prior to, and in prepara¬
tion for, the evacuation program.

This proposal was supported by several civil¬

ian agencies which also offered their services in the conduct of such a registration.
After careful consideration, it was determined that no such registration would
be made.

Important factors in this decision were the following:

1. A registration would require some time for organization and tabula¬
tion before it would yield results useful in the evacuation program.
2. A registration of all enemy aliens had been conducted in February by
the Department of Justice, and copies of the forms were on file with the
local offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and at the Alien Regis¬
tration

Division,

Penna.

Certain preliminary data were made available to the Wartime Civil

Immigration

and

Naturalization

Service,

Philadelphia,

Control Administration from local counts of these registrations, but no
detailed classified information, such as the distribution by small geographical
units, age, sex, occupation, family size, etc., were available.
3. The Japanese community already anticipated evacuation, and it was
felt doubtful that accurate information would be given in all cases.
4. A complete evacuation of the coastal area was contemplated, and
a preliminary verification with Federal Bureau of Investigation and Military
Intelligence data showed that the Census of 1940 would be sufficiently
accurate for the controlled movement.
It was decided that a simplified registration, conducted as part of the process
of evacuation, would be sufficient for Wartime Civil Control Administration
purposes.
The principal factor which was changing the pattern of the Japanese
population on the West Coast, was the voluntary migration of this population
to interior points and the shifting of the population within the coastal strip.
At the beginning of the evacuation program there was already in progress a
voluntary migration from the coastal area to the interior.

(See Chapter IX.)

The encouragement of voluntary migration—with financial assistance where
necessary and proper—was a definite policy of the Western Defense Command.
It was essential, therefore, to collect data on voluntary migration in order
(a)

to measure the success of the program, and

(b)

to provide correction

factors for the later phases of the program.
Public Proclamation No. 1, dated March 2, 1942, required the reporting of
changes of residence address by German and Italian aliens and by all persons
of Japanese ancestry residing in the States of Arizona, California, Oregon and

356

JAPANESE

Washington.

This requirement was extended to the other four States of the

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Western Defense Command area by Public Proclamation No. 2, March 16,
1942.

The methods and results of this Change of Residence reporting system

have been discussed in Chapter IX insofar as they relate to voluntary migration
from the evacuated area.
In planning the logistics of evacuation, daily tabulations were made show¬
ing the intra- and inter-county moves within Military Areas 1 and 2, as well
as the migration from these areas to the interior.

These tabulations were quite

important in developing correction factors for Census data and greatly reduced
the average error of estimate as to the number of Japanese who would be evacu¬
ated under each Civilian Exclusion Order.

Such estimates were necessary for

the Civil Control Station Staff, the Transportation Officer and the Operations
Division in planning the Assembly Center destination and the movement of
the evacuees.

Pre-evacuation migration within the area and the small amount

of migration of Japanese in other states of the Western Defense Command are of
no importance for the purposes of this report.
1.

Evacuation Summary

A total of 117,116 persons were evacuated to Assembly or Relocation Cen¬
ters, migrated from this area, or otherwise came under some phase of the evacu¬
ation program between March 2 and October 31, 1942.

(See Table 45.)

This

includes 110,723 who entered an Assembly or Relocation Center and 6,393
who did not enter a Center.

Of those who entered a Center, 109,427 entered

by direct evacuation, including 206 members of mixed-marriage families who
were later released; 641 persons entered an Assembly Center as a parolee, or
voluntary evacuee, or upon release from the custody of another agency; 151
persons were transferred from the Territory of Alaska to the custody of Wartime
Civil Control Administration; and 504 babies were born to mothers residing
in Assembly Centers.
Mixed-marriage families had 465 individuals, of whom 206 entered a Center
and were later released, and 259 were granted deferments or exemptions from
evacuation. As has been indicated in Chapter IX, 4,889 persons migrated from
the evacuated area prior to the controlled evacuation and did not return to a
Center before October 31.
entries.”

Those who did return are included in "other

A survey of all medical, penal, and charitable institutions in the

States of Washington, Oregon, and California early in November indicated that
1,022 Japanese remained in such institutions located in the evacuated area.
Table 45 includes all of those individuals who were evacuated directly to
Wartime Civil Control Administration Assembly Centers and all other persons
who entered such Centers, i.e., births, parolees, voluntary entries, etc.

It does

not include births, parolees and other inductions directly into Relocation Centers
after the initial, direct evacuation.

All such persons are considered to have come

into a Relocation Center without entering the administrative jurisdiction of the
Wartime Civil Control Administration.

For data concerning such inductions,

the reader is referred to the War Relocation Authority, Washington, D. C.
Before proceeding with the presentation of detailed tables giving the popu-

STATISTICAL

357

SUMMARY

lation statistics of the various phases of the evacuation program, it is pertinent
to refer again to Figure 10, the Evacuee Flow Chart, in Chapter VIIL It will
be noted that evacuees entered Assembly Centers not only from Control Sta¬
tions, but also by birth and as parolees, voluntary entries, etc.

Evacuees also

went from Control Stations directly to certain Relocation Centers and, in a
few cases, direct to War Relocation Authority for work furlough.

Shortly after

the evacuation of Military Area 1, releases from Assembly Centers were made
to the War Relocation Authority for work furlough, and regular transfer move¬
ments to Relocation Centers were initiated.
Figure 35 graphically presents the over-all results of these movements from
the beginning of evacuee occupancy at Manzanar, on March 21, to the last
transfer movement from the Fresno Assembly Center to Jerome, Arkansas, on
October 30. This figure clearly shows the initiation of the controlled evacua¬
tion program in certain of the more critical areas of the West Coast during the
first half of April.

Beginning in the last week of April and continuing at a

very rapid rate until the end of May, came the main part of the controlled
evacuation movement from West Coast areas to Assembly Centers.

The first

phase of the program, the complete evacuation of Military Area No.

1, on

June 6, removed 100,313 persons under Exclusion Orders Numbers 1 to 99.
It was desired that the second phase of the program, the evacuation of the
California portion of Military Area No. 2, be started immediately, but this
movement could not be undertaken until in July and August because of delay
in the selection of relocation sites and the completion of these Centers unless
duplications of temporary facilities had been ordered.

The Figure indicates

the periods in which 9,337 evacuees were removed from Military Area No. 2,
under the provisions of Exclusion Orders Numbers 100 to 108, direct to Relo¬
cation Centers. By August, therefore, 109,650 persons had been removed from
the evacuated area to Assembly and Relocation Centers.
Figure 35

also shows the initiation of direct evacuation to Relocation

Centers the middle of May, the transfer of the Manzanar Reception Center to
the War Relocation Authority on June 1, and the regular transfer movements
from Assembly to Relocation Centers beginning the middle of June and termi¬
nating with the complete evacuation of all Assembly Centers on October 30.
The number of evacuees for whom the Wartime Civil Control Administration
had direct administrative responsibility at each stage of the program is shown
in the darkest shaded portion of the figure.
Table 46 shows the State of origin of the 110,442 evacuees who entered
Assembly Centers or were directly evacuated to War Relocation Authority
custody. The complete detail of this total by Assembly Centers and Exclusion
Orders is shown in Table 47.1
There were 109,650 evacuees for whom a definite Civilian Exclusion Order
was known (eliminating the 792 persons who were not evacuated under the
JThe total shown in Tables 46 and 47 comprising the following groups from Table 45: Those who entered a
Center by direct evacuation, by transfer from Alaska, as members of mixed-marriage families, and as "other entries,”
and, in addition thereto, those in Military Area No. 2 who did not enter a Center but were released to the custody
of War Relocation Authority for immediate furlough after the area of their residence was "frozen” in preparation
for evacuation.

358

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EVACUATION

FROM

THOUSANDS OF

JO

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Figure 35

STATISTICAL

359

SUMMARY

provisions of a specific Exclusion Order but who entered Centers as parolees,
voluntary inductees, and from the Territory of Alaska). These were distributed
as follows: California, 92,785; Washington, 12,892; Oregon, 3,714; Arizona,
259. Of the 18,026 who were evacuated directly to Relocation Centers, 17,062
were from California, 658 from Washington, 290 from Oregon, and 16 from
Arizona. Only two Assembly Centers in California received a major movement
of evacuees from Washington and Oregon; Bainbridge Island (Civilian Exclusion
Order No. 1) was evacuated to Manzanar prior to the establishment of the As¬
sembly Center at Puyallup, Washington; and Pinedale Assembly Center received
3,497 persons from Washington and 551 from Oregon.

As has been indicated

in Chapter XIII, the Assembly Center capacity in these States was insufficient for
the population.

These evacuees from Washington and Oregon were later trans¬

ferred from Pinedale to Tule Lake to join other groups from these States who
had been evacuated directly to this Relocation Center.
The number of evacuees who entered each Center is given in Column I
of Table 46.

Note that Manzanar is classified both as an Assembly and as a Relo¬

cation Center in this table.

Prior to June 1, 1942, Manzanar was operated as a

Reception Center by the Wartime Civil Control Administration and received
9,665 evacuees. It was transferred to the War Relocation Authority on June 1
and thereafter received 165 persons. These were entirely small movements for the
purpose of reuniting families, a part of which had entered Manzanar prior to
June 1.
Table 47 shows the Assembly Center destination of persons who were
evacuated under each Civilian Exclusion Order.2
From nearly all the Civil Control Stations the main body of evacuees were
moved to a single Assembly or Relocation Center.

These movements were

referred to by Assembly Centers as "direct evacuation movements.”

In addi¬

tion, there were small movements of persons evacuated under the provision
of Civilian Exclusion Orders who went to other Assembly and Relocation
Centers.

These persons often moved simultaneously with the main group, but

under special permission from the Provost Marshal at the Civil Control Station.
Frequently, however, as has been indicated in Chapter X, a temporary defer¬
ment from evacuation was granted because of personal or family illness, the
need for continued personal attention to property matters, or for other approved
reasons.

Such deferred persons usually went to the Assembly Center to which

others of their communities had been removed, but were sometimes granted
permission to go elsewhere.
An analysis of the direct evacuation under Civilian Exclusion Orders from
the different areas of the Pacific Coast states can be made from the data pre¬
sented in Table 48.

Using only the Wartime Civil Control Administration data

as to evacuees entering Assembly and Relocation Centers and the net total of
voluntary migrants who did not return to this area to rejoin their families, there
*In using these data on "all evacuees” care should be taken not to confuse them with the data presented below
on "all entries” to Assembly Centers. The "all evacuees” figure includes persons who died while residents in, or
who were released from Assembly Centers (for example, mixed marriage cases), and all persons who were inducted
into an Assembly or Relocation Center by the Wartime Civil Control Administration. The data on "all evacuees”
does not include births within Assembly or Relocation Centers, or parolees or other persons who entered Relocation
Centers independent of Wartime Civil Control Administration action.

360

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

was a total of 114,539 persons removed from the area and for whom a definite
county of residence could be determined.3
The 1940 Census enumerated 111,938 persons of Japanese ancestry in these
areas.

The principal interest in comparing the Census with the number of

persons evacuated or leaving this area lies in the nature of the indicated popula¬
tion shifts, rather than the agreement between aggregate totals—though the
over-all totals are remarkably similar.

City areas, particularly San Francisco,

Los Angeles, San Diego and Seattle showed net losses in Japanese population.
Very appreciable gains, on the other hand, were recorded in rural areas, such
as the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys, San Luis Obispo and Santa Barbara
Counties, and Orange County in California.

This may be explained in part

by the natural tendency of a racial group to concentrate in areas of least
pressure from public opinion, and in part by the return of children to join their
rural-dwelling parents for evacuation. As previously noted, permits were granted
for changes of residence to reunite families during the entire program.
The distribution of the Japanese population in the Western Defense Com¬
mand area on June 7, 1942, at the end of the first phase of the controlled
evacuation program is shown in Figure 36. Next to each Assembly Center name
is indicated its population on the morning of June 7. There remained in Mili¬
tary Area 2 of California two particularly dense concentrations of Japanese
immediately adjacent to the boundary of Military Area No. 1, and also to
numerous vital military installations and important forests.

As was indicated

in Chapter IX, the migration of Japanese to Tulare, Fresno, and Placer Counties
during the voluntary migration phase of the program had been very heavy.
This migration created military as well as social and economic problems in
these areas.
3Table 45 shows a total of 117,116 persons evacuated, or otherwise coming under the evacuation program. Thia
includes several categories not included in Table 48. For example, births in Assembly Centers, persons remaining
in institutions, and parolees and other persons entering Assembly Centers without a definite county of origin.

STATISTICAL

SUMMARY

Figure 36

361

362

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

TABLE 45.—Summary of Persons Evacuated or Otherwise Coming Under The
Evacuation Program: March 2 to October 31, 1942
(Includes evacuation by WCCA directly to Relocation Centers. Does not include the births, parolees
or other persons entering Relocation Centers from sources other than WCCA.)

Type of Action

Total persons affected.

Other entries in Assembly Centers.
Released on work furlough (Area 2).

Total
persons

Entered
a
Center

Did not
enter
a Center

117,116

110,723

6,393

109,221
151
504
641
465
223
1,022
4,889

109,221
151
504
641
206

259
223
1,022
4,889

'Other than mixed-marriage cases.
2Net total of persons migrating from evacuated areas prior to evacuation and who did not return
to a Center before October 31, 1942.

TABLE 46.—State of Origin by Center of Destination of Japanese Evacuees*
STATE OF ORIGIN
All
origins

Arizona

California

All destinations.

110,442

259

Assembly Centers.

92,193

243

Evacuation destination

Pinedale.
Portland.

5,229
9,665
2,460
243
4,565
4,810
5,420
4,043
7,548
4,753
3,592
18,937
4,302
7,928
5,026
3,672

Oregon

Wash¬
ington

92,785

3,714

12,892

792

75,500

3,424

12,234

792

5,183
9,408
2,460

46
257

243
4,540
755
5,391
4
4,753
3,592
18,715
4,292
7,879
4,861
3,667

Relocation Centers.

18,026

16

17,062

4
11
1

Tule Lake.

11,711
2,946
165
3,204

11,707
2,935
163
2,257

223

Not
specified

551

3,497

2,870
2

1,165
7,314
1

1
290

290

25
7
29
4
232
221
10
49
164
5

658

*

1
657

♦
*
*
*

223

*Parolees, Detainees, and other Japanese entering Relocation Centers from Outside the Evacuated
Areas are not included in this count.

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Total Persons Evacuated to Each Assembly and Relocation Center by Civilian Exclusion Order Number and Area.—Continued

(Manzanar Classified as an Assembly Center Until May 31, 1942)
EVACUATION TO
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Total Persons Evacuated to Each Assembly and Relocation Center by Civilian Exclusion Order Number and Area.—Continued

(Manzanar Classified as an Assembly Center Until May 31, 1942)

statistical summary
365

366

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MISCELLANEOUS

1

INYO

EVACUATION

g
u

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it

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j!

55

V

STATE
WORK

JAPANESE

S
P
to

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H

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O

<
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w
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o
cn
P4
w
Ph

H
O
H

PRINCIPAL
BEET
EVACUATION TO

-

0

ALASKA
ALASKA

1
ALL OTHER

TOTAL
TOTAL
CUEES

RELOCATION CENTERS

COUNTY
TULE
LAKE
GILA
RIVER
TUR¬
LOCK
STOCK¬ TANFO
TON
RAN
PINE- POMO¬ PORT¬
DALE NA
LAND
EVA¬

ORDER

EVACUATION TO ASSEMBLY CENTERS
ALL
CIVILIAN

MER¬
CED
EXCLUSION

ss Evacuated to Each Assembly and Relocation Center by Civilian Exclusion Order Number and Area.—Concluded.
(Manzanar Classified as an Assembly Center Until May 31, 1942)

WEST

COAST

TABLE 48.—Japanese Evacuation and Voluntary Migration From Evacuated Areas of Western Defense
Command—Compared to Census Population of 1940

statistical summary

367

368

TABLE 48 (Concluded).—Japanese Evacuation and Voluntary Migration From Evacuated Areas of
Western Defense Command—Compared to Census Population of 1940

JAPANESE
EVACUATION
FROM
THE
WEST
COAST

STATISTICAL SUMMARY

2.

369

Assembly Center Population

The daily population movement of all Assembly Centers combined from
March 21 to October 30 (including Manzanar until June 1) is given in Table
49. These data are graphically presented in Figure 3 5, page 358. The maximum
population of all Assembly Centers (including Center residents who were
temporarily in outside hospitals) occurred on May 31 when there were 89,260
evacuees in Centers under the jurisdiction of the Wartime Civil Control Ad¬
ministration.
The rapidity of the evacuation program is reflected in the number of evacu¬
ees entering Assembly Centers. From April 27 to May 30, the population of
all Centers rose from 10,074 to 89,320 in 34 days. During the time of most
rapid transfer of evacuees from Assembly to Relocation Centers, August 9 to
October 30, the total Assembly Center population decreased by 62,813 in
81 days.
It should be noted that in Table 49, transfers of medical cases between
Assembly Centers and outside hospitals have been omitted from the total.
However, the total number of persons entering and leaving reflects, as it should,
all inter-Center transfers, releases to the War Relocation Authority and other
agencies, and the resumption of custody of evacuees from these agencies.
A graphical summary of the movement of population in each individual
Assembly Center has been presented in Chapter XIX, Figures 19a-19p.
Evacuees entering Assembly Centers. Table 50 summarizes the total
number of evacuees entering (including those re-entering) Assembly Centers by
type of induction or transfer. In all, 93,574 persons were listed as entering
an Assembly Center. The number of persons listed in Table 46, above, as evac¬
uated to Assembly Centers, i.e., original inductions under Civilian Exclusion
Order, or by other direct entry, was 92,193. The difference of 1,3 81 between
these two figures is accounted for by the inclusion in the larger figure of births and
inter-Center transfers, including some transfers from War Relocation Authority.
The total number of different individuals who were inducted into an Assembly
Center, including 39 persons received from War Relocation Authority and 504
live births, was 92,736. (See Table 53.)
Table 51 is presented in order to complete the population accounting for
persons returning to Assembly Centers either from leave to another agency
or after release by the Wartime Civil Control Administration.
Releases and transfers of evacuees leaving the Assembly Centers from March
21, 1942, to October 30, 1942, is shown in Table 52. There were tranferred
to the War Relocation Authority a total of 92,447 persons of whom 89,698
went from an Assembly to a Relocation Center in a regular transfer order
movement. War Relocation Authority work-furlough releases totaled 1,739, of
whom 332 returned to an Assembly Center (See Table 51) and were later trans¬
ferred again to the custody of the War Relocation Authority in a regular move¬
ment. Individual and small group transfers accounted for 1,010. One hundred
and thirty-six evacuees were released to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, and other law enforcement agencies;

370

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

and of these, 22 returned to a Center.

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Other types of releases accounted for 991

evacuees: Mixed-marriage, 206; deaths, 134; inter-Center transfers, 448 ; and all
other form of releases, 203.
The total number of separate individuals entering and leaving Wartime Civil
Control Administration Assembly Centers between March 21 and October 30,
1942, eliminating all double counting because of re-entries of persons originally
inducted into Assembly or Relocation Centers, is presented in Table 53.

Whereas

Tables 50 to 52, above, represent the total entries and departures, Table 53 sum¬
marizes the total number of individuals who entered and departed.
For data on the average and maximum population of Assembly Centers,
the reader is referred to Table 29, Chapter XIX, and Figures 19a-19p. As has been
indicated, a daily population report verified by an actual door-to-door check
was made by the Manager of each Assembly Center.

Tables showing the daily

entries and departures and the total population for individual Assembly Cen¬
ters are too detailed for inclusion in the present report. For those readers of the
present report who are interested in a monthly population figure for each Center,
there is presented Table 54 which shows the de facto population of each Assembly
and Relocation Center from May 1 to November 3 by months.
The evacuees to Assembly Centers spent 9,485,202 evacuee-days under
Wartime Civil Control Administration jurisdiction, an average of 102.3 days for
each of the 92,736 different individuals who entered a Center. This is equivalent
to 25,987 evacuees for one year.
Table 55 gives, by months, the total evacuee-days in each Assembly Center,
both inclusive of, and exclusive of the time spent by those evacuees placed in
hospitals outside of the Center.
To provide a basis for determining needs for evacuee housing units of
different sizes and other general policies for the conduct of Assembly Centers
and for the relocation of evacuees, a tabulation was made of the distribution of
families by size as reported on Social Data Registration forms.

Table 56 gives

the estimated total number of evacuee families, and the mean and median
size of these families, for each of the Assembly Centers.

For Wartime Civil

Control Administration purposes "family” was defined as all those persons regis¬
tering together for evacuation, i.e., recorded on a single Social Data Registration
Form.

STATISTICAL SUMMARY

371

TABLE 49.—Daily Population of All Assembly Centers Including Hospitals:
March 21 to October 30, 1942
(Transfers between Centers and outside hospitals have been omitted from this table)

Date

Evacuees Evacuees
entering leaving
Centers Centers

Total

Net
change

84
90
800
803
806
807
818
821
821
823
835

84
6
710
3
3
1
11
3

84
6
710
3
3
1
11
3

2
12

2
12

1.. .
2.. .
3.. .
4...
5...
6...
i...
8...
9.. .
10.. .
11...
12.. .
13. . .
14...
15.. .
16.. .
17...
18.. .
19.. .
20.. .
21...
22...
23.. .
24.. .
25.. .
26. . .
27.. .
28...
29.. .
30...

1,493
2,365
2.984
4,891
5,737
5,745
6,385
7,523
7,524
7,524
7,527
7,527
7,527
10,044
10,046
10,048
10,049
10,050
10,051
10,056
10,057
10,061
10,061
10,063
10,074
10,074
11,619
14,406
20,764
26,212

658
872
619
1,907
846
8
640
1,138
1

658
872
619
1,907
846
8
640
1,139
1

3

3

2,517
2
2
1
1
1
5
1
4

2,517
2
2
1
1
1
5
1
4

2
11

3
11

1

1,545
2,787
6,358
5,448

1,545
2,788
6,358
5,448

1

May 1....
2. .. .
3....
4....
5....
6. .. .
7....
8....
9. .. .
10....
11. .. .
12. .. .
13. .. .
14....
15. .. .
16....
17. .. .
18....
19....
20....
21. .. .
22....
23... .
24....
25... .
26....
27. .. .
28... .
29....
30....
31....

29,643
31,159
32,193
32,916
33,590
36,412
38,573
42,081
46,578
50,280
51,888
55,556
60,030
64,419
68,340
69,933
72,050
74,328
76,505
79,397
81,008
81,474
82,040
82,554
82,602
82,423
84,085
85,776
88,541
89,320
89,260

3,431
1,516
1,034
723
674
2,822
2,161
3,508
4,497
3,702
1,608
3,668
4,474
4,389
3,921
1,593
2,117
2,278
2,177
2,892
1,611
466
566
514
48
-179
1,662
1,691
2,765
779
-60

3,432
1,516
1,034
726
675
2,822
2,161
3,508
4,499
3,702
1,609
3,668
4,476
4,395
3,930
1,596
2,118
2,282
2,180
2,899
1,619
493
567
517
51
19
1,915
1,745
2,790
782
38

March 21..
22..
23..
24. .
25. .
26. .
27. .
28. .
29. .
30. .
31. .
April

1

1
3
1

2
1
2
6
9
3

1

4
3
7

8
27

1

3
3
198
253
54
25
3
98

Evacuees Evacuees
entering leaving
Centers Centers

Date

Total

Net
change

June 1....
2. .. .
3. .. .
4. . . .
5. .. .
6. . . .
7....
8. .. .
9 .
10....
11. . ..
12. ...
13. .. .
14... .
15. .. .
16. .. .
17. .. .
18... .
19. . . .
20... .
21. ...
22
23....
24. .
25
26....
27. .. .
28....
29. . . .
30....

