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FINAL REPORT | A PA N E S E E V AC U AT IO N FROM THE WEST COAST D 769 U57f1943 NLM D5D07312 3 NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE ARMY MEDICAL LIBRARY WASHINGTON Pounded 1836 Number oro 3—10543 Form 113c, W. D., S. G. O. (Revised June 13, 1936) DUE TWO WEEKS FROM LAST DATE JUL * * GPO 881473 U.S.' A OnT) 'I. b'tafn Cvty\ nrV^Y\T. <»\ V~5VjuC-VVn /^V Vto>nryy FINAL REPORT JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 1942 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1943 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office Washington, D. C. ict> u 51 ^ \9V5 WAR DEPARTMENT THE CHIEF OF STAFF WASHINGTON 19 July 1943 Dear Mr. Secretary: There is transmitted herewith General DeWitt’s final report on the evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from certain areas on the West Coast. Faithfully yours, Chief of Staff. Washington, D. C. Honorable Henry L. The Secretary of War Stimson FOREWORD This volume constitutes a comprehensive report on the evacuation from West Coast areas of persons of Japanese ancestry carried out by the Army in the interests of military security during the spring of 1942. The considerations which led to evacuation as well as the mechanics by which it was achieved, are set forth in detail. Great credit, in my opinion, is due General DeWitt and the Army for the humane yet effi¬ cient manner in which this difficult task was handled. It was unfortunate that the exigencies of the military situation were such as to require the same treatment for all persons of Japa¬ nese ancestry, regardless of their individual loyalty to the United States. But in emergencies, where the safety of the Nation is involved, consideration of the rights of individuals must be subordinated to the common security. As General DeWitt points out, great credit is due our Japanese population for the manner in which they responded to and complied with the orders of exclusion. / Secretary of War. HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOIIKTFT AKMY OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA June 5, 1943 SUBJECT: Final Report on the Evacuation of Japanese from Certain Military Areas in Western Defense Command. TO: Chief of Staff, United States Army, War Department, Washing¬ ton, D. C. 1. I transmit herewith my final report on the evacuation of Japanese from the Pacific Coast. 2. The evacuation was impelled by military necessity. The security of the Pacific Coast continues to require the exclusion of Japanese from the area now prohibited to them and will so continue as long as that military necessity exists. The surprise attack at Pearl Harbor by the enemy crippled a major portion of the Pacific Fleet and exposed the West Coast to an attack which could not have been substantially impeded by defensive fleet operations. More than 115,000 persons of Japanese ancestry resided along the coast and were signifi¬ cantly concentrated near many highly sensitive installations essential to the war effort. Intelligence services records reflected the existence of hundreds of Japanese organizations in California, Washington, Oregon and Arizona which, prior to December 7, 1941, were actively engaged in advancing Japanese war aims. These records also disclosed that thousands of American-born Japanese had gone to Japan to receive their education and indoctrination there and had become rabidly pro-Japanese and then had returned to the United States. Emperor worshipping ceremonies were commonly held and millions of dollars had flowed into the Japanese imperial war chest from the contributions freely made by Jap¬ anese here. The continued presence of a large, unassimilated, tightly knit racial group, bound to an enemy nation by strong ties of race, culture, custom and religion along a frontier vulnerable to attack constituted a menace which had to be dealt with. Their loyalties were unknown and time was of the essence. The evident aspirations of the enemy emboldened by his recent successes made it worse than folly to have left any stone unturned in the building up of our defenses. It is better to have had this protection and not to have needed it than to have needed it and not to have had it—as we have learned to our sorrow. 3. On February 14, 1942, I recommended to the War Department that the military security of the Pacific Coast required the establishment of broad civil control, anti-sabotage and counter-espionage measures, including the evacuation therefrom of all persons of Japanese ancestry. vii In recognition of this situa- via JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST tion, the President issued Executive Order No. 9066 on February 19, 1942, authorizing the accomplishment of these and any other necessary security meas¬ ures. By letter dated February 20, 1942, the Secretary of War authorized me to effectuate my recommendations and to exercise all of the powers which the Executive Order conferred upon him and upon any military commander desig¬ nated by him. A number of separate and distinct security measures have been instituted may under demand the broad the initiation authority of others. thus delegated, Among the and steps future taken events was the evacuation of Japanese from western Washington and Oregon, California, and southern Arizona. Transmitted herewith is the final report of that evacuation. 4. The report comprises nine Parts and reference matter. eight chapters are supplemented by a pictorial summary. Its twenty- In Part I, I have traced the developments which led to the issuance by the President of Executive Order No. 9066, establishing military control over the Pacific Coast. The mili¬ tary necessity for the specific action reported is outlined in Chapter II. Part II, Chapters IV to VI, inclusive, presents a resume of the evacuation method. In these chapters the means provided to protect the persons, the property and the health of evacuees are described. In succeeding Parts a more detailed account of each phase of the operation is found. Part III describes the military organiza¬ tion established to accomplish the evacuation. cover evacuation operations. Part IV, Chapters VIII to XII Part V comprises Chapters XIII to XIX. These offer a narrative of Assembly Center Operations—the selection, construction and administration by the Army of the temporary residences provided evacuees pending their transfer to Relocation Centers in the interior. Chapters XX to XXII. Part VI includes This section reports the Army’s participation in pre¬ paring semi-permanent facilities for the relocation of evacuees and the methods pursued in their transfer to these accommodations. In Part VII is found Chap¬ ters XXIII to XXVI, in which collateral aspects of the program are discussed, such as curfew and travel control, public relations, inspection and repatriation activities. Part VIII, consisting of Chapter XXVII and XXVIII, presents a fiscal and statistical summary. Part IX concludes the report with a series of photo¬ graphs pictorializing the entire operation. Only those data essential to an under¬ standing of the subject are included in the appendices. 5. There was neither pattern nor precedent for an undertaking of this mag¬ nitude and character; and yet over a period of less than ninety operating days, Coast. 110,442 persons of Japanese ancestry were evacuated from the West This compulsory organized mass migration was conducted under com¬ plete military supervision. It was effected without major incident in a time of extreme pressure and severe national stress, consummated at a time when the energies of the military were directed primarily toward the organization and training of an Army of sufficient size and equipment to fight a global war. The task was, nevertheless, completed without any appreciable diver¬ gence of military personnel. Comparatively few were used, and there was no interruption in a training program. 6. In the orderly accomplishment of the program, emphasis was placed upon LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL IX the making of due provision against social and economic dislocation. cultural production was not reduced by the evacuation. Agri¬ Over ninety-nine per cent of all agricultural acreage in the affected area owned or operated by evacuees was successfully kept in production. Purchasers, lessees, or substitute operators were found who took over the acreage subject to relinquishment. The Los Angeles Herald and Express and the San Diego Union, on February 23, 1943, and the Tacoma News-Tribune, on February 25, 1943, reported increases not only in the value but also in the quantity of farm production in their respective areas. 7. So far as could be foreseen, everything essential minimize the impact of evacuation upon evacuees, omy. was provided to as well as upon econ¬ Notwithstanding, exclusive of the costs of construction of facilities, the purchase of evacuee motor vehicles, the aggregate of agricultural crop loans made and the purchase of office equipment now in use for other government purposes, the entire cost was $1.46 per evacuee day for the period of evacua¬ tion, Assembly Center residence and transfer operations. This cost includes financial assistance to evacuees who voluntarily migrated from the area before the controlled evacuation phase of the program. It also covers registration and processing costs; storage of evacuee property and all other aspects of the evacuee property protection program. It includes hospitalization and medical care of all evacuees from the date of evacuation; transportation of evacuees and their personal effects from their homes to Assembly Centers; complete care in Assembly Centers, including all subsistence, medical care and nominal compensation for work performed. It also reflects the cost of family allowances and clothing as well as transportation and meals during the transfer from Assembly to Relocation Centers. 8. Accomplishment of the program in the manner selected would have been impossible without the participation of the Federal civilian agencies so ably assisting throughout. Under my continuous direction, the associated agen¬ cies of the Federal Security Agency, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Fran¬ cisco, the Farm Security Administration of the Department of Agriculture, and the Work Projects Administration of the Federal Works Agency accepted major responsibilities. The War Relocation Authority; the Departments of Treasury, Post Office, Justice, Commerce and Interior; the Division of Central Administrative Services of the Office for Emergency Management performed an important service from the beginning, and various state and local agen¬ cies effectively cooperated. The participating Army Agencies, particularly the Division Engineers of the United States Engineer Corps who supervised the con¬ struction of Assembly and Relocation Centers, discharged their responsibilities in a superior manner. The agencies of my command, military and civilian person¬ nel alike, responded to the difficult assignment devolving upon them with un¬ selfish devotion to duty. To the Japanese themselves great credit is due for the manner in which they, under Army supervision and direction, responded to and complied with the orders of exclusion. X JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 9. A large quantity of primary source materials not found in the Appendix has been selected and bound together. triplicate. These have been made available in It is proposed that one set be retained at this Headquarters. sets are forwarded with this report. Two It is requested that one set be retained in the office of the Adjutant General, War Department, and the other forwarded to the Library of Congress for future reference. The great volume of secon¬ dary source materials will remain on file at this Headquarters. All of these data will be available for research purposes whenever the Secretary of War so directs. FINAL REPORT JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST 1942 COAST i Table of Contents PAGE Letter of Transmittal from the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to the Secretary of War. Foreword . Ill V Letter of Transmittal from Commanding General to the Chief of Staff. U. S. Army, supra. VII Index to Figures. XV Index to Tables. XIX Part I. Evacuation—Its Military Necessity (Pages 1-38) CHAPTER , I. PAGE Action Under Alien Enemy Proclamations. II. Need for Military Control and for Evacuation. III. Establishment of Military Control—Executive Order No. 9066 . . Part II. 3 7 25 Evacuation—Its Development in Summary (Pages 39-62) IV. The Emergence of Controlled Evacuation. 41 V. Separation of Jurisdiction Over Evacuation and Relocation. 50 VI. The Evacuation Method. 53 Part III. Evacuation—The Mechanics for its Accomplishment (Pages 63-74) VII. Organization and Function of Civil Affairs Division, General Staff, and Wartime Civil Control Administration and Other Agencies Part IV. 65 Evacuation—Its Operational Technique (Pages 75-148) VIII. Development and Execution of the Evacuation Plan. 77 IX. Voluntary Migration. X. Operation of Civil Control Stations—Protection of Evacuees and XI. Protection of Property of the Evacuees. 127 XII. Deferments and Exemptions from Evacuation. 145 Their Families. Part V. 101 114 Assembly Center Operations (Pages 149-233) XIII. Assembly Center Location, Construction and Equipment. 151 XIV. Housing, Feeding and Clothing. 186 xiii xiv JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST CHAPTER PAGE XV. Medical Care and Sanitation. 190 XVI. Employment of Evacuees in Assembly Centers. 205 XVII. Education, Recreation, Religion and Assembly Center News¬ papers . 207 XVIII. Assembly Center Security. 215 XIX. Administration of Assembly Centers. 222 Part VI. Relocation of Evacuees (Pages 235-290) XX. War Relocation Authority. 237 XXI. The Construction and Equipment of Relocation Centers. 248 XXII. Transfer of Evacuees from Assembly to Relocation Centers. 278 Part VII. Related Activities of Wartime Civil Control Administration (Pages 291-336) XXIII. Curfew and Travel Control. 293 XXIV. Repatriation . 309 XXV. Public Relations Summary. 328 XXVI. Inspection of Wartime Civil Control Administration Operations. . 334 Part VIII. Statistical and Fiscal Summary (Pages 337-428) XXVII. Fiscal Summary . 339 XXVIII. Statistical Summary. 352 Part IX. Pictorial Summary (Pages 429-509) References Glossary. 511 Appendix. 517 1. Memoranda of March 20, 1942, from the Assistant Chief of Staff for 2. Memorandum of April 23, 1942—"Japanese Evacuation Operations.” 522 3. Delegation to Ninth Service Command and Letters of Transmittal— 4. Standards and Details—Construction of Japanese Evacuee Reception Centers (June 8, 1942). 584 5. Procedure Memorandum issued on June 26, 1942. 592 Index . 601 Civil Affairs Giving Advance Warning of the First Evacuation. . Reports of Survey—Status of Relocation Center Construction... 519 526 Index to Figures FIGURE NO. 1. Part I CHAPTER PAGE Map of Military Areas of the Western Defense Command . II 16 IV 45 VII 68 VII 65 VIII 80 VIII 81 VIII 83 VIII 85 Part II 2. Phases of the Evacuation Program. Part III 3. Organization Chart of Civil Affairs Division and Wartime Civil Control Administration—Evac¬ uation Period . 4. Organization Chart of Civil Affairs Division and Wartime Civil Control Administration—PostEvacuation Period . Part IV 5 a. Geographical Distribution, Japanese Population of 5b. Geographical Distribution, Japanese Population of of the United States: 1940. the United States: 1940 (Color Projection) .... 6. Japanese Population Western Defense Command Area: 1940 . 7. Age and Nativity of Japanese in Arizona, Califor¬ 8. Plan for Evacuating Japanese Population from Pa¬ cific Coast. VIII 87 9. Exclusion Areas, Japanese Evacuation Program.. . VIII 88 10. Evacuee Flow Chart. VIII 96 11. Net Voluntary Movement of Japanese: March 12 IX 108 nia, Oregon and Washington: 1940. to June 5, 1942. 12. Japanese Voluntary Migration by State of Destina¬ tion: March 12 to October 31, 1942. IX 113 13. Woodland Civil Control Station. X 119 Part V 14a-141. Detailed Location Maps of Assembly Centers (12) 15. Assembly Center Map with Population and Occu¬ XIII 153-157 and 160-166 pancy Data. xv XIII 158, 159 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST xvi CHAPTER NO. 16a-16o. Aerial Photographs of Assembly Centers. 17. Evacuee Crime Rate—Offenses Per Thousand Japanese Per Year. 18. Assembly Center Organization. 19a-19p. PAGE XIII 167-181 XVIII 221 XIX 223 Daily Evacuation Population Movement of Each Assembly Center (15). XIX 228-233 Part VI 20a-20j. Location of War Relocation Centers (10). XXI 251-255 and 258-262 21. 22. Relocation Project Sites (Map). XXI 256, 257 Typical Plot Plan—War Relocation Center. XXI 266 23. Typical Housing Block—War Relocation Center. . XXI 267 24. Typical Administration Group—War Relocation XXI 268 25. Typical Military Police Group—War Relocation Center. XXI 269 26. Typical Hospital Group—War Relocation Center. XXI 270 27. Typical Center. XXI 271 28. Transfers from Assembly to Relocation Centers. . . XXII 281 Center. Warehouse Group—War Exclusion Areas Relocation Map Insert I. .Following Page 290 Map Insert II. Assembly Center Destinations.Following Page 290 Map Insert III. Relocation Center Destinations.Following Page 290 Part VII 29. Age and Sex and Nativity of 2,772 Japanese Requesting Repatriation. 30. Nisei, Kibei and Issei Japanese 18 to 39 Years of 31. Wartime Civil Control Administration News Age Requesting Repatriation. XXIV 325 XXIV 327 XXV 329 XXV 329 XXV 330 XXV 332 Releases Concerning Evacuation and Alien Con¬ trol: March-November, 1942. 32. Magazine Articles and Wartime Civil Control Administration News Releases Concerning Evacuation and November, 1942 33. Magazine Articles Evacuation and Alien Control: February- . and Circulation Alien Control: Concerning February - November, 1942 . 34. Organization Chart, Public Relations Division . . INDEX TO FIGURES Xvii Part VIII FIGURE NO. CHAPTER 35. Total Evacuation Population, March 21 to October 36. Japanese Population, Assembly and Relocation 31, 1942 . PAGB XXVIII 358 XXVIII 361 XXVIII 385 XXVIII 386 XXVIII 387 XXVIII 388 XXVIII 390 XXVIII 391 XXVIII 392 XXVIII 393 XXVIII 395 XXVIII 397 Centers, Western Defense Command Area: June 7, 1942 . 37. Growth of Japanese Population United States: 1870 3 8. Distribution of Japanese Population, Arizona, Cali¬ to 1940 . fornia, Oregon, Washington and Entire United States: 1900 to 1940. 39. Japanese Population in Certain Selected Cities, of California, Oregon and Washington: 1940 40. 1900 to . Trends in Sex Composition of Japanese Population, Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington: 1900 to 1940. 41. Trends in Nativity of Japanese Population, Ari¬ zona, California, Oregon and Washington: 1900 to 1940 . 42. Nativity Trends of Japanese, Arizona, California, 43. Trends in Age Composition, Japanese Population 44. Age and Sex Composition, Japanese Population, Oregon and Washington: 1900 to 1940. United States: 1900 to 1940. Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington: 1940 45. . Industry of Employed Japanese 14 Years and Older, by Sex and Nativity, California, Oregon and Washington: 1940 . 46. Japanese Employed Workers 14 Years Old and Over in Agriculture and Wholesale and Retail Trade, California, Oregon and Washington: 1940 Index to Tables Part IV TABLE NO. CHAPTER 1. Japanese Population of the Western Defense Command 2. Nativity of the Total Japanese Population and of the Area, by States and Military Areas: 1940. PAGE VIII 79 VIII 84 VIII 84 VIII 86 IX 107 IX 110 IX 111 IX 112 XI 132 XI 133 XI 134 XI 136 Adult Japanese Population of Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington: 1940. 3. Age and Nativity of Japanese Population in Arizona, 4. Major Industry Groups of Japanese Employed Workers California, Oregon and Washington: 1940. 14 Years Old and Over in California, Oregon and Washington: 1940 . 5. Cumulative Net Voluntary Migration of Japanese from 6. Japanese Migrants from Evacuated Areas, by State and 7. Japanese Migrants from Evacuated Areas, by State of Military Areas: March 12 to June 30, 1942. County of Origin and by Sex. Reported Destination and by Sex. 8. Japanese Migrants from Evacuated Areas, by State of Origin and by Sex and Nativity. 9. Classification of Interviews by Types of Business as of 10. Total Interviews and Total Individual Cases Handled by May 22, 1942, Head Office Zone. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco in Connection with the Evacuation Program. 11. Property Received for Storage in Military Areas 1 and 2 12. Motor Vehicles Received and Handled by the Federal 13. Summary of Cases Served by the Farm Security Adminis¬ tration: Military Areas 1 and 2. XI 143 14. Farms and Acreage Subject to Relinquishment. XI 144 XIV 187 XV 197 XV 197 XV 199 and Transferred to War Relocation Authority. Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Part V 15. Average Daily Cost of Rations per Evacuee. 16. Inpatient Movement During Reporting Period: August I to August 28, 1942. 17. Patient-Days in Hospitals During Reporting Period: 18. Operations Performed During Reporting Period: August August 1 to August 28, 1942. 1 to August 28, 1942. xix JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST XX TABLE NO. 19. CHAPTER PAGE Average Number of Inpatients per Week by Type of Service During Reporting Period: August 1 to August 28, 1942 . XV 199 XV 200 XV 200 XV 201 XV 201 XV 202 XV 203 XV 204 Assembly Centers, April 25 to October 25, 1942. . . . XVIII 220 28. Crime Offenses in Assembly Centers. XVIII 220 29. Average Population, Total Days Occupied by Evacuees, XIX 227 XXI 273 XXI 276 XXII 279 20. Total Outpatient Treatments by Type of Service During 21. Total Treatments and Outpatients for the Reporting 22. Center Hospital Medical Staff During Reporting Period: 23. Average Number of Cases of Communicable Diseases 24. Births, Deaths, and Stillbirths for Japanese Inducted Into the Reporting Period: August 1 to August 28, 1942 . . Period: August 1 to August 28, 1942. August 1 to August 28, 1942. Reported per Week from August 1 to August 28, 1942 Assembly Centers: March 21 to October 30, 1942 .... 25. Japanese Deaths in California, Oregon and Washington During First Ten Months of 1942, by Sex and Month of Death . 26. Deaths, Infant Deaths, and Stillbirths for Japanese in California: 27. 1937-1941 . Number of Offenses Charged—Total Japanese Popula¬ tion of the United States, Calendar Year 1941, and of Dates of Occupancy and Maximum Population of Assembly Centers . Part VI 30. Preliminary Estimate of the Cost of Relocation Centers 31. Quartermaster Property Shipped to War Relocation (December 1, 1942). Authority Centers. 32. Summary of Transfers of Evacuees from Custody of the Army to Custody of the War Relocation Authority. . 33. Transfers from Assembly to Relocation Centers. XXII 282-284 Part VII 34. Summary by Source and Disposition of Persons Who Were Offered Repatriation in June, 1942. 35. XXIV 319 XXIV 319 Address, Age, and Sex of 54 Repatriates Entrained by Wartime Civil Control Administration on June 6, 1942 . INDEX TO TABLES XXI TABLE NO. 3 6. CHAPTER PAGE Distribution of Names on July 31, 1942 State Depart¬ ment Preliminary Repatriation List Found in Wartime Civil Control Administration Master Index File. 37. XXIV 320 XXIV 320 XXIV 321 XXIV 321 XXIV 321 XXIV 322 XXIV 323 XXIV 324 XXIV 326 XXVIII 362 XXVIII 362 Distribution of Names on July 31, 1942 State Depart¬ ment Preliminary Repatriation List Not Found in Wartime Civil Control Administration Master Index File 3 8. . Distribution of Names Under Wartime Civil Control Administration Responsibility on August 19, 1942 State Department List. 39. Disposition of Names Under Wartime Civil Control Ad¬ ministration Responsibility on August 19, 1942 State Department List . 40. Type of Form Letter Sent to Residents of Assembly and 41. Responses Received in Canvass of Persons on Photostat 42. Lists of Japanese Requesting Repatriation Transmitted 43. Age, Sex, Citizenship, and Place of Education of 2,772 Relocation Centers in October, 1942. List and Supplement: October 19-December 31, 1942 by Wartime Civil Control Administration. Japanese Requesting Repatriation as of October 19, 1942 44. Number . and Percentage of Nisei, Kibei, and Issei Requesting Repatriation in Five Age Groups. Part VIII 45. Summary of Persons Evacuated or Otherwise Coming Under the Evacuation Program, March 2 to October 31, 1942 46. Evacuees 47. . State of Origin by Center of Destination of Japanese . Total Persons Evacuated to Each Assembly and Reloca¬ tion Center by Civilian Exclusion Order Number and Area. 48. XXVIII 363-366 Japanese Evacuation and Voluntary Migration from Evacuated Areas of Western Defense Command—• Compared to Census Population of 1940. 49. Hospitals: March 21 to October 30, 1942. 50. XXVIII 367-368 Daily Population of All Assembly Centers Including XXVIII 371-372 Evacuees Entering Assembly Centers by Center and by Type of Induction or Transfer: March 21, 1942 to October 30, 1942. XXVIII 373 Xxii JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST TABLE NO. CHAPTER PAGE XXVIII 373 52. Evacuees Leaving Assembly Centers by Center and by Type of Release or Transfer: March 21, 1942 to October 30, 1942. XXVIII 374 53. Net Total Persons Entering and Leaving Wartime Civil Control Administration Assembly Centers: March 21 to October 30, 1942. XXVIII 375 54. Population of Assembly and Relocation Centers May 1 to November 3, 1942, by Months. XXVIII 375 55. Total Number of Evacuee-Days in Assembly Centers and in Hospitals Outside of Assembly Centers, by Center and Month: March 21, 1942 to October 30, 1942 . XXVIII 376-377 51. Evacuees on Leave and Returning to Assembly Centers. . 56. Estimated Total Number of Evacuee Families and Aver¬ age Size of Such Families, by Center. 57. Center of Origin and Destination of Evacuees Trans¬ ferred from Assembly to Relocation Centers. XXVIII 378 XXVIII 3 81-382 58. Estimated State and Relocation Center Destination of Japanese Evacuees, by State of Origin. XXVIII 3 83 59. Estimated Persons Received by War Relocation Authority from Wartime Civil Control Administration and Other Sources, to October 31, 1942. XXVIII 3 83 60. 61. Population by Race, for the United States: 1940 and 1930 . XXVIII 399 Geographical Distribution of the Japanese Population in the United States: 1940. XXVIII 399 62. Nativity of Japanese in United States: 1890-1940. XXVIII 400 63. Growth of Japanese Population in Certain Selected Cities of California, Oregon, and Washington: 1900-1940 . . XXVIII 400 64. Sex Composition of the Japanese Population in Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington: 1900-1940. . . . XXVIII 401 65. Nativity of the Japanese Population in Arizona, Califor¬ nia, Oregon and Washington: 1900-1940. 66. 67. Age of Japanese by Sex and by Nativity for Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington: 1940. XXVIII 402 XXVIII 403-406 Employed Japanese Workers by Major Industry Groups in California, Oregon and Washington: 1940. XXVIII 407 68. Japanese-Operated Farms Compared with All Farms in California, Oregon and Washington, 1920-1940. XXVIII 408 69. Acreage of Commercial Truck Crops Grown by Japanese in California . XXVIII 409 INDEX TO TABLES TABLE NO. CHAPTER 70. Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads 71. Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads 72. Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads 73. Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads 74. Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads 75. Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Arizona, by Counties: 1940. in California, by Counties: 1940. in Oregon, by Counties: 1940. in Washington, by Counties: 1940. in Idaho, by Counties: 1940. in Montana, by Counties: 1940. 76. XXVIII 409 XXVIII 410 XXVIII 411 XXVIII 412 XXVIII 413 XXVIII 414 XXVIII 415 XXVIII 415 Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Utah, by Counties: 1940. 78. PAGE Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Nevada, by Counties: 1940. 77. XXU1 Japanese Employed Workers 14 Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity, and Major Occupation and Industry Groups, for California, Oregon and Washington: 1940 79. XXVIII 416-418 Japanese Employed Workers 14 Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity and Major Occupation and Industry Groups for California: 1940. 80. XXVIII 419-421 Japanese Employed Workers 14 Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity and Major Occupation and Industry Groups for Oregon: 1940. 81. XXVIII 422-424 Japanese Employed Workers 14 Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity and Major Occupation and Industry Groups for Washington: 1940. XXVIII 425-427 PART 1 EVACUATION—ITS MILITARY NECESSITY CHAPTER I Action Under Alien Enemy Proclamations The ultimate decision to evacuate all persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast under Federal supervision was not made coincidentally with the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States. It was predicated upon a series of intermediate decisions, each of which formed a part of the pro¬ gressive development of the final decision. At certain stages of this development, various semi-official views were advanced proposing action less embracing than that which finally followed. On December 7th and 8th, 1941, the President issued proclamations declar¬ ing all nationals and subjects of the nations with which we were at war to be enemy aliens. This followed the precedent of the last war, and was based upon the same statutory enactment which supported the proclamations of President Wilson in this regard. (See 50 U.S.C. 21.) By executive action, certain restric¬ tive measures were applied against all enemy aliens on an equal basis. In continen¬ tal United States, the Attorney General, through the Department of Justice, was charged with the enforcement and administration of these proclamations. Where necessary fully to implement his action, the Attorney General was assigned the responsibility of issuing administrative regulations. He was also given the author¬ ity to declare prohibited zones, to which enemy aliens were to be denied admit¬ tance or from which they were to be excluded in any case where the national security required. The possession of certain articles was declared by the procla¬ mations to be unlawful, and these articles are described as contraband. Authority was granted for the internment of such enemy aliens as might be regarded by the Attorney General as dangerous to the national security if permitted to remain at large. In continental United States internment was left in any case to the discretion of the Attorney General. On the night of December 7th and the days that followed, certain enemy aliens were apprehended and held in detention pending the determination whether to intern. Essentially, the apprehensions thus effected were based on lists of suspects previously compiled by the intelligence services, the Federal Bureau of Investiga¬ tion, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence Service. During the initial stages of this action, some 2,000 persons were apprehended. Japanese aliens were included in their number. However, no steps were taken to provide for the collection of contraband and no prohibited zones were pro¬ claimed. The Commanding General, during the closing weeks of December, requested the War Department to acquaint the Department of Justice with the need for vigorous action along the Pacific Coast. He sought steps looking toward the enforcement of the contraband prohibitions contained in the proclamations and toward the declaration of certain prohibited zones surrounding “vital installa¬ tions” along the coast. The Commanding General had become convinced that the military security of the coast required these measures. 3 4 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST His conclusion was in part based upon the interception of unauthorized radio communications which had been identified as emanating from certain areas along the coast. Of further concern to him was the fact that for a period of several weeks following December 7th, substantially every ship leaving a West Coast port was attacked by an enemy submarine. This seemed conclusively to point to the existence of hostile shore-to-ship (submarine) communication. The Commanding General requested the War Department to send a repre¬ sentative, and to arrange with the Department of Justice for an officer of that agency to meet with him at San Francisco, in order to consider the situation "on the ground.” His objective was to crystallize a program of forthright action to deal with subversive segments of the population. Preliminary to this a num¬ ber of discussions had been held between War and Justice Department represen¬ tatives in Washington, D. C. The Provost Marshal General, Major General Allen W. Gullion, the Assistant Secretary of War, Honorable John J. McCloy, the Chief of the Enemy Alien Control Unit, Department of Justice, Mr. Edward J. Ennis, and the Chief of the Aliens Division, Office of the Provost Marshal General, participated in these meetings. These conferences between War and Justice Department representatives in Washington were followed by conferences in San Francisco. Mr. James Rowe, Jr., Assistant to the Attorney General, represented the Department of Justice. The Commanding General urged that the Justice Department provide for spot raids in various areas to determine the presence and possession of contraband; that it authorize the ready seizure of contraband, and adopt means for collect¬ ing and storing it. He further requested that the Attorney General declare prohibited zones surrounding certain coastal installations. These conferences continued over the period between January 2nd and 5th, 1942, and, as an outgrowth of these meetings, the Department of Justice agreed to a program of enforcement substantially as desired, with certain important exceptions. These exceptions are described in an exchange of memoranda dated January 5, 1942, between the Commanding General and Mr. Rowe (Appendix to Chapter II infra). The salient feature of the intended program was an agreement arranging for creation of prohibited zones. The Department of Justice agreed to declare pro¬ hibited zones surrounding vital installations and to provide for the exclusion from these zones of enemy aliens. The extent and location of these zones was to be determined on the basis of recommendations submitted by the Commanding General. At the conclusion of these conferences, identical memoranda were ex¬ changed on January 6, 1942, between the Commanding General and the Assistant Attorney General, Mr. James Rowe, Jr., crystallizing the intermediate under¬ standings which had been developed. These were: "Following is a summary of the principles applicable and procedure to be followed in the implementation of the proclamations of the President dated December 7th and 8th, 1941, and the instructions and regulations of the Attorney General, respecting alien enemies in the Western Theater of Operations. These principles and procedure 5 ACTION UNDER ALIEN ENEMY PROCLAMATIONS were formulated in conferences during the past week between Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt, Commanding General of the Western Theater of Operations, Mr. James Rowe, special representative of the Attorney General of the United States, Mr. N. J. L. Pieper, of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Major Karl R. Bendetsen, J.A.G.D., Office of the Provost Marshal General. “1. Restricted Areas: The Attorney General will designate restricted areas. will entertain Army recommendations. He He will require the Army to determine the exact description of each restricted area. What further requirements he will make will depend in large measure upon the nature of the area involved and the extent of alien enemy population in such area. Indications are that, should Army recommendations include areas in which there is resident a large number of alien enemies and evacuation will thereby be rendered necessary, he will also require the submission of detailed plans for evacuation and resettlement. The Army has expressed disinclination to compliance on its part with such a requirement for the reason that the Justice Department will undertake an alien enemy registration and will have in its possession all the informa¬ tion essential for planning purposes once the proposed restricted areas have been made known to that Department by the Army. “2. Alien Enemy Registration: The Department of Justice is committed to an alien enemy registration with the least practicable delay. It is understood that regis¬ tration will include provision for finger printing, photographing, and other information to be filed locally and probably with local police, as well as at a central office, such information to be compiled alphabetically, by nationality and race as well as geo¬ graphical. “3. Apprehension: United States Attorneys have been or will be instructed to issue apprehension warrants upon application of the F.B.I. special agents in charge. F.B.I. agents in charge will entertain Army requests for apprehensions submitted in writing, or, if time does not permit, oral requests which shall be confirmed later in writing. In any case where an alien enemy is found in violation of any of the provisions of the proclamation or any part of the regulations of the Attorney General thereunder, he is subject to summary apprehension with or without a warrant. Presumably at least he is subject to summary apprehension by the Army as well as by the civil authorities. Example: A known alien enemy in possession of contraband is subject to summary apprehension without a warrant. Example: An alien enemy found within a restricted area without authority is subject to apprehension. "In an emergency apprehensions may be made without a warrant. "4. Searches and Seizures: A warrant authorizing the search of the premises of an alien enemy for the presence of contraband may be obtained merely on application to the United States Attorney. It is only necessary to support the issuance of such a warrant that it be stated that the premises are those of an alien enemy. In an emer¬ gency where the time is insufficient in which to procure a warrant, such premises may be searched without a warrant. "5. Mixed Occupancy Dwellings: The search of mixed occupancy premises or dwellings may be by warrant only. In emergencies involving contraband such as radio transmitters, it may be necessary to keep the premises under surveillance while a search warrant is procured. As previously noted, however, in such an emergency an alien enemy’s premises may be searched for contraband without a warrant. "6. Multiple Searches: Attorney General. The term 'mass raid’ will not be employed by the Instructions which have been or will be issued to United States Attorneys and to F.B.I. Special Agents will permit 'spot raids.’ That is to say, if lists of known alien enemies with the addresses of each are prepared by the F.B.I. and war¬ rants are requested to cover such lists, a search of all the premises involved may be undertaken simultaneously. Thus all of the alien enemy premises in a given area can be searched at the same moment. "7. Much of the effective action will be facilitated by a complete registration. is important that it go forward with dispatch. It However, there should be no cessation 6 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST in the vigorous implementation of the President’s proclamations regarding alien enemies. It appears that considerable progress of a clarifying nature has been made. Only actual application of the streamlined mechanics can establish whether there is need for further change in the principles to be applied and the procedure to be followed.” After a series of surveys made by the Commanding Generals of the several Western Defense Command sectors, the Commanding General submitted a number of recommendations calling for the establishment of 99 prohibited zones in the State of California, and two restricted zones. These were to be fol¬ lowed by similar recommendations pertaining to Arizona, Oregon, and Washing¬ ton. Primarily, the prohibited zones in California surrounded various points along the California Coast, installations in the San Francisco Bay area, particularly along the waterfront, and in Los Angeles and San Diego. The recommendation as to California was transmitted by the Commanding General by letter dated January 21, 1942, was received from the Commanding General by the War Department on January 25, 1942, and was forwarded by the Secretary of War to the Attorney General on the same date. In a series of press releases the Attorney General designated as prohibited zones the 99 areas recommended by the Commanding General in California.1 Considerable evacuation thus was necessitated, but most of the enemy aliens concerned were able to take up residence in or near places adjacent to the prohibited zone. For example, a large prohibited zone embraced the San Francisco waterfront area. Enemy aliens living in this section were required only to move elsewhere in San Francisco. Of course, only aliens of enemy nationality were affected, and no persons of Japanese ancestry born in the United States were required to move under the program. Although some problems were presented which required provision for in¬ dividual assistance, essentially there was little of this involved. By arrangement with the Justice Department, the associated agencies of the Federal Security Agency were asked to lend assistance in unusually needy cases. Mr. Tom C. Clark, then the West Coast representative of the Anti-Trust Division of the Justice Department, supervised this phase of enemy alien control and coordinated all activities for the Justice Department. There was much con¬ jecture that this was the forerunner of a general enemy alien evacuation. Mr. Clark and his Anti-Trust Division staff were deluged with inquiries and com¬ ments. Public excitement in certain areas reached a high pitch, and much confusion, the result of conflicting reports and rumors, characterized the picture. However, in essence, there was no substantial dislocation or disruption socially or economically of the affected groups. ^ee Inclosures to letter of transmittal # 7 and #11. CHAPTER II Need for Military Control and for Evacuation The Commanding General, meantime, prepared and submitted recommenda¬ tions for the establishment of prohibited zones in Arizona, Oregon and Wash¬ ington, similar to those he had prepared for California. Upon receipt of these supplemental recommendations, forwarded by the Secretary of War, the Attor¬ ney General declined to act until further study. In the case of Washington State, the recommended prohibited zone included virtually all of the territory lying west of the Cascades. A general enemy alien evacuation from this area would have been required. More than 9,500 persons would have been affected. No agency was then prepared to supervise or conduct a mass movement, and the Attorney General was not convinced of the necessity. As early as January 5, in a memorandum of that date to Mr. Rowe, during the initial conferences at San Francisco, the Commanding General pointed to the need for careful advanced planning to provide against such economic and social dislocations which might ensue from such mass evacuation. The point was also established that the Army had no wish to assume any aspects of civil control if there were any means by which the necessary security measures could be taken through normal civilian channels. In order to trace clearly the develop¬ ments which ultimately led to Executive Order No. 9066, and the establish¬ ment of military control, that memorandum is quoted in full at the end of this chapter. The Department of Justice had indicated informally that it did not consider itself in a position to direct any enforced migrations. The Commanding General’s recommendations for prohibited zones in Washington and Oregon were there¬ fore viewed with particular concern by the Department. Not only did it feel that such action should be predicated on convincing evidence of the military necessity, it regarded the responsibility for collective evacuation as one not within its functions. The Attorney General, on February 9, 1942, formally advised the Secretary of War, by letter, that he could not accept the recommendation of the Com¬ manding General for the establishment of a zone prohibited to enemy aliens in the States of Washington and Oregon of the extent proposed by him. stated in part: "Your recommendation of prohibited areas for Oregon and Washington include the cities of Portland, Seattle and Tacoma and therefore contemplate a mass evacuation of many thousands * * *. No reasons were given for this mass evacuation * * * I understood that * * * Lieutenant General DeWITT has been requested to supply 7 He 8 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST the War Department with further details and further material before any action is taken on these recommendations. I shall, therefore, await your further advice. "* * * The evacuation of very great magnitude. * * * from this area would, of course, present a problem The Department of Justice is not physically equipped to carry out any mass evacuation. It would mean that only the War Department has the equipment and personnel to manage the task. “The proclamations directing the Department of Justice to apprehend, and where necessary, evacuate alien enemies, do not, of course, include American citizens of the Japanese race. If they have to be evacuated, I believe that this would have to be done as a military necessity in these particular areas. Such action, therefore, should in my opinion, be taken by the War Department and not by the Department of Justice.” The Commanding General thereafter submitted a resume of the military considerations which prompted his recommendation for a prohibited zone in Washington and Oregon embracing virtually the westerly half of those states. The Department of Justice, however, concluded that it was not in a position to undertake any mass evacuation, and declined in any event to administer such general civil control measures. Meanwhile, the uncertainties of the situation became further complicated. The enforcement of contraband provisions was impeded by the fact that many Japanese aliens resided in premises owned by American-born persons of Japanese ancestry. The Department of Justice had agreed to authorize its special field agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to undertake spot raids without warrant to determine the possession of arms, cameras and other contraband by Japanese, but only in those premises occupied exclusively by enemy aliens. The search of mixed occupancy premises or dwellings had not been authorized except by warrant only. (See Memo 1/5/42 at end of this chapter.) In the Monterey area in California a Federal Bureau of Investigation spot raid made about February 12, 1942, found more than 60,000 rounds of am¬ munition and many rifles, shotguns and maps of all kinds. These raids had not succeeded in arresting the continuance of illicit signaling. Most dwelling places were in the mixed occupancy class and could not be searched promptly upon receipt of reports. It became increasingly apparent that adequate security mea¬ sures could not be taken unless the Federal Government placed itself in a position to deal with the whole problem. The Pacific Coast had become exposed to attack by enemy successes in the Pacific. The situation in the Pacific theatre had gravely deteriorated. There were hundreds of reports nightly of signal lights visible from the coast, and of intercepts of unidentified radio transmissions. Signaling was often observed at premises which could not be entered without a warrant because of mixed occu¬ pancy. The problem required immediate solution. It called for the application of measures not then in being.1 Further, the situation was fraught with danger to the Japanese population itself. The combination of spot raids revealing hidden caches of contraband, the attacks on coastwise shipping, the interception of illicit radio transmissions, the nightly observation of visual signal lamps from constantly changing locations, JIt is interesting to note that following the signals and shore-to-ship signal lights were virtually coast ports appreciably reduced. evacuation, eliminated interceptions of suspicious and on outbound attacks or unidentified shipping from radio west 9 NEED FOR MILITARY CONTROL AND FOR EVACUATION and the success of the enemy offensive in the Pacific, had so aroused the public along the West Coast against the Japanese that it was ready to take matters into its own hands. Press and periodical reports of the public attitudes along the West Coast from December 7, 1941, to the initiation of controlled evacuation clearly reflected the intensity of feeling. Numerous incidents of violence involv¬ ing Japanese and others occurred; many more were reported but were sub¬ sequently either unverified or were found to be cumulative. The acceptance by the Attorney General of the Washington and Oregon rec¬ ommendations would not have provided the security which the military situ¬ ation then required. More than two-thirds of the total Japanese population on the West Coast were not subject to alien enemy regulations. ultimately taken was based upon authority not then existing. The action It had become essential to provide means which would remove the potential menace to which the presence of this group under all the circumstances subjected the West Coast. It is pertinent now to examine the situation with which the military authorities were then confronted. Because of the ties of race, the intense feeling of filial piety and the strong bonds of common tradition, culture and customs, this population presented a tightly-knit racial group. It included in excess of 115,000 persons deployed along the Pacific Coast. Whether by design or accident, virtually always their communities were adjacent to very vital shore installations, war plants, etc. While it was believed that some were loyal, it was known that many were not. To complicate the situation no ready means existed for determining the loyal and the disloyal with any degree of safety. It was necessary to face the realities—a positive determination could not have been made. It could not be established, of course, that the location of thousands of Japanese adjacent to strategic points verified the existence of some vast con¬ spiracy to which all of them were parties. Some of them doubtless resided there through mere coincidence. It seemed equally beyond doubt, however, that the presence of others was not mere coincidence. It was difficult to explain the situation in Santa Barbara County, for example, by coincidence alone. Throughout the Santa Maria Valley in that County, including the cities of Santa Maria and Guadalupe, every utility, air field, bridge, telephone and power line or other facility of importance was flanked by Japanese. They even sur¬ rounded the oil fields in this area. Only a few miles south, however, in the Santa Ynez Valley, lay an area equally as productive agriculturally as the Santa Maria Valley and with lands equally available for purchase and lease, but without any strategic installations whatever. There were no Japanese in the Santa Ynez Valley. Similarly, along the coastal plain of Santa Barbara County from Gaviota south, the entire plain, though narrow, had been subject to intensive cultivation. Yet, the only Japanese in this area were located immediately adjacent to such widely separated points as the El Capitan Oil Field, Elwood Oil Field, Summerland Oil Field, Santa Barbara airport and Santa Barbara lighthouse and harbor entrance. There were no Japanese on the equally attractive lands between these 10 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST points. In the north end of the county is a stretch of open beach ideally suited for landing purposes, extending for 15 or 20 miles, on which almost the only inhabitants were Japanese. Such a distribution of the Japanese population appeared to manifest some¬ thing more than coincidence. In any case, it was certainly evident that the Japanese population of the Pacific Coast was, as a whole, ideally situated with reference to points of strategic importance, to carry into execution a tremendous program of sabotage on a mass scale should any considerable number of them have been inclined to do so. There were other very disturbing indications that the Commanding General could not ignore. He was forced to consider the character of the Japanese colony along the coast. While this is neither the place nor the time to record in detail significant pro-Japanese activities in the United States, it is pertinent to note some of these in passing. Research has established that there were over 124 separate Japanese organizations along the Pacific Coast engaged, in varying degrees, in common pro-Japanese purposes. This number does not include local branches of parent organizations, of which there were more than 310. Research and co-ordination of information had made possible the identifica¬ tion of more than 100 parent fascistic or militaristic organizations in Japan which have had some relation, either direct or indirect, with Japanese organiza¬ tions or individuals in the United States. Many of the former were parent organ¬ izations of subsidiary or branch organizations in the United States and in that capacity directed organizational and functional activities. There was definite information that the great majority of activities followed a line of control from the Japanese government, through key individuals and associations to the Japanese residents in the United States. That the Japanese associations, as organizations, aided the military campaigns of the Japanese Government is beyond doubt. The contributions of these associa¬ tions towards the Japanese war effort had been freely published in Japanese newspapers throughout California.2 The extent to which Emperor worshiping ceremonies were attended could not have been overlooked. Many articles appearing in issues of Japanese language newspapers gave evidence that these ceremonies had been directed toward the stimulation of "burning patriotism” and "all-out support of the Japanese Asiatic Co-Prosperity Program.” Numerous Emperor worshiping ceremonies had been held. Hundreds of Japanese attended these ceremonies, and it was an objective of the sponsoring organization to encourage one hundred per cent attendance. For example, on 2Some of these newspaper items are as follows: "March 13, 1941. Thirty-two bales of tinfoil were shipped to Japan through the Japanese Consulate General and were contributed by Japanese Associations of Fresno County, Kern County, Delano and San Bernardino.” "July 6, 1941. Central California Japanese Association announces the collection and transmission to the War Ministry of the sum of $3,542.05.” The Japanese Veterans Association was similarly engaged: ’’March 20, 1941. It is announced that the War Veterans Associations in Japan, Germany and Italy, in keeping with the spirit of the Axis Treaty have formed joint and advisory committees to aid and establish the new world order. There are 3l/z million veterans and reservists headed by General Imei who have pledged their cooperation to Axis aims.” (All quotations in this note taken from the Extension of the Testimony of the Attorney General of California given before the House of Representatives, Select Committee on National Defense Migration, pur¬ suant to House Resolution 113, 77th Congress, San Francisco Hearings, part 29. Italics supplied.) NEED FOR MILITARY CONTROL AND FOR EVACUATION 11 February 11, 1940, at 7:00 P.M., the Japanese Association of Sacramento spon¬ sored an Emperor worshiping ceremony in commemoration of the 2,600th anniversary of the founding of Japan. Three thousand attended. Another group of Japanese met on January 1, 1941, at Lindsay, California. They honored the 2,601st Year of the Founding of the Japanese Empire and participated in the annual reverence to the Emperor,* 1 2 3 and bowed their heads toward Japan in order to indicate that they would be "* * * ready to respond to the call of the mother country with one mind. Japan is fighting to carry out our program of Greater Asiatic co-prosperity. Our fellow Japanese countrymen must be of one spirit and should endeavor to unite our Japanese societies in this country * * *.”4 Evidence of the regular occurrence of Emperor worshiping ceremonies in almost every Japanese populated community in the United States had been discovered. A few examples of the many Japanese associations extant along the Pacific Coast are described in the following passages: The Hokubei Butoku Kai. The Hokubei Butoku Kai or Military Virtue Society of North America was organized in 1931 with headquarters at Alvarado, Alameda County, California, and a branch office in Tokyo. One of the pur¬ poses of the organization was to instill the Japanese military code of Bushido among the Japanese throughout North America. This highly nationalistic and militaristic organization was formed primarily to teach Japanese boys "military virtues” through Kendo (fencing), Judo (Jiujitsu), and Sumo (wrestling). The manner in which this society became closely integrated with many other Japanese organizations, both business and social, is well illustrated by the postal address of some of these branches.5 3The program was as follows: a. Singing of Japanese National Anthem; b. Opening of the Emperor’s portrait; c. Reading of the Emperor’s Rescript; d. Reading of Message of Reverence; e. Bowing heads toward Japan; /. Shouting "Banzai” (Long live the Emperor). *New World Sun, January 7, 1941: 5:6. 5For example, in Alvarado, Alameda County, Post Office Box 215 was the address of the following: (1) Headquarters’ Military Virtue Society of North America (2) Kinyai Kumia Finance Association (J) Japanese-American News Correspondent (4) New World Sun Correspondent (5) Hochi Shimbun Correspondent (6) Alvarado Japanese School (7) Takichi Nakamura (President) Military Virtue Society of North America In Sebastopol, Post Office Box 57 was the address of the following: (1) Military Virtue Society of North America (2) Japanese Sunday School (3) Hiroshima Prefectural Society (4) Sabura Baseball Team In Suisun, Post Office Box 252 was the address of: (1) Military Virtue Society of North America (2) Mint Grill (3) Suisun Fishing Club In Auburn, Post Office Box 57 was the address of: (1) Military Virtue Society of North America (2) Japanese School (3) Young Men’s Buddhist Association (4) Young Women’s Buddhist Association (5) Buddhist Church In Lindsay, 157 Mount Vernon Avenue was the address of: (1) Military Virtue Society of North America (2) Japanese School (3) Lindsay Women’s Association 12 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST The Heimusha Kai. The Heimusha Kai was organized for the sole purpose of furthering the Japanese war effort. The intelligences services (including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Military Intelligence Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence) had reached the conclusion that this organization was engaged in espionage. Its membership contained highly militaristic males eligible for compulsory military service in Japan. Its prime function was the collection of war funds for the Japanese army and navy. In more than 1,000 translated articles in which Heimusha Kai was mentioned, there was no evidence of any function save the collection of war relief funds. A prospectus was issued to all Japanese in the United States by the Sponsor Committee for Heimusha Kai in America. That prospectus is quoted as follows: "The world should realize that our military action in China is based upon the sig¬ nificant fact that we are forced to fight under realistic circumstances. As a -matter of historical fact, -whenever the Japanese government begins a military campaign, we, Jap¬ anese, must be united and everyone of us must do his part. "As far as our patriotism is concerned, the world knows that we are superior to any other nation. However, as long as we are staying on foreign soil, what can we do for our mother country? All our courageous fighters are fighting at the front today, for¬ getting their parents, wives and children in their homes! It is beyond our imagination, the manner in which our imperial soldiers are sacrificing their lives at the front line, bomb after bomb, deaths after deaths! can keep from crying in sympathy? Whenever we read and hear this sad news, who Therefore, we, the Japanese in the United States, have been contributing a huge amount of money for war relief funds and numerous comforting bags for our imperial soldiers. “Today, we, Japanese in the United States, who are not able to sacrifice our lives for our National cause are now firmly resolved to stand by to settle the present war as early as possible. 'We are proud to say that our daily happy life in America is depen¬ dent upon the protective power of Great Japan.’ and we will take strong action as planned. .”6 with us for our National cause We are facing a critical emergency, We do hope and beg you all to cooperate (Italics supplied.) The Heimusha Kai was organized on October 24, 1937, in San Francisco. The meeting took place at the Golden Gate Hall, and there were more than 200 members present. The following resolution was passed: "We, the members of the Japanese Reserve Army Corps in America are resolved to do our best in support of the Japanese campaign in China and to set up an Army .”7 Relief Department For Our Mother Country According to reliable sources there were more than 10,000 members of Heimusha Kai in 1940. Additional illustrations of pro-Japanese societies are found in footnotes.8 One extremely important obstacle in the path of Americanization of the second-generation Japanese was the widespread formation, and increasing impor6New World Sun, August 28, 1937: 4:6 10. 7Excerpt from Zaibei Nippon Zin Sbi, published in Japan, 1940. 8The Togo Kai. The Togo Kai was organized in 1905 in memory of Admiral Togo, the hero of the Japanese Russian Naval Battle. (Ref. Japanese Directory of Political and Religious Organizations.) The purposes of this organization were to promote a greater Imperial Japanese Navy, and to collect and transmit funds for the Japanese Navy. It was revealed that there were three Togo Kai branches in the United States: One in Sacramento, one in Sonoma County, and one in San Francisco. All of these branches worked industriously to raise money for the Japanese Navy War Relief Fund. The Togo Kai branches in America were controlled by the parent Togo Kai headquarters in Japan. This fact is substantiated by reference to telegraphic bank transfers from the various branches of the United States to headquarters in Japan. The Kanjo Kai. "Due to the critical situation that has developed in the Orient,” the Zaigo Gunjin Dan (Retired Army Men’s Corps) of Sacramento organized the Kanjo Kai (Society for Defending the Country by 13 NEED FOR MILITARY CONTROL AND FOR EVACUATION tance, of the Japanese language schools in the United States. The purposes and functions of these Japanese language schools are well known. They employed only those textbooks which had been edited by the Department of Education of the Japanese Imperial Government. In order to assist the Japanization of the second generation, the Zaibei Ikuei Kai (Society for Education of the Second Generation in America) was organ¬ ized in Los Angeles in April, 1940. "With the grace of the Emperor, the ZAIBEI IKUEI KAI is being organized in commemoration of the 2,600th Anniversary of the Founding of the Japanese Empire to Japanize the second and third genera¬ tions in this country for the accomplishment of establishing a greater Asia in the future * * *.”9 In California alone there were over 248 schools with an aggregate faculty of 454 and a student body of 17,800. The number of American-born Japanese who had been sent to Japan for education and who were now in the United States could not be overlooked. For more than twenty-five years American-born progeny of alien Japanese had been Swords, or the Sword Society) in July, 1937. (Ref. New World Sun, July 18, 1937: 3:1.) It was the first militant Japanese organization that was established in the United States by Japanese ex-service men to support military action taken by the Japanese government in the Orient. The following telegram from the Japanese Army Department was received by the Kanjo Kai just after the organization of that Society, and was read at the first executive board meeting: "During this emergency, you officials are doing your utmost for the Country and the Army Department is very grateful. For the establishment of peace in the Orient, it is necessary for us to adopt positive steps in China.” (Ref. New World Sun, July 18, 1937: 3:1.) In September, 1940, the Kanjo Kai, together with other organizations in Sacramento, gave a farewell banquet for three representatives who were sent to the Empire Jubilee Conference in Tokyo. (Ref. New World Sun, September 19, 1940: 5:1.) Members of the Kanjo Kai made monthly contributions of $1.00 or more to Imperial Japanese Army War Relief Fund. This proposal was initiated by Consul-General Shiosaki during his visit to Sacramento in 1938. The Nipponjin Kai. The Japanese Association of America (Nipponjin Kai) was the principal controlling organization in the United States. It operated in close cooperation with the consulate and carried out the directives of that office. Article 3 of its by-laws provides: "Article 3. This association is organized by the local Japanese association diction of the Japanese Consulate General of San Francisco.” under the juris¬ (Italics supplied.) The Japanese Association acted as intermediary between the Japanese people in the United States and the Japanese government. It aided the collection of war relief funds and poll taxes, sponsored organization of corps of visitors from the United States to Japan, founded Japanese language schools, disseminated propa¬ ganda, welcomed dignitaries and visiting military and naval officers, encouraged emperor worship, stimu¬ lated the establishment of subsidiaries and other organizations, and participated in a multitude of other pro-Japanese activities. Branches of the Japanese Association were established in every community where the Japanese population was such as to warrant such an organization. Other outstanding Japanese organizations were known to exist in the United States. Some of the more prominent ones are listed below. The translation of the names of these organizations is indicative of their objects. Kaigun Kyokai (Navy Association) ; Aikoku Fujin Kai (Patriotic Women’s Society); Jugo Sekisei Kai (Behind the Gun Society or Red Heart Society) j Hokoku Kai (Society for Service to the Country); Aikokuki Kenno Kisei Domei (Patriotic League for Contribution to the Airplane Fund); Jugo Kai (Behind the Gun Society) ; Ko-A-Sokushin Kai (Society for the Promotion of Asiatic Co-Prosperity); Kokuryu Kai (Black Dragon Society); Kibei Shimin Kai (Kibei Society); Hokyoku Kai (Rising Sun Society); Zaibei Nipponjin Kai (Japanese Association of America) ; Zaibei Nipponjin Kai Renraku Nikkai Kanji Kai (United Councilor’s Convention for Japanese Associations in North America); Nanka Teikoku Gunjin Dan (Japanese Imperial Army Men’s Corps of Southern California) ; Jugo Haibutsu Riyodan (Behind the Gun Waste Utilization Society); Josho Kai (Ever-Victorious or Invincible Society); Hinode Kai (Imperial Japanese Reservists); Hokubei Zaigo Shokuin Dan (North American Reserve Officers’ Association) ; Sokoku Kai (Fatherland Society) ; Suiko Kai (Los Angeles Reserve Officers’ Association); Zaibei Ikuei Kai (Society of Educating the Second Generation in America). 9Neu/ World Sun, April 13, 1940: 4:1. 14 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST sent to Japan by their parents for education and indoctrination. There they remained for extended periods, following which they ordinarily returned to the United States. The extent of their influence upon other Nisei Japanese could not be accurately calculated. But it could not be disregarded. The Kibei Shimin movement was sponsored by the Japanese Association of America. Its objective for many years had been to encourage the return to America from Japan of American-born Japanese. When the movement started it was ascertained that there were about 20,000 American-born Japanese in Japan. The Japanese Association of America sent representatives to Japan to confer with Prefectural officials on the problems of financing and transportation. The Association also arranged with steamship companies for special rates for groups of ten or more so returning, and requested all Japanese associations to secure employment for returning American-born Japanese. During 1941 alone more than 1,573 American-born Japanese entered West Coast ports from Japan. Over 1,147 Issei, or alien Japanese, re-entered the United States from Japan during that year. The 557 male Japanese less than twenty-five years of age who entered West Coast ports from Japan during 1941 had an average age of 18.2 years and had spent an average of 5.2 years in Japan. Of these, 239 had spent more than three years there. This latter group had spent an average of 10.2 years in Japan. Of the 239 males who spent three years or more abroad, 180 were in the age group 15 to 19 (with an assumed average age of 17.5 years) and had spent 10.7 years abroad. In other words, these 180 Kibei lived, on the average, 6.8 years at the beginning of their life in the United States and the next 10.7 years in Japan. Forty of the 239 who had spent three or more years abroad were in the age group 20 to 24, with an assumed average age 22.5. These were returning to the United States after having lived here, on the average, for their first 13 years and having spent the last 9.5 years in Japan, including one or more years when they were of compulsory (Japanese) military age. The table below indicates the nearest relative in Japan for the age groups 15 to 19, and 20 to 24 years of age. It will be noted that 42.3 per cent of those in the 15 to 19 year group lived with a father or mother in Japan, and that 13.2 lived with a grandparent. In AGE GROUP Nearest Relative in Japan 15 to 19 years Number Percent 20 to 24 years Number Percent All. 272 100.0 163 100.0 Father or mother... 115 67 48 42.3 24.6 17.7 66 46 20 40.5 28.2 12.3 36 95 16 10 4 6 13.2 34.9 5.9 3.7 1.5 2.2 18 42 30 7 7 11.0 25.8 18.4 4.3 4.3 Mother. Grandparent. Uncle or aunt. Other relative. No relative indicated. Non-relative. NEED FOR MILITARY CONTROL AND FOR EVACUATION 15 other words, more than 50 per cent of this group of Kibei had a parent or grand¬ parent in Japan, and it is reasonable to assume that in most instances these Kibei lived with this nearest relative. Combining this information with that from the preceding table, it is seen that in a group with an average age of 17.5 years who were returning to the United States after having spent an average of 7.4 years abroad continuously (in other words, from the time they were ten years of age) one-half had lived with their parent or grandparent in Japan. Yet, this group consists entirely of American citizens. Of the Kibei in Hawaii, Andrew W. Lind, Professor of Sociology, University of Hawaii, says: "Finally, there is the rather large Kibei group of the second generation who, although citizens of the United States by virtue of birth within the Territory, are frequently more fanatically Japanese in their disposition than their own parents. Many of these individuals have returned from Japan so recently as to be unable to speak the English language and some are unquestion¬ ably disappointed by the lack of appreciation manifested for their Japanese edu¬ cation.” (American Council Paper No. 5, page 187, American Council, Insti¬ tute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52nd Street, New York.) It was, perforce, a combination of factors and circumstances with which the Commanding General had to deal. Here was a relatively homogenous, unassimi¬ lated element bearing a close relationship through ties of race, religion, language, custom, and indoctrination to the enemy. The mission of the Commanding General was to defend the West Coast from enemy attack, both from within and without. The Japanese were concentrated along the coastal strip. The nature of this area and its relation to the national war effort had to be carefully considered. The areas ultimately evacuated of all persons of Japanese ancestry embraced the coastal area of the Pacific slope. In the States of Washington and Oregon to the north, Military Area No. 1 contains all that portion lying westerly of the eastern bases of the Cascade Mountains. In other words, the coastal plain, the forests, and the mountain barrier. In California the evacuation program encompassed the entire State—that is to say, not only Military Area No. 1 but also Military Area No. 2. Military Area No. 2 in California was evacuated because (1) geographically and strategically the eastern boundary of the State of California approximates the easterly limit of Military Area No. 1 in Washington and Oregon (Figure 1 shows the boundaries of these two Military Areas), and because (2) the natural forests and mountain barriers, from which it was deter¬ mined to exclude all Japanese, lie in Military Area No. 2 in California, although these lie in Military Area No. 1 of Washington and Oregon. A brief reference to the relationship of the coastal states to the national war effort is here pertinent. That part of the States of Washington, Oregon, and California which lies west of the Cascade and Sierra Nevada Ranges, is dominated by many water¬ ways, forests, and vital industrial installations. Throughout the Puget Sound area there are many military and naval establishments as well as shipyards, air¬ plane factories and other industries essential to total war. In the vicinity of 16 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM Figure 1 THE WEST COAST NEED FOR MILITARY CONTROL AND FOR EVACUATION 17 Whidby Island, Island County, Washington, at the north end of the island, is the important Deception Pass bridge. This bridge provides the only means of transit by land from important naval installations, facilities and properties in the vicinity of Whidby Island. This island afforded an ideal rendezvous from which enemy agents might communicate with enemy submarines in the Strait of Juan de Fuca or with other agents on the Olympic Peninsula. From Whidby and Camano Islands, comprising Island County, the passages through Admiralty Inlet, Skagit Bay and Saratoga Passage from Juan de Fuca Strait to the vital areas of the Bremerton Navy Yard and Bainbridge Island can be watched. The important city of Seattle with its airplane plants, airports, waterfront facilities, Army and Navy transport establishments and supply terminals required that an unassimilated group of doubtful loyalty be removed a safe distance from these critical areas. A reference to the spot map (published in Chapter VIII), Fig¬ ure 6, showing the distribution of Japanese population along the frontier, dis¬ closes a high concentration of persons of Japanese ancestry in the Puget Sound area. Seattle is the principal port in the Northwest; it is the port from which troops in Alaska are supplied; its inland water route to Alaska passes the north coast of Washington into the Straits of Georgia on its way to Alaska. The lumber industry is of vital importance to the war effort. The State of Washington, with Oregon and California close seconds, produces the bulk of sawed lumber in the United States. The large area devoted to this industry afforded saboteurs unlimited freedom of action. The danger from forest fires involved not only the destruction of valuable timber but also threatened cities, towns and other installations in the affected area. The entire coastal strip from Cape Flattery south to Lower California is particularly important from a pro¬ tective viewpoint. There are numerous naval installations with such facilities constantly under augmentation. The coast line is particularly vulnerable. Dis¬ tances between inhabited areas are great and enemy activities might be carried on without interference. The petroleum industry of California and its great centers of production for aircraft and shipbuilding, are a vital part of the life blood of a nation at war. The crippling of any part of this would seriously impede the war effort. Through the ports of Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego, flow the sinews of war—the men, equipment and supplies for carrying the battle A further reference to the spot map, Figure 6, against the enemy in the Pacific. in Chapter VIII, reveals the high concentration of this segment of the population surrounding nearly all these key installations. In his estimate of the situation, then, the Commanding General found a tightly-knit, unassimilated racial group, substantial numbers of whom were engaged in pro-Japanese activities. He found them concentrated in great num¬ bers along the Pacific Coast, an area of the utmost importance to the national war effort. These considerations were weighed against the progress of the Emperor’s Imperial Japanese forces in the Pacific. This chapter would be incomplete without a brief reference to the gravity of the external situation obtaining in the Pacific theater. war in the Pacific to show this. It is necessary only to state the chronology of 18 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST At 8:05 A.M., the 7th of December, the Japanese attacked the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor without warning. Simultaneously they struck against Malaysia, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Wake and Midway Islands. On the day following, the Japanese Army invaded Thailand. Two days later the British battleships "H.M.S. Wales” and "H.M.S. Repulse” were sunk off the Malay Peninsula. The enemy’s successes continued without interruption. On the 13 th of December, Guam was captured and on successive days the Japanese captured Wake Island and occupied Hong Kong, December 24th and 25 th, respectively. On January 2nd Manila fell and on the 27th of February the battle of the Java Sea resulted in a crushing naval defeat to the United Nations. Thir¬ teen United Nations’ warships were sunk and one damaged. Japanese losses were limited to two warships sunk and five damaged. On the 9th of March the Japanese Imperial forces established full control of the Netherlands East Indies; Rangoon and Burma were occupied. Continuing during the course of evacuation, on the 9th of April, Bataan was occupied by the Japanese and on May 6th Corregidor surrendered. On June 3rd, Dutch Harbor, Alaska, was attacked by Japanese carrier-based aircraft and, with the occupation by the Japanese on June 7th of Attu and Kiska Islands, United States territory in continental Northern America had been invaded. As already stated, there were many evidences of the successful communica¬ tion of information to the enemy, information regarding positive knowledge on his part of our installations. The most striking illustrations of this are found in three of the several incidents of enemy attacks on West Coast points. On February 23, 1942, a hostile submarine shelled Goleta, near Santa Bar¬ bara, California, in an attempt to destroy vital oil installations there. On the preceding day the shore battery in position at this point had been withdrawn to be replaced by another. On the succeeding day, when the shelling occurred, it was the only point along the coast where an enemy submarine could have successfully surfaced and fired on a vital installation without coming within the range of coast defense guns. In the vicinity of Brookings (Mt. Emily), Oregon, an enemy submarinebased plane dropped incendiary bombs in an effort to start forest fires. At that time it was the only section of the Pacific Coast which could have been approached by enemy aircraft without interception by aircraft warning devices. Similarly, a precise knowledge of the range of coast defense guns at Astoria, Oregon, was in the possession of the enemy. A hostile submarine surfaced and shelled shore batteries there from the only position at which a surfaced sub¬ marine could have approached the coast line close enough to shell a part of its coast defenses without being within range of the coastal batteries. In summary, the Commanding General was confronted with the Pearl Har¬ bor experience, which involved a positive enemy knowledge of our patrols, our naval dispositions, etc., on the morning of December 7th; with the fact that ships leaving West Coast ports were being intercepted regularly by enemy sub¬ marines; and with the fact that an enemy element was in a position to do great damage and substantially to aid the enemy nation. Time was of the essence. The Commanding General, charged as he was with the mission of providing 19 NEED FOR MILITARY CONTROL AND FOR EVACUATION for the defense of the West Coast, had to take into account these and other military considerations. He had no alternative but to conclude that the Japanese constituted a potentially dangerous element from the viewpoint of military security—that military necessity required their immediate evacuation to the interior. The impelling military necessity had become such that any measures other than those pursued along the Pacific Coast might have been "too little and too late”. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II Memorandum from the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, to the Assistant Attorney General, Mr. James Rowe, Jr. "January 5, 1942 "Memorandum for: Assistant Attorney General Rowe. Subject: "1. Alien Enemy Control Requirements. Reference is made to the summary of report of the Assistant Attorney General Rowe to General DeWitt on Sunday, January 4, 1942, at 6:30 P.M. (TAB. 'A.’) "2. It should be stated at the outset that the Army has no wish to undertake the conduct and control of alien enemies anywhere within continental United States. Impressions to the contrary notwithstanding, the Army would accept transfer of such responsibility and authority with the great¬ est reluctance. Its desire is only that the Department of Justice act with expedition and effectiveness in the discharge of its responsibilities under the Presidential Proclamations of December 7th and 8 th. The develop¬ ments which have resulted in the current conferences between the Attor¬ ney General’s representative, and General DeWitt and his staff, have been occasioned by the almost complete absence of action on the part of the Department of Justice over a period of nearly four weeks since promul¬ gation of the mentioned proclamations, toward implementing sections 5 and 9. "3. To the extent that an estimate can now be made, in the absence of actual demonstration, the courses of action proposed to be taken by the Depart¬ ment of Justice, as set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Tab. 'A*, appear to constitute a great step forward. "4. While some amendment, clarification and implementation may be neces¬ sary, it appears that section 5 of the proclamation relative to prohibited articles will have been fully implemented when the measures detailed in Tab. 'A’ have been taken. The means of determining whether all alien enemies are complying with the proscriptions of the Proclamations, as repeated in the contraband regulations promulgated by the Attorney Gen¬ eral, may have to be further clarified. This phase of the problem, how¬ ever, is closely associated with warrant issuance aspect of the alien enemy program. 20 "5. JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST As agreed in the conference referred to in paragraph 1 hereof, the Com¬ manding General of the Western Defense Command has initiated action within the California, Oregon and Washington portions of his command (as augmented by the inclusion of the Air Corps installations throughout his command), to furnish U. S. Attorneys not later than January 9, 1942, a list of the areas which are regarded by Army authorities as falling within section 9 of the regulations relative to restricted areas. This report will include definite descriptions of such areas and will divide them into two categories as follows: "Category A: Those areas within, or through which no alien enemy may be permitted, under any circumstances. "Category B: Those areas through, or within which alien enemies may be permitted on pass or permit. "In this connection attention is invited to the concluding paragraph of Section 9 of the regulations which provides in substance that any alien enemy found within any restricted area contrary to the regulations shall be subject to summary apprehension. The military authorities desire to be advised whether, in the opinion of the Attorney General, apprehension of alien enemies under such circumstances may be without warrant and, if so, whether the military authorities are empowered to enforce. "In order to avoid absolute confusion in the matter, Army authorities strongly urge that the Department of Justice undertake to establish im¬ mediate liaison and coordination xvith all appropriate relief agencies pre¬ pared to alleviate hardship resulting from compulsory change of residence on the part of alien enemies residing in Category A, restricted areas. As the Department of Justice has requested permission to announce that the establishment of restricted areas has been made by the Attorney General only because the Commanding General of this theatre has so requested, military authorities desire it to be unequivocally clear that they desire that everything possible be done to eliminate unnecessary hardship and the need for planning and coordination along this line is strongly emphasized. "Depending upon the manner in which compulsory eviction from Cate¬ gory A restricted areas is handled and upon how the pass and permit system respecting Category B restricted areas is developed, the action pro¬ posed in paragraph 2 of Tab. 'A’ appears presently to provide for full implementation of Section 9. "6. Comments relative to paragraph 3 of Tab 'A’ entitled 'Search Warrants’ will be deferred for inclusion in the portion of this memorandum relative to particular problems. “7. As already noted, neither the War Department nor the Army desire to undertake responsibility for the alien enemy program in Continental United States. In view of this, the comment in paragraph 4 of Tab. 'A’ to the effect that the Department of Justice is of the view that it is better qualified to conduct an alien enemy registration than is the Army, and in view of the expressed intention of that Department to act without NEED FOR MILITARY CONTROL AND FOR EVACUATION 21 delay, it would appear that the action proposed in paragraph 4, Tab. 'A', if speedily accomplished will satisfy the need for immediate registration of alien enemies. "8. Reference is made to paragraph 5 of Tab. 'A’ relative to 'spot raids’ and 'mass raids.’ The military authorities in this theatre are of the view that counter espionage measures require that the Department of Justice take whatever steps are necessary, effectively to provide for simultaneous 'mass raids’ without warning to determine the presence of prohibited articles which may be in possession or under the control of alien enemies, or to which such persons may have access. By this type of raid is meant 'coordi¬ nated action’ in several areas at the same moment and on successive occa¬ sions providing for the search of a given number of alien enemy premises in each area. Under such circumstances the premises to be searched dur¬ ing any such 'mass raid’ would be only those in which it is known that an alien enemy may be found or in which there is cause to believe that an alien enemy may be found. It does not mean the 'willy-nilly’ raiding of all premises within a prescribed area. The number of premises to be searched during any given 'mass raid’ will depend upon the circumstances and the means at hand. This type of sampling or cross-sectional raiding is regarded as vitally important. While such raids may not be successful from the viewpoint of rounding up great quantities of contraband, they will have the important effect of driving contraband more deeply under¬ ground with the result that its illicit use becomes increasingly difficult. "The military authorities request that they be advised by the Depart¬ ment of Justice of its position in this matter. If it is inclined to provide for this type of search, advice is requested as to the steps proposed by this Department. "9. The courses of action proposed in Tab. 'A’, when accomplished, will not solve a number of pressing problems. It is neither possible nor practicable to undertake or attempt to illustrate all of the problems which may arise in connection with the alien enemy program. As limited in the foregoing sentence, some of the problems and some of the questions remaining un¬ solved are: "(a). A fix is established on a radio transmitter. Transmission of un¬ lawful radio signals is established but the location is determined only within a defined area such as a city block. Manifestly an accurate description of the premises, the operator’s name and a description of equipment can not be furnished. The operation of such a transmitter is equally unlawful on the part of a citizen, alien or an alien enemy. Unless a 'John Doe’ search warrant can be obtained and obtained immediately, the consequences may be grave and the transmitter may be moved without trace. What action can be taken? "(b). The facts are sufficient to support the issuance of an alien enemy warrant or a contraband search warrant, but the responsible law JAPANESE 22 EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST enforcement officer on the ground is unable to communicate with the issuing authority due to the lack of means or because of the time element. "(c). What action can he take? A known alien enemy is observed, in transit, in the possession of contraband or in the possession of articles believed, for good cause, to be contraband. If a warrant is procured under present as well as proposed machinery, the quarry will be lost. What action can be taken? "(d). The unlawful transmission of radio signals has been established through interception. A series of fixes determines the location of the transmitter within a general area, such as Monterey County. Further, there is convincing evidence of shore to enemy subma¬ rine communication. What action can be taken to isolate the area and conduct an effective search to locate the mobile unit? "(e). An alien enemy is resident with a citizen, perhaps a relative such as a wife. While it cannot be proven that he owns or actually controls contraband it can be proven that he has unlimited access to such. The situation is as potentially dangerous as if it could be proven that he owned or actually controlled the contraband. What action can be taken? "(f). Question arises whether access of the character description in (e) above is unlawful under the Proclamations. Assuming that it is unlawful, to what extent may the search, under a contraband search warrant, of a mixed occupancy dwelling or other premises be carried to determine access to contraband? "(g). The dual citizen problem is perplexing. Self-serving declarations of an election are of little meaning, particularly where conduct is incompatible with the so-called election. What methods exist or what steps are in contemplation looking toward the control of 1. Dual citizens. 2. Disloyal, subversive citizens (where there has been no overt act detected). "(h). In the opinion of the Attorney General, to what extent may the responsible Military Commander in a theatre of operations, con¬ travene normal processes to take necessary action in an emergency in order to provide for the internal as well as the external security of his theatre—to what extent is the Department of Justice able to take similar measures? "(i). Military authorities are convinced of the desirability of close cooperation and collaboration between the War Department and the Department of Justice in connection with the instant sub¬ ject. However, it is considered desirable to request advice as to the extent to which the Department of Justice is prepared to assume and to discharge the responsibility of taking whatever steps are necessary for the prevention of sabotage, espionage, and other fifth column activities from enemy alien courses, and the extent to NEED FOR MILITARY CONTROL AND FOR EVACUATION 23 which the Department of Justice will expect the military authori¬ ties to continue the outline of the necessary steps for progressive implementation of the enemy alien program. “10. The foregoing represents the consensus of those concerned as under¬ stood by the undersigned. It does not necessarily reflect the official opinions of anyone concerned. It is intended primarily as exploratory of the problem. Inch 1. j L DeWITT, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army.” TAB "A” Summary of Communication—January 4, 1942 “This is the summary by Assistant Attorney General Rowe to the Command¬ ing General of a conversation with the Attorney General of the United States, and Mr. Rowe’s understanding of what the Department of Justice is prepared to do on questions of Alien Enemy Control referred to him by the Commanding General and his staff. "1. PROHIBITED ARTICLES. Besides cameras, radios and firearms, the articles prohibited by the Presi¬ dent’s proclamation are to be deposited by all alien enemies with local police authorities by Monday night, January 5, 1942, at 11 p. m. Because sufficient publicity was not given to the requirement that all prohibited articles be so deposited, the Department of Justice will, by release for Tuesday morning, allow all alien enemies at least two more days, say, 11 p. m., January 7, to dis¬ pose of the articles. An effort will be made to obtain sufficient publicity by radio and in the press. "2. RESTRICTED AREAS. The Department of Justice tonight will by wire direct the United States Attorneys in the Western Theatre of Operations, with particular emphasis on Washington, Oregon, and California, to telephone Major General Benedict for recommendations as to what areas should be regarded as restricted. The United States Attorney will automatically accept the General’s recommendations, and these areas will immediately become restricted areas pending confirmation by the Attorney General. As soon as possible, a press release ordering all enemy aliens to evacuate restricted areas by a certain date and hour will be issued. Any release by the Department of Justice will specifically state that the Attorney General has designated these restricted areas at the specific and urgent request of the Commanding General. The Army will request the Navy to submit its rec¬ ommendations through the Commanding General. It is believed several days will elapse before the Army will be ready to submit its recommendations. "3. SEARCH WARRANTS. New forms for search and seizure of prohibited articles in homes con¬ trolled by, or inhabited by, alien enemies, are to be received tomorrow morning by Federal Bureau of Investigation teletype. The question of probable cause will be met only by the statement that an alien enemy is resident in such premises. It is 24 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Mr. Rowe’s understanding that the local United States Attorney’s interpretation that more information is necessary to show probable cause is incorrect. The United States Attorney will issue a search warrant upon a statement by a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent that an alien enemy is resident at certain premises. It is not necessary that the Department in Washington be consulted. "4. ALIEN ENEMY REGISTRATION. The Department feels it can conduct an alien enemy registration in the Western Theatre of Operations within a week or ten days. Tomorrow morning by Federal Bureau of Investigation teletype a statement will be sent from Wash¬ ington outlining a procedure of what the Department is prepared to do. The De¬ partment feels it can conduct such a registration, through the local police author¬ ities, much faster than the Army itself. The Department also feels that the existing list from the previous alien registration, now in Washington, is in better shape than is the impression in San Francisco, and every effort will be made to have such lists available in the Western Theatre of Operations. “5. The Department is willing to make spot-raids on alien enemies tomor¬ row or at any time after the registration, anywhere within the Western Theatre of Operations. Mr. Rowe emphasized that such raids must be confined to premises controlled by enemy aliens, or where enemy aliens are resident. In other words, the Department cannot raid a specific locality, covering every house in that locality, irrespective of whether such houses are inhabited by enemy aliens or citizens. The Attorney General requested Mr. Rowe to make clear to the Commanding General that under no circumstances will the Depart¬ ment of Justice conduct mass raids on alien enemies. It is understood that the term “mass raids” means, eventually a raid on every alien enemy within the Western Theatre of Operations. The Attorney General will oppose such raids and, if overruled by the President, will request the Army to supersede the Department of Justice in the Western Theatre of Operations. "6. It was agreed by the Commanding General and his staff and Mr. Rowe that certain questions pertaining to raids on localities and the issuance of search warrants, particularly referring to raids on localities in which radio transmitters are probably to be found, will be transmitted to the Department, also for an indication as to how far the Department would proceed, as a matter of law and policy.” CHAPTER III Establishment of Military Control—Executive Order No. 9066 After a series of conferences between War and Justice Department repre¬ sentatives, in Washington, D. C., the Secretary of War ordered a representative of the Department personally to survey the situation along the Pacific Coast. The War Department representative carried back to the Secretary the recom¬ mendation of the Commanding General that some method be developed empow¬ ering the Federal Government to provide for the evacuation from sensitive areas of all persons of Japanese ancestry, and any other persons individually or collectively regarded as potentially dangerous. The Commanding General’s proposal was reduced to writing in a memorandum for the Secretary of War, dated February 14, 1942. It is reproduced in full at the end of this chapter. This recommendation was presented to the Secretary of War on or about Feb¬ ruary 16th. After consultation between War and Justice Department repre¬ sentatives, it was determined that a Presidential executive order should be sought authorizing the Secretary of War to institute civil control measures. A proposed order was drafted in the War Department. With the concurrence of the Department of Justice it was presented to the President. Executive Order No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, was the direct result of these steps. On the day following its signature by the President, the Sec¬ retary of War designated the Commanding General, Western Defense Com¬ mand, as a Military Commander within the meaning of the Executive Order. This meant that the power and authority granted by the Order had been dele¬ gated to the Commanding General. The letter of authority, enclosing a copy of the Order, from the Secretary of War was as follows: “February 20, 1942 "Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Presidio of San Francicso, California. "Dear General DeWitt: “By Executive Order, dated February 19, 1942, copy inclosed, the President author¬ ized and directed me, through the Military Commander whom I designate, to prescribe military areas for the protection of vital installations against sabotage and espionage. The cited Executive Order also authorized and directed the administering authority to impose such restrictions upon the right to enter, remain in, or leave any such areas as may be appropriate to the requirements in each instance. Accordingly, I designate you as the Military Commander to carry out the duties and responsibilities imposed by said Executive Order for that portion of the United States embraced in the West¬ ern Defense Command, including such changes in the prohibited and restricted areas heretofore designated by the Attorney General as you deem proper to prescribe. "In carrying out your duties under this delegation, I desire, so far as military requirements permit, that you do not disturb, for the time being at least, Italian aliens and persons of Italian lineage except where they are, in your judgment, unde¬ sirable or constitute a definite danger to the performance of your mission to defend 25 26 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST the West Coast. I ask that you take this action in respect to Italians for the reason that I consider such persons to be potentially less dangerous, as a whole, than those of other enemy nationalities. Because of the size of the Italian population and the number of troops and facilities which would have to be employed to deal with them, their inclusion in the general plan would greatly overtax our strength. In this con¬ nection it may be necessary for you to relieve Italian aliens from the necessity for compliance with the Attorney General’s order respecting the California prohibited areas 1 to 88 (Category A). This may appropriately be done by designating, suffi¬ ciently in advance of February 24, the said areas as military areas and by excepting Italian aliens from the classes excluded. "With due regard to your other missions you may use the troops you can now make available from your general command, but for this purpose the 27th Division and the 3rd Division reinforced are not to be considered as part of your general command as such troops are assigned to your command only for specific training. "Your attention is invited to those provisions of the Executive Order under which you are authorized to call for assistance, supplies, and services from all Government agencies. It is desired that you take full advantage of that authority. "Removal of individuals from areas in which they are domiciled should be accom¬ plished gradually so as to avoid, so far as it is consistent with national safety and the performance of your mission, unnecessary hardship and dislocation of business and industry. In order to permit the War Department to make plans for the proper dis¬ position of individuals whom you contemplate moving outside of your jurisdiction, it is desired that you make known to me your detailed plans for evacuation. Indi¬ viduals will not be entrained until such plans are furnished and you are informed that accommodations have been prepared at the point of detraining. “So far as practicable, fullest advantage should be taken of voluntary exodus of individuals and of the facilities afforded by other Government and private agencies in assisting evacuees to resettle. Where evacuees are unable to effect resettlement of their own volition, or with the assistance of other agencies, proper provision for housing, feeding, transportation and medical care must be provided. "I desire that from time to time you make report direct to me of important actions and events, particularly with respect to the extent and location of military areas, and the restrictions applicable thereto. "Sincerely yours, "/s/ Henry L. Stimson, “Secretary of War. “Inch Executive Order. Executive Order No. 9066 AUTHORIZING THE SECRETARY OF WAR TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY AREAS "Whereas, The successful prosecution of the war requires every possible pro¬ tection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material, nationaldefense premises and national-defense utilities as defined in Section 4, Act of April 20, 1918, 40 Stat. 533, as amended by the Act of November 30, 1940, 54 Stat. 1220, and the Act of August 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 655 (U.S.C., Title 50, Sec. 104): "Now therefore, By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restriction the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion. The Secretary of War is hereby 27 ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY CONTROL authorized to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgment of the Secretary of War or the said Military Commander, and until other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order. The designation of mili¬ tary areas in any region or locality shall supersede designations of prohibited and restricted areas by the Attorney General under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, and shall supersede the responsibility and authority of the Attorney General under the said Proclamations in respect of such prohibited and restricted areas. "I hereby further authorize and direct the Secretary of War and the said Military Commanders to take such other steps as he or the appropriate Military Commander may deem advisable to enforce compliance with the restrictions applicable to each Military area hereinabove authorized to be designated, including the use of Federal troops and other Federal Agencies, with authority to accept assistance of state and local agencies. "I hereby further authorize and direct all Executive Departments, independent estab¬ lishments and other Federal Agencies, to assist the Secretary of War or the said Military Commanders in carrying out this Executive Order, including the furnishing of medical aid, hospitalization, food, clothing, transportation, use of land, shelter, and other supplies, equipment, utilities, facilities, and services. "This order shall not be construed as modifying or limiting in any way the authority heretofore granted under Executive Order No. 8972, dated December 12, 1941, nor shall it be construed as limiting or modifying the duty and responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with respect to the investigations of alleged acts of sabotage or the duty and responsibility of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, prescribing regulations for the conduct and control of alien enemies, except as such duty and responsibility is superseded by the designation of military areas hereunder.” Franklin The White House, D. Roosevelt February 19, 1942. On the same date, the Assistant Secretary of War forwarded a memo¬ randum to the Commanding General which contained an outline of a suggested method of procedure which might be followed in carrying out an evacuation program. This memorandum had been developed by the War Department representative at the West Coast conferences, and was based upon his survey of the situation there obtained. He drafted the Executive Order on his return. It is pertinent to quote portions of the memorandum here. “February 20, 1942 "My dear General DeWitt: “In accordance with my telephone conversation with you today I am enclosing a memorandum which was prepared in the War Department relating to the effect of the new Executive Order. It represents, as I said, some of our thinking on the subject and I think it may be helpful to you as a guide in the determination of the steps that you will want to take under the authority of the Directive which the Secretary of War has sent you today, "Very truly yours, "(Signed) John "John J. J. McCloy McCloy, "Assistant Secretary of War.” "Lt. Gen. J. L. DeWitt Commanding General Western Defense Command and Fourth Army Presidio of San Francisco, California.” 28 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST OUTLINE MEMORANDUM COAST "February 20, 1942 "... For the purpose of these instructions, persons resident in the Western Defense Command will be classified as follows: "Class 1 Japanese Aliens “Class 2 American citizens of Japanese Lineage "Class 3 German Aliens "Class 4 Italian Aliens "Class 5 Any persons, whether citizens or aliens, who are suspected for any reason by you or your responsible subordinates, of being actually or potentially dangerous either as saboteurs, espionage agents, fifth-columnists or sub¬ versive persons. "Class 6 All other persons who are, or who may be within the Western Defense Command.” "I suggest the advisability of the following course of action: "7. The progressive designation by you of military areas throughout the Western Defense Command of such extent and in such places as you deem necessary to pro¬ vide the maximum protection from sabotage and espionage of installations vital to the war effort consistent with the means available for evacuation and the military responsibilities attendant upon evacuation of large numbers of persons. “8. Where necessary, in your judgment, the designation of protective zones within the military areas referred to in 7 above, in which you will provide (a) for the ex¬ clusion of all persons in Classes 1, 2 and 5, and where in your judgment it is essential, and (b) for the exclusion of persons in Class 3, so as to afford the maximum protec¬ tion from espionage and sabotage to installations vital to the war effort, consistent with the military responsibilities attendant upon such an evacuation, viz., the number of troops which will be diverted from training for combat and from other missions, the fulfillment of which is your responsibility. "9. The promulgation of appropriate restrictive regulations governing the exercise by any person of the right to enter, remain in or leave such military areas and any zones within such military areas. In connection with the initiation, development and accomp¬ lishment of the program outlined above, you will initiate and carry to completion, with¬ out delay, the preparation of detailed plans for the evacuation of those classes of persons and individuals who will be excluded from military areas prescribed by you. In so doing it is desired that you take full advantage of the provisions of the Executive Order whereby you are authorized to call upon the other executive departments and federal agencies for assistance, not only in the furnishing of services, but also of supplies, equipment and land. It is the intention that the heads of the several executive departments, independent establishments, and other federal agencies will be required and will have full authority to respond to such requests as you may make upon them in carrying out the provisions of the executive order. "10. In this connection so far as consistent with safety the development of your program should be by stages. In the most critical areas you may consider it necessary to bring about an almost immediate evacuation of certain classes, particularly classes 1 and 2. However, in order to take full advantage of voluntary exodus and of re-settlement facilities arranged by other agencies, both public and private, the timing of your program should be most carefully conceived and coordinated. Representatives of the Departments of Justice and Agriculture advise that in those instances where it is consistent with the safety to afford evacuees reasonable advance notice that they will be able greatly to de¬ crease the numbers of evacuees to be cared for by the Army, and thereby greatly decrease the drain on our military resources; thus avoiding the diversion of troops from their primary mission, the defense of the West Coast. "11. In providing for the exclusion of classes of persons and individuals from military areas prescribed by you, you will make appropriate exception in favor of the aged, infirm, and the sick. Persons above the age of 70 years should not be disturbed unless for sufficient reason, you consider them suspect. Unless you find that the national safety will not so permit, bona fide refugees in Class 3 should be afforded special consideration, either 29 ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY CONTROL through the development of suitable means to acquire permits to return to prohibited zones or to remain therein. “12. I desire that you make known to me your detailed plans for evacuation as soon as practicable in order to enable the War Department to coordinate with the Corps Area Commanders concerned any movement you propose to undertake of evacuees outside of your command to places of temporary shelter. You will not entrain any evacuees for transportation beyond your command until you have been informed by the War Depart¬ ment that accommodations are prepared to receive them at the places of destination. “13. Yours will be the military responsibility for processing, evacuation, supplying, rationing and transportation to the points of shelter. This, of course, applies only to those evacuees who are unable to re-settle themselves on their own resources or for whom public and private agencies have been unable to arrange re-settlement. For persons in this class, the Army will provide shelter, food and other accommodations, including medical aid and hospitalization in selected places in the interior until civil authorities can make other arrangements. “14. It will, of course, be necessary that your plans include provision for protection of the property, particularly the physical property, of evacuees. All reasonable measures should be taken through publicity and other means, to encourage evacuees to take steps to protect their own property. Where evacuees are unable to do this prior to the time when it is necessary for them to comply with the exclusion orders, there is always danger that unscrupulous persons will take undue advantage or that physical property unavoid¬ ably left behind will be pillaged by lawless elements. The protection of physical property from theft or other harm is primarily the responsibility of state and local law-enforce¬ ment agencies, and you will doubtless call upon them for the maximum assistance in this connection. Where they are unable to protect physical property left behind in mili¬ tary areas, the responsibility will be yours, to provide reasonable protection, either through the use of troops or through other appropriate measures. The appointment by you of a property custodian and the creation by him of an organization to deal with such property in military areas may become necessary. The provisions of the Exec¬ utive Order and the necessity in each given instance are such that you have authority to take such action, either directly or through another federal agency. In the develop¬ ment of your program, it is desired that you accomplish it with the minimum of individual hardship and dislocation of business and industries consistent with safety. Report to me from time to time by telephone, with confirmation in writing, of impor¬ tant action and events, indicating particularly the location and extent of military areas prescribed by you and the character of the restrictions promulgated.” , Immediately upon the promulgation of Executive Order No. 9066 the War Department, with the approval of the President, requested the Congress to enact legislation to provide sanctions for the enforcement of directives issued under the authority of the Executive Order. A draft of proposed legislation for this purpose was transmitted by the Secretary of War simultaneously to the Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, and to the Speaker of the House of Represen¬ tatives. The concurrence of the Department of Justice as to the form and sub¬ stance of the bill had been obtained. The body of each letter of transmittal from the Secretary of War to the Congress read as follows: “There is enclosed herewith draft of a bill entitled 'A bill to provide a penalty for violation of restrictions or orders with respect to persons entering, remaining in, or leaving military areas or zones,’ which the War Department recommends to be enacted into law. 30 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST “The purpose of the proposed legislation is to provide for enforcement in the Federal criminal courts of orders issued under the authority of Executive order of the President No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942. This Executive order authorizes the Secretary of War to prescribe military areas from which any and all persons may be excluded for pur¬ poses of national defense. “It is impossible to estimate the probable cost to the Government consequent upon the enactment of such legislation. “The Bureau of the Budget has advised that there is no objection to the submission of this proposed legislation for the consideration of the Congress, as the enactment thereof would not be in conflict with the program of the President.” While the legislation was under consideration, the Secretary of War, on March 14, 1942, transmitted another letter to the Congress suggesting an amendment and urging immediate enactment. The letter of March 14th is as follows: "Hon. Andrew J. May, Chairman, Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives. “Dear Mr. May: "By telephone on Thursday, March 12, 1942, Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, commanding the Western Defense Command, requested that action be taken to expedite passage of S. 2352 and H. R. 6758, bills to provide penalties for violation of restrictions or orders with respect to persons entering, remaining in, or leaving military areas or zones. "General DeWitt is strongly of the opinion that the bill, when enacted, should be broad enough to enable the Secretary of War or the appropriate military commander to enforce curfews and other restrictions within military areas and zones. To that end, it is suggested that in line 3, page 1, of H. R. 6758 the word 'or’ be stricken and that after the word 'leave’ there be inserted the words, 'or commit any act in.’ "General DeWitt indicated that he was prepared to enforce certain restrictions at once for the purpose of protecting certain vital national defense interests but did not desire to proceed until enforcement machinery had been set up. "The War Department recommends immediate passage of the proposed law. “Sincerely yours, “Henry L. Stimson, "Secretary of War.” This bill became the vehicle for enactment of Public Law No. 503, 77th Congress, approved March 21, 1942. The Department of Justice was consulted in the drafting of this litigation as well as in the drafting, processing and pres¬ entation of Executive Order 9066. Public Law No. 503 follows: "To provide a penalty for violation of restrictions or orders with respect to persons entering, remaining in, leaving, or committing any act in military areas or zones. "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area or military zone prescribed, under the authority of an Executive order of the President, by the Secretary of War, or by any military commander designated by the Secretary of War, contrary to the restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any such military com¬ mander, shall, if it appears that he knew or should have known of the existence and 31 ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY CONTROL extent of the restrictions or order and that his act was in violation thereof, be guilty of misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be liable to a fine of not to exceed $5,000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, for each offense.” Previous to that time, on February 14, 1942, the Commanding General had forwarded his recommendations to the Chief of Staff, United States Army, as to the necessary measures to be taken. (See Appendix to this chapter, Memorandum for The Secretary of War from the Commanding General, Feb¬ ruary 14, 1942.) Included in these proposals were provisions for property pro¬ tection and the rendering of necessary social service. It will be noted that the military authorities contemplated appropriate provision against undue economic and social dislocation from the beginning. This did not emerge as an underly¬ ing policy after the program had been initiated but, on the contrary, consti¬ tuted an essential feature during all of the pre-evacuation discussions. On February 23, the Secretary of War again dispatched a War Depart¬ ment representative to San Francisco to act as liaison officer between the Department and the Commanding General and to be of any possible assis¬ tance. Acting upon recommendations of the Western Defense Command, the Assistant Secretary of War called upon certain federal agencies to designate per¬ sonnel to participate in developing the evacuation program. Prompt responses followed, and by February 27th the first of these representatives arrived in San Francisco. Dr. C. L. Dedrick of the Census Bureau, Department of Commerce, reported at San Francisco. Fie was shortly followed by represtantives of the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve System, the Department of Agri¬ culture, the Federal Security Agency, the Department of Justice, the Alien Property Custodian, and the Office of Price Administration. In a subsequent communication dated March 2, 1942, the Secretary of War broadened the authority of the Commanding General which had been granted him under the previous delegation of February 20, 1942 chapter III, supra). (see p. 2, Full freedom of action was granted to obligate funds, to enter into contracts and to acquire the services of any persons, firms or cor¬ porations in accomplishing the evacuation. The letter was as follows: “March 2, 1942 “Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, Commander, Western Defense Command, San Francisco, California. “Dear General DeWitt: “By letter dated February 20, 1942, I designated you as one of the appropriate Military Commanders to exercise the powers vested in me under Executive Order No. 9066, February 19, 1942, and I delegated to you such powers as are necessary to carry out the purposes of that Executive Order. Incident to the exercise of those powers, you are au¬ thorized to employ without regard to Civil Service or Classification laws or regulations, all persons or agencies necessary to carry out your duties. You are also authorized to employ the service of any association, firm, company, or corporation in furtherance of your mission. You will fix the rates of compensation so as to correspond as nearly as possible to the rate prevailing for similar service in the community in which the services are to be rendered. “Under the terms of Executive Order No. 9001, dated December 27, 1941, and subject to the limitations thereof and of the Act of December 18, 1941 (First War 32 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Powers Act, 1941, Public Law 354—77th Congress), I am expressly authorized to dele¬ gate further the powers therein delegated to me. Pursuant thereto, I delegate to you, within the limits of the amounts appropriated by the Congress, the power to enter into contracts and into amendments or modifications of contracts heretofore or hereafter made, and to make advance, progress, and other payments thereon, without regard to the provisions of law relating to the making, performance, amendment, or modification of contracts. "In order to remove any doubt as to your authority to obligate funds, I specifically authorize you to obligate funds in such amounts as you deem necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Executive Order, and of your instructions, from any funds in an alloted status available to you, or to incur obligations in excess of such funds, reporting deficien¬ cies to the appropriate chief of supply arm or service. "Sincerely yours, "Henry L. Stimson, "Secretary of War.” On March 2nd, the Commanding General issued Public Proclamation No. 1, establishing the westerly half of Washington, Oregon, and California and the southerly half of Arizona as Military Area No. 1. Certain prohibited and restricted zones were also established within Military Area No. 1. The boundary of Military Area No. 1 had been selected on the basis of previous study and the recommendations made by subordinate commanders. Highways were used to designate the boundaries in order that they would be plainly denoted on the ground and that all concerned could be placed on proper notice. The boundaries of Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2, established by Public Proclamation No. 1, were also designated on the ground by the erection of appropriate signs. was marked. Similarly, each prohibited zone created by the Proclamation Later, when additional military areas in the zones were estab¬ lished by Public Proclamation No. 2 on March 14, 1942, the same action was taken. In order to insure proper public notice of the location and extent of each area, zone signs were posted at every entrance to each of them. The Commanding General, Ninth Service Command (then the Ninth Corps Area), and the Commanding Generals of the Northwest, Northern California, Southern California and Southern Land Frontier Sectors, Western Defense Command, were directed by the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, to erect suit¬ able signs. The Commanding General, Ninth Service Command, posted the east boundary of Military Area No. 1 and all of the other zone and area boundaries lying to the east. The Commanding Generals of the Sectors posted the prohibited zones within Military Area No. 1. The task, particularly that required of the Ninth Service Command, was one of unusual magnitude. ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY CONTROL 33 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III Final Recommendation of the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Submitted to The Secretary of War. (see page 1 of this Chapter III) HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY Presidio of San Francisco, California Office of the Commanding General February 14, 1942 014.31 (DCS) Memorandum For: The Secretary (Thru: of War, The Commanding General, Field Forces, Washington, D. C.) Evacuation of Japanese and other Subversive Persons from the Subject: Pacific Coast. 1. In presenting a recommendation for the evacuation of Japanese and other subversive persons from the Pacific Coast, the following facts have been considered: a. Mission of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. (1) Defense of the Pacific Coast of the Western Defense Command, as extended, against attacks by sea, land or air; (2) Local protection of establishments and communications vital to the National Defense for which adequate defense cannot be provided by local civilian authorities. b. Brief Estimate of the Situation. (1) Any estimate of the situation indicates that the following are pos¬ sible and probable enemy activities: (a) Naval attack on shipping in coastal waters; (b) Naval attack on coastal cities and vital installations; (c) Air raids on vital installations, particularly within two hundred miles of the coast; (d) Sabotage of vital installations throughout the Western Defense Command. Hostile Naval and air raids will be assisted by enemy agents signaling from the coastline and the vicinity thereof; and by supplying and other¬ wise assisting enemy vessels and by sabotage. Sabotage, (for example, of airplane factories), may be effected not only by destruction within plants and establishments, but by destroying power, light, water, sewer and other utility and other facilities in the immediate vicinity thereof or at a distance. Serious damage or destruction in congested areas may readily be caused by incendiarism. 