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The Challenge That Lies Ahead: Sluggish Global Growth
August 8, 2013
Over the past three years, global growth has almost
continuously decelerated as the slowdown has reached
the emerging-market economies, Japan has struggled to
bounce back and the recession in the euro area has become more protracted. Short-term indicators in recent
months have contributed to the perception of lowerthan-expected growth, but global inflation remains
largely contained (Chart 1).
The Deceleration of Emerging Economies
A number of emerging economies are showing signs of
straining against capacity constraints and above-target
inflation. Political risks and social unrest have reemerged
in some areas as well. Capital flow volatility and foreign
exchange market pressures have receded somewhat
since May but highlight some external vulnerabilities.
While these developments suggest lower growth and
greater uncertainty in 2013, concern has risen about the
long-term growth prospects of key emerging economies.
Short-term indicators: 1China’s GDP growth stayed
barely above 7.5 percent in the second quarter. China’s
exports fell 3.2 percent in June, the most since October
2009, while imports barely grew at 0.2 percent. India’s
first-quarter growth was 2.8 percent after posting an
average of 8.6 percent during 2003–07. Indonesia’s exports continued their 15-month slide, with a June decline
of 4.4 percent. Retail sales, industrial production and
Purchasing Managers Indexes (PMIs) came on the soft
side for Brazil and Mexico. For South Africa the signs
were mixed, with June exports declining 7.0 percent but
July PMI reaching a five-month high of 52.2. Turkey’s
manufacturing PMI dipped below the 50 threshold in July
to 49.8. The prospect of social unrest flared up with protests erupting in Turkey in late May and then in Brazil.
Strikes in South Africa’s mines and the removal of President Morsi in Egypt are fueling political uncertainty.
External imbalances: Since mid-2011, capital inflows
into emerging economies have moderated, largely as a
result of declining cross-border bank flows (mainly from
European banks after the euro-area crisis dip in 2011–
12). The broader revaluation of emerging markets in
early May in light of expectations of a possible shift in
U.S. monetary policy brought higher volatility and declines in portfolio flows. The currencies of major emerging economies with larger current account deficits—
South Africa, India, Indonesia, Turkey and Brazil—
depreciated the most. Most of them consequently have
been tightening monetary policy with an eye to curtailing
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

Chart 1
Global Growth Remains Sluggish, Global Inflation Subdued
A. Real GDP Growth
Percent, year/year
Emerging
Advanced
8
World
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
B. World Consumer Price Index Inflation
Percent, year/year
7
Headline CPI
6
Core CPI
5
4
3
2
1
0
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
NOTES: Calculations are based on a representative sample of 40 countries. Shaded areas
indicate global recessions.
SOURCES: Haver Analytics; authors' calculations.

Chart 2
Major Emerging Economies Face Lower Growth, Above-Target
Inflation
Difference in GDP growth*
2
1

Indonesia
Mexico

0
-1

South Africa

-2

Turkey
Brazil

-3

India
Russia

-4
0.0

0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
Average deviations of CPI headline inflation from target (2011:Q1-2013:Q1)

4.0

*Average growth 2003:Q1-2007:Q4 minus average growth 2011:Q1-2013:Q1 in percentage points
NOTES: Calculations use consumer price index (CPI) for all countries except India, which uses wholesale
price index (WPI). Size of diamond represents share of world GDP.
SOURCES: Haver Analytics; authors' calculations.

inflation and halting the depreciation of their currencies.
This has raised questions about how emerging economies—especially with de facto nominal anchor to the U.S.
dollar—might respond when U.S. monetary policy becomes tighter. Moderate external debt burdens and the
cushion of accumulated international reserves should allow most emerging economies to withstand short-term
capital outflows.
Long-term trends: Major emerging economies’ growth
is moderating due in part to slower external demand from
mature markets (Japan, euro area) not offset with do-

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mestic demand. Capacity constraints become binding
when the economy grows above potential—the output
level that can be sustained when the factors of production (labor and capital) are fully utilized. Growing above
potential can be sustained only temporarily and generally comes with signs of overheating and accelerating inflation. The evidence that growth has been generally
lower than in the half-decade prior to the recession, with
inflation remaining above target, suggests that the fundamentals of a number of major emerging economies
may not support the same pace of rapid growth as they
did before (Chart 2). Monetary policy is on a tightening
trajectory in a number of these countries.2