79,582
79,303
79,322
79,264
79,630
80,184
80,141
79,950
79 893
79,911
79,918
79,926
79,938
79,903
79,404
78,851
78,350
77,867
77,388
76,876
76,372
75 871
74^950
74 977
74 466
73^919
73,444
72,957
72,093
71,423

-9,678
-279
19
-58
366
554
-43
-191
-57
18
7
8
12
-35
-499
-553
-501
-483
-479
-512
-504
SOI
-921
27
-S11
-547
-475
-487
-864
-670

26
70
23
16
543
661
15
25

9,704
349
4
74
177
107
58
216

25
9
14
21
20
14
17
30
18
23
16
13

7
2
6
9
55
513
570
531
501
502
528
517

152
36

1,073
9

32
22
4
25
17

579
497
491
889
687

July 1....
2. .. .
3. .. .
4. ..
5. .. .
6... .
7
8. ...
9. ...
10....
11. . . .
12. .. .
13. .. .
14....
15... .
16... .
17. .. .
18... .
19... .
20. . . .
21. .. .
22. .. .
23....
24....
25....
26....
27. ...
28....
29....
30. . . .
31. .. .

71,006
70,561
69,810
69 227
69,229
69,232
69 235
69,229
69,241
69,242
69,273
69,282
69,289
69,313
68,344
68,342
67,842
66,824
66,324
65,831
65,158
64,600
64,164
64,170
63,667
63,173
62,643
62,636
62,648
62,704
62,711

-417
-445
-751
-583
2
3
3
-6
12
1
31
9
7
24
-469
-502
-500
-1,018
-500
-493
-673
-558
-436

37
14
15
17
9
16
15
24
14
13
37
19
21
40
44
15
19

-503
-494
-530
-7

15
24

10

454
459
766
600
7
13
12
30
2
12
6
10
14
16
513
517
519
1,040
523
532
705
576
460
16
518
518
540

13
17
73
19

20
12

Aug. 1. .. .
2....
3....
4. . . .
5. .. .
6. .. .
7. .. .
8. .. .
9. .. .
10....
11. .. .

62,717
62,753
62,763
62,773
62,798
62,802
62,812
62,813
62,306
61,790
61,308

16
39
18

10

6

12

56
7

6
36

10
10

25
4

10
1

-507
-516
-482

22

23
39
32
18
24

22

20
26
18
14

8
1

7
43

5
17

3

8
10
1
14
4
7
508
523
525

372

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

TABLE 49 (Concluded).—Daily Population of All Assemby Centers Including
Hospitals: March 21 to October 30, 1942
(Transfers between Centers and outside hospitals have been omitted from this table)
Evacuees Evacuees
entering leaving
Centers Centers

Date

Total

Net
change

Aug.12_
13... .
14... .
15. .. .
16... .
17. .. .
18. .. .
19... .
20....
21... .
22....
23....
24....
25....
26....
27....
28....
29....
30. . . .
31. . . .

60,777
60,783
60,830
59,795
58,734
57,654
56,601
55,566
54,037
52,436
51,951
51,553
51,138
50,348
48,992
48,443
48,445
47,460
45,377
44,328

-531
6
47
-1,035
-1,061
-1,080
-1,053
-1,035
-1,529
-1,601
-485
-398
-415
-790
-1,356
-549
2
-985
-2,083
-1,049

12
14
49
8
3
15
133
32
6
20
18
47
8
4
13
26
10
34
13
5

543
8
2
1,043
1,064
1,095
1,186
1,067
1,535
1,621
503
445
423
794
1,369
575
8
1,019
2,096
1,054

Sept. 1_
2. .. .
3. .. .
4. . . .
5. . . .
6. . . .
7. .. .
8. . . .
9... .
10....
11. . . .
12. . . .
13. . . .
14. . . .
15. . . .
16... .
17. . . .
18. .. .
19. . . .
20....

42,129
40,529
38,439
37,731
36,593
36,088
34,476
33,966
32,635
32,284
31,638
31,541
30,477
29,681
28,636
28,150
27,142
26,641
25,566
24,538

-2,199
-1,600
-2,090
-708
-1,138
-505
-1,612
-510
-1,331
-351
-646
-97
-1,064
-796
-1,045
-486
-1,008
-501
-1,075
-1,028

18
6
12
11
2
3
2
9
6
9
4
5
3
3
1
4
4
4
4
3

2,217
1,606
2,102
719
1,140
508
1,614
519
1,337
-360
650
102
1,067
799
1,046
490
1,012
505
1,079
1,031

Evacuees Evacuees
entering leaving
Centers Centers

Date

Total

Net
change

Sept. 21_
22....
23....
24. ...
25....
26....
27....
28....
29....
30....

23,522
22,445
21,943
21,446
20,995
19,981
19,020
18,011
17,495
16,512

-1,016
-1,077
-502
-497
-451
-1,014
-961
-1,009
-516
-983

3
2
3
2
12
6
10
6
5
3

1,019
1,079
505
499
463
1,020
971
1,015
521
986

Oct. 1. .. .
2. ...
3. .. .
4. . . .
5....
6. .. .
7. .. .
8
9. .. .
10. . . .
11....
12. .. .
13. .. .
14....
15....
16....
17. .. .
18....
19....
20. .. .
21. ...
22....
23. .. .
24....
25. .. .
26... .
27. .. .
28....
29....
30....

15,949
15,289
14,781
14,364
13,824
13,373
12,359
11,831
11,409
10,953
10,535
9,597
8,806
7,851
7,441
6,245
5,247
4,263
3,878
3,421
3,422
2,985
2,987
2,541
2,538
1,709
986
507
506

-563
-660
-508
-417
-540
-451
-1,014
-528
-422
-456
-418
-938
-791
-955
-410
-1,196
-998
-984
-385
-457
1
-437
2
-446
-3
-829
-723
-479
-1
-506

7
24
4

570
684
512
417
545
456
1,016
533
423
460
420
939
798
956
416
1,197
999
986
386
460

....

5
5
2
5
1
4
2
1
7
1
6
1
1
2
1
3
1

437
2
2
19

448
3
848
723
479
1
506

STATISTICAL

373

SUMMARY

TABLE 50.—Evacuees Entering Assembly Centers By Center and ByJType
of Induction or Transfer: March 21, 1942 to October 30, 1942
OTHER EVACUEES
Total
entering

Group
evacua¬
tion

Total.

93,574

90,307

374

673

2,220

Fresno.
Manzanar1.
Marysville.
Mayer.
Merced.
Pinedale.
Pomona.
Portland.
Puyallup.
Sacramento.
Salinas.
Santa Anita.
Stockton.
Tanforan.
Tulare.
Turlock.

5,344
9,681
2,465
251
4,669
4,823
5,514
4,290
7,628
4,770
3,608
19,348
4,390
8,033
5,061
3,699

4,993
9,595
2,437
224
4,481
4,750
5,316
3,973
7,370
4,727
3,572
18,355
4,261
7,794
4,810
3,649

21

47

283

32

28
27
138

4

Center

From
W. R. A.

25

Detainees
Total

86

25
7
30
7

i

219
17

66

167
91
153
40
36
720
83
176
87
39

88
3

42
35

231

11

10

53
163

1
3

8

Inter A.C.
transfers

Births

510**

11

Other*

448

1,262

62
5

189
70
23
24
59
53
77
65
108
24

1

3
57
7
59
3
7

22
6
31
23
38
16
13
197
25
64
18

20

3
168
25
24
14

10

355
33

88
55
19

10

♦Includes persons entering from C. E. O.’s after deferment.
♦♦Includes 6 stillbirths.
lTo June 1, 1942.

TABLE 51.—Evacuees on Leave and Returning to Assembly Centers

Assembly Center

All Assembly Centers.

Total
returning

Transferred
from W. R. A.
custody

384

335

18

18

Detainees

22

5
25

27

5
25

221

1
2

2

219

34

16

10

8
2

3

Puyallup.

Other
releases
returning

1
Santa Anita.

23

19

Stockton.
Tanforan.

35

32
3

2
1
2

7

3

4

10
2

1
2
5

2

374
JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

♦Includes 6 stillbirths.

375

STATISTICAL SUMMARY

TABLE 53.—Net Total Persons Entering and Leaving WCCA Assembly
Centers:
March 21 to October 30, 1942
ENTERING ASSEMBLY CENTERS
Group evacuation from CEO's...
Other evacuation.
Transferred from WRA.
From INS, FBI, etc.
Births (except stillbirths).

Net total.

.
.
.
.
.

.

LEAVING ASSEMBLY CENTERS

90,307
1,235
39
651
504

92,736

Released to WRA.
Transfer orders. 89,698
Furloughs (Net) 1.
1,407
Other movements and trans1,007
fers1.
Releases other than to WRA . .
128
Deaths (except stillbirths).. .
206
Mixed-marriage.
114
To FBI, INS, etc. (Net)». . ..
Other releases (Net)*.
176
Net total.

92,112

624

92,736

'Total leaving Centers, 1,739; returned to Assembly Centers, 332.
includes individual and small group transfers and persons remaining in hospitals at end of Assembly
Centers. Total to WRA, 1,010; returned from WRA, 3.
sTotal detainees leaving Centers, 136; returning, 22.
‘Total leaving Centers, 203; returning, 27.

TABLE 54.—Population of Assembly and Relocation Centers
May 1 to November 3, 1942, by Months
(De facto population. Does not include persons assigned to Center but absent therefrom;
or persons in transit).
Center

May 1

June 1

July 1

Aug. 1

Sept. 1

Oct. 1

Nov. 3

WCCA ASSEMBLY
CENTERS
5,087
Manzanar.

7,180
2,440
245
4,505
4,746

1,984
2,769
11,973
3,048
2,444
210

5.020
5.103
5.117
4.975
Relocation Center after May 31, 1942
4,463
4,780

4,484

3,719

5,396
2,571
7,186
4,703
3,590

5,421
3,448
7.168

5,431
3,388
7,224

2,439
1,320

18,431
4,270
7,804
4,839
3,661

18,469
4,152
7,775
4,888
3,606

18,534
4,134
7,806
4,934
1,537

16,076
4,134
7,777
1,382

7,434

9,198

13,269
2,110

17,816
9,666
212
6,806

9,666

9,704

9,855

10,003
4,839

446

9,040

15,023

15,179

1,672

WRA RELOCATION
CENTERS

Tule Lake.

6,677
3,815
340

6,259
17,252
11,553
6,997
9,875

7,694
17,092
13,237
6,350
9,808

9,072
8,311
2,756
14,654

7,660
9,099
7,580
8,240
14,445

TABLE 55.—Total Number of Evacuee-Days in Assembly Centers and in Hospitals Outside Assembly
Centers, By Center and Month: March 21, 1942 to October 30,1942
Total
evacueedays

1,752,883

850,250

151,945

156,731

158,486

151,166

60,198
245
133,741
143,306
162,420
100,759
215,453
85,453
105,017
553,533
125,241
234,493
145,916
108,353

138,302
86,126
168,397
104,979
223,509
178
3,604
574,231
128,641
242,921
152,465
95,366

138,284
124
96,359
103,136
165,772

27,276
77

569,465
128,948
242,868
134,080
15,361

359,243
119,174
170,806
2,675

to • • • • cn.oo cncn • •
V©.^ © Tf . .
! ! ! !
I I I I ' to to
I I
. .
O'.00 CO

16,469
3,364

o

r*\

UTSIDE HO!3PITALS
]

1,748,206

137,915

• to
•O
• O'
:©
.<N
•
•
•
:
.
• CN
• 00 CO
• CO CN
: >o ro

96,185
102,813
165,381

•
•
•
:
.

• •
• •
. .

\ \

•
.
•
;

568,173
128,406
241,756
133,986
15,297

• t-1 C4 1/)
•
»—i lO
•0C'©l^'©
; *-.* oo* ©c <n*
.to NO
COtItH

3,491
573,328
128,200
241,758
152,399
95,314

iVEST COAST

137,949
85,977
168,252
104,700
223,011

•
•
:
.

60,091
245
133,558
143,154
162,382
100,626
215,084
85,131
104,815
552,838
124,859
233,457
145,884
108,331

1

©.^ 00 co
CO.N©4jh«^
\ \ \ i * * \ \ ; ;co‘^co
On.OOfO

158,294

846,269

•
•
:
.

156,508

]

rs

2,070,887

NO
NO
00
©
*0

151,695

|

in
iM

2,322,150

NESE EVACUATION FROM THE

2,075,450

JAVA

2,326,073

O'

1,974,954

October

September

in

August

(NOO't»H^.\OOON»HfOO'N©NN'©
00(NCCcoi'"CO’-<(NO\COcoi''«r''.Tt*cO'0
0^0 to O l-^CN CO N© *»- CO 00 O NC CN VH
S-H o CO to *<** 00 NO* C-* CN ©* to Tf to* rf 00*
I^N©CO NO to On n© t"- 00 On 0C NO O CN 00
CN
*-<
t^< CN —<

3,608
4,239
98

July

00
N
O'

5,542
156,854

June

Z
Q
p

t>

1,990

o
X

oo
rs

105,845

May

(N

l>
oo

00

783,675
373,356
93,275
5,776
500,398
287,867
523,037
391,848
781,389
165,864
209,187
2,777,570
599,654
1,098,660
567,400
303,206

|

: i i i

Fresno.
Manzanar (to June 1, 1942).
Marysville.
Mayer.
Merced.
Pinedale.
Pomona.
Portland.
Puyallup.
Sacramento.
Salinas.
Santa Anita.
Stockton.
Tanforan.
Tulare.
Turlock.

IN AS

:3

9,462,162

©

All Centers.

•to.O •
O' 00 W
• ^.On • rh to -hcoOv
•oo.On • IO
*N©<N
1
* I I I I
.‘tot^T :<o ■<*
S
.o.K
—
~
W
H
Z
w
u
bn

785,067
373,375
93,423
5,777
501,732
288,458
523,446
392,723
782,950
166,451
209,665
2,784,313
602,214
1,104,575
567,625
303,408

April

•?2.. * • * •

Fresno.
Manzanar (to June 1, 1942).
Marysville.
Mayer.
Merced.
Pinedale2.
Pomona.
Portland.
Puyallup.
Sacramento.
Salinas.
Santa Anita.
Stockton.
Tanforan.
Tulare.
Turlock.

7,508

2
w

9,485,202

m

All centers and hospitals1... .

March

'OnionO'OOOcsoo^xoooo
lO CN fO ?N »-«00 N© <N © 00 O tO CO
© © CN to ^ 00 CN CO 00 00 to <N
<N CN
CN © cO*tO ^*O0*N©
© to tO*tO U^OOr*
t^v©co '©toO\'©r^X©v0C'©OcN00
CN
•<* CN*-<

Center

TABLE 55 (Concluded).—Total Number of Evacuee-Days in Assembly Centers and in Hospitals Outside Assembly
Centers, By Center and Month: March 21, 1942 to October 30, 1942

to
Pi
W
H
Z
w
o

3,472
to

00

^
^

ss
pc

PC

H
«
Q
co
H
PC
^

IN HC

e/3 in

s a)

.a.S
6 pc

u

•a "3

a>ra

gs

4> O

statistical summary

fO • • • • 04.t*Ov • •
lO • • • >H .... . *-H LO ro • •
tO.OOlOO* • •

Q • •
• 04 04 • • 0*4 04 lO © •
© . . • t>. • 00 to • • t'*>f00'04 •
to • • *to
• *-* • • tolOO

04 • • ■ O' rf t* fO
• • 04 04 04
Tp
Os . . • 0040*040' . • O'
O' VO
• • • to
to to • • 04 10

•f^MXfOO'fSM^CN'OfStN
• 00 lO fO tO'O 04 © O'00 to CO 04
• »h
to to 04 O fO ©

to • • •tOO'lOO'OOOOtOtO^HfO'OCN
04 . . •io^Ttr^O't^^OTt'O'O‘0
04 • • •OHrttN^HHO'i'H

© • O*
lO • O
04 •

•^Os^H^H00t^O400^Hr^^Ht^O'^fO-^
O*
lOOiOiOOOO'O'OO'OH'O

O4O'00*ht*<.-hO'»O^<O»00C0©iO»OO4
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to T-1 to »0 Tt 00 »0»0 Tf 1^*0 0^04 04
******
'OofiO

.04 © -O' • •

Fresno.
Manzanar (to June 1,1942).
Marysville.
Mayer.
Merced.
Pinedale*.
Pomona.
Portland.
Puyallup.
Sacramento.
Salinas.
Santa Anita.
Stockton.
Tanforan.
Tulare.
Turlock.

»—i
Oh
C/3

a "

°
C/3

W
ffi

ASSEMBLY

|
I
4,563
|
|
23,040

311
All Centers1.

October
September
August
July
June
May
April
March
Total
evacueedays
Center

377

378

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

TABLE 56.—Estimated Total Number of Evacuee Families and Average
Size of Such Families, by Center*
Total
families

Mean
size

Median
size

Total
individuals

Centers.

24,712

3.7

3.4

92,193

Fresno.
Manzanar (to June 1, 1942).
Marysville.
Mayer.
Merced.
Pinedale.
Pomona.
Portland.
Puyallup.
Sacramento.
Salinas.
Santa Anita.
Stockton.
Tanforan.
Tulare.
Turlock.

1,294
2,318
547
69
1,192
1,185
1,633
1,275
2,233
1,449
726
4,932
1,458
2,043
1,344
1,014

4.0
4.2
4.5
3.5
3.8
4.1
3.3
3.2
3.4
3.3
5.0
3.8
3.0
3.9
3.7
3.6

3.6
3.9
4.5
3.0
3.4
3.9
2.9
2.7
3.1

5,229
9,665
2,460
243
4,565
4,810
5,420
4,043
7,548
4,753
3,592
18,937
4,302
7,928
5,026
3,672

Center

All

2.8

4.5
3.5
1.4
3.5
3.5
3.1

*For evacuation purposes “Family” was defined as all those persons registering for evacuation
together on a single SDR form.

379

STATISTICAL SUMMARY

3.

Transfer of Evacuees to Relocation Centers

The total number of persons transferred by the Wartime Civil Control Ad¬
ministration to the War Relocation Authority was

111,155.

Details as to

Relocation Center destination and type of transfer are shown in Table 32, Chap¬
ter XXII. Relocation Centers received 89,698 evacuees from Assembly Centers
in direct transfer order movements, 18,026 by direct evacuation from Civil
Control Stations, and 779 through individual and small group movements not
covered by formal transfer orders.

In addition to these evacuees who were moved

to a Relocation Center, 1,630 were transferred to the War Relocation Authority
through release on furloughs to this agency from Assembly Centers, or from
Military Area 2, and 1,022 were transferred to the general custody of War
Relocation Authority because of their continued residence in institutions in the
evacuated area.

Of these, 228 had been formally inducted into an Assembly

Center but had been placed in an institution outside of a Center for health
reasons and were not transferred to a Relocation Center with regular move¬
ments.

Institutions in the evacuated area had 794 Japanese who had never

been formally evacuated.

This group includes many cases committed to State

Institutions for the insane and the tubercular, as well as a few cases in penal
or correctional institutions.

The responsibility for these institutional

cases

passed to the War Relocation Authority in September and October, 1942.
The detailed transfer of evacuees from each Assembly Center to each Relo¬
cation Center, by type of transfer, is shown in Table 57.

It was possible to

tabulate both origin and destination by Centers only for the 90,477 persons
who were transferred by regular transfer order movements or who moved as
individuals or small groups to a known destination. No attempt has been made
by the Wartime Civil Control Administration to allocate by Relocation Center
the 1,630 evacuees who were transferred from Assembly Centers or from Military
Area 2 to War Relocation Authority for furlough.
sion of responsibility between the agencies.

This is in line with the divi¬

However, the Wartime Civil Con¬

trol Administration has provided the War Relocation Authority with full infor¬
mation as to each individual furloughed, when requested, to facilitate the ad¬
ministrative problem created by the return of furloughed workers to War Relo¬
cation Authority Centers.
The reader is referred to Figure 28 in Chapter XXII for the graphical
summary of transfers from Assembly to Relocation Centers in accordance with
the regular transfer orders.
An approximation of the State of origin of the evacuees directly evacuated
to or transferred to each Relocation Center is given in Table 58. Of the 109,650
persons evacuated under the provisions of Civilian Exclusion Orders, 18,026
were sent directly to Relocation Centers, 91,401 to Assembly Centers, and 223
were released on work furlough from Area 2.
these persons is known.

The State of origin of each of

By eliminating the 223 work furlough cases, and

assuming that all evacuees to Assembly Centers can be allocated for this pur¬
pose to the Relocation Center which received the majority of persons evacuated
under the same Civilian Exclusion Order, it is possible to arrive at the distribution

380

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

of evacuees in Table 58.

However, it should be remembered that these are as¬

sumed rather than tabulated destination data and make no allowance, of course,
for inter-Center transfers by the War Relocation Authority.
By agreement between the War Relocation Authority and the Wartime Civil
Control Administration, the former submitted daily Relocation Center popula¬
tion reports for consolidation with those from Assembly Centers until they were
closed on October 30, 1942.
Relocation Centers.

These reports showed 111,999 total inductions to

Table 59 combines these data with the summary figures

from Table 32 and provides an approximate distribution by Relocation Centers
of persons of the following groups: (a) Those directly inducted from Civil Con¬
trol Stations; (b) those transferred from Assembly Centers; (c) those inducted
originally by War Relocation Authority up to October 30, 1942.
Table 59 presents the concept of "Center of original residence” and does
not reflect the actual Center population as of October 31.

To do so would

require information as to births, deaths, inter-Center transfers, and furlough
and other releases, which is obtainable only from the records of War Relocation
Authority.

For figures on the de facto population of Relocation Centers monthly

to November 3, 1942, see Table 54.

TABLE 57.—Center of Origin and Destination of Evacuees Transferred From Assembly to Relocation Centers

statistical
summary
381

382
JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

STATISTICAL

383

SUMMARY

TABLE 58.—State and Relocation Center Destination of Japanese Evacuees,
By State of Origin*

STATE OF ORIGIN
State and Relocation
Center Destination
All
origins
All Centers.

California.
Tule Lake.

Arizona

California

109,427

259

92,562

30,220
17,641
12,579

258
247

29,962
17,394
12,568

24,236
9,730
14,506

1

18,920
9,471
9,449

11
1

10,142

Wyoming:

Heart Mountain.

8,494

8,494

17,368
8,461
8,907

17,368
8,461
8,907

7,652

7,652

11,315

10,166

Oregon

Wash¬
ington

3,714

12,892

872
872

4,443
258
4,185

2,842

7,300

1,149

♦This table does not include 223 beet workers from Military Area 2, California, and 792 other evacuees
including those from Alaska, parolees, and voluntary evacuees from other areas.

TABLE 59.—Estimated Persons Received By WRA From WCCA and Other
Sources, To October 31, 1942.

Center or
Class of Custody

Estimated
persons
inducted
to Oct. 31

From
WCCA1

Other
sources

Total WRA Custody.

111,999

111,155*

844

All Relocation Centers.

109,347

108,503

844

Central Utah.
Colorado River.
Heart Mountain.
Jerome.
Gila River.
Granada.
Manzanar.
Minidoka.
Rohwer.
Tule Lake.

8,265
18,086
10,992
7,676
13,296
7,574
10,271
9,512
8,234
15,441

8,255
17,740
10,972
7,674
13,234
7,567
10,049
9,484
8,232
15,296

Other than to Relocation Centers.

2,652

2,652*

Institutions, etc.

1,630
L022

1,630
1,022*

10
346

20
2
62
7

222

28

2

145

♦Including 794 persons remaining in institutions in evacuated area, and who were never evacuated.
1For detail see Table 32.

384

JAPANESE

4.

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

General Population Data

This section summarizes only the principal statistical source material an¬
alyzed by Wartime Civil Control Administration for purposes of the evacuation
program.

Reference should also be made to charts on statistics presented in

previous chapters, particularly Chapter VIII.
The total Japanese population of the United States in 1940 was 126,947.
Though they were but a small proportion, less than one-tenth of one per cent,
of the population of the United States as a whole, they outnumbered all other
minor races of recent foreign origin.
45,563 Filipinos.

There were only 77,504 Chinese and

During the decade from 1930 to 1940, the Japanese popu¬

lation of the United States had decreased by 11,887, or 8.6 per cent.