34 JAPANESE (2) EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST The area lying to the west of the Cascade and Sierra Nevada Moun¬ tains in Washington, Oregon and California, is highly critical not only because the lines of communication and supply to the Pacific theater pass through it, but also because of the vital industrial production therein, particularly air¬ craft. In the war in which we are now engaged racial affinities are not severed by migration. The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become "Americanized”, the racial strains are undi¬ luted. To conclude otherwise is to expect that children born of white parents on Japanese soil sever all racial affinity and become loyal Japanese subjects, ready to fight and, if necessary, to die for Japan in a war against the nation of their parents. That Japan is allied with Germany and Italy in this struggle is no ground for assuming that any Japanese, barred from assimilation by con¬ vention as he is, though born and raised in the United States, will not turn against this nation when the final test of loyalty comes. It, therefore, fol¬ lows that along the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential enemies, of Japanese extraction, are at large today. There are indications that these are organized and ready for concerted action at a favorable opportunity. The very fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming indication that such action will be taken. c. Disposition of the Japanese. (1) 'Washington. As the term is used herein, the word "Japanese” includes alien Japanese and American citizens of Japanese ancestry. In the State of Washington the Japanese population, aggregating over 14,500, is dis¬ posed largely in the area lying west of the Cascade Mountains and south of an east-west line passing through Bellingham, Washington, about 70 miles north of Seattle and some 15 miles south of the Canadian border. The largest concentration of Japanese is in the area, the axis of which is along the line Seattle, Tacoma, Olympia, Willapa Bay and the mouth of the Columbia River, with the heaviest concentration in the agricultural valleys between Seattle and Tacoma, viz., the Green River and the Puyallup Valleys. factory is in the Green River Valley. The Boeing Aircraft The lines of communication and supply including power and water which feed this vital industrial installation, radiate from this plant for many miles through areas heavily populated by Japanese. Large numbers of Japanese also operate vegetable markets along the Seattle and Tacoma water fronts, in Bremerton, near the Bremerton Navy Yard, and inhabit islands in Puget Sound opposite vital naval ship building installations. Still others are engaged in fishing along the southwest Washington Pacific Coast and along the Columbia River. Many of these Japanese are within easy reach of the forests of Washington State, the stock piles of seasoning lumber and the many sawmills of southwest Washington. forests, mills and stock piles are easily fired. (2) Oregon. During the dry season these (See inclosed map.) There are approximately 4,000 Japanese in the State of Oregon, of which the substantial majority reside in the area in the vicinity of Portland along the south bank of the Columbia River, following the general 35 ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY CONTROL line Bonneville, Oregon City, Astoria, Tillamook. Many of these are in the northern reaches of the Willamette Valley and are engaged in agricultural and fishing pursuits. Others operate vegetable markets in the Portland metropoli¬ tan area and still others reside along the northern Oregon sea coast. Their disposition is in intimate relationship with the northwest Oregon sawmills andlumber industry, near and around the vital electric power development at Bonneville and the pulp and paper installations at Camas (on the Washington State side of the Columbia River) and Oregon City, directly south of Port¬ land). (3) (See inclosed map.) California. The Japanese population in California aggregates approx¬ imately 93,500 people. Its disposition is so widespread and so well known that little would be gained by setting it forth in detail here. They live in great numbers along the coastal strip, in and around San Francisco and the Bay Area, the Salinas Valley, Los Angeles and San Diego. Their truck farms are con¬ tiguous to the vital aircraft industry concentration in and around Los Angeles. They live in large numbers in and about San Francisco, now a vast staging area for the war in the Pacific, a point at which the nation’s lines of communi¬ cation and supply converge. Inland they are disposed in the Sacramento, San Joaquin and Imperial Valleys. They are engaged in the production of approxi¬ mately 3 8 % of the vegetable produce of California. Many of them are engaged in the distribution of such produce in and along the water fronts at San Fran¬ cisco and Los Angeles. Of the 93,500 in California, about 25,000 reside inland in the mentioned valleys where they are largely engaged in vegetable production cited above, and 54,600 reside along the coastal strip, that is to say, a strip of coast line varying from eight miles in the north to twenty miles in width in and around the San Francisco bay area, including San Francisco, in Los Angeles and its environs, and in San Diego. Approximately 13,900 are dispersed throughout the remaining portion of the state. In Los Angeles City the disposition of vital aircraft industrial plants covers the entire city. Large numbers of Japanese live and operate markets and truck farms adjacent to or near these installations. (See inclosed map.) d. Disposition of Other Subversive Persons. Disposed within the vital coastal strip already mentioned are large numbers of Italians and Germans, foreign and native born, among whom are many individuals who constitute an actual or potential menace to the safety of the nation. 2. a. Action recommended. Recommendations for the designation of prohibited areas, described as "Category A” areas in California, Oregon and Washington, from which are to be excluded by order of the Attorney General all alien enemies, have gone forward from this headquarters to the Attorney General through the Provost Marshal General and the Secretary of War. These recommendations were made in order to aid the Attorney General in the implementation of the Presiden¬ tial Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, imposing responsibility on him 36 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM for the control of alien enemies as such. THE WEST COAST These recommendations were for the exclusion of all alien enemies from Category "A.” The Attorney General has adopted these recommendations in part, and has the balance under considera¬ tion. Similarly, recommendations were made by this headquarters, and adopted by the Attorney General, for the designation of certain areas as Category "B” areas, within which alien enemies may be permitted on pass or permit. b. I now recommend the following: (1) That the Secretary of War procure from the President direction and authority to designate military areas in the combat zone of the Western The¬ ater of Operations, (if necessary to include the entire combat zone), from which, in his discretion, he may exclude all Japanese, all alien enemies, and all other persons suspected for any reason by the administering military authori¬ ties of being actual or potential saboteurs, espionage agents, or fifth column¬ ists. Such executive order should empower the Secretary of War to requisition the services of any and all other agencies of the Federal Government, with express direction to such agencies to respond to such requisition, and further empowering the Secretary of War to use any and all federal facilities and equipment, including Civilian Conservation Corps Camps, and to accept the use of State facilities for the purpose of providing shelter and equipment for evacuees. Such executive order to provide further for the administration of military areas for the purposes of this plan by appropriate military authorities acting with the requisitioned assistance of the other federal agencies and the cooperation of State and local agencies. The executive order should further provide that by reason of military necessity the right of all persons, whether citizens or aliens, to reside, enter, cross or be within any military areas shall be subject to revo¬ cation and shall exist on a pass and permit basis at the discretion of the Sec¬ retary of War and implemented by the necessary legislation imposing penalties for violation. (2) That, pursuant to such executive order, there be designated as mili¬ tary areas all areas in Washington, Oregon and California, recommended by me to date for designation by the Attorney General as Category "A” areas and such additional areas as it may be found necessary to designate hereafter. (3) That the Secretary of War provide for the exclusion from such mili¬ tary areas, in his discretion, of the following classes of persons, viz: (a) Japanese aliens. (b) Japanese-American citizens. (r) Alien enemies other than Japanese aliens. (d) Any and all other persons who are suspected for any reason by the administering military authorities to be actual or potential saboteurs, espionage agents, fifth columnists, or subversive persons. (4) That the evacuation of classes (a), (b), and (c) from such mili¬ tary areas be initiated on a designated evacuation day and carried to comple¬ tion as rapidly as practicable. That prior to evacuation day all plans be complete for the establishment of initial concentration points, reception centers, registration, rationing, guard- 37 ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY CONTROL ing, transportation to internment points, and the selection and establishment of internment facilities in the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Corps Areas. That persons in class (a) and (c) above be evacuated and interned at such selected places of internment, under guard. That persons in class (b) above, at the time of evacuation, be offered an opportunity to accept voluntary internment, under guard, at the place of internment above mentioned. That persons in class (b) who decline to accept voluntary internment, be excluded from all military areas, and left to their own resources, or, in the alternative, be encouraged to accept resettlement outside of such military areas with such assistance as the State governments concerned or the Federal Security Agency may be by that time prepared to offer. That the evacuation of persons in class (d) be progressive and continuing, and that upon their evacuation persons in class (d) be excluded from all mili¬ tary areas and left in their own resources outside of such military areas, or, in the alternative, be offered voluntary internment or encouraged to accept vol¬ untary resettlement as above outlined, unless the facts in a particular case shall warrant other action. (5) The Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, to be responsible for the evacuation, administration, supply and guard, to the place of internment; the Commanding Generals of the Corps Areas con¬ cerned to be responsible for guard, supply and administration at the places of internment. (6) That direct communication between the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army and the Corps Area Com¬ manders concerned for the purpose of making necessary arrangements be authorized. (7) That the Provost Marshal General coordinate all phases of the plan between the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, on the one hand, and the Corps Area Commanders on the other hand. (8) That all arrangements be accomplished with the utmost secrecy. (9) That adult males (above the age of 14 years) be interned separately from all women and children until the establishment of family units can be accomplished. (10) 3. No change is contemplated in Category "B” areas. Although so far as the Army is concerned, such action is not an essen¬ tial feature of the plan, but merely incidental thereto, I, nevertheless, recom¬ mend that mass internment be considered as largely a temporary expedient pending selective resettlement, to be accomplished by the various Security Agencies of the Federal and State Governments. 4. The number of persons involved in the recommended evacuation will be approximately 133,000. (This total represents all enemy aliens and Japa¬ nese-American citizens in Category "A” areas recommended to date.) 5. If these recommendations are approved detailed plans will be made by this headquarters for the proposed evacuation. The number evacuated to be apportioned by the Provost Marshal General among the Corps Area Com- 38 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST manders concerned as the basis for formulating their respective plans. It is possible that the State of California, and perhaps the State of Washington, will be able to offer resettlement facilities for a given number of evacuees who may be willing to accept resettlement. 6. Pending further and detailed study of the problem, it is further recom¬ mended: (1) That the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, coordinate with the local and State authorities, in order to facilitate the temporary physical protection by them of the property of evacuees not taken with them; (2) That the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, determine the quantity and character of property which the adult males, referred to in paragraph 2b (9), may be permitted to take with them; and (3) That the Treasury Department or other proper Federal agency be responsible for the conservation, liquidation, and proper disposition of the property of evacuees if it cannot be cared for through the usual and normal channels. J. L. DeWITT, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding. 1 Inch Map (indup.). PART II EVACUATION—ITS DEVELOPMENT IN SUMMARY FOREWORD Part II (Chapters IV, V and VI) contains a summary of the evacuation program. The detailed chronology and analysis of the operations appear in the succeeding chapters. CHAPTER IV The Emergence of Controlled Evacuation The voluntary migration phase of evacuation was initiated by the pro¬ mulgation of Public Proclamation No. 1, designating Military Area No. 1 as the zone from which persons of Japanese ancestry were to be required to leave during the first phase of evacuation. Between March 2 and March 10, 1942, the discussions as to evacuation procedures were general in nature and specific planning had not emerged. The voluntary movement did not gain momentum because means had not been provided on the ground for aiding evacuees in the solution of personal problems incident to their voluntary exodus. Prior to March 10 the General Staff of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army had not engaged in any extensive planning or preparation for the program. The tactical duties imposed upon it were such that it was unable to do so and at the same time meet the responsibilities imposed on the Headquarters by the essentially military aspects of its mission. Accordingly, on March 10, by General Order No. 34, the Commanding General established the Civil Affairs Division as an addition to his general staff. On the day fol¬ lowing by General Order No. 3 5 he created the Wartime Civil Control Admin¬ istration as an operating agency of his Command to carry out assigned mis¬ sions involving civil control. With the creation of these agencies specific plans for the evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 1, and the California portion of Military Area No. 2 were immediately initiated. The War Depart¬ ment liaison representative was designated as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs, General Staff, and also as the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administra¬ tion. The offices of Civil Affairs Division, General Staff, and of the Wartime Civil Control Administration were established in the Whitcomb Hotel, San Fran¬ cisco. The Wartime Civil Control Administration initiated its operations with a brief, but none the less all-inclusive, directive from the Commanding General: "To provide for the evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 1 and the California portion of Military Area No. 2 of the Pacific Coast with a minimum of economic and social dislocation, a minimum use of military personnel and maximum speed; and initially to employ all appropriate means to encourage voluntary migration.” To facilitate the organization of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, and to streamline the procurement of personnel, office equipment, personal ser¬ vices and supplies, the Division of Central Administrative Services of the Office for Emergency Management responded to a. request to extend its services to the Wartime Civil Control Administration. Almost overnight the Office for Emer¬ gency Management acquired office space in the Whitcomb Hotel, supplied and equipped these offices, and engaged qualified personnel to meet the requirements of the Director. Mr. Ralph B. Thompson, Regional Director of the Division of Central Administrative Services, personally supervised these activities. 41 Funds 42 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST were transferred to the Office for Emergency Management from appropriations available to the military establishment. This arrangement, which continued throughout the program with highly satisfactory results, was confirmed by let¬ ters of the Commanding General dated March 12, 1942. One of these letters was addressed to Mr. Dallas Dort, Director of that agency, and the other to Mr. Thompson, the Regional Director. These letters follow: (File No. 323.3 WCCA) HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY Office of the Commanding General Presidio of San Francisco, California March 12, 1942 "Mr. Dallas Dort Director, Central Administrative Services Office for Emergency Management 101 Indiana Avenue, Washington, D. C. "Please arrange to provide the disbursing account assigned to Mr. Ralph B. Thomp¬ son, Director of Administrative Services, Merchandise Mart, San Francisco, with funds necessary to service the Wartime Civilian Control Administration under my command. "His account will be reimbursed currently from funds under my direct control. "Funds to protect obligations up to sixty days should be provided. It is estimated that $500,000.00 will be sufficient for the time being. /*/ J. L. DeWitt J. L. DeWitt, Lieutenant General, U. S. A., Commanding.” (File No. 323.3 WCCA) HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY Office of the Commanding General Presidio of San Francisco, California 12 March 1942 "Mr. Ralph B. Thompson, Regional Director Division of Central Administrative Services 1355 Market Street, San Francisco, California "Dear Mr. Thompson: "You are hereby authorized to commence immediately to render the administrative services, as outlined in your letter of March 11, 1942, to the Wartime Civilian Control Administration (under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army) under my command. "Such services are to be rendered only upon order of Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen or his designated representative. "You may utilize the procedure and necessary forms now used by you in servicing other emergency agencies. "You will be reimbursed from appropriations available to the military establishment upon receipt of Standard Government Form 1080, “Voucher Adjustment” between appropriations and/or funds, properly supported by requisitions and vouchers. "You will receive your orders and requests for service from only one source in each city or location serviced, that source to be designated in writing by Colonel Bendetsen or his successor. "In performing this service you will not be subjected to jurisdiction or clearance with any department of the Army except upon my specific order. “You are not authorized or expected to pay any obligations incurred by officers or civilian officials of the Wartime Civilian Control Administration which have not been ordered through your office under your regular procedures. "By authority of the Secretary of War, acting under Executive Order No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, I advise that you are authorized to contract for printing and binding EMERGENCE OF 43 CONTROLLED EVACUATION ordered by the designated officer of the Wartime Civilian Control Administration without prior approval of the Government printing office. “All special services rendered to date, namely the establishment of executive offices and the teletype services in the Whitcomb Hotel Building at the request of Colonel W. Fulton Magill are hereby approved. Sincerely yours, /s/ J. L. DeWitt J. L. DeWitt, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, JLD/tgb Commanding.” As an initial step in the facilitation of voluntary emigration, 48 Wartime Civil Control Administration offices were established, one in each important center of Japanese population in the affected area. These offices were staffed by representatives of the cooperating Federal agencies which had agreed to undertake certain specific responsiblities in the program. The Federal Reserve Bank and the Farm Security Administration had undertaken to provide prop¬ erty protection, under the direction of the Wartime Civil Control Administra¬ tion—the former, primarily as to business and personal property; the latter primarily respecting agricultural property. The Federal Security Agency, through its various associated agencies, had agreed to provide necessary social services. The 48 Wartime Civil Control Administration offices (which became known as "Wartime Civil Control Administration Service Centers”) were staffed by a team with one or more representatives from each of these agencies. Through every available public information channel prospective evacuees were urged to prepare for evacuation, and to go to these offices for assistance in the solution of their personal problems* It was stated that they would receive aid in their actual migration to the interior. These offices were empow¬ ered—among other things—to pay the cost of transportation of evacuees to points in the interior. They undertook to locate specific employment oppor¬ tunities for prospective evacuees. This program met with measurable success in that approximately 9,000 persons of Japanese ancestry voluntarily emigrated from Military Area No. 1 to interior points. However, the attitude of the interior states was hostile. This group considered too dangerous to remain on the West Coast, was similarly regarded by State and local authorities, and by the population of the interior. The evacuees were not welcome. Incidents developed with increasing in¬ tensity, with the result that the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs, on March 21, recommended to the Commanding General that evacuation be placed on the basis of complete Federal supervision and control. By Proclamation No. 4, dated March 27, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry were required to remain within Military Area No. 1 and were not permitted to change their places of residence. Essentially, military necessity required only that the Japanese population be removed from the coastal area and dispersed in the interior, where the danger of action in concert during any attempted enemy raids along the coast, or in advance thereof as preparation for a full scale attack, would be eliminated. That the evacuation program necessarily and ultimately developed into one of 44 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST complete Federal supervision, was due primarily to the fact that the interior states would not accept an uncontrolled Japanese migration. Although the initial recommendation of February 14, 1942 (appendix to chapter 3, page 33, supra) contemplated the internment of alien Japanese, this was abandoned as a method of operation. Once authority had been granted to set the program in motion, the Commanding General encouraged and facilitated a voluntary exodus with free choice of destination in the interior of persons of Japanese ancestry. Voluntary evacuation was Phase I of the program. Through the Federal Security Agency initially and, after March 12, 1942, when the Wartime Civil Control Administration was established, in cooperation with the other partici¬ pating Federal agencies, the means were provided for assisting Japanese in undertaking a free exodus from the West Coast. The accompanying functional chart, Figure 2, is illustrative of the phases through which the evacuation process progressed. Chapter IX of this report presents in greater detail the history of the first phase. During the period between March 12, the establishment of the Civil Affairs Division, General Staff, and the Wartime Civil Control Administration, and the announcement of Proclamation No. 4 on March 27, 1942, plans were going for¬ ward for the specific kind of evacuation that Proclamation No. 4 contemplated. Prior to March 12, when it was hoped that the evacuation would be char¬ acterized primarily by a voluntary exodus, the Commanding General had directed the acquisition and establishment of two "Reception Centers.” These two Centers were to be developed at Manzanar and Parker. The "Reception Center” at Manzanar, California, is located in Owens Valley, Inyo County, at the easterly base of the Sierra. The Parker "Reception Center,” now known as the Colorado River War Relocation Center, is located in Arizona on the Colorado River Indian Reservation along the Arizona-California boundary, south of Parker Dam. Originally, it was intended that each would have a capacity of 10,000 persons and that they would be used to provide temporary housing for those who were either unable to undertake their own evacuation, or who declined to leave until forced so to do. As soon as specific evacuation plans had been initiated, it was foreseen that relocation facilities would have to be developed for virtually all evacuees. Accordingly, within a few days following March 12, site-selection parties were formed and dispatched to the interior states in the Western Defense Command to seek sites for the development of Relocation Centers. The Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, called a meeting of representatives of the Bureau of Reclamation, Department of Interior, the National Resources Planning Board, the Soil Conservation Service, the Farm Security Administration of the Depart¬ ment of Agriculture, the Work Projects Administration, and the Corps of Engi¬ neers, South Pacific Division. The object of this conference was to sift available data as to the location of potential Relocation Center sites and to organize siteselection parties. transport aircraft. Two such parties were formed and each was assigned a military One party was dispatched to cover the area lying north of the California-Oregon boundary and west of the Rocky Mountains. This party was joined by a representative of the North Pacific Division of the United States PHASE AND FUNCTIONAL DISTRIBUTION CHART EMERGENCE OF CONTROLLED EVACUATION t 45 (N Figure 46 JAPANESE Engineer Corps. EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST A second party was assigned to reconnoiter the area lying south of the Oregon-California boundary and west of the Rocky Mountains. These groups initiated their survey on March 16, 1942. Following its establishment, the Director, Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬ tration, on March 12, 1942, requested that Mr. R. L. Nicholson, then Regional Director of the Work Projects Administration for the eleven Western States, come to San Francisco for a conference. He had participated in several informal pre-evacuation conferences at the request of Mr. Tom C. Clark, then the West Coast representative of the Anti-Trust Division of the Department of Justice. The Director requested him to join the staff df Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬ tration as Chief of the Assembly Center Branch of the Temporary Settlement Operations Division. In the course of the discussion, Mr. Nicholson stated that substantial numbers of Work Projects Administration field staff personnel would be available to Wartime Civil Control Administration as that agency’s operations were rapidly diminishing in scope. The Director, Wartime Civil Control Ad¬ ministration asked that such personnel be recruited from Work Projects Admin¬ istration offices to provide Wartime Civil Control Administration administrative staffs for assembly centers and for any reception centers that might be estab¬ lished. The understanding was that all such personnel would join the Wartime Civil Control Administration to be administratively responsible to the Director. It was further understood that, in accordance with the policy of the Commanding General to limit the use of military personnel, all center staff operations would be supervised by civilians. It was agreed that any personnel not available from among Work Projects Administration staff offices would be recruited indepen¬ dently. As internal security and police functions were not to be under the control of the Assembly Center Managers, the recruitment of police staffs, to be admin¬ istratively responsible to the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, was not included in the arrangement. Later, Mr. Nicholson advised that Work Projects Administration person¬ nel, including himself, desired to retain their status with that agency without prejudice and that the Federal Works Agency (Work Projects Administration) would give its consent to an arrangement whereby such personnel would remain on the rolls of Work Projects Administration at Army expense subject, however, to the complete direction and administrative control of the Army. Accordingly, in order to preserve the status of such personnel, a letter of request from the Com¬ manding General to Mr. Nicholson, dated March 28, 1942, was drafted in such manner as to call upon the Work Projects Administration, as an agency, to provide Assembly and Reception Center managerial personnel. The actual arrangement remained as initially agreed, however, viz., that the Commanding General, through Wartime Civil Control Administration as an agency would retain complete respon¬ sibility for the establishment, administration, and operation of Assembly Centers. All such personnel were administratively responsible to the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, and became a part of that organization. It is neces¬ sary, therefore, to bear the foregoing in mind in order fully to understand the letter of March 28, 1942, which, on its face, does not fully reflect the actuality. All plans, policies, and directives were developed by Wartime Civil Control Ad- 47 EMERGENCE OF CONTROLLED EVACUATION ministration, and the manual of Assembly Center operations was issued by the Director. The letter of March 28, 1942, reads as follows: March 28, 1942 "Mr. Rex L. Nicholson, Regional WPA Supervisor W. C. C. A. Whitcomb Hotel, San Francisco, California "My dear Mr. Nicholson: "Under authority granted to me by executive order of the President No. 9066 dated February 19, 1942, it is requested that the Work Projects Administration assume the responsibility for the direction and management of such assembly points and reception centers as may be assigned in connection with the program of evacuation of German, Italian and Japanese enemy aliens and persons of Japanese ancestry from restricted zones within the military areas established by my Military Proclamation No. 1 dated March 2, 1942, and by my Military Proclamation No. 2 dated March 16, 1942. "Subject to general direction from my Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, and in accordance with policies approved by him as the officer responsible for the execution of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, your agency is authorized to incur obliga¬ tions and make expenditures from any funds available to it or made available to it by the War Department, in carrying out the duties and functions assigned. In this connection it is desired that you submit to the Asst. Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, for approval, at the earliest possible date, a Budget Estimate of your fiscal requirements up to May 1, 1942 broken down in such detail as is immediately practicable. Reimbursement to the Work Projects Administration for expenditures made from any funds appropriated to the WPA will be from available funds subject to my control and allocation, appro¬ priate orders having been issued in respect thereto. "General plans and policies for the operation of Reception Centers and Assembly points will be worked out by you with my Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, and subject to his final approval. The actual administration and management of the Assembly Points and Reception Centers will be the responsibility of your agency. "After general plans and policies have been agreed upon, your general operation will be subject to inspection by my Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, and his Deputy for Temporary Settlement Operations to insure conformance with the general plans and policies described. “In the event that the operation of the Reception Centers or Assembly Points does not appear to be satisfactory, upon inspection, it is understood that determinations will be made as to necessary adjustments and revisions of policy and that such changes will be communicated to you by my Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division. “Yours very truly, /s/ J. L. DeWitt J. L. DeWitt, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.” Mr. Nicholson was succeeded as Chief of the Assembly Center Branch, Wartime Civil Control Administration, on June 30, 1942, by Mr. Emil Sandquist, who remained as Chief of that branch until completion of the program. Meanwhile, the construction of the Manzanar and Parker Projects was being pushed. Forty-eight Wartime Civil Control Administration Service Cen¬ ters were in operation for the encouragement of voluntary migration and, at the same time, site-selection parties were in the interior seeking sites for Relocation Centers. The initiation of detailed evacuation planning established the impracti¬ cability of undertaking evacuation and relocation in the same operation. It became evident that the establishment of intermediate assembly facilities would 48 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST be a prime essential to the accomplishment of a rapid, compulsory evacuation. The separation of these phases is best illustrated by a reference to the Wartime Civil Control Administration Functional Distribution Chart. (Figure 2, supra.) Accordingly, the selection of sites within the zone to be evacuated, near each evacuee community, for the establishment of Assembly Centers (initially called “Induction Centers”) was undertaken at the same time when these other activi¬ ties mentioned above were under way, viz., interior relocation site selection, the encouragement of voluntary migration and the operation of the Wartime Civil Control Administration Service Centers. The detailed plan called for the acquisition of Assembly Center sites where existing installations and facilities could be used to the maximum. Fairgrounds and race tracks were the primary source of such locations. The Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, instituted a survey of all available Assembly Center locations with a view to the selection of places near to each center of evacuee population and susceptible of rapid adaptation to the purpose. The Commanding Generals of the Northwest Sector, the Northern and Southern California Sectors, and the Southern Land Frontier Sector, were also directed by the Commanding General to make recommendations as to suit¬ able sites for this purpose. Seventeen such sites were selected, fifteen of which were ultimately used for evacuee housing, in addition to Manzanar and Parker. Twelve of these Centers, exclusive of Manzanar, were developed in California, one in Washington, one in Oregon, and one in Arizona, exclusive of Parker. The names and locations of these Centers are detailed in Chapter XIII. The North and South Pacific Divisions of the United States Engineer Corps were requested to provide for the construction of suitable facilities at each of these sites, making maximum use of existing strucures. The contemplated aggregate capacity (exclusive of Manzanar and Parker) was set at 100,000. The housing was to be suitable for family units, and central messing facili¬ ties were to be provided. A maximum of four weeks was allotted for com¬ pletion of the projects. Thirteen of the fifteen Assembly Centers established were within the South Pacific Division of the United States Engineer Corps and, notwithstanding this unprecedented assignment, the schedule was substantially met. The Division Engineers received their requests for action on March 20, 1942, and the deadline was established for April 21. Specifications were pro¬ vided by Wartime Civil Control Administration only in essential outline. One requirement was that construction be planned so that the reception of evacuees could be initiated in advance of completion of the entire Center. While Assembly Center site selection was under way, and before construc¬ tion was started, the pressure for the initiation of a definite evacuation move¬ ment reached the point where there was grave danger of serious incidents. On March 21, 1942, the Wartime Civil Control Administration organized a voluntary evacuation of some 2,100 persons from Los Angeles, California, to Manzanar which was then, of course, still undergoing construction at a rapid rate. The Commanding General, Southern California Sector, Western Defense Command, provided escort for the convoy of cars and a collateral train move¬ ment. The Quartermaster, Western Defense Command, obtained the necessary 49 EMERGENCE OF CONTROLLED EVACUATION transportation and subsistence, and the United States Public Health Service pro¬ vided medical care. An advance party of voluntary evacuees had preceded the main party to assist the Manzanar Administrative Staff in preparing for the reception of the main party of 2,100. ticularly the Maryknoll Mission. Local Los Angeles agencies aided, par¬ (See Chapters VII and VIII for division of responsibilities.) On March 29, 1942, the first compulsory evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from Bainbridge Island in Puget Sound, Washington, to Manzanar was executed pursuant to Exclusion Order No. 1, dated March 24, 1942. When Proclamation No. 4 was announced, the construction of Assembly Centers on sites already selected was under way. The Work Projects Admin¬ istration had provided a staff at Manzanar and was assembling personnel to administer other Assembly Centers as they were developed. Detailed plans were being formulated by Wartime Civil Control Administration to solve a variety of problems such as those of determining the supply and equipment requirements for each Assembly Center, for transportation of evacuees, for health, sanitation and education, and for all other Assembly Center operation requirements. Also, advanced planning for the designation of Exclusion Areas, for their orderly evacua¬ tion, for the designation of each evacuee group, for the maintenance of family units and of community balance within Centers had to be considered. As War¬ time Civil Control Administration was being organized and a new staff recruited and trained, it was necessary to consider and solve these problems and at the same time place the program in execution. With the initiation of the Assembly Center construction, initial supply requirements for Manzanar had been determined by the Wartime Civil Control Administration and requisitioned. These supplies were rapidly started toward destination by the Quartermaster, Western Defense Command. Plans had to be developed for internal security—the policing of Assembly Centers. The ques¬ tion of evacuee employment, of their compensation, of the establishment of many social services such as barber shops, beauty shops, shoe repair facilities, clothing stores, hospital, optical and dental services, the warehousing of evacuee goods and chattels, all had to be considered and met. For none was there either precedent or pattern. Complex as these operational aspects were, the problem was further com¬ pounded by the public relations aspect of the program. Rumors were ram¬ pant, public feeling ran high, the affected groups were in a state of confusion, and unscrupulous interests were seeking to take advantage of misfortune. There was, therefore, an impelling necessity for the formulation of a definitive public information and public relations program. This was immediately undertaken. A more detailed account of all these aspects of the program will appear in ensuing chapters. G O 0 l vW. ^gton FES 2 »44 0. c CHAPTER V Separation of Jurisdiction Over Evacuation and Relocation When it became finally evident toward the end of February that a com¬ plete evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 1, and ultimately from the California portion of Military Area No. 2, would be ordered, discussions were initiated in Washington as to whether a separate agency should be created to undertake evacuee supervision after the Army had attained its objective. and relocation The primary basis for these discus¬ sions was that Army resources should not be expended in any direction not essential to the military aspects of the successful prosecution of the war. The Attorney General and other representatives of the Justice Department were also concerned with several post-evacuation considerations, particularly those revolving around the civil rights of American-born Japanese. Justice Depart¬ ment officials therefore urged the establishment of a separate civilian agency to undertake the post-evacuation phases of relocation. The Assistant Secretary of War, the Director of the Bureau of Budget and the Attorney General all participated in the consideration of this problem. The desirability of establishing such an operating agency was generally agreed to when the Assistant Secretary of War came to the West Coast for a survey of the situation. He arrived at San Francisco on March 7, 1942, and brought with him representatives of the Treasury Department and of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Treasury Depart¬ ment had accepted the responsibility of providing means for evacuee property protection under the direction of the Commanding General and had selected the Federal Reserve System, long its fiscal agent, as the instrumentality through which it would discharge this mission. The Assistant Secretary of War’s party included Messrs. John Pehle, John Lawlor, and Ansel F. Luxford of the Treasury Department, and Governor M. S. Szymczak and Mr. W. B. Pollard of the Federal Reserve System. Mr. Milton S. Eisenhower, then Assistant to the Sec¬ retary of Agriculture, joined the party as he had participated in the Washing¬ ton discussions concerning the proposed relocation agency. Mr. Eisenhower returned to Washington after having engaged in discussions with the Com¬ manding General, the Assistant Secretary of War and other officials about March 11, 1942. Following his return, Executive Order of the President No. 9102 was published on March 18th. Under its terms, War Relocation Authority was established in the Office for Emergency Management in the Executive Office of the President. Director. Mr. Eisenhower was named as its first Broad powers were accorded. became responsible for "the relocation Primarily, however, the new agency (of evacuees) in appropriate places, providing for their needs in such manner as may be appropriate, and super¬ vising their activities.” Its power, authority and responsibility are clearly expressed in the order.3 'See Inclosure to letter of transmittal # 7. 50 51 SEPARATION OF JURISDICTION Liaison was established between the Director, War Relocation Authority, and the Commanding General. Mr. Eisenhower returned to the Pacific Coast about the end of March and established temporary offices on the third floor of the Whitcomb Hotel building, San Francisco, adjacent to the office of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. Because of the primary interest of War Relocation Authority in the relocation aspects of evacuation, it was agreed that the selection of Relocation Center sites by the Army would be sus¬ pended, and that all data collected would be made available to War Relocation Authority for its use. The Director of War Relocation Authority determined that the characteristics for each site should be such that all lands included were to be a part of the public domain; that each site have an optimum potential for the employment of all em¬ ployables among evacuees there resident; and that there be sufficient water and suitable soil for agricultural development. It was further agreed that War Re¬ location Authority would make the selections subject to the approval of military authorities as to military security features. Also, it was agreed that the acquisition of sites would be through military channels, and that the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, would notify the Governor of each State concerned, prior to acquisition, of the military necessity for the construction of a Relo¬ cation Center on the chosen area. Some time later a formal agreement was executed between the War Department and War Relocation Authority, reflecting this understanding and providing for the construction of Centers on behalf of War Relocation Authority by the Army. This agreement, executed April 17, 1942, is found in Chapter XX. The Western Defense Command, therefore, abandoned Relocation Center site selection and concentrated its efforts on controlled evacuation. Emphasis was placed by Wartime Civil Control Administration on evacuee property pro¬ tection, provision for necessary social services, establishment of Assembly Centers, the evacuation of Japanese to Assembly Centers, operation of Assembly Centers, the construction and equipment of Relocation Centers and the transfer of evacuees from Assembly to Relocation Centers. which met the standards prescribed. It was difficult to locate suitable sites This, in combination with construction delays due to the scarcity of building materials, delayed the ultimate transfer from Assembly Centers to completed Relocation Centers for approximately four months. Assembly Centers were originally conceived and established as a transitory facility and their adaptation to longer evacuee residence became essential. Bear¬ ing in mind the seriousness of the results which might ensue from over-long residence in facilities intended only to provide temporary shelter, the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, on April 22 ,1942, emphasized these con¬ siderations to the Director, War Relocation Authority, in a memorandum to the following effect: "1. The tempo of evacuation is under acceleration. Its accomplishment will place approximately 85,000 evacuees in assembly centers in the next six weeks. Assembly 52 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST centers are not designed to provide suitable semi-permanent housing and other facilities. They are temporary in nature. Their facilities are transitory only. They are made neces¬ sary because of the time required to select relocation sites. Their objective is to meet the demand of military necessity and to avoid any retarding effect caused by relocation site selection. "2. Assembly centers are not and cannot, without the expenditure of tremendous sums of money for space and facilities in duplication of those which will be provided on relocation sites, be designed to permit the development and maintenance of a vocational, educational, recreational and social program. Long residence in an assembly center is bound to have a demoralizing effect. “3. The grave responsibility for the most rapid selection of relocation sites and the compilation of all necessary data to permit speedy acquisition and construction of relocation centers thereon cannot be overemphasized in view of the essential character¬ istics of assembly centers. "4. In this connection, it is suggested that a representative of the office of the ap¬ propriate United States Army Division Engineer be included in War Relocation Au¬ thority site selection parties. This will produce a two-fold effect. (1) It will facilitate acquisition once a site is selected and the data compiled because the real estate section of the Division Engineer’s Office will have been accorded the maximum advance notice. (2) It will facilitate the initiation of construction for manifest reasons in that advance information on the characteristics of a site will have been insured. "5. From the long range point of view and the self-evident desirability of maintaining sound public relations, the suggestion is made that all personnel of both WCCA and WRA, and the associated cooperating federal agencies, bear in mind the necessity for and objective of assembly centers. Thus, their essential characteristics will be more readily understood. The attainment of any social ideal therein is beyond possibility for manifest reasons and the responsibility is grave to avoid misinterpretations. Failure to avoid it may initiate a chain of circumstances resulting in reprisals against our nationals in enemy hands.” CHAPTER VI The Evacuation Method With the formal organization of an Army agency charged with the gen¬ eral supervision of all evacuation activities, rather definite property protection and social service policies and practices emerged with a specific evacuation technique. The central theory of evacuation, upon which the method and technique was developed, was essentially the block system. was ultimately subdivided into 108 exclusion areas. The coastal strip Comprehensive statistical studies of the size and composition of the Japanese population in each of the areas were made. As a particular exclusion area became readied for evacua¬ tion, an Exclusion Order with specific Exclusion Instructions was promulgated. A Civil Control Station was established immediately in the exclusion area concerned. This Control Station was staffed with a team of experts. On definite dates following the posting of an Exclusion Order in an "exclusion area”, the heads of families, and each individual living alone, were required to report to the Civil Control Station in that area for instructions and regis¬ tration. Representatives of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, of the Farm Security Administration, and the associated agencies of the Federal Security Agency, comprised the Control Station staff. The Commanding Gen¬ eral of each Sector provided a military officer with several military police to act as a security group. Applications for exemption from evacuation were re¬ ferred to Control Station Provosts. Normally, a representative of the United States Employment Service acted as the Station Manager for administrative pur¬ poses. As many as 43 Civil Control Stations operated simultaneously at the peak of evacuation. At this time an average of 3,750 evacuees per day were being moved from their homes to Assembly Centers, or, in some cases, direct to Manzanar or Colorado River Relocation Centers. The Department of Agriculture had designated the Farm Security Admin¬ istration as its representative to undertake the responsibility for agricultural property protection. Mr. Laurence I. Hewes, the Pacific Coast Regional Direc¬ tor of the Farm Security Administration, supervised these activities. At con¬ ferences between the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, and Mr. Flewes, the details of the arrangements between the Farm Security Administra¬ tion and Wartime Civil Control Administration were developed. These under¬ standings were confirmed by correspondence dated March 15, 1942, and March 27, 1942, addressed to the Pacific Coast Regional Director of the Farm Security Administration. (Appendix (1) to Chapter VI, infra.) In respect to a telegram dated March 14, 1942 (Appendix (2) to Chapter VI) from the Commanding General, the sum of $1,000,000 was made available from War Department appropriations for the purpose of making loans against evacuee crops and farm implements. The Farm Security Administration representatives, forming a part of Wartime Civil Control Administration, were entrusted with 53 54 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST authority for making loans from this sum. The objective was to facilitate the procurement of substitute farm operators who would take over evacuated farms and other agricultural property, particularly where the financial condition of a given evacuee, or of a specific agricultural property, was such that sufficient moneys to continue operations could not be obtained through commercial sources. Later this was augmented by an additional $4,000,000, obtained from funds available to the President. Both the evacuees and their communities of resi¬ dence derived much benefit from these loans because many properties other¬ wise would have remained idle, and growing crops left unharvested. The Farm Security Administration organized for the task with great facility and soon developed a complete inventory of evacuee agricultural interests. Ultimately satisfactory arrangements were made for over 99 per cent of all this property. Arrangements were successfully accomplished to keep these properties in produc¬ tion without shrinkage in aggregate crop output. Measures for evacuee property protection were rapidly developed following the arrival of the Assistant Secretary of War and of the representatives of the Treasury Department and Federal Reserve System who accompanied him. When the Wartime Civil Control Administration was organized the Director called upon the cooperating agencies to organize 48 Service Center teams. plied rapidly. They com¬ Under the immediate direction of Mr. William H. Hale, Vice- President of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, the bank’s phase of evacuee property protection activities was rapidly developed. The arrangement between Western Defense Command and the Federal Reserve Bank of San Fran¬ cisco was formally confirmed in letters from the Commanding General to the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, dated March 11th and April 5, 1942. (Appendix (3) to Chapter VI.) Service center offices were established in downtown San Francisco, Los Ange¬ les, Portland, and Seattle. These were staffed by personnel specially selected to aid evacuees with their problems. At the request of the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, the Federal Reserve Bank also undertook responsibility for the storage of evacuee household goods. This included the acquisition of suitable warehouses, the em¬ ployment of guards, and the installation of suitable means and methods to en¬ sure a control and inventory of the stored property. As will be outlined in greater detail later in this report, the Wartime Civil Control Administration formulated definite policies, implemented with detailed instructions and forms, in the matter of household goods storage. Any type of personal property was accepted for storage, including business property and automobiles. Farm implements were warehoused, through the Farm Security Administration’s organization. As for automobiles and trucks, the Army offered to purchase any automobile or truck at Blue Book value, through the Federal Reserve Bank, if an evacuee desired to sell. Evacuee response to the property protection services was most gratifying, and clearly indicated their effectiveness. As already noted, the associated agencies of the Federal Security Agency accepted responsibility for providing all necessary social and public health services. THE EVACUATION 55 METHOD These allied agencies included the United States Employment Service, the Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Board, and the United States Public Health Service. The scope and magnitude of the functions performed by these allied agencies will be described in detail in subsequent chapters. Mr. Richard M. Neustadt, Regional Director of the Federal Security Agency, agreed to place all of the facilities of the organizations under his direction at the disposal of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. The closest liaison was constantly mantained. A letter in confirmation of the arrangement made between the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, and Mr. Neustadt was forwarded by the Com¬ manding General on March 31, 1942. (Appendix (4) to Chapter VI.) Among the manifold services provided by these agencies, the United States Public Health Service undertook to examine each evacuee for contagious diseases prior to his entry into an Assembly Center. It also undertook the acquisition of infirmary and hospital equipment, and medical supplies for Assembly Centers, and to make suitable auxiliary arrangements for hospitalization of evacuees in private and public hospitals adjacent to Assembly Centers. Further, it super¬ vised the entire medical program within the Centers. The United States Employment Service provided the Manager for each Civil Control Station and Wartime Civil Control Administration Service Center. The Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Board, in collaboration with the United States Employment Service, undertook the initial interview of each evacuee to determine his individual problems and the social and property protec¬ tion services he would require. These two agencies also undertook the recruit¬ ment of advanced parties of evacuee workers for each Assembly Center. These parties were recruited, organized and transported to each Assembly Center well in advance of the induction of the first groups of evacuees. Thus the Assembly Center staffs were able to organize a skeleton force for the reception of the new Center residents. At the request of the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, the Office of Price Administration sent a liaison representative to be available for con¬ sultation, advice, and the initiation of any necessary action. He established a liaison section at Wartime Civil Control Administration, and remained during the initial phases of evacuation. This relationship was established because it was fore¬ seen that some control might have to be applied to arrest widespread deflation of values. This in turn might have adversely affected the economic structure of the West Coast. This did not prove to be the case. No price control measures were applied. The Post Office Department effectively cooperated throughout the entire operation. When it became essential to devise means for maintaining an account of the progress of voluntary migration, postmasters throughout the Western Defense Command administered the change of address reporting system. Later, during Assembly Center operations, branch post offices were promptly established in each Center. The Inspectors in charge of the San Francisco and Seattle Divisions promptly responded to all Wartime Civil Control Administration requirements. 56 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST By arrangement with the Attorney General, the Department of Justice, through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the United States Attorneys, acted as the enforcing agency for all of the Proclamations and Exclusion Orders of the Commanding General, promulgated under Executive Order No. 9066. Although prosecutions in connection with the Japanese evacuation were few, the number of cases of violation of the Commanding General’s Curfew and Travel restrictions, applicable to alien enemies, were many. Through the agency of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, State and local law-enforcement agen¬ cies cooperated and assisted in enforcement of the evacuation program pri¬ marily by reporting promptly any and all cases of failure to comply with Exclusion Orders. To insure the closest working relationship between Western Defense Command and the enforcement agencies of the Department of Jus¬ tice, preliminary understandings for collaboration were embodied in a memo¬ randum from the Commanding General to the Assistant Secretary of War dated April 20, 1942. (Appendix (5) to Chapter VI.) The cooperation of the participating Federal agencies, and the high devo¬ tion to duty displayed by all of their personnel was outstanding. The will¬ ingness of all concerned to apply themselves to the task without regard to personal convenience, or to the hours of duty, cannot be left unmentioned. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VI Appendix 1 "Mr. Laurence I. Hewes, Jr., Regional Director 15 March 1942 Farm Security Administration 30 Van Ness Avenue San Francisco, California "Dear Mr. Flewes: "By virtue of and pursuant to the authority vested in me as Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, and in order to effectuate the removal of any enemy aliens and other persons designated by me, engaged in farming operations who evacuate from restricted and prohibited areas lying within my command, you are hereby ordered and authorized as follows: “1. To institute and administer a program which will insure continuation of the proper use of agricultural lands voluntarily vacated by enemy aliens and other persons designated by me, and which will insure fair and equitable ar¬ rangements between the evacuees and the operators of their property. "2. To incur the necessary administrative expenses, including the payment of personnel and necessary traveling expenses to be reimbursed by me upon pres¬ entation of reimbursement vouchers. "3. From funds made available or to be made available by me, to make, ser¬ vice and collect loans, including the provision of necessary farm management advice and guidance. "4. To redelegate to such officers and employees of the Farm Security Ad¬ ministration as you may designate, any part of the authority herein contained. "Sincerely yours, /s/ J. L. DeWitt J. L. DeWitt, Lieutennant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.” THE EVACUATION 57 METHOD March 27, 1942 MEMORANDUM For Mr. Larry I. Hewes, Farm Security Administration Subject: Exercise of freezing power of agricultural property. 1. I have been directed by the Commanding General to advise you as follows: 2. After extended consideration of your mission and the problems attendant upon its accomplishment, it has been concluded that there is necessity for a revision in the method and circumstances wherein the freezing power is now exercised. 3. In your relationship with the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, you are regarded as a representative of the Department of Agriculture, and I understand from my conversations with you that, in the accomplishment of the mission assigned the Department, you, as its representative, are employing all of the available departmental agencies. In this connection, I further understand that the Ag¬ ricultural War Boards established in each county by order of the Secretary of Agriculture, have a membership comprising a repesentative of evey agency of the Department of Agriculture. 4. The primary mission imposed upon the Commanding General is accomplishment of the evacuation in satisfaction of military necessity. In the accomplishment of his mission, he has prescribed that it shall be carried out (a) with a minimum loss in agricultural production consistent with prompt execution, and (b) with a maximum of fair dealing to all concerned. In the latter case, protection of the property interests of evacuees and avoidance, so far as practicable, of economic dislocation are major phases of the pre¬ scribed method. 5. In responding to the request of the Commanding General to the Secretary of War, the Agriculture Department has therefore accepted the mission of performing the following: (a) To do everything reasonably necessary to prevent any crop loss subse¬ quent upon evacuation and to reduce to a minimum the spoilage or loss of growing crops; (b) To assist the evacuee in providing a substitute tenant or operator and at the same time to preserve the evacuee’s equity to the fullest practicable extent consistent with the circumstances in each case; (c) If necessary to take over and operate property where, in the absence of such action, growing crops would be neglected or abandoned or where the evacuee’s equity, though of reasonable substance, would otherwise deteriorate. . 6 In order to accomplish these objectives it is essential that the power to "freeze” agricultural property, crops, farm implements and agricultural equipment, lease-hold interests, be readily available for application in cases of necessity. 7. As the Agricultural War Boards have been organized in each county, it must follow that such Boards are familiar with local problems and conditions. They also have the personnel available to make prompt investigation and recommendation upon the rec¬ ommendation of the Farm Security field agent. I therefore propose that the "freezing” powers necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives stated be applied only upon the recommendation of the appropriate county War Board; that such boards be the final arbiter as to whether or not the power to freeze be exercised in any given case. 8. In this way, the action taken to "freeze” in any instance will represent the considered judgment of all agricultural agencies. It is immaterial to me whether the agency empowered to “freeze” on such recommendation is the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, one of its member banks or agencies, or whether it is the field agent of the Farm Security Administration. 9. I am furnishing a copy of this memorandum to Mr. William H. Hale, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco; Mr. Milton Eisenhower, War Relocation Authority; Mr. Ed Dodd, Director, Western Division, Department of Agriculture; and Mr. Dave Davidson, chair¬ man, California War Board. Concurrently I am recommending to the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, that he approve the program 58 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST outlined and that in furtherance of your mission, where property is "frozen” and op¬ erated by your Agency, funds be made available for such operation, as for the hiring of operators and for the purchase of feed and seed, etc. Karl R. Bendetsen, Colonel, G. S. C., Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs, Directing, WCCA. Copies to: Mr. Wm. H. Hale Mr. Milton Eisenhower Mr. Ed Dodd Mr. Dave Davidson Appendix 2 "14 MARCH 1942 "CHIEF OF STAFF "WAR DEPARTMENT "WASHINGTON, D. C. "ORDERLY ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MISSION ASSIGNED ME UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER NINE NAUGHT SIX SIX DATED FEBRUARY NINE¬ TEEN COMMA NINETEEN FORTY TWO BY LETTER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR DATED FEBRUARY TWENTY COMMA NINETEEN FORTY TWO RENDERS IMPERATIVE THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR THE MAK¬ ING OF CROP LOANS IN ORDER TO AVOID THE LOSS OF GROWING CROPS PLANTED BY JAPANESE FARMS WHO WILL BE EXCLUDED FROM THE PACIFIC COASTAL FRONTIER STOP SUCH FUNDS ARE NEEDED FOR SPRAYING AND FOR FINANCING OPERATIONS BY PERSONS PRO¬ CURED TO SUBSTITUTE AS FARM OPERATORS IN THE PLACE OF EVAC¬ UEES STOP THE STIMULUS OF VOLUNTARY EVACUATION ON THE PART OF AFFECTED GROUPS WILL BE GREATLY ENHANCED IF AN ALLOT¬ MENT OF FUNDS FROM THE CHIEF OF STAFFS CONTINGENT FUND OR THE PRESIDENTS EMERGENCY FUND IS MADE FOR THIS PURPOSE STOP OFFICERS OF THE FARM CREDIT AND FARM SECURITY ADMINISTRA¬ TION COMMA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE COMMA WORKING IN COLLABORATION WITH THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ARE UNDER¬ TAKING TO MAKE LOANS IN PROPER CASES AND TO ESTABLISH A MEANS FOR SECURITY AND REPAYMENT ON A SUITABLE BASIS STOP THIS MATTER HAS ALREADY BEEN REFERRED INFORMALLY TO GEN¬ ERAL BROWN COMMA BUDGET OFFICER FOR THE WAR DEPARTMENT STOP PRIORITY ACTION IS URGENTLY REQUESTED. "DeWITT "COMDG WDC AND FOURTH ARMY” Appendix 3 "March 11, 1942 "Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, "San Francisco, California. "Sirs: "By virtue of orders issued by the War Department on December 11, 1941, the entire Pacific Coast of the United States was established as the Western Defense Command and designated as a theatre of operations under my command. "By Executive Order No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, the President of the United States authorized and directed the Secretary of War and the military com¬ manders whom he may from time to time designate to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate military commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to THE EVACUATION 59 METHOD which the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave, shall be subject to what¬ ever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate military commander may impose in his discretion. "The Secretary of War, on February 20, 1942, designated the undersigned as the military commander to carry out the duties and responsibilities imposed by said Executive Order for that portion of the United States embraced in the Western Defense Command. "On March 2, 1942, pursuant to authority vested in me, I issued Public Proclama¬ tion No. zones. 1, under which I designated and established certain military areas and It is my intention, by subsequent proclamations, to exclude certain persons and classes of persons from all of Military Area No. 1, and also from such of those zones described in said Public Proclamation No. 1 as Zones A-2 to A-99 inclusive as are within Military Area No. 2. The evacuees will include Japanese, German and Italian aliens and persons of Japanese ancestry now resident in Military Area No. 1. I am familiar with the contemplated program dealing with the problem of evacuees and I find that the prompt execution of such a program is essential to the successful prosecution of the war and the performance of my duty under Executive Order No. 9066. Accordingly, I hereby authorize and direct you to take all steps which in your judgment are necessary or desirable in order to carry out the objective of the program. "You are authorized and requested to employ such personnel and set up such offices within the Western Defense Command as you may consider advisable, necessary or expedient for the purpose of carrying out the program of dealing with the property interests of said evacuees. You are further authorized to employ such personnel and appoint such sub-agents as you may see fit in connection therewith. "You will be reimbursed for all necessary and proper expenses incurred in con¬ nection with the carrying out of this program. Furthermore, you are directed to perform any and all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of this pro¬ gram, and as such you are, of course, entitled to be reimbursed for all necessary and proper expenses and obligations arising out of such agency, for which under law such an agent would be entitled to reimbursement. "It is understood that in executing the foregoing no warranty of my authority is included nor is any personal liability imposed upon or assumed by the undersigned. "Very truly yours, “J. L. DeWitt, "Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.” "April 5, 1942 "Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, "San Francisco, California. "Sirs: , "Reference is made to my letter dated March 11 1942, addressed to you, in which I authorize and direct you to take all steps which in your judgment are nec¬ essary or desirable in order to carry out the objective of the program dealing with the problem of evacuees from Military Area No. 1, as designated and established in my Public Proclamation No. 1, dated March 2, 1942. "Last week the Congress of the United States enacted and on March 21, 1942, the President of the United States approved Public Law, No. 503, 77th Congress, under the terms of which whomsoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area or any military zone prescribed, under the authority of an execu¬ tive order of the President, by the Secretary of War, or by any military commander designated by the Secretary of War, contrary to the restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any such military commander, shall, if it appears that he knew or should have known of the existence and extent of the restrictions or order and that this act was in violation thereof, 60 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be subject to certain penalties stated therein. "Accordingly, by virtue of the additional authority vested in me by said Public Law, No. 503, 77th Congress, approved by the President of the United States on March 21, 1942, as well as by virtue of all other authority vested in me by Execu¬ tive Order No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, the orders and designation issued by the Secretary of War on February 20, 1942, designating the undersigned as a Military Commander to carry out the duties and responsibilities embodied by said Executive Order No. 9066 for that portion of the United States embraced within the Western Defense Command, and pursuant to all other authority vested in me, I hereby authorize and direct you to continue to take all steps which in your judg¬ ment are necessary or desirable in order to carry out the objectives of the program dealing with the problem of evacuees from the Western Defense Command and par¬ ticularly Military Area No. 1, embraced therein. "Very truly yours, "J. L. DeWitt, “Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.” Appendix 4 "March 31, 1942 “Federal Security Agency, "785 Market Street, "San Francisco, California. “Attention: Mr. Richard M. Neustadt: “Dear Mr. Neustadt: "Under authority of the Executive Order of the President, No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, your Agency has been assigned certain functions and duties by me, to be performed in aid of the program for evacuation of German, Italian and Japanese enemy aliens and persons of Japanese ancestry, from strategic zones within the military areas established by my Public Proclamation No. 1, dated March 2, 1942, and Public Proclamation No. 2, dated March 16, 1942. "Subject to my directions and instructions and in accordance with approved poli¬ cies, your Agency is authorized and directed to incur obligations and make expenditures from any funds available to it in carrying out the duties and functions assigned. In this connection it is desired that you submit, for approval, without delay, a budget estimate of your funds requirements to May 1, 1942, broken down in such detail as is practicable at the present time. "Payment for obligations incurred or funds expended under the approved budget esti¬ mate will be made from funds subject to my control and allocation. “Yours very truly, "J. L. DeWitt, "Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.” Appendix 5 "At a conference in my office during the afternoon of April 20, 1942, attended by Mr. Tom C. Clark, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, Mr. Nat L. Pieper, Special Agent in Charge, San Francisco office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Brig¬ adier-General J. L. Bradley, Chief of Staff, Colonel Joel F. Watson, Judge Advocate, Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen, Assistant Chief of Staff, the following procedure, predi¬ cated upon correspondence exchanged between your office and the Assistant to the Attorney General, governing procedure and liaison between the War Department, the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, and the Depart¬ ment of Justice, was agreed upon: THE "1. (a) EVACUATION 61 METHOD All orders and proclamations issued by me pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order of the President, No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, as the Mili¬ tary Commander designated by the Secretary of War by letter dated March 20, 1942, to carry out the provisions of the cited Executive Order, involving enforcement of the penalties provided by Public Law No. 503, 77th Congress, approved March 20, 1942, will be transmitted to the Assistant Secretary of War by telephone or tele¬ graph for clearance with the Assistant to the Attorney General, Mr. James Rowe, Jr. The Department of Justice has indicated that it will respond with all practicable dispatch and that upon clearance of such orders and proclamations it will undertake enforcement of the penalties provided by the cited law. Thereafter, in the case of any such approved proclamation or order, direct communication between the local Department of Justice representative, viz., Mr. Tom C. Clark (or whomever may be so designated by the Justice Department) Attorneys, will be authorized. "(b) for the several United States District The present form of general exclusion order and general supporting instruc¬ tions employed in effectuating the evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry having been approved will not be so submitted. Any necessary enforcement of the penalties provided by the cited Statute in connection with evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry under such exclusion orders and supporting instructions will be undertaken by the Department of Justice. For local operational purposes, Sector Commanders are authorized to communicate directly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Special Agent in Charge, for the District in which evacuation projects are entrained. Similar direct communication with the appropriate District Attorney is also author¬ ized. Warning notices of impending exclusion orders and copies of the exclusion order will, in each case, be transmitted to Mr. Nat L. Pieper, Special Agent in Charge, San Francisco office, for communication to other Federal Bureau of Investi¬ gation Special Agents in Charge and to local police. Similar material will be fur¬ nished Mr. Tom C. Clark for transmission by his office to the appropriate District Attorneys and the United States Marshals. Mr. Clark will also continue to under¬ take to keep the Department of Justice fully informed as to progress of evacuation as reflected by the copies of warning memoranda and exclusion orders furnished him. "(c) The form of individual exclusion order is currently being submitted to your office for transmission to Mr. Rose in accordance with the arrangement. Upon approval of the form and substance of the individual exclusion order, it is the under¬ standing that the Department of Justice will undertake any necessary enforcement of the penalties provided by Public Law No. 503, supra. Once the form and substance of the individual exclusion order has been approved it is understood that no further clearance with the Department of Justice will be necessary, and that individual exclusion orders may be issued without further reference to the Department of Jus¬ tice. Communication to arrange the necessary enforcement of such individual exclu¬ sion orders, as presently understood, will be through Mr. Nat L. Pieper, Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, but should any Court proceedings develop, local liaison will be through Mr. Tom C. Clark, Special Assistant to the Attorney General. "2. On the basis of current understandings the procedure outlined above will be followed. It is requested, however, that confirmation of the Department of Justice be obtained as soon as practicable. "/s/ J. L. DeWitt, "J. L. DeWitt, "Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.” PART III EVACUATION—THE MECHANICS FOR ITS ACCOMPLISHMENT CHAPTER YII Organization and Functions of Civil Affairs Division, General Staff, and Wartime Civil Control Administration and Other Agencies During the period up to and including March 2, 1942, the date on which Public Proclamation No. 1 was announced, there was no single section of the general or special staff of Headquarters Western Defense Command charged with the formulation of policies, plans, and directives pertaining to civil control. Dur¬ ing most of this time the Commanding General gave extensive personal attention to all aspects of internal security in addition to the manifold tactical responsibili¬ ties imposed upon him. In the preparation of the bases for Proclamations Nos. 1 and 2, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 of the General Staff in collaboration with the Staff Judge Advocate carried the primary burden. The Commanding General had called for the recommendations of the Sector Commanders and of the Commanding Generals of the Air Forces and Ninth Service Command (then Ninth Corps Area) con¬ cerning those areas and installations which they regarded as particularly sensi¬ tive. Much material was submitted in connection with these recommendations. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 analyzed, evaluated, and organized these recom¬ mendations. The direct result of this endeavor laid the basis for the designation by the Commanding General of Military Areas No. 1 and No. 2 and the pro¬ hibited zones therein. In the field of alien control, that is to say, the custody and processing of male internees, the Provost Marshal was the special staff officer whose duties embraced these functions. However, as the special adviser to the Commanding General regarding military police activities throughout Western Defense Com¬ mand, and as the officer responsible for the conduct of the countless investi¬ gations required to clear civilian personnel for duty with the military estab¬ lishment, his duties were pressing and confining. The tactical responsibilities which then confronted the four sections of the General Staff in executing the Commanding General’s directives regarding the training, tactical dispositions, and supply of the substantial military forces within Western Defense Command and Alaska Defense Command were ex¬ tensive. These, together with the problems involved in the development of plans for the joint defense of the West Coast, initially between the Canadian forces and later the Mexican forces and our own, as well as between the United States land and naval forces, were such that their energies were wholly consumed. The requirements, ramifications, and the complex inter-dependent aspects of the program demanded the centralization in one staff agency, under the Commanding General, of full responsibility for the conduct and supervision of the Commanding General’s directives in the civil control field. As military necessity required drastic action, so was it essential to make unusual pro¬ vision. This, added to the fact that the Army was suddenly confronted with 65 JAPANESE 66 EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST full responsibility for immediate action in fields normally occupied by civilian agencies, and in new and unprecedented fields, made necessary the creation of a fifth section of the general staff. Although it is contemplated that the creation of a staff section charged with responsibility for civil affairs would be done only where military forces are in actual occupation of enemy territory or in other cases involving full military government, a novel and unexpected situation here confronted the Commanding General. Accordingly, on March 10, 1942, by General Order No. 34, "The Civil Affairs Division of the General Staff of Western Defense Command and Fourth Army” was created. In addition to any other responsibilities and duties which might be assigned him and "within the directives and general policies of the Commanding General,” the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs was made fully responsible for the "formulation of policies, plans and directives” pertaining to "control and exclusion of civilians.” Notwithstanding the multiple responsibilities devolving upon the entire staff, augmented especially by the creation of a new staff agency, the necessity for a smoothly functioning headquarters became increasingly important. The Chief of Staff coordinated the varying staff functions to the end that the Com¬ manding General’s directives were executed. In order to provide adequately for facile execution of the program, a new agency of Headquarters Western Defense Command was created, and desig¬ nated as the Civil Affairs Division. It was given broad responsibilities and placed under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs. Being a General Staff Division, the Civil Affairs Division was a planning agency. To execute the directives and to administer the plans of the Civil Affairs Division, the Commanding General upon March 11, 1942, by General Order No. 3 5 estab¬ lished the Wartime Civil Control Administration. By its terms the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs was made responsible for, “the organization, estab¬ lishment and direction of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army.” Except as otherwise discharged by direc¬ tive of the Commanding General, the Wartime Civil Control Administration was in turn made responsible for, "the execution of the duties and responsibilities im¬ posed upon the Commanding General, Western Defense Command by the Secre¬ tary of War in designating him, on February 20, 1942, as the Military Com¬ mander to carry out the duties and responsibilities imposed by Executive Order No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, for that portion of the United States em¬ braced in Western Defense Command.” Thus the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs performed a dual function. As a General Staff officer and agent of the Commanding General for Civil Affairs, he was empowered to issue appropriate directives pertaining to the control and exclusion of civilians in the name of the Commanding General. As Director of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, he was authorized to carry such directives into execution. During the pre-evacuation period and particularly during that phase which involved the exclusion of enemy aliens from the 99 prohibited zones estab- ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF 67 AGENCIES lished in California by the Attorney General, Mr. Tom C. Clark, a special assistant to the Attorney General in charge of the Anti-Trust Division on the Pacific Coast, had coordinated the Justice Department’s program in this regard. As the evacuation program was to involve the active participa¬ tion of many Federal civilian agencies, by arrangement between the Depart¬ ment of Justice and the Commanding General, Mr. Clark’s services were retained as the coordinator of these agencies under the direction of the War¬ time Civil Control Administration. He functioned in this capacity until some time in May when duties in Washington required his withdrawal from this activity. A permanent allotment of four officers was accorded the Civil Affairs Division, General Staff. The operating staff of the Wartime Civil Control Admin¬ istration was drawn from among officers available to the Western Defense Com¬ mand and assigned to Wartime Civil Control Administration on a temporary duty status. As the Commanding General’s directive was to reduce to a mini¬ mum the use of military personnel, the major portion of the Wartime Civil Con¬ trol Administration staff was civilian. A maximum of 45 officers and 12 enlisted men comprised the military personnel. The Commanding General directed that Sector Commanders order officers assigned to them to report to Headquarters Western Defense Command for duty with Wartime Civil Control Administra¬ tion. Acting under pressure, the G-l section of the General Staff obtained suit¬ ably qualified officers for this duty in a minimum time. Within the day follow¬ ing the request officers began to report for this duty. At the peak of evacuation and Assembly Center operations the civilian personnel of the Wartime Civil Control Administration totaled 269 at head¬ quarters and 1,660 in the field, an aggregate of 1,929. on the administrative staff of the Of these 762 served 15 Assembly Centers and the Manzanar Reception Center, and 319 were engaged as interior security police within Assembly Centers. The remainder of the personnel comprised the teams which operated the 48 Wartime Civil Control Administration Service Centers and the many Civil Control Stations. The Wartime Civil Control Administration was organized into divisions and branches embracing every aspect of planning, administration, and opera¬ tions. The Inspection Property, Security, and Fiscal, and Regulations Administrative, Evacuation and Temporary Settlement Divisions were headed by military officers. Operations, Operations The Statistical and Public Rela¬ tions Divisions were headed by civilian experts except for that period between March 11 and September 14, 1942, when the Public Relations Division was headed by a military officer. Figure 3 represents the organization of the Civil Affairs Division, General Staff, and the Wartime Civil Control Administration during the evacuation period. When all persons of Japanese ancestry had been evacuated, the organ¬ ization was revised to reflect the cessation of this phase of activities. The Evacuation Operations Division was eliminated, and responsibility for developing and supervising the logistics of transfer of evacuees, their impedimenta, supplies, and equipment from Assembly to Relocation Centers became essentially the re- ORGANIZATION CHART OF CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION AND WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION 68 EVACUATION PERIOD JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Figure 3 ORGANIZATION CHART OF CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION AND WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION POST-EVACUATION PERIOD ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF AGENCIES 69 Figure 4 70 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST ponsibility of the Temporary Settlement Operations Division, renamed the "Op¬ erations Division.” Figure 4 is the organization chart of Civil Affairs Division and Wartime Civil Control Administration during the post-evacuation period. The principal functions of the Wartime Civil Control Administration were: (1) Determination of all necessary requirements for the orderly accom¬ (2) The determination of all evacuation logistics. (3) The general supervision of all plishment of evacuation and Assembly Center operations. aspects of evacuation operations, evacuee property protection, social service and medical and hospital care. (4) The preparation of directives required for the accomplishment of all aspects of the program. Where such directives were for issu¬ ance by the Commanding General, i. e. where their execution was to be accomplished by an Army agency, they were prepared and issued in the name of the Commanding General by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs. Where such directives were for execution by the Wartime Civil Control Administration or by one of the par¬ ticipating Federal agencies, they were issued and published by author¬ ity of the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration. (5) Public information and relations inclusive of the preparation, print¬ ing, and distribution of all public proclamations, civilian exclusion orders, and instructions. (6) The administration and operation of Assembly Centers including internal security. (7) The supervision of Assembly and Relocation Center construction (8) The determination of all logistics relating to the transfer of evac¬ through the agency of the United States Engineer Corps. uees from Assembly to Relocation Centers. (9) The general supervision of all such transfer operations. (10) The administration of evacuation exemptions and deferments. During evacuation operations, the Commanding Generals of the several sectors of Western Defense Command were responsible to the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, for the following: (1) The execution of his directives for escort of each movement of evacuees from the Civil Control Stations in each exclusion area to the prescribed Assembly Center destination. (2) Establishment of security measures at each Civil Control Station and the issuance of any necessary evacuee travel permits and defer¬ ments from evacuation—including security measures during move¬ ment. (3) External security of each Assembly Center. (4) Posting of notices of exclusion and instruction placards in each exclusion area. (5) The escort of each prescribed evacuee transfer unit from Assembly to indicated Relocation Center destination. ORGANIZATION In order to facilitate AND FUNCTIONS OF 71 AGENCIES the evacuation operations by keeping constantly informed of the location, extent, and evacuee population in each exclusion area, each sector had a liaison officer at Wartime Civil Control Administration. By this arrangement Sector Commanders were fully and currently advised of the situation and of the prescribed sequence of evacuation. Similarly, each participating Federal agency had a liaison section at Wartime Civil Control Administration. This assured close coordination, and served as the administrative channel from the Director, Wartime Civil Control Admin¬ istration, to each such agency. It is pertinent to note in passing that representatives from the War Depart¬ ment as well as from observed the operation. Eastern and Southern Defense Commands closely The Assistant Secretary of War was in daily tele¬ phonic liaison and personally inspected the activities on the ground. The Bureau of Public Relations, War Department, sent a liaison officer to study the execution of the program and to inform the War Department of its aspects. The Inspector General of the Army and The Provost Marshal Gen¬ eral each personally viewed the operation. In addition, the Quartermaster General sent subsistence specialists to each Assembly Center to report on the adequacy of messing with special emphasis on dietetics. At the request of the Secretary of War, the American Red Cross instituted a comprehensive study of all aspects. By arrangement with the War Department, the State Department sent representatives in company with members of the Spanish Embassy (the latter represented Japanese Government interests in the United States) to visit each Assembly Center. The evacuation tempo depended largely upon the availability of troops to act as convoy escorts and to provide Assembly Center external security. The demand for troops during this period of sudden Army expansion was par¬ ticularly heavy. Close coordination was maintained between the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. Notwith¬ standing these heavy demands, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 was able to provide the necessary escort troops and guard companies to insure maintenance of the prescribed schedule without a single interruption. The Quartermaster, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, under the supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, was responsible for obtaining the supplies and equipment (other than medical and hospital, and other than Assem¬ bly and Relocation Center fixtures) for Assembly Centers. The requirements were determined and prescribed by Wartime Civil Control Administration. After these requirements had been determined by the Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬ tration, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs approved them for the Com¬ manding General and transmitted them to the Quartermaster for necessary action through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. Thousands of utensils, dishes, cots, and blankets were procured with dispatch and were started rolling from the supply depots to the prescribed Centers. Later, when evacuees were trans¬ ferred from Assembly to Relocation Centers, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 supervised the organization by the Quartermaster of supply teams which 72 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST crated, packed, and shipped messing and barrack equipment from each evacu¬ ated Assembly Center to the Relocation Center or Centers next to receive trans¬ fer increments, in accordance with the Wartime Civil Control Administration logistical plan. In addition, the Quartermaster supervised, through Army central market¬ ing, procurement of subsistence. The stores and perishables acquired were in accordance with the prescribed quantities and diets developed by Wartime Civil Control Administration to meet the peculiar needs of the populations in¬ volved. The Quartermaster was also responsible for obtaining all necessary rail and bus transportation for evacuee movements prescribed, not only to Assembly Centers but from Assembly to Relocation Centers. To recapitulate then, the supply agencies of Western Defense Command functioned in this manner: The Wartime Civil Control Administration deter¬ mined all supply requirements and logistics. These were transmitted to the Assis¬ tant Chief of Staff, G-4. Under the direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, was responsible through the Quartermaster, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, as the operating supply agency for the following: (1) The procurement of subsistence for Assembly Centers, including the procuring of stores and perishables, in accordance with the pre¬ scribed quantities and diets developed by Wartime Civil Control Admin¬ istration to meet the peculiar needs of the populations involved. (2) Transfer of surplus subsistence supplies from Assembly Centers and providing an initial 10-day non-perishable subsistence for War Reloca¬ tion Authority projects. (3) The procurement of Quartermaster supplies and equipment requisi¬ tioned by Wartime Civil Control Administration such as utensils, dishes, cots and blankets for Assembly Centers (other than medical and hospital and other than Assembly and Relocation Center fixtures). (4) Procurement of initial motor transportation required in the opera¬ tion of Assembly Centers and additions as requested, together with their maintenance. (5) Arrangements for burial contracts for each Assembly Center, in¬ cluding provisions for undertaking and interment facilities. (6) The handling of army salvage operations through appropriate sup¬ ply depots. (7) The organization of supply teams to handle crating, packing and shipping of all Quartermaster property, such as messing and bar¬ racks equipment, from Assembly Centers to Relocation Centers. (8) Obtaining movements the rail and prescribed, bus not transportation necessary for evacuee only Assembly to Relocation Centers. to Assembly Centers but from ORGANIZATION (9) AND FUNCTIONS OF AGENCIES 73 In addition, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 and the Quartermaster, Western Defense Command, inspected each Assembly Center at the commencement of operations to determine whether the Quartermaster supplies and equipment procured had been received in good order. In many instances, the pressure of evacuation required emergency pro¬ curement of supplies, equipment and materials, particularly for Assembly Center maintenance, through other than Army channels. Close working liai¬ son was established between this Headquarters and the branch office of the Army-Navy Munitions Board in San Francisco. The War Department rep¬ resentative in charge of the San Francisco office promptly met Wartime Civil Control Administration emergency requirements in this regard by according the necessary priority ratings. The Provost Marshal, Western Defense Command, made continuing inspec¬ tions of the Military Police escort guard companies at each Assembly Center to determine whether the Commanding General’s directives were being properly executed with regard to external security. The relationship between Military Police and the evacuees under their guard was particularly delicate. Military Police personnel unsuited to duty of this trying character were replaced by others. Appropriate directives to the commanding officers of military police escort guard companies were developed to insure that there was no misunderstanding with regard to the responsibility imposed on guard companies for the maintenance of external security. In order to make a photographic record of the evacuation, through an arrangement with the Chief Signal Officer, two Signal Corps moving picture photographic teams were assigned from the Signal Corps laboratory at Mon¬ mouth, New Jersey, to Headquarters Western Defense Command for duty with the Wartime Civil Control Administration. A complete photographic record was obtained of every phase of evacuation operations. A communications net tied Wartime Civil Control Administration by TWX (teletype) and telephone with each Assembly Center. Each Center had its own switching central trained and trusted to handle confidential, as well as routine messages. This system was in operation, as was Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬ tration, twenty-four hours per day, continuously during the entire program. Even minor incidents occurring at any Center were immediately relayed to Wartime Civil Control Administration. The Signal Officer, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, procured and supervised the installation of this signal system. Hospital and infirmary medical supplies and equipment were procured in part by the Surgeon, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. In all matters relating to the health and medical care of evacuees, the Surgeon col¬ laborated with the United States Public Health Service. Under general supervi¬ sion of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, the latter agency had the pri¬ mary responsibility in all these matters. But the counsel and guidance of the Surgeon were freely sought and given. In the main, however, the procurement of 74 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST medical supplies and services was the function of the United States Public Health Service. In furnishing the administrative staffs for Assembly Center operations, the Work Projects Administration also made its procurement and fiscal facilities available to Wartime Civil Control Administration. By direct transfer of funds appropriated for the military establishment to the accounts of Work Projects Administration, the procurement of stocks for Center canteens and stores, and of materials for Assembly Center maintenance and repair was arranged. United States Treasury procurement entered this arrangement and by this method neces¬ sary Assembly Center motor transportation, office equipment and supplies, and all emergency purchases were procured. As previously noted, Wartime Civil Control Administration procured its headquarters office space, personnel, equipment, and services through the Division of Central Administration Services of the Office for Emergency Management. The pressure of events was such that emergency methods were essential to suc¬ cessful operations. For instance, the acquisition of printing without delay was a major requirement, particularly during evacuation operations. Evacuee property protection, business, personal, residential, and agricul¬ tural, was the mission of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and the Farm Security Administration. Provision for necessary social and medical services was the operating responsibility of the associated Federal Security Agencies. The application of sanctions for violations of the exclusion orders of the Commanding General was the duty of the Department of Justice through enforcement of the provisions of Public Law 503, 77th Congress, and through the making of necessary investigations. Thus, the Wartime Civil Control Administration performed its functions in a two-fold manner: First, indirectly, through other operating agencies on the basis of requirements determined by it and, second, directly, through its own staff at headquarters and in the field. Again, the reader’s attention is drawn to Figures 3 and 4, supra, showing the organization of Wartime Civil Control Administration and its relationship to other agencies. PART IV EVACUATION—ITS OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUE CHAPTER VIII Development and Execution of the Evacuation Plan The general plan for the evacuation and relocation of Japanese from the West Coast developed rapidly after the authority was granted for the decision that an evacuation of the Japanese population from coastal areas was a military necessity. The mission was clear cut: To devise and operate an evacuation and temporary settlement plan which would remove substantial numbers of people from strategic areas rapidly and safely, and with as little disturbance and loss as practicable to the evacuees and the coastal communities. No precedents existed in American life. factory for many reasons. European precedents were unsatis¬ Therefore, the Army was faced with the problem of designing a new type of civilian evacuation which would accomplish the mission in a truly American way. The present chapter outlines the evacuation and temporary settlement plan designed to meet this problem. Later chapters of this report recount its actual operation in detail. Several very fundamental decisions were made at the outset of the program which were to guide the evacuation along quite different lines than had been followed in the military evacuation of areas in European countries: First, it was determined that the areas to be evacuated would be handled so far as possible in the order of their relative military importance. Exclusion Order No. Bremerton Navy Yard. 1 covered Bainbridge Island, in the channel Thus, to the Orders No. 2 and No. 3 removed Japanese from San Pedro, Long Beach and other areas in Los Angeles County. (The Japanese had been evacuated from Terminal Island prior to the initiation of the program.) Order No. 4 covered the City and most of the County of San Diego. Order No. 5 removed the Japanese from most dock areas and the water front of San Francisco. Second, it was determined that the evacuation would not split family units or communities where this could be avoided. In certain foreign countries the evacua¬ tion of a civilian population had proceeded as follows: First, dangerous adult males and females—those suspected of subversive activities—were removed to intern¬ ment camps; and second, all other males of military age were sent to special labor camps. of the family. Women and children were often separated from the remainder This method removes the normal economic support of the family and forces it to dissipate its resources. This in turn creates a community prob¬ lem of dependency, and disrupts the entire organization of the family. Of only slightly less significance than the decision to evacuate entire family units, was the decision to move communities together so far as this was possi¬ ble under the pressure of the program. Thus, the Japanese of Seattle were all sent to the Puyallup Assembly Center and later to the Minidoka Relocation Center; those from the San Francisco-Oakland Area were temporarily placed in Tanforan and later moved to Central Utah, etc. The basic principle of maintaining communities was adopted to maintain a natural community and 77 78 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST economic balance and to preserve desirable institutions by moving each family with its relatives and friends. Third, it was determined that the program should entail a minimum of financial loss to the evacuees; that all possible advice and assistance be available to (but not forced upon) evacuees. The property protection activities of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and the Farm Security Administration under the direction of the Commanding General, are reported in detail in Chapter XI. Fourth, it was desired that a minimum of active military units and other military personnel be used in the program; that, instead, the evacuation should be accomplished as far as practicable by civilian personnel, making full use of Federal and State civilian agency facilities. As indicated above, the Wartime Civil Control Administration was created to plan, direct and finance the evacuation program. At no time was its staff sufficiently large to perform all of the operating func¬ tions involved in the evacuation. Troops were used only for security purposes in Civil Control Stations, as escorts for bus and train movements, and for external security at Assembly Centers. Fifth, it was desired that the evacuated population not only be removed to areas outside of the critical military area as rapidly as practicable, but also to locations where the evacuees could be relatively self-supporting for the duration. Steps were immediately taken to find suitable Reception Centers, such as Manzanar. With the establishment of the War Relocation Authority to handle the relocation of evacuees, the Army made its facilities fully available to this agency. (See Chapters XX to XXII.) Sixth, it was concluded that evacuation and relocation could not be accom¬ plished simultaneously. for a transitory phase. This was the heart of the plan. It entailed provision It called for the establishment of Assembly Centers at or near each center of evacuee population. These Centers were to be designed to provide shelter and messing facilities and the minimum essentials for the maintenance of health and morale. all. This was the most significant decision of Without this, accomplishment of the assigned mission and attainment of the incidental objective stated above would have been impossible. It is pertinent to allude briefly to the reason for the use of Assembly Centers. This was because the program would have been seriously delayed if all evacua¬ tion had been forced to await the development of Relocation Centers. The initial movement of evacuees to an Assembly Center as close as possible to the area of origin also aided the program (a) by reducing the initial travel; (b) by keeping evacuees close to their places of former residence for a brief period while prop¬ erty matters and family arrangements which had not been completed prior to evacuation could be settled; and (c) by acclimating the evacuees to the group life of a Center in their own climatic region. Evacuation planning was conditioned by statistical data as to the number of Japanese, their location and characteristics. In this regard the Bureau of the Census was very helpful, supplying considerable statistical data, and technicians to interpret it. (Only those statistics which had an immediate, over-all influence on the procedure are presented in this chapter. More detailed data are given in 79 DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF EVACUATION PLAN Chapter XXVIII.) Of prime importance in shaping the evacuation procedure were the following facts derived principally from the 1940 Census of Population. a. Of the 126,947 persons of Japanese ancestry in the United States in April, 1940, 117,364, or 92.5 percent, lived in the eight states com¬ prising the Western Defense Command. California had 93,717 Japanese; Washington 14,565 ; and Oregon, 4,071. Together, these three states contained 112,353, or 88.5 percent, of all Japanese in continental United States. b. (See Figures 5a and 5b.) Within the Western Defense Command the distribution of the Japanese population by specific Military Areas and States, as shown in Figure 1, Chapter II, is given in Table 1. important Military Area No. It will be noted that the strategically 1 had a total Japanese population of 107,704, which was 84.6 percent of the total Japanese population of the United States. TABLE 1.—Japanese Population of the Western Defense Command Area by States and Military Areas: 1940 State Total, WDC Area. Source: Military Area 1 Military Area 2 Military Areas 3-6 117,364 107,704 5,281 4,379 632 93,717 4,071 14,565 1,191 508 470 2,210 362 89,483 3,843 14,016 270 4,234 228 549 All Areas 1,191 508 470 2,210 Bureau of the Census c. Within Military Area No. 1 there were particularly heavy concentrations in or at the edge of almost all the important cities, particularly the port cities. This is clearly shown in Figure 6. In Los Angeles County alone there were 3 6,866 Japanese. In the immediate San Francisco Bay Area (San Francisco, Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Mateo, Solano, and Sonoma Counties) there were 14,362 Japanese, and in the ring of near-by counties to the northeast, east, and south (Sacramento, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, San Joaquin, and Yolo Counties) lived an additional 17,685 Japanese. San Diego city and county had 2,076; King and Pierce Counties, Washington (Seattle and Tacoma), 11,913; and Multnomah County, Oregon (Portland), 2,390. Thus, even within Military Area No. 1, 67,607 of the 107,704 total Japanese population lived in or near the five principal cities and ports of embarkation. 80 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION JAPANESE POPULATION UNITED STATES: 1940 FIGURES SUMMARY: PROPORTION PACIFIC COAST IN THOUSANDS OF JAPANESE STATES AND IN DEFENSE COMMAND PACIFIC COAST STATES (WASHINGTON, OREGON POPULATION IN ENTIRE WESTERN AREA. AND CALIFORNI WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AREA (WASH, ORE., CALIF., ARIZ., IDAHO, NEV., MONT. AND UTAH, WESTERN OCrCNSC COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION SOURCE' US. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS Figure 5 a GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION JAPANESE POPULATION DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF EVACUATION PLAN Figure 6 83 84 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST d. Of the 112,985 Japanese in the States of Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington, 71,896, or 64 percent, were native-born, and 41,089, or 36 percent, were foreign-born. Because of the large proportion of children, who were almost entirely native-born, the adult Japanese popu¬ lation (21 years of age and older) was comprised of 64 percent foreignborn and 36 percent native-born. (See Table 2.) The age, sex, and nativity distribution of the Japanese population in these states is shown in Table 3, and the distribution of the total Japanese population by age groups is presented in Figure 7. TABLE 2.—Nativity of the Total Japanese Population and of the Adult Japanese Population of Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington: TOTAL POPULATION Sex and Nativity 1940 ADULT POPULATION* Number Percent Number Percent BOTH SEXES All. 112,985 100 62,899 100 Native-born. Foreign-born. 71,896 41,089 64 36 22,375 40,524 36 64 MALES All. 63,208 100 37,438 100 Native-born. Foreign-born. 38,094 25,114 60 40 12,628 24,810 34 66 FEMALES All. 49,777 100 25,461 100 Foreign-born. 33,802 15,975 68 32 9,747 15,714 38 62 ♦Persons 21 years of age or older. TABLE 3.—Age and Nativity of Japanese Population in Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington: Age (Years) TOTAL 1940 NATIVE-BORN FOREIGN-BORN Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent All ages. 112,985 100.0 71,896 100.0 41,089 100.0 Under 5. 5 to 9. 10 to 14. 15 to 19. 7,189 8,357 12,861 18,138 6.4 7.4 11 .4 16.1 7,134 8,281 12,743 17,893 9.9 11.5 17.7 24.9 55 76 118 245 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 20 25 30 35 to to to to 24. 29. 34. 39. 14,636 7,667 4,470 6,381 13.0 6.8 4.0 5.6 14,193 7,075 2,699 1,120 19.7 9.8 3.8 1.6 443 592 1,771 5,261 L.l 1 .4 4.3 12.8 40 45 50 55 to to to to 44. 49. 54. 59. 7,068 5,854 7,412 5,917 6.3 5.2 6.6 5.2 394 195 83 37 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 6,674 5,659 7,329 5,880 16.2 13.8 17.8 14.3 70 to 74. 4,450 1,799 566 220 3.9 1.6 0.5 0.2 18 7 10 14 4,432 1,792 556 206 10.8 4.4 1.4 0 5 21 and older. 62,899 55.7 22,375 40,524 98.6 Source: Bureau of the Census. 31.1 DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF EVACUATION PLAN 85 AGE AND NATIVITY OF JAPANESE IN ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, OREGON, AND WASHINGTON: 1940 e. The typical Japanese family, therefore, consisted of Japanese-born par¬ ents who were enemy aliens, and their American-born children. Because of the Japanese custom of sending substantial numbers of their children, particularly the older children, to Japan to live with their grandparents or other relatives and to be educated as Japanese, there were in the "citi¬ zen” group an undetermined number of Kibei. Many of these were even more Japanese in customs and loyalty than their alien parents. (See dis¬ cussion of Kibei who returned to the United States in 1941, Chapter II, pp. 14-15.) /. Occupationally, nearly half (45.2 percent) of the West Coast Japanese were engaged in agriculture. In the four states comprising Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2 there were 6,170 Japanese operated farms, of which 1,583 were fully or partly owned by Japanese, 262 were operated by Japanese as managers, and 4,325 as tenants. Many of these farms were in the suburbs of the largest cities, astride the principal lines of com¬ munication, transportation, and public utilities. Numerous other farms were located on the coast or immediately adjacent to important military and naval installations. g. It was impracticable to determine statistically the number of business establishments owned or operated by Japanese. It is known that, of the Japanese employed workers 14 years old and over in 1940, 23.6 percent were engaged in wholesale and retail trade, 17.1 percent in personal services (including commercial service, such as hotels, laundries, etc.), JAPANESE 86 EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 4.1 percent were in manufacturing establishments, and only 10 percent in all other industry groups. The evacuation plan, therefore, had to provide for the protection of substantial amounts of property, both in the form of farms and of properties in non-farm areas. (See Table 4.) Many additional data were available and analyzed in the preparation of the general evacuation plan, but the foregoing summarizes certain of the more im¬ portant facts which were taken into consideration. The census data were modified by estimates as to the immigration and emigration of Japanese from this area. Allowance was made for under-enumeration by the census, and data from Change of Residence Report Cards (voluntary migration from this area to the interior) were applied as corrective factors. TABLE 4.—Major Industry Groups of Japanese Employed Workers, 14 Years Old and Over; California, Oregon, and Washington: 1940 Industry Oregon Total California Washington All industries. 48,691 40,374 1,771 6,546 Agriculture. Manufacturing. Wholesale and retail trade. Personal service. All other. 22,027 1,978 11,472 8,336 4,878 19,289 1,131 9,336 6,896 3,722 759 160 404 271 177 1,979 687 1,732 1,169 979 All industries. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Agriculture. M anuf acturing. Wholesale and retail trade. Personal service. All other. 45.2 4.1 23.6 17.1 10.0 47.8 2.8 23.1 17.1 9.2 42.9 9.0 22.8 15.3 10.0 30.2 10.5 26.5 17.9 15.0 PERCENTAGE Source: Bureau of the Census. For planning purposes the West Coast was divided into 22 basic units shown on Figure 8, "Plan for Evacuating Japanese Population from Pacific Coast.” Estimates were made of the Japanese population in each of these areas and a tentative Assembly Center destination was given. Each of these generalplan areas was considered as comprising a community of Japanese, all of whom were to be moved to the same Assembly Center and eventually to the same Relocation Center, if the capacity of the Centers and the logistics of movement permitted. The basic population data for the program were provided from a special tabulation by the Bureau of the Census of Japanese cards of the 1940 Popu¬ lation Census. The total number of Japanese individuals and families in each county, township and incorporated place, and for each census tract in the larger cities, was plotted on maps. These census data, though two years old, were found satisfactory for planning purposes when corrected for emigration, under-enumeration and voluntary migration. From these data and a study of the structure and characteristics of each basic area, it was possible to define and map Exclusion Areas, 108 in all, which were used for operational purposes. Each Exclusion Area was a geographic unit bounded by DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF EVACUATION PLAN Figure 8 87 88 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST EXCLUSION AREAS JAPANESE EVACUATION PROGRAM WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND Figure AND 9 FOURTH ARMY 89 DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF EVACUATION PLAN recognized physical or legal lines and having a Japanese population of approxi¬ mately 1,000 persons (250 families), the number that could be most efficiently handled in a single operation. In those sections of the West Coast where the Japanese were sparsely settled and where several counties were grouped together for evacuation purposes, space, rather than population, became the controlling factor. (See Figure 9; also Map Insert I following page 290.) In establishing the boundaries of the Exclusion Areas every effort was made to adhere to the established policy of keeping family units unbroken, and to move communities with similar social and economic backgrounds to the same Assembly Center. lished policy. There was virtually no deviation from this estab¬ However, in a few instances, particularly in the later stages of evacuation of Military Area No. 1, the availability of space in certain Assembly Centers made it necessary to separate communities. Where this occurred, every effort was made to reunite the community in the process of transfer to Relocation Centers. In each Exclusion Area was placed a Civil Control Station. These stations were usually located in a public hall, school gymnasium, or auditorium, in order to provide adequate space in which to handle all persons of Japanese ancestry in the area. Whenever possible, the Control Station was located near the center of the Japanese population of the area. In all cases it was located within the boundaries of the area to be evacuated. As already noted, cooperating Federal agencies had agreed to staff the Civil Control Stations with a team, which, in concert with an Army representative, registered and processed the Japanese population within the area. The functions of the Army and of each agency can be briefly stated: a. The Federal Security Agency, through the United States Employment Service, located, established, organized and operated the Civil Control Stations. This agency provided suitable space and equipment for all agen¬ cies which operated in the Station. The Manager of the Civil Control Station was named by the Federal Security Agency and was usually a rep¬ resentative of the United States Employment Service. He was responsible for the organization, supply and administration of his Control Station and for the distribution of instructions received by him to the civilian staff. b. The Federal Security Agency through the Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security Board registered all evacuees, and social workers arranged to aid potential evacuees in the solution of family problems, and in some instances gave financial assistance to those who wished to leave the area and who submitted approved plans for relocation. c. The Federal Security Agency through the United States Public Health Service provided for the medical examination of all evacuees either dur¬ ing processing at the Civil Control Station or upon arrival at an Assembly Center. d. The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, by authority of the Treasury Department and Alien Property Custodian, arranged for the storage of 90 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST household goods, acted in the settlement of creditor-debtor disputes and assumed a protective function for all real and personal property of evacuees, except farm property. This agency also provided for the stor¬ age and for the sale to the United States Government of privately owned automobiles not otherwise disposed of by the evacuees. e. The Farm Security Administration as the designee of the United States Department of Agriculture, assumed responsibility for the agricultural aspects of the program such as the securing of substitute operators for Japanese farms to assure continued production of food and to protect the Japanese operators against loss. /. The Sector Commander provided such military personnel as he deemed necessary at the Civil Control Station. He also was responsible for post¬ ing Civilian Exclusion Orders and instructions throughout the specific area, for the escort of evacuees to Assembly Centers and, in some in¬ stances, for the transportation of evacuees. g. All major transportation requirements determined by Wartime Civil Control Administration were procured by the Western Defense Command Rail Transportation Officer under the Quartermaster through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. These arrangements provided virtually for direct liaison between the trans¬ portation officer, Wartime Civil Control Administration, and the Rail Transportation Officer, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. The Sector Rail Transportation Officer concerned was kept informed of the transportation schedules and acted as the field transportation opera¬ tions officer for each movement. h. The Sector Commander, through his Provost Marshal, issued all permits to enter or leave designated areas, passed on requests for deferment from evacuation, and provided internal and external security for Civil Con¬ trol Stations. Though modified by the experience gained in the early evacuation oper¬ ations, this original assignment of civilian agency functions and statement of operating principles (as of March 20) the entire program. remained substantially unchanged for The basic directive entitled "Japanese Evacuation Oper¬ ations,” dated April 23, 1942, was but a modification of the individual direc¬ tives given to each agency for operations prior to that date. It is repro¬ duced in full in Appendix 2. Details concerning the actual protective service ordered at Civil Control Stations are developed in full in Chapters X and XI. As pointed out in Chapter VII the work of the various agencies, both Army and civilian, was directed by Wartime Civil Control Administration. War¬ time Civil Control Administration drafted appropriate orders governing the posting of Exclusion Areas, the establishment and operation of Civil Control Stations, and the transportation of evacuees to Assembly Centers. It gave maxi- 91 DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF EVACUATION PLAN mum notice of planned exclusion operations to the cooperating civilian agencies and to the Sector Commanders through liaison representatives stationed at its central office. It printed and distributed Exclusion Orders and instruction posters for each area to the Sector Commanders. In addition to the Service Centers, all United States Employment Service offices in Military Area No. 1 were authorized to issue travel permits and to act as consultants to potential evacuees. ’'limited service offices.” These offices might be thought of as Cases which required the attention of the Federal Reserve Bank, the Farm Security Administration or the Bureau of Public Assist¬ ance were referred to the nearest Service Center, or to the nearest representative of the agency concerned.1 Both the Service Centers and the Employment Service offices were agents of the 'Wartime Civil Control Administration in the issuance of travel permits required by Proclamation 3, and Change of Residence Reports required by Proclamation 1. Ordinarily all cases involving exemption from curfew were referred to the nearest representative of the Provost Marshal or directly to Wartime Civil Control Administration. When voluntary migration ceased, and controlled evacuation commenced, the Service Center teams, with the exception of those persons engaged in the enforcement of curfew and travel regulations, were transferred to Civil Control Stations, to continue their efforts on the evacuees’ behalf. The evacuation process commenced with the issuance of a Civilian Exclusion Order, a document which defined the Exclusion Area and provided the imme¬ diate sanction for its evacuation. This Order specified the exclusion date, the registration date or dates and the location of the Civil Control Stations. The Order was accompanied by specific Instructions to Evacuees concerning their responsibilities in the evacuation program. (See Specimen Civilian Exclusion Order, at end of chapter.) The various Exclusion Orders were issued in a sequence based upon several considerations. Military security requirements tions but others were involved as well. were the primary considera¬ The ability of Assembly Centers to receive evacuees, the availability of civilian personnel in the various agencies which participated in the operation of Control Stations, the distance evacuees were to be moved, and the availability of rail or motor transportation were other important factors considered in determining the order in which Exclu¬ sion Areas were evacuated. Areas were evacuated in the order indicated by the Civilian Exclusion Order number with but a few exceptions. A preliminary plan for the evacuation of each Exclusion Area was drafted about two weeks prior to the first day of registration proposed for that area. This was referred (1) to the liaison representative of the United States Employ- 1On March advise all local contraband from such contraband. in Military Area 28 the Federal Security Agency was requested by Wartime Civil Control Administration to United States Employment Service offices in California, Oregon and Washington to accept Japanese until midnight, March 31. Each office was instructed concerning the handling of This was a purely temporary service to facilitate the collection of contraband from Japanese No. 1. 