Chart 3
China Working-Age Population Share Declining
Percent of total population
75

70
U.N. projections
65

60

55

China
Other emerging economies

China at a Crossroad
50
1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

China’s external balance is still in surplus and its curren- SOURCES: U.N. Population Division; Haver Analytics; authors' calculations.
cy continues to appreciate, unlike the currencies of other
major emerging economies. But China is increasingly
Chart 4
confronted with the limits to its export- and investment- Strains Show Signs of Financial Underdevelopment and Distortions
A. China Interbank Rates
driven growth model of the past. Long-term projections
Percent
anticipate a slowdown toward 7 percent by 2016–20
Shibor shock
4
(China’s growth target under its current Five Year Plan is 3
3-month Shibor/3-month sovereign bond
7.5 percent) and down to 5 percent by 2026–30,
spread
2
3
“assuming steady reforms and no major shocks.” The
1
real test of China’s reform drive will come if the slow0
down is more abrupt and steep than these projections
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
indicate.
B. Credit Growth in China
The demographic factor and urbanization: China’s
working-age population share (15–59) has peaked, and
its size shrank for the first time in 2012 (Chart 3).4 Its
dependency ratio is projected to rise as well. Labor market mobility is constrained by the hukou (household registration) system, which could amplify the negative impact of Chinese demographics. Local governments resist
the expansion of social services under the hukou system
to rural migrant workers because of the impact this may
have on their finances. Under the current system, local
governments increasingly have had to rely on off-budget
land sales or borrowing with land as collateral to cover
their revenue shortfall, contributing to the buildup of
debt at the local level and to excesses in public infrastructure and land development.

Percent, year/year
40
30

2040

Total loans deflated
Total social financing deflated

20
10
0
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
NOTES: Total loans and total social financing series are deflated with the consumer price
index of China. Shaded areas indicate global recessions.
SOURCES: Bloomberg; Haver Analytics; authors' calculations.

credit to the private sector, notably the more innovative
new firms. The SOEs’ protected position undermines competitiveness and productivity growth.

Reform agenda: On June 20, China’s repurchase agreement (repo) interest rate spreads abruptly soared—the
Shanghai interbank offered rate (Shibor) spreads spiked
similarly (Chart 4A). China’s central bank eventually interConstraints to productivity: A slowdown can occur
vened, helping stabilize interbank rates. Chinese authoriwhen rising wages erode competitiveness but domestic
productivity gains do not materialize to offset them. Sig- ties continue to press for slower credit growth both from
nificant financial strains could also emerge with underde- bank and nonbank financing sources through tighter interbank liquidity (Chart 4B).5 Moreover, China continued its
veloped financial markets, leading in many cases to figradual efforts toward financial reform unabated—on July
nancial crisis and ultimately a steep decline in growth.
20, the central bank removed the lending rate floor, preThe way to avoid this pattern is to maintain the robust
viously set at 30 percent below the 6 percent benchmark
productivity gains of the previous decades. However,
lending rate.
productivity gains from reallocation of resources from
agriculture to manufacturing are narrowing as human
capital becomes key to moving up the technological lad- The offshore renminbi market development continued in
der. China has come to dominate the global markets for 2013 with a cross-border program allowing qualified Hong
Kong banks to lend renminbi to selected Chinese compalow-tech manufactures and cannot grow much more
nies at lower offshore rates. Taiwan initiated renminbi
through gaining market share in those industries. China
clearing and settlement operations, to be followed by Sinhas moved closer to the technological frontier, so
gapore. A bilateral swap arrangement was announced in
productivity growth depends more on China’s ability to
innovate and less on foreign-technology adoption. Finan- March with Brazil for an amount of 188 billion renminbi.
The Chinese authorities have reiterated their intention of
cial sector repression distorts the pricing of capital, creating the incentives behind the rapid increase in shadow “making the renminbi basically convertible by 2015.”
financing. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) crowd out
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

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Chart 5
Gross Household Savings Declines in Peripheral Euro-Area Countries

Japan’s New Policies
Second-quarter growth was stronger than expected in
Japan, driven by consumption and net exports—helped
by a 19.9 percent depreciation of the yen (in real effective terms) since September 2012. Prime Minister Abe’s
reformist policies include proposals to increase labor
force participation, introduce more competition and deregulate the rigid Japanese labor market (reducing duality, making hiring/firing easier and introducing wage flexibility) and open the door to immigration reform. The
exact details are still being worked out.