(See

Table 60.)
Of the 126,947 Japanese, 93,717, or 73.8 per cent, lived in the State of
California alone. The eight states comprising the Western Defense Command had
117,3 64, or 92.5 per cent of all Japanese in continental United States. (See Figures
5 a and 5b, Chapter VIII, and Table 61.)
A spot map showing the geographical distribution of persons of Japanese
ancestry living in the Western Defense Command area at the time of the
decennial Census of 1940 has been presented as Figure 6, Chapter VIII.

Pre¬

vious sections of this report, particularly Chapters II and VIII, have called
attention to the fact that the heaviest concentration of Japanese in the Pacific
Coast area was in and immediately surrounding, the principal port cities: Seattle,
Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles and San Diego.
In preparing estimates for use in planning the logistics of the evacuation
movement a study was made of the trend of Japanese population growth in
this area as well as of the distribution of the population. As indicated in Figure
37 the Japanese population of the United States reached its maximum in 1930
when the decennial Census enumerated 13 8,834. During the next decade there
was a net decrease of 11,887, or 8.6 per cent.

(See Table 62.)

The percentage of the total Japanese population of the United States
residing in the States of Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington has
steadily increased for the past four decades.

(See Figure 3 8.)

Flowever, be¬

cause of the decrease in the total Japanese population in the United States
from 1930 to 1940 none of the four states showed an increase in the Japanese
population during this period; and of the principal cities only Los Angeles
had more Japanese in 1940 than in 1930.

(See Table 63 and Figure 39.)

The changing sex composition of the Japanese population is shown in
Figure 40.

In 1900, 95 per cent of the total Japanese population of Arizona,

California,

Oregon

and

Washington

there were 19 males for each female.

consisted

of

males.

In

other

words,

During the period from 1910 to 1920,

there was a sharp increase in the number of females—this was the era of
"picture brides.”

The proportion of females has steadily increased since 1920

as a result of an increased proportion of native-born.
in the four States under discussion is given in Table 64.

The changing sex ratio

STATISTICAL

c3R0W TH 01r JAFANES E
UNI TED

385

SUMMARY

PO PULA’noN

STATIES : 1 870 T 0 194 0

JAP>kNESE
POPU LATION

il
700,000

200,000

100,000

18:888

70,000
60,000
50,000
40.000

JAPANESE
POPULATION

10,000

8888
7,000
ftOOO

-

f ir««”=,c’r'

3TAL POPULAT ION
Of PACIFIC COA ST
(IX00 TIMES SCA LE)
3oe=30C=3 0C=30*

1,000

**

eaot=J-

188

It

„r=>° *

700
600

)TAL POPULATION

OF T HE UNITED

500

(100.000 TIMES

SI ATES
SC ALE)

400
300

200

1

70
60

50
40
30

20

'

W70

I860

1090

1900

1910
YEAR

Figure 37

1920

1930

1940

386

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

DISTRIBUTION OF JAPANESE POPULATION
ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, OREGON, WASHINGTON AND
ENTIRE

UNITED

STATES: 1900 TO 1940

ARIZONA

CALIFORN I A

100
90

80
o 70
*

60

u 50

a40
ql 30
20
10

0

WCftTCRN NPINII COMMAND ANO TOVRTN ARMY
VAR TIM! CIVIL CONTROL AOMI NitT RATIO N

Figure 3 8

SUMMARY

387

Figure 39

STATISTICAL

388
JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Figure 40

STATISTICAL

SUMMARY

389

In discussions concerning the possible evacuation of only enemy alien
Japanese—which for practical purposes is the equivalent of all foreign-born—
consideration was given to the fact that nearly two-thirds of the total Japanese
population was native-born. Figure 41 shows the trend in nativity from 1900
to 1940 of the Japanese population of the four States under consideration. In
1900, less than three per cent of the Japanese population in Arizona, Califor¬
nia, Oregon and Washington was native-born. By 1910 this proportion had
risen to only 8 per cent. The proportion of native-born has steadily increased
because of the so-called "picture bride” era from 1910 to 1920, and the re¬
sultant native-born children, coupled with the shutting off of all immigration
in 1924. At present the native-born (i.e., citizen) Japanese outnumber the
aliens in these states by 71,896 to 41,089. Because of the peculiar age dis¬
tribution of this population group, however, nearly two-thirds of all adults,
i.e., 21 years of age and over were aliens. (See Table 2, Chapter VIII.)
A more striking form of presentation of the changing nativity of the Jap¬
anese population is shown in Figure 42 which shows the number of native and
the foreign-born in the states under consideration from 1900 to 1940. Numer¬
ically the maximum population of foreign-born was in 1920 or shortly there¬
after. The free immigration of such persons was, of course, almost entirely
stopped by legislation effective in 1924. Since 1920 the number of foreign-born
Japanese has declined rapidly both because of death and emigration.

If no

further immigration is permitted, the number of foreign-born Japanese will
shrink to negligible proportions during the next 3 0 years because of these trends.

As has been pointed out in previous chapters, the nativity of the Japanese
was not the controlling factor, in the evacuation program. The reason for this
has been clearly stated. Within the native-born group are a substantial number
who are Japanese in culture and patriotism.
II and XXIV.)

(See discussion of Kibei, Chapters

The trend in age composition of the Japanese population of the United
States for the past four decades is shown in Figure 43. In 1900, four out of
every five Japanese persons were 20 years of age or older. Because of the immi¬
gration of young males between 1900 and 1910, the resultant population in
1910 consisted of nine persons 20 years of age and over for each person less
than 20 years of age. The "picture bride” era from 1910 to 1920 and the re¬
duction of immigration of males by the "gentlemen’s agreement” of 1907
caused a rapid increase in the proportion of population in the younger age
groups until, in 1930, 45 per cent of the population was less than 20 years of
age. This increase in the proportion of children, plus the increase in the pro¬
portion who were in the older ages materially reduced the proportion of work¬
ers in the population, except for employment in family industries such as farms
and small stores.
Probably the most interesting analysis that can be made of the Japanese
population of the United States is that which would result from a complete
examination of the implications of the Japanese population as shown in Figure
44. The age data are the same as those presented in Figure 7 Chapter VIII but

390
JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

41
Figure

STATISTICAL SUMMARY

391

42
Figure

392

tZo
oi-CL < O

2

ODo
LU CL
o
CO

<LJ !“
_,UJu>

<r uj
(/) Q_ t

Q<|

Z")3

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

3DV±N3Db3d

THE

WEST

COAST

43
Figure

393

STATISTICAL SUMMARY

AGE

AND

SEX

J A PA N E S E

COMPOSITION
P O P U L AT ION

ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA,OREGON AND WASHINGTON: 1940
AGE

10

AGE

98765432
I
O
I
2345678910
FIGURES IN THOUSANDS
NATIVE

KwKi m » ou«t*u

BORN

FOREIGN BORN
•COTIIIM KflNM COWMAN* AM* IOUMTH ARM*
•ART MAC CIVIL CO NT ACM AMMNIM*TCM

Tm c(m»w»

Figure 44

394

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

are here arranged by sex as well as by nativity. Not only does the Japanese
population consist of two distinct nativity groups, but it also consists of two
very distinct generations—parents and children. This results from the sharp
reduction in the immigration of male Japanese following the "gentlemen’s
agreement” of 1907 and the virtual stoppage of all immigration of Japanese
in 1924. Normally, with continued immigration, the younger brothers and
sisters of the "parent” generation would have followed them to this country
and would have supplied what is now the "missing generation” of males
between 25 and 50 years of age and of females between 25 and 40.
As compared with a normal age pyramid, that of the Japanese population
shows a significant excess of males from 50 to 65 years of age (mostly immi¬
grants before 1910); a deficiency of males between 25 and 50 years of age
and of females from 25 to 40 years of age; an excess of youths 15 to 25; and
a deficiency of children under 15 years of age. This deficiency in younger chil¬
dren is apparently the result of two factors: (1) The generation of mothers
have passed out of the child bearing period more rapidly than their daughters
have entered it, and the birth rate, therefore, has declined; and (2) the Jap¬
anese custom of sending, or taking, young children to Japan for education
(and an appreciable number undoubtedly for permanent residence) exagger¬
ates the apparent deficiency of Japanese children.
The following are the median age of each of the sex and nativity groups
shown in Figure 44 and Table 66:
Both
sexes
All Japanese . . 23.4
Native-born . . 17.2
Foreign-born . . 49.7

Male

Female

24.9
17.5
53.0

21.7
16.8
45.0

The industrial distribution of Japanese workers on the Pacific Coast is
shown in Figure 45 and Table 67. In 1940, agriculture employed 22,027 Jap¬
anese 14 years old or over; 11,472, or 23.6 per cent were engaged in trade;
8,336 were in personal services; and 1,978 in manufacturing.
Although the Japanese population of the Pacific Coast formed less than 1.2
per cent of the total population, the 6,118 Japanese-operated farms were 2.2
per cent of all farms in these States. These 6,118 farms had a total acreage of
258,074 and a total value of farm land and buildings of $72,600,000. Their
average size was 42.2 acres, of which more than three-fourths (31.9 acres) was
in harvested crop land. The average value of Japanese-operated firms was
$11,867 compared with an average value of $11,717 for all farms in these
States. (See Table 68.)
Most of the Japanese engaged in agriculture worked on their own firms
which were usually small family enterprises devoted to inter-tilled truck, fruit,
and specialty crops. These crops were usually of a type which required intensive
cultivation, such as strawberries, tomatoes, lettuce, onions, celery, nursery stock,
peas, beans, fruit, sugar beets, etc. Estimates by Schiller and Thompson of the
acreage of commercial truck crops grown by Japanese in California are pre-

STATISTICAL

395

SUMMARY

INDUSTRY OF EMPLOYED JAPANESE
14 YRS AND OLDER. BY SEX AND NATIVITY
CALIFORNIA. OREGON. AND WASHINGTON
NUMBER OF EMPLOYED JAPANESE
*300

10000

AGRICULTURE.
FORESTRY. AM)
FISHERY

WHOLESALE
ANO RETAIL
TRADE

FOREIGN BORN

NATIVE BORN

PROFESSIONAL
SERVICES

ALL OTHERS

Figure 45

15.000

1940

396

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

sented in Table 69. The Farm Security Administration, on direction of the
Commanding General, was outstandingly successful in finding substitute oper¬
ators for Japanese farms and otherwise protecting the interests of the public
as well as the Japanese farm operators. This is reported in detail in Chapter XI.
An abnormally large proportion of all of the Japanese engaged in agricul¬
ture were unpaid family workers, 4,832 of the 22,027. More than half (2,715)
of these unpaid family workers were women and girls. Though Japanese women
were only 1.5 per cent of all employed women on the Pacific Coast states, the
unpaid family workers constituted 48 per cent of all women on all West Coast
farms who were so classified.
Women and girls over 14 years of age comprise nearly one-fifth of all the
Japanese agricultural workers, and they also formed more than one-fifth of all
women and girls engaged in agriculture in the Pacific Coast states. However,
the bulk of labor, Japanese men and boys, constituted only 4.5 per cent of all
males engaged in agriculture.
In trade, the Bureau of the Census reports that 4,972 workers were engaged
in retail food stores, 2,190 in wholesale business (principally importing and
specialties) and 2,082 in restaurants. All other retail and wholesale trades em¬
ployed only 2,228. The relative importance of wholesale and retail trade and
of agriculture in terms of their employment of Japanese workers is shown in
Figure 46.
Although, in the initial phase of the evacuation program, to satisfy the
objective of keeping communities together and moving them to Assembly
Centers as close as possible to their place of residence, certain Centers comprised
almost entirely urban and non-agricultural population, while other Centers were
predominantly rural and farm population. It was a definite part of the original
evacuation plan to relocate the evacuees in such a manner as to provide a more
balanced occupational community in each Relocation Center. This was accom¬
plished by the transfer of both an urban and a rural Assembly Center group to
most Relocation Centers. The logistics of movement, which required the evacu¬
ation of an entire Assembly Center to one Relocation Center if possible, and the
geographic location and the completion of the Relocation Centers were other im¬
portant modifying factors in the accomplishment of this objective.
Among the several special tabulations prepared by the Bureau of the Census
for the Wartime Civil Control Administration, the most widely useful have
been summarized in this chapter.

Because of the interest throughout

the

Western Defense Command area in the distribution of Japanese population by
counties, the special census tabulation showing the total number of individuals
and the total number of Japanese heads of families is reproduced by States as
Tables 70 to 77 at the end of this chapter.

Similarly, widespread interest in

the occupational and industrial classification of the Japanese population by
sex and nativity has resulted in the inclusion of Tables 78-81.
The Wartime Civil Control Administration published 12 statistical bulletins
with summaries of the most important special tabulations received from the
Bureau of the Census. These bulletins were prepared for the use of the civilian

STATISTICAL

SUMMARY

Figure 4 6

397

398

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

and Military agencies and services participating in the evacuation program.
The titles of these bulletins are as follows:

Bulletin
Number

Title

1

Enemy Aliens and Japanese Citizens on the West Coast.

2

Japanese Population and Number of Japanese Family Heads in Arizona
by Minor Civil Division: 1940.

3

Japanese Population and Number of Japanese Family Heads in Califor¬
nia by Minor Civil Divisions: 1940.

4

Japanese Population and Number of Japanese Family Heads in Wash¬

5

Japanese Population and Number of Japanese Family Heads in Oregon

ington by Minor Civil Divisions: 1940.

by Minor Civil Divisions: 1940.
6

Japanese Farm Operators in Arizona, California, Oregon and Washing¬
ton, by Minor Civil Divisions.

7

Major Industry Groups of Japanese Employed Workers 14 Years Old
and Over by Sex for California, Oregon, and Washington, by Counties:
1940.

8

Age of Japanese by Citizenship and Sex for Arizona, California, Oregon,
and Washington, by Counties: 1940.

9

Japanese Operated Farms by Tenure of Operator for Arizona, Califor¬
nia, Oregon and Washington, by Counties: 1940.

10

Employed Japanese Workers 14 Years Old and Over, by Major Occu¬
pation Group, Industry Group, and Sex, for California, Oregon, and
Washington: 1940.

11

Japanese Population and Number of Japanese Family Heads by Nativ¬
ity, for Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Utah, by Counties and Minor
Civil Divisions: 1940.

12

Characteristics of the Japanese Population (I) Pre-Evacuation Statistics,
(II) Evacuation Statistics, (III) Analytical and Methodological Statistics.

STATISTICAL

3 99

SUMMARY

TABLE 60.—Population By Race, For The United States: 1940 and
.
(A minus sign (-) denotes decrease).

1930.

Increase
1930 to 1940
1940

Race

1930
Amount

Percent

131,669,275

122,775,046

8,894,229

7.2

White.
Native-born.
Foreign-born.

118,214,870
106,795,732
11,419,138

110,286,740
96,303,335
13,983,405

7,928,130
10,492,397
-2,564,267

7.2
10.9
-18.3

All classes.

Negro.

12,865,518

11,891,143

974,375

8.2

Indian1.

333,969

332,397

1,572

0.5

Other races.
Chinese.
Japanese.
Filipino.
Hindu.
Korean.
All other.

254,918
77,504
126,947
45,563
2,405
1,711
788

264,766
74,954
138,834
45,208
3,130
1,860
780

-9,848
2,550
-11,887
355
-725
-149
8

-3.7
3.4
-8.6
0.8
-23.2
-8.0
1.0

‘Indian is included in “Other Races” by Census.
Source: Bureau of the Census.

TABLE 61.—Geographical Distribution of The Japanese Population in The
United States: 1940.

Number

Percent of
United States

Total United States.

126,947

100.0

Western Defense Command.

117,364

92.5

Military Areas 1 and 2.

112,985

89.0

Pacific Coast States.
California.
Washington.

112,353
93,717
4,071
14,565

88.5
73.8
3.2
11.5

632

0.5

Military Areas 3-6.
Idaho (Military Area 3).
Montana (Military Area 4).
Nevada (Military Area 5).
Utah (Military Area 6).

4,379
1,191
508
470
2,210

3.4
0.9
0.4
0.4
1.7

Outside Western Defense Command.

9,583
2,734
2,538
480
3,831

7.5
2.2
2.0
0.4
3.0

Area

All Other States.
Source:

Bureau of the Census,

400

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

TABLE 62.—Nativity of Japanese in the United States: 1890 - 1940.
Year

Total

Native-born

Foreign-born

1940.
1930.
1920.
1910.•.
1900.
1890.

126,947
138,834
111,010
72,157
24,326
2,039

79,642
68,357
29,672
4,502
269

47,305
70,477
81,338
67,655
24,057
2,039

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

62.7
49.2
26.7
6.2
1.1

37.3
50.8
73.3
93.8
98.9
100.0

PERCENT
1940.
1930.
1920.
1910.
1900.
1890.
Source:

Bureau of the Census.

TABLE 63.—Growth of Japanese Population in Certain Selected Cities of
California, Oregon, and Washington:

1900 - 1940.

DECENNIAL CENSUS OF —
State and City
1940

1930

1920

1910

1900

CALIFORNIA
Los Angeles.
San Francisco.
Oakland...
Sacramento.
Fresno.
Stockton..
Berkeley.

23,321
5,280
1,790
2,879
797
1,259
1,319

21,081
6,250
2,137
3,347
1,176
1,386
1,320

11,618
5,358
2,709
1,976
1,119
840
911

4,238
4,618
1,520
1,437
629
475
710

150
1,781
194
336
175
39

OREGON
Portland.

1,680

1,861

1,715

1,461

1,189

WASHINGTON
Seattle.
Tacoma.

6,975
877

8,448
1,193

7,874
1,306

6,127
1,018

2,990
606

Source:

Bureau of the Census.

STATISTICAL

401

SUMMARY

TABLE 64.—Sex Composition of The Japanese Population in Arizona, Cali¬
fornia, Oregon, and Washington: 1900 - 1940.

State and Year

Both sexes

Male

Female

Males per
100 females

FOUR STATE TOTAL
1940.
1930.
1920.
1910.
1900.

112,985
121,130
94,040
58,074
18,550

63,208
70,091
59,921
49,832
17,699

49,777
51,039
34,119
8,242
851

127.0
137.3
175.6
604.6
2,079.8

ARIZONA
1940.
1930.
1920.
1910.
1900.

632
879
550
371
281

354
532
383
351
264

278
347
167
20
17

127.3
153.3
229.3
1,755.0
1,552.9

CALIFORNIA
1940.
1930.
1920.
1910.
1900.

93,717
97,456
71,952
41,356
10,151

52,550
56,440
45,414
35,116
9,598

41,167
41,016
26,538
6,240
553

127.7
137.6
171.1
562.8
1,735.6

OREGON
1940.
1930.
1920.
1910.
1900.

4,071
4,958
4,151
3,418
2 ,501

2,271
2,919
2,802
3,124
2,405

1,800
2,039
1,349
294
96

126.2
143.2
207.7
1,062.6
2,505.2

WASHINGTON
1940.
1930.
1920.
1910.
1900.

14,565
17,837
17,387
12,929
5,617

8,033
10,200
11,322
11,241
5,432

6,532
7,637
6,065
1,688
185

123.0
133.6
186.7
665.9
2,936.2

Source:

Bureau of the Census.

402

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

TABLE 65.—Nativity of The Japanese Population in Arizona, California,
Oregon, and Washington: 1900 - 1940
NUMBER

PERCENT

State and Year
Total
Japanese

Nativeborn

Foreignbom

Nativeborn

Foreignbom

FOUR STATE TOTAL
1940.
1930.
1920.
1910.
1900.

112,985
121,130
94,040
58,074
18,550

71,896
60,722
26,350
4,071
204

41,089
60,408
67,690
54,003
18,346

63.6
50.1
28.0
7.0
1.1

36.4
49.9
72.0
93.0
98.9

ARIZONA
1940.
1930.
1920.
1910.
1900.

632
879
550
371
281

412
464
121
6

220
415
429
365
281

65.2
52.8
22.0
1.6
0.0

34.8
47.2
78.0
98.4
100.0

CALIFORNIA
1940.
1930.
1920.
1910.
1900.

93,717
97,456
71,952
41,356
10,151

60,148
48,979
20,814
3,172
143

33,569
48,477
51,138
38,184
10,008

64.2
50.3
28.9
7.7
1.4

35.8
49.7
71.1
92.3
98.6

OREGON
1940.
1930.
1920.
1910.
1900.

4,071
4,958
4,151
3,418
2,501

2,454
2,361
994
138
10

1,617
2,597
3,157
3,280
2,491

60.3
47.6
23.9
4.0
0.4

39.7
52.4
76.1
96.0
99.6

WASHINGTON
1940.
1930.
1920.
1910.
1900.

14,565
17,837
17,387
12,929
5,617

8,882
8,918
4,421
755

5,683
8,919
12,966
12,174
5,566

61.0
50.0
25.4
5.8
0.9

39.0
50.0
74.6
94.2
99.1

Source:

Bureau of the Census.

51

TABLE 66.—Age of Japanese By Sex and By Nativity for Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington: 1940

statistical
summary

403

TABLE 66 (Continued).—Age

of Japanese by Sex and Nativity for Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington:

1940

404
JAPANESE
EVACUATION
FROM
THE
WEST
COAST

TABLE

66

(Continued).—Age

of Japanese by Sex and Nativity for Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington:

1940

statistical
summary

405

66

(Concluded).—Age

of Japanese by Sex and Nativity for Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington:

1940

406

TABLE

JAPANESE
EVACUATION
FROM
THE
WEST
COAST

i

OB

STATISTICAL

407

SUMMARY

TABLE 67.—Employed Japanese Workers*, by Major Industry Groups,
in California, Oregon, and Washington:
1940
Major Industry Group

Number

Percent

48,691

100.0

Agriculture.
Forestry and fishing.
Mining. .;.
Construction.
Manufacturing..

22,027
786
12
96
1,978

45.2
1.6
0.0
0.2
4.1

Food and kindred products
Printing and publishing
Sawmills and planing mills.
Logging.
Textile and apparel.
Others.

769
327
365
60
186
271

1.6
0.7
0.7
0.1
0.4
0.6

Transportation..
Utilities and communication.
Trade.

686
20
11,472

1.4
0.0
23.6

Wholesale....
Food stores, retail.
Restaurants.
Other, including filling stations.

2,190
4,972
2,082
2,228

4.5
10.2
4.3
4.6

Personal services.

8,336

17.1

Domestic.
Hotels and lodging places.
Laundering, cleaning, and dyeing services
Miscellaneous personal services.

4,744
1.335
1,478
779

9.7
2.7
3.0
1.6

Finance, insurance, real estate.
Business and repair services.
Professional and related services._.
Amusement, recreation, and related services....
Government.
Non-classifiable.

656
411
1,326
251
126
508

1.3
0.8
2.7
0.5
0.3
1.0

Total.

*14 years old or over, employed except on public emergency work.
Source: Bureau of the Census.

408

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

TABLE 68.—Japanese-Operated Farms Compared With All Farms in
California, Oregon, and Washington, 1920-40
Category
Number of farms'.
Total.

1940

1930

1920

Percent Japanese.

276,173
6,118
2.2

261,733
4,744
1.8

234,164
6,075
2.6

All land in farms (acres):
Total.
Japanese.
Percent Japanese.

63,694,000
258,074
0.4

60,526,000
212,064
0.4

56,153,000
394,696
0.7

Cropland harvested (acres):
Total.
Japanese.
Percent Japanese.

12,929,000
195,288
1.5

Value of farms, land and buildings:
Total.
Japanese.
Percent Japanese.

*
*

*
*

*

*

$3,236,000,000
$72,600,000
2.2

$4,824,000,000
$93,000,000
1.9

$4,669,000,000
$148,400,000
3.2

Value of buildings:
Total.
Japanese.
Percent Japanese.

$649,474,000
$9,086,000
1.4

$737,486,000
$7,016,000
1.0

*
*
*

Value of farm implements and machinery:
Total.
Japanese.
Percent Japanese.

$233,046,000
$6,829,000
2.9

$228,839,000
$4,121,000
1.8

*
*
*

Average land in farms (acres):
Total.
Japanese.

230.6
42.2

231.3
44.7

Average cropland harvested (acres):
Total.
Japanese.

46.8
31.9

Average value of farms, land and build¬
ings:
Total.
Japanese.

$11,717
$11,867

♦Comparative data not available.
Source: Bureau of the Census.