92 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST ment Service to ascertain if a Control Station Manager could be made available, and if space for the operation of the Control Station could be obtained; (2) to the Rail Transportation Officer of the Fourth Army to ascertain the avail¬ ability of necessary rail or bus transportation on the dates specified; (3) to the liaison officer in the Federal Security Agency to ascertain if personnel for the operation of the Control Station would be available on the proposed dates; and (4) to the liaison officer from the Sector in which the unit area was located to ascertain whether military personnel necessary for the escort of the evacuee movement would be available. The United States Employment Ser¬ vice appointed a Control Station Manager and leased space for the Control Sta¬ tion on receipt of this advice. "When concurrence in the proposed plan was received from the Sector Commander and from the civilian agencies concerned, the planning for the evacuation of the selected unit area went into the final stage. There was then issued a letter directed to all the civilian agencies of the Wartime Civil Control Administration which stated that it was proposed to evacuate all persons of Japanese ancestry from a prescribed area. This letter set forth all pertinent data regarding this evacuation operation, including the number of the Civilian Exclusion Order to be issued, the location of the Control Station, the date and hour for posting, registration, processing and movement of the evacuees, and the effective date and hour after which all persons of Japanese ancestry would be excluded from the area. This letter also specified whether movement by private automobile was to be authorized, and the type and place of medical inspection. These letters outlining proposed evacuation areas were "restricted” so that the information would not reach any affected person within the area. No publicity was permitted concerning the evacuation of any specific unit area prior to the posting of the Civilian Exclusion Order within the unit area affected. The evacuation operations within a normal Exclusion Area covered a period of seven days, as follows: a. Posting of the Exclusion Order throughout the area: From 12:00 noon the first day to 5:00 A. M. the second day. b. Registration of all persons of Japanese ancestry within the area: From 8:00 A. M. to 5:00 P. M. on the second and third days. c. Processing, or the preparing of evacuees for evacuation: From 8:00 A. M. to 5:00 P. M. on the fourth and fifth days. d. Movement of evacuees in increments of approximately 500: On the sixth and seventh days. In practice it was found that registration of from two-thirds to threefourths of the families and single individuals was accomplished on the first day of registration and it was therefore found practical to both process and register on the third day. Some processing continued on the sixth and even the seventh day where necessary. The schedule of operations for Control Sta¬ tions, given above, was the minimum time allowed for those stations which handled one thousand or more evacuees. Where the number of evacuees to 93 DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF EVACUATION PLAN be registered, processed, and moved was known to exceed 1,500, one to three additional days were allowed in order that each person would have adequate time to prepare fully for the movement to the Assembly Center. Additional days were also allowed where large areas with small populations were evacu¬ ated and in other cases where unusual conditions existed. In the normal operation of Control Stations, those persons who were first registered were given the first appointments for medical inspection and were scheduled for departure on the first day of departure. Conversely, those last to register were last to be given physical examinations and to depart. When¬ ever it was found that it was impractical to settle the business or personal property affairs of an evacuee, or an evacuee family, the individual or family was not transferred until the departure date of the last movement from that area. In a few instances where the affairs of the evacuee could not be set¬ tled, or satisfactory arrangements for the settling could not be made, prior to the last date of movement, temporary deferments from evacuation were granted by the Acting Provost Marshal. Less than two weeks after the Wartime Civil Control Administration was established, there was issued the first Civilian Exclusion Order requiring the evac¬ uation of all Japanese living on Bainbridge Island, Kitsap County, Washing¬ ton. Posters containing the Order and presenting instructions to the evacuees were posted throughout the area on March 24, 1942. On March 20, an advance warning of this evacuation was given to the agencies concerned and their functions were defined by memoranda from the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs. (See Appendix 1.) The task of establishing Civil Control Stations to register, process and assist evacuees was not the major operating problem of the Army. The Army’s real job was that of providing temporary housing for the evacuees. Assembly Centers had to be constructed and operated pending the transfer of the evacuees to Relocation Centers. camps. Assembly Centers were not internment or concentration They were temporary shelters where evacuees could be assembled and protected. War Relocation Authority, as was stated in Chapter V, had been created to assume responsibility for the relocation of evacuees, and hence Wartime Civil Control Administration’s operation of Reception Centers stopped with Manzanar. However, Manzanar was used by Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬ tration until May 31, 1942, when it was formally transferred to War Relocation Authority. Wartime Civil Control Administration moved to construct the many other temporary centers necessary to carry through the evacuation program. Race tracks, fairgrounds, and other facilities which permitted of quick conversion to use for temporary housing were acquired. The tempo of the Army’s action can be gauged by the fact that an advance crew of evacuee workers entered Manzanar on March 21, 1942, eleven days after the establishment of the War¬ time Civil Control Administration, and by the fact that Santa Anita Assembly Center was ready for its first movement on March 27, 1942. The details con¬ cerning Assembly Center construction and operation are found in later chapters. 94 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST As was stated in the first part of this chapter, “It was determined that the evacuation would not split family units or communities, where this could be avoided.” This principle was observed throughout the entire program so far as sound logistics of evacuee population movement permitted. Persons were ordinarily moved to the Assembly Center nearest their residence and successive evacuation orders from a given city were destined normally to the same Assembly Center. The ultimate objective of this was to accomplish the relocation of entire communities at their destination in Relocation Centers with a minimum of cross movement. Before the evacuation to Assembly Centers had been completed there was already in preparation a plan for the eventual transfer from Assembly to Reloca¬ tion Centers. Among the principle objectives of this plan were: (1) The evacuation of entire communities as units in relocation; (2) the combination of communities so as to obtain a working balance between urban and rural population groups in each Relocation Center—where possible rural and urban groups from the same general area; (3) the attainment of minimum change in climatic conditions consistent with available relocation sites; and (4) the move¬ ment of each population group a minimum of distance, i. e., to the nearest available relocation site. These objectives were attained to a great extent, although various practical considerations interfered with the perfect realization of these relocation objec¬ tives. Principal among the modifying factors may be mentioned: (1) The need for the early evacuation of certain Assembly Centers, particularly those which had pit latrines and those which presented an abnormal fire hazard; (2) the date of availability of various Relocation Centers; (3) the difficulty of moving small groups (less than train load units for long distances) ; and (4) the operat¬ ing requirement that an entire Assembly Center be evacuated in a continuous movement and, if possible, to the same Relocation Center. In summary, the general plan for controlled movement and relocation pro¬ vided for three main steps: (1) (2) The “registering and servicing” of evacuees at Civil Control Stations. The provision of temporary residence quarters and a minimum of normal community services at Assembly Centers. (3) The ultimate tranfer of evacuees to Relocation Centers under the administration of the War Relocation Authority. The flow of evacuees from Civil Control Stations to each of the later steps in the program is shown graphically in Figure 10. In the operation of the program Civil Control Stations sent the bulk of evacuees direct to Assembly Centers. A few were deferred, and those who needed hospitalization were placed in hospitals. Direct evacuation to Relocation Centers was possible toward the end of the evacuation of Military Area 1; and DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF EVACUATION PLAN 95 all evacuees from control sjations in Military Area 2 were sent directly to Relocation Centers or to work furlough under War Relocation Authority super¬ vision. In the Assembly Center phase of the program there were received in Cen¬ ters, in addition to persons coming directly from control stations, those who entered after the regular movement because of deferment and also parolees, voluntary evacuees, and others who came to an Assembly Center without first passing through a Control Station. The use of outside hospitals to supplement the Center hospitals resulted in a continual exchange of persons between Assem¬ bly Centers and hospitals and other institutions. The movement out of Assembly Centers was principally to Relocation Centers, though provision was made for the following types of release as well: a. To War Relocation Authority for work furlough by that agency. b. To direct release from evacuation (principally mixed-marriage cases). c. To hospitals and various agencies for detention or arrest (such as the Fed¬ eral Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Naturalization Service and Police), and institutions. Detail as to the procedure of movement of evacuees through these various phases of the program are presented in succeeding chapters of this report. A statistical summary of the number of persons entering and leaving each of these phases of the program is presented in Chapter XXVIII. 96 FLOW OF EVACUEES JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF EVACUATION PLAN 97 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII Specimen Civilian Exclusion Order* Headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth Army Presidio of San Francisco, California April 30, 1942 Civilian Exclusion Order No. 27 1. Pursuant to the provisions of Public Proclamations Nos. 1 and 2, this Headquarters, dated March 2, 1942, and March 16, 1942, respectively, it is hereby ordered that from and after 12 o’clock noon, P.W.T., of Thursday, May 7, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien, be excluded from that portion of Military Area No. 1 described as follows: All of that portion of the County of Alameda, State of California, within that boundary beginning at the point at which the southerly limits of the City of Berkeley meet San Francisco Bay; thence easterly and following the southerly limits of said city to College Avenue; thence southerly on College Avenue to Broadway; thence southerly on Broadway to the south¬ erly limits of the City of Oakland; thence following the limits of said city westerly and northerly, and following the shoreline of San Francisco Bay to the point of beginning. 2. A responsible member of each family, and each individual living alone, in the above described area will report between the hours of 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M., Friday, May 1, 1942, or during the same hours on Saturday, May 2, 1942, to the Civil Control Station located at: 530 Eighteenth Street Oakland, California. 3. Any person subject to this order who fails to comply with any of its provisions or with the provisions of published instructions pertaining hereto or who is found in the above area after 12 o’clock noon, P.W.T., of Thursday, May 7, 1942, will be liable to the criminal penalties provided by Public Law No. 503, 77th Congress, approved March 21, 1942 entitled "An Act to Provide a Penalty for Violation of Restrictions or Orders with Respect to Persons Entering, Remaining in, Leaving, or Committing any Act in Military Areas or Zones,” and alien Japanese will be subject to immediate apprehension and in¬ ternment. 4. All persons within the bounds of an established Assembly Center pur¬ suant to instructions from this Headquarters are excepted from the provisions of this order while those persons are in such Assembly Center. J. L. DeWitt Lieutenant General, U. S. Army Commanding ‘Reproduction of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 27. Each Order prepared in both poster and pamphlet size. 98 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST PROHIBITED AREA EXCLUSION ORDER NO. 27 Western Defense Command and Fourth Army C. E. Order 27 This Map is prepared for the convenience of the public; see the Civilian Exclusion Order for the full and correct description. DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF EVACUATION PLAN 99 WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION Presidio of San Francisco, California INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY LIVING IN THE FOLLOWING AREA: All of that portion of the County of Alameda, State of California, within that boundary beginning at the point at which the southerly limits of the City of Berkeley meet San Francisco Bay; thence easterly and following the southerly limits of said city to College Avenue; thence southerly on College Avenue to Broadway; thence southerly on Broadway to the south¬ erly limits of the City of Oakland; thence following the limits of said city westerly and northerly, and following the shoreline of San Francisco Bay to the point of beginning. Pursuant to the provisions of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 27, this Head¬ quarters, dated April 30, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien, will be evacuated from the above area by 12 o’clock noon, P.W.T., Thursday May 7, 1942. No Japanese person living in the above area will be permitted to change residence after 12 o’clock noon, P.W.T., Thursday, April 30, 1942, without obtaining special permission from the representative of the Commanding Gen¬ eral, Northern California Sector, at the Civil Control Station located at: 530 Eighteenth Street, Oakland, California. Such permits will only be granted for the purpose of uniting members of a family, or in cases of grave emergency. The Civil Control Station is equipped to assist the Japanese population affected by this evacuation in the following ways: 1. Give advice and instructions on the evacuation. 2. Provide services with respect to the management, leasing, sale, storage or other disposition of most kinds of property, such as real estate, business and professional equipment, household goods, boats, automobiles and livestock. 3. Provide temporary residence elsewhere for all Japanese in family groups. 4. Transport persons and a limited amount of clothing and equipment to their new residence. 100 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS MUST BE OBSERVED: 1. A responsible member of each family, preferably the head of the family, or the person in whose name most of the property is held, and each individual living alone, will report to the Civil Control Station to receive further in¬ structions. This must be done between 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M. on Friday, May 1, 1942, or between 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M. on Saturday, May 2, 1942. 2. Evacuees must carry with them on departure for the Assembly Center, the following property: (a) Bedding and linens (no mattress) for each member of the family; (b) Toilet articles for each member of the family; (c) (d) Extra clothing for each member of the family; Sufficient knives, forks, spoons, plates, bowls and cups for each mem¬ ber of the family; (e) Essential personal effects for each member of the family. All items carried will be securely packaged, tied and plainly marked with the name of the owner and numbered in accordance with instructions obtained at the Civil Control Station. The size and number of packages is limited to that which can be carried by the individual or family group. 3. No pets of any kind will be permitted. 4. No personal items and no household goods will be shipped to the As¬ sembly Center. 5. The United States Government through its agencies will provide for the storage at the sole risk of the owner of the more substantial household items, such as iceboxes, washing machines, pianos and other heavy furniture. Cooking utensils and other small items will be accepted for storage if crated, packed and plainly marked with the name and address of the owner. Only one name and address will be used by a given family. . 6 Each family, and individual living alone will be furnished transportation to the Assembly Center or will be authorized to travel by private automobile in a supervised group. All instructions pertaining to the movement will be ob¬ tained at the Civil Control Station. Go to the Civil Control Station between the hours of 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M., Friday, May 1, 1942, or between the hours of 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M., Saturday, May 2, 1942, to receive further instructions. J. L. DeWitt Lieutenant General, U. S. Army Commanding April 30, 1942 See Civilian Exclusion Order No. 27. CHAPTER IX Voluntary Migration A voluntary migration of Japanese from West Coast areas began with the first public announcement that they would be evacuated from strategic mili¬ tary areas of the West Coast. Even before Public Proclamation No. 1 was issued, some migration had begun, particularly to the eastern San Joaquin and Sacra¬ mento Valley areas of California and to mountain areas with Japanese colonies. These early movements were not very large. It was deemed advisable to assist this voluntary migration movement as much as possible as an initial phase of the evacuation program. However, a realization of the many problems which would be encountered by those Japanese who moved to new areas clearly indicated that voluntary migration would be but one phase of the over-all program— never a complete and satisfactory solution. As early as February, 1942, some public resistance to the inland movement of large numbers of Pacific Coast Japanese was evident. On the other hand, it was felt that the prospective evacuees should be given every opportunity to determine the areas to which they would go and to utilize such employment opportunities as might be available to them through friends living in inland areas. Thus, while voluntary migration was never considered to be a complete and satisfactory solution to the problem of evacuation, it was encouraged and assisted by the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army until such time as it became clearly evident that this voluntary migration was creating major social and economic problems in the areas to which the Japanese were moving. The following quotation from the statement to the Tolan Committee by the Emergency Defense Council, Seattle Chapter, Japanese-American Citizens League, Seattle, Washington indicates some of the problems of insecurity which faced those Japanese who migrated to inland areas: "A large number of people have remarked that they will go where the Govern¬ ment orders them to go, willingly, if it will help the national defense effort. But the biggest problem in their minds is where to go. The first unofficial evacuation announce¬ ment pointed out that the Government did not concern itself with where evacuees went, just so they left prohibited areas. Obviously, this was no solution to the question, for immediately, from Yakima, Idaho, Montana, Colorado and elsewhere authoritative voices shouted: 'No Japs wanted Here!’ “The Japanese feared with reason that, forced to vacate their homes, unable to find a place to stay, they would be kicked from town to town in the interior like the 'Okies’ of John Steinbeck’s novel. Others went further, and envisioned the day when inhabitants of inland States, aroused by the steady influx of Japanese, would refuse to sell gasoline and food to them. They saw, too, the possibility of mob action against them as exhausted, impoverished and unable to travel further, they stopped in some town or village where they were not wanted.” (National Defense Migration, Hearings, Part 30, p. 11465) The following steps were taken in the supervision, control and assistance of voluntary migration: (a) To record the amount and type of movement, a change of residence reporting system was instituted by Public Proclamation No. 1, March 2, 1942. 101 102 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST (b) To provide the migrants with documentary evidence of compliance with military orders and of military approval of travel, a "Certificate—Change of Residence” was issued. After Public Proclamation No. 3, this was revised to serve as an official "Travel Permit.” (c) To provide assistance to those persons with satisfactory resettlement plans, to disseminate information about employment, living facilities, etc., to those interested in moving out of military areas, and to serve as general evacua¬ tion field offices, Wartime Civil Control Administration Service Centers were established in 48 cities. Definite control over voluntary migration was established in the same proc¬ lamations which laid the ground work for the controlled evacuation of Military Area No. 1. Proclamation No. 1 warned that "Such persons, or classes of persons, as the situation may require will by subsequent Proclamation be ex¬ cluded from all of Military Area No. 1. ...” It also required the reporting of changes of residence by those who left the area. Public Proclamation No. 3 prescribed curfew hours, limited movement to places within five miles of the place of residence and defined certain items as contraband. However it made the travel limitations inapplicable to cases where persons were "visiting the nearest United States Post Office, United States Employment Service Office, or office operated or maintained by the Wartime Civil Control Administration, for the purpose of transacting any business or the making of any arrangements reasonably necessary to accomplish evacuation. The Proclamation also pro¬ vided that, "Travel performed in change of residence to a place outside the prohibited and restricted areas may be performed without regard to curfew hours.” From March 2 to March 29, therefore, under the provisions of Proclama¬ tion No. 1 nearly anyone who was affected by the proposed evacuation program was not only permitted to leave Military Area 1, he was encouraged and assisted to leave. Each German or Italian alien or person of Japanese ancestry residing in the States of Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington was required only to execute a Change of Residence Notice which was obtainable at any post office. This Change of Residence Notice was merely a notification mailed to the Provost Marshal of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army that the person intended to change his place of residence. It was required whether the destination was outside of Military Area No. 1 or within it. Proclamation No. 2 extended this residence change reporting system to Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Utah. The change of residence reporting system accomplished several purposes: (a) It provided the Headquarters with a file of the names and destinations of persons who left the area prior to evacuation. (b) It trained the evacuee population in the shift of authority which had occurred when the primary responsibility for the control of enemy aliens in this area was assumed by the Army. (c) It provided statistical data as to the direction and extent of voluntary VOLUNTARY 103 MIGRATION migration and perforce gave information as to the numbers remaining in each area. The latter purpose was the primary reason for its adoption. Without definite information as to the number of persons who migrated from each county of Military Area No. 1 to Military Area No. 2 and to other sec¬ tions of the Western Defense Command and elsewhere, it would not have been possible to plan the controlled evacuation program without considerable error. These data, when used in conjunction with detailed figures of the 1940 decen¬ nial census of population, proved quite reliable for planning purposes, and are summarized in a later part of this chapter. The following information was secured on the "Change of Residence Report Card:” (1) Name, (2) last address, (3) new address, or destination, (4) sex, (5) age, (6) race, (7) country of citizenship, and (8) alien registration num¬ ber. Each person 14 years of age or older was required to sign his own card and parents returned the cards for children under 14. By arrangement with the Post Office Department supplies of the "Change of Residence Report Card” forms were made available at all post offices in the Western Defense Command Area. The Postmaster was instructed to issue these cards on application without questioning the applicant. When a properly exe¬ cuted form was returned to him, the postmaster issued a "Certificate—Change of Residence Notice” with the name and new address of the applicant. This Certificate stated only that: "The above named person had executed an official change of residence report card declaring his intention to reside at the above address, which Report Card has been forwarded to the Provost Marshal, Western Defense Command, San Francisco, Cali¬ fornia.” After the issuance of Public Proclamation No. 3, the "Certificate—Change of Residence Notice” was revised to also serve as a Travel Permit. At this time the issuance of such permits at post offices in Military Area No. 1 was dis¬ continued and the permits were issued only at Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬ tration Team Offices or at approved United States Employment Service offices. By agreement with the United States Attorneys in Military Area No. 1 the Travel Permits issued after Proclamation No. 3 carried the following statement: “The travel of the above-named person from the place of issue of this permit to the address given above has been approved by the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Wartime Civil Control Administration (and, if an alien, has been approved in the name of the United States Attorney in the district from which he has moved). It is requested that all authorities permit this person to travel to the above address by direct route without molestation or hindrance.” The back of the Travel Permit form contained the following instructions to the migrant: "Upon arrival at the destination indicated on this form the bearer, if an alien, is required to report his change of address to the Alien Registration Division, Immi¬ gration and Naturalization Service, and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Forms for this purpose may be obtained from the Post Office at the place of destination. A new travel permit is required for travel from the destination indicated on this form if this destination is within the above-named States. Travel from the place of issue of this permit to the destination indicated must be by direct route and completed within a rea¬ sonable time after the date of issue.” 104 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST As revised the Travel Permit was used principally for travel within Mili¬ tary Area 1, though some permits to leave the area were approved by the Wartime Civil Control Administration even after March 29 when Public Procla¬ mation No. 4 ended the free migration of Japanese from this area. The Wartime Civil Control Administration through its Service Center Teams provided advice and assistance for volunteer evacuees up to the time that the area in which they resided was posted for evacuation. Many of those who left the area before evacuation used the services of these offices. However, only a relatively few families availed themselves of the full facilities provided by the Army to assist them in attaining an approved relocation plan. The formulation of an approved relocation plan involved the discussion and consideration of the proposed movement with members of the family. It also involved direct correspondence by Wartime Civil Control Administration with out-of-state agencies concerning the presence of a responsible relative, friend, or employer in the community to which the proposed move would be made. In every case an official expression as to the attitude of that community toward Japanese was required. Unless local law enforcement officers would give a clear¬ ance and indicate that the probability of "incidents” was low, no relocation plan would be approved by the Wartime Civil Control Administration. To facilitate the relocation of families, financial assistance was given at Team Offices for travel expenses, maintenance enroute, transportation of personal effects, and other identifiable expenses incident to moving. To insure the well¬ being of the family and the fact, so far as it could be determined, that de¬ pendency in another state would not be created, financial assistance in relocat¬ ing was contingent upon the capacity of the family to establish itself economi¬ cally at the point of relocation. Attention was also given to the availability at the point of destination of community resources such as medical facilities and adequate housing. The investigation of all such cases was a responsibility of the Bureau of Public Assistance, and the Employment Service, of the Federal Security Agency, staff in the Team Office. The staff representatives of the Federal Reserve Bank and the Farm Security Administration also assisted voluntary evacuees with the settlement of property matters. Only a small proportion of all the individuals who left Military Area No. 1 prior to controlled evacuation applied for any assistance or advice. Many of the migrants were persons with some financial independence or with relatives and friends in the area of destination. To June 5, 1942, the Bureau of Public Assistance reported that a total of 125 relocation plans had been approved_ 92 during the voluntary evacuation period—and that approximately $10,200 had been expended in assistance on such plans. As the evacuation program progressed, it became increasingly difficult for evacuees to secure the necessary clearance for voluntary relocation. This was VOLUNTARY 105 MIGRATION because of the widespread hostility which developed in almost every state and every community. It was literally unsafe for Japanese migrants. Free voluntary migration out of Military Area No. 1 was stopped by Procla¬ mation No. 4 dated March 27, 1942. After March 29, permission to leave the area was granted only after a relatively thorough investigation of each case. The principal basis for permission was to allow reuniting of families. A considerable number of families had become separated during the voluntary migration phase. For example the head of a family often went on ahead to accept employment and prepare the way for his family to follow. Frequently cases arose where Proclamation No. 4 intervened before the family had rejoined the head. Wartime Civil Control Administration always permitted such families to reunite. However, some movement was permitted in other classes of cases throughout the entire period of evacuation—but in all cases, only by military permission. When an area was in process of evacuation, i. e., after the area had been posted and before the exclusion date, it was still possible for the evacuees to secure permission from the military representative at the Control Station, the Provost Marshal, to leave the area. After a person had been evacuated to an Assembly Center, it then became necessary for him to secure the approval of the Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬ tration before being released. Japanese who resided in the California portion of Military Area No. 2, including, of course, many who migrated to this area from Military Area No. 1 without definite employment opportunities, were permitted free movement from the area until June 2, 1942. Public Proclamation No. 6 on that date prohibited the further migration out of or into that area in preparation for controlled evacuation. It is pertinent here to record briefly some of the factors which induced the action ending voluntary migration as an evacuation method. Some reference has already been made to this in preceding chapters. Public Proclamation No. 4, dated March 27, 1942, was the vehicle for that decision. Essentially, the objective was twofold. First, it was to alleviate tension and prevent incidents involving violence between Japanese migrants and others. Second, it was to insure an orderly, supervised, and thoroughly controlled evacuation with ade¬ quate provision for the protection of the persons of evacuees as well as their property. Some exodus began early in February when there was much public discussion about it. A reference to the hearings before the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration of the House of Representatives, Seventy-Seventh Congress, Second Session, will serve to illustrate the extent to which vigilante activities were developing. Particularly in Part 29, the hearings at San Francisco between February 21 and 23, 1942, will the reader find illustrative material. For example, the Sheriff of Merced County in a letter to the Attorney General of California, presented at the hearings, stated in part: "To avoid disaster, I believe that action must be taken to protect both the State and enemy aliens, as there are already 'rumblings’ of vigilante activity which has been caused in the main, by the influx of Japanese from the evacuated areas.” (Page 10998) 106 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST In a letter to the Regional Director of the Social Security Board, the Director of the State Department for Social Welfare said, on February 11th, in part: “Any uncontrolled evacuation of Japanese to this county would be a serious and grave mistake at this time as it would only tend to aggravate the present tense situation.” (Page 11044) In his testimony before the Committee Mr. Richard Neustadt, Regional Director of the Social Security Board and Regional Director of the Office of Defense, Health, and Welfare Services, made many references to the state of public feeling. He said in part: "I have seen resolutions of the Governors, the chambers of commerce, and all the hospitality centers west of the Rocky Mountain States. They don’t want them either. “May I say that all they are talking about is Japanese. from all the towns in California protesting.” We have had telegrams (Page 11054) Spokesmen from among the Japanese themselves made the same point. The National Secretary of the Japanese-American Citizens League urged: “That, in view of the alarming developments in Tulare County (California) and other communities against incoming Japanese evacuees all plans for voluntary evacua¬ tion be discouraged; * * *.” (Page 11137) He said further: "Just as I pointed out, the tension is increasing all around and immediate action would be very helpful, I think, to all concerned to protect us from mob violence, * * *. But I do not think it should be voluntary evacuation for the simple reason that I am afraid of what is happening * * *.” (Page 11156) Early in the program an aged Issei couple and their family had migrated to Santa Fe, New Mexico. The racial prejudice against the Hayakawas was so severe that the family petitioned Wartime Civil Control Administration re¬ questing that they be permitted to join the evacuees assembled at Tanforan. The Hayakawa case is cited as but one example from among many. It is il¬ lustrative of the intensity of public feeling. Multiply this by several thousand and it will become apparent why it was necessary for the Army to abandon voluntary migration. The necessity was to provide suitable and adequate protection for the evacuees themselves and to insure an orderly scheduled exodus. Statistics on Voluntary Migration Until the end of the evacuation program from Military Area No. 1, daily tabulations were prepared on the Change of Residence Report Cards received by the Wartime Civil Control Administration. These tabulations were cumula¬ tive by counties so as to show the net migration into or out of each area. Although Public Proclamation No. 1 became immediately effective on March 2, the actual tabulation of Change of Residence Report Cards was not started until March 12 after the establishment of the Wartime Civil Control Administration and after VOLUNTARY 107 MIGRATION sufficient time had elapsed for the distribution of blank forms to all post offices in the affected areas. Of the 4,070 Change of Residence Report Cards received by Wartime Civil Control Administration on or before March 25, only 1,235 reported an intended move to an area outside of Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2, 770 to places in Military Area No. 2, 1,289 to addresses within Military Area No. 1, and 776 to other loca¬ tions within the same county. Thus, nearly a month after the original announce¬ ment of the intended evacuation of Military Area No. 1, and three weeks after Proclamation No. 1, only 2,005 Japanese had moved out of the area and had re¬ ported this fact. With approximately 107,500 Japanese residing in Military Area No. 1, it was quite apparent that voluntary migration was completely in¬ effective as an evacuation device. Now apparent, it was creative of social and economic problems in the areas to which the Japanese were going. Public Proclamation No. 4 was issued on March 27, 1942, and became effective midnight, March 29. As soon as this Proclamation was announced, a very heavy rush of Change of Residence Report Cards was received. After this final rush to leave the area before the "freeze” imposed by Proclamation No. 4, the number of Change of Residence Cards received by the Wartime Civil Control Administration from Japanese moving out of military areas increased only approximately 2,500 for the remainder of the program. The following table shows the total reported voluntary movement of Jap¬ anese from March 12 to June 30, 1942: TABLE 5.—Cumulative Net Voluntary Migration of Japanese From Military Areas—Western Defense Command, March 12 to June 30, 1942 Dates March 12 to 18. March 19 to 25. March 26 to April 1. April 2 to 8. April 9 to 15. April 16 to 22. April 23 to 29. April 30 to May 6. May 7 to 13. May 14 to 20. May 21 to 27. May 28 to June 7. June 17 to 30. Total outside Military Area 1 528 1,555 7,774 8,254 8,529 8,670 8,879 9,057 9,141 10,241 10,255 10,286 10,290 10,312 Military Area 2 90 285 3,087 3,368 3,484 3,556 3,673 3,785 3,776 4,792 4,778 4,793 4,794 4,791 Military Areas 3 to 6 171 517 2,093 2,284 2,425 2,449 2,471 2,490 2,537 2,589 2,614 2,630 2,630 2,633 Outside W D C Area 267 753 2,594 2,602 2.620 2,665 2,735 2,782 2,828 2,860 2,863 2,863 2,866 2,888 A total of 10,312 persons reported their intention to move out of Military Area No. 1 during this period. Of these, 9,536 were in the California portion of Area No. 1. A total of 4,791 Japanese stated that they were moving into Area No. 2, and of these, 4,310 to the California portion of Area No. 2. Other areas of the Western Defense Command and other states of the United States were desig¬ nated as intended residences by 5,521 Japanese from Military Area No. 1. Prospec¬ tive moves to Colorado were reported by 2,292; to Utah, 2,13 8; to Idaho, 3 84; to Montana, 121; and to all other states combined 586. On June 5, 1942, Military Area No. 1 had been completely evacuated, except 108 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Figure 11 VOLUNTARY 109 MIGRATION for persons in Assembly Centers, those in institutions and a few who had been granted deferments from evacuation because of illness. Figure 11 shows the effect of voluntary movement of Japanese in the Western Defense Command Area from March 12 to June 5 by counties. It will be noted that those counties split by, or immediately adjacent to, the boundary of Military Area No. 1 in California received large numbers of voluntary migrants, particularly: Fresno, 2,499; Tulare, 932; and Placer, 495. In the interpretation of the above table and charts showing the reported voluntary movement of Japanese from military areas, the nature of these data should be kept in mind. Proclamation No. 1 required that the Report Card be made out not more than five, or less than one day prior to any intended change of residence. Although no enforcement procedure was set up for this aspect of the program, there is clear evidence that most persons complied with the provisions of the Proclamation by mailing their cards in advance of their intended departure. No requirement was made that a cancellation card or other notice be given if the move was not made. While some Japanese wrote the Wartime Civil Control Administration indicating that they had changed their minds and would not make the originally intended move, most persons who changed their minds did not bother to report this fact. It was not until the end of the evacuation program, therefore, that it was possible to arrive at substantially complete and accurate net migration figures. This was done by an actual card match of Change of Residence Report Cards with the Master File cards for those who had been evacuated to Assembly and Relocation Centers. The Change of Residence Report figures presented in Table 5 and in Figure 11 are, therefore, inflated to an unknown extent by re¬ ported intended changes of residence which were not made. It is also increased by data for persons who returned to their original residences (without reporting this fact) or who joined other members of their family in Assembly and Reloca¬ tion Centers. The final results of the voluntary evacuation program are shown in Tables 6 to 8. These data are net totals, i. e., persons who migrated out of the area but did not return to the area to be evacuated with their families, or did not other¬ wise join their families in Assembly Centers or Relocation Projects prior to Octo¬ ber 31, 1942. A net total of 4,889 Japanese left the evacuated area and returned Change of Residence cards to the Wartime Civil Control Administration. By far the largest number of these, 4,203, migrated from the State of California. ington lost 499 through migration, Oregon 129 and Arizona 58. Wash¬ The counties from which these persons moved are shown in Table 6. Table 7 shows the indicated state of destination of the voluntary migrants. Of the 4,889 net total, Colorado received 1,963, Utah, 1,519, Idaho, 305, eastern Washington, 208, eastern Oregon, 115, and all other states lesser move¬ ments. These data are illustrated in Figure 12. 110 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST TABLE 6.—Japanese Migrants From Evacuated Areas by State and County of Origin and by Sex Total Male Female Four-State total. 4,889 2,602 2,287 Arizona. 58 34 Maricopa. 58 34 24 California. 4,203 2,269 1,934 Alameda. Butte. Contra Costa. Fresno. Imperial. Kern. Kings. Los Angeles. Marin. Merced. Monterey. Orange. Placer. Riverside. Sacramento. San Benito. San Bernardino. San Diego. San Francisco. San Joaquin. San Luis Obispo. San Mateo. Santa Barbara. Santa Clara. Santa Cruz. Sonoma. Stanislaus. Tulare. Tuolumne. Ventura. Yolo. 263 7 18 153 82 7 3 1,969 8 6 234 88 2 10 24 6 13 61 207 21 11 139 205 443 82 17 8 64 20 29 2 1 142 5 8 75 35 5 1 1,080 4 2 143 54 1 4 10 4 9 31 95 10 5 67 116 231 44 9 4 44 15 14 2 121 2 10 78 47 2 2 889 4 4 91 34 1 6 14 2 4 30 112 11 6 72 89 212 38 8 4 20 5 15 Oregon. 129 70 59 Hood River. Lane. Multnomah. Polk. Washington. Yamhill. 1 13 4 54 5 50 2 1 9 2 24 2 32 Washington. 499 229 270 Chelan. Clark. King. Kitsap. Lewis. 2 5 403 6 6 3 5 56 6 7 1 3 183 4 1 3 2 26 2 4 1 2 220 2 5 State and County Pacific. Pierce. Thurston. Yakima. 24 1 Source—Change of Residence Cards: Evacuated to Non-Evacuated Area. 4 2 30 3 18 2 3 30 4 3 VOLUNTARY TABLE 111 MIGRATION 7.—Japanese Migrants From Evacuated Areas by State of Reporter Destination and by Sex State Total Male Female Total. 4,889 2,602 2,287 Arizona. Arkansas. Colorado. District of Columbia. Idaho. Illinois. 105 1 1,963 5 305 72 4 4 6 1 3 24 42 26 85 69 38 4 39 27 7 9 12 39 115 14 51 1,519 3 208 16 72 1 64 41 1 904 4 131 44 2 2 5 1 2 11 23 14 37 28 20 3 21 15 5 5 4 21 54 9 32 697 2 103 7 38 1 Iowa. Kansas. Kentucky.. Massachusetts. Michigan. Minnesota. Missouri. Montana. Nebraska. Nevada. New Jersey. New Mexico. New York. North Carolina. North Dakota. Ohio. Oklahoma. Oregon. Pennsylvania. Texas. Utah. Virginia. Washington. Wisconsin. Wyoming. Canada. 1,059 1 174 28 2 2 1 1 13 19 12 48 41 18 1 18 12 2 4 8 18 61 5 19 822 1 105 9 34 In addition to this recorded net migration, there was, of course, some move¬ ment of Japanese from the West Coast areas to inland points prior to the beginning of the Change of Residence reporting as required by Proclamation No. 1. There is also some evidence that some Japanese slipped across the mili¬ tary area boundaries both before and after the issuance of Proclamation No. 4 and Proclamation No. 6. However, this group is believed not to have been very large. The net total of 4,889 migrants probably accounts for 90 percent of the total number of Japanese now in the United States who voluntarily left the West Coast area for inland points. The distribution by sex, and nativity of those who migrated does not differ markedly from that of the Japanese population of the West Coast. (See Table 8.) Of the 4,889, 3,377, or 69 percent, were native-born; 1,512 were foreign-born. The number of male migrants exceeded the number of female in both the native-born and the foreign-born group in the population as a whole. No attempt has been made to analyze these data by families. Though it is known that the movement occurred largely in family groups, frequently a father or older son would either be accompanied by, or followed by, the mother and other children. Relatively few family groups as such returned for evacuation to Assembly Centers. Such persons as did return were predominantly children who had migrated inland and then later returned to join their family in a Center. 112 JAPANESE TABLE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 8.—Japanese Migrants From Evacuated Areas by State of Origin and by Sex and Nativity STATE OF ORIGIN Nativity and Sex Total Arizona California Oregon Washington ALL MIGRANTS Total. 4,889 58 4,203 129 499 Male. Female. 2,602 2,287 34 24 2,269 1,934 70 59 229 270 Total. 3,377 38 2,888 84 367 Male. Female. 1,763 1,614 23 15 1,531 1,357 47 37 162 205 Total. 1,512 20 1,315 45 132 Male. Female. 839 673 11 9 738 577 23 22 67 65 NATIVE-BORN FOREIGN-BORN 113 VOLUNTARY MIGRATION JAPANESE VOLUNTARY MIGRATION BY STATE OF DESTINATION MARCH 12 TO OCTOBER 31.1942 wcyrcflN ocrcN$e command and fourth armt FAHTlMt CIVIC CONTAOC ADMINISTRATION Figure 12 CHAPTER X Operation of Civil Control Stations Protection of Evacuees and Their Families That phase of evacuation involving complete Federal supervision was in¬ itiated late in March, following the publication of Public Proclamation No. 2, March 16, 1942. It is sometimes referred to as the "controlled phase.” The first exclusion area selected for evacuation was Bainbridge Island in Puget Sound, State of Washington. This area was selected for first evacuation because of its importance to the security of the Pacific Coast. It is located in the channel leading to the Bremerton Navy Yard. This was in accordance with the ap¬ proved policy that the areas most vital to security would be the first to be evacuated. On March 24, 1942, there was issued Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1 which proclaimed that all persons of Japanese ancestry would be excluded from the area of Bainbridge Island, effective 12:00 noon, March 31, 1942. The Command¬ ing General, Northwest Sector, Western Defense Command, and the Federal agencies which had been selected and designated to assist in the evacuation pro¬ gram had been informed of the proposed evacuation by memoranda dated March 20, 1942. (See Appendix 1.) The specific procedures for preparing persons of Japanese ancestry for re¬ moval from that area, and for their actual physical movement, had been devel¬ oped by the Wartime Civil Control Administration prior to this time. The memoranda mentioned above prescribed the methods and designated the re¬ sponsibilities and functions of the Sector Commander and each of the partici¬ pating Federal civilian agencies. (See Chapter VII.) The location of the Control Station for each exclusion area was determined prior to the issuance of the Civilian Exclusion Order. Each Order gave the address of the Control Station, and required that a responsible member of each family, and each individual living alone report to that Station on the date specified therein, for the purpose of registration. The Commanding General of each Sector within the Western Defense Com¬ mand was responsible for the establishment of Control Station security measures and for the escort of all evacuees from each exclusion area to prescribed des¬ tination. He also was responsible for procuring the necessary transportation, and meals enroute to Assembly and Relocation Centers. In addition, he issued any necessary local travel permits (once an area was posted for evacuation, evacuees could not leave without permission), and deferments. To each Control Station the Sector Commander assigned one officer as his representative and as an Acting Provost Marshal. An appropriate number of military guards were as¬ signed to each Control Station to protect the evacuees, to supervise the move¬ ment of individuals, and to guard the official records. The civilian staff at each Control Station was made up of sections repre¬ senting the United States Employment Service, the United States Public Health 114 OPERATION OF CIVIL 115 CONTROL STATIONS Service, the Farm Security Administation and the Federal Reserve Bank. The operation of each Control Station was under the direction of a Control Station Manager selected by the United States Employment Service. Each civilianagency section within the Control Station was headed by a Supervisor who was responsible for the activities of that section. Control Stations performed three basic functions: (1) To register all per¬ sons of Japanese ancestry; (2) To provide all services and assistance necessary to prepare them for movement from the area; and (3) To direct the actual movement from the area. The Army, and each of the participating civilian agencies, was assigned specific responsibilities and duties within the Control Station to insure the complete accomplishment of the three functions and to avoid duplication of effort. Army orders and instructions regarding the responsibilities of the Sector Commander at each Station were sent through normal Army channels to the Acting Provost Marshal. Prior to, as well as during, the activation of each Sta¬ tion, the Wartime Civil Control Administration gave its orders directly to the civilian agencies through their full-time liaison personnel in the Wartime Civil Control Administration. Responsibilities of the Army at each Control Station. The Sector Commander, in whose Sector the Control Station was located, designated an officer as the Acting Provost Marshal for that Control Station. The duties and responsibilities of the Acting Provost Marshals were: 1. To receive and pass on requests for deferments made by individual evacuees, and recommendations for deferments made by the Control Station Manager, or by the participating civilian agencies. In routine cases, such as recommendations for deferments for health reasons made by the United States Public Health Service, temporary deferments were is¬ sued by the Acting Provost Marshal. All unusual requests and recom¬ mendations for deferment were referred by the Acting Provost Marshal to the Provost Marshal of the Sector, or to the Wartime Civil Control Administration for decision; 2. To issue travel permits to evacuees when the request for such travel 3. To provide for the safety of all evacuees during the period of regis¬ came within the prescribed regulations. tration, processing, and movement, and to provide for the safety of all government records; 4. To keep the Sector Commander, the Commanding General and the War¬ time Civil Control Administration informed by periodic reports of the registration, processing, and movement of evacuees; 5. To provide necessary military escort, and to supervise entrainment of evacuees. The responsibility for posting the Civilian Exclusion Orders and Instruc¬ tions to evacuees throughout each area to be evacuated was vested in the ap¬ propriate Sector Commander. Generally an officer designated as a Posting Officer, was responsible for posting these orders in all public places within the area— 116 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST at crossroads and other prominent locations. In a few instances the Acting Provost Marshal assigned to a Control Station was made responsible for the post¬ ing of the area. One of the principal duties of the Acting Provost Marshal in each Control Station was the interpretation to individual evacuees of the terms of the evacu¬ ation order. Practically all individual problems not specifically covered by reg¬ ulations, and not falling within the functions of one of the participating civil¬ ian agencies, were referred to the Acting Provost Marshal for decision. Those included such matters as mixed-marriage, and mixed-blood cases, travel permits for the purpose of reuniting families, shipment of freight to Assembly Centers, departure dates for individual evacuees and convoys, and other problems created by the evacuation order. Responsibilities of the Federal Security Agency The Federal Security Agency was charged with the duty to provide several general services at Control Stations and in turn delegated to component organ¬ izations within that agency the following responsibilities: 1. To the United States Employment Service, the location, establishment, 2. To the Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Board, the regis¬ 3. To the United States Public Health Service, the medical inspection of organization and management of Control Stations; tration of all evacuees and the provision of social welfare service; all evacuees, the providing of medical aid during the registration and processing period and while enroute to Assembly Centers, and the con¬ tinued medical care and hospitalization of persons who could not be evacuated for medical reasons. Responsibilities of the United States Employment Service The United States Employment Service of the Federal Security Agency was responsible for the location, establishment, and management of all Civil Control Stations. Specifically, this responsibility included: 1. The selection of a Station Manager for each Control Station; 2. The securing of space for each Station, and of all supplies and equip¬ ment necessary for its operation, except for that equipment which was furnished by other participating agencies; 3. The furnishing of all civilian employees essential for the operation of the Control Station, except those employees furnished by the other par¬ ticipating agencies; 4. The supervising and coordinating of the activities of all civilian agency staff sections within each Control Station to insure its successful oper¬ ation so far as these agencies were concerned; 5. The transmitting of all orders and instructions pertaining to evacuation received from the Wartime Civil Control Administration to the super¬ visors of the various sections within the Control Station; OPERATION OF CIVIL CONTROL STATIONS 117 6. The maintaining of necessary records and files, and the submission of required reports. Responsibilities of the Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security Board. The Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security Board was responsible for the registration of all persons of Japanese ancestry and for providing all necessary social welfare service for the individuals affect¬ ed by the Exclusion Orders. Specifically, the responsibilities were: 1. To provide a staff of trained social welfare workers to function as inter¬ viewers and welfare supervisors in the Control Station; 2. To give an initial interpretation to all evacuees of Exclusion Orders and instructions pertaining to evacuation; 3. To register all persons of Japanese ancestry affected by the Exclusion Orders, and to complete all necessary social data records pertaining to these individuals; 4. To interview a responsible member of each family, and all individuals living alone, to ascertain what assistance they might require to enable them to comply with the Exclusion Orders; 5. To refer individuals and heads of families to the representatives of the appropriate participating agencies to secure the assistance necessary in settling personal and real property affairs, in securing travel permits, etc; 6. To provide necessary financial assistance and other social welfare aids to individuals and families who required interim subsistence and those items essential to maintain a minimum standard of living at the Assem¬ bly Center; 7. To instruct evacuees in all matters pertaining to baggage and personal effects to be taken to the Assembly Centers; date and hour for medical examination; date and hour of departure for Assembly Center; and all other matters pertaining to the evacuation; 8. To provide all types of social welfare service required by the evacuees under the unusual circumstances created by evacuation. The Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security Board was respon¬ sible for the overall supervision of such work in Civil Control Stations. It also maintained liaison with other Federal agencies and with Wartime Civil Control Administration. By agreement, the various State Public Welfare Agencies as¬ sumed the responsibility for the direct operating phase of this work. The State Agencies furnished for each Control Station a staff member who functioned as the Public Assistant Supervisor. Additional members of the social service staff in each Control Station were recruited from the County Welfare Departments and from private welfare agencies. Responsibilities of the United States Public Health Service. The United States Public Health Service of the Federal Security Agency was responsible for all matters pertaining to the physical health and well-being of evacuees throughout the entire program. The first phase of the Public Health Service’s activities was from the time evacuees reported to a Control Station for registration until 118 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST they were inducted in the Assembly Center of destination. Specifically these responsibilities were as follows: 1. To provide medical service in each Control Station during the entire period of registration and processing of evacuees; 2. To physically inspect all evacuees prior to induction into an Assembly 3. To remove from the evacuee group all persons with detectable commu¬ 4. To detect and remove from the evacuee group all persons whose physical Center; nicable diseases in the infectious stage prior to evacuation or induction; condition indicated that evacuation at the scheduled time might be det¬ rimental to their physical well-being, or to the physical well-being of other evacuees; 5. To provide for necessary medical attention, hospitalization or home care for all evacuees requiring such attention at any time during the regis¬ tration and processing period, or subsequent thereto; 6. To provide for adequate medical attention and care for all evacuees while enroute from Civil Control Stations to Assembly Centers. Organization of the Control Station. Usually, only one Control Station was established within an exclusion area. This was the case in ninety-seven of the one-hundred and eight areas. However, in the other eleven areas, because of the expanse of the area and the great distances involved, two or more Control Stations were established. The establishment of multiple Control Stations re¬ duced the inconvenience to the evacuees to a minimum and made it possible to provide all necessary services to the evacuees on the ground. The staffs of these multiple Control Stations were reduced to fit the anticipated number to be handled, but all participating civilian agencies were represented at each Control Station. Where the distance that an evacuee was required to travel in order to reach a Control Station was more than thirty miles, transportation at government expense was furnished, on application. The instructions to persons of Japanese ancestry in those cases informed the evacuees of this, and authorized them to communicate with the Control Stations at government expense. All personnel assigned to a Control Station normally reported to that Station on the afternoon prior to the first day of registration for a staff meeting, under the direction of the Control Station Manager. The Acting Provost Marshal, as the representative of the Sector Commander, and an appropriate number of military personnel to act as guards, also reported at that time, so that all per¬ sonnel of military and of the civilian agencies might be properly instructed and their activities coordinated. The Control Station was usually so arranged that there was only one en¬ trance and one exit. Evacuees proceeded through the station in single line to avoid cross-traffic and confusion. Registration of Evacuees. When the evacuees arrived at a Control Station to register, they were met by a floorman who directed them to a receptionist. The receptionist first obtained the name and home address of each evacuee, and OPERATION OF CIVIL CONTROL STATIONS 119 checked on the map of the unit area to determine that the individual lived within the described area, and was therefore subject to registration. The name and address of the individual, citizenship, number in family, and sex, was then noted on a "Routing and Control Slip.” This was attached to the outside of a large manila envelope which contained all the material necessary for the regis¬ tration of the evacuee and his family. This envelope and control slip carried a case number, known as the “family number,” which was permanently assigned to the individual and his family. All records pertaining to that evacuee family carried the family number. This number was also used to mark all baggage and freight belonging to the evacuee and his family, which was to be stored or shipped to an Assembly Center. Control of assignment of family numbers was maintained by the Federal Security Agency, as directed by the Wartime Civil Control Administration, to prevent the assigning of the same number to more than one family. Blocks of numbers were assigned to Control Stations and all numbers used were reported and recorded. There was also attached to the registration envelope a form for recording the family history of the evacuee and his family, known as the Social Data Registration Form. The receptionist made the original entries upon this form after having rechecked the address of the evacuee to be certain that the family lived within the areas designated for evacuation. The data recorded on this form were basic in formation regarding all persons who were evacuated, and partic¬ ular care was exercised in making the entries to insure accuracy. Typed copies of the completed registration form were sent immediately to (a) the Wartime Civil Control Administration, (b) the Assembly Center to which the evacuee 120 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST was to be moved, and (c) one copy was given to the officer in charge of a convoyed movement for delivery to the Assembly Center Manager. The registration envelope also contained four copies of the Personal Property Form for use by evacuees in listing personal property for storage, forms for automobile storage and for sales of automobiles, and one triplicate Personal and Baggage Tag. This tag carried the family number assigned to the evacuee— that which appeared on the Social Data Registration Form and the Routing and Control Slip. The first portion of this tag was to be worn by the head of the family at the time of the movement to the Assembly Center; the second portion to be attached to the baggage of the evacuee, and the third part to be taken by the examining physician at the time medical examination was made. Similar triplicate tags were furnished for each additional member of the family, and the assigned family number and the name of the head of the family was written on them at the time of issue. Additional blank tags were furnished the head of the family for use in marking baggage and personal property which was to be stored or shipped. In the normal Control Station there were a minimum of two doormen whose duties were to regulate the flow of traffic to the receptionist, and from the receptionist to the social workers; to prevent crowds from gathering before the reception desk; and to answer questions of arriving evacuees. These doormen worked directly under the supervision of the Station Manager. In most Control Stations one or more bi-lingual Japanese doormen were used to direct evacuees who were unfamiliar with the English language. The average Control Station used five receptionists during the two days of registration, and three receptionists during the processing period. Every effort was made to secure personnel with experience and training which fitted them for this type of work. Considerable use was made of evacuees who spoke both English and Japanese. Many evacuees had little or no knowledge of the English language and could be questioned intelligently only in Japanese to obtain a complete and accurate family history for the registration form. It was necessary to speak in Japanese in order that regulations and instructions regarding evacu¬ ation could be properly explained; so that the personal problems presented by each family could be properly ascertained, and directions given for the evacuee to obtain the necessary assistance in settling these problems. In some few cases Japanese serving in the Control Stations were paid employees, but in many in¬ stances this work was done by evacuees without pay. After completing the preliminary registration entries, the evacuee was then sent to a social worker by the receptionist. Early experience indicated that the average length of the interview by the social worker was 25 minutes, and the assignments were made on this basis. The social workers did not attempt to adhere to a fixed time schedule, but gave each evacuee all the time necessary to complete the registration, explain the evacuation, and to ascertain and arrange for assistance necessary in settling all problems of the evacuee and his family. Bi-lingual evacuees assisted the social workers in questioning those who spoke no English. OPERATION OF CIVIL CONTROL STATIONS 121 When an evacuee came to a social worker’s desk, she first obtained all necessary data for completing the registration of the evacuee and his family. Evacuation instructions, particularly as to the probable time of movement and the baggage and personal items which each family were required to take to Assembly Centers, were then explained in detail. Any special instructions af¬ fecting the individual evacuee also were explained, and written instructions were frequently given as to medical inspection. Each evacuee was then carefully questioned as to his business, property, personal and family affairs, to ascertain the problems created by evacuation, and to establish the existing needs for assistance in settling these problems. The services offered by the Farm Security Administration in settling farming and agricultural problems, and those offered by the Federal Reserve Bank in settling personal affairs and for the storage of automobiles and furniture were explained fully. Every effort was made to ascertain if the particular evacuee was in need of these services. The evacuee was further questioned as to his personal and family needs for clothing, food, and shelter in the interim prior to the date of movement, and as to any needs for items required in the Assembly Centers which he might not have, or might be unable, to purchase. Evacuees were not required to accept any of the services offered at the Con¬ trol Stations for settling business and personal affairs prior to evacuation. Free¬ dom of personal initiative was not infringed. However, each evacuee was fully informed of the type and scope of assistance available. The social worker, after completing the registration interview of the evac¬ uee, noted in appropriate spaces on the Routing and Control Slip, the services, if any, required by the evacuee from the Farm Security Administration and the Federal Reserve Bank. The evacuee was then referred to those sections and in¬ structed to return to the social worker after completing his business with those services. When the evacuee returned to the social worker, the Routing and Control Slip was checked to see if there were any return appointments. He was informed of the date and hour of his appointment for a medical examination, and was instructed that he and his entire family must report at the time specified. The date and hour for his medical examination was written on the medical exam¬ iner’s portion of the triplicate tag which then was given to the evacuee. If the original interview had disclosed a need for social welfare service, the social worker then prepared a recommendation for the issuance of a disbursal voucher or took such other action as was necessary to provide the required welfare service. At this time the evacuee was also issued one triplicate tag for every member of his family, and its use explained. In making appointments for medical examinations, those who were regis¬ tered first generally were given appointments on the first day of medical exam¬ ination, normally the third day of station operation. However, each case was considered individually and appointments arranged so as to best fit the individ¬ ual family. Such factors as the size of the family, distance to be traveled, busi¬ ness and personal affairs to be settled, and the physical condition of the evacuee JAPANESE 122 EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST and the members of his family were all carefully considered in scheduling ap¬ pointments. Financial Assistance to Evacuees. Financial assistance was recommended on the basis of individual and family needs, and was generally given for the purchase of articles which evacuees were required to take with them to As¬ sembly Centers. It was also given to pay for crating of personal property to be stored at Government expense, and to provide food and lodging to the date of exclusion when the individual or family was without adequate financial means. Items purchased for personal use in Assembly Centers were those which each evacuee was required to take to the Center and included: bedding and linen (mattresses together with blankets and pillows were issued at all Assembly Centers to each evacuee), toilet articles, clothing, and essential personal effects. It was not practicable for the Public Assistance Staff to make an accurate or verified determination of need for financial assistance due to the short period of time and large number of individuals who were served with a limited staff. It was therefore necessary to make such determinations on the basis of infor¬ mation obtained during the first interview and to arrive at a judgment at that time. It was necessary to give financial assistance to only a small percentage of the individuals and families, but the possibility of need for such assistance was considered at all times during the registration by the social workers. The social worker, after completing the registration and interviewing of the evacuee referred him to the Assistant Supervisor of Public Assistance. Here all the records of the individual were reviewed to insure that all essential ar¬ rangements had been made and all necessary services had been given, or return appointments scheduled, in order to complete settlement of the affairs of the evacuee. If financial assistance had been recommended, the disbursing order was completed and its use explained to the evacuee. When this work was accom¬ plished and all records in order, the evacuee was referred to the Control Desk. The Control Desk was supervised by an assistant to the Station Manager. At this point the evacuee surrendered the registration envelope but retained the triplicate tags and any necessary property and motor vehicle forms and baggage tags. The Control Desk inspected the records to determine that each essential service had been performed and that necessary action had been taken by the several staff sections to make final disposition of the case. Medical Inspection and Service. At all times during the operation of each Control Station, from the hour the station first opened for registration until the last evacuee had been placed on the train or bus, medical attention was provided at the Control Station or was immediately available. A doctor and at least one registered nurse were provided at each Control Station by the United States Public Health Service. A nurse was on duty at all hours that the Control Station was open and the assigned physician was either present at the Station or immediately available. Specific appointments were scheduled for medical examination of each fam¬ ily unit. These appointments were carefully scheduled so as to distribute the work evenly throughout the days designated for examination, which were OPERATION OF CIVIL CONTROL STATIONS 123 usually the three and four days devoted to "processing.” In areas where evacuees were required to travel considerable distances to Control Stations, medical inspections were conducted at the time of registration or prior to departure, in order to avoid inconvenience and duplication of travel. The inspections were made or supervised by officers of the United States Public Health Service experienced in maritime quarantine inspection. When the num¬ ber of inspections was more than could be undertaken by United States Public Health Service officers, the assistance of State, County and City health officers and, in a few instances, of private physicians from the county medical societies was enlisted. Medical inspection included the observation of general appearance of the individual, the eyes and conjunctival sacs, mouth and throat, hands and such areas of the skin as could be seen without actually disrobing. When a person was suspected of disease, he was taken to a room (or screened area) affording greater privacy, the necessary clothing was removed, and a more thorough examination was made. All examinations of female cases were made in the pres¬ ence of a nurse or other female attendant. In practically all instances, evacuees who were ambulatory appeared at the Control Station at scheduled hours for medical inspection. Those unable to appear were visited in their homes by the inspecting physicians. In the case of those individuals ill in hospitals on the inspection day, certification of the at¬ tendant physician or hospital as to the patient’s condition was often accepted as proof of illness. Medical inspections were made at the Control Station prior to embarkation for a Reception or Assembly Center in 89 of the unit areas evacuated. In the remaining 19 unit areas where the movement from the Control Station to the Assembly Center was short, the inspection was made on arrival at the Center and prior to induction. Every person found suffering from a condition which made evacuation actually or potentially dangerous was recommended for ex¬ emption from evacuation until such time as his condition had so improved that transportation to, or residence in, an Assembly Center would not constitute a hazard to his life, or to the health or life of others. Medical care of the type and quantity required by the patient was supplied to each evacuee found ill at the time of inspection. The quality of the care supplied varied somewhat from one community to another but in every case Japanese patients received medical attention at least equal to that available to the other residents of the same community. Where medical inspections were conducted at Control Stations, the evacuees were routed first to the receptionist, who checked the family number on the triplicate tag in the possession of the head of the family, and then took from the file the registration envelope containing the records of that family. The Routing and Control Slip was checked to see if there were appointments sched¬ uled with any other staff sections and the evacuee family was then sent to the medical section. The medical section receptionist removed the third, or medical examiner’s 124 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST portion of the triplicate tags for each member of the family, and directed the members of the family to the examining physician. If any member of the family was not present due to illness, necessary data regarding the absentee were obtain¬ ed in order that the examining physician could make a home call. All unusual physical conditions were noted on the Social Data Registration form. In those cases where physical conditions made evacuation at that time inadvisable, the examining physician recommended temporary deferment until such time as their condition would permit evacuation with safety. Cases of illness detected on arrival at an Assembly Center, where the inspection was con¬ ducted prior to induction, were handled in the same manner as those detected at the Control Station. Hospitalization and Deferment of Special Cases. Persons with con¬ tagious and infectious diseases were transferred, if their physical condition per¬ mitted, to the most easily available public hospital where they were kept at government expense until the period of communicability was past and the pa¬ tient able to travel. In some instances where hospital facilities were not avail¬ able, or where it was impractical to move the patient, temporary exemption was granted to the patient and to members of the patient’s family so as to provide necessary home care. However, wherever possible the patient was hos¬ pitalized at government expense and the patient’s family was evacuated with the regular movement. Maternity cases in hospitals were allowed to remain in these institutions, for the duration of confinement. In most cases financial arrangements between the patient and hospital had been completed before the evacuation orders were posted. Cases of pregnancy of eight months or more were not normally allowed to go to an Assembly Center. Such cases were recommended for exemption from evacuation until the mother and baby were declared able to travel. While it would have been less expensive to have allowed the women to remain in their homes until time for delivery, there was no provision for the general exemption from exclusion of members of families to care for such cases. However, in a few instances, where hospital facilities were not available, it was necessary to provide for temporary exemption for the pregnant woman and an adult mem¬ ber of her immediate family to care for her at home. Many persons suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis and already in public or private sanitoriums were found. These cases were deferred from evacuation and were transferred, if their physical condition permitted, to the most easily available and best public tuberculosis sanitorium in the community, where they were hospitalized at government expense. Mental patients in sanitoria were exempted from evacuation so that they might remain under psychiatric super¬ vision. Short-term illnesses already hospitalized, when a unit area was evacuated, were usually allowed to remain in hospitals at their own expense. Long-term ill¬ nesses and illnesses occurring during the registration and processing period were placed in public hospitals at Federal expense. If hospitalization was available, every case unable to be evacuated for any medical reason was admitted to a hospital. Persons who of necessity were confined in private homes, remained OPERATION OF CIVIL CONTROL STATIONS 125 under the supervision of the United States Public Health Service until physically fit to be evacuated. All persons deferred from evacuation for medical reasons remained under the direct supervision of physicians of the United States Public Health Service dur¬ ing the period of deferrment. Cases of temporary illness, contagious infections, diseases, childbirth and pregnancies, were moved to Assembly Centers when re¬ covery was complete or when the physical condition, for which deferment had been granted, so improved as to permit evacuation with complete safety to the individual. Cases of long term illnesses and those requiring special medical care, such as pulmonary tuberculosis and insanity, were allowed to remain in insti¬ tutions. No evacuee, deferred for medical reasons, was later transferred to an Assem¬ bly Center until such transfer was recommended by the supervising United States Public Health Service physician. The basis of this recommendation in all cases was the improved physical condition of the individual evacuee and the medical facilities available in the Centers to provide any required additional medical care. At the time of the physical inspection the examining physician noted all cases which would require special accommodations for travel, such as the aged, infirm, babes in arms, and pregnant women. These individuals were recom¬ mended to the Station Manager for Pullman berth accommodations, ambulance service or other special facilities as required. Where the travel to the Assembly Centers was an over-night journey, Pullman berths were provided for all such persons and for all others recommended by the United States Public Health Service representative for that type of accommodation. Transportation from Control Stations to Centers. After the medical examination was completed, the evacuees were directed to the social worker who checked all records to make certain that all necessary services had been furnished to prepare the family for evacuation. The evacuees were then inform¬ ed of the scheduled date and hour for their departure to the Assembly Center, and they were assigned to a specific numbered bus or coach in the convoy. The data as to the date and place of departure and coach or bus number were written on the individual identification tag. In the evacuation of fifty-two of the Exclusion Areas, evacuees were allowed to drive their personal cars in supervised convoys to the Assembly Centers for storage, if the distance to be travelled was not over 100 miles. In those cases where private cars were permitted, the convoys were escorted by military police, and a nurse or doctor, and were accompanied by an Army towcar. Most evacuees were moved in special bus convoys or trains. On busses and train coaches three persons were assigned for each four seats. This gave space for the comfort of the evacuees and for hand luggage. Five hundred evacuees were normally moved in one unit. For such move¬ ments, two baggage cars were provided for baggage which was not taken on the coaches with the evacuees. The baggage cars were loaded and sealed prior 126 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST to departure. For the bus convoys, trucks were provided to transport the surplus baggage. All baggage was marked and tagged with the name of the head of the family and the family number in accordance with instructions given at the Control Station. It was also required that all baggage be in substantial containers or securely wrapped and tied in bundles so as to avoid any possibility of loss. On each special train there was assigned one doctor and a minimum of one registered nurse. Each train was equipped with necessary medical supplies and with any special foods and paraphernalia for the preparation of formulas for infant feeding. The type and quantity of foods and equipment so provided, were varied according to the length of the trip. Provisions were also made for meals enroute as required. In those cases individual box lunches and cold drinks were provided. These were generally arranged for in advance, and were picked up enroute on or about the hour they were to be esrved. Where it was necessary to prepare the lunches prior to the start of the journey, iceboxes were provided in order to properly preserve foodstuffs. A doctor and a nurse were similarly assigned for bus convoys carrying up to 500 evacuees and comparable facilities for the health and comfort of the evacuees were provided. All necessary stops enroute for exercise and personal comfort were made. Any evacuees on the bus convoys who appeared in need of medical care during the movement were placed together in one bus and were accompanied by a registered nurse. Medical personnel in charge of convoys were authorized and instructed to provide hospitalization in the nearest available hospital in all emergency medical cases occurring enroute. CHAPTER XI Protection of Property of the Evacuees While the decision was pending, and even after it had been determined to evacuate all persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast, no single aspect of evacuation procedure stimulated more discussion than that which related to evacuee property protection. During the month of February The Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration for the House of Representatives, 77th Congress (The Tolan Committee), held exhaustive hearings along the Pacific Coast. Persons from all walks of life appeared before this committee including many persons of Japanese ancestry. Virtually every witness expressed interest or concern in the economic and sociological considerations. In substantially every instance, suggestions were made pro¬ posing various methods of affording protection. It would unduly extend this report to refer in any detail to these many suggestions. Many were made not only to the Tolan Committee but also to the Army and other Federal agen¬ cies. It is sufficient to say that the problem was widely recognized and that many proposals were advanced for its solution. During the course of its hearings, the Committee made specific recommendations in this regard to the interested Executive Departments of the government and urged the early appointment of an alien property custodian. It has been noted in Chapter III and IV that consideration was given to this subject from the beginning—as early as January 5 th during discussions between the assistant to the Attorney General, Mr. James Rowe, Jr. and the Commanding General at San Francisco. In a memorandum to Mr. Rowe, quoted at the end of Chapter II, supra, the Commanding General pointed to the need for careful plan¬ ning to avoid undue hardship. It was then still contemplated that the Depart¬ ment of Justice might direct, coordinate and supervise certain alien enemy migra¬ tions from critical areas. Again on February 14th when the Department of Justice had withdrawn from any program involving collective evacuation (see letter of the Attorney General to the Secretary of War dated February 9, 1942, quoted on page 7), the Commanding General in recommending mass total evacuation of Japanese from the Pacific Coast, proposed that authority be granted to make for adequate provision for conservation of property. He recommended that specific means be established for arresting economic loss either through the designation of a trustee in conservation or through affording free facilities for the equitable dis¬ position or liquidation of properties. Once authority had been accorded the Commanding General to take action under Executive Order No. 9066, coincident with the publication of Proclamation No. I on March 2nd, he announced: “The appropriate agencies of the Federal Government are engaged in far reaching preparations to deal with the problem * * * regarding the protection of property, the resettlement and relocation of those who are affected. 127 128 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST “The property section of my staff will deal with the perplexing problem of pro¬ viding a property custodian, of minimizing economic dislocation, and of evading so far as possible forced sale by persons affected.” If the evacuation had been undertaken in the same way as compulsory migrations in other countries, it would not have been an underlying consid¬ eration that the evacuation program should entail a minimum of economic loss and social dislocation. In order to implement that controlling principle very specific steps were taken. for present purposes To describe those steps it is deemed sufficient to present a resume of the activities of the Federal Reserve Bank, San Francisco, and the Farm Security Administration in the field of property protection. The property protection program can be analyzed in two parts. First, that which related to Japanese owned or operated farms, including crops, livestock and farm equipment. Second, that relating to all other classes of evacuee property both real and personal including such categories as house¬ hold goods, business motor vehicles. establishments, accounts receivable and payable, and These two phases of property protection were administered by the Farm Security Administration as the designee of the United States De¬ partment of Agriculture and by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco as fiscal agent for the United States. These instrumentalities functioned under the direction of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. a narrative account of the services rendered by them. This chapter is Each of them has pre¬ pared its own detailed reports, copies of which are to be on file with Head¬ quarters, Western Defense Command, the War Department, and the Library of Congress. These reports present in much greater detail such subjects as the authorizations given them, the exact administrative procedures, personal functions, expenditures and services rendered. The purpose of this chapter is to compress the record of their activities into summary form. That phase of the program undertaken by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco is presented first. It is followed by a summary of the activities of the Farm Security Administration. The formulation of an evacuation plan necessarily entailed consideration of the disposition of the real and personal property of those who would be subject to removal from designated areas. It was anticipated that creditors would be disinclined to afford any protection for the interests of their debtors and that unscrupulous dealers and investors would be prone to take advan¬ tage of the unfavorable bargaining position of those involved. Therefore, means of reducing financial and material losses to a minimum were studied. It was resolved that the enlistment of the services of an agency widely expe¬ rienced in handling a large quantity and variety of property transactions was desirable. Responsive to a request for assistance, the Secretary of the Treasury designated the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, a fiscal agent of the United States, as the agency thus experienced. Authorization and Powers. The Federal Reserve Bank was first advised of its new assignment in a telegram dated March 5, 1942, from the Treasury Department which outlined certain phases of the program then still in the PROTECTION OF PROPERTY 129 formative stage. On March 7, 1942, all powers reposing in the Secretary of the Treasury which were incident to the execution of the new duties were delegated to the Federal Reserve Bank, including those under Section V(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act as amended by Title III of the First War Powers Act of 1941. These powers were re-delegated by the Secretary of the Treasury after the creation of the office of the Enemy Alien Property Custodian on March 11, 1942, because it was believed that a jurisdictional hiatus may have arisen by reason of the creation of that office. On March 11, 1942, the bank was authorized and directed to take all steps necessary to carry out the objectives of the program, as prescribed by his representative, the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration. The letters of authority from the Commanding General to the Federal Reserve Bank are quoted in Chapter IV hereof. A delegation of power by the War Relocation Authority was made on March 25, 1942, to avoid any jurisdictional conflict which may have come into being by reason of the existence of that agency. These directives, author¬ izations and powers emanated from the President’s Executive Order No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942. Administration of the Property Plan Preliminary Action. A series of conferences between the Federal Reserve Bank, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Treasury Department and the Military Authorities was held and a plan of procedure was agreed upon for the protection of property of evacuees under the direc¬ tion and supervision of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. The cooperation of all banks in Military Area No. 1, and later in Mili¬ tary Area No. 2, was solicited, and such institutions were advised of the desired methods and principles to be followed, and the objectives to be attained. The facilities of other governmental agencies, federal, state and local, were utilized. Publicity. The Information Division of the Wartime Civil Control Admin¬ istration secured the support of the press and radio in advising evacuees, cred¬ itors, prospective purchasers, lessees, operators, and the public, of the services, aims and policies of the government and the Military Establishment in the evacuee prop¬ erty program. The response of the press and radio was wholehearted and effective. Advantage of every opportunity favorably to influence future dealings was exercised. Organizations of all kinds, including banking groups, trade, credit and other associations, business organizations and Japanese societies, were periodically addressed for the purpose of inspiring voluntary fair treatment in all transactions involving such organizations, or their clients, and the Japanese. Bank Departments and Offices. An Evacuee Property Department was organized within the Federal Reserve Bank structure which was placed under the direct supervision of a vice-president and an assistant cashier of that insti¬ tution. A Federal Reserve liaison section was established at Wartime Civil Control Administration and the administrative channel from the Director, Wartime Civil 130 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Control Administration, was through this liaison section to the vice-president to the field forces. Directive operations were carried on from the head office but the administrative branch of the new department was decentralized and housed at 500 California Street, San Francisco, California. Other branches were established at addresses independent of bank offices in Los Angeles, California, Portland, Oregon, and Seattle, Washington, between March 9 and March 13 of 1942. Civil Control Station Representation. In addition to the establishment of the four principal offices, arrangements were made to place representatives in certain of the offices of the United States Employment Service throughout Military Area No. 1 and in Service Centers and Civil Control Stations in accord¬ ance with the "team” service plan initiated by Wartime Civil Concrol Admin¬ istration. Federal Reserve Bank representatives frequently visited the territory surrounding Civil Control Stations in order to implement office representation and facilitate problem solution. Bank agents were so stationed for the purpose of administering such of the evacuee property program problems which remained unsolved at the time of actual evacuation. Few such cases were uncompleted at that time in view of the groundwork previously laid. Operations at Assembly Centers. As it was necessary for evacuees to use some household equipment until the day of evacuation, it became necessary for bank agents to remain in contact with evacuees in order to finally settle any pending affairs and to dispose of and store the last of their effects, and for those purposes Bank representatives were maintained at Assembly Centers. In some instances the representatives were permanently assigned to the Centers and in others contact was maintained through periodical visits. As the ultimate responsibility for the care and protection of the property of evacuees rests in the War Relocation Authority, no representatives of the Bank were assigned to War Relocation Centers. All pertinent records in connec¬ tion with evacuee property interests were made available to War Relocation Authority. Personnel. Personnel was generally recruited from the existing Federal Re¬ serve Bank force, and those having particular experience and ability in various fields of endeavor were selected. At the peak of operations, 184 persons were engaged in the Bank’s per¬ formance of the property protection plan. Bank operatives were admonished to hold the information imparted to them in strict confidence and to respect the trust which had been placed in them. They were required to prepare and submit reports of their activities and progress in the field, and their acts and decisions were reviewed by supervisional district officers to determine whether supplemental action was necessary or advisable. The need for flexible "freezing power” in the conduct of evacuee property protection, particularly with regard to personal property, was apparent. of the objectives of the plan was to restrain unconscionable creditors. One Accord- 131 PROTECTION OF PROPERTY ingly, the Bank issued Special Regulation No. 1. It provided that the exercise of any right, power or privilege with respect to "special blocked property” was prohibited except when authorized by the Bank. The term "special blocked property” was defined to be "property in which an evacuee national has an interest and which has been designated as special blocked property.” "Evacuee national” was defined to include all persons of Japanese ancestry subject to exclusion. The regulation was confirmed by the Secretary of the Treasury and was published in the Federal Register March 21, 1942. The authority for the regulation rested upon Section V (b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act and upon the authority vested in the Commanding General under Executive Ordei No. 9066. All Wartime Civil Control Administration teams were advised of the exis¬ tence of the power. The Bank’s representatives were instructed to exercise the power wherever an evacuee property problem proved to be beyond compromise. It developed, however, that the mere existence of the authority had the desired effect. A similar power accorded Farm Security Administration was exercised but once. The Bank’s responsibility did not exercise it in any instance during administration of the program. Optional Service and Private Dealings. The evacuee property protection plan was predicated on the principle that this service was to be available to those who chose to call upon it on a purely voluntary basis. There was a total absence of compulsion, although every appropriate means was pursued to encourage its use. The Japanese were urged to call for the services, present their problems for consideration and solution. A continuous effort was put forth to anticipate and forestall future difficulties. Subject to the limitations of the Foreign Funds Control Operations of the Treasury Department, persons of Japanese ancestry were at liberty to dispose of their properties by sale, lease or any other arrangement desired by them. The Foreign Funds Control limitations imposed little or no burden upon evacuees as all essential licensing transactions were completed with all necessary dispatch. Cases in which powers of attorney were exercised by the institution were largely limited to transactions under the Army motor vehicle purchase program, and only in one case was a power of attorney otherwise used. Operating Procedure and Accomplishment. Problems were classified and assigned to those representatives best qualified in the particular field. Agents were instructed to explore fully the facts and circumstances of each case, to render considered advice. In all instances, when relationships with other persons were involved, they were directed to approach such persons in the interest of the evacuee and achieve a satisfactory solution through negotiation and com¬ promise. Where evacuees elected to avail themselves of assistance and had once pre¬ sented themselves for consultation, and did not reappear, they were queried to ascertain whether their problems were fully and satisfactorily concluded. 132 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Personal interviews and a follow-up system were also pursued with creditors. Complex legal problems were presented and every effort was made to seek their settlement. Contract and conditional sale obligations of all types, realty purchase agreements, tenancy commitments and evaluation of equities of all types, were handled and disposed of. Many accounts payable to evacuees were collected for them. Remittances of refunds, such as those due upon public utility use termina¬ tions were arranged. Business inventories were liquidated, leasehold interests were protected, and management for properties and businesses of all types, including flats, apartments, hotels and other income properties, bakeries, beauty parlors, canneries, church properties, cleaning and dyeing establishments, dry goods concerns, florists, garages, laundries, markets, newspapers, novelty stores, nurseries, packing houses, and restaurants was provided. The service of man¬ agement organizations and other firms specializing in business operation were secured where advisable or where substitute private operators were unobtainable. The following table illustrates the nature and number of business activities handled by the Bank during the program at its peak: TABLE 9.—Classification of Interviews by Types of Businesses as of May 22, 1942, Head Office Zone Number of Cases._. Ntimber of Persons Interviewed. Number of Persons Represented Residences. Flats and Apartments. Business._. Equipment and Merchandise... Furniture and Fixtures. Farms and Orchards. 3,562 6,515 41,483 712 120 1,325 2,111 942 1,002 Major Business Classification Bakeries.... Beauticians. Canneries... Churches... Cleaners.... Dry Goods.. Fertilizers... Florists. Garages Hotels.. Laundries... Liquors. Markets Newspapers. Novelties. .. Nurseries. .. Packers. Professions.. Restaurants. Sport Goods. All Others... 7 38 1 34 205 32 5 21 16 158 75 14 102 6 19 230 9 19 56 2 276 Interviews Conducted. Representatives conducted 26,954 interviews rela¬ tive to general property problems. Many of this number involved the concerns of several members of a family or of associates or organizations, and that figure should be considered in the light of such augmentation. sented 10,600 individual cases. The interviews repre¬ 133 PROTECTION OF PROPERTY TABLE 10.—Total Interviews and Total Individual Cases Handled by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco in Connection With the Evacuation Program Office Number of interviews Number of cases Total (all offices). 26,954 10,600 San Francisco (Head Office). Los Angeles Branch. Portland Branch. Seattle Branch. 7.895 9,109 3,741 6,209 4,630 4,059 207 1,704 Agriculture. The Bank’s inability in some cases, to divorce general prop- lems from those of an agricultural character, necessitated the involvement of the Bank in situations concerning evacuees engaged in farming, although, as the general program progressed, the responsibility for settlement of the majority of all agricultural problems was assumed and administered by the Farm Security Administration. Storage of Personal Property General Considerations. By Proclamation No. 4, dated March 27, 1942, the Commanding General ordered the cessation of further voluntary migration effective March 29th. This was primarily to insure an orderly plan of supervised evacuation. It was stimulated essentially by reason of the need for protecting the evacuees themselves (See Chapter VI). In anticipation of Proclamation No. 4, the Commanding General authorized the Wartime Civil Control Administration to arrange for the storage of all evacuee personal property which they did not desire to dispose of otherwise. A number of possibilities were considered including the construction of facilities at Assembly Centers. While this was favorably regarded it would have imposed a considerable strain on transportation facilities already over-taxed and would have entailed additional construction which the alternative finally adopted eliminated. Accordingly, the Federal Reserve Bank was instructed to anticipate storage needs, locate warehouses and other buildings suitable for storage, and secure them by lease. Forms and procedures were developed for the purpose by Wartime Civil Control Administration and Wartime Civil Control Administra¬ tion Service Center and Civil Control Station teams were instructed fully to inform evacuees of the availability of this service. Whenever possible, a building not previously used for storage purposes was acquired on a monthly basis as economically as circumstances permitted and, where practical, the use of public storage concerns was avoided in an effort to prevent unnecessary warehouse congestion. In those instances where public warehouses only were available, they were used, and sometimes storage space was utilized at Assembly Centers. Guarding service was provided on a twentyfour hour basis for storage premises to prevent damage or destruction through vandalism or theft. All personal property, including stocks of merchandise, other than perish- 134 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST able goods, were accepted for storage, as was machinery and equipment. Inven¬ tory forms were provided and identification tags issued. Evacuees were instructed to crate all belongings and avoid collections of small units or bundles. They were directed to make inventories of everything to be stored. The goods were checked upon delivery to draymen and warehousemen and receipts were issued to the owners. Discrepancies between the property declared and that actually received were adjusted with the evacuee. Drayage facilities were provided in urban communities and the goods were collected at the evacuee’s residence, place of business or other location wherever possible. Shortages of drayage facilities were sometimes encountered in rural communities or districts and under such circumstances evacuees were urged to move as many of their belongings as possible to designated property assembly locations for removal to storage buildings. Where available, local hauling and drayage concerns were employed for the movement of all such property. Scope of the Operation. Those evacuees in both Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2, who elected to use the government storage plan were in the minority, a major portion of them having made private provision for the care of their property. Evacuees from Military Area No. 2 were transferred direct to War Relocation Centers upon evacuation, rather than to Assembly Centers, and in many instances their household effects were forwarded directly to them at the Centers. In addition to the properties stored from Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2, goods were accepted from evacuees and internees from the Territory of Alaska, and stored in Seattle, Washington, the port of their debarkation. These latter properties were subsequently released from storage upon the instructions of the proper authorities. Termination of Wartime Civil Control Administration Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the goods became vested in the War Relocation Authority after the evacuation was completed, and control over 2,983 family units of property was assumed by that agency. (See Chapter XX, Agreement between War De¬ partment and War Relocation Authority of April 17, 1942.) Some specific items of belongings were forwarded to evacuees at Relocation Projects by the bank on the direction of the War Relocation Authority during the period of resul¬ tant readjustment. A schedule of property stored follows: TABLE 11.—Property Received for Storage in Military Areas Transferred to War Relocation Authority Office Number of family units 1 and 2 and Number of individual units Total (all offices). 2,983 38,693 San Francisco (Head Office). Los Angeles Branch. Portland Branch. Seattle Branch. 1,375 1,190 153 265 17,930 15,168 2,966 2,629 Handling and Storage. In the disposition of motor vehicles, evacuees were afforded the following avenues of disposition: (a) private sale, lease or storage through private arrangements; (b) sale or other disposition through the facilities 135 PROTECTION OF PROPERTY provided by Wartime Civil Control Administration; (c) sale to the Army; (d) storage in facilities made available by Wartime Civil Control Administration. In connection with the latter course open to them, evacuees were permitted to drive their cars from a given exclusion area control station to the pre¬ described Assembly Center under convoy. As the emphasis was to encourage and induce evacuees to make their vehicles available for continued use in the war effort, every appropriate means were applied to stimulate private sale or sale to the Army. By far the major portion of evacuees chose to dispose of their vehicles through private channels. The substantial majority of them stored them in private places and these vehicles never came into the custody, con¬ structive or otherwise, of any governmental agency. The minority who did choose to store their cars at public expense drove them to guarded parking lots. In order to arrest the deterioration ensuing from open storage, cars thus stored were immediately appraised by two disinterested appraisers with a view to ultimate purchase or, if owners refused to sell or make some appropriate disposition for beneficial use, their requisition. Sales. Sales to the Army were consummated soon after the appraisal was completed where such procedure was agreed upon by the evacuee. It became ap¬ parent that the storage of vehicles would serve little purpose and would result in deterioration and waste, whereupon renewed offers of Army purchase were submitted to those evacuees who had not availed themselves in the first instance of the Army purchase plan where the vehicles were qualified for Army acquisi¬ tion. Many car storage cases were converted to sales through this approach. The evacuees were permitted, however, to dispose of their vehicles at private sale at any time. Payment. Where no third party claim existed, a check was issued by the Bank to the registered owner in the amount of the appraised value of the vehicle. The vehicle was then delivered to a designated representative of the Army Quartermaster’s Corps against receipt. Many third party claims were encoun¬ tered where vehicles had been purchased under installment contracts. Under those circumstances the legal and registered owners were consulted, balances established and agreements for the transfer consummated. Under such circum¬ stances the interest of the legal owner was cleared through the issuance of a Bank check in the amount required to discharge the unpaid obligation. The difference between the appraised value and such sum was forwarded to the evacuee in satisfaction of his equity. Wartime Civil Control Administration reimbursed the Bank for all sums so advanced upon presentation of proper vouchers. Vehicle Requisition. Vehicles relinquished to the custody of the Bank numbered 1,905, of which 1,469 originally were voluntarily sold to the Army and 319 were released in accordance with the instructions of the evacuees. The 117 vehicles remaining in storage under the control of the Bank were sub¬ sequently subjected to requisition by the Army. Pending completion of the requisition proceedings, voluntary sales to the Army continued. Only those 136 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST vehicles which the evacuee owners refused to sell and which were in open public storage were requisitioned. Farm Vehicles. The motor vehicle purchase program contemplated the acquisition of all vehicles other than farm equipment, the latter falling within the jurisdiction of the Farm Security Administration. At first some difficulty was experienced in arriving at a clear definition of "farm equipment”. Wartime Civil Control Administration subsequently determined that farm equipment should be defined as that type of equipment ordinarily handled by dealers in farm implements. The only motor vehicles actually handled by the Bank were auto¬ mobiles, trucks and a few trailers. There follows a schedule of motor vehicles handled under the program: TABLE 12.—Motor Vehicles Received and Handled by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Total Office Sold to army Released to depositors for private dis¬ position* Submitted for requisitioning 1,905 1,469 319 117 152 1,682 13 58 120 1,312 7 30 28 259 5 27 4 **111 1 1 *On Form EPM 8. **While 111 vehicles in Los Angeles Branch zone were submitted to the Military authorities under pro¬ posals for requisitioning, voluntary sales of the vehicles to the Army continued, pending comp¬ letion of requisitioning details. Conclusion The following objectives of the Evacuee Property Program have been achieved: 1. Real properties and business enterprises of evacuees have been disposed of at fair prices or are being operated through substitute management; 2. Personal property, other than motor vehicles, which was not sold or otherwise disposed of by the Japanese, has been placed in protective storage; 3. Many motor vehicles which were not sold at private sale have been pur¬ chased or requisitioned by the United States Army. 4. Business transactions of all kinds have been adjusted and settled, so far as can be determined, to the satisfaction of the parties concerned. 5. Responsibility for evacuee property protection was relinquished to the War Relocation Authority only after the completion of the evacuation process. Agricultural Property Protection At the time the evacuation program was conceived the Commanding Gen¬ eral was confronted with the problem of the evacuation of the Japanese farmer. This class comprised 45.3 per cent of the employed Japanese population of Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington. An estimated 6,000 farms, 137 PROTECTION OF PROPERTY aggregating some 260,000 acres valued at $73,000,000.00 became the immedi¬ ate concern of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. Japanese farming interests were analyzed with a view to the accomplishment of the intended evacuation with a maximum of expedition and a minimum of crop loss. Protection of many of the growing crops was of concern to Wartime Civil Control Administration in view of the demands of war. The Secretary of Agriculture had established 1942 production goals for certain farm products considered vital in the prosecution of the war. Japanese farms in California had been expected to contribute an appreciable proportion of many of these commodities. Contribution to such effort, in lesser degree, was expected of the Japanese in Oregon, Washington and Arizona. Numerous complicating factors in the successful preservation of the crops and in the minimization of financial loss to the evacuees immediately evinced themselves. The Japanese people were the most important racial minority group engaged in agriculture in the Pacific Coast region. Their systems of farming, types of crops, and conditions of land tenure were such that their replacement by other farmers would be extremely difficult; yet replacement was considered necessary to the successful completion of the plan in order to preserve expected and important production. Since Japanese production was predicated upon the intensification of farming methods, frugality and economy of operation, mini¬ mization of ‘water consumption, family labor, and special and peculiar skill, substituted operation on a practical basis at first seemed a difficult if not an insurmountable obstacle from a production preservation standpoint. A very complex system of land tenure in California resulted from the pro¬ hibitions against Japanese land ownership contained in the Alien Land Law of May 19, 1913, and it further complicated the farm evacuation program. Seventy per cent of the Pacific Coast Japanese farmers were classified as tenants and the remainder owned their land through minors or third parties who appeared to be disinterested parties. Of a total of 48,926 Japanese workers over fourteen years of age, in the four mentioned states, 7,000 were farm operators or managers, and 13,000 were farm laborers, making a total of 20,000 deriving their livelihood from agricultural pursuits. Not only the desire to assure to the Japanese farmer a fair and equitable dis¬ position of his real and personal property was involved, but the necessity for the protection of the American farmer, landlord, creditor, merchant and consumer, as well. Land, rental, crop, and equipment values required stabilization, and the substitution of purchasers, operators, tenants, share croppers, and labor in the places of the evacuees was an immediate and pressing necessity. At the request of the Commanding General transmitted to the Department of Agriculture by the Assistant Secretary of War, the Farm Security Adminis¬ tration was named as the designee of the Department of Agriculture in its evacuation operations participation. Accordingly, on March 15 th, the Farm Security Administration, through 138 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST its Coast Regional Director, was authorized and administer an appropriate program. The directed to institute and program outlined was one de¬ signed to secure the continued operation of Japanese agricultural lands and assure a fair and equitable disposition of Japanese farming interests. Such authority included an authorization to make, service, and collect loans and provide necessary farm management and advice. The letters of authorization from the Commanding General as supplemented by the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, are quoted in Chapter III, supra. The original letter of authority from the Commanding General was in confirmation of arrangements previously made on an informal basis between Mr. Laurence I. Hewes, Jr., Regional Director and the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration. After a brief period of operation by Farm Security Administration, it became apparent that the authority vested in it by the Commanding General’s order and authorization of March 15 th would require supplementation. Instances were soon encountered where the interests of landlords, creditors and potential purchasers of crops and farm assets came into conflict, not only with the interests of Japanese farmers, but also with those of each other. Landlords, because of the presence of non-assignability clauses in leases, sought to deprive Japanese farm operators of their crops and leasehold interests. Conditional contract sellers were ready to exercise forfeitures based upon breaches which would be necessi¬ tated by the enforced evacuation. Landlords, creditors, and prospective pur¬ chasers were ready to take advantage in other ways of the adverse bargaining position of Japanese evacuees, even at the cost of serious loss of agricultural production. There was a further possibility that Japanese operators would abandon farm land, would discontinue normal agricultural operations, would refuse to consummate transfers of their agricultural properties, or would per¬ haps commit sabotage of crops and machinery. None of this could be coun¬ tenanced. On March 7, 1942, evacuees were warned against the destruction of grow¬ ing crops, as follows: "Foodstuffs are vital in prosecution of the war, and for Japanese ranchers professing loyalty to the United States there is no better way of showing sincerity than by continu¬ ing to raise crops. On the other hand, wilful destruction of crops demonstrates disloy¬ alty and unwillingness to cooperate.” On March 9, 1942, it was announced that Japanese farmers, aliens or cit¬ izens, who plowed under growing crops would be arrested and prosecuted as saboteurs. The statement said, "Destruction of growing foodstuffs is outright sabotage and will be dealt with accordingly.” However, action was taken to insure the continued cultivation of farm properties and to protect the interests of evacuee operators. Accordingly, it was requested that authority be delegated to the Secre¬ tary of Agriculture, and, in turn, to the Farm Security Administration and its Regional Director, to exercise "freezing powers.” These powers emanated from Section 5 (b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act as amended by Title III of the First War Powers Act of 1941. cised by the Bank. The power was similar to that exer¬ 139 PROTECTION OF PROPERTY Funds were made available from the Chief of Staff’s Contingent Fund and later from the President’s Emergency Fund to Farm Security Administration for the formation of the California Evacuated Farms Association, a corporate entity capable of undertaking the operation of farms and the acceptance of powers of attorney if such should become necessary through the exercise of the “freezing power.” Administrative Agencies and Services Regional Director. Throughout the evacuation program the Farm Se¬ curity Regional Director was personally responsible to the Commanding Gen¬ eral for the agricultural phases of the evacuation. Fie was the authorized rep¬ resentative of the Department of Agriculture and directed the activities of Farm Security Administration under the supervision of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. A Farm Security Administration liaison section was estab¬ lished at Wartime Civil Control Administration. This served as the administra¬ tive channel from the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, to the Director, Farm Security Administration, and the field forces. Public Information Activities. Meetings between Wartime Civil Control Administration and representatives of Farm Security Administration, State Agri¬ cultural War Board, United States Agricultural Extension Service, Bureau of Ag¬ ricultural Economics, Agricultural Adjustment Administration and Farm Credit Administration were called and the farm evacuation plan was explained and discussed with a view toward effecting unity and cooperation throughout the state and the nation. Farm Security Administration looked to the War Boards for advice and recommendations concerning local conditions of which they were particularly cognizant, and state and local Chambers of Commerce and Japanese-American organizations were called upon for cooperation in the execution of the program. An Information Division, created March 16, 1942, and disbanded June 10, 1942, publicized the movement for the purpose of edifying the evacuee and the farming and general public alike in the agricul¬ tural aspects of evacuation. Reports. Wartime Civil Control Administration’s complete surveillance of the program was materially aided by the submission of daily field progress reports and weekly statistical surveys throughout the operating period by Farm Security Administration. Personnel. Wartime Civil Control Administration agricultural aspects of evacuation operations required the employment of a total of 521 persons, of whom 148 were detailed from the permanent force of the Farm Security Admin¬ istration, 367 were newly employed and 6 were specialists borrowed from the Farm Credit Administration. These figures apply to total numbers of personnel employed, as the maximum number on duty at the peak of operations was 375. Initiation of Activities. On March 13, 1942, Farm Security Administra¬ tion’s Regional Director initiated proceedings for the development of an opera¬ tional field organization. Three days later basic procedure had been formulated and the administrative plan was decided upon. On March 16, 1942, 48 Farm Security Administration Rural Rehabilitation supervisors in Arizona, California, 140 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Oregon, and Washington received orders to report for duty as field agents at 48 Service Centers, which had been established in United States Employment Service offices, throughout Military Area No. 1, and instructions concerning the work they would immediately undertake upon arrival at their destinations were dispatched on the following day. Thirty-nine of these offices were in California, five in Washington, two in Oregon, and one in Arizona. Special information offices were opened in principal metropolitan centers. Eight additional offices were subsequently placed in operation in Military Area No. 1. By June 5, 1942, five offices were staffed in Military Area No. 2, and four additional offices were subsequently opened in that Area. Registration of Japanese Farms. Contact was first established with Japanese farmers through Field Agents. Registration of all Japanese farms and recordation of the location and description of every farm subject to evacuation followed. By March 27, 1942, 6,307 Japanese farms had been listed in Military Area No. 1, of which 5,436, totalling 151,063 acres had been inspected. In Military Area No. 2 over 850 farms were registered. The process of registering Japanese farms by Farm Security Administration in Areas 1 and 2 continued throughout the program with the assistance of Japanese-American Societies, the United States Department of Agriculture County War Boards, local organiza¬ tions, and agricultural commissions, although 80 per cent of the task was ac¬ complished within the first week in both Areas. Registration of Prospective Operators. Aggressive tactics in the loca¬ tion and registration of prospective substitute farm operators and managers and prospective purchasers of crops, machinery and other farm assets were employed after the voluntary phase of the evacuation program ended on March 31, 1942. During the first ten days of field operation in Military Area No. 1, 1,487 prospective operators were registered. One week later this number had doubled, (3,151). By May 15, it had doubled again (6,455). Registration was accomplished with like dispatch in Military Area No. 2. Progress in Completing the Disposal of Farm Properties. During the first ten days of field operation, when voluntary evacuation was still possible, 734 deals were closed and 28,042 acres, (10 per cent), transferred to new operators. One week later, April 3, 1942, 1,776 transactions had been completed, embracing 59,653 acres. By May 31, 1942, over 6,000 deals had been consumated, involving 230,248 acres and 6,596 farms. For all practical purposes the transfer of Japanese farms in Military Area No. 1 had been completely accomplished, and the crops and land were in the hands of the most qualified substitute operators who could be selected under the circumstances. The pro¬ gram was carried out with equal facility in Military Area No. 2. Providing Credit to Substitute Operators. Short term agricultural credit was indispensable to many substitute operators desiring to take over evacuated properties. However, while 6,596 transfers were involved in the entire evacuation of Military Area No. 1, but 722 loans were required. The mere availability of such credit had a stabilizing and stimulating effect on the dealings between prospective operators and established credit agencies PROTECTION OF PROPERTY and between such operators and the Japanese. 