A. Financially Distressed Euro-Area Countries
Corporate savings
Percent of GDP
Household savings
30

Government savings
Gross savings

Gross investment

20
10
0
-10
2002 2003 2004 2005
B. Other Euro-Area Countries
Percent of GDP
30

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Corporate savings
Household savings
Gross investment

2011

2012

Government savings
Gross savings

20
10
0

The Protracted Euro-Area Recession

-10
2002

The euro area’s flash composite output PMI rose to 50.4
in July, an 18-month high, but its sluggish growth remains a major drag on the global outlook. Without the
exchange rate to facilitate the external adjustment as
during the 1991–92 recession, euro-area countries had
limited macro policy options to spur growth. Internal
devaluation was pursued to reduce the costs of labor—
through wage cuts and reform of the labor market and
of labor taxation—in order to improve the external competitiveness of the economy and promote growth
through exports.

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

NOTE: Excluding Slovenia, Cyprus and Greece among the financially distressed and Estonia,
Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and Austria among the other euro-area countries for lack of data.
SOURCES: Dallas Fed's International House Price Database; Haver Analytics; authors' calculations.

Chart 6
Household Income Falling in Peripheral Euro-Area Countries,
Stagnant in Core Countries
Index, start of recession = 100
110
Interquartile range for 1991-92 recession
Post 2007 GDP-weighted average:
105

Financially distressed EA countries
Other EA countries

100

95
The downside of internal devaluation is that it may depress domestic demand. Household savings as a share
90
of GDP has significantly declined since 2009 in the financially distressed euro-area countries (Chart 5), and their
85
households’ income per capita has seen a large decline
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
in the current recession (Chart 6). Households have supQuarters since start of recession
NOTE: Excluding Slovenia, Cyprus and Greece among the financially distressed and Estonia,
ported private consumption to some degree by saving
Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and Austria among the other euro-area countries for lack of data.
less, but the prospects for consumption to pick up have
SOURCES: Dallas Fed's International House Price Database; Haver Analytics, author's calculations.
been weakened. Personal consumption expenditure may
remain severely restrained in the peripheral euro-area
countries. The contribution of exports and the reversal of Notes
the current account deficits of the past have not been
enough to compensate for the low domestic demand and 1. Unless otherwise noted, all indicators are reported seasonally adjusted
and all growth rates are expressed in year-over-year terms.
weak balance sheets, so investment keeps falling and
6
growth remains elusive.
2. Most other emerging economies are experiencing low inflation and are

Financial tensions have eased temporarily in the euro
area since the spike of sovereign and banking risk in
2011–12. Financial reform keeps advancing slowly. The
ECB relaxed its collateral framework, increasing ratings
eligibility for asset-backed securities, among other
changes. Reforms on the path toward a banking union
and a unified labor market continue to lag behind pending the resumption of growth—and there is no appetite
at this juncture for fiscal union.
—Enrique Martínez-García and Valerie Grossman

keeping policy on hold, with a few of them loosening it (mostly in Eastern
Europe).
3. World Bank (2013): “China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and
Creative High-Income Society,” using projections from the Development
Research Center of the State Council of China (Table O.1).
4. The retirement age in China currently is 60 for men, 55 for female civil
servants and 50 for female workers.
5. Total social financing encompasses traditional bank financing (loans) as
well as other forms of nonbank financing that have been permitted in China since 2002 (e.g., corporate bonds, trust loans, entrust loans and bank
acceptances).
6. Up to a statistical discrepancy, national gross saving (S) equals private
gross investment (I) plus the current account (CA).

………………………………………………………………………………………….
About the Authors
Martínez-García is a senior research economist and
Grossman is a research assistant in the Globalization
and Monetary Policy Institute at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas.
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