239.8
65.0

*
*

*
*

$18,431
$19,604

$19,939
$24,428

STATISTICAL

TABLE

409

SUMMARY

69.—Acreage of Commercial Truck Crops Grown by
Japanese in California1

Commodity

Total 1940
acreage for
State

Estimated
acres grown
by Japanese

Estimated acres
grown by Japanese
as percent of State
acreage

10,600
79,780
563
6,950
4,600
2,373
6,850

5,300
20,164
287
6,602
4,369
1,011
2,362

50
25
51
95
95
43
34

26,100
12,000
9,800
13,700

7,830
2,880
3,605
3,630

30
24
37
26

6,700
8,850

4,487
6,302

67
71

8,850
3,100
1,800

5,627
2,954
1,710

64
95
95

2,330
2,200
1,890
30,350
15,200
16,500
27,550
800
1,350
3,200
2,394

1,165
1,100
1,420
10,530
3,800
4,935
7,637
240
675
1,440
182

50
50
75
35
25
30
28
30
50
45
8

Artichokes.
Asparagus.
Canning snap beans.
Marketing snap beans (spring).
Snap beans (fall).
Green lima beans.
Cabbage.
Cantaloup:
Imperial.
Other.
Carrots: (fall and winter).
Spring.
Cauliflower:
Fall and winter.
Spring.
Celery:
Fall and winter.
Spring.
Summer.
Cucumbers:
Pickle.
Table.
Garlic.
Spring lettuce.
Lettuce (Imperial).
Summer lettuce.
Fall lettuce.
Bermuda onions.
Intermediate onions.
Late onions.
Canning peas.

Estimates made by Carl Schiller, Division of Agricultural Statistics, Bureau of Agricultural
Economics, and Murray Thompson, economic adviser to western region. Agricultural Adjustment
Administration. Released by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics for submission to the House
Committee Investigating National Defense Migration. Table 34, Supplement I of the Committee’s
report, “Findings and Recommendations on Evacuation of Enemy Aliens and Others from Prohibited
Military Zones”, May, 1942.

TABLE 70.—Nativity

of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in
Arizona, by Counties: 1940
(The only counties listed are those which had Japanese in 1940)
INDIVIDUALS

HEADS OF FAMILIES

County
Total

Alien

Citizen

Total

Alien

Citizen

State total.

632

220

412

128

117

11

Apache.
Coconino.
Gila.
Greenlee.
Maricopa.

1
9
4
1
534

2
1
1
175

i
1
1
101

i
l
l
93

8

Navajo.
Pima.
Yavapai.
Yuma.

49
17
4
13

24
8
4
5

15
4
3
2

14
2
3
2

Source:

Bureau of the Census

1
7
3
359
25
9
8

1
2
• •'

410

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

TABLE 71.—Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in
California, by Counties:
1940
(The only counties listed are those which had Japanese in 1940)
INDIVIDUALS

HEADS OF FAMILIES

County
Total

Alien

Citizen

Total

Alien

Citizen

State total.

93,717

33,569

60,148

18,838

15,117

3,721

Alameda.
Amador.
Butte.
Calaveras.
Colusa.

5,167
2
216
6
155

1,785

3,382
2
143
6
103

1,068

853

215

42

33

9

30

25

5

Contra Costa.
El Dorado.
Fresno.
Imperial.

829
3
4,527
1,583
1

311
2
1,508
589
1

518
1
3,019
994

169
1
854
326
1

138
1
699
294
1

31

Kern.
Kings.
Lake.
Los Angeles.
Madera.

756
508
1
36,866
170

359
185
1
13,391
52

397
323

112
136
1
8,068
26

87
121
1
6,402
21

Marin.
Mendocino.
Merced.

150
53
715
4
2,247

82
32
234
4
717

32
8
133
2
437

26
7
112
2
340

34
677
490
1
183

20
1,178
1,147
369

7
347
313
1
114

6
274
251
1
96

1
73
62

Riverside.

54
1,855
1,637
1
552

Sacramento.
San Benito.
San Bernardino.
San Diego.
San Francisco.

6,764
526
346
2,076
5,280

2,275
145
135
793
2,276

4,489
381
211
1,283
3,004

1,220
96
68
398
1,138

995
74
56
325
953

225
22
12
73
185

San Joaquin.
San Luis Obispo.
San Mateo.
Santa Barbara.
Santa Clara.

4,484
925
1,218
2,187
4,049

1,725
286
418
768
1,220

2,759
639
800
1,419
2,829

786
187
244
441
573

626
152
191
352
437

160
35
53
89
136

Santa Cruz.
Shasta.
Siskiyou.
Solano.
Sonoma.

1,301
2
7
906
758

370
1
3
388
209

931
1
4
518
549

245
2
2
193
132

187
1
1
169
96

58
1
1
24
36

Stanislaus.
Sutter.
Tehama.
Tulare.
Ventura.

369
423
38
1,812
672

138
149
11
711
251

231
274
27
1,101
421

68
87
8
337
141

57
70
5
273
114

11
17
3
64
27

Yolo.
Yuba.

1,087
429

388
146

699
283

178
66

139
53

39
13

Monterey.
Napa.
Orange.
Placer.

Source:

Bureau of the Census.

73
52

23,475
118
68
21
481
1,530

155
32
25
15
1,666
5
6
1
21
97

18

STATISTICAL

411

SUMMARY

TABLE 72.—Nativity of all Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in
Oregon, by Counties:
1940
(The only counties listed are those which had Japanese in 1940)
INDIVIDUALS

HEADS OF FAMILIES

County
Total

Alien

Citizen

Total

Alien

Citizen

4,071

1,617

2,454

893

790

103

Baker....
Clackamas
Clatsop...
Columbia.
Deschutes.

46
163
98
38
14

25
52
54
18
6

21
111
44
20
8

8
25
26
12
3

8
20
24
10
3

5
2
2

Grant.
Hood River.
Jackson.
Jefferson....
Klamath... .

10
462
41
12
1

5
162
20
2

5
300
21
10
1

2
89
10
4
1

2
79
10
1
.

Lake...
Lane...
Lincoln.
Linn.. .
Malheur

11
1
4
4
137

5
1
2
2
37

6

1

1

2
2
100

1
1
28

1
1
24

193
3
2,390
28
3

70
2
968
15
2

123
1
1,422
13
1

34
1
550
9
1

30
1
484
9
1

10
10
82
245
65

5
1
34
105
24

5
9
48
140
41

2
1
18
54
12

18
49
12

State total

Marion....
Morrow. . .
Multnomah
Polk.
Sherman...
Umatillo.. .
Union.
Wasco.
Washington
Yamhill. . . ,

Source: Bureau of the Census.

10
3
1

4
4
66

2
1
5

412

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

TABLE 73.—Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads

in

Washington, by Counties:
1940
(The only counties listed are those which had Japanese in 1940)
HEADS OF FAMILIES

INDIVIDUALS
County
Total

Citizen

Alien

Citizen

Alien

Total

446

14,565

5,683

8,882

3,154

2,708

23
1
69
26
17

9

4

4

35
17
6

14
1
34
9
11

8
13
3

8
13
3

Clark.
Cowlitz.

110
127
3
67
2

38
49
2
27
2

72
78
1
40

21
44
1
10
1

17
31
1
10
1

4
13

Jefferson.
King.
Kitsap.

37
9,863
345
9
121

13
3,896
117
2
53

24
5,967
228
7
68

7
2,200
64
1
23

5
1,899
55
1
21

2
301
9

5
1
3
1

State total.

Klickitat.

2

Lewis.
Lincoln.
Mason.
Pacific.

62
33
23
94
14

20
13
8
39
3

42
20
15
55
11

19
6
6
21
2

14
5
3
20
2

Pierce.

2,050
2
66
4
57

770
2
26
1
28

1,280

339
1
9
1
16

54

40
3
29

393
1
15
1
16

362
13
90
17
28

168
5
41
10
11

194
8
49
7
17

65
3
35
3
6

59
3
26
2
6

6

16
814

6
266

10
548

3
159

3
130

Skagit.

Spokane.
Thurston.
Walla Walla.

Yakima.
Source: Bureau of the Census.

6

9
1

29

STATISTICAL

413

SUMMARY

TABLE 74.—Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in
Idaho, by Counties:
1940
(The only counties listed are those which had Japanese in 1940)
INDIVIDUALS

HEADS OF FAMILIES

County
Total
State total.

Citizen

Total

Alien

Citizen

1,191

426

765

239

209

17
175
7
1
107

5
56
2
1
37

12
119
5
70

3
30
1
1
20

3
29
1
1
16

5
20
190
27
4

2
7
66
11
2

3
13
124
16
2

2
3
32
2
1

1
3
27
2
1

4
149
2
1
20

1
67
2
1
6

3
82
14

1
36
1
1
4

1
34
1
1
2

11
9
12
14
11

4
5
4
6
8

7
4
8
8
3

2
3
2
4
4

2
2
2
4
4

36
9
5
3
23

8
5
3
2
14

28
4
2
1
9

6
6
2
2
7

4
4
2
2
5

182
22
8
50
1

48
6
2
19

134
16
6
31
1

30
3
1
12

27
3
1
10

1
11
3
2

1
8
3
2

Bannock.
Bingham.
Boise.
Bonneville.

Canyon.
Elmore.
Fremont.

Jerome.
Kootenai.
Lincoln.
Madison.
Owyhee.

Twin Falls.
Washington.
Source:

Alien

Bureau of the Census.

1
1
46
11
7

30
1
4
1
5

2
2
1

2
2
2
3
2

1
1
15
6
4

31
5
3

3

414

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

TABLE 75.—Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in
Montana, by Counties:
1940
(The only counties listed are those which had Japanese in 1940)
HEADS OF FAMILIES

INDIVIDUALS
County
Total

Citizen

Alien

Total

Citizen

Alien

State total.

508

227

281

128

114

Chouteau.

10
39
7
13
11

6
12
2
9
4

4
27
5
4
7

3
7
2
8
3

3
7
2
8
2

24
3
1
3
57

7
2
1
1
26

17
1

9
1

6
1

2
31

1
17

1
17

39
10
1
60
27

24
5
1
17
7

15
5

3
3
1
12
7

3
3
1
10
4

13
32
13
1
9

7
18
10
1
6

6
14
3

3
5
3
1
4

3
5
3
1
4

7
9
19
3
10

4
3
7
3
3

3
6
12
7

3
1
6
1
2

3
1
2
1
2

Valley.
Wheatland.

1
2
4
18
24

1
2
1
11
6

3
7
18

1
1
1
6
4

1
1
1
5
4

Yellowstone.

38

20

18

9

9

Custer.

Hill.'..
Lewis and Clark.

Rosebud.

Source:

Bureau of the Census.

43
20

3

14

1
3

2
3

4

1
.

415

STATISTICAL SUMMARY

TABLE 76.—Nativity

of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in
Nevada, by Counties: 1940

(The only counties listed are those which had Japanese in 1940)
INDIVIDUALS

HEADS OF FAMILIES

County
Total

Alien

Citizen

Total

Alien

Citizen

470

245

225

84

78

6

35
49
4
60
12

8
18
2
30
3

27
31
2
30
9

4
9
1
20
3

4
9
1
18
2

2
1

Lyon.
Nye.

5
20
17
2
6

4
7
10
1
3

1
13
7
1
3

3
4
3
1
1

3
4
2
1
1

1

Pershing.
Washoe.
White Pine.

6
60
194

3
21
135

3
39
59

1
11
23

1
9
23

2

State total.
Clark.
Elko.
Humboldt.

Source:

Bureau of the Census.

TABLE 77.—Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in
Utah, by Counties: 1940
(The only counties listed are those which had Japanese in 1940)
INDIVIDUALS

HEADS OF FAMILIES

County
Total
State Total.

Alien

Citizen

Total

Alien

Citizen

2,210

829

1,381

428

396

32

289
26
193
424
20

78
8
110
132
8

211
18
83
292
12

49
4
40
74
3

44
4
35
71
3

5

24
16
1
773
1

8
5
1
317
1

16
11
456

5
3
1
155

5
3
1
141

26
5
40
37
7

7
3
14
17
2

19
2
26
20
5

3
2
10
9
1

3
2
10
9
1

328

118

210

69

64

Box Elder.
Carbon.
Davis.

Millard.
Salt Lake.

Utah.

Weber.
Source: Bureau of the Census.

5
3

14

5

416
JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

, and Washington:

1940.—Continued

STATISTICAL
SUMMARY

417

Employed Workers

14

Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity, and Major Occupation and Industry

Groups, for California, Oregon, and Washington:

418

TABLE 78.—Japanese

1940.—Concluded

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

TABLE 79.—Japanese

Employed Workers

14

Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity, and Major Occupation and Industry
Groups, for California:

1940

statistical summary

419

Employed Workers

14

420

TABLE 79.—Japanese

Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity, and Major Occupation and Industry

Groups, for California:

1940.—Continued

BOTH SEXES

MALE

FEMALE

Major Occupation Group and Industry Group

00 NO O'
O -H
T*

• *H

IO • CN • • vh •
N
CN
to O' O'
00 O' ^
—< ^ CN

• io
•
•
• cn
•
•

lOTfN
v© O *h
CN 0"0

>©
o

-H IO -H
IO IO CO
00 t''* CN

80
405
368

• •H

764
1,442
724

CO

oo
CO
CO
CO

2,320

1,615
3,197
955

^

00

vOt^ oo cNr^
00 *-<

VO
pH
©
N

3,678

cn •
<o
.
.

•

O
CN

4

3
5
7
1
2

*oo
-rH
•

N • CO • •

Tf r<5 -rH CN CN 'O

<N VO t* CN *-(
IO IO IO

46
69
36

• lO»ON

covooo • •
00
• •
CN
• •

1,036
2,254
480

1
10

•T*

CN
—<
VO

Wholesale trade.
Food and dairy products stores, and milk retailing.
Eating and drinking places.

• O' CO JO

4,724

177

'Ot^CN^HT^COCN'rHlOOO
—i

9,336

Nativeborn

325

391
12
27

CO CO IO CO
CN *-< 00

IO
CN

O CN IO CN Ov
©v CN

Wholesale and retail trade.

Foreignborn

502

rr) .IO
vO •

0'-HIOCN'©1000-*'©00
XT) pH
^

^
CO

155

49
69
36
1
4

241

Total

^

’^OOO'H'OO^'O
©
IOCN©
CN
CN

HN^tH^TtCNHlOO'
CS

159

55
161
61
3
13

1
13

Nativeborn

CO I'- O' CO
CN CN

-CO00 00©
CN • MHH

-h 00

N

Transport, communication and other public utilities...
Railroads (inc. r.r. repair shops) and railway exp. service...
Trucking service.
Other transportation..
Communication.
Utilities.

CN
00 00^0

388

in't^HMCN'O
T*

Transportation equipment, except automobile.
Other and not specified manufacturing industries.

629

^ CN -h CO -H O' -h
CN -H pH
CO
^

lOO'OH'OO'NH
O' CN CO
*OCNiO
IO
CN

Chemicals and allied products.
Petroleum and coal products.
Leather and leather products.
Stone, clay, and glass products.
Iron and steel and their products.
Nonferrous metals and their products.
Machinery.%...

418

O CN
00ON
00-VO
-H
pH

713

CO
O'
CN

1,131

Total

Foreignborn

'O-»H00CN'O'O00^-''OCN
vO—»
CN

Manufacturing.
Food and kindred products.
Textile-mill products.
Apparel and other fabricated textile products.
LocrcinET.
Sawmills and planing mills. .....
Furniture, store fixtures, and miscellaneous wooden goods..
Paper and allied products...
Printing, publishing, and allied industries.

Nativeborn

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

Total

Foreignborn

STATISTICAL SUMMARY

421

Employed Workers

14

Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity, and Major Occupation and Industry
Groups, for Oregon:

422

TABLE 80.—Japanese

1940

JAPANESE
EVACUATION
FROM
THE
WEST
COAST

Table

80.—Japanese

Employed Workers

14

Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity, and Major Occupation and Industry

Groups, for Oregon:

1940.—Continued

STATISTICAL
SUMMARY

ing pl<

423

424
JAPANESE EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

TABLE 81.—Japanese

Employed Workers

14

Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity, and Major Occupation and Industry
Groups, for Washington:

1940

STATISTICAL
SUMMARY

425

1

426

►4

W

!

PP
H

Groups, for Washington: 1940.—Continued

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

B6

>*
B
tr>
!=>
Q
Z

Q

>—t

<
Z
H

o
0*
O
y

<

O

o

Q
a
><

o
a
a
a

w

1940.—Concluded
Groups, for Washington:

STATISTICAL

SUMMARY

427

PART IX

PICTORIAL SUMMARY

Pictorial Summary
To accommodate persons of Japanese ancestry subject to evacuation, pend¬
ing their transfer inland, fourteen temporary Assembly Centers, and one Recep¬
tion Center were constructed in the states of California, Oregon and Wash¬
ington in the record period of an average of 21 days each.

A former Civilian

Conservation Corps camp in Arizona was conditioned as an Assembly Center
also.

Accommodations varied in capacity from 2,500 to 19,000 persons each.

The one Reception Center, at Manzanar, Inyo County, California, was sub¬
sequently transferred to the War Relocation Authority, a civilian agency, and
became one of ten Relocation Centers. The United States Army Engineers were
responsible for the building of all Assembly Centers under the supervision of
the Commanding General, Western Defense Command.
Construction of the temporary Assembly Centers was necessary because of
the need for speedy evacuation.

This could not await the site selection for and

construction of the Relocation Centers.
In some cases existing buildings at fair grounds and race tracks utilized for
the Assembly Centers were renovated and converted into lodgings, but generally
the quarters were newly erected.

Each building usually contained four apart¬

ments.
In addition, there were constructed or put into condition a variety of other
facilities, services and buildings such as administration headquarters, mess halls,
hospital units, laundries, washrooms, center stores or canteens, work shops, recrea¬
tional, educational and religious centers.

Fields were improved for outdoor recrea¬

tional activities.
The series of selected photographs on the following pages, assembled from a
number of sources, show phases of the evacuation program.
Figures 142 to 149, inclusive, show construction activity and completed
facilities in Relocation Centers.

The construction, equipment and initial supply

of Relocation Centers was a function of Western Defense Command.

The

United States Army Engineers also were responsible to the Commanding Gen¬
eral for the construction of Relocation Centers.

431

432

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

SOURCE OF SELECTED PHOTOGRAPHS
The following listings, identifying each photo by the "Figure No.” preceding it in the follow¬
ing pages, shows the source from which gathered.

OFFICIAL

UNITED

STATES

United States Signal Corps—2, 3, 5, 6,
7, 8 , 9, 10 . 11, 12, 13,
26, 27, 28., 29, 30, 31,
46, 48, 49,, 51, 52, 53,
62, 63, 64., 66, 67, 69,

18 , 20, 22, 23, 24., 25,
3 6 , 37, 38, 39, 43,, 45,
54 , 55, 56, 57, 58 , 61,

GOVERNMENT

United

PHOTOS

States

Army

Engineers—142,

143, 144, 146, 147, 148.
Wartime Civil Control Administration,

70,, 71, 72, 78, 79,, 80,
84, 85, 86 , 88,, 90, 91,, 95, 97 , 98 , 100, 101,

Santa

104., 107, 108, 109,, 11 o, 112, 113 , H4, 115,
116 , 117, 118, 119 , 120, 121, 122 , 123, 124,
125,, 126, 127, 128 , 129, 130, 131 , 1313, 137,
138.

75, 76, 77, 81, 83, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 99, 102,

NEWSPAPER

AND

Anita,

California,

Assembly

Center—

19, 21, 32, 33, 42, 44, 47, 50, 59, 60, 65, 68,

103, 105, 106, 111, 132, 139, 140.
War Relocation Authority—145, 149.

PICTURE

SERVICE PHOTOS

Courtesy of paper or service indicated.

Acme Newspictures, Inc.—1, 74, 82.

Portland, Oregon, Oregonian—141.

Long Beach, Calif., Press-Telegram—15.

Portland, Oregon, Oregon Journal—

Los Angeles, Calif., Daily News—
134, 135, 136.

35, 40, 41, 87.
Sacramento, Calif., Union—34.

Los Angeles, Calif., Times—4, 16.

San Francisco, Calif., News—73.

Oakland, Calif., Post-Enquirer—17.

Tacoma, Wash., News-Tribune—14.

PICTORIAL

Figure 1:
County,

433

SUMMARY

An early construction scene at Manzanar Reception Center, in Owens Valley, Inyo

California.

This was

the first

of

a series of Centers

constructed

by

the Army, and

later became a Relocation Center under the War Relocation Authority.

Figure

2:

A

portion

of

the

completed

Santa

Anita

(California)

Assembly

Center,

situated

within the world famous race track at Arcadia, California. This was the largest of all Assembly
Centers.

Nearly

19,000

persons were lodged here.

434

Figure 3:

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Members of an advance party of evacuees loading bedding and other equipment in

warehouse at Pomona

(California)

Assembly Center. Centers were readied for evacuee reception

in advance.

Figure 4:

Scene in the first kitchen to be opened at the Santa Anita

(California)

Assembly

Center. Modern kitchen and cooking equipment were supplied the mess halls at all centers.

PICTORIAL

SUMMARY

435

Figure 5:
Delivering issues of bedding and household utensils to apartment of a newly arrived
evacuee family.

Figure 6:
Military Police posting Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1, requiring evacuation of
Japanese living on Bainbridge Island, in Puget Sound, Washington. Civilian Exclusion Orders,
numbered 1 to 108, were issued by the Commanding General ordering exclusion of persons of
Japanese ancestry from 108 specific areas in the states of California, Oregon, Washington, and
Arizona.

436

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Figure 7:
Young Japanese couple receive their registration record as first step in the evacuation
of San Francisco. The same system and forms were used in registration in all evacuation operations.

Group of registrants in Civil Control Station at Sanger, California. After receiving
registration forms, evacuees were interviewed by civilian clerks, who aided them in filling out
the necessary blanks.

Figure 8:

PICTORIAL

SUMMARY

437

Figure 9:
Registrants being interviewed by the Public Assistance Department of the Control
Station at Visalia, California. Those who registered were given opportunity to arrange their affairs.
They then returned to the Control Station, where they were again interviewed to ascertain if they
needed assistance to evacuate.

10:
Group being interviewed by Farm Security Administration representatives. Ar¬
rangements were made to assist evacuees in the equitable disposition of their agricultural
interests and properties.
Figure

438

JAPANESE

Figure

11:

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Japanese being interviewed by a representative of the Federal

Reserve Bank at

San Francisco Control Station, assisted by a young Japanese of American birth

a

as interpreter

and clerk. The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco had representatives at all Control Sta¬
tions

to

aid

or

advise

evacuees

as

to

storage

or

equitable

disposition

of

their

personal

and

business properties.

Figure

12:

Scene at an assistant Provost Marshal’s desk in the Visalia, California, Control

Station, July 28, 1942. Representatives of the Provost Marshal’s office were assigned to all of
the Control Stations to instruct evacuees as to time and place of departure for the Assembly
Centers and to pass an application for deferment.

Soldier assists departing evacuees at a Tacoma, Wash-

ington, Civil Control Station.

Figure 13:

Figure

14:

Preliminary medical examination of a family group at a

physical examinations of all evacuees.

during the processing operations, or supplied local physicians, to conduct

SUMMARY

trained physicians and registered nurses on hand at all Control Stations

Los Angeles control station. The United States Public Health Service had

PICTORIAL

439

440

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Figure 15: Group of young Japanese girls arriving at a Long Beach, California railroad
station to board a special electric train for the Santa Anita Assembly Center, April 4, 1942.

Figure 16: Caravan of trucks loaded with baggage and private cars ready to leave a Control
Station in Los Angeles, April 2 8, 1942 for Manzanar Reception Center. Departure from the
various areas was at first by private automobile, with trucks for baggage. Later only by train
or bus. Large moving vans were available to handle household or other goods the evacuees
desired to have stored under supervision of the Federal Reserve Bank.

PICTORIAL

Figure

17:

Station April

Evacuees
30,

1942.

loading

baggage

Evacuees from

and

441

SUMMARY

boarding

special

the San Francisco

busses

(California)

at

a

Bay

Berkeley

Control

Area were

trans¬

ported from the Control Stations to Tanforan Assembly Center.