141 The use of credit agencies such as the Farm Credit Administration, the Rural Rehabilitation Offices and private banks, was advocated wherever practical, but Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬ tration productions loans were granted where the substitute operators appeared qualified to assume the operation of evacuated property in all respects except that of eligibility for private credit. Wartime Civil Control Administration loans were authorized “for the pur¬ pose of meeting any expense or charge in connection with land use, feed and fertilizer, livestock, farm machinery, equipment and tools, or supplies and/or services.” They were not authorized for land acquisition or for the construction of real estate improvements. Loans were to be made for a period of one year or less with the definite expectation that renewals of notes at maturity would be permitted where the purchase of durable goods, such as livestock or machinery, was involved. The interest rate was five per cent per annum. All loans were secured by first liens upon crops and chattels purchased with loan proceeds, and in some instances by liens upon additional property possessed by borrowers. Each loan application included a concise farm operating plan which specified the types of farm enterprises to be continued or established by the substitute operator, and the estimated expenses and incomes involved in the individual farm program. Progress in Making Loans. The first two Wartime Civil Control Admin¬ istration loans were submitted from the field on March 23, 1942. By the end of March, 3 5 loans had been received totaling $23 5,312. At the end of the first week in April, 155 loans had been submitted and 33 approved. During the entire period , to June 1 789 loans were submitted totaling $4,450,140. Of these loans 722 were approved, totaling $3,120,243. Forty-two of the loans provided for an advance of funds at future dates. The amount involved in such advances was $320,411. The average size of all loans approved was $4,321.67; 77 per cent were for amounts under $5,000, 22 per cent for amounts under $50,000, and less than 1 per cent for sums exceeding $50,000. The distribution and average size of loans was influenced by certain large corporation loans which were made and which involved the assumption of the operation of several farms by a single borrowing agent. The loan policy was modified during the evacuation of Military Area No. 2 to deny loans to corporations, organizations or associations unless their mem¬ bers, directors, or stockholders assumed payment responsibility. This change met with considerable opposition from prospective operators, but credit was arranged through other channels and no Wartime Civil Control Administration loans whatever were granted in that Area. Special Negotiations Unit Frequently the prevailing size and highly specialized character of Japanese farm enterprises made successful operation by individual substitute operators impractical and uneconomical, and consequently some consolidation of the operation of these small farms was found to be necessary. Local leaders and established agricultural cooperative groups and associations and real estate companies, being best qualified, were interested in the movement and opera- 142 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST tional agreements were consummated with many of them. A Special Negotia¬ tions Unit was established to review, and, in an appropriate degree, supervise these larger scale transactions. In some instances corporations were organized by such groups for this purpose. Each such organization undertook to operate a number of farms and if financing proved necessary it was provided. They supplied competent supervision, management and labor for 124 evacuated farms totaling 4,023 acres and $617,987.17, was loaned by Wartime Civil Control Ad¬ ministration for this purpose. Freezing Power and Fair Dealing When it became evident that hard bargains were to be imposed on the Japanese by creditors, purchasers, and operators, the power of "freezing” any inequitable transaction was delegated to Farm Security Administration, and the formation of an entity through which business could be conducted in consequence of the exercise of the power was undertaken. The vesting of such power and the provision for means to exercise it had the desired effect of stabilization, and, as a result, it became necessary in only one instance in the entire evacuation process to assert the "freezing power.” One power of attorney and management contract was accepted by the California Evacuated Farms Association, the entity so established for the purpose, and thirteen powers of attorney which had been accepted by a Farm Security Administration field agent during the initial phase of the evacuation from Bainbridge Island in Puget Sound were transferred to the Association. Occasionally powers of attorney were given by the Japanese to private individuals who agreed to represent them in the disposition of their properties, but a relatively small number of such situations developed, as nearly all transactions were concluded prior to evacuation. Farm Machinery. The preservation, distribution, and transfer of farm machinery presented such difficulties that the adoption of a firm policy was necessary to prevent waste, destruction, or sale for scrap. Many substitute operators owned or had access to sufficient equipment to farm the added acre¬ age. Dealers in scrap metal attempted to buy from the Japanese at sacrificial prices. Implement dealers were reluctant to purchase, and there was some indication that some equipment may have been intentionally destroyed. There¬ fore Wartime Civil Control Administration directed the institution of a cam¬ paign to assure (1) the retention of farm machinery by the substitute operators upon the land where it had been formerly used if they so desired, (2) the con¬ tinued utilization in the locality of former use if needed by others, and (3) the discouragement of storage or sale for scrap of any such equipment. An agreement was reached with implement dealers’ associations whereby dealers consented to act as attorneys in fact for the Japanese in the sale of farm machinery which was placed with them on a consignment basis. As a result, by May 8, 1942, undisposed of equipment remained on but thirteen farms in Military Area No. 1 and was of an approximate value of $11,655.00, and available farm machinery and equipment had been distributed in a manner consonant with a maximum agricultural war effort. 143 PROTECTION OF PROPERTY Fiscal Summary The Finance Division of the Farm Security Administration provided the necessary services in handling the accounts for the agricultural aspects of the evacuation program, and the creation of a new section of finance in the Wartime Civil Control Administration for this purpose was thus avoided. On March 18, 1942, $1,000,000 was allocated from the contingent fund of the Army Chief of Staff to Farm Security Administration for use in making Wartime Civil Control Administration loans. By the middle of April, this sum had been exhausted, loans aggregating over $900,000 having been made. On April 24, 1942, an additional $5,000,000 was transferred from the President’s Emergency Fund for the continuation of operations. A total of $3,584,025.42 had been expended for loans and administrative costs by the end of May. Of this sum, $3,434,008.08 was for loans and $150,017.34 for administrative costs. Conclusion The first Civil Control Station opened on March 24, 1942 at Winslow, Washington. Between that date and June 6, 1942, over 100,000 persons of Japanese ancestry were processed in 112 Civil Control Stations, and evacuated from Military Area No. 1. On May 27, 1942 the Farm Security Administration was advised by Wartime Civil Control Administration that the California por¬ tion of Military Area No. 2 would be evacuated, and on June 5, 1942, Farm Security Administration agents opened offices in the Sacramento and San Joaquin valleys. Between July 4 and August 11, 1942, over 9,000 persons were evacuated from Military Area No. 2 in California. By August 8, 1942, the Farm Security Administration had completed its phase of the property protection program. Table 13 summarizes the accomplishments of that program. TABLE 13.—Summary of Cases Served by the Farm Security Administration: Military Areas 1 and 2 Military Area No. 1 Military Area No. 2 Total Civil Control Stations. 112 9 Farm cases registered. 5,349 867 5:266 866 Cases with property arrangements Completed when Stations closed. Farm cases with property arrangements Incomplete when Stations closed. Acreage operated by registered evacuees. Acreage with property transactions Completed. Acreage with property transactions Incomplete. 83 1 210,179 34,536 207,942 34,511 2,237 25 After evacuation of the Japanese was accomplished in any area, attention was concentrated upon all incomplete cases and acreages. Of the evacuee Agricultural Property Protection Program, it may be con¬ cluded: 1. That substitute management and operation has been achieved for 99 percent of Japanese farms. 144 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 2. That farm equipment has been utilized, consistent with fair dealing and protection of evacuee interests, to the greatest advantage of the war effort. 3. That the use of land, the nature of crops, and the quantity of production underwent a minimum of change as the result of the evacuation of Japanese owners, operators, and labor, although some deviation was ex¬ perienced in highly subdivided suburban districts or in localities in which poor soil and inadequate water supply were found. the land reverted to pasture. In a few instances, Some reduction in production will have been experienced by reason of the loss of the peculiar skill and experience of the Japanese, his capacity for labor, and his employment of intensive farming methods, but the production of crops vital to the war effort has been maintained and in some instances augmented. Table 14 shows the number of evacuee farms (viz., farms subject to re¬ linquishment) and the number successfully transferred or for which substitute operators were found. The data in this table are for operations in both Military Area 1 and Area 2. TABLE 14.—Farms and Acreage Subject to Relinquishment FARMS SUBJECT TO RELINQUISHMENT Office All farms Transferred N umber ACREAGE SUBJECT TO RELINQUISHMENT Total acreage Percent Transferred Number Percent All offices. 7,311 7,243 99.1 256,741 254,830 99.3 Arizona. Phoenix. 31 31 31 31 100.0 100.0 1,438 1,438 1,438 1,438 100.0 100.0 California. Military Area 1. Bakersfield. El Centro. Fresno. Hayward. Los Angeles. Pasadena. Sacramento. San Diego. San Jose. Santa Ana. Santa Maria. Santa Rosa. Stockton. Torrance. Watsonville. Military Area 2. Chico. Lincoln. Marysville. Reedley. Visalia. Oregon. Portland. Washington. Auburn. Yakima. 6,084 5,437 120 254 469 254 548 352 754 190 604 544 155 81 303 414 395 647 24 52 17 373 181 366 366 830 715 115 6,062 5,415 120 254 469 254 548 351 734 190 604 544 154 81 303 414 395 647 24 52 17 373 181 366 366 784 669 115 99.6 99.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 99.7 97.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 94.5 93.6 100.0 223,257 198,675 6,118 12,729 27,784 6,758 7,941 7,319 36,878 6,070 13,841 15,926 16,776 1,209 15,827 8,462 15,037 24,582 643 2,876 573 13,985 6,505 13,974 13,974 18,072 10,635 7,437 221,744 197,162 6,118 12,729 27,784 6,758 7,941 7,309 35,627 6,070 13,841 15,926 16,524 1,209 15,827 8,462 15,037 24,582 643 2,876 573 13,985 6,505 13,974 13,974 17,674 10,237 7,437 99.3 99.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.9 96.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 97.8 96.3 100.0 CHAPTER XII Deferments and Exemptions From Evacuation The Public Proclamations and Restrictive Orders provided for the immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry. were made in the interest of justice. to be moved without danger to life. However, certain exceptions There were Japanese in hospitals too ill There were Japanese children in orphanages, for whom proper facilities were not available in the Assembly Centers. There were Japanese in institutions who required special attention, which the Assembly Centers were not equipped to provide, and those who were imprisoned. Defer¬ ment from evacuation was granted these persons until their physical condition permitted movement or until they were released. Early in the evacuation program another problem requiring special con¬ sideration was presented. Included among the evacuees were persons who were only part Japanese, some with as little as one-sixteenth Japanese blood; others who, prior to evacuation, were unaware of their Japanese ancestry; and many who had married Caucasians, Chinese, Filipinos, Negroes, Hawaiians, or Eskimos. Most of these people were American-born, had been through American schools, had not developed Oriental thought patterns or been subjected to socalled Japanese culture. Because of their Americanization and their awkward social position, life in the Japanese Centers proved a trying and often humiliating experience. The adults were ostracized and the half-caste children ridiculed. Their presence in the Assembly Centers was the source of constant irritation to the Japanese, provoked bad feeling and added to the difficulties of administra¬ tion. Although non-Japanese spouses were eligible to reside in the Centers, many of them found life in a totally Japanese community unbearable, and left, thus breaking up the family group. A policy was initiated which provided exemption from evacuation for certain mixed-marriage families and mixed-blood individuals whose background made it reasonably clear that their sympathies were and would remain American. Those eligible for exemption from evacuation or eligible to return to the evac¬ uated zone were: 1. Families consisting of a Japanese wife, a non-Japanese husband, citizen of the United States or of a friendly nation, and their mixed-blood un¬ emancipated children. 2. Families consisting of a Caucasian mother, citizen of the United States or of a friendly nation, and her mixed-blood children by a Japanese father (either dead or separated from the family). 3. Mixed-blood (one-half Japanese or less) individuals, citizens of the United States or of friendly nations, whose backgrounds have been Caucasian. 4. Japanese unemancipated children who are being reared by Caucasian foster-parents. 145 146 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 5. Japanese wives of non-Japanese spouses serving in the armed forces of the United States.1 As a condition to release, each applicant’s name was submitted to the several intelligence services, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence, and the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 and to the police chief of the local community where the applicant intended to establish residence. If the applicant had a clean record and his residence in the community was not objected to by the local authorities on the ground that it would provoke incidents, exemption from evacuation was authorized. In addition to residents of the Assembly Centers, applications for exemption from evacuation and for permission to reside in the evacuated area were re¬ ceived from: 1. Persons who for one reason or another had not been evacuated and were still resident in the evacuated areas. 2. Persons in War Relocation Authority Centers. 3. Persons who had voluntarily left their families in the evacuated areas, and had established residence elsewhere. The applications of such individuals for permission to reside in the evacuated area were considered, and where it was deemed necessary, the applicant’s back¬ ground was investigated through the Public Assistance Division of the Federal Social Security Board. If the applicants were found to be eligible under the mixed-marriage policy, permits were issued after the necessary intelligence and police clearances had been secured. Each person granted an exemption from evacuation was furnished a com¬ bination photograph permit showing his authority for residence in the evacuated area with his family. Each is required to furnish a monthly report reflecting births, deaths, marriages, divorces, change of address or any incident bearing upon community acceptance. This information has been recorded in Wartime Civil Control Administration files. All residence addresses of exemptees are imme¬ diately forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The purposes of these safeguards are: 1. To keep informed of the whereabouts of persons of Japanese ancestry in the event future developments require a different solution of the mixed-marriage problem or require the apprehension of an individual. 2. To keep advised of the community attitude with respect to the residence of Japanese in the evacuated area, since community attitude is a factor bearing on the ultimate success or failure of the mixed-marriage program. During the execution of the mixed-marriage program, 465 persons of Japa¬ nese ancestry were released for residence in the evacuated area. Of these, 290 were mixed-blood children, 34 were mixed-blood parents, 72 were Japanese mothers, and 68 were mixed-blood adults with no children. Only one full- 1Otlier mixed-marriage families and mixed-blood individuals were made eligible for release from the Assembly Centers upon the condition that they leave the Western Defense Command area. This feature of the program was incidental since persons eligible were transferred to War Relocation Centers and out of the jurisdiction of the Army before many relocations could be arranged. Many of these were released by War Relocation Authority with Army consent to take up residence within the Western Defense Command area but outside the evacuated zone. Only ten families left the Assembly Centers for residence outside the Western Defense Command area. DEFERMENTS AND EXEMPTIONS FROM EVACUATION 147 blooded Japanese male, a citizen of the United States, was authorized to reside in the evacuated area. A special exception was made in his case because of long and honorable service in the United States Navy. Of the total group, 375 per¬ sons of Japanese ancestry elected to reside in California, 14 in Oregon, 53 in Washington, and 23 in Arizona. (Fourteen persons subsequently moved out of the evacuated area.) The execution of the mixed-marriage program has not adversely affected military security, and it has achieved certain benefits: 1. Mixed-blood children are being reared in an American environment. 2. Families have been reunited. 3. Mixed-blood adults predominantly American in appearance and thought have been restored to their families, to their communities, and to their jobs. PART V ASSEMBLY CENTER OPERATIONS CHAPTER XIII Assembly Center Location, Construction and Equipment The considerations which induced the decision to establish Assembly Centers as transitory evacuation facilities have already been presented in preceding chap¬ ters. The dominant factor was that evacuation could not await the preparation of semi-permanent Relocation Centers. Once their use had been decided upon, evacuation planning and execution moved forward simultaneously. Assembly Center site selection was a task of relative simplicity. As time was of the essence, it will be apparent that the choice was limited by four rather fundamental requirements which virtually pointed out the selections ultimately made. First, it was necessary to find places with some adaptable pre-existing facilities suitable for the establishment of shelter, and the many needed com¬ munity services. Second, power, light, and water had to be within immediate availability as there was no time for a long pre-development period. Third, the distance from the Center of the main elements of evacuee population served had to be short, the connecting road and rail net good, and the potential capacity sufficient to accept the adjacent evacuee group. Finally, it was essen¬ tial that there be some area within the enclosure for recreation and allied activ¬ ities as the necessary confinement would otherwise have been completely demor¬ alizing. The sudden expansion of our military and naval establishments further limited the choice. After an intensive survey the selections were made. Except at Portland, Oregon, Pinedale and Sacramento, California, and Mayer, Arizona, large fair¬ grounds or racetracks were selected. As the Arizona requirements were small, an abandoned Civilian Conservation Corps camp at Mayer was employed. In Portland the Pacific International Live Stock Exposition facilities were adapted to the purpose. At Pinedale the place chosen made use of the facilities remaining on a former mill site where mill employees had previously resided. At Sacramento an area was employed where a migrant camp had once operated and advantage was taken of nearby utilities. However, construction was substantially all new there. It will be remembered that Manzanar Reception Center, located at Owens Valley, Inyo County, California, and the Colorado River War Relocation Center in Arizona were intended essentially for use as Reception Centers. They were to be operated by the Army during the initial phases of evacuation. Manzanar was under Army operation until June 1st, 1942, when it was transferred to War Relo¬ cation Authority for use as a Relocation Center. The Colorado River Center was operated by War Relocation Authority from the beginning. Direct evacuation to both of these Projects was substantial. Nine thousand eight hundred thirty evacuees were moved directly to Manzanar. Eleven thousand seven hundred eleven were evacuated from their former residences to Colorado River. These Centers therefore eliminated the need for additional Assembly Center capacity. In this chapter, however, comments are confined to Assembly Centers. The Manzanar and Colorado River projects are discussed in Chapter XXI. 151 152 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Very largely it was possible to adhere to the objective that Center residents originate exclusively in the areas adjacent to each Center. Some variation in this became essential, however. The Centers at Puyallup, Washington, and Port¬ land, Oregon, lacked sufficient capacity in the aggregate to house all the evacuees from those States. It was not economically feasible to establish a third Center in the Northwest in view of the existence of sufficient excess capacity elsewhere. Toppenish, in eastern Washington, proved to be wholly unsuitable from a health and sanitation viewpoint and although partially readied for use as an Assembly Center it was never so employed. Hence, some movement of Washington and Oregon evacuees to California Centers was unavoidable, although shuttling was kept to a minimum. The largest movement from the States of Washington and Oregon was to the Center at Pinedale. This Center had an excess capacity above the requirements of the area serviced. evacuees were moved directly to Pinedale. 4,048 Washington and Oregon These were later transferred to the Relocation Center at Tule Lake, California, to rejoin other evacuees from the area of their former residence at the earliest opportunity. A second Assembly Center in Arizona was partially readied for use. At Cave Creek a former Civilian Conservation Corps camp was made available for this purpose but, due to considerable voluntary migration into the northern half of the State, the need for the Cave Creek camp did not materialize. The Cave Creek facility was later utilized, however, by an infantry regiment as a Recreation Center. The selections proved to be reasonably adequate for the purpose. It will be recalled that the intention was to house evacuees in Assembly Centers for a much shorter period than that which proved to be the case. For extended occupancy by men, women and children whose movements were necessarily restricted, the use of facilities of this character is not highly desirable. was, however, no alternative. There Modifications and additions effected during the course of operations tended largely to overcome the natural disadvantages inherent in the confinement of a large community within a limited area. Assembly Center construction generally followed those specifications estab¬ lished for Army cantonments. Of course, numerous refinements were included adequately to provide for the housing of family units. Considerable augmen¬ tation was essential because of the necessity for providing separate utilities for men and for women and children. A map of the West Coast States and Arizona with the general location of each Assembly Center is presented as Figure 15, the center spread in the follow¬ ing series of maps. This figure also shows the maximum population of the Center and the period of evacuee occupancy. The exact location of each Assembly Center is shown on Figures 14-a to 14-1 inclusive. These figures are in geographical order from north to south and are self-explanatory. The general features of each Assembly Center are illustrated in the series of aerial photographs (Figures 16-a to 16-o) following the maps. 153 ASSEMBLY CENTER LOCATION, CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER LEGEND 30 Miles PAVED ROADS mimmtw RAILROADS GRAVEL ROADS FEDERAL HIGHWAYS DIRT ROADS STATE HIGHWAYS PRINCIPAL CITIES ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MILES APART. THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES. Figure 14-a JAPANESE 154 EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER PORTLAND Deer Island^ Watemew\ Columbia Oil Cormlcl .Ridgetield Scappoose] IHockinsort C rcharc Wfa Rains 'I PORTLAND Scholl: .Estacada L 464 in A MS LEGEND 10 PAVED ROADS III Hll HUtH RAILROADS GRAVEL ROADS FEDERAL HIGHWAYS DIRT ROADS STATE HIGHWAYS PRINCIPAL CITIES ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MILES APART. THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES. Figure 14-b ASSEMBLY CENTER LOCATION, CONSTRUCTION AND 155 EQUIPMENT LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER LEGEND 10 PAVED ROADS 20 I I I I t II I IHH4 30 Miles m RAILROADS GRAVEL ROADS FEDERAL HIGHWAYS DIRT ROADS STATE HIGHWAYS PRINCIPAL CITIES ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MILES APART. THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES. Figure 14-c 156 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER LEGEND 10 mum ph-f h- PAVED ROADS RAILROADS GRAVEL ROADS FEDERAL HIGHWAYS DIRT ROADS STATE HIGHWAYS PRINCIPAL CITIES ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MILES APART. THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES. Figure 14-d ASSEMBLY CENTER LOCATION, CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER \V SALINAS imadaro mUir. ;j^,982N*l Sargent] Mo** tanning ■ViMtlHa •'Ion ialinas £29 Pt Pino* Pacrtie AiiiomW^fPY* / jKCigling aWorkfield >Seaside\ Buena Visti Carmel Ipnzalea Pinyon PeaJaJj Jamasburg soeo LEGEND 10 10 PAVED ROADS IMI III I H-H-H- GRAVEL ROADS RAILROADS FEDERAL HIGHWAYS DIRT ROADS STATE HIGHWAYS PRINCIPAL CITIES ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MILES APART. THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES. Figure 14-e 157 MAXIMUM JAPANESE POPULATION ■LL/NGHAM OROVILLE OF OCCUPATION AND DATES OF ASSEMBLY CENTERS COlviclV MOUNT '$^J(°«anozah POST> IMCtLES EVERETT ''y^XEWSTCH ASSEMBLY CENTER Ty.ac>»tBATA~ wb^ATj;^ SOOTH| HITZVILLE^ X MAXIMUM POPULATION NUMBER l COLZA* OCCUPIED FROM DATE TO VAKIMA sunnysioc ^«uS?noview ■jrQjtLjo T^Q5>'alama River TILL AMO< WALLA walla imooho IPUYALLUP 7,390 MAY 2 5 APRIL 28 SEPT 12 1 PORTLAND 3,6 76 JUNE 6 MAY 2 SEPT 10 |MARYSVILLE 2,451 JUNE 2 MAY 8 JUNE 29 .SACRAMENTO 4,739 MAY 30 MAY 6 JUNE 26 j TAN FOR AN 7,816 JULY STOCKTON 4,271 MAY TURLOCK 3,661 JUNE 2 L'a GRAND! fOALLj ;sh*ni SALEM ifOSSIL 'ALBANY EL - -I \jrE" ,<s° ^^inoSLj< \ f*V~ "jUNCTtON (Jj ''^RINEVILLE ELOAENCI BEND] 'cahyon i city •CAN 25 APRIL 28 OCT 13 SORT ROCK 'NARROW! RATER l MAY 10 OCT 17 APRIL 30 AUG 12 21 VATlMRt lakevicw SALINAS 3,5 8 6 JUNE 23 APRIL 27 JULY 4 .MERCED 4,508 JUNE 3 MAY 6 SEPT 15 .PINEDALE 4,792 JUNE 29 MAY 7 JULY 23 ..rnrfttsio C#l 5* 9 .TULARE 4,978 AUG II APRIL 20 SEPT 4 [SANTA ANITA 18,719 AUG 23 MARCH 27 OCT 27 [POMONA 5,434 JULY 20 MAY 7 AUG 24 MAY 7 JUNE 2 oonsmwr <n»NA *COO(NG 0«LANO, »T 3 fcZLJ WILLOWS? ^•L LIAMS' - ^>CI.. AUBURN >SCV«LLt SAN FRAN CISC (° yq8£mWE\ Wtl&ark >DE3T( Santa cruz^ WATSON raoficc cip^tlj MAY 25 245 MAYER ^JOCHU [HOLLISTER [LINAS Net GRAND CANYON br/ose if RCDONtA ten Jjflur* \ Tg5EQUO)A Y\natl IK?,™/** YO’S'y 'XOt.l'tNOtl ^ HANnORC (KING C»TY .GRAND CANYON NATIONAL PARR IANO CANNON fAG STAFF WiNSLOn [mojavJ SANTA MARIA WttTORVlLLC $SAN SPRtNGER viLLC BERNARDINO iWlCKENBURG MlRCDLANOS [RIVERSIDE vicKse )BAAWL£Y LA JOLLA® ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES y iiLA BCno Ul CENTRO iNTlNELi NSa/ SAN DIEG61 co«Ooo>p J TUCSON Figure 15 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 160 LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER :airfax San Aa%elmS5 25 TAN FOR AN 7) Tamalpai: linert &&04. Cowell Mill Vallf IBERKELE T 730 layward ^ # 52 Princeton Belmon^ San tarl larton. Simla' / Meridipn ipbcll rnjf LEGEND 10 PAVED ROADS III IIIIIHW GRAVEL ROADS RAILROADS FEDERAL HIGHWAYS DIRT ROADS STATE HIGHWAYS PRINCIPAL CITIES ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MILES APART. THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES. Figure 14-f ASSEMBLY CENTER LOCATION, CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT 161 LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER LEGEND 10 I I I I I I I I HUM PAVED ROADS GRAVEL ROADS RAILROADS FEDERAL HIGHWAYS DIRT ROADS STATE HIGHWAYS PRINCIPAL CITIES ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MILES APART. THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES. Figure 14-g 162 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER TURLOCK AND MERCED Grange / 63! fatarford 610 \ Grai geCL Gi man 698 Ballicot idendale' Tegnerl (Cressay Yo$em1/ )Timba iStevinson erced Agatha' LEGEND 10 PAVED ROADS H H 111 H-H4B- GRAVEL ROADS 20 30 Miles RAILROADS FEDERAL HIGHWAYS DIRT ROADS STATE HIGHWAYS PRINCIPAL CITIES ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MILES APART. THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES. Figure 14-h ASSEMBLY CENTER LOCATION, CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT 163 LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER LEGEND 10 30 Miles HIIUlHUm PAVED ROADS RAILROADS GRAVEL ROADS FEDERAL HIGHWAYS DIRT ROADS STATE HIGHWAYS PRINCIPAL CITIES ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MlfcES APART. THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES. Figure 14-i 164 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER I H II I I H PAVED ROADS GRAVEL ROADS H- RAILROADS FEDERAL HIGHWAYS DIRT ROADS STATE HIGHWAYS PRINCIPAL CITIES ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MlfcES APART. THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES. Figure 14-j ASSEMBLY CENTER LOCATION, CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT 165 LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER SANTA ANITA AND POMONA LEGEND 10 PAVED ROADS 20 I i III H f H-H-H- GRAVEL ROADS 30 Miles RAILROADS FEDERAL HIGHWAYS DIRT ROADS STATE HIGHWAYS PRINCIPAL CITIES ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MILES APART. THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES. Figure 14-k 166 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST LOCATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTER 10 20 PAVED ROADS 111 III I H+H4+ 30 Miles RAILROADS GRAVEL ROADS FEDERAL HIGHWAYS DIRT ROADS STATE HIGHWAYS PRINCIPAL CITIES ASSEMBLY CENTER SITES THE LOCATION OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER SITE IS MARKED BY CIRCLES 5 MILES APART. THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 38 x 50 MILES. Figure 14-1 ASSEMBLY CENTER LOCATION, CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT 167 Figure 16-a—Fresno Assembly Center 168 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Figure 16-b—Marysville Assembly Center ASSEMBLY CENTER LOCATION, CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT 169 Figure 16-c—Manzanar Assembly Center 170 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Figure 16-d—Merced Assembly Center ASSEMBLY CENTER LOCATION, CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT 171 Figure 16-e—Pinedale Assembly Center 172 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Figure 16-f—Pomona Assembly Center ASSEMBLY CENTER LOCATION, CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT 173 174 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Figure 16-h—Puyallup Assembly Center ASSEMBLY CENTER LOCATION, CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT 175 Figure 16-i—Sacramento Assembly Center 176 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Figure 16-j—Salinas Assembly Center ASSEMBLY CENTER LOCATION CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT 177 178 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Assembly Center 16-1—Stockton Figure ASSEMBLY CENTER LOCATION, CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT 179 180 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Figure 16-n—Tulare Assembly Center ASSEMBLY CENTER LOCATION, CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT 181 Assembly Center 16-o—Turlock Figure ASSEMBLY CENTER LOCATION, CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT 183 In most instances, the adaptation of existing structures was limited in scope. These were used, in the main, to provide warehouse facilities, offices, infirmaries or large mess halls. In some cases these buildings were ideal for use in connec¬ tion with evacuee work projects, schools, repair shops and recreational activities. With appropriate modification and renovation, existing buildings were some¬ times suitable for use as apartments. In large measure, apartment space was provided through new construction. The type of buildings erected for this purpose was substantially uniform. Theater of Operations type barracks with suitable floors, ceilings and partitions were built at most Centers.Where the site selected would so permit, apartments were grouped in blocks. ties were erected. Within each block, showers, lavatories and toilet facili¬ The capacity of each block varied, but the norm was between six to eight hundred. Wherever practicable, a kitchen and mess hall were pro¬ vided for each block. In some Centers, however, notably Santa Anita, Tan- foran and Portland, existing facilities were adapted for use as mess halls and in these instances larger groups of evacuees were messed at a single facility. In all Centers climatic conditions were taken into account in design and construction. This also influenced location. Provision was made against cold, rain and extreme heat. As noted, the design and lay-out of construction varied between Centers. At Portland, for example, substantially all of the evacuees were housed under one roof in the Pacific International Livestock Exposition Pavilion. This pavilion cov¬ ered eleven acres of ground, and apartments were provided within it to house 3,800 people. At Santa Anita the stable area was renovated and modified to provide suitable apartments. The apartments in this area were considered to be the most desirable of all by Santa Anita residents. As a matter of fact there was adequate apartment space elsewhere in Santa Anita to house evacuees but residents in the remodeled stable area preferred to remain there. Where existing structures were inadequate to provide housing for commu¬ nity services, buildings were added for this purpose. Infirmaries were established at every Center and, in the larger installations, hospitals were built. Laundries, canteens, post offices, dental clinics, barber shops, warehouses, administration buildings and places for the reception of visitors had to be built or created by adaptation of existing accommodations. Housing for Military Police at each Center was provided in an area separate from the Assembly Center inclosure. to those used by evacuees. Ordinarily, these facilities were similar Where existing accommodations could not be adapted for this purpose, barracks were constructed as were auxiliary installa¬ tions. Following transfer of evacuees to Relocation Centers, Assembly Center facilities were occupied by various Army agencies without exception. Most of them were employed as service schools for the various Army branches, such as ordnance, signal corps, quartermaster and transportation corps. 184 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Physically, all Assembly Centers are more ideally suited for troop use than they were for the housing of families. The dates of transfer from Wartime Civil Control Administration as an agency of Western Defense Command to the new Army using agency and the name of the transferee or new user in each case is set forth in the following table. Center Date of Transfer New Using Agency Fresno November 9, 1942 Fourth Air Force Technical Training Command Marysville June 16, 1942 VII Army Corps Mayer June 27, 1942 Forestry Service Merced September 30, 1942 Fourth Air Service Area Command Pinedale August 6, 1942 Fourth Air Force Pomona September 4, 1942 Ordnance Motor Transport Portland September 30, 1942 Portland Port of Embarkation Sacramento July 30, 1942 Signal Corps Puyallup September 30, 1942 Ninth Service Command Salinas July 24, 1942 VII Army Corps Santa Anita November 30, 1942 Ordnance Stockton October 30, 1942 Fourth Air Service Area Command Tanforan October 27, 1942 Northern California Sector, WDC Tulare September 15, 1942 VII Army Corps Turlock August 24, 1942 Ninth Service Command It is inappropriate to record in detail the character of the equipment installed and the supplies furnished each Assembly Center. fully outfitted kitchens and mess halls. Standard equipment included Showers, lavatories and flush toilets were located and spaced to insure privacy and sanitation. Even where pit type latrines were erected flushing devices were installed. All kitchens, mess halls and barracks were screened and weatherized. Where feasible, central refrigeration was installed; otherwise, each kitchen was furnished its own refrigerator. trical outlets. Evacuee apartments were wired with elec¬ Standard Army steel cots, mattresses, blankets (a minimum of three per person) and pillows were issued. Where evacuees did not have or could not afford linens, these were purchased by arrangement with the Federal Security Agency out of funds made available by the Army. Laundries were equipped with stationary wash tubs and ironing boards. As there was no established precedent, the demand for hot water was inaccurately gauged at some Centers. The initial installations had to be augmented. Ample hot water for use in laundries and showers, as well as the kitchen for scalding utensils and dishes, was thus made available. In the smaller Centers, infirmaries were established. All of these had a sufficient complement of beds and facilities to provide for the less aggravated and less serious in-patient cases. All of these were equipped with sufficient means to include clinical services and to meet the needs of out-patient require¬ ments. A laboratory, surgical room, and kitchen were included in each. The necessary medicines, bandages, dressings, and instruments were also furnished. Some difficulty was experienced in obtaining dental equipment but this was ultimately provided. In the larger Centers, complete hospitals were established ASSEMBLY CENTER LOCATION, CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT 185 with ample equipment and supplies. A detailed description of the medical care provided evacuees is found in Chapter XV. Play fields, recreational halls, and fire stations were equipped with the neces¬ sary items. Fire protection equipment was distributed throughout each Center. Woodworking, gardening, and general maintenance tools were acquired. Necessary motor transportation to maintain Center supply and to provide for garbage disposal was uniformly made available. In short, the equipment and supplies were those to be found in any well ordered community in sufficient quantity to maintain health, sanitation and reasonable comfort. CHAPTER XIV Housing, Feeding and Clothing Apartments were assigned evacuees at Assembly Centers on the basis of family composition. The space assigned to a couple was 10' x 20'. Larger family units received space allotments accordingly. Where necessary, standard apart¬ ments were remodeled to fit specific needs. Housekeeping within each apartment was limited to living and sleeping needs, as all other community services, including meals, were provided centrally at mess halls and elsewhere. Showers, latrines and wash basins were located in the center of each block of apartments. Each apartment was furnished with the necessary Army steel cots, and mattresses, blankets and pillows. Evacuees were encouraged to bring their own additional furnishings and these transported by the Wartime Civil Control Administration. Center carpenter were shops constructed many tables, chairs and other utilities for use in these apart¬ ments. Needed warehouses, administrative buildings, mess halls, kitchens, laundries, latrines, showers, hospital infirmaries and recreational halls were added to normal facilities by the Engineer Corps. Housing problems were relatively simple. In the organization of community life at each Center the Wartime Civil Control Administration Operations Manual required the appointment of evacuee block monitors who were assigned the duty of frequent inspections to see that proper care was taken of each apartment. Bedding was aired twice a week and each barrack was inspected frequently by the Assembly Center housing supervisor. Evacuees were fed in central mess halls. Due to the variation between As¬ sembly Centers and the character of the existing facilities employed, it was not possible for every Center to operate under the same plan. There was a supervisor of housing and feeding at each Assembly Center and, under him, a chief steward, a supervising chef for each five mess halls, and a chief of food warehousing. Where inadequacy in messing facilities, cooking services, dishwashing facilities was discovered, these were augmented. All Assembly Centers were operated within the ration allowance prescribed by the Army for its soldiers, i. e., 50 cents per person per day. Early menus developed an average ration cost of 3 3 cents. There was some tendency to be too conservative at first and, after a period of adjustment, the average cost was revised to approximately 39 cents per person per day. This gave ample allowance for special menus adapted to the feeding of infants, ulcer cases and other chronic sufferers. Of course, food buying opportunities varied in the general area surrounding each Assembly Center. The actual average daily ration cost per person for all Centers from March to October was 3 8.19 cents. Complete data on these costs are shown on the following table: 186 HOUSING, FEEDING AND 187 CLOTHING TABLE 15.—Average Daily Cost of Rations Per Evacuee Center March April May June July Marysville. Sacramento. Stockton. Turlock. Merced. $0.39 .34 .27 .36 .44 $0.33 .34 .43 .41 .37 $0.48 .50 .41 $0.46 .50 .42 $0.38 Fresno. Pinedale. Tulare. Pomona. Tanforan. .36 .30 .28 .37 .30 .36 .37 .46 .37 .33 .38 .44 .42 .47 .38 .41 .38 .39 .48 .39 .39 Salinas. Portland. Puyallup. Manzanar. Santa Anita. .32 .34 .32 .36 .30 .40 .31 .36 .40 .35 .49 .39 .41 .24 .39 .41 .42 .45 .41 $0.36 $0.36 .22 August Sept. October $0.43 .42 .39 .39 Daily average $0.36 .34 .41 .44 .41 .42 .38 .37 .39 .42 .37 .42 .38 .33 .39 .36 .38 Average daily ration cost for all Centers, $0.38. The general diet was subject to constant revision to suit the taste of evacu¬ ees. Menus were developed only after extended consultation with evacuee dieti¬ tians. A table of quantities was determined for each 100 persons. The standard table of allowances per meal in basic items of diet was as follows. QUANTITY PER MEAL PER 100 PERSONS (Basic items only) Rice . 30 pounds Beef in quarters (including bones) . 45 Fish frozen with heads off . 40 " Fish fillets frozen 20 " . “ Beans dry—kidney . 15 “ Beets . 25 " *' Cabbage . 23 Potatoes . 40 " Spinach . 30 " Squash . 28 " . 24 " Tomatoes The system of serving food was a combined cafeteria and family service style. Thus even where the number of persons assigned to a single mess hall exceeded its seating capacity, a continuous serving process, cafeteria style, elim¬ inated delay and waiting. In the larger Centers each evacuee’s meal period was identified by a special ticket which designated the mess hall in which he was served and the hours for each meal. Hot dishes and entrees were served at cafe¬ teria counters. Beverages, bread and butter, salads and desserts were served family fashion on the tables. Specific rules and regulations were promulgated and strictly enforced gov¬ erning the handling and preparation of food. Instructions issued covered such subjects as prevention of food spoilage; control of bacteria; effects of heat, cold, and light; control of insects and other pests; care of fish and meats; and care of fresh fruits and vegetables. These instructions also detailed the methods for the maintenance of sanitation in kitchens, mess halls, pantries, vegetable rooms, cupboards, ice boxes, food storage and garbage containers. Garbage disposal 188 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE "WEST COAST received careful attention, and in most instances garbage racks were screened and placed above ground level. Perishable foods were stored in separate warehouses and, in large Centers where facilities permitted, central refrigeration was installed. In the smaller Centers, ice boxes were used in each mess hall. Where necessary, refrigeration space was contracted for in nearby communities. An interesting development, not followed by the Army, but practiced in all Wartime Civil Control Administration Centers as an experiment was the central cutting of meats. A central butcher shop was installed at each Center. Initially it was realized that inexperienced cutting would result in waste. It was, therefore, necessary to establish a school for butchers. The establishment of central meat cutting resulted in substantial savings. Actually, the saving amounted to 8 cents per pound in the cost of meat used. In the case of hamburger and sausage, made in the Assembly Center butcher shops, the saving was more than 10 cents per pound over the normal quantity market price. While full facilities for baking were not installed at all Centers, central bakeries were established in Portland, Puyallup, and Tanforan, as these three locations had ample gas facilities. In other Centers baking was only undertaken in the kitchens. This was limited in scope. Special care and attention was accorded the preparation of food for infants and small children. Formulas and menus prepared by the United States Public Health Service and the Wartime Civil Control Administration Division of Hous¬ ing and Feeding, were provided for all infants. Feeding periods for formula babies were on a four-hour schedule. War milk formula ingredients, scalding water for sterilization of bottles, nipples and all other necessary items were made available in special diet kitchens and were delivered to mothers by evacuee at¬ tendants at regular intervals throughout the day and night. A detail of trained evacuee girl attendants was assigned in each Center to see that mothers requiring special baby formulas were supplied at the proper intervals. In addition to the special formulas for babies, the United States Public Health Service supervised special diets for children in the lower age groups as well as for diabetics, ulcer patients, outpatients, and the very aged. Where necessary, clothing was made available upon application. It was not an item of regular issue. Where the need was urgent, a controlled clothing issue was granted with a money value allowance per month not to exceed the following: Cost per Month Adult, male . . $3.82 Male, 6-18 years . . 2.15 Children, 1-5 years . . .. Cost per Year $30.50 25.00 2.60 27.57 4.61 Female, 6-18 years . . 2.85 Total cost per family of 5 .. 16.03 42.19 Adult, female Infant to one year .. 2.25 26.81 162.07 27.09 Due to the delay encountered in the selection of sites for Relocation Centers, Assembly Center Residence was extended beyond the period originally contem- HOUSING, FEEDING AND CLOTHING plated by Wartime Civil Control Administration. 189 Therefore, the need for a planned distribution of clothing arose after Assembly Center operations were well under way. Had Assembly Center residence been limited to a shorter period, no extensive purchases would have been necessary. Contracts were executed for deliveries of clothing within the permissible allowance to all of the Centers in California, other than Marysville, Sacramento, Salinas, and Turlock. Evacuees in these four Centers were transferred to Re¬ location Centers at an early date, hence no extensive need developed there. Once evacuees were tranferred to the custody of War Relocation Authority, Army jurisdiction and responsibility ceased. This followed because of the specific pro¬ visions of Executive Order No. 9102 of the President dated March 18, 1942 under which War Relocation Authority was established. The total amount of clothing purchased under contract amounted to ap¬ proximately $586,900. Direct purchase aggregated $44,260. CHAPTER XV Medical Care and Sanitation Frequent references have been planning and execution of a made in medical care the preceding chapters to the program evacuees in the for Civil Control Stations and during the movement of evacuees from the area of their residence to Assembly Centers. The present chapter summarizes the steps taken by the Wartime Civil Control Administration to provide medical care and sanitation in Assembly Centers. In later chapters attention will be given to the construction and equipment of hospital facilities in Relocation Centers and to the medical care of evacuees during their transfer from Assembly Centers to Relocation Centers. The supervision of medical services throughout the entire program was the responsibility of the United States Public Health Service under the direction of the Commanding General. No medical division was established within the Wartime Civil Control Administration; instead, the Office of the Surgeon, West¬ ern Defense Command and Fourth Army, served as a consultant agency during the entire program. The overall planning and coordination for this phase of the program, as well as all others, was the responsibility of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs. The Public Health Service was provided with a general directive, grant of authority and funds. An objective was prescribed. In per¬ forming its mission, the Public Health Service utilized the facilities of several other agencies, particularly county and city health officers, the state and county medical associations, the State Department of Public Health, and public and private hospitals. The medical care and sanitation program for Assembly Centers was initiated with the advance recruitment of Japanese doctors and nurses and the assign¬ ment of such personnel to the Centers. An essential section of the advance party recruited and assembled for each Center consisted of Japanese doctors and nurses. These staffed the infirmaries and outpatient departments of each Center before the arrival of the first group of evacuees. The total number of Japanese doctors and nurses in the entire evacuee population was low. It was therefore necessary to allocate such personnel among the Centers rather than to allow them to follow the normal course of evacuation. In the advance recruitment of medical personnel the Public Health Service was assisted by state and county medical associations, the Japanese doctors themselves, and the staff of the United States Employment Service. The latter agency actively engaged in recruiting the remaining elements of each advance party opening each Center. Under the supervision and frequent visitation of experts from the Public Health Service, the physician in charge, in all cases a Japanese doctor, was in complete charge of the Center hospital outpatient department, dental clinic, and other direct medical functions within the Assembly Center. Administra¬ tively the Chief Medical Officer was responsible to the Center Manager on all matters relating to general policy, space, personnel and non-medical supplies, 190 MEDICAL CARE AND 191 SANITATION and to the Public Health Service on all matters of medical policy, medical supplies and equipment. Daily reports were prepared by the Chief Medical Officer for both the Center Manager and the Public Health Service. The Office of the Surgeon, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, conducted occa¬ sional inspections of medical care and sanitation in the Assembly Centers. Written regulations and procedures governing the more important phases of the operation of Center hospitals, medical programs, etc., were issued by the Public Health Service. Hospital buildings. There were added to the permanent buildings in each Center (buildings constructed before the Army took over the installation) a sufficient number of barrack type buildings to provide ample space for all med¬ ical services. These new buildings differed from other barracks in that they were built from one to three feet off the ground, ceiled overhead and on the sidewalls, and on partition walls inside. They were partitioned into rooms and wards. In many instances the sidewalls and ceilings were painted. These buildings were all completely screened and, where the summer heat was high, a sprinkler system was placed on the roof to lower the temperature. At Santa Anita, the largest of the Assembly Centers, especially constructed buildings were extensively remodeled and made available for hospital uses. The original conception assigned to Center hospitals the role of functioning as infirmaries. All "serious” and operative cases were to be transferred to estab¬ lished public or private county hospitals. As previously noted, residence in the Assembly Centers was intended to be brief and all Centers were on sites adjacent to communities having excellent hospital facilities. Delay in the trans¬ fer of evacuees to Relocation Centers due to the retardation of site selection consequent upon the transfer of this function to War Relocation Authority, required the expansion of medical services in Assembly Centers to include minor surgery, obstetrics, dental, and optical care. Alterations and additions to the infirmary buildings were recommended by the United States Public Health Service. The changes thus recommended were made. Medical Staff. Regular officers of the United States Public Health Service visited the Centers as often as necessary to supervise the program. County health officers close to the Assembly Centers were designated to act as representatives of the Health Service in case of emergencies and in routine requirements. The assistance of the State Department of Health was enlisted. Close relationships were maintained with county hospitals, neighboring sanatoria, and county health departments. A basic principle established by the Public Health Service with Wartime Civil Control Administration approval was that a selected Japanese physician should be in direct charge in each Center of the infirmary and medical care as Chief Medical Officer. His authority embraced professional and administrative supervision over other physicians, dentists, opticians, nurses, and hospital personnel. He was re¬ sponsible to the Public Health Service for the proper administration of health and medical services. The Center Manager, through his Service Division, had general supervision and provided non-medical personnel and supplies. The arrangement 192 JAPANESE proved to be ideal. EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Specialists were utilized when needed and special clinics were established particularly in the field of pediatrics. Outpatient clinical services were available at stated hours for the care of ambulatory patients with minor complaints. A schedule was worked out with physicians so that one member of the staff was on call each night. Special clin¬ ical services were provided as often as needed. In the initial stages of Center administration many of the Centers were short of graduate nurses. In some instances Caucasian public health nurses were procured and assigned to the Centers. To offset this deficiency and to relieve graduate and student nurses a study was made of personnel among the evacuees who might be trained as aids in medical nursing, dental and dietetic duties, and a program of training established. Lectures and instructions in nurse’s-aid pro¬ cedures included bed-making, care of bedding, sponge baths, indication of sick¬ ness, discussion of nursing ethics, personal health and hygiene, sickroom appli¬ ances (their care and use), nutrition and diets, medication (place of drugs in therapy), counterirritants, enemas, hot and cold applications, communicable diseases, infant and maternity care, hospital supplies (how made, preparation for sterilization), procedure for steam inhalations, procedure for preparing hypo¬ dermics, routine regulations and duties of the day, etc. As the program prog¬ ressed, lectures and instruction in work procedure in formula laboratory were given. Thus was built up a corps of nurse’s aides to assist the professionals. In general each infirmary was organized to provide bed care for minor med¬ ical, surgical, uncomplicated obstetrical, and contagious cases. One registered nurse or doctor was on duty at all times. Each infirmary patient was seen a minimum of twice a day by the resident physician; once at morning rounds and again at evening bed check. Necessary clerical and maintenance staff was assigned to the infirmary by the Center Manager. Use of outside hospitals. Complicated obstetrical and major surgical and medical cases were referred, and often physically transferred, to a local hospital for treatment. In several of the Centers facilities were adequate to care for all but the most serious surgical cases. Outside hospitalization was arranged at standard rates not exceeding $3.75 per patient day. These expenses were paid out of Army funds allotted to the Health Service. Evacuees who, at the time of evacuation, were in private hos¬ pitals at their own expense and those who, following evacuation, were in private hospitals at Federal government expense, were transferred to county hospitals as the condition of each permitted moving without harmful effect. Fees were neither charged nor accepted from evacuees for medical, surgical or dental treatment, or for drugs and supplies. This service, and housing, food, personal allowance for necessities, was furnished to all on an equal basis by the Army. Necessary prescriptions ordered by the physician in charge which could not be compounded in the Assembly Center infirmary, were, with the approval of the Center Manager, filled outside. MEDICAL Prenatal care. CARE AND SANITATION 193 In all Centers the registration at prenatal clinics was almost 100 per cent of the known pregnancies. Conferences which large groups of women attended were a part of the prenatal program. Well-baby examina¬ tions were held in specialty clinics or pediatric clinics in all Assembly Centers. In many of the Centers, where Caucasian public health nurses included home visiting in their activities, children were seen in evacuee apartments and pre¬ natal home visits were routine. Postnatal problems also were subjects of in¬ struction and care. Several Centers had well attended lectures on premarital education. Special diets. All formulas for babies were prepared under supervision by central kitchens in one of the hospital buildings in each Center. Lectures and instructions in work procedure were given to train Japanese formula girls in the type of clothes to be worn, the washing of hands, tables and layout cloths, preparation of sterile field and the layout of formula equipment, sterilization of food containers and equipment, and the preparation of diets. For babies from birth to one year special formulas were arranged, and pureed vegetables, fruits, meats and cereals, etc., were provided; children from one year to three years received chopped foods, unseasoned meats and vegetables, and extra quantities of desserts, fresh fruits, and fresh vegetables. Special diets were also prepared for invalids, both ambulatory and bedridden, where such were required because of hypertensives, diabetes, gastric ulcers, nephritis, and senility. For children up to ten years some Centers inaugurated a between-meal snack of milk and fruit or cookies to supplement their food needs. Per capita consumption of milk by the entire population was higher than before evacuation. It was also higher than that of the American population as a whole. Immunization. Virtually all Japanese in Assembly Centers were vaccinated against smallpox and typhoid. The immunization program was thorough both as to the percentage immunized and the potency of the vaccines used. The small percentage of persons not immunized belonged to the following groups: Those individuals refusing absolutely; individuals debilitated because of sickness or age; cases of recent authenticated immunization. All children from six months to five years of age not previously immunized against diphtheria were given three doses of plain toxoid at intervals of four weeks and without a prior Schick test. All children from five to twelve years, and younger children previously immunized, were Schick tested and the susceptibles immunized. All children between the ages of six months and three years were offered immunization against pertussis. Doses advised by the Public Health Service were 5,000 M, 10,000 M, and 15,000 M at weekly intervals. Dental care. Emergency dental treatment including extractions, fillings, and other services was provided as part of the general health services. A Chief of Dental Section was selected by the Public Health Service, or its local repre¬ sentative after consultation with the Japanese physician in charge in each As¬ sembly Center. The dentists in all Centers were kept extremely busy. Optical Service. The multiple phases of the health program included the 194 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST operation of an optometry clinic in most Centers. Eyes were examined by a registered optician under the direction of the physician in charge; glasses were fitted and purchased if needed; and necessary repairs were made. When re¬ quired, an optician in a nearby community might be visited. All such services were without expense to the evacuee. Not initiated in all Centers at the be¬ ginning of operations, these clinics increased the scope of their service as time went on. At Tanforan, for example, the optometry clinic, before closing, issued 1,000 prescriptions. The usual services were adjustments, replacements, and repairs. Of the average of 30 persons who daily visited the clinic, 3 or 4 came with broken glasses. At Portland three registered optometrists aided all those complaining of defects of vision. Clinic hours were advertised in the Center newspapers. Records. A complete system was set up to keep a record for each patient receiving medical care. Unfortunately because of the pressure of work during the early phases of the program, the medical records left much to be desired but before July the inadequacies had been remedied. The individual medical records of evacuees were sent to the Relocation Center to which each was trans¬ ferred. A daily summary report on hospital cases, outpatients, and Center resi¬ dents in outside hospitals, and a more detailed weekly hospital census report were submitted to the Center Manager, the Wartime Civil Control Administration, and the Public Health Service. The physician in charge maintained appropriate records covering the dispensing of narcotic drugs under regulations of the Public Health Service. Equipment and supplies. Initially an effort was made to purchase equip¬ ment locally, and the Public Health Service was charged with the responsibility for procuring supplies. Several Centers were so supplied in part. However, the Public Health Service found that it did not have adequate facilities for pro¬ curement and was unable to secure the required priorities for such large quan¬ tities of drugs and other supplies and it became necessary for the Army to purchase the initial medical equipment. Estimates of the equipment required were furnished by the Public Health Service. Requisitions were prepared by the Office of the Surgeon, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army; and were forwarded to the Medical Section, San Francisco General Depot. In order to expedite medical equipment and supplies, all items were purchased by the Depot for delivery direct to Centers by the various dealers. As the evacua¬ tion program progressed a steady improvement was made in the equipment and medical supplies in Centers. Assembly Centers were equipped initially to operate a dispensary and to provide temporary hospitalization for twenty patients. Shortly after they were occupied the equipment was supplemented by the issuance of beds and other items sufficient for hospitalization of from sixty to one hundred and twenty patients in each Center. Dental equipment also was requisitioned for each Center but could not always be made immediately available. The San Francisco General Depot purchased equipment for a total of 1,370 hospital beds from funds allotted by Headquarters, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. Total cost of MEDICAL CARE AND SANITATION 195 supplies was $147,961.82. Maintenance supplies for the Assembly Centers were purchased locally under direction of the Public Health Service. One regular officer of the Service was assigned to handle the purchase of narcotics. Sanitation Supervision of sanitation was part of the responsibility of the Public Health Service and, of course, the medical departments of the Assembly Centers. In discharging this responsibility, the Public Health Service enlisted the assistance of the State Department of Health and the County Health Department of the counties in which the Assembly Centers were located. A survey of each Center and Center site was made by a commissioned sani¬ tary engineer of the Public Health Service before occupation by the evacuees. The physician in charge at each Center acted as Chief of Sanitation. He was often assisted by a Sanitary Board of evacuees. General administrative super¬ vision was exercised by the Center Manager who provided necessary supplies, equipment, and personnel. Regular, in some cases daily, inspections were made by the County Health Department for the Public Health Service. Reports were submitted to the Center Manager in writing, with appropriate recommendations for any condition not found in order, and a copy was forward¬ ed to the District Director of the Public Health Service. Multiple daily inspections of toilets, baths, laundries, kitchens, dining rooms, and grounds, were made, under the direction of the physician in charge who reported deficiencies to the Center Manager through the Service Division. All reports were required to be forwarded to Wartime Civil Control Administration. If serious deficiencies were noted in these reports the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, took immediate measures to correct them. Detailed instructions, together with general recommendations for the proper sanitation of mess halls, food warehouses, and pantries, for living quarters and such facilities as laundries, latrines, showers, and washrooms were issued to all Center Managers by the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, under date of May 2, 1942, on recommendation of the Public Health Service. The specific instructions conformed in substance, and as far as applicable, to regula¬ tions of the United States Army for its establishments. The Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, called upon the United States Army Engineers Corps to modify or alter construction of toilet, lavatory, and shower facilities to insure a higher standard of sanitation and privacy to meet the needs of women and children. Training of personnel was undertaken by the Public Health Service, through the County Medical Officer and the physician in charge. This personnel was selected from evacuees who had had some technical training, such as under¬ graduate medical students, laboratory technicians, and undergraduate engineer¬ ing students. Lectures and demonstrations were given to prepare them for the assignment. Labor squads were also drilled in various sanitation functions. In several Centers the evacuees formed a Sanitary Board to assist the Physician in Charge and the Manager. An important phase of public health activities in Assembly Centers was the regular examination of food handlers conducted under supervision of the 196 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Public Health Service. Food handlers were examined by physicians before be¬ ginning duty in the mess and at periodical intervals thereafter, to detect cases or carriers of communicable diseases. All kitchen and mess personnel were kept under daily observation for evidences of communicable diseases, particularly of colds or other respiratory diseases, diarrhea or other intestinal diseases. Such cases were promptly relieved from duty. Clean clothing, and clean hands and nails for mess personnel were required. All food received at the mess was inspected for freshness and quality. Canned goods were likewise examined. Refrigeration was provided for all perishable foods, and all places where food was handled were screened and ventilated. It was a recognized rule that thorough cooking and immediate service after cooking are the best safeguards against the transmission of communicable dis¬ eases by food, provided care is taken not to contaminate the food after cooking. All eating and cooking utensils were sterilized immediately after use by proper washing and rinsing. Evacuees were expected to keep their living quarters clean at all times. Barrack monitors were appointed to supervise the housekeeping. Sanitation days were observed when mattresses and bedding were removed for airing and sun¬ ning. From the beginning of the program the daily telegraphic report made to the Wartime Civil Control Administration by the Center Manager included a state¬ ment concerning the number of persons in hospitals and the presence of com¬ municable diseases. A uniform system of reports for hospital and medical services was instituted in all Assembly Centers in June by the United States Public Health Service at the request, and with the assistance of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. Much earlier in the program, however, a uniform system of med¬ ical records for all inpatient and outpatient cases had been started. For purposes of the present report, the "reporting period” from August 1 to August 28, 1942, is used in the presentation of medical statistics. This four weeks’ period can be accepted as a typical period in the operations of Assembly Centers. It was neither subject to the limitations of the early, induction phase of Center life or of the improvements in facilities and services which occurred toward the end of Center operation. Table 16 presents data on inpatient movement, both in Center and in out¬ side hospitals, from August 1 to August 28, 1942, for the nine Assembly Centers then in operation. At the beginning of the period these nine Centers had 483 inpatients; at the end of the period, 446. During these four weeks, 1,318 patients were admitted to Center and/or outside hospitals, and 1,421 were discharged. With an average population of 58,229 for the nine Centers, this represented an admission rate of 5.6 persons per thousand per week. Prob¬ ably a better measure of hospitalization of evacuees is provided in Table 17, which shows the total patient-days in Center and outside hospitals, and the number of patient-days per thousand total evacuee-days of residence. For the nine Centers combined, there were 8.3 patient-days per 1,000 total evacueedays. CARE AND SANITATION ‘Reporting period from August 8 to August 28, 1942. Reporting period from August 1 to August 21, 1942. TABLE 16.—Inpatient Movement During Reporting Period From August 1 to August 28, 1942 MEDICAL 197 198 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST The total number of operations performed for evacuees resident in the nine Centers between August 1 and August 28, was 271, of which 36 were major, and 23 5 were minor. The detail by type of operation, and whether performed in the Center or in outside hospital, is given in Table 18. Only 5 of the 36 major operations were performed in Center hospitals, and these in the well equipped facilities at Santa Anita and Puyallup. The average number of in¬ patients per week by type of medical service required is shown in Table 19. The total outpatient treatments for each type of service required (during the reporting period) is presented in detail by Table 20. In the analysis of the data in this table, it should be recalled that many minor ailments such as cuts, bruises, headaches, and stomachaches, which in a normal community would receive only home treatment, were taken to the Outpatient Clinic of the As¬ sembly Center for free treatment. Thus, any comparison between the number of treatments in an Assembly Center and in a normal community should be made with extreme caution. This table is valuable, however, in showing the ratio between the different types of cases presented to the Outpatient Clinics of Assembly Centers. Four of the nine Centers made separate counts on total treatments and total outpatient cases, thus providing a ratio of average treat¬ ments per outpatient. This is presented for these Centers in Table 21. As has been indicated above, the Center medical staff was composed of pro¬ fessionally trained evacuees assisted by other evacuees who were given special courses for the performance of their duties. Table 22 gives the detail as to Center hospital and medical staff during the reporting period by Centers and by classification of function or skill. The nine Centers, with an average popu¬ lation of 58,229 evacuees, were served by 45 physicians, 43 dentists, 149 nurses, of whom 37 were graduates, and 893 other staff members such as dieticians, aides, administrative assistants, and unskilled help. This table does not show, of course, the number of physicians and other medical personnel serving those Center residents who were placed in outside hospitals. Vital Statistics. The very process of evacuation made the compilation and analysis of vital statistics for the evacuee population alone extremely diffi¬ cult. Those persons who were ill at home (or in hospitals) were placed (or left) in hospitals at government expense immediately after they were registered at a Civil Control Station by some member of their family. No one was removed from a hospital until the Public Health Service certified that the patient might be sent to an Assembly Center without danger to himself or other evacuees. Also, all Japanese, except those who were ill or who were expectant mothers in the eighth month of pregnancy or later, were removed first to an Assembly Center close to their place of residence and later to a Relocation Center, in some instances far removed from their former residence, during the brief span of six months. No strictly comparable basis exists, therefore, for the calculation of birth rates and death rates as in the general population. The total number of births and deaths occurring in the evacuated popula¬ tion, i. e., those who were inducted into Assembly Centers, are shown by Cen¬ ters in Table 24. On the basis of 9,485,202 evacuee-days in Assembly Centers, | Outside hospital 67 04 fO •<* • ^ • rt« • • • CO • • • > < > Venereal diseases Tuber¬ culosis MEDICAL CARE AND SANITATION • • On VO • r* • • • 04 04 ^ £ fOOHHO C'-OOt^^* CO^HVOCO • • ^ 04 04 04 IO CO 04 67 04 • **H • •'t 04 04 04 O 04 o TH Ov • • O'COO^CO 04 . . T* ro IO lO rf co 04 CO 38 OM04»OH 'OWN'OfO CO CO rf< lOO"tN 199 ♦Average based on 3 week period. 60 o io ^ 04 04 CO in 04 lOO'tN'O IO04*HT*\O Santa Anita. Stockton. Tanforan. Tulare*. 242 04 267 CO CO 476 Other 04 Total. Fresno. Merced*. Pomona*. Portland. Puyallup. Obstetrical Outpatient as w CO Communi¬ cable rf« • • • !* Surgical Total 04 00 • • lO • • >* n w us ►SJ <2 £ tf) H H Z u o << z o fa *-h H >—I H ° (4 ^ S O a £ £ (4 (4 O C « > <J Total patients CO • • 04 OfO^H >0 ^ ^ • • • v© co 04 04 'O'O'OfO VO «0 PQ w MEDICAL Center |[ 63 04 O vO vH 04 vO *-< ■<* ■ OO'O^H'O'O CO »0 • * • **H \OhhtJih 168 l>» 235 Inpatient SOI Total c Outside hospital H 36 'tNMON 00 ^ Santa Anita. Stockton. Tanforan. Tulare2. Center hospital CO 271 Fresno. Merced1. Pomona2. Portland. Puyallup. MINOR OPERATIONS Center Hospital Total IT) Total. K Total operations 14 MAJOR OPERATIONS Center Pi o z TABLE 18.—Operations Performed During Reporti August 1 to August 28, 1942, Inclusive 200 TABLE 20.—Total Outpatient Treatments by Type of Service Reporting Period August 1 28, 1942 to August O' TO • 00 t* i© i© <N 00 *0 r* • •© • • Tt< • • hhOO . CO © 1^ 00 CO 00 04 © l© CN c© FROM <D > >o 3 g oo bo § §> o o ’C ’C o, </>££ 2 S. •h « 4) rt 4-> +J ■p MM *,5,2 ft G G *>•£*5 WOP EVACUATION •'©OOOO CN *-< CQ NHO^O © *"» *-< <N C© JAPANESE l© T* tH CO • . »© 00 <© "* O' © CN CO CSH lO CN CN 236 rH 3,856 • 175 CN 1,642 83 567 1 394 © i© ^ 00 4,107 422 1,669 391 150 HHH 10,495 2,552 5,765 1,614 Physio¬ therapy 1,761 • 1© • • CN • Santa Anita. Stockton. Tanforan. Tulare3. Inocula¬ tions and vaccina¬ tions 88 CO 197 51 Arsenicals 692 CO 483 797 1,031 10,008 Veneral diseases1 • CN C© (N c© • *-< tH 1,357 258 Tubercu¬ losis OOCNt*^ O CN CN l© CN »H 4,156 396 Eye, ear, nose and throat COCOOOCO^ U- i© y-J l© 00 9,296 3,361 1,142 1,430 2,193 2,260 Post¬ natal ©CO00© © Tf r© 1© -HCSTj^O CO TH y-T y-< 30,812 Pre¬ natal 'tCNOO'N Tf O' O © 1© t^COt^ONC© Total. Fresno. Merced2. Pomona3. Portland. Puyallup. General medical ^ ••<* Surgical • 1© © • tH Dental O' Total treat¬ ments i-t OBSTETRICAL Center THE WEST COAST 1For the reporting period August 1 to August 21, 1942. TABLE 22.—Center Hospital Medical Staff During Reporting Period 1 August to August 28, 1942 ' NURSES Admin. assistants Other employees III (NNO'OO' lO CO *0 *-< CN HHftjH . CN C"- 0"0 CO i-i 00 (SOOOO <N *-« ■<* 'O'O^CS IO CS to to C^fO'O'O O' 474 AND 3 3 <JC 3 3 o o 'd’d *C'C aa tt, o o CARE CN *lO • t^fOO'CO 44 MEDICAL O' ^ rO fO Dieticians, aids, etc. 375 O' O'OO'O' CO ^ Santa Anita. Stockton. Tanforan. Tulare*. 37 Total <0 Fresno. Merced1. Pomona*. Portland. Puyallup. 149 O'O'»0 CS to 43 CN 45 Other Hf^oCM 1,130 Graduate CO CN CO CO 00 Dentists cot'*—«t^co OOCCOM vH Physicians 00'CO't Total. Total medical staff fO CO ^ fO Center SANITATION 201 •Information not available for Tulare; for Pomona, only for the period August 1 to August 21. 202 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST the realized birth rate was 19.5 births per thousand persons per year of Center residence; and the death rate was 4.9 per thousand. That no sharp increase occurred in the number of deaths in the evacuated area as a result of the evacuation program is shown by Table 25, which gives the number of Japanese deaths in California, Oregon, and Washington during the first ten months of 1942 by sex, and by month of death. For comparative purposes, and by special permission of the California Bureau of Vital Statistics, there is presented in Table 26 the number of deaths, infant deaths, and still¬ births among Japanese in California from 1937 to 1941, by cause of death. TABLE 24.—Deaths, Births, and Stillbirths for Japanese Inducted Into an Assembly Center : March 21 to October 30, 1942 Center Deaths Births Stillbirths Total. 128 504 6 Fresno. Manzanar (To June 1, 1942). Marysville. Mayer. 12 4 1 32 11 4 Merced. Pinedale. Pomona. Portland. 10 5 3 4 21 6 31 23 1 Puyallup. Sacramento. Salinas. Santa Anita. 11 1 2 37 37 15 13 194 1 1 Stockton. Tanforan. Tulare. Turlock. 7 22 5 4 25 64 18 10 3 203 MEDICAL CARE AND SANITATION TABLE 25.—Japanese Deaths in California, Oregon, and Washington First 10 Months of 1942, By Sex and Month of Death* Sex and Month Total California Oregon During Washington BOTH SEXES Total (10 months) 539 457 12 70 82 45 59 55 68 64 54 46 33 33 66 38 45 44 57 57 45 42 31 32 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 14 5 11 10 10 6 8 4 2 Total (10 months). 396 340 6 49 January. February. March. April. May. June. July. August. September. October. 67 35 40 39 42 49 41 35 23 24 55 30 33 31 37 44 34 31 21 24 2 2 10 3 7 8 5 4 6 4 2 Total (10 months).. 144 117 6 21 January. February. March. April. May. 15 10 19 16 26 15 13 11 10 9 11 8 12 13 20 13 11 11 10 8 3 1 1 4 2 4 2 5 2 2 January. February. March. April. May. June. July. August. September. October. i MALE i 1 FEMALE fc:::::::::::::::: August. September. October. *Source: Bureau of Vital Statistics of California, Oregon and Washington. deaths and none of the Oregon deaths occurred in Military Area 2. i Four of the Washington 204 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST TABLE 26.—Deaths, Infant Deaths, and Stillbirths for Japanese in California: Cause of Death 1937-1941* Total 1937-41 1941 1940 1939 1938 1937 causes. 3,043 617 638 562 606 620 Typhoid and paratyphoid fever. Measles. Scarlet fever. Whooping cough. Diphtheria. Influenza. Dysentery. Poliomyelitis, acute. Encephalitis, lethargic. Meningococcus, meningitis. Tuberculosis, lungs. Tuberculosis, other. Venereal diseases. Other general diseases (epidemic). Cancer. Other general diseases. Diseases of nervous system. Diseases of circulatory system. Pneumonia. Other diseases—respiratory system. Diarrhea and enteritis (-2). Diarrhea and enteritis (2 plus). Other diseases digestive system. Nephritis. Other non-venereal genito-urinary. Puerperal state. Diseases skin—cellular tissue. Diseases bone, organs of locomotion. Congenital malformations. Diseases peculiar to early infancy. Suicide. Other external causes. Ill defined or unknown. 10 4 3 6 3 15 6 1 5 1 434 64 58 13 424 117 239 378 153 35 10 12 179 145 18 17 3 6 44 134 141 361 4 4 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 91 13 16 3 89 20 67 70 22 5 2 3 31 21 4 2 1 1 8 24 32 81 1 93 12 13 1 105 28 48 90 23 12 1 1 28 27 3 4 64 13 5 2 88 20 42 76 35 6 4 2 42 29 4 1 1 2 5 24 26 60 1 Infant deaths. 270 50 58 46 58 58 Stillbirths. 135 24 31 30 25 25 All ♦Source: California Bureau of Vital Statistics. 3 2 i 5 1 1 7 33 29 68 1 1 3 2 1 88 16 7 4 79 23 43 74 29 5 2 5 32 36 3 6 1 14 28 27 74 2 1 6 2 1 98 10 17 3 63 26 39 68 44 7 1 1 46 32 4 4 1 1 10 25 27 78 1 CHAPTER XVI Employment of Evacuees in Assembly Centers Some indication of the extent of evacuee employment within Assembly Centers has already been given. It should be recalled that a basic Wartime Civil Control Administration policy required that operations be carried out by evacuees so far as practicable. The means, supplies and equipment, and the supervision were provided. The extent to which evacuees elected to make use of these means was to be largely up to them. It can be generally stated that the response to this policy was excellent. The rates of compensation are detailed in Chapter XIX infra. The unskilled occupation group, compensated at the rate of $8.00 per month, included laborers, dishwashers, mess hall attendants, junior clerks, assistant playground directors, cook’s helpers and similar occupations. The skilled classification, paid at the rate of $12.00 per month, included accountants, senior clerks, playground directors, nurses, motion picture machine operators and cooks. The professional and technical group, whose compensation was $16.00 per month, included physicians, surgeons, dentists, engineers, chemists and teachers. It must be understood that no evacuee was required to work, but, once he accepted a job, he was expected to carry it out except in case of illness. To sever his employment an evacuee was required to give a 48-hour notice of intent in writing. The success of the evacuee employment policies of Wartime Civil Control Administration is measured in part by the fact that more than 27,000 evacuees representing over 3 0 per cent of the total population were employed in necessary and productive Assembly Center tasks. The average man-hours per month of those employed equaled 47.7 hours per person of the aggregate evacuee popula¬ tion, non-workers included. During the Army’s operation of the Manzanar Reception Center a guayule rubber project was established for the purpose of devising practicable methods for the rooting of guayule cuttings. This was instituted with the assistance and guidance of Dr. Robert Emerson of the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena. Evacuee chemists and nursery specialists planted more than 23 0,000 guayule seedlings. ment. The project thus initiated was made a permanent establish¬ Following the transfer of Manzanar to the jurisdiction of War Reloca¬ tion Authority, that agency supervised the guayule project. Another project of interest was the camouflage net project. direction of the United States Engineer Corps, the necessary for the conduct of this project were established at Santa Anita. Under the installations Employment in the camouflaging net project was limited to American-born evacuees. This project garnished and delivered more than 22,000 completed nets, varying in size from 22' x 22' to 36' x 60'. An aggregate of 2,718 man-months of labor was used in garnishing and packing the nets. 205 The net saving accruing to the 206 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST government more than offset the aggregate cost of food served to the evacuee population at Santa Anita. Evacuees were employed in the administrative offices and in every depart¬ ment of Center operations—in maintenance and repairs, construction, sanitation, gardening, recreation, education, cobbler shops, beauty shops, barber shops, and repair shops. Under Staff supervision all kitchens and mess-halls were manned by evacuees. A complete list of the multiple services in which evacuees were engaged would cover every known community service. An example of the scope of work accomplished is evidenced by the record at Santa Anita. There, over 454,252 evacuee man-hours were expended in the maintenance unit of the Work and Maintenance Section alone. This unit in¬ cluded repairs by the carpenter shop, plumbing, electrical, mechanical shop work, cleaning services, trash collection, landscape and nursery maintenance, streets, buildings, sidewalks and sewer repairs. CHAPTER XVII Education, Recreation, Religion and Assembly Center Newspapers In preceding chapters, attention has been directed to measures taken to provide for housing, feeding and clothing the evacuees, for their medical care and employment, and for Center sanitation. This chapter summarizes steps taken to provide for education, recreation, freedom of religious worship and the publication of Assembly Center newspapers. Under the guidance and stimulation of the administration, a program was early set in motion to encourage all groups—child, adolescent and adult of both sexes, alien and American-born—to employ their stay in the Assembly Centers in useful and interesting activities. The educational program especially was conditioned by the time of the evacuation and the temporary character of the Centers. The evacuation of most areas occurred toward the end of the school term with summer vacations near at hand. Hardly had some of the Assembly Centers been established when transfers were begun to Relocation Centers at Colorado River and Tule Lake. Still, it was borne in mind that without a daily routine of activities, both youths and adults would have more leisure than that to which many of them had been accustomed. Parents desired that their children have an opportunity to complete school terms, where evacuation had interrupted them, and to enjoy the wholesome activities offered by school. The evacuation plan developed by the Wartime Civil Control Administration did not contemplate overlong Center residence. The reason for the extension of this period has already been discussed in Chapter XIII. Because the program moved forward with such rapidity, evacuation was well under way before it became known that the satisfaction of the War Relocation Authority’s objectives in site selection would materially extend the period of Assembly Center residence. Hence no formal system of education or recreation was initially provided. When it be¬ came evident that there would be a delay in transfers to the interior, it became a matter of deep concern to Wartime Civil Control Administration to meet the morale problem. It was brought about that, though no formal system of education or recrea¬ tion had been contemplated in the original planning, and no initial budget provision made, an effective program was developed under the direction of the Wartime Civil Control Administration with the active cooperation of the evacuees, using their various training, skills and experiences. In general the program had for its aim the maintenance of the mental and physical health and morale of the evacuees at the highest level possible. It was realized that the program might not be followed in its entirety in any Center but necessarily would be adapted to the needs and facilities and conditions prevailing in each. Supervision of the program was placed with the Director of the Commu207 208 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST nity Service Division and administered in each Assembly Center by his staff members, the Director of Education and the Director of Recreation. There were in all Centers, buildings available for school purposes—unoccu¬ pied barracks, recreation halls, grandstands and other permanent structures— and these were converted to class uses. doors. In some cases, classes were held out of Workmen among the evacuees helped with their skills in fashioning additional benches, chairs, tables and blackboards. Textbooks were supplied by State and County school boards and from cities from which the school children had come. In many cases the parents of the children aided. Paper, pencils, pens and crayons arrived from "outside”, the gifts of interested groups and individuals. Libraries were established. All teachers were Japanese chosen from the evacuees. were created by the administration for instructors. Job classifications Most of these teachers were college graduates. A number were certificated. Many, particularly among the younger set, worked part-time in the classes. At Tanforan, for instance, four of the evacuees had teachers’ certificates and four were majoring in education at the time of leaving college. At Merced, of its twenty full-time teachers, more than half were university graduates and not a single teacher had less than two years of university study. At Tulare, the teaching staff consisted of 37 Japanese teachers of whom four had State teaching certificates and all others either college or junior college training. Girl Scouts and Boy Scouts were trained in leadership. Particularly in the nursery schools, Girl Scouts became valuable assistants. Specialists in the arts and crafts were many among the Japanese and their classes were well attended. Isamu Noguchi, internationally known sculptor, was a resident of Santa Anita; Professor Chiura Obata, whose paintings were exhibited at Mills College, lived and taught at Tanforan. Many excellent musicians contributed their talents to the class-room. From these classes there emerged orchestras of symphonic size for rendition of the classics and ensem¬ bles to delight with dance and informal musical programs. Scarcely had the first bus wheeled out of a Center before classes began. Tanforan opened its library in three days, its educational program in two weeks; Stockton, in ten days. These achievements were matched in other Centers. The informal plan had laid out programs for nursery schools for children from 2 to 5, and schools for children from 6 to 11, for children from 12 to 18, for youths from 19 to 30, for adult women 20 and older and for adult men 20 and older. Suitable programs for these divisions were arranged and the pattern generally followed. The curriculum varied. That at Merced gives an idea of the field covered. Subjects taught consisted of (first to sixth grade) arithmetic, reading, spelling, group singing, dancing, story telling, drawing and crafts. senior high schools, English, algebra, geometry, In junior and trigonometry, shorthand, bookkeeping, business training, elementary economics, commercial art, decora- EDUCATION, RECREATION, RELIGION AND ASSEMBLY CENTER NEWSPAPERS tive art, weaving, costume designing, dance 209 (folk and interpretive), music, handicrafts (paper, wood, needle), child care, hygiene, etiquette, drama, gar¬ dening and physical education. For adults, English for men and women; and for women, knitting and sewing. American history was stressed. Tanfbran, for the three and a half months of its existence, reported an increased enrollment of 276 percent in adult education, 108 percent in ele¬ mentary classes, 281 percent in music and 108 percent in art. and junior high showed lesser percentage increases. ples: High school To cite but a few exam¬ Out of a population of 7,800 evacuees, there were 3,650 students and 100 teachers. Merced had 110 students from 25 to 65 years of age. Three hundred children were in daily attendance at nursery, kindergarten and pri¬ mary schools at Tulare. To encourage the students, reports of their progress were made and exam¬ ples of their handiwork exhibited at community gatherings in the Center bowls or in the large recreation halls. Hobby shows were popular. forums discussed the problems of Center living. cussed at study panels. Public Current questions were dis¬ Quiz programs abounded. Promotions were obtained for students in the schools they attended prior to evacuation. Commencement exercises were occasions of community-wide interest and conducted with collegiate formality with an address by a distin¬ guished educator. At Fresno, for instance, 3,000 parents and friends crowded the amphitheater to applaud the graduates. In those Centers where the evacuees remained as fall approached, study was resumed from nursery to high school and adult classes. Linked with education was a recreation program that embraced in its wide¬ spread activities the nursery tot in the sandbox to the aged wood-carver and needle worker. of education. Especially in nursery and kindergarten, recreation was a part They learned as they played. As in education, the recreational program was a cooperative effort between administration and evacuee. Supervision was under a Caucasian director. Com¬ petent Japanese were placed on the Wartime Civil Control Administration pay¬ roll. Part-time workers and volunteers supplied other directing personnel. The spontaneity of play and the enthusiasm of players offset whatever handicaps existed in the early days because of lack of equipment and budget outlay—a condition progressively remedied by donations from interested organ¬ izations and individuals and from the evacuees themselves. Soon unoccupied barrack rooms and warehouse space were readied for indoor games and gym¬ nasiums. Adequate halls were furnished for dancing and musical programs. Minstrel shows and amateur theatricals had appropriate stages. provided for motion picture presentation. Housing was Galleries were established for exhibi¬ tions of the fine arts and handicraft. Equipment varied among the Centers as did the facilities. The type of recreation was conditioned by the physical resources and terrain of the Centers. In some of the Centers the evacuees constructed pitch-and-putt golf courses. Others boasted miniature lakes for swimming and model yachting. But an JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 210 overall inventory of recreational facilities and equipment would include such items as sandboxes, swings, slides and other playground equipment for chil¬ dren; baseballs, bats and gloves, soft balls, volley balls, basket balls, wrestling mats, tennis and badminton and ping-pong equipment, punching bags and dumbbells, golf sticks, fencing foils and masks, croquet mallets, chess, checkers and marbles, mites and model plans, model yachts and miniature boats, horse¬ shoes, flycasting rods and lines, gym suits and baseball uniforms and swim¬ ming togs. Pianos, bass viols, cellos and cymbals, violins and piccolos moved magically into the Centers, with saxaphones. snare drums, accordions, harmonicas, clarinets and Phonographs and records added to the inventory, and only the shortwave radio was prohibited. Much of this equipment was the property of the evacuees and, when not too bulky, was carried by them into the Centers. The Wartime Civil Control Administration supplied trucks to gather up whatever other equipment would contribute to the program. Many tournaments were started. League lines. official scorers appointed; tabulated. one league: Baseball leagues were organized on Big Contesting teams were uniformed; a panel of umpires, elected; pitching, fielding and batting averages carefully The familiar nick-names of Big League teams were adopted—in The Modesto Browns, the Turlock Senators, the Marin Athletics, the Yuba City Red Sox, the Courtland Yankees, the Yolo White Sox, the Sebastopol Indians and the Cortez Tigers. In the basketball league the Wolves, Bears, Pirates, Bulldogs, Wildcats and Panthers vied for honors. sters bore the titles Midgets, Kittens, Pups and Pappooses. The young¬ Girls were nick¬ named the Bloomer Babes, Wolfers, Skoits, Cabbages, Brussel Sprouts, Hens and Zombies. The whole nomenclature gives an idea both of the seriousness of the play and its sportive spirit. American slang described the play. Those who did not participate in the games were ranged in bleachers or crowded the side-lines. Issei and Nisei and Sansei mingled in play in the same field or in the same hall. Events and games of which a large number of Japanese had no knowledge or in which they had never participated were popular. Sumo squads were divided into East and West, as in old Japanese custom. The referee appeared in gala costume to add to the ceremonial atmosphere. Shogi and Go, a type of chess, was a diversion for adults. It was a familiar scene, in warm weather, to see an aged couple under a palm or fig tree engaged at this native pastime while children romped in ring-a-rosie or knuckled down to marbles. Calisthenics attracted the women folks. Stockton was built up to 3 50. A class of 3 5 Issei started at The value of calisthenics in reducing weight was a popular topic among the ladies. Dancing was popular, from formal, dressy, date affairs to hops in dungarees. Motion picture shows were crowded. The spirit of Wild West was exemplified both in dress and in the young men’s attempts to grow whiskers. Queen contests abounded and the most popular girls were crowned with EDUCATION, RECREATION, RELIGION AND ASSEMBLY CENTER NEWSPAPERS appropriate ceremony. 211 As in the development of the educational program, hobby shows and handicraft exhibitions were planned to develop a spirit of emulation. Talent shows and field days were held to reward the accomplished and crown the victor. Carnival days were celebrated in gay holiday mood. community-wide. The celebrations were At Santa Anita on Independence Day, the Fourth of July, the Anita Funita Festival ran for three days. Throughout the afternoon Boy Scout corps paraded through the Center in gayly decorated trucks and wagons advertising the coming of the evening performance. crowd of 15,000 responded to the summons. jitterbug contests. A swarming laughing Three thousand entered the There was a baby parade with 93 babies entered divided into the arms division and toddler class. position and individuality. Babies were judged on health, dis¬ Prize winners received ribbons of excellence. Tanforan held a Mardi Gras over the Labor Day holidays. in all branches of sport enlivened the athletic program. Tournaments Folk dancing, garden and greenhouse displays, exhibitions of needle craft and handicraft, painting, drawing and modeling filled three eventful days. The festival was topped with a coronation costume ball when the queen chosen by the evacuees re¬ ceived the acclaim of beauty and personality. As early as April 7, 1942, the Director, Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬ tration, was in touch with religious activities within the Centers. Recognized were three general groups: The Christians, with their two general classifica¬ tions of Protestant and Catholic, and the Buddhists. It was estimated that about 10 percent of the Japanese aliens and 50 per¬ cent of the Japanese-American citizens belonged to the Protestant constitu¬ ency. Catholic Japanese church organizations were fewer in comparison with the Protestant. The majority of the older generation Japanese and some of the younger generation belonged to the Buddhist faith. As a result of conferences with religious workers and the Administration’s own studies, a policy was determined and finally approved by the Commanding General. The main features of this policy, with its overriding principle of religious freedom, can be summarized as follows: Japanese evacuees were permitted to promote religious services within the various Centers and to request such Caucasian assistance for coordinating religious activities as might be necessary. The Center Manager arranged with each religious group for such service, provided such facilities as were available for the conduct of services, and in¬ sured that the services were conducted properly and were not used as a vehicle to propagandize or incite the members of the Center. Due to the unusual situation of temporary settlement and military sig- JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 212 nificance of the religious practices of certain Japanese groups, particularly the Shintoists, certain limitations were necessary. Permission was not granted Caucasian religious workers to reside within the confines of the various Centers. Only those Caucasian workers who had a constituency among the evacuees in a Center were permitted to minister within the Center and then only at the request of the Japanese. Japanese religious workers conducted all services and activities wherever possible. In those instances where there was not a Japanese qualified in this field, the Jap¬ anese group concerned might request assistance of Caucasian workers in con¬ ducting religious services. Permission was not granted for transfer of Japanese religious workers from one Assembly Center to another for the purpose of carrying on religious ac¬ tivities, except where there was without a director or leader. a religious constituency within a Center This request for transfer had to be made in writing to Wartime Civil Control Administration headquarters. Any material intended for release in religious publications other than routine matters was cleared by the Press Relations Representative of each Center involved. These routine matters included notices of church services, prayer meetings and activities of a similar nature. Japanese was not spoken in connection with religious services except where the use of English prevented the congregation from comprehending the service. The use of Japanese in this respect had to have the sanction of the Center Manager. No recognition was given any church federation, committee or group as to the authorized representation of its purported members until that representa¬ tion was authorized in writing by the members concerned. Inasmuch as edu¬ cational and recreational programs were coordinated in all Assembly Centers, no educational program was to be included within the scope of religious activities. Among the evacuees were a number of ministers of Christian and Buddhist faiths. Resident in the Centers, they were able to begin immediately the organization and promotion of religious services and to carry on in related fields of social service. In collaboration with Center Managers, religious workers set themselves to the task of providing places of worship and prayer. Grandstands of fair grounds and race courses afforded ample space for large assemblages. Barracks were available for other group activities. Altars and benches and chairs were donated or constructed by the resident faithful, or fellow religionists in the neighboring communities. Denominational conventions drew upon their central treasuries to assist. were helpful. Gifts of Bibles and hymnals and Sunday school material Musical instruments were provided for the choirs. Services followed the pattern familiar to the evacuees in their prior urban or village residence—Sunday morning services with preacher and choir and prayer, Sunday school classes, with mid-week prayer meetings, hours of medita- EDUCATION, RECREATION, RELIGION AND ASSEMBLY CENTER NEWSPAPERS tion and panel discussions. 213 Special prayer meetings were arranged for the Issei. Problems of immediate concern to young people were discussed by Youth Fellowship. Visiting preachers addressed large bodies. Catholic priests ministered to their flocks, celebrated Mass and administered Holy Communion. Like the Christian bodies, the Buddhists organized immediately after arrival at the Centers. Their religious program was designed for all ages—community gatherings for the general faithful, mid-week discussions for young Buddhists and Sunday school for the youngsters. excellent choirs. Flowers used at Many of the Buddhist groups trained religious service were distributed among the sick. Most colorful of the Buddhist festivals was the O-bon Odori, a traditional festival for the resurrection of the soul. Participants were asked to wear their Ukatas (light kimonos) at the festival. The music was ceremonial and familiar to the masses. The organization and development of programs of education, recreation and religion were greatly facilitated by the Center papers. Daily newspapers from metropolitan centers and of the "old home town” were placed on sale at the Centers or the evacuees might subscribe for them. So also were the popular national weekly and monthly magazines. On file in Center libraries were standard publications of wit and humor, and picture periodicals. But these reading sources did not satisfy all the needs of the Centers. the mimeographed home-product newspaper emerged. So, On April 11 the first copy of the Manzanar Free Press was issued; on April 18 the Santa Anita Pacemaker appeared. Sacramento had its own mimeographed paper by May 3, and Stockton by May 11. for editing and Authority to publish, with instructions providing distribution, was contained in a directive issued by the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration. Fifteen of these papers were established. evacuees. They drew their Staffs from the Some of them had had experience in the offices of Japanese dailies or weeklies before their suppression in the military areas evacuated. them had majored in English. Many of Several excellent draftsmen and cartoonists ap¬ peared among them. Facilities for publication were made available by the Center Managers. Editorial comment, news from other Centers, bulletins and news releases from administration headquarters, vital statistics, fashion notes, religious notes and doings in the field of sports filled their pages. Cartoons enlivened Poetry and literary tid-bits flowed from the esthetes. life, indeed, was mirrored in the Center paper. them. The whole community The management found them useful in making instructions known. The text was in English, and the young editors had the assistance and guidance of the Public Relations Representative who saw that news items were confined to those of actual interest to the evacuees. with the Center Manager. Final control rested Circulation was free to all residents of the Center of publication, libraries, universities and a list of approved individuals. 214 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Said the late John D. Barry, columnist of the San Francisco News: "Some day they will be material for history records of a curious interval, sought by col¬ lectors, preserved in libraries.” The Editor of the Pacemaker (title of the Santa Anita Assembly Center paper) wrote in his column: "We’ve had requests from the Library of Con¬ gress, New York Public Library, Pasadena Public Library, Los Angeles County Library, Palo Alto Public Library and California State Library. Colleges which receive our paper include the University of California (Los Angeles Branch), University of Southern California, University of Chicago, Smith and Harvard Universities. Harvard uses our paper in its political science department.” As source material for future reference, complete sets of the Center news¬ papers will be available at Headquarters, Western Defense Command, the War Department, and the Library of Congress. CHAPTER XVIII Assembly Center Security External Security. The Commanding Generals of each Sector of the Western Defense Command were responsible to the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, for the external security at each of the Assembly Centers located in their respective Sectors. One or more military police companies were assigned to each Assembly Center as required by the area and evacuee population involved. The Sector Provost Marshal was responsible for the actual supervision of the military police at all Assembly Centers in his Sector. The Provost Marshal, Western Defense Command, advised the Commanding General, Western De¬ fense Command, in all matters pertaining to external security at Assembly Centers, and prepared the policies and orders of the Commanding General for transmittal to the Commanding Generals of the various Sectors. The Provost Marshal, Western Defense Command, as well as other officers from this headquarters, periodically inspected the manner in which announced func¬ tions and policies were carried out by the military police companies at each of the Assembly Centers. The basic function of the military police at the Assembly Centers was to prevent ingress and egress of unauthorized persons. The Assembly Center Manager, operating within the specific regulations published by the Wartime Civil Control Administration in this regard, was authorized to control the entrance and exit of evacuees and other persons. permission granted. pass. He issued passes to reflect No entrance or exit was permitted without a specific The military police honored the passes thus issued, and refused entrance and exit to those persons not in possession of such authority. The military police also had a contingent responsibility. In the event of a fire, riot, or disorder which passed beyond the control of the Center Manage¬ ment or interior police, the Center Manager or the superior officer of the interior police then on duty was authorized to call upon the commanding officer of the military police for assistance. When the military police were called into an Assembly Center on such an occasion, the commanding officer assumed full charge of the entire Center until the emergency was ended. The policies governing the functioning of military police at Assembly Centers were announced in the following order of the Commanding General: *'370.093 "SUBJECT: Functions of Military Police Units at centers for Japanese evacuees. "To : Commanding Generals, Northwestern Sector, WDC. Northern California Sector, WDC. Southern California Sector, WDC. Southern Land Frontier Sector, WDC. Ninth Corps Area. "1. Prior instructions on the subject of functions of military police units at the Assembly Centers and Relocation Centers for Japanese evacuees are rescinded and the following instructions are substituted therefor: 215 216 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST “a. Purpose of the Evacuation Center. The Evacuation Center has been established for the purpose of caring for Japanese who have been moved from certain military areas. They have been moved from their homes and placed in camps under guard as a matter of military necessity. The camps are not "concentration camps” and the use of this term is considered objectionable. Evacuation Centers are not internment camps. Internment camps are established for another purpose and are not related to the evacu¬ ation program. "b. Operation of the Evacuation Center. The Center is operated by civilian man¬ agement under the Wartime Civilian Control Administration, Headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. A civilian director is in charge of each Center. Civilian police available will be on duty to maintain order within the camp. The civilian police are responsible for the search of individual evacuees and their possessions for contraband. The civilian police are responsible for the escort of visitors and evacu¬ ees throughout the camp. The camp director is responsible for all means of communi¬ cation within the camp. "c. (1) Functions of Military Police at Evacuation Centers. The military police are assigned to the Center for the purpose of preventing ingress or egress of unauthor¬ ized persons and preventing evacuees from leaving the Center without proper authority. The Assembly Centers in the combat area are generally located in grounds surrounded by fences clearly defining the limits for the evacuees. In such places the perimeter of the camp will be guarded to prevent unauthorized departure of evacuees. The Re¬ location Centers are generally large areas of which the evacuee quarters form only a part of the Center. These Centers may have no fences and the boundaries may only be marked by signs. At such Centers the military police will control the roads leading into the Center and may have sentry towers placed to observe the evacuee barracks. The balance of the area may be covered by motor patrols. The camp director will determine those persons authorized to enter the area and will transmit his instructions to the commanding officer of the military police. The camp director is authorized to issue permits to such evacuees as may be allowed to leave the Center. "(2) In case of disorder, such as fire or riot, the camp director or interior police are authorized to call upon the military police for assistance within the camp. When the military police are called into the camp area on such occasions the commander of the military police will assume full charge until the emergency ends. The question of the disposition of unmanageable evacuees is not a responsibility of the military police. "(3) The commanding officer of the military police is responsible for the black-out of the Evacuation Center. A switch will be so located to permit the prompt cut-off by the military police of all electric current in the camp. He will notify the camp director of his instructions relative to black-outs. “(4) The commanding officer of the military police is responsible for the protection of merchandise at the post exchanges furnished for the use of the military personnel. "(5) Enlisted men will be permitted within the areas occupied by the evacuees only when in the performance of prescribed duties. "(6) All military personnel will be impressed with the importance of the duties to which their unit has been assigned, the performance of which demands the highest standards of duty, deportment and military appearance. "(7) A firm but courteous attitude will be maintained toward the evacuees. There will be no fraternizing. Should an evacuee attempt to leave camp without per¬ mission he will be halted, arrested and delivered to the camp police. "(8) Commanding officers of military police units will be furnished copies of operating instructions issued to the camp director. They are required to maintain such close personal contacts with the camp director and his assistants as will assure the efficient and orderly conduct of the camp, and the proper performance of the duties of each.” Interior Security. The original plans for interior security contemplated a civilian law enforcement body consisting of an experienced Caucasian peace 217 ASSEMBLY CENTER SECURITY officer as chief of police and one other Caucasian assistant, with such number of evacuees as necessary to maintain the peace and to enforce the laws and Center regulations. The chief of police under this plan, was responsible to the Center Manager. Early in the operation of the first Centers it became evident that this would not provide the desired security within the Centers and it was abandoned. To insure that disaffection among the evacuees would not become rampant, an organization was created with a separate line of authority to the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration. This line was parallel to that of the Center Management staff. The Interior Security Branch was created within the Property, Security, and Regulatory Division of Wartime Civil Control Administration, and an army officer with previous experience as a student of municipal affairs and as a metro¬ politan police chief was assigned as chief of that Branch. Civilians with con¬ siderable municipal police experience were employed as assistant chiefs of the Branch, inspectors, and planning assistants. A capable police records technician was employed for one month to organize the interior security records and install them in each Center. An experienced interior security municipal police in each police officer Center. interior security police consisted of a In was employed each Center as chief thenceforth chief, assistant chief, of the two or more sergeants, and such number of patrolmen as the evacuee population and area of the Center demanded. Basically there were approximately four interior security police per thousand evacuee population. While this proportion of police per thousand population is greater than the average municipality of similar size, there were many duties to be performed not ordinarily required of police in small communities. Examples of these extra duties were: inspection of all incoming and outgoing parcels, except letter mail, for contraband; inspection of all vehicles passing through entrances and exits; supervision of visiting; patrol of mess halls; and escorting all evacuees who were authorized by the Center Manager to leave the Center. The personnel of the Interior Security Branch reached its maximum in the month of July, 1942, with a total of 334 employees—319 in the Assembly Centers and 15 at the Wartime Civil Control Administration headquarters. To assist in the keeping of the peace and the regulation of foot and mo¬ torized traffic, the chiefs of interior security in each Center were authorized to, and did, recruit staffs of auxiliary police from among evacuees. number of reasons this proved wholly unsuccessful. privileges to influential evacuees For a They extended special (so far as they were able), they demanded extra compensation and extra privileges and in a number of instances "pro¬ tected” gambling rings. After more than fair trial, the evacuee auxiliaries were disbanded. It was so rare as to be exceptional when an evacuee, auxiliary or otherwise, reported a violation to the interior security police, made a worthwhile investi¬ gation, or even produced any information of value regarding a violator or impending disturbances. On the contrary, when the one disturbance mentioned in greater detail later) (to be of any moment occurred, many of the 218 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST former auxiliary police were observed in the forefront of the demonstration. Direct liaison was established between the interior security police in each Center and the local law enforcement agencies, police, sheriffs, county attor¬ neys, and the local courts. All of the interior security police at each Center received deputizations from the county sheriff except in those cases where the Center was entirely within a municipality and then special police commissions were issued by the local police chief. were tried in the local Violations of ordinances and state laws courts with the local prosecutors conducting the prosecution. Subversive activities and violations of Federal laws were investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and prosecuted in the Federal Courts. In conformance with the delimitation agreement between Federal investigative agencies, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was ordinarily responsible for investigations of these types in the Centers. Because the Centers had many of the aspects of military reservations, the usual practice was for the interior security police to conduct preliminary investigations, report those that ap¬ peared to be Federal violations to the Federal Bureau of Investigation office having jurisdiction, and then cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents in such manner as desired in further investigation or in the apprehension of the violators. Several cases of conspiracy to violate Public Law No. 503 (involving liquor transactions and gambling) and theft of government property were com¬ pleted in this manner. Only one disturbance of serious proportions occurred in any of the Assem¬ bly Centers. At Santa Anita on August 4, 1942, a routine search for various articles of contraband was started immediately after the morning meal. A few of the interior security police became over-zealous in their search and some¬ what overbearing in their manner of approach to evacuees in two of the Center’s seven districts. Added to this was an order from the Center Manager to pick up, without advance notice, electric hot plates which had previously been allowed on written individual authorization of the Center Management staff to families who needed them for the preparation of infant formulas and food for the sick. Electric devices, such as hot plates, were strictly controlled to prevent fire. Poor liaison, or rather the complete lack of liaison in this incident, between the Center Management and the heads of the interior security police resulted in the failure of reports of complaints to reach the chief of interior security police until mid-afternoon. Those complaints, based to a certain extent on solid ground grew in the intervening four or five hours to rumors of all kinds of violations on the part of the police. When finally the complaints reached the chief of interior police, the search was promptly postponed just as the crowds were beginning to gather. Two mobs and one crowd of women evacuees formed. One evacuee who had long been suspected by the disorderly elements among the population of giving information to the police was set upon and severely beaten though not seriously injured. injured. The interior security police were harassed but none were ASSEMBLY CENTER SECURITY 219 This is the single instance, mentioned earlier, in which the military police were called into the Center and took complete charge upon entry. No further disturbance occurred after the military police entered. The crowds dispersed, and no further threats of violence were circulated and no actual attempts at violence occurred. This disturbance was spontaneous and not the result of subversive planning. Corrective action was immediately taken to insure against provocation of similar disturbances in the future. Center Management and Interior Security staff officials responsible for the lack of liaison which had allowed the all too evident signs of brewing trouble to reach the boiling point without action were removed from the Center. A survey by military police officers established the two districts in which some of the police were so over-zealous as to cause the rumors and actually identified the responsible individual police employees who were promptly replaced. It is difficult to establish a basis for comparing the incidence of crime in the Assembly Centers with the incidence of crime in municipalities with approximately the same population, or with the incidence of crime committed by persons of Japanese ancestry prior to evacuation. Too many of the charac¬ teristics which are presumed to be crime deterrents in the normal community of similar population were necessarily absent in Assembly Centers. On the other hand, many new factors appeared in the Assembly Centers that are not usually found in communities of a like population. The fact that a great majority of the evacuees had much more unoccupied time than they were accustomed to, is not an insignificant consideration. During the year 1941 a total of 570 persons of Japanese ancestry were arrested for Part I and Part II offenses (see uniform crime reports, Federal Bureau of Investigation, for list of offenses). The crime records in Assembly Centers cover a period of six months during which 534 Part I and Part II offenses were reported to the Interior Security Police. evacuee population during these six months was 58,004. The average monthly The total population of persons of Japanese ancestry in the United States in 1941 was 126,500. The annual crime rate per 1,000 Japanese for 1941 is 4.5, while the same rate projected from the six months of record in the Assembly Centers was 20.6. For the record it must be stated that many of the more serious crimes disappeared en¬ tirely or showed great proportionate decrease in the Assembly Centers. The approximately 450 percent increase is due almost entirely to the multiplicity of assaults, petty thefts, disorderly conduct, and other offenses of similar minor nature which always occur when large populations are concentrated into small areas under abnormal conditions. Because of all the complicating factors, no at¬ tempt is made at actual comparison with cities of approximately the same popu¬ lation. Tables 27 and 28 present an analysis of the crime incidence in Assembly Centers. A graphic presentation of the Evacuee Crime Rate is given as Figure 17. 220 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST TABLE 27.—Number of Offenses Charged—Total Japanese Population of the United States, Calendar Year, 1941, and of Assembly Centers, April 25 to October 25, 1942. Pre-Evacuation1 (12 Mos.) Offense Charged Post-Evacuation (6 Mos.) 570 534 5 5 16 10 10 2 9 1 36 11 123 1 1 1 10 2 24 9 10 9 1 3 30 4 Disorderly Conduct... 2 10 1 7 13 8 4 89 24 192 69 3 22 2 72 7 55 117 9 65 figures are based on “Uniform Crime Reports”, Volume XII, fourth quarterly bulletin, 1941, issued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice. TABLE 28.—Crime Offenses in Assembly Centers Center Average population (Thousands) Days of operation Total Japanese man days (Thousands) Number of offenses Offense rate per 1,000 persons per year Pre-Evacuation1. 126.5 365 46,172.5 570 4.5 All Assembly Centers. 42.2 224 9,462.2 534 20.6 Fresno. Manzanar. Marysville. Mayer. Merced. Pinedale. Pomona. Portland. Puyallup. Sacramento. Salinas. Santa Anita. Stockton. Tanforan. Tulare. Turlock. 4.4 5.2 1.8 0.2 3.8 3.7 4.8 3.0 5.7 3.2 3.0 12.9 3.7 6.5 4.1 2.9 178 72 53 27 133 78 110 132 137 52 69 215 161 169 138 105 783.7 373.4 93.3 5.8 500.4 287.9 523.0 391.8 781.4 165.9 209.2 2,777.6 599.7 1,098.7 567.4 303.2 34 40 1 15.8 39.1 3.9 4 9 11 19 32 8 20 226 16 59 36 19 2.9 11.4 7.7 17.7 14.9 17.6 34.9 29.7 9.7 19.6 23.2 22.9 ■Figures are based on “Uniform Crime Reports”, Volume XII, fourth quarterly bulletin, 1941, issued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of justice. ASSEMBLY CENTER SECURITY EVACUEE CRIME RATE OFFENSES PER THOUSAND JAPANESE PER YEAR *llt Utl_Y CENTER ANO NUMBER OF OFFENSES MAN Z ANAR 40 SALINAS 20 SANTA ANITA 226 TULARE 36 TURLOCK i« ALL CENTERS 534 TANFORAN 39 PORTLAND 19 SACRAMENTO 8 FRESNO 34 PUYALLUP 32 PINEDALE 9 STOCKTON 16 POMONA ll MARYSVILLE i MERCED 4 MAYER 0 0 Figure 17 221 CHAPTER XIX Administration of Assembly Centers As indicated in Chapter IV, supra, the Assembly Centers were largely staffed by personnel "borrowed” from the Work Projects Administration. The Chief of the Assembly Center Branch of the Wartime Civil Control Administration was Rex L. Nicholson, who absented himself temporarily from his position as a Regional Director of the Work Projects Administration, to aid in the evacua¬ tion program. Although Work Projects Administration personnel contributed their valuable experience in Federal fiscal, procurement and administrative mat¬ ters, the responsibility for Assembly Center operations remained exclusively that of the Commanding General, and his administrative directions were carried into effect through the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration. Every effort was made to employ evacuees in Assembly Center operations to the fullest extent practicable on assignments they proved to be capable of per¬ forming. The basic plan, therefore, contemplated that all actual operations were to be carried out by evacuees. This was followed almost without exception. The accompanying chart is illustrative of Assembly Center administrative organization (Figure 18). It enables the reader to visualize for himself the wide range of problems encountered and the division of responsibilities at the Center level. It will be noted that every aspect of community life is included in one of the regularly established administrative divisions. no end to the services that had to be provided. There was literally Of course, housing, feeding, sanitation, public health, maintenance and recreation were the principal con¬ siderations, but provision for these activities did not necessarily meet the neces¬ sity for barbershops, beauty shops, shoe repair shops, clothing stores, canteens and post offices. The problem of compensation for those evacuees accepting employment required solution. Also a proper table of allowances per person and per family had to be computed in order to assure the availability of the necessities for normal maintenance. Provision for maternity wards, for the care of the new¬ born, for the ailing, aged and the chronics was not alone enough, means had to be established for the burial of the deceased. In developing the rates of compensation for evacuees, the Wartime Civil Control Administration took a number of factors into account. First, it was concluded that the net cash wage paid to any evacuee should not exceed the net cash allowance then available to any enlisted man in the United States Army. At this time enlisted men received $21.00 per month for their first four months of service. Further, as the War Relocation Authority was to be¬ come responsible for the continuing problem once evacuees had been removed to the interior by the Army, it was felt that War Relocation Authority should be consulted. In addition, there was the problem of morale. Some compensation was essential and there had to be a division between the various skills. It would not have worked successfully had no recognition been afforded the various dif222 CENTER ORGANIZATION ASSEMBLY ADMINISTRATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTERS 223 Figure 18 224 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST ferences between the unskilled and the professional groups. A pay schedule was developed, and submitted to War Relocation Authority for comment. The Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, and the Director, War Reloca¬ tion Authority, concurred. It was then submitted by Wartime Civil Control Administration to the Commanding General who, following his approval of the schedule, submitted it to the War Department. When finally placed in opera¬ tion as a schedule of compensation, it had the approval of the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Secretary of War and the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, as well as the Director, War Relocation Authority. Although four classifications were initially adopted, over the major period of operations, there were but three general classes and three applicable rates. They were as indicated in Chapter XVI. Unskilled. $ 8.00 per month Skilled . 12.00 " Professional 16.00 ” . “ These rates were based upon a forty-hour week. Only those who accepted employment on a regular basis of forty hours per week were eligible to receive compensation at the stated rate. All evacuees were given a monthly allowance in script or coupons. The objective was to place them all on the same basis irrespective of economic position. In the execution of this objective, evacuees were furnished housing, food, clothing, where necessary, the normal community services and an elastic means based on a fixed allowance for the acquisition of necessities. The monthly coupon allowance was as follows: Evacuees under 16 years of age. $1.00 Evacuees over 16 years of age. 2.50 Married couples. 4.50 per couple (maximum) Families 7.50 per family (maximum) . The available community services such as shoe repair shops, barber and beauty shop services were obtainable in exchange for coupons only. Cash as a medium for the purchase of these services was not permitted. Any evacuee who so desired was allowed to purchase extra coupon books. These coupons were acceptable at canteens as well. A competent system of timekeeping and recording was established at each Center to account for the work performed by evacuees. It was also necessary to maintain a family ledger as every item of clothing, each coupon book and every time check issued an evacuee was accurately recorded. Ultimately, this was reported to the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration. A fully equipped fire department was installed at each Assembly Center and fire discipline was strictly enforced. A Fire Chief, under the direction of the Center Manager, organized a group to train evacuee firemen. Semi-weekly fire drill were held and daily fire inspection was the rule. In all cases specific arrangements were made by the Wartime Civil Control Administration for the assistance of nearby public fire departments in case of serious emergency. The ADMINISTRATION OF ASSEMBLY 225 CENTERS use of hot plates and other electrical devices was strictly limited in order to main¬ tain fire hazard at a minimum. But few fires developed during the course of Assembly Center administration and all of these were relatively minor. As was noted in Chapter XVIII, Assembly Center security was not the responsibility of the Center Manager and his staff. Internal security was the responsibility of the Chief of Internal Security at each Center. He, in turn, was directly responsible to Wartime Civil Control Administration, under a separate line of administration. External security was the function of Army Military Police. Close liaison was maintained between the Military Police Com¬ mander, the Center Manager, and the Chief of Internal Security. Shortly after the establishment of the first Assembly Center, the Wartime Civil Control Administration, issued an Assembly Center Operations Manual as well as an Interior Security Manual. The former covered all aspects of operations, and prescribed the rules to be observed by evacuees in the interests of public health, morals and order. Regulations were posted for the information and guidance of those affected. It would over-extend this report to reprint the Assembly Center Operations and the Interior Security Manuals here. Bound copies, however, are to be on file at Headquarters, Western Defense Command, at the War Department, and at the Library of Congress. Some additional construction was always in progress at each Center. The Works and Maintenance Section was responsible not only for maintenance and repair but also for the construction of additions and improvements. In passing, it is to be noted that this Section was responsible for fire control. Under the direction of the Service Section at each Center, various commu¬ nity needs were satisfied. Education, recreation, welfare, intra-center mail dis¬ tribution and the complaint department were under its aegis. At each Center specific opportunity was afforded every evacuee to make suggestions, complaints and requests in writing or through his Block Leader. complaint was given consideration. Each suggestion and If it had merit, action was taken to remedy the difficulty at the Center level. If the Center Manager lacked author¬ ity, he communicated immediately with the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, San Francisco. The entire emphasis in the Center Administra¬ tion was to provide for the comfort and convenience of evacuees in order to reduce hardship. The Service Section was also responsible for the establishment of a Center newspaper. Each Center had its own paper, prepared, published and edited exclusively by evacuees. A complete file of these publications will be available at Headquarters, Western Defense Command, at the War Department, and at the Library of Congress. The education program of the Service Section was under the technical direction of the United States Office of Education. The educational super¬ visor was a member of the Center Administrative staff. by evacuee supervisors and teachers. He was assisted Existing or specially constructed build¬ ings were converted to school room use. Blackboards, desks, tables, and other school furniture were either constructed with evacuee labor or improvised. Books, classroom and special materials were provided primarily through dona- 226 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST tions. A limited amount of supplies was purchased with Army funds. Instruc¬ tion courses included classes for pre-school, kindergarten, elementary, junior and senior high school, and adult groups. Special classes were held in first aid, safety, fire prevention and nursing. Recreation was an important department in the Service Section; both out¬ door and indoor activities were organized for the benefit of all age groups. Certain existing organizations such as Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts were en¬ couraged to continue unit activities. Special classes were established for dancing, art work and other allied recreational interests. Libraries were estab¬ lished with books and magazines normally donated. Moving pictures were shown periodically, ordinarily with donated equipment. The United States postal service facilities in Assembly Centers were operated by regular, bonded postal employees assigned by postal authorities. They were authorized to sell stamps, postal money orders and handle parcel post packages. They also had authority to sell War Bonds and Stamps and carry on normal post office business. The work of sorting and delivering incoming and outgoing mail was ordi¬ narily accomplished by evacuees. There was no censorship of incoming or out¬ going mail. Parcel post, however, was inspected for contraband in the presence of the addressee. Banking facilities were found to be essential in all Centers, although bank¬ ing by mail was encouraged through the assistance of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. The necessary services were made available. There were many visitors at each Assembly Center, some for social calls and others who had business with evacuees. Visiting houses were established near each Assembly Center gate. Visitors were not allowed to enter the Center proper or to meet evacuees in their living quarters except in cases of serious illness or other emergency. There were, of course, no restrictions whatever against evacuees residing within the Center visiting each other. Visitor passes were issued on application as a matter of course. A record was kept of all visitations. Passes could be obtained through mail application or at the Center gate from an attendant. When a visitor arrived, word was sent to the evacuee who met the visitor in the building provided therefor. Public health and sanitation received the most careful attention. Inspections of latrines, and showers were required to be made a minimum of twice daily. Food handlers underwent careful physical examinations and kitchens were in¬ spected daily. Sanitary requirements had to be met. To encourage this, com¬ petitions were held between Center kitchens. At each center the most sanitary, orderly kitchen was awarded a pennant weekly. Evacuees themselves were the dishwashers and the food handlers, and with but few exceptions Center chefs were evacuees. It is interesting to note that in one or two Centers the Japanese community did not contain any individuals who were qualified as cooks. At these Centers Caucasian cooks were hired and a school was immediately estab¬ lished. Within a short time evacuees took over the task. Although the United States Public Health Service was responsible for the ADMINISTRATION OF ASSEMBLY CENTERS 227 immediate direction of Center infirmaries, hospitals and outpatient service, the Center Manager was responsible for the extension of community services to the infirmaries and hospitals. The success of the operation can be measured in part by the absence of any significant epidemic. A summary showing each of the following facts for each Assembly Center is presented in Table 29: The average population, total days occupied by evacuees, the inclusive dates of occupancy, and the maximum population. The entire Assembly Center operations program from the opening of the Manzanar Reception Center on March 21 to the closing of Fresno, October 30, extended through a period of 224 days. Exclusive of Manzanar, which was transferred to War Relocation Authority, the Santa Anita Center had the longest period of occupancy: 215 days, with an average population of 12,919 for this entire period. During most of the period, the population of Santa Anita was more than 18,000. Next in order of length of evacuee occupancy, were Fresno, with 178 days; Tanforan, 169 days; and Stockton, 161 days. On the other hand, the Center at Mayer, Arizona, was closed after 27 days, Sacramento after 52 days, Marys¬ ville after 53, Salinas after 69, and Pinedale after 78. TABLE 29.—Average Population, Total Days Occupied by Evacuees, Dates of Occupancy and Maximum Population of Assembly Centers (Population in outside hospitals not included) Center Average population Total days occupied DATES OF OCCUPANCY From To MAXIMUM POPULATION Number Date Fresno. Manzanar1. Marysville. Mayer. 4,403 5,186 1,760 214 178 72 53 27 5-6 3-21 5-8 5-7 10-30 5-31 6-29 6-2 5,120 9,666 2,451 245 9-4 5-31 6-2 5-25 Merced. Pinedale. Pomona. Portland. 3,762 3,690 4,755 2,969 133 78 110 132 5-6 5-7 5-7 5-2 9-15 7-23 8-24 9-10 4,508 4,792 5,434 3,676 6-3 6-29 7-20 6-6 Puyallup. Sacramento. Salinas. Santa Anita. 5,704 3,190 3,032 12,919 137 52 69 215 4-28 5-6 4-27 3-27 9-12 6-26 7-4 10-27 7,390 4,739 3,594 18,719 5-25 5-30 6-23 8-23 Stockton. Tanforan. Tulare. Turlock. 3,725 6,501 4,112 2,888 161 169 138 105 5-10 4-28 4-20 4-30 10-17 10-13 9-4 8-12 4,271 7,816 4,978 3,662 5-21 7-25 8-11 6-2 lManzanar was transferred to WRA on June 1, 1942. The following Figures (19-a to 19-p inclusive) graphically present the indi¬ vidual Center data on occupancy. 228 JAPANESE Figure 19-a: EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Evacuee Population of Fresno Assembly Center Daily population movement shown above. Average population 4,403 for 178 days. Occupied from May 6 to October 30. Maximum population 5,120 on September 4. Received evacuees from: Central San Joaquin Valley. Major transfer movements to: Jerome and Gila River. 3000 2000 1000 MARCH APRIL Figure 19-b: Evacuee Population of Marysville Assembly Center Daily population movement shown above. Average population 1,760 for 53 days. Occupied from May 8 to June 29. Maximum population 2,451 on June 2. Received evacuees from: Placer-Sacramento Area. Major transfer movements to: Tule Lake. Figure 19-c: Evacuee Population of Manzanar Assembly Center Daily population movement shown above. Average population 5,186 for 72 days. Occupied from March 21 to May 31. Maximum population 9,666 on May 31. Received evacuees from: Los Angeles County, Bainbridge Island, Sacramento-Amador Area. Major transfer movements to: Manzanar. ADMINISTRATION OF ASSEMBLY 000 jMARCH APRIL Figure flmuuupga MAY 19-d: 229 CENTERS 1 JUNE Evacuee JULY Population of AUGUST Mayer SEPTEMBER1 OCTOBER Assembly Center Daily population movement shown above. Average population 214 for 27 days. Occu¬ pied from May 7 to June 2. Maximum population 245 on May 25. Received evacuees from: Arizona Military Area I. Major transfer movements to: Colorado River. 5000 4 000 3 000 2000 1000 MARCH Figure 19-e: Evacuee Population of Merced Assembly Center Daily population movement shown above. Average population 3,762 for 133 days. Occupied from May 6 to September 15. Maximum population 4,508 on June 3. Received evacuees from: North San Francisco Bay Area—North San Joaquin Valley. Major transfer movements to: Granada. Figure 19-f: Evacuee Population of Portland Assembly Center Daily population movement shown above. Average population 2,969 for 132 days. Occupied from May 2 to September 10. Maximum population 3,676 on June 6. Received evacuees from: Multnomah and Western Counties, Oregon, Central Counties, Washington. Major transfer movements to: Minidoka, Heart Mountain, Tule Lake. JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 230 8000 ™ 7000 ' L 1 M 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 RCH APRIL 1 MAY 1 JUNE 1 JULY ' AUGUST 'sEPTEMBEf! OCTOBER Figure 19-g: Evacuee Population of Puyallup Assembly Center Daily population movement shown above. Average population 5,704 for 137 days. Occupied from April 28 to September 12. Maximum population 7,390 on May 25. Received evacuees from: Seattle-Tacoma Areas, Alaska. Major transfer movements to: Tule Lake, Minidoka. Figure 19-h: Evacuee Population of Pinedale Assembly Center Daily population movement shown above. Average population 3,690 for 78 days. Occupied from May 7 to July 23. Maximum population 4,792 on June 29. Re¬ ceived evacuees from: Pierce, King Counties, Hood River County, Oregon. Major transfer movements to: Tule Lake, Colorado River. ADMINISTRATION Figure 19-i: OF ASSEMBLY CENTERS 231 Evacuee Population of Pomona Assembly Center Daily population movement shown above. Average population 4,755 for 110 days. Occupied from May 7 to August 24. Maximum population 5,434 on July 20 and August 2. Received evacuees from: Los Angeles, San Francisco, Santa Clara. Major transfer movements to: Heart Mountain. Figure 19-j: Evacuee Population of Sacramento Assembly Center Daily population movement shown above. Average population 3,190 for 52 days. Occupied from May 6 to June 26 Maximum population 4,739 on May 30. Received evacuees from: San Joaquin and Sacramento Counties, California. Major transfer movements to: Tule Lake. . 3 000 2000 1 000 MA =*CH APRIL MAY Figure 19-k: 1 JUNE 1 JULY 1 AUGUST September OCTOBER Evacuee Population of Salinas Assembly Center Daily population movement shown above. Average population 3,032 for 69 days. Occupied from April 27 to July 4. Maximum population 3,594 on June 23. Received evacuees from: Monterey, Santa Cruz, and San Benito Counties, California. Major transfer movements to: Colorado River. JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 232 I 9000 I I 8000 I 7000 I 6000 I 5000 — _ I 4000 I 3000 I 2000 I 1000 10000 9000 8000 BhI 7000 6000 .. 5000 4000 r 3000 2000 1000 u Figure 19-1: Evacuee Population of Santa Anita Assembly Center Daily population movement shown above. Average population 12,919 for 215 days. Occupied from March 27 to October 27. Maximum population 18,719 on August 23. Received evacuees from: Los Angeles, San Diego, and Santa Clara Counties, California. Major transfer movements to: Colorado River, Gila River, Heart Mountain, Granada, Rohwer, Central Utah, Jerome. Figure 19-m: Evacuee Population of Stockton Assembly Center Daily population movement shown above. Average population 3,725 for 161 days. Occupied from May 10 to October 17. Maximum population 4,271 on May 21. Received evacuees from: San Joaquin County, California. Major transfer movements to: Rohwer, Gila River. ADMINISTRATION Figure 19-n: Evacuee OF ASSEMBLY Population of 233 CENTERS Tanforan Assembly Center Daily population movement shown above. Average population 6,501 for 169 days. Occupied from April 28 to October 13. Maximum population 7,816 on July 25. Received evacuees from: San Francisco Bay Area. Major transfer movements to: Central Utah. Figure 19-o: Evacuee Population of Tulare Assembly Center Daily population movement shown above. Average population 4,112 for 138 days. Occupied from April 20 to September 4. Maximum population 4,978 on August 11-14. Received evacuees from: Ventura, Santa Barbara, San Luis Obispo, Los Angeles, and Sacramento Counties. Major transfer movements to: Gila River. Figure 19-p: Evacuee Population of Turlock Assembly Center Daily population movement shown above. Average population 2,888 for 105 days. Occupied from April 30 to August 12. Maximum population 3,661 on June 2. Received evacuees from: Solano, Alameda, Los Angeles, and Sacramento Counties. Major transfer movements to: Gila River. PART VI RELOCATION OF EVACUEES CHAPTER XX War Relocation Authority Chapter V hereof alludes to the preliminary considerations which ultimately lead to the establishment of the War Relocation Authority by Executive Order No. 9102 issued by the President of the United States on March 18, 1942. As it was then contemplated that there might be collective evacuations of more than one category from the Atlantic seaboard as well as from the Pacific Coast, the Executive Order (9102) carried broad powers. In essential particu¬ lar, the Director of War Relocation Authority was authorized to formulate and execute a relocation program—to provide shelter, subsistence, clothing, medical attention, educational and recreational facilities, and to provide for private and public employment for evacuees. To effectuate this program the Director of War Relocation Authority was authorized to: Accomplish all necessary evacuation not undertaken by the Secretary of War or Military Commanders, and to relocate, supervise and pro¬ vide for the needs of such persons; to provide for employment of such persons with due regard to the safeguarding of the public interests; to secure coopera¬ tion and assistance of any governmental agency; to consult with the Secretary of War relative to regulations issued by him in order to coordinate evacuation and relocation activities; to delegate authority; to employ personnel, make expenditures including loans, grants, and the purchase of real property. The Order also directed consultation with the United States Employment Service and cooperation with the Alien Property Custodian. A War Relocation Work Corps was created to be made up by voluntary enlistment of persons removed under the Order. Finally, in order to avoid duplication of evacuation activities under the Order, and also under Executive Order No. 9066, it was provided that the Director shall not undertake any evacuation activities within Military Areas designated under Executive Order No. 9066 without the approval of the Secretary of War and an appropriate Military Commander. Obviously the evacuation would lead to the creation of long-range social and economic problems. These problems were essentially non-military in nature and it was considered unwise to require the military establishment to exert its energies in that direction but rather to conserve them for those aspects of the war effort intensely related to the defeat of the enemy. Such a program called for further movement of evacuees, with due regard to military necessity, to Relocation Centers, actual communities where a more normal life could be provided and the energies of the evacuees appropriately directed. The control and administration of these communities, made ready by the Army, became the War Relocation Authority burden. The tenor of the Executive Order establishing War Relocation Authority indicated that it would fully assume the burden of formulating and placing in execution a complete relocation program. However, to expedite the removal of evacuees from the temporary Assembly Centers to the Relocation Centers, the 237 238 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Army assumed certain responsibilities imposed on the "War Relocation Authority by the Executive Order, namely, the construction and equipment of the Reloca¬ tion Centers and the transfer of the evacuees thereto. As noted in Chapter I, the Wartime Civil Control Administration halted the relocation site selection aspects of its program following the creation of War Re¬ location Authority. Otherwise, War Relocation Authority accepted almost without change the program already formulated by Wartime Civil Control Administration in the first fortnight of Wartime Civil Control Administration existence. In essence the program called for the evacuation first to Assembly Cen¬ ters and thence to Relocation Centers in the interior. Accordingly, but for site selection (and ample time was afforded for this because, with evacuees resident in Assembly Centers, the pressure was off), War Relocation Authority was free to concentrate solely on the rehabilitation aspects of relocation. It was able to consider problems incident to the operation of Relocation Centers, for release therefrom, for providing employment in the interior, and the post war aspects. It was not required to devote any of its energies or functions to the logistics of transfers from Assembly to Relocation Centers, to the preserva¬ tion of community patterns in evacuation, to the furnishing of social, medical and property protection services during evacuation, or during the Assembly Center phases, to the construction, equipment and supply of Relocation Cen¬ ters. However, conferences between Wartime Civil Control Administration and War Relocation Authority representatives were held at frequent intervals on all Wartime Civil Control Administration actions which would affect in any way the War Relocation Authority policy and program. Indeed, the War Relocation Authority was free for virtually six months after its creation to develop a specific and thoroughly conceived program of Relocation Center operations. Therefore, the distinction between evacuation and the initial aspects of relocation presump¬ tively established by the terms of the Executive Order creating War Relocation Authority was never fully operative. As previously indicated in Chapter V, the closest coordination was estab¬ lished between headquarters of Wartime Civil Control Administration and War Relocation Authority. As soon as Director Eisenhower arrived in San Francisco following his appointment, he opened offices adjacent to those of the Wartime Civil Control Administration in the Whitcomb Hotel. Although the head¬ quarters of War Relocation Authority were to be established in Washington, until well into the summer of 1942 the principal office was in the San Francisco Regional Office. Major Mark H. Astrup (then Captain) was directed by War Department orders to report for duty to Mr. Eisenhower who assigned him as Liaison Officer from War Relocation Authority to Wartime Civil Control Ad¬ ministration. Consultation between Mr. Eisenhower and the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, was a multiple daily occurrence. The formal understanding of April 17, 1942, between the War Department and War Relocation Authority had been informally agreed to in essential part before the end of March. detail here. As the agreement speaks for itself, it is set forth in WAR RELOCATION 239 AUTHORITY "WAR DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY Washington, D. C. April 17, 1942. "MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE WAR DEPARTMENT AND WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY. "Preamble: The War Relocation Authority is an independent establishment created by Executive Order of the President, No. 9102 dated March 18, 1942, with a primary objective of relieving the military establishment of the burden of providing for the re¬ location of persons excluded from military areas by order of the Secretary of War or any designated military commander acting pursuant to Executive Order of the President, No. 9066 dated February 19, 1942. The emphasis in all War Relocation Authority activ¬ ities will be increasingly to alleviate the drain on military resources with regard to all phases of evacuation and relocation. The War Relocation Authority has agreed to prepare itself as rapidly as practicable to assume those burdens now imposed on the War Depart¬ ment respecting such activities and particularly in connection with the Pacific Coast evacuation now in progress. Accordingly the following understanding is executed between the War Department and the War Relocation Authority to meet the present situation. “1. The evacuation of combat zones is a military necessity and when determined upon must not be retarded by resettlement and relocation. In other words, the timing of evac¬ uation is a military function which War Relocation Authority will do all in its power to accommodate. "2. Assembly Centers are staging areas and necessary because of the time required to select relocation sites and to construct Relocation Centers (Reception Centers). Assembly Centers are constructed and will be supplied and operated by the War Department. "3. Relocation sites, upon which Relocation Centers (Reception Centers) are built, are to be selected by the War Relocation Authority, subject to War Department approval. "4. The acquisition, as distinguished from selection, of sites for Relocation Centers (Reception Centers) is a War Department function. Such acquisition will be made by the War Department upon the request of the War Relocation Authority. The War Re¬ location Authority will reimburse the War Department for the acquisition cost of re¬ location sites, or pay the cost in the first instance. "a. As a part of the acquisition procedure, respecting both private and public lands, the War Department, through an appropriate military commander, will advise the Chief Executive of the State concerned of the military necessity for the location of a relocation project within that State. "b. The War Relocation Authority has full responsibility for compilation of the necessary data and descriptions in connection with 3 and 4 above. "5. Construction of initial facilities at Relocation Centers (Reception Centers) will be accomplished by the War Department. This initial construction will include all facil¬ ities necessary to provide the minimum essentials of living, viz., shelter, hospital, mess, sanitary facilities, administration building, housing for relocation staff, post office, store houses, essential refrigeration equipment, and military police housing. (War Department construction will not include refinements such as schools, churches and other community planning adjuncts.) The placement and construction of military police housing will be subject to the approval of the appropriate military commander. "6. The War Department will procure and supply the initial equipment for Relocation Centers (Reception Centers), viz., kitchen equipment, minimum mess and barrack equip¬ ment, hospital equipment and ten days’ supply of non-perishable subsistence based on the Relocation Center (Reception Center) evacuee capacity. From the date of opening, or the date on which the War Relocation Authority initiates the operation of any Relocation Center (Reception Center), as the case may be, the War Department will transfer ac¬ countability for all such equipment and property to the War Relocation Authority. The War Relocation Authority agrees to assume such accountability. Thereafter, the War Relocation Authority will maintain and replace all such equipment and property, inclu¬ ding subsistence, and will procure whatever additional supplies, subsistence and equipment JAPANESE 240 EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST it may require. The War Department agrees that the War Relocation Authority may effect its procurement through War Department agencies. "a. As to all routine procurement effected by the War Relocation Authority through War Department Agencies, said Authority agrees that it will transmit to the War De¬ partment a forecast of its requirements semi-annually in advance and that it will confirm in writing to the appropriate War Department Agency its actual requirements from time to time as the need for such procurement develops. The War Relocation Authority will take all possible and practicable steps to inform the War Department well in advance of its requirements. "7. After pending arrangements for existing Reception Centers are completed, the War Relocation Authority will operate Relocation Centers (Reception Centers) from the date of opening. This will include staffing, administration, project planning and complete operation and maintenance. In undertaking such operations the War Relocation Authority will not retard completion of the evacuation process but will accommodate military re¬ quirements. It will be prepared to accept successive increments of evacuees as construction is completed and supplies and equipment are delivered. In each case the War Relocation Authority will provide a project manager who will be available to the War Department local construction representative for consultation as soon as a given project is approved for construction. "8. The War Department will provide for the transportation of evacuees to Assembly Centers and from Assembly Centers to Relocation Centers (Reception Centers) under appropriate military escort. The War Department through the Western Defense Com¬ mand, has arranged for the storage of household effects of evacuees through the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. At War Department expense, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco has acquired warehouse space, provided civilian guards, and has ar¬ ranged for inventories of goods stored by each evacuee. When evacuee goods are stored and the Federal Reserve Bank delivers inventory receipts to the War Relocation Authority, said Authority will accept such receipts from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and, upon such acceptance, said Authority assumes the responsibility now borne by the War Department for the warehousing program, including the assumption from the date of delivery of receipts, of payment of all costs. Thereafter, the disposition of such household effects and the transportation thereof to Relocation Centers, or elsewhere, will be the sole responsibility of the War Relocation Authority. "9. In the interest of the security of the evacuees relocation sites will be designated by the appropriate Military Commander or by the Secretary of War, as the case may be, as prohibited zones and military areas, and appropriate restrictions with respect to the rights of evacuees and others to enter, remain in, or leave such areas will be promulgated so that ingress and egress of all persons, including evacuees, will be subject to the control of the responsible Military Commander. Each relocation site will be under Military Police patrol and protection as determined by the War Department. Relocation Centers (Recep¬ tion Centers) will have a minimum capacity of 5,000 evacuees (until otherwise agreed to) in order that the number of Military Police required for patrol and protection will be kept at a minimum. "10. It is understood that all commitments herein as relate to the use of War De¬ partment and/or War Relocation funds are subject to the approval of the Bureau of the Budget. WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY by /s/ M. S. Eisenhower Director WAR DEPARTMENT by /s/ John J. McCloy Assistant Secretary of War.” In other chapters of this report a narrative account outlines the action taken to comply with the Agreement of April 17, by the War Department through Western Defense Command. In addition to Relocation Project site WAR RELOCATION 241 AUTHORITY acquisition, Center construction, equipment and supply, transfer of evacuees and their impedimenta from Assembly Centers to Relocation Centers, transfer of personal property and warehousing, as contemplated by the agreement, cer¬ tain other steps were taken. They are briefly described in the following passages. Each Assembly and Relocation Center within Western Defense Command was ultimately made the basis for a Civilian Restrictive Order.1 All are not of the same character. One group described the boundaries and extent of each Center, and the other group was issued in connection with the group agricultural labor program of War Relocation Authority. Civilian Restrictive Orders Nos. 1, 18, 19, 20, 23, and 24 described the boundaries of the various Centers. within these physical boundaries. Center residents were required to remain Each Center resident was enjoined to obtain express written authority before undertaking to leave the designated area. During the Assembly Center phase, such permits were issued only by the Wartime Civil Control Administration. Once transfer to Relocation Centers was initiated, a delegation of authority was executed by the Commanding Gen¬ eral to the Director of the War Relocation Authority. As ''X^r Relocation Au¬ thority was charged with full responsibility for Relocation Center operations and for all other aspects of relocation, the Army did not undertake to determine who might enter and who might depart from a Relocation Center. Violation of the terms of these Restrictive Orders subjected the violator to the penalties and liabilities provided by law. The Regulatory Branch of Wartime Civil Con¬ trol Administration was charged with the issuance of the authorizations above referred to, and issued appropriate permits, after investigation if that was deemed necessary, in telegraphic or written form, depending on the circumstances sur¬ rounding the particular application. Public Proclamation No. 8 was promulgated by the Commanding General, further to assure the security of Relocation Centers and adjacent communities.2 Under its terms all Center residents were required to obtain a permit before leaving the designated Project boundaries. The Proclamation also specifically controlled ingress and egress of persons other than Center residents. Violations were made subject to the penalties provided under Public Law 503, 77th Con¬ gress. In the delegation of authority to control ingress and egress (described in further detail later in this chapter), War Relocation Authority was given full freedom of action in determining who might enter and who might leave. The military police stationed around the perimeter of the several Projects did not participate in this determination. Their mission was merely to prevent unauthor¬ ized entry and unauthorized departure—as determined solely by War Relocation Authority. Four of the ten War Relocation Centers were established outside of the Western Defense Command and hence outside of the jurisdiction of the Com¬ manding General, Western Defense Command. To secure uniformity of control the War Department published Public Proclamation WD:1 on August 13, 1942. It designated the Heart Mountain Relocation Project in Wyoming, the Granada *See Inclosure to letter of transmittal # 7. 2See Inclosure to letter of transmittal # 7. JAPANESE 242 EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Relocation Project in Colorado, the Jerome Relocation Project and the Rohwer Relocation Project in Arkansas, as military areas and as War Relocation Project areas. In addition, Public Proclamation WD:1 contained provisions similar to those of Public Proclamation No. 8 issued by the Commanding General relative to the ingress to and egress from War Relocation Project areas.3 The Commanding General recognized fully that one of the principal responsi¬ bilities of War Relocation Authority was properly to control ingress and egress at Relocation Centers. The exercise of such control by Army authorities would have been tantamount to administering the Centers themselves. While the Com¬ manding General retained exclusive control to regulate and prohibit the entry or movement of any Japanese in the evacuated areas, he delegated fully the authority and responsibility to determine entry to and departure from the Center proper. The authority to control ingress and egress was delegated to the Director of War Relocation Authority and to such persons as the Director might desig¬ nate in writing. Each permit issued under this authorization was required to set forth the effective period thereof and the terms and conditions upon and the purpose for whiclj it was granted. A complete record of all such permits was required to be kept by the Director. However, the Commanding General retained exclusive jurisdiction over: "(a) Release of persons of Japanese ancestry from any Relocation Center or Project Area for the purpose of private employment within, resettlement within, or permanent or semi-permanent residence within Military Area No. 1 or the California portion of Military Area No. 2.” The delegation was accomplished on August 11, 1942. The Director, War Relocation Authority, in turn further delegated the authority and responsibility to his respective Center Directors. The net result of this arrangement was that in Centers located outside the evacuated zone, the military authorities exercised no control whatever over ingress and egress. That is, none beyond that involved in the military police function of preventing those entries and departures not au¬ thorized by the Center Director. As to the four Centers situated within the evacuated zone (Tule Lake, Manzanar, Colorado River and Gila River)4 the control reserved by the Commanding General was limited to regulating the conditions of travel and movement through the area. Where, for example, the Center Director at Manzanar determined to transfer an evacuee to another Center, or to release him for private employment or to enter a college in the interior, a travel permit for that portion of the travel performed within the evacuated zone was required. In issuing a permit (as a matter of course, a permit is issued on War Relocation Authority request) the Commanding Gen¬ eral merely prescribes the condition of travel—viz., on a stated route under escort. The War Relocation Authority endeavored to use evacuee labor as much as possible in the operation of its Relocation Centers. The railheads serving the Colorado River, Tule Lake, Gila River, and Manzanar Centers were outside SA copy of this Proclamation will also be found in Inclosure to letter of transmittal # 7. 4By Proclamation No. 16, Headquarters, Western Defense Command, dated March 2, 1943, the Colorado and Gila River War Relocation Centers were removed from the evacuated zone in Arizona when the boundary was moved southward an average of 60 miles. WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY 243 the respective Project areas. In order to facilitate the War Relocation Authortiy policy in this regard, notwithstanding the location of the Centers within the evacuated zone, the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, on September 21, 1942, authorized emergency employment of Japanese evacuees outside of the four War Relocation Authority Centers located within the evacuated areas. The authority granted required: “(a) That the work to be done is essential to the operation of the projects and in¬ volves meeting a current emergency. "(b) That payment therefor is not to be received from private individuals or private firms, that it is not private employment. "(c) That military guards are to be furnished to prevent the unauthorized absence of evacuees from the area in which the work is to be performed. This is not to be con¬ strued as indicating that the military personnel is to act as guards in connection with the works party. Military personnel is to be provided solely for the purpose of controlling exits from the particular area involved in order that unauthorized departure of evacuee labor may be prevented. "(d) In the event an evacuee laborer does escape or does effect an unauthorized absence from the area, the military personnel assigned to secure the area are not to take action for the apprehension of the individual. The Military Commander is, however, to immediately notify local County and State civilian law enforcement officials and the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In addition thereto, an immediate report of the occurrence is to be made to this headquarters.” Almost coincidentally with the initiation of evacuation, requests were sub¬ mitted for evacuee labor in the interior from various private sources. The most substantial volume emanated from sugar beet interests. As noted elsewhere in this report, particularly in Chapter IX, voluntary migration was halted pri¬ marily because of the attitude of the interior population. The governors of the interior states, with but one exception, reflected this attitude most forcibly. Their public statements augmented a growing public hostility toward all evacuees. Some few incidents occurred and it became apparent that evacuation would necessarily have to be accomplished under complete Federal supervision. Requests for evacuee labor coming from some sources were accompanied by the suggestion that Federal troops be used to provide for the security of the evacuees and the adjoining communities, but the requests were denied as no troops were available for such assignments. It was announced that if evacuee labor was to be used at all, suitable arrangements would have to be made by the State and County officials concerned, the growers, and the War Relocation Authority. It was also announced that in any event no evacuee labor would be available for employment within the evacuated zone. Flowever, it was agreed that if appropriate arrangements were made betwen those interested, there would be no objection to private employment in the interior of Western Defense Com¬ mand under War Relocation Authority jurisdiction and responsibility. On April 7, 1942, Mr. Eisenhower called a conference of Governors of western states at Salt Lake City. The Director, Wartime Civil Control Admin¬ istration, represented the Commanding General. Fie described the Army’s position to the Governors of several states, outlined in detail the evacuation program 244 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST already under way, and stated that as far as the Army was concerned any group agricultural labor recruitment from among evacuees would have to be the result of suitable arrangements between the interested parties, viz., State and local officials, sugar beet growers, sugar refiners, and the War Relocation Authority. A large group of sugar beet growers and sugar refiners were present at the conference, and shortly thereafter a crystallized program emerged. Although most of the Govern¬ ors present at the conference indicated that they would permit no evacuee labor to enter their respective states, a complete change of heart soon became evident in that suitable agreements were executed in writing covering the use of group evacuee labor parties in the sugar beet fields. The War Relocation Authority policies in this regard were announced in a printed pamphlet, an excerpt from which is quoted here. "A. Assurance from the Governor of the state and from the principal law enforcement officials in the locality that law and order will be maintained in the event that Japanese evacuees move into a specified area. (Such assurances will be released to the newspapers by the War Relocation Authority.) "B. Assurance from the employer that transportation by bus or rail will be provided by the employer from the assembly center to the place of work and return, or, if the assembly center has been evacuated in the meantime, assurance that the employer ■will compensate the Military authority in an amount equivalent to the cost of re¬ turning the evacuees to the assembly centers. In connection with transportation it is to be understood that, in the event the return of the evacuees is deemed necessary by the Director of the War Relocation Authority at any time, the employer will provide for such return as agreed to in this paragraph. "C. Assurance by the employer that not less than the wages prevailing in the locality will be paid the evacuees, and that any legal minimum wage requirement will be ob¬ served. The employer will agree that, in the event the family of the evacuee should be moved from an assembly to a relocation center during the period of private em¬ ployment, a portion of the evacuee’s wages as determined by the War Relocation Authority to be necessary for the support of the family will be paid to the Authority by the employer. The employer will also agree that at each pay period a record of the wages paid to each evacuee is to be submitted to the War Relocation Authority. "D. Assurance by the employer that adequate provision has been made as to housing and sanitary facilities for the evacues without cost to them. "E. Assurance by the employer that adequate provision has been made as to cooking facilities for the evacuees, or assurance that board will be furnished by the employer at cost. *'F. Assurance by the employer that adequate provision has been made as to medical atten¬ tion for the evacuees or assurance that medical attention is readily available to them at rates commensurate with wages. *'G. Assurance by the United States Employment Service, or assurance received by the Employment Service from responsible public officials, that the provisions made by the employer for housing, sanitary conditions, and medical service, are satisfactory. "H. Assurance by the United States Employment Service that labor in the locality will not be displaced by the evacuees, that a genuine labor shortage exists in the local¬ ity, and that the wages offered by the employer are not less than prevailing wages in the locality and not less than minimum wages required by law. "I. Assurance by the United States Employment Service that it will make a weekly WAR RELOCATION 245 AUTHORITY telegraphic report to the War Relocation Authority on general conditions in the area of employment. "When the War Relocation Authority has received the assurances outlined above, it recommends to the Military authority that the recruiting of the desired labor in the assembly centers be permitted. All recruiting is done by the United States Employment Service and all recruiting is done on a strictly voluntary basis.” The program having thus become crystallized, the Commanding General authorized the release of evacuees from Assembly Centers to the custody of War Relocation Authority for "evacuation” by that Authority from Assembly Centers to the appropriate sugar beet fields. The term "evacuation” is used as signifying action by War Relocation Authority under paragraph 3 (a) of Executive Order No. 9102. As the custody and responsibility of the persons involved moved from the Army to War Relocation Authority at the Assembly Center gates—within the prohibited zone—it was distinguished from a mere "transfer” from one point to another. The essential features of the program were that (a) State and local officials executed a signed commitment to maintain order, (b) employers agreed to pay prevailing wages, certified that there was no other available labor, and agreed to maintain certain minimum standards of housing and provision for medical and social care. In aid of this arrangement, the Commanding General issued Civilian Restric¬ tive Orders Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 22, and 25. These orders authorized the release of stated numbers of evacuees to the custody of War Relocation Authority for evacuation by it to prescribed areas in the interior for private employment in agricultural pursuits. Japanese thus transferred were enjoined to abide by the instructions and orders of War Relocation Authority and to return to Centers designated by that Authority whenever so directed. Violations were subject to the penalties prescribed by Public Law No. 503, 77th Congress. Approximately 1,740 evacuees were released from Assembly Centers under Army jurisdiction into the custody of War Relocation Authority in advance of the time when they would otherwise have been transferred to Relocation Centers. Of these 3 32 returned to an Assembly Center to join their families in regular transfers. The program met with measurable success and it was followed later by a more widely organized recruitment. In furtherance of the War Department-War Relocation Authority agreement as to procurement by War Relocation Authority through War Department agen¬ cies, certain preliminary arrangements were made. War Relocation Authority was authorized to procure materials and supplies through various Army depots on requisition. As to requisitions for items kept in stock, they were filled as a credit sale under the provisions of certain Army Regulations.5 As to items not in stock, the Army was to issue a purchase order charging Relocation Authority appropria¬ tions for each item. This purchase order was to direct that certified invoices for the purchase should be mailed to War Relocation Authority for payment and the goods shipped direct. General depots, Engineer depots, Quartermaster depots, and Medical depots were available in this connection. On November 22, 1942, the Commanding General, Ninth Service Command, was delegated the responsibility for liaison with War Relocation Authority, and 5Army Regulations 35-880. 246 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST for the control of military police escort guard companies stationed at the six Relo¬ cation Centers within Western Defense Command. Four of the six Centers, viz., Tule Lake, Manzanar, Colorado River and Gila River, were considered to be in a special category. The delegation made special mention of the Commanding Gen¬ eral’s concern regarding these four Centers because of their location within the evacuated zone. In accomplishing this delegation and rendering the report of survey on the status of Relocation Center construction and supply, the Com¬ manding General, Western Defense Command, announced his conclusion that the evacuation program initiated by him the preceding March was completed, so far as his headquarters might be concerned. The reservation as to the four named Centers contained in the delegation was predicated only upon his general responsibility for the defense of the Command. The delegation was based on the premise that Western Defense Command had no further direct interest in evacuee affairs. This delegation was of rather deep significance. The metamorphosis was complete. The initial problem was one of security—the security of the Pacific Coast. The problem was met by evacuation to Assembly Centers followed by a transfer to Relocation Centers. The latter phase — construction, supply, equipment of Relocation Centers and the transfer of evacuees from Assem¬ bly to Relocation Centers had been accomplished by the Army. (While the Commanding General was made responsible for this latter phase of the program, in so doing, he was accomplishing a mission of the War Relocation Authority rather than strictly an Army mission.) The second problem—national in scope—essentially a social-economic problem, was primarily for solution by the War Relocation Authority, an agency expressly created for that purpose. Had it not been for the responsibility accepted by the War Department, dis¬ charged through Western Defense Command, for executing the second phase of evacuation—a War Relocation Authority responsibility under the terms of the Executive Order—the transmission would have been accomplished sooner. In any event it would not have been later than the time when the last evacuee had been transferred from an Assembly Center. The delegation to Ninth Service Command, and the letters of transmittal of the reports of survey as to the status of Relocation Center construction are presented in Appendix 3. Transfer of Manzanar Reception Center On June 1, the Manzanar Reception Center, which had been operated by the Wartime Civil Control Administration since March 21, was formally trans¬ ferred to the War Relocation Authority. The Transfer agreement was as follows: "TRANSFER AGREEMENT BETWEEN WAR DEPARTMENT AND WAR RELO¬ CATION AUTHORITY PERTAINING TO MANZANAR RELOCATION AREA June 1, 1942. "1. Under and in accordance with the terms of the agreement of April 17, 1942, by the War Department and the War Relocation Authority, the Manzanar Relocation Area, including a Reception Center for approximately 10,000 Japanese evacuees, with all lands, water, buildings and installations, and fixtures and equipment, thereto, is transferred from WAR RELOCATION 247 AUTHORITY the War Department to the War Relocation Authority, effective at 12:01 A. M., June 1, 1942. "2. Accountability for Buildings, Fixtures and Utilities, or, in general, Installations and Equipment provided by the U. S. Engineer District constructing the Center, will be transferred by letter from the appropriate District Engineer to the War Relocation Authority Representative (Project Director). Such transfer to be based on a joint inven¬ tory and inspection by the War Relocation Authority Representative (Project Director), a representative of the Civil Affairs Division, Headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, and the appropriate U. S. Engineer District. The facilities and equip¬ ment transferred to be described in detail on the reverse of the letter of transfer, or by attachment thereto. "3. Accountability for items of equipment and property, other than included under the provisions of Paragraph 2, above, which have been provided by the War Department will be transferred on shipping tickets issued by the War Department Shipping Agency and signed by the War Relocation Authority representative (Project Director) as and when equipment and property is received or taken over by him. “4. All responsibility for administration and all expense incident to operation and maintenance occurring after the date of transfer will be assumed by the War Relocation Authority. For the War Department /s/ J. L. DeWitt J. L. Date: 6/2/42 DeWitt Lieutenant General U. S. Army Commanding Western Defense Command and Fourth Army For the War Relocation Authority: /s/ E. R. Fryer E. R. Fryer Date: 5/31/42 Regional Director War Relocation Authority” The Manzanar Reception Center was originally selected and constructed by the Army for relocation occupancy as distinct from the temporary custodial occupancy for which the Assembly Centers were constructed. In various tables throughout this report the Manzanar Reception Center is included in the pres¬ entation of data for Assembly Centers until May 31, 1942. It should not be overlooked, however, that Manzanar was never intended to be only an Assembly Center. Although the initial steps for the acquisition and construction of the Colorado River Center had been taken by the Army, before the War Relocation Authority was established, this Center was taken over by the War Relocation Authority (in an agreement with the Indian Service) soon after the establishment of the Authority and was never operated by the Wartime Civil Control Admin¬ istration. CHAPTER XXI The Construction and Equipment of Relocation Centers Introduction. General plans for the establishment, construction and equipping of Relocation Centers were developed before the War Relocation Authority was created. The Relocation Centers—at that time spoken of as Reception Centers—were intended to provide the evacuees not only with housing, but also with employment, education, recreation and all other neces¬ sary functions and services of community life. As indicated above (in Chap¬ ters IV and V) the general plan for evacuation and the relocation of evacuees was formulated in advance of the first controlled movement. Soon after the establishment of the War Relocation Authority this agency assumed responsibility for the selection of Relocation Project sites, subject to War Department approval as noted in Chapter I. Such approval was necessary in order that large numbers of evacuees might not be located immediately adjacent to present or proposed military installations or in strategically impor¬ tant areas. The acquisition of Relocation Project sites, as distinct from their selection, remained a War Department function. Such acquisition was made by the War Department upon the request of the Authority and with the understanding that the Authority would undertake to reimburse the Depart¬ ment for the acquisition costs or provide funds to pay the cost in the first instance. This depended on whether appropriations would ultimately be made available by Congress. The initial facilities at Relocation Centers were constructed by the War Department. This included all facilities necessary to provide the minimum essentials of living, viz., shelter, hospitals (all medical facilities), mess, sanitary facilities, administration buildings, housing for the non-evacuee staff of the Center, post office, store and warehouses, essential refrigeration equipment, and military police housing. It was agreed between the Authority and the War Department that the Department would not include in its construction pro¬ gram such utilities as schools, churches, and other community service buildings, except those listed above. This Agreement was reflected in a memorandum dated April 17, 1942, set forth in full in Chapter XX, of this report. The memorandum reflected a previous oral understanding reached between Director Eisenhower, shortly after his appointment, and the Director, Wartime Civil Control Admin¬ istration, acting for the Commanding General. It was planned to utilize evacuee labor in the construction of such facilities and in the interim to use any vacant evacuee housing for these purposes. The War Department also procured and supplied the initial equipment for Relocation Centers, viz., kitchen equipment, minimum mess and barrack equipment, hospital equipment, and ten days’ supply of non-perishable sub¬ sistence, in accordance with the evacuee capacity of the Center. From the date of opening a Center (or other initiation of operation) by the War Relocation 248 CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT OF RELOCATION CENTERS 249 Authority, the accountability for all such equipment and property was trans¬ ferred to the Authority. The present chapter summarizes the action taken by the Wartime Civil Control Administration and other Army agencies and services in the acquisi¬ tion, construction and equipping of Relocation Centers. Project Site Selection. In conformance with the provisions of Par. 3 of the Memorandum of Agreement between the War Department and the War Relocation Authority, sites for the Relocation Projects were selected by the War Relocation Authority. When a decision had been reached that a location was considered suitable for a Relocation Project, the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, was so informed by the Director of the War Relocation Authority. Steps were then taken to "clear” the area from a military standpoint by ascertaining if the appropriate Defense or Corps Area Commander had any objections to the use of the land for evacuee relocation. Where the Navy Department might be interested, clearance was secured from the Commandant of the Naval District concerned. The Manzanar Relocation Center in the Owens Valley, California, was an exception to this procedure. Manzanar was originally selected and acquired by the Army as a Reception Center. It was turned over to the War Relocation Authority on June 1, 1942. Colorado River Relocation Center was also an exception. The Army acquired this site from the Secretary of Interior for a reception center—for use by the Army for such purpose for the duration. The Wartime Civil Control Administration never operated it, however, as Director Eisenhower agreed with the Wartime Civil Control Administration Director, to staff and operate it from the beginning. Because of difficulties in assembling such a staff, Director Eisenhower turned over operations to the Indian Service. Project Site Acquisition. The acquisition of the property comprising Relocation Project sites was a War Department function and was done by the United States Engineer Corps on the request of the Commanding General. When military clearance had been obtained, the Commanding General issued a directive to the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, who acted for the Chief of Engineers, requesting that he direct the Division Engineer concerned to proceed with the acquisition of the necessary land. At the same time the Commanding General notified the Governor of the State concerned that, because of military necessity, a Relocation Center for Japanese evacuees was to be located in his State. Ten sites were acquired and their locations are shown on Figure 21, the center spread in the series of individual Relocation Center location maps follow¬ ing page 250. Description of Relocation Project Sites. Following are brief de¬ scriptions of the ten Relocation Project sites on which Centers have been con¬ structed and to which the Japanese evacuees have been sent. (1) Central Utah. Located at Abraham, Utah, in Millard County, this Project site comprises approximately 19,000 acres. Several thousand acres were in crop but the greatest portion was covered with greasewood 250 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST brush. The land is generally quite level. Fourteen hundred acres were pub¬ lic domain, 8,840 were owned by Millard County and the balance was pri¬ vately owned. The average rainfall here is about 8 inches, with the greater portion coming during the winter months. This area requires considerable irrigation to mature crops, normally between two and three acre-feet of water per acre. To provide for the water needs in connection with the farming planned for this project, the Division Engineer, Mountain Division, has purchased 20,000 shares of water stock in the Abraham and Deseret Water Company. (2) Colorado River. The Colorado River Relocation Center is sit¬ uated on the lands of the United States Indian Service, being part of the Colorado River Indian Reservation at Poston, Arizona. It is seventeen miles south of the town of Parker, the railhead for the Center. The tract consists of 71,600 acres of land. Several types of soil are found in this area. Some is first class soil and highly suited to irrigation while some is fourth class and so highly impregnated with salts and alkali that cultivation would be difficult. Several irrigation canals traverse the area bringing water from the Colo¬ rado River which bounds it for a distance of about twenty-two miles on the west. (3) Gila River. This Center is located in Pinal County, Arizona, near Sacaton on the Gila River Indian Reservation. There are approxi¬ mately 16,100 acres of the reservation set aside for the use of the War Relocation Authority. The soil has an average depth of two feet of fine silt, over adobe and/or caliche. Irrigation produces bountiful crops of long staple cotton, alfalfa, vegetables, melons, etc. Water for irrigation is obtained from canals, originally developed by the Indian Service, and comes from the Gila River Reservoir. (4) Granada. The Granada Relocation Project site is one and one- half miles west of Granada, Colorado, and fourteen miles east of Lamar. It comprises approximately 10,500 acres of land and extends into the State of Kansas. Most of the area was formerly known as the X-Y Ranch. Water stock in the amount of 15,000 shares of the Lamar Canal and Irri¬ gation Company and 127 shares of the X-Y Irrigation Ditch Company were purchased to provide water needs for the agricultural program. Several thousand acres of this area were formerly owned by the American Sugar Beet Co. (5) Heart Mountain. This Project site is located in Park County, northwestern Wyoming, and is in the Heart Mountain Irrigation Division of the Shoshone Project of the Bureau of Reclamation. It consists of some 46,000 acres most of which is irrigable land. The land was public domain and was secured from the Department of the Interior. The soils vary from light sandy to heavy clay. The principal crops are alfalfa, beans, sugar beets, seed peas, potatoes, soy beans and small grains. Conditions are gen¬ erally favorable for dairying and poultry raising. Temperatures in this area range from a maximum of 101 degrees above CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT OF RELOCATION 251 CENTERS LOCATION OF WAR RELOCATION CENTER CITY •^CENTRA UTAH JACINO *a«kc» fnpAJ LEGCNO W.RA. PROJECT SITES PRINCIPAL CITIES •RMGHURST VCLINTOKk SMALL CITIES AND TOWNS PAVED ROAOS OTHER ROADS RAILROADS 9 FEDERAL HIGHWAY © STATE HIGHWAY TOOELI JUAB THE LOCATION OF THE PROJECT CENTER SITE (RESIDENTIAL) IS MARKED BY CIRCLES FIVE MILES APART TOTAL LAND AREA OF VEAICHO THE PROJECT IS NOT SHOWN. THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 63 PARLEY BY 102 MILES. IILLARD UTAH HINCKlI SCALE IN MILES 10 0 10 20 Figure 20-a 30 40 252 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST LOCATION OF WAR RELOCATION COAST CENTER COLORADO RIVER LEGEND ^ IBb o W.RA. PROJECT SITES principal cities SMALL CITIES AND TOWNS —- PAVED ROADS = OTHER ROADS *.*1 Sack RAILROADS ^ FEOERAL HIGHWAY <g) STATE HIGHWAY THE LOCATION OF THE PROJECT CENTER SITE (RESIDENTIAL) IS MARKED BY CIRCLES FIVE MILES APART TOTAL LAND AREA OF THE PROJECT IS NOT SHOWN. sX$l6h/ THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 63 BY 102 MILES. Lff>;v•./,f m\ J COLORADO^ A jt ^ 7 Wt SCALE IN MILES 10 0 10 20 Figure 20-b 30 40 CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT OF RELOCATION LOCATION OF WAR RELOCATION CENTERS 253 CENTER LEGEND W.RA. PROJECT SITES PRINCIPAL o CITIES SMALL CITIES AND TOWNS PAVED ROADS OTHER ROADS RAILROAOS FEDERAL HIGHWAY © STATE HIGHWAY THE LOCATION OF THE PROJECT CENTER SITS (RESIDENTIAL^ IS MARKED BY CIRCLES FIVE MILES APART TOTAL LAND AREA OF THE PROJECT IS NOT SHOWN. THE AREA COWERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 63 BY 102 MILES. SCALE IN MILES 10 0 10 20 Figure 20-c 30 40 254 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST LOCATION OF WAR RELOCATION COAST CENTER LEGEND ■a W.RA. PROJECT SITES Hfcfl PRINCIPAL o CITIES SMALL CITIES AND TOWNS __ PAVED ROADS = OTHER ROADS »«* RAILROADS ^ FEDERAL HIGHWAY (Q) STATE HIGHWAY THE LOCATION OF THE PROJECT CENTER SITE (residential^ is marked by CIRCLES FIVE MILES APART. TOTAL LAND AREA OF THE PROJECT IS NOT SHOWN. THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY B3 BY 102 MILES. 10 0 10 20 Figure 20-d 30 40 CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT OF RELOCATION LOCATION OF WAR RELOCATION 255 CENTERS CENTER HEART MOUNTAIN Imossmain] WAT AG A LEGEND W.RA. PROJECT SITES PRINCIPAL CITIES xlowsti 'ill Wat I SMALL CITIES AND TOWNS .rbon 1 PAVED ROADS OTHER ROADS RAILROADS 9 FEOERAL HIGHWAY © STATE HIGHWAY THE LOCATION OF THE PROJECT CENTER SITE (RESIDENTIAL IS MARKED BY CIRCLES FIVE MILES APART TOTAL LAND AREA OF THE PROJECT IS NOT SHOWN. THE AREA COVERED BY THIS * HE ART ■ MOUNTAIN. MAP IS APPROXIMATELY S3 BY 102 MILES. SCALE IN MILES 10 0 10 20 Figure 20-e 30 40 RELOCATION PROJECT SITES o O CO > O < (- 2 z u U < Z <8* u u < LlI O u gco — O UJ , 51° &5f u o5 Swo °-OTW w y in 2 _ u O 2d id cr Id Q -) (7) <0 O QC U £ ZSh I^S oH° Ucfl, uffe° cr > uj ..<f| £ —' ^ u « -w </) Z 2 O 2 _,J=!S < cr cn I- < z UJ o o o o o' Eisy ££dz < d z Q Q. == O UJ L> < < Z W UJ v' 10 CL £ o uj £-■§ O u. - o o t — u t 2 W oSa £15 <^2 h- O 2* M Z *- id z O <fx I cr h co o 3 8 £ o 3 <0 3,0 ftz Z O u R^U ^ < u. u o w I 2 H i O cr i- 8°fe IOC UJ z o o ,«o cr uj co cr iS5i U O in ^ cr cm oo Id 3 u * °2 ° 2 z o 0>0 q o <M oo tr o °o • a: ® < >- o t 3 uo < Z CO u_ OP3° < >*og < o < X o 5 O O O iff t§ cr 2 z O N <2o - uj l_ g3° o o- (_ co u. cr O uj H?< O O U. UJ . 0 cr < Z o 1- < Qd 2 °<o5 <<5d • • <3 3 Id q-u8 . (O ' < U 10 2< 3 § ® H > 3 X ° j_ t'i ** 2 — < o^ co m Z co „ O UJ CA K _|UJ < H 3°-< OU. W a < z z z _l u 3-2 ^uj CO -z O < gfef * CO ^ m 2 2 CM If) £t Z j w 5 << < 2= ^ CVJ 8! Z < It UJ y cr uj U (Tu J < ^ o H 0. Z z 3 Ur Z o o U uxu <5* §s£ CO If W t z u < O 3 £ H — u. co 2 _i O CM< _X 0- 0 LAKE.* capacity; 16,ooo NEWELL , MODOC COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 35 MILES SOUTHEAST OF KLAMATH .FALLS 2 MILES SOUTH OF STRONGHOLD TULE MOUNTAIN: capacity; ii,ooo VOCATION. PARK COUNTY, WYOMING 13 MILES NORTHEAST OF CODY 8 MILES SOUTH OF RALSTON HEART WAR RELOCATION PROJECT SITES 258 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST LOCATION OF WAR RELOCATION COAST CENTER JEROME LEGEND W.RA. PROJECT SITES JhaleyN L0E.SHM XCgMINT^ PRINCIPAL CITIES [CHlEpT 9T- SMALL CITIES AND TOWNS PAVED ROADS ASHLEY' OTHER ROADS RAILROADS 8 FEDERAL HIGHWAY © STATE HIGHWAY THE LOCATION OF THE PROJECT CENTER SITE (RESIDENTIAL) IS MARKED BY CIRCLES FIVE MILES APART TOTAL LAND AREA OF THE PROJECT IS NOT SHOWN. THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY tANJYLVAMl, 63 VSAT IA BY 102 MILES. IISON ■ayvillT iTallul. CHAPLltYILLf1 SCALE IN MILES 10_O_ 10 Figure 20 20-f 30 40 CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT OF RELOCATION LOCATION OF WAR RELOCATION CENTERS 259 CENTER MANZANAR LEGEND .LOWE PINE W.RA. PROJECT SITES PRINCIPAL CITIES SMALL CITIES AND TOWNS PAVED ROADS OTHER ROADS RAILROADS $ FEDERAL HIGHWAY © STATE HIGHWAY THE LOCATION OF THE PROJECT CENTER SITE (RESIDENTIAL,) IS MARKED BY CIRCLES FIVE W>TSPRJNCJ£. MILES APART TOTAL LAND AREA OF THE PROJECT IS NOT SHOWN. THE AREA COVERED BY THIS [EBNVIH.I MAP IS APPROXIMATELY 83 BY 102 MILES. rm W Wk note: <«; i. ». HIGH WAV gT§ P BOM 1"^ . 'pAXC BSFIELO INTERSECTS U S. i^'^'JlICHWAr^TO MANZANAR NORTH 0 r MOJAVE, CALIFORNIA WHICH “"■*» tA*T •» or FIELD ANO 12ft MILES SOUTH OF --'-/MANX ANAR- RAILROADS FOLLOW APPROX IMATELT THE SAME ROUTE. SCALE IN MILES 10 0 10 20 Figure 20-g 30 40 260 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST LOCATION OF WAR RELOCATION COAST CENTER SCALE IN MILES ■0_O_ 10 20 Figure 20-h 30 40 CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT OF RELOCATION LOCATION OF WAR RELOCATION CENTER LEGEND W.RA. PROJECT SITES PRINCIPAL o CITIES SMALL CITIES AND TOWNS PAVED ROADS OTHER ROADS RAILROADS FEDERAL HIGHWAY @ STATE HIGHWAY THE LOCATION OF THE PROJECT CENTER SITE (RESIDENTIAL^ IS MARKED BY CIRCLES FIVE MILES A PARI TOTAL LAND AREA OF THE PROJECT IS NOT SHOWN. THE AREA COVERED BY THIS MAP IS APPROXIMATELY CENTERS 63 BY 102 MILES. Figure 20-i 261 262 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST LOCATION OF WAR RELOCATION COAST CENTER TULE LAKE LEGEND [aIc6mV WRA BMm o PROJECT SITES principal cities SMALL CITIES AND TOWNS —. PAVED ROADS = OTHER ROADS h**++ RAILROADS JMstukei Kdv-a FEDERAL HIGHWAY @ STATE HIGHWAY /mav V •HOLD MM - J SO ME Rsty, fMACDoJ<<^ JEROME THE LOCATION OF THE PROJECT CENTER SITE (RESIDENTIAL) IS MARKED BY CIRCLES FIVE MILES APART TOTAL LAND AREA OF THE PROJECT IS NOT SHOWN. THE AREA COVERED BY THIS FSCARFACj MAP IS APPROXIMATELY BY 102 MILES. 63 .ACK' |f ANTAR> IDOSA m rfK iDAHA^ ’q&mr J SCALE IN MILES 10 20 Figure 20-j 30 40 CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT OF RELOCATION zero to a minimum of 30 degrees below zero. 263 CENTERS The frost-free season extends from the end of May to the middle of September. Rainfall averages 5 l/z inches per year. (6) Jerome. This Project site is adjacent to the town of Jerome, Arkansas, and comprises 10,054 acres, most of which is in Chicot County, Arkansas. The land was obtained from the Farm Security Administration. It is in the Mississippi River Delta and is particularly suited to cotton and vegetables. (7) Manzanar. Manzanar differs from the other Centers in that it was originally selected by the Western Defense Command as a Reception Center. Japanese The initial movement from the West Coast consisted of those who went from ginning March 21, 1942. their homes directly to Manzanar be¬ It was operated by the Wartime Civil Control Administration until May 31, 1942, when it was transferred to the War Relocation Authority. The Project site is situated in the Owens Valley, Inyo County, California, and consists of approximately 60,000 acres of land leased from the City of Los Angeles. This land was acquired by the city when it built the Owens Valley Aqueduct, the most important part of the Los Angeles city water system. Formerly ranches and farms occupied this valley but during the thirty years of city ownership the land reverted to desert conditions. Under irrigation it is capable of producing heavy crops and the Japanese have been very successful in raising vegetables here. (8) Minidoka. The Minidoka Relocation Project site is located in Jerome County, Idaho, about six miles north of the town of Eden. There are 33,500 acres in the tract. The land was obtained from the Bureau of Reclamation, United States Department of the Interior. The terrain here is rolling and the soil is particularly good for the growing of potatoes, sugar beets, beans and peas. Underlying most of the area there is a rock strata known as malapai. Surplus water from the American Falls Dam is sufficient for the irri¬ gation of about 17,000 acres of this land. (9) Rohwer. This Project site is adjacent to and west of the town of Rohwer in Desha County, Arkansas. Of the 10,161 acres, 9,560 were secured from the Farm Security Administration. vately owned. The balance was pri¬ This section is also in the Mississippi River Delta country and the nearby farmers are cotton growers. Most of the center land is heavily wooded and some is quite swampy. (10) Tule Lake. The Bureau of Reclamation formerly controlled the land which now constitutes the Tule Lake Relocation Project site. Situ¬ ated in Modoc County, California, approximately forty miles south of Klam¬ ath Falls, Oregon, the site was formerly the bed of the lake from which the Center derives its name. There are approximately 7,400 acres in the 264 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST tract. The soil is a sandy loam interspersed with a layer of shells of fresh water spiral mollusks. It is extremely fertile and raises bumper crops of garden vegetables and barley. Nearby is Tule Lake and the Game Refuge where wild life abounds. Design of Relocation Centers. The design of temporary buildings to house the evacuees at the Relocation Centers presented a problem since no precedents for this type of housing existed. not desired. Permanent type buildings were It was essential to be as economical as possible and to avoid the excessive use of critical materials. Speed of construction was also a vital factor because it was desired to move the Japanese out of the Assembly Cen¬ ters as quickly as possible. There were available drawings of cantonment type of buildings which might be classed as semi-permanent, and of theater of operations type buildings which were purely temporary, the latter being intended primarily for rapid construction to house troops in the rear of combat zones. Theater of operations type buildings answered most of the requirements for troop shelter but were too crude for the housing of women, children and elderly persons. Normally this type of housing has no floors: toilet facilities are meager (usually pit latrines), and heating units are omitted in all except extremely cold climates. It was decided that a modified theater of operations camp could be developed which would adequately house all evacuees, young and old, male and female, and still meet fairly well the desire for speed, low cost, and restricted use of critical materials. A set of standards and details for the construction of Relocation Centers were developed by the Wartime Civil Control Administration and these were adopted in a conference between the Commanding General, and a representative of the Office of the Chief of Engineers. This was issued on June 8, 1942, under the title—"Standards and Details, Construction of Japanese Evacuee Reception Centers”. Later it was necessary to issue two supplements, No. 1, dated June 18th, listed the hospital equipment to be provided; No. 2, dated June 29th, cov¬ ered the fire fighting equipment. These standards provided uniformity of construction at the Centers con¬ structed after this date. Prior to their issuance several Centers—Manzanar, Tule Lake, Colorado River and Unit No. 1 at Gila River—were under construc¬ tion. The Wartime Civil Control Administration staff had some difficulty in estab¬ lishing uniformity in what facilities were to be provided because more than one Engineer Division was involved and each placed its own interpretation on War¬ time Civil Control Administration requests. The standards provided a basis on which all of the contractors and engineers could work towards the common goal. A copy of these standards and their supplements is shown in Appendix 4 to this report. Lay-out of a Typical Center. The buildings in each Center are grouped CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT OF as to use. RELOCATION 265 CENTERS The evacuee housing group is the largest and consists of the blocks in which the evacuees have their homes. reserved for future schools, churches, Several blocks in this grouping are and recreational centers. The other principal groups in each Center are an administration group, a warehouse group, a military police camp, and a hospital. (See Figure 22.) In a typical Center designed for 10,000 evacuees there are 36 housing blocks. Each block holds 12 barrack buildings, a recreation building, a mess hall, and a combination H-shaped building which has toilet and bath facilities for both men and women and a laundry room and a heater room. (See Fig¬ ure 23.) The administration group comprises the buildings devoted to the use of the Center Management. Included are four dormitories for non-evacuee em¬ ployees, two office buildings, a post office, store, fire house, warehouse, shop building, garage, mess hall for the non-evacuee staff, and a recreation building. (See Figure 24.) The Military Police camp is usually separated from the Center proper. This aids in preventing fraternization between the guards and the evacuees. buildings comprise: The Four enlisted men’s barracks, a bachelor officers’ quarters, a headquarters and supply building, a guard house, a recreation and post ex¬ change building, a dispensary, latrine and bathhouse, mess hall, and a garage. (See Figure 25.) These facilities are found adequate for one company of mili¬ tary police. The hospital is an outstanding feature at each of the Relocation Centers. The hospital buildings provide space for the principal medical activities carried on in any metropolitan community. Such facilities as modern surgeries, ob¬ stetrical and isolation wards, X-ray rooms, a morgue, and a fully equipped laundry are included. All these buildings are steam heated. The hospital group is composed of an administration building, doctors’ quarters, nurses’ quarters, three general wards, an outpatient building, obstetrical ward, surgery building, pediatric ward, mess hall, isolation ward, morgue, laundry, two storehouses for supplies and equipment, and a boiler house which supplies steam for heat and sterilization. (See Figure 26.) The large quantities of food, supplies, and equipment needed daily by the Centers made it necessary to have ample storage space available. It was decided to erect a group of warehouses some of which would be refrigerated for the preservation of perishable foods and the balance for housing staple foods and for supplies and equipment. Originally two 20' x 100' refrigerated warehouses were provided for a 10,000 population center, but it was found to be more efficient to erect one, a 40' x 100' building, divided into compartments for the different types of perishable food. Space is provided for fruits and vegetables, meats, and dairy products. Twenty 40' x 100' warehouses for dry storage, i.e., not only food but all general warehouse requirements, are standard for 10,000 people. These buildings are unpartitioned and unheated. (See Figure 27.) JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 266 TYPICAL PLOT PLAN WAR RELOCATION CENTER 10,000 POPULATION V u 1 S • N 0 H G Future Schools and Community Activities Play Area PlayArea A A R E —x -* ■L. ; Military j : Police ) ; Area 5; r Hospital Area idministratioi Area »i Figure 22 Warehouse Area CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT OF RELOCATION CENTERS TYPICAL HOUSING BLOCK WAR RELOCATION CENTER 1. 2. 3. 4. Barracks 20x120 Mess Hall 40x120 Women's Latrine lien's Latrine 5. 6. 7. Figure 23 Laundry Room Heater Room Recreation Hall 267 268 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST TYPICAL ADMINISTRATION GROUP WAR RELOCATION CENTER 1. 2. 3. 4* 5, Administration Headquarters Post Office Warehouse Fire Station Dormitory Figure 24 6. 7. 6, 9. 10* Garage Store Mess Recreation Shop CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT OF RELOCATION CENTERS 269 TYPICAL MILITARY POLICE GROUP WAR RELOCATION CENTER Guard House Barracks Latrine Dispensary Mess Headquarters Officers* Quarters P.X. and Recreation Garage Figure 25 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST TYPICAL HOSPITAL GROUP WAR RELOCATION CENTER mr~i . 1. 2 11 l H=~l 3. 4. 5. . 6 . 10. 11. . 7. 8 11 9. HI—I 12 13. 14 Figure 26 Heating Plant Laundry Administration Doctors' Quarters Nurses' Quarters Out Patients Obstetrics Surgery Children Mess Adults Warehouse Morgue and Disinfecting Isolation CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT OF RELOCATION CENTERS TYPICAL WAREHOUSE GROUP WAR RELOCATION CENTER Figure 27 1. Z. 'Warehouse Refrigerated Warehouse 271 272 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST In planning the Centers the following utilities were included: Adequate water for culinary, sanitary and fire-protection pur¬ (1) poses. The water supply systems were designed to provide 100 gallons per capita per day with ample storage capacity. In most instances the water was secured from wells which produced potable water that needed no treatment, in some other Centers partial or complete treatment was required. (2) Water-borne sewage disposal conforming to minimum health requirements. Sewer capacity is based on 75 gallons per capita per day. The treatment ranges from large septic tanks with no chlorination of effluent to modern disposal plants that include digester, chlorinators, sludge beds, and effluent ponds. In all cases the requirements of the appropriate State Health Departments were met and the plants were approved by the State Inspectors. (3) Electric power and lighting was designed on the basis of 2,000 KVA per 10,000 population. the load for all needs. This was considered ample to handle In the earlier Centers, street lighting was used. Centers built after the Standards were issued have, in lieu of street light¬ ing, one light at each end of all main buildings. (4) The telephone facilities provided usually consist of not more than four trunk lines to a 40 line board with 60 handset stations for ad¬ ministration and operation and 15 handsets for the Military Police unit. One separate outside line with handset station is provided for the Com¬ manding Officer of the Military Police unit. The Signal Corps of each Service Command installed, or supervised the installation of the telephone communication system at Relocation Centers in their area. Construction. Plans and specifications for the construction of the build¬ ings at the Centers were prepared at the District Engineer’s office in the dis¬ trict in which the Centers were located. These plans were then submitted for approval to the Civil Affairs Division, General Staff (thence to Wartime Civil Control Administration) of the Western Defense Command. When approved, contracts were awarded by the District Engineers to private builders. Considerable difficulty was encountered in obtaining building materials and mechanical equipment. Deliveries were slow and it was necessary to have expediters working constantly to speed shipments. At times a contractor would have no two-by-four lumber on hand but would have plenty of one-by-six or two-by-eight planks. Nails, pipe, and plumbing fixtures were particularly hard to secure on schedule, as were the pumps for the water supply and sewage systems. Skilled building-trades craftsmen were scarce in certain localities and had to be imported. To keep them on the job the contractors had to establish commissaries and dormitories. CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT OF RELOCATION 273 CENTERS Table 30 gives the capacity, date construction started, and costs of the various Centers. These costs are estimated, not final. In most cases re-negotia¬ tion of contracts is now taking place; in several instances credits have not been posted for excess materials shipped from the Centers to other construc¬ tion projects in a district. TABLE 30.—Preliminary Estimate of the Cost of Relocation Centers (December 1, 1942) Capacity Center Work started 120,000 10,000 20,000 15,000 8,000 11,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 16,000 Description of Evacuee Housing. 7/10/42 3/27/42 5/1/42 6/12/42 6/15/42 7/15/42 3/10/42 6/5/42 7/1/42 4/23/42 ESTIMATED COST Total Per capita $56,482,000 $471 3,929,000 9,365,000 7,560,000 4,200,000 5,095,000 5,003,000 3,764,000 5,837,000 4,804,000 6,925,000 393 468 504 525 463 500 376 584 480 433 Originally barracks were 20' x 100' divided into five 20' x 20' rooms or “apartments.” To accommodate differences in family sizes the design was changed to provide for 120' buildings with two 16' x 20', two 20' x 20', and two 24' x 20' apartments. A family was assigned to each apartment. No toilet or bath facilities were provided as these were common for each block. A heating unit, either cannon type stove or cabinet oil heater, depending on the fuel used, was placed in each room. In the colder climates wall board was given the War Relocation Authority so that the evacuees might line and ceil the interiors. The exterior walls and roofs were generally of shiplap or other sheathing covered with tarpaper. In Granada weatherized wallboard was used for the side walls, eliminating the paper and saving labor. One drop light per room was furnished. Floors of the apartments at all Centers were of wood, except at Granada, where they were of brick. Single floors were tried but found unsatisfactory because of the drying of green lumber. Over these floors the War Relocation Authority applied a patented flooring called Mastipave which gave a smooth, washable surface. This flooring was procured by the Army for War Relocation Authority use in the Tule Lake, Manzanar, Gila River, and Colorado River Centers. Fly screening was given to the evacuees to make screens for their homes. In the earlier Centers bachelors were housed in barracks which were not par¬ titioned off into rooms. Usually there were two of these buildings to a block, but it was proven to be more efficient to divide all barracks into rooms. Bach¬ elors could then be assigned wherever desired and all buildings were available for the housing of families. Mess halls are 40' x 100' of which approximately one-third is devoted to kitchen, store room, and scullery. Windows and doors are screened against flies, heat is provided by cannon stoves or cabinet heaters. Sufficient mess 274 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST tables, with benches, to seat 300 persons are standard. Each kitchen is equipped with three ranges, 60 cubic feet of electric refrigeration, scullery sinks, hot water heater and tank, cooks’ tables, and a meat block. Shelving is built into the store room, and serving counters are provided. Concrete floors were stand¬ ard after the first four camps where wooden ones were built. One recreation building was constructed for each evacuee housing block. This is a 20'x 100' structure without partitions and has no equipment other than heaters. A combination latrine and laundry building, built in a "H” shape, was located between the two rows of barracks in each block. One side of this building contains the block laundry, the other, the men’s toilet and shower rooms and women’s toilet and bath rooms. In the space forming the cross bar of the "H” is housed the water heater and storage tank. Floors throughout are concrete. The laundry room is fitted out with 18 double compartment laundry trays and 18 ironing boards with an electric outlet at each board. Plumbing fixtures in each unit or block facility are hung on the basis of eight showerheads, four bathtubs, fourteen lavatories, fourteen toilets, and one slop sink for the women; and twelve showerheads, twelve lavatories, ten toilets, four urinals and one slop sink for men. Supplies and Equipment. As stated in the introduction to this chapter, initial supplies and equipment were furnished to the War Relocation Authority by the War Department. This included not only major items that became a part of the buildings in which they were placed, but also the items which are used in the preparation and serving of food, the treatment of patients in the hospitals, and beds, mattresses and blankets for the homes of the evacuees. Hospital Equipment and Medical Supplies. In the buildings compris¬ ing the hospital, special equipment was installed to make them modern in every respect. Each ward has a diet kitchen with an electric range, an eight cubic foot electric refrigerator, shelving, and a sink. Flush rim sinks and bedpan sterilizers are located in the wards. The isolation ward kitchen has in addition a mechanical dishwasher. Each outpatient building has a 100-200 MA X-Ray Machine as well as a portable 15-50 MA X-Ray. Ventilating fans are provided for the X-Ray devel¬ oping room, the dental and the general laboratory. In the outpatient building there is a dental clinic with modern chairs and equipment. Each surgery building has special lighting in its two operating rooms. Op¬ erating tables are provided and wash-up sinks, knee-operated, are available for the doctors’ use. Four-piece sterilizer batteries handle the sterilizing of the instruments. The morgue has a four-body electric refrigerator, autopsy table, and a bulk-pressure sterilizer and disinfector. The most recent types of heavy duty kitchen appliances are to be found in the hospital mess hall. Included are a steam table, electric bake oven, mechan- CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT OF RELOCATION CENTERS 275 ical dishwasher, steam pressure cooker, electric mixer, and deep fat fryer as well as the usual ranges and coffee urn battery. The laundry is fully equipped to handle all hospital work with washers drying tumblers, extractors, a flatwork ironer, starch cooker, and electric hand irons. Each hospital was provided with an initial allowance of drugs and medical supplies on requisition, prepared by the Office of the Surgeon, Western De¬ fense Command. These requisitions were forwarded as far in advance as pos¬ sible to the Surgeon General for approval and designation of a medical depot to issue. In addition to a large and varied stock of drugs and medicines, bandages, sutures, syringes and numerous other articles were furnished. Among these were forceps, knives, needles, ophthalmoscopes, retractors, scissors, gloves, and catheters. There was also a complete issue of the supplies used in the wards such as sheets, pillow cases, rubber sheeting, basins, bedpans and hot water bags. With this equipment and supply the medical staff was prepared to prop¬ erly treat and hospitalize any and all patients who came to them. Quartermaster Property. The supply of items of Quartermaster prop¬ erty and subsistence to the Relocation Centers was the mission of the Quarter¬ master, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. This was accomplished by transferring property from evacuated Assembly Centers and by shipment of additional items from Quartermaster Depots. As proper packing, crating, and shipping from the Assembly Centers was of vital importance, an army supply team composed of three officers and one hundred enlisted men was organized to perform this duty. A follow-up system to check the status of shipment was put into effect. Each Center Director was required to report by teletype daily what items of property he received. One officer and two enlisted men were sent to each Center to assist in setting up a property record account and to spot check daily receipts. Each Center was provided with an initial supply of ten days’ requirements of Type B rations, i.e., non-perishible foods such as canned goods, smoked meats, and staples such as beans, rice, flour, sugar, etc. Table 31 shows the total amount of Quartermaster property shipped to the War Relocation Authority. Transfer of supplies from Assembly to Relocation Center. The logistics of transfer of evacuees from Assembly to Relocation Centers were developed by Wartime Civil Control Administration in such a manner as to result in the use of a minimum of supplies and equipment. graphically illustrates the logistics of transfer.) (Figure 28, Chapter XXII, By providing those Relocation Centers which received the first movements of evacuees with sufficient supplies and equipment to handle transfers for a three or four week period, and by scheduling the movement of supplies and equipment out of evacuated Assembly Centers to Relocation Centers in the order in which evacuees would be transferred to them, it was possible to utilize again the supplies and equipment originally purchased for the Japanese in Assembly Centers. Transfer movements of evacuees were timed to provide a two weeks period in which beds, mattresses, 276 JAPANESE EVACUATION TABLE 31.—Quartermaster Item FROM THE Property Shipped to Amount Cots, Steel. Blankets, W. O. D. or Comforters. Covers, Mattresses or Bed Sacks. . Axes, S. B. Buckets, G. I. Cans, G. I., 10 Gallon. Cans, G. I., 32 Gallons. Boats, Gravy. Bowls, Soup. Bowls, Sugar. Cups, Coffee. Dishes, Pickle. Dishes, Vegetable. Porks. Knives. Pitchers, Syrup. Pitchers, Water. Plates, Dinner. Platters, Meat. Pots, Mustard. Saucers, Coffee. Shakers, Pepper. Shakers, Salt. Spoons... Cleavers, Butcher. Dippers. Forks, Meat. Graters. WEST 117,393 275,141 118,626 2,635 9,478 4,159 5,555 19,915 123,583 21,002 122,797 10,125 39,195 117,620 121,114 19,390 19,774 125,627 10,149 19,879 123,345 17,600 20,444 117,821 604 5,166 2,434 1,224 COAST WRA Centers* Item Amount Griddles. Knives, Butcher. Knives, Paring. Ladles, Soup. Machines, Grinder. Mashers, Potato. Measures, Quart. Openers, Can. Pans, Bake, Large. Pans, Cake or Pie. Pans, Dish. Pans, Frying. Picks, Ice. Pins, Rolling. Pots, Stock, 10 Gallon. Pots, Stock, 15 Gallon. Pots, Stock, 20 Gallon. Saws, Butcher. Scrapers, Dough. Sieves, Flour. Skimmers, Large. Spoons, Basting. Steels, Butcher. Tongs, Ice. Turners, Cake. Whips, Wire. Ranges, Army No. 5, complete.... 1,240 1,805 3,518 4,022 659 1,207 594 1,179 2,894 18,116 5,228 618 590 592 1,292 1,340 466 625 586 594 1,521 1,348 560 639 2,507 1,213 1,236 ♦Most of this equipment was transferred from Assembly to Relocation Centers. cooking and eating utensils, and all other supplies and equipment which were to be moved from Assembly to Relocation Centers, could be inventoried, reno¬ vated, and shipped to a new Center. Fire Protection. The fire hazard that is always present in a settlement composed of closely grouped wooden structures made it necessary to provide adequate equipment for protection against fire. matic sprinkler systems were installed. In hospital buildings, auto¬ Fire hydrants were located throughout the entire area of each Center. Two fire trucks were provided for each Center of 10,000 capacity or less; for the larger ones, one truck for each 5,000 ca¬ pacity. These trucks are equipped with a minimum of 600 feet of 2/2 inch hose, wrenches, hand operated chemical extinguishers and two ladders 12 feet long, and pumper engines with a capacity of 600 GPM. In addition to that carried on fire trucks, enough 2 l/z inch hose was furnished to make a minimum of 2,000 feet. Two hand extinguishers were furnished for each building. These were 2 /z gallon size and were foamite and pump types. Inspections. During the course of construction of the Relocation Cen¬ ters, inspections were made by the members of the Construction Branch as well as by the Inspection and Fiscal Division of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, Western Defense Command. Before the initiation of the first movement of evacuees to a Center, an inspection was made to verify that the Center was ready for beneficial oc¬ cupancy. This inspection was conducted far enough in advance—usually one week—so that, if necessary, movement schedules could be altered without confusion. CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT OF RELOCATION CENTERS 277 During the period from November 10th to 29th, 1942, inclusive, a Board of Officers appointed by the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, made a tour of all the Centers making a final inspection of each. This Board was composed of a representative from the Provost Marshal’s Office, the Surgeon’s Office, the Signal Office, the Quartermaster’s Office and the Construction Branch of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, all from the Western De¬ fense Command and Fourth Army. The Board reported to the Commanding Gen¬ eral that, with certain exceptions, the agreement of the War Department to pro¬ vide the War Relocation Authority with the minimum essentials of living had been fulfilled. The exceptions noted were minor ones and were, in most instances, items that were not completed on the date of inspection, but which were shortly sched¬ uled for completion. The reports of survey at each Relocation Center are set forth in Appendix 3, to this Report. CHAPTER XXII Transfer of Evacuees From Assembly to Relocation Centers In accord with the agreement between the War Department and the War Relo¬ cation Authority, evacuees were transferred from the custody of the Army to the War Relocation Authority as rapidly as Relocation Centers were completed for beneficial occupancy. Evacuees passed from the custody of the Army to the War Relocation Authority in the following ways: (1) By the regular transfer movement from an Assembly to a Relocation Center. (2) (3) By direct transfer of the Manzanar Reception Center on June 1, 1942. By direct evacuation from an Exclusion Area to the Relocation Cen¬ ters at Colorado River, Gila River, and Tule Lake. (4) (5) By release to War Relocation Authority on work furlough. By the transfer to War Relocation Authority Centers of individual evacuees and special groups. There were also transferred to War Relo¬ cation Authority during September and October the responsibilities for all institutional cases remaining in hospitals, homes, prisons, jails, etc., physically located within the evacuated area. These various transfers accounted for all of the persons who came directly under the evacuation program, except, (1) those persons who had been released from Assembly Centers in accordance with regulations governing the release of mixed-marriage cases, (2) a few persons who were deferred from evacuation and later released, and (3) a few persons who were permitted to leave the As¬ sembly Centers for interior points to join their families which had previously established themselves there. The total number of evacuees transferred by the Wartime Civil Control Ad¬ ministration to the War Relocation Authority by the several methods indicated above is summarized in Table 32. These data are presented to provide an overall picture of the number of persons transferred by the Wartime Civil Control Administration to War Reloca¬ tion Authority. It is the purpose of this chapter, however, to give a detailed account only of the regular movement of evacuees from Assembly to Relocation Centers in accordance with the standard procedure developed for this purpose. The other types of transfers indicated above are discussed elsewhere in the present report. Authority for Transfer of Evacuees. The memorandum of agreement between the War Department and the War Relocation Authority dated April 17, 1942, (See Chapter XX) provided in part: “The War Department will provide for the transportation of evacuees to AssemblyCenters and from Assembly Centers to Relocation Centers (Reception Centers) under appropriate military escort . . .” 278 279 TRANSFER OF EVACUEES TABLE 32.—Summary of Transfers of Evacuees From Custody of The Army to Custody of War Relocation Authority Total Transfer order Direct evacuation Other movement WRA Custody. 111,155* 89,698 18,249 2,414 To all Relocation Centers. 108,503 89,698 18,026 779 8,255 17,740 10,972 7,674 13,234 7,567 10,049 9,484 8,232 15,296 8,223 5,919 10,954 7,674 10,202 7,554 9,731 9,467 8,232 11,742 11,711 32 110 18 Place of Custody Colorado River. Gila River. Manzanar2. Tule Lake. To other than Relocation Centers. 2,946 165 86 13 153 17 3,204 350 2,652* 223 1,635 1,630 1,022* 223 1,407 228 ♦Including 794 persons remaining in institutions in evacuated area, and who were never evacuated. including 894 persons enroute from Fresno on October 31. s9,666 evacuees transferred by inter-agency agreement, June 1, 1942. The Commanding General authorized and directed the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs, to make all necessary arrangements for the transfer of evacuees and their impedimenta. This directive, dated May 23, 1942, also granted authority to call on the Sector Commanders in the name of the Commanding General for necessary military assistance in the accomplishment of this trans¬ fer. The directives given to civilian agencies cooperating in the Wartime Civil Control Administration program were sufficiently broad to cover their functions in the transfer operations. The latter instructions were issued by the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration. General Transfer Plan. It has been indicated in Chapter VIII that the transfer of evacuees from Assembly to Relocation Centers was an integral part of the overall plan for evacuation and relocation. In scheduling the transfer movements the dominant objectives of the program as a whole were not over¬ looked. A schedule of movement was prepared as the first step in the detailed plan for the transfer of evacuees from Assembly to Relocation Centers. This schedule indicated: (1) The destination to which each Assembly Center or a defined group of evacuees would be transferred. (2) The date or dates on which movements would be made. (3) The estimated number of persons. In the preparation of this schedule the following factors were considered: a. The date when each of the Relocation Centers would be available for beneficial occupancy. This was determined primarily by the progress of 280 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST construction but it also involved a consideration of the availability of supplies, including the transfer of supplies from Assembly to Relocation Centers. b. (See Chapter XXI.) The urgency of the early evacuation of certain Assembly Centers having pit latrines or which presented an abnormal fire hazard. c. The desirability, for efficient operation, of transferring the evacuees in an entire Assembly Center in a continuous movement and, if possible, to the same Relocation Center destination. d. The need to balance the urban and rural population in each Relocation Center; and the desirability of relocating together the rural and urban groups which were from the same general area. e. The attainment of a minimum climatic change consistent with the place¬ ment in available Centers. /. The transfer of evacuees to a Relocation Center as close to their com¬ munity of former residence as possible. g. The availability of sufficient train equipment to transport the evacuees without interrupting the prearranged schedules of major troop move¬ ments. A preliminary transfer schedule was prepared early in June. In addition to all proposed transfers, it made allowance for the direct evacuation of Japanese from the California portion of Military Area No. 2 to Relocation Centers. Because of the delay in construction of certain Relocation Centers and the availability of certain types of supplies, this preliminary schedule was revised slightly in August. The initial schedule had called for the evacuation of all Assembly Centers by October 12, while the revised schedule had set October 30—the realized goal—as the date of the final movement. The logistics of transfer as prescribed by Wartime Civil Control Administration is represented in the accompanying Chart and Table (Figure 28 and Table 33). Transfer Orders and General Operating Procedure. Specific trans¬ fer orders were issued covering all of the regular transfer movements of evac¬ uees from Assembly to Relocation Centers. These transfer orders were prepared by Civil Affairs Division, General Staff, and issued by Headquarters, Western Defense Command, and were addressed to the Commanding General of the Sector in which the movement originated and to all Wartime Civil Control Administra¬ tion agencies concerned with transfer operations.1 Before each transfer order was issued a determination was made by Wartime Civil Control Administration on each of the following points: a. That adequate accommodations were ready for beneficial occupancy at the Center of destination. b. That sufficient supplies were available or would be available in advance of the arrival of the evacuees. transfer orders Nos. 1 to 5, inclusive, and No. 7 were issued by the Director, Wartime Civil Control Admin¬ istration, pursuant to the authority contained in the letter from the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, dated May 23, 1942, which stated, “You are directed ... to make all necessary arrangements for the transfer of evacuees. . . .” Such orders were usually issued 12 to 19 days prior to the departure of the first train of evacuees to be moved under the order. LjJ if) tr U to TRANSFER OF EVACUEES 281 OCTOBER 1 SEPTEMBER 1 H Z O Z o X H UJ CE O 0 < tr < CE z to u. u a UJ o tr o a. < u o _l u a. o H 5 CD 5 UJ < (/) </) O a. u. UJ c/> a. u. c/> < z a. Figure 28 AUGUST 1 JULY 1 JUNE * MAY JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 282 TABLE 33—Transfers From Asssembly to Relocation (Regular movements by Transfer Order) Assembly Center origin Portland Puyallup Relocation Center destination Transfer order number Centers DATE OF Departure Persons transferred Arrival Tule Lake Tule Lake 1 5-26 5-26 5-26 5-26 250 196 Mayer Colorado River 2 6-2 6-2 246 Sacramento Sacramento Sacramento Sacramento Sacramento Sacramento Sacramento Sacramento Sacramento Sacramento Tule Tule Tule Tule Tule Tule Tule Tule Tule Tule Lake Lake Lake Lake Lake Lake Lake Lake Lake Lake 3 6-15 6-16 6-17 6-18 6-19 6-20 6-21 6-22 6-23 6-26 6-16 6-17 6-18 6-19 6-20 6-21 6-22 6-23 6-24 6-26 498 504 512 494 497 499 509 512 545 85 Marysville Marysville Marysville Marysville Marysville Tule Tule Tule Tule Tule Lake Lake Lake Lake Lake 4 6-24 6-25 6-26 6-27 6-28 6-25 6-26 6-27 6-28 6-29 520 499 488 490 397 Salinas Salinas Salinas Salinas River River River River River River River 5 Salinas Salinas Colorado Colorado Colorado Colorado Colorado Colorado Colorado 6-28 6-29 6-30 7-1 7-2 7-3 7-4 6-29 6-30 7-1 7-2 7-3 7-4 7-5 483 482 499 451 451 517 592 Pined ale Pinedale Pined ale Pinedale Pinedale Pinedale Pinedale Pinedale Pinedale Pinedale Tule Lake Tule Lake Tule Lake Tule Lake Tule Lake Tule Lake Tule Lake Tule Lake Colorado River Colorado River 6 7-15 7-16 7-17 7-18 7-19 7-20 7-22 7-23 7-21 7-21 7-16 7-17 7-18 7-19 7-20 7-21 7-23 7-24 7-22 7-22 501 503 508 515 513 515 510 446 345 350 Salinas Tule Lake 7 7-3 7-4 105 Turlock Turlock Turlock Turlock Turlock Turlock Turlock Gila Gila Gila Gila Gila Gila Gila 8 7-18 7-25 7-26 7-27 8-10 8-11 8-12 7-20 7-27 7-28 7-29 8-12 8-13 8-14 520 510 513 519 507 502 502 Pinedale Gila River 9 7-22 7-23 40 Puyallup Puyallup Puyallup Puyallup Puyallup Puyallup Puyallup Puyallup Puyallup Puyallup Puyallup Puyallup Puyallup Puyallup Puyallup Puyallup Minidoka Minidoka Minidoka Minidoka Minidoka Minidoka Minidoka Minidoka Minidoka Minidoka Minidoka Minidoka Minidoka Minidoka Minidoka Minidoka 10 8-9 8-15 8-16 8-17 8-18 8-19 8-20 8-21 8-29 8-30 8-31 9-1 9-2 9-3 9-4 9-12 8-10 8-16 8-17 8-18 8-19 8-20 8-21 8-22 8-30 8-31 9-1 9-2 9-3 9-4 9-5 9-13 213 493 516 508 524 511 525 516 517 512 503 505 505 412 297 92 Pomona Pomona Pomona Pomona Heart Heart Heart Heart 11 8-9 8-15 8-16 8-17 8-12 8-18 8-19 8-20 292 529 519 530 River River River River River River River Mountain Mountain Mountain Mountain TRANSFER OF EVACUEES 283 TABLE 33—Transfers From Assembly to Relocation Centers (Regular movements by Transfer Order)—Continued Assembly Center origin Relocation Center destination DATE OF Persons transferred Departure Arrival 11 8-18 8-19 8-20 8-21 8-22 8-23 8-24 8-21 8-22 8-23 8-24 8-25 8-26 8-27 545 507 499 542 492 392 413 12 8-20 8-21 8-25 8-26 8-30 8-31 9-1 9-2 9-3 9-4 8-21 8-22 8-26 8-27 8-31 9-1 9-2 9-3 9-4 9-5 506 529 514 485 523 516 501 521 447 400 Pomona Pomona Pomona Pomona Pomona Pomona Pomona Heart Heart Heart Heart Heart Heart Heart Tulare Tulare Tulare Tulare Tulare Tulare Tulare Tulare Tulare Tulare Gila Gila Gila Gila Gila Gila Gila Gila Gila Gila Portland Portland Portland Portland Portland Portland Portland Heart Mountain Heart Mountain Minidoka Minidoka Minidoka Minidoka Minidoka 13 8-29 8-30 9-6 9-7 9-8 9-9 9-10 8-31 9-1 9-7 9-8 9-9 9-10 9-11 498 440 500 494 501 506 317 Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Colorado River Colorado River Colorado River Heart Mountain Heart Mountain Heart Mountain Heart Mountain Heart Mountain Heart Mountain Heart Mountain Heart Mountain 14 8-26 8-26 8-27 8-30 9-1 9-3 9-5 9-7 9-9 9-1L 9-13 8-27 8-27 8-28 9-2 9-4 9-6 9-8 9-10 9-12 9-13 9-17 639 231 540 608 597 595 583 586 561 541 532 Puyallup Tule Lake 15 8-25 8-26 53 Merced Merced Merced Merced Merced Merced Merced Merced Merced Granada Granada Granada Granada Granada Granada Granada Granada Granada 16 8-25 9-1 9-2 9-3 9-5 9-7 9-13 9-14 9-15 8-27 9-3 9-5 9-5 9-7 9-9 9-16 9-16 9-17 212 557 550 556 553 527 529 527 481 Portland Tule Lake 17 9-3 9-3 Tanforan Tanforan Tanforan Tanforan Tanforan Tanforan Tanforan Tanforan Tanforan Tanforan Tanforan Tanforan Tanforan Tanforan Tanforan Tanforan Central Central Central Central Central Central Central Central Central Central Central Central Central Central Central Central 18 9-9 9-15 9-16 9-17 9-18 9-19 9-20 9-21 9-22 9-26 9-27 9-28 9-29 9-30 10-1 10-13 9-11 9-17 9-18 9-19 9-20 9-21 9-22 9-23 9-24 9-28 9-29 9-30 9-31 10-2 10-3 10-15 214 502 482 511 498 505 520 500 516 525 514 516 513 522 527 308 Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Granada Granada Granada Granada Granada Granada 19 9-17 9-19 9-21 9-23 9-25 9-27 9-19 9-21 9-24 9-25 9-27 9-29 495 524 514 500 452 457 Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Mountain Mountain Mountain Mountain Mountain Mountain Mountain Transfer order number River River River River River River River River River River Utah Utah Utah Utah Utah Utah Utah Utah Utah Utah Utah Utah Utah Utah Utah Utah 78 284 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST TABLE 33—Transfers From Assembly to Relocation Centers (Regular movements by Transfer Order)—Concluded Assembly Center origin Transfer order number DATE OF Departure Persons transferred Arrival Portland Heart Mountain 20 9-9 9-11 Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Rohwer Rohwer Rohwer Rohwer Rohwer Rohwer Rohwer Rohwer Rohwer 21 9-20 9-22 9-24 9-26 9-28 9-30 10-2 10-4 10-6 9-24 9-26 9-27 9-30 10-1 10-3 10-6 10-7 10-10 503 522 496 494 492 453 480 417 389 Rohwer Rohwer Rohwer Rohwer Rohwer Rohwer Rohwer Rohwer Rohwer 22 9-14 10-3 10-5 10-7 10-9 10-11 10-13 10-15 10-17 9-18 10-7 10-9 10-11 10-13 10-15 10-17 10-19 10-21 249 512 515 426 423 417 432 414 425 Santa Anita Central Utah 23 10-7 10-9 550 Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Jerome Jerome Jerome Jerome Jerome Jerome 24 10-8 10-10 10-12 10-14 10-16 10-19 10-11 10-13 10-16 10-18 10-19 10-22 510 457 476 472 355 386 Fresno Fresno Fresno Fresno Fresno Fresno Fresno Fresno Fresno Fresno Fresno Jerome Jerome Jerome Jerome Jerome Jerome Jerome Jerome Jerome Jerome Jerome 25 10-2 10-12 10-14 10-16 10-18 10-20 10-22 10-24 10-26 10-28 10-30 10-6 10-16 10-18 10-20 10-22 10-24 10-26 10-28 10-30 11-1 11-3 202 463 472 466 468 459 437 438 462 479 415 Santa Anita Santa Anita Gila River Gila River 26 10-17 10-18 10-18 10-19 533 514 Stockton Fresno Gila River Gila River 27 10-16 10-16 10-17 10-17 220 156 Santa Santa Santa Santa Heart Mountain Granada Jerome Rohwer 28 10-27 10-27 10-27 10-27 10-30 10-29 10-30 10-31 105 120 257 173 Gila River Colorado River Manzanar 29 10-26 10-26 10-26 10-27 10-26 10-27 224 93 65 Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Stockton Stockton Stockton Stockton Stockton Stockton Stockton Stockton Stockton . Relocation Center destination Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Anita Santa Anita Santa Anita Santa Anita 48 TRANSFER OF EVACUEES c. 285 That rail transportation facilities for the proposed movement would be available. d. That the War Relocation Authority would be prepared to receive this movement. Each transfer order directed that the agencies concerned make the neces¬ sary arrangements for the transfer of the evacuees as indicated. In the order were given the approximate number of persons, the Assembly Center of origin, the Relocation destination, the dates of movement and, where necessary, a specific description by family numbers or civilian exclusion order of the exact group of evacuees who were to be moved. It also directed that a suitable mili¬ tary escort be provided and that the necessary transportation and meals be furnished to the evacuees, the Caucasian medical attendants, and the military escort. There grew out of the Instructional Bulletins which accompanied the var¬ ious transfer orders, beginning with Evacuation Bulletin No. 1 dated May 25, 1942, a formal operating procedure which was presented in detail in a Procedure Memorandum issued on June 26, 1942. The procedure as outlined on this date worked satisfactorily for the remainder of the transfer program with but two minor provisions which are not of consequence at this point. A copy of this memorandum with its amendments is presented in Appendix 5. Process of Evacuation of an Assembly Center. A representative of the Operations Division, Wartime Civil Control Administration, proceeded to the Assembly Center to assist the Manager and his staff in preparing for the coming transfer. In a conference with the Center staff a preliminary plan for the evacua¬ tion of the Center was drafted. This covered the logistics of movement within the Center, and set a definite schedule for each step in the operation. Quite important in this plan was the exact location of and time of loading of the train or bus. This determined whether a shuttle-bus service was necessary to transport the evacuees from the Assembly Center to the train. Recommendations as to transportation were teletyped to the Wartime Civil Control Administration and, if approved, were relayed to the Rail Transportation Officer, Western Defense Command. The As¬ sembly Center evacuation plan also covered such items as the listing of individuals who were to go on each movement, their notification, the advance inspection and loading of the baggage (other than hand baggage), and the organization of the transfer group into specific car units, for each of which a Monitor was appointed. Rosters of the persons who were scheduled to depart in each train unit were prepared by the Center Manager in quadruplicate, and each individual was iden¬ tified thereon by name and by the family number assigned at the Civil Control Station at the time of registration. In the preparation of these rosters an effort was made to maintain as transfer units all those evacuees who were from the same locality prior to evacuation. So far as practicable, the evacuation of an Assembly Center was accomplished by blocks or other administrative areas within the Center. This permitted the closing off of unused portions of the 286 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Center for cleaning up by the remaining evacuees and for the removal and inventory of government property. The roster was submitted to the Medical Department of the Center to de¬ termine the number and names of persons who, because of their age, health, or other condition, required special sleeper accommodations, medicines, diets, or personal attention enroute. Expectant mothers and those mothers with babes- in-arms or infants were also given Pullman sleeping accommodations. In preparing for the transfer, certain teletyped information was required from the Manager of the Assembly Center. Five days prior to each scheduled train departure date, the Wartime Civil Control Administration was advised by teletype: a. The number of full fares, half fares, and infants for whom transportation would be required. b. The number of full fares, half fares, and infants who, because of their age, state of health, physical condition, or other reason, required sleeper accommodations. c. A statement as to whether all personal baggage (other than hand bag¬ gage) to be taken on the train by the evacuees could be transported in the two baggage cars provided. In addition to the above teletyped information, the Center Manager was required to furnish by teletype at least five days prior to the initial movement under a transfer order (excluding the advance detachment), a statement of the amount of freight to be transported on each day of the movement. This did not include personal baggage transportable in the baggage cars. An organization by cars was then made up for each train unit and an evacuee Monitor was assigned to each car. It then became his duty to assist the Center staff in all further steps of the transfer. He notified the evacuees con¬ cerning any change in plans, notified the Center Manager if there was any change in the health status of any individual, assisted the evacuees in the prep¬ aration of their freight and baggage for shipment, and on the day of departure assisted the Center Registrars in checking out his group. A carefully prepared and verified train list accompanied each movement. On this list appeared the name and family number (and sometimes the age and sex) of each individual, in family group order. This list was signed by the Center Manager and counter-signed by the Train Commander in charge of the escort part of the military escort. Extra copies of the list were carried by the Train Commander and delivered to the Director at the Relocation Center. The original signed copy was again counter-signed by the Train Commander and receipted by the Relocation Center Director upon delivery of the evacuees at the Relocation Center. In addition to the train list the following records were turned over to the Train Commander for delivery to the Director of the Relocation Center: The Social Data Registration forms for each family, all medical and hospital records, and copies of pertinent correspondence relating to each family and individual. TRANSFER OF EVACUEES 287 In each of the larger Centers a cleanup crew of evacuees was retained for a short period after the main body had moved. These workers performed such services as were necessary to prepare the Center for any later reoccupancy and to assist the Center staff in the completion of certain fiscal and property records and the storage of government property. As each Center was evacuated, the residents of the evacuated area were required to do all the necessary policing of the barracks, the latrines and grounds immediately surrounding the barracks. All shelving, wiring and other facilities that were installed in their living quar¬ ters by the evacuees were removed. Change of Address cards were furnished to the evacuees in each movement so that postal authorities could be advised as to a change of residence of evacuees. Upon the receipt of the certified train list, the Wartime Civil Control Administra¬ tion staff posted the change of residence and the date of movement on the Indi¬ vidual Record card which was maintained for each evacuee in the Wartime Civil Control Administration Master File. Advance Group of Evacuees to Open a Relocation Center. If the trans¬ fer was to a Relocation Center which had not yet received any evacuees, a small advance detachment of about 200 persons was sent at least six days in advance of the main movement. This advance detachment consisted of the key evacuee personnel necessary to receive, feed, house and provide medical service for the evacuees of the main body as they arrived. Personnel for an advance detachment was selected by the United States Em¬ ployment Service and the United States Public Health Service at the request of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. The requests to these two Federal Services, were usually prepared at least 15 days prior to the departure of the first increment of the main body, and prior to the issuance of the order directing the transfer. Each request asked that the advance detachment be selected, so far as prac¬ ticable, from the Assembly Center scheduled for immediate evacuation to the designated Relocation Center. If necessary personnel for the advance detach¬ ment were not available at that Assembly Center, the Wartime Civil Control Ad¬ ministration would authorize recruiting at additional named Assembly Centers. All persons doing recruiting were instructed not to divulge the name of the Center to which the advance detachment was to go. Evacuees interviewed for possible selection were informed only whether the destination of the advance detachment was the same as that scheduled for the other evacuees of that Assembly Center. Evacuees selected were urged to have their families travel to the Relocation Center with the first increment of the main body to minimize the size of the advance party. This request was generally observed. It was not compulsory because the an¬ nounced policy was against family separation. The United States Employment Service representatives, subject to the approval of the Center Manager concerned, selected all persons in the advance detachment, 288 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST except certain professional and technical medical personnel. Members of its advance detachment usually consisted of the following: Hospital Attendants . . . . . Hospital Maids . Hospital Secretary 10 Recreation 15 Social Workers . . . . . . 1 . . . . 2 10 Cooks’ Helpers . . . . . Dishwashers . . . . . 4 . 1 2 . . 1 1 Steno-Typists . . 10 10 Clerks . Guides (preferably high . 5 . . . . . . 10 10 . .... 20 . 1 Butchers . 1 Store Managers . . . . . Bakers Carpenters . 10 Waiters . . . . . 2 . . . . . 2 Retail Clerks Leaders school or college men) Truck Drivers Laborers . . . 