Group of evacuees assembled at a Los Angeles railroad station waiting to board
train for Santa Anita Assembly Center. Other evacuees were transported from their residence
areas to Assembly Centers by train.
Figure 18:

442

Figure

JAPANESE

19:

Center and

Group

of evacuees

EVACUATION

after

FROM

arriving by bus

undergoing baggage inspection.

Upon

at

THE

WEST

Santa Anita

COAST

(California)

Assembly

arrival at Assembly Centers the baggage of

evacuees was inspected by the Interior Security Police and articles of contraband removed and
receipts issued for this and other articles not needed for storage in warehouses.

Figure

20:

A

trainload

of evacuees

arrive by

train

at

Santa

Anita

(California)

Center and disembark for registration within the Center and assignment to quarters.

Assembly

PICTORIAL

SUMMARY

443

Figure 21:
Registration and processing scene at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center.
On arrival at Assembly Centers, the evacuees were directed to registrars, who had the individual
and family files before them, registered in and assigned to quarters; given identification buttons
and escorted to quarters.

Head of a family of four being interviewed after arrival at Santa Anita (California)
Assembly Center. After assignment to quarters, the head of each family was interviewed by
members of the administrative staff, usually Japanese, as to experience, ability and willingness
to work.
Figure 22:

444

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

23: Guard on duty in watch tower at Tanforan (California) Assembly Center. The
Military Police were responsible for the external security of the Assembly Centers. In addition
to details of Military Police assigned to the external boundaries of the Centers, guard towers
were erected at strategic points and a watch kent for fires or other dangers.
Figure

PICTORIAL

SUMMARY

445

24:
Japanese police unit at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. Under Caucasian
supervision, internal police units of evacuees were organized in the Assembly Centers.
Figure

Figure 25: Unit of the Tanforan (California) Assembly Center Fire Department, manned by
two Caucasian firemen and a group of evacuees who were given training in fire prevention.
Modern fire fighting equipment was supplied to all Assembly Centers, in many cases from the
nearest town or city, and operated under the direction of experienced firemen.

446

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Figure 26:
Administrative staffs under the Caucasian Center Manager were established at all
Centers to supervise all Center operations and activities. Evacuee personnel were enlisted and
paid to assist in administration as well as all other Center work. Scene in an Assembly Center
Welfare Office.

Figure 27:
Mess and lodging office at Pomona (California) Assembly Center. Another phase
of administration was the mess and lodging staff composed of evacuees under the direction of a
Caucasian manager. This unit handled the assignment of Japanese employees to mess and
lodging employment.

PICTORIAL

SUMMARY

447

Figure 28:
Employment office at the Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. Employment
offices, through which evacuees desiring to work were given suitable assignments, were established
in all the Centers.

Figure

29:

Scene in the timekeeping office at Stockton (California) Assembly Center.

448

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

3 0:
The information section at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. An important
phase of the administrative facilities at each Assembly Center was the information unit.

Figure

notice
"wwiwioS

notice
NC SAllSSKALl
MJtDt rt*o^
*"01 COWOfi

Figure 31:
Evacuees drawing coupon books at Assembly Center. In addition to the nominal
wages paid, if employed within the Centers, evacuees were entitled without cost to coupon or
script books, redeemable at Center stores or canteens for personal items.

PICTORIAL

SUMMARY

449

Figure 32.
Finance division at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. Evacuees staffed the
finance divisions at all the Centers, where employment and other fiscal records were kept.

Figure 33:
Group of evacuee representatives of the Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center
at a regular meeting. Evacuees in the Assembly Centers expressed their opinion and recommenda¬
tions on internal problems through a center council, which worked in an advisory capacity
with the administrative staff.

450

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Wr

JAPANESE

3
Figure

Figure

34:

3 5:

Family group in an apartment at Sacramento (California) Assembly Center.

Brother and sister preparing quarters at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center.

PICTORIAL

Figure

3 6:

SUMMARY

451

A single men’s dormitory at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center.

Figure 37:
Evacuees signing up for clothing issue at Fresno (California) Assembly Center.
Clothing allowances for necessary apparel for evacuees were authorized, upon application.

452

Figure

JAPANESE

38:

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

An evacuee checker inspecting fresh vegetables at Fresno (California)

Assembly

Center.

39: Evacuee workers at the Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center preparing
vegetables for cooking. Assorted vegetables were supplied for standard and special diets for the
evacuees, and prepared for table by the evacuee culinary staffs.

Figure

PICTORIAL

SUMMARY

453

A kitchen scene at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. In all Assembly Centers
food for the evacuees was prepared in modern kitchens by Japanese culinary staffs, operating
under Caucasian supervision.
Figure 40:

A group of evacuee bakers at the Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center preparing
a batch of apple cobbler.

Figure 41:

454

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Figure 42:
A scene in the meat storage room at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center.
Evacuees received a balanced ration, which included fresh meat, vegetables and fruits. Refrig¬
eration facilities were provided at all Centers.

43: Evacuee meat cutters at work at Turlock (California) Assembly Center. Exper¬
ienced evacuee butchers were employed in the meat cutting departments at the Centers, under
supervision of Caucasian cooks.
Figure

PICTORIAL

SUMMARY

44: Japanese fish butchers at the Santa Anita (California)
fish in season was supplied for the evacuees where available.
Figure

455

Assembly Center. Fresh

Evacuee waitresses setting tables in a mess hall in one of the assembly centers—
meals were served family style in nearly all centers.
Figure 45:

456

Figure 46:

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

A family group at mess at Tanforan

THE

(California)

WEST

COAST

Assembly Center. Every effort

was made to provide mess facilities for family groups.

Figure 47:

Sanitation in kitchens and mess halls in all assembly centers was rigidly supervised.

A dishwashing unit in operation at Santa Anita

(California)

Assembly Center.

PICTORIAL

SUMMARY

457

48:
An evacuee nurse’s aid at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center, weighing a
baby, while mother watches. Modern facilities were provided for the care of infants at the
Assembly Center.

Figure

49: An evacuee doctor examining a baby while an evacuee nurse writes the medical
record. Experienced physicians and nurses were provided at all Centers to protect the health of
infant evacuees.

Figure

458

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

50:
An infant formula preparation unit at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center.
Formula kitchens under the direction of the chief medical officers and hospital dieticians pre¬
pared the formulaes under the most sanitary conditions, and prepared the bottles for delivery.

Figure

51: An evacuee messenger delivering a bottle of baby formula to a mother at Fresno
(California) Assembly Center. Baby formulaes were delivered direct to the apartments of the
infants by messengers, or obtained at convenient milk station.
Figure

PICTORIAL

SUMMARY

459

52: Evacuee workers giving garbage cans a daily washing, at Puyallup (Washington)
Assembly Center.
Figure

53: A wash room scene at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. Modern wash rooms,
with hot and cold running water, were provided in all of the Centers.
Figure

460

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

54:
A shower room scene at Fresno (California)
rooms for men and women were provided in all Centers.

Figure

WEST

COAST

Assembly Center. Separate shower

m

55:
First-aid treatment for superficial cuts and bruises being administered at the Santa
Anita (California) Assembly Center. Modern first-aid stations were provided at all the Centers.
Figure

PICTORIAL

56: A technician in X-Ray laboratory at Pomona
Hospital equipment at the centers included X-Ray machines.
Figure

461

SUMMARY

(California)

Assembly

Center.

57: A mock operation scene at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. Skilled
surgeons and experienced surgical nurses were among the evacuees at nearly all of the Centers.

Figure-

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

4m*

462

58: Attended by evacuee nurses and orderlies, convalescing patients rest in the shade
on the lawn behind the center hospital at Puyallup (Washington) Assembly Center.
Figure

Figure 59:
of essential

Hospital pharmacy at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. A complete line
drugs and medical supplies were available at all Assembly Center pharmacies.

PICTORIAL

SUMMARY

463

60:
Two evacuee laboratory technicians at work at Santa Anita (California) Assembly
Center. Hospital facilities at all centers included adequately equipped laboratories.

Figure

61:
Dental clinic in operation at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. Many dentists
were among the evacuees and they conducted clinics under Caucasian supervision, to provide
essential dental care.
Figure

464

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

62: Laundry room at Portland (Oregon)
veniently located, were provided in all Centers.
Figure

Figure

63:

THE

WEST

COAST

Assembly Center. Laundry facilities con¬

One of several laundry drying yards at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center.

PICTORIAL

SUMMARY

465

Figure 64:
An ironing room at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. Facilities for ironing
clothes, including sockets for electric irons, were provided at all the Centers.

Figure 65: One of two 12-chair barber shops at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center.
Barber shops were operated in all the Centers.

466

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

66: One of the Pomona (California) Assembly Center stores with various sections
selling cookies, cakes, pies and fruit, tobaccos, drugs and sundries. Center stores, or canteens
were operated in all Assembly Centers and carried a wide variety of articles which the evacuees
could purchase with coupons issued each month.
Figure

Figure

67:

A display of an assortment of candy bars at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center.

PICTORIAL

Figure

68:

A busy hour in one of the three canteens at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center.

69: The lost and found department at Portland
department was found in each Center.

Figure

467

SUMMARY

(Oregon)

Assembly Center.

This

468

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

70:
A shoe repair shop at Stockton (California) Assembly Center. Experienced evacuee
shoemakers operated repair shops in some Centers for employees only.

Figure

71: The laundry and dry cleaning office at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. These
facilities were available to evacuees at all Centers through service offices manned by evacuees.
Figure

PICTORIAL

SUMMARY

469

72: The post office at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. Complete postal service,
under jurisdiction of the nearest U. S. Post Office, was provided at all Centers and included
regular mail delivery, general delivery, parcel post, money order, and other units.
Figure

73: A play scene at Tanforan (California) Assembly Center, with home-made rocking
horses, teeter-totters, and swings. Playfields with rustic equipment made of scrap material and
other installations stimulated recreational and outdoor play activities which many young
evacuees had never before enjoyed.
Figure

470

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

74:
Adults and children sailing model yachts in a contest during a Mardi Gras cele¬
bration at Tanforan (California) Assembly Center. A variety of recreational activities were
conducted at various Centers.
Figure

Evacuees in a watermelon eating contest at Santa Anita (California) Assembly
Center. Special activities sections were established at centers under the Recreation Division and
conducted diversified recreational stunts.

Figure 75:

PICTORIAL

SUMMARY

471

IHMI
Figure 76:
A baby parade, with humorous touches added by adults posing as infants, was a
feature of a three day "Funita” staged at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center.

Figure 77:

A youthful group intensely interested in a game of Monopoly at Santa Anita

(California)

Assembly Center.

472

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

78:
"Go,” a Japanese type of chess or checkers, being played at Santa Anita (California)
Assembly Center. A variety of games were provided as part of the recreational programs.
Figure

79. A family group enjoy a card game and the radio outside of their quarters at an
Assembly Center.

Figure

PICTORIAL

Figure 80:

Figure

81:

473

SUMMARY

A needlework display at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center.

A handicraft and hobby show at Santa Anita

(California)

Assembly Center

474

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

A portion of a handicraft and hobby show staged at Tanforan (California) Assem¬
bly Center, where everything from juvenile drawings and paintings to model airplanes were
shown.

Figure 82:

PICTORIAL

SUMMARY

475

83: A rocking chair made by an evacuee at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center.
Evacuees made many improvised articles of furniture out of scrap material, usually with no
more tools than a saw and hammer.

-t.

m,

Figure

84: Evacuees signing for baseball equipment, horseshoes and volley balls at Portland
(Oregon) Assembly Center. Athletic equipment was available to evacuees at all centers for
nearly all types of sports.
Figure

476

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

85:
Two young evacuees at "skin the cat” on exercise bars at Portland
Assembly Center.

Figure

(Oregon)

Figure 86:
A youthful group of "pyramiders” in action at Fresno (California) Assembly
Center. Gymnastics was a favorite form of recreation of many of the younger evacuees.

PICTORIAL

SUMMARY

477

•a

87: A volley ball game at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. Baseball, basketball,
tennis and badminton facilities were also available at Centers.
Figure

88: Action in a baseball game at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. Baseball was
favorite sport at all of the Centers and many teams were organized and played regular league
schedules within the Centers.
Figure
a

478

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Figure 89:
Softball games proved popular with the girls at Assembly Centers. Leagues were
organized, and re-organized at intervals to permit new players to participate.

Figure

90:

A group of young evacuees receiving instruction in Jiu Jitsui, or Judo wrestling,

at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center, while rest of class look on.

PICTORIAL

Figure

SUMMARY

91: A shot at the basket at Stockton (California) Assembly Center.

and other forms of sports were available to the feminine evacuees.

479

Basketball, softball

480

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

92: A sumo match at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center, with the referee in
traditional costume. Sumo, another form of Japanese type wrestling, was a favorite activity
at the Centers.

Figure

93:
Action in an American style wrestling match at Santa Anita (California)
sembly Center.
Figure

As¬

PICTORIAL

SUMMARY

481

The "Starlight Serenaders,” a first class dance orchestra organized at Santa Anita
(California) Assembly Center. This is one of many dance and concert orchestras organized at
the Assembly Centers.

Figure 94:

95:
A dance scene at Fresno (California) Assembly Center. Dancing was an almost
nightly diversion for the younger evacuees at the Centers.
Figure

482

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

96: Japanese-Hawaiian hula dancers on an improvised stage during one of the frequent
talent shows at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center.

Figure

Figure

97:

Majorettes of all sizes and ages in drills at Fresno (California) Assembly Center.

Drill teams of many types were organized at various Centers.

PICTORIAL

Figure

SUMMARY

483

98: A Japanese girl impersonating a popular motion picture actress at Turlock (Califor¬

nia) Assembly Center Amateur show.
at various Centers.

Vaudeville and native Japanese theatricals were staged

484

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

A Boy Scout drum and bugle corps at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center
led by Majorette. Scout activities were carried on at virtually all Centers.

Figure 99:

The education administrative department at Fresno (California) Assembly Center.
Educational departments that supervised work for all ages were established at all Centers,
staffed by evacuees under Caucasian supervision.
Figure 100:

PICTORIAL

SUMMARY

485

101:
The kindergarten room at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. Educational
programs were developed by the Service Division and classes were organized for all groups from
nursery schools to adult education.
Figure

102:
Kindergarten children dress in costume to take part in a baby parade and show
at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center.

Figure

486

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Figure

103:

An elementary class at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center.

Figure

104:

A class in the lower grades at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center.

PICTORIAL

SUMMARY

487

Figure 105:
At the Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center junior and senior high school
students who were unable to graduate with their former home town classes because of evacuation
receive diplomas at a special graduating ceremony.

106: Graduating students pledging allegiance to The Flag preliminary to the distribu¬
tion of diplomas, at the graduation ceremonies at the Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center.
Figure

488

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

107: A Japanese teacher instructing a group of adult evacuees at Tanforan (California)
Assembly Center. Many middle-aged and elderly evacuees, particularly women, took an active
interest in adult education.

Figure

Figure 108:
Singing classes were organized and conducted at all the Centers by experienced
Japanese teachers. A teacher leading a singing class at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center.

PICTORIAL

SUMMARY

489

Figure 109:
A teen-age orchestra tuning up under the leadership of a Japanese woman in¬
structor at Salinas (California) Assembly Center. Orchestras were organized among all age
groups at different centers.

Figure 110:
Libraries were established at all the Centers, volumes being furnished by state,
county and city educational departments, churches, and other organizations, and friends of
evacuees. The library at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center.

490

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Figure 111: A Boy Scout Color Guard leading a parade at a celebration in Santa Anita
(California) Assembly Center.

Figure 112:
A section of the Christian Work study section at Fresno (California) Assembly
Center. Evacuees enjoyed freedom of worship at all the Centers.

PICTORIAL

Figure 114:
Maryknoll
Assembly Center.

Sisters

visiting

their

SUMMARY

former

wards

491

at

Santa

Anita

(California)

JAPANESE

492

Figure 115:

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Mass was celebrated and other Catholic religious activities carried on at all the

Centers. A Catholic Mass at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center.

Figure 116:
ifornia)

A Christian minister conducting services in the grandstand at Santa Anita

Assembly Center.

(Cal¬

PICTORIAL

Figure

Figure
nia)

117:

118;

SUMMARY

A Buddhist congregation praying at Santa Anita

493

(California)

Assembly Center.

A happy young couple immediately after the ceremony at Santa Anita

Assembly

Center.

Numerous

weddings

of

evacuees

occurred

at

the

Assembly

(Califor¬
Centers.

THE
WEST

traditions were observed in connection with weddings at Centers.

FROM

Figure 120: A groom carrying his bride across the threshold of their
apartment at Stockton (California) Assembly Center. Many American

EVACUATION

119: A bride in her boudoir just before a wedding in an Assembly
Center.

JAPANESE

Figure

494
COAST

PICTORIAL

SUMMARY

495

121: A Japanese artist sketching girl posed against a background of landscapes at
Tanforan (California) Assembly Center. Art classes for all ages were conducted at various
Centers.
Figure

Figure 122:

Center.

A woman artist at work on a landscape scene at Tanforan (California) Assembly

496

JAPANESE

Figure 123:
Center.

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

Evacuees buying San Francisco morning papers at Turlock

Newspapers

from

metropolitan

and

local communities were

COAST

(California) Assembly

available for purchase by

the evacuees at all Centers.

Figure 124:

The editorial offices of the "Grapevine,” the Fresno (California) Assembly Center

newspaper. Each of the Centers had its own newspaper, a mimeographed publication with news,
editorial, art work and mimeographing done by the evacuees under the supervision of the Center
Manager and

the Press Relations Representative.

PICTORIAL

SUMMARY

497

125: The Center newspaper, the "Grapevine,” being mimeographed at Fresno (Califor¬
nia) Assembly Center. The office boy appears to be more interested in "Our Gang” than in
the mimeographing.
Figure

Figure 126:

A

group of evacuees busy in a drafting room of an Assembly Center.

498

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Figure 127:
Evacuees receiving tools and supplies at the Supply Depot at Portland (Oregon)
Assembly Center. Work crews, on a pay basis, took care of the maintenance of the Assem¬
bly Centers.

Figure 128:
The interior of a carpenter shop at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. Many
of the work projects, in the Centers, called for skilled mechanics.

PICTORIAL

Figure

129:

A radio shop at Portland

499

SUMMARY

(Oregon)

Assembly Center where the sets owned by

evacuees were repaired. Radio sets, without long or short wave bands, remained in the possession
of the Japanese evacuees.

Figure

130:

Diversified

outlets

for

mechanical

skills

provided

work

with

pay

for

many

evacuees in the Assembly Centers. A group of mechanics welding an upright in the plumbing
shop at Fresno

(California)

Assembly Center.

500

Figure

JAPANESE

131:

A

paint

shop

at

EVACUATION

Portland

FROM

(Oregon)

THE

Assembly

WEST

Center

COAST

with

young

evacuees

finishing an office desk and file box.

Figure 132:
Making camouflage nets at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. This
work is termed "garnishing.” A "pattern net” with a design woven into it is first set up and
over it a plain net is placed. Weavers worked burlap strips into the top net, following exactly
the pattern net as to color and weaving design. The women at work are American-born Japanese.

PICTORIAL

Figure
Anita

133:

Japanese

(California)

evacuees

in

a

501

SUMMARY

progressing

stage

of

making

camouflage

nets

at

Santa

Assembly Center. To the left a group raises a partially completed net.

502

Figure

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

134:

Evacuee clearing an irrigation ditch to bring water to the experimental station

for the growing of the rubber producing guayule shrub at the Manzanar (California)

Reception

Center. This was one of the first work projects to be instituted at Manzanar.

Figure

13 5:

Evacuees preparing

a seed

bed

in

the experimental station for

the rubber producing guayule shrub, at Manzanar

(California)

the growing of

Reception Center.

PICTORIAL

SUMMARY

503

136: Tiny guayule plants being thinned out and replanted for the production of
rubber at Manzanar (California) Reception Center by evacuees experienced in agriculture.
Figure

137:
A Japanese evacuee hoeing in his garden at Fresno (California) Assembly Center.
Many gardens flourished in the Assembly Centers brightening the open spaces between barracks.
Figure

504

Figure

JAPANESE

138:

EVACUATION

A street scene in Turlock

FROM

(California)

THE

WEST

COAST

Assembly Center

with

flowering plants

massed in front of the barracks. Many of the Japanese, prior to evacuation, had been commer¬
cial gardeners and nurserymen, and carried their love of growing things to the Assembly Centers.

Figure

139:

Assembly

Family

Center

at

Relocation

Authority,

Centers

War

to

groups

Santa
a

identifying

Anita,

civilian

Relocation

their

California
agency.

Centers was

hand

for

The

a

baggage

Relocation

transfer

conducted

by

of
the

the

prior
Center,

to

evacuees

Army.

departure

operated
from

by
the

from
the

the
War

Assembly

PICTORIAL

Figure

140:

Evacuees boarding

a special

enroute to a War Relocation Center.

505

SUMMARY

train at

Santa Anita

(California)

traveling from Assembly Centers to War

Relocation

Centers.

Each

train

carried

physician and two nurses. Pullman cars, as needed, were furnished with each
special

Figure

accommodations

141:

for

the

aged,

Assembly Center

Great care was exercised for the comfort of the evacuees

the infirm

and

A group boarding the train at Portland

take them to a War Relocation Center for evacuees.

mothers

with

(Oregon)

a

train

Caucasian
to provide

infants.

Assembly Center which

will

JAPANESE

505

Figure

142:

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

While the evacuation program was under way placing persons of Japanese ances¬

try in Assembly Centers, construction of War Relocation Centers was begun by Army Engineers.
Construction operations at Heart Mountain Relocation Center, near Cody, Wyoming.

4

Figure

143:

Buildings were put together in sections in a central construction area and

sections hauled by truck to the building site.

these

PICTORIAL

Figure

144:

507

SUMMARY

Deep below the sod of Heart Mountain Relocation Center, near Cody, Wyoming,

once pounded by buffalo herds, rise the forms of reinforced concrete to house Imhoff or sani¬
tary tank.

Figure

145:

Panorama

of

Granada

Relocation

foreground a typical barracks unit consisting of

Center,
12

Amache,

six-room

Colorado,

showing

in

the

apartment barracks buildings,

recreation hall, laundry and bathhouse, and the mess hall, constructed by Army Engineers.

a

The

Center is made up of 30 such blocks, complemented by hospital buildings, administrative office
buildings, living quarters, general warehouse structures and Military Police quarters.

508

Figure

JAPANESE

146:

Typical

mess

hall

EVACUATION

in

FROM

THE

WEST

a Relocation Center hospital unit

COAST

is completed by Army

Engineers.

Figure

147:

Ready

to begin service

this

modern,

hospital unit at Fdeart Mountain Relocation Center.

well-equipped

kitchen is

attached

to

the

PICTORIAL

Figure

148:

Airy

and

spotless

is

this

section

509

SUMMARY

of

a

Relocation Center

laundry with

modern

plumbing and tanks, ironing boards and side-wall bench for bundles.

Figure

149:

Typical evacuee apartment at Granada Relocation Center, Amache, Colorado. The

furniture, the book niches, flower pots and print mats are all made by the evacuees from scrap
lumber and scrap pieces of wall board.

GLOSSARY

Glossary of Terms
Assembly Center—A temporary enclosed area maintained by Army where
persons of Japanese ancestry were housed and fed during primary stages of
evacuation prior to transfer to War Relocation Projects.
Blocked Account—Any property or interest therein of a Japanese national
which the Alien Property Custodian has declared to be vested in him under
authority of Executive Order No. 9095.
Civil Affairs Division—A division of the General Staff of Western Defense
Command and Fourth Army, charged with responsibility for control and
exclusion of civilians, designation of military areas and zones, establishment
of general or limited military government and liaison with governmental
agencies.
Civil Control Station—A temporary Wartime Civil Control Administration
office where persons of Japanese ancestry being evacuated reported for preevacuation registration, information and assistance. One of such offices was
set up to service each group of evacuees excluded by one exclusion order.
Civil Control Team—The personnel of a Civil Control Station representing
all governmental agencies concerned—such as United States Employment
Service, Federal Security Administration, United States Public Health, and
Federal Reserve Bank.
Civilian Exclusion Order

(CEO)—An order issued by the Commanding

General Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, by the terms of
which all persons of Japanese ancestry within a designated area were ex¬
cluded therefrom.
Coastal Frontier—Generally Military Area No. 1, and the California portion
of Military Area No. 2, Western Defense Command.
Commanding General—Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt.
Contraband—Articles the possession and use of which was denied to all per¬
sons of Japanese ancestry while within Western Defense Command, enu¬
merated in Public Proclamation No. 3.
Curfew—The hours between 8:00 P. M. and 6:00 A. M. when all persons of
Japanese ancestry in Military Area No. 1 and the California portion of
Military Area No. 2 were required to be within their respective places of
residence. Paragraph No. 1, Public Proclamation No. 3, and Paragraph No.

.

3, Public Proclamation No. 6

Evacuee—A person of Japanese ancestry excluded from Military Area No. 1
and the California portion of Military Area No. 2, by proclamation of the
Commanding General Western Defense Command.
Evacuee National—Includes all persons of Japanese ancestry subject to ex¬
clusion.
Exclusion Area—The area described in each Civilian Exclusion Order from
which all persons of Japanese ancestry were excluded.
513

514

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

Exemption from Evacuation—Temporary privilege of remaining in Military
Area No. 1 or California portion of Military Area No. 2 granted on author¬
ity of Paragraphs (e) and (f) Public Proclamation No. 5, and also under
Mixed-Blood and Mixed-Marriage policies.
Family Head—The one that registered for the family; NOT necessarily a
parent or older member.
Family Number—Is a Wartime Civil Control Administration number not to
be confused with I. D. number. Each family unit or individual living alone
was registered and assigned a separate number for all administrative and
identification of property purposes.

Often is mistakenly called United

States Employment Service number—actually there is no United

States

Employment Service number.
Freezing Power—Power of Alien Property Custodian under Executive Order
No. 9095 to block property of Japanese nationals and to allow trading
therein only on license.
I. D. Number—That number which was given to individuals at some (but
not all) assembly centers. NOT to be confused with Wartime Civil Control
Administration number as given to families when registering.
Interior—That portion of the United States not declared by the Commanding
General of any of the Defense Commands to be a prohibited military area.
Internee—An alien enemy interned by order of the Attorney General. (NOT
to be confused with evacuee).
Issei—Any person of Japanese ancestry born in Japan. Sometimes called First
Generation Japanese.
Japanese Ancestry—Any person who has a Japanese ancestor regardless of
degree, is considered a person of Japanese ancestry.
JACL—Japanese American Citizens League.
Kibei—Any person of Japanese ancestry born outside of Japan who has been
to and returned from Japan. Particularly, American-born Japanese who have
received some of their education in Japan.
Logistics—Applies to movements of evacuees when used in this report.
Military Area—Any area declared to be a military area by virtue of authority
granted by Executive Order No. 9066.
Mixed-Marriage—Any marriage between a person of Japanese ancestry and
a person not of Japanese ancestry.
Nisei—Any person of Japanese ancestry not born in Japan. Sometimes called
Second Generation Japanese.
Office for Emergency Management—(Division of Central Administrative
Services.)
Parolee—An alien enemy once interned by order of the Attorney General but
paroled from internment at the direction of the Attorney General.
Proclamation—(Public Proclamation). Public announcements of the Com¬
manding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, dealing

GLOSSARY

515

with the conduct of civilians within Western Defense Command, having
the force of law and issued under authority of Executive Order No. 9066.
Reception Center—A temporary enclosed area maintained by the Army where
persons of Japanese ancestry were to be housed and fed between the primary
stage of evacuation and ultimate transfer to War Relocation Projects. (Only
one Reception Center was ever established, Manzanar, and it ultimately be¬
came a War Relocation Project.)
Registration—The registration of all persons of Japanese ancestry for evacu¬
ation at Civil Control Stations.
Relocation Center—(War Relocation Center). The populated section of a
War Relocation Project Area.
Relocation Project—(War Relocation Project). Temporary community es¬
tablished and conducted by War Relocation Authority where evacuees under
jurisdiction of War Relocation Authority are housed and fed. It has boun¬
daries established by the Commanding General.
Repatriate—A person of Japanese ancestry who is returned at his request to
Japan.
Repatriation—The process of returning persons of Japanese ancestry to Japan
at their request.
Sansei—Children of Nisei. Sometimes called Third Generation Japanese.
Segregation—The process of separating persons of Japanese ancestry who are
actively discordant and openly pro-axis from the remainder.
Social Data Registration Form (SDR)—The Social Data Registration Form
is the form on which persons of Japanese ancestry, living in the area to be
evacuated, were registered at the Civil Control Station.
Special Blocked Property—Property in which an evacuee national has an in¬
terest, and which has been designated as special blocked property.
Spot Raids—Mass apprehensions of persons of Japanese ancestry possessing con¬
traband by Federal Bureau of Investigation prior to evacuation.
Transfer Orders—Directive from the Commanding General, Western Defense
Command, for the transfer of evacuees from Assembly Centers to War
Relocation Projects.
Travel Regulations — Regulations imposed by the Commanding General,
Western Defense Command governing travel of persons of Japanese ances¬
try, and others, in Military Area No. 1 and California portion of Military
Area No. 2.
Voluntary Migration—Voluntary movement of persons of Japanese ancestry
from Military Area No. 1 and California portion of Military Area No. 2, to
points further inland, prior to evacuation under complete Army supervision
as reflected by Public Proclamation No. 4, dated March 27, 1942.
W.D. Form 1034—Public Voucher for Purchases and Services other than
Personal.
W.D. Form 1080—Voucher for Adjustments between Appropriations and/or
Funds.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX ONE
Memoranda of March 20, 1942, From the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Civil Affairs Giving Advance Warning of the First Evacuation
March 20, 1942
MEMORANDUM For Mr. Richard M. Neustadt, Federal Security Administration
Subject: Evacuation of Bainbridge Island
The accompanying copy of a memorandum to Mr. Larry Hewes of the Farm Security Ad¬
ministration is self-explanatory.
1. It is requested that you arrange for participation of the Public Health Service and any
other agencies under the supervision of the Federal Security Agency in the evacuation of Bain¬
bridge Island.
2. Specifically, it is desired that the Public Health Service undertake full responsibility for
the organization, equipping, staffing and establishment of a suitable medical examination and
innoculation station at the induction point, to be organized by the Associated Federal agencies,
presumably at the Bainbridge Island ferry landing.
3. It is further requested that specific provision be made for the care, hospitalization or
other disposition of any persons among the Japanese residents on Bainbridge Island who require
such attention, including all bed cases.
4. Further it is requested specifically that suitable provision be made for a registration
system for such persons, including the issuance of suitable tags for identification of individuals,
family units and property, such tag to bear a thumb print and a notation as to whether a
medical examination has been performed.
5. It is requested that you or your representative attend the meeting referred to in
Paragraph 5 of the copy of the memorandum to Mr. Larry I. Hewes.
Karl R. Bendetsen
Col. G. S. C.
Ass’t. Chief of Staff
Civil Affairs Division
March 20, 1942
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LARRY I. HEWES
SUBJECT: Bainbridge Island, restricted
1. Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, desires to undertake
the immediate forced evacuation of all Japanese now resident on Bainbridge Island, Puget Sound,
State of Washington. The statistics showing the number of families and the occupations of
each are attached in Exhibit A.
2. You will note from the accompanying exhibit that there are several families engaged in
agricultural pursuits. It is requested that you take whatever action is necessary to provide neces¬
sary staff and procedure for the handling and disposition of all agricultural property, including
live stock owned or controlled by Japanese on Bainbridge Island, within the limits of the au¬
thority assigned you previously by General DeWitt..
3. It is proposed that an evacuation order will be posted not later than Wednesday, March 25,
1942. It is proposed that all Japanese will be evacuated within five days from the date of post¬
ing of evacuation order. During this interim it is further proposed that all Japanese will be
required to pass through a general service office established on the Island, presumably at the
ferryboat landing, and that during this period none of such persons will be allowed to leave except
by special permission of military authorities. Decision as to who may leave during this period
will be up to the Commanding General, Northwest Sector, and will be permitted only in the
most exceptional cases.
4. Captain Truman R. Young will be in Seattle at the Olympic Hotel commencing Saturday,
March 21, 1942, where either you or your representative in that region may reach him.
519

520

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

5. It is requested that you or your representative be present to attend a joint conference of
the interested agencies to be held in Seattle on Monday, March 23, 1942. For the time and place
of the meeting, get in touch with Captain Young.
Karl

R.

Bendetsen

Col. G. S. C.
Ass’t. Chief of Staff
Civil Affairs Division

March 20, 1942
MEMORANDUM for Mr.

William

H. Hale, Federal Reserve Bank

Subject: Evacuation of Bainbridge Island
1. The accompanying copies of memorandum to Mr. Larry Hewes and Mr. Richard Neustadt
are self-explanatory.
2. It is requested that your organization participate fully in the proposed evacuation of
Bainbridge Island.
3. Specifically, it is requested with respect to your function that you undertake full responsi¬
bility for the necessary staffing and organization of the general service induction center to be
established, presumably at the Bainbridge Island ferry landing, and that you also undertake full
responsibility for the following:
a. Acquisition of suitable warehouse space for the storage of personal property which
evacuees cannot otherwise dispose of, such storage to be at the sole risk of the owners
and to include only the more substantial household items, such as ice boxes, pianos,
heavy dining room, living room, bed room and kitchen furniture. Cooking utensils and
other small items must be crated, packed and plainly marked. Bric-a-brac will not be
accepted. It is possible that such warehouse space may be available on Bainbridge
Island. It should be low cost.
b.

Provision of suitable civilian guards to protect the storage against possible pillage or
other direct action.

c.

Suitable impounding space for automobiles, trucks, tractors and other mobile farm
implements should be provided, presumably on Bainbridge Island; and an impounding
system established to include the filing of title certificates, the collection of distributor
blocks and hiring of the necessary guards.

4. As the evacuation will be hasty, the application of your "special block property” would
seem to be appropriate in the majority of instances. The staff provided should be capable of
rendering rapid service in view of the speed of the proposed program.
5. If, in your judgment it is necessary, arrangements should be made for guarding any prop¬
erty left behind on the Island—not warehoused—against direct action or pillage. Primarily this
is the responsibility of the local authorities.

.

6

It is requested that you or your representative attend the meeting referred to in Para¬

graph 5 of the copy of the memorandum to Mr. Larry I. Hewes.
Karl

R.

Bendetsen

Col. G. S. C.
Ass’t. Chief of Staff
Civil Affairs Division
March 20, 1942
MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL NORTHWEST SECTOR:
SUBJECT: Evacuation, Bainbridge Island
Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, directs: That the
following outline memoranda covering the proposed evacuation of Bainbridge Island be sub¬
mitted for information and guidance:
1. The accompanying copies of memoranda to Messrs. Larry Hewes, R. M. Neustadt and
William M. Hale, are self-explanatory.

APPENDIX

521

ONE

2. Captain Truman R. Young, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division,
will be in the Northwest Sector, Saturday, March 21, 1942, representing the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Civil Affairs Division.
3. The

Commanding

General

Northwest

Sector

will

be

responsible for

the following:

a) General supervision of the evacuation and coordination of the local services to be rendered
by the civilian agencies concerned. Such coordination and service to be within the general
policy directed in the accompanying memoranda, and as announced from time to time by the
Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, b) Posting and distribution of the evacuation
orders. Evacuation orders and instructions in printed form will be furnished except as to supply
and movement of the evacuees, which will be prepared and distributed by you. c) Furnishing
all necessary guards, security patrols, including the guard enroute from Bainbridge Island to
destination. This does not include any responsibility for guarding personal property so long as
civil authorities can maintain order, d) Enforcement and compliance with evacuation orders
refer to the following: 1. Aliens failing to comply will be immediately apprehended and turned
over to the Immigration Authorities for detention. 2. As to citizens failing to comply, warrants
should be issued for their arrest for violation of the penal statute enacted this week by the Congress,
making it a crime for failing to comply with the order of Commanding General in a military
area.
4. The G-4 Division, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, is responsible for mak¬
ing the necessary arrangements for transportation from Bainbridge Island to point of destination.
5. Commanding General of the Northwest Sector is responsible for the collection of evacuees
and their organization and movement transportation furnished by Headquarters of the Western
Defense Command and Fourth Army.
6 Direct communication by the Commanding General Northwest Sector and Assistant Chief

.

of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army is authorized for
the purpose of concluding any necessary arrangement.
7. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum and advise of action taken verbally, with
confirmation in writing.
Karl R. Bendetsen

Col. G. S. C.
Ass’t. Chief of Staff
Civil Affairs Division

APPENDIX TWO
Memorandum of April 23, 1942—"Japanese Evacuation Operations.”
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of Commanding General
Presidio of San Francisco, California
April 23, 1942
SUBJECT: Japanese Evacuation Operations
TO: All Sector Commanders, All Civilian Agencies, Wartime Civil Control Administration
1. References:
Public Proclamation No. 1, this Headquarters, March 2, 1942
Public Proclamation No. 2, this Headquarters, March 16, 1942
Public Proclamation No. 3, this Headquarters, March 24, 1942
Public Proclamation No. 4, this Headquarters, March 27, 1942
Public Proclamation No. 5, this Headquarters, March 30, 1942
2. The following instructions will guide the activities of Sector Commanders and Civilian
Agencies in the evacuation processes. The instructions contained herein will replace the separate
directives which previously have been forwarded for each evacuation project. The practice of
distributing such separate directives is discontinued. It is contemplated that only such advance
information as is pertinent to an evacuation project will be forwarded.
3. The evacuation of all Japanese, both aliens and non-aliens, from the area of the Western
Defense Command will be directed by this Headquarters. Pending the resettlement of such
persons by the War Relocation Authority, evacuees will be provided temporary shelter and
other facilities at Assembly Centers and Reception Centers.
4. Numbered Exclusion Orders issued from this Headquarters with Instructions pertaining
thereto will provide for the exclusion by a specific time of all Japanese, both aliens and non¬
aliens, from a specifically described area. The Sector Commanders are charged with the super¬
vision of the evacuation from their respective Sectors of all affected persons within such areas
to Assembly Centers or Reception Centers to be designated by this Headquarters. They will
cause Exclusion Orders and Instructions pertaining thereto to be posted at prominent points
throughout the prescribed areas during such hours as are specified by this Headquarters. A
suitable supply of such Orders and Instructions will be furnished by this Headquarters at the
earliest practicable date preceding the effective date of each Exclusion Order. The Officers spe¬
cifically charged with the posting of Exclusion Orders and Instructions pertaining thereto will
execute certificates of such posting to include the area, the date, the time and manner of posting.
These certificates will be forwarded to this Headquarters within twelve hours after completion
of posting.
5. For the purpose of registering and processing evacuees, Civil Control Stations will be
located in each area to be evacuated. The Federal Security Agency will locate, establish, or¬
ganize, and operate these installations.

That agency is authorized to deal directly with the

Office of Emergency Management and other Federal Agencies as may be needed in the estab¬
lishment and operation of Control Stations. Within each such station there will be included
appropriate sections to render services applicable to the several interested Civilian Agencies. The
Civilian Agencies concerned will provide for the personnel and the instruction of the personnel
assigned to these sections. The Supervisor of each section will control all matters pertaining to
the services rendered by his particular Civilian Agency.
6. The manager of each Control Station will be named by the Federal Security Agency. This
manager will receive instructions with reference to the evacuation project from the representative
of the Sector Commander at the Control Station and will be responsible for the distribution and
execution of these instructions by Supervisors of sections within the Control Station.
7. The several Civilian Agencies will control the services rendered by their representatives
at Control Stations but, insofar as the coordination and operation of the installation as a whole
is concerned, Supervisors of sections will receive their instructions from the manager of the
Control Station.
522

APPENDIX TWO

523

8. The Federal Security Agency, the Department of Agriculture, and the Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco will provide for necessary general services such as:
a.

The registration of all evacuees.

b.

The medical examination of all evacuees either during processing or after their arrival
at an Assembly Center.

c.

Medical aid, including hospitalization, and social welfare service for and during the
processing.

d.

The settlement and protection of all the real and personal property of the evacuees,
including the registration of those private automobiles belonging to evacuees to be
used as transportation to an Assembly Center.

e.

Storage facilities for items not otherwise disposed of, parking and immobilization of
private automobiles at the Assembly Center or other designated place, and provision
for proper policing thereof.

/.

All forms, and operating details incidental to the foregoing, and the maintenance of
an adequate filing system for all documents and other data assembled in connection
with a particular project or combination of projects.

9. A physician will be made available by the Federal Security Agency at the Civil Control
Station during the entire period of registration and processing to attend invalid and other
exception medical cases.
10. In addition to their prescribed functions, the Civilian Agencies mentioned above will
assist the Sector Commander in the discharge of his duties pertaining to the evacuation.
11. The Sector Commander will provide such military personnel as he deems necessary for
and during the registration and processing of evacuees.
12. Sector Commanders will be responsible for the supervision of all movements of evacuees
from affected areas in their respective Sectors to the destination designated by this Head¬
quarters. Arrangements for all transportation other than by private conveyance will be made by
this Headquarters for movements of evacuees from control stations in affected areas to As¬
sembly Centers and Reception Centers. Any additional transportation for evacuees within an
affected area will be arranged for locally by the Sector Commander.
13. In certain cases where specifically directed by this Headquarters, evacuees will be per¬
mitted to use their own private automobiles as transportation to an Assembly Center. All private
automobiles so used will first have been registered with the representative of the Federal Re¬
serve Bank of San Francisco at the Control Station and provision made by that Agency for
the disposition of such automobiles upon arrival at the Assembly Center. As soon as is prac¬
ticable after registration, the Sector Commander will cause a schedule of such movement to
be prepared for the Civil Control Station concerned and provide for adequate supervision of con¬
voys of not more than twenty-five cars each. Arrivals of these groups of automobiles will be spaced
throughout the travel day with emphasis being placed upon morning arrivals in order to permit
the early settlement of evacuees at the point of destination.
14. The Sector Commander will provide such military personnel as he deems necessary for
and during all movements of evacuees. In addition thereto, appropriate maintenance personnel
and wrecking equipment will be provided by the Sector Commanders for all movements in
supervised groups involving the use of private automobiles by evacuees.
15. The Federal Security Agency will provide medical aid, to include an appropriate number
of physicians, and social welfare service for and during all bus and train movements of evacuees
from Control Stations in the affected areas to Assembly Centers and Reception Centers. For
movements of evacuees by private automobiles, the Federal Security Agency will make appro¬
priate arrangements for medical service.
16.

It is contemplated that the number of evacuees moved from one affected area under a

given project will not exceed five hundred per day and the number of evacuees arriving at any
one Assembly Center or Reception Center from all areas being evacuated under simultaneous opera¬
tions will not exceed one thousand per day. If practicable, rail transportation will be utilized
for all movements involving travel of more than one hundred miles and for all trips during
which a meal must be served to the evacuees. At least one tourist-sleeper will be provided for
each train to insure appropriate accommodations for medical cases. Once the mode of transpor¬
tation has been established and a schedule determined, evacuees will be assigned by the manager
of the Control Station to a particular bus, street-car, railroad-car or motor convoy in sufficient

524

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

numbers as directed by the Sector Commander. Close liaison between the representatives of the
Sector Commander at the Control Station and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, this Headquarters,
is essential during the entire period of processing, in order to coordinate specific transportation
requirements and transportation schedules. In the preparation of all transportation schedules,
primary consideration should be given to the capacity of a given Assembly Center or Reception
Center to assimilate properly the arriving evacuees. In this connection, movements from affected
areas will be coordinated so that all arrivals will be spaced and timed as early as is practicable
during daylight hours in order to insure proper settlement in the Center prior to darkness.
Sector Commanders will designate specifically a train Commander for each train used in trans¬
porting evacuees from his Sector to a Center. Similarly, Commanders will be specifically desig¬
nated for all other group movements of evacuees.
17. Sector Commanders will inform other Sector Commanders concerned if the route of a
movement of evacuees from his Sector to an Assembly Center or Reception Center requires the
crossing of, or movement into, another Sector. This action is designed to obviate tactical compli¬
cations and the possibility of rail and highway congestion.
18. Sector Commanders will cause the following reports to be made at the times indicated:
a.

At noon and at 5:00 p.m. of each day of registration a statement as of that time
showing the total number of families registered and the total number of individuals
to be evacuated thereunder, will be forwarded by wire or teletype to the Wartime

b.

Civil Control Administration, 1231 Market Street, San Francisco, California.
At least forty-eight hours prior to departure of evacuees, a statement showing the
exact number of persons who will require rail or bus transportation to the Assembly
Center or Reception Center, will be forwarded by wire or teletype to the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-4, Headquarters, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army,
Presidio of San Francisco, California.

c.

At least forty-eight hours prior to the departure of evacuees for Assembly Centers or
Reception Centers, a statement showing the total number of persons for which lunches
are to be prepared, will be forwarded by wire or teletype to the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-4, Headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Presidio of
San Francisco, California. In rendering this report, full consideration should be given

d.

to the number of children and infants requiring food and formula milk and ingredients.
At least twenty-four hours prior to departure of evacuees, the Manager of the
Assembly Center or Reception Center concerned will be informed by the most ex¬
peditious means of the total number of evacuees to be expected with the mode or
modes of travel, date, and the probable time of arrival.

e.

Upon departure of evacuees, a statement showing the exact number of evacuees who
departed, the type of transportation utilized, the number of private cars in any and
all convoys, with the date and the probable time of arrival thereof, will be for¬
warded to the Manager of the Assembly Center or Reception Center concerned, by the
most expeditious means.

f.

Upon departure of evacuees for Assembly Centers or Reception Centers, a statement
showing the exact number of evacuees who departed, the type of transportation uti¬
lized, the number of private automobiles in any and all convoys, the time of departure
and the destinations of such movements will be forwarded by wire or teletype to the
Wartime Civil Control Administration, 1231 Market Street, San Francisco, California.

g.

Timely information will be forwarded to the Manager of the Assembly Center or
Reception Center concerned in order that appropriate arrangements can be made for
unloading, if the nature of the baggage or other equipment forwarded with evacuees
to the Assembly Center or Reception Center cannot be adequately handled by the

evacuees.
h. Within seventy-two hours after the completion of the evacuation of any specified area,
the Sector Commander will forward a report covering the operation of the evacuation
project with such recommendations as he desires to make thereon, to the Wartime
Civil Control Administration, 1231 Market Street, San Francisco, California.
i.

Within seventy-two hours after the completion of the evacuation of any specified
area, the Control Station Manager and the Supervisor of each Civilian Agency involved
in the evacuation project will forward through their immediate superiors, a report

APPENDIX TWO

525

covering their actions in connection with such evacuation project with such recom¬
mendations as they desire to make, to the Wartime Civil Control Administration, 1231
Market Street, San Francisco, California. Copies of the reports by the Civilian Agencies
concerned with each evacuation project will be made available to the Federal Security
Agency at the time they are submitted to the Wartime Civil Control Administration.
19. Aliens failing to comply with the Exclusion Order and the Instructions issued there¬
under are subject to immediate apprehension and detention. Alien and non-alien Japanese alike
are subject to the penalties provided by Public Law No. 503, 77th Congress, approved March 21,
1942, entitled, "An Act to Provide a Penalty for Violation of Restrictions or Orders with
Respect to Persons Entering, Remaining in, Leaving, or Committing any Act in Military Areas
or Zones.” Sector Commanders will make suitable provisions for bringing this matter to the
attention of the Federal Civil Authorities for any necessary action.

Sector Commanders are

authorized to call upon the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the enforcement of the statute
and for the apprehension of any aliens failing to comply with published orders and instructions.
By Command of Lieutenant General DeWITT:
Hugh

T.