70 — Total. . .198 The United States Public Health Service representatives, with the assistance of the Regional Medical Director of War Relocation Authority, and the approval of the Center Manager, selected the doctors, nurses, and dentists required for the ad¬ vance detachment. There was also selected a dietitian, a pharmacist, a laboratory technician, and an X-ray technician. No person was accepted as a member of the advance detachment if the removal of that evacuee would unduly interfere with the satisfactory continued operation of the Assembly Center. For this reason several of the advance detachments did not have an evacuee doctor, though every detachment had at least one evacuee registered nurse. Train Accommodations. Once the evacuation of an Assembly Center started it was usually continuous until the Center was empty. Evacuees were normally moved by special train in increments of approximately 500 persons. Movements occurred daily or on alternate days until the ordered transfer was complete. The unit of 500 persons was used because it approximated an opti¬ mum train load, and was near the maximum number that could be efficiently handled in departing from an Assembly Center, and quickly cared for on arrival at a Relocation Center. Of the evacuees transferred, only 710 were moved by bus—these for relatively short distances. All other transfers were accomplished by train—171 special trains being required. The coordination for transportation necessary to move evacuees, baggage, and freight under provisions of each transfer order was the responsibility of the Rail Transportation Officer, Office of the Quartermaster, Western Defense Com¬ mand. This office was authorized to deal directly with the Rail Transportation Officers in the different Western Defense Command Sectors concerned. After transportation requirements were ascertained, the Sector Transportation Officer assured in advance that adequate rail or bus equipment would be on hand at the time of each projected movement. Necessary ambulances, when required, were provided by the United States Public Health Service. In no case was an evacuee permitted to drive from an Assembly Center to a Relocation Center in his privately owned conveyance. In each movement the evacuees were permitted to take on the same train only such personal effects and bedding as required by the evacuee immediately upon arrival at the War Relocation Center. Two baggage cars were provided for each 289 TRANSFER OF EVACUEES train of 500 evacuees, and the amount of personal effects were limited to that which could be transported in these two baggage cars. Excess baggage was sent to the Relocation Center by freight. Care was taken in preparation of personal effects of evacuees. Such personal effects were required to be securely bundled and tagged. When two or more meals were required enroute between the Assembly and the Relocation Center, dining cars were included in the train equipment by the Rail Transportation Officer. For movements involving only one or two meals, lunches were provided by the Manager of the Assembly Center concerned. In connection with the movements of evacuees, the Sector Commander fur¬ nished the necessary military personnel, including a Sector Transportation Officer, a Train Commander, and sufficient military personnel to assure the safe conduct of the evacuees. (The Train Commanders took delivery of, and accepted responsibility for, the evacuees at the exit gate of the Assembly Center.) The War Relocation Authority was responsible for the movement of house¬ hold and personal effects of evacuees not transferred by the regular movements from the Assembly to the Relocation Centers. The War Relocation Authority selected warehouses wherein such household and personal effects of evacuees could be stored. The evacuees were requested to furnish the War Relocation Authority information as to the volume of household and personal effects which were to be shipped from privately owned storage to central receiving warehouses designated by the War Relocation Authority. Medical Care. The United States Public Health Service provided the necessary medical care by employing one physician and one or two registered nurses to accompany the longer transfers. Such physicians and nurses were se¬ cured through many channels. They were authorized to render any type of treatment which their judgment seemed to dictate, and they were further authorized to hospitalize in the nearest adequate hospital, any person who be¬ came too ill enroute to continue. These medical attendants were required to submit a trip report to the Director of the United States Public Health Service relating details of medical care and supervision exercised on the trip. That Service also determined the number of tourist sleepers required for the transfer of infants, invalids, and others who, due to their physical condition, required such accommodation. There were cases where it was necessary that certain hospitalized evacuees be left behind when Assembly Centers were evac¬ uated. In such instances it was necessary to make arrangements locally for the care of these people in the movement of evacuees from Assembly to Relocation Centers. The United States Public Health Service in such instances recom¬ mended deferment of cases only on medical grounds. Certain medical supplies were required for all transfer movements. Medical kits containing drugs and medical supplies considered necessary by the train physician to have on hand to meet any immediate development while enroute, were provided through the Center Manager. Evacuee girls were trained by the Center physician and Public Health representative in methods of infants’ feeding preparation. These formula girls handled such work under the supervision of the nurses accompanying the train movements. All utensils and materials for formula preparations were placed on the trains from supplies in the Center hospital. The three colored map inserts which follow have been arranged to depict: (a) the areas of the West Coast from which Japanese were evacuated under each of the 108 Civilian Ex¬ clusion Orders; (b) the Assembly Center destinations of the evacuees by area of origin; and (c) the Relocation Center destinations by area of origin. MAP INSERT I EXCLUSION AREAS JAPANESE EVACUATION PROGRAM WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY SEATTLE AND VICINITY WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION 1 [^MILITARY AREA 2 SEE INSET TOR DETAILS EXCLUSION AREAS M—u I jDOUCL A S LINCOLN SPOKANE MASON GRAYS HARBOR -r h i ston" j portNA, | 1 BENEWAH ' h-U , F RAN KLI :Kit^ PORTLAND AND VICINITY : inset tordetails IOAHO rJ ^PORTLAND I YAMHILL ^ CLACKAMAS ™ X :; Lr — iy I BEN-'; ■ ton! \ 49 ~| ) UNION V .GILLIAul L-U f-—i 91 JtrfygjsON linn ; | | WHEELER ' /r J-j I /_If 0 R WASHINGTON I LEGEND | "V—j 1* -1 L 7 IPAYET-' 'H U 7 E 3 EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY LINES .CANYON EXCLUSION AREA ORDER NUMBERS J t[ I J ^“^IoACKSON j L~i LA" n \ m ASSEMBLY CENTERS gHp—E-LJ I NORTlj SACRAMENTO AND VICINITY I --^PLACER SAN FRANCISCO AND VICINITY RELOCATION 7 CENTERS EL DORADO muubolot AMAD , MENDOCINO iEVADA YUBA COLUSA i 69 Eldorado ALPINE SEE INSET TOR CTV DETAILS / 102 TUOLUMNE SEE INSET TO DETAILS TANFORAI LOS ANGELES AND VICINITY Sill 62 FRESNOi Ml ^ MAYER IS VENTURA RIVER^\ ___ \ pMSANTA AN l‘ l$wpq^ona L GIU SEE INSET DETAILS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION STATISTICAL DIVISION EXP LANATORY NOT E - I THIS IS NUMBER I OF A SERIES OF THREE MAPS. ABOVE IN DISTINCTIVE COLORS ARE THE 108 EXCLUSION TION OF COMMUNITY AND FAMILY UNITS. IT SHOWS THE AREAS FROM WHICH ALL PERSONS OF AREAS, EACH CONTAINING AN EVACUEE POPULATION MARCH 24 AND JUNE 6 NEARLY 100,000 JAPANESE ANCESTRY WERE EVACUATED BY THE ARMY UNIT OF APPROXIMATELY 1,000 PERSONS. WERE EVACUATED FROM MILITARY AREA I. IN SATISFACTION OF THE IMPELLING MILITARY NECES¬ FOR DETERMINING THESE AREAS WERE! SITY movement: character of population: CREATED BY TOTAL WAR WITH JAPAN. SHOWN THE BASIS CONTROL OF preserva- THAN BETWEEN PERSONS MORE 9,000 WERE EVACUATED FROM MILITARY AREA 2 OF CALIFORNIA FROM JULY 4 TO AUGUST II, 1942. MAP INSERT II ASSEMBLY CENTER DESTINATIONS JAPANESE EVACUATION PROGRAM WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY SEATTLE AND VICINITY WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION MILITARY SEE INSET DETAILS area \ I I MILITARY AREA 2_ I r1 I BOUNDARY T i \ ; .n ^atcom ASSEMBLY CENTER OKANOGAN f ^ • f CHeLAN ) GRAYS HARBOR DOUGLAS 'l r- j(~l' ij 1 I 1 BONNER X— H u |-Aj f I LINCOLN • If DESTINATIONS r -A"V .. STOr? V (‘ j 1 i WHITMAN v'M-1 Vranklin/ / ! v A It i u . I J BENTON 4 f'~\ y— -Tsar-I j Lfielo \ 1 \ / [COLUMBIA W l. I ,r TTpERtSr- V V [LEWIS !*,o.\ I n-—^ _J PORTLAND AND VICINITY ,c_ StLARKl : INSET rORDETAILS \ r, -i ^PORTqXNO 7AMHII.lj/l^ / CLACKAMAS ■Lr - iyli j I 4 Mf ( rr j L-, WILLIAM l i 4 91 UMATILLA | J £ F F^js o N ' s UNION J | WHEELER' i BAKER legend /fir ^1 [f 8 ) N E S A 4 cRoo R , r1 - EXCLUSION *—>4 / j I / I jJ ( | "-4 DU u o L A S J WL\ /enc(uTijl W r AREA BOUNDARY LINES ha, EXCLUSION AREA ORDER NUMBERS 4r'—' ./ U] .J.... 441....... y i j \ \ ) 1 ^ I i <§> i ASSEMBLY CENTERS 44-4—■■—1-n-—1 1 tule lak^ NORTlI .J. SAN FRANCISCO AND VICINITY r -J SACRAMENTO AND VICINITY I -===^PLACER 7 'PLACER / RELOCATION CENTERS ^ EL DORADO TRINITY llfcs r k / L—ek 10 ea P rvr jV-J TtMAv t / 7 A i plumas 102 YOLO COLORADO RIVER FRESNO GILA RIVER ( I MANZANAR MARYSVILLE MAYER MERCED PINEDALE 1 POMONA ] 1 TURLOCK \^ • EVADA COLUSA L 69 'placer Eldorado yolo I NOMA | SACRUM SEE INSET rOR &v details PORTLAND PUYALLUP SACRAMENTO SALINAS SANTA ANITA STOCKTON TANFORAN TULARE TULE LAKE TANFORA iMERCED 'INEDALE MANZANAR LOS ANGELES AND VICINITY pi-m \ m JOS ANGELES MAYER. / 12 X VENTURA 0 RIVER L--. POMONA \ LGILA SEE INSET FORDETAILS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION STATISTICAL DIVISION EXP LANATORY NOT E - II DIRECTLY MOVED. THOSE WHO WERE TAKEN TO RELO¬ TION BY THE ARMY. THE COLOR SCHEME OF THIS MAP IT SHOWS THE LOCATIONS OF 15 TEMPORARY ASSEMBLY CATION CENTERS REMAINED THERE. IS DESIGNED TO SHOW THE CENTER DESTINATION OF CENTERS AND OF 4 OF THE PERMANENT RELOCATION SHELTERED IN ASSEMBLY CENTERS PENDING TRANSFER CENTERS. INTO THE CENTERS SHOWN EVACUEES WERE TO INTERIOR RELOCATION CENTERS UNDER CONSTRUC- THIS IS NUMBER II OF A SERIES OF THREE MAPS. THE OTHERS WERE THE PERSONS EVACUATED FROM EACH EXCLUSION AREA. MAP INSERT III RELOCATION CENTER DESTINATIONS JAPANESE EVACUATION PROGRAM WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY SEATTLE AND VICINITY WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION MILITARY SEE INSET FOR DETAILS area I military AREA 2 V'WHATCOM T BOUNDARY ) "1 [W i_j OGAM Vi RELOCATION CENTER 1 >—pA 1DOUGLA S SPOKANE GRAYS HARBOR __T MASON | GRANT | J T H/u R 5 T On / VtLARKl / i y [COLUMBIA J | rs i WHEELER ! C R O 0 A V iLEWIS V "t~ I iaso-I -i, umion r \ V BAKER Is-> _ i ~L! - L., / j / ( \ legend j L_ C «M U T E 3 I ! V-! W7r—1 My L ,r‘ i s.y \— 7 - HI?»S 1 .oiuiami J t r F^Js o LATAH UjtLD \Jn£Z cou*J / ;W tt : INSET FORDETAILS DESTINATIONS -r~i I > PORTLAND AND VICINITY j 1 WHITMAN !«—1 SKAMA> J j ! V" .KOOTENAI -- BENEWAH | -1 | — I EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY LINES EXCLUSION AREA ORDER NUMBERS Iff kla/math 1 I • DEL NORTlI TULE LAK $ CENTERS SACRAMENTO AND VICINITY RELOCATION MODOC SAN FRANCISCO AND VICINITY CENTERS EL DORADO f u / L_j_, ■” I TR INITY J / HUMBOLDT ASSEMBLY I V- j / ® H A S TA j LASS E N YOLO ^ 102 ■ I I I r I I I A--1 .MENDOCINO ALAV \EF iEVADA COLUSA k 69 \ 'PLACER M*m N ELDORADO YOLO SACR^MI SEE INSET FOR $V DETAILS . _ —— /TUOLUMNE 102 i \ CENTRAL UTAH COLORADO RIVER GILA RIVER GRANADA HEART MOUNTAIN JEROME MANZANAR MINIDOKA ROHWER TULE LAKE TANFORA MADERA LOS ANGELES AND VICINITY « MAYER;.^ river A -- " 1_ \ SEE INSET FOR DETAILS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION STATISTICAL DIVISION EXP THIS IS NUMBER III OF A SERIES OF THREE MAPS. LANATORY NOT E ~ III DESTINATION OF EACH EVACUEE POPULATION GROUP MITTED, THE CONTROLLING CONSIDERATIONS IN THE 10 PERMANENT RELOCATION CENTERS WERE CONSTRUC¬ MOVED FROM THE EXCLUSION AREAS OUTLINED ABOVE. DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF THE PLAN OF MOVE¬ TED BY THE ARMY IN 7 STATES. EACH RELOCATION CENTER HAS BEEN ASSIGNED A MENT TO ULTIMATE DESTINATION WERE: CHARACTER DISTINCTIVE COLOR. SO FAR AS SOUND LOGISTICS PER- OF POPULATION; COMMUNITY BALANCE', PRESERVATION THE COLOR SCHEME IS DESIGNED TO SHOW THE ULTIMATE RELOCATION CENTER OF COMMUNITY AND FAMILY UNITS. PART VII RELATED ACTIVITIES OF WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION CHAPTER XXIII Curfew and Travel Control INTRODUCTION To have suggested that the enemy would not exploit the fifth column technique to its fullest extent in the development of its expansive program would have been naive. To have ignored the potential dangers arising out of the presence of nearly 200,000 enemy aliens on the West Coast would have been indifference tantamount to military indiscretion. National security de¬ manded that precautions be taken immediately. In the year following Pearl Harbor regulations were imposed governing the conduct of enemy aliens which are without parallel in the history of the United States. While the full story of alien control embraces the evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from strategic areas on the West Coast, it is with the curfew and travel regulations only that this chapter is concerned. These regulations applied to alien enemies and to all Japanese. To fully appreciate the chronological development and ultimate revision of these regulations, it must be understood at the outset that they were interim measures designed as safeguards against espionage, sabotage, and fifth column activities pending evacuation. With the evacuation of the Japanese accomplished, the interim measures were thereafter continued as military precautions until their withdrawal could be effected without jeopardizing the national security. Alien Control By Presidential Proclamation The President in Proclamations issued on December 7 and 8, 1941, pre¬ scribed the conduct to be observed by all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of Japan, Germany, and Italy. These Proclamations were numbered 2526 and 2527 respectively. All such persons of the ages of 14 years or over who were within the United States or within any territories in any way subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and not actually naturalized were termed for the purpose of the said Proclamations “alien enemies”. These Proclamations by their terms enjoined all such persons to preserve the peace toward the United States. More specifically, alien enemies were directed to refrain from acts against public safety and from violating the laws of the United States and of the states and terri¬ tories thereof. They were enjoined against actual hostility or giving information, aid, or comfort to the enemies of the United States or interfering by word or deed with the defense of the United States or the political processes and public opinions thereof. They were required to comply strictly with the regulations which were thereby, or thereafter, promulgated by the President. The Attorney General was charged with the duty of executing the regula¬ tions prescribed by the Proclamation regarding the conduct of alien enemies within the continental United States and Alaska. The Secretary of War had the duty of executing such regulations in the Canal Zone, Hawaiian Islands, 293 294 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST and the Philippine Islands. Each, within his own sphere, was directed to cause the apprehension of such enemy aliens as in their judgment were subject to arrest or deportation under the regulations prescribed by the said Proclamation. The authority and duty of the Attorney General to execute the regulations applicable to alien enemies in Alaska were transferred to the Secretary of War by Presidential Proclamation 2533, issued on December 29, 1941. a. Certificate of Identification Program. Security measures required that enemy aliens at all times might be identified as such. In a Proclamation issued on January 14, 1942, the President directed all such persons within the continental United States to apply for and acquire Certificates of Identifica¬ tion. The Attorney General was thereby authorized and directed to provide for the receipt of such applications and for the issuance of appropriate Identi¬ fication Certificates. Upon the issuance of Identification Certificates, all enemy aliens were directed to have such certificates on their persons at all times. Pursuant to the directive contained in the said Proclamation, the Attorney General designated the United States Postal Department as the governmental agency to administer the Certificate of Identification Program. He declared the week commencing on February 2, 1942, as the period during which all alien enemies were required to register at the times and places designated by the Postal Authorities in their communities. Regulations of Attorney General The Attorney General on February 4, 1942, pursuant to the Proclama¬ tions of December 7 and 8, 1941, and January 14, 1942, published regulations controlling travel and other activities of aliens of enemy nationalities, which in substance provided as follows: 1. Travel By Enemy Aliens Without Special Permission. a. Travel from place to place within the community of residence or place of business to the extent necessary to engage in the activities usual to the community. b. Commuting to regular place of business, usual place of religious wor¬ ship, school, college, or institution of learning regularly attended, and any Federal, state, or local governmental agency for the purpose of transacting business. 2. Occasional Travel or Trips By Alien Enemies. a. Travel, trips, or moving from one locality to another permissible upon approval of United States Attorney. In connection with such travel, alien enemies were required to file applications in writing 7 days prior to intended departure, setting forth in full the circumstances surrounding the said travel. All such applications were submitted by the Attorney General to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for clearance. 3. Frequent Travel or Regular Business Travel of Alien Enemies. a. Alien enemies whose occupations required frequent or regular business travel could apply in writing to the United States Attorney for permission to accomplish the said travel, setting forth the purpose of the travel and the 295 CURFEW AND TRAVEL CONTROL complete itinerary. All such applications were submitted by the Attorney General to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for clearance. 4. Air Travel By Alien Enemies Prohibited. 5. Travel Incident to Permanent Change of Residence. a. At least 7 days prior to changing their place of abode, alien enemies were required to file with the United States Attorney a statement in writing containing the full particulars of such change and to give written notice thereof immediately to: a. The Alien Registration Division of the Immigration and Naturaliza¬ tion Service. b. Federal Bureau of Investigation at the office shown on the holder’s Certificate of Identification. To facilitate the fulfillment of the requirements regarding written notice to the various agencies, Form AR-11 (Revised) was prepared and distributed by the United States Post Offices for execution by alien enemies. a. Attorney General’s Curfew. The Attorney General in a press re¬ lease on February 4, 1942, announced the establishment of a “restricted area” for all alien enemies along the West Coast. The announced area followed the coastline of California from the Oregon Border south to a point approximately 50 miles north of Los Angeles and extended for distances varying from 30 to 150 miles inland. In connection with the establishment of the restricted area, a new regulation in the form of a curfew was imposed upon all Japanese, German, and Italian aliens living therein. It required them to be within the place of residence indicated on their Certificates of Identification between the hours of 9 P. M. and 6 A. M. At all other times during the day they were to be found only at the place of residence or employment indicated on their Certificates of Identification, or going between those two places. They were permitted to travel within a radius of not more than five miles from the place of residence. The United States Attorneys were authorized to grant exceptions to these restrictions only in cases where a compelling reason existed and after completion of a suitable investigation. Executive Order No. 9066 The President in Executive Order No. 9066 dated February 19, 1942, authorized and directed the Secretary of War and the military commanders whom he might from time to time designate, to prescribe Military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate military commanders may determine. It authorized a designated Military Commander to exclude any and all persons from such areas. Further, it empowered such a com¬ mander to issue regulations governing the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave a military area. Executive Order No. 9066 thus afforded means to exert any necessary control over persons within a designated military area. In short, to the extent that military security required, the defense commander was empowered to act. In order to establish the security of the Pacific Coast the Command- 296 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST ing General exercised the powers granted him in two ways. First, the author¬ ity to exclude was applied to persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien. This also applied in specific cases to persons who were found, after hearing, to be dangerous or potentially dangerous to the military security of the Pacific Coast. No. Second, to those remaining within the Military Area 1, classified as alien enemies by the President, were applied restrictive measures. That is to say, the right of persons within this group to remain in Military Area No. 1, was subjected to stated restrictions limiting their travel and imposing a curfew. As noted in Chapters IV, V, and VII, Parts II and III of this report, the enforcement of sanctions for failure to comply with the announced restrictions was accomplished through the Department of Justice agencies. The Seventy-Seventh Congress in enacting Public Law 503 had made noncompliance a misdemeanor. Persons found guilty were subject to a fine not exceeding $5,000 and to imprisonment not exceeding one year. While violators were subject to immediate exclusion from the Pacific Coast, all alien ene¬ mies were also subject to internment as well as to prosecution under the Con¬ gressional statute. Accordingly, the Commanding General did not exercise his exclusion powers in those cases where subject failed to observe curfew and travel restrictions. His policy was against the extension of military control over civilians except where absolute necessity required. As the normal processes of law had been made available, enforcement was left to the regularly con¬ stituted Federal civilian enforcement agency. The understanding between the Commanding General and the Department of Justice in this regard was ulti¬ mately reflected in a memorandum dated June 2, 1942. That memorandum is quoted here: ''Memorandum between War and Justice Departments on Enforcement of Contraband, Curfew and Travel Regulations in the Western Defense Command. “On June 2, 1942, Lieutenant General DeWitt, Colonel Bendetsen and Mr. Ennis of the Department of Justice conferred on the enforcement of the contraband, resi¬ dence, curfew and travel regulations in force in the Western Defense Command and on enforcement of exclusion orders and certain other related subjects. General DeWitt stated that during the present military situation, which he explained to Mr. Ennis, he wished a strict enforcement of the regulations. Mr. Ennis explained that at the orders of the President after consultation with General Marshall, the United States Attorneys were, since May 27, operating under instructions which prohibited them from releasing any person apprehended for violation of the instructions even though the circumstances involving the apprehension of several persons since these instructions went into effect were such that the United States Attorney, if he had discretion, would direct the release of the person detained as a case involving no violation or an excusable violation. General DeWitt agreed that even strict enforcement permitted the exercise of some discretion and requested, however, that for the present, release in the discretion of the United States Attorney should be after consultation with the War Department officials. Thereupon the following was agreed: “During the present military situation, and until termination after consultation between representatives of the War and Justice Departments, all U. S. Attorneys in the Western Defense Command will order the apprehension and detention of all persons violating contraband, residence, curfew, travel, prohibited zones and exclusion 29? CURFEW AND TRAVEL CONTROL regulations, or of any other person, citizen or alien, whose activities are deemed by the War Department to be dangerous to the security of the nation, and will consult duly designated representatives of the War Department before releasing any such persons. "By use of the term War Department herein, is meant the War Department through Commanding General, Western Defense Command. "Dated at San Francisco, California, this 2nd day of June, 1942. For the Department of Justice /s/ Edward J. Ennis Director, Alien Enemy Control, Department of Justice For the War Department, through the Commanding General, Western Defense Command /s/ Karl R. Bendetsen Assistant Chief of Staff.” Control By Military Proclamation The Secretary of War on February 20, 1942, designated the Commanding General as the military commander to carry out the duties and responsi¬ bilities imposed by Executive Order No. 9066 for that portion of the United States embraced within the Western Defense Command. Pursuant to that authority, based on a determination of military necessity he issued Public Proclamation No. 1 on March 2, 1942. This established Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2 and various prohibited and restricted zones therein. Military Area No. 1 roughly comprised the western half of the States of Washington, Oregon, California, and the southern half of the state of Arizona. The remaining portions of the said states comprised Military Area No. 2. This proclamation imposed the first military regulation upon alien enemies and all persons of Japanese ancestry residing in Military Area No. 1. It re¬ quired them to obtain and execute a “Change of Residence Notice” (Form PM-2) not more than five, nor less than one day prior to any change of habitual residence. These notices were distributed by the Wartime Civil Control Administration through the United States Post Offices situated within the geographical limits of Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2. As a condition to the procurement of Form PM-2, the execution of a “Change of Residence Report Card” (Form PM-1) was required. This latter form required informational data surrounding the change of residence, including the old and new address, as well as personal identifying data. Public Proclamation No. 2 The requirements of Public Proclamation No. 1 with reference to the execution of Change of Residence Notices were extended to enemy aliens and persons of Japanese ancestry residing within the geographical limits of the Western Defense Command by Public Proclamation No. 2 issued by the Com¬ manding General on March 16, 1942. Public Proclamation No. 3 The Commanding General mation No. 3. on March 24, 1942, issued Public Procla¬ This required all Japanese, German, and Italian aliens, and all 298 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST other persons of Japanese ancestry residing or being within the geographical limits of Military Area No. 1 or within any of the zones established within Military Areas Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 to be within their places of residence between the hours of 8 P. M. and 6 A. M. "hours of curfew”. This period was designated as the At all other times such persons were required to be at their places of residence or employment. They were permitted to travel be¬ tween those places and also to any point within a distance of not more than 5 miles from the place of residence. This proclamation intensified rather than superseded the prevailing regula¬ tions of the Attorney General governing the conduct of alien enemies within Military Area No. 1. That this was so, can be fully understood and appre¬ ciated only when considered in connection with the situation preceding its promulgation. The regulations of the Attorney General in effect throughout Military Area No. 1 were, for the most part, acceptable to the military authori¬ ties as far as they went. They were, however, national in scope and designed as overall safeguards without due regard for local conditions. The invasion of the Aleutians, the deterioration of the position of the United States in the Pacific Theatre, the frequency of submarine attack on coast¬ wise shipping, and the shelling of the California and Oregon coasts and the bomb¬ ing by submarine based aircraft of the Oregon forest area were incidents of war that kept the Commanding General ever conscious of the proximity of the Pacific battlefront and furnished full justification for the designation of the Western Defense Command as a theater of operations. In the considered judgment of the military authorities, this situation required treatment special and apart from that routinely accorded to the rest of the nation. In a sense, then, the military views in connection with the control of alien enemies on the West Coast were expressed in the terms of Public Proclamation No. 3. It was designed to augment rather than supersede the prevailing regula¬ tions of the Attorney General. Recognizing that regulation of enemy aliens was essentially a civilian prob¬ lem, the military was content that the Attorney General should continue the ad¬ ministration of his regulations as augmented by the terms of this new military proclamation. Having contemplated the continued existence of the Attorney General’s regulations, no provision was made in Public Proclamation No. 3 for the relaxation of the restrictions therein contained. If, in the first instance, it had been the intent of the military to supersede the Attorney General as the monitor of enemy aliens on the West Coast, the acceptable features of the prevailing regulations would have been embodied within the terms of this latest Proclamation. It was not therefore the inten¬ tion that Public Proclamation No. 3 would in effect be an obituary for the Attorney General’s regulations insofar as the same applied to Military Area No. 1. Such was the case, however, as the Attorney General interpreted the provisions of this new military proclamation as superseding his duties and responsibilities with respect to the conduct and control of alien enemies within Military Area No. 1. The effect of this interpretation was to catapult Public CURFEW AND TRAVEL CONTROL 299 Proclamation No. 3 into the position of controlling prominence in the alien enemy regulation field. This made the administration of such regulations a military problem by reason of the action of the Justice Department in withdrawing from the administration of alien control. The military immediately set about to administer Public Procla¬ mation No. 3. There were two requirements—a field organization to service the needs of nearly 200,000 alien enemies widely distributed throughout Mili¬ tary Area No. 1, and workable regulations. The enforcement of Public Procla¬ mation No. 3 to the letter would have seriously disrupted normal community life, which at no time was the intent of this proclamation. Elastic regulations were, therefore, requested. Ably assisting the Wartime Civil Control Administration in the evacuation of the Japanese at the time Public Proclamation No. 3 came into being was the United States Employment Service. This agency, a unit of the Federal Security Agency, had 138 field offices situated throughout Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2. This organization was adequately staffed and was designated as the field organization to act under the direction of the Wartime Civil Control Admin¬ istration in administering the travel and curfew restrictions announced in Public Proclamation No. 3. Those charged with the administration of Public Proclamation No. 3 were instructed that some relaxation thereof was essential to the preservation of normal community life. Accordingly, Form PM-2 was converted from a simple Change of Residence Certificate to a Change of Residence Certificate and Travel Permit. This new form (PM-2 Revised) was used exclusively by the United States Employment Service in the field. The Wartime Civil Control Administration from its headquarters in San Francisco reviewed all unusual applications and in many instances issued special permits. These always recited the basis upon which the relaxation was granted and specified the limitations. In practice, the Wartime Civil Control Administration ultimately resorted to extensive use of the special permit. Literally thousands of travel permits and temporary curfew exemptions were issued by the Wartime Civil Control Administration and the United States Employment Service between the period commencing on March 27, 1942, and terminating on August 27, 1942. The travel and curfew regulations as ad¬ ministered by, and through direction of, the Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬ tration differed in no material respect from the regulations of the Attorney General. The Wartime Civil Control Administration was able to so regulate travel and curfew within Military Area No. 1 as to assure substantial compliance with Public Proclamation No. 3 and at the same time avoid undue hardship in any emergencies. The military was fully cognizant of the existence of such situations and endeav¬ ored whenever possible to alleviate them through relaxation of the provisions of Public Proclamation No. 3. The facilities of the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 were at all times available to the Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬ tration. Prior to relaxation in a given case, a clearance from the Military In- 300 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST telligence was invariably obtained. (A clearance indicated that the files of the investigative services did not reflect criminal or subversive activities on the part of the subject.) Cases of doubt were consistently resolved against the alien to the end that military security should not be compromised. Upon the creation of the War Manpower Commission, there was imposed upon the United States Employment Service heavily increased responsibilities. In the early part of July, 1942, this organization requested that it be relieved of its duties in connection with the issuance of travel permits and curfew exemptions to enemy aliens. Loss of the United States Employment Service as a field agency involved more than the physical substitution of one government agency for another. The United States Employment Service had been identified with the Wartime Civil Control Administration since the latter agency’s inception. It had a valuable field of background information. Its necessary withdrawal from further participa¬ tion was therefore keenly felt. However, the Ninth Regional Office of Civilian Defense signified its willing¬ ness to assume the responsibilities. By letter dated August 19, 1942, the Com¬ manding General, requested and authorized the Regional Director, Ninth Civilian Defense Region, United States Office of Civilian Defense, to act. The arrangement contemplated that the several city and county Civilian Defense Councils would provide for the issuance of permits authorizing certain temporary exemptions from the travel limitations and hours of curfew provisions of Proclamation No. 3. In exercising this authority and discharging its responsibilities thereunder, the said agency operated under the supervision and as part of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. The exchange of correspondence reflecting the new connection follows: "August 19, 1942 "Mr. James C. Sheppard Regional Director, Ninth Civilian Defense Region United States Office of Civilian Defense 1355 Market Street, San Francisco, California. "Dear Mr. Sheppard: "I am pleased to transmit herewith a letter dated August 19, 1942, from the Commanding General, Western Defense Command. As previously understood and in¬ formally agreed upon between your office and the office of the Commanding General, the United States Office of Civilian Defense, through its several County Defense Councils, has agreed to undertake the administration of certain phases of Proclamation No. 3, headquarters, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, dated March 24, 1942, within Military Area No. 1, operating as such as a part of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. The enclosed letter from the Commanding General authorizes your organization so to function. "In accordance with the authorization and designation enclosed, the Wartime Civil Control Administration, which operates under the command of the undersigned, has prepared operating rules and regulations applicable to the administration to be under¬ taken. Reprints of the enclosed set of rules and regulations, together with necessary forms, are being distributed to the city and county defense councils designated by you, for their use. In addition, an appropriate public statement will be released by head¬ quarters, Western Defense Command, of the assumption of your new duties formerly discharged by the United States Employment Service. In this connection, you will 301 CURFEW AND TRAVEL CONTROL note that the regulations approved by the Commanding General require that all publicity and press releases with reference to this subject have the approval of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, or his designated representative. I hereby designate The Chief, Public Relations Branch, Wartime Civil Control Ad¬ ministration, Major Norman Beasley, A. U. S., as authorized to pass on such questions. "It is understood that you will instruct your field agencies to refer all emergency matters not covered by these regulations and questions of an unusual nature to the San Francisco office of the Wartime Civil Control Administration for action or de¬ cision as the case may be. You are assured that every effort will be made to accord prompt response to inquiries. This office maintains 24-hour service, seven days a week. "It will be appreciated if you will acknowledge this letter and its enclosures, and at the same time confirm the understanding expressed herein and in the accompanying letter from the Commanding General, Western Defense Command. “Your cooperation in this matter is much appreciated. "Sincerely yours, Karl R. Bendetsen "Colonel, General Staff Corps Assistant Chief of Staff Civil Affairs Division "Directing, Wartime Civil Control Administration. "Enclosures—2 1— Itr from Commanding General 2— rules and regulations” "August 19, 1942 "Mr. James C. Sheppard Regional Director, Ninth Civilian Defense Region Office of Civilian Defense 1355 Market Street San Francisco, California "Dear Sir: "By virtue of the authority vested in me as a Military Commander designated by the Secretary of War to carry out the duties and responsibilities imposed by Executive Order of the President, No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, with respect to that portion of the United States embraced in Western Defense Command, I hereby authorize the Regional Director, Ninth Civilian Defense Region, United States Office of Civilian Defense, through the agency of the several county or city civilian defense councils, to provide for the issuance of permits authorizing certain temporary exemp¬ tions from the travel limitations and hours of curfew provisions of Public Procla¬ mation No. 3, this headquarters, dated March 24, 1942. Under this authorization the Ninth Civilian Defense Regional Office and the several city or county defense councils will exercise authority and discharge its responsibilities hereunder as a part of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. The issuance of such permits will be in con¬ formity with such rules and regulations as shall be published by or pursuant to my authority by the Assistant Chief of Staff Civil Affairs Division, his headquarters, through the agency of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. "The Wartime Civil Control Administration, an agency of my command, is under the immediate direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division. The Wartime Civil Control Administration is authorized and directed to furnish to your office for distribution to your agency defense councils, for their guidance, a statement of the rules and regulations governing the issuance of permits as indicated above. Any question concerning the interpretation of Proclamation No. 3, of the published rules and regulations governing the issuance of permits and concerning the promulgation of any necessary new or amended rules or regulations should be 302 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST referred by your office to the Wartime Civil Control Administration, this headquarters, for appropriate action. “The enforcement of the provisions of Proclamation No. 3 continues to be vested in the Department of Justice through the agency of the Federal Bureau of Investi¬ gation and the several United States District Attorneys. "It is requested that the United States Office of Civilian Defense, (Ninth Civilian Defense Region), designate a member of its staff to act as liaison officer between your office and the office of the Wartime Civil Control Administration at the Whitcomb Hotel, San Francisco, California. “Very truly yours, J. L. DeWitt "Lieutenant General, U. S. Army Commanding.” “OFFICE OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE Ninth Civilian Defense Region 1355 Market Street San Francisco, California "August 19, 1942 "Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen, G. S. C. Wartime Civil Control Administration 1231 Market Street, San Francisco, California "Dear Colonel Bendetsen: "This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 19, 1942, in duplicate, having attached thereto a letter signed by Lieutenant General DeWitt, dated August 19, 1942, and addressed to me together with proof sheets entitled respectively, "Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Permits. "Tab A consisting of a proof sheet of the Change of Residence Report Card. "Tab B containing a Certificate Change of Residence Notice. "Tab C consisting of a proof sheet of a Round Trip Travel Permit. "Tab D containing instructions for applicants for exemption. "Tab E consisting of a form for Exemption from Curfew Hours. "Tab F consisting of mimeographed form RB-3, Travel and Curfew Report. “As Regional Director of the Ninth Civilian Defense region, the authorization con¬ tained in Lieutenant General DeWitt’s letter of August 19 is accepted as well as the under¬ standing contained in your letter to me, dated August 19, 1942, with one clarification. That is, the concluding two sentences in the second paragraph of your letter with regard to publicity and press releases. There is no objection to that understanding insofar as the Regional Office is concerned. However, it would be exceedingly difficult for us to require the several city and county defense councils to submit all publicity and press releases to the Chief, Public Relations Branch, Wartime Civil Control Administration. I am acting upon the assumption that this was not intended, and I would appreciate your acquiescence in this interpretation. “I also observe that the first paragraph of your letter utilizes the phrase, 'through its several county defense councils,’ while the second paragraph of your letter refers to 'city and county defense councils designated by you.’ I am assuming that in accordance with our telephone conversation that we may interpret the first paragraph as meaning city and county defense councils in the same sense in which it is used in the second paragraph. "Yours sincerely, (s) James C. Sheppard James C. Sheppard Regional Director.” 303 CURFEW AND TRAVEL CONTROL "August 20, 1942 "Mr. James C. Sheppard Regional Director Ninth Civilian Defense Region Office of Civilian Defense 1355 Market Street San Francisco, California "Dear Mr. Sheppard: “I am pleased to acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 19, 1942, in which you accept and confirm the arrangements communicated to you by letters dated August 19, 1942, from the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, and the undersigned, respectively, regarding the functioning of your office and of your agency city and county civilian defense councils as a part of the Wartime Civil Control Administration for the purpose of administering certain phases of Proclamation No. 3, this headquarters, dated March 24, 1942. In your letter you also accept and acknowledge receipt of certain rules and regulations governing the issuance of permits in connection with the functions to be undertaken by your organization, together with certain exhibits A to F, inclusive, supporting the mentioned rules and regulations. "In the closing paragraph of your letter you refer to the use of the phrase in my letter 'through its several county defense councils’ in its second paragraph. In all cases where either phrase appears it is intended that both the city and county civilian defense councils operating under your supervision in Military Area No. 1 of the Western Defense Command are included. "You have alluded to the requirement that all public statements and publicity re¬ leases in connection with the program be approved by the San Francisco office of the Wartime Civil Control Administration prior to issuance. I am sure you will agree that there is the utmost desirability in achieving and preserving uniformity, particularly in connection with a program affecting substantial sections of the civilian components of the Pacific Coast population. With this objective in view the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, has taken great pains to do everything practicable throughout the civilian control program to attain this standard. I appreciate the difficulties inherent in exercising control of this nature over widely scattered cooperating agencies. If it were not a matter of the utmost importance, the Commanding General would not consider the imposition of such a burden upon you. It is with the solid conviction that real benefit will accrue to all concerned that I advise you of the applicability of the requirement to your agency councils. However, the requirement does not contemplate the several participating city and county defense councils are precluded from releasing factual statements designed solely to give information as to the location, hours of service and names of the officials who will administer the program in each locality. “I trust the foregoing will fully clarify the subjects of your inquiry. May I again express the real appreciation of the Commanding General, to which I add my own, of your valued cooperation and service in this important work. "Sincerely yours, Karl R. Bendetsen Colonel, G. S. C. Assistant Chief of Staff Civil Affairs Division.” “August 27, 1942 "Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt Commanding General Western Defense Command and Fourth Army Presidio of San Francisco California "Dear Sir: “I have been delayed in replying to your letter of August 19 due to the fact that I have been compelled to be away from San Francisco. 304 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST "Please be advised that pursuant to the authorization contained in your letter of August 19 provision has been made for the issuance of permits authorizing certain tem¬ porary exemptions from the travel limitations and hours of curfew provisions of Public Proclamation No. 3 of your Command, dated March 24, 1942. “All such local defense councils have received the necessary instructions and forms, and will be prepared to be fully operating as of the effective date, August 28, 1942. “I think, General DeWitt, you will be interested to know that the some three hundred defense councils who were asked to undertake this work did so willingly and with enthu¬ siasm. There was not one single objection raised. Having contacted many of them, I think I can state that they are willing to undertake any assignment which is given them with the same enthusiasm. “A copy of the communication sent by this office to such defense councils, together with the attachments, is enclosed herewith for your information. "Pursuant to the request contained in the concluding paragraph of your letter, the deputy director, George L. Levison, is designated as the liaison officer between this office and the office of the Wartime Civil Control Administration at the Hotel Whitcomb, San Francisco, California. "Very truly yours, James C. Sheppard Director Ninth Civilian Defense Region. "enc—9 (WCCA Rules and Reg. of Aug. 19, 1942 Pub. Proc. 1. 2, 3 and 5 Memo to Local Defense Council 8-24-42 Regional Regulations No. 4, 8-24-42 Form—Nom. of Alien Permit Officer Form—Oath of Office” Entitled "Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Travel Permits, Authorizing Temporary Exemptions from Travel and Curfew Provisions of Public Proclamation No. 3, Headquarters, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, dated March 24, 1942”, a manual was issued on August 19, 1942, by the Director of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. To insure the proper indoctrination of this new field agency, in the early part of Septem¬ ber, 1942, representatives of the Wartime Civil Control Administration in com¬ pany with the regional alien permit officer of the Office of Civilian Defense toured Military Area No. 1. They lectured before groups of alien permit officers in all of the principal cities thereof respecting their duties and obligations in administering the policies of the Wartime Civil Control Administration in connection with the control of enemy aliens. The Wartime Civil Control Administration published appropriate forms for use in connection with the rules and regulations. Form RB-1 was created for the purpose of providing an adequate permit form for round-trip travel. Form RB-2 was devised for the purpose of providing an adequate form for curfew exemptions. In the discharge of its newly acquired duties, the Office of Civilian Defense appointed 336 permit officers who served without compensation within Military Area No. 1 from August 28, 1942, to December 24, 1942. All were provided with Interview Records (Form RB-4) which were executed in triplicate. On these forms were recorded the identity of the aliens requesting travel permits or curfew exemptions, together with the date and nature of said request and the 305 CURFEW AND TRAVEL CONTROL disposition made in connection therewith. At the conclusion of each week the various alien permit officers throughout Military Area No. 1 forwarded a copy of the Interview Record to the office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at San Francisco. This was done so that the Bureau might be apprized of the number and identity of outstanding permits. A copy of the said Interview Record was likewise forwarded to the Headquarters of the Office of Civilian Defense in San Francisco for review. This enabled the San Francisco office to determine whether the issuance of travel permits and curfew exemptions by the various field agencies had been in accordance with the rules and regulations governing their issuance. On the 9th and 25 th day of every month a recapitulation of the number of travel permits and curfew exemptions issued to enemy aliens was prepared by the alien permit officers in the field. This was recorded on Form RB-3, which was forwarded to the Headquarters of the Office of Civilian Defense in San Francisco. The San Francisco office prepared a recapitulation for the entire area for the information of the Commanding General, Western Defense Com¬ mand and Fourth Army. Public Proclamation No. 5 During the evacuation period there was some indication that further enemy alien migrations might be ordered in the interest of national security. It was intended that some sensitive areas, in addition to those announced by the Attor¬ ney General in California, would have to be established. Upon their creation, alien enemies resident therein were to become subject to exclusion. In antici¬ pation of this possibility, provision was made for the extension of exemptions from exclusion to certain categories of enemy aliens. Accordingly, on March 30, 1942, Public Proclamation No. 5 was announced. Its primary purpose was to afford a basis for exempting the classes named from the necessity for observing curfew and travel regulations. The categories eligible for exemption from com¬ pliance with travel and curfew regulations were: "1. German and Italian aliens 70 or more years of age. "2. In the case of German and Italian aliens, the parent, wife, husband, child of (or other person who resides in the household and whose support is wholly dependent upon) an officer, enlisted man, or commissioned nurse on active duty in the Army of the United States (or any component thereof). United States Navy, United States Marine Corps, or United States Coast Guard. "3. In the case of German and Italian aliens, the parent, wife, husband, child of (or other person who resides in the household and whose support is wholly dependent upon) an officer, enlisted man, or commissioned nurse, who on or since December 7, 1941, died in line of duty with the armed forces of the United States indicated in the pre¬ ceding paragraph. “4. German and Italian aliens awaiting naturalization who had filed petition for nat¬ uralization and who had paid the filing fee therefore in a court of competent juris¬ diction on or before December 7, 1941. "5. Patients in hospitals or confined elsewhere and too ill or incapacitated to be removed therefrom without endangering their lives. "6. Inmates of orphanages and the totally deaf, dumb, or blind.” In May it was recommended to the War Department that further categories be relieved from compliance. It was proposed that this be accomplished on a 306 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST national scale if at all. It was suggested that the War Department forward the recommendations to the Department of Justice with a view to the amend¬ ment of the Attorney General’s recommendations throughout continental United States. governing alien enemies If the recommendations were favorably regarded by the Department of Justice, it was proposed to amend Public Proc¬ lamation No. 3 accordingly. The additional categories submitted in this pro¬ posal were: “1. Any German or Italian person expatriated by decree of the present German Gov¬ ernment or Italian Government, and who has or who shall have within 60 days from the issuance of an appropriate proclamation declared his intention of becoming a citizen of the United States. "2. Any German or Italian persons who having been residents in the United States since June 1, 1924, who have failed to become United States citizens or who were denied admission to citizenship by reason of lack of educational or mental qualifications. “3. Any person who has ever served in the Armed Forces of the United States on active duty (land or naval forces) and whose separation from the service was not under conditions other than honorable. “4. The parents, spouse, or minor children of any person who is now serving or who has ever served with the forces of the United Nations since September 8, 1939, and whose separation from such services was not under conditions other than honorable. "5. The parents, spouse, or minor children of any person who served with the Allies during the period April 6, 1917 to November 11, 1918, and whose separation from the service was not under conditions other than honorable. “6. All those classes of persons now accorded exemption under Proclamation No. 5 (curfew exemptions) issued by Headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth Army.” However, the suggestion was not favorably considered by the Attorney General and no action was taken at that time. As already noted, finally on December 24, 1942, all curfew and travel regulations were rescinded. Under the provisions of Proclamation No. 5, eligibles were required to make application for exemption. Forms (Application Form WDC-PM 5) were dis¬ tributed by the offices of the United States Post Office, the United States Employ¬ ment Service, the United States Immigration Service, and the Office of Civilian Defense. The Commanding Generals of the Sectors of Western Defense Com¬ mand were the primary agencies administering the granting of exemptions under Proclamation No. 5. The provost marshals in each sector were responsible for the immediate supervision of this activity. For the convenience of eligibles, the procedure directed an applicant to submit his proofs to the local draft board nearest his residence. These boards, upon receipt of an application, inspected it for completeness and forwarded it to the Commanding General of the sector concerned with a recommendation. The Sector Commander made a final decision unless the case fell into an unusual category. All special cases, known as "hard¬ ship” cases, were normally forwarded to Headquarters, Western Defense Com¬ mand, for determination. If an application was approved, the applicant was issued a certificate of exemption from exclusion and curfew (Form WDC-PM 6). relieved from compliance with curfew and travel restrictions. He was then A clearance by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 was a condition precedent in all cases to the 307 CURFEW AND TRAVEL CONTROL issuance of an exemption. A recapitulation of exemptions granted under this procedure follows: Cumulative total of Western Defense Command-PM 6 Exemptions granted to December 24, 1942: Northwestern Sector. 1,295 Northern California Sector. Southern California Sector. 7,483 2,118 Southern Land Frontier Sector. 10 Ninth Service Command . Provost Marshal, Western Defense Command. Wartime Civil Control Administration. 43 13 126 11,088 It is estimated that approximately 40,000 persons made application, of which roughly 10,000 were referred to the Wartime Civil Control Administra¬ tion as special cases not falling within any established regulation or policy. Public Proclamation No. 13 The regulations of the Attorney General governing the conduct of aliens of enemy nationalities specifically designated certain classes of persons who were not required to comply with the provisions of the said regulations. For the purposes of the regulations these were not considered enemy aliens. On October 12, 1942, the Attorney General announced that effective October 19, 1942, the President had relieved all citizens or subjects of Italy (and all aliens who at that time were stateless, but who at the time at which they became stateless were citizens or subjects of Italy) from compliance with the provisions of the general enemy regulations. For these purposes the President no longer required their classification as enemy aliens. In order to establish uniformity, on October 19, 1942, Public Proclamation No. 13 was issued. By its terms, all such persons were specifically exempted from the provisions of curfew and travel regulations established under the proc¬ lamations theretofore issued. Public Proclamation No. 15 In the year following Pearl Harbor much was accomplished in the field of civil control to reduce the dangers existing on the West Coast. The Japanese, aliens and citizens alike, had been excluded from Military Area No. 1 and that portion of Military Area No. 2 lying within the State of California. The Attor¬ ney General, under the authority conferred upon him in the Presidential Procla¬ mations of December 7 and 8, 1941, had apprehended, detained, and interned enemy aliens deemed dangerous to the national security. In addition, the Com¬ manding General established a procedure for the exclusion of potentially dangerous persons from the West Coast—persons whose presence endangered the military security of the Coast. With these safeguards in operation, the military necessity upon which the continuance of the military curfew and travel regulations was predicated had been substantially satisfied. Accordingly, on December 24, 1942, Public Proclamation No. 15, rescinding the travel and 308 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST curfew provisions of Public Proclamation No. 3 was issued. This, in effect, brought to an end the military regulation of enemy aliens on the West Coast. It revived the Attorney General’s alien regulations. Citizens and aliens alike continued to be subject to exclusion from Military Area No. 1 in all cases where their presence on the West Coast endangered its military security. In announc¬ ing the change, it was stated in part: . . the need for the curfew no longer exists as other security measures have now been provided. Among these measures is the Individual Exclusion Procedure under which persons who are found, after hearing, to be dangerous or potentially dangerous to the military security of the West Coast are excluded. I desire to make it plain, however, that there will be no retardation of the program to rid the West Coast of such persons.” Calendar of Enemy Alien Regulations December 7, 1941 Presidential Proclamation No. 2525 December 8, 1941 Presidential Proclamation No. 2526 (Conduct to be observed by German December 8, 1941 Presidential Proclamation No. 2527 aliens prescribed) (Conduct to be observed by Italian December 29, 1941 Presidential Proclamation No. 2533 January 14, 1942 Presidential Proclamation No. 2537 (Conduct to be observed Japanese prescribed) by alien aliens prescribed) (Secretary of War substituted for Attorney General as monitor of enemy aliens in Alaska) (Certificate of Identification pro¬ gram announced) February 2-9, 1942 Certificate of Identification Program February 5, 1942 Regulations controlling travel and (Enemy aliens required to register) other conduct of aliens of enemy nationality announced by Attor¬ ney General. February 24, 1942 Attorney General announces curfew March 2, 1942 Public Proclamation No. 1 (Enemy aliens in northwestern por¬ tion of California placed under cur¬ few) (Aliens within Military Area No. 1 required to execute Change of Resi¬ dence Notices) March 16, 1942 Public Proclamation No. 2 (Alien enemies within Western De¬ fense Command required to execute Change of Residence Notices.) March 24, 1942 Public Proclamation No. 3 (Military curfew and travel regula¬ tions imposed on enemy aliens) March 30, 1942 Public Proclamation No. 5 October 12, 1942 Italian aliens relieved from the (Exemptions from curfew and exclu¬ sion announced) provisions of the Attorney General’s regulations. October 19, 1942 Public Proclamation No. 13 (Italian aliens relieved from the pro¬ visions of Public Proclamations Nos. 1, 2, and 3.) December 24, 1942 Public Proclamation No. 15 (Curfew and travel provisions of Public Proclamation No. 3 rescinded) CHAPTER XXIV Repatriation of Japanese On June 6, 1942, the Wartime Civil Control Administration entrained 54 Japanese for New York where they were scheduled to sail on the S. S. Gripsholm for Lourenco Marques, Portuguese East Africa, on June 11. Although these 54 persons are, in fact, the only Japanese under Wartime Civil Control Administra¬ tion jurisdiction ever to have been repatriated, this fact alone gives no indication whatever of the total repatriation activities which were carried out by this agency. The purpose of this Chapter is to present these activities as briefly as possible. When any person under Wartime Civil Control Administration jurisdiction either (a) of his accord requested repatriation, or (b) was listed by the State Department as being considered for repatriation, it became necessary to carry out certain very definite functions. In outlining these functions, and the results thereof, the Chapter is divided into three parts: (1) Scope of responsibility in repatriation matters, (2) State Department Lists of persons being considered for repatriation, and (3) the Request for Repatriation Procedure. It would unduly extend this portion of the report to recount in detail here the steps taken by Wartime Civil Control Administration in preparing evacuees for repatriation, determining identity and derivative eligibility, transporting them to New York City, arranging their fiscal affairs, property disposition, and insuring against attempts on the part of repatriates to carry contraband or excessive monies with them. In point of fact, there were two groups of repatriates handled by Wartime Civil Control Administration. The second group originated in Hawaii. Custody of the second group was accepted by the Wartime Civil Control Admin¬ istration in San Francisco and the same elaborate steps were taken to transport this party to North Carolina (there to await repatrition) with some minor omis¬ sions, as those which were taken to organize the first party of fifty-four who left from Assembly and Relocation Centers bound for New York. When the first repatriation exchange agreement ultimately developed, the responsibility was imposed on Wartime Civil Control Administration to organize the movement within less than seven days. Few ground rules had been pre-determined which specified what kinds of property could be taken, how much money, how financial transfers were to be arranged, whether there would be baggage inspection, customs inspection, and internal revenue examinations. Neither had rules been announced to govern the eligibility of persons whose names did not appear on any list to accept repatriation by derivation from a member of the immediate family. Accordingly, it fell to the lot of Wartime Civil Control Ad¬ ministration to develop a set of rules, a series of questions and answers, and a number of policies for guidance. This was done under considerable handicap be¬ cause all of the solutions to these problems proposed by Wartime Civil Control Administration had to be transmitted by telephone through the War Depart¬ ment to the State Department for clearance. There was insufficient time with which to resort even to the use of teletype messages. The train parties, once organized, were placed under the command of a 309 310 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST commissioned officer and in each car, trained civilian personnel, including guards and nurses, were provided. All baggage had to be searched and questionable items were taken up, receipts given, and those items in turn shipped to the State Department for disposition. Although only fifty-four persons were ulti¬ mately to comprise the first repatriation party, it took the full time and energies of seven officers and over thirty civilians at Wartime Civil Control Administra¬ tion offices to conclude the necessary arrangements. In addition, the Director of Wartime Civil Control Administration held a number of telephone conference calls with the managers of all Assembly and Relocation Centers to give them specific instructions as to how to proceed. All international requirements were observed, because it was keenly felt by the Wartime Civil Control Administra¬ tion staff that any omission, no matter how slight, might result in reprisals against our nationals in the hands of the enemy, or perhaps even in the break¬ down of the repatriation agreement which would have denied to many of our nationals the opportunity to return home. The many problems which arose, their solution, the human interest aspects, if narrated in detail would occupy a volume of considerable extent itself. I. Scope of responsibility in repatriation matters. When, on June 1, it first became possible to repatriate Japanese in America in exchange for Americans held in Japan, those Japanese who had been evacu¬ ated from the West Coast were housed in 18 Centers, of which three, Colorado River (Parker), Manzanar, and Tule Lake, were Relocation Centers operated by the War Relocation Authority, and 15 were Assembly Centers under Wartime Civil Control Administration operation. In order to expedite the June repatriation of west coast Japanese under unified direction, the War Relocation Authority at that time gave Wartime Civil Control Administration jurisdiction in all matters affecting the repatriation of evacuees in Relocation as well as Assembly Centers. On July 17-18 a canvass of Assembly and Relocation Centers was institu¬ ted in order to determine the names of evacuees who wished to be repatriated. This canvass was begun as a joint undertaking of both Wartime Civil Control Administration and War Relocation Authority, and an explanation of the proce¬ dure and results constitutes Part III of this Chapter. Again, however, it was apparent that the canvass, and subsequent actual repatriation, could be much more efficiently handled under unified rather than joint jurisdiction. Accordingly, on July 25, with 63 per cent of the evacuees remaining under Wartime Civil Control Administration control in Assembly Centers, a Wartime Civil Control Admin¬ istration memorandum entitled: "Interim Report and Recommendation—Re¬ patriation,” was prepared for discussion with War Relocation Authority repre¬ sentatives and made certain specific proposals for handling the problem. Of pertinence here is the following excerpt from this memorandum: "(Repatria¬ tion) operations of War Relocation Authority and Wartime Civil Control Administration should be consolidated at this time. One office should be charged with the responsibility of preparing all lists for transmittal to the War and State Departments, maintaining all records, and providing for release of repatriates. Since this is largely a War Department program, it is recommended that War- REPATRIATION OF 311 JAPANESE time Civil Control Administration be charged with this responsibility. It is further recommended that an official of War Relocation Authority should work closely with Wartime Civil Control Administration persons in charge of this project and be present at all meetings and conferences relating to this project.” On July 26 this recommendation was discussed by Wartime Civil Control Administration representatives with Mr. E. R. Fryer, San Francisco Regional Director of War Relocation Authority, and it was agreed that Wartime Civil Control Administration should bear the responsibility for processing potential repatriates in Relocation as well as Assembly Centers. Inasmuch as all Japanese evacuees were to be transferred to War Relocation Authority by November 1, a request was made in October by Wartime Civil Control Administration that War Relocation Authority be prepared to take over all responsibility concerning repatriation of Center residents as early in November as possible. In compliance with this request, on October 20 War Relocation Authority placed two statistical clerks with the Repatriation Sec¬ tion for training in the handling of repatriation matters. It was agreed, how¬ ever, that Wartime Civil Control Administration would continue to receive, tabulate, and transmit the documented decisions of persons being canvassed because of their listing on the State Department so-called Photostat List (see section on List 4 in Part II of this chapter). For any repatriation up to Novem¬ ber 15, 1942, Wartime Civil Control Administration was to retain full responsi¬ bility. Continuing with this responsibility concerning repatriation, Wartime Civil Control Administration on November 15, transferred its index file of persons who had received, or were receiving, repatriation consideration to War Relocation Authority, and that agency, having established a Repatriation unit, assumed all further functions having to do with the repatriation of Japanese evacuees under its jurisdiction. II. State Department Lists of persons being considered for repatriation. List No. 1. On June 1, 1942, Wartime Civil Control Administration received a list of names of 539 Japanese from the State Department. was entitled: "Japanese Nationals Sailing First Voyage S. S. Gripsholm. This list Group II (A) : Non-Officials From the United States.” In addition to names, the list in most cases provided some indication of last known occupation and city of residence of each person. All persons who were shown to have lived within the evacuated portion of the Western Defense Command, and who were not interned as dangerous enemy aliens, were considered to constitute that portion of the list for which Wartime Civil Control Administration was responsible. A search of the list showed 142 of the 539 persons to have lived within the evacuated area of the Western Defense Command, and thus presumed to be under Wartime Civil Control Administration jurisdiction. To these 142 were later added 34 dependents of listed persons who were eligible for repatria¬ tion because of such dependency, thus making a total of 176 persons to be located and questioned for a decision. Because of prior international agreements concerning this first wartime exchange of repatriates between the United States and Japan, it was necessary for the exchange vessel, the S. S. Gripsholm, to sail from New York City on JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 312 June 11. To meet this sailing date it was necessary that repatriates from the West Coast be entrained before June 7. Operating under considerable pressure because of this imposed time limit, and carrying on all correspondence with Centers and other points by teletype, telegram, and telephone, 101 of the 176 persons were located and their decision obtained. Of these 101 persons, 41 declined repatriation, six were found to be ineligible, and 54 accepted and were subsequently repatriated.1 Although those who wished to accept repatriation could do so simply by notifying Wartime Civil Control Administration of their decision, those who wished to decline repatriation were asked to sign five copies of a declaration to that effect. Four copies of these declarations were trasmitted by airmail to the War Department on June 8. Of the 54 persons who were repatriated, two were from Pasco, Washing¬ ton, one was from the Arequipa Sanatorium in Marin County, California, and the remaining 51 were from nine Assembly Centers and one Relocation Cen¬ ter. Thirty-six of the repatriates were adults eighteen years of age and older, and eighteen were children under the age of eighteen.2 List No. 2. On August 5, a mimeographed list was received which con¬ sisted of 2,803 Japanese names, most of which were listed at some type of address. This list was entitled: "Preliminary List of Japanese Nationals Who Are Being Considered for the Second Sailing of the Exchange Vessel 'Gripsholm’: Revised July 31, 1942.” The State Department did not ask that any of these persons be questioned regarding repatriation, but, instead, it was stated in a letter from S. K. Lafoon to Col. Ralph H. Tate, Executive Officer, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, that, "It would be greatly appreciated if you would provide the Department with any corrections of the addresses given or supply any missing addresses that may be available in your files.” The Repatriation Section had individual blue Address Tracer cards typed for each name and address listed. These names were then searched in the Wartime Civil Control Administration master index file, and 778 names were found at current addresses. This information was teletyped to the War Department by August 13, for transmission to the State Department.8 List No. 3. The next repatriation list consisted of 1,366 Japanese names dated August 19, 1942, and entitled: "Tentative Office List of Japanese Na¬ tionals Eligible for Repatriation on Next 'Gripsholm’ ”, Wartime Civil Control Administration was requested to canvass those persons within its area of responsibility, together with those who were found in three west coast internment enclosures, viz., Sharp’s Park, Angel Island, and United States Immigration Service, Los Angeles, and to notify the State Department concerning the names and addresses of those persons wishing to accept repatria¬ tion, as well as those wishing to decline. list. *Table 34 shows the disposition made by Wartime Civil Control Administration of persons on the June See Chapter Appendix for Tables and Figures. *Table 35 shows the address, age, and sex distribution of the repatriates. 'Table 36 shows the distribution of these 778 persons by address. Table 37 shows the distribution of the remaining 2,025 names which were not found indexed in the master file. REPATRIATION OF 313 JAPANESE After adding the names of 20 persons later made eligible by the State De¬ partment, and deducting duplicated names and names of deceased persons, it became apparent from an examination of the addresses, that the Wartime Civil Control Administration was responsible for obtaining the decision of 3 52 persons.4 Because Japanese evacuees were being continuously transferred from As¬ sembly to Relocation Centers, it was necessary to re-check all names against the master index file before communicating with the potential repatriates. After this search was complete, and addresses verified or revised, lists were made up for each Center and Internment Enclosure concerned, and transmitted to the administrator of each such place. Each administrator was instructed to advise the persons on his list that they had been made eligible for repatriation to Japan on the forthcoming second sailing of the exchange vessel Gripsholm, and were to be permitted to accept formally or decline the offer. It was further directed that persons wishing to accept should fill out and sign Requests for Repatriation in triplicate, and that persons 18 years of age and older who wished to decline repatriation should sign five copies of a Declaration of Declination. It was specifically stated that persons under the age of 18 who were being considered for repatriation must abide by the decision of their parents or guardians. After the completion of the canvass it was determined that 199 persons wished to accept repatriation. One copy of each of the Individual Request for Repatriation and Family Summary Sheets for these people was sent to the War Department, as well as three copies of each Declaration of Declination received from persons 18 years of age and older declining the repatriation offer. A re¬ port, in list form, was made up and transmitted to the War Department on September for whom 10, which Wartime provided Civil the Control following information for each Administration was responsible: person State Department list number, name and address as listed by the State Department. In addition, for each person with whom Wartime Civil Control Administration had actually communicated, the list provided this information: repatriation decision, Wartime Civil Control Administration family number, correct spelling of name, correct address, age, and sex.5 List No. 4. On August 28, three photostatic copies of a list of 986 Japanese names were received from the War Department. This list differed radically from previous lists of possible repatriates in that only the name of the family head was given, and the Repatriation Section was asked to ascertain name and current location of all family members wherever possible. The request from the State Department to the War Department in turn transmitted to Wartime Civil Control Administration read as follows: "1. In the attached list you will note that the names of some individuals have been crossed off. This indicates that the Department has already located these individuals. 2. Where a red circle is placed around the number preceding the name, it indicates that the individual 4The distribution of these persons appear in Table 38. sThe disposition of the 352 cases for which Wartime Civil Control Administration was responsible appears in Table 39. 314 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST has been located in the records of the Provost Marshal General but that no record of the family groups is available. In all cases where a red circle precedes the name, please endeavor to locate the families only. 3. It is desired that all other names on the list be checked with reference to the location of the indi¬ vidual as well as the family.”6 As a matter of fact, it was decided to search all names against Wartime Civil Control Administration files because of the continuing transfer of persons from Assembly to Relocation Centers, and because of the continuing parole of interned persons to these Centers. Fortunately, the list provided a last known private address as well as a former occupation for the persons listed. With this information in hand, the names were first searched through the file of Social Data Registration forms which had been filled out for each Japanese family group evacuated from the West Coast. By this expedient, the names of family members of 657 of the 986 listed individuals were found. After transferring the available data on both listed individuals and their family members to Address Tracer Cards, the names were searched against the master index file in an attempt to determine the present address of each person. At this time, although the State Department had advised that, "It is possible that some of these persons may have to be considered for repatriation in the very near future,”' no request was made to attempt communication with them. But, in accordance with the expressed request for current locations of these people, Wartime Civil Control Administration transmitted between September 4 and September 12, eight partial lists providing the following information for the 657 families found to be indexed in the master file: name, sex, Wartime Civil Control Administration family number, and current residence. On September 27 the War Department notified Wartime Civil Control Administration by telephone that the State Department desired to know the names of family members of listed persons who would accept repatriation to Japan, if offered, and names of those who would not be willing to be repatriated. In other words, a canvass of the 657 families was desired, although no assurance could be made that those expressing a desire for repatriation would actually be permitted to sail. Before commencing a canvass of listed persons and their families, it was necessary to re-search the master index file in the case of all names previously located in Assembly Centers. This was necessary because of the unabated con¬ tinuing transfer of Japanese evacuees from Assembly to Relocation Centers. On September 12 when the final list of names and addresses of listed persons and their family members was transmitted by Wartime Civil Control Administra¬ tion, there was a total of 31,417 evacuees residing in the five extant Assembly Centers. By October 13, when this repatriation canvass actually commenced, only three Assembly Centers remained in operation and all but 8,806 evacuees had been transferred to Relocation Centers or otherwise relocated. After this search was completed, the names of the persons to be canvassed were listed according to the Center of residence. Three different form letters were printed, eExccrpt from memorandum to Colonel Ralph H. Tate from S. K. Lafoon dated August 26, 1942. 7Ibid. REPATRIATION OF JAPANESE 315 based on three broad categories of families to be canvassed. On the evening of October 12 lists were transmitted to the three Assembly Centers remaining in operation8 and the ten Relocation Centers, together with covering letters to the Managers and Directors explaining the purposes of the canvass. At the same time, the form letters to persons being canvassed were inserted, with a franked pre-addressed return envelope, in envelopes addressed to the oldest resident family member concerned; these envelopes were bundled by Center of residence and transmitted to the Managers and directors for distribution. Later, on October 21, 54 more names were added as a supplement. These latter names resulted from a list, since entitled War Relocation Authority List-I, which had been given War Relocation Authority by the State Department. Form letters were then mailed out to these additional persons.9 Persons wishing to accept repatriation, if later offered, were directed to file formal Request for Repatriation forms if this had previously not been done, and those wishing to decline such an offer were directed to sign five copies of the Declaration of Declination form. The form letters were provided with a per¬ forated stub on which the recipients were asked to indicate their wish to accept or decline by signing their names under the appropriate decision. It was re¬ quested that these stubs then be separated from the form letter and returned immediately to the attention of the Repatriation Section in the pre-addressed franked envelope which had been provided. Replies were allowed to accumulate until October 19, at which time the first partial list of decisions (involving 184 persons) was forwarded to the War Department. Periodically thereafter when a sufficient number of replies had been received, further partial lists were transmitted. These lists provided information as to the State Department number under which the family had originally been listed, name, age, sex, Wartime Civil Control Administration Family number, and decision concerning repatriation. By December 31, the decisions of 2,229 of the 2,744 persons, to whom form letters had been mailed on October 12, had been received, tabulated, and trans¬ mitted.10 It is interesting to note that only 6.4 per cent, or 142, of these respondents indicated that they would be willing to accept an offer of repatria¬ tion to Japan. This amounts to only 30 more persons than those who had filed a Request for Repatriation prior to the commencement of the canvass. It is conjectural why so few expressed a willingness to be repatriated. Although this is not the place to detail the factors which may have been operating to greatly reduce the numbers of potential acceptances, it should be emphasized that no actual offer of repatriation was made to these people, and no scheduled sailing of an exchange vessel had been announced. Instead, the form letters simply stated that: "Certain Japanese persons are currently being considered for repatriation to Japan. You, and those members of your family listed above, are ®A fourth Assembly Center, Tanforan, actually transferred the last of its residents on October 13. The Manager of this Center forwarded the form letter to the desination of the addressees. •Table 40 shows the total number of persons who were canvassed, and the type of printed form letters which they received. 10Table 41 shows the number of persons whose decisions were transmitted from October 19 through December 31. 316 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST being so considered,” and further on, "If repatriation would be accepted, three copies of a Request for Repatriation should be filled out and signed by each person 18 years of age and older.” By way of comparison, in June when "Wartime Civil Control Administration sought the decision of 95 persons who had actually received assurance that they had been declared eligible for repatriation by the State Department, 57 per cent accepted and were repatriated. Again, when 344 persons who had been listed by the State Department on August 19 (List No. 3) were located and (errone¬ ously) informed that they were eligible for repatriation, a total of 60 per cent accepted. III. The Request for Repatriation Procedure. The State Department had originally planned that the S. S. Grips holm would sail from New York on or about August 10 with a second group of Japanese repatriates.11 It was desirable that advance knowledge be secured con¬ cerning those Japanese who, if offered an opportunity to be sent to Japan, would accept repatriation. Accordingly, on July 11 the State Department requested a canvass of the Centers for persons in the following categories who would like to be repatriated: 1) Treaty merchants, 2) professors, 3) temporary visitors, 4) students, and 5) clergymen. There was no facile way by which only those evacuees in these five limited categories could be questioned. It was decided that the request of the State Department made it necessary to immediately undertake a canvass of all Jap¬ anese Center residents. It was fortunate that this was so, because later, on July 16, the State Department broadened its request to include information concern¬ ing any and all Japanese who might wish to be repatriated. Necessary forms and instructions for the use of evacuees wishing to request repatriation were devised and printed, and on July 17 supplies of these, together with a memorandum from the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, explaining procedure to be followed, were sent to the Managers of the ten Assembly Centers remaining in operation.12 And on July 18, the San Francisco regional office of the War Relocation Authority sent a supply of identical forms and instructions to the Directors of the existing Relocation Centers. Later, on July 26, the agreement mentioned in Part I of this chapter, was made that all completed forms being returned to War Relocation Authority from its Centers were to be turned over to Wartime Civil Control Administration for tabulation, listing, and transmission to the War Department. The following forms were used in this program to obtain a formal request from each evacuee who wished to be repatriated: 1. Wartime Civil Control Administration Form R-100. "Individual Request for Repatriation.” This form was filled out in triplicate by each person 18 years of age and older. One copy was forwarded to the attention of the State Department, one copy was provided the War Relocation Authority, and the “This plan as well as later plans based on other tentative dates all had to be abandoned. sailed in June were the only ones actually repatriated during the year 1942. “Not including Pinedale from which all evacuees were transferred by July 23. The Japanese who REPATRIATION OF 317 JAPANESE remaining copy was retained by Wartime Civil Control Administration. was provided on the form for the following information: Space Name; sex; age and date of birth; height; weight; marital status; place of birth; citizenship; port, date; vessel and entry status at time of last entry into the United States; informa¬ tion covering residence outside the United States (dates of departure and return, foreign country of residence, and occupation or activity while there); educa¬ tional history; employment history; residence addresses for previous five years; name, relationship, sex, age, and present address of all first degree relatives; signature of applicant and of witness; and date of filing. In addition, space was provided for the following information to be filled in by the Repatriation Section: Center; Wartime Civil Control Administration Family number; and place from which applicant was evacuated. 2. Wartime Civil Control Administration Form R-l01. Repatriation—Family Summary.” "Request for This form was provided in order that mem¬ bers of family groups who wished to be repatriated together would not be considered individually, and perhaps be repatriated separately. in triplicate for each such family. It was filled out These were distributed with the attached R-l00 forms to the State Department, War Relocation Authority, and Wartime Civil Control Administration. Space was provided on this form for the following information for each family member for whom repatriation was requested: Name; relationship; sex; age; place of birth; and affirmation or negation of fact that form R-l00 for the named person was attached. This form was signed by the acting head of the family, witnessed, dated, and the name of the Center entered. This was the form from which information concerning children under the age of 18 and interned family members was secured. 3. Wartime Civil Control Administration Form R-103. "Notice and General Instructions to Japanese Seeking Repatriation.” This form consisted of eleven paragraphs explaining the request for repatriation procedure and the rights and duties of persons wishing to apply for repatriation. 4. Japanese Translation of Form R-103. This was prepared by the Army Language School, Camp Savage, Minnesota. 5. Wartime Civil Control Administration Form R-104. "Instructions for the Individual Request for Repatriation.” This form contained specific instructions for filling out each item of Form R-l00. 6. Wartime Civil Control Administration Form R-105. Japanese Requesting Repatriation.” "List of This form was used to summarize the information for all persons who themselves requested repatriation, or for whom repatriation was requested, i. e., minors under 18, and interned persons. When each list was completed, two copies were sent to the War Department for transmittal to the State Department, two copies were sent to G-2, and one copy was provided War Relocation Authority. lowing information in columnar form: This list provided the fol¬ Wartime Civil Control Administration Family number; name; relationship to (family) head; sex; age; citizenship; last entry date; entry status; occupation; previous address; and name of the Center from which the Request for Repatriation was received. A total of 2,640 names of Japanese evacuees wishing to be repatriated had 318 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST been listed and forwarded to the War Department by August 13. One copy of each Individual Request for Repatriation and each Family Summary covering the persons listed, was also transmitted for the State Department. Later, on September 12, and October 21, a total of 132 more names, together with com¬ pleted forms, were transmitted in two additional lists, thus making a grand total of 2,772 names.13 The names of only 151, or 5.5 per cent, of the 2,772 persons who sub¬ mitted Requests for Repatriation under this voluntary program appeared on the State Department lists of persons being considered for repatriation which have been mentioned in this chapter. Certain salient facts about that portion of the Japanese who prefer re¬ patriation to continuing residence in the United States can be gained by an analysis of the age, sex, citizenship, and place of education of the 2,772 persons filing Requests for Repatriation.14 1. Sex. The preponderance of males is immediately apparent, particu¬ larly in the older ages.15 It is particularly interesting to note that of all appli¬ cants 18 years of age and older 70.9 per cent are males. In other words, there are 2.4 adult males for every adult female. 2. Citizenship. Of the 2,772 applicants 1,171, or 42.2 per cent, were born in the United States and can, therefore, claim American citizenship. Nevertheless, of the 525 U. S. born Japanese eighteen years of age and older, 363, or 69.1 per cent, claimed on their Individual Request for Repatriation to be registered with Japan as dual citizens. 3. Place of education of U. S. born. Further analysis of the Individ¬ ual Requests for Repatriation filed by the 525 U. S. born Japanese 18 years of age and older reveals that 375, or 71.4 per cent, claimed to have been partially or wholly educated in Japan. It can thus be asserted that 71.4 per cent of these U. S. born Japanese are Kibei and only 28.6 per cent are Nisei. As would be expected, a high degree of correlation is evident between those U. S. born Japanese who claim dual citizenship and those who claim to have received school training in Japan. Focusing more particularly on certain age groups, it can be shown that of the 23 5 persons in the 20-24 age group, 164, or 69.8 per cent are Kibei. Also of all persons in the 25-29 age group, 70.9 per cent are Kibei.16 13Table 42 shows the dates on which the various lists were transmitted and involved. the number of applicants 14In presenting these data in Table 43, a division is made between those under and over the age of 18 inasmuch as certain information is lacking on the under 18 group. Because these minors were not required to fill out an Individual Request for Repatriation, there is no data on their dual citizenship status or education in Japan, if any. 15This is shown graphically in the population pyramid presented as Figure 29. leTable 44 shows a detailed analysis of the percentage of male and female Nisei, Kibei, and Issei for each of five age groups, and Figure 30 presents these same data in graphic form. REPATRIATION OF 319 JAPANESE APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV TABLE 34.—Summary by Source and Disposition of Persons Who Were Offered Repatriation in June, 1942 Number of persons Source and Disposition Total searched by WCCA. 573 SOURCE 539 34 DISPOSITION Listed persons found to be interned or at addresses outside WCCA jurisdiction. .. . Listed persons and unlisted dependents with whom WCCA communicated. 397 101 54 41 6 Listed persons whose last known address was within evacuated portion of WDC but who were not located by "WCCA. 75 TABLE 35.—Address, Age, and Sex of 54 Repatriates Entrained by WCCA on June 6, 1942 MINORS UNDER AGE OF 18 ADULTS Center, or Other Address Total persons Male Female Male Total persons. 54 18 18 Marysville. Pomona. Portland. Puyallup. Sacramento. 3 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 4 2 1 i 1 10 5 2 1 2 2 1 4 Santa Anita. Stockton. Tanforan. Turlock. Colorado River. Arequipa Sanatorium. Pasco, Washington. 3 15 4 4 1 2 2 4 4 2 1 6 5 Female 1 1 2 i l i 13 i i 320 JAPANESE EVACUATION TABLE 36.—Distribution FROM THE of Names on July WEST 31, 1942 COAST State Department Preliminary Repatriation List Found in WCCA Master Index File Number of persons Distribution of Names Found Total names teletyped to War Department, together with current 778 Residents of Assembly Centers. 407 11 12 29 35 25 202 7 50 36 Residents of Relocation Centers. 291 90 27 120 54 At private addresses in unevacuated portions of WDC. 40 At private addresses outside WDC. 40 TABLE 37.—Distribution of Names on July 31, 1942 State Department Preliminary Repatriation List not Found in WCCA Master Index File Distribution of Names not Found Number of persons 2,025 52 399 487 993 39 23 32 REPATRIATION OF 321 JAPANESE TABLE 38.—Distribution of Names Under WCCA Responsibility on August 19, 1942 State Department List Distribution Number of persons Total persons from whom WCCA was responsible for obtaining a decision. 352 Residents of Assembly and Relocation Centers. Originally listed at Centers. Added by special permission of State Department. Originally listed at internment enclosures but found paroled to Centers ... Internees at Angel Island, Sharp’s Park, and U. S. I. S., Los Angeles. Listed at former private addresses within evacuated portion of WDC but not found indexed in WCCA Master File. 299 275 20 4 22 31 TABLE 39.—Disposition of Names Under WCCA Responsibility August 19, 1942 State Department List on Number of persons Disposition Total persons from whom WCCA was responsible for obtaining a 352 334 199 135 2 16 TABLE 40.—Type of Form Letter Sent to Residents of Assembly and Relocation Centers in October, 1942 PERSONS Form Letter Total persons. WCCA Form R-106. Sent to persons who had formerly submitted Individual Requests for Repatriation. . WCCA Form R-107. Sent to immediate family of listed persons. WCCA Form R-108. Sent to other family group members who had registered for evacuation with immediate family (i. e., non-dependent children, aunts, uncles, in-laws, cousins, etc.). ♦From WRA List-I received October 21, 1942. Total Photostat list Supplement* 2,744 2,690 54 112 87 25 1,994 1,973 21 638 630 8 322 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST REPATRIATION TABLE List No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 OF 323 JAPANESE 42.—Lists of Japanese Requesting Repatriation Transmitted by Wartime Civil Control Administration Date transmitted 1942 7-31 7-31 7-31 7-31 8-2 8-2 8-2 8-2 8-5 8-5 8-5 8-5 8-6 8-6 8-6 8-6 8-6 8-6 8-13 8-13 8-13 9-12 10-21 Total individuals Total signed requests* Total. 2,772 2,086 Fresno. Merced. Pomona. Portland. Stockton. Tanforan. Tulare. Pomona. Tanforan. Tule Lake. Turlock. Puyallup. Manzanar. Gila River. Colorado River. Santa Anita. Manzanar. Miscellaneous. Miscellaneous. Gila River. Colorado River. Miscellaneous. Miscellaneous. 43 79 77 71 130 61 170 117 128 110 182 309 237 24 170 299 97 15 198 44 79 105 27 36 69 65 55 85 50 119 79 102 98 126 244 189 14 119 220 85 10 152 35 54 67 13 Center ♦Exclusive of persons under age of 18 and interned family members whose names appeared only on Family Summary Sheets. M o < PQ H 149 171 203 123 2,126 0-4. 5-9. 10-14. 15-17. Total 18 and over. 54 1,601 363 162 lO'OOONiOTfO"t^,NO 1,507 149 171 203 123 co CO 00 70 93 101 62 54 1,601 320 C*■< sO 808 646 939 aoONH OO *H 326 Japan Dual CN On rt< 00 GO lO CO th Female U. S. XT) 00 v© *h 00 •<* lOvOOvCO Male 96 Female 127 Female 127 ] tr) 248 248 Male FROM cc V© CO • THE WEST OHCOPOHf^HH . . . fOH»ONH ... (NtNONvH(N. rO •<* tH . (SHOOHHH. cs cs . vH cs (N (N (N VH T-t . . . . .... • • tH . . . . MO'»OOCS'O»O^00lOH lOcooOTfTHt^r^rHrot^co TH j£ s co.Jj p‘o ONCO-^COCCOCCNVOI^CNIO S'* **U. S. born Japanese with no education in Japan are here termed "Nisei”, and those partially or entirely educated in Japan are termed “Kibei”. data available on place of education of those under 18 years of age. f Nisei EDUCATION, IF U. S. BORN** EVACUATION 18-19. 20-24. 25-29. 30-34. 35-39. 40-44. 45-49. 50-54. 55-59. 60-64. 65 and over. 646 W 2,772 Both sexes < Total all ages. CO CITIZENSHIP* *c3 s Total under 18. K w TOTAL BY SEX U Age Group JAPANESE 96 19, 1942 w £ O' H P4 pqix Repatriation as of October 324 COAST I l/> T* CN. . o REPATRIATION OF 325 JAPANESE AGE, BY SEX AND NATIVITY, OF 2,772 JAPANESE REQUESTING REPATRIATION (SOURCE : TABLE 43) AGE I 1 I 1 I 1 I 1 240 220 200 180 I ' I 160 140 120 100 80 60 U S.BORN 40 20 0 20 40 60 JAPANESE BORN Figure 29 80 100 326 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST REPATRIATION OF 327 JAPANESE NISEI, KIBEI AND ISSEI JAPANESE 18 TO 39 YEARS OF AGE REQUESTING REPATRIATION PERCENTAGE BY CLASS AND SEX OF TOTAL IN EACH AGE GROUP TABLE 44-) PERCENTAGE OF EACH AGE GROUP (^SOURCE M 18 - F M 19 20 NISEI F - M 24 25 I - F M 29 30 KIBEI Figure 30 F M 34 35 u EES ISSEI - CHAPTER XXV Public Relations Summary Few public relations problems materialized during the course of the pro¬ gram. This was the case because such problems were kept to a minimum. Early recognition of the causes from which difficulties of this character might arise led to the establishment of a Public Relations Division in Wartime Civil Control Administration as one of its first Divisions. All public relations activities con¬ cerning civil control functions were governed by Wartime Civil Control Admin¬ istration. There were two basic policies which governed activities in this field through¬ out the program. The first was the policy of complete frankness. This required that all news releases be confined to factual statements only. The second was a policy of cooperation with press and radio. This required simply that (a) rep¬ resentatives of press and radio be kept fully advised of the background of the program in advance of publication, and (b) that they be asked to publish only that factual information which was necessary to the successful accomplishment of the program. To state it another way, it meant that press and radio should not be called upon to fill their columns and broadcasts with unimportant or "manufactured” information. It also involved permitting duly accredited mem¬ bers of the press and radio free access to all phases of evacuation operations. Appreciating the important position of press and radio in dissemination of accurate information about the evacuation, the Commanding General, as early as March 27, 1942, spoke to a large gathering of news men at the San Francisco Press Club. He explained, "off the record,” the military necessity for the evacu¬ ation, and the program to be followed. During the week of March 15, 1942, the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, spoke "off the record” to gatherings of newspaper publishers, editorial executives, and representatives of radio and wire services. Meetings of this character were arranged at Los Angeles, San Francisco, Portland, and Seattle. The first of these "off the record” appearances occurred at Los Angeles. The comment of the Chairman, Committee on Public Information, California State Council of Defense, in a communication to that organization of April 15, 1942. is quoted here because it is illustrative of how the basic policies worked. "Through the Wartime Civil Control Administration, * * * the Chairman of your Committee on Public Information arranged * * * meetings with the press for the un¬ folding of the entire plan of Japanese evacuation as background material for the handling of the news as it broke, * * *. Rumors were promptly stifled with facts; a mutuality of confidence and trust between the military and the press worked beau¬ tifully and that relationship—so important to civilian spirit—seems well on its way to continue through this history-making migration.” 328 PUBLIC RELATIONS 329 SUMMARY WCCA NEWS RELEASES CONCERNING EVACUATION AND ALIEN CONTROL: MARCH-NOVEMBER. 1942 MARCH APRIL MAT JUNE JULY AUGUST SCPTCMKR OCTOBER NCVtUWtR Figure 31 MAGAZINE ARTICLES AND WCCA NEWS RELEASES CONCERNING EVACUATION AND ALIEN CONTROL: FEBRUARY-NOVEMBER, 1942 30 43 40 35 30 30 IS WESTERN DEFENSE COWMANO *N0 FOORTN MM WARTIME OWL «NT*OL AOMWfcTAAUCW Figure 32 330 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST MAGAZINE ARTICLES AND CIRCULATION CONCERNING EVACUATION AND ALIEN CONTROL: FEBRUARY-NOVEMBER. 1942 FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL MAY JUNE JULY AUGUST SEPTEMBER OCTOBER NOVEMBER WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND ANO FOURTH ARMY WARTIME Cm. COWTROl ADMINISTRATOR Figure 33 PUBLIC RELATIONS 331 SUMMARY The basic policy outlined above controlled the continuous relationship with the press. Confident that the Commanding General was fully appreciative of the position of the public, the press, wire services, and radio went to unusual lengths in cooperating. This relationship resulted in an unusual presentation of facts to the public. Figures 31, 32 and 33 are illustrative of the ratio between public information releases and the publication of factual accounts concerning evacu¬ ation. In Figure 3 3 some idea of the circulation is given. Two distinct types of information were presented. The first was that to the wire services, the newspapers and the radio. These releases were entirely factual. Recognizing that the public knowledge of events as they transpired was dependent upon the radio and press, great care was exercised in the preparation of these releases. No attempt was made to control news as it was recognized that a truthful presentation of events was the most honest control. With this in mind, each statement issued was edited to the point of stark clarity. Quotations were carefully considered and were solely informative. As the result of the printing of factual news by the newspapers of the country, there developed a sustained interest in the historical and featured phases of the evacuation. For this, a second type of news service was developed. Maga¬ zines of a wide variety of interest and circulation were serviced upon request with factual and statistical data as well as features. As public interest diminished, news releases were shortened to terse state¬ ments reflecting the actual news value of the event recorded. This diminishing news interest, by newspapers, resulted in a partial control of the sustained pub¬ lic interest exhibited by the magazines. A study of the above-mentioned Figures will show that this method of handling news releases shortened public discussion on the evacuation. There was never an attempt to develop news, but only to present actual happenings at their news value. The charts reflect this practice by showing the relationship between sustained public interest and news releases. During the actual evacuation operations magazines of large circulation which have "spot news” interest in outstanding events carried featured articles relating to the evacuation. The result was that public discussion of the event reached a circulation of more than nine million magazine readers during the month of March. As the "spot news” value diminished, magazines with smaller specialized circulation picked up the feature angles of the evacuation for pre¬ sentation to their readers. In consequence of this trend the number of national articles increased while the circulation diminished. Prime interest shown by the magazines in the evacuation was in the first stage—that of actual evacuation to Assembly Centers, though naturally because of the interim between observation and publication, a large number of magazine and periodical articles continued to be issued months after the actual evacuation was completed. During the second stage of transfer to War Relocation Author¬ ity Centers both news stories and magazine circulation diminished. By that time public knowledge of the event had destroyed much of the novelty. 332 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST PUBLIC RELATIONS DIVISION ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS Figure 34 PUBLIC RELATIONS SUMMARY 333 However, there is a continuing interest in the evacuation evidenced by cer¬ tain groups that have reported their intention of further studying the historical, sociological and economic phases of the evacuation. The organization chart of the Public Relations Division of Wartime Civil Control Administration best illustrates the method employed in dealing with the requirements in the field. (See figure 34). Most important to the operation was the establishment of a press relations representative at each assembly center. In this manner, all accredited press and radio representatives, as well as writers, were accorded an opportunity for personal service. Whenever a visiting writer or reporter called at a Center he was re¬ ferred at once to the press relations representative for that Center. He was furnished with whatever information he required and arrangements were made for escorting him through the entire facility. The press relations representative at each Assembly Center was normally an active or former editorial executive or newspaper publisher. As a professional news executive he was thus thoroughly familiar with all aspects of his assignment. The basic policy which governed his relations was the “no censorship” rule. Recognized representatives of publications and of the radio could visit any Assembly Center, interview evacuees, take photographs, and ask for any in¬ formation desired. A full explanation of the background of evacuation and the military necessity therefor was given each visitor by the press relations representa¬ tive. Stressed by him always was the necessity for a completely factual report by every writer. The point was made that any other action on the part of a writer might have serious effect upon the treatment of our own nationals in the hands of the enemy. With but a few exceptions there was no misinterpretation re¬ ported in any newspaper, periodical, or domestic broadcast. It must be here recorded that the cooperation, assistance, and sympathetic understanding of press and radio was outstanding. Without it, the evacuation problem would have been more complex, for the operation was dependent in no small degree upon the immediate and complete dissemination of factual data and instructions to all those affected. CHAPTER XXVI Inspection of Wartime Civil Control Administration Operations One of the important considerations in providing for adequate direction of the evacuation program was the establishment of a means to insure that the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration was currently and accurately advised on all aspects. Accordingly, plans were developed and executed for a constant and reliable field inspection service. The Inspection Branch of the Wartime Civil Control Administration was organized March 29, 1942. Its mission was to keep the Director informed of the progress of all operations of the Wartime Civil Control Administration to determine whether these operations conformed to established policies and direc¬ tives. The Chief of the Branch reported to the Director and was responsible to him. Three officers of field grade were selected to perform these functions. One was assigned as Chief of the Branch and two as field inspectors. Careful con¬ sideration was given to their backgrounds and experience in the establishment, operation and supply of Army Field Training and Civilian Conservation Corps camps. On April 1, 1942, after receipt of instructions on the evacuation plan, the field inspectors were dispatched to observe evacuation activities already in process. Close liaison was maintained by telephone with Wartime Civil Control Administration as they visited information centers. Control Stations, and Assembly and Reception Centers. The information reported was evaluated and transmitted to the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, and by him to the interested division heads with appropriate instructions for institution of any necessary corrective action. These reports, where applicable to functions of the several Sectors of Western Defense Command were also furnished to the liaison officers from each Sector. Where departures from the prescribed operating procedures were noted, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs issued appropriate directives in the name of the Commanding General for corrective action on the part of the Sectors concerned. Where pertinent, the Director also furnished copies of inspection reports with requests for remedial action to the liaison section of the participating Federal Civilian Agencies. Inspection forms and check lists were developed as guides to insure that all phases of the program were fully inspected. Field inspectors were encouraged to maintain a continuous vigilance for trends that might indicate a source of future trouble. They were instructed to make free use of telephone, teletype, telegraph and airmail facilities in reporting conditions so that any required corrective action could be taken immediately. The establishment of a thorough inspection service proved to be of in334 INSPECTION OF 335 OPERATIONS estimable value. It insured uniformity, prevented abuses of discretion and tended to check the circulation of unfounded rumors. It has been noted that Wartime Civil Control Administration Service Centers were established in 48 communities along the West Coast to assist evacuees in accomplishing a voluntary relocation plan. Each Service Center was the chief source of information available to the evacuee in the community it served. An important function was involved. Accordingly, field inspection was immediately extended to these Centers. At each of these Service Centers information was gathered on all aspects of its operations. Of course the demeanor, attitude, efficiency and attendance of the staff was carefully observed. Uniformly reported as well were the location of the Service Center in relation to Control Stations; its accessibility to the people affected; the means employed to make known its location; the hours and days of the week each Service Center remained open; the presence of an inter¬ preter; the status of liaison with Sector representatives, including the Sector Provost Marshal. At each Civil Control Station an inspection was made of the following: Its location, its adequacy to service the area being evacuated, the number of persons being processed, and the density of traffic within the area. Also care¬ fully observed were the efficiency of Control Station personnel and equipment; internal coordination and dissemination of information; liaison between the Sector Transportation Officer and Control Station Manager regarding time of departure of trains and buses; the adequacy of the period allotted for assignment of evacuees to transportation; sufficiency of time for processing; efficiency of loading; liaison with the Manager of Assembly Center at point of destination, and the appropriateness of time of arrival at Assembly Center. While at Control Stations, the field inspectors investigated the adequacy of medical aid and social welfare services during processing and while en route. They also reported on the adequacy of the arrangements being made for trans¬ porting evacuees from each assembly point to point of entrainment. Uniformly observed also were: the disposition of private automobiles used by evacuees to reach the assembly point, the adequacy of Control Station records, the precau¬ tions taken to insure that family groups remained intact, the provisions made for transportation and storage of personal property of evacuees, and the arrange¬ ments for medical and hospital service for those persons too ill to travel and whose evacuation was therefore deferred. Assembly Center inspection was constant and thorough. Inspectors were accorded full freedom of action and were directed to spare no effort in devel¬ oping an adequate report. The attitude, efficiency and demeanor of administra¬ tive and interior security personnel was the subject of careful observation. Evacuees were freely interviewed and their complaints investigated. Any de¬ partures in operative and administrative practices from those prescribed by the Wartime Civil Control Administration manual were noted, and corrective measures followed. They inspected the warehouses for efficiency, security, fire protection, records. Quantities of stock on hand were reported. Special atten¬ tion was given to the promptness with which supplies and rations were being 336 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM received and distributed at each Center. each mess hall and kitchen. THE WEST COAST A detailed inspection was made of The prescribed inspection guide required the answering of eighty-five separate questions covering management, operation, the quality, variety, and sufficiency of food, sanitation, cost, waste, and special foods for the infants, ill and aged. A similar inspection was made of each infirmary. At infirmaries and hospitals, 107 special questions were posed. These covered'organization, personnel, records, ward rules, the treatment of patients, the method of handling alcohol, narcotics and poisons, and the ability and helpfulness of doctors, dentists, nurses, dietitians and cooperating Public Health representatives. Particular attention was directed to special diets for the sick, and fire protection. Any complaints made by patients were investigated. The general condition of each Assembly Center was thoroughly studied. Questions uniformly answered by inspectors in their reports were on the sub¬ jects of health and sanitation, water supply, sewerage, baths, latrines, laundries, lighting, heating and ventilation, condition of quarters, clothing and bedding. Welfare conditions were investigated, including facilities for recreation, educaton and religious worship, postal facilities and camp stores. Inspectors mingled freely with evacuees and transmitted to proper authorities any complaint against the civilian staff or the interior or exterior police. When Relocation Centers were ready for occupancy, field inspectors ac¬ companied movements of evacuees from the Assembly Centers of origin to the Relocation Centers of destination. They were present to observe the adequacy of entrainment arrangements and to see that facilities were adequate for health and welfare. They also reported on the propriety of arrangements for each movement, including the question whether dining car and rail service were satisfactory. Numerous special investigations were made on complaints received at Head¬ quarters, Western Defense Command, and the War Department as well as by the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration. Most of these complaints were from interested citizens and observers. In a majority of instances they were presented in utmost good faith but were based on misinformation and rumor. The inspection service made a valuable contribution in this regard for these inquiries were fully and satisfactorily answered. PART VIII STATISTICAL AND FISCAL SUMMARY CHAPTER XXVII Fiscal Summary Introduction. The scope of the West Coast evacuation, its urgency as a military necessity, the number of agencies involved, and the geographical size of the area in which simultaneous operations were being carried out, presented an unusual problem in finance. Executive Order of the President No. 9066 authorized and directed that all Executive Departments, independent establishments and other federal agen¬ cies, were to assist the Secretary of War, or the Military Commander, in carry¬ ing out this Executive Order, "including the furnishing of medical aid, hospital¬ ization, food, clothing, transportation, use of land, shelter, and other supplies, equipment, utilities, facilities, and services.” As it was the decision of the Com¬ manding General to utilize to the fullest extent various federal agencies in accomplishing evacuation, it was necessary to devise some flexible method of promptly financing the various agencies in order that their operations might not be impaired. On March 10, 1942, the division of Central Administrative Services, Office for Emergency Management, offered to perform specific services in office man¬ agement, personnel management, and fiscal processes for the Wartime Civil Control Administration, and this offer was accepted on March 12, 1942. In the initial plan for the organization of the Wartime Civil Control Administra¬ tion, it was contemplated that all fiscal affairs would be handled by the Office for Emergency Management, under the direction of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. It soon became apparent, however, that this plan was imprac¬ ticable because of differences in the fiscal procedures of the various agencies, and the military problems of supply and finance. This led to the establishment of a Fiscal Branch in the Wartime Civil Control Administration, charged with the duties of providing fiscal procedures and liaison between the Army and the various co-operating civilian agencies. In order for the newly established Fiscal Branch to operate efficiently contin¬ uing liaison between the Finance Officer, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, as a member of the Commanding General’s special staff, and the Wartime Civil Control Administration, was needed. This resulted in a request upon the Finance. Officer, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, to detail an officer of the Finance Department to effect the necessary liaison. An experienced Finance Officer of field grade was accordingly detailed by the Finance Officer to fulfill the fiscal requisites of Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬ tration. Civilian personnel were hired and trained to carry out the functions of the Fiscal Branch, and a set of fiscal records supplementary and comple¬ mentary to those of the Finance Officer, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, was devised. Vouchers originating from Army sources and sent to the Wartime Civil Control Administration for action were processed and passed for payment by the Fiscal Branch. 339 Copies of paid vouchers emanating 340 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST from the several co-operating civilian agencies were received and recorded for purposes of fiscal control and record. A manual, titled "Fiscal Guide,” was prepared and distributed to those concerned, setting forth the financial pro¬ cedure to be followed by agencies performing services for the Wartime Civil Control Administration. Fiscal Operations by Army Agencies. A study of the proposed finan¬ cial plan revealed that no funds had been distinctly set aside to cover evacuation costs. Broad power existed to use and, if necessary, to over-obligate any funds held in an allotted status by the Commanding General. It was ascertained that the only allotted status funds available were, in general, limited to use for tacti¬ cal field operations and therefore were obviously unsuited for the evacuation program. This situation was brought to the attention of the War Department and the recommendation made that allotments be issued to cover general pur¬ poses which could be forseen in the tremendous task of evacuating over 115,000 people. Expenses were anticipated to fall in the general classification of (1) travel, (2) subsistence, (3) clothing, (4) communications, (5) shelter and utilities, (6) transportation, (7) pay of civilian employees, (8) pay for work done by evacuees, (9) contingencies, (10) incidental expenses, (11) medical and hos¬ pital expenses, (12) regular supplies, (13) cemeterial expenses, (14) equipment, and (15) printing and binding. As the projected evacuation operations had no precedent, no definite financial requirements could be associated with any of the general purposes. It was hoped that token allotments would be made in order to establish procurement authority and appropriation identification, and that such token allotments would be replenished as obligations were incurred. The foregoing recommendations met favorable reception in the War Depart¬ ment shortly after the passage by Congress of the Fifth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942. This Act permitted consolidation of several Quartermaster Corps appropriations into one general appropriation known as Quartermaster Service Army. This consolidation resulted in reducing the number of separate general fund purposes set forth above by half. Subsequent combination of Quartermaster Service, Army, and Supplies and Transportation, Army, tended to further simplify use of Army funds. Upon passage of the Military Appropriation Act of 1943 the transfer to open allotments of travel, transportation, commutation of subsistence and ceme¬ terial expenses was authorized. This not only facilitated use of those funds but provided more flexibility and less restrictions on funds in an allotted status. Likewise, a definite contribution toward simplification of fiscal accounting was provided when the War Department allotted the Commanding General $1,500,000, under the general authority FDGA-13, to be used for all purposes of civil control, in lieu of the five different allotments previously utilized. The schedule of funds allotted to November 30, 1942, by the War Department to FISCAL 341 SUMMARY the Commanding General, for direct obligation or sub-allotment and disburse¬ ment through Army channels is shown below: COMMANDING GENERAL’S ACCOUNT As of November 30, 1942 Total Obligated Total Available for Obligation or Return Supplies and Transp., Army QM D-l. . $4,411,199.81 Finance Service, Army FDGA-13.... 1,251,308.73 Signal Service, Army SC 6121. 105,058.59 148,140.82 Med. and Hosp. Dept., Army MD 1612 Engineer Service, Army Eng. 30109... 41,297.03 $4,479,350.69 436,145.61 105,058.59 148,140.82 41,297.03 $ 68,150.88 815,163.12 .00 .00 .00 $5,957,004.98 $5,209,992.74 $747,012.24 Amount Allotted Finance Officer, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. Funds allotted by the War Department for use by the Commanding General in the evacuation program were disbursed through or suballotted by the Finance Office, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. Reimbursements made to Federal Agencies as detailed later in this report were: Federal Reserve Bank—All operating expenses and services.$310,215.90 Federal Reserve Bank—Automobile Purchases . 258,842.35 Farm Security Administration—All operating expenses and services. 226,857-53 $795,915.78 Other disbursements through Army channels were: FINANCE OFFICER WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY As of November 30, 1942 C. G. 9th Corps Area (9th S. C.).$ 111,522.26 C. G. So. Calif. Sector . 22,921.62 C. G. No. Calif. Sector . 112,396.63 C. G. Northwest Sector . 11,506.64 C. G. Alaska Defense Command . 119.05 C. G. So. Land Frontier . 3,126.77 C. O. Calif. QM. Depot, Oakland . 3,198,261.33 C. O. QM. Depot, Seattle . 356,806.72 C. O. QM. Depot, Kansas City . 11,470.94 C. O. QM. Depot, Memphis . 55,833.46 QM. W. D. C. and 4A .. 248,127.34 Med. Supply Off., S. F. Gen. Depot. 147,961.82 Sig. Off. Forward Ech. 9 th S. C. 19,155.11 Sig. Off. 9th Serv. Com. 1,212.48 S. F. Signal Procurement District . 91,104.28 Engineer Service, Army . 35,858.99 $4,427,3 85.44 342 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST The obligated funds reported in the Commanding General’s Account above, viz., $5,209,992.74, was the source from which these accounts were paid. The difference, viz., $13,308.48, was from open allotment accounts. Fiscal Operations of Civilian Agencies. Throughout the course of the program of civil control and evacuation, several civilian government agencies performed assigned functions in cooperation with the Western Defense Com¬ mand and Fourth Army. Not all of these agencies required financing of their respective functions in the program. In the preliminary days of the program, the cooperating civilian agencies (referred to simply as agencies hereafter) used their own funds, and looked to the Commanding General, for reimbursement. The reimbursement procedure was in accordance with provisions of Army Regulations 35-880 and General Accounting Office Regulations No. 78-Revised. Each reimbursement voucher submitted required detail of an exacting nature, virtually a verbatim reproduc¬ tion of the data carried on the original disbursing voucher of the agency. Such detail was necessary in order that the purpose of the expenditure could be reconciled with the serial, purpose, and appropriation numbers used in Army accounting. These constitute the necessary allotment number that must be determined and stated on reimbursement vouchers prior to settlement by the designated Army disbursing officer. Alphabetical and numerical indices were evolved to enable inexperienced personnel to reconcile the supplies and services stated on the reimbursement voucher with the applicable allotment number in the Army Accounting system. Upon completion of the classification into Army accounting terms, the reimbursement vouchers were ready for recording and payment from funds available to Commanding General. The recording of these vouchers required a more detailed system of accounting than was necessary in Army fiscal accounting. It was necessary for Wartime Civil Control Admin¬ istration to establish fund control ledgers for each allotment number available to the Commanding General. Ledgers were also required for each agency. It developed, during the course of the evacuation, that the "1080” process1 of reimbursing agencies as outlined in Army Regulations 35-880 was cumber¬ some and not entirely suitable. To remedy this, the system of making advance or anticipatory transfers of Army funds in Washington, D. C., to the partici¬ pating agencies was put into effect. The agencies were required to submit a quarterly estimate of their needs to Wartime Civil Control Administration. Upon approval, a request for funds based on these estimates was teletyped to Commanding General, Service of Supply, Washington, D. C. This procedure was used to finance all agencies except the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, and the Farm Security Administration. Advance transfers of Army funds in Washington, D. C., to agencies, and their respective obligations, expenditures and unobligated balances on November 30, 1942, were as follows: ^ee Glossary (W. D. Form 1080). FISCAL 343 SUMMARY WASHINGTON TRANSFERS As of November 30, 1942 Total Total Total Unobligated Allotted Obligated Expended Balance OEM (WCCA—All Administrative Costs) .. $1,746,436.00 $ 986,162.26 $ 830,584.52 $ 760,273.74 617,232.00 532,714.93 436,226.85 84,517.07 5,398,582.00 3,788,231.04 3,054,925.46 1,610,350.96 826,603.30 684,578.08 516,320.89 142,025.22 $8,588,853.30 $5,991,686.31 $4,838,057.72 $2,597,166.99 Federal Security Agency Federal Works Agency— WPA Working Fund. Revolving Fund: Allotted $250,000.00 Collections 576,603.30 Agencies financed by "1034”2 and "1080” processes from funds allotted by the War Department to the Commanding General, and included in the Com¬ manding General’s Account, were the Federal Reserve Bank, and the operating expenses of the Farm Security Administration. The details of these accounts are shown under the respective agencies. Central ment. Administrative Services—Office for Emergency Manage¬ The Office for Emergency Management was originally charged solely with the duty of servicing the operating needs of Wartime Civil Control Ad¬ ministration. This involved the hire and pay of personnel, procurement and payment of supplies and services, travel of individuals, and many other services. It was found that because of the speed with which Office for Emergency Management acted and the flexibility of its organization, it was advantageous to utilize this agency for performing various emergency projects. In the early stages of evacuation, no funds were readily available to finance the activities required of Office for Emergency Management. As an emergency measure there was advanced to this agency, by Washington transfer, the lump sum of $3 50,000.00 from the Appropriation Pay of the Army, 1942. This amount was later augmented from Army funds in an allotted status by transfers in amounts of $371,436.00, $75,000.00 and $950,000.00 for a total of $1,746,436.00. Control of funds at the outset of the program was maintained through a monthly reporting method. The Office for Emergency Management furnished the Wartime Civil Control Administration a copy of its monthly allotment ledger. Control This was reconciled with the control ledger kept by Wartime Civil Administration. When the substantial sum of $950,000.00 was advanced, a system requiring the Office for Emergency Management to submit all prospective purchases of supplies and services for approval prior to obligation and payment was put into effect. Under this system a budget control showing all obligations and expenditures was kept by Wartime Civil Control Ad¬ ministration. 2See Glossary (W. D. Form 1034). 344 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST The record of expenditures by this agency on November 30, 1942, was as follows: OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT EXPENDITURES As of November 30, 1942 Payrolls .$548,736.86 Supplies and Equipment . 102,921.15 Printing . 78,212.26 Transportation of Things . All Other (Contractual) Travel 3,393.40 . 23,858.44 . Communications 17,908.99 . 26,114.41 Rents, Utilities, etc. 29,439.01 $830,584.52 Federal Security Agency. This agency, through its component agencies, United States Public Health Service, Social Security Board, Defense Health and Welfare Service and United States Employment Service, was, by a confirming letter from the Commanding General under date of March 31, 1942, assigned * the task of: Providing services of civilian physicians and nurses; hospitalization and ambulance service; aid and miscellaneous assistance expenditures at Control Stations, Reception Centers and in the field; social service involving direct aid; and operation of Control Stations. Total funds advanced to finance operations of Federal Security Agency were $617,232.00. Control of these funds was maintained by Wartime Civil Control Administration by means of review of copies of paid vouchers submitted for that purpose. A set of control books was kept by Wartime Civil Control Admin¬ istration as a further check. The record of expenditures by this agency on November 3 0, 1942, was as follows: FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY ACCOUNT EXPENDITURES As of November 30, 1942 Payrolls .$148,921.63 Supplies and Equipment. 227,170.52 Clothing . Transportation of Things 3,021.40 . 17775.75 . 24,227.91 All Others Travel 7,750.96 . Communications . 6,072.92 Rents, Utilities, etc. 1,285.76 $436,226.85 Federal Works Agency — Work Projects Administration. This agency was requested, by a confirming letter from the Commanding General, dated March 30, 1942, to assume responsibility for providing personnel to man¬ age and operate Assembly and Reception Centers established within the Western Defense Command area. It was also requested to make its fiscal and procure¬ ment facilities available. Due to the absence of suitable fiscal arrangements at the outset of the evacu- FISCAL 345 SUMMARY ation it was necessary to have Work Projects Administration pay expenses in¬ curred from its own funds and to be reimbursed later by use of Standard Form 1080, providing for inter-agency adjustments. Upon presentation of its first budget, covering anticipated expenses of early months of operation, and after proper approval, a request was made upon the War Department to transfer the necessary funds to Federal Works Agency-Work Projects Administration for obligation and disbursement through its normal channels. Subsequent advances of funds were handled in the same manner. Funds advanced to Federal Works Agency-Work Projects Administration for management and operation of Reception and Assembly Centers totaled $5,398,582.00, of which, on November 30, 1942, there was an unobligated balance of $1,367,711.31. The balance remaining after all outstanding accounts are processed and paid will be somewhat less. Control and supervision of funds advanced to this agency were maintained by the requirement that it supply Wartime Civil Control Administration with copies of all paid vouchers immediately upon payment thereof. These copies of vouchers were reviewed and, if payments evidenced thereby were questionable or irrelevant to the purpose for which funds were advanced, were either (1) referred back to the agency for clarification, or (2) if necessary, a request was submitted for reimbursement of War Department funds. There was advanced the further sum of $250,000.00 to operate Center stores. The Center store funds were put into a revolving fund with provisions that, upon closing of Centers, the funds advanced would be deposited back to the appropriation from which advanced, and, that the operating profit would be deposited to Miscellaneous Receipts, Treasury of the United States. On November 30, 1942, the records in the office of Wartime Civil Control Admin¬ istration disclosed the following: WORK PROJECTS ADMINISTRATION CENTER STORE REVOLVING FUND Total funds advanced .$250,000.00 Received from sales . 576,603.30 Total funds .$826,603.30 Less Obligations. 684,578.08 Book profits .$142,025.22 Expenditures from the working fund account by objective classification e: WORK PROJECTS ADMINISTRATION ACCOUNT EXPENDITURES As of November 30, 1942 Payrolls .$1,735,211.32 Supplies and Equipment Clothing . 354,762.06 . 156,158.21 Transportation of Things . All Others Travel . . Communications 40,506.99 314,263.82 72,961.04 . 6,989.00 Rents, Construction, etc. 374,073.02 $3,054,925.46 346 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Expenditures from the working fund account, by individual Assembly Cen¬ ters were: WORK PROJECTS ADMINISTRATION ACCOUNT EXPENDITURES BY ASSEMBLY CENTER As of November 30, 1942 Office No. Location 50 Central Office .$ 257,583.26 1 Marysville . 2 Sacramento 37,119.27 3 Stockton 4 Turlock . 98,171.87 5 Merced . 188,862.77 . . 56,660.93 152,524.30 6 Pinedale . 98,135.68 7 Fresno . 221,268.70 8 Tulare . 9 Tanforan 10 Salinas 16 Santa . 144,671.80 260,466.48 . Anita 50,276.17 . 663,592.00 . 225,990.26 . 187,144.17 17 Pomona 18 Manzanar 21 Mayer (Arizona) 22 Cave Creek 26 Puyallup 27 Toppenish (Washington) 31 Portland . (Arizona) 6,948.42 . 4,022.05 . 210,993.61 (Oregon) . 6,111.20 . 184,382.52 $3,054,925.46 Federal Reserve Bank, as Fiscal Agent of the United States. To the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco was delegated the task of evacuee prop¬ erty protection. By letters of the Commanding General dated March 11 and April 5, 1942, and telegrams from the Secretary of the Treasury of March 7 and 11 1942, prior informal arrangements were confirmed. These delegations of authority provided that the Bank would be reimbursed for all necessary and proper expenses incurred in carrying out its assigned duties. In all instances the Bank paid all expenses from its own funds. Upon sub¬ mission of receipted copies of bills or other satisfactory evidences of disburse¬ ment, reimbursement from Army funds followed. The use of Standard Form 1034, public voucher for purchases and services other than personal, was the method employed. There were 1,512 cars purchased by the Bank on behalf of the Government at a total cost (purchase price of vehicles only) of $258,842.35. penses incurred for all other purposes aggregated $310,215.90. Total ex¬ FISCAL 347 SUMMARY The record of expenditures by this agency on November 30, 1942, was as follows: FEDERAL RESERVE BANK ACCOUNT EXPENDITURES As of November 30, 1942 Payrolls .$208,156.37 Supplies and Equipment . Transportation of Things . All Others Travel 3,953.29 22,631.44 . 9,913.26 . 15,928.55 Communications . 7,659.57 Rents, Utilities, etc. 41,973.42 Total Administrative Expenditures .$310,215.90 Expenditures to purchasing of Evacuees’ Automobiles.. 258,842.35 $569,058.25 Department of Agriculture—Farm Security letter of March 14, 1942, the Commanding Administration. General authorized the By Farm Security Administration to institute and administer a program to insure that growing crops on farm lands evacuated by Japanese were cared for and har¬ vested, and to assist evacuees in arriving at fair and equitable arrangements with the operators of their properties. To provide funds for loan to substitute operators of evacuated lands and advance transfer, in Washington, D. C., of $1,000,000.00 was made to the Farm Security Administration from Contingent Fund, Chief of Staff, Army, 1942. Later, when this amount was exhausted, an advance transfer of $5,000,- 000.00 was made from the President’s Emergency Fund. The $5,000,000.00 fund was later reduced to $3,984,525.00 by decrease effected in Washington, D. C., thereby leaving a total advanced from both sources of $4,984,525.00. Total loans made under this crop loan program amount to $4,146,036.31. The status of this account on November 30, 1942, was as follows: FARM SECURITY ADMINISTRATION CROP LOAN FUNDS (From Washington Transfers) As of November 30, 1942 Total Allotted Total Total Unobligated Wash. Trans. Obligated Expended Balance Department of Agri¬ culture, Farm Security Agency FD 4127. . $1,000,000.00 $ 992,597.40 $ 992,597.40 $ 7,402.60 President’s Fund . . 3,984,525.00 3,153,438.91 3,153,438.91 831,086.09 $4,984,525.00 $4,146,036.31 $4,146,036.31 $838,488.69 Credited repayments on loans to January 31, 1943, were $1,724,075.21, or 41.6 percent of the total loaned. Up to September 30, 1942, administrative expenses incident to this program, totaling $226,857.53, were paid by use of Standard Form 1034 and by reim- 348 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST bursement on Form 1080 from funds allotted to the Commanding General, as follows: FARM SECURITY ADMINISTRATION ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES (From Commanding General’s Account) As of November 30, 1942 Payrolls .$145,630.51 Supplies and Equipment . 3,634.66 Transportation of Things . 369.61 All Others . 984.45 Travel . 68,491.46 Communications. 7,683.84 Rents, Utilities, etc. 63.00 $226,857.53 Since September 30, 1942, administrative costs have been charged to the funds advanced from President’s Emergency Fund. Wartime Civil Control Administration Consolidated Account. The consolidated statement of administrative and operational expenditures (exclud¬ ing construction, travel and subsistence) made by Wartime Civil Control Administration up to November 30, 1942, is as follows: WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION CONSOLIDATED ACCOUNT As of November 30, 1942 Army Total Total T otal Allotted Obligated Expended .$5,957,004.98 $5,209,992.74 U nobligated Balance $5,209,992.74 $ 747,012.24 (Including Federal Reserve Bank, Farm Security Administration Cleared through Army Disbursing Office) OEM (WCCA Adminis¬ trative Cost) . 1,746,436.00 986,162.26 830,584.52 760,273.74 617,232.00 532,714.93 436,226.85 84,517.07 Working Fund . 5,398,582.00 3,788,231.04 3,054,925.46 1,610,350.96 684,578.08 516,320.89 142,025.22 4,146,036.31* 838,488.69 Federal Security Agency. Federal W orks Agency—WP A Revolving Fund: Allotted $250,000.00 Collections 576,603.30 826,603.30 Department of Agriculture—FSA (Crop Loans) FD 4127 $1,000,000.00 President’s Fund 3,984,525.00 4,984,525.00 4,146,036.31* $19,530,383.28 $ 15,347,71 5.36 $ 14,221,086.77 $4,182,667.92 $4,144,034.31 loam made, 41.4% had been repaid by January 31, 1943. FISCAL Additional Costs. 349 SUMMARY In addition to the expenditures recorded in the books maintained by the Wartime Civil Control Administration, other costs in con¬ nection with the evacuation have been reported as follows: QUARTERMASTER EXPENDITURES QM Property—War Relocation Projects .$2,993,714.84 Transportation—Depots to WCCA Centers . 43,428.49 Tansportation—Centers and Depots to WRA Projects. 153,473.48 Transferring QM Property from Centers to other points. 5,773.88 Transportation—Rations—Depots to Centers . 7,736.23 Transportation—Rations—Depots to Projects . 26,551.31 Rail Transportation—Evacuees to Assembly and Relocation Centers with escort . Freight Shipments (Baggage) 2,281,976.14 . 104,549.94 Evacuee Subsistence enroute . 517,213.73 $6,134,418.04 UNITED STATES ENGINEERS CONSTRUCTION COSTS As of November 30, 1942 ASSEMBLY CENTERS Posted Costs Cave Creek .$ Mayer . Fresno . Marysville Merced 9,974.87 Estimated Cost $ 9,974.87 12,030.13 12,030.13 611,546.00 613,029.00 . 364,889.00 364,889.00 . 583,926.00 601,359.00 Pinedale . 696,341.00 708,498.00 Pomona . 963,744.00 978,514.00 Portland . 235,308.00 350,000.00 514,183.00 514,183.00 Sacramento . 821,682.00 822,966.00 Salinas . 585,967.00 589,967.00 Santa Anita . 2,335,505.00 2,452,154.00 Puyallup . Stockton . Tanforan . Toppenish Tulare Turlock 475,314.00 476,815.00 1,147,216.00 1,147,260.00 . 47,018.00 47,018.00 . 541,690.00 543,160.00 . 468,349.00 469,819.00 $10,414,683.00 $10,701,636.00 Although the cost of constructing Assembly Centers has been included in the cost of evacuation, consideration should be given to the fact that, upon vacancy, each Center was taken over by other Army agencies for use in con¬ nection with troop training and housing. and as service schools. These are now in use for billeting 350 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST RELOCATION PROJECTS Posted Costs Central Utah (Abraham) . . . _$ 3,512,877.00 Estimated Cost $ 3,928,917.00 . _ 8,016,575.00 9,365,203.00 . _ 4,723,089.00 7,559,702.00 . _ Colorado River Gila River 4,091,373.24 4,200,235.81 . _ 5,059,854.00 5,094,700.00 . _ 4,703,347.00 5,003,014.00 Manzanar . _ 3,507,018.00 3,763,646.00 Minidoka . _ 5,199,577.00 5,837,379.00 Granada Heart Mountain Jerome Rohwer . Tule Lake 4,804,121.00 . _ 6,908,236.00 6,925,721.00 $50,522,504.24 $56,482,638.81 No attempt has been made to compile payments made from open allotments covering salaries and travel expenses of military personnel performing duty in connection with the evacuation. Attention is directed to the fact that at the date of this report, all bills had not yet been processed and paid. For that reason all accounts reported herein are subject to additional entries before final fiscal accounting is made. For present purposes, however, the total amount expended by the Army for activities relating to the evacuation program can be summarized as follows: TOTAL COSTS As of November 30, 1942 Federal Reserve Bank—(All evacuee services) .$ 310,215.90 Federal Reserve Bank—Automobile Purchases . 258,842.35 Farm Security Administration—(All evacuee services) 226,857.53 Farm Security Administration—Crop Loan Account . . Office For Emergency Management . Federal Security Agency . Federal Works Agency—Working Fund . 4,146,036.31* 986,162.26 532,714.93 3,788,231.04 Federal Works Agency—Revolving Fund . 684,578.08 Finance Officer, WDC and 4A. 4,427,385.44 Quartermaster 6,134,418.04 . U. S. Engineers—Assembly Centers . 10,701,636.00 U. S. Engineers—Relocation Projects . 56,482,638.81 $88,679,716.69 ’Thu lum will be returned in substantial part. 41.6% was repaid by January 31, 1943. FISCAL 351 SUMMARY It is noted that, after deducting from the above total the estimated salvage values, expected refunds and construction costs, viz., Automobile Salvage 50% .$ Crop Loans 80% . 129,421.17 3,316,829.05 Estimated Interest on Crop Loans . 10,000.00 Equipment from OEM Purchases . 15,000.00 Federal Works Agency—Revolving Fund . 684,578.08 Estimated Profits—FWA Revolving Fund . 142,025.22 QM Property—War Relocation Projects . 2,993,714.84 U. S. Engineers—Assembly Centers . 10,701,63 6.00 U. S. Engineers—Relocation Projects . 56,482,638.81 $74,475,843.17 there remains a net cost of $14,203,873.52. This sum includes the following major phases of the program: General operations costs for the entire period; cost incurred by Wartime Civil Control Administration Service Center offices during the entire period; financial assistance to evacuees who voluntarily migrated from the area before the controlled evacua¬ tion phase of the program; registration and processing costs at Civil Control Stations; storage of evacuee property, and all other aspects of the property pro¬ tection program; hospitalization and medical care of all evacuees from the date of their evacuation; transportation of evacuees and their personal effects from their homes to Assembly Centers; complete care in Assembly Centers, including all food and medical care, nominal payment for work performed, family allowances, and clothes, where necessary; and transportation and meals during the transfer from Assembly to Relocation Centers. The evacuees spent a total of 9,485,202 evacuee-days of residence in Assembly Centers. In addition, it is estimated that 294,000 evacuee-days were spent on trains or other means of transportation from their homes to Assembly Centers and from Assembly to Relocation Centers. The overall net cost of the program as described in the preceding paragraph per evacuee-day in Assembly Centers, en route thereto and therefrom was $1.46. CHAPTER XXVIII Statistical Summary Statistical information, primarily that relating to the Japanese population, was important in every phase of the evacuation program. Various statistics have been presented in earlier chapters of this report. The present chapter sum¬ marizes the evacuee and general population data of the program. It is organized in the following general sections: 1. Data on evacuation movements from Civil Control Stations and other origins to Assembly Centers. 2. Data on population movements during the operation of Assembly Centers. 3. Transfer movements from Assembly to Relocation Centers. 4. General population data from both Census and evacuation program sources. No attempt is made in this report to give a general statistical analysis of the Japanese population of the United States, or to summarize the many spe¬ cial analyses which were made by the Wartime Civil Control Administration in preparing for, and conducting, the evacuation program. The most important single source of information prior to the evacuation was the 1940 Census of Population. Fortunately, the Bureau of the Census had reproduced a duplicate set of punched cards for all Japanese in the United States shortly after the outbreak of war and had prepared certain general tabulations for the use of war agencies. By arrangement with the Bureau of the Census, through the Office of the Provost Marshal General in Washington, the War¬ time Civil Control Administration had the Bureau prepare several special tab¬ ulations of these Japanese census cards. These special tabulations, when ana¬ lyzed, became the basis for the general evacuation and relocation plan. Though nearly two years old at the beginning of the evacuation program, the Census data were found to be sufficiently representative of the situation as of March, 1942, to be used for general planning purposes. The aggregate total Japanese population of states, the larger cities and groups of counties were used for this purpose. Where more accurate estimates were necessary, for example, in planning the movement under a specific Civilian Exclusion Order, the Census data were often modified by data from other sources, including recent partial surveys by Military Intelligence, Western Defense Command. Immediately on the establishment of the Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬ tration, steps were taken to insure that adequate reports would come to the Wartime Civil Control Administration, from each step in the evacuation opera¬ tions. as However, great care was exercised to make operating reports as simple practicable, in order not to impose too heavy a on the staffs of the military and civilian agencies. 352 clerical responsibility The collection and compi- STATISTICAL 353 SUMMARY lation of information was centrally supervised. The Wartime Civil Control Administration exercised a control review function on all statistical forms and procedures. Among the various types of data which came to the Wartime Civil Control Administration, from its own Divisions and from co-operating agencies, the fol¬ lowing are particularly important: 1. From each Civil Control Station came daily reports during its entire operating period, and two registration progress reports daily during regis¬ tration days. The Control Station Manager reported to the liaison officer of the Federal Security Agency at the Wartime Civil Control Administra¬ tion, and the representative of the Sector Commander reported to Wartime Civil Control Administration through the Sector Commander’s liaison officer who also was at the Wartime Civil Control Administration. Transporta¬ tion requirements were re-estimated daily during the registration period at the Civil Control Station and were reported to the Transportation Officer of each Sector, and to the Wartime Civil Control Administration Transpor¬ tation Section. 2. Assembly Centers sent daily reports to Wartime Civil Control Ad¬ ministration, by teletype, showing such factors as the total population, total inductions, total releases, cases of contagious disease, etc. In addition, a daily population summary was mailed to Wartime Civil Control Adminis¬ tration by each Center Manager, beginning in June and continuing to the end of the program. 3. The United States Public Health Service and Wartime Civil Control Administration received daily and weekly reports showing, by appropriate medical classifications, the movement of inpatients and outpatients in Center hospitals, and of evacuees (from Centers) who were in outside hospitals. A daily census was taken in each Assembly Center as a routine procedure. On June 30, a complete Center census list was made of all evacuees giving their name, family number, age, sex, and Center address. 4. Transfer movements from Assembly to Relocation Centers were controlled by carefully prepared lists of names from which exact transporta¬ tion requirements could be determined. Signed copies of these lists certified the movement of each individual who was transferred. 5. Special data were collected and lists prepared when necessary, for example, those containing the names of persons in special categories, such as parolees released to Assembly Centers, persons listed for repatriation, and persons residing in institutions in the evacuated area at the end of the program. Social Data Registration Forms executed by social workers at the Civil Control Stations provided the basic registration record of the program. These forms were numbered in accordance with the pre-numbered tag which was given to the head of each family. On the Social Data Registration form appeared the following facts relating to the family as a whole: Residence address at the time 354 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST of evacuation; the number of persons in the family who were moving together and were, therefore, registering together. The following facts were secured for each individual: Name; relationship to registering head of family; sex; age; place of birth; education; occupation (and industry) ; alien registration number (if an alien) ; and physical condition. Space was provided on the form for notation of the date of departure, the appointment for medical inspection, and for indi¬ cating the completion of necessary property arrangements at the Civil Control Station. A special box was provided for Assembly Center notations on each family. Three typed copies were prepared from the longhand original of this form. The distribution of these copies was as follows: One was sent in advance of the evacuee to the Assembly Center to which he was being moved; one was given to the escort officer in charge of the movement (from the Civil Control Station to the Assembly Center) to be delivered to the Center Manager; and one was sent to Wartime Civil Control Administration. When evacuees were transferred from an Assembly to a Relocation Center, one copy of the Social Data Registration accompanied them to become a basic record for the War Relo¬ cation Authority. Both the type and the amount of information secured on the Social Data Registration Form was the minimum necessary for Civil Control Station and Assembly Center operation purposes. Prior to the establishment of the War Relocation Authority, Wartime Civil Control Administration, had prepared an individual registration form which was intended for use in securing complete information for Relocation purposes. This form, together with its instructions, was given to the War Relocation Authority for its use in Relocation Centers. All of the names on Social Data Registration Forms (and received by Wartime Civil Control Administration from various other sources) tered on cards by Wartime Civil Control Administration. were en¬ This Master Index File was initially compiled at the Tanforan Assembly Center, from June to September, 1942, by trained evacuee clerks. This evacuee staff copied, on a 4x6 inch index card, all of the pertinent information from the Social Data Registration form. These cards were then arranged by Assembly Centers and verified against the information given on the Assembly Center census record as of June 30. The Relocation destination of each evacuee was posted on his card later from the train list certifying his movement. Births were recorded on new cards and the names of infants were entered on the Social Data Registration Form of the mother. Deaths, transfers and releases were also posted. At the conclu¬ sion of the program, therefore, it was possible to reproduce the essential identifica¬ tion data for each individual, and to trace him through each step of controlled movement. Subsequently, there were added to the Master Index, cards for all Japanese persons who had been interned or detained by various authorities, and who resided in the evacuated area at the time of apprehension. Parolees and others released from internment or detention were registered at Assembly and Relocation Centers and were added to the Index. Master Index cards were also made for all persons who migrated from the evacuated area and reported this fact STATISTICAL 355 SUMMARY to Wartime Civil Control Administration. Subsequent changes of address were posted as well as the original move. Since many evacuees had moved immediately prior to registration at a Civil Control Station and the Social Data Registration Form gave their address at the time of evacuation, all intra-evacuated-area address cards were posted to their corresponding Index cards to provide additional pre¬ evacuation residence addresses. Consideration was given by the Wartime Civil Control Administration to the possibility of conducting a general compulsory registration of all enemy aliens and of native-born persons of Japanese ancestry prior to, and in prepara¬ tion for, the evacuation program. This proposal was supported by several civil¬ ian agencies which also offered their services in the conduct of such a registration. After careful consideration, it was determined that no such registration would be made. Important factors in this decision were the following: 1. A registration would require some time for organization and tabula¬ tion before it would yield results useful in the evacuation program. 2. A registration of all enemy aliens had been conducted in February by the Department of Justice, and copies of the forms were on file with the local offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and at the Alien Regis¬ tration Division, Penna. Certain preliminary data were made available to the Wartime Civil Immigration and Naturalization Service, Philadelphia, Control Administration from local counts of these registrations, but no detailed classified information, such as the distribution by small geographical units, age, sex, occupation, family size, etc., were available. 3. The Japanese community already anticipated evacuation, and it was felt doubtful that accurate information would be given in all cases. 4. A complete evacuation of the coastal area was contemplated, and a preliminary verification with Federal Bureau of Investigation and Military Intelligence data showed that the Census of 1940 would be sufficiently accurate for the controlled movement. It was decided that a simplified registration, conducted as part of the process of evacuation, would be sufficient for Wartime Civil Control Administration purposes. The principal factor which was changing the pattern of the Japanese population on the West Coast, was the voluntary migration of this population to interior points and the shifting of the population within the coastal strip. At the beginning of the evacuation program there was already in progress a voluntary migration from the coastal area to the interior. (See Chapter IX.) The encouragement of voluntary migration—with financial assistance where necessary and proper—was a definite policy of the Western Defense Command. It was essential, therefore, to collect data on voluntary migration in order (a) to measure the success of the program, and (b) to provide correction factors for the later phases of the program. Public Proclamation No. 1, dated March 2, 1942, required the reporting of changes of residence address by German and Italian aliens and by all persons of Japanese ancestry residing in the States of Arizona, California, Oregon and 356 JAPANESE Washington. This requirement was extended to the other four States of the EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Western Defense Command area by Public Proclamation No. 2, March 16, 1942. The methods and results of this Change of Residence reporting system have been discussed in Chapter IX insofar as they relate to voluntary migration from the evacuated area. In planning the logistics of evacuation, daily tabulations were made show¬ ing the intra- and inter-county moves within Military Areas 1 and 2, as well as the migration from these areas to the interior. These tabulations were quite important in developing correction factors for Census data and greatly reduced the average error of estimate as to the number of Japanese who would be evacu¬ ated under each Civilian Exclusion Order. Such estimates were necessary for the Civil Control Station Staff, the Transportation Officer and the Operations Division in planning the Assembly Center destination and the movement of the evacuees. Pre-evacuation migration within the area and the small amount of migration of Japanese in other states of the Western Defense Command are of no importance for the purposes of this report. 1. Evacuation Summary A total of 117,116 persons were evacuated to Assembly or Relocation Cen¬ ters, migrated from this area, or otherwise came under some phase of the evacu¬ ation program between March 2 and October 31, 1942. (See Table 45.) This includes 110,723 who entered an Assembly or Relocation Center and 6,393 who did not enter a Center. Of those who entered a Center, 109,427 entered by direct evacuation, including 206 members of mixed-marriage families who were later released; 641 persons entered an Assembly Center as a parolee, or voluntary evacuee, or upon release from the custody of another agency; 151 persons were transferred from the Territory of Alaska to the custody of Wartime Civil Control Administration; and 504 babies were born to mothers residing in Assembly Centers. Mixed-marriage families had 465 individuals, of whom 206 entered a Center and were later released, and 259 were granted deferments or exemptions from evacuation. As has been indicated in Chapter IX, 4,889 persons migrated from the evacuated area prior to the controlled evacuation and did not return to a Center before October 31. entries.” Those who did return are included in "other A survey of all medical, penal, and charitable institutions in the States of Washington, Oregon, and California early in November indicated that 1,022 Japanese remained in such institutions located in the evacuated area. Table 45 includes all of those individuals who were evacuated directly to Wartime Civil Control Administration Assembly Centers and all other persons who entered such Centers, i.e., births, parolees, voluntary entries, etc. It does not include births, parolees and other inductions directly into Relocation Centers after the initial, direct evacuation. All such persons are considered to have come into a Relocation Center without entering the administrative jurisdiction of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. For data concerning such inductions, the reader is referred to the War Relocation Authority, Washington, D. C. Before proceeding with the presentation of detailed tables giving the popu- STATISTICAL 357 SUMMARY lation statistics of the various phases of the evacuation program, it is pertinent to refer again to Figure 10, the Evacuee Flow Chart, in Chapter VIIL It will be noted that evacuees entered Assembly Centers not only from Control Sta¬ tions, but also by birth and as parolees, voluntary entries, etc. Evacuees also went from Control Stations directly to certain Relocation Centers and, in a few cases, direct to War Relocation Authority for work furlough. Shortly after the evacuation of Military Area 1, releases from Assembly Centers were made to the War Relocation Authority for work furlough, and regular transfer move¬ ments to Relocation Centers were initiated. Figure 35 graphically presents the over-all results of these movements from the beginning of evacuee occupancy at Manzanar, on March 21, to the last transfer movement from the Fresno Assembly Center to Jerome, Arkansas, on October 30. This figure clearly shows the initiation of the controlled evacua¬ tion program in certain of the more critical areas of the West Coast during the first half of April. Beginning in the last week of April and continuing at a very rapid rate until the end of May, came the main part of the controlled evacuation movement from West Coast areas to Assembly Centers. The first phase of the program, the complete evacuation of Military Area No. 1, on June 6, removed 100,313 persons under Exclusion Orders Numbers 1 to 99. It was desired that the second phase of the program, the evacuation of the California portion of Military Area No. 2, be started immediately, but this movement could not be undertaken until in July and August because of delay in the selection of relocation sites and the completion of these Centers unless duplications of temporary facilities had been ordered. The Figure indicates the periods in which 9,337 evacuees were removed from Military Area No. 2, under the provisions of Exclusion Orders Numbers 100 to 108, direct to Relo¬ cation Centers. By August, therefore, 109,650 persons had been removed from the evacuated area to Assembly and Relocation Centers. Figure 35 also shows the initiation of direct evacuation to Relocation Centers the middle of May, the transfer of the Manzanar Reception Center to the War Relocation Authority on June 1, and the regular transfer movements from Assembly to Relocation Centers beginning the middle of June and termi¬ nating with the complete evacuation of all Assembly Centers on October 30. The number of evacuees for whom the Wartime Civil Control Administration had direct administrative responsibility at each stage of the program is shown in the darkest shaded portion of the figure. Table 46 shows the State of origin of the 110,442 evacuees who entered Assembly Centers or were directly evacuated to War Relocation Authority custody. The complete detail of this total by Assembly Centers and Exclusion Orders is shown in Table 47.1 There were 109,650 evacuees for whom a definite Civilian Exclusion Order was known (eliminating the 792 persons who were not evacuated under the JThe total shown in Tables 46 and 47 comprising the following groups from Table 45: Those who entered a Center by direct evacuation, by transfer from Alaska, as members of mixed-marriage families, and as "other entries,” and, in addition thereto, those in Military Area No. 2 who did not enter a Center but were released to the custody of War Relocation Authority for immediate furlough after the area of their residence was "frozen” in preparation for evacuation. 358 z o <: ui m O I— ac ro _i o> D Q_ o Q. U 1 o OJ H o LJ o o 3 2 u 2 _l cr < o h JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THOUSANDS OF JO THE WEST CVACUCCS SQNVSnOHJ. COAST QOQOOOOOOOOOO S33n0VA3 Figure 35 STATISTICAL 359 SUMMARY provisions of a specific Exclusion Order but who entered Centers as parolees, voluntary inductees, and from the Territory of Alaska). These were distributed as follows: California, 92,785; Washington, 12,892; Oregon, 3,714; Arizona, 259. Of the 18,026 who were evacuated directly to Relocation Centers, 17,062 were from California, 658 from Washington, 290 from Oregon, and 16 from Arizona. Only two Assembly Centers in California received a major movement of evacuees from Washington and Oregon; Bainbridge Island (Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1) was evacuated to Manzanar prior to the establishment of the As¬ sembly Center at Puyallup, Washington; and Pinedale Assembly Center received 3,497 persons from Washington and 551 from Oregon. As has been indicated in Chapter XIII, the Assembly Center capacity in these States was insufficient for the population. These evacuees from Washington and Oregon were later trans¬ ferred from Pinedale to Tule Lake to join other groups from these States who had been evacuated directly to this Relocation Center. The number of evacuees who entered each Center is given in Column I of Table 46. Note that Manzanar is classified both as an Assembly and as a Relo¬ cation Center in this table. Prior to June 1, 1942, Manzanar was operated as a Reception Center by the Wartime Civil Control Administration and received 9,665 evacuees. It was transferred to the War Relocation Authority on June 1 and thereafter received 165 persons. These were entirely small movements for the purpose of reuniting families, a part of which had entered Manzanar prior to June 1. Table 47 shows the Assembly Center destination of persons who were evacuated under each Civilian Exclusion Order.2 From nearly all the Civil Control Stations the main body of evacuees were moved to a single Assembly or Relocation Center. These movements were referred to by Assembly Centers as "direct evacuation movements.” In addi¬ tion, there were small movements of persons evacuated under the provision of Civilian Exclusion Orders who went to other Assembly and Relocation Centers. These persons often moved simultaneously with the main group, but under special permission from the Provost Marshal at the Civil Control Station. Frequently, however, as has been indicated in Chapter X, a temporary defer¬ ment from evacuation was granted because of personal or family illness, the need for continued personal attention to property matters, or for other approved reasons. Such deferred persons usually went to the Assembly Center to which others of their communities had been removed, but were sometimes granted permission to go elsewhere. An analysis of the direct evacuation under Civilian Exclusion Orders from the different areas of the Pacific Coast states can be made from the data pre¬ sented in Table 48. Using only the Wartime Civil Control Administration data as to evacuees entering Assembly and Relocation Centers and the net total of voluntary migrants who did not return to this area to rejoin their families, there *In using these data on "all evacuees” care should be taken not to confuse them with the data presented below on "all entries” to Assembly Centers. The "all evacuees” figure includes persons who died while residents in, or who were released from Assembly Centers (for example, mixed marriage cases), and all persons who were inducted into an Assembly or Relocation Center by the Wartime Civil Control Administration. The data on "all evacuees” does not include births within Assembly or Relocation Centers, or parolees or other persons who entered Relocation Centers independent of Wartime Civil Control Administration action. 360 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST was a total of 114,539 persons removed from the area and for whom a definite county of residence could be determined.3 The 1940 Census enumerated 111,938 persons of Japanese ancestry in these areas. The principal interest in comparing the Census with the number of persons evacuated or leaving this area lies in the nature of the indicated popula¬ tion shifts, rather than the agreement between aggregate totals—though the over-all totals are remarkably similar. City areas, particularly San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego and Seattle showed net losses in Japanese population. Very appreciable gains, on the other hand, were recorded in rural areas, such as the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys, San Luis Obispo and Santa Barbara Counties, and Orange County in California. This may be explained in part by the natural tendency of a racial group to concentrate in areas of least pressure from public opinion, and in part by the return of children to join their rural-dwelling parents for evacuation. As previously noted, permits were granted for changes of residence to reunite families during the entire program. The distribution of the Japanese population in the Western Defense Com¬ mand area on June 7, 1942, at the end of the first phase of the controlled evacuation program is shown in Figure 36. Next to each Assembly Center name is indicated its population on the morning of June 7. There remained in Mili¬ tary Area 2 of California two particularly dense concentrations of Japanese immediately adjacent to the boundary of Military Area No. 1, and also to numerous vital military installations and important forests. As was indicated in Chapter IX, the migration of Japanese to Tulare, Fresno, and Placer Counties during the voluntary migration phase of the program had been very heavy. This migration created military as well as social and economic problems in these areas. 3Table 45 shows a total of 117,116 persons evacuated, or otherwise coming under the evacuation program. Thia includes several categories not included in Table 48. For example, births in Assembly Centers, persons remaining in institutions, and parolees and other persons entering Assembly Centers without a definite county of origin. STATISTICAL SUMMARY Figure 36 361 362 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST TABLE 45.—Summary of Persons Evacuated or Otherwise Coming Under The Evacuation Program: March 2 to October 31, 1942 (Includes evacuation by WCCA directly to Relocation Centers. Does not include the births, parolees or other persons entering Relocation Centers from sources other than WCCA.) Type of Action Total persons affected. Other entries in Assembly Centers. Released on work furlough (Area 2). Total persons Entered a Center Did not enter a Center 117,116 110,723 6,393 109,221 151 504 641 465 223 1,022 4,889 109,221 151 504 641 206 259 223 1,022 4,889 'Other than mixed-marriage cases. 2Net total of persons migrating from evacuated areas prior to evacuation and who did not return to a Center before October 31, 1942. TABLE 46.—State of Origin by Center of Destination of Japanese Evacuees* STATE OF ORIGIN All origins Arizona California All destinations. 110,442 259 Assembly Centers. 92,193 243 Evacuation destination Pinedale. Portland. 5,229 9,665 2,460 243 4,565 4,810 5,420 4,043 7,548 4,753 3,592 18,937 4,302 7,928 5,026 3,672 Oregon Wash¬ ington 92,785 3,714 12,892 792 75,500 3,424 12,234 792 5,183 9,408 2,460 46 257 243 4,540 755 5,391 4 4,753 3,592 18,715 4,292 7,879 4,861 3,667 Relocation Centers. 18,026 16 17,062 4 11 1 Tule Lake. 11,711 2,946 165 3,204 11,707 2,935 163 2,257 223 Not specified 551 3,497 2,870 2 1,165 7,314 1 1 290 290 25 7 29 4 232 221 10 49 164 5 658 * 1 657 ♦ * * * 223 *Parolees, Detainees, and other Japanese entering Relocation Centers from Outside the Evacuated Areas are not included in this count. « « M c S5-S C <u <w 5 < Q. 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KING WASHINGTON ■ ■ © 9 to r-' o» to o 5 <5» - $ © o CALIFORNIA . ■ © 9 ■ I ■ 'T £ § V, v tv oJ © © (0 <C <*■ 0» o Og 2 (N ©- CALIFORNIA • CALIFORNIA SANTA BARBARA 1 MONTEREY CALIFORNIA [ VENTURA SAN LUIS OBISPO CALIFORNIA CALIFORNIA - ! 1 LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA ■ CALIFORNIA 1 LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA CALIFORNIA ■ o CALIFORNIA_1 - * <7 o 4 0 LOS ANGELES • | LOS ANGELES ■ CALIFORNIA < o CALIFORNIA [ SAN FRANCISCO 1 SAN DIEGO | LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA • s rO <vJ r— (V o o 3 trf V CD 9 rg 0» co r* (V n o o* i £o X z J < o 5 co J < z o Ot 2 o “S~ © z < < 2 < CALIFORNIA CALIFORNIA | • n ttt If 3 <tf © ■ w (V 0 S> ii © © © Tf © t" If Q 1.540 W2 <o CV o © TOTAL K33 SO EVACUATION TO ASSEMBLY CENTERS H co w . <o b h- o 4 < Z d o «0 o -J 3 -I -j « s o 2 o° o S 3 o<> h 0*01 TANFO RAN o >> < <43 © 5 O' N* a! i< H § 9 T3 Z <U s s§s o •0 1 2,149! >< w <3 * 3 § c 5 < | z ALL EVA¬ CUEES TABLE 47—EVACUATION SUMMARY ^ ro Z ^ | I ALL M - TULE LAKE X ■ • 3 UJ O z < 363 SUMMARY •« o GILA RIVER J O' U T-H to tv (V s TUR¬ LOCK oo rlj' £ •<* n N TOTAL BEET o EVACUATION TO RELOCATION CENTERS O Z </) a: POMO PORT¬ NA LAND as WORK < aaHi WASHINGTON ! 1 STATE J |1 KITSAP - | LOS ANGELES COUNTY PRINCIPAL STATISTICAL O O tg 0 © *V ui s _ oj <•> * •n K « o» o N <*> V) to eo 0* O CVi rv eg tn fV * •O c h* ® (M 0* <N OJ OJ O 01 o OI o t*> n 3 364 Total Persons Evacuated to Each Assembly and Relocation Center by Civilian Exclusion Order Number and Area.—Continued (Manzanar Classified as an Assembly Center Until May 31, 1942) EVACUATION TO RELOCATION CENTERS EVACUATION TO ASSEMBLY CENTERS TUR¬ LOCK TOTAL 6 otr STOCK- TANFQ TON RAN o<> «ja:cr < < — IS) PUYAL SACRA !LUP MENTO ii POMO' NA a tt 2 O < ? < tt Q tt Q 2 S ~oT" FRES¬ NO fg TOTAL 2 § < 5 Si* - w UJ £ D 9 ALL EVA¬ CUEES BEET COUNTY ERS o i i i l i i O' © O' n • CALIFORNIA 1 ALAMEDA | CALIFORNIA | SAN MATEO | WASHINGTON [ KING 1 WASHINGTON 1 1 KING < I SOUTHERN COUNTIES < Z o N - ■ CO o = e'¬ 00 en CO |1 KING 1 SAN FRANCISCO < Z tt o | LOS ANGELES . N < z tt o lb _> < o 1 LOS ANGELES M < < x: o < cr < • ■ ■ ■ • • > ■ • • ■ • ■ ■ “ HOOD RIVER OREGON © D < z SAN JOAQUIN LOS ANGEUES LOS ANGELES • • • ■ ■ • • • • • CM • • ■ • O • ■ • • • © r- CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES G < Z < O • • • • © cn © i i i 006 • Oi •n SAN DIEGO ■ • • l • i i i i i i i i i i i i i CM ■ • ■ • © • • • • • • J* ■ • • • O' G 2 M ttl £ • ■ ■ • © © O' § © l i i i © i l i i i • l l i © 8 © © • • • I KITSAP ■ | PIERCE WASHINGTON - WASHINGTON | • CALIFORNIA 1 ■ CALIFORNIA 1 • 1 • ■ CM CALIFORNIA ■ MADERA 1 • CALIFORNIA • FRESNO 1 • ORANGE CALIFORNIA • CALIFORNIA | o o n I X o z it 8 © z O © kl < o ■ ■ • • • © F« • " i • i O © 8 O h© CM • • - CM • ■ • • • • • • • 1 i l 1 i i i i i i i 1 i i V © « © © © T © • • • • O r*© nm © © »*< CD © 1 5 * © s ORANGE © © © © © © cn * in © © © CALIFORNIA o CM © 1 • © © O O © © COAST al | a: WASHINGTON o | KING o c 2 O © 3 © 00 in WASHINGTON WEST CALIFORNIA CALIFORNIA THE . • < • < 2 m < 0 . © & ■M r- s £ © © © 1 O • ■ SACRAMENTO CALIFORNIA o • ■ MERCED . • • ■ • ■ • • • ■ CM • • ■ • ■ • ■ ■ • • ■ O' O' * r- g © i*] IT • ■ • ■ • ■ • o ■ ■ • ■ ■ ■ ■ • • ■ • ■ ■ ■ • ■ “ CM • © © T- (V «o ■ ■ 8 0 • - ■ •n CALIFORNIA • • ■ ■ • ■ • (M CM • • - • • • « • • • C\ s o © CALIFORNIA FROM o s ■ 2 • • • • • <£ 2 Ol * ( a < D I- . ■ • PLACER CALIFORNIA ■ CALIFORNIA •3 © © CC * KINGS OREGON s ® CC © © * CM a © © © co CALIFORNIA CC s •0 CALIFORNIA 1 8 © O * I EVACUATION WASHINGTON * $ • N v - © CD n © O' 1 KING 1 • • • rCM ■ ■ © • ■ - • • ■ © • ■ • © WASHINGTON < 2 c O • • ■ ■ i i i l i O' in i s O' C\l <n * 1 < < o o l i " s O' i • O' © O' O' * CM O) O <*> 006 s 1 JAPANESE 5 © • O' CO CO •O <0 1,660 PRINCIPAL STATE WORK TULE LAKE GILA RIVER TABLE 47.—EVACUATION SUMMARY Total Persons Evacuated to Each Assembly and Relocation Center by Civilian Exclusion Order Number and Area.—Continued (Manzanar Classified as an Assembly Center Until May 31, 1942) statistical summary 365 366 $7 p 2 1 < 2 2 < 1 o 2 • CO • CM fM O M o> 2 cO * • co D o UJ 2 < u o 2 x * * • THE c/> 8 u» 2 < -1 J UJ O in 2 x ON -S3U3 J g to u.' u J X r0 cO cfi < • • • •o CM f- O' CM M 6 CD • ■ a. CM O O* t X * * X * * * * * * * * X 1 1 FROM • O' • < < I < 2 CC £ , 1 z cO U) < L. £ U.a. -1 «o CO CM CM N M ' * • • • CM CM q f" o o CO 10 aro • • o o Ol <o •n o» cm • • o» •n • CM • • CM rt nj M o> IN r» • • «n CM ■ ' < CO M CM O' • - X < a: u X h O 1 MISCELLANEOUS * CM • • • • ■ ' ' ' ' ■ • • • • CM ' ' CM ' ■ ■ ■ • o» (0 • <0 to CO O' r* s q « r~ ro to « h CO O O o s a o - ' . ■ < o 5 < < 2 cc i o cO TULARE o CO ro CALIFORNIA N- in O o • • <0 • r- ■ o r» CALIFORNIA MISCELLANEOUS 1 INYO EVACUATION g u 5 <r 5< i2 UK it < 2 j! 55 V STATE WORK JAPANESE S P to •—i H £ O < P O <s > w I o cn P4 w Ph H O H PRINCIPAL BEET EVACUATION TO - 0 ALASKA ALASKA 1 ALL OTHER TOTAL TOTAL CUEES RELOCATION CENTERS COUNTY TULE LAKE GILA RIVER TUR¬ LOCK STOCK¬ TANFO TON RAN PINE- POMO¬ PORT¬ DALE NA LAND EVA¬ ORDER EVACUATION TO ASSEMBLY CENTERS ALL CIVILIAN MER¬ CED EXCLUSION ss Evacuated to Each Assembly and Relocation Center by Civilian Exclusion Order Number and Area.—Concluded. (Manzanar Classified as an Assembly Center Until May 31, 1942) WEST COAST TABLE 48.—Japanese Evacuation and Voluntary Migration From Evacuated Areas of Western Defense Command—Compared to Census Population of 1940 statistical summary 367 368 TABLE 48 (Concluded).—Japanese Evacuation and Voluntary Migration From Evacuated Areas of Western Defense Command—Compared to Census Population of 1940 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST STATISTICAL SUMMARY 2. 369 Assembly Center Population The daily population movement of all Assembly Centers combined from March 21 to October 30 (including Manzanar until June 1) is given in Table 49. These data are graphically presented in Figure 3 5, page 358. The maximum population of all Assembly Centers (including Center residents who were temporarily in outside hospitals) occurred on May 31 when there were 89,260 evacuees in Centers under the jurisdiction of the Wartime Civil Control Ad¬ ministration. The rapidity of the evacuation program is reflected in the number of evacu¬ ees entering Assembly Centers. From April 27 to May 30, the population of all Centers rose from 10,074 to 89,320 in 34 days. During the time of most rapid transfer of evacuees from Assembly to Relocation Centers, August 9 to October 30, the total Assembly Center population decreased by 62,813 in 81 days. It should be noted that in Table 49, transfers of medical cases between Assembly Centers and outside hospitals have been omitted from the total. However, the total number of persons entering and leaving reflects, as it should, all inter-Center transfers, releases to the War Relocation Authority and other agencies, and the resumption of custody of evacuees from these agencies. A graphical summary of the movement of population in each individual Assembly Center has been presented in Chapter XIX, Figures 19a-19p. Evacuees entering Assembly Centers. Table 50 summarizes the total number of evacuees entering (including those re-entering) Assembly Centers by type of induction or transfer. In all, 93,574 persons were listed as entering an Assembly Center. The number of persons listed in Table 46, above, as evac¬ uated to Assembly Centers, i.e., original inductions under Civilian Exclusion Order, or by other direct entry, was 92,193. The difference of 1,3 81 between these two figures is accounted for by the inclusion in the larger figure of births and inter-Center transfers, including some transfers from War Relocation Authority. The total number of different individuals who were inducted into an Assembly Center, including 39 persons received from War Relocation Authority and 504 live births, was 92,736. (See Table 53.) Table 51 is presented in order to complete the population accounting for persons returning to Assembly Centers either from leave to another agency or after release by the Wartime Civil Control Administration. Releases and transfers of evacuees leaving the Assembly Centers from March 21, 1942, to October 30, 1942, is shown in Table 52. There were tranferred to the War Relocation Authority a total of 92,447 persons of whom 89,698 went from an Assembly to a Relocation Center in a regular transfer order movement. War Relocation Authority work-furlough releases totaled 1,739, of whom 332 returned to an Assembly Center (See Table 51) and were later trans¬ ferred again to the custody of the War Relocation Authority in a regular move¬ ment. Individual and small group transfers accounted for 1,010. One hundred and thirty-six evacuees were released to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and other law enforcement agencies; 370 JAPANESE EVACUATION and of these, 22 returned to a Center. FROM THE WEST COAST Other types of releases accounted for 991 evacuees: Mixed-marriage, 206; deaths, 134; inter-Center transfers, 448 ; and all other form of releases, 203. The total number of separate individuals entering and leaving Wartime Civil Control Administration Assembly Centers between March 21 and October 30, 1942, eliminating all double counting because of re-entries of persons originally inducted into Assembly or Relocation Centers, is presented in Table 53. Whereas Tables 50 to 52, above, represent the total entries and departures, Table 53 sum¬ marizes the total number of individuals who entered and departed. For data on the average and maximum population of Assembly Centers, the reader is referred to Table 29, Chapter XIX, and Figures 19a-19p. As has been indicated, a daily population report verified by an actual door-to-door check was made by the Manager of each Assembly Center. Tables showing the daily entries and departures and the total population for individual Assembly Cen¬ ters are too detailed for inclusion in the present report. For those readers of the present report who are interested in a monthly population figure for each Center, there is presented Table 54 which shows the de facto population of each Assembly and Relocation Center from May 1 to November 3 by months. The evacuees to Assembly Centers spent 9,485,202 evacuee-days under Wartime Civil Control Administration jurisdiction, an average of 102.3 days for each of the 92,736 different individuals who entered a Center. This is equivalent to 25,987 evacuees for one year. Table 55 gives, by months, the total evacuee-days in each Assembly Center, both inclusive of, and exclusive of the time spent by those evacuees placed in hospitals outside of the Center. To provide a basis for determining needs for evacuee housing units of different sizes and other general policies for the conduct of Assembly Centers and for the relocation of evacuees, a tabulation was made of the distribution of families by size as reported on Social Data Registration forms. Table 56 gives the estimated total number of evacuee families, and the mean and median size of these families, for each of the Assembly Centers. For Wartime Civil Control Administration purposes "family” was defined as all those persons regis¬ tering together for evacuation, i.e., recorded on a single Social Data Registration Form. STATISTICAL SUMMARY 371 TABLE 49.—Daily Population of All Assembly Centers Including Hospitals: March 21 to October 30, 1942 (Transfers between Centers and outside hospitals have been omitted from this table) Date Evacuees Evacuees entering leaving Centers Centers Total Net change 84 90 800 803 806 807 818 821 821 823 835 84 6 710 3 3 1 11 3 84 6 710 3 3 1 11 3 2 12 2 12 1.. . 2.. . 3.. . 4... 5... 6... i... 8... 9.. . 10.. . 11... 12.. . 13. . . 14... 15.. . 16.. . 17... 18.. . 19.. . 20.. . 21... 22... 23.. . 24.. . 25.. . 26. . . 27.. . 28... 29.. . 30... 1,493 2,365 2.984 4,891 5,737 5,745 6,385 7,523 7,524 7,524 7,527 7,527 7,527 10,044 10,046 10,048 10,049 10,050 10,051 10,056 10,057 10,061 10,061 10,063 10,074 10,074 11,619 14,406 20,764 26,212 658 872 619 1,907 846 8 640 1,138 1 658 872 619 1,907 846 8 640 1,139 1 3 3 2,517 2 2 1 1 1 5 1 4 2,517 2 2 1 1 1 5 1 4 2 11 3 11 1 1,545 2,787 6,358 5,448 1,545 2,788 6,358 5,448 1 May 1.... 2. .. . 3.... 4.... 5.... 6. .. . 7.... 8.... 9. .. . 10.... 11. .. . 12. .. . 13. .. . 14.... 15. .. . 16.... 17. .. . 18.... 19.... 20.... 21. .. . 22.... 23... . 24.... 25... . 26.... 27. .. . 28... . 29.... 30.... 31.... 29,643 31,159 32,193 32,916 33,590 36,412 38,573 42,081 46,578 50,280 51,888 55,556 60,030 64,419 68,340 69,933 72,050 74,328 76,505 79,397 81,008 81,474 82,040 82,554 82,602 82,423 84,085 85,776 88,541 89,320 89,260 3,431 1,516 1,034 723 674 2,822 2,161 3,508 4,497 3,702 1,608 3,668 4,474 4,389 3,921 1,593 2,117 2,278 2,177 2,892 1,611 466 566 514 48 -179 1,662 1,691 2,765 779 -60 3,432 1,516 1,034 726 675 2,822 2,161 3,508 4,499 3,702 1,609 3,668 4,476 4,395 3,930 1,596 2,118 2,282 2,180 2,899 1,619 493 567 517 51 19 1,915 1,745 2,790 782 38 March 21.. 22.. 23.. 24. . 25. . 26. . 27. . 28. . 29. . 30. . 31. . April 1 1 3 1 2 1 2 6 9 3 1 4 3 7 8 27 1 3 3 198 253 54 25 3 98 Evacuees Evacuees entering leaving Centers Centers Date Total Net change June 1.... 2. .. . 3. .. . 4. . . . 5. .. . 6. . . . 7.... 8. .. . 9 . 10.... 11. . .. 12. ... 13. .. . 14... . 15. .. . 16. .. . 17. .. . 18... . 19. . . . 20... . 21. ... 22 23.... 24. . 25 26.... 27. .. . 28.... 29. . . . 30.... 79,582 79,303 79,322 79,264 79,630 80,184 80,141 79,950 79 893 79,911 79,918 79,926 79,938 79,903 79,404 78,851 78,350 77,867 77,388 76,876 76,372 75 871 74^950 74 977 74 466 73^919 73,444 72,957 72,093 71,423 -9,678 -279 19 -58 366 554 -43 -191 -57 18 7 8 12 -35 -499 -553 -501 -483 -479 -512 -504 SOI -921 27 -S11 -547 -475 -487 -864 -670 26 70 23 16 543 661 15 25 9,704 349 4 74 177 107 58 216 25 9 14 21 20 14 17 30 18 23 16 13 7 2 6 9 55 513 570 531 501 502 528 517 152 36 1,073 9 32 22 4 25 17 579 497 491 889 687 July 1.... 2. .. . 3. .. . 4. .. 5. .. . 6... . 7 8. ... 9. ... 10.... 11. . . . 12. .. . 13. .. . 14.... 15... . 16... . 17. .. . 18... . 19... . 20. . . . 21. .. . 22. .. . 23.... 24.... 25.... 26.... 27. ... 28.... 29.... 30. . . . 31. .. . 71,006 70,561 69,810 69 227 69,229 69,232 69 235 69,229 69,241 69,242 69,273 69,282 69,289 69,313 68,344 68,342 67,842 66,824 66,324 65,831 65,158 64,600 64,164 64,170 63,667 63,173 62,643 62,636 62,648 62,704 62,711 -417 -445 -751 -583 2 3 3 -6 12 1 31 9 7 24 -469 -502 -500 -1,018 -500 -493 -673 -558 -436 37 14 15 17 9 16 15 24 14 13 37 19 21 40 44 15 19 -503 -494 -530 -7 15 24 10 454 459 766 600 7 13 12 30 2 12 6 10 14 16 513 517 519 1,040 523 532 705 576 460 16 518 518 540 13 17 73 19 20 12 Aug. 1. .. . 2.... 3.... 4. . . . 5. .. . 6. .. . 7. .. . 8. .. . 9. .. . 10.... 11. .. . 62,717 62,753 62,763 62,773 62,798 62,802 62,812 62,813 62,306 61,790 61,308 16 39 18 10 6 12 56 7 6 36 10 10 25 4 10 1 -507 -516 -482 22 23 39 32 18 24 22 20 26 18 14 8 1 7 43 5 17 3 8 10 1 14 4 7 508 523 525 372 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST TABLE 49 (Concluded).—Daily Population of All Assemby Centers Including Hospitals: March 21 to October 30, 1942 (Transfers between Centers and outside hospitals have been omitted from this table) Evacuees Evacuees entering leaving Centers Centers Date Total Net change Aug.12_ 13... . 14... . 15. .. . 16... . 17. .. . 18. .. . 19... . 20.... 21... . 22.... 23.... 24.... 25.... 26.... 27.... 28.... 29.... 30. . . . 31. . . . 60,777 60,783 60,830 59,795 58,734 57,654 56,601 55,566 54,037 52,436 51,951 51,553 51,138 50,348 48,992 48,443 48,445 47,460 45,377 44,328 -531 6 47 -1,035 -1,061 -1,080 -1,053 -1,035 -1,529 -1,601 -485 -398 -415 -790 -1,356 -549 2 -985 -2,083 -1,049 12 14 49 8 3 15 133 32 6 20 18 47 8 4 13 26 10 34 13 5 543 8 2 1,043 1,064 1,095 1,186 1,067 1,535 1,621 503 445 423 794 1,369 575 8 1,019 2,096 1,054 Sept. 1_ 2. .. . 3. .. . 4. . . . 5. . . . 6. . . . 7. .. . 8. . . . 9... . 10.... 11. . . . 12. . . . 13. . . . 14. . . . 15. . . . 16... . 17. . . . 18. .. . 19. . . . 20.... 42,129 40,529 38,439 37,731 36,593 36,088 34,476 33,966 32,635 32,284 31,638 31,541 30,477 29,681 28,636 28,150 27,142 26,641 25,566 24,538 -2,199 -1,600 -2,090 -708 -1,138 -505 -1,612 -510 -1,331 -351 -646 -97 -1,064 -796 -1,045 -486 -1,008 -501 -1,075 -1,028 18 6 12 11 2 3 2 9 6 9 4 5 3 3 1 4 4 4 4 3 2,217 1,606 2,102 719 1,140 508 1,614 519 1,337 -360 650 102 1,067 799 1,046 490 1,012 505 1,079 1,031 Evacuees Evacuees entering leaving Centers Centers Date Total Net change Sept. 21_ 22.... 23.... 24. ... 25.... 26.... 27.... 28.... 29.... 30.... 23,522 22,445 21,943 21,446 20,995 19,981 19,020 18,011 17,495 16,512 -1,016 -1,077 -502 -497 -451 -1,014 -961 -1,009 -516 -983 3 2 3 2 12 6 10 6 5 3 1,019 1,079 505 499 463 1,020 971 1,015 521 986 Oct. 1. .. . 2. ... 3. .. . 4. . . . 5.... 6. .. . 7. .. . 8 9. .. . 10. . . . 11.... 12. .. . 13. .. . 14.... 15.... 16.... 17. .. . 18.... 19.... 20. .. . 21. ... 22.... 23. .. . 24.... 25. .. . 26... . 27. .. . 28.... 29.... 30.... 15,949 15,289 14,781 14,364 13,824 13,373 12,359 11,831 11,409 10,953 10,535 9,597 8,806 7,851 7,441 6,245 5,247 4,263 3,878 3,421 3,422 2,985 2,987 2,541 2,538 1,709 986 507 506 -563 -660 -508 -417 -540 -451 -1,014 -528 -422 -456 -418 -938 -791 -955 -410 -1,196 -998 -984 -385 -457 1 -437 2 -446 -3 -829 -723 -479 -1 -506 7 24 4 570 684 512 417 545 456 1,016 533 423 460 420 939 798 956 416 1,197 999 986 386 460 .... 5 5 2 5 1 4 2 1 7 1 6 1 1 2 1 3 1 437 2 2 19 448 3 848 723 479 1 506 STATISTICAL 373 SUMMARY TABLE 50.—Evacuees Entering Assembly Centers By Center and ByJType of Induction or Transfer: March 21, 1942 to October 30, 1942 OTHER EVACUEES Total entering Group evacua¬ tion Total. 93,574 90,307 374 673 2,220 Fresno. Manzanar1. Marysville. Mayer. Merced. Pinedale. Pomona. Portland. Puyallup. Sacramento. Salinas. Santa Anita. Stockton. Tanforan. Tulare. Turlock. 5,344 9,681 2,465 251 4,669 4,823 5,514 4,290 7,628 4,770 3,608 19,348 4,390 8,033 5,061 3,699 4,993 9,595 2,437 224 4,481 4,750 5,316 3,973 7,370 4,727 3,572 18,355 4,261 7,794 4,810 3,649 21 47 283 32 28 27 138 4 Center From W. R. A. 25 Detainees Total 86 25 7 30 7 i 219 17 66 167 91 153 40 36 720 83 176 87 39 88 3 42 35 231 11 10 53 163 1 3 8 Inter A.C. transfers Births 510** 11 Other* 448 1,262 62 5 189 70 23 24 59 53 77 65 108 24 1 3 57 7 59 3 7 22 6 31 23 38 16 13 197 25 64 18 20 3 168 25 24 14 10 355 33 88 55 19 10 ♦Includes persons entering from C. E. O.’s after deferment. ♦♦Includes 6 stillbirths. lTo June 1, 1942. TABLE 51.—Evacuees on Leave and Returning to Assembly Centers Assembly Center All Assembly Centers. Total returning Transferred from W. R. A. custody 384 335 18 18 Detainees 22 5 25 27 5 25 221 1 2 2 219 34 16 10 8 2 3 Puyallup. Other releases returning 1 Santa Anita. 23 19 Stockton. Tanforan. 35 32 3 2 1 2 7 3 4 10 2 1 2 5 2 374 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST ♦Includes 6 stillbirths. 375 STATISTICAL SUMMARY TABLE 53.—Net Total Persons Entering and Leaving WCCA Assembly Centers: March 21 to October 30, 1942 ENTERING ASSEMBLY CENTERS Group evacuation from CEO's... Other evacuation. Transferred from WRA. From INS, FBI, etc. Births (except stillbirths). Net total. . . . . . . LEAVING ASSEMBLY CENTERS 90,307 1,235 39 651 504 92,736 Released to WRA. Transfer orders. 89,698 Furloughs (Net) 1. 1,407 Other movements and trans1,007 fers1. Releases other than to WRA . . 128 Deaths (except stillbirths).. . 206 Mixed-marriage. 114 To FBI, INS, etc. (Net)». . .. Other releases (Net)*. 176 Net total. 92,112 624 92,736 'Total leaving Centers, 1,739; returned to Assembly Centers, 332. includes individual and small group transfers and persons remaining in hospitals at end of Assembly Centers. Total to WRA, 1,010; returned from WRA, 3. sTotal detainees leaving Centers, 136; returning, 22. ‘Total leaving Centers, 203; returning, 27. TABLE 54.—Population of Assembly and Relocation Centers May 1 to November 3, 1942, by Months (De facto population. Does not include persons assigned to Center but absent therefrom; or persons in transit). Center May 1 June 1 July 1 Aug. 1 Sept. 1 Oct. 1 Nov. 3 WCCA ASSEMBLY CENTERS 5,087 Manzanar. 7,180 2,440 245 4,505 4,746 1,984 2,769 11,973 3,048 2,444 210 5.020 5.103 5.117 4.975 Relocation Center after May 31, 1942 4,463 4,780 4,484 3,719 5,396 2,571 7,186 4,703 3,590 5,421 3,448 7.168 5,431 3,388 7,224 2,439 1,320 18,431 4,270 7,804 4,839 3,661 18,469 4,152 7,775 4,888 3,606 18,534 4,134 7,806 4,934 1,537 16,076 4,134 7,777 1,382 7,434 9,198 13,269 2,110 17,816 9,666 212 6,806 9,666 9,704 9,855 10,003 4,839 446 9,040 15,023 15,179 1,672 WRA RELOCATION CENTERS Tule Lake. 6,677 3,815 340 6,259 17,252 11,553 6,997 9,875 7,694 17,092 13,237 6,350 9,808 9,072 8,311 2,756 14,654 7,660 9,099 7,580 8,240 14,445 TABLE 55.—Total Number of Evacuee-Days in Assembly Centers and in Hospitals Outside Assembly Centers, By Center and Month: March 21, 1942 to October 30,1942 Total evacueedays 1,752,883 850,250 151,945 156,731 158,486 151,166 60,198 245 133,741 143,306 162,420 100,759 215,453 85,453 105,017 553,533 125,241 234,493 145,916 108,353 138,302 86,126 168,397 104,979 223,509 178 3,604 574,231 128,641 242,921 152,465 95,366 138,284 124 96,359 103,136 165,772 27,276 77 569,465 128,948 242,868 134,080 15,361 359,243 119,174 170,806 2,675 to • • • • cn.oo cncn • • V©.^ © Tf . . ! ! ! ! I I I I ' to to I I . . O'.00 CO 16,469 3,364 o r*\ UTSIDE HO!3PITALS ] 1,748,206 137,915 • to •O • O' :© .<N • • • : . • CN • 00 CO • CO CN : >o ro 96,185 102,813 165,381 • • • : . • • • • . . \ \ • . • ; 568,173 128,406 241,756 133,986 15,297 • t-1 C4 1/) • »—i lO •0C'©l^'© ; *-.* oo* ©c <n* .to NO COtItH 3,491 573,328 128,200 241,758 152,399 95,314 iVEST COAST 137,949 85,977 168,252 104,700 223,011 • • : . 60,091 245 133,558 143,154 162,382 100,626 215,084 85,131 104,815 552,838 124,859 233,457 145,884 108,331 1 ©.^ 00 co CO.N©4jh«^ \ \ \ i * * \ \ ; ;co‘^co On.OOfO 158,294 846,269 • • : . 156,508 ] rs 2,070,887 NO NO 00 © *0 151,695 | in iM 2,322,150 NESE EVACUATION FROM THE 2,075,450 JAVA 2,326,073 O' 1,974,954 October September in August (NOO't»H^.\OOON»HfOO'N©NN'© 00(NCCcoi'"CO’-<(NO\COcoi''«r''.Tt*cO'0 0^0 to O l-^CN CO N© *»- CO 00 O NC CN VH S-H o CO to *<** 00 NO* C-* CN ©* to Tf to* rf 00* I^N©CO NO to On n© t"- 00 On 0C NO O CN 00 CN *-< t^< CN —< 3,608 4,239 98 July 00 N O' 5,542 156,854 June Z Q p t> 1,990 o X oo rs 105,845 May (N l> oo 00 783,675 373,356 93,275 5,776 500,398 287,867 523,037 391,848 781,389 165,864 209,187 2,777,570 599,654 1,098,660 567,400 303,206 | : i i i Fresno. Manzanar (to June 1, 1942). Marysville. Mayer. Merced. Pinedale. Pomona. Portland. Puyallup. Sacramento. Salinas. Santa Anita. Stockton. Tanforan. Tulare. Turlock. IN AS :3 9,462,162 © All Centers. •to.O • O' 00 W • ^.On • rh to -hcoOv •oo.On • IO *N©<N 1 * I I I I .‘tot^T :<o ■<* S .o.K — ~ W H Z w u bn 785,067 373,375 93,423 5,777 501,732 288,458 523,446 392,723 782,950 166,451 209,665 2,784,313 602,214 1,104,575 567,625 303,408 April •?2.. * • * • Fresno. Manzanar (to June 1, 1942). Marysville. Mayer. Merced. Pinedale2. Pomona. Portland. Puyallup. Sacramento. Salinas. Santa Anita. Stockton. Tanforan. Tulare. Turlock. 7,508 2 w 9,485,202 m All centers and hospitals1... . March 'OnionO'OOOcsoo^xoooo lO CN fO ?N »-«00 N© <N © 00 O tO CO © © CN to ^ 00 CN CO 00 00 to <N <N CN CN © cO*tO ^*O0*N© © to tO*tO U^OOr* t^v©co '©toO\'©r^X©v0C'©OcN00 CN •<* CN*-< Center TABLE 55 (Concluded).—Total Number of Evacuee-Days in Assembly Centers and in Hospitals Outside Assembly Centers, By Center and Month: March 21, 1942 to October 30, 1942 to Pi W H Z w o 3,472 to 00 ^ ^ ss pc PC H « Q co H PC ^ IN HC e/3 in s a) .a.S 6 pc u •a "3 a>ra gs 4> O statistical summary fO • • • • 04.t*Ov • • lO • • • >H .... . *-H LO ro • • tO.OOlOO* • • Q • • • 04 04 • • 0*4 04 lO © • © . . • t>. • 00 to • • t'*>f00'04 • to • • *to • *-* • • tolOO 04 • • ■ O' rf t* fO • • 04 04 04 Tp Os . . • 0040*040' . • O' O' VO • • • to to to • • 04 10 •f^MXfOO'fSM^CN'OfStN • 00 lO fO tO'O 04 © O'00 to CO 04 • »h to to 04 O fO © to • • •tOO'lOO'OOOOtOtO^HfO'OCN 04 . . •io^Ttr^O't^^OTt'O'O‘0 04 • • •OHrttN^HHO'i'H © • O* lO • O 04 • •^Os^H^H00t^O400^Hr^^Ht^O'^fO-^ O* lOOiOiOOOO'O'OO'OH'O O4O'00*ht*<.-hO'»O^<O»00C0©iO»OO4 O' »HTf fOO'ON'OCON^'OHOlO to T-1 to »0 Tt 00 »0»0 Tf 1^*0 0^04 04 ****** 'OofiO .04 © -O' • • Fresno. Manzanar (to June 1,1942). Marysville. Mayer. Merced. Pinedale*. Pomona. Portland. Puyallup. Sacramento. Salinas. Santa Anita. Stockton. Tanforan. Tulare. Turlock. »—i Oh C/3 a " ° C/3 W ffi ASSEMBLY | I 4,563 | | 23,040 311 All Centers1. October September August July June May April March Total evacueedays Center 377 378 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST TABLE 56.—Estimated Total Number of Evacuee Families and Average Size of Such Families, by Center* Total families Mean size Median size Total individuals Centers. 24,712 3.7 3.4 92,193 Fresno. Manzanar (to June 1, 1942). Marysville. Mayer. Merced. Pinedale. Pomona. Portland. Puyallup. Sacramento. Salinas. Santa Anita. Stockton. Tanforan. Tulare. Turlock. 1,294 2,318 547 69 1,192 1,185 1,633 1,275 2,233 1,449 726 4,932 1,458 2,043 1,344 1,014 4.0 4.2 4.5 3.5 3.8 4.1 3.3 3.2 3.4 3.3 5.0 3.8 3.0 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.9 4.5 3.0 3.4 3.9 2.9 2.7 3.1 5,229 9,665 2,460 243 4,565 4,810 5,420 4,043 7,548 4,753 3,592 18,937 4,302 7,928 5,026 3,672 Center All 2.8 4.5 3.5 1.4 3.5 3.5 3.1 *For evacuation purposes “Family” was defined as all those persons registering for evacuation together on a single SDR form. 379 STATISTICAL SUMMARY 3. Transfer of Evacuees to Relocation Centers The total number of persons transferred by the Wartime Civil Control Ad¬ ministration to the War Relocation Authority was 111,155. Details as to Relocation Center destination and type of transfer are shown in Table 32, Chap¬ ter XXII. Relocation Centers received 89,698 evacuees from Assembly Centers in direct transfer order movements, 18,026 by direct evacuation from Civil Control Stations, and 779 through individual and small group movements not covered by formal transfer orders. In addition to these evacuees who were moved to a Relocation Center, 1,630 were transferred to the War Relocation Authority through release on furloughs to this agency from Assembly Centers, or from Military Area 2, and 1,022 were transferred to the general custody of War Relocation Authority because of their continued residence in institutions in the evacuated area. Of these, 228 had been formally inducted into an Assembly Center but had been placed in an institution outside of a Center for health reasons and were not transferred to a Relocation Center with regular move¬ ments. Institutions in the evacuated area had 794 Japanese who had never been formally evacuated. This group includes many cases committed to State Institutions for the insane and the tubercular, as well as a few cases in penal or correctional institutions. The responsibility for these institutional cases passed to the War Relocation Authority in September and October, 1942. The detailed transfer of evacuees from each Assembly Center to each Relo¬ cation Center, by type of transfer, is shown in Table 57. It was possible to tabulate both origin and destination by Centers only for the 90,477 persons who were transferred by regular transfer order movements or who moved as individuals or small groups to a known destination. No attempt has been made by the Wartime Civil Control Administration to allocate by Relocation Center the 1,630 evacuees who were transferred from Assembly Centers or from Military Area 2 to War Relocation Authority for furlough. sion of responsibility between the agencies. This is in line with the divi¬ However, the Wartime Civil Con¬ trol Administration has provided the War Relocation Authority with full infor¬ mation as to each individual furloughed, when requested, to facilitate the ad¬ ministrative problem created by the return of furloughed workers to War Relo¬ cation Authority Centers. The reader is referred to Figure 28 in Chapter XXII for the graphical summary of transfers from Assembly to Relocation Centers in accordance with the regular transfer orders. An approximation of the State of origin of the evacuees directly evacuated to or transferred to each Relocation Center is given in Table 58. Of the 109,650 persons evacuated under the provisions of Civilian Exclusion Orders, 18,026 were sent directly to Relocation Centers, 91,401 to Assembly Centers, and 223 were released on work furlough from Area 2. these persons is known. The State of origin of each of By eliminating the 223 work furlough cases, and assuming that all evacuees to Assembly Centers can be allocated for this pur¬ pose to the Relocation Center which received the majority of persons evacuated under the same Civilian Exclusion Order, it is possible to arrive at the distribution 380 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST of evacuees in Table 58. However, it should be remembered that these are as¬ sumed rather than tabulated destination data and make no allowance, of course, for inter-Center transfers by the War Relocation Authority. By agreement between the War Relocation Authority and the Wartime Civil Control Administration, the former submitted daily Relocation Center popula¬ tion reports for consolidation with those from Assembly Centers until they were closed on October 30, 1942. Relocation Centers. These reports showed 111,999 total inductions to Table 59 combines these data with the summary figures from Table 32 and provides an approximate distribution by Relocation Centers of persons of the following groups: (a) Those directly inducted from Civil Con¬ trol Stations; (b) those transferred from Assembly Centers; (c) those inducted originally by War Relocation Authority up to October 30, 1942. Table 59 presents the concept of "Center of original residence” and does not reflect the actual Center population as of October 31. To do so would require information as to births, deaths, inter-Center transfers, and furlough and other releases, which is obtainable only from the records of War Relocation Authority. For figures on the de facto population of Relocation Centers monthly to November 3, 1942, see Table 54. TABLE 57.—Center of Origin and Destination of Evacuees Transferred From Assembly to Relocation Centers statistical summary 381 382 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST STATISTICAL 383 SUMMARY TABLE 58.—State and Relocation Center Destination of Japanese Evacuees, By State of Origin* STATE OF ORIGIN State and Relocation Center Destination All origins All Centers. California. Tule Lake. Arizona California 109,427 259 92,562 30,220 17,641 12,579 258 247 29,962 17,394 12,568 24,236 9,730 14,506 1 18,920 9,471 9,449 11 1 10,142 Wyoming: Heart Mountain. 8,494 8,494 17,368 8,461 8,907 17,368 8,461 8,907 7,652 7,652 11,315 10,166 Oregon Wash¬ ington 3,714 12,892 872 872 4,443 258 4,185 2,842 7,300 1,149 ♦This table does not include 223 beet workers from Military Area 2, California, and 792 other evacuees including those from Alaska, parolees, and voluntary evacuees from other areas. TABLE 59.—Estimated Persons Received By WRA From WCCA and Other Sources, To October 31, 1942. Center or Class of Custody Estimated persons inducted to Oct. 31 From WCCA1 Other sources Total WRA Custody. 111,999 111,155* 844 All Relocation Centers. 109,347 108,503 844 Central Utah. Colorado River. Heart Mountain. Jerome. Gila River. Granada. Manzanar. Minidoka. Rohwer. Tule Lake. 8,265 18,086 10,992 7,676 13,296 7,574 10,271 9,512 8,234 15,441 8,255 17,740 10,972 7,674 13,234 7,567 10,049 9,484 8,232 15,296 Other than to Relocation Centers. 2,652 2,652* Institutions, etc. 1,630 L022 1,630 1,022* 10 346 20 2 62 7 222 28 2 145 ♦Including 794 persons remaining in institutions in evacuated area, and who were never evacuated. 1For detail see Table 32. 384 JAPANESE 4. EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST General Population Data This section summarizes only the principal statistical source material an¬ alyzed by Wartime Civil Control Administration for purposes of the evacuation program. Reference should also be made to charts on statistics presented in previous chapters, particularly Chapter VIII. The total Japanese population of the United States in 1940 was 126,947. Though they were but a small proportion, less than one-tenth of one per cent, of the population of the United States as a whole, they outnumbered all other minor races of recent foreign origin. 45,563 Filipinos. There were only 77,504 Chinese and During the decade from 1930 to 1940, the Japanese popu¬ lation of the United States had decreased by 11,887, or 8.6 per cent. (See Table 60.) Of the 126,947 Japanese, 93,717, or 73.8 per cent, lived in the State of California alone. The eight states comprising the Western Defense Command had 117,3 64, or 92.5 per cent of all Japanese in continental United States. (See Figures 5 a and 5b, Chapter VIII, and Table 61.) A spot map showing the geographical distribution of persons of Japanese ancestry living in the Western Defense Command area at the time of the decennial Census of 1940 has been presented as Figure 6, Chapter VIII. Pre¬ vious sections of this report, particularly Chapters II and VIII, have called attention to the fact that the heaviest concentration of Japanese in the Pacific Coast area was in and immediately surrounding, the principal port cities: Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles and San Diego. In preparing estimates for use in planning the logistics of the evacuation movement a study was made of the trend of Japanese population growth in this area as well as of the distribution of the population. As indicated in Figure 37 the Japanese population of the United States reached its maximum in 1930 when the decennial Census enumerated 13 8,834. During the next decade there was a net decrease of 11,887, or 8.6 per cent. (See Table 62.) The percentage of the total Japanese population of the United States residing in the States of Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington has steadily increased for the past four decades. (See Figure 3 8.) Flowever, be¬ cause of the decrease in the total Japanese population in the United States from 1930 to 1940 none of the four states showed an increase in the Japanese population during this period; and of the principal cities only Los Angeles had more Japanese in 1940 than in 1930. (See Table 63 and Figure 39.) The changing sex composition of the Japanese population is shown in Figure 40. In 1900, 95 per cent of the total Japanese population of Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington there were 19 males for each female. consisted of males. In other words, During the period from 1910 to 1920, there was a sharp increase in the number of females—this was the era of "picture brides.” The proportion of females has steadily increased since 1920 as a result of an increased proportion of native-born. in the four States under discussion is given in Table 64. The changing sex ratio STATISTICAL c3R0W TH 01r JAFANES E UNI TED 385 SUMMARY PO PULA’noN STATIES : 1 870 T 0 194 0 JAP>kNESE POPU LATION il 700,000 200,000 100,000 18:888 70,000 60,000 50,000 40.000 JAPANESE POPULATION 10,000 8888 7,000 ftOOO - f ir««”=,c’r' 3TAL POPULAT ION Of PACIFIC COA ST (IX00 TIMES SCA LE) 3oe=30C=3 0C=30* 1,000 ** eaot=J- 188 It „r=>° * 700 600 )TAL POPULATION OF T HE UNITED 500 (100.000 TIMES SI ATES SC ALE) 400 300 200 1 70 60 50 40 30 20 ' W70 I860 1090 1900 1910 YEAR Figure 37 1920 1930 1940 386 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST DISTRIBUTION OF JAPANESE POPULATION ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, OREGON, WASHINGTON AND ENTIRE UNITED STATES: 1900 TO 1940 ARIZONA CALIFORN I A 100 90 80 o 70 * 60 u 50 a40 ql 30 20 10 0 WCftTCRN NPINII COMMAND ANO TOVRTN ARMY VAR TIM! CIVIL CONTROL AOMI NitT RATIO N Figure 3 8 SUMMARY 387 Figure 39 STATISTICAL 388 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Figure 40 STATISTICAL SUMMARY 389 In discussions concerning the possible evacuation of only enemy alien Japanese—which for practical purposes is the equivalent of all foreign-born— consideration was given to the fact that nearly two-thirds of the total Japanese population was native-born. Figure 41 shows the trend in nativity from 1900 to 1940 of the Japanese population of the four States under consideration. In 1900, less than three per cent of the Japanese population in Arizona, Califor¬ nia, Oregon and Washington was native-born. By 1910 this proportion had risen to only 8 per cent. The proportion of native-born has steadily increased because of the so-called "picture bride” era from 1910 to 1920, and the re¬ sultant native-born children, coupled with the shutting off of all immigration in 1924. At present the native-born (i.e., citizen) Japanese outnumber the aliens in these states by 71,896 to 41,089. Because of the peculiar age dis¬ tribution of this population group, however, nearly two-thirds of all adults, i.e., 21 years of age and over were aliens. (See Table 2, Chapter VIII.) A more striking form of presentation of the changing nativity of the Jap¬ anese population is shown in Figure 42 which shows the number of native and the foreign-born in the states under consideration from 1900 to 1940. Numer¬ ically the maximum population of foreign-born was in 1920 or shortly there¬ after. The free immigration of such persons was, of course, almost entirely stopped by legislation effective in 1924. Since 1920 the number of foreign-born Japanese has declined rapidly both because of death and emigration. If no further immigration is permitted, the number of foreign-born Japanese will shrink to negligible proportions during the next 3 0 years because of these trends. As has been pointed out in previous chapters, the nativity of the Japanese was not the controlling factor, in the evacuation program. The reason for this has been clearly stated. Within the native-born group are a substantial number who are Japanese in culture and patriotism. II and XXIV.) (See discussion of Kibei, Chapters The trend in age composition of the Japanese population of the United States for the past four decades is shown in Figure 43. In 1900, four out of every five Japanese persons were 20 years of age or older. Because of the immi¬ gration of young males between 1900 and 1910, the resultant population in 1910 consisted of nine persons 20 years of age and over for each person less than 20 years of age. The "picture bride” era from 1910 to 1920 and the re¬ duction of immigration of males by the "gentlemen’s agreement” of 1907 caused a rapid increase in the proportion of population in the younger age groups until, in 1930, 45 per cent of the population was less than 20 years of age. This increase in the proportion of children, plus the increase in the pro¬ portion who were in the older ages materially reduced the proportion of work¬ ers in the population, except for employment in family industries such as farms and small stores. Probably the most interesting analysis that can be made of the Japanese population of the United States is that which would result from a complete examination of the implications of the Japanese population as shown in Figure 44. The age data are the same as those presented in Figure 7 Chapter VIII but 390 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 41 Figure STATISTICAL SUMMARY 391 42 Figure 392 tZo oi-CL < O 2 ODo LU CL o CO <LJ !“ _,UJu> <r uj (/) Q_ t Q<| Z")3 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM 3DV±N3Db3d THE WEST COAST 43 Figure 393 STATISTICAL SUMMARY AGE AND SEX J A PA N E S E COMPOSITION P O P U L AT ION ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA,OREGON AND WASHINGTON: 1940 AGE 10 AGE 98765432 I O I 2345678910 FIGURES IN THOUSANDS NATIVE KwKi m » ou«t*u BORN FOREIGN BORN •COTIIIM KflNM COWMAN* AM* IOUMTH ARM* •ART MAC CIVIL CO NT ACM AMMNIM*TCM Tm c(m»w» Figure 44 394 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST are here arranged by sex as well as by nativity. Not only does the Japanese population consist of two distinct nativity groups, but it also consists of two very distinct generations—parents and children. This results from the sharp reduction in the immigration of male Japanese following the "gentlemen’s agreement” of 1907 and the virtual stoppage of all immigration of Japanese in 1924. Normally, with continued immigration, the younger brothers and sisters of the "parent” generation would have followed them to this country and would have supplied what is now the "missing generation” of males between 25 and 50 years of age and of females between 25 and 40. As compared with a normal age pyramid, that of the Japanese population shows a significant excess of males from 50 to 65 years of age (mostly immi¬ grants before 1910); a deficiency of males between 25 and 50 years of age and of females from 25 to 40 years of age; an excess of youths 15 to 25; and a deficiency of children under 15 years of age. This deficiency in younger chil¬ dren is apparently the result of two factors: (1) The generation of mothers have passed out of the child bearing period more rapidly than their daughters have entered it, and the birth rate, therefore, has declined; and (2) the Jap¬ anese custom of sending, or taking, young children to Japan for education (and an appreciable number undoubtedly for permanent residence) exagger¬ ates the apparent deficiency of Japanese children. The following are the median age of each of the sex and nativity groups shown in Figure 44 and Table 66: Both sexes All Japanese . . 23.4 Native-born . . 17.2 Foreign-born . . 49.7 Male Female 24.9 17.5 53.0 21.7 16.8 45.0 The industrial distribution of Japanese workers on the Pacific Coast is shown in Figure 45 and Table 67. In 1940, agriculture employed 22,027 Jap¬ anese 14 years old or over; 11,472, or 23.6 per cent were engaged in trade; 8,336 were in personal services; and 1,978 in manufacturing. Although the Japanese population of the Pacific Coast formed less than 1.2 per cent of the total population, the 6,118 Japanese-operated farms were 2.2 per cent of all farms in these States. These 6,118 farms had a total acreage of 258,074 and a total value of farm land and buildings of $72,600,000. Their average size was 42.2 acres, of which more than three-fourths (31.9 acres) was in harvested crop land. The average value of Japanese-operated firms was $11,867 compared with an average value of $11,717 for all farms in these States. (See Table 68.) Most of the Japanese engaged in agriculture worked on their own firms which were usually small family enterprises devoted to inter-tilled truck, fruit, and specialty crops. These crops were usually of a type which required intensive cultivation, such as strawberries, tomatoes, lettuce, onions, celery, nursery stock, peas, beans, fruit, sugar beets, etc. Estimates by Schiller and Thompson of the acreage of commercial truck crops grown by Japanese in California are pre- STATISTICAL 395 SUMMARY INDUSTRY OF EMPLOYED JAPANESE 14 YRS AND OLDER. BY SEX AND NATIVITY CALIFORNIA. OREGON. AND WASHINGTON NUMBER OF EMPLOYED JAPANESE *300 10000 AGRICULTURE. FORESTRY. AM) FISHERY WHOLESALE ANO RETAIL TRADE FOREIGN BORN NATIVE BORN PROFESSIONAL SERVICES ALL OTHERS Figure 45 15.000 1940 396 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST sented in Table 69. The Farm Security Administration, on direction of the Commanding General, was outstandingly successful in finding substitute oper¬ ators for Japanese farms and otherwise protecting the interests of the public as well as the Japanese farm operators. This is reported in detail in Chapter XI. An abnormally large proportion of all of the Japanese engaged in agricul¬ ture were unpaid family workers, 4,832 of the 22,027. More than half (2,715) of these unpaid family workers were women and girls. Though Japanese women were only 1.5 per cent of all employed women on the Pacific Coast states, the unpaid family workers constituted 48 per cent of all women on all West Coast farms who were so classified. Women and girls over 14 years of age comprise nearly one-fifth of all the Japanese agricultural workers, and they also formed more than one-fifth of all women and girls engaged in agriculture in the Pacific Coast states. However, the bulk of labor, Japanese men and boys, constituted only 4.5 per cent of all males engaged in agriculture. In trade, the Bureau of the Census reports that 4,972 workers were engaged in retail food stores, 2,190 in wholesale business (principally importing and specialties) and 2,082 in restaurants. All other retail and wholesale trades em¬ ployed only 2,228. The relative importance of wholesale and retail trade and of agriculture in terms of their employment of Japanese workers is shown in Figure 46. Although, in the initial phase of the evacuation program, to satisfy the objective of keeping communities together and moving them to Assembly Centers as close as possible to their place of residence, certain Centers comprised almost entirely urban and non-agricultural population, while other Centers were predominantly rural and farm population. It was a definite part of the original evacuation plan to relocate the evacuees in such a manner as to provide a more balanced occupational community in each Relocation Center. This was accom¬ plished by the transfer of both an urban and a rural Assembly Center group to most Relocation Centers. The logistics of movement, which required the evacu¬ ation of an entire Assembly Center to one Relocation Center if possible, and the geographic location and the completion of the Relocation Centers were other im¬ portant modifying factors in the accomplishment of this objective. Among the several special tabulations prepared by the Bureau of the Census for the Wartime Civil Control Administration, the most widely useful have been summarized in this chapter. Because of the interest throughout the Western Defense Command area in the distribution of Japanese population by counties, the special census tabulation showing the total number of individuals and the total number of Japanese heads of families is reproduced by States as Tables 70 to 77 at the end of this chapter. Similarly, widespread interest in the occupational and industrial classification of the Japanese population by sex and nativity has resulted in the inclusion of Tables 78-81. The Wartime Civil Control Administration published 12 statistical bulletins with summaries of the most important special tabulations received from the Bureau of the Census. These bulletins were prepared for the use of the civilian STATISTICAL SUMMARY Figure 4 6 397 398 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST and Military agencies and services participating in the evacuation program. The titles of these bulletins are as follows: Bulletin Number Title 1 Enemy Aliens and Japanese Citizens on the West Coast. 2 Japanese Population and Number of Japanese Family Heads in Arizona by Minor Civil Division: 1940. 3 Japanese Population and Number of Japanese Family Heads in Califor¬ nia by Minor Civil Divisions: 1940. 4 Japanese Population and Number of Japanese Family Heads in Wash¬ 5 Japanese Population and Number of Japanese Family Heads in Oregon ington by Minor Civil Divisions: 1940. by Minor Civil Divisions: 1940. 6 Japanese Farm Operators in Arizona, California, Oregon and Washing¬ ton, by Minor Civil Divisions. 7 Major Industry Groups of Japanese Employed Workers 14 Years Old and Over by Sex for California, Oregon, and Washington, by Counties: 1940. 8 Age of Japanese by Citizenship and Sex for Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington, by Counties: 1940. 9 Japanese Operated Farms by Tenure of Operator for Arizona, Califor¬ nia, Oregon and Washington, by Counties: 1940. 10 Employed Japanese Workers 14 Years Old and Over, by Major Occu¬ pation Group, Industry Group, and Sex, for California, Oregon, and Washington: 1940. 11 Japanese Population and Number of Japanese Family Heads by Nativ¬ ity, for Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Utah, by Counties and Minor Civil Divisions: 1940. 12 Characteristics of the Japanese Population (I) Pre-Evacuation Statistics, (II) Evacuation Statistics, (III) Analytical and Methodological Statistics. STATISTICAL 3 99 SUMMARY TABLE 60.—Population By Race, For The United States: 1940 and . (A minus sign (-) denotes decrease). 1930. Increase 1930 to 1940 1940 Race 1930 Amount Percent 131,669,275 122,775,046 8,894,229 7.2 White. Native-born. Foreign-born. 118,214,870 106,795,732 11,419,138 110,286,740 96,303,335 13,983,405 7,928,130 10,492,397 -2,564,267 7.2 10.9 -18.3 All classes. Negro. 12,865,518 11,891,143 974,375 8.2 Indian1. 333,969 332,397 1,572 0.5 Other races. Chinese. Japanese. Filipino. Hindu. Korean. All other. 254,918 77,504 126,947 45,563 2,405 1,711 788 264,766 74,954 138,834 45,208 3,130 1,860 780 -9,848 2,550 -11,887 355 -725 -149 8 -3.7 3.4 -8.6 0.8 -23.2 -8.0 1.0 ‘Indian is included in “Other Races” by Census. Source: Bureau of the Census. TABLE 61.—Geographical Distribution of The Japanese Population in The United States: 1940. Number Percent of United States Total United States. 126,947 100.0 Western Defense Command. 117,364 92.5 Military Areas 1 and 2. 112,985 89.0 Pacific Coast States. California. Washington. 112,353 93,717 4,071 14,565 88.5 73.8 3.2 11.5 632 0.5 Military Areas 3-6. Idaho (Military Area 3). Montana (Military Area 4). Nevada (Military Area 5). Utah (Military Area 6). 4,379 1,191 508 470 2,210 3.4 0.9 0.4 0.4 1.7 Outside Western Defense Command. 9,583 2,734 2,538 480 3,831 7.5 2.2 2.0 0.4 3.0 Area All Other States. Source: Bureau of the Census, 400 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST TABLE 62.—Nativity of Japanese in the United States: 1890 - 1940. Year Total Native-born Foreign-born 1940. 1930. 1920. 1910.•. 1900. 1890. 126,947 138,834 111,010 72,157 24,326 2,039 79,642 68,357 29,672 4,502 269 47,305 70,477 81,338 67,655 24,057 2,039 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 62.7 49.2 26.7 6.2 1.1 37.3 50.8 73.3 93.8 98.9 100.0 PERCENT 1940. 1930. 1920. 1910. 1900. 1890. Source: Bureau of the Census. TABLE 63.—Growth of Japanese Population in Certain Selected Cities of California, Oregon, and Washington: 1900 - 1940. DECENNIAL CENSUS OF — State and City 1940 1930 1920 1910 1900 CALIFORNIA Los Angeles. San Francisco. Oakland... Sacramento. Fresno. Stockton.. Berkeley. 23,321 5,280 1,790 2,879 797 1,259 1,319 21,081 6,250 2,137 3,347 1,176 1,386 1,320 11,618 5,358 2,709 1,976 1,119 840 911 4,238 4,618 1,520 1,437 629 475 710 150 1,781 194 336 175 39 OREGON Portland. 1,680 1,861 1,715 1,461 1,189 WASHINGTON Seattle. Tacoma. 6,975 877 8,448 1,193 7,874 1,306 6,127 1,018 2,990 606 Source: Bureau of the Census. STATISTICAL 401 SUMMARY TABLE 64.—Sex Composition of The Japanese Population in Arizona, Cali¬ fornia, Oregon, and Washington: 1900 - 1940. State and Year Both sexes Male Female Males per 100 females FOUR STATE TOTAL 1940. 1930. 1920. 1910. 1900. 112,985 121,130 94,040 58,074 18,550 63,208 70,091 59,921 49,832 17,699 49,777 51,039 34,119 8,242 851 127.0 137.3 175.6 604.6 2,079.8 ARIZONA 1940. 1930. 1920. 1910. 1900. 632 879 550 371 281 354 532 383 351 264 278 347 167 20 17 127.3 153.3 229.3 1,755.0 1,552.9 CALIFORNIA 1940. 1930. 1920. 1910. 1900. 93,717 97,456 71,952 41,356 10,151 52,550 56,440 45,414 35,116 9,598 41,167 41,016 26,538 6,240 553 127.7 137.6 171.1 562.8 1,735.6 OREGON 1940. 1930. 1920. 1910. 1900. 4,071 4,958 4,151 3,418 2 ,501 2,271 2,919 2,802 3,124 2,405 1,800 2,039 1,349 294 96 126.2 143.2 207.7 1,062.6 2,505.2 WASHINGTON 1940. 1930. 1920. 1910. 1900. 14,565 17,837 17,387 12,929 5,617 8,033 10,200 11,322 11,241 5,432 6,532 7,637 6,065 1,688 185 123.0 133.6 186.7 665.9 2,936.2 Source: Bureau of the Census. 402 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST TABLE 65.—Nativity of The Japanese Population in Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington: 1900 - 1940 NUMBER PERCENT State and Year Total Japanese Nativeborn Foreignbom Nativeborn Foreignbom FOUR STATE TOTAL 1940. 1930. 1920. 1910. 1900. 112,985 121,130 94,040 58,074 18,550 71,896 60,722 26,350 4,071 204 41,089 60,408 67,690 54,003 18,346 63.6 50.1 28.0 7.0 1.1 36.4 49.9 72.0 93.0 98.9 ARIZONA 1940. 1930. 1920. 1910. 1900. 632 879 550 371 281 412 464 121 6 220 415 429 365 281 65.2 52.8 22.0 1.6 0.0 34.8 47.2 78.0 98.4 100.0 CALIFORNIA 1940. 1930. 1920. 1910. 1900. 93,717 97,456 71,952 41,356 10,151 60,148 48,979 20,814 3,172 143 33,569 48,477 51,138 38,184 10,008 64.2 50.3 28.9 7.7 1.4 35.8 49.7 71.1 92.3 98.6 OREGON 1940. 1930. 1920. 1910. 1900. 4,071 4,958 4,151 3,418 2,501 2,454 2,361 994 138 10 1,617 2,597 3,157 3,280 2,491 60.3 47.6 23.9 4.0 0.4 39.7 52.4 76.1 96.0 99.6 WASHINGTON 1940. 1930. 1920. 1910. 1900. 14,565 17,837 17,387 12,929 5,617 8,882 8,918 4,421 755 5,683 8,919 12,966 12,174 5,566 61.0 50.0 25.4 5.8 0.9 39.0 50.0 74.6 94.2 99.1 Source: Bureau of the Census. 51 TABLE 66.—Age of Japanese By Sex and By Nativity for Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington: 1940 statistical summary 403 TABLE 66 (Continued).—Age of Japanese by Sex and Nativity for Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington: 1940 404 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST TABLE 66 (Continued).—Age of Japanese by Sex and Nativity for Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington: 1940 statistical summary 405 66 (Concluded).—Age of Japanese by Sex and Nativity for Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington: 1940 406 TABLE JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST i OB STATISTICAL 407 SUMMARY TABLE 67.—Employed Japanese Workers*, by Major Industry Groups, in California, Oregon, and Washington: 1940 Major Industry Group Number Percent 48,691 100.0 Agriculture. Forestry and fishing. Mining. .;. Construction. Manufacturing.. 22,027 786 12 96 1,978 45.2 1.6 0.0 0.2 4.1 Food and kindred products Printing and publishing Sawmills and planing mills. Logging. Textile and apparel. Others. 769 327 365 60 186 271 1.6 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.6 Transportation.. Utilities and communication. Trade. 686 20 11,472 1.4 0.0 23.6 Wholesale.... Food stores, retail. Restaurants. Other, including filling stations. 2,190 4,972 2,082 2,228 4.5 10.2 4.3 4.6 Personal services. 8,336 17.1 Domestic. Hotels and lodging places. Laundering, cleaning, and dyeing services Miscellaneous personal services. 4,744 1.335 1,478 779 9.7 2.7 3.0 1.6 Finance, insurance, real estate. Business and repair services. Professional and related services._. Amusement, recreation, and related services.... Government. Non-classifiable. 656 411 1,326 251 126 508 1.3 0.8 2.7 0.5 0.3 1.0 Total. *14 years old or over, employed except on public emergency work. Source: Bureau of the Census. 408 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST TABLE 68.—Japanese-Operated Farms Compared With All Farms in California, Oregon, and Washington, 1920-40 Category Number of farms'. Total. 1940 1930 1920 Percent Japanese. 276,173 6,118 2.2 261,733 4,744 1.8 234,164 6,075 2.6 All land in farms (acres): Total. Japanese. Percent Japanese. 63,694,000 258,074 0.4 60,526,000 212,064 0.4 56,153,000 394,696 0.7 Cropland harvested (acres): Total. Japanese. Percent Japanese. 12,929,000 195,288 1.5 Value of farms, land and buildings: Total. Japanese. Percent Japanese. * * * * * * $3,236,000,000 $72,600,000 2.2 $4,824,000,000 $93,000,000 1.9 $4,669,000,000 $148,400,000 3.2 Value of buildings: Total. Japanese. Percent Japanese. $649,474,000 $9,086,000 1.4 $737,486,000 $7,016,000 1.0 * * * Value of farm implements and machinery: Total. Japanese. Percent Japanese. $233,046,000 $6,829,000 2.9 $228,839,000 $4,121,000 1.8 * * * Average land in farms (acres): Total. Japanese. 230.6 42.2 231.3 44.7 Average cropland harvested (acres): Total. Japanese. 46.8 31.9 Average value of farms, land and build¬ ings: Total. Japanese. $11,717 $11,867 ♦Comparative data not available. Source: Bureau of the Census. 239.8 65.0 * * * * $18,431 $19,604 $19,939 $24,428 STATISTICAL TABLE 409 SUMMARY 69.—Acreage of Commercial Truck Crops Grown by Japanese in California1 Commodity Total 1940 acreage for State Estimated acres grown by Japanese Estimated acres grown by Japanese as percent of State acreage 10,600 79,780 563 6,950 4,600 2,373 6,850 5,300 20,164 287 6,602 4,369 1,011 2,362 50 25 51 95 95 43 34 26,100 12,000 9,800 13,700 7,830 2,880 3,605 3,630 30 24 37 26 6,700 8,850 4,487 6,302 67 71 8,850 3,100 1,800 5,627 2,954 1,710 64 95 95 2,330 2,200 1,890 30,350 15,200 16,500 27,550 800 1,350 3,200 2,394 1,165 1,100 1,420 10,530 3,800 4,935 7,637 240 675 1,440 182 50 50 75 35 25 30 28 30 50 45 8 Artichokes. Asparagus. Canning snap beans. Marketing snap beans (spring). Snap beans (fall). Green lima beans. Cabbage. Cantaloup: Imperial. Other. Carrots: (fall and winter). Spring. Cauliflower: Fall and winter. Spring. Celery: Fall and winter. Spring. Summer. Cucumbers: Pickle. Table. Garlic. Spring lettuce. Lettuce (Imperial). Summer lettuce. Fall lettuce. Bermuda onions. Intermediate onions. Late onions. Canning peas. Estimates made by Carl Schiller, Division of Agricultural Statistics, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, and Murray Thompson, economic adviser to western region. Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Released by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics for submission to the House Committee Investigating National Defense Migration. Table 34, Supplement I of the Committee’s report, “Findings and Recommendations on Evacuation of Enemy Aliens and Others from Prohibited Military Zones”, May, 1942. TABLE 70.—Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Arizona, by Counties: 1940 (The only counties listed are those which had Japanese in 1940) INDIVIDUALS HEADS OF FAMILIES County Total Alien Citizen Total Alien Citizen State total. 632 220 412 128 117 11 Apache. Coconino. Gila. Greenlee. Maricopa. 1 9 4 1 534 2 1 1 175 i 1 1 101 i l l 93 8 Navajo. Pima. Yavapai. Yuma. 49 17 4 13 24 8 4 5 15 4 3 2 14 2 3 2 Source: Bureau of the Census 1 7 3 359 25 9 8 1 2 • •' 410 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST TABLE 71.—Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in California, by Counties: 1940 (The only counties listed are those which had Japanese in 1940) INDIVIDUALS HEADS OF FAMILIES County Total Alien Citizen Total Alien Citizen State total. 93,717 33,569 60,148 18,838 15,117 3,721 Alameda. Amador. Butte. Calaveras. Colusa. 5,167 2 216 6 155 1,785 3,382 2 143 6 103 1,068 853 215 42 33 9 30 25 5 Contra Costa. El Dorado. Fresno. Imperial. 829 3 4,527 1,583 1 311 2 1,508 589 1 518 1 3,019 994 169 1 854 326 1 138 1 699 294 1 31 Kern. Kings. Lake. Los Angeles. Madera. 756 508 1 36,866 170 359 185 1 13,391 52 397 323 112 136 1 8,068 26 87 121 1 6,402 21 Marin. Mendocino. Merced. 150 53 715 4 2,247 82 32 234 4 717 32 8 133 2 437 26 7 112 2 340 34 677 490 1 183 20 1,178 1,147 369 7 347 313 1 114 6 274 251 1 96 1 73 62 Riverside. 54 1,855 1,637 1 552 Sacramento. San Benito. San Bernardino. San Diego. San Francisco. 6,764 526 346 2,076 5,280 2,275 145 135 793 2,276 4,489 381 211 1,283 3,004 1,220 96 68 398 1,138 995 74 56 325 953 225 22 12 73 185 San Joaquin. San Luis Obispo. San Mateo. Santa Barbara. Santa Clara. 4,484 925 1,218 2,187 4,049 1,725 286 418 768 1,220 2,759 639 800 1,419 2,829 786 187 244 441 573 626 152 191 352 437 160 35 53 89 136 Santa Cruz. Shasta. Siskiyou. Solano. Sonoma. 1,301 2 7 906 758 370 1 3 388 209 931 1 4 518 549 245 2 2 193 132 187 1 1 169 96 58 1 1 24 36 Stanislaus. Sutter. Tehama. Tulare. Ventura. 369 423 38 1,812 672 138 149 11 711 251 231 274 27 1,101 421 68 87 8 337 141 57 70 5 273 114 11 17 3 64 27 Yolo. Yuba. 1,087 429 388 146 699 283 178 66 139 53 39 13 Monterey. Napa. Orange. Placer. Source: Bureau of the Census. 73 52 23,475 118 68 21 481 1,530 155 32 25 15 1,666 5 6 1 21 97 18 STATISTICAL 411 SUMMARY TABLE 72.—Nativity of all Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Oregon, by Counties: 1940 (The only counties listed are those which had Japanese in 1940) INDIVIDUALS HEADS OF FAMILIES County Total Alien Citizen Total Alien Citizen 4,071 1,617 2,454 893 790 103 Baker.... Clackamas Clatsop... Columbia. Deschutes. 46 163 98 38 14 25 52 54 18 6 21 111 44 20 8 8 25 26 12 3 8 20 24 10 3 5 2 2 Grant. Hood River. Jackson. Jefferson.... Klamath... . 10 462 41 12 1 5 162 20 2 5 300 21 10 1 2 89 10 4 1 2 79 10 1 . Lake... Lane... Lincoln. Linn.. . Malheur 11 1 4 4 137 5 1 2 2 37 6 1 1 2 2 100 1 1 28 1 1 24 193 3 2,390 28 3 70 2 968 15 2 123 1 1,422 13 1 34 1 550 9 1 30 1 484 9 1 10 10 82 245 65 5 1 34 105 24 5 9 48 140 41 2 1 18 54 12 18 49 12 State total Marion.... Morrow. . . Multnomah Polk. Sherman... Umatillo.. . Union. Wasco. Washington Yamhill. . . , Source: Bureau of the Census. 10 3 1 4 4 66 2 1 5 412 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST TABLE 73.—Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Washington, by Counties: 1940 (The only counties listed are those which had Japanese in 1940) HEADS OF FAMILIES INDIVIDUALS County Total Citizen Alien Citizen Alien Total 446 14,565 5,683 8,882 3,154 2,708 23 1 69 26 17 9 4 4 35 17 6 14 1 34 9 11 8 13 3 8 13 3 Clark. Cowlitz. 110 127 3 67 2 38 49 2 27 2 72 78 1 40 21 44 1 10 1 17 31 1 10 1 4 13 Jefferson. King. Kitsap. 37 9,863 345 9 121 13 3,896 117 2 53 24 5,967 228 7 68 7 2,200 64 1 23 5 1,899 55 1 21 2 301 9 5 1 3 1 State total. Klickitat. 2 Lewis. Lincoln. Mason. Pacific. 62 33 23 94 14 20 13 8 39 3 42 20 15 55 11 19 6 6 21 2 14 5 3 20 2 Pierce. 2,050 2 66 4 57 770 2 26 1 28 1,280 339 1 9 1 16 54 40 3 29 393 1 15 1 16 362 13 90 17 28 168 5 41 10 11 194 8 49 7 17 65 3 35 3 6 59 3 26 2 6 6 16 814 6 266 10 548 3 159 3 130 Skagit. Spokane. Thurston. Walla Walla. Yakima. Source: Bureau of the Census. 6 9 1 29 STATISTICAL 413 SUMMARY TABLE 74.—Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Idaho, by Counties: 1940 (The only counties listed are those which had Japanese in 1940) INDIVIDUALS HEADS OF FAMILIES County Total State total. Citizen Total Alien Citizen 1,191 426 765 239 209 17 175 7 1 107 5 56 2 1 37 12 119 5 70 3 30 1 1 20 3 29 1 1 16 5 20 190 27 4 2 7 66 11 2 3 13 124 16 2 2 3 32 2 1 1 3 27 2 1 4 149 2 1 20 1 67 2 1 6 3 82 14 1 36 1 1 4 1 34 1 1 2 11 9 12 14 11 4 5 4 6 8 7 4 8 8 3 2 3 2 4 4 2 2 2 4 4 36 9 5 3 23 8 5 3 2 14 28 4 2 1 9 6 6 2 2 7 4 4 2 2 5 182 22 8 50 1 48 6 2 19 134 16 6 31 1 30 3 1 12 27 3 1 10 1 11 3 2 1 8 3 2 Bannock. Bingham. Boise. Bonneville. Canyon. Elmore. Fremont. Jerome. Kootenai. Lincoln. Madison. Owyhee. Twin Falls. Washington. Source: Alien Bureau of the Census. 1 1 46 11 7 30 1 4 1 5 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 1 1 15 6 4 31 5 3 3 414 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST TABLE 75.—Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Montana, by Counties: 1940 (The only counties listed are those which had Japanese in 1940) HEADS OF FAMILIES INDIVIDUALS County Total Citizen Alien Total Citizen Alien State total. 508 227 281 128 114 Chouteau. 10 39 7 13 11 6 12 2 9 4 4 27 5 4 7 3 7 2 8 3 3 7 2 8 2 24 3 1 3 57 7 2 1 1 26 17 1 9 1 6 1 2 31 1 17 1 17 39 10 1 60 27 24 5 1 17 7 15 5 3 3 1 12 7 3 3 1 10 4 13 32 13 1 9 7 18 10 1 6 6 14 3 3 5 3 1 4 3 5 3 1 4 7 9 19 3 10 4 3 7 3 3 3 6 12 7 3 1 6 1 2 3 1 2 1 2 Valley. Wheatland. 1 2 4 18 24 1 2 1 11 6 3 7 18 1 1 1 6 4 1 1 1 5 4 Yellowstone. 38 20 18 9 9 Custer. Hill.'.. Lewis and Clark. Rosebud. Source: Bureau of the Census. 43 20 3 14 1 3 2 3 4 1 . 415 STATISTICAL SUMMARY TABLE 76.—Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Nevada, by Counties: 1940 (The only counties listed are those which had Japanese in 1940) INDIVIDUALS HEADS OF FAMILIES County Total Alien Citizen Total Alien Citizen 470 245 225 84 78 6 35 49 4 60 12 8 18 2 30 3 27 31 2 30 9 4 9 1 20 3 4 9 1 18 2 2 1 Lyon. Nye. 5 20 17 2 6 4 7 10 1 3 1 13 7 1 3 3 4 3 1 1 3 4 2 1 1 1 Pershing. Washoe. White Pine. 6 60 194 3 21 135 3 39 59 1 11 23 1 9 23 2 State total. Clark. Elko. Humboldt. Source: Bureau of the Census. TABLE 77.—Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Utah, by Counties: 1940 (The only counties listed are those which had Japanese in 1940) INDIVIDUALS HEADS OF FAMILIES County Total State Total. Alien Citizen Total Alien Citizen 2,210 829 1,381 428 396 32 289 26 193 424 20 78 8 110 132 8 211 18 83 292 12 49 4 40 74 3 44 4 35 71 3 5 24 16 1 773 1 8 5 1 317 1 16 11 456 5 3 1 155 5 3 1 141 26 5 40 37 7 7 3 14 17 2 19 2 26 20 5 3 2 10 9 1 3 2 10 9 1 328 118 210 69 64 Box Elder. Carbon. Davis. Millard. Salt Lake. Utah. Weber. Source: Bureau of the Census. 5 3 14 5 416 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST , and Washington: 1940.—Continued STATISTICAL SUMMARY 417 Employed Workers 14 Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity, and Major Occupation and Industry Groups, for California, Oregon, and Washington: 418 TABLE 78.—Japanese 1940.—Concluded JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST TABLE 79.—Japanese Employed Workers 14 Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity, and Major Occupation and Industry Groups, for California: 1940 statistical summary 419 Employed Workers 14 420 TABLE 79.—Japanese Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity, and Major Occupation and Industry Groups, for California: 1940.—Continued BOTH SEXES MALE FEMALE Major Occupation Group and Industry Group 00 NO O' O -H T* • *H IO • CN • • vh • N CN to O' O' 00 O' ^ —< ^ CN • io • • • cn • • lOTfN v© O *h CN 0"0 >© o -H IO -H IO IO CO 00 t''* CN 80 405 368 • •H 764 1,442 724 CO oo CO CO CO 2,320 1,615 3,197 955 ^ 00 vOt^ oo cNr^ 00 *-< VO pH © N 3,678 cn • <o . . • O CN 4 3 5 7 1 2 *oo -rH • N • CO • • Tf r<5 -rH CN CN 'O <N VO t* CN *-( IO IO IO 46 69 36 • lO»ON covooo • • 00 • • CN • • 1,036 2,254 480 1 10 •T* CN —< VO Wholesale trade. Food and dairy products stores, and milk retailing. Eating and drinking places. • O' CO JO 4,724 177 'Ot^CN^HT^COCN'rHlOOO —i 9,336 Nativeborn 325 391 12 27 CO CO IO CO CN *-< 00 IO CN O CN IO CN Ov ©v CN Wholesale and retail trade. Foreignborn 502 rr) .IO vO • 0'-HIOCN'©1000-*'©00 XT) pH ^ ^ CO 155 49 69 36 1 4 241 Total ^ ’^OOO'H'OO^'O © IOCN© CN CN HN^tH^TtCNHlOO' CS 159 55 161 61 3 13 1 13 Nativeborn CO I'- O' CO CN CN -CO00 00© CN • MHH -h 00 N Transport, communication and other public utilities... Railroads (inc. r.r. repair shops) and railway exp. service... Trucking service. Other transportation.. Communication. Utilities. CN 00 00^0 388 in't^HMCN'O T* Transportation equipment, except automobile. Other and not specified manufacturing industries. 629 ^ CN -h CO -H O' -h CN -H pH CO ^ lOO'OH'OO'NH O' CN CO *OCNiO IO CN Chemicals and allied products. Petroleum and coal products. Leather and leather products. Stone, clay, and glass products. Iron and steel and their products. Nonferrous metals and their products. Machinery.%... 418 O CN 00ON 00-VO -H pH 713 CO O' CN 1,131 Total Foreignborn 'O-»H00CN'O'O00^-''OCN vO—» CN Manufacturing. Food and kindred products. Textile-mill products. Apparel and other fabricated textile products. LocrcinET. Sawmills and planing mills. ..... Furniture, store fixtures, and miscellaneous wooden goods.. Paper and allied products... Printing, publishing, and allied industries. Nativeborn JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Total Foreignborn STATISTICAL SUMMARY 421 Employed Workers 14 Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity, and Major Occupation and Industry Groups, for Oregon: 422 TABLE 80.—Japanese 1940 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Table 80.—Japanese Employed Workers 14 Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity, and Major Occupation and Industry Groups, for Oregon: 1940.—Continued STATISTICAL SUMMARY ing pl< 423 424 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST TABLE 81.—Japanese Employed Workers 14 Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity, and Major Occupation and Industry Groups, for Washington: 1940 STATISTICAL SUMMARY 425 1 426 ►4 W ! PP H Groups, for Washington: 1940.—Continued JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST B6 >* B tr> !=> Q Z Q >—t < Z H o 0* O y < O o Q a >< o a a a w 1940.—Concluded Groups, for Washington: STATISTICAL SUMMARY 427 PART IX PICTORIAL SUMMARY Pictorial Summary To accommodate persons of Japanese ancestry subject to evacuation, pend¬ ing their transfer inland, fourteen temporary Assembly Centers, and one Recep¬ tion Center were constructed in the states of California, Oregon and Wash¬ ington in the record period of an average of 21 days each. A former Civilian Conservation Corps camp in Arizona was conditioned as an Assembly Center also. Accommodations varied in capacity from 2,500 to 19,000 persons each. The one Reception Center, at Manzanar, Inyo County, California, was sub¬ sequently transferred to the War Relocation Authority, a civilian agency, and became one of ten Relocation Centers. The United States Army Engineers were responsible for the building of all Assembly Centers under the supervision of the Commanding General, Western Defense Command. Construction of the temporary Assembly Centers was necessary because of the need for speedy evacuation. This could not await the site selection for and construction of the Relocation Centers. In some cases existing buildings at fair grounds and race tracks utilized for the Assembly Centers were renovated and converted into lodgings, but generally the quarters were newly erected. Each building usually contained four apart¬ ments. In addition, there were constructed or put into condition a variety of other facilities, services and buildings such as administration headquarters, mess halls, hospital units, laundries, washrooms, center stores or canteens, work shops, recrea¬ tional, educational and religious centers. Fields were improved for outdoor recrea¬ tional activities. The series of selected photographs on the following pages, assembled from a number of sources, show phases of the evacuation program. Figures 142 to 149, inclusive, show construction activity and completed facilities in Relocation Centers. The construction, equipment and initial supply of Relocation Centers was a function of Western Defense Command. The United States Army Engineers also were responsible to the Commanding Gen¬ eral for the construction of Relocation Centers. 431 432 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST SOURCE OF SELECTED PHOTOGRAPHS The following listings, identifying each photo by the "Figure No.” preceding it in the follow¬ ing pages, shows the source from which gathered. OFFICIAL UNITED STATES United States Signal Corps—2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 , 9, 10 . 11, 12, 13, 26, 27, 28., 29, 30, 31, 46, 48, 49,, 51, 52, 53, 62, 63, 64., 66, 67, 69, 18 , 20, 22, 23, 24., 25, 3 6 , 37, 38, 39, 43,, 45, 54 , 55, 56, 57, 58 , 61, GOVERNMENT United PHOTOS States Army Engineers—142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 148. Wartime Civil Control Administration, 70,, 71, 72, 78, 79,, 80, 84, 85, 86 , 88,, 90, 91,, 95, 97 , 98 , 100, 101, Santa 104., 107, 108, 109,, 11 o, 112, 113 , H4, 115, 116 , 117, 118, 119 , 120, 121, 122 , 123, 124, 125,, 126, 127, 128 , 129, 130, 131 , 1313, 137, 138. 75, 76, 77, 81, 83, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 99, 102, NEWSPAPER AND Anita, California, Assembly Center— 19, 21, 32, 33, 42, 44, 47, 50, 59, 60, 65, 68, 103, 105, 106, 111, 132, 139, 140. War Relocation Authority—145, 149. PICTURE SERVICE PHOTOS Courtesy of paper or service indicated. Acme Newspictures, Inc.—1, 74, 82. Portland, Oregon, Oregonian—141. Long Beach, Calif., Press-Telegram—15. Portland, Oregon, Oregon Journal— Los Angeles, Calif., Daily News— 134, 135, 136. 35, 40, 41, 87. Sacramento, Calif., Union—34. Los Angeles, Calif., Times—4, 16. San Francisco, Calif., News—73. Oakland, Calif., Post-Enquirer—17. Tacoma, Wash., News-Tribune—14. PICTORIAL Figure 1: County, 433 SUMMARY An early construction scene at Manzanar Reception Center, in Owens Valley, Inyo California. This was the first of a series of Centers constructed by the Army, and later became a Relocation Center under the War Relocation Authority. Figure 2: A portion of the completed Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center, situated within the world famous race track at Arcadia, California. This was the largest of all Assembly Centers. Nearly 19,000 persons were lodged here. 434 Figure 3: JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Members of an advance party of evacuees loading bedding and other equipment in warehouse at Pomona (California) Assembly Center. Centers were readied for evacuee reception in advance. Figure 4: Scene in the first kitchen to be opened at the Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. Modern kitchen and cooking equipment were supplied the mess halls at all centers. PICTORIAL SUMMARY 435 Figure 5: Delivering issues of bedding and household utensils to apartment of a newly arrived evacuee family. Figure 6: Military Police posting Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1, requiring evacuation of Japanese living on Bainbridge Island, in Puget Sound, Washington. Civilian Exclusion Orders, numbered 1 to 108, were issued by the Commanding General ordering exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from 108 specific areas in the states of California, Oregon, Washington, and Arizona. 436 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Figure 7: Young Japanese couple receive their registration record as first step in the evacuation of San Francisco. The same system and forms were used in registration in all evacuation operations. Group of registrants in Civil Control Station at Sanger, California. After receiving registration forms, evacuees were interviewed by civilian clerks, who aided them in filling out the necessary blanks. Figure 8: PICTORIAL SUMMARY 437 Figure 9: Registrants being interviewed by the Public Assistance Department of the Control Station at Visalia, California. Those who registered were given opportunity to arrange their affairs. They then returned to the Control Station, where they were again interviewed to ascertain if they needed assistance to evacuate. 10: Group being interviewed by Farm Security Administration representatives. Ar¬ rangements were made to assist evacuees in the equitable disposition of their agricultural interests and properties. Figure 438 JAPANESE Figure 11: EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Japanese being interviewed by a representative of the Federal Reserve Bank at San Francisco Control Station, assisted by a young Japanese of American birth a as interpreter and clerk. The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco had representatives at all Control Sta¬ tions to aid or advise evacuees as to storage or equitable disposition of their personal and business properties. Figure 12: Scene at an assistant Provost Marshal’s desk in the Visalia, California, Control Station, July 28, 1942. Representatives of the Provost Marshal’s office were assigned to all of the Control Stations to instruct evacuees as to time and place of departure for the Assembly Centers and to pass an application for deferment. Soldier assists departing evacuees at a Tacoma, Wash- ington, Civil Control Station. Figure 13: Figure 14: Preliminary medical examination of a family group at a physical examinations of all evacuees. during the processing operations, or supplied local physicians, to conduct SUMMARY trained physicians and registered nurses on hand at all Control Stations Los Angeles control station. The United States Public Health Service had PICTORIAL 439 440 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Figure 15: Group of young Japanese girls arriving at a Long Beach, California railroad station to board a special electric train for the Santa Anita Assembly Center, April 4, 1942. Figure 16: Caravan of trucks loaded with baggage and private cars ready to leave a Control Station in Los Angeles, April 2 8, 1942 for Manzanar Reception Center. Departure from the various areas was at first by private automobile, with trucks for baggage. Later only by train or bus. Large moving vans were available to handle household or other goods the evacuees desired to have stored under supervision of the Federal Reserve Bank. PICTORIAL Figure 17: Station April Evacuees 30, 1942. loading baggage Evacuees from and 441 SUMMARY boarding special the San Francisco busses (California) at a Bay Berkeley Control Area were trans¬ ported from the Control Stations to Tanforan Assembly Center. Group of evacuees assembled at a Los Angeles railroad station waiting to board train for Santa Anita Assembly Center. Other evacuees were transported from their residence areas to Assembly Centers by train. Figure 18: 442 Figure JAPANESE 19: Center and Group of evacuees EVACUATION after FROM arriving by bus undergoing baggage inspection. Upon at THE WEST Santa Anita COAST (California) Assembly arrival at Assembly Centers the baggage of evacuees was inspected by the Interior Security Police and articles of contraband removed and receipts issued for this and other articles not needed for storage in warehouses. Figure 20: A trainload of evacuees arrive by train at Santa Anita (California) Center and disembark for registration within the Center and assignment to quarters. Assembly PICTORIAL SUMMARY 443 Figure 21: Registration and processing scene at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. On arrival at Assembly Centers, the evacuees were directed to registrars, who had the individual and family files before them, registered in and assigned to quarters; given identification buttons and escorted to quarters. Head of a family of four being interviewed after arrival at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. After assignment to quarters, the head of each family was interviewed by members of the administrative staff, usually Japanese, as to experience, ability and willingness to work. Figure 22: 444 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 23: Guard on duty in watch tower at Tanforan (California) Assembly Center. The Military Police were responsible for the external security of the Assembly Centers. In addition to details of Military Police assigned to the external boundaries of the Centers, guard towers were erected at strategic points and a watch kent for fires or other dangers. Figure PICTORIAL SUMMARY 445 24: Japanese police unit at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. Under Caucasian supervision, internal police units of evacuees were organized in the Assembly Centers. Figure Figure 25: Unit of the Tanforan (California) Assembly Center Fire Department, manned by two Caucasian firemen and a group of evacuees who were given training in fire prevention. Modern fire fighting equipment was supplied to all Assembly Centers, in many cases from the nearest town or city, and operated under the direction of experienced firemen. 446 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Figure 26: Administrative staffs under the Caucasian Center Manager were established at all Centers to supervise all Center operations and activities. Evacuee personnel were enlisted and paid to assist in administration as well as all other Center work. Scene in an Assembly Center Welfare Office. Figure 27: Mess and lodging office at Pomona (California) Assembly Center. Another phase of administration was the mess and lodging staff composed of evacuees under the direction of a Caucasian manager. This unit handled the assignment of Japanese employees to mess and lodging employment. PICTORIAL SUMMARY 447 Figure 28: Employment office at the Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. Employment offices, through which evacuees desiring to work were given suitable assignments, were established in all the Centers. Figure 29: Scene in the timekeeping office at Stockton (California) Assembly Center. 448 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 3 0: The information section at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. An important phase of the administrative facilities at each Assembly Center was the information unit. Figure notice "wwiwioS notice NC SAllSSKALl MJtDt rt*o^ *"01 COWOfi Figure 31: Evacuees drawing coupon books at Assembly Center. In addition to the nominal wages paid, if employed within the Centers, evacuees were entitled without cost to coupon or script books, redeemable at Center stores or canteens for personal items. PICTORIAL SUMMARY 449 Figure 32. Finance division at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. Evacuees staffed the finance divisions at all the Centers, where employment and other fiscal records were kept. Figure 33: Group of evacuee representatives of the Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center at a regular meeting. Evacuees in the Assembly Centers expressed their opinion and recommenda¬ tions on internal problems through a center council, which worked in an advisory capacity with the administrative staff. 450 EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Wr JAPANESE 3 Figure Figure 34: 3 5: Family group in an apartment at Sacramento (California) Assembly Center. Brother and sister preparing quarters at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. PICTORIAL Figure 3 6: SUMMARY 451 A single men’s dormitory at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. Figure 37: Evacuees signing up for clothing issue at Fresno (California) Assembly Center. Clothing allowances for necessary apparel for evacuees were authorized, upon application. 452 Figure JAPANESE 38: EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST An evacuee checker inspecting fresh vegetables at Fresno (California) Assembly Center. 39: Evacuee workers at the Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center preparing vegetables for cooking. Assorted vegetables were supplied for standard and special diets for the evacuees, and prepared for table by the evacuee culinary staffs. Figure PICTORIAL SUMMARY 453 A kitchen scene at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. In all Assembly Centers food for the evacuees was prepared in modern kitchens by Japanese culinary staffs, operating under Caucasian supervision. Figure 40: A group of evacuee bakers at the Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center preparing a batch of apple cobbler. Figure 41: 454 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Figure 42: A scene in the meat storage room at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. Evacuees received a balanced ration, which included fresh meat, vegetables and fruits. Refrig¬ eration facilities were provided at all Centers. 