Fullerton

Captain A.G.D.
Assistant Adjutant General
Distribution "M”

APPENDIX THREE
Delegation to Ninth Service Command and Letters of Transmittal—
Reports of Survey—Status of Relocation Center Construction
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of Commanding General
Presidio of San Francisco, California
November 22, 1942
SUBJECT: Policies as to Relationship of Western Defense Command with Ninth Service Command
and War Relocation Authority
TO: Commanding General, Ninth Service Command, Fort Douglas, Utah; Commanding Gen¬
eral, Northwest Sector, Fort Lewis, Washington; Commanding General, Northern California
Sector, Presidio of San Francisco, California;

Commanding General, Southern California

Sector, Pasadena, California; Commanding General, Southern Land Frontier Sector, Camp
Lockett, California.
1. The transfer of all persons of Japanese ancestry from Assembly Centers operated by
the Wartime Civil Control Administration under the control of this headquarters, to War
Relocation projects, operated by the War Relocation Authority, having been accomplished, the
following policies are announced

regarding the future relationship of the Western Defense

Command with Service Commands and War Relocation Authority in connection with these
projects:
a.

War Relocation projects located outside of the Western Defense Command are of no

b.

War Relocation projects located within the Western Defense Command.

further concern of this headquarters.

(1) Operating under such general policies as may be announced from time to time
by this headquarters, the Commanding General, Ninth Service Command is designated
as the agent responsible for the enforcement of all security measures in connection with
these projects, and for the enforcement of such parts of Public Proclamations 3, 5, 6,
7, 8 and 11 as apply. He is further authorized to deal directly with the War Relocation
Authority on all matters pertaining to these projects without further reference to West¬
ern Defense Command.

Similarly, War Relocation Authority will deal directly with the

Commanding General, Ninth Service Command.
(2) Escort Guard Companies presently on duty at these projects are assigned to the
Ninth Service Command.
(3) All matters concerning the operation of these projects for which the War De¬
partment is responsible under the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 17, 1942; will
be handled directly between the War Relocation Authority and such agencies as the War
Department may designate.
c. The following statements of policy are announced:
(1) Military Police:

See Circular No. 19, this headquarters, September 17, 1942.

(2) Ingress to and egress from War Relocation Project Areas:
4th Army, subject:

See letter Hq WDC &

“Authorization to Issue Permits for Ingress to and Egress from War

Relocation Project Areas for Purposes of Emergency Hospitalization and Incarceration,”
dated October 29, 1942, with inclosures thereto.
(3) Parcel Inspection at War Relocation Projects:
subject:

See letter Hq WDC & 4th Army,

"Parcel Inspection at Certain War Relocation Authority Projects,” dated Sep¬

tember 13, 1942.
(4) The Commanding General, Western Defense Command will be kept informed
as to instructions issued and agreements entered into, under this directive.
d.

The Relocation projects at Manzanar and Tule Lake, California and Poston and Sacaton
(Gila River), Arizona are within the evacuated area of the Western Defense Command
526

APPENDIX

527

THREE

and, therefore, have a special status and are of particular concern to this headquarters.
Accordingly, it is directed that the Commanding General, Ninth Service Command
provide for immediate reports to this headquarters of any incidents occurring within
these centers involving disaffection or riot on the part of center residents in order that
appropriate instructions may be issued to provide for the security of the evacuated area
whenever such action appears necessary.
J. L. DeWITT
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding
3 Incls:
Incl # 1—Circular No. 19, this Hq.,
September 17, 1942.
Incl $ 2—Ltr fr Hq WDC & 4A, subject:

“Authorization to Issue Permits for Ingress

To and Egress from War Relocation Project Areas for Purposes of Emergency Hospitalization
and Incarceration,” Oct. 29, 1942, with incls.
Incl # 3—Ltr fr Hq WDC & 4A, subject:

"Parcel Inspection at Certain War Relocation

Authority Projects,” Sept. 13, 1942.
DISTRIBUTION:
"Al”
War Relocation Authority—5 copies
Seventh Service Command—5 copies
Eighth Service Command—5 copies
319th M.P. Co.—2 copies
320th M.P. Co.—2 copies
321st M.P. Co.—2 copies
322nd M.P. Co.—2 copies
323rd M.P. Co.—2 copies
331st M.P. Co.—2 copies
3 34th M.P. Co.—2 copies
335th M.P. Co.—2 copies
336th M.P. Co.—2 copies

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Presidio of San Francisco, California
17 September 1942
CIRCULAR NO. 19
POLICIES PERTAINING TO USE OF MILITARY POLICE AT
WAR RELOCATION CENTERS
1. Under the authority granted the Commanding General Western Defense Command pur¬
suant to Executive Order No. 9066, February 19, 1942, Japanese civilians have been moved
from certain military areas in this command as a matter of military necessity.
2. Pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 9102, March 18, 1942, the War Relo¬
cation Authority has been established as a civilian agency to assist the military in the evacuation
of certain persons; to provide for the relocation of such persons in appropriate places; to provide
for their needs; to provide for the employment of such persons at useful work; to supervise
their activities; and other related matters.
3. For the purpose of carrying out the directions of Executive Order No. 9102, the War
Relocation Authority has selected the following sites in the territorial area of the Western De¬
fense

Command:

River);

Manzanar,

Sacaton, Arizona

California;

Tule

Lake,

California;

Poston,

Arizona

(Colorado

(Gila River); Delta, Utah; and Minidoka, Idaho. These sites are

designated as military areas known as War Relocation Project Areas. The boundaries of such
areas shall be marked with appropriate signs in both English and Japanese language. The pro¬
visions of Public Proclamation No. 8, this headquarters require that those Japanese persons
evacuated to a War Relocation Project Area shall remain in that area, except as movement is

528

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

authorized in writing by this headquarters, transmitted through the War Relocation Authority.
Violations of these provisions are subject to prosecution as provided by Public Law No. 50J,
77 th Congress.
4. The War Relocation Project Area, later referred to as "Relocation Area” or "Area,” covers
the entire area and includes one or more "Relocation Centers.” The Relocation Center includes
the populated area and the administrative and industrial area. The Relocation Centers and Areas
are not "concentration camps” and the use of this term is considered objectionable. Relocation
Centers and Areas are not internment camps. Internment camps are established for another pur¬
pose and are not related to the evacuation program. While the relocation program up to the
present time has related particularly to the Japanese, the same program may be extended to
other civilians as military necessity may dictate.
5. Relocation centers are operated by civilian

management

under

the War Relocation

Authority. A Project Director is in charge of each center. The Project Director will determine
those persons authorized to enter the center or the area, other than evacuees being transferred
by War Department authority.

The Project Director is authorized to issue permits to such

evacuees as may be allowed to leave the center or the area.

He will transmit his instructions

regarding passes and permits to the commanding officer of the military police unit.
6. Civilian police, operating under the Project Director, will be on duty to maintain order
within the area; to apprehend and guard against subversive activities; or undercover crimes
and misdemeanors; to make such search of the person and property of the evacuees as may be
necessary to guard against the introduction or use of articles heretofore or hereafter declared
contraband; to control traffic within the center; and to enforce camp rules and regulations.
Public Proclamation No. 3, this headquarters, March 24, 1942, designated certain articles of
contraband which are denied to all persons of Japanese ancestry within the limits of this
command.
7. Each relocation site will be under military police patrol and protection as determined
by the War Department.

Certain Military Police Escort Guard Companies have been assigned

to duty at each of the relocation areas in the Western Defense Command.
8. The military police on duty at relocation centers and areas shall perform the following
functions:
a.

They shall control the traffic on and the passage of all persons at the arteries leading

b.

They shall allow no person to pass the center gates without proper authority from the

c.

They will maintain periodic motor patrols around the boundaries of the center or area

into the area;
project directors;
in order to guard against attempts by evacuees to leave the center without permission.
The perimeter of the relocation area shall be patrolled from sunrise until sunset and
during such other times as the commanding officer of the military police units deems
advisable. The perimeter of the relocation center shall be patrolled only from sunset to
d.

sunrise;
They shall apprehend and arrest evacuees who do leave the center or area without

e.

They shall not be called upon for service in apprehending evacuees who have effected a

/.

They shall be available, upon call by the project director or by the project police, in

authority, using such force as is necessary to make the arrest;
departure unobserved;
case of emergencies such as fire or riot. When called upon in such instances, the com¬
manding officer of the military police unit shall assume full charge until the emergency
g.

ends;
They shall inspect parcels and packages consigned to evacuees at those centers where
the inspection is directed by the Commanding General, Western Defense Command.
Special instructions for such inspections and for the confiscation of designated items of
contraband will be issued by the Commanding General, Western Defense Command.

9. Evacuees in the relocation centers should be allowed as great a degree of freedom within
the relocation area as is consistent with military security and the protection of the evacuees. In
general, the evacuees will have complete freedom of movement within the relocation area from
sunrise to sunset.

From sunset to sunrise, the evacuees will not be allowed beyond the center

APPENDIX

529

THREE

limits without special permission of the project director.

Sentry towers, with flood lights, may

be placed outside of the boundaries of the center to assist the military police in maintaining proper
control.
10. Enlisted men will be permitted within the areas occupied by the evacuees only when in
the performance of prescribed duties.

A firm but courteous attitude will be maintained toward

the evacuees. There will be no fraternizing with evacuees.
11. All military personnel will be impressed with the importance of the duties to which
their unit has been assigned, the performance of which demands the highest standards of duty,
deportment, and military appearance.
12. The commanding officer of the military police unit is responsible for the protection of
merchandise at the post exchange furnished for the use of the military personnel.
13. In areas where there are black-out regulations, the commanding officer of the military
police unit will be responsible for the black-out of the center. A switch will be so located as to
permit the prompt cut-off by the military police of all electric current in camp. The commanding
officer of the military police unit will notify the project director of his instructions relative to
black-outs.
14. Commanding officers of military police units will be furnished copies of operating in¬
structions issued to project directors. Project directors, their assistants, and the commanding
officers of military police units will maintain such close personal contacts with each other as will
assure the efficient and orderly operation of the area, and the proper performance of the duties
of all.
By command of Lieutenant General DeWITT:
J. W. BARNETT
•

Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:
B. Y. READ,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.
DISTRIBUTION:
"A”
"F” (5 copies)
"H”
CG, ADC—5 copies
CG, NSC—25 copies
PM, WDC—25 copies
CAD, WDC—25 copies
October 29, 1942
SUBJECT: Authorization to Issue Permits for Ingress To and Egress From War Relocation
Project Areas for Purposes of Emergency Hospitalization and Incarceration.
TO: Director, War Relocation Authority, Washington, D. C.
1. Supplementing authority granted in letter this headquarters August 11, 1942, subject,
“Authorization to Issue Permits for Ingress To and Egress From War Relocation Project Areas”,
address as above, authority is delegated to the Director, War Relocation Authority, and to each
person not of Japanese ancestry whom such director may designate in writing, to grant written
authorization for persons to leave and to enter War Relocation Project Areas for purposes of
emergency hospitalization, institutional detention and incarceration. Each such authorization shall
set forth the effective period thereof, if this can be determined, and the terms and conditions upon
and the purposes for which it is granted. A complete record of all such authorizations shall be
made and kept by the Director, War Relocation Authority. In addition thereto, copies of all
such authorizations shall be furnished to this headquarters and to the Commanding Officer of the
Military Police company on duty at the particular Project involved.
2. There is attached hereto, for information purposes, copies of all directives issued by this
headquarters and by War Relocation Authority concerning authorization for evacuees or other

530

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

personnel to enter or leave War Relocation Project areas. To insure uniformity of thought and
action, the term, "current emergency”, as contained in Paragraph 2a (1) of Inclosure 3, will be
construed to have the following meaning:
"That all work essential to the operation of the Project and which cannot be carried
on within the limits of the Project areas, is considered by this headquarters as con¬
stituting a current emergency.”
For the Commanding General:
Hugh

T.

Fullerton

Major, A.G.D.
Assistant Adjutant General
3 Inch
# 1—Letter of Aug. 11, 1942, this headquarters to Director, WRA
# 2—Letter of Aug. 24, 1942, Director, WRA
# 3—Letter of Sept. 21, 1942, this headquarters to Commanding General, Ninth Service
Command
August 11, 1942
SUBJECT: Authorization to issue permits for ingress to and egress from War Relocation Project
Areas
TO: Director, War Relocation Authority
1. Pursuant to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4, Public Proclamation No. 8 of the
Commanding General, dated June 27, 1942, and subject to the limitations in paragraph 2 hereof,
authority is delegated to the Director, War Relocation Authority, and to each person whom such
Director may designate in writing, to grant written authorization to persons to leave and to enter
War Relocation Project Areas.

Each such authorization shall set forth the effective period

thereof and the terms and conditions upon and the purposes for which it is granted. A complete
record of all such authorizations shall be made and kept by the Director, War Relocation Authority.
2. The Commanding General retains the jurisdiction to and this grant of authority shall not
authorize the Director, War Relocation Authority to permit:
a. Release of persons of Japanese ancestry from any relocation center or project area for
the purpose of private employment within, resettlement within, or permanent or semi¬
permanent residence within Military Area No. 1 or the California portion of Military Area
No. 2.
b. Travel of persons of Japanese ancestry within Military Area No. 1 or the California
portion of Military Area No. 2.
The release or travel, referred to in a and b above, shall be by authority of the Commanding
General under permits issued by or under authority of Civil Affairs Division, this headquarters.
3. This authority supersedes and revokes, as of this date, the authority granted by letters
dated July 8, 1942, by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, on behalf of the
Commanding General, to the Regional Director and Executive Assistant, War Relocation Author¬
ity, and to all War Relocation Authority Project Directors and Assistant Project Directors.
For the Commanding General:
Hugh

T.

Fullerton

Captain A.G.D.
Assistant Adjutant General
WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
San Francisco, California
Whitcomb Hotel Building
August 24, 1942
TO:

The Regional Director and all Project Directors, Pacific Coast Region, War Relocation
Authority

SUBJECT: Delegation of authority to issue permits for ingress to and egress from relocation areas.
1. Pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Commanding General, Western Defense
Command and Fourth Army, by letter of August 11, 1942, I hereby designate and authorize the

APPENDIX

531

THREE

Regional Director of the Pacific Coast Region of the War Relocation Authority, and all Project
Directors and Assistant Project Directors for relocation areas within such Region, to grant written
authorizations to persons to leave and to enter the particular relocation area or areas over which
they have, respectively, been authorized to exercise jurisdiction, in accordance with paragraphs
3 and 4, Public Proclamation No. 8 of the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and
Fourth Army, dated June 27, 1942.
2. Each such written authorization shall set forth the effective period thereof and the terms
and conditions upon and the purposes for which it is granted, and shall otherwise be in such
form as may be required by applicable regulations or instructions of the War Relocation Authority.
A complete record shall be made and kept, separately for each such relocation area, of all written
authorizations issued under the authority granted in this memorandum.
3. No authorization to enter any relocation area designated above, issued pursuant to paragraph
4 of said Public Proclamation No. 8 shall be for a period in excess of 30 days.
4.

No one of the above-named delegatees shall issue any written authorization, pursuant to

this memorandum, that will permit—
(a) Release of a person of Japanese ancestry from any relocation area for the purpose of
private employment within, resettlement within, or permanent or semi-permanent
residence within Military Area No. 1 or the California portion of Military Area
No. 2; or
(b) Travel of a person of Japanese ancestry within Military Area No. 1 or the California
portion of Military Area No. 2;
until written authorization for such release or travel has been given by authority of the Com¬
manding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, by permits issued by or under
authority of the Civil Affairs Division.
5. Any prior delegation of authority that is inconsistent with this memorandum is hereby
revoked.
D. S.

Myer

Director, War Relocation Authority

September 21, 1942
SUBJECT: Emergency Employment of Japanese Evacuees Outside of War Relocation Authority
Projects Located Within Evacuated Areas of Western Defense Command.
TO:

Commanding General, Ninth Service Command and Communications Zone, Fort Douglas,
Utah

1. In certain of the War Relocation Projects located within evacuated areas of the Western
Defense Command (see "la” below) occasions may arise when the use of evacuee labor outside of
the designated boundaries of the project area will be essential to the proper operation of the
project. For example, it may prove necessary to use evacuee labor to unload freight when the rail
head for the project is not within the project area.
a.

Colorado River War Relocation Project, Poston, Arizona.
Gila River War Relocation Project, Rivers, Arizona.
Tulelake War Relocation Project, Newell, California.
Manzanar War Relocation Project, Manzanar, California.

2. There is no objection on the part of this headquarters to such employment of evacuee labor
providing the points outlined below are understood and observed by those concerned.

In order

that there shall be no doubt as to the policy of the Commanding General, Western Defense Com¬
mand and Fourth Army, Military Police units on duty at the concerned relocation projects are
requested to observe and comply with these instructions.

To this end, it is requested that the

following information be furnished to each such commander:
a.

Evacuee labor may be used by project directors at locations not within the boundaries
of the Relocation Project under the following conditions:

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

532

(1) That the work to be done is essential to the operation of the project and involves
meeting a current emergency.
(2) That payment therefor is not to be received from private individuals or private
firms—that is, that it is not “private employment”.
(3) That military guards are to be furnished to prevent the unauthorized absence of
evacuees from the area in which the work is to be performed. This is not to be
construed as indicating that the military personnel is to act as guards in connection
with the work party. Military personnel is to be provided solely for the purpose of
controlling exits from the particular area involved in order that unauthorized
departure of evacuees may be prevented.
(4) In the event an evacuee laborer does escape or does effect an unauthorized absence
from the area, the military personnel assigned to secure the area are not to take
action for the apprehension of the individual.

The Military Commander is,

however, to immediately notify local county and state civilian law enforcement
officials and the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In addition
thereto, an immediate report of the occurrence is to be made to this headquarters.
For the Commanding General:
Hugh T. Fullerton

Captain, A.G.D.
Assistant Adjutant General

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of the Commanding General
Presidio of San Francisco, California
September 13, 1942
SUBJECT:

Parcel Inspection at Certain War Relocation Authority Projects

TO: Commanding General, Communications Zone
1. Reference is made to the establishment and operation of Relocation Projects for persons
of Japanese ancestry at Tule Lake and Manzanar, California, and at Poston (sometimes designated
as Parker) and Sacaton (sometimes designated as Gila River), Arizona.

Each of these projects

is operated by War Relocation Authority, an independent Federal civilian agency. Their location
within areas evacuated of persons of Japanese ancestry necessitates the establishment and mainte¬
nance by this Command of certain security measures not currently requisite at other relocation
centers.
2. It is desired that you provide for contraband inspection of all packages destined for
delivery to any center resident (any person of Japanese ancestry or the non-Japanese spouse of
any such person who is a center resident) at the relocation projects designated in paragraph 1
hereof

Such inspection to be accomplished through the agency of military police under your

command stationed at each of such projects. Inspection will be applicable to all such packages
irrespective of the method of delivery and will be inclusive of parcel post and express.

In all

cases it will precede delivery to the addressee.
3. Inspection will be conducted in a manner which will insure the detection and removal from
all such packages of contraband.

In establishing the inspection procedure the following basic

requirements will be observed:
(a) Each package will be opened in the presence of the adressee.
(b) Each item of contraband discovered and removed from a package will be labeled and
plainly marked.

Such label will show the addressee’s name and the sender (if the

latter is known). Each item of contraband discovered will be appropriately numbered
by an identifying serial number.
(c) A receipt will be issued the addressee for each item of contraband discovered and re¬
moved.

Such receipt will bear the identifying serial number previously assigned the

item covered.
(d) By arrangement with the project director inspection will be conducted in a building

APPENDIX

533

THREE

at or near the center. The building should be chosen with a view to facilitating the
presence of the addressee, the inspection procedure and the delivery of packages.
(e)

A contraband register will be maintained.
entered in the register.
number.

Each item of contraband seized will be

The descriptive entry may be limited to the assigned serial

Periodically, contraband so seized will be delivered to the custody of the

project director for safe keeping. A covering receipt reflecting the serial numbers of
the items delivered will be obtained from the project director.
(f) No item of contraband will thereafter be delivered to a center resident without the
express permission of this headquarters.
4. The following are contraband:
(a) Those articles, commodities or things; the use, possession or operation of which are
prohibited by paragraph 6, Proclamation No. 3, of this headquarters, i.e., firearms,
weapons or implements of war or component parts thereof, ammunition, bombs,
explosives or the component parts thereof, short-wave radio receiving sets having a
frequency of 1,750 kilocycles or greater or of 540 kilocycles or less, radio trans¬
mitting sets, signal devices, codes or ciphers, cameras.
(b) Those articles, commodities or things; the use, possession or operation of which are
prohibited by Public Proclamation No. 2525, promulgated by the President of the
United States on December 7, 1941, i.e., papers, documents or books in which there
may

be invisible

writings;

photographs,

sketches,

pictures,

drawings,

maps,

or

graphical representation of any military or naval installations or equipment or of any
arms, ammunition, implements of war, device or thing used or intended to be used
in the combat equipment of the land or naval forces of the United States or of any
military or naval post, camp, or station.

The provisions of this sub-paragraph, b,

shall be subject to the following exceptions: (1) First class mail will not be inspected;
(2) Magazines, periodicals, newspapers and books printed in the English language by
publishers in the United States and transmitted as second class mail by the original
publisher to such person of Japanese ancestry will not be confiscated or withheld as
contraband within the meaning of this sub-paragraph b. If, however, such magazines,
periodicals, newspapers and books have been mailed by a person other than the original
publisher to such person of Japanese ancestry, then the same shall be searched for
contraband which may be secreted between the pages or covers thereof and in the
event any such contraband is found, the same together with the container thereof,
shall be confiscated and disposed of as provided in paragraph 3 hereof
5. The tools and implements of an artisan or of a professional person of Japanese ancestry,
are not absolute contraband and are not subject to confiscation.

These items are inclusive of

wood-working tools, agricultural implements, dressmakers or tailors trade tools, and mechanics
tools as well.

It is not intended to prevent the development of skills, crafts, trades and pro¬

fessional endeavors within relocation centers.
6. The War Relocation Authority has concurred in this order and has agreed to provide for
the issuance of appropriate instructions to each project director affected. These instructions will
direct the discontinuance of current postal, express, or other parcel delivery service and in lieu
thereof the delivery of all packages to military police for inspection. The Authority will further
instruct project directors to accept delivery of, receipt for and safely store all such contraband.
7. It is requested that you advise this headquarters of the action taken at each center to comply
with this directive.
J. L. DeWITT
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

December 7, 1942
SUBJECT:

"War Relocation Projects.

TO: Director, War Relocation Authority, Barr Building, Washington, D. C.
1. Reference is made to letter this headquarters dated November 22, 1942, file 334.7 (DSC),
subject: "Policies as to Relationship of Western Defense Command with Ninth Service Command

534

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

and War Relocation Authority,” copies of which were furnished you; and particularly to para¬
graph lb (3) thereof.
2. In accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement between the War Relocation Authority
and the War Department dated April 17, 1942

(Inclosure $ 1), this headquarters assumed

certain responsibilities in connection with the provision of necessary housing, hospital and sanitary
facilities, Military Police facilities and signal installations for War Relocation Projects. In addi¬
tion, largely by transfer from Assembly Centers, this headquarters provided certain minimum
barrack and mess and hospital equipment.
3. The completion of the various projects is a progressive one and it is apparent that this
headquarters cannot finally assure the completion without retaining control for a considerable
period of time, a procedure not contemplated under present policies (paragraph 1, above).

For

this reason a Board of Officers was appointed to visit the projects to determine the status of
construction, property and other matters on the date of the visit.

Copies of Board reports are

inclosed for the following projects:
a. Colorado River War Relocation Project, Poston, Arizona.
b. Gila River War Relocation Project, Rivers, Pinal County, Arizona.
c. Minidoka War Relocation Project, Hunt, Idaho.
d. Tule Lake War Relocation Project, Newell, California.
e. Manzanar War Relocation Project, Manzanar, California.
f.

Central Utah War Relocation Project, Delta, Utah.

g. Heart Mountain War Relocation Project, Heart Mountain, Wyoming.
h. Granada War Relocation Project, Amache Branch, Lamar, Colorado.
*.

Jerome War Relocation Project, Jerome, Arkansas.

j. Rohwer War Relocation Project, McGehee, Arkansas.
Copies of the reports have also been furnished to the War Department and to interested Service
Commands.
4. This information is furnished you in order that you may look to such other agencies as the
War Department may designate in connection with these projects.