43: Evacuee meat cutters at work at Turlock (California) Assembly Center. Exper¬ ienced evacuee butchers were employed in the meat cutting departments at the Centers, under supervision of Caucasian cooks. Figure PICTORIAL SUMMARY 44: Japanese fish butchers at the Santa Anita (California) fish in season was supplied for the evacuees where available. Figure 455 Assembly Center. Fresh Evacuee waitresses setting tables in a mess hall in one of the assembly centers— meals were served family style in nearly all centers. Figure 45: 456 Figure 46: JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM A family group at mess at Tanforan THE (California) WEST COAST Assembly Center. Every effort was made to provide mess facilities for family groups. Figure 47: Sanitation in kitchens and mess halls in all assembly centers was rigidly supervised. A dishwashing unit in operation at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. PICTORIAL SUMMARY 457 48: An evacuee nurse’s aid at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center, weighing a baby, while mother watches. Modern facilities were provided for the care of infants at the Assembly Center. Figure 49: An evacuee doctor examining a baby while an evacuee nurse writes the medical record. Experienced physicians and nurses were provided at all Centers to protect the health of infant evacuees. Figure 458 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 50: An infant formula preparation unit at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. Formula kitchens under the direction of the chief medical officers and hospital dieticians pre¬ pared the formulaes under the most sanitary conditions, and prepared the bottles for delivery. Figure 51: An evacuee messenger delivering a bottle of baby formula to a mother at Fresno (California) Assembly Center. Baby formulaes were delivered direct to the apartments of the infants by messengers, or obtained at convenient milk station. Figure PICTORIAL SUMMARY 459 52: Evacuee workers giving garbage cans a daily washing, at Puyallup (Washington) Assembly Center. Figure 53: A wash room scene at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. Modern wash rooms, with hot and cold running water, were provided in all of the Centers. Figure 460 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE 54: A shower room scene at Fresno (California) rooms for men and women were provided in all Centers. Figure WEST COAST Assembly Center. Separate shower m 55: First-aid treatment for superficial cuts and bruises being administered at the Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. Modern first-aid stations were provided at all the Centers. Figure PICTORIAL 56: A technician in X-Ray laboratory at Pomona Hospital equipment at the centers included X-Ray machines. Figure 461 SUMMARY (California) Assembly Center. 57: A mock operation scene at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. Skilled surgeons and experienced surgical nurses were among the evacuees at nearly all of the Centers. Figure- JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 4m* 462 58: Attended by evacuee nurses and orderlies, convalescing patients rest in the shade on the lawn behind the center hospital at Puyallup (Washington) Assembly Center. Figure Figure 59: of essential Hospital pharmacy at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. A complete line drugs and medical supplies were available at all Assembly Center pharmacies. PICTORIAL SUMMARY 463 60: Two evacuee laboratory technicians at work at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. Hospital facilities at all centers included adequately equipped laboratories. Figure 61: Dental clinic in operation at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. Many dentists were among the evacuees and they conducted clinics under Caucasian supervision, to provide essential dental care. Figure 464 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM 62: Laundry room at Portland (Oregon) veniently located, were provided in all Centers. Figure Figure 63: THE WEST COAST Assembly Center. Laundry facilities con¬ One of several laundry drying yards at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. PICTORIAL SUMMARY 465 Figure 64: An ironing room at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. Facilities for ironing clothes, including sockets for electric irons, were provided at all the Centers. Figure 65: One of two 12-chair barber shops at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. Barber shops were operated in all the Centers. 466 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 66: One of the Pomona (California) Assembly Center stores with various sections selling cookies, cakes, pies and fruit, tobaccos, drugs and sundries. Center stores, or canteens were operated in all Assembly Centers and carried a wide variety of articles which the evacuees could purchase with coupons issued each month. Figure Figure 67: A display of an assortment of candy bars at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. PICTORIAL Figure 68: A busy hour in one of the three canteens at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. 69: The lost and found department at Portland department was found in each Center. Figure 467 SUMMARY (Oregon) Assembly Center. This 468 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 70: A shoe repair shop at Stockton (California) Assembly Center. Experienced evacuee shoemakers operated repair shops in some Centers for employees only. Figure 71: The laundry and dry cleaning office at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. These facilities were available to evacuees at all Centers through service offices manned by evacuees. Figure PICTORIAL SUMMARY 469 72: The post office at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. Complete postal service, under jurisdiction of the nearest U. S. Post Office, was provided at all Centers and included regular mail delivery, general delivery, parcel post, money order, and other units. Figure 73: A play scene at Tanforan (California) Assembly Center, with home-made rocking horses, teeter-totters, and swings. Playfields with rustic equipment made of scrap material and other installations stimulated recreational and outdoor play activities which many young evacuees had never before enjoyed. Figure 470 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 74: Adults and children sailing model yachts in a contest during a Mardi Gras cele¬ bration at Tanforan (California) Assembly Center. A variety of recreational activities were conducted at various Centers. Figure Evacuees in a watermelon eating contest at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. Special activities sections were established at centers under the Recreation Division and conducted diversified recreational stunts. Figure 75: PICTORIAL SUMMARY 471 IHMI Figure 76: A baby parade, with humorous touches added by adults posing as infants, was a feature of a three day "Funita” staged at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. Figure 77: A youthful group intensely interested in a game of Monopoly at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. 472 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 78: "Go,” a Japanese type of chess or checkers, being played at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. A variety of games were provided as part of the recreational programs. Figure 79. A family group enjoy a card game and the radio outside of their quarters at an Assembly Center. Figure PICTORIAL Figure 80: Figure 81: 473 SUMMARY A needlework display at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. A handicraft and hobby show at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center 474 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST A portion of a handicraft and hobby show staged at Tanforan (California) Assem¬ bly Center, where everything from juvenile drawings and paintings to model airplanes were shown. Figure 82: PICTORIAL SUMMARY 475 83: A rocking chair made by an evacuee at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. Evacuees made many improvised articles of furniture out of scrap material, usually with no more tools than a saw and hammer. -t. m, Figure 84: Evacuees signing for baseball equipment, horseshoes and volley balls at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. Athletic equipment was available to evacuees at all centers for nearly all types of sports. Figure 476 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 85: Two young evacuees at "skin the cat” on exercise bars at Portland Assembly Center. Figure (Oregon) Figure 86: A youthful group of "pyramiders” in action at Fresno (California) Assembly Center. Gymnastics was a favorite form of recreation of many of the younger evacuees. PICTORIAL SUMMARY 477 •a 87: A volley ball game at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. Baseball, basketball, tennis and badminton facilities were also available at Centers. Figure 88: Action in a baseball game at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. Baseball was favorite sport at all of the Centers and many teams were organized and played regular league schedules within the Centers. Figure a 478 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Figure 89: Softball games proved popular with the girls at Assembly Centers. Leagues were organized, and re-organized at intervals to permit new players to participate. Figure 90: A group of young evacuees receiving instruction in Jiu Jitsui, or Judo wrestling, at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center, while rest of class look on. PICTORIAL Figure SUMMARY 91: A shot at the basket at Stockton (California) Assembly Center. and other forms of sports were available to the feminine evacuees. 479 Basketball, softball 480 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 92: A sumo match at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center, with the referee in traditional costume. Sumo, another form of Japanese type wrestling, was a favorite activity at the Centers. Figure 93: Action in an American style wrestling match at Santa Anita (California) sembly Center. Figure As¬ PICTORIAL SUMMARY 481 The "Starlight Serenaders,” a first class dance orchestra organized at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. This is one of many dance and concert orchestras organized at the Assembly Centers. Figure 94: 95: A dance scene at Fresno (California) Assembly Center. Dancing was an almost nightly diversion for the younger evacuees at the Centers. Figure 482 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 96: Japanese-Hawaiian hula dancers on an improvised stage during one of the frequent talent shows at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. Figure Figure 97: Majorettes of all sizes and ages in drills at Fresno (California) Assembly Center. Drill teams of many types were organized at various Centers. PICTORIAL Figure SUMMARY 483 98: A Japanese girl impersonating a popular motion picture actress at Turlock (Califor¬ nia) Assembly Center Amateur show. at various Centers. Vaudeville and native Japanese theatricals were staged 484 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST A Boy Scout drum and bugle corps at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center led by Majorette. Scout activities were carried on at virtually all Centers. Figure 99: The education administrative department at Fresno (California) Assembly Center. Educational departments that supervised work for all ages were established at all Centers, staffed by evacuees under Caucasian supervision. Figure 100: PICTORIAL SUMMARY 485 101: The kindergarten room at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. Educational programs were developed by the Service Division and classes were organized for all groups from nursery schools to adult education. Figure 102: Kindergarten children dress in costume to take part in a baby parade and show at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. Figure 486 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Figure 103: An elementary class at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. Figure 104: A class in the lower grades at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. PICTORIAL SUMMARY 487 Figure 105: At the Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center junior and senior high school students who were unable to graduate with their former home town classes because of evacuation receive diplomas at a special graduating ceremony. 106: Graduating students pledging allegiance to The Flag preliminary to the distribu¬ tion of diplomas, at the graduation ceremonies at the Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. Figure 488 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 107: A Japanese teacher instructing a group of adult evacuees at Tanforan (California) Assembly Center. Many middle-aged and elderly evacuees, particularly women, took an active interest in adult education. Figure Figure 108: Singing classes were organized and conducted at all the Centers by experienced Japanese teachers. A teacher leading a singing class at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. PICTORIAL SUMMARY 489 Figure 109: A teen-age orchestra tuning up under the leadership of a Japanese woman in¬ structor at Salinas (California) Assembly Center. Orchestras were organized among all age groups at different centers. Figure 110: Libraries were established at all the Centers, volumes being furnished by state, county and city educational departments, churches, and other organizations, and friends of evacuees. The library at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. 490 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Figure 111: A Boy Scout Color Guard leading a parade at a celebration in Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. Figure 112: A section of the Christian Work study section at Fresno (California) Assembly Center. Evacuees enjoyed freedom of worship at all the Centers. PICTORIAL Figure 114: Maryknoll Assembly Center. Sisters visiting their SUMMARY former wards 491 at Santa Anita (California) JAPANESE 492 Figure 115: EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Mass was celebrated and other Catholic religious activities carried on at all the Centers. A Catholic Mass at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. Figure 116: ifornia) A Christian minister conducting services in the grandstand at Santa Anita Assembly Center. (Cal¬ PICTORIAL Figure Figure nia) 117: 118; SUMMARY A Buddhist congregation praying at Santa Anita 493 (California) Assembly Center. A happy young couple immediately after the ceremony at Santa Anita Assembly Center. Numerous weddings of evacuees occurred at the Assembly (Califor¬ Centers. THE WEST traditions were observed in connection with weddings at Centers. FROM Figure 120: A groom carrying his bride across the threshold of their apartment at Stockton (California) Assembly Center. Many American EVACUATION 119: A bride in her boudoir just before a wedding in an Assembly Center. JAPANESE Figure 494 COAST PICTORIAL SUMMARY 495 121: A Japanese artist sketching girl posed against a background of landscapes at Tanforan (California) Assembly Center. Art classes for all ages were conducted at various Centers. Figure Figure 122: Center. A woman artist at work on a landscape scene at Tanforan (California) Assembly 496 JAPANESE Figure 123: Center. EVACUATION FROM THE WEST Evacuees buying San Francisco morning papers at Turlock Newspapers from metropolitan and local communities were COAST (California) Assembly available for purchase by the evacuees at all Centers. Figure 124: The editorial offices of the "Grapevine,” the Fresno (California) Assembly Center newspaper. Each of the Centers had its own newspaper, a mimeographed publication with news, editorial, art work and mimeographing done by the evacuees under the supervision of the Center Manager and the Press Relations Representative. PICTORIAL SUMMARY 497 125: The Center newspaper, the "Grapevine,” being mimeographed at Fresno (Califor¬ nia) Assembly Center. The office boy appears to be more interested in "Our Gang” than in the mimeographing. Figure Figure 126: A group of evacuees busy in a drafting room of an Assembly Center. 498 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Figure 127: Evacuees receiving tools and supplies at the Supply Depot at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. Work crews, on a pay basis, took care of the maintenance of the Assem¬ bly Centers. Figure 128: The interior of a carpenter shop at Portland (Oregon) Assembly Center. Many of the work projects, in the Centers, called for skilled mechanics. PICTORIAL Figure 129: A radio shop at Portland 499 SUMMARY (Oregon) Assembly Center where the sets owned by evacuees were repaired. Radio sets, without long or short wave bands, remained in the possession of the Japanese evacuees. Figure 130: Diversified outlets for mechanical skills provided work with pay for many evacuees in the Assembly Centers. A group of mechanics welding an upright in the plumbing shop at Fresno (California) Assembly Center. 500 Figure JAPANESE 131: A paint shop at EVACUATION Portland FROM (Oregon) THE Assembly WEST Center COAST with young evacuees finishing an office desk and file box. Figure 132: Making camouflage nets at Santa Anita (California) Assembly Center. This work is termed "garnishing.” A "pattern net” with a design woven into it is first set up and over it a plain net is placed. Weavers worked burlap strips into the top net, following exactly the pattern net as to color and weaving design. The women at work are American-born Japanese. PICTORIAL Figure Anita 133: Japanese (California) evacuees in a 501 SUMMARY progressing stage of making camouflage nets at Santa Assembly Center. To the left a group raises a partially completed net. 502 Figure JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 134: Evacuee clearing an irrigation ditch to bring water to the experimental station for the growing of the rubber producing guayule shrub at the Manzanar (California) Reception Center. This was one of the first work projects to be instituted at Manzanar. Figure 13 5: Evacuees preparing a seed bed in the experimental station for the rubber producing guayule shrub, at Manzanar (California) the growing of Reception Center. PICTORIAL SUMMARY 503 136: Tiny guayule plants being thinned out and replanted for the production of rubber at Manzanar (California) Reception Center by evacuees experienced in agriculture. Figure 137: A Japanese evacuee hoeing in his garden at Fresno (California) Assembly Center. Many gardens flourished in the Assembly Centers brightening the open spaces between barracks. Figure 504 Figure JAPANESE 138: EVACUATION A street scene in Turlock FROM (California) THE WEST COAST Assembly Center with flowering plants massed in front of the barracks. Many of the Japanese, prior to evacuation, had been commer¬ cial gardeners and nurserymen, and carried their love of growing things to the Assembly Centers. Figure 139: Assembly Family Center at Relocation Authority, Centers War to groups Santa a identifying Anita, civilian Relocation their California agency. Centers was hand for The a baggage Relocation transfer conducted by of the the prior Center, to evacuees Army. departure operated from by the from the the War Assembly PICTORIAL Figure 140: Evacuees boarding a special enroute to a War Relocation Center. 505 SUMMARY train at Santa Anita (California) traveling from Assembly Centers to War Relocation Centers. Each train carried physician and two nurses. Pullman cars, as needed, were furnished with each special Figure accommodations 141: for the aged, Assembly Center Great care was exercised for the comfort of the evacuees the infirm and A group boarding the train at Portland take them to a War Relocation Center for evacuees. mothers with (Oregon) a train Caucasian to provide infants. Assembly Center which will JAPANESE 505 Figure 142: EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST While the evacuation program was under way placing persons of Japanese ances¬ try in Assembly Centers, construction of War Relocation Centers was begun by Army Engineers. Construction operations at Heart Mountain Relocation Center, near Cody, Wyoming. 4 Figure 143: Buildings were put together in sections in a central construction area and sections hauled by truck to the building site. these PICTORIAL Figure 144: 507 SUMMARY Deep below the sod of Heart Mountain Relocation Center, near Cody, Wyoming, once pounded by buffalo herds, rise the forms of reinforced concrete to house Imhoff or sani¬ tary tank. Figure 145: Panorama of Granada Relocation foreground a typical barracks unit consisting of Center, 12 Amache, six-room Colorado, showing in the apartment barracks buildings, recreation hall, laundry and bathhouse, and the mess hall, constructed by Army Engineers. a The Center is made up of 30 such blocks, complemented by hospital buildings, administrative office buildings, living quarters, general warehouse structures and Military Police quarters. 508 Figure JAPANESE 146: Typical mess hall EVACUATION in FROM THE WEST a Relocation Center hospital unit COAST is completed by Army Engineers. Figure 147: Ready to begin service this modern, hospital unit at Fdeart Mountain Relocation Center. well-equipped kitchen is attached to the PICTORIAL Figure 148: Airy and spotless is this section 509 SUMMARY of a Relocation Center laundry with modern plumbing and tanks, ironing boards and side-wall bench for bundles. Figure 149: Typical evacuee apartment at Granada Relocation Center, Amache, Colorado. The furniture, the book niches, flower pots and print mats are all made by the evacuees from scrap lumber and scrap pieces of wall board. GLOSSARY Glossary of Terms Assembly Center—A temporary enclosed area maintained by Army where persons of Japanese ancestry were housed and fed during primary stages of evacuation prior to transfer to War Relocation Projects. Blocked Account—Any property or interest therein of a Japanese national which the Alien Property Custodian has declared to be vested in him under authority of Executive Order No. 9095. Civil Affairs Division—A division of the General Staff of Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, charged with responsibility for control and exclusion of civilians, designation of military areas and zones, establishment of general or limited military government and liaison with governmental agencies. Civil Control Station—A temporary Wartime Civil Control Administration office where persons of Japanese ancestry being evacuated reported for preevacuation registration, information and assistance. One of such offices was set up to service each group of evacuees excluded by one exclusion order. Civil Control Team—The personnel of a Civil Control Station representing all governmental agencies concerned—such as United States Employment Service, Federal Security Administration, United States Public Health, and Federal Reserve Bank. Civilian Exclusion Order (CEO)—An order issued by the Commanding General Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, by the terms of which all persons of Japanese ancestry within a designated area were ex¬ cluded therefrom. Coastal Frontier—Generally Military Area No. 1, and the California portion of Military Area No. 2, Western Defense Command. Commanding General—Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt. Contraband—Articles the possession and use of which was denied to all per¬ sons of Japanese ancestry while within Western Defense Command, enu¬ merated in Public Proclamation No. 3. Curfew—The hours between 8:00 P. M. and 6:00 A. M. when all persons of Japanese ancestry in Military Area No. 1 and the California portion of Military Area No. 2 were required to be within their respective places of residence. Paragraph No. 1, Public Proclamation No. 3, and Paragraph No. . 3, Public Proclamation No. 6 Evacuee—A person of Japanese ancestry excluded from Military Area No. 1 and the California portion of Military Area No. 2, by proclamation of the Commanding General Western Defense Command. Evacuee National—Includes all persons of Japanese ancestry subject to ex¬ clusion. Exclusion Area—The area described in each Civilian Exclusion Order from which all persons of Japanese ancestry were excluded. 513 514 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Exemption from Evacuation—Temporary privilege of remaining in Military Area No. 1 or California portion of Military Area No. 2 granted on author¬ ity of Paragraphs (e) and (f) Public Proclamation No. 5, and also under Mixed-Blood and Mixed-Marriage policies. Family Head—The one that registered for the family; NOT necessarily a parent or older member. Family Number—Is a Wartime Civil Control Administration number not to be confused with I. D. number. Each family unit or individual living alone was registered and assigned a separate number for all administrative and identification of property purposes. Often is mistakenly called United States Employment Service number—actually there is no United States Employment Service number. Freezing Power—Power of Alien Property Custodian under Executive Order No. 9095 to block property of Japanese nationals and to allow trading therein only on license. I. D. Number—That number which was given to individuals at some (but not all) assembly centers. NOT to be confused with Wartime Civil Control Administration number as given to families when registering. Interior—That portion of the United States not declared by the Commanding General of any of the Defense Commands to be a prohibited military area. Internee—An alien enemy interned by order of the Attorney General. (NOT to be confused with evacuee). Issei—Any person of Japanese ancestry born in Japan. Sometimes called First Generation Japanese. Japanese Ancestry—Any person who has a Japanese ancestor regardless of degree, is considered a person of Japanese ancestry. JACL—Japanese American Citizens League. Kibei—Any person of Japanese ancestry born outside of Japan who has been to and returned from Japan. Particularly, American-born Japanese who have received some of their education in Japan. Logistics—Applies to movements of evacuees when used in this report. Military Area—Any area declared to be a military area by virtue of authority granted by Executive Order No. 9066. Mixed-Marriage—Any marriage between a person of Japanese ancestry and a person not of Japanese ancestry. Nisei—Any person of Japanese ancestry not born in Japan. Sometimes called Second Generation Japanese. Office for Emergency Management—(Division of Central Administrative Services.) Parolee—An alien enemy once interned by order of the Attorney General but paroled from internment at the direction of the Attorney General. Proclamation—(Public Proclamation). Public announcements of the Com¬ manding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, dealing GLOSSARY 515 with the conduct of civilians within Western Defense Command, having the force of law and issued under authority of Executive Order No. 9066. Reception Center—A temporary enclosed area maintained by the Army where persons of Japanese ancestry were to be housed and fed between the primary stage of evacuation and ultimate transfer to War Relocation Projects. (Only one Reception Center was ever established, Manzanar, and it ultimately be¬ came a War Relocation Project.) Registration—The registration of all persons of Japanese ancestry for evacu¬ ation at Civil Control Stations. Relocation Center—(War Relocation Center). The populated section of a War Relocation Project Area. Relocation Project—(War Relocation Project). Temporary community es¬ tablished and conducted by War Relocation Authority where evacuees under jurisdiction of War Relocation Authority are housed and fed. It has boun¬ daries established by the Commanding General. Repatriate—A person of Japanese ancestry who is returned at his request to Japan. Repatriation—The process of returning persons of Japanese ancestry to Japan at their request. Sansei—Children of Nisei. Sometimes called Third Generation Japanese. Segregation—The process of separating persons of Japanese ancestry who are actively discordant and openly pro-axis from the remainder. Social Data Registration Form (SDR)—The Social Data Registration Form is the form on which persons of Japanese ancestry, living in the area to be evacuated, were registered at the Civil Control Station. Special Blocked Property—Property in which an evacuee national has an in¬ terest, and which has been designated as special blocked property. Spot Raids—Mass apprehensions of persons of Japanese ancestry possessing con¬ traband by Federal Bureau of Investigation prior to evacuation. Transfer Orders—Directive from the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, for the transfer of evacuees from Assembly Centers to War Relocation Projects. Travel Regulations — Regulations imposed by the Commanding General, Western Defense Command governing travel of persons of Japanese ances¬ try, and others, in Military Area No. 1 and California portion of Military Area No. 2. Voluntary Migration—Voluntary movement of persons of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 1 and California portion of Military Area No. 2, to points further inland, prior to evacuation under complete Army supervision as reflected by Public Proclamation No. 4, dated March 27, 1942. W.D. Form 1034—Public Voucher for Purchases and Services other than Personal. W.D. Form 1080—Voucher for Adjustments between Appropriations and/or Funds. APPENDIX APPENDIX ONE Memoranda of March 20, 1942, From the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs Giving Advance Warning of the First Evacuation March 20, 1942 MEMORANDUM For Mr. Richard M. Neustadt, Federal Security Administration Subject: Evacuation of Bainbridge Island The accompanying copy of a memorandum to Mr. Larry Hewes of the Farm Security Ad¬ ministration is self-explanatory. 1. It is requested that you arrange for participation of the Public Health Service and any other agencies under the supervision of the Federal Security Agency in the evacuation of Bain¬ bridge Island. 2. Specifically, it is desired that the Public Health Service undertake full responsibility for the organization, equipping, staffing and establishment of a suitable medical examination and innoculation station at the induction point, to be organized by the Associated Federal agencies, presumably at the Bainbridge Island ferry landing. 3. It is further requested that specific provision be made for the care, hospitalization or other disposition of any persons among the Japanese residents on Bainbridge Island who require such attention, including all bed cases. 4. Further it is requested specifically that suitable provision be made for a registration system for such persons, including the issuance of suitable tags for identification of individuals, family units and property, such tag to bear a thumb print and a notation as to whether a medical examination has been performed. 5. It is requested that you or your representative attend the meeting referred to in Paragraph 5 of the copy of the memorandum to Mr. Larry I. Hewes. Karl R. Bendetsen Col. G. S. C. Ass’t. Chief of Staff Civil Affairs Division March 20, 1942 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LARRY I. HEWES SUBJECT: Bainbridge Island, restricted 1. Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, desires to undertake the immediate forced evacuation of all Japanese now resident on Bainbridge Island, Puget Sound, State of Washington. The statistics showing the number of families and the occupations of each are attached in Exhibit A. 2. You will note from the accompanying exhibit that there are several families engaged in agricultural pursuits. It is requested that you take whatever action is necessary to provide neces¬ sary staff and procedure for the handling and disposition of all agricultural property, including live stock owned or controlled by Japanese on Bainbridge Island, within the limits of the au¬ thority assigned you previously by General DeWitt.. 3. It is proposed that an evacuation order will be posted not later than Wednesday, March 25, 1942. It is proposed that all Japanese will be evacuated within five days from the date of post¬ ing of evacuation order. During this interim it is further proposed that all Japanese will be required to pass through a general service office established on the Island, presumably at the ferryboat landing, and that during this period none of such persons will be allowed to leave except by special permission of military authorities. Decision as to who may leave during this period will be up to the Commanding General, Northwest Sector, and will be permitted only in the most exceptional cases. 4. Captain Truman R. Young will be in Seattle at the Olympic Hotel commencing Saturday, March 21, 1942, where either you or your representative in that region may reach him. 519 520 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 5. It is requested that you or your representative be present to attend a joint conference of the interested agencies to be held in Seattle on Monday, March 23, 1942. For the time and place of the meeting, get in touch with Captain Young. Karl R. Bendetsen Col. G. S. C. Ass’t. Chief of Staff Civil Affairs Division March 20, 1942 MEMORANDUM for Mr. William H. Hale, Federal Reserve Bank Subject: Evacuation of Bainbridge Island 1. The accompanying copies of memorandum to Mr. Larry Hewes and Mr. Richard Neustadt are self-explanatory. 2. It is requested that your organization participate fully in the proposed evacuation of Bainbridge Island. 3. Specifically, it is requested with respect to your function that you undertake full responsi¬ bility for the necessary staffing and organization of the general service induction center to be established, presumably at the Bainbridge Island ferry landing, and that you also undertake full responsibility for the following: a. Acquisition of suitable warehouse space for the storage of personal property which evacuees cannot otherwise dispose of, such storage to be at the sole risk of the owners and to include only the more substantial household items, such as ice boxes, pianos, heavy dining room, living room, bed room and kitchen furniture. Cooking utensils and other small items must be crated, packed and plainly marked. Bric-a-brac will not be accepted. It is possible that such warehouse space may be available on Bainbridge Island. It should be low cost. b. Provision of suitable civilian guards to protect the storage against possible pillage or other direct action. c. Suitable impounding space for automobiles, trucks, tractors and other mobile farm implements should be provided, presumably on Bainbridge Island; and an impounding system established to include the filing of title certificates, the collection of distributor blocks and hiring of the necessary guards. 4. As the evacuation will be hasty, the application of your "special block property” would seem to be appropriate in the majority of instances. The staff provided should be capable of rendering rapid service in view of the speed of the proposed program. 5. If, in your judgment it is necessary, arrangements should be made for guarding any prop¬ erty left behind on the Island—not warehoused—against direct action or pillage. Primarily this is the responsibility of the local authorities. . 6 It is requested that you or your representative attend the meeting referred to in Para¬ graph 5 of the copy of the memorandum to Mr. Larry I. Hewes. Karl R. Bendetsen Col. G. S. C. Ass’t. Chief of Staff Civil Affairs Division March 20, 1942 MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL NORTHWEST SECTOR: SUBJECT: Evacuation, Bainbridge Island Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, directs: That the following outline memoranda covering the proposed evacuation of Bainbridge Island be sub¬ mitted for information and guidance: 1. The accompanying copies of memoranda to Messrs. Larry Hewes, R. M. Neustadt and William M. Hale, are self-explanatory. APPENDIX 521 ONE 2. Captain Truman R. Young, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, will be in the Northwest Sector, Saturday, March 21, 1942, representing the Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division. 3. The Commanding General Northwest Sector will be responsible for the following: a) General supervision of the evacuation and coordination of the local services to be rendered by the civilian agencies concerned. Such coordination and service to be within the general policy directed in the accompanying memoranda, and as announced from time to time by the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, b) Posting and distribution of the evacuation orders. Evacuation orders and instructions in printed form will be furnished except as to supply and movement of the evacuees, which will be prepared and distributed by you. c) Furnishing all necessary guards, security patrols, including the guard enroute from Bainbridge Island to destination. This does not include any responsibility for guarding personal property so long as civil authorities can maintain order, d) Enforcement and compliance with evacuation orders refer to the following: 1. Aliens failing to comply will be immediately apprehended and turned over to the Immigration Authorities for detention. 2. As to citizens failing to comply, warrants should be issued for their arrest for violation of the penal statute enacted this week by the Congress, making it a crime for failing to comply with the order of Commanding General in a military area. 4. The G-4 Division, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, is responsible for mak¬ ing the necessary arrangements for transportation from Bainbridge Island to point of destination. 5. Commanding General of the Northwest Sector is responsible for the collection of evacuees and their organization and movement transportation furnished by Headquarters of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. 6 Direct communication by the Commanding General Northwest Sector and Assistant Chief . of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army is authorized for the purpose of concluding any necessary arrangement. 7. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum and advise of action taken verbally, with confirmation in writing. Karl R. Bendetsen Col. G. S. C. Ass’t. Chief of Staff Civil Affairs Division APPENDIX TWO Memorandum of April 23, 1942—"Japanese Evacuation Operations.” HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY Office of Commanding General Presidio of San Francisco, California April 23, 1942 SUBJECT: Japanese Evacuation Operations TO: All Sector Commanders, All Civilian Agencies, Wartime Civil Control Administration 1. References: Public Proclamation No. 1, this Headquarters, March 2, 1942 Public Proclamation No. 2, this Headquarters, March 16, 1942 Public Proclamation No. 3, this Headquarters, March 24, 1942 Public Proclamation No. 4, this Headquarters, March 27, 1942 Public Proclamation No. 5, this Headquarters, March 30, 1942 2. The following instructions will guide the activities of Sector Commanders and Civilian Agencies in the evacuation processes. The instructions contained herein will replace the separate directives which previously have been forwarded for each evacuation project. The practice of distributing such separate directives is discontinued. It is contemplated that only such advance information as is pertinent to an evacuation project will be forwarded. 3. The evacuation of all Japanese, both aliens and non-aliens, from the area of the Western Defense Command will be directed by this Headquarters. Pending the resettlement of such persons by the War Relocation Authority, evacuees will be provided temporary shelter and other facilities at Assembly Centers and Reception Centers. 4. Numbered Exclusion Orders issued from this Headquarters with Instructions pertaining thereto will provide for the exclusion by a specific time of all Japanese, both aliens and non¬ aliens, from a specifically described area. The Sector Commanders are charged with the super¬ vision of the evacuation from their respective Sectors of all affected persons within such areas to Assembly Centers or Reception Centers to be designated by this Headquarters. They will cause Exclusion Orders and Instructions pertaining thereto to be posted at prominent points throughout the prescribed areas during such hours as are specified by this Headquarters. A suitable supply of such Orders and Instructions will be furnished by this Headquarters at the earliest practicable date preceding the effective date of each Exclusion Order. The Officers spe¬ cifically charged with the posting of Exclusion Orders and Instructions pertaining thereto will execute certificates of such posting to include the area, the date, the time and manner of posting. These certificates will be forwarded to this Headquarters within twelve hours after completion of posting. 5. For the purpose of registering and processing evacuees, Civil Control Stations will be located in each area to be evacuated. The Federal Security Agency will locate, establish, or¬ ganize, and operate these installations. That agency is authorized to deal directly with the Office of Emergency Management and other Federal Agencies as may be needed in the estab¬ lishment and operation of Control Stations. Within each such station there will be included appropriate sections to render services applicable to the several interested Civilian Agencies. The Civilian Agencies concerned will provide for the personnel and the instruction of the personnel assigned to these sections. The Supervisor of each section will control all matters pertaining to the services rendered by his particular Civilian Agency. 6. The manager of each Control Station will be named by the Federal Security Agency. This manager will receive instructions with reference to the evacuation project from the representative of the Sector Commander at the Control Station and will be responsible for the distribution and execution of these instructions by Supervisors of sections within the Control Station. 7. The several Civilian Agencies will control the services rendered by their representatives at Control Stations but, insofar as the coordination and operation of the installation as a whole is concerned, Supervisors of sections will receive their instructions from the manager of the Control Station. 522 APPENDIX TWO 523 8. The Federal Security Agency, the Department of Agriculture, and the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco will provide for necessary general services such as: a. The registration of all evacuees. b. The medical examination of all evacuees either during processing or after their arrival at an Assembly Center. c. Medical aid, including hospitalization, and social welfare service for and during the processing. d. The settlement and protection of all the real and personal property of the evacuees, including the registration of those private automobiles belonging to evacuees to be used as transportation to an Assembly Center. e. Storage facilities for items not otherwise disposed of, parking and immobilization of private automobiles at the Assembly Center or other designated place, and provision for proper policing thereof. /. All forms, and operating details incidental to the foregoing, and the maintenance of an adequate filing system for all documents and other data assembled in connection with a particular project or combination of projects. 9. A physician will be made available by the Federal Security Agency at the Civil Control Station during the entire period of registration and processing to attend invalid and other exception medical cases. 10. In addition to their prescribed functions, the Civilian Agencies mentioned above will assist the Sector Commander in the discharge of his duties pertaining to the evacuation. 11. The Sector Commander will provide such military personnel as he deems necessary for and during the registration and processing of evacuees. 12. Sector Commanders will be responsible for the supervision of all movements of evacuees from affected areas in their respective Sectors to the destination designated by this Head¬ quarters. Arrangements for all transportation other than by private conveyance will be made by this Headquarters for movements of evacuees from control stations in affected areas to As¬ sembly Centers and Reception Centers. Any additional transportation for evacuees within an affected area will be arranged for locally by the Sector Commander. 13. In certain cases where specifically directed by this Headquarters, evacuees will be per¬ mitted to use their own private automobiles as transportation to an Assembly Center. All private automobiles so used will first have been registered with the representative of the Federal Re¬ serve Bank of San Francisco at the Control Station and provision made by that Agency for the disposition of such automobiles upon arrival at the Assembly Center. As soon as is prac¬ ticable after registration, the Sector Commander will cause a schedule of such movement to be prepared for the Civil Control Station concerned and provide for adequate supervision of con¬ voys of not more than twenty-five cars each. Arrivals of these groups of automobiles will be spaced throughout the travel day with emphasis being placed upon morning arrivals in order to permit the early settlement of evacuees at the point of destination. 14. The Sector Commander will provide such military personnel as he deems necessary for and during all movements of evacuees. In addition thereto, appropriate maintenance personnel and wrecking equipment will be provided by the Sector Commanders for all movements in supervised groups involving the use of private automobiles by evacuees. 15. The Federal Security Agency will provide medical aid, to include an appropriate number of physicians, and social welfare service for and during all bus and train movements of evacuees from Control Stations in the affected areas to Assembly Centers and Reception Centers. For movements of evacuees by private automobiles, the Federal Security Agency will make appro¬ priate arrangements for medical service. 16. It is contemplated that the number of evacuees moved from one affected area under a given project will not exceed five hundred per day and the number of evacuees arriving at any one Assembly Center or Reception Center from all areas being evacuated under simultaneous opera¬ tions will not exceed one thousand per day. If practicable, rail transportation will be utilized for all movements involving travel of more than one hundred miles and for all trips during which a meal must be served to the evacuees. At least one tourist-sleeper will be provided for each train to insure appropriate accommodations for medical cases. Once the mode of transpor¬ tation has been established and a schedule determined, evacuees will be assigned by the manager of the Control Station to a particular bus, street-car, railroad-car or motor convoy in sufficient 524 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST numbers as directed by the Sector Commander. Close liaison between the representatives of the Sector Commander at the Control Station and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, this Headquarters, is essential during the entire period of processing, in order to coordinate specific transportation requirements and transportation schedules. In the preparation of all transportation schedules, primary consideration should be given to the capacity of a given Assembly Center or Reception Center to assimilate properly the arriving evacuees. In this connection, movements from affected areas will be coordinated so that all arrivals will be spaced and timed as early as is practicable during daylight hours in order to insure proper settlement in the Center prior to darkness. Sector Commanders will designate specifically a train Commander for each train used in trans¬ porting evacuees from his Sector to a Center. Similarly, Commanders will be specifically desig¬ nated for all other group movements of evacuees. 17. Sector Commanders will inform other Sector Commanders concerned if the route of a movement of evacuees from his Sector to an Assembly Center or Reception Center requires the crossing of, or movement into, another Sector. This action is designed to obviate tactical compli¬ cations and the possibility of rail and highway congestion. 18. Sector Commanders will cause the following reports to be made at the times indicated: a. At noon and at 5:00 p.m. of each day of registration a statement as of that time showing the total number of families registered and the total number of individuals to be evacuated thereunder, will be forwarded by wire or teletype to the Wartime b. Civil Control Administration, 1231 Market Street, San Francisco, California. At least forty-eight hours prior to departure of evacuees, a statement showing the exact number of persons who will require rail or bus transportation to the Assembly Center or Reception Center, will be forwarded by wire or teletype to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Headquarters, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Presidio of San Francisco, California. c. At least forty-eight hours prior to the departure of evacuees for Assembly Centers or Reception Centers, a statement showing the total number of persons for which lunches are to be prepared, will be forwarded by wire or teletype to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Presidio of San Francisco, California. In rendering this report, full consideration should be given d. to the number of children and infants requiring food and formula milk and ingredients. At least twenty-four hours prior to departure of evacuees, the Manager of the Assembly Center or Reception Center concerned will be informed by the most ex¬ peditious means of the total number of evacuees to be expected with the mode or modes of travel, date, and the probable time of arrival. e. Upon departure of evacuees, a statement showing the exact number of evacuees who departed, the type of transportation utilized, the number of private cars in any and all convoys, with the date and the probable time of arrival thereof, will be for¬ warded to the Manager of the Assembly Center or Reception Center concerned, by the most expeditious means. f. Upon departure of evacuees for Assembly Centers or Reception Centers, a statement showing the exact number of evacuees who departed, the type of transportation uti¬ lized, the number of private automobiles in any and all convoys, the time of departure and the destinations of such movements will be forwarded by wire or teletype to the Wartime Civil Control Administration, 1231 Market Street, San Francisco, California. g. Timely information will be forwarded to the Manager of the Assembly Center or Reception Center concerned in order that appropriate arrangements can be made for unloading, if the nature of the baggage or other equipment forwarded with evacuees to the Assembly Center or Reception Center cannot be adequately handled by the evacuees. h. Within seventy-two hours after the completion of the evacuation of any specified area, the Sector Commander will forward a report covering the operation of the evacuation project with such recommendations as he desires to make thereon, to the Wartime Civil Control Administration, 1231 Market Street, San Francisco, California. i. Within seventy-two hours after the completion of the evacuation of any specified area, the Control Station Manager and the Supervisor of each Civilian Agency involved in the evacuation project will forward through their immediate superiors, a report APPENDIX TWO 525 covering their actions in connection with such evacuation project with such recom¬ mendations as they desire to make, to the Wartime Civil Control Administration, 1231 Market Street, San Francisco, California. Copies of the reports by the Civilian Agencies concerned with each evacuation project will be made available to the Federal Security Agency at the time they are submitted to the Wartime Civil Control Administration. 19. Aliens failing to comply with the Exclusion Order and the Instructions issued there¬ under are subject to immediate apprehension and detention. Alien and non-alien Japanese alike are subject to the penalties provided by Public Law No. 503, 77th Congress, approved March 21, 1942, entitled, "An Act to Provide a Penalty for Violation of Restrictions or Orders with Respect to Persons Entering, Remaining in, Leaving, or Committing any Act in Military Areas or Zones.” Sector Commanders will make suitable provisions for bringing this matter to the attention of the Federal Civil Authorities for any necessary action. Sector Commanders are authorized to call upon the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the enforcement of the statute and for the apprehension of any aliens failing to comply with published orders and instructions. By Command of Lieutenant General DeWITT: Hugh T. Fullerton Captain A.G.D. Assistant Adjutant General Distribution "M” APPENDIX THREE Delegation to Ninth Service Command and Letters of Transmittal— Reports of Survey—Status of Relocation Center Construction HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY Office of Commanding General Presidio of San Francisco, California November 22, 1942 SUBJECT: Policies as to Relationship of Western Defense Command with Ninth Service Command and War Relocation Authority TO: Commanding General, Ninth Service Command, Fort Douglas, Utah; Commanding Gen¬ eral, Northwest Sector, Fort Lewis, Washington; Commanding General, Northern California Sector, Presidio of San Francisco, California; Commanding General, Southern California Sector, Pasadena, California; Commanding General, Southern Land Frontier Sector, Camp Lockett, California. 1. The transfer of all persons of Japanese ancestry from Assembly Centers operated by the Wartime Civil Control Administration under the control of this headquarters, to War Relocation projects, operated by the War Relocation Authority, having been accomplished, the following policies are announced regarding the future relationship of the Western Defense Command with Service Commands and War Relocation Authority in connection with these projects: a. War Relocation projects located outside of the Western Defense Command are of no b. War Relocation projects located within the Western Defense Command. further concern of this headquarters. (1) Operating under such general policies as may be announced from time to time by this headquarters, the Commanding General, Ninth Service Command is designated as the agent responsible for the enforcement of all security measures in connection with these projects, and for the enforcement of such parts of Public Proclamations 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11 as apply. He is further authorized to deal directly with the War Relocation Authority on all matters pertaining to these projects without further reference to West¬ ern Defense Command. Similarly, War Relocation Authority will deal directly with the Commanding General, Ninth Service Command. (2) Escort Guard Companies presently on duty at these projects are assigned to the Ninth Service Command. (3) All matters concerning the operation of these projects for which the War De¬ partment is responsible under the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 17, 1942; will be handled directly between the War Relocation Authority and such agencies as the War Department may designate. c. The following statements of policy are announced: (1) Military Police: See Circular No. 19, this headquarters, September 17, 1942. (2) Ingress to and egress from War Relocation Project Areas: 4th Army, subject: See letter Hq WDC & “Authorization to Issue Permits for Ingress to and Egress from War Relocation Project Areas for Purposes of Emergency Hospitalization and Incarceration,” dated October 29, 1942, with inclosures thereto. (3) Parcel Inspection at War Relocation Projects: subject: See letter Hq WDC & 4th Army, "Parcel Inspection at Certain War Relocation Authority Projects,” dated Sep¬ tember 13, 1942. (4) The Commanding General, Western Defense Command will be kept informed as to instructions issued and agreements entered into, under this directive. d. The Relocation projects at Manzanar and Tule Lake, California and Poston and Sacaton (Gila River), Arizona are within the evacuated area of the Western Defense Command 526 APPENDIX 527 THREE and, therefore, have a special status and are of particular concern to this headquarters. Accordingly, it is directed that the Commanding General, Ninth Service Command provide for immediate reports to this headquarters of any incidents occurring within these centers involving disaffection or riot on the part of center residents in order that appropriate instructions may be issued to provide for the security of the evacuated area whenever such action appears necessary. J. L. DeWITT Lieutenant General, U. S. Army Commanding 3 Incls: Incl # 1—Circular No. 19, this Hq., September 17, 1942. Incl $ 2—Ltr fr Hq WDC & 4A, subject: “Authorization to Issue Permits for Ingress To and Egress from War Relocation Project Areas for Purposes of Emergency Hospitalization and Incarceration,” Oct. 29, 1942, with incls. Incl # 3—Ltr fr Hq WDC & 4A, subject: "Parcel Inspection at Certain War Relocation Authority Projects,” Sept. 13, 1942. DISTRIBUTION: "Al” War Relocation Authority—5 copies Seventh Service Command—5 copies Eighth Service Command—5 copies 319th M.P. Co.—2 copies 320th M.P. Co.—2 copies 321st M.P. Co.—2 copies 322nd M.P. Co.—2 copies 323rd M.P. Co.—2 copies 331st M.P. Co.—2 copies 3 34th M.P. Co.—2 copies 335th M.P. Co.—2 copies 336th M.P. Co.—2 copies HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY Presidio of San Francisco, California 17 September 1942 CIRCULAR NO. 19 POLICIES PERTAINING TO USE OF MILITARY POLICE AT WAR RELOCATION CENTERS 1. Under the authority granted the Commanding General Western Defense Command pur¬ suant to Executive Order No. 9066, February 19, 1942, Japanese civilians have been moved from certain military areas in this command as a matter of military necessity. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 9102, March 18, 1942, the War Relo¬ cation Authority has been established as a civilian agency to assist the military in the evacuation of certain persons; to provide for the relocation of such persons in appropriate places; to provide for their needs; to provide for the employment of such persons at useful work; to supervise their activities; and other related matters. 3. For the purpose of carrying out the directions of Executive Order No. 9102, the War Relocation Authority has selected the following sites in the territorial area of the Western De¬ fense Command: River); Manzanar, Sacaton, Arizona California; Tule Lake, California; Poston, Arizona (Colorado (Gila River); Delta, Utah; and Minidoka, Idaho. These sites are designated as military areas known as War Relocation Project Areas. The boundaries of such areas shall be marked with appropriate signs in both English and Japanese language. The pro¬ visions of Public Proclamation No. 8, this headquarters require that those Japanese persons evacuated to a War Relocation Project Area shall remain in that area, except as movement is 528 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST authorized in writing by this headquarters, transmitted through the War Relocation Authority. Violations of these provisions are subject to prosecution as provided by Public Law No. 50J, 77 th Congress. 4. The War Relocation Project Area, later referred to as "Relocation Area” or "Area,” covers the entire area and includes one or more "Relocation Centers.” The Relocation Center includes the populated area and the administrative and industrial area. The Relocation Centers and Areas are not "concentration camps” and the use of this term is considered objectionable. Relocation Centers and Areas are not internment camps. Internment camps are established for another pur¬ pose and are not related to the evacuation program. While the relocation program up to the present time has related particularly to the Japanese, the same program may be extended to other civilians as military necessity may dictate. 5. Relocation centers are operated by civilian management under the War Relocation Authority. A Project Director is in charge of each center. The Project Director will determine those persons authorized to enter the center or the area, other than evacuees being transferred by War Department authority. The Project Director is authorized to issue permits to such evacuees as may be allowed to leave the center or the area. He will transmit his instructions regarding passes and permits to the commanding officer of the military police unit. 6. Civilian police, operating under the Project Director, will be on duty to maintain order within the area; to apprehend and guard against subversive activities; or undercover crimes and misdemeanors; to make such search of the person and property of the evacuees as may be necessary to guard against the introduction or use of articles heretofore or hereafter declared contraband; to control traffic within the center; and to enforce camp rules and regulations. Public Proclamation No. 3, this headquarters, March 24, 1942, designated certain articles of contraband which are denied to all persons of Japanese ancestry within the limits of this command. 7. Each relocation site will be under military police patrol and protection as determined by the War Department. Certain Military Police Escort Guard Companies have been assigned to duty at each of the relocation areas in the Western Defense Command. 8. The military police on duty at relocation centers and areas shall perform the following functions: a. They shall control the traffic on and the passage of all persons at the arteries leading b. They shall allow no person to pass the center gates without proper authority from the c. They will maintain periodic motor patrols around the boundaries of the center or area into the area; project directors; in order to guard against attempts by evacuees to leave the center without permission. The perimeter of the relocation area shall be patrolled from sunrise until sunset and during such other times as the commanding officer of the military police units deems advisable. The perimeter of the relocation center shall be patrolled only from sunset to d. sunrise; They shall apprehend and arrest evacuees who do leave the center or area without e. They shall not be called upon for service in apprehending evacuees who have effected a /. They shall be available, upon call by the project director or by the project police, in authority, using such force as is necessary to make the arrest; departure unobserved; case of emergencies such as fire or riot. When called upon in such instances, the com¬ manding officer of the military police unit shall assume full charge until the emergency g. ends; They shall inspect parcels and packages consigned to evacuees at those centers where the inspection is directed by the Commanding General, Western Defense Command. Special instructions for such inspections and for the confiscation of designated items of contraband will be issued by the Commanding General, Western Defense Command. 9. Evacuees in the relocation centers should be allowed as great a degree of freedom within the relocation area as is consistent with military security and the protection of the evacuees. In general, the evacuees will have complete freedom of movement within the relocation area from sunrise to sunset. From sunset to sunrise, the evacuees will not be allowed beyond the center APPENDIX 529 THREE limits without special permission of the project director. Sentry towers, with flood lights, may be placed outside of the boundaries of the center to assist the military police in maintaining proper control. 10. Enlisted men will be permitted within the areas occupied by the evacuees only when in the performance of prescribed duties. A firm but courteous attitude will be maintained toward the evacuees. There will be no fraternizing with evacuees. 11. All military personnel will be impressed with the importance of the duties to which their unit has been assigned, the performance of which demands the highest standards of duty, deportment, and military appearance. 12. The commanding officer of the military police unit is responsible for the protection of merchandise at the post exchange furnished for the use of the military personnel. 13. In areas where there are black-out regulations, the commanding officer of the military police unit will be responsible for the black-out of the center. A switch will be so located as to permit the prompt cut-off by the military police of all electric current in camp. The commanding officer of the military police unit will notify the project director of his instructions relative to black-outs. 14. Commanding officers of military police units will be furnished copies of operating in¬ structions issued to project directors. Project directors, their assistants, and the commanding officers of military police units will maintain such close personal contacts with each other as will assure the efficient and orderly operation of the area, and the proper performance of the duties of all. By command of Lieutenant General DeWITT: J. W. BARNETT • Brigadier General, G.S.C. Chief of Staff OFFICIAL: B. Y. READ, Colonel, A.G.D., Adjutant General. DISTRIBUTION: "A” "F” (5 copies) "H” CG, ADC—5 copies CG, NSC—25 copies PM, WDC—25 copies CAD, WDC—25 copies October 29, 1942 SUBJECT: Authorization to Issue Permits for Ingress To and Egress From War Relocation Project Areas for Purposes of Emergency Hospitalization and Incarceration. TO: Director, War Relocation Authority, Washington, D. C. 1. Supplementing authority granted in letter this headquarters August 11, 1942, subject, “Authorization to Issue Permits for Ingress To and Egress From War Relocation Project Areas”, address as above, authority is delegated to the Director, War Relocation Authority, and to each person not of Japanese ancestry whom such director may designate in writing, to grant written authorization for persons to leave and to enter War Relocation Project Areas for purposes of emergency hospitalization, institutional detention and incarceration. Each such authorization shall set forth the effective period thereof, if this can be determined, and the terms and conditions upon and the purposes for which it is granted. A complete record of all such authorizations shall be made and kept by the Director, War Relocation Authority. In addition thereto, copies of all such authorizations shall be furnished to this headquarters and to the Commanding Officer of the Military Police company on duty at the particular Project involved. 2. There is attached hereto, for information purposes, copies of all directives issued by this headquarters and by War Relocation Authority concerning authorization for evacuees or other 530 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST personnel to enter or leave War Relocation Project areas. To insure uniformity of thought and action, the term, "current emergency”, as contained in Paragraph 2a (1) of Inclosure 3, will be construed to have the following meaning: "That all work essential to the operation of the Project and which cannot be carried on within the limits of the Project areas, is considered by this headquarters as con¬ stituting a current emergency.” For the Commanding General: Hugh T. Fullerton Major, A.G.D. Assistant Adjutant General 3 Inch # 1—Letter of Aug. 11, 1942, this headquarters to Director, WRA # 2—Letter of Aug. 24, 1942, Director, WRA # 3—Letter of Sept. 21, 1942, this headquarters to Commanding General, Ninth Service Command August 11, 1942 SUBJECT: Authorization to issue permits for ingress to and egress from War Relocation Project Areas TO: Director, War Relocation Authority 1. Pursuant to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4, Public Proclamation No. 8 of the Commanding General, dated June 27, 1942, and subject to the limitations in paragraph 2 hereof, authority is delegated to the Director, War Relocation Authority, and to each person whom such Director may designate in writing, to grant written authorization to persons to leave and to enter War Relocation Project Areas. Each such authorization shall set forth the effective period thereof and the terms and conditions upon and the purposes for which it is granted. A complete record of all such authorizations shall be made and kept by the Director, War Relocation Authority. 2. The Commanding General retains the jurisdiction to and this grant of authority shall not authorize the Director, War Relocation Authority to permit: a. Release of persons of Japanese ancestry from any relocation center or project area for the purpose of private employment within, resettlement within, or permanent or semi¬ permanent residence within Military Area No. 1 or the California portion of Military Area No. 2. b. Travel of persons of Japanese ancestry within Military Area No. 1 or the California portion of Military Area No. 2. The release or travel, referred to in a and b above, shall be by authority of the Commanding General under permits issued by or under authority of Civil Affairs Division, this headquarters. 3. This authority supersedes and revokes, as of this date, the authority granted by letters dated July 8, 1942, by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, on behalf of the Commanding General, to the Regional Director and Executive Assistant, War Relocation Author¬ ity, and to all War Relocation Authority Project Directors and Assistant Project Directors. For the Commanding General: Hugh T. Fullerton Captain A.G.D. Assistant Adjutant General WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY San Francisco, California Whitcomb Hotel Building August 24, 1942 TO: The Regional Director and all Project Directors, Pacific Coast Region, War Relocation Authority SUBJECT: Delegation of authority to issue permits for ingress to and egress from relocation areas. 1. Pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, by letter of August 11, 1942, I hereby designate and authorize the APPENDIX 531 THREE Regional Director of the Pacific Coast Region of the War Relocation Authority, and all Project Directors and Assistant Project Directors for relocation areas within such Region, to grant written authorizations to persons to leave and to enter the particular relocation area or areas over which they have, respectively, been authorized to exercise jurisdiction, in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4, Public Proclamation No. 8 of the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, dated June 27, 1942. 2. Each such written authorization shall set forth the effective period thereof and the terms and conditions upon and the purposes for which it is granted, and shall otherwise be in such form as may be required by applicable regulations or instructions of the War Relocation Authority. A complete record shall be made and kept, separately for each such relocation area, of all written authorizations issued under the authority granted in this memorandum. 3. No authorization to enter any relocation area designated above, issued pursuant to paragraph 4 of said Public Proclamation No. 8 shall be for a period in excess of 30 days. 4. No one of the above-named delegatees shall issue any written authorization, pursuant to this memorandum, that will permit— (a) Release of a person of Japanese ancestry from any relocation area for the purpose of private employment within, resettlement within, or permanent or semi-permanent residence within Military Area No. 1 or the California portion of Military Area No. 2; or (b) Travel of a person of Japanese ancestry within Military Area No. 1 or the California portion of Military Area No. 2; until written authorization for such release or travel has been given by authority of the Com¬ manding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, by permits issued by or under authority of the Civil Affairs Division. 5. Any prior delegation of authority that is inconsistent with this memorandum is hereby revoked. D. S. Myer Director, War Relocation Authority September 21, 1942 SUBJECT: Emergency Employment of Japanese Evacuees Outside of War Relocation Authority Projects Located Within Evacuated Areas of Western Defense Command. TO: Commanding General, Ninth Service Command and Communications Zone, Fort Douglas, Utah 1. In certain of the War Relocation Projects located within evacuated areas of the Western Defense Command (see "la” below) occasions may arise when the use of evacuee labor outside of the designated boundaries of the project area will be essential to the proper operation of the project. For example, it may prove necessary to use evacuee labor to unload freight when the rail head for the project is not within the project area. a. Colorado River War Relocation Project, Poston, Arizona. Gila River War Relocation Project, Rivers, Arizona. Tulelake War Relocation Project, Newell, California. Manzanar War Relocation Project, Manzanar, California. 2. There is no objection on the part of this headquarters to such employment of evacuee labor providing the points outlined below are understood and observed by those concerned. In order that there shall be no doubt as to the policy of the Commanding General, Western Defense Com¬ mand and Fourth Army, Military Police units on duty at the concerned relocation projects are requested to observe and comply with these instructions. To this end, it is requested that the following information be furnished to each such commander: a. Evacuee labor may be used by project directors at locations not within the boundaries of the Relocation Project under the following conditions: JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 532 (1) That the work to be done is essential to the operation of the project and involves meeting a current emergency. (2) That payment therefor is not to be received from private individuals or private firms—that is, that it is not “private employment”. (3) That military guards are to be furnished to prevent the unauthorized absence of evacuees from the area in which the work is to be performed. This is not to be construed as indicating that the military personnel is to act as guards in connection with the work party. Military personnel is to be provided solely for the purpose of controlling exits from the particular area involved in order that unauthorized departure of evacuees may be prevented. (4) In the event an evacuee laborer does escape or does effect an unauthorized absence from the area, the military personnel assigned to secure the area are not to take action for the apprehension of the individual. The Military Commander is, however, to immediately notify local county and state civilian law enforcement officials and the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In addition thereto, an immediate report of the occurrence is to be made to this headquarters. For the Commanding General: Hugh T. Fullerton Captain, A.G.D. Assistant Adjutant General HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY Office of the Commanding General Presidio of San Francisco, California September 13, 1942 SUBJECT: Parcel Inspection at Certain War Relocation Authority Projects TO: Commanding General, Communications Zone 1. Reference is made to the establishment and operation of Relocation Projects for persons of Japanese ancestry at Tule Lake and Manzanar, California, and at Poston (sometimes designated as Parker) and Sacaton (sometimes designated as Gila River), Arizona. Each of these projects is operated by War Relocation Authority, an independent Federal civilian agency. Their location within areas evacuated of persons of Japanese ancestry necessitates the establishment and mainte¬ nance by this Command of certain security measures not currently requisite at other relocation centers. 2. It is desired that you provide for contraband inspection of all packages destined for delivery to any center resident (any person of Japanese ancestry or the non-Japanese spouse of any such person who is a center resident) at the relocation projects designated in paragraph 1 hereof Such inspection to be accomplished through the agency of military police under your command stationed at each of such projects. Inspection will be applicable to all such packages irrespective of the method of delivery and will be inclusive of parcel post and express. In all cases it will precede delivery to the addressee. 3. Inspection will be conducted in a manner which will insure the detection and removal from all such packages of contraband. In establishing the inspection procedure the following basic requirements will be observed: (a) Each package will be opened in the presence of the adressee. (b) Each item of contraband discovered and removed from a package will be labeled and plainly marked. Such label will show the addressee’s name and the sender (if the latter is known). Each item of contraband discovered will be appropriately numbered by an identifying serial number. (c) A receipt will be issued the addressee for each item of contraband discovered and re¬ moved. Such receipt will bear the identifying serial number previously assigned the item covered. (d) By arrangement with the project director inspection will be conducted in a building APPENDIX 533 THREE at or near the center. The building should be chosen with a view to facilitating the presence of the addressee, the inspection procedure and the delivery of packages. (e) A contraband register will be maintained. entered in the register. number. Each item of contraband seized will be The descriptive entry may be limited to the assigned serial Periodically, contraband so seized will be delivered to the custody of the project director for safe keeping. A covering receipt reflecting the serial numbers of the items delivered will be obtained from the project director. (f) No item of contraband will thereafter be delivered to a center resident without the express permission of this headquarters. 4. The following are contraband: (a) Those articles, commodities or things; the use, possession or operation of which are prohibited by paragraph 6, Proclamation No. 3, of this headquarters, i.e., firearms, weapons or implements of war or component parts thereof, ammunition, bombs, explosives or the component parts thereof, short-wave radio receiving sets having a frequency of 1,750 kilocycles or greater or of 540 kilocycles or less, radio trans¬ mitting sets, signal devices, codes or ciphers, cameras. (b) Those articles, commodities or things; the use, possession or operation of which are prohibited by Public Proclamation No. 2525, promulgated by the President of the United States on December 7, 1941, i.e., papers, documents or books in which there may be invisible writings; photographs, sketches, pictures, drawings, maps, or graphical representation of any military or naval installations or equipment or of any arms, ammunition, implements of war, device or thing used or intended to be used in the combat equipment of the land or naval forces of the United States or of any military or naval post, camp, or station. The provisions of this sub-paragraph, b, shall be subject to the following exceptions: (1) First class mail will not be inspected; (2) Magazines, periodicals, newspapers and books printed in the English language by publishers in the United States and transmitted as second class mail by the original publisher to such person of Japanese ancestry will not be confiscated or withheld as contraband within the meaning of this sub-paragraph b. If, however, such magazines, periodicals, newspapers and books have been mailed by a person other than the original publisher to such person of Japanese ancestry, then the same shall be searched for contraband which may be secreted between the pages or covers thereof and in the event any such contraband is found, the same together with the container thereof, shall be confiscated and disposed of as provided in paragraph 3 hereof 5. The tools and implements of an artisan or of a professional person of Japanese ancestry, are not absolute contraband and are not subject to confiscation. These items are inclusive of wood-working tools, agricultural implements, dressmakers or tailors trade tools, and mechanics tools as well. It is not intended to prevent the development of skills, crafts, trades and pro¬ fessional endeavors within relocation centers. 6. The War Relocation Authority has concurred in this order and has agreed to provide for the issuance of appropriate instructions to each project director affected. These instructions will direct the discontinuance of current postal, express, or other parcel delivery service and in lieu thereof the delivery of all packages to military police for inspection. The Authority will further instruct project directors to accept delivery of, receipt for and safely store all such contraband. 7. It is requested that you advise this headquarters of the action taken at each center to comply with this directive. J. L. DeWITT Lieutenant General, U. S. Army Commanding December 7, 1942 SUBJECT: "War Relocation Projects. TO: Director, War Relocation Authority, Barr Building, Washington, D. C. 1. Reference is made to letter this headquarters dated November 22, 1942, file 334.7 (DSC), subject: "Policies as to Relationship of Western Defense Command with Ninth Service Command 534 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST and War Relocation Authority,” copies of which were furnished you; and particularly to para¬ graph lb (3) thereof. 2. In accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement between the War Relocation Authority and the War Department dated April 17, 1942 (Inclosure $ 1), this headquarters assumed certain responsibilities in connection with the provision of necessary housing, hospital and sanitary facilities, Military Police facilities and signal installations for War Relocation Projects. In addi¬ tion, largely by transfer from Assembly Centers, this headquarters provided certain minimum barrack and mess and hospital equipment. 3. The completion of the various projects is a progressive one and it is apparent that this headquarters cannot finally assure the completion without retaining control for a considerable period of time, a procedure not contemplated under present policies (paragraph 1, above). For this reason a Board of Officers was appointed to visit the projects to determine the status of construction, property and other matters on the date of the visit. Copies of Board reports are inclosed for the following projects: a. Colorado River War Relocation Project, Poston, Arizona. b. Gila River War Relocation Project, Rivers, Pinal County, Arizona. c. Minidoka War Relocation Project, Hunt, Idaho. d. Tule Lake War Relocation Project, Newell, California. e. Manzanar War Relocation Project, Manzanar, California. f. Central Utah War Relocation Project, Delta, Utah. g. Heart Mountain War Relocation Project, Heart Mountain, Wyoming. h. Granada War Relocation Project, Amache Branch, Lamar, Colorado. *. Jerome War Relocation Project, Jerome, Arkansas. j. Rohwer War Relocation Project, McGehee, Arkansas. Copies of the reports have also been furnished to the War Department and to interested Service Commands. 4. This information is furnished you in order that you may look to such other agencies as the War Department may designate in connection with these projects. No further action in con¬ nection with matters covered by the Board reports is contemplated by this headquarters. For the Commanding General: 11 Incls: Incl # Incl # Incl # Incl # Incl # 1—Memo of Agreement between the WD and WRA, dated April 17, 1942. 2—Board Report on Colorado River War Relocation Project. 3—Board Report on Gila River War Relocation Project. 4—Board Report on Minidoka War Relocation Project. 5—Board Report on Tule Lake War Relocation Project. Incl # Incl # 7—Board Report on Central Utah War Relocation Project. Incl # Incl # 9—Board Report on Granada War Relocation Project. 6—Board Report on Manzanar War Relocation Project. 8—Board Report on Heart Mountain War Relocation Project. Incl # 10—Board Report on Jerome War Relocation Project. Incl # 11—Board Report on Rohwer War Relocation Project. December 7, 1942 SUBJECT: War Relocation Projects. TO: Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington D. C. 1. In accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement between the War Relocation Authority and the War Department dated April 17, 1942, (Inclosure 1), this headquarters assumed certain responsibilities in connection with the provision of necessary housing, hospital and sanitary facilities, Military Police facilities and signal installations for War Relocation Projects. In addi¬ tion, largely by transfer from Assembly Centers, this headquarters provided certain minimum barrack and mess and hospital equipment. 2. The transfer of all persons of Japanese ancestry from Assembly Centers, operated by the Wartime Civil Control Administration, to War Relocation Projects, operated by the War Reloca¬ tion Authority, has been completed and certain policies have been announced regarding the future APPENDIX 535 THREE relationship of the Western Defense Command with Service Commands and War Relocation Authority in connection with these provisions. (Inclosure $ 2.) 3. The completion of the various projects is a progressive one and it is apparent that this headquarters cannot finally assure the completion without retaining control for a considerable period of time, a procedure not contemplated under present policies. (Inclosure $ 2.) For this reason a Board of Officers was appointed to visit the projects to determine the status of construc¬ tion, property and other matters on the date of the visit. Copies of Board reports are inclosed for the following projects: a. Colorado River War Relocation Project, Poston, Arizona. b. Gila River War Relocation Project, Rivers, Pinal County, Arizona. c. Minidoka War Relocation Project, Hunt, Idaho. d. Tule Lake War Relocation Project, Newell, California. e. Manzanar War Relocation Project, Manzanar, California. f. Central Utah War Relocation Project, Delta, Utah. g. Heart Mountain War Relocation Project, Heart Mountain, Wyoming. h. Granada War Relocation Project, Amache Branch, Lamar, Colorado. i. Jerome War Relocation Project, Jerome, Arkansas. j. Rohwer War Relocation Project, McGehee, Arkansas. Copies of the reports have also been furnished to the interested Service Commands and to the War Relocation Authority. 4. This information is furnished for such further action as the War Department desires to take under the Memorandum of Agreement referred to above as no further action in this matter is contemplated by this headquarters. For the Commanding General: 12 Incls: Incl # 1— Memo of Agreement between the WD and WRA dated April 17, 1942. Incl # 2— Ltr fr Hq WDC & 4A, file 334.7 (DCS) subj: "Policies as to Relationship of Western Defense Command with Ninth Service Command & WRA,” dated n/22/42, with inclosures thereto. Incl # 3— Board Report on Colorado River War Relocation Project. Incl # 4— Board report on Gila River War Relocation Project. Incl # 5— Board Report on Minidoka War Relocation Project. Incl # 6— Board Report on Tule Lake War Relocation Project. Incl # 7— Board Report on Manzanar War Relocation Project. Incl # 8— Board Report on Central Utah War Relocation Project. Incl # 9— Board Report on Heart Mountain War Relocation Project. Incl # 10— Board Report on Granada War Relocation Project. Incl # 11— Board Report on Jerome War Relocation Project. Incl # 12— Board Report on Rohwer War Relocation Project. December 7, 1942 SUBJECT: War Relocation Projects. TO: Commanding General, Ninth Service Command, Fort Douglas, Utah. 1. Reference is made to letter this headquarters dated November 22, 1942, file 334.7 (DCS), subject: "Policies as to Relationship of Western Defense Command with Ninth Service Command and War Relocation Authority,” and particularly to paragraph lb (3) thereof. 2. In accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement between the War Relocation Authority and the War Department dated April 17, 1942 (Inclosure $ 1), this headquarters assumed certain responsibilities in connection with the provision of necessary housing, hospital and sanitary facilities, Military Police facilities and signal installations for War Relocation Projects. In addi¬ tion, largely by transfer from Assembly Centers, this headquarters provided certain minimum barrack and mess and hospital equipment. 3. The completion of the various projects is a progressive one and it is apparent that this headquarters cannot finally assure the completion without retaining control for a considerable 536 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST period of time, a procedure not contemplated under present policies (paragraph 1, above). For this reason a Board of Officers was appointed to visit the projects to determine the status of con¬ struction, property and other matters on the date of the visit. Copies of Board reports are inclosed for the following projects: a. Colorado River War Relocation Project, Poston, Arizona. b. Gila River War Relocation Project, Rivers, Pinal County, Arizona. c. Minidoka War Relocation Project, Plunt, Idaho. d. Tule Lake War Relocation Project, Newell, California. e. Manzanar War Relocation Project, Manzanar, California. f Central Utah War Relocation Project, Delta, Utah. Copies of the reports have also been furnished the War Department and the War Relocation Authority. 4. This information is furnished as a matter pertaining to your command in view of present policies as to the relationship of agencies of the War Department and the War Relocation Authority as stated in the letter referred to in paragraph 1. No further action in connection with matters covered by the Board reports is contemplated by this headquarters. For the Commanding General: 7 Incls: Incl $ 1—Memo of Agreement between the WD and WRA, dated April 17, 1942. Incl # 2—Board Report on Colorado River War Relocation Project. Incl $ 3—Board Report on Gila River War Relocation Project. Incl # 4—Board Report on Minidoka War Relocation Project. Incl # 5—Board Report on Tule Lake War Relocation Project. Incl # 6—Board Report on Manzanar Relocation Project. Incl $ 7—Board Report on Central Utah War Relocation Project. December 7, 1942 SUBJECT: War Relocation Projects. TO: Commanding General, Eighth Service Command, Santa Fe Building, Dallas, Texas. 1. Reference is made to letter this headquarters dated November 22, (DCS), subject: 1942, file 334.7 "Policies as to Relationship of Western Defense Command with Ninth Service Command and War Relocation Authority,” copies of which were furnished your headquarters; and particularly to paragraph lb (3) thereof 2. In accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement between the War Relocation Authority and the War Department dated Apr. 17, 1942 (Inclosure # 1), this headquarters assumed certain responsibilities in connection with the provision of necessary housing, hospital and sanitary facilities, Military Police facilities and signal installations for War Relocation Projects. In addition, largely by transfer from Assembly Centers, this headquarters provided certain minimum barrack and mess and hospital equipment. 3. The completion of the various projects is a progressive one and it is apparent that this head¬ quarters cannot finally assure the completion without retaining control for a considerable period of time, a procedure not contemplated under present policies (paragraph 1, above). For this reason a Board of Officers was appointed to visit the projects to determine the status of construction, property and other matters on the date of the visit. following project: a. Copy of Board report is inclosed for the Granada War Relocation Project, Amache Branch, Lamar, Colorado. Copies of this report have also been furnished the War Department and the War Relocation Authority. 4. This information is furnished as a matter pertaining to your command in view of present policies as to the relationship of agencies of the War Department and the War Relocation Authority as stated in the letter referred to in paragraph 1. No further action in connection with matters covered by the Board report is contemplated by this headquarters. For the Commanding General: 2 Incls: Incl $ 1—Memo of Agreement between the WD & WRA, dated April 17, 1942. Incl $ 2—Board Report on Granada War Relocation Project. APPENDIX 537 THREE December 7, 1942 SUBJECT: War Relocation Projects. TO: Commanding General, Seventh Service Command, New Federal Building, 15th and Dodge Streets, Omaha, Nebraska. 1. Reference is made to letter this headquarters dated November 22, 1942, file 334.7 (DCS), subject: “Policies as to Relationship of Western Defense Command with Ninth Service Command and War Relocation Authority,” copies of which were furnished your headquarters; and partic¬ ularly to paragraph 1 b (3) thereof. 2. In accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement between the War Relocation Authority and the War Department dated April 17, 1942 (inclosure # 1), this headquarters assumed certain responsibilities in connection with the provision of necessary housing, hospital and sanitary facilities, Military Police facilities and signal installations for War Relocation Projects. In addition, largely by transfer from Assembly Centers, this headquarters provided certain minimum barrack and mess and hospital equipment. 3. The completion of the various projects is a progressive one and it is apparent that this headquarters cannot finally assure the completion without retaining control for a considerable period of time, a procedure not contemplated under present policies (paragraph 1, above). For this reason a Board of Officers was appointed to visit the projects to determine the status of construction, property and other matters on the date of the visit. Copies of Board reports are inclosed for the following projects: a. Heart Mountain War Relocation Project, Heart Mountain, Wyoming. b. Jerome War Relocation Project, Jerome, Arkansas. c. Rohwer War Relocation Project, McGehee, Arkansas. Copies of the reports have also been furnished the War Department and the War Relocation Authority. 4. This information is furnished as a matter pertaining to your command in view of present policies as to the relationship of agencies of the War Department and the War Relocation Authority, as stated in the letter referred to in paragraph 1. No further action in connection with matters covered by the Board reports is contemplated by this headquarters. For the Commanding General: 4 Incls: Incl # 1—Memo of Agreement between the WD and WRA, dated April 17, 1942. Incl $ 2—Board Report on Heart Mountain War Relocation Project. Incl # 3—Board Report on Jerome War Relocation Project. Incl # 4—Board Report on Rohwer War Relocation Project. REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF A BOARD OF OFFICERS Proceedings of a board of officers which convened at Colorado River War Relocation Project, Poston, Arizona, pursuant to paragraph 1, Special Orders No. 304, Headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, 5 November, 1942, copy of which is inclosed herewith as Exhibit "A”. The Board convened at 8:00AM, November 29, 1942, at Colorado River War Relocation Project, Poston, Arizona, and proceeded to an inspection of the facilities and items set forth in paragraph 1 c., S.O. No. 304. MEMBERS PRESENT AT THE MEETING Colonel Herbert D. Crall, Medical Corps Lt. Colonel Joe P. Price, Corps of Military Police Major John R. Sharp, Corps of Engineers Captain Robert M. Petersen, Quartermaster Corps First Lieutenant William D. Knox, Signal Corps Lt. Colonel Joe P. Price, CMP, appointed November 15, 1942, as a member of the Board vice Colonel W. F. Magill, Jr., Inf., relieved. Exhibit "B”. Copy of orders effecting this change included as 538 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST PURPOSE: To investigate and report for the purpose of determining the present status of construction, supply, communication facilities, and hospitalization in the War Relocation Projects now being operated by the War Relocation Authority. FINDINGS: The findings of the Board are: 1. Construction of Initial Facilities: a. The provisions of the memorandum of agreement, April 17, 1942, have been complied with and the construction meets the requirements of "Standards and Details—Con¬ struction of Japanese Evacuees Reception Centers” with the following exceptions: (1) Only fifty percent of wire mesh for fly screening provided. (2) Interior roads have been surfaced. (3) One administrative shop building not provided. (4) No gasoline operated stand-by pump provided for water supply system. (5) No minor surgery room provided in hospital. (6) Not all the heating stoves have been provided for evacuee barracks. (7) One fire engine short. (8) Sprinkler system not provided in hospital group. Steam and hot water systems not completed in this group. (9) Wall board not provided to line evacuee barracks. (10) All of the elevated water tanks leak and there has been noticeable settle¬ ment of the tank footings at well # 1, in Unit # 2. (11) No doctor’s and nurses’ dressing rooms provided. (12) No means for heating doctor’s or nurses’ quarters. 2. Status of Supply: a. All Quartermaster supplies furnished in compliance with memorandum of agreement between the War Department and the War Relocation Authority dated April 17, 1942, were received in a serviceable condition except some cots, steel canvas which had to be repaired before they were issued. b. All Type B rations were received in good condition suitable for immediate issue. 3. Hospital and Sanitary Facilities: a. Construction is complete except for heating plant for the hospital, doctors’ and nurses’ dressing rooms, minor surgery and dispensary in Camp No. 3. b. Following equipment has not yet been installed: (1) Ventilators for the main laboratory, dental laboratory and X-ray developing room. (2) Electric ranges for wards. (Hot plates are in use). (3) Dish washer for the hospital kitchen. (4) Any heating arrangement for doctors’ or nurses’ quarters. c. Following essential items of equipment and supply have not been received: See Exhibit "C” attached. d. Sanitary Facilities: (1) There is no heating in any of the apartments of the evacuees. (2) This camp was put in operation prior to the agreement of June 6, 1942, and there are no bath tubs in women’s lavatories, however, sanitary facilities are con¬ sidered adequate. (3) Sewage plants are operating satisfactorily. (4) Ample potable water supply has been provided which is chlorinated at the pumps. 4. Military Police Facilities: a. Construction of military police housing and facilities is complete with the following exceptions: (1) Toilet in Administration Building. (2) Shower and window guards for guard house. (3) Meat block and garbage rack for mess hall. (4) Guard towers. (5) Outside telephone and separate PBX. APPENDIX 535 THREE 5. Signal Installations: a. The initial requirements on telephone switchboard and telephones within the project have not been met. b. Detailed report of present facilities is included as Exhibit “D”. The Board adjourned at 3.00PM, November 29, 1942, at Colorado River War Relocation Project, Poston, Arizona. /s/ Herbert D. Crall Herbert D. Crall Colonel Medical Corps President MEMBERS: Is/ Joe P. Price Lt. Colonel Joe P. Price, Corps of Military Police /s/ John R. Sharp Major John R. Sharp, Corps of Engineers /s/ Robert M. Petersen Captain Robert M. Petersen, Quartermaster Corps. HQ WDC & 4A Pres. SF Calif 5 Dec 42 APPROVED: J. L. DeWITT, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding. /s/ Wm. D. Knox WM. D. KNOX 1st Lieut., Signal Corps Recorder EXHIBITS: "A”—Cpy SO # 304 Hq WDC & 4A Dated 11/5/42 "B”—Cpy SO #314 Hq WDC & 4A Dated 11/15/42 “C”—Insp. Hosp. & Sant’ry Fac. Colo. R. War Rel. Project Dated 11 /29/42—Col. Crall, MC "D”—Insp. Sign. Install’tns. Colo. R. War. Rel. Project Dated 11/29/42—Lieut. Knox, SC HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY Presidio of San Francisco, California SPECIAL ORDERS NUMBER 304 EXTRACT November 5, 1942 1. a. A Board of Officers is appointed to meet at this Headquarters on November 5, 1942, or as soon thereafter as practicable for the purpose of determining the present status of construction, supply, communication facilities and hospitalization in the War Relo¬ cation Projects now being operated by the War Relocation Authority and designated as follows: Colorado River War Relocation Project, Poston, Arizona. Gila River War Relocation Project, Rivers, Pinal County, Arizona. Minidoka War Relocation Project, Hunt, Idaho. Tule Lake War Relocation Project, Newell, California. Manzanar War Relocation Project, Manzanar, California. Central Utah War Relocation Project, Delta, Utah. Heart Mountain War Relocation Project, Heart Mountain, Wyoming. 540 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Granada War Relocation Project, Amache Branch, Lamar, Colorado. Jerome War Relocation Project, Jerome, Arkansas. Rohwer War Relocation Project, McGehee, Arkansas. b. DETAIL FOR THE BOARD: COLONEL W. FULTON MAGILL JR. 07251 Infantry COLONEL HERBERT D. CRALL 0235629 Medical Corps MAJOR JOHN R. SHARP 0183 351 Corps of Engineers CAPTAIN ROBERT M. PETERSEN 03 87752 Quartermaster Corps FIRST LIEUTENANT WILLIAM D. KNOX 0344911 Signal Corps c. The Board will visit each of the War Relocation Centers in turn and will determine the status of the following: (1) Construction of initial facilities. (Paragraph 5, Memorandum of Agreement between the War Department and War Relocation Authority, dated April 17 1942). (2) Supply of initial equipment for Relocation Centers. (Paragraph 6, above quoted agreement). (3) Hospital and sanitary facilities. (Paragraph 5, above quoted agreement). (4) Military Police Housing. (Paragraph 5, above quoted agreement). (5) Signal Installations. (Paragraph 5, above quoted agreement). d. The Board is a fact finding body only whose report will reflect the status of the various projects at the time of the visit under the headings shown above. It will confine its report to these matters without initiating corrective action. e. The report of the Board will show whether the supplies, equipment and construction provided under the Memorandum of Agreement meet the minimum standards set forth in "Standards and Details,” with supplements thereto, available in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division. Where these standards have not been met, the report will include a detailed statement of that which is lacking. /. Separate reports will be made on each project and all reports will reach this head¬ quarters by December 5, 1942. By command of Lieutenant General DeWITT: J. W. BARNETT, Brigadier General, General Staff Corps, Chief of Staff. OFFICIAL: B. Y. READ, Colonel, Adjutant General’s Department, Adjutant General. DISTRIBUTION "F” HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY Presidio of San Francisco, California November 15, 1942 SPECIAL ORDERS NUMBER 314 1. Confidential. 2. COL ANDREW D CHAFFIN 01857 GSC having reported Nov 13 1942 in compliance with par 2 SO 302 WD cs, is asgd to duty as Asst to the AC OF S, Civil Affairs Div, San Francisco, Calif. 3. MAJ HERMAN P GOEBEL, JR 0274477 Cav having been asgd to this Hq Nov 5 1942 in compliance with par 10 SO 301 WD cs, is asgd to duty as Asst to the AC of S, Civil Affairs Div, San Francisco, Califi 4. 1ST LT WILLIAM C KORB 0271597 FA this Hq WP at such time as will enable him to report not earlier than November 28, 1942 nor later than November 29, 1942 to the Comdt APPENDIX 541 THREE C&GS Sch, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas on temp duty for purpose of pursuing G-2 course of instruc¬ tion and upon completion will return to proper station. TDN. FD 34 P 434-02 A 0425-23. Auth: WD TAGO Memo No W3 50-97-42, dated October 9, 1942, subject: "Courses, Command and General Staff School (Eleventh General Staff and Third Services of Supply Staff)”. 5. MAJ JOHN D MALNIGHT 021851 1 Sig C is reld fr asgmt and duty with Hq Western Def Comd and Fourth Army, Presidio of San Francisco, Calif is then asgd to 43 8th Sig Cons Bn (Avn.), Camp Pinedale, Fresno, Calif. WP. TPA. TDN. FD 31 P 431-01 02 03 07 08 A 0425-23. 6. So much of par 6 SO 293 as amended by par 13 SO 303, both this Hq cs, as reads, "Techn Gr 5 D’Arcy V Controy, 393 89644, 255th Sig Cons Co, Camp Adair, Ore”, is further amended to read, "Techn Gr 5 D’Arcy V Conroy, 39389644, 255th Sig Cons Co, Camp Adair, Ore”. 7. The following change is made in the composition of the board of officers appointed by par 1 SO 304, this Hq, cs: RELIEVED COLONEL W FULTON MAGILL JR 07251 Inf DETAILED LT COL JOE P PRICE 0236100 CMP 8. The following named EM, both Inf Hq Co Fourth Army are trfd in gr of Put to Sig C, Hq Co Fourth Army, Presidio of San Francisco, Calif: Put Richard A Brown, 19084998 Put Peter A Tobin, 1913826) By Command of Lieutenant General DeWITT: J. W. BARNETT, Brigadier General, General Staff Corps, Chief of Staff. OFFICIAL: B. Y. READ, Colonel Adjutant General’s Department, Adjutant General DIST: "F’ INSPECTION OF HOSPITAL AND SANITARY FACILITIES Colorado River War Relocation Project Poston, Arizona November 29, 1942 Colonel Herbert D. Crall, M.C. 1. This project is divided into 3 separate camps originally built to house 10,000, 5,000, and 5,000 evacuees. Camp 1 has a population of 9,300 with about 700 out at work. Camp 2 and 3 have a population of about 4,000. 2. Personnel, medical: Caucasian—Dr. Pressman 3 nurses 1 nutritionist Japanese —11 doctors 3 optometrists 19 dentists 5 nurses, plus 2 who are not working, 3 nurses are graduates of Japanese nursing schools 4 medical students 4 chiropractors 1 midwife JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 542 9 pharmacists 1 laboratory technician I X-ray technician 1 bacteriologist 1 entomologist and sanitarian 3. Medical supplies: There are numerous shortages on requisitions for medical supply, 100- bed basic, UA-801-95-13 and 25-bed expansion unit, Requisition No. UA-801-88-11. Original 100-bed hospital was received from San Francisco Medical Depot and has no S.G.O. requisition number. The following items are shortages which are urgently desired: Atropine sulfate, grains gr 10860 l/lOO (difficult to se¬ cure locally) 12280 Hematropine hydrobromide 30060 Bag, obstetrical 30770 Case, diagnostic, eye, ear, nose and throat Steinmann apparatus and pins 31960 & 31965 . 37126 Mask, gas, oxygen therapy 36630 Class 5 50040 Crutches Dental equipment is generally short. Burrs are critical 51750 Compressor unit Amalgam Handpieces 52610 & 52630 Dental laboratory equipment; dental unit lamps, oper¬ ating; portable engines have not been received. 60400 Illuminator, X-ray 61200, 61220, 61230, & 61240 70560 Film holders Nurse’s desk 70604 Chart holders Following equipment and construction to be provided by the USEC has not been provided. Ventilators for the dental laboratory, the main laboratory, and the X-ray developing room, doctors’ and nurses’ dressing rooms, and minor surgery. Electric ranges for each ward. Dish washer for the main kitchen. Heating for the doctors and nurses quarters. 4. The hospital laundry is not yet in operation since only 1 of the 3 boilers of the hospital heating plant is now in operation. 5. Sanitary facilities in the main camp areas of all 3 camps are ample although bath tubs have not been installed in women’s shower rooms since this center was constructed prior to the agreement of June 6th between the War Department and the W.R.A. Facilities, however, are considered adequate. 6. There are no stoves at present available for the heating of any of the apartments of the evacuees. 7. Three sewage plants are in operation; 1 in each camp and are satisfactory except that in camp 2, additional drainage must be provided to care for the effluent which now practically fills the basin provided. (Units have been in operation for about one week.) 8. An ample potable water supply has been provided for the 3 camps. 9. No method has been provided for the washing of garbage cans although steps are being taken locally to care for this situation. INSPECTION OF SIGNAL INSTALLATIONS Colorado River War Relocation Project Poston, Arizona November 29, 1942 1st Lieut. William D. Knox, Signal Corps Project has a Western Electric drop type switchboard. Installation of telephone facilities is on a temporary basis. Three trunk lines, two to Parker and one to Blythe are in operation. 543 APPENDIX THREE Thirty-four lines serving 46 telephones, are in operation distributed as follows: 25 Administration and operation lines. 3 Military Police lines. 2 Party lines for Fire Stations. 3 Party lines for Hospital. 1 Line for Del Sc Webb, Contractors The Project Director and Associate Project Director have a direct line to Parker. No provision has been made for a Fire Reporting System. No Guard Reporting System has been installed. The Military Police Commander does not have a direct outside line. The project does not have teletypewriter exchange service, but has access to TWX service used by the U. S. Engineers. Three Western Electric 551-B switchboards have been received. One of these boards is equipped for 80 lines and two are equipped for 40 lines each. The 80 line board is to be installed in the camp having 10,000 population and the two 40 line boards are to serve the two camps, each having 5,000 population. REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF A BOARD OF OFFICERS Proceedings of a board of officers which convened at Central Utah War Relocation Project, Delta, Utah, pursuant to paragraph 1, Special Orders No. 304, Headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, 5 November, 1942, copy of which is enclosed herewith as Exhibit “A”. The Board convened at 4:20 PM, November 27, 1942, at Central Utah War Relocation Project, Delta, Utah, and proceeded to an inspection of the facilities and items set forth in paragraph 1 c., S.O. No. 304. MEMBERS PRESENT AT THE MEETING Colonel Herbert D. Crall, Medical Corps Lt. Colonel Joe P. Price, Corps of Military Police Major John R. Sharp, Corps of Engineers Captain Robert M. Petersen, Quartermaster Corps First Lieutenant William D. Knox, Signal Corps Lt. Colonel Joe P. Price, CMP, appointed November 15, 1942, as a member of the Board vice Colonel W. F. Magill, Jr., Inf., relieved. Copy of orders effecting this change included as Exhibit "B”. PURPOSE: To investigate and report for the purpose of determining the present status of construction, supply, communication facilities, and hospitalization in the War Relocation Projects now being operated by the War Relocation Authority. FINDINGS: The findings of the Board are: 1. Construction of Initial Facilities. a. The provisions of the memorandum of agreement, April 17, 1942, have been complied with and the construction meets the requirements of “Standards and Details—Con¬ struction of Japanese Evacuee Reception Centers” with the following exceptions: (1) Boiler plant in hospital group not completed. (2) Dishwasher not installed in Hospital Isolation Ward. (3 ) One fire engine not delivered. (4) Elevated water storage tanks not completed. (5) No sprinkler system in hospital group. (6) No partitions provided in doctors’ and nurses’ dressing rooms. 2. Status of Supply. a. All Quartermaster supplies furnished in compliance with memorandum of agreement between the War Department and War Relocation Authority, dated April 17, 1942, were received in a serviceable condition. 544 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST b. All Type B Rations were received in good condition suitable for immediate issue. 3. Hospital and Sanitary Facilities. a. Construction is complete except for heating plant, sprinkler system, main water storage b. Following equipment has not yet been installed: tank, and partitions in doctors’ and nurses’ dressing rooms. (1) Hospital kitchen. (2) Sterilizers for the contagious-disease ward. (3) Bulk Pressure sterilizer. (4) Autopsy table (5) Dishwashers for main hospital kitchen and contagious-disease ward. c. Following essential items of supply and equipment have not been received: hibit “C”). d. Sanitary facilities: (See Ex¬ (1) Water supply is ample and potable. (2) Sewage disposal plant is in satisfactory operation. (3) Ample bathing and toilet facilities including laundry have been provided. 4. Military Police Facilities: a. The military police housing and other facilities are complete with the following ex¬ ceptions: (1) Garbage racks. (2) Searchlights for guard towers. (3) Telephones both for guard towers and for direct outside communication. 5. Signal Installations: a. Maximum allowance of Signal equipment has not been met, however, it is believed that present installation is satisfactory with the following exceptions: (1) Fire Reporting System has not been installed. (2) Guard Reporting System has not been completely installed. (3) Commander of Military Police does not have a direct outside line. b. Detailed report of present facilities and contemplated installations is included as Exhibit *'D”. The Board adjourned at 9:10PM, November 27, 1942, and proceeded to Colorado River War Relocation Project, Poston, Arizona, for the purpose of inspecting same. /s/ Herbert D. Crall HERBERT D. CRALL Colonel, Medical Corps President MEMBERS: /s/ Joe P. Price Lt. Colonel Joe P. Price, Corps of Military Police. /s/ John R. Sharp Major John R. Sharp, Corps of Engineers. /s/ Robert M. Petersen Captain Robert M. Petersen, Quartermaster Corps HQ WDC & 4A Pres SF Calif 5 Dec 42. APPROVED: (SEAL) /$/ Wm. D. Knox WM. D. KNOX 1st Lieut., Signal Corps Recorder J. L. DeWlTT, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding. APPENDIX THREE EXHIBITS: "A”—Cpy SO # 304 HQ. WDC & 4A Dated ll/s/42. "B”—Cpy SO # 314 Hq. WDC & 4A Dated 11/15/42. "C”—Insp. Hosp. & San’try Facilities Cen. Utah War Reloc’tn Proj. dated 11/27/42—Col. Crall, MC. “D”—Insp. Sig. Installation Cen. Utah War Reloc’tn Proj. dated 11/27/42—Lt. Wm. Knox, SC. Refer to Special Orders Nos. 304 and 314 INSPECTION OF HOSPITAL AND SANITARY FACILITIES Central Utah War Relocation Center Abraham, Utah November 28, 1942 Colonel Herbert D. Crall, M. C. 1. 2. Population: 7,688 plus 2,000 now on outside work. Medical Personnel: Caucasian— 1 Doctor (Dr. Ramsey) 2 Nurses Japanese — 6 Doctors 12 Dentists 5 Nurses 14 Pharmacists 5 Laboratory technicians 7 Optometrists 1 Mortician 3. Medical Supplies: a. Approximately 70% of the total equipment has been received of the 100-bed hospital requisition No. UA-801-95-28; 50-bed expansion unit, requisition No. UA-801-89-37; 25-bed expansion unit, requisition No. UA-801-88-25. b. The following is a list of shortages which are urgently desired: Item No. Description NS Ampules ergotrate and tablets or FI. Ext. Ergot NS 20140 Cotton, absorbent 20370 20050 NS 2 30060 30770 Ampules ptuitrin obstetric Plaster of Paris Bandage, 3 inch, roller Kotex pads Bag, obstetrical Case, diagnostic, eye, ear, nose, and throat 30780 Case, emergency 33400 Knife, plaster 34320 Proc to-Sigmoidoscope 37126 37973 (et al) Mask, oxygen therapy Suture, silk, braided 38430 Syringe, luer, 1 c.c. NS 3 41840 Tuberculin syringes 42260 Distilling apparatus 44770 Water bath Colorimeter 546 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST Class 5 Only a few items have been received 51080 Cabinet, dental Chair, operating 51430 52530 Engine, dental, electric, portable, (2 have been received) 52610 Engine, handpiece, angle 52630 Engine, handpiece, straight 53880 Lamp, operating, dental, dental operating equipment 60090 Cassettes for X-ray films 60100 Cassettes for X-ray films 60110 Cassettes for X-ray films 70310 Carriage, dressing 71580 Blankets 76680 78337 Typewriters Lamp, operating, emergency NS 7-A 92030 Bandage, plaster of Paris 92105 92107 92109 95021 c. Bassinets and cribs with sheets and blankets for same Surgical sponge Surgical sponge Surgical sponge Chair, Dental, field, anesthesia apparatus There are still some shortages of office furniture, kitchen utensils, and crockery, and silver for the dining room, none of which are considered critical. The sterilizers for the contagious-disease ward, disinfecting room, and the autopsy table have not yet been 4. received. The hospital laundry is not yet in operation due to lack of steam and hot water. 5. A temporary heating plant has been installed in the hospital area which furnishes heating for all hospital wards now being used. Note, pending completion of permanent heating plant, 1 additional boiler may be secured for temporary use by the engineer, on request of the project director. Following equipment to be installed by the engineers is not yet completed: Sprinkler system for the hospital, and ceiling lights in the obstetrical room, and minor surgery. (Although ceiling lights mentioned above are not of approved design, they are deemed satisfactory.) Dish washers for the main hospital kitchen and the contagious-disease ward. 6. Partitions should be constructed in the doctors’ and nurses’ quarters to insure privacy. 7. Although the main water-storage tank is not yet installed, the one in temporary use is satisfactory and 3 wells furnish an ample supply of potable water. 8. The sewage disposal plant now in operation is satisfactory and has been approved by the local health authorities. EXHIBIT "D” INSPECTION OF SIGNAL INSTALLATIONS Central Utah War Relocation Project, Delta, Utah November 27, 1942. 1st Lieut. William D. Knox, Signal Corps Project has a Western Electric Switchboard, equipped for 40 lines. Four trunks are in operation, one to Fort Douglas and three to Delta. One trunk to Delta is on a party line basis. Thirty-one lines are in operation. Distribution of lines is as follows: 21 Administration and Operational lines, six on a two-party line basis. 2 Guard lines, one to guard house and one two-party guard reporting line. 1 Line to Military Police Hq. 4 Lines to U.S. Engineers 1 Line to Daley Bros., Contractors 1 Line to Fire House. 1 Hospital Administration line. 547 APPENDIX THREE No Fire Reporting System has been installed. Guard Reporting System has not been completely installed. Commander of Military Police does not have a direct outside line. One Bell System teletypewriter has been installed and is in service. Contemplated Installations: 13 Guard and Fire Reporting telephones (combination 20 mine type telephones have been received and will be used for this installation). 16 Military Police telephones, including telephones for the Guard Towers. 8 Hospital telephones. No Public Pay Stations have been installed on the project. REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF A BOARD OF OFFICERS Proceedings of a board of officers which convened at Manzanar War Relocation Project, Manzanar, California, pursuant to paragraph 1, Special Orders No. 304, Headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, 5 November, 1942, copy of which is inclosed herewith as Exhibit “A”. The Board convened at 9:00AM, November 13, 1942, at Manzanar War Relocation Project, Manzanar, California, and proceeded to an inspection of the facilities and items set forth in paragraph 1 c., S.O. No. 304. MEMBERS PRESENT AT THE MEETING Colonel W. Fulton Magill, Jr., Infantry Colonel Herbert D. Crall, Medical Corps Major John R. Sharp, Corps of Engineers Captain Robert M. Petersen, Quartermaster Corps First Lieutenant William D. Knox, Signal Corps PURPOSE: To investigate and report for the purpose of determining the present status of construction, supply, communication facilities, and hospitalization in the War Relocation Projects now being operated by the War Relocation Authority. FINDINGS: The findings of the Board are: 1. Construction of Initial Facilities. a. The provisions of the Memorandum of Agreement, April 17, 1942, have been complied with and the construction meets the requirements of “Standards and details—construc¬ tion of Japanese evacuee relocation centers”, with the following exceptions: (1) Insufficient hot water facilities have been installed in the orphanage. (2) Four guard towers are without electricity for lighting. (3) The sewage disposal plant is not in operating condition due to failure of suction pumps. (4) The hospital sprinkler system has not been installed. Materials are on the site and work should be started within one week. (5) Space heaters for living quarters have not been completely installed. Installation continues as rapidly as deliveries are made. (6) Only one fire truck has been provided. One truck is on order. (7) The fence around the center is only half complete. Work is progressing on this item. 2. Supply of initial equipment. a. The initial equipment at this project was received by the WCCA., which removed the original records and transferred property to the War Relocation Authority on inventory on May 16, 1942. The present project director indicates that all initial items of Quartermaster supply were received to the best of his knowledge. b. The following items were received in an unserviceable condition: (1) 10 Stock pots (2) 24 Roasting pans (3) An unknown number of butcher knives. 548 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST c. The initial supply of rations was received. 3. Hospital and Sanitary Facilities. a. Hospital construction is complete with the following exceptions: (1) Autopsy table. (2) Electric ranges for ward kitchens. (3) Ventilators for X-ray laboratory, main laboratory and dental laboratory. (4) Bulk pressure sterilizer. (5) Ceiling lights for obstetrical delivery room and minor surgery. b. The following items of equipment which are considered to be critical have not been supplied on requisitions, UA-801-95-07 (100 bed hospital) and UA-801-89-13 (50 bed expansion unit): (1) 79170 Instrument sterilizers for wards (3) (2) 70330 Field carriages. (3) 34320 Proctoscope and lamps (4) 37120 Spinal manometer (5) 37126 Oxygen masks (6) 51430 Dental chairs (2) (7) 53920 Electric lathe (8) Obstetrical bed 70080 (9) N. S. Otoscope ophthalmoscope set (10) Cups, dinner plates and spoons. c. Sanitary Facilities (1) Construction was effected prior to the initiation of the agreement on standards, June 8, 1942. Bath and tub facilities and laundries do not meet the minimum requirements. The present facilities are considered to be adequate. (2) Water supply is adequate, is properly chlorinated and is potable. (3) Sewage disposal is unsatisfactory due to present breakdown of sewage disposal plant. 4. Military Police Housing. a. Construction of military police housing and facilities is complete with the following exceptions: (1) 12 stoves needed for military police buildings. (2) No heating has been provided for the guard towers. 5. Signal Installations. a. The initial requirements on telephone switchboard, telephone lines and teletype service b. Telephone communications have not been provided for the guard towers. within the project have been installed. c. A direct outside line has not been provided for the military police company. d. No fire reporting system has been installed. e. Detailed report of present facilities is included as Exhibit "C”. The Board adjourned at 4:30PM, November 13, 1942, and proceeded to Gila River War Relocation Project, for the purpose of inspecting same. /s/ W. F. Magill, Jr. W. F. MAGILL, JR. Colonel, Infantry President MEMBERS: /s/ Herbert D. Crall Colonel Herbert D. Crall, Medical Corps /s/ John R. Sharp Major John R. Sharp, Corps of Engineers /s/ Robert M. Petersen Captain Robert M. Petersen, Quartermaster Corps HQ WDC & 4A PRES SF CALIF 5 Dec 42 549 APPENDIX THREE APPROVED: /%/ Wm. D. Knox WM. D. KNOX 1st Lieut., Signal Corps Recorder (SEAL) J. L. DeWITT, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding. EXHIBITS: "A”—Cpy SO # 304 Hq WDC & 4A Dated 11/5/42 "B”—Insp. Hosp. & San’try Facilities Manzanar War Reloc’tn Proj. Dated 11/13/42—Col. Crall, MC. "C”—Inspection Sig. Installations, Manzanar War Reloc’tn Proj. Dated ll/l3/42—Lt. Wm. Knox, SC. Refer to Special Order No. 304 INSPECTION OF HOSPITAL AND SANITARY FACILITIES Manzanar War Relocation Project, Manzanar, California November 13, 1942 Colonel Herbert D. Crall, M. C. . . 1 Population, November 6, 1942: 2 Medical personnel: 9,145 Caucasian—Dr. Morse Little, Surgeon 5 nurses (1 sick in hospital) Japanese— 6 doctors (1 now 7 months pregnant) 5 dentists 10 registered nurses 5 senior student nurses who will get degree in January 5 pharmacists 2 X-ray technicians 2 laboratory technicians 1 dental technician 1 optometrist 3. Construction is ample for camp of this size and two wards are still vacant. 4. Medical supplies and hospital equipment: a. This War Relocation Authority camp has received supplies from many sources, from the Savannah, San Francisco, and St. Louis Medical Depots, from Wartime Civil Control Administration assembly centers, and as gifts from various sources. b. There are still some shortages on requisitions for 100-bed hospital, UA-801-95-07 and 50-bed expansion unit, requisition No. UA-801-89-13 but only a few of these items are considered critical, namely: 79170 Instrument sterilizers for wards (3) 70330 Field carriages 34320 Proctoscope and lamps therefor Cups, dinner plates, tablespoons 550 JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 37120 Spinal manometer Oxygen masks 37126 Otoscope opthalmoscope set NS 51430 53920 Dental chairs (2) 70080 Obstetrical bed. Electric lathe All of these items are on back order and some are being received regularly. 5. Equipment to be provided and installed by the USED has the following shortages: autopsy table, electric ranges for ward kitchens, ventilators for X-ray, main laboratory and dental labora¬ tory, bulk pressure sterilizer, and ceiling lights for obstetrical delivery room and minor surgery. In the main surgery a battery of four neon lights has been set up which is considered quite satisfactory. 6. Since this camp was constructed prior to the establishment of “standards and details” (Mutual agreement between General DeWitt and the War Relocation Authority) paragraph 4 b and c. Bath and tub facilities and laundries have not been complied with in detail but the number of showers together with large community bath tubs is considered adequate and there was no objection from evacuees or camp staff on other minimal toilet facilities provided by the War Department. 7. One problem has come up which is felt to be a purely local one to be handled by the camp officials and by the War Relocation Authority; namely, some 1500-2000 children occupy the school area daily which has facilities for only the normal block of 300. Arrangements will probably be made locally to correct this condition. 8. Water supply is adequate, is properly chlorinated and is potable. 9. The sewage disposal plant is not now in operation and raw sewage is running down into a wash some 1 /z miles from camp. So far, there has been no increase in fly breeding. 10. Garbage is disposed of by hauling from the camp to the vicinity of the sewage disposal plant where it is buried. Refuse is burned. 11. Some means should be provided for the storage of X-ray films in the hospital since con¬ struction is wood and this is a distinct fire hazard. EXHIBIT "C” INSPECTION OF SIGNAL INSTALLATIONS Manzanar War Relocation Project, Manzanar, California November 13, 1942 1st Lieut. William D. Knox, Signal Corps The project has a 40 line Western Electric switchboard equipped for 30 lines. Twenty-eight lines are actually in operation serving 44 administrative and operational telephones. There are 18 private lines serving 26 telephones. Three extensions have been installed on private lines. No fire reporting system has yet been installed. An estimate of $8,726 for this installation has been made by the Interstate Telegraph Company and forwarded to Lt. D. M. Stamper of the 9th Service Command by letter dated November 6, 1942. The proposed plan called for the installation of a hundred line annunciator and a message register. These two items are deemed unnecessary to the satisfactory operation of this system. No guard reporting system has yet been installed. Inquiry was made of the local Telephone Company as to the possibility of securing nine magneto sets to install a guard system. The manager thought that instruments could be obtained and offered to investigate the possibilities and report to the Project Director. Cost on these instruments was quoted on a monthly rental basis of 75$. The Military Police Commander does not have a direct commercial line for his use. The project has one Bell System teletypewriter connected on TWX service. REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF A BOARD OF OFFICERS Proceedings of a board of officers which convened at Gila River War Relocation Project, Rivers, Pinal County, Arizona, pursuant to paragraph 1, Special Orders No. 304, Headquarters 551 APPENDIX THREE Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, 5 November, 1942, copy of which is inclosed herewith as Exhibit "A”. The Board convened at 9:30AM, November 14, 1942, at Gila River War Relocation Project, Rivers, Pinal County, Arizona, and proceeded to an inspection of the facilities and items set forth in paragraph 1 c., S.O. No. 304. MEMBERS PRESENT AT THE MEETING Colonel W. Fulton Magill, Jr., Infantry
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