No further action in con¬

nection with matters covered by the Board reports is contemplated by this headquarters.
For the Commanding General:
11 Incls:
Incl #
Incl #
Incl #
Incl #
Incl #

1—Memo of Agreement between the WD and WRA, dated April 17, 1942.
2—Board Report on Colorado River War Relocation Project.
3—Board Report on Gila River War Relocation Project.
4—Board Report on Minidoka War Relocation Project.
5—Board Report on Tule Lake War Relocation Project.

Incl #
Incl #

7—Board Report on Central Utah War Relocation Project.

Incl #
Incl #

9—Board Report on Granada War Relocation Project.

6—Board Report on Manzanar War Relocation Project.
8—Board Report on Heart Mountain War Relocation Project.

Incl # 10—Board Report on Jerome War Relocation Project.
Incl # 11—Board Report on Rohwer War Relocation Project.
December 7, 1942
SUBJECT: War Relocation Projects.
TO: Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington D. C.
1. In accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement between the War Relocation Authority
and the War Department dated April 17, 1942, (Inclosure

1), this headquarters assumed

certain responsibilities in connection with the provision of necessary housing, hospital and sanitary
facilities, Military Police facilities and signal installations for War Relocation Projects.

In addi¬

tion, largely by transfer from Assembly Centers, this headquarters provided certain minimum
barrack and mess and hospital equipment.
2. The transfer of all persons of Japanese ancestry from Assembly Centers, operated by the
Wartime Civil Control Administration, to War Relocation Projects, operated by the War Reloca¬
tion Authority, has been completed and certain policies have been announced regarding the future

APPENDIX

535

THREE

relationship of the Western Defense Command with Service Commands and War Relocation
Authority in connection with these provisions.

(Inclosure $ 2.)

3. The completion of the various projects is a progressive one and it is apparent that this
headquarters cannot finally assure the completion without retaining control for a considerable
period of time, a procedure not contemplated under present policies.

(Inclosure $ 2.)

For this

reason a Board of Officers was appointed to visit the projects to determine the status of construc¬
tion, property and other matters on the date of the visit.

Copies of Board reports are inclosed

for the following projects:
a. Colorado River War Relocation Project, Poston, Arizona.
b. Gila River War Relocation Project, Rivers, Pinal County, Arizona.
c. Minidoka War Relocation Project, Hunt, Idaho.
d. Tule Lake War Relocation Project, Newell, California.
e. Manzanar War Relocation Project, Manzanar, California.
f.

Central Utah War Relocation Project, Delta, Utah.

g. Heart Mountain War Relocation Project, Heart Mountain, Wyoming.
h. Granada War Relocation Project, Amache Branch, Lamar, Colorado.
i.

Jerome War Relocation Project, Jerome, Arkansas.

j. Rohwer War Relocation Project, McGehee, Arkansas.
Copies of the reports have also been furnished to the interested Service Commands and to the War
Relocation Authority.
4. This information is furnished for such further action as the War Department desires to
take under the Memorandum of Agreement referred to above as no further action in this matter
is contemplated by this headquarters.
For the Commanding General:
12 Incls:
Incl #

1— Memo of Agreement between the WD and WRA dated April 17, 1942.

Incl #

2— Ltr fr Hq WDC & 4A, file 334.7

(DCS) subj: "Policies as to Relationship

of Western Defense Command with Ninth Service Command & WRA,” dated
n/22/42, with inclosures thereto.
Incl #

3— Board Report on Colorado River War Relocation Project.

Incl #

4— Board report on Gila River War Relocation Project.

Incl #

5— Board Report on Minidoka War Relocation Project.

Incl #

6— Board Report on Tule Lake War Relocation Project.

Incl #

7— Board Report on Manzanar War Relocation Project.

Incl #

8— Board Report on Central Utah War Relocation Project.

Incl #

9— Board Report on Heart Mountain War Relocation Project.

Incl # 10— Board Report on Granada War Relocation Project.
Incl # 11— Board Report on Jerome War Relocation Project.
Incl # 12— Board Report on Rohwer War Relocation Project.

December 7, 1942
SUBJECT: War Relocation Projects.
TO: Commanding General, Ninth Service Command, Fort Douglas, Utah.
1. Reference is made to letter this headquarters dated November 22, 1942, file 334.7 (DCS),
subject: "Policies as to Relationship of Western Defense Command with Ninth Service Command
and War Relocation Authority,” and particularly to paragraph lb (3) thereof.
2. In accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement between the War Relocation Authority
and the War Department dated April 17, 1942

(Inclosure $ 1), this headquarters assumed

certain responsibilities in connection with the provision of necessary housing, hospital and sanitary
facilities, Military Police facilities and signal installations for War Relocation Projects. In addi¬
tion, largely by transfer from Assembly Centers, this headquarters provided certain minimum
barrack and mess and hospital equipment.
3. The completion of the various projects is a progressive one and it is apparent that this
headquarters cannot finally assure the completion without retaining control for a considerable

536

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EVACUATION

FROM

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WEST

COAST

period of time, a procedure not contemplated under present policies (paragraph 1, above).

For

this reason a Board of Officers was appointed to visit the projects to determine the status of con¬
struction, property and other matters on the date of the visit. Copies of Board reports are inclosed
for the following projects:
a. Colorado River War Relocation Project, Poston, Arizona.
b. Gila River War Relocation Project, Rivers, Pinal County, Arizona.
c. Minidoka War Relocation Project, Plunt, Idaho.
d. Tule Lake War Relocation Project, Newell, California.
e. Manzanar War Relocation Project, Manzanar, California.
f

Central Utah War Relocation Project, Delta, Utah.

Copies of the reports have also been furnished the War Department and the War Relocation
Authority.
4. This information is furnished as a matter pertaining to your command in view of present
policies as to the relationship of agencies of the War Department and the War Relocation Authority
as stated in the letter referred to in paragraph 1. No further action in connection with matters
covered by the Board reports is contemplated by this headquarters.
For the Commanding General:
7 Incls:
Incl $ 1—Memo of Agreement between the WD and WRA, dated April 17, 1942.
Incl # 2—Board Report on Colorado River War Relocation Project.
Incl $ 3—Board Report on Gila River War Relocation Project.
Incl # 4—Board Report on Minidoka War Relocation Project.
Incl # 5—Board Report on Tule Lake War Relocation Project.
Incl # 6—Board Report on Manzanar Relocation Project.
Incl $ 7—Board Report on Central Utah War Relocation Project.
December 7, 1942
SUBJECT: War Relocation Projects.
TO: Commanding General, Eighth Service Command, Santa Fe Building, Dallas, Texas.
1.

Reference is made to letter this headquarters dated November 22,

(DCS), subject:

1942, file 334.7

"Policies as to Relationship of Western Defense Command with Ninth Service

Command and War Relocation Authority,” copies of which were furnished your headquarters;
and particularly to paragraph lb (3) thereof
2. In accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement between the War Relocation Authority
and the War Department dated Apr. 17, 1942 (Inclosure # 1), this headquarters assumed certain
responsibilities in connection with the provision of necessary housing, hospital and sanitary facilities,
Military Police facilities and signal installations for War Relocation Projects. In addition, largely
by transfer from Assembly Centers, this headquarters provided certain minimum barrack and mess
and hospital equipment.
3. The completion of the various projects is a progressive one and it is apparent that this head¬
quarters cannot finally assure the completion without retaining control for a considerable period
of time, a procedure not contemplated under present policies (paragraph 1, above). For this reason
a Board of Officers was appointed to visit the projects to determine the status of construction,
property and other matters on the date of the visit.
following project:
a.

Copy of Board report is inclosed for the

Granada War Relocation Project, Amache Branch, Lamar, Colorado.

Copies of this report have also been furnished the War Department and the War Relocation
Authority.
4. This information is furnished as a matter pertaining to your command in view of present
policies as to the relationship of agencies of the War Department and the War Relocation Authority
as stated in the letter referred to in paragraph 1. No further action in connection with matters
covered by the Board report is contemplated by this headquarters.
For the Commanding General:
2 Incls:
Incl $ 1—Memo of Agreement between the WD & WRA, dated April 17, 1942.
Incl $ 2—Board Report on Granada War Relocation Project.

APPENDIX

537

THREE

December 7, 1942
SUBJECT: War Relocation Projects.
TO: Commanding General, Seventh Service Command, New Federal Building, 15th and Dodge
Streets, Omaha, Nebraska.
1. Reference is made to letter this headquarters dated November 22, 1942, file 334.7 (DCS),
subject: “Policies as to Relationship of Western Defense Command with Ninth Service Command
and War Relocation Authority,” copies of which were furnished your headquarters; and partic¬
ularly to paragraph 1 b (3) thereof.
2. In accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement between the War Relocation Authority
and the War Department dated April 17, 1942

(inclosure # 1), this headquarters assumed

certain responsibilities in connection with the provision of necessary housing, hospital and sanitary
facilities, Military Police facilities and signal installations for War Relocation Projects. In addition,
largely by transfer from Assembly Centers, this headquarters provided certain minimum barrack
and mess and hospital equipment.
3. The completion of the various projects is a progressive one and it is apparent that this
headquarters cannot finally assure the completion without retaining control for a considerable
period of time, a procedure not contemplated under present policies (paragraph 1, above). For
this reason a Board of Officers was appointed to visit the projects to determine the status of
construction, property and other matters on the date of the visit.

Copies of Board reports are

inclosed for the following projects:
a.

Heart Mountain War Relocation Project, Heart Mountain, Wyoming.

b.

Jerome War Relocation Project, Jerome, Arkansas.

c.

Rohwer War Relocation Project, McGehee, Arkansas.

Copies of the reports have also been furnished the War Department and the War Relocation
Authority.
4.

This information is furnished as a matter pertaining to your command in view of present

policies as to the relationship of agencies of the War Department and the War Relocation
Authority, as stated in the letter referred to in paragraph 1.

No further action in connection

with matters covered by the Board reports is contemplated by this headquarters.
For the Commanding General:
4 Incls:
Incl # 1—Memo of Agreement between the WD and WRA, dated April 17, 1942.
Incl $ 2—Board Report on Heart Mountain War Relocation Project.
Incl # 3—Board Report on Jerome War Relocation Project.
Incl # 4—Board Report on Rohwer War Relocation Project.

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF A BOARD OF OFFICERS
Proceedings of a board of officers which convened at Colorado River War Relocation Project,
Poston, Arizona, pursuant to paragraph 1, Special Orders No. 304, Headquarters Western Defense
Command and Fourth Army, 5 November, 1942, copy of which is inclosed herewith as Exhibit "A”.
The Board convened at 8:00AM, November 29, 1942, at Colorado River War Relocation
Project, Poston, Arizona, and proceeded to an inspection of the facilities and items set forth in
paragraph 1 c., S.O. No. 304.

MEMBERS PRESENT AT THE MEETING
Colonel Herbert D. Crall, Medical Corps
Lt. Colonel Joe P. Price, Corps of Military Police
Major John R. Sharp, Corps of Engineers
Captain Robert M. Petersen, Quartermaster Corps
First Lieutenant William D. Knox, Signal Corps
Lt. Colonel Joe P. Price, CMP, appointed November 15, 1942, as a member of the Board vice
Colonel W. F. Magill, Jr., Inf., relieved.
Exhibit

"B”.

Copy of orders effecting this change included as

538

JAPANESE

EVACUATION

FROM

THE

WEST

COAST

PURPOSE: To investigate and report for the purpose of determining the present status of
construction, supply, communication facilities, and hospitalization in the War Relocation Projects
now being operated by the War Relocation Authority.
FINDINGS: The findings of the Board are:
1. Construction of Initial Facilities:
a. The provisions of the memorandum of agreement, April 17, 1942, have been complied
with and the construction meets the requirements of "Standards and Details—Con¬
struction of Japanese Evacuees Reception Centers” with the following exceptions:
(1) Only fifty percent of wire mesh for fly screening provided.
(2) Interior roads have been surfaced.
(3) One administrative shop building not provided.
(4) No gasoline operated stand-by pump provided for water supply system.
(5) No minor surgery room provided in hospital.
(6) Not all the heating stoves have been provided for evacuee barracks.
(7) One fire engine short.
(8) Sprinkler system not provided in hospital group.

Steam and hot water systems

not completed in this group.
(9) Wall board not provided to line evacuee barracks.
(10) All of the elevated water tanks leak and there has been noticeable settle¬
ment of the tank footings at well # 1, in Unit # 2.
(11) No doctor’s and nurses’ dressing rooms provided.
(12) No means for heating doctor’s or nurses’ quarters.
2.

Status of Supply:

a.

All Quartermaster supplies furnished in compliance with memorandum of agreement
between the War Department and the War Relocation Authority dated April 17,
1942, were received in a serviceable condition except some cots, steel canvas which
had to be repaired before they were issued.

b.

All Type B rations were received in good condition suitable for immediate issue.

3.

Hospital and Sanitary Facilities:

a.

Construction is complete except for heating plant for the hospital, doctors’ and nurses’
dressing rooms, minor surgery and dispensary in Camp No. 3.

b.

Following equipment has not yet been installed:
(1) Ventilators for the main laboratory, dental laboratory and X-ray developing room.
(2) Electric ranges for wards.

(Hot plates are in use).

(3) Dish washer for the hospital kitchen.
(4) Any heating arrangement for doctors’ or nurses’ quarters.
c.

Following essential items of equipment and supply have not been received:

See Exhibit

"C” attached.
d.

Sanitary Facilities:
(1) There is no heating in any of the apartments of the evacuees.
(2) This camp was put in operation prior to the agreement of June 6, 1942, and
there are no bath tubs in women’s lavatories, however, sanitary facilities are con¬
sidered adequate.
(3) Sewage plants are operating satisfactorily.
(4) Ample potable water supply has been provided which is chlorinated at the pumps.

4.

Military Police Facilities:

a.

Construction of military police housing and facilities is complete with the following
exceptions:
(1) Toilet in Administration Building.
(2) Shower and window guards for guard house.
(3) Meat block and garbage rack for mess hall.
(4) Guard towers.
(5) Outside telephone and separate PBX.

APPENDIX

535

THREE

5.

Signal Installations:

a.

The initial requirements on telephone switchboard and telephones within the project
have not been met.

b.

Detailed report of present facilities is included as Exhibit “D”.

The Board adjourned at 3.00PM, November 29, 1942, at Colorado River War Relocation
Project, Poston, Arizona.
/s/

Herbert

D. Crall

Herbert

D. Crall

Colonel Medical Corps
President
MEMBERS:

Is/

Joe P. Price

Lt. Colonel Joe P. Price, Corps of Military Police
/s/

John R. Sharp

Major John R. Sharp, Corps of Engineers
/s/

Robert

M. Petersen

Captain Robert M. Petersen, Quartermaster Corps.
HQ WDC & 4A Pres. SF Calif 5 Dec 42
APPROVED:
J. L. DeWITT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.
/s/ Wm.

D. Knox

WM. D. KNOX
1st Lieut., Signal Corps
Recorder
EXHIBITS:
"A”—Cpy SO # 304 Hq WDC & 4A
Dated 11/5/42
"B”—Cpy SO #314 Hq WDC & 4A
Dated 11/15/42
“C”—Insp. Hosp. & Sant’ry Fac.
Colo. R. War Rel. Project
Dated 11 /29/42—Col. Crall, MC
"D”—Insp. Sign. Install’tns.
Colo. R. War. Rel. Project
Dated 11/29/42—Lieut. Knox, SC

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Presidio of San Francisco, California
SPECIAL ORDERS
NUMBER 304
EXTRACT
November 5, 1942
1.

a.

A Board of Officers is appointed to meet at this Headquarters on November 5, 1942,
or as soon thereafter as practicable for the purpose of determining the present status
of construction, supply, communication facilities and hospitalization in the War Relo¬
cation Projects now being operated by the War Relocation Authority and designated
as follows:
Colorado River War Relocation Project, Poston, Arizona.
Gila River War Relocation Project, Rivers, Pinal County, Arizona.
Minidoka War Relocation Project, Hunt, Idaho.
Tule Lake War Relocation Project, Newell, California.
Manzanar War Relocation Project, Manzanar, California.
Central Utah War Relocation Project, Delta, Utah.
Heart Mountain War Relocation Project, Heart Mountain, Wyoming.

540

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

Granada War Relocation Project, Amache Branch, Lamar, Colorado.
Jerome War Relocation Project, Jerome, Arkansas.
Rohwer War Relocation Project, McGehee, Arkansas.
b. DETAIL FOR THE BOARD:
COLONEL W. FULTON MAGILL JR. 07251 Infantry
COLONEL HERBERT D. CRALL 0235629 Medical Corps
MAJOR JOHN R. SHARP 0183 351 Corps of Engineers
CAPTAIN ROBERT M. PETERSEN 03 87752 Quartermaster Corps
FIRST LIEUTENANT WILLIAM D. KNOX 0344911 Signal Corps
c. The Board will visit each of the War Relocation Centers in turn and will determine the
status of the following:
(1) Construction of initial facilities. (Paragraph 5, Memorandum of Agreement
between the War Department and War Relocation Authority, dated April 17
1942).
(2) Supply of initial equipment for Relocation Centers. (Paragraph 6, above quoted
agreement).
(3) Hospital and sanitary facilities. (Paragraph 5, above quoted agreement).
(4) Military Police Housing. (Paragraph 5, above quoted agreement).
(5) Signal Installations. (Paragraph 5, above quoted agreement).
d. The Board is a fact finding body only whose report will reflect the status of the
various projects at the time of the visit under the headings shown above. It will
confine its report to these matters without initiating corrective action.
e. The report of the Board will show whether the supplies, equipment and construction
provided under the Memorandum of Agreement meet the minimum standards set
forth in "Standards and Details,” with supplements thereto, available in the Office
of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division. Where these standards have not
been met, the report will include a detailed statement of that which is lacking.
/. Separate reports will be made on each project and all reports will reach this head¬
quarters by December 5, 1942.
By command of Lieutenant General DeWITT:
J. W. BARNETT,
Brigadier General, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.
OFFICIAL:
B. Y. READ,
Colonel, Adjutant General’s Department,
Adjutant General.
DISTRIBUTION "F”
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Presidio of San Francisco, California
November 15, 1942
SPECIAL ORDERS
NUMBER 314
1. Confidential.
2. COL ANDREW D CHAFFIN 01857 GSC having reported Nov 13 1942 in compliance
with par 2 SO 302 WD cs, is asgd to duty as Asst to the AC OF S, Civil Affairs Div, San
Francisco, Calif.
3. MAJ HERMAN P GOEBEL, JR 0274477 Cav having been asgd to this Hq Nov 5 1942
in compliance with par 10 SO 301 WD cs, is asgd to duty as Asst to the AC of S, Civil Affairs Div,
San Francisco, Califi
4. 1ST LT WILLIAM C KORB 0271597 FA this Hq WP at such time as will enable him to
report not earlier than November 28, 1942 nor later than November 29, 1942 to the Comdt

APPENDIX

541

THREE

C&GS Sch, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas on temp duty for purpose of pursuing G-2 course of instruc¬
tion and upon completion will return to proper station.

TDN.

FD 34 P 434-02 A 0425-23.

Auth: WD TAGO Memo No W3 50-97-42, dated October 9, 1942, subject: "Courses, Command
and General Staff School (Eleventh General Staff and Third Services of Supply Staff)”.
5.

MAJ JOHN D MALNIGHT 021851 1 Sig C is reld fr asgmt and duty with Hq Western

Def Comd and Fourth Army, Presidio of San Francisco, Calif is then asgd to 43 8th Sig Cons
Bn (Avn.), Camp Pinedale, Fresno, Calif.

WP.

TPA.

TDN.

FD 31 P 431-01 02 03 07 08

A 0425-23.
6. So much of par 6 SO 293 as amended by par 13 SO 303, both this Hq cs, as reads, "Techn
Gr 5 D’Arcy V Controy, 393 89644, 255th Sig Cons Co, Camp Adair, Ore”, is further amended
to read, "Techn Gr 5 D’Arcy V Conroy, 39389644, 255th Sig Cons Co, Camp Adair, Ore”.
7.

The following change is made in the composition of the board of officers appointed by

par 1 SO 304, this Hq, cs:
RELIEVED
COLONEL W FULTON MAGILL JR 07251 Inf
DETAILED
LT COL JOE P PRICE 0236100 CMP
8.

The following named EM, both Inf Hq Co Fourth Army are trfd in gr of Put to Sig C,

Hq Co Fourth Army, Presidio of San Francisco, Calif:
Put Richard A Brown, 19084998
Put Peter A Tobin, 1913826)
By Command of Lieutenant General DeWITT:
J. W. BARNETT,
Brigadier General, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.
OFFICIAL:
B. Y. READ,
Colonel Adjutant General’s Department,
Adjutant General
DIST: "F’
INSPECTION OF HOSPITAL AND SANITARY FACILITIES
Colorado River War Relocation Project
Poston, Arizona
November 29, 1942
Colonel Herbert D. Crall, M.C.
1.

This project is divided into 3 separate camps originally built to house 10,000, 5,000, and

5,000 evacuees. Camp 1 has a population of 9,300 with about 700 out at work. Camp 2 and 3
have a population of about 4,000.
2.

Personnel, medical:
Caucasian—Dr. Pressman
3 nurses
1 nutritionist
Japanese —11 doctors
3 optometrists
19 dentists
5 nurses, plus 2 who are not working, 3 nurses are graduates of
Japanese nursing schools
4 medical students
4 chiropractors
1 midwife

JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST

542

9 pharmacists
1 laboratory technician
I X-ray technician
1 bacteriologist
1 entomologist and sanitarian
3. Medical supplies:

There are numerous shortages on requisitions for medical supply, 100-

bed basic, UA-801-95-13 and 25-bed expansion unit, Requisition No. UA-801-88-11.

Original

100-bed hospital was received from San Francisco Medical Depot and has no S.G.O. requisition
number. The following items are shortages which are urgently desired:
Atropine sulfate, grains gr

10860

l/lOO

(difficult to se¬

cure locally)
12280

Hematropine hydrobromide

30060

Bag, obstetrical

30770

Case, diagnostic, eye, ear, nose and throat
Steinmann apparatus and pins

31960 & 31965
.

37126

Mask, gas, oxygen therapy

36630
Class 5
50040

Crutches
Dental equipment is generally short. Burrs are critical

51750

Compressor unit

Amalgam
Handpieces

52610 & 52630

Dental laboratory equipment; dental unit lamps, oper¬
ating; portable engines have not been received.
60400

Illuminator, X-ray

61200, 61220, 61230, & 61240
70560

Film holders
Nurse’s desk

70604

Chart holders

Following equipment and construction to be provided by the USEC has not been provided.
Ventilators for the dental laboratory, the main laboratory, and the X-ray developing room, doctors’
and nurses’ dressing rooms, and minor surgery. Electric ranges for each ward.

Dish washer for

the main kitchen. Heating for the doctors and nurses quarters.
4.

The hospital laundry is not yet in operation since only 1 of the 3 boilers of the hospital

heating plant is now in operation.
5.

Sanitary facilities in the main camp areas of all 3 camps are ample although bath tubs

have not been installed in women’s shower rooms since this center was constructed prior to the
agreement of June 6th between the War Department and the W.R.A.

Facilities, however, are

considered adequate.
6.

There are no stoves at present available for the heating of any of the apartments of

the evacuees.
7.

Three sewage plants are in operation; 1 in each camp and are satisfactory except that in

camp 2, additional drainage must be provided to care for the effluent which now practically fills
the basin provided.

(Units have been in operation for about one week.)

8.

An ample potable water supply has been provided for the 3 camps.

9.

No method has been provided for the washing of garbage cans although steps are being

taken locally to care for this situation.

INSPECTION OF SIGNAL INSTALLATIONS
Colorado River War Relocation Project
Poston, Arizona
November 29, 1942
1st Lieut. William D. Knox, Signal Corps
Project has a Western Electric drop type switchboard.

Installation of telephone facilities is

on a temporary basis. Three trunk lines, two to Parker and one to Blythe are in operation.

543

APPENDIX THREE

Thirty-four lines serving 46 telephones, are in operation distributed as follows:
25 Administration and operation lines.
3 Military Police lines.
2 Party lines for Fire Stations.
3 Party lines for Hospi